1
imt&
HISTORY
OF
THE WAR
PRINTING HOUSR SQUARE.
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE TIMES
PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON.
PREFACE.
^HE TIMES " HISTORY OF THE WAR has been framed with the
object of producing an account of the great contest now in progress,
which shall be at once popular and authoritative. While striving
to be popular in the best sense of the word, and endeavouring
to discuss the poUtical factors which have led up to the crisis and the
military operations of the war, in a manner which will prove useful to those who
have not hitherto followed European pohcy with any very close attention, this
history will also aim at securing a genuine position as a work of reference. It will
be an account written bj' men of great experience in pohtical, mihtary, and naval
matters, and will contain a great deal of first-hand material which will be really
valuable to historians of the future.
Readers of The Times will not need to be told that it possesses unique facihties
for supplying a narrative of the kind here indicated. The Times staff of foreign
correspondents has for years been celebrated for the knowledge and insight into
pohtical and social conditions which its members possess. Their efforts have
combined to make the foreign pages of The Times the most accurate review of current
foreign affairs pubUshed in any paper in t.he world. Equally well-known are the
mihtary and naval correspondents of The Times, who are, by universal consent,
amongst the most brilliant exponents of their respective subjects.
The services of the special staff of war correspondents now acting for The Times
in the theatre of Mar will be available for this history. Many of their graphic and
moving descriptions of events in Belgium, and along the Franco- Belgian frontier,
have already appeared in The Times. The best of these descriptions of eye-witnesses
of the actual scenes of battle will be employed m this woric. As they are the copy-
right of The Times it is scarcely' necessary to state that they cannot be used else-
where. A word should also be said about the maps which will appear in the present
work. They will, for the most part, be reproduced from those appearing in the pages
of The Times, but in some cases special maps will be prepared for particular purpo.ses-
They are in all cases specially designed to illustrate the immediate points imder
review at the moment, and very special pains have been taken to secure their
accuracy in every particular.
3
4 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
It is, for obvious reasons, impossible that a history of contemporary events,
many of the most important of which are shrouded in the fog of war, can lay claim
to the fullness of information, and consequently the stability of judgment, which are
within reach of an historian writing many years after the events have taken place.
But it will be the endeavour of the composers of this history to approximate as
nearly as may be to the historical standard attainable in ordinary circumstances,
and so far as the conditions allow to present a faithful record of the progress of
the struggle which is the subject of their narrative. The history of this War will
not consist merely of a resume of matter which has appeared in The Times, but
will draw upon other sources as well, with the object of laying before the pubHc
the most accurate and complete account of the War that will for a long time be
available.
In order to attain this result The Times, in addition to its own staff, has suc-
ceeded in obtaining the services of writers well versed in Mihtary and Naval affairs
and in foreign poUtical matters not always sufficiently comprehended in this country.
The general supervision and arrangement of the volumes is in the charge of the
Editor of the various special supplements which, whether dealing with individual
countries or with great industries, have been recognized all over the world for their
authority and completeness.
Aug^ist, 1914.
CHAPTER I.
POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS
TO THE WAR.
Birth or German wori,d -policy — Germany and Russia — Germany in South America
AND IN Africa — The Kbuger telegram — Exploitation of the Boer War — The
Franco -Russian Alliance — Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 — Anglo-Russian Agree-
ment OF 1907 — Eastern crisis of 1908-9 and Germany's armed diplomacy — Agadir
CRISIS OF 1911 — Growth of the German Navy — The Balkan wars of 1912-13 —
Disablement of Turkey — Germany and England — Increase of the German Army
— June 28, 1914, murder of the Archduke Ferdinand — Austrian ultimatum to
Sbbvia — Analysis of the Parliamentary White Paper — Attitude of Germany —
The " infamous " proposal — Appeal of the King of the Belgians to King
George' V. — ■ The British ultimatum — German feeling.
NEVER probably in the history of the
world, not even in the last years of
the Napoleonic domination, has there
taken place such a display of wai'-
like passion as manifested itself in the most
civilized countries of Evu-opo at the beginning
of August, 1914. Then was seen how frail
were the commercial and political forces on
which modern cosmopolitanism had fondly
relied for the obliteration of national barriers.
The elaborate system of European finance
which, in the opinion of some, had rendered
War impossible no more availed to avert the
catastrophe than the Utopian aspirations of
international Socialism, or the links with which
a common culture had bound together the more
educated classes of the Continent. The world
of credit set to work to adapt itself to condi-
tions which seemed, for a moment, to threaten
it with annihilation. The voices of the advo-
cates of a World-wide fraternity and equality
were drowned in a roar of hostile preparation. The
great gulfs that separate Slav, Latin, Teuton,
and Anglo-Saxon Were revealed ; and the forces
which decide the destinies of the world were
gauntly expressed in terms of racial antagonism.
Yet, though the racial factor was the pre-
dominating force in this tremendous struggle,
it was nevertheless the instrument of viiryinir
policies and ideals. Russia stood forth as the
representative and protectress of Slav nation-
ality and religion against Teutonic encroachment
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
H.M. THE KING.
THE TIMES Iff STORY OF THE WAB.
H.M. THE QUEEN.
[Thomson.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LUXEMBURG.
and oppression. France, bound to Russia by
the exigencies of national existence, meurched to
support an ally of alien faith and race. Austria
went to war in the hope of cementing her ill-
compacted dominions by the subjugation of a
race akin to a portion of her own suljjects. Eng-
land, the Mother of a w'orld-Eiupire " brought
forth in liberty,' stood forward as the friend of
Bmall nations, and sis the upholder of the
European balance which she had once main-
tained against the ambition of Spain and
France, and with which her own security was
inextricably involved. Together with France,
now freed from her old dreams of European
domination, she appeared as the protagonist
of European democracy and liberty against the
militarism of Germany, as the upholder of
political idealism against the materialism of
lYussia. Germany, nurtured on the doctrines
of Clausewitz and Troitschke, strong in her
belief in the sufficiency of the law of force
and in her power to fulfil its con-
ditions, confident in the memory of
earlier successes and in the energies
of the Teutonic peoples, aspired through
European victory to world-wide dominion.
Like Nap>oleon she looked for ships, commerce
and colonies ; like him she prepared to wage
war on land and sea, and like him in the days
of hifl decadence, and forgetful of the ally of
1813, she strove to strengthen her moral position
by posing as the bulwark of Europe against
Muscovite barbarism. Alone of the great
powers Italy stood aside. Diplomatically she
was justifed in excusing herself from joining
the other members of the Triple Alliance on
the ground that she was not bound to partici-
pate in a war of aggression ; nationally the
repugnance of her people for the unnatural
alliance with the German Powers made joint
action with them impossible. Tlie smaller
countries announced their neutrality ; the
precariousness of their position was sufficiently
emphasized by the fact that most of them,
including Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, Holland,
and Belgium, thought it necessary to accom-
pany the announcement by a complete mobiliza-
tion.
One feeling, apparent from the first and
deepening in strength and volume as the war
proceeded, dominated not merely the populations
allied against the German Powers, but those
beyond the area of confliet. This was antagonism
to Germany as the author of the war and to
the system for which her Government stood.
Outside her frontiers and those of Austria
hardly one representative voice was raised in
her justification. Her arrogance, her cynical
disregard for the rights of others, her dis-
graceful treatment of ambassadors and
foreigners, her use of brute force, estranged
sympathy and roused against her believers
in humanity and liberty in all parts of the world.
The American Press was not the least loud
in its denunciations. In the words of Colonel
Stoffcl, the French military attache at Berlin
before the war of 1870, it was felt that the
Prussians were a race "sans passions g^n^reuses."
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
9
THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBURG
The nobler qualities of the German peojjle
-were forgotten ; and they were simply regarded
as the instrument of a system dangerous to
«11 that was best in European civilization.
The desperate opposition that their soldiers
were to encounter from the countries they
invaded was the measure of the intensity of
this feeling. The omission of the directors
■of German policy to reckon with it was the
measure of their statesmanship.
The war was, above all, Imperial Germany's
war, not merely because throughout the final
crisis she alone of all the I'owers might have
averted it and did not, but because it was
the direct and inevitable outcome of the trans-
formation which her whole policy underwent
during the reign of William II.
Bismarck, who deliberately fought three
wars, 1864. 1800, and 1870, in order to create
a Gorman Empire and restore German national
imity under the ajgis of Prussia, was a man of
blood and iron, but he was also a great states-
man. So long as he remained at the helm the
policy of Imperial Germany was mainly con-
fined to the undiminished maintenance of the
dominant position she had acquired in Europe
after 1870. This object lu- attained by sub-
stituting where he could binding alliances for
mere friendships, whilst his diplomacy laboured
xinceasingly to keep all other Powers, as far
as possible, apart, and so to prevent the estab
lishmeut of any other systom of alliances than
the Triple Alliance, which Germany dominated.
It wa«, in the main, a policy of conservative
concentration, and he never concealed his
reluctance to take the risks of speculative
entanglements, whether in the Balkans or
beyond the seas, which might have endangered
his main position.
This did not satisfy the Emperor William's
more ardent imagination. His ambition wa«
to transform the German Kinjiire from a purely
continental Power into a world Power. Thia
involved the substitution of a world policy
for Bismarck's policy- of I'^uropean concentra-
tion. Let us recall briefly the diief stages of
the " Imperial Rake's Progress." The old
chancellor was dismissed in 1890, two years
after the Kaiser's accession to the throne.
The famous " re-insurance " Treaty with
Russia was dropped and with it the coping-
stone of the diplomatic system which Bismarck's
genius had built up. The Kaiser preferred to
rely on the Asiatic interests of Russia to
THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON,
M. PAUL CAMBON
lUlaytlU
10
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
11
paralyse her influence in Eurojjo mid so his
first clriunatic appoaraiico on the largor stage
of world-policy was his cooporation with Russia
in the Far East at the close of the war between
China and Japan, when he joined in 1895
with Russia and her more unwilling ally, France,
in iniposii g upon the Japanese the surrender of
a largo part of the spoils of victory. China herself
was soon to feel the weight of the " nia-iled
fist " in the seizure of Kiaochao in 1897, and
again in 1900 in the dispatch of a largo expe-
Ainerica, and if he could have succeeded in his
attempts to use Great Britain against the XTnitod
States at the time of the Spanish-American war
of 1898 he would soon have driven the " mailed
fist " tlirough the Monroe doctrine. But of this
pha.so of Cierman world policy the annexation of
Samoa remains as the only important achieve-
ment. Our loyalty to our American kinsmen
■forced him to fall back upon Africa as the more
])romising field for Gorman expansion. There,
however, Great Britain inevitably blockotl his
BERLIN.
ditionary forc<^ whifh, if it arrived too late
for the relief of the Peking legations, spreatl
tf^rror of the German name tliroiighout Xorthern
China, The severe blow inflicted by the
Japanese arms on Russia's policy of ad\onture
in Asia, which the Kaiser had steadily en-
couraged, was a serious check to Germany's
political calculations, but it scarcely affected
the campaign of peaceful penetration which
she was waging at the same time for the econo-
mic conquest of Cliina, chiefly at the expense
of British interests.
But it was not only in the Far East
that Germany was pegging-out claims for
" a place in the svin." For a moment the
Kaiser undoubtedly cast his eye on Soiith
way by her mere presence. Her difficulties
could alone be Germany's opportunities. So
whilst Germany picked up such cnunbs as she
could in West and Central and East Africa with-
out coming actually to logperheads with Great
Britain, the Kaiser eagerly watched and en-
couraged the growing estrangement between
Boer and Briton. The Janie-son Raid j>ave him,
as he thought, his opportunity, and the notorious
Krugor telegram was the first open challenge
flung to British p6wer. It miscarried, partly
owing to the unexpected outburst of feeling it
provoked throughout the British Empire, and
partly- owing to the failure of German diplomacy
to elicit any cordial respon.se in Paris or St.
Petersburg. During the Boer War the Kaiser
14
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
15
from Berlin -won another temporary triimi])li
for tlio Kaiser's turned (liplomaey. Nevertlie-
]eas, in spite of this oiitwiird success, the Kaiser
had again failed in his main object. The
Triple Entente survived this shock just as the
Anf^lcj-French Agreement had survived the first
Germftn onslaught in Morocco.
Tlie Kaiser, however, was not yet cured of his
illusions, and in the French occupation of Fez
in 1911, at a timo when England was passing
through a diflicult domestic crisis, lie saw
another chance of smashing the Entente. The
dispatcli of the Panther to Agadir was an even
more direct provocation to France than had
been the Kaiser's own demonstrative visit to
Tangier in 1905. It was destined to still
more signal failure. Great Britain's loyalty to
France again never wavered, nor did French
patience and moderation give way. Germany.
it is true, secured a slice of French Colonial
territory towards the Congo, but the Entente
remained intact. Germany's main consolation
was a fresh outburst of Anglophobia, with a
new Navy Bill deliberately baaed upon untrue
statements regarding British naval prepara-
tions " to fall upon Germany."
In this place it is worth while to summarize
the series of steps by which the Emperor
William during the past 15 years sought to
forward the growth of the German Navy.
His embarcation upon a world policy was neces-
THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, M. SAZONOFF.
THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN,
SIR EDWARD GOSCHEN.
sarily accompanied by the development of the
weapon upon which the realization of such »
policy must depend. It was, as we have
t«en, the South African War that en-
abled the Emperor finally to suppress
(ierman reluctance to unlimited naval
expenditure, and upon ground prepared
by an unparalleled campaign of anti-British
calumny to create universal enthusiasm for
(Jerman sea power. Immediately after Presi-
dent Kruger's Ultimatum the Emperor de-
clared : — " We are in bitter need of a powerful
German navy. Had I not boon refused the
increase for which I repeatedly pressed during
the early years of my reign, how different would
be our position to-day." In 1900 the first
great Navy Bill was introduced with the
plirase : — " Germany must have a fleet of such
strength that even for the luightiest naval
power a war with her would involve such
risks as to jeopardize its own supremacy."
Tlienceforward there wo-s no turning back.
There was a second Navy Bill in 1906, a third
in 1908, and a fourth in 1912, and although the
Bill of 1912 added about 15,000 officers and
men there wr.s to havo boon a further increase
of personnel in 1914. Most of the increases were
carried upon artificial wa\es of Anglophobia,
although explained with soft words. Most
strenuous resistance wa-s offered to all sugges-
tions or proposals of disarmament, and the
16
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS H.
[/)'. & D. Downey.
THE TIMES IIISTOBY OF THE WAR.
BELGRADE.
successive efforts of British Governments
to arrive at some agreement were always
treated as hypocrisy. In 1911, when the
Agadir crisis tlireatened war, the German naval
authorities had to admit they were not ready.
From about 1912 they were able to say that
" Germany had a fleet of such strength that
even for the mightiest naval power a war with
her would involve s\ich risks as to jeopardize
its own supremacy."
There can be no doubt that tierman naval
policy was throughout directed against England.
It was explained in all sorts of ways ; at first as
aiming only at a modest defence of Gorman
trade, but it was always es,sentially a challenge
to England in the matter tliat was most vital to
England and to her alone. If England remained
in " splendid isolation " as far as other Powers
were concerned, she could meet the growth of a
great navy on the other side of the North Sea
only by direct agreement with Germany, at the
expense of other Powers and of her own Im-
peiial interests, or by war. One effect of
Germany's naval challenge — much to her con-
tinual surprise — was to weld even more firmly
the fabric of the British Empire, and to
strengthen the ties between Great Britain and
the Dominions beyond the sciis. Tlic ot her main
effect was to give England's friendships with
France and Ruf«sia a shape which, although
the British Government maintained its freedom
to the very end, rendered naval and military
cooperation more and more probable. Up to
the very end Germany could have altered her
coiu^e if she had wished to do so, and England
remained free to negotiate for the limitation of
expenditure upon armaments which she earn-
estly desired. But Germany chmg steadily
to her ambition.s. Twice — in 1905 and 1911 — -
British Governments had to avert European
war by plain intimations to Germany that
England would .stand by France. In Novem-
ber, 1912, the position was defined in an ex-
change of letters between Sir Edward Grey and
the French Ambassador in London. Sir
Edward Grey then wrote : —
Prom time to time in recent years the French and
BritiKh naval and military exix'rts liave con.sulted
together. It has always been midei-stood that such
con-siiltation does not restrict the freedom of either
Government to decide at any future time wliethor or
not to assist the f)t.her tiy arme<l force. We have
agreed that con-sultation between experts is not,
and ought not to be regar<i«><i as, an engagement that
commit.s either Government to action in a contingency
that has not arisen and may never ari.se. The disposi-
tion, for inst.ancc, of the French and British Fleets
respectively at the present monient is not based upon
an engagenxent to cooperate' in war.
You have, however, point^tl out that, if either
Government hiul grave reason to exix!ct an unpro-
voked attack liy a third Power, it might become es.sen-
tial to know wliether it could in that event depend
upon the armed assistance of t he other.
I agi-et! that, if either Government had grave reason
to expect an unpn)voked attjick by a thirtl Power, or
something that tlireat<>ned the general [K'iice, it should
18
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE KING OF THE BELGIANS.
[W. ijr D. Downey.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
19
THE SERVIAN PRIME MINISTER,
M. PASHITGH.
immediately discuss witli tiie otlicr wiietlier botii
Governments siiould act together t<i prevent agf^es-
sion and to preserve peace, and, if so, wliat measures
they would be prepared to take in common. If these
measures involved action, the plans of the general
staffs would at once be taken into consideration and
the Governments would then decide what effect should
be given to them.
In 1912 came the Turkish and Balkan Wars.
The war between Italy and Turkey was by no
means altogether welcome to Germany. If, on
tlio one liand, it made Italy more dependent
upon her German allies, and incidentally created
a good deal tf friction between Italj' and France,
it was calculated to impair to some extent
Germany's position in Constantinople, where
tlio Turks felt, not mmaturally, siu-prise and
indignation at finding themselves attacked by
one of the members of the Triple Alliance.
Far more disconcerting, however, to Germany
were the results of the Balkan Wars, 1912- 1913.
The enfecblement of Turkej- and the new par-
tition of her European provinces before Germany
had completed her exploitation of the Turkish
Empire, and the aggrandisement of Servia and
Greece, which barred the way to Salonika
against Austria and checked the growth of
Austro-Gorman preponderance in the Balkan
Peninsula, constituted a severe, if indirect, blow
to the whole fabric of European relationships
which the Austro-German alliance had slowly
an! laboriously sought to build up. Incident-
ally, the exacerbation of the always latent
jealousy between Austria and Italy, barely
veiled by tlie outward appearances of coopera-
tion in Albania, undermined, to a degree which
tlie Italian declaration of neutrality has suddenly
illuminated, the foundations of the Triple
Alliance in which Italy \\aA been for many years
the prisoner rather than the partner of Austria
and Germany.
During the first Balkan War Germany un-
questionably regarded every defeat by Turkey
as a victory of the Slav forces, and as far as
Servia was concerned the results of the second
v\ar were still more unpalatable to Giermany,
inasmuch as the failure of the Bulgarian attack
was a furtlier failure for the Austro-German
diplomacy which had certainly encourt^jod it.
In spite of the recapture of Adrianoplo by the
Turks, Germany could no longer count with the
same confidence on the cooperation in any
European conflict of the large number of Turkish
iirmy corps which the Emperor William had been
accustomsd to regard as additional army corps
of the Gernaan Army. The rapprochement
with England during and after the Balkan Wars,
out of which German diplomacy made a good
deal of capital at the time, was in these circum-
stances, as far as Germany was concerned, a com-
pulsory rapprochement for a purely temporary
purpose. As soon as the fortunes of war turned
so unexpectedly against Turkey it was ob-
viously Germany's interest to cooperate with
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COUNT
BERCHTOLD.
Map OF THE AREA OF
The European War
'-- £M£TLAND'4ij^l'sLANDS
Ji
r.l"
""""Z,
''"'Jll^SUjfMU
Itft ffairnautjt.
Oirt/ndcJ<r-\
"y Limoges
m
: k'ljU.ni^
fs
Ctptia^J
'*■ ■ -'-C!F«'4s?-/'.!3i , ^ , ^ ^ ^ , ■»-- — «... , .^
has \ ,,-'1 _ , ^ivitona -"J^' SX ..T^a! T^f«>.
^^EEEiRO]
rferuel tifftiiJ
Cuenca
X.„ ^«."
J f E R"^^^^ E ji^
22
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN VIENNA,
SIR MAURICE DE BUNSEN.
England in arresting as rapidly as possible the
progress of hostilities during the first war, and
for similar reasons again during the second war,
as soon as the Bulgarian effort was seen to have
failed. How little, nevertheless, German policy
was directed towards any permanent preserva-
tion of European peace subsequent events
abundantly showed.
Before the end of 1912 Germany had resolved
upon enormous increases of the Army. It
was announced in the spring of 1913 that they
were to cost from £60,000,000 to £65,000,000.
Although the peace strength of the Army had
only a year before been increased to 544,000,
it was increased further to 661,000, and all
the meet important measures were treated as
"urgent" and carried out .by October, 1913.
In introducing the Army and Taxation Bills
the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-
HoUweg, said : —
One thing remains beyond doubt — -if it should
ever come to a European conflagration wliich set
Slavenlum against Germanentum, it is then for us a
disadvantage that the position in the balance of forces
which was occupied hitherto by European Turkey
is now nil<-d in part by Slav states.
Ho professed a perfunctory belief in the possi-
bilit3{ of continued good relations between
Russia and Germany, but the whole speech
was full of warnings and forebodings, and was
as nearly a preface to the coming conflict as
diplomatic decency at the moment allowed.
The Army increases were mdeed accompanied
by a number of violent Press attacks, now
upon Russia, now upon France, and occasionally
upon both. England was left as far as possible
out of all discussions, and every attempt was
made to accentuate the improvement of Anglo -
German relations, and to make the most of
so-called " negotiations," especially witli regard
to the Portuguese colonies in Africa, which
Germany believed to be already in her grasp.
Interrupted only by a peculiarly venomous
Press assault upon Russia in February, 1914,
matters drifted on until June 28, 1914, when
the Austrian Heir-apparent, the Archduke
Francis Ferdinand, and liis morganatic wife,
the Duchess of Hohenberg, were murdered
in the streets of Serajevo, the capital of the
Bosnian province annexed in 1909. The news
interrupted a British naval visit to Kiel. It
was a great blow to the German Emperor,
who for some years past had conquered his
personal antipathy, and had created intimate
ties with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand,
whose policy as Emperor he hoped to guide
and to control. His dreams for the next decade
were shattered, and the conflict with Russia,
which it was probably hoped to postpone a
little longer, was brought nearer. Germany,
like Austria, chose immediately to assume,
without trustworthy evidence, that the Sera-
jevo crime was the direct work of Servia. and
THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN PARIS,
SIR FRANCIS L. BERTIE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
23
METZ.
that Servia must be punished. As a matter
of fact, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and
his wife, who had insisted upon accompanying
him upon his perilous tour, were wantonl_\-
exposed to a deatli for which the true respon-
sibility will probably be found to have lain less
in Belgrade than in Vienna. Under the
circumstances, however, all the Powers were
ready to give Austria any reasonable amount
of " aatisfaction " and to justify any treatment
of Servia which did not menace her existence
as a sovereign state. Austria-Hungary, how-
ever, was bent upon a military punishment of
Servia, and Austria-Himgary and Germany
together were bent upon eitlier a fresh humilia-
tion of Russia or war. There wa.s a lull of nearly
three weeks after the Serajevo crime, and then
there was a further fortnight of diplomacy
beginning with the presentation by Austria
to Servia of a monstrous Ultimatum, to which
wa.0 attached a peremptory demand for an
entirely favourable answer within 48 hours.
VVitliin 48 hours Servia, acting upon Russian
advice, accepted all the Austrian demands
except two, which she asked to be reserved for
The Hague Tribunal. Austria, however, im-
mediately withdrew her Minister from Belgrade,
and opened hostilities. Germany had placed
herself in a situation of nominal detachment
by avoiding direct knowledge of the contents
of the Austrian Note, and by showing readi-
ness to communicate good advice from London *o
Vienna. As late as July 25, when Austria broke
off relations with Servia, the Russian Minister
for Foreign Affairs " did not believe that
Germany really wanted war." Eurojje was
soon undeceived.
A Parliamentary White Pajjer entitled
'■ Correspondence Respecting the European
Crisis " told with grim simplicity the grim story
of the fruitless efforts to maintain peace. On
July 26 Sir Edward Grey inquired whether
(iermany, Italy, and France " would instruct
their representatives in London to njoet him
in conference immediately for the purpose
of discovering an issue which would prevent
complications." Germany alone refused on
the ground that " such a conference was not
practicable." The German Foreign Secretary,
Herr von Jagow, advanced many specious ob-
jections, and " thought it would be Ijest "
(July 27) to await the outcome of an exchange
of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg.
The very next day Austria declared war against
Servia, and Russia replied by a partial mobiliza-
tion of her forces.
Three days before, the Rus.sian Minister for
Foreign Affairs had impressed upon the British
Ambassador in St. Petersburg the supreme
importance of England's attitude. If she took
her stand firmly with France and Russia there
would be no war. If she failed them now,
rivers of blood would flow and she would in the
end be dragged into the war. Prophetic words !
Similar arguments were used by the French and
then by the Italian Governments to press Sir
Edward Grey to tlu-ow the weight of British
influence into the scale in the only way in which
they believed it could effectively redress the
balance against the influences which were
24
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
BISMARCK.
[Augustin Rischgit^.
making for war in Vienna and in Berlin. But
the Britisli Foreign Minister had to reckon
with pubUc opinion in this country, and to M.
Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London
(July 29), he explained that
It approached the present difflculty from quite a
different point of view from that taken during the
difliculty ns to Morocco a few years ago. In the case
of .Morocco, the dispute was one in which France was
primarily interested, and In which it appeared that
Germany, in an attempt to crush Prance, was fastening
a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject
of a special agreement between France and u.s. In the
present c;i«e, the dispute between Austria and Servia
was not one in which we felt called to take a hand.
Even if the question became one between Austria and
Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand
in it. . . . If Germany became involved and
France became involved, we had not made up our
minds what we should do ; it was a case that we
should have to consider. Prance would then have been
drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which,
owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged
her to engage. We were free from engagements, and
wc should liave to decide what British interests re.
quired us to do.
Nevertheless — and the same intimation wa.s
conveyed to the German Ambassador — we
were taking all precatitions with regard to our
Fleet, and Cierrnany was not to count on our
standing aside.
On the same day that Sir Edward Grey made
this cautious communication a council of war
was held at Potsdam under the presidency of the
German Emperor. Immediately after the
Council — at midnight — the German Imperial
Chancellor sent for the British Ambassador in
Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, who telegraphed
the following account of the Chancellor's ex-
traordinary proposals to London : —
He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia
a European conflagration might, he feared, become
inevitable, owing to Genna!iy's obligations as Austria'^
ally, iu spite of his continued ofEorts to maintain
peace. He then proceeded to m<ike the following
strong bid for Uritish neutrality. Ho said that it
was clear, so far ys he was able to judge the main
principle which governed British policy, that Great
Britiiin would never stand by and allow Pi'ance
to b" crushed in any conflict there might be. That,
however, was not the object at which Geimany aimed.
Provided tliat neutrality of Great Britain were
certain, every assurance would be given to the
British Government that the Imperial Government
aimed at no t>erritorial acquisitions at the expense of
Prance should they prove victorious in any war
that miglit ensue.
I ((uestioned his Excellency about the French
colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a
similar undertaking in that respect. As regards
Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long
as Gemiany's adversaries respected the integrity and
neutrality of the Netherlands Germany was ready
to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that
she would do likewise. It depended upon the action
of Prance what openitions Germany might be forced
to enter u])on in Belgium, but when the war was over>
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not
sided against Gemiany.
Sir Edward Grey replied : —
His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment
entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should
bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by
while French colonies are taken and France is beaten
so long as Germany does not take French territory
iis distinct from the colonies.
Prom the material point of view such a proposal
is unacceptable, for Prance, without further territory
in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as
to lose her position as a Great Power, and become
subordinate to German policy.
Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace
for us to make this bargain with Germany at the
expense of Prance, a disgrace from which the good
name of this country would never recover.
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain
away wliatever obligation or interest we have as
regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not
entertain that bargain either.
In the House of Commons on August 6th
the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, branded the
Chancellor's proposal as " infamous," and as
meaning that behind the back of France we
should give free licence to Germany to annex
the whole of the extra-European dominions
and possessions of France, and as regarded
Belgium, moaning that without her knowledge
we should barter away to the Power that
was tlireatening her our obligation to keep
our plighted word.
Notwithstanding the extent to wliich German
diplomacy had now been unmasked, Sir Edward
Grey maintained his efforts to the end, and
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
26
actually appended the following passage to
liis stinging reply to Germany : —
It the jicjioe of Europe can be preserved and the
present ci-isis safely passed, my own endeavour will
be to proni^>te some arran,L;ement', to which Gennany
could be a party, by which she could be assure<l that
no aggi'essive or hostile policy would be pursued
a);aiiist her or her allies by France, Russia, and
ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this
and worked for it, as far as I could, through the lust
IJalkan crisLs, and, (Jonniiny having a corresponding
object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea
has hitherto been too Uto|)ian t<» form ttie subject
of definite proposals, but if this y)resent crisis, so
much more acute tlian any that Europe has gone
through for generations, be safely pjissed, I am
liopetui that the relief and reaction which will follow
may make possible some more definite rapprochement
between the Powers than lias been possible hitherto.
On July 31, the day on which Germany
dispatched an Ultimatum to Russia requiring
iinmediat3 demobilization and an inquiry
to France as to lier attitude, Sir Edward Grey
inquired of the French and German Govern-
ments respectively whether they would respect
the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other
Power violated it. France gave a definite
pledge. Germany gave no reply.
' On August 4 Germany was informed that the
King of the Belgians had made the following
appeal to King George : —
Plemembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's
friendship and that of your predecessor, and the
friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof
of friendship you have just, given us again, I make
a supreme ayipeal to the diplomatic intervention of
your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integ-
rity of Belgium.
England again demanded assurances from
Germany, but German troops were then already
in Belgium. Luxemburg had been occupied
by Germany some days before. The Imperial
Chancellor, speaking in the Reichstag which
had been specially convened, said : —
\Vc are now in a state of necessity, and necessity
knows no law ! . . . We were compelled to
override the just protest of the Luxemburg and
Belgian Governments. The wrong — I speak openly —
that we are committing we will endeavour to make
good jis soon ivs our milit^iry goal lias been reached.
,\nybody wlio is threatened, as we are threatened,
and is (igliliug for liis higliest possessions, can have
only one thought — how he is to hack his way through.
There was nothing left to the British Govern-
ment but to send Sir Edward Goschen the
following final instructions, which reached
Berlin at 7 p.m. on August 4 : —
Wo hear that Gennany has a<ldressed Note ' to
Belgian Minister for Foreign Aftaii-s stating that
Gemiim trovcrnment will be compelled to carry out,
if necessary by force of arms, the measures con-
sidered indispensable.
We are also informed that Belgian territory has
been violated at Genunenicli.
In these circiuiist ances, and in view of the fact
that Gcrnumy declined to give the same H-ssuraiue
respecting Belgium as France gave last week iu
rejily to our request iivide simultjineouHly at Berlin
and Paris, we must repeat tliat request, and ask
tluit a .satisfactory re])ly to it and to ray t;elegram
of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-
night. It not, you are instructed to imk for your
p;issports, and to say tliat his .Majesty's Oovem-
nierit feel bound to take all steps in their power to
uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance
of a treaty to which (iermany is as much a party as
ourselves.
. Immediately after these instructiona reached
Berhn the German Government, without wait-
ing for the tdtimatum to ex|)ir(', announced that
England liad declared war. There had been
disgraceful scenes on the departure of the
Russian Amba,ssador, M. Sverbejev, but they
were as nothing in comparison with tlie outburst
of fiuy when it was found that the efforts to
keep England neutral had failed. There was a
mob demonstration at the British Embassy,
where windows were broken, many Englishmen
were arrested as spies, and only the vigour of the
American Embas.sy, which had undertaken the
protection of British interests, made the situa-
tion - thanks especially to Gennan eagerness to
court American feeUng — to som3 extent toler-
able. As the Government was unable for
obvious reasons to explain the fa -ts about the
neutrality of Belgium, for which (iermany, as
Sir Edward Grey pointed out, was as much
responsible as England and the other Powers,
it encouraged the public to believe that England
had only been waiting her opportimity to strike
Germany when she was alrpad\- at war on both
VON MOLTKE.
[.-lugtisfin RiukgUi,
26
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
frontiers. The world then saw the bad side of
her patriotism, wliich wtis in itself admirable.
All who had aix opportunity of watching Ger-
many during the fortnight of acute tension could
testify to the patience, confidence, and en-
thusiasm of the people, although in Prussia, and
in most other parts of the Empire, practically
the whole reserves were called upon at once,
absorbing the bulk of the able-bodied population
and bringing ordinary life to a standstill. There
was no sound of complaint or question of a policy
which the country did not understand, and
had no opportimity to judge. The Socialists,
although they in Germany constituted not less
than one-third of the whJle population, and
although they had been organizing great anti-
war demonstrations, came immediately into
line. The Reich.stag passed without considera-
tion all the emergency Bills presented by
the Government, including war credits of
£250,000,000, together with the absorption of
the Empire's " war chest " of gold and silver
to the amount of £15,000,000, and the author-
ization of loans on all sorts of securities to the
amount of £75,000,000. But, once England
was involved, there appeared beneath all
this patriotism and readiness to make sacri-
ficas a deep and general animosity against
THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN PARIS,
BARON VON SCHOEN.
THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN,
M. JULES CAMBON.
England. It was the fruit of the teaching of
the whole school of German intellectuals ; the
fruit of the many violent campaigns against
England with which the German Government
had accompanied all its efforts for a generation,
and especially the challenge to British naval
supremacy ; and the fruit of the overweening
contempt which sprang from Germany's
abnormal and, to a largo extent, unnatural
industrial and commercial expansion in a
period of only about 20 years. Germany had
become incapable of seeing any but one side —
the German side — of any question, and although
her own moral and intellectual ideals had been'
submerged in an utter materialism, she was
unable to appreciate interests which did not
march with her own — much less to appreciate
iTioral obligations and national sentiments which
did not suit the ambitions of Germany. The
fault lay mainly with the Government and
with the Emperor, for they had deceived the
German people and led them along paths which
ended only in an impenetrable wall. But, as
has been well observed, the responsibility must
rest, not only with those who constructed an
impossible programme, but with all those —
and they were the whole German people — who
would have welcomed its success.
CHAPTER II.
THE GERMAN ARMY AND
GERMAN STRATEGY.
1'he outbreak of hostilities in Eastern Europe — German declaration of war on
RtrssiA — Attitude op France — The British ultimatum — The Powers at war — German
offensive against France — The German Army — War organization — Criticism on the
German Army — German plan of campaign — Alternative lines of attack on France —
Conditions in 1870 and 1914 — The element of time- — Northern line of attack — A
question of space — Disadvantages — Advantages.
THE first weeks of hostilities, with
the remarkable exception of the
fighting at Liege, were marked
by few collisions of importance.
This period was necessarily occupied with the
work of mobilization and concentration, and the
speed and success with which the&e great opera-
tions were completed amply testify to the
power which modem conditions of transport
and organization confer upon the masters of
armies. Austria, the first to take up arms, was
natiu-ally first in the field. Her military pre-
parations had conunenced before July 25,
the day on which slie broke off diplomatic
relations with Servia ; on that day a mobiliza-
tion of eight of her 16 army corps began, and
on the 28th she formally declared war. On
the same day her troops began to bombard
Belgrade, already deserted by the Servian
Government. This act seems to have decided
the Tsar ; on the 29th ho signed the Ukase
mobilizinj, the 13 Army Corps of the foiu-
southern districts lying opposite the Austrian
frontier. Austria responded by mobilizing
the whole of her army, a step which compelled
Russia at midnight on the 30tli to follow suit.
On the 31st the German ambassador at St.
Petersburg signified that unless Russia agreed
within 12 liours to demobilize his Government
would order a general mobilization by land and
sea. No reply being foi-thcoming orders for a
general mobilization were issued by Berlm on
August 1, at 5.15 p.m., and at 7.30 p.m. the
German ambassador handed to M. Sazonoff
the declaration ol war. This step was hailed,
both at BerUn and St. Petersbiu-g, with savage
enthusiasm. Not since 1812 had a war been so
popular in Russia. During the following days
skirmishes took place in the frontier districts
between German and Russian, and later between
Austrian and Russian, troops. But the time
necessary to enable Russia to bring her masses
into the field, and the defensive attitude assumed
by the German Powers, prevented any impor-
tant collision.
Meanwhile in the west of Europe events had
moved fast. As early as the 25th July Ger-
many had begun her preparations ; on the 26th
General von Moltke had returned to Berlin, and
the great General Staff had commenced work in
earnest. During the following days, although
no piiblic announcement had been made,
the military authorities had taken advantage
of their ' large independent powers to recall
officers and reservists, and had taken steps
which practically amounted to a veiled mobiliza ■
tion. On the 28th the German Fleet was
reported to be assembling at Kiel and Wilhelms-
havon ; a day, that is, before the British Fleet
left Portland. On the 30th " mancEUvres " at
27
28
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, M. POINCARE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
j_ " ^ Louvain
■V BRUSSELS
oUcnS
Ton<,tei° »^»<te? "'
NAMUR pV~^ / '
'Aacfic
Charlcroi
0
«' 1 * S'HubsrIS '
I
<I ft
V^ * «i • ^ LUXEMBURG 3 \
6eims
VERDUl
OChilon
Ssarrefouis rb'
,S'«//>.«/
' CJufaju- Sitifla.
Vitry
^
OBadet
^•"■^.,
O '"'■"y 3
ii" Forts
(
"Neufchitejii
o )
ft s*
„ , V\STRASSBUR^''oT»,
I
I
Langres ^
ftft ft
V
BELFOHt'*''' I
ftftft *.
MAP OF FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER.
Sfcrassburg were announced, and by Friday 3lst
the German covering troops were close to the
French frontier.
The rapidity with which tliis opening con-
centration was effected oilers a striking con-
trast to wliat liappened in 1870. At that
time the idea of a covering force in the modern
sense scarcely existed. There is no evidence
to show that on either side any considerable
body of frontier troojis was kept permanently
in a state of preparedness higher than the
rest of the main armies. Ten days at least
elapsed before any seriovis collision took place,
and the hostile offensive was not met on the
border by a force powerful enough to check
the enemy and gain time, but was evaded,
as Moltke, had it been ncccaoary to evade it,
would have done, by a concentration out of
reach of the enemy, even at the cost of aban-
doning a considerable part of the frontier
provinces. In 1914 the procedure was totally
different. For many years it had been the
practice both of Germany and France to main-
tain the corps localized on the frontier on an
establishment which almost amounted to a
war footing and capable of mobilization in a
very short space of time ; the German corps
were held to be cajmble of action within 24
hours. By the end of July it wa.s believed in
France — and subsequent events appeared to
justify the belief — tliat eight German corps
were ready to march. Thesic included, counting
from north to south, the \"Iir., with its head-
quarters at Coblenz, the X\'I. at Metz, the
30
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE H. H. ASQUITH.
[Reginald Haines.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
31
GOBLENZ.
XXI. at Saarbriick, the XV. at Stras.sburg,
tlie XIV. at Karlsruhe, tlio I!, liavariau in
Lorraine and the Palatinate, reinforced by
the XIII. from Stuttgart and the XVIII.
from Frankfurt. With them wa.s a very
powerful force of cavalry. It i.s noteworthy,
as showing that mobilization in Germany had
begun some days before it was publicly ordered,
that none of the infantry belonging to the
above forces were employed in the attack on
Liege which began very early on the morning
of August 5. This was entrvLsted to other
troops, including the VII., X., and later the
IX. It seems to follow from this that two
corps at least, which had nothing to do with
the covering fcrce on the side of France, mvist
have left their mobilization areas little more
than a day after war was formally d.eclared.
Luxemburg territory was entered very early
on the morning of August 2, and Belgium only
two davs later.
In tlii? trying situation the behaviour
of the French (Sovornmont was admirable.
Well aware that in the event of war it must
support Russia, and that the first blow of its
formidable opponent would be directed against
France, it yet decided, as a.procf of the sincerity
of its desire for peace, to run the risk of being
attacked before its prepaiations were complete ;
and in ordei to avoid the possibility ot any prema-
ture collision it took the grave and exceptional
step of withdrawing all its troops to a line 10
kilometres within the frontier. The mobiliza-
tion of the covering troops was not begim till
the 30th ; and the order for the general mobiliza-
tion was not issued until the night of the 3 1st,
when the delivery of the German Ultimatum to
Russia had been made known in Paris. The
calmness and resolution of the French people
were worthy of their rulers, and formed an
extraordinary contrast to the hysterical ex-
altation of 1870. Such popular demonstra-
tions as took place arose not from bellicose but
from patriotic feeling. Everyone knew that
the national existence was involved ; and all
witnesses testify to the quiet self-devotion of
the people, and to the smoothness and rapidity
of the mobilization.
The steady coolness with which they faced
this supreme crisis wa.s the more admirable in
that until August 2nd they could not be sure
what attitude England would adopt. On that
day, however. Sir Edwiird Grey was able to
give the French Ambassador an assurance
that, subject to the approval of Parliament,
" if the German Fleet comes into the Channel
or through the North Sea to undertake hostile
operations against French coasts or shipping,
the British fleet will give all the protection in
its power." The enthusiastic reception of the
announcement of this decision in England and
throughout the Empire, and the refusal of the
British . Government to acquiesce in the
Germ&n violation of Belgium, finally dissipated
all French approheasions. On the night of
Augiist 4 the world was aware that the whole
might of the British Empire, directed with a
singleness of purpose hitherto unknown, had
been tlirown into the s<,"ale of war,
Tliis momentous event marks the outbreak
of active hostilities in the VWst of Europe.
On the same day on which the British time-limit
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE RIGHT HON. SIR EDWARD GREY. i« «"«" H""""-
THE TIMES intSTORY OF THE WAR.
33
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN
AMBASSADOR IN LONDON,
COUNT MENSDORFF.
expired Germany liad declared war on France
a-id Belgium; and her troops, which had
several times violated French territory during
the preceding days, definitely crossed the
frontier of both states. On the morning of
the 5th the attack on Liege begun, and the
German mine-layer Konigin Luise was sunk by
British gun-fire in the North Sea. On the 6th
the grim circle was completed by the Austrian
declaration of war on Russia. Five Great
Powers were now at wa;-, and some 15 millions
of men. if the reserve formations are includi-
were arming or already in movement.
It wa^ pretty certain that the first great scene
of confiict would Ije on the French and Belgian
frontiers. So long as the numerical superiorit_%-
of the British Fleet was maintained in the
North Sea it was unlikely that the German
Fleet would risk a general engagement ; while
on the Russian frontier the tardiness of the
one combatant and the comparative weakness
of the other militated against the probability
of important collisions. But it wa.s well known
that in the event of a double war against
Russia and France Germany would take svdvan-
tago of the length of time required for the
concontration of the Russian armies to spring
upon the nearer, readier, and, as slie hoped,
the weaker of her two opponents ; and would
endeavour by a more rapid concentration to
surprise and overwhelm \\'.t in the midst of her
mol)ilization. The adojition of such a plan
was not merely sound, perhaps inevitable, from
a strategic point of view, but it had alao th»
recommendation that it would eventually
bring the (Jorman armies into a theatre rich
in supplies and well roaded, and, above all,
famous for earlier victories. Three times
during the 19th century had the Prussian
soldier entered Paris and looked down from
tlie heights of Montmartre on a prostrat*
France. The confidence inspired by these
recollections would he the most valuable of
all auxiliaries in an offensive o|ieration which,
was to be carried through regardless of co.st,
at the highest speed, and with unflinching reso-
lution. The attempt to realize this plan wa«!
made ; but before we can follow the event«
by which it was marked we must say something
about the army which was to es.say it.
The German Army ui its modern shape was.
simply the extension of the Prussian system
tliroughout the whole of the German Empire.
This process was not wholly completed at the
outbreak of the war of 1870, but ever sincfr
the general Prussianization of all the German
states from a militars' point of view went
steadily forward ; and both in general organiza-
tion and in doctrine and spirit they bore a
close resemblance to the central source of
inspiration and control at Berlin. The division
THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON,
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY. \Ulay,iu^
34
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE GERMAN IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, DR. VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
35
of the fighting army into army corps,
and tlioir establixhmont as well as that of
reserve formations of landwehr and laiidstiirm
on a territorial basis was a general characteristic
of the whole system, as of most great armies.
The nimiber of army corps amovmtod to 25. The
corps war-organization of 1 870 had >)oen modified
and enlarged. Each corps still possessed two
infantry divisions, most divisions two brigades,
most brigades two regiments, and nearly every
regiment throe liattalions, making a total,
including a battalion of riflemen, of 25 in all.
But on mobilization each corps formed a third
or reserve division, presumably of about the
same strength as the others and composed
mainly of reservists who had recently left the
fcolours. The artiller>' had l)oen largely in-
creased, and wa.s attached in equal proportions
to the divisions, the old corps-artillery wliich
played so remarkable a part in 1870 having
btien abolished. A cavalry regiment was still
attached to the bulk of the infantry divisions.
The whole fighting organization, as in the case
of other armies, had of course been complicated
by the introduction of varied natures of
artillery ; not to mention machine gims, air-
craft, and the huge impedimenta reqmred to
bring so elaborate a machine into effective
action. Including its reserve division the
average corps in 1914 probably averaged
something over 40,000 rifles and sabres, and
about 150 guivs. In addition to the army
corps there were formed about 10 independent
cavalry divisions, consisting mostly of sis
regiments in three brigades, each provided with
several batteries of horse artillery. Non-
combatants, special troops, lines of communica-
tion troops and certain landwehr formations
included, the total first line German army was
computed at 2,300,000 men and 6,000 field
gims ; but very largo deductions would have to
be made in order to arrive at the actual number
of sabres and bayonets available for the shock
of battle. Tlie movement and supply of so
enormous a mass necessitated a vast number of
assistants whose duties did not necessarily
comprehend the business of fighting.
Opinions as to the real worth of this army
had in recent years considerably varied. With
the exception of the cavalry and horse artillery,
in whoso case it was three, the term of ser-
vice with the colours was only two years ; but
its brevity was compensated by imremitting
work, and no one doubted that the physique
and discipline were of a high standard. Its
oflicer corps, then as always the heart and soul
of the Prussian Army, was probably one of the
hardest -worked bodies of men existing. It*
machinery for supply and movement was
carefully studied and every detail that could
(insure smoothness and regularity was
tlioroughly worked out. The liigher com-
manders were accustomed to deal with large
bodies, were trained to disregard loss of life,
and to believe in resolute and united action ;
and vigorous subordinate initiative was taught
as the leading principle of all command. Tlie
Staff-Officer remained, as he had done for at
least a century, the driving-wheel of the whole
organization, and possessed an authority pro-
bably unknown in other armies. The great
prestige which he had won iinder Moltke was
no sudden or ephemeral development. Lastly
it may be added that, as at every period of
the eventful history of the German Army,
exactitude, obedience and a high standard of
duty were characteristic of all ranks.
So far it was generally admitted that this
great organization was a sound and formidable
machine. Doubts, the justification of which
could only be tested in war, had from time to
time been expre8.scd as to how far it was suited,
individually and collectively, to the conditions
of modem war. The criticism had been made
that it was somewhat too much of a machine,
and that organically and intellectually it
showed signs of ossification. Stress was laid
upon the dull and lifeless precision of the
German private, and the antiquated nature
of some parts of liis armament and equipment.
The rise of a French school of tactics and
strategy, wliich attributed more importance
to manoeuxre and distribution of forces than to
the uniform system of envelopnient wliich had
been a characteristic of Moltke's victories,
challenged the adequacy of German doctrine
in the higher branches of generalship ; and
the question as to whether the German system
either in theory or practice was sufficiently
elastic and adaptable was often raised. But
in spite of all criticism there were not many
who, had they been asked to say which was the
best of the great armies, would not liave chosen
that of Germany. Its numbers and the fact
that its leaders were impregnated with the
spirit of the offensive were alone sufficient to
render it a most imjiosing and formidable
instrument of war.
Four-fifths of this mighty host were destined
for the attack on France, the remainder
being left, in conjvmction with landwehr
and other reserve formations, and such parts
of the army as Austria could divert from
Servia, to contain and check the ponderoiw
36
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GERMAN ARMY, GENERAL VON MOLTKE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
87
THE GERMAN FOREIGN SECRETARY,
HERR VON JAGOW.
masses of Russia, until tlie overtlirow of
France released some of the corps for service
on the Eastern frontier. The line of attack
had long been decided on ; in fact, so far as
can be seen, the Emperor William, less fortunate
than his grandfather, had little choice. The
conditions governing the invasion of France
had greatly altered since 1870. Then, altliough
Alsace and Lorraine were not in German hands,
the Germans held, with the exception of
Strassburg, most of the great bridgeheads on
tie Rhine ; and once the isolated fortresses
oa the Moselle were passed — and they did not
of themselves enforce any obligation upon
an invading army beyond that of observation
or investment — the heart of France lay open
to an advance through the plains of Champagne.
Emerging from the almost impenetrable barrier
of the Rhine they had been able to meet their
opponents in a country suited to large move-
ments of troops in which their superior numbers
and resolute strategy had been used to the
best effect. Once the great battles, with a view to
which all Moltke's preparations had been made,
had been won France lay at the niercy of the
enemy. Moreover, and this entered largely into
his plan of campaign, an advance to the South
of Metz had offered a fair chance of separating
at least a part of the French, armies from their
southern and soi.th -western lines of commuixica-
tion and retreat and driving them to destruction
against the neutral frontier of Belgium. How
well this anticipation was founded was shown
by the catastrophe of Sedan.
Now, however, these favourable conditions
no longer existed. The nulitary advantages
which Moltke hoped to reap from the annexation
of the frontier provinces and the transformation
of Metz into an impregnable point de debouche-
ment and place d'armes were largely counter-
balanced by the elaborate line of forts d'arrel
flanked and strengthened by the fortres-ses of
Verdun, Toul, Nancy, Epinal, and Bclfort,
with which the French had more or less com-
pletely barred the central and southern parts of
their eastern frontier. The Germans were there-
fore compelled either to force this lino of defence,
or to turn it and enter France from the north -
cast. The first alternative was of itself a some-
what desperate enterprise, not certain to be
successful, and certain to cost much blood,
which the invaders might be willing to lose, and
a good deal of time which they were not. For
in considering the different lines of attack
open to the Germans it must always be
remembered that in the case of a war with France
or Russia time was the one thing they could not
afford to waste. Their whole scheme was,
considered in its simplest form, a huge operation
on the interior line against divided enemies,
only li'^ely to succeed if the first could be
defeated before the second came into action.
THE FRENCH PRIME MINISTER,
M. VIVIANI.
38
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
KING PETER OF SESIVIA.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
39
-Li
^~~"
^1
s
r
1
^
[
A
^A
IS
1
THE CROWN PRINCE OF GERMANY.
The second alternative, like all solutions of
strategic problems, was attended by serious dis-
advantages. To tlirow the German Army
on a line of invasion to the north of Metz and
Verdun inevitably involved the violation of the
Duchy of Luxemburg, a territory whose integrity-
was guaranteed under a treaty dating from 1867.
And since the vast numbers of men employed
necessitated a broad front of march it was
pretty certain from the first that Luxemburg
would not be the only state whose neutrality
would be threatened. The breadth of the Duch\-
is only about 40 miles, and whether for purposes
of march or battle could not be expected under
modern conditions to accommodate the columns
of more than three army corp.s abreast, or six
in double line. To have piled up 12 or 15 corps
in the space between Metz and the northern
border of the Duchy, would have been an un-
thinkable military blunder and would not have
saved the Germans from the accusation of vio-
lating neutral territory. It followed, then, that
if the main attack of Germany was to be made
to the north of Metz, a violation of Belgium in the
neighbourhood of the Ardennes and Liege was
a military necessity, however culpable from other
points of view. The only remaining alterna-
tive, from the German standpoint a wholly
inadmissible one, was to stand on the defensive
between the Meuse and Rhine. Their plan of
campaign involved the violation of both Belgium
and Luxemburg in their first marches.
There were obvious disadvantages attendant
on such a barefaced affront to international obli-
gations. It was not likely that Belgium would
consent to allow a free passage to the German
troops. Her army was mobilizing, her people
were aroused ; and Berlin was aware that
by infringing the neutrality of Belgium.
Germany was running a grave risk of oblig-
ing England to resort tc arms. The entry of
(ireat Britain into the struggle would be a terrible
blow for Germany ; that her Government
prt^ferred to face the risk rather tlian modify
its plan, of attack proves either that it con-
.sidered that a decisive victory over France
A'ould neutralize or outweigh the hostile action
of England, or that England, disunited at home
and blinded by a genial sentimentalism, would
suffer the violation of Belgium to pass with a
protest.
Apart from these grave considerations, which
involved not merely great strategic risks but
the reputation of the German Government,
certain strategic advantages were undoubtedly
conferred by the Belgian line of advance.
In the first place, as Clausewitz long ago had
pointed out, it was, considered from a military
point of view, the natural, that is to say the
shortest and straightest, line of attack. As a
matter of fact — it is a point of no strategic
importance and is merely added by way of
illustration — a straight line drawn from Berlin
to Pans passes close to Mezieres in rear of the
Belgian frontier. In the second place the area
of concentration of the main army would be
beised on, and might in some measure be
THE CROWN PRINCE OF AUSTRIA.
40
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
considered to be protected by, the great Rliine
fortress group of Mainz, Cologne, and Coblenz.
The great system of railways which had their
junction in this part of the frontier, some of
them deliberately built for the purposes of such a
concentration, all favoured the northern alterna-
tive. In the third place the coimtry between
Verdim and Liege, badly roaded, broken and
wooded though much of it was, was compara-
tively bare of fortresses, and offered a strategic
screen behind which the invader might conceal
his dispositions, and a terrain unfavourable to
the action of the superior French artillery.
The fortresses on the Meuse, Liege, and Namur
were known to be technically strong, but
their value would depend on whether the action
of Belgium proved prompt and resolute,
and on whether, if armed resistance was oi^ered,
their garrisons were strong enough to make
the most of the forts entrusted to them. When
Lord Sydenham reported on them in 1890 he
liad estimated the minimum of troops necessary
to hold them at 74,000 men ; and it was known
to every one that the Belgians were short of
men. The policy of a coup de main would at
any rate be worth trying, for, as already pointed
out, the first essential of German success was
speed ; and the loss of many men to an army
so numerous was of little account compared
with the secure control of the valley of the
Meuse and the roads and railways which the
fortresses commanded. If such an attack
proved successful, if the Belgian Army could
be shattered and dashed aside before French
support could reach it, a prospect of great suc-
cesses would open to the German arms.
The barrier of the Ardennes and the Middle
Meuse would be turned, the supports of the
PVench left shattered, and the German right,
freed from obstacles, and gathering weight and
speed as it gained space to unfold itself, would
descend like an avalanche upon Paris, forcing
the French armies to fall back, and so enabling
its own centre and left to debouch from the
woods of the Ardennes and to press their
rear. The combination of momentum and
envelopment obtained by such a movement
would oifer a fine vindication of German
strategic doctrine and, what was more im-
portant, might bo expected to result in the
defeat and demoralization of the defending
army. By the end of August the whole of
north-eastern France might be overrun and the
German hosts, for the fourth time in a himdred
years, might look upon the spires of Notre Dame.
The feasibility of the plan still remained
to be proved. If it succeeded it seemed
likely to satisfy the test by which, we
imagine, all strategy on the grand scale
must be tried. That is to say, it might be
expected not merely to achieve its nearer
object, the defeat of the armies immediately
concerned, but to dominate the whole campaign
and neutralize any local failures in other parts
of the theatre of war. No French successes
in Alsace, even if pushed to the gates of Metz
and Strassburg, would compensate for the
driving of the main armies back on Paris.
Once the invaders had forced their way to the
borders of Belgium they would stand, strate-
gically speaking, in the same position as
Wellington and Bliicher in 1815 ; and, Uke
Wellington, they would possess the assurance
that a movement upon Paris from the north-
east would inevitably bring a successful French
offensive towards the Rhine to a stop and
comjjel the troops to which it had been entrusttd
to retire and succour the armies in the interior.
Such it may be imagined were the calcula-
tions of the great General Staff at Berlin,
when they issued orders for the concentration
on their western frontiers.
CHAPTER III.
THE BRITISH NAVY AND
ITS WORK.
Tasks of the Navy — Subsidiary duties — Commerce pbotection^Safeouarding the food
SUPPLY — Patrols — Closing the enemy's ports — Transport of an expeditionary force —
Main object destruction of the enemy's fleets — General considerations — Conditions
OF A German initiative — Strength and distribution of the Navy at outbreak of War.
IT is not the purpose of this chapter to
deal with technical questions concerning
the Navy, or to discuss at length the
tactical views held by the British com-
manders at the commencement of the campaign.
It is rather our object to point out, by
illustration when possible, the general tasks
which awaited the Navy and the immense,
even decisive, importance of their effective
performance.
The three principal duties that the Navy was
called upon to perform were, first, the securing
of the seas for the passage of British ships,
especially the safeguarding of our food supply
and the transport of troops ; secondly, the
destruction by capture of the hostile shipping
with the object of depriving the enemy of his
supplies and rendering futile all projects of in-
vasion ; thirdly, the destruction of the hostile
fleets and naval bases. It was obvious that the
last, for practical purposes, would comprehend
the other two ; but it was not so certain that
opportunities would offer for its accomplish-
ment. In the meantime it was to be hoped that
the British Fleet, by reason of its superior battle
strength, would be able either to force the enemy
to fight or to retire to his ports, and so afford
an opportunity for its numerous cruisers to
carry, out the subsidiary, but all-important,
work of safeguarding their own and destroying
the enemy's conunerce.
We propose to refer to these subsidiary duties
first. The wide development ■ of this closely- ,
Vol. I.— Part 2. 41
knit system of commercial protection, and the
effect of the offensive action of our cruisers upon
the enemy's shipping, was perhaps not quite
adequately realized by the British public at the
commencement of the war. A few days after
the beginning, of hostilities nearly every street
comer in London displayed a placard bearing
the legend, " Olympic saved by British cruiser."
The suggestion was that this was an isolated
occurrence deserving of special and emphatic
notice. As a matter of fact, this was merely
one of many such accidents ; or, to speak more
correctly, it was an incident of the general
situation at sea that the OljTnpic should have
come under the duect convoy of the particular
cruiser which saved her. \Mmt f«ally saved
her, what rendered her practically safe from one
end of the voyage to the other, was the fact
that the British and French cruisers guarding
that particular line of communication were
numerous, vigilant, and well-nigh ubiquitous,
whereas the enemy's cruisers seeking to assail
that line were few and for tlie most part fugitive.
This incident has been used to illustrate the
true nature imd the immense siguificanee of
what our forefathers called " the sea affair."
From the moment when war became imminent
the main British Fleet melted into space.
Nothing was seen of any part of it, except of
the flotillas patrolling our coasts. Neverthe-
less, although it was invisible, there was never
in the world's history a more sudden, overwhelm-
ing, and all-pervading manifestation of the
42
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE KING
In Admiral's uniform.
{W. & D. Dovnuy.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH,
(3
"^
H.M.S. "DREADNOUGHT."
44
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LORD NELSON.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
*5
[Ku.^icU iir Sons, Southsea.
CAPTAIN CECIL H. FOX
of H.M.S. "Amphion."
power of the sea than that given by the Britisli
Fleet, admirably seconded by that of France,
in the first fortnight of the war. The rarity of
properly-called naval incidents might have left
a different impression. It might well have
seemed that the Fleets of France and England
had done nothing. As a matter of fact, the,>'
had done all in their power, and that all was
stupendous. Those weeks saw German mari-
time commerce paralysed ; British maritime
commerce fast returning to normal conditions
in all the outer seas of the world, and
not even wholly suspended in the area of im-
mediate conflict. Nay, more, it was already
seeking new realms to conquer — realms
left derelict by the collapse of the maritime
commerce of the enemy. That is, in a few words,
the long and the short of it. Prize Court notices
of German and Austrian merchantmen captured
on the seas or seized in our ports appeared
daily in increa.sing numbers in The Times.
Side by side with them appeared the familiar
notices of the regular sailings of our liners for
nearly all the ports of the outer seas. The
Times published daily accounts of the new
avenues of trade, manufacture, and transport
opened up by the collapse of our enemies'
commerce, and of the enorgj' and enter|}ri.se
with which our merchants, manufacturers, and
sea -carriers were preparing to exploit them.
How it stood with Germany on the other hand
we have unimpeachable German authority to
show. On Augu.st 20 The Times published the
following extract from the VorwUrts, the German
Socialist organ : —
If the Briti.sh blockade took place imports into
Germany of roughly six thoiLnand million inark.s
(£300,000,000) and exports of about eight thoiuand
million marks (£400,000,000) would bo int<>rriiptcd—
tOHolher an ovenw-a trade of 14 mllliardH of marks
(£700,000,000). This in ius.iuminK tliat Germany'ii
tnvde relations with Aiistria-lluiipiry, Switzerland,
Italy, lielgiuin, HoII.iikI, Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden rem.ained entirely uiiinflueneed by the war — •
an iwsumption tlio oi>timiNni of which is wlf-evidii.t.
.\ Klinec at the flgiu'es of the imports shows llio
frightful Seriou-sness of the situation. What is
the iioNition, for example, of the German textile
indastry if it must forgo the imports of oversea
cotton, jute, and wool ? If it must forgo the 462
millions (£23,100,000) of cotton front the United
States, the 73 millions (£3,(150,000) of cotton from
Egypt, the 58 millions (£2,900,000) of cotton from
British India, the 100 millions (£5,000,000) of jute
from the .same countries, and further the 121 millions
(£0,050,000) of merino wool from Australia, and the
23 millions (£1,150,000) of th<? s;vme material from the
Argentine ? What could she do in the event of a
war of longer duration without these raw materials
CAPTAIN ARTHUR A. M. DUFF
of H.M.S. "Birfnin^ham.''
46
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE RIGHT HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.
f Bassanc
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
47
r=rT-ai,
THE BRITISH SUBMARINE DI.
which in one ye<ai' amount in vahie to 830 millions
(£41,500.000) ?
It may also be mentioned, said the Vorwiirts, that
Germany received in 191 S aUjne fiom the United
States about 300 millions (£15,000,00(1) o( copper,
and further that the petroleum import would be as
good as completely shut down. The German leather
industry is largely dependent on imports of hides
from ovei-sea. The Argentine alone sent 71 millions
(£3,550,000) worth of hides. ' .Vgriculture would be
sensibly injured by the intt-rniption of the exports
of Chilean saltpetre from Chile, which in 1913 were
of the value of not less than 131 millions (£6,550,000).
The significance of an effective blockade of German
foodst.ufts is to be seen in the ff)llowing few figures: —
The value in marks of wh(vit from the United States
is 165 millions (£8,250,00(1), fnmi Russia 81 millions
(£1,050,000), from Canada 51 millions (£2,550,000),
from the Argentine 75 millions (£3,750,000) — 372
millions (£18,600,000) from the.se four countries.
There will also be a discontinuanc** of t.he importation
from Russia of the following foodstuffs : — Eggs worth
80 millions (£4.000,000), milk and butter 63 millions
(£3,150,000), hay 32 millions (£1,600,000), lard from
the United States worth 1 12 millions (£5.600,000), rice
from British India worth 46 millions (£2,300,000), and
coffee from Brazil worth 151 millions (£7,550,000)
should be added to the foregoing. No one who con-
templates without prejiidice, said the Vorwiirts,
these few^ facts, to which many others could be added,
will be able lightly to estimate the economic conse-
quences of a war of lon^ duration.
" If the British blockade took place," said
the Vorwiirts, and it dwelt on the consequences
of a war of long duration. The British blockade
was actually taking place at the moment
these words were written, though it Was not
called by that name forrea-sons which need not
here be examined. Acting together with the
hostility of Ru.ssia, whicli closed the whole of
the Russian frontier of Germany to tlie transit
of merchandise either way, the control of sea
communication established by the fleets of
England and France had already secured the
first fruits of those consequences of a war of
long duration on which the Vorw'.irls dwelt
with such pathetic significance. Thost^ con-
sequences were bound to be continuous and
cumulative so long as the control of sea com-
munications remained unrelaxed. The menace
of the few German cruisei-s which were still
at large was already abated. Already its bite
had been found to be far less formidable than
its bark. War premiums on British ships at
sea were falling fivst. German maritime com-
merce was uninsurable, and in fact there
was none to insure. Its remains were stranded
and derelict in many a neutral port One of the
greatest dangers, in the opinion of some eminent
authorities the most serioiw danger, that this
country had to guard against in war was already
averted, or would remain so as long as the
control England had established over her sea
48
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
H.S.H. PRINCE LOUIS OF BATTENBERG,
First Sea Lord, in the uniform of a Commodore.
{LattyfUt.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
49
H.M.S.
SHANNON."
communications continued to be effective. This
was the first result of our naval preparations,
the first great manifestation of sea power.
But there was a second result far more
dramatic than the first, and not less significant
in its implications, nor in its concrete mani-
festation of the overwhelming power of the
sea. The whole of the Expeditionary Force,
witli all its manifold equipment for taking and
keeping the field, had been silently, secretly,
swiftly, and safely transported to the Continent
without the loss of a single man, and without
the slight(«t show of opposition from the Power
wliich thought itself strong enough to challenge
the imaggressive mistress of the seas.
" Germany," says the Preamble to the Nav,\-
Law of 1900, " must possess a battle fleet of
such strength that even for the most power-
ful naval adversary a war would involve such
risks as to make that Power's own supremacy
doubtful." Such a war had now been forced
upon England, and one of its first accomplished
results had been the entirely successful com-
pletion of an operation which, if the enem_\' had
deemed oiu- naval supremacy even so much as
doubtful, he might have been expected to put
forth his uttermost efforts to impeach. That
Germany declined the challenge was a proof
even more striking of the power of superior
force at sea than the, action of the British Navy
upon the trade routes of the world.
We now come to the third task of the Navy,
the destruction of the hostile fleet. Some
general remarks on this subject may not bo out
of place. However great may be the immediate
consequences of command of the sea, these advan-
tages do not constitute the final and paramount
end at wWch we should aim. That end is the
overthrow of the enemy's fleets at sea. We
must wait until the enemy gives us the oppor-
tunity, but then we must make the best of it.
The essential thing is always that if and when
the enemy comes out in force lie may be en-
countered as soon as may be in superior force,
and forthwith brought to decisive action
in a life and death struggle for the supreme
prize of all naval warfare. Nothing can be
further from the purpose of a sujierior navy
than to keep the enemy's fleet peiuied
jjorts. " I bog to inform your
wrote Nelson in 1804, " that
of Toulon has never been
blockaded by me : quite the rev-erse — every
opportunity has been offered to the enemy
to put to sea, for it is there that we hope to
realize the hopes and expectAtions of our country
and I trust they will not be disappointed."
But how if the enemy will not put to sea —
up in his
Lordship,'
the port
50
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE,
Cotnmander-in-Cblef, Home Fleets.
[Russell 6- Sons, Soufhsea.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
51
H.M.S.
' IRON DUKE.
with his battle fleet, that is ? Then we must
wait until he does, and in the meanwhile we
must use our best endeavours to parry his
sporadic acts of aggression and to give him as
much more than he gef^ as we can manage. He
will seek to wear us down, and we on our part
must seek to wear him down. The rationale
of this type of naval warfare — the type most
likely to prevail between two belligerents, one
of whom is appreciably stronger in all the
elements of naval force than the other — is ex-
pounded as follows in Mr. J. R. Thursfield's
little book on "Naval Warfare" : —
The weaker Ijelligerent will at the outset keep
his battle fleet in his fortifled ports. Tlie st njnger
may do the same, but ho will be under no such para-
mount inducement to do so. Both sides will, how-
ever, s»>nd out their torpedo craft and support inii
cruisers with intent to do as much Iiarm as they can
to the armed forces of the enemy. If one belligerent
can get his tor|>edo craft to sea l)efoix> the enemy
is ready, he will, if he i.s thn stronger of the two,
forthwith attempt to establish as close and sustaimnl
a watch of the ports sheltering the enemy's armed
forces as may be practicable ; if he is the weaker
he will attempt sporadic attacks on the ports of his
advei'saiy and on such of his wai'ships as m.ay be found
in the open. . . . Sucli attacks may be very
effective and m.iy even go so far to redress the b.ilancc
of naval strength as to encoin-jige the originally weaker
belligerent to seek a decision in the open. But the
forces of the stronger belligerent must be very ba<?ly
handled and disposed tor anything of the kind to take
place. The advantage of suiK'rior foree is a tre-
mendous one. If it is associated with energy, deter-
mination, initiative, and skill of disposition no more
than equal to those of the assailant, it is overwhelming.
The sea-keejjing capacity, or wh.at has been called
the enduring moljility, of torpedo craft is com-
paratively small. Their c<i,al supply is limited,
especially when they are st^'aming at full sp<"ed, and
they carry no very lai-ge reserve of torp<'does. They
must, therefore, very frequently return to a base to
replenish their supplies. The sup<>rior enemy is,
it is true, subject to the same disabilities, but Ix'ing
superior he has mor'- torpedo craft to spai-e and more
cruisers to attack the torpedo craft of the enemy
and their own escort of crui-sers. When the raiding
torpi'do craft return to their base he «nll make it
very difHicult for them to get in and just lus diflicult
for them to get out again. He will suffer losses,
of couiwe, for there is no superiority of force that will
confer immunity in that resix-ct in war. But oven
l)otweon equal forws, equally well led and handled,
there is no reason to suppose that the k>sses of one
side will be more than equal to those of the other;
whereas if one side is appreciably suiK'Hor to the other
it is rea.sonable to suppose th.it it will inflict greater
losses on the enemy than it suffers itself, while even
if the losses are equal the residue of the stronger force
will still Ik' greater than that of the weaker.
One must not assume, when the enemy does
not come out, that the menace and display of
superior force in every direction have acted as
a deterrent and quelled initiative to the point of
paralysis. No such hypothesis con be enter-
tained on tlie merely negative evidence of a
situation still obscure and undeveloped. It
52
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LORD FISHER,
A former First Sea Lord.
[Berssford
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
53
BRITISH TRAWLKRS EQUIPPED AS MINE SWEEPERS. [Fr,d La C^rU,.
is far more likely that the enemy is pre-
paring some great coup requiring him to keep
all liis available forces in hand and to use them
when the time comes with the utmost vigour and
determination. At any rate, that is what the
British Fleet had to be prepared for. It must
stand at all times in full readiness to parry the
blow, whensoever and wheresoever it is delivered,
to anticipate it, if it may be, and in any case
to meet the enemy with a vigour, determina-
tion, and skill not inferior to his own, and witli
a force so superior as to crown our arms with
victory. No nation wliich wages war on the
seas can hope for anytliing more or better than
a decision sought and obtained on t«rms such
as these.
In the circumstances wliich prevailed in the
war between Germany and England in 1914,
it was peculiarly probable that Germany would
at the outset show an apparent feebleness of
initiative. In connexion with the first great
German Navy Bill of 1900 it was laid down
that the German Navy need not be ivs strong as
that of the greatest naval Power " for, as a rule,
a great naval Power will not be in a position
to concentrate all it:'- forces against us." In the
event it was, perhaps, the German Navy that
was at the outset least able " to concentrate all
ite forces " against " the greatest naval Power."
The German Fleet was compelled at first to be
a two -fold containing force — against a formid-
able military adversary in the Baltic and against
an overwhelmingly sujxjrior naval adversary
in the North Sea. To go out to fight in the
North Sea might be to imcover the Baltic
coasts of Germany to the assaults of Rutsiia
from the sea and thereby greatly to facilitate
the military o[)erations of Russia in that region.
We may fitly conclude this chapter with a
brief enumeration of the British naval forcet-..
The First Fleet consisted of four battle
squadroiis together with a fleet flagship, the
Iron Duke, which carried the flag of Sir John
Jellicoe, the supreme Conunander-in-Chic f afloe-t.
The first battle squadron consisted of eight
battleships of the Dreadnought and super-
Dreadnought type, seven of which carried
tx;n 12in. giuis, together with a secondary
anuament of 4in. gims, while the eighth, the
Marlborough, a sister ship to the fleet flagsliip,
liad ten i;l-5in. guns and a 6in. secondary
armament. The second battle squadron con-
sisted of eight super-Dreadnoughts, each carry-
ing ten 13'5in. gims with a 4in. s(»condary arma-
ment. The tliird battle squadron consisted
of the eight fine pre-Dreadnouglit shij>s of the
Iving Edward VII. type, each carrying four
12in., four 9'2in., and ten 6in. ginis. The
fourth battle squadron consisted of the Dread-
nought herself and two others of a later type.
54
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
all carrying ten 12in. guns apiece and two of
them a 4in. secondary armament, together
with the Agamemnon, one of the latest of the
pre -Dreadnought ships, carrying four I2in.
and ten 9-2in. guiis. As two Turkish ships wore
purchased on the outbreak of war and other
Britisli ships were nearing completion, it
was contemplated that this squadron would
soon be strengthened, though not necessarily
with the newly commissioned ships themselves.
A light cruiser and a destroyer were attached
to the Fleet flagsiiip, each battle squadron had
also a Ught cruiser attached to it, two repair
ships accompanied the whole fleet, and it had
also eight attached destroyers. Affiliated to the
First Fleet were (1) the battle cruiser squadron,
consisting of four ships, three of them carrying
eight 13'5in. guns apiece and the fourth eight
12in. guns, all with a 4in. secondary arma-
ment ; (2) the second cruiser squadron, consisting
of four powerful armoured cruisers ; (3) the
third cruiser squadron of four cruisers of the
Devonshire type, each carrying four 7-5in.
and six Bin. guns ; (4) the fourth cruiser squad-
ron, coiviisting of four .ships of the Monmouth
type, with an armament of fourteen Gin. guns,
and one light cruiser, the Bristol, with an
armament of two 6in. and ten 4in. guns ;
(.5) the first light cruiser squadron consisting
of four ships, and (6) a squadron of six mine-
sweeping gunboats. Furthermore, there were
four flotillas of destroyers attached to the
First Fleet under the command of a Commodore,
whose brofid pennant flew in the Amethyst,
a light cruiser. Each had a flotilla cruiser
attached to it, and a depot ship as well. The
first, second, and foiulih flotillas had 20
destroyers apiece, and the third had 15.
This, then, was our first line of defence in home
waters. But it was not our only line. Behind
it stood the Second Fleet and behind that the
Third, each with its battle squadrons and its
cruiser squadrons. The Second Fleet liad two
battle squadrons, each with a light cruiser
attached. The first of these squadrons con-
sisted of eight ships of the Formidable type,
and the second, with the Lord Nelson, a sister
ship to the Agamemnon, whose armament has
already been given, as fleet flagship, had six
other vessels, five of the Duncan type and one
of the Canopus type. All these ships of both
fleets liad the uniform pre-Dreadnought arma-
ment of four 12in. and twalve Gin. guns. For
cruiser squadrons the Second Fleet hiid first
the fifth cruiser squad -on, coasisting of the
Carnarvon with four 7-5in., and six Gin.
guns, the Falmouth with eight Gin. and the
Liverpool with two Gin. and ten 4in. ; and,
secondly, the sixth cruiser squadron, consisting
of the four fine armoured cruisers of the Drake
type, all armed alike with two 9-2in. guns and
sixteen Gin. It had also a mine-layer squadron
of seven vessels. Its patrol flotillas, indspeu-
dantly organized imda.' the Ad niral of Patrols,
were four in nunabor, the sixth, seventh, eighth,
and ninth, with seven flotilla cruisers and four
depot ships attached. The sixth flotilla con-
sisted of 23 destroyers, the seventh of 21
destroyers and 12 torpedo-boats, tho third of 13
destroyers and 1 1 torpedo-boats, and the fourth
of 17 destroyers. Last, but not least, there were
seven flotillas of submarines with 1 1 depot ships
attached to them. In all they mustered 52 vessels,
the balance of submarines in commission being
accounted for by the flotillas stationed abroad.
Lastly came the Third Fleet, with two battle
squadrons, the seventh and eighth, each with a
light cruiser attached, and six cruiser squadrons,
one of which, however, was " temporarily not
constituted " when war began. The seventh
battle squadron consisted of five ships of the
Majestic type, and the eighth of five of the
Canopus type. They were comparatively old
ships, the earliest dating from 1895 and the
latest from 1902, but they had a good deal of
fight in them. All were armed with four 12in.
and twalve Gin. guns, not of course of the newest
type, but by no means to be despised or
neglected. The cruiser squadrons of this fleet
mustered 30 vessels in all, of types too various
to be enumerated in detail. They were for
the most part old ships, but none of them
obsolete in any legitimate sense, and they were
certain to give a very good account of them-
selves in any work which they were likely to
be called upon to do. Of the several fleets,
squadrons, and flotillas stationed abroad nothing
need here be said excppt that in conjunction
with the French Fleet in the Mediterranean Euid
other waters they were amply strong enough
to make snort work of any enemy they were
likely to encounter.
Such was the material strength of our guard
upon the seas. If battles were won by ships
nothing more need be said. But battles are
not won by ships. They are won by the men
who fight them. One spirit animated the
whole Navy, a spirit of unswerving devotion
to their King, their country, and the call of
duty or of danger.
CHAPTER IV.
THE GERMAN, FRENCH, RUSSIAN
AND AUSTRIAN NAVIES.
German Navai, Policy — Von Tikpitz — ^The Navy Law of 1900 — Materiel op the Navy-
Personnel — German Naval Bases — French Navy — Policy — Decline — Revival — BouA
13B LAPfeYRi^aiE — Personnel — Dockyards — Composition of Fleet — Russian Navy — The
Japanese War — Renaissance of the Navy- — The Navy Bill of 1912 — Standards of
Strength and Policy — Gregorovitch — Strength at Outbreak of Wah — Strategic Posi-
tion— The Austro-Hunoarian Navy — -An Austrian Tirpitz — Adriatic Bases — Strength
of the Fleet.
OF all the problems of the war
there was none more monientoufi
than the trial of strength of
the German Navy. It was itself
the chief German creation of the past fifteen
yearf., the chief work of the Emperor W illiam II.,
the chief sjinbol and weapon cf Gorman Welt-
poliiik. Its rapid ccnstruction had for a decade
influenced more than anything else the course
of international relations, and been the most
powerful factor in determining the respective
places of Great Britain and Germany in the
grouping of the European Powers. From
1900 onwards German naval ambitions liad
enibittered Angle -German relations, and for a
good many years the most urgent question in
ix)litics liad been whether an Anglo -German
war could be averted. The prospect of such a
duel had been becoming to all appearance
more and more remote wlien Germany took
a course wliich set all Europe ablaze and
" brought England in," almost as if naval
war with the greatest naval Power, with all
its menace not only to the German Navy but
to Germany's conununications and trade, were
a minor issue.
Sea-power played no part in the making of
modern Germany, and was irrelevant to Ger-
many's homo defence. It was sought deliber-
ately as an engine of conquest and as the only
effective wbapon with which Germany could
win power abroad and above all dispute British
supremacy. German historians and orators,
from the Emperor William downwards, embel-
lished their appeals to tne popular imagination
with much medieval lore, and regarded the
new Navy as the fulfilment of the aspirations
of all great Germans who had dreamed of a new
and greater German Empire. But in reality
the German Navy built up between 1898 and
1914 wiis a new work. Its foundations were
on the one hand prosperity and conunercial
ambition, and on the other hand a carefully
fostered belief in the impending dowiifall and
decay of the British Empire. The tliree wars
fought by Bismarck for German unity were
from a naval point of view insignificant. The
war of 1864 gave Kiel to Prussia and secured
her position on the Baltic. The war of 1866
gave Prussia the whole North Sea littoral (she
had previously purchased Wilhelmshaven from
the Grand Ducliy of Oldenburg). But, owing
to tlie unpreparedness of France, sea-iwwer
played no importart part in the great
struggle of 1870, and after the wars which
brought Germany so much glory on land
Bismarck even diminislied such modest naval
proposals as he had hitherto been mailing.
65
56
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GRAND ADMIRAL, PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF I'HE WAR.
57
KIEL.
There was very little change in the next twenty
years, and notwithstanding Bismarck's success-
ful policy of tariff protection the Navy esti-
mates remained almost stationary or fluctuated
within a narrow range imtil some time after
the accession of the Emperor William II. in
1888.
In the year 1897 the rejection of naval in-
creases of no great amount by the German
Keichstag caused the retirement of Admiral
von HoUmann, the Muster in charge of naval
matters, and he was succeeded by a com-
paratively unknown naval officer named Tirpitz,
who soon obtained the title of a Secretary of
State. He appears to have been selected
because he had found means to persuade the
Emperor William that he could devise and
carry out a progressive scheme of naval ox-
pan.'sion on lines which would prevent or
circmnvent Parliamentary interference. If
so, he was as good as his word. Ho began, in
1898, with a Bill which was modest in extent
■ — it provided, for instance, for an establishment
of only 19 battleships — but which contained the
all-important principle that the strength of the
fleet should be fixed for a definite period, and
that the dates should also be fixed at which
old ships should bo " replaced " by new. The
Reichstag was supposed to retain a sort of
control over naval finance because, although
the programme was determined in advance,
the Navy Estimates were presented and voted
annually. Tirpitz, however, foresaw acciu-at^ly
that this control would be only nominal, and
there was hardly an occasion in the next 15
years on which he had the least reason to fear
any distiu-bance of his plans from Parliament.
The only at all effective checks — and they were
seldom exercised — were the occasional qualms
of the Foreign Office and the occasional de-
mands of the military authorities that the
claims of the Aniiy should have precedence over
those of the Navy. At the beginning of the
year 1912, for example, there was a t harp
tussle between Tirpitz and the Ministry of
War, and there was even an attempt to upset
the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-
Hollweg, in order to make way for the Naval
Minister. In any ca.so nothing could mo\e
Tirpitz fro:n power. When the war camo he
Was still in the office to which he had been
appointed 17 years before. He had served
under, or rather with, three Imperial Cliancollorg
and had seen Ministers come and go in all the
other Departments of the State.
Having once established liis main principles
in the Bill of 1898, Tirpitz seized every oppor-
timity of expansion. He Was unscnipulous
to a degree in the handling of the Press organizti-
tion that was always a feature of his administra-
tion, and whenever naval increases were
imminent he insisted most emphatically upon
their impossibility. In 1899 he denied abso-
lutely that there was any intention of going
58
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE GERMAN BATTLE-CRUISER " VON DER TANN."
beyond the Navy Law passed in the preceding
year. Within a few months he had presented
the great measure which became the Navy
Law of 1900 and the real foundation of the
naval challenge to Great Britain. It practi-
cally doubled Germany's naval establishment,,
turning, for example, at a stroke of the pen two
squadrons of battlesliips into four. It was
definitely presented as a measure which would
make war with Germany dangerous " even
for the greatest naval Power." As we have
seen in an earlier chapter, the Navy Law
of 1900 was the direct outcome of the passionate
Anglophobia which the German Government
fomented upon the outbreak of the South African
War. Later on the German Emperor and German
sailors generally were wont to forget the
beginnings of their great endeavour, and to
speak as though they had been moved to
compete with England only by admiration. In
truth the modem German Navy was bom of
jealousy and hatred. It was expected that
disaster would befall us in South Africa, and it
was hoped and believed that the British
Empire would crumble and decay, so that our
heritage would fall to the Power that was ready
to join issue with us upon the seas.
Having set about their work, the Germans
carried it on with wonderful determination.
The Emperor William, hmiseif indefatigable,
was ably assisted by his brother I'rince Henry
of Prussia, who for some time commanded the
High Sea Fleet and at the outbreak of war
was Inspector-General. Public opinion was
instructed by an elaborate propaganda, and
especially by a powerful Navy League and
an efficient Admiralty Press Bureau. The
universities and schools did their part. In
a very short time the Navy became almost as
popular as the Army, and public faith in its
mission was as firmly established.
We need not here discuss the several " amend-
ments " of the Navy Law of 1900. There was
a Navy Bill in 190C, another in 1908, and
another in 1912, and special provision for
naval air work was included in the great Army
Bill of 1913. The main effect of the Bill of
1912 had been, as regards materiel, to add
a third squadron of battleships to the active
battle fleet and greatly to increase the number
of destroyers and submarines in commiasion.
At the outbreak of war the High Sea Fleet,
under the command of Admiral von Ingenohl
(flagship Friedrich der Grosse) consisted
of 21 battleships, of which 13 were
Dreadnoughts, four battle -cruisers, eight light
cruisers, and some 80 torpedo craft. The
full strength of Germany was nominally 37
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
59
battleships and battle-cruisers, nine armoured
and 39 light cruisers, 142 destroyers, 47 tor-
pedo-boats, and 27 submarines. There wore,
however, three Dreadnoughts, the Mark-
graf, the Grosser Kurfiirst and the Konig, and
one battle-cruiser, the Derfflinger, nearly reiKlx
for oomnxissioning, and it was known that the
number of submarines was considerably larger
than had been officially admitted. AH the later
battleships carried a main arnxament of ten
12in. gims, the preceding class having twelve
12in. gims and the earliest Dreadnoughts
twelve 11 in. guns.
In materiel Germany liad from the begin-
ning been content to iniitato English types.
and she made no effort to anticipate ' British
design.s after inaccurate imformation, too
eagerly acquired, concerning the British In-
vincible class had led her in 1907 to construct
one conspicuously unsucces.sful cruiser, the
Bliicher. What of the personnel 1 It was
obvious that it lacked both the inspiration of
naval traditions and experience not only
of actual warfare but of distant voyages. It
had been a great event for the German Navy,
a few months before the war, to send its
newest Dreadnoughts on a tour to South
America, mainly for the purpose of attracting
orders for the German building yards. A
GRAND ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ,
Secretary of State for the German Imperial
Navy.
GRAND ADMIRAL VON KOESTER,
President of the German Navy League.
great part of the Navy had confined
its exercises almost entirely to the North Sea,
with occasional exciuT<ions to Norwegian
waters. There, however, at any rate, minute
local knowledge had been obtained, which it
was hop€>d to turn to good accoimt in a war
with England. The German imval officers were
a.s a whole keen, intelligent, and very ambi-
tious, and every observer had been struck by
their rapid development and the extent to
which they had grow7i away from the routine
and machinelike methods of the I^xssian Army.
Unlike British officws they hatl, however,
entered upon their careers at the age of 18 or
later, after an ordinary school education. Of the
crews, about one quarter were volunteers or
men Who had re-engaged after their period of
compulsory service — in no case longer than three
years. The rest were coruicripts, whom choice
or accident had brought to the Navy rather than
the Army. The Navy was originally recruitod
es.sentially from the " seafaring "' population,
but of necessity, a.s the Navy grew, an ever
larger proportion of men had to be drawn from
the inland population. That was the main
rea.son why the Navy propaganda was carried
on with increasing zeal in Bavaria and other
States with no seaboard of their own and a
population of peasants. A senae of the draw-
backs of such recruiting luid been very evident
BO
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ADMIRAL VON INGENOHL.
Commander-in-Chief, German Fleet.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
01
THE GERMAN GUNBOAT "PANTHER" WHICH WAS SENT TO MOROCCO IN 1911.
among the German naval authorities, and large
increases had been advocated for the very
reiuiou that the training of first-year recruits
greatly impaired the fighting efficiency of any
ship to which they were allotted.
Cemian naval strategy had been concerned
ahnost exclusively with possibilities of war
with England, just as German sailors had been
brought up exclusively on British naval history,
and it was improbable that the early stages of
the war would bring any surprises from the
German side. Germany was operating from one
vast war station extending from the island of
Sylt in the north to the island of Borkum in
the south — a semi-circle with Heligoland as
its geographical centre. The whole position was
magnificently fortified and equipped, laul,
since the completion just before the ■sVar of the
widening and deepening of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Canal for the pa8.sage of the largest ships, there
was free and rapid communication between the
two great naval stations of Wilhelmshaven and
Iviel. Nominally Kiel was the base of two
squadrons of battleships and Wilhehnsliaven
of the tliird battleship squadron and the battle
THE FRENCH NAVY.
Within the years inunediately preceding the
war the French naval situation had undergone
a nidical transformation, due partly to a
change in pxiblic opinion, but as much to
the circumstance that the eminent men who
ruled the destinies of the French Navy during
these years were not only inspired by a patriotic
desire to restore the prestige at sea of the nation
but had taken the best measures to ensure
that result. Tlianks to the stable and con^-
prehensive progress which the Republican
Navy liad nxode under men like Bono de
Lapeyrerr, Dolciusse, and Baxidin, it entered
upon the struggle with a faith in itself and a
conviction of ultimate success which was the
beet augury of victory. Strong in tlie un-
doubted efficiency of its administration, in
the professional competency of its leaders,
and in tlio keen fighting spirit of its seamen,
it was ready to perform its duties in a mamier
worthy of its great traditions and the interests
of the Republic.
Like the British, the French Navy had seen
no serious fighting for over a century. Diu-ing
that long iieriod the conditions cf naval war-
faro had undergone many and material clianges.
The construction and equipment of the Navy
had been entirely altered. Steam had taken
the place of sail, steel of oak and hemp. Not
only had the power a:id range of the gun
enonnously increased, but the torpedo liad
become its rival. Submarines and air-craft
had been added to tlie naval onnoury.
In all the permutations wliich had taken
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
^^^^^^K^
l^^^^^^'
1'
Pi
^'-^ ■«»
^^^^^^^Kr
/ ^
^^Hr
r
a
^^^
1
f
H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.
[Campbell Gray,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
63
M. DELGASSE.
The French Statesman and Diplomatist.
It was about twenty years before the out-
hreivk of war lliat the decline of the French
Navy bepan, but oven b<ifore this the school
of tliought known as the Jcune Ecole, with a
distinguisiied admiral at it« heM and a talent-txl
journalist for its mouthpiece, had already
sung the praises of tlie guerre dc cmirse, and
prophesied an early victory for the microbe
over the msistodon. Then this school hid its
way. Battlesliip building declined, cruisers
and hundr(!ds of torpedo boats were con-
structed instead. For nearly ton years this
mischievous policy prevailed, although fortu-
nately, owing to a change of Ministry, six battle-
ships of the Patrie class were ordered in 1901-2:
It was a forward movement, but insufficient
to make up for the leeway of the past yoers.
Even after these ships were ordered, changes
in desiga delayed their completion, while the
toqiodo craft that were supposed to supply their
place were too small and slight for offen-sive
warfare on the high seas.
Previously, Franco had been outnumbered
only by England in armoured battleships.
Hers was the second navy in the world. But
then retrogression .set m, the Navy did not find
place it was always France that led the way.
The genius of her inventors and sciertific
men enabled them to foresee and anticii^ate
iiaval needs and the requirements of future
naval warfare. Yet, ciu-iously enough, the
French had failed to take advantage of their
initial successes. They had not always devel-
oped their ngw ideas along practical lines.
It is sufficient to mention that to them we
owed the first see^going iroiKilad, and they were
likewise the pioneers of the tor|X!(lo boat and
the submarine.
To some extent an explanation of the extra-
oixlinary lack of continuity which obtained in
regard to French naval construction may be
found in the influence which successive schools
of thought exerted upon the Ministers of
Marine who ruled the Fleet, and during the
many changes in this office the material
strength of the Navy gained or lost, according
to the whim of the controlling hand. So-called
reforms followed one another too quickly to
allow of any one of them having its desired
effect. Nevertheless, despite all the vicissi-
tudes through which its material construction
passe<l, the ptrsonnel of the Fleet never lost
its vitality, and even the harm done by the
administration of M. PoUetan was insufficient
to shake its real strength and inJierent buoyancy
and patriotism.
THE KING OF SERVIA.
{Rtcord Prfss.
64
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
■
B
■
^^^^^H|
iP^iii%^ ''^H
1
w^A
101
l^B^^^^^R III/' A
^P' ' " '^ Mm Mil ^M
^^Ki!Su»SHI^^»-'^^^^M|^^^|Hfl
m 1
^^H|
1 ^
^H
1 1
^H
1 1
HV^^te '^^1
ADMIRAL BOUE DE LAPEYRERE.
Commander-in-Chief, French Fleet.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS.
06
BREST.
the encouragement from the country that was
its due, and other nations entered the field of
naval construction, competing with her for her
place as a great sea power. Thus French
relative superiority afloat declined, until it
was possible for Admiral de Cuverville to state
that the fleet had dropped to fifth place among
the navies of the world, having been overtaken
by the sea forces of Germany, the United
States, and Japan.
In 1906 another change of Ministry and of
policy occurred. Consent was obtained for
the construction of six vessels of the Danton
class, but these ships were not Dreadnoughts,
although the Dreadnought era had begun.
The Dreadnought cruisers to a largo extent
lessened the value as fighting units of p.11 the
earlier armoured cruisers, especially of those
of no greater speed than Fruice had then com-
pleting. M. Gaston Thomson, whose adminis-
tration was in several respects nv.rked both by
an improx'ement in construction and in the
training of the fleets, was succeeded as MinLst<>r
oi Marine by M. Alfred Picprd, a rruxn of scientific
ability and considerable organizing power,
from whose efforts much was hojied. He liad.
however, scarcely taken office before the Gov-
ernment again changed, and Admiral Bou6 de
Lapeyrere became Minister of Marine. From
this date the real renaissance of the French
Navy begins.
Bou^ de I>apeyrere, when war began
Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy
afloat, was a man of great initiative, restless
energy, and stubborn determination. When
he became Minister of Marino he had already
naade a reputation as a naval administrator,
as well as having had much sea experience. He
was also the youngest officer of his rank in the
French Navy. It was a daring experiment
after a succession of civil administrators to
put a seaman at the helm, but it proved entirely
successful. LapejTere had had no experience
in the command of a battle fleet, but he had been
flag-captain to Admiral Fournier, who was the
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean
from 1898 to 1900. He had also seen war
service in China, and had commanded the
Newfoundland and Atlantic divisions, as well
as having been in charge of the naval establish-
ment at Rochefort and acted as Maritime
Prefect at Brest.
The Admiral set himself about the task of
the refonning of the Navy with the same high
sense of professional duty and resolute firmness
wliich liad already characterized his naval
career. Among his first acta was the importa-
tion of fresh blood at the Rue Royale, where he
formed soTnething in the nature of the British
.\dmiralty Board. He also instituted a policy
of concentration, bringing all the newer ships
into one fleet in the Mediterranean, entrusting
the task of training it to Adiriiral C«illard.
In every way he set himself, by a courageous
sweep of abuses, to dissipate the conservatism,
sloth, and inertness which so far had hampered
66
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAM.
VICE-ADMIRAL SIR FREDERICK STURDEE,
Chief of the War Staff, in Captain's uniform.
[hllioll 6r Fry.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
67
■ 1
ij
L.
■*""■ "' - ,HCt
mitsmf 1
. . .,-f^-
FRENCH BATTLESHIP "DANTON."
the efforts of those who tK^heved it incumbent
on France to strengthen her naval forces vvitliout
delay. A new building programme, which
beoiine eventually an organic law, was proposed,
the public and private arsenals and dockyard i
wero urged to further efforts, their organiza-
tion was improved, and money spent on the
renewal of their plant and equipment to accord
with modern requirements. The prospects
of the French Navy became brighter than they
had been for many years.
Admiral Bou6 de Lapeyrero was succeeded
by M. Delcasse, who most energetically pushed
the plans of his predecessor, and even enlarged
their scojie. This sagacious and able statesman
maintained that France must possess " a fleet
strong enough to demand the resjject of any
rival, and enjoying uncontested supremacy in
the Mediterranean." Hi was succeeded by
M. Pierre Baudin, wlio caiiie into office about
the same tiine that Mr. Churchill became
First Lord of the British Admiralty. He
again, by a new Navy law, not only provided for
the laying down of new ships, but for the
acceleration of those already iu\der construc-
tion, and at the same time forwarded measures
for increasing the number of officers and men
and reducing the age of tlie officers serving
afloat. At last it appeared to be clearly
recognized by, the Government and the people
that without a consistent policy, zealously
carried out by men of authority and competence,
with a firm grasp of essentials, all tlie un-
doubted resources of the country would bo of
no avail. Thenceforward, although there were
further changes at the Rue Royale, there was
continuous progress in all directions. The
policy of atlvance and development was
steadily maintained.
To a certain extent the inefficiency of the
central Power was boimd to have an adverse
effect upon the personnel. Fortunately, the
enfeeblement of the Navy in this respect did
not go very deep. In her Breton seamen the
French Navy possesses the finest possible ele-
ment for manning its shit>8. In all seamatilike
qualities these men are second to none, and in
spite of much that had been written to the
contrary, those who knew maintained that the
standartl of patriotism, discipline, and devotion
to duty of the crews of the French vessels was
a very liigh one. Reforms in the methods
both of enlistment and training were carried
out to great advantage, not only making a much
larger number of men available for the service
of the Fleet, but also, by a system of long
service, ensuring that men holding the higher
skilled ratings were fully competent for their
68
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ADMIRAL SIR HENRY JACKSON, F.R.S.
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
[LafayeUe^
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
69
MAP OF THE ADRIATIC SEA
duties. As to the officers, they were imbued
witli tlie liigliest spirit of devotion to tlie service
of their country, and fully recognized Ihat
authority, vigilance, and responsibility must bo
the watchwords of an efficient navy. The
Fleet received under successive admirals con-
stant and strenuous training ^at sea, until it
had attained a high proficiency in gumiery an<l
other battle exercises. Under the leadership
of Admiral IJoue de Laj^ejTere there were a
number of comparatively young flag-officei's
willing and able and ready to assist liim. At
the time of the outbn-ak of war Vice-Admiral
Charles Chocheprat was the second-in-connnaixd,
and Rear-Adiniral Le Bris, well-known au a
gumiery expert, was third-in-command, while
Vice-Admiral C. E. Favereau was in command
in the Channel. In addition, there were among
the younger rear-admirals, all under sixty, such
men as Senes, de Suguy, Gauchet, Moreau,
Nicol, and Lacaze, all of whose names carried
weight and confidence.
The French pulilic dockyards were five in
n\unber, and as in England they wore used both
for the construction and repair of all cla.sses of
vessels. At Toulon, which since the concentra-
tion of the bulk of the Xavy in the Mediter-
ranean had 1 een the principal base and arsenal,
tl-.ere were throe battleship docks and alwut
six for cruisers and torj^edo craft. With its
increased u.se as a repairing establishment, new
construction had declined, and no armoured
ship had been built since 1901, but destroyers
and submarines continued to be builti Toulon
70
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ADMIRAL SIR GEORGE CALLAGHAN.
Late Commander in-ChUf, Home Fleets, in Rear-Admiral's uniform.
[Elliot, & Fry.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
71
TOULON.
was filso tlio lieadqimrtors of tho gunnory and
torpedo schools. At Brest, and also at Lorient,
battleships were constructed, but not small
craft. Both the.so Atlantic yards turned o\it
some fine vessels, including Dreadnoughts.
The other two public jards were Rochofort, on
the Bay of Biscay, and Cherbourg, in the Channel,
which had not lavuiche:! an armoured ves.sel
.since 1900 and 1903 respectively, but con-
tinued to build torpedo craft and suiimarines.
It will be noticed that nearly all the French
Government yards were outside the Mediter-
ranean, just as most of the British yards were
outside the North Sea, the reason in both
cases being that they were founded in times
when diiTeront strategical conditions obtained,
and tho Chaiuicl and Atlantic were the iwuix
cruising and battle groiuids of the fleets. The
naval bases used by the French Fleet also
included Ajaccio and Bonifaoio, in Corsica ;
Bizerta, in Tunis ; and Algiers and Oran, in
Algeria. In the Channel, Dunkirk ajid Calais
were used as torpedo bases.
France was well served with private ship-
building establishments, who.se efliciency had
been encouraged under recent Administrations.
At least four yards could build Dreadnoughts —
two at St. Nazaire, one at J^a Soyne, and one at
Bordeaux. There were torpedo craft con-
8tn.;ction works at St. Xazaire, Bordeaux,
Havre, Nantes, and Rouen. Armour liad been
cliiefly supplied by contract, but a certain
quantity of desk plates had been manufactured
by the Government establishment at Gu^rigny.
In view of its economical working, which was
about 40 per cent, cheaper than private estab-
lishments, the Gu^rigny factory was being
equipped with new plant and enlarged to enable
it to produce one-fifth of the armour required
for the ships in the organic Navy Law of 1912.
As regards ordnance, it had for some time
been the practice to receive only the element.s
of guns from private firms, the Navy fitting
together and finishing off it« own weapons
instead of having them delivered complete.
A number of serious accidents in the French
Navy owing to the deterioration of the powders
in use led to changes which gave a greater
sense of security in this direction. The former
intermittent control of the Navy over its powder
mmufacture was superseded by a system of
permanent control, and naval officers were
sent to Ga\Tes and Sevran-Livry to receive
instruction in the practical side of minufacturo,
while courses in the science of exjilosives wore
add«l to the curricuhnn of the gunnery schools.
Means had also been found to bring down the
moan tomi>©rature of the magazines on board
the no west vessels to Sfideg. F., and in some
even to 77deg. F.
At the outbreak of war tlie French Navy
had an effective strength of 23 battleships.
72
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE
THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF MARINE, ADMIRAL GREGOROVITCH.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ST. PETERSBURG.
24 cruisers, eight ligiit cruisers, 80 destroyers,
about 140 torpedo boats, and over 50 submarines.
Individually, these warships were all, on the
whole, of good size or power, comparing well
with their contemporaries in other navies.
The battle fleet was headed by ten ships of
the Dreadnought era. Four of them were of
?3,095 tons, or as large as the battleships
of the same date in the British Navy, and
armed witli twelve 12in. guns, with a broadside
fire of ten 12in. guns, the same as that of the
newest German battlesliips. The other si.\,
although built at the same time as the early
British Dreadnoughts, had not a uniform
calibre main armament, but were armed with
four 12in. and twelve 9'4in. guns. Of the pre-
Dreadnought battleships, five were of the
Patrie type, of 14,900 tons, which was similar
to the British Bulwark type, though with a
heavier secondary battery. All the other
battleships, with one exception, carried 12in.
guns, the oldest having two of this calibre in
conjunction with two 10-8in. The "tail"
of the French battle fleet was much stronger
tlian that of Germany or Austria-Hvuigary.
For instance, the Ma-ssena, of 12,120 tons,
am^ed with two 12in., two 10-8in., eight 5-5in.,
and eight 3-9in. gims, and a designed speed of
17 J knots, compared well with the German ^-Egir,
of 4,084 tons, armed with three 9-4in. guns, and
designed for 15J knots ; or with the Austrian
Monarch, of 5,510 tons, armed with four 9-4in.
and six 5-9in. guns, designed for 17 knots.
All these throe ships were launched in 1895.
There were 114 guns of 12in. calibre mounted
in the battle fleet, eight of lO-Sin. calibre,
72 of 9-4in. calibre, 30 of 7-6in., and 46 of
0'5in. calibre. In the Austrian battle fleet
of 15 units there were 48 guns of 12in. calibre,
with 57 of 9-4in. and 36 of 7'5ii . calibre.
Thus the French fleet was even more superior
in material strength than the mere number
of its battleships would indicate.
The outstanding feature of the 24 French
cruisers, or the latest of them, was their large
size and power. As many as 16 were of over
8,000 tons displat!ement. The principal guns
moimted were 7-6in., the newest ves.sels of the
Edgar Quinet type having as many as 14 of
them. There were in the French Navy,
however, no battle-cruisers such as the British
Invincibles and Lions and the German Goeben,
and the construction of the armoured cruisers
had ceased for about seven years. Conse-
quently 23J knots was the highest designed
speed of any Frencli cruiser, although some
exceeded this rate, the Ernest Renan making
25 J knots on trial. At the time they were
designed the Edgar Quinet class might liavo
been thought very fast ships, but they did
not compare with the battle -cruisers of a
designed speed of from 25 to 28 knots. No
74
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
H.R.H. PRINCE ALBERT.
[Emsst Brooks.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
75
RUSSIAN ARMOURED CRUISER " GROMOBOI."
Mefliterranean Power however had at the time
built any battlo-crviisers. Light cruisers weye
a class which had been even more neglected
by French constructors, none having been
launched since 1897, when the 21 knot D'Estr^es
was put afloat. Tlie eight effective vessels
provided a sufficient set-off to their contem-
poraries in the Austrian Navy, but against tlm
four 26-knot vessels of the Admiral Spaiin
type in the latter France had no vessels to
match in point of speed.
A very different state of things prevailed
in regard to torjiodo craft. France had taken
the lead in all cla.s.ses of the mosquito fleet,
sometimes to the detriment of her battleship
programme. Her latest destroyers were of
880 tons, armed with two 3-9in. and four
9-poundor guns, and two double torpedo
tubes, wliile several other tyjjes wore
between 755 and 400 tons, and the
speeds ranged from 28 to 35 knots. So
with siibinarines. The latest boats wore
cf 820 tons and carried ten torpedo
tubes, and thanks to the weeding out policy
all the 50 odd boats on the list were of
inodern and effective types.
THE RUSSIAN NAVY.
At the commencement of the war of 1914
the Russian Navy laboured imder very con-
siderable disadvantages. The war against Japan
had ended in tlie annihilation of the greater
part of the Fleet ami in a terrible diminution
of the prestige of Rassian seamanship. As
is usual in such ca^es, the imfortunate fleet,
insufficient as its training proved to be, was
far less responsible for the repeated disasters
it had undergone than were the management
of its commanders and the policy of its own
Government. While admitting to the full
that the almost unbroken series of its failures
is attributable in largo part to its tactical
inferiority, ship for sliip., to the Japanese Xavy,
it must be owned that it had a very full sliare
of bad management and bad luck. In the
opening days of the campaign it was suriirised
and crippled by the sheer incapacity and want
of prevision of those who directed it ; in the
weeks that followed it lost its one great admiral
at the sinking of the Petrojiavlox-sk, and in the
first great sea action it was deprived of what
chances of victory it ever had by the death of
its commander at the critical moment of the fight.
The removal of some of its guns to a.ssist in the
76
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
MAP OF THE NORTH SEA.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
77
defence of tlie fortress proclaimed the despair
and incapacity of the then directors of naval
policy, and tliat iindiu^ tendency to subordinate
the Navy to the requirements of the Army wliich
has often been a cliaraoteristio of Russian
strategy. The destruction of the remainder
of its ships in the last stage of the siego
by laud artillery — a siege, be it remembered,
which was pressed largely with that very
object and for fear of their powers for
mischief if left intact — was a final and
damning comment on the vacillation and mis-
apprehension of the meaning of sea-power
which prevailed in high quarters. The crown-
ing act of the tragedy, the battle of Tsusliima,
was no fair trial of strength, no real test of the
abilities of the brave a Imiral and gallant
crews into whose hands were given the conduct
of the last Russian Fleet. With men half
trained and ships clogged by a long voyage and
indifferently constructed — the voyage of the
Baltic Fleet was punctuated at every stage by
breakdowns — the Russian commander sud-
denly found himself confronted by a fleet
hardened by war, encouraged by victory,
refreshed by repose, and carefully prepared
for the encounter. The result was almost
inevitable, and it is scarcely too much to say
that hardly once in the war, from the day when
two detached ships were overpowered by gim-
fire on the coast of Korea to the end of the
battle of Tsushima, the Russian officers and
sailors had an opportunity of showing the
inherent qualities of which all readers of history
knew them to be possessed, qualities which
had earned them, amongst that of others, the
respect of Nelson.
• The almost wholesale destruction of the
Russian Navy was not to be repaired in a day ;
and it was the good fortime of Germany to enter
the war when there was no squadron capable
of opposing her battle fleet in the Baltic.
Nevertheless, the nine years which had
elapsed since Tsashima had not been wasted,
and much had been done before the outbreak
of the war to repair her losses and to reopen
the path to her old renown.
The date from which the renaissance of the
Russian Navy may be said to commence was
1912, in wliich year an epoch-making Navy
Bill, which provided for an expenditure of
over £50,000,000 on sliipbuilding and on the
construction of naval ports, was passed by the
Duma by the great majority of 228 to 71.
The Bill only included expenditure up to 1917,
and even this limited programme was inter-
rupted by the war ; but it is not uninteresting
to remark that the ultiniate standard tliat
was contemplated by the Russian Admiralty
for the Baltic Fleet was 16 hattlcsliips, 8
armoured cruisers, 16 light cruisers, 92 de-
stroyers, and 24 submarines, all to be ready by
1924. The Fleet was to be "so strong
as to prevent any hostile operations,
of whatsover kind, giving the enemy
victory." In the Black Sea the standard
was to be a strength half as great again as any
possible combination of fleets in those waters.
Throe Dreadnoughts were begun at Nikolaieff
in 1911, and in addition to these the Navy Bill
authorized the construction of two light cruisers.
For the Baltic, in addition to four Dreadnoughts
laimehed in 1911, the Bill sanctioned the con-
struction of four battle-cruisers, four light
cruisers, 36 destroyers, and 12 submarines.!
It is interesting to recall, in the light of
after events, the views of the Russian Govern-
ment as stated in the preamble to the Bill by
Admiral Gregorovitch. In this he dwelt re-
peatedly on the respective relations of Russia
and Germany as a fundamental reason for the
revival of Russia's naval power. M. Sazonoff
spoke of the imminence of a hostile coalition.
The whole policy was drawn on broad lines and
was not confined to the building of ships. It
was proposed to create a new naval base at
Reval, which would possess the great advantage
that, unlike Kronstadt. it would not be ice-bound
ADMIRAL SIR ARTHUR WILSON.
A former First Sea Lord.
IRuSi^ll & Sons, Stmthsta*
THE TIMES HISTORY OP THE WAR.
dtiring the winter inoutlis. A secondary base
for torpedo craft had already been prepared
at Sveaborir, and this also was to receive an
equipment which would enable it to furnish a
secondary base for the main fleet. It may be
added that the Xavy Bill definitely settled the
question as to whether Russia would henceforth
confine her naval armament in the Baltic to
torpedo defences or would revert to a battle fleet-
The fact that during the summer months there
is practically no darkness in the Baltic seems
to have been one of the reasons which decided
the Govemmjnt in favour of the last-named
policy. Torpedo-boats and submarines, it was
held, could not attack an enemy's squadron
except under cover of night ; and as the summer
would preferably be chosen as the season for the
landing of a hostile force, such craft would
become useless just when their services were
most required. Nor, it was clear, was it in-
tended that the action of the Baltic Fleet should
be confined to that sea alone. The four Dread-
noughts launched in 1911 were equal to the most
powerful ships afloat, and possessed a coal
capacity large enough to enable them to operate
either in the North Sea or in the Mediterranean.
It was therefore evident that they were intended
to intervene effectively in the case of any at-
tempt to settle the Balkan problem in a manner
adverse to the interests of Russia and her friends.
The extensive programme outlined above
was necessarily only begun when the war broke
out, but it had already made good progress and
was calculated to place the naval power of Russia
on a far larger and stronger basis. Apart from
the redevelopment of her fleets indicated above,
the practical creation by progressive steps of a
national shipbuilding industry was of itself
THE CROWN PRINCE OF SERVIA.
significant of a policy which was intended not
merely to be large and effective, but also a per-
manent and expanding feature of Russia's
defensive and offensive system. The fact that
although the Russian authorities found
that their existing resources were in-
adequate for the construction of Dread-
noughts they yet hesitated to go to
foreign firms was a further indication of their
intention to nationalize, to a degree not hitherto
contemplated, the whole of their naval policy.
Ultimately, a middle course was adopted, and
a proportion of the work was given to contractors
abroad. But steps were taken at the same
time to extend the Government works in
Russia and to encourage the establishment of
private firms with the object of supplementing
the State yards and foundries. The initiation
of these large constructive operations was
principally due to the energy and capacity
of Admiral Gregorovitch.
Unfortunately, these vigorous aims were not
destined to be completed in peace. When the
European war began Russia had in the Baltic
only four Dreadnoughts, 10 armoured and
protected cruisers, two light cruisers, about
80 destroyers, and 24 submarines. The
destroyers were regarded as out of date at the
time of the Navy Bill, and the submarines were
not of the latest types. The Dreadnoughts were,
of course, very formidable ships. They carried
twelve 12in. and sixteen 4-7in. gunsin addition
to their smaller armament. The Rurik was a
powerful cruiser, carrying four lOin., eight Sin.
and twenty 4-7in. gvms ; her defensive armour
was exceptionally heavy, a consequence of the
lessons of the Japanese war. With the above
exceptions the armoured ships were of but
moderate speed and power. The Black Sea
Fleet was about half as strong as that in the
Baltic.
This disparity in strength cannot be said to
have been counterbalanced by any decisive
strategic advantages. By itself the Baltic
Fleet was too feeble to undertake active opera-
tions against the German ; and the command-
ing position occupied by the Navy of the
Kaiser at Iviel and Wilhelmshaven rendered
any attempt at cooperation with the British
in the North Sea a practical impossibility.
On the other hand, th0 withdrawal of the whole
of the German Fleet into the North Sea for
the purpose of dehvering battle to the British
would leave the Russian ships free to under-
take operations against the German coast.
They were therefore very far from being a
negligible factor, even if they could hardly
hope to play a preponderant rile in the war.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
70
AUSTRIAN BATTLESHIP "RADETZKV."
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY.
The Navy of the Dual Monarchy advanced
in the last years before the war, both abso-
lutely and relatively, in a manner not unlike
the expansion of the German Fleet. It had
made a near approach in material strength
to the Italian Navy, and had about as many
effective battleships as the latter, which was,
however, better equipped with cruisers and
small craft. The qualities of the later Austrian
vessels reflected the energetic and virile spirit
which animated those in charge at the Marine
Office and the naval ports and arsenals. The
ships had nothing of the coast defence as|3ect
of earlier types, but were of a size and power
enabling them to take the offensive against
contemporary \'es8els in other fleets with reason-
able probability of success.
Admiral Count Montecuccoli, the Austrian
Tirpitz, was the leading spirit in the move-
ment which had produced a fleet so worthy
to xipliold the traditions of Tegetthoff and
Lissa. Tegetthoff was Marine Commandant
from 1868 to 1871, and formulated an ambi-
tious programme, as did his four successors,
but they failed to obtain approval from the
country. Montecuccoli, with the encourage-
ment of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand,
was more fortimate, and may he said to have
rea])ed where they had sown. In the ten years
from 1904 to 1914 naval expenditure increased
from £2,615,460 to £7,402,333.
A Dreadnought programme was formulated
in 1909, including four battleships of 20,010
tons. Credits were not immediately forth-
coming, but the private yard known as the
Stabilimento Tecnico at Trieste was encouraged
to begin two of the vessels at its own risk,
and did so, laying the keels in the spring and
summer of 1910, although the programme
was not passed by the Delegations until March
3, 1911. The third ship was begun early in
1912. These three Dreadnoughts were com-
missioned as the Viribus Unitis, Tegetthoff,
and Priaz Eugcn, the first-named beitig sym-
bolical of the spirit of united strength in which
the work of building a new fleet was imder-
taken. A desire being manifested that the
fourth unit should be built in Hungarian
territory, the Danubius yard at Fiume, wliich
had before only built small craft, was equipped
with the necessary plant and facilities, and
the Szent Istvan was launched there in 1914.
80
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
POLA.
Pola was the fleet's headquarters, and a
good deal of money had been spent on its im-
provement. It was able to undertake battle-
ship construction if required, but had been
devoted chiefly to the needs of the seagoing
fleet. Well situated at the head of the Adriatic,
at the southern end of the province of Kusten-
land, Pola forms as it were a dividing point
between the routes up the Gulf of Quamero to
Fiume on the one hand and up the Gulf of
Venice to Trieste on the other. In addition
to these three naval stations, a fourth had
been established in the last two or three years
before the war at Sebenico, on the Dalmatian
coast, sonae 70 miles to the south-east. Sites
for fortifications were approved and a wire-
less station erected. The place was already
in use as a torpedo station for the flotillas
constantly training along the Dalmatian coast
which produced a number of skilful and dashing
young officers and seamen. For guns and
ajriuuut Austria had no need to go abroad ,
having noted and well-equipped resources in
the Skodawerke establishment at Pilsen in
Bohemia and the Witkowitz works in Moravia .
The Marine Commandant at the outbreak
of war was Admiral Anton Haus, an officer
of high attainments and wide experience, who
succeeded Admiral Count Montecuccoli in
February, 1913, when the latter retired on
reaching the age of 70. The commander of
the battle squadron was Vice-Admiral Franz
Loefler, who took his ships on a visit to Malta
in May, 1914, when Captain Paul E. von
Mecenseffy was his chief of staff. Rear-
Admiral Karl Seidensacher was in command
of the cruiser squadron, and Rear-Admiral
Ricard Ritter von Barry of the reserve squadron.
The devotion of these officers to their veteran
chief had been most marked, and they might
be expected to be as thorough and energetic
in their use of the new material of war as they
were in its creation.
As regards numbers, as many as 15 battle-
ships could be put into the fighting line, in-
cluding the three completed Dreadnoughts,
but this figure would include the three Monarchs
of 1895-6 and the three Habsburgs of 1900-02,
which were only of 5,510 and 8,167 tons respec-
tively and carried 9'4in. guns as their principal
weapons. The six principal pre-Dreadnoughts
were the three of the Erzlierzog class, of
10,430 tons, which also had only four 9-4in.
guns, but a good secondary battery of twelve
7-5in. ; and the three of the Radetzky class, of
1908-10, which had a displacement of 14,230
tons, an armament of four 12in. and eight
9-4in. guns, and a speed of 20J knots, being
fine vessels which had been classed with the
British Lord Nelsons. There were two
armoured and nine Ught cruisers. Three fast
light cruisers were completing. The torpedo
flotilla was understood to have attained
a high standard of efficiency, and included
15 destroyers, 58 torpedo boats, and six
submarines.
CHAPTER V.
THE FRENCH ARMY.
The French Abmy ai'Teu Waterloo — Causes that Contributed to its Decay — Sociai, —
Legislative — Political — Military — The Regeneration — Luvws of 1872 and 1889 — The
Loi DE DEUX ANS 1905 — Law OF 1913 — France's Last Card— Numbers and Categories of
French Army at Outbreak of War — Distribution in Time of Peace — Mobilization —
Employment of Reserve Formations — War Organization of J'rench Army — Training —
The New School — Minor Tactics — Infantry — Artillery — Cavalry — The Officers — Staff
— Literature — Invention — The Higher Command — Decrbtes of 1911 — Character of the
French Government — Prognostications Unjustified — French Unity — General Plan op
Campaign — The Defensive Phase — Difficulties of Modern Strategic Defensive — Front
OF German Concentration and Lines of Attack — Lorraine and Belgium.
w
' HEN the successes and failures of
the French Republic diu-ing tlie
past five and thirty years are
placed on record by a competent
historian, not the least merit which will justly
be claimed for the Republican regime will bo
that it restored the military power of France
and established a sense of security unknown to
any previous generation, or any former rule,"
So wrote Tlie Times Military Correspondent in
March, 1906, a year after the " Loide deux ans "
had registered the final triumph of the principle
of national service. By way of illustration of
the justice of this judgment we propose to
recall the general causes which led to the
failure in 1870, and then to enumerate rapidly
the principal phases tJirough which the Army
had passed from that fatal year down to the
moment when it again entered the field.
The catastrophe of 1870 is attributable not
so much to the merely- teclmical inferiority of
the French armies and their generals, as to
causes which had been operative during the
whole of the half century which followed
Waterloo, to cankers which had eaten deeply
into the life and had perverted the vision of
the nation itself. Napoleon I. left many
legacies to France — some good, some biul ;
but none more ruinous than that loathing of
the idea of national service which the long and
Vol. I. — Part 3. 81
appalling orgj- of his wars had implanted in
the French mind. The splendid energy of 1793
was dead ; the population was physicaUy
and morally exhausted ; the ruthless spend-
thrift, whose superhuman powers of will and
intellect had alone made his system possible,
was gone. The result was an inevitable and
violent reaction, which his weak and nerveless
successors were powerless to control. Wheroaa
to Prussia military service appeared as the
inistrument which had helped to restore her
independence and her national existence, for
France it was associated with imbridled and
wasteful aggression indulged at the cost of
imcoasing and imiversal misery and ending
in gigantic disa-sters.
Nor was it thLs feeling alone tliat was re-
sponsible for the collapse of 1870. The ten
dencies of the time were largely accountable.
Men saw in the alleviation of the burden
of military service the logical consequence of
the prevailing political and social dogmas. The
pacificist preached the brotherhood of man, and
saw in the railway, not a fresh and powerful
instrument in the hands of the general,
but a new avenue of int«rcouso between the
nations. Economists preached the wasteful-
ness of war and the advantages of material
prosperity. " Get rich," was the advice
of one of the most famous of French
82
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL JOFFRE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
83
GENERALS JOFFRE, CASTELNAU (Chief of Staff), and PAU.
statesmen. Politicians harped on tlu necessity
of retrenchment. Demagogues protested
against tlie .sacrifice of the people to the ambi-
tions of princes. The individual was exalted
at the expense of the State. _ Luxury and in-
difference grew apace, and witli these grew
selfishness. The consequence was that when at
last France found herself at Iiandgrips with
a civilization in many ways less generous and
less enlightened but of harder fibre than her
own, .she was morally and nationally', as well
as technicalls', unprepared.
It is hardly to be wondered at that the French
soldier did not take himself very seriously- in
such an atinosphere ; a high standard of effi-
ciency is scarcely possible for an army when
the nation it is intended to defend is dispo.sed
to regard it as a relic of barbarism. The French
Army lived on its past ; its victories in
the Crimea and in Italy, so far from teaching
it the necessity of studying modem conditions,
had only confirmed its belief in its own invin-
cibility. The more serious-minded of its
officers were ridiculed as " officer-professors,"
the rest were thoroughly well satisfied and
generally lazy. Worst of all, it had for a long
time ceased to be a reallj- national body. The
rage for retrenchment and the hatred of per-
sonal service had resulted in a series of measures
which had gradually deprived it of its best
elements and liad tended to degrade the military
profession in the eyes of the people.
After the fall of Napoleon the .system h:id
been, in theory at least, voluntary-. The hated
word " conscription " was banned ; but when
volunteering failed to produce the requisite
number of men the Government was allow«l
to complete the necessary annual contingent
by men chosen by lot, and denominated appeles.
The supply of volunteers was so small that the
appeles soon came to constitute bj- far the
larger portion of the recruits ; the system in
fact developed into a sort of limited conscrip-
tion. This plan was thoroughly unsatisfac-
tory. \\'hatever value it possessed was^ mini-
mized by all sorts of limiting provisions. In
the first place exemptions, often quite unjusti-
fiable, were granted ; and these, by favour-
ing the men of a higher social scale and members
of the learned professions, tended to remove
from the Army the more intelligent classes of
the jjopulation. In the second the jx-riod of
service was rendered larg»>ly illusorj' b_\- the
grant of extensive furloughs to the men in
the ranks, and by the creation of a second class
in the annual contingent which wa-s allowed
to remain at home without training unless
the Jlinister of War thought fit to call it up.
After 1832 the fixing of the numbers of the
contingent was left to the Chambers, and, as
84
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
M. ETIENNE,
a former Minister of War.
[Richard Stanley & Co.
economy was preached in and out of season,
this second class was practically never trained
at all. The same vicious principle reappeared
in the provisions for the " tirage au sort "
embodied in the law of 1872, and was not
finally removed till 1889. Last and
worst of all, the law of 1818 had
introduced the fatal principle of remplace-
ment or substitution, by which an appele
was allowed to find a substitute to take his place
on payment of a sum of money. It was in-
evitable that the well-to-do classes would take
advantage of this ; and, as a result, the bulk of
those who could afford it evaded their national
obligations. The substitutes naturally be-
longed to the poorer and less-educated sections
of the population, some to the very lowest.
Agences de remplacement, known as " Marchands
tPHommes" arose for the purpose of exploiting
the increasing popularity of substitution ; and
the fact that in some cases the substitute was
better fitted to be a soldier than the man whose
place he took did not prevent the demoraliza-
tion attendant on a system which fostered
unpatriotic selfishness. The nation was de-
graded by this avoidance of its duties ; the
Army was degraded by the lowering of the
standard of its personnel. As the century
advanced substitution became more and more
common ; in the contingent of 1869 out of a
total of 75,000 men there were no less than
42,000 substitutes.
Yet another downward step was taken in
1855, when in order to lighten the " blood -tax "
it was enacted that men should be allowed to
re-engage, the inducement to do so being a
premiinii paid by the person whose place the
re-engaged man was to take into the Govern-
ment Chest. The results were that all re-
sponsibility of the original appele for his rem-
pUK^ant ceased ; that the idea of personal
service, in one form or the other, was finally
lost ; that the Government now dealt directly
with the Agences de remplacement and shared i
with them the odiimi attaching to their business ;
and that the re-engaged men who served for
the sake of the money remained in the Army
long after they were imfit for duty, and so pre-
vented younger men from taking their places.
It is not necessary here to refer in detail to
the well-intended but unrealized reforms
of Napoleon III. Six weeks after Koniggratz
he announced his intention of re-organizing
the Army, and a high commission of Ministers
and soldiers was constituted and sat at Com-
piegne. It was determined that the numbers
of the Army must be increased, and the mili-
tary members asked for 1,000,000 men, to be
divided into the now familiar sections of field
army, reserve, and territorial army. But the
M. MILLERAND,
the French Minister of War.
THE TIM EH 111 STORY OF THE WAN
85
plan was objected to by the politicians as
likely to arouse resistance in the country,
especially in view of the fact that Europe was
at peace and that the Exhibition of 1867 was
in close prospect. The result was that the
original scheme was mutilated, and what
remained was still incomplete when Marshal
Niel, one of the few Frenclimon of real energy
and insight then in authority, died. The
great feature of the plan, the organization of the
Garde Mobile, which was to be a sort of second
line army, was never carried out. The re-engage-
ment system (known as " exoneration ") was
abolished , although its baneful effects were still
felt in 1870. Lastly, the period of colour
service was shortened, and the formation of a
reserve was begun ; but before the full benefits
of this measure could be felt the war of 1870
broke out. It foimd the discipline of the rank
and file weakened by extended furloughs ;
the officers lazy and lacking in authority and
without the confidence of <iheir men ; the
generals for the most part ignorant of the
higher branches of their profession : a staff
unpractised in the handling of troops and
consisting either of aides-de-camp or clerks.
When we add to this that the French Army
was heavily outnumbered and constantly out-
manoeuvred, that none of its arms knew their
projier work, and that the arrangements for
supply and mobilization were lamentably
deficient, the wonder is not that they were
beaten, but that they managed to put up so
gallant a fight. Whatever else the war prove<l,
it certainly failed to demonstrate the superiority
of the individual Prussian over the individual
French soldier.
Tlie fearful lesson of 1 870 recalled the French
nation to its senses. In July, 1872, was passed
the first of the great laws which have con-
tributed to place the defences of the country
on a worthy footing. Substitution was
abolished and the principle of universal com-
pulst)ry service was reintroduced, the period
of service with the colours being five years,
followed by foiu- in the Reserve, five in the
Territorial Army, and six in the Territ'orial
Reserve. But the application of the prin-
ciple was still not absolute ; the annual con-
tingent was divided by lot into two portions,
tmd in time of peace one of them was let off
with only one year of service in the Active
Army. Thepreviotis exemptions of whole clas.ses.
such as bread-winners, teachers, and so forth,
were still allowed in time of peace ; and con-
ditional engagements for one year only were
permitted to students and apprentices. It
was hoped by this arrangement to combine
an army of veterans with a really numerous
and trulj' National Army ; indeed, in some of
its features it wa.s a realization, on a far larger
scale, of the principles which had underlain
the scheme of Marshal Niol. The measure
was very far from commanding general approlm-
tion. Its acceptance was mainly due to Tliierx,
who was strongly convinced that a short -
service army could never be efficient. General
Trochu was in favour of a throe-year system ;
and there was a strong nrunority who were
wholly opposed to the idea of a National Arm>-,
and were in favour of the retention of the
principle of substitution. After-developm<!nt«
proved the General to have been right. The
law of 1872, though a great advance on its
predecessors, showed grave defects. The
'■ tirage du sort," which condemned one half
of the contingent to five years service and allowed
the other to escape with 12 months, was felt to be
wholly inequitable ; and strong objection was
also taken to the '• volontariat conditioHnol."
a provision under which any man could escaije
with a year's service by paying l,500f. So
many could afford thissvim that the numbers of
the fully-trained men wore serioiLsly reduced.
Both these provisions were abolished in 1889,
when a three-year system was made obliga-
tory on all, and service in tho Reserve was raised
to seven, in the Territorial Army to six, and
in the Territorial Reserve to nine years respec-
tively. It was anticipated that this measure
would ultimately raise the total number of
trained men from two to three millions.
But in the years which followed a factor,
which far tran.scended in imfKtrtanee these
internal arrangements, began to press more
and more heavily upon P'rance. This was the
alteration of tho balance of population in
favour of Germany, and with it a growing
disparity in the peace-effectives of the armit^,
and con.sequontly in the capiwity for exp8n.=ion
in time of war. Other tilings being equal, tlie
I arger the peace effectives the more numerous is
the annual contingent which can be trained, and
the larger become the accumulated reserN'es.
As late as 1893 the peace effectives of France
and Germany were practically equal, 453,000
to 457,000 ; but from 1899 onwards the equi-
poise was lost and in 1905 the figures were
.stated to be 109,000 in Germany's favour.
The means of neutralizing this inferiority, which
was the result of natural causes and beyond
the reach of legislation, was the principal
preoccupation of French statesmen and soldiers
in the years preceding the Great War. The
Russian Alliance, however valuable from the
paint of view of the general position of France
86
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
GENERAL PAU.
in Europe, was not by itself sufficient to redress
the balance, because the slowness of the Rus-
sian concentration made it possible for Germany
to attack France before her ally was ready.
It was therefore decided to carry still further
the principle of universal service and, by
imposing on her people a heavier proportionate
denjand than Germany with her larger popula-
tion found it necessary to make, to restore
as far as possible the numerical equality of the
two armies. This was the object of the " Loi
de deux ans," which was passed in March, 1905,
and came into operation a year later. It was
intended to develop to its utmost limit the
recruiting capacity of the nation. The term
of service with the colours was reduced to two
years, but service in the Army Reserve was
increased to 11, to be followed by six years in
the Territorial Army, and six in the Territorial
Reserve. Thus every Frenchman from the
age of 20 to 45 became liable for service. No
exemptions, except on grounds of physical un-
fitness, were granted, although certain modifi-
cations of a reasonable character were intro-
duced, and the hardships inflicted on separate
families were diminished by doles. It was
calculated that these arrangements would
bring the peace effective up to about half
a million of men, and would in time
produce an active army and a territorial
army, amounting, inclusive of their reserves,
to about 2,000,000 apiece. Thus did the need
for self-preservation at last compel the French
people to accept a system in which " military
service was equal for all," and so to fulfil the
principle of the law of March 4, 1791, that " tlie
service of the Fatherland is a civic and general
duty."
But these efforts, great as they were, were not
long to suffice. Early in 1912 the peace effec-
tives of the German Army had been raised ; by
the end of that year enormous increases had
been decided on. By October, 1913, the pro-
posals had become law. Whatever weight is
to be attached — and without doubt there was
much to be said from a German point of view — -
to the argument that Russian military expansion
had rendered these additions a vital necessity
to the security of the Empire, it weis im-
possible on that ground for France to
remain indifferent to them. The question was
not, as in 1905, so much one of further develop-
ing her total resources of men— indeed, as has
teen said, her resruiting powers had already
been strained to their utmost limit by the law of
1905 — ^but of having a sufficient proportion
THE TIMEU imSTORY OF THE WAR.
87
of trained men ready at any moment. It
was antici?iated that the German peace-effec-
tives would, imder the new proposals, eventually
be raised to about 870,000, to whicli France
could only oppose about 567,000 ; and it was
of vital importance that she sliould find some
means of securing lierself against the sudden
attack of superior numbers. The only way
of doing this was to keep each annual contingent
a longer time with the colours, an expedient
necessarily entailing a larger expenditure and
heavier sacrifices. The Conseil Superieur de
la Guerre decided unanimously in March,
1912, that the sole means of diminishing
efficaciously the dangerous difference between
the French and German peace strengths, of
reinforcing the troops on the frontier without
disorganizing those in the interior, of ensuring
adequate training, and of coping with the
accelerated mobilization of Germany, was to
introduce three years' service with the colours
strictly arid rigorously for all ranks and all
branches. " There is something," ran the
Preamble of the Bill which embodied this
proposal, " which dominates all contingencies,
which triumphs over all hesitations, which
governs and doc'des the individual and collec-
tive impulses of a groat and noble democracy
like ours, namely, the resolute will to live
strong and free and to remain mistress of
our destinies."
GENERAL PERCIN.
[Henri Manuel, Paris,
GENERAL MICHEL.
This proposal, in spite of aU kinds of oppo-
sition, was eventually carried in 1913. Every
Frenchman found fit for service had in future
to pass tliree years in the Active Army, eleven
in the Reserve; and seven each in the Territorial
Army and the Territorial Reserve. Thus the
total liability for service was extended by
three years, an arrangement necessarily carry-
ing with it a considerable eventual increase
in the reserve, and raising the peace strength
to 673,000 men. Henceforth the recruit was
to be incorporated at the age, not, as had
hitherto been the practice, of 21 but of 20 ; an
alteration calculated to minimize the effects of
the additional year of active service on his
future career. The first to come under the
new law was the class of 1913. In order to
obtain the number of instructors necessary
for the increased size of the contingent, special
bonuses were offered as an inducement to non-
commissioned officers and old soldiers to re-
engage ; and it was anticipated that by the
spring of 1914 the Army would have assimilated
its recruits and would bo able to mobilize
satisfactorily. From a military point of view
it is important to observe that under the new
arrangement the infantry on the lugher estab-
Ushmcnt on the frontier were raised to 200 per
company, and those in the interior to 140,
respectively four -fifths and rather over one-
half of tlieir war strength. The cavalry
regiments were fixed at 740 ; the field
88
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A MITRAILLEUSE ON THE BACK OF A MULE.
[Topical.
batteries at 140 and 110, respectively about
seven-ninths and two-thirds of their full
complement. The increased annual cost was
reckoned at £7,000,000, the non-recurring cost
at £29,000,000. From the broad numerical
point of view, as The Times Military Corre-
spondent said at the tinxe, the Law was France's
last card. But the new burden had its com-
jjensations. It was calculated to give greater
security in the first days of mobilization,
s somewhat larger reserve and, had time been
allowed, a longer period of training to her rank
and file than was the case in Germany. Un-
fortunately its full effects were not obtained
when war broke out.
At the commencement of the campaign,
France possessed, inclusive of the Territorial
Army and its Reserve, fully 4,000,000 of
trained men. This enormous mass may be
roughly divided into six different categories,
each averaging close on 700,000 men. Those
consisted of the peace establishments of the
Active Army, that portion of the Resor\e
(about half of the whole) reqviirod to bring the
Active Army up to war strength, the remaining
portion of the Reserve, the formed troops of
the Territorial Army, the depots, and finally
the surplus. The comparative values of the
last five sections may roughly be gathered from
the fact that the Army reservists were liable
to be called up twice in 11 years for one month's
mancuuvres ; the men of the Territorial Army
once in seven years for a fortnight's training ;
the Territorial reservists were subject in seven
years to one muster of a day. The territorial
distribution, whicli formed the basis of the war
organization, consisted of 20 army corps dis-
tricts, including one in Algeria. These districts
again were divided, so far as the infantry were
concerned, into districts each furnishing one
regiment ; but cavalry, engineers, artillery,
and the chasseur or rifle battalions were re-
cruited throughout the army corps district, and
a large proportion of these troops were located
not in the part of the country in which they were
raised, but wherever the requirements of in-
struction or strategy londored necessary. Thus
the bulk of the cavalry and the chasseurs were
permanently located on the eastern frontier,
and the engineers were assembled foi purposes
of ti'aining at special centres. With these
exceptions each army corps district comprised
all the elements required to form an army corps ;
each was mobilized in its own territorial area
and thence proceeded to the point allotted te
it in the plan of strategic concentration.
Mobilization, of course, comprised not merely
the Active Army and its Reserve, but the whole
of the Territorial Army and its Reserve.
Broadly speaking the scheme involved the fol-
lowing proeesfics. The peace establishment of
the Active Army was to be raised to war strength
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
89
Coro.
■x/
O
Hon
&
Ca.
Bla.req
/to .»^ / O Crom-lez-Rpuveroy
i> '^— sSarts * \cr..Mf''-''-^'^
•J^ OBersillies \ \ SK
FelgniesO \-^w^
O \ 1
a Longue\/ille Douiies
h DE LEV.EAU £,esm>5QrTp£ BOUSSOIS.
tieut-MesmI
r^:
Harqnies
:_ O
/Ti.^'r'r^-r^'^--^^,^ ■^'^ >Re.Recquiq"hieS'
"™'-a' ; FJDE.CERF0NTA1NE
^ 0 ^
Be}-siTles-
. REFERENiE'7'""6'-'"'' F^DU BOURDI'AU
Qi Forts / BeaafJ^'"'" . ,
>V Batteries i. Redoubts Foniajne Choisies
"o ^ \J
Cousoire
tss
PLAN OF THE MAUBEUGE FORTRESSES.
by the incorporation of a number of reservdsli?
about equal in number to the men already serving
wi th the colours. The remaining Army reservists
wee to be formed into reserve units correspond-
ing to those of the Active Army, with the
result that jn war time the units of the Active
Army would be doubled. These Reserve
units were to be officered partly by Active,
partly by Keserve ofiRcers, and, it would
appear, were to rec ivo in addition a
certain proportion of non-commissioned officers
from the Active Army. If this Reserve Army
were employed at the front the total troops in
the first line would consist of an active army of
1,400,000—1,500,000 men.and of a Reserve Arm.v
of about half that niunber. i.e., about 2,100,000
in all. The remaining 2,000,000 odd of the
Territorial Army and its Reserve were to be
formed into three bodies of about equal strength.
First of all the Territorial Army proper was to
form ur.its corresponding with those of the
Active^ Army and the Reserve. Secondly,
depots were to be organized to replace casual-
ties in the active and reserve regiments at a
fixed ratio per vinit, giving, it was anticipated,
about tliree men at the depots for every eight
in the field. The remaining men of the Terri-
torial Reserve were available as a last resoiu-ce
for the replenisliment of the depots, and for
subsidiary purposes of all kinds. In this way
it was possible to provide not merely for a
powerful fighting line, but for its maintenance
at full strength, and for the auxiliary services
in its rear ; in a word, for a national organiza-
tion capable of sustaining a war. Everything
that forethought and infinite supervision of
detail could suggest was done to make the
enormous business of mobilization easy and
rapid. Special care was bestowed on the boots
of the infantry wliich were served out, not new,
as was the case in Giermany, but sufficiently
worn to be comfortable, .so as to ensure that the
exceptional marching powers of the French
soldier should be developed to the utmost.
Tlie cavalry regiments were maintained on
practically a war footing and required com-
paratively little preparation. The main diffi-
culty was in the case of the artillery and train,
the mobilization of which involved the accumu-
lation of great masses of materiel, and a con-
siderable expansion and redistribution of per-
simnel.
The method of employment of the French
Army remained a secret ; everything dejjending
on the use that would be made of the reserve
and territorial formations, or, to s|X)ak more
exactly, on whether the reserve divisions would
be attached to the army corps or formed,
either with or without the addition of terri-
torial troojjs, in s<iparate army corps of their
own. The possibility of variations of this
kind, as had been recognized by the Japanese,
the German, and other modem armies, could
be reckoned on as one of tlie most effective
means of producing great strategic surprises.
Tliat is to say, while every unit in the
90
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
original Jager army corps was known to any-
one who chose to study the ordinary text-books,
the position, numbers and compjosition of
troops not formed until mobilization could only
be guessed at and gave opportunities for secret
concentration and unexpected attack. The
normal formations in the French Army closely
resembled the German. The ordinary infantry
regiment contained three battalions, each of
1,000 men, in four companies; the normal
brigade two regiments ; the normal division
two brigades ; the normal army corps two
divisions. To these, as was the custom in
the case of the Jager battalions, might be
added a battalion of chasseurs. The
corps cavalry consisted of a brigade of two
regiments, the divisional cavalry of one
squadron per division. Only in the artillery
organization was there a marked difference
from the German arrangement. Whereas in
the German Army Corps the artillery was
equally divided between the infantry divisions,
in the French the corps artillery was retained,
and numbered 12 batteries, that of the divisions
being nine batteries apiece. The batteries only
contained four guns, a numerical inferiority
which it was believed would be amply com-
jjensated by the great superiority of the gun
itself, and by the special skill possessed by the
French artillerymen. Inclusive of gunners
the normal army corps numbered between
30,000 and 40,000 combatants and 120 guns.
A reserve of light and heavy howitzers marched
with the different armies. They did not form
part of the artillery of the army corps, but were
intended to be retained in the hand of the army
commander.
The only remaining units that require
mention here were the eight independent
cavalry divisions and the African troops.
The normal cavalry division numbered six
regiments, divided into two or three brigades,
in which heavy, medium, and light cavalry
were fairly evenly distributed. The heavy
cavalry consisted of the ever -famous Cuirassiers,
the nuniber of whose regiments was the same
as in the days when they won immortal renown
imder the great Emperor ; they still wore the
beautiful helmet and cuirass and carried the
long thrusting sword. The dragoon regiments,
classed as medium cavalry, were armed with the
lance. Attached to each division were two
batteries of horse artillery, armed with the field
guns, but with mounted detachments, and some
galloping machine guns. The African infantry
consisted of four regiments of Zouaves, each of
five battalions, and four of Algerian Rifles or
" Turcos," each of six ; there were ten light
cavalry regimsnts, six of Chasseurs d'Afrique,
and four of Spahis. The Turcos and
Spahis were black troops commanded partly
by French, partly by native officers. All the
infantry were armed with the Lebel, a serviceable
but somewhat antiquated type of magazine
rifle. Each man, following the old French
tradition, seems to have carried some 601b., an
enormous weight hkely to tell severely under
the exhausting conditions of modern fighting.
Inclusive of the rations carried by the soldier,
the army corps took with it eight days' supply
which was constantly replenished by the rail-
ways in the rear. The solution of the problem
of the transport of supplies between the rail-
heads and the armies had in the years preceding
the war been greatly facilitated by the intro-
duction of motor -lorries. It was found that a
comparatively small number of these vehicles
sufficed for the daily supply of an army corps,
and rendered the massing of endless trains of
horsed wagons in the rear of the troops un-
necessary. The practical advantages of the
new system need no illustration.
Thus far we have confined oiurselves to the
history of the construction and organization of
the national army — a history which jiistified the
proud boast of the French Minister of War in
1908 : " L'Arm6e Frangaise, c'est la France.''
We must now turn to its training. Since 1870
the French Army had undergone a moral and in-
tellectual revolution. At that melancholy period
it is hardly too much to say that the methods
of French leadership had tended to discard or
depress all the grand traditions and qualities
that had made the French Army the moft
famous of modern history. From top to bottom
it was characterized by a tendency to exaggerate
the defensive power of modern weapons, by a
neglect of the theory and practice of the higher
art of generalship, and by a tentative and piece-
meal employment of all the arms ; a combina-
tion of weaknesses which made resolute and
effective action on the battlefield impossible,
and rendered inoperative those moral factors
to which the great warriors of the past had been
accustomed to appeal. But ditfing the years of
recovery after the Franco-Prussian War, and
especially during the first decade of the 20th
century, there had arisen a generation which
took a juster and more inspiring view of the
special capacities of the French soldier. The
adoption of a national system and tlie knowledge
that upon its soundness would henceforth
depend the existence of France as a great
Power had placed at the command of the
Ministry of War all that was best in the Frerch
people and the French mind. The result, was
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
01
A GROUP OF ZOUAVES.
TRANSPORT OF A FRENCH HEAVY GUN.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
FRENCH TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH PARIS.
HUY.
THE TIMES UIHTORY OF THE WAR.
03
le Touquet j
QjCSnoysurOeulc
PLAN OF THE LILLE FORTRESSES.
the development of a national school of tactics
and strategy, complete, coherent and woU-flttod
to the bold and ardent character of the troops.
We do not propose in this place to discuss the
French theory of strategy and grand tactics, or
to compare it with that which prevailed in
Germany. We shall deal with these all impor-
tant subjects in a later section ; f this work.
and for the present sliall content ourselves with
a brief description of French minor tactics.
These tactics were, in accordance with tradi-
tion and national temperament, dominated by
the idea of the offensive ; but they found their
technical justification in the superior arma-
ment of the artillery and the special support
which that arm was expected to afford to the
infantry. This, in the opinion of the French,
made it possible for them to assign to infantry
fire a less important place in the preparatory
stages of an action than was regarded as jxr-
missible in the German Arm_\-. The busi-
ness of the infantry was to " conquer
and win ground " ; it had two means
of action, " fire and forward movement "' ;
" the only object of fire was to prepare for the
rosvunptioa of a forward movement." Fire,
that is, was to be a means, not an end ; and the
idea of a stationary defensive was not sidmitted'
This theory of infantry action was intended to be
realized by a systJ^m of manoeuvre and distribu-
tion which, while it insisted on the use of maas
at the decisive point, aimed at com-
bining perfect elasticity and adaptability
with careful economy of men and anunu-
nition. With these objects in view, long range
firing, except imder sjjecial conditions and when
carried out by picked shots, wa.s discouraged ;
the distant zones were to be crossed as rapidl\-
as- possible, in close bodies when shelter was
forthcoming, in small groups when it was
not. The aim of the a.ssailant was to got to
within fixed-sight range before firing a shot,
or nearer stillif it was possible to do so : and
for the same reason the deployment of the
firing line was to bo delayed until further
advance without firing became impracticable.
Only the troops necessary for the special pur-
pose were to be deployed, the prematiu«
94
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
expenditure of men in open formations being
regarded as one of the most serious of faults.
Once, however, a firing line had been constituted,
it was to be rapidly reinforced, s that the
fire should grow heavier and the 1 ine more dense
the nearer the moment of the decisive ttack
approached. Fire was not to be continuous,
but, as in the case of the artillery, was to be
delivered in gusts, " sudden, brief, vicious and
violent," according as a target presented it-
self. The preparation for the attack was to
culminate in an overwhelming short range fire
upon the whole of the defender's position, pre-
venting the action of his reserves and weakening
his fire sufficiently to allow of the advance of
those of the assailant. The final assault was
to be delivered in mass upon the decisive
point ; rapidity and the bayonet rather than
fire effect being relied on in this last phase
of an action. To the commander was left
the selection of objectives, the distribution of
the troops, and the choice of the time and place'
of the fiinal attack.
This method of attack was well calculated
to appeal to an ardent and intelligent infantry,
and to judge from the manoeuvres it was well
understood and executed. Its forms at least
had historical sanction. They bore a distinct
resemblance to the cumulative and tempestuous
attack of the French infantry in the best days
of Napoleon. The swarms and chains of
tirailleurs, the quick and supple action of
small columns, the final advance of heavier
masses were all characteristic of the tactics
of the Grande Arm^e. That the moral and
physical qualities of the men were still the same
was not doubted. " There are practically no
limits," wrote The Times Military Corre-
spondent in 1906, " to the demands which can
be made upon the endurance of the Frencli
infantry by a leader who understands them,
and whom they trust."
In support of this quick and daring in-
fantry the French possessed what was generally
regarded as the best artillery in Europe. The
gun was a true quick-firer ; its rapidity, thanks
largely to the arrangement known as the
independent line of sight,* astonished those
who had seen it in practice. It was a powerful
and accurate weapon throwing shrapnel or
high-explosio.T shell of about 151b. ; its only
weak points being that it was some-
what heavy and that the shield with
which it was fitted was rather small. Its
Tie principle of tbis contrivance Ik tbat the work of regulating
tbe devatlon and the sighting 1b greatly quickened by being divided
between two men iasUiad of. ae in older eytUnnts. beins entrusted
to one.
technical superiority, combined with the gi-eater
handiness of the small battery, seemed amply
to justify the belief of the French that four such
guns were at least equal to six of the older
German type. This belief was strengthened
by their confidence in their tactical methods.
The principles on which they were based were
much the same as those which governed the
action of th3 infantry. Here also economy in
guns and ammunition was insisted on, while
at the same time it was clearly understood
that at critical moments the artillery should
not hesitate to expose itself to heavy rifle
fire, and should advance at all costs if the
infantry required its support. Indirect fire
was employed whenever possible, and no guns
were sent into action unless the tactical situation
demanded it. Long range fire, as in the case
of the infantry, was unusual ; 4,000 yards was
rarely exceeded, the view of the authorities
being that in Europe opportunities for long-
distance shooting would rarely occur. Within
that range various forms of fire were carefully
practised, the object being not merely to hit a
visible object, but to make defined zones of
ground, whether invisible or not, untenable or
impassable. Very accurate ranging, carried
out slowly and followed by a deliberate fire,
as in the case of the German artillery,
was not a characteristic of the French gunner,
all such elaborate procedures in his view being
unsuited to the conditions of the battlefield.
He regarded the rafale, that is, a sudden tempest
of shell, lasting for a few seconds and sweeping
a given area, as the more eiTective method of
the two. The expenditure of ammunition in-
volved by such a procedure was provided for
by an exceptionally large supply, amounting,
inclusive of that carried in the army corps
park, to about 500 rounds per gun. Tactically
the batteries accompanj'ing an army corps
in action were destined for separate action,
the Corps Artillery ( 1 2 batteries) being intended
to crush the opposing artillery, the divisional
batteries (18) to shatter the hostile infantry.
Naturally such a rule was made subject to
infinitely varying conditions, but the defini-
tion of the two different tasks that would fall
to the lot of artillery and the detailing of
special imits for the accomplishment of each,
are typical of the French love of clearness and
precision. It was generally agreed that the
tactical combination of the artillery and infantry
was exceptionally well managed, and that the
science of the officers and the courage and
endurance of the rank and file of the artillery
left nothing to be desired.
In many respects the French cavalry of 1914
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
95
Giromagnyo ovescemont
Auxe//es BdSQ _|y \
Eiueffont BasO
^■1 AnjouteP
'omagny
O
S' Germain
SermamagnyQ
/.5a?^S^ " '^^"•'i^'/eo -St?/?...?''"'"""""''
FTduSalbert Vk^/'^'/'- ^ ^^
LaMiotteF'
°^^°^- ^/,at...7/a&/"'^'^'''^"
F'^DENFERTRoCHEREAUmXt^ ■» |_
'^s Perches
OFontenelle
-■f^aunvilldrs
HericourtO
MILES
i2±.
Fi'duB.d'Oye
ChatenoisO
BourogneO
JreboJJe
REFERENCE
U Forts
^ BatLeries
PLAN OF THE BELFORT FORTRESSES.
was tlie best Franco ever produced. The
riding was good, the horses excellent, and •if,
according to British ideas, the French horse-
men were too much inclined to trust to shock-
action and too little to the rifle, no one
doubted that they fully realized the
importance of their strategic mission, and
the truth of the old dicta that " Cavalry is
made for action " and that " any decision
is better than none." For them, also, the
principle of economy of forces, late deploy-
ment, and strong reserves held good ; and
special attention was devoted to the business
of scouting.
Everything in the case of the French, even
more than in that of other armies, depended
on the leadership, and doubts were sometimes
expressed as to whether the French officer -
corps, especially in its higher branches, would
prove equal to its task. France did not
possess, like Prussia, a military aristocracy,
a special class set apart by tradition &iid by
its social status for tlie task of leading armies.
But the high standard maintained in all parts
of the Army, to say nothing of the witness of
history, seemed a sufficient answer to such
dubitations. The training appears to liave
been sound and thorough, at any rat© as far
as the officers of the first line were concerned.
Ail candidates for commissioned rank, whether
they passed through St. Cyr or the Ecole
Polyteclmique (the Sandhurst and the Woolwich
of France), or were promoted from the ranks,
had first to serve as privates and had then to pass
qualifj'ing examinations. The final examina-
tion was competitive as well as comprehen-
sive. Promotion from the rank of major and
above it was entirely by selection, in the lower
ranks it was decided partly by selection and
partly by seniority. The officers of the Reserve
and Territorial Army were not required to
satisfj- so high a technical standard ; but all
had to serve six months with the colours, and
were liable to be called up for instruction every
two years. The Staff of the Army, whoso
weakness largely contributed to the disasters
of 1870. had immensely improved. All candi-
dates for the Staff had to pass a competitive en-
trance examination at the Ecole Sup<^rieure de la
Guerre, an institution corresponding to our
Staff College, and after passing another at the
termination of the course, went through a
!)f.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
4^r
BELGIAN SCOUTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF WATERLOO.
two-years' probation on a staff, being attaclied
during that period to other arms than tlieir
own. Thenceforward they spent their time,
818 did Prussian Staff officers, alternately' with
their unit and on staff duty, every step in
promotion being preceded by two years' service
with their unit. There is ample evidence to
show that their work in all branches was done
very efficiently and very rapidly. A striking,,
if not an imimpeachable, witness to their high
qualities Ls to be found in the large amount
of important literature produced during the last
20 or 30 years by individual officers. Milliard,
Langlois, Bonnal, and Foch, not to mention
others, were men whose historical and pro-
fessional studies influenced thought in perhaps
a greater degree than any other military
writers of the age, and with hardly an exception
were far superior to anything produced during
the last 30 years in Germany. This literary
activity was very cha:a:^:teristic of the renaissance
of the French Army ; and it is significant that
the new school of writers, throwing aside the
decadent ideas of the Second Empire, drew
their inspiration not from Germany, but from
that supreme repository of military instruction,
the theory and practice of Napoleon. Nor did
French military thinkers confine themselves
to this work of tactical and strategical re-
construction. Hand in hand with it the scientific
genius of the nation led the way in military
invention. The French were the firat to re-
arm their artillery with a quick-firing gun ; and
in* aviation they had strong claims to be con-
sidered the pioneers of the world. It was not
merely its generous heart and fiery soul that
made the army formidable in 1914 ; with these
there also moved to battle that other tutelary
spirit of France, her clear and splendid intelli-
gence.
The question of the higher military com-
mand was one that for many years had exercised
the minds of Frenchmen, and the solution offered
by the decrees of 1911 was not entirely satis-
factory. ' Down to that year the business of
preparation for war was in the hands of the
Conseil Superieur de la Guerre, a body pre-
sided over by the Minister of War, which could
be summoned at'any time by the President of the
Republic, and whose deliberations could on those
occasions be attended by the Prime Minister and
the Minister of Marine. It consisted generally
of a committee of ten. and included as its Vice-
President the Gerieralissime appointed to direct
the principal group of the French armies in
lime of war, besides several officers destined
for the command of separate armies. The defect
of this system was that none of its members
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
97
were in close touch with the (Jeneral Staff,
or possessed any staff of their own correspond-
ing with the importance of their missions. By
the Presidential decree of 1911 these defi-
ciencies were repaired. The chiefs of the new
Army staffs were formed into a General Staff
Committee under the GoneralLssime, to whom
was accoi-ded the title of Chef d'Etat Major-
(!eneral. In time of war Ke was to be seconde<l
by the Chef d'Etat Major de I'armee, who was
intended to remain by the side of the Minister of
War as the representative of the General
Staff. At the same time the work of the
(^.eneral Staff was redistributed, the divLsion
dealing with preparation for war being placed
imder a Sous-Chef d'Etat Major, this officer
being destined in time of war to act as chief of
the staff of the Gen^ralLssime in the field.
The Chef d'Etat Major-General (or future
G6n6ralLs.sime) and the Chef d'Etat Major de
Tarm^e (or the future adviser of the Minister
in war time) were included among the members
of the Conseil Sup^rieur. These arrangements
made it possible for the Generalissime per-
.sonally to direct the chiefs of the separate
army staffs, and at the same time to share in
the work of the Con.seil Superieur and exchange
views with the destined Commandei-s of the
Armies, a combination which, it was hoped,
would smooth the way to a community of views
and policy and would provide all the commanders
with suitable staff organs of their own. The
plan seemed a cumbrous one, but it was pro-
bably the only means by which the General
Staff could be brought into line with the Con-
seil Superieur, a matter which the military,
constitutional and political significance of that
body rendered essential to the wellbeing of
the Army. The peculiarity of the relation of
the Army and of the civil Government is brought
out by the fact that the Minister insisted on
his right to appoint Army commanders, and
that the decree of 1911 actually restricted
their tenvu-e of these all important posts to a
single year. The advantages posses.sed in
these matters by a monarchical Government
of the Prussian type over a Republican system
are obvious and require no comment. A good
deal of criticism both in and outside France
was directed to considerations of this kind in
the years before the war. It was said that
the discipline and spirit of the Army was sapped
by anti-miUtarist propaganda, that its per-
sonnel was of unequal quality, that the nation
was rent by political divisions, that the succee-
sive governments were weak and unstable, and
that the good of the Army, especially in the
matter of the higher command, was constantly
sacrificed to intrigue. When war came it was
at once evident that theee views were far
from being justified by the facts. In face of
the national danger divisions disappeared to a
degree that those who knew France best
would a few weeks earlier liave pronounced
impossible. Anti- militarism became voiceless
and was abandoned by its foremost advocates,
including the lamented M. Jaures, who was
assassinated as a " traitor " after ho had
made it known that he renounced his ordi-
nary views as inopportune and unfMitriotic.
How far General Joffre, a soldier of great
Colonial distinction and wide ex|}erience of
high command, and hia subordinates would
prove equal to their task, and- how far the
French Army itself would prove worthy of
its old "renown, the events of the campaign
alone could show. But of the nature of the
dominant motive none could doubt for a single
instant. Frenchmen had but one object, the
preservation of their beloved country ; and
but one thought, how best they might
serve her interests.
A word must be said in conclusion as to the
general plan of campaign. Its opening phase
was boimd to be of a defensive character,
although the defence, concordantly with the
national temperament and French militarj'
theory, was certain to take an active form.
France's policy, and her earnest wish to avoid
war if war could be avoided with honour, for-
bade the assumption of an aggressive attitude,
even if her inferior numbers and the expected
slowness of the Russian concentration had not
rendered an offensive impossible from a mili-
tary point of view. She could not expect her
Ally seriously to affect the situation before
the 20th day of mobilization, and for the first
30 days at least she could not count on am-
diminution of the hostile forces directed
against herself. She knew that she would be
obliged for a more or less indefinite period to
devote her energies to repelling a superior
enemy. It was consequently obvious that
she would be compelled, at any rate until the
enemy's main line of attack became certain,
to submit in some mea.sur(! to his initiative
and .so to distribute the bulk of her forces as
to render them available to meet the impend-
ing blow wherever it might fall. Such a ttvsk
is one of the hardest that war can demand of
an army and a nation. There was a good
deal to be said for the view, which was current
in Germany, that from the tecluiical as well
as from the moral point of view the r61e of the
defender had been made more difficult by
modern conditions. According to this school
98
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
REPUBLICAN GUARDS IN PARIS.
[Daily AUrrcr,
of thought, the view of Clausewitz that the
iefender would always have on his side the
Advantages of concealment and time, and that
the assailant would always be exposed to the
risk of discovery and of premature commit-
nxent, was less applicable than of old. The
enormous size of modern armies, the immense
breadth and depth of fronts, whether in the
theatre of war or on the battlefield, and the
consequent difficulty of acciu'ate observation,
were believed considerably to have reduced the
advantages of that deferred form of action
which the great Prussian author, writing of
days when armies were comparatively small
and visible, regarded as outweighing the moral
advantages of the offensive. Most of the
experience of 1870 and 1905 seemed to prove
that the advantage had passed to the army
which was powerful enough to take the offen
sive, to seize the initiative, to be first on the
spot. On the other hand it was held in France
that the counter-attack was a tremendously
powerful weapon, perfectly capable of giving
victory to the defenders, providing that there
were forthcoming on the part of their com-
manders the knowledge, judgment, and resolu-
tion necessary to enable them to profit by the
mistakes and the exhaustion of the assailant ;
and on the part of their people the intelligence
and endurance necessary to enable them to
understand and to wait. Such were, in brief-
the two strategic theories which circumstances
and policy were destined to bring into opposi-
tion on the French frontiers.
To find the means, in accordance with their
strategic theory, of carrying on an effective
defensive until the moment when a suc-
cessful Russian advance would enable them
to assume the offensive, was the task of
the French commanders. Broadly speaking,
the possible front of the. main German
concentration extended roughly from Aix-
la-Chapelle, close to the meeting of the
Dutch, German, and Belgian frontiers, to
the point of the Vosges at Schirmeck, west of
Strassburg, a breadth of about 180 miles ;
and whatever the probabilities it would be
impossible to say, until the form of the concen-
tration was fairly defined, exactly the point
where the real effort would be made. All that
could be safely predicted would be that once
begun, and from whatever point, it would be
pushed forward as fast as possible and as
straight as possible upon Paris, that is to say
that the main fighting was bovmd to take place
somewhere within the triangle of Liege, Strass-
burg, and Paris, or close to its sides ; an area
which, from the French point of view and
speaking purely geographically, would be
covered by a preliminary concentration from
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
99
DINANT.
Maubeuge to Toiil (a breadth of 150 miles).
But, while admitting that it would be necessary
to occupy in some degree the whole of this por-
tion of the frontier, not to mention the spaces
towards Lille on the one flank and Belfort on the
other, anytliing like an equal distribution of
force along it would obviously be a negation of
all modern strategic teacliing, a return to the
cordon system condemned a century ago.
The French concentration had to be fixed with
a view to certain definite strategic eventualities.
These were comparatively few. It was evident
for years before the war that only two main
alternatiTes, already referred to in Chapter 2,
were open to Germany. It was certain,
owing to the lie of French and German territory,
the arrangement of the German railways, and the
distribution of the French fortress system south-
ward and in rear of Epinal, that no large
concentration would take place in Upper
Alsace ; but that, while leaving sufficient troops
between Strassburg and the French frontier
to retard any attempt at a French offen-sive
from the soufch, the Germans had to clioose
bat ween a grand offensive from Loiraine
(Thionville-Metz-Scliirmeck) or one from the
front Metz-Aix-la-Chapelle, passing througli
(he neutral territory of Belgium and Luxem-
burg. The first involved the storming of the
French barrier forts between t)ie fortresses of
Verdun-Toul and Nancy, and could best be
met by a concentration of the main French
Army on that formidable front, and in the gaps
on its flanks. Such a concentration, which
102
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
was rendered feasible by the strength of the
covering troops, might be expected to enable
the French Army to accept battle under very
favourable conditions, for the front of the
position would be enormously strong, and
the fortresses would ailord excellent pivots
for out-flanking operations, or for counter
attacks if the entmy endeavoured to turn them.
The northern alternative was by some regarded
as even more mifavourable to the German
Army, on the ground that the passage through
Belgium, and the capture of the Belgian
fortresses, would occupy more time and cost
more men than even the storming of the Verdun-
Toul defences. In any case it was certain
that even if the Belgian resistance was neg-
ligible, som3 days must elapse before the
invading hosts could reach the French frontiers ;
while, if it was vigorous, it might even be
possible for the French Army to join the
Belgian Army and operate in conjunction with
its Ally. Nor was it to be forgotten that the
intervention of a British Army was more
likely to take place in the event of a
violation of Belgium than otherwise. From
the French point of view, moreover, the
existence of neutral territory offered another
important skdvantage. It was hardly Ukely
that Germany would invade neutral territory
unless she meant to make serious use of it.
The news of the violation of Belgium, therefore,
seemed calculated to set doubts at rest as to
the zone which the Germans had chosen for
their main effort, and therefore to indicate
the direction in wliich the main French con-
centration would have to take place. Beyond
this nothing was certain. The strength of the
Belgian resistance, the stopping power of the
fortresses, the intended lines of advance and
the relative distribution of the German troops,
as well as the total strength of the hostile force
in the northern area could only be cleared up
by the operations themselves. In one other
important respect the French were lucky. The
neutral attitude of Spain, and especially of
Italy, freed them of aU apprehensions on their
south-eastern and southern frontiers. It was
from the first possible for them to accumulate a
considerably larger force of troops on their
western frontier than could have been reckoned
upon with any safety in the plans drawn up
in time of peace.
CHAPTER VI.
THE ARMY AND THE FORTRESSES
OF BELGIUM.
BELGiAif Neutrality as a Political Abstraction and its Violation as a Military Theorem-
Neutrality Becomes a Focus op Patriotism -The Old Army a Governmental Army-The
New Citizen Army-The Creation of the Fortresses-Brialmont-The Problem op Lieoe
and Namur— Concrete and Cupola— The Army in 1863, 1899, and 1902— The National
Army Acts of 1909 and 1913-Strength in 1914-TheGardeCivique-Organization of the
Army on Mobilization— Armament and Equipment— Typical Brialmont Forts— Lateb
Designs- Antwerp— LiKOE and Namur— Cupolas verms Modern Howitzers.
WHEN Belgium was declared " por-
petualh- neutral " it was quife as
much in the interests of the Great
Powers as in her own. A
dangerous crisis over the fate of Limburg had
just been passed, and botii France and Prussia
had formed the habit of studying the invasion
•of their respective covmtrios by way of Belgium.
In nearly all Moltke's memoranda of 1859-
1869 on possible Franco-German wars the
eventuality of a French attacli from Belgium
was taken into considoratioii. Since 1870,
however, the question liad been studfed rather
from the point of view of German attack upon
France thp„n vice versa, and it is safe to say that
tiiere was no problem of higher strategy that had
been so freely discussed as that of the violation
of Belgium's neutrality.
That Germany would not be restrained by the
old Treaty of London if it suited her to attack
France by way of Belgium was assumed on all
sides as the basis of discussion. Rightly and
naturally, the soldiers left the question of puVilic
law and policy to higher authority, and applied
themselves to the consideration of the military
conditions and consequence?- of an act which
was obviously possible.
It must be said that, after the formation of
the Dual Alliance and the consequent possi-
bility of a war on two fronts for Germanj-,
military opinion was by no means agreed,
either in principle or in detail, on the question of
Germany's advahttige in the matter. Some
held that the time limit imposed upon Ger-
many by Eastern necessities was too small
to allow of the march through Belgium.
Others considered that Germany's only
object would be to pass troops through
Southern Belgium only as rapidly as
possible, and, deploying for the first time in
France itself, to pick up new railway com-
munications with (Jermany via Mezieres and
Luxemburg — in other words, to borrow part
of Belgium for a week or so, to con-
front Europe with the fait accompli, and to
pacify Belgium by prompt pajment of
the bill for damages. Still others held that
Germany needed Belgium, south and north of
the Meuse alike, both for the deplojiuent and
for the subsequent maintenance of her huge
forces. In all these studies, as a matter of
course, esthnates were formed of the theoretical
resistance of the Belgian Ann.v to the invaders.
One would assert that mobilization would re-
quire such-and-such a period, others would cal-
culate in terms of " neutralizing " one, two, or
tlu"ee Genn"n army corps, and others imagined
that Belgium would only save her face,and worked
out their problem purely on the distances and
times separating Aix-la-ChapelJe from Mezieres.
)03
104
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
PALACE OF JUSTICE, BRUSSELS.
LOUVAIN,
TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
105
THE KING OF THE BELGIANS.
[By the courftsy of Uu Brtgian Reiiij Fund,
106
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Theee frigid calculations and estimates
usually ignored the fact that siiice her inde-
pendence Belgium had developed a distinct and
remarkable national spirit. Yet in some re-
spects tliis omission was natural enough, for it
was not always that the Belgian authorities
themselves realized, before the war, the bearing
of patriotism — this new and real patriotism —
on their military problem. One of the leading
Belgian generals, for instance, defined the role
of the Belgian Army as the detaining of such a
proportion of the invader's force as would
weaken him imduly en his main battlefield.
On these cold premises, Belgium was not a
neutral nation at aU, but simply a State possess-
ing a certain number of soldiers who could
be thrown into the scale on this side or that, if
her treaty rights were infringed. In fact, in
the eyes of the Army, neutrality had become, in
a sense, a badge of servitude.
Far different were the realities of the case.
When Belgium faced the Germans in August,
1914, in defence of her neutrality, that privilege
stood for nothing less, in the eyes of the people,
than national independence. It was not a
question of telling the Army to act ets a make-
weight, but a question of fighting the Germans
to the bitter end. Belgian patriotism, fre-
quently supposed to have been smothered in
infancy by sectional, political, and industrial
quarrels, was suddenly put to the supreme test
and proved its existence.
At that moment the Regular Army had only
recently come to be representative of that
patriotism — ^to be an army, so to speak, of
"principals." Up to 1913, or at least
up to 1909, it had been conceived of
rather as an army of "agents." The com-
munity itseK had been too completely absorbed
in its industrial development and its social
questions to pay much heed to those of defence.
It paid, and willingly paid, for its costly fortifica-
tions, just as the British public paid for its
Navy. But its personal living connexion with
the Army was small. The Government, on its
part, was certainly somewhat unwilling to
smrender to the principle of the armed nation,
conceiving that it needed a force of agents of its
own to support its authority in time of internal
trouble.
At the time when the Belgian Army took
shape, practically all the armies of Europe were
organized on the principle of substitute-con-
scription. This principle produced, in prac-
tice, armies that were chiefly composed of
volunteer professionals, since, on the one hand,
the substitute who served on behalf of a con-
script was really a volunteer with a bounty.
and on the other, the re-engagement of the
time-expired substitute to servo for a second
conscript gave the State a long-service army
that it could fairly regard as its own pro-
perty. Until after 1871, therefore, this form
of army was as normal and natural as an
army of soldiers of fortune in the 17th century
or a mechanical army in the 18th century.
After 1871, however, the military problem
of Belgium was by no means so simple. The
most formidable military Power of Europe
was to the east, and the second most formidable
to the west, of her. At the same time, in
Belgium itself both the popular view of the
Army as a thing apart and the governmental
objections to the arming of a people not easily
governed still held good. Whereas in the case of
the new French Army the new organization was a
recombination of free atoms into which the
war had disintegrated it, Belgiiun had under
gone no such process of disintegration, and the
reforms in her Army after the precautionary
mobilization of that year were rather adjust-
ments than reconstructions. In fact, for
more than 30 years the Army remained, in
kind and type, the same.
Belgium's answer to the new conditions
created by 1870 was fortification. It so hap-
pened that she possessed in General Brialmont
the greatest military engineer of the 19th cen-
tury, and his genius and activity dominated
the scheme of defence. As a young officer
in the days of smooth-bore guns, he was, like
his French contemporaries, a disciple of the
orthodox " bastion " school of fortification,
but presently he went over to the " poly-
gonal " side of Carnot, Montalembert, and
the Prussians. The enceinte of Antwerp,
built to his designs in 1859, with its chicanes
of all sorts — little rises of the parapet level
to give fire upon this or that corner, little falls
and recesses to protect it from enfilade, in-
geniously-curved short flanks to search shy
comers of the ditch, and so on — still exists
to" attest his skill and ingenuity in a lost cause.
But with 1864 and 1870 came the rifled gun,
and Brialmont was young enough to adapt his
works to the new standard of resistance.
For some years after 1870 the question of
the Army had precedence over the question
of the forts. Strong and determined efforts
were being made by the army officers iprial-
mont amongst them) and the democrats,
approaching the problem from widely different
sides, to introduce the principle of the nation
in arms, and it was with the arriire pensee of
diverting attention from this side of the defence
question that the Government took up the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
107
LIEGE.
fortification propt^als of Colonel Deboer, Brial-
mont's right-hand man.
It was already provided in the defence scheme
of 1859 that Antwerp should be the main strong-
hold of the kingdom, upon which all field opera-
tions— whether against French or against
German intruders — should be based. Deboer,
supported by his chief, proposed some barrier-
forts (not, be it observed, a ring of
forts) at Liege in 1879. Tliree years
later Brialmont himself proposed more im-
portant works, both at Liege and at
Namur, and with these proposals began three
fresh sets of controversies. These were, first,
the political disputes which made the expendi-
ture of money on those new works a party
question ; secondly, the strategical question
whether Namur and Liege should be made
into important fortresses, a- proposition to
which, many senior officers of the Belgian Army
would not assent ; and, thirdly, the technical
military question of armour and concrete
versus earth parapets, which was then at its
height in all coiuitries.*
Echoes of this last still lingered thirty years
afterwards, when war put the Meuse fortresses
to the test. The first was set at rest when,
under the sj^ell of Brialmont' s personality,
the Government decided to make Liege and
Namur fortresses after his own heart. The
second, or strategical, issue was fought and
re -fought throughout the years of iieace, the
most serious competing proposal being that of
General Dejardin, who lu-ged his countrymen
to give up the too exposed Mouse line and to
make Brussels itself a first-class fortress con-
nected with Antwerp by barrier-forts on the
Dyle and Scheldt.
The forts as actually constructed were of Brial-
mont's third period — strong simple masses of
steel and concrete without chicanes or weak-
nesses, but of course very expensive. Tlie course
of operations in 1914 may be said on the whole
to have justified the money simk in these passive
defences. Wliat is more questionable, how-
ever, is their service to the general defence of
Belgiiun. For beyond doubt Belgians were
content to point with pride to these superb
structiu-es, the finest miUtary engineering work
of the age,* as British people were wont to
eniunerate the ships of their great Navy instead
of tackling the problem of the personnel.
In 1863, on the eve of Prussia's challenge to
the old armies of Austria luid France, Belgium
possessed a substitute -conscript " standing
army" of 73,718 rank and file, which was
raised as far eis possible by voluntary enlist-
ment, the ballot (with 'jubstitution) making
good vacancies, as in other armies. The term
of service for all alike was eight years, of which
foiu" were spent " on fuiiough," and thus
roughly 38,000 men were permanently under
arms, with a drilled reserve of 36,000 behind
them.f The eleven fortresses that then existed
•Major G. S. Clarke (afterwards Lord Sydenham) and Major
Ixnili Jackson (afterwards .4^wistant Director of Fortiflcatiom)
were amoni;st those who broke a lance with General Brialmont
"Though rivalled perhaps by the same enKlneer'u Bucharest
works in Kninania.
tTben; was also a small naval force. To-day Uie only Govern-
ment v&mjIs are fast Channel steamers.
108
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ri0-
^*
m^^f
GENERAL LEMAN.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
109
oEysdeny \
PLAN OF THE LIEGE FORTRESSES.
absorbed practically the whole of tliis force.
At that time the population was just under
5,000,000 souls.
In 1899, in a population of about 6,750,000,
the peace strength was still only 43,000 rank and
file, and substitution was still the ruling principle.
But the Army had ceased to be the almost
))urely professional force that it had been,
for enough non-substitute militiamen had been
passed through the ranks into the reserve to
give a total war strength (in the ten year -classes*
liable) of about 130,000. On the other hand,
Namur and Liege had, rightly or wrongly, been
raised from the status of forts d'arret to that
of fortresses, r.nd their garrisons had been
correspondingly enlarged, so that it wa« doubt-
ful whether even as many as 80,000 men wouk'
be available for the free field army.
It was this last fact which more than any
other consideration led to the passing of the
•I.etfally only eight wore available, but the Govemmeat had
«inergeucy powers to call up two more.
Army Law of 1902. This Law certainly marked
no progress towards the realization of a
national militia. On the contrary, it inade
\oluntary enlistment of professionals the
acknowledged basis of the Army by in-
creasing their emolument.s and practicoUy
doubling tlie proportion of them on the peace
establishment. But two reforms of great import-
ance were effected. First, the liability [leriod
was extended to thirteen years, and, secondly,
the framework of the Army was recast so as
to give many cadres on a low peace establish-
ment, to be filled on mobilization by the reser-
vists, of whom thirteen-year cla.sscs wore now
available instead of eight or ten. Thanks to those
two reforms, it was expected that on mobiliza-
tion 180,000 men would lx> available in organ
ized formations. Under this Iawv the strength
of the eventual field army — after garri.sons liad
been provided for — was supposed to be 100,000.
In a few years, however, it became evident
that the system of relying upon increased
no
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
BELGIAN SOLDIERS AT BRUSSELS.
CIVIL GUARDS AT ANTWERP.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Ill
voluntary enlistinont was a failure. The
deficit was not indeed very alarming in itself,
considered in relation either to the peace
8trenf,th or to the \iltimate mobilizable force,
but it did indicate that no farther expansion
was possible on the old lines of a governmental
army. The reason for this was certainly not
want of patriotism in tlie Belgian people, for
national military service was in the creed of
the most democratic political parties, as it
had been in the creed of the old Radicals ot
the 1848 Revolutions. It was due partly to
tlie fact that the Army was being kept away
from the people by the Government, and still
more to the absorption of the unemployed in
the growing industries at home and of the
most adventurous in the service of the Congo.*
Meanwhile the international outlook grew
darker. The Russo-,)apanese war, the first
Morocco dispute, and the Austrian annexation
of Bosnia followed one another swiftly.
Every other year at least there was a tlireat
of general European war. Every year witnessed
some development in mobile siege artillery that
was supposed to increase the military chances
of a "brusque attack on Brialmont's Mouse
fortresses, hitherto supposed to be reducible
only by sapping and mining. It was now not
the fortresses, but the Army, that took first
place in the scheme of national defence. There
were moments in the years 1909-1914 when
Liege and Namur could fairly have been said
to be suffering from neglect — a thing that
would have been inconceivable ten years before.
Antwerp, on the other hand, resumed the place
that it had held in the defence scheme of 1859.
While Liege and Namur began to be looked
upon again as simple barrier-groups, Antwerp,
in its capacity as base of the field army, received
an enormous outer ring of new forts, more
modern in conception even than Brialmont's.f
Almost the last act of King Leopold II. was
to give the Royal assent to the Army Bill of
1909. In that Bill substitution and the
govermnental army that it produced at last
definitely gave way to the principle of the
national army. The 'new scheme was in many
respects tentative and iniperfect, and in fact
had to be thoroughly revised in 1913. But the
first and hardest step was taken. The nation
was armed, and neutrality as a politico -military
abstraction rapidly gave Way to " independ-
ence " as a popular creed.
By limiting substitution to the one case of
l)rothers the character of the Army Was changed
•Moreover, the ilrilled volunteer battalioas of the avio Guard
("<>e below) aoubtless aljsorlMd some promising material.
tThes^e fort* were comi)let«U and fit to stand a siege, ttcoording
to published German reports, iji November. 1913.
COUNT DE LALAING,
the Belgian Minister in London.
\BasuHu.
from that of a contract force rendering services
professionally to that of a duty force serving as
members of society. The peace strength
(42,800) remained at much the same figure as
before, as also did the periods of colour service
required of the militiamen. But tlie absence
of a high proportion of long-service men enabled
the annual intake of recruits -which is what
determines the war strength of an army — to be
increased from a nominal 13,000 to a real
17,500. The low-establishment cadres of the
previous organization were thus fille<l up to
the ordinary standard of active units in peace.
At the same time the liability period was re-
duced by one yeeir, so that a war strength of
210,000 rank and file could be obtained with
certainty so long as the i-olontaires de carriers
— i.e., the enlisted professionals — still remained
in the Army in great numbers. Given this
standard of strength, it was clearly un-
necessary to apply the principle of universal
service rigorously throughout a population of
over 7,000,000.* Accordingly, liability was
restricted to one son in each family, and, as
above mentioned, one brother could join au
substitute for another.
But the question was soon asked — Was this
war strength itself adequate ? Having regard
to the immense development of the new en-
trenched camp of Antwerp, not less than 130,000
•The maximum annual oontingent on such a poi>ulation would
have been about 67,000. of whom some 33.000 or :M,000 m>:M
be fit for servlc»».
112
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
of the 210,000 would l:>e required for fortress
duties, and the field army, instead of being
increased, would remain 8tfl.tionary at the
figure of 80,000.*
The second Morocco crisis of 1911, and the
Italian and Balkan wars of 191 1- 12, with the con-
sequent increases in the strength and war-readi-
ness of the French and German Armies, answered
the question promptly and decisively ; and in
January, 1913, a new Army scheme was brought
forward by the Government. It became law
in due course and had been about a year and
a half in operation when the Great War broke
out.
Under this scheme the standard of strength on
mobilization was to be as follows (rank and file
only) :—
Field army 150,000
Antwerp 90,000
Liege 22,500
Namur 17,500
Reserves in dep6t« (for drafts) 60,000
340,000
To realize this standard, liability to service
was made in fact, as it already was in theory,
universal. But certain exemptions were, as
usual, granted, and allowing for these and for the
physically unfit it was calculated that no more
than 49 per cent, of the gross annual contingent
would be available for service. The thirteen
years' term of liability to serve on mobilization
was reintroduced. Had events permitted the
scheme to grow to maturity, the above numbers
would have been realized with certainty, since
thirteen classes each of 33,000 compulsory
service men and 2,000 volunteers would have
given a total of 455,000. As it was, how-
ever, only two classes had become available
imder the new scheme, and the resources of the
country in trained men (not counting the Civic
Guard) were, roughly : —
The 1913 class ' .. .. 30,000
Four classes (1909-12), at
20,000 .. .. .. 80,000
Eight classes (1901-8), at
13,300 106,400
Volunteers (steadily decreas-
ing from 1901, but averaged
at about 2,500) . . . . 34,600
251,000
Plus the recruit class of 1914 33,000
Plus professional cadres . . 12,000
Gross
296,000
Deduct 15 per cent, as unfit
and missing on mobilization,
and the net strength be-
comes 261,000
Add gendarmerie not included
in the classes above, about 2,000
Total available
263,000
• Tbl« fljure. Iwwever. would now be a minimum an-l not a mail-
aramu^art it would liave proved In a mobilization under the 1902
If therefore, as foreseen, Antwerp, Namur, and
Liege were to absorb 130,000 men of the active
army and its reserves, only 133,000 at the
outside would be available for the field army,
even assuming that the new recruits of thelOH
contingent could by judicious distribution be
safely incorporated in the active ranks, and the
hoped-for drafting reserve of 60,000 men at the
depots would be non-existent. If, therefore, the
war establishment of the field army (150,000) was
to be attained, it was necessary to economize on
the fortress garrisons, and to that end to call
upon the Civic Guard to bear a greater share
in the defence than had been contemplated.
This call was the final test of the reality of
Belgian patriotism.
The Garde Civique was one of the few sur-
vivors of the National Guards of the days when
the citizen-in-arms stood for liberty against
Governmental autocracy ; in its virtues and its
defects, therefore, it was the true descendant
of the citizen bands who had risen against
the Dutch in the War of Independence, and
of the National Guards that in France,
Germany, and Italy played so great a part in
the revolutionary movements of 1830-48.
As with all formations of this kind, its military
efficacy was in proportion simply to its passion.
That it could not give full effect to its passion
for want of specifically military training may
freely bo admitted — the point is that all the
value that it possessed was derived from the
cause in which it was called upon to fight.
On any conception of Belgian defence as
a Governmental act, therefore, little reliance
was or could be placed upon the Garde Civique ;
and, moreover, by its very nature it was rather
a counterpoise than an auxiliary to the Army,
which, both as a regular force and a Govern-
mental force, looked down upon the bourgeois
amateur. But, as we have seen, the con-
ception of neutrality as an affair of policy
involving the use of an army as the agent of
policy had given way to the conception of a
national independence defended by the stout
hearts of the citizens themselves. In making this
new patriotism possible the Garde Civique had
worthily played its part, as it had done also
in assisting to maintain public order during
industrial disputes. With the bringing together
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
113
of the Army and the nation that followed
the Army Act« of 1909 and 1913, its part
seemed to be over, and gradually, am the
Army absorbed the citizens, it was intended
to die out.
But in August, 1914, this absorption had
no more than begun, and the Garde Civique
still existed in the old form and the old numbers.
To it belonged in theory every able-bodied
man who was not in the line or the reserve
of the regular forces, between the ages of
twenty-one and thirty-two ; and behind it
was its reserve of men of thirty-th-ee to fifty,
whose sole peace liability was to report them-
selves three times a year. Taking 35,000 as the
total able-bodied contingent, and deducting
15,000 as enrolled in the Army, we find
the nominal strength of the Ist Ban
Garde Civique to be 13x20,000, or 260,000.
Actually it was far below that figure, for only
in the cities and towns did it possess any effec-
tive organization, and it may be as.sumed that
not more than 90,000 Gardes Civiques were
available for duty. These men had been
present at ten drills a year, but (as was to bo
expected from their origin and principle)
they were imder the Home and not the War
Department, and received little if any assistance,
either in training or in organization, from the
active army. However, in modem Belgium,
as in the France of Louis Philippe, the exist-
ence of the general liability had given the
enthusiasts the opportunity of forming volim-
teer corps, and these like the British Volunteers,
met habitually for drill and social purposes.
and, with little direct assistance from above,
attained a fair standard of military oflfieiency.
This category included between 37,000 and
40,000 of the 90,000 men in the organized
force. How well these men did their duty by
the side of the regulars the defence of Li^ge
attests. If as a national guard they wore mori-
bund, as part of the now National Army that had
not had time to grow, they bore their full share
of the defence of the kingdom, and this in spite
of the brutality of the invaders, who chose to
regard them as non-military irregulars, to be
shot when caught — a view which might equally
well be taken of the police of Great Britain, or
oven of the King's African regiments under the
Colonial Office. For a moment, when over-
whelmed and unsupported by the Allies, the
Belgian Government dismissed the Civic Guard,
in order to save it from this treatment, but it
was soon re-armed and re-employed.
The aid of the Garde Civique, then, l>eing
justly reckoned upon for the fortresses, it was
possible on mobilization to constitute the field
army more or less in accordance with the
normal scheme.
This provided for six divisions and a cavalry
division, besides the regular fortress troops.
The division consisted of staff and three " mixed
brigades " ; each was composed of two tlu-ee-
battalion regiments of infantry and a group of
three four-g&n field batteries, plus the divisional
artillery (tliree groups), divisional cavalry (one
regiment) and s}>ecial troops.
The order of battle of the division is shown
in the accompanying diagram : —
Bde.
Bde.
Bde.
Regt.
□ □□
Regt. with
Machine Guns
□ □□1
field ijl ijl ^Batteries
Regt.
□ □ □
Regt. with
l\1achine Guns
□ □CZIJ.
Field \ l[l ijl Batteries
Div. Troops
Field ijl iJi ^Batteries
fiji i "h
aomtzerl 7 7 7 Batteries
I'l' '1' 'i'
^ S 12 EI
Regt.
g| Engineers
g^ Flying Corps
S^ Supply and
L^^sl Transport
pf~| Med. Deti
Regt.
□ □ O
Regt. nitti
Maciiine. Guns
□□tni
Field l[l ijl ijl Batteries
114
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
, Hfirf
tnLaiiglement
^H'int Entsngjement
PENTAGONAL BRIALMONT FORT.
TRIANGULAR BRIALMONT FORT.
{For description see pages 16 6- 17.)
A very interesting feature of this organization,
which is almost peculiar to the Belgian Army, is
the mixed brigade of six battalions and three
batteries. Such an organization, when found
in other armies, is usually only for detach-
ments stationed in outlying frontier districts
(e.g., the Austro-Montenegrin and the Franco-
Italian frontiers). In Belgium, on the contrary,
it was not detachments, but the parts of the
main army itself that were so organized.
The needs of modem tactics had produced
the idea of the " tactical group " of all arms
within the division in the French and the
British Armies, but in these armies the grouping
was only a temporary ad hoc arrangement,
whereas in Belgium it was the basis of the
regular organization.
The cavalry division consisted of three
brigades, each of two four-squadron regiments,
a mobilized gendarmerie regiment in addition,
and three batteries of horse artillery ; a cyclist
battalion, a cyclist engineer detachment on
bicycles and a motor-ambulance section also
figured in the organization.
The establishment-strength of the division
was roughly 22,000 combatants, which meant
that the so-called division was in reality a
small army corps. The cavalry division was
about 5,000 strong in combatants.
This force of six divisions,* a cavalry
division, t with the 13th and 14th mobile
brigades at Namur and Liege, was formed
on mobilization by the expansion of each of
the 20 infantry regiments of tliree battalions,
or about 1,650 men, into a six-battalion brigade
of about 7,000. This meant a four-fold expan-
sion for the regular field army alone, without
counting the fortress garrisons, but the Balkan
Wars had already shown that for a thoroughly
national war it was safe to multiply even by
eight. The lieutenant-colonels and the second
captains of the active regiments, with a propor-
tion of junior officers serving as supernumeraries
in peace, commanded the regiment and com-
panies newly formed on mobilization. J
The cavalry and artillery were maintained on a
high establishment in peace, the field artillery
being only doubled and the cavalry scarcely
•1st Gheut, 2nii Antwerp. Srd Li^ge, 4th '.Namur, 5th Mans.
6th BruHnels, limtead of the two howitz^jr groups of divisional
artillery, the 6th division hatl one of horse artillery and one of
iieavy howitzers.
tBnisseLs.
JThe regiments at Namur and Ll^ge forme<l 'ortress battalions
in addition.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
115
UTCH \
\ FRONTIER*
REFERENCE.
"Y" Forts
y BaLLenes & Redoubts
THE MODERN DEFENCES OF ANTWERP.
increased at all, by the intake of reservists
(men and horses) on mobilization.*
Of the fortress troops, both artillery and
engineer, details need not be given. It will
suffice to say that the formations in these
branches were numerous, as one would expect
from the preponderant part played by the
tliree fortresses in the defence scheme.
Before we deal with these fortresses in any de-
tail, however, we naay sot forth briefly tlie char-
acteristic points of the armament, equipment,
and uniform of the Belgian Army. The field
artillery weapon was a Krupp quick-firer of
1905,* with single long running-up spring
and panorama sight, but without " indepen-
dent line of sight " — in a word, a typical equip-
ment of its date, inferior to the French, Russian,
and Britisli models, but superior to the German.
At the outbreak of war no definite decision had
been made as to the pattern of qtiick-firing field
howitzer to be adopted, and the old breech-
loading weapons were taken into the field.
The rifle, pattern 1889, a Mauser, of -SOliru
calibire, was also a typical weapon, differing
only in points of detail from the rifle of many
other armies.
*The periods of militiamen's service with the colours weit3 '.- —
Infantry. Heavy Artillery, and Picnsers. 15 morths; Cavalry and
Horse Artillerv. 24 months ; Field Artillery and Train, 21 montlis.
* Some of the swne were made at Avon, and oCben at t&e
ordnance works of Ckxrkerjll. at Seialng. lA^n-
116
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
NAMUR.
The machine-guns were of three types — a
Hotchkiss, used in the fortresses, a Maxim of
much the same pattern and weights as those
of other armies, and a new tj-pe named the
" Berthier," a Hght automatic weapon weighing
only 18lb. This was frequently, if not always,
mounted (for transport only) on a light two-
wheeled carriage drawn by dogs. The cavalry
machine guns had pack transport. W hen in
action all field machine guns were tripod-
mounted.
On the whole, then, as regards weapons
Belgium was on a level with her contemporaries,
but in no way ahead of them, for even the
light machine-gun had been introduced into the
Danish, Russian, and other armies.
The same can hardly be said of the uniforms
and the infantry equipment. The Belgian
linesmen went into action against the grey
Giermans wearing the blue tunic or greatcoat,
the heavy knapsack, and the white buff
accoutrements of peace time. Trials had re-
cently been made of a khaki field imiform, but
none such had been adopted.
As we have already seen, the older
fortifications of Antwerp represent Brial-
mont's youth, and those of Liege and Namur,
and some of the newer Antwerp forts, liis
maturity, while the newer Antwerp works
are more modem in design than even Brial
TOont's final plans. The first, constructed
before the days of the siege howitzer
shell, scarcely concern ug. But the second and
third call for more detailed description, and for
that purpose we taice two of Brialmonfs
designs — one for a large fort with an internal
keep, and one for a " fortin " or smaller work-
The ring fortresses of Namur r.nd Liege were
simply combinations of these forts and
" fortius," varied slightly in detail to suit the
sites.
The larger tort shown is five-sided, and
surrounded by a deep ditch, of which
the counttw-scarp is a masonry wall, while the
earthen escarp is simply the prolongation of the
exterior slope of the parapet. Behind the '
counter-scarp wall and running along almost
its whole length is a vaulted gallery, which
at the angles of the ditch is pierced for machine-
guns and rifles, so as to sweep the floor of the
ditch at the moment of assault. From this
gallery small galleries run outwards and down-
wards at right angles to enable the defenders
to counter-attack the besiegers' mining
operations, and other galleries conimimicate
with the fort below the floor of the ditch. This
counter-scarp gallery, therefore, is the main
defence of the fort during the final stages of
the besiegers' advance, both against his assault
overground across the ditch, and against his
mining operations imderground, and it is
itself practically secure against any form of
attack except slow and systematic mining —
unless, indeed, artillery of quite unforeseen
piwer were to be brought against it, in which
case it would succumb like any other work.s.
In the rear (or "gorge") of the fort the
escarp is of masonry, and galleried and pierced
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
W
BELGIAN SOLDIERS IN BRUSS-ELS.
so as to command the floor of the ditch. The
parapet of the fort is a plain infantry breast-
work, with steel gun-cupolas bedded in
concrete at intervals.
Within this five-sided work and separated
from it by an inner ditch is a triangular
mass of concrete, galleried and pierced on
its rear side to sweep the rear of the inner
ditch* and on all sides so as to give
fire upwards upon the interior of the outer fort,
and so to prevent an enemy who has stormed
the front part from establishing himself solidly
m the interior and to keep open a way for
reinforcements by way of the rear side or
" gorge." Access from the outer fort to the
inner ditch is obtained through a timnel from
a well or simk "area,"! all parts of which
are kept imder fire by carefully sloping the
earth on the inner side, glacis -fashion, so as to
bring it under the observation of a cupola
in the centre of the triangular keep.
•The counter-t:can> galleries at the aijex provide for ditch
defence on the front faces.
tTbLs sunk ** area " also assists In limiting the spa<« open to
the as,sailant after ijenetratiiig the outer fort.
The smaller fort is a triangular work of simpler
trace, and without provision for interior de-
fence. At the angles of the triangle are small
cupolas for light quick-firing guns. The in-
fantry parapet is traced somewhat in the shape
of a heart, and in the hollow of this heart is
a solid central mass of concrete, on which are the
shelters and gun-cupolas. The mortar-cupolas
emerge from the floor of the hollow, outside tlie
central mass. Ditch defence is provided for the
front faces by counter-.scarp galleries, and for the
rear face by the trace and loopholes of the e.s(«rp
gallery, as in the case of the larger fort.
By the later engineers, though cupolas and
concrete were used freely, the upright e.scarps
and deep ditches and general costly massiveneas
of Brialmont's works were replaced, in Belgium,
as in other countries, by glacis-ditches ; that is,
the parapet slope was continued outwards and
downwards until the proper depth was reached
for the building up of a st^ep, forbidding counter-
scarp. Entanglements and steel fences were
fi.xed on this slope as a barrier to sudden
assault. The gun-cupolas were placed much
as they were in Brialmont's designs, but in
118
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
BELGIAN TROOPS.
general the earthen slopes were longer and
flatter.
The Antwerp fortifications were (1) the 1859
enceinte, already alluded to as a fine example
of the old" polygonal " fortification, and still
possessing nailitary value against all forms of
attack except a regular siege, although, of course,
powerless to protect the town against bombard,
ment ; (2) the " old " forts, a partial ring of
self-contained works at regular intervals of
2,200 yards, and at an average distance of 3,500
yards from the enceinte ; these were built at the
same time as the enciente and at first extended
only from the river at Hoboken, above the city,
to the railway running out of Antwerp eastward,
but after 1869 were reinforced by Fort Merxem,
north of the city, and Forts Cruybeke and
Zwyndrecht to the west of the Scheldt, to which
was presently added the combined fort and coast-
battery, Sainte-Marie, on the lower Scheldt ;
(3) the first instalment of the " new " forts,
built in 1879 and the following
by Brialmont ; these marked the
important points of an immense
fended area, Rupelmonde — Waelhem
Malines — Lierre — Schooten — Berendrecht ;
(4) the second instalment of the " new forts,"
which were completed in 1913, and filled up the
wide intervals left unguarded in the preliminary
scheme ; (5) the defences commanding the
ship-cliamwl, of which the water battery of Fort
years
most
de-
near
Sainte Marie witli its long row of casemate guns
at the water level behind heavy masses of
curved armour was perhaps the most effective ;
(6) the inundated areas. It is to be noted that
the old forts of class (2) received new cupolas
and additional concrete at the same time as the
works of class (4) were built.
As the base of the field army and the final
keep of the Kingdom, Antwerp had generally
been well cared for. With Liege and Namur,
however, matters were different. They were
intended originally as barrier-fortresses, to be
held only for a few days, and many authorities
declared that any further development of them
as fortresses in the ordinary sense was un-
desirable in the general interests of the defence.
Only the strong will and personality of Brial-
mont made them what they were, for good and
evil, and the war gave no final answer to the
question, since the resistance of L'ege sur-
prised those who regarded it as a mere barrier
position while the swift overwhelming of
Namur was equally startling to those who
looked upon it as a fortress.
Liege possessed a ring of six forts and six
" fortius," Namur a ring of four forts and five
" fortius " of the two kinds described above,
or analogous types. The armaments were the
same in all cases — two 6in., four 4'7in., two
Sin. mortars, four light quickfirers for the forts,
two 6in., two 4'7in., one (or two) Sin. mortars.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
119
O 77/// er
OS' Denis
FT DE COGNELEE-A/ '^''''''''"'^^one
oRhisnes ^ j^tf'''" ijt
Hingeon
OGelbressee
FT D' Em I N.ES F^'DE Marchovelette ^^^
5.a./.e ttK y' ., ^'""'"'' /Vfa>c.e -/«.Z^.« ^^^
FTdeSu'arlee-'^-^
CI "I
r/an'/nne
©
^rse/ayn
Namecffe
THE DEFENCES OF NAMUR.
and three light quickfirors for the " fortius."
Including separately em placed guns, Liege had
400 and Namur 350 pieces.
Searchlights and the necessary stores and
supplies for resisting a siege were reported as
ready and complete in the winter of 1913.
even the line enlargement being in position.
But what was true for the forts individually
was not altogether true for the fort ring as a whole,
for bomb-proof infantry redoubts would have
guarded the intervals of the forts far more
effectually than the mere field defences that
were hastily tlirown up after mobilization.
The uses and design of such redoubts were
well known to aL European engineers, and it
can only be supposed that no definite decision
to treat Liege and Namur as fortresses had
ever been reached.
One other consideration must be mentioned.
At the time when the cupolas, were con-
structed and the depth of the concrete
determined, the typical siege gun was the
6-inch howitzer. But artillery had made
great progress since the siege of Port Arthur
)iad afforded definite data as to the numbers
and kinds of guns required, and 8-inch and even
II -inch liowitzers could now be moimted on
wheeled carriages and brought into ectioi
without waiting to make concrete beds foi
them.
The resisting power of the cupolas was there-
fore, in August, 1914, somewhat doubtful, and
this doubt camiot but have intensified in the
minds of the Belgian st^tff their more general
doubts as to the wisdom of treating the
Meuse places as fortresses at all. These doubts,
indeec*. had been partially allayed by the
manoeuvres of 1913, in which the "Red"
Army attacked Xamur from the East and was
repulsed, even though the umpires allowed the
attack to smother the cupolas in a few hours.
But manoeuvres and realities may differ, and
luitil the hea\-ier shell was actually pitted agaiiist
the cupola in war, indecision was bound to
120
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ANTWERP.
remain. Had the new army scheme been com-
plete in August, 1914, a clear policy one way
or the other as to the Meuse forts would ipso
facto have been, decided upon. As it was, in
this as in other matters of defence, Belgium
was caught at a moment of transition.
CHAPTER VII.
THE BRITISH ARMY.
Review of the History of the Army — Evolution Without REVOnmoN — Cardwell's
Linked Battalions — The Professional Army and the Citizen Army — The Napoleonic
War — The Nineteenth Century — Progress of the Volunteer Movement — The Franco-
German War — Consequent Changes in the Regular Army — The South African War —
The Haldane Reforms — -Drafts and Establishments Between 1904-1913 — Mobiuzation
— Reserves — • Territorial Force — Officers and Reserve of Officers — War Office
Organization — Fighting Organization of the Expeditionary Force — The Infantry Divi-
sion— Auxiliary Services — Line of Communication — Supply — Motor Transport — Medical
Service — The Cavalry Division — " An Enemy Not to be Despised."
THE British Army was the result of
centuries of slow development, at
no period of which there had
occurred any event or reiorm so
comprehensive as to deserve the name of
revolution. Organized originally for King's
garrisons overseas and King's retainers at
home and long styled by constitutional
usage " guards and garrisons," the Regular
Army had grown up regiment by regiment
precisely as needs presented themselves, and had
been reduced regiment by regiment whenever
a need passed away or the political and social
circumstances called or seemed to call for econo-
mies.
It began with the small remnant consisting of
two regiments only, which the Restoration
Government of 1660 took over from the Army
of Cromwell. To this were added regiments of
men who had shared exile with the King —
in the nature of things a verj' small body.
The King himself was a " King upon condi-
tions," and one condition exacted by public
opinion was that there should be no repetition of
the military occupation of England by Cromwell's
major-generals. It was the acquisition of
Tangier, which came as Catherine of Braganza"s
dowry, that first called for an increase which
Parliament would admit. Similar small increases
followed, each with its own occasion to sanction
it, and were considered so formidable to liberty
Vol. I.— Part 4. '21
as to interest Paruament in cancelling them after
such occasions had passed. In larger emergencies
Great Briteiin raised emergency armies in much
the same way as other countries had done up
to the time of the introduction of the " standing
army " by Louis XIV. and Louvois. These
emergency armies were largely foreign troops,
taken into pay temporarily, a procedure that
to the 18th-century conceptions of statehood
and nationality wa»s not in the least shocking,
but rather wise. But some were British,
and although at the peace superfluous
British regiments were disbanded at the
same time as the foreign regiments were given
back to their masters, yet at the end of each
war a few regiments managed to weather the
storm of retrenchment, just as a century before
temporary regiments in the French Army
were now and then " given the white flag,"
which placed them on the permanent establish-
ment. TWs practice was, as regards the French,
already 150 years old when Charles II. came to
the tlirone in England, and the French had
obtained a long start in the formation of regular
and permanent armies. In so far as the King
was able by a process of " here a little there a
little " to expand the force at his personal
disposal at home, ho followed the French fa.shion,
which in due course was succeeded by the Prus-
sian fashion, placed beyond cavil and criticism
by Frederick the Great.
122
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
These French and Prussian influences, as well
8s the peculiar conditions which made the
British Anny a group of " guards and garrisons,"
still possessed not a little significance even in
1914, when the circumstances of Great Britain
had undergone great transformations. They
were responsible, in fact, for three of the most
marked characteristics of the Regular Army —
its oversea service, it« close regimental system,
and its strictly professional type.
Up to the time of the Indian Mutiny these
characteristics were far more marked. But when
oversea garrisons on a really large scale had
to be found, it became gradually clear that one
characteristic interfered with the other. The
Prussian and French armies, which gave the
British their regimental system, had no such
drain upon them ; while, on the other hand, if
fresh men had constantly to be found for the
Colonies and India, the essence of the
regimental system — the long-service private
soldier — was forfeited so far as troops at home
were concerned. In fact, the regimental
system in its ordinary working broke down
utterly when the smallest additional transfer
' of force from home to abroad or vice versa
was required. For a century before that date
there was no better means of finding the
annual Indian draft of men from home, or of
reinforcing the home forces for war, than the
clumsy expedient of inducing men by a bounty
to transfer from one regiment to another.
We have said that the Army had evolved
gradually without any single event or reform
that could be called a revolution. If any
reform could be considered as a contradiction
to that statement, it would be the reform
which Mr. Cardwell introduced of linking the
old single-battalion regiments by pairs for
purposes of drafting and routine of reliefs.
The working of this system, which was still,
in 1914, the basic system of the Army, will
be examined in due course. It has been
misimderstood, in the Army and out of it,
and it is all the more important, therefore, that
the reader should have a clear view of the
conditions that it had to meet. For the pre-
sent it will svtffice to note that it only achieved
its ends by boldly affronting the old close
regimental spirit. Battalions with traditions
of their own were amalgamated into two-
battalion regiments with no traditions at all.
But the regimental system siu-vived, and
enough of it still remained in the first years
■of the 20th centtiry to complicate the drafting
question, and also that of promotion, to a
•degree that Continental armies, with their
luniform organizations and uniform service,
could never realize. The drafting question,
the reader will find, absolutely dominated
our Army problem. The promotion problem
was simpler, yet its solution was
certainly not in sight in 1914. Whereas in
Continental armies an officer, above all an excep-
tionally good officer, practically never spent
his career in one regiinent, in Great Britain
transfers were few, and usually limited to
the simple case of man-for-man exchanges —
which was quite in accord with the general com-
petitive outlook between regiments. In con-
sequence the rate of promotion was very unequal
in the various regiments, notably after the South
African War of 1899-1902, in which many men
of equal ages and in the same regiment were
almost simultaneously promoted. In the case
of the rank and file transfer without consent
was a form of punishment.
That the regiment, thus conceived as the
soldier's one home, possessed the fullest
measure of esprit de corps goes without saying.
With all that that virtue implies the fine regi-
ments of the Expeditionary Force can without
hesitation be credited. Yet it is important
to note that there were certain directions in
which the strength of that esprit de corps
affected imfavourably the administration
and war -readiness of the Army at large.
Of the strictly professional spirit of the Regular
Army it is hardly necessary to adduce examples'
Although the Militia and Volunteer battalions
were " affiliated " to the Regular regiment of
their county, in practice the tie was only
nominal,* and there were cases in which no
Regular battaUon had visited its county for
a century and more. Voluntary enlistment
for service in any part of the world and for
any cause in which the Government wished
to use it meant that the Army was the recruit's
career and business. It was not a national duty
imposed upon the citizen as such, but in its
essence, contract service.
Now, such an Army is a precious possession,
and Great Britain was fortunate in that she
was the only Eiiropean Power which had force
in hand which could be used for the lesser
emergencies. It has been aptly remarked that
the cominental military machinery will only
work at full power. Taking this phrase in
the sense in which it was meant, the military
advantage of Great Britain was the capacity
to work effectively, if not economically, at all
powers. A grand battle on the Continent, the
maintenance of internal order at home, war upon
a kinglet in a tropical forest, and punishment
• Save In so tot a« the Mllltlft was used as a " feeder " lor the Armr.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
123
FIELD MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS.
IW. ir D. namuy.
of a high mountain tribe — all these tasks
were luiderstood to be within the capacity
of the infantry battalion that found itself
" next on the list for duty " at any given
moment.
Services so different as these imply that it
is service for service's sake, and not service on
behalf of personal beliefs and passions, that
is the main-spring of a professional army-
The British professional army went into action
against savages or against Boers with as much
bravery as against Napoleon or the Kaiser, and
we as a nation have the best reasons for real-
izing the truth of the remark of M. Psicharri's
French officer who, in contrasting the motives
of the " colonial " or adventurer army with
those of the " Metropolitan " or national
army, said that it was " a vulgar error
to attribute more patriotism to the former
than to the latter " ; that it was " a sub-
limated conception of fighting in itself as an
ideal " irrespective of victor\'and defeat which
Inspired the colonial anny*.
But if we recognize that it is not primarily
patriotism but high adventiu* that drives
the professional soldier to affront the manifold
chances of his service, we must accept it as
a necessary consequence tliat when the greatest
and gravest emergencies — the emergencies that
* The oruiiital is beK condensed ^td p&rBpbraaed slUbtly.
124
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. H. WILSON.
IH. Waller Barnett.
enlist the ordinary citizen — arise, fundamental
difference of character between the Regular
forces and the citizen forces will make itself
felt, however patriotic the soldier may be,
and however anxious the citizen in arms may
be for pay, separation allowances, &c. —
however completely, in short, their formal
outward regulations and terms of service may
be assimilated and unified. In effect,
a citizen army is definitely marked off
from a professional army, even thought
as in the case of modern European
armies, it is trained in barracks for consecutive
years, and even though, as in the American
Civil War, it goes through three years on hard
warfare, a citizen army it remains. The
question of voluntary or compulsory service,
which agitated Great Britain for some years
before the Great War, bears only indirectly
upon this larger question. A nominal com-
pulsion if combined with substitutions, but
only so, will produce the professional type,
the armee de metier of the Second Empire,
for example ; for the substitute is simply a
volunteer with a bounty, and the " principal "
who pays him to serve in his stead is a citizen
whose ideal may be patriotism, but is certainlj'
not war and adventure. And the citizen army
is even more an army animated by what is
called its voluntary spirit, since it is essentially
an army fighting ad hoc for a great and per-
sonally inspiring cause, and short of that
cannot be used at all. So that when com-
pulsion is applied to such a force in peace it
must, to succeed, have the certainty that
the voluntary spirit will be wholly operative
in war.
If, then, a nation is to have a professional
army of the British type, it should also possess
for those graver emergencies a separate army
based upon the citizen serving not as an agent
of the community, still less as an agent of the
Cabinet, but strictly as a member of the com-
munity. Continental armies, organized for the
great emergency and for that alone, can regard
their different categories of armed forces as
one in kind though various in degree of fitness.*
But the British was necessarily a " two-
line army "■ — an army consisting of two differ-
ent parts, each self-contained.
Now the professional army is always for its
numbers the most costly form, whether it be
a purely voluntary one, showing the whole
of its expenses on the State's budget, or a con-
script substitute one in which part of the
burden of cost is laid directly upon the indi-
viduals who pay substitutes to serve for them.
In the given two-line organization therefore
it is to be expected that the expenditure for
the uniforms, arms, training facilities, per-
manent cadres, &c., of this second line will be
kept as low as possible. The more professional
the first line then the less completely trained
the second Une can be. But both must be
employed, and must also expand on the out-
break of a war of great and deep significance.
The only precedent in modem English history
for such a war was the Napoleonic, and it is
interesting to see how the problem of expansion
was dealt with then.
The conditions differed from the modem in this
much, that in 1793-1815 there was no balance
maintained between the Regular Army at home
and that abroad — it was, of course, in the days
of the " volunteering " system above mentioned
— nor was there any Army Reserve, since in the
existing small Army service was practically
for life. But thanks to the Militia organiza-
tion it was possible, in a series of wars that
extended over more than half a generation,
to develop the Regular Army at home into an
expeditionary force, each battalion of which,
on going abroad, left behind it a draft-producing
•AlthouKh even here the neoepsity for neater techniral efficiency
for war — for instance, the prepare<lneHs in certain frontier troops — ■
liad Kone far enouwh to Huiiucst to iuivanceU students the possibility
of a return to the old armiie de mitier.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
225
battalion of the Regular Militia. This Militia
was raised nominally by compulsion, but in
practice by substitution. Insurance societies
which were formed to protect their members
against the luck of the ballot were able to pay
handsome bounties to substitutes, and it was
far more profitable for a man wljo intended to
anlist to do so in several stages, at each of
which he obtained money in some form, rather
than to go direct into the line for the single
bounty. Behind this Keguhir Militia, which
closely corresponded with the later Special
Reserve, there was the Local Militia of 1808,
equivalent to the modem Territorial Force,
in which personal S(>rvice was compulsory
and substitution forbidden. This was purely
a home-service force, formed out of the Volun-
teers previously existing, and there is no evi-
dence that it found any reinforcements for the
Regular Army, though a certain number of its
:nen volunteered for the Regular Militia.
After the peace the Militia of both kinds was
disbanded and ceased to exist, though Yeo-
manry belonging to it were from time to time
called out in aid of the civil power in the troubled
years of 1820-1850. All foreign and Colonial
wars and emergencies from 1815 to 1859 were
strictly of the kind to which a professional
army, and only a professional army, was adapted,
and although the Militia was re-created, and
embodied in the Crimean War, it was volun-
tarily enlisted from the same classes as those
which recruited the line direct. It became
an ante-chamber of the Regular service, and as
such gradually ceased both to be recruited from
citizens or to represent in any way the idea of ser-
vice as a duty to society. Into its place stepped
the Volimteers, who had primarily been formed,
or had rather formed themselves, to meet the
most serious danger that had threatened Britain
for centuries — the first Napoleon at the head
of the best professional army in the world and
a navy numerically equal, or even sujierior,
to the British Fleet. But, unlike previous
emergency forces, this did not vanish when the
emergency passed. On the contrary, it grew
into a permanent force, witn its own settled
habits and traditions and a strong tie of mem-
bership to assist or replace the purely military
cohesion that its intermittent trainings could not
be expected to give.
While this process of solidifying the tem-
porary Volunteers was going on, the Regular
Army was itself undergoing great changes. The
Franco-German War of 1870-1871 had revealed
the prowess of the short-service national army ;
iLs great aptitude for the changed teclinical con-
ditions of warfare, its extraordinary numerical
strength, and its intensive trftinftig. None
of those things made it a type of army that
could serve the piiri)oses of a Colonial
Empire, but ita munbers and flexibility at any
rate were factors in its favour that had to be
taken into account and answered by like factors
in any professional army that might b<' called
upon to face it. TJie only way of increasing the
numbers of that professional army was to divide
the period of the soldier's service into colour
service and reserve service. To those unfamiliar
with the working of the Army system it may
seem to be a mere truism to say that the war
strength of the Army depends on the annual
intake of recruits ; yet it is a fact that critics of
the system frequently sought to increase that •
strength by other means, such as changing the
periods of service, re-enlisting reservists, &c.
It is therefore important to make it clear that
the real gain from short service is the great in-
crease in the number of vacancies to be filled
annually, and therefore a great increase in the
intake of recruits, establishments and cost
remaining unaltered.*
The short service principle was not, of course,
applicable in its entirety. To begin with,
service in the professional overseas Army could
not be made incumbent upon the citizen as
such. Further, when a man enlisted for Army
service he did so with the intention of rendering
Service for a reasonable number of years, and
not with that of receiving training as quickly as
possible in view of a future emergency ; and,
lastly, the cost of changing the whole of the
rank-and-file personnel abroad every three years
or so was prohibitive. A compromise therefore
was adopted. The period of liability and of
pay for that UabiUty was fixed at 12 years, of
which six or seven were spent with the colours
and six or five in the reserve.f
At the same time the Unking of the single
battaUons was carried out, and to each regiment
thus formed was affiliated one or more Militia
battalions, which were closely associated with
the dep6t8 of the Regular battaUons, and so
occupied a middle position between the old self-
contained citizen force and the pure draft -pro-
ducing agency, the function of the latter tending
constantly to develop in importance at the
expense of the fonner.
This system — professional Regulars, half at
home and half abroad ; MiUtia, half drafts
for Regulars, half agricultural volunteers ;
Volunteers, townisraen thorouglily organized in
• Thus on an establbihiiiunt o( lOC.OOO men alwitrs present » 1th
the ooloure 25.000 recruits a >e»r could be taken lor four yem'
service. 60.000 for two years', and 200.00<i for si v months'.
t The periods have varied slluhtly. «id in one owe, to be lefemd
to presently, a mu«h sliorttr terra of (oiour service w«« introduced.
The aeriocU vary also acoorUiiiK to the inn of the service.
12»
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL SIR HORACE SMITH-DORRIEN
[Newman
battalions and looseiy grouped in brigades, and
a Regular Army Reserve — was the system in
force when the next great occasion for expansion
came in the South African War of 1899-1902.
The expansion required proved to be too much
for the system, especially in respect of mounted
men. Battalions of Militia and companies of
Volimteers who offered to serve abroad were
sent out to reinforce the,i:ifantry and to set free
a large number of infantrymen who had been
trained in mounted infantry work. Moreover,
a very large part of the Yeomanry — ^the light
cavalry of the Vohuitsers* — ^was sent out, and
fresh regiments raised ad hoc constantly followed
them. Other contingents of mounted troops
were raised in the Dominions and Colonies,
South Africa of course included.
These various forms of " expansion," with
their unavoidable overlapping and the technical
difficulties, both of handling and of administra-
tion, owing to the dissimilarities of organi-
zation, terms of service, pay, and train-
ing, led, after the war, to a re-examination
of the whole military system. After variou.s
unsatisfactory experiments had been made,
a fresh system was matured and brought into
operation by Mr. Secretary Haldane in 1907-
1910
Under this system, the Regular forces at
home were re-grouped and permanently or-
ganized as an expeditionary force of six divi-
sions and a cavalry division ; the Militia in
its old form was abolished and replaced by the
Special Reserve, a force destined on mobiliza-
tion to form a reserve battalion upon which
the Regular Army fighting oversea could draw
.steadily for reinforcements ; and the Yeomanry
and Vohmteers were re-formed as the Territorial
Force of all arms and branches, with a complete
divisional organization analogous tc that of the
Regular Army. This was the Army system
in force at the outbreak of the great war, and it
is now oiu- duty to describe it in some detail.
For the infantry of the line, half of which was
at home and half abroad, the period of service
was seven years with the Colours and five in
the Reserve. This division of the twelve years'
liability had been found by experience to give
the best mean between the length of service
necessary to allow the drafts and reliefs to work
well and the shortness of service necessary for
the production of a large Reserve. After the
South African War, which had been carried
through, with a little assistance from India,
chiefly by the home Army and the Jleserve,
the value of the latter had become so con-
spicuous that the drafting problem was allowed
to 'all into the background. Three years'
Colour and nine Reserve service was intro-
duced in 1902 for the express purpose of build-
ing up a great Reserve. But the conditions of
a man's eligibility for service in India — (o) age
20 ; (h) service at least one year ; (c) not less
than four years to run before expiry of Coloiu-
•Xho^'sh ofBdally a ilWInct roroe.
MAJOR-GENERAL
ALLENBY.
{Gale & Pald^n
THE TIMES mUTOHY OF THE WAR
127
FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN FRENCH.
l/f. HaiHfi
sprvice — obviovisly made it impossible for any
soldier enlisted on these terms to bo sent to
India at all. It was hoped that between two-
thirds and three-quarters of the men would
voluntarily " extend their service," and hwl
that hojje been realized no difficulty of course
would have arisen. But it was not realized,
and the working of the draft.'' broke down so
badly that nine years' Colour and three Reserve
had to be adopted in order to redrosj the
balance. Finally, the former seven-five term
was reintroduced.
But it was not only the years immediately
concerned that were affected by these thanges
of terms. Until the last men enli.sted on the
three-nine year terms of li)02 finally passed out
of the Reserve in 1914, tlio routine smoothness
with which the recruiting branch had been
working in the nineties could not be restored,
and just before the Declaration of War the
recruiting system was being taxed to the utmost
to make good the great efHux of both the nine-
year men of 1904-5 and the seven-year men
of 1906-7.
Inseparable from the question of drafts was
that of establishments. The Indian battalion
was on a war footing, 1,000 in round munlx>rs,
j)ermanently, the home battalion on an
establislunent of about 750. Now wlien a
battalion went abroad to relieve its sister
battalion it had at the .same tinje to increase
its establishment, and as the battalion due to
come honie included, in the nature of things,
very many soldiers in their last \ear of service.
i.e., due for discharge, it could leave l)ehind but
fev,- for the newcomers to take over. The
battalion going out, therefore, would have to
[jrovide most of its own extra men. Further
— and this was always the mix of the problem — '■
it could not take with it men less tliau 20 years
of age. nor recruits. If, therefore, it was to stand
on its new footing in trained men over 19, it must
have been over-filled with recruits two years
beforehand, and — ivs the home establishm nt
128
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
then governed it— serving soldiers must have
been dismissed prematurely to the Reserve
to make vacancies for these recruits. Under
these rigid conditions it w&s possible, and even
frequent, for a battalion at home to be below
establishment and yet closed to recruiting,
and, worse still, these premature discharges to
the Reserve might have to take place at a
moment unfavourable for recruiting— as was
the case in 1912-1913, when in order to make
room a very large number of men who would
be trained and available for drafts in 1914-15
serving soldiers were prematurely sent to the
Reserve by the thousand, though recruiting
was far from brisk at the time. Hence there
occurred a shortage in the Regular Army,
which alarmed the nation not a little, but was,
in iact, largely the result of the violent dis-
turbance of the seven-five year terin in 1902
and of the limiting conditions of establishment
and qualification for Indian service.
Undsr these conditions the establishment of
a home battalion weis practically determined
by the ntunbers of the annual draft for India.
In the days of " volunteering," as we have
seen, there was no large force of units at home,
and the units abroad were fed from depots.
But after the battalions were linked, those at
home foimd the draft for their " links," and
as they were the onjy available expeditionary
force it was impossible to regard them as
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBB.
iGalt & Poldtn
MAJOR-GENERAL PULTENEY.
lElliol &■ Fry
mere dep6t8. It was therefore settled that
the home battalion should consist of
three sets of men destined for three annual
drafts of 150 each, to be sent out as each set
becomes qualified, plus 300 men who would
grow to maturity in, and remain throughout
their service with, the home battalion, which
without them would be in the condition de-
scribed by Lord Wolseley as that of a " squeezed
lemon."
All this administrative and actuarial work
had been reduced to a science by the recruiting
branch, and short of disturbing reforms the
system worked with a certainty that would
hardly be credible under an apparently hap-
hazard system of voluntary enlistment, were
it not that the laws of probability act with
the greater certainty when the numbers dealt
with are large and the causes influencing them
manifold, diverse, and independent.
In the case of the Expeditionary Force as
it stood at the Declaration of War in August
1914, the far-reaching effect of the previous
distwbances was completely neutralized by
two simple expedients — the lowering of the
foreign service age limit to 19 and the abolition
of the mounted infantry, which was replaced
by additional cavalry, made available by with-
drawals of Imperial troops from South Africa in
1912-13. The latter step alone meant that per-
haps 50 picked men per battalion remained
with their vmits, and the former made
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
129
available 100 to 200 men jwr battdlion
who would Imve Ihx^ii too immature for a tropical
or sub-tropical war. Mol)ilization therefore was
carried tlirough without a hitch, and the
Special Reserve battalions were at once ready
to absorb the surplus Regular reservists.
In the case of the Guards, who were not
employed on foreign service in peace, there was
no draft question to complicate matters
The term of service therefore was three and
nine years, and an enormous Reserve wag
thereby created.*
The Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers
were each a single corps. Men enhsted for
Garrison Artillery could not be posted to mounted
corps, and in the E.igineers tliere was an ela-
borate classification of men according to their
trades. But apart from these complications
drafting presented no problems for the scie.it ific
arms, indeed no Engineer units at all were
stationed in India.f
In the cavalry of the line men were enlisted
tor the " corps " of Hussars, Dragoons, &o.,
and allowed to express preference for particular
regiments within these corps. This arrangement
*In all calculatfonB of Reserve streiiKth It is Important to note •
on the awtUoritv of Sir C. HarriH, the Assistant Financial Secretary
of the War (>rti<.^, tlj^it '" wastage," year for year, was not appre-
cial)ly greater in tlie case of reserviata tlian In that of uien with the
Colours.
tllad some grouping of infintry regiments been practicable
th« example of the Koyal Artillery shows that many if not
most of the complications previously de cribetl would have been
removed. Hut this reform, though sugso^tetl and supiK>rlod by
high authority, failed to i)entitrate the strong waits of the regimental
cattle.
GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON.
lEUiott Or Fn
LT.-GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.
U. RusuU & Sons
at once removed most of the complications
of drafting, and as cavalry is an arm always
maintained on a higli peace footing, there
were no seriou.s changes of establishment to
be prepared for when units went abroad.
In consequence, the mobihzation of cavalry
regiments at home presented no special diffi-
culty. Each regiment, on proceeding on active
service, left behind it a reserve squadron
which absorbed tecruits and surplus reservists
and continued to feed its unit throughout the
war, in the same way as a special reserve unit
of infantry.*
In the horse mobilization of the mounteu
branches both of the Field Force and of the
Territorial Army there was the same thorough-
ness and attention to detail. Whereas in the
Soiitli African War the lack of system liad been
quite as marked in the matter of horses as in
the matter of men, when tlje European War
broke out it found the authorities in all grades
prepared to deal witli the situation, for the
rapid growth of motor traction in the inter-
vening years had drawn public attention to tlie
horsing problem. The peace establishments of
the Army in horses had been increased, 'li«
system of " boarding-out "■^ had been intro-
duced, first tentatively and then on a larger
* There wa) no draft-flndinff Spjcial Reierv'e dnirr.
t Iki^rded-out horses were Cloverimi.'nt-o*wned animals additional
to the ordinary peace establishment,
and othsis and maintained by them.
which were lent to farmen
130
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
scale, oivilian buyers had been appointed in
readiness for emergency, and above all a really
useful census of, horses had been taken.
Built up on these principles of organization,
the Regular Army on October 1, 1913, was
distributed as shown below : —
Militia elements of the force was the '' regular
establishment," which carried on the work of
the regimental depot and trained the
recruits there. This force, however, had in
peace times failed to attract sufficient recruits.
It was generally thought by the classes likely
DISTKIBUnON
OP THE BEGUI^AE
ARMY.
Infantry.
Cavalry.
Horse &
Field
Artillery.
Garrison Engi-
Artillery. neers
Flying
Corps.
A.S.C.
Depart-
luentii.
Colonial Indian
troops . ttviops in
Irap.pay.
Total.
ON HOME ESTABLISHMENT
Uaited Kingdom
IieUmd
Cb&nnel Islands
61.442
14.409
1.355
10 673
2.052
13,640
4.0/2
6.728
733
299
5 978
35
822
4.848
889
11
5.161
850
36
-
99.192
2'1.282
1,736
Total
67.206
54.584
12.625
17,712
7.760
7.290
822
5.748
6.046
- -
126 .209
ON INDIAN ESTABLISH
MENT
5.695
10.971
4.463
377
-
-
638
— ' 602
77.130
ON COLONIAL ESTABLISH-
MENT.
Gibraltar
Malta
Egypt and Cyp' us
Ceylon. Straits Settlements and
China Stations . .
Bouth Africa
Various, on passage. &(;.
1.830
4.172
4.543
4,069
3.600
3,168
633
1,137
180
453
1.387
1.577
193
1.699
292
846
396
410
163
458
520
399
~
85
109
104
120
282
57
179
229
217
300
482
270
437
621
2.867
200
6.267
3.877
6.934
6.233
13.434
6.826
7.607
Totol
21.442
1.770
633
5.994
2.346
10.013
~
757
1.077
3,825 6.467
44.911
Grand Total . .
143,232
19,990
29.316
18.217
822
6.505
8,261
3.826
7,069
247.250
The Army Reserve, the strength of which
had fluctuated considerably in consequence
of the various changes in the terms of colour
service, consisted of : —
STRENGTH OF THE ARMY RESEEVE
ON OCTOBER 1, 11113.
A.
B.
D.
Total.
Cavalry
Horse and Field Artillery
Garrison Artillery
Engineers . .
Inlantry
Various
670
426
4.234
493
6.967
13.694
6.023
4,079
62.510
10.823
3.708
4.645
259
959
23.382
2.218
10.675
19.009
6.282
5.464
90.126
13.534
Total
5.823
104,096
35.171
145. 090
Section A consisted of Reservists who had
ijndertaken to rejoin the colours if required
on an emergency short of general mobilization ;
Section B (with C) comprised all who had enlisted
for short service (3-7 years) and had discharged
their active duties. Section D consisted of men
who after the expiry of their 12 years total term
had re -enlisted for a further four years in the
Reserve.
The Special Reserve, which consisted almost
entirely of infantry,* was created from the re-
mains of the Militia to act as the " Regular Militia'
battalions had acted in the Napoleonic wars, as
feeders for the Line in war. All ranks were liable
for foreign service in war, and the term of enlist-
ment was six years. Incorporated with the
•At one time a large force of Field Artillery Special Heservlsti
was enlisted for the manning of anununition columns. Hut these
were no longer required when Army Service Corps motor transport
look over this duty.
to join that pressure was brought to bear on
" S.R." recruits while at the depot to enter the
Regular Army ; and in fact many thousands of
men annually joined the Special Reserve in
order to bring up their physical and other
qualifications to the Regular standard before
passing into the Line, or in order to see " how
they liked the life " before committing them-
selves finally. These men were, of course,
potential Regulars, and not part-trained
Reservists.
The Territorial Force since its reconstruction
had had a troubled history. Upon it had
centred many criticisms that might have been
directed against the Army system as a whole.
Its weaknesses were naturally more in evi-
dence than those of the Special Reserve, or
those which were the outcome of drafting
difficulties in the Regular Army. Since it
was pre-eminently the national army, embody-
ing the idea of duty service, those who
advocated and worked for compulsory military
service focassed their efforts upon it. Whether
this volume of criticism affected its material
training is doubtful, but at times certainly
it did affect the moral of the force, and from
first to last it almost controlled the recruiting.
Further, the local recruiting authorities were in
many cases too much absorbed in the business
administration of the units under their charge
to be able to deal with recruiting in the
more scientific spirit of the Recruiting
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
131
BRIGADIER GENERAL
SIR PHILIP CHETWODE.
IH. Waller Barnill.
Branon of the War Office ; unnecessarily
wild fluctuations of intake — alternate
" booms " and '" slumps " — were the result.
In some years one-seventh, in otliers as
much as one-tliird of tiie Territorial Force
would be due for discharge, and the problem
of making flood the deficiency in advance
of its occurrence was a liard one. In the
result the force was considerably short of iXs
peace ostablisliment of 315,438, tliough it was
never much below 250,000.
The term of service in the Territorial Force waa
four years, re-engageioents being allowed. The
training liabilities were ten to twenty drills
ix<r aiinimi, two wfteks' continuous training in
<'amp, and a musketry course. When the
Territorial Force was created, it was intended to
form a Reserve for it as soon as possible, and
to that end re-engagements of time-expired
men were at first discouraged. Owing, how-
ever, to inelastic regulations by which com-
paratively few men were qualifiiKl to pass into
this Reserve*, and to the sudden popularity of
the new National Reaer\'e, the Territorial Force
Reserve was little more than a list of officers
who, while leaving their regiments on change
of residence, &c., wishetl to continue in the force
against the day of mobilization. Far more
satisfactory was the condition of two other
auxiliaries of the Territorial Force, the National
Reserve and the \'oluntar\- Aid Detachments.
The former nimibered over 200,000 old soldiers
and sailors divided into three categories, (1)
i-egistered for general service ; (2) registered
for home service ; (3) not available for
service under arms. The provision of officers
for these various forces we» regulated thus : —
In the ca.se of the Regular Army, officers were
appointed (a) from cadets trained at the Royal
Military Academy, Woolwich (for Artillery
and Engineers), or at the Royal Militarj' College,
Sandhiu^t (for other arms), to which in-
stitutions they were admitted in some cases by
Governmental or headmasters' nominations, in
the rest by comjjetitive examination ; (6) from
•Another branch of this Reserve, wliich was provided for but
never formal, w;is the " Technlwil " lte«erve. a reslster of inen
available u« local Buldet*. sui>erint.-ndent--4 of works. Ac.
VIEW OF SALISBURY PLAIN.
/>.;.,v Mirror.
132
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
among University students, after examination
and preliminary military training in the Officers
Training Corps ; (c) from Colonial candidates
trained at the Royal Military Colleges of Canada,
AustraUa, &c.
In the case of the Special Reserve and the
Territorial Force, officers were appointed either
after service in the Officers Training Corps
or direct from civil life. The O.T.C. was
composed of senior division contingents belong-
ing to the Universities and junior division con-
tingents belonging to the public schools. The
total strength of cadets in the O.T.C. was
approximately 25,000, of whom about 5,000 in
the senior division were imdergraduates of
military age available for inunediate service.
The officers of the corps were drawn from the
Special Reserve and the Territorial Force.
There were practical and written examina-
tions in military subjects for cadets, as well
as drill and camp training.
In the general organization of the Army the
principle had been adopted since the South
African War of separating as far as possible
command and training from administration.
To that end the General Staff of the Army
was made distinct from other branches of
headquarters and staffs ; the administration,
equipment, &c., of the Territorial Force was
placed in the hands of a County Association,
and that of the] Regular Army in the
hands of a special general officer subordinate
to the Commands-in-Chief in each region, but
endowed with wide powers of Administration.
The central administration of the. Army was
divided into four n»in departments. The
General-Staff dealt with operations, the Adjutant-
General's Staff with personnel, the Quarter-
master-General's with materiel, and the Staff
of the Master-General of the Ordnance with
armament.
The Army at home, including the Special
Reserve and the Territorial Force, was grouped
by divisions and brigades into large " com-
mands " imder generals commanding-in-chief,
each of whom had under him a general staff
branch, under a brigadier-general or colonel,
and a major-general or brigadier-general in
charge of Administration. The London district
was separately organized. For recruiting and
record purposes, or, so far as concerned the
Regular Army and Special Reserve, the Com-
mands, except Aldershot, were sub-divided
jnto districts. Under the Army Coimcil and
directly reporting to it were the Inspector-
General Home Forces and the Inspector-
General Oversea Forces (who was also
Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Com-
mand, but had no jurisdiction in India). These
officers with their staffs were charged with the
duty of constantly moving about amongst the
troops and satisfying themselves of the efficiency
of their training for war.
Such being the general organization of the
British Army at home, we now come to consider
the fighting organization of its parts as con-
stituted for military operations.
The unit of infantry was the battalion, com-
manded by a lieutenant-colonel. In 1913 the
previous organization of eight companies
of about 120 each had been replaced by one of
four companies of about 240, commanded by
a mounted officer, major or captain, with a
second captain, and a subaltern in command of
each of the four " platoons " of 60 men into
which the company was divided. The battalion
included, fiu'ther, a machine gun section of two
guns, a section of signallers, medical officer and
bearers, &c. Its first line transport, which
immediately accompanied the troops on the
march, comprised eight company ammunition
mules and six ammunition carts (one of which
was for the machine guns), two tool carts,
two water carts, four travelling kitchens (one
per company), and a medical cart. The
armament was the " short Lee-Enfield " of 1903
and bayonet. The men's equipment was
made not of leather but of strong webbing, of
the same grey-green colour as the uniforms.
The baggage and supply wagons of the infantry
formed part of the Train. The brigade of in-
fantry consisted of four battalions under a
Brigadier-General, which had a small reserve
of tools, and also a brigade ammunition
ARMY MOTOR CYCLISTS.
[Sport Or Getural
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
133
LONDON SCOTTISH RIFLES.
reserve formed by assembling some of the
battalion c irts.
The cavalry regiment consist^ of three
squadrons, each of about 150 sabros, divided
into four troops, and a regimental machine gun
section of two guns. The squadron was com-
manded by a major, with a captain as his
second. The first line transport included
squadron baggage wagons, squadron ammuni-
tion carts, and squadron tool carts, and
for the regiment a wagon-carryin - raft equip-
ment for the hasty crossing of streams, and a
cook's vehicle corresponding in cooking
capacity to about two of the travelling kitchens
used by the infantry.
The Cavalry Brigade consisted of three such
regiments. The armament of the cavalry
was sword, rifle, and in some cases lance. The
equipment was light and stripped to bare
essentials, but the cloth puttees worn by the
men since the loose individual skirmishing
of the South African War were less satisfactory
for the knee-to-knee charge that was to be
expected in Eiu-opean warfare. The Field
Artillery unit was the so-called " brigade "
(corresponding to the " group " of foreign
armies and to be differentiated from the brigade
in the larger sense). Each brigade, whether of
I8-pounder q.f. gims or of 4-lin. q.f. howit-
zers, comprised a brigade headquarters with
telephone equipment, and three six-gun bat-
teries. For each gun there were two ammuni-
tion wagons, one of which, in action, was
placed close beside the gun itself. Both
gims and wagons were six-horsed flexible double
carriages, composed of body (or gun-carriage)
and limber, which gave them a balance, and
therefore a mobility, which compared with
that of the " General Service " wagon in much
the same w.iy as a hansom compares with a
" four-wheeler."
In the Horse Artillery the " brigade " con-
sisted of two batteries only. The distinctive
mark of this branch was speed, owing to the
lighter gim (I2.pounder q.f.), and to the fact
that most of the gunners instead of being carried
on the gun, gun limber, or first wagon, as in
the case of the Field Artillery, rode separately.
Heavy Artillery also accompanied the field
army. A heavy battery consisted of four 60.
pounder guns,* manned by the garrison artil-
lery and drawn at a walk or slow trot by eight
heavy draught horses apiece.
To each " brigade " of field or horse artillery
guns was attached a " brigade ammunition
column," which provided a third full wagon
for each gun, and also a reser\-e of rifle ammuni-
tion for the infantry. Tlie howitzer brigade
and heavy battery ammunition columns were
similar, -except that they provided no rifle
ammunition. Another reserve of ammunition
behind this was provided by the Divisional
Ammunition Column, this also under artillery
charge,- and behind this again was the Motor
Ammimition Park, to be alluded to presently.
The field units of the Royal Engineers wwe : —
The " field squadrons " or fielci troops, the signal
squadrons and signal troops attached to cavalry
divisions or brigades, the field companies and
signal companies attached to divisions, and
the bridging trains and signal sections at the
disposal of commanders of higher formations.
Tire details of the Signal Sers'ice cannot here be
described, and it must suffice to mention' that
the imits of this service included wireless
telephone and telegraph operators with their
equipment, as well as flag and lamp signallers
and dispatch riders, mounted on horses or
motor-bicycles. Wireless was employed
cliiefly to connect General Headquarters with
*Not howitzers, as was almost always tbe case In tbe Ooottnental
heavy artillery.
134
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
the fast-moving cavalry in advance ; telegraplis
(air-line or ground cable) were for general
work, and telephones for communication on
the battlefield itself.
The bridging trains were simply a great
mobile reserve of pontoons and trestles, to be
used bj' the field companies when the bridging
equipment of the latter proved insufficient.
The field squadrons, field troops, and field com-
panies were the most important and generally
useful of the engineer organizations. They
provided for bridging, for demolitions, for
Such were the constituent parts of the
division. The division itself was commanded by
a major-general, whose st-aff, like all higher
staffs, was divided into a general staff branch, an
adjutant general's branch, and a quartermaster-
general's branch. It consisted of throe infantry
brigades, three field artillery brigades,
one field howitzer brigade and one heavy
battery, with a divisional signal company,
two field companies Royal Engineers, and
one squadron of cavalry, in all 18,073 men,
5,592 horses, 76 guns, and 24 machine guns.
I NFANTRV
ARTI UL.E: R Y
dddd
X J. X X
X X X X
X X X X
Three infantry br/gac/es iv/t/t
batta/Zon macfi/ne ffun seci/ons
'I' 'I' i'
[El
|. .|.
Ill II III
ISl
i|i .|. i|.
lEI
Three f/e/c/art///ert/grcy/f
be/ffs py/t/> t/?e/r am. co/s.
Ill
F/e/d
Hoiv'rBde.
i
IS
Heavu
Baty.
^
Sguac/ron
Cava/ry
° g Co</s./^.£.
a □
SBrigade A/?^
Sect/ons Sect/on
Di\/is/ona/ S/ff. Coy.
& &
Am. Co/s. Am. Co/s.
Three F/e/d Ambu/ances ^ A, /\ Tent AAA AAA
a El B Bearers EI H EI EI B EI
D/Wsfona/ Train
Four /lorsec/ co/r?pan/es Ar/ny Serv/ce Corps.
(3 br/gac/e co/npao/es ar?c/ / /7eac/^c/art€rs)
co/npany For ar/:///ery, er?q/r?eers e^er.)
KE! S la Kl
D/'y/s/ona/ Ammun/t/on
Co/umn
Fhur .sect/ons {/r? arti//ery, cAaryeJ
ISS ^^ S^ SIS
expert supervision of infantry working parties,
£Uid for water supply.
The Army Service Corps units in the field
fall into two distinct branches, the horsed
" trains " and the mechanical transport
" columns."
The medical service in the field centred
around the Field Ambulance. Each unit of that
name included three " tent " and three " bearer "
subdivisions, etich self-contained and there-
fore separable from the rest for the benefit
of outlying detachments, flying columns, &c.
The catalogue of the necessary auxiliaries to
the fighting troops, in itself meaningless to
readers unacquainted with the military system,
included a coinplete and up-to-date organization,
which we may briefly describe under the three
headings of baggage and supply, anununition,
and medical aid. But before it is possible to
do so a few words must be said as to the working
of the lines of communication of an army.
Perhaps no Army in the world had its lines
of communication services so well organized
in peace as the British. The reason is simple
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
135
60-POUNDER IN ACTION.
[Sport Or Gtiurai.
enough, viz., that it was accustomed to fight
in ill-developed countries where the Army
must create the resoiu-ces of civilization before
it could use them. Duties on the line of com-
munication were administrative, controlled
by an Inspector-General of Communications ;
and defensive (for the protection of the line
itself), controlled by the " commander of L.
of C. Defences." At the safer end of the line
lay the base, generally a port, and at frequent
intervals along the line were small posts for
traffic control. Sometimes an advanced dep6t
was formed at some distance up the
line, where emergency reserves of stores
were accumulated, but the " line " extended
far in front of it. At " railhead," the variable
point at which railway traffic ceased, there
were no accumulations of stores, a day's
requirements being sent daily by train to be
taken thence by the motor lorries of the " supply
columns " to the troops.
This motor-transport was a new system,
unlike that of anv other armv. and had been
introduced in 1911. In it a complete break
had been made with the traditions of the old
horse -and -cart supply system. Horse trans-
port was now used purely for distributing,
the conveyance of supplies to the areas occupied
by the troops being performed wholly by motor
transport.
The daily rim of the motor lorry being taken
at 90 miles, the army could advance to a dis-
tance from its railhead of 45 miles — or rath«r
to a distance such that " refilling point,"
where the horsed trains took over the contents
of the lorries daily for distribution, should not
be more than 45 miles. But if a new and nearer
railhead could be chosen for next day this
distance could be by so much exceeded.*
Tbe new system thus gave greater range and
flexibility to the army's operations. It also
cleared the roads in rear of the troops of the
vast convoys of horsed wagons which formerly
gravely impeded the army's manoeuvres,
•As there were no stores aocumulated at milhead, thifi point
could t)e chanKed at four to five hours' notice.
IRISH GUARDS.
iSport 6- Gen/Tji,
136
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
DURHAM LIGHT INFANTRY.
[.Sport & Getural,
To gfive a practical example. On a Thursday
evening the men of an infantry battalion would
have Friday's bread and cheese in their haver-
sacks {plus a preserved ration for emergencies),
and the travelling kitchens (called " cookers ")
Friday's meat, groceries, &c. At that time the
wagons of the train allotted to the service of the
unit would be empty, waiting to meet the motor
" supply columns " on Friday. These supply
columns themselves would be at railhead,
waiting for the rations to be railed thither from
down the line. At 3 a. m. or so on Friday
these railway trains would have discharged
their contents and the lorries would be on their
way at a speed of ten miles an hour to meet the
enjpty wagons of the train at " refilling point."
Thus for the first time in the history of war it
had become possible for fresh meat and bread
to be supplied to a distant army. The meat
that our battalion would eat on Friday even-
ing was probably alive on Wednesday morn-
ing 100 miles away down the line.
This, however was not the only, or indeed
the principal, method of supply. As far as
possible the resources of the country traversed
by the army were utilized by requisitioning.
Until a few years* before the war the British
Army, with its 18th-century tradition of
regarding the civilian as a spectator in the
Government's wars, and its experience of wild
colonial campaigns, had been quite unfamiUar
with this resource ; but latterly much study
liad been devoted to it and ample provision of
motor-cars had been made for the requisition-
ing officers.
The replacement of ammunition was con-
ducted upon a somewhat similar system.
At various posts along the line of communica-
tion were dejjots of the Army Ordnance Corps,
which forwarded ammunition as required to
QUEEN'S OWN OXFORD HUSSARS.
[Sport & Central,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
137
GENERAL SIR CH.\RLES DOUGLAS.
IRusuO & Sims.
railhead, where the motor-lorries of the divi-
sional ammunition park took it over for con-
veyance to the horsed distritiiting agency
(corresponding to the trains above-mentioned )
called C'tB Diviaioiial Ammunition Colunm.
This coliunn was generally broken up into
sections, each following at some distance one
of the artillery brigade ammunition columns,
which were the actual issuers to batteries and
to infantry brigades.
In both these cases the governing principle
was that no one should have to go back
for food, and no one to retire to fetch
ammunition. In the medical service the same
thing is observable — persistent effort to keep
the front in working condition. In this case
the principle was that of " evacuation." The
nearer a hospital to the front, the clearer it
was kept. This of course served both the
interests of the army, which, in theor>% should
never be compelled to forgo its Eeld ambulances
in an advance after battle, and those of the
wounded man, who was removed as far as his
condition would allow from the area of conflict
and hurry, to recover in quiet. The working of
the orgEmization was briefly this : — A wounded
man* was taken by the regimental stretcher-
bearers (the bandsmen of peace tinie) to the
" aid post," where the regimental medical officer
■Etot soldier had a ~ Ont tiM dnniiic " in his pocket.
GORDON HIGHL.\NDERS.
iSftri S- Ctmml,
138
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A MAXIM GUN ON NEW TRIPOD.
[Sport is General.
attended to him. To these aid posts came up the
bearer subdivisions of the field ambulance, which
conveyed the patient to an " Advanced Dressing
Station ' ' formed by a Tent Sub division. Thence
he was conveyed after treatment, and perhaps
a day's rest, by the ambulance wagons (bearer
subdivision) to meet a party from the " clearing
hospital," a large field hospital at some con-
venient point near railhead. It was the
business of this hospital, as its name shows,
to evacuate the wounded from the field am-
bulances, which it did by any available means
of transport — country carts, canal boats,
railway trains, motor- lorries of the supply
columns, or ammi nition parks. Once on the
line of communications, the patient could be
dealt with by stationary hospitals, the general
hospital at the base, or convalescent camps,
as required, or .sent back to Great Britain by
hospital train and hospital ship.
The organization of a cavalry division
consisted of four brigades, four batteries of
horse artillery, and auxiliary .services, as shown
in the following table : —
S<juadrons —
Machine _
Cun Sections
Sym/Troc^-*
000 000
0£ii
Brigade of 3Rgts.
O
000 000 000
-L i -L
Brigade of J ^Ay.
2 "Brigades" Horse
ill ill ill ill Artillery
■en ir;i //Je//
H S em. cols.
D^ field Sijuadron R.C.
[X!l Signal Squadron
I Cavalry Field
Ambulance
000 000 000
Brigade of 5 Rpts.
O
000 000 000
Brigade of J Rgts.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
139
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD
MURRAY. iSftaieht.
In some cfises cavalry brigades wore formed
without being allotted to a cavalry division.
Such brigades were given a battery of horse
artillery, and enough of other services to
render them self-supporting and self-contained
bodies.
The food and anirnunition systems differed
from thos<^ of the infantry divisions, in tliat the
motor- lorries delivered food direct to the
" cookers " of the regiments and ammunition
direct to the brigade ammunition columns,
there being no " train " or divisional ammuni-
tion columii. The ambulances, too, were
differently organized, to provide for the special
needs of cavalrj', which had to fight over wide
areas and at great distances in front of the main
body.*
The war strength of a cavalry division was
9,269 men and 9,815 horses, 24 guns, and 24
machine guns.
The whole Expeditionary Force as organized
in 1914 consisted of six divisions, one cavalry
division, and one (or two) unallotted cavalry
brigades, with additional troops styled " army
troops " at the disposal of the higher com-
manders, besides the line of communication
troops both for administration and for the de-
fence of the line. The army troops included
*Tt ithould be noted that all bagease and supply vehicles of cavairr
were drawn by four horses of the " vanner " or ortlinary military
tyiie, whereas Uiose of the greater iiart of the anny were drawn by
two lieavy cart horses each.
BRITISH TROOPS AT HAVRE.
IDaHf Mimr.
140
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
FIFTH LANCERS.
ISport &■ General.
the squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps,
each squadron being subdivided into three
"Flights" each of foiu- aeroplanes with their
attendant motors and stores.
Taken all in all, the organization and equip-
ment of this force was on a more elaborate scale
than that of Continental units of corresponding
strength. This, and the professional character
of the Army, in no small degree compensated
for its small numbers, and the German critic
who in 1913 remarked that the British Ex-
peditionary Force was " not an enemy to
be despised " (keine zu verachtende Oegner) was
nearer the truth than perliaps he realized
k
CHAPTER VIII.
THE ARMIES OF THE DOMINIONS.
Importance of Sea Power Generally Understood — Lack of Organization or Imperial
Land Forces — The Value of a Striking Force — The Dominions in Advance of the Mother
Country — National Obugation Realized and Enforced — Democracy and National Service
— Popularity and Success of the Experiment — Canada — An Army in Embryo — Character
of Her Military Institutions — The Australasian and New Zealand Systems— Defence
System of South Africa — A Difficult Problem — English, Dutch, and Native —
Frontier and Intbpjjal Defence — The Defence Act of 1912 — The Rally of the Dominions
— Men — Supplies — Unanimity op Empire.
WHEN the war broke out it found
Great Britain and the Dominions
organically unready, so far at
least as military preparations
were concerned, to put even a small proportion
of their potential strength into the field.
The Navy was ready, as it always had been
ready. There a sound instinct had warned
the British peoples to maintain at all costs
the margin of strength which was considered
necessary. It was a bare margin, reckoned
merely by the niuiiber of ships available, but it
was indefinitely increased by the spirit of their
crews, men who through years of waiting had
always kept their will fixed on the single object
that of preparation for the day of trial.
In a sense, too, the Navy was representative
of the maximum effort of the whole British
peoples. The. Dominions had for some time
recognized the debt they owed tc its protection.
Australia had gone far to complete a squadron
of her own. The battle cruiser New Zealand,
the gift of the Dominion whose name she bore,
was attached to the Home Fleet. Canada
had made it perfectly clear some years before
that she intended to bear all that she could of
the burden imposed on the people of Great
Britain by the building of new ships and the
CANADIAN TROOPS. THE QUEEN'S RIFLES.
141
[Daily Minor
142
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
cost of their maintenance and equipment.
Unfortunate domestic differences had com-
pelled the Western Dominion to postpone her
offer to provide three Dreadnoughts for the
Britfeh Fleet. But it was perfectly under,
stood in the British Isles that the will to help
was there, even though the power to give it
concrete form had been suspended by differ-
ences of opinion about the exact shape which
the help should take. South Africa, only
recently recovered from a period of over-
whelming financial depression, and still more
recently engaged in the task of forming and
establishing the Union of her four self-governing
Colonies, had not been able to do much fpr the
Navy. But she had contributed yearly a sum
towards its upkeep, small in amount but
intended as a proof that she had not forgotten
what was due from her. There was never
any doubt that when the Union of Scuth
Africa found itself in a position to do something
more substantial it would be done willingly
and quickly, for no Dominion owed more,
or was more conscious of its debt, to the Navy
than South Africa.
There had, then, in the years before the war
been many signs that Naval Defence would,
if time was given, be organized on a truly
Imperial basis. There had been no such signs
in the case of Land Defence. No uniform
system of raising troops had been adopted.
Elementary principles were matters of dispute.
The need of military organization for the Empire
as a whole was more often denied than affirmed.
Even within the British Isles popular opinion
was, on the v.hole, opposed to any effort to
provide Great Britain with an Army sufficiently
strong to give her an equal voice in a European
war. While the peoples of the Continent had
been straining every nerve for years to arm
and train every available man for the
decisive day. Great Britain and the
Dominions had deliberately abstained from any
such attempt. It was an axiom of British
policy that what was required for each part
of the Empire should be for internal defence
alone, and though it was vaguely admitted
that the Regular Army might, be required
to provide an Expeditionary Force, it was
thought that this need not be large in
numbers so long as its material was good, its
equipment efficient, and its transport adequately .
organized.
.These negative theories were, of course,
based on a principle thoroughly sound in itself,
though limited in its application, because its con-
sequences inevitably required time to show their
decisiveness. History had taught the British
peoples that control of the sea was the first
essential of their existence as a nation. Tliat
seciu-ed, they might wait with confidence upon
the outcome of any European war, however
widespread it might be, and whatever might be
its immediate results. Control of the sea, iuk^t
the new conditions created by the naval ambi-
tions of Germany, had involved a stupendous
effort for its maintenance. It had been main-
tained, b\it at the cOst of obsciu'ing another
principle, more immediate in its application,
though more limited in its effects, yet equally
sound if the experience of the Napoleonic wars
was to be regarded as valid. This principle was
that Great Britain, though she could secure her-
self from invasion and could protect her com-
merce by means of her Fleet, could exercise no
real influence upon the result of a Evu-opean
war unless she was prepared to take her place on
equal terms with the combatant nations. The
corollary was equally clear, but had equally
been obscured. It was that when the Con-
tinental nations were imposing on all their men
capable of military service the duty of bearing
arms. Great Britain, if she wanted to inter-
vene on equal terms with them in war on the
Continent, must follow their example, so far at
least as was necessary to secure as many
recruits for her Army as her military advisers
thought necessary. Needless to say, notliing
of the kind had been done. Famous generals
who had fought and won British battles in all
quarters of the globe warned the British people
again and again that some form of compulsory
military .service should be part of the duties of
citizenship. These warnings fell on deaf ears,
so far as they were addressed to the people of
the British Isles.
In some of the Dominions, however, there
had been, for some years before the war, a
clearer realization of the essentials of military
defence. Australia, New Zealfmd, South Africa
had all begun the organization of citizen armies.
These armies were all based on tlie same
principle. The State required all male citizens
as they grew to manhood to be registered for
military service. Service was not in practice
exacted from all thus registered. In South
Africa, for instance, registration was merely
the means by which the State enabled itself
to ascertain the numbers which were available
in the last resort. From those thus registered
volunteers for military training could l)e called
for. If the number of volunteers proved in-
sufficient the State held the ballot n reserve.
But the number of volunteers was not in-
sufficient. On the contrary, in the first year
the number of those who volunteered for training
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
143
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH HORSE.
{Topical.
greatly exceeded the estimate made b>-
the authorities of the number likely to be
availal)Ie. In Australia, though every male
between certain ,\ears was liaV)le for s(>r\ice,
the number of exemptions was in practice
large. This was cliiefly due to tlie difficulty
of training men in sparsely populated areas.
In New Zealand, where th(f cotmtry was more
closely settled, the proportion of exemptions
was considerably less than in Australia.
The details of the different systems will be
described later. For the naoment the important
thing is to insist on the fact that in three of
the Dominions the principle of compulsory
military service had been adopted by Parliament
and put into practice before the European
war began. In Great Britain the popular
theory had been that compulsory service
was a form of slavery imworthy of free Britons,
a tyranny imposed on the imfortunate peoples of
the Continent by the ambition of monarchs or
by the fears of republican governments tremb-
ling at the thought of the ■ consequences that
such ambitions might entail for them. In
Australia, in New Zealand, in South Africa,
the same ideas prevailed for many years.
They were dissipated by experience. It became
clear, as soon as compulsory military training
wa.s given a trial, that a free and self-govern-
ing people might deliberately recognize the
obligation of each citizen to equip himself for
the defence of liis country, might call upon each
to fulfil that obligation, and in doing so might
confer substantial benefits upon itself.
In each case, however, a strong stimulus
was required before the experiment could be
tried. In each case, when once it was re-
cognized that the effort involved in the adoption
of military training had to be made, political
differences were suspended and men of all
parties cooperated in the determination to make
the experinjent a success. In each ca^ie the
success of the experiment led to an unex-
l^ected revelation of social benefits in the
new system, suggested indeed by writers and
tliinkers in Germany, but .up to that time
altogether unrealized by Ebiglish observers.
The motives for the adoption of compulsorj
service in the three Dominions wore very similar,
and quite foreign to the traditional beliefe
of the British peoples. Australia and New
Zealand suddenly realized that they were
isolated outposts of Europe, set in an ocean
ringed by Asiatic jieopTes who had begim to
show unmistakable signs of waking to the reali-
ties of world power. The leiuling men in both
countries were no longer content to trust entirely
1
1
^
mtm
1
M
^^^n^H
1
HON. SAMUEL HUGHES,
Canadian Minister of Defence.
iTopic i.
144
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLES.
[Topical,
to the protection of the British Fleet. The fear
of Asiatic invasion, or perhaps rather of Asiatic
migration from overcrowded countries into
their empty lands, took hold upon them. Once
convinced that there was real danger of this,
they set themselves to provide for their own
defence by land and sea. When war broke
out in Europe their plans were still incomplete,
but enough had been done to prove that. the
scheme to which they were committed was well
conceived and offered them at least a prospect
of being able to give some account of them-
selves if they were ever challenged. In South
Africa the motive power of the Defence Act
was the clear necessity of providing for the
security of a country in which the native
population outnumbered the European by
five to one. Not that there was any suggestion
of turbulence or sedition among the natives.
But self-respect made self-defence a primary
duty, and it speedily became evident to public
men of all schools of thought that the Union
of South Africa could not rely longer on the
protection of Imperial troops.
CANADA.
Canada, when Great Britain went to war,
was less completely organized than Australia,
South Africa, and New Zealand, although her
potential strength was lar greater. The reason
for this condition of affairs was obvious. She
had only two possible enemies who might
invtide her territory, and the possibility of
invasion by either of these was very remote.
Japan was the ally of great Britain, and neither
from her nor from the United States was an
attack within the range of practical politics.
It was no.- surprising, therefore, that her army
was in an embryonic condition, and that time
would be required for the purposes of expan-
sion and training. Nevertheless, the embryo
was very much alive, and everything was to
be expected from the resolute patriotism
of her hardy sons. Like other parts of
the Anglo-Saxon race her people were not
military but warlike ; and her military
institutions, though small in themselves,
were supplemented by the bold, active, and
/.. .
»,f, > ■//
V y;.'^
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL*S BODYGUARD (CANADA).
T&ptcai
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
145
self-confident spirit of the mass of tlit-
pojiulatioii.
The strength of the Canadian Permanent
Mihtia — Staff, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers,
and Technical Service Corps all included —
was about 270 officers and 2,700 other ranks.
These forces trained throughout the year and
completed every year the course of musketry
laid down for the Regular Army in the Britisli
Isles. The " Active Militia " hatl a nominal
strength of about 3,850 officers and 44,500
other ranks. But in practice the regiments
and corps of this force were considerably
below their theoretical strength. Even so,
much had been done to improve the Army in
the years immediately preceding the war.
The Officers' Training College at Kingston was
an admirably efficient institution, and there had
been a marked improvement in the attendance
of the Active Militia at training, drills, and
camps. The conditions of service demanded
from the Cavalry, Artillery, and Army Service
Corps 16 days' training a year. From other
amis and departments 12 days annually were
required.
Besides the Active Militia, there were three
other semi-military organizations in Canada.
The Royal North-West Mounted Police were
organized in 12 divisions, under the Dominion
Government, with headquarters at Regina.
They consisted in all of about 650 men and were
trained as cavalry. Rifle associations, about
430 in all, with something like 24,000 members
ready in an emergency to serve in the Militia,
SIR ROBERT BORDEN,
Prime Minister of Canada.
were spread throughout the Dominion. Finally,
there were about 270 cadet corps with a total
of about 20,000 cadets, divided into senior
cadets (14 to 18 years old) and jimior caidets
(12 to 14 years). There were, therefore, a
considerable " number of men and boys
who were more or less familiar with the idea
of discipline and with the business of the
soldier.
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.
If there was superficial irony, there was also
deep significance in the fact that Australia
and New Zealand — pioneers among the British
peoples in every democratic experiment —
should also have been the first to establish
a system of compulsory citizen service. Ob-
servers of the progress of democratic institu.
tions had already noted this as another proof
that the most complete self-government exacts
ultimately a more rigid self-discipline than
any other form of organized freedom. The
people of Germany had been drilled to military
service by the iron determination of the ruling
«lttss, backed by the teaching of professors
who had developed the doctrine of national
efficiency to its last word in a severely logical
progresi oa The French had been compelled
by a sure insight into the essentials of national
existence to follow the example of Germany.
This Franco-German rivalry had imposed on
the whole of Europe a corresponding sub-
mission to the dictiun that the life of a people
depends on its military efficiency. Only Great
Britain, secure in her conunand of the narrow
seas, absorbed in the problem of relieving for
the poorer cla.s.ses the stress of economic com-
petition, had refused to admit the validity of
this dictum. So far from following her example,
Australia and New Zealand hatl begim to train
their young men to arms, and had arrived, though
by a quite different road, at the same conclu-
sion as the German professors — that national
military service yvas a discipline beneficial tr
the race. After barely two years' experience
of the national training system, this was the
conclusion at which Australia and New
Zealand had come. The remaining opponents
of the system were few and were no longer
146
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
listened to. This was shown in an article
contributed to the Empire Number of The
Times (published on May 25, 1914) by one
who had had spiecial opportunities of studying
the effects of national military training in
Australia and New Zealand. His conclusion
was that " the ordinary citizen of Australia
and New Zealand . . . regards it as so
self-evident as not to be worth discussing that
the only possible way to secure either the
numbers or the efficiency required for national
defence lies in the enforcement of the duty
of military training upon the whole body of
citizens. . . . The moral value of disci-
pline hsB come to him as a new revelation, too
fresh and too vivid to be accepted as merely
in the ordinary course of things."
The same authority ' may be quoted upon
the details of the Australasian system. Its
chief characteristics, in his opinion, were
"* the early age at which it begins, the ntrmber
of \ears for which it is enforced, and the limited
time devoted to continuous training in any one
year." Australia and New Zealand began
to train their boys at the age of 12. The
training continued till they reached 25 —
a ]5eriod of 13 years. But in each year not
more than 16 days of service, or their
equivalent in half-days or shorter periods of
drill, were required. From the age
of 12 to 14 the boys were trained as junior
cadets, receiving 90 hours' instruction in
physical exercLses and elementary drill a year
under the education authorities. At 14 they
became senior cadets, passed under military
control, and, till they were 18, had to do four
\ 11^
THE HON. T. ALLEN.
New Zealand Minister of Defence.
whole-day drills, 12 half -day drills, and 14 night
drills per year. At 18 they entered the Citizen
Force, and for seven years were required to do
16 days' training (made up in part of half-
day or night drills), with not less than eight
days spent continuously in camp in each year.
For this they were paid 3s. a day and upwards.
At 25 their period of training closed. Those
who chose to enter the teclinical branches
of the .service at 18 — naval service, artillery,
engineers, and other special corps — had to do
25 da>'s' service a year. Of this, 17 days in
GROUP OF ALL UNITS, CAPE COLONY.
ITopicai
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
147
each year had to be continuous training; on
board ship or in camp. " The total length of
Service," to quote again the same authority,
" is thus some 6^ months in the infantry and
moiuited corps and SJ months in the technical
corps. This is considerably longer in the
aggregate than that demanded by the Swiss
system, which only asks 152 days of the
infantry and artillery and 180 of the cavalry.
But the Swiss training does not begin till the
age of 20 and opens with a continuous re-ruit
training of 65 days for infantry and 90 days for
cavalry, followed by re|)etition courses of
11 days every second year for 14 years.''
" From the military point of view," he adds,
"it would undoubtedly be an improvement if
at least one longer period of continuous train-
ing could be given. This would in all pro-
bability also be supported for reasons of con-
venience by the community as a whole."
Two other essential elements in the Austra-
lasian .system of national military training,
as it existed at the outbreak of war in Europe,
must also be described briefly
First, the forces of Australia were organized
on what is technically known as the " Area "
plan. This had been recommended by Lord
Kitchener in a report to the Australian Govern-
ment which had formed the basis of the neces-
sary legislation. Australia was subdivided
into some 200 training areas, each imd^r the
sujjervision of an " area officer." The numbers
of men imder training in each area varied
with the density of the population. Again,
every ten areas were grouped under a superior
officer, responsible in peace time for the co-
ordination of the work of training, and designated
in war time as brigade major for the forces of
the ten areas. In New Zealand the " area
system " was also the main principle of the
organization, but the grouping differed in
minor details.
Second, great attention had been paid to
the training of officers. The aim of the
organizers of the system had been the combina-
tion of a democratic principle of selection and
promotion with the most rigid tests of efficiency.
A training college for officers had been esta-
blished at Duntroon, close to Canberra, the site
of the Federal capital which was tmder con-
struction. To this ten cadets from New
Zealand were admitted each year in addition
to about 33 from Avistralia. The age of entry
was from 1 6 to 18. The total number of cadets
in the college was abovit 160. No charge was
made for their training. On the contrary, they
received £30 on joining and an allowance of
THE HON. E. D. MILLEN.
Australian Minister of Defence.
5s. 6d. per day. In return, the authorities
were able to exact a high standard of efficiency
and to require from each cadet entering the
college an undertaking — given by the parent or
guardian — of service in the Permanent Military
Forces for at least 12 years from the date of
joining the college. Tlie course of instruction
was exacting. Special attention was paid to
the training of character. The cadet, on com-
pletion of his training, was guaranteed a com-
mission and pay at £250 a jear, and was required
to spend his first year of service in Great Britain
as a member of some unit of the Imjx-rial
Army.
The Australasian systems had not reached
their full maturity at the beginning of the
European War, but it was estimated that when
their full effects were operative they would
provide a total of about 150,000 men, with from
four to 1 1 years' of full training behind them.
Tlie object of these citizen forces was the
defence of their own countries, and they formed
no part of any systematic organization for
Imperial Defence, though jirobably the Imjierial
Defence Committee had taken them into
account when considering the military strength
which the Empire could command at a moment
of crisis. Whether this was so or not, the
crisis, when it came, found the Australasian
people ready and eager to send men to the help
of the Mother Country.
148
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
SOUTH AFRICA.
In South Africa, just as much as in Australia
and New Zealand, the defence organization had
been expressly designed to meet special local
needs, without much thought of Imperial re-
quirements as a whole. This was natural.
When war broke out the South African defence
scheme had been in existence as a working
organization barely two years. Its full effects
were still to be seen. But it had progressed so
far that the Government of the Dominion
were able to set free the Imperial troops — to the
number of about 6,000 — which were still in the
counti-y, undertaking themselves the whole
duty of local defence.
This was no small achievement, for the work
of organizing National Defence in South Africa
had been peculiarly difficult and delicate. It
had been necessary to make provision for equal
conditions of service for English and Dutch,
to elaborate the composition of a force in which
they should serve side by side, and to provide
with the utmost care against anything that
might cause friction between them. The
Defence Act was passed by the South African
Parliament during the Session of 1912. Ten
years before Boer and Britain had been at war
throughout the country. Those ten years had
seen the re-settlement and re-stocking of a
devastated country. It had seen the triumph
of British methods of dealing with a people
whose land had been conquered, whose homes
had been burnt, whose people had been com-
pelled to accept the will of Great Britain. The
work that had been done in those ten years
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR
EDWARD MORRIS.
Premier of Newfoundland.
{J. Russell G* Sons.
must stand as an imperishable monument to the
genius of Great Britain for winning the respect;
the loyalty, and even the affection of peoples
whose territory has passed into her possession.
The Transvaal and the Orange Free State had
been part of the Dominions of Great Britain only
for ten years. In that time their people had
become loyal citizens of Greater Britain. The
Government of the Dominion was actually in
the hands of Dutch-speaking South Africans.
THE NEWFOUNDLAND NAVAL RESERVES
i
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
149
The author of the Defence Act was General
Smuts, who had fought against Great Britain
ten years before. The Commandant-General
of the Citizen Force was General Beyers,
another Boor general of conspicuous ability.
And in the ranks of the force English and Dutch
served side by side — all thought of race dis-
tinction obliterated — all equally ready to do
their utmost for the Empire in the crisis that
had come upon it so suddenly.
But the task of combining Dutch and English
in one homogeneous force had not been the only
difficulty which those who had designed the
scheme of National Defence for South Africa
liad had to meet. The European population
of the Dominion was small, the native popula-
tion large. The natural increase of the natives
was greater than that of the Europeans. The
distribution of the European population was
also a difficulty. A few large cities — Cape
Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Bloem-
fontein — absorbed a very large proportion of
the white people of the country. The rest
lived on scattered farms, at considerable dis-
tances from each other, separated in such a way
that it was difficult to provide for their training
except by means of an excessive number of
small units. Yet these difficulties were
balanced by some advantages. South Africa
had known many wars. Its early days had
seen constant conflicts of white men against the
natives. These had happily passed away and
left a native population contented on the whole
with its conditions of life and extraordinarily
loyal and devoted to the British Sovereign.
Later war& between English and Dutch had loft a
white population trained to arms by the stem
discipline of actual warfare and equipped with
a knowledge of the meaning of modern war
far in advance of that of any other part of the
Emjiire.
The organization of the South African Defence
Force had naturally been adapted to these con-
ditions. It was the work of practical men who
knew the nature of the material available.
The force which was required was one that
would safeguard the position of the white
population. Its organization was not directed
in any sense against the native peoples, who
were perfectly peaceable and loyal. But it had
in view the possibility — however remote —
of a change in the attitude of the natives.
If such a change should come, if the native
tribes should grow discontented, if some
revolutionary leader should arise and win
them over to discontent and hostility, then it
might be necessary in the future, as it had been
iu tlie past, for the Europeans to defend them-
GENERAL THE HON. J. G. SMUTS.
Minister oi Defence Union of South Airica.
selves, their institutions, and their civiliza.
tions, against, an organized attack by natives
who, for all their amazing progress, were stijl
in the mass barbarians. Little, naturally,
had been said about this while the Defence Act
was before Parliament. There had been no
necessity to talk about it. Such a threat to
European civilization in South Africa was a
remote contingency. But it was still a con-
tingency, and provision had YvaA to be made
against it.
There were two other reasons why South
Africa should have created a Citizen Army for
her own defence by land. First, her frontier
on the north-west marched with that of Germsa
South-West Africa. In a European war, if the
British Navy should prove unable to guard all
the oceans of the world, it might have been
possible for Germany to pour troops into
German South-West Africa and to in"ade the
Union of South Africa by that route. This, too,
was a remote contingency, but provision had
to be made against it. Secondly, troops were
needed in South Africa — as in oth?r countries —
to safeguard law and order in the last resort
against internal disruption. The industrial con-
ditions, especially in the Transvaal, where the
gold-mining industry had collected a large
number of artisans and laboiu-ers in a relatively
small area, made the country specially liable
150
TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
to sudden outbreaks of social unrest. And
the railways, which were essential to the life
of the people, because food had to be imported
and transported to the inland districts, were
State-owned railways worked by labourers and
artisans, who were naturally subject to iieriods
of acute discontent. Less than a year after
the Defence Organization had been set on
foot these industrial conditions caused a great
upheaval. It was suppressed by the help
of Imperial troops. Six months later it broke
out again. Tliis time the Defence Force was
an instrument ready to the hands of the Govern-
ment. It was at once called into being. Its
members responded with marked alacrity and
the disorders were suppressed without blood-
shed. To have been able to use with such
efficiency an organization so recently begun,
to have dispensed, in- this second trial,
with Imperial troops, the Grovemment must
have had full confidence in the work which the
Defence Act had given them the power to do.
Their confidence was not misplaced.
What South Africa required, then, was a mobile
and efficient force, ready for mobilization at
any moment, not very large in numbers at
first, but with ample reserves available if they
were required. The Defence Act of 1912 aimed
at the provision of such a force. A small
body ( f permanent mounted men was main-
tained, ready for service at any moment and
in any part of the Union. These mounted
troop were available for police duty in the
outlying districts diu-ing peace time. If war
broke out, reserves were available to do pdice
duty while they were on active service. Next
ctune the organization known as the Active
CStizen Force. This was obtained bj' a system
of registration and volunteering, w ith the ballot
in reserve. The " area system," as in Australia
aoA New Zealand, was the basis of this organiza-
tion. In each area all males between the ages
of 16 and 25 were compelled to register them-
selves. A certain number of volunteers were
called for from among those registered. If
in any area the number of volunteers was
insufficient, the Government had the right
to ballot for the men it required. In practice
this power proved unnecessary. The number
of volunteers for service in the two years
during which the system had been working
before war came upon Europe had largely
exceeded the number estimated as likely to be
available when the details of the system were
being worked out.
The training of these volunteers was similar to
that adopted in Australasia. But although
founded upon the cadet system, it did not give
such definite recognition to that system as the
Australasian organizations did. The course
of training prescribed by the South African
Defence Act of 1912 was to extend over four
years. In the first year the days of train-
ing required were not to exceed thirty ; in
the other three years they were to be limited
to twenty-one. In the first year there were
to be not more than twenty-two days of con-
tinuovis training ; and in each of the other
years not more tlian fifteen days of continuous
training. Days of non-continuous training
were carefvilly defined. Each day was to be
made up of either " a period of instruction
or exercise lasting eight hours " ; or of " two
periods of instruction or exercise each lasting
'four hours " ; or of " six periods of instruction
or exercise each lasting one hour and a half."
Such was the organization of the Active
Citizen Force. It was, of coiu-se, supplemented
by provisions for training officers (South Africa
had naturally a large niunber of men equipped
by actual war experience for command) ; for
coast and garrison defence and for artillery
training. But it was also backed by an elaborate
organization of trained and partially -trained
reserves. Men who had completed their four
years' training (there were no such men when
war broke out, as the Act was only passed in
1912) were to be drafted into Class A of the
Reserves, where they would remain till they
were over forty-hve. Men registered who had
not volunteered for service or who, having
volunteered, were not accepted, were trained
to shoot in Rifle Associations. These formed
Class B of the Reserve. Thus every male
between sixteen and twenty-five passed through
the hands of the Government either as a member
of the Active Citizen Force or in one of the
Rifle Associations. Males under twenty-iOne
who were registered but did not volunteer for
service had to pay £1 per annum to the Govern-
ment and were still liable to be called on to
serve by ballot if the number of volunteers
was insufficient. Men in Classes A and B
of the Reserve, when they reached forty-
five, were to pass into what was known as
the National Reserve until the age of sixty.
The whole force thus organized was imder
the control of a Council of Defence, appointed
in practice by the Ministry in power. This
Council exercised advisory functions without
executive power. It acted as a body assisting
the Minister of Defence and was composed of
men who were experts in military matters,
irrespective of their political opinions. In
South Africa, as in Australia and New Zealand,
the defence organization was the work of all
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
151
political parties. The \i.sual conditions of
Parliamentary life were suspended whil(> it
was under discussion. All cooperated in
devising the best possible system, considering
the needs of the country, and the advice of
men like Field-Marslial Lord Methuen, who
was then Commander-in-Chief ot the Imperial
Forces in the Dominion, was asked and freely
given. The result was that the system estab-
lished under the Defence Act of 1912 had the
full support of the whole country and had
given every promise of providing the Dominion
with an efficient and adequate force for its
land defence at the moment when Great Britain
was plunged into war.
Such were the organizations of the Dominions
for their internal defence. If there had been
no organized system before the European
War of raising and training troops for the
defence of the Empire, it was speedily clear
that when the crisis came Great Britain could
rely upon them for their utmost efforts in the
common cause. The South African War, fifteen
years earlier, had gone a long way to prove
this. But there had then been nothing like
the spontaneous rally of all parts of the Empire
to the help of Great Britain that marked the
declaration of war against Germany. The
people of the Dominions seemed to realize,
with an instinctive insight which was the best
testimony to their patriotism, the full extent
of the issues involved. Offer.s of help in men,
money, and supplies came pouring in. Canada
immediately offered 20,000 men and let it
be known that if more were required thej-
would be forthcoming. Within a month
another 10,000 had been added to this number,
and the pressiu-e of men clamouring to go to
the assistance of the Old Country swelled the
recruiting lists of the Govenunent of the
Dominion. Australia also offered 20,000 men.
In her case, too, this nimiber was speedily
augmented hy the addition of an Infantrj' and
a Light Horse Brigade. Xew Zealand's first
offer was 8,000 men, and she, too, made it
known that more would be sent if they wt^re
needed. South Africa released at once the Im-
jierial troop.-i within her borders, thus showing
the value of the Home Defence Force that
she was creating. Besides these 6,000 Imperial
troojjs — a true contribution to the common
cause — there were offers from all parts of the
Union for service in additional special contin-
gents. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand at
ynce undertook the whole cost of equipment
and maintenance of their contingents.
To tliese offers were added numberless
other acts, equally valuable and equally welcome
ai showing the intense devotion of the
oversea j)3opl;>s. The Royal Australian Xavy
was placed under the control of the Admiralty,
while New Zealand and Canada alao made free
gifts of all their available resoiu'ces in shijw and
men. The Now Zealand, the magniticent
battle-cruiser which had been presented without
condition of any kind to the British Fleet,
was already on service in Home waters. Canada
put her two cruisers, the Niobo and the llain-
bow, fully equipped for service, under Admiralty
orders for purposes of commerce protection.
Her Government also purcha-sc^l two sub-
marines to be used in the same way and for the
same pvupose on her Pacific coast >.
Thus the doubts that had been entertained
by many obscsrvers of the development of the
armies and naval forces of the Dominions
vanished at the first threat to the integrity of
the Empire. Without a moment's hesitation,
with a magnificent unanimity that will live in
the records of British honour, each of the
TYPE
OF CWADIAN .SOLDIER,
STRATHCONA'S CORPS.
LORD
[Topicd
152
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Dominions tlirew its immediately available
strength into the scale. The new worlds re-
dressed, in a new sense, the balance of the old.
They " let everything go in," and set themselves
at once to continue their efforts vmtil success
should be assiu^d. Their public men expressed
this far-sighted determination in words of reso-
lute enthusiasm. Differences of race, minor con-
tentions of party, doubts, hesitations, com-
plaints about the inertia and slackness of the
people of the British Isles — all disappeared
in a night. The first morrow of war found
the whole Empire, in the inspiring words
used by the Iving in his Message to the
Dominions, " united, calm, resolute, trusting
in God."
The resources of a country engaged in a great
war do not consist only in the numbers of its
armed men or the spirit of its citizens. The
women of Carada equipped a hospital ship for
the British Navy. Newfoundland, unable to
provide an army out of her small population,
did nobly in raising 500 men for service abroad,
while she increased her Home Defence Force by
500 men and her naval reserve by 400. In many
of the great cities of the Empire funds similar
to that initiated by the Prince of Wales in
Great Britain were started and met with the
most open-handed support. In Australia a
fund of this kind was specifically de-
voted to the purchase of food supplies for
the British Isles. In Canada, gifts of food in
many kinds were immediately organized. The
Dominion led the way with 1,000,000 bags of
flour, the first instalment of which reached
Great Britain less than a month after the
declaration of war. Similar gifts in kind were
made by the Provincial Governments. In such
acts of beneficent generosity private citizens
vied with public bodies, and in both public and
private generosity the other Dominions did
their best to rival Canada. A complete list of
all such offers of aid to the Mother Country
wovJd be difficult to compile. The examples
given are sufficient to show the splendid spirit
which aninaated the Self-Governing Dominions
in the hour of crisis.
Most conspicuous of all was the absolute
unanimity of all races within the Empire in
support of the Mother Country. The French of
Canada, the Dutch of South Africa, were heart
and soul with their fellow-citizens in support
of the British cause. The native races of
South Africa lost no time in giving equally
striking proofs of their loyalty. Amid all the
anxieties of the moment these proofs of the
success of British policy were welcomed with pro-
found gladness in Great Britain. There had been
many who, in earlier days, had doubted whether
the Empire would endure the strain of a great
crisis. All such doubts were now resolved.
The people of Great Britain prepared themselves
for the long trial of an unexpected war with all
the more confidence in the final success of their
arms since the very first result of that trial had
been to prove the essential soundness of their
Imperial policy and the strength of the fabric
based on that foundation.
CHAPTER IX.
THE NATIVE INDIAN ARMY.
Britain's Position in India— Supposed Source of Weakness— Indian Troops at Malta- -
Effect of Good Government in India— Employing Coloured Troops against White Foes-
The Gurkhas— The Sikhs have First Place— What is a Sikh ?— The Punjabi Musalmans^
The Pathans— Baluchis and Brahuis— The Brahmans— Rajputs and Mahrattas— Madrasis
—The Dogras— Difficulties of Creed and Caste— The Loyal Native States' Contingent.?—
No N.\tive Field Artillery — Abolition of the " Colour Line " in War.
BY the possession of India, Britain
at the outbreak of the great Euro-
pean war occupied a vinique position
among the empires. A compara-
tively small European coimtry herself, relying
for self-defence chiefly upon a powerful Navy,
she was at the same time the ruler of vast
Asian territory with an extended land frontier.
It is true that along practically the whole of
this frontier the Himalayas, with the spurs
and buttresses of minor mountain ranges,
constituted a mighty barrier ; but it was a
barrier which had many times been pierced
by successful invasion within historical times
and the burden of maintaining it in an efficient
state of defence had been heavy. Heavy too
had been the burden of maintaining peace
within the borders of India, wher6 rival nations
with jarring creeds seemed ever ready to fly at
each other's throats and only likely to unite
in a common effort to shake off. our yoke.
Thus, although we had always set ourselves
the task of governing India so justly and
sympathetically that her peoples might be on
our side in the day of trouble, our position in
Asia had always been regarded by our pro-
spective enemies in Eiu'ope as a source of weak-
ness. It is true that Lord Beaconsfield, by
bringing Indian troops to Malta on an occasion
of crisis, gave the world a hint of future possi-
bilities ; but his bold stroke was derided as
a theatrical coup, and other European nations
had continued to regard India as a country
where the great Mutiny would be surpassed
in horror by the upheaval that would inevitably
follow the entanglement of Britain in a great
war. At the outset of the present conflict the
German Press confidently relied upon trouble
in India as a large factor on their side.
But in the meantime the sympathetic justice
of our rule in India had been doing its silent
work ; and the superficial splashes of sedition
in densely-populated centres were as nothing
compared with the steady undercurrent of
loyalty all over the peninsula, which had
resulted from the trarwparent sincerity of our
efforts to govern India in her own best interests.
Yet the very success of these efforts had brought
to the siu-faee new difficulties, arising directly
from our anomalous position. We, a free and
independent people, were governing — by the
power of the sword in the last resort — a larger
people that was not free and independent.
The more they learned of the goodness of
our Western civilization and the higher,
especially, we raised the standard of our
native Indian Army, the stronger became
the pressure upon us from below, seeking
some outlet for the high ambitions which we
ourselves had awakened. Looking only at the
military side of the question, no one conversant
with the facts could fail to see that the time
was at hand when we could no longer deny to a
force of British subjects, with the glorious
record and splendid efficiency of our native
Indian troops, the right to stand shoulder to
shoulder with their Britisli comrades in defence
of the Empire, wherever it might be assailed.
153
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
155
TYPICAL GURKHA RIFLES.
iVnderwood &■ Underwood
We British are constitutionally the last
people in the world to take unfair advantage
in sport, conmierce or war of our opponents.
The instinct which intde us such sticklers
for propriety in all our dealings made us more
reluctant than other nations would feel,
to employ coloured troops against a white
enemy. But the very success of our rule in
India had been based upon our conscientious
disregard of colour. The very value of our
dasky native troops lay in the fact that they
had proved themselves wo"^hy, in victory and
defeat, to fight by the side of our own white
men. So, e\en if our active alliance with the
yellow people of Japan in the Far East and
the employment of dusky French Turcos in
Belgium could not have been quoted as pre-
cedents for ignoring colour in this war, it
would scarcely have been possible and certainly
not wise for us to refuse to our native Indian
Army the privilege of taking its place beside
British troops against the Germans.
What, then, was this native Indian Army,
of which we ha\e such good reason to be proud ?
To begin with, the average Englishman, who
talked about the Indian Army, generally fell
into a large error at the very outset ; be-
cause he almost always began to sing the praises
of the " little Gurklias." With them he
usually mentioned the Siklis ; but it waa only
lui if the little Gurkha cast a large Sikh shadow.
The substance of his admiration was always
for the former. Far be it from us to under-
value the splendid fighting qualities and the
glorious military record of the Gurkha. The
ten regiments of Gurkha Rifles — little, stocky
men in dull green uniforms, all looking exactly
alike, " as if they had come out of a quarter-
master's store " - — are probably surpassed in
fighting value by no block of ten regiments of
their kind in any other army. The names of
Bhurtpore, Aliwal, Sobraon, DeUii, Kabul,
Chitral, Tirah, Burma, and China appeared
among their records, a glorious summary of
British military history in Asia ; and if some
European names are to be added now, there is
no doubt that the additions are equally honour-
able and well deserved. But this was no
reason why Englishmen, in speaking or writing
of the native Indian Army, should put the
Gurkha (even with the Sikh for a shadow)
first and the rest almast nowliere, seeing that,
strictly speaking, the Gurkha did not belong to
the native Indian Army at all. He was a
mercenary, a subject of the independent
Kingdom of Nepal, in which we had by treaty —
a " scrap of paper " which has been faithfully
observed by both sides since 1814, when General
Ochterlony's soldierly generosity to a brave
enemy converted the defeated foe into a loyal
friend — the right to recruit these active little
hilimen for the army in India. Cheery and self-
confident, with none of the shyness and reserve
which embarrass acquaintanceship with the
natives of India, the Gurkha exhibits a
natural aptitude for making friends with the
British soldier. Stalwart Highlanders were
always his especial chums : and on our side
Tommy Atkins was never slow to reciprocate
the friendship of these smart little Nepalese,
whose fidelity to the British had been so often
shown, notably at Dellii, where they fought
on with us until 327 out of a contingent of 490
were killed. No Briton can visit the monument
on Delhi's famous Ridge without willingly
grasping a Gurkha hand in friendship whenever
it is proffered. All the same, when we talk
of the Indian Army proper, we must not
give the Gurkha the first place. Nor did his
employment in Eurijpe raise the same permanent
world-wide issues which were involved in putting
our Indian fellow-subjects by the side of the
British soldier in the fighting line against the
Germans. Incidentally it may be mentioned
that the Gurkha is a Hindu, but is free
from many caste prejudices of his co-religionists.
156
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GROUP OF INDIAN OFFICERS, with Orderlies, etc., and British Staff Officers in mufti.
[Sport i}r Centra'.'
On the other hand he is a great believer
in devils.
Undoubtedly the first place among the races
and castes which compose our native Indian,
Army must be given to the Sikhs. Not only
were they the most numerous among the native
wearers of his Majesty's uniform, but, without
any disrespect to the other factors of our Army,
they might be described as the backbone of
British military prestige in the East. It was
always understood, of course, by our enemies
that there was the British soldier, supported by
the British Fleet, to be reckoned with : but, in
the East, British soldiers were — compared with
the vast interests which we had to safeguard —
few and, through difficulties of distant transport
and other causes, very expensive. We were,,
therefore, peculiarly fortunate in having, in the
Sikhs, material for our Army which, for trust-
worthiness and courage, for confidence in its
British leaders and stern devotion to duty, for dis-
cipline and soldierly skill, could not be surpassed.
When Ranjit Singh, the " Lion of the Punjab,"
lived, mutual respect and courtesy marked the
relations between our Indian territories and the
warrior dominion which he had established over
the Land of the Five Rivers ; but after his death
restless spirits among the Sikhs forced war
upon us, and it is admitted in our military annals
that if the enemy had been better led the vary-
ing fortunes of our Sikh wars might not have
ended finally in our favour. But so it was ;
and, like the Gurkhas, the Sikhs quickly turned
from formidable foes to staunch friends. From
the date of the Sikh wars, when the strongest
provinces of our modem India were still foreign
territory, there was no great episode in the
history of British arms in India which is not
enrolled upon the colours of Sikli regiments. In
all Asia there was scarcely a mile of British terri-
tory which had not known the Sikh soldier or
policeman, dean, tall, and magnificently
bearded, with an upward sweep which took
beard, moustache, whiskers, and hair, all
together, under the turban, the Sikh looked
the embodiment of the high soldierly virtues
which he possessed, witli a suggestion of the
tiger's ferocity, should his passions be let loose.
The desperate stands which small parties
of British Sikhs have made against hopeless
odds are chronicled among the glorious
incidents of British history in India —
one such was the occasion of the establish-
ment of the " Indian Heroes' Fund " some
years ago — and so truly were the Sikhs bred to
the fighting type that it is scarcely an exag-
geration to say that whenever you saw a man
in the uniform of a Sikh regiment, you saw a
man who would be a steady and courageous
comrade to you in the- worst circumstances oi
war.
Who, then, is the Sikh ? As enlisted in our
Indian Army, the Sikhs were neither a race nor
a sect. Nor, although they were Hindu by origin,
could they be described as a caste. Every Sikh
enlisted in our service was a Singh, meaning
" lion," i.e., a member of a fighting brother-
hood. No one was born a Singh and no woman
could become one. Each man was initiated
into the faith — a purer faith than Hinduism,
involving little more than worshipping God as-
" the Timeless One " and reverencing the
Gurus as His prophets — by certain rites on
reaching the prescribed age. Thenceforward
he was bound by vows to avoid idolatry, to
abjure alcohol and tobacco, and to cultivate all
the manly virtues. His hair was never cut.
Cattle were sacred to him. Love of military
adventure and the desire to save money have
been well described as his ruling passions. Of
course, the Singh was human and sometimes,
especially among the higher classes, the vows of
abstemiousness might sit lightly on his con-
science ; but, take him all in all, the Sikh
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
157
soldier of to-day is a worthy representative of
the warrior fraternity which raised the " Lion
of the Punjab " to his great miUtary eminence.
Into the differences between the Sikh clans,
such as the Jat Siklis and Mazbi SikJis, there is
no need to enter liere ; but the latter provided
us only witli some Pioneer regiments, and when
we spoke of a Sikh sepoy or sowar, it was alm( st
always a Jat Sikh that we meant. The
name " Jat," pronounced " Jut," meant that
the Sikh was by descent a " Jat," pro-
nounced " Jaht," a strict Hindu caste of the
Punjab plains. From this caste, a race of superb
horsenien from childhood, some of our finest
Iiidiau cavalry was recruited, and Indian mili-
tary liistory is full of gallant incidents to the
credit of the Jat horse. One regiment, the
14th Murray's Jat Lancers, retains the caste
name in its official title.
INDIAN CAVALRY:
a Typical Sowar.
{Topical.
Next to the Sikhs in numbers in the British
8«r\-ice, and therefore before tlio Gurkhas,
the Punjabi Musulmans must be placed.
They were, of course, Mahomedans, though
not of a fanatical kind. They were of
mixed descent, but uniformly strict in observ-
ance of their religious obligations. They were,
however, very tolerant of the religious beliefs of
others and gave very little trouble in canton-
ments. Good all-round soldiers, easy for any
real soldiers to be friends with, the Punjabi
Musulmans deserved a much higher place than
was asually given to them in British ostoem,
seeing that, next to the Sikhs, they were the
most numerous class of natives in our Army and
it was they who had been recruited to fill the
places of abandoned regiments of other less
useful races. " Sikhs, Punjabis, and Gurkhas,
side by side with their British comrades " —
this quotation from a Mutiny record placed the
tliree most distinguished and valuable elements
of our Indian Army in their proper order ; and
it WEis to be hoped that one result of the use of
Indian troojjs in European war would be to bring
home to the British public tliat the Indian Army
did not entirely consist of the Gurkha with a
Sikh shadow, but that, next to the Sikhs, the
Punjabi Musulmans deserved the highest place
in oitf esteejn and gratitude.
Not far behind the Punjabi Musulmans an
accurate judge of the fighting values of the
native factors of our Indian Amiy would
probably have placed the Pathans. These —
although hastily-raised Pathan levies did grand
service for us in the Mutiny — were a com-
paratively recent addition to the fighting
strength of our Indian Empire, representing
as they did the gradual spread of British
prestige and the influence of the Indian rupee
over the wild fastnesses which make the natural
frontier between India and Afghanistan.
Formerly the " Gate of India " on the North-
West Frontier used to stand open for anysufli-
ciently bold and powerful invader. Assyrians,
Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Afghans, Tartars, and
others — at least thirty distinct iixvasions, all
more or less successful, of northern India,
besides inniunerable plundering forays, are
recorded in liistory ; but, although it is true
that, when this great war broke out in Europe,
the Pathan still foimd liis shortt-st cut to
wealth and honour through the rocky defiles
between Peshawar and Kabul, it was only
as a recruit for oiu- Army that he came. With
strong featiu-es, wliich support liis claim to be
a descendant of tlie lost tribes of Israel —
a claim almost substantiated, too, by the fac^-
158
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR:
that his names reminded us r-lways of the Old
Testament, as Ishak (Isaac), Yakub (Jacob),
Yustif (Joseph), and so on — the wild Pathan
was a very unktmpt and unclean looking
person. But, on the other hand, he had
almost all the soldierly virtues in a high degree.
He was a bad enemy — one of the worst — but
a good friend ; and his record in British service
was splendid, both for dare-devil dash and
dogged endurance. He was the ideal skir-
misher in difficult country. His language was
the guttural but eeisily-learnt Pushtu, and in
religion he was a Mahomedan of the most
fanatical kind. He was a sharp weapon
which needed careful handling ; but a British
officer who knew how to handle his Pathans
would be followed cheerfully to death any-
where.
From the Pathans, whose very name con-
jured up memories of all the stormy history
of our hard-fought North-Western Frontier of
India, the mind's eye naturally travelled
down that frontier to the lemd of the Baluchis,
increasingly employed in our frontier line.
Here, too, the mountain barrier was pierced by
passes which lead from Afghanistan to India ;
but compared with the stormy torrent by which
our military position at Peshawar, with its
fljTng buttress in the Ah Masjid Fort, had so
often been shaken, the stream of fitful human
traffic which flowed slowly past our Quetta
stronghold might be regarded as a peaceful
backwater ; and to some extent this wa^ reflected
in the character of the native troops, Baluchis
and Brahuis, which we derive from this region.
Devout, but not fanatical, Mahomedans, they
made cheery, tough, and courteous warriors,
serving always with credit to us and to them-
selves. Fine, well-set-up men, the Baluchis
always made a good show among other troops ;
and they were as useful in the field as amenable
in cantonments.
Turning now to the Hindu regiments, we
come at once to an element which, for exactly
opposite reasons, needed as careful handling
aK the fiercely fanatical Moslems of the North-
West Frontier. The leading infantry regiment
on the Indian Army list was the 1st Brahmans,
and the 3rd regiment was Brahman also. These
Brahmans are Hindus of the Hindus, so fenced
round with holy caste restrictions that
it was high testimony to the sympathetic
skill of our military administration that
these fine old regiments still retained their
pride of place in the Army List. It was not
too much to say that if by any mischance in
peace the men of a Brahman regiment and a
Pathan regiment were left together without
any control there would not be a man left
alive in the weaker corps, whichever that might
be, on the following day. War makes large
differences, of course, for Brahmans and Pathans
are both human and both soldiers at heart ;
but against the extended employment of the
very highest Hindu castes always had to be set
the difficulties which religious restrictions im-
posed upon them. Nevertheless, the Brahmans
had done good service, both in Afghanistan
ar.d Burma.
Other high-caste Hindus who supplied our
Indian Army with splendid fighting men were
the Rajputs and the Mahrattas. Both names
loom large in the history of India ; and pro-
bably there was no living race of men who had
more reason to be proud of their lineage than
the Rajputs. Their very name meant " of
Royal blood," and in no community had the
pride of ancestry worked so strictly to keep the
blood pure from age to age. The story of
Chitor, where the beleaguered Rajputs killed all
their wives and children and perished, fighting,
to a :nan themselves rather than give a Rajput
princess as wife to Akbar, the mighty Moslem
Emperor of Delhi, makes one of the bloodiest
and most glorious pages in the history of the
world's chivalry ; and the modern Rajput,
although he might be only a foot soldier in our
Indian Army, was instinct with the spirit of his
race.' Great credit might our government of
India take from the fact that the oldest of our
Rajput regiments, the Queen's Own Rajputs,
still held its place as the second corps of infantry
in the Indian Army List. High-caste Hindus,
proud, pure-blooded warriors, the Rajputs were
not men whom we might fear to place before
the most determined European foe, if caste
restrictions could be observed unbroken.
Much that has been said of tlie Bralmians
and Rajputs applies to the Mahrattas, who were
also Hindus and inclined to be fanatical in all
matters affecting their caste and creed. This
was the natural result of their history of almost
ceaseless warfare against Mahomedan invaders.
Holding their mountain strongholds of the
Western Ghauts against all assailants* and
occupying the plains on either side of the great
hills, the Mahrattas were a power to be reckoned
with in the destinies of India ; and our Mahratta
wars were protracted, difficult, and costly.
Now, in our service, these high-spirited
mountameers, although not great in stature, nor
thick-set in physique, made very tough, good
fighters.
Of the remaining Hindu elements in our
Indian Army, only two need be mentioned.
The Madrasis, natives of the Madras province,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
15'J
were a dwindling factor. Intelligent and well-
educated as a class, they had impressed many
of t hoir liritish officers with a high sense of their
value )XS figliting men ; but this opinion had not
been reflected in the military policy of the years
before the war. It was only natural that
officers who had devoted their lives to per-
fecting a regiment should take a pride in its
merit ; and in no service in the world, perhaps,
was this tendency more marked than among the
British officers of the Indian Army, who were
entrusted with material which varied in every
detail. Hence it arose that the " shop "
talk of a British officer of a Ourklia battalion
was often almost intolerable to officers of other
units ; wliile the nickname of one brilliant
frontier corps as " God's Own Guides " is elo-
quent of the mental suffering which a mixed mess
had often endured when an officer of the Guides
was fairlv started talking about his men. So
the Madrasi sepoy had enthusiastic defenders
of his reputation as a fighting man ; but, even
if all that his apologists said was true, it could
not be suggested that in finding more room
for the Dogra the Army suffered by the loss
of the Madrasi. For the Dogra, who was also
a high-caste Hindu, filled three entire regiments,
besides " class " squadrons or companies of
many others. He was the typical stalwart
yeoman of the Punjab, recruited from the
sub-Himalayan regions of the North-west.
Like the Mahrattas, the Dogras had retained
their spirit as fighting Hindus Vjy constant
contact with Mohainedan neighbours ; but their
Hinduism was not fanatical. In many re-
spects they resembled the Sikhs. Patient as
their own bullocks under hardship, they were
sturdy and manly, courteous and brave. Per-
haps it was the wide horizon of the Punjab
plains and the community of interests which
must be felt by all dwellers therein, who were
equally at the mercy of the weather which God
sends to them, that had given to the Punjabis,
whether Musulman or Hindu, that broader
spirit which rendered possible the rise of the
Sikh brotherhood with its pure religion and
high ideals. However this may be, it is certain
that in the Dogras of the Punjab we had a
Hindu factor of great military value, resembling
in many ways that of their neighboiirs, the
Punjabi Musuhnans.
From this brief review of the materials from
which our native Indian Army was drawn
we can see that it was composed of pure-blooded
races with fighting traditions, of proved service,
and splendid conduct in the field, in every
way worthy to be welcomed as comrades by
the British troops who were to serve with
thenj against the King-Emperor's enemies.
We can also see that those upon whom the duty
fell of .^electing Indian units to sers'e with our
own Expeditionary Force in Europe had an
invidious and difficult task. Not only was
there einbarras rfe richesses in the wide range
of varying merits to be con.sidered ; but there
were also the practical obstacles, much greater
in the case of some units than of others, of
bringing into the close cohesion necessary for
distant service the mixed force selected. This
difficulty was not les.sened by the natural desire
of the authorities to recogm'zo the self-sacrific-
ing loyalty of the rulers of the Native States
I
GROUP OF MAHOMEDAN OFFICERS AND MEN, LANCERS AND INFANTRY.
160
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
by gi\'ing to their Imperial Sendee Troops a
chance of distinction by the side of our own
regiments on European service. In our native
infantry regiments each battaUon had from
thirteen to fifteen British officers in addition
to sixteen native officers, whereas the Im-
perial Service Corps of the Native States were
commanded entirely by native officers with
British advisers only. Although the troops
themselves might fairly be described as crack
corps, the want of British officers would \m-
doubtedly be felt in employment on any large
scale in Europe. The readiness of the Imperial
Service Troops, however, to fall into line for
the defence of the Empire was fine evidence
of the status which our British Government
of India occupied in the native mind ; and even
in the case of our own Indian troops it must
always be remembered that the best native
soldiers, especially in the cavalry, did not
really serve for their pay, but, as befits men
of good family, for military honour.
Another point to be remembered in con
nexion with the Indian Army is that it could not
have furnished a complete field force of natives
alone. So far as the cavalry and infantry are
concerned the native regiments might always
be trusted to give a good account of them-
selves, even without any " stiffening " of
British troops ; but the instinct of self-pre-
servation, engendered in the mind of British
rulers in India through the experience of the
Mutiny, insisted upon the paramount necessity
that artillery in India shall be entirely in
British hands. There were indeed twelve
mountain batteries, in which service is so
popular, especially among the Sikhs, that they
could always command recruits of exceptional
physique and the highest quality, with the
result that in our frontier wars the little guns
were always served to the admiration of all
beholders ; but with this exception there were
no native gunners in India. Horse, field, and
garrison artillery were solely British.
In any case, therefore, a force in which Indian
troops were included must necessarily have
been a composite force, although in the thirty
IHIR^
I^H
H^HJl^^^^
vQ^^^I
jA|H
wU^^^^BKmp^^
K'»9^^^^H
r^^^^^^Bs^H^
I^HH
4^^^^^^^^^H
M
■
A VETERAN SUBADA-MAJOR OF
THE 45th RATTRAY'S SIKHS.
nine regiments of cavalry and 130 regiments
of infantry, in addition to the mixed Corps of
Guides and the ten regiments of Gurkha
Rifles, there was ample material from which
to select as fine a contingent of the two arms
as any general officer could desire to command.
The real difficulty was to make the selection
and at the same time to remember the claims
of the loyal Native States, and to disappoint
the legitimate ambitions of the bulk of the
eager troops as little as might be. And of
course only those to whom the task was given
were cognisant of all the circumstances which
influenced the selection. It was made with
a care appropriate to the occasion ; for the
occasion was the most momentous which had
occurred in the history of the Indian Army —
momentous not only for that Army or for India,
but also for the world at large, as definitely
erasing the " colour line " in war.
CHAPTER X.
THE RALLY OF THE EMPIRE.
Moral as well as Material Support — Opinion in Canada and Australia — The Kino's
Message to the Dominions— Effect of Sir Edward Grey's Speech — The Canadian and
South African Press — The King's Second Message to the Dominions — Loyalty of India
— Lord Hardinge's Speech in Council — Indian Ruling Princes' Offers of Men, Personal
Service, and Money — Statement in Parliament — The Kino -Emperor's Message to India
— The Empire United.
IMPORTANT as were the offers of help,
both of men and of provisions, which the
Self -Governing Dominions and the Indian
Empire made to the Mother Country
almost unmediately after the outbreak of the
war, the knowledge that these great daughter-
nations were morally convinced of the justice
of the British cause was a factor of even
more far-reaching importance. Great as was
the necessity of organizing and expanding
the Imperial forces, and thus creating
an extra army or armies to reinforce
the British Expeditionary Force in France,
urgent as was the need of taking advant-
age of the prompt offers of help which
came from all parts of the Empire, the necessity
of convincing the Self-Governing Dominions
and the Empire at large of the righteousness
of the cause for which Great Britain was
fighting was more imperative still. For in the
long run the consciousness of the justice of
the principles for which a people is fighting
alone can ensure the massing of material force
sufficient to socvire material victory.
Evidence that the case for Great Britain
was fully understood and thoroughly
approved, not only by our own peoples
but by the bulk of the neutral States of the
world, was not long in presenting itself. The
Dominions as a whole had satisfied themselves
that the British cause was just before Sir
Edward Grey had made it plain by his speech
of August 3 that the British Government had
Vol. I. — Part .5. Ifil
done everything short of sacrificing the honour
of the country to avoid war. In the words
of Sir Richard McBride, the Premier of British
Columbia, " Should it unfortunately develop
that Great Britain is compelled to engage in
hostilities, Canada will automatically be at
war also " ; while in Australia Mr. Fisher,
the ex-Prime Minister, declared, " Should
honour demand the Mother Coimtrj- to take
part in hostilities, Australians will stand
beside her to the last man and the last shilling."
These sentiments found expression in the offers
of lielp of men and material which have been
described in the preceding chapter. To these
offers the King replied by a message to Ihe
Overseas Dominions : —
I desire to express to my people of the
Overseas Dominions with what appreciation
and pride I have received the messages
from their respective Governments during
the last few days.
These spontaneous assurances of their
fidlest support recall to me the generous,
self-sacrificing help given by them in the
past to the Mother Country.
I sliall be strengthened in the discharge
of the great responsibility which rests upon
me by the confident belief that in this time
of trial my Empire will stand united, calm
resolute, trusting in God. — George R.I.
Sir Edward Grey's speech produced its
inevitable effect throughout the Empire. In
162
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
the words of Sir James Whitney, the Premier
of Ontario :
The momentous crisis we are now facing
makes it plain what Canada's course must
be. That course is to exert our whole
strength and power at once on behalf of the
Empire. I know my fellow Canadians too
well to doubt they ^v^ll respond with en-
thusiastic loyalty to the appeal. Sir Robert
Borden has all Canada behind him if steps
must be taken to join in fighting the Empire's
battles, because the contest is forced upon
Great Britain. It is our contest as much as
hers, and upon the issue of events depends
oiu- national existence. Never before in our
history has the call to duty and honour
been so clear and imperative, and Canada
will neither quaU nor falter at the test.
The British Government have done every-
tliing possible to avoid war and sought peace
with an earnestness worthy of responsible
statesmen. But a dishonourable peace would
prove disastrous to the Empire. We should
be unworthy of the blood that runs in our
veins if we sought to avoid an inevitable
conflict. I rejoice at the evidences of Imperial
umty displayed on all sides, and if our cause
is to preserve liberty and to resist unjust
aggression, it will evoke all that is best and
noblest in the Canadian character.
Not the least remarkable of the utterances
of the Dominion statesmen was that of General
Botha, foiuiieen years before the ablest and the
most dreaded cf the Boer leaders. In the course
of a speech delivered on September 9, he said
that at the request of the Imperial Government
his Government had decided to undertake opera-
tions in German South- West Africa. Then he
continued : —
t There could only be oae reply to the Im-
perial Government's request. There were
many in South Africa who did not recognize
the tremendous seriousness and great possi-
bilities of this war, and some thought that the
storm did not threaten South Africa. This
was a most narrow-minded conception. The
Empire was at war ; consequently South
Africa was at war with the common enemy.
Only two patlis were open — the path of faith-
fulness to duty and honour and the path of
disloyalty and dishonour. A characteristic
of the South African jjeople was their high
sense of honour, and they would maintain
their reputation for honourable dealing
unlamishod. To forget their loyalty to th(;
Empire in this hour of trial would bo scanda-
lous and sliameful, and would, blacken Soutli
Africa in the eyes of the whole world. Of
this South Africans were incapable.
They had endured some of the greatest
sacrifices that could be demanded of a people,
but they had always kept before them ideals
founded on Christianity, and never in their
darkest days had they sought to gain their
ends by treasonable moans. The path of
treason was an unknown path to Dutch and
English alike. Their duty and their conscience
alike bade them be faithful and true to the
Imperial Government in all respects in tliis
hoiu" of darkness and trouble. That was the
attitude of the Union Government ; that was
the attitude of the people of South Africa.
Nor was the Press of the Dominions less em-
phatic in the position it assumed. Before the
outbreak of hostilities the Toronto Olobe said : —
Of one thing let there be no cavil or question ; i£ it
means war for Great Britain, it means war also for
Canada. If it means war for Canada it means also
the union of Canadians for the defence of Canada, for
the maintenance of the Empire's integrity, and for
the preservation in the world of Great Britain's
ideals of democratic government and life,
while an article in the Cape Times after "the
publication of Sir Edward Grey's speech gave
a fair example of the effect of that utterance
in the South African Union : —
We shall fight to save Europe from the threatened
tyranny which has troubled her peace since the
German Empire was first founded upon blood and
iron, to guard for ourselves and for those who have
put their trust in us the heritage of freedom, and,
above all, to redeem the solemn pledges given many
years ago that the might of Britain should be inter-
posed to shield the weaker nations of Western Europe
against aggression. Never did a nation go into war
in a cause better fitted to draw together the peoples
that have learnt to know liberty under the British
Flag . . . Britain has stood for peace until the
arrogance and madness of the German Emperor
have forced the sword into her hand. Germany has
deliberately taken the role of international highway-
man, and the highwayman,' sooner or later, meets his
deserts.
The sentim.ents felt by the whole Empire
were finely expressed in the further message
which the King issued to the Governments
and people of liis Self-Governing Dominions : —
During the past few weeks the peoples
of My whole Empire at Home and Over-
seas have moved with one mind and pur-
pose to confront and overthrow an un-
paralleled assault upon the continuity of
civilization and the peace of mankind.
The calamitous conflict is not of My
seeking. My voice has been cast tlirough-
out on the side of peace. My Ministers
earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife
and to appease differences with which My
Empire was not concerned. Had I stood
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
163
H.M. THE KING.
l(f. Or D. DowMf.
164
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS.
SIR PERTAB SINGH,
the Veteran of the Indian Expeditionary Force.
[Lafayttte,
aside when, in defiance of pledges to whicli
My ICingdom was a party, the soil of Belgium
was violated and her cities laid desolate,
when the very life of the French nation was
threatened with extinction, I should have
sacrificed My honour and given to destruction
the liberties of My Empire and of mankind.
I rejoice that every part of the Empire is
with me in this decision.
Paramount regard for treaty faith and
the pledged word of rulers and peoples is
the common heritage of Great Britain and
of the Empire.
My peoples in the Self-Goveming Do-
minions have shown beyond all doubt
that they wholeheartedly endorse the grave
decision which it was necessary to take.
My personal knowledge of the loyalty
and devotion of My Oversea Dominions
had led me to expect that they would cheer-
fully make the great eflorts and bear the
great sacrifices which the present conflict
entails. The full measure in which they
have placed their services and resources at
My disposal fills me with gratitude, and I
am proud to be able to show to the world
that My Peoples Oversea are as determined
as the People of the United Kingdom to pro-
secute a just cause to a successful end.
The Dominion of Canada, the Common-
wealth of Australia, and the Dominion of
New Zealand have placed at My disposal
their naval forces, which have already
rendered good service for the Empire.
Strong Expeditionary forces are being pre-
pared in Canada, in Australia, and in New
Zealand for service at the Front, and the
Union of South Africa has released all British
Troops and has undertaken important mili-
tary responsibilities the discharge of which
will be of the utmost value to the Empire.
Newfoundland has doubled the numbers
of its branch of the Royal Naval Reserve
and is sending a body of men to take part
in the operations at the Front. From the
Dominion and Provincial Governments of
Canada large and welcome gifts of supplies
are on their way for the use both of My
Naval and Military forces and for the relief
of the distress in the United Kingdom which
must inevitably follow in the wake of war.
All parts of My Oversea Dominions have thus
demonstrated in the most unmistakable
manner the fundamental vinity of the Empire
amidst all its diversity of situation and
circumstance.
GEORGE R.I.
Even more striking and not less spontaneous
were the expressions of passionate loyalty to the
Throne and Empire which came from India.
Assurances of Indian support were imanimously
forthcoming, and as early as August 6 The
Times Correspondent in Bombay was able to
announce that the military Princes of India
had placed the whole of their resources at the
disposal of the Emperor. Later on in the
Viceroy's Council Lord Hardinge, speaking
of the employment of the Indian Army in
the War, said : —
It was, moreover, with confidence and
pride that I was able to offer to his Majesty
the first and largest military force of British
and Indian troops for service in Europe that
has ever left the shores of India. I an. con-
fident that the honour of this laud and of the
British Empire may be safely entrusted to
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
105
LORD HARDINGE OF PENSHURST,
Viceroy of India.
[EWolt Or Fry.
our brave soldiers, and that they will acquit
themselves nobly and ever maintain their
high traditions of military chivalry and
courage. To the people of India 1 would
say at this time, let us display to the world
an attitude of unity, of self-sacrifice, and of
unswerving confidence under all circumstances
in the justice of our cause and in the assur-
ance that God will defend the right.
A summary of the various offers of service,
money, and so forth made by the rulers of the
native States was given in a telegram from
the Viceroy dated September 8, which was
read by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords,
and by Mr. Charles Roberts, Under-Secretary
of State for India, in the House of Commons
on September 9 : —
Following is a summary of ofJers of ser-
vice, money, &c., made in India to the
Viceroy. The Rulers of the Native States
in India, who number nearly seven himdred
in all, have with one accord rallied to the
defence of the Empire and offered their
personal services and the resources of
their States for the war. From among
the many Princes and Nobles who have
volunteered for active service, the Viceroy
has selected the Chiefs of Jodhpur, Bikanei,
Kishangarh, Rutlam, Sachin, Fatiala, Sir
Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, the Heir
Apparent of Bhopal, and a brother of the
Maharaja of Cooch Behar, together with
other cadets of noble laniilies. The veteran
Sir Pertab would not be denied his right to
serve the King-Emperor in spite of his
seventy years, and his nephew, the Maharaja,
who is but sixteen years old, goes with him.
All these have, with the Commander-
in-Chief's approval, already joined the
hixpeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of
Gwalior and the Chiefs of Jaora and Dholpur
together with the Heir- Apparent of Palanpur
were, to their great regret, preventetl from
leaving their States. Twenty-seven of the
larger States in India maintain Imperial
Service Troops, and the services of every
corps were immediately placed at the dis-
posal of the Government of India on the
outbreak of war. The Viceroy has accepted
from twelve States contingents of cavalry,
infantry, sappers, and transport, besides a
camel corps from Bikaner, and most of them
have already embarked. As particular in-
stances of generosity and eager loyalty of
the Chiefs the following may be quoted : —
Various Durbars have combined together to
provide a hospital ship to be called '' The
Loyalty " for the use of the Expeditionary
Forces. The Maharaja of Mysore has placet!
Rs.50 lakhs at the disposal of the Government
of India for expenditure in connexion with the
Expeditionary Force.
The Chief of Gwalior, in addition to
sharing in the expenses of the hospital ship.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE,
Secretary of State lor India.
16(5
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE MAHARAJA OF MYSORE.
t [Sporl & General.
the idea of which was originated with himself
and the Begum of Bhopal, has offered to
place large sums of money at the disposal of
the Government of India and to pro-
vide thousands of horses a? remounts.
From Loharu in the Punjab and Las
Bela and Kalat in Baluchistan come offers
of camels with drivers, to be supplied
and maintained by the Chiefs. and Sardars.
Several chiefs have offered to raise additional
troops for military service should they be
required, and donations to the Indian Relief
Fund have poured in from all States. The
Maharaja of Rewa has offered his troops,
his trea«ury, and even his private jewelry
for the service of the King-Emperor. In
addition to contributions to the Indian
Fund some Chiefs — namely, those of Kashmir,
Bundi, Orchha, and Gwaiior and Indore —
have also given large sums to the Prince of
Wales's Fund.
The Maharaja of Kashmir, not content
with subscribing himself to the Indian Fund,
presided at a meeting of 20,000 people held
recently at Srinagar and delivered a stirring
speech, in response to which large subscrip-
tions were collected.
IMaharaja Holkar offers, free of charge, all
horses in his State Army which may be
suitable for Government purposes. Horses
also offered by Nizam's Government, by
Jamnagar, and other Bombay States. Every
Chief in the Bombay Presidency has placed
the resources of his State at the disposal
of Government, and all have made contribu-
tions to the Relief Fund.
Loyal messages and offers also received
from Mehtar of Chitral and tribes of Khyber
Agency as well as lUiyber Rifles.
I^etters have been received from the most
remote States in India, all marked by deep
sincerity of desire t'> render some assistance,
however humble, to the British Government
in its hour of need.
Last, but not least, from beyond the
borders of India have been received generous
offers of assistance from the Nepal Durbar ;
the military resources of the State have been
placed at the disposal of the British Govern-
ment, and the Prime Minister has offered
a sum of Rs.3 lakhs to the Viceroy for the
purchase of machine guns or field equipment
for British Gurkha Regiments proceeding
overseas, in addition to large donations from
his private purse to the Prince of Wales's
Fund and the Imperial Indian Relief Fund.
To the 4th Gurkha Rifles, of which the
Prime Minister is honorary Colonel, the
Prime Minister has offered Rs. 30,000 for the
purchase of machine guns in the event of
their going on service. The Dalai Lama
of Tibet has offered 1,000 Tibetan troops
for service imder the British Government.
His Holiness also states that Lamas in-
numerable throughout length and breadth
of Tibet are offering prayers for success of
British Army and for happiness of souls of
all victims of war.
The same spirit has prevailed throughout
British India. Hundreds of telegrams and
letters received by Viceroy expressing loyalty
and desire to serve Government either in the
field or by cooperation in India. Many
hundreds also received by local administra-
tions. They corne from commimities and
associations, religious, political, and social,
of all classes and creeds, also from individuals
offering their resources or asking for oppor-
tunity to prove loyalty by personal service.
Following may be mentioned as typical
examples : —
The All India Moslem League, the Bengal
Presidency Moslem League, the Moslem
Association of Rangoon, the Trustees of the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
167
Aligarh Collogo, the Behar Provincial Moslem
League the Central National Mahomedan
Association of Calcutta, the Khoja Com-
munity, and other followers of Aga Khan,
the Punjab Moslem League, Mahomedans of
Eastern liengal. Citizens of Calcutta, Madras,
Rangoon, and many other cities, Behar
Landholders' Association, Madras Provincial
Congress, Taluqdars of Oudh, Punjab Chiefs'
Association, L^nitod Provinces Provincial
Congress, Hindus of the Pimjab Chief Klialsa
Divvan representing orthodox Sikhf^, Bohra
C^omniimity of Bombay, Parsee Commimity oi
Bombay.
Delhi Medical Association offer field
hospital that was sent to Turkey during
Balkan War ; Bengalee students ofTer
enthusiastic services for an ambulance corps,
and there were many other offers of medical
aid ; Zemnidars of Madras have offered 500
horses, and among other practical steps
taken to assist Government may be noted
the holding of meetings to allay panic, keep
down ]irices, and maintain public confi-
dence and credit. Generous contributions
have poured in from all quarters to Imperial
Indian Belief Fur.d.
These great and splendid ofTers of service
were acknowledged by the King-Emporor in the
following terms : —
To the Princes and Peoples of My
Indian Empire :
Among the many incidents that have
marked the unanimous uprising of the
popvilations of My Empire in defence of
its tinity and integrity, nothing has mover
ine more than the passionate ottvotion to
My Throne expressed both by My Indian
subjects, and by the Feudatory Princes
and the ruling Chiefs of India, and their
prodigal offers of their lives and their re-
soiirces in the cause of the Realm. Their
one-voiced demand to l)e foremost in the
conflict has touched my heeirl, and ha« in-
spired to the highe&t issues the love and
devotion which, as I well know, have ever
linked My Indian subjects and Myself.
I recall to mind India's gracious mesf>age
to the British nation of good will and
fellowship wliich greeted my return in
February, 1912, after the solemn cere-
mony of My Coronation Durbar at Delhi,
and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest
and a noble fulfilment of the assurance
given by you that the destinies of Great
Britain and India are indissolubly linked. —
GEORGE R.L
It is unnecessary to dwell upon the tremend-
ous significance of these documents. The
British Empire went to war for ju.stice, mercy,
and righteousness, knowing that those great
principles of human government were not
merely endorsed by its imited conscience but
that in India not less than elsewhere they had
been put to the practical proof and had not
been found wanting. Indian loyalty owed its
existence not only to the monarchic instincts
of its peoples and to their martial pride, but to*
their gratitude for the benefits of British
Government and to their determination to
uphold at all costs the Empire to which they
were so deeply indebted.
CHAPTER XI.
THE WAR AND FINANCE.
Financial Conditions when War Broke Out — Paris a Source of Weakness — Rise in London;
Open Market Discount Rate — Heavy Borrowing from the Bank of England — Fall in Paris
Cheque on London — Rise in New York Sterling Rate — Advance of Bank Rate — Clearing
Banks Decide to Pay in Notes — Bank Applied to for Gold — Official Minimum Eight,.
THEN Ten per Cent. — The Banks Lending Freely — Some Relief Experienced — The Pro-
longed Bank Holiday — The Moratorium Act- — The Difficulties of the Accepting Houses —
Small Bank Notes Issued — Large Gold Imports — Bank Rate Five per Cent. — Money
Market Still Dead — Government Help — Bank Guaranteed Against Loss on Bills — Slow-
Revival of Money Market — Prolongation of the Moratorium — Effects of the War:
ON Trade — Clearing House Retihins Greatly Reduced — Big Drop in Imports and Exports:
— The Stock Exchange — Collapse of Markets — Panic on the Continent — Closing of the;
" House " — Continental Bourses — New York.
SINCE the end of the Napoleonic War
there has been no such general dis-
turbance to finance, commerce, and
industry as resulted from the de-
claration by Austria - Hungary of hostilities
against Servia on July 28. The momentous
character of that declaration was perceived
by every banker, merchant, and manufacturer
in Europe, and although many business men
found it hard to believe that the Triple Alliance
and the Triple Entente were on the eve of
battle, a feeling of sick apprehension at once
seized on the consciousness of all. Those who
took the most unfavourable view of the political
probabilities were right, but even their prevision
failed to foresee how prompt and benumbing
would be the effect of the catastrophe on the
world's economic life. The actual outbreak
of the war, in which five out of the six Great
Powers speedily became involved, paralysed,
and for the moment seemed, indeed, to have
destroyed, the complicated and delicate economic
organs of the world. These organs were not,
of course, destroyed any more than a man's
lungs are destroyed when he unwittingly
walks into an atmosphere heavily charged
with carbonic acid gas ; but they were rendered
temporarily unable to perform their regular
functions. In the case of an animal oppressedl
with an excess of air for which its respiratory
organs are unsuited, death would follow
promptly unless it were withdrawn from the-
baleful atmosphere. But modern communi-
ties of men whose complicated economic
organisms have been paralysed by a recrudes-
cence of the semi-barbaric conditions created
by a general European war can adopt measures,
for preventing a stoppage of the life of the
community.
The general financial condition of the world's
money markets was far from satisfac-
tory when the fear of war became definite
on Tuesday, July 28. The condition of the-
Paris market was unusual. Until about thre»
years before the war Paris had been a constant
source of support to London and the World's
money markets generally, because of the large
amount of balances which Fren' h banking houses
always had at their disposal, owing to the thrifty
character of the French people and their
readiness to be led as regaids their invest-
ments by the big French institutions. During.
this time, and especially since the end of
the Balkan wars, these institutions had
become involved in financial commitments-,
abroad on so large a scale that Paris had.
1P8
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
109
litlte tree money for financing othor places
of business either by teniiJorary advunces or
by taking up loans as an investineat. During
the year 1914, however, Paris had called in
a great deal of what was owing to it in
various countries, and brought it home in
gold, so that the Bank of France was better
supphed with the metal than any other coimtry.
except Russia, a result which, in view of the
coming catastroplie, was certainly matter for
congratulation.
Now York was in no condition to meet the
heavy demands made on it from Europe, to
which it was always indebted, owing to the
enormous quantity of United States securities
of all kinds held by European capita
lists and investors, and the very largo
credits always open here and in Paris
for supplying the requirements of Ameri-
can residents and visitors in the Old World. In
normal times this big liability to Europe was
kept within bounds by constant remittances,
chiefly to London, against exports of American
produce which in the autumn assumed very
large dimensions, owing to the marketing of
the grain and cotton crops. The stability of
the equilibrium, however, depended on the
readiness or ability of European holders
of American securities to retain them. The
excessive issue by American railway and other
companies of short-term notes, the bad
state of affairs in Mexico, and the sudden
ooUapse of tlio St. Louis and San Francisco
railroad in the spring of 1913, at a time when
short-term and other securities were being
issued too freely by Canadian and other
borrowers, greatly injiu'ed the market for
American issues, especially in Paris, where
the leading houses were already beginning to
feel over-loaded with foreign issues of all
kinds. The result was that Paris had for some
time been ro'ilizing its American seoviritios and
bringing the money home in gold. Tins
movement had been especially conspicuous
during the first six months of 1914, during
which France imported £26,486,000 of " bullion
iind specie," the bulk of which was gold, and
exported £7,297,000, giving a net import of
£19,189,000; the whole of this did not come
from the United States, but a considerable
rjroportion was received thence.
On Saturday, Julj' 25, the Austro -Hungarian
Bank raised its rate from four per cent, to five
per cent. ; in this comparatively modest manner
the gigantic crisis first made itself felt. It
was noticed that in spite of this rise the Vienna
oxchango on London moved in favour of the
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
DAVID LLOVD GEORGE.
\Ulavellt.
latter place, the discount rate here having
risen sharply close up to the Bank of
England' s official minimum, which was then
three percent., as it had been since January 29.
On .Monday, July 27, the London Money
Market began to adopt the measures of defence
which have usually been foimd effective in the
past at times of difficulty. Apart from the
portentous aspect of foreign politics and the
known financial difficulties in Paris and else-
where, the situation here did not, on the sur-
face, suggest that anything extraordinary
was about to occur. The Bank possessed,
according to the return of July 22. a reserve of
£29,297,000, which, though somewhat less than
it had been hoped would be held on the eve of
the August Bank Holiday, was about £1,500,000
better than was held on July 23, 1913. The
private deposits, the variations in which were
a rough indication of the magnitude of the
bankers' balances, were £42,185,000, a figure
which, in normal circumstances, moans that
these balances are ample and that the market
should consequently be ea,sy. Nevertheless,
on that Monday the market rates of discount for
two, three, and four months' bills were 1 per
cent, and the six months' rate was i per
cent, above Satiu-day's level. In other words,
the market quotation was 1 per cent, over
Bank rate. In spite of this high level th*;
170
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Paris cheque* fell 3c. to 25f. 14}c. The clearing
banks called a good deal of money from the
discount houses, and the latter, of course,
applied to the Bank, which did a large business,
chiefly in short bills. Heavy calls from foreign
banks were also experienced.
On Tuesday the market, meaning the discount
houses and bill brokers, again had money called
from them, but not to so large an extent as on
Monday, and the applications to the Bank of
England were on a smaller scale. It was noticed
that the calls of money proceeded chiefly from
the foreign banks, and that the external
character of the crisis was becoming more
marked, the most striking features being the
unprecedented fall in the Paris cheque to
25f. 5c. after official hours and the equally sur-
prising rise in the New York sterling exchange
to §4.93c.f owing to the difficulty of insuring
gold shipments, wliich were much in demand
owing to the disappearance of ordinary means
of remittance to London from New York.
The dro i in the Paris rate was partly due to
large French selling of securities here, the
coulisse, or unofficial bovirse in Paris, being
closed.
On Wednesday the situation became very
much worse, the Austro -Hungarian Declaration
of War on Servia having reduced the Money
*Tbe teim '* Paris cheque '* means the rate of exchanze In the
case of payments at sight, as by cheque. Thus the value of the
BovereiKn for such pajouents fell from 25 francs 17 i centimes to
23 francs 141 centimes.
tin other words the value in New Yorlt of a sovereign in London
rose to the erceptionally higli level of 4 dollars 93 cents.
Market to a condition of paralysis. Discoiml
quotations were nominal at 4|-5 per cent, for
all dates, the applications to the Bank were very
large, a big total of sovereigns was withdrawn
from the Bank for the Continent and Egypt, and
the Paris cheque fell below 25f. In these cir-
cumstances an iimnodiate advance in the Bank
rate was inevitable. The following day, Thurs-
day, July 30, the rate was raised from 3 to 4
per cent., and the Bank of France rate was
raised from 3^ to 4 J per cent., while the Belgian,
Swedish, and Swiss State banks also raised
their rates by 1 per cent. It was evident that
a further advance would be necessary very
soon, in view of the fact that over £1,000,000
in gold was withdrawn on balance from the
Bank for export. The Bank return (dated
the previous day, July 29) was of a very imusual
character, though not unexpected by the well-
informed. Its cliief features were increases
of £13,675,000 in the "other" seciu-ities,
representing the additional accommodation in
loans and discounts fvirnished to tlie market
by the Bank, and £12,234,000 in tlie private
deposits, which indicated that nearly all the
money borrowed by the market was still on
the bankers' balances. There was a decrease
of £2,422,000 in the reserve, of which about
£1,600,000 was coin and notes taken out for
internal purposes, which, though a good deal
more than was withdrawn for holiday purposes
at the end of July, 1913, was not considered
very surprising in view of the alarm due to
SCENE IN FRONT OF THE ROYAL EXCHANGE-
\SpoTt and General
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
171
tho political situation. The drop in tho pro-
portion of tho reserve to current liabilities
by 12| per cent, to 40 per cent., tho fact that
nearly all tho Continental exchanges had
become nominal, that tho Paris clvequo was,
in spite of a sUght recovery, well below 25f., and
that, on the other hand. New York sterling was
close on §5, all tended to show that the financial
and commercial business of the whole world,
already in a somewhat uncomfortable state
had received a blow diu-ing the week from wliich
an early recovery was not probable, even in the
event of a general Eiu-opean war being averted
During that week the Bank of France's holding
of bills discoimted increased by £;!6, 125,000.
and as a result of this additional aid to the
public £30,851,000 of notes were withdrawn
by the Bank's customers. Tlie Bank's current
accounts (Paris and branches) were only
increased very slightly.
Friday, July 31, was a day unexampled in
the history of tho City as we and our fathers
had known it. Soon after tho commence-
ment of business — a little later than 10 a.m. —
tho Stock Exchange was shut, by order of the
committee, until further notice. A deep im-
pression was produced by this announcement,
as the pressure in the Money Market was
greatly increased by it ; it was also learnt
that a large total of gold, amounting on balance
to over £1,200,000, would bo withdrawn from
the Bank for export. Very big amounts were
called by the clearing banks from tho discount
houses, thus obliging them to apply for aid to
the Bank, which did a huge business in short
bills. Tlicse tho Bank at first bought at 6
per cent., but tho demand on it was so strong
that it had to raise tho rate rapidly luitil tho
rate for such bills reached 10 per cent. ; lOi
per cent, was charged for loans for a week.
About 3 p.m. the Bank Court decided to
raise its official minimum to 8 per cent., and
the committee of clearing bankers, after dis-
cussion, fixed their deposit rate at 4 per cent. ;
the discount houses and bill brokers then decided
to allow 4 J per cent, and 4| per cent, for money
at call and notice respectively. The discount
houses did hardly any business apart from
procuring money from the Bank. When tho
first New York cables arrived in tho afternoon
■t was announced that tho New York Stock
Exchange had been closed, but a more cheering
piece of news was received to the effect that
over £1,000,000 in gold had been engaged for
shipment to London. No quotations were
received for the Continental exchanges ; tho
New York sterling rate for demand drafts
was nominally S5.20o. and that for cable
SIR WILLIAM PLENDER. ,Swa,n4.
transfers §6, quotations never before heard of.
The Silver Market was closed.
The Reichsbank raised its rate to 5 per
cent., and the Austro-Hungarian Bank moved
up to 6 per cent.
During the day several of the clearing banks
refused to give gold to customers in exchange
for their own cheques, but paid the cheques
in bank notes. This policy had the un-
fortunate result of producing tho unseemly
spectacle of a large crowd of persons at the
Issue Department of the Bank of England, at
that time undergoing some repairs, bringing
£5 notes to be converted into gold. Most of
those who presented the notes required money
in small amounts for holiday purposes, and
others required cash for paying weekly wages,
for both which purposes tho notes were un
suitable.
On Satiu-day morning tho discount houses
were in a state of serious anxiety as to how far
the clearing banks and the Bank of England
would a.'^sist them by buying bills or granting
loans ; large sums had again been called from
them by banks, though not to such an extent as
on Friday by the clearing institutions, several
of which not only did not make calls but were
actual lenders to a fair extent. The discount
houses, however, were very uneasy until after
midday, when the Bank Court, after raising the
official minimum to 10 per cent. — thus making
the official rate identical with the actual charge
on Friday afternoon — let it be known that the
172
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AUSTEN
CHAMBERLAIN. [Swame.
Bank would help the market in the usual
manner. The amount of money asked for was
much less than was taken on Friday, and some
relief was experienced when, at a later hour
than usual on Saturdays, City men went home
with the feeling that, as Monday was a Bank
Holiday, there was a two days' respite from
further strain on their resources. Naturally
no discount business was done in the open
market.
The disorganization of the foreign exchanges
was, in some respects, the most serious feature
of the breakdown of credit caused by the War.
We have already referred to the extraordinary
fall in the Paris cheque, which usually moves
between what are called the gold points —
25f. 32Jc., being the price at which, in theory,
gold should come to London, and 25f. 12Jc.
that at which the metal should leave London for
Paris. On July 28 the cheque was quoted
25f. lljc, and on the 29th it hid dropped to
24f. 90c. ; on the following day, Thurs-
day, July 30, there was a slight recovery
to 24f. 95c., but on the 31st there
was no quotation at all for Paris or any
other Continental exchange. The meaning of this
decline was that remittances on Paris had been
very saroe for several days and that finally
the scarcity had become so great that thosa who
wanted them bought gold to send to the French
capital. Tha movements of the New York
exchange were equally surprising, but in the
opposite direction. In the United States,
which is always in debt to Europe, remittances
on London were unusvially keenly sought for
towards the end of July ; they wore wanted to
I^ay for huge masses of American securities
sold by London and other European places,
most of which wore disposed of through London.
In addition. New York houses were, as usual,
buyers of remittances on London to meet the
constant requirenieiits of American residents
and visitors in Europe. The pressure increased
so much that the New York sterling rate on
London, which does not usually rise above
S4.89c. even for cable transfers, had risen by
Saturday, July 25, to $4.89ic. for that class of
exchange, and during the momentous' week
which enc'ei August 1 rose nominally to §6,
a level never before seen.
After July 31 quotations from the French
and American exchanges were either not received
or wore purely nominal.
The collapse in the machinery of remittance
of money from the United States was accom-
panied by the collapse of most of the foreign
exchanges of other countries which owed money
to London ; and this had the very serious e3ect
of )i;aking it doubtful whether the accepting
houses, on whose operations the import trade
of the country largely depended, would be able
to continue them. There was thus some danger
lest, in spite of our command of the sea, supplies
of food and othpr necessaries might before
long be seriously reduced. To mset this danger
the first of the impjrtant financial measures
adopted by the Governm:;nt in order to deal
with a wholly abnormal situation was taken.
On Monday, August 3, an " empowering "
Moratorium Act was rapidly passed tlirough
Parliamont, and the Royal Assent was given
to it the same evening. The Act is entitled
"The Postpinemant of Pajinsnts Act, 1914,"
and its terms are as follows : —
1. — (1) His Majesty may by Proclamation authorize
the postponement of the payment of any bill of
exchange, oi' o£ any negotiable instrument, or any other
payment in pursuance of any contract, to such
extent, for such time, and subject to such conditions
or other provisions as may bo specided in the Pro-
clan. ation.
(2) j»o additional stamp duty .shall be payable
in respect of any insti-ument as a consequence of any
postponement of payment in pursuance of a Pro-
clamation under this Act unless the Proclamation
otherwise directs.
(3) Any such Proclamation may be varied, extended,
or revoked by any subsequent Proclamation, .and
separate Proclamations may be made dealing with
separate subjects.
(4) The Proclamation dated the third day of August,
nineteen hundred and fourteen, relating to the post-
pouemeut of payment of certain bills of exchaugs
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
173
is hcroby (^onfiiinpil and shall be deemed to have been
made under the Act.
2. — (1) Tlii.s Act may bo cited as the Postpone-
ment of Payments Act, 1914.
(2) This Act sliall remain in force for a period of six
months from the date of the passing thereof.
Tho saint) evening the pjwors granted under
the Act were put in force as regards '* certain
bills of exchange " by tho following Royal Pro-
clamation, accompinied by a form for reaccept-
anco : —
It on tlic prcsent.ation for payment of
a, bill of exchange, otiier than a cheque
or bill on demand, which has been ac-
ecptcKl before the beginning of the fourth day of
August, nineteen hundred and fourteen, the acceptor
reacccpts tlie bill by a declaration on the face of the
bill in tlie form set out hereunder, that bill shall,
for all purposes, including tho liability of any drawer
or indorser or any other party thereto, be deemed to
bo due and be payable on a date one calendar niontli
after the date of its original niaturity instx^ad of
on the date of its original maturity, and to be a bill
for the original amount thereof incrciused by tlie
amount of interest thereon calculated from the date
of reacceptance to the new date of payment at tho
Uanlc of England rate current on the date of the
reacceptiinco of the bill.
At a meeting of bankers and other persons
held at the Bank of England the same evening
suitable machinery for acting on the Proclama-
tion was agreed vipon.
Towards tho end of August the difficulties of
these houses received further attention from
tho Chancellor, who had a series of confer-
ences with a largo number of bankers, heads
of accepting houses, and traders, the out-
come of which was an arrangement designed
to put an end to tho dislocation of the foreign
exchanges and thus facilitate the importation
and exportation of goods.
The main features were thus summarized in
The Times of September 5 : —
1. The Bank of England will provide where
required acceptors with the funds necessary to
pay all approved pre-moratorium bills at maturity.
This couisu will release tho drawers and endoreers of
such bills from their liabilities as parties to these bills
but their liability under any agreement with the
acccptora for payment or cover will be retained.
2. The acceptoi-s will be under obligation to
collect from their clients all the funds due to thenj
as soon as possible, and to apply those funds to repay-
ment of tlie advances made by the Bank of England.
Inteivst will be charged upon these advances at 2 per
cent, above tlie ruling Bank rate.
.3. The Bank of England undertakes not to claim
repayment of any amounts not recovered by the
acceptors fiom their clients for a period of one year
after the close of tlie war. Until the end of this perio<l
the Bank of England's claim will rank after clamis in
iTspect of post-moratorium transactions.
4. In order to facilitate fresh business and the
movement of produce and mercliandise from and to
.all parts of the world, tlie joint stock banks have
arr.anged, with the co-operation, if necessary, of the
Bank of England and tho Government, to advance to
clients the amounts necessary to pay their accept-
ances at maturity where the funds have not been
piov'ded in due time by the clients of the acceptors.
MR. BONAR LAW.
\Bas;jito.
The acceptor would \iavo to satisfy the joint stock
banks or the Bank of England both iis to the nature
of tho transaction and iis to the reason why the money
is not forthcoming from the client. These advances
would be on the same terms jis regards interest a.s the
pre-moratorium bill advances.
The Government is now negotiating with a view to
assisting the irstoration of exchange between the
United States of America and this country.
An Act prolonging the Bank Holiday of
August 3 for tliree more days was also pa.ssed ;
it was explained during tho brief debate on
it that it applied only to banks. In the course
of years it had been very generally forgotten
that, on all Bank Holidays, closing is obligatory
only on banks. Tlie same evening on which
these measures were taken the State Scheme
for War Insurance dealt with in tho next
chapter was announced.
The three days prolongation of tho Bank
Holiday was asked for by bankers and business
men generally ; it was needed in order to give
banks and discount houses time to ascertain
liow they stood, and to give the Government
time to prepare and issue £1 and lOs. notes
in order that the banks should be able to meet
demands on thfm for smaller currency than
£5 notes. The new notes, which were payable
ill gold at the Bank, were ready to the extent of
over £3,000,000 on August 7, when the banks
reojiened ; tlie pressure was greatly reUeved at
once in London, and the subsequent issue ot
notes at the rate of £5,000,000 a day soon
supplied all that was needed elsewhere.
In order to supply further currency, pending
174
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
M. RIBOT.
The French Minister of Finance.
[Nadar, Paris,
the issue of sufficient new banU notes, postal
orders were made legal tender, temporarily, on
the same terms. These arrangements were
announced by the Cliancellor of the Exchequer
in the House of Commons on Augast 5.
The Chancellor stated on that occasion that the
Bank of England was satisfied that it would be
able to reduce its rate to 6 per cent, on Friday,
August 7. He announced that a S3cond Mora-
torium Proclamation would be issued as soon
as its terms could be settled ; and pointed out
the danger to the national welfare of the
hoarding of gold. The following day he gave
further explanations as to the second Mora-
torium Proclamation, which defined more in
detail the effect of this instrument on the pay-
ment of debts.
On August 6 Mr. Lloyd George intro-
duced the Currency and Bank Notes Bill, wliich
became law that evening, and Mr. Asquith
obtained from the House a Vote of Credit for
£100,000,000.
On the same day (Thursday, August 6) the
Bank reduced its rate to 6 per cent. On
the following day, when the banks reopened,
there was an entire absence of excitement.
The new notes were well received, though
their appearance was criticized ; and although
there were during the first day or two com-
plaints that they were not sufficiently plentiful,
the supply was soon ample. According to
a return published in the Gazette of August 28,
the total of notes outstanding on August 26 wan
£21,535,064. On August 27 Mr. Lloyd George
stated that instructions for stopping the issue
of further postal orders as ciurency had been
given, and that when they were all got back
a Proclamation that they were no longer legal
tender would bo issued. No poundage was
charged on them while they were being issued
H'^ currency.
On Saturday, August 8, only a week after
the breakdown of credit, the Bank reduced its
rate to 5 per cent. The clearing banks fixed
their deposit rate at 3 J per cent., and the dis-
count houses and bill brokers fixed theirs at
4 per cent, and 4J per cent. There was no
fresh business in the Money Market, but the
feeling was hopeful. During the week ended
August 5, which included only three working
days, £2,298,000 of gold had left the Bank
for export, chiefly to Paris, and a still larger
amount, £8,211,000 in coin, besides £6,399,000
in notes, was withdrawn for " home purposes,"
much of it to be placed in hoard?. The foreign
movement, however, promptly turned in favour
of the Bank, which received during the last
three days of the week £0,300,500 in gold, on
balance, including £2,000,000 released for
Indian purposes by the India Council, and a
good impression was produced by the announce-
ment of these additions to the Bank's gold
resources. So ended one of the most extra-
ordinary iDeriods of eight days ever experienced
in the City, probably the most extraordinary
since the time of tho " Bank Restriction " in
the Napoleonic Wars. The measures taken
were unusual, like the evils they were intended
to remedy.
On Monday, August 10, over £2,600,000 of
imported gold was received by the Bank,
chiefly from the United States, and it was
known that a good deal more gold was afloat
for London ; the problem of providing currency
was being successfully met by the issue of the new
Government notes ; there had been no suspen-
sion of specie payments and no actual suspension
of the Bank Act, though power had been taken
to suspend that Act if necessary. But the
Money Market was still in a state of catalepsy,
no new busine.ss being undertaken.' " This
inactivity was partly due to the enormous
amount of office work which had to be done by
everybody in order to " straighten out " the
tangle into which business had become in-
volved. It had become evident that some-
thing more would have to be done by the
State to relieve the dead-lock, and accordingly
it was announced on Wednesday evening.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
175
August 12, ailor careful oonsultiition with the
Hank of England, the clearing bankers, and
other parties, that the Government would
guarantee the Bank of England from any loss
which it might incur in discounting approved
bills of exchange accepted prior to August 4,
1914. The following announcement was pub-
lished in The Times of August 13 : —
Thi' Bank of Kngland arc prepared, on the applica-
tion of tlie holder of any aiiproved Ijill of exchange
jiccepted before August 4, 1914. to discount at any
time before its due date at Bank rate, witliout
recourse to such liolder, and upon its maturity tin-
Bank of England will, in order to assist the resump-
tion of norraal business operations, give the acceptor
the opportxmity until further notice of postponing
payment, interest being payable in the meantime
at 2 per cent, over Bank rate varying. Airangi^-
raents will be made to carry this scheme into effect
so a-s to preserve all existing obligations.
The Bank of England will be prepared for this
purpose to approve such bills of exchange as are
customarily discounted by them and also good trade
bills and the acceptances of such foreign and Colonial
firms and bank agencies aa are established in Groat
Britain.
It was also announced that the Chancellor
of the Exchequer had appointed Sir George
Paish, who retired from the editorship of the
Statist, to assist the Treasury in dealing with
economic and financial questions arising out
of the war.
The effect of this decision to make a coacreto
reality of the credit of the United Kingdom
was very groat, but it was not so groat at first
as was expected by many people. The scheme
worked marvellously well ; a large quantity
of " pre-moratorium " billa was taken
by the Bank daily under the arrangement,
and, when allowance is made for the
novelty of the business, the disputes and mis-
imderstandings arising out of it must be regarded
as quite trivial. The Money Market began to
show signs of life again within a week; banks
and discount houses commenced very cautiously
to take a few " post-moratorium " bills as
SDon as they had got rid of an adequate amount
of their " pre-moratorium " paper, which had
been, as regards a large portion of it, a source
of anxiety and embarrassment. The full results
nf the Government's action, of which advan-
tage was freely taken, as was intended
and expected, could only develop later.
Some of the normal phenomena of the
market soon reippeared. Quotations re-
appeared first for day-to-day advances,
as was natural, for the sale of bills under the
scheme to the Bank placed a very largo amount
of money in the hands of the banks and discount
houses, and every day they had big balances
wliich they found it difficult to lend or to employ
in discounting bills, partly because they were
SCENE IN THROGMORTON STREET.
THE STOCK EXCHANGE CLOSED.
{Daily Mirror,
176
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
very careful, some critics said over-careful, as
to the securities they took, and partly, it must
be admitted, because bills of a suitable class
were undoubtedly scarce, owing to the contrac-
tion of trade due to the war. A few days after
the Bank's announcement was made several
discoimt houses began quoting rates for short
Ixtures as well as for daily advances, and quota-
tions were also obtainable for bills ; the latter,
however, were very nominal, and the terms on
which actual transactions were aone depended
more than usually on the quality of the bill,
fine paper* being taken at very much lower rates
than were quoted. Moreover, there was little
or no distinction for over a fortnight between
the dates of discountable paper, desirable
bills being taken whether they ran for two or
six months. This lumping together of the
quotation for all maturities ceased only at the
end of August. The slow revival of the
market and gradual differentiation of dates for
bills were very interesting phenomena to watch,
but they did not proceed with sufficient
celerity to satisfy people who had not realized
the violence of the blow which credit had
received.
As already indicated, the purchase of " pre-
moratorium " acceptances by the Bank was
not carried on without a certain amount of
friction. A day or two after the scheme was in
operation it began to be seen that the Bank
would probably have physical difficulties in
working so big a discount business by its ordi-
nary methods. Questions of interpretation also
had to be dealt with, but they were settled
quickly, as they arose, with the good sense
characteristic of the City, which has a mar-
vellous power of adjusting itself to new situa-
tions if given a little time to think things over.
The Bank's difficulty of dealing with the
huge mass of bills presented to it daUy threw
a very great strain on its staff, which was met
with admirable determination, formidably long
hours being endured for several days with cheer-
fulness and assiduity. On Monday, August 17,
matters camie to a head, the mass of bills
put in early in the day being so great that
a notice was posted up that no more would be
taken till the following day. The exact terms
of this announcement were as follows : —
The number of bills tendered for discount to-day
having reached the maximum limit with which it Is
physically possible for the Bank to deal, no further
oills can be accepted until to-morrow.
The Bank takes this opportunity of assuring all
holders of bills of exchange that the facilities promised
on Thursday, the 13th inst., will not be withdrawn.
•The term " flne paper " is applied to bills of the best dcBcrlp-
tion : that is, hills Khlch are backed with the names of houses of
the highest financial credit.
There was a little griunbling at this by houses
who had been too late to get their bills taken,
but the market at once recognized the reason-
ableness of the Bank's decision. It became the
practice to send the bills in when the Bank began
business, and in a day or two clerks began to
wait outside the Bank for the doors to be opened,
a rather ludicrous situation which was put an
end to on August 23 by the following notice : —
Houses who wish to discount pre-moratorium bills
at the Bank of England should hand in their applica-
tion before 4 p.m. on the preceding day. They will
be infoi-med at or before 5 o'clock on that day as to
the amount of the bills that the Bank will take from
them on the following morning before 11 o'clock.
This arrangement will begin on the afternoon of
Monday, the 24th of August.
The new plan met with general approval.
On August 31 the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer announced that the Government had
come to the conclusion that the moratoriimi,
which would end on September 4, must be
extended for at least another month, although
the majority of the traders who had been con-
sulted " were rather in favour " of bringing
it to an end. He went on to say, as reported
in The Times of September 1 : —
During the last few days there had been signs
that people were in increasing numbers taking the
view that it was their duty to pay if they could.
At the end of the present term the Government
would have to consider the advisability of limiting
the class of debts to which the moratorium should
extend. It would evidently be impossible at the
end of the month to bring the moratorium absolutely
to an end. In the case of bills of exchange the
moratorium would have to be prolonged for a very
considerable time, probably, some suggested, to the
end of the war. He was glaid to be able to state
that the attitude on which he had animadverted on
the part of some timid bankers had largely disap-
peared and that there was a very considerable change
for the better. In the main people wanted to behave
fairly towards their neighbours. He believed con-
fidence would broaden at an accelerated pace and
that in the course of the next few weeks they would
be able to take a step forward and get rid of the
morator-um.
A Proclamation on the subject was issued
on Tuesday, September 2, and revoked by
another two days later.
We have already referred to the effects pro-
duced on the situation of the Bank of England
by the beginning of the war, but it will be
useful to set forth briefly the figures of the
Bank returns published since that for July 29,
the last normal return. The amounts are in
millions sterling.
Other
Reserve.
arcula-
Bullion.
Private
Securi-
Public
tion.
Deposits.
ties
Deposit
July 29. .
26,9
29.7
38,1
64,4
47,3
12.7
».ug. 6..
10.0
36.1
27.6
66,7
65,4
11,5
.. 12..
1B,5
36,9
33.0
83,3
70,8
7,9
.. IB..
19,2
37,2
38.0
108,1
94.7
13,7
,. 26..
26^4
35,6
43.5
123,9
109.9
23.9
Sept. 2..
30.9
36.3
47,8
133,8
121.8
28,7
The return for July 29 had shown a rather
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
177
ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF A MORATORIUM READ IN THE
CITY
{Daily Graphic.
liirger reduction in the reserve than is usuiil
just before an August Bank Holiday, and much
larger increases than usual in the private
tleposits and " other " securities ; it conse-
quently showed a reduction of 12| per cent,
to 40 per cent, in the proportion of the
reserve to current liabilities. The next return
showed a fall in the proportion of no less than
25| per cent., to 14f per cent., the lowest
point touched as yet; the proportion rose to
17 per cent, on August 12, and fell to 15J per
cent, on August 19, recovered to 17J per cent,
on August 26, and to 19 per cent, on Septem-
ber 2.
Owing chiefly to the Government's finan-
cial operations the Government securities rose
from £11,005,000 on July 29 to £29,779,000
on August 26, but fell to £28,027,000 on Septem-
ber 2, owing to the repayment of Ways and
Means advances. The recovery in the
Bank's gold stock was mainly due to imports,
which amounted in the four weeks
ended September 2 (including the £2,000,000
released by the India Council) to £18,639,000.
The withdrawals for homo purposes were at
first large, £13,621,000 being so taken during
the three Weeks ended August 12, but during
the three weeks ended September 2 £5,709,000
came back. The Bank showed its power
to attract gold oven when the ordinary
machinery of the London Money Market was
paralysed, as was the case at the end of July.
One of the delusions which was entertained
by enemies and timid friends of the United
Kingdom was that it would be possible to
" break " the Bank of England on the eve
of a war by large withdrawals of gold, and thus
cripple the execution of our mobilization
arrangements and other measures rendered
necessary by war. But no trouble worth
mentioning arose on this score, for even during
the week ended August 5, when a total of
£10,509,000 was withdrawn from the Bank,
it was well known that gold to a large amount
was already engaged abroad for shipment to
London. The internal withdrawals looked
menacing only during that week ; the issue of
the new currency notes reassured those who
had made a rush to secure gold, and also
incidentally gave a demonstration of the con-
venience of notes smaller than £5. The follow-
ing is a statement of the gold movements at the
Bank during the six weeks ended September 2 : —
Week ended
External.
Intenial.
Total.
July 29
August 5
August 12
August 19
August 28
September 2
- £820.000
- 2.298.000
+ 9.590.000
+ 3.402.000
-H 4.297,000
+ 1.350.000
- £1,213.000
- ^.21!.000
- 4.197.000
+ 1.643.000
■1- 1.217.000
-H 2.949.000
- £2.033.0011
- 10.509.000
-f- 6.S93.000
-1- 4,945.000
■V 5,514.000
+ 4,299.000
Among the remarkable minor events of the
month of August was the negotiating and put-
ting in operation of a scheme, which had often
been talked of as feasible, by wliich the Bank of
England bought gold in Canada and South
Africa, to be held, imtil it was convenient to ship
it to London, by the Finance Ministers of the
Dominion of Canada and of the t!nion of South
Africa respectively. The Bank announced the
purchase of the gold, when duly informed of
it by cable, in the usual manner in London.
This arrangement is a remarkable example of
the enormous influence the Bank could exert
when the national welfare demanded it.
178
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
An interesting episode in the series of events
affecting the City since the war began was the
closing of the branches of the German and
Austrian banks which for a groat many years
had been doing business in London. These
branches were not allowed to reopen on August
7. A notification was issued on August 11
that they had been granted licences to carry on
business under strict conditions, including
supervision by a nominee of the Treasury, to
which post Sir William Plender had been ap-
pointed. On August 14 Sir William was also
appointed to take charge of the branches of
the Austrian banks in London.
Wliile the outbreak of war paralysed the
money market, its effect on the London Stock
Exchange was equally disastrous. Fi'oni the
moment that war became imminent, the
Stock Exchange was inundated with sellini;
orders. They came from every quarter of the
world, and intrinsic values were thrown to the
winds. Owing to the rush to sell, prices of
practically every stock and share in existence
fell heavily, the amount of buying on each
fresh decline being a negligible quantity.
JIarkets shivered and colla^psed, not only ail
over Europe, but all over the world wherever
securities are dealt in. The perpendicular fall in
prices which occurred during the disastrous 19-
day account which ended on July 29 followed a
steady shrinkage in values which had been going
on for months previously. Except for a brief
period in January, when the highest prices were
reached, quotations had drooped nearly all
the time, and in some instances the decline
was colossal. Fortunately the open account
had been greatly reduced in the last
couple of years, although even then the
amount of stock being carried on margin
by the joint stock banks must have
been very large at the time of the
outbreak of hostilities. London is, of course,
a market to which every Bovu-se abroad
turns for help when there is any pressure ;
consequently for at least a fortnight the London
Stock Exchange had to bear the strain of a
flood of selling orders from Europe. Right up
to the hour of closing on July 30 London
faced the panic-strickon selling with wonderful
steadiness, although for several days the jobbers
ceased to make prices in the more speculative
securities, thus bringing about a virtual sus-
pension of business in those stocks in which
dealings were regarded as dangerous. While
the Bourses had to all intents and purposes
suspended busineas, there was a fairly free
market in London in the great majority of inter-
national securities almost up to the last, though
in many stocks it was difficult to deal. Any
panic that occurred originated on the Conti-
nental Bo\irses, which sent streams of selling
orders to London owing to the inability to deal
in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and elsewhere. The
breakdown of practically all the Bourses
caused enormous sales here ; therefore, naturally,
the securities which showed the heaviest fall
in prices were the favoiirites of the Bourses,
notably Canadian Pacific Railway shares, Brazil-
ian Traction stock, and the various Foreign Gov-
ernment stocks held by international operators.
During the course of a few days the new Austrian
4i per cent, loan fell 13, Hungarian bonds in
the .same period losing from 2 to 8J points, but
the collapse in Canadian Pacific Railway shares
indicated more remarkably the complete de-
moralization of markets generally, when deal-
ings in a security so universally held as
" Canadas " are were reported within the space
of a few minutes at a difference of $9 in the
price.
In order to give a clear indication of the course
of events in the Stock Exchange during the
eventful week which culminated on the morning
of Friday, July 31, when the Committee decided
to close the House indefinitely, it is necessary
to outline very briefly the daily occurrences
which led up to this decision.
On Friday, July 24, the Stock Exchange
opened in a very depressed manner as advices
from Paris indicated that the market there
was in a condition approaching panic, and
the state of affairs on the other Continental
Bourses was equally unsatisfactory, so that
dealers took the precaution to mark down
prices all round in anticipation of sales. While
Continental operators proceeded to effect
heavy realizations with a view to a reduction
of their engagements, the stocks thus offered did
not find ready buyers, particular weakness
naturally being shown by all securities
susceptible to foreign influences. The next
day foimd the Berlin Bourse wildly excited
and the selling continued unabated. Per-
sistent rumours were circulated with regard
to the position of German banks of high
standing and great apparent wealth. Then
came the definite announcement of the break-
down of the Ulster conference which had been
sitting at Buckingham Palace, and in passing
it may be noted that for several days previously
a nervous feeling had been caused as to the
solution of the Ulster problem, although it was
not until the publication of the Austro-Huii
garian ultimatum to Servia, quickly followed
by the interposition of Russia, that the un-
easiness became acute and took on some of tlio
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
179
qualities of panic. Mark(!ts then reelod iindor
two simultaiioons strokes of throatonod disiistor,
and prices foil before the pressure of real and
speculative offers of stock. It has to bo borne
in mind that, unfortunately, the blow fell
on markets already rendered timorous, not
only by the Ulster question but by the prolonged
trouble in Mexico, and the uneasiness caused
by the financial difficulties in Brazil.
Saturday, July 25, was a veritable " Black
Satiu-day." Demoralized by the European
crisis the feeling was one of the deepest depres-
sion, and conditions generally were reminiscent
of those which niiirkod the outbreak of the
Balkan War in October, 1912. Every market
in the Stock Exchange was impartially iiit by
the prevailing pessimism, investment securities
as well as the speculative descriptions being
drawn into the vortex of the debacle ; no
market escaped the shrinkage in values, which
aifected all alike and ranged from Consols to
rubber, oil, and mining shares. The fear of a
possible European conflict had already affected
the Money Market, so that the firmer tendency
of discount rates was also a minor factor in the
collapse. Those with capital available, which
they were prepared to lock up until the trouble
was over, showed their courage by acquiring
the best class of gilt-edged securities at the
time when Consols were falling by points in
a fashion without precedent so far as thi'
memory of the oldest members of the Stock
Kxchang(» went.
On the following Monday the bie coljapso
in prices which had taken ploco during the
previous week-end was followed by a further
decline, any hopes that had been ontertainetl
that markets would rally being completely
shattered, as heavy selling from all quarters
absolutely demoralized the House. Mar.y job-
bers soon declined to " inake prices " at all,
or at any rate insisted on It^timing which way
a broker wished to deal before quoting a price.
Others made very wide quotations, so wide
in fact as to check the desire to enter into a
bargain in all but the most determined sellers.
This was the general carry-over day, and matters
were made worse by the discovery that facili-
ties in connexion with the carry-over were
being: curtailed in that foreign institutions
which were in normal times lenders of largo
sums of money were withdrawing it. The
withdrawal of this enormous amount of money
by the foreign banks cansed serious embarrass-
ment to many who had counted on the usual
facilities being granted. But the joint-stock
banks lent every assistance, with the result
that rat«s of continuation* at the last carry-
over before the Stock Exchange closed were a
•That is. the rates raid by specul'itive buyers for tlie privilege
of postltoning payment of the purdiase pritw until the following
settlement.
SCENE IN THE CITY DURING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS.
ISport and Gtneral
180
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
mere J per cent, heavier than at the previous
settlement. Covering a period of exceptional
anxiety the 19 day account thus came to an
end. The differences to be met by speculators
having accounts open for the rise had reached
app>alling proportions, the trend of prices
practically throughout the account having been
in the downward direction.
To mention a few of the differences which
hsA to be met. Canadian Pacific Railway
shares made up 22J points lower. There wore
falls of 11 J in South-Eastern Railway Deferred
stock \\5\ in Baltimore and Ohio ; 13J in
Brazilian Traction stock ; 10 in Buenos Aires
and Pacific Railway Ordinary ; 8J in Rio
Tinto shares ; and 7 J in Peruvian Corporation
Preference stock. Some of these securities
had been pressed for sale by weak Continental
holders in inconveniently large quantities. The
financial position here was then found to have
been aggravated by the above-mentioned with-
drawals of credit by the foreign banks, and as
many operators were then feeling the full effect
of these withdrawals, the result was further
persistent selling for cash of such securities as
Canadian Pacific and Union Pacific shares and
Brazilian Traction stock. There appeared to
be a fair amount of investment buying of
gilt-edged stocks and certain Home Railway
securities, although the purchases effected
were not of sufficient magnitude to absorb
the liquidation sales, all stock which could
not be contangoed* being thrown on the market
regardless of price. The dealers in the Foreign
market were now flatly refusing to make
prices, and there was a general marking down
of quotations throughout the list. But with
it all the solidity displayed by London was in
marked contrast to the weakness of the Conti-
nental Bourses, several of which had by this time
entirely ceased business, thus throwing the whole
burden of absorbing sales made by embar-
ra.ssed holders of international securities on
this market. Masses of stock usually held
abroad were offered in London, and the way
in which it was taken was highly creditable to
the Stock Exchange. The sales were only
effected at considerably lower prices than were
ruling even a week earUer, but the remarkable
fact was that such big blocks of securities were
taken at all by a single market, which was not
merely deprived of the assistance which in
normal times the more important Bourses are
able to give in holding existing issues and
financing new ones, but was compelled to
•When stock cannot l»e coutangoe<l it means that the speculator
who han hought It cannot iwstlionc payment for It even by pnyliiK
a iat« o( continuation. Jle has to pay the purclinse price at the
settlement.
take up large amounts previously held in Paris,
Berlin, and other centres. In spite of the
formidable dimensions of the differences which
had to be met, the Stock Exchange completed
the settlement on Wednesday, July 29, without
any serious disaster, and even with fewer
small casualties than had been expected.
When allowance was made for the unexampled
conditions under which business had to be con-
ducted during the week, experienced men had
no hesitation in declaring that the general
state of the stock markets was sound and even
healthy. A good many people had had doubts
as to whether the Stock Exchange would be
able to stand the enormous strain placed upon
it by the breakdown of practically all the
Continental markets. Nine failures, involving
20 members in all, were announced, though it
was known that a number of other firms were
not at the moment in a position to meet their
differences.
On Thursday, July 30, the London Stock
Exchange opened for its last session. During
the first two hours no attempt was made to
transact business, and, needless to say, such a
thing had never happened before within the
recollection of the oldest members. Though the
feeling was one of deep dejection, there weis
nothing in the nature of panic, simply be-
cause there were no dealings. While several
failures had been announced, only two of the
suspensions were important, but many cheques
were held over in the hope that the clients of the
firms concerned might be in a position to settle
their differences later. During the closing hours
it was again possible to deal with a fair amount of
freedom, and in view of all the circumstances
the whole of the markets displayed a
quite commendable amount of steadiness.
Much gratification was expressed at the
manner in which New York had with-
stood the avalanche of selling on Conti-
nental account. To some extent the em-
barrassed sitxiation in Paris arose out of the fact
that financial institutions there were loaded up
with a large accvimulation of short-dated se-
curities created in the previous year in order to
fuiance Turkey and the Balkan States. In
London conditions were aggravated by the fact
that the collapse occurred on the very eve of
the settlement. When it became known that
the Paris Bourse had postponed its settlement
for a month fears were first entertained that the
London market might have to be closed. The
Committee of the London Stock Exchange
met very early on the morning of Friday, July
31, and decided not to open at all. Had this
drastic step not been taken there was the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
181
SCENE AT THE BANK OF ENGLAND
certainty that as the result of the speculative
transtictions entered into between the previous
settlement and the date of suspension of busi-
ness, and which involved huge sums in the shape
of differences to be met at the mid- August
account, there would be many more than the
comparatively few failures that were actually
announced at the end- July settlement. In all
markets there was an over-weighted accoxmt
which had to be liquidated. For a considerable
time previously the public had been selling stocks
on the London market, until it had got far more
than it could digest. Consequently many of the
dealers were overloaded at the moment when
the blow fell. Then it also became impossible
to obtain remittances from Berlin or Vienna in
payment for the stock sold to those markets.
Closing prices given in the Official List of
.July 30 were in many instances purely nominal,
as the dealers decided not to alter them, thougli
the bargains marked, which of course repre-
sented actual business, were usually effected at
well below the current quotations.
Having ordered the House to be closed, the
Committee at once announced that the fort-
nightly settlement and also the monthly settle-
ment in Consols had been postponed. At all
the provincial stock exchanges business auto-
matically came to an end.
On Monday, July 27, business was offi-
cially recorded in Consols for cash at 73, 72,
71, 72^four consecutive bargains in Consols
showing a movement of £1 between each deal
never before having l)een recorded. By the
DURING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS.
[Daily Graphic.
time the House closed there had been dealings
reported down to 69j. Not since 1821 had the
quotation fallen below 70.
The closing of the London Stock Exchange
\\as preceded by that of the Continental Bourses.
Rmnours of the coming war had affected the
Continental markets quite early in July. On
July 13 the Vienna market was described
as having become quite demoralized by the fear
of hostiUties. Now and then, in the early part
of the month, these rumours reached the London
market, and though the seriousness of the posi-
tion was realized there was no general inclina-
tion to take a pessimistic view of the outlook.
Thus, while the Viemia market was depressed
the more important centres remained com-
paratively calm, except the Berlin Bourse, which
was rendered more susceptible to the adverse
political reports from Vienna in consequence
partly of persistent liquidation from local and
Austrian sources. Moreover, Germany Ls
Austria-Hungary's cliief moneylender, the
Austrian and Hungarian Government loans,
the Bosnian loan, and Vienna and Budapest
loans being held in Germany to the extent of
over £200,000,000 ; and the heavy fall on the
Vienna Bourse naturally unsettled the holders
of these securities. That the dread of war wa.s
seriously exercising the minds of financiers
and business men on the Continent before the
Austro-Servian crisis passed into aa acute
stage has been demonstrated since. For instance,
a Paris correspondent pointed out that a
war clause was inserted in the contract for the
182
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Bulgarian loan, providing for its cancellation i£
a European war broke out between the date of
its signature and the time fixed for the emission
of the two series of the loan.
A little before the presentation of the ulti-
matum to Servia the Vienna Bourse developed
marked weakness, which was attributed to
hquidation by those who were reported to be
conversant with the terms of the Avistrian
Xote. Berlin was sympathetically affected,
and later, when the terms of that diplomatic
document became known, other markets lost
tlieir equanimity. Prices tumbled quickly
under pressure by speculative holders anxious
to sell what stocks they had bought and weio
not in a position to pay for. As the political
tension increased the pressure to sell grew more
pronounced, and very soon all markets became
demoralized.
On Monday, July 27, the day before the
declaration of war by Austria, the panic in
Vienna was such that the Bourse was ordered to
be closed imtil Thursday, Jvdy 30, but as subse-
quent events showed it was destined to remain
closed indefinitely. Curiously enough the posi-
tion in Berlin on that day improved, and there
was some buying of German and Russian bank
shares. The Bourse, however, remained very
unsettled ; for though it was confidently believed
that the large banking institutions would in their
own interests endeavour to prevent any further
heavy fall in prices, German capitalists were
naturally alarmed at the prospect of a country
in which they had considerable interests de-
claring war.
The Brussels market, too, seemed to have be-
come rather alarmed, for it immediately followed
the lead of Vienna, ceasing operations on July 27,
and the Paris Coulisse, or outside unofficial
market, suspended operations on the same day.
On Tuesday, July 28, before the declaration of
war by Austria had become known, business in
Paris and Berlin and the lesser German markets
had become very difficult to transact. Dealings
were often a matter of negotiation. A great
many stocks were unquoted on the Paris official
market, wliile Berlin was wildly excited, grave
fears being entertained as to difficulties at the
Settlement. On the following day, July 29,
all account dealings in Berlin were suspended
transactions being confined to cash bargains.
The Amsterdam and Petrograd Bourses were
entirely closed that day ; while on Thursday all
markets suspended business, except Berlin,
Paris, and New York, but the Settlement in
Paris, fixed for July 31, was postponed. Busi-
ness on the Berlin Bourse was ordered to come
to a standstill on PViday, though the Bourse was
kept open. The Paris market remained open,
though on that day, July 31, only six quotations
were available out of some sixty stocks and
shares usually quoted.
The New York Stock Exchange had the mis-
fortune to be open on Tuesday, July 28, when the
news of the declaration of war by Austria-
Hungary against Servia first became known, and
as the European centres were then closed the
American market had accordingly to withstand
the first flood of selling which developed as a
result of that declaration. Heavy liquidating
oi'ders came from Eiu-ope, and Wall-street
seethed with excited crowds. Large blocks of
stock were flung on the market to be realized at
any price, and every fresh fall in quotations had
the effect of increasing the pressure rather than
of alleviating it, as fresh selling limits were
thereby uncovered, bringing out further stock
wliich had been left with brokers to bo sold
should the price descend to a certain level. By
the end of the session it was found that transac-
tions had for the first time this year reached a
total of considerably over one million shares.
The liquidation from Europe was heavy, but
less so than it might have been if the demoralized
state of the sterling exchange had not restricted
transactions with London. On Tviesday the
Toronto Stock Exchange was closed after having
been open for ten minutes, so great was the rush
to sell, and business in Montreal was suspended
in the afternoon, a result which tended to in-
crease the pressure in New York. Some support
was forthcoming on Wednesday, July 29, but
the tendency to recover was offset by heavy
selling from Paris of Copper shares, and from
Berlin of Canadian Pacific and Baltimore and
Ohio shares.
The behaviour of Wall-street was commend-
able throughout this trying period. On July 30,
the last working day, violent declines occurred,
and it is doubtful whether such a perpendiciilar
fall in prices had ever taken place before. Euro-
pean holders of American securities who desired
to liquidate had no other market open to them^
and accordingly sent their orders to New York,
and these were of such volume that together with
the home business they almost ovei"whelmed the
market. Nevertheless, there was a market at
all times down to the close, but on Friday the
authorities decided to follow the lead of London
and to close the exchange until further notice.
The Paris Bourse was the cnly stock :narket
to keep open its doors after Thursday, July 30.
But unlike the Stock Exchange here the Paris
market is vmder the direct control of the Govern-
ment. Its seventy members, agents de change,
as thev are called, are under the disciplinary rule
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP,.
1S3
WALL STREET, NEW YORK.
\Und4ncood a»J U luUrvtioJ,
erf the Minister of Finaiicu ; and tlio authority ol>tainable, but on that day, owing presumably
of the Government was, no doubt, responsible to the near approacli of the German invaders to
for the Bourse being kept open. Down to the French capital, the authorities decided to
September 2 a few quotations were frequently close the Bovirse until further notice.
18):
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
s
o
s
II
II
is
CO
E
g
II
a-?
(4
HHfj^^^^^^^^^Hlj^^^HCv -Mtl^^^BK '
^^^S^^HPIIi^ ,-.agT.:'
1 Hib
^^^^^■^^^^^^■^
o
3
a
d
-. O
H U
O
CO
i>
oM
Maco
^ 2
5 OS
<
I
CHAPTER XII.
BRITISH COMMERCE, SHIPPING,
AND WAR FINANCE.
The State Insurance Scheme — Speech bv the Chancellor ok the Exchequer — Agree-
ment WITH the War Insurance Clubs — Rates Charged for Hulls — The War Risks Office
FOR Cargo — The First Premium Quotation- — Subsequent Reductions — The Open Market —
I^osses of Underwriters — German Mines and Neutral Shipping — State Insurance Schemes
IN France, United States, and New Zealand — Captures of German Vessels — British Ship.s
IN German Ports — German Liners Detained at New York — Proposed Purchase by United
States Government — Admiralty Statement on Trade Routes — Additional Freight Chaboss
— Chartering on the Baltic — Attempts to Preserve German Shipping Connexions — Offer
to British Owners — Chartering of Norwegian Vessels — The Maintenance of British
Oversea Commerce — Effects on Trade — Labour Statistics — Bankers' Clearing House
Returns — Sugar Supplies — Advances in Iron and Steel — Cotton Trade Disorganized —
Woollen Industry and Khaki Orders — Financial Position in the United States —
British Government Finance.
SPEAKING in the House of Common.s on
August 4 the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer said it was vital that in order
that we sliould have an uninterrupted
supply of food and material our trade should
go on during the time of war an it did in the
time of peace. The Government was perfectly
convinced that by the powerful aid of the
British Navy, supplemented by a scheme
of this kind (State War Insurance), that vital
object of our people could be secured.
On Bank Holiday August 3, there had been
issued as a White Paper the report of a sub-
committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence
on the insurance of British shipping in time
of war. This report had been under con-
sideration for months previously, and in normal
circumstances would probably have been issued
for public discussion and detailed consideration
during the late summer and autumn months.
The sub-committee consisted of the Right Hon.
F. Huth Jackson (in the chair). Lord Inch-
cape, Sir A. Norman Hill (the secretary of the
Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association),
Sir Raymond Beck (deputy-chairman of
Lloyd's), and Mr. Arthur Lindley (a well-
known average adjuster). In the emergency it
was decided to put the scheme into opera-
tion at once. The scheme was divided
into two parts dealing respectively with the
war insurance of hulls and of cargoes. That
part which dealt with hulls was largely in-
fluenced by the fact that during recent years
the insurance of steam.ships against war risks
had largely been transferred from underwriters
to mutual insurance associations or clubs.
There were three principal associations of this
kind in existence at the time, namely, the North
of England Protecting and Indemnity Associa-
tion, the London Group of War Risks Associa-
tions, and the Liverpool and London War Risks
Insiu-ance Association. Of these the last
two had only been formed during the past two
years, and the total values insured in the tliree
associations amounted to about £87,000,000.
These clubs only covered the vessels against the
war risks which were specifically excluded from
the ordinary marine policies, and then, only
185
186
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
provided cover of a limited natvire. Thus, they
only covered vessels actually at sea or in an
enemy's port on the declaration of war or on the
outbreak of hostilities imtil their arrival at a
British or neutral port. It was apparent that one
main effect of this scheme would be to keep
vessels in port, a result wliich, in the interests
of British commerce, was altogether short of the
requirements. But the existence of these
clubs supplied a foundation on which the
Government scheme could be built. In virtue
of a special agreement between the clubs and
the Government the clubs agreed to continue
the protection of their policies until comple-
tion of the voyage, 80 per cent, of the risk
to be insured with the Government and 20 per
cent, to be retained by the clubs. For the
voyages still to be completed no premium
was to be levied on the owners of the vessels,
but for subsequent voyages a premium was to
be charged, such percentage not to exceed
a maximum of 5 per cent, or to be less
than 1 per cent. As under the cargo in-
surance scheme only cargo in vessels entered
in one of the approved clubs could be insured
most of the owners entered their vessels in the
flubs within a very short time of the outbreak
of war.
At first rates on hulls of IJ per cent, for the
single voyage and 2^ per cent, for the round,
voyage were charged ; then in the middle of
August it was decided that vessels might be
covered for a period of three months for a
liremium of 2| per cent. At the beginning of
September premiums for the single and round
voyages were reduced to 1 and 2 per cent,
respectively and the rate for tlie three montlis'
policy was reduced to 2 per cent. The further
important concession was made that a ballast
voyage not exceeding 800 miles in length might
be treated as part of the following voyage.*
The finance of the scheme rested on the
hypothesis of a loss of nearly 10 per cent,
of the value of British steamers which on the
outbreak of war and for six months thereafter
were at risk. The State's share of tlie total
losses of hulls incurred without premium was
estimated at £3,460,000 and that incurred
against premiums £4,907,000. A feature of the
scheme was that ships so insured should \mder-
take, as far as possible, to carry out the orders
of the State through the clubs in regard to
their routes, ports of call, and stoppages.
"Tnis meant that owners could insure their vessels to a loading
port and thence onwards to the final port of discharge at a premium
of 1 per cent., instead of having to cover them for a period of threj
ni:inths at 2 per cent.
SIR SAMUEL EVANS PRESIDING OVER THE FIRST PRIZE COURT
SINCE THE CRIMEAN WAR. iBanati.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
is:
'I'ho arrangomonts connocUd with tlio h\ill
insurances were outside the province of tho
War Risks Insuranco Office and wore carri(>(l
out between the chil..« and tlio Board of Trade.
Tlio second part of the scheme provided for
tlie institution of the Government War Kisks
Insurance Office to undertake the insuranco
of cargoes limited to the case of cargoes carried
in British vessels insured against war risks
with approved clubs. Estimates of the values
of cargoes were necessarily problematical, but in
preparing the scheme the Committee suggested
that the value of the cargo lost in the steamers
which it had assumed might be seized or cap-
tured by the enemy would be £8,000,000.
Taking the figures for losses of hulls given above,
the grand total of the State's share of estimated
losses on hulls and cargoes within six months,
without allowing for premiums received,
would thus be £16,367,000. It was recom-
mended that the maximum rate to be cliarged
on cargo should bo five guinejxs por cent, and
the minimum rate one guinea per cent. On
Tuesday, August 4, tho Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer described in the House of Commons
the double scheme for the insuranco of hulls
and cargoes in tlie speech to which wo liave
referred above.
At 2 p.m. on the following day, August 5,
the Government War Risks Insurance Office
opened its doors for cargo business and an-
nounced that until further decision the rate of
insurance would be five guineas per cent.
The able manner in which the authorities had
arranged within two or three days for the
complete inauguration of the scheme deserves
recognition. The management rested with an
expert Advisory Board, whose names are given
below,* with Mr. Douglas Owen as chairman.
During the first afternoon the office was mainly
engaged in answering inquiries. But tho more
fact that it was pre]3ar.'d to accept risks at a
maximum rate of five guineas per cent, as a
maximum had a wonderfully steadying effect
on commerce. The office, in accordance with
the terms of the scheme, was not accepting risks
on vessels actually at sea when war broke out,
and therefore high rates, such as 15 or 20 per
cent., had to be paid for insuranco on tliese
in the op; n market. Arrangements were soon
made, however, for an extension of the system
•Mr, Dou2hw Owen (Chairman) ; Sir Ktlward Reaiichaiiip. M.P.:
Sir Raymond IJeck (l)eputy-CUairman of Lloyd's) ; Sir .Macljenzic
Chalmera. K.C.B., C.S.I. : Sir Algernon Firth ; .Mr. W. K. Ilar-
greavea (C. T. BowTing and Company, Limitcil) ; Mr. E. G. llannan.
C.IJ. ; Mr. H. T. Hines (Koyal Kxchange As-surance) ; Lord Inelicape.
a.C.M.G.. K.C.S.I.. K.C.I.E. ; Sir Henry .lolmson ; Mr. K. B. Lemon
• The Marine Insurance Company) ; Mr. .\rthur Litidley : Sir
John Luscombe : Mr. 11. A.. Ogilvie (late Alliance Assurance Com-
oany) : Mr. W. Klchanls ; Jiear-.\dmiral Sir E. Slade. K.C.I.E..
.v.C.V.O. : Mr. J. 11. Warrack; Mr. J. A. Webster; .Mr. Walter
Carter (secretaryi.
SIR SAMUEL EVANS.
The President of the Admiralty Division.
U- Rusull & Sons.
to enable the Office to accept insurances a.s
from the time that vessels at sea arrived at
a port of calj. Vessels could thus be insuretl
from the time that they left, say, an Australian
port for the United Kingdom and also from a
South American port of call, such as Montevideo
or Rio de Janeiro ; but vessels at some pomt
in the ocean between Australia and South
America could not be insured. Where owners
desired to cover cargo from such points it was
necessary to apply to imderwriters and jiay
market rates.
On Saturday, August 8, the Government rate
was reduced to four guineas per cent., on
Tuesday, August 18, to tlu«e guineas per cent.,
and on Tuesday, September 1, to two guineas
por cent. Throughout August an immense
amount of business was placed, and
the influence of the scheme in main-
tahiing commerce was incalculable. Merclianta
tlirpughout the world knew that the highest rat<
they would be called upon to pay would Ijt
limited to five guineas per cent, as a maximum
and they could conduct their business ac-
cordingly. Private underwriters felt that in
order to attract business they must offer oven
lower terms than those of the Government,
and trade benefited thereby. At various times
there were certain areas deemed by the Govern-
ment inadvisable for shipping, and such risks
had of necessity to be offered in the market.
188
THE TIMES HISTORY Olf THE WAR.
At a certain period of the hostilities cargo in a
number of vessels from the Baltic was thus
covered at a rate of 10 guineas per cent.
Such losses as there were at first apjjeared
to fall on the open market. There was the
seizing of the British steamer City of Win-
chester off the East African Coast, while
homeward bound from Calcutta with a valuable
cargo of tea and other Indian produce, which
was at sea when war broke out ; the sinking
of the British steamer Hyades off the South
American coast while homeward bound to
Rotterdam from the Plate with grain, with a
cargo believed to be insured in (Jennany ;
the sinking of the Kaipara off the Canaries
while heavily laden with New Zealand produce ;
and the sinking of the Nyanga in the same
locality on a voyage from West Africa. Xhesi>
two latter vessels fell a prey to the Kaiser Wilhelm
der Grosse, well-known as a North Atlantic
liner of the Norddeutscher Lloyd and con-
verted when hostilities broke out into an armed
merchant cruiser. Happily the German vessel
was herself sunk later by His Majesty's Ship
Highflyer. The British steamer Holmwood
was sunk, while outward bound to the Plate
with coal, by the German cruiser Dresden ;
and the British steamer Bowes Castle was also
sunk off the South American coast, while bound
from Chile to the United States with nitrate
believed to be owned in America, by the German
cruiser Karlsruhe. . The Wilson liner Runo
while bound from Hull for Archangel struck a
mine in the North Sea on September 5, and
f oimdered. Many trawlers and neutral ships were
sunk by German mines strewn indiscriminately
in the North Sea. How severely neutral
vessels suffered is shown by the following
list of vessels which struck mines and
foundered.
NETJTEAL VESSELS SimK BY MINES.
Date.
Vessel.
NAnoNALm.
Aw. 8
Tysla
Norwegian
.. 28
Maryland
Danlah
.. 23
Chv. Brobem
Daniah
.. 23
Alloe H.
Dutch
.. 23
Hoatdijk
Dutch
.. 27
SkiUi FSKoU
Danish
.. 27
Gottfried
Norwegian
.. 27
Ena
Danish
.. 27
Gaea
Danish
Sept. 2
St. Paul
Swedish
A scheme of war insurance on hulls and cargo
somewhat similar to the British plan was
adopted by the French Governnaent in the
middle of August, and State war insurance
schemes were also introduced by the United
States and New Zealand Governments All,
like the British system, had as their object the
maintenance of the overseas trade of the respec-
tive countries.
SIR JOHN SIMON,
The Attorney-General.
ILalayette, Dublin.
The London Marine Insurance Market was
one of the few important markets which were
very active during the first weeks of the war.
Apart from war insm-anoe, a good deal of busi-
ness was brought to London through the
collapse of the German insurance centres.
In the years preceding the war German offices
had been very enterprising, and had collected
large premium inconxes as the result, to a con-
siderable extent, of cutting rates. These
offices had branch establishments or agencies
in this country, and it had been maintained
that there were sufficient funds held here to
meet all claims that might be expected
to fall on the offices. But in some instances
after the outbreak of war the German
agents reinsured their accounts wholesale with
British office's, while in others brokers them-
selves hastened to effect fresh insurances in
British offices for their clients. Comparatively
high rates had to be paid, not merely because
British underwriters realized that they were
being made a convenience of, but also because,
owing to increased risks of navigation, all rates
had advanced since the war began. Thus
many British firms which before the war broke
out had been accepting German policies pro-
bably found their choice expensive.
British Fire Insurance offices had large
reinsurance contracts with German com-
panies, and the value of these during the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
189
period of the war was considered problematical.
In spito of the few captures already recorded
British shipping services were maintained,
while German merchant vessels did not
■dare to venture out of port. During the
first few days of the war large numbers
of German steamers were seized in British
ports or wore captured at sea. On
September 4 the first Prize Court since the
Crimean war, 60 years ago, was held in Admiralty
Coijrt II. for the hearing of the cases. Sir
Samuel Evans, the President of the Probate,
Divorce, ana Admiralty Division, presided, and
after a simple ceremony the Attorney-General
■(Sir John Simon, K.C.) gave a short account of
■the history of the Prize Court. Then two cases
were hoard. The Coiu-t directed that the
•German barque Cliile, seized at Cardiff, should
be detained imtil further order and the ship
Perkeo, captured off Dover by H.M.S. Zulu,
was condemned. As a small set-off against the
Harge numbers of German vessels seized in
British ports about two dozen British vessels
were seized in Hambiu-g and other German
ports. A suggested agreement between Ger-
many and Groat Britain respecting similar
•treatment for each country's vessels failed to
be reached, though later a reciprocal arrangement
between the A\iatro-Hvmgarian Government
and this country was accepted, and the vessels
which had arrived at enemy ports before the
declaration of the war or without knowledge of
the war were allowed so many days within
which to return to their own country.
Much attention was directed at the out-
break of the war to the interrupted voyage of
the Norddeutscher Lloyd liner Kronprinzessin
Cecilie, known as " the gold ship." The liner
left New York on July 28 with £2,000,000 in gold
for London and Paris, largely insured in London.
It was thought that the vessel might attempt
to make the passage direct to Bremerhaven
and that complications about the gold might
ensue ; but on August 5 the liner put back to
Bar Harbour, Maine. The passengers and the
gold were dispatched thence to New York.
A vessel of the same name belonging to
the Hamburg-Amerika fleet was seized at
Falmouth.
Some uneasiness similar to that felt for the
Norddeutscher Lloyd liner was expressed on
account of other liners, British and French, which
were bound from New York for Europe with large
consignments of gold ; but each vessel safely
reached port. The Lusitania, strangely enough,
made her slowest passage from New York to
THE MARIE LEONHARDT,
a German vessel, captured in the Port of London, being unloaded.
\AllUTi.
190
THE TIMES HISTORY UJf' THE WAIi.
THE OCEANIC.
Wrecked off the north coast of Scotland.
[Spari and General.
Liverpool owing to the breakdown of a turbine
and after sighting a destroyer made the voyage
with lights out. Other vessels had exciting
passages.
The Kronprinz Wilhelm, of the Norddeutscher
Lloyd fleet, left New York on August 3 heavily
laden with coal, and it is believed acted as
collier to the German cruisers which were at
largo in the Atlantic.
Numerous German vessels were detained at
New York, notably the Vaterland, Amerika,
George Washington, Barbarossa, Pennsylvania,
President Grant, and Grosser Kiirfurst.
Offers were mado to purchase some of the
flamburg-Amorika vessels and a proposal was
set on foot that the United States Government
should acquire a number of the German liners.
Opposition was at once started among certain
sections of the United States public, and it is
understood that the French Government pro-
tested against the proposed purchase as involving
a breach of neutrality.
The sailing of the Imperator, which was to
have left Cuxhaven for New York on August 1,
svas cancelled, and the giant liner remained in
port.
On August 12 a notable announcement was
made by the Admiralty describing the steps
which had been taken to ensure the safety of
British shipping. They stated that at the
request of the Fort ign Office they had considered
attentively the position of Brazil, Uruguay,
Argentina, and Chile, with the intention of
so concerting naval measures as to protect
British trade with those countries. They had
dispatched a large number of mobilized cruisers
to their stations commanding the trade routes,
nearly trebling the superior cruiser forces
there. Twenty-four British cruisers, besides
French ships, were searching for the five
German cruisers known to be in the Atlantic.
A number cf fast merchant vessels, fitted and
armed in British naval arsenals, were being
commissioned by the Admiralty for the purpose
of patrolling the routes and keeping them clear
ol German commerce raiders. " With every
day that passes," the annovincement continued,
" the Admiralty's control of the trade routes,,
including especially the Atlantic trade routes,
becomes stronger. Traders with Great Britain
of all nations should therefore continue con-
fidently and boldly to send their ships and
cargoes to sea in British or neutral ships, and
British ships are themselves now plying on
the Atlantic Ocean with almost the same
certainty as in times of peace. In the North
Sea alone, where the Germans have scattered
mines indiscriminately and where the most
formidable operations of naval war are pro-
ceeding, the Admiralty can give no reassur-
ance." Yet it may be noted that as regards
the North Sea the trade had very largely
reasserted itself, since as from August 10 coal
shipments to Norway were permitted and
there had been a resumption of the mail and
passenger services to Northern Europe.
Following this official announcement the
International ]\Iercantile Marine Company an-
nounced the immediate departure of four
liners from New York for this country.
Although British services were maintained
shippers were at first, at any rate, asked to pay
very much higher freights. Some lines, which
had advanced their rates by as much as 50 per
cent., within a month reduced the increases to 2&
per cent., and then reduced them further to
20 per cent. As reasons for the formidable
increases they pointed out that the insurance
of the hulls wa.i a serious burden and that
bunker coals were costing more. But when a
reduction of the war premiums on hulls was
made owners in the Australasian and South
American trades announced an immediate
reduction in freights to meet the new situation.
These movements of rates related of course to
the regular lines. Although no official intimation
was made beyond that contained in the an-
nouncement reproduced above, it may be-
assumed that many vessels were acquired
by or chartered to the Admiralty either for the
patrolling of trade routes or for transport
purposes, and the removal of these vessels from
their regular trades naturally involved adjust-
ments in services.
On the Baltic, where tramp cargo tonnage
is dealt in, business was at first brovight practi-
cally to a standstill. The main difficulty was-
financial. Cargoes of grain are bought largely
on the strength of drafts, and as credit was very
seriously curtailed during the first few days oJ
the war there were few, if any, dealings. Gradu-
ally, however, the position improved through-
out August, and early September found quite
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
1»1
a fair amount of activity. Rates before tlio
war wore on a very low level, owing to the
superabundance of tonnage, and the situation
was aggravated when many contracts were
broken in consequence of the war and vessels
were thus liberated. Owners complained that tlie
low rates did not meet the expenses, swollen
as they were by the additional costs of the war,
and it was not until there was some hardening
of rates that owners showed much
inclination to transact new business. Charter-
ing of tramp tonnage by the Government
for coal and other purposes was probably a
favourable factor in stiffening freights.
But if there were certain inconveniences in
carrying on British trade German shipping
came to a standstill. Various efforts were
made by German agents in neutral countries to
coiLserve their interests. Those attempts were
specially notable in the United States, where
German agents tried to come to an arrangement
with British lines to carry on their business for
.them during the war, and then organized a service
from New York to South America under the
N'orwegian flag. British vessels were wanted
for the trade partly because of the protection
given by the British Navy and partly because
the British Government's scheme of cargo in-
surance was only available for goods shipped
in British vessels insured against war riskii with
approved British clubs. No doubt inducements
were offered to British companies to step into the
breach, but they were not at all disposed to
accept them. All the working agreement*
which had existed between British and German
lines before the war natiu-ally camo to an
.md, and, with the Continental ports closed,
lines sailing under the British, French, Russian,
and neutral flags were quite able to take care
of the triido that was offering. There was
no closing down of British oversea commerce.
Trade with North and South America, Austra-
lasia, India, and the Far East was maintained,
ensuring a supply of foodstuffs and of raw
material for the factories.
During the first weeks of hostilities it
was impossible to furnish much quantitative
evidence of the injury that had been done
by the war to trade. Some of our best means
of measuring the commercial and inoustiial
activity of the country were temporarily in
abeyance, such as the railway traffic returns,
whicli had ceased to bo available after the lines
were taken over by the Government on
U.S.A. CRUISER TENNESSEE, the "relief" ship with cargo of gold.
\ Daily M'rror.
192
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
U.S.A. CRUISER TENNESSEE.
Sailors carrying kegs of gold for aid of
American refugees.
[Daily Mirror,
August 5. Other periodical statistics re-
specting August were meagre. The market
reports and other similar evidence from the
various centres of industry are valuable, so far
as they go, but do not lend themselves to the
presentment of a really adequate survey of the
state of industry and trade. The information
collected by the Labour Department of the
Board of Trade is useful; it showed that the
number of people unemployed liad not in-
creased so quickly as was feared from the rapid
rise in it during the first half of the month.
The Board of Trade " figure of unemplojmient,"
■which shows the state of the insured trades,
was only 4'0 on August 7, but by the 17th it
had risen to 5-1, and on August 21 to 5-8;
during the next week, however, ended
August 28, it only increased to 6-2, and there
was practically ' no increase for the week
ended September 4. These trades, however,
were not sufficiently representative of the whole
labour position, though they included several
big groups of workmen, especially those engaged
in shipbuilding and engineering, as well as
the building operatives. The drop in the rate
of increase was probably duo to the recent
improvement in recruiting — the result of the
growing comprehension of the objects of the
war by the people generally. In uninsured
trades' there was hardly any increase during the
last week of August in the number of persons
registered as unemployed, which on the 28th
was 80,868, and on September 4 their number
had fallen to 73,891. Distress was not widespread,
and thougl) trades largely engaged in manu-
facturing for export, especially the cotton in-
dustry, at once were affected, some branches of
the clothing trade were benefited by the demand
due to the war. The heavy steel trades were
active, the branches producing war material
for the Government having big orders on
hand, and firms and companies which made
small arms and articles necessary for naval and
military equipment were very busy.
The cliief actual evidence of the falling off
of general business was the decline in the London
Clearing House returns, from wliich, however,
too much in the way of inference could not be
safely drawn, as owing to the closing of the
Stock Exchange the clearings were curtailed by
a large mass of transactions which, though
economically of importance, do not directly
represent industry and commerce. The fol-
lowing is a statement of the amounts paid
at the London Bankers' Clearing House at the
undermentioned dates (OOO's omitted) : —
Amount.
Inc. or Dec.
Weeks ended
1914. 1 1913.
Amount.
Per (ent
July 29
August 5
Augu.st 12
Auiust 19 ..
August 26
Septemlier 2
£
337.450
161.929
187.317
179.421
150,432
155,707
£
328.280
305.297
274.092
315.412
255.204
324,544
£
+ 9.170
- 143.368
- 87.375
- 135.991
- 104,772
- 168.837
+ 2-8
- 470
- 81-8
- 43-1
- 410
- 52-0
Total. January 1 to
September 2 . .
10,965,273
11,165,445 - 200,172
- 1-8
The total clearings to July 29 showed an in-
crease on the corresponding period of 1913 of
£440,000,000, or 4J per cent., which was after-
wards converted into the decrease shown in the
table. The falling off in the country cheque
clearing up to the same date was less than 1 per
cent. ; these clearings were probably a better test
of the decline in the general business of the
country than the total. They were as follows
for the five weeks ended September 2 (OOO's
omitted) : —
Amount.
Inc. or Dec.
Weeks ended
1914.
1913.
Amount, | Ter cent.
£
£
£
August 5..
12,059
25.312
- 12.653
- 60-0
August 12..
30.125
27.778
-1- 8.347
+ 30-0
August 19..
24,157
26,491
- 2,334
8-8
August 20 . .
20.632
22.1B8
- 1.536
6-9
Sei)tember 2
20,010
23,364
- 3,354
- 14-8
The principal grain markets remained open
throughout the crisis, although the declaration
of war caused considerable nervousness and there
was a rush to buy wheat, which advanced at
Mark-lane on August 6 about 7s. per quarter,
English being offered at POs. per quarter as
compared with 37s. before the crisis, and a
corresponding advance was paid fir flour.
The business, however, was put tlirough
without excitement or speculation. Within
a few days the market assumed a more normal
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
193
state luxder the influence of the Government
war insurance scheme, the reduction in the Bank
rate, and the diversion to this country of grain
cargoes primarily destined for German and
Scandinavian ports. Prices of wheat fell
rapidly and settled down to a basis of about
40s. per quarter, though at this level the
market remained very firm owing to tiie some-
what tardy resumption of Atlantic shipments
and encouraging advices from the American
markets.
Other food products generally wore unduly
inflated in price early in August by the anxiety
of consumers to lay in stocks. This was checlced
by reassuring statements from the Government
as to supplies of the principal products both
present and prospective, and tlie inflation of
prices was prevented on the appointment by
the Government of a standing committee of
retail traders who fixed from day to day maxi-
mum retail prices. The principal articles
dealt with were siigar, butter, cheese, lard,
margarine, and bacon.
The price of sugar, as might have been
expected, advanced much more rapidly than
other foods. At first cubes sold at as much
as 40s. per cwt., as against ISs. per cwt. before
the war, but there was a drop from the high
figure to about 33s. 6d. per cwt. For about
a week the homo refiners withdrew all their
offerings from the market in order to protect
their stocks while the rush to buy was in pro-
gress. There was no serious scarcity of
raw sxigar, but the initial difficulty experienced
in obtaining supplies of the finished article
was duo chiefly to the inability of the British
refineries to cope with the extra work thrown
upon them by the sudden cessation of the
output from Continental refineries. Supplies of
sugar were drawn from the West Indies and
other 'sources, but it was obvious that those
would be by no means sufficient to fill the
large gap caused by the loss of imports from
the Continent.
As regards meat the price remained at a
normal level. In fact, September supplies at
the principal markets were more than sufficient
to meet the demand in spite of a sharp con-
traction in shipments from Argentina diu-ing
August. Bacon, cheese, and butter also re-
turned to almost normal prices consequent on
the opening of the trade route from Denmark
to tliis country.
After the first shock a remarkable change came
over the iron trade, which before the war had
been suffering considerably owing to keen foreign
competition, principally from Germany. Busi-
ness was resumed ratlier unexpectedly on the
Glasgow warrant market, and prices imme-
diately took an upward turn. 1 lie reason for
this was the temporary interruption of the
import of foreign ores and the complete
stoppage of supplies of semi-finished iron
and steel from Germany and Belgium, which
forced manufacturers to obtain their require-
ments from the home markets. Substantial
advances took place in the price of iron and steel,
wliich adversely afiected business, especially
in regard to exports. Another influence which
had an injurious effect on export business was
the action of shipowners in raising freights
from 25 to 50 per cent. Still man .facturers
wore receiving orders that would otherwise
have gone to the Continent.
After the outbreak of war the London Metal
Exchange remained closed as far as dealing
was concerned, though transactions were on
privately ; no prices were available except
those fi.xed by the committee of the exchonge.
The statistics of copper and tin for July
showed no remarkable changes, but copper
producers in the United States took measures
to curtail the output to the extent of about
50 per cent. The action of the Govern-
ment in <ommandeering most of the supplies
of spelter in England caused the price of
that metal, which is obtained largely from
Germany, to be more than doubled. Heavy
arrivals from America,' however, considerably
I
^^K' tI^^I
\ •
\
»
' ^M^^^^^^^^^B .^^^^^^^hI
1 ^^^^^^^^^^n ^^v^^IhH
U.S.A. CRUISER TENNESSEE
landing stranded Americans from France at
Weymouth. [Oailv M.rror.
194
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Cdlieved the pituation. Trade requirements
of lead were naturally small and there was
an adequate supply for armnunition purposes.
The cotton trade was thoroughly disorganized,
and considerable alarm was at first felt as to the
effect on Lancashire, though this subsided
with the improvement in the financial situa-
tion. Some confidence was also gained from
the announcement that the trade route through
the Mediterranean to the Far East was open,
while it was realized that the cessation of
exports of cotton goods from Germany and
Austria would divert some business to Man-
chester. The first step taken to relieve
the situation was a restriction of output
of yam and cloth, which was eiTected
by the decision of the Federation of
Master Cotton Spinners' Associations to stop
the mills for a period of three weeks. This
affected 30 million spindles ; in addition other
mills outside the federation announced their
intention of falling into line.
Dealing on the Liverpool and Manchester
Cotton Exchanges was entirely suspended for
a few days, and cash transactions only were
resumed on a moderate scale after a plan had
been arranged by the Liverpool Cotton Associa-
tion whereby no cotton should be sold below
a minimum price to be fixed by the committee.
The scheme was devised solely with the object
of safeguarding the interests of importers and
consun»ers, and was generally approved by
spinners. The liquidation of existing contracts
proved to be a difficult task, but machinery
was set in motion whereby good progress was
made in this direction. Although several Liver-
pool firms were badly hit by the slump in prices
and the failure of a large New York house con-
sequent on the crisis, no financial trouble
W£t8 reported at the Settlement held on the
Jjiverpool Exchange in the middle of August.
Similar conditions prevailed on the New York
and New Orleans Exchanges, where dealings in
futures were suspended. Three delegates from
I..iverpool were sent to New York to discuss the
situation, and a scheme was arranged between
the two Exchanges for the liquidation of inter-
national cotton obligations. The marketing
of the American crop was greatly retarded, and
a proposal was put forward by the United
States Government for advancing funds to
growers to enable them to hold their cotton
until a more rapid movement was possible.
In the woollen industry the loss of the im-
portant Continental trade had a serious effect
in Bradford and Leeds, where the working
hours at the factories had to be greatly reduced
owing to the cancellation of orders or indefinite
postponement of deliveries. On the other
hand, several firms were kept busy on orders for
clotliing for the Army, and the Government
were urged to distribute their orders among as
many firms as possible in order to prevent the
closing down of the mills. Prices of the raw
material were very little disturbed, though some
descriptions required for khaki cloth showed a
hardening tendency. The sales in Australia
were either postponed or abandoned owing
to the absence of European buyers.
It was a fortunate circumstance that sea-going
commerce in the first weeks of the war was
almost free from molestation by German and
Austrian war ves.sels. This was especially the
case as regards the United States, from which
very large supplies of food and other com-
modities were expected. From South America,
also, valuable imports were obtained, but the
poorness of the Argentine harvest curtailed these
supplies ; less maize was available from that
quarter than in 1913, when the maize crop was
magnificent. But a serious obstacle to the further
importation of goods came into existence when
the war began, in the form of a paralysed
sterling exchange market, as already mentioned.
Arrangements wore, however, made, with the
object of overcoming this, by the Government
and the Bank of England on September 4.
In an article on the grain situation in Finan-
cial America of August 24 the difficulties created
by the exchange situation as it appeared at that
date were thus discussed : —
British and French buyers have shown willingness
to cooperate with shippers here to bring about a
satisfactory settlement o£ the situation. On account
of the almost total paralysis of shipping, which lasted
about a week, and the fact that, while improved, the
shipping situation is by no means normal as yet,
it waa recognized that it might be impossible for
sellers in many cases to make deliveries on contract
time. Of the 60,000,000 bushels or more wheat under
contract in this market tor export, the greater part
is for September or October delivery. Buyers were
sounded as to whether they would consent to an ex-
tension of the time for delivery, anl answers received
by the North American Grain Export Association
from many buyei-s all indicate that buyers are willing
to make every allowance and to grant all the exten-
sion necessary. This will go a far way toward elimizLa-
ting the need for cancellation of contracts.
No shipments can be made to Germany, of course.
The occupation of Brussels and the turning of Antwerp
into an armed camp will also debar dealers here
who have contracts for that port from filling them.
Shipments to Rotterdam will also, it is said, be
cancelled, as British vessels bearing grain to that port
have already been diverted to home ports and shippers
are not willing to run further risks of loss in this
manner.
The disturbance of ordinary business caused
by the war was necessarily felt keenly in the
United States, owing to its dependence on large
amounts of capital from London in order to
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
196
■carry on the development of the enormous
natural resources of the country, its own
capital, though increasing yearly, being in-
sufficient for the purpose. The indebtediiess of
New York to London was largely in short-dated
securities, and in normal times there is no
difficulty in providing for their renewal on
matiu-ity, as British and other Eiu-opean capital-
ists are glad to hold such very satisfactorj'
paper. But the financial position during
the early weeks of the war caused
anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic.
The leaders of business in the United States
were fully aware of the profound change that
the war had created in the economic situa-
tion all over the world. A country like the
United States, which is almost self dependent
as regards the necessaries of life, was less affected
in some respects than older countries, but the
speed of the fiu-ther development of its resources
was, for a time, slower than the United
States had been accustomed to.
An interesting event was the dispatch of
the cruiser Tennessee from the United States
with £1,600,000 in gold " for the protection of
American credit in London." The cruiser,
accompanied by the Carolina, arrived at Fal-
jnouth on August 16. Officers proceeded to
Paris shortly afterwards with £50,000 in gold
to meet the immediate needs of Americans in
France and to provide for their repatriation.
The" initial financial arrangements made
by the British Government for meeting the
cost of the war were on a very large but
not on an unusual scale. The first measure
was the voting on August 6 of a credit of
£100,000,000. This was promptly made use
of by obtaining £9,000,000 of Ways and Means
advances from the Bank ; a fiu-ther £5,720,000 .
of these advances was taken during the week
ended August 15, during which week also
tenders were invited (on Friday, the 14th)
for £15,000,000 of six months' Treasury bills
which were allotted on August 19 at an aver-
age discount rate a shade over 3| per cent, per
annum. An additional £l,340,000of Ways and
Means advances was obtained during the week
•ended August 22. In the week ended the
29th another £15,000,000 of Treasury bills
were placed (on the 26th) at a shade over
3£ per cent., and £410,000 of Ways and Means
advances were received into the Exchequer.
Of the second issue of Treasury bills, £10,000,000
were for the purpose of making a loan to
Belgium.
The total of Ways and Means advances re-
ceived during the four weeks ended August 29
was £46,470,000; but as £8,000,000 of such
advances were paid oil during the last of those
weeks the net amount of Ways and Means
debt on that date duo to the war finance was
£38,470,000.
The revenue got in during this four weeks was
£9,975,000, again.st £10,680,000 in the corre-
sponding period of 1913. The decrease was
£705,000 — a moderate loss, in the circum-
stances, even if it were not almost wholly
accounted for by a decline of £671,000 in the
Death Duties. The only important reduc-
tion was £301,000 in stamps, the revenue
from which had necessarily suffered from
the contraction of trade. It was satisfactory
to note that the Customs showed an increa.se of
£103,000.
As regards expenditure, the issues for supply
services for the four weeks ended August 29
amounted to £32,246,000. Dujing the corre-
sponding four weeks in 1913 the issues for
supply were £9,621,000, so that the known
additional expenditure on war in August,
1914, taking what we may call normal outgo
for the four weeks at £10,000,000, appears to
have been in the neighbourhood of £22,250,000,
about £5,550,000 per week. The expenditure
was very much greater in the first week thtwi
in the others. There was much discussion of the
issue of a big loan early in the month of August,
but the ease with which Treasury bills were
placed, owing to the big mass of money con-
trolled by the clearing banks, con\dnced
most good judges that issues of similar paper
affo rded the British Government its best means
of financing its current requirements.
After a number of meetings the British Life
Assurance offices decided to make no extra
charge on the policies of members who might
serve abroad in the Territorial Forces, Yeo-
manry, or new armies raised during the war,
provided that members effected their poUcies
when civilians. It had at once been decided
that no extra premium should be charged on
account of home service. Officers in the Royal
Navy afloat or abroad and in the Expeditionary
Army who had not paid the ordinary additional
rate in peace time for naval or military service
were charged an additional premium of £5 Ss.
per cent, for the period of the war, and non-
combatants were asked to pay an extra rat«
of £3 3s. per cent. On new policies of com-
batants in the Expeditionary Force the extra
rate charged was £7 7s. per cent., and on the
policies of non-combatants £5 5s. per cent.
Friendly alien combatants were charged an
additional rate of £10 10s. per cent.
CHAPTER XIII.
GERMAN FINANCE.
Gebman Indebtedness — A " Levy " on Pbopebty — Internal Stbuctube of Germak
Industby and Trade — ^The Test of Wab — ^Was Gebmany Self-Suppobting ?— The German
Banks — Mortgages and Cash Reserves — The Morocco Cbisis, 1911 — Financial Position in
FiEST Half of 1914 — The War Crisis — Rush for Gold — Suspension of Payments — Apprehen-
sions— A Short ob a Long Wab — Extbaobdxnaby Measubes — Impobts Made Feee — Fixing
OF Prices — Loan Papeb — War Credit Banks — A German Victory Essential.
FOR a good many years before the war
Germany's financial position had pre-
sented not only Germany but all the
world that had dealings with her with
a set of problems of extraordinary com-
plexity. Most countries had been made pain-
fully conscious of the formidable character
of German business competition, and every-
body was aware of the rapid growth of Ger-
many's internal and foreign trade and of the
abundant outward evidence of strength and
prosperity. On the other hand, she was for
ever piling up debt on unfavourable conditions,
and repeated political crises showed that she
had the greatest difficulty in adjusting her con-
stitutional and fiscal systems to the growth of
expenditure which was rnainly due to the
extravagant demands of hor Army and Navy.
" Finance reform " had been again and again
the one great problem of German politics.
Partial solutions of the problem had been
effected only at the cost of great internal
upheavals and bitter but indecisive battles
between the agrarian and industrial interests,
between the reactionary and the " liberal "
forces, and indeed between the different States
of the Empire. When, in 1913, Germany
made the last and enormous addition to her
Army, to which reference was made in an earlier
chapter of this work, the Imperial Treasury
coxild not face another battle about direct and
indirect taxation, and had recourse to the
simple but medieval method of imposing a
direct " levy " on all property on a scale which
was expected to produce about £50,000,000.
When war broke out the assessments for this
" levy " had been made, but not a penny had
actually been collected. The " levy " was by
its nature war and not peace finance, and one
immediate result was that, while other countries,
immediately the war began, had recourse to a
moratorium, Germany preferred to adopt all
sorts of special remedies and precautions, the
main reason being that while the Government
could not suspend the heavy taxation upon which
it was relying, it could not collect the taxes
if the people could not collect their debts.
Peculiar as was the financial system of the
German Empire, not less peculiar was the
internal structure of German finance, industry,
and trade. There was no doubt that, from
having been a proverbially poor country, Ger-
many had in a very short time become, statistic-
ally, at any rate, a very wealthy one. It was a
favourite pastime of German financiers, in the
period immediately preceding the war, to com-
pile and publish dazzling estimates of the
whole national wealth. As nobody in Germany
had ever seriously considered the possibility
of Germany being defeated in war, the figures
were ever fresh incitements to industrial ex-
pansion and speculation and also to almost
unlimited expenditvu-e on armaments, and yet
there was no reason to be sure that .the statistico
would ultimately carry more weight in history
than the far more stupendous statistics which
have often been compiled about the wealth
of the Chinese Empire.
190
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
197
THE DECLARATION OF WAR IN BERLIN.
Scene in front of the Royal Palace.
The course of the war will, however, toll
its own tale as regards the general soundness
of German calculations. It was sure of neces-
sity to change the whole course of German
development, and above all to move the founda-
tions of German industry and finance. There
are only two or three vital points to bear in
mind. The first question which war was to
answer was to what extent Germany, still
and notwithstanding her industrial expansion
a very great producer of corn and cattle, wa,s
" self-supporting." The second question was
to what extent her resources and credit could
stand the strain of a war which, as long as the
Britisn Navy existed, was sure to close her
ports, stop most of her supplies of raw materials,
shut down her factories and mills, and test
all her reserves. Two things at least wore
clear. Germany had retained a wonderfully
antiquated system of payments, innocent of
the most ordinary cash-sparing devices, cheques
being almost unknown to a great part of the
population. On the other hand, Germany had
developed with extraordinary daring every
method of employing all available capital.
The German banks, working moreover in the
closest possible community, became ever more
and more money-lenders and organizers of
industry, themselves directly involved in every
great industrial and commercial concern in
the cocintry, competing eagerly for the deposits
which fed these concerns, and encouraging and
directing private enterprise in every direction.
Jlortgage transactions assumed enormous pro-
portions, and even the Prussian savings banks,
which held deposits of more than £550,000,000,
had more than half of their whole funds in
mortgages. Even in peace time the state of
the cash reserves of the banks caused grave
misgivings, and when war broke out a dis-
cussion was proceeding with a view to com-
pelling the banks to maintain 10 per cent, of
their deposits in cash or bills at the Imperial
Bank.
At the time of the Morocco crisis, in the
autumn of 1911, the German Foreign Office
was embarrassed at the critical moment by strong
warnings from the German financiers. After
the crisis there was a general feeling that Ger-
many ought to make more definite financial pre-
parations for war. A good deal was indeed done,
partly in the directions already indicated, partly
by municipal and other local enterprise, wliich
paved the way for the measures actually taken
when the war broke out, and psirtly by measures
— which were helped by the general course of
trade and finance — for strengthening the money
mtirket. During the spring and early summer
of 1914 Berlin was indeed quite abnormally
strong, and although it was obvious that the
strength was mainly due to the falling off in
trade in a country which, as we have seen,
employed all available capital to an extra-
ordinary extent, the abimdance of money was
contemplated with pride by the Emperor and
his political advisers, and no doubt affected
198
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
RUN ON A BERLIN BANK.
[Topical,
their actions. On April 23, for instance, the
Imperial Bank return showed increases during
the preceding week of more than £2,000,000 in
gold and more than £1,000,000 in silver, while
the note circulation had been reduced by
£6,000,000 and the total note circulation was
£22,593,000 below the tax-free maximum.
The position remained very strong until the
end of the half-year. There was then an un-
expectedly large drain on the Bank. The
return of June 30 showed, for example, a re-
duction of gold by £3,246,000 and a reduction of
deposits by more than £10,000,000, while the
note circulation increased by more than
£30,000,000. During July there was again
steady all-roimd improvement. The retiu-n
of July 23, the day before the publication of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia, showed a large
increase in gold and in deposits, while the note
circulation had decreased by more than
£5,000,000 and was £22,804,000 below the tax-
free maximum. The development of the crisis
very rapidly changed the aspect of affairs.
Between July 23 and July 31, the eve of the
declaration of war on Russia, the stock of gold
decreased by more than £5,000,000 and the
notes in circulation increased by more than
£62,000,000. In the course of the next few
days the special war legislation which we sha"
describe was passed and fundamentally altered
the working machinery of the Imperial Bank.
The main featiu-e during the next few weeks
was an enormous increase in the circuitttion of
notes. In the days preceding the war there
were all the expected financial phenomena. The
German Bourses were kept open for a few
days, thanks to the intervention of the banks,
but business was practically stopped on July 29.
There were very severe runs on the savings
banks, especially in places near the frontiers,
on July 27 and the following days. There was
a great rush on the Imperial Bank of people
trying to get gold for paper. Meanwhile,
although it was certain then that there would
be no moratorium in Germany, traders hastened
to annoimce that they would suspend payments,
and the great industrial and commercial
organizations began to prepare for cooperative
action.
The general situation in Germany at
the outbreak of war can be described as
one of t<::mporary financial strength and
gtave industrial and commercial appre-
hension. It was pretty generally believed that
Germany could well stand a short war, but few
people cared or dared to think of the possibilities
of a long one. It was obvious that, unless
disaster befell the British Navy, German ports
would practically be closed, and it was evident
that, esRept as regarded the manufacture
of war material, industry would soon be
brought to something like a standstill What
Germany had to do wae not so much to attempt
the hopeless task of "keeping things going"
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
1U9
CROWDS IN BERLIN CHEERING FOR WAR.
^Topical.
a8 to readjust her whole structure to an ex-
tremely uncomfortable situation which she
could only hope would not endure.
The first measiu-e adopted was to authorize
extraordinary expenditure to tlie amount of
£265,000,000. Loans to the amount of
£250,000,000 were to be raised as need occurred,
and the Imperial Bank was placed in possession
of the stock of gold and silver which Germany
had for a good many years stored up as a
" war chest." The Imperial Bank was relieved
of the obligations to pay a tax on the amount
by which its notes in circulation exceeded its
stock of cash. Other far-reaching facilities were
offered for the covering of the note issue. All
paper money was made legal tender, and the
bank was relieved of its obligation to give gold
in exchange for paper.
As for food supplies, all restrictions on im-
ports were removed. The local authorities wore
given power to fix maximiun prices of food-
stuffs, natural products, and fuel, and to
compel sales.
As we have seen, there was no question in
Germany of a general moratorium, and people
pointed with much pride to the fact, although
the truth was that Germany was not in a posi-
tion to introduce a general moratoriujn and had
to deal with the situation in other ways. The
most important action was in the direction of
supplying cash, or rather paper, to anybody and
everybody who possessed property of any
value. Special loan institutions in connexion
with the Imperial Bank were established and
authorized to issue special " loan " paper up to
a total amount of £75,000,000. They were
empowered to grant loans not only on stocks
and shares but on non-perishable goods of all
Idnds, doing business down to amounts so small
as £5. The " loan " paper was given nearly
the same status as bank-notes, although the
public was not obliged to accept them in
payment. One of the main objects of all this
was to enable the public to borrow on their
existing investments in order to be able to
subscribe to the new war loans.
In addition to these Government loan esta-
blishments " war credit banks " were set up
200
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
in all parta of the country in the course of a
few weeks and proceeded to do business especi-
ally with small traders and others.
By these and similar methods Germany
patched up the situation and made it appear
fairly tolerable to the ordinary citizen. There
was inevitably a great deal of unemployment
from the very outset, notwithstanding the fact
that almost the whole able-bodied population
was in the field. There was also a good deal of
distress, but it was perhaps at first due in
great part to the dislocation caused by the
mobilization and movement of troops. There
was want in some places and plenty in others,
but there was at the outset little to warn the
people generally of the appalling risks of Ger-
many's great adventure. The real question
was not whether the position was superficially
sound, or what was the particular merit of
ingenious financial devices. The only real
basis of the whole business was confidence in the
success of German arms.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE GERMAN ARMY— 1870-19 14.
Traditions of the Army — The New Arms — Literature — Moltke- — His Colleagues —
The War of 1866 and its Lessons — 1870 — Prussian Strategy — The Tactical Envelopment —
Criticisms — Meckel — Genbkal Effect of 1870 on the Army — The German Constitution —
Increases of Strength to 1890 — The Law of 1893 — Further Increases — The Law of 1913 —
Application of the Principle of National Service- — Numbers of Trained Men — The Age
Factor — Categories of Troops — Ersatz Reserve — First Ban of Landsturm — One-Year
Volunteers — Non -Commissioned Officers — Corps of Officers — Paramount Influence of
Army on German Society — Territorial Distribution of the Army — " Inspections " — Army
Corps — Commanding Officers — Fortresses — The Military Cabinet — Wab Ministry —
Finance — Readiness for War — Emigrant Law of 1913.
THE rise and decline of armies i.s an
aspect of universal history which
never fails to interest, and with
armies as with States the past has in
it the seeds of the future. As it is impossible
to understand the character and organization
of the formidable enemy opposed to the Allies
in 1914 without some knowledge of its develop-
ment in the preceding decades, we propose to
revert in greater detail to a subject already
referred to in Cliapter II. The most natural
starting point is the war of 1870-1, at which
time the German Army, after a period of
laborious evolution, reached a remarkable
standard of efficiency. Several factors had
contributed to this result. In the fir.--t place,
the traditions of the old Prussian Army had been
revived by the study of the Seven Years' War.
In the second, the traditions of the War of
Liberation and the teaching of the school of
Biiicher and Gneisenau were still living. In
the third, the idea of tmiversal service intro-
duced by Schamhorst had been carried to a
logical conclusion. Th science of leadership,
built up by a long series of distinguished
soldiers, culminated in Moltke, who founded a
school of which perhaps the most distinguished
survivor was Marshal von der Goltz. The great
" battle-thinker " found apt pupils amongst
the Prussian aristocracy, who formed a military
Vol I. Part 6. 201
caste steeped in the precepts of Clausewitz.
Full-blooded manhood in Germany manifested
itself in military study and military exercises,
just as in England at the same period it began
to manifest itself in athletics. Among the
troops esprit de corps was fostered by a real
territorial system by which the men of the
soil were gathered together in their own dis-
tricts, and were nourished and trained by and
among the people to whom they belonged.
The Silesiana formed one corps, the Pomer-
anians i nother ; the corps leader was a fort
of military governor in his own province and
the autonomy of the corps was carried to the
point of equipping the troops out of local funds.
The women were no less enthusiastic than
the men. A sickly family " thinking of a
coming war deplore the fact that they will
have no relations in the Army." The mechani-
cal genius of Nicholas Drejse produced the
first breech-loading rifle which was sufficiently
strong to imdergo the wear and tear of cam-
paigning, and Krupp's cannon foundry yielded
one of the first rifled breech-loading cannon.
The mental activity of officers found vent in
books and pamplilets of an astonishing variety
and excellence, as, for example, the " Tactical
Retrospfct," written by a company com-
mander after the war of 1866, in which the
defects of the Army as discovered during this
202
THE TIMES HI8T0BY OF THE WAR.
THE CROWN PRINCE OF BAVARIA.
[£. O. Hoppr.
brief campaign were frealy exposed. More
remarkable still, the thinker of the 'sixties
became the man of action in 1870, avoiding
the reproach so often levelled at arm-chair
critics. Although since Waterloo the Prussian
Army had rested on its laurels, it proved itself
a trustworthy and efficient instrument in
the hands of its great strategist. The pub-
lished works of Moltke show that he had fore-
cast almost every military situation that could
arise in the case of a quarrel with neighbouring
Powers, and his strategical conceptions have
formed the starting point of most of the military
thought of the past half century. This
was very Itirgely due to the fact that he
was the first to grasp the potential effects of the
railway, the telegraph, and of modem arms on
the handling of great armies, and the modifica-
tions which these new factors had rendered
necessary or desirable in the earlier practice of
Napoleon. The view that his strategy was
based on different principles to that of the
Emperor has been strongly contested ; certainly,
so far as their practice was concerned, it would
be possible to quote a good deal of evidence in
favour of the opposite opinion. That Moltke
was not afraid to adopt wide strategic fronts,
and relied rather on envelopment than penetra-
tion of the hostile front tis the means of victory,
was probably due more to the practical changes
in the conditions than to divergencies of funda-
mental theory. Like all great soldiers he was,
as the Germans say, a realist ; and as he said
himself, strategy is a matter of " makeshifts,"
not of hard and-fast system. Moltke was happ>-
in his associates, for he had the personal support
in the field of King William, and as a general rule
he saw eye to eye with Bismarck in questions of
State policy, a necessary condition of all effective
strategy. He had, moreover, at Ixis disposal
that remarkable administrator. Von Roon, who
fis Minister for War kept ready sharpened
the sword which it was Moltke's business to
use. It was, indeed, a galaxy of talent that took
the field against the French in 1870 ; Steinmetz,
" the lion of Nachod," Prince Frederick Charles,
and the Crown Prince of Saxony commanded
armies ; Blumenthal, Stiehle, Sperling, and
Stosch were the chiefs of the Army staffs ; and
amongst the corps leaders were Goeben and
Werder, both of whom showed themselves
capable of commanding armies, Manteuffel, who
had led the Army of the Main in 1866, Fran-
secky, the hero of Maslowed, Constantin Alvens-
leben, who was to immortalize himself at Mars
la Tour, Kirchbach, who had led the famous 10th
Division at Nachod, and Skalitz, Tumpling,
Zastrow, Manstein, all well-tried as divisional
commanders in 1866 ; the Bavarian generals,
Hartmann and Von der Tann, and two Prussian
generals. Von Beyer and Von Obernitz, the
leaders of the Baden and Wurtemberg inde-
pendent divisions. Moltke's immediate en-
tourage included General von Podbielski, who
served as Quartermaster-General, and the three
" sous-chefs " of staff, Bronsart, Verdy du
Vernois, and Brandenstein ; and it was said
that so perfect an understanding existed between
them that if one was suddenly called away while
drafting an Army order another could take up
the pen and finish the document in the spirit of
'ts author. They were, indeed, a " band of
brothers." Major Blume, who afterwards com-
manded the 15th Army Corps, was chief of the
Executive Department, and the present com-
mander of the 8th Corps, von Biilow, was then
a captain on the staff. Of these members of the
General Staff in 1870 two became Ministers of
War, six were given command of Army Corps
or held the post of Inspector-General, two
became generals, and four became major-
generals.
The German Aimy had the advantage of
entering upon the war of 1870 while its experi-
ences of war in 1866 were still fresh ; the earlier
campaign was, in fact, a much-needed prepara-
tion for the later one. The well-known letters
of Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe enumerate the prin-
cipal changes that were effected within four years
to make good the deficiencies that had been
discovered in the war against Austria. It was
found, for example, that the value of the Krupp
gun in 1866 had been insufficiently realized
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
203
IHE CROWN PRINCE OF GERMANY IN THE UNIFORM cji 1 HL UL-ATH'S HEAD HUSSARS.
[Ctn'reU NrtDs.
through want of tactical training among tlio
artillery officers. Kraft, who was a gunner
himself — he commanded the artillery of the
Prussian Guard Corps — is unsparing in liis con-
denuiation of his own arm. He says, " our
artillery on almost every occasion entered upon
the scene far too late and with'far too small a
lumber of guns." Yet they had gone into action
with a feeling of absolute certainty that notlung
could resist them, for it was considered
tliat ten Prussian guns would o\ercome IG
Austrian guns, so superior were the
former to the latter in point of construction.
With regard to the cavalry it had been found
that Napoleon's practice had been so far mis-
read that the mobile arm was kept in large
masses in rear of the Army with the
idea that it should be carefully preserved
with a view to its possible employment
as a reserve on the battlefield, a remark
that applies equally to the so-calletl reserve
artillen,', which absorbed more than half of
the gims of the Army and retained them a
day's march distant from the battlefield.
Such is the influence. of a mere phrase on the
practice of war. The infantn,' alone escaped
criticism, as indeed it might, smce it won the
decisive battle. In the words of the oflicial
lustory " the infantry fought almost alone." But
the success of the infantry was largely ascribable
to the powerful influence brought to bear on the
battle by the intelligence of the nation in arms.
204
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL VON KLUCK.
{Record I'ress.
A striking instance of the correction on the
battlefield of the terrors of peace training may
be mentioned. Captain May, author of the
" Tactical Retrospect," says : " When tlie
needle gun (breech-loading rifle) at the com-
mencement of the fifth year of its existence
was first generally issued to the troops, a
standing order, insisted on by generals who
preached at all inspections and parades, was :
' Gentlemen, throw out very few skirmishers —
only one section ; that is now as efficient as
an old sub-division ; let all the rest be kept
well in hand.' Experience, however, soon
showed that the exact reverse of these theoreti-
cal rules, which appeared so judicious at the
time, was the right practice. Above all things,
every one sought to give full effect to the
efficiency of his trustworthy arm. Why should
they be held back ? Why not strike with the
full weight of the weapon in their possession ?
Thus they all dissolved themselves into a swarm
of skirmishers, because in that formation the
breech-loader can be best used, and because i t was,
besides, sufficiently analogous to a company
coliunn, which often stood more than ten deep
and fired from all possible-positions. And this
would take place not so much at the word of
command of their leader (who perhaps could
only hear himself from the deafening noise of
the guns and small arms) as from a natural
consequence of the circumstances in which they
were placed."
The Army of 1870, then, was the finished
article which had been proved iii its rougli
state in the furnace of Sadowa. 1870 showed
how greatly it hal benefited by its ex-
perience. ' The mobilization wa-scanied out un-
disturbed by fears for what tlio- entimy might
do on the frontier. The concent lation was
effected at points which enabled the Supreme
Command to defend the whole of 190 miles
of frontier while acting in a mass offensively
against the enemy's main army, and even the
encounters at Spicheren and Worth on August
6, which were spoken of afterwards as hors
d'ceuvres and were said to have ruined Moltke's
plan for a great battle on the right bank of the
Moselle,, proved to be of considerable value
in a tactical sense as enabling the troops to
test their powers in non-conimittal actions
against a foe who was known to be in. possession
of a superior fire-arm, the Chassopot. The
manner in which all units marched to the soiuid
of the cannon showed that the value of co-
operation had been thoroughly realized. The
artillery, determined to remove the stigma
that rested upon their service, came into
action ;early -and in mass, and, where necessary,
brought their guns up into the firing line to cope
with the French rifle and thus cover the advance
of their infantry. The German gunners re-
ceived their guerdon when the Frencli
Emperor, an artillerist himself, remarked after
Sedan, " In my artillerj^ I feel^ myself per-
sonally conquered." The cavalry had begun to
grasp the importance of its strategical mission^ —
" Cavalry forward " was an injunction inscribed
in .almost every telegram in the early days-of
August — apart from its use on the battle-
field ; and the infantry, now screened by its
cavalry and protected by its artillery, never
hesitated to come to close quarters. The
higher leading, generally speaking, was extra-
ordinarily successful. This was due in the
first 'place to Moltke, in the second to the
fatviity of the French generalship ; in the third
to 'the loyalty with which the different com-
manders supported one another. It is com-
paratively rarely that we hoar of friction be-
tween commanders and staffs, and when it
occurred the obstructionist was quickly removed,
as -.in the case of Steinmetz. In a general way
harmony was preserved by the exercise of tact,
of which Verdy du Vernois gives an early
example. On July 31 the Crown Prince demurred
to an order to advance on the ground that
the Third Army was not yet ready for the field.
A somewhat peremptory telegram was about
to be dispatched from the Royal headquarters
when Verdy du Vernois remarked : " I knew
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
205
that staff very well in the last war. If j on wish
to create strained relations with them during
tlio whole of tliis campaign send it ; but I
am perfectly sure that they will be offended,
and I think not without some cause. For a
good reason there must surely bo for their not
yet fixing the date of starting." Moltko re-
1)1 ied, " Well, but how are we to manage it,
tlion ? " Vordy then proposed tliat ho
should himself go to the Crown Prince's head-
quarters and personally explain the need for
immediate action. And accordingly he journeyed
from Mayence to Speyer, and returned within 72
hours to say that General von Blumenthal,
who was the Crown Prince's Chief Staff Officer,
had agreed to cross the frontier at Weissenburg
on August 4.
Prussian strategy in 1870 may be sumuipd up
in foiu' aphor:sms : —
( 1 ) that errors in the original assembly of
the Army can scarcely ever be rectified
during the course of the campaign ;
(2) that no plan of operations can with safety
go beyond the first meeting with the
enemy's main army ;
(3) that the only geographical point to be
considered is the point where the enemy's
main army will be found ;
(4) that the enemy's main army is to bo
assailed wherever met.
The form of strategic attack generally used
by Moltke was that called by some the turning
movement and by others strategic interception.
Bazaine's army was cut off from Paris before
battle was delivered at Gravelott« ; and Mac-
mahon's army was completely surroimded before
it was decisively attacked at Sedan. This form of
strategic attack naturally led to that of tactical
envelopment on the battlefield ; and as in all
the earlier battles, except Mars la Tour, the
factor of numerical superiority was on the side
of the Germans, the first condition of successful
enveloping tactics was secured. For a general
to attempt to envelop an army equal in number
and quality to his own obviously e.xposes his
over-extended line to the danger of being broken
by the more compact masses of the enemy.
This danger the Germans usually managed to
avoid during the campaign of Metz and Sedan,
and later on, when with armies inferior in
numbers tliey had to oppose the numerous but
ill-trained troops of the Bepublic, the superirr
quality of their own troops enabled them to
adopt breadths of front wliich under other
circumstances would have proved disastrous.
GENERAL VON HEERINGEN.
{Internationa! Itlustralions,
The general success of the envelopment m 1870
did not deceive them as to its limitations or as
to the necessity of strong reserves. As Von
Meckel, the future teacher of the Japanese,
pointed out after the war. " depth and breadth
of front stand in opposition to, and mutually
control, each other. Broad fronts have great
strength at the commencement of an action,
but depth alone secures its being thoroughly
carried out. . . . It is a common fault to under-
value the waste and the necessity of feeding [the
fr )nt line] in a battle . . . and on many
occasions during the last war we stood for hours
on the brink of disaster, all our forces being
used up . . . The greatest opponent of a
judicious relation between depth and breadth
is the desire to outflank. Though this is imiato
in all minds it must be combated."
A notable change was evident in the miner
tactics of infantry. The tendency to dis-
persion which in 1866 startled the Prussian
leaders as an unauthorized improvisation
calculated to deprive the company conmiander
of the force necessary to execute the assault
had in 1870 been accepted as inevitable and
the cry had arisen to " organize disorder,"
in other words, to methodize a form of tactics
which, strictly considered, wi^s no form at
all. That it had the advantage of decreasing
loss in a series of battles in which for the
first time both sides were armed with broech-
206
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN,
Prussian Minister of War.
• [Cenlral N^w^*
loading rifles was evident, but it was accompanied
by a drawback until then unheard of, which
WBS, only revealed to the world by independent
writers after the war, as, for example, the author
oi the famous " Summer Night's Dream."
The example to which tlie writer, Meckel,
called attention was that of Gravolotte, where,
according to the Oflficial ■ History, 43 com -
panics of different regiments were at oiie and
the same time in the Auberge of St. Hubert.
" You have seen the farmhouse and know the
building is scarcely large enough to contain a
single company on war strength, especially when
you remember that the low garden was com-
manded from Moscow farm and under a heavy
fire. Forty -three companies are more than 10,000
men. Where were the 9,800 men who had no
room ? " The explanation lie gives is that " this
epidemic of withdrawing from the battle begins
with the game and spreading with pestilential
rapidity rages over the battlefield like a fever."
The writer emphatically declares that at his first
battle in France, on reaching the scene late in
the day, " the field was literally strewed with
men who had left the ranks and were doing
nothing. Whole battalions could have been
formed from them. From where we stood you
could count hundreds. Some were lying down,
their rifles pointing to the front a.s if they were
still in the firing line and were expecting the
enemy to attack them at any moment. Those
had evidently remained behind lying down
when the more couraaeous had advanced. Others
had squatted like hares in the furrows. Wherever
a bush or ditch gave shelter there were men to be
seen.who in some cases had made themselves very
comfortable." In short, this kind of straggling
was the consequence of teaching men to take
cover in attack. " In dispersion it is difficult to
be steadfast, in close order it is difficult to be
weak. Under the leader's influence the ex-
ample of the strong impels the whole. Among
the leaderless. the example of the confused and
the cowards has the upper hand." Moreover,
the vice of " extended order," as Meckel con-
ceived it to be, produced anothei phenomenon,
namely, " the effort of the lieutenant to release
himself from company ties, and the similar
effort of his captain to release himself from
battalion ties, in order to seek opportunities of
distinction by individual acts-of heroism."
In these excerpts, as the reader will perceive,
are raised many of those burning questions
with which the British Army became familiar
in the course of the South African War, and the
solution of which was attempted in Manchuria in
1904-5 and in Europe in 1914. ^Vithout pro-
posing to enter upon the later developments of
the German tactical school, it is worth noticing
here that as the war of 1870 proceeded there
was a tendency to abandon the closer order of
battle and to fight in more extended formations.
How tar this was due to the general nature of
the operations, how far to the diminished capa-
city of the French troops, how far to the growing
experience and confidence of the Germans them-
selves cannot be discussed here. But there is no
doiibt that in the concluding period of the war
the German infantrymen had learnt to fight
effectively and with far less loss to themselves in
comparatively open order.
The army that recrossed the frontier in the
spring of 1871, now truly a German Army, had
on the whole vindicated the principles on which
it had been formed and led. In spite of the
friction which from different causes had arisen
between some of its component parts, they had
shared the same experiences and were therefore
likely to respond to the same teaching. The
war had prepared the way not merely to politi-
cal but to military unity. The road to Prussian
hegemony in soldiership as well as in statesman-
ship had been opened, and when the Army again
entered the field it was to demonstrate the
thoroughness with which the consolidation had
been effected. We now propose to sketch the
developments which the German military
system underwent in the period between 1871
and 1914
THE TIMES in STORY OF THE WAR.
207
The great purpose pursued by Bismarck
was the imification of Gorinariy and the founda-
tion of a German Empire mider tlio lead and
control of Prvissia. Ho attained Iiis end by tlio
wars of 1864, 1806, and 1870. The results were
then put on paper in the shape of a " Constitu-
tion of the German Empire," which became
law in the spring of 1871. This Constitution
laid down the main principles of military organi-
zation, and was supplemented, as regarded the
relations between the most important of the
Geniian States, by military conventions con-
cluded by Prussia with Bavaria, Saxony, and
Wurtemberg.
It was laid down in the Constitution that every
German capable of bearing arms belonged for
seven years — in principle from the end of his
20th to the beginning of his 28th year — to the
active Army. Ho was to pass tliree years with
the colours and four in the reserve, and then, for
five more years, belong to the Landwehr. From
the end of 1871 the peace strength of the Army
was fixed at one per cent, of the population,
which was then just over 41,000,000.
The whole military forces were placed under
the control of the Emperor, subject only to the
nieasiu'e of military independence preserved to
some of the States in peace time. Even in
Bavaria tlie Emperor was to have in peace time
a right of inspection, involving the responsibiUty
for elYiciency of the forces. In war ho bocann-
altogether supreme. Bavaria retained lier own
military organization . and administration, and
her " contingent " consisted of two Army Corpe,
which were called, as hitherto, the I. Bavarian
Corps and the II. Bavarian Corps. Saxony re-
tained some autonomy in that she had a Minis-
try of War (but not a General Staff ) of lior own,
and, as in 1870, gave her name to an Army Corpn
(the XII.). Wurtemberg had much the same
rights 'as Saxony and provided the XIII. Army
Corps. Baden, with no special rights, provided
the troops of the XIV. Army Corps. Some otlier
units were given^ a territorial character — for
example, the 25th Hessian division.
The whole peace strength of Germany,
after the French war, waa one per cent, of a
population of 41,000,000. It was actually
fixed by a Law of 1874, for the period from
January, 1875, to December, 1881, at 401.059
non-commissioned officers and men. There
were 18 Army Corps — the Prassian Guard
Corps, 11 Prussian Army Corps, the XII.
(Saxony), the XIII. (Wurtemberg), the XIV.
(Baden), the XV. (Alsace-Lorraine), and the
I. and II. Bavarian. These 18 Army Corps
comprised 469 battalions of infantry, 465
squadrons of cavalry, 300 batteries of field
artillery, 29 battalions of garrison artillery,
18 engineer battalions, and 18 train battalions.
THE JULIUS TOWER, SPANDAU, WHERE THE GERMAN WAR CHEST WAS STORED.
[Undtncood &■ UnJcrzcooJ,
208
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL VON EMMICH.
[Ort/ro/ /^*a'S.
The number of officers, a3 well as of officials of
all sorts, was not fixed by law, but decided
aixnually in the Budget.
In 1880 began the long series of in-
creases, justified fyartly by the constitutional
principle that the peace strength should be one
per cent, of the population, but mainly by
pjlitical considerations and the alleged strength
of other countries. All the official explanations oi
later increases were, indeed, variations of the
explanation given of the Bill of 1880 : —
Since 1874 consideralile military reforms h.'vve been
carried out in other States. These reforms are of
capital importance for Germany. Bounded along aii
immen.se frontier by three great Poweis and four
smaller Powers, and accessible from the sea along a
great stretch of coa.st, Germany must be constantly
ready to defend her liberty and her security. It is
absolutely necessary to increase the effectives and the
number of units, unless we want the efforts made in
time Of peace to be rendered fruitless in time of war
because of the numerical superiority and sounder
organization which our enemies could set against us.
So the peace strength was raised, for the period
1881-1888, from 401,659 to 427,274, by the
increase of the infantry from 469 battalions to
503, of the field artillery from 300 batteries to
340, of the garrison .artillery from 29 batteries
to- 31, and of the engineers from 18 battalions
to 19. It was also decided to give some aimual
training to part of the so-called Ersatz Reserve,
vhich consisted of men who by good fortune or
for some slight physical reason escaped their
military service, but were liable to be called up in
the event of mobilization. About 20,000 or
30,000 a year of these men were thus trained
until 1893, when the training of the Ersatz
Reserve was almost entirely abolished.
In 1886, two years before the completion of
the period covered by the Law of 1880, tlie
Government proposed fresh increases, calling
attention once more to the incresised strength of
France and Russia and other neighbouring
States. The Empire, " tlie child of a glorious
war," must again be put in a position to enforce
its policy when " tiie day arrived of the menace
of an European conflict." Bismarck was at the
time engaged in a fierce confiict with the German
Catholic Party, and dissolved the Reichstag on
account of its opposition to the new increases.
After the elections the Law was passed in 1887.
[t increased the peace strength of the Army, for
the poriod from 1887* to 1894, from 427,274 to
468,409, the infantry being increased from
503 battalions to 534, and tlie field artillery from
340 batteries to 364, the strength of the other
arms reinaining unchanged.
In 189(1 tlie niunber of Army Corps was raised
from 18 to 20 by the formation of the XVI.
Army Corps in Lorraine and of the XVII. Army
Corps on the eastern frontier, and a few montlis
later the peace strengtli was again increased,
for the period from 1890 until 1894, from 468,409
to 486,983. The infantry was increased from
534 battalions to 538, the field artillery from
364 batteries to 434, the engineers from 19
battalions to 20, and the train from 18 batta-
lions to 21.
In 1893 came far more important changes,
effected again only after a Parliamentary con-
fiict and a dissolution of the Reichstag. The
Government announced, once more with sjjecial
reference to both France and Russia, that
the gradual increases of the peace strength
were no longer sufiicient. The Emijire must
proceed " to utilize to the full all its resources
in men." Tho Govermnent said : —
We must adopt an oiganization involving the em-
ployment of all the men i-eally lit for service. Only
then shall we be able to face calmly the possibility of
an attack. The system which consists in slow and
steady progress must now be abandoned and give
way to the immediat« application of the principles
upon H'liich our military constitution rests. This
application of principles will be piLShed iis far a-s
the economic and linancial resources ot the Kmpire
allow.
It was found impjssible for tho present to
increase tlie number of Army Corps. The
increase in the number of men taken up im-
plied, therefore, some shortening of service
with the colours, and colour service was to bo
reduced from three years to two with all arms
except cavalry and horse artillery. The
peace strength of the Army was increased fron.
THE TIMES HISTORY Oh' THE WAR.
20!)
GERMAN INFANTRY
486,983 to 557,193. But the main effect of
the reorganization was that the Army was pre-
pared to mobilize with a larger number of
young and well-trained men, the total being
estimated at 4,300,000.
In 1899 the Government was again alarmed
by the progress of France and Russia, and
found a fresh argument in tlie Spanish-American
War, whiclx liad " proved with terrifying
clearness what a price has to be paid for lack of
regular preparation for war in time of peace."
T)io number of Army Corps was now increased
from 20 to 23, by tlie formation of the XVIII.
Army Corps at Frankfurt-on-the-Main, theXTX.
(2nd Saxon) Army Corps, and a III. Bavarian
Army Corps. T}ie peace strengtli of the Army
was increased bj' 10,000 men, apart from
noncommissioned officers. The 23 Army Corpi
now comprised 625 battalionS of infantry,
482 squadrons of cavalry, 574 batteries of
field artillery, 38 battalions of garrison artillery,
26 battalions of engineers, 11 battalions of
communication troops, and 23 battalions of
train-
In 1905 tJiere was a further increase of the
peace strength by 10,000 men, together with an
improvement of the provisions for the training of
the reserves. There was a similar increiuse of
tlie peace strengtli in 1911, and great technical
improvements were effected, especially by
the creation of machine gim companies and by
a large increase of expenditure on instruction.
Tlie internal political situation was not then
favourable for the Government, and it needed
the Morocco crisis of 1911 to give full liberty
to the appetites of the military authorities.
Even then they were somewhat hampered by
the competition of the naval authorities ; and
MARCHING THROUGH BERLIN.
[Cenlral News.
there was open strife for a time between the
then Prussian Jlinister of War, General von
Heoringen, and the Secretary of State for the
Imperial Navy.
There was a general election in Germany at
the beginning of 1912, and the Govermnent
aimounced that it was necessary to have a
Reiclistag " ready to maintain the Army and
Navy in a perfect state of preparation and to
fill up the gaps in Germany'si armaments."
Although the elections resulted in tremendous
Socialist victories, and the Iniperial Minister
of Finance, Herr Wennuth, resigned office, the
F1ELD-MARSH.\L VON DER GOLTZ.
210
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
OFFICERS OF THE DEATH'S HEAD HUSSARS.
The Crown Prince in the Centre.
military mcrease.s were obtained. The Law of
1912 raised the peace strength of the Anny to
544,211, and the number of Army Corps was
increased from 23 to 25 by the creation of t^ie
XX. Army Corps for the eastern frontier
(AUonstein) and of the XXI. Army Corps for the
western frontier (Saarbriicken). It was decided
that the most important provisions of the Law
of 1911, as well as of the new Law, should be
carried out immediately, instead of being
Bpread over the period until 1915. The Law
involved a considerable reorganization and re-
distribution on both frontiers. It increased
enormously the readiness of the Army for war,
and was the greatest efiort made by Gennany
since 1870. As regards numbers, the total peace
strength became approximately 723,000, all
ranks included, that Ls to say, 544,000
privates, 30,000 officers, 95,000 non-commis-
sioned officers, 14,000 one-year volunteers,
and 40,000 officers and others of the admini-
strative cadre.
Nevertheless, the Law of 1912 was hardly in
force before fresh increases began to be de-
manded and predicted. The inspired news-
papers pretended to castigate the military
authorities for their slowness, and the Emperor
delivered a speech referring to the " thorough
application of the principle of obligatory
service." The new Bill itself very soon appeared.
It proposed the increase of the peace strength
from 544,211 to 661,176 privatf^s, and the
addition cf 4,00") officers, 15,000 non-commis-
sioned officers, and 27,000 horses. Adding the
administrative cadre and 18,000 one-year
vokmteers the total peace strength was raised to
about 870,000 men. Most of the increase was
to be effected immediately, although the Bill
covered a period of three years. The number of
Anny Corps remained 25, but the various arms
were ultimately to be raised to totals of 669
battalions of infantrj', 550 squadrons of cavalrj-.
633 batteries of field artillery, 55 battalions of
gairison artillery, 44 battalions of engineers, 31
battalions of communication troops, and 26
battalions of the train. We are dealing here
only with peace strengths, but the ultimate
effect of the Law of 1913 and its predecessors
would have been, after the lapse of 24 years,
to provide Germany with a fully trained
reserve of 5,400,000 men. The Imperial
Chancellor, in introducing the Bill in the
Reiclistag, said : —
The directing thought of the Bill is the adoption
of military service for all, according to the resources
of the population. In round nuiiil)ers we niu.st
incorporate 03,000 more men annually. Tlieir in-
corporation must, above everything, serve to raise
the strength of certain troops. This incrca.se of the
strength of units will render mobilization mon'
rapid, will facilitate the transition from peace to
war footing, will give us younger reservists on mobili-
zation, and will augment their number.
The Law was passed in June, 1913, together
with the extraordinary financial "levy" which
was mentioned in a previous chapter of this work
The great increase of numbers allowed battalions.
batteries, and cavalry regiments to be raised
to such a high establislunent that not more
than one or two classes of the Reserve would be
THE TIMES niSTURY OF THE WAR.
Ill
reqiiirod to mobilize the first line. Hence.
the quality of the atitive Army and its
training in peace was improved, mobilization
was accelerated, and the covering troops
on the frontiers were made strong enougli
to take the field and deal a blow against
an unprepared enemy without waiting for
reservists from the interior. Although little
definite information was forthcoming, it
was evident that the number of units of the
German covering troops and their effectives,
whose business it is to protect the mobilization
and concentration of the main armies, was
to be largely increased. All German troops had
increased strengtlis under the new Law, but
the troops of 11 corps — six on the French
frontier and five on the Russian frontier —
had a higher establishment than the rest. One
marked feature of the new plans was
the strengthening of fortified places, especially
Konigsberg and Griiiiden-/. in the east.
Judging the Law of 1913 as a whole just after
it had been passed, the Military Correspondent
of The Times made the following very accurate
estimate : —
Thiire is no evidence of any marked change in the
principles which liave hitherto guided German
military administrators, nor in the strategical use of
the great Army which has been fashioned with such
splendid continuity of purpose during the past 40
years. There is still the underlying design, academic
though at present it be, to crush France by a vigorous
offensive before the weight of Russia can be bi'ought
to bear. There is still a very plain temptation on
military grounds to travei'se neutral States in an
offensive cami)aign against France. There is still
the obvious intention to fight a defensive campaign
at fu'st against Kussia, and this intention is made
moi-e manifest by the plans for improving the fortresses
THE KAISER IN UHLAN UxNIKORM.
[R€.otd rrtis.
A TROOPER OF THE DEATH'S
HEAD HUSSARS.
[f^ewspjper Ittuitraiions,
in East Prussia. Tlic determination to wage oflensivo
war with the utmost energy and ruthlessness remains
to-day as always the central idea of the German
strategist, and the main clTect of the new naval
and military laws is to second oflen.sive • policy by
placing in the hands of German diplomacy a weapon
fashioned for offensive war.
We have seen that, by the terms of the
Imperial Constitution, every Gflrman capable of
bearing arms was rendered liable to three years'
service with the colours and foui' years' service
in the Reserve, followed by five years in the
Landwehr. We have seen also that, by the
Constitution, the petice strength of the Army
was fixed at one per coat, of the popvilation, and
that, by a series of Army Laws, the German
Army between 1870 and 1913 kept pace with
the growth of the population from 41,000,000,
just after the Franco-Gorman War, to the total
of nearly 05,000,000 shown by the census taken
at the end of 1910. We must now consider
in more detail the application of the principle
of national service.
Liability to military service began at the ago
of 17 and ended at the age of 15. Liability to
active service began at the age of 20. The
normal military record of a German citizen,
recruited for the infantry, was as follows : —
He joined the colours at the age of 20 and
remained in them for two years. He then joined
the reserve of the active forces for approxi-
mately five-and-a-half years, being called up for
periodical trainings. He then belonged to the
First Ban of the Landwehr for five years, and
to the Second Ban of the Landwehr for six years.
While in the First Ban he was liable to be calliHl
up twice for training of a week or fortnight.
212
THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR.
In the Second Ban of the Landwehr he was not
liable to training but could volunteer for train-
ing. Leaving the Landwehr at tl.e age of 39,
lie was enrolled in the Second Ban of the Land-
stumi until the end of his 45th year. In tho
cavalry and horse artillery the period of active
service was three years instead of two, followed
by only about four-and-a-half years in the
reserve of the active Army, only three years in
the First Ban of the Landwehr, and. finally,
eight years, instead of six, in the Second Ban
of the Landvvelir.
The development of this system, which was
very different from the original idea of universal
and uniform service of three years with the
colours, four years in the active Reserve, and five
yoirs in the Landwehr, was marked by the
lollowing stages : — In 1888 it was observed that
Germany, with the 12 years' service system, had
only 12 classes to set against the 20 classes of
France and the 15 classes of Russia. It was
therefore considered necessary to increase the
number of men available in the event of mobili-
zation by using a part of the Landwehr in the
reserve formation. It was accordingly decided to
lengthen the period of service with the colours, in
the active Reserve and in the Landwehr from
12 to 19 years, to re-establish a Second Ban of
the Landwehr, and to lengthen the period of
service in the Landsturm by three years, lu
this way service with the colours, in the active
Reserve, and in the Landwehr ended at the age
of 39, instead of at the age of 32: and the
liability to service ceased at the age of 45. in-
stead of at the age of 42.
In 1893 came the reduction of service with the
colours from three years to two, except in the
ca\alry and horse artillery. We have explained
that the main effect of the Law of 1893 was to en-
able the Army to mobilize with a larger number
of young and well- trained men. There was in this
no intention whatever to reduce the biu'den
of military service, and all efforts to do so
were throughout resisted with the utmost
energy. Again and again in the following years
the Socialist Party in the Reiclistag attempted
without the least success to get service in the
cavalry reduced from three years to two. The
only purpose of the reduction of the period of
colour service of immountcd troops was to
seciu-e the training of a far larger proiwrtion
of the population. Although there was an
annual available contingent of about 465,000
men, it was not possible, under the syste:n of
universal three years' service, to take up more
tlian from 175,000 to 178,000. The remainder
1 1 -- - 'dl
*
-I
; illN-,:'^ Vi
i
THE ALEXANDER GRENADIER GUARD REGIMENT, OF WHICH THE TSAR WAS
COLONEL. THE TSAR AND THE KAISER IN THE FOREGROUND.
[Sport & G*n*Tal,
THE TIMES IIISTOHY OF THE WAR.
•iU
wore left at liomo or subjected to a short traiiiiut;
of little military value. The authors of the
haw of 1893 calculated that, with shortened
HiM'vice, there would bo about 229,(K)() instead
of 175,000 recruits a year, and that the ulti-
mate result would be 24 classes of trained men,
making a total of about 4,:{00,000. The
ultimate effect of the Law of 1913 would have
been, as already stated, to increase this number
to 5,400,000.
So much for the increase in the number of
trained men. Almost as much importance
was attached to the consequent lowering of
age of tlie troops destined to form the main
field armies. The war of 1870 had shown
grave defects in the troops of the Landwelir—
lack of physical and moral force imder great
strain, a large proportion of sick, and insuffi-
cient vigour in attack and stubbornness in
defence. The annual contingents being in-
creased, it became less necessary to call up
the older men. If, for instance, on the three
years' system, it had been necessary to fill the
reserves of the field armies with men from the
oldest class of the First Ban of the Landwehr,
men of from 32 to 33 years of age, these same
places would in future bo taken by men from
25 to 28 years of age. Where it had previously
been necessary to go back to the 13th class,
it would in future be necessary to employ only
8 classes.
We ha\e sp.)ken hitherto of the normal
case of the recruit taken up at the age of 20
and passing through all the normal stages
to exemption from service at the age of 45
At no time, however, did the number.-!
recruited exhaust all the available re-
soiu-ces. There were considerable numbers of
men who obtained total or temporary exemption
from service — apart from the exclusion from
the Army of common criminals and of men who
remained totally unfit for five years after the
eommencoment of their legal obligation to
military service. The main causes of exemption
were, of course, physical, but there was a large
measure of consideration for men with peculiar
family or business ties, as well as for men
destined for careers in which they woxild- be
seriously handicapped by the interruption of
tlieir studies for the purpose of military service.
Upon the whole, however, there was very little
disposition to avoid military training, even in
cases where exemption could be obtained.
The untrained men of the German Army
belonged to the Ersatz lUserve or the Fii-st
Ban of the Landstm-m. The Ersatz Reserve
consisted, first, of men who were liable and fit
for ser\'iee but who, owing to the excess of the
DUKE ALBRECHT OF WURTEMBERG.
[Ctntral Ntwi.
supply of recruits, had not been embodied by
the age of 23 ; secondly, of the various classes
of men who for one reason or another had been
allowed to postpone their military service ;
and, thirdly, of men suffering from slight
physical defects, but regarded as " moderately
fit " for service. The importance of the Ersatz
Reserve lay in the fact that upon it in a large
degree depended the filling up of the depdts
after the active and reserve units of the field
armies had been mobilised ; upon these depflts
formed of cadres from the active army, the
Ersatz, and the annual contingent of recruits,
depended the replacing of casualties in the fight-
ing formations. The First Ban of the Land-
sturm consisted (1) of all boys over 17 years of
age who had not begiui their military serviw? ;
(2) of young men who were jx>rmanently unfit
for service in the field, but who could bo used
as workmen or for purposes for which their
ordinary occupations specially fitted tliem ;
and (3) of young men who would have been em-
bodied in the Ersatz Reserve, but were rejectetl
owing to excess of numbers.
Over and above the ordinary troops thus
recruited and distributed there was the very
important class (in 1913 about 18,000) of so-
called one-year volunteers (Einjiihrige) They
consisted of practically all the sons of well-
214
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL ULRIGH VON BULOW.
to-do classes, who bod had a Oymnasium educa-
tion and had passed the examination
on leaving school which was the one
and only certificate of aptitude for
the University and subsequently for any
of the superior branches of Government
service. Armed with this certificate and with
sufficient means to provide their own food and
equipment, they were allowed to serve in the
Army for one year only, and enjoyed great
privileges during the period of their service.
They could choose their own year of service
up to the age of 23, or, for any reasonable
cause of delay, up to the age of 26 or 27. They
could select, moreover, the arm, and in many
cases the regiment, which they wished to join.
They formed, afterwards, the main source of
supply of officers and non-commissioned officers
of the Reserve.
The number of non-commissioned officers in
1914 was about 100,000. As in almost all other
German walks of life, they bore a great variety of
titles, Ijut they could be divided for practical
purposes into a superior class and an inferior —
the Feldwebel, or sergeant-major, and the
Vizefeldivebel, who wore swords with the
officer's knot, and the Sergeant and simple
UtUeroffizier, who had not this distinction. The
great niajority of the non-commissioned officers
rose from the ranks, and were either men who
had volunteered at the age of 17 or had re-
engaged at the end of their two or three years of
military service. Men with any special aptitude,
who during their service showed an inclination
to rejoin, were given special instruction for
the duties of non-conimissioned officers. A
niinority — perhaps one-quarter — of the non-
commissioned officers came from special schools,
wliich were of two kinds — preparatory schools
for boys of 15, who remained two years, and
" schools for non-commissioned officers," which
took the pupils from the preparatory schools,
and any other candidates between the ages of
17 and 20 who had good recommendations and
a good elementary education. Those who
passed tlu"ough both schools could become non-
commissioned officers at the age of 19.
The quality of the non-commissioned officers
was certainly very various. The general level
of education, both general and military, was
high, but system was more powerful than initia-
tive, and especially aniong the younger non-
commissioned officers there was a lack of real
discipline combined with a taste for authority
which developed easily into brutality.
The corps of officers of the German Army
was composed in the main of two classes of can-
didates, " cadets," who had received all their
education in the special cadet schools, and
youths who, at the end of their ordinary school
education, had joined the rank-, as Fahnenjiinker
with a view to obtaining commissions. The
second class, which fonued about two-thirds of
the whole, enjoyed preliminary advantages in
proportion to their educational attainments,
and the Enaperor William had always endea-
voured to raise the general level by giving special
advantages to those who had passed the
" abiturient," or leaving, examination of the
public schools. A small percentage, about
five or six per cent., had passed one year at a
university before entering the Army. Two
tests had to be satisfied by every candidate,
whatever his origin. He had to pass the general
examination qualifying him for a commission.
His nomination had also to be approved by
a vote of the officers of the regiment which
he was to join. This requirement was main-
tained with absolute rigour, and served to
uphold the very strong class distinctions in
the different arms and even in different regi-
ments of the same arm. It was an absolute
barrier to the entrance, for instance, of Jews,
whether as officers or reserve officers.
The cadets were for the most part sc^s of
officers or of Civil servants of the higher grades.
Having obtained a nomination they entered a
cadet school at the age of 10, passed a prelimi-
nary examination at the age of 17, and then,
normally, served with the colours for six
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
215
months as non-commissioned officers. Thence
thoy passed into a war school, and obtained their
commissions at about the ac;o of 19. Trained
to arms as it were from the cradle, and imbued
with military traditions and military doctrine,
the officers who came from the cadet schools
retained the stamp throughout their lives.
Curiously enough, the first cadet companies
formed in Prussia in 1686 were composed of
French children whose families had emigrated
after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.
When the French supply of candidates fell oft,
Frederick William I. reorganized the corps
by bringing all the schools together in Berlin.
Frederick the Great improved the system,
especially by mitigating the severities of the
training and treating the boys, a^ he sadd, " not
like farm hands but like gentlemen and future
officers." In the Seven Years War ho employed
as officers cadets hardly 14 years old. The
schools were kept up with varying success.
After the war of 1870 there was a great increase
in the number of candidates. The Berlin cadets
were established all together in the famous
cadet school at Gross-Lichterfelde. There were
cadet schools also at Bensberg, Ccislin, Karlsruhe,
Naiunburg, Plon, Potsdam, and Wahlstadt.
The great Army Law of 1913 involved, as we
have seen, an addition of no less than 4,000
officers. Matters were so arranged as to secure
a considerable improvement in the rate of
promotion. For some years discontent had
been growing among the officers themselves,
and the congestion in the lower ranks of the
officers' corps of this enormous Army which had
seen practically no wiu' for more than 40 years,
caused grave misgivings as to its real efficiency
in the field. The statistics of 1910 and 1911
showed that, on the average, Prussian officers
had to wait from 14 to 16 years for promotion
to the rank of captain, and from 11 to 12 years
more for promotion to the rank of major. In
Bavaria promotion was considerably more
rapid, but for the young Prussian officer the
main hope was to find his way into the General
Staff, where advancement was sure.
We have now reviewed the main elements in
the composition of the great German military
machine. It is easy to realize that its worldng
affected closely the whole fabric of society, and
that the claims and the spirit of the Army per-
\-aded everytliiug. Although the wars of 1864>
1866, and 1870 were but a faint memory to the
greater part of the population, the military
spirit was kept alive by every possible means,
in the schools, in the Army itself, and in politics.
As regards the corps of officers, tradition was
GENERAL VON HAUSEN.
enormously strong, and it was well supported by
family and personal interest. The Army was
ever the most important of all professions, and
every attempt to lower its position was resisted
with the utmost vigour. All the well-intended
and ingenious proposals which emanated from
Great Britain and other countries for reduction
or limitation of armaments were of necessity
doomed to failure, because the German Empire
wiis saturated with the belief that the future
belonged to the strong, and that the only way
to keep Germany strong was not only to train
every available man for service in the field, but
to keep the whole nation in the strong military
grip of Prussia and to maintain as the head and
the mainspring of the State the Prussian military
caste. Notwitlistanding all theories of equal
opportunity, and even the sincere efforts of the
Emperor William to check the growth of luxury
in the Army and especially in " crack " regi-
ments, social gradations continued to be
reflected nowhere so accurately as in the German
Army List. Commissions in the Prus.sian
Guard, for in.stance, and especially in the
more exclusive regiments, such as the famous
regiment of Gardes du Corps, Wfie the undis-
puted preserve of the great landowning families.
And so down to the humblest line regim?nt in
the dullest and least desirable frontier garrisons.
If the prevailing motive at the top of the sca'e
was the determination to retain power — luid
power in the Anny meant power throughout i he
216
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GERMAN SIEGE GUN.
\1 opicai.
State — the prevailing motive lower down in the
scale was pride. For some years before the
Great War the Army had begun to be infected by
the luxury and materialism which had come of
too rapid prosperity and increase of wealth.
But the great majority, especially of regimental
officers, were keen, hard, simple, and devoted
soldiers, whose only reward for their work was
the proud position which they enjoyed. On
the other hand, the level of real intelligence was
not high. Like people in so many other sjiheres
of life in Germany, the officers were often well-
instructed without being well-educated, cock-
sure and self -satisfied without being intelligent.
Judged even more by the officers than by the
men, the German Army was an Army which
badly needed some sharp lessons from ex-
perience and especially from defeats.
Throughout the officers' corps ran an almost
universal, if at most times good-natured,
contempt for civilians as such, and a
conviction that, while political freedom
must be tolerated to a certain extent, there
were well-defined limits beyond which freedom
must not go. The field of German politics
was dotted with landmarks and boundaries
defining the points at which " the military "
would as a matter of course inter\'one. The
Army devoted its speciel attention on the ono
hand to the growth of Socialism and on the
other hand to any culpable moderation in
dealing with the frontier populations — Alsa-
tians, Poles, and Danes. In the year before the
war the famous Zabem affair afforded a peculiar
illustration of the fact that the Army, and
not the Governnient or the Civil Adnainistration,
was the supreme force in the provinces whicli
Bismarck had taken from France. Similar
tendencies were at least as strong in Posen and
even in Schleswig-Holstein. As for Socialisiu_
it was ono of the groat resources of militarx-
argument — just as, for the matter of that.
" militarism " was one of the gieat resources
of Socialist argiunent. Year after year the
Reichstag debates on the Army estimates
consisted of sham fights between the Prussian
Minister of War, whoever he might be, and
the Socialist leaders. The Socialists carried
on an incessant campaign against the brutal
treatment of recruits, a campaign which had
some, but not in latter years very much,
foundation in fact. The Minister of War
invariably railed against the perils of Socialism
in the Army, and accused the Socialists of sowing
the seeds of mutiny and even of treason. Both
parties to these disputes knew very well that
the Anny was in no danger whatever from
public opinion and that in tho liour of need
every Gennan would rally to the flag.
As to Gennan feeling generally, it woiikl he
too much to say that tho Army was universftll\-
popular, but military service was accepted as
a matter of course, and with absolute belief
not only in its value for the country's defence
but in its vast importance as a training for
civil life and for all organized effort. Tho
Socialist party itself based its unequalled
organization upon military standards, and the
TUE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
217
training of the whole youth of the country at
an improssionablo age to regard thomsolves
as part of one groat machine was the root of
most of tho order and discipline that {wrvaded
Ciorman hfo and was so impressive and so
deceptive. It was especially decejitive as
regards the " pea(!e-lovinp " character of tho
(iernian people, and concealed realities that
were all too horribly revealed as soon as tho
Gorman people went to war. Frojii the
Army tho whole people learned tho bolicifs and
habits that were afterwards the strongest in
daily life. They learned to control and also
to obey, to organize and be organized, and to
ivcoept as in the nature of things a sj'stematiza-
tion of life that was nothing but a reflection in
every sphere of the spirit and methods of the
F^riLssian Army.
We have seen that at the outbreak of war the
German Army consisted of 25 Army Cjrps. Since
the increases and changes effected in 191.') they
were grouped in eight " inspections." These
insijections wore at Danzig (General von
I'rittwitz und Gaffron) for tho I., XVII., and
XX. Army Corps ; at Berlin (General von
Ifeeringen) for the Prussian Guard Corps, tho
XII. Army Corps, and tho XIX. Armv Corps ;
at Hannover (General voa Bu'ow) for tho VII..
IX., and X. Army Corps; at Mimich (Prince
Kupert of Bavaria) for tho UI. Army Corps and
the I., II., and III. Bavarian Corps ; at
Carlsruhe, the capital of Baden (the Grand
Duke of Baden) for the VIIT., XIV., and XV.
Army Corps ; at Stuttgart, the capital of
Wurtemberg (Duke Albert of Wurtemberg)
for tho IV., XT., and XIII. Army Corjjs; at
Saarbriicken (General von Eiclihom) for tho
XVI., XVni, and XXI. Army Corps ; and at
Berlin (General von Kluck) for tho II., V.
and VI. Army Corps. The peace distribution
and composition of Army Corps ia shown in
the accompanying table : —
PEACE DISTRIBUTION AND COMPOSITION OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY*
ON OCTOBER 1, 1913.
Infantry.
Cavalry.
Artillery.
Uegiments.
■^
Bat-
teries.
Corps H.Q.
1
1
i
c
Corps.
1
§
>
i
1
i
s
c
0*
c
.2
1
i
I
"a
■31
i
£
•c
1
'3
i
1
3
3
23
0
8
•a
3.
•E
a
4)
S
5
ii
n
1
2
^
5
^
K
a
f-i
n |K
X
0
0
a
U
n
n
e
»
£
0
Prussian Guard
Berlin . .
2
11
33
c>
4
8
40
2
2
I
3
_
2
9
24
3
F. Corps . .
KoniRsberg
2
4
8
24
-
3
6
30
1
-
2
2
2
9
24
3
II
St<-W.in..
2
4
0
27
_
2
4
20
2
_
1
_
2
8
24
—
iir
H<Tlin
2
8
24
2
4
20
1
1 1 1
-
2
«
24
3
IV
Ma^iloburg
2
8 24
2 4
20
_
2
1
..
2
8
24
_
V. „ ..
Poscn
2
10
30
2 4
20
_
1
_
2
1
2
»
24
3
VI
Brcslau
2
10
30
3 6
30
I
2
1
1
2
8
24
_
Vll
.Miinster
2
10
t
2 4
20
-.
2
1
—
i
8
24
.
vin. ,
(Koblenz
2
8
_
2 4
20
.,.
2
_
I
2
8
24
_
IX.
Altona
2
10
30
2 4
20
-
2
2
_
_
2
8
24
-
X
Hannover
2
8
24
2 i 4
20
_
2
I
1
—
2
8
24
-
XI
(Xssel
2
8
24
2 ! 4
20
_
1
1
_
2
2
4
9
24
3
X ll.( 1st U. Saxon)
Dresden
2
8
24
2
2 i 4
20
I
_
2
I
_
2
9
24
3
XIII. Corps
Wurt<>nibcrg . .
2
it
27
-
2 ' 4
20
-
2
-
2
-
2
8
24
-
XIV. ,
Karlsruhe
2
10
30
_
2 4
20
_
3
_
-
1
2
8
24
—
XV
Str.xssbui'g
o
4
8
24
2
2 4
20
_
2
1
1
2
8
24
-
XVI
Metz ..
2
8
24
-
3
6
30
_
2
1
I
2
2
8
24
.
XVII
Danzig
2
A
8
24
1
2
4
20
_
_
3
_
1
2
8
24
-
XVII I. „ ..
Fi'ankturt - on -
Main
2
9
27
_
2
4
20
_
3
_
I
_
2
8
24
-
XIX.(2n(l H. Saxon)
Leii)zig
2
8
24
-
2
4
20
1
-
1
2
-
2
9
24
3
XX. Corjw ..
Allenstein
2
8
24
1
2 4
20
I
2
1
—
_
2
9
24
3
XXI
Sjuirbriickon . .
2
9
27
_
2
4
20
_
1
3
—
2
10
24
6
1. Havarian. .
Munich
2
8
24
1
2
4
10
0
—
_
_
2
2
8
24
_
II. Bavarian
Wiirzburg
2
8
24
1
2
4
20
_
_
-
2
2
i
9
24
3
III. Bavai-ian
Xiirnberg
2
* 1
8
24
-
2
4
18
■-
7 .
-
-
4
2 *l
8
24
-
1
50
108
217
,131 .
TTlsTi
no
547
14
28
iT
25
20
50 |100 2ll
000
33
66
»
110
633~
*The above table is compiled from Lob^II's Jalirbericlit<^. 1013.
telegraph troops, flying corps, and train battalions are omitted.
Fortress artillery, pioneers, nilway and
218
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
GERMAN TELEPHONE RANGEFINDER.
[Ctniral Ntws.
lie Generals-in-Command were Baron von
Plettenberg (Prussian Guard) ; von Francois
(I.) ; von Linsingen (II.) ; von Lochow
(m.) ; Sixt von Arnim (IV.) ; von Strantz
(V.) ; von Pritzelwitz (VI.) ; von Ein^m (VII.) ;
Tiilfi von Tschepe und Weidenbach (VIII.) ; von
Quast (IX.) ; von Enunich (X.) ; Baron von
Scheffer-Boyadel (XI.); von Elsa (XII.) ;
von Fabeck (XIII.) ; von Hoiningen (XIV.) ;
von DeimUng (XV.) ; von Mudra (XVI.) ; von
Mackensen (XVII.) ; von Schenck (XVIII.) ; von
GERMANS TAKING OBSERVATIONS.
[Kicord Press.
Kirchbach (XIX.) ; von Scholtz (XX.) ; von
Billow (XXI.) ; von Xylander (I. Bavarian) ;
von Martini (TI. Bavarian) ; and Baron von
Horn (III. Bavarian). ^■
Apart from the eight army inspectors there
were an inspector-general of cavalry in Berlin,
with inspections of cavalry at Posen, Stettin,
Strassburg, and Saarbriicken ; an inspector-
general of field artillery in Berlin ; an inspector-
general of garrison artillery in Berlin, with
inspections at Berlin, Strassburg, and Cologne ;
an inspector-general of engineers and fortresses
in Berlin, with inspections at Berlin, Posen,
Strassburg, Mainz, and Thorn ; an inspector-
general of communication troops in Berlin,
with inspections of railway troops, military
telegraphs, and military aviation and aeronau-
tics ; a train inspection ; and an inspection of
machine gims.
There were also military governors and com-
mandants at the following strong places : —
Altona, Borkum, Cuxhaven, Geestemiinde, Heli-
goland, and Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea ;
Danzig, Friedrichsort, Kiel, Konigsberg, Swine-
iniinde, and Pillau on or near the Baltic ;
Broslau, Glatz, and Glogau in Silesia ; Posen,
Thorn, Grandenz, and Feste Boyen, and other
barrier forts along the eastern frontier ; Metz,
Bitsche, and Diedcnliofen (Thionville) in Lor-
raine ; Neu Breisach, Hiiningon, Freiburg,
Strassburg, Germersheim, Mainz, Coblenz,
Cologne, and Wesel along the Rhine ; Custrin
on the Oder ; Ulm and Ingolstadt on the
Danube.
The Emperor, who became supremo in war,
was supreme in peace also, except for the degree
THE TIMES HISTORY OF TUK WAR.
219
of indopondcnce retained after 1870 by the
Bavarian army and to some extent by the
Saxon and Wurtemberg forces. Apart from the
Groat General Staff, which is dealt with else-
wliore, and the " inspections " alreiwly enume-
rated, the Emperor's fimctions were performed
through the Ministry of War and through his
Military Cabinet. The existence of the Military
Cabinet, whose head wiis at all times the Em-
peror's chief agent and mouthpiece, was a
frequent subject of controversy and the charge
of dual control and of interference with the
powers of the Imperial Chancellor (who was
responsible for the Ministry of War as for all
other Departments of State) and of Parliament
was often made. In reality serious difficulties
only arose in times of political crisis, wliich were
always in Germany to a peculiar extent times of
intrigue, and the Emperor's Military Cabinet,
no less than his Naval and Civil Cabinets, was
a necessary part of the machine of " personal "
government. It was the business of the
Military Cabinet to report to the Emperor on
all military questions and to form a channel
of communication between him and the generals
in command of army corps, and also to deal
with promotions, transfers, and other personal
questions.
GENERAJ^ VON EINEM.
The Ministry of War was the supreme ad-
ministrative authority of the Army responsible
for recruiting, equipment, commissariat, forti-
tications, pay, and mobilization. It was
divided into some half-dozen departments,
which were subdivided again into sections.
The finances of the Army were managed
tlirough a central bureau (Oenerai Militiirkaase^
GERMAN SIEGE GUN IN TRANSIT.
Ttt-xat.
220
TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF
GERMAN ARMY CORPS AREAS.
HEADQUARTERS ofARMYCORPS [xtoIdantzig
BAVARIAN AND SAXON CORPS BAV. SAX
HEADQUARTERS ofDIVISIONS 3B.OERFURT
,, ,, nuRTTEMBURG DIVISIONS - Oil-W)
,, ,, CAVALRY INSPECTION... di 4
,, „ ARTILLERY .. A3
,, „ ENGINEERS ., tfl2
,, „ PIONEERS ., ▼ I
M lies
20 9 20 40 ^60 SO 100
221
?/C
«)0O
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
COLOUR-SERGEANT, ALEXANDER
GRENADIER GUARD REGIMENT.
[Ball.
Tile organization of the Army was immensely
assisted by the perfection of the general organi-
zation of the State services — for example, rail-
ways and telegraphs. Not only was the Army
ready to assunae control of these services, but
the services were ready to be taken under mili-
tary control. Immediately after the war of
1870 the Airny began to pay special attention
to the training of railway troops, able both to
manage existing railways and to construct new
ones. The establishment of military control of
the postal and telegraph systems was effected
without the least difficulty or confusion. Within
an hour or two of the dispatch of the ultimatums
to Russia and France and the declaration of the
" state of imminent peril of war," the telegraph
offices all over Germany were in the hands of the
military, working indeed at higher pressm-e but
without any disturbance.
Not content with universal service at home,
the German Govermnent in 1913 passed an im-
portant Law definitely linking up rights of
nationality with the performance of military
service. It was always one of the bitterest
blows to German pride that the vast majority of
German emigrants were finally lost to the
country. The provision, hitherto existing, that
residence abroad for more than 10 years involved
loss of German nationality unless the emigrant
in Berlin, with a branch for each army corps
district. As soon as the Finance Law for the
year had been passed the Ministry of War fixed
the distribution of the credits, and communi-
cated with the Army through the Intendantur
of each army corps. So the funds passed
down to the smallest administrative units —
a company, or a battery, or a squadron. All
I he administrative services of the Army were
governed by minutely detailed regulations, and
, the whole machine was constructed with a view
to smooth and uniform working in peace time —
an aim which was certainly attained — and to the
utmost possible speed and precision on mobiliza-
tion.
There was, indeed, no army that ever existed
which was so sure to be found completely ready
when war began, so perfectly able to strike at
once with all its force. Only defeats, and a
series of defeats, could seriously upset such an
organization. Only a long process of attrition
could dangerously disturb the elaborate prepara-
tions for the concentration and movement of
troops, and for supplying them always and every-
where with all that they would need in the field.
GENERAL VON HINDENBURG.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
223
took special steps to preserve his Glerman status
was repealed. On the other hand, loss of nation-
ality was rendered certain in the case of Germans
who failed to perform their military service
GERMAN SIEGE HOWITZER. i*'""' /•'«»•
witliin a fixed time of having been declared
deserters. Special facilities and extensions of
tune, however, were granted to Germans hving
abroad.
CHAPTER XV.
THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE
FIELD.
The Reserve Formations and their Us ic — The "Sudden Maximum" — Speed in Action — The
General Staff — Violence in Execution — Studv of Detaii. — Expansion in War -Estimate
OP Available Numbers — Use of Reserves — The Emperor and his Moi.tke — Commanders —
The Army CIorps Organization — CAVAiiRv and Resmrve Divisions — Infantry and Machini>
ouN Tactics — Cavalry Tactic-s— Artillery Tactics — Artillery Armament — German Heavy
Howitzers — Other Troops — Supplies — Hospitai s — Mechanical Efficiency.
THE peace organization of tlie German
army gave, of course, a very in-
adequate notion of its full strength
when mobilized for aition. Behind
the units which figured on the peace establish-
ments, even after their completion to war
strength, were huge reserves, and the intended
composition and employment of these reserves
— whether in the form of duplication or triplica-
tion of active army units or of attachment of
newly -formed reserve units to each Army Corps,
or, again, of their grouping in fresh and indepen-
dent Army Corps of their own — ^was, as a French
student remarked but a short time before the
war, " the great secret of the Supreme Com-
mand." For that reason it was somewhat
futile to condemn, on the authority of Clause-
witz himself, the two-unit organization (regi-
ments paired in brigades, brigades paired in
divisions, divisions paired in Army Corps), for
nothing would be simpler than to convert
the binary system into a ternary one, by adding
a reserve regiment to each brigade, a reserve
brigade to a division, and so on at the moment
of mobilization.
These, and similar possibilities of variation,
however, must be considered as the unofficial
student's reserN-ations forced upon him by the
imjjerfection of liis data rather than as matters
kept open for eleventh hour decision by the
German authorities. The use to which reserve
formations would be put was, as we have said,
the secret of the higher command. But it was
certainly settled both in principle and in
detail long before the v/ar. Similarly, wliile
to outsiders it appeared doubtful whether
Germany would employ the vast masses of able-
bodied men who had received no training, no
such doubt existed in the confidential mobiliza-
tion schemes.
This mobilization scheme presented the
sharpest contrast with that of Great Britain.
For the characteristic of the latter was that it
was based upon the assumption of a long war, in
which the British Army, small at first, would
be expanded by an elaborate machinery of
recruit depots and reserve battalions at home,
until at the end of the war its strength was
at a maxunum. Under the German system
its strength was at its greatest in the first
days and at its lowest at thcs close of a war.
Continental critics were well aware of this
difference, and, as most of them subscribed to
the ruling opinion that the war would be a brief
shock of extreme violence, they reproacheil
Great Britain with keeping too largo a propor-
tion of the available trained men in reserve
formations, destined only to fill gaps
in the first line and iricantime idling at
a moment when every soldier's place was at
the decisive point. Such was the rcproivch.
Whether it was well or ill deserved we need
224
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
22.5
not inqiiirn. It was connected only indirectly,
if lit all, with the other favourito reproacli
that British citizens would not take the " manly
resolution " of adopting compulsory service ;
and, indeed, it was only natural that a Con-
tinental Army which developed its whole power
in a fortnight or three weeks should read with
amazement that with 120,000 odd serving
soldiers at homo and some 140,000 regular
reservists, besides special reserves and terri-
torials registered for foreign service, Great
IJritain could only produce, at the outset, an
tlxpeditionary Force of 170,000 men.
No army in the world represented the theory
of the sudden immediate maximum better
than the German, not even the French, for
the doctrines of strategy held in honour at the
JCcole de Guerre were based upon the " offensive
return," and by that very fact admitted that
every day had a to-morrow, whereas the ideal
of the Kriegsaladcmie was " the day," i.e.,
the battle without a to-morrow, complete and
all sufficing. The question for the French was,
whether a short service national army would be
capable of enduring till their to-morrow came.
And it was the cliiof virtue of the German
theory of war that it was, in theory at least,
based upon the human natiu-o of citizen-soldiers,
men capable of one effort of maximum violence
and possibly little else. In the event the French
proved their case by proving that the staying
power of human nature, when fortified by a
just cause and an honest anger, was far greater
than the German theory admitted. But,
bearing in mind the likelihood of Germany's
having to fight for existence on " two fronts "
and the consequent desire to bring the struggle
on one of these fronts to the speediest possible
HERR KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND
HALBACH.
issue, the German theory of war had much to
recommend it. The bases of that theory, in
principle and in detail, will be discussed later.
Our present concern is to show the mutual
relations of the theory and the army that was
to put it into practice.
The theory demanded, first of all, speed in
action on a large scale — not so much actual
speed of manoeuvre or of march as reduction
to zero of the waste of time that would result
from imperfect arrangements for the larger
movements of Army Corps and armies — and
NEW GERMAN BOMB-GUN.
BOMB-GUN READY FOR FIRING.
226
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
soxmd staff-work was the essential condition
for securing this speed. How successfully
diis condition had been met 1870 and the
Kaisermaniiver of the years of armed peace
showed. In respect of what may be called
its business side the German General Staff had
no superior in the world. It is recorded that
the casualty and ammunition returns of the
troops that fought at Gravelotte and St.
Privat, on August 18, 1870, were in the hands
of the general headquarters before dawn on
the 19th, to serve as the basis for Von Moltke's
next decision. More than this no staff could
do. But even this staff had its imperfections,
both on service (as in the cases of the lost
dispatch of Rezonvilie and the army orders
of Worth) and on manoeuvres, and if its occa-
sional errors were to be neutralized this had
to be done by the troops. Hence the over-
marching so often noted and criticized on
manoeuvres.
The possibility of over -marching the men was
itself another means of obtaining speed. The
condition of weary blanknf ss to which it reduced
the men was accepted as a necessary evil. What
mattered was the punctual execution of the
programme laid down at all costs. But here
again it was minutely careful organization of
regimental detail rather than the pace of the
individual that was relied upon to produce
the resvilt. Thus it was that in 1870, in
modern manoeuvres, and in 1914 alike the
ground covered by German units was astonish-
ing, even though the troops in themselves were
slow and heavy.
The theory demanded, further, extreme
violence in execution — that is, an output of
power so great that it wovild liave wrecked
delicate machinery. Simplicity and strength,
therefore, were just as characteristic of the
German Army system as thorough organization.
Lastly, as the attempt to produce by envelop-
ment a day of battle that needed no morrow
of pursuit required great extension of front, and
therefore either extraordinarily high develop-
ment of the lateral communications or, in the
alternative, deployment at the outset in accor-
dance with a preconceived and unalterable plan,
it followed that the German Army and all its
material auxiliaries, such as railway platforms
and loop lines, could and had to be arranged
and prepared in peace in accordance with
plans and time-tables studied and considered
at leisure — in accordance, in fact, with the
" Fundamental Plan."
On these foundations the German Army
organization was built up until 1912. After
that year, indeed, there was a noticeable ten.
dency to develop it on different lines, owing to
the rise of new militarv Powers to tlie south-
GERMAN MILITARY MOTOR CAR. GUN IN POSITION FOR FIRING AT AEROPLANES.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
227
east of Austria and to the " specding-iip "
of the Russian Army. But up to the declivrii-
tion of war in 1914 the tendency had done no
more than round off the old system as a
preparation for a new one, and in point of
organization the army that took tlic field
in that year was, substantially, the army that
had been conceived 20 years before and felowly
matured. What other qualities and possi-
bilities had been sacrificed to the perfection of
the organization the story of the war itself
will show in due course. But the military
machine, as a machine, was strongly built,
powerful, speedy, and well oiled.
Let us see, first, how the peace organization
of the active army was supposed to function
on mobilization. At any given moment the
infantry — to take the most important arm
first — consisted of the professional officers and
non-commissioned officers and two-year con-
tingents of conscripts. The peace establish-
ment of the infantry battalion stoqd in 1914
atabo-ut740 for certain corps* and 670 for the
rest. To complete to a war establishment
of about 1,080, no corps required more than
35 per cent, of ie&ervists,t and some needed only
20 per cent. In other words, hardly one
year's contingent of reservists was needed
for the completion of the active unit to war
establishment. Cavalry, as in most other
countries, had one more squadron in ))eace than
in war — in this case 5 to 4 — and it rode out of
barracks for field service with few or no reservists,
either men or horses, in its ranks. In the artil-
lery, the serious defect of low horse establish-
ment had been removed, and the foot (heavy)
artillery had been increased, both as to number
of miits and establishment, an increase wliich
was to have no small influence on the w^ar.
These few details will servo to show the care
that was taken to make the first-line army as
professional as was humanly possible within
the limits imposed by citizen recruiting and
short service. It is true that the increased
establishments referred to were recent — they
formed, in fact, the greater part of the changes
consequent upon the Balkan wars — but it is
equally true that they took effect upon the
army of 1912. It was as though a rebuilding
of the old edifice upon new lines had been begun
by the strengthening of the structvire as it
stood.
Another portion of the peace mechanism
provided the cadres for reserve units.
GENERAL VON MOLTKE.
Chief of the Great General Staff of the
German Army.
Following the example of France, Germany
had provided her active peace regiments with
supernumerary officers of the higher ranks,
whose future ta-sk it was to form the thousands
of reservists whom the mobilized active unit
did not need (viz., the four classes aged
25-28) into reserve regiments. Up to 1913
it had been intended to form one reserve
battalion, but the increase of recniit intake
and establishments in 1913 set free enough
reservists for the formation of two reserve
battalions per active regiment. And not only
the reserve, but also the Landwehr of still older
men, had its expansion mechanism. The majors
administering Landwelir districts became, on
mobilization, commanders of Landwehr batta-
lions.
In sum, the units of the principal arms in
1914 could be estimated with fair accuracy as
follows : —
—
Battalions of
Infantiy.
Squadrons of
Cavalry.
Batteries ot
Field Art.*
Active
llcscrve . ,
Liandwelir
669
434
310
650
> About
{ 300t
633
300t
• About 45 per cent, of the Infantry were on Ihe hlsher estab-
lishment.
tVery small doiluctions need bv nwdc for unfit, ns the c?t.nbiisli-
mcnt » a minimum anil not a niaxinmm ; 8 to 9 per cent, additional
conscripts bciuL- taken in yearly to meet " wastece.
•InclndiDg horse artillery batteries.
IWonld probably Include Landwehr men to some extent, as nv
servtsts were required to man the nuiumnition colucuu of the
mobilized active army.
:Reserve squadrons, i.e., drafting dcrOts, of active ngimenis
not included.
SLack of horses would make the mobilixatiou of tiese batteries
very dithcult.
228
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
iv y
)
>
^
''^l
g|
1
^^^f -•
R
\
1
PRINCE VON BULOW. rr«(.«*'.
Formations of older men (Landsturm) for
local defence scarcely concern us, except in so
far as they released Landwehr units for line-
of -communication service near the front. In
respect of this branch, the German organization
was in no way superior to that of France and
other belligerents, more stringent administra-
tion of the liabihty lists being counterbalanced
by the lack of that local initiative which in this
local service is worth more than bureaucratic
efficiency.
As regards the total military force at the
disposal of the Emperor, an estimate of 1918
gave : —
Active army reserve, and Landwehr,
all trained (3,700,000 gross), net .. 3,100,000
Ersatz reserve (surplas of annual con-
tingents——i.e., men of active army and
reserve age, who, though fit, had never
sei'ved) . . . . . . . . . . 900,000
Others liable, mostly untrained, of all ages
and trained men over 36 (gross about
6,000,000), net, say .•5,000.000
7,000,000
net
Of these trained men, the units of the
active army, reserve and Landwehr (1,403
battalions. 850 squadrons. 933 batteries,
pins engineers, train, &o.) would absorb
about 2,100,000, or somewhat less, leaving
one million trained men. as well as nearly
the same nimiber untrained in hand. More
than half of these 1,900,000 would be available
for replacing casualties in the active army, even
after all garrisons, railway guards?, &c., had been
jirovided for on a liberal scale, both in ofTicors
and in men.
Now this capacity for sustained war at firat
sight appears to be opposed to the first objects
of Gerrnan organization — the sudden blow of
maximum violence. The discrepancy is, how-
ever, only apparent, for however boldly Ger-
many staked the whole of her finest troops on
the chance of crushing her western neighbour in
three weeks, she had to make allowance tor
the needs of " containing " that neighbour
when the active regiments hastened eastward to
deal with the Russians. Just as in the first
stage little more than reserve formations would
be told off to delay the Russians while the
active army crushed France, so too in a second
stage, not only had the gaps in her active
army, now opposed to Russia, to be filled, but
extra reserve formations had to be provided
on a grand scale in order to hold France down
when conquered.
A single active army — as nearly professional
and as independent of reservists as possible —
two sets of reserve formations, one to go west
with the Active Army and to remain in the
west, the other to ho.d the east until the Active
Army could be transferred thither ; in addition,
coiist defence troops, fortress garrisons, and
railway guards, and unformed masses of indi-
viduals to replace csisualties in each and all of
these categories of service units — such, in brief,
seems to have been the composition of the
German Army in 1914.
The effective command of these millions was,
as in 1870, vested in the Kaiser, who as
" Supreme War Lord " (Oberste Kriegsherr)
of the Empire enjoyed powers, even in the
kingdoms of other members of it, such as not
even the Tsar exercised over the Russiar armies-
He was both King and commander-in-chief, as
every Hohenzollern ruler had been before liim.
His experience in handling troops on manoeuvres
was probably as great as that of any man living,
and his favourate finale, the charge of cavalry
masses, though ridiculed in other countries, was
regarded by some few level-headed critics as a
proof of nerve and judgment, for men who can
handle 50 or 60 squadrons at the gallop are, and
always were, rare in any army. What was
more doubtful than his cavalry qualities was his
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
229
capacity as supreme director of millions. Of
the cold, steady mind, the slirewduoss, the sonso
of proportion of Moltko, he had given no evi-
dence. It was fortunate for Prussia that her
modern military system had been designed at a
time when tlie ruling HohcnzoUern was not a
first-class soldier, and needed a chief of the great
General Staff to " keep him straight." The
institution of tliis office had had as its result,
first, the offacement of the King as initiator of
strategical and tactical operations ; secondly,
the possibility of selecting the best general of the
Army, irrespective of seniority, as the real direc-
tor of operations (since he was only an adviser
to the King and not a commander sot over his
seniors) ; thirdly, the intimate correlation of
peace -preparatioa and war-action, in that the
same officer and his staff managed both ; and,
lastly, tlie com.bination both of authority aiad of
responsibility in the head of the State. This
peculiar method of command, tried in two wars,
had succeeded. But William I. was both a
veteran of the campaigns' against Napoleon,
iind a man of remarkable solidity of character,
and liis Moltke was a very great soldier. No
one could prophesy an equally easy woridng of
the system when the commander-in-chief was
both imaginative and erratic and the chief of
staff an ordinary general. But the Germans
pinned their faith to the system of combining
the man of highest authority with the man
selected for greatest technical ability. The
system — always the system !
For the purpose of operations the General
Heatlquartcrs then consisted of the Kaiser and
t lie Chief of the General Staff. The units inmie-
diately controlled by them were styled armies,
and numbered I., II., &c. In many cases,
though not in all, the army conmiaiiders were
the " Army inspectors " of peace. For some
years before the war the 25 Army Ck>rp8 had been
grouped for purposes of inspection and training
under those inspectors, of whom latterly there
wero eight. It had been assumed that these
generals would command armies composed of
the army corps with which they had dealt
in peace. Tliis was not in all cases done. But
the principle remained, and the forces in the
liold wero divided into armies, each under it.*
own army commander and consisting of three
or more army corps and one or more cavalry
divisions, according to the part entrusted to
each in the " fmidamental plan."
The army corps, without reserve formations
incorporated in it, was the ba^io unit of the
Army. In peace time it consisted of two
divisions, each of two infantry brigades ( = four
regiments. = twelve battalions) ;* one cavalry
brigade, and one field artillery brigade. To
one or other of the divisions were attached a
light infantry battalion, a pioneer battalion
(equivalent to the British field units of Royal
Engineers), and a battalion of train (Array
Service Corps).
As a rule each corps, division, &c., was
recruited and stationed in its own area, and
from this fact had resulted a considerable
advantage in speed of mobilization, since the
unit's reservists wero close at hand. But the
absorption of all the Polish, Alsatian and
Lorraine recruits in the units of the V., XV'.,
and XVI. corps was naturally dangerous,
and these corps drew recruits from all over
the Prussian dominions, as also did the Corps
d' elite of the Guard ; as, however, these units
were frontier corps, they stood on an exception -^
ally high peace footing and needed few reser-
. ♦ This sUtement held lood In the cms oI 15 corvs : the otbcn
oonlalnerl fl. 10 and. hi the rase of the Guard. 11 rartmcnt*. Al
corp« with 10 or more regiments formed an extra brixade.
UHLANS.
230
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB
vists, so that their more general recruiting did
oot impair their rapidity of mobilization.*
In close connexion with this territorial re-
cruiting stood the organization of " Landwehr
districts " above mentioned, whereby the
closest touch was maintained between the
recruits of the district, its serving soldiers,
and its reservists of all ages. It had formerly
been the practice to split up the units of each
corps in many towns, with a view to preserving
this local touch ; but in more recent years
the risk of small isolated units falling into a
stagnant condition had been seen, and though
the system was retained, it was supplemented,
at great expense, by the provision in each
corps area of a central training camp, in wloich
the troops spent the summer in company.
•The former objectioiiR to tlie employment of Hanoverians in
the X. Corps had practically ceased to be vaiid. and tliat corps
waK to aU iBteutJi and purpoises territorially recruited.
In war, one division of each corps gave up
its cavalry brigade and its horse artillery,
which went to form part of a cavalry division,*
and the other brigade was broken up so as to
give each division of the corps a regiment of
divisional cavalry.
Thus cleared of the units that belonged to
it only for purposes of peace recruiting and
administration, the normal corps consisted of
two divisions and an extra battalion of infantry,
two cavalry regiments attached to the divisions,
two field artillery brigades, f one to each divi-
sion, and technical and departmental troops,
as shewn in the diagram annexed.
*Tliere had l)een prolonged controversy on the subject of the
permanent cavalry division, but. except in the Guard, no organized
cavalry division existed in peace.
tThese were far larger units than the British Field Artillery
" brigade." which was a lieutenant-colonel's connnand of tliree
batteries, whereas tne German was a major-general's commaud
of two held artillery regiiueatfi.
ORDRE de: bataille
2^° DIVISION
OF A NORMAL CORPS
l?T DIVISION
iii
iii
666
666
666
666
iii
666
_L
J_
_L
J_
J_
_L
X
-L
Infantry Regiments and Machine
Gun Companies
Infantry Pediments and A/lachine
Cun Companies
Inf. Brigade
Inf Brigade
Inf Brigade
Inf Brigade
Field Artillery Brigade
Field Artillery Brigade
F Arty Regt.
F Arty. Regt
F Arty Regt
F Arty. Regt.
f^Arty.
Croup
FArty.
Croup
FArty.
Croup
FArty.
Croup
FArty.
Croup
FArty
Croup
FArty
Croup
F Arty.
Croup
1' 1' 1'
'i' 1' 1'
•1' 1' 1'
'i' 1' 1'
•J. .J. ;[.
1' 1' 1'
ill 1' 1'
i 1' 1'
lEI
^
IS
ISl
m
IS
IS
IS
Croup
Am.
Column
Croup
Am.
Column
Croup
Am.
Column
Croup
Am.
Column
Croup
Am.
Column
Croup
Am.
Column
Croup
Am.
Column
Croup
Am.
Column
6 6 1^ li ^ ^^'^- ^^3*-
lAl^lillS ICav.Regt.
1 1 / Pioneer Company
□ / Pioneer Company
O-O / Telephone DetdcM
0<3 / Telephone Detach^
W 1 Bridging Train
W 1 Bridging Train
f+] / Sanitary Company
[+J / Sanitary Company
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
CORPS TROOPS
231
l[l Ijl lll lll
13
Heet/j' Hoivit^er
Bdttdlion and
Am. Column
O
o
o
o
o
Air Service
Signal
iV/reless ■•
Telegraph ••
Telephone ••
DIVISIONAL TRAINS Etc. . CORPS TRAINS Etc. DIVISIONAL TRAINS Etc.
+ e Field Hospitals
O Veterinary Section
Corps Bridging
Train
[+] 6 Field hospitals
O Veterinary Section
Field Bakeries
o o
Ammunition Columns
—,,^,^,„ Field Cun
SS^S and
lioiv'r Am.
Ammunition
Column
13
Hvy. Artillery
Ammunition Co/umns
ir-, le-. . . _. '^e/o' Gun
IE33I3 ^nd
Hoyvr. Am.
Train
Y^ Baggage
^ Supply
Train
[3 Baggage
ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF A CAVALRY DIVISION
Brigade
Brigade
Brigade
Regt.
0000
Regt
0000
Regt
Regt
Regt
0000
Regt
0000
Q Wireless
Section
Q Pioneer
Section
1' 'i' i'
J Horse Batteries
and am. cols.
Machine
-L Cun
Section
232
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A Reserve division, whether forming tlie
third division of an active corps or grouped
with other reserve divisions, was similar in
strength and organization to an active division-
except that it had only one regiment of field
artillery (6 batteries) instead of two. The
larger units of the Landwelir, grouped by
themselves or with reserve units, varied m
composition according to the resources available
on mobilization and their special tasks.
The strengtli of the army corps of 25 battahons,
eight squadroixs, twid 24 field batteries, with its
combatant and non-combatant auxiliaries, was,
according to Lehnerts Handbuch for 1913, 41,000
all ranks with 14,000 horses and 2,400 vehicles,
guns included- That of a cavalry division,
without auxiliaries other than those shown in
the diagram (*) was 5,000 men, 5,300 horses,
iind 200 vehicles inclusive of guns. It will be
observed, therefore, that the Gorman army
c(Mps was practically equivalent to two British
divisions, but that a German cavalry division
was little more than half as strong as, and much
less completely equipped in teclmical troops
than, the British. Nor had the German division
fuiy heavy guns, although the army corps
was usually provided with one heavy howitzer
battalion. The equipment of the Germans in
machine guns was also less complete. We have
hitherto considered the units of each arm simply
as blocks to be arranged in large and small boxes
called corps, divisions, and brigades. It remains
to described their structure and their working
in rather more detail.
The infantry regiments, commanded by a full
colonel, had three battalions, each com-
manded by a lieutenant-colonel or a major, and
a machine gun company. The battalion had
four companies, commanded by mounted
captains, and the company three platoons,
under subalterns. The war strength of the
company in officers and men was 270, which
gave about 250 rifles for the firing line. Thus,
broadly, the strength of the 12-oompany
regiments was 3,000 rifles. '
The machine gun company of the regiment
had six guns, the same proportion to the
battalion as in the British Army. But the
different organization must lie noted, for it
had reference to a different idea of the uses
of macliine guns. Whereas in the British
and French Army these weapons were scattered
by pairs amongst the battalions at the outset
with a view to aiding the development of
maximum fire power from a minimum number
of men, thus economizing defensive forces for
the benefit of the eventual counter-attack,
the German machine guns were massed in a
group and regarded as a reserve of fire, which
enabled the local commander to dispense with
human reserves and to put his whole force of
rifles into action from the first without fear.
Here is an example of tactical doctrine
and formal organization dovetailing into
one another. The machine gim is a compendium
of some fifty rifles, and was so regarded in
all armies ; in the French and British it
was deployed at the outset in order
to allow the equivalent number of men to be
reserved, and in the German it was reserved
in order to allow these men to be deployed
at the outset. The Gennan infantry machine
guns were conveyed on the march in a wagon,
and when unpacked for action were fitted
imderneath with sleigh-rvmners and dragged
across country.*
(•) The provleioii of a cavalry train was another controversial
sublect in Germany. Tliere was much to be said for it. but it is
wortll noting that in Great Britain tlie cavalry train introduced in
1911 waa alx)li«ht'd in 1913.
•The cavaby machine gim battery (one per division) was somewhat
(litferently organized.
GERMAN FIELD BATTERY.
THE TIMES HlSTOliY UF THE WAR.
233
THE PRUSSIAN GOOSE STEP.
Tlio weapon of the infantry soldier was
the excellent long riflo of 1898, with a box
magazine taking a clip of five cartridges at a
time.
In the infantry company a certain number
of buglers, range-takers, and signallers formed
a small party under the captain's orders, distinct
from the platoons- — an arrangement that had
been copied by the British Army from the
German a short time before the war.
The ruling idea of infantry tactics was the
de\ elopnient of the greatest possible fire-power,
which it was sought to produce by forming
very strong firing lines at long range so as to
open fire simultaneously when more eflective
ranges were reached. Behind this strong firing
line came supports, also denloyed, so as to be
able to fill up the gaps along the length of the
firing line as men were shot or straggled away
for safety. Not dasli, but sheer power, w-as the
ideal. Even the bayonet charge was regarded
as merely a way of "presenting for jiayment the
cheque drawn by rifle-fire," as the sequel
rather than the culmination of tlie infantr>
attack. In the interests of this theory tlio
Germans had tlieir infantry formations princi-
pally selected, if not exclusively, with a view
to rapid deployment. Tlie old " company
column " of 1870 — platoons in line one behind
the other — was freely used under the name
of " colunui of platoons," and a new " company
column " had been introduced which affords
yet another example of the dovetailing of doc-
trine and organization. In appearance it was
exactly the same as a French or British " line of
platoons in fours," but whereas in the armies
of the Allies it was a formation for manoeuvring
under fire in Germany it was used to reduce
the time of deployment to a minimum, so as
to show that powerful fire-front to which the
Germans pimied their faith as rapidly as
possible. Their confident belief in the power
of fire to win battles has already been mentioned
in connexion with machine guns, and it will be
sufficient here to note that it underlay all their
severely practical formations, from that of the
GERMAN MILITARY MOTOR-CAR, ARMED WITH A KRUPP GUN FOR FIRING AT
234
THE TIMES HlSTORi OF THE WAR.
di\-ision on the march down to that of the
platoon under shrapnel fire.
The unit of the cavalry, as always, was the
squadron of about 150 sabres — " lancos "
would be a better expression, since the whole
of the German cavalry, and not the Uhlans
alone, were armed with the lance. The regi-
ment on service had four squadrons of this
strength, commanded by captains with
subalterns in charge of the " troops," of wliich
there were four to the squadron. No arm of
the service had been the object of more
severe criticism and attack than the cavalry,
and the events of the South African War and
the Manchurian Campaign had not been en-
couraging to the champions of the old knec-
to-knee charge, in which for a generation before
1900 the Germans had excelled all others.
Even in Germany the orthodox views on
cavalry had been rudely challenged, and so
liigh an authority as Bernhardi had openly
joined the heretics. At one time, only a couple of
years before this war, it had even been seriously
proposed that the Gennan trooper should bo
armed with the rifle and bayonet. In this
instance, then, German tactical ideas both
official and imoffieial were in a state of flux,
and no certain indication as to the details of
cavalry action could have been discerned in
advance. There were, of course, general
principles, such as that of reconnaissance by
cavalry masses as the best basis of general
strategic dispositions^ — a principle wliich the
opposite party flatly denied — but in so far as
these were true there was nothing new about
them, and in so far as they were new the
doctrines of the Bernhardi school were at
least questionable. What the special quality,
the differentia, of German cavalry was to be
was then unknown. Formerly it had excelled
on its own solid groiuid in the horsemastership
and individual riding that Schmidt, Rosenberg,
CONCEALED OERMAN ARTILLERY.
[Central Neus,
THE TIMES iniSTORY OF THE WAR.
235
Seufft-Pilnaoh, and cavalr^• leaders of their
stamp had made the basis of the grand charge.
Now, not only had its enemies learned as much,
hut it was doubtful whether the grand charge
would figiu"e in the new cavalry tactics at all.
The regimental organization of the field artillery
is shown in the diagram. For each infantry
division one regiment was available, each of
two groups (Abteilungen) of tliree six-gun
batteries and a light ammunition column,
In one of the two regiments a howitzer grou])
was substitutt^d for one of the gun groups.
Kach battery had, in addition, an " ob.servation
wagon," from the ladder of whicli its captain
directed the fire. To each gun one battery
wagon was allotted, but all these wagons,
collectively called the echelon (stajjel), marched
in rear of tlie guns and only tliree were normally
brought up alongside the guns in action. Herein
the German artillery procedure presented a
sharjj contra.st to tlie more up-to-date methods
of the French and the English, whose batteries
always had one wagon per gun and sometimes
more in the fighting line, as well as a second
and even a third in the wagon line. This
comparative poverty of immediate ammuni-
tion supply tlie Germans expected to make good
by means of the light ammunition column,
which was organized on the basis of one wagon
per gun. The British and German systems
may thus be compared : —
Wagons per battery —
German firing battery, 3 ; staffel, 3 :
light ammunition column, 6=12.*
British firing battery, 6.; wagon line, 6 ;
brigade ammunition column, 6=18.*
As in the case of the cavalry, so in that of
the artillery, tactical ideas in Germany were
ill a state of flux. But whereas in. the case of
tiie cavalry the disputants on both sides were
well abreast of the times, in that of the artillery
an imfortunate blunder of the higher authorities
had compelled the arm to lag behind the same
arm in other countries, and that at a peritd in
\\liich artillery was developing with unheard of
rapidity. In 1896 the German tiovernmcnt
decided to rearm its field batteries with the
0/96 gun, a breech-loader that was probably
better than any gun of corresponding date in
other armies. This was carried out at enormous
expense almost immediately. But in 1897
France rearmed with an entirely new class of
gun, the quick-firer, and it soon became evident
that artillery tactics and even tactics in general
had been revolutionized. Germany, found
•IMuB gun-limbers in each case ; the observation wagoD of the
CJerman battery also carried wmie jumu'iiiUiou.
L
e^
E
J J '^JhSh' ^^^^H
Tf
-1^3
h:.
^^^^m T^ *
» '4HHI
MEMBKK.S Ot i HE GKKMAN HlvU C;ROSS
CORPS.
[Smspjper ItltistrstioHS.
wanting for once in that slirewd foresight with
which she is generally credited, luwi to face the
fact that her brand-new guru* were out of date.
But as it was impossible to spend fresh millions
on a reannament there was notliing to bo done
but to watch and wait. Lest moral should suffer
it was asserted that the -96 gim was " jiractic-
ally " a quick-firer, and that no revolution in tec-
tics, artillery or other, had come about in con-
sequence of the new French weapon Thus
the methods and instructions of field artillery
training remained in the breech-loader era
while other armies were successively following
the lead of France. The points of the quick-
firer are soniewliat tecluiical, but they can be
summed up roughly in. one plirjvsc — the steady
carriage and the free-recoiling gun. The
anchoring of the 'Carriage made it possible to
(ire with far greater speed, since the giui-
carriage did not leap back on tiring, and had not
to be re-laycd at each roiuid, as of old. It
made indirect tire from behind cover com-
paratively easy, since the ctirriage accurately
kept its position and angles once mea.stired
from an observing station hold good
in action. The recoil of the gun
along the set path of its guides or
rumiers was so smooth that the accuracy
of tire was greater than it had over been. And,
lastly, the gun-carriage remaining steady, the
men serving the gun coidd take cover Ix'hind
a gun-shield and had not at every roimd to
stand clear of the wheels. In every one of
these important points the German gun, fiood
236
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GERMAN TRANSPORT.
of its kind as it was, was totally wanting, and
its tactics had necessarily to conform — or
rather were prevented from following the
progress of other artilleries. Presently the
crisis passed as a means was found of converting
the guns so as to recoil on an anchored carriage.
[t became " 96/NA," a true quickfirer, though,
as was to be expected, not a very successful
one. In power and general quality it was
inferior to the gun of any European Power's
first line army, and equivalent, or nearly so,
to the British Territorial Arrny's converted
15-pounder. One advantage, however, it
possessed over better models — it was very light
«D man-handle in action. What other possi-
bilities had been sacrificed to this rio one but
the designers could tell. But the ^vantage,
so far as it went, was incontestabl*. It must
be noted however that the gun limbered up
and travelling was quite as iieaVy as other field -
gun equipments elsewhere. In other respects,
such as speed of ranging and accuracy of
slirapnel fir© under normal conditions,* ease of
switching batteries on to successive targets,
&c., the Germans were at a very great dis-
advar>tagc, and if the infantry that underwent
its fire in 1914 spoke of it with respect, it was
chiefly because time-shrapnel fire on a large
scale had never been experienced by that
infantry. Destructive bombardment of ac-
curately located trenches by German field-
guns was occasionally, if not frequently, re-
corded, but in its function — the chief function
"Hence, probably, the denperate eftorls made by the OermanB
to take riuHiee by means oi spies, reported by British and other
aoliien* In the west.
of field artillery — of covering the infantry's
advance to the assault, the cool shooting oi
the British infantry on the defensive proves
it to have failed.
But if the field gun and its tactics were
below the most modern standards, the
howitzers, both great and small, were of the
most modern and formidable types, and it
is probable that most of the effect achieved
by the German artillery in the v/ar was the work
of the howitzers.
The field howitzers (•t-lin. calibre), as we
have said, formed part of the field artillery of
the divisions and were organized in the same
wa^ in a group (ableilung) of three six-gun
batteries and anmumition column. The heavy
howitzers were, however, manned by the foot
artillery (corresponding to the British Royal
garrison artillery). A heavy field howitzer
battalion horsed for field service with an army
corps consisted -of four four-gun batteries of
Gin. (15c/m.) howitzer.-i with two extra observa-
tion wagons to enable the whole to work in two
two-battery groups. The 'battery of four guns
had an observation wagon, four first wagons with
the gims, four second wagons in the ataffel.
and a liglit ammunition column. The mobility
of these weapons was roughly that of the 6(1-
pounder long gun of the British Army
Heavier still were t)ie mortars*, of 8.4in. and,
for siege purposes, of llin. calibre, on special
wheeled carriafjes, of which the wheels were
equipped so as to give a good bearing both on
•A certain number of batteries were equipped with 41n. and 5in.
lonfE Ruus instead of he:ivy howitzers anu mortars.
THE TIMES HlSTOkf OF THE WAR.
237
FORTIFICATIONS OF THE RHINE FRONTIER.
238
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GERMAN FIELD POST-OFFICE.
[NewspapfT lUustratwns.
the road and on the ground when firing. This
device had been so far perfected that the great
llin. howitzers (mortars) which had hitherto
required concrete beds were brought into action
before the Belgian fortresses on their own
wheels.
The horse artillery, of which 11 groups were
provided for the service of 11 line cavalry
divisions, were organized in four-gun batteries.
The gun was simply the field gun stripped of
the gunners, their kits, and various other
weights, and not a lighter piece in itself as
was the British horse artillery gun.
The foot artillery allotted to fortresses and
the fortress engineers falls outside the scope
of the present chapter, which deals with field
armies and field units only. Little need be
said, too, of the field engineers, who were
styled pioneers, except that the sharp division
^ of the whole technical arm into fortress and
barrack engineers and field pioneers is in
complete contrast to the organization ot the
British royal engineers, who form one large
corps, of which all parts are ofiBcially considered
•Eather becaune only 22 were available . under the itrevioun
■ix-Run battery orKanizatlon for 33 cavalry brigades than from
general acceptance on tactical grounds of tlie four-gun ijrinciple.
which in other countries hiui rapidly grown in favour since the
xlopticn ot the auick-Hier.
to DO interchangeable. Shortly before the war
it had been suggested that the German system
should be adopted in Great Britain, but the
controversy which grew out of the suggestion
showed a very strong opposition to the pro-
posal, and while pioneer battalions are abso-
lutely indispensable in undeveloped countries
such as India, there was certainly nothing in the
performances of the German pioneer companies
in 1870 to warrant acceptance of the dual
organization by others.
Another point to be noted is that all such
branches as telegraphy, air service, and railway
troops were in Germany completely separated
from both the engineers and the pioneers, and
formed a class by themselves as " communica-
tion troops " (verkehrstruppen). How far
these communication troops entered into the
composition of the army corps the diagrams
above indicate ; the remainder wore, of course,
allotted to the service of lines of communication.
Cyclists, other than those employed as dispatch
riders, had been for many years regarded with
disfavour in Germany. A short time before
the war, however, their utility for certain
combatant services was at last admitted, and
detachments (of the strength of a small com-
pany) were formed by the light infantry
battalions (jiigers) as infantry supports for the
advancea cavalry divisions.
Signallers, other than telegraphists, were
an ill-developed branch in Germany as else-
where, for it was only in the British Army that
visual signalling had been brought to any high
degree of usefulness. In Germany, as late aa
five years before the war, fiag signalling had only
been used for communication between butts
and firing points at target practice.
Supply was controlled by the train and the
staff officers representing that branch of the
service on the staffs of armies, corps, and divi-
sions. In general, local resources were used as far
as possible, but there was of course a full organiza-
tion for supply from the rear, and in the soldiers'
haversacks there were two or more " iron "
rations as emergency supplies. The complete
break with horsed transport traditions that had
been possible for Great Britain, with her small
Army and her large resources in motor lorries,
was not so for Germany, whose mechanical
transport vehicles, in spite of heavy subsidiee
from the State, were not-.numerou8 enough to
deal with the supplies of her huge forces in
the British way. In its broadest outline,
therefore, the system of supply from the rear
was a construction of horsed magazines and
" road-trains " (petrol tractors with trucks)
analogous to that of the British Army between
THt: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
239
1905 and 1911, with the exception- — an impor-
tant one, as all staff officers know — that thoro
seems to have been no accumulation of stores
at an " advanced dep6t," but a daily dispatch
to one or more clumgeable " railheads." Such
magazines as there were in the neighbourhood
of the fighting area were " field depots " for
the storage of requisitioned supplies. Infantry
companies, &c., were furnished with travelling
kitchens. The train was as usual divided into
baggage sections and supply portion-s, and the
latter were organized and their wagons packed
by sections of one day's food each.
The system of medical aid in the field differed
from that of the British Army chiefly in^-the
greater development of the regimental aid
post system and the absence of the clearing
hospital, which in the British system was
intended to free the field ambulances of wounded
at the earliest possible moment. The German
system, in short, was one of field hospitals rather
tlian one of field ambulances.* But the
main point, the principle of evacuating wounded
us fast as possible and placing them in line of
communication or base hospitals, was common
to both — indeed to all — armies. The ammuni-
tion supply of the infantry was secured first
by company ammunition wagons, whose contents
— as in the British service — were brought to the
firing line by the incoming supports and reserves ;
PRINCE OF LIPPE.
iCtnUal Nms.
and secondly by the divisional ammunition
columns*, wliich formed the most advanced
portion of the train, half a day's march behind
the troops.
The organization of these auxiliary services
*Field hospitals formed part of the trains and not, as did
British fleid ambulances, of tlie liist-iine transport.
*Not tlie itirtit ammunition columns of the artillery, as in Uie
British service.
GERMAN INFANTRY CELEBRATING SEDAN DAY IN BERLIN.
{CtHtfot Ntm.
24U
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
was, in short, minute and thorough. But it
was certainly questionable whether it was up
to date.
The same might indeed be said of the fighting
troops themselves. Foreign observers who
had attended the KaisermanGver year after
year were agreed upon the fact that the German
Army was a wonderful machine. But many
if not most of them noted at the same time
that the elements of the machine — the human
beings, the short-service citizens — had been
sacrificed to mechanical efficiency, and that
if the fate of a raodem battle, as all asserted —
Germans as emphatically as any — depended
upon the qualities of the individual soldier,
the German Army would fall far below the
reputation for invincibility that it had arrogated
to itself.
CHAPTER XVI.
THE GERMAN THEORY OF WAR.
Historical Development Since 1870 — Prussianizing the Army — Large and Inefficient
VERSUS Small and Efficient Akmies — ^Wab on Two Fronts Determining Factor — The Battle
WITH " No Morrow " or " Battle of Reversed Fronts " — The Napoleonic and 1870 Examples
— Close Group and Deploying of Central Reserves Impossible — The " Tidal Wave "
Envelopment — ^Moltke's Practice — Objections to the " Tidal Wave " Theory — ^Need for
Accurate Information as to Position of Enemy — Means of Obtaining Information Am-
craft — Use of Cavalry and Machine Guns — The German Railways — ^Necessity of a Wide
Strategic Front and Consequent Need fob Invading by Luxemburg and Belgium ^Move-
ments OF Corps had to be Simultaneous and According to a Time-table — Danger of
counterstrokes protective detachments initiative of commanders rfstricted
German Tactics Accompanying the " Tidal Wave."
ON land, the conflict of Germany
with France and Great Britain was
a conflict not only of principles
and of men and of weapons, but also
one between different ideas on the methods of
conducting miUtary operations. Some of the
differences were derived from and others
governed the principles, the men, and the arms.
If, therefore, we are to understand the opera-
tions of the war aright, it is necessary to reaUze
the nature of the rival, almost opposed, theories
of war wliich were put into practice in those
operations.
It has already been remarked that the
German organization stands in closer relation
to the German doctrines of strategy and tactics
than the French organization to the French
principles. For in Germany the Government
through its police-like bureaucracy has a far
greater hold on the individual citizen than in
France, and it had had that hold for so long that
several successive army systems based upon it
had come and had their day and gone again.
In other words, purely strategic and tactical
lionsiderations could be allowed for in the forms
and framework of the Army to an extent that
would not have been possible in a comnumity
less wealthy (like Japaji) or one more in-
VOL. I.— Part 7. 241
dividualized (as in the case of France), or one
in which defence problems were manifold in
kind and varying in degree (as in Great Britain).
Germany's military problem, on however great
a scale it seemed to be set, was in reality a
simple one, and simplicity and power were
the main elements of the military system
adopted to solve it. Nevertheless, traditions
and matters of external and internal policy
had their effect here as elsewhere upon the
military system, and it was not a slight one.
To begin with, 1866 and 1870 had imbued the
German Army and the German people at large
with a conviction that, in general, their organi-
zation— a single-line army which was a com-
[iromise between the regular profassional type
and the national militia type — -was that most
suited to the circumstances of a European War
of the future, and the fact that other nations
copied, their system more or less slavishly after
1870 made of tliis conviction a creed of self-
satisfaction. When from time to time German
officers preached that the Empire was in danger,
it was not in the belief that matters were really
in that case, but with the intention of improving
still more upon their formidable war engine.
The bible of this tradition \raa the Official
History of the 1870 war. But the authorities
242
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL GALLIENI.
Military Governor of Paris in 1914
and observant officers of all ranks who had been
through that war knev? vpell that the army of
1 870 was imperfect in many vital points, and, as
a first reform, the authorities set about imposing
the Prussian military institutions upon the
South German contingents, in the name of
simplicity, and sous-entendu in that of power,
since it was not only the want of homogeneity
but also the lack of discipline and " drive "
in battle that had made those contingents so
feeble. The process of forming the homogeneous
army was neither easy nor pleasant, for
it involved putting strict officially-minded
Prussians in the midst of easy-going South-
erners as comrades in field and mess ; and in one
respect it was even necessary to infringe upon
the historic territorial system of recruitment,
since it was obviously impossible to put Hano-
verians en masse into the X. Corps, or Alsatians
in the XV.
This process of Prussianizing the Army was
praictically completed in about 30 years, and
thus, when the Great War came, it had taken
effect for 15 years or so.
There were yet other things to be done.
The tactical results of 1870 — the first war in
which breech-loader met breech-loader— were
hard to digest, and it is safe to say that for
many years no two groups of officers held
exactly the same opinions on the most serious
questions of tactics. No authority in the world
has less liking for chaos than the Prussian,
but authority was powerless to deal with the
men of 1870 — whom it had so well taught to
exercise " initiative " — and the old 1812-1848
drill-book was retained for parade purposes
till 1888, while outside the limits of the barrack
square all was opinion and controversy. When
homogeneity of organization and type was
fairly well completed, homogeneity in the
tactical sphere was still far distant. Each
master-mind evolved his own tactical theories,
and the rest followed agape. Tn those days
there were giants — Bronsart, Verdy du Vemois,
Meckel, Scherff, Boguslawski, Hoenig.
The phenomena which these men set them-
selves to examine were the same for each,
the battlefield phenomena of 1870, the " dis-
solving " effect of rifle fire, and above all the
problem of preventing, imder the new condi-
tions of warfare, the wholesale skulking of
unvvounded men.*
Time after time in the earlier battles one-
third and more of the m.en nominally engaged
had been missing as unwounded stragglers —
runaways in some cases, but chiefly skulkers
who, after lying down to fire, were " deaf to
the call of the whistle " when their comrades
rose and pushed forward, and who lay cowering
or, worse still, kept up a fusillade against all
troops that approached them. The problem
of these " squatting hares " (Driickeberger)
dominates the military thought of the eighties
and nineties, and at the close of this epoch two
broad ideas, understood rather than expressed
in words, had taken shape in men's minds.
One was that, human nature being human
nature, the only way in which to ensure that
all the available brave men were brought into
action was to bring into the army every possible
man, even at the cost of shortening the term
of service and lowering the physical standards,
since no test really told except the psychic
test of battle itself. Tactically (according to
the supporters of this school of thought) the
mass was to be handled in the simplest possible
fashion— quietly deployed in full strength at
the outset, and then at the proper momem
launched in full sudden violence to drive
through to victory by its inherent worth alone.
All manoeuvres and dispositions were to bo
made in view of the one purpose of giving effect
to the will power of those private soldiers who
possessed it. Of the rest some would be
carried on by their brave comrades, and as
•Mttssendriickeberaertuvi is the technical term Invented by the
Germans for this phenomenon.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
243
for thn romainder, who enciunbered the battle-
field, matters would be no worse after all than
in 1870.
The other school, or rather the other tondoncy
(for the word school is too definite and formal),
had as its starting point the principles of
Frederick the Great ; it was proposed to
sacrifice quantity to quality and initiative to
hard discipline, and to seek victory with a
smaller army trained to mechanical per-
fection. For the supporters of this school
the secret of victory was speed of onset coupled
with crushing volleys* during the advance.
At the same time those leaders who knew
1870 from the company and battalion
point of view, and were now risen to
higher rank, no longer influenced the
company and battalion training upon
which controversy then centred. Younger
men had taken their places, and it was these
who fou2id themselves in the superior commands
when the war of 1914 broke out. Below them
again was one generation after another, from
major to subaltern, which knew nothing of
1870 at first hand, and in their case experience
of the realities of the battlefield no longer
operated as a check upon attempts to
harden extreme theories into practice. Those
" realities " were indeed brought into the
light by the published works of Meckel, Hoenig,
and otliers, but they were regarded by some
of the new generation as an almost treasonable
attack upon the sacred and also profitable
legends of 1870.
Those who looked upon them calmly, how-
ever, tended to regard them as proving the
case for the small, iron quality-army. But
the controversy, as a controversy, entered on
a new lease of life owing to the introduction of
the magazine rifle with its smokeless powder ;
when first introduced it threatened to chastise
with scorpions the errors and weaknesses that the
rifles of 1870 had only beaten with whips.
Some held that the Frederician discipline was
more than ever necessary, and others that
nothing but the thin-swarm method of attack
could cope with the fire power of the new
weapons.
But the former class had the prestige of war
experience and the latter, with few exceptions,
had not, and the theory of the thick-volley
firing line was practically in possession of the
field, when a new set of conditions — this
time political — arose to confirm it.
Before the time of which we axe speaking the
game of diplomacy had been played between the
•Not literally the old I'redericlan volleys, but what are now
railed " bursts of nre."
GENERAL D'AMADK.
\H. Walltr BjimU.
league of the Three Emperors and the Triple
Alliance, with Bismarck as " honest broker," and
a war with Frahce was the focus to which all
ways of German military activity converged.
But at that moment of military development
the Franco-Russian imderstanding hardened
into alliance and Germany was faced with a
new problem — the " war on two fronts " —
one to which the Austriaji and Italian
alliances were no more than a contribution or
aid. The shape that German strategy and
war doctrine was to take, then, depended
cliiefly upon the time which the inunensa
Russian Emjiire would need to bring its
forces into action. Hitherto this had been in-
ordinately long, but now French capital was
employed for Russian strategic raihvajis, and
the Russian Army, instead of being a peace
army distributed tlirough the whole Empire,
became a frontier army, with seven-eighths of
its strength permanently stationed in Poland
and the Balkan provinces. The danger then
was really simultaneous action of France and
Russia on the two frontiers. But thii danger
was rather in the futiu-e than in the present. Many
years must elapse before Russian mobilization
could be " speeded up " to anything approach-
ing that of France or Germany, and there was,
therefore, so far as the generation of 1890-
1910 was concerned, an appreciable interval
244
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
between the French side of the possible war and
the Russian. That interval it was proposed
to use for the crushing of France, whose mobiliza-
tion period was two days longer than the
German,* and an army that could overwhelm
France in a month or six weeks and still be fit
afterwards to deal with the Russians had to be
an army of high quality and training.
But if the conditions of foreign politics
favoured the supporters of the quality-army,
those at home told almost as much in
favour of the quantity-army. While the
population had been rapidly growing, the
proportion of the recruit contingent taken in
annually had not increased. The " universal
service " theory had become a farce in
practice,- since not much more than
one-third of the available recruits were
taken, and the others were allowed to go scot
free. The result was, on the one hand,
a separation of army and nation and an unfair
method of recruiting which was creating dis-
content and disaffection, and, on the other
hand, too few men were undergoing the educa-
tion of military discipline which the Government
regarded as its safeguard. But unless the peace
establishment of the Army was considerably
increased, which was impossible, the only
• Owing chiefly to the fact that the French Atmy was recruited
generaiiy. the regiments drawing their recruits witiiout regard to
territorial connexions, whereas in Germany the recruiting system
was (save in case of Hanoverians, Alsatians, &c.) strictly local,
ail reservists, therefore, living within easy reach of their regiments.
The German system was tried In France in the regime of General
Andr6, but was a failure.
method of passing more men through the ranks
was the reduction of the term of colour service,
and accordingly the two years' term was in-
troduced instead of the old three years', except
for cavalry and certain other branches. These
conditions, of course, tended to support the
adherents of the quantity army.
But both the external influences which meule
for the quality army and the internal which
produced the quantity army were equally power-
ful, for their needs were equally imperative.
And so the attempt was made to produce the
quantity army by conscription and to make
it, when produced, into a quality army by cease-
less, ruthless intensity of training.
From these antecedents and in these condi-
tions the modem German doctrine of war grow
up. Before it came to its test in 1914, however,
the army which was to be its instrmnent had
begun over again the cycle of progress. The
population continued to increase, while the Armj'
strength and the recruit contingent to furnish
it remained much the same. Even with two
years' service — a minimum that- Germany,
with her internal political difficulties, dared not
reduce — ^by about 1905 less than half the able-
bodied men were being taken into the Army.
More and more, then, the notion of the small
quality army was gaining ground, while to
produce it on a two years' term meant an
intensive training which dulled the men by
its monotone intensity. But Ru.ssia, mean-
while, though temporarily put out of action
THE KAISER INSTRUCTING HIS GENERALS.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS.
245
by her Japanese war, began — horn 1910
especially —to organize not only her troops
but her administrative services, and General
Sukliomlinov's reforms rapidly brought tlio
day nearer upon which Ruasia could feel sure
of concentrating all her forces in three weeks.
Thus approached the really simultaneous war
on two fronts, not to be met by two successive
blows, however fierce they might be and however
higlily-tempered the army that delivered them.
The hmit was reached in 1912, when the rise
of Serbia and Greece made it apjiarent that
sometliing less than the whole Austrian Army
would be free to serve in Galicia. A halt
was called in expenditure on the Fleet. Money
was voted to the Army and the peace establish-
ments enormously expanded with a view
( 1 ) to reducing the number of reservists required
to complete the " active," or liighly-tempered,
anny to war strength ; and (2) to providing a
cadre of active officers and non-commissioned
officers for the reserve formations.
The development of these reserve formations,
which has already been alluded to in an earlier
chapter, was the most important feature of
recent military reforms in Germany. Viewed
in one aspect, it was a partial return to the
principle of two-lino armies, discredited since
1870 ; viewed from another, it was an attempt
to secure the worldng of the previous war-plan
and war-theory by the old army, by keeping the
ring clear for it, under new conditions that had
not been allowed for in the original scheme.
It may be assumed, then, that the blow upon
France was delivered in accordance with the
doctrines accepted and the plans prepared in
accordance with them.
The exact terms of the doctrine or creed are
unknown. All that had become known about
it before the war was that there was a confiden-
tial " instructions for higher commanders,"
revised in 1910, distinct from the Field Service
Regulations of the Army. That being so, the
only foundations for what were necessarily
guesses were (a) manoeuvre practice ; (b) trend
of opinions in German military literatvire ; and
(c) the location of the strategic railway stations.
These however, taken together, afforded plenty
of trustworthy evidence, and the character of
the doctrine itself, its plainness and its scorn
of artifice and variants indicated that the facts
could bo trusted as premises for a conclusion.
Its aim was the " battle with no morrow," the
complete and self-sufficing decisive victory. As we
have seen, temporizing in any form had become
less and less possible as against France in pro-
portion as the Russian mobilization had become
more rapid. If, then, a new Sedan htul been
GENERAL DE CASTELNAU.
[Pitrrt Pllil.
the ideal of the generation of Verdy du Vernois
and Bronsart, Moltke's confidential assistants,
how much more was it that of the newer genera-
tion whose problem demanded speed above
all else, and whose manoeuvre experience had
not told them the limits imposed by human
nature upon the process of speeding-up, nor
brought home the fact that in war an army
marches not to the " stand-fast " of a field
day but to the strain of battle.
Policy thus demanding the single decisive
victory at the earhest possible date, strategy,
called upon to find the means of achieving it,
answered with the " battle on reversed fronts.''
If the German Army could place itself in rear
of the French, the French would ipso faclo be
in rear of the Germans — that is, in each case,
the army would be cut off from its mother
country. Obviously such a battle would be
decisive enough, since the retreat of the beaten
side into hostile territorj' instead of friendly
woxild be sheer dissolution, not to mention that
the descent of one side upon the enemy's rear
would inevitably breakup or capture his wagon
trains of all sorts. It is true that this is a
double-edged weapon, for the Germans woiJd
expose their wagons — or more strictly speaking
their lines of comminiications — to the same
fate. But it was held that success in this
246
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GERMAN FIELD ARTILLERY.
[Centra News.
extremely dangerous game would go to the
side which sViowed the most desperate resolu-
tion and driving force, and compelled the
enemy to submit to it, or to try to evade it,
rather than to answer it with its like. German
authorities spoke of the battle with reversed
fronts as the purest form of strategy — as indeed
it is, for it plays for nothing less than the
annihilation of one side or of the other — but
though, with Von der Goltz, they went on to
a.ssert that such strategy needed the German
Army to execute it, the fact was rather that
the German Army needed such strategy.
Exceptional circumstances call for strong
measures.
But whereas in Napoleon's days it was
quite feasible, with a compact army in a theatre
of war spacious relatively to the army's area
within it, to bring about a battle with fronts
reversed as at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena, in
the modem war of citizen masses its achieve-
ment was by no means so easy. In 1870 the
great battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat was
fought with fronts reversed, bvit it was not
the Prussian armies as a whole that brought
about the decision, but the few brigades that
were still in hand after the French right flank
had been found and their whole front engaged.
In the case of Sedan it was onlv the forward
plunge of McMahon's army that enabled the
Crown Prince to get in his rear ; far from
deliberately naanoeuvring for the purpose, the
German Army III. simply fovmd itself in a
position to cut the ]\Iarshal from Paris, and
did so.*
The possibility of a group of armies on the
modern scale passing coinpletely round another
similar army was, to say the least, doubtful,
and the problem had to be tackled in a different
waj. Instead of by passing round, it was to
be achieved by a<lvancing in a long deployed
line, the flanks of which would, it was expected,
lap round those of the more closely grouped
enemy, wherever he was met with. This
theory of envelopment was the basis of all
modern German strategy.
Envelopment is simply the surroxmding of
the enemy. Supposing that enemy to be
stationary (as the French were at Sedan) there
are two waj'S of bringing this about — ^(a) by
advancing in a close group imtil the enemy is
met and then deploying the central reserves
out to one or both flanks so as to swing them
in upon the enemy's rear ; (b) by starting
from a very wide front and gradually converging
•The operative strategy of the Sedan Campaign was far from
being as simple as tills, and still repays the closest study as a piece
of " start work." But as regards theory alone, the above generaliza-
tion is correct enough.
GERMAN MEDICAL CORPS AND FIELD KITCHEN CROSSING A PONTOON BRIDGE.
ICfntral Nfws,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
247
Concentration
o-
o-
^
o
n '^ O
c5 ^O-----
o-
o-
Marching otT _j—
-□
t ^-
I
l/Vin§
Centre
H J
All ip Line
Idling -< I
Dei^elopment
iNing _| | oF the\Nings
O-D \
-D 1
-D I
■D-a \
Qentre
Wing
-C
-D
-a
•a
-a
Centre "D
-D
-D
-a
-a
-a
^/•/7^ <-
swinging in
Centre
^
t^'
y
/Vb/'e Aoiy the outer
Corps on the right
is sa ving time by
crossing the tafi
oF the other
J'HASES OF A GERMAN " ENVELOPMENT " MOVEMENT.
248
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GERMAN INFANTRY ABOUT TO ATTACK.
[Central News,
upon the enemy's assumed position. Both
methods had been tried on several occasions, the
first tactically and on a small scale at Worth
in 1870 and strategically on a big scale at
Mukden ; the second in 1866, 1870, and at
Liao-Yang in 1904. Each had successes and
also failures to its account. But with armies
of the size that a Franco-German conflict
would bring into line the first method was
almost, if not quite, impossible owing to the
time which the massed central reserves would
take to work away to the flanks before they could
overlap the enemy and swing in upon his rear.
The only form of offensive in which it could be
employed was, in fact, the counter-offensive
which could be initiated on the basis of a faiily
clear military situation, and the counter-
offensive ana even the delayed offensive
A CUIRASSIER WITH CARBINE.
were forms of war in which the Germans,
situated as they were with respect to Russia,
could not have indulged in if they had wished
to do so.
• The German envelopment, then, would start
from a very wide base on the frontiei- itself —
or rather on the line of railheads where the
troops were detrained — and thence convoige
upon the enemy. It is qviostionable whether
Moltke himself ever accepted this principle
in toto. In 1866 a strategic deployment of this
kind was forced upon him by the lie of the
Prussian railways, and many were the risks
run in carrying it forward to an issue of de-
cisive victory. In 1870 the tendency to envelop
certainly appeared on every occasion, but it
was coupled with constant striving on Moltke's
part to keep his forces in hand and to avoid
over-extension. His ideal, if he had ono^and
he himself defined strategy as a " system of
expedients " — was a hne of closely grouped
masses each so far separated from its neighbours
as to have elbow room not only for plain de-
ployment for battle but for manoeuvre as well.
But those who regarded themselves as the
inheritors of the Moltke tradition based thein-
selves frankly upon the dispositions of 1866,
which only came to a happy issue through the
enemy's internal dissensions, and of August,
1870, which completely failed in the attempt to
envelop the French Army on the Saar. In
1914, then, there was more " system " than
" expedients." In other words, the standard
enveloping strategy was preconceived — based
upon peace-time studies and preconceived
ideas as to how the enemy must act according
to the rules of the game.
As Moltke remarked, " One must always
credit the enemy with doing the right thing."
But such a saying, axiomatic as it looks,
must on no account be treated as an axiom
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
240
It Was all very well for Moltke to say so, but
lio himself had on more than one grave occasion,
in 18C0 and 1870, seen his best-laid schemes
crumble to nothing because the enemy did not
take tl:e correct military course — as it api«>ared
to Moltke on the data before him. From this
it is no groat step to the belief that
the onomy must do as our best general
tells him, and the expression of this belief
is the doctrine that by rapidity and violence of
action we can compel an enemy to conform to
our own moves. That doctrine and the
doctrine of envelopment wore the two principal
articles of the German military faith before
the war.
Their connexion it is important to realize. It
is true that with the small armies and slow travel-
ling of Napoleon's day the seizure of the initia-
tive by sudden violence was quite possible in
combination with a close, deep grouping of
the forces. But modern conditions of national
recruiting and railway transport had, as we
have already observed, made this form the
instrument of the reserved counter-attack. The
side which aimed at the speediest decision
could make no use of a form in which the
depth of the army during its advance was five
or six days' marches. The deployed line, or
I.DAYA
^>
(B.)
' tidal wave,' on the other hand, was a form that
gave the minimxim depth for a given force,
hence a minimum lime for deploying to the
front for battle, and consequently the speediest
decision one way or the other. By the same
token, it gave the widest possible front for the
given force, and, therefore, the greatest possible
chances of overlapping the enemy's front and
so of ensuring by envelopment the completest
decision.
On the other hand, an army deployed to ita
greatest possible lateral extension was irre- ,
trievably committed to the direction then
given it. It could not regroup itself to meet
new situations on account of its very length.
If the point at which the enemy was met
lay upon one flank of the line (diagram a)
instead of at the centre, as had been presumed
GERMAN WAR ROCKET PHOTOGR.\PHY.
The Camera is fitted to a parachute which is fired into the air lilce a rocket.
1. Sighting. 2. The Rocket fired. 3. One of the photographs obtained.
\,Nras lUusirttions.
250
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GERMAN CAVALRY TAKING UP POSITIONS.
{Central News,
(diagram h), the attempted envelopment might,
and with an active adversary would almost
certainly, come too late. If, again, the enemy's
group lay conipletcly outside the sweep of the
enveloper's flanks, the latter would have struck
the blow in the air, exposed his flank and rear
before reaching the enemy's, and, in short,
squandered the assets of his initiative to no
purpose. If, again, the enenxy were after all
in the area presumed, the enveloper would have
no small difficulty in so timing his marches as
to achieve his purpose, for the enemy, retarding
his advance by rearguards, would detain some
of the oncoming colunuis far longer than
others.
These disadvantages of the enveloping
method being recognized, let us see how the
side that intends to adopt it can neutralize, or
attempt to neutralize, them.
It is clear, first of all, that everytliing, or
nearly everything, depends on the accuracy of
the forecast which determines the direction
of the line's advance. A part of this informa-
tion can be collected, classified, and studied
in peace. The remainder must be observed
during the course of the operations themselves,
either by one or more of the following means :
a detachment of all arms carrying out a
" reconnaissance in force," and holding the
enemy, when found, long enough to ensure that
the information gleaned will be still valid at
the time of the action based upon it ; or cavalry
masses flung out far ahead to ascertain the
general outline and apparent movements of the
hostile group ; or air reconnaissance ; or,
lastly, the reports of spies, newspaper checkers,
and other individual agents. Practically all
these means are employed by all armies, for
information is of very high importance for the
working of any form of strategy ; it is in the
relative utility of these means that we find
divergencies of doctrine. Air reconnaissance
being an unl«iown factor, no defiaite weight
could be attached to it before the
war, for, considering the magnitude of
the stakes, it would have been sheer gam-
bling to allow great resolutions to depend upon
aircraft roconaissance. Apart from the fact that
both airships and a roplanes wore hardly out of
the experimental or embryonic stage of their
development, aircraft, even if they had been
perfect, could not have seen into the mind of
the hostile general, or taken prisoners with
tell-tale regimental numbers on their buttons and
caps and divisional colours on their shoulder-
straps. Spy reports, &c., on the other hand,
were neither more nor less trustworthy than
they had been in past wars ; they were, in tact,
a constraint for all armies. The divergencies
of method referred to lay in the relative im-
portance assigned to the detachment of all
arms and to the cavalry mass for the service of
information. In France and Great Britain,
as we shall see, the two were combined ; in
Germany, however, it may safely be said that
the mixed detachment was anath-. ma, and
that the securing of information during the
operations was the task of the cavalry alone.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
251
In spite of tho lopend of tho " ubiquitous
Uhlan," export opinion was agreed, oven in
Germany, that tlie performances of tho re-
connoitring cavalry in 1870 were modiocro.
In France, after the revival of Napoleonic
studies had shown that even the famous
squadrons of Murat could not give tho Emperor
a firm basis for his manoeuvres, it was hold that
the capacity of cavalry for useful strategic
reconnaissance was limited by the nature of tho
arm itsolf. " Cavalry can reconnoitre, but it
cannot hold,"* that is, by the time that tlio
cavalry reports had reached headquarters and
action liad been taken on them they were out
of date and misleading, since the enemy was
meantime free to move. In Germany, on tho
contrary, it was considered that cavalry reports,
transmitted with all tho speed that wireless
and motor-cars made possible, were good
enough to go on. Certainly the German form of
strategic deployment admitted of no other,
since the attempt to obtain information by largo
detachments of all arms would be contrary to
the principle of the simultaneous onset of all
parts of the line, to which allusion will presently
be made.
•Colonel F. N. Maude, C.R
At tho same time, attributing tho inability of
tho old-fashioned cavalry to ponotrnto an
enemy's screen to their feeble fire-power
(though nowhere was the shock action of
cavalry lield in higher honour than in Germany),
the Germans did their utmost to increano it ;
carbine, pistol, horso artillery gim were all
developed and made use of, and it is significant
that the machine-gun, long regarded with
suspicion on the Continent, was first adoi)tod
by Germany as a fire auxiliary for her cavalry.*
At one time, 1912-13, there was even a pro-
posal to give tho trooper a bayonet, and finally
cyclists — another arm that German military
opinion had formerly thought useless — were
grouped into companies for the fire-support of
the cavalrj'.f These innovations might bo
looked upon as a tentative concession to the
notion of the all-arras detachment, but it is
more accurate to regard thorn as attempts to
fortify tho one-arm reconnaissance by enabling
it to keep to its main task.| This main task.
•Infant rjr iiuwbiiie Kun9 CMiie later — Indeed, the (nrmatloD of
infantry maclUiic Kiltl companies wtka only Just cumplated at ttie
outbreak of war.
tit was also proposed to attach tlia light iDfantnr (.IHcer) battalions
to the cavalry.
Jin battle the Germans, like other Powers, used their caralrr
to contribute to the volume of (ire as well as for shoctt action.
IN THE KRUPP WORKS AT ESSEN.
[L.N.A.
252
TEE TIMES HISTORY OF TEE WAR.
FRENCH FORTRESS ARTILLERY.
Charging a 95 mm. gun.
as we have seen, was the discovery of the
enemy's grouping. As a rule, the defeat
of the enemy's main bodies of horse was a
necessary preliminary, but in all cases the main
body of the German cavalry was meant to
pierce the protective cordon which sur-
rounded the enemy and to hold the gap for the
safe return of the patrols that were immediately
pushed into the enemy's area.
One requisite for a successful envelopment
then was information. But it was admitted
that information would not necessarily be forth-
coming at the very outset, and an army situated
as the Germans were could not wait. So,
in the first instance, the long line was directed
upon the area in which the enemy were
supposed to be moving. In the deter-
mination of this area the cavalry naturally
played a smaller part than peace-time
study and careful agent work. But its
part in cutting out, one after the other,
Wrong hypotheses as to the enemy's position
in that area was expected to bo very consider-
able. When all was said and done, however,
it was not believed that the cavalry could do
more than help to clear up the situation. The
real beginnings of the envelopment were in
the railway lines of Germany.
In this fact — so German authorities con-
sidered — lay the best guarantee of all. Not
only were nunxerous through lines of railway
transport and railheads provided with platforms
for the detrainment of guns a.id animals*
essential for speed in the operations, but they
'Aa ererr tiaveUer knovs. ordioaiT aeiman raUwsj itatloni
bave uo platfornui In the British seiue.
ensured a simultaneous controlled start of the
whole line by marking a limit which every corps
could reach within a given period, and further
enabled the whole frontier line to be taken as
the forward edge of the zone of concentration.*
The extent of frontier intended to be taken into
this zone was not easy to foresee. That portion
of it adjacent to the French frontier was com-
paratively narrow, and on both sides portions
of it Were closed — whether partially or com-
pletely war alone could prove — by barrier forts.
In France the gap of ]l)pinal-Toul, in Germany
the gap of Dehne-Mutzig were the only really
clear avenues of hostile approach. Therefore,
though the numbers of troops on both sides wei-c
continually growing, and progress in armament
too was enabling a force to fight on an ever wider
and wider front for the same numbers, tlie
opposed fronts of battle wore equally strong
against direct attack and equally difficult to
tarn without violation of Luxemburg, Belgian,
and Swiss neutrality. Now these new condi-
tions told rather against Germany than against
France, for the latter's war doctrine did not
favour extension of fronts and the former's did
so. As civilization knov\s to its cost, Germany
thought it necessary to expand the front of
concentration so as to take in practically the
whole of her frontier hne from Emmerich to
Basle. It is not credible that a doctrine of war
that was no more than skin-deep, a peace-time
strategical essay, would have brought this
about. It must therefore bo held to be finally
•They did not, however, contribut« It, but were rather detri-
mental to Becrecy, for railway worl(8 are constructed and run
openly in peace. It. was, possible for . any foreign staff officer,
therefore, to work out time tables for the concentration.
FKKNCH FORTRESS ARTILLERY.
Officers watching effect of fire.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
253
proved, what other evidence had already
indicated more and more strongly, that accord-
ing to Gorman ideas tlie envelopment mvst
start by converging marches, and not be de-
veloped from an initial close grouping.
Wliother or not such procedure was correct
under tlie circumstances was a question upon
which strategists were by no means agreed. Some
of the most eminent held that by extending tlio
aone of concentration along the Luxemburg-
Belgian frontier the Germans sacrificed in speed
what they gained in width, in that the entry
of the enveloping wing into Franco was delayed
by the amount of time required for its traversing
of Belgium, so that to ensure simultaneous onset
it became necessary to hold back the central
or Franco-German frontier portion of the lino
for an appreciable number of days. But that
German soldiers believed it to be the correct
procedure is evidenced bj' the price that they
ivere prepared to pay for it.
Before discussing the mechanism of the
envelopment, let us consider for a moment this
factor of simultaneity. Wo have noted that it is
essential to the working of the German type
of envelopment that the taking of contact with
the enemy should be practically simultaneous
at all points. This is necessary, because, in
the first instance, the front of deployment is
as wide as nature allows, and each of the nuclei
that form at the railheads presents a separate
weak target for the blow of a better prepared
enemy, and in tlie later stages the deeply-
disposed opponent will have detachments
called protective troops pushed out in all
dangerous directions. We shall have to deal at
greater length with this conabination when we
come to discuss the French doctrine in which
it played an important and even dominant
part. Hero it only need be pointed out that
these protective detachments would delay
those portions of the long deployed line of the
Germans which they met, while the rest
progressed with less retardation. If that line
was to be kept intact, therefore, parts of it
must be held back and others pushed on,
regardless of the purely local circumstance of
each part. But such a theory, which might
have been possible with nonchalant professional
armies of the eighteenth century kind,* was less
securely based when the army to execute it was
a high-tension citizen army. If it was a re-
proach to the French school of strategy that its
methods overstrained the instriunent, in some
respects at any rate the German doctrme was
•If lhe7 had possessed DUmbers and raanoftuvrinu capncJtr.
wblcb they did not.
FRENCH ARMOURED TRAIN GAR.
The upper picture shows the Observation
Tower raised.
in no better case. The soldier is influenced
chiefly, if not entirely, by the local situation ;
and though a professional would slirug his
shoulders if told to attack an obviously im-
pregnable position or to abandon a pursuit, a
citizen soldier would not bo so philosophical.
In August, 1870, for instance, Moltke intended
his right and centre armies to lie low for five
days on the Saar until the Crown Prince's left
army could come into line with them and
commence the envelopment of the French right.
But on the very first of these five days the units
of these centre armies were moving about
amongst themselves, and on the third day a
piecemeal attack by parts of these mixed-up
commands ended in the defeat of a French
detaclunent at Spicheren and a general advance
over the Saar. Not only was the Crown Prince's
army unable to come up in time for the pro-
jected envelopment of the area of the Saar,
b>it also the French Army was — save for the
detachment above mentioned — not in that
area at all.
254
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
The instance just quoted shows further that
timing is quite as important an ingredient of
success as is direction. For not only the
central armies, but those on the flanks as
well must be pushed on or held back
so as to form a continuous line with its
neighbours, and the wing armies have to
choose the exact moment for swinging in, lest
the enemj', instead of standing spellbound
as the magic circle formed itself round liim,
should retire in time and leave the enveloper
facing inwards on the circumference of an
empty circle — than which no more ludicrous
position can be conceived* either in strategy
or in tactics. And there were more dangerous,
if less absurd, possibilities than this. If the
wing that was to envelop went too far before
swinging, the enemy could counter-attack
the dormant centre, and, if it swung too soon,
a mistake in the choice of enveloped area would
expose it to be taken in reverse. Qui tourne
est tourne.
The dilemma was, in short, this. Nothing
but a fierce simultaneous onset upon every
hostile body that presented itself would prevent
an opponent from manoeuvring for a counter-
stroke, but this attack all along the Une
was itself dangerous, if not fatal, to simul-
'Grand Duke of Mecklenburg before Nogent-Ie-Rotron. 1870.
Japanese at Mukden.
taneous action. But all these questions were
mere details of greater or less importance
according to the circumstances of the case and
the skill and resolution of the leaders. The
one great and controlling principle in this form
of strategy is its finality. All means tending to
the decisive issue are deployed at the outset
in a formation that gives either the maximum
victory or the maximum disaster. For the
long deployed line once launched is incapable
of manoeuvring in any new direction or meeting
any new emergency. Once and for all the die
has been cast. These being some of the pur-
poses, advantages, and risks of envelopment,
we may sketch very briefly the mechanism of
execution, first in the strategical and then in the
tactical sphere.
The first phase is the selection of the front of
initial concentration, which is as broad aa
circumstances allow, to ensure of the overlap
later, and also because the broader the front the
greater the number of through railway lines
available and the shorter the time required to
concentrate. This line of railheads is so chosen
that its flanks are safe by position from a swoop
of the enemy's readiest troops, and if no natural
obstacle is available the railheads are slanted
back en echelon on the exposed flank so as to
increase the time of marching and to place the
inner and more forward railheads on the flank
FRENCH MOBILIZATION.
Drawing up Orders in a Railway Car.
{Topical.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
255
FRENCH HEAVY ARTILLERY.
of an enemy desirous of attacking them.*
The second phase — wliich is hardly distinguish-
able from the first — is the protection of the
central railheads against the immediate and
direct onset of the enemy's readiest frontier
forces diu'ing the period of concentration. In
1870, leaving no protective forces in advance
of his centre, Moltke was compelled on the
first threat of a French offensive to put back
the line of railheads from the Saar to the Rhine,
a step which, taken in the very middle of the
delicate phase of concentration, produced a
most dangerous situation, f From 1871 on-
wards therefore the Germans so far accepted the
idea of protective detachments that a very
powerful force in a high state of readiness was
maintained on the frontier districts at all times.
The disadvantages attacliing to such a force —
its liability to attack before the main armies had
gathered, and the necessity of mobilizing in
two stages — were accepted with it. These were
inconveniences, but hostile interference with
the strategic deployment when the latter was
preparatory to a simultaneous advance would
be a disaster.
For, as we have seen, the flanks of the line
were, in the first instance, echeloned back,
whQe during the advance they must be level
with the centre, and as the moment for their
swing came nearer they must be 6clieloned
forward. Simultaneous action, difficult enough
to obtain on a level line, might seem to b(>
more so when the flanks had to move fasti r
than the centre. Yet if the direction of the
advance had boon well chosen, the centre,
full in front of the enemy's main body, would
automatically be slowed down enougli for the
•The protective troops ia front of the centre alluded to a little
later do not extend tar enouRli to the flanks to afford direct pro-
tection to the whole lonit line of railheads.
tThat It had been foreseen and its detjiils fixed lieforeliaiid
made little or no difference. It wa-s nothing les.s than the plan of
ui>eration8 iteelf that was thrown out of gear by tlie variant.
wings to <5chelon themselves forward. One
difficulty neutralized the other, provided only
that the supreme command had made his
choice correctly. But, as we know, his decision
Was founded upon a preconceived idea and
supported by a certain amount of cavalry
information, and, therefore, liable to error.
In this 6cljoloning out o* the flanks, as in
all other details in the act of envelopment,
the straightforward workini? of the plan
depended wholly upon correct premises. Sup-
pose that one of the wings met with sharp
opposition that slowed it down to the pace of
the centre, the whole system would never
succeed in forming the forward crescent that
was the immediate prelude of envelopment.
It would remain a line, and a thin line at that.
GENERAL BONNAL.
The eminent French strategist.
256
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
M. MESSIMY.
French Minister for War at the outbreak of
hostilities.
and the solid counter-attacking mass would
roll it up. The deployed line cannot retrieve
its mistakes.
Another factor, which is strictly speaking of
the moral and not of the mechanical order, is
the necessity of restricting the initiative of
subordinate commanders. Every student of
1870 knows that the history of that war teems
with examples of reckless acts of initiative,
sometimes fruitful, sometimes dangerous, but
always bearing the stamp of official approval,
fhe heavy precision of the Prussian mind had
liad to be educated to display " initiative." and
it gave out its lesson, once learnt in season
and out of season.* By 1914 this freedom
had been almost wholly withdrawn. The form
of envelopment having been chosen, and its
attendant difficulties of timing accepted, the
least that could be done was to restrict the
subordinate initiative that had caused most of
the' mistiming of 1870. No army did more
hearty lip-service to the god of initiative than
the German. No army allowed less of it in
practice. The commander with initiative
as understood and encouraged in Germany
was simply what in Great Britain would be
called the " thrustor," the man of energy who,
somehow, anyhow, carried through the set
task within the set limits. The initiative of o
Kameke or a Schkopp, the initiative which
without reference to the higher authorities
evolved new plans of general battle whenever
confronted with local emergencies, had been
altogether suppressed.
Yet another point of German procedvire may
be noted before we pass on to the tactical
outcome of this strategy. As has been re-
marked, the long deployed line is incapable of
manoeuvre, meaning by manoeuvre-capacitj'
the power of moving in any direction and not
merely forward and back. A change of front,
say from south to east, would take for a line 100
miles long swinging on one of its flanks as a
•It mislit bt! KUBSestcJ that the iicte o( barl.'arity which so utterly
dlsgraceii the army In 1914 can be attrlhuted in part at least to tb«
same psychology as the^e f?cts of iiiitiatlTe of 1870 — a mentality
which is not capable of nuances, but can only take in its lesson
if It iB put in its crudely ab'iolute terms and reproduces it exactly
as learnt.
FRENCH FORTRESS ARTILLERY— 22 CM. MORTARS.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
257
A VIEW OF THE BATTLEFIELD NEAR SEZANNE.
iL.N A.
fixed pivot no loss than ten days of ordinary
inarching (the outer-flank troops liaving to
move along an arc of 150 miles). Certain Ger-
man writers, therefore, Bernhardi amongst
them, had proposed to use the principle of
Echeloning in cases of change of front with the
pivot at the centre. This obviously shortens
the time of wheeling through a right-angle,
the arc being now 75 miles, equivalent to five
days.* But while one half of the line swung
forward the other would have to swing back,
and it was perhaps doubtful how far the moral
of modern national armies would be affected by
a retrograde movement that neither was com-
pelled by the enemy nor had any obvious ad-
vantage. And naturally the advantages of
the great arm's length swing as well as its dis-
advantages were halved by this procedvu-e.
Without entering into any discussion of this
highly technical point, we simply note it as
one of the methods at the German strategists'
disposal. The type, or rather the tendency
of the Germans' tactics was in complete accord
with their tendencies in strategy. It would be
more accurate to say that the strategy from
the detrainment on the line of railheads to the
inward swing of the flank armies was simply
the first chapter of the same book. Even in
1870 this was true to some extent. But then
the numbers available were comparatively
small and the, density of the battle-grouping
comparatively great, so that the armies con-
verged more sluirply than was the case in the
war with which we are concerned. In 1914
the thin battle-front of the deployed millions
tvas almost as long as the line of railheads
itself, and the lines of advance of the various
armies were almost parallel. More than ever,
in these conditions, the strategy and the tactics
•There were illso ctrtain technical advautnges attnchinff to this
[>rocetUire in the matter of preveutiiiK the w:\Kon trains of cue corps
from hnpetluis the flghtiiis troops of auother.
are simply part i. and part ii. respectively of the
same work. Did our space permit it would
be interesting to discuss the several methods by
which the battle and the approach were made
to dovetail into one another — for in this
branch and in this branch alone* of the
art of war the Germans appeared to be theoreti-
cally ahead of their opponents. But it must
sufRce, as a prelude to our brief study of the
German battle, to mention that the greatest
possible attention had been paid to the smooth
and quick deployment of long marcliing
columns. In France and Great Britain the
word deployment is tised in two senses —
in its true meaning for the forming combatant
lines on the battlefield and more loosely for the
arraying of masses in a general line before
action. The Germans, on the other hand, dis-
tinguished carefully between Aujmarach (march
•Not strictly true, for the Ochelon morements of armlen, however,
had also been practt*ied more often and were raliie<l more hishl7
br the Cerroans than by other*
PART OF A BATIERY OF 155 MM,
REMAILHO Q.F. GUNS
258
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A FRENCH INFANTRYMAN SHOWING
MODERN EQUIPMENT.
[Topical.
up to the field) and Deployieren (deploy-
ment on the field), and the intermediate stage,
too, had a designation of its own, Entfaltung
(unfolding), which was the process by which
the thirty-mile deep marching columns of the
army corps on the main roads broke up into
smaller columns moving on all available by
roads and even across cmmtry preparatory to
the deployment proper. The high training of
corps and divisional staffs in the management
of the Entfaltung made itself felt in the early
stages of the war, in which time after time
we find the Allies taken aback by the rapidity
with which the enemy developed his huge masses
from their columns of route.
By this well-managed transition the Germans
were brought out of the domain of strategy into
that of tactics. In that field their constancy
of strategy was expected to reap its reward.
The theory of the enveloping battle is that under
modern conditions the number of men suscep-
t ible of useful employment on a given frontage
is small, and that no good purpose is served by
piling up reserves behind the fighting line,
since only one rifle per yard of front can be
effective. Granting, though not admitting,
this proposition, then it follows that every
increment of force beyond that required to
establish and to maintain a firing line of one
rifle to the yard (with its immediate aids of
artillery) can only be employed towards the
flanks. Only superiority of fire can justify
assault and ensure victory, and superiority of
fire is gained by a superior number of rifles*
in action. Now, yard for yard, the maximum
number of these rifles is the same on both
sides. Superiority therefore can only be ob-
tained by contriving the convergence of fire
•This proposition, agulu, is not one that would be accepte.i
without many re^^ervations in Great Brifciin.
FRENCH OFFICER INSTRUCTING HIS SOLDIERS BEFORE GOING INTO ACTION.
[Rtcord Press.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
259
FRENCH INFANTRY IN ACTION.
Irom a wider arc than that held by the defence.
Extension towards the flanks and incurving of
the line thus extended are therefore the main
characteristics of the German battle, and the
logical extreme to which they tended were of
course complete envelopment of a smaller de-
fending circle by a larger attacking circle. Such
a result, even if only partially obtained, gave, so
the Germans held, the greatest chances of
victory, and as we have seen, the victory of
envelopment is definitive, a " crowning mercy,"
as Cromwell would have said.* It was ad-
mitted, at the same time, that the issue might be
definitive defeat, but as, tactically, envelop-
ment and convergence of fire went hand in
hand, victory was much more likely than defeat.
The attempt to realize superiority of fire is
made not only by deploying on the outer are,
but by all available means, whether on the front
or the incurving flanks. Most of the character-
istics to which we have already alluded in the
province of strategy appear also in that of
tactics — methodical advance during the ent-
faltung, methodical and complete preparation
during the initial stage, and then the fierce
simultaneous onset in maxinmm force and at
maximum speed upon a spellbound adversary.
We have watched the component masses of the
army advancing first in deep columns along the
main roads, then in shallower columns on all
available tracks, the wings first echeloned back,
then cpming up into line, and then drawing out
forward for the decisive blow. The columns
are preceded by very small advanced guards
•Worcester haa been callci hy the eminent German critio Friti
Uoeuis the " irchetrpe of Sedan."
[Rtcord Pun.
which are purely for local defensive purposes
and as soon as the enemy is met with spread
out as a screen for the deployment, carefully
avoiding serious encounters. Under cover of
this — the adversary of course being presumed
to have been dazed by the tremendous sweep and
power of the approach marches — the masses of
artillery trot forward and spread out in their
positions, reserving their iire until the
highest authority on the groimd speaks
the word. It is with these artillery masses
rather than with the small advanced guards
that it is sought to forestall the enemy in
possession of ground, and it is under cover of the
same organs that the infantry establishes itself
on the outskirts of the battlefield.
Here appears the factor of timing — nothing
is launch('d until everything is ready. WTiether
a
Corps in Column
of Route.
4 1 H» M- (♦ « (^ l-5•^
r
o
o
o
'Entfa.ltunq".
-H- - - - - -^
*l i 1 >.- ~. :- H
1
o -a^-f • i- / ^ —
^,''
o
o
o
° -H :g Deployment.
^ -a
^ -a
° ^ a a
o -^ -a
•a
260
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ZOUAVES WORKING MITRAILLEUSE.
[Topual.
the Germans would not lose in this phase a good
deal of the momentum that they had gained in
the rapid and powerful strategical advance was
questionable. But, for good or evil, matters
were so ordained, for the need of simultaneous
general action overrode all local con-
siderations. The Germans would sooner with-
draw their advance guards altogether than
reinforce them.
Intimately connected with these special
features of the German doctrine, and indeed
more important than any of them, is the absence
of reserves. As we have seen, the Germans
held that over and above a certain small number
of men to the yard and the appropriate gun
power in support of them, no force could make
its action felt in the front-to-front engagement.
They must, therefore, be employed on the
flanks, and it is better to place them there in the
first instance, by converging marches from a
previous still wider front, than to march them
out from behind the centre after contact has
been made there. Hence it follows that the
only functions of a reserve in the centre were
that of a reservoir to keep the firing line up to
strength and that of acting as small change to
deal with local emergencies as they occurred.*
The whole of the artillery likewise are given over
to the divisional commanders, the corps com-
mander retaining nothing but some technical
troops in his own hands. This theory was
acted upon in all its risky simplicity until about
1912, when the extreme danger of deploying
all available means in front of a mere false
position or advanced guard of the enemy was '
so far recognized that reserves of fire — ^not
be it observed, of men — were constituted in the
shape of machine-gun batteries (companies)
and heavy artillery units at the disposal of the
liigher commanders. But this was the only
precaution taken ; in general the old doctrine
remained unchanged. While the unit might
be, and was. disposed in successive lines, no
two self-contained units with different functions
were disposed one behind the other.* Every
man behind a given part of tlie front was
simply a second or third or fourth instalment
of the effort already begun on that part of it.
Behind the front, then, was no manoetivring
body whatever.
Fast, smooth deployment, precaution against
premature or partial engagement, and absence
of reserves, then, are the elements of the German
battle. Suppose now that it proceeds as
arranged, undisturbed by counter-attack. The
fully-arrayed Germans need not hiu'ry. The
enemy is bound to accept the fight — he cannot,
so they said, break away and manoeuvre, once
lie has been subjected to the sudden intense
fire simultaneously opened by all the concealed
batteries of the attack. Tlie firing line of the
frontal attack can form itself methodically,
at a range well beyond that at which decisive
losses can be inflicted on it, and wait for the
•Save in so far as the process of developing the frontage might
momentarily place a marching wing unit in rear of a fighting frontal
unit.
^4"'-^p5t^
•In one Kaixermanaver after another such tiny reserves as 1/10
imd 1/12 of the total are found.
FRENCH MOUNTAIN
ARTILLEKV.
[Tcpica!.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
261
A FRENCH GUN TRAVELLING OVER ROUGH GROUND.
[Topual,
enveloping or decisive attack to como into
line with it. In this waiting phase, which may
be— and in the event was — prolonged over days,
a great strain is put upon the discipline and
endurance of the rank and file, subjected night
and day at irregular intervals to gusts of shell
fire and all the time to the fear of the next gust.
But supposing that this test — for which
the iron " Old Prussian '• discipUne
has prepared them — is passed successfully,
then the whole line, centre and wings together,
deployed at 1,000 yards or so from the enemy
in its " principal fi»o position " opens the
decisive attack, fighting its way in by sheer
battering volume of fire from gun and rifle.
As the fresh wing will necessarily progress faster
than the tired centre the line automatically
becomes a crescent, and the envelopment
and convergence of fire, already half effected
thereby, wUl become more and more pronounced
until it is complete and triumphant. The final
assault is merely the act of " cashing the cheque
drawn by frre-pcwer."
This is the, full envelopment by both flanks
in which there is no pursuit, as there is no enemy
free to run away. But it is possible and likely
that only one flank of the adversary will be
successfully enveloped. But the course of
events is pretctically the same. A pursuit will
be necessary, and in its reckless vigour every
man and horse must be used up in the pursuit,
but once the enemy begins to break up, under
the stress of partial envelopment and consequent
pursuit, the decisive and complete envelopnient
is only a matter of days. Such, then, were the
German conceptions of modern war and tho
tendencies to be foreseen in putting them into
practice — the long line held completely under
control up to the proper moment and then
launched with all possible speed and violence,
without partial engagements, feints, or adroit,
individual strokes of any kind.
262
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
CHAPTER XVII.
THE FRENCH THEORY OF WAR
Historical Evolution of P'rench Strategy since 1870 — Influence of Napoleon ; His Four
Maxims — The " General Reserve " — Criticisms on Neo -Napoleonic Strategy — ^The Flank
Attack and Envelopment Doctrine — Shrapnel and the " Canon de 75 " — The " Mass of
Manoeuvre " — Importance of Manceuvbes — Protective Detachments — Strategic Advanced
Guards — The " Manceuvre upon a Fixed Point " — Concentration on a Flank — The Lozenge
Formation of Napoleon— Colonel db Grandmaison's Chain of Independent Masses with
Reserves — French Tactics.
THE conceptions of modern war-
fare held in France were very
different from the German ones>
though the forms in which these
were expressed in practice possessed certa n
outward similarities, which deluded some
people into imagining that there was much in
common with, and little difference in, the
rival doctrines. It was not so. For though the
French and the German infantries formed their
outposts, assaulted with the bayonet, drilled
and carried out many other operat ions in practi«
cally the same way, yet as to the ideas and ob-
jects whii'h these forms were meant to realize
they differed fundamentally.
After the defeats of 1870 France was for years
the very humble pupil of Moltke, and, moreover,
foreseeing that her mobilization was bound to
take longer than that of Germany, she had
resigned herself to meet the naked simple offen-
sive of her neighbour with a naked simple
defensive. The expression of this negative
doctrine was the lines of fortresses and barrier
forts Lille-Valenciennes-Maubeuge, V^erdun-
Toul, and Epinal-Belfort-Besan«;on with their
Irouees or gaps that were intended to " canalize
the flood of invasion." This conception hard-
ened during the troubled years in which France
was settling down to the new system of republi-
can government and personal military service.
But from about 1888 a new current of idea?;
set in. For one thing, the advent of smokeless
powder seemed to challenge the data of 1870,
and for another, a peculiarly brilliant group ol
military thinkers, men who had been ardent
young soldiers in the disasters of Vanned terrible
and had come to maturity in the study of their
disasters, come at the psychological moment
to positions of influence. These men aet to
work to discover the key of Prussia's successes,
and found it in the fact that Moltke had gone
back to Napoleon. So back they too went to
the Emperor. The archives were ransacked.
Volume after volume of original documents,
edited and annotated, were published by the
new military history section of the General
Staff, and a new doctrine began to take shape.
It was in the spirit of this doctrine, tempered
by a more recent intellectual revolt against the
more extreme advocates who had sought to
apply it in season and out of season, that the
French took the field in 1914.
This doctrine, soimd in itself, found a favour-
able milieu for its propagation. The conditions
imposing a momentary defensive upon Franco
still existed in 1890-1900, but the army and the
people, less and less influenced by memories of
defeat as the years went on, were chafing at the
Germans' assumption of a monopoly of offensive
spirit. And, more important for once than
moral conditions, the ntat«rial advances in
armament due to smokeless powder were about
to place the French Army in possession of the
very weapon wliich was needed to give effect to
the doctrine.
The bases of the doctrine were four aphorisms
263
264
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
of Napoleon in which his system of weir was
concentrated : (1) " One can never be too strong
at the decisive point " ; (2) " Engage every-
where, and then see " ; (3) " Be vulnerable
nowhere " ; (4) " Manoeuvre only about a fixed
point." The first of these is in direct conflict
with the German principles of lateral expansion
and equal density at all points at the moment
of crisis. As we have seen, the German view
was that men over and above the number re-
quired for maintaining one firing line could not
usefully be put into action in one area. The
' after an interval of years and controversy, by
the British General Stafi, whoso definition of
the assault as the " culmination of gradually
increasing pressure " on a selected portion of the
enemy's line may be taken as one of the best
expressions of the principle. This phrase
is a definite assertion that greater pressure
(subjectively) should be exercised at some
points than at others, and that the greatest
pressure of all should be applied at a chosen
point. The principle niay be represented
diagrammatically thus, each line representing
French, on the contrary, sought to reproduce,
with all necessary modifications, the Napoleonic
blow of concentrated thousands upon a selected
point, and in that view they wore followed,
FRENCH SOLDIER WITH NEW
SERVICE EQUIPMENT.
[ Topical.
fighting troops at the standard minimum
density and the point chos?en for attack being
opposite the loft centre.
The corollary of this principle was the notion
of the " general reserve " as a separate body ;
in French practice this body was over one-third,
and in British " at least half " (in some cases)
of the total available force. Now, opponents of
the '■ new French " theory could argue plausibly
enough that nothing like this proportion of
force could be reserved while the rest was called
upon for days together to sustain the whole
fury of the German onset. They could point to
frequent instances in Napoleon's own campaigns
and elsewhere in which the decisive attack at
the selected point was delivered by a compara-
tively small portion of the forces on the ground,
the rest having been used up in holding and
wearing down the enemy. And when, as
sometimes happened on manoeuvres, the Napo-
leonic forms as well as the Napoleonic idea were
used, they could carry all level-headed soldiers
with them in denoimcing as absurd a theory
which asserted that masses of men shoulder to
shoulder and line upon line could live for five
minutes under the fire of modern weapons.
They could assert, moreover, that superiority
of fire was essential to success, and ask in what
way the rear lines (other than those used
as reservoirs to replace casualties) could con-
tribute to the obtaining of this superiority.
But what these critics failed to see
was the fact that it was not their own
type of battle at all that was intended to
be produced. Subject to the adoption of
suitable formations — which, as we liave just
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
26S
FRENCH ARTILLERY.
A 75 mm. Gun en route.
[Rtcmd Pnts.
observed, were not always seen on manoeuvres —
none of the criticisms summarized in the above
lines will boar close examination. The remedy
for absorption of force in the wearing-down
engagement lay in the great principle of
" economy of force." If the effective density
n-ith modern arms was one rifle to the yard
(five reservoirs) the front of an army fighting
on the French principle was just as capable of
resistance as that of an opponent fighting on
the German, and every man economized in tho
non -decisive areas was a man more for the
general reserve, or the " mass of manoeuvre," as
the French more correctly termed it. Further,
field fortification was an aid to economy of
force that Napoleon had never enjoyed.*
Rough field defences had enabled Lee at
Richmond (1862) and Chancellorsville (1863)
to deliver crushing blows with his mass of
manoeuvre while the rest of the line was held
by an absolutely trifling force, and this lesson
at least was learned by Europe fiom a war which
it had been fashionable to caU a conflict of
armed mobs. In short, the very factors which
were supposed to authorize and compel the
Germans to expand laterally equally allowed
French and British generals to form a sub-
stantial " mass of manoeuvre " in rear of the
front — or elsewhere, for the Napoleonic attack
might be delivered either on the centre or the
flanks, and indeed under modern conditions
(size of armies and length of fronts) the latter
was the more likely alternative.
But there was this vital difference between the
envelopment as conceived in Germany and the
flank attack as conceived in France. The
•Owing to the time and laliour required In his day for the oon-
Unictlon o( works that had to present a material barrier to assault
and not pimply a certain amount of cover (or riflemen as is the case
nowadays.
former was, as we know, based upon a pre-
conceived idea and a prearranged programme
while the latter was initiated not in the phase
of strategic concentration, but subsequent to
contact. For the Germans the " zone of
manoeuvre " was the open country in front
of their advanced guards ; for tho French
that term implied the zone behind them, in
which tho "mass of manoeuvre" could move
freely. It is in this, and its consequences
upon tho battlefield, that we seem to find the
answer to those opponents of the French
doctrine, who asserted that, superiority of fire
being essential, no man was being usefully em-
ployed wliile he did not contribute to that result.
Napoleon himself said that fire is everything.
But superiority of fire in his sense was a local
and temporary, but overwhelmiiic, accom-
paniment, and not a preparation, of the decisive
attack. This being so, the decisive attack was,
as the British regulations above quoted say,
a culmination. How, then, was to be obtained
the increment of fire power that would make
this general reserve, engaged after contact,
effective, given tho fact that along the whole
front one rifle per yard and a proportion of
guns were already in action ?
The answer is in the material advances
above alluded to — viz., the coming of th? time
shrapnel. In Napoleon's day, with short-
range muskets, the prelude of the smashing
" decisive attack " was the launr'hing of a mas.s
of field batteries which galloped up to a range
at which, immune from bullets, they could
deliver their terrible " cekse " and "grape"
shot. Often a portion of the enemy's line was
so thoroughly destroyed that the assaulting
infantry marched into it with their arms at the
slope. But the coming of the infantry rifle
266
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
FRENCH ARTILLERY CROSSING A ROAD.
presently forbade the guns to drive up to case
rancres, and the part of artillery in the attack
was for a long time insignificant. Even
in 1870, effective as was the Prussian
field artillery, its role was simply the pre-
paration of the attack by methodical
bombardment with common shell.* To cover
the assault, as distinct from preparing it,
artillery had to reproduce the effect of case-shot
with some long-range projectile. This pro-
jectile, of British origin, was the shrapnel
with time fuse. For technical reasons which
cannot here be discussed no satisfactory
time fuse could be designed for use in modern
rifled guns for many years after the introduction
of the latter. Nor was the rapidity of fire that
was needed to cover the Napoleonic attack
feasible at the new long ranges until the gun
itself (or rather its carriage) had been revolu-
tionized. This was achieved by French de-
signers in 1897, and with the appearance of the
famous " canon de 75 " Napoleon's tactics
came to their own again.
The increment of fire-power being thus ob-
tained, the French doctrine formulated for
tactics by General Langlois, even before the
introduction of the " 75," was placed on secure
ground. But though the Napoleonic principle
be admitted, it still remains to be seen whether
the proper point for its application can be dis-
cerned, and, if so, on what grounds.
This brings us to the second point of doctrine,
" engage everywhere, and then see," a point
upon which there was almost as much contro-
*Owine: t.) the technical deficiencies of the German gun (alrendjr
dealt witti in a previous chapter) many traces of 1870 procedure
Htm lingered in 1014.
versy as over the first — with which, of course,
it is integrally connected. The theory was that,
information having been obtained from the
cavalry and other sources sufficient to define
the enemy's limits — more was not expected —
the troops told off to the " engagement " (as
the French " Field Service Regulations " of
1913 called it) would advance and engage him
wherever found. A general line of contact
would thus be formed, upon which the French
advanced guards would seek to press sufficiently
hard to compel the enemy to develop his forces.
This " engagement " might take days, perhaps
a week or more, and it would impose on citizen-
soldiers of a sensitive race a most severe test
of endurance and solidity. Many critics indeed
asserted that the Napoleonic battle would break
down on this weakness alone if on no other.
But it is fair to point out that even in the GJerman
war-theory much the same strain would be im-
posed on the men concerned. The only differ-
ence which told against the French lay in the
fact that to carry out the mission of " engage-
ment " the troops would have to make ceaseless
local attacks in order to wear down the enemy
and compel him to feed his firing lino, whereas
in the case of the Gernnan doctrine the infantry
at least was (in the interests of timing) kept
out of action until the general advance sounded.
This was evidently not a small disadvantage
against the French. But it must be assumed
that the French generals knew their country-
men, and it is the fact that though the doctrine
had in recent years been subjected to a good
deal of criticism, this particular part of it was
made an article of faith by the 1913 edition of
the " Service en Campagne," above quoted.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
267
Granted the necessary solidity, then the
course of the battle would go on from engage-
ment to serious frontal fighting with attack and
counter-attack, and thus the fighting itself
would, by cutting out, one after the other,
the alternative hypotheses that had V)een
formed as to tlio enemy's grouping, afford
enough evidence for the timely placing of the
" mass of mano3uvre." At the proper moment
the battle would in the environs of the selected
area gi-ow in intensity by fresh feeding ol the
firing line, until in the selected area itself
it would culminate in a fierce attack by every
available man and gun of the reserve, the
men advancing as fast as possible, halting to
fire as little as they could help, and covered by
an appalling rain of time slirapnel from every
gun that could be brought to boar. This is
the phase tersely described by Napoleon as
the evenenmni.
But, as Napoleon reniarked, all this requires
un peu d'art et quelques evenenients. Germans
excepted, there were few soldiers who denied
the decisive effect of this attack, if it got home,
tor when you break the enemy's centre you
ttirn two flanks and roll them up outwards.
Controversy, however, never reached finality,
even in France, as to the peu d'art. As we
have seen, the Germa,n doctrine was wholly
destivate of arts, and the question was. Was it
practicable, with modern armies, to finesse
with men's lives ? Was t.he moral of the citizen-
soldier such that he would calmly give his life
in a fight which ho knew to be a non-decisive
part of the ensemble ? Moreover, allowing for
the characteristic " emptiness of the battle-
field " due to the use of smokeless powder, and
tor the consequent difficulty of distinguishing
between false positions and real, advanced lines
and main, was it certain that any tentative,
non-decisive engagement of forces would either
reveal or pin the opponent T To the«e ques-
tions the answer? were, if not exactly negative,
at least doubtful. Accordingly it was laid
down that every attack was locally a
" decisive " attack, that no troops should bo
put into action for any other purpose thtui to
close with the enemy, and that the great
Napoleonic evenemenl must be, as the British
regulations above-mentioned say, tho culmina-
tion of gradually increasing pressure. But in
that case, bearing in mind that the preliminary
fighting would take days and tho placing of
the " mass of manoeuvre " yet more days,
would national short-service troops be capable
of fighting time' after time on ground where
they had failed once, twice, and thrice T
Although in fact the French regulations of 1913
accepted the " engagement " for good or evil,
still these risks were evident enough to make
it desirable to ensure in every other way possible
the freedom, of action of the conunander who
disposes of the mass of manoeuvre. This was
sought in two ways, defined by the two remain-
ing Napoleonic aphorisms that we have quoted
— " be vulnerable nowhere " and " manoeuvre
only about a fixed point." Freedom of action
the Germans expected to obtain by stunning or
dazing their opponent. Not so the French,
who held that only positive freedom secured by
means within his own control was of any use
to the conamander. But before stating these
means in general terms* let us understand
•The expanded theory and the executive detail may be best
studied In the Princives de laQuerre of General Foch. who In 1914
commanded the Nancy Conw.
FRENCH ARTILLERY. Placing in position a 75 mm. Gun.
268
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
what we mean by freedom of action. It is
freedom to carry out an intention without
hostile interference. The later the intention
is formed the more serious the risk of the
interference with it, and the larger the de-
tachments that must be placed as
advanced guards, flank guards, and rearguards
to prevent it, the smaller, accordingly, will
be the force available for carrying out
the intention it-self when formed. It was the
tendency to wait for too many data before
taking a definitive resolution that gave rise to
the criticisms of the doctrine which arose within
the French Army itself about 1910. Nearly all of
these alleged that in the attempt to be "vulner-
able nowhere " French generals were far too
lavish in the use of protective detachments.
Further, with the million -armies of the present
day, action taken cannot become effective until
a period of days ha.s elapsed, and if the army,
already in contact with the foe, is not to be
overstrained, it must be taken very early —
practically on the first reasonable data to
hand.
The most dangerous case of infringed liberty
is that which occurs when an army is caught in
a state of " inevitable unreadiness "* half-
soncentrated, over-dispersed in rest quarters,
and so on. In this case almost any proportion
of detachments from main body is justified —
witness the placing of no less than six French
frontier army corps permanently on a war
footing in peace time in 1913. And even so,
the commander is rarely able to wait upon
events before committing himself to an
•This aspect of the question is dealt with at length In Major-
General Aylmcr's work " Protection."
•' intention," and that intention as often as rot
is simply one of self-defence.
None of this, however, alters the fact that the
French doctrine, construed roasonabh\ does —
and in war did — give the only guarantee of
freedom of action thar can really be depended
upon. Whether in certain cpses freedom is not
bought at too high a price is doubtful. But
in general the doctrine as formulated by
General Bonnal and General Foch held its
own against criticism, and the events of the
war of 1914 showed that almost any sacrifice
of men and ground was better than the forcing
of the commander's hand. An initial defensive,
coupled with the preservation of the army at
all costs, was imposed upon France by broader
political and military circumstances. Un-
official criticism might question the application
of the principle of self-contained protective
detachments, but it could not alter the fact of
their necessity, nor of their value, when rightly
employed. For in France the defensive was
regarded as the auxiliary of the offensive.
The mission of the protective detachments was
not simply to protect, but to offer a bait. Their
authors confidently expected that by rearguard-
like fighting they could not only gain time for
offensive dispositions to be made elsewhere,
but also provoke the enemy into deploying in
a wrong direction, draw him across the front of
the main body, and generally play the part of
will o' the wisp. It is questionable — and it
was questioned by the younger critics — whether
these manoeuvres, applicable enough to the old
small armies, had not something of the character
of minor chicanes about them when regarded
FRENCH PATROL GUARDING RAILWAY LINE.
[Record Press.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
269
ZOUAVES.
\Topitai,
from the point of view of the million-army.
But, on the other hand, it is certain that
smokelesA powder and long- ranging weapons
have made rearg\]p,rd actions. Smokeless
powder and long-ranging weapons have enabled
a rearguard to keep at a distance the pursuing
enemy in a way which was in former times
impossible.
The offensive counterpart of the protective
detachment (couverture) is the " strategic ad-
vanced guard " — another focus of controversy.
Its r6le is that defined in the last of the aphorisms
which we have used as our texts, " Manoeuvre
only about a fixed point."
Never officially recognized by the French
regulations, though partially accepted by
the British and Italian, the strategic advanced
guard was nevertheless the corner-stone of the
" New French " doctrine. It was a very large
force of all arms — in Napoleon's campaigns
at) army corps, in our own times a whole army —
which preceded the main body by as. many
days' marches as its own capacity for fighting
unaided permitted. It was handled strate-
gically on the same principles as the fanious
Prussian advanced guards of 1870 were handled
tactically, with the exception that in the hands
■of a first-class leader like Lannes it never com-
mitted itself so deeply as to involve the main
army in its affair witliout direct orders to that
effect from the Emperor. In the absence of
such orders, it was merely a potential pro-
tective detachment, latent if the enemy did
nothing and active if he tried to advance.
But its proper purpose was very different.
It was with its cavalry* to find, and with its
infantry and artillery to engage, the enemy's
main body, thereby giving the Emperor the
'■ fixed point " upon which to build up his
manoeuvre. It had, furtlier, by hard fighting,
and if necessary by sacrificing itself, to holdtlie
enemy's attention and effort for tlio time
needed for that nianoeuvre without support
from the " mass of manoeuvre," every regiment
of which the Emperor jealously reserv-ed.
In the great majority of cases the sacrifice
was not in vain- There are few of Napoleon's
victoi'ies which are without any traoo of tlie
idea, and when it failed it was because the
movements of the main body, by reason of
weather or unforeseen emergencies, were de-
layed beyond the calculated time.
The action was perfectly familiar to the
Prussians, for it had not escaped Clau-sewitz's
observation, t and one of the most magnificent
examples of its working had been given by
Ckjiistantin von Alvcnsleben, when with the
3rd Coqjs on August 16, 1870, he engaged the
whole of Bazaine's army single-handed in
order to prevent it from marching away until
•Often two or more divisions.
tThotuh CUusewitz was tar from suspecting its importance.
270
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Prince Frederick Charles should have gathered
liis scattered amiy for a decisive blow upon it.
But the idea had been deliberately rejected
in toto by the more modern Germans, who
disbelieved in the power of modern armies,
fighting at long range, to fix one another, and
in the pcwer of modern unprofessional troops to
fight at a sacrifice. How little they expected
from the " combat of fixation " may be gauged
from the fact, already alluded to, that they
engaged their artillery alone in the phase of
. battle to which it applied, keeping their in-
fantry back until the real general attack was
ripe. The only effective fixation they, held
was the previous overpowering of the enemy's
will by the speed and power of their strategic
advance. In short, they contributed nothing,
either by way of objection or acceptance, to
the controversy which centred on the strategic
advanced guard. The whole " order of ideas "
wa.s different.
The application of the theory to the first
phase of a Franco-German war was admitted
to be difficult if not impossible, owing to the
fact that the armies were almost in face of one
another at the outset, whereas in proportion to
their length, and therefore to the tinxe-relations
of manoeuvres based upon the advanced guard,
the main bodies should have been separated by
a hundred miles or so for an army of three or four
corps to have elbow room for action as strate-
gic advanced guard. It was when the armies
had fallen apart again after a first clinch that
this organ woiild come into play, and if at that
point the huge masses became divided up into
smaller bodies, each with its own theatre of war
and set of tasks, Auerstadts and Friedlands
would become possible.
Intimately connected with the theory of the
strategic advanced guard (though it dated from
the piu-ely defensive period of French nulitary
policy) was the idea, which had many ardent
supporters and many fierce opponents, of fixing
the concentration area of the French armies
well back from the frontier and somewhat
to a flank — at Dijon, for example. Many of the
partisans of the strategic advanced guard
considered that this retired concentration,
coupled with skilful handling of the (then)
three frontier corps as a strategic advanced
guard and strategic rear guard by tiu-ns, would
infallibly result in the Germans being drawn so
far westward from Lorraine as to be cut off by
the offensive from Dijon. But neither General
Bonnal himself, nor Langlois nor Foch (both of
whom commanded the Nancy Army Corps)
seem to have shared in this opinion, since, as
Moltke remarked a propos of the Silesian
FRENCH CYCLISTS' COMPANY.
\Topicat.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ni
SN
I
Ul Corps
40 miles
Diagram showing the "lozenge" with the first corps used as strategic
advance-^uard. (See pp. 273-4.)
272
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
concentration of 1866, " one does not, in practice,
abandon rich provinces." If, liowever,
the main armies of the Germans were to
pass through Belgimn, a broad belt of country
■n-ould be open between the initial concentra-
tion areeis, and in that belt a great French
advanced guard might well operate with a view
to provoking the Germans into a premature
Entfaltung in a more or less doubtful direction.
In combination with these protective or
provocative detachments, the main army
itself was to be grouped, according to the
accepted doctrine, in a deep lozenge formation
similar to that which Napoleon adopted in the
Jena campaign of 1806.
This great lozong), preceded by its strategic
advanced guard, would advance in the direction
where the enemy was a priori most likely
to be found. If the advanced guard came into
contact, the head of the lozenge would reinforce
it on one flank within 48 hours, the flanks of it
would come up into line within foiir or five days,
^
^ ^
-'0 ,,
r^
^ ^
-'0 4-, ■
r^ ^
. 1 .
■ fj-i
_JL_.
H^
3 ,-■ ^
1 ' '
\
1
Lozenge with Strategic
advanced guard.
Lozenge changing direction
on its own ground.
•
\
V /
1
\
Lozenge manoeuvring about
a Fixed point Formed^by the
strategic advanced guard.
The ** lozenge" formation and its uses.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
278
FRENCH MOTOR AMBULANCE.
[Rtcori P'tss.
and the rear group would be still in hand. If
the advanced guard missed its target, or only
came into touch with its extreme flank, then
the rdle of advanced guard would fall to ono of
the flank masses of the lozenge itself, and the
original advanced guard would become part of
tlie mass of manoeuvre. The virtue of the
lozenge formation, in a word, is its capacity
for changing direction — a capacity which the
long deployed line of the Germans almost
entirely lacked. And the virtue of the strategic
advanced guard, from whichever side of the
lozenge it emerged, was that it provided a
C.Ked point about which this supple mass could
manoeuvre.
Of all criticisms of the strategic advanced
guard, none was as serious as that which
pointed out that its flanks would be overlapped
by superior forces before the head of the k zenge
could act. This danger was admitted, but
minimized by the allotment to it of almost all
available cavalry, which by the combination of
its fan -wise reconnaissance, its fire power, and
its shock action would prolong the front to
either flank sufficiently far to compel the enemy
to make long turning movements and so to
waste the critical hours.
As compared with its defensive counterpart,
the protective detachment, the strategic
advanced guard, whose very mission it was to
affront superior numbers of the enemy, un-
doubtedly ran more rislis, since it w; s eSect as
well as endurance for a given time that was
expected of it, and it could not break off the
engagement so readily.* On the other hand,
the troops composing it did enjoy all the mora!
advantages of- the sharp offensive, whereas
those of protective detachments were condemned
to the disillusionments of retreat. These
differences of principle and intent were explained,
so far as the French Army was concerned, in
the regulations of 1913, which made it clear
that the detachment with a separate temporary
mission was a self-contained force while an
advanced guard was integrally connected with
its main body, since " it cannot be admitted
that a leader would send troops against the
enemy without his . having the intention to
tight."
The accompanying diagram shows how a
strategic advanced guard extended its flanks
for protection in this manner (formations and
distances being of course no more than indica-
tion of the general tendencies). It illustrates
also how, instead of being a self-contained body
additional to the lozenge, as at ono time it was
conceived to be, it has become simply an ad-
vanced portion of the head of it, specially dis-
posed for its special functions and dangers.
It shows, moreover, that in practice there
was no real discrepancy between the advanced
•German advanced suards. aa w« haT« seen, weie deUberatelr
kept snuU in order that they should not be tempted br ahy con-
sciousneiis uf their own stiecgtli t3 eiuage ct an Inopportune
moment.
274
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
guard and lozenge tj-pe of strategic advance
and tliat which Colonel de Grandmaison {the
intellectual leader of the revolt against the
tendency to multiply advanced guards and
protective detachments) proposed, viz., a chain
of independent masses, each disposed internally
according to its own needs in echelon, lozenge
or otherwise, and all together forming a long
line with reserves massed behind at one point
of it. The Grandmaison conception was better
suited to the management of the huge armies
of to-day than a crude reproduction,
on five times th# scale, of Napoleon's
" battalion square of 200,000 men." But
it' shared the characteristic principles and
incoiijorated the characteristic forms of the
Napoleonic method, of which indeed it wa=i
simply a speciarcase. The outstanding features
'of French tactical methods of course expressed
the same doctrine. In the battle as a whole,
fire superiority was not regarded as the con-
dition of success as it was in Germany. On
the contrary, it became the accepted idea in
France and in Groat Britain that the chief use
of fire was to cover movement, and that it was
but an auxiliary to the actual assault. Hence
came the characteristic division of the
attacker's artillery, not " counter batteries "
whose mission it was to account for the enemy's
artillery and " infantry batteries " which were
to support the infantry advance with their full
fire-power at everj' stage, and, above all, in the
final assault. Hence, too, the development of
infantry formations* in close order that could
live and move in the zone of hostile artillery
fire by fitting into even the smallest covered
lines of approach and need only extend for
fire action of their own at the very limit of cover.
Henco also the " burst of rapid fire " from rifle
and from gun in which the British Army ex-
celled friend and foe alike. And hence, the
tremendous violence of the action of the "mass
of manoeuvre " — its surprise effect, its speed,
•Irregular lines of platoons or hair-platoons In fours or file.
Uiaracterlstic also of British infantry tactics.
GENERAL CHEVENET.
Military Governor of Belfort.
and its overwhelming weight of " covering
fire." Such a blow was only possible when
enough data had been obtained to ensure it
agiinst being a blow in the air, and the advanced
guards had to pay for this insurance. It was
only possible when the commander-in-chief was
insured against anxieties in other directions,
and the protective detachments had to ensure
this by resisting to the utmost limit of their
powers and their ground. And it was only
possible when all ranks, whether in the " wear-
ing-down " engagement or in the swift decisive
attack, were imbued with the desire to close
with the foe.
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE BRITISH THEORY OF WAR.
Advantage of Practical Experience— Lord IOtchener on the Ibiportance of Feeding
Soldiers and of Cover— Small Armies with Lono Training— Individual Efficiency-
Quality Rather than Quantity— India as a Training Ground— The Wellington Tradition
—Crimean War— Indian Mutiny— Lord Roberts and Lord Wolseley— South African War
WHILE German and, to a large
extent, French strategy had been
based mainly on tradition and
theory controlled by peace
manoeuvres, the British strategy was the out-
come of practical experience in numerous and
various theatres of war. The campaigns, it is
true, in wliich the British Army had been tested
were against barbaric and semi -civilized
coloured races or against the half-organized
nations in arms of the Transvaal Republic
«nd the Orange Free State, and only a few
living Britons {e.g., Sir Evelyn Wood, Lord
Kitchener, and Sir Ian Hamilton) had taken
part in or observed with their own eyes
wars on the Continental scale. A large pro-
portion of the British troops, however, had
been under the fire of modern weapons, and in
the South African War very many officers had
learnt what their men could and could not do
in face of the terrible instruments of destruction
created by science during the latter half of
the 1 9th and the beginning of the 20th century
Thus Lord Kitchener, addressing the Is
Punjab Rifles in March, 1906, remarked as
follows : —
You must not get into the way of thinking that men
can go on fighting interminably. Men get hungry,
men get thirsty, men get tired. In real warfare,
Avlicre many hours of hard marching and . fighting
may pass before you achieve success, you have to ask
youreelves at the critical moment : Can I trust my men,
with gnawing pains of hunger in their stomachs, with
a depressing s^usj of having suffered casualties, and
witli fatigue in all their limbs ; can I trust them to
press upon the retreating enemy and ci-ush him ?
And therefore I say to you olTlcei's — -Look after your
men's stomachs. Thcsa field days of two or three
houis' duration do not bring the lesson home to you
with sufllcient force. Men cannot fight wcU unless
they are fed well, and men cannot fight well when they
are tired. I have more than once on active service
taken the ammunition out of my ammunition carts
and loade<I up the carts with bully beef. . . .
Gentlemen, I wish to add a word about the behaviour
of your men in the field. Colonel Western, without
a word or a suggestion from me, spontaneously came
>ip and said, '' I think the men are taking cover very
intelligently." Cover, as you know, is all-important
in modern warfare, and soldiers who know how to
take advantage of every possible cover on the battle-
field have learnt one of their greatest and most valuable
lessons.*
Doubtless the German leaders would have ac-
quiesced in the above observations, but few of
them had had the facts driven into their souls
on the battle-field. Lord Kitchener's audience
must have felt that they were in the presence of
an artist and not of an art-master of war. Like
the Russian and Serbian, the British generals
had made war, and, as Napoleon said, " It is
necessarj' to have made war for a long time to
be able to conceive it."
The Russian and Serbian generals had also
handled men in action, but they had been
dealing with a material substantially different
from that with which the British officer worked.
The Slav soldiers were conscripts ; the British
were volunteers ; the former had had a short,
the latter a long training. The British officers
alone had at their disposition forces similar to
the small, highly -trained, professional armies of
the 17th, 18th, and the earlv 19th centuries.
•Thi!< lesson liad been thonmithly le.init by the British lrooi«.
" Tlie Knelish." wrote a Ginimii offcer to lils parcDts on 8<.iit«mber
17. 1914. " are marveilou-sly trained in making u>;e of tbe ttround.
One never f-eei them, and one is con.'itantly imder tire." Here is an
extract from anotlier letter found on a German otfiwr ; — " With
the Knglish trooiw we liave grwit diflleulties. They have a queer
way of caui^ing losses to the enemy. I'Ley make good trelicbes lo
wliich they wait fiatiently. They carefully measure the ransw
for their rille tire, and they then open a truly hellish tire on the un-
smiiecting cavaliy, Ihi;> ns Uie rwsoa tluit we had such beary
losses."
275
276
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES
FERGUSSON, commanding 5th Division.
\H. Waller Banietl.
The result was that British strategy and
tactics differed in many respects from Con-
tinental. Compared with other European
Armies, the British corps resembled the legions
which guarded the frontiers of the Roman
Empire during the fii'st two centuries
of the Christian Era, with this im-
portant distinction, that the army of
Augustus and Trajan was recruited mostly in
the provinces, whereas the bulk of the British
Army was composed of citizens drawn from the
British Isles. A British general was unable,
as Continental generals were, immediately to
tap an immense reserve of more or less disci-
plined soldiers and he was consequently
obliged to husband his resources. " I can
spend a hundred thousand men a year," said
Napoleon, who oft«n spent more. No British
general before the Great War could have ven-
tured to talk in that fashion. The British aims
had perforce been to inflict a maximum while
suffering a minimum loss in war, and to render
the individual soldier and the tactical units
superior to those produced imder a universal
military service system. The second of those
aims was admirably expressed in the Infantry
Training manual issued by the General Staff : —
The objects in view in developing a soldierly-
spirit are to help the soldier to bear fatigue, privation,
and danger cheerfully ; to imbue him with a
sense of honour ; to give him confidence in his
superioi*s and comrades ; to increase liis powers of
initiative, of self-confidence, and of self-restraint ;
to train him to obey orders, or to act in the absence
of orders tor the advantage of his regiment under all
conditions ; to produce such a high degree of courage
and disreurard of self that in the stress of battle he
will use his brains and his weapons coolly and to the
host advantage ; to impress upon liira tliat, so long as
lie Ls physically capable of fighting, surrender to the
enemy is a disgraceful act ; and, finally, to teach him
liow to act in combination witli his comrades in order
to defeat the enemy.
Like Alexander, Hannibal, Marius, Sulla,
Caesar in Ancient, and like Gustavus Adolphus,
Turenne, Frederick the Great, Lee, and Stone-
wall Jackson in Modern times, the great cap-
tains of the British nation relied on quality
rather than quantity. They did not believe
that God was on the side of the big battalions,
and it was significant that the campaign of
Napoleon most admired by Wellington was that
of 1814, when the French Emperor with a small
army, by his manoeuvring and tlirough the
superior merits of his troops, held at bay for
many weeks the enormous hosts of the Allies
and inflicted a crushing defeat on Bliicher
between the Marne and the Seine. The
business of a British commander was to fight
with every natural and artificial advantage on
his side. In other words, he trusted by his
art, and the art of his men, to overcome the
hordes of a modern Attila. British generals'
MAJOR-GENERAL SNOW,
commanding 4th Division.
lEllhtl Or Fry.
THE TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR.
277
contrary to thr fond belief of the Kaiser and his
advisers, were thoroughly up to date. They
had studied with p articular attention the Russo-
Japanese and Balkan Wars, and the Kaiser
was to find that the British Army, thougli
" little," was very far from being " con-
temptible."
The British praoube of pitting small armies
against large continental armies dated from
the Hundred Years War. During the struggle
with Louis XIV., the next occasion on which
we exerted a decisive influence on the Continent,
the British contingent and Marlborough were
perhaps the chief cause of the victory gained
by the Allies over the French monarch. But
at the opening of the French Revolutionary
Wars oiu: troops, whose prestige had been
lowered in the American War of Independence,
did not at the outset distinguish themselves.
In his first encounter with the French Wellington
had to help to conduct a retreat before them.
Fortunately the efforts of Abercrombie, Moore,
and others to raise the standard of efficiency
in our Army were successful, and at the battles
of Alexandria and Maida it was clearly
demonstrated that the British could hold their
own against forces trained by Napoleon him-
self or under his direction. Fortunately,
too, in India we had acquired a unique
training ground for our soldiers. En-
camped among a vast and then hostile
GENERAL SIR HENRY HILDYARD,
late Commander-in-Chief in Soutli Africa.
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM
ROBERTSON, Director of Military Training.
[From a painting by J. St. Htlitr Lander,
population the British garrison had to struggle
fiercely for its existence, and in the struggle
characters as daring and resourceful as any
produced by the French Revolution were de-
veloped. One of them, Wellington, was des-
tined to destroy the reputation for invincibility
gained by the Marshals of Napoleon. While
the Prussians (who, be it remembered, rose
against Napoleon only when he had lost hia
Grande Arra^e in Russia) were cowering before
Davout, French leaders whose mere names
struck terror throughout Germany and Austria-
Hungary were being worsted by Wellington.
The strategy and tactics of Wellington in
Portugal, Spain, and the South of France
were, in 1914, still sovirces of uispiration to
British soldiers.
The infantry of Wellington, as Marbot
points out, shot better than the French, and a
bayonet charge by them was almost irresistible.
Wellington in India had predicted that against
British infantry the tactics of Napoleon would
be unavailing. If on the defensive, Welling-
ton was accustomed to await the attack of the
French with his infantry drawn up in lines and
under cbver. When the enemyli columns
had been shattered by musketry and artillery
fire they were attacked with the bayonet.
But it must not be forgotten that for every
defensive battle the Iron Duke fought five on
the offensive, and the masterly manoeuvres by
which from 1813 onwards ho drove the French
from Spain belong piu-ely to this class.
As a strategist, Wellington was equally
remarkable. His march to emd crossing of
S78
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
VICKERS' LATEST QUICK-FIRER.
Firing 600 rounds per minute.
[By courteiy of Vickers, Ltd.
the Douro in front of Soult, whom Jl^apoleon
called " the first manoeuvorer of Europe," is
a model of its kind. By constructing the lines
of Torres Vedrns and devastating Portugal he
ensured the failure of Mass^na's invasion in
1810. Napoleon, who earlier had sneered at
Wellington as a " Sepoy General," expressed
to Foy his admiration of the methods employed
by the British generalissimo on that occasion.
Wellington's sudden pounces upon and storm-
ings of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos in 1812
were masterly. His advance in 1813 against
the French lines of communication, and the
skill with, which, availing himself of the com-
mand of the sea, he shifted his base from
Lisbon to Santander, was as brilliant a feat
as Napoleon's campaign of Marengo. In the
Waterloo campaign he had few of his Peninsular
veterans with hinx, and the majority of his troops
were Belgian, Dutch, and German soldiers.
According to Lord Roberts, Wellington made no
mistake in 1815, and, had the Prussian army
been also placed under his command, it is
improbable that the French Emperor would
have succeeded in winning, as he did, p. battle
(that of Ligny) after he had crossed the Sambre.
The value set upon Wellington by contemporary
Prussians may be gathered from the fact that,
according to report, years later, when war
between France and Prussia seemed imminent,
the Prussian Government offered the command
of its forces to the Iron Duke.
Between Waierloo and 1914 a British
army apoeared only once on the Oonti-
ncut. In the interval between Waterloo
and the Crimean War a wave of comnier-
cial prosperity had swept over the country.
The warning of Wellington that steamboats
had altered the conditions of warfare and that
our islands might be invaded fell upon deaf ears.
Like Lord Roberts in the years preceding the
Great War, the Duke was pronomiced by
demagogues to be in his dotage. Our Army was
qiiite imprepared when the Crimean War broke
out, and though the British infantry at the
Alma and Inkerman and the British cavalry
in the charges of the Heavy and Light Brigades
exhibited the same stubbornness, energy, and
courage they liad shown in the Peninsula and
at Waterloo, the reputation of the British
Army was not increased. A year after the con-
clusion of peace the Indian Mutiny broke out,
and the British soldier, divorced from a civilian-
encumbered War Office, astonislied the world
by his sublime courage and resourcefulness.
The officers and men who fought at Mens and on
the Marne remembered the capture of Delhi
and the raising of the siege of Lucknow, just
as the Nicholsons, Havelocks, Outrams, and
Hodsons remembered Assaye, Albuera, Quatre
Bras, and Waterloo.
In the Indian Mutiny two soldiers who wero
to keep the Army abreast of the times cam J lo
the front — Lord Roberts and Lord Wolseley.
The latter had distinguished himself in the
Crimea. From the respect in which he was
held by officers of unquestionable ability,
there can be no doubt that he was one of the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
279
foremost captains of the ago. Like Havelock,
he had studied profoundly the campaigns of
Napoleon, the lessons taught by Lee, Jackson,
and Grant in the North and South War, by
Moltko in the Sadowa and the Gravelotte-
Sedan campaigns were not lost on him. It is
interesting to note that, while Moltke cast a
disdainful eye on tho deeds of the American
generals. Lord Wolsoloy (as also Colonel
Henderson) examined with sympathetic atten-
tion their achievements. Lee, in Lord Wolsoley's
view, was greater than, Jackson (according
to Colonel Henderson) was as great as.
Napoleon. Such obiter dicta might smack of
exaggeration, but they were characteristic
of the independent attitude of British military
men. Napoleon was admired in Great Britain,
but he was not worshipped as ho was in Prussia.
The blind admiration felt for Napoleon by
Imperial Germany would not have been
tolerated in our military circles. " You think
that Wellington is a great general because he
defeated you," said Napoleon, for the purpose
of hoiu'tening his men, to SouJt on the morning
of Waterloo. The Prussians, because they had
been so often routed by Napoleon, had deified
him. It was Lord Wolsoley who superintended
the metamorphosis of the British from a Long
into a, comparatively, Short Service Army,
from one led by men who had purchased their
commissions into one with officers selected by
competitive examination.
We turn now to Lord Roberts, whose
brilliant march to Candahar brought him
prominently before the public. No one had
done more than he to convert tho private and non-
commissioned officer into the chivalrous, clean-
living, and intelligent soldier who was to win
the admiration and aflection of the French
Allies. As a strategist and tactician. Lord
Roberts had been always alertly appreciative
of new fivctors in warfare. His orders issued,
and his speeches before the Boer War show
that he accurately calculated the effect of
the modern artillery, of smokeless powder,
and of repeating rifles on the battle-field.
After the battle of Colenso he was dispatched
with Lord Kitchener to South Africa. He took
over the command of a half-dispirited army
which had not been trained to meet mounted
infantry who were also m&rk.smen. The
Spectator, a representative organ of British
opinion, was then hinting that the war might
last 20 years. Lords Roberts and Kitchener
landed at Cape Town on Janutuy 10, 1900,
and by February 18 Cronje had been out-
manoeuvred and surrounded at Paardeberg.
The surrender of Cronje a few days later led
to the raising of the siege of Ladysmith and
was followed by the occupation of Bloemfontein
and Pretoria. Seldom in history has tho
arrival of two men on a theatre of war wrought
a transformation so sudden. One may be per-
mitted to wonder what would have happened
if Von der Goltz and the younger Moltke had
been set tho same problem ! Lords Roberts
A VICKERS 75 M.M. GUN.
[yidUrs, LimiUd.
280
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
and Kitchener had not been deputed to prepare
for the cantpaign, and, until the Boer War, if
we except the skirmishes of Laing's Nek and
Majuba, the British Anny had had no experi-
ence of fighting against white men armed with
modem artillery and rifles. Lord Roberts's
bold inarch from the Modder River to Bloem-
fontein and the turning movements by which
he subsequently drove the Boers from their
kopjes decided the struggle. After his return
to England he had striven successfully to
iiiq>ress on the Army the paramount importance
of accurate shooting, unsuccessfully to rouse the
nation to a sense of the German Peril.
Among the other officers who, with Lord
Wolseley tuid Lord Roberts, prepared the British
Army for a European war may be mentioned
Sir Evelyn Wood (also the first British Sirdar
of the Egyptian Army), General Sir Henry
Hildyard (first Commandant of the Staff
College and afterwards Commander-in-Chief
in South Africa), Sir Edward HaTnley (the author
of an original text book on the Art of War),
Colonel Henderson (also ' a Commandant
of the Staff College), and Colonel Reping-
ton. Standing entirely in a class by
himself was " Chinese " Gordon, a Nelson on
land. If, as Napoleon asserted, the moral are
to the material factors in war as three to one,
Gordon's services to his coimtry cannot be
overrated. The avenger of Gordon was Lord
Kitchener, whose direct and indirect influence
on the Army which fought in the Great War,
was of the most decisive kind. He was not
permitted by the politicians to superintend
the preparations for it. ^
In our next chapter we shall give a brief
biography of this extraordinary man.
CHAPTER XIX.
LORD KITCHENER.
l>ORD Kitchener — His Appointment as Minister of War — His Qualifications for the Po8t
AND Qualities — Lord Kitchener's Career — Education and Early Life — Serves in the
French Army in Franco -Prussian War — Surveys Western Palestine and Cyprus — Second -
IN-COMMAND of EGYPTIAN CaVALRY ViSIT TO Mx. SiNAI ADVENTURES AmONG THE ArABS
His Efforts to Save Gordon — Governor-General of Suakin — Struggle with Osmau Digna
— Kitchener Wounded — Adjutant-General of Egyptian Army — Succeeds General Grbnfell
AS Sirdar — Lord Cromer's Opinion of Him — The River War — Action op Firket and the
Battles of the Atbara and Omdurman — Lord Roberts on His Tactics — Fashoda — Lord
Salisbury's View of Him — Founds Gordon Memorial College and Refounds Khartum —
BoEB War — Promotes Union of Races in South Africa — Ideas on Universal Military
Service — In India Abolishes Dual Control of, and Remodels and Redistributes Army
— Staff College at Quetta Created — His Conception of a Modern Officer and a Modern
Army — Visit to Far East, Australia, New Zealand, and United States — British Consul-
General IN Egypt — A Prussian Officer's Judgments on Him — His Place in History.
ON Sunday, August 2 — the day after
Germany's declaration of war on
Russia and her violation of the
neutrality of Luxemburg, and the very
day on which she delivered her ultimatum
to Belgium and her troops began crossing the
French frontier — The Times announced that Lord
Kitchener was " leaving England for Egj'pt." It
was then believed that Lord Haldane would
succeed Mr. Asquith, who had himself succeeded
Colonel Seely as Minister of War. The previous
activities of Lord Haldane at the War Office had
not been calculated to inspire confidence in such
an appointment at such a time. Despite his
great services in helping to create the Terri-
torials, Lord Haldane's record seemed to many
people to be an illustration of the truth of an
axiom of Napoleon hurled in 1813 at his brother
Joseph, who had interfered with the French
commanders in Spain, that "it is the greatest
of all immoralities to engage in a profession of
which one is ignorant." The profession of
arms in 1813 was a far less serious one than in
1914, and the common sense of the British
people revolted at the notion that a civilian
who had not even had a business education
Vol. I. — Part 8.
should conduct a war to be waged for the very
existence of the British Empire.
The Socialist, Mr. Blatchford, had advised
in 1909 that Lord Kitchener should prepare
the nation for an Anglo-German war. Like
Lord Roberts's, Mr. Blatchford's warnings and
advice had been disregarded. But when
Germany threw her gigantic forces into Belgium
and France it was no longer possible for the
politicians to withstand the popular demand
that one of the foremost generals, if not the
foremost general, of the age should sui-ceed
the Prime Minister at the War Office.
On August 5 The Times voiced the people's
wishes, and later on the same day the Premier
announced that Lord Kitchener had been
offered and had accepted the post of Minister
of War. It was contrary to Constitutional
precedent, but the appointment was acclaimed
by the Colonies and Dependencies, and by the
French Allies, for whom Lord Kitchener in
his teens had voluntarily served, when France,
after the defeats of Spicheren, Worth, Mars-la-
Tour, Gravelotte, and Sedan lay at the feet of
the insolent soldiery of the King of Pru.ssia-
At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War
281
:;s-'
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
SNAPSHOT OF LORD KITCHENER.
[Daily Mirror.
Moltke was 70 ; at the outbreak of the Great
War Lord Kitchener was 64 years old.
With Sir Evelyn Wood and Lord Grenfell he
had organized the Egyptian Army ; he had
crushed the hordes of an African Attila at the
action of Firket and the battles of the Atbara
and Omdurman ; by his tact at Fashoda he had
largely prevented a collision between the British
Empire and the French Republic ; he had been
the loyal lieutenant and successor of Lord
Roberts in the South African War, and had
brought it to a satisfactory termination.
Again, by the exercise of tact he had con-
verted Boer generals, like General Botha,
into loyal Britons ; he had remodelled
and " speeded up " the Indian Army ;
and he had laid down the lines of
the new military forces which had sprung into
existence in Australia and New Zealand. Until
he was turned thirty his life had been filled
with dangerous adventures ; but, from the time
when he entered the Egyptian Army, he had
been in positions of ever-increasing responsi-
bility. Smce the days of the Lawrences no
administrator (with the exception of Lord
Cromer) in the service of the Crown had exhi-
bited more transcendent abilities. Appointed
British Agent and Consul-General to Egypt in
1911, by his justice and far-seeing measures he
had conciliated the Nationalist party, had gained
the love of the peasants in the Valley of the
Nile, and he had managed to keep the Mahome-
dan population from aiding their co-religionists
in Tripoli against Italy, a country for which he
felt the sincerest admiration. " Every English-
man," he is reported to have said to Sir Reiinell
Rodd, " has two countries — old England and
young Italy."
In 1899 he had refounded Khartum, and
collected the money for and founded the
Gordon Memorial College there. From 1911
to 1914 he was reforming the Egyptian system
of education. A yovmg man, he had helped to
survey and map Western Palestine and the
district of Sinai. He had also surveyed and
mapped Cyprus, and established land courts and
a system of land registration in that island, and
he had been Vice-Consul in Anatolia. Later
he had been on a commission to delimit the
frontiers of Zanzibar, the protectorate of which
was soon to be ceded by Germany to Great
Britain in exchange for the cession to Germany of
Heligoland. Under his directions a railway
and telegraph line had been run up the Valley
of the Nile from Sarras to Wady Haifa, from
Wady Haifa across the Nubian Desert to Abu
Hamed, and thence by the Atbara fort to Khar-
tum. Strategic railways were also constructed
by him in India. During his administration
of Egypt the road from Cairo to Alexandria was
repaired, Helouan connected by one with Cairo,
the draining of the Delta commenced, the Suevs
Canal fortified, and plans were prepared for a
barrage across the White Nile.
Lord Ivitchener had failed in nothing which
he had undertaken. On the rare occasions
when he had delivered speeches in public
his utterances were as judicious as they were
weighty. His writings, from which we sliall
quote, showed that he possessed both a massive,
clear, and masculine style, and also humour
and imagination. He spoke more than one
Oriental language like a native. As a gardener
and a collector of blue china and other curios
his skill and knowledge were remarkable.
Recognizing the importance of supplying cotton
to Lancashire from areas within the British
Empire, he had encouraged to the utmost
cotton-culture in Egypt and the Sudan, and
experimented on its cultivation atBiala. While
he was governing Egypt a parasite, the Rhogas
Kilcheneri, had been discovered to destroy the
boll-worm which preyed on cotton. Whether from
pride or a sense of the fitness of things, he did
not court popular applause, and in a period when
most personages were advertising themselves, he
preferred to let his reputation grow without the
assistance of the newspapers. He did not pam-
per journalists, although his kindly words on
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
283
GUNSBOROUGH HOUSE, NEAR
TRALEE, IRELAND.
Lord Kitchener's Birthplace.
[Daily Mirror,
loarning of the death at Ladysmith of the most
Ijrilliant of war correspondents, George Steevens,
showed that he appreciated sincere men who,
at the risk of their lives, endeavoured to convey
to the pubHc information that could be spread
without injury to the interests of the com-
munity.
Physically, morally, and intellectually he
wae a big man, and his dauntless courage
had been shown on innumerable occasions.
At this great crisis in the history of the British
Empire men naturally turned to him as
people had turned in the past to Wellington
and Nelson. Even the Thersites of the day, Mr.
Keir Hardie, had admitted that Lord Kitchener
was a " big, brainy, brawny man, to whom all
littleness and meanness were foreign." Unlike
Wellington, and like Lord Roberts, Lord
Kitchener had never hesitated to acknowledge
the share of his subordinates in his victories.
His piercing blue eyes and quiet, firm voice ex-
pressed his character. A German who saw
Napoleon driving his tired troops through the
streets of Dresden remarked that he had " the
eyes of a tyrant and the voice of a lion." Lord
Kitchener's eyes were the eyes of a master whose
will was chained to duty and not to personal
ambition.
Horatio Herbert Kitchener was born on June
24, 1850, at Gunsborough House, near Tralee, in
Ireland. The day after his birth, Lord Palmer-
ston de'.ivered the famous Don Pacifico speech,
in which ho asked the House of Commons to
decide whether or not, " just as in days of old
a Roman held himself to be free from indignity
when he could say civis Romanus sum, a British
subject should consider himself in foreign
countries as protected by the vigilant eye and
strong arm of his Government against injustice
and wrong." Lord Kitchener's father. Colonel
Horatio Kitfihener, belonged to a Suffolk family.
but, before Lord Kitchener's birth, he had
become an Irish landowner. On the side of his
mother, nee Chevallier, Lord Kitchener was
descended from Huguenots. French as woU as
English blood ran in his veins.
The early years of his life were spent in
Ireland. At the age of thirteen ho was sent by his
father to a school near Villeneuve, at the eastern
end of the Lake of Geneva. Colonel Kitchener
had perceived that steam transport was drawing
all the nations of the world together, and that a
knowledge of foreign languages was becoming
every day of more value to his countrymen.
At Villeneuve the boy was in one of the most
interesting regions of Europe. He was in siglit
of the Castle of Chillon, and of Clarens, immor-
talized by the revolutionist, Rousseau. At the
other end of the Lake had lived two other
revolution-producers, Voltaire and Byron.
Between Geneva and Villeneuve lay Lausanne,
where Gibbon, the historian of the Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire, had resided.
Away to the East of Villeneuve stretched the
Valley of the Rhone, from which Bonaparte had
:.^H
t
'
W^ii,
w
^MM'^'
'
mjkL. ]
f
- — -t|
IL
\
\
9
.^\m
'^ li
r'v-
%pf
i
/^
m^\
^J
m ^
% P
)
-*<«
-m^g
<
HORATIO AND WALTER KITCHENER.
{Daily Mirror
2S4
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
i
0
V
!»
.'>■■
r
r
' * /
j>f^h
■\i
j-'^*^^
<
Koi^^
1
\
t
^■l^^^B ' ^'' ^^^^^^^^1
FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS.
[RusstU Or Sons.
descended on Italy in 1800. The Marengo
campaign had been the first of the vast
strategic combinations of the Corsican genius
who was strangely destined nearly a hundred
years after his death to be adored at Potsdam.
in 1863 the district to the west of Villeneuve
had not yet been wholly captured by hotel
keepers.
From the school at Villeneuve Horatio
J<itchener proceeded to a London coach, the
Rev. George Frost, of 28 and 29, Kensington
Square. A few doors away lived Green, the
historian of the English People ; Mill had
been living in the same square, Thackeray in
the adjoining Young Street.
Like Bismarck, Lord Kitchener appears to
have been indebted to one of the race so much
abused by teachers with licences. When Mr.
Frost died, a letter of thanks from Lord
Kitchener for the congratulations which his .old
tutor had sent him on the occasion of the
former's victories in the Sudan was found
beneath the dead man's pillow.*
Kitchener was seventeen years old when
he entered the Royal Military Academy
at Woolwich, the more scientific of the
two colleges for the training of future
officers in the Army. He had not
received a public school education. When he
was at Woolwich he was distinguished for his pro-
ficiency in mathematics and for a bold breach of
(ii^^cipline. In 1866 Prussia, under the leadership
of Moltke, Roon, Bismarck, and its King
William (styled by the Emperor William II.
"the Great"), had crushed Austria-Hungary.
In 1870 Prussia performed a similar operation on
France. Horatio Kitchener, whose father was
now living at Dinan, in Brittany, was sta.ving
with Colonel Kitchener at the time of the war.
Without consulting his father, much less the
Woolwich authorities*, he chivalrously joined
as a private the losing side. He was in the
second army of the Loire, commanded by the
capable General Cliaazy, who was being inter-
fered with by Gambetta. After having opposed
Marshal Kiel's wise proposals, before the war, for
strengthening the French Army, the French
Dictator felt it incumbent upon him to direct
the operations of the armies improvised after the
disaster at Sedan. Kitchener may have con-
trasted Gambetta's conduct with that of Lincoln
during the North and South War, which had
been concluded in his boyhood.
One thing is certain. Though his service with
the French was ended by an attack of pneu-
monia, and his chief experience of campaigning
was a perilous ascent in a warballoont.hesaw
quite enough of the frightful results which follow
unpreparedness for war to make him realize
• Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. By the author of " Kins
Edward the Seventh " (Nlsbet), p. 10.
♦ It may be mentioned that on December 29. 1913, Lord Kitchener
w ent for an aeroplane fliKht with tlie airman Olivier.
■Lord Kitcbeoer.
iI-lmHrd). iei4
Br H. O. GroHer (d. 2:11. C. Arthur Pearaoa
THE LATE FIELD-MARSHAL LORD
WOLSELEY. \^EllM & Frv.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
285
the responsibility attending tiis future pro-
fession, and the need for organizing an army
with the greatest thoroughness before, and not
after, war breaks out. By the irony of fate,
43 years later he was set by Mr. Asquith the
same task that Clmnzy had been set by Gam-
betta, that of improvising an Army in time of
war. Happily for Great Britain there have
been factors in the British Constitution which
constitutional lawyers and historians forget
to mention. These factors are the sea and
the British sailors who patrol it.
We may here observe that Mr. Churchill, the
first Lord of the Admiralty at the outbreak
of the Great War, like Lord Kitchener, had
served in a foreign (the Spanish) Army.
Horatio Kitchener, French private, was not
unnaturally looked at askance by the rulers
of the Royal Military Academy, and his father
had to bring very powerful influences to bear in
order to enable him to re-enter Woolw.jh.* On
leaving Woolwich he entered the Royal En-
gineers. It was fortunate that he joined a
branch of the Army which was, thanks to the
improvements in guns and rifles, becoming
every day of more importance. The Napo-
leonic dynasty, too, had ceased to reign, and
Carlylo's misreading of Prussian history had
led superficial observers to beheve that the
creation of a German Empire was almost tanta-
mount to a guarantee of universal peace. Wliile
the aged Bismarck, sated with honours, ruled
Germany, this behef had justification. The
interests of peace for nearly twenty years
dominated those of war in the European-
controlled world, and the opportunities of an
engineer, whether military or civil, to come to
the front were excellent. A military engineer
may be a producer as well as a destroyer, and
in peace time ho is more directly useful than
a gunner or a cavalry or foot soldier.
Lieutenant Kitchener specialized in field-
telegraphy, the making and working of rail-
roads, photography, and surveying. His
expert knowledge of the two latter subjects
was the cause of his being employed by the
administrators of the Palestine Exploration
Fund to help Lieutenant Conder to survey and
map Western Palestine.
Whether by design or chance he had laid the
foundations of a great career. The Suez 0 iiial
and a short sea-route to India had been opened
in 1869, and Syria and Egypt had suddenly
become of vital importance to the British
Empire. That the British might be forced to
•Lord Kitchener ol Khartoum : By the Author ol • ' KJni Edward
the Seventh " (page 19). Nisbet.
MAJOR-GENERAL HUBERT I. W.
HAMILTON, Military Secretary to Lord
Kitchener in South Africa and India.
lEUkt & Fry.
interfere in the affairs of the heavily -mortgaged
Egypt was in 1874 probable. An enemy ad-
vancing from the east to cut the Su3z Canal and
to drive the British from Egypt would pass
tlirough Western Palestine, and a minute
acquaintance with the topagraphy and the
inhabitants of the Holy Land might be expected,
sooner or later, to be profitable to its possessor.
One may remember that the Kaiser and a Staff,
disguised as pilgrims, visited Jerusalem in 1898,
to observe the same locality. In Palestina,
moreover, Turkish and Arabic (the most im-
portant language for an officer who might be
sent to Egypt) could be more easily mastered
than in England.
From 1874 to 1877 Ki(chen?r worked at
the survey, and some of tha results of
his labours are embodied in tliree monu-
mental volumes of observations, a paper on
Remains of Synagogues in Galilee, and
the map of Western Palestine set up by
himself and Conder. The surveying was hard
and risky work. In an affray with the natives
Conder, who had been saved from drowning at
Ascalon by Kitchener, owed hi? life to his
colleague's cooln3ss and courage. Kitchener
was himself wounded, and subsequently suffered
283
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
28 AND 29, KENSINGTON SQUARE :
HOUSE OF KITCHENER'S COACH.
from malaria. When in Palestine he became
friendly with Holman Huiat, the sincerest and
most religious of English painters. " Lieutenant
Kitchener," wrote the pre-Raphaelite artist,
" . . was completing the survey. We . . .
had many opportimities of talking about the
future military prospects of Syria."
On his way home from Palestine in 1877,
Kitchener visited Constantinople, Adrianople,
and Sofia, all disturbed by the outbreak of the
Russo-Turkish War. He had in the Turkish Army
a second opportunity of observing an army
unprepared for war. A virile article contri-
buted to Blackwood's Magazb^e for February,
1878, contains his impression of the Turkish
soldiers : —
" Always ready to fight (he wrote), they are
perfect heroes, never conquered except by over-
powering numbers, their motto might well be
' While we have life we will fight.' "
The Turks defeated in the Balkan War njay
well lia%-e regretted that in 1 883 this magnanimous
Englishman was not employed by the Sultan
to remodel the Turkish Army. The task, as
it happened, was entrusted to the military
theorist. Von der Goltz. Though, as Von
Bemhardi subsequently pointed out, it was to
Prussia's advantage that Turkey should have
a strong armj', her agents failed to create one.
Gokz, like Moltke before him, could not, or did
not, do full justice to the splendid raw material
for armies in the Nearer East.
Kitchener's next tasK was to survey Cyprus,
which Sur Garnet Wolseley had been sent out
to govern. He organized a system of land
registration, made a map of the island, and
contributed to Blackwood's Magazine a bright
description of the country, with suggestions
how it might be developed commercially.
During his stay in Cyprus he was appointed
Vice-Consul at Erzeroum in Asia Minor.*
Since 1874 he had become familiar with the
manners, character, and languages of Arabs,
Turks, and Greeks.
In 1882 we find him in Alexandria when the
bombardment of the city was imminent. He
took refuge on a ship during the shelling of the
forts, and doubtless witnessed Beresford's daring
handling of the Condor. When Wolseley arrived
to restore order in the Valley of the Nile emploj'-
ment was naturally found for the Arabic-
speaking Kitchener, who served through the
Tel-el-Kebir campaign as a major of Egyptian
cavalry. His knowledge of Arabic and of
Orientals had stood him in good stead.
Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed Sirdar of
the Egyptian Army, and Kitchener became
second-in-command of the Egyptian cavalry.
At the end of 1883 he took a holiday in the
form of joining a party which proposed to
survey the Sinai peninsula — a dangerous
undertaking, since the Arabic scholar. Pro-
fessor Palmer, with two officers had just been
murdered in that district. He started from
Suez on the 10th November, 1883. On the last
day of December Kitchener, at ended by four
Arabs, returning to Egypt, left for Ismailia.
The return of Kitchener to Egypt coincided
with the departure of Gordon to the Sudan, a
province Gordon had already governed from 1877
to 1879. TheMahdi had appeared in July, 1881,
and, after several reverses which had not shaken
the belief of his adherents in his divine mission,
had annihilated an Egyptian Army under
Hicks Pasha, sent to suppress the rising in the
Sudan. In accordance with the wishes of the
popular journalist, Mr. W. T. Stead, and
contrary to those of Lord Cromer (then Sir
Evelyn Baring), the rfe facto ruler of Egypt,
Gordon was dispatched . to Khartum and
appointed Governor-General of the Sudan.
His glorious and astonishing record in China
had apparently hypnotized the British Govern-
ment into imagining that among black savages,
who were as unlike the Chinese as any persons
could well be, he could perform mira(des at a
trifling cost. Gordon disobeyed orders from
home, but that was to bo expected from ono
• " The Life of Lord Kitchener," by F. W. Haokwood (Collins).
P. 07.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
287
FIELD-MARSHAL EARL KITCHENER, Secretary of State for War.
[From thg painting by AnfieU,
w}io did not regard material as superior to
naoral considerations. Some of liis mea.siires
may have been wrong, but errors may be
excused in a white man isolated among cruel
black men, who were then very low down
in the scale of humanity. He reached Khartum
on February 18, 1884, but by that date the
defeat ■ of Baker Pasha on Fcbruar^■ 5
at El-Teb had rendered his position most
precarious. Kitchener had in 1877 met
Valentine Baker commanding Turks during the
Russo-Turkish War. The victories of General
Graham over the Mahdi's general, Osman
Digna, at the second battle of El-Teb and at
Tamaniab (March 13, 1884) were not sufficient to
restore the situation. Kliartum had beou
288
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
^/Ui ^ l^ct::: ^.^yl^ ^w^ .L^
^ >- -i' ~ *-y^'" *^-t~.i^ v-vwXj "ZSCr .-^^L-O^ -
W^C/A-i./». _ t//vw«<<
ioo. «-K-. uJLl^^i~r^ IfXiUU. At^t'^ ""vR A. ««n^ aO^,»0
COPY OF ENTRY IN GORDON'S JOURNAL REFERRING TO LORD KITCHENER.
\by permission of Messrs, Ke^an, Paul and Trench,
besieged in April, and Gordon witli Colonel
Stewart and Mr. Tower were the only white men
left in the city.
The news that Gordon was cut off from
Egypt reached England, and the British
people realized that something was at stake
higher than the lowering of the franchise.
If Gordon were left to perish the honour of tlie
nation would be tarnished. The Goverimient
decided that Lord Wolsoley was at all costs to
relieve Khartum.
Meanwhile, Kitchener was acting a no less
heroic part than Gordon himself. As an officer
of the Egyptian Intelligence Department he
had gone alone, or accompanied by Lieutenant
(now General Sir Leslie) Rundle, among
the tribes tlirough which a relieving force
would have to move. Disguised as an
Arab, and, Hke Napoleon in the Russian
campaign, carrying poison about his person,
bo proceeded to Dongola and beyond, en-
deavouring by argument and bribes to keep the
natives from joining the False Prophet. The
war correspondent, Bennet Burleigh, who with
reckless courage had passed through Dongola,
met him at Debbeh. " In manner," wrote
Mr. Bennet Burleigh, " Captain Kitchener is
good-natured, a listener rather than a talker,
but readily pronouncing an opinion if it is
cafled for. All his life," added Mr. Burleigh,
" ho has been, par excellence, a ' volunteer '
noldier — volunteering, time and again, for one
difficult and dangerous duty after another."
If Gordon could have followed the movements
of Kitchener, he would have deleted certain
criticisms in his Journal. It is pleasant,
however, to reflect — as the passage reproduced
above from the original journal shows — that he
realized to some extent the unique qualities
of his fellow countryman. " I like Baker's
description of Kitchener," he wrote on Novem-
ber 26, 1884, two months before he was killed.
Baker had observed in a letter to Gordon that
Kitchener was " one of the few very superior
British officers."
By October Wolseley had arrived at Wady
Haifa and Kitchener (now a Major), as Deputy
Assistant Adjutant — and Quartermaster-General
on the Intelligence Staff, accompanied General
Stewart in his dash across the desert from Korti
to Metemmeh. To his annoyance Kitchener
was recalled before Metemmeh was reached.
Though Stewart won the battle of Abu Klea,
the expedition failed. Gordon perished, and
the Sudan was abandoned for years to the Mahdi
and his successor, the Khalifa.
When Gordon fell. Kitchener was thirty-four
years old. His intellect hai been sharpened and
his character hardened through years of
semi-solitary and dangerous work. Masterful
and original by nature, as his action in joining
the French Army had shown, he had been
steadily moving away from the beaten track
followed by the vast majority of his stereotyped
contemporaries. To them he bore much the
same relation as Sven Hedin* did to
the ordinary globe-trotter. He now, in
disgust, threw up his commission in the
Egyptian Army and paid one of liis infre-
quent visits to England. A I,ieuten ant-Colonel,
he next accepted the post of a Boundary Com-
missioner for Zanzibar.f His knowledge of
•surveying had again stood him in good stead.
• The Swedish traveller : lie Is au almircr ot Lord Kitchener,
t " lord Kitchener." by H. G. Groser, p. 10.>.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
2S9
GORDON'S LAST STAND AT KHARTUM.
January 26, 1885.
I From tin painting by George IV. Joy.
By courtesy c/ the Graphic
The next year (1886) he was appointed Govemor-
•Coneral of the Rod Sea Littoral and Comman-
<lant of Sviakin. Hitherto, when not on his
lonelyand venturesome journeys, he had been a
ser\'ant. He was now, in no small measure,
liis own master.
At Sualdn he was on the eastern flank
■of the Dervisli theocratic despotism. The
Mahdi had died a few months after his cele-
brated victim's murder. Ho had shifted the
capital from Khartum, which hes in the fork
formed by the confluence of the WTiite and
Blue Nilcs, to Omdurman, a Uttlo to the north,
below the junction of tlic two rivers, on the west
l)ank. Ho had chosen as liis successor his lieu-
tenant, a villain, by nanw AbduUahi. The most
290
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE BOMBARDMENT
MEN OF H.M.S. INVINCIBLE
thoughtful of modern historians, the Italian
Ferrero, in his work on Militarism has lucidly de-
cribed the characteristic features of the short-
lived Kaliphate of Omdurman. The reader
who wishes to contrast African with German
barbarities may be referred to Ferrero's book,
to Mr. Winston Chiu-chill's " River War," to
the reminiscences of the Khalifa's captive,
Slatin Pasha, and to Steevens's " With Kitchener
to Khartum."
From the intellectual standpoint the Khalifa's
FIELD-MARSHAL SIR EVELYN WOOD.
{Laiay0lt*.
OF ALEXANDRIA.
CHEERING THE CONDOR.
I By courtesy of The Graphic.
tyranny was contemptible. The Khalifa, with'
the assistance of slave-dealers and mercenaries,
ruled by brute force alone. The population and
the resources of his kingdom dwindled year
by year. Kitchener began a crusade against
the lascivious monster who had pushed against
Suakin the ablest of his officers, the ubiquitous
Osman Digna.
The advantage of having at Suakin an officer
who could speak Arabic like a native, and under-
stood the Arab character, was at once apparent.
Kitchener made friends with tribes in the
neighbourhood, and speedily precipitated them
on his clever and cunning opponent. On
October 7, 1886, Osman Digna's stronghold
at Tamai was stormed by " Friendlios," and a
great store of rifles and ammunition captured.
At the end of 1887 the " Friendlies "again routed
the Dervish leader, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Kitchener decided to make an effort to capture
him. On January 17, 1888, he surprised
Osman Digna's camp, but was struck by a bullet
which traversed his jaw and entered his neck. To
get cured of his wound, Kitcliener departed to
Cairo, and, later, to England. He was,
however, soon back at his post and assisted the
Sirdar, General GrentoU, on December 20 of the-
same year to rout the Dervishes at Gomaizeh,
in the vicinity of Suakin. The following year
he led the decisive charge of the Hussars and
Egyptian cavalry at the battle of Toski,
August 3, 1889. Sir Evelyn Wood had ceased
to be Sirdar in 1885, and had been succeeded by.
Sir Francis (afterwards Lord) Orenfeil.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
291
Kitchener was now Adjutant-General of the
Egyptian Army, and from 1890 to 1891 tom-
porary commander of the Police.* In 1892,
on the resignation of Sir Francis Grenfoll, he
was chosen by Lord Cromer for the post of Sirdar.
That illustrious statesman, nine years his
senior, had been through Woolwich, had
entered the Royal Artillery and won the
Wellington Prize. Lord Cromer's opinion of
Lord Kitchener as a soldier contained in his
"Modern Egypt," published in 1908, is not,
therefore, the opinion of a mere layman. He
is describing Lord Kitchener at the opening of
the campaign which was to end with the
capture of Omdurman :^
A better choice could not have been made. Young,
energetic, ardently and exclusively devoted to his
profession, and, as the honourable scars on his face
testified, experienced in Sudanese warfare, Sir
Herbert Kitchener posssssod all the qualities neces-
sary to bring the campaign to a successful issue.
Like many another military commander, the bonds
which united liim and his subordinates were those of
stern discipline on the one side, and, on the other, the
respect duo to superior talent and the confidence felt
in the resourcefulness of a strong and masterful
spirit, rather than the afftictionate obedience yielded
to the behests of a genial chief. When the campaign
was over, there were not wanting critics who whispeied
that Sir Herbert Kitchener's success had beec duo
as much to good luck as to good management If,
it was said, a number of events had hai/pened,
which, as a matter of fact, did not hapf-en, the
result might have been different. The samo may be
said of any military commander and of any campaign.
Fortune is proverbially fickle in war. . . . The
fact, however, is that Sir Herbert Kitchener's main
merit was that he left as little as possible to chance.
A lirst-rate military a<lministrator, every detail of
the machine, with which he had to work, received
' " Lord Kitchener." by H. G. Groser. p. 106.
ADMIRAL LORD CHARLES BERESFORD,
who commanded the Condor at the
bombardment of Alexandria.
1 LalayetU.
adequate attention. Before any decisive movement
was made, each portion of the machine was adapted,
so far as human foresight could provide, to perform
its allotted task.
Sir Herbert Kitchener also possessed another
quality which is rare among soldiers, and which
wa3 of special value under the circumstances then
^m
'■■■Se?**'*.'
%f>^
MAIN ATTACK ON DERVISH POSITION, BATTLE OF FIRKET.
[By courtisy o] thi CrapkU.
292
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL SIR F.
R. WINGATE.
lEIlioll & Fry.
existing. He did not think that extravagance was the
necessary handmaid of elViciency. On the contrary,
he was a rigid economist, and, whilst malting adequate
provision for all essential and necessary expenditure,
suppressed with a firm hand any tendency towards
waste and extravagance.
Lord Groiner's selection of Lord Kitchener
was amply justified. At last the engineer,
in Egypt turned cavalryman, was to have
an opportunity of organizing a large body of
troops and preparing for a campaign, not merely
for a battle. " In all our recent expeditions,"
wrote Sir Samuel Baker to him in 1892, " one
notes a general absence of military science."
There was an absence of the absence of military
science in the operations of Kitchener in the
valley of the Nile.
For the moment, indeed, there was
small prospect of . the Egyptian Army
being used to recover the Sudan. Lord
Cromer, owing to financial reasons, was not
anxious to spend Egyptian monoj' on
extending southwards the Egyptian frontier,
and the British Premier, Lord Salisbury (re-
placed later in the year by Mr. Gladstone),
distrusted enthiwiastic soldiers. " If the
soldiers were allowed full scope," he wrote
privately to Lord Cromer, " they would insist
on the importance of garrisoning the moon in
order to jjrotect as from Mars."* The Radical
Party, though it was a mistake (as the Germans
• ■■ Modem r.trvt." \ir tlie Va rl of Oromer. Vol. II.. p. 75.
afterwards discovered) to suppose that they
wore completely dominated by pacifists, also
opposed a forward policy. The Sudan was
associated in their minds with unpleasant
memories. Not until the return of Lord
Salisbury to power in 1896 was Kitchener
to be unleashed on the Khalifa ; and then only
at the instance of Italy, which had met with a
severe reverse (the battle of Adowa) at the hands
of the Abyssinians, who, it was then rumoured,
were in league with the Dervishes. The now
Sirdar's duties were at first confined to com-
pleting the process — commenced by Sir Evelyn
Wood and Sir Francis Grenfell — of turning
Egyptian peasants and Sudanese nomads into
brave, disciplined, and intelligent warriors,
and to discovering the resources and plans of
the Khalifa.
For Colonel Kitchener those duties were
easy. He had assisted Wood and Grenfell in
the task of training Egyptian and Sudanese
soldiers, and he fully understood the value of
and the appropriate measures for ascertaining
the forces and designs of an enemy.
He had himself been an Intelligence
Officer of extraordinary merit. He may have
known from personal experience, or from the
reports of eye-witnesses of the Franco-German
War, how greatly the triumph of Moltke had
been due to the services of the spy, Stieber.
That a British general would resort to the dis-
gusting methods by which Stieber and his
successors prepared the way for German in-
vasions was, of course, unthinkable. Between
discovering through spies the plans of a savage
enemy, who is waiting at any moment to devas-
tate a civilized community, and sending in effect
an advance guard during peace time into a
civilized country, and instructing members of
that guard secretly to construct platforms for
heavy guns, or to manufacture bombs for the
destruction of bridges, railways, canals, and
reservoirs, there is a difference which, though
it may not be apparent to same Teutonic minds,
is a very real one. Bismarck might say, and in-
deed said, that Germany ought to be grateful
to him for " pursuing reptiles into their caves "
to .see what they were scheming ; the peoples
" peacefully " penetrated by Bismarck's
reptiles might be excused for resentting his
treacherous conduct. Lord Kitchener made
a legitimate use of spies, and Major (now
General Sir Reginald) Wingate, who was at the
head of his Intelligence Department, abiy
carried out his instructions. The Khalifa's
secrets were soon no secrets to the Sirdar. Ifi
1895 an Austrian, Slatin Pasha, who had been
captured by the Decvishes, escaped, and Slatin
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
293
CAPTURE OF THE KHALIFA'S BLACK FLAG AT OMDURMAN.
[By Courtesy 0/ the Graphic.
confirmed or added to the information already
collected by Major Wingate.
As has been mentioned, it was Italy's inter-
vention that set in motion the Egyptian Army.
On March 12, 1896, Lord Salisbury's Cabinet—
the Conservatives had been returned to office
in 1895 — suddenly decided that Dongola, which
had been abandoned, should be reoccupied, and
in June 2,500 Indian troops arrived at Suakin,
thereby releasing its Egyptian garrison for a war
in the valley of the Nile. The general lines of
the plan of campaign were settled by Kitchener
with Lord Cromer at Cairo ; a statesman with a
military training consulted with a soldier who
was to prove that he too was a statesman.
Seldom in British history had there been
294
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE FIRST BRITISH BRIGADE MARCHING OUT OF WAD HAMED.
[By courtesy of the Graphic,
80 fortunate a coiabination. Behind the
ruler of Egypt stood the wisest and most ex-
perienced of British diplomatists. Bismarck
might call Lord Salisbury a " lath painted to
resemble iron." To the brutal and cynical
Prussian Mr. Gladstone (whom the acute Ameri-
can psychologist, William James, credited with
as much or more will-power than was possessed
by Napoleon) was " Professor " Gladstone. The
conjunction of Salisbury, Cromer, Kitchener
pointed to the immediate destruction of the
detestable tyranny of the Mahdi's successor.
Two questions dominated the coming cam-
paign. Would Egyptian troops, even with
superior weapons, face the most fanatical
savages in Africa ? How was the Army to
bo fed and supplied with ammunition on its
advance to the Dervish capital ?
" The main point," we quote from Lord
Cromer's Modern Egypt, " was to bring
on an action at an early period of the
campaign. Once victorious, even on a
small scale, the Egyptian troops would
acquire confidence in themselves, and the
enemy would be proportionately discouraged."
The disastrous defeats of Baker Pasha and
Hicks Pasha were still present in the minds of
the Egyptian soldiers, and the recent discom-
fiture of the Italians by the Abyssinians had
shaken the prestige of Eiu'opeans. The Der-
vishes at the battle of Debra Sin in 1887 had
routed the Abyssinians and sacked Gondar,
the ancient capital of the Negus, and though
the Negus John had -won a victory over the
Dervishes in 1889, the Abyssinian monarch had
been killed in the action, and the Abyssinian
rearguard, retiring before the Dervishes, cut to
pieces. The body of the dead Negus had
been captured and carried in triumph to
Omdurman. If attacked by the Khalifa's
followers, would the small Egyptian Army fare
any better than had the large armies of the
Abyssinians who had been beaten by the
Dervishes ten years before ? As Lord Cromer
observes, " the smallest check had above all
things to be avoided. It would be magnified in
the eyes of the world, and although perhaps of
sUght intrinsic importance would produce a
bad moral effect." The Commissioners of the
Egyptian Debt representing France and Russia,
then opposed to Great Britain's guardianship of
Egypt, objected to the expedition and to the
expenses being paid out of the General Keserve
Fund, from which £E.500,000 had been drawn
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
296
to cover the outlay. The dissenting Com-
missioners liad at once commenced an action
against the Egyptian Government in the Mixed
Tribunal of First Instance at Cairo.
The other question, the feeding and muni-
tioning of the Army, was also a difficult one.
Omdurman, it is true, was on the Nile, which
might be used for the transport of food, baggage,
and arms. But it was by no means certain that
the capture of Omdurman would end the war.
The expedition'b base would be Wady Haifa on
the Nile. There was a railway as far as Sarras, a
little to the south of Wady Haifa and of the second
Cataract. But between Sarras and Omdurman
four more cataracts obstructed tlie Nile. During
high Nile, however, the river between Wady
Haifa and Omdurman was navigable, and gun-
boats could accompany the invaders as they
advanced, though " everybody told the Sirdar
that he would never get the gunboats over the
Fourth Cataract."* With unlimited money —
the money, it happened, was ,very limited — the
navigation of the Nile would have been, com-
paratively speaking, an easy affair. The ascent
of the Nile with second-rate steamboats,
sailing boats and barges was another matter.
The wind would not be, nor was it always,
favourable, and delays on the banks of the Nile
under a blazing sun might spell disease and
insubordination among the troops.
• •■ With Kitchener to Khartum." bj O. W. Steevens, p. 103.
There were those further considerations. If the
Salisbury Cabinet fell, the expeditionary force
might be recalled, and also — if he did not hasten
his progress — the Sirdar might find on the Upper
Nile a French expeditionary force in theoretical,
or the Abyssinians in actual, possession of the
lost Egyptian province.
On July 26, 1890, indeed. Major Marchand
landed at Loango, in the French Congo,
to organize an expedition to the Upper Nile.
The contention of the French diplomatists was
that the Sudan had become a res nullius — a
no-man's land which, like a desert island, might
be appropriated by the first comer.
The perfection of the Sirdar's arrangements
for surmounting the obstacles in his path
diminished those obstacles in the eyes of hia
contemporaries.
On Slarch 20, 1896, Akaslia, fifty miles
south of Sarras, was occupied and by the
beginning of June joined by a railway
to Sarras. On the night of June 6 the Sirdar
directed two columns, numbering some 10,000
men, on a Dervish force of less than 4,000
encamped at Firket, sixteen miles south
of Akasha. The next morning the Dervishes
were surprised and routed at the trifling
cost of 20 killed and 80 wounded. Don-
gola was in the Sirdar's possession before the
end of September and the furthest Egyptian
outpost was fixed at Meroe (the frontier post of
THE BATTLE OF ATBARA.
FINAL CHARGE OF BRITISH AND EGYPTIAN TROOPS.
[By aourUsy of 'flu Graphic
295
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LORD KITCHENER LAYING THE FOUNDA-
TION-STONE OF THE AGRIGITLTURAL
COLLEGE, LUXOR.
Roman Egypt), situated at the foot of the
Fourth Cataract. The first Act of the campaign
had cost 411 lives (364 soldiers had died from
cholera and other diseases) and £E. 7 15, 000.*
Ascending the river, the Nile from VVady Haifa
to Korti runs southwards, from Korti to Abu
Hamed it turns north-eastwards. Along the base
— Wady Haifa-Abu Hamed — of the triangle,
Wady Haifa, Korti, Abu Hamed, the Sirdar
determined to construct a railway. The line
would run through the Nubian desert, and he
" launched his rails and sleepers into the water-
less desert wliile the other end of the line was
still held by the enemy."t Bimbashi (Sir
Percy) Girouard, who superintended the build-
ing of the railway, was a Canadian, afterwards
Director of Railways in South Africa. Before
the work was completed General Sir Archibald
Hunter, the sword-arm of the Eg3rptian Army
— to use Steevens's phrase — had moved from
Meroe to Abu Hamed. A Dervish garrison had
scattered before him.
From Abu Hamed 'the course of the Nile is
again southwards, and nearly half-way between
Abu Hamed and Omdurman a tributary, the
Atbara, rvms into it. A little to the north of the
junction of the Atbara and the Nile lies Berber,on
the eastern bank of the river. On August 31, 1897,
this town was in the hands of the invaders, and
the railway was now pushed forward from Abu
• •■ Modern Egypt IL," p. 91.
t •* With Kitcbeoet to Khartum." p. 39.
Hamed to Berber. January 1, 1898, the
Sirdar telegraphed to Lord Cromer that he
thought that " British troops should be sent
to Abu Hamed," and that " the fight for the
Sudan would appear to be likely to take place
at Berber." His request for reinforcements was
complied with and a British brigade had joined
him by the beginning of March. The Sirdar's
" forecast of the force which would be neces-
sary," remarks Lord Cromer, " was wonderfully
accurate. . . . Amongst other high military
qualities the Sirdar possessed the knowledge
of how to adapt his means to his end."
The second and last Act of the River
War is divided into two Scenes. The
first ends with the battle of the Atbara,
the second with the battle of Omdur-
man. To parry a counter-offensive against his
commimications, garrisons were kept by the
Sirdar at Meroe and Korti. In the angle north
of the junction of the Atbara and the Nile an
entrenched camp. Fort Atbara, was made.
In February, 1898, the Emir Mahmoud,who com-
manded the Dervish division on the western bank
of the Nile at Metemmeh, nearly half-way between
Fort Atbara and Omdurman, threw his troops
across the river and effected a junction with the
Sirdar's old enemy, Osman Digna, on the oppo-
site bank, at Shendi. The combined Dervish
forces advanced up the right bank of
the Nile to Aliab and then struck across
country to the Atbara. They were forced by
the Sirdar, who had moved up the Atbara to
Hudi, to take up a position at Nakheila, some
35 miles from its mouth, on the north bank.
THE EARL OF CROMER.
W. Wdtet Barnett.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
207
THE " SUDAN MILITARY RAILWAY.
Moving camp to Abu Hamed section.
The intention of Mahmoud had been to cross the
river, at that period of the year waterless, at
Hudi, and attack Berber and the railhead.
Mahmoud had been anticipated by the Sirdar,
whose east flank the Dervish leader was unable
to turn because the wells on the line of march
to Berber were either held by the Egj'ptians or
filled up.
The Dervishes had reached Nakheila on
March 20. Tlie following day the Sirdar moved
nearer to tlie enemy. " The deiour" says Mr.
[By coHTtfsy of The Graphic.
Winston Churchill, " which the Arabs would
have to make to march round the troops was
nearly doubled by this movement. The utter
impossibility of their flank march with a
stronger enemy on the radius of the circle was
now apparent."
The Sirdar's next step was to capture their
base on the Nile at Shendi. A flotilla, consisting
of tliree gunboats and boats on which were em-
barked some Egyptian troops, ascended the river
and took the town. On April 4 the Sirdar's force
C^
THE MAHDI'S TOMB, OMDLiRMAN.
Showing the damage caused by the gunboats.
'Captain E. A. Stanton^ Ov courtesv ot Th« Grat>hie.
298
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
of 14,000 men, including the British brigade
under General Gatacre, advanced still nearer to
Mahmoud's position, which had been located
by General Hvinter and reported by him to
be "a strong one with zariba (stockade)
and in heavy bush." The Sirdar took no un-
necessary risks, and a final reconnaissance
was made on April 5. Two days later, the
Egyptian Army, by a night march, arrived
before Mahmoud's zariba. At dawn the
bombardment of the Dervish camp began, and
at 7.40 a.m. on April 8 the Sirdar ordered it to
be stormed. "By 8.20 a.m.;" writes Mr.
Churchill, " the whole force " had " marched
completely through the position and shot or
bayoneted all in their path." Eighteen British,
16 native officers, and 525 men had been
killed or wovmded. Of Mahmoud's force
scarcely 4,000 escaped ; thousands had been
killed and Mahmoud himself was a prisoner.
Sir Horatio Kitchener's first engagement on
a large scale resembled a deftly performed
surgical operation.
Among the civilians who entered into the
zariba was the journalist, George Steevens.
He had reminded the British public that
the Sirdar's army was nearly 1,400 miles from
the sea, and about 1,200 from any place that
the things armies wanted could possibly come
from. " It had," ho said, " to be supplied
along a sand -banked river, a single line of rail.
MAJOR MARCHAND.
IBy courtesy oj The Graphic.
OSMAN DIGNA,
The Chief of the Mahdi's Generals.
[By courtesy of The Graphic.
which was carrying the material for its own
construction as well, and various camel-tracks.
That 13,000 men could ever have been brought
into this hungry limbo at all," he added,
" shows that the Sirdar is the only English
general who has known how to campaign in
this country."
Steevens was a man who had had a most
brilliant career at Oxford and in journalism.
It may interest the reader to see, if he has
not already seen it, the character-sketch
of Kitchener from the pen of one who
was by nature and education critical and
who had trained to a very high degree
his powers of observation and analysis.
Major-General Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener is 48
years old by tlie book ; but that is irrelevant. He
stands several inches over 6ft., straight as a lance,
and looks out imperiously above most men's heads ;
his motions are deliberate and strong ; slender but
firmly knit, he seems built for tireless, steel-wire en-
durance rather than for power or agility : that also
is irrelevant. Steady, passionless eyes sliaded by
decisive brows, brick-red rather full cheeks, a long
moustache beneath which you divine an immovable
mouth ; his face is harsh, and neither appeals for aftec-
tion nor stirs dislike. All this is irrelevant too :
neither age, nor figure, nor face, nor any accident of
person has any bearing on the essential Sirdar. You
could imagine the character just the same as if all the
externals were different. He has no nge but the prime
of life, no body but one to carry his mind, no face but
one to keep his brain behind. The brain and the will
are the essence and the whole of the man — a brain and
a will so perfect in their workings that, in the face of
extremest difiiculty, they never seem to know what
struggle is. You cannot imagine the Sinlar other\visc
than as seeing the right thing to do and doing it. His
precision is so inhumanly unerring, he is more like a
machine than a man. You feel that he ought to be
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
299
MAP ILLUSTRATING BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN EGYPT.
300
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LORD KITCHENER
Talking to Egyptian Officials.
[Zola^s Studios.
patented and shown wifcli pride at tlic Paris Interna-
tional Exhibition. British Empire : Exhibit No. I.
hors coytcovrSy the Sudan Machine.
The battle of the Atbara had been fought to
the east, the battle of Omdurman was fought
to the west of the Nile. The Army, reinforced
by a second British brigade and the 21st Lancers,
and by a battery of howitzers and two large
40-pounder guns, began in August to march
up the western bank. Three new gun-boats
had been brought up in sections, put to-
gether and launched. An advanced base was
formed, first at Wad Hamed and afterwards
upon Royan Island. Friendly Arab irregulars
kept step with the Expeditionary Force on the
opposite bank of the river.
It was on September 2, 1898, that the African
Attila was routed. He could oppose 50,000
fanatics against Kitchener's 22,000 troops.
But the fanatics were badly, the Egyptian
and Britisli soldiers well, armed. Tlie lOialifa's
eole chance of success had lain in a night
attack on the Egyptian camp, but he had
unaccountably preferred to stake his fortunes
in the daylight. Tlie details of the battle can
be studied in Mr. Churchill's " River War " and
in other works ; the criticism on Kitchener's
tactics may be left to Lord Roberts.
The Battle of Omdurman [he wrote] is a proof that
the Sirdar possesses all the qualities which are neces-
sary for a general commanding an army in the field :
clear judgment, sound common sense, tenacity of
purpose, quickness of i)erception, promptitude of
decision, and, above all, an infmite capacity for
taking pains, whilst his talent for organiz<vtion has
shone most conspicuously. It is owing to Iiord
Kitchener that the Egyptian Army has been turned
into such a splendid fighting machine, and it is to the
system of organi7.ation which he perfected in such a
masterly manner that the several details of the cam-
paign in the Sudan wore carried out without a hitcU
in the" face of considerable dilTiculties, and lie was
enabled to concentrate his force on the pl.-iins of
Omdurman almost to the hour at which he had pre-
dicted long before that Gordon should at last be
avenged."*
Judged by results, the Sirdar's conduct of the
battle was beyond reproach. Of the Dervish
host it has been estimated that 11,000 or so
were killed and 16,000 wounded. The British
losses did not exceed 400, of whom only a small
proportion were killed. Omdurman fell into
tlie hands of the conqueror, the Khalifa fled, and
Gordon had been avenged.
Kitchener's campaign in the valley of the Nile
had set up a new standard of efficiency in mili-
tary matters ; the tradition of " mudc'ling
through " was ended, and the result had been
obtained at a trifling cost in naen and money.
Naval officers who, like Lieutenant (now Rear-
Admiral) Beatty,took part in the expedition may
have had little to learu in respect of efficiency, but
to some soldiers in the British Army — and, above
all, to the British War Office — ^Kitchener had
tacitly administered a needed lesson.
In an article entitled " Campaigning with
Kitchener," which appeared in Blackwood's
Magazine for December, 1902, a staff officer
— glancing at the War Office — indicated one of
the causes of Kitchener's success.
None of our generals before Kitchener [wrote this
officer] ever attempted, still less succeeded in attempt-
ing, to wage war without orders, without forms, with-
'The Times, December 2. 1898.
The Late GEORGE W. STEEVENS.
lEUioU & Frv.
. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
301
-:-i'-:.i
-' i^'jiiiyi" V
THE SIRDAR, SIR H. H. KITCHENER, AND HIS A.D.C., BIMBASHI J. K. WATSON.
[By courtesy of The Graphic.
out states or paperasserie of any sort or kind. A
normal year's campaign in tlie Sudan began with the
issue of the ordre de bataille to tliose concerned and
ended witli the promulgation of the Queen's con-
gratulations at the close of the war. The rest of the
usually voluminous documents incidental to cam-
paigning are wanting, for the best of all reasons —
namely, that none ever existed.
When the average Aldershot general takes the field
he has foisted on him a mass of phenomenally
useless documents, which do more to cause general
(rouble and paralysis than any acts of the enemy.
I could name a campaign not a thousand miles from
Suakin that was entirely ruined by them. But
Kitchener's oilice stationery consisted of a sheaf
of telegraph forms which he carried in his helmet and
a pencil which he carried in his pocket — 'and that
sufficed. Moreover, he soldoni read an official letter,
and never wrote one, and how much wear and tear
was thereby saved let those say who have had the
misfortune to serve under generals afflicted with the
curse of penmanship.
The picture might be overcoloiired, but it
threw into relief an essential feature of
20J
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. .
1
1
1
1
I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^BB^t ,<^ ■«5»^^^^^^^B
^
I^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HJ L ^^^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B
^P'**"*
H^E^^^B
1
1
COLONEL SIR PERCY GIROUARD.
[LafayttU.
Kitchener's methods. He saved time and lie
saved money by ignoring antiquated precedent
and out-of-dat« examples. " The financial
Buccess," comments Lord Cromer, " was no less
remarkable than the military. The total cost
of the campaign of 1896-98 was £B.2,354,000,
of which £E. 1,200,000 was spent on railways and
telegraphs and £E. 155,000 on gunboats. The
military expenditure, properly so called, only
amounted to £E.996,000."
Five days after the battle of Omdurman,
on September 7, news of a grave character
reached the Sirdar. Europeans had arrived at
Fashoda on the White Nile. Sending the jour-
nalists back to Cairo, he steamed up the river
to ascertain the facts for himself, taking on board
his boats a considerable force, a battery of
artillery and four Maxim guns. On September
18 he approached Fashoda and discovered Major
Marchaud there with a handful of black soldiers
and a few French officers. Marchand was
claiming the country in the name of France. An
interview took place between the French ex-
plorer and the British general, who, as a youth,
had fought for France. Marchand reports the
conversation that passed between them : —
" Do you know. Major, that tliia affair may set
France and England at war ? "
I bowed, without replying. General Kitchener
(ose. H^ was very pale. I also rose. Kitchener
gazed at his 2,000 ; then at my fort, on the ramparts
ot which the btfyonets gleamed.
" We are the stronger," Kitchener remarked after
his leisurely survey.
" Only a flght can settle tliat," was Marchand's
reply.
" Right you are," was the Englishman's reply,
" come along, let's have a whisky and soda."*
According to Dr. Emily, who was with
Marchand, the Sirdar, unlike one of his com-
panions, was exceedingly tactful. A slip on his
part might have caused war between France
and England and the history of the world have
been changed.
If he was, it is not to be wondered that the
Sirdar was " very pale." The cautious Bismarck
had been dismissed by tlie flighty William II. in
1890, which was the year of the publication of
Captain Mahan's " Influence of Sea Power upon
History " — a work which was to have such an in-
fluence on the Kaiser. The Kiel Canal had been
opened in 1895, the Kaiser's telegram dispatched
to Kruger in 1896. German intrigues in Turkey
were notorious, and it was announced that the
German Emperor and Empress were to visit
at the end of 1898 Constantinople and Jerusalem.
A war between the two groat democracies of
Western Europe would have been for both
suicidal, and, thanks mainly to Kitchener's
delicate handling of the negotiations with
Marchand, the danger of a collision between
France and Great Britain vanished. It is not
the least of the services which have been ren-
dered by Kitchener to the British nation.
The victory of Omdurman was rewarded with
a peerage, and Lord Kitchener returned to
England. He met with an enthusiastic wel-
come. Lord Salisbury, who as a scientist dis-
liked rhetoric, praised him unreservedly.
He will remain [said tlie then Premier] a striking
figure, not only adorned by the valour iiiul patriotism
which all successful generals can show, but with the
most extraordinary combination of calculation, of
strategy, of statesmanship, which it ever fell to any
general in these circumstances to display. . .
He took exactly the time necessary tor his work ;
he made precisely the preparations which that work
required ; he expended upon it the time, the resource,
and the military strength precisely which it demanded,
and his victory came out with absolute accuracy,
like the .answer to a scientific calculation.
Perhaps, however, the tribute which Lord
Kitchener valued most was the £120,000
raised at his instance for the foundation of a
Gordon Memorial College. " Those who have
conquered." he said, " are called upon to civi-
lize," and he proposed to civilize the Sudanese
by educating them. The foundation-stone
was laid by him in January, 1899, and the
College opened by him in 1902. Tlirough the
Gordon Memorial College he spread the
English language and British ideas on the
• " Lord Kitchener of Khartoum," by the Author of
Edward the Seventh " (Nlsbet). p. 92.
King
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
■6^'S
Upper Nile. Further, a new Khartum was
planned by hira.
At the end of 1899 he was suddenly sum-
moned to the seat of the Boer War. As Lord
Roberts's Chief of the Staff, he contributed
greatly to the victories of the Field-Marshal.
At Paardeberg he was virtually in command,
but, as General Maurice observed, " he entirely
lacked any stafi adequate to watch over for
him the general scope of the action." Paarde-
berg, though a drawn, was for the British a
successful battle. " Cronje's mobility," again
to quote General Maurice, " was destroyed
and his oxen and horses killed and scattered,
the spirit of his burghers crushed. The Boer
commandos imprisoned in the bed of the
Modder were, in fact, doomed."
Lord Roberts had eulogized Lord Kitchener's
tactics at Omdurman. He had now an oppor-
tunity of personally acquainting himself with
Lord Kitchener's qualities. After resigning
the command in South Africa to him, he told
the public that he had " implicit confidence "
in Lord Kitchener's " judgment and military
skill " and that " no one could have laboured
more incessantly or in a more self-effacing
manner than Lord Kitchener had done, and no
one coiild have assisted him more loyally without
a thought of self-aggrandizement." In the
latter connexion we may mention that, when it
was suggested by the Government that Sir
Evelyn Wood, his old chief, should serve under
him in South Africa, Lord Kitchener refused
to entertain the idea, but offered instead to
serve under his senior offiier.
As Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, Lord
Kitchener will be chiefly remembered for his
blockhouse system and his efforts to bring the
war to a satisfactory conclusion without
humiliating the Boers. Wliile there can be little
doubt but that the bloclthouse system, and the
"drives" incidental to it, materially shortened
the war, it is certain that the loyalty of the
Boers during the Great War was very largely
due to his firm but kindly treatment of that
brave and patriotic people. Years after.
General Botha publicly called Lord Kitchener
his " old war friend."
The quotation below is from a report of a
speech of Lord Kitchener delivered at Cape
Town when he was on the point of leaving
South Africa : —
Lord Kitchener, in reply, said he accepted
the presentation sword as an honour dono
to the Army. To liis relief he had found
that the Capo Colonists did not denounce
martial law, for which he was primarily
responsible. Without it the farmers of the
colony would have been either actually
or politically dead. The farmers hud been
fed with lies, not always told thorn in
Dutch, until they thought the British people
were a nation of monsters. Martial law
had then stepped in and prevented people
from taking a fatal step. It had also been
effective in preventing munitions of war
from reaching the enemy. Now that peace
had come, he asked them all to put aside
racial feelings, and also to put aside " leagues "
and " bonds," and to strive for the welfare
of their common colony. Briton and Boer
had had a good fujht, and they uere now shaking
hands after it. It was a happy augury for
the future that the people of Cape Colony had
not dealt in a vindictive spirit with the ques-
tion of the rebels. Lord Kitchener con-
cluded by expressing the hope that all the
colonists would soon become again a happy
and united family as Providence meant- them
to be.
The Boer War had ended by June, 1902,
and once again Lord Kitchener was in his native
country. During his brief stay he made some
weighty pronouncements on the duty of pre-
paring in peace time for war. Thus, addressing
FIELD-MARSHAL LORD GRENFELL.
ILafayilU.
304
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Yeomanry at Welshpool in September, 1902, he
spoke as follows : —
You Yeomanry have had some experience
of what it means to be more or less untrained
in war, and how greatly a man, whatever his
spirit and pluck may be, is handicapped by
want of training in a fight. Y^ou, therefore,
well realize witli mo how essential it is that
the j'oung men of the country should join the
military forces and become trained by those
who have reaped experience during this war,
so that they may in their turn be ready, if the
necessity should arise, to take their place as
trained men in the ranks. You must not for-
get that we shall not always have, nor do we
wish to have, a war that lasts long enough to
train our men during the campaign. It is,
therefore, I think, of vital importance that
everyone, whether in this country or in that
Greater Britain beyond the seas, should rea-
lize that it is the bounden duty and high
privilege of every British able-bodied man to
defend and maintain that great Empire, the
citizenship of which we have inlierited and
the honour and glory of which the men of the
Empire are determined shall, as far as lies in
their power, be handed on untarnished to
those that foUow us.
A few days before he had spoken to much the
same effect at Stockton-on-Tees and had,
besides, appealed to capitalists to employ,
whenever they could, the soldiers who had
fought in South Africa.
I would take this opportunity of reminding
you that a great number of the very best of
those men who were with me in South
Africa have now returned, or are returning,
to their homes in this country. These men
have a certain amount of money which will
enable them to have a holiday with their
people. But after that tliey will want em-
ployment ; and I maintain that, . having
merited the approbation of their countrymen
by their services in South Africa, it is not too
much to ask that some direct step should be
taken in great industrial centres like this, and
amongst large employers of labour, to find
them good, permanent, wage-earning posi-
tions.
The next post to be filled by Lord Kitchener
was that of Commander-in-Chief in India, where
he resided from the en dof 1902 to September,
1909. The term Commander-in-Chief was,
however, a misnomer, since th? Commander-
in-Chief's control of the Army was shared with
another soldier, the Military Member of Council.
To abolish this dual control became an object
of Lord Kitchener. The Viceroy, Lord Curzon,
opposed him, and an unfortunate quarrel arose,
which finished with the resignation of the
Vioerov.
VIEW OF KHARTUM AND OMDURMAN.
[Record Press.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
305
In his Mimite.s of January 1 and March 18,
1905, Lord Kitchener stated his ciuso against
dual control.
In no other department of the Government of
India, he objected, was it considered necessary
to liave a dual control. The offices of the
Commander-in-Chief and Military Member,
owing to the dual system, became " paper-
logged with more or less unnecessary verbiage."
One of the chiej faults of tlie Indian
system is the enormous delay and endless dis-
cussion which it involves. It is mipossiblo
to formulate or carry out any consistent
military policy. No needed reform can he
initiated, no useful measure can he adopted,
without being subject to vexatious and, for tJie
most part, unnecessary criticism — not merely
as regards the financial effect of the proposal,
but as to its desirability or necessity from, the
purely military poini of view. The fault
lies simply in the system, which has created
two offices which have been trained to un-
fortunate jealousy and antagonism and which,
therefore, duplicate work, and in the duplica-
tion destroy progress and defeat the true
ends of military efficiency. The system is one
of dual control and divided responsibility.
It is a system of " want of trust," such as that
which has recently been condemned and
abolished in the Army at home.
In India, as in England, it was " owing to the
defects in the higher administration of the Army
that essentials had been disregarded and military
progress and efficiency had not kept pace with
the times." The Military Department had no
direct relations with the Army, and, being a
civil department, were out of touch with the
troops. " It is true," he added, " they keep
records and opinions which thej' quote from
time to time ; but these are generally anti-
quated." He felt it was his " imperative duty "
to state his conviction that the then present
system was " faulty, inefficient, and incapable
of the expansion necessary for a great war in
which the armed might of the Empire would be
engaged in a life and death struggle," and he
quoted the example of Japan as showing what
could be done by thoroughly enlightened and
up-to-date methods of army administration.
Lord Kitchener had, to a considerable extent,
his own way. The Military Member disappeared ;
the new Viceroy, Lord Minto, sympatliized with
Lord Kitchener's aims. The reforms which the
Commander-in-Chief made both during and after
Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty were far-reaching.
In a Memorandum of April 11, 1904, he had
pointed out that " nothing was more essential
for complete preparation in peace and for
LORD KITCHENER'S STATUE AT
CALCUTTA.
IBoumt Gr SfupJurd, India.
successful operation in war than that an army
should have a thoroughly trained and highly
educated general staff." Accordingly a Staff
College at Quetta was created. The stress
which he laid on education may be gathered
from an extract from the same Memorandum : —
We must follow a system of training for
war suited to the vastly changed conditions
of the present day, and stedfastly eliminate
all obsolete traditions. In all ranks, from the
private soldier to the General Officer, each
step up the ladder requires a corresponding
increase in knowledge, in self-reliance, in the
power of initiative, in the habit of readily
accepting responsibility, and in the faculty of
command, qualities which can be attained
only by unremitting study combined with
constant practice.
It is recognized that it is the duty of a com-
manding officer to educate and train his men
in all branches of soldiering, but hitherto it
has not been so generally imderstood that this
holds equally true as regards tlie education
and training of the officers serving under him.
The plea that teaching is a difficult art which
it is given to few to acquire is one wlueh cannot
be accepted. The whole secret of preparing
for war is a matter of training and instruction,
and commanding or other officers who profess
or show their incapacity as instructors, ^nd
their inability to train and educate those under
them for all the situations of modern war, must
be deemed unfit for the positions they hold.
306
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL DE WET.
[Russell & Sons.
[By courtesy of tlie Graphic.
The system at present in force in India,
whereby officers are sent to garrison classes to
prepare for their promotion examinations,
is particularly faulty. Knowledge thus
crammed up in the course of a few weeks,
only to be forgotten as soon as the examina-
tion is passed, is in no sense education. In
future the military education of officers must
be imparted within their, regiments ; it must
commence from the day they join and con-
tinue until they leave the service.
Among other measures he rearmed and .re-
distributed the Army and did everything he
could to promote decentralization of work and
devolution of authority. His object throughout
was to prepare the Army for war, not peace
manoeuvres.
" My sole aim," he said m a farewell speech,
" ... has been to place the administra-
tion of the Army in India on a business footing."
) A modern army [he continued] is not, as is
sometimes erroneously supposed, a costly
toy maintained for purposes of ceremonial
and display, nor, on the other hand, is it an
instrument of aggression to be used for
national or individual aggrandizement. It
is simply an insurance acnins-t national
disaster ; and the expenditure incurred on it
is strictly comparable with private expendi-
ture on similar precautionary measures.
The first business condition necessary to
justify our military expenditure is that the
army maintained should be in a thoroughly
efficient state, and, therefore, able, at all
times of need, to carry out whatever may
be expected from its numerical strength.
Expenditure of money on an inefficient
army can no more be defended than the pay-
ment of premia to an insolvent company.
Created Field-Marshal in 1909 he returned
home from India via China, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand, and the United States. The
Governments of Australia and New Zealand
called him in as a specialist to advise them on
military affairs.
In 1911 he was appointed British Agent
and Consul-General in Egypt, and he was
holding that position when the Great War
broke out. His reports on the finances, ad-
ministration, and condition of Egypt and the
Sudan are additional evidence of his untiring
energy, comprehensive ability, and genuine
benevolence.
Here is a last quotation from his writings :
" The development and elevation of the char-
acter of a people depends mainly on the growth
of self-control and the power to domiaate
natural impulses, as well as on the practice of
unobtrusive self -reliance and perseverance, com-
bined with reasoned determination."
Such in brief outline had been the career of
the British Minister of War who succeeded Mr.
Asquith in the " paper-logged" offices at White-
hall. Respected and admired in Great Britain,
the Colonies, India, France, and Russia, and
feared in Germany, Lord Kitchener was
obviously the right man to direct the
military forces of the Empire. A Prussian
Staff Officer who had been sent to study
him during the Omdurman Campaign published
at the time his impressions of the Sirdar
" Lord Kitchener is animated," Major von
Tiedemarm informed the Germans, "with
keen ambition, but he does not covet favour
with the crowd ; he knows that everytliing he
does and orders is right and proper." At the
Battle of Omdurman the Prussian remarked
that Lord Kitchener " was cool and perfectly
calm " and " gave his orders without in the
least raising his voice " and " always made the
right arrangements at the right moment."
. . . He seemed to be " absolutely in-
different to personal danger," but never to do
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
307
anything o>ib of bravado. " Acting," said
tliis critic, " is out of the question with him ;
he is alv\ays porfoctly natural."
Summarizing the campaign, Major von Tiodo-
mann observed : — " Thus Lord ICitchoner waited
unconcernedly for the right moment, but pounced
with eaglo-Iike swiftness and certainty upon
his prey and dealt the decisive blow in a
surprisingly short time. He had neglected
nothing."
From the Omdurman campaign onwards
the over-trained soldiers of Germany, who had
come to believe that they had almost a mono-
poly of military science, watched with uneasiness
the movements of the " Man of Khartiun."
If in the years before the Great War he had been
placed at the War Office and not at Cairo, it
is conceivable that the German plans for leaping
upon Europe would have been laid aside, or,
at all events, postponed. The Omniscient at
Potsdam had a wholesome respect for him — a
lespect which the Germans certainly did not
extend to any " political " Minister of War.
Carljle had told the Germans that Great
Britain was inhabited mostly by fools. The
knaves at Berlin perceived that here was a
Briton who was neither fool nor Ivnave.
Lord Kitchener was the soldier-representative
of British civilization, just as the barbarian who
invited his soldiers to contemplate with cheerful
submission the possibility of their having, in
The late GENERAL CRONJE.
[By courtesy of Tbs Graphic
obedience to Jiis orders, to shoot their own
fathers and brothers, who bade liis soldiers give
no quarter to the Cliinese, and who commanded
SIGNING THE TREATY AT THE END OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR.
ISydiuy P. Hall, MMJO. By courttay of Tht Graphic
SOS
THE TJMESi HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LORD KITCHENER LEAVING
BELGRAVE-SQUARE.
[A/«(J5 Futures.
or acquiesced in the devastation of Belgium re-
presented the forces of disorder that had sur-
vived from ages when brigands and pirates were
revered as heroes. To Lord Kitchener waging
war was a painful duty, not a pleasant, exciting
and lucrative occupation. While General von
Liebert, ex-Governor of German East Africa,
was asserting in a German Court of Justice
that " in Africa it was impossible to get on
without cruelty," Lord Kitchener's life was one
long protest against that inhuman doctrine.
His character and conceptions of government
take us back through the centuries to the
wisest and noblest of the Roman administrator-
soldiers. A few years before the birth of Christ
there was living in the Roman Empire a
personage who, allowing for the progress that
humanity has made in the interval, possessed
many of the qualities which distinguish the
refounder of Khartum. The character of
Agrippa, the bvisinoss manager of Augustvis,
has been drawn by the inspiring historian,
Ferrero.
" Agrippa," ho observes, " was a representa-
tive of the true Roman character. . . . To
tlio fine qualities of his race ho had been able to
add the attractions of culture. Gifted with an
intellect both bold and agile, practical and eager
to learn, proud but at the same time simple,
strong, sure, and faithful, he had been both a
general and an admiral, an architect, a geogra-
pher, a writer, a collector of works of art, and
an administrator of public departments. For
32 years without a moment's relaxation his
varied and inexhaustible talents had been
placed at the service of his party during the civil
wars, and afterwards devoted to the republic and
its people. . . . Destiny had for ever
attached his name to the facade of the Pantheon,
in the centre of the world, and had placed it
above the generations who were to pass before
this imperishable monxunent, but destiny had
been unwilling to make him Caesar's equal by
granting him time for the conquest of Ger-
mania."
Lord Kitchener had kept aloof from the
mimic warfare of party politics. When the
Great War burst forth he had been serving his
Monarch and his country in the field or in the
Council Chamber for over 40 years.
His childhood had been spent amid the
echoes of the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny.
He had lived to see the Russians and the
Indians facing with the British the same foe, and
to see his countrymen as a body follow the
example he had set them in 1870, when, a
youth, he had joined the heroic Frenchmen
who were struggling with the forces of " blood
and iron" which then, as in 1914, were seeking
to destroy France.
Would destiny grant Lord Kitchener time to
organize the military forces of the British
Empire so that they might decisively tiirn the
scale in the struggle with Pan-Germanism ?
On August 5, 1914, he shouldered the immense
burden which had been suddenly thrvist upon
his shoulders. As his instructions to tho
soldiers who were leaving for the seat of war
show, he was, as ever, calm and self-reliant.
Between those instructions and the Kaiser's
orders no greater contrast could well be imagined.
We end this chapter by quoting in extenso
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAU.
3u:)
Lord Kitchoiior's messajie to each member
of the Expeditionary Army : —
You are ordered aliroad as a soldier of the
King to help our French comrades against
tlie invasion of a common enemy. You have
to perform a task which will need your
courage, yoiu- energy, your patience. Re-
member that the honour of the British Army
depends on your individual conduct.
It will be your duty not only to set an
example of discipline and perfect steadiness
imder fire, but also to maintain the most
friendly relations with those whom you are
helping in this struggle. The operations in
which you are engaged will, for the most part,
take place in a friendly country, and you
■can do your own country no better service
than in showing yourself in France and
Belgium in the true character of a British
soldier.
Be invariably courteovis, considerate, and
kind. Never do anything likely to injure or
destroy property, and always look upon
looting as a disgraceful act. You are sure
to meet with a welcome and to be trusted ;
your conduct must jUstify that welcome and
that trust.
Your duty cannot be done unless your
health is soimd. So keep constantly on your
guard against any excesses. In this now
• experience you may find temptations both in
wine and women. You must entirely resist
both temptations, and, while treating all
women with perfect courtesy, you should
avoid any intimacy.
Do your duty bravely.
Fear God,
Honour the King.
KITCHENER,
Field-Marshal.
The personality of a man is not always
exp'-essed by his style, but Lord KitcViener's
style was the man.
A PHOTOGRAPH OF LORD KITCHENER TAKEN IN JAPAN.
[By courissy of Ths Graphic,
310
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
if /'x X Scale of Mites
LUXEMBURG AND THE SURROUNDING COUNTRY.
CHAPTER XX.
THE GERMAN INVASION OF
LUXEMBURG AND BELGIUM.
Thk Wak Begins — Gebman Seizure of Luxembubg — Useless Protests— Prepabations voes
Defence — Unexpectedness of German Attack — Courageous Belgian Resistance — Negotia-
tions Still in Progress — Object of German Strategy — Speech by Kino Albert — The Cross-
ing OF THE Belgian Frontier — Limburg and Verviers — Meuse Bridges Destroyed^Thb
Attack on Vise — First Reports of Massacres Untrue — Anomalous Position of the Gardb
CiviQUE — German Force Ambushed — Belgian Civilians Involved — German Reprisals —
" Frightfulness."
IN the very early days of August, 1914,
Europe passed suddenly from the cool
ante-chamber of politics into the heated
arena of war. The war, as we have
seen, opened with the German invasion of
Belgium. The first military operation of real
importance was the attack on Liege.
In order to comprehend the purport of
the sudden onslaught upon Liege and the
full importance of the check which its
unexpectedly gallant defence inflicted upon
the Germans, it is necessary to note the
success which had attended the first step
of their advance, in Luxemburg. Here
almost everything went in accordance with
the general German plan, which was secretly
and swiftly to move a large but lightly-equipped
force towards the Franco-Belgian frontier.
The light equipment was due to the necessity
for rapid and secret movement and also to the
belief in Berlin that the troops would obtain
provisions in Belgium and that ammunition
and transport trains with the heavy artillery
could be sent on after the mask was thrown
off and would reach the troops before they
were seriously needed. Thus it was possible
for the advance guard to ta1<e Luxemburg
completely by surprise. During the night of
Saturday, August 1, German soldiers arrived
and occupied the station as well as the railway
bridges on the Treves and Trois Vierges lines
so as to ensiu-e the subsequent passage of Ger-
man troop trains through the Grand Duchy,
and on Siuiday, August 2, the population of
Luxemburg awakened to find that they were
no longer free citizens in their own country,
because all the means of communication wero-
in the hands of detachments of soldiers in.
German uniform, conunanded in many cases-
by officers in whom the surprised citizens
recognized men who, up to two days previously,
had been masquerading as employees in offices
in Luxemburg. There, of course, they had
acquired an intimate knowledge of the topo-
graphy of the place and all its internal arrange-
ments, which enabled them not only to place
the soldiers everywhere to the best advantage,
but also to indicate where stores of provisions-
could be commandeered and what persons should
be arrested in furtherance of German plans.
Against a plot so cunningly devised and so-
effectively carried out the citizens .of Luxem-
burg were helpless.
This might not have been the case if Europe,
only half a century ago, could have foreseen
the rise of a great military Power in Germany
which would regard international treaties a»
mere " scraps of paper," because the position
311
312
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE REIGNING GRAND DUCHESS MARIE
ADELAIDE OF LUXEMBURG.
of l,uxemburg, which has sometimes been
compared to Jerusalem and sometimes to
Gibraltar, makes it one of the great natural
strongholds of the earth. The city stands on a
rocky plateau, with precipitous descents of
several hundred feet upon three sides, and is
only connected with the neighbouring country
on the west — i.e., towards France. Thus it
seemed to have been placed as the natural
barrier against advance from the German side ;
and the fortifications, chiefiy hewn out of the
solid rock, had been so increased and
strengthened by the Spaniards, Austrians,
French, and Dutch, who had held Luxemburg
in successive age.^, that in the middle of the last
century, before the days of high explosives,
it was held to be second only to Gibraltar in
impregnaVjility if resolutely defended.
But, as has been said, Europe did not foresee
that a time could come when an armed German
P'mpire would strive to abolish international
honour as a factor in world-politics. So the
mighty fortifications of Luxemburg were de-
molished in accordance with the Treaty of
London in 1867 and beautiful public gardens
were laid out in their place.
This was a great triumph of civilization,
substituting a mere scrap of paper and the
national honour of its signatories for the
frowning forts with their snarling embrasures
toothed with guns ! No doubt there were
many among the cultured German officers who
strolled amid the roses and lavender, never
more beautiful or fragrant than in the early
August of 1914's wondrous summer, who had
studied the liistory of Europe enough to realize
that their Kaiser had in very deed made a
name for himself unlike that of any potentate
in the previous annals of the world.
At this time, of course, the great gorges
of Luxemburg were spanned by fine viaducts,
and of these the most important to the Gernains
was the Adolf Bridge, which they had carefully
seized on the night of August 1. ■
The first to attempt a futile resistance was
M. Eyschen, a member of the Cabinet, who
drove his motor-car across the Adolf Bridge
and confronted the leading officer of the
German advance guard with a copy of the
Treaty, guaranteeing the neutrality of the
State. To this the German officer merely
replied that he was acquainted with the Treaty,
but had his orders. The Archduchess Marie
Adelaide, who also tried to block the bridge
with her motor-car, and General Vandyck,
Commandant of Luxemburg, who arrived in
anger to protest, fared no better, for the former
was simply told to go home at once and the
latter was confronted with a revolver.
On the same day the Imperial Chancsllor
at Berlin telegraphed to the Luxemburg Govern-
ment that no hostile act against the Grand
Duchy had been taken, but only measures
necessary to secure the safety of German
troops by protecting the railways of Luxem-
burg against a possible attack by the French.
Having thus seized Luxemburg the Germans
lost no time in strengthening their position
against attack, destroying for this purpose
all the villas, farm-houses, woods, and standing
crops which might have provided cover for an
enemy. At the same time no pretext was too
flimsy for the arrest of the citizens as spies.
Thus Luxemburg began to appreciate fully
the blessings of German rule.
In a few days Luxemburg began to wonder
why the tide of German invasion did not pass on
more quickly towards France ; but the fa< t was
that the tide had received an unexpected check
elsewhere, which delayed it all along the line.
The light equipment of the invading force had
proved to be too light to break down the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
:ii3
Bolgiiin baiTier at Lie^e. Provisions nnd
ammunition ran sliort, and the attaclsing army
was obliged to wait not only for tlieso, but also
for the heavy guns which, according to the
original plan, were to have been sent on com-
fortably through Belgium, behind the victorious
army of occupation, because tliey would pro-
bably not be needed, except to batter down
the forts of Paris !
The resistance of Liege upset all these
plans, altlioiigii the actual circujnstances
of the fighting which led to this result were
equally puzzling at the moment to Belgium's
friends and foes.
It was on August 2 that Germany
Jiad already signified the value which,
she attached to " scraps of paper " by
seizing Luxemburg, whoso neutrality she
was bound by treaty to respect and protect.
Baron de Broqueville, Chief of the Belgian
Cabinet, declared on that date his con\'iction
that Belgian territory would not be violated.
Nevertheless, no effort was being spared to
make ready for the worst, altliough perhaps not
even the Belgians dreamed at that moment of
the frightful ordeal which was coming upon
their country — almost with the suddenness of a
thunderbolt from a blue sky — or the splendid
heroism with which it would be met.
At the end of July, when the storm was about
to burst, 13 classes of Belgian recruits
had been called to the colours ; but even so the
entire army numbered only 200,000 men —
a total which in a historical retrospect of the
forces subsequently engaged, scarcely seems
M. EYSCHEN,
The Minister of State for Luxemburg.
more than a group of men struggling against
the first waves of the grey-green tide of troops
by which they were soon inevitably sur-
rounded and thrown back.
Perhaps no better evidence of the unexpected-
ness of the smashing blow, deliberately pre-
pared and , remorselessly delivered, against
Belgium can be found than the fact that in
The Times report of the British Cabinet meeting
in London on tihe following day it was pointed
out that no necessity had as yet arisen for
dissensions in the Government ranks.
VIEW OF LUXEMBURG.
From a corner of the old fortifications, wliicli were turned into public gardens because the European Powers
had signed a " scrap of paper " which was supposed to render the fortress unnecessary.
314
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE ADOLF BRIDGE AND VIADUCT, LUXEMBURG.
It was in order to obtain possession of this bridge that the German plot to seize Luxemburg by sui-prise
was necessary, because it was practically the only means of access to the city from the side of Germany.
It wai at this spot that the Archduchess and the Commandant and M. Eyschen offered a futile opposition.
because the occasion had not yet arisen at
which " the plain and acknowledged duty
and interest of this country — tlie preservation
of Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg against
German invasion " needed to be fulfilled. So
far were British observers from comprehending
the cynical contempt of Germany for her
sacred obligations that in reviewing the con-
siderations which impelled Britain to support
France it was pointed out by The Times that
' ' if once the German armies are allowed to
crush France, not only will England be unable
tr preserve the independence of Holland,
Belgium, and Luxemburg," &c. \Vliat was in
British minds was that we should be compelled
to support France primarily to prevent the
violation of Belgium, not that we should need
to combine with France to exact vengeance
for imhappy Belgium ruthlessly outraged and
shockingly mutilated.
And if few of us anticipated the callous
brutality which the Teuton was about to dis-
play to an indignant world, still fewer could
liave foreseen the magnificent courage with
which the little Belgian nation flung itself in
the way of the Kaiser's armed millions. Had
even the Belgians been able to calculate before-
liand the price which they would be called upon to
pay for doing their duty to themselves and to
Europe, flesh and blood might have proved too
weak. But honour does not count costs be-
foreliand, and to the eternal glory of Belgium be
it said that she went straight with head erect and
step unflinching into the hell upon earth which
tlie Kaiser's hordes had prepared for her.
Even after the German guns had spoken to
Liege, so little did wo think in Britain of the
value of Belgian resistance that in the tables
then published, in Berlin as in London, of the
armed strength of the conflicting parties
no mention whatever was made of
the Belgian army ; for who could have
foreseen that its gallant handful of
men would be able to do much
more than vehemently protest against
the high-handed breach of treaty obligations
by the German hosts ?
Even the Belgians themselves seem to have
expected to make little armed resistance ;
because, several days after the outbreak of
war, the Paris correspondent of The. Times
stated that among the foreigners applying for
enrolment in the French Army " Italians,
Belgians, and Dutch form the majority." If
those Belgians had orJy dimly foreseen the
halo of military glory so soon to crown their
countrymen in arms at home it would not have
been in the ranks of France that they would
have sought to answer the call of honour.
And it is greatly to the credit of the Belgian
Government that, even when the army had
been mobilized and 100,000 men were hurrying
to the frontier in every direction, it endeavoured
to maintain the strictest neutrality, as was
shown in Brussels on August 2 by the seizure
of the Petit Bleu for publishing an article
headed " Vive France ! " ; and in the British
Press of the same date it was merely announced
that " genera) mobilization is taking place in
Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland,"
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
3J5
as though these four counlries were placed on
the same level of semi-detached interest in
the threatened war.
Even while the violation of Belgium was in
progress Europe had no knowledge that the
crime was done. The leading article in The
Times of August 3, dealing with the situation
generally, said : — " Yesterday it was Luxem-
burg. To-day it may be Belgium or Holland."
And so it was : for on that day we learned that
Germany had followed up her illegitimate
invasion of Luxemburg by an ultimatum to
Belgium. She had indeed offered terms.
If Belgium would but allow German (roops to
use hor territory as a basis for an attack on
Franco, Germany would undertake to respect
her integrity. In case of refusal Germany
tlireatened to treat Belgium as an enemy.
To this the Belgian Government worthily
replied that Belgium had too high a regard for
her dignity to acquiesce in the proposal, that
she refused to facilitate the German operations,
and that she was prepared to defend energetic-
ally her neutrality, which was guaranteed by
treaties signed by the King of Prussia him-
self.
Subsequent rapid negotiations made no im-
pression upon the little country's loyalty to her
treaty obligations ; and, even whOe these
negotiations were proceeding, Germany, with
cynical disregard of the international etiquette
which would have embarrassed at this juncture
the action of any more punctilious Power, had
already sent troops across the Belgian frontier
near Liege.
The obvious object of the Germans in in-
vading Belgium was, as lias been adequately
■explained in Chapter II., to avoid a difficult
frontal attack upon the troops and fortresses
on the eastern frontier of France, by using the
triangle of Belgium between Namur, Arlon,
and Aix-la-Chapelle as a base from which to
turn the left of the French defences ; and it
was expected that, in this case, Belgium,
taken by surprise before her new Army organiza-
tion was complete, could do no better than give
way before the German hosts and unite her
Army with the left of the French line.
But Belgium could do better ; and the defence
of Liege against the Germans at the outset of
the great war of 1914 took its place in history,
at once and for all time, among the most
glorious events in the annals of Europe.
For the national spirit and the spirit especially
of the Artny had risen in worthy response to
the brave words of King Albert, who, addressing
(ho extraordinary sitting of the Belgian Par-
liament— a largo proportion of whose members
were already in campaigning kit, ready to start
for the front — had said : —
" Never since 1830 has a graver hour sounded
for Belgium. The strength of our right and
the need of Europe for our autonomous existence
make us still hope that the dreaded events
will not occur. If it is necessary for us to resist
an invasion of our soil, however, that duty will
find us armed and ready to make the greatest
sacrifices. Our young men have already come
forward to defend the Fatherland in danger.
" One duty alone is imposed upon us, namely,
the maintenance of a stubborn resistance,
courage, and union. Our bravery is proved
by our faultless mobilization and by the multi-
tude of voluntary engagements. This is the
moment for action. I have called you together
to-day in order to allow the Cliambers to par-
ticipate in the enthusiasm of the country.
You will know how to adopt with urgency all
necessary measures. Are you decided to
maintain inviolate the sacred patrimony ot
our ancestors ?
" No one will fail in his duty, and the Army
is capable of performing its task. The Govern-
ment and I are fully confident. The Govern-
ment is aware of its responsibilities, and will
carry them out to the end to guard the supreme
PALACE OF THE GRAND DUCHESS
OF LUXEMBURG.
316
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
welfare of tho country. If a stranger should
violate our territory he will find all the Belgians
gathered rovmd their Sovereign, who will never
betray his constitutional oath. I have faith
in our destinies A coiuitry which defends
itself wins the respect of everyone, and cannot
perish.
" God will be with us."
It may seem surprising that the attack upon
Liege should itself have been in the nature of a
surprise, seeing that it was not a frontier town
and fighting between the Belgians and Germans
had already been taking place. But tlie fact
was that the German occupation of Verviers
near the frontier had been so sudden that there
was no adequate Belgian force to resist them
there, and the German troops, coming by train
part of the way to Liege, were themselves
practically the first to announce their arrival
on Belgian soil. Before they actually reached
Liege, however, the Belgians had had time to
tear up the rails, and the last part of the German
advance was completed by road. To under-
stand what had happened up to this point — •
and in view of the subsequent savagery of the
German invasion, it is essential to know how
it all began^we must go back to the frontier,
to Verviers, and try to realize the actual
conditions imder which German troops, trans-
gressing international law, crossed the Belgian
frontier.
BELGIAN SOLDIERS SNIPING FROM A
BRIDGE.
[Sport &■ General.
As far as Herbesthal, the German town whose
suburbs actually touch the frontier nearest to
Liege, the troops had been conveyed by train,
and they.simply formed up after detraining and
took their places in the lengthening coliunn
on the road into Belgium.
Thus on the actual frontier there was abso-
lutely no resistance, although the cavalry
which advanced in front of the main force and
penetrated to a distance beyond the frontier
reported that stray shots had been fired upon
it. These came, no doubt, from Belgian
sentries or scouts ; but there was no military
opposition to the German occupation of Lim-
burg, the first Belgian town on the road to
Liege. So unexpected, indeed, had been the
turn of events that the Germans found not
only the railway intact, but also the locomotives
and rolling stock, wliich were very useful for
their transport towards Liege.
The next Belgian town beyond Limburg wa»
Verviers ; and from this place a weak Belgian
force had easily been driven by the German
cavalry. The panic-stricken inhabitants offered
no resistance, only peeping tlirough closed
shutters at the invaders, who quietly took
possession of the public buildings and issued
proclamations announcing the annexation of
the town and district, appointing a German
officer as Governor and warning the populace
that any resistance to German authority would
be punished immediately with death. So far,
no doubt, events had marched exactly in
accordance with the Gennans' plan ; and, as-
they had expected, the people were not only
meek and zealous in carrying out orders for
provisions, but very soon overcame their fear
sufficiently to come out of their houses and
converse freely with the enemy. On the same
day German troops entered Belgium without
opposition at Dalhem, Franconchamps, and
Stavelot.
This auspicious beginning was, however,,
much too good to last. The " peaceful occupa-
tion of Belgian territory " reported in the first
telegrams to Berlin did not extend for many
miles ; and unexpected opposition had a bad
effect on the German temper.
The first serious intimation to the invader
that Belgian words of protest meant effective
deeds to follow was found by the German troops
advancing towards Liege by Dalhem and Herve
in the blown-up bridges of the Mouse and the
Trois Fonts tunnels. Thus the German
attempt to seize these bridges by surprise was
foiled, and their efforts to throw others over
were at first successfully resisted. These,,
however, were only affairs of outposts ; and
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
31-
VIEW ON THE RIVERSIDE, LUXEMBURG.
[Underwood^ Undeiwood,
ihough the fortifications of Liege were in
iptidiness and order and tlio garrison of 22,5(10
men apportioned to them complete in numbers
and high in courage, it was not expected any-
where that the defence of Liege by the Belgians
could exert any real influence upon the course
of the campaign.
This was no iloubt in the minds of the
Germans when they had crossed the Belgian
frontier. One of their first objectives was
naturally Vise, a qviiet little Belgian town just
outside the Dutch frontier, and occuiiying a
strategic position on the flank of any forc;^-
!Ki\ ancing from the east upon Liege. Here, how-
ever, the Germans discovered that, prompt iw
their advance had been, the Belgians had been at
least equally prompt ; because the bridges had
been blown up and they were forced to stop
to build others. Nor was this an uninterrupted
work. In one case the German encineers wero
318
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ONE OF THE INCIDENTS WHICH IMPEDED THE GERMAN ADVANCE.
[Sporl & G^nfral.
allowed to proceed until the new pontoon
bridge was just completed. Then a concealed
Belgian force opened fire upon it and most of
the engineers perished with their construction.
Thus the capture of Vis6, which should have
been a preliminary to the partial investment
of Liege with a view to attacking the forts,
was itself delayed until the general assault
upon the forts was already being delivered.
After fierce fighting the Germans then succeeded
in entering Vis6. At first, however, they
did Dot, as was reported at the time, massacre
the inhabitants, although those who assisted
the Belgian troops, including women and
boys who threw stones, were remorselessly shot
down. There was, however, no indiscriminate
slaughter ; and it is some satisfaction to
make this record, because the first accounts
which reetched England of the capture of
Vis^ accused the Germans of wholesale
atrocities, and these accusations were re-
peated without reservation and evidently
without inquiry in later accounts professing
to be historical. The indictment against
the Germans under this head is heavy enough
without adding thereto charges which can-
not be supported by evidence. Moreover,
it is particularly important that we should
be scrupulously just and accurate with regard
to these initial proceedings, because outragtis
committed by the Germans before they had
received any provocation at all would mani-
festly fall under a worse category of crime
than similar outrages perpetrated as " reprisals."
even if the provocation, judicially "onsidered,
did not justify them. For we must not
forget that amid the excitement of war, and
especially under the aggravation of an unex-
pected and humiliating reverse, most men's
mindsarevmfitted to takea calm, judicial view
of things in general, and, least of all, the conduct
of the enemy. You have only to listen to the
unfair and often absurd insinuations which the
defeated team in a hotly-contested football
match usually make against their rivals to
understand how roused passions impair fair
judgment ; and it is certain that in Belgium
not only were the German " reprisals " based
upon untrue rumours of the conduct of Belgian
civilians, but also that they were exaggerated
in extent by rumour current upon the Belgian
side. In the interest of fair play it is necessary
to remember this, and also to bear in mind that
the international military situation was gravely
complicated by the ahomalous position of the
Belgian Garde Civique.
As has been pointed out in a previous chapter,
the outbreak of war came aipon Belgium at
a peculiarly awkward moment, when her
military forces were in a state of transition.
The problem which she had had to solve was
how to obtain enough men to garrison her
great fortresses of Antwerp, Liege, and Namur,
to fill the ranks of her mode.«t field Army of
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
319
*«50,000, and to maintain adequate rcsprvos in
the depots. Without a more stringent system
of conscription it was only possible to bring
the Army up to strength by allowing it to
absorb the old Garde Civique, a relic of the
days when Belgium had no national policy and
therefore needed no force more military than
a sort of armed police. So it wa.s decided
to absorb the Garde Civique into the Army ;
but war came before the process could be carried
out, and when the Garde Civique gallantly fell
into line with the regular Army to oppose the
German invader the latter insisted upon; re-
garding it as a civilian force which was breaking
the rules of war by taking part in military
operations. The Garde Civique possessed all
the attributes of soldiers, and wore a distinct
uniform. But the Germans found in them a
part of the Belgian forces which might be
excluded by the tlu'eat of treating tliem as non-
combatants. Eventually Belgium withdrew
them. The shooting of a captxired member
of the Garde Civique was inevitably regarded
by the Belgians as the miu^er of a prisoner
and by the Germans as merely the execution
of a spy. Such occurrences, however, naturally
exasperated the Belgians ; and it is therefore
some consolation to know that even Belgian
witnesses exonerate the Germans from the
charge of committing entirely unprovoked
atrocities on the occasion of the capture of
Vise. Til the first full narrative of the attack
upon Li^ge. which was sent to The Times, it
is expressly stated : —
" After fierce fighting the German troopt
succeeded in entering Vis6. They did not,
however, as has been reported, massacre the
inhabitants of this place. With the exception
of a few civilians who were shot during the
attack, the civil population was not much
interfered with. Fire broke out in several
quarters, but the town was not fired
deliberately."
This passage, quoted from a narrative wliich
was instinct tliroughout with sympathy
and tidmiration for the Belgians in their
gallant struggle, is very important, because it
shows that the Germans, whatever their sub-
sequent conduct may have been, did not
deliberately adopt brutal methods against the
Belgian population as part of their plan of cam-
paign at the outset.
Yet, although the passage quoted above
fairly summarizes the facts, it waa really at
Vis6 that the Germans first showed how quickly
their methods wore changing for the worse.
According to a Belgian eye-witness the troubl*
materialized when the Germans attempted to
seize Vis6 bridge over the Meuse. The Belgians
had destroyed about 50 yards of it in the centre,
and when the first party of Prussian cavalry
arrived to take possession they were almost
annihilated by a hot fire which was opened
upon them by infantry hidden among the
BELGIAN EXPERT SHOTS ON A FAST AUTOMOBILE.
Who were continually harassing the Germans.
iR^cord />«5.
320
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GERMANS MARCHING THROUGH A BURNING VILLAGE.
[Dally Mirror-
piers of the broken bridfje. At the same time
shots were fired from houses near the bank ;
and, according to the account- of the eye-witness,
it was then that German troops, coming up
in support of the ambushed cavalry, commenced
an indiscriminate massacre of the inhabitants,
although they had no proof that the shots
from the houses were not fired by Belgian
soldiers.
When the latter had retired and all
resistance was over, the remaining inhabi-
tants were rounded up likf; sheep in the
centre of their shattered town and surrounded
by the troops, whoso commander addressed
the sullen crowd in French, explaining that
Germany was " not at war with Belgium," but
that they must submit to German military law,
and that any attack upon the troops would
immediately be punished with death. At that'
moment a pistol-shot rang out and the officer
fell wounded ; whereupon a group of eight
persons from whose midst the shot had come
were seized and executed, although it was
known to all that only one shot had been fired.
This was the small beginning of the reign of
" frightfulness " which subsequently became
the admitted rule of German work in Belgium,
increasing in ferocity as the invaders' prospects
became more gloomy and culminating in the
senseless acts of vandalism so numerous and so
terrible that the accounts of them make (to
Germany's everlasting shame) a separate entire
section of this history of the war.
The reference above to " frightfulness " as
the " admitted " rule of German work in
Belgium is based upon an official German
statement of policy circulated by wireless
telegraphy from Berlin for tlie informati on of tlu'
world at large. The statement was as follows : —
" The distribution of arms and ammunition
among the civil population of Belgiiun had been
carried out on systematic lines, and the authori-
ties enraged the public against Germany b>-
assiduously circulating false reports. They
were under the impression that, with the aid of
the French, they would be able to drive the
Germans out of Belgium in two days. The only
means of preventing surprise attacks from the
civil population has been to interfere with un-
relenting severity and to create examples,
which by their frightfulness would be a warning
to the whole coimtry."
The opening sentence of this statement wns
a deliberate falsehood ; because the German
commanders in the field had all seen the pro-
clamations of the Belgian Governmint in the
villages which they destroyed, lU'gii^g the in-
habitants to take no part in the fighting for
their own and their neighbours' sakes ; and the
concluding sentence — cahnly and complacently
issued by a Government which had admitted
doing " wrong " by invading Belgium as an
excuse for unspeakable atrocities committed
upon Belgian men, women, and children who
resented that wrong — threw such a lurid light
upon the thing which the Germans of the day
regarded as their national " conscience " as to
horrify the civilized world.
CHAPTER XXI.
THE STORY OF LIEGE.
The " Birmingham " of Belgium — Its Stormy History — Physical and Architectural
Beauties — Belgium's Bavarian Queen — Germany's Checked Plan— First Attack on
Li'kge — Misemployment of Massed Infantry — Skilful Belgian Defence — The Decisive
Bayonet — The Error of German Discipline — Strength and Weakness of Liege — Facts
ABOUT the Forts — -Secret German Work in LifcoE — General Leman's Narrow Escape —
Massacre of Li{:ge Citizens — Disingenuous Statement from Berlin — International Law
Misapplied — Dishonesty of the German Case — Parallel of the Self-Righteous Burcilar —
Golden Opportunity Neglected by the Germans — Evidence of Atrocities at Likoe —
Excuse for Belgium — General von Emmich and His Task — Value of Initial Belgian
Successes — ^Terrible Slaughter of Germans — Three Army Corps Brought to a Standstill
— ^Inexorable German Advance — More Brilliant Belgian Successes — Cross of the Legion
of Honour for LikoE — Records of Individual Gallantry — Nothing Availed against the
Big Guns — Difficulty of their Transport — Collapse of the Forts — ^Messrs. Krupp's
Triumph — Summary of the Siege — Playing Hide-and-Seek with Shells — Destruction of
Buildings — Occupation of the Town — ^Unique Position thus Created — Ill-founded Re-
joicings IN Berlin and Mist.\ken Hopes in London — In Spite of Checks German Advance
Irresistible — LiteE and Namur Compared — The Value of Ring Fv/Rtresses — General
Leman " Plays the Game " — Moral and Political Effects of Belgian Success in Resistance
— ^Destruction of Forts and Capture of Genf.ral Leman — ^Pathetic and Gallant Finale —
Testimony of British Statesmen.
THE usual description of Liege as
the " Birmingham of Belgium "
gave one no idea of the peaceful
beauty of the town with its numerous
spires and spacious streets, fringed with boule-
vards spreading outwards from the wide waters
of the Meuse toward the undulating country with
its mi ny lovely woods, the haunts of butterflies
and birds. Between these were situated the
forts, like great iron ant-hills, each cupola crown-
ing the smooth glacis on wliich on the night of
August 5 tl e German dead lay in high ridges
like the jetsam of the tide upon a beach, each
ridge indicating the high-water mark to which
the futile rush of a wave of infantry had reached.
But as the sun set peacefully on Augvist 3 the
forts were no more conspicuous than usual
Vol. I. — Part 9.
amid their picturesque surroundings. They
werp always familiar features in a bird's-eye
view of the environs of Liege, but they did not
dominate the landscape ; and there was little,
even in the minds of the Liegeois as thoy
listened to the music of St. Bartholemy's evening
chimes, to suggest that the morrow would see
that landscape ringed with steel or that for
many days the incessant thunder of tho guns
would be speaking to the world of the heroism
and the wreckage of Liege.
Indeed, oa that close, hot evening at the
beginning of August the wooded slopes beyond
which the Germans were waiting for nig'itfall
seemed to contain nothing more dangerous than
the magpies that flickered black and wliite along
the margins of the thickets ; and the quiet fields
:\1\
322
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LIEGE.
The above, with the illustration on the opposite page, forms a panoramic view of Li^ge as it was,, and sliows
tlie entrance to the Hallway Station.
around the farms showed no worse enemios than
the family parties of crows prospecting for early
walnuts — crows that would soon fatten on
horses' entrails and pick the eyes of men.
No serious shadow of the coming evil had
yet fallen across those fair hUls. There had
been rumours, of course, and of course the
troops were ready in Liege ; but the contented
Walloon farmer paid little attention to rumours
or the activities of the soldiers. He hoped
the sultry sunset did not portend thunder —
little dreaming of the thunder of the guns that
would be in his oars for many nights and days.
Perhaps he thought, as he looked over the
rolling fields, ripe through abundant simshine
with early crops, that the harvest of 1914
would be one that the Liegeois would remember
for many years. And so indeed it was ; for it
proved to bo the crowning harvest of the city's
stormy prominence in history, passing back
for pearly 1,200 years.
Liege made her entry into the field of political
history in the year 720, when, with the consent
of Pope Gregory the Second, the Bishop of
•Maestricht transferred the See from that
sleepy city to its fast-growing rival at the
junction of the Meuse and the Ourthe. In the
following century the Bishops of Liege added
to their honours the titles of Princes of the
Empire and Dukes of Bouillon. Their residence
in the city of Liege added of coiu'se vastly to
its dignity and consequence, and their eccle-
siastical and military subordinates swelled its
population and fed its growing trade.
But there was another side to these benefits.
The difference between the lay and ecclesiastical
aristocracy of the Middle Ages was often
merely skin-deep, a matter of title and costume
rather than of nature or of habit of life ; and
the long list of the Prince -Bishops of Liege
comprised few individuals who were not as
insolent in their pretensions, as sudden and
quick in quarrel, as vindictive in revenge, and
as extortionate as their unsanctified brethren.
The history of Liege is the story of a long
struggle between the turbulent and liberty-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL
323
LIEGE.
Centre o£ the to^\'n, and the nver, with a view o[ tlie bridge
tliat was destroyed.
loving citizens and thoir priestJy oppressors,
many of whom were only able to enter the city
either at the head or in the rear of armies of
mercenaries. Revolts were frequent and
bloody, and sometimes more or less successful ;
but on the whole the Prince-Bishops of Liega
held their own so well that the French historian,
Jules Dalhaizo, tells us that even in the
eighteenth century they were still absolute
rulers, and that Gerard de Hoonsbroeck, who
occupied the episcopal throne in 1789, " knew
no other law than his own. will."
The continuance and growth of the Priiice-
IJishops' power would indicate that most of
them must have been men of considerable
political talent, with a keen eye for the winning
side, as, in the interminable quarrels between
the Empire and the Papacy, they pursued no
settled lino of policy, but fought with or against
the Holy See as their personal interest tended.
One of them, Henry of Leyden, Prince-Bishop
from 1145 to 1164, followed Frederick Bar-
barossa to Italy, helped in the downfall of
Pope Alexander III., supported the Anti-Pope
Victor, and consecrated his successor, Paschal.
In strange contrast with rebels of this type
were Bishop Alexander, who, deposed in 1134
by Innocent the Second, died of shame ; Al-
beron of Namur, whose heart broke at an angry
summons to the presence of Eugenius the Tliird ;
and Raoul of Zeringhen, who, admonished for
malpractice by the pontifical legate, laid asidi,
his crozier and expiated his offences as a
crusader. Best known of all to history is
Louis de Bourbon, the victim of the ferocity
of William de la Marck, " the Boar of the
Ardennes.' Far from an ideal priest, worldly,
luxurious, and indolent, the courage and
dignity with which he met his death would have
earned pardon for much lieavier offences.
Amid all these turmoils Liege had flourisheil
and grown, and about the year 1400 the demo-
cratic element had held its own so well that it
could bo described as " a city of priests changed
into one of colliers and armourers." "' It
was," we are told, " a city that gloried in its
324
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
STEPS LEADING UP TO THE FORTS, LIEGE, iUndtrwoo.i c- UnJauo..d.
rupture with the paat," but " the past " rose
and reasserted itself in 1408, when the Prince-
Bishop John of Bavaria, assisted by his cousin,
John the Fearless, broke the forces of the
citizenK and excluded them ruthlessly from
power. A generation later democracy
triumpheu again, again to be overthrown,
this time by Charles the Bold of Burgundy,
who, in 1467, defeated the Li^geois in the field,
and reinstated the Bishop and his kinsman,
the afore-mentioned I^uis de Bourbon. In the
following year the undismayed burghers rose
in fresh revolt, provoked thereto by -the intrigues
iind promises of tlie crafty Louis XI. of France,
Charles's seeming friend and deadliest enemy.
It was probably the most triumphant hour of
Charles's life, and the bitterest hour that
Louis ever knew, when, in the enforced presence
and ^vith the extorted consent of the latter,
Charles stormed Liege, put its inhabitants to
indiscriminate slaughter, and, save for its
pillaged churches, razed it to. the ground.
It was characteristic of Charles that he failed
to complete the political annexation of the
THE TIMES aiS'lORY OF THE WAR.
325
princ-ipality ho had so frightfully chastised.
At his death, nine years later, in 1477, the un-
conquorablo spirit of the Walloon population
had already done much to restore the city to
its forirjer strength, and a single generation
sufficed to erase the last vestiges of her ruin.
Liege passed practically unscathed tfirough
the long agony of the struggle of the Netherlands
against Philip II. and the Duke of Alva, and
underwent no such calamities as those which
desolated the sister cities of Maestricht, Brussels,
and Antwerp. She was stormed and occupied
by the soldiers of Louis XIV. in 1691, and in
1702 was occupied by the English under Marl-
borough. Her occupation in 1792 by a French
contingent commanded by La Fayette con-
cluded the tale of her warlike experiences
uatil the outbreak of the present struggle.
In its modern aspect Liege, as the centre of
the coalmining industry of Eastern Belgium,
has always exhibited to the traveller, even at a
distance, the signs of its occupation in the pall
of smoke overhead, to which the countless
chimneys of the factories which the output of
coal supports are constantly contributing.
One of the mines is the deepest in the world,
and many others, now abandoned, pass beneath
the city and the river.
Among the chief industries for which Liege
lias long been, and will doubtless again be,
famous through the world is the manufacture
of arms and weapons of all kinds — congenial
work, one might suppose, for the quick-witted
Walloon people, who have always in their
city's stormy history shown that they know
how to use weapons as well as how to make
ihem. Perhaps a little over-readiness in this
direction on their part, forgetting that modern
war is confined to combatants only, offers some
explanation, but no excuse, for the savagery
of the German " reprisals."
Besides the manufacture of arms, of which
there were more than 180 factories, the Liege
zinc foundries, engine factories, and cycle works
were all world-famous, and the zinc works ot
Vieille Montague were the largest in existence.
But though this vast industrial activity
clouded the air above Liege with smoke, and
though wherever one looked upon the en-
circling hills the chimneys and shafts of mines
were to be seen, the town itself was pleasant
and well laid out, and tJie surrounding land-
scape beautiful.
Many of the improvements in Liege dated
from 1905, when an International Exhibition
was held there ; and in preparing the area for
this the course ot the river Ourthe, which here
joins the Meusc, had been diverted from its
GENERAL LEMAN,
The Gallant Defender of Lidge.
old bed and convened into the Canal de
Derivation, the old ri\Br course being filled up
and added, with the adjoining land, to the
Exhibition grounds. A fine park was also
laid out on' the Plateau de Cointe, whence
the best general view of Liege is obtained,
and several new bridges and streets were
made, including the handsome and spacious
boulevards.
Another grand view was obtained from the
Citadel, an ancient and disused fort close to the
north side of the town, which was built on the
site of still older fortifications by the Prince-
Blsliop Maximilian Henry of Bavaria after the
famous siege of Liege in 1649. No doubt ho
thought that he was makiiig the city impregnable
for over ; but three centuries had not passed
before the newer fortresses, whose construction
relegated the Citadel to the level of an antique
curiosity, had themselves fallen utterly before
the power of modern guns. The position of the
Citadel, however, still remains commanding,
and the view therefrom includes the entire
city, of which all the centre from
north to south looks like a cluster of islands
between the canals and winding rivers,
as well as the thickly-wooded background
of the Ardennes Moimtains on the right, and
on the left the hills near Ma( stricht in Holland
and the broad plaina of Liinburg, whence the
German armies crossed the frontier in three
streams at the beginning of the gieat war.
326
THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.
Between this distant historic landscape and the
near view of Liege, rising from her ashes, the
valleys of the Meuse, the Oiirthe, and the
Vesdi* diverge, thickly dotted with populous
Walloon villages. This had been a favourite
country for German tourists and a rich field
for German commercial enterprise; but 1914
wrought a change.
On the other side of the city another disused
fortification. Fort Chartreuse, gave an almost
equally fine prospect from the opposite point
of view ; and although the old fort itself was
blown up by the Belgians during the siege in
order that it might not provide cover for the
enemy, the hill remained a vantage point from
which, as far as the eye can reach on either
hand, evidence of German devastation could
be seen.
Before the bombardment the general aspect
of the city was that of a place of parks and
pleasure gardens, fine churches and spacious
buildings. Among the latter the University,
by its prominence, became a magnet for the
German shells, and though only founded in
1817 as the central seat of learning for the
Walloon race, no priceless heritage of ancient
days could have been more thoroughly smashed
and pulverized.
The grand Palais de Justice also, with its
picturesque courts and vaulted pillars, blending
late Gothic and Renaissance styles — and its
west wing used a.s the Government House,
faced by pleasure grounds and fountains on a
picturesque slope — was only a product of
16th to 19th century genius ; and the Town Hall
only dated from early in the 18th century,
although it contained pictures and tapestries
of great age and value.
But in the Church of St. Jacques, with its
famous stained-glass windows, the western
facade was nearly 700 years old, while parts of
the Cathedral Church of St. Paul, also con-
taining beautiful stained glass and statues,
dated back to 968, 1280, and 1528. The Church
of St. Jean belonged to the 12th, 14th, and
18th centuries, that of St. Croix to the 10th,
12th, and 14th, St. Martin to the 16th, St.
Antoine, with its wood carvings and frescoes,
to the 13th, and St. Barth^lemy to the 11th and
12th, with its two towers and well-known chimes
and famous bronze font of 12th-century work.
In addition there were the domed church of St.
Andrew, used as the Exchange, and the baroque
foimtains in the Place du Marche. Thus, as
a subject for German bombardment, it may be
seen that Liege had many attractions, even if
it did not come up to the standard of Louvain
or Reims.
Such, then, was the ancient town which lay
sleeping peacefully amid its ring of watchdog
forts that nestled so comfortably between the
wooded uplands on the night of August 3,
1914.
The stirring events of the following day,
■ culminating in the tragedy of Vise, have already
been narrated, sliowing that varied fortunes had
so far attended Germany's first steps in the war.
The successful seizure of Luxemburg and the
quiet crossing of the Belgian frontier, with the
occupation of Limburg, had promised well for
her. At the moment, indeed, it looked as if the
Kaiser's plans for an invasion of France would be
smoothly carried out and his Majesty would be
able to count Belgium among the dutiful children
of his Empire. Perhaps he even found some
hope in the fact that the Queen of the Belgians
was a German Princess, born at Possenhofen,
and before her marriage known as the Duchess
Elisabeth of Bavaria. But Germany who
treated the claims of national honour so lightly
herself had yet to learn that others placed them
above ties of family and even above considera-
tions of self-interest !
Instead of an obedient vassal the Kaiser
found in Belgimn a most resolute antagonist ;
and, when the storm broke. General von Em-
mich's three Army Corps, travelling lightly-
equipped for speed, discovered that it was not so
much an attack upon France through Belgium
as a serious invasion of Belgium itself which lay
before them, while the taking of even the little
town of Vise had caused so much bloodshed and
provoked such bitter enmity as augured ill for
future progress.
The bombardment of Liege commenced in the
early morning — a dull and hot morning — of
August 5, the advance of the artillery having
been covered — as is always the case in a German
movement — ^by masses of cavalry, and it was
continued without cessation imtil the 8th.
The Germans attacked along a very wide front,
stretching north to the smoking ruins of Vis6
close to the Dutch frontier, and on the south
a considerable distance below Liege ; but the
artillery employed was not heavy enough.
The big siege guns had not arrived and the forts
had the best of the preliminary duel.
Then the amazing thing happened. It was
as though the German generals, loiowing noticing
of war, had just read in some book how Napoleon
won victories by the sudden, imexpected use
of solid masses of men and had said to them-
selves, " Good ! No one will expect the sudden
application of masses of men in a case like this :
so we will apply them." The result almo.st
moved even the busy Belgians in the trenches
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
m
THE QUEEN OF THE BELGIANS.
328
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH.
WHERE THE GERMANS ARE SAID TO HAVE FIRST GROSSED THIi iMEUSE.
to pity. " It was death in haystacks," said one
of them afterwards, trjdng to describe the eSect
of the combined field-gun, machine-gun, and
rifle fire upon the masses of men. Another
eye-witness stated that the average height of
the ridges of German dead was \\ yards. Many
corpses are required to reach that level. It was
the visible result of a form of military enter-
prise which a civilian who had dined too well
might conceive.
As the day wore on the battle became more
fierce, for the simple reason that the successive
waves of Germans jammed each other on, until
oefore one of the forts a great host of men
succeeded in gaining a footing on the near slopes,
where the great guns could not be depressed to
roach them. For a brief space they seemed to
think that they were on the threshold of victory
and rushed forward, only to discover — what,
surely, their oflficers should have known all
along — that the machine guns were waiting
for them. Further back their comrades had
been killed : here they were massacred.
In contrast with this useless waste of German
life, the Belgian troops in the trenches appear
to have been kept admirably in hand. Some of
the subsiding ripples of the tide of German
assault wGTO only definitely suppressed by rifle
fire at .'50 yards ; and often the ideal distance for
a bayonet charge, when you can see the whites
of you' enemies' eyes, seemed almost reached.
Now anf) auain it actually was reached ; and
then the. staggering German ranks appeared to
have no stomach for cold steel. Many turned
and ran ; many held up their hands and sur-
rendered ; the rest were killed.
It was rather surprising that men who had
gone through so much should have been cowed
at the last by the bayonet. Considered in cold
blood, as a feat performed by intelligent men,
it should seem a much more terrible test of
courage to march, as on parade, in solid ranks
into the hell of an entrenched enemy's com-
bined and concentrated fire of big guns,
machine guns, and rifles than to meet a bajimjt
charge in which such solidity as the raiUo
retained would have been all on the side of the
Germans. Yet it was not only at Liege, but
also on many fields of subsequent battle, that
the Belgian and allied troops discovered to
their surprise and almost to their disappoint-
ment that the German infantry would not
wait for the applic.ition of steel. Scores of
instances could be quoted in which British
soldiers, after expressing their personal contempt
for the German niie-fire — " they can't shoot
for nuts " was a favourite conmient — still ex-
pressed their great admiration for the way in
which those ranks of men, came stumbling over
the corpses of their slaughtered comrades to be
slaughtered in their turn. And then always
^ame the final criticism — " but they won't wail
for the bayonet." This seeming anomaly is ex-
plained by one word used above, in considering
THE TIMES UltSTORY OF THE WAR.
329
wlii'thor the courageous advance of the
Oerniiiii soldiers to almost certain death was
*' a feat perfoi'raed by intelligenl men." That
is just what it was not. The German system
of disfi])luie took a human being and conv'erted
him, in spite of wliatever individual inleUigence
he miglit possess, into a military machine
which could exhibit no individual inteOigence
whatever. The British system, and the French
and Belgian also, set a higher vaUie upon the
men, seeking to convert each lumian being in
the ranks into an intelligent fighting man. The
result was that in action the Allied troops did
not perfunctorily loose oH their cartridges at
the landscape in general. Each man of them
tried to kill as many Germans as he could.
Hence the tremendous difference in the effective-
ness of the rifle fire on the two sides ; and, of
course, when it came to bayonet work the
difference was more marked still. Behind each
Belgian, French, or British bayonet was a
trained man intelligently determined to do as
much damage with it to the enemy as he could.
Behind the rows of German bayonets were
almost mechanical combatants, whose discipline
and courage had already been strained to the
breaking point by the fearful ordeal through
which they had been marched. Of course,
t,hey did not want to wait for the cold steel.
Yet it is not to be denied — as indeed the
Belgians admitted without reservation — that
up to this point the unfortunate 'German
soldiers showed most stoical courage. The
blame tor the disaster rested with their com
mander. It was as though he had heard
that you cannot make an omelette without
breaking eggs, and so flung a whole ba.sketful
of eggs upon the floor to show liimself a cook I
Contrast this with the wiser and, as it proved,
much more rapid method adopted against the
equally strong fortress of Kamur later on.
Then the first news which we recei\ed came, at
the end of a long telegram describing the con-
tinued advance of the German Army towards
Paris, in the following words : — " They (the
Germans) have, too, partially invested Namur
and opened upon its forts with heavy artillery."
This was, of course, the right coiu-se to adopt in
attacking a ring fortress. Such a fortress is
comparable to an encircling wall, and the first
thing to do is to invest it and make a breach in
it. Then and not till then is the time to send
ma ses of infantry forward — tlu-ough the breach.
At Liege the masses of infantry were sent against
the unbroken wall. At Namur the fire of
the heavy guns was so overwhelming that the
ring was broken in several places almost
simultaneously. No wonder that at Liege the
THE CHURCH AT VISii.
Probably the First Church Destroyed by the Germans.
[Ntaspjptr lltustrJiions,
330
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Germans wore sent staggering back or that at
*famiir they quickly advanced to victory.
To understand why Liege could not be taken
by assault, in spite of the great force which was
hurled upon it ; why, up to a certain point,
it was able to resist the determined and con-
tinuous attack subs?quently made upon it by
s\ip?rior force ; and also why it inevitably fell,
we must have a clear picture of the defences in
our minds. The diagram maps published on
pages 340 and 341 illustrate the main facts of the
position, and we must remember that the ring
of twelve forts was 33 miles in circumference,
and that they were situated each about four
miles from the town and on the average about
two to three miles from one another. Thus
the interval between fort and fort was too large
to be held by a garrison which was numerically
so weak as was the force under General Leman's .
command. It is true that during the earlier
stages of the fighting, when the German attack
developed only on a narrow front, the superior
mobility of the Belgian forces, moving hither
and thither on short interior lines of communica-
tion, enabled them on each occasion to oppose
a withering machine-gun and rifle fire to the
German advance and even to fling back the
shattered ranks of the assailants finally with
resolute bayonet charges ; but this advantage
was lost so soon as the widening area of the
German attack involved so many of the forts
that no man could be spared from the defender's
trenches between any two of them to strengthen
the defencft elsewhere. It was then that the
necessity of withdrawing the field forces became
apparent to General Leman, who elected to
hold out with the forts alone. By this time,
however, the 400 guns, which represented the
total armament of the forts, were both out-
numbered and outclassed by the heavy artillery
which the Germans had brought into position,
and tlie last stand of Liege was quite hopeless.
All that General Leman could hope to do — and
grandly succeeded in doing — was to delay the
German advance a little longer and to make
sure that the forts on falling into the hands of
the enemy should be only masses of ruins.
The conflicting nature of the accounts which
were published at the time concerning the
resistance offered by the forts was largely
due to confusion between the large and the small
forts. Of the ring of 12, three on the north
and east, namely Pontisse, Barchon, and
F16ron, and three on the west and south,
namely, Loncin, Fl^malle, and Boncelles, were
large and strong. The other six were com-
paratively small and unimportant as strong-
holds, although if the whole ring had been held
by an adequate force they would have con
tinued to be, as they were at first, invaluable
as buttresses to the fighting line and connecting
links between the large forts.
They were not, however, strong enough,
when isolated, to withstand a siege with modern
artillery ; and in regarding Liege as a ring
fortress for this purpose only the six forts
named above should be taken into considera-
tion ; and when the Germans claimed to have
demolished three of the south-eastern forts,
namely, Embourg, Chaudfontaine, and Evegnee,
this did not really affect the claim of the Belgians
that " the forts on the east and south,"
namely, Barchon, Fleron, and Boncelles, were
" still holding out." All of the larger forts
were constructed upon the same plan, being
triangular in shape, with a moat on each side
and giuis at each corner. In the centre of the
interior space was a steel turret with two 6in.
howitzers, and in a square round this four
other steel turrets, all armed with Sin. quick-
firing guns. All these turrets were embedded
in one solid concrete block ; and in addition,
besides searchlights and many machine guns,
the corners of the triangle held quick-firing
guns in disappearing turrets. Against any
known artillery at the time of their construction
these forts were probably impregnable ; and
oven at the time of the war they were doubtless
capable of holding out for months against any
ordinary field force. But the big siege guns
which the Germans brought against them were
another matter ; and the daily legend, " Liege
forts still holding out," only continued to bo
true until they had been bombarded.
In order to understand some of the curious
incidents in the first stages of the attack upon
Liege we must remember that the same secret
preparations which succeeded so well in Luxem-
burg had been made in Liege also. In many
of the houses, occupied by unsuspected citizen.s
who were really secret German agents, were
found thousiAids of rifles, quickfiring gims,
and sets of harness, intended for the armament
of the Germans who had entered the city in
mufti and unarmed. It was this arrangement,
only very partially successful, which nearly
cost the life of General Leman on the occasion
when Colonel Marchand was killed, at the
beginning of the siege, because it enabled a
party of armed Germans surreptitiously to
surround the house where the Commandant
was conferring with the General Staff. Various
accounts are given of the melee which followed,
but all agree as to the circumstance of Colonel
Marchand' s death and the saving of General
Leman by an officer of Herculean build whc
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
331
BRAVO, BELGIUM!
This cartoon, reproduced by special permission of tiie proprietors of "Puncli," admirably expresses
the true spirit of the Belgians' resistance to German aggression.
forced him over the wall of an adjoining
foundry.
It was, no doubt, this startling discovery of
the presence of concealed enemies in Liege
which led General Leman — who in many of
his methods and the personal enthusiasm which
he evoked reminds the British reader of Baden-
Powell in Mafeking — to lay the trap which led
to the annihilation of one German band and
the capture of another.
From the welter of confusetl accounts of the
bloody happenings on the night of August 7
one fact seems to stand out boldly, that, while
the German demand for an armistice for the
alleged purpose of biu-ying their dead was
supposed to be still under consideration.
332
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
PLACE ST. LAMBERT AND PALACE OF JUSTICE, LIEGE.
German troops succeeded in entering the town
of Liege and fiei-ce street fighting ensued, as
a result of which the greater part of the Belgian
garrison retreated in good order from the
town. Unfortunately, as at Vis6, some of the
inhabitants had taken a prominent part in
the fighting, and in retaliation the Germans
shot every one, man, woman, or child, who fell
into their hands. There appears to be no doubt
that this was done, or that it was done by order.
A semi-official statement, issued in Berlin
on August 9, ran : — " According to news re-
ceived here about the operations around Liege
the civilian population took part in the struggle,
and German troops and doctors were fired upon
from ambush. . . . It is possible that these
facts were due to the mixed population in
industrial centres, but it is also possible that
France and Belgium are preparing a Jranc-
tireur war against oiu* troops. If this is proved
by further facts our adversaries are themselves
responsible if the war Ls extended with inexor-
able strength to the guilty population. The
German troops are only accustomed to fight
against the armed power of a hostile State, and
cannot be blamed if in self-defence they do not
give quarter."
If the severely judicial note of the first part
of this proclamation had been maintained in
the conduct of the troops in the field the
world might have had little reason to com-
plain of Teuton brutality. Non-com-
batant Belgians undoubtedly took part
m the defence of Li6ge as well as of Vise.
But everything had happened so suddenly
through the treacherous completeness of Ger-
many's plans for the invasion of Belgium
without warning that there had been little time
for the Belgian authorities to issue any effective
advice to the Belgian population as to the
rules of war regarding non-combatants. Every
effort was made indeed to placard the villages
with warning notices ; but there is no evidence
that such notices wore or could have been
placarded in the neighbourhood of Liega in
time to anticipate the events of August 5-/
If, moreover, there could be any circumstances
in which the plain duty of an invader was to
waive the strictness of the rules of war and to
strain his spirit of mercy and forbearance to
the utmost those circumstances were present
here : because the German Government openly
admitted before the world that it was doing
a " wrong " to Belgium by breaking down her
sanctioned neutrality. Indeed, unless inter-
national law is based upon s me lower ideal
of justice than that which inspires all civilized
law as between man and man, the Germans could
not lawfully appeal to the rules of war at all.
The armed burglar cannot take legal proceedings
for assault against a householder who arrests
him. It is true that according to law the right
to arrest belongs to the police, and that one
ordinary civilian who violently seizes another
commits an assault ; but the armed biu-glar,
by doing wrong himself in the first instance and
thus provoking the plucky householder to seizo
him, has deliberately discarded that status ol
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
%ZZ
ordinary citizenship which would have entitled
him to protection by the law.
If, then, there had been an adequate force
behind international law, as there is behind the
ordinary law of all civilized countries, the
Belgian civilian who resisted the German in-
vader should have been able to say to his oppo-
nent, as the householder can say to the armed
burglar : " If I kill you, it is only justifiable
homicide, but if you kill me, it is murder."
This difference in their positions before the law
would directly follow from the fact that the
burglar had caused the whole trouble by doing
wrong. Yet we have the spectacle of the Ger-
man Government admittedly doing wrong and
at the same time claiming the right to take
extreme advantage of international law !
Moreover, even if the German Government
had not deliberately placed itself outside the
pale of international law by committing the
" wrong " to which it brazenly pleaded guOt^,
any claim which it might have to execute inter-
national law would only hold against those who
had committed breaches of that law. Great
latitude is necessarily given to civilized com-
manders in the field in interpreting the law of
war and in carrying out their judgments. A
civilian strongly and reasonably suspected of
having fired upon the enemy's troops, who has
fallen into that enemy's hands, cannot claim
to be defended by counsel ; nor is ho often able
to call witnesses in his behalf. His trial ia
brief, often with — it is to be feared — a strong
bias against him in the mind of his judge.
The fact that in war time many an innocent
citizen thus gets shot by the enemy as a spy
is one which international law is forced to over-
look as one of the incidental evils of war, which
can be neither prevented nor remedied. But
this shooting of an innocent citizen on sus-
picion only, after a mockery of a " trial," is the
utmost limit to which the inflamed passions of
civilized men can claim the sanction of inter-
national law in shedding innocent blood. Therel a
no " law," human or divine — or one might even
say devilish — which could sanction the hideous
and wholesale atrocities committed in Liege by
these sanctimonious apostles of German culture.
Still further — in order to leave no loophole
for casuistry to wriggle out of the frightful
charge recorded against Germany in this war —
even if the German Government had not, on
its own admission, placed itself outside the pale
of international law, and even if the outrages
committed by its agents had not gone far
beyond the worst form of reprisal which that
law could sanction, this mock-serious " warn-
ing " of reprisal was deliberately issued by the
German Government after it knew that the
bloody deeds had already been done.
SQUARE OF THE VIRGIN, LIEGE, BEFORE BOMBARDMENT.
334
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
CHURCH OF ST. JACQUES, LIEGE.
It was on August 9 that in Berlin the Kaiser's
Government proclaimed : " If this (that France
and Belgium were preparing an illegitimate
form of war against the German Army) is
proved by further facts our adversaries are them-
selves responsible if tlie war is extended with
inexorable strength to the guilty population."
And it was on August 7, two days earlier, that
the German Government had full information
of the atrocities committed by its troops upon
unarmed Belgians in Liege, where there was
general massacre of " tous ceux qui leur sont
tombes sous la main, hommes. femmes el
enfants."
Think of the hideous irony of it all ! Here
was the armed burglar who had, by his own
confessed crime, put himself outside the pale
of the law, not only claiming a legal right
to execute the householder who resisted
him, but also self -righteously tlireatening to
apply " inexorable strength " to the rest of the
household two days after he had murdered
them all and burned down the house.
It has been necessary thus to deal somewhat
fully with the terrible charges which lie at the
door of the German Government at this point
of our narrative, because it was here, in and near
Liege, at the very outset of the campaign in
Belgium, that the German commanders had a
golden opportunity to strike a high and noble
keynote of the war. Since their Government
had admitted doing a wrong to Belgium and
had promised . reparation later, they should
have realized that they lay under a moral
disadvantage and should have done everything
in their power to put themselves right with the
Belgian people. Instead of insisting upon
their " right " to enforce, and even to exceed,
the rules of war in dealing with civilian belliger-
ents— like a burglar demanding the observance
of Queensberry rules, with additions of his own,
in a fight with an aggrieved householder — they
shoiild have been watchful for opportunity
to exhibit forbearance and clemency to
civilians taken in arms, thus illustrating their
Government's professed desire to make repara-
tion for its wrongdoing.
But this did not satisfy the Germans. They
were in a hurry to begin with. Like a man
who has wagered to go round the world in a
certain time and has missed his train at the
start, they were already infuriated by their
own failure to bring up their heavy artillery
and ammunition in time to make short work
of the Liege forts. They were further enraged
by the vigorous resistance of Belgian troops,
which they did not expect to find in their way
so much ; and the fact that patriotic Belgian
civilians took part in the fighting caused
their fury to boil over. So they sought to
terrify ihe Belgian nation by massacre ; and
Liege's blood-drenched ashes bore the first
signature of the new German war-spirit on
Belgian soil — an evil spirit for which, as the
evidence shows, not merely the German soldiery
were to blame, nor even merely their com-
manders in the field, but also the coldly biutal
centre of military power in Berlin.
Among other specific charges, supported by
evidence, which were issued on August 25 by
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
335
the British Press Bureau on the authority of the
Belgian Minister, it was stated that on August
6, before one of the forts of Liege, the Germans
surprised a party of Belgian soldiers engaged
in digging entrenchments. The latter, being
unarmed, hoisted a whit" flag ; but the Germans
ignored this and continued to fire upon the
helpless party. On the same day, before
Fort Loncin, a case of treacherous abuse of
the white flag occiu-red in the case of a body
of German troops who hoisted the signal of
surrender and then opened f5re at close range
upon the party of Belgians sent to take charge
of them.
Contrast such conduct as this with the
war-spirit of Belgium. The victim of an un-
provoked attack and almost unprepared for
the storm that had biu-st upon her, she gave
to the world an example of public spirit which
electrified Europe. That in the excitement of
the moment she struck with both hands at
the invader, obviously unaware that the
laws of war permit the use of the swordhand
only — for the Belgian Government had not
had time then to post up in the villages the
official warning to civilians not to take part
in the conflict — was a venial offence, which
a generous enemy would have met by a serious
warning of the consequences which would
follow its repetition ; and for a generous enemy
Belgium and her alUes would have felt at least
respect. But that was not the German way ;
and for the evil conBequenoes which fol-
lowed the brutalization of war in Europe
the Kaiser's Gtovemment is directly re-
sponsible.
General von Emmich waa at this period the
Commander-in-Chief of the German Army of
the Meuse. He had been previously in conunand
of the 10th Army Corps at Hanover, and this,
with the 7th Corps, was the part of his force
which he employed to carry out the orders
that had evidently been given to him to cap-
ture Liege quickly at all costs. He used
88,000 men on the first day, increased to
120,000 on the second, against the Belgian
22,500, which the Germans knew to be in-
adequate for the complete defence of the
fortress ; and what was more natural than
that he should have determined, even without
the explicit orders from Berlin, to sweep them
out of his path £is a preliminary to swift advance
tlirough Belgium towards the French frontier 7
His officers certainly believed that they had
an easy job before them — a task pour rire,
as one of them, a prisoner, explained afterwards
— and entered into action in the gayest spirits.
Bitter must have been their disappointment
when the great 7th Army Corps, after concen-
trating its attack upon the three eastern forts
— naniely, Barchon, Evegnee, and Fleron —
was met with such devastating artillery fire
from the forts and such well-directed machine-
gun end infantry fire from the trenches and
THE CLOISTERS, PALACE OF JUSTICE.
336
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A RUINED STREET IN LIEGE.
[Newspaper Illustrations.
barricades which had been thrown up between
then) that only a remnant came reeling back.
The value of the success gained by the Belgians
in witlistanding the first German onset was
incalculable. Not only did it destroy one
large factor in the Kaiser's scheme for the con-
quest of France, i.e., the belief that, as he him-
self had said, he could sweep through Belgium
as easily as he could wave his hand ; not only
did it disarrangs the time-table by which the
conquest of France was to be completed before
Russia could come to her assistance ; it also
shattered the European reputation of the
Kaiser's Army for invincibility ; it had been
supposed that German officers necessarily were
prodigies of military efficiency and that the
troops which they commanded were the most
perfect man-slaying machine which human
genius and German " thoroughness " could
create. But at Liege the German commanders
showed themselves to be grievous bunglers in
setting their men tasks which mere flesh and
blood could not perform, while the men also
bhowed themselves to be inept with the rifle
and to have a wholesome dislike for the bayonet.
British troops made these discoveries on their
own account later ; but in the initial stages of
the campaign in Belgium it was worth another
100,000 men to General Lemanthat his soldiers
should know that they had only to use their
rifles and bayonets with intelligence and
courage to beat the Germans every time if they
met on anything like equal terms.
At the outset, therefore. General von
Emmich's effort to overrun Liege — to " take
it in his stride," as it were, on his march to
Paris — with the 7th Army Corps failed utterly ;
and when the 7th was reinforced by the 10th
and 9th Corps, and six of the forts were simul-
taneously attacked, no better results, from the
German point of view, followed the assault in
force.
That the Belgians should thus have hold up
120,000 of the best German troops for two
whole days of fierce fighting was a splendid
feat of arms which gladdened the hearts of the
Allies as an omen of ultimate victory.
Some notion of the carnage which resulted
frona the German niethod of attack may be
gathered from the following description given
by a Belgian officer who took part in the de-
fence : —
" As line after line of the German infantry
advanced, wo simply mowed them down. It
was terribly easy, monsieur, and I turned to
a brother officer of mine more than once and
said, ' Voila ! They are coming on again, in a
dense, close formation ! < They must be mad ! '
They made no attempt at deploying, but came
on, line after line, almost shoulder to shoulder,
until, as we shot them down, the fallen were
heaped one on top of the otlier, in an awful
barricade of dead and wounded men that
threatened tc mask our guns and cause us
trouble. I thought of Napoleon's saying — if he
said it, monsieur ; and I dc ubt it, for he liad no
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
$37
care of human life ! — ' C'est magniflque, mais
CO n'est pas la guerre ! " No, it was slaughter —
just slaughter !
" So liigh became the barricade of the dead
and wounded that we did not know whether
to fire through it or to go out and clear openings
with our hands. We would have liked to
extricate some of the wounded from the dead,
but we dared not. A stiff wind carried away
the smoke of the guns quickly, and we could
see some of the wounded men trying to release
themselves from their terrible position. I
will confess I crossed myself, and could have
wished that the smoke had remained !
" But, would you believe it, this veritable
wall of dead and dying actually enabled these
wonderful Germans to creep closer, and
actually charge up the glacis ! Of course,
they got no fui'ther than half-way, for our
maxims and rifles swept them back. Of course,
wo had our own losses, but they were slight
compared with the carnage inflicted upon our
In spite of these terrible experiences General
von Einmich appears to have adhered to the
old-fashioned German idea that a fortress like
Liege could be rushed if you only hurled a
suflficiont number of men against it. But the
third day of the assault added nothing to the
result of the previous two, except that a division
of German cavalry which had forded the Meusp
was surprised and cut up by the Belgian Mixed
Brigade ; and the 9th f lerinan Army Corps
had been brought to a standstill by the side of
the 7th and 10th, with enormous losses —
although these do not appear to have ap-
proached the number of 25,000 given in con-
temporary accounts, which was more than the
strength of the entire Belgian garrison. Yet
how severely the Germans' advance had indeed
been checked appeared from their request for
an armistice of 24 hours to bury the dead and
collect the wounded ; and it was not inhumanity
but reasonable distrust of German honour
which prompted the Belgian commander's
refusal.
EFFECT OF GERMAN SHELL FIRE.
INtwspaptr Jtiustrations,
338
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LEFT SIDE OF THE FAMOUS BRIDGE AT LIEGE.
Blown up by Belgians to impede the German Advance.
[Newspaper /Uuslrtiions.
Practically the sole witnesses of this terribly
imequal duel between the advancing German
hosts and the intrepid defenders of Liege were
the Dutch, who at Maestricht, just within the
safe frontier of Holland, were almost within
eyeshot of it all. Thus, on the afternoon of the
fateful August 6 came the following glimpse
through the fog of war which had settled
around Liege from a correspondent at
Maestricht : —
" I could clearly see from the hill the Germans
in little boats and others building a pontoon
over the Mouse south of Vis6. The horses were
swum across. The crossing was carried out in
half a dozen places with great regularity. The
Germans did not seem much concerned at the
fire of the Belgian forts. The Belgian troops
were spread out over the rising ground. Fire
from a German mitrailleuse kept the Belgians
at a distance, and slowly the whole hillside
became covered with German soldiers, who
drove the Belgians before them.
" By 5 o'clock a large force of Germans had
crossed the Meuse and commenced to march
south on Liege. The Belgians tried to harass
tlHj Oennans by firing into tTie progressing
columns. At last the Belgians cease firing
and retire. From the houses along the road
the people take to flight in despair.
" In the village of Eben I find people calm,
looking with astonishment at the tremendous
body of troops passing along the route. They
were not molested at all as the Germans pro-
gressed towards Liege along both banks of the
Meuse.
" With characteristic optimism Germans
said, ' In two days we will have Liege, and
within a week we will be before Paris.' "
This brief telegram gives a picturesque but
accurate summary of the whole tenor of the
campaign not only before Liege but beyond
Liege and Namur and Brussels to the line where
they first encountered the shock of the allied
French and British in battle. First, we see the
steady inexorable advance of the German hosts
swarming forward like ants — even when, as
happened later, the ground was increasingly
cumbered with their own dead. We see tlie
spirited but futile counter-attacks of the
numerically weak Belgian forces. We see in
every direction small but gallant parties of the
defenders of Belgium swallowed up and des-
troyed by the advancing grey-green flood of
German soldiery. In many places we see the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
339
■1
RIGHT SIDE OF BRIDGE AT LIEGE.
Left side shown on opposite page.
lN*vspap*r lUustratiom,
rural population fleeing along the crowded
roads in mad panic before the German advance.
In others, we see them lining the streets of towns
and villages, staring in stolid despair at the
seemingly interminable hosts of Germans
marching in columns to the west.
That is the whole picttire of the war around
and beyond Liege ; but its minor episodes
varied dramatically from day to day.
Thus, on the eve of that fateful August day
when Liege town surrendered and the forts of
Barchon, Evegnee, F16ron, Chaudfontaine,
Embourg, and Boncolles were all subjected to
bomoardment, one counter-attack by the
Belgians was crowned with brilliant success.
This was delivered from the heights of
Wandre, a position to the west of Barchon,
which was the most northerly of the forts then
involved. It was in fact an assault upon the
outposts on the right flank of the Germans ;
and the Belgians succeeded in slaughtering
many and driving the rest northwards, away
from their main army, to Maastricht. From
here they were said to have been sent by the
Dutch authorities to Aix-la-Chapelle, an instance
of misguided assistance to belligerents which
might have raised serious international ques-
tions. The Dutch, however, claimed that the
only persons thus befriended were Gorman
civilian refugees from Belgium ; and the
neutrality of the Dutch had been so correctly
maintained in other respects that this was
probably the case, although of course great
numbers of the German refugees were spies
and military agents.
On the same day, at the other extremity of
the semi-circular line of battle, on the outside
left, that is to say, of the German advance,
the Garde Civique of Liege gained a brilliant
little success and practically destroyed an
attacking force near the fort of Boncelles. Here,
too, international questions were involved,
because the Germans insisted upon regarding
the Garde Civique as non-combatants.
Yet another trivial Belgian success on this
day stands out from the battle smoke envelop-
ing two sides of Liege at the Chateau de Langres.
Here the Belgians made a show of resistance
before'taking to flight ; and when the victorious
Germans crowded into the stately building,
intent on loot, a terrific explosion for a moment
drowned even the deafening noise of the big
MAP OF LIEGE AND T
Showing the roads, railways, rivers, etc., and indicating
340
RROUNDING COUNTRY.
erence between the large and small forts defending LiSge.
341
342
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ONE OF THE FAMOUS GERMAN SIEGE GUNS. [Nmstafer ulustratiom.
This photograph shows part of gun mounted on a special trolley to facilitate transport. The photograph below
illustrates the lower mounting of the gun, with recoil cylinders. The gun is mounted up and placed on a
concrete foundation for firing.
guns which were battering the forts. The
chateau had been skilfully mined.
Thus the fortunes of the day seemed to vary
80 much in detail that the Belgians, who had
taken many prisoners and seven guns and had
certainly defeated the crack corps of Branden-
burg, were elated with the result.
Already, too, the gallant defence of Liege
had won for the city the highest honour wliich
the French Government could bestow. Anti-
MOUNTING OF THE GUN SHOWN ABOVE.
^Newspaper illustrations.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
343
cipating the impulse of gratitude and admira-
tion which went out not only from France but
from the entire civihzod world to this battered
and blood-stained Walloon town, M. Poincar6,
President of the Republic, sent on August 7 the
following message to the King of the Belgians : —
" I am happy to announce to your Majesty
that the Government of the Republic has just
decorated with the Legion of Honour the valiant
town of Liege.
" It wishes thus to honour the courageous
defenders of the place and the whole Belgian
Army, with which since tliis morning the French
Army sheds its blood on the battlefield.
" Raymond Poincab^."
To the Belgian nation no doubt many names,
both of regiments and individuals, have been
con.secrated by the martyrdom of Liege as
worthy to be placed with that of General Leman
in the roll of undying honour ; and even to the
necessarily superficial view of the international
historian the valour of the 13th Mixed Brigade
in meeting the brunt of the German assault
stands out as a permanent record of fame.
The successful charge of a single squadron of
the Belgian lancers upon six squadrons of
German cavalry was another brilliant episode
of arms which Belgians will never forget when
the Great War is discussed ; while of individual
heroes — from Colonel Marchand, who gave his
life for his chief, to Private Demolin, who carried
out a bayonet charge on his own account against
the advancing Germans and returned safely
after killing four — these were enough at Liege
alone to satisfy any nration's pride. Of tlie
Belgian heroes of Liege, Europe will always
cherish a grateful memory.
But the high hopes awakened by these
Bel'gian successes, which had so deservedly
earned this tribute from the French Republic,
were entirelj' fallacious in so far as they en-
couraged the belief that the Germans had been
worsted in a trial of strength. This was not so.
Nothing which the Belgians could have hoped
to do could have been of any avail against the
overwhelming German numbers and the great
gims which slowly liunbered up into position and
to wliich the Belgians had no artillery that could
hope to reply effectively, nor any fortifications
that could offer resistance. According to eye-
witnes.ses. nothing so terrible had ever been
seen in war as the effect of the great shells fired
into the Liege forts. Men were not simply
killed or wounded ; they were blackened,
biuTxt, and smashed. No wonder that three of
the forts, although they had been expected to
hold out for at least a month, surrendered
within the week, when the real bombardment
DISMANTLED CUPOLA.
[Newspaper illustrations^
began. Indeed, the only reason why all the
forts in the ring around Liege were not quickly
reduced was the difficulty encountered by the
Germans in bringing up these monstrous engines
and moving them into position.
Although many rumours had been rife on
this subject, it was not imtil September 22,
more than a month after the centre of war
interest had been shifted from Liege, that any
detailed account of the method by which these
big 42cm. (16.4in.) siege guns travelled was re-
ceived. For its hauling each gun required no
fewer than 13 traction engines. Each gun was in
four pieces and each piece was drawn by three
engines, the extra engine going ahead to test
the road and being used as a helper up hills.
The engines were all of the broad-wheeled
steam-roller type, and it was noted, as a sort
of compliment to Britisli engineering, that
very nearly all the engines bore the name plates *
of an English firm. The delay in getting these
guns for ward was not due to the slow pace
of the traction engines, but to the difficulty of
finding or making roads suitable for such heavy
traffic.
During the first few days of assault upon
Liege these siege guns were not available ; and
the Belgians seemed still to be fighting with
success xintil the morning of the 7th, when the
German enveloping movement extended to the
north-east beyond Fort Barchon and Fort
Pontisse became involved. On the opposite side
of the ring fortress — namely, the extreme south-
west— Fort Flemalle was also attacked, being
bombarded like Pontisse from across the
344
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Meiise, which ran close to both of these forts on
the south-eastern side and through the town of
liege, which lay in a direct line between them.
This, however, was the limit for the time
oeing of the effective range of the German
artillery from the wooded heights south of the
Meuse ; and the forts of Loncin, Lantin, and
Liers, on the north-west side of the town of
Liege, were able to hold out and, with the aid
of the small but mobile and energetic force
which General Leman still maintained in the
op)en, to embarrass all the attempts of the
Germans to cross the Meuse in force.
It would almost seem as if the Belgian head-
quarters were unaware of the possible value
wliich the -second line of defence, consisting of
the four north-western forts with the river
Meuse across the whole front at a distance of
about five miles, might have possessed if it had
been strongly held. Even with the skeleton
force at his disposal General Leman was
able to hold up the main force of
the enemy for days on the other side of
the river. Even so late as August 21 these
forts -were still able to harass the Grermana by
destroying their pontoon bridges across the
Meuse. One Belgian gun alone had, it wan said.
succeeded in smashing ten of these
structures.
On Thursday, August 13, however, the boom-
ing of the heavy guns recommenced after two
days of quietness. The Germans had succeeded
at last in getting them across the Meuse and
through the town of Liege. Such elaborate
machines of war were these terror-striking
guns that the German gunners were not com-
petent to handle them. This was done by
specialists from the factories of Messrs. Krupp :
and no doubt their admiration of the short work
which they made of the Belgian defences was
sweetened by patriotic recollections of the way
in which Messrs. Krupp, on one excuse after
another, had delayed delivery of fortress guns
ordered by the Belgian Government until it
was too late. Promptitude and dispatch were
not characteristics of Messrs. Krupp's dealings
with a neutral Power upon which Germany was
planning a secret attack. The guns, however,
had no more qualms of conscience than the
Krupp experts who handled them. They at
any rate did their business for the Germans with
promptitude and dispatch. The forts were
silenced in two hours, one being destroyed in
foiu' shots.
GERMAN SOLDIERS STANDING ON ONE OF THE OVERTURNED BELGIAN GUNS.
[StvjspapfT lUusira'ions.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
345
GROUND SURROUNDING ONE OF THE LIEGE FORTS.
Showing shattered armour plate.
[Daily Minor.
Notliing like these guns had been expected,
otherwise no doubt much greater efEorts would
have been made to prevent them from being
brought across the Meuse ; for, as it was, they
introduced a new factor which entirely vitiated
all the calculations of the Allies as to the
holding power of the fortresses of Liege and
Namur.
Owing to the departure of the field troops
and the flight of the populace, the demolition of
the forts and the capture of General Leman
with the survivors of his staff, followed by a
rigorous German occupation of the place,
nothing in the shape of an authentic record of
the last days of Liege before its fall has been
available ; but the following facts deserve
permanent record.
The Gennan attack commenced on the night
of Tuesday, August 4, with an advance of the
7th Army Corps against the Forts F16ron and
Evegnee. The point was well chosen because
the approach was made tlirough undulating
and heavily-wooded country, in which the
troops were able to occupy a natural semi-
circle, opposite which an interval of more than
three miles separated F16ron from Fort Chaud--
fontaine on her right. This space was, of course,
strongly entrenched and occupied by Belgian
troops full of the courage and confidence en-
gendered by their previous successes. This was
shown by the fate of the 3rd Battalion of the
German 125th Regiment, which, in taking
up position, got too close to the Belgian lines
and was cut t<i Diecest Bv tb« lurid light of
subsequent events such successes seem trivial
indeed ; but the excitement of the moment
had magnified them into victories. Neverthe-
less, had the Germans been able to employ the
same tactics here as they did subsequently
at Namiu- and deferred action until they were
able to concentrate an insupportable artillery
fire from heavy guns simultaneously upon all
the forts and the trenches between them* the
result would not have been many hours in
doubt. Instead, after an ineffective bombard-
ment of the two forts selected for attack with
badly-timed shells wliich made no impression
upon them, masses of infantry were sent forward.
Of course, the inevitable happened. Under the
glare of searchlights the solid ranks of men
were simply m.owed down by machine guns and
field gvms, until the shattered remnant was
ripe for retreat before the bayonets with which
the already victorious Belgians charged upon
them from the trenches.
Thus the first attack of the 7th Army Corps
was brilliantly, if easily, repulsed ; and on
the morning of the 5th the Liege forts on the
east opened fire upon the Germans and the latter
replied ; but, although the noise of the guns drove
the inhabitants of Liege into their cellars
at first, it was soon discovered that there was
little danger, becau.se the enemy evidently
had few guns in position and these were out-
classed by the artillery in the forts. So during
the day most of the Liegeois learned, as besieged
peoples do so quickly, to play hide-and seek w^ith
the shells, bolting into shelter only when the
346
TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
look-out bell, signalling the flash of a German
gun, was heard.
During the day, however, there were ominous
rumours that the Germans had threatened a
heavy bombardment of the town unless both it
and the surrounding forts were surrendered ;
and it was stated that, while the Mayor, in order
to save the helpless houses from destruction,
was then willing to yield. General Leman
decisively refused to give up the forts. Then
real panic seized part of the population, who
stormed the train leaving the city, while :nany
returned to their cellars.
So the day of dread passed, and on the follow-
ing day (August 6) the Germans, having got
their heavy guns into position, commenced
bombardment of the town as well eis the forts.
One shell completely wrecked the roof of the
Cathedral, and the University — which the
Germans appear to have mistaken for the
Government House, as they made it a special
target — was destroyed ; but most of the buildings
were still intact when the town siurendered,
though the forts still strove to maintain the un-
equal struggle.
Meanwhile the invaders marched into Liege,
singing patriotic songs, but maintaining good
order ; although a hint of the German methods
was immediately given to the people in a
proclamation by the German Commander
that if a single shot were fired the town would bo
devastated.
The actual bombardment of the town occupied
only seven hours, with an interval of one hour ;
but many people were killed and wounded and
the general effect was so terrible that further
resistance would have been useless folly on the
part of the unprotected town, since it could do
nothing now to aid the doomed foi'ts.
To vmderstand why Liege thus surrendered
in the midst of a seemingly brilliant defence,
we must realize that when the attack
which commenced on August 5 was
continued until the morning of the 6th by
the united strength of the 7th, 10th, and 9th
Corps, the chief brunt of the extended assault
fell farther to the south between the forts
of Flemalle, Boncelles, and Embourg ; and to
meet this the Belgian general was compelled
to move down his field force to fill the entrench-
ments between those forts. Although here
also the German advance of massed infantry
was again met and repulsed, the simultaneous
reopening of the attack upon Forts Fl^ron and
Evegn6e warned General Leman of the in-
adequacy of his force to hold the entire 33-mile
' THE LIEGE FORTS
A photograph taken after bombardment.
[N*XBSpaptr JUustrations.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
347
EFFECT OF FIRING ON CUPOLAS. [C. B.ndaiU
Top dotted line shows the line of flight of siege howitzer shell, flniilly bursting on top of cupola, the exact
TMiige having been asceriained by tlie Germms long b 'fore war was declared. The bottom dotted lines
represent Oeld-gun fire and sliow shell glancing off cupola.
circle of the fortress. He wisely took the warning,
and even in the hour of victory successfully sent
back his little field army across the Meuse, leav-
ing the town of Liege open to the invaders.
Thus the very peculiar position was created
of a great industrial city, only partially demo-
lished by bombardment, peaceably occupied in
force by an enemy who had appointed a military
government and had entrenched his forces
in the sviburbs, surrounded by the forts which
had been constructed for its defence and wore
still occupied by the defenders.
The explanation of this unique situation
was, however, simple. There was now nothing
whatever to prevent the free passage of German
troops, especially in small parties and at night,
through the wide intervals between the forts,
thus keeping open the comnumications between
the investing force and the force in oo cupation of
the town ; while on the other side the Belgian forts
refrained from opening fire upon the town fro:n
patriotic considerations. In war, however,
obedience to the nobler sentiments is usually —
at any rate temporarily — costly, and the
Germans in Liege of course took advantage of
the inaction of the forts to entrench themselves
more completely while the siege batteries were
being erected for the final demolition of the forts.
Thus ended Act I. of the drama of Liege;
and although the fortune of war had no choice
but to declare on the side of the " big batta-
lions"—or, perhaps it would be more correct
to say, the " big guns " — the honours of
the war lay so completely on the Belgian
side that the report — often contradicted
and as often " confirmed " — that the
German Commander, General von Emmich,
had committed suicide excited no surprise.
Whatever the orders given to him may have
been and however great may have been the
difficulties which he had encountered in bringing
up his heavy siege gims, the attempt to rush a
modern fortress with mere masses of flesh and
blood was not even magnificent — and it cer-
tainly was not war.
A remarkable contrast to the unfortunate,
blundering von Emmich was presented by
General Leman, the astute and cool-headed
defender of Liege. Althougli a martinet in
discipline, his own life was so strictly soldierly
that he commanded the absolute loyalty of
all ranks vmder him. Like Lord Roberts, he
seemed incapable of fatigue ; and it is related of
him, before the outbreak of the war, that he
would often after a ride of 30 miles return to the
Military School, of which he was Commandant,
and discuss strategical and tactical problems
with his officers until early morning. Many
other anecdotes are told to his credit, for he
evidently possessed the remarkable personality
which almost always distinguishes the bom
commander. Thus the two most striking
incidents which are narrated by the survivors
of Liege relate to him personally. One of these
is to the effect that by means of a clever ruse,
" the character of which [says the special
correspondent who narrates it] had better be
left undescribed," the General tempted a
number of Uhlans to enter the town of Liege
on the morning of August 6 in the hope of
348
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
capturing him. The Uhlans came in two
patrols, every man of the first being killed
and of the second captut-ed.
The other incident occurred when, according
to the Brussels Special Correspondent of The
Times, two German spies, disguised as French
officers, gained access to the town and desired
to be conducted to the General. " Their plan
miscarried, however, and they were arrested
just in the nick of time. They were taken out
and shot at one of the gates of the town."
Although such narratives may have little
connexion with the serious history of the war,
they are interesting as showing the gi-eat in-
fluence which the personality of General
ssa^*'^
No. 1 DIAGRAM SHOWS A CUPOLA
RAISED FOR FIRING. No. 2 SHOWS
CUPOLA LOWERED. [C. BmdaU.
These cupolas were main features of the Brial-
mont Bystcm of ring-fortresses, which have been
proved by this war to be incapable of withstand-
ing artillery heavier than their own.
Leman had upon the opening phase of the
campaign. It is probable that when, as com-
mander of the Liege garrison, he was shut
up in the fortress, and later was nearly killed
in the explosion of Fort Loncin and taken
prisoner by the Germans, Belgium lost the
services of one of its finest soldiers.
In addition to his practical mastery of
strategy and tactics in the field, he was a
recognized expert in Roman law, military
architecture, and engineering science. -With
ready skill he had so handled the opening phase
of the great game of war, which his cotintry
was playing for her very existence, as to
inflict greater damage than perhaps even he
could have hoped upon the enemy, and then
to extract his force from a position that was
destined to become almost immed lately hopeless.
Thus he brilliantly commenced that long
series of withdrawals before superior force
which marked the whole of the first chapter
of the great war, until in fact the wearying
German hosts were brought up " with a round
turn " almost under the walls of Paris.
The great fault of the German attack upon
Liege was its total lack of co-ordination. It
commenced with an ineffective bombardment
against which the Belgian artillery, whose fire
was accurate and well-directed, easily held
their own, with the result that dviring the three
hours' duel two heavy pieces of German
artillery had been destroyed by the guns of
Fort Evegn^e, where not a man was killed or
wounded and the cupola was undamaged.
Having thus completely failed to prepare the
way for an assault, the German commander,
nevertheless, flung a solid army corps at the
fortress. As was inevitable, the advancing
ranks were cut down like standing wheat by
the concentrated fii-e from the trenches and the
forts. The trenches were never reached, and
the 7th Army Corps staggered back more than
decimated.
Next day, when it was too late to repair his
initial blunder. General von Emmich began to
make some use of his superior strength by
bringing the 10th Army Corps, the famous
Iron Division of Brandenburg, to the support
of the 7th, and thus extending the front of hir
operations so that five of the Liege forts,
instead of two only, were involved. Later the
9th Army Corps and a division of cavalry were
brought up to assist the other two, and thus the
entire force of 120,000 men to which the Kaiser
had entrusted the prospective honour of
sweeping through Belgium to the French
frontier was held up before Liege by General
Leman and 40,000 Belgians. So unequal a
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
349
ANOTHER TYPE OF GERMAN GUN— SIEGE HOWITZER. [R.cord Prisa.
■contest could not, however, be maintained in-
definitely ; and although the second German
onslausjVit was no more effective than the first,
the ill -served artillery proving unable to make
more impression on the forts than the mis-
directed infantry fire had upon the trenches,
while the massed cavalry had no opportunities
&t all, nevertheless General Leman recognized
that he had done all that could be prudently
attempted to stay the German advance, and
adroitly withdrew before his powerful enemy
could recover from his second staggering blow.
The chief excuse which can be offered for
the German mismanagement of the attack
upon Liege is that tlie Belgian resistance must
have come upon General von Emmich as a
surprise. All his plans were made with a view
to a rapid advance through Belgium towards
France. These plans were in complete readiness
before the ultimatum to Belgium was sent.
Indeed, a calculation of the time necessarily
occupied by the German corps in getting from
their headquarters in Germany to the frontier
shows that they must have commenced their
march on July 31, before the declaration of
war. The disposition of the entire Belgian
force at the time was well known to tbe German
staff, and no considerable part of the Belgian
Field Aimy was on August 3 nearer tlan
Diest, where the 3rd Division, under General
Leman, was stationed. So there is little doubt
that the German commander, when he arranged
his night attack upon Liege on August 6,
imagined that he had only to reckon with the
garrison of the forts and one mixed brigade
of the Belgian Army. His intention appar-
ently was to engage heavily the three eastern
forts with his artillery and push his forces
through the wide intervals between them,
when the town of Liege in the centre would have
been at his mercy. What he had not cal-
culated upon apparently was the possibility
that in the 48 hours which had elapsed
between the delivery of the ultimatum and the
preparation for attack. General Leman, with
the 3rd Belgian Division, would, by forced
marches, have covered the 80 miles from Diest
to Liege and be occupying the trenches between
the forts. This probably explains why the
German attack was delivered in such a way as
to render disaster inevitable in the circum-
stances ; and it would seem to show that at the
outset the blind confidence of the Germans,
that Belgium would be unable and unwilling
to offer serious resistance, was such as to
render them temporarily oblivious of the
plainest dictates of prudence.
In the subsequent phase of the campaign,
indeed, when German anny corps were crowd-
ing upon the rear of the British Anny, as it
retired, fighting step by step, towards Paris,
there was always the same waste of Gorman
troops tlirough sending them forward in masses
against an entrenched enemy. But there this
350
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
prodigality of luinian life may have been de-
liberately calculated expenditure, the only weak
point of the calculation being that it under-
estimated the steadiness of the British soldier.
Had the Germans been able to smother Tommy
Atkins, even with heaps of their own slain,
I he game would have been worth- the stakes.
ft is just possible, too, that even at Liege the
importance of swift passage through Belgium
in order to strike France down before help could
come to her so dominated all other considera-
tions that prudence in tactics was thrown to
the winds. These are the opportunities of the
Nemesis which waits upon unjust invaders ;
and the disaster 'which marked the first step of
the Gennans on Belgian soil was ominous.
It was not so accepted in Berlin, however,
for news came thence that on the 7th the happy
tidings of " the fall of Liege " had spread with
lightning-like rapidity throughout the city
and created boundless enthusiasm. The Kaiser
himself, never reluctant to pose with theatrical
effect, sent his own uniformed aide-de-camp
out to the crowds before the Palace to give the
news, and policemen on bicycles dashed along
Un^r den Linden with the joyful tidings !
Imagination fails utterly to conceive a similar
scene being enacted before Buckingham Palace
and in the Mall over the first reports of a pre-
liminary success in war. But allowances muai
be made for the Germans, who knew at the back
of their minds that their Emperor had staked
all the interests of their country upon a gambler's
throw. No wonder that they listened with
excitement to the first rattle of the dice, and the
German Press raptiu-ously exclaimed that the
line of advance into Northern France waa
assured.
This was not, of course, exactly the way to
state the case. So far as the figliting wliich had
then taken place was concerned, the advantage
had all been on the side of the Belgians. Yet,
as happened more than once diu-ing this first
phase of the great war, the conclusions draviTi
from false news of " victories " in Berlin were
nearer to the truth than the hopes based upon
accurate accounts of successes in Paris or
London. The explanation of this seeming
anomaly was that the Germans were fighting at-
this stage — as they had carefully arrangod that
they should be fighting — with prejjonderating
odds in their favour. So immense was the
volume of their initial moving strength that
local reverses scarcely checked it at all. They
caused little more than swirls in the resistless
tide of advance.
So when Berlin, shouting itself hoarse over b
victory which had not been won, declared that
ONE OF THE FORTS AT LIEGE AFTER BOMBARDMENT.
Showing damage caused by German siege guns.
{Daily MiiTor.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A5\
ANOTHER VIEW OF THE RUINED BRIDGE.
the way was now open to tho French frontier,
it was nearer to the truth than London, which
calculated that, if 40,000 Belgians could thus
clieck the German hosts at Liege, the combined
P'rench and Belgian armies might fight a de-
cisively victorious battle not much farther west.
At that time people in England were not
thinking much about what the British soldiers
might bo able to do. They had heard that
there was to be a substantial " expeditionary
force " ; but the very title suggested its em-
ployment in some side-issue of the war, and all
eyes were fixed in hope upon the gallant
defenders of Liege.
Disappointed bewilderment therefore ensued
when it was seen that, although the Berlin
reports of victory were indubitably false, the
subsequent course of events was no better than
if they had been true. The German hosts
poured through Liege into the heart of Belgium,
and the fog of war settled deeply over the ring
of forts, which daily bulletins assured us were
" still holding out."
Thus it was that the crucial test of war had
definitely decided the much-debated question
of the value of great ring-fortresses like
Liege and Namur. Liege and Nainur
were sisters, and it is not possible to draw
definite conclusions from the determined re-
sistance which one was able to ofier to the
invader, without considering also the reasons
why the other fell so quickly. For both of thess
strongholds represented the mature genius of
Brialmont in the science of fortification ;
and the success or failure of both to hold the
Germans would have been taken by rival schools
of theorists as conclusive evidence for or againsl
the principle of ring-fortresses. AVliat actually
happened was therefore entirely unexpected
by both sides ; for while Liege seemed to crown
the memory of Brialmont with glory, all the
costly and extensive fortifications of Nam\ir
served no better than a trap for its unfortunate
defenders.
The fact is that both were strongholds which
would have been absolutely impregnable if
two conditions had been fulfilled. One con-
dition was that the cupolas of the forts in their
• beds of cement should be strong enough ta
resist the enemy's heaviest guns ; and the other
was that an adequate force should be available
to hold the trenches which occupied the interval*
between the forts. If these conditions were
present Brialmont 's ring fortresses might be
compared to gigantic entrenched camps, with
invincible artillery placed at all the numerous
salient angles. Such a position would un-
doubtedly be impregnable. But at Liege one,
and at Namur the other, of these conditions
was not present. Namur fell quickly because
the Germans, profiting by the experience of
Liege, had brought up artillery of sufficient
strength to smash the forts by bombardment
at the commencement. Liege also fell quickly
as a military position, although the forts held
out gallantly, because the adequate force to.
35"
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
GERMAN SOLDIERS MARCHING THROUGH LIEGE.
occupy 33 miles of entrenchments was lacking.
This was not generally understood outside the
war councils of General Joftre and the Belgian
King. In Berlin the people rejoiced in the
fruits of a fictitious victory, and in Britain
the people wondered why victory had no
apparent fruits.
Even with all the facts of the situation before
us, we are inclined to wonder at the self-
sacrificing steadiness with which General Leman
adhered to his part in the general plan of cam-
paign. The war which was being waged was
so vast that his handful of 40,000 men at Liege
was only a pawn in the game. Yet it was a
pawn which in the gambit selected had occupied
so brilliant a position that a less cool-headed
and less dutiful player would have been excused
in history if he had been tempted to sacrifice
it in a glorious " check " to the opponent. But
checkmate was the end for which the Allies
were playing ; and in the alert and mobile
Belgian Army — which, more than a month after
the defence of Liege had become past
history, commenced to harass the German
army corps hurrying Pariswards to help their
comrades sorely pressed by those pestilent
British — were many men who would have been
sleeping in their graves among the ruins of
Liege's defences if General Leman had not
known when to move back his pawn.
It was dismal experience of the same kind
OB General French endured when the compact
British force, admirably fitted in every detail
to be the spearhead of a victorious advance, was
[Newspaper Illustrations.
compelled day after day, week after week, to
fight rearguard actions against superior forces
in order to keep the general plan of campaign
intact. The reward of such devotion to duty
may seem slow in coming, but it is sure ; and
in the aggressive activity of the Belgian Army
of Antwerp, even after Namur had fallen and
Brussels had been occupied. General Leman,
then a prisoner in Germany, must have seen,
with justifiable pride, a factor of ultimate success
to which his own self-denial had largely con-
tributed .
But the really great service which the Belgians
who defended Liege so gallantly had done for
the cause of the Allies lay in shattering the
Continental superstition that German armies
were invincible. This did not affect the British
soldier, who always has a cheery confidence —
which this war has done nothing to shake —
that he is as good a man as anybody else in any
company into which he may happen to be
tlirown by the exigencies of service. Bia every
man in the French ranks was the son of parents
who had seen France, after prolonged and
desperate resistance, forced under the heel of
Prussia ; and just when he was nerving himself
to the supreme effort to endeavour to right his
country's ancient wrong in spite of this previous
disparity of strength, it was like a message of
hope from heaven to learn that 40,000 Belgians
had held back 120,000 Germans for days,
slaughtering them wholesale arid coming out
of the encounter almost unscathed themselves.
Thus General Leman's success, fruitless as it
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
353
may have seemed in tactical results from
a superficial point of view, was infinitely
valuable to the Allied Armies in consequence
of the new spirit which it gave to all the
Continental enemies of Germany. It was
the first prick to the bubble of the German
reputation.
Equally important was another result of
General Leman's success : that it threw out
of gear the whole time-table of the German
campaign. In any case this would have been a
serious matter, because all the detailed arrange-
ments in connexion with the transport of a
great army are necessarily co-ordinated with the
utmost precision. An army in the field is a vast
and complicated fighting machine, of which
every nut and bolt must be exactly in its right
place at the right moment to ensure smooth
working. If any part of it is seriously and
suddenly obstructed, the whole machine may
be unexpectedly delayed, and it is true of all
armies in the field that unexpected delays are
very dangerous.
In th^ case of the German Army which was
invading Belgium this was doubly true, because
the necessity for promptitude and dispatch in
the performance of the task which had
been allotted to it was paramount, inasmuch
as the greater "part of it would almost
certainly be required, after defeating
France, to hurry back in order to confront
Russia. For thisi reason delay at the
outset of its advance amounted to a
defeat much more serious in ita conneqiienoea
than there had been any reason to hope
tlmt the Belgian Army would bo able to
inflict.
To this extent, then, it was easy to award the
honour due to General Leman's gallant little
force ; and it was a happy day for Belgians
all over the world — except in Germany — when
the news of the Battle of Liege was received.
In Berlin, indeed, by some process of sancti-
monious casuistry, Belgium, against whom the
Kaiser's Government admitted that a wrong
had been done, was regarded thenceforward as
an associate of the Evil One and a sort of rebel
against God, because she fought against the
wrong. No German seemed to realize that
Belgium by admitting the German Army would
in effect be declaring war upon France, and that
even the almighty Kaiser could not at that
moment have protected Belgium's western
frontier from the hostile onslaught which France
would have been justified in making. But
in all the world, except Germany, the heroism
of Belgium was worthily acknowledged, and
the newspaper headlines of " Gallant Little
Belgium " in every language must have
gladdened the eyes of Belgian exiles, who were, of
course, not unaware how often in the past the
phrase " les braves beiges " had been used in
irony. Thus time brings its revenges and teaches
mankind that in the issue between right and
wrong the strong are still liable to be humbled
by the weak.
GERMAN SENTRIES ON THE BANKS OF THE MEUSE.
354
THE TIMES HISTORY . OF THE WAR.
Tlie<50 considerations rendered it difficult for
contemporary onlookers to appreciate the kind of
courage — moral courage of a high order — wliich
the Belgian commander displayed in deliberately
depri\'ing himself of the chance of winning
further glory, in order that ho might not imperil
the success of the war drama as a whole by
over-acting the minor part which had been
assigned to him.
For, when the psychological moment had
arrived when, In General Leman's cool judgment,
it was time to abandon Liege as a stronghold
and use it merely as a place d' arret, he had sent
back his 40,000 men to their place in the
Belgian field army, remaining himself as
Military Governor of Liege in order to co-
ordinate the defence of the forts as much as
possible and to exercise moral influence upon
the garrison. This is the explanation of his
decision given by himself in a pathetic
letter written from captivity to his master,
the King of the Belgians, narrating how
the Fort Loncin, where he had establishec^
his headquarters when the town of Liege had
been occupied by the Germans, was blown
up, " the greater part of the gaiTison being
the
The letter
buried under
continues : —
" That I did not lose my life in that.
catastrophe is due to the fact that my escort,
composed of Commandant Collard, a sub-officer
of infantry, who has undoubtedly perished, the
gendarme Thevenin, and my two orderlies,
Vanden Bossche and Jos Lecocq, drew me from
a position of danger where I was being
asphyxiated by gas from the exploded
powder. I was carried into a trench, where a
German captain named Griison gave me drink,
after which I was made prisoner and taken to
Liege in an ambulance.
" I am convinced that the honour of our arms
has been sustained. I have not surrendered
either the fortress or the forts. Deign, Sire, to
pardon any defects in this letter. I am physically
shattered by the explosion of Loncin. In Ger-
many, whither I am proceeding, my thoughts
will be, as they have ever been, of Belgium and
the King. I would willingly have ^iven my
GENERAL WONTERS AND HIS AIDES-DE-CAMP.
The General who directed most of the tactical moves against the Germans in Belgium.
[Newspaper Illustrations.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
355
BELGIANS LOADING A GUN.
Actual photograph taken in the firing line.
{Daily Mirror.
life the better to serve tliem, but death was
denied me."
It would scarcely bo possible to add a more
illuminating commentary to this simple,
soldierly letter than the following testimony of
a German officer : —
" General Leman's defence of Liege com-
bined all that is noble, all that is tragic.
" As long as possible he inspected the forts
daily to see everything was in order. By a
piece of falling masonry, dislodged by our guns,
both General Leman's legs were crushed.
Undaunted he visited the forts in an auto-
mobile. Fort Chaudfontaine was destroyed by
a German shell dropping in the magazine. In
the strong Fort Loncin General Leman decided
to hold his ground or die.
" When the end was inevitable the Belgians
disabled the last three guns and exploded the
supply of shells kept by the guns in readiness.
Before this General Leman destroyed all
plans, majis, and papers relating to the de-
fences. The food supplies were also de-
stroyed. With about 100 men General Leman
attempted to retire to another fort, but we had
cut off their retreat. By this time our heaviest
guns were in position, and a well-placed shell
tore through the cracked and battered masonry
and exploded in the main magazine. With a
thunderous crash the mighty walls of the fort
fell. Pieces of stone and concrete 25 cubic
metres in size were hurled into the air. When
the dust and fumes passed away we stormed the
fort across ground literally strewn with the
bodies of the troops who had gone out to storm
the fort and never returned. All the men in
the fort were wounded, and most were uncon-
scious. A corporal with one arm shattered
valiantly tried to drive us back by firing his
rifle. Buried in the debris and pinned beneath
a massive beam was General Leman.
" ' Rospoctez le general, il est mort,' said
an aide-de-camp.
" With gentleness and care, which showed
tliey respected the man who had resisted them
so valiantly and stubbortdy, our infantry re-
leased the general's wounded form and carried
him away. We thought him dead, but he re-
covered consciousness, and, looking round,
said, ' It is as it is. The men fought valiantly,'
and then, turning to us, added, ' Put in your
dispatches that I was luiconscious.'
" We brought him to our commander, General
von Emmich, and the two generals saluted.
We tried to speak words of comfort, but he
was silent — he is known as the silent general.
' I was unconscious. Be sure and put that in
your dispatches.' More ho would not say.
356
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
" Extending his hand, our commander said,
• General, you have gallantly tuid nobly held
your forts.' General Leman replied, ' I thank
you. Our troops have lived up to their repu-
tations.' With a smile he added, ' War is not
like manoeuvres ' — a reference to the fact that
General von Emmich was recently with General
Leman during the Belgian manoeuvres. Then,
unbuckling his sword. General Leman tendered
it to General von Emmich. ' No,' replied the
German commander, with a bow ; ' keep your
sword. To have crossed swords with you has
been an honour,' and the fire in General Leman's
eye was dimmed by a tear."
Many similar authentic cases were recorded
during the war of Germans, both officers and
men, behaving with true chivalry and kindness
to French, British, and Belgian wounded and
prisoners. If only this had been the guiding
spirit of their conduct in general !
In the foregoing, however, we are anticipating
the finale of the last chapter of the glorious
story of the defence of Liege. The forts, bereft
of support from the Belgian Army in the field,
with the city and ancient citadel which they
were designed to protect in ruins, with an
insolent enemy in occupation lording it over the
trembling populsuje — the forts maintained their
gallant resistance, the Military Governor, shut
up in one of them, continuing to exercise, so far
as was possible, his moral influence upon the
scattered garrison.
This was the position of affairs from the
night of August 7 onwards, for Liege was then
closely invested by the Germans and all com-
munication between the forts and the outer
world was completely cut off. They were,
however, still intact, and, being well supplied
with food and ammunition, they were expected
to hold out for a long time.
At the same time the Belgian field force
wliich had taken so brilliant a part in the de-
fence, including the Third Division and the
Fifth Brigade, had joined the headquarters of
the Belgian Army, when it was reviewed by
Kirg Albert, who congratulated all ranks upon
their achievement. The Tsar also telegraphed
to the King an expression of his sincere admira-
tion for the valiant Belgian Army and liis best
wishes for their success in this " heroic struggle
for the independence of the country."
In the circumstances it was perhf ps inevit'ible-
that the General Staff of the Belgian Army
should have overrated the tactical value of the
success which had been achieved ; and on the
night of August 9 the official announcement was
BELGIAN SOLDIERS.
In iront of the tree trunk a pit has been dug, and covered over with branches.
\Undervo'-d ir Undtrwood.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THu. WAR.
367
INSIDE A BELGIAN TRENCH.
\Rtcofi Prea.
iniide that " the offensive movements of the
enemy had been completely stopped " and that
the French ard Belgian Armies would " take
offensive action simultaneously in accord-
ance with their concerted plans." If, at
this time, offensive action was really con-
templated by the Allies, it must have beeu
through lack of jjerspective, because the
losst« suffered by the three army corps which had
assaulted Liege, heavy as they were, were mere
trifles compared with the price which Germany
was prepared to pay on the spot for a rapid
advance through Belgiuin upon France.
This more serious note in the struggle had
been emphasized in the deep tones of the big
^ms which had arrived at last and began to
speak to the Liege forts in a way that there
was no misunderstanding. These heavy siego
guns were supposed by Messrs. Krupp and their
patrons the German War Department to be
the last word in modern artillery, and their
existence had been a jealously-guarded secret
for " der Tag." It must be admitted, too,
that they were a secret worth keeping ; for the
havoc which they wrought in the forts of
Liege was terrible and insupportable. From
that day — since the relief of Liege by any
adequate force was not possible — :the question
whether the forts should surrender or bo
destroyed was only a question of the com-
parative endurance of steel and concrete on
the one hand and of flesh and blood on the other.
To the everlasting honour of the Belgians bo
it recorded that the indomitable courage of
the garrison of Liege outlasted the strength of
the shattered cupolas.
Perhaps we camnot more fitly close this
blood-stained but glorious chapter in the history
of Belgium better than by quoting from the
measured utterances of leading British states-
men in the two Houses of Parliament on
August 27.
In the House of Commons the Prime Minister,
Mr. Asquith, rising to propose a resolu-
tion of sympathy and gratitude to the Belgian
Government and the gallant Belgian nation,
said : —
" The defence of Liege (cheers) will always be
the theme of one of the most inspiring cliapters
in the annals of liberty. The Belgians have won
for themselves the immortal glory which belongs
to a people who prefer freedom to ease, to
secm-ity, even to life itself. We are proud of
their alliance and their friendship." (Cheers.)
He was immediately followed by Mr. Bonar
Law, the Leader of the Opposition, who said : —
■' Belgium has deserved well of the world.
She has added another to the long list of great
deeds wliich have been done by the heroic
patriotism of small nations."
As furt her proof of the solidarity of the British
in their admiration of Belgian pluck and prowess,
Mr. Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalist
Party, said that there was no sacrifice
wliich the Irish would not willingly make on
behalf of Belgium.
358
TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
In the House of Lords Lord Crowo, on behalf
of the Government, and Lord Lansdowne,
speaking for the Unionist majority, expressed
similar sentiments ; and the former uttered a
solemn warning to Gennany with regard to the
atrocities committed by her troops at Liege.
'■ I do venture to declare," he said, " that any
nation that so conducts itself pays, soon or lato,
and pays to the uttermost farthing."
With the British nation it had already become
a serious resolve to see that fartliing paid.
The story of Liege leaves us with a sense
of having witnessed a drama complete in
its thenoie and glorious in its motif. And the
glamour of it seemed to ennoble every contem-
porary reference to its circumstances. At
Dublin, on September 25, 1914, the British
Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, expressed in
measured words no more than the heart-feolitig
of every man in his vast audience when he said
that the indomitable resistance of the Belgians
" proved to the world that ideas which cannot be
weighed or measured by any material calculus
can still inspire and dominate mankind."
Those are not the words in which the man in the
street would have clothed the thought. He
would have been content to say : — " Belgium is
in the right and, by God, we'll see her through ! "
There are times when an expletive becomes
dignified as the very spirit of a sentence ; and
this was one of them. The words italicized in
the supposititious sentence above, common as it
may seem, were the national British expression
of the " ideas " which still dominate mankind,
in spite of Kaisers. Belgium was " right "
and " by God " we would see her through.
That was the idea.
jVIr. Asquith rose to the level of that idea. So
did Mr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer ; so did Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the
Admiralty ; so did all the other Ministers in their
degrees and according to their abilities. So did
the leaders of the Opposition. So did the Irish
Nationalists and the Ulstermen, lately so ready
to fly at one another's throats. So did the
Boers and the British, not long ago deadly
foes and until then mostly suspicious of each
other's motives. So did Canada and Australia
and New Zealand. So did all the diverse races
with jarring creeds which compose Britain's
most magnificent heritage, the loyal Indian
Empire. So did all our Crown colonies. So did
all our Allies and our friends in other lands.
Nor did Mr. Asquith overstate the case when
he said that by establishing this idea Belgium
had done more than change the whole face of
the German campaign. Even the tremendous
political results of the war wore not so important
as this new unity of mankind in defence of the
Right. It is not a coincidence that throughout
AN 11-in. GERMAN MORTAR.
This is the barrel section on a special carriage for transport.
[Record Press.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
:539
BELGIAN SOLDIERS FIRING AT A PASSING AEROPLANE,
[ J opicul.
Britain the war period was marked by aa
amazing absence of crime. There may seem
to be no direct antagonism between a scheme of
world-\\ar hatched at Potsdam and a. burglary
l)laniied in Whitechapel. But many a burglar,
moved to honest indignation by the German
outrage, enlisted as a soldier or foimd some
other way to declare himself on the side of the
Right ; and thus many police were set free to
protect the nation's interests, instead of watching
the criminals.
And what happened in Britain occurred in
varying degress throughout the civilized world.
Men became better. This is what Belgium did
for the world ; and it was a service for which
mankind can never sufficiently thank her.
The crisis was one towards which the civilized
world had been inevitably {advancing for many
3 ears ; and to the historian of the distant
future the era of 1914 will still stand out as a
great lardmark, for' a companion to which liis
eye may even travel down the long perspective
of centuries to that time when Christ preached
" peace on earth and goodwill towards men " —
the idea which, to repeat Mr. Asquith's plirase,
" still dominates mankind." That in most
Hplieres of human activity it has seemed little
more than an " idea," as far removed from
daily practice in individual as in international
life, lias been due to the stress of the persistent
struggle for existence. The " idea " was in
every heart ; but the pressvire of necessity
controlled everj' brain, and the brain was,
almost N always, the working partner.
And out of the struggle for existence en-
gineered by the brain arose tlio armed might
of the German Empire, a gigantic organism
deliberately constructed in every detail upon
theories of hard science. Christ's " idea "
had no place in this ; although even in
German dreams it asserted itself as the final
ambition — a .world-peace of goodwill and
content under the sheltering wings of the
Prussian eagle.
Thus the real question at issue was whether
or not Christ's teaching should definitely bo
shelved until Germany, after subduing the
world, had time to attend to it. It would
have been difficult, and rightly so, to per-
suade the British nation that so plain an
issue was involved in the quarrel between
Servia and Austria, or between Austria and
Russia, or Germany and Russia, or even Ger-
many and France. Treaty obligations might
have compelled the British Government to
declare war against Germany under conditions
whicli did not apparentlj' involve this issue ;
for treaties are entangling things which some-
time? drag a nation in the direction whither it
should not go.
360
THE TIMEIS HISTOUl OF THE WAR.
Whether wo should necessarily have been
enabroiled in a war between Germany and France
would have depended upon circumstances ; and
if the Kaiser had realized that the British Empire
would go headlong into war for the " idea " of
which Mr. Asquith spoke at Dublin, his diplo-
mats might have been adroit enough to shift the
rupture with France on to ground where the
" idea " had no place. But the fact was that
the German mind, having itself shelved the
" idea " — ^that the Right must prevail by the will
of God — did not conceive that it could still be
the mainspring of British policy, nay, more, that
it should, as Mr. Asquith said at Dublin, " still
donainato mankind." So the German, claiming
to be a superman, did not trouble himself to be
adroit in- diplomacy. " Finesse and scruples,"
he said — in action, if not in words — " for weaker
folk ; for me the mailed fist and the big batta-
lions— and the big gxms." So the German deli-
berately embarked upon his course of war by
committing a wrong — by outraging the neutra-
lity of a Uttle State which he had pledged his
honour to protect. His lofty excuse to God and
his own conscience was that he would make it all
right afterwards. " I shall defy God now," he
said, " in order to win this war easily by a dis-
honourable trick, and then, when I have won the
war and all Europe is at my feet, I shall con-
descend to make amends to poor little Belgium
who will then be my grateful slave." From
this mad dream he had a rude awakening at
Liege.
And in describing the German's dream of
treachery and conquest as " mad," we are not
going beyond the facts of the case. " Quem
Deus vult perdere prius dementat " — " Whom
God decides to ruin He first makes mad " —
is the ancient Christian form of a still more
ancient classic proverb, founded — like our own
simple old proverb, " Pride goeth before a fall "
— upon the immemorial theme of the oldest
Greek tragedies in which Nemesis always waited
grimly upon the insolence (6/3pts) of trium-
phant tyrants. This was the ailment of the
Gterman. Ho was too swelled with pride in tht»
Teuton " thoroughness " of his own prepara
tions for the conquest of the world in peace and
war to be able to give way to the " rights " of
little peoples. He would look into the matter
after he had finished his conquest. Belgium and
. Britain — and God — must wait until then
These may not be the exact words which the
German Government used, but they convey
no exaggeration in fact of the attitude which
that Government adopted. It had quite
forgotten the idea which still inspires and
dominates mankind — the idea that in defending
the Right we fight on the side of God.
Thus the German, who deliberately omitted
the Right from his scheme of world-conquest,
unconsciously did greater service for the Right
than any philanthropist could have conceived
in his wildest dreams.
" It is my Imperial and Royal intention,"
said the Kaiser in effect on August 3, 19; 4,
" to give consideration to the wishes of God
with regard to Belgium when I shall have
executed my Imperial and Royal will with
regard to France and the pestilent and con-
temptible English." As a foreigner his Imperial
and Royal Majesty was not to be blamed for
failing to observe that, besides the English,
there were Scotch, Irish, Welsh, Canadian,
Australian, South African, Indian, and manj'
other contingents concerned in the offence of
lese majeale which he so much resented. Even
those natives in South Africa who are wisely
prohibited from carrying arms had petitioned
the Government that they might be allowed to
" throw a few stones " at the Germans 1
The Kaiser did not dream of the magnificent
work which he was doing ; how he was welding
the Empire upon which the sun never sets
into a single active organism for the good of
the world and to the glory of God. He was
thinking only of Germany as typified in its
Supreme War Lord, himself.
CHAPTER XXII.
THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO
BRUSSELS.
Belgiums Real Ambitions — Social Reform — The Neglect of Militarism — Preparations
Come too Late — Hopes or Foreign Assistance — The Peasant Guards— German Cavalry
Advance — First Skirjushes — The Battle of Haelen — Eghezee — French Troops ix Bel-
gium— The German Advance in Earnest — Belgian Retreat on Antwerp — Belgian Staff
Explanation — The Position in Brussels — Refugees — Growing Public Alarji — Goverxjient
Retires to Antwerp — False Hopes of Victory — M. Max — The German Entry into Brussei^.
THE position of Belgium in tho days
immediately following the outbreak
of the war was one of obvious peril.
Tho forts of Li^ge controUod tho
main roads from Germany to the coast, but Liege
could not hope to hold out against a resolute
German attack for more than a few days. Once
Liege fell, there were no effective fortress
defences between the German frontier and Ant-
werp. Brussels was an open city, and the battles
for its possession mast be fought, not in its
suburbs, but fartlier afield, in the neighbouring
districts of Aerschot, Diest, Louvain. and
Wavre. If Germany made a sustained attempt
to conqvier Belgium, it was evident that no
unaided effort of the Belgians could save it.
The hope of the nation lay in two possibilities,
the arrival of immediate aid from England
and France, or the chance that the German
Armies would advance, not to the coast,
Ijut straight to Paris. The road to Paris lay
to the west. Hence, even although day by da>'
the news from the front foreshadowed the early
capture of Liege, the people of NorthtTu
Belgium hoped against hope that their homes,
at least, would escape the horrors of foreign
occupation.
Tho country on the Franco-Belgian frontier
between the Lys and the Yser and the valley of
the Somme below Amiens could be flooded,
from which it seemed to follow that the right ot
Vol. I.— Part 10. 3fil
the main German advance on Paris woidd be
limited by tho lino Liege-Bru.ssels-Lille-Amiens.
The Germans were very vmlikely to make con-
siderable detachments imtil after their main
object — the rout of the hostile field armies — had
been attained. Hence it was likely that the whole
country west and north of tlie line indicated
would escape effective occupation until after the
German advance on Paris hfd succeeded or
failed.
To the people of Belgium war came un-
desired and unsought. They had nothing to
gain by it and everything to lose. Social re-
form, not militarism, had been their aim. Tlio
Army, and all that had to do with the Army,
was for long regarded with a feeling of in-
difference not untouched wth contempt. There
was no strong military caste, as in France and
Germany. Trusting to the pledged word of
Europe, guaranteeing Belgian independence
and permanent neutrality, the Belgian Parlia-
ment had until 1912 neglected adequate jjrepaia-
tions for national defence. Compulsory service
was only com]>ulsory tor the po:)r or those with-
out influence ; the time of training was far too
short. Service in the ranks was regarded as a
task to be avoided whenever opportiuiity offered.
While France and Germany endured the hea\iest
burdens to maintain their fighting strength,
Belgiiun devoted herself to commercial and in-
dustrial progress.
362
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
NAMUR, FROM THE MEUSE, BEFORE BOMBARDMENT.
Showing the Citadel Hotel and Fortifications.
Social problems, arising out of the density of
the populati jn and the comparative poverty of
a large number of the people, were the main
subjects of public concern. Industry was care-
fully encouraged. Cooperative experiments were
initiated, and the standard of well-being of
the people was appreciably raised. The Bel-
gians were able to boast — with a large degree of
truth — that their country afforded the maxi-
mum of comfort and the minimum of expense
for those Uving in it of any part of Western
Europe. Belgian manufactures steadily gained
reputation. Tlie products of the Cockerill
Ironworks at Liege, for example, competed
successfully with those of Germany, England,
and America; Belgium became a favourite
centre for the erection of factories, many
German and British firms maintaining works
on the various river banks. Antwerp grew to
be one of the largest and best-equipped shipping
ports in Europe. Belgian finance was making
itself more and more felt in certain specialized
fields. The Belgians were markedly active in
the newer markets of the world. In China and
in Central Africa, in South America and in
Manchuria, their representatives were found
seeking concessions, laying railways, promoting
electrical schemes, and acquiring power.
Belgium, with its ideal geographical position
and its widespread prosperity, aroused the envy
and desire of its ambitious and powerful neigh-
bour to the south-east. Germany wanted an
outlet to the sea — ^Antwerp and Zeebrugge
would afford it. Germany wanted an open road
to the heart of France — the road lay right
through Southern Belgium. It was the unhappy
fortune of this little kingdom to be the Naboth's
Vineyard of Europe.
It is true that since 1912, alarmed by the
growing German menace, sustained efforts had
been made to remedy the backward defences of
the country and to recreate the Army. But a
great national army cannot be created in less
than two years. Thus Belgium found herself
at the outbreak of the war lacking trained
fighting men, lacking in equipment, lacking in
officers, and lacking in experience. What was
not lacking, as events soon proved, was bold-
ness, courage, and eagerness to meet the foe.
Had the Belgians been given time, they might
have raised and trained within a few months a
force of half a million men that could have at
least held up the Germans along prepared lines
of fortified places until France and England
could come to their aid. But time was the
one thing denied Belgium. Her borders ran,
from Vise to Luxemburg, next to those
of Germany. The German railways from
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
303
Diissoldorf, Cologne, and Coblentz could bring
strong armies into Belgian torritory in a few
hours, and lino after lino of long sidings wero
already prepared at each frontier station from
which the troop trains coiild disgorge their
men in the shortest possible time. The mili-
tary headquarters at Aix-la-Chapelle were
practically within sight of Belgian soil. Germany
had made all her preparations to strike at
Belgiuni suddenly and overwhelmingly. Even
before war was declared German troops crossed
the border. Allowing for the necessary troops
for the fortresses of Namur and Antwerp,
Belgium could put on the fighting line after
the fall of Liege only a Field Army of aVjout
110,000 men to guard the road to Brussels
and the north. Against these the Germans
could easily bring a quarter of a million
men and as many more a.s might be
necessary.
The Belgians did not, perhaps, anticipate
having to conduct their own defence for more
than a few days at the outside. They believed
that the British and the French would be able
to give them strong help at once. Day after
day, at the beginning of the war, crowds of
people stood on the front at Ostend, many of
them with powerful glas.ses, searching the
horizon for the first signs of the coming of the
British Relief Expedition. Every Englishman
throughciut the country was constantly asked :
" When will your troops arrive ? " When
news came to hand that a British Expeditionary
Force had left England, Brussels papers stated
that it was landing at Zeebrugge and Ostend,
and would soon be fighting on the Meuse. On
more than one occasion crowds hurried to the
Garo du Nord at Brussels on the rumour that
the British had come, prepared to give them a
great welcome.
The Belgians were equally confident of
French assistance. They assumed that French
armies assembled between Namur and Verdun
would move eastwards through Belgian Luxem-
burg and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Belgian hopes of the cooperation of the French
were encouraged by the appearance of French
Staff Officers in Brussels and of French cavalry
in apparent strength from Longwy northwards
to Gembloux. Reports wero received that the
French were iKlvancing in force eastwards from
Namur along the" banks of the Meuse towards
Li6ge. It was known that they were strongly
holding the strategic triangular position where
the Sambro and the Meuse meet close to Namur.
The Belgian people, as has been said, Icnew
that their Army was in itself insufficient to
offer any permanent resistance to a German
attack. This, however, did not check t\v
resolution of the people to fight to the last.
A wave of patriotism swept over the nation
that wiped away all local and party differences.
The King voiced the cry " Aux armos !" and
led the way to the trenches. He became in
an hour the popular idol, and men who had
persistently sought his overthrow admitted
gladly : " If we make Beigiimi a republic, we will
have Albert as our first President." Th<^
Socialists, a powerful and numerous group, who
in the past had led the cause of pacifism and
opposed Army reform, were now among the first
to volunteer for war. The Prime Minister
invited the cooperation of all parties. M.
Vandervelde, the Labour leader, was appointed
a Minister of State and voiced the sentiments of
his party when ho declared that the workers
would defend their country when attacked with
A BELGIAN LOOK-OUT MAN.
\ Daily Mirror.
364
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
GERMAN FIELD KITCHEN CAPTURED AND USED BY THE BELGIANS.
[Sport and General.
the same ardour with which they had defended
their hberties in the past. Le Peuple, the organ
of the Labour Party, called upon the workers to
arm : " Why do we," it asked, " as irreconcilable
anti-militarists, cry ' Bravo ! ' from the bottom of
om hearts to all those who offer themselves for
the defence of the country ? Because it
is not only necessary to protect the hearths
and homes, the women and the children,
but it is also necessary to protect at the
price of our blood the heritage of our ancient
freedom.
" Go, then, sons of the workers, and regipter
your names as recruits. We will rather die for
the idea of progress and solidarity of humanity
than live under a regime whose brutal force and
savage violence have wiped out right."
While the German troops were flinging them-
selves against Li6ge, the Belgians were preparing
for a stubborn national defence. The Army
was aLready at its post, the reserves had been
called up, the Civil Guaid were being armed, and
the towns and villages south of Biussels from
flasselt to Gembloux and Namur were hi Id in
force. The peasants in many villages gethered
together. Thoy brought out their guns —
ancient fowling-pieces, rook rifles, sporting
guns, anything they had. Those who had no
^uns could at least secure knives. They banded
themselves together and formed local guards.
No stranger could pass without satisfying them
concerning his business. " As showing how all
the roads leading to tlie fiont are guarded,"
wrote one correspondent who attempted to
reach the front at this time, " I me y say that I
was stopped during a joiu'ney of 70 kilometres
no fewer than 52 times by police, civil guards,
soldiers, and, last but not least, by peasants.
These latter are* armed with the most varied
collection of guns, far more fearful and wonder-
ful than any I have seen outside of a museum.
Many carry in addition bayonets which certainly
must have been picked up on the field of Water-
loo. They shout in bad French and Flemish
for any innocent voyager to stop, and swarm
round youi car with the firm conviction that you
are a spy. Passports signed by the highest
military and civil authorities in the country are
often of no avail whatever."
A spy fever spread over the country, and
there was good cause for it. People who had
lived in different parts for years a.ii trusted neigh-
bours suddenly disappeared, only to return later
as guides for advance parties of the German
Army. Others were discovered attempting to
injure telegraphs and railvvay^'or endeavouring,
by carrier pigeons and other mtans, to keep up
communication with the Germans on the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
365
frontier. Some wore disguised as monks or
nims, some as parish priests, some con-
trolled secret wireless apparatus. The German
espionage department proved its efficiency
liore o! elsewhere in the early days of the
ivar.
The uprising of the peasants, admirable as it
was as a revelation of national spirit, was use-
less, if not worse tlian useless, from the point of
view of real fighting strength. Chance groups
of ill-armed and untrained civilians con present
no eflective resistance to regular troops. The
Belgian peasants caught a certairi number of
isolated Uhlans, thus giving an excuse for
subsequent German severity against ,tho
people at large. Soon their own authorities
asked them to desist. The German coin-
manders let it be known that they would
show no mercy to civilians who took up arms,
but would treat them and the districts from
which they operated with the utmost rigour.
For civilians generally there was to be one
penalty for resistance — death. The places
where they fought were to be burned to the
ground. Even the civil guards, uniformed
though they were, were to be treated as civilians
and shot at once when caught with arms in their
hands.
The Belgian authorities posted notices through-
out the country warning civilians that they
must not resist German troops, but must leave
military measures to the Army. The peasant
uprising did not delay the main advance of the
German Army for an hour. It ended almost as
quickly a? it began, but not before a large num-
ber of men and boys of all ages throughout
Brabant, Namur, Liege, and Belgian Luxem-
biu-g had been sacrificed. It served to empha-
size the lesson that resistance to a powerful
enemy must be organized in advance. The
man who refuses to sjrve his country in
times of peace by preparing for war may
find, when real nations 1 danger comes, that
his only occupation must bo to sit down and
do nothing because he is — from a military point
of view — good for nothing.
Tl»e little Belgian Army used thi tune at
its disposal during the German delay in front
of Liege to the best advantage. The whole
southern countryside was prepared for resist-
ance. Roadways were blown up with dyna-
mite sticks. Cunning traps were laid across
the roads for the Uhlans, low and almost
invisible barriers of barbed wire being arranged
in two parts in such a way that ordinary traffic
could pass in safety with carr) but any attempt
BELGIAN SOLDIERS HAVING THEIR MIDDAY MEAL.
[L/r.^ruxtd and UnJtnrood,
366
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
to rush hy would inevitably bring horses and
riders to the ground. The country southward
bf Louvain lent itself to guerilla warfare,
being well wooded and suitable for the conceal-
ment of small parties of troops.
The sustained resistance of Gteneral Leman
and his garrison at Li6ge, described in the
previous chapter, gave the main Belgian Army
a few days of grace. Li^ge was the principal
railway centre for the lines southwards, the
main roads ran through there, and the im[)ortant
bridges across the Meuse lay under the reach
of its guns. When the Belgian troops blew
up the bridge at Vis6 in the opening hours of
the war, the Germans at once attempted to
tlirow pontoon bridges across the river. Their
first efforts were continuously xinsuccessful.
At Vis6 itself they built no fewer than 20 pon-
toon bridges, it is reported, each one being
immediately destroyed by the guns of the
Liege forts. One bridge was, however, erected
within 200 yards of the Dutch frontier and
considerable forces were poiu-ed in over it.
While the Germans were waiting around
Li6ge for the arrival of their large siege gims
BELGIAN SOLDIERS FIRING FROM
COVER. lUndtmood & UnJiraood.
which were to destroy the forts, a strong
force — no fewer than five army corps — ^was
brought into the region to the south of the
river. A cavalry screen was thrown across
the river and proceeded to overriui the countrj'-
side. Following the plan that had proved so
successful in the Franco-Prussian War, little
bands of Ulalans, Hussars, and Cuirassiers
were sent out throughout the north. Many of
these were apparently ill-equipped for their
task. They had no proper supply of maps,
and they did not seem to have any definite
plan except. to move ahead until they got in
touch with the Belgians. They had very little
food. This was probably deliberately arranged
in order to make them live on the country.
Many of them were captured and many were
killed. It is possible that the dispatch of these
unsupported and isolated little bands was
purposely devised, not alone to keep in com-
plete touch with the enemy, but also to give
the Belgians a false idea of the German prepara-
tions. It is a well-known and adnaitted
principle of German niilitary strategy to make
a show of weakness until preparations are
completed which enable an army to strike
with its full strength. And if the German
cavalry were defeated at some places they
drove terror home in others.
Soon the reputation of the Ulilans spread
through himdreds of villages, as that of men who
spared neither themselves nor their foes, who
rode recklessly against any enemy in sight, who
died with a laugh when beaten, and who slew
man and boy, ruined women and burned
homes without compimction and without
mercy wherever they went. It is not necessary
at this point to inquire how far this reputation
was deserved, or how far the advancing German
cavalry were actually guilty of the charges soon
to be laid against them. It is clear, however,
that their instructions were not only to find
out what forces were in front of them and
what serious resistance would have to be
faced, but also to strike fear into the hearts of
the people.
The countryside between Li6ge and Louvain
presented a sombre picture in these early days
of the war. The fields were ripe for harvest,
but there were no men to spare to gather the
crops of golden com, and the women and
children had in many cases fled northwards.
In the villages some houses had been destroyed
by the Belgians thenaselvos lest they should
afford protection for the enemy, while others
had been biwned down by advancing Germans.
Every road was barricaded, and behind the
lines of barrels and bushes and the eeurthen
THE TIMES FI I STORY OF THE WAR.
367
GERMAN SHELLS BURSTING IN A FIELD NEAR THE BELGIAN POSITION WHERE
INFANTRY WERE CONCEALED. ^OaUy Mirror.
embankments little companies of soldiers and
civil guards lay waiting. Many of these men
were reservists who had been called up almost
without notice — fathers of families and respon-
sible citizens whose hearts were still full of
anxiety for their families and their affairs.
Already they showed, however, abundant signs
that the ancient coiu"age of the men of Flanders
could still be coimted upon. There was a gay
grimness a:nong them that betrayed the born
fighting man. Their discipline was lax, their
military loiowledgo was in many cases trivial,
and they were ill-prepared for the physical
and material strain of day-and-night work
against an active foe in the open. But none
oould deny their courage or their zeal. The
pity of it was that men so brave and so fine
should not have been more fully prepared
for the tremendous task ahead.
Many regiments started out accompanied
by priests, who exhorted the soldiers to fight
for their country and their faith. The
wives and friends of the soldiers visited them in
the very front lino of trenches, bringing them
food and cigarettes. These men were fighting,
many of them just by their homes, almost
within sight of their own families. They did not
liesitate, however, to sacrifice overj-thing in front
of them that could help the enemy. The rail-
ways were torn up, bridges were blown into the
air whenever possible, and tunnels were blocked
by derailing locomotives and then sending others
crashing into t'hem, forming one great tanirled
and mixed mass. The Belgians laid part of the
country to waste — the Germans, as they
advanced, completed the work.
The Belgians at first made some use of Ckero-
planes for reconnoitring purposes. But their
own peasants and volunteers fired on every aero-
plane they saw, and there is only too much
reason to believe that they brought do\vn several
Belgian aeroplanes in that way. Orders were
issued when too late to stop this indiscriminate
shooting. Gradually, as the German armoured
Taube aeroplanes came into action, less and less
was heard of the Belgian aircraft, and before the
fall of Brussels the German aeroplanes appa-
rently held supremacy of the air.
At the end of the first week the Belgian mili-
tary authorities expressed considerable satisfac-
tion with the state of affairs. Li^ge was still
holding out and was engaging the attention of
three German Array Corps. In numerous minor
engagements the Belgian troops had proved their
mettle. The Belgian cavalry in particular had
distinguished themselves by the most reckless
bravery. " Tout est calme. Tout va bien "
was the phrase on many lips. Reports were
oven circulated that the Germans were con-
templating retirement and were entrenching
368
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE LAST STAND MADE BY THE BELGIANS AT LOUVAIN.
[Record Press..
themselves on the banks of the river Ourthe
and in Luxemburg to protect their retreat.
The reality was very different. The Germans
had at last succeeded in erecting a bridge at
Lixhe over which their cavalry and heavy artil-
lery could be conveyed. A considerable force of
cavalry had already crossed the river, and this
made a preliminary advance while the main force
took up its position.
On Sunday, August 9, two divisions of German
cavalry, numbering about 7,000 sabres, and
supported by infantry, moved upwards towards
the Hesbaye. The people of Tongres were sur-
prised that day to find a detachment of the
enemy riding down their main street. There
was a sudden panic, and people hastily closed
and barred their windows and locked their doors,
leaving the roadways deserted. The cavalry rode
to the town hall, and there ordered the mayor
to produce his money chest and to lower the
Belgian flag hanging out of the window. The
mayor refused to lower the flag, whereupon the
Germans lowered it for him. They appro-
priated the town's money and seized 10,000
francs at the post office. Then they ordered
food, for which they paid, and had a meal in the
market place.
Cavalry moved forward along different roads
ana joined issue with the Belgian troops all
along the line at St. Trend, Tirlemont, Osmael,
Guxenhoven, and at smaller places. The
Gorman troops were accompanied by motor
machine-guns, which did great execution. It
is evident that their purpose was only to
reconnoitre and not to engage in serious battHoi-
for, after some skirmishing, they retired. The
Belgians imagined that they had defeated and
driven them back.
On the next day word came into Louvain, the
Belgian Military Headquarters, that a German
scouting force of 6,000 cavalry was moving up-
wards close to the Dutch frontier. That same
afternoon the Germans captured Landen, only
38 miles east of Brussels. A passenger train was
stopped when it arrived there by a strong force-
of the enemy. The Germans destroyed the
telegraphic apparatus and the railway signals-
and tore up the rails, and then moved on.
In addition to the cavalry recoimaissance,.
military aeroplanes were now to be seen advanc-
ing and hovering at groat height over the Belgian
positions.
Another engagement was reported at Tirle-
mont, where there was a fierce charge of Belgian
lancers against German Uldans. The lancers
routed the Germans, who returned later, how-
ever, witli reinforcements and witli machine-
guns and forced the Belgians, in turn, to fall
back upon their infantry supports.
Hasselt was the scene of a sustained fight.
Here a Gorman cavalry division supported by a
battalion of infantry and 12 guns attacked
a Belgian force consisting of a cavalry division
and a brigade of infantry. The place was
taken and retaken three times.
It became evident that the plan of the German
Army was to move northwards through the
plain between Hasselt and Htielen and to seek.
THE TIMES HlSTOliY OF THE WAR.
369
to turn the Belgian Army. So long as the
Belgians could, hold the line they had taken
up from Hasselt to St. Trond and Tirlemont,
all was well. But this lino was soon broken,
and strong German forces attacked Hasselt on
the one side and Haelon and Diest on the other.
Early on the morning of August 12 a force
of German cavalry, estimated at 10,000 men,
accompanied by artillery and a few infantry,
moved forward from various directions towards
Haelen and Diest. The country in this region
is intersected by three tributaries of the
River Domer, the Herck, Gethe, and Velp.
In order to reach Diest it was necessary to
cross the Gethe at Haelen. The Belgians
were fully informed of the German advance
and had laid their plans to meet them at this
spot. Barricades were erected and entrench-
ments dug and field artillery placed in
advantageous positions. The Germans ap-
proached about 11 o'clock in the morning and
•were allowed to draw comparatively near,
when the Belgian artillery opened on them.
The German guns were quickly unlimbered
and an artillery duel followed. The Belgians
had their ranges and were able to plant their
shrapnel over the cavalry with groat effect.
The utmost violence and covirage were shown
on either side. The Belgian cavalry attempted
to charge the Germans but failed on account of
the broken nature of the ^onnd. The German
cavalry in turn camo on at a gallop againnt the
Belgian barricades. As they approached,
machine guns that had been concealed opened
on them, sweeping many away. Notw^ith-
st'vnding their losses the Germans rode right
up to the barricades, attempting to break
through them or to tear them down. The
effort was hopeless, and after losing throe-
Rftha of their effective strength the Germans
had to retire.
Other German forces attempted to advance
at Cortenaeken. There were fights at several
river bridges. Everywhere the result was
the .same. The Belgians themselves were the
first to proclaim the great courage shown by
the Germans in this sustained engagement.
At one point when they were driven back the
survivors sought to entrench themselves behind
a rampart of dead horses and dead men.
Compared with the fighting that was soon
to follow, the engagement at Haelen and Diest
may seem too small to demand much attention.
It was a strildng example, however, of the way
in wliich the Belgian soldiers, many of them
called to the colours from the re.serves only a
fortnight before, were able to face the foe.
Several stories were told of the conduct of the
Belgian troops. Here is one : —
" One notable instance of Belgian bravery
GERMANS HOLDING A REVIEW IN RUINED LOUVAIN.
[Nmspaptr lllustrationu
370
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE CHURCH AT HAELEN.
All Belgian Churches appear to have afforded
special targets for the Germans.
[Newspaper Ilhislrjiions.
is found in the conduct of a farrier sergeant,
Rousseau, of the Chasse\.irs a Cheval. At the
head of eight men he charged a whole squadron
of Uhlans, who dispersed, leaving many dead
and wounded. The brave squadron of Belgians
returned in triumph to Haelen with a dozen
excellent horses as trophies of their exploit.
" During the afternoon Lieutenant Van
Doren, who was specially detailed to defend
Diest, was asked to send reinforcements to the
neighbouring village of Zechk. .There was
a difficulty, insomuch as practically all the
available troops had been sent forward to
Haelen, but, undismayed. Lieutenant Van Doren
summoned the town fire brigade and, picking
up as many soldiers as he could from different
posts on the road, made a dash for Zechk."
There was a fight at Eghezee, 10 miles to
the north of Namur, where a party of 350
Uhlans rode up, preceded by 60 cyclists, who
had forcibly requisitioned three motor-cars,
one of them belonging to a doctor of the Belgian
Red Cross Service. The Germans stayed at
the place for the night, and in the morning a
Belgian airman, flying low over the cornfield
in which they had parked their horses, drew
their fire, thus revealing their whereabovits
to some Belgian cyclist scouts, who hurried
in the direction of the firing. " The Uhlan
cyclists, who were out scouting, saw them
coming," wrote the special correspondent of
The Times in describing the scene, " and rode
back as hard as they could to give the alarm.
At once there was a general sauve qui pent.
Most of the Germans were sitting quietly
in the cafes of the village of Bonoffe at
the time, talking to the villagers. They
rushed off down the road away from_
Eghezee leaving everything behind them,
horses, rifles, mitrailleuse guns, and the re-
quisitioned motor-cars. Tlie few men who wore
looking after the liorses in the cornfield lot
them loose, the bugler who was with the fugi-
tives sounded a call to which they rallied, and
as the pursuers, only about 30 in number, came
round the corner of the road into view, the
Uhlans tlirew themselves on to their horses and
galloped off. The Belgians meanwhile dashed
into a trench in a field of beetroot, about 500
yards off, which had been thrown up last week
to repel the expected German advance, and
opened fire on the horses and the retreating
Uhlans on the road. They killed four or five
men in the field and about 35 more in the
retreat, including an obor-lioutenant and, it is
thought, the colonel and several of the horses."
Oia Friday, August 14, it was officially an-
nounced that French troops had entered Belgium
by Charloroi and had joined forces with the
Belgian Army. Three French officers had been
attached to the Belgian headquarters and two
Belgian officers were to represent the Belgian
Army with the French troops. The French ad-
vanced northwards from Charleroi in the direc-
tion of Wavre. They were reported to be hold-
ing a very strong position, and numerous engage-
ments were reported between the French and
German cavalry.
Then followed a slight pause. The Germans,
having discovered the strength of the enemy,
awaited reinforcements. Thoii cavalry scouting
parties, however, kept creeping around by the
Dutch frontier until some of them were within
25 miles of Antwerp at Gheel and Moll. The
Germans, as they travelled acro.ss the coimtry,
ruined most of the villages they left behind them.
They hanged or shot every pe.isant suspected of
resistance ; they returned to places where
isolated Uhlans had been killed a few days earlier
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
371
and razod tlioin to tlio ground. Tho inoro
suspicion of having attacked Germans was
suflieiont to ensure doatli. Tho policy of wlioio-
salo terrorism was carried out on too wide ii
scale to have been anything but a deliberate plan
executed in obedience to oidors from head-
quarters. Tho German General Staff probably
aimed not only at terrorizing the Belgians and
stamping out any sign of civilian resistance, but
also at creating such alarm throughout the
neighliouring Dutch districts that tho people of
Holland would not permit their Governmont to
take steps against so merciless a foe.
Tho Belgian General Staff continued to issue
reassuring bulletins concerning tlu) position at
the front, but it could have had no delusions
about the real state of things. It became evi-
dent, hour by hour, that the position of Brussels
was becoming more perilous. Once tho Belgian
Armj' was turned Brussels must fall. Should
the Germans renew the attack at Diest and
succeed, not only would Brussels itself be open,
but the entire Field Army would be threatened
with capture. Brussels could not be defended.
It is true that 20,000 civil guards had been
armed with Mauser rifles and tho environs of the
city had been entrenched and protected with
barbed wire entanglements. Trenches manned
with civil guards might bo of some service in
checking a slight cavalry raid — they could do
nothing of any value against the serious advance
in force such as it was now more and more
apparent the Germans were attempting.
On Monday, August 17, the Germans began
their advance in earnest. One strong force
drove itself in like a wedge between tho French
and Belgian Armies in the neighbourhood of
Wavre. From Diest, from Tirlemont, and
from a hundred villages around came news
that the Germans were moving forward in over-
whelming force.
The Belgian Army rosi.sted desperately a\\
along the line, but it was hopelessly out-
numbered in men, in field artillery, and in
machine-guns. All the villages had been made
into entrenched camps, with wagons upset
across the roadways, wire entanglements erected,
and trenches dug. But the Germans adopted
tactics before which such precautioris were use-
less. Villages wore first overwhelmed witli
artillery fire. When the Belgian cavalry
attempted to repeat their former exploits and
charge the enemy they were met by the fire of
well-placed machine-guns, before which they
were swept away. At the least sign of weaken-
ing tho German cavalry came on at tlio charge.
THK VlLLAGi: OF MELLE.
Scene of very fierce fighting. Remains of a German gun carriage.
372
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GERMAN SOLDIERS TENDING THE
WOUNDED.
^Newspaper Illusiralwns,
Tirlemont was the scene of a specially vigorous
attack. Powerful German guns shelled the
place with great effect, and then the German
cavalry suddenly charged. Their advance was
80 rapid and so unexpected that numbers of
peaceful villagers, women and children, were
unable to escape. Hurrying across the fields
as quickly as they could it was impossible
to get away from the German cavalry,
who followed them, shooting and stabbing
men and women alike, riding down children,
sweeping over the place in a mad, reckless
charge.
It became obvious that the Belgian Army
could stay no longer in its positions. Further
delay might well lead to total destruction.
Some regiments were already almost completely
wiped out, particularly some of the cavalry.
Two mixed brigades wore given orders to hold
the enemy back at any cost and to cover a
retreat in the direction of Antwerp.
The defeat of the Belgian Field Army all
along the line was complete and overwhelming.
The fighting started early on Monday, August
17th. In the darkness of that night the Belgian
retreat began. ■
Everywhere it was the German artillery
that broke the Belgian defence Now the
Belgians were forced back to Vertryck. Next
they were at Corbeek Loo, and from Corbeek
Loo they had to retire on Louvain, whert
they were prepared to make a last stand.
At this point one consideration stay«d them.
In view of the way they had been forced
back, they could hope to do no more at
Louvain than temporarily to arrest the Ger-
man advance. The Germans, already pressing
up, would imdoubtedly shell and destroy the
town, and would probably put it to the flames as
they had already that day burned numerous
villages.
To every Belgian Louvain was a city of pre-
cious memories, regarded with veneration, to be
guarded, protected, and shielded from harm.
Its ancient University, its beautiful Town Hall,
its quaint 14th-century buildings, and its price-
less library, once lost could never be replaced.
To risk the destruction of these would be a crime
against civilization. Yielding to this considera-
tion, the Belgian Army retired beyond the city
and allowed the Germans to enter without oppo-
sition. They little imagined — for they had not
yet realized the depths to which some German
commanders wovild go — that in surrendering
Louvain as they did they were only handing it
over to a worse fate and a more remorseless
slaughter than any which fighting could have
involved.
The position of the Belgian Army was im-
possible. It could not hope to keep back the
Germans. To remain in the open much longer
was to invite needless destruction. The spirit
of the men was for the moment shaken by the
terrific attacks they had endiu-ed. The Army
was separated from tlio French. Only one
course remained — to abandon Brussels and to
retire upon Antwerp. The main fighting had
fallen on the 1st, the 2nd, and the 3rd divisions
of the Army. The two mixed brigades that
covered their retreat held out for some hours
against a formidable attack made by the
Germans between Becquoboort and Gelrode.
The Belgian Staff considered it necessary to
issue a somewhat elaborate explanation of the
retirement. It ran as follows : —
" At the present moment the general situation
in the Belgian theatre of war may be described
as follows : — After having lost a great deal of
tim », a large number of men, and a great quan-
tity of material, the Prussian Army has manago^l
to gain ground on both banks of the Meuso up to
a line where it is in contact with the Allied armies.
The German troops on the north side of the
Mouse belong to various corps whose operations
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
373
have boon principally diroctod against Li<Sgo
and who in the course of time have become
avnilal)Io in other directioiis. There is also a
strong force of cavalry, by means of wliicli the
Germans have been able to make a great show
by extending to the north and south. In the
south thoj^ camo into collision with our troops
and woro repulsed. In the north, on tho other
hand, thoy found an open road, and small por-
tions of them managed to make dashes far afield.
" In a word, tho Germans have taken the
measure of our position, but that they should
have lost a fortnight in attaining this result is
all to tho honour of our arms. That may have
incalculable consequences for the issues of the
operations. Tho normal developinent of the
latter according to the plan concerted between
the Allies may load to the carrying out of
■ manoeuvres ' — • that is to say, to changes of
position in order to effect a cliango in the general
situation. Wo are on tho outside wing, where
tliese manffiuvros are nearly always necessitated
either for the direct or indirect protection of the
flank. Our Army therefore must necessarily
modify its original positions and thus carry out
completely the first ta,sk devolving upon it,
which consists in gaining time. There is, con-
sequently, no ground for anxiety if the Army
makes a movement in such and such a direc-
tion, and arm-chair strategists need not occupy
themselves with the arrangements made, but
should realize that our Army now belongs to a
co-ordinated whole and remember that tho
strategic conditions have entirely changed since
close contact has been established with our
allies on our right.
" The object of the operations as at present
going on is not to cover such and such a district
or such and such a town, which has now become
a matter of only secondary importance.
" The pursmt of the aim assigned to the
Belgian troops in the general plan of campaign
preponderates over everything. This object
cannot be revealed, and the most well-informed
persons are unable to discover it, in view of the
veil of obscurity which is rightly being sprea*!
over all the news allowed to como through re-
garding the operations. Fighting is going on
along the whole front from Basel to Diest.
The closer the contact comes between the two
armies and the closer one gets to a decisive action
tho more one must expect to see an advantage
gained at one point while ground is lost at
another. That is only to be expected in the
case of battles taking place over such inamense
fronts as those occupied by the great armies of
modern times.
" To sum up, one may say that what is going
on at our gates is not the only thing to be
thought of. A strategic movement conceived
with a well-defined object is not necessarily a
retreat. The. fighting which has taken place at
PRIEST ASSISTING THE WOUNDED AFTER THE BATTLE OF HOFSTADE.
\DaUy Mirror.
374
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
tho front during the last few days has resulted
in making the enemy more circumspect and in
delajdng his forward march, to the great advan-
tage of the whole scheme of operations. There
is no reason at the present time for letting one-
self be himg up, thus playing into tho hands of
the Germans. That is the motive of the move-
ments now being carried out. We are not
beaten, far from it, but are making arrange-
ments for beating the enemy in the best possible
conditions. The public should, in tliis matter,
place all trust in the commander of the Army
and should remain calm and confident."
It has been asked why the French Army,
resting upon its lines from Namur northwards,
did not, by a forward movement, attempt to
relieve the Belgian position. A considerable
German force was already facing and engaging
the French. The blow on the Belgians came so
suddenly that there was scarcely time for French
relieving forces to arrive. Further, there is
every reason to believe that the French at this
stage were not in sufficient force north of Namur
to make such an tidvance possible. The main
French armies were concentrated, not here, but
further south. Even after the Belgian Field
Army had been defeated the French General
Staff appeirently believed that the advance into
Belgivun was little more than g, feint made to
take attention off the Alsace-Lorraine front.
Believing this, it refused, until the danger to its
own left flank was almost overwhelming, to alter
its original plans.
Brussels, the Belgian capital, rested secure
from the opening of the war in the conviction
that the English would come to help it before the
Germans could arrive, and that another Water-
loo would be fought beyond the suburbs of the
city with the same result as the battle 99 years
before.
The General Staff issued reassuring bulletins.
The Press fully supported the attempt to main-
tain the confidence of the people. There was
little grumbling, and no signs of weakening. A
fierce flame of patriotism had been kindled,
and manifested itself among all classes. If devo-
tion and self-sacrifice could have made up for
lack of military training, it certainly would have
been accomplished here. " This is a war for
home and for faith — in the truest sense of the
word a holy war," wrote one observer at Brussels
at the time. " It has united all classes ; it has
HOMELESS.
[Newspaper Illustrations.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
375
GERMAN TROOPS RESTING AFTER THE FIGHTING AT VISE.
iNmspaptr /Uustraiions.
made of the nation one man. The very clerks
in the Government offices are giving their ser-
vices voluntarily ; the workmen lay telegraph
wires, handle trains, perform all manner of
services, in many cases without reward. In the
country villages peasant women bring bread
and beer for the soldiers, giving of their best
freely. They scorn payment. And the poorest
of the poor have contributed their pence gla,dly
to the cause."
There could no longer be any ignoring the
realities of the war, even had the people
desired it. The city was now the great
receiving home for the wounded from the
front. Royal palaces, hotels, private houses,
and public institutions were occupied by
doctors and nurses, and steady processions of
the wounded arrived either in specially equipped
automobiles or by train. The contingents of
disabled men were received often enough by
vast crowds who stood bare-headed and bo%ving
as a token of respect as the stretchers were
borne by. The Queen led the Red Cross work,
and women of every rank joined in the mission
of pity and help for the victims of war.
Apart from the woiuided, another army of
war victims was beginning to pour into the
city— refugees from the villages and towns
destroyed by the advancing Germans. Many
of thorn had nothing but what they stood up
in. Others had baskets and bags containing
all that was left of their worldly possessions.
Mothers came along footsore with their children,
well-dressed mothers and well-dressed cliildren
often enough, accustomed hitherto to a life of
comfort, and now with their homes biu-ned
and their men-folk killed, penniless, not knowing
what to do, where to go, or where to obtain their
next meal. Here were peasant women who
told how their husbands and sons, venturing
to resist the Uhlan outposts, had been promptly
hanged from the nearest trees. Here were
young lads who related how, in their villages,
all the men had been seized as hostages, the
priest and the doctor and the schoolmaster
shot, and the remainder sent off they knew
not where. Many of the tales were more dread-
ful still, tales which left the listener wondering
whether grief had turned the brains of the people
or whether the details which they passionately
poured out of outrage and maiming and murder
of women and children could be true.
Significant preparations were going on for
the defence of the city. Much confidence was
reposed in the civil guard, who could be seen
drilling in the parks. Trenches were being dug,
and barbed wire barricades put up out on the
Chaus3<5e de Louvain, in the Champs des Manoeu-
vres, and beyond the cemeteries. The military
authorities explained that these precautions were
necessary because various scattered bands of
Uhlans were about. They were being rounded up
by the Belgians, and some of them might be driven
back in such a way as to fall upon the city,
which therefore must be protected against
the danger of a sudden raid. Such a raid, it
was added in an official annoimcement, was
for that matter entirely improbable.
On Monday, August 17th, however, the real
gravity of the situation became more evident.
Refugees began to arrive in increa.sed numbers.
The Government considered it necessary to make
a formal statement of the measvires taken for
local defence. At the same time significant
376
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
1
m
^i'^'^imi^^ 1 '"'-1 :^
^HH^^HHjH^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^v^M^"^'^'
*^
BELGIANS DRIVEN FROM THEIR HOMES.
{Newspaper Illustrations.
notices were put in the papers, warning civilians
that they must not attempt to resist German
troops if they arrived, but must stay in their
houses, close their doors and windows, and do
nothing which would give the enemy an excuse
to shoot them down.
The Press was under the strictest censorship.
A decree of the 17th limited the editions of the
newspapers to two a day. Later the limitation
was made still closer. Each paper, before
publication, had to be submitted in proof to
military censors, who cut out whatever they did
lot like. One paper did attempt to give some
warning of what might happen. It was quickly
brought to book.
By the afternoon of the 17th it became clear to
the authorities that Brussels could not be held,
and it was determined to transfer the seat of
Government to Antwerp. The Official Journal
attempted to minimize the importance of this
news as much as it could in a notice
published next morning. " Contrary to the
provisions of the law of 1859," it said, " the
Government has remained in Brussels during
the phase of the war in which our Army was
alone to oppose the enemy. Now, when the
Armies of our friends are on our territory, the
Govermnent has judged that its seat may without
inconvenience be transferred to Antwerp, in
conformity with the wish of those who created
that great fortified position.
"It is not that events are more grave than
they have been hitherto. On the contrary,
we are recording a new success of our troops
supported by French cavalry. But as it is
necessary that the transfer should be made
normally and without the slightest interruption
in the execution of the sovereign functions,
the Government has considered it preferable
to begin to transfer the services of the various
Ministries while the families of the Ministers
remain in the capital. Certain of the Ministers
will therefore take up their residence in Antwerp,
where the war services will be better placed
while the Army is in the field. In deference
to the desire of the Government, her Majesty
the Queen and the Royal Princes will remove
to the Palace at Antwerp. As long as the
King remains anaong our valiant soldiers the
establishment of the Royal Palace will con-
tinue to work in Brussels.
" At the request of the Government several
statesmen holding the rank of Minister, especially
those of the Opposition, will proceed temporarily
to Antwerp."
Even before the announcement was made
the military archives had been dispatched in
motor wagons to Antwerp. State papers «wid
treasure were also on their way.
During all these stormy scenes of impending
tragedy Brussels had had its fill of emotion. Day
by day during the previous fortnight crowds had
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
377
assembled and demonstrated in the streets
on any excuse. Now it was the King riding
to Parliament, riding on a war-horse in the
uniform in which he was to take the field at
the head of the Army. Now it was the Queen
and the Royal children driving through the
streets followed everywhere by the shouts
and acclamations of the people. Now it was
soldiers going forth to the south, the regulars,
the volunteers, the special corps, all of them
surrounded, not alone by their own friends,
but by all who could gather to encourage them.
Now the people found fresh cause for enthusiasm
in the sight of the uniform of a French Army
officer. That surely meant the arrival of the
French troops ! Now they cheered at the word
that the English were coming.
The city had determined to maintain its
good spirits and to show a brave front. What
if the Germans were only forty miles or so to
the south ? The Allies would see to it that they
came no farther.
In the early days, before the Press restrictions
were enforced, limiting the number of editions
issued each day, the newspapers appeared
every hour and were bought eagerly. The
streets were decked with flags. The " Braban-
9onne " was heard on all sides. At certain
hour? one might have imagined, were it not for
the processions of th-) woimded and the house*
marked with the Red Cross, that Bruasels was
en fete.
Then the great display of enthusiasm cooled.
The constantly repeated rumours of the arrival
of foreign armies turned out all to be falsa
Day after day people got tired of hearing that
the English were a mile or two away, or the
French just to liand. " I received informa-
tion this morning," wrote one experienced
correspondent on the day after the outbreak
of the war, " that British troops had landed
and were on their way to the frontier to defend
Belgian neutrality. I at once drove out to
Laeken, through which suburb they must
pass. There I learned that the news was
premature. French regiments are alleged to
have arrived at Namur. Others are marching
into Belgium." Multiply such reports a
thousandfold, add to them detailed accounts
of the automobiles attached to the British
Army, of the flower-decked guns, of the cheering
and triumphant British troops, and of the
countless armies of French infantry morching
to the north-east, and the reader will have
some idea of the reports which, never proving
true, made the hearts of the Bruxellois sick.
Then there came something else to think of.
Rumours of massacres at Vise racked with
GERMAN TROOPS HAVING THEIR MIDDAY MEAL IN THE GRANDE PLACE, BRUSSELS.
378
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
BELGIAN AIRMEN. INewsfaper llludmlions.
They have been of great use in locating the enemy's positions.
anxiety many of the people in the city who
had friends and relatives at Vise. The stories
of massacre and of looting to the south were
no more impersonal to the folks of the
capital than stories of the burning of Kentish
villages or Northampton farms would bo
impersonal to Londoners. The authorities
tried to suppress the accounts of a ruined country
side, but the very attempt made them spread
the more. Then the sight of the civil guards at
drill around the town, the digging of entrench-
ments and the building of the barricades, were
recognized even by the most optimistic as having
a tremendous significance. When on the
morning of Tuesday, August 18th, it was known
that the Government had transferred itself to
Antwerp, anxiety became acute.
Even as late as Tuesday night, however, many
people in the city attempted to argue that all
would yet be well. The French, it was said,
were assuming the aggressive and were liunting
the Uhlans out of the woods and back across the
roads between Namur and Brussels. The
Germans had changed their plan of campaign.
They had lost so much in attacking the Belgian
Army that they would now abandon the north-
ward move. " From a good source I have
the news," wrote one correspondent on Tuesday
night, " that the French generals have chosen
their battle-ground and have the Germans now
in such a position that they cannot avoid fight-
ing a battle in which two-thirds of their northern
forces must be engaged if it is to face the main
body of the French which has been rolled up into
Belgium." Obviously, if such a fight came,
the Germans would be too fully engaged to
make an immediate attempt to press on to
the city.
Men told one another in the caf^s and in the
streets that the approach of the Germans
formed part of the Allies' plan. They were being
lured on to destruction. They had not yet
secured a victory. Brussels was the bait, and
in attempting to take it the foe ware to be
caught in a steel trap from which there would
be no escape.
The stories of coming victory grew *> they
passed from mouth to mouth. Mesnwhile the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
379
people could hear the dull sounds of explosions
in the distance as bridges and roadways were
being blown up to check the German advance.
In the suburbs the poorest inhabitaiits gave up
everything they could in helping to build up the
barricades against the Germans. " Hundreds of
people," wrote one observer, " have sacrificed all
their household furniture in the common caase.
Beds, pianos, carts, boxes, baskets of earth —
one child I saw filling up a ba ket from the
gutter — are all piled up. Roads aud bridges
had been destroyed wholesale."
During Tuesday night and all Wednesday
armies of refugees poured in. They came in
family parties, small and great, old women of
80 helping along little toddling cliildren, men and
women in their prime with faces stricken with
grief wliich told of ruined homes and broken
prospects. Some sat down in the mtin streets
on their little bundles, waiting on fate. Others,
people of means, rushed tlirough in their car-
riages to the coast. " On Wednesday," wrote
one visitor, " the aristocracy from the sur-
roimding chateaux began to come in in
carts, motor-cars, and wagons. I saw women
and children in every sort of clothes mixed up
with household goods, many of wliich were quite
without value in such a crisis, but which had
been snatched up at the moment, of departure'
These people with money did not stay a second in
Brussels, but continued their wild peregrination
towards the coast. Every motor, cart, and
carriage was plastered with huge red croasee
hastily improvised out of wallpaper, old petti-
coats, or any material which happened to
come to hand. That evening thoasands of
terrified peasants poured down the Avenue du
Regent, weeping and bemoaning their fate.
They, poor souls, had no money and nowhere to
go to. For the first time in their lives they
foimd themselves homeless. It was a terrible
sight." Every train going to the north was
packed with people. Thousands of BruxeUois,
caught in sudden fear, not knowing what to do
started tramping out on the road towards
Ghent.
The great masses of the people, however,
took the graver situation with comparative
calmness, and most strangers who were present
recorded their surprise, not so much at the
crowds of refugees in the streets or the crowds
of others seeking to escape from the city to the
north, but at the vast number of men and women
who went about their work quietly right up to
the end. Even yet they did not give up all hopes
of succour. But if the worst were to come, the
GERMAN INFANTRY IN THE SQUARE AT BRUSSELS.
[Newspaper Utustraiioiu.
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE T)
380
3ERMAN ADVANCE TO BRUSSELS.
381
382
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
German occupation of the city would be only
momentary. They rested content in the
Tightness of their cause. It became generally
known on the 19th that the Belgian Army
had retired from Louvain towards Antwerp.
It was reported at first that a considerable
Belgian force still held the high wooded country
between Louvain and Brussels, that it was well
equipped with artillery, and that it could hold
any attack back. Tliese troops, it was added,
would be still further reinforced, and would have
as their reserve the much-advertised civil
guard. But those at the head of affairs had no
delusions. They knew very well that any effort
to check the Germans. at this stage could only
result in more or less destruction to Brussels
itself. There were those who yet advocated
fighting to the last. They were in the minority,
and cool advisers from neutral nations strongly
urged the duty of not attempting an impossible
task. To attempt a battle at the barricades
would onlj' mean bombardment of the city and
street fighting, with all the horrors that street
fighting entails. The wiser coxm^sels prevailed,
and it was resolved to allow the Germans to
enter peacefully.
That night a proclamation was posted on the
walls of Brussels. It was signed by M. Max,
the Burgomaster, who in the anxious weeks
that followed weis to win high reputation by his
courage and common sense in dealing with the
Germans, and read : —
Despite the heroic resistance of our troops, aided by
the Allied armies, it is to be feared that the enemy may
occupy Brussels. In tlie event of such an occurrence
I rely on the population to remain calm. Avoid all
panic. The laws of war forbid the enemy obtaining
by force information relating to national defence.
Tlie inhabitants of Brussels have tlie riglit to refuse
all such information.
As long as I am alive or a free agent I shall endeavour
to protect the rights and dignity of my fellow-citizens.
I pray you to render my task loss difHcult by abstain-
ing from all hostile acts. Citizens, whatever befall,
listen to your burgomaster. He will not betray you.
Long live a free and independent Belgium 1 Long
live Brussels !
On Thursday morning the Burgomaster went
out in a motor-oar, accompanied by his four
sheriffs, to meet the German military comman-
der. He was attired in his scarf of office. He
was received with great brusqueness, bidden
to remove his scarf, and then asked if he
was prepared to surrender the city uncon-
ditionally. If not, it would be bombarded. He
intimated that he had no other choice than
to yield. He was thereupon informed that he
would be held personally responsible for the good
behaviour of the citizens, and that any acts of
violence on the part of the people against the
Germans would be visited on him and the other
responsible heads of the city. The German troops
would enter and occupy the place that day.
GERMAN TROOPS OUTSIDE THE BOURSE, BRUSSELS.
[Ntvspaptr itiusirathns.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
383
M. MAX, [Central Niws.
Burgomaster of Brussels.
The German Commander, General Sixtus von
Arnim, issued the following proclamation,
which was placarded in Brussels : —
German troops will pass through Brussels to-day
and on the following days, and are obliged by circum-
Blances to demand from ^the city lodging, food, and
supplies. All these matters will be regularly arranged
through the municipal authorities.
I expect the population to conform itself without
resistance to these necessities of war, and in particular
to commit no act of aggression against the safety of the
troops, ,and promptly to furnish the supplies demanded.
In this case I give every guarantee for the preserva-
tion of the city and the safety of its inhabitants.
If, however, theie should be, as there has un-
fortunately been elsewhere, any act of aggression
against the soldiers, the burning of buildings, or ex-
plosions of any kind, I shall be compelled to take the
severest measures.
The General Commanding the Army Corps,
SiXTUS VON Aknim.
During the morning quiet crowds assembled
in the main streets in the heart of the capital.
No one knew quite what to expect. Every one
was drawn by curiosity to see the arrival of the
invader. It was told that the Germans were
V > i^^H
*
(X)l NT \ON ARMM, [SlaxUys.
who was Military Governor of Brussels.
already outside in great force on the roads to
Waterloo, to Louvain, and to Tervueren.
The German General Staff had evidently
ordered that the entry into Brussels was to be
made as effective as possible. In place of parad-
ing the thinned ranks of the regiments that had
fought so hard on the road frora Liege, a fresh
Army Corps was brought up. The people of
Brussels expected to see exhausted and battle-
worn soldiers — men bearing scars and wotinds,
with torn imiforms and depleted ranks. The
reality was very different.
- Soon after 2 in the afternoon the distant
sound of artillery fire proclaimed the approach
of the Germans. Then the sound of music
could be heard, and the advance guards of the
triumphant Army appeared. At the head rode
a Prussian general, described by onlookers as
'• a swarthy, black-moustached, ill-natured
brute, dressed in khaki-grey." Had he been
Apollo himself his looks would scarce have
pleased the people of Brussels that day. Every
384
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
regiment, infantry or cavalry, liad its band, and
the music of the instruments was broken by the
singing by the soldiers of " Die Wacht am Rhein "
and "Deutschland iiber Alles." The troops were
fresh and marched as though on parade. Their
uniforms were new, their equipment undamaged,
and their military elan such as to arouse the
unwilling admiration of the onlookers. The
long procession of troops was estimated to
number 40,000. Every branch of the German
service was represented. One part was a pro-
cession of a hundred motor-cars with machine-
guns mounted on them. There was a com-
plete siege train. The whole Army was dressed
in one colour — a greenish grey. The very
guns and the pontoon bridges and the equip-
ment of the sappers were all grey. It was the
war dress of Germany.
The Army moved down the Chauss6e de
Louvain into the Grands Boulevards up in
the direction of the Gare du Nord. As they
reached the main section of the route the
word of conunand broke out and the infantry
instantly broke into the famous German goose-
step. It was a dramatic touch and it had its
efiect.
The people watched and wondered and feared.
" Towards the centre of the city," wrote the
special correspondent of The Times, " the
crowds had gathered on the pavements ten and
twelve deep. In stony silence they watched
the German soldiers pass ; the children ap-
peared interested in the wonderful spectacle,
women trembled and whispered beneath their
breath, old men and men too young for the
Belgian colours stood white as ghosts and
speechless with anger."
The troops quickly took possession of various
strategic points in the city. All fears of im-
mediate massacre were set at rest. The
soldiers, so far from plundering the people,
seemed anxious to prove the German power
and prosperity by their display of abundance
of money and their willingness to spend it.
M. Max, the Burgomaster, was still held re-
sponsible for much of the routine work of 1 cal
administration. The Germans appointed their
own Civil Governor, who was the supreme
authority. One of the first demands of the
Germans when they had taken control tvas for
an indemnity of eight million pounds as a war
Iev3'. This demand the Burgomaster informed
them could not be complied with, as thp city's
money had been sent away to Antwerp.
A COMMON SIGHT IN DISTRESSED BELGIUM:
Villagers flying from the approaching Germans.
INmspaptr I Uustrationt.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
386
DESTITUTE BELGIANS.
They came from the villages around Malines before the bombardment.
With the German entry into Brussels the
first stage of the war came to an end. The
Belgians had done their work well. They had
succeeded in holding up the German advance
in unexpected fasliion. They had given
France time to complete the mobilization of
her forces, and England opportunity to land
her completely equipped Expeditionary Force
in France. The war was now to assume
another aspect. In place of the fighting of
[Nfwspaptr / UuslralioHS,
comparatively small forces along limited fronts
in Belgium, there was to be direct conflict
between the big armies of France backed by
the English against the forces of Germany,
first on the Belgian frontier and then on
French soil. Germany had made ready
for her great blow. The blow was now
about to be struck, to use the characteristic
phiase of the German Gieneral Staff, "like a
thmiderbolt."
386
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
'o~ °Marsal
*N,, , Moyenvic
Luneville'
Ogevillero
^
O
f {Fenestranges) \
Hemmirigen ^ Artiweiler '•;
Brudersdorf" ^^^^
BuchsweHer„ t
•^^ Hagenau
abern
Brumat
>Maursmunster
sft
Bl
•"N ) Albersweiler •■/./ ^ \
=.^, Vi3scsm6or/, Os" .■" ^Ballbronn^ STRASSBI
'Oomevre I ^•.%^ ^ .■-„', v
jMqyen
o
MontiQny
;ii"'
'/<QMLui:zelf7auSen^''^utz\°>
imberviliers
^ai6n\i\\\eti..{^f',0Ji'f^^f°GrandFontame
'opexonne/ -^ -•.# ^chirmeclf
Senonei Qi*o / •' — ^"
a^ii^ s^jSu/zeren V
Neuf'Maison
nRapn I
.§
■ '«m
S^ Helen eo
Deyrimonh
Colroy " ' '
S*J)ie
. Steige
S ..„^
ti r oeutsch ffHmieh
'^ Rheir
nintrux
o \
chlettstadt.
-VS'.? Marie-aux-Mine
'\enzinqen
\ldrmen
Hemiremi
fColnmr
\ttBretsacn\
NeuBreisacnK
*ji?'',;jsi^*
" Vent rah
J>~rM'"itr. 1 0K ('"''*;!.''**»^Ma3rniJn3ter
mpagney \ \-- '■'■
J VKo^* • HJInntrpi
\Ens;s/ie/mt2 V HeitPrsheim
JBollwillsr h / Sulzburg
wmj J I ^ — -ifiKeucnburq
Kandern
pq
Mgntreux VieuK
Tgmemarie
Her/court^
Montbelian
^
N^..
Siecentz\
^A/tkirch
«te
in.
acH
Hunningenl
Miles.
5 10
J/*
S W I T z
E R
L ^
N ^
.7iO
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE FRENCH OPERATIONS IN ALSACE.
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE FIRST FRENCH OFFENSIVE
IN ALSACE.
The French Invade Alsace — -Criticisms on General Joffre's Strategy — ^His Career —
The Frontiers Involved — Belfout the French Base — French Frontier Defences — Thb
Object of an Offensive — ^Ferment est Alsace-Lorraine — Probability of a German Offen-
sive— The French Raid — Thann, Altkirch, and MUlhausen Captured — The German
Counter-attack Forces the French to Withdraw — Superiority of French Artillery
Established — Serious French Invasion of Alsace — • Germans Routed — Thann and
MtJLHAUSEN Retaken — Premature Jubilation in Paris — German Counter-offensive Drives
the French from the Lost Provinces.
ON August 2 the Germans had violated
tlie neutraUty of Luxemburg ; on
the 3rd they had invaded Belgium ;
and from the 3rd to the 5th they were
attempting to take some of the forts of Liege by
a coup de main. Two days later the French
forces, moving to succour the Belgians, joined
hands with their new allies, while simultaneously
a French brigade from Belfort — at the point
where the frontiers of Germany, France, and
Switzerland converge — advanced into Upper
Alsace and, towards nightfall, occupied Altkirch.
The next day — the 8th — Miilhausen was
entered by the French, and the following
proclamation by General Joffre, the French
Commander-in-Chief, was being circulated
among the Alsatians : —
Children of Alsace,
After 44 years of sorrowful waiting French
soldiers once more tread the soil of your
noble country. They are the pioneers in
the great work of revenge. For them what
emotions it calls forth and what pride !
To complete the work they have made the
sacrifice of their lives. The French nation
unanimously urges them on, and in the folds
of their flag are inscribed the magic words
" Right and Liberty." Long live Alsace.
Long live France.
General-in-Chief of the French Armies,
Joffre.
The strategy of General Joffre in throwing
•troops into Alsace when every spare man and
gun was, as it happened, required in Belgium
has been — after the events — severely criticized.
But, in fairness to the French generalissimo, it
must be pointed out that at the time it seemed
to experienced critics to be justified. Mr.
Belloc, whose striking prophecy of what would
occur if the Germans invaded Belgium will
be remembered, observed, ten days or so after the
French entered Alsace, that there had been
" at the very other end of the field of war the
first signs of a movement that was to have a pro-
found effect (the future would show it) upon all
succeeding operations," and that, though the
effect of " this raid " into Alsace was " political
rather than strategic," there was " strategy
behind it."
That was indeed probable. The French
Commander-in-Chief was no hot-headed general
of the Murat type. Born in 1852, he was, like
Lord Ivitchener, a student when the Franco-
Prussian War broke out. Like Lord Kitchener,
he had been an engineer. For three years he
was occupied on the new fortifications for Paris.
In 1885 he took part in the expedition to For-
mosa, and afterwards organized the defences of
Upper Tonldn. Tliree years later he joined the
engineer staff at headquarters, and was em-
ployed on railway work. He returned to the
387
388
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
PANORAMIC VIEW OF MULHAUSEN.
French colonies, but on this occasion to Africa,
directing the construction of the railway from
Senegal to the Niger. It was largely thanks to
JoSre that Timbuotoo was secured by the French.
Next he saw service in Madagascar- Again in
France, he became Director of Engineers at
headquarters, and afte wards he was in com-
mand of the 6th Infantry Division. From May,
1908, to February, 1910, he commanded the
Second Army Corps. Finally, he entered the
Superior Council of War, and in 1911 was
appointed Chief of the General Staff. As Chief
of the General Stafi, he had signalized himself by
sending into retirement five commanding
generals whom he had judged to be incompe-
tent. Quiet, taciturn, masterful, he was the
last person to allow purely political considera-
tions to dictate his strategy. MacMahon heid
gone to Sedan because the politicians at Paris had
ordered him to. After Sedan Gambetta from Bor-
deaux had, with disastrous results, manoeuvred
the armies which he had helped so materially to
create. But Joffre was neither a MacMahon
nor a Bourbaki. " I assure you," said the
French Minister of War at the opening of the
struggle to an English journalist, " that if I
were to take a motor-car and drive into the
zone of operations without General Joffre's
()ermi8sion General Joffre would have me
turned out."
On August 3 the French generalissimo left
Paris for the frontier behind wluch the French
covering troops had been withdrawn some
eight miles in order that it should be clear
to the world, and especially to Italy, that
the Germans, if they invaded France, were
unprovoked aggressors.*
To understand the problem that this military
scientist was called upon to solve it is necessary
to have present in the mind a picture of the
frontier open to attack by Germany. This
frontier starts from the point where three
countries — Switzerland, France, Germany —
meet, runs north for 70 miles, and then strikes
north-west for 275 miles, finishing on the
North Sea some seven miles E.N.E. of Dunkirk.
For the first 165 miles France is bounded by
her lost provinces — Alsace-Lorraine ; for four
or five miles by the independent principality
of Luxemburg, and for 175 miles by Belgium.
The obsoletet fortress of Longwy stands in
•It should be recollected that the Triple Alliance, to which Italy
was a partner, was an alliance for defensive'and not for offensive
purposes. The Kaiser and his diplomatists made a de.^|:erate
attempt to drag Italy into the war by pretending th.at Germany
had been attacked by France. On August 3 they issued at lierlin
the following mendacious statements : — " It lias become known
here that It Is declared in France'tliat Germany began the war by
Invading France with her troops. This Is not correct. Yesterday
morning, the 2nd Inst., a French aviator threw bombs over Nurem-
berg. During the night of the Ist Inst. French aviators manoeuvred
over the Ithine provinces. Yesterday morning, moreover. French
officers in German uniforms crossed the frontier from Belgiiml
into Germany In motor-cars. Later In the day French troops
crossed the frontier near Belfort and endeavoured to press forward
Into Upper Alsace. It is therefore considered here that France
has attacked us without breaking ott diplomatic relations."
Renter's Agency was also informed that. " according to toleitrams
received on August 3 In London from the Chief of the German
General Staff, a party of French men and ollicers dlsirulsed In
Prussian miifomis tried to cross the Gennan frontier near.the Dutch
boundary. They were detected and prevented from crossing. The
German telegram added that a French doctor and two other. French-
men tried to poison the wells near ,Metz with cholera ndcrobes."
These false allegations are evidence that the <;:enuan Government-
was already meditating the most llagrant breaclies.ot International
Law. They, douljtless. wlslicd to be able to plead justification for
the barbarities about to Ik perpetrated by their Iluns !
tDcsplte Its antiquated defences Longwy held out for three
weeks and more against the German invaders.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
389
the pocket formed by the frontiers of Belgium,
Luxembui'g, and Germany.
The geograpliical, as opposed to the strategic,
frontier ran from the eastern environs of
Belfort, mostly along the crest of the Vosges,
to the Donon, a peak a little to the south of
a straight line connecting Nancy and Strass-
biirg. Thence it turned westward along the
edge of Lorraine until, abreast of Metz, it
struck north and touched, a few miles to the
east of Longwy, the frontier of Luxemburg.
The formidable German ring-fortress of Metz is in
the same longitude as Nancy. The rest of the
frontier need not be described for our purpose.
Between Longwy and the spiu-s of Mt. Donon
the ooimtry is what is called " rolling." Some
miles to the south-west of Metz the Moselle
enters German territory and proceeds north-
wards through the capital of Lorraine and
the fortress of Thionville (to the south-east of
l^ongwy) by Treves — the centre from wliich
the Germans had marched, motored, or trained
on Luxeinburg-^to Coblentz, where it joins the
Rliine. At the head-waters of the Moselle was
the French ring-fortress Epinal, and mid-
way between Epinal and Metz, 10 miles or
so to the west of Nancy, another, Toul.
From the Donon (3,310ft.), a peak 250ft.
lower than Snowdon, the range of the Vosges
falls and rises to the Ballon de Soultz, the
highest point of the Vosges, 4,870ft. in altitude
and some 260ft. higher than Ben Nevis, the
loftiest point in the British Isles. To the
South-west of the B.illon do Soultz was the
Ballon d' Alsace (4,085ft.).
The Vosges is a precipitous range, more
abrupt on the German than on the French side ;
its lower flanks and crest are mostly wooded.
Several carriage roads cross the Vosges and
light railways ascend German and French
valleys leading to the crest of the mountains.
North of the Donon the line from Nancy and
Luneville to Strassburg traversed Saarburg and
the Zabem tunnel, both of which were in
German territory. South of the Ballon d' Alsace
a railway connected Belfort with Miilhausen.
Belfort, the base for the French operations in
Alsace, lies 15 miles or so south of the Ballon
d' Alsace. This ring-fortress, with the forts round
Montbelliard to the south of it, blocked the
depression between the Swiss Jura and the Vosges,
known as the Trou6e de Belfort. The lie of the
land here is apparent from the fact that the
Rhone-Rhine Canal passes tlirough the gap of
Belfort.
Captvired by the French in 1636, ceded to
them in 1648, and successfully defended by its
garrison in 1814, 1815, and 1870-1, Belfort is,
as it were, the lock of the southern gate between
France and Germany. The Germans must have
ALTKIRCH, LOOKING TOWARDS SAINT MOKAIN.
Where very severe fighting took place at the beginning of the War.
390
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
regretted that it was not transferred to them at
the end of the Franco-German War. With Bol-
fort in their possession they might have marched
on Paris by the plateau of Langres (they would,
however, have had to mask or capture the ring-
fortress of Langres) or on Lyons by the valley of
the Saone. As it was, the French could open the
gate at Belfort and move with ease into the plain
of Upper Alsace and, also, to the banks of the
Rhine, Which at Base! passes between the Jura
and the Black Forest and sweeps northwards to
the strongly fortified Strassburg. On the left
(west) bank of the Rhine from Basel to Strass-
burg, however, stood the fortress of Neu
Breisach, through wliich Bavarian and Austrian
troops — if Austrian corps were detached to the
French theatre of war — could be poured on the
flank of an army advancing from Belfort in the
direction of Strassburg.
Provided that the French did not violate the
neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, the
obvious avenue into Germany lay tlirough Bel-
fort. To protect France from a German offen-
sive on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier, a chain of
forts ran from Belfort to Kpinal. Between
Fpinal and Toul a gap — the gap of Nancy —
had been intentionally left unprotected by
fortresses. It was hoped that the Germans,
with their habitual contempt for their neigh-
bours, might traverse the gap and expose their
flanks to French armies pivoting respectively
on Toul and Epinal. To the east of the Nancy
gap and guarding the approaches to Lun6ville
was the Fort de Manonviller.
As we have seen, the Upper Moselle was
French, the Lower jSIoselle German. The Meuse,
on the other hand, rose in France and, until it
entered Belgium at Givet, ran through French
territory. A few miles to the west of Toul it
approached the Moselle and then turned north-
westwards to Verdun. Another chain of forts
stretched from Toul to Verdun. One of them,
St. Mihiel, played later an important part
during the attempts of the Germans to burst
through this barrier. Verdun, the most northern
of the ring -fortresses on the eastern frontier,
faced Metz. It blocked a German advance on
Reims or Chalons.
So far, then, as engineers could make it, the
French line of defence from Verdun to Belfort
was a strong one. But would the fortifications
along it be able to resist howitzers — and the
super-howitzers which a cimning and secretive
enemy might bring against the fortresses ?
The Germans had predicted that, if a sector of
a ring-fortress were attacked by brave and
A TRAIN OF WOUNDED AT NANCY.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
391
VIEW OF NANCY FROM THE HOTEL DE VILLE.
detennined troops under cover of the fire of
modern artillery, the fortress would certainly
fall. The reckless indifference to human life
which was a feature of HohenzoUern statecraft
pointed to the probability that the Prussian
generals would sacrifice their men by tens of
thousands to capture the ring-fortresses or
links in the chain of fortifications between
Verdim and Toul, between Epinal and Belfort.
There was another factor to be considered.
The German Government had reduced treachery
to a fine art, and the successors of Stieber had
honeycombed France with spies and traitors.
Treason might effect what howitzers could not,
and, vmtil war had shown that France was united
to a man against Germany, it would be perilous
to rely on a passive defensive. Of recent years
there had been a rapid growth of, apparently,
anti-patriotic Socialism, and the ferment aroused
by the murder of M. Calmette in the spring of
1914 seemed to point to the possibility of a
foreign war being accompanied by civil dis-
turbances. The siiccesises of the Prussians in
1870 had been largely due both to treachery and
to domestic dissensions. A victorious advance
on to hostile territory would cement the nation,
and against a nation boiling over with enthu-
siasna the German advance guard of spies and
desperadoes would be able to effect little.
Every Frenchman would then be an eager
detective.
There were still more powerful reasons why
General Joffre should throw troops into Alsace
and Lorraine. The majority of the inhabitants
of those provinces were French at heart, if
Gorman bj' nationality. Whatever their re-
mote racial origin may have been the Lorrainers
and Alsatians had not taken kindly to the strait-
waistcoat of German Imperialism. Tlie Kaiser
and his agents by cajolery and threats had en-
deavoured to persuade them that they were
mad to prefer the French language, literature,
customs, and habits. Like the Poles, the
Alsatians and Lorrainers persisted in their
resistance to German " Culture." Unlike the
Poles, they had still a fatherland to which they
could appeal for aid and .sympathy.
The year before the Great War the ever-
smouldering hostility of the population had been
fanned into a flame by a typical example of the
brutal conduct always to be expected from their
German oppressors. At Zabern in Alsace a
Lieutenant von Forstner was reported to have
promised to reward a recruit if he stabbed a
" Wacke." This term was a local and oppro-
bious expression for a native of Alsace. 'Dis-
turbances arose and, in the course of them.
Von Forstner drew his sword and cut a lame
cobbler over the head. The military' superseded
the civil authorities and their action was sup-
ported by the Prussian Minister of War, General
von Falkenhayn, who declared in the Reichstag
392
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
COLONEL VON REUTER,
who supported Von Forstner.
[Daily Mirror.
that " if the military authorities had given way,
there inight have been momentary peace in
Zabem, but it would have been a treacherous
pesice. . . . The recent scandals," he con-
tinued, " cried to Heaven, and unless the autho-
rities could suppress the agitation with vigour
they must be prepared to see life for a German
at Zabem become less safe than life in the
Congo."
It w£is the lame cobbler, however, not the
soldier whose head had been cut, and the Reichs-
tag, for once showing some independence, cen-
sured the Imperial Chancellor by a heavy
majority. Further, the Military Court of the
30th Division at Strassburg sentenced the
lieutenant to 43 days' imprisonment.
It need hardly bo said that the conduct of the
Reichstag and the Military Court was violently
attacked by the German militarists. The
Police President of Berlin, Herr von Jagow, in
a letter to the papers, described Alsace-Lorraine
as " almost an enemy's country." The superior
Military Court of the Strassburg Army Corps
reversed the sentence passed on Lieutenant von
Forstner and the Military Court of the 30th
Division acquitted Colonel von Renter and
Lieutenant Schad, who, between them, had sub-
stituted the rule of the sword for the rule of law
in Zabem. Colonel von Renter hivd pleaded a
Cabinet Order of Frederick William ill., issued
in 1820, which had been reprinted and counter-
signed by the Minister of War 15 years before
the Zabem incident. During these pro-
ceedings the Crown Prince by telegram had
signified his approval of the tyramious and
illegal behaviour of liis father's Janizaries.
With the Zabern outrages fresh in their
memories the Alsatians and Lorrainers would
siu'ely flock to the tricolour if it crossed the
frontier ! As Alsace and Lorraine were the
immediate bases for a direct invasion of France
by the Germans, to raise Alsace and Lorraine
was one way of preventing or hindering a
German offensive. That the whole of the
vast German forces (which niight, moreover,
since the Russian mobilization was slower
than that of the Teutonic Allies, be reinforced
by one or more Austrian corps) would traverse
only Luxemburg and Belgium was improbable.
" It is well known," runs an official French
communique published on tlie 15th of August,
" by the declarations made by Germans them-
selves, such as Generals BernJiardi and Falken-
hayn. Marshal voa der Goltz, and others,
that the German plan consisted in the first
place in an abrupt attack upon the French
covering troops near Nancy. It is also known
that a second abrupt attack was to take place
in Belgium with an immediate march on the
French frontier. A decisive proof of the reality
of this double plan is revealed by the fact that
a number of Germans who should have joined
the colours on the fifth to the fifteenth day of
the mobilization had received orders to join
their regiments in French towns, such as
Verdim, Reims, Chalons, and other places."
Lastly, the French nature needed and
demanded a movement such as the invasion
of Alsace. The last war with the Germans
had been attended by a succession of disastrous
defeats. For over • 40 years the Germans by
speech, gesture, and writing had done their
utmost to impress on the French that the
German Army was incomparably superior to
their French neighbour's, and that the German
soldier was a better man than the French soldier
on the field of battle. The reverses in 1870-1
had destroyed the prestige of the French Army.
Japan and Turkey — to take two examples —
had sent for German instructors in the art of
war. The Anglo-Saxon world, too, haa? for
a period, been inclined to revere the German
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
395
strategists and tacticians. Recently, indeed,
the Christian Balkan States had turned towards
Paris as the military centre of the civilized
world, but even the King of the Hellenes had
seemed to acknowledge that ho and his king-
iom were in greater debt to Grerman strategists
than to the French instructors of the Greek
Army. At the earliest moment to remove
the burden of the momory of past defeats
from the shoulders of the French nation and to
prove that the leaders who in 1870 made the
Frencli fight on the defensive had utterly mis-
understood the national temperament, may well
have been the main motive at the back of
General Jofire's mind when he ordered or sanc-
tioned the invasion of Upper Alsace.
" We knew," said a communique of August
22, " from the reconnaissances of our aviators
that the Germans had left relatively unim-
portant forces between the French frontier and
Miilhausen, and that the bulk of their forces
had fallen back on the right bank of the Rhine.
This being the case, our objective was to
attack those forces and throw them back,
in order to gain command of the Rhine bridges
and to bo able to repulse a counter-attack
tliere, should the enemy make one."
There was an excellent chance of routing the
hated enemy in the first days of the war, of
releasing the French in Alsace from bondage, of
disturbing the plans of the Kaiser and his
son, of threatening the flank of a German Army
advancing towards the gap of Nancy, and also,
perhaps, of firing mines of disaffection in
Southern Germany. Becker in 1840 had written,
addressing the French : —
" Sie sollen ilin nicht haben
Den freien Deutschen Rhein : "
and De Musset had replied : —
" Nous I'avons eu, votre Rhin AUemand."
For French troops once more to bivouac on
the banlis of the mighty river whicli their great
grandfathers had so often crossed under Napo-
leon Would be the happiest of auguries for France
in the gigantic struggle which had just opened.
As already mentioned, the campaign began
with the capture of Altkirch on August 7.
Previously to this, and even before the declara-
tion of war, the Germans had at various points
RETURN OF COLONEL VON REUTER'S NOTORIOUS REGIMENT TO ZABERN.
394
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LIEUTENANT VON FORSTNER of ALSACE,
who cut the head of a cripple at Zabern.
[Daily Mirror.
crossed the French frontier and a German air-
man had dropped bombs on Lundville. The
French troops were divided into two columns ;
their objective was Miilhausen. One advanced
through the gap of Belfort on Altkirch, the
other crossed the Vosges near the Rheinkopf
(4,260ft.), a little to the N.W. of the Ballon
de Soultz. descending by tho valley of the
Thur on Thann. Miilhausen is at the apex of a
triangle, of which the base is a line dra\vn
between Thann and Altkirch.
The wings of the German forces were posted at
Thann and Altkirch ; between Miilhausen and
the Rhine lay the Forest of Hard, 20 miles in
length, " where a whole Army Corps could take
shelter."* The first operation of the French
was to dislodge the Germans from Thann and
Altkirch.
Thann, 12 miles from Miilhausen, was a town
of less than 10,000 inhabitants. It lay at the
mouth of the valley of the Thur. The moun-
tains between which the river flowed were
covered with woods on their upper and vine-
yards on their lower slopes. The town was in-
teresting from both an antiquarian and a
modem standpoint. The Church of St. Theo-
bald was a gem of Gothic architecture, and on
the left Vjank of the Thur rose the Engelburg,
a castle which commanded the town and entrance
to the valley. The tower of the castle had been
•French crtmrnuniqui.
destroyed by Turenne in 1674. Thann in 1914
was a small manufacturing town. It contained
machinery, cotton and silk factories. The
Germans had placed artillery behind earthworks
at Thanu and at the smaller town of Altkirch,
situated in an amphitheatre on tlie right bank
of the 111.
Despite the fact that the Germans were
entrenched and in approximately equal numbers
the French carried both positions. The Ger-
man losses were considerable. The next day
(August 8) the French pushed forward to Miil-
hausen, wliich, amid the acclamations of the in-
habitants, they entered at nightfall. Miil-
hausen, on the Rhine-Rhone canal, with a popu-
lation of some 100,000 inhabitants, was the most
important manufactiu-ing centre in Alsace, and
the seat of government for the district. It had
been a free city of the old German Empire, and
from 1515 to 1798 it had been in alliance with
the Swiss Confederation. Numerous monu-
ments attested its ancient importance, while the
Arbeiterstadt — the Port Sunlight of Alsace —
foimded in 1853, was one of the earliest
examples of a town built expressly for the
benefit of the working-classes.
It was not to be supposed that the Germans
would tamely acquiesce in the loss of this im-
portant place. The 14th Army Corps (recruited
from Baden) — or a considerable portion of it —
on the night of the next day (August 9) attacked
the French from two directions, viz., tlirough
the Forest of Hard and from Colmar and Neu
Breisach. Tho French communications which
passed through Thann wore struck at by the
Germans at Cernay on the Thur. " In remain-
ing at Miilhausen with insufficient forces,"
says the French official communique, " we risked
losing our line of retreat on the Upper Vosges
and Belfort." It is possible, but not probable,
that the Germans had permitted the French
to enter Miilhausen with a view to dis-
covering, through spies left behind, the names
of the disaffected inhabitants. The alterna-
tive of delivering a counter-attack with the
reserves at Altkirch, which was not imme-
diately threatened by the Germans, did not
meet with the approval of the French com-
mander. " To retreat," again to quote from
the French communique, " was the wisest course
in the circumstances. After this affair we were
certain that the Germans did not intend to
abandon Upper Alsace without fighting, and had
strong forces there at their disposal."
This raid — it was little more than a raid —
had confirmed the reports of the French aviators
that the Germans had left relatively unim-
portant forces between the French frontier and
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
395
Miilhansen. A small body of French troops had
immobilized in Upper Alsace a much larger
body of Germans ; the superiority of the French
field artillery had been demonstrated ; the
French infantry had exhibited the elan for
which it had been so celebrated in the past ; and
the Alsatians had been encouraged to expect
a sjDoedy deliverance from the yoke of their
Gorman tyrants.
On the other hand, the French had had to
evacuate Miilhausen, which paid dearly to the
Germans for its burst of enthusiasm, and it had
been discovered that the ravines through which
the French must debouch from the Vosges into
the plain were commanded by German howitzers
firing from skilfully concealed positions.
Writing 10 days later, a soldier in the French
ranks gave his impressions — probably the im-
pressions of the average French soldier — of the
results achieved by these combats. His letter,
allowing for pardonable exaggeration, brings
vividly before us the nature of a modern
battle.
" Already after a fortnight's war eye-
witnesses can state definitely that the first
operations in Alsace clearly prove two things
— ^the indisputable superiority of our artillery
and the qualities of our infantry in attack.
On August 9 we were at Riedisheim after
having entered Miilhausen. One of our divi-
sions was attacked by a superior force and we
had to withdraw. Prudence dictated this with-
drawal, which was in no way disturbed by the
enemy, so greatly had he been demoralized by
the damage wrought by our field artillery,
which was using melinite shells with terrible
effect. From afar off we could cleat ly see
whole sections of the enemy wiped out by our
accurate fire. When a shell fell near a
German half-company it was annihilated.
After a few seconds one saw two or three men
get up and flee, the rest remained. It was a
complete destruction. Our batteries of four
guns do the work of four or six gun batteries of
the enemy. Our fire is quicker, and we can
direct a hail of shells from a given spot in a
very short space of time. Our gun-carriage
does not move during fire. Only a very slight
and a quickly executed adjustment is re-
quired before the next shell goes. The Ger-
mans find that their guns shift after each shot.
In addition to the rapidity of our fire, our shells
are extremely powerful.
" On August 13 the 109th Infantry Regiment
of the enemy advanced upon positions occu-
pied by us between Breche-au-Mont and
Vauthiermont. Suddenly our guns wore
heard, and a panic followed in the Baden ranks.
Our immediate success was due to our artil-
lery. I saw the battlefield and the damage
done was awful. Our artillery compare the
effect of the bursting of our melinite shells
with that of a gigantic blow with an axe.
This is quite exact. The impression one has
THE CITADEL AT BELFORT.
Showing the huge carved Lion which faces Germany.
?P6
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
""<^ ... ,4_ , "%
|^^^^^^^HHAg|B|||tJ
CAPTURED GERMAN GUNS IN BELFORT.
is that a giant has struck everywhere with
some Titanic axe. Those who are hit directly
are pulverized, others are killed by the shock
of the explosion. Their convulsed faces are
blackened with the powder of the enemy. At
Breche-au-Mont they fled in such panic that
the infantry we sent in pursuit was unable to
catch them up.
" Letters written by the enemy were seized
in villages occupied by oxir troops. They all
bear testimony to the havoc and panic
wrought by our guns. One of these letters,
written by an officer to his wife, states that
such caxnage is unimaginable."
The second paragraph in the above letter
anticipates the narrative of events. On August
9 the French had retired from Miilhausen, but
General Jofire decided that the raid should be
followed by an invasion of Alsace. The forts at
Li6ge were holding out ; the defences at Namur
were supposed to be as strong as, or stronger,
than those of Li^ge ; a German offensive
from Lorraine and Alsace into the Nancy gap
between Toul and Epinal would be dangerous
and difficult if the French secured Upper Alsace.
Should, too, the French succeed in establishing
themselves round the Donon they might cut the
communications between Motz and Strassburg,
and parhaps divert a portion of the enemy's
forces seeking to break through the French
lines (which were not protected by permanent
fortifications) between Verdun and Sedan.
Moreover, there was the feeling of the Alsatians
and Lorrainers to be considered. They would
be bitterly disappointed if the French remained
on the defensive. Many Alsatians had com-
promised themselves irretrievably, and the
suspicious and savage rulers of the two pro-
vinces had already shown in Belgium that they
would not hesitate to overawe the population
by making the most terrifying examples.
General Pan, a veteran of the Franco -Prussian
War, was entrusted with the direction of the
invading army. Like Nelson, he had lost an
arm. His capacities were such that he had been
a candidate for the post held by General Joffre
himself. " It was a question this time," says
the French communique., " of a decisive effort
and not of a mere reconnaissance."
At first the French had everything their own
way. They moved through Thann and Danne-
marie, which lies between Belfort and Altkirch,
on Miilhausen. Both places were stormed.
Miilhausen was the next to fall. It was
attacked by both the French left from the
direction of Thann, and by the French right,
which had been pushed towards the Rhine-Rhone
canal. The fighting at Miilhausen began in the
suburb of Dornach. No fewer than 24 German
guns were captured, and the city, after a brief
resistance, was once more in the possession of
the French (August 19-20).
From Miilhausen the bulk of the invading
troops at this point of the theatre of war were
directed southward to Altkirch, which had
been abandoned by the French at the conclusion
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL
397
of the raid. The Gormans, afraid of
being cut oil from ■ tlie Rhino bridges,
■etreated in great confusion. The western
tads of tlie bridges fell into tlio hands of tlie
Froncli and the uppor part of Upper Alsace
was evacuated by the Germans. Their line of
battle, wliich stretched from Li6go to Basel, liad
Ijeen turned and General Pau was in a position
lo move up the plain between tlie Vosges and
the Rhino to Colmar and Neu Breisach — a
fortress to tlie east of Colmar protecting one
(if the main crossings of the Rhine.
While these events were taldng place the
b'rench were swarming across the Vosges by
the passes between the Ballon d' Alsace and
the Donon, tluis tlireatening the communi-
cations of the Germans between Colmar and
Strassburg. The pass of Saales, south of the
Donon, was seized. Coui^ter-offensive moves
of the Germans from the direction of Metz
towards Spinoourt (north-east of Verdun) and
La Garde and Blamont (to the east of Lun6ville
and Nancy) had been unsuccessful. On August
15 the French Staff was able to inform the public
that " the German attack by way of Nancy had
scarcely been attempted " and that " the
Germans had been forced to desist by the
French covering troops. As to the abrupt
attack through Belgium," they added with undue
assurance, " that had had no better fate.
Tlie resistance of the Liege forts, the valour
of the Belgian Army, and the action of the
French cavalry had had tlie result that the
German plan had been foiled."
The advantages, small though they were,
gained in Alsace had destroyed the legend of
German invincibility. The French, who had
entered on the war with griin determination,
felt their spirits rise. The memories of the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars — of Valmy,
Rivoli, Austerlitz, Jena, Auerstadt, Ecltmuhl,
Wagram, Liitzen, Bautzen, Dresden, Mont-
mirail, Ligny, Magenta, and Solferino — revived
within them. It may have seemed a good omen
to them that the Germans had felt constrained
to call Austrian troops to Alsace. The name of
Austria was associated with innumerable
\ictories in the mind of Franco !
To illustrate the confidence felt at French
lieadquarters we quote the concluding para-
graphs of the communique of August 15. issued
before the recapture of Miilhausen : —
" The French mobilization and concentra-
tion have been carried out with perfect
regularity. The men have been carried to
their dep6ts without incident and armed
and equipped with a miniriunn of dela\-.
The concentration has been effected in con
ditions just as satisfactory. The fears often
and legitimately expressed of the disorganiza-
tion likely to result to the French concentra-
tion by the German invasion have, hajipily,
been set definitely at rest.
"Again, there has been a co-ordination of
movement between the allied armies. The
Belgian Army has brilliantly played its
part. The Russian Army is accelerating it*
mobilization, and it can now operate with
the French and Belgian armies. On the
other hand, the Servian Army, which is now
mistress of Herzegovina, has made Austria
hesitate to send more troops to Upper Alsace,
as she has been doing for a week past. The
last and not the least factor is the domina-
tion of the sea. English and French squadrons
have been able to assure the perfect security
of the sea for the transport of troops from
Africa to France. The two German cruisers
are out of the running, and the revictualling
of the belligerent allies of France and of
THE FAMOUS MILITARY MONUMENT
AT BELFORT.
Erected In commemoration of the three siege-i
of the town.
398
THE TIMER HISTORY OF THE WAB.
A TYPICAL VIEW IN THE VOSGES.
Difficult country so ably captured by the French.
France herself is certain and easy. Such
are the indisputable results attained at the
present hour. They are of capital import-
ance, and axe an augiuy of success for the
combined operations of the allied armies
against the invaders."
Such was the situation as it appeared to the
military authorities of France on August 15.
Events were to prove that they were deceived
and that the people of Paris who, on August
11, had removed all signs of mourning from
the statue of Strassburg had acted prematurely.*
For a few days more, however, success crowned
the French invasion of Alsace and the outskirts
of Lorraine. As has been mentioned, the
French from the crest of the Vosges dominated
the plain of Alsace.
Though at the opening of the Great War
they had abandoned the summits of the Vosges,
which had been at once occupied by the Ger-
•A brief report In The Times of this patriotic outburst will Inteiest
the reader, *' The occupat ion of Altklrcli by t^iicb troops prompted
the Alsatians of Paris to march lu pilgriraage to the statue of
Strassburs on the Place de la Concorde. The procession was
led by a number of Alsatian women in Alsatian costuint, carrying
palm branches. Behind tbera came the standards of the Alsatian
Federation and the Ileifrian flaK. These weie followed by the
Alsatians, who marched bateheuded. led by theit president. Ladders
baring been placed aKalnst the pedestal of the monument, an
Alsatian mouLted and wound a broad tricolour sash around the
statue. The crowd l)elow shouted ' Away with the crfipe I ' ard
In an instairt ail the signs of mourning that had surrounded the
statue since 1871 were tore away. Each Alsatian secured a shred
of the Cl6p«, Alter a patriotic speech by the president of the
UROclatlon the * Haiselllalse ' was simg and the pilgrimage dls-
iwrsed,"
mans, they had, commencing from the south,
captured one by one the principal passes
and positions. First the Ballon d' Alsace
(Welsche Belchen) and the Col de Bussang
had been taken ; next the Hohneck and the
Schlucht. These had been easy achievements.
On the French side the mountains sloped gradu-
ally to the plain. In the central sector of the
Vosges the difficulties encountered had been very
serious. The approaches to the crest were
steep and the Germans had entrenched them-
selves, while the valleys leading to the plain of
Alsace were defended by field fortifications and
heavy artillery. The summits here were narrow
and wooded and the French could not iostal
their artillery when they had captured them.
In securing the Cols du Bonhomme and St. Mariu
aux Mines they had lost 600 killed or wounded.
The Col d'Urbeis and the Col de Saales (to the
north) had offered less obstacles to the invader,
and they and the Donon had been gained at a
comparatively trifling loss.
The French, too, were in strong force at Avri-
court, on the railway from Lunevills to Zabern,
and, so far from the Germans penetrating tlirough
the gap of Nancy, their enemies from that gap
were beginning to enter Lorraine. From the
Donon they descended into the Valley of the
Bruche and struck the railway from Saales to
StrassbiirK, capturing 1..500 prisoners, 12 guns.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
39&
and eight mltrailleiiseu. On the 15th tlio Ger-
mans had been repulsed at Diuant and on the
16th the whole of the British Expeditionary
Force was on French soil. A communique
of August 17 reported that iu Upper Alsace
the Germans were retiring in groat disorder,
abandoning vast quantities of material. Various
German atrocities in the region of Belfort were
notified, and it is interesting to observe that
German civilians took part in the fighting.
The Germans had one law for themselves,
another for their enemies. To the south
of Saarbiu-g, between Avricourt and Zabem,
the Germans had fortified a strong position and
armed it with heavy artillery. They were driven
from it by the French, and on the 18th Saar-
burg was seized and the direct line of railway
between Metz and Strassburg cut. It almost
seemed that the French would be in front of
Metz and Strassburg before the Germans
arrived at Brussels.
The satisfaction felt in Paris was speedily
turned to anxiety. The Germans had concen-
trated several corps d'arm6e for a counter-
attack, which began on August 20, the very
day that the enemv entered Brussels. The
Germans by superior numbers overwhelmed
the French troops in Lorraine ; thoy claimed to
have captured 10,000 prisoners .and 50 guns.
The French left wing retired on the advanced
works of Nancy, while the right endeavoured to
maintain itself on the Donon. By August 23 —
the day after the defeat of the French at Charle-
roi and the day of the battle of Moas and the
capture of Namur by the Germans — the French
were on or behind the Mourtho which flows into
the Moselle below Nancy ; and Lun6ville, on the
Meurthe, was in their possession. The Donon
and the pass of Saales were evacuated. Two
days later the French retired from Alsace,
abandoning Miilhausen. They were pursued by
the Germans, but a general attack all along the
line was repulsed. The exceedingly vigorous
advance of the enemy on Paris had forced
General Joftre to re-form lois right wing and to
concentrate his reserves on the extreme left.
It was the arrival of General Pau at Paris
which, perhaps, as much as anything saved the
capital from being besieged by Von Kluck.
The news of the German victory in Lorraine
was received in Berlin and elsewhere throughout
the German Empire and in Austria with great
GENERALS JOFFRE, MICHEL, GALLIENI, AND PAU. (jv«r,f,^„ LUustraiioni.
40U
. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
rejoicing. A Cabinet Order was issued by the
Kaiser, in which he stated : —
The mobilization and concentration of the Array
is now complete, the German railways having carried
out the enormous transoort movements with un-
paralleled certainty and punctuality. With a heart
lUled with gratitude my first thoughts turn to those
who since 1870-1 have worked quietly upon the
levelopment of an organijiation wliich has emerged
from its first serious test with such glorious success
To all who have cooperated witli them I wish to
express my Imperial thanks for their loyal devotion
to duty in making possible in obedience to my call the
transportation of armed masses of German troops
against my enemies. The present achievement con-
vinces me that the railways of the country will be
equal to the heaviest demands that might be matio
upon them during the course of the gigantic struggle
in wliicb we are engaged for the future of the German
nation.
The reflections of the Kaiser were justified.
Napoleon III. in exile had said that the French
had been defeated in 1870-1 because they
had not luiderstood the value of railways.
The Germans will not be able to complain that
the Kaiser neglected to provide adequate
means of traction. Never, indeed, Ixad an
army been better supplied with mechanical
appliances than the Gernxan.
The French invasion of Alsace had failed,
but had it been, as a strategical move, a failure ?
Time would show. It had stifienod the moral
of the French ; it had convinced them that
man for man they were naore than a matcli
for the Gennans ; it had probably prevented
the Germans at the outset of the war flinging
themselves through the gap of Nancy and
distiu-bing the French mobihzation ; and the
advance on Saarburg had forced the German
leaders to draw southward to the Meurthe
forces which could have been used niore effec-
tively on the Meuse between Verdun and
Sedan
CHAPTER XXIV.
GERMAN VANDALISM IN
BELGIUM.
Prussian " Cui.ture " — ^Mommsen's Unavailing Protest — Treitschke's Dominance — ^The
Country of Belgium — Industry and Independence — Art and Civic Life — German Methods
OF Warfare — Vise — Liege — Dinant — Namur — Louvain — Its History — Its Buildings — Its
University — Louvain Scholars — Louvain and England — Destruction of Louvain — ^Maline.s
— Its Ancient Dignity — St. Rombaut — Old Houses — Destruction of Malines — Termonde
- -Its Utter Ruin — Alost — Deynze and Thielt — Antwerp — ^AcaiicTJLTUHE.
AT the outbreak of the war it became
swiftly evident that the German
forces had no intention of sparing
any of the horrors of war to tlie
towns and villages tlirough which they were to
pass. This need, perhaps, have caused little
surprise, at any rate among those who had
stvidied German methods of warfare in other
parts of the globe. In July, 1900, the Emperor
William II., addressing the German troops dis-
patched to quell the Boxer rising in China, said :
" Whoever falls into your hands is forfeit to you,
just as 1,000 years ago the Huns under King
Attila made a name for themselves which is stil 1
mighty in tradition and story." Such an utter-
ance seems as sharply opposed to the common
ideal of that " culture " of which the German
Empire has proclaimed itself the apostle as
the acts committed by the Prussian troops are
to the accepted notions of warfare among
<,-ivilized peoples ; but the contradiction is not
BO difficult to understand when the true
meaning of German" culture " is realized.
The root-principle of German " culture "
is this : German civilization is the best, there-
fore it is Germany's duty to impose it every-
where. " The Germans " (wTites Mr. Cloudesley
Brereton in his book " Who is Responsible ? ")
" are the chosen people of the twentieth century.
Hence, one law for the Germans and another for
other nations — or, in other words, a total
disregard for international law, as instanced by
Vol. I.— Part U. 401
the Belgian atrocities and the destruction of
Louvain." One man in particular is responsible
for the expression and the systematization of
this philosophy, which had its origin in the
Prussian mind at least as far back as the days
of Frederick the Great. That man was Heinrich
von Troitsclike, a professor in the University
of Berlin and a member of the Reichstag. Tall
and impressive in appearance, though harsh-
voiced, clumsy, and mechanical in speech,
Treitschke attracted round him not only the
students of the university, but soldiers, writers,
officials, all the intellectual leadership of
Germany. So far back as 1866 Sir A. W. Ward,
now Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge, called
attention to the tendencies in Treitschko's
teaching, liis avowed aim being " through
history to govern politics," to forecast and
bring to being the future tlirough an undt^r-
standingof the past. The victory over France
in the war of 1870-187 1 largely determined what
that future was to be, and at the same time in-
fluenced and directed the teaching of Treitschke.
Success in arms led to a wave of materialism that
swept over the country. Wealth and industry
were the sole objects of German desire. The great
German historian, Theodor Mommsen, had
issued a warning which might well have been
laid to heart. " Have a care," he said, " lest
in this State, which has been at once a power
in arms and a power in intelligence, the
intelligence should vanish and nothing but the
402
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
BELGIAN SOLDIERS OX THE MARCH.
[Newspaper iUusiraiions,
pure military State should remain." But
Mommsen's warning remained unheeded ; and
Treitschke was there to throw the glamour of a
false idealism over these debasing tendencies.
He gave them, it has been said, a soul, and that
soiil was the quintessence of the worst and
most dangerous qualities of victorious Ger-
many, glorified only by the scale on which
they were to be applied. First, all Gerinany
must become an expansion of Prussia ; next,
Germany beijg the chosen people, German
dominion must be extended over the whole
world by any and every means. There must be
no surrender to " fine phrases of tolerance and
enlightenment " ; that the strong should
triumph over the weak is an inexorable law of
nature. Such are the grounds of the " new
barbarism," which Mommsen foresaw as the
outcome of victory and material aims as
phUosophized by Treitschke, To most civilized
peoples " culture " means a state of mind that
includes knowledge and love of the great worlts
of beauty of the past and the present ; an inner
" sweetness and light," as Matthsw Arnold ex-
pressed it ; respect for other people's rights
and feelings : a chivalrous attitude to the weak
and a pride that will not stoop to barbaric acts
of violence. German "culture" means rather
the aggrandisement by any and every means
of Germany and the Germans ; the imposition
upon the whole world of the German
dominion ; the ruthless destruction of any
thing that may stand in the way of that
object.
In Belgium the Germans found a country
peculiarly liable to vandalism. The leading
characteristic of Belgium's achievements in all
fields is that she owes very little to unsought
advantage and nearly everything to hard work.
Her natural beauties, save in the south-eastern
corner, are not the ready-made beauties of
Italy, of the Alps, of the Rhine. Over a great
portion of her surface she has not the' fertile
soil which makes parts of England, of France,
and of Italy peculiarly and almost inevitably
fruitful. Between Ghent and Antwerp, to
take an instance, lies the district luiown as the
Waesland. A few centuries ago the Waesland
was a barren moor ; to-day every inch of it
is cultivated, and some of the trimmest and
most attractive farms in Belgium are dotted
about it. The whole sandy district has been
covered, cartload by cartload, spadeful by
spadeful, with good soil brought from elsewhere ;
and, in order to be worth cultivation, each
field, shaped at edge and corner with the
characteristic neatness of the Belgians, mi st be
as carefully and minutely tended as a flower-
bed. By comparison with th«» Waesland, even
the flower-gardens of Ghent are a light achieve-
ment ; yet Ghent, the flower-city of Europe,
owes her supremacy far less to any natural
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
40$
kindliness or wealth of soil tliau to the minutt!
and uureniitting laljour that lias created what
Nature had denied. Belgium loves her flowers
— we may imagine,then, the feelings of the people
of Brussels when they watched, on the arrival
of the Oeriiians, cavalry officers wantoily
trampling under their horses' hoofs, in a lust
of brutal destruction, the flower-beds of the
city. To her unremitting labour in the coal-
mines of the Borinage, the great iron and steel
factories of Charleroi, the fields and gardens of
Flanders, Belgium owes her wealth. Even the
forests of the Ardennes are kept with a careful
arboriculture that no other country can excel.
And to this thorougliness and skill in labour
Belgium has always owed lier position. Very
early in her history we find the Belgian weavers
the finest in Europe, their trade and commerce
rich enough to bring them safely through all
but the most serious of their troubles. Turbulent
fellows they were, these weavers. Louvain,
Ypres, and especially Ghent could tell terrible
tales of their risings against authority imposed
from without. The tall and noble belfries
which adorned many old Belgian towns before
the outbreak of war had stood for centuries
as memorials of their watchfulness against
attack or tyranny ; for there hunir the great bell
whose most notable function it was to summon
the citizens together to resist the troops of the
foreigner or of the ruler. But it was precisely
this sturdy indepondonco of theirs, controlled
and intensified by the corporate spirit of the
trade guild, that made the greatness of medie-
val Belgium, and also raised the Flemish
to a position in the world of art second only
to that of Italy. In Belgium, for all tho
magnificence of Philip the Bold of Burgundy,
or his grandson Philip the Good, or in later years,
of the Archduches-s Clara Isabella Eugenia and
her husband, the Spanish Governors, the most
effective patron of art in Belgium was not, as
in Italy, the prince or ruler, but the town, or
the trade guild, in its intimate association
with the Church. This applies in particular
to architecture. The church and the town
hall and the market hall are the chief beauties
of every Belgian town, and all three are the
creation of the workers, the btirgesses and
traders, seeking to fulfil their own needs and
ideals, not, like the Siegesallce at Berlin,
an ideal imposed by a single dominant will and
taste upon a submissive public. With regard
to the churches, though architecturally most of
them are less interesting than the Cloth HalLs
and the Town Halls, inasmuch as they are due
rather to the influence of French Gothic than to
any independent Flemish school of architecture,
they are nevertheless almost inevitably dearer
to the Belgians than to most ixoplos, not only
because the Belgian still emulates his forbears
in lavishing upon the Church all the wealth he
FUGITIVES ON THE ROAD.
[Ctnlral Prtss.
404
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LOUVAIN.
General view after bombardment.
[Newspaper Illustration!;,
can spare, that it may be rich in pictures and
carving, in stained glass and marble and plate,
but because Belgium remains a devoutly
religious country, a more thoroughly and
willingly Catholic country even than Spain.
And just as the civic life reached in Flanders
its strongest and freest development, so
the ancient Town Halls of Belgium are
the most elaborate and daring expres-
sions of that development. Upon them
the public spirit, working through its archi-
tects and sculptors, set free all the pride and
independence, all the riotous imagination,
religious and worldly fancy, all the broad humour
and spiritual aspiration and earthly satisfaction
which cliaracterized Flanders in its ancient
days of prosperity. The Town Hall dominating
the Groot'-Markt, or grand' place, of a Belgian
town, is more than a work of art. It is a
symbol of a spirit that has not yet died out of
Belgium, though the towns which possess the
finest examples may be but one-third of their
ancient size, and the greater part of the once
crowded space within the old walls may be
laid out in gardnss and walks. The Town
Hall proclaims the spirit of hard and honourable
work ; it is the voice of Belgium's old prayer,
" Leave me alone to do my work and be happj'
in my own way !" That prayer has but seldom
been answered, and once more " the cockpit of
Europe " was to be subjected to the brutalities
of an invading force.
It is the same story with regard to the
Flemish school of painting. Unlike tlw rest
of Europe, Flanders in painting owed little
or nothing to Italy. Cliaracteristically, she
worked out her own art on her own lines,
independent of foreign influence and largely
independent of Court encouragement. It i:^
democratic art — the art of the town and the
liome — that won fame for Flanders in the
domain of true culture. It can scarcely even
be said that there was any artistic centre in the
land. Sporadic schools of art grew up in separate
towns. Bruges gave birth to Van Eyck ; Louvaiu
was the artistic home of Roger van der Weyden
and of Dierck Bouts ; Termonde had its special
school of painters and so had many other towns.
This, then, was tlie coxmtry or which all the
horrors of false culture were let loose : a country
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
406'
of gpniiino and ancient culture, which its people
had worked out for themselves along their own
lines with their characteristic independence
and sturdy individuality ; a country where men
loved their comfortoble ho:res, tlieir noblo
churches, their monuments of civic wealth and
self-governance. It was not the less on that
account, as the invader learned to his cost.
a country where each man could defend, with
unmatched pertinacity and coiu-age, the rewards
that he had toiled to win, the home that he had
built up for himself, his family, and his kind.
The first news of the methods by which the
Germans intended to carry on war upon the
country which they had invaded, in spite of
their sworn promise to maintain its neutrality
inviolate, came from Vise, 12 miles north-east
of Liege. On August 6 it became known that
they had burned a portion of the town ; but a
few families remained there. Some few days
later shots were again fired in the town— by the
inhabitants, said the Germans ; by drunken
Gorman soldiers, said the inhabitants. Which-
e%'or the truth. Vise was burned to the ground.
An attractive city of nearly 4,000 inhabitants,
typical in the cheery pride and gaiety of the
Walloon portion of Belgium, Vise possessed a
quaint town hall, and in the church was a
famous reliquary, the silver Chasse de St.
Hadelin, of which the fine relief work proclaimed
it to date from the early part of the 12th
century. The stories of those who visited Vise
soon afterwards tell of nothing but smoking
ruins, not a house standing intact, and in the
blackened and smoking streets the todies of
non-combatant townsfolk riddled with bullets
or pierced with bayonets. The town of Argen-
teau, beautifully situated on tlie Mouse beneath
its limestone rocks, crowned with the ancient
and the modern chateaux, shared the same
fate. And all about this district, wherever the
German troops could reach, lay burnt-out
farms and smouldering villages. Streets wore
burned at Huy, the fascinating town on the
Meuso at the moutli of the Hoyoux. Louvoigne
and Bar-le-Duc were totally destroyed. Ver-
viors was largely burned. Soiron was sacked.
Before the Germans had captured Li^ge they
had done their best to devastate the country-
side and to destroy all the villages and towns,
all of them open and undefended, upon which
they came.
Liege itself was a fortified town, and must
therefore expect to suffer for defending itself ;
but Liege unquestionably suffered more than
the demands of military action required. She
had always been a storm-centre in history and
had Buffered much, as has been shown in a
previous chapter ; but now, although still an
ancient and a proud city, Li6ge was an in-
dustrial town of great importance and activity.
For more than a himdrod years she had
settled down to quiet if strenuous labour,
and in those hundred years she had done very
much to improve her appearance and hor
conditions. She had built bridges over the
Mouse ; she had provided a university. Of
these bridges, the Pont des Arches, the
town's pride, built on the site of a
bridge dating from the 11th century ; the Pont
de Fragn^e, with its sculptiu-ed tritons and
mermaids, and others were destroyed. The
University buildings, which included an ancient
Jesuit college, with its library, its museum of
antediluvian animals found in the caves for
which the district is remarkable, were burned ;
and of the tale of houses destroyed by in-
cendiarism or by shell fire there is no end. On
one occasion, some shots being fired from a
house, the German soldiers turned machine-
guns on the street, destroying many houses
and killing the inmates, while other houses were
set on fire.
BRIDGE OVER THE MEUSE,
Showing the destroyed centre.
[NewspdpeT lUustraiioni.
406
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
* .-■'
i.t^^
--'•*'?*i7":xf^-
'''^■2'lfittfev
DINANT.
As It appeared before bombardment.
li E. Fincham.
Far more dreadful was the fate of Dinant.
This wonderfully picturesque old town is well
known to a great many English people. Quiet,
smiling, and gently gay, it lay on the banks of
the Meuse in a country peculiarly rich in the
tables and history of romance. Just as the
district round Liege is sacred to the legends of
Charlemagne and the cradle of the race of
Pepin, wliich gave to France her Idngs, so round
Dinant lies a world of beautiful legend. The
four sons of Aymon, for instance, and their
great horse Bayard, dwelt in the castle hard
l)j' ; and here is the Roche h Bayard, where the
great steed left his hoof-mark, as, pursued by
Charlemagne, he leaped across the valley.
And Dinant itself was surely one of the most
picturesque towns in the world. It lay on the
bank of the Meuse, imder the shelter of the
enormous cliff on which stood its citadel. The
church of Notre Dame lay just beneath that
cliff, pres.sed so closely against it, wrote Camille
Lcmonnier, " that it seems like a block of the
mountain itself into which light has been let
through its tall >vindow8. The mountain lias
here said to the work of man's hands : ' Thus
far ehalt thou go, and no farther.' Thus,
preased against the rock, the flower of the late
half of the 13th century, which would otherwise
appear imposing, seems reduced to moderate pro-
portions by comparison with the colossal height
that crushes and stifles it with its prodigious
mass. Seen from below or from above, the
church looks like a dwarf beside a giant, as if
Nature had intended to make the real cathedral
of the cliff and left nothing to the builder of
the church but the chance of distantly imita-
ting the moimtain. Yet, dwarfed as it is by
this huge pile of stone, the cliurch none the less
keeps its precioxis beauty. Scarcely has one
set foot beneath its vaulted roof than its magic
begins to work, and within this restricted space,
which from outside seems incompatible with
the idea of grandeiu-, the three aisles open out,
ample and magnificent between their venerable
pillars, like the deep alleys of a forest. Notre
Dame of Dinant was one of the purest blooms
in the garden of early Gothic, a fair and spotless
lily in the glorious pleasaunce of great Catholic
churches." In decoration Notre Dame de
Dinant was not rich, though it contained some
admirable work in copper, and had notable
twelfth-century fonts. But its architectural
beauty, its wonderful doorways, and its mural
paintings made it remarkable, no less than its
position under the cliff which dwarfed its
tulip-shaped tower of more than 200 feet high.
The Town Hall was ancient and interesting.
On the summit of the cliff, reached by a flight
of 408 steps, stood the Citadel, erected by the
Dutch in the 15th century. And the bridge of
Dinant, a worthy successor of a very old bridge,
which in its turn replaced others yet older
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
407
— one of which had five arches and a tower two
storeys high^was famous all over Belgium.
By shell -fire and the incendiarism provided
by tlieir special celluloid bombs and discs of
compressed chemicals the Germans destroyed
Dinant in a few hours. Not Charles the Bold
of Burgimdy, when he seized the town in 1400,
not all the attacks and havoc in the long
struggle between Dinant and its neighbour
and rival Bovignos, worked so much destruc-
tion as the entry of Prussian " kultur " in August,
1914. The excuse was the familiar one — that
shots had been fired at the German troops by
non-combatant inhabitants. The civilized
world iiad soon good reason for doubting the
truth of that invariable pretext. Be that as
it may, this is the story of Dinant, as told by
Mr. Arthvu" Terwagne, brother of the Deputy of
Antwerp, in the Belgian newspaper Le Matin : — -
On August 15 a tremendous battle was fought in
the streets of the town between the French and the
Germans, while the guns thund 'nd away at each
other from both sidi^s of the Mfuse. The town suf-
fered very htlle during this battle, only a few houses
afterwards beai'ing signs of the bombardment, which
lasted 13 houra. During the following days the
French retired on to the left bank of the Meuse, where
they remained up to the day on wliich tlie order for a
general retreat was given.
In the night of August 21 a German armoured
motor-car entered Dinant by the Rue Saint -Jacques,
and, without the sliglitest provocation, began to
fire on the liousea in tliis street. A woman sleeping in
her bed was killed, and her child, which was at her
side, was mortally wounded. Startled by the noiss
of the firing, a man and his wife opened the door of
their house. They were immediately done to death
by Uhlans. An employee of the gasworks who was
returning from his woi'k was killed on his doorstep.
The .nssassins^for one cannot call them soldiers —
set lire to several houses before they bravely with-
di'i'w.
But theso savage acts were only the prelude to the
fate which the hoide of brigands were reserving for
the unhappy town of Dinant. On the following day
large mass s of troops arrived and were guilty of the
most abominable atrocities which have ever been
recorded. The Germans forced open the doors of the
houses and murdered everyone they found within.
There was Victor Poncelet, done to death in the
presence of his wife and of his six children ; there were
the members of the staff of the Arm of Capelle, mur-
dered in cold blood. In every house a fresh crime was
committed, while the women were driven from their
beds and taken, half naktd, to a monastery, where
they were kept for three diys with hardly any food,
half d ad with hunger and tear.
Some workmen of Lefle liid in a drain near the
large cotton mill, the manager of which, M. nimraer,
was killed. There were about 60 of them, and when
the Germans discovered them they shot them all.
although not one of them was armed. In the Fau-
bourg Saint-Pierre a number of men hid in the
cellars of the brewery owned by the brothers Nicaise,
old men of over 70, and their nephew, Jules Monin.
DINANT AFTER BOMBARDMENT.
Remains of the famous Church and Bridge.
[Nevispipfr /HustrMions,
408
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
The modem barbarians had pity on none. All of
them fell under the German bullets — they were about
40 in number.
Over 200 men and lads — old men of 75 and boys of
12 and 14 — -fathers and sons together, were driven on
to the Place d'Armes. In order that the work might
be carried out more quickly a machine gun was brought
up. It was here that Xavier Wassoige, the manager ot
the Banque de la Jleuse, was killed, together with
Ms two so:is, and here too died CamiUe Fisette and
his little boy, aged 12.
The fate of the male inhabitants having thus been
settled, the Germans set to work metliodically on the
destruction of the town, using bombs to set fire to the
houses. Soon nothing but a heap of ashes remained.
The district of Saint-Medart, between the station
and the bridge, has been wiped out. Coming from the
bridge to Bouvignes, the first hous? that is left stand-
ing is the Hotel du Nord. The splendid post-office
building is a heap of ruins. The bridge is destroyed,
the Germans having built a pontoon bridge a little
higher up the river. The church has lost its cele-
brated tower, and all the houses of the Rue Sax, near
the Meuse, have been destroyed. In the Bue Grande,
the Grand' Place, and the Place Saint-Nicolas it is
the same, and it is said that many families who had
hidden in the cellars died in the flames. But for one
or two housps in the Place do la Meus?, the Laurent
restaurant and a few houses standing beside it, the
barracks and the communal school, in which the Ger-
man garrison is lodged, the whole town of Dinant has
been destioyed.
That is what the bandits of the great Empire whicli
wished to rule Europe have done to one of the most
picturesque towns of Belgium. The monster who
presided over these abominable atrocities was Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Beeger.
Namur, the famous town on the Meuso,
beloved of all En^ish people for its memories
of Tristram Shandy's " My Uncle Toby," who,
it will be remembered, was womided there,
and solaced his declining years by following
the movements of the Allies m the miniatm-e
fortifications in his own orchard — Namur,
a great fortress town in the 17th and 18th cen-
turies, and a yet greater fortress town in the
20th centiuy, was given up sooner than was
expected, and therefore escaped all the horrors
of devastation that were with good reason feared.
Scarcely, however, had Namur fallen than the
civilized world was horrified by the news of an
act of vandalism far greater than any that the
German troops had yet committed — a greater,
indeed, than it seemed likely that they could
commit in the course of the whole war. On
August 25 the town of Louvain was destroyed.
Louvain, on the River Dyle, some 30 miles-
south-east of Antwerp and 18 miles east of
Brussels, had the reputation of being a duUi
town. A quiet town it certainly was, but
not dull for anyone interested in the
humanities and the study of ancient
achievements in art and learning. In old days
Louvain, like most of the towns of Belgium,
was a large and prosperous commercial place,
with something over 100,000 inhabitants, more-
than double its population on the outbreak of
the Great War. It was the seat of the ducal
house of Lower Lorraine, or, as it came after-
wards to be called, the house of Brabant ; and,
like most of these cities, it had no great love tor
its rulers. A more terrible scene than any
enacted even in Ghent took pl.ice here in 1378-9,.
when from the windows of the town hall (not
the present building) 13 magistrates of patrician
H* fl^^H
HF^'
1
i
^^^' ^^^^H
PMH'
^ffl
wR
M^
%
m
m-
i
1
KEFUGEES ON THE ROAD BETWEEN MALINES AND BRUSSELS.
[Newst>atier Itiusiiaiions.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
40f)
NAMUR.
The Citadel from the river.
♦jlood were tossed by the populace on to the
swords and halberds raised up to receive them
from the square below. A terrible vengeance
was exacted by Duke Wenceslas a few years
later — a vengeance from which Louvain had
never commercially or financially recovered —
yet a vengeance less terrible than that of the
apostles of culture, who had received no provo-
cation whatever from its then peaceful and quiet
citizens.
Ecclesiastically the central point of Louvain
was the magnificent late Gothic church ,of St.
Peter, designed in 1425 by Sulpice van Vorst
to take the place of an earlier building, with his
son and the statuary Eustache van Molenbcke
to aid him in the sculptural portion of the
splendid edifice. It was originally intended that
of its five towers the highest should rise to 535ft.,
but the foundations proved insufficiently strong.
The interior of the church had a majesty and
solemnity all its own, and in treasures of art
it was peculiarly rich. At one time it was the
fortunate possessor of the famous triptych
by Quentin Matsys, the great master — origi-
nally an ironsmith and always an exquisite
worker in metal as well as in pn.int,vi ho was born
in Louvain, to become later the greatest Flemish
colourist and the founder of the Antwerp school;
This triptych was removed some years ago to
the Museum at Brussels ; but St. Pierre of
Louvaiii still possessed one, or more, of the
glories of Flemish painting, the great " Last
Supper " of Dierck Bouts (long attributed to
Memling) and the striking, if unplea.sant,
" Martyrdom of St. Erasmus," by the same
{Sainter, who settled in Louvain about the middle
of the 15th century and became painter to the
mmiicipality. The " Last Supper " was painted
about 1467, and is universally acknowledged to
be the artist's masterpiece. The picture in St.
Pierre of Louvain was only the central portion of
a triptych of which one wing was in Berlin and
the other in the Pinakothek at Munich. Another
famous picture, " The Descent from the Cross,"
attributed to Roger van der Weyden, hung in
one of the chapels of the ambulatory. But pic-
tures were not alone the wealth of St. Pierre of
Louvain. A famous object was the great stone
tabernacle of St. Peter, 40ft. high, exquisitely
carv-ed by Matthew de Layens (who built the
410
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Sanctuary of the Cathedral.
LOU VAIN.
A Priest is seen standing by the ruins of the Altar.
[The Sphere.
town hall). The carved wooden rood-screen
with the surmounting figures and cross was one
of the most renowned in Belgium, or in Europe ;
and there was a font, of cast bronze superbly
worked, which was commonly said to be the work
of Quentin Matsys himself. The church of St.
Pierre, though the noblest, was not the only
church in Louvain. There was St. Jacques, a
fine 15th-century building, noteworthy for its
reliquaries of St. James, St. Margaret, and St.
Hubert, its Gothic tabernacle in stone with a
wonderful bra.ss balustrade in the style of the
Flemish Renaissance, and a painting of St.
Hubert by De Grayer. Close by stands the
statue of Father Damien, the Belgian missionary
who gave his life for the lepers. There was the
14th-century church of St. Gertrude, with its
lofty tower and its magnificently elaborate choir
stalls of the 16th century by Mathias de Wayer ;
and there was the almost fantastically baroque
Jesuit church of St. Michael.
Yet in Louvain, for all its chm-ches, the
sacred buildings gave place to the secular.
The Town Hall of Louvain is (and it seems
almost miraculous that it can still be spoken of
as existing) one of the most extraordinary
productions of the human genius ever created.
Its towering walls speak of the pride of
the wealthy town which in the middle of the
1.5th century entrusted the design of its official
centre to Matthew de Layens. Its statues
speak of the citizens' active religious faith.
" All the Bible," says Camille Lemonnier,
" files past ; you may follow from niche to
niche the principal episodes of the Old Testa-
ment, and the naif sculptor, to make his story
the easier understood, has given the characters
the aspect of men and women of his own time."
The riot of carving which covers every inch of
the walls, the steep roof and lofty fretted
pinnacles, the elaborate windows, speak of the
full and many-sided life of hard-working,
wealthy, and comfortable people, while here and
there breaks out a lively humoiu-. " The building
resembles a vast, joyous chronicle where many a
contemporary could see himself sculptured from
the life ; and the gaiety breaks out now and
then into licence — a Rabelaisian commentary on
the vast satire." Dierck Bouts designed two
paintings for the Council Room ; and the works
of art in the Town Hall included two triptyolis
by the Louvain master, Jan van Rillaert the
Elder.
But oven the Town Hall of Louvain was
eo'ipsed by another centre of interest — the
buildings of the famous University. Originally
the Cloth Hall, this beautiful edifice was made
over to the University in the first half of the
1
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR,
411
15th century. For, as Louvain declined in
commercial ominenco after the vengeance of
Duke Wenceslas, she rose to fame in another
direction. Slio becaipe the most famous
. university town in Europe next to Paris —
the "Athens of Belgium," as she was called
by one of her professors, who was also one
of the greatest scholars the world has ever seen,
Justus Lipsius. The University was founded
in 1425 by Pope Martin V., and Duke John IV.
of Brabant, one of a line of princes whose court
was always associated with a love of French and
Latin poetry. In 1431 it nioved into the Cloth
Hall. Yet, founded as it was by a Pope and a
Prince, the University of Louvain owed yet
more to " the educational and intellectual
strength of the schools of the Brethren of the
Con^mon Life," and, as Prof. Foster Watson has
written, " as in art, so in intellectual culture.
Belgium traces its origin to i.ative, not to
Italian, sources." Tlie University of Louvain
produced or employed a large nmnber of
famous humanists, who had a peculiarly close
connexion with England. One of thofe wa«
Jerome de Bu.s!eiden, who studied law at Lou-
vain, and was apjx)inted Councillor of State
and Master of Requests. He came to England
to offer the congratulations of his nation on the
accession of Henry VIII. ; and hero, perhaps,
he made the acquaintance of Sir Thomas
More. In 1510 More wrote an account of a visit
that he paid to Busleiden in Louvain while the
English statesman was on a mission in Flanders.
More found in Busleidon's house an organ,
which delighted his musical heait ; he praises
hLs great library and his nnnd that v;&^ even
better stocked than his library ; his wonderful
collection ct Roman medals, his sculptures,
THK LAST SUPPER, by Dierck Bouts.
In the Church of St. Pierre, Louvain.
[hfanstUQrCo.
412
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
paintings, and carvings. Prof. Foster Watson sug-
gests tliat More's own famous house at Chelsea
was built and adorned, in its more modest way,
with Busleiden's mansion at the background of
Moro's memory. Then there was Peter Oillos,
or Giles, of peculiar interest to English people,
t)ecause it was in conversation with him that
More saw first the seafaring man, Raphael
Hytnloday, formerly the companion of Amerigo
Vespucci, into whose mouth More put the
"idle talk" of the "Utopia." It was Gilles
who gave More the Utopian alphabet, and the
" four verses in the Utopian tongue." And it
wa.s Gilles who wrote to Busleiden of More as
" the singular ornament of this our age, as you
yourself (right honourable Busleiden) can witness,
to whom he is perfectly well laiown." Further
yet ; it was in the hands of Peter Gilles that More
put the " Utopia " for publication ; and after
consultation between Gilles and Erasmus, who
was much at Louvain, it weis to a famous Lovivain
bookseller, Thierry Martens, that the production
of the book was entrusted. It was a Louvain
artist, the great Quentin Matsys, who painted
a portrait of Erasmus, and in the pictiire with
him was Peter Gilles, holding in his hand a
letter from Sir Thomas More. The picture was
sent to More as a present, and passod in time to
I ho collection of Charles I. ; since the dissipation
of which it has been lost to knowledge. " In
the friendship of Thomas More with Erasmus
and Gilles," writes Prof. Foster Watson," English
and Belgian hunianism were united, and this
union was typified and cemented in their common
delight in the visions of the longed-for ideal
Commonwealth." And it was Louvain, the
augxist and hallowed birthplace of these dreams
of an ideal state of mankind, that the Huns of
the 20th century chose for destruction.
The bookshops of Louvain, that great city
of learning, were famous, and often must Eras-
mus and other great scholars have visited that
of Martens, which was the most famous of all,
Thierry Martens was the successor of the earliest
of printers in Belgium, Jolin of Westphalia.
He printed, among other well-known works, the
"Enchiridion Militis Christiani " of Erasmus;
and. by a strange coincidence, he issued
MamiUf^Co.i THE MARTYKUOM OF ST. ERASMUS, by Dierck Bouts. [Media Sxteiy Lu.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
413
LOUVAIN.
Ruins of the Vestibule of the Library.
[Newspapfr Ittustraiions.
the same author's " Bellum," of which it has
been said that it is " a soul-Btirring protest
against war, a contribution to real progress, for
which the world will yet thank Erasmus, and
will look to Louvain also with gratitude as his
home of the time."
Louvain has often been called " the Oxford
of the Low Countries " ; and in one respect
especially it resembled the great English Uni-
versity. It was made up of a niunber of separate
colleges attached to a central order. Indeed
in this respect Louvain was actvially ahead of
her intimate sister-university ; she had niore
colleges than Oxford. In the 18th century
Louvain had 42 to Oxford's 18. The first of
these came into being as the result of the will
of Jerome de Busleiden, who left money for the
teaching of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. The
Latin of the University Professors was not pure
Latin, but the jargon of the medieval school-
men, endlessly engaging in disputations on
theology in a peculiarly corrupt form of the
tongue. And so the executors of Busleiden's
will found it advisable to found a special college
where Latin and Greek should be taught pro-
perly and Hebrew should also be in the curri-
culum. This College, named the College of the
Three Languages, was opened on September 1,
1518, and Erasmus agreed to become the
supervisor. Thus " the ' prince of literary
Europe ' directed the scholars of the future,
and he directed them — from Louvain."
Among the famous men of the College who
maintained the intimate connexion of Louvain
with England was Adrian Barland, the great
Latinist, who visited our country. To Justus
Lipsius, one ■ of the most eminent philologists
that the world has ever produced, a statue was
erected but a few years ago near the station at
Louvain ; he is well known to many English
people, if for no other reason, on account of the
slj' joke which Sterne permitted My Uncle
Toby to make upon him in " Tristram Shandy."
Two Englishmen, Robert Wakefield, of Cam-
bridge, and Robert Shirwood, of Oxford, were
successively professors of Hebrew at Louvain.
Juan Luis Vives, a Spaniard, lectured for part of
the year at Oxford, where he had rooms in
Corpus Christi College, then lately founded by
Bishop Foxe, and part of the year at Louvain ;
and it was from a book by Vives, called " De
Oonsultatione," that Ben Jonson took many
passages in his " Timber." Among other great
men of Louvain were Dodoens, the botanist,
a native of Malines, Mercator, the geographer,
van Helmont, the chemist, and Andreas Vesa-
lius, the founder of modern anatomy. And all
these men loved Louvain well. " Hail, our
Athens, the Athens of Belgium, O faitlxfuL
fruitful scat of the arts, shedding far and wide
thy light and thy name " — so sang Justus
Lipsius. Erasmus dwelt upon the delicious
skies and the quiet for study. Vives says that
there " all things are fuU of love and charm,"
414
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LOUVAIN.
The old Church of St. Pierre before its destruction.
[Central News.
Clenard, ardently prosecuting in Spain and in
Africa the study of languages, longs for " sweet
Louvain." But the mere pleasiu'e of physical
surrovmdings does not explain their enthusiasm.
So writes Prof. Foster Watson in an article in the
Nineteenth Century for October, 1914, to which
we have been deeply indebted for information ;
and he continues thus : —
" It was the ideal element in life, the saving of
the soul by losing it in something greater than
itself that stirred the humanists — Erasmiis
seeking in his scriptural and classical studies
a method of criticism and research which should
lead to historical truth ; Vivos aiming at social
amelioration by a reasoned method of poor relief ;
Vesalius bent on establishing habits of exact
observation in anatomy ; and Clenard intent
upon applying linguistic studies for the up-
raising of Eastern thought and life. These
high and broad aims of the inner life became
as real as the marvels of the discovery of the
Ne w World geographically. These things entered
into the ' study of imagination ' of the human-
ists, and were the deeper sources of the active
joy which they ascribed to the physical
charms of Louvain, for it was the atmosphere
in which their inspirations had come to
them."
Since those great and lofty days of the
Renaissance of learning, in which Belgium, as
we have seen, played her part, the career of the
University of Louvain had not been unchequered.
The Emperor Joseph II. of Austria, in the course
of liis long quarrel with his subjects of the Low
Countries, closed the university. Reopened later,
it became the only road to public appointments
in the Austrian Netherlands. The French closed
it again in 1797 ; but in 1817 it was opened once
more by the Dutch during the Union. In 1834,
after the separation of the two kingdoms of
Belgium and Holland, the State ceased to control
the University, and it had since been maintained
by the Belgian bishops as a Catholic Univer-
sity. The University of Louvain was therefore
the headquarters of religious education in the
most Catholic covmtry in Europe, and as such
it maintained the tradition of its long and
honourable past.
Such was the atmosphere and the spirit — an
atmosphere of learning in a quiet old town, the
spirit of culture and peace — upon which on that
Tuesday evening in August broke all the din
and devastation, all the rapine and savagery, of
the hordes of modern Huns. It is time to
turn to the narrative of what the Prime Minister
of Great Britain called "the greatest crime
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
•tlf
against civilization and culture since the
Thirty Years' War."
The destruction was not accidental, nor the
result of shell-fire. It was systematically .and
deliberately carried out by German soldiers
provided with special appliances for the purpose.
The name of the officer who gave the order was
Major von Manteuffel, who, about the end of
September, was superseded in liis command,
possibly as, the result of an official inquiry into
the atrocities committed by the German troops.
The Germans first pleaded in defence of their
action that their troops had been engaged in a
conflict with the inhabitants for 24 hours, and
that the town had been damaged in the course of
this fight. It was proved, however, that before
the invaders' entry of the undefended town
the Civic Guard had been disarmed and a
thorough search made among the inhabitants
for all weapons, ancient or modern. The next
excuse was that the son of the Burgomaster
had fired on the Chief of Staff of the
General commancUng Louvain, and this had been
a signal for the civic guard of Louvain to fire
at the soldiers, 50 Germans being killed or
wounded. The same objection answers this
excuse as the preceding plea. A more probable
account of the affair is this. A body of German
soldiers driven out of Malines by the Belgians
fell back upon Louvain. Of their comrades,
already in the town of Louvain, many by this
time were very drunk, since the German sol-
dier, looting the choice cellars of a people with a
fine taste in good wine, had been, hero as else-
where, swilling Burgundy as if it were beer.
Mistaking the arrival of their fugitive follows
for an attack by the Belgian troops, the drunk-
ards fired upon their own men. The mistake
had to be covered up at all costs ; and the cost in
this case w£is the burning of the town. Numbers
of the male inhabitants were driven away and
shot. An eye-witness, who was among those
threatened with death, gave the following
account of his experiences : —
At 0 o'clock, wlien everytliing was ready for dinner,
alarm signals sounded, and the soldiers rushed into the
streets ; sliots wliistlod through tlie air, cries and
groans arose on all sides, but we did not dare leave
our house, and took refuge in the cellar, where we
stayed through long and fearful hours.
At break o£ day I crawled from the cellar to the
street door, and saw nothing but a raging sea of fire.
At 9 o'clock tlie shooting diminished, and we resolved
to make a dash to the station. Abandoning our liome
and all our goods except what wo could carry, and
taking all the money we had, we rushed out. What
we saw on our way to the staiAon is hardly describable.
Everything was burning ; the streets were covered
with bodies shot dead and half burnt. Everywhere
proclamations had been posted summoning every
■ ■*♦".■
LOUVAIN.
The Church of St. Pierre as the Germans left it. The Hotel de Ville on the right
was practically uninjured. [Newspaper lUusira'ionst
416
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
man to assist in quenching the flames and the women
and cliildren to stay inside the houses.
The st^ition was crowded with fugitives, and I wjus
just trying to show an offlcer my legitimation papers
when the soldiei-s st^paratcd me from my wife and
children. All pi-otcsts were ussloss, and a lot of us
were marched off to a big shed in the goods yard,
from where we could see the finest buildings ot the city,
the most beautiful historical monuments, being burned
down.
Sliortly afterwards German soldiers drove before
them 300 men and lads to the corner of the Boulevard
van Tienen and the Maria Theresa-street, opposite the
Oatk Verraalen. There they were shot. The sight
Oiled us with horror. The Burgomaster, two magis-
trates, tlie llector of the University, aud all police
ofncials hatl been shot already.
Wioh our hands bound behind our backs we were
then marched oft by the soldiers, still without having
seen our wives or children. We went through the
Juste de Lipse-street, along the Diest Boulevard,
across the Vaart, and up the hill. From the Mont
Oesar we had a full view ot tlie burning town, St.
Peter in flames, while the troops incessantly sent shot
after shot into the unfortunate town.
Tlie soldiers worked at the incendiarism
methodically. They began at the heart o£ the
oity and worked down to the outskirts, taking
street by street and house by house. They
went into the houses, churches, and shops,
gathered the goods or furniture together, and
when they saw that all was vcell alight passed
on to the next building. There was no opposi-
tion from the inliabitants, who had either
been driven away or were too terrified even to
protest. The firing of houses went on steadily
for 36 hours or more.
The district most thoroughly wiped out was
that in which were situated the university, the
library, and the church of St. Pierre. It was
at first reported that the famous Town Hall
had been destroyed. Later it was learned that
the Germans themselves had prevented the
flames from attacking it, and that the exterior
at least remains uninjured, though it stands
amid a waste of desolation and blackened
ruins, while the interior was much injured.
The damage to St. Peter's Church was not
altogether irreparable, though the marvellous
&nd exquisite rood-screen was destroyed ; and
its pictures were rescued by the soldiers — for
subsequent transport, no doubt, to Berlin. A
famous early 16th-century house in the Rue de
Namur was utterly wrecked. As to the Univer-
sity, a university cannot be burned. It is not
a matter of buildings and works of art, it is a
thing of the spirit, an organization, an ideal ;
and the Unive' dity of Louvain, helped no doubt
by her sister anivorsities in other countries,
some of whom inunodiately hastened to offer
their hospitality to the survivors among her
professors and students, may be confidently
expected to rise again from this the most
dastardly and the heaviest blow that has ever
fallen upon her. But the University of Louvain
must for the future do without the famous old
building in which her headquarters had been
established for nearly 500 years. The old
" Halles," the Cloth Hall, of Louvain, a noble
building in the severer form of Gothic, was
totally destroyed. True, it had not survived in
its pristine form and beauty. Towards tlie
dose of the 17th century an upper storey was
added, and the interior had been much altered
in order to adapt it to the purposes of a univer-
sity. But there remained, until the Germans
came, the wonderful Romanesque arches and
pillars in the great hall, or Salle des Pas-
Perdus, and much else of architectural and
artistic beauty. " Nothing could better
indicate," writes Camille Lemonnier, " the
power of tliis citadel of scholarship than
the scope and amplitude of its installations ;
the vesture of long accumulated wealth,
nurtured into spreading bloom by privileges,
which enabled the university to prosper
in the midst of the most cruel torments.
Large and spacious courts, imposing buildings,
a succession of vast halls, monumental stair-
oases, suggesting the palace of a prelate luxuri-
ously lodged in the midst of all the conveniences
of life. Here, one feels, a sovereign master
reigns over stone and intellect, equally subser-
vient to his will ; and, in fact, the Rector main-
tains complete jurisdiction over all the members
of the university.'" Tlie pillars alone were
left standing. The laboratories, the museum,
the workshops, all the equipment of this
seat of learning, were destroyed. Even this
however, pales before the entire loss of the
great library of the University of Louvain,
" the arsenal of the great institution," a library
smaller, indeed, than the Bodleian or the
British Museum, but yet a library famous all
over the world, and one of the finest in Europe.
Founded by Canon Beyerlinck, continued by
Cornelius Janssens, Pierre Stockmans, and
Jacques Boonen, Archbishop of Malines, the
library of Louvain University had been the
recipient through centuries of treasures of
learning books, manuscripts, incunabula, in all
amounting to more than. 100,000 in number
and including priceless and unique things that
can never be replaced. A Professor of the
University, standing in his garden hard by,
saw, floating past him on the summer air,
charred fragments of priceless illuminated
manuscripts. He could do nothing to save
them. The loss is irreparable. Learning must
suffer for it so long as the world endures. , And
the destruction was carried out in the name
of Culture.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
417
DESTRUCTION OF LOUVAIN. [Cniral Nfus.
A photograph of Louvain before the German devastation will be found on page 104 of this volume.
After Louvain, Malines. Malines, or Mechlin,
as it was known to tlie English in the past, and
especially to the ladies and gallants who bought
the favourite Mechlin lace, is a town of very
great antiquity and historical interest, and was
a town of great charm and beauty. It was a
capital before Brussels. Towards the close of
the 15th century Malines became tlie seat
of the Provincial Court or Great Council,
the supremo tribunal of the Netliorlands.
It was to Malines that Margaret of York
moved her seat after the death of her husband,
Charles the Bold, and here were educated Philippe
le Bel and Margaret of Austria, the famous
Regent of the Netherlands. Margaret's successor
transferred her residence to Brussels in the middle
of the 16th century, and shortly afterwards
Malines, which had previously been in the ec-
clesiastical diocese of Cambrai, was made the seat
of the Archbishopric, a dignity which it still held.
418
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LOU VAIN.
Destruction in tlie Rue de Namur.
iCnUrai Neva.
Bound the railway station of Malines was
always activity and bustle, for here was a great
junction of three lines of the excellent Belgian
railway system, and here, also, were railway
workshops and factories. On the Dyle, too,
whichijwinds through the town, there was in times
of peace a modest amount of quiet shipping in
progress under the bridges, along the quays, and
between the tall gabled houses. Everywhere else
in Malines there was the quiet of a city which had
seen her great days go by and lived only in the
dreams of the past. Once a gay and luxurious
town, she was scarcely more than a memory,
save for the buildings that bore witness to her
ancient splendour and the rich life that teemed
within her walls. The centre of the town and
the town's life was, as in all old Belgian cities, the
Grand' Place. Here stood the large and sombre
Halles or Cloth Hall, rebuilt in the early part of
the 14th century on the model of the Halles of
Bruges, with a later and im^finished belfry and a
16th century north wing that was never com-
pleted. Here, too, stood the Gothic house, the
Schepenhuis, or Vieux Palais of the 14th cen-
tury, where for a century and a half the Great
Council used to sit, and where lately were kept
the city archives and the library of Malines ;
and the Town Hall, a much restored and unin-
teresting building. A statue of the town's
great patroness, Margaret of Austria, stood in
the centre, and all round were charming old
houses. But in the Grand' Place of Malines it
was always difficult to look about, so engrossed
were the eyes and the mind by one object — the
immense and lovely fabric of the great Cathedral
of St. Rombaut. To tvirn from the street into
the Grand' Place, however well one might linow
what to expect, was always to be arrested with
a shook of delight at the spectacle of the enor-
mous tower flinging itself mightily into the sky.
And yet that tower was little more thin half
what its 15th century builders intended it to be.
Within the cathedral used to stand a model of
the church with the tower as it was to have been ;
a springing mass, colossal yet exquisitely grace-
ful, 550ft. in height. Could it have looked
nobler than the unfinished tower that was the
pride of Malines ? This tower was the home
of one of the most famous and beautiful of
all those carillons, or sets of chimes, which are
among the chief attractions of the Belgian towns.
The carillon of St. Rombaut was the rival of
that of Bruges, and nothing more exquisite
in the sound of bells can be imagined than the
music that came from this mighty tower on
suminer evenings. The church, which was very
largely biiilt out of the offerings of the myriads
of pilgrims to Malines, where indulgencies were
I
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
419
to be obtained, was begun late in the 13th cen-
tury, and finished early in the 14th ; but a fire
in 1342 compelled the rebuilding of a great deal
of it, and subsequent centuries saw still further
changes. It was cruciform in shape, with a high-
pitched roof and many elaborate pinnacles —
a noble building, entirely worthy of its liigh
position as the archiepiscopal metropolitan
church of the Low Countries.
And witliin it was more full of glories than any
church in Belgium, save perhaps Ste. Gudule
at Brussels and the Cathedral of Antwerp.
Behind the massive pillars of the huge nave lay
a profusion of chapels ; and the whole cathedral
was rich in carved doorways, tombs, statues,
pictures, painted glass, altars, tabernacles, stalls,
marble and metal. An object rather extraordi-
nary than beautiful was the famous " Chaire de
V6rit6 " or pulpit, a work of the early 18th cen-
tury, designed by Michael Vervoort, of Antwerp,
an immense and very elaborately carved struc-
ture of wood, with tree trunks and foliage twin-
ing up the shaft to break in ebullience at the
top, while the base consisted of a representation
of the conversion of St. Norbert, who was seen
falling from his horse at the spectacle of the
Crucified towering above him, with the holy
women at the foot of the Cross. Amid the
foliage appealed Adam and Eve, the latter
just raising her hand to take the apple from the
serpent's mouth. But the chief glory of the
interior of St. Rombaut lay in its
pictures. There were, as usual in Catho-
lic cathedrals, a vast number of paintings of
inferior artistic merit ; but St. Rombaut's was
the possessor of a Van Dyck of surpassing
beauty, a " Crucifixion," painted in 1627,
in which the colour is superb, the dramatic
contrasts are powerful, and the gradations of
grief in the chief personages and in the crowd
of spectators is finely observed.
There were other churches in Alalines with
proud claims to distinction. The 15th-century
church of St. Jean contained, besides some
notable carved woodwork in pulpit (representing
the Good Shepherd), high altar and confes-
sionals by Verhaeghen, a famous picture by
Rubens of " The Adoration of the Magi," which
hung above Verhaeghen's altar. Painted in
1617, this was one of the master's finest works.
Not to speak of its superb colour, on which
Rubens lavished all the pomp of his glowing
palette, the picture shows his unique power
over the artistic representation of various
LOUVAIN.
Remains of part of the University buildings.
[Farringdon Photo Co,
420
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LOUVAIN.
Interior of the famous Library before its destruction.
[The Sphere,
moods ajid sides of life. Tlie smile on the face
of the Virgin seems to create the whole
atmosphere of the main subject. One of the
volets shows the beheading of St. John the
Baptist, the other the martyrdom, in a cauldron
of boiling oil, of St. John the Evangelist ; and
the palm-bearing angels who fill the sky in the
latter subject cannot detract from the horro'
of the execution. On the outside of the shutters
are the Baptism of Christ, and St. John writing
the Revelations in the island of Patmos. The
picture, as were most of Rubens's works, was
very rapidly painted. The parish of St. John
gave him the commission at Christmas, 1616 ;
the picture was in position in September, 1617,
though Rubens paid several visits to Malines
to put finislung touches to it on the spot.
Rubens was to be soon at his noblest again
in another church of Malines; — the church of
Nfitre-Dame au dela de la Dyle, the church of
the Boatmen of Malines, whose guild did much
for its ornamentation. This was the church
which the Guild of the Fishmongers chose for
their gift of a picture by Rubens, choosing an
appropriate subject, " The Miraculous Draught
of Fishes," and commissioning the work in
1618. Never, perhaps, did the brush of Rubens
achieve a finer work than 'the head of the figure
of Christ, Who, standing at ilie edge of the boat,
watched His disciples haul ashore their teeming
nets. The colour of the whole was magnificent,
and the action was as dramatic and full of move-
ment as even Rubens could make it. The
wings showed equally germane subjects —
Tobias and the Angel, St. Peter finding the
coin in the fish's mouth, and four fishermen
saints.
The interest and beauty of Malines, however,
was not confined to its churches. The Palais
de Justice was formerly the residence of Mar-
garet of Austria, and afterwards of the great
Cardinal Granvella ; and this rambling building
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
421
round its wide courtyard combined in very
interesting fashion the late Gothic with the
earliest example in Belgium of Kenaissanco
architecture. Inside were very handsome
and elaborate chimney-pieces and other works
of art. In old houses of interest, indeed,
Malines was particularly rich. The Academy
of Music, where church music had its official
headquarters in Belgium, occupied part of the
old house of Canon Busleiden. Of the old
Keizerhof, built by Margaret of York in 1480,
and late the residence of Philippe le Bel and of
Charles v., nothing remained except the facade.
But on the Quai au Sel stood the well-known
Maison du Saumon, " In den grooten Zaim,"
the guild-house of the Fishmongers, with a
wonderful Renaissance front, the pillars and
carvings of whicli between the lofty windows
clearly betrayed Italian influence. Near by was
the Lopelaer, another fine 16th-century hovise ;
and on the Quai aux Avoines stood tliree re-
markable old buildings together. The middle
one had a tall and severe front, with three
strange figures supporting the tier above the
door. This was the Maison du Diable, or
" Duyvelsgevel," and other grotesque figures
carved in the woodwork helped to emphasize
the idea. Next to it at the corner stood a
more elaborate structure under a lofty gable
with painted reliefs representing Adam and
Eve in Paradise, and the Expulsion from
I'aradiso. And on the other side of the Devil's
House stood a very elaborately-ornamented
house of pleasure, on which were carved figures
representing earthly joys. The list of old
houses in Malines might be almost indefinitely
extended ; and among the town's treasures
was the Grand-Pont, the 13th century bridge
over the Dyle, and the Brussels Gate, or Overste
Poort, rebuilt in the 17th century, and the
sole remaining out of tlie twelve gates which
once gave ingress and egress through the city
walls. But enough has been said to show that the
ancient and once proud city had preserved
sufficient memorials of her august past to deserve
the respect and affection of all who see in Culture
the understanding and care of the future by
means of the softening and refining influences of
the ancient days and the enduring expressions
of the life, work, worship, and enjoyment of
manlvind.
Malines, a treasure-house of ancient memories,
of works of art, and of peaceful dignity, was an
undefended, or open, town ; yet it was several
times bombarded by the German troops. The
first occasion was on August 27, in the course of
the German advance north-west across Belgium.
There was no good military reason, as it appears
MALINES.
Removing a picture by Van Dyck to a
place of safety.
for the Belgian forces lay between Willebroeck
and Termondo. But on this occasion the Town
Hall was reduced to ruins, the roof of the Cathe-
dral of St. Rombaut was broken up, large holes
were knocked in the walls on one side, and the
stained glass was all shattered. The population
almost immediately deserted the town ; the
shops were barricaded, and upon Malines, always
a quiet place, there fell the silence of death.
A second bombardment, nevertheless, was
thought necessary, by the German commanders.
And this time damage yet more serious was
ruthlessly achieved. Among the work of
destruction, shells fell \ipon the church of
Notre-Dame au dela de la Dyle. Fortunately
the Belgians, with their usual care for things of
interest and beauty, and their usual foresight,
had removed the famous Rubens to a place of
safety, as later they removed other pictures
from Antwerp Cathedral and elsewhere. On
September 2 Malines was again bombarded for
two hours. Nearly 100 shrapnel shells exploded
in the defenceless and innocuous town. This time
St. Rombaut's suffered more seriously than
before. It was at first reported to be in ruins,
though that, so far as the exterior, at any rate,
was concerned, was an over-statement. What was
left of the roof and windows was destroyed ; and
the Germans cannot be acquitted of the charge of
deliberately aiming at the famous tower, which,
of course, furnished them with an excellent
mark. The magnificent gateway beneath it was
turned to a heap of ruins. bid now the time
had come, too, for the carillon of Malines to
share the fate of the other things of beauty and
charm which gave to the ancient archiepiscopal
422
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
MALINES CATHEDRAL.
The Famous Carved Pulpit, which has been
nearly destroyed. [Manseii Cr Co.
city its chief title to distinction. Playing
upon the tower of St. Rombaut, the German
guns knocked the bells to pieces, and in a very
short time they were totally destroyed. Mean-
while, the refugees from the city, driven from
their ruined homes, were still struggling along
the roads towards Ostend, with as nauch of their
possessions as they could contrive to carry with
them — 8. pitiful remnant of devastated comfort
and peace. Happily, forethought had been at
work. On September 14 the chiefs of all
the Diplomatic Missions then in Antwerp
went to Malines by motor-car in order to see for
themselves the destruction that had been com-
mitted and report upon it to their Governments.
" Unnecessary destruction " was the temperate
phreise in which the wrecking of the defence-
less town was described by the responsible
people who saw it. Yet the Germans had not
finished with Malines. On September 26 a
detachment of German troops was surprised on
its march from Brussels to Termonde tlirough
Alost. Attacked by the Belgians in front and
in the flank the detachment fell back in disorder
upon Assche, leaving many wounded and much
ammunition in the hands of the victors. In
revenge for this (for no other motive can be
assigned for the deed) the Germans on the
following morning shelled Malines with long-
distance guns. It was a Sunday morning ;
and such few people as had remained in
the town, or had crept back since the last
bombardment, were returning from Mass about
half-past nine, when a shell suddenly fell
in the middle of a group, killing several people.
The remainder fled to a caii. Shortly after-
wards a shell exploded in the cafe and several)
more people were wounded. The rain of shells
continued, falling at the rate of nearly one a
minute. The railway station wsis early shelled.
Shells fell in the Place de la Gare and the neigh-
bourhood ; and the fires then set up consumed
the railway station, the barracks, the factory
of -a cabinet-maker, the house of the Little
Sisters of the Poor, the national stamp manu-
factory, and many private houses. Other
houses collapsed in the street, completely
blocking traffic. If the destruction of Malines
was not so thorough-going as that of Termonde,
nor, on the whole, so disastrous as that of
Louvain, it was great enough to satisfy the
most exacting lust for havoc. " The Cathedral
of St Rombaut," wrote an eye-witness, " ia
almost completelj' destroyed, and the tower is
seriously injured."
Meanwhile the Kaiser's modern Huns had
been spreading their peculiar form of " Kultur "
further afield over the peaceful and gallant
little country which had done them no
injury. It was early in September that news
came of the Germans' behaviour in Aerschot.
Aerschot lies a few miles north of Louvain,
on the line from Antwerp to Maastricht and
Aix-la-Chapelle. It had a fine Gothic Church
of St. Sulpice, chiefly remarkable for its magnifi-
cent carved rood-loft and choir stalls, 15th-
century work of the richest order. It was
this church that the German troops chose as
a stable for their horses ; this carved woodwork
that the troopers of the advance movement
destroyed in wanton insolence. In Aerachot,
as elsewhere, houses were burned to the ground
in revenge for some alleged shooting on the
part of the inhabitants, which was probably
the act of drunken Gorman soldiers firing
their rifles in sport ; and in Aerschot, the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
42a
burgomastor, his son, and brother were shot
in the enforced presence of 150 of the male
inhabitants, and the males of the town were
forced to run towards the river while the Ger-
mans fired at them. Over forty were killed
by this cultured form of sport.
We come now to one of the most appalling
of all the crimes of vandalism committed by
the apostles of Culture in Belgium. Among all
the ancient cities of Belgium the town of
Termonde had a charm peculiarly its own.
Termonde, or Dondermonde, lay in the low
country about half-way between Ghent and
MaUnes, on the right bank of the Scheldt, and
both banlis of the Dondre. Around it ran
fortifications which had been formidable in
their day. Louis XIV. attempted to capture
the place in 1667 ; the inhabitants opened the
sluices, as the modern Belgian has proved
himself not afraid to do, and the Grand Mon-
arque's army was flooded out. It took Marl-
borough ten days' bombardment in a dry season
to reduce the gallant little city. The central
beauty of Termonde was its Grand Place, with
Its exquisite and severe Town Hall and belfry
on one side, and on another the ancient building
that was once the Cloth Hall and was later
adapted to make the town's museum. The
Grand' Place of Termonde was small, but it
was strikingly beautiful. Of the Town Hall
Camille Lemotmier well says : " Certainly it
has nothing of the imposing solemnity of the
belfry of Bruges ; but such as it is, with the
symmetry of its proportions, the balance of its
lines, and the deUcious silhouette that it throw*
into the air, it makes a good appearance among
the other stone ancients of the country." The
streets were smiling and comfortable, giving
every evidence of ease and peace ; and on
one of the cosy -looking houses the curious might
M4X1NES.
Interior of Cathedral photographed from above. In the left comer is one of the manuscript
notes of the last sermon preached before the bombardment ; and a leaf from a book on
the right, both pierced by pieces of shell. lUnJenmod Sr Undtrwood.
424
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ST. ROMBAUT, MALINES,
And the Market-place : a characteristic view of life as it was in times of peace.
discern a tablet which recorded the birthplace
of a young Belgian, Polydore de Keyser, who
afterwards became Lord Mayor of London and
was knighted by Queen Victoria. The Gothic
church of N6tre-Dame, massive and somewhat
gloomy on the exterior, standing a little aside
from the road amid a bower of trees, was not
large, but it had rare treasures within it. First
of aU might be mentioned the superb Roman-
esque font dating from the twelfth century, and
surrounding it the severe and beautiful oak
and brass-railed doors, dated 1635, which wore
a feature of the famous Brussels Exliibition.
But the glory of the Church of N6tre-Dame
at Termonde consisted in its three great pictures,
" The Assumption of the Virgin," one of the
finest works of that fine painter, De Crayer,
who was at one time held to be the only serious
rival of Rubens, and a " Crucifixion " and an
" Adoration of the Shepherds," by Van Dyck.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
425
This picture was apparently not destroyed.
This painting of " The Crucifixion " is one of
the best of the master's sacred pictures. At the
foot of the cross are the figures of St. Francis
of Assisi, the Virgin, and St. Mary Magdalene,
and the whole picture is a masterpiece not only
of emotional painting but of silvery and ex-
quisite colour.
In the early days of September Termondo,
an open town, was bombarded and captured by
the Germans, despite the fact that, as in the
days of Louis XIV., the surrounding country
had been flooded. A good many buildings were
destroyed by shells ; the suburb of St. Gilles
was wiped out, and on the entry of the invading
troops the town was sacked and the bridges
blown up. Villages around Termonde suffered
a similar fate and were burned to the ground.
The demand for a fine of £40,000 proving fruit-
less, the Germans in revenge trained heavy guns
on the houses, and burned right and left. By
the evening of Sunday, September 6, not a
house stood whole ; the place was practically
a smouldering ruin. As if this were not enough,
the Germans, having later evacuated the posi-
tion, returned some days afterwards and again
bombarded the town. This time the Town
Hall shared the common fato. The famous peal
0^
S^^'C^ -«
f
MARINES CATHEDRAL.
Window destroyed by German sheU.
[Undfru'ood & U ndcrwood.
THE CRUCIFIXION, by Van Dyck,
In the Church of Notre Dame, at Termionde.
MansellCrCo.] {Photo by Herman.
of bells in the belfry were brought down ; the
interior was gutted and its paintings and other
art treasures utterly destroyed. Field guns
were trained on the tower of N6tre-Dame,
and the church was seriously injured.
A fortnight later the remains of this once
fainous and beautiful city were visited, in
company with a Belgian Staff Officer and others,
Ijy Mr. J. H. Whitehouso, M.P., who has thus
recorded what he saw : —
Termonde a few weeks ago was a beautiful city of
about 16,000 inhabitants ; a city in whicli the dignity
of its buildings harmonized with the natural beauty
of its situation ; a city whicli contained some buildings
of surpassing interest. I found it entirely destroyed ;
I went through street after street , square after square,
and I found that every house wiis entirely destroyed
witli all its contents. It was not the result of a
bombardment. It was systematic destruction. In
eacli house a separate bomb had been placed which
luul blown up the interior and had set fire to the
contents. All that i-eniained in every case were
portions of the outer walls still constantly falling, and
inside the cinders of the oontcnts. Not a slired of
furniture or of anything else remained.
Tiiis sight continued in street after street througli-
out the (uitire extent of what had been a considerable
town. It had an indescribable influence upon the
observer wliich no printed description or even pictorial
record could give. This influence was increased by
t he utter silence of the city, brolicn only by the sound
of the guns. Of the population I thought not a soul
remained — I was wrong. For as we turned into a
square where the wreck of what hatl been one of the
most beautiful of Gotliic churches met my eyes,
a blind woman and her daughter groped among the
426
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
MALINES.
The Old Brussels Gate.
[Undtneood &■ Underwood,
ruins. They were the sole living creatures in the
whole of the town. Shops, factories, churches, the
houses of the wealthy, all were similarly destroyed.
One qualification only have I to make of this state-
ment. Two, or perhaps three, houses bore a German
command in chalk that they were not to be burnt.
These remained standing, but deserted, amidst the
ruins on either side. Where a destroyed house had
obviously contained articles of value looting had
taken place. In the ruins of what had been a jeweller's
shop the remains of the safe were visible amidst the
cinders. The part around the lock had been blown
off and the contents obviously rifled. I inquired
what had become of the population. It was a ques-
tion to which no direct reply could be given. They
had fled in all directions. Some had reached Antwerp,
but a great number were wandering about the country
panic-stricken and starving; many were already dead.
I had other opportunities of seeing that what had
happened at Termonde was similar to what had
happened in other parts of Belgium under the mili-
tary occupation of Germany, and I have given this
record of the condition of Termonde because it is
typical of so many other parts of Belgium. The
result is that conditions have been set up for the
civilian population throughout the occupied terri-
tory of unexampled misery. Comparatively only
a few refugees have reached this country. The others
remain wandering about Belgium, flocking into other
towns and villages or flying to points a little way
across the Dutch frontier.
The whole life of the nation has been arrested ;
the food supplies which would ordinarily reach the
civilian population are being taken by the German
troops for their own support ; the peasants and poor
are without the necessaries of lite, and the conditions
of starvation grow more acute every day. Even
wlicro, as in some eas 's happens, there is a supply of
wheat available, the peasants are not allowed to use
their windmills owing to the German fear that they
will send signals to the Belgian Army. Wo are
therefore face to face with a fa,ct which has rarely,
if ever, occurred in the history of the world — an
entire nation in a state of famine, and that within
half a day's journey of our own shores.
The completeness of the destruction in each in-
dividual case was explained to me later by the Bel-
gian Ministers, who described to mo the numerous
appliances which the German soldiers carried for
destroying property. Not only were hand-bombs
of various sizes and descriptions carried, but each
soldier was supplied with a quantity of small black
discs little bigger than a sixpenny piece. I saw
these discs which had been taken fi-om Gorman
soldiers on the field of battle. These were described
to me as being composed of compressed benzine ;
when lighted they burn brilliantly for a few minutes,
and are sufTicient to start whatever fire is necessary
after the explosion of the bomb.
" The revengeful act of disappointed black-
mailers " is a fitting description of such a deed
as this. The responsible author of the outrage
was Major Sommerfeld.
The turn of Alost was to come. Alost,
a thriving town of East Flanders and a railway
junction about half-way between Ghent and
Brussels, was important as the centre of the
Belgian trade in hops, but still more perhaps
for its ancient memories. Alost, or Aalst, was
once a capital — the metropolitan city of Koizer-
Vlanderen, the realm of the Counts of Flanders
from the eleventh century onwards. Little
remained of its ancient glories except the evi-
dence of the elaborate and handsome Town Hall
with a very high and crocketed belfry of the
fifteenth century. The Church of St. Martin, un-
finished, could give but a poor idea of the great
fane that should have stood upon the site ;
but it contained, besides some fifteenth century
mural paintings, one great treasiu-e — a picture
painted by Rubens about 1625 for the Guild
of Alost of Brewers. The subject is Christ
appointing St. Roch the guardian of the plague,
stricken, and the painter has made the most of
the dramatic contrast between the lepers and
other sufferers and the radiant glory of the
celestial figures.
The ancient ramparts of Alost had mainly
disappeared — partly to gratify the modern
Belgian's love of broad and airy boulevards,
but partly in the stress of centuries of
combat. For Alost was no stranger to the
horrors of war. In the Wars of Religion it
suffered terribly ; again and again in later
times it was ravaged, and Turenne left an
indelible mark upon it. Its final ruin by the
German forces in the Great War seemed to be as
wanton and needless as the burning of Louvain.
A Belgian force advancing westward drove out
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
427
TERMONDE.
The Railway Bridge.
{Sport and Ceneral.
of Alost the German troops who had entered
the undefended and peaceful town. No moles-
tation had been offered them while they were
there ; but in departing they set fire to the
town in several places.
The tale might be almost indefinitely pro-
longed. On September 28, 1914, a special corre-
spondent of The Times wrote an account of the
German treatment of two inoffensive and unde-
fended towns, Deynzoand Thiolt, on the night of
BELGIAN SOLDIER STANDING ON THE RUINS OF ABOVE BRIDGE.
Photographed shortly after it was blown up. ^spori and Central,
428
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
TERMONDE.
Re-occupied by the Belgian soldiers after bombardment.
{Record Press.
Saturday, September 26. Both were small
places a few miles south-westward of Ghent.
Thielt retained from its busy and prosperous past
an old Cloth Hall and belfry ; Deynze had an old
church. " Nothing that Germany has done in
this war," wrote The Times correspondent,
ha-s been more contemplilile than the dropping of
bombs on Saturday night on Deynze and Thielt, and
especially on Deynze. At Thielt no harm whatever
was done. The bombs fell where they could do, and
did, no damage. At Deynze the result was not much
diflerent.
Deynze is an open town of no military strength or
impoi-tance. Besides the church it has one con-
spicuous institution, the Hospital and Pensionnat of
the SLsters of St. Vincent de Paul. It is the mother
institution o{ the order in this region, with some 2S
afflliated hospitals and orphanages in other towns. It
contains 90 sisters. In addition there are the serving
sisters, a nmnber of aged and infirm sisters who are
tended here, sick folk who are taken in and nursed,
a number of girl orphans, and, at the moment, some
20 poor refugees from Malines. In all, the building
shelters some 200 people, women and children, either
sick or aged or orphan or giving their lives to
charity. Over the building floats a large Bed Cross
flag.
On this building the airship on Saturday night
dropped four bombs. That the injuries to persons
were limited to the slight wounding in the leg of one
old man of over 80, who had been allowed to sleep in a
kind of outhouse, Is nothing less than a miracle. The
particular bomb which hurt the old man landed and
exploded at the outhouse door, shattering it and the
bed in which he slept and digging a hole nearly 2ft.
deep in the ground. Another fell harmlessly, diggmg
another deep hole in a small paved alley or endroil
alongside. Two others struck the building.
Both these exploded immediately on hitting the
roof — one at a point where it did no Jiann, except to
the roof itself, and the other immediately above the
party wall separating the sisters' dormitory from
other rooms. The wall, the passage outside, much of
the floor, and a large part of the ceiling of the dor-
mitory were completely wrecked. The sleeping
women were covered with plaster and wreckage, but
not one was even scratched.
I went over the builduig yesterday afternoon with
the Sister Superior and the Directress, and stood in the
half-wrecked dormitory open to the sky. The sisters
were even yet carrying their bedding down to the
ground floor in fear of a second attack, a work in which
we lent a hand. It seems to me that even more
damning than any of the great atrocities which the
Germans have committed is the picture of that build-
ing, the abode of charity and gentleness, with all its
heli>less inmates, and the midnight bombs exploding
in the very sleeping chamber of the Sisters of Mercy.
The sight of ths house and its inmates to-day enraged
me as I have been enraged by nothing even in Ter-
monde, Malines, and elsewhere.
The fate of Antwerp is the subjeot of a
separate chapter ; but as early as the night,
of August 24-25 it had received a menacing
hint of the coming " Kultur," when a German
airship passed over the city and dropped
a number of bombs. According to the cal-
culation of an eye-witness, nearly a thous-
and houses were slightly damaged and over
50 houses nearly destroyed. One bomb
fell very near the Royal Palace ; and the
majority were aimed at public buildings. The
number of victims was considerable. Yet there
was a touch of humour in the affair. It was
said that a bomb fell upon the German Club and
destroyed a statue of the Emperor William.
On subsequent occasions Antwerp was again.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
429
visited by airships, and among the buildings
struck was a largo liospital, clearly marked by
the Red Cross. The Belgian authorities took
the precaution of removing the most valuable
objects in the great Cathedral of Antwerp into
a place of safe custody ; and among the pictures
so safeguarded was Rubens' groat masterpiece,
■" The Descent from the Cross."
The facts already given by no means oxliaust
the list of towns and villages pillaged, shelled, or
■destroyed by the German troops in tlieir advance
towards France through Belgium. At Lierre,
for instance, the religious houses of the Black
Sisters and the Jesuits were shattered to pieces ;
the Town Hall of Willebroeek was blown to
bits by shells ; the village of Andegem was ■
almost totally wrecked, and the chiu'ch re-
duced to little better than a ruin. A heavy
fate befell Saventhem, a place of peculiar in-
terest owing to its association with Van Dyck.
Not only did it possess a famous picture of
^' St. Martin dividing his cloak with a beggar,"
painted by that ma.ster as one of a series diu-ing
his early days in Italy, and commissioned for
Saventhem bj' the Seigneur of the place, Ferdi-
nand de Boisschot, Comte d'Erps, but it was
Saventhem that saw the famous romance
between the painter and the " fair maid."
Isabella van Ophom, which occupied some
months of liis life in or about 1630. To all
true lovers of art Saventhem should have been
a place to protect and cherish for the sake of its
association with a great artist. But the more
the subject was examined the more complete
and awful became the evidence of the trail of
devastation which the German forces left
behind them in the spread of culture. War,
of course (and especially war by means of the
terrible explosives which modern science has
invented for the destruction of man and all his
works), cannot be carried on without havoc. In
some cases the Germans could justly plead mili-
tary necessities. In many others history is unable
to acquit them of wanton damage, inspired merely
by revenge or by a lust of brutal destruction.
The loss of crops, stock, and farming plant
tliroughout the countryside was incalculable.
Before the war Belgium was a densely popu-
lated country ; most of the land was occupied
in small holdings, into which the peasant
proprietor and every member of his family
put the incessant labour which was character-
istic of the people, especially in the portion
of the coimtry inhabited by the Flemings,
and which had made Belgium what she was.
It was no uncommon sight to see the smallest
TERMONDE.
Scene of Destruction.
[Record Press.
m
4J0
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
HOTEL DE VILLE, LIERRE.
Former Belgian Headquarters ; Garde Civique in the foreground.
children taking their simple and easy share
in the cultivation of the family fields and
gardens ; and it was this universal and un-
remitting'labour that brought prosperity to the
countryside. Such small occupations leave
their holders a much narrower margin between
comfort and destitution than do large estates,
the owner of wliich can frequently afford to
finance his tenants in case of necessity ; and
the destruction — not all of it, no doubt, wanton
— ^which was wreaked upon these small holdings
by the invader entailed a much greater amount
of loss and suffering than would have been the
case with large holdings, both by reason of the
greater proportion of people to the area, and
because small occupiers necessarily put every-
thing they have into their farms and can
maintain little reserves of money. Of the
refugees who came in their thousands to England
a great nvunber were absolutely destitute.
Their homesteads had been knocked to pieces and
burned ; their horses and dogs carried off, their
crops utterly ruined, and their very land so left
that only years of cultivation could restore it
to the state into which minute and laborious
toil had brought it.
CHAPTER XXV.
EVIDENCE OF GERMAN
ATROCITIES.
Appointment and Constitution op the Belgian CoMjnssiON — First Report of the Commis-
sion— German Allegation Controverted — Atrocities in Villages — Commandant Gilson's
Evidence — Women and Children used as Shields — Second Report — ^Mutilation, Hangino,
Burning — Louvain University — Wholesale Enslavement of Belgians — Summary of
Atrocities — Third Report — Tourth Report — Evidence of Sacrilege — ^^Murder as
" Reprisal " — Execution by Chance — Germans' Drunken Orgies — The Aerschot Outrage —
Madame Tielemans' Statement — Conclusion.
WE come now to a very painful
and delicate subject — the Germans'
treatment of the lives and liberties
of non-combatants. This was a
subject in itself very difficult of strict investiga-
tion, and rendered far more difficult than it
need have been by the innumerable unfounded
tales that were spread by people in panic or people
too ready to speak without proper evidence.
The harm dono by those unfounded tales was
not confined to the possible exaggerations
which they spread abroad. The denial and
exposure of a considerable number of them
threw discredit in the mind of the civilized
world on those that were, unhappily, true ;
and the imjustified cries of " Wolf ! " inclined
a large number of people to the belief that there
was no wolf abroad at all. That being the case,
the Belgian Government did wisely to appoint,
at a comparatively earlj' stage of the war, a
Commission to inqviire into the alleged atroci-
ties, and thus to put on record facts supported
by good and sufficient evidence taken by
men of weight and discretion. It is not
suggested that this Commission was or could be
capable of giving a judicial decision upon the
question at issue. Where there was no oppor-
tunity of cross-examination of witnesses by the
defence, it is obvious that the case which was
presented by the Belgian Commission was only
the case for the prosecution ; although it must
also be borne in mind that by selecting as mem-
bers of the Commission only men of high judi-
cial authority and famous experts in the testing
of scientific evidence, the Belgian Government
did all that was humanly possible to secure that
the case for the prosecution should be scrupu-
lously accurate, so that it might fearlessly be
left on record for the final judgment of the
historian of the future — as well as for the arbitra-
ment of the international tribimal summoned
after the war to award to Germany the proper
penalty of her misdeeds.
The Commission was composed of M. Coore-
man. Minister of State (President) ; Count
Goblet d'Aviella, Minister of State and Vice-
President of the Senate ; M. Ryckmans, Senator ;
M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of Antwerp ;
M. Van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Tribunal
of First Instance of Antwerp ; and, as Secre-
taries, M. Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet
of the Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Coun-
cillor of Legation.
The First Report was issued by the Belgian
Minister in London towards the end of August,
1914, and it definitely controverted the defence
which the German Governn\ent had attempted
to make for the atrocities by alleging them to be
only " reprisals " for the action of the Belgian
Governmf nt, whom they accused of deliberately
431
432
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LEOPOLD DEW AN.
This man was bayoneted by German soldiers,
and afterwards forced to niarch in front
of the troops.
[Daily Mirror,
preparing a franc-tireur war against the German
troops. We might have expected that even the
Teuton would have recognized the absurdity of
suggesting that a neighbouring country which
he had attacked by siirprise on Monday night
had dehberately prepared any kind of campaign
for the small hours of Tuesday morning ; but,
since Berlin was so lacking in the sense of
humour as to make the accusation with a full
parade of official seriousness, it is well that the
Belgian Minister in England, in issuing the First
Report of the evidence, should have dealt
categorically with this issue, as follows : —
When German troops invaded our country the
Belgian Government issued public statements which
were placarded in every town, village, and hamlet
warning all civilians to abstain scrupulously from
hostile acts against the enemy's troops. Nevertheless
the German authorities have issued lately statements
containing grave imputations against the attitude
of the Belgian civilian population, threatening us at
the same time with dire reprisals. These imputations
are contrary to the real facte of the case, and as to
threats of further vengeance no menace of odious
reprisals on the part of the German troops will deter
the Belgian Government from protesting before the
civilized world against the fearful and atrocious crimes
committed wilfully and deliberately by the invading
hosts against helpless non-combatants, old men,
women, and children.
From this point it becomes the tinpleasant
duty of the historian to recount a part at least
of the gruesome list of outrages alleged to have
been committed by German troops and not
alleged merely by atrocity-mongers, but deli-
berately placed on record by this Commission
composed of the best men the Kingdom of
Belgium possessed for the piu-pose of a fair and
judicial inquiry — well-known Judges, accus-
tomed to weighing human evidence, and scientific
Professors with deserved reputations for imma-
culate accuracy. It is necessary to bear this in
mind, because the list of atrocities to which
they give the authority of their names is so
appalling that one would like to believe it all a
nightmare and to say that such things could not
really have happened in the 20th century of th.)
Cliristian era. Nevertheless, the Belgian Com-
mission state that the following, among many
other equally terrible occurrences, were esta-
blished by careful investigations, based in each
case on the evidence of reliable eye-witnesses : —
When the German cavalry occupied the village of
Linsmeau not a man of the civilian population took
part in the fighting. Nevertheless, the village was in-
vaded at duslc on August 10 and all the male inhabi-
tants were then compelled to come forward and hand
over whatever arms they possessed. No recently
discharged firearms were found. The invaders
divided these peasants into three groups, those in one
group were bound, and 11 of them placed in a ditch,
where they were afterwards found dead.
In the villages of Orsmael and Neerhespen on
August 10, 11, and 12, according to evidence
accepted by this Commission of legal and scien-
tific exports, the following incidents occurred : —
An old man bad his arm sliced in three longitudinal
cuts ; he was then hanged head downwards and
burned alive. Young girls were raped and little
cliildren outraged at Orsmael, where several inhabi-
tants suffered mutilations too horrible to describe.
A Belgian soldier belonging to a battalion of cyclist
carabiniers, who had been wounded and made
prisoner was hanged, whilst another, who was tend-
ing his comrade, was bound to a telegraph pole on
t'le St. Trond-road and shot.
\ny "^ ' '
A/V, aU»^/*f7. (jSrf^ "i^^Tt-a^-^.
Chalked on a door at Alost ;
" Do not plunder ; very good people.
TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
433
A SAD PROCESSION.
German soldiers driving non-combatants before tliem.
The following statement, made to the Com-
mittee by Commandant Georges Gilson of the
Belgian 9th Infantry of the Line when lying in
hospital at Antwerp, deals with the charge,
so often made by indignant Belgians against the
German troops, of using Belgian women and
children as shields to cover an advance of Ger-
man infantry : —
I was told to cover the retreat of our troops in front
of Aerschot. During the action fouglit there on
Wednesday, August 19, between 6 and 8 o'clock in the
morning, suddenly I saw on the liigh road, between the
German and Belgian forces, which were fighting at
close range, a group of four women, with babies in their
arms, and two little girls clinging to their skirts. Our
men stopped firing till the women got through our
lines, but the German machine-guns went on flring
all the time, and one of the women was wounded in the
arm. These women could not have got through the
neighbouring Gennan lines and been on the liigh road
unless with the consent of the enemy.
All the evidence and circumstances seem to point to
tlie fact that these women had been deliberately pushed
forward by the Germans to act as a shield for tlieir
advance guard, and in the hope that the Belgians
would cease firing for fear of killing the women and
cliildren.
Tlie Second Report, which was communicated
in England by the Belgian Legation on Septem-
ber 11, was addressed to M. Carton de Wiart,
Minister of Justice, by the signatories at Antwerp
on August 31, and after describing in general
terms the burning of unoffending villages and
the pillage of Louvnin, it proceeds with the
investigation of individual cases of savagery.
[Central Nevis
Of tliese, omitting the charges which referred
to the treatment of young women and girls, the
following specimens will suffice : —
Belgian soldiers, entering Hotstade on August 25,
found the body of an old woman who had been
killed by bayonet thrusts. She still held in her
hand the needle with which she was sewing wlien she
was killed. A woman and her 15 or 16 year old son
lay on the ground pierced by bayonets. A man had
been hanged.
At Seinpst, a neighbouring village, wore found the
bodies of two men, partially carbonized. One of
them had his legs cut off at the knees ; the other had
the arms and legs cut off. A workman, whose burnt
body has been seen by several witnesses, had been
struck several times with bayonets, and then, while
still alive, the Germans had poured petroleum over
him, and thiown him into a house to which they set
fire. A woman who came out of her house was killed
in the same way.
Between Impde and Wolvorthera two wounded
Belgian soldiers lay near a house which was on fire.
The Oennans thiew these two unfortunate men into
the flames.
From hoA-iblo details such as these it is
almost a relief when the Commission turns to
consideration of the vaster crimes against
civilization which were conunitted by the
Germans with deliberate intent, such as the
destruction of the world-famous library of the
University of Louvain. With regard to this
the Commission's report, after describing the
bombardment and general conflagration in
the town, said : —
Wherever the fire had not spptad the German
soldiers entered the bouses and tlircw fire-
grenades, with which some of them seem to be
434
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
MOULAND.
Germans leaving after looting and burning the village.
[Central hJews.
piovided. The greater part of the town of Louvain
was thus a prey to the flames, particularly the quarters
o£ the upper town, comprising the modern buildings,
the ancient Cathedral of St. Pierre, the University
buildings, together with the University library, its
manuscripts and collections, and the municipal
theatre.
The Commission considers it its duty to insist, in
the midst of all these horrors, on the crime com-
mitted against civilization by the deliberate destruc-
tion of an academic library which was one of the
treasures of Europe.
A charge of another sort is outlined in the
following brief statement : —
It appears from other witnesses that several
thousand male inhabitants of Louvain, who had es-
caped the shooting and the fire, were sent to Germany
for a purpose which is still unknown to us.
It does not seem possible that a Commission
which included well-known legal luminaries
could have committed itself to a statement of
this kind concerning " several thousand male
inhabitants " of a single town without ample
evidence ; yet its acceptance involves the
amazing conclusion that a deliberate revival
of the barbarian practice of making slaves of
the men of conquered places was part of the
Gierman plan of culture. Indeed this charge
of slavemaking is distinctly stated in the
following summary with which the Commission
eloses its Second Report : —
The Commission is able to draw the following
conclusions from the facts wliich have so far been
brought to its notice : — -
In this war, the occupation of any place is syste-
matically accompanied and followed, sometimes even
preceded, by acts of violence towards the civil popula-
tion, which acts are contrary both to the usages of
war and to the most elementary principles of humanity.
The German procedure is everywhere the same.
They advance along a road, shooting inoffensive
passers-by — particularly bicyclists — ^as well as peasants
working in the fields.
In the towns or villages where they stop they begin
by requisitioning food and drink, which they consume
till intoxicated.
Sometimes from the interior of deserted houses they
let off their rifles at random, and declare that it was the
inhabitants who flred. Then the scenes of fire,
murder, and especially pillage begin, accompanied by
acts of deliberate cruelty, without respect to sex or age.
Even where they pretend to know the actual person
guilty of the acts they allege, they do not content
themselves with executing him summarily, but they
seize the opportunity to decimate the population,
pillage the houses, and then set them on fire.
After a preliminary attack and massacre they shut
up the men in tlie church, and then order the women to
return to their houses and to leave their doors open all
niglit.
From several places the male population ha.s been
sent to Germany, there to be forced, it appears, to work
at the harvest, as in the old days of slavery. There
are many cases of the inhabitants being forced to act
as guides, and to dig trenches and entrenchments for
tile Germans. Numerous witnesses assert that during
their marches, and even when attacking, the Germans
THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.
435
place civilians, men and women, in their front ranks,
in order to prevent our soldiers firing. The evidence
of Belgian oflicers and soldiers shows that German
detachments do not hesitate to display either the white
flag or the Red Cross Hag in order to approach our
troops with impunity. On the other hand, they fire
on our ambulances and maltreat the ambulance men.
They maltreat and even kill the wounded. The
clergy seem to be jiarticularly chosen as subjects for
their brutality. Finally, we have in our possession
expanding bullets which had been abandoned by the
tnemy at Werchter, and we possess doctors' certifi-
cates showing that wounds must have been inflicted
liy bullets of this kind. !
The Third Report was-. dated at Antwerp,
September 10, and in addition to further
evidence regarding the happenings at Louyain
it deals in some detail with the case of Vii?6.
In an earlier chapter of this History we have
pointed out that, although the • atrocities com-
• tnitted at Vis6 were far exceeded in magnitude
and horror by subsequent occurrences, they had
primary importance, because they were the
first in point of time, and it was therefore
from thorn that we had to learn if possible how
and why the Germans began to inaiigurate
their terrible reign of " frightfulness " in
Belgium. The same consideration was strong
in the minds of the members of the Belgian
Commission, as appears- from the following
long extract of the Thii-d Report : —
The Commission hn.s resumed the inquiry l)ogim at
Brussels on the subject of the occurrences at Vi»6.
This place vfaa the first Belgian town destroyed in
pursuance of the system applied subsequently by the
invader to so many other of our cities and villages.
It is for this reason that we have been careful to deter-
mine what truth there is in the German version ac-
cording to which the civilian population of Vis^
took part in the defence of the town or rose ngain.st
the Germans after the town had been occupied.
Several witnesses now at Antwerp have been
heard, notably soldiers belonging to the detachment
which dispute'd with the Germans the p».ssage of the
Meuse, north of LIc'ge, and a lady of German nation-
ality, who belongs to the religious community of the
Sistei-s of Notre Dame at Vis6.
The result is to prove that the inhabitants took no
part wh.atever in the fighting which took place on
August 4 at the ford of Lixhe and at VIs^ itself.
Moreover, It was only in the night of August 16-19
that the destruction of the town began, the signal
being given by several shots fired on the evening of
the 15th. The Germans asserted that the inhabitants
had fired upon them, particularly from a house the
o%vner of which gave evidence before the Commission.
The Germans discovered no arms in this house
any more than they did in neighbouring buildings,
which, nevertheless, were burnt after being pillaged,
and the male occupants of which were carried oft to
Germany.
A I'OOK WOMAN AND IIER CHILDREN FORCED I'O BKG FOR FOOD.
[Daily Mirror,
436
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
BELGIAN SOLDIER ESCORTING AN
A.GED REFUGEE TO SAFETY.
[Daily Mirror.
The evidence has brought to light the Improbability
of any rising among a disarmed population against a
numerous German garrison at a time when the last
Belgian troops had for 11 days evacuated the district,
and the witnesses have declared that the firat shots
were fired by intoxicated German infantry soldiers
at their own officers. This fact appears not to be
exceptional. It is, indeed, notorious that at Maas-
tricht, either by mistake or in consequence of a
mutiny, Germans about this same time killed one
another during the night at a cavalry camp which
they had established at Mesch, close to the Dutch
frontier in Limbourg.
It is confirmed that the town of V\a6 was entirely
burnt, with the exception, it appears, of a religious
establishment which seems to have been respected,
and that several citizens, both of the town and of the
village of Canne, were shot.
A large number of places situated in the triangle
between Vilvorde, Malincs, and Louvaiu — that is to
say, in one of the most populous and, a few days ago,
one of the most prosperous regions in Belgium — have
been given over to plunder, partially or entirely
destroyed by fire, their population dispersed, while the
inhabitants were indiscriminately arrested and shot
without trial and without apparent reason, the sole
object being, it seems, to inspire terror and to compel
the migration of the population.
This was notably the case in the commune or ham-
lets of Sempst, Weerde, Elewyt, Holstade, Wespelaer,
Wilsele, Bucken, Eppeghem, Wackerzeele, Botselaer,
Werchter, Thildonck, Boortmeerbeek, Houthem,
Trcmcloo. In this last village only the church and
the presbytery remained standing. On the few houses
which have been spared may be seen the following
inscriptions : — •" Nicht abbrennen (do not burn),
Bitteschonc (please spare), Gute leute, nicht pliindcm
(good people, do not plunder)." These houses, how-
ever, were sacked afterwards. . ,
The Germans, in order to excuse their violence,
declare that wherever they have shot civilians or
burnt and pillaged towns and villages, armed resist-
ance hiis been offered by tlic inhabitants. Wliile there
may possibly have been isolated instances of this
kind, that is nothing more than occurs in all wars, and
if they had confined themselves to executing the guilty
persons wo could only have bowed before the rigour
of military law. But in no case could individual and
absolutely exceptional acts of aggression justify the
wholesale measures of repression which have been
adopted against the persons and the property of the
inhabitants of our towns .ind villages — the shooting,
the burning, the pillaging which has proceeded pretty
well everywhere in o>u' country, not only by way of
reprisals, but wth a refinement of cruelty. More-
over, no provocation has been proved at Vis^, Mar-
sage, Louvain, Wavre, Termonde, an I other places
which have been entirely and deliberately destroyed
several days after being occupied, not to mention
the systematic burning of isolated buildings situated
in the line of march of the troops, and the shooting
of the unfortunate inhabitants who fled.
The Germans have asserted in their newspapers that
the Belgian Government distributed to the civU popu-
lation arms which were to be used against the invaders.
They add that the Catholic clergy preached a sort
of holy war and incited their flock everywhere to
massacre the Germans. Finally, they have declared, in
order to justify the massacres of women, that women
showed themselves as ferocious an the men, and went
so far as to pour boiling oil from their windows upon
the troops on the march.
All these allegations are so many falsehoods. Far
from having distribuf^ed arms, the authorities every-
where on the approach of the enemy disarmed the
inhabitants. The Burgomastere everywhere warned
the townspeople against acts of violence, which
would involve reprisals. The clergy have unceasingly
preached calm to their flock. As for the women, if
we except a story in a foreign newspaper, the source of
which is suspected, everything shows that their only
anxiety was to escape the horrors of a ruthles ^ war.
The true motives for the atrocities the moving evi-
dence of which we have gathered can only be, on the
one hand, the desire to terrorize and demoralize the
people in accordance with the inhuman theories of
German military writers, and, on the other hand, the
desire for plunder. A shot fired, no one knows where,
or by whom, or against whom, by a drunken soldier
or an excited sentry, is enough to furnish a i)rrtext for
the sack of a whole city. Individual plunder is suc-
ceeded by war levies of a magnitude which it is im-
possible to satisfy and by the taking of hostages who-
will be shot or kept in confinement until payment of the
ransoms in full, according to the well-known procedure-
of cla.ssic brigandage. It must also be stated that in
order to establish the German case all resistance offered
by detachments of the Regular Array is laid to the
account of the civilian population, and that the in-
vader invariably avenges himself upon the civilians
for the checks or even the disappointments which he
suffers in the course of the campaign.
In the course of this inquiry we use only facts sup-
ported by trustworthy evidence. It should be noted
that up to the present we have been able to record only
a small part of the crimes committed against law,
humanity, and civilization, which will constitute one
of the most sinister and most revolting pages in con-
temporary history. If an international inquiry, like
that which was conducted in the Balkans by the Car-
negie Commission, could be conducted in our country,
we are convinced that it would establish the truth of
our assertions.
The Fourth Report, dated at Antwerp on
September 17, deals solely with the condition of
Aerschot, of which some account was given
earlier ; and the text is to a very great extent
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
437
merely a repetition in other words of tho facts
which have already been recorded. In view,
however, of the high authority which attaches
to tlie deliberate findings of this Commission
of distinguished men specially appointed for
the purpose by the Government of Belgium,
it is well to extract from tho report certain
brief passages which deal with the salient
points at issue in the trial of Germany before
the tribunal of civilizod humanity.
V\'ith regard, for instance, to the charge of
deliberate sacrilege in the destruction and
defilement of religious edifices, the following
pregnant paragraph is devoted to the condition
of the beautiful church at Aerschot :—
Tho church prf>onts a lamcntaVjle aspect. Its
three doois, as well as that of the sacristy, have
been more or less consumed. The door of tho
nave and side door on the right, both of massive
oak, seem to liave been forced in by a battering
ram afU^r the flames had wealccned thcra. In the
interior, tho altars, confessionals, haimoniums,
and candelabra are broken, the collection boxes are
forced open, the wooden Gothic statues which
decorated the columns of the nave have been torn
down, otlurs have been paitially destroyed by
lire. The floor was littered with hay on which a
great number of inhabitants— who were (as we know)
shut up in the church — have slept for many days.
Tho details given above are not hearsay, nor
merely the evidence of credible witnesses ex-
amined by the Commission, but a pimplo
description of things which M. Orts, Counsellor
of I.«gation, personally deputed by tho Com-
mission to investigate, observed himself. In the
face of those facts it was idle to say on behalf of
the Germans that they were only guilty of mili-
tary "reprisals." Another account stnUs that
the Germans 8tal)ied their horses in the church.
Another important charge upon which the
direct statement of M. Orts must be accepted
as conclusive is that the Germans, even when
they pretended that they were only executing
international law against guilty non-com-
batants, made no attempt to tamper their
severities with any show of justice. Of his visit
to the spot where the so-called " executions "
of Aerschot citizens took place, M. Orts
states : —
It is there, on the outskirts of the town, in a ndd
a hundred yards to the left of the road, that the
Germans shot Burgomaster Tielemans, his son, his
brother, and a whole group of their fellow citizens.
After some searching I found at the foot of a
bank tlio spot where fell thes<! innocent victims of
Gorman fury. Black clots of blood still marked
PRIESTS AND RED CROSS DETACHMENT
awaiting the arrival of the wounded.
\Ri<^i Prtts.
4:is
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE ANXIETIES OF WAR.
On the road between Malines and Brussels.
on the stubble the place occupied by each of them
under the (Ire of the executioners. These blood-
stains are two yards distant from each other, which
confirms the testimony of the witnesses according
to which, at iho last moment, the executioners took
from the ranks two out of every three men, chance,
in default of any sort of inquiry, pointing out those
who had to die.
A tew st«ps from there the newly-turned earth and
a humble wooden cross, raised secretly by friendly
hands, mark the spoi.,jrhe>^ *'*"'**>odies of 27 victims
rest. The pit g?^-. j flllod seemed to wait for more
dead. ^r^"
No words of condemnation need to be added
to this simple description of the German method
of execution — " chance, in default of any sort of
inquiry, pointing out those who had to die "
Except tliat such things undoubtedly occurred
in many places, it should be difficult to believe
them possible in a war conducted by a nation
which was supposed to be civilized.
Yet another count in the indictment against
the Germans in Belgium was based on the fre-
quent descriptions given of the drunken orgies in
which both officers and men indulged in captured
towns and villages ; and under this head also
the testimony of the Counsellor of I>egation is
[Newspaper Illustrations.
valuable. Still writing of his personal investi-
gations at Aerschot, M. Orts says : —
I entered several houses, chosen haphazard, and I
went through their various landings ; through the
windows and the broken doors I glanced into a
number of other dwellings. Everywhere the furniture
is overturned, torn, and soiled in the vilest manner ;
t.he wallpaper hangs in rags from the walls, the doors
of cellars are broken open, all locks have been forced
open, all cupboards and drawers emptied, linen and
the most incongruous objects scattered on the flooi-s,
together with an incredible number of empty bottles.
In the houses of the well-to-do the pictures have
been slashed, the works of art broken. On the door
of one of them, a large, fine building belonging to
Dr. , one could still read, though partly efTaced.
the following inscription traced in chalk : Biile desis
Haus zu schonen da icirklich friecUiche gule Leulc.
[Please spare this house, as the occupants are peaceful
and good people.] . . . (S) Bannach Wachl-
nifiister. 1 entered the house which was said to have
been occupied by officcis which the solicitude of one
of them seemed to have saved from the general ruin.
On reaching the threshold a smell of spilt wine drew
our attention to hundreds of empty and broken bottles
which filled the hall, the staircase, and even the yard
opening on the garden. The rooms were in inde-
scribable disorder. I walked on a bed of torn clothes,
of pieces of wool torn fi'om open mattresses, every-
where open chests, aiid in every room, by t,he bed, still
more empty bottles. The drawing-room wjus full of
them, dozens of wiiie-gla,sses covered the t.able and
sideboards, by which stood tattered ai-inohairs and
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
43a
eoEiis, whilst, in a corner a piano, with stained key-
boai'il, seemed to have been smaslied by boots. All
showed that tlie place had been, during many days
and nights, the scene of the vilest debauches and
diinkinR bouts.
It will be remembered by those who have read
the preceding chapter that it was at Aerschot
that the German.s claimed to have the strongest
claim to execute bloody reprisals, because the
general in command of the force of occupation
was undoubtedly shot dead in the balcony of the
burgomaster's house. The concluding para-
graph which we shall quote from the Commis-
sion's Fourth Report deals with this matter : —
As for the cause of the calamity which befell this
defenceless town, it originated, according to the
German military authoritier,, in the murder of an
ofTlcer by a civilian whom they name, and who was
immediately shot. This fact remains, however, to be
proved, as it ha-s not been possible to find anyone in
Aei-schot who admits the culpability of Ticlcman'B
son. It is enough to bear in mind at present that
by the invaders' Own admission Aerschot's destruc-
tion has been the result of a deliberate decision. In
the eyes of the German commander, the massacre
of an indeterminate number of innocent people, the
transportation of several hundred othere, the savage
treatment inllicted on old men, women, and cliilden,
the ruin of so many families, the burning and the
sacking of a town of 8,000 souls constitute jastifiable
reprisals for the act of a single individual.
A great part of the Fifth Report deals with the
same subject, giving, among other evidence,
the written statement of Madame Tielemans.
Irom ai-tiwingby c.Mismiii.] SACRILEGE AT AERSCHOT.
German soldiers use the Church as a stable.
iTht Sphtii.
440
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAM.
the widow of the unfortunate burgomaster and
mother of the alleged assassin. Hero is hor
account of the occurrence : —
About 4 o'clock in tho afternoon ray husband was
distributing some cigars to the soldiers, standing out-
sid;? our door. I was with him. Seeing that the
general and his aides-de-camps were watcliing us from
the balcony, I advis^'d him to come in. At this
moment, looking towards tho Grand Place, where
more than 2,000 soldiers wei'e encamped, I saw dis-
tinctly two puffs of smoke. Firing followed. The
Gcnnans were tiring towaixls the houses and breaking
into them. My husband, my cliildren, the servants
and myself had just time to rush to the stairs leading to
the cellars. Tiie Germans were even firing in the halls
of the houses. After a few minutes of great anxiety
one of the general's aides-de-camps came down, say-
ing : —
" The General is dead ; where is the burgoraiister ?"
My husband said to me, " This will be serious for me."
.:\s he was stepping forward, I said to the aide-de-camp,
" You may see, sir, that my liusband did not lire."
" Never mind," he answered, " he is responsible."
My husband was taken away. My son, who was at
my side, led us to another cellar. The same aide-d''-
(•amp then came back and took him away from me,
kicking him along. The poor boy could scarcely walk.
During the morning, while entering the town, the
Germans had find into the windows of the houses ; a
bullet nad entered tho room where my son was and
had wounded him in the leg. After tliey had takim my
son and my husband from me tho Gei-mans led me
through the whole hotis?, levelling their revolver's at
my head. I was made to look at the dead body of
their general ; thim they threw me, with my daughter,
out of the hous(^ without a coat or anything on. They
left us on thi! Grand F'l ine. Wo were surrounded by
a line of soldiers and had to see our d"ar town burn
before our eyes. There, in tho sinister liglit of the
lire, I saw for the last time, towards 1 o'clock in the
morning, fa her and son bound together. Followed
by my brother-in-law, they were being brought to
their death.
Bearing in mind the disorderly drinking bouts
of which the subsequent state of Aerschot,
littered with empty bottles, bore such convincing
testimony, it seems at least more probable that
the general was struck by a stray bullet
recklessly fired in the direction of the burgo-
master's house by one of the German soldiers
than that he should have been deliberately
murdered by the boy. No one appiuenily
clainned to have seen the shot fired and no
weapon was found in the house. No inquiry
was held. It was simply decided to make
an example of frightfulness, as a lesson to
the Belgians.
And, since nothing is to be gained by prolonga-
tion of the evidence, already overwhelming, on
these nauseating topics, we here close our re-
view of the Reports of the Commission. We will
only note that on the appearance of the first of
these Reports the English Press Bureau offered
the comment that " these atrocities ajpear to
be committed in villages and throughout the
countryside with tho deliberate intention of
terrorizing the people, and so making it un-
necessary to leave troops in occupation of small
places or to protect lines of communication. In
large places like Brussels, whjre the diplomatic
representatives of neutral Powers are eye-
witnesses, there appear tf) have been no ex-
cesses." Subsequent evni ts were to prove this
comment not wholly well groimded. In general,
while much of tho brutality exercised was
dotibtless due to dnmkenness and tho gross
impulses of imrestrained soldiers, much was
obviously planned beforehand and carried
out by the express command of the Gorman
leaders.
CHAPTER XXVI.
THE GERMAN ADVANCE ON PARIS:
BATTLES OF NAMUR, CHARLEROI,
MONS.
The German Objective — An Invasion Tibouoh Belgium Inevitable — Strength of the
French Eastern Frontier and Weakness of French Northern Frontier- — Expenditure on
Fortresses — Systems of Fortification — The German and French Plans — A Rapid Offensive
Imperative for the Germans — The British Expeditionary Force and its Place in General
Joffre's Scheme — Composition of the Expeditionary Force — Sib John French and his
Record — Mobilization, Composition, and Transport of the British Army to France — The
Theatre of War and Position op the British in it — The Kaiser and the " Contemptible "
British Army — March or the Germans on the Sambre- — Capture of Namur — Forcing op the
Sambre at and near Charleroi — Battle of Mons.
WE have seen from the foregoing chap-
ters that the German plans were com-
pletely upset by the gallant resistance
offered by the fortress of Liege and
the determined opposition of tlie Belgian Army.
It is true that rarely can any operations of war
be carried on continuously in accordance with a
previously prepared scheme, for, as ]Moltke
pointed out, the measures taken for any stra-
tegical movement only hold good up to the first
collision between the opposing forces, the result
of which may strongly influence or even com-
pletely change the direction of the line of
action. It is more correct, therefore, to say
that war is condscted in accordance with some
" General Idea," which bears in mind certain
specific objects.
The first and most important of these is the
destruction of the enemy's field armies, for once
these are crushed his power of resistance is at an
end, and h3 must perforce yield to the wishes of
the victor.
Still, history shows that while this is the main
objective, there are others, the attainment of
which will often influence the result of a war.
The capture of important sources of supply,
Vol. I.— Part 12. 441
whether of food or munitions of war, will have
some effect, and in highly centraUzed States the
occupation of the enemy's capital has always
produced a profound impression.
Remembering the results previously obtained
by the fall of Paris, the Germans believed that
its reduction would produce a like effect in the
present struggle. Hence the leading idea in the
Gennan plan was a quick rush through Belgiiun,
to be followed by a rapid advance on Paris.
It might be bombarded from all sides or
at any rate a sufficient nimiber of its forts
were to be reduced by this means, and then it
was believed the city itself would soon surrender
under the threat of destruction.
With the large forces which the Germans put
in the field at the outset of the war it was abso-
lutely necessary to have a long line of strategical
deployment, i.e., the line of country along which
the forces were to be developed as a preliminary
to their advance into France. To move tlirough
the Vosges was impossible on any large scale
owing to the paucity of roads. Moreover,
the heads of the German columns debouching
tlirough the passes would have been brought up
by the long line of barrier forts from Epinal
442
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ROYAL MARINE LIGHT INFANTRY ARRIVE ON THE
This was the first time they bad worn khaki.
CONTINENT.
[Record PresS'
to Belfort. The Gap of Belfort, through
which the Austrian Army under Schwartzenberg
came in 1814, was stopped by the important for-
tress erected at that point. There remained only
two zones of invasion, viz., that between Nancy
and Thionville, and that from Maubeuge to Dtm-
kirk, the latter being approachable only through
Belgium. For between Thionville and Maubeuge
lay the difficult country of the Ardennes, covered
with woods, with few railroads leading towards
France, and with roads unsmted for the move-
ment of large bodies of men with their heavy
military wheel carriage. This region, therefore,
could only be used for a comparatively small
portion of the invading army.
The advance through Belgium then had
many advantages ; it was hoped "that ithe
Government of the country would yield to
force majeure and oppose no hindrance to it.
It was believed the Belgian Army was of but
little value and could be swept out of the way.
Thus the Germans would reach a point on the
French frontier only about 120 miles from Paris,
and their further advance would turn the line
of defences on the French eastern frontier. It
was Icnown that those of the Northern frontier
were not capable of resisting an attack with
modern weapons, and would, therefore, not
oppose a vigorous resistance to the onward
inarch of the Germans.
France, after the war of 1870, had entered
on a period on which it was admitted she must
at first assume a defensive attitude towards a
German mvasion, and she had constructed a
\ast series of fortifications at a cost of over
£95,000,000 to protect her frontiers. Two
main lines of invasion had to be dealt with,
which may roughly be described as being the
one tlirough Belgium against the line Lille-
Maubeuge, the other from the Bavarian Pala-
tinate between Treves and Nancy. The Com-
mittee of Defence, presided over by General do
Riviere, proposed to moot both dangers by
lines of works directly barring them.
The eastern frontier was naturally considered
the more important, as the danger of irrup-
tion in that direction was more imminent
since the northern frontier was to some extent
rendered secure by the neutrality of Belgium,
guaranteed jointly by France, Prussia, and Eng-
land ; accordingly it received the first and
greatest attention. The fortifications of Paris
also were so improved that by 1878 it was con-
sidered that the enormous perimeter a blockad-
ing army would have to occupy — not less than
120 miles — would involve such a subtraction
from the German field armies as to reduce the
latter to a very restricted offensive and neutralize
the advantage that the numerically gi-eater
population of Germany, and consequently
larger army, gave to that country.
But the heavy cost of construction prevented
the carrying out of the plan of work for the
northern frontier in its entirety. The first pro-
ject had comprised a very complete defensive
organization. An army was to be assembled
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
443
in a central position between the Scarpe and
the Sambre, ready to resist a frontal attack
from Belgium or to act on the flanks of a force
penetrating from that country into France. It
was to bo supported on its left by Douai and a
number of forts which were to protect the inun-
dations to be created on the Scarpe. The
Scheldt was also to furnish similar obstacles,
which wore to be covered by an important for-
tress at Valenciennes. The right end was to be
defended by Maubeugo, to be made into an
entrenched camp,* while minor works were to
support the latter and also the centre at Ques-
noy and other places. Between the Scarpe and
the Lys, Lille was also to be made a great en-
trenched camp, and further to be protected by
inundations, while on the coast Dunkirk was to
be raised to the status of an important fortress,
and Gravelines and Calais were also to be
defended.
Further to the south-east of Maubeuge,
M^zieres on the Meure was to be converted into
a powerful fortress, and forts were to be erected
at Rocroy and Hirson ; Montmedy and Longwy
were to be strengthened.
The discovery of high explosives which could
be employed instead of ordinary gunpowder
•An entrenched camp Is a region enclosed by a ring of forts. If
constructed round a town, the latter is often protected by a continu-
ous line of fortifications known as an " enceinte." This secures the
town from being rushed should a section of the forta be overpowered.
Tlie absence of an enceinte allowed the Germans to nish the town of
Li6ge before the forts had yielded.
for the charges of shells — thereby enormously
increasing their disruptive effect — brought about
a complete change in the military engineering
world. The French designers of the seventies
Jiad built their fortifications to resist the old
weapons ; against them could be brought the
new. Not only were these superior in the
eflieacy of their projectiles, but it became plain
that heavier guns would, with the great improve-
ments made in the construction of carriages,
be brought into the field. For instance, in the
middle eighties the Germans kept in constant
readiness at Mainz a so-called light siege train
of sixty 15m. howitzers intended for use against
barrier-forts on the eastern French frontier.*
The enormous sum of money already expended
on the provision of fortifications, which, as we
have seen, amoimted to nearly a hundred
million poimds sterling, precluded the complete
remodelling of the whole system, but con-
siderable sums Were devoted to improving that
portion which faced Lorraine, and this was
largely provided from savings due to the non-
completion of works on the Belgian frontier.
Tnose projected at Dunkirk, Valenciennes,
and M^zieres were postponed, but Fort des
AyoUes at the latter place was constructed.
A like fate befell St. Omer, Douai,
Peronne and other works which it had been
' Equivalent to an English 6in. weapon, firing a shell of about
901b. weight.
A SECTION OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS AT THE FRONT.
{NtvDiPapiT /Uusiratums.
444
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
BRITISH TROOPS AT THE FRONT.
Photograph taken in a French town.
[London, Neu-s Agency.
originally intended to erect on this frontier.
Nor was Lille finished in accordance with the
original plan, and was, therefore, in the Great
War, not defended. Moreover, the second
line which it had been determined to build
from La Fere-Laon-Rheims was never pro-
parly completed, and thus offered little or
no resistance to the onward march of the
Germans.
There had, indeed, long been growing up a
school of engineers which held that the future
of fortification lay in the use of concrete, a
more homogeneous material, and therefore not
so easily destroyed as brick or stone work, and
which believed that the only protection for
gims wm to be found in armoured positions
made of concrete (later on ferroconcrete), with
the guns placed in steel defended cupolas.
Spasmodic efforts had been made in this direc-
tion a few years after the termination of the
Franco-German War. One of the old Antwerp
forts had been given an armoured turret. The
Germans at first proposed to use large masses
of chilled iron to cover gun positions for defence
against attacjk from the sea. Rumania built
a ring of forts armed with 6-ineh guns in
turrets round Bukarest. Lastly, that great
master of fortification, the Belgian General
Brialmont, who may be truly called the
modern Vauban, adopted the system of con
creto and iron which ho applied to the fortresses
of Namur and Liege and the intervening fort of
Huy, all on the Meuse, fortresses intended to
bar the entry of the Germans into Belgium to
Liege and to the ramifications of railways from
that town to Brussels, to Kamiu- and through
the Ardennes, and to prevent them using the
main railway from Aix-la-Chapelle beyond the
frontier. Recent events seem to show liis views
were scarcely correct ; he certainly did not fore-
see the enormous development in power of
artillery, and, moreover, he armed his forts with
too light gims, viz., 6in. and 4.7in. howitzers
firing shells weighing about 901b. and 40Ib.
respectively, which could not successfully cope
with the far heavier weapons brought against
tliem. It cannot be said that the resistance
offered by Namur was adequate to the amount
spent on its defences. In the case of Ii6ge,
however, the stand it made was of the highest
value to the Allies.
The deduction is obvious; if the concrete
and turret system is to be employed, the very
largest gims must be used and the most powerful
cupolas. Will the result be adequate to the
price paid ? It seems very doubtful, and more
than ever the old adage seems to hold good—
" Place assiegec, place prise."
It was this consideration which gave rise
to another school of engineers which held that
all elaborate fortification was a mistake ; that
forts should be built of earth for infantry
defence only, and that guns should be placed
in positions carefully thought out, but not
constructed till attack was imminent. They
pinned their faith on mobility and regarded a
railwav round the position tb be defended as
the most important item in a scheme of
defence which would allow weapons and
munitions to be transferred from one pomt to
another as the requirements of the case de-
manded. Such a railway would, of course, be
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
443
covered from the enemy's fire by a parapet of
gentle slope, as shown below. Here 6, h, b, are
the earthen forts, c. r. c, the railway.
Section through d. e.
Sebastopiil and I'levna were pood cxampies
of the possibilities of such a system. The lines
of Torres- Vedras in 1811, constructed by
Wellington for the defence of Lisbon, were
beyond the power of Mass6na's army to attack.
Tlu' forts constructed at the end of the
19th century for the defence of London
were based on these ideas. On the advent
of a Radical Government to power the
whole project, however, was abandoned.
To understand the fighting which marked
the opening of the war it is necessary to realize
the General Ideas of both the German and
French commandt-rs. Hoth were simple in
their conception. The former proposed to
overrun Bcf^ium and to move rapidly across
the French frontier down to Paris and, after
the destruction of the British Fleet, to invade
England and dictat<» peace in London on such
terms as Germany might determine. The
French plan offered a more modest progi'amme.
At first it was to be defensive. An anny was
to watch the debouch of the Germans from
Belgivmi, another was to watch the Eastern
frontier of France from a position behind
Verdun. I'robably a force was to be assembled
within the pentagon formed by the entrenched
camp of l<]pinal, T^angres, Besan^on, Dijon, and
i?elfort, while behind tliere was to be a reserve
ready to be thrown towards whichever flank
required it. None of these arrangements was
carried out in its entirety. *
With a reprehensible neglect of the wishes of
the great War Lord, the Belgians determined
to play the part of honovirable men and defend
their country, llie Belgian Army barred the
way and Li^ge wsis prepared to defend itself
to the bitter end. So certain had the Germans
been of the easiness of the task of disposing
of the Belgian forces that the troops which
first invaded Belgivim appear to have besen
A BELGIAN CAR i DRAWN BY DOGS. [Sporl c„J G,„cral.
Has been used in France for transporting machine-guns and ammunition.
446
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE BRITISH.
British troops are lining tlie route.
[London News Agency.
imperfectly mobilized and to have possessed
very little siege artillery to deal with the forts.
The result is well known. Liege held out ;
the Germans uselessly expended thousands of
men, and the time-table of campaign so care-
fully drawn up by the German demi-gods of the
Imperial General Stafi had to be radically re-
vised. The pos.session of Li6ge and its sister-
fortress of Namur was vital to the Germans,
becau.se without them the main railway line
through Belgium to the French frontier was not
available nor could the other lines from Li6ge
be used. But the gallantry displayed in the
old archbishopric town did something more.
It was diflficult for a nation like the French, so
brave in itself and such an admirer of bravery
in others, to avoid the principle of moving to the
sound of the cannon. Part of the French north-
em army, therefore, was moved up to aid their
allies. When Namur fell and the enemy was
enabled to bring up more troops and supplies,
the advanced force found itself exposed to direct
attEick by far superior numbers, and, what was
more dangerous, to flank attack on its right by
Germans coming through the Ardennes. In the
meantime Sir John French had brought up two
divisions and the cavalry division of the English
Army, in accordance with the arrangenient
come to with General Joffre, to occupy the
ground on the left of the French, and this, as we
xhall see, helped to stem the German advance.
Before going into considerations of the fighting
which thus arose, let us consider briefly the
strategical events up to the time of the jvmctioii
of the British with the French.
In the German plan time was the essence of
the bargain. To rush down to Paris and captiu-e
it was to form the first act of the drama. As
the main advance of the Emperor's troops was
to be made through Belgium, a considerable part
of his army moved in this direction, and of the
whole German Army by far the greater part was
used against the French, whom it was desired to
crush before dealing with the Russians, who
would, it was calculated, be scarcely concen-
trated on the joint frontier before the French
were put out of action. This plan, however,
had in it the fatal error that no one of the German
adversaries did what the German General Staff
liad laid down as its duty to do. On the Allies'
left Belgium resisted, the Russians mobilized far
more rapidly than was anticipated, while all
along the line of invasion the French put up
so good a fight that the cooperation of the
German centre and left wing coming through
Luxemburg and Lorraine was limited to obtain-
ing contact with their right wing.
Of the 25 Army Corps of their first-line
troops four only seem to have been employed
against Russia and 21 against France.* Of
these aV)out four were used at first for the opera-
tions against Li6ge, and) in the advance against
' The French had 21 Anny Corps. i.e„ the same number as the
Germans, and of about equal strength. The Germans imt
Into the held 21 Reserve Corps, Ijesides a number of Land-
wehr and even Ijvndstunu divisions, Imt all of these were probably
not available at first. Tne number of Reserve Divisions ui Ihr
French is uncertalu.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
447
the retiring Allies, appear to have been paitly
on the left of the Gorman First Army, which
formed the right of the force following up the
left of the Allies in tlieir retreat towards Paris.
Now, it was essential for the Germans to keep
the French occupied on the whole line of their
north and north-eastern frontiers and along the
intervening section between these two regions
facing the Ardennes. For if the line of attack
tlirough Belgium was clearly indicated from the
first, it would be possible for the French, with
their extensive network of railways stretching
along the line on which their troops were de-
ployed, to move their troops so as to concentrate
in superior force against them. Roughly, at the
outset, so far as the regular troops were con-
cerned, the numbers must have been fairly
equal, and the German superiority, wliich
undoubtedly existed, must have been due to
the use of Reserve Corps from the beginning.
But this superiority never had any great effect
on the struggle. Why-? In the first place, the
French incursion into Alsace from Belfort and
over the Vosges seems to have diverted a con-
siderable body of German troops against it. In
the second, there can be no doubt that Verdim
and the forts around it were able to resist any
attempts made against them because the Ger-
mans were not able to spare their heaviest
artillery for use in this direction, and because
the fortifications were more thoroughly prepared
than those facing Belgium. Hence their
infantry advances were all eventually repelled.
The line of battle, it is true, fluctuated, but,
on the whole, the French held their own on their
right flank and in the centre.
When the Allied left was driven back the
distance retreated was much greater than was
the rearward movement on their right. The
explanation of this is simple. Under modem
conditions frontal attack is exceedingly difficult
and costly, and almost impossible against a
well -hold line. Hence, in the centre, where
flank attack on any large scale was impossible,
progress was necessarily slow. On the right
(the Verdun-Belfort) flank, the defensive posi-
tions held by the French were too strong when
directly attacked, while to outflank them was
impossible because, great as were the numbers
the Germans brought into the 6eld, they did
not suffice to devote sufficient force to encircling
the right as well as the left of the Allies. The
Germans had definitely committed themselves
to the former course ; they had perforce to
abandon the lattqr for fear their general front,
becoming too thin, should be penetrated, which
would have given rise to a highly dangerous
position, as it would have exposed the portion
cut off from the rest (which would certainly
have been the right wing) to complete disaster.
It is an axiom of war that every offensive
must in time come to an end, because when
BRITISH FIELD GUN.
Ck)vered with wheat to conceal its presence from tke eaemy.
{Daily Mirror
448
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
invading an enemy's country troops have to be
left behind to guard communications, which the
defenders do not need to do as the country is
friendly to them. This was clearly shown in
Russia in 1812, when out of the 600,000 with
which Napoleon crossed the Niemen only 90,000
were available for the battle of Borodino.
When Kluck with the first German Army fol-
lowed up the British, extending his line more
and more to the right, there came a time when
he had so weakened it that it was Uable to pene-
tration, combined with flank attack, by the
reinforcements the British received, and by
the bringing up to the extreme left of the Paris
array. This was impossible at first because
very large forces were committed to the offen-
sive operations in Alsace. But as soon as these
came to an end, the French being driven back
by the superior forces the Germans brought
against them, the attitude on the eastern frontier
became entirely defensive, and Pau was sent
oB with the 6th Army to support the British
left. The German leaders began to appreciate
this danger when they saw the peril which
their own extension of the right wing had led
them into, and from the end of the first week
in September they saw the need for drawing in
their horns. Instead of the Allies' left wing
being threatened with outflankment, it was
the German right wing which was now in danger ;
hence the pulling it in and Truck's fiank march
of concentration to join the German centre.
Then the Allies assumed the offensive.
To the upsetting of the German plans by
compelling them to abandon all attempts on
ParLs— the second act of the Kaiser's drama —
the British largely contributed.
The composition of our Expeditionary Amiy
was as follows : — *
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF :
FIELD-M-A-RSHAL SIR JOHN FRENCH.
Chief of the Staff.
Lt.-Gen. Sik Abchibald Murray, K.C.B.
Ma.i.-Gkn. Sir W. Robertson. K.C.V.O..
Quartermastek-General.
Maj.-Gen. Sib Nevil Macready. K.C.B.,
Adj utant-G enebal.
1st ARMY CORPS.
Lt.-Gev. Sir Douglas Haiq, K.C.B., &c.
( 1st and 2nd Divisions.)
1st DIVISION— Maj.-Gen. Lomax.
1st INFANTRY BRIGADE— Brig.-Gen. Maxsb,
O.B.
1st Coldstream Guards.
1st Scots Guards.
1st Royal Highlanders.
•2iid Royal Munster Fusiliers.
2nd INFANTRY BRIGADE— Brig.-G EN. Boi^TN,
O.B.
2nd Royal Sussex Regiment.
1st North Lancashire Regiment.
1st Northamptonshire Regiment.
2nd King's Royal Rifle Corjjs.
3rd INFANTRY BRIGADE— I3rio.-Gen. LANnoK,
C.B.
1st Royal West Surrey Regiment.
1st South Wales Borderers..
1st Gloucester Regiment.
2nd Welsh Regiment.
ROYAL ARTILLERY— Brig.-Ges. Findlay, C.B.
XXV., XXVI., and XXXIX. Brigades Roya)
Field Artillery, 18-pounders.
XLIII. Howitzer Brigade.
26th Heavy Battery, 60-pounders.
ROYAL ENGINEERS— Lr.-COL. Schbeiber.
23rd and 26th Field Companies and 1st Signal
Company.
There was also a Cavalry Regiment with the
division.
• These details have been compiled entl'ely from the Army List
and bv reference to the Field Service Pocket Book, and from noti.i»
which have apiieare 1 in the newspapers.
MEAUX FROM THE RIVER MARNE. y^p.n and G.ncal.
Showing the broken bridge and sunken house-boats.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
449
2nd division.
41 h INFANTRY BUIGADK^
2nd Grenadier Guards.
2nd Coldstream Guards.
3rd Coldstiiani „
1st Irish Guards
6tli INFANTRY BRIGADlv IJrig.-Gen. Hakino,
O.B.
2nd Worcester Regiment.
2nd Oxford and Bucks Regiment.
2nd Highland Light Infantry.
2nd Connaught Rangere.
6tli INFANTRY BRIGADE— Brio. -Gen. I{. II.
Davies, O.B.
1st Liverpool Regiment.
2nd South Staflordshire Regiment.
Ist Berkshire Regiment.
1st King's Royal Rifle Corps.
ROYAL ARTILLERY— Brkj.-Oen.I'krceval, D.S.O.
XXXIV., XXXVI., and XLI. Brigade Royal
Field Aitillerj', 18-poundera.
XLIV. Brigade Howitzere.
35th Heavy Battery, 60-poimders.
ROYAL ENGINEERS— Lt.-Col. Boys.
5th and 11th Field Ooni))anies, Ist Bridging
Train. 2nd Signal Company.
There was also a Cavalry Regiment.
2nd ARMY CORPS.
Oenebal Sir H. L. Smith- Doruien, G.C.B. &c.
(3rd and 5th Divisions).
3rd DIVISION— Maj.-Oen. U. I. W. Hamilton, C.B.
Tth INFANTRY BRIGADE— Brio.-Gen. AIc-
Cracken, O.B.
3rd Worcester Regiment.
2nd South Lancashire Regiment.
1st Wiltshire Regiment.
2nd Royal Irish Rifles.
8lh INFANTRY BRIGADE— Brig.-Gen. Doran,C.1{.
2nd Royal Scots.
2nd Royal Irish Regiment,
tth Middlesex Regiment.
1st Gordon Highlanders.
!ith INl^-ANTRY BRIGADE— Brio.-Gkn. Shaw. C.B.
1st Northumberland Fusilii is.
4th Royal Fusiliers.
Ist Lincoln Regiment.
1st Royal Scots Fusiliei's.
ROYAL ARTILLERY- -Brio.-Gen. Wi.ng, C.B.
XXIII., XL., and XLH. Brig.ide Royal Field
Artillery, 1 8-poundei-s.
XXX. Brigade Howitzei's.
48th Battery, 60-pounders.
ROYAL ENGINEERS— Lt.-Coi.. Wilson.
56th and S7th Field Companies. 3rd Signal
Company.
There was also a Cavaliy Regiment unidentifi-
able fiom the Army List.
5th
Sir
Ferguson,
DIVISION— Ma-i.-Gen.
Bt., O.B.
1.3tli INKANTRY BRIGADE— Brig.-Gen. Cuth-
bert, C.B.
2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers.
2nd West Riding Ri^giment.
1st Royal West Kent Regiment.
2nd Yorkshire Liglit Infantry.
14th INFANTRY BRIGADE— Brig.-Gen. Kolt.C.H.
2nd Suffolk Regiment.
1st East Surrey Regiment.
1st Dcike of Cornwall's Ligiit Infantry.
2nd Manchester Regiment.
A BRITISH OUTPOST.
On the look-out for the enemy.
[Daily Mirror
loth
Signal
INFANTRY BRIGADE— Brig.-Gen. Count
Gleichen, C.B., &c.
1st Norfolk Regiment.
1st Bedford Regiment.
1st Cheshire Regiment.
1st Dorset Regiment.
ROYAL ARTILLERY— Biiio.-Gi-:n. Heaulam, C.B.
XV., XVII., XVIII. Brigades Koyal Fielil
Artillery, 18-pounders.
VIII. Howitzer Brigade.
108th Heavy Battery, 60-pounders.
ROYAL ENGINEERS— Lt.-Col. Tulloch.
Tth and 59th Field Companies.
Companies.
Tliere was also a Cavalry Regiment.
The 4th Division apparently formed part of
the 3rd Army Corps, the other Division being
the 6th. Only the 4th Division took part in
these operations
It was composed as follows : —
. 4th DIVISION- M.\j.-Gen. Snow, C.li.
lOth INFANTRY BRIGADE- Bbig.-Gen. J. A. L.
Haldane. C.B.
1st Itoyal Warwick Regiment.
2nd Soatorlh Highlanders.
1st Royal Irish Fusiliers.
2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
lllh INFANTRY BRIGADE— liRiG.-tiEs. Hu.nter-
Weston, C.B.
Isl Somei-set Light Infantry.
1st East Ijaneasliire Regiment .
1st Hampshire Regiment.
1st Rifle Brigade.
460
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ENTRENCHING A 60-POUNDER GUN.
{Daily Mirror.
12th INPANTKY BRIGADE— Bbio.-Gbn. H. P- M.
Wilson, C.B.
1st Royal Lancashire Regiment.
1st Lancashire Fusiliers.
2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
2nd Essex Regiment.
ROYAL ARTILLERY— Bbio.-Ge.s. Milne, O.B.
XIV., XXIX. and XXXII. Brigades Royal Field
Artillery, 18-pounders.
XXXVII. Brigade Howitzers
31st Battery, 60 pounders.
ROYAL ENGINEERS.
o4th Field Company. 2nd Bridging Train.
There was also a Cavalry Regiment.
The Cavalry witli the Expeditionary Force
numbered five brigades, according to the Army
List : —
1st C.WALRY BRIGADE, under Bbio.-Gek. 0. J.
Hiiioos, C.B.
2nd Dragoon Guards.
5th Dragoon Guards.
1 1th Hussars.
2nd CAVALRY BRIGADE, unier. Bnin.-GEN. De
Lisle, C.B.
4th Dragoon Guards.
9th I/incers.
18th Hussars.
3rd CAVALRY BRIGADE, under Brio.-Gen. H.
GOUGH, C.B.
4th Hussars,
.'jth Lancers.
16th Lancers.
4tli CAVALRY BRIGADE, under Brio.-Gen. the
Hon. C. E. Binoham, C.B.
Composite Regiment Household Cavalry.
6th Dragoon Guards.
3rd Hussars.
5th CAVALRY BRIGADE, under BraG.-(iEN-. .Sir
P. W. Chetwodb, Bt., D.S.O.
2nd Dragoons.
12th Lancers.
20th Hussars.
Of these, the first four formed the Cavalry
Division, under Maj.-Gen. AUenby, C.B. Other
troops with the Division would be two Horse
Artillery brigades, or 24 gvins, 2 machine guns
per regiment, or 24 in all. It had, in addition,
one Field Squadron of Engineers and one Signal
Squadron.
The average strength of a British Division
may be taken as 12,000 infantry, one regiment
of cavalry, and 76 guns, viz., 54 18-
pounders, 18 howitzers and 4 60 -pounder
gims for the heavy battery ; two Field Com-
panies of Engineers, besides signallers and the
train services for ammunition and food supply.
Altogether the division has 24 machine guns
distributed among the twelve battalions, two
to each. For the purposes of calculating the
fighting strength in the line of battle, it is the
infantry and artillery alone which coimt.
Sir John French, the generalissimo, was turn-
ing sixty-two, and, therefore, a couple of years
yoimger than Lord Kitchener. Like Sir Evelyn
Wood and other illustrious officers, he had been
originally destined for a naval career. The son
of a naval officer, and, though born in Kent, of
Irish descent on his father's side, he had joined
the Britamvia in 1866, and served as a naval
cadet and midshipman for four years. His
experience in the Navy had caused him to hold
strong views on the advantage of training
soldiers from their boyhood for the arduous
profession of arms. " I have," he had publicly
said in the January of 1914, " always been an
ardent advocate of the principle that youths
and boys who are destined to become officers
in the Army should commence a special military
training at the earliest possible age. The
principles of war have to be known and remem-
bered, and its practice conducted under very
distracting conditions. The science of war
. . . . must, so to speak, form part of our
flesh and blood, and the earlier in life this know-
ledge is instilled and acquired, the more instruc-
tive, valuable and lasting it is likely to be." He
had left the Navy, and through the Militia had
entered the 8th Hussars in 1874. Transferred
immediately to the 19th Hussars, he had, after
being Adjutant to the Auxiliary Forces, served
THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR.
461
through I>ord Wolseley's Nile Campaign, and
he had been present at the actions of Abu Klea
and Metemmeh. In 1889, at the age of thirty-
seven, he became Colonel of his regiment, and
was the first to establish the squadron system
of training which was subsequently adopted
throughout the Army. He had attracted the
notice of Lord Wolseley and, from 1893 to 1894,
he was employed on the Staff as Assistant Adju-
tant-General of Cavalrj', and, froni 1895 to 1897,
as Assistant Adjvitant-General at Headquarters.
In the latter year he was appointed Brigadier
to command the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, and in
1899 he was transferred as temporary Major-
General to the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot.
The South African War broke out and he
departed for Natal in conmiand of the cavalry.
He directed the troops at the victory of Elands-
laagte, so graphically described by the late
George Steovens, and he was present at the
actions of Reitfontein and Lombard's Kop.
He left Ladysmith in the very last train to start
before that town was completely beleaguered.
" Had it not been for this," he is reported to
have said, " I should never have had the luck
subsequently to command the Cavalry Brigade,
and someone else would have been filling my
shoes to-day. and," ho added with characteristic
modesty, " probably filling them a good deal
better."
His conduct during the remainder of the war
belied his self-depreciation. At Colesberg, with
a skeleton force, he guarded Cape Colony while
Lords Roberts and Kitchener were preparing
for the great offensive movement to relieve
Kimberley and Cecil Rhodes, tmd, indirectly,
to relieve Ladysmith and Sir George White.
It was French who, as Lieut.-General, com-
manded the cavalry which galloped through the
Boers at Klip Drift and raised the siege of
Kimberley. From Kimberley he was called bj
Lord Kitchener to Paardeberg, where he headed
the retreating Cronje. Throughout the ro-
mainder of the war he was one of the right-
hand men, first of Lord Roberts, and then of
Lord Kitchener, being mentioned in dispatches
eight times.
On his return to England in 1902 he com-
manded the 1st Army Corps at Aldershot until,
in 1907, ho succeeded the Duke of Connaught
as Inspector-General of the Forces. In 1911 he
was appointed Chief of the Imperial General
Staff. The eflficiency of the British Army,
especially the Cavalry (the conversion of which
into mottnted infantry he had strongly and, aa
it tiurned out, very properly resisted), was
largely due to his exertions and ability.
He was a cool, level-headed soldier, and — as
his action in resisting the tide of plausible
opinion which was for relegating tlie lance and
sword to military museums had shown — an
independent thinker. Though he had written
little, he was .widely read in military history
and military science. Ho liad attended the
French manoeuvres, and was liked and respected
by the French officers. His affection for their
BRITISH ARTILLERY ON THE MARCH.
{Phohprtss.
462
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A RAILWAY WRECK. Ii>ri "-^ CntrM.
A train of wounded was precipitated into tlie River Ourcq near Lizy, caused by the blowing
up of a bridge, tiie driver believing the line to be safe.
nation was sincere and luidoubted. Seventeen
years older than Cromwell at Marston Moor,
ten years older than Marlborough when he took
command of the allied forces in Holland against
Louis XIV., fifteen years older than Sir John
Moore at the date of the latter's daring stroke
against the communications of Napoleon in 1808,
seventeen years older than Wellington on the
field of Waterloo, and five years younger than
Lord Roberts when he landed at the Cape in
1 000, Field-Marshal French was about to imder-
take perhaps the most difficult and momentous
operation ever entrusted to a British General.
Would some future soldier say of him as he had
said of Wolfe in the January preceding the
fateful August of 1914 : — " What has struck me
more than anything in reading his history has
been the extraordinary fertility of his brain in
the ingenious and varied forms of stratagem
wluch he conceived to deceive his enemy and
effect surprise ! " A month after the Expe-
ditionary Force landed in France, Lord Kit.
chener, his old commander, in the House of
Lords, was referring to the " consummate skill
and calm courage of Sir John French in the
conduct of the strategic withdrawal in the face
of vastly superior forces. His Majesty's Govern-
ment," pursued Lord Kitchener, " appreciated
to the full the value of the service which Sir
John French had rendered to this country and
to the cause of the Allies."
The order to mobilize was issued to
the British generals who were to command
the Expeditionary Force on August 4th, while
at the same time the General I'osl Offlco
delivered to the Reservists orders for rejoining
their reginients. On the 5th, the depots \\(>ro
delivering clothes and equipments to tlie
Reservists who, clothed and equipped, were
dispatched to their regiments. Moiiiiwhile,
to guard against alien enemies interfering with
the railway traffic, the Special Service Section
of the 'J'erritorial Force was posted on the
lines, bridges, culverts and cuttings of the
railroads. All Governmcnit stores, harbours,
docks and transports wore also protected.
By the incorporation of the Reservists
the Army was stiffened with men in the prime
of life, who, after a much longer term of dis-
cipline than that of soldiers in Continental
Armies, had afterwards been forced to think
and act for themselves in the various exigencies
of civil business.
For each Reservist the clothes and equipment
required for a campaign were kept in readiness.
The boots furnished were the best military
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
453
boots in the world. Times had changed
since George Steevens, referring to the equipment
of the Britisli contingent sent to Omdiu:man,
uTOte that the " lioots our British troops were
expected to march in had not even a toe-cap,"
and that " the soles peeled oft, and instead
of a solid double sole revealed a layer of
shoddy packing sandwiched between two
thin slices of leather."
An army marches not only on its feet but on
its belly, and both facts had been fully appre-
ciated. The organization for feeding the men
and bringing up supplies of all kinds in the
field were of the most modern kind. Motor
lorries for the transport of stores had been
abundantly provided, and soon the roads
of France were to be traversed with automobiles
and vehicles conunandeered from the commercial
firms of Great Britain and Ireland.
Within a week tho Expeditionary Force
was ready to start for France. This was
entirely due to the General Staff at the War
Office, and tho fact that the concentration of the
troops worked with machine-like regularity
showed how admirably their work of preparation
had been done.
The next step was to transport the army to
the seat of war. The railways had been taken
over by the Government, and were being run
witli the a.ssistance of a Committee of Civilian
Managers. The first Army Service Corps
unit left for the Lines of Communication at
8 a.m. on the initial day of mobilization.
Train after train loaded with soldiers passed
to the ports of embarcation. At the quays
the process of conveying the troops and ma-
terials of war was handed over to the Navy.
How the Navy performed its task will be
described in a subsequent chapter. Convojod
by the li'leet, the Expeditionary Force was
carried without mishap to the shores of France.
At Boulogne, Havre, and the other points
where the Expeditionary Force was lande^d,
and where in advance rest-camps had bi-eii
prepared for it, the troops were received with
the wildest enthusia.sm. On August 14th the
British Commander-in- Chief, who had been
met on his landing by Comte Daru, arrived at
the French Headquarters, and the next day he
visited Paris to pay his respects to the President
of the French Republic.
To aid intercourse with their new allies, a.s
few of the privates and non-commissioned officers
could speak French, the men had been given
a half-sheet typowTitton French-Englisii dic-
tionary, containing the words which it was most
necessary for them to know, and a staff of
interpreters drawn from various sources in
Gieat Britain was provided for them.
From the rest-camps, almost the whole of
the 1st and 2nd Corps — the 3rd Corps had not
yet arrived — ^proceeded to the Belgian frontier.
It was in a stay but determined spirit that
the British marched to meet the most formid-
able engine of war ever constructed in the history
ci
r
tarr-..
A FRENCH RED CROSS TRAIN WHICH WAS DERAILED AND PRECIPITATED
INTO THE RIVER. lU«dfrwood md Undervi:ood.
454
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
of man. One incident, however, had cast a
momentary gloom over the Army ; General
Grierson, who commanded the 2nd Corps, had
died of heart fai'ure on the 17th August. No
British officer was better acquainted wnth the
merits and demerits of the German Army.
Years before he had conveyed to his fellow-
soldiers the result of liis researches on Germany
(in his "Armed Strength " of the German Army).
He was fifty-four years old at the date of his
death. His place was filled by General Sir
Horace Smith-Dorrien.
The position assigned to the British Army by
General Joffre was north of the Sambre, a tribu-
tary of the Meuse, into which the Sambre flowed
at Namur, a Belgian ring-fortress. The bulk of
the Allied Army was disposed in the area
bounded on the west by the Oise, wliich enters
the Seine a few miles below Paris, on the north
by the Sambre, on the east by the Meuse, and on
the south by the Seine, and by its nortlaern
tributary, the Aube, The headwaters of the
Seine, Aube and Mease are on or near the
plateau of Langres, which was guarded by the
fortress of that name. Between the sources
of the Aube and the Meuse rises the Mame,
which, traversing Vitry, Chalons-sur-Mame,
Epemay, Chateau Thierry, La Fert6, Meaux,
enters the Seine within the vast entrenched
camp of Paris.
From Vitry the Mame-Rhine canal started
for Strassburg, also the terminus of the Rhone-
Rhine canal. At La Ferte the Petit Morin,
which runs through Montmirail, empties itself
from the south into the Mame, while, between
La Fert6 and Meaux, the Marne is increased from
the north by the waters of the Oiu-cq. The
Grand Morin from the south joins the Marne
below Meaux.
As the lower courses of the Seine, Aube, and
Marne flow from the east to the west, and their
upper courses from the south to the north,
they form barriers to an in\ader coming either
from the north or from the east. A further
natiu'al obstacle to an inxader from the north
is a tributary of the Oiso, the Aisne, rising in
the Argonne Forest hills which lie west of Ver-
dun. Verdun was the fortress at the northern
end of the line of artificial defences — Belfort-
l<;pinal-Toul-Verdim — stretching from the
frontiers of Switzerland to the latitude of iho
fortress of Metz in Lorraine, which faces Verdun.
The nature of this line of artificial defences has
been described in Chapter XXIII. From Verdun
to the ring-fortress of Toul, from Epinal
to Belfort, there were chains of isolated and
powerful forts. To the south, behind Epinal,
commenced that mountain barrier which, under
various names, separates the valleys of the
Saone and Rh6ne from the rest of France.
In the Argonne district is Valmj', where the
Teutonic invaders of France in 1792 were
finally checked. The Aisne, rising from the
southern end of the Argonne, flows northward
to about the latitude of Longwy, situated in
the pocket formed by the frontiers of Belgium,
GERMAN OFFICERS IN AN ELABORATE SPLINTER- PROOF ENTRENCHMENT.
[Recori Prist.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
455
V
. ■- .'
ffifp
i»i*
^::--
, 4
BRITISH SOLDIERS IN THE TRENCHES.
[Daily Mirror.
Luxembiirg, and Germany. It then turns
westward and, passing about midway between
the fortifications of Rheiras (due north of
Epernay on the Marne) and those of Laon,
traverses Soissoiis and joins the Oise at Com-
piegne. The Aisne, for most of its course, is
anotlier barrier to an invader from the north.
On the Oise, above Compiegne and a little to
the north-west of the latitude of Laon, was
the fortress of La Fere.*
In the oblong formed by the Oise and the
upper Sambre on the east, the Seine on the
south, the English Channel and the Straits of
Do\er on tlie west, and the Franco -Belgian
frontier on the north, the chi(if natural obstacle
to an invader from Belgium was the River
Somme, which rises a little to the north of St.
Quentin, itself fifteen miles north-west of
La Fere. The Somme, flowing through Amiens
and Abbeville, divides this oblong roughly
into two halves. In the southern half, on the
coast, were the ports of Dieppe and, at the
■It lias been PDlated out on p. 443 that the tortr^'sses of
Ehfims. Laon. Iji Ftre. Mauljeuse. and Lille had not been
foinpleted. Maubetige alone offered a seriou-i resistance.
mouth of the Seine, Havre, which was strongly
fortified. The chief ports in the northern
half were (from south to north) Boulogne,
Calais, and, on the French side of the Belgian
frontier, Dunkirk. The two latter towns
were afforded some protection by forts.
Half-way between Dunkirk and the fortroas
of Maubeuge on the Sambre was the luifinished
fortress of Lille. It was between Lille and the
northern bank of the Sambre that General
Joffre had decided that the British Army
should be stationed. Assuming that the German
invasion was repulsed. Sir John French's forces
would be within easy reach of Calais and
Boulogne, two of their ports of disembarca-
tion, and their base, Havre. Thrust to the
\icinity of Paris, they could draw their rein-
forcements, munitions, and supplies, if necessar>'
(which, indeed, happened), tlirough Le Mans
from St. Nazaire at the mouth of the Loire.
On October 1 Ths Times published the text
of an army order Issued by the Emperor William
on August 19 : —
" It is my Royal and Imperial Command
that you concentrate your energies, for the
immediate present, upon one single purpose,
and that is that you address all your skill
and all the valour of my soldiers to exter-
minate first the treacherous English and
walk over "General French's contemptible
little Army*. . . ."
" Walk over " our Army, forsooth ! Did
the Kaiser not know that oiu" men are the
descendants of those who fought the live-
long day at Waterloo till the tardy arrival
of the Prussians enabled them to advance
and drive their opponents from the field ?
That their forebears formed the immortal
Light Division which at the storming of
Badajos could not vrin their way up the deadly
breach yet stood for hours in the ditch, a prey
to shot and shell, unable to go forward, but
sternly refusing to go back ; that their grand-
fathers held for months the ridge at Delhi, a
mere handful compared with their foes witliin
the town, and that they finally stormed it
with a force which was not a third of the
disciplined men who manned its walls ?
What does Muffling say of the British ? — that
they were the finest troops in Europe for the
day of battle. What did Marshal Bugeaud say t
" The English infantrj' is the most magnificent
in the world ; happily there is but little of it."
In Belgium, at any rate, there was enough to
hold at bay four times its own strength of
• The authenticity of this order was subeequcnUy denied by the
Genran Government. Nevertheless an order of almost equal Insolence
was issued by the Crown Prince of Bavaria (see The Timei>. October
19. 1914).
45B
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
■
HHHH
t|^^i»iw>XBH
■■piH
!■
■
^SHI^
^v' :r,,,^
I^^^^^K )
^
■
1
^^^^^
^.A^^h
WFiKKm^^&^A
InHJ^^P^'''^^ ^ jA^
i
1
GERMAN INFANTRY ADVANCING.
{Daily Mirror,
Germans and dispute with the greatest courage
every yard of the road to Paris.
Against the AlHed Army on the Sambre was
marching, riding or motoring a vast force
of Germans. They were accompanied by an
enormous number of gims and mitrailleuses —
some mounted on armoured automobiles — by
a flock of Taube aeroplanes and some airships,
and by trains of pontoons. Motor ploughs had
been, provided for digging trenches — and
graves. Imagine that all the inhabitants of
Birmingham were men in the prime of life, that
they were dre.ssed in a uniform which rendered
them invisible except at close quarters ; that
they were armed with repeating rifies, swords,
lances, automatic pistols, and that, attended by
doctor.", cooks, portable kitchens, motor-omni-
biisss, traction engines, motor -lorries, horses and
carts, and grave-diggers, they were moving in
columns, on foot or on horseback, in motor-cars
or char-a-bancs, or in aeroplanes, to cross or
fly over the Thames from Reading to Oxford.
One has then some faint idea of the disciplined
horde advancing on the Allies deployed from
Conde to Namur. The following description
of a distinguished French artist arrested by
the Germans near Namur enables us to catch a
glimpse of this phenomenon so novel in the
annals of humanity :—
AituT sleeping in a barn with Zouavf prisonci's, .i
soldier standing over us with fixed bayonet, we were
called at 5 the next morning. Tlie piisoners were
told to peel potatoes for the field kitclien. I made
my toilet while a guard followed me about. At 0 all
the soldiers began to form up. Orders came from tlie
officers like pistolshots, the click of heels and the
thud of shoulder arms coming as from one man.
Woe to the man slightly out of line I The dose-
troj)ped officer spat at him a flow of expletives,
showing his teeth like a tiger ready to spring.
I was placed in the middle of a marching column,
and as I was loaded with my knapsack and coat
(a soldier near me carrying my papers) I could take
part in the sensations of the men under the iron
discipline of the officers. The road lay inches thick
of chalky dust, which rose in clouds above our heads.
Never were we allowed to op-n out as I had seen the
marching Belgians do, and let the air circulate. We
plodded on the whole day, the only rest being when
there was an occasional block on the road. The
march was as if on parade. Should one fall out of
step the shouts of his superior soon brought him up.
Now and tlxen men were waiting with buckets and
as the column swung by the soldiers dipped in their
aluminium cups. Another man would bo holding a
biscuit tin full of sweets, or it might be handfuls of
prunes, but still the march went on. It was remark-
able to see the field post-office at work ; the armed
blue-coated postmen stood by the marching column
receiving the postcards handed to them. Sometimes
an officer would hand over a fowling piece or antique
with the address hanging from it.
At noon I was handed over to officers, and I left the
regiment. I was on tlie box seat of a char-fi,-banc
full of officers and could observe the marvellous
organization of the column. The pace was at a walk,
but continuous. Ammunition wagons, field pieces,
carts filled with flour, wliole trains of enormous
pontoons pulled by heavy horses, and great traction
engines pulling siege guns, landaus and motor-cars
filled with doctore and officers, whose only dis-
tinguishing mark is a strip of colour at the neck —
all advanced at the same pace. Should a slight
block occur the whole column would stop as om;
train, the drivers passing the message back by a
pumping movement made with the fist on high.
The warning of a declivity or bend in the road passed
backwards like musketry flre. AH vehicles belonged
to the Army. .Some liad chalked on their grey si<h s
'■ Berlin-Paris."
Sometimes the column would let an enormous grey
motor-omnibus dash by, and through the glass sides
I saw staff ofTlcei-3 bending over maps. Every driver
and service man carried his w(?apons, the great wagons
simply bristlins with rifles.
On our way v,i\ passed crowds of peasants returning
to their ruined liomes. It was pitiful to see them
humbly raist; their hats to the invaders. We passefi
many villages in ruins. IjOcked-up houses were
instantly broken open .and searched. The better-
class houses were pillaged for wine, every soldier
marching witli bottles sticking out of his knapsack.
A French aeroplane daringly flew above the column,
the German shrapnel Ineffectively bursting like little
balls of thistledown underneath it.
At last, at a village near the French frontier, I was
set down in the littei-ed mairie, where, at a hmg table
lighted by the unshaded light of lamps. st.alT officers
were quickly writing, giving out or<Iers lietween the
puffs of cigarettes. At a word the aides-de-cami>
stood at attention, clicking their boots and their hands
at the side like a statue. Great bundles of detailed
m.ajis were brought in and distributed tor the following
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
467
day's march. Then the lonin was lift to tho clerks,
who wore writing all night, with a hottlc of wine on the
table. Broth from the field kitchen, with hlack bread,
hard as a brick, made an excellent supper with a bottle
of lilched liurgundy. Aft t sleei)iug in the open hall,
the next morning I was given papers to return, one
stair ollieer kindly giving nie the use<l half of his inili-
tary map.
The impression I gathered from conversation with
the ofTicers was angry surprise that England had joined
with their enemy. One said lie was sorry for the
Belgians and even for the Prcncli, but they would
never forgive England. Even superior ordcers were
under the illusion that war had been forced upon
them.
We have seen tluvt the reason why the
British and Frencli entered Belgium was the
very natural desire to help the Belgians. Tliey
wore suddenly struck by very superior forces
and compelled to fall back before them, while
a portion of the Belgian Anny retired on
Xainur.
jSfamur, like Liege, was fortified by a ring
of detached forts constructed of concrete,
armed with 6in. guns and 4.7 howitzers behind
armour-plated turrets. Unlike Liege. Namur
had a considerable time to strengthen its fortifi.
cations. General Michel, who commanded the
25,000 men who formed its garrison, had availed
himself of the respite afforded to close the
intervals between the forts, by trenches covered
in front bv barbed wire and defended bv mines
along the likely lines of approach. To over-
come these by assault would have been a costly
process, if not impossible, and the tactics of the
lirst few days of the operations against Li^ge were
not repeated. At th(! same time there was no
intention of beginning the lengthy proooss of a
regular siege. At Li^go it seems probable that
at first nothing beyond tho giuis and howitzers
forming part of the Army were employed.
I'hese would include the light field howitzer and
tho heavy field howitzer. The hea\'y field guns
with the Army, in what numbers is not known,
fired a 361b. shell. Of all these weapons
the heavy howitzer was the only one
capable of injuring to any extent the cupolas
in the forts. For the first part of the attack,
therefore, the iron defences of the forts were
quite strong enough to offer good resistance.
The fact is the Germans neither thought that
the Belgians would resist the passage of their
Army nor that the forts would withstand all
efforts to take them by assault. Hence they
had thrust their troops into Belgium imperfectly
mobilized and without s'ege guns. The weapons
of this category, when they did reach the front,
were at once successfully made use of. These
consisted chiefly of two classes, the 21 and the
28em. calibre. Both of thes ■ weapons fire formid-
able projectiles. That of the former (equivalent
in calibre to an 8.4in. English gun) is ashell 2.5011'.
A GERMAN SHELTER TRENCH. [^m,,,.
Removing the earth dug out from the front, so as not to indicate its position.
458
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
BRITISH WOUNDED AWAITING
REMOVAL TO HOSPITAL BASE.
[London News /igency.
which contains 37Jlb. of high explosive in
the so-called mine shell, or 12ilb. in the case
of the thick-walled shell. In the 28cm. (equiva-
lent to 11.2in.) the shell weighs 7601b., the
mine shell holds 1141b. of high explosive, the
thick-walled 381b. The mine shell, from its
tliinner walls, has not the penetrative power
of tlie thicker-walled pattern, but has sufficient
to enable it to penetrate before exploding.
Both of these it will be seen are distinctly
powerful pieces. The 28cm. was used by the
Japanese against Port Arthur, and is credited
with having caused great damage to the work,
and against the Russian fleet in the harbour,
and a- few were afterwPi'ds taken to the front
and employed against the Russian lines at
Mukden.
The Sin. and llin. howitzers can both be filed
from the wheeled carriages which transport them.
The illustrations on pages 349 and 358 show one of
the llin. howitzers when arranged for transport
and when in firing position. The girdle at-
tached to the wheels enables it to move more
easily over bad ground. It is usually drawn by
an automobile tractor. Its total weight when
in action is nearly 15 tons, that of the Sin.
6 tons. The heaviest weight to be transpoited
is 9J and 4^ tons respectively. These weights
can be moved along any ordinary road (though
the heavier one might try some country bridges)
and may be described as mobile. The ranges
of these weapons are five and seven miles
respectively.
But it is a very different thing when we come
to the 42cm. howitzer, equivalent to 16. Sin.
The weight of this piece of ordnance is 21 J
tons approximately, and when in action 50 tons.
It can, of course, be quite easily transported
by rail, but the task of moving it by road
would be quite another thine. The heaviest
load to be moved would probably be about
32 tons, and ordinary road bridges would not
bear this amount, and most certainly the
howitzer could not be fired from its travelling
carriagi!. Hence, no doubt, the concrete founda-
tions that the Germans have constructed at
various points where they might consider it
likely they would need to employ them. It
fires a shell weighing about 2,5001b. with a
high explosive bursting charge of 3801b.
Now it seems probable that some of these may
have been employed, and their effect would
undoubtedly bo great. But it is extremely
doubtful if they have been used in any numbers.
German papers say, without giving figiu-es, that
they have been employed. The British Vice-
Consul says two were fired against Li6ge. Two
were also reported as being seen near Waterlc o
on September 21. No doubt some of oi r
readers have noticed the picture of a shell ex-
hibited in some of the shops in London, with
a record of the brave deeds the weapon in
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
459
BRITISH WOUNDED BEING CONVEYED TO A HOSPITAL TRAIN.
[London News Agrncy.
question had done. This, though professing to
be a 16.8in. ohell, is really only an 11.2in.
From Austria it is stated that 37 of these
pondarous weapons have been sent to Trent — a
mountain fortress ! This is sheer nonsense. It
would be as reasonable to send loin, guns to
VValmer Castle.
According to General Michel, who commanded
at Namur, it was the enormous 28cm. guns
that destroyed the defences. The fire was so
continuous that it was impossible to attempt
to repair the damage done to the im-
provised defences between the forts against
which the Germans first of > all concentrated
their fire. For ten hours the Belgian infantry
bravely bore the fire of the huge shells, supple-
mented by those from a multitude of smaller
weapons, to which they <'ould practically
make no reply. Any man who raised his
head above the sliot-swept parapets was im-
mediately struck. The majority of the officers
were killed, and at last a general sauve qui peut
took place and the demoralized troops aban-
doned their positions, thus leaving a large
gap through which the Germans could advance.
Nor did the forts, on which the Germans
next turned their fire, fare any better. It has
been pointed out that their old-fashioned
and feeble armament was useless ; it was simply
snuffed out. Maizeret in fact only fired ten
shots and received 1,200 at the rate of 20 a
minute. At Marchovelette 75 men were killed
in the batteries. The bombardment of fort
Suarl6e commenced on Sunday iuonung>
August 23, and it fell on the 25th at five
in the afternoon. Three German batteries
armed with the 28cm. howitzer fired 600
shells each weighing 7501b. on the 23rd,
1,300 on the 24th, and 1,400 on the 25th against
it. These destroyed the whole of the massive
structure of concrete and wrecked all the
turrets, and fiu-ther resistance was impossible.
The forts -of Andoy and Cognelde suffered a
like fate. (For plan of Namur defences,
see page 119.)
The number of the 28cm. howitzers employed
is said to have been 32, the nearest being
tliree miles from their target, a range at
which the Belgian guns could do no damage
even if they were, which is scarcely probable,
able to identify their positions. Probably
also some 42cm. (i.e., 16.8 in.) weapons were
these, though not according to General Michel.
The Gennan troops engaged on the siege,
which conmienced on August 20, though not
in all its \ngour till the next day — doubtless
because it had been impossible to prepare all
the positions for the artillery till the 21st —
nimibered some four Army Corps.
Thus it is seen that the German fire literally
swept off tlie face of the earth forts 6Uld impro-
vised defences, troops and gims.
Tricot
M^iyne/ay
Lassi^ny
4- ^W
t RONO DOR
(stJuBt
,..^'
•3^"-
<M:,.
MoyenneyiHe
Estre'es S-Dents\
oRemy
Liancburt
'S^'«.
tegne
L fic -Si/r
AttlChy iP't'Sri
Nourron
O
©rontenoy
JLon^ueils S*
Montigny
AmUenv
o PitrrefoaOs
Verberie
^o'ntS^ Maxence.
Creil * •.f/euz-inj
\ «A [ChantlHy "^^-^s/,.
sXhafnp/ieu
Cr6pv-en-Valois
^-'Mti^^.^^.,
Chuc
Villers Cottereta^* '0^„„„„w
Vt'i^i'
» I "- I 1-0. £ >■
iPontartTXB '^;
Lcizarches .
^'CCd'UCN/
Chapell,/ t^ *-•:'<
en JerkiV ^^^.
DammarEin^
/^OrmoyA
. ^Nanteu^l-
leHaudouin
Le Plassis
\Bcllevtlle
SjSoupplets
I 4*
Ira'
BeLz
Silly-la-Poteme
VicheHianteuh
O La ferte Milton ^^
Neuill
It
areui/s-Uurca
Crouys-Ourti
zy-sur-OurcQ
MEAID
L.vry ^ ^^
''.^U' v -^ r-rT'^
%
C|aye
Chang is
<^>^
sP Lag NY
ljlf''«P^^
-Crecy
'yrf^'ie vuuers
-,ferrieres
Villfneuve
Comte
^Kf DE CHAMPICM^
V
' oEmerahaniie , .
'i.a-.o'^
dAmamviIbers
COULOJ
Rebaigi
HERS
7^
, f^BoissyS^Ltqe^
3 j^i/i^eyveS'GeorQ g »
I "^L*
O Mortcerf ^ XCfyaiflyen-Bne
rareenoutters c^A
"• J"
Rozoy en Brie .
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE SECOND PARI
The fiisl. part of tlie retreat ii
00
)F THE BRITISH RETREAT FROM MONS.
1 istiated by a Map on page 47<i.
461
462
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Another fact which much affected the defence
was that on the soutli of the town the Germans
managed to open the lock gates of the Meuse,
thus lowering its waters and destroying the
water defence of Namur and allowing their
troops to enter the town.
For four daj-B and a half the Belgians with-
stood the attack of the Germans, ten times
more numerous than they were. When General
Michel saw that further resistance was impossible
without entailing the loss of the whole garrison,
he tried to bring in the troops from the different
forts ; but, owing undoubtedly to the help of
traitors or spies, he found his underground
telephone destroyed and could not do so.
To secure the retreat of as many as possible
the commanders of each regiment fouglit their
way out of Namur separately, thus losing a
great number of men.
General Michel, the staff, his officers, and
soldiers did all they possibly could to
defend the town and they could do no more.
He has been much criticized for having
retreated, but if the garrison had remain<;d
12 hours more in Namur, not a man, not a
horse, not a gun would have been able to join
the main army.
The troops thus saved were gained for
Belgium ; to have climg with them to Namiu-
WANTON DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY
GERMAN SOLDIERS IN A CHATEAU
NEAR M ALINES.
[Daily Mirror.
would have been to lose them for no adequate
purpose or sound military reason.
The Germans had seized the fortress in the
angle formed by the junction of the Mease
and Sambre, and the railway back to Aix-la-
Chapelle was in their hands. It was part of
their plan to throw huge bodies of troops
across the Meuse between Verdun and Namur,
and across the Sambre between Namur and
Maubeuge. We take the operations on the
Sambre first.
From August 15 important French forces J)ad
been pouring into Belgium — as they had done in
1815 — through Charleroi between Maubeuge
and Namur. Moving in the direction of
Gembloux, French troops had passed over
the battlefield of Ligny, the las.t of Napo-
leon's victories over the Prussians. From a
communique of August 24 it is clear that it was
General Joffre's intention to take the offensive
at almost all points along the gigantic line of
battle from Cond6 to Belfort. " An anny," so
runs that document, " advancing from the
northern part of the Woevre " (the forest land
east of Verdim) " and moving on Nevifchateau ''
(in the Belgian Ardennes) ".is attacking the
German forces which have been going through the
Duchy of Luxemburg and are on the right bank
of the Semoy Another army from the region
of Sedan is traversing the Belgian Ardennes
and attacking the German forces marching
between the Lesse and the Meuse. A third
army from the region of Chimay has attacked
the German right between the Sambre and the
Meuse. It is supported by the English Army
from the region of Mons."
As already mentioned, Alsace and Southern
Lorraine had been invaded by the French.
The surprise attack (on August 20) on the
French Army in Southern Lorraine, where the
15th Corps, recruited in the south of France,
had been severely handled by overwhelming
German forces from the region of Metz, and the
German occupation of Luneville had effectually
stopped the French offensive south of Verdun.
We have now to explain the cause of the French
failure on the Middle Meuse and the Sambre.
On the 15th a division of the Prussian Guard
and the 5th Division of Cavalry, with several
battalions of infantry and companies of mitrail-
leuses, had crossed the Meuse at Dinant
between Givet and Namur. Suddenly they
were attacked by the French and driven in the
greatest disorder into or across the river.
A regiment of chasseurs a cheval pursued them
for several miles, putting to flight superior
forces of cavalry covering the retreat. This
small victory elated the French.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
463
INTERIOR OF BARGY CHURCH WRECKED BY THE GERMANS.
[Sport and General.
Tlio next day the French officials had bod
news to report. The French, defeated in
Lorraine, were retiring on Nancy, and the
Germans had occupied Brussels. Reports
came in that the enemy's cavalry were
pushing forward in the direction of Ghent
and the Franco-Belgian frontier. The
Germans were about to launch their hosts
on the Franco-BeIgian.s in and around Namur,
on the French along the Sambre from
Nainur to Maubeuge, and the British around
Mons.
The Germans attacked Charleroi itself, a city
of some 30,000 inhabitants, the centre of the
South Belgian iron industry, a town and neigh-
bourhood reminding British visitors of the
Black Country. Lofty chimneys, furnaces,
iron-foundries, glass-works attested the change
that had come over the world since Napoleon
rode through Charleroi on June 15, 1815.
At seven o'clock on Friday, August 21,
1914, a score of German Hussars entered the
town, and, pretending to be British cavalry,
canteted towards the Sambre. They were
detected by a French officer and promptly
expelled with the loss of two killed and three
wounded. The inhabitants were ordered to
their houses, mitrailleuses posted at different
places in the town, and every preparation made
to defend it. Fighting was going on towards
Genappo.
On Saturday the Germans assaulted Charle-
roi, and the bridges above and below it at
Thuin and Chatelet respectively. Their artil-
lery had opened on Charleroi and Thuin the
day before. The Germans forced ten miners
to march at the head of their column, just aa at
Mons they forced Belgian women to precede the
coliunns attacking the British. On Sunday
there was a desperate struggle in the streets of
Charleroi itself, and on Monday a terrific hand-
to-hand encounter between the Turcos and the
Prussian Guard. The coloured troops from
Algeria and Senegal inflicted heavy losses on
the Germans, but quick-firers placed in a
ruined factory appear speedily to have decided
the combat in favour of the enemy. The
Sambre, from Namur to the environs of
Maubeuge, was in the possession of the
Gennans ; their advance to, and crossing of
the Mouse will bo described later. We turn now
to the position of tlie British Army, north of
the Sambre between Maubeuge and Cond6.
The concentration of the 1st and 2nd corps
of the British Army had been completed by
Fridaj', the 21st August, and during Saturday,
the 22nd, Sir John French took up a position
extending from the fortress of Conde, a few miles
464
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
MAXIM SECTION ON THE MARCH.
Mules are used for the transport of these guns.
[Record Freas,
to the north of Valenciennes, tlirough Mens,
to Binche on the east.
The second corps, now commanded by Sir
Horace Smith -Dorrien, occupied the line from
Conde to Mons, the right of the third Division,
which was \inder General H. I. W. Hamilton,
one of Lord Kitchener's most trusted oificers,
being at Mons itself. The 1st corps, under
General Sir Douglas Haig, formed the right
wing of the army. Both Sir Horace Smith-
Dorrien and Sir Douglas Haig were dis
tinguished and experienced oflfictTS.
The son of a colonel, and born on the 26th
of May, 1858, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien was fifty-
six years old. The brother of the " King of
the Scilly Islands," he came of a well-known
west country family. He had been educated
at Harrow and at Sandhurst, and had been
a Staff College man, and a brilliant student
of the art of war. He was a devotee to sport,
a first-rate rider, and an athlete. In 1879 he
had been through the Zulu War, and had been
mentioned in dispatches. He had fought in
Egypt and the Sudan, and from 1893 to 1898,
he had been in India, whore he had served with
distinction in the Chitral Relief Force, and also
during the Tirah Campaign. He had accom-
[)anied Lord Kitchener to Omdurman, and had
, held high command during the South African
War when, at the ago of forty-one, he was
promoted Major-General " for distinguished
services in the field." From 1901 to 1903 he
was Adjutant-General in India, and from 1903
to 1907, during the Kitchener regime, he com-
manded the 4th (Quetta) Division. In 1907 ho
became Commander-in-Cliief of the Aldershof^
Command. Ho was not a blind admirer of
the Germans. " Give me," he is reported to
have said, " a thousand Colonials, men well
acquainted with the rifle and expert in horse-
manship ; let me train them for six months,
and I would lead them against any equal
number of men from any Continental army
with the greatest confidence in the result."
He was respected and loved by the rank and
file. While at Aldershot he had abolished the
military police and lightened the punishments.
He had put the private on his honour, and, as
mucli as any commanding officer, he had helped
to produce that change in the British Army
which had been so noticeable since tfie South
African War. Wellington had called his troops
" the scum " ; the soldiers who fought at Mons
were " the salt of the earth." General Smith-
Dorrien had walked over many of the battle-
fields of Europe, and was already thoroughly
familiar with the terrain round Mons.*
The 5th Cavalry Brigade, led by Sir Philip
Chetwode, was placed at Binche (a little manu-
facturing town of less than 10,000 inhabitants,
to cover the right. As the 3rd Corps had not
arrived, the reserve was formed by the four
brigades of the Cavalrj' Division, which also
furnished parties to protect the British right.
They were commanded • by General Allonby.
Since the cavalryman had been trained to use
the rifle this body might be handled as a
reserve of mounted infantry.
To guard the front of the position and watch
for anj' forward movement of the Germans was
the task of Sir Philip Chetwode with the 5th
♦ A biography of Sir Douglas Haig will appear in tbe iwxt
ntunber.
THE TIMES MIHTOBY OF THE WAB.
465
Cavalry Bripado, assisted by a few squadrons
from the reserve. During the 22nd and the
23rd the reconnoitring cavalry penetrated as
far as Soignies on the road which leads from
Mons, past Hal (to the left of the battlefield of
Waterloo) to Brussels. The cavalry confirmed
the surmise of the French that little more than
one corps or, at most.two corps of the Germans
were opposed to the British. The reports of
scouting airmen pointed to the same conclusion.
The battle began on Sunday, 23rd. At 3 p.m.
reports reached Sir John French that the enemy
were concentrating on the line between Mons and
Bray, to the west of Binche, and were attacking
briskly. Severe fighting ensued along the Cotide-
Mons Canal. Sir Douglas Haig \^^thd^ew his
troops to some high ground behind Bray, and
Binche was evacuated by Sir Philip Chetwode's
Brigade, which moved slightly to the south. The
Germans promptly occupied Binche. The result
was that the right of General Hamilton's Division
in Mons formed, to use Sir John French's expres-
sion, "a somewhat dangerous salient." Accord-
ingly the Commander-in-Chief directed that the
centre should be drawn back behind Mons.
This was effected before nightfall.
To some of the British soldiers the battle had
come as a surprise. " We thought," said one
of them, " the Germans were fifteen miles
away, when suddenly some German aeroplanes
wheeled over tis, and soon afterwards the
artillery opened fire, hefore my regiment had
time to take cover." •
Among the accounts of the battle on Siinday
around -Mons we select that of Sergeant W.
Loftus, which gives a vivid picture of the
essential features of the fighting.
" Well," he says, " we know what it is like I o be in
a battle. It came to us uncxpectidly at a time
wlien we had given up hope of seeing any GenuanH.
Tlie first inkUiig we had of it was just after ' reveille '
when our cavalry pickets fell back and reported tlie
presence of tlic enemy in stiengtii on our front
and slightly to the left. In a fiw minutes we
were all at our posts without the slightest confusion
and as we lay down in the trendies our artillery
opened on the beggars in fine style.
" Soon they returned the compliment ; but they
were a long time finding anything approaching the
range, and they didn't know of sheltc'i-s, a trick we
learned from the Boers, I believe. After about half
an hour of this work their infantry came into view
along our front,
" They were in solid square blocks, standing out
sharply against the skyline, and you couldn't help
hitting them. It was like butting your head against
a- stone wall.
" We lay in our trenches with not a sound or sign
to tell them of what was before them. They crept
nearer and nearer, and then our ofilcers gave the
word.
" A sheet of flame flickered along the line of trenches
and a stream of bullets tore through the advancing
mass of Germans. They seemed to stagger like a
drunk man suddenly hit between the eyes, after which
they made a run for us, shouting some outlandish
cry that we couldn't make out.
" Half-way across the open another volley tore
through their ranks, and by this time our artillery
began dropping shells around them. Then an officer
gave an order and they broke into open formation,
rushing like mad towards the trenches on our left.
" Some of our men continued the volley firing, but
a few of the crack shots were told oft to indulge in
independent firing for tlie benefit of the Oeiiiians.
BKlliSli S>OLUltKb llAi.M^ A MACHINE GLj.N liN POSITION. [PhoU, Pr,ss.
466
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
NIGHT FIGHT IN THE STREET OF LANDRECIES.
(see p. 472)
That is another trick taught us by Brother Boer, and
our Germans did not like it at all.
" They fell back in confusion, and then lay down
wherever cover was available. We gave them no
rest, and soon they were on the move again in flight.
" Then came more furiou.s shelling of our trenches,
and after that another mad rush across tlie open on
our front. This time they were strongly supported
by cavaliy, who sufljred terribly, but came right
up to our lines.
" We received them in the good old way, the front
ranks with the bayonet and the rear ranks keeping
up incessant ftre on them. After a hard tussle they
retired hastily, and just as they thought themselves
sate our mounted men swooped down on them, cut-
ting them right and left,
" This sort of thing went on through the whole day
without bringing the Germans any nearer to shitting uh.
After the last at tack we lay down in our clothes to sleep
as best we could, but long before sunrise were called out
to be told that we had got to abandon our position.
" Nobody knew why we had to go ; but like good
soldiers we obeyed, without a murmur. The enemy's
cavalry, evidently misunderstanding our action,
came down on us again in force ; but our men behaved
very well indeed, and they gave it up as a bad job.
" Their losses must have been terrible. Little
mounds of dead were to be seen all along the line
of their advance to the attack, and in the retreat
we picked oft their cavalry by the score."
From Sergeant Loftiis's narrative, it might
almost seem that the British had the fighting
all their own waj'. A man wounded at ^lons
paints a very different scene : —
"We were in the trenches waiting for them," he says,
" but we didn't expect anything like the smashing
blow that struck us. All at once, so it seemed, tlie
sky began to rain down bullets and shells. At first
the shells went very wide, for their fire was bad, but
,^fter a time — I think it was a long time — they got oiu-
range and then they fairly mopped us uj). I saw shells
bursting to right and left of me and I saw many a good
comrade go out."
The German artillery fire was directed by
airmen who dropped smoke bombs over the
British trenches which were not easy to locate,
because dummy trenches had been made before
or behind those in which the men lay. The
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
467
power and accurficy of the eiiomy'o artillery
impressod most of the eye-witnesses, but there
were exceptions. " They couldn't hit the gas-
works at Mons," a man of the Berkshiros told a
Times correspondent. " If they had, I wouldn't
be here. . . . They couldn't get it fair,
and just as well for us they didn't, or we'd have
been all blown up." On the other hand, the
shooting of the British artillery was deadly and
accurate, the big siege guns of the Royal
Garrison Artillery playing havoc among the
Germans.
We complete our accoimt of the first day's
fighting with the narrative of a Belgian corre-
spondent, and a detailed accoimt of the struggle
to the south of Mons by a Gordon Highlander
named Smiley. The Belgian writes —
By the most wonderful chance I happened to be in
the Britisli lines in Belgium just when the great battle
of Charleroi began, a light that will remain inscribed
in letters of blood on the scroll of History.
. . It was at Mons, on Saturday, August 22nd.
Thi' first outpostengagements wire beginning, and the
British troops, who had only arrived on the scene the
same morning, immediately entered the battle without
even a moment's rest. In a few hours Mons was ])ut
in a state of defence, and you should have seen those
ftUlows working. Trenches were dug and the bridges
b.irricaded by eager hands. In sight of such willing-
ness and such irresistible gaiety, you would never have
thought that these men were on the eve of a terrible
battle. Pei'sonally I could not help feeling that I was
only watching a manoeuvre scene, for the phlegm and
the nonchalance of these soldiers would never have
permitted one to suppose that the enemy were only
a iew miles away.
Sniiley's ropoft on what he saw is, perhaps, the
most detailed of the narratives that have reached
us. It was illustrated by the accompanying plan-
You want an account of ray fighting. This shall be
true of all I saw and shall apply only to .Mons, because
I have absolutely no coherent remembrance of Cam-
brai. The hurricane of shell there has left me be-
numbed even yet, and I do not yet realize that I am
home. Our position : —
ff'ore^^ti
Reference.
J - Village defended
by.(^.. R.Irish RegrP
(^-Middlesex
@_ Gordons
@)_ R.F.A.
We marched out of our billets at 4 .a.m. We
marched up to No. 1 and wheeled to the right, which
fetched us on the main Paris road (Rue Mons), with
Mons itself somewhat half-left on our rear. We
THE GRAVEYARDS OF THE BATTLEFIELDS. [N^s lliuii,ai,om.
Three hundred Germans were burled in this one huge grave, and a similar number
of French in another.
468
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
immediately set about clearing the foregi'ound of
willows, beans, wheat, and anything which gave heml
cover. About 10 a.m. we had (except buildings) a cloitr
rifle range of quite 2,000 yards. Wo then dug our
trenches, and much labour and love we put into them.
The ball opened at 11.30 a.m. by a terrible artillery
iluel by the Germans over our trenches to No. 5.
This went on tor some hours, until a movement of
infantry was seen at No. 6. This movement was
evidently intended for the Gordons ; as you will see
that had they managed t.o reach the wood in front of
us (No. 7), our position (No. 4) would have been made
untenable by hidden infantry and well-served artillery,
who could have flanked us merely by sheer weight of
numbers.
However, wo opened the ball on them at No. 6 with
a t<'rrific Maxim fire. Poor devils of infantry ! They
advanced in companies of quite 150 men in flies five
deep, and our rifle has a flat trajectory up to 600 yards.
Guess the result. We could steady our rifles on the
trench and take ileliberatc aim. The first company
were siiiijily blasted away fx) Ileavun by a voUey at
700 yards, and in their insane formation every bullet
was almost sure to find two billets. The other com-
f.anies kept advancing very slowly, using their dead
eomrades as cover, but they had absolutely no chance,
and at about ."> p.m. their infantry retired.
Wc were still being subjected to a terrible artillery
fire. God ! how their artillery do fire. But we had
time to see what was happening on our left flank 1, 2,
and 3. The Koy.al Irish Tli ■^'iln 'lit had been suri>rised
and tearfufly cut up, and so, too, had tile Middlesex,
and it was found impossible for our B and C companies
to reinforce them. We (D company) were lA miles
away and were ordered to proceed to No. 2 and relieve
the Koyal Irisli iis nuieh :is possible. We crept from
our trenches and crossed to the oilier side of the road,
where we had the benefit of a ditch and the road
camber na cover. We made most excellent progress
until 150 yards from No. 1. At that distance thei(>
was a small white house, flush with the road, standing
in a clearance. Our young sub. was leading and
safely crossed the front of the house. Immediately
the Germans opened a hellish cyclone of shrapnel at
the house. They could not see us, but I guess they
knew the reason why troops would or might pass that
house. However, we were to relieve the H.I.'s, and,
astounding as it may seem, we passed that house and
I was the only one to be hit. Even yet 1 am amazed
at our luck.
By this time dusk had set in. four villages were on
fire, and the Germans had been, and were, shelling
the hospitals. We managed to get into the R.I.'s
trench and beat olT a, very faint-hearted Uhlan att.ack
on us. About U ii.in. came our orders to retire.
Wli.at a pitiful handful we were against that host,
an<i yet we held the flower of the German ^Vrmy at
bay all day ! We picked up a dead olTicer of ours
and retreated all night. At 2 a.m. we halted, and at
4 a.m. (Monilay) we started retiring again.
CHAPTER XXVII.
THE RETREAT TO THE MARNE
Causes of the British Retreat — The French for the Moment Unable to Support British —
The German Pursuit — Action of Landrecies — Battle of Le Gateau — Laudatory Criti-
crsMS of a German Staff Officer on British Forces — Achievements of Royal Flying
Corps — Fighting in the Valley of the Meuse from Namur to Verdun — Battle of Charle-
viLLE — French Aviators drop Bombs on Zeppelin Hangar at Metz — Cavalry Combats
BBTWEEisr British and Germans : Sir Philip Chetwodb's Charge — The New French
Cabinet — Interview between General Joffre and Sir John French — Decision to Retire
on the Marne — Coctnter-Offensive of French Armies to Protect British Retreat —
Battle of Guise — British Capture Twelve Guns at CoMPifeGNE — Retreat of the Allies
hkhind the Marne — Results or the Campaign from the British Standpoint.
SERGEANT LOFTUS, it will be remem.
bered, could not understand why
he and the other soldiers had to retire
from Mens. The reaison for the retreat
wEis this. At 5 p.m. on the Sunday Sir John
French had received a " most important message
from General Joffre by telegram." It appeared
that three German corps — a reserve corps, the
4th and 9th corps — were moving on the British
front, and that the 2nd corps was engaged in a
turning movement on the left from the direction
of Tournai ; also the Germans had gained
possession of the passages of the Sambre
between Charleroi and Namur, and two reserve
French divisions and the 5th French Army on
Sir John French's right were in full retreat.
The accuracy of this information was confirmed
by aeroplane reconnaissance, and Sir Jolua
determined to withdraw his army to a position
which had been previously reconnoitred. It
rested on the fortress of JMaubeuge on the right,
and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of
Valenciennes, on the loft, but it was diflficult to
hold, because standing crops and buildings
made the siting of trenches very difficult, and
limited the field of fire in many important
localities. Nevertheless it contained some good
artillery positions.
The Germans, commanded by \'on Kluck, gave
the British no rest in the small hours of August
24, and continuous fighting occurred during the
night, the Germans at various points employ-
ing powerful searclilights to assist their attack.
To cover the retreat of Sir Horace Smith-
Dorrien's Corps (the 2nd) from the line Conde-
Mons, Sir John French, who had posted himself
with his staff at Bavai, proposed to lavmch
the Cavalry Division against the enemy en-
deavouring to tiu"n the left of his line, while to
aid the retreat of the right of the 2nd Corps from
behind Mons he advanced the 1st Corps, whose
2nd Division was directed to make a powerfiil
demonstration from the direction of Hannignies
as if it was desired to retake Binche. Thus the
offensive was taken at both ends of the British
line. The artillery of the 1st and 2nd Divisions
supported the attack of the 2nd Division, and
the 1st Division took up a supporting position
in the neighbourhood of Peissant.
Under cover of this demonstration Sir Horace
Smith-Dorrien retired from Conde-Mons on the
lineDour-Quarouble-Frameries. The 3rd Division
(General Hamilton's) on the right of the 2nd
Corps suffered considerable loss from the enemy
debouching from Mons. By Sir John French's
orders General Allenby witli the Cavalry Division
was operating vigorously on the left flank of
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrion, but about 7.30 a.m.
a message arrived from Sir Charles Fergusson,
commanding the 5th Division (part of Sir
ir.o
470
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
FRENCH HEAVY GUN IN A VILLAGE NEAR ARRAS. [Sport md General.
Horace Smith-Dorrien's Corps, the 2nd), that
he was very hard pressed. General Allenby,
therefore, withdrew his cavalry to Sir Charles
Fergusson's support. In the course of this
operation General De Lisle, with the 2nd
Cavalry Brigade, charged the flank of the ad-
vancing German infantry, but 500 yards or so
from the enemy was held up by wire. The
9th Lancers and 18th Hussars suffered severely
in the retirement of General De Lisle's Brigade.
The situation of the British force was now
most precarious. The only reinforcement it
had received was the 19th Infantry Brigade,
which had been hurried up from the lines of
communication to Valenciennes, and on the
morning of Monday, August 24, was stationed
Bouth of Quarouble to support the left flank of
the Army. The 4th Division under General Snow
had commenced detraining at Le Catoau on the,
23rd, but it was not till the next day (the 25th)
that it became available for service.
By nightfall Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's
Corps, which was retiring under cover of the
cavalry, held a position west of Bavai, Sir
Douglas Haig being on his right. The left
wing of the British Army was protected by the
cavalry and by the newly arrived 1 9th Infantry
Brigade posted between Jenlain and Bry ; the
right wing rested on the fortress of Maubeuge.
A paragraph from Sir John French's dispatch
of September 7 will show the reader how
dangerous was the position of the British
Army. " The French were still retiring,"
he says, " and I had no support except such as
was afforded by the fortress of Maubeuge ; and
the determined attempts of the enemy to gel
round my left flank assured me that it was his
intention to hem me against that place and
surround me. I felt that not a moment must be
lost in retiring to another position ....
The operation, however, was full of danger
and difficulty, not only owing to the very
superior force in my front, but also to the exhaus-
tion of the troops." Moreover Sir John doubted
the wisdom of standing to fight on the, about
to be partially entrenched, position, Cambrai-
Le Cateau-Landrecies, and he had determined
to make a, great effort to continue the retreat
till he could put some substantial obstacle,
such as the Somme or the Gise, between his
troops and the enemy, and afford the former
some opportunity of rest and reorganization.
The line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont wa*i
indicated to the Corps commanders as that
towards which they were to continue their
retreat. St. Quentin is on the Somme, Ribe-
mont on the Oise, Vennand to the west of St.
Quentin. Behind St. Quentin and Ribemont
lay the uncompleted fortress of La Fere.
The immediate problem before Sir John was
to withdraw his army from between Valen-
ciennes and Maubeuge to the road joining
Cambrai and Le Cateau. From Maubeuge to
Landrecies (a few miles north-east of Le Cateau
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
471
on the road from the lK.tter place to Maubeuge)
stretches the Forest of Mormal. The giina of
the forts to the soutli of Maubeuge would not
prevent the Germans from occupying the
forest. General Snow's division from Le Cateau
was moved up to a central position, with his
right south of Solesmes and his left resting
on the Cambrai-Le Cateau road south of
La Chaprie.
The retirement recommonced iu the early
morning of Tuesday, August 25, and the rear-
guards were ordered to fee clear of the Eth-
Bavai-Maubeuge road by 5 30 a.m. General
Allenby and the cavalry were to cover the
retreat. With the 1st Corps Sir Douglas
Haig was to march to Landrecies by the
road along the eastern border of the Forest
of Mormal.
The two French Reserve Divisions were
right of the British Army, and the 24tli, a J^rench
cavalry corps, under General Sordet, had been
in billets north of Avesnes to the east of Lan-
drecies. Sir John French had visited General
Sordet and earnestly requested his cooperation
and support during the fighting of the 23rd and
24th. Sordet had promised to obtain sanction
from his army commander to act on Sir Jolin
French's left, but his horses were too tired to
move. Sir John could, however, rely on the
aid of the two French Reserve Divisions, but
not immediately on the cavalry of Goneral
Sordet. From the west he might also expect
some indirect assistance. General D'Amade
was near Arras with the 61st and 62nd French
Reserve Divisions. It will bo remembered that
the 2nd German Corps had lioen moving from tlie
direction of Tournai to envelop the left of Sir Jolm
French. Further to the west a German cavalry
division, a battalion of infantry, with artillery
and machine guns, had occupied Lille, on which a
heavy fine was imposed, and routed the French
Territorials (who had no artillery) at Bethune
and captured C'ambrai. West of Cambrai they
inflicted another severe defeat on the Terri-
torials at Bapaume, and threatened Arras.
General D'Amiide, who was organizing the
French defensive north of the Somme, hurried
up Regular troops to the latter place. General
D'Amade, one of the most illustrious French
soldiers, had been military attach^ with the
British Army during the South African War,
and he had subsequently commanded the French
troops in Morocco. Sir John French could count
on his attacking the right of the German
forces endeavouring to envelop the British
loft wing.
Throughout Tuesday, August 25, the 1st
Corps continued its march on Landrecies, which
was reached about 10 p.m. They haid been
intended to fill the gap between Le Cateau and
AFTER A BATTLE. [Sport and Gtmral.
A country cart collecting equipment of dead soldiers from the battle- fields and unloading
\ on the station platform.
472
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Landrecies, but the troops were too exhaustod
to march further. They were heavily engap;od
south and oast of Maroilles, a few niiles north-
«aat of I-andrecies, and the 9th German Army
Corps, moving througli the Forest of Mormal, in
the evening attacked the 4th Guards Brigade
stationed in tuid around Landrocies itself.
During the fighting a German Infantry Brigade
suffered heavily. It advanced from the woods
in the closest order into the narrow street,
which WGS completely filled. The British
machine guns from the head of the street swept
tiway the crown of the German coKunn, a fright-
ful panic ensued, and it was estimated that no
fewer than 800 to 900 dead and wounded were
lying in the street alone. The German officers,
who were accustomed from behind to shoot
with revolvers the privates who hesitated to
advance, had not been able to check the
stampede. The British in these encounters liad
received a.ssistanco from the two French Reserve
Divisions on the right, but, as Sir John French
said in his dispatch, it was owing mainly " to the
skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig had
extricated his Corps from an exceptionally
difficult position in the darkness of the night "
that the Ist Corps was able at dawn to resume
tlieir march south towards Wassigny on Guise.
PARIS.
For defensive use in case of necessity trenches
were dug across the streets.
[Spor' and General.
Meanwhile Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, cc)\("rpd
by the cavalry which during the 24th and 2otli
had become a good deal scattered, inid by
General Snow's Division posted north of the
Cambrai-Le Catoau road with its right south of
Solesmes, had by 6 p.m. reached the line
Le Cateau-Cambrai, their right being at Le
Cateau and their left in the neighbourhood of
Caudry. The 4th Division, which had been
placed temporarily under the command of Sir
Horace Smith-Dorrien, had fallen back beyond
Caudry towards Seranvillers, the left being
thrown back.
Wednesday, the 26th, was the most critical
day of the retreat. At dawn it became
apparent that the enemy was throwing the
Ijulk of his strength against Sir Horace Smith-
Dorrien and General Snow. The guns of no
fewer than four German Corps were in position
before the British left, and Sir Horace judged
it impossible to continue his retreat at daybreak
in face of this attack. The Ist Corps at that
moment was incapable of movement, and
General Sordet, owing to the state of his
horses, was unable to help the British. There
had been no time properly to entrench the
position.
According to the rules of Kriogspiel the British
left wing was doomed to destruction, but, as
on so many previous occasions in history, the
British soldier did not kiiow when he
was beat(^n. Outnumbered as it was by at
least four gvms to one, the Artillery deluged
the advancing Germans with slu-apnel. In vain
the German commander threw his picked
cavalry — the German Guard Cavalry Divi-
sion-— into the battle. It was thrown back
by the British 12th Infantry Brigade in com-
plete disorder.
Still there are limits to human endurance,
and it was obvious that if General Smith-
Dorrien was to escape annihilation he must
at all costs retreat. About 3.30 p.m. the order
to retire was given, and, thanks to the Artillery
and the Cavalry, and the General's superb
liandling of his Corps, this most difficult and
dangerous operation was successfully effected.
" I say without hesitation," wrote Sir John
French, " that the saving of the left wing
. . . could never have been accomplished
unles'^ a commander" (Sir Horace Smith-
Dorric^n) "of rare and imusual coolness, intre
pidity, and determination had been present to
p(!rsonally conduct the operation." The British
liad inflicted terrible losses on the enemy, and
the German public, who had been led to expect
a new Sedan, wfTo instead to read long lists of
casualties suffered bj- the finest regimehts in
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
47a
SAVING THE GUNS IN THE ACTION AT COMPIEGNE.
tlio German Army. From the 23rd to the 2fith
inclusive the British losses wore estimated by
Sir John French at between 5,000 to 6,000
men. Considering the enormous forces that they
had baffled for four days, thesa figures are the
most eloquent of tributes to the skill of tlio
British commander, his officers and men.
The judgment of a foreigner — especially a
hostile foreigner — is very frequently the judg-
ment of posterity, and after ages will doubtless
repeat that of a member of the German General
Staff, who was conversing one day with a Dane
in tlie September of 1914. He was referring to
the Battles of Mens and Landrecies-Lo Catoau ;
" The English," he said, " have prepared a
surprise for us in this war, especially in the
battles in North France.
The Englishman is cool, imliiTorent to danger, anil
to the dispensations of Providence. He stays where
ho is commanded. He shoots magnificently, extra-
ordinarily well. He is good at bayonet attack,
. . . and it is during these bayonet attacks
when luck is agaiast him that he is at liis very be.st.
His endurance and inarksraan.ship make him an op-
ponent of high rank. It is the English wo try
to hit hardest in this war.
After we had broken thi'ougli the French positions
on the Belgian frontier and had got JofTre's army on
the move towards the south the Gennan Army's ad-
vance appeared to be checked. It was General
French's army that had stayed the retreat. We ordered
the English lines to be stormed. Our troops da.shod
into them with fixed bayonets, but our efforts to
drive the English back were in vain. They are very
good at resisting a bayonet attack. The English
are strong people, athletic, and well developed. So-
we decided to shoot them down, but we found that
they aimed remarkably well. " Every bullet found
its billet," as they say.
We ordered our best shots to tackle them, but the
result was not in our favour. Then we got all our artil"
lery at work that could be spared against them. We
swept the English positions with a rain of shells —
ii regular bombardment. When the (Iring ceased \vi'
expected to find the English had lied. The Knglish
artillery cannot be compared with oui-s or the French*
and we soon silenced it. We had not heard from the
English tor an hour.
But how can I describe oui' a.stonishraent ? Beyond
the shell-s,wcpt zone we saw English soldiers' heads
moving and they began to use their rifles again as
soon as the coast was clear. The English are a cool.
474
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
lot ! We had to assault again and again, but in vain.
We were in fact repulsed after having literally sur-
rounded them. Their poi-severance and pluck had
gained their just reward. The retirement could now
be carried out in an orderly way. All risk of cata-
strophe to the retreating army was averted.
Even the sight of the wounded surprised us and
commanded our respect. -They lay so still and
scarcely ever complained.
The retreat continued far into tlie night of
the 26th and tlirough the 27tli and 2Stli,
when the troops halted on the lino Noyon-
Chaiuiaye-La Fere. The feebleness of the
Gennan pursuit is further evidence of the
efficiency with which the British troops had
been handled in action, though it must be
remembered that by now General Sordet %vith
his cavalry was reh'eving the pressure on the
British rear, and General d'Amado with the
61st and 62nd French Reserve Divisions from
the neighbourhood of Arras wa« attacking
Kluck's right flank. No fewer than five German
corps had been flung at two British corps and
General Snow's Division. The German military
reputation, damaged by General Pan in Alsace,
had been shattered by Sir John French. Among
the officers besides those already mentioned
whom Sir John selected for special praise in
respect of their conduct during this tremendous
test of ability, courage, and endurance were
his Military Secretary, the Hon. W. Lambton ;
the Chief and Sub-Chief of the General Staff,
Sir Archibald Murray and Major-General
Wilson ; the Quartermaster-General, Sir William
Robertson ; and the Adjutant-General, Sir
Nevil Macready.
The Royal Flying Corps, under Sir David
Henderson, had had their baptism of fire, and
covered thems ilves with glory. " They have,"
said Sir John French, " furnished me with the
most complete and accurate infonnation, which
has been of incalculable value in the conduct
of the operations. Fired at constantly both
bj' friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly
in every kind of weather, they have remained
undaunted throughout." They had also
destroyed five of the enemy's machines by
fighting in the air.
One of the duels in the air has been graphic-
ally described by a private of the 1st Royal
West Kent Regiment. The airman was a
Frenchman, but it brings vividly before us
the nature of part of the work done by Sir
David Henderson's heroic subordinates : —
There was one interesting sight I saw as the column
was on the march, and that was a duel in the air
between French and German aeroplanes. It was
wonderful to see the Frenchman manoeuvre to get
the upper position of the German, and after about
10 minutes or a quarter of an hour the Frenchman
got on top and blazed away with a revolver on the
German. He injured him so much as to cause him
to descend, and when found he was dead. The British
troops buried the airman and burnt the aeroplane.
During that day we were not troubled by any more
G;Tman aeroplanes.
FRENCH ARMY
ON THE MARCH IN THE CHAMFAG.Nt
Earthworks in the foreground.
Ult) 1 UlC 1 .
ICentral Prea.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
475
REMAINS OF A GERMAN MOTOR CONVOY.
Which was surprised by a French battery.
ITtpical.
Leaving for a time the British, we must now
turn to the Meuse side of the theatre of war.
The fall of Xamur and the German crossing
of the Sambre might not by themselves have
obliged the British and French to retreat from
the Sambre. It was the failure of the French
offensive through the Belgian Ardennes, the
withdrawal of the French troops to the v-alley
of the Sleuse, and the forcing, after desperate
fighting, of the Meuse between Givet and Namur
that perhaps decided General Joffre to retreat
on the Aisne and Marne. Near Givet, the
point where the Meuse leaves France and enters
Belgium, the Germans had traversed the
river. The possession of the triangle of country
from the environs of Maubeuge to Namiu- and
from Namur to Givet enabled them to tiu'n the
French defensive on the left liank of the Meuse.
A body of Germans advanced from Rocroi on
Rethel.
The wooded country between Givet and
M^zieres permitted the French to oppose a des-
perate resistance to the invaders ascending the
Meuse. At Charleville, on the western bank of
the Meuse opposite Mezieres (a few miles to the
west of Sedan), a deternxinod stai:d Was made.
The inhabitants were withdrawn from Charle-
\ ille and mitrailleuses hidden in the houses.
The Germans reached Charleville on August 25.
They were permitted to cross the tlu-ee bridges
into the town. Suddenly the bridges were
blown up by contact mines, and the Germans
in Charleville were raked by the fire of the
mitrailleuses and overwhelmed with shells.
Nevertheless the Germans, with reckless courage,
persisted in their enterprise. The French guns
from the hills round Charleville swept away the
heads of their columns, but the Germans threw
pontoon bridges over the river, and ultimately
the French gunners had to retire.
South-west, between M6zieres and Rethel,
near Signy I'Abbaye, there was another fierce
encounter. Mezieres itself was abandoned by
the French.
Meanwhile, the French invasion of the
Belgian Ardennes and the Duchy of Luxem-
burg, from the region between Mezieres and
Verdun, had, like the invasion of the Belgian
Ardemies from the valley of the Meuse, been
imsuccessful. The French crossed the Semois,
a tributary of the Meuse which enters it below
Mezieres, and advanced towards Neufchateau.
They were repulsed by the Germans, com-
manded by Duke Albrecht of Wiirtemberg.
At the opening of the war a large bodj' of
German cavalry had descended from Luxem-
burg, and endeavoured to slip past Longwy
and cut the French line between Verdvm and
Mezieres. But the garrison of Longwy, led by
the heroic Colonel d'Arche, had held them in
check and driven them back with heavy
losses. Longwy, though its defences were
out of date, did not surrender till August 27,
and the magnificent resistance of its garrison
seriously retarded the advance of the German
Army (based on Treves) imder the command
of the Crown Prince. Near Spincourt, north-
east of Verdvm, the French repulsed a German
attack (August 10-11) and captured three guns
and three mitrailleuses.
476
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
477
STEINHAUER.
The Kaiser's Master Spy.
[Record Pr/st.
Tlie French troops victorious near Spincoiirt
pursued the enemy, and their artillery on
the 12th surprised and destroyed a regiment
of dragoons. Two aviators from Verdun,
Lieutenant Cesari and Corporal Prudhommeau,
flew over Metz and droijped bombs on a
Zeppelin hangar. At Virton, north-east of
Jlontmedy, the French 6th Corps inflicted
a considerable defeat on the Germans. In the
environs of Nancy on the 2oth there was a
desperate battle between the French and the
Crown Prince of Bavaria's Army. The 15th
Corps, surprised in the battle of August 20
(referred to in Chapter XXIII.), executed a
brilliant counter-attack (August 25-26). The
Oormans suffered heavily.
In spite of the French successes between v
M^zieres and Verdun, the French, owing to
the failure of the operations on the Sambre
and the northern Mouse, and in the Belgian
Ardennes, had to withdraw to the valley of
the Meuso. On the 27th Longwy capitulated.
A regiment of Germans who were crossing the
liver near Dim were driven into it. In the
region between the Meuse and Rethel there
was a great battle on August 31. But, as
General Joffre had decided to retire on the
Marne, the lino of the Meuse between Verdun
and Jle^ieres was abandoned, and the Germans
advanced to the Fore.st of the Argonne.
Thus pursued by the Gorman Armies
commanded by Kluck on the west. Biilow
from Charloroi and Namur, Hansen from
Dinant and Givet, the Allied forces by
.\ugust 28 liad beoi pusiied back to a
line stretching rouglily from Amiens to
Mezieres, while their forces east of the
Meuse, between Mezieres and Verdun, were
retiring before Duke Albrocht of Wiirtom-
borg and the Crown Prince, and to the
south-east of Verdun the Crown Prince of
Bavaria was being headed oE the gap of
Nancv.
On August 28 the British Army was retiring
from ^cyon and La Fere on Compiegne and
Soissons. Two columns of German cavalry from
the neighbourhood of St. Quentin were in hot
pursuit. The western column, led by the
Uhlans of the Guard, was charged by
General Gough at the head of the
3rd Cavalry Brigade and routed. The
column to the cast was attacked by
General Chotwode with the 5th Cavalry
Brigade. The 12th Lancers and Royal
Scots Greys rode down the enemy, spear-
ing large numbers of them. The Soot--
Greys were apparently acting in con-
junction with the Black Watch. Imitating
the Greys' tactics at Waterloo, they plunged
straight into the ranks of the enemy, a
soldier of the Black Watch hanging on
to each horseman. The Germans, com-
pletely surprised, were broken up and
repulsed with tremendous losses. " Our
men," said a wounded soldier who was
a witness of one of the charges, " came on
with a mighty shout, and fell upon the
enemy with the utmost violence. The weight
of the horses carried them into the close-
formed ranks of the Germans, and the gallant
Greys and the ' Kilties ' gave a fearful account
of themselves."
Still the position of the British was critical
in the extreme. For six days they had been
marching and fighting continuously — by day
under a blazing August sun, and by night in
a heavy, stifling atmosphere — in a country
the features of which were unfamiliar to thena
and the inhabitants of which spoke a language
which most of the soldiers could not under-
stand.
At Paris the Cabinet which had prepared for
the war was being replaced by another and
a stronger one. It was presided over by M.
Viviaui ; tlie ex-Socialist, Briand, was Minister
478
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
MAUBEUGE.
A Cupola fort after the bombardment.
[Central News.
of Justice ; Delcass6 — to whom France and Great
Britain owed such a debt of gratitude — -held
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and Millerand
was Minister of War. Two days earlier
(August 27) General Gallieni had been
appointed Governor of Paris. A few days later
the President of the Republic and the Ministry
were to leave Paris for Bordeaux.
The moment had come for a consultation
between the French and British Commanders.
Should the retreat be continued, or, as the
French and British peoples would have pre-
ferred, should the offensive be resumed ? On
the 25th Lord Kitchener had delivered his first
speech in the House of Lords. The Empires,
he had said, with whom the British were at war
had called to the colours almost their entire
male population. The principle the British
on their part would observe was this, that while
the enemy's maximum force underwent a con-
stant diminution, the reinforcements prepared
by the British would steadily and increasingly
flow out until they had an army which in numbers
not less than in quality would not be unworthy
of the power and responsibilities of the British
Empire. A speedy victory was needed by
Germany. The Russians had mobilized
more quickly than had been expected ; they
had invaded Galicia and Eastern Prussia,
while the Serbians on the 22nd had severely
beate.i the Austrians. There was no need to
play into the German hands by a prematviro
offensive.
At 1 o'clock on August 29 Sir John
French was visited by General Joft're. The
French Commander-in-Chief, whose plans for
invading Gennany through the Belgian Arden-
nes and the Duchy of Luxemburg, while General
Fan was seizing Alsace and Southern Lorraine
had, owing to the capture of Namur and defeats
in the Ardennes, been rendered impossible
of execution, had changed his strategy with a
rapidity and coolness which would have delighted
Napoleon himself. To the German offensive
he had opposed a defensive which recalls
Wellington's retreat in Portugal before Mas-
sena, Barclay de Tolly's before Napoleon in
1812. "His strategic conception," says Sir
John French, " was to draw the ene ny on at
all points, until a favotu'ablo situation was
created from which to assume the offensive."
From day to day, owing to the development of
the German plans and the vicissitudes of the
immense combat, he had had to modify the
methods by which he thought to attain his
object. In General Joffro and the cool,
eloquent President of the Repviblic, Rajnnond
Poincar^, was personified the spirit of the new
France, that France which, while retaining its
pre-eminence in arts and literatiu-e, had given
to humanity a Pasteur, a Curie, and the greatest
mathematician of his day, Henri Poincar6
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
479
that France whose aviator B16riot had been
the first to fly the Straits of Dover, whoso
champions in the world of sport, Carpentier
and Boiiin* had just won the admiration of
every sportsman and athlete.
The meeting of the silent, thoughtfiil British
Commander and the calm, resolute engineer,
who for the second time had seen his native
land ravaged by the hordes from beyond
the Rhino, will remain for ever memorable.
" General Joffre was most kind, cordial, and
sympathetic, as he has always been," wrote
Sir John French to Lord Kitchener. The lines
of the Somme and Aisne, together with the
half-fortified La Fere, Laon, and Reims, it
was decided, were to be abandoned, and the
retreat was to be continued to the Marne. To
this movement the French forces in the east
were to confonn.
The British were provisionally to occupy the
line Compiegne-Soissons, while the German
piu-suit was to be checked by a French counter-
offensive on the west and north-east of the
British positions. General Joffre had al-
ready directed the 5th French Army (consisting
of four corps) behind the Oise between La
Fere and Guise to attack the Germans on the
Somme. Commanded by General Pau, who had
been recalled from Alsace, it engaged the
'This maijnificent athlete, one of the finest long-distance runners
that has ever appearetl, was to be a victim (,f the Kaiser'B ambltlcn.
German forces from Poronne on the Somme to
Guise on the Oise. The German Guard, its
reserve corps, and the 10th Corps were de-
cisively beaten south of Guise, and the Guard
and the 10th Corps were rapidly driven by
the French Army across the Oise. But the
left wing of the French was unsuccessful, and
Amiens and the line of the Somme were
evacuated.
General Joffre inform<'cl Sir John French that
the 6th French Army, composed of the 7th
Corps, which had been railed up from the south
to the east of Amiens, of four reserve divisions,
and of Sordet's cavalry, was forming up on the
British left. The right wing of this army rested
on Roye, north-west of Noyon. In the space
to the right of the 5th Army (which had beaten
the Germans at the Battle of Guise) and to the
left of the 4th Army, wliich was retiring through
the country between the Oise and the Mouse,
a new army (the 9th) under General Foch,
made up of tliree corps from the south, W6W
operating.
Such was the situation on August 29. The
retirement once more began, and the 2nd Corps
of the British Army withdrew tlirough Com-
piegno, the city whore Joan of Arc was taken
prisoner, and where at the Palace Napoleon I.
and Napoleon III. had held their Courts. In
the forest to the south of Compiegne the 1st
FRENCH WOUNDED SOLDIERS DETRAINING AND BO.\RDlNG A HOSPIT.\I. SHIP.
\Jopi4it.
480
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Cavalry Brigade after momentarily losing a
Horse Artillerj' batterj-, with the help of some
detachments from the 3rd Corps (which were
now at the scat of war) operating on their left,
defeated the pursuing cavalry, recovered the
guns and captured twelve of the enemy. The
1st (Sir Douglas Haig's) Corps, which was
retiring from Soissons to the east, also fought
a reargi:r,rd Bction at Villers-Cotterets on the
road from Soissons to Paris. The 4th Guards
Brigade in this engagement suffered severely.
As the British retreated they blew up the
bridges across the rivers and streams crossed
by them. By September 3 they were behind
the Marne, between Lagny and Signy-Signets,
but General Joffre decided that they should not
halt there, but place the Seine between them
and the enemy. The Germans threw bridges
over the Marne and threatened the line of the
British Army and of the 5th and 9th French
Armies to their right. On September 5 the
British were beyond the Seine, and on that day
Sir John French saw General Joftre, who
explained to him that he intended at last to
take the offensive. The President of the French
Republic, the Ministers and the Diplomatic Corps
had left for Bordeaux on the 2nd. The news
had arrived of a decisive victory by the Russians
over the Austrians in Galicia. On the 4th the
Germans appeared to have suspended their
movement on Paris, and their armies to the
east were west of the Argonne. Maubevige had
not yet fallen.
It was obvious that Von Kluck was moving
to join BiJlow and Haussn and avoid the
danger of a gap in the German line. The Allied
army now rested to the west on Paris, and
to the east on Verdun. The moment had
arrived when a blow could be struck against the
German communications. Von Kluck's Army
(the 1st) was moving east, the 2nd German
Arrr.y, after taking Reims, was advancing
south-west to the Marne, the 4th German Army
W3S west of the Argonne, and the 7th German
Army had been repulsed by a French corps near
D'Einville.
The British losses in the operations from
Mons to the Marne were estimated at 15,000
killed, woimdod, or missing. Drafts amounting
to 19,000 men had reached, or wore reaching,
the Army, and lost material had been replaced.
The moral results were summed up by the
Press Biu-oau in the following words : —
There is no doubt whatever that our men
have estal)lishod a personal ascendancy over
the Germans and that they are conscious of
the fact that with anything like even numbers
the result would not be doubtful; The shoot-
ing of the Gorman infantry is poor, wliilo the
British rifle fire has devastated every column
of attack that has presented itself. Their
superior training and intoUigonce has enabled
the British to use open formations with effect,
and thus to cope with the vast numbers em-
ployed by the enemy. The cavalry, who have
had even more opportunities for displaying
personal prowess and address, have defi-
nitely established their superiority. Sir John
French's reports dwell on this marked
superiority of the British troops of every
arm of the service over the Grermans. " The
cavalry," he says, " do as they like with the
enemy until they are confronted by thrice their
numbers. Tlie German patrols simply fly
before our horsemen. The German troops
will not face our infantry fire, and as regards
our artillery they have never been opposed
by less than three or four times their
numbers."
Our troops held their own in the prolonged
trial of the retreat because they were ably
handled, because our methods of using infantry
wore superior to those of the Germans, because
our field artillery was more than the equal of
its opponents, and because when the time came
for the cavalry to thrust itself into battle it
rode home and proved itself far superior to the
German. Never before had the British horse-
man shown himself to be such a master of his
trade. For this he has to thank his instructors,
Sir Evelyn Wood, who always preached its
value, French, Haig, Allenby, Remington,
Chetwode, and others, who taught it and
enabled it to gain the honours it reaped in
the operations in France.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
THE HISTORY OF THE
RUSSIAN ARMY.
Okigin of tht: Slav Race — Over-lordship of the " Ru.ss ": A Norse Tribe — Becinnino
OF THE Feudal System — Degenerating Later into Serfdom — Emancipation of Serfs
— Russian Army Becomes Representative of Russian Peopi-e — Sociological Regeneration
Dates from the Coming of the " Invisible Death " of the Bullet — Stanchness of Russian
Army at Zorndorf and at Kunersdorf — Russian Services During Napoleonic Epoch —
Losses Inflicted on French by Russians at Eylau — Tolstoy's "Peace and War" — The
Reresina — Russian Army under Barclay de Tolly — Prussians in the Silesian Army —
Illiteracy in the Russian Army — Prussian Drill Methods — Influence of Suvaroff — His
Triumphs in 1799 — The Russians against the Turks 1828 — Severe Losses by Disease —
Only 30,000 reached Adkianoplf. — The Beginnings op the Crimean Campaign, 1853-54 —
The Emancipation of the Serfs, 1861-63 — The Old Soldier the Popular Educator — The
Lot of the Serf in Russia — Influence of the Campaigns of 1866 and 1870 — Triumph of
Universal Service over Conscription — A Standard of Education Fixed — The Balkan
Campaigns, 1877-78 — Disease again Reduces Effectives to .'iO.OOO men — Railways
Discounted by Corruption — Results of Courts of Inquiry" — Tactical Regeneration — ■
Influence of Dragomihoff — Revival of Suvaroff's Tradition — Reference to British
Volleys in the Peninsula as the Ideal — Skobeleff and Kuropatkin support Drago-
MiROFF — Skobeleff at Plevna — Kuropatkin in Manchuria — Hjs Knowledge of French
Strategy and Tactics^ — Influence of Climate on Operations around Mukden — Conse-
quences OF THE MaNCHURIAN CAMPAIGN ThE SpIRIT OF THE RUSSIAN ATTACK ThE RUSSIAN
Railways.
THE stock from which the bulk of the
Russian, people have spriuig is essen-
tially Slavonic, and the focus of the
Slav race lia-i at iengtii been definitely
located by botanic and linguistic research as
the great central niarsli wliich lies on the
watershed of Europe, midway l)etween the
Baltic and the Black Sea.
Geologically it must have retained its char-
acteristics throughout many ages, and this
permanence of environment must account for
the extraordinary tenacity of racial peculiarities
which have always been maintained.
Marsh dwellers are invariably of the same
type — frugal, hardy, and industrious, but essen-
tially solitary souls, incapable of governing
themselves in large communities. Moreover,
Vol. L— Part 13 481
their conquest by alien invaders is practically
impossible if the area of their marshland is
considerable. In tliis case it is now equal to
about two-tliirdw of the area of England. When
in winter the marshes are frozen over their
inhabitants may be harried by more liardy
tribes ; but this Would strengthen the moral
fibre of the race, rendering it, with each suc-
ceeding generation, more capable of resisting
the aggression of the moimted barbarian
hordes which ever and again strove to force an
entrance into the rich plains of Europe which
lay beyond their boimdaries.
As these raids began to lessen in frequency
the natural fertility of a thoroughly hardened
race led to expansion beyond their original
limits ; and then, being again exposed to the
482
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS 11.
full fury of the nomad races, they at length
realized the weakness due to their lack of
power of combination. So, according to
their oldest chronicle?, which are dated a.d. 859,
they went to the Russ, a tribe of Varangians
(Norsemen), and invited them to come over
and govern them. The Russians came, bringing
with them what was practically the feudal
system, as brought by the Normans to Eng-
land ; and finding the Slavs a paaceful and
amenable people — very unlike the mixture of
British, Roman, Saxon, and Danish stock
which our Normans encountered in England
— they rapidly acquired complete control of
the land.
They instituted almost absolute serfdom,
founding in fact a State in which there were
only two castes — rulers and slaves — without
the middle classes of freemen, burgesses, mer-
chants, Ac, between them.
In England the Normans found an altogether
more settled civilization. Neither Danes,
Saxons, nor the Roman-British stock had
invited the intruders to rule over them, and
the Norman conquest was the kind of com-
promise that Anglo-Norman conquests liave
been ever since those days, viz., an agreement
on tlio part of men who had taught their
conquerors to respect them to serve the
overlord as free fighting men when the
need for their services arose. His ar-
rangements provided for the freemen being
allowed exceeding latitude for managing their
own affairs when their help was not required
against external dangers. Hence, more or
loss — less until the formation of the first
Volunteer Force in 1803-— the Army of Eng-
land has always been a force representative
of all classes in the realm — ^juat, in fact, what
an army ought to be.
But in Russia, before the emancipation of
the serfs followed by the law of imiversal
service, which is only now beginning to jnake
itself really felt, the Russian Army had been
a body of serfs led by aristocrats, in which the
trades, the professional men, and so forth
had never been represented at all.
This is the cardinal contrast which must
always be borne in mind if the Russian Army
is to be appreciated correctly. Numbers alone
have never made for military efficiency ; it is
only the loyal cooperation of all classes, and
in particular the knowledge among the aris-
tocracy that the position they are accorded is
given or deserved in recognition of the services
they render, which enables the army to rise to
its proper level of the nation in arms This
mutual understand in<j; between classes ensures
'jhe liarmonious and intelhgent cooperation of
members of an army in the sacrifices and
endurance that a state of war entails. It was
only because during the last twenty years
before the Great War the Russian aristocracy
had begun to entertain this fundamental
principle that they proved themselves capable
of sweeping both Austrians and Prussians
before them in a manner which no soldier in
either of those countries had for a moment
conceived to be possible.
Nevertheless, careful observers could see this
change slowly coming as far back as 1878.
Only the extraordinary arrogance of the Ger-
man military caste prevented it from per-
ceiving the growing efficiency of its formidable
neighboiir.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
483
The sociologieal regeneration of all nations in
Europe dates from the introduction of the
firearm as the principal weapon of the battle-
field, for until it Vjocame necessary for success
that men should stand steady under fire with-
out replying or in any way contributing to the
general movement except by their cool and
vmflinching bearing, war made no demand on
the moral nature of either the loader or his
men. Battle was merely tlie unlimited indul-
gence of the fighting passions of man (the
oldest in human evolution) without check or
hindrance. Great personal strength and a vile
temper seem to have been the surest qualifica-
tions for high command in the days when men
fought hand to hand with club or axe or sword ;
but with the introduction of the invisible death,
which struck down from a distance, and against
which no armour could protect its wearers, only
men ofgreat self-control and fearless of personal
risk could hope to achieve eminence, nor could
they induce their men to execute even the
simplest manoeuvres unless they also had a fair
share of the same qualifications as their leaders.
The pa-ssage from the old school to the new
proved fairly easy for the western armies, for
weapons had evolved with the races. But when
the Russians imported western arms and methods
the standard of intelligence of the moujiks
was unequal to the demands now made upon
them , and we find them in their first encounters,
in which the musket was the dominant factor
on the battlefield, too cumbrous to manoeuvre
and far too slow in loading to bo a niatcli for
the Prussians under Frederick the Great.
Nevertheless, the3' proved by far the most
redoubtable foe that Frederick met. Thus at
Zorndorf only the incomparable skill of
Seydlitz at the head of his Cuirassiers saved
the Prussians from complete defeat, and though
at the end of the day victory certainly rested
with his troops, the Russians next morning
still showed such an vmbroken front that the
King did not dare to renew his attack, and
allowed the Russians to withdraw unmolested.
The Russian loss was 21,000 out of 42,000,
or 50 per cent. ; that of the Prussians 13,500
out of 36,000, viz., 37-5 per cent., in a battle
which had lasted only six hours.
At Kunersdorf the Prussian defeat was com-
plete, and, indeed, though want of manoeuvring
power always prevented the Russians from
reaping the full benefit conferred upon them
by their stedfastness under punishment, and
though the same defect stood in their way
almost to the present day, the fact remains that
whether victorious or vanquished on the field
they always inflicted greater punishment on
their opponents than any other troops in
the world, exclusive of the British.
REGIMENTAL FETE AT TSARSKOE SELO.
His Majesty is seen shaking hands with the Grand Duke Andrew.
484
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERALISSIMO
THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS.
[C. 0. Bulla.
It was the same during the Napoleonic wars,
where their encounters with the French, when
the latter fought imder the Emperor's eye, more
often approximated to a drawn battle than did
any of his battles against his other enemies.
Even Austerlitz has been shown to have been
a far less serious defeat than our reliance on
former French -sources of history had led us to
beUeve. For example, the story of whole
Russian divisions having been engulfed in the
lakes by the breaking of the ice under French
artillery fire has long since been shown to be a,
myth, for when some years after the battle the
lakes were drained only one broken limber and
gun, two or three carts, and half a dozen
skeletons could be found, to the immense dis-
gust of archaeologists, who had expected to find
thousands of skeletons, dozens of guns, and a
myriad mementoes of the fight of all kinds.
At Bylau the punishment inflicted on
Napoleon's army was tremendous for the
period. Augereau's Corps lost 57 percent., and
its remains next day had to be distributed
amongst the other commands — it was quite
impossible to reform it. The 14eme de Ligne, a
celebrated French regiment, was destroyed to the
last man. Marbot tells the extraordinary story
of its heroic stand, and for once he is confirmed
by the regimental history. The whole army
was so shaken by its punishment that no
pursuit was- undertaken, and, indeed, anybody
but Napoleon would have coiosidered himself
thoroughly beaten.
At Heilsberg, against the Russians, the
French suffered a severe defeat ; even the
Emperor's bulletin could scarcely disguise the
fact, and though Friedland was a victory in so
far that the Russians were subject to a lively
piu-suit and shortly afterwards signed the Peace
of Tilsit, there remains now not the , slightest
doubt that it was the stanchness of the
Russian fighting tliroughout the campaign that
first broke the spell of the Napoleonic legend
and proved to be the begiiming of his downfall.
In 1812 it formed no part of the Russian plan
to-be drawn into a decisive battle until the
Moskva waa reached, but at Borodino they
turned to bay, and again Napoleon could only
claim a Pyrrhic victory. Those who want to
uiaderstand how the Russian can fight when the
cause is one he understands should read
Tolstoy's " Peace and War." A more extra-
ordinary picture of endurance, fanaticism, and
unselfish devotion has never been painted in
words.
Throughout the following events of the
campaign up to the passage of the Beresina
the same qualities of stanchness and endurance
showed up. It is not generally realized how
very heavy were the Russian losses, the idea
being that men in their own climate are inured
to its extremes better than foreigners can
possibly be. But the truth is that in these
climates natives are far too wise to expose them-
selves in such extreme weather unless they are
GENERAL IVANOFF.
Commander-in-Chief, South-western Front.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
485
abundantly well clad and well shod. This,
however, was just wliere the attempt to copy
conventional European dress and methods broke
down in Russia, and as a consequence tlie deatli
roll was nearly as high as that of the French.*
Few of the survivors of the great pursuit
Wore fit to take the field when, in the spring of
1813, the campaign was nsnewed. An entirely
new Russian Army was constituted, under
Barclay de Tolly (a Scot by heritage, as his
name " Barclay " sufficiently indicates) ; and,
in spite of the difficulties and friction engendered
by the fact that, with the exception of Sacken,
a Baltic German, his corps commanders were
French emigres of great pretensions and but
little merit, this anny did in fact prove the
backbone of all subsequent operations, which
led them through the battles of Bautzen,
Dresden and Leipsic, Brierme, Vitry-le-Fran-
cois, Sezanne, Arcis-sur-Aube, Champ Aubert
and Montmirail, right up to the gates of Paris
in the spring of 1814, an almost unexampled
record of marching and fighting.
The Russians' extraordinary tenacity in
defeat — and they had suffered many — had
proved of the utmost value to the Allies, more
particularly to the Prussians, in whose " Silesian
Army," under Bliicher, they were incorporated,
for the short-service levies organized by the
Prussians under every conceivable difficulty
between the middle of Mtrch and the opsning
" There ia evidence to support the statement that of all the many
nationalities engaged in tjiis retreat tlie Neapolitans actually
suffered least, although their discipline was very bad. Speaking
genemlly. the real cause of the French (Uh<'icle was want of disci-
pline. Until after the pas.sage of the Beresina the cold was by no
means so intense, as is quite evident from the fact that the river in
fiuestion, though very sluggish, was not frozen over. Our own
troops, both British and native, ha\e many times home far worse
extremes in the highlands of .-ifghanistau, though often most
insufliciently clad and nourished. Want of discipline costs far more
ia human lives than do clmiatic extremes.
H^^^^ ^.^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HNhi^^^^^^^h
GENERAL RADKO DMITRIEFF.
GENERAL RENNENKAMPF.
of the campaign in May — unwilling conscripto
as to four-fifths of them — ^liad given endless
trouble in their own country. They deserted
wholesale after every check, breaking out under
the privations- of war, to which they were
unaccustomed, to such a degree that they were
often reproached by their own countrymen aa
being a greater infliction to the inhabitants tlian
were the French. Cossack columns had to be
formed to beat them up, and even to hang a
few marauders, to encourage the remainder.
(See Prussian official histories of the campaign
of 1813-14.)
The Russians, on the other hand, who were
soldiers for life, in fact if not by law, knew no
other home than the regiment. The colours
signified more to these stanch, simple souls
than to perhaps any other soldiers in the world.
No matter how they might be broken up oa the
battlefield, they found their way back to their
own battalions with a kind of homing instinct,
and it is clear that their Draconic code of
punishment was used during that terrible period
with great judgment and clemency.
It must be remembered that in all armies ex-
cept the French, at that time and for many years
afterwards, the code of punishments which could
be legally carried out was most cruelly severe,
but it was not more severe than the feeling of
the men themselves towards offenders justified.
Originally all these punishments were invented
by the troops themselves, who, for their own pro-
tection against the consequences which might
arise from cowardice in the field, sleeping on
486
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
one's post, stealing from a comrade, &c., claimed
in all the armies of Europe, up to nearly the
end of the seventeenth century, the right to try
the culprits in the troop, squadron, or company,
and to carry out the punishment themselves.
It was only because the sufferers were, in the
nature of things, not the best qualified to treat
the matter with judicial detachment that the
" Customs of War " were codified and their
administration entrusted to courts-martial,
chosen on a wider basis, in which, according to
the magnitude of the oSence, more or fewer
officers from other regiments or commands were
associated.
The French, during the Revolution, were the
first to abolish corporal and all other degrad-
ing punishment — recognizing only the death
penalty. But almost at once the common sense
of the Army revolted against the impractic-
ability of a scale which admitted of nothing
between shooting a man or reprimanding him,
and the regiments themselves went back to the
practice of " hazing " an offender into discipline,
with results often worse for the culprit than the
200 lashes he would have received for the same
penalty in our own Army, for instance, at that
time. Further, it must be borne in mind that
the illiteracy of' the Russian moujik in these
days was something terrible — even to-day 90
per cent, of the peasants cannot read or write.
and it was considerably worse then than it is
now.
An amusing instance of this illiteracy is given
in the diary of a Prussian officer in the Q.M.
General's Staff of the Silesian Army. It was
then as now customary to attach a Staff Officer
as interpreter to each of the several corps, to
keep Headquarters and each other mutually
informed of their relative movements and con-
ditions, and it happened that attjached to the
corps of Sacken there was a Prussian oflicer
whose pedantic adherence to prescribed methods
of reports, Ac, had got on Saoken's nerves,
because he knew his men and their natural
aptitude for their duties. One day on the march
through the Champagne, one of Platoff's
Cosssicks brought him as outpost report a sheet
of paper covered with hieroglj-phics somewhat
like the marks that Red Indians make on birch
bark. There was a hill with a very crude castle
on the top ; in the middle distance were piled
arms, men sleeping, and the ^noke of cooldng
fires rising ; in the foreground a sentry \ cry
evidently asleep on his post. Sacken passed
the paper over to the Pnissian, and asked
him what he could make of it, and the latter
very naturally gave it up. " It is quite simple,"
Sacken remarked. " The Cossacks rode in from
there " — pointing north west, — " and somewhere
out there, therefore, there is a fortified town
COSSACKS OF THE GUARD, WITH THEIR COLOURS.
[C. Ckutsnu-Fltatns,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
487
of some kind- -Vitry le Francois, I should say.
Tho French troops are all around it, cooking
and sleeping, and the sentry is clearly off his
guard. It is a chance for a surprise ; now we
will go and make it." Which they did, sur-
prising the camp and capturing the town,
which was Vitry le Fran5oi8, as Sacken had
guessed.
Men with this inborn habit of warfare did not,
in fact, need much training — beyond enough
to enable them to charge in ordered bodies.
But because their Prussian neighbours had found
a rigid drill indispensable, the Russians had
for years endeavoured to cram their excellent
material into the same mould. They hired
foreigners and drill sergeants of all nations to
help them, with the result that in the end their
discipline became " fear of the stick," and the
natural impulse to go forward and close with
the enemy, which was, in fact, their greatest
asset, was completely destroyed. What
the Russian Army might have been, had it
been left more in the hands of its natural leaders,
one can judge from the extraordinary influence
exercised upon it by Suvaroff in his all too short
tenure of command about the beginning of the
nineteenth century.
Suvaroff rightly deserves a chapter to himself,
for a more extraordinary personality has perhaps
never existed. Under the exterior of a born
" natural " he did in fact conceal military
genius of a most unusual order, and above all
he understood most completely the real nature
of the Russian moujik. His sayings represent
the instinctivj protest of the Russian mind
against the extreme pedantry of the Prussian
drill-masters, and though taken by themselves
the Russian sayings suggest an absolutely
untutored intellect — applied as Suvaroff very
well knew how to apply them they became
in fact the expression of the highest tactical
truths.
" The bullet is a fool, the bayonet is a hero,"
is as true to-day as it was then, always provided
that the leader knows how to seize the psycho-
logical moment to call on his men to use tho
cold steel. Suvaroff knew this exactly, when
in battle after battle he swept the French
before him from the Trentino in the east, right
across the Lombard plains almost to their
western limits.
Certainly he had not Napoleon to deal with,
■ind at the^ time the French Revolutionary
armies had carried the doctriiae of extended
Drder fighting to such extreme limits that
they could no longer develop fire power enough
to stop a determined rush ; but whereas the
Austrians had allowed themselves to be imposed
1
uS
K^' "t^^^l
i
^^^
Wm
1
I
GENERAL SUKHOMLINOFF.
The Minister of War.
upon by the text-book rules laid down to meet
other circumstances, Suvaroff adapted his
tactics to suit the altered circumstances, and
was justified by the results. The French, in
fact, during these years from 1798 to 1800
had become altogether over-confident in their
fire power, and in this spirit of over-confidence
had reduced the number of muskets on each
mile of front to about 3,000 only, where the
school of Frederick the Great, which the
Austrians had been trained to meet, would
have allowed at least three times as many ;
and when Suvaroff told not only his own men,
but the Austrians, who during this campaign
in Italy were serving under him (much to their
officers' vexation and chagrin), that " the bullet
was a fool, and the bayonet a hero," he only
stated the common-sense fact that it was foolish
spending invaluable time in endeavouring to
shoot a way into the enemy's position with
bullets when the way lay already open before
the storming party, and it only needed resolution
on the part of the leader to seize and exploit it.
Ultimately, under Napoleon, the French
increased the density of their formation, until
they sometimes — as at Waterloo — stood 30,000
men to the mile in rows of successive lines and
columns, and to have used the bayonet then
without fire preparation would have been the
act of a madman. But as Suvaroff never had
488
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
COUNT BENCKENDORFF.
Russian Ambassador in London.
[From thg drawing by Sari;ent.
the opportunity of testing his wits against this
totally different problem, it is only fair to give
him the benefit of the donbt, and to assume
that his natural instinct for war would have
guided him as safely under these altered
conditions as imder the former ones.
" The art of war consists," according to
Moltke, " in making the best practical use of
the means at hand to the attainment of the
object in view," and judged by that standard
one must rate Suvaroff as a mtister indeed.
With the close of the Napoleonic wars the
influence of the French emigres declined in
Russia, and their places were taken by men
of Baltic German families, who riveted on the
Army yet more firmly the chains of routine
and the drill ground.
For years nothing approaching a leader
emerged from the crowd, and again in 1828-29
the docile soldiers were sacrificed in appalling
numbers to the incapacity of their generals.
The legend of the regiment which sacrificed
itself in order to fill the ditch of a fortification
so that the field guns could gallop over their
writhing bodies, which is commemorated in a
gruesome picture in the gallery of the Hermitage
at Petrograd, remains to show what the ideal
of discipline in the Russian Army really was,
even if the event itself has been over-colotired.
Fortunately for the Russians, the Turkish
generals made even more ..mistakes than did
their own officers, and though their machine
made battalions proved no match for the agile
and deternnned individual fighters of the
Crescent, thoy did by degrees bear down al
opposition and occupied at last Adrianople
But disease had worked such havoc in their
ranks that thoy had but .30,000 left fit for
duty of the hosts whicli had cros.sod the frontier
ol Turkey. Disease was the scourge of all
armies in those days, but in none did it ever
claim so many victims as amongst the Riissians,
for in no other was the standard of village
customs so unspeakably low. The Musulmans
were relatively clean by reason of their religion-
the French and English by an older civilization.
Even the Prussians had at least rudimentary
hygienic ideas drilled into them under Frederick
the Gr(^at ; but the Russians were still so
primitive that even a single regiment camped
on the same ground for ten days in wet autumn
weather was sufficient to induce a pestilence
in the district. It is necessary to recall these
unpleasant facts in order to realize how very
far the Russians have advanced since those
days. ,
The war came to an end through a process
of mutual exhaustion, but after twenty years,
or a little more, nature had made up the losses,
and a new generation again sprang forward
to defend the Cross which the Crescent had
never threatened, and again history repeated
itself.
Neither Russians nor Turks had learnt any-
thing or forgotten anything ; and, as before,
the Russians poured southwards, losing ten
men by disease for each one who fell before the
enemy. Gallantly as ever the Turks met them,
and the sieges of Silistria, Shvimla, and Ismailia
again brought out the inherent weakness of
the Russian parade-ground tactics. Russia
was indeed half beaten, and had actually
evacuated Turkish territory before the English
and French appeared on the scene and com-
pelled her to continue the conflict
Over and above the ethical awakening which
the Crimean War brought to Russia, it omplui-
sized in the most striking manner the defects
and shortcomings of her tactical methods as
opposed to those of Western Europe. Against
the Turks it had always been possible to explain
away defeat by the worthless methods those
heathen employed. Most armies are familiar
with this excuse in more or less diplomatic
" dressing up," but against the Allies, and more
particularly against the French, who were still
the models for European emulation, the facts
had to be faced that whether in the open field,
as at the Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman,
THE TTMKR UFSITORY OF THE WAR.
489
imw
INFANTRY OF THE GUARD BEFORE THE IMPERIAL PALACE.
'C. Chussfjti'Flaviens.
or in the countless sorties and assaults around
the fortress of Sevastopol itself, the Rvissian
parade-ground soldier was no match against
either French or English. He would still stand
up to be shot down, showing all the tenacity of
the earlier days, and he would endure uncom-
plainingly horrors of suffering unspeakable, but
it became at last evident even to the most
recalcitrant members of the Imperial Circle
that something more than passive endurance
was needed from troops if they were to hold
their own in the struggle with the Western
Powers, which already showed signs of deve-
loping.
The emancipation of the serfs was the first
great object to engage the attention of the
Tsar and his advisers. This movement began
in 1861, and was completed in 1863, bringing
of necessity in its train the complete remodel-
ling of the conditions of military service. Up
to this date, in fact, no real organization
for raising recruits had existed. Such system
as already existed was entirely feudal in its
conception. The Crown called on the great
GRENADIERS OF THE GUARD.
tC Chiisseau- Hlavitns,
490
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
The late GENERAL SAMSONOFF.
landowners for a certain number of men, and the
landowners picked the best, or the worst, just
according to which procedure best suited their
persona! convenience. If the landowner was
a great person at Court, it paid him to select
the best of his serfs ; if he cared little about the
Court, but much about the economic condition
of his estates, he naturally sent all the ne'er-do-
wells and the physical weaklings who were not
worth their keep to him.
Noniinally service was for twenty years, but
in the early days of almost continuous warfare,
and with the abnormally high death-rate that
prevailed, twenty years was practically a life
sentence, and few indeed ever found their way
back to their original villages.
Still, a few did survive by reason of greater
vitality and intelligence, and these men proved
the popular educators of their districts. They
had known men and cities, and they knew by
experience the qualities which go to make a
man and a loader. If their immediate over-
lord was an inferior bully, the old soldier weighed
him up in the village tavern, as he does all
over the world, and people began to make
comparisons.
This is how in every nation the influence of
the array system works back upon the people,
and thus forms the starting-point of all great
social movements. Discipline in an army may
be cruelly severe, but there is always some
atmosphere of legality and publicity about it ;
and if now and again it may tend towards
downright terrorism, in the last resort men with
arms in their hands can be driven to use them.
Hence in any and every stage of evolution
there is more sense of equality and of legality
within the Army or Navy than amongst the
population from which this armed force has
arisen.
What made the lot of the serf m Russia
so terrible was the complete isolation of his
communities, and the fact that they carried no
arms. Free from the pressure of any effective
public opinion, outrages could be enacted by
a cruel over-lord which at all times would have
been impossible in any regiment. What really
held the Russians back for so long was that
the men came exclusively from the masses of
the peasants, and the officers too exclusively
from the landed aristocrats — the two extremes
of the social scale.
Had not the wars of 1866 and 1870 come so
closely on the final acts of emancipation this
misfortvme might have been indefinitely pro-
longed ; for following out the French system
— which until the first of these dates had been
the model for all Europe — the system of paid
substitutes, whereby men drawn for the colours
who could afford it paid another to take their
places in the ranks, would have become the
law of the land. But fortunately the triumph
of the Prussian S5^tem of universal service, in
1
i'^fi^ ■--
HI^H
mt4
^SBb:"'* '"' ^llaH^lHJ
fJh
yr^^ !
f
M. '^.>WOD
W^
W^^^m
^xjim^^r^' ■
GENERAI, BRUSILOFF.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
491
which no man could escape the fate drawn
from the balloting urn, was so conclusively
demonstrated in both of these campaigns
that the same condition was imported into the
fundamental law of service in the Russian
Army, which was thus made for the first time
really representative of all classes of the
nation.
Of course the law could not be made at
once as effective as in Prussia, for the number
of men becoming amiually liable for service
was far in excess of any military budget the
coimtry could supply, hence very numerous
and elastic terms of exemption were legalized,
most of which favoured imduly the educated
classes. But even this hud its effect in the fact
that a standard of education was prescribed.
and men of the middle classes who dreaded
the hardships and surroimdiiigs of a soldier's
life worked as they had never worked before
to escape such a fate.
Matters were then in this condition, and the new
leaven had indeed scarcely begun to work when
the Turkish troubles again became acute, and,
as in 1827 and 1852, so in 1877 Russia was
again plunged into what nine-tentlis of her
population at least considered at once a Holy
V\'ar and a war for the liberation of their
oppressed Slavonic brethren.
Again Russians crossed the Pruth, and then
the Danube, fighting their way doggedly up
to and over the Balkans. But here again their
momentum died out before the obstinate and
GENERAL ZHILINSKY.
Former Commander-in-Chief of North-
West Front.
heroic resistance of the Turks, and but for the
assistance of the Rumanians they would never
have reached even Adrianople. Again it was
the absence of sufficient intelligence in their
battalions to apply practically the hygienic
ideas tiiey ■ had been taught in peace which
turned their camp into plague spots, and
destroyed more men by far than fell before
GENERAL SUKHOMLINOFF, Minister of War.
Inspecting a Red Cross Train with Madame Sukhomlinoff.
[Undtrwood and Undtrwood.
492
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL ALEXIEFF.
the enemy's bullets. So low indeed had their
effectives fallen that notwithstanding that they
now had through railway communications right
up to the Danube, it happened that when at
last they reached the heights opposite the lines
of Tchataldja they could only muster 59,000
effectives, and would have been quite incapable
of prolonging the war, even had Great Britain
not interfered.
The railways had indeed been completely
discounted by the hopeless corruption of the
Russian supply and transport departments.
Whether these were better or worse than in
the old days cannot now be ascertained ; the
difference is that this time the awakened
intelligence of the Army began to stir, and a
most searching inquiry was made into all cases
of misappropriation. The amount of bribery
and corruptioA proved before the nimaerous
courts of inquiry held after the war sounds
almost incredible to our ears, and too many
people are still living to make it expedient to
disclose all the names involved. But the broad
facts can be gathered from the pages of the
well-known author, Stepniak, who was careful
always to keep well within the margin of his
facts.
As to the quality of food supplied to the
troops the following extract from the official
report of a Commission consisting of the expert
Professors of the University of Kieff assembled
to report on some consignments of Army
biscuits will speak for itsslf : —
Out of 100 parts of this biscuit wo have found
that 30 parts consist of ingredients devoid o£ nutri-
tion, such as corn-husks, straw, sand, and dirt. The
wat«r employed in their manufacture was, properly
speaking, not water at all, but a reddish-brown
fluid resembling cocoa in appearance, and swarming
with living organisms, which, by keeping it in inces-
sant movement, prevented the deposit of inorganic
matter. The manufactory where these biscuits were
produced was low and damp ; and from motives of
economy the kilns in which they were dried were
only raised to a temperature of 70 deg. C. instead of
120 deg. C- — the minimum necessary to destroy such
germs. The consequence has been that each of the
biscuits has become a hot-bed for the propagation
of these bacteria, which have spread to the outside
and formed a coating of greenish-brown mould.
The Commission absolutely decHned to experi-
ment with these articles of so-called food on
dogs, still less on human beings. But thousands
of tons of these same biscuits were issued to
the armies, who, having nothing else, were
compelled to eat them or starve. The other
articles supplied to the army were no better.
Their clothing was shoddy, and their shoe-
soles brown paper ; but in that respect they
were probably no worse off than o'jr own men
in the Crimea.
The armament of the troops was relatively
little better than their food. Setting aside the
complaints of sawdust in cartridges, which
invariably make their appearance amon<?st men
GENERAL DRAGOMIROFF.
THE TIMEU HISTORY OF THE WAR.
493
who have been severely handled, the fact
remains tliat the Krnka rifle, with which all the
infantry except the Rifle llrigados were armed,
was, without any exception, the worst in
Europe. The Peabody Henry, with which tlie
Turks were supplied, on the other hand, was
much tlie host weapon then in European hands,
better balanced, and with a far more reliable
extractor, which could not jam, as our own
Martini action so frequently did, to our misfor-
tune in the Sudan and on the Indian frontier.
This difference in armament determined
nearly all the phenomena of the battlefield,
reproducing, in fact, the same conditions as
those which gave rise to all the confusion of
tactical thought in all ^^'estorn Armies after the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870. For here, as
before in France, the hail of long range pro-
jectiles swept the open field for a good 1,000
yards before the Russian infantry were able to
open an effective return fire.
In 1870, the Germans had in their great artil-
lery superiority, at least, the means of making
good the deficiency of their small-arm lire, and
by degrees they learnt how to use their supe-
riority to groat advantage. But the Russians
had at first nothing whatever to set against
their enemy's superiority in infantry fire. The
Russian artillery, both field and siege guns,
were the poorest, by far, that existed in Europe,
and here again, at least in field artillery, the
Turks had, gun for gun, the advantage over
them. But, fortunately for the Russians, the
u!b*^
GENERAL RUZSKY.
GENERAL-LIEUTENANT NIKOLAUS
JANUSCHKEVITCH.
The New Chief of the Imperial General
Staff. {Record Press.
guns were far too few in number for the effective
application of artillery fire tactics, and they
were generally short of ammunition.
As if their defects in armament were not
sufficient, the Russians had made an ahnost
slavish copy of the Prussian infantry drill and
methods of the period, which methods were
not only bad in themselves, but in their spirit
were absolutely unsuited to the Russian Army.
It was the influence of the Baltic Germans
again ; and the true Russian school of military
patriots could at this period only find one man
with adequate literary talent and enthusiasm
to champion the cause of his countrymen.
This man was Dragomiroff, who afterwards
became one of their leading tacticians. He
had a most intimate acquaintance with the
Prussian Army, having been attached to the
Staff of Von Steiimietz throughout the cam-
paign of 1866, and he was one of the first, if
not the very first, to prick the bubble of Prus-
sian infantry fighting, which for so long held
the field, even in France and England.
Where our witnesses saw only the marvellous
apparent success of the new breechloader, and
believed that the employment of the weapon,
as they saw it, had actually been arrived at
beforehand by conscious intellectual effort, he
494
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
saw more deeply that it was a real want of the
spirit and desire to get home with the bayonet
which led to the " rudderless confusion of the
fight," which Wivs admitted years afterwards
by Meckel, the organizer subsequently of the
Japanese Army but then spokesman for tlie
Prussian General Staff.
Dragomiroff knew that his countrymen were
not afraid to die in company. What they
hated was the feeling of loneliness in extended
order. This went against their most primitive
instincts ; and lie thoroughly understood what
Suvaroff had said about the bayonet in tlie sense
which has been explained above. Dragomiroff
saw the battle as a whole — nist as a series of
independent duels between each of the three
arms. He looked to the adequate preparation
by artillery, supplemented by the ordered
volleys of the infantry line, to breakdown the
opposition of his enemy, thus opening the way
for cold steel. His ideal was the old British
line in the Peninsula and at Waterloo ; and
when people talked to him of the tremendous
fire power of the modern weapons, he pointed
out that in his experience it took a good deal
longer to kill a man with the breechloader
than it had ever taken in the past ; that,
in fact, in the old days troops had often
gone right home to the final charge against
losses heavier by far than those before which
the Germans had simply thrown themselves
down and refused to go on at all ; facts, it
may be noted in passing, which no one could
contradict. If Western nations had become too
refined for the bloody business of the battle-
field, that was their misfortune. The Kussian
moujik was the same moujik as in SuvaroSf's
time, whom every one else refused to under-
stand. Dragomiroff was in fact the instigator
of the revolt against all things Prussian, which
now began to set in. But many years were to
elapse before his teaching bore full fruit. That
Dragomiroff was in the right the following
description of Skoboleff s attack on the Green
Hills at Plevna will show. Skobeleff, though of
Scottish origin, as his name implies, was the
one general of his day who understood the real
soul of his men — and this is how Kuro-
patkin*, his staff officer, relates the incident : —
The fog was still lying in the valley which
separated the Kussians from the Turkish works
Abdul Bey tabiya and Rodi Bey tabiya. The latter
was already fairly visible, and the unintorrupted fire
of the Turks showed by the rising powder smoke the
position of the rifle pits. These were about 120 yards
in front of the redoubts and the long cuF\'ed ap-
proach connecting them. To reach the works the
Eussians had to descend the slope, some 1,000 yards
• Kuropatkin. who subsequently became Commander-in-Chief
of the Russian Armies in Manchuria, was then a captain of the
General Staff.
SIBERIAN SHARPSHOOTERS.
Officers and Privates leaving for the Front.
[Daily Mirror.
THE TIMES HI STORY OF THE WAR.
495
SUVAROFF.
[H. J. Clark.
long, of the Green Hill, which was closely planted
with vineyards ; in the bottom flowed a brook
between steep banks, impassable for artillery ;
beyond came a stiff ascent of 400 yards which merged
into the glacis of the redoubts.
Punctually at 3 p.m. the A'ladimir and Sus-
dallski regiments, together with the 9th and 10th
Kifle Battalions, advanced with bauds playing to the
as.sault . . . The Russians dashed forward and
commenced with cheers to ascend the further slope ;
but the reinforced fire of the Turks brought them to a
standstill, and only a small party of the bravest still
hung on. Reinforcements were urgently necessary
. . . The 7th Bewal Regiment was to foUow with
two battalions in first line, the 3rd in second ; the
companies deployed at small intervals, and with their
bands playing advanced to the attack. The hollow
was soon crossed ; the expended debris of the first
assaulting troops joined, and all together in a dense
commingled swarm they attempted the ascent.
They only succeeded in getting half-way, then
threw themselves down in the open and began a wild
fire. It was evident that without fresh support even
these troops would melt away ; there were still in
hand 12 companies of the Libau Regiment, and two
Rifle battalions, standing behind the Green Hill.
The choice lay between employing them as a covering
force behind which to withdraw the others, or to
throw them all in to decide the victory. Skobcleff
chose the latter.
This fresh support carried the crowd on some
way, but the Turks seized the opportunity to make
a counter-attack. The Russian right staggered ; it
seemed as if the whole would give way.
Then Skobeleff fhmg in his last reserve — himself —
into the scale. What other leader in Europe but he
could, by tile power of his will and example, have
checked the instinct in 10.000 men to sive themselves
by flight ? Mounted on his white horse, himself in
fullest white uniform, he galloped to the front, and
his " Forward, my lads I " brought even the dying to
life. The troops rose and followed him, and in a few
moments the redoubt was in his hands, and remained
in them till, worn out by hunger and fatigue, and
deserted by the whole of the rest of the army, the
gallant remnant of his division retired " by order "
about 6 p.m. on the following day, having beaten oft
five successive Turkish attacks.
(The above is not a verbal translation, but
simply a precis from Kuropatkin.)
Men who could thus press home a charge
and come on again in spite of inadequate ar-
tillery support, and unable with their own
defective armament to reply effectively to their
enemy's musketry fire, needed only to meet
their opponents on equal terms to sweep
over all Continental adversaries.
Skobeleff died too soon. But against im-
mense opposition, Kuropatkin carried on his
traditions. Often away for long periods on
diplomatic duties, he always kept touch with
the Russian school, and was on the higli road
to success, when events in the East confronted
him with an impossible task.
Meanwhile, progress throughout the Russian
nation was making rapid strides. As the danger
of the Triple Alliance loomed ever nearer,
immense numerical additions had to be made
to the Army. Exceptions from conscription
became more difficult to obtain, and as the
general level of intelligence in the ranks improved
and more searching inspections by such Gtenerals
as Skobeleff and Kuropatkin were made,
officers were compelled to take a more
serious view of their profession, and as the
Russian School, including therein the cult of
Suvaroff and Dragomiroff, became fashionable,
they began to take a more human interest
in their men. The school of the Prussian
BARCLAY DE TOLLY.
496
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
""'k^^-^':'.'
CAVALRY AT KRASNOE SELO.
[C. O. BuUa.
drill-master became unpopular, and was no
longer recognized as a sure road to preferment.
The armament, both of artillery and infantry,
was brought up to the fullest European standard,
and the percentage of corruption in the Supply
Departments fell at least fifty per cent. Above
all things railway construction was pressed for-
ward, and great advances were already made
towards a more rapid mobilization against the
nation's western enemies.
Unfortunately, when the blow fell, it came
from the East, and as his bad luck would have
it, Kiu-opatkin found himself called upon to
meet with the most inefficient portion of
the whole Russian Army the onslaught of
an absolutely new order of warfare — some-
thing that was neither Western nor Oriental,
but embodied the best of both and the defects
of neither.
To gain time in a retreat is at all times a
difficult task, for the rearguard must not bo
exposed too long, or it maj' be overwhelmed
and driven into panic flight, or if withdrawn too
soon the pursuers may catch up with the main
body, entailing most serious consequences in
the difficult groimd over which at first the
Russians were compelled to retire. But in tliis
case the difficulty was ten times greater because
the immense superiority of the Japanese
artillery fire introduced an entirely new factor
into the calculations of the Russian General.
Hitherto the length of time that a Brigade,
Division, or Army Corps could resist without
serious danger had been estimated in all Staff
handbooks from the data supplied by the years
of experience gained during the Napoleonic
campaign ; and it happened quite fortuitously
that this experience tallied almost exactly
with that of the Prussians in 1866 and 1870,
who alone had seriously collated their facts.
The Japanese, fortunately for the Rvissians, used
the same data, and consequently were never
SQUADRON OF COSSACKS WITH REGIMENTAL COLOURS.
[ i'opjcal.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
497
A CHARGE OF
ready in the first engagements to reap the
advantages their batteries obtained for them.
But presently, as the knowledge came home to
them, the Russians were seriously embarrassed,
and K\iropatliin lost what should have been
his chief advantage. This was his knowledge
of the French Napoleonic stategy that, under
the conditions which obtained on most days
in the encounters from the battle of Liao-Yang
onwards should have given him certain victory
over his enemy's troops, handled as they were
with minute fidelity to their pattern on the
German methods of von Moltke.
At Liao-Yang, the Russians actvially stood in
the Napoleonic lozenge formation of the old
books. But the Japanese artillery fire acted so
much more rapidly than was expected, that the
whole arrangement was broken up, and though
Orloff's counter-attack should have come in
time, had Kuropatkin's order been obeyed,
it did arrive too late, and the whole army was
RUSSIAN LANCERS. I-^- O^oup.
forced into retreat. Still with that extra-
ordinary Russian stubbornness, the retreat
never degenerated into flight, and as the fresh
army corps from the west began to arrive, the
Japanese soon found out that they had a very
difficult foe to contend with. Their batteries
were over and over again outclassed by the
new quick-firing Russian artillery that now
appeared in the field, trained on the French
method to fire shrapnel by rafales, or " gusts "
— and with this artillery support behind them,
the Russians again and again made good their
baj'onet charges, so that before the war was
ended, the school of Suvaroff was again triumph-
antly in the ascendant.
The nature of the climatic conditions which
prevailed during the last three months of
the war rendered strategic manoeuvring of any
kind practically impossible, and thus Kuro-
patkin lost the opportunity of re-establish-
ing prestige as a leader. But though
RIFLES OF THE GUARD.
At the Krasnoe Selo Manceuvres.
[C. 0. BuUa.
498
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
disgraced by authority, the fact remains that it
was tlirougli him and his school that Russian
self-respect was restored ; and it is on the lines
which he laid down that the regeneration in
tactics and strateg;^-, the fruits of which we are
now about to consider in the East of Eiu"ope,
has been essentially conducted.
The great result of the Russo-Japanese War
was the bringing together of officers and men
into a practical sympathy with one another ;
also the eUmination of the exclusive sway of
the Potsdam tradition. The Army now began
to feel itself as representative of the nation,
and it learnt by suffering the bitter lessons of
defeat. From time to time every army needs
this lesson of the consequences of neglected
duties, to wean it from the over-confidence
bom of easy triumphs. But it is only when
both army and nation are in sympathy with
one another, as in this case, that the full fruits
of their suffering can be gathered. During the
years which followed progress was rapid and
sustained. Again, the Russian inquiry into
corruption and peculation was thorough and
the examples made drastic ; and in 1914 for
the first time in history Russia sent into
the field a mighty army, well-shod, well-fed,
and amply supplied with the best equipment
the technical skill ot Europe could supply.
Frequent conferences with their French Allies
had brought about unity of doctrine, both in
strategy and tactics, and at last we had all
tho conditions necessary to develop to the
full the latent power of the bayonet to which
Suvaroff invariably appealed, viz., fire tactics
in the artillery, capable of " making the oppor-
tunity," and infantry quick and bold enough
to seize it when made.
There is no one secret of tactics suitable
to all armies, and we shall look in vain for the
same characteristics in the Russian infantry
that we find in our own ; for we are of two
totally different races, and what suits our men
does not siu't the Russians. The greater the
crisis the cooler and more deliberate becomes
the Englishman's aim. It is an instinct in him
derived from sturdy generations of bowmen
ancestors, and the change from the bow and
arrow to the musket, and ultimately to the
magazine rifle, was all in the course of natural
evolution. The Russian, on the contrary, was
hurled into the firearm stage without (except
as regards Tartar tribes) any transitional stage
at all, and his instinct is to get in close to the
enemy and use his musket or rifle preferably
as a club — an instinct wliich is also common
amongst all the Northern Germans, who have
also a strong Mongolian and Slav sub-strain in
their blood.
The Russian onset is of the nature of a crowd
rush. " It is pleasanter to die in company,
and old Mother Russia has sons enough," is
a very old saying with them. The leader who
l<nows his men will always give full play
SIBERIAN COSSACKS.
With machine gun packed for transport on horse-back-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
499
SIBERIAN COSSACKS WITH MACHINE GUN IN ACTION.
to this instinct, provided his artillery has
the fire-power necessary to clear the way
for them.
Such tactics are no doubt expensive in
human life, but the Russian nation has
shown tliat she can stand the strain, and
ha« always been invincible when the right
conditions prevailed. When French and
British have always fought best with sufficient
elbow-room, but not too much, both
Germans and Russians have excelled in
masses.
One last point deserves to be mentioned in
this general survey of the evolution of the
Russian armies, viz., the extraordinary increase
of efficiency in the Russian railway system.
Not only had the extent of lines open for
traffic increased by 40 per cent, in the last
ten years before the War, but the efficiency of
the original lines had been more than doubled by
the provision of more siding ac;commodation,
better laid track, and the doubling of many
lines. Perhaps this was most marked on the Une
leading north from Moscow via Vologda to
Archangel, where fairly extensive jetties had
been provided and the channel dredged out
to a depth of 18 feet opposite the town itself.
It is much deeper not many miles down — facts
of great significance, as our future narrative
will disclose.
The impetus to this development was first
given by Prince Kilikoff, who went to Canada
as a youth and worked his way through every
grade of the railway world on the Canadian
Pacific Railway, returning to Russia just in
time to take over the management of the
Siberian Railway on the outbreak of the
Japanese War.
The development which this line underwent
in his hands, notwithstanding the difficulties
of the primary necessity of subordinating
construction to traffic throughout the whole
duration of the campaign, has been generally
considered by our most competent British and
American railway engineers as one of the
greatest triumphs of administrative talent
the world has ever seen ; and it is essentially
to the Prince that Russia owed her power to
bring about a termination of hostilities on very
reasonable terms before the social revolution
had acquired momentum enough seriously to
threaten the stability of the Tsar's Government.
The danger was grave indeed, but nothing in
comparison with what it would have become
had the war been prolonged for another six
montlis. Russia made the most of the period
of respite allowed her, and it was to her railways,
and essentially to Prince Kilikoff, that the Allies
owed the timely support she was able to give
at the crisis of the British and French retreat
-^ Stockholnv^^— ^-^
\, jrXadoga
TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION
OFTHE
RUSSIAN MILITARY
DISTRICTS.
HEADQUARTERS of . vtHkAZAN
MILITARY DISTRICTS. ULiLI
BOUNDARIES OF MILITARY
DISTRICTS -■■_».
FORTRESSES -0.
RAILWAYS -DOUBLE LINE..
SINGLE M
50(.)
—fr-
I
o
Scaleof Miles
so /go
iOO
30O
'VclogdaV\i
J'
Borovichi
C
'\
JJ.
(^atUi
yBologo^
*%
'o--.
^Ipinsti
»•— .
1/ ;;
« -
VTvet
wa""-"^
■^Wo
Mijni No^'qo'~od>
'■y*.
*>v.
I MOSCOW
fyazma
^^Ij^TVladirnir
Caorevsh
!ft*»
L
r
furo/n
Ser,
'""Va
'0/-1
' ut<bovif-^i
/v^
rtjuic
L.^^t^^^'''^
OreH
Hzloi^aya
^rkhovi
fuiserHs^
.KAZAN
Till
~^ Me I ken
„\5;
iRyajsk
'^Bogoyavlensk i*"*"'
**"-^^=^
{Pe n 2 a
•i.^.,
V.
v/
V i"
^**.
^/Vni
iCryazi
JlursU I J
^loikof
Igof
Worojba
Voronej itf"
rd'SA,
AtHaisti
tyubotin\
Marefax
ORoltava
[C^yelogorod \)
\ A
„»^C~«-^ Balanda
I' \ \ ^^^
/ Uryupjnsl<aya ^- '
/Ta/acA \
:,Ust-Med^ied I
t
I
I
famlshin
Alexandrof Gai -
^nstatitinbgi^d
-!!«■* ""'J' >W)/jf //>/ia^^2j^ X""^ / ^--^^^ »
,.s
Konst3ntinovk3\ \ i^-rr^ , >
VekaterinoslaF -^7Sif^»-i"^>C_r
^le/andro,^sk J \ \Shakhtnaya ■
kalachf,
MiUero^o
"•^^«
' Berdransi
"SGenjchesk — - -
lorodishche :
.V8
,|\»°
<^
501
502
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Si
^
ft
.J
**"" ^^^^— T^ttHf tf^JBL '^''"^^Bbj
A MOTOR SQUADRON.
[Daily Muror.
from Mons to the Marne. But for these greatly
improved transport conditions, sufficient num-
bers could never have been accumulated on
the East Prussian frontier with which to compel
the German General Staff to transfer large
bodies of troops, generally estimated at ten
Corps or 500,000 fighting men, from the west
to the east of Europe.
What is more, but for the railways it is
most probable that the somewhat early advent
of the autumn rains in Poland in 1914 would
have thrown the Russians on the defensive for
many months until the coming of frost and
snow.
Before this great improvement in railway
communication, which was efiEected largely
by French capital, the Russian scheme of
mobilization was necessarily slow. It is true
that the units in the Western miUtary districts
of Vilna, Warsaw, and Kieff were kept at a
high peace strength and could be mobilized
in eight days, but no general concentration on
the frontier could take place until more than a
month had elapsed. All this was altered in the
years before the war by the building of new
strategic lines. Where there had been a few
years before only six concentration lines, three
of which were single lines, there were eight
lines, six of which were double, with feeder lines,
which allowed mobilization to be speeded up.
Heavier rails were laid, permitting the use of
more powerful locomotives and of a consequeo",
increase in the speed of trains. This revolution
in railway communication was followed by the
withdrawal of an array corps from the East
Prussian frontier and of a cavalry division from
Poland, a proceeding which, in the new
circumstances, did not necessarily weaken
Russian defence in the West.
Seven army corps and two cavalry divisions
were massed in the Moscow and Kazan districts,
in the midst of a rapidly growing population
more than capable of supplying the men
required. These masses of troops placed at the
heart of the railway 85-stem could be dispatched
east, south, or west to any theatre of war, so
that nowhere could an enemy be certain of the
strength of the forces which might be Qpn-
c;>n rated against him.
Concurrently with the withdrawal of troops
from Warsaw the new railway dispositions
permitted a change in the line of mobilization in
Poland, which was drawn back from the Vistu'*
about 90 miles to the line Byelostok-Brest-
Litovski-Kovel. The new line presented an
obvious advantage, in that the Warsaw troops
were no longer thrust forward in advance of
the other armies, but were fairly alined on
either flank by the concentration line of the
troops in the Vilna and Kieff districts. Mobili-
zation would take place in greater security and
with smaller risks of delay consequent on the
congestion of troops, while the central mass of
troops could be handled to meet any strategic
situation, so that the covering forces in the
West had no longer the same importance.
CHAPTER XXIX.
THE RUSSIAN ARMY AT THE
OUTBREAK OF WAR.
Peace Strength — ^Universal Service — Periods of Service — The Reserve — The Cossacks-
Supply OF Officers — ^The Reform Wave and its Effect on Personnel — Distribution of
Commands — Composition of Units — Infantry — Infantry Tactics — Cavalry — Artillery — •
Staff and Staff Duties — Progress in Aviation — Russia's Task as an Ally.
AT the outbreak of the war the
peace strength of the Russian Army
was about 50,000 officers and over
1,200,000 men, including about
1,000,000 combatants. The annual contingent
in recent years had been about 430,000. The
Ukaso proclaiming the general mobilization
issued at the end of July called up five classes
to the colours, or about two million men. With
the addition of other reserves and volunteers
the total number called to arms for active
service amounted to 4,100,000.
The constitution of the Russian Army was
based on the law of .January 13, 1874, by which,
with exceptions presently to be noted, the whole
male population, without distinction nj rank, was
declared liable to personal military service.
Liability to service extended from the be-
ginning of the 21st to the end of the 43rd year
of a man's age, of which the first 18 years would
be passed in the Standing Army, the remainder
in the " Opolchenie " or Militia.
Service with the colours, originally fixed for
five years, with 13 in the Reserve, had been
gradually reduced until at the outbreak of the
war it stood at 3^ years with the colours and
14J in the Reserve. This alteration had made
it possible to give thorough training to a much
hxrger portion of the annual contingent than
was formerly possible.
The Reserve men were liable to bo called out
for two annual trainings of six weeks each, but
in districts remote from the Western frontier
their lialiilitv was not often enforced.
The " Opolchenie " included all men fit to
bear arms from their 21st to the end of the
43rd year, and was divided into two categories or
" bans," the term originally adopted from the
Prussian practice.
The .first ban might be used to reinforce or
complete the Standing Army, or to form special
units, and it included all men who had passed
through the Standing Army after they had
completed their 18 years' service, and all men
fit for active service who had not been
taken in the first instance owing to want of
room in the cadres of the Standing Army. Its
four youngest contingents were kept imder
military control, liable to be called up to fill
vEicancies, and received two trainings, each
of six weeks' duration.
The second ban comprised men who had been
exempted from service in peace time for family
reasons and men not quite up to the medical
standard. Except for the above-mentioned
first four contingents the Opolchenie could be
called out only by Imperial Ukase.
In Transcaucasia and the Kuban and Terek
Provinces Christians served for tliree years with
the colours and 15 in the Reserve, but Mahome-
dans paid a military tax in heu of personal
service, except such as enlisted in the Osset or
Daghestan cavalry or Militia.
Young men who reached certain standards of
education were granted shorter terms of service
according to their proficiency. The Reserve
officers, as in Germany, were principally ob-
tained from this selected cla.ss : and this
60.3
504
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE ISMAIL GUARDS.
Who did a thousand versts on skis from Archangel to Petrograd,
[C. O. Bulla.
regulation proved an immense incentive to in-
dustrious study.
The Co8S8«:ks hold their land by military
tenure, and accordingly come under special
regulations.
Their service began on the completion of
the 18th year, and lasted for 20 years divided
into three periods. During the first tliree
years they remained in their stanitsas, or settle-
ments, undergoing training. Thence they
passed to the second, or " Front " category, in
which they remained for 12 yenrs, during the
first four of which they served on furlough at
their homes, bound to keep their equipment and
horses ready for service, and for the last
four years they belonged to the third category
unit and were only expected to keep their
equipment serviceable.
Men of the second category were called up
every year for a three weeks' training — those
in the third only once for one turn of threo
weeks in the whole four years.
THE KAISER INSPECTING RUSSIAN TROOPS. IRicord Puss.
He Is accompanied by the Emperor and the Grand Duke Nicholas.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
505
For tho last five years of their total liaoility
of 25 years they remained in the Reserve cate
gory, only liable to be turned out in case of war.
Finally, in a supreme emergency all Cossacks
fit to bear arms might be called up as a levee
en masse.
As in all armies, non-commissioned officers
were mainly selected from the ranks, and
generally were men who had ro-engaged under
special tenns as to pension ard employment
under Government. There were special schools
lor their higher military education, but the
system was about the weakest link in the whole
Army, for the Government could not afford terms
even nearly good enough to attract the better
class amongst the conscripts, and the chances
of active or colonial service wliich popularize tho
Army in England in such a marked manner were
too distant to act as an inducement to remain ;
hence only men of little enterprise elected to
re-engage, and except after a recent war in which
the best men had come to the front and developed
a true soldierly attachment to the colours,
their work was done in a rather perfunctory
manner. This is the experience of all compul-
sory service armies, but it was Russia's good
f ortim.e that the Great War overtook the Army
just when tho non-commissioned ranks were
at their prime, and thus it was possible to pro-
mote numbers of these men to commissioned
rank to supplement the shortage of officers which
had previously been Russia's greatest trouble.
At the time of the outbreak of war the Russian
Anny had its full complement of officers, and
thanks to the enormous capacity of the military
schools Russia was at least as able as other
belligerents to make good the wastage of
war. Especially as regarded the personnel
of the Army the changes effected since the war
with Japan had been of a most sweeping
character. Promotion beyond the rank of
captain went no longer by seniority but en-
tirely by merit, and a complex but most effi-
"jient machinery had been introduced for test-
ing the qualifications of officers. The higher the
rank or post, the more searching the tests. One
flattering compliment to British ideals was that
no cavalry colonel was allowed to take command
of his regiment until he had ridden to hounds
for a season.
A much more exacting standard than of old
had come to be applied, both in the Guard and
in the rest of the Army, to the private life of
officers Regimental courts of honour were
known to call vipon an officer to leave the regi-
ment for behaviour that formerly wotild have
provoked no censure. The Russian Army had
become more part and parcel of the nation.
RUSSIAN TROOP TRAIN LEAVING FOR
THE THEATRE OF WAR.
The military exclusiveness that at one time led
to deplorable acts of violence on the part
of officers towards civilians had become com-
pletely discredited.
A corresponding change was noticeable among
the men. The Japanese War and the abortive
revolution that followed it had left a deep im-
print upon the youth of the coxintry, who, a few
years later, were conscripted to form the bulk
of the Army. They presented an entirely new
form of raw material, more receptive, but far
less prone to the blind obedience of their imme-
diate predecessors. The task of training these
men was much more difficult, but also much
more interesting, and the officers took it up with
keen zest. Perhaps in no army in the world
can good officers do so much to influence their
men.
In all the branches of military training the
reform wave htui fully exerted itself. In the
new Field Service regulations every effort was
made to foster initiative among the men ; every
advantage was taken to promote a healthy spirit
of emulation. Gymnastics, outdoor sports, all
kinds of healthy recreation were encouraged.
506
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
TROOPS ENTRAINED FOR THE FRONT.
[Underwood and U nderwood*
In this domain, perhaps, no single man had
done so much for the Russian Army as the
Grand Duke Nicholas, who became the General-
issimo. Year by year, as the troops of the
Petrograd military district, of which he was
Commander-in-Chief, displayed the progress
made at the autunm manoeuvres, the fruitful
labours of his Imperial Highness were recorded
gratefully in Imperial rescripts. As a former
colonel of the Hussars of the Guard, the Grand
Duke naturally took a special pride in his
cavalry. Visitors who were privileged to see
the reviews at Krasnoe Seloe during the last
three years could not fail to be struck by the
smart appearance, not only of the Guards, but
of all the cavalry regiments. It would be un j ust
not to record the great service rendered by
another member of the Imperial family, the
Grand Duke Sergius Mikhailovitch, to the
artillery, as Inspector-General of Ordnance.
He had certainly been to a very large extent
responsible for the splendid showing made by
the Russian guns and gunners when war came.
In war, the Army comprised Field Troops,
Reserve Troops, and Dep6t Troops. The Field
troops consisted of the units of the standing
Army brought up to war strength by calling up as
many of the Reserve categories as were required.
The Reserve Troops were formed by the ex-
pansion of the " reserve cadres " maintained
in peace. They were divided into two classes,
in the first of which the cadres were materially
stronger than those of the second, and could
therefore be mobilized and sent to the front
more rapidly. Following the German model,
this first class had been almost completely
organized in Reserve divisions which formed
part of the Field " Arm}' Corps " Commands,
and took the field simultaneously with the corps
to which they were assigned.*
The Depot Troops were formed on cadres
detached from each unit on mobilization by
the Field Army, and were filled vip from those
men of the Reserve not required on mobilization
of the active units, by fresh recruits, or by men
of the four youngest contingents of the Opol-
chenie. Volunteers over 17 years were also
accepted, and drafts were sent forward froni
these depots to make good the losses in the units
to which they belonged.
As in all other Continental armies, fortresses
were garrisoned and internal order preserved
by troops outside the framework of the Field
Army.
As the term of service in the Reserve was
approximately five times as long as the colour
service, it will be seen that tliere was an ample
number of men available to supply all those
needs. For administrative purposes the whole
area of European Russia was divided into the
eight military districts of the Caucasus, Kazan,
Kieff , Moscow, Odessa, Petrograd, Warsaw, and
Vilna. In addition there were four Siberian
districts, making twelve in all.
To each of these, according to their distance
from the frontier, and other considerations
•No exact details as to their allotment have tjeen attainable, as
this was one of the most carefully guarUe'l mobilization secrets.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
507
affecting rapid mobilization, two or more Army
Corps Commands were assigned, and in war
these Army Corps were grouped in varying
numbers from three to five to form an Army
or Army Group.
The Army Corps was originally organized on
the Prussian model— viz., two divisions with a
Corps Artillery and Engineers and supply
details— but during the Franco-German War
this d\ial division and its uniformity throughout
the Army so greatly facilitated the work of the
French Intelligence Department that by degrees
all armies, whilst maintaining the form for
peace purposes, deliberately and secretly de-
parted from it on mobilization, adding one,
two, or three reserve divisions to each corps
according to convenience. In doing this, they
all reverted to the Napoleonic plan, which
possessed the great advantage that you could
suit the importance of the command to the skill
and character of its loader. There are generals
who would be simply wasted at the head of
only two divisions, others who could not safely
be trusted with more, and always there remains
the great advantage that if tlie secret of mobili-
zation has been well kept the enemy, if he
capttires men of the 10th Corps, for example,
cannot at once determine whether he has only
two divisions to deal with or five. The same
rule also applies to tlie armies or army groups
referred to above, and logically to the com-
position of smaller units, as divisions, brigades,
Ac, but in practice no modern European army
went as far in this matter as Napoleon, and in
Russia, as throughout all Continental Europe,
a division consisted at the outbreak of the war
of two brigades of Infantry and a brigade of
Artillery of six field batteries with Engineers,
supply and medical columns, a complete
miniature army, capable of being employed as a
unit on any detached service.
Below this divisional unit the Russians,
following the usual practice, had no other units
of the three arms. There were brigades of
Infantry and brigades of Cavalry to which
batteries and Engineers might or might not be
attached foir convenience, but when such
attachment took place the batteries, &c., were
only lent temporarily to the brigadier ; they
did not become integral parts of his command.
From this point, therefore, it will be con-
venient to deal with the three arms in order,
taking first the Infantry.
The Infantry consisted at the outbreak of
the war of 353 regiments, each of four bat-
talions of four companies and one non-com-
batant company.
Of these, 12 were regiments of the Guards,
16 were Grenadiers, and the remaining 325
"Army" Infantry regiments.
The regiments of the Guards had titles
only, as for instance " the Preobrajenski
regiment of Foot Guards." The Grenadier
regiments had numbers only, 1 to 16,
and the Army regiments had an Army
number, in addition to the name of the
RESERVISTS ON THEIR WAY TO CAMP.
[Daily Mirror.
508
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
city or province with which they were
associated.
Tile Reserve regiments on the higher cadre
establishment were numbered consecutively
after the Army regiments, those on the lower
cadre establisliment taking the name of the
district only, and throughout the whole Army
and Reserve the battalions were numbered 1, 2,
3, and 4, and the 16 companies 1 to 16. The
non-combatant company had no number at all.
Throughout the Army the regiments were
organized by twos to form brigades, and two
brigades supplied the Infantry for a division.
The 1st Division consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd.
and 4th Regiments, and so on consecutively,
so that if some prisoners of, say, the 64th
Regiment were taken it was at once fairly
obvious that the 16th Division was near at
hand. This point is worth remembering, be-
cause, though the same rule is general in most
Continental armies, so many exceptions occur,
particularly in Germany, that it is not at all
a safe inference to draw from the numbers on
a prisoner's shoulder strap.
The peace strength of a battalion was 15 to
16 ofBcers and 440 combatants, which was
expanded on the outbreak of war to 18 officers
and 958 combatants, 23 non-combatants, 27
horses, and 3 carriages. This shows a very
large number of Reservists to be absorbed, and
it must be noted that in fact, though the
numbers of officers remain nearly the same.
many officers have to be withdrawn from the
active list for staff duties, and their places filled
by officers from the Reserve lists. This defect
is, however, common to all short-service armies.
The infantry uniform worn on active service
consisted of a khaki blouse, not cut to the
figure, except in the crack corps of the
Guards, khaki laiickerbockers, flat cloth
cap with no peak, and long boots reaching
to the knee. The grey aspect of Russian
troops — Tennyson's " great grey slope of men "
— was due to the fact that they marched
and fought in their greatcoats, wliich were
of heavy greyish-brown cloth, and reached
to half-way between knee and ankle. Under
this a sheepskin coat coming down to
the knees was worn in winter, with a warm
hood of brown camel's-hair cloth. Another
protection against the inclement weather
which usually fell to the lot of the Russian
soldier in the field was provided in brown cloth
mitts, with two fingers, one for the forefinger
the other for the other three, and a thumb
But perhaps the most marked peculiarity of
the outfit of the Russian was the supply of
foot-cloths, instead of socks. These were merely
linen or cotton wrappers kept well greased ;
but English officers who have tried this foot-
wear speak very highly of it, some considering
it superior to our army socks.
All combatant non-commissioned officers and
men were armed with the rifle. This was a
A
L ^ ^
ti
^ ^^ ifc^
M . .^
i
m
->!,. ^ % ^^
r :-'■ 1
\%^^-
jyj^^^ ^^^ft>^ f"
1
:m^
>^^^
.' ■ ^*^A ^ > *% •
MAXIM GUN IN ACTION SCREENED BY UNDERGROWTH.
\ Daily Mirror*
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
509
THE GREAT SIKORSKY AEROPLANE.
The Minister of War is seen in the foreground with the Inventor
•299nini. weapon, with a quadrangular bayonet,
always carried fixed, bayonet scabbards being
left behind on service. Whether the omission
of this article of accoutrement was an advan-
tage or a disadvantage is a point on which
it would be very interesting to have the views
of the soldiers themselves, as well as their
officers, because every unnecessary oimce which
a man has to carry counts heavily against him
in a long day's march.
The supply of ammvmition in the field per man
was 423 rounds, of which he carried 120 rounds,
The remainder followed the fighting line more
or less closely in the regimental carts, the
Artillery Flying Parks, and the Local Parks.
The equipment of the Riissian infantry
soldier consisted in 1914 of a buff leather waist-
belt (white only in the first three regiments of
each division of the Guards and black in all
the others), supporting a pouch for 30 roimds
on each side of the clasp, and the Linnemann
tool — a small entrenching tool called after
its inventor, and introduced after the Turkish
campaign of 1878 — on the right side in a case,
handle downwards. A bandolier, holding another
30 roimds, was carried over the left shoulder
under the rolled greatcoat, and a reserve pouch
also holding 30 rounds and completing the
full load of 1 20 rounds per man, was suspended
by a strap over the right shoulder and fastened
to the waistbelt on the left side.
Over the right shoulder was slung a water-
proof canvas kit bag containing two shirts,
one pair drawers, two pairs foot -cloths, one
towel, one pair mitts, 4Jlb. of army biscuit
in two bags, salt in another bag, with materials
for cleaning the rifle, cloth for repairs, soap,
housewife, and drinking cup. The water-
bottle, usually of aluminium, but sometimes of
an older copper pattern, was also suspended over
the right shoulder, and lay on the top of the kit
bag. When not being worn, the greatcoat was
rolled, bandolier-fashion, over the left shoulder,
one-sixth portion of a shelter tent and a spare
pair of boots in a bag being strapped on to it,
the hood rolled \ip in it, and the alimainiuna
mess-tin pvilled over the ends of the roll and
fastened by the cloak .strap. Thus the total
weight carried by the Russian infantry soldier
in marcliing order was very nearly 58Jlb. The
shelter tent consisted of six sheets, with three
poles in two pieces each, ten ropes, and eight
pegs, and the whole equipment was divided
among six men.
In addition to the flag of the battalion, each
company had a distinctive flag. Those of
battalions had three horizontal stripes of black,
orange, and white, with the number of the
510
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
COSSACKS OF THE GUARD. I'-- O. Bulla.
The Cossacks, as Irregular Troops, have the right to wear their hair long.
battalion on the central stripe. Those of com-
panies were red, blue, white, and dark green,
according as the regiment was the 1st, 2nd,
3rd, or 4th of its division, with vertical and
horizontal stripes forming a cross in the centre.
These flags were carried on the bayonets of
the markers, and served, of coxirse, as assembling
and rallying points for the men of their
respective companies.
At the time of the war no " emergency
ration," such as British troops carry, had been in-
troduced into the Russian service, but each man
carried 2^ days' biscuit and salt in his Idt bag.
This is not looked upon as a reserve, but is con-
sumed and replaced from the supplies carried in
the regimental transport. The remaining articles
of the ration and a further supply of biscuit are
carried in the regimental transport, so that the
RUSSIAN CAVALRY MANOiUVRING.
(C. 0. Bulla.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
511
baggage of each corps includes several days'
supplies of biscuit, groats, salt, tea, and sugar.
Slaughter cattle are driven on foot with the
baggage ; and for the horses three days' oats
and two days' hay are carried in the regimental
transport, furtlier supplies following, of course,
in the general supply and transport columns,
which consisted of ono-horse carts and two-horse
baggage wagons, the transport of each regiment
requiring 77 vehicles and 157 horses. These
were divided into two lines, of which the first
closely followed the regiment in every move-
ment, while the second, containing the heavy
baggage, came after. Roughly speaking, the
first line of the regimental baggage was designed
to supply all the needs of the regiment in food,
ammunition, medical stores, &c., for 2J days,
and therefore the ordinary mobility of a Russian
infantry force might be calculated as the
distance which horsed carts and wagons can
travel in four days.
Although it is conveiiient in a brief summary
to class all the infantry together, there are, of
course, great differences between the units in
the Russian service as in others. The Russian
rifle battalions, for instance, arc recruited from a
better stamp of men than the other infantry ;
and one battalion of Rifles is generally assigned
to every Infantry Division, just as was the case
in the British Army during the old Peninsular
War, and as was still the practice in the Ger-
man Army in 1914.
The Cossack Infantry, again, differed in many
respects from the ordinary infantry of the
Russian line, and were furnished by two Field
Army Command.s only, those of the Kuban and
Transbaikal.
In addition to the standing regiments of the
line, the Rifles and the Cossacks, a number of
reserve cadre regiments or battalions were
maintained and recruited in the ordinary
manner from the annual contingent, and for
the war expanded twofold, fourfold, or even
sixteenfold, according to the distance of their
quarters from the frontier, and the duties which
they had to perform.
As for the use of infantry on the battlefield
there was, of course, no essential difference
between the Russian practice and that which
prevailed in the armies of other civilized
nations ; and the details for the execution of
a Russian infantry advance imder fire were
almost identical with those in use throughout
Europe.
A single company in attack would send out
two platoons as a firing line, retaining two in
reserve, and each of the platoons in front
COSSACK OF THE GUARD.
[C O. Bulla
provided its own skirmishing protection, accord-
ing to the nature of the ground. If the cover
was good a few rifles sufficed to locate the
enemy, and they could be gradually reinforced
or the front could be extended as circumstances
dictated. If the ground, on the other hand,
was quite open, the two leading platoons at
once extended at the rate of about one man
to the yard, so as to oppose an equal weight
of fire to the enemy, and then advanced by
rushes, each section covering the rush of its
comrade by their fire alternately. The two
reserve platoons could then be used either to
outflank the enemy, if the groimd permitted,
or for direct reinforcement, and in any forma-
. tion which might be desirable. No positive
rule could, of course, be laid down ; the captain
was judged by the appreciation of the ground
which he showed.
In larger bodies the procedure was naturally
more formal, for equal latitude could not
then be afforded to subordinates. It was
necessary for them to ketp in line with one
another, and all lateral extension was impossible
except for troops operating on a flank.
Every attack thus resoK'ed itself in open
ground into the advance of a series of lines —
at first in single rank, later on in two deep
lines with six inches between the files only.
It was expected that men would fall, and
that an unsupported line might very soon
512
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A TYPICAL RUSSIAN COSSACK.
XUnderviood Or Underwood.
be shot to a standstill, so that the distances
between the successive lines were normally
calculated at about 500 yards- — the distance which
infantry can fairly traverse in five minutes.
Whether such an attack would succeed or
fail depended entirely upon whether it had
been adequately prepared by fire power, both
of infantry and artillery combined ; and, of
course, the more the infantry, by good shooting,
could overpower the enemy's fire, the more
certain was the result.
Practically all nations, from Great Britain
to Japan, think alike on this point : and the
only advantage which Russia possessed at the
outbreak of this war lay in the fact that both
her infantry and artillery possessed a far larger
number of officers who had been trained,
against a thoroughly formidable opponent, to
understand how to adjust in practice the many
elements which in peace-time have to be left
to the imagination.
The most important element of infantry
success must always be the control and direc-
tion of rifle-fire, which in turn depends upon
training in peace-time, and, with regard to
musketry instruction, this was based in the
Russian Army entirely on the German model,
but owing to the longer term of service (three-
and-a-half years against two) and the greater
facilities for field firing to be found in the
sparsely-populated districts of Russia, the
standard reached was markedly superior. The
rifle battalions in particular excel, for not only
were the men drawn from the forester and
gamekeeper class, but, whenever possible, they
wore given opportunities to take part in great
drives for wolves and other wild game ; while
i n the forests in Transcaucasia a whole battalion
often turned out for tiger-shooting. Tigers were
not so strictly preserved there as in India.
The Russian cavalry suffered fundamentally
from a plethora of horses which are small and
of inferior strain. Nobody had ever valued
them, and as a consequence their riders wasted
them by over-exertion in the field. They had
not the stamina and endurance necessary for
modern tactical requirements ; and, as a
matter of fact, the Russian cavalry was really
trained more as mounted infantry, which suited
their requirements better, because their numbers--
made them exceedingly valuable in war, and
the hardiness of their horses, who would pick up
a living through the snow, when all other animals
would starve, made them exceedingly valuable
during the winter months.
The Guard cavalry, of course, were a highly
select, well-mounted corps, and in every way
equal to the European standard. The Lino
cavalry varied much with the district from
which they came, and they were formidable only
by reason of their great numbers.
In each cavalry regiment there were two
groups of specially trained men. One consisted
of 16 selected men under an officer, who were
trained in scouting, reconnaissance, long-dis-
tance rides, &c. The other was a detaclament
of two officers and 16 men, specially trained as
pioneers in the destruction of railways and
telegraphs and the establishment of tele-
graphic and signalling communication.
The field uniforms of the various regiments
need not be specially described. They aU
follow the khaki tunic type common to all
branches, and the Cuirassiers, Lancers, Hussars,
&c., were distinguished essentially by their
head-dresses and details of uniform, which, as
in all armies, have a potent influence in the
establishment of that esprit de corps which is
so valuable an asset on the battlefield.
The whole of the Russian cavalry was armed
with the sword, carbine, and bayonet, carrying
a scabbard for the last on the outside of the
sword scabbard.
The weight of the cavalryman's clothing,
equipment, &c., is 1191b., say 8 stone 71b., which
with a lO-stone man makes about 18 stone —
a somewhat lighte- riding weight than that of
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
513
RUSSIAN CAVALRY.
[C. Chusi4aU'Flaviens,
Prussian Hussars. In the Cuirassiers,' omitting
the cuirass no longer worn in war, the big men
bring up the weight to a minimum of 20 stone.
Each man carried on the saddle IJ day's
rations, exclusive of meat, and two days' oats,
and 2J days' rations were carried in regimental
transport, four days' in the divisional supply
column, and four days' in the transport columns,
in which latter column tliree days' oats wore
carried, a total with the army in the field of 12
days' rations and five days' oats. This allowed
to th& Russian cavalry the wide range of
mobility necessary for that arm : and, taken in
conjimction with the natural endiu-ance of the
men and the hardiness of the horses, established
a standard of utihty which the cavalry of other
nations would not easily excel.
The majority of the field batteries near the
Western Russian frontier and almost all those
in Asia had in peace eight guns, and many of
them a number of Wagons also horsed in peace,
the number of horses maintained in some being
as many as 145 per battery. In most of the
batteries in Asia the number of men maintained
in peace was the same as the war footing.
This difference between the Asiatic and Euro-
pean establishments of the Russian Artillery
may be compared to the necessity which
*K*^
CAVALRY FORDING A RIVER.
514
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
RUSSIAN FIELD GUN.
IC. 0. Bulla.
Britain also experienced of maintaining its
forces and especially its artillery in Asia in a
constant state of preparedness for war. In
the first instance, of course, the military precau-
tions of both Empires were taken with a view
to the probability of war between them upon
the long land-frontiers of Persia and Afghanis-
tan ; and it is one of the rare pleasantries which
we can attribute to that ancient agency, " the
irony of Fate," that the first serious use which
both needed to make of their carefully -measured
strength was in support of one another.
Every staff of and above that of an infantry
or cavalry division \iaA at its head a Chief of
the Staff, an officer of the General Staff, who
superintended generally the work of all depart-
ments of that staff, even of those not placed
directly imder him. In all cases there were
placed under his direct orders a body of General
Staff officers and adjutants, who carried out
t4ie staff duties properly so-called. The depart-
ments which were not directly imder the
Chief of the Staff were those of the artillery,
engineers, intendance, pay and control, but
the working of those was superintended by
him. The medical, judge-advocate's, police,
and chaplain's services were directly under
the Chief of the Staff.
RUSSIAN ARTILLERY.
A Battery at Firing Practice.
iC. 0. Bulla.
THE TIMES IIISTOMY OF THE WAR.
515
The Staff, properly so-calltxi, was divided
broadly into the Qiiartermaster-Geuerars and
the Adjiitant-Genoral's Departmerits, and in
that of an Army into the General of Comiuiini-
cations Department also. The Quartermaster-
Gcneral's Department was officered entirely
from the General Staff, and that of the Adjutant-
General from the Adjvitant's service, while in
the Communications Department were employed
officers of both.
General Staf? officers were recruited from
those who had passed the General Staff Academy
and who, after appointment to the General
Staff, formed a separate corps, from which
they were only detached for periodical training
with troops before each step of promotion.
Broiwlly speaking, the duties of the General
Staff officers were those connected with the
niovements and operations of the army, intelli-
gence of the enemy, and reconnaissance of the
theatre of war.
The keenest interest had been shown through-
out Russia in the development of military
aviation. Gifts in money and in kind poured in
from private persons and from public bodi(?s to
this comparatively new branch of the Russian
military service, which owed a great deal to the
initiative of the Grand Duke Alexander. He
was one of the founders of the aviation school
at Sebastopol, where two -thirds of the Russian
aviation officers received their training. In the
spring of 1914 the air-fleet consisted of 16
dirigibles, 12 of which, however, were small
ships used mainly for manoeuvre and training
purposes. Of the four larger new airships, one
was a Parseval, one an Astra lorres, a third a
Clement Bayard, and the fourth a Russian-
built Albatross. The Astra Torres and the
C'leiiient Bayard were purchased from the
French Government. A large airship of 20,000
cubic metres capacity, the Gigant, was building
by a Baltic firm, to be stationed at Petrograd.
The Russian Army was already provided in
the spring with 360 aeroplanes, while orders for
1,000 aircraft of various descriptions were placed
si'ith different Russian firms.
Tile military Flying Corps itself dated from
1912. There were two regular military aviation
schools, at Petrograd and Tashkend, while there
were otlier schools, not purely military, notably
those of Sebastopol, Odessa, and Moscow, where
officers Were permitted to study. The three
fl\ing battalions were stationed in peace time
at Petrograd, in the neighbourhood of Warsaw,
and at Madivostok ; separate companies were
stationed at Petrograd, Sebastopol, Kiev, and
Warsaw. These arrangements were temporary,
(lending the establishment of a flying section,
THE EMPEROR TAKING THE RANGE
FOR ARTILLERY FIRE.
[C. 0. Bulla.
with adequate reserves, for every army corps
and every fortress. Meanwhile Russian aviators
had established a reputation of being among
the most daring airmen in the world, and Rus-
sian firms had proved themselves increasingly
successful in the manufacture of the machines.
The terms of the Franco-Russian military
convention had been kept secret, but it was
generally understood that, in accordance with
arrangements embodied in the document and
annually supplemented by an exchange of views
between the respective General Staffs, each
partner was left entirely free both in the dis-
tribution of his forces and in the event of war
in the direction of the respective campaigns,
subject to the general purport of the Alliance
itself, which was that it should be a defensive
alliance against attack by Austria and Gonnany.
In compliance with this understanding and
the ascertainable plans of the enemy, and
having also in view the great difficulties of rapid
mobilization in Russia, it was always regarded
as a foregone conclusion that France would have
to stand the first shock of the German hosts,
but that Russia would, so far as lay in her power,
assvime a vigorous offensive at the earliest
510
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
-^ .-w...
\
^: -^1
Ad#^^^ , «r
,.*^M.*-
BW
,-.■ i^^..-"
"il
1
L
.SMHHMi
BLESSING THE OFFICERS OF THE PREOBRAJENSKI REGIMENT BEFORE THEY
LEFT FOR THE FRONT.
moment, in order to draw off and weaken the
pressure from the German armies.
It was understood that France would con-
tinue to engage the enemy as long as possible,
and at least long enough to enable the Russian
hosts to carry out their concentration and to
assume a vigorous offensive along the whole
line. It w&s natvu-ally assumed that neither
Germany nor Austria-Hungary would venture
to engage in hostilities except conjointly and
simultaneously.
The delay in the declaration of war against
Russia on the part of the Dual Monarchy was due
not to military but to political causes. Aus-
tria-Hungary hoped to goad Russia into offen-
sive action along her borders in order that the
terms of the Austro-German Treaty with Italy
might be invoked to compel that Power to join
in hostilities. It was only when the Vienna
Government clearly understood that Italy was
determined at all costs to play a waiting game
that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in
Petrograd asked for his passports and war
was declared. This did not, however, in any way
affect the conduct of operations, for meanwliile,
on both sides of the Austro -Russian borders,
mobilization was in full swing.
The Russian Ukase of mobilization as origin-
ally presented for the Tsar's signature included
the whole Army, but, determined to prove his
conciliatory disposition to the end, his Majesty
put his pen tlu-ough the words " general mobili-
zation " and ordered only a partial mobiliza-
tion confined to the four military districts
confronting Austria-Hungary. It was only on
the following day, when the insincerity of the
German Government had become manifest
before the whole world, that the Tsar converted
the partial order into a general order. That
was Julj' 30, the day of the bombardment of
Belgrade. Upon the following day Germany
declared war against Russia and invaded
Luxpmburg.
It was generally believed that Russia could not
possibly concentrate her vast forces within a
period of loss than three weeks, whereas Germany
did not require more than 1 0 days, France 1 2, and
Avistria-Hungary a somewhat longer period.
The gain of even a single day on the Russian
side was fraught with very imdesirablc con-
sequences for the Austro-German plans.
As a matter of fact the Ru.ssian concentration
for the armies that were necessary for the initial
stages of the war wa.s completed within 16 days.
Rennenkampf's forces crossed the German
borders on August 2. Thenceforth there was
constant skirmishing along the border. The
Russian advance along the whole line began on
August 16 ; on the East Pru.'3sian border severe
fighting almost immediately ensued, and through
out the remainder of the month of August the
German forces in East Prussia wore successively
routed at Giunbinnen, Insterburg, and far
westward. The end of the month was marked
by an unfortunate and very serious reverse
sustained by General Samsonof's army, but
already Rennenkampf's energetic operations
had produced the desired result. The thousands
of refugees who had flod to Berlin compelled
the Government to send strong reinforcements
to East Prussia ; and the " pressure," which
it was Russia's function to exert if war were
{orced upon the Powers of the Entente, was
already felt.
END OF VOLUME ONE.
INDEX TO VOLUME I.
Abdul Hamid, 13
Ahorcrombie, Sir Ralph, 277
Admiralty ; announcement to
eixsure safety of British
Sliipping, 190
Adolf Bridge (Luxemburg) seized,
312
Aerschot : Atrocities ; 436, 440 ;
destruction of, 422, 423, 437
Afghanistan, 157, 158
Agadir Crisis (1911), 17
Aircraft, 250 ; Belgian, 367, 370 ;
British, 469, 474 ; French,
477 ; German, 367, 394, 407,
428, 429, 456, 465, 466;
Russian, 515
Aisne, description, 454, 455 :
operations, 479
Albert I., King of Belgians,
362, 354, 363 ; appeal to
King George, 25 ; speech
quoted, 315, 316; reviews
Liege defenders, 356
Alexander III, Pope, 323
Alexander, Grand Duke (Rus-
sia), 515
Alexandria, 282; battle of, 277.
286
Allcnby, Maj.-Gen., 450, 464,
480. : at Mons, 469, 470,
471
Alma, 278
Alost, destruction of, 427 ; his-
tory, 426 : operations, 422
Alsace-Lorraine, 37, 99, 270 ; at
time of Zabern incident,
392; French offensive in,
387, 400, 448 ; operations,
374, 389, 392, 400, 462
Altkirch : French occupation,
387, 393, 394
Alva, Duke of, 325
Alvensleben, Constantin von, 202,
269
American Civil War, 124
Amerika, 190
Amiens, 361
Anglo-French agreement (1904),
12, 15
Anglo-German relations, 55
Anglo-Russian agreement (1907),
12, 13
Antwerp, 112, 110, 118, 318, 325,
361, 382; (1859), 106, 107,
111 ; bombs dropped on, 428,
429; destruction of, 429,
fortresses, 444
Argenteau, destruction of, 405
Army Ordnance Corps, 136
Vol. I. — Index.
Army Service Corps : organiza-
tion, 134 ; transport of, 453
Ardennes, description of, 442
Arnim, General Sixtus von,
218; issues proclamation in
Brussels, 383
Arnold, Matthew, 402
Artillery, orgaijization of, 133
Asquith Rt. Hon. H. H., 24,
174, 281, 285, 359, 414 ;
in Dublin, 360 ; on Lidge,
357, 358
Atljara, battle of, 282, 296, 300
Attila, King, 401
Australian Army, 142, 143,145;
organization, 150, 151 ; train-
ing, 146, 147
Australian Navy, 141
Austria - Hungary, declaration
of war against Servia, 23,
27, 168 ; against Russia,
33; financial conditions, 169
Austrian Army, 245; (1814),
442 ; mobilization, 27
Austrian Navy, bases, 80 ; •
French, comparison with,
73 ; increases, 79 ; strength,
79, 80
Austro-German Alliance, 19
B
Badajos (1812), storming of,
278
Baden-Powell, Sir Robert, 331
Baghdad railway, 13
Baker, Sir Samuel, 292
Baker Pasha, 287
Balkan Wars (1912-13), 19,
112, 179, 227, 277
Barbarossa, 190
Barbarossa, Frederick, 323
Barclay de Tolly, 485
Barland, Adrian, 413
Baudin, M. Pierre, 61, 67
Bavaria, 207
Bavaria, Crown Prince of, 477
Bavarian Army, 23V, 215, 219
Beaconsfield, Lord, 153
Beatty, Rear-Admiral, 300
Beck, Sir Raymond, 185
Becquoboort, 372
Beeger, Lieutenant-Colonel, 408
Belfort, 99, 263 ; fortresses.
389, 390, 442
Belgian Army, 102, 106, 107,
352, 365, 442 ; spu-it of,
315 ; in the trenches, 367
Bill (1909), 111; com-
pulsory service, 361 ;
Garde Civique, 113, 319;
Belgian Army — conld.
mobilization, 39, 103,
112, 314 ; organization,
114 ; staff explanation
of retirement from
Brussels, 372, 374 ;
strength, 109, HI, 112,
113, 114
Belgian Commission, names,
431 ; atrocities : evidence,
432; reports: first, 431,
second, 433, 434 ; third,
435, 436 ; fourth, 436,
437, 439 ; flfth, 439, 440
Belgium, 120, 155, 253, 272 ;
fortresses, 106, 107 ; Ger-
man Vandalism in, 401-
430 ; Government trans-
ferred from Brussels to
Antwerp, 376 ; invasion,
311, 314, 315, 316 ; neutra-
lity, 25, 39, 99, 102, 103,
106, 112, 252, 377, 387,
442 ; religion of, 404
Belgrade, operations, 27, 516
Belloc, Mr. 387
Beresford, Lord Charles, 280
Berlin, 403
Bernhardi, General von, 234,
257, 286, 392
Besangon, 2()3
Bethmann-IIoUweg, Hear von,
57, 219, 312, proposals
to Great Britain, 24 ; on
army increases, 22, 210 ; on
Luxemburg and Belgium
(speech quoted), 25
Beyer, General von, 202
Beyerlinck, Canon, founder of
Louvain University, 416
Beyers, General, 149
Bhopal, Begum, of, 166
Bismarck, 55, 57, 202, 216, 243,
284, 285, 294 ; biographi-
cal, 9, 207, 292, 302 ;
conflict with German
Catholic party, 208
Blatchford, Mr., 281
Bloemfontcin, 149, 279
Blucher, 40, 201, 276, 485
Blume, Major, 202
BlumenthaJ, General von, 202,
205
Boer war : see South African
War
Boguslawski, 242
Bonnal, General, 96, 268, 270'
Borden, Sir Robert, 162
Bosnia, 111
Botha, General, 162, 282, 303
Boulogne, 455
u.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Bourbon, Louis, de, 323, 324
Boircs Caslle sunk, 188
Brabant, 365
Bradonst-ein, 202
Brazil, 179
Breehe-au-Mont, occupied by
French, 395
Brereton, Mr. Cloudesley
(" Who is responsible ? "
quoted), 401
Brialniont, General, 106, 107,
111, 116, 117, 118,351, 444
Briand, M. 477
British Army, 102, 114, 121,
140, 142, 274, 275, 280,
336 ; professional cliaracter
discussed, 123, 140, 278
Artillery, organization, 133;
comparison with German,
236, 238 ; siege guns, 467
Card well system, 122
Cavalry: efdciency, 451; or-
ganization, 133. 138
Distribution (table), 130
Emergency armies, 121
Establishments, 127
Expeditionary Force, 122, 124
128, 140, 159, 161, 195, 225|
351, 363, 385 ; composition,
448-450; .strengtli. 139;
transport of, 49, 453 ; Lord
Kitchener's message quoted,
309 ; in France, 399, 452,
453
German, comparison with, 224,
232, 235, 239
History, 121
Infantry organization, 132
Losses estimated at Mons, 473,
480
Militia organization, 124, 125
Mobilization, 129, 452
Motor transport, 135, 453
Organization of food supplies,
453
Reserves, 125, 126, 130, 452
Short service system, 125
Territorial Force, 130, 132
British Navy, 47, 51, 125, 144,
149, 197, 198 ; in the North
Sea, 31, 33 ; duties, 41, 185 ;
Expeditionary Force, trans-
port of, 49, 453 ; food
supply, safeguarding of, 41 .
First Fleet, 53, 54 ; gifts
from Dominions, 142, 151,
152 ; prizes, 45 ; Second
Fleet, 54 ; strength, 53, 54 •
Third Fleet, 54
British strategy, 275, 276
British theory, 275-280
Bronsart. 202, 242, 245
Broqueville, Baron de, 313, 363
Bruges, 404, 418
Brussels, )07, 325, 338, 361, 367,
368, 378 ; occupation of, 362,
382-385, 399, 463 ; position
of, 371 ; abandoned, 371.'-
374 ; Government trans-
ferred to Antwerp, 376, 377
Bugeaud, Marshal : on British
Army, 455
BukareKt, fortification, 444
Baiow, von, 202, 218, 480;
at Mons, 477
Bunswyck, M. Ern.st de, 431
Burleigh, .Mr. Bennett. 288
Busleiden, .ferom-' de, 413
Caillard, Admiral, 65
Cairo, 282
Calais. 443, 455
Calmette, M., 391
Cambrai, capture of, 471
Canadian Army : organization
144 ; strength, 145
Cape Town, 149
Cardwell, Mr. : Army system. 122
Carlyle, 285, 307
Carnegie Commission, 436
Cesari, Lieutenant (aviator). 477
Chanzy, General, 284, 285
Charleroi, industries. 403 ; opera-
tions, 370, 399, 463
Charles II., King, 121
Charleville. operations, 475
Chetwode, Sir Philip, 464, 465,
477, 480
Chochcprat, Vice - Admiral
Cliarles. 69
Churchill, Right Hon. Winston,
28.5, 297, 298, 358 ; ap-
pointed First Lord of Ad-
miralty, 67
Cily of Winchester : captured,
188
Ciudad Rodrigo (1812), storming
of, 278
Clausewitz, 39, 98, 201, 224, 269
Coblentz, 363, 389
Colenso, battle of, 279
Colmar. 394 ; fortresses, 397
Cologne, 303
Corapidgne, 455, 477, 479
Cornier, Lieutenant, 285
Connaught, Duke of, 451
Contenaeken, 369
Cotton Exchanges, effect on, 194
Crewe, Lord, 165 ; on Li^ge, 358
Crimean War, 125, 278, 308, 488
Cromer, Lord, 282, 286, 293, 296;
302 ; (" Modern Egypt '
quoted), 291, 292, 294 ; on
Ijord Kitchener, 296
Cromwell, Oliver, 121, 259
Cronje, General, 279, 303, 451
Currency: note issues, 173
Currency and Bank Notes Bill,
174
Curzon, Lord, 304
Cutsem, M. van, 431
Cuverville, Admiral de, 65
Cyprus, 282
D
Dalhaize, Jules, 323
D'Amade, General, biographical,
471 ; at Mons, 474
Danncmarie, 396
d'Arche, Colonel, 475
Daru, Comte : receives Genera)
French, 453
D'Aviella, Count Goblet, 431
Debra Sin, battle of (1887), 294
Deimling, General von, 218
Dejardin, General, 107
Delcass^, M., 12, 61, 07
Delhi, 155, 455 ; capture of, 278
Demolin, Private, horo of Li(^ge,
343
Deynze, bombs dropped on, 427,
428
Dieppe, 455
Diest. battle of. 369, 370, 371
Dijon, 270
Dinant. 399 ; history, 406 : des-
truction of, 407, 408 ; oper-
ations, 407
Dominions' support of the Mother
Country, 151, 152
Douro, 278
Dragoniiroff, General, 493, 494,
495
Dresden, 188
Dreyse, Nicholas, 201
Dunkirk, 388, 443
Durban, 149
Diisseldorf, 863
Dyle (river), 421
Eghezee, battle of, 370
Egypt, 282, 285
Egyptian Army, 282. 293
Einem, General von, 218
Elisabeth, Queen of the Belgians,
326, 375 ; leaves Brussels,
376
Elsa, General von, 218
E!-Teb, battle of, 287
Emily, Dr., 302
Eramich, General von, 218, 326,
348 ; Commander-in-Chief of
German Army of the Meuse.
335, 336 ; suicide rumours,
347 ; meets General Leman
after Liege, 355, 356
Epinal, 263, 389, 441
Espionage, German, 364, 365,
391
Evans, Sir Samuel, 189
Expeditionary Force : see under
British Army
Expenditure and revenue, 195
Eyck, Van, 404
Eyschen, M., 312
Fabeck, General von. 218
Falkenhayn, General von, 391,
392
Favereau, Vice-Admiral C. E.,
69
Fergusson, Sir Charles, at Mons,
469, 470
Ferrero (historian), 290, 308
Fez, French occupation in (1911),
15
Financial conditions, 168-183;
loans, 181
Fisher, Mr., 161
Foch, General, 96, 268, 270, 479
Food: prices, 193; transport,
191
Formosa expedition, 387
Forstner, Lieutenant von, 391 :
sentence reversed in Zabern
incident, 392
Forts, earthen : diagram, 445
Fpurnier, Admiral, 65
France, 37, 208 243, 388; finan-
cial condtiow, 168, 169!
fortiflcalioiLs, 442, 443, 444;
new Cabinet, 477
Francis Ferdinand, Archduke
(Au-stria), 22, 23, 79
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
111.
Francois, General von, 218
Franc'o- Prussian War, 90, 125,
211, 270, 281, 292, 366,
387, 390, 396, 444, 493
Franco-Russian Alliance, 12, 85
Pransocky, 202
Frederick the Great, 121, 215,
243, 276. 401
Frederick William I., 215
Frederick William III., 392
French, (ieiural Sir John, 352,
446, 463, 46,5. 474, 480 ;
biographical, 450. 451. 452 ;
in Nile (Campaign. 451 ; in
South Africa, 451 ; appointed
Chief of Imperial General
Staff, 461 ; received in
France, 453 ; dispatches
quoted, 470, 472 ; at Mons,
471 ; reason for Mons re-
treat, 469 ; on General
Joffre, 479
French Army, 122, 248, 253,
273, 284; after Waterloo,
81, 83; (1870), 85; (1910),
268; (1914), 263
Artillery, superiority of, 40,
no, 395
Cavalry, 94, 95
Concentration, 98, 99, 102
Conscription, 83
Defensive position, 447
German, comparison with, 87,
232, 235, 265, 392
Laws (1872 and 1889), 84, 85
Mobilization, 31, 88, 89, 97,
244, 385, 397
Organization, 84, 106
Beserve, 85, 86, 87, 88
Strength, 87, 88, 89, 90
Tactics, 93, 94, 95
Territorial, 85, 86, 87, 88
Training, 95, 96
French Navy, 41, 61 ; Austrian,
comparison with, 73 ; bases,
71 ; German, comparison
with, 73; increases, 71;
organization, 65, 67, 69 ;
reforms, 65, 67 ; strength,
63, 71, 73, 75
French revolutionary wars, 277,
397
French strategy, 253, 275
French theory. 263-274
Frost, Ilev, George, 284
Galicia, 245
Gat.acre, General, 298
Gauchet, Rear-Admiral, 69
George V., King, 54, 159; mes-
sage to Dommions, 152, 161,
162, 164; acknowledges In-
dian services, 167
George Washington, 190
German Army, 39, 57, 86, 90,
196, 214-219, 236, 238, 240,
251, 260, 446; (1870), 201-
206, 242, 256; (1914), 228 ;
abuse of white (lag, 335 ;
inefTiciency, 336 ; advance
to Liege, 338, 366 ; supe-
riority of, 447
Artillery : large si'^ge guns,
2.36, 343, 344, 357, 457, 458,
459
German Army — contd.
Cavalry, 234, 388
Corps in coluums of rout<>,
259
Ersatz Reserve. 208, 213, 228
French, comparison with, 87,
i32, 235, 265, 392
Generals-in-Command : list,
218
Increases, 22, 86, 209
Landsturm, 35, 212, 213
Landwehr. 35, 211, 212, 213,
227, 228, 230, 232
Law (1913), 210, 211, 215
Mobilization, 27, 29, 31, 224,
229
Organization, 33, 35, 208, 209,
210, 226, 228, 241 ; peace,
227
Peace distribution of Field
Army (table), 217
Prussianizing, 33, 242
Railway transport, 252
Reserves, 211, 212
Strength, 207, 208, 211, 232,
244
Theory, 225, 226, 233
Traditions, 241
Uhlans, 365, 366, 370
German culture, 401, 402, 422
German militarism, 8, 215,
216
German Navy, 31, 33, 55, 61,
78 ; at Kiel and Wilhelms-
haven, 27
Bases, 61, 78
Bills (1898), 57; (1900), 53,
58; new, 15
Estimates, 57
Increases, 12
Strength, 17, 58, 59
German South-West Africa, 149,
162
German spies : see under Es-
pionage
German strategy, 243, 246, 257,
258, 366
German theory, 241-261
German trade, 196
Germany, 26, 33, 37, 53 ; declar-
ation of war against Russia,
France, and Belgium, 27,
33 ; financial condition, 1 96-
200 ; invasion plans, 443,
446
Germany, Crown Prince of, 393,
475, 477
Ghent, 379 ; history, 402
Gibson, Commandant Georges :
statement to Belgian Com-
mission, 433
Girouard, Sir Percy, 296
Gladstone, Mr. W. E., 292, 294
Gneisenau. 201
Goebon, 202
Goltz, Marsh.al von der, 201, 246,
279, 280, 392
Gordon. General, 280, 286 ; ap-
pointed Governor-General of
the Sudan, 286 ; death, 288 ;
avenged, 300
Goschen. Sir Edward, 24 ; leaves
Berlin, 25
Gough, General, 477
Graham, General, 287
Grandmaison, Colonel de, 274
Graudenz, 211
(Jravolotte, 246, 281
Great Britain : declaration of
war against Germany, 31
Greece, 245
Gregorovitcli. Admiral, 78
(jrenfell. Ixird. 282, 290, 291, 292
(irey. Sir Edward, 23, 31, 161,
162; letters to French Am-
bassador, 17, 19, 24; pro-
posals to Germany, 25
Grierson, General : death, 454
(Irosser KUrfuml, 190
(iuise, battle of, 479
Gumbinnen operations, 516
Gwalior, Maharaja of, 165
H
Haelen, battle of, 368, 369, 370
Haig, General Sir Douglas, 464,
465, 480 ; at Mons, 470, 471 ;
mentioned in dispatches, 472
Haldane, Lord, 126, 281
Hamilton, General II. I. W. : at
Mons, 464, 465, 469
Hamilton, Sir Ian, 275
Ilamley, Sir Edw.ird, 280
Bardie, Mr. Keir, 283
Hardinge, Lord, 164
Harris, Sir C., 129
Hartmann, General, 202
Hasselt, battle of, 368, 369
Haus, Admiral Anton, 80
Havelock, General, 279
Havre, fortifications, 455
Heeringen, General von, 209
Heligoland, 282
Henderson, Colonel, 279, 280
Henderson, Sir David, Comman-
der of Royal Flying Corps,
474
Herzegovina, 397
Hesbaye, 368
Highflyer, H.M.S., 188
Hildyard, General Sir Henry, 280
Hill, Sir A. Norman, 185
Hoensbroeck, Gerard de, 323
Hohenberg, Duchess of, 22
Hohenlohe, Prince Kraft of, 202
Hoiningcn, General von, 218
Holkar, Maharaja, 166
Holland : neutrality, 339
HoUmann, Admiral von, 57
Holmwood; sunk, 188
Horn, Baron von, 218
Hunter, General Sir Archibald,
296
Huy, destruction of, 405 ; for
tress, 444
Hyades : sunk, 1 88
I
Imperator, 190
Inchcape, Lord, 185
Indian Army, 159, 282
Indian ^Vrmy, Native, 153, 155,
157, 158, 160; Gurkhas,
155 ; Sikhs, 155, 156, 159
Indian Mutiny, 122, 160, 278,
308
Ingenohl, Admiral von, 58
Insterburg operations, 516
Italian Navy, comparison with
Austrian, 79
Italy, 8, 19, 388; neutrality, 102
IV.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Jackson, Right Hon. F. Huth,
185
Jagow, Herr von. 23, 392
, Japanese Navj-, 75
Jaur^, M., 97
Jellicoe, Vice-Admiral Sir John,
53
Jena Campaign, 246, 272
Joffre, General, 97, 352, 391,
393, 396, 399, 446, 462, 469,
475, 479, 480 ; biographical,
388 ; proclamation to Alsa-
tians, 387 ; assigns position
to British Army, 454, 455 ;
decides to retire on the
Marne, 477
K
Kaipara : sunk, 188
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse : sunk,
188
Karlsruhe, 188
Kashmir, Maharaja of, 166
Khartum, 282 ; siege, 287, 288
Kiel : naval base, 61, 78
Kiel Canal, 302
Kilikoft, Prince, 499
Kimberley, relief of, 451
Kirchbach, General von, 218
Kitchener, Earl, 147, 275, 307,
387, 450, 464 ; biographical ;
283, 284, 285, 288 ; enters
Royal Military Academy,
284 ; Adjutant-General of
Egyptian Army, 291; Con-
sul-General in Egypt, 282 ;
in South Africa, 279,
280, 451 ; appointed Vice-
Consul at Erzeroum in
Asia Minor, 286 ; at
Suakin, 290 ; character
sketch, 298 ; speech quoted,
303 ; at Paardeberg, 303 ;
Commander-in-Chief in India
304, 305 ; appointed British
agent and Consul-General
in Egypt, 306 ; appointed
Minister ofWar,281 ; message
to the Expeditionary Force,
309 ; on General French, 452
Kluck, General von, 399, 480;
following up the British,
448 ; at Mons, 469, 477
Konigin Luise, sunk, 33
Kronprimessin Cecilie, 189
Kronprinz Wilhelm, 190
Kruger telegram, 302
Krupp, Messrs., 344; Krupp gun
(1866), 202; Krupp's Can-
non Foundry, 201
Kuropatkin, 494, 497
liacaze, Rear-Admiral, 69
lialaing. Count de : i-ssues first
report of Belgian Com-
mission, 431, 432
liambton, Hon. W. ; mentioned
in dispatches, 474
Landcn, capture of 368
Landrecies, 471 ; operations, 472
Langlois, General, 96, 266, 270
liansdowne, Lord : on Li6gc, 358
Lap^yr^re, Admiral Bou6 de,
61, 65, 67, 69
Law, Right Hon. A. Bonar :
on Liege, 357
Le Bris, Rear-.\dmiral, 69
lisman. General, 343, 347, 352,
353, 366 ; in Li6ge, 330, 331,
336, 344, 349 ; saved by
officer, 330 ; refusal to sur-
render Li6ge forts, 346 ;
taken prisoner, 348, 355 ;
letter to King of the Bel-
gians, 354, 355
Lemonnier, Camille : on Dinant,
406 ; Louvain, 410, 416
Leopold II., King, 111
Lichnowsky, Prince, 24
Ijiebert, General von, 308
Li6ge, 98, 107, 109, 111, 112,
114, 116, 118, 119, 361;
before the war, 321, 322;
bridges, 405 ; churches,
326, destruction of, 405 ;
fortresses, 116, 118, 119,
330, 444, 457 ; history, 322,
323, 324, 325, 405; indus-
tries, 325, 362 ; Legion of
Honour conferred, 343 ;
siege (1649), 325; siege
operations, 31, 39, 113, 313,
314, 315, 317, 319, 326,
329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 339,
342-351, 356, 357, 365, 396,
397, 441, 445, 446, 457
Ligny, 462
Lille, 99, 263, 443; fortress,
455 ; occupied by Germans,
471
Limburg, 103, 325 ; occupation
of, 316, 326
Lindley, Mr. Arthur, 185
Linsingen, General von, 218
Lisle, General De, at Mons, 470
Lloyd George, Right Hon. D.,
358 : on bank rate 174, 175,
176; food supply, 185;
insurance scheme, 187
Ixichow, General von, 218
Loefler, Vice-Admiral Franz, 80
Loftus, Sergeant W., 469 : ac.
count of battle of Mons,
465, 466
Longwy, 363, 389, 443, 454,
477 ; operations, 475
Louvain, 326, 361, 366, 368,
382, 383, 404 ; churches,
410; destruction of, 401,
415, 416, 433, 434; history,
408, 409, 410, 411, 412,
413; surrender, 372; Uni-
versity of, 411, 416
lK)Uveign6, destruction of, 405
Lun^ville, 389 ; fortresses, 390 ;
bombs dropped, 394 ; Ger-
m>in occupation, 462
L\isilania, 189
Luxemburg, Grand Duchy of,
25, 31, 330, 362, 388; inva-
sion, 311, 315; neutrality,
39, 99, 252, 281, 387 ;
seizure, 312, 326
Lys, 361
M
McBride, Sir Richard, 161
Mackensen, General von, 218
Macready, Sir Nevil : mentioned
in dispatches, 474
Maestricht, 326, 338
Mahan, Captain, 302
Malines, 118, 415 ; churches, 419,
420 ; destruction of, 421 ;
history, 417, 418, 419, 421;
operations, 421, 422
Manteuffel, Major von, 202, 415
Marbot, 484
Marchand, Colonel : death, 330,
343
Marchand, Major, 295, 302
Marck, William de la, 323
Marie Adelaide, Grand Duchess
of Luxemburg, 312
Marne, 278, 480 ; description,
454
Martini, General von, 218
Maubeuge, 263, 443
Maurice, General, 303
Max, M. (Burgomaster of Brus-
sels), 384 ; issues proclama-
tion to peoijle of Brussels,
382
May, Captain, 204
Mecenseffy, Captain Paul E. von,
80
Meckel, von. 494
Methuen, Field-Marshal Lord,
151
Metz, 37, 205, 389, 454
Meuse, 103, 107, 119, 120, 316,
326, 363, 390 ; operations,
344, 372
M^zieres : fortress, 443
Michel, Genf^ral : in Naniur, 457,
459, 462
Millerand, M., 388
Minto, Lord, 305
Moltke, General von, 27, 3", 103,
201, 202, 204, 248, 270,
279; tactics, 205,226(1870),
253, 255 263
Momrasen, Theodor : warning to
Germany quoted, 401, 402
Mons, British Army in, 463 ;
operations, 278, 399, 464;
465, 466 ; eye-witness's
stories, 465, 466, 467, 468 ;
retreat, 469-480
Montecuccoli, Admiral Count, 79,
80
Moratorium Act, 172, 173
Moreau, Bcar-Admiral, 69
Morocco crisis (1911), 197, 209
Moselle, 204, 390 ; fortresses, 37
Mudra, General von, 218
Miilhausen, 387, 393 ; operations,
394, 395, 396, 397, 399
Murray, Sir Archibald : men»
tioned in dispatches, 474
Mysore, Maharaja of, 165
N
Namur, 107, 109, HI, 112, 114,
318, 338, 374 ; attack, 329,
351; fortresses, 116, 118,
119, 444, 457 ; operations,
399, 408, 446, 459, 462
Nancy, 99, 389, 390, 442
Napoleon, 202, 203, 263-266,
267, 275-280, 326
Napoleon campaigns, 269, 278,
279, 397, 462. 484
Nelson, Lord, 49, 283, 396
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
\ .
New Zealand Army, 142, 143,
145, 140, 147
Nicholas II., Emperor, 27, 228,
356, 489 ; ordei's mobiliza-
tion. 516
Nicholas, Grand Duke (Russia),
.')06
Nicol, Bear-Admiral, 69
Niel, Marshal, 85, 284
Nyanza : sunk, 188
o
Obernifcz, General von, 202
Ochterlony, General, 155
Officers Training Corps, 132
Oise, 454, 455, 479
Olympic, 41
Orloff, 497
Opts, M., 431 : statement ou
Aerschot, 437, 438
Osmau Digna, 287, 290, 296
Ostend, 363, 422
Ourthe, 325, 326, 368
Owen, Mr. Douglas, 187
Paris, 98 ; German advance on,
441, 448
Pau, General, 390, 397, 399, 448,
474, 479
Pelletan, M., 63
Peronne, 443, 479
Petrograd, 27
Picard, M. Alfred, 05
Plender, Sir William, 178
Plettenberg, Baron von, 218
Podbielski, General von, 202
PoiucarS, President, 453 ; mes-
sage to King of the Belgians,
343
Pola, 80
Poland, 243
PortuKal, 277, 278
Pourtales, Count, 27
Pritzelwitz, General von, 218
Prize Court, 189
Prudhommeau, Corporal, 477
Prussia, Prince Henry of, 58
Prussian Army, 90, 122, 202, 240 ;
organization, 35 ; traditions,
201
Prussian strategy (1870), 205
Psicharri, M., 123
Quast, General von, 218
R
Redmond, Mr. John, 367
Refugees, Belgian, 376, 379, 422,
430
Reims, 326, 392 ; fortifications,
455
Rennenkampf, General, 516
Reuter, Colonel von, 392
Rewa, Maharaja of , 166
RhiAe, 255, 389, 393 ; bridges,
397
Ritter von Barry, Hear-Admiral
Ricard, 80
Rivii^re, (ieneral de, 442
Roberts, Lord, 279, 280, 281, 283,
347 ; on Lord Kitchener,
300, 303
Roberts, Mr. Charles, 165
Robertson, Sir WilUam : men-
tioned in dispatches, 474
Uodd, .Sir Rennell, 282
Royal Engineers : organization,
133
Royal Flying Corpt; : organiza-
tion, 140; mentioned in
dispatches, 474
Rumania: fortifications, 444
Rundle, (ieneral Sir Leslie, 288
Rnno : mined, 188
Russia, 13, 208
Russia — Railway systems, cITi-
ciency, 499 ; Serf emancipa-
tion, 489, 490
Russian Army, 33, 227, 243 ;
mobilization, 27, 245, 397,
446 ; organization, 244, 245 ;
bases, 77, 78; Bill (1912),
77, 78 ; inferiority of, 75 :
strength, 77, 78
Russian Army — Armament, com-
pared with Turkish, 493
Artillery, 493
Cavalry equipment, 512
Cossacks, 486, 486, 604, 505, 611
Discipline, 488
Efficiency, 498
Flying Corps, 515
Food supplies, 492
History, 482, 483, 485, 486
Infantry, 507 ; uniform, 508 ;
equipment, 609 ; superiority
of, 512
Linnemann tool, 509
Mobilization, 502, 503, 506,
507, 616
Organization, 489, 495, 496, 508
Peace strength, 503
Reserves, 603
Strength, 606, 607
Transport, 511
Transport improvements, 502
Russo-Japanese War, 111, 245,
277, 490, 497, 498, 505
Russc -Turkish War, 286
Ryckmaus, M., 431
Saales, Pass of, seized, 397, 399
Saar, 248, 253, 265
Saarburg, 389 ; operations, 399
Backer, 485, 486
Salisbury, Lord, 292, 294, 302
Sambre, 278, 363, 454 ; German
advance on, 450 ; opera-
tions, 402, 403, 409, 477 ;
retreat, 476
Samsonoft, General, 516
.Saxony : Army, 207
Saxony, Crown Prince of, 202
.Sazonoff, M., 23, 27, 77
.Scliad, Lieutenant, 392
Scharnhorst, 201
Scheffer-Boyadel, Baron vop, 218
Schenck, (ieneral von, 218
Scholtz, General von, 218
Sedan, 37, 204, 205, 245, 246,281
Seely, Colonel, 281
Senes, Rear- Admiral, 69
S rajevo crime, 22, 23
Serbia, 19, 245
S,.rbian Army, 397
Sergias Mikhailovitcb, Grand
Duke (Russia), 506
Silcsian Army, 48(i
Simon, Sir John, 189
Singh, Sir Pertab, 165
SkobcleiT, 494, 495
Slav Race, origin of, 481, 482
Smiley (Gordon Highlander) ac-
count of battle of Mons,
467, 468
Smith-Dorrien, General Sir
Horace, 454, 469 ; biograph-
ical, 464 ; m"ntion<.'d in
dispatches, 472 ; at Mons,
470, 472
Smuts, General, 149
Snow, General, 470 ; at Mons*
471, 472, 474
Soiron sacked, 405
Soi.s.sons, 455, 479, 480
Somme, 361, 465, 479
Sommerteld, Major, 426
Sord6t, General, 471, 474
South Africa, 162; Defence Act,
144, 148, 149, 150, 151
South African jVrray, 142, 149 ;
organization, 151 ; training,
160
South African War, 11, 12, 58,
122, 126, 128, 132, 133, 148,
151, 206, 234, 275, 279, 280,
282, 303, 451, 464
Spies : see under Espionage
State Insurance scheme, 1 85, 1 86,
187
Steevens, George, 283, 298, 451,
453,
Steinmetz, von, 493
Stepniak, 492
Stewart, Colonel, 288
Stock Exchange, 178, 179. 180;
closed, 171, 178, 181
Stoflel, Colonel, 8
Strantz, General von, 218
Sfcrassburg, 37, 98, 99, 389 ; tor-
tre.sses, 390
Strauss, M., 431
Suguy, Rear-Admiral de, 69
Sukhomlmoff. General, 245
Suvarofl, 487, 488, 498
Svorbejev, M., leaves Berlin, 25
Sydenham, Lord, 40
SzipA,ry, Count Friedrich, 516
Tamaniab, battle of, 287
Tormonde, destruction of, 422,
423 ; history, 404, 405, 423 ;
operations, 425
Territorial Force, 126, 130, 131
Terwagne, Mr. Arthur, 407
Thaim ; history, 394 ; occupied
by the Kr,-nch, 394
Thielt, 427 ; bombs dropped on,
428
Thionville, 442 : fortress, 389
Thomson, M. Ga-ston, 65
Thuin : operations, 463
Tiederaann, Major von, 306, 307
Tielemaus, Burgomaster, 437
Tielemans, Ma<lame — Aerschot
atrocities, 439, 440
Tirlemont operations, 368. 389,
371, 372
VI.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Tirpitz, Admiral von, 57
Tolstoy, Count, 4S4
Tongres: occupation, 368
Toski, battle of, 290
Totl fortresses, 390, 391
Toulon, 49 : naval base, 69
Trade, effect on. 192
Trade rcut-es, 190, 194
Transport, laotor, 135, 453
Treaty of London, 103, 313
Treitschke, Heiniich von, 401,
402
Triple Alliance, 13, 19, 168, 243,
388, 495
Triple Entente, 13, 15, 168
Trochu, General, 85
Tschepe und Weidenbach, Gen-
eral Tulfl von, 218
Turkish Array, 19
Turkish Army, Armament com-
pared with Russian, 493
u
Dlster conference, 178
United States, 144, 195; fm-
ancial conditions, 169 ;
proposal to acquire German
liners, 190
Valenciennes, 263, 443
Vandervelde, M., 363
Van Doren, Lieutenant, 370
Vandyck, General, 312
Valerland, 190
Vauthiermont occupied by
French, 395
Verdun fortresses, 390, 391, 447
Vernois, Verdy du, 202, 204, 205,
242, 243
Verviers, destruction of, 405 ;
German occupation of, 316
Vessels sunk by mines : neutral
list, 188
Villeneuve, 283, 284
Vis6, 317, 362; atrocities, 435;
massacre rumours, 319, 320,
377, 378 ; destruction of,
405, 435 ; operations, 318,
319, 332, 366
Viviani, M., 477
Volunteers, 125, 126
Vorst, Sulpice van, 409
Vosges, 389, 394
w
Waesland : history, 402
Wakelield, Professor Robert, 413
Ward, Sir A. W., 401
Waterloo campaign, 202, 278,
364, 374, 452, 487
Watson, Professor Foster, 411,
412, 414
Weissenburg, 205
Wellington, Duke of, 40, 276,
277, 278, 279, 283, 452
Wenceslas, Duke, 409, 411
Wermuth, Herr, 209
Western, Colonel, 275
Weyden, Roger von der, 404, 409
Wliitehousc, Mr. .T. H., 425
Whitney, Sir James, 162
Wiart, M. Carton de, 433
Willielmshaven naval base, 61, 78
William 1. of Prussia, 229
William II., Emperor of Ger-
many, 37, 57, 58, 123, l(i2.
197, 214, 21S, 219, 353, 3S)1 ;
ambitions, 9, 11 ; biographi-
cal, 228 ; paval visit to Kiel
interrupted, 22 ; president
at Potsdam Council, 24 ;
visits Jerusalem, 285 ; dis-
misses Bismarck, 302 ; issues
Cabinet Order, 400 ; ad-
dress to troops in 1900>
401 ; sends aide-de-camp
with news of fall of Liege,
350 ; on Belgium, 336, 360 ;
British Army, 277, 455 ;
Navy increases, 12, 15, 55 ;
Turkish Army, 13, 19
Wilson, Major-Genoral, men-
tioned in dispatches, 474
Wtngate, General Sir Reginald,
292, 293
Wolseley, Lord, 128, 278, 279,
280, 286, 288, 451
Wood, Sir Evelyn, 275, 280, 282,
286, 290, 292, 303, 480 ;
biographical, 450
WUrtemberg, Duke Albrecht of,
475, 477
X
Xylander, General von, 218
Yeomanry, 125, 126
Ypros, 403
Yser, 301
z
Zabern incident, 216, 392
Zouaves, 90
LIST OF PORTRAITS AND MAPS
IN VOLUME I.
PAGE
H.M. The King .. 6, 42, 1G3
H.M. The Queen . . . . 7
H.B.H. The Prince of Wales 62
H.U.H. Prince Albert . . 74
Alexieff, general . . . . 492
Allen, The Hon. T. .. 14((
Allenby, Major-(ieneral .. 12(J
Alsace, French operations
in 38«
Antwerp, modern defences
of 115
Arnira, Count von . . 383
Asriuith, Right Hon. H. H. 30
Austria, Crown Prince of . . 39
Austria, Emperor Francis
•foseph of . . . . 14
Austria, late Archduke
Francis Ferdinand . . 12
Barclay de Tolly . . . . 495
Battenberg, H.S.H. Prince
Louis of . . . . 48
Bavaria, Crown Prince of . . 202
Belfort Fortresses . . . . 95
Benckendorff. Count . . 488
Berchtold, Count . . . . 19
Beresford, Admiral Lorl
Charles .. .. 291
Bertie, Sir Francis L. . . 22
Bothmann Hollweg, Dr. von 34
Bismarck, Prince . . . . 24
Bonnal, (ieneral . . . . 255
Borden. Sir Robert .. 145
BrusilolT, General . . 490
Brussels, Gern>an advance
to .. .. 330, 381
Billow, Prince von 22-j
Billow, (teneral Ulrich voi> 214
Bunsen, .Sir Maurice de . . 22
Callaghan, Admiral Sir
(reorge . . . . 70
Cambon, M. Jules . . 26
Cambon, M. Paul . . . . 9
CiVsUOnaii, General . . 83-. 245
Chamberlain, Right Hon.
Austim . . • . 172
Chotwode, Brigadier-Gen-
eral Sir Philip . . 131
Chevenet, General .. 274
Churchill. Right Hon. Win-
ston S. . . . . 46
Crewe, Marquess of .. 165
Cromer, Earl of . . ..296
Cronjo, late General . . 30 7
D'Amade, General . . 243
Delcasse, M. . . . . 63
De Wet, General . . . . 306
DmitrielT, General Radko 485
Douglas, late General Sir
Charles . . . . 137
DragoiniroIT, (Jeiif'ral . . 492
Dull, Captain .\rthui' A. ^l. 45
Egypt,British campaigns in 2iH)
Einen, General von . . 219
Emmich, (General von . . 208
Etienue, M. . . . . 84
European war area .. 20,' 21
Evans, Sir .Samuel. . . . 187
Eyscheu, M. . . ..313
Falkenhayn, Gen"r.il von . . 206
Fergusson, Major-Gereral
Sir Charles . . . . 27{>
Fisher, Ixird . . . . 52
Porstner, Lieutenant von . . 394
PAGB
Fortincations of the Rhine
Frontier . . . . 237
Fox, Captain Cecil H. . . 45
France, territorial distribu-
tion of French Army 100, 101
Franco-German frontier . . 29
French, Field-Marshal Sir John 127
Gallioni, General . . 242, 399
German Army Corps area 220, 221
Germany, Crown Prince of 39, 203
Girouard, Colonel Sir Percy 302
Goltz, Field-Marshal von
der ! 209
Goschen. Sir Edward . . 15
Gregorovitch, Admiral . . 72
(Jrenfell, Field-Marshal Lord 303
Grey, Right Hon. .Sir Ed-
ward 32
Hai':;, Lieutenaixt-General
Sir Douglas .. .. 129
H.amilton, (ii'ncral Sir Ian 129
Hamilton, late Major-Gen-
eral Hubert I. W. . . 285
Hardinge of Penshurst, Ixjrd 1 65
Hansen, General von .. 216
Heeringen, General von . . 205
Hildyard, General Sir Henry 277
Hindenburg, General von. . 222
Hohenberg, late Duchess of 12
Hughes, the Hon. Samuel . . 143
Tngenohl, Admiral von . . 60
Ivanhoff, General . . . . 484
.Tackson; Admiral Sir Henry 68
Jagow, Ilerr von . . . . 37
Januschkevitch, General-
Lieuten.ant Nikolaus . . 493
.Tellicoe, Admiral Sir John . . 50
PAOE
Mons, British retreat from
460, 461, 476
Morris, Right Hon. Sir Ed-
ward 148
Murrav, Afajor-Oeneral Sir
Archibald .. .. 139
Mysore, Maharaja of .. 166
Joftre, General
82, 83, 399
Kaiser, the .. 10, 211, 244
Kinfe of the Belgians 18,105
Kitchener, Lord 282, 283, 287,
296, 300, 301, 308, 309
Kluck, General von . . 204
Koester, Grand Admiral
von . . . . . . 59
Krupp von Bohlen und
Halbach . . . . 225
Lalaing, Count de . . . . Ill
Lapeyrdre. Admiral BoiK^de 64
Law, Right Hon. A. Bonar 173
Leman, General . . 108, 325
Lichnowsky, Prince . . 33
Li(5ge fortresses . . . . 109
Li^ge and surrounding
country .. 340, 341
Lille fortresses . . . . 93
Lippc, Prince of . . . . 239
Lloyd George, Bight Hon.
David 169
Luxemburg and surround-
in<? country . . . . 310
Luxemburg, Grand Duchess
Marie Adelaide of 9, 312
Marchand, Major . . . . 298
Maubeugc fortresses . . 89
Max. M 383
Mensdorff. Count . . . . 33
Messimy. M. . . . . 256
Michel, General . . 87. 399
MiUen, The lion. E. D. . . 147
Moltke, General von 25, 36, 227
Namur, defences of
Nelson, Ijord
Nicholas, Grand Duke
North Sea, map of
Osman Digna
Pashitch, M.
Pau, General
Percin, General
Plender, Sir William
Poincar(5, M.
Prussia, Grand Admiral
Prince Henry of
Pulteney, Major-General . .
119
44
484
76
.. 298
19
83, 86, 399
87
.. 171
28
56
128
Queen of the Belgians . . 327
Rennenkampf, General . . 485
Renter, Colonel von . . 392
Ribot, M 174
Robb, Major-General . . 128
Roberts, Earl . . 123, 284
Robertson, Major-General
Sir WiUiara . . . . 277
Russia, The Emperor Nich-
olas II. of . . 16, 482
Russian military districts,
territorial distribution
of . . . . 500, 501
Ruzsky, General . . . . 493
Samsonoff, late General . . 400
Sazonoft, .\I. .. .. 15
Schoen, Baron von . . 26
Servia, Crown Prince of . . 78
Servia, King Peter of . . 38
Simon, .Sir John .. .. 188
Singh, Sir Pertab . . . . 164
Smith-Dorrien , General Sir
Horace . . . . 126
Smuts, General the Hon.
H. C 149
Snow, Major-Genera! . . 276
Sukhomlinoff, General . . 487
Suvaroft . . . . . . 495
Steevens, late George W. 300
Steinhauer (The Kaiser's
Master Spy) . . . . 477
Sturdee, Vice-Admiral .Sir
Frederick . . . . 66
Tippitz, Grand Admiral von 59
Viviani, M. . . 37
Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur 77
Wilson, Brigadier-GeniTal
IT. H 124
Wincate, General Sir F. R. 292
Wnlseley, late Lord . . 284
Wontners, General, and his
Aides-de-Camp . . 354
Wood, Sir Evelyn . . . . 290
Woild, Map of, showing
British, French, and
German possessions 154
Wurtemberg, Duke Al-
brechtof .. ..213
Zhilinsky, General .. 491
The Tines, London.
D
510*
The Times history of the war, .T5
T.l