HISTORY
I If
OF
THE WAR
VOL. XI.
a 3
PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE.
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES,'
PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON.
.917.
D
SO
T5
v.l
CONTENTS OF VOL XI.
PAOK
CHAPTER CLXVII.
BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE: SEPTEMBER, 1914 TO OCTOBER, 1916 .. .. 1
CHAPTER CLXVIII.
SCIENCE AND THE HEALTH OF ARMIES (II.) . . . . . . . . • • . . 41
CHAPTER CLXIX.
THE SHIPPING PROBLEM : AUGUST, 1914 TO FEBRUARY, 1917 77
CHAPTER CLXX.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (IV.) .... .... 117
CHAPTER CLXXI.
THE WORK OF THE MERCANTILE MARINE (II.) . . 167
CHAPTER CLXXII.
FISHERMEN AND THE WAR (II.)
CHAPTER CLXXIH.
THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1916: (I.) TRANSYLVANIA .. ..197
CHAPTER CLXXIV.
ITALIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE CARSO, AUGUST TO DECEMBER, 1916:
WAR WITH GERMANY
CHAPTER CLXXV.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (V.)
CHAPTER CLXXVI.
317
PERSIA AND THE WAR
CHAPTER CLXXVn.
THE END OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY . .
CHAPTER CLXXVIII.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (VI.)
CHAPTER CLXXIX.
THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1916 : (II.) To FALL OF BUKAREST .. 433
THE GERMAN PEACE CAMPAIGN OF
CHAPTER CLXXX.
DECEMBER, 1916 .. .. .. •• 473
CHAPTER CLXVII.
BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE :
SEPTEMBER, i9i4-OCTOBER, 1916.
BELGIUM AFTER THREE MONTHS OF WAR — REMAINING ELEMENTS OF BELGIAN NATIONALITY —
ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN RULE — GOVERNOR-GENERAL VON DER GOLTZ — FIRST PROCLAMATIONS
— UNLAWFUL DECREES — POLICE GOVERNMENT — SEIZURE OF HOSTAGES — RETURN OF REFUGEES
AND GERMAN PROMISES — SUPPRESSION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY — GOVERNOR-GENERAL VON BISSING
— PENALTIES FOR LOYALTY — THE BELGIAN FRONTIERS AND ESCAPES OF BELGIANS — THE EXECU-
TION OF EDITH CAVELL — GERMAN CENSORSHIP AND THE PRESS — FLEMINGS AND WALLOONS — THE
GERMAN " LIBERATION OF THE FLEMINGS " — GHENT UNIVERSITY FIASCO — CONTROL OF BANKING
— FORCED CURRENCY — CONTRIBUTIONS AND REQUISITIONS — GERMAN SYSTEM OF PILLAGE —
BEGINNING OF THE DEPORTATIONS — BELGIAN " MORAL " — PUNITIVE TAXATION — CARDINAL
MERCIER'S PASTORAL LETTER — THE SPIRIT OF BELGIUM.
THE beginning of November, 1914,
marked a new stage in Germany's
violation of Belgium. The German
armies had crossed the frontier on
August 4, three months before, and ever since
then they had been campaigning on Belgian
soil. In August Liege fell, Louvain and Brussels
were occupied, the Anglo-French forces were
driven back into France in the battle of Mons-
Charleroi, and the Belgian Army contained
within the forts of Antwerp. Then there was
a check in Belgium while the fate of France was
decided on the Marne, and Belgian sorties from
Antwerp held the German containing force from
sending reinforcements to the southern battle.
But in October, when the Germans had stemmed
the Anglo-French counter-attack at the Aisne,
they pushed on with the invasion of Belgium
again. Antwerp fell, after a week's bombard-
ment, on October 9, and the Provinces of East
and West Flanders, which had so far escaped
invasion behind the line of the Scheldt, were
abandoned to the conqueror. The Germans
pressed on to the sea, to the Yser, to Ypres.
But on October 31 the Battles of Ypres and
the Yser reached, and passed, their climax,
and the Western Front became as stationary
Vol. XL— Part 131.
in its Belgian section as it had become in
France a month before. A fragment of
Belgium, not one-fiftieth part of the whole
national territory, was definitely saved from
German conquest ; the rest of the country was
as definitely in the Germans' power. And as
the open manoeuvring of the armies concen-
trated itself into the equilibrium of trench-
warfare, the greater part of the conquered
territory passed out of the immediate zone
of hostilities. The German invasion was
over, and the German occupation had begun.
The occupied territory in November, 1914,
was a wreck of the Belgian! that had existed
three months earlier. In August Belgium
had been one of the most densely populated,
industrious, highly organized, well-governed
countries in Europe. All these factors had
made its prosperity, but now all were gone.
The Government had gene to Havre, in
France ; the National Bank had accepted
the hospitality of the Bank of England, and,
warned in time by the conduct of the invader
at Liege and Hasselt, it had taken it* notes,
securities, and specie with it across the sea.
Foreign trade was at a standstill, for the
ports had passed into German hands and were
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
cut off, like the German ports, from the trade
Df the world. Internal communications were
IMwalysed ; such railways as were still in work-
ing order were monopolized by the German
Army Command ; but traffic was chiefly
paralyzed by the German terror. During
the three months of invasion, more than
21,000 houses had been burnt down in five
ulone of the nine provinces of Belgium, and
a far greater number pillaged — more than
16,000, for instance, in the single Province of
Brabant. Of the civilian population, between
5,000 and 6,000 men, women, and children
had been massacred, some singly and some
in batches, some by clean killing and some
on Land, in which it was agreed that their
property should be treated as private property.
and should not be liable to seizure by the'
Occupying Power. The judicial institutions
of Belgium were also in being. The Germans
had, indeed, commandeered the great Palais
de Justice at Brussels, a few days after their
entry into the city on August 20, and turned
it into a place d'armes — contrary to the Con-
vention of Geneva, for the building had
already been occupied by a Red Cross Hospital,
which the Germans dissolved.* But the
courts still sat in the few rooms left to them,
and the Brussels Bar, as well as the provincial
Bars in the other Belgian cities, continued tc
YPKES.
after lingering tortures, some in frenzy and
some in cold blood, but all with the object
of terrorization and with that result. Fleeing
before the terror, many hundreds of thousands
of Belgians, especially of the middle and upper
classes, had taken refuge in Holland and the
British Isles.
Yet something remained. The communal
and municipal authorities, with their high
traditions handed down from the Middle
Ages, were still at their posts. By an emer-
gency law of August 4 the King had delegated
to them the Government's powers in the
contingency of invasion, and they were pro-
teeteil to some extent by an article (Sect, iii.,
Art. 56) in the Hague Convention of 1907
concerning the Laws and Customs of War
plead. Another body which survived was
the Church, though . it had suffered cruelly
during the invasion, for the fanatical Lutheran
regiments, of which the invading army was
mainly composed, singled out the priests
and monks for ill-treatment. In the Dioceses
of Liege, Namur, Tournai, and Malines at
least 33 ecclesiastics were killed, f and in the
whole of Belgium 49 altogether. But the
malice of the Germans, combined with t In-
fine conduct of the Belgian clergy, who had
* The intruders stole the hospital equipment, including
11 stock of fine wines, the gift of the Belgian legal pro-
fession. They also barbarously damaged the interior of
the building — the marbles, wood-work, pietures. and
upholstery.
f Mentioned by name in Cardinal Mercier's Pastoral
Letter, Christmas, 1914.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE PALAIS DE JUSTICE, BRUSSELS.
Inset : The Interior as German Barracks.
sacrificed themselves for their flocks and thrown
themselves into the work o£ the Red Cross,
bridged over the party difference between
Liberal and Clerical, which had divided
Belgium before the war, and made the
Church a rallying point for the nation. The
Belgians were fortunate, too, in their eccle-
siastical leaders— the Bishops of Namur and
Liege, and the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines
—men strong in personal character and strong
by their position as dignitaries of an inter-
national Church, to which more than half the
population of Germany and Austria-Hungary,
and many great neutral peoples, belonged.
There were also private corporations, like the
Antwerp Chamber of Commerce, which could
keep watch on the economic condition of the
country, though they could not retrieve the
ruin which the invasion had caused, and which
the occupation was to complete. And, lastly,
there was the great body of workers in the
industrial towns, who had been unable to
emigrate wholesale like the people of other
classes, and had not been mobilized in the
Army, because only a small percentage of
tha able-bodied had been conscripted in
Belgium before the new military law of 1913,
wiiile the invasion had spread too rapidly for
the raising of volunteers.
Thess were the chief elements of Beleian
nationality that remained in the occupied
territory, and upon which German rule, as
opposed to the mere terrorism of the invading
Army Commands, was now imposed. The
country in German hands was divided into
three zones. The " Zone of Operations," in
which the trenches lay and the fighting went
on, was completely under martial law, but it
was only a few miles broad. Behind it lay
the " Etappen-Zone," or Zone of Depots and
Lines of Communication, on which the fighting
line was based. This zone was also governed
by the military authorities, but their govern-
ment extended to civil functions, and the
Belgian local authorities were allowed to
subsist. The Etappen-Zone covered most of
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE
i
FIELD-MARSHAL VON DER GOLTZ,
First German Governor-General in Belgium.
West and East Flanders. Lastly there was
the " Zone of Occupation," extending over
the rest of the territory, and this was given
a semi-civil German administration under a
Governor-General at Brussi ']-.
In the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the
limits of " Military Authority over the Territory
of the Hostile State " are partially defined.
" The authority of the power of the State
having passed de facto into the hands of the
Occupant," it is laid down in Article 43, "the
latter shall do all in his power to restore, and
ensure as far as possible, public order and safety,
respecting at the same time, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country."
By Article 45, " It is forbidden to force the
inhabitants of occupied territory to swear
allegiance to the hostile Power." This Con-
vention had been ratified by Gerjnany, and in
administering her " Zone of Occupation " in
Belgium she was under obligation to abide by it.
For their first Governor-General in Belgium,
the German Government selected Field -Mar-
shal Baron von der Goltz Pasha, a soldier who
had made his reputation in Turkey. He was
appointed as early as August 26, and on Sep-
tember 5 he announced himself in a proclama-
tion to the Belgians :
His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, after the
occupation of the greater part of Belgian territory, ha«
deigned to nominate me as Governor-General in Bel-
gium.
PILLAGE AT ANTWERP.
[From n German photograph
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
By His Majesty's command, a civil administration has
been established under my Governor-Generalship. . .
Every act of hostility on the part of the population
against the German troops, every attempt to disturb
their communications with Germany, or to embarrass
or interrupt the working of the railways, telegraphs or
telephones, will be punished very severely. Any resist-
ance or revolt against the German Administration will
be repressed without mercy.
It is the stern necessity of war that punishment for
hostile acts must strike the innocent as well as the
guilty. . . .
Belgian citizens who wish to attend peaceably to their
business have nothing to fear from the German troops
and Decrees for the Occupied Belgian Terri-
tory."
The regime thus inaugurated was not re-
assuring. The respect for patriotic sentiments
and the revival of economic life had both a
fair sound, but the doctrine that " the innocent
must suffer for the guilty " was a direct
repudiation of the Hague Convention cited
above, which provides, in Article 60, that " no
collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall
DINANT AS THE GERMAN GUNS LEFT IT.
and authorities. As far as can be done, commerce must
be started again, the factories set at work, and the
harvests gathered in.
The announcement was followed by an
appeal : " Belgian citizens, I ask no one to
renounce his patriotic sentiments. But I
expect of you all a reasonable submission and
an absolute obedience to the orders of my
Government." Then came a decree : " The
laws and decrees issued by the Governor-
General for the Occupied Belgian Territory
will be drawn up in the German language."
These documents were published together as
the first number of the Geselz-und Verordnungs-
blatt fur die Okkupierten Oebiete Belgians," the
official German title of the " Bulletin of Laws
be inflicted on the population on account of
the acts of individuals for which it cannot be
regarded as collectively responsible." And
while emphasis was laid on the Governor-
General's intention to police the country in
the interests of the German Army, nothing was
said about " respecting the laws in force in
the country " or " defraying the expenses of
the administration of the occupied territory
to the same extent as the National Govern-
ment," which were the duties of the Occupying
Power under the Hague Convention of 1907
by the Articles defining its authority (Articles
43 and 48). »
The expenses of administration were pro-
vided for later, by a decree of November 12,
131-2
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
in which it was announced that the existing
taxes would continue to be levied, and that
the administration would be paid for from the
proceeds, as the Hague Convention prescribes.
A decree of December 23 confirmed this
expressly for the year 1915, though its correct-
ness was marred by a supplementary decree
of January 16, 1915, in which " German
nationals, and nationals of States not at war
with Germany," were granted " special facilities
for the payment of communal, provincial or
public taxes due from them in the Occupied
Executive Acts with which a German public authority,
or a person of German nationality whose acts bear a
public character, has been empowered or has empowered
others, can be applied in Belgium if they are legalized by
the chief of the (civil) administration attached to the
Governor-General.
By this decree Belgium was incorporated
legislatively in the German Empire as uncon-
ditionally as it would have been by formal
annexation. But this was the work of von
Bissing, who succeeded von der Goltz at the
beginning of December, 1914. Von Biasing's
first act was to define his position, which his
A TRAIN-LOAD OF LOOT FOR GERMANY.
Territory, or even the partial or total remission
of the same." But " the laws in force in the
country " were never acknowledged as binding
by the Occupying Authorities. From Novem-
ber 8 onwards, for instance, the Belgian law
making Greenwich time legal time in Belgium
was set aside, and German time substituted for
it, by a regulation of von Luttwitz, the Military
Governor of Brussels. This petty illegality,
involving nothing worse than a confusion in
the registration of births and deaths, was
symptomatic of the German attitude, and the
Governor-General usurped a legislative licence
in the territory within his zone, which cul-
minated i" the decree of June 16, ]91."> :
predecessor had never cleared up after his
inaugural proclamation, in a decree dated
December 3 :
DECREE
Abrogating the (Belgian) law of Aug. 4, 1914, on the
delegation of powers in the contingency of an invasion
of tho national territory, and regulating tho exercise <>!
the pmvors which belong to the Provincial (lovernors
and to the King of the Belgians, in virtue of the laws
on the administration of tho I'mvinces and Ccmmi:i es,
Art. I. — The law of Aug. 4 i-; abrogated.
Art. 2. — All powers belonging to the Provincial
(iiivornors am exorcised by tho Military Governors of
the German Empire. The president.-, of the civil govern-
ment attached to the {military) Governors deal, in their
name, with the current business of provincial adminis-
tration, and are responsible for the business of the
Standing Committees (of the Provincial Councils) and
for presiding over them. The powers belonging to the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
King of the Belgians are exercised by me, in my capacity
as Imperial Governor-General.
Art. 3. — The resolutions passed, since the law of
Aug. 4 came into force, by the Standing Committees and
Provincial and Communal Councils, will only be valid
if they are ratified, retrospectively, by the authorities
designated in Art. 2, in so far as these decisions would
have had to be ratified by the Provincial Governors or
by the King.
BARON VON BISSINO,
Governor -General in Belgium.
Brussels, Dec. 3, 1914.
The substitution of German for Belgian
authority in the occupied territory was pro-
claimed still more emphatically in a decree of
January 4, 1915 :
You are reminded that in the parts of Belgium subject
to German government, as from the day when this
government was established, only the regulations of the
Governor-General and his subordinates have the force
of law.
No decrees which the King of the Belgians and the
Belgian Ministers of State have issued since this date,
or may issue hereafter, have any binding force within the
domain of German government in Belgium. I am
determined to secure, by every means at my disposal,
that the powers of government shall be exercised exclu-
sively by the German authorities established in Belgium.
I expect Belgian officials, in the true interests of their
country, not to refuse to continue their services, especially
as I shall not require of them any services in the direct
interests of the German Army.
The concluding pledge was falsified in the
event, and the respect for the Hague Con-
vention which it intimated was indeed incon-
sistent with the rest of the decree. In claiming
to supplant the lawful government of the
country instead of to represent it, von Bissing
was contradicting the whole spirit in which the
GENERAL VON BISSING,
Appointed German Governor-General in Belgium,
December, 1914.
Convention was framed ; the military element
in his administration, dominant from the
beginning, was bound to oust the civil move
and more, and German authority in Belgium
resolved itself into terrorism by " Special
Military Tribunals." These tribunals were
introduced with sinister regularity as the
sanction of the administrative decrees. Con-
demnation " by a Military Tribunal " or
COURT-MARTIAL
On a man and boy charged with assisting Belgians to escape.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Les habitants de l» ville d Andenne. aprtw
avoir pmt«iU» de latin intentions paciflques.
ont but une surprise ututre BUT noo ironpoa.
Ceet avec mon consentement quo le General
en chef • ftvt brnler toute la localit* et que
cent personnes environ ont ete fusilleea.
Je port* ce hit a la oonnaJmanop dp la Villc
de Liege pour que le» Liegeois se representent
le sort dont ila aont menaces, sils prenaieiit
parpille attitude.
Enauite. il a ete trouvft dans nn magasin
darmes a Huy des projifttl«« • rtntn-dum • dann
le genre du specimen joint a la present--
Au ca« qup <~eln arrivat on demandera rigou-
reusement compt* ch«[ue fois des personnel
-.Hon.
Le General-Command •
s von BULOW.
PROCLAMATION
recording the shooting of about a hundred persons
at Andenne for an alleged traitorous attack on
German troops.
" according to Martial Law " was held over the
Belgians' heads for being in possession of
carrier pigeons after September 15 (Proclama-
tion of September 13, 19141 : infringing the
German military censorship (Decree of Octo-
ber 13) ; evading the German supervision over
Belgian branches of banks belonging to
countries at war with Germany (November 26) ;
dissuading their fellow-citizens from working
for the German authorities (this offence, by a
decree of November 19, was within the Military
Tribunals' exclusive competence) ; issuing
bank notes — " the attempt " being " punish-
able in itself " (December 22) ; infringing the —
abrogation of the — right of assembly (Janu-
ary 17, 1915) ; buying French paper or specie
above its nominal price (May 22) ; wearing,
" even in an unprovocative manner," the
colours of Belgium or any other country at war
with Germany or her Allies (June 6).
The last -mentioned prohibition shows the
" Police State " erected by Germany on the
ruins of Belgian democracy in its naked un-
loveliness. Apart from its inconceivable trivi-
.ality, it was a breach of von der Goltz's under-
taking that "no one should be asked to re-
nounce his patriotic sentiments." But the
tyranny struck deeper than this. In Novem-
ber, 1914, the following was posted up, in
German, French, and Flemish, in the streets of
Brussels : —
NOTICE
On Oct. 28, 1914, a legally constituted Military
Tribunal pronounced the following sentences :
1. The police-constable DE RYCKEKE was condemned
for having, in the legal exercise of his duties, attacked an
A GERMAN PATROL IN BELGIUM.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
authorized agent of the German Authorities ; for having
in two instances intentionally inflicted bodily injury,
with the aid of other persons ; for having in one instance
procured the escape of a prisoner; and for having
attacked a German soldier ; to
FIVE YEARS' IMPRISONMENT.
2. The police-constable SEQHERS was condemned for
having, in the legal exercise of his duties, attacked an
authorized agent of the German Authorities ; for having
intentionally inflicted bodily injury on this German
agent ; and for having procured the escape of a prisoner
(all these offences constituting one charge) ; to
THREE YEARS' IMPRISONMENT.
The verdicts were confirmed on Oct. 31, 1914, by the
Governor-General Baron von der Goltz.
This German police government in Belgium
stands convicted of three main abuses on a
general view : —
(i.) Its decrees, which often involved ques-
tions of life and death for those subject to
them, were not properly accessible to the
Belgian public. Only a few were placarded
in the streets ; the majority, including all
those of more complicated contents, were
merely published in the Governor-General's
" Official Bulletin of Laws and Decrees,"
GERMAN DEFENCES AT THE PALAIS DE JUSTICE, BRUSSELS.
The City of Brussels, not including its suburbs, has
been punished for the assault committed by its police-
constable DE RVCKERE upon a German soldier by an
additional war contribution of
FIVE. MILLION FHANCS.
BARON VON LC"TTWTTZ, General,
Governor of Brussels.
Brussels, Nov. 1, 1914.
The German agent whose misadventure the
Military Tribunal and the Military Governor
of Brussels so royally redressed, was one of
those " police out of uniform " or spies in plain
clothes whose business was to sweep the
unwary into the Tribunal's net. It is sufficient
to say that there were even more of them in
Belgium after the German occupation than there
were before the war, and that the streets,
cafes, and trams were picketed by them as
ubiquitously as in Germany itself.
which had only a limited and official circula-
tion, and even in this the exhaustive publica-
tion of them seems only to have been pro-
vided for by a decree of December 23, when
the German Administration had been four
months in activity. The definitive text, more-
over, was drafted in German, so that in cases of
doubtful phrasing the Belgians had to interpret
a language not their own.
(ii.) Both offences and penalties were de-
nned with a quite inequitable latitude. On
September 17, 1914, for instance, the Governor-
General gave notice that " anyone approach-
ing German troops or advanced posts in such a
way as to present the appearance of spying
upon them, will be shot summarily." This
was practically a licence to any German officer,
10
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
however subordinate, to shoot without in-
vestigation any Belgian civilian who crossed
the path of the unit under his command. In
the prescription of penalties, " a heavy fine,"
" a prolonged imprisonment," " penalties of
imprisonment," or even " severe penalties "
without further specification, .were at least as
put into practice. The following are three
proclamations by Baron von der Goltz him-
self :—
(a) It has happened recently,, in regions not actually
under occupation by German troops either in weak
detachments or in force, that supply-columns mid
patrols have been ambuscaded by the inhabitants. I
draw the attention of the public to the fact tlmt a list
TEACHING BELGIAN CHILDREN GERMAN SONGS.
common formulas as the exact term of im-
prisonment and the exact amount of fine,
which modern legislation is always scrupulous
in defining. Even the mode of trial was often
no more explicit than "according to Martial
law " »r " by the laws of War." In other
coses the " Military Tribunals " were expressly
mentioned ; but though every Belgian in the '
occupied territory was acutely aware of their
existence, their constitution and procedure
were never made public by the Governor-
General by whom they were appointed, so
that the " legally constituted " tribunal, which
imposed eight years imprisonment and five
million francs fine, according to the proclama-
tion cited above, was really an arbitrary body
working, behind closed doors, upon victims over
whom it had no title but force to jurisdiction,
like the German " Wehmgerichte " of the
Middle Ages.
(iii.) The punishment of the innocent for
the guilty, forbidden by Article 50 of the
Hague Convention of 1907, concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, but
threatened by von der Goltz in his inaugural
proclamation of September 2, was reeularly
has been kept of towns and communes in the neighbour
hood of which such attacks have taken place, and that
they must be prepared for punishment as soon as German
troops come within reach of them.
BARON VON DKR GOLTZ. Field-Marshal.
Governor-General of Belgium.
Brussels, September 26, 1914.
(6) On the evening of September 25, the railway-track
and telegraph-wires were destroyed on the line Loven-
joul- Vertryek. In consequence, the two places named
were called to account on the morning of September 30,
and had to give hostages. In future, the places nearest
the spot where such acts have occurred — whether they
are parties to them or not — will be punished without
pity. To this end, hostages have been taken from all
places near railways threatened by such attacks, and at
the first attempt to destroy railway, telegraph or tele-
phone lines, they will immediately be shot. Moreover,
all troops guarding railways have been ordered to shoot
everyone approaching railway, telegraph or telephone
lines in a suspicious manner.
BABON VON DEB GOLTZ, Field-Marshal,
Governor-General in Belgium.
Brussels, October 1, 1914.
(c) A generalisation of (6), daced Brussels.
October 5, declaring that the places affected
" will be punished without pity, no matter
whether they are guilty of these acts or not,"
and that the hostages taken <_" will imme-
diately be shot at the first attempt at the
destruction " of the objects afore-mentioned.
It may be added that these raids on German
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
11
communications, for which such ferocious
collective penalties were prescribed by von der
Goltz, were not the work of Belgian civilians
in the occupied territory under his govern-
ment, or of any Belgian civilians whatsoever,
but of the Belgian Army, which was still
holding out in Antwerp at these dates, and
was performing entirely legitimate acts of war.
The seizure of hostages, moreover, by which
the collective punishment was applied, is not
only a flagrant injustice in itself, but has been
condemned as illegal by the modern authori-
ties on International Law. Yet throughout
the occupation as well as the invasion of
Belgium the Germans seized hostages without
of the administration have the first liability.
From the panel submitted to me I shall
designate the persons to serve as hostages from
mid-day to mid-day. A hostage, if hot re-
placed in good time, will be kept another
twenty -four hours. After this further period,
the hostage, if not replaced, incurs the penalty
of death."
These were the general characteristics of
von der Goltz's and von Bissing's regime.
They were the heads of a " Police -State," and
they revealed the purpose of their government
in the objects to which they applied themselves,
and in the organs they created to carry them
out.
A GERMAN SCHOOL CLASS IN BELGIUM.
A typical advertisement of the blessings of German rule.
scruple, and often inflicted on them the extreme
penalty for acts for which from the nature of
their position they could not be responsible
themselves. The classic seizure of hostages
in Belgium was by a certain Major Dieckmann
in the Commune of Grivegnee, a suburb of
Liege. In return for " permitting the houses
in Grivegnee to be inhabited by the persons
who lived in them formerly," he demanded
from the Commune a panel of hostages to be
held by him for twenty-four hours in turn.
" Priests, burgomasters and other members
The first object of the German authorities
was to procure the return of the refugees,
whose absence not only embarrassed them in
their attempt to carry on the government of
the country which they had usurped, but was
a standing indictment of the barbarity with
which they had conducted their invasion.
They were particularly anxious to get back
the population of Antwerp, which had fled en
masse across the neighbouring Dutch frontier,
and had been given hospitality by the people
of Holland ; and accordingly they let it be
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ANTWERP: CIVILIANS COLLECTED FOR DEPORTATION AND THEIR GUARD.
known, through the Netherlands Legation at
Brussels and the Netherlands Consul -General
at Antwerp, that they intended to restore
" normal conditions " in Belgium, and there-
fore invited the refugees to return. This
overture was taken up by the local Dutch
authorities in the frontier districts, who were
overwhelmed with the difficulty of providing
for the refugees, and believed that their return
would be to the refugees' own advantage, as it
would have been if the German intentions had
been sincere. On the advice of their Dutch
hosts, many of the refugees accepted the
German invitation and returned to their homes.
Special assurances were given to members of
the Belgian Oarde Civique. On October 9,
the day on which Antwerp capitulated, General
von Beseler, who commanded the besieging
army, assured the Belgian delegates negotiating
with him that " Civic Guards who had been
disarmed would not be treated as prisoners of
war," and Lieutenant-General von Schiitz, who
was appointed German Commandant of Ant-
\u-rp on the same date, pledged himself
explicitly that " there was nothing to prevent
the return of the inhabitants to their homes.
None of them would be molested," and that
"members of the Garde Civique, if they had
been disarmed, could return in complete
security."
On October 16 the same pledge was given
in writing by the German Military authorities
at Antwerp to General van Terwisga, in com-
mand of the Dutch Armies in the field, with
the addition that " the rumour to the effect
that young Belgians would be taken to Ger-
many was entirely without foundation." But
the most solemn pledges of all were given to
Cardinal Mercier, who, since the Royal Govern
ment had retired to Havre, had become the
recognized spokesman, in the occupied ter-
ritory, of the Belgian nation.
Cardinal Mercier received from Baron von
Huene, who had succeeded General von
Schiitz as Governor of Antwerp, a written
undertaking that " Young men need have no
fear of being carried off to Germany, either to
be enrolled in the army or to be subjected to
forced labour." As soon as Baron von der
Goltz arrived at Brussels as Governor-General,
Cardinal Mercier asked him to ratify this
pledge and to extend it to the whole territory
under his administration. " The Governor-
General retained my petition," the Cardinal
records,* " in order to consider it at his leisure.
The following day he was gooc1 enough to
come in person to Malines to express his
* Protest ayainst the deportations, urawn up by'
Cardinal Mercier in the name of the Belgian Episcopate,
and dated November 7, 1916.
THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAE.
13
RUINED MOUSES IN ANTWERP.
approval, and, in the presence of two aides-
de-camp and of my 'private secretary, to con-
firm the promise that the liberty of Belgian
citizens would be respected."
On the strength ot these pledges a con-
siderable number of Belgian refugees, especially
decree of January 15, announced a resort to
forcible measures.
Belgians gubject to direct taxation during the year
1914, who since the beginning of the war have voluntarily
left their domicile and have resided more than two months
outside Belgium, are to pay a special additional tax,
assessed at ten times the total of the taxation aforesaid,
unless they return to Belgium before March 1, 1915.
Until proof to the contrary, every person is considered
as resident outside Belgium who has not remained or does
not remain at his domicile in Belgium.
This was the first article of the Decree, and
it was further provided that half the proceeds
of the fine were to go towards the administra-
tive expenses of the occupied territory,
" according to Articles 48 and 49 of the Hague
Convention concerning War on Land," and
half to the commune in which the particular
refugee was formerly domiciled. " The tax
is payable on April 15 at latest, and recoverable
by distraint after the expiry of that date."
But this arbitrary spoliation, crushing
though it was, did not bring many more
REFUGEES RETURN TO THEIR RUINED
HOME.
from Holland, recrossed the frontier into the
occupied territory. 'But those who hung
back were not encouraged to follow this
example by the fashion in which the pledges
were observed. The guarantee against de-
portation, it is true, was not violated openly
and on a large scale for nearly two years, but
the promise of " normal conditions " and
" freedom from molestation " was a dead
letter from the beginning. By the end oi
1914 the refugees still abroad were no longer
open to enticement, and von Bissing, in a
A WALL DIRECTORY.
How refugees to Holland made their whereabouts
known to their friends.
131—3
14
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
refugees within von Bissing's fold. The German
regime in the occupied territory was already
so onerous that those beyond the reach of the
Governor-General's arm were content to save
their persons from it at the price of their
goods.
The suppression of personal liberty was the
next concern of the German Administration.
CARDINAL MERCIER,
Archbishop of Malines.
The Belgians under it — the returned refugees
and those who had never left their homes —
were systematically isolated from one another
and from the rest of the world. On January 17,
1915, von Bissing signed a sweeping decree in
restriction of the right of assembly : —
Art. I. — 1. Open-air meetings are forbidden.
2. Political meetings within doors, in which political
questions are to be dealt with and discussed, are equally
forbidden.
3. For any other public or private meeting, previous
authorization is required, which must be applied for at
least five days in advance. The grant of such authoriza-
tion is within the province of the local military comman-
dant, or, failing him, of the (civil) head of the arron-
dis*omont.
4. Public meetings with a religious object, as well as
private meetings o.f a purely religious, social, scientific,
professional or artistic character, are exempted from the
penalties laid down in Article III. For such meetings no
authorization U required.
5. In the event of the conditions laid down in this
article being infringed, all those attending the said
meeting as well as the promoters. <M j;ut;/..-r^ and execu-
tive committees, will be held responsible.
Art. II. — All clubs and societies of a political tendency,
or designed for the discussion of political objects, are
1. The formation of new clubs or societies of this
character i- forbidden. The officers, founders and
members of surh societies will be liable to pennltie-.
Art. III. — Infringement 1 1 at t In- 'I'1' rec will be punished
by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine
«>1 not in itv, than 5,000 francs.
Infringements are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Military Courts.
BARON VON BISSINO, Ooloncl-General,
Governor-General in Belgium.
Brussels, January 17, 1916.
This general assault upon the right ol
assembly was reinforced by restrictive measures
in detail. Civilians might not travel from
one place to another in the occupied terri-
tory without a special passport, and all the
expense and delay that obtaining a passport
entailed. They could hardly travel by train,
for the railways were commandeered, and
sometimes entirely monopolized, by the Gen nun
Army. But motor cars, too, were forbidden
to civilians, and then bicycles were placed
under the ban as well. And while people
were thus prevented from meeting each other
in person, equal care was taken that they
should not communicate from a distance.
Telephones and carrier-pigeons particularly
exercised the Governor-General, and drew
from him, on December 22, 1914, an elaborate
" Recapitulatory Notice/' in the following
terms : —
It is necessary to recall attention to the subjoined
regulations : —
A. — The right to possess and use wireless installations
belongs exclusively to the German troops. Anyone in
Belgium possessing any kind of wireless installation or
having knowledge of such, must immediately give notice
of the same to the German authorities.
B. — All telephone and telegraph installations in
Belgium are also for the exclusive use of the German
authorities and the German troops, as well as the func-
tionaries of communes, canals and those railways which
hsve received, for certain sections of line, an express
written permission from the Governor-General or the
military railway authorities. Whoever possesses any
telephone or telegraph installation in working order, 01
has knowledge of any, must immediately give notice of
the same to tne nearest military authority.
The only exceptions allowed are telegraph installat ions
for domestic use, which work exclusively within the
interior of a single house, and are not connected up with
any wires outside the house.
C. — The right of flying pigeons belongs exclusively to
the German troops and authorities. All other owners of
pigeons must conform strictly to the following rules : —
I. Owners of pigeons of every kind arc bound to keep
their pigeons shut up in the pigeon-cotes until further
orders. . . . No distinction is made between
carrier-pigeons and others. Anyone letting'pigcons loose
is punished by imprisonment for not. more than thice
months or a fine of not more than 3,000 francs.
1*. Kvery owner of pigeons is bound to furnish the
local German military commandant, or, in places without
a garrison, the Belgian communal authorities, with a
list for every pigeon-cote, indicating the colour and the
marks on the rings (number, year, etc.) of each pigeon
separately. The Belgian authorities are to hold these
onstantly "' tli'1 disposal of the German military
commissions of verification. The keys of the jti^eon-
cotc must be constantly at the dispoMl ion of Ihc verifiers.
If pigeons happen to die, the owner must keep their
ring's intact.
"i. The transport of pigeons, including their transport
from one pigeon-cote to another, is wholly forbidden.
All traffic in or exchange of live pigeons is likewise for-
bidden. Only the transport of dead pigeons is autho
rizecl in the street or to the market. Anyone found
carrying a live pigeon outside the pigeon-cote will be
punished with imprisonment for not more than one year
or a fine of not more than 10,000 fiancs. . . .
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
15
CARDINAL MERCIER'S PROTEST
Read in the presece cf a German Guard.
8. Infringements of this regulation, in so far as heavier
penalties are not prescribed, will be punished by im-
prisonment for not more than one month or a fine of not
more than 2,090 francs. If occasion arises, an inquiry on
suspicion of espionage will also be opened. . . .
BABOS VON BISSINO,
Qovernnr-Qeneral in Belgium.
December 2 2, 1914.
This decree might have been thought to be
exhaustive, and, indeed, the Governor-General
seems to have found, after two years' experience,
that mere supervision could no further go,
for he ordered successively " the total destruc-
tion of all pigeon-cotes in Flanders," and the
as ertainment of the " juridical status " (etat-
civil) of all pigeons in other parts of the country.
Finally, in October, 1916, he forbade any
further issue of pigeon rings.
These regulations affected all Bel<_n;:Ms
within von Bissing's territory, but members
of the Garde Civique and other men of military
age who had not been called upon to serve
in the Belgian Army, were placed under
special restraints, just as they had been treated
16
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
to special promises to induce them to put
themselves in the Germans' power. The
following decree was signed on December 30,
1914, by Colonel von Leipzig, (civil) head of
the arrondissement of Brussels : —
All Belgians liable to military service in the years
1912-5, who, for whatever reason, were never called to
the colours before the war, are forbidden to go beyond a
radius of five kilometres from their residence without
having received a written authorization from the com-
petent military authority. Men liable to service who
have left their domicile without the aforementioned
was only a corollary to one already signed by
von Bissing himself, to this effect : —
All Belgian laws and decrees concerning the. Army
(" milice ") and the Garde Civique are suspended.
Infringements of what is prescribed in the said laws
and decrees, committed before the publication of the
present decree, remain unpunished, and involve no
prejudicial consequences for the party committing them.
No verification of the observance of the said laws and
decrees is required for, among other things, the cele-
bration of a marriage, the application for and delivery of
a passport or patent, or for appointment to a public,
provincial or communal office.
NORTH
SEA
Zeebr
R E FE RENCE.
Boundary of
occupied Territory-.-. —
Provincial Boundaries .......
French
Territory
'Annexed"by
Decree of
Jan.3.1915
Flemings —
Walloons
Scale of Miles.
0 5 10 20 3O 40
MAP SHOWING THE TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE GERMANS.
authorization and are absent at the roll-call will In:
severely punished. The Burgomasters, who are bound
in the first instance to keep men liable to military
service under control, will likewise be responsible.
'Ili>- men restricted by this measure were
not soldiers by any possible interpretation.
They had not only not been mobilized by the
Belgian Government since the war ; they
had never been called up for training before
it. They were merely men whom the Belgian
Government might have trained as soldiers
if it had wished. The Burgomasters, more-
p, had no special control over them and
not, therefore, in justice be made res-
ponsible for their actions. But this decree
The present decree in no way modifies the measures
that have been or will be taken by the Governor-General
relative to the supervision of former members of the
Army and the Garde Civique, or relative to the recruit-
ment of the (Belgian) Army.
BAKON VON BISSING, General of Cavalry,
Governor-General in Belgium.
Brussels, December 12, 1914.
Belgians, in fact, who had performed any
kind of military or semi-military service,
and also those who had not, if they happened
to be of military age, were, on the one hand,
absolved by the German Administration from
their duties towards the Belgian State and
indemnified for the breach of these duties
(both actions being entirely beyond the com-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
17
VON BISSING (marked x) INSPECTING BARBED WIRE FENCE ON THE DUTCH
FRONTIER.
petence of the Occupying Power), while, on
the other hand, they were placed under special
police restrictions on account of the very
status of which they were being divested by
force. But they were not merely placed under
restrictions. At Ath, for example, they had
to present themselves every morning at the
German barracks and perform fatigue-duties
for the garrison. The Germans amused them-
selves by picking out the most cultivated of
these men for the most humiliating tasks —
filling cellars with coal, cleaning out latrines,
and carrying dust-bins through the streets.
This seemed to them a clever method of sapping
the Belgian national spirit.
But while carrying out these measures of
internal police, von Bissing did not neglect to
secure his frontiers. On the south his terri-
tory marched with the territory also under
German occupation in France, and here he
provided himself with a " scientific frontier "
by annexing a salient of French territory to
his own.
In future (he decreed on January 3, 1915) the Belgian
laws concerning customs and taxation will be applicable
in that portion of the French district of Givet-Fumay
which has been joined to my Government. (The new
frontier towards French territory follows, from Fumay,
the valleys of the Mouse and the Semoy to the Belgian
frontier, south-east of Hautes-Rivieres.)
East of him he had the Grand-Duchy of
Luxembourg, also under forcible occupation,
and a portion of Prussia, where he could safely
leave the police work to the local authorities'
zeal. His least comfortable frontier was on
the north, where he bordered on the free,
neutral country of Holland. Von Bissing
never forgot the welcome which the Belgians
had received in Dutch territory in the days
of their deepest despair, when Antwerp fell,
and he took particular pains to make this
frontier impenetrable.
From the Meuse to the sea a fence of electri-
fied barbed wire was gradually erected between
Belgium and Holland. Pickets of German
Landsturmers were established along it at
intervals ; they were linked with one another
by telephone and telegraph, and, to assist them
in keeping watch, all undergrowth, trees and
buildings on the Belgian side, within a certain
distance of the wires, were levelled with the
ground. Behind this, again, a wider frontier-
zone was marked out, and no passport admitted
into this zone any Belgian not already resident
in it. Placards were posted throughout the
occupied territory announcing that anyone
18
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
PROCLAMATION
l «• C-.il 4. C.MT.
d .»(•« • Bra.Cfc. •
Mrtk,(;\>fcU, lMU«Irirru Brmril*..
J-j,n,.r ttf BEU Kt ll-IJ'. <!•- M*DtiKD.'v
1 »u^- Till HJK7. Pn*««,i * I..U-
l^iio ttCVEKt^t Plufviro a Bruii-Bi'i
ilWrt LUIE?. *>«-Ji * M.«».
>. - ld> BOD U
njw- Inprrwlrv
KV dr Briurllr* part' rrr l*iK • b i'
[By permission from " Scrjps of Paper."
PROCLAMATION
Announcing that Edith Cavell had been shot.
found within the frontier-zone at night would
be shot without warning.
But these moral and physical shackles were
forged to be broken. The young men of
Belgium were put on their honour to serve
their country by von Bissing's spurious abso-
lution of them from their service ; they were
stimulated to set foot in a free land by the
barrier so laboriously built up to keep them
from it. During the whole period of the
German occupation they braved the crossing
of the frontier, singly or in small parties, at
the risk of their lives. Some were shot by the
guards or electrocuted in struggling through
the wires ; but many got through to Holland
and on to England and Havre, and in due course
to the trenches on the Yser — von Bisising's
fourth frontier — only this time they were not
on the German side.
In making their escape these young Belgians
had not only the sympathy of their com-
patriots under the German yoke, but their
active assistance, though the consequences
were as dangerous to these helpers as to the
men themselves. The crime of " conducting
soldiers to the enemy," as defined by Para-
graph 90 of the German Penal Code, was
punishable, under Paragraph 58 of the German
Military Code, with death ; and, by Paragraph
160, the penalty applied, under a state of war,
to foreigners as well as German subjects. The
Belgians and other citizens of Allied countries,
who performed this " War Treason," as the
German official idiom described it, were quite
aware of what they would suffer if they were
discovered ; but they no more hesitated to
risk their lives than the young men whose
escape they made possible. The most famous
of these patriotic organizations was that of
YOUNG BELGIANS REPORTING THEMSELVES TO THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
19
which Edith Cavell was a member.,, and it was
for the part she took in it that she was put to
death. The story of Edith Cavell's secret
trial and hurried execution has been recorded
already*, and here we will only reproduce the
characteristic proclamation in which von
Bissing announced the accomplished fact —
with the object (as stated by Herr Zimmer-
mann, then German Under-Secretary for
Foreign Affairs) of "frightening those who
The Governor-General of Brussels brings these facts to
the knowledge of the Public that they may serve as a
warning.
GENERAL VON Bissrao,
The Governor oj the City.
Brussels, October 12, 1915.
These executions (and they occurred inter-
mittently during the whole period of the
German Occupation, though the case of Edith
Cavell was more notorious than the rest in the
outer world) were the culmination of the
WOULD-BE TRAVELLERS TO HOLLAND APPLYING FOR PERMITS.
may presume on their sex to take part in
enterprises punishable with death." Von
Bissing's proclamation read as follows :
PROCLAMATION
The Tribunal of the Imperial German Council of War
sitting in Brussels has pronounced the following sen-
tences :—
Condemned to Death for conspiring together to com-
mit Treason : —
Edith Cavell, Teacher, of Brussels ;
Philippe Bancq, Architect, of Brussels ;
Jeanne de Belleville, of Jlontignies ;
Louise Thuiliez, Professor at Lille ;
Louis Severin, Chemist, of Brussels j
Albert Libioz, Lawyer, of Mons ;
For the same offence the following have been con-
demned to 15 years' hard labour : —
Hermann Capiau, Engineer, of Wasmes ;
Ada Bodart, of Brussels ;
George Derveau, Chemist, of Paturages;
Mary de Croy, of Bellignies.
At the same sitting, the Council of War condemned 17
others charged with treason against the Imperial Armies
to sentences of penal servitude and imprisonment varyintr
from two to eight years.
The sentences passed on Bancq and Edith Cavell have
already been executed.
* Vol. VI., Chapter CVII.
German police campaign against the rights of
the individual. But social institutions as well
as individuals were marked out for repression,
and special attention was paid to the Press and
the Banks. In these less personal departments
of the German police regime, the negative aim
of repressing Belgian liberties passed over into
the intensive exploitation of Belgian resources
for the German conduct of the war.
The Censorship in the occupied territory
was established by a comprehensive decree of
October 13, 1914 :—
1. All printed matter, as well as all other reproduc-
tions of written matter or of pictures, with or without
letterpress, or of musical compositions with a text or
commentaries (in print), obtained by mechanical or
chemical processes and intended for distribution, must
be submitted to he Censorship of the Imperial German
Governor-Generalship (Civil Administration).
Whoever produces or distributes printed matter of
the kinds specified in Clause 1, without the Censor's
permission, will be punished according to Martial Law.
The printed matter will be confiscated, and the plates
and cliches intended for reproduction will be rendered
unfit for use.
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20
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
21
The posting, exhibition or display of any printed
matter prohibited by the present decree, in places where
the public is able to take knowledge of it, is considered
equivalent to distribution.
'2. Theatrical presentations, recitations of all kinds,
whether spoken or sung, and luminous projections,
whether by cinematograph or other means, may not be
organized until the pieces, recitations and projections
aforesaid have been passed by the Censor.
Anyone organizing theatrical presentations, recita-
tions or luminous projections without the Censor's
permission, and anyone taking part in any way in such
presentations, recitations or projections, will be punished
according to Martia! Law. The plates and films will be
confiscated.
This decree enters into force immediately.
BABON VON DER GOLTZ, Field-Marshal,
Governor -General in Belgium.
Brussels, October 13, 1914.
Von der Goltz's intention was to feed the
Belgians exclusively on news of German official
manufacture. The Germans themselves had
been treated in this way by their rulers from
the beginning of the war, and a systematic mis-
representation of the course the war was taking
might have been as effective for disheartening
Belgium as it appears to have been for encourag-
ing Germany. But in this, as In other depart-
ments of the police regime in the occupied
territory, decrees only aroused the will to
resist them. To begin with, the leading Belgian
newspapers all suspended publication within
the German zone, and either transferred their
offices to London and le Havre, or withheld
further issues altogether until better times.
And news sheets appeared in their place which
were most unwelcome to the German Civil .
Administration. The most noteworthy of these
was La Libre Belgique, which was printed in
the occupied territory in defiance of the
Censor, and was edited with great spirit and
wit. The German authorities were sensitive
beyond expectation to its stings, and made
ludicrously earnest efforts to run its authors to
earth. Large rewards were offered, inoffensive
people — including girls and boys and priests —
were arrested on suspicion, and in many cases
condemned ; but La Libre Belgique continued
to appear, and the Germans never knew whether
they had merely missed the culprits altogether,
or caught them only to see their work pass on
into other equally courageous hands. There
were also organizations for distributing uncen-
sored news through the occupied territory,
as widespread as those for smuggling out the
young men across the frontier. Copies of The.
Times and other Entente and neutral journal*-
were imported, transmitted from hand to hand,
and copied in manuscript by a regular under-
ground post. And in this struggle of wills the
Belgians won. The German Administration
despaired in the end of damming the leaks,
and authorized several Dutch newspapers to
publish and circulate an edition for the Occupied
Belgian Territory (Dutch and Flemish being
practically the same language). The papers
thus privileged were naturally such as had
shown themselves not unfriendly to Germany ;
their Belgian edition was under the Governor-
General's Censorship ; and the power to with-
draw the privilege granted gave the Governor-
General a considerable influence over their
selection of news and their editorial tone.
Nevertheless, the admission of these neutral
journals into the occupied territory was, on
the Germans' part, a genuine confession of
defeat.
I
Von Bissing was also baffled in his attempt
to manipulate the Press in Belgium for a
positive political aim — the destruction of
Belgian unity, by setting Fleming against
Walloon.
Belgium, like Switzerland, Great Britain
and other of the most firmly-founded national
States in Western Europe, has more than one
national language. If you drew an imaginary
line across Belgium, West and East, from the
French frontier just south of Ypres to the
Dutch frontier on the Mevise, just north of
Liege, you would find that most Belgians living
north of it spoke Flemish as their mother-
tongue, and most of those living south of it
Walloon. The two languages are entirely dif-
ferent ; Flemish is a Teutonic dialect, prac-
tically the same as Dutch, while Walloon is
Romance, and is related to the neighbouring
dialects in France. But this difference of
language has not the least political significance.
The linguistic boundary has never in history
been a political frontier ; it was not even fol-
lowed by the modern provincial demarcations,
any more than the Border between England
and Scotland follows the boundary between
the English and Gaelic languages. The dif-
ference of language was so little felt as an
administrative difficulty that the provinces
cut across the boundary on old traditional lines.
Indeed, none of the important divisions within
the Belgian people coincided with the division
between Fleming and Walloon. There was
the party division between Liberal and Clerical,
but the two parties were very evenly balanced
all over the country. There was the economic
division between Industry and Agriculture,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
~1
TRENCH DUG BY THE GERMANS THROUGH A FLEMISH COAST VILLAGE.
but this did not go by language either. Of the
industrial centres in Belgium, Charleroi and
Namur and Liege lay in the Walloon area,
Ghent and Antwerp and the Campine in the
Flemish. The Walloon province of Luxem-
bourg was noted for its peasant proprietors,
the plains of Flanders for their breed of horses
and their intensive market-garden cultivation.
The Belgians were little conscious of their
linguistic differences, because they had never
persecuted each other on account of them.
Brussels, the national capital, was common
ground between the two linguistic areas ; the
National Government seated at Brussels em-
ployed in its official transactions, not the
\Vulloon dialect any more than the Flemish,
but standard French, and this since the
foundation of the kingdom, and for reasons of
obvious utility — French, unlike these local
dialects, being a language of general currency,
l-'or the same reason the educated people in
nil parts of the country were in the habit of
'if-iiic French in business and speaking it among
themselves. But it had never occurred to any
Kcl^ian authority to impose French where it
uas not voluntarily adopted. No Belgian
Ccivornmont had legislated against the use of
Flemish in communal administration or in
education. The harmonious subsistence of
the two languages side by side showed that
Belgium was a tolerant, enlightened, demo-
cratic country, but this was nothing uncommon
for Western Europe.
To the German mind, however, it was so
uncommon as to be beyond belief. The Ger-
mans had never known how to get on with
populations of another language, as the French
got on with the Alsatians, the English and the
Lowlanders with the Welsh and the Gaels, or
the Flemings and Walloons with one another.
The Germans' only idea of living in the same
community with Alsatians or Danes or Poles
was to turn them into Germans by force ; to
make them speak German and do things in
German ways ; to prohibit their mother-tongue
in their local government and their schools.
And in following this policy the Germans had
always failed ; they had aroused an antagonistic
national feeling in the populations they had
tried to overbear, just as they were now
rousing the spirit of the Belgians in the occupied
territory. Prussia, with its diversity of lan-
guages, had never, like Belgium, Switzerland,
or Great Britain, become a united nation. It
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAE.
23
had remained a Police-State, in which the
Government tried to impose the language of
one part of the population on the rest, and only
succeeded in producing a morbid consciousness
of linguistic differences among them all. Under
the influence of this failure at home, the
German Administrators of Belgium fastened
upon the difference between Fleming and
Walloon as a weak spot in the Belgian
organism. They pictured the Flemings as an
oppressed race in suppressed rebellion against
the domination of the Walloons, as the Poles
and Alsatians were against the Germans them-
selves. They knew how their own subject
populations prayed for a liberator, and hastened
to pose, themselves, as liberators of the " Flemish
Nationality." They dreamed, as the goal of
their intrigue, of an autonomous Flemish
principality, carved out of the dead body of
Belgium by Germany, as the patroness of all
Teutons, at the expressed desire of the Flem-
ings, and with the applause of the neutral
world.
The first step was to create an " atmos-
phere," for neither the Flemings nor the
neutrals had found their own way to the proper
point of view. The Flemings had fought
shoulder to shoulder with the " dominant "
Walloons for the preservation of Belgium, and
were still fighting in the trenches along the
Yser ; while neutrals were far from perceiving
the liberators of the Flemish nation in the vio-
lators of Belgian neutrality. But the German*
were convinced, from their own experience,
that a " Flemish Problem " must be there,
and that they had only to rub the wound to
set it smarting.
"The Political Department at Brussels," wrote Pro-
fessor von Hissing, of Munich, the son of the Governor-
General,* " has logically dependent upon it the Flemish
Bureau and the Press Bureau. The present Governor-
General devotes special attention to Press matters.
Beyond supplying information to German newspaper*
and following the foreign newspapers, collaboration with
the native Press (with the assistance of the Flemish
Bureau) also falls within the Press Bureau's province.
A number of Belgian journals . . . appear daily,
arxi are in enjoyment, under certain fixed conditions,
of all the liberties that are possible. . . ."
One of the journals mentioned in Professor
von Bissing's list was tha Vlaamsche Post of
Ghent, and this was the organ selected and
subsidized by the Governor-General to be the
mouthpiece of his. " Flamandising " policy.
The Vlaamsche Post started a campaign for
* Suddeutsche Monalshefte, April, 1915.
THE GENTLE GERMAN : SHOOTING THE CANARY OF A LOOTED HOUSE.
24
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
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Ex.
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Flemish autonomy. Its articles were repeated
word for word in the other papers promoted
by the German Administration in Belgium,
and were e. hoed with variations in the German
Press and in the pro-German papers in Holland
The newspaper campaign was supported by a
deluge of pamphlets in Belgium, Germany and
the neutral countries. In Belgium these
anonymous effusions were deposited during
the night at people's front doors.
This literary propaganda was given substance
by administrative measures. The official use
of the French language in Flemish -speaking
districts was forbidden, and at Ostend, Bruges
and other places the local German authorities
went so far as to order all shop signs or adver-
tisements in French to be removed. Care
was taken in German decrees and proclama-
tions to disguise the names of Belgian cities
(even those which both in philology and in
population were purely Romance) in good
" Teutonic " forms — " Namen " for Namur,
" Doornyk " for Tournai, " Luttich " for Liege,
and so on. Passing from pedantry to perse-
cution, the Germans removed " Walloon "
functionaries in " Flemish territory " from
their posts, and forbade the use of French in
schools. At a higher-grade school at Hasselt ,
for instance, in the Province of Limburg, the
teachers were not only forbidden to give lessons
in French, but might not even talk French
to their pupils out of school, with the result
that the parents, anxious that their children
should be familiar with both the national
languages, removed them from the school
altogether and had them taught privately at
home. But so little had the Germans learnt
from their educational failures in Prussian
Poland that they designed, as the master-
piece of their Flemish policy, the foundation of
a " Flemish University " at Ghent.
After eighteen months of intensive Press
preparation, the Flemish University was
opened with a flourish of trumpets on Octo-
ber 21, 1910. The German Administration
announced that the restrictions on railway
travelling would be waived in favour of all true
Flemings who wished to attend the ceremony.
They were gratified by the flood of applications,
not only from the Flemish districts, but from
all the occupied territory, and von Bissing
found his route congested when he journeyed
to Ghent on the appointed day. He only met
one party going in the opposite direction — they
were 2,000 Flemings from Ghent itself who
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
were being deported to forced labour in Ger-
many under the decree of October 3, and who
had been packed off before their national
festival by the over-zealous local German
authorities. But when von Bissing alighted
at Ghent station and proceeded towards his
university buildings, his fellow-travellers melted
away. They had availed themselves of the
German Railway Bureau's generosity, not to
hear their Governor-General's inaugural
speech, but to visit their Belgian friends
them unsaid. His subordinates, searching for
an artist to design a commemorative medal,
could not find a Fleming in Ghent who would
execute the commission, and the school
children, who had been given a special holiday
in honour of their national liberation, appeared
at school as if nothing unusual were hap-
pening. They were turned back at the door
by German gendarmes, but they had made
their protest.
" The organization." continued von Bissing,
GERMAN "KULTUR" IN BELGIUM:
A performance of Goethe's " Iphigenie " in the open-air theatre of the Citadel of Namur.
Von Bi--sing delivered his discourse to a
select German audience, including the Bavarian
Minister of Education and representatives of
the Federal States and of the Imperial Chan-
cellor.
"To secure the re-opening of the University," the
Governor-General is reported to have said, " I appealed
in Germany to a Commission appointed to assist my
Civil Administration. Working hand in hand with the
Flemings and well counselled by German and Dutch
friends, this Commission has settled the appointments
and created the organization for our new educational
institution, without departing far from the former
Belgian organization. Thus Germans and Flemings have
found themselves working together, in mutual confidence
and perfect understanding."
At the moment these words were issuing
from the Governor-General's lips, incidents
were occurring that must have made him wish
" and especially the organization of the tech-
nical faculties, will be completed in the course
of next year." But 1917 had hardly begun
before the Flemish University of Ghent was
closed. The contingent of genuine students,
54 at the beginning, dwindled with each
month, and there was little edification in a body
of " Flemish " professors of whom the majority
were Dutch. "The God of War," declaimed
von Bissing in his peroration, " has held
Flanders at the font with his sword drawn.
May the God of Peace be kind to her during
the long centuries to come."
Von Bissing's oratory betrayed the German
vision of an " Autonomous Flanders " under
permanent German tutelage, when the " tern-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A FOOD QUEUE OF IMPOVERISHED BELGIANS.
porary " German occupation of Belgium should
be brought to an end by the signing of peace.
But he burst his own bubble by drawing a
retort from the Flemings themselves.
Prominent Flemings explained, in indignant
letters to the neutral Press, that the real
Flemish movement was of a purely cultural
and social character. It existed to enrich the
life of Belgium by re-creating for her a literature
in the Flemish language ; preserving for her
the monuments of Flemish art and architecture
(which German weapons had been destroying
at Louvain and Malines and Termonde and
Ypres) ; reviving for her the romantic tra-
ditions of the Flemish Middle Ages ; and
improving the conditions of life of her Flemish
peasants and workmen at the present day.
The Teutonic origin of their language no more
beguiled them into suffering German violence
gladly than it beguiled the Dutch or the
English or the Danes.
"It requires no extraordinary perspicacity," wrote
M. van Caulewaert, Editor of the Vrij Belyie, & Belgian
newspaper in the Flemish language which had emigrated
to The Hague, "to understand that the German Govern-
ment is attempting to make use of the Flemish Move-
ment exclusively for the two objects which I shall
enumerate — to sow dissensions between Belgians and to
find a pretext for continuing, after the war, to interfere
in our internal politics. But these two objects blend
into a single aim — to turn Belgium into a permanent
acquisition of the German Empire. We know the
German idolatry of self and gospel of national egotism ;
and we also know enough of the sorrowful history of the
Danish people — related to the German people, like our-
selves, by race — to keep us on our guard."
GERMANS IN OCCUPATION OF A BELGIAN CHATEAU.
A Landsturm Regiment, under command of Herr Naumann-Hofer, a Radical Reichstag Deputy, at the
looted Chateau of M. Davignon. former Minister of Foreign Affairs.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
27
" What do you think of the Belgians who
have gone with the Germans ? " the Belgian
socialist, -Canaille Huysmans, was asked by a
representative of the Danish paper Poli'iken,
in allusion to the editors of the Vlaamsche Post
and the lonely professors at Ghent. " I think,"
M. Huysmans answered, " that they will be
wise to get themselves naturalized in Ger-
many." Such was the Flemish retort to the
German project for Flanders after the war.
These were some of the ramifications of
German Press policy in the occupied territory.
nize and modify the whole conduct of the banks'
affairs. " The costs of control will be charged in
proportion to their funds upon the banks
superintended." By a further decree of
November 30 the Commissary-General was
authorized to extend his control by delegating
it to assistants — " the cost of this likewise to be
charged upon the enterprises under surveil-
lance " — and these assistant commissaries were
to be " given notice in good time of each Board
Meeting or General Assembly."
In the meantime all banks in the occupied
territory whatsoever had been forbidden to
RETURN OF A
The control of banking was also a much studied
department of police, and this merged into a
systematic appropriation of the country's
material resources.
By a decree of September 18, 1914, von der
Goltz ordered all banks or branches of banks in
th<> occupied territory, of which the central
management was in countries at war with
Germany, to wind up their affairs immediately,
" the remaining cash balance to be deposited
for the duration of the war in a place hereinafter
to be designated." A German Commissary-
General was appointed to superintend the
execution of this decree, with power to scruti-
FORAGING PARTY.
make payments to England, Ireland and France,
by a decree of November 3, which was extended
on the 28th, " by way of reprisals," to Russia
and Finland. It was notified, however, that
" this prohibition does not extend to payments
' intended for the benefit of German nationals."
" All legal and contractual consequences," the
decree continued, " which might be involved in
the non-execution of contracts made with
persons domiciled in the countries designated,
are considered null and void. The debtor may
clear himself by consigning the sums owing
from him to his creditor's account at the
Treasury of the German Civil Administration.
28
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Whoever infringes, or attempts to infringe, the
regulations of Article 1 will be punish. •< I
according to Martial Law."
On December 22 the monopoly of issuing
bank-notes was transferred, by von Bissing,
from the National Bank of Belgium, to which,
under Belgian law, it legitimately belonged, to
tho Socifti Gintrale de Belgique, and another
commissary, though this time one of Belgian
iiat ionality, was appointed to the new Depart-
ment of Issue. In a notice appended to this
appointed by the Belgian Government." It is
superfluous to point out on which side the
illegal!. y lay.
" My Civil Government," von Bissing con-
cluded, " in cooperation with the Soci&te
GMrale, will also inquire into the measures to
be taken in order to restore the General Savings
Bank and its depositors to possession of their
property at present unlawfully detained at the
Bank of England." The only measure under
this head which is revealed by a perusal of the
BELGIAN WOMEN SACK-MAKING FO < THE GERMANS IN A FACTORY AT
BRUSSELS.
decree, von Bissing assumed the part of the
" honest broker." He complained bitterly that
the National Bank had transferred its assets to
England, had refused to remit them to the
oei-iipie.l territory when requested (by von
His ing) to do so, and had been so unpatriotic
i s to lend the same to the Belgian Government
at Havre, " a procedure on the part of the
National Bank of Belgium and the Belgian
Mini-it ry "f Finaii* e which was contrary to law
mid statute-/' "For all these reasons," the
Covernor-Ceiic'ral continued, "I find myself
obliged to withdraw from the National Bank of
H'/</'<iiii the privilege of issuing bank-notes, and
to depose the Governor and Commissary
" Bulletin of Laws and Decrees " is the appoint-
ment, as member of the General and Executive
Councils of the Belgian Savings Bank, of a
certain Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, by a decree of von
Bissing's dated January 16, 1915. Before the
war Dr. Schacht was " publicity " director of
the Dresdner Bank in Berlin. The know-
ledge that their savings had been consigned, in
default, to this Teutonic gentleman's care, must
have done much to console the depositors for
the removal of them beyond the sea.
But the " cooperation " between the German
Civil Government and the Societe Genfrale was
not destined to endure, for two years later, on
September 3, 1916, we find von Bissing address-
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
, j
BELGIAN ..WOMEN LABOURERS AT THE MAR1EMONT-BASGOUN COAL MINES
WORKING UNDER GERMAN GUARDS.
ing an ultimatum to the latter in the following
terms : —
I have to inform you that I must consider our nego-
tiations broken off if you refuse to submit, on your own
responsibility, a proposition for the transfer to Germany
of your balance in paper-marks. I refuse your demand
to communicate with le Havre, and I give you till
Monday, September 4, 1916, midnight (German time),
to inform me in precise terms whether you are disposed
to transfer your balance in paper-marks to Germany.
If you refuse to send your balance in paper-marks
to the German banks, then you are conducting your
affairs in a manner contrary to German interests, ana
in this case I have received a mandate to place yoni
Bank under sequestration. If you oppose sequestra-
tion by passive resistance, there will be no course left
for me but to wind up the Bank by force. . • •
During the course of to-morrow you have time to
weigh the heavy consequences of such measures for
your Bank and for your country. I order you to call
your General Council to-morrow, so that you may be
in a position to forward me a declaration binding upon
them before the expiration of the time-limit. . . .
The profession of banking in the occupied
territory under von Hissing's stewardship had
CIVILIANS IMPRISONED FOR TRIVIAL OFFENCES EMPLOYED IN
ROAD-MAKING FOR THE GERMANS.
30
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
•
become a form of " working for the King of
Prussia." A cruder act of financial tyranny was
the imposition of the German mark. On
October 3, 1914, the following decree was
published by von der Goltz : —
German money (coin or paper) must be accepted as
tender in the Occupied Belgian Territory, at the rate,
until further notice of 1 Mark as the equivalent of a
minimum of 1.26 Franca.
Inasmuch as the German mark had only been
worth 1.15 Belgian francs before the war, and
steadily depreciated on the international money
market as the war continued, this forced
currency at an inflated value was a comprehen-
sive confiscation of private property, which
infringed the provisions of the Hague Conven-
tion of 1907 under Article 46. On November 15,
1914, von der Goltz had occasion to decree that
this compulsory rate of exchange might not be
repudiated by private agreement, and on
May 22, 1915, von Bissing took the comple-
mentary step of threatening " anyone buying,
or attempting to buy, French gold, silver,
nickel or paper at a price in excess of the
nominal value" with "imprisonment for not
more than a year and a fine of not more than
10,000 francs." But all these measures of
spoliation, though effective, were indirect, and
were far from contenting the Occupying Power.
GERMAN SOLDIERS TILLING THE LAND
IN BELGIUM.
The Hague Convention of 1907, concerning
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, is
explicit on the subject of War Contributions.
In Article 49 it is laid down that " if, in addition
to the taxes " previously payable to the State,
" the Occupant levies other money contribu-
tions in the occupied territory, they shall only
be applied to the needs of the Army or of the
administration of the territory in question."
But this Convention, to which the German
Government was pledged, was irreconcileable
with their designs upon Belgian resources, and
it became evident that von Bissing meditated
a notable violation of it when he published
(once more in excess of his legitimate powers)
the following decree :
Concerning the Summoning of the Provincial Councils
in Special Session.
Art. 1. — The Provincial Councils of the Belgian
Provinces are summoned by these presents in special
session for Saturday, December 19, 1914, midday
(German time) . . .
Art. 3. — . . . The session will be opened and closed
in the name of the Imperial German Governor-General.
Art. 4. — The session will not last more than one day.
The sitting will be behind closed doors.
The sole subject of discussion, of which the assembly
is hound to take exclusive cognizance, is : " Ways and
means of meeting the war contribution charged upon
the Belgian population.*'
Art. 5. — The proceedings are valid without regard to
the number of members present.
BARON VON BISSING.
Governor -General in Belgium.
Brussels, December 8, 1014.
The sequel to the decree was an order :
A War Contribution, amounting to 40,000,000 francs,
to be paid in monthly instalments over the course of a
year, is imposed on the population of Belgium.
The payment of these sums devolves upon the Nine
Provinces, which are held collectively responsible for
the discharge of it.
The two first instalments are to be paid up, at latest,
on January 15, 1916, and the following instalments
on the 10th, at latest, of each following month, to the
Viold Army Treasury of the Imperial Governor-General-
ship at Brussels.
In case the Provinces have to resort to the issue nf
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
31
bonds in order to obtain the funds necessary, the form
and terms of these bonds will be settled by the Imperial
Commissary-General for the Banks in Belgium.
BARON VON BISSINO,
Governor -General in Belgium.
Brussels, December 10, 1914.
Month by month from the date of the order
this crushing toll was paid. It was iniquitous
both in amount and in assessment — in amount
because it was infinitely in excess of what was
required for the administration of the country
and the maintenance of the occupying army,
even if the expenses of administration had not
been covered already, as they were covered,
by the ordinary revenues of the Belgian
Exchequer, which the Germans continued to
raise. It was iniquitous in its assessment
because, to begin with, an important part of
West Flanders, one of the Provinces saddled
with collective responsibility, was not in
German hands, and therefore not amenable to
German exactions. But spoliation under this
head had at any rate its definite limits. A
specific sum was demanded within a specific
and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants
in the obligation of taking part in military operations
against their own country.
Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded
on the authority of the commander in the locality
occupied.
Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid
for in ready money ; if not, a receipt shall be given,
and the payment of the amount due shall be made as
soon as possible.
To this, too, Germany was pledged, and
again her pledge was incompatible with her
intentions. It is impossible to reconcile the
Convention with the principle laid down by the
German Headquarters Staff on August 27, 1914:
The Landsturm will be called out to secure the
lines of communication and for the supervision of
Belgium. The country, placed under German adminis.
tration. will have to provide for military requirements
of all kinds, in order to afford relief to German territory.
The application of this principle was the
chef d'ceuvre of German organization in the
occupied territory. Germany appropriated,
without compensation, the total material
resources of the country, and this was done by
methodical steps.
PIGS FOR GERMANY REARED IN BELGIUM.
time ; if the Provincial authorities could raise
it, the country was quit. It was incomparably
less onerous than requisitions in kind, which
the German administration inflicted in detail
till it had stripped Belgium bare.
Requisitions, as well as war contributions,
are dealt with in the Hague Convention of 1907,
under Article 52, and their limits are defined in
a corresponding sense.
Requisitions in kind and services, it is set forth, shall
not be demanded from local authorities or inhabitants
oxccpt for the needs of the Army of Occupation. They
shall be in proportion to the resources of the country,
The first step was to prohibit exports — the
export of " horses, cattle, pigs, sheep and all
kinds of foodstuffs," for instance, by a decree
of September 30, 1914, and of "all kinds of
fodder " by a decree of December 27. " Dis-
obedience," it was announced. " will be
punished by confiscation."*
* The opposite policy was adopted in the case of
articles of which the Central Empires possessed a surplus.
For example, on December 10, 1914, von Biasing
signed a decree forbidding the import of salt into the
occupied territory from countries at war with Germany,
thus giving a monopoly of imoort to the German and
Austrian salt-producers.
82
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
The second step was to take a census of all
that the country contained. Returns of agri-
lultural produce were demanded by von der
Goltz in a decree of November 1, 1914 : " Pro-
duce not notified within a term of 10 days will
be confiscated. The public is reminded, by
the present notice, of the prohibition upon
exports already in force." On December 11
the same order was extended to " benzine,
petrol, glycerine, oils and fats of all kinds,
raw rubber and rubber waste, pneumatic
commodities was placed under the control of
the Commissary at Brussels of the Berlin
Ministry of War, under sanction of confiscation.
Finally, Article III. enacted that : —
The Commissary of the Ministry of War may decide
that stocks of any of the commodities enumerated in
Art. 1 are to be ceded in full property either to the
German Empire or to a third party, in return for their
money value. The value of the commodities will be
settled definitely by a commission appointed by the Ministry
o} War at Berlin.
Thus the German principle of Requisitions
amounted to this, that Germany placed an
REQUISITIONED CATTLE.
automobile tyres," and other commodities.
" The military authority is to decide whether
the goods notified shall be bought or left free
for commerce and private use. In case of
omission to notify, the goods will be confiscated
to the profit of the State, and the offender
punished by the military authority." On
January 25, 1915, again, both order and
penalty were applied to a comprehensive list
of metals, this time unambiguously " with a
view to eventual purchase."
But the third step had already been taken in
a decree of October 26, 1914. The first article
of this decree was an enumeration of materials
and commodities of every conceivable kind,
which was afterwards largely augmented by
decrees of November 15 and December 20.*
My tin- second article the export of all these
• And by constant subsequent decrees — e.g., on
O.-iobiT 7. 1916 (compounds of sulphur); onAugust 10
and October 17, 1916 (rubber) ; on April 22 and Septem-
ber 3d. 1'IIIi (steel).
embargo on the total wealth of the occupied
territory, made an inventory of it at leisure,
and then compelled the private owners of it
to part with anything that the German Govern-
ment or private German firms (the " third
parties " provided for) had a mind to take, in
return for whatever compensation, in whatever
form and at whatever date, the German Ministry
of War saw fit to assign. And this requisitioning
was merely a supplement to the indiscriminate
pillage of the three months of invasion, and to
the direct contribution in money which was
wrung out of the country, month by month, so
long as the occupation endured.
These general Requisitioning Decrees were
acted upon energetically. Every timber mer-
chant, for example, in the occupied territory
was served with the following notice : —
Whatever stock you hold, either on your own account
or on other people's, of five to nine centimetre pine
joists, of the maximum breadth and not less than four
metres in length, or of pine planks, likewise of the
m ixim'im breadth and not less than four metres in
THE TIMES H1STUUY OF THE WAR.
83
length by approximately 2j centimetres thickness,
are seized or requisitioned by the German Army Depart-
ment, and will shortly be exported to Germany.
You are responsible for the preservation, warranty,
and insurance of the goods. The price will be fixed
later by the Ministry of War at Berlin.
There were certain things in Belgium which
the Germans coveted particularly. Quantities
of horses, for instance, of the famous Belgian
breed were stolen during the invasion, and in
October, 1914, a special Commission was sent
by the Ministry of Agriculture at Berlin to lay
hands on the rest. This Commission toured the
occupied territory methodically and held
compulsory inspections of horses from place to
place. The following proclamation is a specimen
of their work : —
General Dep6t for Horses.
The Commission for the purchase of horses will sit
on Monday, November 3, at 3 o'clock (4 o'clock German
time), at the Grand* Place, Thuillies.
All harness and saddle horses, as well as yearling
foals, must be brought before the Commission.
Harness horses, must, if possible, be provided with
their working harness. Purchases will be paid for in
ready money a»id without rebate.
THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE CENTRAL DEPST FOB
HORSES.
For the German Governor -Generalship.
Any persons neglecting to bring their horses before
the Commission will be liable to have their stock requisi-
tioned without compensation.
The horses so seized were transported to
Germany and sold at auction to the German
farmers under the Ministry of Agriculture's
auspices. The German newspapers in the winter
of 1914-5 were full of advertisements of such
sales. Another object of German covetousness
was the standing timber, especially walnut.
REQUISITIONED METAL.
which was felled wherever found, whether it was
the property of the State, of the Communes, or
of private individuals. Leather was also much
sought after, and, later on, again, it was found
that the rails and rolling-stock of the Belgian
light railways (chemins de fer vicinaux) served
excellently for bringing up ammunition to the
German artillery on the western front. This
network of light railways had been laid in
Belgium during recent years at a great capital
outlay, and was an integral factor in the
country's economic life. It brought the products
of intensive agriculture to the urban markets
and enabled the workmen to reach the mines
and factories from the villages in a wide radius
round. But the Germans did not hesitate to
dismantle these railways in one section of the
occupied territory after another. An even
more deadly form of spoliation was the seizure
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
35
of machinery, which was simply removed from
private factories in Belgium and sent by rail to
Germany to be set up in factories there. Textile
machinery was especially raided, much of it
being extremely costly and also impossible to
replace within any calculable period ; so that
the industry of the country was crippled, and
the industry of Germany correspondingly
strengthened, by an act of sheer robbery, not
only for the duration of the war, but for the
period of reconstruction to follow.
These seizures were robbery in the precise
sense of the word. The Hague Convention pre-
scribes that " contributions in kind shall as far
as possible be paid for in ready money ; if not,
a receipt shall be given, and the payment of the
amount due shall be made as soon as possible."
Payment in ready money was indeed fraudu-
lently promised in many of the German decrees
and proclamations under which the seizures
were made. But when the goods were in the
Germans' hands, the owners were invariably
paid in vouchers only, and these only for a
fraction of the real value of the " requisitioned "
object. Owners of horses, for instance, were
given vouchers for half, a third, or a quarter of
the current price ; owners of trees were given
vouchers for 10 francs for timber worth 100 to
150 francs in the market. Owners of machinery
were often given no vouchers at all.
These various branches of robbery were
consolidated into one system by von Bissing in
the following proclamation, dated January 13,
1915:—
In pursuance of my proclamation of the 9th inst.
I have ordered that, from January 15, 1915, onwards,
in the part of Belgium under my Government, requisi-
tions without payment in ready money shall not, as a
rule, be made.
If, in exceptional cases, payment in ready money it*
impossible and the requisition nevertheless indispens-
able in the interests of the (military) service, a formal
requisition voucher will be given. As far as possible,
printed forms made out as below will be used for this
purpose : —
Requisition Voucher.
The undersigned declares hereby that X.,
at , on the , 191—, has, upon requisi-
tion, delivered to the German Army goods
to the value of .
(Sura in words).
Specification of goods delivered.
(Stamp.) (Date.)
(Signature, rank and unit.)
Payable at the Treasury of the Military
Government of the Province
. at
For Brussels, special regulations are in force.
This order does not apply to the wholesale stocks of
rioods detained by the Military Administration at Antwerp
and various other places. For these, special measures
will be taken.
This proclamation, in which von Bissing
professed to regulate the payment of requisi-
tions in ready money, simply confirmed the
robbery already practised. The price of his
promise of cash payment in future was the
repudiation of payment of any kind for goods
seized in the past— not only during the three
months of invasion, but during the first two
months and a half of peaceful occupation under
his own and von der Goltz's government. And
even this shadowy promise for the future was
only extended to a fraction of the property
threatened, for the great bulk of the available
resources of the occupied territory was con-
centrated in the stocks at Antwerp and other
places which were specially excepted from the
provisions of the decree.
On March 18, 1915, the Acting President of
the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce addressed
a report on the seizure of these stocks to the
Inter-Communal Committee of the City, in
which the following table of Requisitions was
worked out, up to date : — •
Value In
Material. francs of goods
Price.
Payment.
requisitioned.
Grain 1 13,000,000
Settled
Made
Linseed . .
2,450,000
Settled at
Made
Oil-cakes . .
5,000,000
(whole stock)
25 percent, loss
Satisfactory
Made in part
Nitrates . .
4,000,000
Not settled
Not made
Animal and Vege-
table Oils
Petrol and Mineral
(whole stock)
6,000,000
(whole stock)
3,000,000
Not settled
Settled for
Made in part
Made for the
the most
most part
Wool . . ' . . . . «,000,000 Not settled
Not made
Cotton 1,300,000 Not settled
Not made
Rubber . . . . 10.000,000 Not settled
Foreign Leather 20,000,000 Not .settled
Not made
Not made
Hair
Ivory (luxuries)
1,150,000 Not settled
785,000 Not settled
Not made
Not made
Wood
500,000 Settled tor
Made for the
the most
most part
part
Cocoa
2,000,000 Notsettled
Not made
Coffee
275,000
Not settled
Not made
Rice 2,000,000
Settled
Not made
Wines 1,100,000 Partly settled
Partly made
You are expressly reminded that only those voucher**
will be honoured which shall have been given after
January 14, 1915.
The total came to 85,000,000 francs, of which
only 20,000,000 francs had been paid ; and of
the 65,000,000 francs still owing, 60,000,000
represented the value of goods for which the
price had not yet been settled by the Ministry
of War at Berlin. These were the figures
when Antwerp had not yet been six months
in German hands.
The President of the Chamber of Commerce
further pointed out in his Report that the figures
in question only concerned stocks of raw
materials, and did not touch the requisitions.
36
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
from Belgian industrial concerns, of raw
materials, plant, and manufactured products,
nor again the requisitions of manufactured
products from the warehouses of the great
importing and exporting firms. Since Antwerp
was one of the most important centres of dis-
tribution for the European Continent, the
goods in bond there were of great bulk and
diversity — " matches, type-writers, children's
toys, motor-cars, ingots of metal, bales of
cotton, wool and jute, colonial and tropical
products." These goods were carried off
wholesale to Germany. And when the
Germans did not find it convenient to trans-
port them for the moment, they placed them,
until further notice, under embargo. The
stocks thus held up and withdrawn from
trade and industry were in some cases far
larger than those actually taken. By the
table, for instance, the Germans had contented
themselves with requisitioning 275,000 francs
worth of coffee, but they had placed the total
stock in Antwerp under embargo, and the value
of this was 60,000,000 francs.
But that was not the limit of German exploita-
tion. Having drained Belgium of her material
wealth, the Occupying Power laid hands on
her human labour, and this second field of
spoliation was deliberately approached through
the first. In stripping Belgium of her resources,
the Germans brought about the paralysis of
her economic life. Her factories had to shut
down, her workmen were thrown out of
employment, and unemployment gave the
pretext for deportation.
The history of the Belgian Deportations —
the infamous decree of October 3, 1916, the
steps by which the Occupying Authorities
calculatingly prepared for it, and the inhuman
fashion in which they carried it out — are beyond
the province of the present chapter. It shall
only be stated here that in the Deportations
the Germans found the limit — not of their
violence and injustice, nor of their physical
power, for they could deport the Belgians'
bodies as easily as their goods— but the limit
of their will-power over the wills of other men.
Krnn, beginning to end of the German
Occupation, the will of the Belgian people
was never broken. On the contrary, it
n -covered from the shock of the first treacherous
onslaught,"* and hardened under the pressure
of the police-regime which von der Goltz
and von Bissing imposed. Every class and
profession, every corporation and institution,
found its leader, often its martyr, to uplift
its spirit. The King and Queen, driven from
the Belgian capital, but never from Belgian
soil, were an inspiration to the whole nation
on both sides of the Yser. Brussels gave her
Burgomaster Max. By September 26, 1914,
Max was deported to a Silesian fortress — his
coolness, courtesy, and unflinching fortitude
in office were too damaging to German prestige
— but in five weeks he had set the communes
and municipalities a standard which they
sustained for years. The Bar gave Theodor,
the senior counsel to the Brussels Court of
Appeal. M. Theodor was deported to Ger-
many without trial, and was only released
after seven months imprisonment, by the
intervention of the King of Spain. His
health was broken, but he had made a protest
against the usurpation of judicial powers
which the German Administration could not
live down. The Church gave Mercier, who
upheld a freedom of speech which the German
censorship could not countervail, and published
indictments which no Governor-General could
answer. The working-class gave the strikers
who refused to work for the German Army at
Malines and Luttre and Sweveghem, and the
exiles who sang their national hymns in the
trains that were carrying them to Germany.
This national will could never be bent to
German service, or brought to acknowledge
the title of the Occupying Power. Two
spiritual forces were face to face, and the issue
between them was expressed, again and again,
in the utterances of their protagonists.
Thus spake von der Goltz : —
The German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Turkey
are not to be considered, as regards the Occupied Terri-
tory of Belgium, as foreign or enemy powers. . . .
Anyone, therefore, who attempts to hinder by con-
straint, threats, persuasion, or other means, in the
performance of work destined for the German Autho-
rities, any persons willing to perform such work, or any
contractors commissioned by the German Authorities
to perform such work, will be punished with imprison-
ment.
The Military Tribunals are alone empowered to take
cognizance of misdemeanours under this head. . .
I: MI. is VON DER Goi/rz, Field-Marshal,
Governor-General in Belgium.
Brussels, November 4, 1914.
Thus, again, spake von Bissing : —
The Chief of the Arrondissement of Malines has in-
formed me that his proclamation of May 25 (1915)
has not induced a sufficient number of skilled workmen
to return to work at the Arsenal. ... I am, there-
fore, obliged to punish the town of Malines and its
neighbourhood, by stopping all means of communication
until a sufficient number of workmen at the Arsenal
have returned to work again.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
37
I, therefore, decree that :
If by Wednesday, June 2, at 10.0 a.m. (German
time), 500 of the workmen formerly employed at the
Arsenal . . . do not present themselves for work, the
following restrictions upon communication will come
into force on June 3, at 6.0 a.m. :
(A) The Railway Authorities will prevent any pas-
sengers travelling from the following stations. . . . All
civilians will be forbidden, under threat of punishment,
to set foot in the stations in question.
(B) All vehicular traffic, bicycle, and motor traffic or
traffic on waterways and light-railways, including through
traffic, will be forbidden in the following area. . . .
The rails of the light-railways will be taken up at the
boundaries of the area thus delimited. . . .
(D' The Passport Office will be closed.
With regard to this matter, I hereby give notice that
I shall repress, by every means in my power, such con-
spiracies, which can only disturb the good understanding
existing up to the present moment between the said
officials and the population.
I shall hold the communal authorities responsible in
the first place for the increase of such tendencies, and I
further give notice that the people themselves will be to
blame if the liberty hitherto accorded them in the widest
fashion has to be 'taken from them and replaced by
restrictive measures rendered necessary by their own
fault.
(Signed)
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL COUNT VON WESTARP,
The Commander o/ the Depot.
Ghent, June 10, 1915.
STRIPPING BELGIUM OF HER TIMBER.
If the economic life of Malines and the neighbourhood,
which I have taken special pains to foster, should suffer
gravely from the measures aforesaid, the fault and the
responsibility will lie with the workers at the Arsenal,
in being so short-sighted as to let themselves be influenced
by agitators.
The Governor-Generals were, however, con-
stitutionalists compared with the commandants
in the " Etappen-Zone " under purely military
rule. Here is a proclamation of June 10, 1915,
by von Westarp, Etappen-Kommandant of the
great Flemish city of Ghent : —
By order of his Excellency the Inspector of the Depot,
I bring the following to the notice of the communes.
The attitude of certain factories which, under the
pretext of patriotism and relying upon The Hague Con-
vention, have refused to work for the German Army,
proves that amongst the population there are tendencies
aiming at the creation of difficulties for the officials of the
Cerman Army.
But von Westarp was surpassed by his
colleague, Hopfer, at Tournai. Hopfer had
called on the Municipality to furnish him with
a list of unemployed, to be deported to Germany
and made to work in German service there, and
the Municipality had courteously but firmly
refused " to provide arms," as it expressed it,
" for use against its own children." To this
municipal resolution General Hopfer made the
following reply : —
Tournai.. October 23, 1916.
No. 17404.
Mob. Et. K.S. des IBIK.
PUNITIVE TAXATION.
(ReJ. Your letter of October 20th, 1916. No. 7458.)
In permitting itself, through the medium of Municipal
Resolutions, to oppose the orders of the German Military
Authorities in the occupied territory, the City is guilt;
THE TIMES HISTORY- OF THE WAR.
THE TIMES HISTORY 01' THE WAN.
39
of an unexampled arrogance and of a complete misunder-
standing of the situation created by the state oi war.
The " clear and simple situation " is in reality the
following : —
The Military Authorities order the City to obey.
Otherwise the City must bear the heavy consequences,
as I have pointed out in my previous explanations.
The General Commanding the Army has inflicted
on the City — on account ot its refusal, up to date, to
furnish the lists demanded — a punitive contribution
of 200,000 marks, which must be paid within the next
six days, beginning with to-day. The General also adds
that xintil such time as all the lists demanded are in
his hands, for every day in arrear, beginning with
December 31st, 1916, a sum of 20,000 marks will be
paid by the City.
(Signed)
HOPFEK, Major-General,
Etappen-Kommandant.
Thus the Germans did their worst, but the
Belgians knew how to defeat them. At Malines,
for instance, not a single workman returned to
the Arsenal, and after 10 days von Bissing
had to remove his interdict, because the suspen-
sion of traffic was preventing his own garrisons
in the neighbourhood from receiving their
supplies, and the Landsturmers were unwilling
to go short in order that Belgian workmen
might be " brought to reason." Von Bissing
covered his retreat with a lie and a threat : —
As a sufficient number of workmen have now presented
themselves at the railway workshops at Malines, the
measures of coercion decreed by my proclamation of
May 30 last will be discontinued from midnight on the
night of June 11—12. I reserve to myself discretion for
instantaneously restoring these measures to force if the
number should diminish again to such an extent as to
impede, in the shops, the work necessary for the main-
tenance of traffic on the Belgian railways.
But the truth was known all over the occupied
territory within a week, and was emphasized
by another victory for the workmen at Sweveg-
hem, near Courtrai, where they were being
treated to the same tactics, because they
refused to make barbed wire for the German
trenches on the Western Front. Von Bissing
actually cut off communications at Sweveghem
on the same day that he allowed traffic to be
resumed again at Malines, and the Burgomaster
of the Commune was compelled to sign a
proclamation in the following terms : —
First-Lieutenant von der Knesebeck, the Etappen-
Kommandant, constrains the Burgomaster of Sweveghem
to urge the workmen at the wire factory of M. Bakaert
to go on with their work, and to explain to them that a
matter vital to the Commune is at stake. The workmen
may rest assured that, after the war, they will incur no
responsibility for having continued their work in the
wire factory, considering that they have been forced
to do so by the German military authority. If there
should be any responsibility, I take it entirely upon
myself. If work is started again, all punishments will
cease.
TH. TROVE,
Burgomaster.
But the workmen read between the Burgo-
master's lines, and the only responsibility which
weighed with them was one which neither he
nor the Etappen-Kommandant could take off
their shoulders. For them the " vital matter
at stake " was to do their duty as citizens of
Belgium, and they maintained their resistance
till they beat the Governor-General as signally
as their comrades in the railway shops at
Malines.
The Germans were discomfited in little
things and big. A little thing was the prohibi-
tion against wearing, " even in an unprovocative
manner," the colours of Belgium and her Allies,
which produced a festival of ivy leaves — Bel-
gium's national tree. The ivy leaves were sold
in the streets ; they were worn in hats and
button-holes ; the horses had them on their
harness ; and the Germans had to shut their
eyes. A proclamation against ivy leaves would
have been too embarrassing a document for
von Bissing's " Bulletin of Laws and Decrees."
A big thing was the victory of Cardinal
Mercier, in his Pastoral Letter of Christmas,
1914. In this address to the clergy of his
diocese, the Cardinal made a precise, documented
statement of some of the crimes of the German
Invasion, condemned them in restrained and
unanswerable words, and bade his fellow-
countrymen take courage in the magnificent
sacrifice which their country had made, and the
hopes of restoration which the future held in
store.
As soon as a copy of this Pastoral came under
the German authorities' eyes, they arrested the
diocesan printer of the Archbishopric of Malines
and condemned him to a fine of 500 marks, or
imprisonment for 30 days. Perquisitions were
made for published copies at Malines, Antwerp,
Brussels, and even in the villages ; the cures
were forbidden to read the letter from the
pulpit, and several were arrested for refusing
to pledge themselves not to do so. On Satur-
day, January 2, 1915, an official summons
reached the Cardinal to appear before the
Governor-General the same morning. On
Sunday, January 3, the Governor-General
forbade him, by telegram, to go to Antwerp,
where he was to have celebrated a service in
the Cathedral. On Monday, January 4, a
German officer handed him a memorandum
from the Governor-General, in which von
Bissing put on record, among other things, that
the permission formerly granted to Cardinal
Mercier to visit his fellow-bishops in Belgium,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
was now withdrawn. Von Biasing's last move-
was a communique, launched from his Press
Bureau, to the effect that " Cardinal Mercier's
pastoral letter had been subjected to no
restrictions," and this the Cardinal answered by
a circular letter in Latin to his clergy, dated
January 10, in which he exposed von Hissing's
communiqui as " contrary to the truth."
The following proclamation, posted in Alost
and other towns of the Occupied Zone, shows
how the Germans sought, at all costs, to silence
Mercier's voice : —
The Burgomaster is to inform the cures of the com-
mune that they may not read Cardinal Mercier's Pastoral
Letter aloud, inasmuch as it may neither be printed nor
put in circulation. The leaflet in which the Cardinal
testifies that he has not withdrawn anything in his
Pastoral Letter is to be destroyed. The Kommandantur
is under orders to inflict severe penalties in the case of
any infringement of this proclamation.
THE GERMAN KOMMANDANTCR.
Alost, January 23, 1915.
The Germans were right. It was worth their
while to strip off the mask and expose their
own methods in Belgium for the lie and tyranny
that they were, if they could by any means
prevent Cardinal Mercier from revealing to his
countrymen and the world the Belgian people's
unconquered soul. The Germans were beaten,
and at every crisis in the history of the Occupa-
tion the Cardinal made his voice heard as
courageously as in the last days of 1914 ; but
perhaps nothing he subsequently said or wrote
expressed so powerfully as the following
sentences in that first Pastoral letter the spirit
against which German methods could not
prevail :—
The rights of conscience are sovereign. It would
have been unworthy of us to take refuge in a mere show
o; resistance.
We do not regret our first enthusiasm ; we are proud
of it. Writing, in a tragic hour, a solemn page of our
national history, we have desired that page to be sincere
and glorious
We shall know how to endure, as long as endurance
is necessary. . . .
Trial, in the hands of the Divine Omnipotence, is a
two-edged sword. If you rebel against it, it will wound
you to death ; if you bow your head and accept it, it
will hallow you. . . .
Let us earn our liberation. Let us hasten it by
our courage, even more than by the prayers of our
lips. . . .
The Power which has invaded our soil and momen-
tarily occupies the greater part of it, is not a legitimate
authority. Therefore, in the secret of your heart,
you owe it neither esteem, nor attachment, nor obedi-
ence.
The only legitimate Power in Belgium is that which
belongs to our King, to His Government, and to the
Representatives of the Nation. The King is the only
authority we acknowledge. He alone has a right to
the affection of our hearts, and to our loyalty.
[By pfrmtssion o/ " I. an 1 (u
THE PROMISE.
From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.
The British Government has repeatedly assured Belgium that
• shall never sheath the sword until she has recovere 1 all
and more than all that she has sacrificed.
CHAPTER CLXVIII.
SCIENCE AND THE HEALTH OF
ARMIES (II).
GERM-KILLERS — THE SEARCH FOR THE IDEAL ANTISEPTIC — THE BLOOD STREAM — DARIN'S SOLU-
TION— METHOD OF TREATMENT — MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE'S WORK — DISCOVERY OF
" FLA VINE " — ITS IMPORTANCE — THE FIGHT AGAINST " SPOTTED FEVER " — IDENTIFICATION OF
THE GERMS — PREPARATION OF A SERUM — REMARKABLE RESULTS — THE REDUCTION OF MORTALITY
—THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DYSENTERY — " BISMUTH EMETINE " — TYPHOID FEVER — TYPHUS IN
SERBIA — EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE — JAPANESE RESEARCH — NEW VIEWS OF MEDICINE.
IN an earlier chapter* an account has been
given of the wonderful strides which were
made during the early months of the war
in the recognition and treatment of disease. It
was shown that the chief enemy in those days
was blood poisoning in wounds, of which indeed
there was a great epidemic extending over the
whole European continent, and it was ex-
plained in what manner that epidemic was
brought under control. Again, the work
accomplished against preventable diseases like
typhoid fever was described and an account
was given of the very successful mission under
Lieut. -Colonel Leiper to find out the cause of
Bilharzia in Egypt.
These early efforts, as was indicated, saved
the Army from any serious harm by disease ;
they laid the foundations for future work ;
they were an inspiration and an encourage-
ment to the host of toilers in this most impor-
tant and difficult field. It is unnecessary to
refer again to the vital character of the infor-
mation which they furnished, but if a clear idea
of later developments is to be gained some
indication must be given of the directions in
which that information was faulty.
In the first place it was soon evident that,
though the epidemic of blood poisoning in
wounds had been controlled, it had not been
mastered. Valuable lives were still being lost
in spite of all precautions, and none of the
» Vol. VI., Chapter XCVII.
Vol. XI.— Part 132. 1
methods devised had attained to the ideal which
every surgeon saw clearly in front of him.
Thanks to the researches of Sir Almroth
Wright, many misconceptions with regard to
the cleansing and healing of wounds had been
swept away. The old method of treating a
wound was to apply to it some more or less
powerful germ killer and hope that by this
means inflammation would be prevented. Sir
Almroth Wright pointed out the simple fact
that the germ-killing substances in general use
were as damaging to the tissues of the patient
as they were to the invading microbes.
The importance of this fact is at once evident
when it is borne in mind that in the last issue
it is the flesh and blood of the wounded man
which protect him against the germs of blood
poisoning. In his tissues are qualities of re-
sistance and antagonism to disease germs which
when exercised freely afford a high degree of
safety. But an interference with these powers of
protection which does not at the same time com-
pletely destroy the invaders makes the second
case of the wounded man worse than the first.
It was thus possible to show that antiseptics,
as used in the beginning of the war, were
inefficient because they inflicted damage upon
the resisting powers of the patients and because
they did not penetrate into the recesses of the
wounds where the germs lurked. This state-
ment was of a revolutionary character and was
hotly assailed, but no successful attempt was
42
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
43
made to refute it. Attempts to find better
antiseptics were, however, made on every
hand.
The work on the healing of wounds thus
begun was continued with zeal, and at a later
date a number of important conclusions became
possible. It was pointed out, in the first place,
that the great work of Metehnikoff must be
given its due share of consideration. Metehni-
koff had shown how certain of the white cor-
puscles in the blood are in reality '' warrior
cells " which, at the coming of danger, go out
in battalions to repel and destroy the invading
microbes. This " battle of the blood " had
been for many years one of the wonders of
medicine, and the truth of Metchnikoff's views
had been proven to the hilt. Again and again
observers had seen that strange marshalling of
the fighting forces in answer to what was called
a " chemiotactic influence," a subtle call trans-
mitted along all the blood-ways of the body.
They had watched the hastening of the white
armies by a million paths to the scene of battle.
They had seen these fearless defenders cast
themselves bodily upon the enemy and by the
enemy be stricken in their tens of thousands.
Finally, they had observed the coming of
victory when the white warrior cells, the
phagocytes, were able to swallow up and
digest the bodies of their foes.
The warrior cells came, travelling, in the
blood stream. For a time Metchnikoff's work
focused attention so completely upon the
warrior cells that the properties of the blood
stream were neglected. For a considerable
period before the war, however, this had been
remedied and attention had been re-directed
to the importance of .the blood stream. It was
now, during the war, demonstrated again that
the efficiency of the work of the warrior cells
depended in great measure upon the state of
the blood fluid or serum.
In other words, there were qualities in a
man's blood serum which were of equal im-
portance to him with the fighting capacity of
his warrior cells. The chief of these qualities
was called the " anti-tryptic power " — that is
to say, the power of antagonizing the action
of a ferment called trypsin. When the hostile
germ began its attack it found itself in circum-
stances inimical to its safety and well-being.
It found itself in a wound flooded with blood
serum having a high " anti-tryptic power "—
a power acting directly against its tendency
to grow and multiply, and it found also a host
of warrior cells moving in this anti-tryptic
serum to attack it.
But, curiously enough, the body of each
warrior cell contained a quantity of the fer-
ment trypsin. So long as the warrior cell lived
this trypsin was fighting on the side of the
patient, for by means of it the warrior cell was
able to digest the germs it had swallowed.
But if the warrior cell died, then the trypsin
escaped out into the blood serum, where it
came in contact with the anti-tryptic power to
which reference has been made. Trypsin and
anti-tryptic power cancelled one another. The
blood serum was deteriorated as a fighting force,
for its anti-tryptic power — or, in other words,
its anti-bacterial power — was lowered.
From the point of view of the invading
germs, therefore, anything tending to kill
white warrior cells was of the utmost help.
By this means not one but two enemies were
disposed of ; the warrior cell itself was killed,
and the dead body of the warrior cell helped,
because of its store of trypsin, to weaken the
fighting anti-tryptic quality of the blood serum.
This fact was evidently of vital importance.
This mysterious, small " laboratory " fact
meant, clearly enough, the lives or the deaths
of fighting men, the value of whom to their
country was very great. Any agents which
hindered these protective forces of nature was
an agent hindering the healing of wounds and
the recovery of wounded soldiers. It was
thus an agent hindering the march of armies
and giving help to the enemy.
This was the essence of the indictment of anti-
septics. It could be and was shown that the
vast majority of the antiseptics in use killed
white warrior cells more easily than they killed
germs. Thus, though they might kill some of
the germs, they also created a favoxirable
" atmosphere " for germ growth, and so for
blood poisoning. Worse still, by coagulating
the lymph and serum on the surface of the
wound they actually made a covering for the
germs under which, in a blood serum, robbed of
its anti-tryptic power, they could breed and
flourish.
The immediate result of these investigations
was a reaction against antiseptics of the old
order — carbolic acid, iodine, and others. In-
stead surgeons began to devote themselves to
considering in what way they could encourage
and promote the rapid flow of blood serum, or
" lymph," from wounds, so that the hostile
germs would be continually bathed in fresh,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
OPEN-AIR HOSPITAL IN A WOOD IN FRANCE
[French official pMograpk.
active serum, with undiminished anti-tryptic
power.
Clearly the best way to achieve this end was
to open up all wounds thoroughly so as to
expose the microbes as much as possible, and
to drain them thoroughly so as to carry away
all diminished blood serum and al! dead
warrior cells, and replace them by the out-
flowing fresh serum and cells. It was suggested
that the liberal use of very dilute salt water
("normal saline solution") along with citrate
of soda greatly helped this work by preventing
coagulation of the serum in the wound, and by
promoting a free oozing of serum from the
wound walls.
This new surgical technique was, of course,
a vast improvement upon the old technique,
for it was founded upon definite scientific
principles applied after careful research. Very-
soon the effects of it became evident in the
reduced casualties from blood poisoning and
in the increased attention paid to the subject
by all surgeons and scientific workers. Never-
theless, nil effort to kill the germs in situ was
not abandoned. It was felt that while every
effort should be made to give the powers of
nature, the white warrior cells and the anti-
tryptic power of the blood, free play, at the
same time every effort should also be made
to devise means of killing the germs without
harming the white warrior cells. In other
words, there began at once the search for the
ideal antiseptic.
It had been laid down, as the result of the
early work, that the ideal antiseptic when
found must conform to certain definite terms.
These terms were :
(1) Great potency against all germs in the
presence of blood serum.
(2) No harmful effect on the white warrior
cells.
(3) Absence of irritant action on living tissues
in general, so that it might be applied to delicate
surfaces such as mucous membranes.
(4) A suitable stimulant action on repairing
tissues so that healing be encouraged.
(5) Non-poisonous to any tissue of the body.
Thus, even if strychnine was the most potent
antiseptic known, its effects on the nervous
system would absolutely preclude its use.
These five terms were, it will be seen, of a
most exacting kind and investigators might
well pause to consider whether it was possible
to satisfy them. The need, however, was great,
for the wounds of war were all poisoned wounds,
THE TIMES HI3TOEY OF THE WAR.
45
and every day saved from the time occupied by
healing represented an added efficiency in
fighting force.
The first serious attempt to produce an ideal
antiseptic has already been mentioned. The
substance was hypochlorite of soda, and it was
presented by Dr. Dakin under the title of
Dakin's Solution, and also independently by
Professor Lorrain Smith and his co-workers.
The further developments of Dakin's Solution
deserve to be recorded, for they were of great
importance both from the medical and the
military point of view.
Dakin's Solution originally consisted of 140
grammes of dry carbonate of soda dissolved in
10 litres of water to which 200 grammes of
chloride of lime and 40 grammes of boric acid
had been added. This solution was very
favourably reported upon and many surgeons
began to use it. Finally the distinguished
AN OPERATION BY JAPANESE SURGEONS IN FRANCE.
46
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
French surgeon. Dr. Alexis Carrell, began a
series of cases on the solution at his hospital at.
Compiegne, near the French front line. Carrell,
however, adopted a modification of the original
jolution introduced by Daufresne, which con-
- '
-
DR. ALEXIS CARRELL,
Inventor of the new method of sterilizing wounds.
tabled no boric acid and a smaller proportion
of hypochlorite.
Carrell's success depended to a great extent,
upon his technique, but there was no question
that the antiseptic was also of great value,
even if it did not, as we shall presently see,
satisfy all the five terms of the ideal antiseptic.
Carrell based his system upon very early
treatment of wounds. He advised that at the
advanced dressing station just behind the lines
the skin surrounding all wounds should bo
treated with tincture of iodine as an early
measure. If the wound was small or narrow
an injection into the course of it of Dakin's
Solution was recommended ; if wide and freely
open it could be packed with swabs soaked in
the solution, but the value of these procedures
was problematical.
At the Casualty Clearing Station the patient
was anaesthetised and his wound thoroughly
treated. Bullets nnd pieces of shell were
removed. The solution was then injected into
the wound and the cavity of the wound com-
pletely filled with it. Some remarkable appara-
tus was used in irrigating the wound. This
consisted of a number of indiarubber tubes
arranged in connexion with a single supply
tube, like the teeth to the stem of a cornb,
and perforated with many small holes. The
tubes were introduced into the cavity of the ,
wound so as to allow the solution to be well
sprayed into it ; they were kept in position by
means of strips of gauze. The antiseptic
solution was introduced into the wound every
two hours by the nurse, who by releasing a
stop-cock allowed just sufficient solution to fill
the wound full.
The solution was found to be non-irritating,
and thus it fulfilled one at least of the terms of
the ideal antiseptic. It was also possessed of
great powers of dissolving away dead tissue and
so of cleaning the wound. Further, it certainly
destroyed the poison thrown out by the germs,
and thus reduced the chances of damage to the
affected man.
No doubt could be felt that this hypo-
chlorite solution marked a great stride in
PATHOLOGICAL MUSEUM OF THE
BLAND-SUTTON INSTITUTE.
antiseptic treatment. Indeed, the proof was
given in the fact that, after wounds had been
treated by it for relatively short periods, it was
found possible to stitch them up. The
character of this advance is vinderstood when
it is remembered that in the early days of the
war, in the days of the Marne and Ypres, it
would have been criminal folly to stitch up any
wound, no matter how clean it might look.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
There was a saying in those days that surgical
needles and sutures should be abolished from
the British Army as a greater danger than the
shells and bayonets of the enemy.
This stitching up of newly cleansed wounds
naturally aroused a great deal of interest, and
many surgeons investigated the matter. The
eminent Belgian surgeon, Dr. Depage, stated
that the transformation which occurred in his
results, thanks to the new method, was very
impressive, that immediate complications be-
In virulent infections the number of microbes
counted at the beginning of treatment was
often very great, and frequently the " bacterial
chart " would show oscillations about this
period. But the tendency of the chart was
always downwards ; there was " a descent of the
bacterial curve." The curve, as a rule, arrived
at zero after from five to 25 days of treatment,
the rate depending naturally upon the depth
and character of the wound. When the
bacterial chart arrived at zero the wound was
[Official photograph.
SERBIAN DRESSING STATION IN A MONASTERY.
came more and more rare, and that suppura-
tions disappeared completely. Efforts were
made to test the results obtained by examining
to see whether any germs remained alive in the
wounds after they had been cleaned by the
solution. A method was adopted by which the
number of microbes present in a wound during
the stages of its evolution towards healing were
counted ; it was thus possible to make com-
parisons between cases treated by means of
Dakin's Solution and cases treated by other
means. Thus what were called " bacterial
charts " could be drawn up which, at a glance,
showed the course of the cleansing of the wound
«i germs, just as a temperature chart shows the
course of a fever.
stitched up. Dr. Depage reported upon the re-
sults of 137 wounds stitched up after complete
cleansing as follows :
(a.) Complete success, 112. In these cases heal-
ing was perfect on the whole extent of the wound
and no inflammation of any kind was observed.
(6.) Partial success, 23. In these cases some
slight inflammation occurred.
(c.) Failures, 2. Both these cases were
stitched up rather soon, but quickly recovered
on being re-treated.
As these cases included wounds of soft tissues,
wounds of bones and joints and amputation
stumps, the results were good. Reports from
other surgeons, notably Drs. Dohally and
Dumas, Professors Poyel, Turner and Chutre,
48
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
confirmed them. Indeed, it was stated that
under the Carrell treatment a soldier's stay
in hospital was very appreciably shortened,
and that men were able to be discharged
in from four to six weeks who would have
required no less than from three to six
months' treatment under former methods.
Professor Chutre stated that he was forced to
do one amputation where formerly 20 had been
nece-sary and where there had been 10 deaths
there wa now only one.
The importance of this does not need to be
emphasized. Clearly the loss by death or from
permanent or partial disability increased the
economic and military value of every indi-
vidual. Decrease in earning power was in pro-
portion to the permanent disability sustained,
and the machinist or skilled mechanic who
suffered the loss of an arm became doubly a loss
to his community, first by reason of the pension
to which he was entitled, and secondly by the
diminution of his productive capacity. The
employment of the Carrell method and
Dakin Solution shortened convalescence and
minimized pain ; it appreciably reduced the
cost of hospital maintenance and the strain
imposed on doctors and nurses.
Excellent and valuable as these results were,
they did not save the Dakin solution from criti-
cism by bacteriologists, who applied to it the
rigorous tests laid down in respect of the " ideal
antiseptic." Notwithstanding its undoubted
bactericidal powers, Dakin's Solution did not
entirely satisfy these requirements. It was
very poisonous to genus, but it was also
poisonous to the white warrior cells ; in fact, its
value lay probably more in its power to destroy
the toxines thrown out by the genus of blood
poisoning than in its power to kill the germs
themselves.
Investigation therefore proceeded, and efforts
were redoubled to discover a substance which
should prove a still nearer approach to the ideal.
These efforts were directed along lines which
the work of Ehrlich had made familiar to
medical science. Briefly what was aimed at
was a substance having a " selective affinity "
for germs. Just as the sportsman condemns
the unsportsmanlike practice of " firing into
the brown " and demands that each " gun "
shall select his bird and account for it cleanly,
so the workers in this field provisionally con-
demned the method of using any antiseptic
which injured the patient as well as the microbes-.
OPERATING THEATRE OF LORD TREDEGAR'S YACHT
INTO A HOSPITAL SHIP.
•LIBERTY," CONVERTED
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
49
WHERE CROSS AND CRESCENT WORK
SIDE BY SIDE.
Arrival of a Red Crescent train in Cairo.
They desired to possess a method which would
enable them to single out their microbe from
its human surroundings and dispose of it with
speed and certainty. They demanded, in short,
a sighted rifle to replace the blunderbuss of
earlier days.
The quest was difficult, but not perhaps so
hopeless as may at first sight appear. The
thing had been done already. It was Ehrlich's
object to discover a substance capable of
destroying the germ of syphilis, the Spirochaete
pallida, without in any way harming the
tissues of the infected individual. So well did
he achieve his object that salvarsan, " 606,"
came to be universally recognised as a sighted
rifle of very great accuracy. In almost every
case the bullet could be relied upon to find its
intended billet.
Remarkable as this was, it was not the full
measure of the accuracy which had already been
obtained by the use of the drugs of the aniline
dye series of which salvarsan is a member.
This accuracy had actually been increased and
developed so that it was possible to " hit " not
only a particular germ but even a small part
of a particular germ. An allied parasite, the
trypanosome of sleeping sickness, for example,
is a small animal cell having two nuclei or
" nerve spots " in it. One of the nuclei is
situated in the body of the trypanosome and
the other is situated in its tail and is thus
known as the " caudal nucleus."
As the result of investigation it was found
that .a particular drug was able to attack the
tail nucleus without in any other way affecting
the activity or virulent character of the try-
panosome. All that happened was that try-
panosomes exposed to this drug lost their tail
nuclei. The experiment was carried out by
inoculating a mouse with the parasites and treat •
ing it with minute doses of the drug. A most
remarkable fact was that when re-inoculated
into other mice which had not been treated
with the drug the parasites remained without
the tail nucleus. In other words, a process of
germ -evolution had been carried out.
Here, then, was an indication of the extra-
ordinary degree of accuracy it was possible to
obtain if only the right drug could be found
for the purpose in hand. The purpose in hand
was the destruction of the various bacteria
which are found in most ordinary war -wounds,
notably the so-called cocci — the streptococcus,
the slapfif/lococcus, and also the bacillus coli
commiinis and other forms.
The work was carried out at the Bland-
60
THE TIMES HlSTOliY OF THE WAR.
STREPTOCOCCI IN PUS.
Sutton Institute of Pathology of the Middlesex
Hospital by Dr. C. H. Browning, Director of the
Institute, and his assistants, Drs. Kennaway
and Thornton and Miss Gulbransen, and their
report was presented to the Medical Research
Committee under the National Insurance Act.
This work began with a clear recognition of
the defects of other antiseptics. In the first
place Dr. Browning satisfied himself that one
of the reasons why ordinary antiseptics failed
was that they entered into combination with
materials in the blood in the same manner in
which iron enters into combination to form
rust. Let it be supposed that a piece of
iron of a certain strength is required for a
purpose, but that in process of performing that
purpose half the iron is rusted away, it is obvious
that the purpose will not be efficiently per-
formed. More than half the ordinary anti-
septics were " rusted away " by means of the
materials in the blood and tissues which com-
bined with them and rendered them inert.
In the second place it was found that the
ordinary antiseptics destroyed the life of
the cells of the patient's body and prevented
or inhibited the attacking power of the white
warrior cells, thus, as has been explained,
depriving the patient of one of his most im-
portant weapons in combating local infection.
Thirdly, the antiseptics, by destroying the
patient's tissues, produced layers of dead
material which acted as screens to the germs
lying under them and protected these germs,
thus affording them every chance of growth and
action. Finally, the antiseptics were deficient
in penetrating power, and so did not reach the
deep-seated microbes in wounds.
STAPHYLOCOCCI IN PUS.
The first step was to test all the best known
antiseptics — and this will give some idea of the
vast amount of careful and detailed work
accomplished — according to a definite plan.
The series tested included carbolic acid, mercury
perchloride ("corrosive sublimate"), iodine,
Dakin's Solution and Daufresne's modification
of Dakin's Solution, and chlorine water. The
three points specially investigated were the
effects of these antiseptics on the work of the
white warrior cells, their effect upon the body
tissues of the patient, and the difference, if any,
of their action upon germs in water and in
blood serum.
In regard to carbolic acid it was found that
it acted as well in blood serum as in water, but
that while 1 part in 250 dilution was required to
kill cocci, 1 part in 500 dilution prevented the
action of the white warrior cells. That is to
say that long before the strength necessary to
kill the germs had been reached the beneficial
action of the warrior cells had been interfered
with.
In the case of iodine matters were even worse,
for while iodine killed cocci in strength 1 part
in 10,000 dilution if the cocci were in water, it
would not kill them at this strength if they
were in blood serum, i.e., if they were in their
natural surroundings. In that case a strength
of 1 part in 700 was necessary. On the other
hand, iodine prevented the action of the white
warrior cells in strengths of 1 part in 3,500.
Here, again, long before the antiseptic was
strong enough to do the cocci any harm, it had
tlirown the patient's own mechanism of defence
out of working order.
" Corrosive sublimate," or perchloride of
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
51
mercury, was next tested, it being a prime
favourite with surgeons. This substance killed
cocci in strengths of 1 part in 1,000,000 in water ;
but in blood serum strengths of 1 part in 10,000
were required, the potency of the antiseptic
falling actually 100 times on account of loss by
combination with materials in the blood..
Corrosive sublimate prevented the action of
the white warrior cells at strengths of 1 part
in 7,000 dilution. This antiseptic, therefore,
killed cocci in blood at a less strength than that
at which it prevented warrior cell activity, and
so approached nearer to the ideal antiseptic
than either carbolic acid or iodine. The
difference between concentration of 1 part in
10,000, at which it killed cocci, and 1 part in
7,000, at which it interfered with warrior cell
action, was not very great, and also it was a
powerful poison for all the tissues.
The results, with the modification of Dakin's
Solution referred to, in CarrelPs work were that
while it killed cocci in strengths of 1 part in
4,000 in water, as reckoned by its content in
" available " chlorine, strengths of 1 part in
1,000 were required in blood serum. On the
other hand, warrior cell activity was prevented
at strengths of 1. part in 4,000.
The immense importance of this work does
not need to be emphasized. Here was proof
that all the best known and most valued
antiseptics actually defeated the work of the
warrior cells of the blood before they began to
accomplish their own work — the destruction
of the germs. Yet, in spite of this, there could
be little doubt that one of these antiseptics,
Dakin's Solution, was a valuable help to surgery.
How much more valuable would not the help
be of a substance free from detrimental action
upon the warrior cells.
1HE BLAND-SUTTON INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY: EXTERIOR AND
BACTERIOLOGICAL LABORATORY.
132-3
52
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
The ground having been cleared, efforts were
now directed to testing a series of aniline dye?
which, in a general way, were known to possess
antiseptic powers. It is not necessary to detain
the reader with details of this work. Various
substances, among them " malachite green,"
" crystal violet " and " brilliant green," were
investigated, and then finally Dr. Browning
arrived at " flavine."
The results of the tests of this remarkable
substance showed at once that a new sphere
had been entered. In the first place flavine
proved to be exactly a hundred times more
powerful as a destroyer of cocci in blood serum
than in water. This was in marked contradis-
tinction to the action of " corrosive sublimate,"
which was a hundred times less powerful in blood
serum than in water. Again, flavine killed cocci
in serum in strengths of 1 part in 200,000, while
it did not interfere with the action of the white
warrior cells until strengths of 1 part in 500 had
been reached. That is to say, that cocci were
killed by this drug 400 times as easily as warrior
cells were affected, or in other words that you ,
had to multiply the lethal dose for cocci by 400
before you could make any adverse impression
upon the patient's own mechanism of defence.
Flavine was also by far the most potent anti-
septic known against bacillus coli, an important
organism which causes suppuration, especially
in connexion with the bowel ; suppurative ap-
pendicitis is a condition in which bacilli coli is
responsible for most of the evil.
Thus of all the antiseptics examined flavine
was far and away the best. It had great anti-
septic power combined with practically no
toxic power toward the warrior cells, and it
was entirely free from irritating qualities so
far as the patient's tissues were concerned.
The next step was to put it to the test of actual
use in wound surgery.
The results happily bore out the scientific data
in a very complete manner, and under clinical
test it was evident that the claims made on its
behalf had been substantiated. It proved
entirely non-irritating to patients' tissues, and
there were no ganeral or local ill-effects from
its use. On the other hand, wounds healed up
with surprising rapidity when it was used.
In one case a wound of the hand had been
un-ler medical care for two weeks. The third
fing,»r of the hand was at least twice its normal
si/.e : it was livid, the skin was shiny, and there
were two open sores upon it. It seemed certain
that the finger must }>e lost. An operation
was performed, and flavine applied to the
finger. The result was that within 14 days
there was no trace of suppuration, and the
finger had resumed its normal size. In another
case, also a hand wound, treatment had been
continued for three weeks. The hand was as
thick as it was broad, and there was a sore in the
palm. Flavine was syringed in and boric
fomentations used, and in three days the hand
resumed its normal size.
A case of gunshot wound of the arm was
operated on in France, an amputation being
performed. The " stump " became heavily
infected, but after treatment by flavine for
one week the wound became clean. A re-
amputation was then performed, and this
healed up healthily without any inflammation.
In another case a leg had been removed, and
the stump had become very dirty. Treatment
with " eusol " — i.e., one of the hypochlorite
solution* — was carried out for three weeks
without definite result. After four days'
treatment with flavine the wound had entirely
ceased to give trouble, and it quickly healed up.
In shrapnel wounds a clean surface might
always be expected in four or five days. The
absence of any deterrent effect from the drug
on the process of healing and repair of the
tissues was also revealed in every instance.
Thus flavine actually satisfied all the tests of
the ideal antiseptic ; it had (1) great potency
against germs in the presence of blood serum :
(2) no deleterious effects on the white warrior
cells ; (3) no irritant action on living tissues in
general, so that it could be applied to delicate
surfaces such as mucous membranes ; (4) a
suitable stimulating effect on the repair of the
tissues ; and (5) no poisonous effect upon any
'special tissue. It was, in short, the weapon of
precision which had been so eagerly sought.
White this great work was going on, other
work had been begun in connexion with one of
the deadliest diseases known to medicine —
etrehro-spinal fever, popularly called " spotted
fever." " Spotted fever " is the dread of armies,
for it tends to break out whenever large bodies of
menarecongregatedtogether. Soonafter the great
recruiting campaign began in England in the
first period of the war, and the new formations
were sent out to be trained, this scourge made
its appearance. Cases were reported from all
parts of the country. Many deaths occurred.
The utmost anxiety prevailed, the more so
because, in the public rnind, the disease was
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
53
CHEMOTHERAPEUTFC LABORATORY.
protected. The defending forces lacked almost
everything which, in this war, makes for victory.
Yet the assaults of the enemy were so severe
that counter-attack was absolutely necessary.
Time was short, and the work to be accom-
plished apparently very great. Happily, in
this case as in so many other cases, Sir Alfred
Keogh, the Director-General of the Army
Medical Services, saw the right thing to do,
and did it at once with all his might. He decided
upon a great mass attack upon the stronghold of
the enemy, and he resolved to enlist in this
attack the very best brains which the scientific
BLAND-SUTTON INSTITUTE: CHEMICAL
LABORATORY.
regarded as being very infectious. Its sudden
onset, the extreme severity of the symptoms,
the dramatic character of some of these symp-
toms— instantaneous blindness and deafness,
for example — caused it to be regarded with
lively terror.
Very soon it became evident that a serious
epidemic was to be feared unless instant
measures were taken to cope with the trouble.
Unhappily, knowledge of the disease was frag-
mentary and unsatisfactory, and no cure
worth the name of cure was known to medical
science. Beyond the fact that an organism
could be found in the fluid surrounding the
brain and spinal cord, and that this fluid was
usually greatly increased in amount so that
pressure was exerted on the brain, there was no
authentic information. The battle began with
the enemy strongly entrenched and powerfully
SEROLOG1CAL LABORATORY.
world was able to offer him. In January, 1915,
he invited the Medical Research Committee
to assist him, and a plan of campaign wr.s
immediately drawn up.
It was manifest in the first place that, as
knowledge of the character of the disease was
faulty and inaccurate, it was necessary not only
to provide for the immediate application in
54
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
preventive work of what was certainly known,
but also to arrange for organized research work
to improve knowledge and make further
administrative action possible.
The Medical Research Committee therefore
appointed Dr. Mervyn Gordon, assistant patho-
logist to St. Bartholomew's Hospital, who had
formerly done the chief work in England in
connexion with the disease, to be their bacterio-
logist, and they further supplied him with expert
help. They placed him face to face with his
problem and they left him to solve it on behalf
of the War Office and the country as best he
might. Dr. Gordon was gazetted Lt. -Colonel
on his appointment.
MENINGOCOCCI,
From a case of cerebro-spinal meningitis.
In point of fact a great declaration of war
upon one of the most dangerous and implacable
of the foes of armies had been made. The
enemy, as has been pointed out, was well en-
trenched ; the attacking force lacked almost
everything except support and a good courage.
So the war began. Colonel Gordon, like a wise
general, sat down and put the facts he had
already gathered about this enemy on paper
before him. One thing was certain. Extensive
bacteriological observations made during pre-
vious outbreaks of the disease had shown that
no matter in what country it appeared it was
invariably associated with the presence of one
particular germ, the so-called meningococcus of
WciehseUmum. This meningococcus had come
to be regarded as the cause of the disease.
Another point, about which some definite
information existed, was that previous outbreaks
had seemed to indicate that the chief mode of
the spread of the disease was by healthy
" carriers," who carried the germ in their noses
and throats but did' not themselves show any
symptoms. These carriers were exceedingly
liable to infect other people. It was thought
that the average time of " carrying " the germ
in this way was about three or four weeks.
Possessed of this rather slender information,
Colonel Gordon came to the conclusion that his
first duty was to isolate every case as it arose,
to segregate, etc., all " contacts," i.e., people who
might have been in contact with the cases
before they actually took ill, and who might
therefore be harbouring the infection, and to
make careful examinations of all the bacteria
present in the noses and throats of these
" contacts."
The aim was to check the disease without
disturbing the organization of the troops more
than might be absolutely necessary, for those
were the fierce days of 1915 when England was
calling for men to defend her at Neuve Chapelle ,
on the second battlefield of Ypres, at Festubert
and at Loos. It was decided that all those
who were found to be free from the meningo-
coccus were to be returned to duty with the
smallest possible delay ; those, on the other
hand, who were found to harbour in their
nasopharynx any micro-organism indistinguish-
able from the meningococcus were to be kept in
isolation until such time as they were free from
it.
It was not perhaps a dramatic plan of cam-
paign; but it was an eminently common-sense
one. The methods were old — isolation, segrega-
tion, bacteriological examination. No " bril-
liant new method " was included in the scheme.
But what was included in the scheme was a deter-
mination that it should be carried out with
vigorous thoroughness and that it should ex-
pand with expanding knowledge. The question
of preventive inoculation was considered, only
to be put aside. There was not enough know-
ledge available to justify the proceeding.
The next step was to issue as orders these
first lines of attack, and a War Office memoran-
dum was accordingly sent out giving full in-
structions to the medical officers in charge of
the troops. It was insisted that the orders be
most strictly followed, and it was soon found
that where they were strictly followed it was
possible to release 70 per cent, of the " contacts "
within twenty-four hours and the majority of
the rest within a further interval of from two
to four days. This, as will be seen, was a great
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
65
step, for it gave security without any serious
interference with military training.
It was necessary, however, to have certain
facilities. In the first place a practical method
of identifying the meningococcus, then a series
of laboratories within easy access of the various
military camps all over the country, finally
bacteriologists to work in the laboratories who
svere capable of identifying the meningococcus,
and laboratory assistants to help them.
This meant, of course, a big organisation.
It meant that a " G.H.Q." was essential, a
General Head-Quarters which should form an
administrative centre and also a research centre;
it meant, too, that the needs of the " front "
must be met by local stations ; these must again
be supplemented by one or two laboratories
capable of being rushed at short notice to a
storm centre.
A Central Cerebro-Spinal Laboratory was
accordingly equipped at the Royal Army Medi-
cal College, and 37 district laboratories were
started or co-opted at points throughout the
country where it had been decided at the War
Office that they were likely to be of most
service. The central laboratory supplied the
district laboratories with the necessary material
for examining cases— for example, swabs — and
also with the necessary " media " for growing
cultures of the bacteria. By this means the
materials were able to be obtained with greater
speed and also economy was effected in their
preparation.
The Central Laboratory, or G.H.Q. , how-
ever, was by no means intended to be a dis-
tributing station only. It was also to serve
as a training school for new workers, a kind of
cadet establishment. Advice was rendered,
and courses of instruction in the disease were
given to officers of the Royal Army Medical
Corps sent for the purpose. Further, non-
commissioned officers and men of the Royal
Army Medical Corps were also trained at the
Central Laboratory in the making of media,
swabs, and other appliances.
Finally, the Central Laboratory had its
Intelligence Department, or Research Depart-
ment, where knowledge about the enemy was
gathered and investigations into his modes of
attack were carried out. The district labora-
tories were formed on a plan elaborated at the
War Office by Colonel Horrocks and Surgeon -
Colonel Reece. The laboratories were placed
in carefully and specially chosen sites, though
if accommodation was already available it was
made use of.
The personnel of the Central Laboratory
was a matter of anxious care, for upon this
THE MOTOR LABORATORY.
56
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
clearly depended in great measure the success
of the campaign. Major Hine was placed in
charge of the media and supply department
and the training of laboratory assistants. He
also assisted in the training of officers, and he
was in charge of the Motor Laboratory which
waited to be sent to places of special pressure.
Further, he looked after the accounts. Other
workers were Mr. E. C. Murray, Lieutenant
Tulloch, Captain R. R. Armstrong, Captain
Davies, and Captain Martin Flack. In the
hands of Colonel Gordon, as Commander-in-
Chief, remained the direction of the whole
effort and also the carrying out of .special
research work.
The campaign was now opened. Means had
been found to isolate every case of the disease,
to segregate every " contact," and to examine
the bacteria present in the nose and throat of
every contact in order to determine whether or
not he harboured the meningococcu* The next
SALINE
SOLUTION
OF RABBITS
BLOOD
APPARATUS FOR THE PREPARATION OF
CULTURE MEDIUM FOR THE GROWTH
OF MENINGOCOCCI.
step was to study and. if possible, improve the
methods of identifying the jneningococcun, and
distinguishing it from the many other similar
cocci which inhabit the nose and throat, but
which are not the cause of " spotted fever.'"
It was known that one peculiarity of the
meningococcus was that it would not grow
upon a culture medium called " Nasgar " if the
temperature was kept at 23° centigrade. This
however, was a somewhat difficult method to
apply, and so another test was taken into con-
sideration. This was known as the " agglu-
tination test." The agglutination test depends
on the fact that if a man has become infected
with a disease his blood at once develops an
antidote to that disease. If the antidote is
strong enough the man recovers, if not he dies.
The antidote has the power to kill the bacteria
of the disease. Thus if a drop of blood of a
patient suffering from " spotted fever " is
brought into contact with some of the germs
of the disease, the ineningococci, those germs
will be killed. On the other hand, if a drop of
the blood of a healthy man which contains, of
course, no antidote, is added to them the
germs will not be affected. The destruction of
the germs by the antidote is spoken of n,s
"bacteriolysis." The antidote serum has the
property of causing the germs to gather into
clumps. This is known as agglutination.
Clearly this method of agglutination forms a
double test. On the one hand, it will tell
whether or not a patient has got a particular
disease — Kloes his blood agglutinate the
bacteria of that disease ? On the other hand,
it will distinguish the bacteria of one disease
from the bacteria of all other diseases, for only
the bacteria of the actual disease under con-
sideration will be agglutinated by the blood
of a man affected by the disease. All other
bacteria will remain unaffected.
Upon a property akin to this power to
agglutinate had been founded the treatment
by sera — notably the treatment of diphtheria
by anti-diphtheria serum ; in this ca e the
poisons of the diphtheria bacilli are acted on
by the antoxic serum and neutralized. An
attempt had also been made to use a
serum against the meningococous of " spotted
fever " — that is to say, to use some of
the antidote developed in the blood of an
infected person or animal in order to kill the
infection in the blood of some other infected
person or animal. But while the serum or
blood antidote against diphtheria had proved
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
57
an unqualified success, the serum or blood
antidote against " spotted fever " was most
unreliable and unsatisfactory.
It was the first business of the Central
Laboratory to ask why the anti-meningococcutt
serum had failed. The question was re-stated,
some available serum being brought into con-
tact with meningococci from the epidemic. The
serum entirely failed to destroy the meningo-
cocci as it would have destroyed them had it
possessed antidotal powers to their poisons.
The obvious inference was that the animal
from which this serum had been obtained had
not been infected with the same kind of menin-
gococcus as that with which the soldiers in this
epidemic were infected.
This at once opened up the question whether
there might not be several types of the meningo-
coccal germ, each capable of producing the
disease, but each sharply differentiated from
the others. The intelligence department of
the Central Laboratory became exceedingly
busy with this idea at once, as busy as the
intelligence department of a great army in its
work of identifying enemy units.
But it was not only the intelligence depart-
ment which became busy. No matter how
many types of meningococci there might be, the
immediate necessity was a serum powerful as
an antidote against the type found in this
epidemic. The first thing, therefore, which it
was needful to do was to prepare such a
serum.
The preparation of a serum is no easy or
rapid work. In order to carry it out an
animal hati to be slowly " immunized " or ren-
dered insusceptible to the particular germs
against which the serum is to act — that is to
say, an animal has to be given very minute doses
of the disease poison from tim to time until
its blood develops a great quantity of antidote
to the poison and it can tolerate huge doses
without trouble. (A comparable process is
that by which a man accustoms himself to the
use of tobacco and opium. A few drops of
laudanum will kill a novice at opium-taking ;
de Quincey, on the other hand, was able to
swallow half-a-pint of the drug at a time.)
It w is usually considered necessary to devote
a month or six weeks to the immunizing
of an animal from which a serum was to be
obtained. But the needs of the soldiers in th)
"spotted fever " epidemic were far too urgent
to allow of this long delay. A quicker method
of serum preparation must be found, an " in-
THE AGGLUTINATION TEST
For ascertaining the presence or absence of
meningococci in suspected cases. Tubes 1 and 3
positive (tube 3 has been shaken to show the
flocculi of agglutinated cocci), Tube 2 negative
result.
tensive " method, capable of giving results in a
short space of time.
Happily some work had already been per-
formed on this subject. It had been found
that if a rabbit was " saturated " with " spotted
fever " poison it did not necessarily succumb
at once. If the " saturation " was carefully
controlled the rabbit recovered, and its blood
very quickly gained an antidotal power. A
series of experiments was therefore planned
for the purpose of proving this statement, upon
the accuracy of which clearly many lives
might depend.
Major Hine found that serum with a high anti-
dotal or agglutinating power could be obtained
in eight days by giving a young rabbit three
doses of 1,000,000,000 killed meningororci
into a vein at intervals of an hour on the first
day. Thus at once a plentiful supply of serum
which could be prepared by means of the germs
actually found in the patients' bodies became
available. There was no longer the fear that th«
58
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
serum might be powerful only against some
form of germ which was not present in the
epidemic and powerless against the form which
was present. The new serum was " made to
measure," if the expression may be used ; it
was bound to fit, though whether it would
actually be able to effect cures remained to be
proved.
The intelligence department of the Central
Laboratory met with very considerable success
in its early efforts to identify the types of
enemy which were being encountered. No one
unacquainted with bacteriological methods can
have any idea of the amount of patience and
care needed for this work — detective work of
the very subtlest kind. These doctors were not
looking, be it remembered, for a new germ ;
they were looking for differences between germs
THE INTERIOR OF THE MOTOR LABORATORY,
Fitted with incubators, sterilizers, microscope, blowpipe, chemicals, tools, &c.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
which appeared under the microscope to be
exactly the same, which acted in the same
manner and which produced the same disease.
It is often difficult enough to distinguish
be i ween members of the same family. How
much more difficult to distinguish between
minute particles of living matter requiring the
highest powers of the microscope for their
detection ! Yet the task was undertaken in the
full assurance that, given energy and patience,
it could be accomplished. Modern bacterio-
logy had placed many clues in the hands of
these detectives of disease.
The first step was to determine whether
certain cocci which looked exactly like the
meningococci and which had been found in the
throats and noses of suspected " carriers " of
" spotted fever " were or were not identical with
the meningococci of the outbreak. A first in-
vestigation was carried out upon six separate
cocci. Of these four were typical meningococci
(meningococcus I., II., III., and IV. ) taken from
recent cases of " spotted fever." The fifth was
a coccus indistinguishable from the meningo-
coccus in shape and method of growing. It
came from the throat of an officer who was
suspected of being a " carrier." The sixth
coccus came from the throat of a soldier who
suffered from an inflammation of his throat at
that time prevalent in a certain regiment. It
was also indistinguishable from -the true
meningococcua.
The first step was to prepare a serum by
treating a rabbit with one of the four meningo-
cocci from the declared cases of " spotted
fever." This was done, the rabbit being given
a number of doses of meningococcus No. I.
until its blood had produced a powerful anti-
dote. In this antidote-containing rabbit
serum a few of each of the four meningococci
from the declared cases of " spotted fever "
were now placed. The rabbit serum, of course,
at once agglutinated the meningococcus No. I.
by means of which its antidotal power had been
developed. But it also destroyed, and with
equal facility, meningococci Nos. II., III., and
IV. The presumption was, of course, that
meningococci I., II., III., and IV. were germs
of identical type or strain, and that what was an
antidote for any one of them was an antidote
for all.
Next the cocci from the throat of the officer
suspected of being a " carrier " were placed in
the serum. They were affected to a certain
extent, but not so much as the meningococci
had been. In order to determine whether they
were being affected by the antidote agglutinin
itself, or only — as frequently occurs — by some
other substance in the serum, the serum in which
they had been placed was now used again, some
meningococci from the " spotted fever " cases
being put into it. This serum which had been
used to test the cocci from the officer's throat
was then found to be just as powerful as ever
against the meningococci from the " spotted
fever " cases. In other words, it had not lost
any of its specific power as a result of dealing
with the cocci from the officer's throat (which
would have occurred had these been identical
with the true meningococci of " spotted fever.")
That is to say, in the case of the cocci from the
officer's throat the key had not fitted- the lock
and so none of the goods had been stolen. The
goods were all there when a key which did fit
the lock was used.
In the sixth case — the coccus from the
throat of the soldier — exactly the same thing
happened as had happened in the fifth case.
None of the special antidote was used up. It
was, therefore, a fair conclusion that while all
the four meningococci (Nos. I . IT., III. and IV.)
were identical, the two cocci which appeared
exactly like the meningococci belonged, in fact,
to a different family and category.
But there was a second conclusion to be
drawn, and one of very great practical im-
portance. As has already been stated, there
was an " anti-meningococcal serum " on the
market at the time when this work began.
That serum had been prepared from meningo-
cocci taken from " spotted fever " cases in an
earlier epidemic. Presumably it was potent
against these meningococci from which it had
been prepared. But it was not potent against
the meningococci of this outbreak. Therefore
at least two separate types of true meningo-
cocci existed, each type being able to cause the
disease " spotted fever."
The next step, therefore, was to collect a
large number of true meningococci from a large
number of different cases in different parts of
the country and to compare them so as to find
out whether in this particular outbreak all were
of the same breed or not. Thirty -two different
" strains " of meningococci were accordingly
obtained, and a rabbit was prepared in the usual
way against one of the 32 strains. Then one
by one each of the 32 strains was tested by
means of the serum of the prepared rabbit.
The result was that the antidote containing
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
PREPARATIONS FOR VACCINATION
rabbit serum prepared by means of one of the
32 strains of meningococci was found to destroy
19 out of the 32 strains. The remaining 13
strains were not destroyed, and did not use up
any of the antidote. Accordingly the 19
meningococci were grouped together and classed
as Type I.
Next, another rabbit was prepared with one
of the remaining 13 strains of meningococci
which were not affected by the antidote con-
taining serum of the first rabbit. Each of the
32 strains of meningococci was tested by means
of the serum of this second rabbit, with the
result that eight of them were destroyed, and
the remaining 24 were not affected. The eight
strains of meningococci which were destroyed by
this second serum were grouped together and
classed as Type II.
j There thus remained five strains of nifiiin-
gococci out of the original 32 which had not
been affected by either the first or second
antidote-containing sorum. A third rabbit
was accordingly prepared in the same way by
means nf one of these five remaining strains of
meningococci. and all the 32 strains were tested
in the resulting.' serum. It was found that only
four strains of meningococci were destroyed by
this third serum. These four strains belonged
AGAINST TYPHOID IN FRANCE.
to the still unclassified group of five strains
which had been unaffected by the first and
second antidote-containing sera. They were
therefore classified as Type III.
That left one strain only unclassified. A
fourth rabbit was prepared with this one strain,
and the whole 32 strains were tested by means
of the serum which resulted. Only one strain
was destroyed — the strain by means of which
the rabbit had been prepared. This strain
was therefore classed as Type IV.
Thus of the 32 meningococci investigated
there were found to be 19 of Type I., 8 of
Type II., 4 of Type III., and 1 of Type IV.
Here, then, was the answer to the question why
the serum which was on the market at the
beginning of the epidemic was useless. It was
useless because it was a serum containing the
antidote to a type met with only seldom in
this epidemic. In order to be of any vise a
serum must clearly contain the exact antidote
of the type of meningococcus actually present
in the case treated by it.
This was a discovery of enormous importance
and of revolutionary character. It meant that
a new epoch in the diagnosis and treatment of
this terrible disease had been opened. The old
days of groping in darkness, of bitter disap-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
61
INOCULATING FRENCH SOLDIERS TO THE MUSIC OF A GRAMOPHONE.
pointment with serum treatment in one case and
lively hope in another (depending on whether
the serum used matched the type of germ
present), were past for ever. Exact knowledge
ushered in the period of exact methods of
attack. Already tho intelligence department
of the Central Laboratory had justified itself
by getting into close touch with the enemy.
The first investigation, to which reference
has been made, had shown that some suspected
carriers had cocci in their throats which did not
react to one type of seriun prepared by means
of some true meningococci. This investigation
was now carried a stage farther, and all the
meningococcus-like organisms which had been
secured from suspected carriers were examined
by means of the four separate types of sera.
Each serum related to one special type of
germ. The result was that while several of
these cocci were incriminated as belonging to
one or other of the four types, the majority
were acquitted.
Here, then, was a simple and a rapid method
of dealing with any case which might arise. As
soon as the man was suspected of being a'
carrier of the disease a swab must be taken
from his throat and all the germs in his throat
grown on culture media. These germs must
then be tested by means of the four " type
sera." If they happened to be destroyed by
any one of these sera then they would be classed
as belonging to the type to which the serum
that destroyed them belonged ; if they did not
happen to be destroyed by any one of these
type sera, then the patient could be acquitted
forthwith.
This knowledge was rapidly disseminated
from G.H.Q. to the various fronts. By the
financial assistance of the Medical Research
Committee outfits containing specimens of each
of the four types of meningococci and also sam-
ples of each of the four type sera were dis-
patched with full directions how to use them
to the district laboratories. It was urged that
the exact type of meningococcu^ present in
cases, carriers and contacts, should be deter-
mined in every instance. Sera for treatment of
each of the types were also prepared and sent
out.
The main issue had now been settled — that
there were four types of this mcningococnu.
But it remained to settle some lesser questions
upon which the full success of the work depend-
ed. The first of these related to the distri-
62
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
[French official photograph.
LIEUTENANT BEUXIN, ANALYST TO THE FRENCH ARMY, EXAMINING
GERMAN PROJECTILES.
bution of the types throughout the country.
It was found that the meningococci coming
from military cases during 1915 were chiefly
specimens of Type I. at first, but that, as the
outbreak progressed, Type II. became more
abundant. When the disease declined during
the summer of 1915 several specimens of Type
III. were met with, and the solitary specimen
of Type IV. which was found also dated from
the late stages of this 1915 outbreak. It was
also noted that when the disease returned in
the last months of 1915 first of all Type I.
reappeared, to be shortly succeeded by Type
II., which then became the predominant type.
The epidemic of 1916, however, was remarkable
for an increase in the number of cases due to
Type IV. A relatively large number of cases of
Type II. were met with in the London district.
The next question was : Does more than one
type of meningococcus occur in the fluid sur-
rounding the brain in any one case of " spotted
fever " ? The answer was obtained by collect-
ing a number of cases and testing the bacteria
found in them by means of the type sera. In
every instance in which the brain fluid was
examined in this way one type of meningococcus
and one type only was discovered.
This important discovery settled the diffi-
culty of " mixed " infections and gave the
doctor treating " spotted fever " the assurance
that in any one case he had but one type of
germ to fight against. It was soon followed
by the discovery that the type found in the
brain fluid was also always the same as the
type found in the nose and throat of the same
patient.
This, again, was of the highest importance,
because it had come to be recognized that this
disease, "spotted fever," begins when the
germ makes its way from throat or nose through
the skull to the brain fluid. Here was con-
firmation of that view. Moreover, when
suspicion rested upon a case it was now only
necessary to examine a swab from the throat —
a much, easier matter than drawing fluid off
from brain and spinal cord. On the result of
the examination of the throat swab a diagnosis
could be made forthwith and treatment
begun, thus saving valuable time and affording
the patient a much better chance.
Further, the fact that the meningococcus
was found to be always present in the naso-
pharyngeal secretion at the beginning of an
attack, and that it was constantly of the same
type as the meningococcus in the brain fluid,
indicated unmistakably that every case of
''spotted fever " was in reality an instance of a
carrier developing the disease. The fact
that if the germs obtained from any case were
inoculated into animals, these animals
invariably became infected with the same
type as that injected into them, and never
harboured any other type, was convincing
proof that in this disease "type breeds true,"
or. in other words, that while Types I., II., III.,
and IV. produce much the same symptoms
in the people they infect, they are nevertheless
entirely distinct and different organisms which
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
63
never in any circumstances " change into "
other forms, but which always maintain their
own characteristics.
This work furnished, as will be seen, weapons
against the disease which were bound to prove
successful if used with courage and care. Not
a moment was lost in bringing the full force of
the new knowledge to bear upon the disease.
The following example shows, indeed, how
thoroughly and even unsparingly the know-
ledge was applied.
An outbreak of the fever was notified from
a large garrison town in the spring of 1916.
Captain Armstrong, at that time attached to
the Central Laboratory, was sent down to
assist in the identification of carriers. He
took immediate and what might at one time
have been regarded as drastic steps. He
proceeded to swab not only the immediate
contacts — i.e., persons who had been in contact
with victims oi the disease during the incuba-
tion period — but also a very large section of the
entire garrison who, so far as could be ascer-
tained, had not been in direct contact with the
actual cases. " In this way," runs the report
of Colonel Gordon to the Medical Research
Committee, " he and his assistants examined
the naso -pharynx of some 10,000 men, the vast
majority of whom had been in no direct contact
with the cases. As the result of this extensive
swabbing, Captain Armstrong provisionally
isolated 410 men as being carriers of an
organism closely resembling the meningo-
coccus. At this point Captain Armstrong was
unavoidably detached for duty elsewhere, and
Lieutenant W. J. Tulloch, K.A.M.C., attached
to the Central Laboratory, was sent down
in the motor laboratory to investigate . . . th>
cocci present in the naso-pharynx of the men
provisionally placed in isolation by Captain
Armstrong." Of these 410 men, 86 had
become free of suspicious organisms by the
time of Lieutenant Tulloch's first visit and were
discharged. All of the remaining 324 yielded
meningococcus-like organisms. When these
organisms were tested by means of sera
Types I., II., and IV. (the types found present
in this outbreak) no less than 103 showed no
specific effect, i.e., they were not affected by
the sera. The men carrying these unaffected
organisms were accordingly set free. The
remaining 221 cocci showed definitely positiv
results, and it was found possible in the case of
193 of these to relegate them to their exact
type forthwith. The results were as follows :
Specimens examined, 193 ; Type I., 30 ;
Type II., 72 ; Type IV., 71.
The report concluded : " Evidence of the
efficacy of Captain Armstrong's work is afforded
by the fact that in spite of the large number of
men examined in this infected garrison, no
single instance came to notice of a man passed
by him as a negative either developing the
disease or transmitting it to another."
PASTEUR INSTITUTE AT ALGIERS.
Preparation of Serum.
\
64
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A routine procedure was now established
in all cases of outbreak. When information of
a suspected case of " spotted fever " was re-
ceived, and if the case was already in hospital,
details as to his unit were ascertained at once by
telephone. If the unit was in the London area,
the immediate contacts were segregated by tele-
phone pending investigation of the case. If it
appeared in the least degree probable that the
case was one of cerebro -spinal fever, a quantity
of fluid was at once drawn off from the fluid sur-
rounding the brain and spinal cord. A quantity
at once, i.e., rubbed over a layer of medium in a
glass dish so as to convey the germs on the
swab to the medium for hatching and growth ;
the "plates" were carried in heated water —
jacketed tins supplied for the purpose. Actual
cases of the disease were treated in special
wards ; positive carriers were sent to isolation
wards at another military hospital.
The treatment of actual cases was carried
out under the care of Captain A. C. E. Gray,
and by means of the new polyvalent serum
called the " Millbank-Lister Institute Serum."
PASTEUR INSTITUTE AT ALGIERS.
Triturating the Vaccine.
of serum was then injected into this brain fluid
— what is known as a polyvalent serum being
used, i.e., a mixture of the four sera for Types I.,
II., III., and IV., so that no matter which type
of germ was present, it would be attacked at once
while bacteriological investigation was going on.
A naso-pharyngeal swab was also taken.
The " hospital contacts " were determined
by various considerations. If the case had
been admitted but a few hours it was thought
sufficient to swab the patients in the two or
three beds on either side, and in the four or
five beds opposite, together with the nurses and
orderlies ; but if the case had been longer in the
wards, a more complete examination was carried
out. ' Regimental contacts were dealt with in
the same way. AH swabs were " plated "
The patient got his first dose of this serum
when the fluid was drawn from his spine. A
second dose and a third at intervals of 24 hours
were given as soon as he reached the special
wards, and this irrespective of the amount of
improvement which had taken place. Generally
speaking, a case of average severity required
from four to six doses, very severe cases from
six to ten doses, while cases which failed to
improve before ten doses of serum had been
given usually proved fatal. The injections
were continued xintil the patient's temperature
had been normal for at least two days.
It was found that if treatment was begun
before the seventh day of the disease the mor-
tality was about 13 per cent., whereas if it wns
begun on the third day, or earlier, the mortality
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
was only 9 per cent. The vast importance of
early diagnosis was thus made evident, and
the careful work accomplished to enable early
diagnosis to be made justified to the full.
These mortality percentages — 13 and 9—
are seen in their true light when they are com-
pared with the mortality percentages from
this disease which prevailed before the Mill-
bank-Lister serum was available. In those
days the mortality percentage varied from 40
to 60 per cent., the course of the disease was
much more protracted, the symptoms much
Two parts of this three-fold problem had
now been solved. A method of examining
and segregating contacts had been devised
and what amounted to a cure of the disease — if
given early enough — had been found. In order
to complete the work it was necessary to
devise some means of curing carriers and
rendering them safe.
The carrier problem had for long been
one of the most perplexing of all medical pro-
blems. It was known, for example, that many
more severe, and the complications and after
troubles more frequent.
This reduction of mortality from 60 per
cent., the worst of the old figures, to 9 per cent.,
the best of the new ones, represented one of the
greatest triumphs in the medical history of the
war ; it represented sheer achievement, for the
victory had been won step by step against
what seemed like overwhelming odds. The
immediate fruits of the victory were very
many lives, and these frviits would con-
tinue to be gathered indefinitely until this
fell plague was finally stamped out. To
put the matter in concrete form a single figure
may be given : out of the 33 military cases
which were treated by serum in the London
district alone in 1916 only three died.
PASTEUR INSTITUTE AT ALGIERS.
Filling phials with Vaccine.
an epidemic of typhoid fever owed its origin to
a carrier, yet it was almost impossible to cure
many of these carriers. Again, there were
diphtheria carriers who were a danger to all
with whom they came into contact. These
also constituted a serious difficulty. Finally,
the " spotted fever " carrier promised, if he
was allowed to go his way uncured and un-
supervised, to be the author of fresh epidemics
and outbreaks.
This was no idle threat, as the following
cases, histories of which were presented to
th ) Medical Research Committee, show :
" Sapper B. returned from France on
April 9, 1916, and had been complaining of
headache and pains in the back and legs while
in the trenches a few days previously. There
66
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
\v is no evidence' that he had had any menin-
gitis. Two days after his arrival one of his
children was taken ill and removed to a general
hospital \iith symptoms of cerebro-spinal
meningitis. Next day another child was taken
ill, and removed to an isolation hospital, where
PASTEUR INSTITUTE AT ALGIERS.
Closing phials of Vaccine.
he died of the disease. The father was now
isolated, and found to be a carrier of Type II.
meningococcus. A few days after removal the
first child was discharged after what was
termed an ' abortive ' attack of cerebro-spinal
meningitis. He was then fetched by his sister.
Up till then the sister had been quite well.
She did not subsequently see her father at close
quarters, but on the following Sunday she was*
taken ill in the morning and died within 24
hours. A swab from the child having the
' abortive ' attack showed the presence of
Type II. meningococcus in the naso-pharynx.
There had been no cerebro-spinal fever in the
borough for eighteen months until these cases
occurred."
An t-vi-ii me PIT striking case was the fol-
lowing : "The patient developed the disease
ut ... Military Hospital after he had Ix-m
t he.v for two months on account of an accident.
Of the four positive contacts three were of the
sunn- typ' ii- the i-nsr. Two of these were in
tin' beds on cither side of the case, and the
other was the staff nurse of the ward. All the
available evidence went to show that the nurse
was a chronic carrier, and inquiry revealed the
fact that she had started nursing in the ward
within two months, arid had been nursing
several cases of meningitis a year before, and
had not been swabbed subsequently. It seemed
probable that the case was infected by this
staff nurse." The nurse remained a carrier.
The one positive contact who harboured a
meningococcus of a different type could, of
course, be excluded from the group. He was
perhaps a carrier on his own account, for in all
outbreaks it was found that the carriers greatly
outnumbered the cases.
Many efforts were made to treat the carriers,
and these included an iodine and menthol spray
for the nose and throat, " eusol," chlorine water,
and " chloramine." It might have been ex-
pected that any of these efforts would succeed,
for the meningococcus is one of the least resistant
of all bacteria to disinfectants. Unhappily it
was found that the results of treatment were
disappointing, not to say discouraging. On
the assumption that the reason for this was
the failure of the douches and sprays to reach
the lodging-places of the germs, it was decided
to attempt a new method of administration —
the breathing of a steam-laden atmosphere
into which the drug had been introduced in the
form of fine droplets floating as a cloud, mist
or nebula. The drug selected for use was
" chloramine," as it had proved the most
efficacious, and a small " inhalation chamber "
was secured for the work.
This chamber was a room of 1,050 cubic feet
capacity, kindly put at the disposal of the
investigators by Sir David Bruce, Commandant
of the Royal Army Medical College. A Lingner
Spray was employed. It was found that when
5 per cent, of chloramine was being sprayed
the atmosphere was too pungent for the com-
fort of those in the chamber, " but with 2 per
cent, the atmosphere could, during the spring
months, be tolerated easily for five minutes,
and by some for 20 minutes or longer The
atmosphere during these tests became so
dense that it was not possible to see across the
room, but this steam-laden air when inhaled
through the nostrils caused a not uncom-
fortable flow of secretion, and the chloramine
impinging on the mucous membrane of the
naso-pharynx produced a pleasant tingling
sensation."
Observations were first made on two carriers,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
67
THE LINGNER ATOMIZER.
and it was found that if they breathed deeply
and steadily the meningococcus was temporarily
destroyed in their naso-pharyngeal secretion
within five minutes. In one of the carriers,
however, the meningococcus reappeared. Both
then had a further treatment, and both were
rid of the meningococcus as a result of it.
This was so satisfactory that it was decided
to subject thirteen chronic and troublesome
carriers, who had been under treatment for
periods varying from three to 17 months,
to the inhalations. In the event, 10 of the
chronic carriers were cured, the longest period
occupied in treatment being 13 days, and the
shortest four. Inhalations were carried out daily
for 15 to 20 minutes. Three cases did not clear
up, but of these, two .were too nervous to
inhale properly, and the third could not,
tolerate the drug. It was concluded, there,
fore, that in chloramine given by means of a
steam spray in an inhalation chamber a means
was available of getting rid once and for all
of chronic carriers of "spotted fever." This
final discovery may be said to have ended the
campaign as a whole.
While the campaign against " spotted fever "
was being pressed forward, another campaign
against another disease which, if less fatal, was
no less threatening, was in progress. This
disease was dysentery, brought into Great
Britain from the Eastern Mediterranean in the
bodies of a large number of soldiers. These
soldiers had had the disease themselves, and
had so far recovered from it as to look and feel
fairly well ; but there was, nevertheless, good
reason to regard them as carriers. Unhappily,
when the rush of men from the East began
there was no existing organization staffed
and equipped for the diagnosis of dysen-
tery. The diagnosis of dysentery depends
upon the finding of the so-called Entamceba
histolytica. This is a small protozoon or
animalcule which inhabits the bowel, in which
it moves about, So long as it remains in the
bowel the patient is a danger to himself and
others.
The military authorities quickly realized
that active steps must be taken to deal with
these dysentery carriers, who were arriving in
great numbers. It was evidently necessary to
obtain specialist help at once ; but unfortu-
THE FALMOUTH ATOMIZER.
68
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
nately the number of persons available in
England who were competent to make the
requisite examinations and to produce records
of scientific value was very small in relation to
the sudden call for this particular knowledge
and skill.
The Army authorities therefore called to their
assistance the Medical Research Committee,
just as they had done in the case of " spotted
fever," and immediate steps were taken to
plan out a campaign.
The difficulties to be faced were very for-
midable. The amoeba which causes the dysen-
tery is very difficult to find and also difficult to
recognize. It was easy to see that if those who
were deputed to search for it proved incom-
petent much more harm than good would result.
Men who were in fact infected would be passed
as healthy, and on being liberated from super-
vision would almost certainly act as spreaders
of the disease.
The first step, then, was to collect together
all the competent investigators whose work
could be relied upon, and to set them to train
other people to carry on the work. This, as
will be seen, was a step similar to that taken
by Colonel Gordon in the case of " spotted
fever." It was a necessary preliminary to a
mass attack on the disease. The people selected
for training were not doctors — doctors were
too scarce at the time, but they were students
of science who had already acquired apti-
tude in microscopic work. The majority
were zoologists, botanists and bacteriologists.
None, however, had had any training in
protozoology. Yet they were all eager to
acquire proficiency and thus as a class of
learners were very much above the average.
The instruction was given at the Wellcome
Bureau. Each day a number of suspected
specimens from various hospitals arrived at the
Bureau for protozoological examination. The
examinations were all made by experts and the
findings recorded. Then each member of the
class also examined the specimen. Thus it
was possible for the learners to become ac-
quainted with all the difficulties and puzzles,
and mistakes did not escape detection.
The Medical Research Committee placed the
direction of the work in the hands of Mr.
Clifford Dobell, lecturer in protistology in the
Imperial College of Science, and it was under
his care that the workers referred to were
trained. A study of the records of cases
available at the beginning of the work, indeed,
convinced Mr. Dobell that the very first, and
most important, step was to make sure that
every examiner for the amceba of dysentery was
competent to do his or her work. Only by
securing that the detectives knew their business
LABORATORY IN THE SANATORIUM AT BLIGNV FOR THE TREATMENT
OF CONSUMPTION.
Microscopic examination of patients' sputa.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
69
BACTERIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.
Looking for cholera bacillus.
could it be secured that the amoeba would not
in any instance escape detection. Indeed it
was stated definitely at the time in a report
that " examinations made by persons— ^how-
ever skilled they may be in other matters — who
have not served their apprenticeship to the
actual work itself, possess no scientific value
whatsoever, and that for the average worker a
practical training of not less than four to six
weeks is, even under the most favourable
conditions, requisite. The errors committed
by an examiner with little or no previous ex-
perience are such as I could not have believed
possible, if I had not actually encountered them ;
and in cases where the health of the patient is
at stake it is, I believe, almost better that no
examination at all should be made than that
it should be made by an incompetent or in-
experienced person."
This definite statement had an immediate
effect. It disposed of the idea that casual
examinations meant anything ,at all, and it
proved that this question of the dysentery
carrier was a much bigger question than had
been supposed — and probably a much more
urgent question.
But not only was it necessary to have com-
petent examiners ; it was also necessary to
have frequent examinations. As soon as the
work of examination was begun in earnest at
the laboratory to which the military hospitals
sent their specimens, it was found that in many
instances one specimen would prove negative —
i.e., no amoabse would be found in it ; yet
another specimen taken from the same patient
at a later date would contain the amrebse,
perhaps in large numbers. The following
table shows this very clearly (the cases werj
untreated when examined) :
NUMBER OP EXAMINATIONS.
Case.
Amoebae
Amoeba;
found.
not found.
Total.
5
17
22
12
1
13
1
22
23
6
15
21
22
21
43
A
B
C
D
E
That is to say, that in five cases 122 examina-
tions were made, and at thes3 examinations
amoebae were found only 46 times. Yet all
of these patients were infected, and had any
one of them been allowed to go free disaster
might conceivably have followed. In the cas>
of patients undergoing treatment by " emetine,"
a drug prepared from ipecacuanha, examina-
tions were nearly always negative, yet it wai
found that as soon as treatment stopped tha
amoebae reappeared in very many of these
cases. It was therefore concluded that at the
time of this treatment negative examinations
70
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
had no value whatsoever, and should be discon-
tinued. When they became valuable was
after treatment— as a test of the effects of
treatment. It was reported :
" In more than 50 per cent, of uncured cases
the return has taken place (i.e., the effects of
ENTAMCEBA HISTOLYTICA.
treatment have disappeared) by the end of the
first week. By the sixteenth day after '.treat-
ment more than 90 per cent, have returned to
normal " — that is to say, show the amoebae as
before — " but in some cases as many as 20 days
may possibly elapse before the effects of treat-
ment disappear. Consequently, the value of
a negative examination made during the first
three weeks after treatment increases with the
increase of the interval of time intervening
between it and the end of treatment."
It does not need to be pointed out that this
discovery was also of very great value. In the
first place the praises of emetine as a " cure " of
amoebic dysentery had been loudly sung, and
an impression was abroad that if a patient had
a few doses of this drug he was all right and
might be dismissed. That false and dangerous
view was refuted and disproved, and thus a
great calamity undoubtedly prevented. Again
the way was opened up for a thorough test of
the drug and for work upon other drugs which
mi^ht give better results. Meantime some
rules were laid down for the guidance of
medical officers handling these cases, one of
which was -that untreated cases should be
subjected to six examinations on six separate
days at least before being pronounced free
from amoebiB. (This was a minimum ; a
greater number of examinations was not at
fiiv-t possible owing to pressure of work and
time.) As regards treated cases, no negative
examination made during or just after treat-
ment was to be accepted. Six examinations
in all were to be made, the first three or four
days after treatment, the next a week later,
the next four in the following week.
The next work was to investigate and deal
with the problem of treatment. By treatment
was meant only those methods which aimed at
ridding a patient of his infection — in other
words,. at disinfecting him of his amoebae. (It
should be noted that other amoebae than the
Entamceba histolytica were found. The Entamceba
histolytica was, however, the cause of dysentery.)
The infected person was very seldom ill ; he
was a " carrier " — he might not even have
" had dysentery " at all. Amoebae were
found almost as frequently in wounded men as
in old dysentery cases. " Cure," therefore,
meant always, and only, complete riddance from
the Entamceba histolytica, and " relapse " meant
that some specimen from the patient had been
found to contain the amoeba — even one amoeba !
As a beginning, the old-established drug
emetine was put to test. About this drug all
kinds of favourable reports had been made ;
unhappily all the reports were based upon an
insufficient number of examinations, and also
upon examinations made while treatment was
being carried on. These reports were therefore
of little, if of any, practical value. It was
necessary to begin all over again. This was done,
and the following conclusions were formulated :
(1) Emetine injected hypodermically in small
quantities (less than 10 grains in total amount)
very rarely rids a carrier of Entamceba histolytica .
(2) Full courses of the drug (10-12 grains or
more) are successful in about one-third only of
the cases treated.
(3) Betreatment — with equal or larger
amounts of the drug — of patients who have
already received full courses of treatment offers
little hope of success.
Happily at the time when this distinctly
unfavourable report upon emetine was being
worked out another drug was becoming known.
This was known as " bismuth emetine." This
drug owed its origin to the remarkable work of
Dr. H. H. Dale. It gave most excellent
results, as the following table shows :
Cases treated with bismuth emetine 24
Certain cures ... ... ... 14
Uncertain cures ... ... ... 9
Besult uncertain ... ... ... 1
Certainly not cured ... ... 0
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
71
The tests made were exceedingly searching.
Several of these cases were subjected to a very
large number of examinations, one of 'them 30,
another 34, another 51, the period of examina-
tion extending over 132, 107 and 67 days
respectively. Yet in the words of the investi-
gator " the results so far have been uniformly
successful." Two of the cured cases had
received large doses of the old emetine un-
successfully. The new drug was found to bs
just as effective against acute dysentery as
against the " carrier " type. Large doses were
found to be necessary — not less than 36 to 40
•grains in daily doses of 3 to 4 grains.
Thus were three remarkable triumphs
achieved during the year 1916 — the discovery of
an ideal antiseptic, flavine ; the tracking down
of the four different germs which cause " spotted
fever " (cerebro -spinal meningitis), and the
preparation of a serum against each of them
with resulting drop in death-rate from 40-60 per
cent, to 9 per cent. ; and, finally, the discovery
of a drug capable in the great majority of cases
of curing the dysentery carrier. The work upon
flavine was largely individual, depending upon
Dr. Browning's own extensive, indeed un-
rivalled, knowledge of the chemistry of
the aniline drugs ; the other two works
were examples of the " method of mass
attack " which Sir Alfred Keogh, with the
assistance of the Medical Research Committee,
introduced during the war. It was his idea,
when a great disease problem presented, to fling
against it every available force and so conquer
it once and for all ; physicians, surgeons,
bacteriologists.physicists, pathologists, chemists
were all enlisted in these campaigns. The
success of these campaigns furnished the
justification of the method employed.
It would not be possible to bring this chapter
to a close without a reference to the result of the
great campaign against typhoid fever, the lines
of which have already, in an earlier chapter,
been dealt with. Typhoid fever, as was then
pointed out, has ever been the supreme dread
of armies. In the Boer War there were 20,000
casualties as a result of it, and twice as many
A TOXIGOLOGICAL LABORATORY IN A FIELD-HOSPITAL ON THE SOMME.
72
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
IN A PARIS DISPENSARY.
The Laboratory.
victims as there were victims to enemy shot and
shell. The same thing held good of almost
every other war in history.
In this war, with its millions of soldiers, there
were not 2,000 cases of the fever, and on
February 13, 1917, Sir Alfred Keogh was able
to tell an audience in London that only five
cases of the disease were to be found in the
British Army. Sir Douglas Haig also testified
to the fact that the forces under his command
were free from preventable disease. That
these miraculous results — for they cannot be
regarded as anything else — were due to the
policy of inoculation adopted at the beginning
of the war no man could doubt.
Another notable scientific triumph was the
DRESSING A WOUNDED MAN IN A SHELTER.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
70
ridding of Serbia of typhus fever. Reference
has already been made to the beginning of the
gallant struggle made against this most deadly
disease. The struggle was entirely successful,
and its success fully bore out the idea that lice
were the means of transmitting this disease.
vestigators, Inada and Ito, reported the dis-
covery of a spirochaete in the liver of a guinea
pig which had been injected with the blood of
a patient who was suffering from epidemic
jaundice. In 1915 these authors came to the
conclusion that this spirochsete was the cause
A SERBIAN WELL.
The devoted band of scientific workers who
went out to fight the plague worked upon this
idea. They made it their business to prevent
spread by preventing the transit of lice from
infected to uninfected persons and so destroying
ths means of spread so far as possible. Before
Serbia was finally invaded the great epidemic
had been conquered.
One further piece of scientific work remains
to be dealt with — the discovery of the cause of
the so-called Weil's disease, or epidemic
jaundice. This disease broke out among the
troops in the East and also in Prance, and for
a time its true character was not guessed. The
disease had first been described by Weil in 1886.
It was characterized by jaundice, fever, and
haemorrhages, and it was apparently of an
infectious character. The disease broke ovit in
Eastern Japan in 1914, and 178 patients were
reported. The Japanese outbreak led to some
important bacteriological work and two in-
TROUSERS AS IMPROVIZED FILTER
IN MESOPOTAMIA.
of Weil's disease, and later they found that the
blood of patients recovering from the disease
contained antidotes against the spirochaete
they had discovered. This latter piece of in-
formation showed that the spirochaete was,
in fact, the cause of the disease, and that
recovery took place only when an antidote had
been produced by the blood. Further, the
investigators were able to show that when they
74
////: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
15
injected the blood of patients with Weil's
disease into guinea pigs tha animals developed
the disease and showed spirochsetes in their
livera and blood. It was found possible to
pass the infection from animal to animal and
in one strain they reached actually 50 genera-
tions.
It was at one time supposed that the mode of
infection in this disease was by the mouth
But Ito and Ohi were able to communicate the
disease to animals by applying material infected
by the spirochsetes to uninjured skin. That
led to the idea that possibly infection occurred
through the skin. In support of this rather
interesting view it was found that the disease
was frequent in men working in a certain part
ously under the microscope. The screwing
movements of the syphilis germ were not
seen, but the movements from side to side of
one end which Inada described were seen.
The spirochsetes could only be seen by refracted
light, and this gave them a peculiar appear-
ance, rather resembling a string of brilliants.
Efforts were at once made to treat cases of
the disease in animals with salvarsan (" 606 ").
But unhappily this drug, which had proved so
potent against the very similar spirochsete of
syphilis, was useless against the spirochsete of
jaundice, the so-called spirochcete ichter?-
hcemorrhagica. The work of devising some
lethal weapon against the new microbe was,
therefore, begun, and efforts were made to solve
TYPHOID BACILLI SHOWING FLAGELL^. SPIROCHyETE ICHTERO-H/EMORRHAGICA
of a coal mine, and that when the accumulated
water was pumped out of ths mina there was
no further case in that part of the mine. There
were more cases in wet than in dry mines, and
men working on the surface did not contract
the disease.
The cases which broke out in France were
at firs; supposed to be ordinary jaundice. But
when two fatal cases of very deep jaundice
were noted near one another the matter was
regarded as suggestive and investigations were
made by Captains Stokes and Ryle, R.A.M.C.
(Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps).
These investigations led to the finding of the
spirochsete in the blood of the patients and so
to the confirming o the work of the Japanese
investigators.
These spirochsetes were not unlike the famous
spirochcete pallida, the germ of syphilis. They
wen; actively mobile and lashed about vigor-
the riddle. Meanwhile, further knowledge of
the character and habit of the spirochsete was
being gained. The idea that it could penetrate
the skin and so gain access to the blood was be-
coming accepted — some workers with the spiro-
chsete had unhappily become victims to it.
Further, good grounds for supposing that the
germ was an inhabitant — possibly a normal in-
habitant— of the body of the rat had been found.
The rats presumably infected the trenches which
they inhabited in great numbers. The soldiers
then touched the infected places, and thus the
germ was able to gain an entrance to their bodies.
Here, again, the wonderful new detective
work of the scientist traced a deadly germ, and
convicted it as the cause of a disease. If no
cure was forthcoming at once, means of pre-
vention were made available by the new
knowledge obtained. Trenches from which
cases had come were dealt with in a very
Till-: T/.UKX HISTOEY <)!•' THK \\'AH.
BRITISH SICK AND WOUNDED ON BOARD SHIP.
thorough manner, and every effort made to
keep down the rats inhabiting them. In this
way the epidemic was checked.
In earlier chapters dealing with the health
of armies, efforts have been made to point out
how enormous was the influence exercised
upon the men by these devoted efforts to
preserve their health. No more need be said
upon that subject. But it must be pointed
out that this scientific work, begun by the
Army for the Anmy, had a vast effect upon the
attitude of the civil population to research
It inaugurated a new conception of medicine ;
it introduced new methods of attacking and
resisting disease ; the sure knowledge that by
mass attack upon these lines any disease could
be mastered and stamped out gained cur
rency. All manner of workers began to demand
that Army methods should be applied to the
problems of home life — the syphilis problem and
the problem of consumption. In the case of
syphilis a beginning was indeed made forth-
with, partly as a result of the findings of the
Royal Commission, and partly as a result of
public pressure. Thus the services of the Royal
Army Medical Corps were not only for the war
— they were for all time. In the Medical
Research Committee the British people had an
assurance that the good work would be carried
on in peace as in war, until one by one the
fortresses of disease should be assaulted and
forced to surrender.
CHAPTER CLXIX.
THE SHIPPING PROBLEM :
AUGUST, 1914 FEBRUARY, 1917.
EFFECT OF WAR ON SHIPPING UNFORESEEN — TIMID POLICIES— FIRST STEPS IN REQUISITIONING —
RISE IN FREIGHTS — EXCESS PROFITS — CAUSES of TONNAGE SCARCITY — PORT CONGESTION — CONTROL
OF THE FROZEN MEAT INDUSTRY — LICENSING OF VOYAGES — IMPORTANT COMMITTEES — ASQUITH
GOVERNMENT HESITATIONS — RESTRICTION OF IMPORTS — SHIPPING PROFITS — COAL FOR FRANCE
AND ITALY — MR. LLOYD GEORGE APPOINTS A SHIPPING CONTROLLER — SIR JOSEPH MACLAY'S
TASK — FIRST REFORMS — THE LOAD LINE — STANDARDIZED SHIPS — THE EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION
— EXPEDITING CONSTRUCTION — POOLING or LABOUR — SHIPBUILDING ABROAD — WOODEN SHIPS —
— CANADA — SECOND-HAND SHIPS — AUSTRALIAN PURCHASES — SHIPPING FUSIONS — NEUTRAL SHIP-
PING— INTER-ALLIED CHARTERING EXECUTIVE — INSURANCE. ^
WHEX war broke out no owner
could possibly have foreseen the
full extent of the changes which
were to be brought about in the
British mercantile marine within 30 months.
Such academic discussions as there had been
in the years of peace as to the probable effect
on British shipping of a war with Germany
had been confined practically to the expectation
that a few British merchant ships would be
sunk by German cruisers before the British
Navy was fully able to assert its complete
mastery over the enemy fleet. British owners
had reason enough to know that tho fighting
spirit was abroad in Germany in the aggressive
extension of the German shipping services,
encouraged and subsidized by the State, but
they sometimes thought that Germany would
achieve best what she wanted by an active
trade war. In any case, they argued in the
British business stylo so prevalent before the
Great War that foreign politics were no con-
cern of theirs but of the statesmen, who,
presumably, were awake. ,
Thus scarcely a merchant ship had ever
been modelled with military purposes in view.
One owner, perhaps, with the South African
Vol. XI.— Part 133.
campaign in mind, had favoured a particular
type of ship, partly owing to its suitability for
carrying men and horses, but one among many
hundreds was a negligible fraction. Yet the
owner who had been gifted with marvellous
foresight would have seen scores of merchant
ships transporting millions of men across the
waters and laden with horses and guns and
equipment and coal and stores. He would
have seen, as more and more vessels were
gradually requisitioned by the State, freights
rise to levels such as could never have been
visioned in his wildest dreams. He would have
seen, it is true, the German cruiser menace
dealt with quickly by the British Navy, but he
would have seen a more insidious form of
warfare instituted, because the enemy, in
practising it, put aside all considerations for
the safety of civilians, whether belonging to
belligerent or neutral nations, and gloated
while the victims drowned.
As the expert manager of shipping foresaw
so little, the ordinary business man could have
had small inkling of what was coming. He
did not foresee that the Army would have to
absorb millions of men, putting a heavy strain
on industry, and that the scarcity of labour
77
'////v TIMM HISTORY OF THE WAR.
[Ellivtt & Fry, pkolo.
LORD INCHCAPE, G.C.M.G.,
Chairman of the P. & O. Company.
at the docks and on the railways would bring
about great congestion and consequently most
serious delays to shipping. He did not foresee
that many imports, including even food sup-
plies, would have to be prohibited and drastic
restrictions be placed on others because of the
scarcity ot tonnage.
The statesman, too, could have had little
idea of how events would shape themselves.
It wa? understood that in the early days of
the war a general scheme of requisitioning was
submitted to the Admiralty, but was vetoed.
Thenceforward for nearly two and a half years
such statesmanship as was shown towards
what became known as the shipping problem
was fumbling and amateurish. At the Board
of Trade was a President who, by heredity
and early business experience, should have
been steeped in shipping lore, and the country
should have been infinitely the gainer by
that circumstance. Yet Mr. Walter Runciman,
with good intentions, industrious and self-
confident, entirely failed throughout to cope
with the issues ruis, il. iheru was little sign
of any leading on the part of the Board of
Trade, but there were so many committees
formed— so many cooks each with his finger
in the pie— that it was difficult to say whoso
\\as really th" responsibility for the chaos
into which shippinj: was allowed to drift. All
that was done to relieve the situation was
done in each instance only after there had
been strong public agitations. Steps were
pointed out to Mr. Asquith's Government
which it refused to take or ignored. It was
only after the formation of Mr. Lloyd George's
Government in December, 1916, that it became
clear that a firm grip had at last been secured on
the shipping problem. The measures taken
were very lite, but obviously this was a case
in which they were better late than never.
It was a fortunate circumstance that just
before the war there was more shipping afloat
than was actually required for the world's
needs. So great was the surplus that schemes
were actually mooted for laying up tonnage.
When, therefore, the Admiralty first began to
requisition vessels for war purposes, mam-
owners accepted the terms with alacrity, and
some were known to be delighted that their
ships were requisitioned at rates substantially
above those previously ruling in the market.
These terms were agreed upon between the
Admiralty and a number of committees formed
of the owners of the different classes of tonnage,
over all of which Lord Inchcape, G.C.M.G..
Chairman of the P. & O. Company, presided.
They provided scales of hire for liners of varying
speed, cross-Channel steamers, oil-tank vessels,
large and small cargo steamers, and colliers.
" The shipowners," wrote Lord Inchcape to
Lord Mersey, the President of the Admiralty
Transport Arbitration Board which had been
set up, " have responded loyally to the de-
mands of the country, and have placed all their
resources ungrudgingly at the service of the
Government in this national emergency. The
shipowners' foresight and enterprise have
placed at the disposal of the Government a
splendid fleet of transports which have for
years been run without anything in the shape
of Government aid." And he added, " bur,
inasmuch as the rates and conditions agreed
upon were in all cases arrived at by a process
of give and take, and by an honest determina-
tiori to arrive at a fair and friendly settlement,
I venture to express the hope that the Admiralty
will not regard thorn as in any sense a maximum
which is capable of reduction, and at the same
time I trust that the shipowners will not look
upon them as a minimum on which increases
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
79
may be built, as any dispute of this kind
on either side would inevitably lead to a re-
opening of all the questions and considerations
which led up to our recommendations." Some
of the rates in the course of time were modified,
hut the terms then agreed upon formed the basis
on which practic.illy the whole of the British
mercantile marine had, by the beginning of
1917, come under requisition to the Government.
The rates scheduled were based on the gross
tonnage, whereas rates of charter in the market
are usually based on deadweight carrying
capacity. A representative rate for cargo
steamers under the agreement with the Govern-
ment was about lls. per gross ton per month,
equivalent to about 7s. on the deadweight.
Before the war, owners had been earning
about 5s., and in the first few weeks after the
outbreak of hostilities vessels were actually
chartered at 3s. ; so the terms seemed satis-
factory enough. But a new factor was soon
introduced, namely, a sharp rise in working
expenses caused by increases in wage charges,
great advances in .the cost of coals, which be-
came more and more accentuated, and dearer
Stores of all descriptions.
Within a few months owners were regarding
the requisitioning terms which had become
known as the Blue Book rates as almost
absurdly low, although there was never
any dovibt of the rates leaving a substantial
surplus over working costs in respect of existing
tonnage. The Government felt compelled to
explain with what care the vessels of individual
owners were requisitioned, the plan being to
take, as far as possible, the same proportion
from each fleet, so that no undue " hardship "
was inflicted on particular owners by excessive
demands. This attitude was adopted so
assiduously that in February, 1916, the Director
of Transports considered it appropriate to ad-
dress a letter to owners in an apologetic strain,
suggesting certain reflections for. their con-
sideration, which he hoped would reconcile
them to having their ships employed in Govern-
ment service. The following extract? are
illuminating, as indicating the ideas which
prevailed at that time :
An owner, who has at the moment done more than
the average of service may reflect that the result may
be a freedom from requisitioning at a later date which
may fully, or more than fully, compensate him. He
will doubtless also reflect that, in any event, the help
he has been asked to give can scarcely be considered
an excessive contribution to the naval and military
requirements of the war, in view of the extent to which
COALING LINERS.
80
THE TIMES HISTCHiY OF THE WAX.
his profit, in re,|>eet ot hi- in".- vessels, ha bean InonaMd
tlireetly by \v;ir eoiiilit ions. an<! hv the ine\ if nhli.' re-
strietions of tonnage n-snltin^ from reiiuisitinninf!. It
i* hoped that if "II miner- I«-<ir these considerations
in mind they will very nirely timl it necessary to make
representations to the department (which will have
alrealy eotisiilered the employment of the vessels and
the owner's share "l iBrvioe) to eatieel requisitions that
may have been served to them.
The phrasing of tlie letter shows that there
was every desire to treat owners very gently
and generously.
Foreign owners did not foresee any moro
than most British owners what was coining.
This was proved by the fact that in the autumn
of 1914 a few .British owners were able to
charter neutral vessels at extremely low rates,
the neutral owners in some cases stipulating
that their vessels should be chartered for not
less than twelve months. Those British owners
who had sufficient foresight to enter into these
transactions were able to make very large
profits on the transactions.
Since the beginning of the war the re-
quisitioning of vessels had been' the main
influence in causing a scarcity of shipping for
commerco. The fast and largo liner was
required to \>o fitted out as an armed merchant
cruiser, a transport, or a hospital ship. Colliers
were required to accompany the Fleet .and
cargo ships to carry supplies 1'or the nrn
and to bring commodities over which the
Government took control, such us sugar and.
later, wheat.
By the end of 1914 the withdrawal of ton-
n.iL'r was affecting freights. The grain freight
from Argentina rose from 12s. 6d. per ton at
the end of July, 1914, to 50s., as compared
with 37s. 6d. per ton, which was th* highest
point reached during the " boom " year of
1912. The freight, however, was to advance
fir further throughout 1915 and 1916. By
the end of 1915 the Argentine freight advanced
to 130s., and during 1916 to 183s. 6d., repre-
senting as compared with the low rate of 1914
an increase of 171s. In normal years L'.V.
would have been regarded as a very satis-
factory rate, so that compared even with (his
the highest freight touched in 1916 represented
a sevenfold increase. Early in 1917 the
position was taken closely in hand, and rates
were brought down to a rather lower basis. A
large proportion of these abnormally high
freights went, of course, to the Government in
the form of excess profit taxation ; indeed, there
is reason to believe that this policy stimulalcd
the rise. For instance, on September 20,
the day before the announcement by
uuuueu
'), 1 <»i:,
jy Mr. f
SHIPPING COAL AT GRIMSBY.
THE TIMES H1STOEY OF THE WAR.
81
COAL TIPS AT SWANSEA.
McKenna, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
of an excess profit tax of 50 per cent., the
Argentine rate was 57s. 6d. a ton. Within a
month it had risen to 70s., and by the end of
that year to 120s. Other rates also moved in
the samo direction, showing the influence of
the taxation. On the same day of 1915 the
rate for wheat from the Atlantic ports of the
United States to the West of England was 9s.
a quarter; by October 20 it had risen to 12s.,
and by the end of the year to 16s. It sub-
sequently advanced to 20s., the highest point
reached in 1916. On September 20, 1915, the
rate for coals from Cardiff to the West of Italy
was 32s. as compared with about 7s. 6d. a ton
before the war ; within a month it had advanced
to 42s. 6d., and by the end of the year to 65s.,
subsequently rising to lOOo. The excess profit
taxation gave owners an opportunity of
arguing that the rise in the rate was com-
paratively harmless, since the bulk of the
profits went to the Government. Yet the
amount remaining to them was very substantial
indeed. There was also an impression pre-
vailing that the Government did not look
altogether unfavourably on these high freights,
because they meant such large contributions
to the Exchequer. But if high freights were
really regarded as a convenient means of
taxation, the system was undoubtedly an
unfair one to many classes of the population.
By a real system of control there is no doubt
that it could have been avoided, and the monev
TIPPING A COAL TRUCK.
paid by consumers in respect of high freights,
part of which was retained by shipowners,
would have been available for direct con-
tribution to the State.
The chief causes of the short supply of
shipping available for commerce may now be
recounted. The outstanding reason was the
requisitioning of a very large proportion of
tonnage for Government services ; and, in this
connexion, first the Dardanelles Campaign and
then the Salonika Expedition threw a very
heavy burden on the mercantile marine. The
imperious demands of the fighting departments
had naturally to be met — sometimes at very
short notice — and as the war progressed ship
after ship had to be withdrawn from commerce,
producing great disturbance in particular trades.
Precisely what proportion was requisitioned
from time to time was not exactly stated,
but indications were given on various occasions,
and especially in Parliament in February, 1917.
133-2
82
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
LOADING WHEAT IN AUSTRALIA.
On February 13, Lord Curzon. a member of the
War Cabinet, indicated that the bulk of British
shipping was so requisitioned. On the following
day Sir Leo Chiozza Money, Parliamentary
Secretary to the Shipping Controller, pointed
out that it was not true to say that three-
quarters of our shipping was engaged in the
services of the Army and Navy, since the
vessels so employed were occupied in many
commercial services as well as those of the
nation. The 75 per cent, which had been
described as being engaged in naval or military
service for ourselves and our Allies referred to
miscellaneous services, and, in addition, some
of the major services of the population were
included in the 75 per cent. The carrying of
ore, and of wheat and sugar, the most essential
supplies for the people, alone accounted for
12 per cent, of the tonnage which had been
<|i 'scribed as employed in national service.
Since so large a proportion of shipping was
in direct Government service obviously much
doj>ended upon the use which was made of it.
There was from the beginning of the war a great
deal of criticism of the Government Depart-
ments concerned, on the ground that the most
efficient use was not being made of the tonnage
requisitioned, and on December 23, 1915. Mr.
Balfour, then First Lord of the Admiralty, did
not dispute that there was waste, but he
maintained that it was unavoidable. He
reasoned that the Admiralty Transport Depart-
ment was a department and nothing but a,
department for obtaining for the Army, and
for tho Navy in a secondary degree, but
primarily and mostly for the Army, the shipping
necessary for the conveyance of troops and
supplies. " The Army," he continued, " say
we want such and such ships, or rather they
say we want so many thousand men conveyed
from such and such a place to another place.
We want for the supply of those troops so many
tons conveyed, so many horses conveyed, and
so many hospital ships provided, and all the
Admiralty Transport Department has to do —
and it is no light matter, it is very difficult and
responsible work— is to provide that tonnagi-
and provide it as far as it can with fairness ii>
the shipping trade — a very difficult operation —
and with as little inconvenience to those who
are engaged in carrying on the shipping industry
as may be. . . . The Director of Transports is
perpetually urging upon those who use the
tonnage that it should be utilized economically
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
and that transports should be unloaded with
speed and returned as soon as possible. It is
the Army and the Admiralty, regarded as
fighting departments, which requisition ; it is
the Army and Navy that manage the loading
and unloading of transport at home and
abroad. It is not fair or just to throw upon a
department which has no power to deal with
this question any responsibility for such
wastage as may have occurred." He con-
tinued :
The Department of the Admiralty is not and cannot bo
made responsible for the fact that a particular transport
is kept three weeks when she might perhaps have been
kept only for a week. The result is very serious, but it
is not the fault of the Admiralty or the Board of Trade,
and I have not yet discovered a thoroughly satisfactory
method of dealing with it. Something is being done,
however, but it can only be done through the people
responsible for the military operations. If a General
says, " I am very sorry that this or that ship should be
detained, but detained she must l>e in the military
interests of the expedition," what am I to say ? What
is the Secretary for War, or the Transport Department,
or the Board of Trade, to say ? They cannot say any-
thing except, " Please be as economical with the tonnage
as you can, because it is of national importance that as
much as possible should be available for the general
purposes of the country."
I hope the House will see that I have been perfectly
candid and that I have shown where, in my opinion, the
shoe pinches. If you can suggest a method of dealing
with the situation which gets over the difficulty I shall
be most happy to consider it. I do not think it can
be dealt with by central control here. AH that can be
done is to press upon those who have to conduct these
military operations the extreme desirability of saving
the tonnage in the general interests.
The position was not left until the end of the
war entirely in this distinctly unsatisfactory
state, as will be shown later.
Another primary cause of the short supply
of tonnage was the very serious delay at all
ports owing to congestion. When ships were
delayed for months in port, either waiting for
berths or alongside the docks while discharge
proceeded very slowly, whereas in ordinary
times they would have been able to discharge
and load again within a few days, it was obvious
that the carrying capacity was terribly cur-
tailed. The public probably never had any real
perception of the extent to which the short
supply was due to these delays, and even ship-
owners who did understand what they meant
encountered the greatest difficulty in getting
any measures adopted to effect an improve-
ment. The difficulty was due mainly to
the withdrawal of very large numbers of dock
workers and railway men for the Army, and
also quite noticeably to Customs regulations
introduced for the purpose of preventing goods
from reaching the enemy. Lack of organization
[French Official phdograpli.
UNLOADING DRIED COD FROM NEWFOUNDLAND AT FECAMP.
84
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL
in shipping large quantities of commodities
controlled by the Government was also a
factor.
Then the substitution of long voyages for
short distance passages was also a factor. For
instance, whereas the bulk of our sugar supplies
before the war merely had to be brought across
the North Sea from Germany, directly this
source of supply ceased sugar had to be brought
from the East and West Indies and Centra!
America. Then the locking up of so large a
proportion of the German Mercantile Marine in
home and neutral ports had left more work for
neutral vessels to do. New demands, moreover,
were made upon shipping. Thus, there
was a formidable fleet of ships allocated
H1HBBBMBHHHBBBHB
FLOATING ELEVATOR.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
35
to bring foodstuffs for the Belgian popu-
tion organized by the Commission for
Relief in Belgium. There were also, as
is well known, large shipments of munitions
from the United States to England and the
other European ports of the Allies, and there
were shipments of supplies from the United
States to Vladivostok, for Russian account ;
while the detention owing to ice of many vessels
during the winter of 1914-15 at Archangel should
have been avoided. The closing of the Panama
Canal in consequence of a " slide " from the
end of September, 1915, until the middle of the
following March, came at a critical time and
by prolonging voyages accentuated the short
supply. All the time the sinking of ships by the
enemy continued, increasing periodically in
numbers for a time as fresh campaigns were
started. Some figures given by Lord Curzon in
the House of Lords on February 13 are interest-
ing. He stated that in July, 1914, there were
3,890 vessels of over 1,600 tons gross, with a
total of 16,850,000. On January 31, 1917, the
total number was 3,540 and the total tonnage
just under 16,000,000. Thus, in 30 months of
the war the net loss of this class of vessel from
all causes in the British Mercantile Marine
amounted to only from 5 to 6 per cent, of the
gross tonnage. The figures would have been
more valuable if a line had not been drawn at
1,600 tons, because a large number of vessels
of smaller tonnage are very useful.
The German submarine campaign could have
been encountered with equanimity if the ship-
yards of the country had been freely available
to undertake mercantile work. Owing, how-
ever, to very large demands made upon the
shipbuilding resources of the country by the
Admiralty, the output of merchant tonnage
was reduced to very small proportions. Even
the normal wastage of tonnage due to ordinary
marine perils could not be made good.
Just as the main cause of the scarcity of
shipping was due to Government requisitioning,
so was the extraordinary rise in freights.
Directly the Government began to requisition
shipping in the early days of the war, rates for
free tonnage advanced. As more and more
tonnage was removed from the market, the
competition for what was left increased until
any free vessels could get practically any freight.
When vessels engaged in regular trades were
ift (uisitioned, their owners went into the market
and chartered " tramp " steamers to take their
place— a procesr- which was quite the most
effective method of forcing up freights, and was
humorously described as the " snowball
system." For every vessel required by the
Government two were disturbed. The most
unfortunate effect of the Government's policy
was the benefit it conferred on neutral shipping.
The more British vessels were requisitioned, the
higher the freights which neutrals could demand.
Yet the latter would have been well satisfied
in the early months of the war with rates
of hire for long periods which later came
to be regarded as ridiculously low. Even if
large numbers had not been chartered by the
British Government at these low rates, it was
obvious that, with all British shipping undor the
control of the Government, rates for neutral
vessels would never have risen to such extra-
ordinary levels. In normal times owners had
experience of the depressing effect on freights
of diverting ships into a particular trade. So
what had been done in a comparatively small
way by private owners as an ordinary incident
of business could have been done on a large
scale by a Government authority backed by-
vast resources.
Although for nearly two and a half years no
bold policy was adopted, measure after measure
was introduced and committee after committee ,
created. The problem was never dealt with |
as a whole but piecemeal : all was patch -work. P
Some of the steps, taken generally after the
need for some improvement had become obvious
to the merest layman, may now bo described.
The first decision, which represented one of the
few^fcjjpntaneous acts of the Government, was
to requisit'ioji the services of a number of ship-
owners to assist the Transport Department of
the~~Admiralty. Their duties were understood
to~1>e to advise the officials as to the suitability
of tonnage for particular work and to acquire
vessels, as far as possible, in proportion to the
size of the fleets belonging to the different
ownerships. From time to time the services
of other owners were enlisted for this depart-
ment, which at the outbreak of war was quite a
small one. No doubt, although owners were
merely acting in an advisory capacity to the
Transport Department, their services were yet
of great value.
One of the most successful measures adopted
throughout the war was carried out at the
instigation of owners themselves, and provided
for the requisitioning of the whole of the
insulated spaces in British steamships trading
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
between Australia and Now Zealand ami
England. This was put into effect by an
Order in Council issued in April, 1916, and \va.-.
followed in May l>y a similar order applicable to
the insulated steamers in the South American
trade. It was plain to owners that, unless
such measures were adopted, there would be
no limit to the rise in freights for the carriage
of frozen and chilled meat. There was plenty
of meat overseas, and the supply in England was
regulated solely by the amount of freights,
and it was known that foreign firms were pre-
pared to pay almost any price for tonnage. The
Board of Trade approved the scheme and rates
wore agreed upon amounting to only about
l|d. a Ib. as compared with Id. per Ib. before
the war. The following account of the measures
taken was given in the annual report of Messrs.
W. Weddel A Co. for 1915 :
The importance of frozen meat in connexion with the
conduct of the great war was made abundantly manifest
in the course of 1914 ; but it was not until the beginning
of 1915 that the British Government took the steps
necessary to secure what was practically complete control
of the industry at all stages. The requisitioning of the
output of the freezing works of Australia and New
Zealand, by agreement with the Australasian Govern-
ments, on terms more or less acceptable to the producers,
secured the main supplies produced within the British
Umpire ; while the simple expedient of commandeering
the British refrigerated mercantile marine effectually
secured control of foreign supplies— primarily of South
America, and indirectly of North America and all outside
sources. These -important steps, far-reaching in their
consequences, were taken with a view to guaranteeing
the- necessary supplies not only for the British Army and
<_'fHi'rul publir, but also for the French Army, and,
latterly, for the Italian. They involved fundamental
changes in the methods of carrying on a Y;IM trade which
has been built up painstakingly during the past 30 years.
In order to attain the objects of the Board of Trade and
the U'nr Olli.-e, existing contracts were left unfilled or
unceremoniously cancelled ; steamers were diverted on
short notice from their intended routes ; the established
modes of buying and of selling were entirely altered ;
freedom of contract ceased to exist ; and at every stage
the industry became regulated and controlled at the wilt
of the authorities, untrammelled by any ordinary con-
siderations of Joss or profit.
In the spring of 1915 a further measure of
control was introduced in a request that all
o\raers should keep the Admiralty informed
of the movements of al! their ships. E-irly
in that summer a scheme was instituted on
behalf of the Indian Government for buying
and importing Indian wheat. The freight
arrangements were put in the hands of a well-
known broker, who was successful in re-
taining the rates upon a comparatively low
basis. Little more was done until the following
November, when three committees were ap-
pointed by the Government. The first com
inittee WAS-£OJ_ dealing^ with the congestion _at
the ports, which had then become a very
FILLING SACKS WITH WHEAT FROM FLOATING ELEVATOR.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
87
[French Official rhntofrapli.
FLOUR FROM AMERICA.
DISCHARGING
serious matter. Its duties were described in
the official announcement as follows :
The Prime Minister has appointed a Committee to
inquire into difficulties and congestion arising from time
to time at harbours, ports, and docks (including dock-
sheds and warehouses) in the United Kingdom.; to
regulate the work and traffic thereat ; to coordinate the
requirements of all interests concerned so as to avoid so
far as possible interference with the normal flow of trade ;
to decide all questions relating to the difficulties and
congestion aforesaid that may be referred to them :
and to give directions to all executive bodies at the
harbours, ports, and docks for carrying their decisions
into effect.
Lord Inchcape was chairman, and the
following were members, of the Board : Mr.
Graeme Thomson and Major T. H. Hawkins
(Admiralty), Brigadier-General the Hon. A. R.
Monta Stuart Wortley (War Office); Sir
Frederick Bolton, Mr. J. G. Broodbank, Sir
Sam Fay, Sir Edward H.iin and Sir A. Norman
Hill, and the secretary was Sir Frederick
Dumayne, Board of Trade.
The committee was thus representative of
the Admiralty, the War Office, shipping
companies, dock companies and the railways.
It soon set to work to deal, among other things,
with a great loss and delay resulting from the
JACK'S FLOUR SUPPLY.
various formalities which had to be observed
before goods could be exported, owing to tho
lack of Customs Officers at the docks with any
discretionary powers. It had frequently hap-
pened that vessels had to sail with a largp
amount of empty space, leaving hundreds of
tens of cargo in the sheds marked " Not
passed by Customs." A special form of
Shipping Note was introduced, which was found
considerably to facilitate shipments.
The second committee was for the licensing of
ships, the principle being that, as ships were
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
[French Official Photograph.
SPANISH SAILING VESSELS BRINGING ORANGES.
urgently required in British trade, the voyages
of British ships between foreign ports should be
subject to scrutiny. The desire not to interfere
until absolutely necessary with ships trading
abroad had been reasonable since, before the
war, Great Britain had acted as carrier for tin-
world, and the profits earned by such trading
were especially useful during the war as an
.•instance to foreign exchange questions. The
committee was able to relieve the situation by
refusing licences for voyages to ports known to
be seriously congested. The chairman of this.
committee was Mr. (afterwards Sir) Maurice Hill,
who in January, 1917, was appointed a judge in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of
the High Court, in the place of Mr. Justice
Bargrave Deane, resigned, and it included
Mr. F. W. Lewis, deputy chairman of Furness,
Withv & Co., as vice-chairman, Mr. H. A.
Sanderson (the president of the International
Mercantile Marine Co., and chairman of the
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.), Mr. Schole-
field, a shipowner of Newcastle, Mr. Purdie of
Glasgow, and Mr. Burton Chadwick of Liver-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
89
pool. This committee proved a workmanlike
body and steadily earned an excellent reputa-
tion for dealing expeditiously with applications.
The. principle of ship licensing was developed
further in March, 1916, when it was made
applicable to all ships of over 500 tons gross
trading to and from the United Kingdom.
This committee was now able to assist in the
relief of the congestion at British ports by
refusing licences to ports where it was known
ships could not be dealt with quickly, in the
same way as had already been done in the case
of foreign ports.
The third committee was made responsible
for the requisitioning of ships for the carriage
of foodstuffs. It was presided over by Mr.
J. H. Whitley, M.P., and included the three
owners who had been advising the Transport
Department of the Admiralty — namely, Mr. T.
Royden, deputy-chairman of the Cunard Com-
pany, Mr. E. G. Glover, previously known as a
member of the firm of Glover Bros., ship and
insurance brokers, and Mr. R. D. Holt, M.P., the
Liverpool owner. The policy of the committee
was to direct owners to load their vessels in
trades where tonnage was especially wanted,
leaving them to accept the full market rates.
Thus a number of vessels were released from
Admiralty service on condition that they
loaded wheat in North America. There were
still signs, however, of confusion and the lack
of any firm grip on the situation.
For instance, on November 3, 1915, the
Board of Trade informed owners that, with a
view to encouraging imports <5f wheat, vessels
loading in North America not later than
December 15 should be exempt from requisi-
tion (a well-known bait) on arrival at a United
Kingdom port. They were to be free to start
on another voyage, which need not necessarily
be a North Atlantic voyage, after discharge of
fjirgo. One effect of this attractive offer had,
however, not been foreseen. Owners who
could not take advantage of it as their trade
was not in the North Atlantic also applied
for the exemption of their vessels because they
considered that these were being equally well
employed elsewhere.
No doubt there would have been distinct
difficulty in drawing a line, so within two days
tins privilege was cancelled. The issue and
withdrawal of this order followed very closely
upon the issue and withdrawal by the Board
of Trade, '' after further consideration p,nd
discussion," of a far-reaching clause which
it had been proposed to have inserted in bill?
of lading, but which had quickly been seen by
merchants and brokers to be quite unworkable.
These two little incidents naturally confirmed
the opinion which was then being very strongly
expressed by many business men, that the
authorities were still only groping, and were
still intent on patching wherever a particularly
blatant evil became exposed, instead of dealing
with the p'roblem as a whole. What, it was
felt, was obviously needed was not a multi-
plicity of committees co-equal in authority and
overlapping each other, but one supreme
central expert authority who, while availing
himself of the best advice, would be able to
know what he could and could not do.
The Times consistently urged the pressing
MR. F. W. LEWIS,
Deputy Chairman of Furness, Withy & Co.
need for more effective control. On January 17,
1916, its Shipping Correspondent wrote :
Before the war, there was in one direction work for,
say, 100 ships to do, and, since wastage during peace
was comparatively unimportant, it mattered little to
the nation whether these 100 ships were in the hands
of one or of ten owners. But now, though there is still
work for 100 ships, there are, say, only 60 ships to do it.
It is vitally important that every ton measurement of
sjmeo shall be put to the most effective use for the
benefit of the whole nation. The point is, therefore,
whether the most efficient work will be got out of all
these ships if they are still in the hands of 10 British
owners, each with his own ideas, and each intent on
133-3
90
THE TIMES HISTOliY OF THI-: WAR.
doing the best he can for himself, or, if they are con-
trolled by one supreme authority. No competent
shipping manager can have any doubt on the matter.
The supreme expert authority would be able to take
a comprehensive view of the work which our imaginary
100 ships used to perform, and would admit that it was
useless to expect the 60 ships now left to do the whole
of it. Consequently, the authority would have to
decide which trades were essential to the country, and
which, in view of the circumstances, could best be
spared. The supreme authority would discover all
sorts of anomalies in the present conditions. Inquiry,
for instance, might be made, whether it was in the best
interests of the country that great volumes of space
in British ships should now be used for transporting
loss of his commission on management, since all would
be paid on the same generous scale, whatever work
their ships were doing. The supreme authority would
interfere as little as possible with the management of
the ships, but the one aim always before it would be the
use of the ships in the best interest of the country. It
would hold a watching brief for the nation. Instead of
ollicials of the Transport Department of the Admiralty
the President and officials of the Board of Trade, the
Indian and Colonial Governments, the Advisory Com-
mittee to the Transport Department of the Admiralty,
the Ship Licensing Committee, and the Committee for
Requisitioning Ships for the Carriage of Foodstuffs, and
various other bodies all overlapping each other and
bringing about no real improvement, there would be one
UNLOADING FROZEN MEAT.
cheap American motor-cars from New York to
Australia. Many other questions might with ad-
vantage be examined. There is only one authority
which could exercise such a beneficent inauenco,
and that is an expert shipping authority appointed by
the Government. There is only one way in which such
authority could be exercised, and that is by hiring all
ships to the State for the period of the war.
The particular rate of hire then advocated
was one based on the cost price of the ship.
The State (it was pointed out) can afford to treat the
shipowner very generously. It could afford to pay the
owner a handsome percentage of the original cost of the
ships, after some allowance for depreciation, and, in
addition, it could afford, in order to encourage the owner to
i-iintiimi! to give his Ix-st attention to the management of
the ship-, a commission on the profits. The owners
would 1* asked to manage their ships, just as at present, ;
hut when the Admiralty wanted a ship there would be
11. me of the forcing up of freights which is tho immediate
effect of the present system of requisitioning.
No owner would "suffer " through having his ship
withdrawn for Admiralty work, except possibly from tin-
supreme authority with which the control of British
shipping in the best interests of the nation for the period
of the war would rest.
On the following day it was pointed out :
Owners manage their own ships according to their
individual ideas, and not solely with the aim of putting
them to the best po.ssible use in the service of the State.
Sailings are maintained, although the particular trades
may be very quiet ; while in other trades there are not
nearly sufficient vessels. Obviously, only a supreme
authority would be able to see all the trades in their
proper perspective, and could provide that ships should
he allotted to the routes in which they were most
urgently needed.
Again, on January 19 it was pointed out
that " high shipping authorities are convinced
that the gain in efficiency from a central control,
such ns has been described in The Times during
the past few days, would be very substantial
indeed."
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
91
The agitation could not be ignored, but Mr.
Runoiman, the then President of the Board of
Trade, still hesitated to take drastic measures.
In the House of Commons on January 19 he
said :
There is a, serious shortage of the world's tonnage
as compared with the world's requirements. We
went fully into the question of commandeering the
whole of British tonnage in order to regulate freights,
and came to the conclusion (a conclusion which is, I
believe, confirmed by all the experts who have studied
the question) that this particular remedy would only
is assured." Although the functions of this
body were never more closely defined, the
genera! assumption was that it was to exercise a
general sort of supervision over the whole of
British shipping, and that the appointment of
the committee was intended to be a reply to the
demand for closer .control. The composition
of the committee was criticized on the ground
that Lord Curzon, the Chairman, had no direct
knowledge of shipping, that Mr. Royden and
Mr. Lewis, whose ability no one doubted, were
AUSTRALIAN MEAT IN COLD STORAGE.
aggravate the shortage of tonnage available for the
United Kingdom and the Allies.
By January 27 the Government had, how-
ever, come to the conclusion that some form of
centralized control was required, and the then
President of the Board of Trade announced
that, in order that tonnage should be allocated
to the best advantage of the Allied Govern-
ments, the Government was to be assisted by
a small body consisting of Lord Faringdon, Mr.
Thomas Royden, and Mr. F. W. Lewis, presided
over by Lord Curzon, who had accepted the
invitation of the Prime Minister to undertake
this duty. It was added that "all the expert
committees dealing with these complex and
many-sided shipping problems are in the closest
touch with each other so that full cooperation
already advisers of the Government on shipping,
and that the experience of Lord Faringdon,
then better known as Sir Alexander Henderson,
Chairman of the Great Central Railway Com-
pany, had been gained mainly in railway
management and finance. Consequently there
was> no addition to the councils of the Govern-
ment of any fresh force recognized as a leader
of the shipping industry. It was not until tho
end of the year, on December 4, 1916, that Mr.
Asquith. then Prime Minister, appointed Sir
Kenneth Anderson, K.C.M.G., one of the
managers of the Orient Line, to be a member
of the " Shipping Control Committee."
On January 27, 1916, the President of the
Board of Trade also announced that the Govern-
92
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE HM/,'.
incut hail decided to cut down some of the
imports less essential for national existence,
which then occupied space in vessels arriving
in port or prevented vessels being used for more
urgent purposes. Paper, paper pulp and grass for
making of paper were the first subjects for the
jperation of this policy because, it was stated,
of their great bulk and influence on tonnage.
Mr. Runciman explained that he had been in
conference with the paper-makers and news-
paper proprietors and had had the benefit
of their views. In order to conserve the
internal sources of the raw material of paper,
the export from this country of rags and waste -
paper was prohibited. On February 16, 1916,
the appointment of a Royal Commission was
announced, with Sir Thomas Whittaker as
chairman, to grant licences for the importation
of paper and paper-making materials, the
intention being to cut down the supplies by
one-third. In continuation of this policy
the importation of a large number of other
articles and materials of a bulky nature was
shortly afterwards prohibited except under
licence, including raw tobacco, of which there
were very large stocks in this country ; many
building materials; furniture woods and
veneers ; and some fruits. Special Com-
missions were appointed to deal with each
trade. Further very drastic restrictions on
imports were announced by Mr. Lloyd George
as Prime Minister on February 23, 1917.
These proposals involved the prohibition of
imports of certain fruits, foreign teas, coffer
and cocoa, rum, and a number of manufactured
articles, and a reduction of paper and paper-
making materials by a half, and a very formid-
able curtailment of many other commodities.
The policy of limiting imports to necessities
was obviously a right one, for whatever
system was adopted of controlling tonnage it
was clear that there were not sufficient ships
to carry on the commerce of the country
on the same scale as in pre-war times. The
main cause of the scarcity of tonnage for ordin-
ary commerce was the large amount of shipping
directly in Government service. The public
which had to suffer by the restriction of trade
was justified in urging that the utmost efficiency
should be secured from the vessels removed
from commerce. A number of extraordinary
cases of the ineffectual use of requisitioned
vessels had been quoted, indicating what
appeared to the commercial mind flagrant
instances of waste. Still, nobody doubted the
strain thrown on the Transport Department of
the Admiralty, and there was every desire to
give it full credit for the highly important and
successful part it had taken in arranging for
the transport of enormous numbers of men and
s -applies overseas. While the restrictio s of
imports were being put into operation in 1910,
freights were still rising, and th? profits of
shipping companies, us publicly announced,
were, as a rule, very large indeed. The^e
TORPEDOED WITHOUT WARNING : THE END OF AN UNARMED "sHuT
THE TIMES H1STOEY OF THE WAR.
HOME WITH
A battered steamer
profits, not unnaturally, created a good deal
of unrest, especially among labour. Ship-
owners generally came in for some very-
sharp criticism, which in all cases -was not
<|iiit<> justified. A number of owners had in
tin' parly days of the war made it quite clear
that they did not want to make extraordinary
profits out of the war ; by enterprise and good
management they had established successful
!>u*in"-is;-s yielding satisfactory returns, and the
HONOUR:
making for port.
idea of benefiting from the national misfortune
was repugnant to them. It cannot, however,
be said that this was the attitude adopted in«all
quarters. The arguments in justification of
high profits were, usually, that the returns in
some of the years preceding the war had been
poor, and that there was no agitation on the
part of the public when shipowners had been
unable to make both ends meet. Then it was
argued that shipowners were quite helpless —
94
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
I luit the cvtr.iordinary freights were forced
upon them by merchants out -bidding each
other for tonnage ; in other words, that there
mis no g.iiusaying the law of supply and
demand. It was even advanced, further, that
high freights were actually a benefit, since they
acted as a restraint on imports, only those
commodities which could bear high rates being
imported. There was, of course, a limit to.be
put to this argument, for, if it was merely a
question of high freight, many " luxuries "
could bear much higher rates than what were
regarded as the necessaries of the poorer classes.
Finally, there was always the argument at the
back that high freights were a convenient means
of taxing the people every time they bought
bread, since so large a proportion of the excess
profits went to the State. On September 21,
1915, this excess profit taxation had been fixed
at 50 per cent., and in the following April it
was raised to 60 per cent. The weakness of
this argument of high taxation was, however,
that the larger the amount that" went to the
State the larger the amount which was retained
by the shipowners themselves. Thus it hap-
pened that within a very short time of the first
imposition of the excess profit taxation freights
rose to such an extent that the 50 per cent,
(hen allowed to be retained by owners exceeded
the whole 100 per cent, before the tax was in
troduced. It was to be regretted that during
the war shipowners did undoubtedly earn a bad
name as " profiteers." All did not deserve it,
but all were tarred with the same brush. The
public had no means of discriminating, and any
owner who was inclined to take up an in-
dependent line was thought by his fellow-
owners to be rendering a dis-service to the
shipping industry. It was common for British
owners, quite effectively, to point to the even
larger profits which were earned by neutrals,
but they shut their eyes to the fact that
under the British system, or, rather, lack of
system, the neutral was benefiting far more than
the British owner. The enormous strengthen-
ing of the neutral owner's position was indeed
one of the serious and permanent results of
the shipping muddle. This was proved again
and again by the fact that neutrals were able
to pay far higher prices for new tonnage than
British owners. They paid enormous prices
for ships in the United States, and even placed
orders in the British Empire, as in British
Columbia and in the Allied country, .Japan.
A BUSY TIME AT THE BONDED WAREHOUSES.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
85
[Official Photograph.
DOCKERS IN KHAKI UNLOADING FROZEN MEAT AT LIVERPOOL.
In order to assist in the relief of congestion at the ports Transport Workers' Battalions were formed.
It was a pity that the criticism to which
owners were exposed was not always taken in
good part. An angry outburst by Sir Walter
Runciman, in February, 1916, at the annurJ
meeting of the Moor Line (Ltd.), which had
disclosed very large profits, portrayed a
spirit which was not very helpful in solving
a problem that had even then become of extreme
importance to this country and her Allies. In
the course of his speech Sir Walter said :
There is a comic as well as a serious side to some of
the denunciation to which we are subjected, which is
ojways exhilarating when the irrepressible self-styled
" expert " of shipping matters, with h'3 head whirling
with abstract notions, abandons himself with tragic
solemnity to the task of teaching successful, well-
informed men who, notwithstanding their human
failings, are at all events a national asset, how they
.should carry on an industry that the self-styled
"experts" may have lamentably failed to make a
success of. This class of person has a mania for im-
parting knowledge they do not in any degree uiidoi1-
stand. Let it be understood that I am speaking
of types ; some of them are superlatively ignorant of
every commercial instinct. Their assurance stuns the
imagination, and their pitiful panaceas indicate the mind
of a quack. They are like unto a tub when, filled to
overflowing, all at once the bottom falls out.
Shipowners were occasionally apt to overlook
the fact that the rise in freights had reached
such proportions that every single person in the
country was vitally affected, and that a policy
of laisser faire could not be condoned.
At about this time there was a very strong
feeling on the subject of the high prices ruling
for coal in France and Italy. With a large
proportion of the French coalfields in the hands
of the German Army, France became, to a very
considerable extent, dependent upon British
supplies. The position in Italy was even more
serious, because Italy, having no coalfields of
her own, was absolutely dependent upon Great
Britain, except for a little which she was able
to get, by means of British ships, from the
United States. It has already been shown
that the coal freight from Cardiff to Genoa had
risen from about 7s. 6d. before the war to 100s.
in March, 1916, so that fabulous prices had to be
paid by consumers in Italy. For some time
arrangements had been made for supplying the
essential services of the Italian Government
\vith coals, but this special arrangement did not
affect many industries and private consumers.
In May, 1916, a scheme was devised for reducing
the selling price of coal in France. This in-
volved the fixing of the prices at which coal was
96
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL
sold at the pit's mouth, the middlemen's
charges and the freights, so that the whole chain
of transactions from the selling of the coal
until it reached the consumer was intended to
be controlled. The new prices and freights came
into operation on June 1, 1916. The prices for
coal represented reductions of from 40 to 50
per cent, below those ruling at the time for
prompt delivery, and the freights reductions
.somewhat similar. The commission of the
exporters was fixed at 5 per cent, in addition
owing to the greater length of voyage and the
larger type of ship employed, but in the autumn
a similar scheme was prepared for Italian ports.
Unfortunately, owing partly, it must be
admitted, to the submarine campaign, neither of
these schemes worked entirely smoothly. It was
reported that French firms, in order to secure ton-
nage, had paid higher freights than those pro-
vided for in the limitation scheme. The attitude
seemed to be that it was better to pay heavily
for the coals than not to get them at all. Early in
THE BEGINNINGS OF A SHIPYARD : THE SITE AND A TEMPORARY WHARF.
to the f.o.b price, with a maximum of Is. per
ton. The elaboration of this scheme involved
a great deal of work on the part of Mr. Runci-
man, President of the Board of Trade, and it was
significant that shortly afterwards he had a
serious breakdown and had to rest for two
months. It cannot be said that Mr. Asquith's
Government was quick to act in this serious
matter of the cost of coal in France and
Italy, and more might, at any rate, have
been done earlier in explaining the position.
An important fact was that a large pro-
portion of the coal shipping trade with the
Continent was done by neutrals, and that
the problem of neutral shipping was dis-
tinct from that of the British mercantile
marine. gThe shipping difficulties of Italy were
also more serious than those of France,
1917 the situation was again tackled, and the
limitation freights were considerably advanced.
With the formation of Mr. I.loycl George's
Government in December, 1916. n ne\v Ministry
\\iis unrated, that, of shipping, und a Shipping
Controller appointed, a position the need of
which had been so consistently urged.* The
choice fell upon Sir Joseph Maclay, a successful
Glasgow owner who was comparatively little
known to the English public. His function M.I-..
in a sentence, to ensure that all British shipping
was used to the best possible advantage of the
nation. Sir Joseph Maclay was admitted in
shipping circles to know et least as much about
the efficient management of cargo steamers as
any owner in the United Kingdom. He had a
* See Vol. XI., p. 369.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
97
THE BEGINNINGS OF A SHIPYARD:
Part of the Site.
reputation of being an extreme,^ hard worker,
and tho appointment was generally regarded
as a good one. His powers had to be denned,
and it was understood that by the middle of
February, 1917, his functions had been satis-
factorily arranged. By his own wish he was not
a member of the House of Commons, having
explained that lie considered he could do his
work better outside. Ho was, however, repre
sented there by Sir Leo Chiozza Money, Parlia-
THE OLD SLIPS. INSET: AN EXCAVATOR.
98
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
mentary Secretary to the Ministry of Shipping
Control. Replying in the House of Commons
on February 13 to a question as to whether the
Controller exercised authority over ships em-
ployed in Government service, the Parlia-
mentary S"crrtary said :
They are used with our knowledge, and, as it were,
if I may call it with our consent. Of course, it is a matter
of goodwill between the different departments, and
that goodwill, I am happy to say, exists and will continue
tu I'xist, and, as long as it docs exist, there cannot be any
real difficulty with regard to what I may call the connect-
ing link between the Ministry of Shipping on the one
hand and the Admiralty on the other. The Minister of
Shipping knows that certain ships are being used, for
example, as colliers, and he has power, and indeed
authority, to satisfy himself that those colliers are being
properly used, but there, of course, his authority ends.
The Admiralty alone can in actual employment use these
colliers.
Regarding the functions of the Controller,
the Parliamentary Secretary said :
Of course, as the House is aware, when the Ministry
of Shipping was formed, my right hon. friend found
i-xisting a considerable number of bodies — committees,
ftnd so on — which had been framed and very properly
framed by the late Government in order to deal with
different phases of this great problem. All these
threads are being drawn together under the Ministry of
SI lipping, and I hope it will be true to say that in a very
short space of time we shall have drawn them together,
and that we shall then be able to grapple with a proper
organization. We have been handicapped in this
matter, because we have been worse housed, -if that is
possible, than any other Ministry of the Government.
We are not so fortunate as to possess a gilded hotel.
Nevertheless, we do hope now that we shall take up our
residence in a modest and unassuming building which
is rtot inappropriately situated, where water used to run
in St. James's Park.
On February 21 Sir Edward Carson, now
First Lord of the Admiralty, announced that
the whole of the Transport Department, except
so far as it was concerned with naval transport
and the duty of naval transport to the Army,
had been entirely taken over by the ShippingCon-
troller. The Advisory Committee to the Trans-
port Department had resigned shortly after
the appointment of the Shipping Controller.
There were soon ,-iigns that the Controller was
losing no time in getting to work and ensuring
that all possible use was made of the available
tonnage. One little scheme, indicative of the
attention being given to the problem, which
was announced just a fortnight after his
appointment, provided that all owners of what
arc known as shelter-deck steamers should,
where it was practicable, utilize the shelter-
deck for cargo and get the load-line re-assigned.
It had always been open to owners to have this
••lung; made, and some had done so in peace
and others earlier in the war. It was estimated
that if the change were made in all shelter-deck
Meamers the carrying capacity of the British
Mercantile Marine would be increased by some
250,000 tons, but there were some obvious cases
in which nothing was to be gained by the
alteration. What the' Controller did after
consultation with the surveyors of the Board
of Trade and the registration societies was to
make compulsory the use of these spaces, not in
all cases, but in every appropriate case. It had
been held that, subject to any necessary altera-
tions in the structure of the ships being carried
out to the satisfaction of the surveyors, the
change could, as a rule, be made with absolute
safety. If an owner thought the change inadvis-
able for technical reasons his case would be
considered on its merits. This particular
change was due largely to the elimination of
some of the lighter cargoes. When in peace time
vessels were carrying comparatively light
cargoes the raising of the load-line would not
have enabled them to carry a ton more cargo,
which was prescribed only by the cubic
capacity of the ship. Another little innovation
was the granting of permission to owners that,
as an exceptional war measure, they might load
vessels in the River Plate down to what is known
as the Indian summer mark, provided that
when the ships reached .northern latitudes,
between October and March inclusive, their
winter marks were immersed. As the quantities
of grain shipped from South America normally
amount to some millions of tons annually and t his,
change represented an addition of about ti per
cent, to the carrying capacity of ships, it was dis-
tinctly important. Attention was also imme-
diately concentrated on improving the con-
ditions at the ports where shipping was again
being held up by congestion, caused especially
by railway troubles, and the policy which
liad already been adopted under the old
regime for substituting shorter voyages for
longer voyages, where this was possible, was
carried out still further. Many more ships
were requisitioned to be employed in trades
where they were most urgently needed, so that
in February, 1917, the position approximated
to a general requisition. .
But one of the most important of the Shipping
Controller's plans was the Isying down of a large
programme of standardized cargo ships. The
possibilities of building a large number of
standard ships in this country seems to have
found its genesis in an article which appeared
in The. Times of February 25 showing what was
being done in the United States. This was
followed up by a number of other articles.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
99
It was then pointed out that there would
obviously be economy of money in manu-
facturing the parts for ships on a large scale.
The following advertisement from an American
newspaper was quoted : —
Stock cargo steamships, 7,200 tons d.w. capacity.
Classification 100 Al. Br. Lloyd's. Scotch boilers,
Triple expansion engines. Speed 10 J knots, Hi knots
on oil fuel.
We have recently purchased 7,500 tons of steel ship
plates and shapes, with options for more, and with
deliveries to assure completion and delivery of 1,720 d.w.
steamship in the'last quarter of 1016; one more ship
in 14 months and one in 16 months, and one of our
stock cargo steamships about each month hereafter.
One or more of our stock cargo steamships are now for
to terms. There are even still serious difficulties, owing
to the rise in costs, in the way of the completion of
mercantile tonnage contracted for and started before the
war, and these difficulties are indicative of those which
hinder the making of now contracts. In some cases the
builders stipulate for very wide prices, offering to accept
less if costs prove to be less than the maximum they
name, and they will guarantee no dates for delivery.
The owners are chary of placing orders when everything
is so uncertain, and the result is an unsatisfactory
deadlock.
This is where the intervention of the State would
be of advantage. Having arranged, by some means,
for the completion of tonnage now unfinished, the State
could itself place orders for new construction. The
first point in favour of a State programme is that for
both sentimental and financial reasons the men are
reluctant to handle any but Government work. The
WITH DECKS AWASH A STEAMER STRUGGLES BACK TO PORT AFTER STRIKING
A MINE.
sale to the highest responsible bidders. Prospective
purchasers of cargo steamships are invited to submit
written proposals for the purchase of one or more of
our stock cargo steamships. Offers of purchase from
responsible bidders will be filed in the order received,
and, subject to prior sale, will be acted upon in that
order. Sales will be closed at terms and times to be
fixed by our Board of Directors.
On February 28. 1910, an article developing
the idea of standardization was published in
The Times, which, as an indication of the con-
ditions then prevailing and of what happened
nearly a year later, may be reproduced as
follows :
It is generally admitted that nothing will so relieve the
present serious position as new construction. Yet
builders and owners are finding it very difficult to come
second reason is thai by standardization the work could
be greatly expedited. There would obviously be diffi-
culties, if the matter were left to private enterprise,
in getting owners to agree to a standard specification
which wonld not exist in the case of a Government
committee including representatives of owners, naval
architects, shipbuilders, and engine-builders.
Generally the hull of a ship can be built at the present
time more rapidly than the engines and boilers to go into
it. The great bulk of the work on the hull must be done
in the yard where it is being built, but it should be
perfectly practicable to exj>edite work on the engines
by increased subdivision and standardisation. For
instance, time might be saved by sending the engines
across from the East Coast or any other centre to the
Clyde, while the boilers might be built in the Midlands.
But vessels built under such arrangements would have
to conform to the same specifications and their parts
be made interchangeable.
The present proposal is for the State to arrange to
100
////•; TIMES H1STOKY OF THE WAR.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
101
build 100 or whatever number of whips may be deter-
mined. They should probably be of one or, possibly,
two types. If it were resolved to build more types they
should be built in blocks.
It is proposed that these vessels when built should be
allotted to owners in proportion to the number of ships
they have lost through enemy acts. The State would
take the profits and the owner to whom the ships were
entrusted would be paid management commission on
them. At the conclusion of the war the vessels would ba
sold by auction, and if the short supply of tonnage proves
then to be as great as now seems probable, there would
be very little chance of any loss falling on the State.
The type of ship recommended is a cargo steamer
about 8,000 tons deadweight, serviceable for many
trades. The exact details of measurement and speed
would be determined by the committee, which should be
prepared to sacrifice ruthlessly all luxuries and even
conveniences which add to the labour and time required
for construction. It is questionable, for example, whether
in the present circumstances electric light should be
installed. This and other conveniences could be added
without great expense when the vessels came into the
possession of their ultimate owners.
Such is the scheme broadly outlined. It is a matter
for deliberate consideration whether, if some such plan
be not adopted, this country is not running a serious risk
of finding itself unable to carry not only the cargoes it
ought to be able to carry, but even the bare necessities
for the successful prosecution of the war, and at the end
of the war of finding its mercantile marine at the mercy
of the German interned ships and of the neutral fleets
Replying to a question in the House of
Commons on March 7, 1916, Mr. Runciman
said tbat his attention had been called to the
question of standardization and that it was
having his careful consideration, a stereotyped
form of reply to which, unfortunately, the
public had become well accustomed in connexion
with the shipping problem.
In June, 1916, however, the standardiza-
tion scheme received strong support in the
formation of a Standard Ship Building Com-
pany to work at Chepstow, River Wye.
This company was very powerfully backed,
as appears from the fact that the capital
was subscribed by, among others, such com-
panies as the P. & O. and British India, the
New Zealand Shipping, Orient Steam Navi-
gation, Federal Steam Navigation, Furness,
Withy & Company, Shire Line (Turnbull,
Martin & Co.), A. Weir & Company, Harris
& Dixon (Ltd.), Trinder, Anderson & Com-
pany, Bethell, Gwyn & Company, and Birt,
Potter and Hughes (Ltd.). The Chairman
was Mr. James Caird, head of Turnbull,
Martin & Company, and the Vice-Chair-
man Mr. John Silley, Managing Director of
R. & H. Green and Silley Weir (Ltd.), one of
the oldest and most famous shipbuilding and
ship repairing companies in the country. Unfor-
tunately, the scheme was much handicapped by
the difficulty of securing sufficient skilled labour.
On August 15, however, the company took over
the engineering firm of Messrs. Edward Finch
& Co. (Ltd.), which was originally formed to
build Brunei's bridge over the Wye, and a new
company was formed, entitled Edward Finch
& Co. (1916) (Limited). In spite of labour
difficulties three slipways were prepared in
this yard, and, early in 1917, two 3,300 ton
cargo steamers were being built there. It
was hoped that by the end of the year five
new steamers would be put into the water
from this yard, in addition to 18 smaller
vessels, all of which were urgently needed.
The first four slips for building steamers
up to 10,000 tons in the Standard Company's
new " yard were being prepared. A special
feature of the scheme was the planning of a
garden city, and a considerable progress was
being made early in 1917 with the construction
of cottages under licence from the Ministry of
Munitions. It wa? known that the Directors
felt much indebted to the assistance given not
only by this Ministry but also by the Admiralty
and the Board of Trade. Every assistance in
forwarding the scheme was also rendered by the
Oreat Western Railway Company.
Towards the end of 1916 it was understood
that the P. & O. Company had had plans drafted
for a number of standard cargo vessels to be
built in various yards, and Mr. John Latta, a
well-known owner, was urging in The 'limes
( lovernment construction. Then, shortly after
the new Ministry of Shipping had been created,
it was announced that the Shipping Controller
had himself in view a large programme of
standard cargo vessels to be built for account
of the State. It became known that they
were to be single-deck steamers designed for
purely cargo-carrying purposes, and that one
batch of them would be 400 ft. in length,
52 ft. in beam, with a depth of 31 ft., and a
deadweight carrying capacity of about 8,200
tons. They were to be distinctly utilitarian
in character, having practically no super-
structure, and with nothing in their construc-
tion that was not absolutely necessary for
their efficient handling and for the carrying
of general or bulk cargoes. The fact that they
were to be standardized in design would facili-
tate the obtaining of materials, as well as
increase the speed of construction, and some
of the firms with whom contracts had been
placed estimated that, given adequate supplies
of material and a sufficiency of steadily working
labour, the vessels could be completed within
six or seven months. Standardization was to be
102
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
applied, not only to the hulls, but also to the
propelling machinery, and. as far as possible,
to all tin- auxiliaries and parts. The recipro
catine cnt-'incs decided upon were of a typo
which had proved thoroughly trustworthy and
could be turned out to pattern by any marine
engineering firm, the arrangements being such
that any particular set of engines need not
necessarily be reserved for any particular hull.
If a hull wa~ ready anywhere, and a set of
engines ready somewhere else, these might be
brought together to form one ship, so that the
delays caused by hulls being ahead of engines,
or engines ahead of hulls,, would be very largely
avoided.
In his preliminary work the Shipping Con-
troller was greatly assisted by the co-operation
of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, and
it was a fortunate coincidence that, just about
the time when he was appointed, the head-
quarter; of the Federation were being removed
to London. Until then the Federation had
joint offices at Glasgow and Newcastle, with
joint secretaries, one in each city, but the great
increase in the amount of business which had
to be done in London made it necessary for
the co-ordination of the work of the Federation
that it should have one headquarters office and
that this should be in the Metropolis. On
December 28 the announcement was made that
Sir Joseph Mat-lay had appointed a committee
to advise him on all matters connected with the
acceleration of merchant ships under construc-
tion and nearing completion, and the general
administration of a new merchant shipbuilding
programme should be undertaken by him. The
composition of the committee wa= as follows :—
Mr. George J. Carter (of Messrs. Cammell,
Laird & Co., Ltd.), President of the Shipbuilding
Employers' Federation (Chairman) ; Mr. W. S.
Abell (Chief Surveyor to Lloyd's Register of
Shipping) ; Mr. F. N. Henderson (of Messrs.
D. & W. Henderson & Co., Ltd.) ; Mr. James
Marr (of Messrs. J. L. Thompson & Sons, Ltd.) ;
Mr. Summers Hunter (of the NorthrEastern
Marine Engineering Co., Ltd.); Mr. C. J. O
Sanders (of the Marine Department, Board of
Trade) ; and Mr. W. Rowan Thomson (of
Messrs. D. Rowan & Co., Ltd.), President of the
North -West (Clyde) Engineering Trades' Em-
A LINER PASSING THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
103
FRUIT FROM GREECE AT NEWCASTLE.
ployers' Association. Mr. A. R. Duncan,
secretary to the Shipbuilding Employers'
Federation, was appointed secretary.
By appointing the President of tlje Employers'
Federation as Chairman of his Advisory Com-
mittee and its new secretary as his secretary,
Sir Joseph Maclay at once enlisted in his
service all the machinery of the Federation
and all its capacity of getting into touch, on the
shortest possible notice, with every department
of the industry. On February 1 1 the statement
was made that the Shipping Controller had
appointed Mr. A. Wilkie, M.P., secretary of the
Shipwrights' Society, and Mr. John Hill,
secretary of the Boilermakers' Society, to advise
his department on labour questions. It must be
admitted that in some quarters there was some
little apprehension, both amongst shipowners
and builders, regarding the probable effects of
the policy of standardization on the future of
their particular industries. These critics failed
to give full recognition to the fact that this
policy was essentially a war policy, prompted by
the extreme importance of producing the largest
number of cargo vessels within the shortest
possible time. Even in peace time certain
builders had steadily concentrated on particular
types, but, if time had been no object, no one
would have advocated many of the yards
bringing all their work to a common level. No
doubt the best results were to be achieved by
individuality. Owners settled upon particular
types and, from the point of view of commercial
competition, there was no real reason why they
should share their experience, knowledge, and
judgment with their competitors. In the
critical times through which the country was
passing all such considerations, however, needed
to be jettisoned. That is one of the reasons why
a large programme of new construction could
only be carried out by the Government. No
one could doubt that the Committee which Sir
Joseph Maclay formed to advise him was an
extremely able and representative one. Further,
no shipowner could doubt that the ships which
were planned would be extremely useful for
carrying bulk cargo, even after the end of
the war. They were of a type thoroughly suit-
able for carrying coal, the principal export of the
country, and for bringing home grain from North
and South America, the Black Sea and India.
Coupled with this Government programme of
new ship construction was a scheme for ex-
pediting the large number of vessels already in
course of completion. A feature of the quarterly
shipbuilding returns issued by Lloyd's Register
104
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
AUCTION SALE OF THE PRIZE SHIP " PRINZ ADALBERT."
This ex-Hamburg-Amerika liner, of 6,000 tons, was sold at the Baltic Exchange on January 17, 1917,
for £152,000.
was the large amount of shipping under con-
struction and the very small amount actually
launched. Vessels in various stages of construc-
tion were left untouched for months, mainly
owing to the fact that labour had been diverted
to naval work. A certain amount of delay was
also caused by difficulties of finance. Material
intended for merchant ships had been requi-
sitioned for naval work, and consequently
builders informed owners that they could not
complete the ships on the terms contracted for
either before the war or in the early months of
hostilities. Gradually, however, these difficulties
were overcome, partly owing to the good offices
of the Board of Trade. Owners paid very large
sin r is for the expedition of their ships and the
Government intimated that such ships should
be allowed, as far as possible, to take advantage
of the full market rates. They should not, except
in the case of extreme national urgency, be
requisitioned at the Blue-Book rates. Special
difficulties cropped up in the case of the
refrigerated steamers, partly owing to the
exceptional cost of such vessels and partly owing
to the fact that, when completed, they would
like till the other meat ships, be requisitioned
by the Government. Still, even in these excep
tional, but important, instances an agreement
was finally concluded.
Tn the House of Commons on November 15,
1916, Mr. Runciman stated that the shipyards
of the country could, in a normal year, with all
labour available and all engine works operating
at full-time, put very nearly 2,000,000 gross
tons of shipping into the water. The country
had then only lost 2,250,000 tons by all risks
since the war began, and all the depredations
on shipping could have been far more than
made good if the shipyards and engine works
were producing their maximum. Unfortunately,
they were not doing so. By the middle of
1915 the production of new tonnage in Great
Britain had reached a minimum. Tn the quarter
ending June 30, 1915, only the trivial amount
of 80,000 tons gro^.s had been completed. A
•very large number of engineers, fitters, and
mechanics had been recalled from the Colours
and a number of men were drawn out of some
of the yards which, were mailing munitions.
It was hoped that by the end of 1916 the six
months' output would approach 500,000 tons,
a very large advance on what was expected at
the end of the summer, but it was pointed out
that the country would have to go on with
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
increasing rapidity if it was to hold its own.
Mr. Runciman then stated that arrangements
had been made with shipbuilders on the Wear
to provide for the pooling of the whole of their
skilled labour, so that they could concentrate
their attention on some of the vessels nearest
completion, taking them one after the other.
It was hoped to extend the system by negotia-
tion on the Tyne, the Clyde, and similar ports.
" By mobilizing our labour in that way," he
said, " we shall get most even with the shortage
which at present exists." That the gravity of
the situation was realized appears from the
following passage : —
We shall have to take a plunge in this matter, and my
own view is that the most urgent thing at this moment
is the construction of merchant vessels. I£ there is
to be a comparative shortage for a time— I hope only for
a short time — in some of those branches of the Army,
these men will be put to their best use for turning out
vessels and engines which will add to the merchant
vessels of ourselves and Allies.
The underlying principle of this pooling
scheme was that of treating all shipyards and
engineering shops in one district as one large
establishment, within which men and materials
might be handled and utilised as they would
be by a single firm. On December 23 — after
the formation of the new Government — The
Times announced that at the instance of the
Marine Department of the Board of Trade
a similar voluntary scheme to that reached on
the Wear had been concluded on the Tyno with
thorough goodwill on the part of masters and
men. The following statement on this ques-
tion of new construction, made in the course of
a speech by the Parliamentary Secretary to the
Ministry of Shipping Control in the House of
Commons on February 13, sheds light on the
position at the beginning of 1917 :
A very larpe amount of tonnage is already under con-
struction, and I should like in this connexion, in the
absence of my right honourable friend, the ex-President
of the Board of Trade — and I am sure my right honour-
able friend the Shipping Controller would like me to do
so — to pay a tribute to the work he did in that connexion
before he left office. That is to say, we found a consider-
able amount of new construction proceeding. The
larger that amount the smaller, of course, our immediate
programme. We are accelerating every suitable vessel
by every means in our power, and we are retarding the
construction of any vessel which does not, in our opinion,
THE MARBLE HALL AT THE BALTIC EXCHANGE.
105
////•; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
\\c\\ servo tho national interests at this time. For
example, your passenger liner is put back, while your
tramp is put forward. If we have been able to accelerate
(In- aeeeleration which was already in progress when we
eame into ofliee, it is because my right, honourable
friend the Shipping Controller has nothing else to
think of, whereas my right honourable friend tho
Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Runciman) had many
other tilings to think of as well. Surely, therefore,
there is something to be said for the formation of a
Mini-try of Shipping, if it has to be said. Xow, with
regard to new construction, it is true to say that a
considerable programme is now actually in progress.
A very large amount of tonnage has actually been
ordered.
That short statement puts clearly one aspect
of the case for the formation of a Shipping
Ministry, with nothing else to concentrate
on but shipping, which had been so consistently
urged. Shipping, hitherto, had been one of
the many public services which the Board
of Trade had attempted to supervise, but it had
long been obvious that the best results could
not possibly be secured without undivided expert
attention. That the permanent officials of the
Board of Trade had in their respective spheres
done much good work was well recognized.
While merchant shipbuilding in the country
had naturally fallen to very small proportions,
the shipbuilding industry abroad had received
an enormous impetus, especially in the United
States. According to an official statement
issued by the Bureau of Navigation at Washing-
ton, the output, for the first nine months of
1916, of ocean steel merchant tonnage by the
American shipyards exceeded by 30,000 tons
the British production. There were built in
American shipyards in 1916, 1,163 merchant
vessels of 520,847 tons gross, which were
officially numbered for American shipowners,
and accordingly at the end of that year were
either in trade or were about to engage in trade.
There were also built 50 vessels of 39,392 tons
gross for foreign owners, making a total output
of 1,213 vessels of 560,239 tons gross for
the 12 months. This production compared
with 614,216 tons gross built during the
12 months ended Juno, 1908, but the out-
put for that year was mainly for the Great
Lakes, whereas most of the tonnage for 1916
was built, for the ocean foreign trade. Except-
ing in 1908, the output of 1916 had not been
exceeded since the fiscal year 1855, when
583,450 tons gross were built, all being of wood
except seven iron vessels of 1,891 tons gross.
The very large total for 1916 compared with
1,216 vessels of only 215.602 tons built in 1915.
PRHSSING WOOL IN AUSTRALIA FOR EXPORT.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
107
DISCHARGING MAIZE INTO LIGHTERS.
An interesting feature of construction in
North America, yaq +1™ revival Of wooden ship^
building^- Letters asking for information were
sent by the United States Bureau of Navigation
to 145 builders of wooden vessels, and replies
received from the principal builders showed
that on December 1, 1916, there were building,
or under contract to be built, 116 vessels of
156,615 tons gross, thus averaging 1,350 tons
each. Only vessels of 500 tons gross were taken
into account. Of the total number, 67, of 109,775
tons, were to be fitted with engines, and the
majority of these were being built at the ports
on the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico coasts
and on Puget Sound and Colombia River. A
number of wooden vessels were also being built
in Canada, some of them for West Indian trade.
The revival of wooden shipbuilding was attri-
buted entirely to the war and the consequent
demand for tonnage of all descriptions, the high
prices of steel and iron, and the difficulty of
securing metal at many centres where wood
was available. Wooden ships can be built
capable of being driven by oil at 7 or 8 knots,
and there is no question, as the maritime
history of Great Britain has shown, of their great
strength. Many wooden ships have remained
seaworthy for 100 years. This movement in the
United States contained a speculative element,
for owners were evidently calculating on the
maintenance of high freights for a sufficiently
long period to cover the cost of construction.
The position of wooden tonnage when con-
ditions again became normal at the end of the
war could only then be conjectured.
Ship construction in Canada showed at one
time an anomalous state of affairs. It was
pointed out in The Times that large cargo
steamers of 8,800 tons and 7,000 tons dead-
weight were building at Vancouver and Montreal
respectively, all for Norwegian account. In a
telegraphed reply published on November 28,
Mr. Alfred Wallace, Chairman of the Wallace
Shipyards (Ltd.), Vancouver, defended the
action of Canadian builders in accepting such
orders, pointing out that his company would
much prefer to build steamers for British rather
than for foreign account. It had offered con-
tracts to several British owners at prices lower
than the contracts to the Norwegians and had
invariably been refused on account of the high
price and long delivery. One London firm had
replied that it could do better at home. The
cost of material on the Pacific Coast was
excessive, owing to railway freight and the
high cost of and scarcity of labour. The Pacific
yards of the United States were, he added, full,
mainly for Norwegian account. British owners
would not pay Pacific Coast prices. By taking
Norwegian orders money was brought into
108
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Canada, assisting the national finances ; yards
were equipped to compete with American
builders when conditions were again normal ;
a permanent industry on the Canadian Pacific
Coast \\ascre.ited : business was brought under
the British flag ; and yards were provided which
were equipped for naval construction and
A GIANT CRANE.
repairs. Commenting on this statement, Tin
Times remarked that "Mr. Wallace will, we
think, agree that the publicity given to this
question will have served its purpose well if it
results in the whole of the shipyards of the
Empire being thoroughly mobilized for the
purpose of replenishing the British mercantile
marine, which has already been seriously
depleted. That there should be such a complete
mobilization, in spite of any difficulties of high
making costs, there can be no doubt." On
January 30 it was intimated in The Times
that Wallace Shipyards (Ltd.) was again
prepared to accept contracts from British
owners for steamers of from 7,500 to 8,000
tons deadweight to be built according to
buyers' specifications. The company, it was
stated, could undertake to deliver a steamer of
this type in September, and one each month
thereafter. It was notable, further, that in the
House of Lords on February 13, 1917, Lord
Cnrzon declared that the Government was
using every effort to build new ships, and not
merely new ships at home, where a large
programme was on the slips, but to secure extra
shipping by arrangements with the Dominions
and Dependencies and with Allied States.
The enormous increase in ship construction
in the United States was recognized early in
1916 by the creation of an American Committee,
of Lloyd's Register, with headquarters in New
York, for the purpose of supervizing building
and carrying out periodical surveys. The
Committee was a powerful one representative
of shipping companies and insurance institutions
in the United States.
In Japan also the yards were fully employed,
and very high prices were paid. The Japanese
industry was handicapped by the difficulty of
securing steel. Shipments from England had
to be prohibited owing to the insistent demands
of the munition works for supplies, naturally
causing disappointment in Japan, and, in view
largely of the high freights, steel products of
the United States cost very heavy prices to be
laid down in Japan. Here, again, as in Canada
and the United States, neutrals were able to
outbid British firms. As an indication of the
prices which were paid, a cargo steamer ready
for sea was bought by Norwegians in September
1916, for £200,000, which was equivalent to
£40 a ton on the deadweight. Before the war
such a steamer could have been built in Great
Britain for £6 or £7 a ton. For another new
Japanese steamer of 5,100 tons deadweight
£190,000 was paid, equivalent to about ^37 a
ton. Yet another striking example was that
of a steamer built in Japan for delivery in the
autumn of 1916 at a contract price of about
£100,000, which before delivery was re-solrl
for £375,000, showing a profit to the original
buyer of £275,000, and representing a price of
£35 a ton. In connexion with the output of
the Japanese yards, the statement of Lord
Curzon on February 13 respecting buying for
this country in oversea yards has already been
quoted.
With freights >i,t enormous levels and pri< •>••
for new ships prodigious, it was natural that
fabulous prices should also be paid for second-
hand vessels. Neutral ships could always
command higher prices than British because
they were free from the risk of requisit ion by tho
British Government. Gradually, however, one
neutral nation after another placed restrictions
on the transfers of ships outside the country,
so that the market became rather limited.
The great bulk of the British sales were carried
out by private treaty, but a number of vessels
were sold at auction. Among these «cre
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
109
the prize vessels and these auctions naturally
created great interest. As an indication of the
upward trend, the ex-Norddeutscher Lloyd
liner, Schlesien. of 5,500 tons, which was sold
by Messrs. Kellock's at a prize auction in
January, 1915, for £65,200, was subsequently
resold eight months later for £120,000. Many
examples of the enormous prices might be
cited. As an instance, the prize steamer,
Polkerris, of 943 tons gross, built at Rostock
in 1889, was sold on the. Baltic Exchange in
February, 1916, for £26,000, equivalent to more
than £27 10s. per ton gross. As the German
steamer Adolf she was captured soon after
the outbreak of war and was taken into Gib-
raltar. There she was offered at auction, but
as £2,050, the highest offer made, was thought
by the authorities to be too low she was with -
on her on account of a Lloyd's survey which
was due, and for renewals. Before the war
£2 a ton, or a total of about £4,000, might,
perhaps, have been paid for her for breaking-up
purposes. This sale was by order of the
Admiralty, for the vessel was seized at Alex-
andria while under Greek managership, and
was condemned on account of Turkish interest.
The auctioneer made a special point of the fact
that she was built of iron, " since an iron steamer
her age would be better than a steel steamer
of the same age."
At various periods just before the intro-
ductions of new Budgets the shipping sale
market became very quiet. The market
became particularly inactive at the end of
1916 and early in 1917 on a statement by the
Prime Minister with reference to the ' ' nationali-
UNLOADING TIMBER.
drawn from the sale and was then employed
in British Government service. Right down
to nearly the end of 1910 very high prices
continued to be paid. Thus, on November 22
of that yew, for the old iron prize steamer
Xicolaos, of 2,047 tons deadweight, the high
price of £29,250 was bid at auction on the
Baltic Exchange, representing more than £14
a ton. The steamer was built 39 years before,
the boiler was reported to have been new 22
years before, and it was understood that some
thousands of pounds would have to be expended
zation " of shipping. On January 30 four good
British steamers out of five which were offered
at auction at the Baltic Exchange failed to
find buyers. If they had been put up for
auction a. few months previously undoubtedly
all would have been sold for very handsome
prices. The fifth was sold for a price certainly
not equal to some of those paid in 1915. In
the middle of February the Shipping Controller
announced that all sales of British ships were
not to be completed without his sanction.
Negotiations for the purchase of British «hips
110
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
THE DOCK OFFICES, LIVERPOOL.
by British subjects might proceed, subject to
the approval of the Controller being obtained
before the purchase was finally effected. All
negotiations respecting non-British ships were
to be suspended for the time being.
Of all the purchases wliirh were effected
during the war one completed on behalf of tho
Commonwealth Government in June, 1916,
created most interest. Tho difficulty of obtain-
ing tonnage to transport the products of Aus-
tralia to the ports of the United Kingdom and
those of the Allied countries had long been
apparent, and it was stated on behalf of the Com-
monwealth Government that the high rates of
freights which, except where controlled by
Admiralty requisition or Admiralty influence,
threatened to become prohibitive, made action
necessary. It was well known that Mr. Hughes,
PRINCE'S LANDING STAGE, LIVERPOOL.
Prime Minister of Australia, encountered
difficulties in arranging for ships to transport
the Australian wheat crop when he arrived in
this country in March, 1916, and his troubles
became greater during his visit owing, in a
large degree, to the Imperial Government's
shipping policy. The price of Australian
wheat in this country was under the influence
of the price of the Canadian varieties, although
it was always able to command a premium
of ft few shillings a quarter. One of the
Government's numerous committees set itself
to beat, down the North Atlantic freight,
which it did most effectively by directing a
large number of vessels into the North Atlantic
trade. The price of Australian wheat landed
in this country fell in accordance with the fall
in Nortli American wheat, but the Australian
freight did not, with the result that after allow-
ing for all transport charges, etc., the price
quoted was perilously near tho point at which
the cost of growing the wheat in Australia
would not have been covered. The home
shipping authorities having thus, in the in-
terests of the public at home, incidentally
"queered" the Australian Government's mar-
ket, it might have seemed that their obvious
course was to meet them in some way. There
wa" no indication of their having done so. Mr.
Hughes was told that ships were employed
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Ill
to greater advantage than in bringing wheat
from Australia, which was then probably true.
But it was unreasonable to expect the Common-
wealth Government to stand by and see its
crop rot, while enormous supplies were being
drawn from the United States, and it was false
economy to refuse Mr. Hughes the loan of
ships and drive him to seize them practically
by force. Undaunted by the rebuff, Mr.
Hughes set to work very quietly to buy 15
ships, the announcement of the purchase not
being made until after he had actually sailed
from England on his return to Australia. Ten
of the 15 vessels were bought from Messrs.
Barrell's Strath Line. All were good, service-
able and modern cargo steamers, with an
average deadweight capacity of between 7,000
and 8,000 tons. It was understood that for
the larger vessels about £140,000 was paid,
representing, on a deadweight of about 7,500
tons, a value of about £19 a ton. Before the
war the value of such ships as were bought
might perhaps have been estimated at an
average price of about £4 per ton. Tt was
stated that the primary intention of the scheme
was the transport of Australia's products to
the world's markets, but that the vessels would,
of course, be run and managed in a similar
manner to those owned by private companies,
and would be required to show a reasonable
profit. This policy was subsequently indicated
by the fact that after discharging cargoes in
Great Britain some were sent across the North
Atlantic to load general cargoes of United
States manufactures. By being transferred
from the home registry to that of Australia,
the earnings of the ships were no longer subject
to the Imperial income-tax and excess profit
taxation and so should prove a good invest-
ment for the Australian Government. The
scheme was naturally not liked by British
owners, and the purchase caused considerable
disturbance in the Australian trade. How-
ever, in the autumn the strong line adopted by
Mr. Hughes was vindicated to some extent,
at any rate, in an announcement by Mr. Runci-
man that a large purchase of Australian wheat
had been made and that a number of steamers
had been requisitioned to proceed to load
wheat in Australia at Blue-Book rates.
During 1916 a number of important shipping
fusions were carried out. At the end of June a
provisional agreement was entered into for an
TRAVELLING CRANES IN A LONDON DOCK.
112
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
[French official photograph.
SPANISH WINE FOR THE FRENCH ARMY.
SUPPLIES FOR THE BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE.
[Official photograph.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
113
amalgamation between the P. and O. Company
and the New Zealand Shipping Company,
which owned the Federal Line. The P. and O.
had in the early months of the war absorbed
the British India, and as the New Zealand and
Federal Companies had worked in close agree-
ment with the British India in the Australian
trade, this further arrangement seemed natural
enough. It was understood that the directors
of the companies had in view, when carrying
out this arrangement, the expectation of
attacks on British trades from German com-
panies after the war. Immediately before
number of shares in the Prince Line were also
purchased in the open market. The Prince Line
, consisted of 37 steamers of a very useful type.
At about the same time an agreement was
carried through for the sale of the London and
Northern Steamship Company to Messrs.
Pyman, Watson and Co., of South Wales. The
fleet consisted of 16 very useful steamers of
54,000 tons gross, and the price paid for the
business, all the assets, and the managing
interest amounted to rather over £2,000,000.
In the middle of October arrangements were
completed whereby Sir John Ellerman, Chair
A SHIP-LOAD OF STEEL FROM THE UNITED STATES.
the outbreak of war the German lines had
announced their intention of entering into
the direct trade with New Zealand, and dis-
cussions with British owners were actually
stopped by the war. The amalgamation of
the P. & O. and New Zealand Companies
meant that the combined fleets of the companies
amounted to 228 steamers, of 1,386,589 tons
gross.
Towards the end of August, 1916, a brief
announcement was made that Furness, Withy
& Company (Ltd.) had acquired a preponderat-
ing interest in the Prince Line (Ltd.). Little
was disclosed as to this transaction, but the view
generally accepted in shipping circles was that
the managing interest of Mr James Knott, the
founder of the Line, was acquired, together with
shares by private negotiation, and that a large
man of the Ellerman Line.=, acquired the whole
of the shares of Messrs. Thos. Wilson, Sons & Co.
(Ltd.), the Wilson fleet consisting of nearly
80 steamers of about 200,000 tons. As explain-
ing this transaction the announcement was made
that it had been evident for some time to those
concerned in the management of the Wilson
Line that definite steps would have to be taken
to provide for the future of the business, which
was an extremely important one for the Port
of Hull. A large number of the Wilson ships
had been lost during the war, and it was
essential that the various lines served by the
company should be efficiently carried on after
peace was concluded.
In the autumn of 1916 an agreement was
completed between the Anchor Line (Henderson
Bros., Ltd.) and the Donaldson Line (Ltd.) for
114
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
a fusion of the interests of the two companies in
ih" passenger and cargo service between
Clnsgow and Canada. A new company was
fanned with the title of the Anchor- Donaldson
Line, with Sir Alfred Booth as chairman. The
Cunard Company already held a controlling
interest in the Anchor Line and had acquired
the shipping interests of t he < 'aiuidian Northern
Company, so that this latest arrangement meant
MR. EDWARD F. NICHOLLS,
Chairman of the Institute of London Underwriters,
1915 1917.
a linking up of the Cunard, Anchor, Canadian
Northern, and Donaldson Lines. The two
other big groups representing the passenger
interests in the Canadian trade then consisted
of the Canadian Pacific and Allan Lines and
of the White Star and Dominion Companies.
The desirability of effecting consolidations
among British companies could be appreciated.
Before the war there was far too little cohesion
among the British lines, which were conse-
quently at a disadvantage in facing the solid
front presented by the German companies
Sales of shipping made, however, in order
primarily that owners might retire from busi-
ness with large fortunes, were in a different
category. By the disposals of fleets or single
ships owners were able to escape taxation, anil
it had to be remembered that ownerships which
ha> I bought ships at enormous prices during the
war would not be in the most advantageous
position to meet competition after the war.
Those ownerships which would be most favour-
ably circumstanced would be those which had
written down their fleets to very low levels.
St ress was repeatedly laid by British owners
on the difficulty of dealing with neutral shipping,
but even this problem proved by no means
insc iluble. Early in the war it was being pointed
out in The Times that Great Britain was very
far from being at the mercy of neutral owners.
A large amount of neutral tonnage had always
found employment in British trade, and other
markets we^e very few. Practically the only
bulk cargo available for neutral vessels from
Europe was British coal. Neutral vessels were
accustomed to bunker in England, and to some
authorities the question of supplying such
bunkers to neutrals seemed to resolve itself in toa
simple business proposition. British miners were
exempted from military service because of the
importance of the coal industry to the country,
and it was obviously reasonable that the first
call on supplies should be for British industries,
British ships, and neutral ships which were
engaged in British trade. In official quarters
there was at first great reluctance to exercise
even the smallest discrimination in this matter,
but gradually the principle came to be fully
recognized that all the facilities of British ports
and shipyards must be reserved for those who
were employing their ships to the advantage
of the British Empire.
It must be remembered that trading with
British ports was extremely profitable to
neutral vessels. There was for a long time
absolutely no restriction on rates, the first
effort in this direction being the limitations
schemes covering the shipment of coal supplies
to France and Italy. British merchants reck-
lessly outbid each other for tonnage, caring
little or nothing what they paid, since they
could always rely on passing on the cost of the
high freights to the consumer. Some respon-
sibility in this matter undoubtedly rested with
the British representatives of neutral owner-
ships, who, actuated by ordinary business
considerations, not unnaturally did their best
to secure the highest rates for their foreign
clients. The evil of this bidding had long
been felt and early in 1917 the Board of Trade
took the matter in hand. By an Order in
Council published on January 12 official per-
mission was required to be obtained before
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
115
any neutral ship could be chartered, and even
before the purchase of any goods from abroad
exceeding 1,000 tons in weight could be com-
pleted. An Inter-Allied Chartering Executive
was formed, with the object of ensuring that
all charters of foreign vessels by private firms
wore in the best interests of the allied nations.
An office was opened close to the Baltic Ex-
change in charge of two well-known brokers,
and the system adopted was found to work
very smoothly. Shipbrokers immediately
showed some alarm at the restriction imposed,
but it was soon apparent that their interests were
protected. The Executive acted as a channel
through which the chartering of vessels to bring
grain for account of the Royal Commission
was effected. Important services were ren-
dered in this connexion by Messrs. Furness,
Withy & Co., who, it was stated, received no
profit, direct or indirect, in respect of their
work. Early in January an offer was made by
the British Government for the use of Greek
shipping during the war and for six months
afterwards. The terms provided for a rate of
hire of 30 shillings per ton deadweight per
month, as compared with about seven shillings
paid by the British Government for British
vessels, and for acceptance of the war insurance
of the Greek vessels by the British Govern-
ment.
In the same month the limitation rates to
France and Italy were revised, and it then
became clear that something would have to
be done for improving the insurance facilities
for neutrals. Most neutral nations had their
own war insurance schemes, of varying scope,
but a very large amount of insurance since the
outbreak of war had been placed in the London
market The rates on British ships and their
cargoes had always been subject to the British
influence of the Government insurance schemes
but there was not the same influence at work
respecting neutral vessels. The services of
British underwriters throughout the war had
UNDERWRITERS' ROOM AT LLOYD'S.
116
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Keen extremely valuable, Imt naturally rates
in the open market were the subject of indi-
vidual judgment and were governed by con-
siderations of profit and loss. On February 7,
1917, The Times announced that a new
scheme of war insurance for neutral vessels
was to be put in operation at once, applicable
to neutral vessels engaged in carrying essential
cargoes, such as foodstuffs, munitions, materials
for munitions and coal to allied ports. It
was operated by a number of leading companies.
The rates represented a very considerable
reduction on those hitherto current, and the
scheme provided for the fixing of the values
to be insured. These were on a very high
basis, rising from £25 per gross ton for steamers
built between 1875 and 1881 to £40 a ton for
vessels built in 1911 and later.
An enormous amount of business was effected
during the war in the Marine Insurance market,
and by the beginning of 1916 the congestion
and delays at Lloyd's had become so serious
that it was obvious that measures would have
to be adopted to improve the conditions. As
from March 1, 1916, a separate office with a
staff of women clerks was inaugurated, the
plan being that the policies should be stamped
with the names of the various syndicates
instead of being signed by hand as hitherto.
More than 50 women clerks were at once
installed, and it was found that the pressure
of work on underwriters and brokers was
immediately relieved. It had frequently hap-
pened under the old system that policies had
been passing from hand to hand for several
weeks. Under the new plan policies were
available on the same day or the next. While
the amount of business was greatly incr< •:'.-> il
the staffs of the ollices naturally becr.me more
and more reduced. In many ways under-
writers were able greatly to assist commerce
and incidentally they helped to carry out the
Government's regulations, published from time
to time, respecting oversea trailing. The strain
imposed on underwriters during the war wr*s
heavy, but they had the satisfaction of knowing
that the pre-eminence of London as the insur-
ance market of the world was accentuated.
This chapter will have shown that, difficult
though the position had become early in 1917,
the whole shipping problem was then being
closely tackled in a way that had never been
attempted before. Measures were being actively
adopted to ensure that more efficient and
effect ive use was made of the tonnage available
for naval, military and commercial purposes,
construction was being expedited, and more
advantage was being taken of the extensive
insurance facilities of the country. The evils
of the old lax methods were not to be eradicated
in a day, but there were at last ample signs
that no thought, skill and energy would be
spared to keep the situation well under
control.
CHAPTER CLXX.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (IV.).
POSITION ON AUGUST 22 — GERMAN " MORAL " — • FIGHTING OF AUGUST 24— WILTS AND WORCESTEHS
AT THIEPVAL — FRENCH GAINS — GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS — ALLIED OFFENSIVE OF SEPT. 3-6
FEINTS ON THE ANCHE — THE MAIN ATTACK — THE FALL OF GUILLEMONT — THE FRENCH OPERATIONS
-GENERAL MICHELER'S ARMY — SEPTEMBER 9 — THE IRISH AT GINCHY — HEAVY GERMAN LOSSES
FRENCH SUCCESSES ON SEPTEMBER 12 — THIEPVAL AND THE " WUNDERWERK " — SEPTEMBER 14—
FRANCO-BRITISH COOPERATION AND PREPARATIONS— POSITION ON SEPTEMBER 15.
THE events of the Battle of the Somrne
up to the evening of August 22 have
been already related in Chapters
CLI., CLIV. and CLXV. We had
made considerable progress, but the country
had still to be reached over which manoeuvre
battles might be fought unhindered by en-
trenchments prepared months beforehand, and
where the Allies might fairly hope that the
superior moral of their troops would ensure the
defeat of the enemy. As early as July 30 the
Germans had begun to appreciate the dangers
which would arise if their lines were pierced
between the Ancre and the Somnie. An
Order of the Day of that date, signed by the
German General in command, had run as
follows :
Within a short space of time we must be prepared for
violent attacks on the part of the enemy. The decisive
battle of the war is now being fought on the fields of the
.Somme. It must be impressed on every officer and man
up at the front line that the fate of our country is at
stake in this struggle. By ceaseless vigilance and self-
sacrificing courage the enemy must be prevented from
gaining another inch of ground. His attacks must
break against a wall of German breasts.
The German General was right ; the glorious
retreat from Mons and the fighting on the Marne
nad shown that in open country the British
and French Armies were superior to his troops.
A letter written by a prisoner of the German
X Tilth Corps shows how the battle of the
Somme was regarded by the German rank and
Vol. XI— Part 134. 117
file, and the straits to which the foe was reduced.
" We are, indeed, no longer men, but as it were
half-living creatures." Other prisoners con-
firmed the statement and showed that previous
battles compared with that on the Somme
were " child's play." One slightly wounded
German, who before the war had been manager
in the grill-room of a well-known London hotel,
and who had fought against the Russians on
the Eastern Front, observed : " I suppose they
will send me back to England under circum-
stances very different from those in which I
left London more than two years ago. Well,
I am quite ready for the change — anything to
be out of the awful hell in which I have lived
here." "Here" was Delville Wood. "At
first," he remarked, " I was confident that we
must win — everybody thought so. But we
had not reckoned on your fleet, which I know
has got us by the throat. . . . We cannot win.
Neither," he added, with affected hopefulness,
" I think, can you and your Allies. It is true
that it is we, and not you, who are now on the
defensive ; but we are far from being exhausted,
and I think that before long you will have to
make terms with us. If you don't, and it's
going to be a fight to the finish, then all I can
say is God help everybody ! " These state-
ments, which might be supported by many
others, showed how greatly the moral of the
Germans had been affected. On the other
IIS
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
119
hand, our soldiers were full of confidence and
elated by their successes.
At 9 p.m., on August 22, a desperate effort
was made by the enemy to recover the trenches
wrested from him south of Thiepval. The
waves of German infantry reached and entered
them in places,, but their success was short-
lived. Counter-attacks promptly disposed cf
all who had penetrated, or drove the survivors
back. A second assault at 1 a.m., on the
night of tho 22nd-23rd, was equally futile.
Our artillery and infantry fire wrought terrible
execution among the charging lines which were
lit up by the light of their own flares. Both
attempts resulted in heavy losses to the enemy,
without any gain.
While tnese operations were in progress the
German artillery kept up a severe fire against
High Wood and Bazentin-le-Petit. The Ger-
man aeroplanes in the evening had shown
unwonted activity They had been engaged
by our airmen, and at least four machines
destroyed. Others were driven down badly
damaged, or pursued to their aerodromes, while
ours suffered no casualties. An aerial re-
connaissance was completely successful, and
^Official photograph.
A TRENCH NEAR THIEPVAL.
bombing raids were carried out by us against
sundry points of importance.
During the 23rd we resumed the offensive
south of Thiepval and secured 200 yards of
German trench, straightening our line arid
improving our position in this region. The
counter-battery work of our guns was this day
very effective. The enemy's artillery in three
different areas was silenced, and it was re-
ported that a score of direct hits had been
made.' Our gunners had some time since
overtaken and were now outclassing in accuracy
the enemy's, and the German ammunition
showed signs of deterioration, as the percentage
of blind shells discharged by the hostile artillery
was steadily rising. " Duds," as our men
[Official photograph.
A GERMAN "DUD" LANDS IN A
TRENCH NEAR THIEPVAL.
called them, were, however, not always a disad-
vantage when they came from our own guns.
One of our officers, when ascending the parapet
of a German trench, felt a shell from a .British
gun drop immediately behind him. Fortunately
it did not explode, but the shock of, impact on
the ground lifted him over the parapet on to a
German, whom he speedily took prisoner !
As the sun was sinking, the sky, which for
four days had been bright and cloudless,
became overcast, and a steady rain commenced
to fall. At 8.45 p.m. the German batteries
concentrated their fire on the ground gained
by us between Guillemont Station and the
quarry, the capture of which has been already
recounted. When the gun-fire lifted, a body
of infantry advanced with the greatest deter-
mination and reached the British parapet. A
sharp and fierce struggle ensued, and then, as
was usual in hand-to-hand combats, the
enemy broke, leaving behind him many dead
and wounded.
At 12 30 a.m. on Thursday, August 24, the
German artillery repeated the bombardment,
but no infantry assault materialized. In the
course of the same day, on the battlefield oi
Loos, a German raid was repulsed by us near
the celebrated Hohenzollern Redoubt, and
north-west of La Bassee some of our trooos
successfully entered the enemy's trenches.
Meanwhile, north of the Somme the German
guns had violently bombarded the French
front lines and communication trenches north
120
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
and south of Maurepas, while south of the river,
after intense artillery preparation, the enemy
had launched attacks against the troops of our
Allies in and south-east of Soyecourt Wood.
They were all repulsed. Adjutant Donne on
the 23rd brought down his fifth and sixth
German aeroplanes. The former fell in the
direction of Moislains, north-east of Peronne,
the latter in the region of Marche-le-Pot,
north-west of Chaulnes. Four other enemy
machines were severely damaged by French
found on the person of, a prisoner of the German
125th Regiment captured about this date.*
" During the day," he wrote, " one hardly
dares to be seen in the trench owing to tho
British aeroplanes, which fly so low that it is a
wonder they do not come and pull us out of
our trenches." Forgetful of the glowing
pictures painted by his superiors of the exploits
of German airmen, he indulged in some bitter
reflections. "Nothing is to be seen," lie
grumbled, " of our German hero airmen, and
THE SITE OF THlEPVAL.
cial photograph.
machine-gun fire, and another was destroyed
near Rove.
The events of the 23rd, above described,
naturally did not figure in the German com-
munitjut of the 24th. That veracious docu-
ment deserves to be quoted :
North of the Somme yesterday the fresh efforts of the
•TH-niv during the evening and night failed.
The British attacks were again directed against
the - ili'-ni between Thi6pval and I'ozieres and our
positions at Guillemont.
At Maurepas, especially to the south of that village,
strong enemy forces were repulsed after fighting which
was at some points severe.
On Thursday, August 24, the weather again
turned fine, and the aerial supremacy of the
Allies was once more pronounced. What our
command of tho air, coupled as it was with
so marked a superiority of our artillery, meant
to the enemy, and how it affected his moral
may be gathered from the diary kept by, and
yet their ratio is supposed to be 81 to 29 !
The fact that the British are one thousand
times more daring is, however, never men-
tioned. One can hardly calculate how much
additional loss of life and strain on the nerves
this costs us. I often feel doubtful," he
added, " regarding the final issue of our good
cause when such bad fighters are here to
champion it."
The weather conditions being so favourable,
it was decided by the Allied Commanders to
make three new thrusts into the German lines,
one on the left towards Thiepval, the second
in the centre at Delville Wood, and the third
on the right in the Maurepas region. The
advance between Authuille Wood and Mouquet
Farm on Thiepval was entrusted by Sir
* Morning Pott, August 28.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
121
' '
THE WILTSHIRE MEN GOING TO THE FRONT.
[Official pkotcgrap't.
Hubert Gough to the Wilts and Worcester?.
In the reduction of the position still retained
by the enemy on the upper eastern fringes of
Delville Wood, units of the Rifle Brigade were
to take part. The French were to capture
the last ruins in Maurepas, to which the Ger-
mans were clinging, and to extend their line
northwards to the Clery-Combles railway,
southwards to Hill 121. Opposing the Wilts
and Worcesters were detachments of the
Prussian Guard ; while the 5th Bavarian
Reserve Division and the 1st Division of the
Prussian Guard, commanded by the Kaiser's
second son. Prince Eitel Friedrich, confronted
the troops of our gallant Allies. To save the
Thi6pval salient, to prevent the British from
Delville Wood reaching the summit of the
ridge over which ran the Longueval-Flers-
Ligny-Tilloy-Bapaume road, to check any
eastward movement along the ridge on Ginchy
and Combles and to stop the forward movement
of the French through Maurepas on Combles,
the Germans had concentrated every available
battery and man. Their guns, though in num-
bers inferior to those of the Allies, were numer-
ous. The front of battle was the 8-mile line
which ran from Authuille to Maurepas.
Between the Wilts and Worcesters and the
village of Thiepval, hidden by the tree-
crowned ridge, lay a long trench which had
been named by the enemy after their idol,
Hindenburg. Into this, protected by a maze
[Official photograph.
MEN OF THE WILTSHIRE REGIMENT ADVANCING TO THE ATTACK.
134—2
122
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.I I!.
WORCESTERS RESTING IN A HARVEST FIELD.
[Official Pkatagrtpk.
of trenches, there ran back, at its western end,
a perfectly straight trench. Another trench
the " Koenigstrasse," itself joined by another,
commemorated the recovery of Lemberg.
Where the Koenigstrasse met the Lemberg
trench there were strong redoubts. Our
troops, ensconced behind their parapets, had
to cross 300 yards of sloping, open ground.
Towards the right a glimpse could be obtained
of the ruins of Mouquet Farm. Away on the
,left was the shattered wood of Authuille.
Under the blazing autumnal sun officers and
men were posted in the trenches, smoking
pipes and cigarettes, and watching the huge
shells bursting from time to time above their
heads. The novelty of the shells had worn
off, and they attracted little attention. " Worse
than the rats are these infernal flies," a
lieutenant was heard to say, as he tried to
puff them off with tobacco smoke. A breeze
blowing from left to right slightly mitigated
the stifling heat. Nothing betrayed to the
foe that an assault in this area was imminent.
He for his part was grimly silent. Now and
then, however, a head cautiously thrust above
the parapet, and rapidly withdrawn, showed
that the Hindenburg trench was still tenanted.
Hut for the rush through the air and explosion
of an occasional shell, there was nothing which
showed visibly tin1 preparations for the struggle
about to begin.
The hours passed by, and the sun WHS
reaching the western horizon, when suddenly
the whole scene was transformed with lightning-
like rapidity. In a moment, volley after
volley of heavy shells was poured forth from
our batteries against the devoted sector to be
assaulted. The noise from the guns was
deafening, and was echoed by that of the
exploding shells as they burst on the German
lines, throwing up into the air clouds of smoke
mingled 'with earth from the parapets which
they struck. Blown slowly eastward by tli"
light breeze which rent the mist here and there
asunder, there were revealed masses of timbers
and the shattered bodies of the German
soldiers who had held their front trenches
thrown up into the air. Ever and anon a pro-
jectile would reach a shell store and blow it up
with a mighty crash, accompanied by flaim ••<
which lit up the neighbourhood like lurid
lightning.
" Magnificent, splendid," was the cry of n
French officer who saw the display. " How
grand are your guns." Above the rushing
shells and beyond the smoke of their explo-
sions flew our aeroplanes watching and signalling
back the effect of our gun-fire. Regardless
of the bursting shrapnel fired at them by the
anti-aircraft guns, the white puffs of which
could be seen surrounding our gallant airmen,
the latter swept backwards and forwards as
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
123
they calmly carried out their observation
duties.
Ten minutes was the time allowed for the
intensive bombardment of the Hindenburg,
Koenigstrasse, and Lemberg trenches. By this
time the German artillery, roused to a per-
ception of what was about to happen, had got
to work, and was pounding our front line
trenches and placing barrages in front and
behind them. The order was now given to
the Wilts and Worcesters, and wave after wave
of them dashed forward. On approaching
the Hindenburg trench a gap of some 50 yards
separated Worcesters from Wilts. Into this
gap pressed groups of Prussian Guards, and a
fierce bombing and bayonet struggle took
place. The Prussians were killed, wounded,
or taken prisoners. One of the Wilts officers —
an expert shot — snatched up a rifle and shot
five of the enemy bombers dead. A sergeant
of the same regiment ran along the top of the
parapet of the trench bombing the Germans in
it. Some of the Prussians issued from their
dug-outs and, refusing to surrender, put up a
plucky but unavailing fight. On the left the
maze of trenches was cleared, snipers and
Lewis guns silencing the machine gunners,
and the redoubts at the junction of the Koenig-
strasse and Lemberg trenches were rushed.
Altogether it was, in the characteristic language
of the soldiers engaged, " a very fine and a
very pretty show." We had penetrated to a
depth of 300 yards on a front of a little under
half a mile, and were within 650 yards of the
southern outskirts of Thiepval itself. Over
200 prisoners had been taken. How many
of the Prussian Guard lay dead and wounded
in the torn and twisted ground captured was
not ascertained. Our losses, on the other
hand, were relatively insignificant. " We
evacuated portions of our advanced trench
north of Ovillers, which were completely
destroyed," was the comment of the German
Higher Command on this action. To cover
this admission of defeat, it was stated in the
German communique of the 25th that " re-
peated Anglo-French attacks were delivered
simultaneously yesterday evening on our (the
German) entire front from Thiepval to the
Somme," and that between " Thiepval and
the Foureaux (High) Wood the enemy attacks
collapsed with great loss."
In the " sector Longueval-Delville Wood,"
the German communique admitted that the
Germans had suffered a reverse, which was a
mild expression for what had really happened.
The enemy garrison holding the northern and
eastern fringes of the wood and the adjacent
orchards was disposed in three lines of trenches,
all strengthened with redoubts and provided
WORCESTERS GOING TO THE FRONT.
[Official photograph.
124
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
[Official
HEAVY WORK ON A MUDDY ROAD.
•with dug-outs. The foremost trench was well
within the wood, and to reach it broken tree-
trunks and craters had to be crossed. The
second trench was on the edge of the wood —
shallow and lightly held. It served only as a
support to the first. The third was very
formidable. Though tho Germans had not
had time to construct their deep dug-outs for
the infantry, they had connected with trenches
a number of dug-outs formerly occupied by the
gunners of the batteries which, in the early
stages of the Battle of the Somme, had fired
over Delville Wood at our troops advancing
up the ridges. At the extreme eastern angle of
the wood was a strong redoubt garrisoned by
some 50 men. Unlike the Prussian Guard at
Thiepval, the Germans anticipated an attack
in this quarter. Before the time fixed for it,
our troops were subjected to a very heavy
bombardment of 8 in. and 5.9 in. shells. This
did not, however, succeed in deterring us from
delivering the blow. It was preceded by a
hurricane of shells of all calibres which churned
up the edges of the wood and wrecked the
German positions in the open. When the
guns were supposed to have done their work,
the British left their trenches, and advanced
against tl e enemy's position. On the left or
LONDON GUNNERS LOADING A HEAVY GUN.
[Official photograph'
THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.
125
western side of the wood progress was delayed,
when the open country was reached, by an
enfilading machine gun. An officer with a
small group of his men hastily built a barricade
which received the stream of bullets, and our
troops on the right coming x:p soon put it out
of action. Then the advance continued some
500 yards along and on both sides of the
Longueval-Flers-Bapaume road to the summit
of the ridge, whence they looked down on the
village of Flers, our machine guns greatly
assisting the operation. It was reckoned that
we had sprinkled the ground north of the
actual arrangement of the four companies of
the battalion, which may be regarded as typical
of the method usually employed by our infantry
on such occasions.
We have just finished our "act" in ft part of the
so-called " Great Push," and, as perhaps you already
guess, I am still alive ! I will tell you a little about
it.
For the last fortnight we have been working day and
night in preparation for an offensive of our own. I and
my two platoons were to bo in the fourth line, two com-
panies going over first, then one company, and then
mine in reserve to come in for all the shelling and dig
communications up to the front line. There was to be
a bombardment, and at 5.45 we were to go over.
At 3 p.m. we were all in our places ; all knew exactly
GERMAN PRISONERS,
wood with no less than 999,500 bullets on that
day, an expenditure of ammunition which five
years before would have been regarded as impos-
sible and foolish.
The attack on the left had met with little
resistance. On the right, in the direction of
Ginchy, the fight went on after sunset, and well
into the next day, until the redoubt at .the
north-eastern angle of the wood and the other
posts of the enemy were in our possession.
Thus the way from this point to Combles vi&
Ginchy was opened. Of the nature of the
fighting a vivid idea is given by an officer's
letter. It is, moreover, valuable as showing tbe
GRAVE AND GAY.
their own job, and all waited for the minutes to go by.
Quarter to four came at last, and our heavies started.
Immediately the German lines became a mass of earth,
bits of trees being tossed about in the air like the foam
on giant waves — in fact, it looked for all the world like a
heavy sea, only the waves were of earth. When the last
10 minutes came, intense fire was started. The ground
rocked and swayed in the frightful din and force of
explosions, and every one was deaf and dazed by the
roar.
Finally, after what seemed years ot waiting, 5.45
came, and I stood up and watched the two first com-
panies go over, all strolling perfectly in line, all calmly
smoking, while the few German survivors ran out like
msn demented, with hands up, yelling for mercy with
the usual cry of " Kamerad, Kamerad ! " Then the
Huns started to barrage our old front line in which I and
my two platoons were crouching. Shells fell all round us.
Two or three times I was completely cieaiened, saw yellow
126
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
o
z
H
X
o
Q
z
•<
as
6
H
Q
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
127
and red, pot knocked down by the concussion, and still
didn't get hit.
My time came, and we went on to do our job of digging,
right in the middle of all the shelling. I got the men
started and then just waited to get blown to bits. I saw
shells falling amongst small groups of men, and sometimes
German prisoners ; sometimes our men were simply
scattering to pieces in the air. Then a curious thing
happened. All of a sudden rapid rifle fire and
machine-gun fire opened into us, and I gave the order to
drop tools, fix bayonets, and get into position to meet an
attack, or, if necessary, to attack. I thought our front
line had been broken, but couldn't be certain what had
happened, for everything was smoke and flying earth
with trees falling and being blown skywards.
I gave the order to crawl forward towards the firing,
dud then I saw that about 30 Germans with a machine-
gun was pushed over the crater's edge dfid
wiped out the gun. team.* In addition to our
successes in the Thiepval and Delville Wood
regions, our airmen had engaged and driven
down damaged a number of enemy aeroplanes,
and several trains had been hit on the Germaa
lines of communication.
While Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops were
slowly debouching from Delville Wood on Flers
and Ginchy, the French, after a two -days' bom-
bardment of terrific intensity, attacked on
August 24, at 5 p.m., the Germans who still
[Official photograph.
A TRENCH COUNCIL: TWO GENERALS AND THEIR STAFFS AT THE FRONT.
gun had. after surrendering, taken up their arms again,
and were firing at us. I felt something burn my neck,
but took no notice. We crawled steadily forward and
then started throwing bombs. Again I felt something
burn my back and I shot the German who had fired at
me. About three minutes later the Germans surren-
dered to me, and although I was going to order my men
to kill them all for their treachery, I thought better of it,
got hold of their captain, and got some information out of
him in French, and then sent them back under escort.
Two companies of the enemy, from the
direction of Ginchy, counter-attacked during
the night (24th-25th), but were driven back
by machine-gun fire. The Lewis gun was
proving invaluable. For example, the Germans
had a machine gun concealed in a crater. It
held up the advance at this point until a Lewis
lurked in part ol Maurepas and the trenches
north and soutn ot the village. The left wing
of the assaulting infantry, assisted by a
British demonstration south of Guillemont,
swarmed over the Maurepas-Ginchy road and
penetrated to the north of the Clery-Combles
railway. In the centre the Germans were
cleared from the ruins still defended by them
in Maurepas and from two lines of trenches
in the open ground beyond. South-east of
Maurepas our Allies got astride of Hill 121.
The First Division of the Prussian Guard had,
* The Lewis gun can bo fired from the shoulder — i.e..
it is a one-man weapon. The Maxim cannot bo so
employed.
128
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
THE FRENCH ATTACK ON MAUREPAS : PASSING A BARBED-WIRE FENCE.
under the eyes of Prince Eitel Friedrich, suf-
fered a bloody reverse. Eight field guns, 10
machine-guns, and some 600 prisoners had
been captured, and the French line had been
advanced 200 yards on a front of a mile and a
quarter. At 8 p.m. the French dug them-
selves in and awaited counter-attacks. One
came during the night. As the western side
of Hill 121 commanded Maurepas, it was
natural that the Germans should make every
effort to recover it. The enemy's masses
advanced boldly, but under the shell and
machine-gun fire were unable to attain their
object. Reluctantly the German Higher Com-
mand had to content itself by circulating
another false statement : " The village of
Maurepas," it admitted, " is at present in
French hands, but between Maurepas and the
Somme the French attack met with no success."
Hill 121 is between Maurepas and the Somme.
So cowed was the enemy by his experiences
on the 24th that, apart from some fighting in
the neighbourhood of Delville Wood, no
attempt was made to recover the lost positions
till late on the 25th, when at 7 p.m. the German
batteries bombarded the British first-line
trenches along the greater portion of our front
south of the Ancre until early in the morning
of Saturday, August 26, and at 7.45 p.m. the
Prussian Guards were thrown in two waves at
the Wilts and Worcesters. The attack was
pressed with determination, but repulsed with
heavy loss to the foe. We, on the other hand,
made further progress to the east of Mouquet
Farm, and also along the Courcelette-Thiepval
road. At the right extremity of our line the
British trenches west of Guillemont, between
the Quarries and the Montauban-Guillemont
road, were ineffectually attacked. At 10 p.m.
a German reconnaissance in the direction of
Hill 121 was dispersed. The British counter-
batteries' that day, the 25th, destroyed or
damaged many of the enemy's positions, and
the French artillery, as usual, had been active
with good effect.
On Saturday, August 26, the fighting con-
tinued round Mouquet Farm, and in the
evening we captured 200 yards of German
trench north of Bazeiitin-le-Petit, and a
machine-gun. The weather had again become
bad, and the Allied operations were con-
sequently hindered. A heavy storm overtook
eight of our aeroplanes, and five machines did
not return to their aerodrome.
On Sunday, August 27, there was considerable
artillery activity on both sides, and we gained
some ground north-west of Ginchy. This
period of relative rest was, according to the
German communiques, one of constant fighting,
in which, according to their own account, the
Germans were successful. Thus the commuit irjiie
of August 27 was to the following effect :
North of the Somme, yesterday morning and during the
night, the British, after strong artillery preparations,
made repeated attacks south of Thiepval and north-west
of Pozieres, which were repulsed partially, after hitter
hand-to-hand fights. Wo captured one officer and GO
men.
Advances north of Bazentin-Ie-Potit and grenade
fighting at the Foureaux Wood were also unsuccessful
for the enemy.
In the Maurepas-CIery sector the French, after a vio-
lent artillery fire and the use of flame throwers, brought
up strong forces to an unsuccessful attack. North of
Clery we repulsed parties which had penetrated there.
South of the Somme grenade attacks west of Vcrmand-
ovillers were repulsed.
On Monday, August 28, in spite of the vile
weather, we gained a little ground eastward of
Delville Wood, and some minor enterprises
near Mouquet Farm were successful. Our
long-range guns hit troops and wagons in dif-
ferent places between Miraumoiit and Bapaume.
The next day, Tuesday, August 29, in the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
129
afternoon a heavy storm burst, but neverthe-
less we continued to gain ground between the
western outskirts of Guillemont and Ginchy.
Between Delville Wood and High Wood hostile
defences were captured, and south-east of
Thiepval further progress was made and a
machine-gun captured. An attack by the
enemy near Pozieres windmill was dispersed,
and during the night of the 29th- 30th, West
Australians and men from New South Wales
went at a run over the slippery clay and
entered Mouquet Farm, and trenches north-east
of it. There was some close hand-to-hand
fighting, after which our men returned to their
own lines. The bad weather continued on
the 30th, and the only incident of note was
our capture of a small salient south of Martin-
puich, taking prisoners 4 officers and 120 men.
In the evening the rain ceased.
The importance of the British gains in High
Wood and Delville Wood was too well under-
stood by the German leaders for them to
resign themselves patiently to the loss of that
sector, the key to the crest of the main ridge.
On Wednesday, August 30, every gun that
could be brought to bear on the British lines
between Bazentin-le-Petit and Longueval,
poured out shells throughout the day, and
towards evening an attack was launched on our
trenches in the vicinity of High Wood. Caught
by machine-gun, trench-mortar, and artillery
fire, the enemy's troops hesitated, and then
drew back into their shelters, leaving behind
them heaps of killed and wounded. Even
fresh troops could not stand such punishment.
That the spirit of many of the Germans on the
battlefield was shaken may be gathered from
a German regimental order dated the next
day, which was subsequently secured by us.
I must state with the greatest regret that the regiment*
during this change of position, had to take notice of the
sad fact that the men of four of the companies, inspired by
shameful cowardice, left their companies on their own
initiative and did not move into line. To the hesitating
and fainthearted in the regiment I would say the follow-
ing : " What the Englishman can do the German can do
also, or if, on the other hand, the Englishman really is a
better and superior being, ho would bo quite justified iu
his aims as regards this war, namely, the extermination
of the German. There is a further point to be noted.
This is the first time we have been in the line on the
Somrae, and, what is more, we are there at a time when
things are more calm. The English regiments opposing
us, as has been established, have been in the firing lin •
for the second, and in some cases even for the third Uiu •.
Heads up and play the man.**
In another order, bearing the date of Septem-
ber 18, which was found in a captured dug-
out, there was the following passage :
Proofs are multiplying of men leaving the position
without permission or reporting, and hiding at the rear.
It is our duty, each at his post, to deal with this fact with
energy and success.
The next day, Thursday, August 31, after
an intense bombardment, no less than five
attacks were made on a front of some 3,000
yards between High Wood and Ginchy.
Four times the British, in their muddy, water-
logged trenches, beat off the Germans, but
S
THE FRENCH ATTACK ON MAUREPAS: CROSSING A DESERTED TRENCH.
134—3
130
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
their fifth charge was more successful. On
the north-west of Delville Wood \v<> were
obliged to give ground, and our advanced posts
A LOOK-OUT.
day before. On September 2, the only infantry
action consisted of some bombing encounters.
During both days the British, French, and
German, artillery was active, and on Saturday
the enemy's guns discharged large numbers of
gas shells at our positions. South of Estrees
the Germans recovered some trenches lost by
them to our Allies on August 31.
There were also a considerable number of
aerial combats. On September 1 a British
airman encountered a squadron of twelve
Rolands. It dived in amongst them, firing a
drum of ammunition from its machine gun,
and broke up their formation. Then the
British pilot swiftly placed himself beneath
the nearest enemy machine, and another
drum was discharged at it from below. The
Roland, badly damaged, plunged to earth,
NEAR DELVILLE WOOD: BRINGING UP
STONE FOR REPAIR OF TRENCHES.
beyond the north-east of this point were forced
some distance back. At one part a few of the
enemy penetrated into the wreckage. All,
with the exception of 21, who were taken
prisoners, were promptly killed.
The time had now come for a further advance
against the German lines from Ginchy to
Clery-sur-Somme, and, south of the Somme,
from Barleux to Chilly. While the prepara-
tiniis for it were in progress, the British and
French, except at one or two points along the
front of battle, desisted from any infantry
offensive. Hut on the night of Friday, Septem-
ber 1, we recovered the trenches north-west of
Delville Wood taken from us by the enemy the
A WATER-LOGGED TRENCH.
south-east of Bapiumie. Another company of
hostile machines flew to avenge their comrade.
The British aeroplane attacked one of the
enemy's, which went down and landed in a
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
131
[Official photograph.
A STORM-TOSSED AEROPLANE LANDS UPSIDE DOWN.
In this accident, however, no one was hurt, nor was the machine badly damaged.
gap between two woods. After battling with
the rest arid expending all his ammunition,
the lieutenant in charge of the British machine
returned safely to his base. The same evening
another lieutenant, single-handed, attacked a
German group of eight aeroplanes in the air
over Bapaume. One was sent spinning down-
wards to its destruction. On September 1 the
French aeronauts accounted for four German
machines, Adjutant Dorme bringing his '' bag "
up to eight, by emptying at close quarters his
machine gun into a German aeroplane above
Combles. It came crashing to the ground east
of the village. On the other hand, the Germans
claimed to have put out of action on Saturday
six of the Allied aeroplanes.
Be that as it may, it is certain that on
Saturday four more German aeroplanes were
badly damaged in encounters with the French,
and that, to distract the German commanders,
numerous British and French bombarding
squadrons crossed the German lines and
dropped bombs. A naval aeroplane in the
afternoon bombarded the shipbuilding yards
at Hoboken, near Antwerp. The French
squadrons once more visited the railway
station of Metz-Sablons, throwing 86 120 rnm.
bombs on the buildings and railway trenches,
and 60 bombs of the same size on military
establishments north of Metz. Two hundred
and ten bombs were allotted to the stations of
Maizieres-les-Metz, Conflans, Sedan, and Autun
le-Roman, and to the cantonments and depots
at Guiscard, Ham, Monchy-Lagache, Nesle,
and Athies. These raids were a fitting pre-
lude to the great battle which was to be joined
the next day, Sunday, September 3, between
the Ancre and the region south of Chaulnes.
Up the roads leading to the hostile fronts
streamed countless motor-lorries carrying
ammunition and supplies. The main and
light railways were full of trains. Concealment
of our intentions from the Germans was im-
possible. They were aware that we were
about to attack, and made their arrangements
to meet us. Reinforcements from the Eastern
and from other sections of the Western front
were being brought by train or motors or were
marching to the line Bapauine-Roye. In
anticipation of the coming onslaught the
German artillery on Saturday and throughout
the night of September 2-3 hurled myriads of
projectiles on spots, like the Trones Wood,
where they suspected that the British or
French were concentrating the troops about to
take part in a struggle which might prove to
be decisive. Most, if not all, of the Prussian
Guard had been brought up, and so dangerous
did the German Higher Command consider
the position to be that in the Guillemont region
alone they massed the whole of the 2nd
Bavarian Corps, and the llth and 56th Divi-
sions.
The first step of the new Allied offensive
132
THE TIMES H1STOEY OF THE WAR.
V^s
'
J Photograph.
MACHINE GUNNERS PREPARED FOR AN ATTACK UNDER COVER OF POISON-GAS.
was taken during Sunday, Monday, Tuesday
and Wednesday, September 3, 4, 5 and 6.
It was preceded by a bombardment even
more severe than any which had preceded
it. Feint attacks were also made on both
sides of the Ancre and near Thiepval.
Throughout the night of September 2-3 an
almost continuous zone of fire seemed to stretch
for 30 miles south of the Ancre. The horizon,
to watchers in the background, appeared
to be ablaze. When day broke the German
lines were seen everywhere blotted out by the
fumes from exploding shells, amid which could
here and there be seen thrown up into the air
the masses of timber, brick, and the various
materials used by the Germans in constructing
their defences. From behind the lines squad-
rons of aeroplanes rose and engaged one another
above the dull and gas-laden atmosphere.
Dawn was breaking when the momentary
cessation of our guns far off on the left beyond
Thiepval indicated that Sir Hubert Gough's
troops were advancing against the Germans
north and south of the Aiicre. As in the
battle of July 1, Sir Douglas Haig had hoped
by a demonstration against the northern face
of the Thiepval salient to deceive the enemy's
leaders as to his intentions. The position to be
assaulted was indeed formidable. From the
river-bed the ground rose on the left to the
ridge, in a crease of which lies Beaumont
Hamel, on the right to the Thiepval plateau.
Under Beaumont Hamel were huge caves filled
with the German reserves, many of whom had
also shelter in the trenches and dug-outs on the
slopes of the Ancre Valley.
The destructive bombardment had wrecked
the German parapets, filled in their trenches,
blocked up the entrances to their dug-outs,
and converted the ground to be traversed into
a collection of pits formed by the craters of the
exploding shells. The British north of the
Ancre speedily crashed through the first and
second German lines, sweeping away all opposi-
tion. But on the right, south of the Ancre,
the attack was held up by shell fire, and soon
the troops north of the river were enfiladed by
machine-gun fire and artillery fire and counter-
attacked. As the day wore on it was seen that
no advantage would be gained by their remain-
ing in the conquered area. They were slowly
withdrawn, and the bombardment was once
more renewed.
Almost simultaneously with the attack in
this region, the Anzaca assaulted the southern
face of the Thiepval salient at Mouquet Farm,
now a waste of battered rubbish lying amonp
broken tree-trunks. They were opposed by
the Reserve Regiment of the 1st Division
of the Prussian Guard. The struggle was of
the most stubborn and bloody description.
Through shrapnel and machine-gun fire the
Anzac soldiers came to grips with the Kaiser's
picked troops. Into one of the rbomy under-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
133
ground villas a party of our men descended.
It was apparently untenanted, and the Anzacs
were leisurely appropriating some of the cigars
left by the late occupants when a number of
Germans entered and called upon them to
surrender. " Surrender be d d ! " was the
reply. " Surrender yourselves ! " Bombs were
flung at and by the intruders, and in the smoke -
filled cavern the combatants swayed to and fro
for several minutes. Finally the surviving
Anzacs got the upper hand and emerged into
the open, driving before them a few wounded
and cowed prisoners. The result of the
Mouquet Farm action was that at the end of
it our troops were well beyond the ruins and
on the high ground to the north-west, and
were holding the position won. There they
were ineffectually counter-attacked on the next
day.
The actions on both banks of the Ancre and
at Mouquet Farm in the early hours of Sep-
tember 3 were, as mentioned, feints on the part
of the British. It was at noon that the main
attacks of the British and French were delivered
north and south of the Somme. The position
held by Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops, who
were facing east, ran from the east of Delville
Wood southward to near Guillemont Station,
and thence by the quarry at the western edge
of Guillemont to near the head of the ravine
which runs westward from Angle Wood.
Sir Henry's immediate objectives were Ginchy,
Guillemont, and the German trenches from
Guillemont through Wedge Wood — a small
patch of trees — to the redoubt of Falfemont
Farm which faced Angle Wood. Behind
Falfemont Farm and east of Ginchy and Guille-
mont lay on high ground a long, narrow wood,
Leuze Wood, the northern end of which was
known as Bouleaux Wood. Here among the as
yet untouched trees the German reserves were
hidden. From the lower end of Leuze Wood a
narrow spur 500 yards long extends south-
westwards. Wedge Wood was in the valley on
the Guillemont side, Falfemont Farm at the
end of the spur. Beyond and below Leuze
Wood in a deep wooded valley was Combles.
To facilitate the French movements from
Maurepas towards the heights east of Combles,
Sir Henry Rawlinson at 9 a.m. had launched
an attack against Falfemont Farm. Our
troops reached the farm, but could not hold it.
This strong outpost of the enemy was not taken
till the morning of September 5.
While the Germans were clinging desperately
to Falfemont Farm, the Irish, Londoners and
HEAVY FRENCH ARTILLERY AND MOTOR LORRIES ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT.
184
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
North Countrymen, at noon on Sunday,
;i-.-Miilted Cuillemont and the fortified areas
north and south of the ruined village, in which
the only thoroughfare now discernible was the
.-liirlitly depressed highway running through
the centre of the shapeless heaps of masonry
to Leuze Wood and Combles. This highway
was crossed 500 yards east of Guillemont by a
sunken road connecting Ginchy with Wedge
Wood, and along the sunken road were rows of
deep dug-outs, especially on the south-western
and southern sides of the village. One wrecked
and battered barn, all of Guillemont that
remained, served to guide the British to their
objective. Every other edifice in the village
had long before been pounded into shapeless
fragments, or resolved into dust. Expecting
the attack, the German artillery had discharged
at our front lines in the morning, among other
projectiles, a large number of gas shells.
The garrison of Guillemont consisted of
Prussian Guards and Hanoverians. They had
been driven into their subterranean refuges
by the storm of shells which preceded the
British advance. Some of the defenders who
ventured to show their heads were blinded by
the smoke, dust and fumes. In such a murky
atmosphere the periscope was useless. Nothing
could be seen, and little heard but ear-splitting
explosions. Then, accompanied by a wild
burst of cheering and the shrill wailing of
the war-pipes, waves of Irishmen burst over
the northern section of Guillemont. The
first, second, and third lines of the enemy
were passed and the sunken road beyond
reached in one rush. To the right of the
Irish, Londoners and North Countrymen
moved coolly forward at the heels of the
advancing barrage of shells. The combination
of Celtic and English troops was irresistible.
° . . . ™° >P°° German Trenches A~_
10MetreContours(328Ft) Wire Entanglements +***
MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS AROUND GUILLEMONT AND GINCHY.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
135
•JBWK f _ * J^t sf , '." ' -
* - /V ' •»' '
v - < • ' ^ » .
%*••,'..•
THE RUINED STATION
Prussians and Hanoverians who had emerged
from their holes and were firing at the backs
of the Irish were taken in flank by platoons of
an English battalion engaged in methodically
rounding up the enemy in the quarry and
southern section of Guillemont. A hollow
road leading south-west from Guillemont was
cleared of the Germans. There 150 corpses
were afterwards counted and numbers of
prisoners taken. The quarry north of it gave
considerable trouble, as the defenders kept
below ground until the assailants had passed,
after which they emerged and fired at the backs
of the British pressing eastwards. A detach-
ment was speedily directed to storm the quarry,
and soon cries of " Kamerad ! " and "Mercy ! "
told that the task had been accomplished.
Meanwhile from Guillemont station our men
had swept round the northern edge of the
village, and from Arrow Head copse to the
south other British troops had pushed up to
meet them. At last the village which had so
long resisted us was taken, and, undeterred by
machine-gun fire from Ginchy, Wedge Wood
and Falfemont Farm, Irish and English pressed
on, cleared out the Germans from their refuges
along the sunken road, and dug themselves in.
_The German 73rd, 76th and 164th Regiments
had ceased to exist. The headlong flight
of some Hanoverians was bitterly com-
mented on by a Prussian officer who, however,
[Official photograph.
AT GUILLEMONT
had permitted himself to be taken prisoner :
" They run well," he said to his captors, " they
will be in Berlin before I am in England ! " Of
the prisoners, some forced into the open by
sulphur bombs were weeping. Six out
of 43 occupants of a dug-out on the
Ginchy-Wedge Wood road sobbed as they
crawled into the presence of a bombing party,
and begged for quarter. An officer — spectacled
and elderly — went on his knees before a British
sergeant. Many Germans offered watches and
trinkets in the hope of saving their lives. But
it was explained to them that British soldiers
were not thieves.
The capture of Guillemont was succeeded by
the seizure of Ginchy, and the systematic
bombardment of Leuze Wood, but in the after-
noon and evening the Germans counter-
attacked at Ginchy and Guillemont. They
succeeded in recovering the former, but were
repulsed with terrible loss at Guillemont.
Meanwhile north of Delville Wood and away to
the north-west of it in High Wood we had
gained ground. Rain again fell in the evening
and impeded the advance.
The next day, Monday, September 4, Sir
Henry Rawlinson's offensive was resumed.
Through the night and the morning of the 4th
the bombardment, now chiefly directed against
Ginchy, Leuze and Wedge Woods and Falfe-
mont Farm, had continued. The rain ceased
136
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
and the sun shone on the battlefield. Ginchy
was assaulted, and at 3 p.m. our troops from
the sunken road charged into Wedge Wood,
and carried it and the trench beyond it. Falfe-
mont Farm — or rather its site — was also
attacked from the north and south and momen-
tarily taken. Suddenly a solid line of Prussian
Guards emerged from Leuze Wood and
charged over the high ground towards A Veil}; •
Wood and the farm which lay on the slope of the
ridge opposite Angle Wood. As the oncoming
infantry reached the edge of the ravine it was
swept by shrapnel and riddled by machine-gun
fire. After a desperate struggle Wedge Wood
remained in our possession, but Falfemont
Fann was reoccupied by the enemy. Mean-
while parties of our men from the sunken road
had penetrated into Leuze Wood, and many
hardly fought combats had taken place in the
ruins of Ginchy.
On the morning of Tuesday, September 5,
Falfemont Farm was taken, but the Germans
were still entrenched in the greater part of
Ginchy, where attack and counter-attack had
succeeded one another in rapid succession. By
the evening of the same day we held Leuze
Wood firmly, and it was completely cleared of
the Germans the next day. We had by then
advanced on a front of two miles to an average
depth of nearly one mile. We had disposed of
thousands of the enemy, including large num-
bers of prisoners, and many machine-guns.
Seldom had the tenacity of the British soldier
been exhibited to greater advantage than in
this four days' battle.
The battle of the Somme during this period
was equally memorable in the annals of our
gallant Ally. North of the river at noon on
September 3, when the British were advancing
against Guillemont, General Fayolle, after a
tremendous bombardment, flung his infantry
at the German trenches from the northern
environs of Maurepas, to 'the western outskirts
of Clery-sur-Somme (a length of 3J miles).
The 2nd Bavarian Corps, stimulated by Hinden-
burg's recent visit, barred the way, but th •
onset of the poilus was irresistible. They
drove the enemy up the eastern side of the
Combles Valley almost to the northern edge of
Combles ; they stormed Le Forest and carried
tin- German trenches between it and Clery-
sur-Somme. They also in places crossed the
< 'ombles-Clery-sur-Somme road. The latter
village was taken, and a German counter-
attack south of Le Forest was caught under tht-»
fire of French batteries and completely dis-
persed. Two thousand unwounded prisoners,
14 guns, and 50 machine-guns were captured in
this most successful action. During the night
the French gains were consolidated, and the
next day the advance was continued. The
French forward movement east of Le Forest
outflanked the Hcpital Farm and occupied the
crest of the ridge to the west of the Bois
Marrieres. Several sorties from Combles were
broken by machine-gun fire and by artillery
barrages. Five hundred more prisoners and
10 machine-guns were brought in by the
victors. During the night torrential rain
hindered the operations, and the enemy took
advantage of the lull to attempt a counter-
attack. Debouching from the wood of Anderlu,
north of Le Forest, he endeavoured to pierce
the new French line between Combles and
Le Forest ; but the artillery and machine-guns
soon stopped it. On Tuesday, September 5,
the French reached the vvestern border of
Anderlu Wood, captured the Hopital Farm and
the Rainette Wood, entered the Marrieres Wood,
north-east of Clery-sur-Somme, and occupied
the end of the ridge across which runs the
road from Clery to Bouchavesnes. South of the
Somme, Omiecourt, at the edge of the river
bank, was taken and the southern brought
into line with the northern sector. The Colo-
nial troops carried the village at the point
of the bayonet in 40 minutes. The remnant
of the enemy's garrison endeavoured to escape
but were stopped at the level crossing of the
Bapaume-Peronne light railway and forced to
surrender. By this time 24 heavy and 8 field
guns, 2 bomb mortars, 2 trench guns, a depot of
150 mm. shells, a captive balloon, and numerous
machine-guns had been wrested from the
Germans. During Wednesday, September 6,
nothing of importance occurred on the French
front north of the Somme, but in the night of
the 6th-7th, violent counter-attacks were
made on the French garrison in the trenches at
Hopital Fann. They were all stopped by
artillery barrages.
Thus, by the evening of September 6, Sir
Henry Rawlinson's right wing ran from the
western edge of Ginchy through Leuze Wood
to the edge of the ridge overlooking Combles,
and the extremity of General Fayolle's left
wing was across the Combles Valley, in the
woods just south of the village. Thence the
French line went south-westwards through
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
137
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
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THE GROUND OVER WHICH THE FRENCH ADVANCED.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
139
the wood of Anderlu by Hopital Farm into
the wood of Marrieres. Thence it turned
southwards and touched the Somme just east
of Clery-sur-Somme. The reduction of Com-
bles and the advance on Sailly-Sallisel would
not long be delayed. Through Clery-sur-
Somme the French Commander was also in a
position to aim a blow at Mt. St. Quentin, the
northern key to Peronne, and the P6ronne-
Bapaume highway.
While Sir Henry Rawlinson and General
Fayolle were moving on Combles, the French
Somme, the French south-west of Barleux
carried three trenches and advanced over a
mile to the outskirts of Berny and Deniecourt.
Farther south they secured Soyecourt, cap-
turing a battalion, and also progressed farther
in Vermandovillers, where there were sanguinary
encounters in and around the church.
At 2 p.m. the new French Army, under
General Micheler, came into action, but it was
not till approaching 5 p.m. that a breach was
made in the German lines slightly north of
Chilly. Through it poured the victorious
AFTER THE CAPTURE OF GUILLEMONT: THE RETURN OF THE IRISH BRIGADE.
south of the Somme had not been idle. On
Monday, September 4, Fayolle's right wing, in
conjunction with a new French Army, deployed
south of Vermandovillers, and delivered battle
between Barleux and Chilly, a village south of
Lihona, along a front of over 12 miles. Barleux,
attacked since July, again and again had held
out, and at the opening of the battle the
French line ran from the west of Barleux south-
westwards to Belloy-en-Santerre, then to the
west of Soyecourt and through the north-
western portion of Vermandovillers by the
Soyecourt -Lihons road to the district west of
Chilly. After a very severe bombardment
analogous to those which had been such a
feature of the recent fighting north of the
French infantry, and by 5 p.m. the enemy had
retired to his second position, leaving behind
him 1,200 prisoners and several guns and
machine-guns. The whole of Chilly was aban-
doned to the French, who also seized Hill 86
and entered the western fringes of Chaulnes
Wood. South of Chilly the French heavy
artillery caught and dispersed enemy troops
moving along the Liaucourt-Fouches road.
During the day 2,700 prisoners had been cap-
tured south of the Somme, and the French had
made an appreciable advance towards the
Pe>onne-Roye high road. Six counter-attacks
delivered by troops hurried up from the Roye
region were beaten off, chiefly by shell fire, and
the French were left to consolidate during the
140
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAlt.
night their new positions, which turned out
very wet. Several assaults in. the neighbour-
hood of Belloy were repulsed, and 100 more
prisoners secured.
Tuesday, September 5, was another success-
ful day for our Allies in the operations south of
the Somme. Massed charges of the Germans
occurred at numerous points, notably between
Barleux and Belloy and between Belloy and
Soyecourt. They were made in vain, and the
French, after inflicting heavy losses on the
and advanced as far as the .southern projection
of the park. The French wore now across the
Barleux-Chaulnes road, arid their guns were
able to dominate Barleux from the south as
well as from tho north. The northern portion
of Vermandovillers was completely cleared of
the enemy as far as the Vermandovillers-
Estrees road, and the Etoile Wood was captured.
South of Vermandovillers the troops of
Micheler's Army expelled tho Germans from
the long plateau north of the Chilly -Hallu road
LIGHT RAILWAY BEHIND THE FRENCH LINES.
enemy, retained their hold on the ground they
had captured. East of Soyecourt our Allies,
driving the enemy before them, reached the
north-western and southern borders of Denie-
court Park, which, with its chateau, had been
strongly fortified, and between Soyecourt and
Chilly they carried a salient and numerous
works south of Vermandovillers. The total
prisoners taken had now risen to 4,047, in-
cluding 55 officers. Counter-attacks in tho
Berny-en-Santerre and Deniecourt regions were
smashed by barrages.
On Wednesday, tho 6th, in the afternoon,
the right wing of General Fayolle's Army
stormed German trenches south-oast of Belloy,
carried most of the village of Berny-en-Santerre
and attacked the enemy trenches on the eastern
slopes at the foot of which ran the Chaulnes-
Koye railway. Round the junction of the
Amiens-St. Quentin and Roye - Chaulnes-
Peroniie railways the struggle raged till 6 p.m.
The entrenchments here ware particularly
strong, but the French succeeded in storming
them. At sunset our Allies were within a few
hundred yards of Chaulnes station. Their
artillery had crushed a sugar factory with
munition depots north of it, and east of Chilly
tho troops of a Saxon Division, hurried up
from the Aisne front, had met with a bloody
reverse. Later tho Germans debouched from
Horgny, and attacked again and again betw-een
Barleux and Berny : but artillery barrages
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
141
prevented them from reaching the French
lines. In the day's fighting 400 and more
prisoners had been captured.
During the night of the 6th-7th 16 French
bombarding aeroplanes dropped heavy bombs
on Villecourt, a village on the Somme, -
between Peronne and Ham, on Athies, through
which passes the Peronne-Ham highroad, and
on Roisel, a station between Peronne and Cam-
brai, and the enemy vainly attacked the French
between Berny and Chaulnes. Four times his
artillery deluged the French positions south
of Vermandovillers with high explosive and
shrapnel shell, and after each bombardment
the Germans in masses advanced to recover
the ground lost by them in the course of the
preceding days. At no point, however, were
they successful. Two hundred more prisoners
were captured, and on the 7th our Allies
carried some more trenches east of Deniecourt.
Thus, between September 4 and 7,
Generals Fayolle and Micheler south of the
Somme had cut the Roye-Peronne railway,
loosened the hold of the Germans on Chaulnes,
and driven a wedge into the enemy's zone of
fortifications between Chaulnes and Barleux.
Xorth of the Somme the French from Clery
had moved nearer to Mont St. Quentin,
which defended Peronne from an attack down
the Bapaume-Peronne road and the guns on
which protected the fortified village of Barleux.
The left wing of General Fayolle now extended
northwards from the east of Clery to the
southern environs of Combles.
Across the Combles valley the right wing of
Sir Henry Rawlinson on September 7 stretched
from Falfemont Farm by the wood of Leuze
to the western outskirts of Ginchy. Generals
Fayolle and Micheler now suspended their
offensive, while Sir Henry Rawlinson made
preparations for the storming of Ginchy and
the expulsion of the Germans between Ginchy
and the Bois des Bouleaux, the long strip of
woodland running north-eastwards out of the
wood of Leuze. These preparations were
made on the 7th and 8th, during which there
was fighting — on the 8th — round Mouquet
Farm, in High Wood and at Vermandovillers,
whore the French advanced and captured 50
prisoners.
In beautiful but misty weather Sir Henry
Rawlinson struck his blow on Saturday,
September 9, in the presence of the British
Premier, Mr. Asquith, who had been spending
GENERAL FAYOLLE AND HIS CHIEF
OF THE STAFF.
some days in the Somme area. The troops
detailed for the operation were drawn from
Ireland and England. The line of battle ran
from the north-east of Pozieres by High Wood
and Ginchy to Leuze Wood.
After the usual intense preliminary bombard-
ment the troops at 4.45 p.m. went forward
over their parapets. On the southern side of
the Pozieres-Bapaume road towards Martin-
puich they carried a series of trenches and cap-
tured 62 unwounded prisoners. Soon after
9 p.m. the victors beat off a counter-attack,
inflicting heavy losses. The attack in High
Wood was also successful, our men advancing
300 yards on a 600 yards front. It was, how-
ever, the assaults on Ginchy and the ground
from Ginchy to Leuze Wood which were the
crowning triumph of the day.
Ginchy and the area south-east of it were
defended by fresh troops, the 19th Bavarian
Division supplying the garrison of the village,
and troops of the 185th Division lining the
trenches from Ginchy to the north-western
end of Leuze Wood. At 4.45 p.m. the Irish
142
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
A PATROL IN CHAULNES WOOD.
made for Ginchy. The ruins — especially those
of a farm near the centre of the village —
bristled with machine-guns. This attack was
graphically described by an officer who took
part in it. He wrote :
We were in reserve. The front line was some 500
or 600 yards higher up the slope nearer Ginchy. We
knew that a big attack was coming oft that day, but
did not think we should be called upon to take part.
Accordingly, we settled down for the day, and most
of the men slept. I felt quit* at home, as I sat in the
bottom of the deep trench, reading the papers I had
received the previous day from home. I went through
The Times, and was much interested in its Japanese
Supplement, for the memories it brought back of many
happy days in Dai Nippon were vivid ones.
It was about four o'clock in the afternoon when we
first learned that we should have to take part in the
attack on Ginchy. We were ordered to move up
into the front line to reinforce ; none of us knew for a
certainty whether we were going over the top or not,
but everything seemed to point that way. Our shells
bursting in the village of Ginchy made it belch forth
smoke like a volcano. The Hun shells were bursting
on the slope in front of us. The noise was deafening.
I turned to my servant O'Brien, who has always been a
cheery, optimistic soul, and said, " Well, O'Brien,
how do you think we'll fare ? " and his answer was fur
once not encouraging. " We'll never come out alive,
sir," was his answer. Happily we both came out
alive.
It was at this moment, just as we were debouching
on to the scragged front line of trench, that we beheld
a scene which stirred and thrilled us to the depths of
our souls. The great charge of the Irish had begun,
and we had come up in the nick of time. Mere won Is
fail to convey anything like a true picture of tlip
hut it is burned into the memory of all th,..r
who were there and saw it. Between the outer frin .:••
.it Cincliy and tlio front line of our own trenches is X<>
Man's Land, a wilderness of pits s0 close together that
you could ride astraddle the partitions between any
two of them. As you look half right, obliquely down
along No Man's Land, you behold a groat host of
yellow-coated men rise out of the earth and sur^o
forward and upward in a torrent — not in extended
order, as you might expect, but in one mass. There
seems to be no end to them. Just when you think tho
flood is subsiding, another wave comes surging up
the bend towards Ginchy. We joined in on the left.
There was no time for us any more than the others
to get into extended order. We formed another stream
converging on the others at the summit.
By this time we were all wildly excited. Our shouts
and yells alone must have struck terror into the Huns.
who were firing their machine-guns down the slope.
But there wag no wavering in the Irish host. W<»
couldn't run. We advanced at a steady walking
pace, stumbling here and there, but going ever onward
and upward. That numbing dread had now left me
completely. Like the others I was intoxicated with
the glory of it all. I can remember shouting and
bawling to the men of ray platoon, who were only too
eager to go on.
The Hun barrage had now been opened in earnest,
and shells wore falling here, there, and everywhere
in No Man's Land. They were mostly dropping on our
right, but they were coming nearer and nearer, as if
a screen were being drawn across our front. I kn"w
that it was a case of " Now or never," and stumbled
on feverishly. We managed to get through the barni_'!
in the nick of time, for it closed behind us, and after
that we had no shells to fear in front of us.
I mention merely as an interesting fart in psychology
how in a crisis of this sort one's mental faculties ar.3
sharpened. Instinct told us when the shells were
coming gradually closer to crouch down in the holes
until they had passed. Acquired knowledge, on the
other hand — the knowledge instilled into one by lectures
and books (of which I have only read one — rjamelv. •
Making's " Company Training") — told us that it was
safer in the long run to push ahead before the enemy
got our range, and it was acquired knowledge that
won.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
143
And hero another observation I should like to make
by the way. I remember reading somewhere — I think
it was in a book by Winston Churchill — that of the
Kattle of Oradurraan the writer could recollect nothing
in the way of noise. He had an acute visual recollec-
tion of all that went on about him, but his aural recol-
lection was nil ; he could only recall the scene as if it
were a cinematograph picture. Curiously this was
my own experience at Ginchy. The din must have been
deafening (I learned afterwards that it could be heard
miles away), yet I have only a confused remembrance of it.
How long we were in crossing No Man's Land I
don't know. It could not have been more than five
minutes, yet it seemed much longer. We were now well
up to the Boche. We had to clamber over all manner
of obstacles — fallen trees, beams, great mounds of
brick and rubble — in fact, over the ruins of Ginchy.
It seems liko a nightmare to me now. I remember seeing
comrades falling round me. My sense of hearing returned
to me, for I became conscious of a new sound — namely,
the pop, pop, pop, pop ot machine-guns, and the con-
tinuous crackling of rifle fire. By this time all units
were mixed up, but they were all Irishmen. They
wore cheering and cheering liko mad. There was a
machine-gun playing on us near by, and we all made
for it.
At this moment we caught our first sight of the Huns.
They were in a trench of sorts, which ran in and out
among the ruins. Some of them had theic hands
up. Others were kneeling and holding their arms
out to us. Still others were running up and down
the trench distractedly as if they didn't know which
way to go, but as we got closer they went down on
their knees, too. To the everlasting good name of
the Irish soldiery, not one of these Huns, some of
whom had been engaged in slaughtering our men up
to the very last moment, was killed. I did not see a
single instance of a prisoner being shot or bayoneted.
When you remember that our men were worked up to
a frenzy of excitement, this crowning act of mercy
to their foes is surely to their eternal credit. They
could feel pity even in their rage.
TRANSPORTING A HEAVY FRENCH GUN.
[French official photograph.
Ill
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
By this time we had penetrated the German front
line, and were on the first flat ground where the village
once stood surrounded by a wood of fairly high trees.
There w-is no holding the men back. They rushed
through Gincliy, driving the Huns before thorn. The
Hun dead wore lying everywhere, some of them having
been frightfully mangled by our shell fire. We dug
in by linking up the shell craters, and though the men
were tired (some wanted to smoke and others to make
tea) they worked with a will, and before long we had
got a pretty decent trench outlined.
I heard that when Captain 'a company rushed
• trench to our right, round the corner of the wood,
a German officer surrendered in great style. He
atood to attention, gave a clinking salute, and said
in perfect English, "Sir, myself, this other officer
and 10 men are your prisoners." Captain said,
" Right you are, old chap ! " and they shook hands,
the prisoners being led away immediately. So you
see there are certain amenities of battlefields. I believe
our prisoners were all Bavarians, who are better man-
nered from all accounts than the Prussians. They
could thank their stars they had Irish chivalry to deal
with.
The trench (between ours and the wood) was stacked
with German dead. It was full of dt'iria, bombs, shovels,
and what-not, and torn books, magazines, and news-
papers. I came across a copy of Schiller's " Wallen-
6t«in."
Our men are very good to tho German wounded.
An Irishman's heart melts very soon. 3n fact, kindness
and compassion for the wounded, our own and the
enemy's, is about tho . only decent thing I have seen in
war. It is not at all uncommon to see a British and
German soldier side by side in the same shell-hole,
nursing each other as best they can and placidly smoking
cigarettes. A poor wounded Hun who hobbled into
our trench in the morning, his face badly mutilated
by a bullet — he whimpered and moaned as piteou^ly
as a child — was bound up by one of our officers, who took
off his coat and set to work in earnest. Another Boche,
whose legs were hit, was carried in by our men and put
into a shell-hole for safety, where he lay awaiting the
stretcher-bearers when we left. It is with a sense of
pride that I can write this of our soldiers.
The first advance of the Irish carried them
to the main road running through tho centre of
the village. The soldiers on the left reached it
in eight minutes, those on the right were held
up by machine-gun fire. A trench mortar was
hurriedly brought forward, and the Germans
forced to evacuate the emplacement. Another
trench mortar silenced the mitrailleuses in the
ruins of the farm above mentioned. At
5.30 p.m. a second rush carried the Irish out
into the open. They pushed up the Ginchy-
Morval road about 800 yards to the farther
edge of the plateau. Thence they looked
down on Morval. To the right of Ginchy the-
English troops had been no less successful.
They had seized over 1,000 yards of trencher
from a point just south of the Guillemont-
Morval tramway to the south-west corner of
Bouleaux Wood. Over 500 prisoners were
taken on that and the succeeding dayt°, and
A SHELL-HOLE AS COVER FOR A FIELD-GUN.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
145
COLLECTING THE WOUNDED NEAR GINCHY AFTER THE BATTLE.
the total of prisoners captured since July 1
was raised to over 17,000. The French, who
on Saturday carried a small wood and part of
a trench east of Belloy, made fresh progress
east of Deniecourt, and repulsed an attack
north of Berny. Since September 3 in the
region south of the Somme they had secured
7,600 German privates and some 100
officers
As a result of the efforts of Sir Henry Raw-
linson's Army, and particularly of the Irish
troops from Connaught, Leinster and Munster,
of the Rifle Regiments and the regiments from
Warwickshire, Kent, Devonshire, Gloucester-
shire, Surrey, Cornwall, and from Wales and
Scotland, the British line, from September 3 to
September 9 had been pushed forward on a
front of 6,000 yards to a depth varying from
300 to 3,000 yards. The enemy had lost all
his observation posts on the main ridge with
ths exception of those in High Wood and north
and north-east of Ginchy. He was being
forced mora and more to rely on reports from
a3roplan3s and captive balloons for the direc-
tion of his still very powerful artillery. We,
on the other hand, had now a clear view of
Couraelette, Martinpuich, Flers, Lesboeufs,
Morval and Combles, the knots as it were in
the next chain of defences between the British
and the Bapaume-Peronne highway. By our
victorious offensive through Ginchy and the
Leuze Wood we dominated Combles and,
consequently, were in a position materially to
assist the left of General Fayolle in its pro-
jected advance on both sides of the Bapaume-
Peronne road towards Sailly-Sallisel. From
the eastern edge of the wood of Leuze to that
important highway was but a distance of two
miles and a half, and batteries established in
the wood would be able to enfilade the German
guns in the Bois St. Pierre Vaast seeking to
impede the movement of Fayolle on Sailly-
Sallisel, while from Ginchy a direct thrust at
the last named village -fortress might be made
through Morval by Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Gradually the enemy was being pushed into
the low-lying ground in the apex of the triangle
Albert-Bapaume-Peronne, the western side of
which was formed by the Amiens -Cambrai, the
eastern by the Ham -Arras chaussee. The base
of the triangle, almost to the gates of Peronne,
was already in the possession of the Allies, and
146
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
they wore on the ridge above Martinpuich
half-way up the western side.
Perceiving the imminent danger he was
running of having his main line of communica-
tion with Peronne cut by Sir Henry Rawlin-
PREPARATIONS FOR REMOVING A
CAPTURED HOWITZER.
son's troops debouching through Ginchy, the
enemy, about noon on Sunday, September 10,
attacked north of the village and was bloodily
repulsed. A second attempt later in the day
was equally unsuccessful. Small detachments
of German infantry made ineffectual efforts to
recover the trenches lost near Mouquet Farm
in the vicinity of Pozieres. Over 350 more
prisoners and 3 machine-guns captured during
the last 24 hours were brought in by our
men.
While General Baron von Marschall and
General von Kirchbach were vainly striving to
relax the grip of the British on the ridges between
Thiepval and Combles, south of the Somme,
General von Quast during the night of Septem-
ber 9-10 launched several attacks in the sector
Barleux-Belloy. The flammenwerjer were once
more employed, and the enemy managed to enter
one of the French trenches. He was speedily
ejected by a vigorous counter-attack, and four
of his machine-guns were captured. To the
south-west of Berny, to the east of Deniecourt,
and to the south of Vermandovillers, German
bombers advanced against the French lines,
which had been previously subjected to severe
shelling. Fierce hand-to-hand struggles en-
sued. Finally the Germans were thrown back
all along the front, leaving behind a large
number of dead. On Sunday, the 10th, two
more attacks were made south-west of Berny.
Both failed completely. During the night of
the 10th- llth the enemy, undeterred by his
heavy losses, delivered a series of charges
south of the Somme. From Berny to the
region Chaulnes-Chilly, no less than five
attacks, in which the bombers were accom-
panied by bearers of flammenwerfer, were made.
The French artillery and mitrailleuses scattered
and thinned the advancing masses, the sur-
vivors of whom sullenly retreated to their own
trenches. Meanwhile the French airmen had
not been inactive. On the preceding Saturday,
Adjutant Dorme had brought down his ninth
aeroplane, which fell at Beaulencourt, south of
Bapaume. Four other German machines were
damaged — one in the region of La Maisonnette,
the others to the north and east of Peronne.
On Saturday night a squadron dropped 480
bombs on the stations and enemy depots
in the region of Chauny, south-east of Ham,
an important point on the railway in the Oise
Valley, and another squadron of 18 machines
bombed military establishments at Ham on
the Somme and between Ham and Peronne.
On Monday, September 11, the ascent of 16
German balloons north of Ginchy gave visible
evidence that the Germans were no longer able
to direct their guns from posts on the ground
at this point. The day passed almost unevent-
fully save for the furious artillery duels. Our
heavy guns caused two large conflagrations in
A WAGON IN DIFFICULTIES.
an ammunition depot at Grandcourt on the
Ancre, north-east of Thiepval. During the
night our trenches between Mouquet Farm
and Delville Wood were heavily shelled. The
battle-field round Guillemont and Ginchy was
a gruesome sight. German corpses lay thickly
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
147
MR. LLOYD GEORGE AT THE FRONT, \OfftUftoUfapk,
With (from left to right) M. Thomas, Sir Douglas Haig and General Joffre.
about the roads and craters. In one place
straight rows of dead men clad in " field-grey "
showed where a massed counter-attack had
been caught by our machine-guns. The
twisted iron frame of a goods wagon, the
foundations of the railway station, and the
concrete base of an observation post were now
the sole indications that Guillemont had ever
existed. South of the Somrne the French with
grenades beat off a German attack east of
Beiloy, and our Allies captured an enemy
trench south of the cemetery of Berny.
The British having had time to consolidate
their positions from Ginchy to Leuze Wood,
from which positions they menaced Morval and
Combles, General Fayolle decided to advance
his left wing between Combles and the Somme.
On Tuesday, September 12, while Mr. Lloyd
14*
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
FRESH PRISONERS ARRIVING AT A "CAGE."
[Official photograph.
George was visiting the rear of the British
salient, and desultory fighting was proceeding
in High Wood and east of Ginchy, the turning
movement which was designed to sever Combles
from Sailly-Sallisel and to place the French
astride of the Peronne-Bapaume road began.
It was preceded by a terrific two days' bom-
bardment of the enemy's lines, west and east of
the road. These consisted of a belt of entrench-
ments descending from Morval to the banks of
the Somme. Behind them on the road the
villages of Rancourt, due east of Combles, and
Bouchavesnes, due east of Maurepas, had been
organized for defence with characteristic Ger-
man thoroughness. Rancourt was just in
front of the largo wood of St. Pierre Vaast. On
the country road from Combles to Rancourt,
the farm of L,e Priez had been converted into
a small subterranean fortress. Between Clery-
sur- Somme and Peronne was the Canal du
Nord, which, after crossing the Bapaume-
Peronne road north of Mont St. Quentin,
entered the river at Halle. Parallel with,
close to, and east of the canal flowed the Tor-
tille, a little tributary of the Somme.
On the morning of the 12th the French were
on the western slopes of the little plateau, the
summit of which was 76 metres high, and at
whose eastern foot ran the Canal du Nord.
Thence their line ascended just west of the long
patch of woodland known as the Bois de Mar-
rieres, and curved north-westwards to the Bois
d'Anderlu and the southern outskirts of Combles.
The front from which the advance started,
when at 12.30 p.m. the guns lifted, was nearly
four miles long. So admirably had the French
artillery done its work that within half an hour
the whole of the enemy's battered, crater-
pitted trenches were in the possession of our
Allies. On the left the infantry debouching
from the wood of Anderlu passed round the
Priez Farm and reached a little chapel 600
yards or so in front of Raneourt. Simul-
taneously the troops on Hill 111 mounted the
western slopes of the plateau between them
and the Bapaume-Peronne road and seized the
summit of Hill 145. The Germans rallied behind
a ruined windmill west of the road. Meanwhile
the troops who had traversed the wood of
Marrieres, which they did not do till 4.30 p.m.,
the garrison there putting up a plucky fight,
came up on the right, and the French guns
placed a barrage east of the high road and
prevented reinforcements coming up to the aid
of the broken enemy. To check the oncoming
French, masses of Germans charged out of
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
149
Combles and Fregicourt. Another barrage of
shells stopped this flank attack. After several
hours of stubborn fighting the Bapaume-
Peronrie road was gained. The French
seized houses at the southern end of Ban-
court, and deployed along the road as far
as Brioche, south-west of Bouchavesnes.
The hamlet of Brioche was carried, and,
pivoting on it, the remainder of the French
forces advanced eastwards, the troops from
the Clery region capturing the plateau of
Hill 76, and saw below them the Canal
du Nord and beyond it the Peronne-
Bapaume highway. Not content with these
successes and with the capture of 1,500 prisoners
including numbers of officers, towards 8 p.m.
the French crossed the highway and assaulted
Bouchavesnes. After two hours of severe
hand-to-hand fighting the ruins of the village
were seized. The troops concerned in this
brilliant little episode worts the 6th Brigade of
Chasseurs (comprising the 6th and 27th Chas-
seurs and the 28th Alpine Chasseurs), a bat-
talion of the 44th and one of the 133rd Infantry.
During the night some units of a division
which had been rushed up from the Verdun
district were hurled at the Hill 76 plateau.
Mont St. Quentin, menaced by the French
in Bouchavesnes, would be in great danger
if the plateau was not recovered. Time
after time the German columns crossed the
canal and swarmed up the eastern slopes only
to be driven back in hopeless confusion.
At daybreak on Wednesday, September 13,
the French resumed the offensive up the road
from Bouchavesnes to the village of Haut-
Allaines, north-east of Mont St. QuentSn.
They stormed the German positions on the
western slopes of the plateau of Hill 130 and
the farm of the Bois 1'Abbe, which was half
a mile east of the Bapaume-Peronne roac'.
At the same time, in the direction of Combles,
they cleared the Germans from the six suc-
cessive trenches round the Le Priez Farm,
which itself was carried on the 14th. In the
two days' fighting over 2,500 prisoners had
been taken, and in Bouchavesnes alone 10
pieces, several of them heavy guns, and 40
machine-guns.
Enraged at their defeat the German leaders
counter-attacked throughout the 13th. Two
regiments were sent against the Farm of Bois
I'Abbe. The defenders at first gave way, but
the chasseurs with irresistible elan swept the
enemy from the wrecked building. Hill 76 was
also the scene of stubborn encounters. For
hours the fighting went on, but at last the
plateau remained in French hands. South of
the Somme on the same day, in the hope of
retrieving his signal defeat north of the river,
the enemy advanced again and again at various
points. He was everywhere repulsed, a com-
pany west of Chaulnes being wiped out by the
French fire.
It will be seen that the battles of
September 9, 12, and 13 had materially im-
proved the Allied chances of breaking right
GENERAL BARON VON MARSGHALL,
One of the German Commanders on the Somme.
150
THE TIMES HIXTUUY OF THE WAR.
through the German lines north of the Somme.
Cniiibles was now under the fire of the British
from tlu- west and north-west, and under that
of the French from the south and south-east.
A section of the Bapaume-Peronne road was
firmly held by our Allies, and Mont St. Quentin
could be attacked from the north and north-
east as well as from the west. Mont St. Quentin,
350 feet high, was, indeed, protected by the
Tortille on the north and the Somme on the
south-west, but it would be difficult henceforth
for the Germans to send supplies of ammunition
and guns to its defenders, for most of the roads
The progress towards Thiepval had already
been considerable, but between us and that
village there lay an intricate organization of
trenches, produced by the strenuous exertions
of the past two years. The key of this position,
an elaborate stronghold embodying the highest
examples of the engineer's art, was the central
kernel known to the Germans as the W under -
werk behind the Hohenzollern Trench and
600 yards in front of Thiepval. It was placed
on the spur which runs south-eastwards from
Thiepval towards Authuille, and dominated
to a considerable extent the surrounding
THE COMMANDANT PERSONALLY INSPECTS THE DEFENCES.
leading to the hill were under the direct fire of
French batteries. Nor had the Germans any-
where between the Ancre and Chilly gained
counter-balancing successes. During the night
of the 12th-13th they had been repulsed near
Mouquet Farm, and on the 13th the British
had pushed ahead north of Ginchy. On the
14th there was a lull — the lull which precedes
the storm — on. the British front, and the
French beat off attacks north and south of
Bouchavesnes, and south of the Somme
advanced by bombing east of Belloy. The
situation was decidedly promising for the
Allies.
country. The main value of this fortification,
beyond its intrinsic strength, was the fact that
from it the Germans could sweep the ground
to " Sky Line " trench and Mouquet Farm.
It was plain, therefore, that before any advance
could be made by the British up the valleys
on either side of the spur it was necessary to
capture it. Moreover, before our centre could
move towards Courcelette and Martinpuich
the Germans had to be expelled from these
advanced posts, whence our troops moving
to the assault of the Courcelette sector could
be struck in flank.
The Wwnderwerk itself had formed the target
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
151
/^German Trenches
PLAN OF THE " WUNDERWERK" AND ADJOINING GERMAN TRENCHES.
ol our artillery for the previous fortnight with
the usual result. So far as concerned the
works above ground, it had been beaten and
blown out of existence and many of the dug-
outs had been destroyed or seriously damaged.
Yet some still remained which afforded shelter
to many of the garrison, and in the trenches
before and around it which had escaped to some
extent the devastating fire of our guns, the
enemy was hanging on in some strength, and
it was recognized that the Germans rightly
attached great importance to this part of their
line. It was part of Sir Hubert Gough's task
to capture it, and it was determined that the
operation was to be carried out on the evening
of September 14.
Before our infantry advanced to the assault
the usual tornado of projectiles swept over the
doomed spot. Suddenly our artillery increased
their range and formed a barrage behind the
Wunderwerk to keep back the enemy's supports.
The effect of this, combined with the havoc
wrought on the actual position, had a double
effect. The remains of the unhappy garrison
had seen their comrades falling all around
them, and knew that their retreat could only
be made through a veil of shell-fire. Many of
them fled before the British infantry closed
with them ; others remained to put up a really
good hand-to-hand fight. It was not of long
duration. Our men had come on swiftly and
with determination, and soon cleared out their
opponents and drove such of them as survived
and did not surrender into the barrage which
few lived to pass through. The German
casualties were very heavy, ours but a few,
while the total advance we made was along a
line of 900 yards and a depth of 350. The
Wunderwerk and the trenches connected with
it on the spur were in our hands and an advance
on Mouquet Farm and Courcelette could now
be proceeded with without fear of flank attack.
No sooner were our troops in the German
position than they began to turn it into a
stronghold for themselves. The nature of
their task may be judged from the statement
of a sapper. " The Germans," he said, " do
not stay in their trenches any more. These
are so badly blown up that we have to dig
them anew." The enemy appreciated that
they had been deprived of an important point
which it was probable that we should endeavour
to hold at any cost. Counter-attacks were,
therefore, made, and although these did not
actually take place till the next evening, as
they had no practical relation to the fighting on
the 15th they may here be disposed of. En-
deavours to recover the lost ground were made
twice by the Germans. One took the shape of a
direct attempt to turn the British out of the
captured position, but this failed completely ;
indeed, it could scarcely be regarded as serious.
The assailants came on in half-hearted fashion
and made no effort to come to close quarters.
Indeed, they contented themselves with a
stationary and harmless bombing when quite
a hundred yards from our newly occupied line.
The only result was a numerous series of harm-
less explosions in front of the British trench
which were totally devoid of effect on it
152
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
Against our loft a more rational assault was
delivered. Here the position was more favour-
able, for the German trench on the north-
\\estem side of the Thiepval slope lapped round
the line we held and this somewhat outflanked
it. Moreover, the distance between the two
opposed lilies \\as small, and the attacking
troops were able to get well within bombing
range from almost the first onset. The con-
flict lasted for some time and was severe.
There does not seem to have been any actual
collision between the hostile forces ; the fighting
was conducted chiefly if not entirely with
bombs, we alone using up 1,500. But eventu-
GENERAL VON KIRCHBACH,
One of the German Commanders on the Sonime.
ally the enemy was driven back, and he then
allowed us to consolidate the conquered
position without further hindrance.
On Friday, September 15, both Allies had
arranged for a further conjoint attack. Sir
Douglas Haig had ordered Sir Hubert Cough's
army, which formed the left wing of the British
in the ensuing battle, and was now on high
ground in the Thiepval salient with its left
centre secured by the capture of the W under-
werk, to act as a pivot to the 4th Army on its
right commanded by Sir Henry Rawliason.
The latter was to direct his efforts to the rear-
most of the enemy's original systems of defence
between Le Sars on the Albert -Bapaume road
and Morval. If be were successful, the left of
the attack would be extended to embrace the
villages of Martinpuich and Coureelette. As
soon as the advance had reached the Morval
line, the left of the British would be brought
across the Thiepval ridge in lino with the
Fourth Army.
To the right of the British, General Fayolle
was to continue the line of advance from the
slopes south and east of Combles to the Somme,
directing his main efforts against the villages
of Rancourt and Fr6gicourt, so as to complete
the isolation of Combles and open a road for
the attack on Sailly-Sallisel. By this time the
whole of the forward crest of the main ridge
from Mouquet Farm to the Delville Wood, a
distance of 9,000 yards, was held by the British,
giving them a clear view over the slopes beyond.
East of Delville Wood to Leuze Wood, which
is a thousand yards from Combles, we held a
line of 3,000 yards, while farther east on the
other side of the Combles Valley the French
had, as previously narrated, successfully gained
ground. The centre of our line was well placed,
but on the British flanks there were still diffi-
cult positions to be won. Ginchy, which had
been taken, is situated on the plateau running
towards Lesboeufs and to the east of Ginchy
the ground drops somewhat steeply towards
Combles. North of Combles, but a little
below the edge of the plateau, stood the village
of Morval, commanding a wide field of fire in
every direction. It was an obstacle to the
French advance through Fregicourt on Sailly-
Sallisel. From Leuze Wood the British right
would have a distance of 2,000 yards to cross,
passing over the valley which intervenes
between the wood and Morval. Combles itself
was strongly fortified and held by a large
garrison and, although dominated from the
Leuze Wood, and by the French left on the
heights across the valley, still remained so
serious an obstacle that it was best to avoid
taking it by direct assault and to render it
untenable by both armies pressing forward
along the ridges on either side of it.
The direct capture of Morval from the south'
presented considerable difficulty, that of Sailly-
Sallisel, which was about 3,000 yards to the
north of the French left, was an even harder
task, for the advance had to be made along a
line flanked on one side by the strongly fortified
wood of St. Pierre Vaast and over the Combles
Valley, which was dominated by the German
work on the high ground to the west.
It will be seen how necessary it was to have
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
158
GENERAL FAYOLLE.
Commanded a French Army on the Somme.
close cooperation between the Allied armies to
make the sufficient progress on the British right
without which the advance of Sir Douglas
Haig's centre was impossible. At the time
when this operation commenced the Fifth
Army followed a line back some distance from
Mouquet Farm down the spur which went
between Pozieres, and then, crossing the inter-
vening valley, mounted the Thiepval ridge to
the Wunderwerk, which wo hud captured on
the evening of September 14. It will be seen
what an important point of support this formed
for any further advance against Thiepval. In
this direction General Gough had since July 3
been making methodical progress in which
great skill and patience had been displayed,
and had considerably improved his position.
For the moment it was not an essential part of
the plan of operations to capture Thiepval
itself by a sudden rush, which would only have
154
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAI!.
GENERAL MICHELER,
Commanded a new French Army south of the
Somme.
been successful at the price of heavy casualties.
An advance in the direction of Courcelette
would indirectly threaten the Germans on the
high ground in the neighbourhood of Thiepval
and render the capture of this village easier.
What direction was the French Army to
take to connect with the British forward
movement and facilitate the advance towards
Bapaume ? Plainly it was desirable, after
Rancourt and Fregicourt had been won, to
capture the wood of St. Pierre Vaast and to
gain the height on which Sailly-Sallisel was
situated.
At the beginning of the Battle of the Somme
the French line extended from a point near
Hardecourt across the Somme by Dompienv.
and Fay, to the east of Lihons and west of
Chilly. Since July 1 General Fayolle had
made, a considerable inroad into the German
fortified belt north and south of the Somme.
The French, as related, had taken Maurepas
and reached the southern outskirts of Combles
and were also at Priez Farm, across the country
road which ran from Combles to Rancourt,
\\ hich was on the summit of the plateau over-
looking the narrow valley at the northern end
of which was Combles. South of Rancourt
our Allies had severed the main road running
between Peronne and Bapaume by occupying
Bouchavesnes. Along the right bank of the
Somme the French had pushed their way
through Curlu and Clery-sur-Somme until
they were within a few thousand yards of
Mont St. Quentin, which is close to Peronne on
the south side of the Tortille.
Sir Henry Rawlinson, after clearing itie
Bouleaux Wood — the northern end of the
wood of Leuze — was to push on towards
Morval, while the French from Priez Farm
would advance on Fregicourt, the fortified
hamlet between Combles and Rancourt. South
of Fregicourt was a collection of trenches
which had to be carried, and to the west of
this point a trench ran north-westwards and
joined the southern defences of Morval. From
this trench another behind Fregicourt went
westwards to Combles station. Combles was
a strongly fortified point possessing vast
underground caverns extending under the
village over an area of nearly 400 yards.
Rancourt, a straggling village traversed by
the Bapaume-Peronne highway, was defended
on the south by a network of trenches, on the
west by the works at Fregicourt and on the
TRENCH CUT THROUGH A
RUINED VILLAGE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
155
east by the wood of St. Pierre Vaast, through
which was cut a road from Kancourt to Manan-
court, and Etricourt. The wood of St. Pierre
Vaast and the Vaux Wood to the east of it had
been treated by the German engineers in the
same way as the woods of Mametz, Tr6nes
and Delville. Entrenched on several lines,
entangled with barbed wire, freely provided
with communications, they formed together
a most formidable defence, with the village of
Manancourt in support. At the northern
edge of the wood, close to Sallisel and Sailly-
Sallisel, the ground was almost on a level
with the highest point north of Ginchy. Be-
yond Sailly-Sallisel the ridge rapidly descended
towards Bapamne. Between Rancourt and
Sailly-Sallisel a German trench crossed the
high-road
Taking the foregoing into consideration
and looking at the map, it will be seen that if
the French secured Fregicourt they had turned
both Combles and the St. Vaast Wood and
thus facilitated the acquisition of the defensive
group formed by the two woods and the village
of Manancourt. Once this was gained, with the
ridge line in the Allies' possession, they would
have before them the more gentle slopes
descending to the north.
South of the Somme, while the British and
General Fayolle were making their advance
north of the river, General Micheler was to
advance between Barleux and a point south
of Vermandovillers, a front of between 7
and 8 miles. Here the French had to deal
with a strong line of German defences based
upon the fortified villages of Barleux, Berny,
Deniecourt, Soyecourt, and Vermandovillers.
Of these Soyecourt had already been captured,
but the remainder still formed an unbroken
chain of strong posts. Deniecourt was ' of
special value to the Germans. It consisted
of the village of that name, together with the
country house and park belonging to the
Comte de Kergorlay. The house itself had
long been reduced to ruins, but these had
been utilized to form a most formidable keep
with the park defences to the German position
in this part of their line. Barleux stood at the
bottom of a narrow valley dominated by high
ground, of which the French held the northern
and western sides. The French trenches
then ran across flat ground for a mile and a half
and crossed the Barleux road at Berny-en-
Santerre. The retrenchment formed by this
latter village in the German position had, so
far as its outer edge was concerned, been
occupied by French troops since the early days
of September, but they had not been able to
penetrate beyond a little park at the east end
of the village.
Berny-en-Santerre was a point of consider-
able tactical interest to the Germans. I 'laced
at the entrance of a long, narrow valley, which
ran for a distance of 3 miles to the Somme
THB FIGHT IN THE CEMETERY AT CURLU.
1.3G
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
north of Briost, it completely commanded it.
The valley cut across the German lines, which
were hero almost parallel with the Soinnie. If
the French could occupy Berny-en-Santerre
mid the valley they would cut the German
position in two, A mile farther to the west was
1 Viiiecourt, already described, and three-
quarters of a mile beyond it Soyeeourt. The
village of Vermandovillers stood in the re-
entering angle of the French front.
The front of battle from Thiepval to Chilly,
measuring 20 miles as the crow flies and
about 25 along the actual trench front,
may be looked upon as divided into three
sections. One of these was south of the Somme
from Barleux to Chilly, and it was here that
General Micheler commanded what may be
regarded as the right flank of the operations.
The troops of General Fayolle extended the
French line from Barleux across the Somme
at Omiecourt and thence to the wood of
Douage, where it joined on to the British
forces.
The history of the operations hitherto given
shows that these three groups — the British,
Fayolle and Micheler — had not attacked
simultaneously, but that each in accordance
with the plan laid down by the supreme com-
manders had operated to some extent inde-
pendently— one at a time, each having its own
special objectives. On the 15th, however,
this was changed, for the whole force of the
Allies moved forward at the same time from the
line Thiepval to Vermandovillers in a combined
endeavour to thrust the enemy back over the
whole front of attack.
The fighting described in this chapter repre-
sented considerable gain of ground, with the
noteworthy feature that there w vs a distinct
falling off in the resisting power of the Ger-
mans. This was shown not only by the
increasing number of unwounded prisoners,
but also by the fact that our successes were
obtained with diminished losses, proving
clearly that the enemy's power of continued
contest was not what it had been.
A force which feels it is being beaten is apt
to have recourse to means very often futile, but
which it fondly hopes may have some useful
effect. Such was the case with the Germans.
To hide bombs just before abandoning trenches
which go off when trodden on may cause a few
casualties, but can produce no useful military
results. Still less justifiable is the employ-
ment of the old-fashioned man-trap, probably
known to some of our readers as an object of
curiosity in a museum. This enlarged rat-trap
will break the leg of a soldier who manages to
get caught in it, but such dastardly devices as
these bring in time their own revenge. They
infuriate the men who see these atrocities, and
they punish them.
ONCB A DWELLING, NOW A STABLE.
CHAPTER CLXXI.
THE WORK OF THE
MERCANTILE MARINE (II).
THE TONNAGE PROBLEM — VITAL IMPORTANCE or THE MERCANTILE MARINE — SOME STATISTICS —
SIR JOHN JELLICOE'S TRIBUTE — INCIDENTS OF THE SUBMARINE WAR — THE RAPPAHANNOCK —
THE NORTH WALES — THE CITY or BIRMINGHAM — THE ARTIST — THE CALEDONIA — SEIZURE OF
MERCHANT CAPTAINS — GERMAN RUSES — THE ARMING OF MERCHANT SHIPS — THE CLAN MACLEOD
—THE CALIFORNIA — THE ARABIA — GERMAN MINES AND MINELAYERS — THE MALOJA — AIR ATTACKS
— GERJMAN RAIDERS — THE SOUTHPORT.
IN an earlier chapter * some account was
given of the vital part taken in the Great
War by the mercantile marine, and the
gallantry and heroism displayed by the
officers and men of the merchant navy when
faced by unprecedented perils. It has also been
fully explained how, an important proportion
of the British mercantile tonnage having been
requisitioned for the naval and military pur-
poses of ourselves and our Allies, the balance
remaining over had become barely sufficient
for the essential needs of civil life in the British
Isles. It was obligatory, therefore, that re-
liance should to a large extent be placed upon
neutral shipping for help in bringing to th3.se
shores the necessary food supplies and raw
materials for our manufactures. The enemy
had quickly realized the situation, and when
he had failed to effect any considerable success
with his submarines in a war of attrition upon
the ships of the Navy and their auxiliaries,
his attention was directed to the commercial
traffic. The earlier attempts of the German
submarines to bring about a blockade of the
British Isles by the wanton destruction of
passenger liners and traders and fishing craft,
both Allied and neutral, have also been
described, and it has been seen how the cam-
paign was met and foiled by the inexhaustible
» Chapter CXX., Vol. VII.
Vol. XI.— Part 135. 157
resourcefulness, ingenuity, and courage shown
by the seamen of the regular Navy and mercan-
tile marine alike. In this chapter the narra-
tive of the enemy operations against comv-
mercial sea-borne traffic is carried down to the
early spring of 1917, when they attained great
intensity and virulence.
It will be seen from the following accounts
of selected instances of attacks upon merchant
ships during the period under review that,
although the German methods varied con-
siderably, their treatment of the crews of the
ships destroyed was substantially the same in
every case. Ships were almost always attacked
without warning ; the unfortunate seamen and
passengers, if there were any, were seldom
s;iven sufficient time to take to their boats,
and they were left to reach the shore as best
they could. Sometimes the distance from
land was so great that the majority of the
survivors perished before succour came. Some-
times the Germans shelled the boats as they
left their stricken ships, murdering the occu-
pants in the most cold-blooded manner. No
respect for the custom of the seas, the laws of
man, or the dictates of humanity restrained the
barbarity of the callous Germans. The one
feature which stood out in bright relief against
this picture of black cruelty was the heroism,
the devotion, and the endurance of the brave
158
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL
and hardy mariners. They never failed, in
face of even,' danger, and indescribable suf-
fering, to exhibit the splendid discipline of
their calling and the unquenchable courage of
their race.
During 1916 there came about a distinct
change in the general attitude of Great Britain
towards the merchant navy. The value and
importance of the work of the trading vessels
THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS.
(Full size.)
and their sturdy crews had always been more
or less recognized, but during this year the
growing scarcity of carrying tonnage, owing
to the enlarged demands upon the shipowners
for military requirements and the extended
activities of the enemy submarines, had far-
reaching effects, especially in the rise of food
prices and the shortage of certain staple com-
modities. This condition of things brought
home to the people, not merely the important,
but the vital, nature of the work of our merchant
seamen Previously the average British citizen
had regarded them as valuable : he was now
compelled to realize, if he had not already done
so, that they were indispensable. In the
House of Commons on November 15, 1910,
Mr. Hunciinan, then President of the Board of
Trade, spoke of the question of sea transport
as being the key to the w;;r situation and as
the A. B.C. of European politics. "I must
sav, ' he de.-lared, " that if wo are succo.ssfullv
to victual our people throughout the remaining
period of the war, it is also absolutely essential
to regard shipping as labour is regarded, as
serving the national interests, not only when
flying the fighting colours but when it is
carrying food over here." In other words, it
was not only as a reserve for the fighting Navy,
both as regards men and vessels, and as a
means for the conveyance of troops and mili-
tary requirements of all kinds, that the mer-
chant service came to be accepted by the
public generally as an essential part of the life
of the nation, but also in its everyday capacity.
This recognition was signalized when it was
announced in the London Gazette on Decem-
ber 22, 1910, that the King had been graciously
pleased to approve the award of Decorations
and Medals to a number of officers and men of
the British mercantile marine " in recognition
of zeal and devotion to duty shown in carrying
on the trade of the country during the war."
There followed the names of 11 merchant
captains who were awarded the Distinguished
Service Cross, and seven quartermasters, fire-
men, and the like, who received the Dis-
tinguished Service Medal. In addition, 73
THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL.
(Two-thirds scale.)
officers and men had their names published in
the Gazette, " as having received an expression
of commendation for their services," and six
officers were granted commissions as
Lieutenants in the Royal Naval Reserve. The
Council of the Mercantile Marine Service
Association expressed the opinion that these
awards were merely a preliminary to further
recognition of British merchant seamen, " who
have gone to sea with wonderful regularity,
notwithstanding the increased risks from mines
and torpedoes — cruel instruments which do
not distinguish between neutral and belligerent,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
159
combatant and non-combatant. When the veil
is lifted," this message concluded, " the noble
part that has been played in the war by the
masters, officers, and men of the British
merchant service will surprise many even of
those who think they know the seaman and the
dogged courage of his race."
Speaking on the Navy Estimates on
February 21, 1917, Sir Edward Carson, the
new First Lord, quoted from a return brought
up to October 30, 1916, dealing with transport
operations at sea since wax began. In regard
to personnel, the total numbers which had been
moved up to that date across the seas had been
of vessels engaged in purely foreign trade, and
we had merely kept the skeleton of that con-
nexion alive. Then there were cargo liners,
loading on berth, and tramps chartered to
liner companies while loading on berth — their
total being 588. That, said Mr. Runciman,
was not a large number to keep alive the con-
nexion between this country and other coun-
tries : a mere skeleton of the organization
necessary. Lastly, there were the free tramp
steamers which were able to go out and take
the high rates prevailing, and which numbered
233. Only about 60 of this number were
engaged in carrying food. Mr. Runciman eon-
KHAKI AT THE DOCKS: TRANSPORT WORKEKS' BATTALION HANDLING SUPPLIES.
8,000,000 men, and, although he regretted to
say there had been two or three untoward
incidents, when the vast domain of sea over
which they were moved was considered he
thought it might be said that these men were
transported almost without mishap. In regard
to supplies and explosives, 9,420,000 tons had
been moved, with 47,504,000 gallons of petrol,
and over 1,000,000 horses and mules. The sick
and wounded moved also numbered over
1 ,000,000. So much for the ships on " war
work." As regards those which were retained
in the carrying trade of the Empire, Mr.
Runoiman. then President of the Board of
Trade, in a speech on October 17, 1916, said
there were 297 vessels employed permanently
abroad, because we had to provide for our not
being entirely out of the shipping business after
the war. In normal times there were thousands
tinned : " I have given the House a total which
reaches 1,118 vessels, which are, for good
national reasons, free to trade where they will.
Out of a total merchant fleet of nearly 10,000
vessels, only 1,100 ocean-going vessels are free
to conduct their own operations. Then what
of the re.st ? There is a very large number of
vessels engaged in the service of the Army
imd Navy. The Foodstuffs Requisitioning
Committee has a very large number of vessels
under requisition. There are steamers trading
on behalf of the Allied Governments, steamers
trading on behalf of the Colonies."
The knowledge that the number of ships
for bringing food to the British Isles was much
less than in normal times obviously increased
the determination of the enemy to prosecute
their submarine war. Earlier chapters have
shown the dauntless spirit in which the mer-
160
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
HOISTING CARGO ABOARD.
KHAKI AT THE DOCKS: TRANSPORT WORKERS UNLOADING FLOUR.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
161
chant seamen withstood the first attacks.
That spirit was in no way lessened by the more
virulent and brutal methods to which the
Germans descended. They failed entirely to
intimidate or terrorize the British merchant
seamen, whose conduct elicited many notable
tributes.
King George, in acknowledging through his
Secretary, Lord Stamfordham, the receipt of
a copy of the Imperial Merchant Service Guild
Gazette on July 14, 1910, said that he felt sure
" the country at large joins with him in appre-
ciating the noble services rendered by the
officers and men of the merchant service since
the beginning of the war, and the heroism dis-
played by those who have risked and often
given their lives in carrying out their arduous
duties." Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, speaking
at the Fishmongers' Hall on January 11, 1917,
also referred to the merchant service in the
following terms :
Without our mercantile marine the Navy — and, indeed,
the nation — could not exist. Upon it we have been
dependent for the movement of our troops oversea —
over seven millions of men having been transported1 —
together with all the guns, munitions, and stores required
by ths Army. The safeguarding of these transports,
both from the attack of such surface vessels as have been
at large and from submarine attack, has been carried
out by the Navy. We have had to draw also upon the
personnel of the mercantile marine, not only for the
manning of the transport ships, but also very largely
for the manning of the whole of our patrol and mine-
sweeping craft, nearly 2,500 skippers being employed
as skippers R.N.R. The number of R.N.R. executive
officers has increased almost fourfold since the outbreak
of war. Indeed, it is impossible to measure fully the
debt which the country owes to our mercantile marine.
In the old days it used to be said that there was
jealousy between the mercantile marine and the Royal
Navy, but whatever may have been the case then,
there is no room now in the Navy for anything but the
most sincere admiration and respect for the officers and
inon of the mercantile marine. I think I know sufficient
of those officers and men to believe that the feeling is
reciprocated. Those of us who have been closely
associated with the officers and men who man our armed
merchant vessels and patrol craft have realized from the
first day of the war how magnificent were their services,
how courageous their conduct, and how unflinching their
devotion to duty under the most dangerous conditions.
The Vilue of the services of the officers and men of the
mercantile marine goes a^so far beyond their work in
armed vessels. When one thinks of the innumerable
cases of unarmed ships being sunk by torpedo or gun fire
far from land, in a heavy sea, with the ship's company
dependent upon boats alone for their safety, one is lost
in admiration of the spirit of heroism of those who not
only endure dangers and hardships without complaint,
but are ever ready to take the risks again and again in
repeated voyages in other ships.
Similarly, Sir Edward Carson on February 21,
1917, in dealing with the submarine menace,
said it was wearying work to read of the boats
with frozen corpses that were brought in from
ships torpedoed without notice, yet he was
encouraged by the fact that he had not heard
of one sailor who had refused to sail. That,
he declared, was what was going to win the war.
To come now to some of the most stirring
examples of the way in which the mercantile
marine employed in pursuit of its ordinary
trade withstood the stress of the intensified
German submarine war, reference may first
be made to a series of cases of which the
details were officially published. The Furness-
Withy liner Rappahannock, a steamer of
3,871 tons, built in 1893, and fitted with wire-
less telegraphy, left Halifax, Nova Scotia, for
London on October 17, 1916, and should have
arrived at the end of the month. The only
other news received concerning her was a
statement in the Berlin official wireless report,
on November 8, to the effect that she had been
sunk. She was evidently torpedoed without
warning, and the 37 men in her crew
all drowned. In announcing the loss the
Admiralty said : " If the crew were forced to
take to their boats in the ordinary way it is
clear that this must have occurred so far from
land, or in such weather conditions, that there
was no probability of their reaching the shore.
The German pledge not to sink vessels ' without
saving human lives ' has thus once more been
disregarded, and another of their submarines
has been guilty of constructive murder on the
high seas."
On December 29, 1910, the Admiralty drew
attention to another case, if anything more
brutal in its details, the sinking of the 4,342-
ton steamer Westminster, built in 1905 and
belonging to the Westminster Shipping Co.,
the crew of which vessel were fired upon while
in their boats. The official statement said :
The degree of savagery which the Germans have
attained in their submarine policy of sinking merchant
ships at sight would appear to have reached its climax
in the sinking of the British steamship Westminster,
proceeding in ballast from Torre Annunziata to Port Said.
On December 14 this vessel was attacked by a German
submarine, without warning, when 180 miles from the
nearest land, and struck by two torpedoes in quick
succession, which killed four men. She sank in four
minutes.
This ruthless disregard of the rules of international
law was followed by a deliberate attempt to murder the
survivors. The officers and crew, white effecting their
escape from the sinking ship in boats, were shelled by the
submarine at a range of 3,000 yards. The master and
chief engineer were killed outright and their boat sunk.
The second and third engineers and three of the crew
were not picked up, and are presumed to have been
drowned.
Groat Britain, in common with all other civilized
nations, regards the sinking without warning of merchant
ships with detestation, but in view of the.avowed policy
135-2
it;-2
•/'///•: 77.W/W HISTORY OF THE WAP.
THE S.S. "WESTMINSTER": TORPEDOED WITHOUT WARNING.
of the German Government, and their refusal to consider
the protests of neutrals it is recognized that mere
protests are unavailing. The captain of the German
submarine must, however, have satisfied himself as to
the effectiveness of his two torpedoes, and yet proceeded
to carry out in cold blood an act of murder which could
not possibly be justified by any urgency of war, and
can only be regarded in the eyes of the world as a further
proof of the degradation of German honour.
In a wireless message dated January 17 the
German Government attempted to refute the
statements contained in the British Admiralty
commwiiqu^. These particulars were based
on the statements of the survivors made on
oath, but on receipt of the German denial
the survivors were minutely cross-examined,
and, as a result of this further investigation,
the facts remain unchanged. The vessel was
torpedoed without warning and struck by two
torpedoes. The survivors of the explosion
took to the boats and were shelled by the sub-
marine, the captain and the chief engineer
being killed by shell-fire. Furthermore, this
cross-examination elicited the fact that no
other ship was in sight when the submarine
opened lire, and the only surviving boat
was not picked up until 27 hours later.
The statement in the German submarine
officer's alleged report that rescue by the sub-
marine uas made impossible by the approach
of a patrol steamer must, therefore, be regarded
as, fiction. The British Admiralty had nothing
further to add to, and nothing to modify in,
its original communique.
It proved only too true, as the Admiralty
remarked, that mere protests were unavailing.
On January 4 they had again to inform the
country of a further case of callous disregard
for the lives of non-combatant seamen. The
British steamship North Wales, proceeding in
ballast from Hull to Canada, was reported by
the German Wireless on November 9, 1910,
as having been torpedoed. Beyond one piece
of varnished wood marked " North Wales,"
found in Sennen Cove, and bodies washed
ashore on the Cornish coast, nothing further
was heard of her, and it was presumed that the
crew took to their boats in the gales raging
at the time, and were all drowned. In the
destruction of another and larger vessel, th;>
City of Birmingham, about three weeks after
the North Wales, there was exemplified splendid
conduct by all on board, including some women
passengers. The facts relating to the loss
of this Kllerman liner, of 7,498 tons, were
published by the Admiralty on February ">,
1917, as follows: —
The Hritish steamship City of Birmingham was
torpe.l I without, warning on November L'7 lust l.y an
enemy submarine when l^li miles from the nearest land.
Slie curried a crew of 145 and 170 pa-scngers. of whom !M>
were \\omcii imil children.
The torpedo struck the ship abreast the afterholcl, mill
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
168
so heavy was the explosion that the ship at once began
to settle by the stern. One of the lifeboats was blown to
pieces. Engines were .stopped and steam allowed to
escape from the boilers, while everybody assembled
at their stations for abandoning the ship.
A heavy swell was running, but within 10 minutes
of tne explosion all boats had been lowered and all the
passengers and crew were clear of the ship. In accord-
ance with British sea tradition, the master, Captain
\V. J. Haughton, remained on board until the ship sank
under him ; lie wa* picked up half an hour later by one
of the boats.
The conduct of the crew and passengers was admirable
throughout. The master reports that the women took
their places in the boats *' as calmly as if they were going
down to their meals," and when in the boats they began
singing.
Three hours later the boats were picked vip by a
hospital ship [reported at the time to have been the
Letitia], and the passengers and crew mustered. It was
\ TORPEDO ON ITS FATEFUL MISSION.
Torpedoes usually travel beneath the surface : this one is exceptionally high in the water.
104
y/Wf;s ///STOflY OF THE WAH.
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
165
THE "CITY OF BIRMINGHAM," TORPEDOED: LOWERING THE BOATS.
then found that the ship's doctor, the barman, and two
lascars were not among the survivors and had presumably
been drowned.
A shocking case of men suffering from being
exposed in open boats in mid-winter was made
known by the authorities on January 31, 1917.
Four days earlier, or on the morning of Saturday,
January 27, the British steamship Artist,
when 48 miles from land, in a heavy easterly
gale, was torpedoed by a German submarine.
In response to her appeal sent by wireless,
" S.O.S. ; sinking quickly," auxiliary patrol
craft proceeded to the spot and searched the
vicinity, but founrl no trace of the vessel or her
succour. Those of them who perished during
those three days of bitter exposure were
murdered, and to pretend that anything was
done to ensure their safety would be sheer
hypocrisy. As the Admiralty pointed out,
the pledge given by Germany to the United
States not to sink merchant ships without
ensuring the safety of the passengers and crews
had been broken before, " but never in cir-
cumstances of more cold-blooded brutality."
The foregoing, it will be noticed, were cases
in which, as far as the available information
showed, the merchant vessels were attacked by
torpedo, and usually without warning. This
GERMAN SUBMARINE FITTED WITH WIRELESS SIGNALLING APPARATUS.
survivors. Three days later the steamship
Luehana picked up a boat containing 16 of the
survivors. The boat had originally contained
23, but seven had died of wounds and exposure
and were buried at sea. The surviving 16
were landed, and of these five were suffering
from severe frostbite and one from a broken arm.
The crew had been forced to abandon their
ship in open boats, in a mid-winter gale, and
utterly without means of reaching land or
method of destruction was by no means general,
however, being very costly, inasmuch as the
submarines had only a limited carrying capacity
for torpedoes, and when these missiles had been
expended a return to some base or depot became
necessary if the vessels had no other means of
waging their unlawful war on the trade.
In cases where for any reason the submarines
refrained from torpedoing vessels at sight
- — and also from the torpedoed ships if it was
166
////•: Y7.W/-:x 1IIS70HY OF THE WAIL
practicable — the flermans inaugurated.
'hue clurinv' IJHii. the practice of taking
prisoners the captains <>f the merchantmen,
perhaps with a view to giving them, if possible,
the status of eon i bat ants. On December 4
1 !)!<>, the Anchor liner Caledonia, of 9,22:5
tons, was sunk in the Mediterranean, and
her master, Captain James Blaikie, taken
prisoner in this way. On the 10th it was
alleged in an official Berlin telegram that
the Caledonia endeavoured to ram the sub-
marine without having previously been attacked
by the latter. Fears were aroused lest this
announcement was an attempt to justify in the
eyes of the world another judicial murder of an
English mercantile marine captain, as Captain
Charles Fryatt, of the City of Brussels, had been
executed in the previous July. * Representations
were therefore made to the Government that
the Germans should be informed that if any
harm was done to Captain Blaikie, one of their
officer prisoners of high rank would be shot
forthwith. On December 14 it was announced
that the American Ambassador at Berlin had
been asked to report at once any action the
Germans contemplated against the captain,
and on the 19th the welcome news was received
that the German Foreign Office had given
a personal assurance to the Charge d' Affaires
of the United States in Berlin that Captain
Blaikie would not share the fate of Captain
Fryatt. The German Admiralty considered
t he Caledonia as an armed cruiser, and therefore,
that in attempting to ram the submarine Cap-
tain Blaikie was only doing his duty. Early in
January news was received from Captain
Blaikie stating that he was quite well. It was
subsequently reported that he was detained
in a military officers' camp at Friedberg.
Hessen.
A few weeks before the destruction of the
Caledonia a group of steamers, including
neutrals, had been destroyed in the Atlantic
by U 49, and their captains taken on board
the submarine, but later they were released,
and were then able to give an account of their
experiences in the " black hole " of a German
under-water craft. Captain Arthur Patterson,
of the British steamer Setonia, was in the
submarine for eight days ; Captain Yellugsen,
of the Norwegian ship Balto, for seven
days ; and Captain Frederick Curtis, of the
American steamer Columbian, for six. ( 'aptaiii
* rimpicr run.,
Curtis gave the following account in an inter-
view : —
My ship carried n cargo of about !l,000 tons and a
•rcw of 109. We were all saved. I stopped on the
lem:md of the submarine, whose commander orders!
ne to abandon my ship with the crew immediately,
vhich we did without other baggage than two satchel.-
vith documents and money.
Submarine U 49 at once fired two torpedoes at the
Columbia.!, which immediately sank. The crew were
left in the lifeboats, while 1 was taken on board the
submarine, which plunged immediately afterwards.
I was taken into the c|uartermastcr's small cabin,
where I found tha captains of the Setonia and Kalto.
CAPTAIN JAMES BLAIKIE.
After me came the captain of the Norwegian ship,
Foidalo.
The cabin was very small. It contained a little
folding table, a folding chair and three wall bunks.
All were permeated with the odour of benzine. There
was no communication with the exterior cabin. It
was absolutely dark both by night and day.
We were given each morning a few morsels of black
bread, a cup of coffee, and a. small portion of bad butter.
At noon we had stew made of canned meat and s<mj».
Supper was at 10, consisting of coffee or tea, with butter
or marmalade. Hours passed in this narrow prison,
very long and disagreeable. The captain of the submarine
was a man about 36, while the crew of 40 snilorx were
all very young and were dressed in shiny leather clothing.
The merchant captains were allowed at
intervals between the operations of the sub-
marine to go on deck and smoke a cigarette.
They were watched by members of the crew
armed with revolvers, but when they went
below the crew put aside their weapons. Then-
was only one chair in the cabin, which the
captains used in turn ; otherwise they lay
down in their bunks. Towards noon on
November 9 the submarine signalled to the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
167
DAMAGE TO A SHIP'S BOWS BY MINE.
Swedish steamer Varing, 13 miles off the Spanish
port of Camarina, and this vessel took on
board the captains and landed them.
A variant of this procedure was observed in
the case of an unnamed steamer which was
stopped, ordered to take on board survivors
of three other vessels, and then compelled to
follow the submarine for three days. The
three vessels were the British steamer Auchen-
crag, of Glasgow, which was sunk on January 12,
1917, with the loss of four of her crew ; the
sailing vessel Kilpurney, of London, of 1,944
tons ; and the Danish steamer Omsk, of
Copenhagen, 1,574 tons. There were 84 mem-
bers of the crews of these three vessels, who
were apparently left in open boats. Another
steamer was then stopped, as already men-
tioned, and, having rescued the shipwrecked
crews, was forced to follow the course of
the submarine from 9 a.m. on January 13 to
midnight on January 16. The submarine then
helped herself to the cargo of this steamer, and
what she could not or did not wish to take for
her own use was ordered to be discharged
overboard. Then she made off. Many anec-
dotes of the tricks and methods of the sub-
marines could be related. On January 5,
1917, the correspondent of The Times at
REPAIRING A SHIP DAMAGED BY A
MINE.
HOLE IN A SHIP'S SIDE MADE BY A
MINE.
Amsterdam reported that German submarines
were sending out the " S.O.S." wireless signal
to lure British vessels to destruction. The
Telegraaf learnt from an officer of a large
steamer of an important Dutch line that on
the journey from the Dutch East Indies he
received, while in the Bay of Biscay, an " S.O.S."
message. Proceeding to the place indicated,
he found a German submarine, which was not
in distress, and the captain of which expressed
regret that it was a Dutch and not a British
vessel which had arrived. He said: "We
don't want you to save our souls. We want
the British to save our souls."
There were other ruses adopted by the
Germans to lure the merchant ships to their
destruction, and such tricks necessitated in-
creased caution and alertness on the part of
the oftiooTS and men of the latter. On Decem-
Ifi8
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL
her 10, 1916, the Danish steamer Gerda was
stopped in the Bay of Biscay by U 46. The
captain was ordered to come on board the
submarine with his papers. Ho was detained,
and a prize crew of six men and a lieutenant
was placed in the Gerda. They replaced the
Danish by German colours, and gave out that
THE ANCHOR LINER "CALIFORNIA."
Sunk by submarine, February 7, 1917.
the vessel would be taken to Hamburg as a
prize. As a matter of fact, her course was set
in a south-westerly direction, and the steamer
was used as a decoy to attract other victims
for the submarine, which followed the Gerda.
In the next two days three steamers were sunk.
Each time the Gerda approached a ship she
hoisted the Danish flag, but after sinking the
vessel the German flag was rehoisted. The
Gerda was also used as a depot for the crews of
the sunken ships, the number on board her
increasing to 62. On the 19th the fresh water
gave out, and being then off Cape Finisterre
the Germans entered the bay east of Finisterre
within the territorial limits. All on board the
captured vessel were then ordered into the
boats. They were forbidden to take any
extra clothes or other possessions, a German
officer standing at the head of the gangway
with a revolver to see that this order was com-
plied with. Nautical instruments and certain
other articles were then stolen by the Germans
and taken into the submarine, after which
the Gerda was towed outside the territorial
limit and sunk.
In other cases some curious anecdotes were
related about the methods of the submarine
crews. The captain of the Spanish steamer
Gaeta, which was sunk about the middle of
Jiimuvry off the north coast of Spain, reported
that the Germans removed all the provisions
from his ship, and before leaving handed him
a card bearing the words, " The U 44 sank
the Gaeta." There were other examples of
German swagger, as, for instance, when an
American ship, stopped off the coast of Corn-
wall, was spared, and her commander given a
certificate showing that his ship had been
granted '' permission " by the German sub-
marine captain to sail up the English Channel.
Au amusing sidelight upon the conscience of a
German submarine commander was forthcoming
when a ship's boat, containing the master and
crew of a small vessel, reached Guernsey in the
last week of December, 1916. The master had
been " submarined " for the second time, and
the commander of the submarine was the man
who had sunk his first vessel. On the first
occasion, among the valuables retained by the
German officer was the master's gold watch,
but after sinking the second vessel he recog-
nized the master and returned the watch.
Some three weeks after this the daily list of
losses included the three vessels, two British
and one Danish, which have already been
referred to. The crews were hurriedly ordered
into their boats, and one of the latter, belonging
to the British steamer Auchencrag, capsized
and drowned four men. Yet the Germans
found time to help themselves to the stores of
their victims, including 40 cans of whisky.
The deeds of heroism on the part of the
merchant seamen which light up the cruel and
grim record of the submarine war are in-
numerable. It must suffice to mention one,
which the Royal Humane Society deemed
worthy of the award of their Stanhope Gold
Medal and £5 as the most gallant feat of the
year. The hero was John Paxton, a fireman
in the steamship Swedish Prince, which vessel
was attacked by a submarine in the Mediter-
ranean on August 17, 1916. In the hurry to
abandon the ship Pa's: ton was left on board
with three other men. There was a high wind
and a heavy sea was running, but Paxton by
his gallantry saved all three of these men. He
jumped overboard, and called to the first man
to follow. He then swam with him to the
nearest boat. The two other men were rescued
in the same manner. This gallant deed is a
reminder of the heroism which inspires all
classes of our merchant service, whether on
deck or below. The situation of the engine-
room complement in ships attacked by torpedo
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
169
is one calling for a high degree of courage, yet
the men never shirked their duty. When the
Italian steamer Unione, for instance, was tor-
pedoed on April 10, 1916, the vessel sank so
quickly that all the firemen lost their lives.
Some were probably killed by the explosion,
but the remainder had no chance to reach the
deck before the vessel foundered.
In devising measures for meeting the
piratical onslaught of the German submarines
the British and Allied Admiralties could count,
as Lord Lytton said in the House of Lords on
February 13, 1917, on "no one sovereign
remedy for dealing with the subject, no one
panacea which can be used to clear the seas
of these pests." The danger was one which
could only be met by the successful com-
bination of a very great number of measures,
and by the cooperation of all branches of the
Service, and also of the public. One im-
portant step which was attended by good
results was that of arming the merchant ships.
The policy was adopted by the Coalition
Government, as stated by Lord Lytton on
February 13. It was rapidly pushed forward
by the new National Ministry, and the rate of
progress at which merchant ships were pro-
vided with guns was very much increased.
When he spoke on the Navy Estimates on
February 21, 1917, Sir Edward Carson was able
THE SINKING OF THE "CALIFORNIA."
135—3
170
THE TIM IK HISTORY OF THE WAR.
to say that, in the previous two months, the
number of armed merchant ships had increased
by 47'5 per cent. He added :
I do not know thai Unit rcmvrys to you the amount <>f
work that was involved. \Vo had, in the first place, to
get guns in competition with the Army. We had to get
tin- mountings, and, above all, we had to get the gun
ratings. All I cau say is that the increase in the arming
of the merchant ships is going on better and better each
wrnk. \\ hrn I tell the House the percentage, .so far as
I can gather, of the number of armed merchantmen and
unarmed merchantmen that have escaped the sub-
marine menace, they will .see how right we were to
throw our whole force and power into carrying out this
arming. As far as I can gather, of armed merchantmen
that escape there are about 70 or 75 per cent., and of
unarmed merchantmen 24 per cent. Therefore, you
will see how important is every gun you get and every
ship you arm.
These figures show how well the merchant
seamen adapted themselves to the new condi-
tions, and what good use they made of the
weapons with which they were provided.
The guns, of course, would have been useless
without trained crews to handle them, and
captains of nerve and judgment as well as
daring to decide when and how to open fire.
There was at least one case on record where
the mere appearance of a gun in .a merchant
ship was sufficient to scare away her submarine
antagonist. This was in the case of the
SURVIVORS OF THE "CALIFORNIA."
Mr. Kesson, the Chief Officer, giving an account of
the torpedoing of the ship.
SURVIVORS OF THE "CALIFORNIA."
The three children (Margaret Little, aged 9; Mary,
aged 3, and Andrew, 13 months), whose mother and
eldest sister were drowned
Harrison Line steamship Director, and the
incident happened on January 25, 191(i.
According to the statement of a horseman of
New Mexico, on his arrival at New York on
March 14, the Director was bound for Liverpool,
and when about 200 miles from the Irish coast
sighted a submarine some distance astern,
endeavouring to overhaul the liner. For two
hours the submarine hung on, in spite of the
best speed that the engineer of the Director
was able to get out of her.
A typical case in which a British steamer
baffled a submarine by means of a gun, and
damaged if she did not sink her under-water
antagonist, occurred on the evening of July 15,
1916, near Algiers, as reported in The Times
on August 7 and 8, 1910. Captain David
Thomson, master of the steamship Strathness,
sent to his employers the following extract from
the ship's log describing his encounter : —
July 15, 6.0 p.m. — Saturday a terrific explosion
occurred on port side of steamer nearly amidships ,
heaving water and smoke over the top bridge, making
steamer shake and tremble. I thought it was a torpedo,
hut could see no submarine about. A few minutes after-
wards shots were fired by submarine, but we could not
make out his position. At last gunner made him out
astern, and we commenced firing at him. His shots
were going right over us, and landing in the water a few
yards ahead ; one shot nearly got us, dropping in the
water a few yards astern of steamer.
At onr sixth shot submarine was hit, and also with
our seventh, when a big explosion with fire was caused
in the submarine. Then firing ceased, and submarine
disappeared, which I have no doubt was sunk by our
lire. Altogether the submarine fired about 15 shots,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
171
but none took effect. We fired seven shots, and two
hits were made. Great credit is due to the gunners
for the way in which they worked, especially the remark-
able marksmanship they made at the submarine. Engines
were opened full out and zigzag courses were steered.
Latitude 37.05 N., longitude 3.38 E., where submarine
was sunk or disappeared.
A contrast to the foregoing action, and one
which shows equally the stubborn and dauntless
•qualities of the British merchant seaman and
the brutality of the Germans when they have a
helpless foe to deal with, is afforded by the
circumstances attending the loss of the steam-
ship Clan MacLeod, sunk on December 1, 1915.
Captain H. S. Southward, who had to spend
P. & O. LINER "ARABIA."
Photographed after she was struck, and while her
boats were alongside. An upturned boat can be
seen at her stern.
four months in hospital recovering from
wounds, stated on his return home in April,
1916, that a submarine was sighted at 7.45 a.m.,
opened fire about an hour later, and an hour and
ten minutes after this had closed to within
half a mile of the steamer. Realizing that he
•could not save his ship, Captain Southward
hoisted the international signal of surrender,
stopped the engines, and rounded to. To his
surprise the submarine began to shell the
bridge, doing considerable damage. He was
himself struck by the first shell. The Germans
then began to shell the boats and boat crews,
killing nine men, wounding six (three fatally)
and smashing the starboard boats. Captain
Southward, summoned on board the submarine,
found the commander in a furious rage because
the liner had not stopped immediately. The
British master replied to a question on the
point that he wanted to save his ship if possible.
Tho German officer then said : " I can shoot
you 0fifranr.-lire.ur," and the captain answered,
" I don't think so." The former then said :
" You are assisting my enemy," and the reply
was, " 1 am your enemy." In the only two
boats which remained, the survivors set sail
for Malta. The lifeboat, with Captain South-
ward and 5'"* men, was picked up at 0 p.m. on
December 2, but the cutter, with the chief
officer and 19 men, remained adrift until 2 a.m.
OP December 4, having thus been tossed about
for the greater part of three days and three
nights.
It is not surprising that, with such untold
hardships and dangers confronting them, the
risks of which they accept cheerfully every day
of their lives, there should have been expressed
many tributes of praise to the merchant seamen,
and a desire to afford them greater recognition.
As the Daily Mail said early in 1916 : " If for
these men there is no Westminster Abbey at
the last, let us at least know them and be able
to take off our hats to them in their life."
Lord Beresford shortly afterwards remarked,
at a meeting of the Mercantile Marine Service
Association, that " he did not think the
THE "ARABIA" SINKING.
recognition of the Mercantile Marine was
sufficient, or what it ought to be ; he did not
think they got their due. . . . There ought to be
a special decoration for the Mercantile Marine.
. . . They had to remember that, with the excep-
tion of the transports, which were convoyed,
every mercantile ship that left port or went to
any of their vast Dominions over the sea was
in greater danger than a transport or man-of-
war, because she was unprovided with convoy,
and they knew this was the class of vessel that
their barbarous adversaries liked to sink with-
out warning. "
Tho value, as an example to their crews and
passengers, of the admirable coolness and calm
courage shown by mercantile officers when their
ships were overtaken with disaster cannot be
17-2
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
spoken of too highly When the Anchor liner
California was torpedoed without warning on
February 7, 1917, and remained afloat for only
seven minutes, the captain, in accordance
with British tradition, did not leave his post
on the bridge until the vessel sank beneath
liim. A number of the officers also stood bv
the sinking vessel even after the boats had
rilled, and they had then to plunge overboard
to save themselves from being carried down by
the suction of the huge hull. Similarly, when
the P. and O. steamer Arabia was destroyed,
also without warning, in the Mediterranean
on November 6, 1916, an Eastbourne doctor
w
,,$
SURVIVORS FROM THE "ARABIA.'
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
173
WHITE STAR LINER "CYMRIC."
who was 011 board, saicl : " What one must be
proud of was the calmness, discipline, and self-
possession with which officers, crew, and
passengers gathered, without the least con-
fusion, at their pre-ordained places. It seemed
rather a rehearsal of what was to be done in
case of disaster than a disaster itself. . . *
A touching spectacle, on which the Allies must
be congratulated, was the appearance on the
horizon, practically from all direction?, 15
minutes after the alarm call, of five Allied
steamers, rushing .at full speed to our rescue,
and reaching us three- quarters of an hour later."
Although the ship had 4S7 passengers, including
169 women and children, on board, every one
was saved. Of the crew, two engineers alone
were missing, and were believed to have been
killed by the explosion ; all the rest were picked
up. When the Marina, a Donaldson liner, was
torpedoed on October 28, 1910, Captain Browne
and his chief engineer both remained on board
until the last. They then jumped for a boat,
but missed it, and were drowned. Some of the
survivors of this ship were adrift for 31 J hours
in pouring rain before being picked up. In one
boat during that time the occupants had only
three biscuits and a bit of bully beef each.
The following anecdote is related in connexion
with the sinking of the White Star liner Cymric
on May 8, 1916, in which all the crew, except
five killed by the explosion of the torpedo, were
saved. James Rogers, a trimmer, said that he
was in a ooat, which was smashed, and the nine
men in it thrown into the water, but they were
nil rescued. They had to sit nine and a half
hours in an open boat with their clothes wet
through. " The Germans have missed me
again," said a cheery member of the crew.
" I was in the Southland when she was torpedoed
in the Mediterranean last September." " Had
enough "i " he was asked. " Not me," he
replied, " I shall be off again as soon as I can
get a berth." This readiness of the: seamen
to volunteer for further service was exemplified
in scores of instances. In fact, the men
accepted it as a matter of course. The sea was
their calling, and whatever its perils they
would face them. As Dr. Macnamara said on
February 15, 1917 : " There had been nothing
finer in the history of the war, crowded though
it was with deeds of herosim on the part of the
Army and Navy, than the way in which the
officers and men of the Merchant Service had
carried on their- duties, and this they would
continue to do in spite of Germany's latest
threat of unrestricted savagery. The nation
could never hope to -repay them sufficiently,
and any sacrifice which civilians could make
was insignificant compared with that made by
those men."
This chapter has so far dwelt chiefly upon
the dangers to the mercantile marine from the
submarine war, which was the greatest menace
confronting the traders. It must not be for-
gotten that there were other means employed
by the enemy to destroy or injure them, ^ome
no less callous and brutal in their application.
The laying of mines in the track of peaceful
shipping continued, and when, owing to the
174
T1MKS HISTORY OF THE WAP.
decree of control asserted over the trade routes
by the British Navy, it was no longer possible
to pursue this policy to any large extent by
surface vessels, the Germans designed a special
type of submarine to do it. A specimen sub-
marine minelayer was the UC 5, exhibited in
the Thames in July and August, 1916 ; another
was the UC 12, which fell into Italian hands.
UC5.
A German mine-laying submarine.
Mines were also dropped by the disguised
raiders of armed mercantile type sent out by
the Germans.
The P. & O. line Maloja was among the
principal victims of mines during 1916. She
was destroyed off Dover on February 27, and of
the 411 lives on board 155 were lost. The
explosion caused great damage, the captain
remarking at the inquest that he saw boats,
davits, and d&bris going up into the air, while
the poop was blown up. He ordered the ship
to be stopped and the engines reversed, to take
way off the ship and enable the boats to be
lowered. A few seconds later the ship began
rapidly to pick up stern way, and the order was
given to stop engines, but it could not be
executed as the engine-room was by that time
flooded. With the ship going eight or nine
knots astern it was not possible to lower boats
safely, besides which she had a list of about
75 degrees. Had the engines stopped every
one would have been saved. There were some
pathetic cases of loss among the passengers.
An accountant in the National Bank of India
was returning to India after a holiday in
England, during which he had been married.
His wife was accompanying him, and they
both slid off the .sinking vessel just after he had
put a lifebelt on her. The wife was picked
\\\> after being in the sea for 25 minutes; the
husband was drowned. Several military officers
taking passage in the ship also lost their lives.
Another species of attack of which the
merchant steamers had to run the gauntlet
was that from the air. ff this method was not
so deadly as the under-vvater attacks, it was
severely trying to the nerves of the seamen.
loth as they were to admit anything of the
kind. One of the earliest affairs of the kind
occurred about 7 a.m. on the morning of
March 23, 1915, when the Teal, a small steamer
on a voyage from Amsterdam to Londcu, was
PICKING UP THE CREW OF A SUNKEN
VESSEL.
attacked by a Taube aeroplane. According
to the account of one of the officers, when the
Teal was between the Schouwen and the North
Hinder Lights, the first mate, who was in charge
at the time, saw an aeroplane coming up on
the stern. Near the Teal was a fishing trawler
which sent up a five-star rocket, apparently as
a signal to the airman and his observe! . The
Flushing steamer, which was two or three miles.
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
175
off and must easily have seen all that happened,
kept on her course, taking no notice whatever.
As soon as the Taube came up to the Teal the
first mate changed his course. A bomb was
dropped, but missed the steamer by about
40 yards, raising a great column of water. A
second bomb fell on the opposite side to the
first. The Taube then, after making a wide
circle, dropped two more bombs in quick suc-
cession. But as the mate was steering a zig-zag
course they were eluded. Two or three
minutes later the observer in the Taube opened
a captured enemy vessel trading under
the British flag. She left Hartlepool on
January 31, 1916, on a voyage south, and when
she was at anchor off the Kentish Knock on
the following evening a Zeppelin appeared
right over the vessel and dropped an explosive
bomb, which struck the sliip amidships. She
sank within a couple of minutes, all on board
being lost. It was on the morning after this
that Zeppelin L 19 was found floating in the
North Sea by the late Skipper W. Martin, of the
trawler King Stephen from Grimsby, which
STEAM YACHT AS MINE-SINKER.
fire down on the Teal with a machine-gun, but
without success. Then a number of steel darts
were dropped, one of which struck the vessel
but did no damage. Finally the Germans
opened fire again with their machine-gun, firing
at least another dozen rounds, but they had
no more success than before, and gave up the
attempt, having bombarded the Teal for three-
quarters of an hour.
There were also the dangers facing the
merchant seamen from Zeppelins. Like the
aeroplanes, very few of these monsters suc-
ceeded in destroying any trading vessels. This,
however, was not for want of trying, but
because of the lack of precision and reliability
in their weapons. One ship sunk by a Zep-
pelin was the coasting collier Franz Fischer,
rather pointed to the probability that the same
airship may have been responsible for the
murderous attack on a humble collier the night
before.
In the outer seas the disguised raiders sent
out by the Germans had a very limited success.
Only two of the attempts made in 1916 to put
such raiders on to the trade routes came to
anything, the Mowe making several captures
in January and February, and a second vessel
of the same character being sighted in the
North Atlantic on December 4. The crews of
the victims of these craft were taken at first
on board the raiders, and later transferred to
one of the captured vessels delegated to act as
a tender. The conditions of confinement were
not of the most satisfactory kind, and the
176
'/•///•; TIM US HISTORY OF THE WAE.
behaviour of the Germans was. as usual, callous
and at times brutal, but nothing could " down "
the spirits of the Briti-h seamen. Captain
Andersen, of the Norwegian steamer Hallbjorg,
one of the ships sunk by the second raider,
said that the merchant seamen were by no
means downhearted, and from morning to
night they would sing " Tipperary " and other
songs. The victims of the raider, who were
landed at Pernamburo in January, 1917,
declared that they were closely confined,
poorly fed, and subjected to much suffering
while on board the German vessel, and also
the steamer Saint Theodore, which was con-
verted into a " prison ship." It was also
stated that 100 lascars, taken from captured
vessels, were compelled to work in the raider's
stokehold, being told that the German stokers
were released for other work. Whenever a
merchant ship was captured in daylight moving
pictures were taken of the event, according to
the captain of the steamship Radnorshire, who
said that the German captain told him he had
orders to spare all passenger ships and vessels
not carrying big cargoes. This British captain
also stated that he and his men were kept in
the raider's port bow practically without air,
and compelled to sleep for five days with
" roughnecks." At length the Japanese ship
Hudson Maru was utilized to send them into
Pernambuco, with barely enough water and
sea biscuits to complete the voyage.
A fitting episode to conclude this chapter is
that of the escape of the Cardiff steamship
Southport, which is not only amusing, but
illustrates that never-failing resource which
lias carried the British merchant sailor through
so many stiff ordeals. This vessel was at
Kusai, an island in the east of the Caroline
group, formerly in the possession of Germany,
on September 4, 1914, when a party from the
German gunboat Geier boarded her. They
hoisted the German flag, damaged and removed
parts of the machinery, and left after taking
the vessel's papers. The Geier then went
elsewhere to try and hold vip other merchant-
men. No sooner had she gone than the
engineers of the Southport set to work to effect
temporary repairs. They were successful, and
on September 30 it was reported from Brisbane
that the steamer had reached there safely
after a slow voyage from the Carolines. If
ever the Geier went back to Kusai, her officers
must have reflected that they had not taken
adequate measure of the British seaman's
character. They were like the bold German
magistrate at Naurn Island, another ex-German
possession in the Pacific, who when war was
declared took a boat's party off to the British
steamer Messina and demanded to be taken on
board. " By whose orders ? " asked the mate.
" By order of his Imperial Majesty the German
Emperor," replied the pompous magistrate.
The mate gave a loud laugh, and, ordering full
speed ahead, the Messina quickly reached the
open sea.
CHAPTER CLXXII.
FISHERMEN AND THE WAR (II)
A PREVIOUS CHAPTER — SKIPPERS AND FISHERMEN, R.N.R. — ACTIVITY OF BRITISH FISHINC; VESSELS
- — CASUALTIES — HEAVY WAR LOSSES — ADVENTURE ON A GERMAN SUBMARINE — THE FISH SUPPLY
• — A PRISONER OF WAR — "SUBMARINE BILLY" — THE WORK OF PATROLLERS AND MINE -SWEEPERS
— FISHERMEN'S ROLL OF HONOUR — ACTS OF HEROISM — SPORADIC LAWLESSNESS — OUT OF BOUNDS
— PROFIT AND Loss OF FISHING — PRICES OF FISHING VESSELS — LIFE-SAVING — A FISH YARN
— SPECIAL FUNDS AND AGENCIES
IN Chapter CXXI. the organization of
fishermen as mine -sweepers and patrollers
in connexion with the Royal Navy was
described, and their wonderful and effec-
tive work was dealt with ; the system of
fishing which existed before the war was ex-
piained, and an account was given of the great
changes that hostilities necessitated in carrying
on this vast enterprise on which such an im-
portant part of the supply of the nation's food
depended It was shown how priceless an
asset were the men of the deep-sea grounds
and the in-shore waters — the fleeters and the
single boaters, and to what an enormous
extent the materiel and personnel of the fishing
industry had been used by the naval authori-
ties in the successful prosecution of the war at
sea. Details were given which showed how
extensive and far reaching were the operations
of the one-time fishermen ; but it was not
until the beginning of 1917 that Admiral
Jellicoe publicly stated that the number of
\essels of all classes comprising the British
Navy was nearly 4,000, nnd that the personnel
of the mercantile marine had been largely
drawn upon for, amongst other things, " the
manning of the whole of our patrol and mine-
sweeping craft, nearly 2,500 skippers being
employed as skippers R.N.R." The public
had been previously allowed to know that
100,000 fishermen were serving with the Navy.
In addition to these mine-sweepers and patrol-
lers. fishermen were going to sea, taking all th?
risks of ruthless warfare, enduring all the
privations of an exceptionally severe winter,
and doing their business of catching fish and
sending or taking it to market. In those hard,
dangerous gales there were many casualties of
various sorts, including the toll of wandering
mines ; skippers and men suffered acutely
from exposure to the piercing wind and freezing
sleet and spray ; there were many torn and
bleeding hands at work on icy trawls and war-
like warps and other sinister contrivances — but
the skippers and men endured it all heroically
and stoically, and were apt curtly and gruffly
to belittle their tribulations, and to declare that
hardship was only part of the day's work, and
that the fisherman was used to it, just as he
was used to being drowned.
Two and a half years after the outbreak of
war about 75 per cent, of the first-class fishing
boats were on Admiralty service, including all
the big steamboats ; and the majority of the
fishermen had joined the Navy. Yet in spite
of these immense calls the work of fishing,
mostly by single-boating, but also with a
modified form of fleeting, went on, and with so
much success' that the supply of fish had dropped
only about 30 per cent, below the normal.
The work of the 2,500 skippers and the
100,000 fishermen was of every sort that can
fall to a powerful and well-organized auxiliary
in time of war. When first enrolled the fisher-
178
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Q
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
17!)
men were soon busily employed as mine-
sweepers and patrollcrs in armed trawlers ;
they did transport work in distant waters, and
they maintained in splendid fashion their fine
tradition as some of the most skilful life-savers
afloat. There was no disaster of any descrip-
tion, from a mined or torpedoed battleship
such as the Formidable to a submarined ship
like the Lusitania or a lost leviathan like the
Britannic, in connexion with which one or
more trawlers, sail or steam, did not do some
uoble work of saving life.
The North Sea at the outset of the war gave
ample scope for the exercise of the skill and
energy of the sweepers and patrollers ; but
later the area of usefulness was enormously
extended, and fishermen who had never known
a change on the bleak and dangerous banks
were operating in the romantic regions of the
Mediterranean, the Adriatic and the Ionian
Sea ; sunny skies in winter replaced the grey
gloom of the Dogger, and when notorious bad
weather zones were entered they came as a not
unwelcome change to the deep-sea men to
whom bad weather and peril were inseparable
from a hard existence.
While the German fishing vessels were im-
prisoned in a cramped area by the British
blockade, and the fishing port of Altona had
its crowded trawlers, the British fishing craft
of every sort were at large upon the seas in
numerous capacities. Fine big new trawlers
were launched and immediately put in com-
mission ; as lads at seaports came of age they
gravitated to the toilsome calling of their fathers,
so keeping up the supply of new and needed
blood ; while from decaying fishing ports old
men once more adventured with fresh life and
hope, and wooden smacks that had grown into
being in the 'sixties were reaping the sea's
great harvest, and fetching fancy prices when
put up for sale Built in 1866, a wooden smack
was sold for about £400, although before the
war such a craft as she secured no offers, except
as firewood.
Old-time crews manned old-time smacks, so
that when they were met at sea they might
almost have been mistaken for contemporaries
of Vanderdecken and his spectral band on
board the Flying Dutchman. A remarkable
case in point was afforded by the drifter Success
of Lowestoft. She was manned by seven
hands and their total ages came to 478 years.
The " boy " was 62 years old ; but he, was a
mere juvenile compared with the oldest member
of the crew, whose years were 75. The skipper
was 68, and other ages were 72, 69, 68 and 64.
That these old smacksmen were capable of
sustained and profitable effort was shown by
the way in which they handled their nets and
did the hard work of their vessel. They
proudly boasted that they had had a good season,
and expressed regret, tinged with pity, . that
A TRAWLER IN PORT.
the authorities considered them too old to
bear the " lighter " duties of a man-of-war.
The fisherman went forth to fish literally
with his life in his hands, regardless of the
region in which he lived — north, south, east or
west. In the beginning the danger zone was
well defined. It was mostly in the North Sea,
but extended until it embraced the whole of
the coasts of the British Isles, and submarines
and mines became an ever present menace to
the fishermen. The enemy appeared in most
unlikely places. One winter day, at a sleepy
old-world fishing port, brown-sailed smacks
which had put to sea were observed to stagger
back in very odd ways, taking every course,
apparently, except the right one. It was not
until the first skipper landed that the explana-
tion was available, and it was that he had seen
a submarine laying mines with the object of
cutting off the smacks' return to harbour. The
mines had been scattered across the mouth of
the romantic bay ; but the watchful skipper
had seen the cowardly act and had promptly
180
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
niven tin- alarm and piloted his comrades
through tho iminfested areas back to port. His
sharpness and skill undoubtedly did much to
avert loss of life and ship. Submarines and
mines were the cause of the posting as missing
of many fishing; vessels. There were many
CAPTAIN PILLAR
of the Brixham trawler " Provident," decorated
by the King with the Distinguished Service Medal.
mute tragedies of the home seas in connexion
with the great army of British fishermen who
were keeping up the food supply of the country.
And what was happening in western waters
was taking place far more frequently in the
North Sea.
There had been since the outbreak of war
verv heavy losses of fishing vessels through
enemy attacks while peacefully pursuing their
calling. These attacks on fishermen and their
helpless craft appealed with special force to the
" brave German hearts," as their proud com-
patriots called them ; and in the new campaign
of ruthlessness they had heavy bags to their
discredit.
The commander of a submarine who wrote a
.etter to his brother, a military officer shortly
afterwards captured on the Somme, said :
" For four months I have not been able to
renew my stock of torpedoes. I am, therefore,
obliged to attack traders with my guns — a very
risky proceeding now that the British and
French boats defend themselves. A single
shot well placed might easily send us to the
bottom. . . . My submarine is an old crock.
I wish I could get command of one of our now
submarine-cruisers As it is known that
my boat is not much good I am not given
anything very difficult to do. I am generally
after fishermen and sailing boats and run very
little risk." A typical raid such as is referred
to in this letter was made upon the Brixham
fishing fleet on November 28, 1916. At 2 o'clock
in the afternoon, in broad daylight, a submarine
rose to the surface among the trawlers and
began her murderous work against the helpless
fishermen. She opened fire upon the Provident,
Skipper William Pillar, who was the gallant
seaman to whom so many of the crew of the
battleship Formidable owed their lives after
that ship was torpedoed. The shells from the
submarine brought down the jib of the Provi-
dent, and also parted her topsail halyards.
After the first shot, the crew took to their boat,
and the submarine then came in close enough
to put a bomb in the Provident, which sank her.
Then the raider opened on the Amphitrite,
whose skipper, William Norris, declared in an
interview that after his crew had taken to their
boat they were still shelled from the submarine.
The boat was not more than 100 yards astern
of the Amphitrite when the Germans opened
fire. Failing to hit with the two shells directed
at the boat, the submarine resumed her shelling
of the trawler. The third vessel attacked was
the Lynx, and her crew, taking promptly to
their boat, were likewise shelled from a range
BRIXHAM TKAWLERS.
of not more than 200 yards, but fortunately
escaped. This third trawler was not sunk,
but was found derelict and brought into
Brixham. The men of all three craft declared
it was only by good fortune that they were
not injured by the hail of shrapnel fired at
them.
Great havoc was done amongst fishing
boats off the north-east coast on the night of
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.4P.
181
August 3, 1916. A German submarine sud-
denly appeared, and as the peaceful craft were
quite helpless she had matters pretty much her
own way. She set to work at wanton destruc-
tion, and in a very short period sank nearly a
dozen of the vessels, which were mostly small
motor herring drifters. The skipper of one of
the boats, a Scotsman, said it was one of the
hour and a quarter — he directed his crew
below. Three men. were beside him, with
largo glasses, continuously sweeping the seas,
apparently intensely apprehensive of the coming
of British war vessels.
When the submarine got under way, her
speed being estimated at 17 or 18 knots,
the commander persistently questioned the
A GRIMSBY TRAWLER.
calmest nights at sea that he ever remembered.
The boats had their nets out, their lights were
showing, and a good watch was kept. At
about midnight an explosion was heard, and it
was instantly suspected that a submarine was
at work. A second explosion followed, and a
fishing vessel was seen to disappear. A
number of the drifters had already cut their
nets adrift and were making a rush for port
and safety. The skipper himself tried to
escape, but a big submarine came up rapidly,
and he was ordered to stop. Two tall men
boarded him from the submarine, each of them
carrying bombs.
The drifter was destroyed, and her crew
were taken on board the submarine, on whose
deck other fishermen were assembled, making
twenty in all. The German commander was
in the conning tower, and all the time the
skipper was on board the submarine — about an
skipper as to the lights that were seen, and
whether any of the fishing vessels carried guns.
A stop was made to destroy another drifter,
and fishermen were added to the crowd on the
submarine's deck, making a total of 30, all
of whom realized that their fate was almost
certain if a warship appeared. They were
satisfied that if such a vessel came up the
submarine would dive and leave them in the
sea. This, fortunately, did not happen, and
the fishermen, to their intense relief, were put
on board a small drifter, and left to themselves.
Before he disappeared the submarine com-
mander gave precise orders that lights should
be kept burning, and that the drifters were
not to move till daylight, the punishment for
disobedience being instant destruction. Having
issued his directions he resumed his work of
sinking drifters.
The skipper described the destruction as
1S2
THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.
very deliberate and well organized, and he
calculated that on an average one vessel was
sunk every 16 minutes. In some cases
crews of destroyed craft were sent adrift in
their own little boats ; in others refuge was
sought on board vessels which escaped destruc-
tion. Finally a patrol boat picked up some of
the men and took them into port. The time
of the year and the calmness of the weather
prevented much suffering and loss of life.
This wholesale destruction of fishing vessels
or damaged," he said, " is communicated
confidentially to the shipowners concerned
and to Lloyd's. If it is stated that they are
sunk by submarines it cannot be in consequence
of official information from us."
The losses of fishermen and fishing vessels
were grievous. Many of them took place
during the winter of 1916-17, which was one
of exceptional bitterness, and men might well
have declared that to go to sea was to court
almost sure disaster from submarine, mine, or
A RECORD CATCH OF BETWEEN 60,000 AND 70,000 MACKEREL AT YAKMOUTH.
was the forerunner of other similar acts against
fishing fleets. Though the losses were heavy,
yet they were almost inevitable, in view of the
methods which were adopted to cause them,
and the vast area of sea which, even under the
rigid regulations that were in force, had to be
protected by the Navy. It was significant
that the fisherman, who suffered most, was the
last man to raise the foolish cry, " Where is
the Navy — what is it doing ? "
While most of the losses among.st fishing
vessels were doubtless due to submarine attacks
it was not the policy of the Admiralty to
announce how or where ships were sunk.
Both these facts, Dr. Macnamara stated in
the House of Commons, were of vise to the
" Information that a vessel is sunk
gale. But the old North Sea spirit triumphed.
No danger daunted and no threat deterred.
The more the Germans resorted to barbarism
the more determined was the British fisherman
to reap the harvest of the sea on which he had
been a life -long toiler. . He went forth and he
laboured, under the protection of the all-
powerful Navy, and with such success that
even in the abnormal state of the weather at
the beginning of 1917, when the severest frost
prevailed that had been known for 22 years,
when ships at sea were filigreed in ice,
he was able to send good supplies of fish to
market. In January, 1917, the weight of fish
landed at Billingsgate Market was 7,348 tons.
In the previous January the supplies amounted
to 6,741 tons. These quantities were, of
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
183
course, far below the pre-war rates ; but at
that period four large fleets of steam trawlers
were at work on the North Sea, maintaining
constant communication with Billingsgate by
means of carriers. The Board of Trade Labour
Gazette, in a review of food prices in 1910,
stated : "In July, 1916, fish averaged about
80 per cent, above the level of two years earlier,
this being the lowest point reached during the
year and representing a drop from 105 per cent,
at the beginning of February. At the end of
191 (i the price of fish was about one-third
liigher than a year earlier."
In keeping the markets supplied fishermen
ran the gravest risks of death or capture. A
skipper who was fishing in the very early days
of the war was made prisoner with many other
fishermen, their vessels, steam trawlers which
were single-boating, being sunk by Germans.
For fifteen months he was a prisoner, then he
FILLING BASKETS ON BOARD.
was sent home, being too old to fight ; anil
even if he had been young enough the brutal
treatment of his captors would have put him
utterly beyond the power of combat. The
war had ruined him ; he had lost all in adven-
turously harvesting the Dogger.
Many fishermen went to sea in spite of the
fact that they had been submarined or bombed
once or more. A very remarkable case was
that of a man who won the name " Submarine
Billy," because on three different occasions on
the North Sea he had sailed in smacks which
had been blown up by crews of German sub-
marines. The second time he was shot through
the thigh, while in the little boat to which the
men had been ordered. Helpless on the water
though they were — and there was a little lad
amongst them — they were deliberately fired
upon by the Germans. With each little
brown-sailed smack the procedure was pre-
cisely the same — five minutes' notice to quit
and take to the boat, then annihilation by
bomb.
HAULING "KITS" ON TO THE WHARF.
" About a quarter of an hour after we left
the smack there was a terrific explosion," said
" Submarine Billy." " The deck split up,
there was a lot of fire and smoke, she began to
sink, and in about eight minutes she. had gone
altogether. Our floating home and everything
in it went to the bottom." The Germans lost
no time over their task, the narrator added.
They did not mind unarmed fishermen, but
they dreaded the appearance of British
destroyers and armed trawlers and patrols.
" Submarine Billy " had his woes crowned by
being " gassed " by the fumes of a bomb
dropped from a Zeppelin which was hovering
low in a thick haze. He was asked what
happened to the boy. " He was a splendid
little chap," he answered. " He had been
badly scared, but he pulled up, and in two or
three days went to sea again."
" Went to sea again." That summed up
the ordinary fisherman's achievement. And all
the time he maintained his indomitable optim-
ism, and his resolution never faltered. He
was furnished with efficient tools, and knew
precisely how to use them ; he had faith in his
superiors and a childlike trust in the genius
that controlled the Navy — and he was incor-
184
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
WHITE FISH MARKET, NORTH SHIELDS.
Inset : Scottish Fisher Lasses.
rigibly contemptuous of the German. He
\vas still disposed to look upon the Teuton as
the fat, somewhat simple fellow he had so
often met near Heligoland and on the Dutch
and German coasts, and to whom he had, in
hours of relaxation, sung a doggerel composition
PACKING HERRINGS.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
185
of obscure humour which ended with the
encouraging refrain : — •
" Copenhagen shall be tagen —
Ja, ja, ja ! "
But he had solid reason for the faith and
comfort that were in him, because he knew
what was being done ; there was not for him
the impenetrable veil which hid the doings of
the Navy from the anxious public. Except
amongst his own kind he seldom spoke of what
he did and saw ; letters from sea were rigidly
censored, and rightly so, but it was known that
not a few Germans, especially in the North
he said, " anyway every two months, then I
get four days. 1 am not mine -sweeping, but
doing escort work and patrol, and it's very
trying at times. There's something • more
than haddocks to play about with now. but I
think we can manage them all right. ... I
have just arrived in port, having been waiting
for an escort for three days, only to hear that
she is sunk. So here I am at my base
for 24 hours' rest, after eight days at
sea. It's a warm place here, on this East
Coast. We had our Christmas at sea,
but under fairly comfortable circumstances.
MOCK AUCTION OF FISH AT YARMOUTH.
Sea, had paid the final price as the result of
meeting one or more armed trawlers or patrol-
boats. Strenuous and successful work was
<lone by the fishermen auxiliaries. One skipper,
a fine, steady, reliable example of his class,
who had distinguished himself and received a
well-merited honour, said that two German
submarines in a certain area had suddenly
shown themselves to two armed trawlers —
and very soon after the meeting there was " a
tough job."
The winter work of the patrollers was well
described by the skipper of a craft on his
return to his base. " I get home fairly often,"
The weather was not so bad — plenty of rain,
but that don't hurt the old North Sea boys."
A sweeper who was busy in submarine-
infested areas wrote : " Our men were out and
sighted a submarine, but it came on to blow
and they had a rough time of it. One drifter
. was almost lost through a heavy sea cominsr
on board. We have been very busy with the
submarines. We have been at it night and
day — and so bitter cold, too. One young
man coming aboard his ship — it was very dark
at the time — fell overboard and was drowned.
The glass is well down ; the sky looks very bad.
It has been bad times with us lately — no rest
THE T1MKS HISTORY OF THE WAR.
\\hile these submarines nrc about. Wo are on
deck in all weathers. c;>ld and wet through."
" We have been very busy with the sub-
marines lately" another sweeper said, "and
MINE SWEEPERS.
The trawlers work in pairs : the second vessel can
be seen behind the funnel of the foremost ; a
strong cable is stretched between the two.
the weather has been awful bad for our small
craft. They sunk three steamers close here,
and afterwards it blew very hard and cold.
Poor fellows ! We managed to pick up the
three boats full of the crews. It blew a heavy
gale of wind at the time. One hardly expects
a ship to stand it, let alone a small boat."
Another mine-sweeper said that during
four sweeps he brought 12 mines to the
surface and exploded them. " I have been
out sweeping continually up to yesterday,"
he went on, " but did not get any thing. I
believe I have cleared them away, but there
might be a few missed ; anyhow, the next time
we shall sweep east and, west, to make certain
— have done before the sweeping north and
south. I have been at it every morning at
3, finishing at 5 p.m. Last month, when
nearly completing the sweeping, I swept up
five mines and came across five full petrol
tanks, each holding about 51 gallons or more,
which appeared as if they had been moored.
I therefore set to work by destroying and sink-
ing them."
The fishermen were not good correspondents ;
to some of them reading and writing were
unknown, but there were many, especially of
the younger generation, who were able to put
on record stories of quiet heroism and resource-
fulness. From the English Channel, in the
spring of 1916, a sweeper wrote saying : " We
have helped to do a little good since we have
been patrolling this part of the coast. There
are four ships in our division, and we have
sunk four mines this last month. . . . We
picked up 29 hands oft the steamship -
belonging to - — . The crew had just time
to get into the boats before the steamer sunk.
When we took them on board thev found out.
SALVING A DERELICT TORPEDO.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
187
MINE-SWEEPING TRAWLERS AT LOWESTOFT.
that the captain and the second mate were
not there, so we launched our small boat.
Two of our crew and myself went to look for
the captain and mate. We had not pulled
far before we could hear them in the water,
shouting for help. Pleased to let you know
that we got them all right. They were
swimming away from the ship, or else if they
had not she would have taken them down.
I heard the explosion. I had just turned in
my bunk. As soon as I got on the deck the
vessel had begun to sink. She was torpedoed
by a German submarine. It was about 9 p.m.,
and getting dark. I was glad they were all
saved and not one injured. I should think
their poor wives and children would be pleased
when they got the news that all hands were
saved."
The fishermen's roll of honour grew to an
extent whicli could be appreciated only by a
close study of the lists issued by the Admiralty
and published in. extenso in The Times. On
December 6, 1916, the Admiralty lists showed
that 27 fishermen, second hands, deck-hands,
enginemen, trimmers, etc., had been killed ;
21 were missing, believed killed; and 11 were
missing. There were also announced, throe
days later, the names of no fewer than seven
skippers amongst 34 naval officers reported
killed. An official publication contained in
January, 1917, the names of 80 skippers who
had been killed in action.
Many of the acts of heroism were not recorded,
and it was only occasionally that the public,
through the newspapers, became aware of tho
consistently courageous conduct of the fisher-
men. There was a Grimsby fisliing vessel — her
name was not given — under whose keel a mine
exploded. A hole wa? made in the vessel's
hull, and the little cramped engine-room was
filled with scalding steam from the damaged
boiler, while the sea rushed in and almost
overwhelmed her. The situation was extremely
perilous, and called for promptest action and
the highest courage. Both were instantly at
hand. The chief engineer, P. P. Wilson, and
the second engineer, C. E. East, set to work to
save both ship and life. Wilson, reckless of
the scalding steam and rush of sea, forced his
way into the engine-room and plugged, as best
he could, the hole caused by the explosion ;
while East, although violently thrown against
the boiler by the motion of the vessel, " made
his way to tho bunker to save his fireman."
1SS
77.U/-:x HISTORY OF THE WAK.
That i-; to say, he struggled in the blinding,
scalding, darkening atmosphere of what was
nothing inoro than a larao steel box, crawled
and dragged himself to the appalling little hole
CHIEF ENGINEER F. P. WILSON, D.S.M.
•which was called a bunker, and saved the
imprisoned stoker whose chance of salvation
seemed hopeless. While this was going on
another trawler near at hand, which had been
mined also, was sinking, and her crew of seven
were in imminent peril. It might well have
been that the men on the other ship thought
they had their own hands full, and could do
no more ; but that was not the North Sea way,
it was not the fighting, conquering spirit of the
Dogger. In the old days, in the deadly gales
which fishers called " smart breezes," when a
smack was hove down or a boat capsized in
boarding fish, the smacksmen paid no thought
to danger and they went about the work of
rescue. So now the second hand — the mate —
on Wilson's vessel took in charge the launching
of the little boat. E. R. Gooderham they
called him. He got the boat overboard and
took it to the other mined trawler, which by
this time was capsizing. Oooderham fonirlit
his way into the very vortex, and though the
sinking vessel was almost turning completely
over on to his boat yet he saved the seven
members of her crew ; then he strenuously
pulled out of the death-embracing area. For
tl^ese acts of true heroism the engineers were
awarded Distinguished Service Medals, while
Hie M-cimd hand was "highly commended for
exceptional bravery in emergencies." The
Victoria Cross had been given for less. This
case was merely typical — there were very many
like it, all around the British coasts and far
afield. Many of the acts were put on record
and officially acknowledged ; but there were
many others, just as splendid, of which no
word of praise could be spoken or written, for
the doers had perished in the time of their
achievement.
A trawler was attacked and sunk by a sub-
marine. A few months later the skipper went
off in a drifter for the night, to take the place
of a man who was forced to remain ashore.
The drifter was blown up ; but again the skipper
had the good fortune to escape. He was asked
what he thought of the matter, and he answered,
" There's one good thing about it — you take,
it calmer the second time!" That was the
spirit which, with rare exceptions, was shown
by the fishermen ; and the exceptions were
mostly cases in which men's nervous systems
had been seriously weakened by incessant
strain. The fisherman had no complaint to
make about the inevitable hazards of war ; he
bore them philosophically, and whenever he
could do so he spoke a good word for the enemy.
There were rare and precious occasions on
SECOND ENGINEER C. E. EAST, D.S.M.
which he was able to say that the German had
acted like a gentleman.
The new and heavy dangers which the war
had added to his life had but little effect upon
the fisherman, except to make him even more
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
389
BOARDING FISH : A BROADSIDE VIEW.
BOARDING FISH: THE SCENE CN BOARD THE CARRIER.
I'.M)
THE TLMKS HISTOUY OF THE WAR.
enduring than of old. His courage sustained
him in the darkest hours, his resourcefulness
enabled him to conquer apparently hopeless
dilHeulties, and his old-time ways were not to
he amended except at heavy cost. His habit
of closely examining and somewhat carelessly
handling oddments that his trawl brought tip
A CAPTURED TORPEDO.
from the deep sea clung to him when extreme
caution was essential ; hence such tales as that
of a crew who hauled on board a mysterious
object which was believed to be a mine, but
was so heavily barnacled as to make identity
doubtful. A scraping of the barnacles to solve
the mystery resulted in the posting of the
vessel and the crew as missing. That, at any
rate, was a tale of the sea ; and there \vcre
many like it.
The old spirit of freedom which was little
less than lawlessness occasionally reasserted
itself in individuals. Such instances usually
came to light by way of the police courts, but
one special case was made public through the
unexpected medium of an Honours List, in the
-•etion " Police Medals : Service at Home and
Abroad." \7arious members of the police forces
and fire brigades of the United Kingdom were
honoured, and amongst them was the following :
" Albert Edward Bell, constable, Isle of Man
Constabulary. A drunken skipper of a patrol
I M »it came ashore at Ramsey Harbour with
two revolvers, and landed four of his crew as
iirined sentries. He threatened various people,
fired two shots, and then aimed at one of his
crew. The revolver missed lire, and while he
was raising it again Bel! rushed at him and
took the revolver nway."
Tlii- was an unu-snal instance of drunken
folly ; it was reminiscent of the wild deeds of
" Paraffin Jack " in the days of the old sailing
fleets ; but there were many regrettable cases
of insubordination and other wrongdoing due
to drink, as anyone saw who came into contact
with the sweepers and fishermen on the vast
stretch of coast-line that provided bases. On
the other hand the various religious and philan-
thropic agencies, working with the efficient
Naval Chaplains' Department, did much to
ameliorate the evil and to raise the tone of the
large bodies of men who were assembled at the
bases.
At one important base a naval officer who
wished to make a special effort to accommodate
DRIFTER BRINGING FRESH FISH
ALONGSIDE A WARSHIP.
trawler ratings saw the military officer >vho
was in charge of certain buildings which might
be available as temporary quarters. " They
shall not come here if I can help it," the
military officer declared, and on being pressed
for the reason of his objection he replied that
he had been given to understand that the
trawlennen were the refuse of the community,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAU
CLEANING FISH FOR BREAKFAST.
and were lost to all sense of discipline. This
was in the earlier period of the war, the base was
in a region greatly frequented by fishermen in
normal times, and near a port which had be-
come notorious by reason of its fishing popu-
lation's doings ; yet this port gave lavishly of
its toilers of the deep and showed that they
merely needed help and guidance to prove
themselves as amenable to discipline as any
members of the Royal Navy.
One of the most striking features of the
affiliation of the fishermen with the Navy was
the improvement that took place in directions
in which advance seemed hopeless. The rigid
restrictions of the drink traffic undoubtedly
had much to do with this satisfactory result.
Nothing that the Germans could do deterred
the vast body of fishermen from going to ser,
and trying their luck, and it was obvious that
but for the Naval Regulations there would
have been skippers daring enough to go over
to the German coast itself. Not even the
heavy penalties that were imposed for infringe-
ment of them kept fishermen away from pro-
hibited areas ; and even after severe losses on
craft had been inflicted by enemy submarines
they persisted on getting out of bounds. In
connexion with the actual sinking of some
Grimsby trawlers in September, 1916, eleven
skippers were charged at the Grimsby Police
Court with fishing in prohibited waters. They
pleaded guilty, but urged that the offence was
unintentional. They were, however, severely
punished, for fines amounting to £325 were
imposed. One great temptation to enter pro-
hibited areas was undoubtedly the eagerness
to get fish, in view of the exceptional prices
which ruled on the markets and the enormous
incomes which it was possible for skippers and
other share-hands to make. It was freely stated
at the end of 1916 that there were skippers who
were making from £5,000 to £6,000 a year ;
but this was doubtless an exaggeration, al-
though skippers were certainly earning
incomes which went well into four figures
sterling.
The prosperity of some of the fishing com-
panies was shown by ths fact that one of them
was able to subscribe £100,000 to the great
U'ar Loan in February, 1917 : and skippers who
had become affluent invested large sums in the
Loan. During the war, as in time of peace,
the're existed the good and ill luck that are
inseparable from fishing, for while some men
192
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
< •*
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
reaped fortunes there were others to whom the
enterprise meant heavy or complete loss.
In spite of the losses which had been sustained
there was not that advance in the price of
fishing vessels which had been anticipated,
though the increase both in cost of production
and in the value of second-hand craft was very
considerable. The sum of £6,500 was asked
for an iron trawler nearly 27 years old ; a
small vessel, a 20-year old trawler, changed
hands at the reported price of £10,700, a
remarkable sum in view of the fact that even
at that 'time a first-class North Sea trawler
had been launchod at a cost of £10,000, and
vessels which had been previously contracted
for were only about 35 per cent, above pre-war
quotations. Yet with high prices like these
to pay it was possible to operate with great
success. Allied nations were in the same posi-
tion as the British, and heavy prices had to be
paid for fishing craft. The Japanese-owned
steel screw trawler Kaiko Maru, built at Osaka
in 191 1, was sold to French buyers for £13,000.
No official details were given as to the number
of lives which had been saved in various ways
by fishermen who were serving in sweepers
and patrollers ; but reports showed that the
number was very great and embraced rescues
from ships of every sort and nationality.
The Mediterranean was frequently mentioned
as the sphere of much of this quiet heroism,
a display for which the fisherman's training
peculiarly well fitted him. for he was accustomed
to prompt action in boat work, and heavy
seas in small craft had no terrors for him.
Most of his existence had been spent in a vessel
over the low rail of which the sea could almost
be touched with the hand ; he had been in the
habit of " throwing "' his boat overboard,
tumbling into it and hurrying off in North Sea
fashion, standing to his rowing, one man facing
forward, one man facing aft, the better to meet
the uncertain seas ; and it was this readiness
for emergencies, this celerity in action, that
enabled him to say, as one skipper, writing
from a Mediterranean base, did say, that within
a comparatively brief period the trawlers had
saved many lives. Many of these were soldiers :
many were women and children.
One of the finest achievements of the trawlers
in the Mediterranean was in connexion with
the cowardly torpedoing of the Arabia, referred
to in the preceding chapter. According to the
Admiralty account all the passengers were
saved by various vessels which were diverted
to the scene of the disaster. Amongst those
vessels were several trawlers, whose crews set
instantly to work to save the Arabia's people,
especially the women and children. A cor-
respondent of The Times telegraphed on Novem-
ber 13 from Marseilles a story which had been
told to him by Mr. Prentice, of the Indian Civil
Service. That little narrative revealed some-
thing of the rescuing trawlers' fine work :
" Ultimately I was put aboard a trawler on
which were about 166 rescued. We set off in
a calm sea for Malta, 270 miles away The
first few hours were by no means unpleasant,
H.M. MINE SWEEPERS' RIBBON
Of which the men are justifiably proud.
but after nightfall the sea grew rough. Every
wave swept the trawler from stem to stern.
We had few wraps, and most of us lay with
drenched clothes till we reached Malta. They
were 37 hours of utter misery On the first
afternoon the crew of the trawler gave us a
good meal of stew, but that exhausted their
supplies, and from that moment we subsisted
on ship's biscuits. More than half the sur-
vivors on the trawlers were women and
children."
Wondrous fish yarns were related in connex-
ion with the war at sea, and even more astonish-
ing than some of the wildest works of fiction
194
THE TIMES HISTORY Of' THE WAR.
SCENE IN THE FISH DOCK AT HULL.
were devices with which the enemy were
credited. The story of a remarkable incident
found its way across the North Sea from Sulen,
n?ar the entrance to the Trondhjem Fjord.
Some fisharmen secured a wooden box, which
they saw floating on the sea, and on opening
it they found a tin box containing a fish. The
fish suddenly began to burn and emit a sul-
phurous smell, whereupon the men, unnerved
by the astounding performance of the occupant
of this rival to Pandora's box, hurled it back
into the water. When this was done the un-
friendly fish exploded and flames shot up from
it to a tremendous height. The fishing-boat
was nearly capsized, her boat was smashed to
atoms and her lanterns were destroyed, while
one man was nearly killed. The narrator added
that the region where this occurred was infesterl
'with mines, so that fishermen wero almost
afraid to go to sea.
Such was the story, an 1, striking though it
was, yet it was not improbable in view of the
avowed determination of the " brave German
hearts " to sweep the fishers from the seas,
and the " frightfuliiess " of German chemists
who, in connexion with the war, had gained a
notoriety which was as unsavoury as some of
their scientific products.
The special efforts which had been made to
alleviate the hardships of fishermen prisoners
of war in Germany were continued with un-
abated energy. As tune went on it became
necessary to take steps to avoid overlapping
in work relating to these captives, and accord-
ingly the Government decided that as from
December 1, 1916, all parcels of food must be
transmitted to prisoners in Germany through
a recognized association. The Royal National
Mission to Deep Sea Fishermen was the society
recognized by the Government for ministeririx
to the needs of fishermen prisoners of war, and
no other association or private individual was
permitted to send parcels of food except
through the Mission That society had for a
considerable p3riod paid close attention to the
needs of these unfortunate men and lads, to
each of whom, weekly, was dispatched a parcel
of food from the Grimsby Institute, under the
direction of Miss Newnham. The parcel was
of the value of 5s., and was often accompanied
by boots and clothing and gifts of tobarco.
During 1910 no fewer than 10,075 parcels
were sent to prisoners, and so areat became the
calls upon this special fund that a preliminary
expenditure of £40 a week ros?, at the end of
the year, to nearly £100 a week, and was steadily
growing. It spoke well for the interest of the
public in the imprisoned fishermen that this
special fund was maintained entirely irrespective
of the ordinary support which was given to
religious and philanthropic work amongst
fishermen. It was undoubtedly these parcels
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THK WAK.
195
of food and clothing which kept the fishermen
prisoners of war healthy and contributed to
their comfort and happiness ; and there was
abundant evidence from tho men that without
them they would have suffered severely or
staived altogether. While these special efforts
contact with sweepers and pati oilers. Abroad,
as well as at home, many vo untary workers
interested themselves in fishermen who had
joined the Navy, many of whom were absent
for long periods without leave. In Rome ladies
took in hand the cases of North Sea and other
';
EXPLODING A BOMB DROPPED ON A SUBMARINE.
The bomb has been dropped from a fast patrol vessel which has chased and overtaken the submarine.
It explodes beneath the water at a depth which can be regulated. The photograph
shows the wake of the patrol vessel in the foreground.
on behalf of prisoners were being made, a very
fine work amongst fishermen ashore was being
done, great voluntary help being given on the
West Coast by Miss Elizabeth Cooper, who had
the support and encouragement of prominent
naval officers who wera brought much into
fishermen who had been absent from their
homes for 18 months
At the many bases around the coasts there
came into existence various social organizations
promoted by sweepers and patrollers and their
friends, which were the direct outcome of the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A QUIET MOMENT ON BOARD A TRAWLER.
war, and were in keeping with the new and
improved position in which the deep sea toiler
found himself. There were skippers' clubs and
club.s for lowor ratings, and the establishment
of these rendezvous, when they were of the right
and helpful sort, was officially encouraged, and
many of them proved beneficial to men who
were far from their families for Jong periods.
In numerous instances prosperous skippers
who were employed in fishing, and skippers and
other men who were sweeping and patrolling,
moved with their wives and families to their
bases, and in this way helped to make the
condition? of war more tolerable.
Great, almost incredible, social changes in
the fishing community and in fishing mi thods
had been brought about by the war, and it was
obvious to students of the fishing enterprise
that some of these changes were merely fore-
runners ot far-reaching alterations that would
be inevitable when the war was over. Men
had developed a wider and more comprehending
outlook, and it was improbable that they would
ever return to the old conditions which governed
the conduct of the industry, especially in the
fleets. The war had severely penalized the
fisherman • but it had brought him into his
own in the way of public recognition and rewarti.
CHAPTER CLXXIII.
THE
RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 19 1 6 :
. • (I) TRANSYLVANIA.
THE STRATEGIC POSITION ON RUMANIA'S ENTRY INTO THK WAR — HER ARMIES THEIR PLAN
OF CAMPAIGN — THE RUMANIAN ADVANCE INTO TKANSYLVANIA — THE ENEMY ADVANCE IN THE
DOBRUDJA ; STOPPED ON THE RASHOVA-TUZLA FRONT — THE GERMAN FORCES IN TRANSYLVANIA
THEIR COUNTER-OFFENSIVE — THE BATTLES NORTH OF THE VULCAN PASS AND ROUND HERMANN-
STADT — THE RETREAT OF THE FIRST RUMANIAN ARMY — THE RETREAT OF THE SECOND ARMY TO
THE PASSES SOUTH OF KRONSTADT — THE RETREAT OF THE FOURTH ARMY TO THE MOLDAVIAN
BORDER — THE CHARACTER OF THE RUMANIAN OCCUPATION OF TRANSYLVANIA ENEMY
FRIGHTFULNESS.
RUMANIA'S intervention in the war
was a historic necessity ; events
were to prove that her entry on
August 27, 1916, was a military
blunder. The additional number of men that
Rumania brought to the Allies was not pro-
portionate to the new extension of the battle
line. Her entry into the war implied an
extension of the Eastern front by about 750
miles ; its length was practically doubled. A
lengthening of the front as a rule benefits the
wide with which lies the initiative. But, from
the middle of August, 1916, the Russians had
been gradually losing the superiority which they
had established during the preceding two
months ; by the end of August the strategic
initiative was no longer with them. Mean-
time in Greece the deadlock continued, and
with it the immobility of the Allies with re-
gard to Bulgaria. Rumania received com-
paratively little support in the first stages of
her campaign ; on the other hand, the enemy-
proved able to raise greater numbers of men,
and to raise them more quickly than had been
generally expected.
In this war of straight, continuous lines, the
position on the frontiers of Rumania could
Vol. XI— Part 136. 197
not possibly have remained one of even balance.
South of the Jablonitsa Pass — where the
Russian battle line touched the Carpathians
the Eastern front presented a fantastic outline.
Transylvania formed a vast enemy salient
between south-eastern Galicia, the Bukovina
(both under Russian occupation) and Moldavia
in the north-east, and Wallachia in the south,
these two fronts enclosing Transylvania like
the arms of an angle of about 60°. But even
more peculiar was the position of Wallachia.
It found itself completely sandwiched in
between Transylvania and Bulgaria ; it enters
like a deep inland bay between these two
countries, the opposite shores facing each
other on long parallel lines. Bulgaria itself
was in turn sandwiched in between Rmnania
and the Salonika armies, threatened by the
possibility of a Russian invasion from the
Dobrudja, and of an advance of the Allies from
their ^Egean base.
This system of stratified fronts and inter-
sandwiched belligerent countries could not
possibly have continued for long. The straight,
short line had to be regained either by an
allied sweep through Transylvania, Bulgaria,
and Serbia, or by an enemy sweep through
198
'llii: TLMKS H1STOKY OF THE WAR.
DORNA VATRA: THE MARKET SQUARE.
Wallachia. It was a shortening of the front
in the sense favourable to the enemy that
was the result of the Rumanian campaign of
1916. The line reached by the troops of the
Central Powers in the beginning of January,
1917, was practically an extension across
Rumania of the Carpathian front in Galicia
and the Bukovina, along which the Annies of
Russia and of the Central Powers had been
facing each other ever since July, 1916. The
new battle-line across Rumania, from Dorna.
Vatra to the mouths of the Danube, was only
about one-third the length of the front which
Rumania had originally added on her entry into
the war.
It was certain from the very outset that the
Rumanian campaign would become a moving
battle. Neither side disposed of anything like
the number of troops required for holding the
line of August 28, 1916, as a continuous front.
The battle had to move — and just as liquids
tend towards the level, so the weaker side in a
modern campaign seeks, when driven into the
open, the shortest possible line on which to
regain a stable balance. As against all the
dead -locks and immovable fronts, at last a
clear field could have been opened here for an
Allied advance, for a seeking of new short
fronts at the enemy's expense. That the field
should have been opened at a most inoppor-
tune moment was the tragic blunder of the
Rumanian campaign. It might have been
foreseen that the enemy would concentrate all
his available forces for an invasion of Rumania ;
indeed, he had no choice in the matter, and
could not possibly have rested satisfied with
merely holding his own frontier. Quite apart
from conquest and booty, it was for him a
question of strategic security and of attaining
an easily defensible short line on this front
for the future. But if the Rumanians were to
meet in an open battle German Armies, even
approximately equal in numbers, they were
bound to find themselves labouring under most
serious disadvantages.
The modern system of entrenchments has
its origin in the need of cover against the
immense destructive power of modern weapons.
It stands to reason that the more elaborate the
defensive system the easier it is to withstand a
superiority of armament. But Rumania, very
inferior to the Central Powers in artillery,
machine-guns, aviation and all the necessary
technical equipment, had to fight a moving
battle. Further, leadership and organization
count for more in strategic advances and re-
treats than in stationary trench warfare. There
is seldom time to retrieve blunders where big
strategic movements take place. Battles are
decisive and rallies are difficult. But Rumania
entered the war under -untried leaders, and
with an untried organization ; generals who had
never seen actual warfare, except perhaps as
youths some 40 years before, had to meet
the best leaders that the experience and selec-
tion of two years of warfare had put at the head
of the German war-machine. It was not
until Rumania's position had become extremely
grave, and for the time being even irretrievable,
that Russian Generals and French staff officers
were conceded a leading part in the campaign.
In August, 1916, the Rumania i front fell
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
191)
into three marked divisions. From Dorna
Vatra, in the corner between Austria, Hungary,
and Rumania, to Orsova, near the meeting
point of Serbia, Hungary and Rumania,
extended on a stretch of about - 380 miles
the mountainous Transylvanian front. From
Orsova to a point some 10 miles west of Tut-
rakan, the Danube intervened on a front of
about 270 miles between the opposing forces.
Lastly, between the Danube and the Black
Sea supervened again a dry frontier, separating
for a distance of about 100 miles the Rumanian
province of the Dobrudja from Bulgaria. It
could be regarded as certain that, at least in the
first phase of the hostilities, the line of the
Danube would not become the scene of any
army disposing of modem engineering re-
sources, and there is no river which could be
directly defended on a stretch of 270 miles
unless very considerable forces were detailed
for that task. Yet on the frontier between
Rumania and Bulgaria the indirect means of
defence were such as to exclude from the very
outset an attempt on either side to open
hostilities across the Danube. Why .should
the Rumanians have gone to the trouble
and taken the risk of crossing the river where
their boats or pontoons would soon have come
under hostile fire, when they had at their
disposal the safe river-crossings of Tutrakan
and Silistria, and the great railway bridge of
Cernavoda, with both banks safely in their
A RUMANIAN FIELD GUN.
serious operations. Below the Iron Gates of
Orsova the river broadens to an average width
of almost a mile and attains a depth of 10 to
15 feet. It flows through a flat, low -lying
valley varying from two to eight miles in
width, and subject to frequent inundations.
On the northern — i.e., the Rumanian side —
the Danube is lined by a long string of lakes
and marshes, which break up the flat clay
surface of the valley and impede the access to
the river. The southern bank rises on almost
the entire stretch steep above the river, forming
rocky cliffs, from which the Bulgarian and
German artillery could dominate the approaches
from the opposite side. There is, of course,
no river which could not be crossed by an
possession ? In fact, the Dobrudja was for
Rumania the bridge-head leading into Bul-
garia. On the other hand Bulgaria, although
she held a dominating position on the banks
of the Danube, could not have risked an invasion
of Rumania across the river, as long as the
flank and rear of the attacking force were
exposed to a counter-offensive from the
Dobrudja. Hence, in August, 1916, of the
three divisions of the Rumanian frontier,
only two counted for purposes of active war-
fare ; there were only two theatres of war — •
Transylvania and the Dobrudja.
In either theatre Rumania required a suc-
cessful offensive to establish a balance in the
strategic position. In this war of railway
200
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
KVI
ON THE RUMANIAN FRONT.
A priest with the advanced line.
RUMANIANS ON THE MARCH IN THE CARPATHIANS.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
201
manoeuvres Rumania found herself under a
serious disadvantage on either front. Along
more than three-fourths of the Transylvanian
boundary the enemy disposed of an excellent
lateral railway running parallel to it, at a
distance which seldom exceeds 25 miles.
In Moldavia the lateral railway on which the
Rumanian armies had to rely ran more than
50 miles east of the frontier. In Wallachia
east of Ploeshti, they h'ad practically no
lateral railway at their disposal— except the
main railway from Bukarest to Craiova which
runs through the centre of Wallachia'and marks
a line resembling the path of St. Paul " when
.the winds were contrary." To give but one
example, which, it is true, shows the position
at its worst : the journey from the Tomos
Pass to the Red Tower Pass, if made on the
Transylvanian side, took one over some
80 miles of rail ; the same journey, if made by
the Rumanian railway, took one over a distance
of about 270 miles ! Though not quite as
bad, the discrepancy was yet very great also
with regard to movements, as between all the
other passes. What this meant from the
strategic point of view in a war in which the
entire line of the frontier could not be held for
lack of forces, does not require elaboration.
In fact, Rumania had never prepared for a
war against Austria-Hungary. During the
last 36 years of King Charles's reign, the country
had practically remained under the patronage
of Austrians and Germans. It was they who
had planned and built its railways. And
although much of the course taken by the
Rumanian railways was due to the configuration
of the ground, very different in Rumania
from what it is on the Transylvanian side,
yet had the Rumanian railways been built
with a view to war, as were those of Hungary,
many inconveniences might have been avoided,
which counted most heavily against our new
Allies in the campaign of 1916.
If it is right to describe the Dobrudja as a
Rumanian bridge-head against Bulgaria, one
must add that, in 1916, it was one of which
the construction had not been completed.
In 1913, as a result of the Second Balkan War,
the frontier between the two countries had
been shifted by some 25 to 30 miles to the
south-wrsi. Before the change the frontier
ran closer to the Rumanian railway leading
from Cernavoda to Constanza than ' to the'
Bulgarian railway connecting Rustchuk with
Varna. But now the distance between the
Rumanian railway and the frontier had become
very considerable. Under the new conditions
it would, therefore, hardly have been possible
for the Rumanians to have taken up an
expectant defensive position along the new
frontier. It is true they had at their disposal
the new railway from Megidia to Dobritch.
But in the way of lateral communication.1-:
they had nothing to put against the Bulgarian
line, now only about 15 to 20 miles distant
from the frontier. Had the Rumanians opened
the campaign by a vigorous advance against
Bulgaria, the possession of the so-oalled New-
Dobrudja might have proved of considerable
value — it placed the Rumanian armies, within
striking distance of the railway system of
North-Eastern Bulgaria. The main centres
of that system were no farther from the
frontier than Silistria. But, if the defensive
was chosen on this front, the newly acquired
ground was dead weight. The Germans de-
scribed Tutrakan and Silistria by the grandil-
oquent name of first-class bridge-heads. As a
matter of fact they were nothing of the kind ;
there were no bridges at all across the Danube
at those places. These were towns offering
convenient conditions for a crossing of the
river by boats, or pontoons, and had they been
properly fortified, they might have proved
of some value. But in reality their fortifica-
tions were practically useless against heavy
artillery. Once Tutrakan and Silistria were
attacked by superior forces, there was little
chance of holding either' place. But these in-
herent difficulties of a defensive warfare in the
Dobrudja do not seem to have been properly
guarded against. There is little, if any, excuse
for the disposition of the Rumanian forces on
the . vulnerable Dobrudja frontier oa the
outbreak of the war.
The Rumanians were throughout decided
in favour of an 'advance into Transylvania.
No doubt in this decision sentimental motives
counted for very much, just as they had
counted for much in the original French advance
into Alsace-Lorraine, in August, 1914. The war
for Transylvania was Rumania's own. war.
Her eyes were fixed on Transylvania, the
home of the Rinnan race, the land of its his-
toric traditions. " Lea Carpaihes sont notre
histoire," wrote one of the greatest Rumanian
statesmen, " les Carpathes sont le berceau de
notre race." Every peasant soldier on entering
Transylvania, when greeted in his own tongue
by his countrymen from over the border,
136—2
•202
Till-: TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR.
RUMANIAN TROOPS AWAITING THE ORDER TO ADVANCE.
could grasp the full meaning of .the war for
liberation and national unity. Even from the
strategic point of view there was more to be
said in favour of that decision than was usually
admitted immediately after the plan had
failed. The Rumanian Headquarters must
have looked with misgivings at the central
position of Transylvania and its magnificent
railway system. If this remained in the
hands of the enemy, how could the Rumanians
prevent an invasion of their own country when
once the enemy had concentrated • sufficient
forces ? How could they escape defeat with
their armies scattered in the many passes,
and the different detachments isolated and
immobilized for lack of proper lateral com-
munications in their rear ? Moreover, the
defence of a mountain-range is by no means an
easy task. " Where a goat can get through, a
soldier can," was a saying of Frederick the
Great : and nowadays the soldier can carry
with him a machine-gun, the most deadly
weapon for enfilading positions. There is
hardly a pass which cannot be turned. People
serin to remember how with a hiindful of
comrades Laonidas held up vast hosts in the
Thermopylae but they forget the rest of t lu-
st ory ; how the Spartans succumbed because
there were not enough of them to hold all
the approaches of the pass. And on tin-
frontier of Rumania, and Transylvania the
number of good, convenient passes is enormous.
It was, therefore, but natural and justified,
even from the strategical point of view, that
the Rumanians wished to take full advantage
of the initiative and to secure in Transylvania
a more defensible position before they had
against them any serious enemy forces. Finally
a grave political miscalculation determined the
course of Rumanian military action. The
Rumanian Government seems to have con- '
sidered it possible to confine the war to the
one front on which Rumania's own vital
interests were concerned. They thought it
possible to avoid war with Bulgaria. They
overrated the freedom of actiort of whatever
independent elements there had remained in
Bulgaria, and they did not see through the
duplicity of the Sofia Court and Government.
The political premises on which the plan of
the Rumanian campaign was drafted con-
tained, therefore, grave elements of error.
At the opening of 1914 the Rumanian Army
consisted of five army corps, and two cavalry
divisions. Each army corps was composed of
two divisions of the line and one reserve division.
The total fighting strength of the Rumanian
Army was estimated at LViO.OOO rifles, 18,000
sabres, (100 modern and 200 older field guns and
howitzers, and 300 machine-guns. During the
first two years of the European war the numbers
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
203
of the Rumanian Army were about, doubled.
This increase was, however, by no means a
clear gain, for it meant also a dilution of skilled
forces and teclmical resources. The circle of
educated men is very narrow in Rumania,
and it was not possible to enlarge the size 01
the military cadres to almost double their
previous size without lowering considerably
the level of efficiency. Still worse off was the
Rumanian Army with regard to equipment.
It was in any case short of heavy guns, machine-
guns, flying machines, field telephones, etc.
Inadequate use could be made by Rumania
of the two years of neutrality, as she was
unable to complete her armaments by her
own resources, and could not receive any
imports from neutrals except through belli-
gerent countries. But what belligerent country
would have strained its overtaxed means of
communication for the benefit of an uncertain
neutral ? Could Russia have been expected
to do so, when she received a great part of her
own war supplies from abroad only by a few
and very roundabout routes ? And if we
discount Germany's allies, it was only by way
of Russia that it was possible to reach Rumania.
Much was done by the Allies after Rumania's
entry into the war had become a certainty.
Yet even so the equipment of her armies
remained very incomplete, and, in addition'
was diluted by the increase in their numbers.
At the time of Rumania's entry into the war,
her forces were grouped into four armies. But
when the Rumanian "Armies" are mentioned,
it ought to be borne in mind that they were
not armies such as were known on the Western
or the Russian fronts. These were merely
groups of about four to six infantry divisions,
with a complement of cavalry and a by no
means overbountiful support of artillery and
technical detachments.
Of the four Rumanian Armies, three were
directed against Transylvania. The First
Rumanian Army under General Culcer and the
Second under General Averescu,* were to invade
* General Averescu was to prove in the ensuing
campaign Rumania's ablest military leader. He
owed his position entirely to his own merits, having risen
from the ranks, which was a most significant achieve^
ment in the era of the " boyar " rule. He was born
in 1859, served in the campaign of 1877 as a trooper,
and received a commission of second lieutenant in 1881,
He received his further military education at Milan, not
in Germany like many of the other Rumanian generals.
In 1912 he attained the rank of General of Division.
He was Chief of the Staff during the invasion of Bulgaria
in the summer of in lit. At the outbreak of the war he
commanded the First Army Corps with headquarters
at Craiova. *.
RUMANIAN OFFICERS SELECTING POSITIONS FOR ARTILLERY.
204
THE TIMES H1STOEY OF THE WAR.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE \VAIt.
205
Transylvania from the south and the south-
east, the front of the First Army extending
from Orsova to east of the Red Tower Pass,
that of the Second Army from the Red Tower
to the Oitoz Pass. The Fourth Rumanian
Army, sometimes referred to as the Army of
the North, under General Presan, with its
right flank joining the Ninth Russian Army
under General Lechitsky, was to enter Transyl-
runs through the Maros valley may bo de-
scribed as the inner base of the. Transylvaniaii
railway system. With it the Rumanians would
have gained a well-nigh impregnable position.
.Moreover, a Rumanian advance into the centre
of the Maros valley would have necessarily
compelled the enemy to withdraw from the
positions on which he was facing the Russian
troops in East Galicia and the Bukovina.
GENERAL AVERESCU,
Rumania's ablest military leader.
vania from the north-east and east. The
Third Rumanian Army under General Asian
was left to guard the Bulgarian frontier.
The common objective of the Rumanian
Armies which invaded Transylvania was the
middle course of the River Maros. It extends
like a chord within the Transylvanian arc and
forms the shortest natural line between the
two extreme ends of Rumania, the north-
western corner of Moldavia, and the farthest
western front of Wallaehia. The railway which
Eastern Hungary would have been lost to the
enemy for good.
At first sight the map of Transylvania pre-
sents itself to the unaccustomed eye as a wild
maze of railways, rivers and mountain ridges.
Yet on closer study the geography of Transyl-
vania is found to be much simpler than at
first appears. Two big rivers, the Aluta and
the Maros, determine the features of the
country. Their sources are close together,
near the middle of Transylvania's eastern
20f,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
RUMANIAN TROOHS IN CAMP.
frontier, approximately opposite the Gyinies
Pass. From thence the two rivers flow in
opposite directions— the Maros to the north,
the Aluta to the south — skirting the eastern
side of the Gorgeny, Hargitta, and Barot
Mountains, which extend north-west-north and
south-east-south. Having reached the flanks
of those heavy mountain ridges, the two rivers
encircle them, and again approach one another.
At the widest point the distance between them
amounts to about 90 miles ; between Maros -
Vasarhely and Fogaras it hardly exceeds 50.
The Aluta now flows mainly west until, near
Hermannstadt, it suddenly turns to the south,
and breaking through the Red Tower Pass, con-
tinues its southward course through Wallachia.
The Maros also assumes below Maros Vasarhely
a predominantly western course with occasional
deviations to the south. Thus, having en-
circled the main mountain-ridges of Eastern
Transylvania, the two rivers flow practically
parallel to each other. In approximately
similar directions run in between the Maros
and the Aluta a few minor streams, which
have their sources on the western slope of the
< 'orfreny-Hargitta-Barot ridge. Of them the
( Ireat and the Little Kokel join the Maros
pJaove Karlsburg, the Haar joins the Aluta
north of the Red Tower Pass. Between
Karlsburg and the Red Tower Pass, where the
Aluta again turns away from the Maros, a
GENERAL CULCER,
Originally commanded the First Rumanian
Army.
depression intervenes between the two rivers,
opening an easy road between their basins.
The railway system of Transylvania naturally
follows the fundamental outlines of the system
of mountains and rivers'. There is first of all
the circular railway of the Maros and the Aluta
Valleys, closed by the branch across the Her-
mannstadt depression. Then there are two
important railways following the Kokel Rivers,
with their termini on the western slope of the
< lorgeny-Hargitta-Barot Mountains. Lastly,
three branch lines following the valleys of
the Weiss, Haar, and of the two other small con-
fluents of the Aluta connect the railway in the
Great Kokel Valley with the Hermannstadt-
Kronstadt line.
In the circular railway line two parts may be
distinguished— an inner and an outer division.
The outer division is the part which faces the
THE TIMES H1STOEY OF THE WAR.
207
Rumanian frontier. It is connected with
Rumania by three railways, one across the
Gyimes Pass, the other across the Tomos Pass,
and the third across the Red Tower Pass:
.Moreover, several lines run from it toward the
Rumanian frontier without direct connexion
on the other side. The outer half of the
circular railway had been planned as a base for
an attack against Rumania. No such attack
could have been effectively undertaken by the
enemy unless the whole of this line was in his
hands. But the loss of the entire outer part
of the railway, from Toplitsa past Kronstadt
to Hermannstadt, would not have interfered
with the enemy's communications with the
interior. Only if the inner part had been con-
quered, if the Rumanians had reached the
Maros valley between Maros-Vasarhely, Knrls-
burg, and Broos, would the strategic basis for
the defence of Transylvania have broken down.
On the Dees-Karlsburg-Hatszeg line, the posi-
tion of the Russo-Rumanian forces would have
become strategically dominant, and no enemy
counter-offensive would henceforth have had
a reasonable chance of success. It would have
had to be conducted over the mighty mountain
wall of Western Transylvania without con-
venient lateral railways and with hardly any
chance for railway manoeuvres.
Such a convenient line for defence was
badly needed by the Rumanians. As pre-
viously stated, Rumania, when she entered
the war, was not yet fully equipped for it,
whilst Russia's military stores, after the
intense summer campaign, were no longer
superabundant. Hence it would have been
of the utmost importance to secure a con-
venient line on which the Allied armies could
have passed to the defensive while replenishing
their stores and completing their armament
for the campaign of 1917.
The Rumanians seem to have set a high
value on the element of surprise. They knew
that the enemv forces in Transvlvania were
CARRYING BARBED WIRE TO THE FRONT.
208
THE ZM.VKN HISTORY OF THE WAP.
small, and they counted on over-running the
country in a short, time. Its entire garrison
consisted of some four or five Austro-Hungarian
divisions under General Ar/, von Straussenberg.
Mn-l of these were composed of buttered units
withdrawn from the Russian frontier (thus,
e-f/., the 61st. Austro-Hungariaii Division,
now posted round Gyergyo-St. Jliklos, had
gone through the Lutsk disaster, and liad been
s-cnt home to recuperate). All tlirough July and
Yet the Rumanian plan for the invasion of
Transylvania can hardly be said to have
iiimed by the shortest routes at, the most,
vulnerable strategical points ; it did not cut
in at the flanks of the basic railway line in the'
central Maros valley, but rather aimed at a
systematic advance over the ground and at
a systematic eviction of the enemy forces.
The. Rumanian troops advancing from the
cast and south-east were to be the driving
AUSTRIAN SENTRIES HOLDING ROADS IN THE "GOLDEN VALLEY" OF
BISTRITZ,
A little to the north of the Rumanian advance in Transylvania.
the first half of August the enemy armies were
fighting a desperate battle on the Somme, in
Volhynia, and in Galicia, and it was not
possible to detail any important forces to
guard the Rumanian frontier. In the first
days of September, 1916, the Hungarian
Premier, Count Stephen Tisza, when attacked
in Parliament on account of the defenceless
condition of Transylvania, answered that the
( < ntral Powers had known Rumania's prepara-
tions to have been incomplete, and, therefore,
had discounted the possibility of her immediate
entry into the war. Count Tisza repeated
this statement in the speech delivered at the
\"w Ycivr reception of 1917, thus long after the
tide of invasion had turned — and for once liis
word may perhaps be accepted. The initial
Itmnanian invasion of Transylvania was thus
i> nice— -or a gamble — as between two condi-
tion^ of unpreparedness.
force, whilst those from the south were to
support them by a flanking movement ; as
the advance proceeded the southern groups
were to join the armies' moving to the west
across Transylvania, thus adding momentum
to their movement. The plan resembled
in its outlines that followed by the Austro-
Gennan forces in Oalicia, in the summer
of 1015, when Mackensen advanced from
west to east, gathering in from across the
Carpathians the armies which were standing
a.t right angles to his own line and were pressing
against the southern flank of his Russian
opponents. The geometrical position of the
Rumanian armies with regard to the enemy
was, no doubt, similar to tluU of the Atistro-
Gcrman forces in <!n.licia in the summer of
1 !)!.">. Yet the application of this plan to the
advance, into Transylvania implied very serious
risks, such as had never confronted the enemy
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
•209
armies in 1915. The Austro-German Armies had
stood along a continuous line, whereas the
Rumanian forces were absolutely insufficient to
keep contact with one another when scattered
over the enormous length of the Transylvanian
frontier. The detachments which entered
Transylvania from the south had, therefore,
to remain isolated groups until reached by the
forces advancing from the east. In other
words, a delay in the advance of the main
body left these flanking groups in an exceedingly
precarious position. The First Rumanian
Army, to which this chiefly applies, advanced
on a front of over 120 miles ! (And even of the
troops originally detailed for that front some
were soon to be withdrawn for the Dobrudja.)
This, of course, does not mean that the First
Army actually scattered along the entire
line. Its forces were divided into three
main groups, each separated from the next
by more than 50 miles of mountain range,
and with no lateral connexions except
some 50 to 80 miles in the rear, in 0he centre
of Wallachia. The group farthest to the west
consisted of a single division, and advanced
against the Orsova-Mehadia railway ; the next
group advanced across the -Vulcan Pass against
Hatszeg, and the third, the strongest of the
three, the Aluta Army-Group under General
Manolescu, through the Red Tower Pass
against Hermannstadt. None of them had
made any considerable progress or had yet
been reached by the forces from the east, when
the enemy counter-offensive came down upon
thorn.
Meantime the Fourth or Northern Army had
achieved fair progress during the first month
of the war, except that no serious headway
had been made by its northern wing", where it
would have turned the position of the Austrian
Armies facing the Russians on the frontier
of the Bukovina. By the end of September,
which marks the high tide of the ' Rumanian
advance into Transylvania, the Fourth Army
had got within some 15 miles of Szasz-Regen,
had passed Parajd, the eastern terminus of the
railway line in the Little Kokel valley, and had
advanced within short distance of Schassburg
in the Great Kokel valley. The Second Army
was meantime approaching Schassburg from
the south and advancing to the west beyond
Fogaras. Measured in square miles the results
were conspicuous, but strategically they added
little to the strength of the Rumanian position.
Also here, in Eastern Transylvania, their
forces were scattered ; they were divided
•between the different parallel valleys on the
western slopes of the Gorgeny-Hargitta-Barot
Mountains, without strategic cohesion which
would have enabled them to defend their gains
against a powerful enemy counter-offensive.
In short, the Rumarfian plan had been only
very partially carried out when this enemy
counter-offensive set in. It was an arch
without the keystone and collapsed under
the heavy blows which were now directed
against it. In estimating the causes of that
failure allowance has, of course, also to be
made for the effects of the early defeats in
(he Dobrudja. The advance into Tran-
sylvania had only just begun when the Tran-
sylvanian armies . were weakened by a with-
drawal of valuable forces to the southern
t heatre of war. Moreover, the ablest Rumanian
leader, General Averescu, had to relinquish
the command of the Second Army when called
upon to re-establish the seriously threatened
position in the Dobrudja.
IN THE VALLEY OF THE BISTR.ITZ,
. TRANSYLVANIA.
!?.&— 3
210
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
RELIEVING A RUMANIAN OUTPOST
IN THE CARPATHIANS.
The declaration of war found the Rumanian
troups massed in readiness along the Transyl-
vanian frontier and awaiting the order to
advance. On August 28 they crossed the
border at some 18 points. In Eastern Tran-
sylvania, the lateral railway in the upper
valleys of the Maros and the Aluta was their
immediate objective. They were advancing
towards it from the Tolgyes and the Brkas
Pass ; along the road and railway which lead
through the Gyimes Pass ; through the Uz
valley, by the road to Oitoz, and along the
mountain paths which cross the frontier near
tin' sources of the Putna and the Xaruyii..
From the south-east the Rumanian columns
were converging towards the old city of Kron-
.st.'idt (Brasso). founded by ji German Knightly
Order towards the beginning of the thirteenth
century. It lies at the southern fringe of a \ erv
wide and rich mountain valley, and is the
junction of five- railways and a network of
high road?. One railway line, crossing the
mo'.inttiiu chain by the Tomos Pass, connects
Kronstiwlt with Ploeshti and Bukarest, whilst
the roads into Rumania spread fan -wise to the
south of Kronstadt. By all these roads the
Rumanians were now advancing, through the
valley of the Buzeu, on the road to Bodzavama,
across the Altschanz, the Tomos and the
Torzburg Passes. From western Wallachia
the Rumanians weie pressing forward through
the Red Tower Pass to Hermannstadt, and
were making along several paths and through
the Vulcan Pass for the important mining
district of Petroseny. In the extreme west
they were pressing forward toward the Cerna
valley and against Orsova.
The advance was rapid, all opposition being
quickly overcome. On the very first day, the
IVth Rumanian Army Corps, which formed
part of the Fourth Army, took prisoners
seven Austro-Hungarian officers and 734 men.
South of Kronstadt, in the Tomos Pass, the
82nd Austro-Hungarian Regiment, composed
of Szekels, a Magyar tribe inhabiting Tran-
sylvania, opposed itself to the Rumanians.
This was a regiment consisting of old, seasoned
troops — as part of the IXth Army Corps,
in the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under
Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, it had gone all
through the Galician campaign of 1915, and
then through the Volhynian disaster of June
1916. But now this was a different struggle.
They fought with desperation, for it was the
battle of their own tribe which they were
fighting. They, the small Magyar minority
which rules Transylvania, were trying to
arrest the advance of the Rumanians who
came to establish the rights of the Rinnan
majority in that country. In spite of their
obstinate resistance, the Rumanians after a
fierce struggle forced their way through the
pass. Very different was the attitude of the
Czech Regiment, which was sent to meet tin-
Rumanians in the Tolgyes Pass — anyone out
to fight their German and Magyar oppressors
was looked upon by the Czechs as a friend.
They withdrew from the pass, opening the
road to the Rumanians, and when again sent
to the front from Maros-Keviz in the Maros
valley, the Czech Regiment — according to a
statement made in the Hungarian Parliament
on September 5, 1910 — " disappeared without
anyone being able to say where they went."
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
211
"Vet, whether opposed or welcomed, the
Rumanians were advancing. In the very first
two or three days of the war they captured
Kronstadt, Sepsi-St. Gyorgy, and Kezdi-Vasar-
hely, thus seizing the whole of the lowlands of
south-eastern Transylvania, the Saxon Burzen-
land as well as the Haromszek (" The Valley of
the Szekels "). The Austro-Huiigariari troops
had also to withdraw from the Upper Aluta
Valley, retiring to fortified positions in the
Gorgeny, Hargitta and Barot Mountains, which,
ranging from 4,000 to 5,000 feet in height, and
covered with dense forests, offered favourable
conditions for defence. By September 9, south
of Toplitsa, the entire valley extending at the
eastern foot of these mountains was in the
hands of the Rumanians. The outer wall of
Transylvania had been scaled, and from the
lateral valley, with its useful road and railwav,
fanwise in different directions — to the east
along the Aluta towards Fogaras, through
the valley of the Haar to Schassburg, to
the north through the valley of the Weiss,
and to the north-west through the Miihl-
bach-Hermannstadt depression towards Karls-
burg in the Lower Maros Valley. A move-
ment along any of these divergent roads,
would have required considerable forces and
a thoroughly organized system of observa-
tion. But here, as also elsewhere, the
Rumanian Army was groping in the dark,
being exceedingly short of flying machines
and aviators, and as to numbers, the First
Army in its scattered condition had never
been fully equal to its task. Moreover, now
that it had already embarked on the invasion
of Transylvania, it was weakened by with-
drawals to the Dobrudja front. It was not
HERMANNSTADT.
the invasion proceeded towards the interior of
Transylvania.
Meantime, the advance from western Walla-
<chia, though far less rapid, seemed at first to
proceed fairly satisfactorily. The Rumanians
had forced their way through the gorge of the
Red Tower Pass, where the Aluta breaks
its narrow path between the rocks, and,
on August 30, reached round Talmesh the
country of rolling hills and flat, wide river
valleys. Beyond Talmesh the Rumanian
advance slowed down considerably. From
her? the roads and railways spread out
until September 10 that the Rumanians
entered Schellenberg, some two miles south-
east of Hermannstadt. Meantime, the enemy
had completely evacuated Hermannstadt, and
had withdrawn to the hills which from the
north dominate the valleys of the Sibiu and
the Haar. From the strong, well-prepared
positions on these hills his heavy artillery kept
the valleys and town under fire, turning them
into no man's land. The Rumanian advance
came here to a complete stop, and hardly any
serious movement against the Austrian posi-
tions north of Hermannstadt seems to have
21-2
Till-: TJMKK HISTOJfY OF THE WAR.
THE TIMEH HISTORY OF THE WAR.
213
been attempted during the fortnight following
on the capture of Schellenberg. Evidently it
was decided to wait for the Fourth and Second
Annies, which were pressing towards Schiissburg
and Fogaras, and whose advance from the
north-east and east would have turned the
enemy positions above Hermannstadt.
In the district north of the Vulcan Pass the
enemy offered from the outset a much more
decided resistance. Here the Rumanians stood
nearest to his vital lines of communication and
their advance to Hatszeg had to be prevented at
all cost. After severe fighting our Allies occu-
pied in the first days of September the important
coal district of Petroseny, and advanced across
the mountains through the Streiu valley to
Merisor. The progress was necessarily slow.
High mountain walls extend east and west. The
road and railway wind along steep terraces and
through narrow gorges ; again and again oppor-
tunity offered itself to the enemy for opposing
effectively the Rumanian advance, especially
as the Rumanians did not dispose of forces
which would have enabled them to execute any
wide flanking movements. On September 10
the enemy attempted a counter-attack, west of
Merisor. He was repulsed, and the Rumanians,
following up their success, gained further
ground, capturing two guns, some machine-
guns, and 305 prisoners. By September 12
they had reached Baru Mare, where the railway
passes over its last big loop and enters a much
wider, open valley ; Rumanian out-posts ad-
vanced even as far as Puj, three miles north-
west of Baru Mare. The hardest two-thirds of
the road to Hatszeg had been traversed by the
Rumanians — but, again, what was the 'use of
the movement when executed by altogether
inadequate forces, and along a line where no
support could reach them from other groups if
they were attacked by superior enemy forces ?
Only some 75 miles to the east of Hatszeg lies
Temesvar, the junction of eight railways, one
of the chief places d'armes of the Central Powers.
Beginning with September 12, .German troops
began to make their appearance in the Streiu
Vallev — the forerunners of the enemy counter-
offensive.
At the farthest western end of Wallachia, the
First Rumanian Division under General Draga-
lina, a Ruman from the Banat, who had received
his earliest military training as a conscript in
the Austro -Hungarian Army, was ordered to
advance against the Cerna line. It was thus
into his own native land, for the liberation of his
nearest kinsmen, that General Dragalina was
leading his troops. On August 28, at 7 a.m.,
the Rumanian batteries opened indirect fire,
across the Allion Mountain, against the forti-
fications of Orsova. During the next few days
severe fighting developed • along the front
extending from Herkulesbad to the Danube
On September 2 the enemy had to withdraw on
to the eastern bank of the Cerna and our
Allies occupied the range of hills wliich domin-
ates Orsova, including Mount Allion (over
1,000 feet high). On the next day they entered
Orsova, forced the passage of 'the Cerna round
the villages of Tuffas, Nagy-Zsupany and
Koromnok, and captured a few more heights.
o ,3, [Sbaroselo
Turk.Smil Si/ahlar
Antimovo
o Oajdir
oMeseMahle
°Den/z/er
B?elitsa
SCALE OF MILES.
2 3 * j
Mhmatlero 0
IP Kasimlar
- forts. Heights in metres.
9/9
APPROACHES TO TUTRAKAN.
A convenient position had been gained at the
narrow gates of the Danube for preventing all
traffic on the river, but nothing more, no ad-
vance of permanent strategic value could have
been effected by a single isolated division
Meantime the enemy had struck his blow in
the Dobrudja. The Bulgarian Government had.
waited for five days before declaring war on
Rumania, until Field -Marshal von Mackensen,
who on August 28 had been put in command of
the enemy armies on Rumania's southern
frontier, had completed both his military and
his political preparations. (The cause of the
sudden death of General Jostoff, the Chief of
the Bulgarian Staff and an opponent of German
dominion over Bulgaria, was not known, but
some bullet-holes were said to have been found
in his body.) On September 1, after four days'
delay, the Bulgarian Government declared war
on Rumania and on the same day enemy troops
began to cross the frontier. The first blow was
directed against the eastern Dobrudja. The
214
THE TI.MKS HISTORY OF THE WAE.
Third Bulgarian Army, under (icnera-l Tosheff,
who had distinguished himself ill the First
I-ialkim \\ ar and Inul commanded a division at
Lulf Burgas, advanced against the Dobriteh-
Haltehik front. Dobritch is an important
centre of roads and railways ; here the new
railway, which runs north and south through
the Dohrudja and connects the Cernavoda-
Constanza line with the Bulgarian railway
system, is met by the branch line from Baltchik.
Through Dobritch run's also the important
high-road which connects Silistria with Balt-
chik. The weak Rumanian forces in this region
were unable to resist the Bulgarian advance,
and on September 4 the enemy entered
Dobritch, whilst on the sea-coast he captured
Baltchik, Kavarna and Kaliakra. The attack
against the eastern Dobrudja was. however,
meant mereiy a? a preliminary movement and
did not involve the main enemy forces. Having
reached a convenient strategic front, the Bul-
garians strongly entrenched themselves north
of the Dobritch -Baltchik line and awaited in
their new positions the arrival of Turkish rein-
forcements, of which the first regiment- reached
them in the first days of September.
Whilst the right wing had thus for its task to
arrest on a convenient front any offensive move-
ments which our Allies might undertake in the
direction of Shumla or Varna, the left wing of the
enemy army was to execute asweep against and
along the Danube, fall on the scattered Ru-
manian forces at Tutrakan and Silistria, capture
that important junction of roads, and thereby
open the way for a further systematic advance
through the Dobrudja. The first attack was
directed against Tutrakan. On September -
the two best Bulgarian divisions (the First and
Fourth), under General Kiseloff, were ordered
to advance from west of Kara Agach past
Kasimlar, Akhmatlar and Mese Male against
the centre of the line of forts which surround
Tutrakan. There were 13 of them, ex-
tending across low wooded heights in n semi-
circle in front of the river. The Bulgarian
operations from the south were supported from
the west by the advance of a mixed German-
Bulgarian force along both sides of the Rust-
chuk-Tutrakan road. The Bulgaro-German
troops attacking Tutrakan disposed of heavy
Anstro-Hungarian siege artillery. During Sep-
tember 3 and 4 the enemy forces gradually
closed in against the line of the Tutrakan forts,
although the western group suffered severely
from the flanking fire of Rumanian batteries
from across the river, and also from the fire of
the Rumanian Danube flotilla. By the night
of September 4/5 the German-Bulgarian troops
had reached the close proximity of the forts
and had gained possession of Height 131. west
TUTRAKAN.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
•215
BULGARIAN TROOPS IN A RUMANIAN
VILLAGE
• of Staroselo, the highest hill in the district.
During the night heavy artillery was moved up
on to the western slope of the hill, and in the*
morning of September 5 began the bombard-
ment of Hill 109 and of Fort 2. Meantime the
Bulgarians had opened their operations on the
right wing. Their attacks, though delivered
with considerable forces and under cover of
superior artillery, were repeatedly repulsed.
At last they scored their first success in gaining
possession of Fort 8, near the village of Anti-
movo, south-east of Tutrakan. On the same
day the Bulgarians succeeded in further en-
larging the breach in the Rumanian defences by
capturing the adjoining Forts 5-7. Similarly,
the German onslaught against Fort 2 met with
tough resistance. Though very inferior in
artillery, the Rumanians held out for hours
under the most violent fire from the German
batteries, repulsing several attacks and vigor-
ously contesting every inch of ground. It was
not until 5.30 p m. that the Germans entered
Fort 2. On the next day the Rumanians
attempted a counter-attack from Hill 62
and Fort 3, trying to break through the enemy
ring, but the steadily increasing Bulgarian
pressure from the east rendered the position
hopeless. The attempt which General Basara-
bescu, who commanded the Ninth Rumanian
Division at Silistria, made on September 5-6
to reach Tutrakan led to no result. The
Bulgarians had previously pushed forward
their screen against Silistria to the Kapakli-
Tchataldja-Alfatar line. They were now
ONE OF SEVERAL MONUMENTS
erected by the Bulgars in memory of Russians who
fell in the War of Bulgarian Liberation (1877).
pressed back and our Allies advanced as far as
Sarsanlar, a place more than 25 miles south-
west of Silistria, and only about 12 miles east
from Tutrakan. But cooperation with the
garrison of Tutrakan was no longer possible.
Nor could any effective help reach it from
beyond the river— the crossing was already
under enemy fire. By the night of September 6
the garrison of Tutrakan had to surrender to
the enemy — the Rumanians had to pay the
first penalty for having scattered their army
in the Dobrudja, and for having assigned
valuable forces to the defence of isolated,
untenable fortifications, instead of concen-
trating them on a strategic plan for the defence
of the entire Dobrudja.
•////•: v/.u/-:s
' OF THE WAI:.
Alexandria 0
v 0
KaraAgach
R azgrgd
B U L GAR. I A
Scalt of Miles. Shuirria
0 5 /O 20 30
MAP OF THE DOBRUDJA.
The exultant Bulgarian and German com-
tnuniquts which were issued on the fall of
Tutrakan claimed the capture of two entire
Rumanian infantry divisions (the 15th and 17th)
of 25,000 unwounded prisoners, of 100 guns,
62 machine-guns, etc. These figures are
exaggerated. As a matter of fact there had
been only one Rumanian division at Tutrakan ;
possibly the civilian population of Tutrakan was
included in the captures to add to their bulk.
Yet however much the enemy exaggerated the
material importance of his victory, important it
was in its immediate consequences, in the moral
effect which it produced, and, lastly, because
it was the first to expose a serious deficiency
both in the Rumanian organization, and in the
cooperation as established between Rumania
and Russia. Within less than a fortnight from
the day which after two years of cautious
hesitation Rumania had chosen for her entry
into the war, she had suffered a serious reverse.
For almost a year Russia had been awaiting
the hour in which she could avenge on the
rulers of Bulgaria the base treachery com-
mitted by them against the Slav idea — and
now no sooner had the road into Bulgaria
hoemed to open before her than it was closed
once more. For the Rumanian retreat could
not have been arrested at Tutrakan.
The garrison of Silistria grasped the lesson
of Tutrakan and evfacuated the town which
would have proved merely another trap for
the- Rumanian troops. On September 9 the
Bulgarians entered Silistria, which had been
theirs until 1913. From the steep rocks which
on the southern bank rise some 200 feet above
the Danube, the hostile eye of the Bulgarian
could now once more survey the flat, fertile
Rumanian plain beyond the river.
But as yet the left bank of the Danube lay
beyond the enemy's reach. His most imme-
diate concern was now to re-establish the
connexion between the Silistria and the
Dobritch groups of his Dobrudja army, between
which a gap intervened of about 25 miles.
The reunion was attempted by means of a
further strong advance. ' The Dobrudja narrows
up towards the north ; the front along the
border as drawn in 1913 is about 100 miles
long, on the Silistria-Dobritch-Baltchik line
60 miles,' whilst between Cernavoda and Con-
stanza the distance from the Danube to the
'Black Sea measures only 30 miles. Quite
apart from the enormous strategic importance
attaching to the Cernavoda bridge, the only
one which spans the Lower Danube,* it was
necessarily the endeavour of the enemy to
* The nearest bridge across the Danube above
Cernavoda was that of NeiiHatzjPoterwardoin in Hun-
gary, about 600 miles up-stream. There was none
below Cernavoda.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
217
reach the shortest possible front. The dis-
organization of the Rumanian forces had
given Mackensen the initial victories. But
although he was receiving all the time fresh
reinforcements he had to reckon with the fact
that the Rumanians were fighting on the
inner lines, that it was only a question of weeks,
if not days, when he would have to meet
strong pressure against, the Bulgarian forces
in the Eastern Dobrudja. But tlie enemy
wheel along the Danube now threatened its
right flank and its rear, and compelled it
.thereby to retire.
On September 1 1 the two enemy groups
re-established contact with each other on the
line extending from KarakiSi, past Alexandria,
KING FERDINAND AND THE CROWN PRINCE OF RUMANIA.
more formidable forces and when he would
have to pass from the attack to the defensive.
He, therefore, pressed with all speed his wheel
along the Danube, until the two wings of the
Bulgaro-German army in the Dobrudja stood
«t right angles to each other. An allied force,
•consisting of the 61st Russian, the 19th
Rumanian, and a Jugo-Slav division, Lad
hitherto fully held in cheek, and even exerted
Arsabla, and Duzbati to Kara Agach. In their'
further advance the Bulgaro-German forces
met, however, with an increasing resistance,
and even with some severe reverses. Thus,
e.g., on September 12, a few Prussian crack
regiments, supported by Bulgarian infantry,
knocked against a Rumanian force between
Lipnitsa and Kara Orman, losing eight guna
and a German princeling who — fa va sans dire —
213
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE QUEEN OF RUMANIA AS NURSE,
Cutting up the dinner of a disabled man.
had displayed in the battle the proverbial
" shining heroism " of his race and rank (rj.
any contemporary German account). On the
same day another sore reverse was inflicted
on the Bulgarians by the Russians and Serbians
on the Bogdali-Tchiflik line. On the next day
again a swaying battle was fought round
Aptaat, about half-way between the Danube
and the Cernavoda-Baltchik railway. Yet all
these were mere rearguard actions. The main
Allied forces were gathering in prepared positions
on the Rashova-Copadinu-Tuzla line, some
nine to twelve miles southfof the Cernavoda-
Constanza railway. This line was reached. by
the- enemy on September 16 and a pitched
battle developed along most of the front.
The news of the defeats in the Dobrudja
could not have failed to produce a deep and
painful impression in Bukarest Government
circles, and some of the measures taken at the
time bear the nmrks of flurry and agitation.
It was decided to continue the advance into
Transylvania. \ ct three divisions were with-
drawn from tin' invading armies which had
lieeii anyhow hardly equal to their task.
Moreover the ablest Rumanian general, Alex-
ander Averescu, was sent to the Dobrudja,
to replace General Asian, who had hitherto
commanded the Third Rumanian Army (some-
times referred to as the Army of the Danube).
Hardly had General Averescu had time to take
in hand the work in Transylvania when he
was thus transferred to a new theatre of war.
only to be sent back to Transylvania about a
month later when, in turn, the position in
Transylvania had assumed a very grave aspect.
The forces of the Allies on the Rashova-Tuzla
line comprised, towards the close of the battle
— considerable reinforcements arrived about
September 20 — eight Russian and Rumanian
divisions and one Serbian division, about
Hi. 1)00 men strong. The Rumanian forces
consisted of fresh forces brought up from
Transylvania, of the 9th Division from Silistria,
the garrison of Cernavoda, and the 19th
Division from the Eastern Dobrudja. The
Russian forces included the greater part of tlu-
47th Army Corps and the Third Cavalry-
Division. The Serbian Division which was
to distinguish itself very highly in the ensuing
ba,ttles, consisting almost entirely of Jugo-Slav
prisoners from the Austro-Hungarian Army,
who, having surrendered to the Russians,
demanded to be allowed to fight on the side of
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
•219
the Entente. Recognition has been made .of
the magnificent bravery and endurance dis-
played by that division both by allies and
enemies. The supreme direction of all the
Allied forces rested' with the Russian com-
mander, General Zayonchkovski. The opposing
forces of Mackensen were about equal in num-
bers, and consisted of three Bulgarian infantry
divisions (the 1st and 4th, and half of the 6th
and 12th), two Bulgarian cavalry divisions,
some smaller Bulgarian mixed units, two
Turkish divisions of infantry, and a con-
siderable number of German regiments properly
distributed as " chaperons " among their
allies ; Austria and Germany supplied the
heavy artillery.
It was in the centre of the Dobrudja that the
two armies joined in the first general battle
for that ancient high-road of nations.
Like a connecting ridge, the high, hilly
tableland of the Dobrudja extends between the
Balkan Peninsula and Southern Russia. The
chain of hills which runs through the Western
Dobrudja and attains its highest point in the
north, in the Baba Dagh Mountains (about
1,700 feet high) is the farthest northern branch
of the Balkan range. Rising below Silistria
to an average of 300 feet above the level of
the Wallachian plain, it deflects the Danube
from its easterly course. The river turns to
the north, divides into many branches and
spreads its waters in the low-lying Rumanian
plain over a belt of land which, with the
exception of the neighbourhood of Hirshova,
is about six to ten miles wide. It is not
until east of Galatz that the Danube turns
again to the east, marking the frontier between
the Dobrudja and Bessarabia. Near Braila
and Galatz, and between Isaccea and Tulcea,
where the Dobrudja Mountains throw out their
last spurs to the north, a few convenient
crossings open over the Danube. These were,
since times immemorial, the gates through
which the nations and armies from the north
had swarmed towards the coasts of the ^Egean.
It was along the high-road of the Dobrudja
that the Roman Emperor Trajan feared to see
the barbaric invaders advance against the
Eastern provinces of his Empire. Between the
harbour of Constanza and the Danube, where
the Dobrudja narrows down to about 30 miles,
he constructed three consecutive powerful
lines of defence, known even now as Trajan's
Wall. Considerable portions of these works
THE RUMANIAN ROYAL BODY GUARD.
•220
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
are still in existence; the entrenchments
;MV 10 to 20 feet high, and are studded through-
out their whole length with fortified camps.
It was through the Dobrudja that the suc-
cessive waves of Goths and Slavs ran up against
the territory of the Byzantine Empire, and it
\vus across it that, in the Middle Ages, the
nrarcst land route led- from the settlements
of the Crimean Tartars to Constantinople.
Since Russia had advanced her borders in 1812
to the river Pruth and to the Delta of the
Danube, it was by the Dobrudja road that
her armies marched to the south, to fight
• for the liberation of the Greek-Orthodox
nations, and especially the Slav sister-nation,
the Bulgarians. In 1828 General Dibitch
" Zabalkanski " * marched through the Do-
brudja against Adrianople, and again in 1854,
during the Crimean War, the Russian Armies,
under Prince Paskievitch, crossed through the
Dobrudja in their advance against Silistria.
The highroad of nations and a temporary
shelter to them, the Dobrudja presented no
attractions which would have made con-
querors choose it for permanent settlements.
The central portion is a regular steppe,' con-
sisting of fine gray sand overlying limestone
rock, with hardly a tree or running water. The
* This title, conferred on him by Tsar Nicholas I.
for his victories over the Turks, means literally " of
beyond the Balkan (mountains)."
rivers lose themselves before reaching the sea.
It is an open country, wherein the human eye
surveys from any hillock a wide tract of land,
desolate and gray like the sea itself. The
northern part of the Dobrudja consists largely
of barren hills. In the east along the coast the
Dobrudja drops towards the sea into flat low-
lands, and is girded by a broad belt of lagoons.
But this no man's land wliich no conquering
nation desired to retain became the refuge of
broken tribes, of small persecuted communities
from the neighbouring States, of fugitive
individuals ; lastly, during the eighteenth and
nineteenth century, of Russia's enemies, especi-
ally of Polish revolutionaries who sought the
help of Turkey or who entered her service.*
To the present day the nationality map of the
Dobrudja remains most fantastically chequered.
" On forlorn shores I have discovered humble
hamlets where Turks dwelt in solitary aloof-
ness," wrote the Queen of Roumania about
the Dobrudja in an article contributed to
The Times of November 2, 1916. "Near
the broad Danube I have strayed amongst
* At the time of the Crimean war, the Polish
revolutionaries and exiles made the Dobrudja the
base of their operations against Russia. They raised
a regiment of Ottoman Cossacks, consisting of adven-
turers of every possible nationality. Their leaders
were Michael Czajkowski, better known as Sadik 1'aslm,
and Akhmet Bey Pulaski, a Lithuanian Tartar. They
stood in close touch with the Polish Committees at
Paris, especially with that of Prince Adam Czartorvski.
SILISTRIA.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
221
tiny boroughs inhabited by Russian fisher-
folk, whose type is so different from that of the
Rumanian peasant. At first sight one recog-
nizes their nationality — tall, fair-bearded giants,
with blue eyes, their red shirts visible from a
great way off. It is especially in the Dobrudja
that these different nationalities jostle together.
Besides Rumanians, Bulgarians, Turks, Tar-
tars, Russians, in places even Germans, live
peacefully side by side." And here and there
one can come across small settlements of
Serbs, Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. They
are all the drift-wood of the storms of history.
The Tartars in the Dobrudja are fragments
of the Golden Horde which withdrew from
Southern Russia when the country passed
under Christian domination. Among the Little
Russians descendants can be found of Cossack
rebels, of the followers of Nekrassoff, and of
the even more famous Mazepa ; among the
Great Russians prevail all kinds of quaint
religious sects, who in the days of persecution
had abandoned their homes — Dukhobors and
Old Believers, Molokans and " Bezpapovtsi "
(" having no priests "). It was in that no
man's land, the home of many various nations,
that armies gathered from many distant
lands were now meeting in the battle for the
great highroad of the Dobrudja.
The objective of the Bulgaro- German troops
attacking the Rashova-Tuzla line was the
Cernavoda bridge and the Cernavoda -Con-
stanza railway. Had they succeeded in
capturing these, they would have cut off
Rumania's access to the Black Sea and Russia's
road to the Balkans. The railway itself is one
of the oldest in the Balkans ; it was built, still
under Turkish rule, by an English Company
in 1860, and acquired by the Rumanian Govern-
ment in 1882. It follows approximately the
direction of Trajan's Wall, and cuts its lines
at several points. The Carol Bridge, which
carries the railway across .the Danube, was
begun in 1895, and was one of the longest
iron bridges in the world ; the cost of con-
structing it amounted to nearly £1,500,000. It
starts on the Rumanian side at Feteshti,
crosses the left arm of the Danube called
Borcea, then the wide inundation plain ; and,
lastly, the main branch of the river, which .at
this spot reaches a normal depth of nearly
100 feet. Th> total length of the causeway,
viaducts, and other approaches across the
marshes, together with the actual bridge
structure, is about 12 miles. A line of forts
GENERAL ZAYONCHKOVSKI,
Commanded the Allied Forces in the Dobrudja.
extends east of Cernavoda, but having been
laid out about the same time as the bridge
itself, by 1916 they had lost all defensive
value. They surround the bridgehead at a.
distance of about three miles, which is wholly
inadequate as against modern heavy artillery.
Unless it was possible to hold the Rashova-
Tuzla line, some nine to twelve miles south of
the bridge and railway, this main artery of the
Dobrudja was lost.
On September 16 the Germans opened the
attack on their left wing between Arabagi and
Cocargea. In the immediate neighbourhood
of the Danube the Balta Bachin swamps
impeded their advance. The attack was
pressed with special vigour north of Enigea,
where the Germans had been able to collect a
very considerable artillery force, and round
Copadinu, along the Megidia-Baltchik railway
line. After the first day of the battle the
German wireless triumphantly announced their
hiving " forced their way " into the Rumanian
lines. Even on September 20 Sofia still per-
sisted in the statement that the fighting along
the entire line " is developing in our favour."
But the German report of the same day ia
chastened in tone, and prepares the public
for reverses. " In the Dobrudja," it says.
222
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
223
*' stubborn fluctuating battles have taken place
with hastily brought up reinforcements. The
enemy is defending himself with great stub-
bornness." Indeed, he was. Throughout the
first four days repeated enemy attacks were
repulsed by the Allied forces, and by Septem-
ber 20, when these attacks were approaching
exhaustion, reinforcements arrived which
enabled General Zayonchkovski to open a
counter-offensive. The Rumanian troops
attacked east of the Megidia-Copadinu-Balt-
chik railway, round Toprosari. The Bulgarian
communique of September 22 "records that
attack, and closes with the reassuring state-
ment that the Rumanians had been repulsed
" in disorderly flight." Curiously enough, the
next daily ration of Bulgarian victories — as
announced on September 23 — has to be located
some 10 miles back, on the Casicci-Enghez-
Karakioi line, and on September 24 fighting
was reported at Mustafa-Azi, still another
five miles farther to the south. Evidently it
was the Bulgarians who were in full retreat.
Soon the retirement became general, and the
defeated German, Bulgarian and Turkish
forces were falling back throughout the Do-
bruflja beyond the line which they had passed
on September 14. The rout of the enemy was
complete. Yet, unfortunately, the Allied com-
manders disposed of no fresh reserves, and the
troops which had stood in the thick of the
fight for the last four or six days were not in
a position to press the pursuit. The enemy
withdrew his line to an average distance of
about 15 miles from the Rashova-Tuzla front,
and took up strong defensive positions in
which he would be able to await fresh rein-
forcements and a favourable opportunity for
a new advance.
Thus, in the first phase of the Dobrudja
fighting, Mackensen had failed to attain his
" crowning mercy." The Carol Bridge and
the Cernavoda-Constanza railway remained
safely in Rumanian hands. Yet the results
which Mackensen had attained were by no
means inconsiderable. He had snatched from
our Allies the initiative in the Dobrudja.
He had reached a strong line hemming in the
Allied troops on a continuous front — this
front being now only half the length of the
original Dobrudja border. He had extended
his line along the Danube south of Bukarest,
thus outflanking Wallachia still farther to the
east. He had deprived any Allied Arm:"s
which might gather in the Dobrudja of
important lines of supply ; in other words,
he had succeeded in circumscribing the Allies'
capacity for military concentrations in the
Dobrudja. Tutrakan and Silistria were of
small importance as fortresses or strategic
points d'appui, yet, with a view to communica-
tions, they would have been of the greatest
value for an army concentration against Bul-
garia. Two Rumanian railway lines touch
the Danube at Oltenitsa and Calai-ashi, opposite
Tutrakan and Silistria. These could now no
longer have sxipplied the needs of an Allied
Army gathering against Bulgaria ; it would
have had to rely exclusively on the Cernavoda-
Bukarest railway, and on the fragments of the
line which was being built between Tulcea
and Megidia. Lastly, by his advance in the
Dobrudja, Mackensen had caused the
Rumanians to weaken their forces in Tran-
sylvania, just on the eve of the Austro-German
counter-offensive.
In Eastern Transylvania the Fourth and
S?cond Rumanian Armies were still advancing.
The troops of General Presan were crossing the
inner mountain wall formed by the Gorgeny-
Hargitta-Barot range, and e,pproaching the
railheads in the Upper Kokel valleys. The
Second Army, under General Crainiceanu,
who had succeeded General Averescu on his
transfer to the Dobrudja, supported them by
a flanking movement from the south-east.
On September 16 the right wing of the Second
Army reached Homorod and Kohalom, and
on the same day the Fourth Rumanian Division
under General Simonescu entered the old
historic city of Fogaras, in the valley of the
Aluta, about half-way between Kronstadt
and Hermannstadt. It was from here that
the Rumanian national hero, Radu Negru,
had started on his victorious expedition
across the Carpathians which led to the for-
mation of an independent Rumanian State
extending to the Danube. But whilst the
advance was thus still continuing in the east
and stimulating popular imagination by the
historic reminiscences which were taken for
good auguries, the first signs of the approaching
storm were rising over the western horizon.
The concentration of German troops had
begun in the Hungarian plain, especially in
the direction of Arad and Temesvar. Most
people had thought that the Germans, having
taken over the Volhynian and also consider-
able parts of the Galician front, and having
22-1
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
TYPES OF RUMANIAN OFFICERS.
lost enormous numbers of men at Verdun
and on the Somnie, would hardly be able to
marshal any considerable forces for an expedi-
tion against Rumania. As a matter of fact,
these forces were obtained, partly from new
formations, but to a much greater extent by
means of the re-organization of the existing
armies which had proceeded, throughout 1916.
During, the first two years of the war each
German division had consisted of four regi-
ments of infantry and one brigade of artillery
(the intermediary formation of infantry
brigades — each comprising two regiments —
uus dropped in the course of the war, partly
in order to simplify the organization, and
partly because economy had to be practised in
the employment of officers qualified to command
big army units). In 1910 the shortage of men
and the steady improvement in the mechanical
means of defence caused and enabled the
Gorman supreme command to withdraw from
each division one regiment of infantry ; the
forces, which had thus been liberated were
funned into new divisions.
Stated in plain terms (lie reorganization
\\iis primarily a change in the relative propor-
tion* of artillery and infantry. It meant that
n weaker accompaniment of infantry was left
in each brigade of artillery, mid that in the
passive sectors of the front, which, after all,
constituted by far its biggest part, the Gorman
commanders had found it possible to thin their
ranks by substituting mechanical obstacles
and machinery for men. In that way the
greater part was built up of the new formations
which were required both in the East and in
the West. The most competent Swiss observers
stated that at the time when Marshal von
Hindenburg was appointed Chief of the General
Staff, there still remained 57 German divisions
with four regiments each. Here, then, was
material for some new 19 divisions, and gradu-
ally, as the fighting was subsiding in Volhynia
and in the West, German troops were with-
drawn from those fronts for Rumania, whilst
Austro-Hungarian troops were brought up
from Galicia, the Western Balkans and the-
Italian front. Tliroughout the. three autumn
months of 1916 one can trace almost continually
the arrival of fresh German and Austrian
units in the Rumanian theatre of war.
The first move in the German counter-
offensive was directed against the Rumanian
force which had crossed the Vulcan Pass and
was advancing along the Streiu Valley towards
llatszeg. The enemy had to secure the
principal railway line, which leads from Temes-
var by Broos (some 20 miles north of Hatszcg)
and Miihlbach to Hermannstadt and Ivron-
stadt from any possible flank attacks, before
lie could undertake operations on a large soj'.ln
against the main Rumanian forces in southern
and eastern Transylvania. On September 15
ii group of German and Magyar regiments
under Lieutenant -General von Staabs advanced
against the positions occupied by the Ruma-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
225
mans on both sides of the Streiu Valley near
Baru Mare, and extending from Barlu to
Mount Muncelului. The enemy, who disposed
of an exceedingly strong concentration of
howitzers and mountain artillery, delivered a
frontal attack, the main weight of which was
directed against the Rumanian left centre,
round Mount Branu. After a whole day of
very severe fighting our Allies withdrew before
the superior numbers of the enemy and his
even more overwhelming superiority in artillery.
" As far as one can say at present," wrote the
war correspondent of the Vienna Neue Freie
Presse from German headquarters in Transyl-
vania under date September 20, 1916, "the
Rumanians generally fight very well. Reports
have reached us from the Hatszeg sector about
Romanian units which, having lost half their
' effectives, still continued the battle. Similar
facts have been observed in other sectors."
The Rumanian retirement from Baru Mare
was carried out with considerable skill and in
perfect order. The main Rumanian line of
communication followed the Hatszeg-Petroseny
railway to the east, and ran almost parallel to
the frontier ; the Hatszeg mountain range
intervenes between the two. At Petroseny the
road and railway turn at an almost straight
angle to the south and cross through the Vulcan
and Szurduk Passes into Wallachia. It was
naturally the aim of the enemy to outflank the
Rumanians in the Hatszeg Mountains and to
reach by a short cut the passes in their rear.
With that goal in view, lie divided his forces
into six columns, which attempted a wide
sweeping movement through the mountains.
But the Rumanians kept their front intact,
and holding on strongly to the main range of
the Hatszeg Mountains, executed a wheel to
the right. Their original front at Baru Mare
ran north and south. By September 19 they
had reached a line extending east and west,
between Mount Tulisini and Petroseny. They
were now standing parallel to the frontier with
all their lines of retreat fully covered. The
wheel on the right wing continued, however,
still farther ; on September 20 the Rumanians
evacuated Petroseny and two days later tha
. enemy reached the Vulcan Pass.
During the night of September 22-23 a new
change supervened in the situation. Tho
Germans seem to have imagined that they had
finished off their opponents, and withdrew
some of their forces to the east, where a big
RUMANIAN CAVALRY.
•2-2IJ
THE TJMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR.
battle was jvist developing round Hermann-
stadt. As soon, however, as an approximate
equality of forces Imd been established, our
Allies ooimter-attaeked in the Vulcan Pass,
iind repulsed the enemy, capturing several
hundred prisoners and seven machine-guns.
At the same time they carried out a successful
outflanking movement from the valley of the
Silu Roinaneseu, which rendered untenable the
enemy's position in the passes. Even more
interesting were the developments on the ex-
treme left Rumanian wing. The wheel in the
centre and on the right wing had for its pivot
the positions in the Tulisini-Muncelului district ;
there our Allies had stubbornly maintained
their ground, thus remaining at a short distance
from the principal German line of communica-
tions in the Streiu Valley. By a new descent
into that valley they now threatened to cut
the communications to the west, in the rear of
the main German forces, which having turned
the corner at Petroseny, were facing south
towards the Vulcan Pass. The position of
September 15 had thus been reversed within a
week. To avoid being cut off in the defiles
south of Petroseny the Germans withdrew in
haste into the Streiu Valley, and concentrated
their forces on their threatened line of commu-
nications, mainly round Merisor, on the northern
slope of the Hatszeg Mountains.
In the first days of October the enemy
resumed his attack north of the Vulcan, and
in view of the events which had meantime
occurred farther east the Rumanians withdrew
to the pass, having previously destroyed the
valuable coal mines round Petroseny.
On September 19 General von Falkenhayn,
late Chief of the German General Staff, took
over the command of the Ninth German Army
which had been concentrated in Southern
Hungary for a counter-offensive against the
llumaniah armies. Besides German troops
withdrawn from the Russian front or brought
up from the interior, the Ninth Army included
;ilso the Alpine Corps which had hitherto been
with the. Fifth German Army at Verdun, and a
number of Magyar regiments, most of which
had gained experience in mountain fighting on
the Italian front. Whilst General von Staabs
was securing the approaches to the Maros from
t he Streiu Valley, the main forces under Falken-
hayn's command proceeded with the next task
in hand, and advanced against the strongest
detachment of the First Rumanian Army, the
Aluta Group round Hermannstadt. The
Rumanians were to pay once more the penalty
for having dispersed their forces, and were to
suffer again from the deficiencies in the
equipment and organization of their intelligence
service. Falkenhayn, disposing of much
superior forces, succeeded by quick movements
across the mountains in outflanking and sur-
rounding our Allies in the Sibiu Valley. It
was not until a very late hour that the neces-
sary counter-measures were taken, and then
it was only owing to the determination ;nicl
resourcefulness of some of the commanders
and to the splendid heroism of the Rumanian
peasant-soldier that a most serious disaster was
avoided. Yet the losses in men, and still more
in material, which our Allies suffered in that
unequal battle north of the Red Tower Pass,
were considerable.
The main Rumanian positions north of the
Red Tower Pass extended east and west,
with Schellenberg for their centre. To the east
they reached Porumbacu, in the Aluta Valley.
on the road and railway to Fogaras ; in t he
centre they extended to Height 566 and the
Grigori-Warte (601 metres) north-east of Her-
mannstadt ; in the west to the Szecsel-Orlat-
Poplaka line. A gap of about 15 miles
intervened between the extreme right wing of
the Aluta Group round Porumbacu and the
vanguard of the Second Army, west of Fogaras.
Similarly the left wing of the Aluta Group west
of Hermannstadt, had no connexion either to
the west or to the south. The two wings
extended like the branches of a tree— their
stem being the road and railway through the
Red Tower Pass. More than 10 miles of high
mountains intervened between the Rumanian
positions on the Schellenberg-Orlat front and
the Rumanian frontier. No Rumanian forces
of any importance had been moved into that
vital district in the rear of the left wing of the
Aluta Army, and on the left flank of the Red
Tower Pass, and even the placing of proper
outposts seems to have been neglected.
The plan on which the Germans carried out
their operations against the forces of General
Manolescu was very simple. They advanced
in three groups. On the wings two groups
were thrown out, like arms, encircling the
Rumanians; the column advancing from the
west was to cut their line of retreat through
the Red Tower Pass, whilst the eastern column
was to step into the gap between the First and
the Second Rumanian Armies and prevent any
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
227
relief reaching .the troops north of the Red
Tower Pass froia Fogaras or their retreat in
that direction. By the time that both these
encircling det achments should have reached their
assigned positions, the bulk of Falkenhayn's
forces was to open from the north and west an
attack against the entire line of the Aluta
Army.
The Alpine Corps, under the Bavarian
General KrafEt von Delmensingen was chosen
for the encircling movement from the .west.
provocation. It was this lad? of experience
in mountain warfare wliich accounted for
many blunders committed by the Rumanians
during the invasion of Transylvania, and in
particular for some of the sad omissions in the
disposition of the forces north of the Red
Tower Pass, and also for the ease with which
these forces let themselves be surprised by the
encircling march of the Alpine Corps across
the mountains.
The date fixed for the general attack against
WITH THE RUMANIAN ARMY: CLEARING UP AT A CAMP.
A rapid march across high mountains was
essential to the success of their enterprise.
The Corps, consisting mainly of Bavarian
highlanders, trained and used for mountain
operations, was admirably equipped for its
undertaking. The Rumanians, on the con-
trary, were neither equipped nor trained for
mountain warfare, nor had they as yet any
serious experience of it. In the days of King
Charles no one thought of the possibility of
war against Austria-Hungary, and since 1914
rnanreuvres on a large scale in the mountains
on the Transylvanian frontier could not be
undertaken for fear that they might be con-
strued by the Central Powers as a threat or n,
the Orlat-Hermannstadt-Porumbacu front was
September 26. On September 22, a strong
detachment of the Alpine Corps was pushed
forward from Reussinarkt to Szelistye, as a
guard on the left flank of its main forces, which
had meantime started their inarch across the
mountains. Their path led by Sinna, across
Mount Guga (about 4,500 feet) and Varful
Strimba (almost 6,000 feet) to the foot of Mount
Cindrelul. This point was reached by the night
of September 23-24 without any resistance
having been encountered. On the next day the
advance was continued across difficult ground
and by bridle paths. It proceeded due south
until Mount Strefflesci was reached near the
228
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Uumiinian frontier. From here the advance
assumed an easterly direction. But a screen
was thrown out towards the Rumanian frontier
which on the line Mount IS.'il) to Mount Robu
\vus to protect the flank and rear of the Alpine
( 'cirps against any sudden attack from the south.
On Mount 1850 the first serious encounter was
fought with Rumanian forces on September 25.
Another screen in the Gauszoru mountains
covered the left flank of the advancing troops.
Meantime the bulk of the German forces reached
'.Mount Negovanul during the night of Sep-
tcinbrr 24-25, and towards the close of the
following day they deployed on the Prejba-
Varful Mare front, about 10 miles east of the
Red Tower Pass. On the assigned day — Sep-
tember 20 — the Alpine Corps attacked the pass
itself, reached both its ends, occupied' the
mountain spurs which dominate it from the
west, and took up positions on Mount Murgasu
on the Rumanian side of the border. Near
Cain?ni, at the southern end of the pass, they
.succeeded towards the night in cutting the
railway line which connects Hermannstadt
with Rumania.
The German column which was to encircle
the Army Group of the Aluta from the east, was
l';icrd with a more difficult task. In its advance
across the mountain ridge which separates the
valley of the Haar from that of the Aluta, it met
with determined resistance. Still its superior
numbers enabled it to force the crossing of the
Aluta at Colun and to interpose in that district
an effective barrier between the First and the
Second Rumanian Armies.
On the night of September 26 the German
artillery began its preparation for an infantry
advance ; the bombardment continued through-
out the night and in the chosen sectors chang< •( 1 ; 1 1
5 a.m. on the following day into a hurricane fire
of the greatest intensity. The attack proceeded
from two directions. On the western flank
Falkenhayn pushed forward very considerable
forces, including some of the best North
German regiments against the left Rumanian
flank, in an attempt to roll it up towards the
east, whilst in the centre a powerful blow was
delivered from north of Hermannstadt against
Schellenberg, Heltau and Thalheim, with
Talmesh for its ulterior objective. It was to break
up the Rumanian front and throw the broken
forces to the south into the mountains, where
they were to be finished off by the Alpine Corps
and the troops which advanced from the west.
AIRING GRAIN IN PART OF THE DOBRUDJA PREPARATORY TO REMOVING IT.
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAI.
229
I
.
WITH THE RUMANIAN ARMY: AN OUTPOST IN A CAVE.
The extraordinarily tough resistance of the
Rumanian infantry frustrated the execution of
the plan. The Rumanians were by now aware
of their critical position, and the order was given
for a general retreat in a south-easterly direc-
tion. But strong rearguards were covering the
movement. On the right wing the villages of
Szecsel, Orlat, Guraro and Poplaka had to be
captured by the Germans one by one, and bitter,
swaying battles were fought in their streets.
Similarly the heights of the Obreju, Cipara and
Valare were defended with skill and determina-
tion, and the Germans themselves give a tribute
of praise to the Rumanian troops which fought
in that district.
Nor did the advance in the centre proceed
with the expected rapidity. It was not until
September 27 that the German and Magyar
forces captured the Grigori-Warte, whilst on
their left other regiments were slowly making
their way through Thalheim, Baumgarteii
and Kastenholz towards Talmesh. Naturally
in their withdrawal from the encircled positions
I he Rumanians suffered considerable losses.
Not every detachment received the order to
retire whilst this was . still possible. Even
beyond Talmesh the retreat was by no means
easy. The strenuous endeavours of fresh
Rumanian forces to break from the south the
bar which closed the Red Tower Pass to the
retreating Army Group of the Aluta did not
succeed in freeing that highway, though they
did much to facilitate its retreat to the south-
east. The Second Army in the Upper Aluta
Valley could not get up sufficient numbers in
time to open the. road to the east. It forced
its way as far as Porumbacu, but by that time
the Rumanian detachment, which had stood
there on the extreme right wing of the Aluta
Group, had been forced by the enemy to retreat
to the east — and the German forces continued
to separate the two armies. The pressure
which the Rumanian armies were meantime
exerting in Eastern Transylvania had hardly
any bearing on the battle round Hermannstadt.
'• The distance was such that whatever their-
progress might have been it could not have
affected the issue of the battle. Only by the
mountain roads east of the defiles were the
troops of the Aluta Group able to break through
the encircling grip and regain their connexion
with Wallachia. The movement was carried
out with remarkable skill and in good order.
During their retreat to Caineni through the
•230
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ii Valley the Rumanians even succeeded
in c-nptiirini' :tOO prisoners. The battle round
lleriuitnnstadt is summarized in the Romanian
official fonii/unii'i/iK' 'i< September 30: "Our
ROCKS OF TRAJAN, ON THE ALUTA.
troops at Hermannstadt, attacked on all
sides by superior enemy forces, after fighting
which lasted three days, re-established their
. communication with the south, repulsing the
enemy who was attacking from that direction.
Our troops retired southwards." The enemy
reports, and still more the more or less fan-
tastic descriptions of the battle supplied by
enemy correspondents and military exports,
suggest, or even explicitly state, that the
Army Group of the Aluta was annihilated in
the battle and that it never succeeded in
reaching again Rumanian soil. " The number
of prisoners is increasing hourly, while tho
booty is enormous," was the suggestive an-
nouncement made from Vienna on September
30 But then when definite figures are
mentioned in the Berlin report of the next day
— though even these figures are left conveniently
round — one finds with amazement that the
total captures claimed were 3,000 prisoners
and 13 guns, whilst the "enormous booty"
consisted mainly of railway rolling-stock and
laden wagons which naturally could not have
been withdrawn once the retreat along the
railway line was cut. It was an extraordinary
position in which the Rumanians had let
themselves be caught round Hermannstadt,
but the manner in which they fought when
surrounded and in which they finally extricated
themselves does honour both to the com-
manders and to the troops.
" In Transylvania tho Rumanian troops
advance with circumspection, systematically
fortifying tho positions pained," wroto Tin'
correspondent from Bukarest. undor
da? i- of September 25. "An effort is being
made to straighten and shorten the front."
Tin- district round Schiissburg seems to have
been chosen for the common objective. As
far as the- First Rumanian Army was concerned,
this effort at concentration was clearly belated,
and its attempts in the direction of Holzmengen
had made but very slight progress, when it
found itself engaged by the bulk of Falken-
hayn's forces. But the other two armies con-
tinued their advance towards Schassburg and
scored several fine successes before the change
wrought in the general situation by the Battle
of Hermannstadt compelled them to recast
their plans. In the last days of September
tho Rumanian Army of the North reached
the district of Libanfalva, about 10 miles east
of Szasz-Regen, and Parajd, the terminus
of the railway line which follows the valley
of the Little Kokel. F.ven more marked was
tho advance on both sides of the Great Kokel
River, where the Berlin report of October 2
admits the Rumanians to have "gained ground."
'* The struggle continues in the Gorgeny and
Hargitta Mountains," says the Rumanian
official communignS of the same day. " We
took 11 officers and 500 men prisoners and
captured four machine-guns." On the next
day further progress was made beyond Szekely-
Koresztar and 14 officers and 1.228 men wen-
taken, whilst the Second Army, advancing on
the front Gross Schenk-Bekokten-Henndorf,
captured 800 German prisoners and eight
machine-guns. A line drawn approximately
through Libanfalva, Magyaros (west of Parajd),
Szekely-Keresztar, Henndorf and Bekokton
was, however, to remain the high-water mark
of the Rumanian advance in Eastern Tran-
sylvania, for the Ninth German Army, now
about 12 divisions strong, was quickly
advancing towards the east. Moreover, tho
few Austro-Hungarian divisions under General
Arz von Straussenberg, which at the end of
August had been scattered throughout Tran-
sylvania, had by the beginning of October
received very considerable reinforcements and,
as the southern front was now taken over by
the Germans, were all concentrated on the
western slopes of the Gorgeny -Hargitta Moun-
tains. They were formed into a regular com-
pact army, and henceforth were described as
the First Austro-Hungarian Army.
Leaving behind the Alpine Corps in front of
I he Red Tower 1'ass, and also sufficient forces
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
231
to hold the mountain range, Falkenhayn
directed the bulk of his army to the east, along
the roads which lead to Fogaras and Schass-
burg. As previously stated, during the battle
of Hermannstadt the Second Rumanian Army
had attempted to reach the encircled Rumanian
group by marching down the Aluta Valley, and
it had forced its way as far as Porumbacu,
25 miles west of Fogaras. The move was bold
and risky. It implied an enormous lengthen-
ing of the front and an advance along a narrow
corridor from which the Rumanians could not
have withdrawn, otherwise than by retracing
their steps. From the south they were closed
in by the impassable chain of the Fogaras
Mountains, rising in height about 8,000 feet ;
on the northern side the enemy occupied the
parallel valley of the Haar. After the Army
Croup of the Aluta had effected its retreat into
Wallachia there would have been no sense in
•clinging on to the isolated advanced positions
round Porumbacu. The left wing of the
Second Army was, therefore, quickly drawn
back towards Fogaras. Before the advance of
very much superior German forces the town of
Fogaras was evacuated on October 4. The
retreat became universal. The Fourth and the
Second Rumanian Armies were still in touch
in the district of Szekely-Udvarhely, yet it was
clear that if the retirement was to be continued
still farther — which it had to be — the connexion
between them could not be maintained for
long. Their natural lines of retreat were
divergent ; the Second Army had to fall back
along the roads which cross the frontier range
south of Kronstadt, between the Torzburg
Pass to the Buzeu Valley, whilst the main
body of the Army of the North had to with-
draw to the east, covering in its retreat the
Gyimes, Uz and Oitoz Passes. . On October 5
the right wing of the Second Army stood
south-east of Szekely-Udvarhely in the Homo-
rod Valley, the centre covered in the valley of
the Aluta, between Heviz and Sarkany, the
access to the mountains of the Geisterwald, the
left wing extended from Sarkany to the
mountain group of Scortia (about 6,400 feet
high), on the Wallachian frontier. The further
retreat of the Second Army had to be a wheel
to the right to the Zernesti-Kronstadt-Sepsi
St. Gyorgy line, and finally on to the frontier
range and passes.
TURKISH PRISONERS OF THE RUMANIANS.
-.332
THE TIMES HISTORIC OF THE WAP.
The ruemy advanced in three groups. On
October ;"> his left wing, formed by a strong
group of German divisions, engaged the Ru-
manians near Reps (in Magyar : Kdhalom), and
from here forced its way through the Geistcr-
wald against the Barot-Xussbach line. In the
centre a mixed German and Magyar column
advanced in the direction of Vledeny and
Weidenbach. In the south a third and
purely German group marched past Vadu,
along the valley of the Sinca and across the
Persanerwald by Polana Morulia against the
Torzburg Pass. The Rumanians offered a
determined resistance along the western edge
of the Geisterwald and the Persanerwald, but
by the night of October 5 had to withdraw on
to the mountainous plateau which, about
15 miles wide, covers the approaches to the
plain round Kronstadt. The retreat across
that plateau, covered with woods or heather,
was effected amid continuous fighting. Under
the strong pressure from the southern German
column the left Rumanian wing separated
from the centre and receded to the sovith
towards the Torzburg Pass and the' La Omu
mountain group. On October 8 the enemy
entered the town of Torzburg. Meantime the
main forces of the Second Army had withdrawn
on to the Sepsi St. Cyorgy-Botfalu-Kronstadt
line. On the night of October 7 the western
suburbs of Kronstadt were entered by tho
\iiuuuaril of the German-Magyar group, which
advanced from the direction of Weidenbach.
On the following day a battle developed in the
plain north of Kronstadt, where the railway
line running towards the north in the direction.
nf Foldvar, marked approximately the dividing
line between the Germans and the Rumanian
rearguards. The bulk of the Rumanian Army
was on October 8 in full retreat towards the
frontier, but the troops detailed to cover the
withdrawal were still gallantly counter-attack-
ing near Szent-Peter, or holding the barricades
in the streets of Kronstadt. In this battle
round Kronstadt the Germans claim to have
captured 1,175 prisoners and 25 guns. By
October 10 the frontier range had been reached
by the Rumanians on the entire front south of
Kronstadt. During the last stages of the
retreat beyond Kronstadt the enemy was not
even in touch with the Rumanian troops, and
our Allies carried out the movement quietly
and without the smallest demoralisation in
their ranks. They withdrew to positions
which were about 12 miles from the summit
of the frontier range. With that retirement
closes the Rumanian invasion of Southern
Transylvania. The official communique issued
at Bukarest on October 11 speaks of fighting
near Crasna in the valley of the Buzeu, near
the village 'of Altschanz, north of the pass
bearing the same name, north of the village of
THE FOGAKAS VALLEY,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
283
THE FATE OF TWO SPIES: THE
PRIEST'S LAST OFFICES.
Predeal in the Tomos and near Moecui in tho
Tor/.burg Pass. The battle for the roads into
Wallachia had begun.
The, Fourth Rumanian Army under General
Presan, though nowhere seriously pressed or
threatened by the opposing troops of General
Arz, had to conform with the retreat of the
Second Army. About October 5 it began its
withdrawal to the east along the entire front
extending over some 50 miles from Ratosnya
in the Upper Maros Valley to the heights south
of the Great Kokel River. On October 7 the
town of Szekely-Udvarhely was evacuated.
During the next three days the . Rumanians
recrossed the Gorgeny and Hargittn Moun-
tains, and on October 10 withdrew to the
eastern banks of the Upper Maros and the t'ppcr
Alutti. By October 14 the Army of the North
had almost everywhere reached the Moldavian
frontier, having effected its retreat in the best
order and suffering only quite negligible losses.
Also on the eastern borde*1 of Transylvania the
battle from now onwards wivs fought tit the
gateways of Rumania.
On October 14 an. official statement was
published in Bukarest concerning the captures
of prisoners by the Rumanians since the out-
break of the war ; their number \vas 103 officers
and 14,911 men.
During the fortnight which marks the close
•of the expedition into Transylvania some HC\V
changes were made in the highest commands of
EXAMINING
PAPERS ON
ROAD.
A RUMANIAN
the Rumanian Army. On October 9 General
Averescu was recalled to his former post on the
Transylvanian front, his place in tho Dobrudja
being taken by his Chief-of-Staff, General
Christescu. On October 11 General lancovescu,
0110 of the ablest Rumanian officers, was
appointed Assistant to tho Chief of the Gtneral
Staff, whilst his previous place of Secretary -
General to the Ministry of War was filled by
Brigadier-General G. Burghele. (General lan-
eovesc.u had succeeded at the War Office General
lliescu, who at the outbreak had been put at
the head of the General Staff.) On October 24
General Culcer, Commander of the First Army,
was replaced by General Ion Dragalina, who
had greatly distinguished himself m tho pre-
ceding operations, and Culcer's Chief-of-Staff,
General A. Lupescu, was replaced by Lieu-
tenant-Colonel C. Gavanescu. About the middle
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
of October the French military mission under
C.'H-ra! Berthelot arrived in Rumania to
reinforce and advis ) the Rumanian < ieneral
Staff. General Berthelot himself was one of the
most distinguished French commanders, and his
arrival was gr eted with the gr.-atest joy
throughout Rumania.
For seven week Transylvania was the scene
of military advances and withdrawals. The
GENERAL IANGOVESCU,
Assistant to the Chief of the Rumanian
General Staff.
Rumanian and the Austro-Hungarian armies
moved forward and re reated over land claimed
by Rumania, but remaining as yet tinder the
Hapsburg scept e. What was the attitude of
these armies with regard to the population of
Transylvania ?
Th ) districts first entered by the Rumanian
armies are largely inhabited by non-Ruman
races. In the east, along the Upper Maros and
the Upper Aluta and in the plain of Haromszek,
extend the settlements of the Szekels, a Magyar
tribe, the worst enemies of the Rumanian
nation. They, a small minority, play tin-
masters in Transylvania, and rule with a heavy
haivl and a bitter hatred the three million
Humans who inhabit mainly the central and
western part of the country. In the south,
between Hermannstadt and Kronstadt, the
descendants of the old German colonists,
generally described as " Saxons," form n
considerable proportion of the population. The
Rinnans scattered also in these parts of Tran-
sylvania naturally welcomed their fellow-
countrymen and liberators. The Germans
preserved an attitude of sly neutrality. But
the Szekel civilian population, without any
provocation, in many places treacherously
attacked small scattered groups of Rumanian
soldiers. This fact was not merely admitted,
but even quoted with praise in the Magyar
Press — e.g., in the Pesti Naplo of September 1,
191(3. Yet nowhere did the Rumanian com-
manders take to reprisals or go beyond fighting
and disarming the civilians who offered them
active resistance. Wherever the Rumanian
troops advanced proclamations were published
promising safety and protection to all inhabi-
tants, including the Jews, without distinction
of nationality. And when the time had conn-
to withdraw no damage was done by the
Rumanian armies to the property of civilians,
even if they belonged to the hostile tribes of
Szekels and Saxons. Even enemy papers had
to admit the orderly character of the Rumanian
occupation. Thus the correspondent of the
Vienna Neue Freie Presse, who visited the
parts of Transylvania wliich had been
evacuated by the Rumanian armies, stated in
its issue of October 4, 1916, that he had nowhere
seen any farms owned by Szekels or Germans
which had suffered destruction during the
occupation or retreat.
The Hungarian methods were very different.
As soon as the Magyar authorities had
recovered from the sudden shock of the
Rumanian invasion, a carefully thought out
scheme was set on foot for the " evacuation
of the districts likely ' to come under enemy
occupation. No Rumans were to be left behind
to welcome or help their brethren from across
the border. The Szekels or Saxons (except, of
course, men of military age) were left free to
remain behind or to withdraw with the Austrian
armies, and no damage was done to their
property. I3ut the Human peasants were com-
pelled to accompany the Austrian troops, and
if they refused their houses find farms were set
on fire. Moreover, hostages were taken from
among the leading Rumans of Transylvania to
be held responsible for any untoward incidents
which might occur in the country during the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Rumanian invasion. The Bukarest Universul
of September 16, 1916 (N.S.), published a
proclamation issued by he Austro-Hungarian
military commander of Fogaras under date of
September 6. The popula ion was warned
against committing any acts of espionage, high
treason or revolt, and the announcement was
made that should any such incidents occur
Dr. Nicolas Sherbaii, a Human who represented
Fogaras in the Hungarian Parliament, would
be immediately put to death. Together with
him were detained a few leading Ruman priests
and other Ruman notables of the district.
As yet the enemy had nowhere advanced on
to native Rumanian soil (the Dobrudja, that
land of no nationality, may be left out of
account), as yet his armies could not teach
Rumania their usual lesson of frightfulness.
Air-raids were so far the only weapon of
frightfulness which the Germans could
effectively employ against. Rumania. They
made of it the fullest and most criminal use.
Bukarest lies so near the Bulgarian frontier
that not only Zeppelins, but also Taubes, could
easily reach it. The Rumanian air service
was extremely weak, and whatever machines
and flying-men there were, were required for
the front. Especially towards the end of
September, having made sure through spies
that no French or British aviators were in the
town, the Germans organized a regular system
of raids and murder. A vivid picture of those
days was given in letters written by an English
lady who worked in a Bukarest hospital, and
published in The Times of October 26, 1916 :
To-day I drove to the hospital with Mrs. C. and my
other girl nurse (writes the correspondent under date of
September 27). It was 3 o'clock on a lovely sunny day.
We got to an open market place, and noticed that all
the people were looking up ... and then, for half-an-
hour we were really in it ! For there were six Taubes
overhead, all dropping bombs.
We bought our cheese quite calmly in the market,
and drove on. As we neared the hospital shrapnel
began to fall and bombs all round. I picked up one
man wounded and unconscious, and took him on with
us in the motor. A woman was killed at the gate
of the hospital, and another man died on the doorstep.
We went in and settled down to work. We had three
operations between 4 and 7, and were just going home
when men on stretchers began to come in from the
different parts of the town where bombs and shrapnel
had fallen. I wired home not to expert me till they
saw me, and we worked on till nearly 9.30, till all the
operations were over. I've never had such a nightmare
day, but we finished them all. The other hospitals
were all full up, too, and the wounded were all over the
town. The casualties were 30 dead and over a hundred
wounded, for the streets were crowded when the Taubes
came. The beasts flew round and round, hardly a
((uarter of the town escaped. I got home to find that
A. and a lot of others had stood in the garden and
watched ; five big pieces of shrapnel fell there, and yet
the silly people stayed. I have collected the pieces,
and shall have them decorated with silver bands. A.
consents not to do it again, but he was so interested,
and says it was such a fine sight that he couldn't resist
it !
One couldn't be excited in the hospital, there was
no time. If a doctor is cutting off things and calls
out " panaement ! " or " aqua lactea I " like a pistol
at your head, you somehow find it, even if you don't
know what it is ! One just works without realizing
at all what one is doing. After it was all over we
collapsed and sat in the hospital model kitchen with
the petrol-cooking lamp and drank hot tea and "zwicka "
and tried to recover. I don't feel it's over yet. We
GENERAL GHRISTESCU
Commanded the Rumanian Forces in the Dobrudja
after the transference of General Averescu
to the Transylvanian Front.
shall have the beasts before morning again : they
have only half an hour to fly for more bombs, but
twice in 24 hours would be too much for one's nerves.
They came last night, too, you know, but I was too
tired to get up for them.
SEPTEMBER 29.
Well, you'll think T am romancing, but they came
again last night — six Taubes — that's three times in
24 hours ! . . . Yesterday already seems like a dream
except for the fact that we helped to save lives, and
that's all that seems to count. In the market, people's
arms were blown off, and one man's head ; 20 women
and children lay dead in the Hospital Colce.
SEPTKMBER 20.
It's nearly 8 o'clock and we've had 12 hours' peace.
. . . Three of the poor legless fellows died. ... I am
trying to console myself with the one remaining who
will recover. Apparently a Zepp comes at night
and the six Taubes by day. The bombs behave
differently and procedure is different when avoiding
236
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
WRECKAGE OF A GERMAN AEROPLANE SHOT DOWN BY THE RUMANIANS.
11 Zepp or a laube. The latter bombs are .small and
pointed and timed, they pierce the floor, and explode
downstairs ... so you go up. The Zepp bombs
explode on contact — so at night you go down. By
day one has time to decide, as one can watch the ap-
proach— by night we sleep in our bedrooms and trust
to luck. So far we have been lucky. They — the
'•;jfiny — were undoubtedly well informed by spies,
t'Ue they would not have come when ail our airmen were
away. They are scared of the French airmen, and cowards
at heart.
My nerves are a little off colour to-day. It's seeing
the wounded that does it. A child was killed in our
street. We had apparently five bombs in the hospital
grounds — it has upset the patients, of course, but
then the noise of the machine-guns alone is enough
to do that. The hospital you were in has had three
people killed in it.
And with it all the weather is divine. It's really
not the bombardment that has upset me, but all the
horrors I've seen. One poor chap with both legs oil'
sat up on his bleeding stumps, saying. " Thank God.
I'm alive." No bombs have fallen on the interned
Germans, which i.s significant of spy work. I think
that the Red Cross flags should come down off tli"
hospitals, for I'm sure that the Taubes try for them.
SEPTEMBER 30.
To-day was simply very amusing. They came — six
Taubes — and they were chased all over the town, and
didn't dare drop a bomb. One of the Taubes flew
back, t.nd I missed seeing it shot down, for I had to
stay with the helpless, who get very nervous.
The French aviators had come back, and soon
some British aviators arrived from Salonika and
the yEgean Islands, and Bukarest ceased to be
the happy hunting ground of the Knights of
the Iron Cross.
CHAPTER CLXXIV.
ITALIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE
CARSO, AUGUST-DECEMBER, 1916
WAR WITH GERMANY.
MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1916 IN THE TRENTINO — GENERAL
CADOHNA'S PLANS POSTPONED' — PREPARATIONS FOR THE ISONZO OFFENSIVE — THE FIGHTING OF
AUGUST 6 — GREAT ITALIAN ADVANCE — FALL OF GORIZIA — ADVANCE ON THE CARSO — RESULTS OF
TWELVE DAYS' FIGHTING — FURTHER ITALIAN OPERATIONS AND GAINS IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER
— LAST PHASE OF THE CARSO OFFENSIVE — OTHER OPERATIONS — ADVANCE UPON THE FASSA ALPS —
MILITARY PROGRESS' IN 1916^-lTALY AND THE BALKANS — ITALY DECLARES WAR ON GERMANY.
THERE was a great deal of discussion
regarding the real objective of the
Austrian offensive in the Trentino
which was successfully repulsed in
June, 1916, after six weeks' very hard fighting.*
Many critics threw doubt upon the theory that
the invaders really hoped, or intended, to reach
the Venetian plain and cut the Italian lines of
communication with the Isonzo front. They
argued that with the troops available the Aus-
trian Command could not have expected to
overcome the much larger forces which General
Cadorna was able to bring against his adver-
saries. There is much to be said for such an
argument, but it seems to be based upon two
assumptions, neither of which appears justified.
It assumes a correctness of judgment on the
part of the Austrian, or Austro-German, High
Command which fortunately was not always
evident. It assumes further that in the event
of the invaders establishing themselves success-
fully in the Venetian plain no assistance would
have been given by Germany to the original
operating force. If the first phase of the move-
ment had been wholly successful, if the Italian
wings, and particularly the' left wing, had not
defied the violence of the Austrian assault, the
door to the plain would have been fairly forced,
* Seo Vol. IX., Chapter CXXXIX.
Vol. XI.— Part 137. 237
and, to put it shortly, it would have been worth
while going on. Austria's duty was to batter
down the gate. There is good reason to believe
that if this duty had been fulfilled an attempt
would have been made to continue and develop
the offensive, with German help if German help
were necessary. That Germany and Italy were
not yet formally at war would have mattered
little. Germany had already helped Austria in
every way that suited her, and though it is
probable that she wished to avoid war with
Italy, or wished at least that the declaration
should come from the other side, she would
hardly have refused the chance of a smashing
blow, if that chance had offered. Very pro-
bably Germany would not have been able to
assist. Events proved that she had miscalcu-
lated the possibilities of Allied action both on
the western and eastern fronts, but when the
Austrian offensive began, the hopes of the
Central Empires were running high.
It may fairly be assumed, therefore, that the
Austrian drive in the Trentino had really two
objectives. The larger aim must have been to
open the way for a decisive blow against Italy.
This enterprise seemed to promise a good chance
of success, for the enemy command knew that
Italy was short of heavy guns, and it had
altogether underestimated Italian powers of
288
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
resistance and Italian resource. And foiling
the attainment of the main objective, a second
seemed well within reach — to paralyse the
Italian offensive which had been prepared on
the Isonzo front.
6<<xj '9° i "f1' J<~
0fc***+ >\ 1 vS
KEY MAP.
(See detailed Maps of Area " A," on page 246, and
Area " B " on page 268.)
The Italian preparations had been long and
thorough. The winter months of 1915-16 had
been spent in ceaseless labour, on the front, in
the training " camps, and in. the munition
factories. These last were still too few for
Italy's requirements, and she was greatly handi-
capped by the difficulty of securing adequate
supplies of steel and coal, but very great pro-
gress had been made. Special attention was
devoted to the provision of a new arm — the
bombarda, ;a glorified trench-mortar. Italy's
manufacturing resources were insufficient to
turn out the number of heavy guns required to
demolish the enemy trenches in the way that
experience on all fronts had shown to be neces-
sary. The heroic attacks of her infantry in the
summer and autumn of 1915 had failed to break
the Austrian lines owing to lack of sufficient
artillery preparation, and the problem that pre-
sented itself was very serious. Italy's allies
could give little help, for the demands on their
output were already greater than they could
meet. The -question was how to secure a
sufficient weight of high explosive fire upon the
enemy positions, and the answer was the big
bombarda, throwing an 11 -inch projectile a
much further distance than was generally
supposed to be within the range of the trench-
mortar tribe. The bombarda had obvious
advantages over the big gun, given Italy's
special position. It cost little, required a com-
paratively insignificant amount of the precious
raw material, and it could be turned out in
adequate numbers. Its disadvantages wen-
equally obvious in a short time. It was iiiucli
more vulnerable than a gun, for it had to be
pushed far forward, where the big flame of its
discharge made its position easily detected, so
that it became a comparatively easy mark for
the enemy's artillery fire. The advanced
position, moreover, naturally complicated the
question of ammunition supply. Nor was the
fire of the bombarda as accurate as that of the
gun. It was confessedly a pis alter, but it
served its purpose well, as events were to show.
The formation and training of bombarda
batteries stood out as a special feature of the
winter preparations, but these were very
extensive in other directions. The spring found
many new formations ready to take the field,
and the hard work of the munition factories had
brought about a great and necessary increase
in the proportion of machine-guns and light and
medium artillery allotted to each division.
The Italian Army was immensely stronger than
it had been during the summer and autumn
campaign of 1915^
Preparations were well advanced when
AN ITALIAN " BOMBARDA " OF 240 mm.
(9i INCH) CALIBRE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
•239
information regarding the Austrian concentra-
tion in the Trentino indicated that this sector
of the line would require reinforcement, and some
of the new troops destined for the Isonzo front
were diverted to the threatened area. As was
shown in Chapter CXXXIX., the extent of the
imminent Austrian effort was miscalculated,
and it soon proved necessary to concentrate a
very large force to provide against the event
of the enemy breaking through. A great part
of the new reserves were hurried to the Vieenza
front. But the commander-in-chief had no
misgivings, and no hesitations. His emphatic
words, uttered at a time when the fighting in
the Trentino filled almost every mind but his
own, admitted of no doubt or questioning :
" I shall make the big offensive on the lower
Isonzo." ; As soon as the Austrian offensive
was fairly held General Cadorna ordered
plans to be drawn up for the quick transport
of the necessary forces to their original destina-
tion— the Isonzo line. They had another duty
ITALIAN GUN ON THE CARSO.
district, and there the counter-offensive was
prepared, in the manner already described.
But General Cadorna never let his mind
be diverted from the original plan. When
the Austrian troops were still pressing hard
upon the last mountain bulwarks and the
bursting shells could be clearly seen from
Vieenza, he declared his intention clearly
and firmly to General Pecori-Giraldi, the
commander of the Army that was being so
sorely tried. It was at a moment when many
feared that all the strength of Italy would
be necessary to resist the invader, and when
many others thought that in any event General
Cadorna would be unable to spare attention
and troops for important action on his eastern
to perform first — their share in the counter-
offensive that was to signal the final failure
of the Austrian attack, but everything was to
be in readiness for the moment that General
Cadorna foresaw.
The Austrian offensive, its failure, and the
skilful retreat that withdrew the invading
troops to strong defensive positions before the
Italian counter-offensive could properly develop,
have been described. It may well have been
a great temptation to the Italian Commander
in-Chief to pvish the counter-offensive stttl
farther, to free the small area of Italian soil
that still remained to the invaders, and win a
* These are the exact words. They closed a historic
conversation with General Pecori-Giraldi.
240
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
better defensive line, General Cadorna did
not play with Hi" temptation. The' Austrians
began to retreat on June !'.">. and on June 29
tin- movement of Italian troops to the Isonzo
front began. Reserve units \vere quietly
transported from the Vicenza district ; drafts
were sent to the armies on the Isonzo, and much
war material was collected in the eastern
zone. This phase of the preparation lasted
exactly four weeks, during which time the
troops on the Trentino border were keeping
THE DUKE OF AOSTA.
Commanded the Third Italian Army.
the enemy busy at various points, and the
Austrian? were further distracted by new
movements in Tirol. During the next week,
from July 27 to August 4, in the words of the
official report, " the real strategic manoeuvre
was carried out." Large masses of troops,
with guns and bombarde, were swiftly trans-
ferred to the Isonzo front, and by the evening
of August 3 every man was in place, and every
gun. The direction of the attack was entrusted
to the Duke of Aosta, Commander of the Third
Army.
The real offensive was preceded by a feint.
On August 4, after a heavy bombardment,
the Italians launched an attack against the
low hills east of Mot.falcone. They stormed
Hills 85 and 121, both of them already stained
deeply with Italian and Austrian blood. But
their success was only temporary. The enemy
had filled the trenches with gas bombs, which
they exploded as they were driven out. In
the disorganization which follows the successful
use of gas, the Austrians counter-attacked,
and the Italians were driven from the trenches
they had won. The attack had failed for the
moment, but it was to be renewed, and in the
meantime the Austrians believed they had
found the danger-point. Reinforcements were
hurried to the Monfalcone sector of the line,
which continued to be heavily bombarded.
The guns were now thundering all along the
Isonzo front, but special attention was being
paid to the little ridge that rises beyond the
Rocca di Monfalcone.
On the morning of August 6 the Italian
heavy guns and bombarde opened a furious
fire on a front of about 10 miles from Monte
Sabotino to Monte San Michele. The enemy
front-line trenches were practically obliterated.
The bombarde did their duty, and for the first
time the infantry could feel that they had
a fair chance. No doubt the enemy, smitten
by a ceaseless storm of heavy shells such as
they had not experienced before, thought that
the pendulum had swung too far. The Austrians,
like the Germans, had seen the heroic attacks
of their opponents fail, or only partially succeed,
through lack of heavy artillery ; and when the
deficiency was made good the Austrians, like
the Germans, protested against the fury of
shells that beat down their carefully prepared
defences and buried many of the defenders in
the trenches and dug-outs.
The whole front from Sabotino to San Michele
was overwhelmed by the Italian fire, but the
main attacks were directed upon two separate
sectors — the line that ran from the Sabotino
ridge through the broken hills about Oslavia
to the hog-back of Podgora and the line traced
along the summit of San Michele. The
positions on the low ground, between Podgora
and the Carso, were clearly doomed if the
heights were gained. All the three hills men-
tioned had already witnessed desperate fight ing.
The woods on the slopes of Sabotino and on
Podgora had gone up in flame long before ;
the bare, stony crest of San Michele had been
won and lost by the Italians, after a brilliant
attack which could not be made good owing
to the converging artillery fire of the enemy.
Sabotino, top, had once been taken, and lost
again owing to a delay in the arrival of she
reserves. The desolate summit of Podgora
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
241
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137-2
24-2
THE TIMES U1STOUY OF THE WAB.
liad for a time been practically a " No Mini's
Land," but the Austrians had finally dug an
elaborate trench system along the line of the
ridge.
The positions on the eve of the attack wen
as follows. The Austrians held the greater part
of the Sabotino ridge, their front-line trenches
crossing the ridge some distance to the north-
west of the highest, point (1,995 feet). The
Italians held the northern third of the ridge,
including a peak known as Hill 507 (1,661 feet).
From Sabotino the Austrian line ran down to
Hill 188, north-east of the village of Oslavia.
thence through Oslavia and west of Pevrria to
Podgora. This line, with a short stretch of
flat ground between Podgora and the Ison/.o.
formed the Gorizia bridge-head. More than once
it had looked as though the Italians would
succeed in breaking down the Austrian resis-
tance, but on each occasion the defenders had
succeeded in regaining lost ground by means of
fierce counter-attacks and a, concentration of
artillery fire. The position was very favourable
to the defence. From the top of Sabotino
almost the whole landscape lay plain and open
to the west, and those folds in the ground which
\\ere hidden from Sabotino were practically all
visible either from Podgora, or from Monte Kuk
( 2,000 feet ), on the other side of the Isonzo, two
miles due north of Sabotino. On the far or
Austrian side Sabotino drops in places almost
sheer to the Isonzo valley, giving to troops
beneath the crest a comparative immunity from
enemy fire. In addition, the Austrians had
hewn large caves and driven galleries clean
through the mountain, so that reserves of men
and munitions could be brought from the valley
with the minimum of risk and remain completely
sheltered until they were required. The pro-
blem of transport up the precipitous north-
eastern side was solved by a cable railway
which ran up a shallow gully to the mouth of
one of the principal galleries.
The line which ran through the Oslavia hills
AUSTRIAN DEFENCES OF GORIZIA.
Reference.
Austrian Trenches
Wire Entanglements
Co/nmue? Trenc h e s
Caves - —
Italian-Line
beFore offensive J.^
Heights in Metres
On Monte Podgora tfie Austrians were clinging to the eastern side of the hog-back, with a sharp drop
to the Isonzo behind. Caverns on the eastern slope gave perfect shelter. The Monte San Michele
trenches formed the main and final line of the Austrian defences on this part of the Carso. The four
"peaks" are slight excrescences on a nearly level ridge.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
243
and joined the two main bastions of the bridge-
head was very strongly held by successive lines
of trenches, fronted by wire entanglements of an
unusual depth. 1'odgora was, so to speak.
southern spur of Podgora to the Isonzo, where
an intricate system of defence had been pre-
pared.
On the Carso the Italians had won a firm
footing, but the enemy had held very tena-
ciously. The whole western rim of the barren,
dreary plateau was drenched in blood. There
is a shallow depression running up from Selz
that the Italian soldiers called the ^7alley of
Death. The glen leading to San Martino del
Carso had earned the right to a similar name.
Among the defenders the Carso was known as
" the Cemetery of the Hungarians," for the bulk
of the troops which had held so long and so
MONTE SABOTINO AND THE STATION
OF THE TRANS-ALPINE RAILWAY.
Inset : The summit of Sabotino.
Sabot iuo in miniature, for the eastern side of
the ridge dropped steeply .to the road that ran
beside the Isonzo, and the defending side hail
the advantage of a good deal of " dead ground."
The Austrian front-line trenches ran along
the crest, those of the Italians a little way
below.
The gap in the hilly country between Podgora
<iii' I San Michele was really defended by the
two gate-posts mentioned, though the Isonzo
and its tributary the Vippacco were natural
obstacles in the way of an offensive. The
i-nemy were not in force on the low ground.
except along the short tract that ran from the
ITALIANS ON MONTE SABOTINO.
gallantly had come from Hungary. Above
Sagrado, at the end of June, 1910, when the
danger in the Trentino had receded, the Aus-
trians hail made a surprise gas attack which
practically destroyed the Italian force in the
•211
THE TIMES UISTOHY OF THE WAH.
MONFALCONE, DESTROYED AUSTRIAN
LINE ON
trenches of the .sector. Four thousand men
were killed outright or died afterwards from the
effect of the gas. There was one little square in
Sagrado where (500 men who had staggered back
from the trenches, gasping, choking, almost
unconscious, lay down to wait for the ambu-
lances, and died before they came. It was in
this attack thr.it the Austrian^ first made use,
or were first detected in making use, of short
spiked clubs to "finish off" the wounded, or
those who were disabled by the gas. They
broke the Italian line and cr.me streaming down
the hillside towards Sagrado, but a furious
counter-attack regained the lost ground ; they
lost several hundred prisoners and very niruy
dead.
On August (i the Italian line still ran just,
below the skyline of San Michele along the flat
plateau by Monte Sei Busi to the little hills cast
of Monfalcone, and thence across the Lisscrt
nmrshcs to the MB.
The preliminary bombardment lasted from
7.. 'lo in t he morning till 4 in the afternoon, when,
the infantry attack began. The Italians swept
tor\u>rd, pn-eedfd by a heavy curtain fire, and
at lust the keys of Gorizia were wrested from
the enemy. A force of five battalions, selected
from the 45th division, the 78th infantry of the
Toseuna Brigade, the :inl battalion of the 58th
(Abruzzi Brigade), and the 3rd battalion of the
ENTANGLEMENTS AND NEW ITALIAN
HILL 85.
115th (Treviso Brigade), stormed the Sabotino
ridge. The force was under the command of
Colonel Badoglio, of the General Staff, who had
studied the Sabotino problem for months and
made the most complete preparations. Digging
rind blasting had made it possible to concentrate
large bodies of men in the front line close under
the enemy trenches, and the Austriaiis were
overwhelmed by the first rush. They had taken
refuge in their dug-outs and galleries, trusting
to wire anil machine-guns to hold back the
attack until they could reinforce the trenches.
But the bomhardi blew approaches through the
wire, destroyed the trenches and buried most
of the men in them, and the positions were
rushed before the reserves could come out of
their lairs. In forty minutes the whole trench
system had fallen and the Italian wave had
s\\ept on and up to the highest peak, while
supporting troops were picking up the enemy re-
inforcement s j's they poured out of their caverns
• — too late. The rest of the ridge was quickly
cleared, and evening found the Italians firmly
established at San Valentino, the south-eastern
end of Sabotino, above the Isonzo, and at San
Mauro, n. handful of houses at the foot of the
ridge, to the south, right upon the river bank.
Among the low hills of Oslavia the attack
was not quite so successful. The work of the
bombardc was deadly. The ground was rent
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
245
and upturned as by an appalling earthquake,
and when the Italians went forward they
trod upon a gruesome field. The resting-places
of those who had fallen throughout long months
of fighting vipon this hardly contested line were
desecrated by the cruel fire, and countless
bodies, enemy and friend, were laid bare to the
summer sun. Hill 188, the scene of many
fierce struggles, fell to the Lambro Brigade
(205th and 206th regiments), and the lines
that ran through Oslavia to Podgora were
stormed by the Abruzzi Brigade (57th and
58th regiments). The fighting here was very
stubborn. The enemy fought desperately,
but wa^ forced to fall back, and by evening
the Italians were not far from the village of
Pevma, close upon one of the main bridges
over the Isonzo. But the Austrians still held
the bridges and the low hills immediately in
front.
Podgora also fell. The Cuneo Brigade
(7th and 8th regiments) broke through on
the northern. end of the ridge, and swept down
to the Isonzo. Here they came into touch
with large enemy reinforcements and hand-
to-hand fighting went on all night. One
battalion pressed on too far and part of it
was cut off, some 300 men facing into the hands
of the Austrians.* The rest of the ridge was
taken by the 12th Division, which stormed
Monte Calvario, the southern peak, and went
through the lines on the low ground between
Podgora and the river.
Meanwhile the attack on San Michele had
gone no less favourably. The attack, which
covered a front of nearly three miles, was
entrusted to* the 22nd Division, consisting of
the Bresc;a (19th and 20th regiments), Ferrara
(47th and 48th), and Catanzaro (141st and
142nd) Brigades. After repeated assaults the
Italians succeeded in breaking through in the
.centre and establishing themselves along the
crest of the whole ridge. The wings of the
Austrian line, the positions on the northern
slope of the mountain, and the trenches that
ran by San Martino del Carso to Hift 150 still
held ; but they were now doomed to fall,
enfiladed as they were from the San Michelo
ridge. Farther to the south the attack on
the hills east of Monfalcone was renewed.
Hill 85 was taken by three battalions of Ber-
saglieri, and this time it was held against all
the efforts of the enemy to regain the lost
ground.
* The Austrian official communique, by the simple
addition of a nought, made the number o,000.
MACHINE-GUN EMPLACEMENT ON SAN MICHELE.
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
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August 6. 1916 —
At close of oFFensive^ — .
GOR1ZIA AND THE CARSO.
THE TIMES HISTORY 01* THE WAR.
247
ON MONTE CALVARIO AFTER THE BATTLE.
The first day of General Cadorna's " big
push " had borne splendid fruit. More than
3,000 prisoners were taken, with ten guns,
large numbers of machine-guns, and a mass of
other war material. But this was only the
beginning. The work of the first day was far
greater in promise than in accomplishment,
for at last the key positions of the Gorizia
front were all three firmly gripped. And there
were guns and shells and men enough to make
use of the advantage gained.
It has already been said that the end of the
first day's fighting found the Austrians still
in possession of the Pevma bridges and the
low hills immediately west of the Isonzo.
They were still in some force, moreover,
between Podgora and the river, and on the steep
side of Podgora itself isolated bodies of men
clung resolutely to their dug-outs, refusing to
surrender. And on the eastern slope of San
Michele they still held their second -line trenches
and numerous doline,* which had been fortified
and turned into powerful redoubts. The enemy
were not beaten yet, though they must have
been sadly disheartened by the loss of positions
which they had come to look upon as practi-
cally impregnable. They had been taken by
surprise, but they had put up a gallant fight
everywhere but on Sabotino, where the Italians
* The doline of the Ciirso are deep, round hollows or
depressions in the rooky ground, resembling small
orators.
were too quick for them and had them by the
throat before they could move. They were to
make desperate efforts still, which were to
lessen the weight of the blow that was threaten-
ing.
On the evening of August 6 General Boroe-
vich, commander-in-chief of the Austrian
forces on the Isonzo, issued the following
Army Order •
" The enemy has begun a decisive attack
along almost the entire front, and seeks a
final success. I expect my troops to give him
a worthy welcome and repulse him completely.
The general situation, to-day more than ever,
requires that all our positions, stubbornly
defended for more than a year, shall remain in
our hands. I have confidence that my wish
will be everywhere realized. Victory must be
ours"
Reinforcements were hurried across the
Isonzo by the Pevma bridges and to the
lines on the Carso which still held out, while
fresh troops were concentrated for a counter-
attack on San Michele.. For three days the
Austrians not only held most of their positions,
on the Carso, but -made several vain attacks
on the lines they had lost. There was a con-
tinuous artillery duel, and the dry Carso was
darkened by great clouds of smoke and dust.
The Italians had no difficulty in holding the
San Michele line while they prepared a further
pffort, and on llic left they advanced a little,
248
THE TIMES J1IXTOHY OF THE WAIl.
ITALIANS ON A CAPTURED HILL ABOVE MONFALCONE.
capturing the strongly fortified positions round
the village of Boschini, low down on the northern
slope of San Michele, near the junction of the
Vippacco wiih the Isonzo. Meanwhile very
hard fighting was continuous on the right bank
of the river, from below Sabotino to near
Podgora. In the light of knowledge now avail-
able it would seem that the Austriaiis had little
real hope of retaking the all-important positions
they had lost in this sector. The gallant
counter-attacks they made were probably
the desperate efforts of a rearguard deliberati Ox-
sacrificed to give time for the main forces to
retreat to new positions. The retaking of
Podgora and Sabotino required very much
larger forces than the enemy could dispose of,
and the .Austrian Command must certainly
have realized that with Podgora and Sabotino
gone the (ior'/.ia bridge-head, and (lori/.ia
itself, were no longer tenable against a deter-
mined attack. Their only course was to
evacuate the town, and take up favourable
positions on the hills to the east, before the
Italian advance progressed any farther. For
two days the Austrian rearguard hung on to
their last lines on the right bank of (lie river,
and were not content merely to hold but CM in
several times to th" attack. Tn spite of the
repeated onslaughts of the Italians precious
time was gained, but the defenders paid a heavy
price. On the afternoon of August 8 the assail-
ants finally reached the river all along the line,
breaking the stubborn resistance of the enemy
and taking a very large number of prisoners.
In these operations the Tqscana (77th and
78th regiments) and Trapani (143rd and
144th) Brigades specially distinguished them-
selves. Fresh Austrian counter-attacks were
beaten back across the river, and though in
their final withdrawal the enemy liiitl succeeded
in partially destroying the bridges, the summer-
shrunken waters of the Isonzo wen- no great
obstacle to infantry. At dusk the same
e\ening detachments of the < 'asale and Pavia
Brigades crossed the river and entrenched
on the further bank, while a force of cavalry
and Bersaglieri cyclists was dispatched to
reconnoitre the ground. The enemy was in
full retreat, covered by a heavy artillery fire,
which was directed specially upon the river
line and the damaged bridges. The engineers
were already hard at \\ ork repairing the Austrian
bridges and tin-owing pontoons across the river
and next morning the Italians crossed in force
and entered (lori/ia. The cavalry and cyclists
scoured the low ground, picking iip prisoner.*
here and there, but meeting with practically
no resistance. On August 10 the lines wero
pushed forward to the lower slopes . of the
hills east of (Jorixia, and to the Vertojbica,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
249
a stream that runs southward to the
Vippnooo.
On the Carso the Austrian resistance lasted
one day longer. Hard fighting went on during
August 7, 8 and 9, but the line was cracking,
and when the Italians attacked on August 10
it broke. The attack was made on a front of
about six miles, from north of San Michele to
Monte Cosicli, north-east of Monfalcone, and it
was everywhere successful. Here, again, the
enemy sacrificed a rearguard in order to with-
draw the bulk of his forces to a prepared line
farther east, and it seemed as though in this
sector some of the defending troops had lost
heart. One Hungarian regiment near San
Martino del Carso, finding itself outflanked by
the storming of a trench system on its left, came
out and surrendered en bloc. This was in
notable contrast to the reputation which the
Hungarians had won for themselves in the
Carso battles, but the troops on this part of the
front were doubtless disheartened by the news
that Gorizia had fallen, and by the knowledge
that they themselves were only covering a
retreat from the positions which they had
believed untakable. Moreover, the news of
Genoral Brusiloff's successes on the eastern
front had caused a good deal of murmuring
among the Hungarian troops, who were restless
at the thought that they were fighting in a part
of the Hapsburg dominions which interested
them very little, while their country seemed to
be threatened by invasion. But the main cause
of their depression doubtless lay in the surprise
of the Italian attack, the intensity of the
bombardment, and the relentless onslaughts of
the infantry. Perhaps for the first time the
defenders felt that the natural strength of their
positions and the elaborate preparations with
which Nature had been reinforced would no
longer serve them, as they had done in the past.
If the formidable system of defence was being
torn from them, which they had strengthened in
every conceivable manner, and held for more
than a year against repeated attacks, how would
they fare on the new lines to which they were
being driven ? Officer prisoners expressed con-
fidence that these new lines would never be
taken, and certainly they looked strong enough,
but the men could hardly reason in the same
way.
The Italian attack of August 10 pushed the
Austrians back across the Vallone, the deep,
narrow valley that runs southward from the
(Jorkia plain to the east of Monfalcone, and
completely cuts off the San Michele- Doberdo
A DUG-OUT IN THE TRENCHES ABOVE MONFALCONE.
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
251
plateau from the main Carso system. The
enemy abandoned all the ground west of the
Vallone, except to the east of Monfalcone, where
strong rearguards still held Hill 121 and Debeli
Vrh, south of the Doberdo lake. Next day
the advance continued. On the left the Italians
• crossed the Vallone and won a footing on the
steep eastern slope leading up to the hill of
Nad Logem. On the right they had halted, the
previous evening, at Doberdo, faced by the
ridge of Crni Hrib (the Black Hill), which seemed
specially adapted for defence. But next day
it was found that Crni Hrib had been practically
abandoned by the Austrians and the hill was
occupied without any difficulty. On the
following day, August 12, the left wing made
further progress, storming the heights of Nad
Logsm and establishing itself firmly beyond the
Vallone. The defence here was very stubborn,
but the 23rd Division, the Sardegna ( Grenadiers),
Lombardia, and Catanzaro Brigades, swept away
all resistance. Farther to the south the Italians
took the village of Oppacchiasella and pushed
on about 1,000 yards on both sides of the road
that runs eastwards ' towards Kostanjevica.
Debeli Vrh and Hill 121 also fell, but in this
TRENCHES ABOVE MONFALCONE.
sector two hills west of the Vallone road, 144
and 77, still remained in Austrian hands. For
three more days lively fighting went on, and
the Italians took various enerhy trenches, but
they were now faced by a new line of defence,
and further preparation was clearly necessary.
By the evening of August 15 the offensive was
checked, for the moment.
Great results had been won. In the twelve
days' fighting that began with the attack east
of Monfalcone the Duke of Aosta's army had
taken 18,758 prisoners (including 393 officers),
30 guns, 63 trench mortars, 92 machine-guns,
12,225 rifles, 5,000,000 cartridges, 3,000 shells,
60,000 hand grenades, and large quantities of
other war material. Our Allies had dealt the
AN AUSTRIAN TRENCH MORTAR.
Austrians a very heavy blow, and they had put
themselves into a position to strike further
blows. The entry into Gorizia was a notable
triumph, for Gorizia stood for much, both
to assailants and defenders. But the .value of
its occupation was much more moral than
military, as the town and the plain surrounding
it were dominated by the new Austrian positions
to the east. Of real military value was the
occupation of the bridge-head — the Sabotino-
Podgora system. It completed the Italian
possession of the Isonzo line, and made that line
far stronger against a possible enemy attack.
For Sabotino and Podgora between them, but
especially the former, constitute a wonderful
system of observation posts, apt for use in either
direction. Both ridges, moreover, and the
broken hilly country between, made very
strong defensive positions. The Austrians had
held them for more than a year against repeated
attacks, conducted with the greatest determina-
tion, and they had seemed almost impregnable.
Perhaps if the defenders had not been deceived
by the belief that the Italian offensive power
had been broken by the Treritirio fighting, the
positions might still have held out. Looked at
from -the east they presented a no less formidable
problem. In fact, they were a worse obstacle "
to a possible Austrian attack than they had
been to the Italian advance, for the Isonzo flows
beneath them like a moat. And the eastern
side of Sabotino drops almost sheer to the river.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
The Italians on Sabot ino nn<l Podgora \u-n-
uu\v. roughly, in the same position us (lie
Austrians had been on San Michele. There was
this important- difference, that .some of the
approaches to Sabotino were open to direct.
observation from Monte Kuk, and those to
Podgora were under the eyes of Monte Santo,
whereas the Austrians on the < 'ai-so had beer
free from enemy observation, except from the
air. But the greater height and steepness of
the Sabotino ridge may be held to have com
pensated for this drawback to its value as a
defensive position.
directly east of Gorizia presented enormous
difficulties* The occupation of the western
segment, of the Carso, on the other hand. \\ as n,
step which gave good promise of being the first
of a series. The first-line system of defence had
been broken along an extensive front, and then-
was reason to believe that the positions upon
which the Austrians had fallen back were less
thoroughly prepared than those which had held
out for so long. Moreover, the advance had
given to the Italians an admirable line of
observation points, from which they commanded
u wide view, while the Austrians had lost their
THE PIAZZA GRANDE OF GORIZIA; MULE TRANSPORT ENTERING THE TOWN.
The capture of the town of Gorizia was n,
great blow to Austria and a great triumph for
Italy. The occupation of the bridge-head was
a solid military gain. The advance on the
Carso was more, for it made a much greater
change in the prospects of a further offensive.
In the Gorizia sector proper the Austrians still
dominated the situation from the hills east of
the town. The Isonzo bridges were under close
and direct observation. The plain about the
town lay open like a map. Behind the lower
hills to the eastward rises the great range of the
Selva di Ternova, and to the north Monte Santo
enfilades the plain. Anv notable advanec
look-out over a great part of the lower Isonzo
plain.
An idea of the position in the middle of
August may best be given, perhaps, by brief
descriptions of the terrain as it appears from
two points — the top of Monte Sabotino and a
low rise (Hill 150) a little south of San Martino
f
del Carso. San Michele gives a wider panor-
ama than can be seen from this latter point, as
it commands a part of the .Gorizia plain, but
the general view of the plateau beyond the
Yallone is better obtained from the more
cent ral position.
Straight across the Isonzo, opposite Sabo-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
tino, rises Monte Santo — almost a twin ridge.
the southern spur of the Bainsizza upland.
The intervening gorge is deep and narrow ; its
wooded sides rise abruptly to a height of nearly
1,800 feet above the river bed, and the two
summits are well within rifle range — the
distance across being about 1,500 yards. To
the north lies the Bainsizza plateau, the wide
upland between the Isonzo and the Chiapovano
valley, which divides the Bainsizza from the
dark masses of the Selva di Ternova. This
plateau, which extends nearly to Santa Lucia,
the station where the Wochein railway leaves
the Isonzo valley, rises like a great rampart
above the swift -rushing Isonzo. Looking due
east from Sabotino a green valley opens up,
with two roads winding into the distance.
One turns northward behind Monte Santo, and
leads by way of Chiapovano to the Wochein
railway. This road is in view for a short
distance only. The other leads up to the
village of Ternova, and lies open for several
miles. But the valley mouth is well guarded,
by Monte Santo on the north and by the steep
heights of Monte San Gabriele on the south.
South from Sabotino, which forms a sharp
salient, the whole Gorizia plain shows clear to
view, backed on the left by the low wooded
hills east of the town, where the Austrians
lay in wait, strongly entrenched on the upper
slopes, with the Italians a little way beneath
them. Southward, again, appears the mouth of
the low-lying valley of the Vippacco, with the
Carso plateau rising sharply beyond. The
view of the Carso from this point is particu-
larly interesting, for here it is seen in profile,
CASTLE Ob GOK1Z1A.
showing how the range of hills that form its
northern bulwark rises like a great stairway from
the Vallone to the Iron Gates. Nad Logem,
Veliki Hribach, Fajti Hrib, Golnek, Trijesnek,
Stol, and Trstelj — these are the main steps of
.the stairway that finally reaches a height of
'2, 100 feet.
From Hill 150, south of San Mftrtino del
•••••••MB
MOVING HEAVY ARTILLERY AFTEK THE CAPTURE OF GORIZIA.
'251
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
( 'urso. a wide view of the rocky plateau si retches
eastwards as far as the ridge running south
from Trstolj, which marks the limits of the
steady rise from the Vallone. In front the
Around slopes gently downwards past the village
i'1 Marcottini, till it falls abruptly into the deep
eut of the Vallone, from which it rises quickly
tn the village of Oppacchiasella. Straight
eastwards from Oppaochiasella runs the road
to Kostanjevica, which shows clearly for some
distance, and then dips before rising to the
village. A bare two miles beyond, the riili;e
It is a dreary picture. The Carso upland is
bare and stony, covered only in places by a
scanty red soil that is fine dust in the summer
find sticky mud in the wet seasons. There are
great stretches of naked stone, ribs, and slabs,
and boulders heaped bewilderingly together.
Here and there grow stunted trees and miser-
able brushwood tangles, and in sheltered
hollows there were in peace time scattered
patches of tillage. All the cultivable area is
laced by innumerable stone walls, which serve
as shelter, even more than as boundary marks,
AUSTRIAN PRISONERS TAKEN AT GORIZIA.
above-mentioned, crowned by the villages of
Ten mica and Voj?eica, each with a tall cam-
panile, shows dark against -the sky. To the
left the great hill stairway climbs to its sum-
mit, and nearer lies a jumble of stony hum-
mocks and ridges — Pecinka, Hill 308, and other
rises that are known only by their height in
metres. On the right the view is more limited,
for just beyond the Vallone, opposite the
village of Doberdo and the height of Cini
II rib. a long, flat ridge blocks the view, one end
of it known as Kill 208 north, the other as
Hill L'OS south. Farther to the right are the
two low bare hills, Debeli and Hill 144, and
beyond them to the south-east the wooded
ridge of Hermada closes the view of the enemy
eoufitrv.
against the furious bora that scourges the
Carso in winter. On the northern and southern
edges of the plateau the landscape is less
desolate. Fair-sized trees grow on the slopes
leading up from the Vippacco valley, and the
Hermada ridge is well wooded. But the wide
st ret eh between is all gaunt and forbidding,
with no beauty of colour or outline to justify
its nakedness.
Kven to a casual view the Carso looks a
I'.illic.ult battle-ground for an attacking force,
and a closer examination shows how it lends
itself to defence. The upland is pit'ed with
ilnliiie and actual caverns, forming^ natural
systems of fortification that can be readily
adapted to modern requirements. The attack
suffered from other disadvantages — trenches
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.I 11.
GRAD1SCA AND THE ISONZO FROM THE CARSO.
could not be made, or transformed, in a hurry,
for there is no depth of soil. The making of a
satisfactory trench demanded rock-drills and
blasting charges. Moreover, a high explosive
shell that burst upon the rocky surface of the
Oar.-so had a very much greater destructive
effect than it would have .upon softer ground.
Not only was the area of destruction wider, but
the rock splinters reinforced the deadly _ work
of the shell fragments.
Our Allies had a very stiff task before them,
for the lines to which the enemy had retreated
were well prepared. But the relative positions
were now far more equal, especially for observa-
tion. And the Italians had victory in their
hearts, while the Austrians had been outwitted
and outfought.
The preparations for a further push took
some time. It was not uiVil September 14
THE CAKSO PLATEAU NEAR DOBERDO.
25C,
I///-; TLMI'-.S HISTOh'Y <>!•' THE W.lH.
AUSTRIAN TRENCHES ON THE CARSO.
that an attack in force was launched. On that
morning a tremendous bombardment was
opened all along the line from the Vippacco to
the sea. The weather was threatening, and in
the afternoon, just upon the hour fixed for the
infantry advance, a furious thunderstorm
burst over the Carso. The trenches east of
Nad Logem were carried immediately, at the
first rush, and large numbers of prisoners were
taken, but both on the left and right of this
sector the Austrians put up a very stubborn
resistance. The fighting was very bloody,
especially near Nova Vas, a hamlet about half
a mile due south of Oppacchiasella, and on tin1
ridge between the twin Hills 208. A number of
trenches were taken, and a good many prisoners,
but the Austrian line was not broken ; and
though the summit of the ridge was gained,
only the southern point was held. Farther
south the fighting was still more inconclusive,
for the Austi-'iuis. hacked by the big guns on
Henuada, held grimly to Hills 144 and 77.
Just south of the Vippacco, however, a notable
gain was made. After heavy fighting in tin-
afternoon a second assault WHS carried out in
the evening, and swept away the Austrian
resistance, bringing the Italians right up to the
village of San Grado di Merna, which stands on
a little hill immediately south of the river.
The hill was surrounded, and the weary troop,
lay down to rest.
But that night there was little rest. Another
terrific thunderstorm broke upon the battle-
field, and the guns never ceased. In the early
morning the Italian fire redoubled, and after
the enemy positions had been hammered for
eight hours the chilled and dripping men went
forward again. San Grado was taken and a
long column of Austrian prisoners came hasten-
ing to the rear of the fight, relentlessly pursued
I >y t he fire of their own guns. Several important
eutrenelmients in the front of Lokvica (south-
east of Nad Logem) were wrested from the
enemy, and a further advance was made east
of Oppacchiasella. It was hard fighting, and
the Austrians contested every foot of ground
with the utmost bravery, but the Italians were
not to be denied. The following day, after
repulsing several counter-attacks during the
night, they came again to the assault. They
gained ground along a considerable front on
the Carso, and took 800 prisoners. The next
day was spent in consolidating the new lines,
mid in throwing back a determined counter-
offensive by the enemy, who realized the import-
ance of some of the points he had lost. The Aus-
trian efforts had no result, and several hundred
prisoners were left in the hands of the Italians.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
257
During the four days' fighting 4,294 prisoners
were taken by our Allies, and a series of useful
positions were occupied. It was disappointing
that the progress on the right was less satis-
factory than on the left, but the Austrian lines
on Hills 208, 144, and 77 were very strong and
very difficult of approach. Both sides lost
heavily here, especially on the two Hills 208,
where the Austrians took a couple of hundred
Italian prisoners in their successful counter-
attack on the ridge.
Our Allies were very soon ready to deal
another blow, but persistent rain and mist
made observation almost impossible. Here, as
i I M -where, little could be done without artillery
preparation, and it was well on in October
before the offensive could be resumed on the
scale planned. Early in the month a prepara-
tory bombardment was actually opened, but
the weather broke suddenly and completely,
and the idea of an attack had to be abandoned.
On. October 9 the usual artillery fire was
greatly intensified along all the front from
eastward of Gorizia to the sea. The guns
continued all night, and on the following
morning their fury redoubled. Unfortunately,
the morning was foggy, as it so often is on the
Carso and on the Isonzo line, especially in the
autumn. It cleared after midday, but at
2.45, when the infantry went " over the top,"
visibility was still only fair.
The attack was splendidly successful. The
bombardment on the Carso had been crushing
in its effect. The Austrian first line was over-
whelmed, and when the Italian infantry
advanced to the assault they carried all before
them along the greater part of the front. Some
of the ground gained could not be maintained,
for the Austrians hung on desperately to
certain important positions, and the advancing
Italians found themselves here and there in
unprotected salients, close xipon new lines of
trenches. At nightfall those eager fighters
were withdrawn, reluctant to give up the
ground won. It was essential to consolidate
the new line, to keep the troops together for
the next day's advance. Some were cut off,
and killed or taken prisoners, but this was the
inevitable price of success.
The September operations had left the
trench-line on the Carso full of twists and
zig-zags, which were straightened out by the
attack of October 10. The most important
gain was the enemy salient that included Nova
Vas and Hill 208 north and ran back just east
of Hill 208 routh. which the Italians had held
WATEk SUPPLY BASE ON THE CARSO.
258
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
against the Austrian counter-attacks. This
salient was very strongly fortified with three
lines of trenches and various "redoubts," but
the Italian bombardment pounded the de-
fences to [tieees, and the da/.ed men who sur-
vived the destruction had little fight in them.
Another important position to fall was the
summit of Hill 144. The hill had been hotly
contested during the September fighting, but
the Italians had been unable to establish
themselves on the summit. Xow at last they
succeeded, but the Austrian* hung on to the
eastern and southern slopes.
By the end of the day (October 10) the Italian
line on the Carso ran almost in a straight line
from Hill 144 to the western slopes of Veliki
' • -
^. > L
, - n
AUSTRIAN DUG-OUTS ON THE CARSO.
Hribach. with a slight curve forward cast of
Oppacchiasella, and a slight curve backward
west of Lokvica. The Italians had now won
the whole of the first line to which the enemy
had retreated in August, and they had taken
many prisoner-*. The total for the day was
5,034, including 104 officers, and a great store
of war material was found in the conquered
positions. Progress had also been made among
the low hills east of the Vertojbica. The jii-e-
liminarv bombardment here was less destruc-
tive than 011 the Carso, for the ground was deep
in soft mud, but a determined attack carried
an important system of trenches between the
hamlets of Sober and Vertojba on a front of
1,000 yards, and 801 prisoners \\e-e taken.
Xext morning the weather was very im-
A COMMUNICATION TRENCH ON THE
SLOPE OF THE CARSO.
favourable. Mist lay thick in the valleys and
on the Carso upland, and the artillery fire was
slacker. Seizing their opportunity, the Aus-
trians counter-attacked on various parts of the
front. For them artillery preparation vas
less important, for the Italians were in the
open, or in the trenches which had been laid
in ruins during the two previous days. The
fighting was hardest east of the Vertojbica —
the enemy had not yet brought up sufficient
reserves to take the initiative on the Carso — •
but the Italians held their ground : and in the
afternoon, with clearer weather, they renewed
the attack all along the line. They gained
ground on the Carso, taking here a trench and
there a doline or a mined redoubt, and they
pushed forward their lines beyond Sober. All
day long the fighting was furious, and during
the following night and morning the Austriaiis
made desperate efforts to regain their lost
positions. The air was fairly clear, and the
artillery on both sides was very active. Re-
peated Austrian attacks upon Sober, the new
line south of Xova Vas and Hill 144, were
bloodily repulsed. On the front held by a,
single battalion, near Sober, 400 enemy bodies
were counted and buried. About midday the
Austrian efforts died away, and the Italians
attacked again. They pushed forward to-
wards the summit of Pecinka, and gained a
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
259
•foothold in. the hamlets of Lokvica and Hudi
Log, 2,000 yards east of Nova Vas. The line
OH the Carso was once more bent into curves.
On the left the Italians were well forward, near
the summit of Veliki Hribach, and in the centre
they were close upon the road that runs south-
eastwards from Lokvica to Hudi Log. But the
Austrian* clung to Lokvica, and the Italian
right could make little or no progress. Their
line bent back from Hudi Log to the east of
Hill 208 south, and thence ran across the
Vallone to Hill 144.
On October 13 the weather grew worse again.
Little fighting took place on the Carso, but
hand to hand, while the artillery on both sides
put a very heavy barrage fire on the reserve
lines. Comparatively few prisoners were taken,
but the Italians brought their number of
captures up to over 8,000. The Austrians
claimed 2,700, but on this occasion, as on many
others, they included in the number the dead
left in their lines.
The breakdown of the weather was a heavy
blow to the Italians. They were unable to go
on as they had intended, and the forced lull
in their offensive operations compelled a with-
drawal from certain positions which were only
steps on the way. They came back to about
PRISONERS CAPTURED ON THE CARSO.
north of Sober the Italians advanced'beyoiid the
hills to the road that runs from Gorizia by
San Pietro to Prvacina, the line followed by
the Corizia-Dornberg railway to Trieste. The
losses during the four days' fighting were very
heavy on both sides. On the first day the
Italians lost comparatively few men, and the
Austrians suffered very heavily. The Italian
artillery fire was exceedingly destructive, and
on many parts of the line the enemy was
unable to put up a fight. On the second and
third day, when the Austrians threw in their
)•( 'serves, the struggle was terrible. It was com-
paratively old-fashioned fighting, more or less
in the open, for the trenches were crushed tmd
flattened, and the only cover was supplied by
the unevemyss of the ground. It was a ghastly
melcV, where companies and battalion's fought
.100 yards from the sumitiits of Veliki Hribach,
and Pecinka. They left Lokvica to the enemy
anil flattened the Hudi Log salient. It was
essential to secure a proper jumping-off place
for the next advance.
«
Bad weather continued for over a rortnight,
except for one short spell of 48 hours, which
raised unfounded hopes. For more than a
week after this break in the succession of warm,
wet, misty days the soldiers in the front line
were keyed up, waiting for the word to attack,
knowing that it would come when the fojjs
lifted and gave a fair view of the enemy's lines.
The weather cleared very gradually. The
soaking rains ceased, but the clouds kept very •
low, and the mists came thinly up from the
drenched ground. At length, on October 29,
2fif>
///STO//V
THI-: w\n.
AUSTRIAN WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS.
there was 11 liint of cold, and though the next
day was overcast, the clouds were riding high
and the landscape was luminous and distinct.
The last preparations were made. The scene
was set for a still greater effort than, the two
which had preceded it. Next day the curtain
Mould go up it' the weather held.
The dawn was clear and grey, and soon the
trailing clouds dissolved under a strong sun.
All the morning a steady fire went on, and at
midday the real bombardment began — from
San Marco right down to the sea. The hit ensit y
of the fire outdid all previous bombardments
on the Curso front, and in an hour the whole of
the plateau was covered with a vast pall ot
smoke, which grew ever higher and thicker
till it dimmed the clear mountain ranges and
darkened the whole eastern sky. All afternoon,
all evening, and all night the terrible fire
continued, and when the next dawn broke it
grew even fiercer. The day promised well,
but the morning mists were slow to rise, and
when the hour approached tor the iut'autrv
aAack the whole plateau was si ill t hickly veiled.
The infantry went forward at exactly Id minutes
past 11. and the Austrian artillery lire, which
had not been very heavy, beea much
more intense. The enemy pursued the same
tactics as during the two previous attacks,
reserving their fire until the Italians came into
the open, when they sprayed shrapnel over the
advancing troops, and plastered the rear lines
with high explosive. It was noticeable, how-
ever, that along a considerable part of the front
the enemy fire was uncertain and fitful. The
Italian counter-batteries were doing their work
very well.
On the left of the Carso plateau the Italian
attack, conducted by the llth Army Corps,
was immediately successful. The lines in
front of Pecinka fell to the first rush, Lokvica
was occupied after a short but furious struggle,
and while Veliki was resisting frontal attacks
on the wooded slopes to the north and on the
bare western face a supporting column swept
through the shattered lines of Pecinka. which
had been captured by a Bersaglieri Brigade
((ith and 12th regiments), turned northward,
swarmed up the stony ridge that leads from
Pecinka to Veliki, and took the enemy trenches
in the flank. Pecinka fell in less than 40
minutes. Veliki in little over an hour. Nor did
the advance stop here. The Bersaglieri pushed
on to Hill :!dS. another stony hummock, east
of Pecinka, and the Toscana Brigade, which had
captured Veliki, advanced along the ridge to
the east and occupied the next peak — Hill 370.
South of T.okvica, and along the Oppacchia-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
261
sella-Kostanjevica road, the attack was equally
successful. The resistance of the enemy was
completely overpowered. The line was carried
forward 1,000 yards east of Segeti, and the
strongly fortified cross-roads, where the Lokvica-
Hudi Log rortd intersects that from Oppacchia-
sella to Kostanjeviea, was taken on the run,
the advance being pushed to within a kilometre
of Kostanjeviea. Farther to the south little
real propvss was made. Tlill 238-— to the east
of Hill 208 south — was carried by the first rush,
and ground was gained in the direction of Hill
235, on the edge of the south-eastern corner of
the main Carso plateau, just above the village
of Jamiano, in the Vallone. The enemy were
driven out of Jamiano not for the first time, but
the occupation of this point depended on the
success of the attack on the heights above, and
here it was found impossible to make good the
ground won. A strong counter-attack regained
ON THE WATCH IN T.HE TRENCHES.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Hill 238 for the enemy, and though the fight
v.im'd doubtfully for a long time, and the
Italians held tenaciously to various points that
improved their original line, they could not
hrenk tlirough the enemj defences as they had
done further north As the battle died down
on the left it grew ever fiercer on the right. All
the low ground east and south of Hill 144, where
the Vallone meets the valley that runs down
westward from Brestovica and divides Hennada
and the lower hills by the sea from the main
( 'JH-SO plateau, was a horrible seething caldron
of smoke and flame ; and on the heights above
fell an unceasing rain of shells. Till night came
there was no slackening of the fight.
In the Gorizia sector useful progress was
made on the hills to the east of the town,
towards Tivoli and San Marco, and on the
heights beyond Sober towards the railway.
The distance gained was not great, but several
important points wore occupied, which im-
proved the line and eased the position near the
town itself. The ground was deep in mud, and
the troops found it very difficult to move, while
the effect of the shells was greatly lessened.
But this part of the fight was of minor import.
The operations on the Carso were what chiefly
mattered, and the results of the first day's work
were triumphant. The Austrian line was com-
pletely broken on a front of over two miles.
from the northern rim of the Carso to the
Oppacchiaselln-Kostanjevica road, find it is
difficult to say how far the attacking troops
might have gone if they had not been held hack
to avoid tho .formation of too pronounced a
salient. The enemy lost 4,731 prisoners,
including 132 officers, and a great mass of war
material. The speed and impetus of the Italia. i
attack were so great that mule trains laden with
provisions and ammunition were captured tar
in t he rear of the trenches, before the Austrian*
had realized that their line had crumpled.
The capture of two three-gun batteries of four-
inch guns was reported the same night, but i>
was known already that other guns and ;i
great number of machine-guns were left within
the lines torn from the enemy. They were seen
and passed in the first onrush of the victorious
infantry, but it was days before all the cunning
hiding-places were explored and gave up their
secrets.
A great hole was punched in the Austrian line
by the first day's fighting, but the enemy were
not to give in readily to defeat. The surprise
had been great, and the counter-attack took
some time to develop. It was not until after
one o'clock in the morning of November 2 that
the Austrian artillery opened a new phase of the
battle. A tremendous fire was directed upon
the lost ground, especially upon Hill 308.
Pecinka, and the ridge running northward to
Veliki Hribach. Along this line th:> Italims
BERSAGLIERI IN A CAPTURED TRENCH ON THE CARSO.
THI<: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
263
GORIZIA FROM LUGINIGO.
were lying out in the open, on the bare stony
ground. The enemy trenches were gone — filled
with shattered rock and broken bodies — and as
yet only a few dug-outs had been discovered.
Here and there a dolina gave shelter, or a rock
cavern, but for the most part the troops had
little protection against the furious storm of
shrapnel and high explosive. The Bersaglieri
Brigade, in particular, was very highly tried by
the bombardment, and- suffered very heavily.
The brigadier and the two regimental com-
manders spent the night walking up and down
in the front lines, and their example held the
men firm under the cruel strain. But by the
morning only one of the three was left. The
brigadier and one of the colonels had both been
wounded by shell fragments, the brigadier being
saved from death by his helmet. The unhurt
survivor was the colonel who had taken San
Michele in July, 1915, and held it for 17
hours against repeated attacks till he was
ordered to withdraw the remnants of his
command.*
Various counter-attacks were attempted
during the night, but it was not until towards
midday that the real effort came. The reason
of the artillery concentration on Pecinka and
Hill 308 at once became apparent, for the enemy
launched a formidable body of men against these
pomts. They were trying to drive a wedge into
the salient that had been formed by the Italian
advance. Masses of infantry moved forward
from behind Hill 278, to the south-east of Hill
* Sep Vol. VIT.. Chapter OTX.. p. 69.
308. but they were met by a terrific artillery
fire from the Italian batteries, while the machine
guns of the Bersaglieri and an infantry brigade
which had been moved up in support played
upon them unceasingly. The masses broke,
re-formed, broke again. After a little the attack
was attempted afresh, but could make no head-
way. Several times the advance was renewed,
but always to break down under the Italian
fire. The enemy attack died away, and the'
Italian line swept forward in pursuit, while
farther north the troops on the mountain stair-
way climbed two more steps— Hill 399 and the
very important position of Fajti Hrib (1,425
feet).
The taking of the Fajti ridge was a serious
•loss to the enemy. It was the key of the
Austrian line in this sector. Not only does it
dominate Kostanjevica and the network of
roads that spreads out from the village ; it also
commands completely the lower part of the
main road that winds upwards from Ranziano
to the Oarso. An Austrian colonel taken
prisoner in the September offensive declared
that nothing mattered so long as Fajti Hrib was
held, and that the Italians would never succeed
in taking it. His estimate of its importance was
doubtless exaggerated, but its capture was a
heavy blow. By the evening of November 2
the Italian line ran south-westwards from Fajti
by Hill 319 to Hill 278, and thence south-
eastwards to H'll 229, 700 yards due west of
Kostanjevica, just above the terminal loop of
the narrow-gauge Carso railway. And patrols
•2(1 1
THE Tl.MKS HISTOh'Y Ol- THK WAR.
SCENE OF THE OFFENSIVE OF NOVEMBER, 1916.
The Fajti Ridge in the Background.
were out well eastward of this line, finding
nothing but wounded men and abandoned war
material. They pushed right up to Kostan-
jevica and to a line that runs due north from
the village, but here they came in touch with
a new trench system which the enemy were
holding in force.
In the centre the Austrians had given way
completely, but they were holding firm on the
wings, and were not content with holding.
South of the Oppacchiasella-Kostanjevica road,
right down to Hill 144, they delivered a series
of determined counter-attacks, and they were
equally active among the hills east of Gorizia.
But the Italians living on to the ground they
had made good on the first day, and in the
evening there was nothing but good news to
report. Nearly 3,500 prisoners were added to
the number already reported, and among them
were a brigadier, a regimental commander, and
I hive field officers.
The position was now very curious, und not
\\ithout its perils for the victorious Italians.
On a front of a little over two miles an advance
had been made that varied in depth from two
miles to a mile and a half. The salient was
very narrow in relation to its depth. The
Austrians were in force, and very strongly
entrenched, on the wooded slopes that fall to
the Vijipacco, as far forward as the neighbour-
hood of San Grado di Merna. Their lines were
immensely strong. Thick strands of wire ran
from tree to tree in front of the trenches,
making impassable barriers, and artillery fire
tipon a wood is apt to have results the reverse
of what is intended. Instead of clearing :i.w ay
obstacles, it adds to them. When the Italians
went forward against the wooded slopes south-
east of San Grado, they found it impossible to
make any great headway against the heaped
tangle of wire, chevaux-de-frise and fallen tree-
trunks. One line of trenches fell to the attack
of a flanking column, but many others lay
beyond.
But the positions were turned by the Italian
advance on the high ridges, and there were not
enough Austrian troops available for an attack
on the flank of that advance before it had been
thoroughly made good. By the time the
Austrians were ready to eome up from the
Vippaceo to the rim of the Carso, the Italians
were defending their exposed flank by making
11 strong attack downhill. On November 3
troops of the 49th Division, which had pushed
up inside t he newly-formed salient, proceeded to
widen it by coming down in the rear of the
main Austrian lines between the Vippaeeo and
the Carso. The main attack developed be-
tween Veliki Hribach and Fajti Hrib, against
the wooded ridge of Volkovniak (925 feet)
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
265
RUINS OF LOKVICA— OFFENSIVE OF NOVEMBER, 1916.
which juts out northward from the main
plateau. The enemy had not had time to
prepare their lines against an advance from
this direction. The hill was surrounded and
taken, and the Italians reached and occupied
the line of the Vippacco, west of Biglia. Oppo-
site the village the enemy still held on to two
little hills that formed a bridge-head over the
river, and the Italians made no effort to dis-
lodge them from these positions. The northern
flank of the salient was now adequately secured.
While this operation was being carried out on
the extreme left, a considerable advance was
being made on the northern half of the plateau.
Hill 291, a kilometre east of Hill 278, was
solidly occupied, and farther south the line
was advanced to within 200 yards of Kos-
tanjevica. During the day some 500 prisoners
were taken, bringing the total for the three
days' fighting to 8,750, including 270 officers.
The enemy were HOW right back on their third
line all the way from the Vippacco to Kostan-
jevica. They had lost two very elaborate
lines of entrenchment on a front of over three
miles. But on the southern half of the plateau,
and on the lower ground towards the sea, they
were counter-attacking with great vigour,
especially in the direction of Hill 208 south.
They seemed to hope for a success he>-e *!n,t
might jeopardize the Italian gains to the north,
but thev made ho impression on the Italians,
who were now content to remain on the defen-
sive in this sector. The Italian attack on the
right was, in fact, a subsidiary operation. It
was hoped that ground might be gained to-
wards Selo and above Jamiano, but when the
enemy's lines held against the first push, the
offensive was practically abandoned for a
containing action. The main objectives were
north of the Oppacchiasella-Kostanjevica
road. Experience had shown that the Austrian
lines from Hudi Log down to the sea were
particularly strong. Frontal attacks had
gained ground but very little, and at heavy
cost. A successful blow farther north pro-
mised the chance of capture by another method.
For two reasons the Austrian left wing on the
Carso was a harder nut to crack than the right.
In the first place, the lines themselves, on a
considerable part of the sector, were actually
stronger. Perhaps they were stronger even by
nature ; but in addition they belonged in great
part to that elaborate first-lino system of
defence which was broken farther north in th'-
great August offensive, but never qmte pierced
in the extreme south. In the. second place,
the southern sector was basked by the guns on
Hermada. The whole of the Hermada ridge
was tunnelled and galleried in such a way that
ut
it was almost impossible to locate the hidden
guns with any accuracy, and for this reason
the Italian counter-batteries were unable to
2tif,
THI-: rniKS HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ITALIANS IN AN AUSTRIAN
keep down the enemy lire as they succeeded
in doing farther north. Hermada seemed
definitely to forbid a direct advance, and to
tvirn the position from the north appeared to be
the only solution of a very difficult problem.
The third day's fighting practically closed
this phase of the long offensive. A week later
the Italians occupied Hill 309, 1,000 yards due
north of Kostanjevica, so that their line now
ran practically straight from Fajti Hrib to the
outskirts of Kostanjevica. But this operation
was virtually unopposed. The enemy had
fallen back pn their third line, and were making
no attempt to hold any of the ground in front
of it. 'The week following the three days'
advance was spent by the Italians in con-
solidating the ground won, and " cleaning
up " the battle-field. They were now in front
of a strong trench line, to attack which required
fresh artillery preparation. A pause was
necessary to allow the moving of guns and
bombard* and the selection of new observation
posts. And when this had been accomplished,
the weather put a stop to the further attack
that had been planned. It broke on the
evening of the third day's fighting. The rain
TRENCH ON THE CARSO.
came down in sheets, and the whole Carso was
.swathed in mist. After a week the weather
changed for the better, but it did not hold, and
just when hopes were highest they were dashed
again. Conditions in the trenches became
very bad. The lines on the low ground and the
doline, on the' Carso were flooded with water, or,
rather, with a thick mixture of mud and water,
while the rocky Carso trenches were so many
small torrents. And always the mist kept low.
Karly in December everything was ready for
a very big attack. Full use had been made of
the extra time that had been given by the bad
weather, and it wa< hoped and believed that
the results would compensate- for the delay.
Throughout December the Italian Army waited
for the chr.nce it \\a- ready to take, but the
conditions were persistently unfavourable, and
at the end of the year General Ctidorna re-
luctantly abandoned the idea of a further
offensive until the coming of spring. Another
stage of the long struggle on the Carso had
come to <vn end.
Thr main features of Ifaly'x share in the war
during 191(i were, of couive, the repulse *>f the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
267
Austrian offensive on the Trentino front and
the notable advance beyond the Isonzo. . These
two fierce struggles — the one lasting uninter-
ruptedly for six weeks, and the other being
carried on at intervals through more than three
months — were events of first-class importance in
the European War, and they naturally over-
shadowed other military operations which were
remarkable in themselves, and would in different
times have claimed wide attention. Among
these operations the most noteworthy was the
Italian advance upon the Fassa Alps. During
the first days of the war the Italians had crossed
the frontier and pushed up the Val Cismon
and the Val Cortella till they were some 15
miles within Austrian territory. A line was
established that ran from Cima d'Asta by Cima
Spiadon to Caoria, where the torrent of the
Valsorda joins the Vanoi, and thence by Cima
di Valsorda and Cima d'Arzon to Valmesta
in the Upper Val Cismon, about three miles
below the famous summer- resort and Dolo-
mite centre, San Martino di Castrozza. The
enemy made no attempt to contest this advance,
but withdrew to the south-western curve of the
vast Fassa range which sweeps up from the
Trentjno Alps to the Marmolada, protecting
the Val Fiemme and the Val Travignolo, and
the great Dolomite roads that meet at Pre-
dazzo. As they withdrew they burned and
destroyed. The upper Val Cismon was laid
waste, and San Martino di Castrozza,
with ita great hotels, remained a blackened
ruin.
In this region, for more than a year, the Italian
and Austrian lines were widely separated, the
situation resembling that which long prevailed
in the Val Giudicaria. There was an exten-
sive No-Man's Land where patrols met and
skirmished in the woods that clothe the lower
mountain slopes, where occasional prisoners
were taken, and men laid down their lives in
little, lonely conflicts that never figured in the
official dispatches. The Austrians did not
confine themselves to the recognized methods
of warfare. " In addition to the usual appa-
ratus of defence, every barbarous device which
a feudal Government had inherited from the
Feudal Ages was made to serve against tho
Italians. Traps for wild beasts were set to
REFUGEES FROM A VILLAGE ON THE LOWER ISONZO.
268
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
catch men, regardless of the inhuman torture
involved.'' *
The immense mountain rampart which was
manned by the enemy seemed to forbid any
possibility of an Italian advance. But here,
as elsewhere among the Alps and Dolomites,
no natural obstacle was considered impregnable
by the incomparable mountain fighters of our
Allies The first mention of a forward move-
ment was contained in General Cadorna's
bulletin of June 27, 191G. The report was
characteristically laconic : " In the region of
diversion. The real movement came 10 days
Inter, at the head of the Val Cismon.
Above San Martino di Castrozza the high
road winds up towards the dividing ridge
between the Val Cismon and the Val Travig-
nolo. On the right tower the jagged peaks of
the Rosetta, Cimon della Pala and Cima della
Vezzana, the two latter both over 10,000 feet.
On the left rises the rocky mass of the Caval-
lazza (7,630 feet). The road climbs northward
past the Cavallazza, then turns westward
behind it and traverses the mountain range at
A rrfft
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE FIGHTING IN THE FASSA ALPS.
the Upper Vanoi we occupied the Tognola
ridge." Tognola is a spur nearly 8,000 feet
high, which runs south-westward from the
principal range opposite Cima d'Arzon, and
divided from it by the Valsorda valley. The
news passed unnoticed. All eyes were still
upon the uplands of Arsiero and Asiago. A
fortnight later a move was made much farther
wc?,t. The Col degli Uceelli was occupied, the
I>,i-s which divides the Val Cia (Upper Vanoi)
fnii a the Val Campelle, leading down to Borgo
and Strigno in the Brenta Valley. This was a
* The T,mc°, Scntember fi.
11 height of 0,510 feet. This pass, the Passo di
Rolle. is one of the only two less than 2,000
metres in height that cross the great chain of
the Fassa Alps. The other, the Passo di
Colbricon (6,240 feet), lies immediately west of
the Cavallazza, dividing it from the much
higher ridge of Colbricon (8,540 feet).
Cavallazza looks right down the Val Cismon
from north to south, commanding the road
from Fiera di Primiero for the greater part of
its length. It was a very valuable observation
post to the Austrians, and it seemed almost
out of the question that they should ever lose
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
2G9
it. Tho huga rock bastions to the east appeared
to safeguard the position from a flank attack,
for only one feasible route — the Passo di Valles
(6,665 feet) — led from Italian territory down
to the Val Travignolo. And this route was
easy to defend. The Austrians were enclosed
in a rock fortress that seemed inaccessible.
Early in July the preparations for a serious
advance were begun. Cavallazza dominated
the only road fit for the transport of artillery,
so that all the work had to be carried out at
night. The Italian lines had by this time
been brought forward some distance up the
Val Cismon, but a wde stretch still remained
between the trenches. The long inaction had
given the Austrians a false sense of security,
and their patrols were much less active and
vigilant than they had been. Moreover here,
as on the Isonzo, they were convinced that
their offensive on the Trentino border, even if
it had failed in its main object, had tied the
hands of the Italians on other sectors of the
front. Under cover of night guns were hauled
up the steep sides of the Val Cismon, and troops
were quietly concentrated \ipon the wooded
slopes. Right under Cavallazza there is a
dense wood, the Bosco della Chiesa, and here
on the night of July 19 the Italian columns
assembled for the attack. They were favoured
by the luck of a heavy thunderstorm, which
helped them to escape notice, and all the next
day, which was foggy, they lay unobserved in
the woods. The morning of July 21 dawned
clear, and a heavy bombardment was opened
upon Cavallazza. Under cover of this fire the
[talians climbed the steep slopes from the
wood, while another column pushed up the
road towards the Passo di Bolle. Still another
column crossed the. Passo di Valles and came
down upon the Val Travignolo from the north-
east. The enemy were completely surprised.
The Italians gained a footing in the Cavallazza
trenches before the defenders had left the
dug-outs where they had been sheltering from
the rain of artillery fire. There was desultory
disorganized fighting for a day, but on July 22
the Passo di Bolle, Cavallazza, Cima di Col-
bricon and the Colbricon Pass were all safely
in Italian hands.
The following day Cima Stradone, a peak
north of Cima di Colbricon, was occupied, and
during the next few days, in spite of stubborn
resistance on the part of the enemy, the Italians
pushed down the northern slopes of Colbricon
and westward to the little valley of Ccremana;
that runs down steeply to the Travignolo from
between Colbricon and Cima di Ceremana. In
spite of strong counter-attacks by tho Austrians,
who had hurried up reinforcements of men and
ARMED ALPINI CLIMBING WITH
THE AID OF PICKS.
guns, these positions were firmly held, and on
July 31 the village of Paneveggio, where the
road from the Passo di Valle? joins the Dolomite
Road, \vas occupied in force. The whole of
the Val Cismon was now free of Austrians, and
the Upper Travignolo was dominated by the
Italians. The fear of any counter-movement
from the north had been removed by a success-
ful advance down the Val Pellegrino, on the
1'nr side of Cima di Bocche. This advance was
carried out simultaneously with the attack
•270
'////•; V/.W/VN ///.STOAT w THE w.u;.
'
K
Q
35
z
H
Z
Z
O
<!
O
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
271
upon Cavallazza and the Passo di Rolle, and
resulted in the occupation of positions on the
northern slopes of Cima di Booche and the
southern slopes of Monte Allochet.
The enemy had been rendered thoroughly
nervous by this swift stroke, which had stripped
off a piece of their flank armour. They hastily
transferred to the Val Travignolo a considerable
body of troops which they would certainly have
preferred to employ elsewhere, and made re-
peated attempts to recapture their lost positions.
They brought up fresh guns and used them very
freely, but with no result. The Italians held
(irmly to their gains, and prepared a fresh
movement farther west. Great difficulties of
transport were faced and overcome, and by
August 23 the Italians were assailing the rocky
battlements of the Fassa Alps at three fresh
points. They seized two outlying peaks below
Cima di Cece — Hills 2354 and 2351, one at the
head of the Val Fossernica, the other above the
Valzanea, and stormed a line of Austrian
entrenchments on the lower slopes of Cauriol
(8,180 feet), the huge rocky pyramid that stands
above the Val C'ia (Upper Vaiioi) and looks across
at Predazzo and Cavales •. The capture of the
peaks below Cima di Cece served the purpose
of the movement in this sector, which was to
relieve the left flank of the troops on Colbricon.
The real attack was on Cauriol. In three days
the Austrians were cleared out of their entrench-
ments on the wooded lower slopes, and the
Alpini prepared to attack the precipitous rocks
that, rise above. The enemy opposed a stub-
born resistance, but nothing can stop the Alpini
but wire, and by August 28 Cauriol had fallen.
Next day they extended their hold on the ridge
and prepared to meet the counter-attacks of
the Austrians, who were hurrying up reinforce-
ments. During the whole of the first week of
September the Austrians tried very hard to
regain Cauriol ; but the Alpini were immovable,
Hud by the middle of the month they were on the
offensive again. They fought their way slowly
along the rocky precipices north-east of Cauriol.
On September 15 they had a stiff fight for one
difficult position, but they could not be with-
stood. The Tirolesjager who faced them
fought bravely till most of them were killed.
A hundred survivors surrendered. Still the
Alpini pushed on ; on September 23 they stormed
the peak of Cardinal (8,050 feet) that lies mid-
way between Cauriol and Cirna Busa Alta, and
a little later they took the first peak of BUSM
Alta.
All through October this extraordinary
fighting continued. The Austrians had gradu-
ally filled the Val Fiemme and the Val Travig-
nolo with troops and guns. They were clearly
anxious, and they made many attempts to drive
the Italians' off the peaks they had won. They
brought up a great quantity of artillery to
support their infantry attacks, but to no
purpose. On the contrary, the Italians ex-
tended their gains, taking a second peak on
Colbricon, south-west of the Cima, and resisting
every attempt to recapture the position. On
October 3 and 4 the Austrians attacked in force
but were repulsed with heavy loss, after taking
one advanced trench. The October fighting on
Colbricon has a particular interest owing to the
fact that in this sector the place of the Alpini,
who were wanted elsewhere, had been taken by
Bersaglieri, who adapted themselves remarkably
to this mixture of warfare and gymnastics. It
is a hallowed legend that when the Corps of
Bersaglieri was first formed the new barracks
built for them were unprovided with stairs, so
that the men had to reach the upper floors by
ropes. The fact of the legend shows at least
the spirit of the Bersaglieri training, which is
an excellent preparation for work such as they
had to do on Colbricon.
Early in October it was hoped that the
Austrians might be driven off the line of the
Fassa Alps before winter set in. But winter
came early, first hampering the operations and
finally imposing a complete stop. In other
sectors than this, too, the early winter came as
a great disappointment to the Italians. General
Cadorna had not given up hopes of dealing
another blow on the Trentino front, though
after securing his flank he made operations in
this sector subordinate to the offensive east of
the Isonzo. He was still handicapped by a
shortage of heavy artillery, but certain local
offensives, calculated to strengthen the chosen
line of defence, were carefully planned. The
first of these took place on Pasubio, or, rather,
on the mountain mass of which Pasubio is the
highest point. Pasubio itself had resisted every
effort of the Austrians during their great
offensive in May and June,* but more ground
was needed for a satisfactory defensive line, and
it was especially important that certain points
of vantage, which dominated the Vallarsa road,
should change hands. The enemy held the
central ridge that runs northward from Pasubio
and is known as Cosmagnon. The ridge is wide,
» See Vol. IX., Chapter CXXXIX.
•272
THE TIMES HISTORY VJ? THE WAR.
BERSAGLIERI
but on the west it drops precipitously and the
Austrian trenches ran along the top of the
cliffs.
In the afternoon of October 9 the Italians
attacked from below the cliffs above the
Vallarsa and from the ridges to the south. The
artillery had prepared the way by a very heavy
bombardment along the whole massif as far as
Col Santo, and the enemy were puzzled to know
where the real attack was coming. Their
trenches on the edge of Cosmagnon fell quickly,
and the Italians gained a footing on the dreary
rolling surface of the broad rklgo. It was a
strange battle. The whole Pasubio mass was
bathed in brilliant sunshine, but the valleys
were filled with a thick mist which cut off the
mountain from all the world below. During
that afternoon, and throughout the clear moon-
lit night that followed, the Alpini and Bersaglieri
pushed slowly forward, meeting and overcoming
the reinforcements which the Austrians had
hastily dispatched. By the end of the day they
had cleared a wide stretch of mountain plateau,
10 square miles in extent, and tin- next day
1 hey Milv.ui'-ed to the foot of the peak known as
Mon!.' lioit,.. nu the farthest edge of Cosmagnon.
The Austrians still clung desperately to their
lines ,,ii the north and cast of the Pasubio
system, hut the Italians hail gained the soaco
CYCLISTS.
they required and freed 10 miles of the Vallarsa
road from direct observation.
The left of the Italian line between the
Adige and the Brenta was greatly strengthened
by this successful stroke, and it was the
intention of the Comando Supnmo to carry
out a similar but more extensive operation
on the right of the line, in the Sette Comuni.
Every preparation was made, but the snow
came early and paralysed all movement.
Even if it had been possible for the infantry to
move, artillery preparation would have been
largely ineffective. The deep snow protected
the enemy trenches and entanglements, and
experiments showed that a great proportion
of shells did not burst. Here, as on the Carso,
the weather prevented operations which would
certainly have borne useful fruit.
It would he difficult to over-estimate the
increase in Italian military strength from May,
1915, to the end of 1916. When Italy took
the field against Austria she w<w still only
ha'f prepared. A great many gaps had been
filled during the period of neutrality, but in
the prime requirement of modern war, heavy
artillery, there was a very grave deficiency.
Her power of manufacturing war material
was far from equal to the demands made upon
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
278
it, and in Italy, as elsewhere, it took time,
first to realize the necessities and then to
organize the industry for their supply. By the
end of 1916 468,940 workers were engaged in
the manufacture of munitions, and of these
72,324 were women. There were 66 principal
military factories and 932 auxiliary factories,
which between them covered every kind of
war work, besides 1,181 smaller establishments
for the making of shells exclusively. The
production of heavy guns in sufficient quantity
was still beyond Italy's powers, but in the case
of certain other war material she was able event-
ually to produce a surplus. As the idea of
the " Single Front " gained ground among the
Allies and their manufacturing resources de-
veloped, certain of Italy's deficiencies were
made good from outside, and in return she was
able to assist the common cause by increasing
her production of other materials beyond her
own requirements
By the end of 1916 the Italian Army was
ncomparably better equipped than it had
been a year earlier, and Italy's powers of
production were still increasing. It was not
only in equipment, however, that the Army
had progressed. It had gained technique, and
SUMMIT OF PASUBIO.
it had gained confidence. Long months of
war had tempered the raw metal and well-
earned victory had put an edge to 'the
steel.
During the winter of 1915-16 the Italian
Government had come in for a good deal of
criticism, both in Italy and in the Allied
countries, on the ground that Italians were
taking no part in the tardy attempt of the
Entente Powers to repair the diplomatic
muddle in the Balkans by military effort.
The plain fact is that Italy was not yet ready,
from a military point of view, to indulge
in the luxury of sending more than one petit
A MULE SUPPLY COLUMN.
274
THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAE.
of her troops on to foreign soil.* It
was constantly urged by her critics, with
perfect justice, that she had great reserves of
men. It was constantly forgotten that modern
armies or expeditionary forces are not made of
men alone. The fighting between the Adige
and the Brenta showed how right Italy had
been in refusing to weaken her capacity for
MINARET, NEAR VALONA, OCCUPIED
BY ITALIAN TROOPS.
defending her own frontiers at a time when her
resources in war material were so limited.
Her hesitation to cooperate in the Balkans
was natural and right, and was fully justified
by time. When her frontiers were secured,
i'lid General Cadorna had made adequate
preparation for the offensive on the Isonzo,
there was no more hesitation. During the
month of August the Italian commander in
* A strong Italian force was entrenched in the Valona
••ejjion.
the Valona zone pushed southward, occupying
Port Palermo and the coast strip by Kimara,
and preparations were made to extend the
Italian occupation to the whole of Southern
Albania. On August 23 a strong Italian
force arrived at Salonika, under the command
of General Pettitti, an officer who had greatly
distinguished himself at a very critical period
of the Austrian offensive. A portion of this
force was detailed to strengthen the defensive
line that ran from the Vardar to the Struma,
while another detachment formed part of the
Allied Army which advanced upon Monastir.
Nor was this the limit of Italian cooperation
in the Balkans. At dawn on October 2 an
expeditionary force arrived at Sante Quaranta
and was swiftly disembarked. On the same
day a column marched southward from Tepeleni
on the Voyusa and occupied Argyrokastro,
and on the following day connexion was
established between the two forces. On
October 25 it was announced that the Italian
forces in Albania had come in touch with
the left wing of the Allied advance from
Salonika.
The participation of Italy in the Salonika
expedition was in itself an answer to certain
hasty, if natural, criticisms. The real cause
which inspired all such criticism was removed
on August 27 when Italy formally declared
war on Germany. In Chapter CXXXIX.
it was briefly indicated how the absence of
such a declaration had led to uneasiness and
uncertainty in the public opinion of Italy and
Italy's Allies, and how this absence gave rise
to much groundless gossip. It was evident
to all who were in touch with the situation that
a formal declaration of hostilities was inevitable,
and was only a qiiestion of time and oppor-
tunity. Italy had long ago given adequate
pledges of h?r solidarity with the other members
of the Entente, by her adhesion to the Pact
of London, and by her participation in the
Economic Conference at Paris. German troops
and German sailors had taken part in military
operations against Italy. A state of war
existed in everything but name.
Undoubtedly the • Salandra Government
wished the formal declaration to come from
Germany, but Germany still hoped something
from her friends in Italian political circles, and
she saw clearly that the apparently ambiguous
position was a cause of uncertainty in Italy,
and of some suspicion in the public opinion of
Italy's Allies. The atmosphere of doubt was
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
275
all to Germany's advantage, and it may bo
presumed that she had no intention of altering
the situation xmless and until the prospect of
an important military success against Italy
should outweigh the benefits she gained from
the absence of open war. As the Italian
Government realized that Germany was dis-
inclined to declare war, it took various steps to
widen the rupture caused by the breach of
diplomatic relations. Some of these have been
already indicated. Others were the provisions
which definitely forbade any kind of com-
mercial traffic, direct or indirect, with Germany
Meanwhile Germany was preventing the de-
parture of Italian subjects, and in many cases
treating those subjects as enemies, and in view
of this fact the Salaridra Government denounced
the agreement of May 21, 1915.* The Boselli
Government went farther, and on July 19,
1916, a decree was issued providing that the
dispositions with regard to Austrian subjects
laid down in previous decrees should be ex-
tended to " the subjects of all enemy States
or of States allied with enemy States." On
July 27 the Stefani Agency published a long
communique showing the various points of
friction which had arisen. This communique
was nominally in answer to a publication by the
Wolff Bureau which had accused Italy of
illegal acts, but it was actually a forecast of
* See Vol. IX., Chapter CXXXIX., p. 111.
the inevitable stqp. That step was delayed
another month, but on August 27 the following
formal declaration of war was sent through the
Swiss Government.
" Acts of hostility by the German Govern-
ment towards Italy follow one another with
increasing frequency. It suffices to mention
the repeated supply of arms and instrument*
of land and sea warfare by Germany to Austria-
Hungary and the uninterrupted participation
of German officers and soldiers and sailors in
the different operations of war directed against
Italy. It is only thanks to the assistance
which has thus lavishly been bestowed
by Germany in the most various ways
that Austria-Hungary has recently been able
to concentrate against Italy her greatest
effort.
" It is necessary to add :
"1. The surrender to our enemy by the
German Government of Italian prisoners who
had escaped from Austro-Hungarian concen-
tration camps and had taken refuge in German
territory.
" 2. The invitation addressed to credit
establishments and German bankers at the
initiative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to
consider all Italian subjects as alien enemies,
and to postpone all payments which might be
due to them.
" 3. The suspension of the payment to
i
ITALIAN RESERVISTS REPAIRING BOADS IN VALONA.
27C
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
ITALIANS AT SALONIKA.
Italian workmen of pensions clue to them in
accordance with the formal dispositions of
German law.
• "These are all facts which reveal the real
feelings, systematically hostile, which the
imperial Government cherishes with regard to
Italy. Such a state of affairs could not finally
be tolerated by the Royal Government, since
it aggravates, exclusively to the detriment of
Italy, the deep contrast between the situation
de facto and the situation de jure which has
already resulted from the fact of the alliance of
Italy and Germany with two groups of powers
at war with one another.
" For the above-mentioned reasons the
Italian Government declares, in the name of
the King, that Italy will consider herself, as
from August 28, in a state of war with
Germany, and requests the Swiss Federal
Government to convey the above communi-
cation to the knowledge of the Imperial
Government."
The use of the expressions de facto and de jure
practically sums up the situation. There u us
no real change. Neither Italy nor Germany
had a new enemy, but the ground was finally
cleared from certain misunderstandings and
manoeuvres.
CHAPTER CLXXV.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (V.).
THE BRITISH ATTACK ON SEPTEMBER 15 — THE " TANKS " IN ACTION — CAPTURE OF COURCELETTE,
MARTINPUICH AND FLERS — THE NEW ZEALANDERS — THE GUARDS — THE CANADIANS — SIR DOUGLAS
HAIG'S VICTORY — IMPORTANT FRENCH GAINS — THE BATTLE OF SEPTEMBER 25 — FALL OF COMBLES
—BRITISH IN THIEPVAL — RESULTS OF THE BATTLE TO END OF SEPTEMBER — GERMAN LOSSES.
ON the morning of September 15, 191C,
the British troops attacked the Ger-
mans along the line extending from
Bouleaux Wood, between Guillemont
and Combles, to the north of the Albert-
Bapaume road — i.e., a. distance of some six
miles.
The ground over which the righting took
placo was generalty undulating on the south
side of the watershed extending from Bouleaux
Wood through Delville Wood and High Wood
to Thiepval. To the efist of Bouleaux Wood
the ground sloped down with some sharpness
to the valley in which was Combles. This
valley divides into two horns, one going north,
west and upwards to the west of Morval, the
other north-east rising up to Sailly-Saillisel.
Morval was on a prolongation of the Delville
Wrood-Ginchy ridge and sornewhat below it.
North of the main backbone the ground sloped
down more gently. The-villages which dotted
the battlefield were strongly defended and had
been largely sheltered from view by trees till
tho British bombardment swept these away
and pounded the villages themselves into
mere masses of ruins. Still the trenches round
them afforded some cover, and although any
protection near the surface had been largely
destroyed, sufficient was left, combined with the
deeper dug-outs, to shelter the garrisons until
they had to resist the near approach of the
British troops.
Everywhere the attack was successful ; the
first and second German lines were captured
Vol. XI— Part 138. 27 'i
and, along a good part of their position, even the
third line was pierced. The depth of tho Britisli
in-burst, varying in places, measured on an
average from one to two miles, and included
Courcelette, Martinpuieh, High Wood, Flers,
and a large portion of Bouleaux Wood.
Thus the British now stood on the high
ground extending through Bouleaux Wood and
Martinpuieh, nearly to Thiepval. Many too
w-ere the trophies gained. Prisoners to the
number of over 2,300 were gathered in, includ-
ing 65 officers, of whom no less than six were
battalion commanders, a sure proof that the
enemy had been taken, or had surrendered, in
large units.
The bombardment of the German position had
been going on since early morning on September
12, and had become highly intense before tho
infantry were launched to the assault at 0.20 a.m.
It was a remarkable achievement even for tho
British artillery, which had done so much good
and efficient work since it had been adequately
equipped. The duties of every heavy battery
had been most carefully and exactly worked
out, its targets were defined, and it knew when
to switch off one and switch on to another.
It understood when a barrage was to be carried
out and what points behind the enemy's line
were to be expressly dealt with.
The field batteries acted with a brave audacity
worthy of the highest praise, taking up position
after position nearer to the enemy as the latter
was pressed back. The forward observing
officers pushed up to the high ground as soon
278
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAI!.
Fig. 1. FRENCH ARMOURED CAR WITH MACHINE GUN.
as the infantry captured it, and so were able
to telephone back the directions in which fire
was .wanted, and to pass back corrections in
range and direction when needed.* The fire
of our guns of every. kind was arranged with a
mathematical precision marvellous in itself,
yet necessary, to get the full effect from
« The Forward Observing Officer is an officer who from
.i'i .UK-mired position notes the fall of the shells from hi-
liattcry and telephones back to it, MO that the Battery
Commander may know how to correct the aim of his
guns.
modern weapons. The enemy's artillery was
still strong and well worked, but it was not so
powerful as ours, which was soon able to
dominate it.
Before discussing the fighting in detail it is
necessary to describe the famous " TaiikV'
which on September 15 made their first appear-
ance on the field of battle.
An armoured train had been proved useful
at Alexandria, in 1882, and others had been
fit. 2. BELGIAN ARMOURED CAR WITH MACHINE GUN.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
279
employed in the South African War, producing,
however, no particular effect. They were only
improvised arrangements of no great tactical
value, being entirely limited to the railways.
A car which could move over ordinary ground
had to await the arrival of the internal com
bustion engine before it could be made in any
way successful.* Nor had the first protected
automobiles been capable of producing much
influence on battle tactics, though they were
of some utility as supports to reconnoitring
cavalry, or advanced guard infantry, or for
reconnaissances on their own account. The
•reason for this was that they were just ordinary
motor-cars, more or less protected by steel
gives the Rolls-Royce armoured car used in
Egypt with such good results in the expedition
aga'nst the Senussi.*
It will easily be seen how liable all these types
were to injury of their wheels, the shielding
of which was very imperfect. Moreover, the
engines and air coolers were not well protected.
The designers of the Tanks woiked on different
lines entirely. In them the whole of the motor
machinery was securely housed inside the car
itself. The latter did not run on wheels, but
on the two side caterpillar constructions
which, revolving, drew the car forward. A
glance at Fig 6 will show how much safer
and better this method was. Moreover, the
Fig. 3. BELGIAN ARMOURED CAR WITH QUICK-FIRER.
wedge-like shape of the front part of the car
shields fixed to them. Types of these are shown
in figs. 1, 2 and 3. Fig. 1 shows the French
type of armoured car with machine gun.
These did good work for the French Army.
Fig. 2 is a type made use of by the Belgian
Army with a machine gun. Fig. 3 is another
Belgian type with a quick-firer. Fig. 4 is an
armoured car, the quick-firer of which could
be used as an anti-aircraft weapon. Fig. 5
* In 1880 a steam-driven armoured car was brought to
the attention of N'apolcon III. It was armed with two
guns and furnished" with revolving scythes which were
f intended to mow down any of the enemy's infantiy which
might attempt to close with it. Nothing came of the
suggestion.
made it possible to drive through or over
obstacles which an ordinary car could not
traverse, as its hood would be doubled up ;
while the longer caterpillar sides formed as it
were a movable girder, which enabled the Tank
to pass over ditches and trenches. For if the
point but reached the other side the caterpillars
could claw it forward. The Tank also had a far
superior armament to that of any ordinary
armoured car, which can take but one or two
machine guns or small quick-firers at the most.
* See Vol. IX., Chapter CXLV.
280
THE TIMKti ///N/o/.T OF THE tt'AK.
Several weapons of either or both of these
classes could In- carried in the 'L'aiik. while thei-i-
was no comparison between the security it
afforded its crew and that given to the ordinary
armoured cars. No armoured motor-car could
charge a brick wall without, damage, and even
passing over a wire entanglement would be
dangerous. But experience soon showed that
the Tank could deal with quite considerable
<ihst ructions. Its special form enabled it
to overcome opposition and pass through or
over many- obstacles which would be quite
unnegotiable by the ordinary motor-car, ar-
these monstrous engines, and it is urgent
to take whatever measures are possible to
counteract them.'
The correspondent of the Dusaeldorfer General-
ameiyen said that, as the Germans saw the
monsters coining on through the mist at the
moment when some cessation of the bombard-
ment allowed them to emerge from their
shelters, " their blood froze in their veins " :
Stupefied by the earthquake which had rayed arouiul
them they all rubbed their eye.--, which were riveted
aa if deprived of sense on the two fabulous creatures.
The imagination, flogged by the storm of fire, was full of
excitement, and no wonder it had the mastery over these
Fig. 4. ARMOURED MOTOR-CAR WITH ANTI-AIRCKAFT QUICK-FIRER.
moured or unarmoured. To render it as
indistinguishable as possible, it was painted in a
curious medley of browns, greens and yellows,
which harmonized with the broken ground over
\\hich it had to pass. We shall see in tin-
description of the fight on September 15 and
following days that these novel engines of war
played an important part.
They certainly proved an objectionable
surprise to the Germans. The chief of tin-
Staff of the Third Group of German Armies said :
" The enemy in the latest fighting has employed
new engines of war as cruel as they are effective.
No doubt he will adopt on an extensive sca/e
men, tried by suffering, who were well aware that the
enemy would push with all the mean*: of destruction
through a wall hard as steel, though made of frail human
bodies. They have learnt not to fear men, but there was
Something approaching which the human brain, with
tremendous mechanical powers, had fitted out for a
devil's trick, a mystery which oppressed and .shackled
the powers, because one could not. comprehend it with
the understanding — a fatality again-t whi'-h one seemed
helpless. One stared and stared as if paralysed.
The monster approached slowly, hobbling, moving
from .side to side, rocking and pitching, but it came
nearer. Xothing obstructed it ; a supernatural force
seemed to drive it onwards. Someone in the trenches
cried " the devil comes," and that word ran down the
line like lightning. Suddenly tongue's of fire licked out
of the armoured hide of the iron caterpillar, shells
whistled over our heads, and a terrible concert of machine-
gun orchestra filled the air. The mysterious creature
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
•281
Fig. 5. ROLLS-ROYCE ARMOURED CAR
As used In Egypt.
had surrendered its secret, and sense returned with it,
and toughness and defiance, as the English waves of
infantry surged up behind the devil's chariot.
Describing the participation of two of these
" land Dreadnoughts " at Flers on September
16 the correspondent said :
Our machine-gun fire and hand grenades rattled
ineffectively on their iron hide. As our roar connasioiis
Fig. 6. A BRITISH "TANK" IN ACTION CROSSING A SHELL-CRATER.
2S2
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
STAR SHELLS IN THE EARLY MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 15.
were out, the artillery could not be summoned to help
against the mass fire of these iron towers, as they easily
<J .'^1 royed what remained of the garrisons of the advanced
shell holes. They then advanced over the first German
line away into Flers village, remaining there some time.
When the English infantry had arrived and occupied the
village they proceeded further on the Ligny-Thilloy road.
Meanwhile, as their appearance became known in other
rear positions, well-placed shots made an end of their
triumphal march behind the villas^.
But although one Tank seems to have been
disabled, the Germans did not succeed in
capturing any of them. The Tanks, for their
part, brought in many German prisoners,
usually following submissively behind, or, as
in the case of a few officers, inside.
It is plain that the moral effect of the now
weapons was great, and it will be seen from the
narrative which follows that tactical gains were
very considerable. Officially called His
Majesty's Land-Ships, each of them had a
name given it by its crew ; two which were
attached to the New Zealanders on September
15 were known as " Cordon Rouge " ami
" Creme-de-menthe."
September 15 was fine, but the morning mist
still clung to the ground and somewhat obscured
the movements of the infantry. The huge
projectiles from the big guns and heavy howitzers
THE CAPTURE OF COURCELETTE AND FLERS.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
288
boomed over the heads of our men in the front
line and burst with terrific explosions on their
target, destroying the front line of German
trenches. At first the enemy did not appreciate
that an assault was imminent, probably because
the British artillery had expended so much
ammunition on the German position as to keep
the majority of its garrison lying close for
shelter, and thus the sudden intense fire was
regarded as a mere incident in the artillery duel
and not as a prologue to the coming infantry
assault. The Germans, too, in the days im-
mediately preceding the attack, had been
distributing a considerable amount of shell fire
and made a rush at the trenches where part
of the Canadians were assembled ; coming sud-
denly out of the mist which concealed their
approach, they flung their bombs into the
trench and, following on, succeeded in entering
it. The success was but a short one. It was
the hour fixed for the British advance and
forward accordingly went our men, sweeping the
Germans back before them. This was the only
incident before our attack began, and it had
no effect whatever on the arrangements.
The left of our attack executed by one Army
Corps was engaged with the German positions
from Thiepval down towards the Stufen (called
CANADIANS FIRING A HEAVY HOWITZER.
[Canadian War Records.
against their opponents' position, and are said to
have had over 1,000 guns in action against us.
But we had more, and our artillery had dis-
tinctly gained the upper hand before our
infantry went over the front trench parapet at
6.20 a.m.
There is some reason to believe that the
Germans were planning an attack at the same
time as we were, for the number of men in their
position was larger than usual, although this
may also have been due to the reliefs arriving
and being there with the outgoing garrison
before the latter had left. Still it is certain
that shortly before our advance began a German
force covered by bombers crossed No Manis Land
by us the Stuff) Redoubt ; beyond it the
Canadians directed their efforts against Cour-
celette. Beyond these again the remainder of
General Gough's command was aimed at High
Wood and Martinpuich.
On the right of the Fifth Army was the
Fourth Army under Sir Henry Rawlinson.
The village of Flers was the objective of the
left of this force. Against it were engaged the
left of Rawlinson's men, one Corps going
for Flers, and the New Zealanders pushing
forward to the west of the village.
The length of the right portion of this attack
was about 2,500 yards, and extended from the
east side of Delville Wood to some distance
284
THh TIMI-'.S HISTORY OF THE WAR.
••- .v ^ .. - •"•••
- '- VjB^-,
THE SEAFORTHS HOLDING A FRONT-LINE TRENCH OPPOSITE MART1NPUICH.
east of Flers. Beyond this was the remainder
of the Fourth Army connecting with the French.
The German position to be attacked formed
a treble line of works well strung together by
connecting trenches amply provided with
bomb-proof shelters and covered by a very strong
wire entanglement. A fourth formidable line
had also been recently constructed in front of
Le Transloy, facing almost west and covering
the road from that important village to
Bapaume. In advance of the first line were
several advanced works with the usual machine-
gun emplacements, which allowed a powerful
flanking fire to be brought on any troops who
endeavoured to pass between them. It was
necessary to silence these before an attack
could make progress.
One of them was the so-called " Mystery
Corner " at the eastern end of Delville Wood,
which at this time was still in German hands,
though most of the rest of the wood had been
for some time in our possession. It was a
formidable redoubt, well provided with machine-
guns which would enfilade any British attack
moving northward across its line of (in1.
Moreover, it protected two lines of communi-
cation trenches which went back from tin's
point towards the great length of trench known
as the Switch Trench, which ran from the
neighbourhood of High Wood to the south of
and past Flers, towards the east. It was
plainly necessary, therefore, to storm this
redoubt and turn the enemy out of the con-
necting trenches before the main advance
could be pushed forward towards Flers.
Somewhat before the time fixed for the
assault, when the half light of commencing
dawn had scarcely appeared, two detachments,
about a section each, crept swiftly and quietly
forward. One tackled the redoubt, the other
the communicating trenches. The assailants
of the former were over its parapets and in the
midst of the garrison before the latter could
get their machine-guns into action. A short,
sharp combat sufficed to settle the question of
possession — the redoubt was ours, and with it
some 50 prisoners and its armament of
machine guns.
The other detachment was accompanied by
two Tanks, and supported by them went for
the two communication trenches. But little
opposition was met with, for here our artillery
had been able to enfilade the hostile defences,
and they found them almost filled up with
dead and dying, the result of the recent bom-
bardment. Now the way was clear for the
main advance.
The first thing to be done was to capture the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
285
Switch trench. But in advance of it there
were two other trenches, roughly parallel to
it, known as the Brown Trench and Tea
Support Trench, while more to the east, and
behind the Switch, was the Gap Trench,
which connected up with the trench running
from the front of Lesboeufs, past Gueudecourt
to the Grid Trench 1£ miles to the rear.''' In
addition to these more elaborate works there
were many shell -craters organized for defence,
many little projections from the innumerable
connexion trenches in which machine-guns
and riflemen were nested. The position was,
indeed, a powerful one, and had it not been
thoroughly searched out by our artillery fire
would have been impregnable to an infantry
attack. Fortunately our guns had dealt with
it thoroughly, and those who were about to
assault it were first-re.te fighting men.
The men told off went over the parapet in a
succession of waves, and in advancing went
by the two detachments which had taken
the redoubt and communication trenches, and
were now resting after their labours. These,
* The reader will do well to refer to the coloured maps
of the battle area which form the frontispieces of Voln.
IX. and X.
although their task was done, and all their
officers wounded, declined to be left behind,
and acted as a connecting link between two
units of the attack, which became a little
separated as the advance went on. The troops
concerned in the direct attack on Flers and to
the right of it were chiefly Londoners who had
not had much previous experience, but they
bore themselves that day as well as any war-
seasoned troops. They showed their readiness
in the intricate fight both in trench storming
and the more individual work of hunting the
Germans out of the village. The Switch
Trench was quickly entered by the first two
waves of men, who then proceeded to round
up the few — very few — living Germans, the
majority having been killed by the British
artillery fire.
Leaving the front line of men to hold the newly
won ground, the officer in command sent
the supports forward against Flers. Forcing
their way over shell craters under machine-gun
and shrapnel fire, they reached the outer line
of the village defences. Here they were held
up, for the German trench was covered by a
strong wire entanglement. It was a job for a
Tank, and one arrived to do the business. Coming
..
~
AWAITING THE ORDER TO ADVANCE.
286
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
up in its own fashion witli 11 dcadlv persistence.
it passed over shell craters, reached the wire,
and then proceeded to iron out flat a sufficient
length of the oh^im-lr to give the infantry room
to advance, meanwhile bringing a deadly
flanking tire to bear on the defenders of the
C en nan t reuc-h. Once the way was clear, our foot
soldiers moved, forward once more, and Flers
was taken with a rush. There was really very
little resistance, and the position does not
appear to have been held with any determina-
tion. Perhaps the garrison had fled before
the terrifying monster which proceeded up the
main street amid the cheers of our men, as
calmly as an omnibus up Oxford Street.
Two counlel-attacks were made about three
and four in the afternoon; both were stopped
without difficulty by machine-gun fire.
On the right of this portion of Sir Henry
Rawlinson's army, the fight at this time was
of a tentative nature.
The New Zealanders took a considerable
part in the battle of the 15th. The position
against which they advanced lay between Flers
and High Wood, on the high ground at the
top of the plateau. Their flanks were
protected by the British troops attacking
Flers and on their left. The assault was
furnished by the men of Auckland, Canter-
bury, Otago, and Wellington, and their main
objective was the German trench 500 yards
ahead of the British line. Our men advanced
in a series of waves with distances between
them, and they suffered on the upward move
from both shrapnel and machine-gun fire.
But nothing could stop them, and they burst
into the German trench. A prolonged and
desperate close-quarter fight ensued, in which
scarcely any other weapon was used than the
bayonet. It was a terrible combat of com-
parative silence, in which little was to be
heard except the clash of steel and the half-
smothered cries of the wounded. But eventu-
ally the garrison were completely conquered ;
few, indeed, escaped with their lives. A
slight pause was made there, and then the
advance began again, a distance of 800 yards
to the second German position, consisting of
two lines of trenches covered by deep wire
entanglements.
This time the New Zealand Rifles led the
assault, moving in open order, yet keeping
touch and their alignment. The enemy's
defences had been considerably damaged by
WOUNDED GUARDSMEN NOWISE DOWNHEARTED.
Official photograph.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
287
THE CANADIANS ADVANCING TO THE CHARGE.
[Official photoiraph.
our artillery fire, but several machine-gun
emplacements were still in working order, and
much of the wire obstacle was still effective.
The New Zealanders suffered heavily, but
stuck to their task, in which they were soon
aided by a powerful auxiliary. Two Tanks,
which had been somewhat delayed in their
progress over the shell -pitted ground, now
came up and proceeded with characteristic
deliberation to flatten out the wire for the
infantry to pass, then getting astride the
German trench and beating out the machine-
guns and their detachments by their fire. In
vain the Germans bombed them and covered
them with rifle fire ; they carried out their
task. A German battery 1,500 yards off
brought its fire to bear on them, but obtained
no direct hits, and was itself soon reduced to
silence by British guns. Then the infantry
came on and drove back the rest of the German
trarrison. The New Zealanders went on still
farther, accompanied by one of the Tanks.
They succeeded, indeed, in progressing beyond
the troops at Flers and on their left flank, in
both of which directions the fighting had been
stiffer, and then- fire swept down the shallow
gulley which points north-east 1,500 yards
west of Flers.
The projecting salient they made threatened
tho lines of the enemy from either flank. The
Germans naturally made a strong counter-
attack, and the New Zealanders were drawn
back to a straighter line which ran westward
from the north end of Flers village, and there
they held their ground.
A more desperate counter-attack was de-
livered by the enemy in the afternoon in con-
junction with a similar effort against Flers
already mentioned. It was equally unsuc-
cessful ; but in this case it was not fire only
which stopped the Germans. The downward
slope of the ground appears to have afforded
some shelter to the latter in their advance, and
they came on in a more or less dense line, to
use cold steel. The New Zealanders were
ready to meet them with their own weapon,
and gallantly Jed, dashed into them at the
double with their bayonets, while the Germans
stood to receive them. Such was the impetus
of our troops that they drove back their
opponents after a short struggle. Their slow
retreat grew faster, and then became a run,
until, finally, they took to their heels and fled
helter-skelter, pursued by the New Zealanders.
There were no more counter-attacks by the
enemy in this part of the field.
While the fighting had been going on round
Flers, the Guards had been engaged in another
part of the front. All five regiments took
part.
The place of assembly, before the advance,
had been on the hither slope of the Thiepval-
Ginchy Ridge, and the nature of the ground
on the farther side and its occupation were
not very well known. It had been thought
that there was some little distance before the
line of trench to be taken would be reached.
But no sooner had the men gone some 200
yards and breasted the crest than they found
themselves before two lines of trenches covered
by an unbroken wire entanglement defended
by machine-guns and bombers to back up the
infantry. The three battalions of Coldstreams
led the advance, supported by the Grenadiers,
with the Irish Guards in reserve behind
them
288
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
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The troops on the right of the Guards had
been held up by obstacles, and thus the Cold-
streams going on beyond them exposed their
right flank and suffered accordingly. But they
drove steadily onwards, over wire, over parapet,
till Briton encountered German in the trench.
Nor were our opponents loth to meet the
attack. Both sides fought desperately with
bomb and bayonet. The Coldstreams were
reinforced by the Grenadiers, and the Irish
Guards came up too, while later on the Welsh
joined in the fray. After an hour or more of
handy-strokes we gained the victory, and once
more the Guards went on. They saw the
German infantry beating a hasty retreat before
them, they saw the German gunners endeavoxir-
ing to remove their guns. They had advanced
more than 2,000 yards from the point of
departure, they had broken a gap in the German
lines, but they had come to the limit of the
possible and wisely determined to halt where
they were and dig in. They had taken 200
prisoners, and disposed of many hundreds of
the enemy.
The night by no means brought peace.
The Germans launched counter-attack after
counter-attack on them, but in vain, and so the
Guards won through the darkness and held the
position they had conquered.
Martinpuich and High Wood formed the
connexion points of the battle between Flers
and Courcelette.
High Wood had only been partly in our
possession, the northern portion being still in
the hands of the Germans when the battle of
September 15 began. What they held they
held strongly with a mass of machine guns.
Here the Tanks gave great assistance, and,
indeed, it was they that really turned the
enemy out. Going on over trees, over wire,
over trenches, they flattened out the enemy,
and by 10 o'clock the whole wood was
in our hands. Meanwhile the infantry had
moved to the assault of Me-rtinpuich. The
front defences of the village were taken with a
rush, but a counter-attack drove our men back.
They went forward, once more supported by
Tanks, and this time with entire success. The
Bavarians fled before them, and. the Tanks
plied them with fire, enfiladed their trenches, sat
on their dug-outs and thoroughly dominated
them in every way. Many were the prisoners
who fell to them — over a hundred surrendered
to one alone, and two of the crew sufficed to
keep them till the infantry came up. Another
captured a regimental commander who came
out of a dug-out to see what was going on.
The share taken by the Canadians in the
advance of September 15 and 16 was consider-
able. When they went over the parapet and
advanced over the ground towards the German
position they saw Martinpuich on their right
and Courcelette to their left front, with an
intervening network of trenches. Mouquet
Farm, or rather the trenches round it, formed
[Official photograph.
SETTING FUSES.
their first objective, and part of these were
captured after a short but severe struggle.
Farther forward pressed the Maple Leaves,
towards the brick ruins and white chalk heaps
of what had once been the renowned sugar
refinery, the subterranean defences of which
still served to shelter the enemy, who also held
the trenches right and left of it. These together
formed the main objective of our troops. But
before they could be reached other works had
to be taken. Nor were they captured without
a considerable fight. As usual, the German
trenches were so laid out that portions of them,
manned with machine guns, flanked their lines.
These for a time held up the movement. But
soon a new auxiliary arrived to aid the Cana-
dians— His Majesty's Landship " Creme de
Menthe." Moving deliberately buf continu-
ously forward, lurching a bit as it bumped over
the shell craters and other obstacles, but al-
ways getting nearer and nearer to the German
138-3
'2110
Till'. 77.WKN 111STOHY <>L- THK \VAlt.
lino, the stool-clad automobile battery passed
through the cheering foot -soldiers and went
on ainid a hail of rifle and machine gun bullets
to which it paid no attention. Then, taking
position across the On nan front trench, its fire
swept to right and left down it, and thus eased
the way for Canadian infantry to continue
their advance. The enemy's machine-guns
were silenced and a considerable number of
prisoners taken, and the main line of the
(ierman entrenchments here was captured, and
even parts of the trenches on the outskirts of
Courcelette. Soldiers from all parts of Canada
took part in the triumph— Mounted Rifles
from the eastern provinces with men from
Toronto, London, and Kingston ; while from
the western side came the men from Vancouver
and Regina, with the volunteers of Winnipeg,
from the centre of the Dominion. It was a
glorious combination. Having reached the
point above indicated, the storming force
proceeded to dig itself in, while the reserve
battalions were brought up to complete the
occupation of the grotuufr gained.
The attack had indeed been so successful
that Sir Julian Byng. the Canadian Corps
Commander, determined to push on still
farther and take Courcelette, although tin-
evening was advancing. The reserve bat-
talion had now come up, and was told off to
lead the new assault. A French Canadian
battalion swung round to the left and struck
the village on the eastern side, while other
Canadians pressed straight forward against it.
It was through a hot fire of artillery and small
arms that our troops advanced, but they would
not be denied, and, in the darkening shades of
evening, the outer ring of the Courcelette
fortification was broken through and the greater
part of the garrison, now thoroughly de-
moralized, were made prisoners. Defences
were improvized, and these served to beat off
several counter-attacks made during the night
against the newly won village. The prisoners
taken numbered over 1,000, together with two
pieces of artillery and a number of machine-guns
and trench mortars.
On the extreme left, in front of Thiepva
and down towards the Bapaume road, it
was not the policy of Sir Douglas Haig to
push matters to extremities at this period.
But here, too, fighting went on ; attacks
CANADIANS HANDING DRINK TO GERMAN PRISONERS TAKEN BY THEM
AT COURCELETTE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A KITE BALLOON PREPARING TO ASCEND.
^Canadian official photograph.
were driven off, and some little progress
was made.
The victory gained was a great one, and the
Germans had been taught a lesson. Sitting
down beyond the risk of danger the higher
commanders might order their men to hold on
till death or make counter-attack after counter-
attack. But there is a limit to the capacity
for resisting loss beyond which troops will not
go. This had been reached by the Germans
on the ground where the fighting of the 15th
took place, and hence the great results gained
this day by the British Army. In the language
of General Haig, the fighting of the 15th and
16th was of great importance, and probably
the most effective blow which had yet been
dealt to the enemy by British troops. The
damage to his moral was probably of greater
consequence than the seizure of dominating
positions and the capture of between 4,000 and
5,000 prisoners. Guards, Northumbrians and
London Territorials, Scottish and English New
Army divisions, with troops from Canada and
New Zealand, shared the glory of the battle
between them. Nor were our aviators without
their share. They destroyed 15 aeroplanes
of the enemy and drove others off, then they
came down lower and used their machine-guns
on the enemy's guns and on the infantry in his
trenches. At the same time they kept con-
stant count of the enemy's movements,
observed his batteries, and informed our own
where to fire. The perfection to which the
work of the Royal Flying Corps had been
brought is impossible to put into words.
September 16 was chiefly a day of consoli-
dation of our new position and of driving back
counter-attacks of the enemy which were
entirely unsuccessful. Late in the evening
our troops obtained a considerable success,
taking the " Danube " Trench near Thiepval
on a front of about a mile, and with it many
prisoners and a considerable quantity of rifles
and equipment abandoned by the enemy.
The network of defences round Mouquet
Farm, which had been in dispute for some weeks
past was almost completely conquered, and we
extended our gains near Courcelette on a line
of 1,000 yards. A number of minor advantages
were secured on other parts of the British Front-
On the 17th, to the south of the Ancre, the
Germans made several heavy counter-attacks,
which were all repulsed. One which came from
the direction of Lesboeufs and from the country
2!>2
THE T1MKX HISTORY OF THE WAR.
PRISONERS COMING IN.
_»-" -~
[Official f holograph.
north of Flers was caught by our artillery
barrage and suffered heavy loss. Between
Flers and Martinpuich a German brigade
commenced an attack in the direction of
High Wood. Our troops, only two battalions,
did not wait for them to join issue, but leaving
the shallow trenches which they had recently
made, went on at a double to meet them.
The result was never for a moment in doubt.
Although the Germans were in "threefold
strength they were driven back with great
slaughter.
[From the official A ncre film.
PRISONERS CLAIMING THEIR LETTERS
AND OTHER PROPERTY.
To the north of Mouquet Farm more ground
was gained. Our artillery, too, maintained
its fire generally against the German lino,
and among other successes blew up an ammu-
nition dump at Grandcourt. During the night
further progress was made east of Courcelette
und our line was appreciably advanced, and
we gained more ground south of Thiepval,
thus threatening to surround this position.
The Germans, on the other hand, under
cover of a heavy bombardment, managed to
'•tiler one of our trendies \vest of Mouquet
Farm, but were at once counter-attacked and
driven back with heavy loss. During the
night they kept up an intermittent artillery
fire against various points of our line.
It was at this juncture that the French and
British Commanders-in-Chief exchanged the
letters published below :
TO GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.
General Headquarters of French Armies.
September 17.
My Dear General, — I desire to convey to you my most
sincere congratulations on the brilliant successes gained
by the British troops under your command during the
hard-fought battles of the 15th and 16th of September.
Following on the continuous progress made by your
Armies since the beginning of the Somme offensive, these
fresh successes are a sure guarantee of final victory over
our common enemy, whose physical and moral forces are
already severely shaken.
Permit me, my dear General, to take this opportunity
of saying that the combined offensive which we have
carried on now for more than two months has. if it were
possible, drawn still closer the ties which unite our two
Armies ; our adversary will find therein proof of our firm
determination to combine our efforts until the end to
ensure the complete triumph of our cause.
I bow before those of your soldiers by whose bravery
these successes have been achieved but who have fallen
before the completion of our task ; and I a«k you to
convey, in my name and in the name of the whole French
Army, to those who stand ready for the fights to come,
a greeting of comradeship and confidence.
J. JOFKRK.
TO fiENERA-L .TOFFRE.
General Headquarters, Britl-h Armies in France.
September 10.
My Dear General, — I thank you most sincerely for the
kind message of congratulation and goodwill that you
have addressed to me and to the troops under my
command on their recent successes. This fresh expres-
sion of the good wishes of yourself and of your gallant
Army, without whose close cooperation and support
those successes could scarcely have been achieved, will
be very warmly appreciated by all ranks of the British
Armic^.
I thank you, too, for your noble tribute to those who
have fallen. Our brave dead, whose blood has been
shcil together on the soil of your great country, will prove
a bond to unite our two peoples long after the combined
action of our Armies has carried the common cause for
which they have fought to its ultimate triumph.
The unremitting efforts of our forces north and south
of the Somme, added to the glorious deeds of your
Armies umiiiled at Verdun, have alreadv begun to break
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
293
down the enemy's power of resistance ; while the energy
of our troops and their confidence in each other increases
from day to day. Every frosh success that attends our
arm.-; brings us nearer to the final victory to which, like
you, I look forward with absolute confidence. — Yours
very truly,
D. HATQ, General,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.
On September 18 another important advance
was made. East of Ginchy and north-west
of Combles we captured the important work
known as the Quadrilateral, which gave us
an important gain of ground and straightened
our line. We also captured five heavy howit-
zers, two field guns, and lighter pieces.
While the British on the 15th were capturing
Courcelette, Martinpuich and Flers, the French,
trench north-east of Berny was carried the
same day.
On the 17th, in the afternoon, a great battle
was delivered south of the Somme between
Barleux and Vermandovillers. Numerous
trenches were carried south of Barleux. 'The
enemy was cleared out of the last houses held
by him in Berny, and his lines from Berny to
Deniecourt were pierced. Deniecourt was
completely .surrounded, and the German en-
trenchments thence to Vermandovillers were
stormed. Simultaneously the enemy was
ejected from such portion of Vermandovillers
as he had still managed to retain. Violent
counter-attacks towards nightfall were repulsed
with terrible punishment to the foe. When
ch official photograph.
THE TRENCHES AT VERMANDOVILLERS: ARRIVAL OF FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS.
Photographed from an aeroplane.
who at nightfall on the 14th had carried enemy
trenches just south of Rancourt and some hours
later had repulsed attacks east of Clery, moved
forward north of Priez Farm, threatening
Combles from that region. South of the
Somme also, at 4 p.m. in the sector Deniecourt-
Berny they delivered two charges. To the
east of Deniecourt a trench and small wood
were wrested from the enemy ; and north-east
of Berny three German trenches were seized.
Two hundred prisoners and 10 mitrailleuses
remained in the hands of our Allies. The next
day the troops of General Fayolle from Bou-
chavesnes struck northwards in the direction
of the wood of St. Pierre Vaast, and reached a
narrow depression south of the wood. Another
sun set the French :had beeh everywhere
successful and had captured 700 unwounded
prisoners, among them 15 officers. The battle
went on through the night, counter-attack
succeeding counter-attack. Vainly the troops
of the 10th Ersatz Division strove to retake
the ground lost near Berny. On the 18th the
French finally secured Deniecourt, and pushed
on towards Ablaincourt. At nightfall they
were before the hamlet of Bovent. They had
also captured three little woods south-east of
Deniecourt and a trench west of Horgny, a
village east of Berny.
During the night of September 18-19 the
British beat off several determined counter-
attacks south of the Ancre, destroyed two gun
294
THE TIMES HISTOKY OF THE WAR.
emplacements, and exploded an ammuni-
tion store. South of Arras we cleared the
enemy from 200 yards of trenches, and the
French made further progress south of the
Somme to the east of Berny, taking some
prisoners. The next day, September 20,
north-east of Bethune, in the neighbourhood
of Richebourg 1'Avoue, three raids resulted
in the capture of prisoners and a machine-
GENERAL DUPORT,
Chief of the French General Staff.
gun. A hostile balloon was brought down
south-west of Arras. In the Somme area a
German attack on the British trenches east of
Martinpuich was easily repulsed. The next
evening, south of the Ancre, in a torrential
downpour, the New Zealanders were violently
and continuously attacked, but at no point
did the Germans penetrate their lines, and at
daybreak the ground in front of their trenches
was seen to be littered with the dead and
dying. Many prisoners were captured in this
and other regions.
On September 20 the main event was the
determined effort of the Germans to drive back
the French north of the Somme. The 18th
Corps had been brought up from the Aisne and
the 214th Division which was on its way to the
Kastern Theatre of War, had been hastily
recalled. It had arrived on the 14th. With
these fresh troops, the Crown Prince of
Bavaria, at 9 a.m., attacked General Fayolle's
position between the Priez and 1'Abbe, farms,
and east of Clery to the Somme. The 214th
Division operated in the Bouchavesnes region.
Preceded by violent bombardments, mass after
mass of the enemy were precipitated against
Bouchavesnes and the French trenches north
a 111 1 south of it. Four waves of grey-green
infantry were cut down by the French guns
before Priez Farm. The survivors fled, leaving
t he ground covered with corpses. But at 3 p.m.
the Germans after a succession of bloody
checks burst into the north-east end of
Bouchavesnes. It was only a momentary
triumph, for the French rallied and drove them
out at the point of the bayonet. Few of them
escaped and several officers and men were
captured. The 75- and 120-mrn. guns and the
mitrailleuses had here, and at Priez Farm,
caused frightful losses. At ridge 76, which is
crossed by the road from Clery to Haut Al-
laines, regiments of the 18th Corps were kept
at bay by ttie barrages of shell and shrapnel
fire, but, nearer the Somme, parties of Ger-
mans succeeded in entering some trenches. They
were swiftly ejected by counter-attacks. At
nightfall the desperate contest died down.
Prisoners stated that one company alone in the
llth Bavarian Division lost 110 men out of 210,
that two battalions of the 123rd Prussian
Regiment had been almost wiped out and that
the 12th Reserve Division had suffered terribly.
" I cannot understand," said a French artillery
- officer present, " how, after so many disastrous
experiences, the German Higher Commanders
can order attacks to be carried out in massed
formation. The road from Combles to Ran-
court is covered with dead Germans, sacrificed
to no purpose." General Fayolle was able to
report the victory to the new Chief of the
French General Staff, at the Ministry of War,
General Duport, who took the place the next
day of General Graziani, whose health had
broken down. Since the first months of the
war the latter had filled this onerous post
attached to the French War Office. It must
not be confused with that occupied by
General de Castelnau, who still continued to
direct the movements of the armies at the
front. Duport, a colonel in August 1914,
was an infantry officer. He had been educated
at the Military College of St. Cyr, and had
fought on the Algerian frontier between 1885
and 1888. Promoted General of Brigade in
THE TIMES 'HISTORY OF THE WAR.
295
-Tune, 1915, he had been since August 31, 1916,
Commander of the 14th Corps d'Armee. Like
so many other officers almost unknown at the
beginning of the war, he had forced his way
up by the exercise of conspicuous abilities.
So bloody had been the repulse of the German
18th Corps and 214th Division, that the next
day, Thursday, September 21, Prince Rup-
precht made no further attempt to pierce the
lines of General Fayolle north of the Somme.
On the British front in the neighbourhood of
Flers, bombing parties vainly endeavoured to
wrest from us the positions taken in the battle
of the 15th-ieth. The night before, in vile
weather, there had been encounters on the
edge of Courcelette and north of Martinpuich.
A hostile kite-balloon fell to the ground in
flames, but, as against this, we had to record
the loss of an aeroplane.
During the night of the 21sf^22nd, while our
troops were raiding enemy trenches south of
Arras and north of that point, seizing a crater
in the Neuville St. Vaast region caused by the
explosion of one of our mines, an advance was
also made by the British between Martinpuich
and Flers. Up to the 21st our line sagged east-
ward from Courcelette round the northern end
of Martinpuich and hugged the eastern face of
the village. Thence it zigzagged towards Flers.
It was now decided that the mill of Martinpuich,
500 yards north of the village, must mark the
alignment of our front from Courceletto
cemetery to Flers, and that a redoubt between
the mill and the Albert-Bapaume road must be
carried, and the German salients in our position
flattened out. After desperate fighting two
lines of hostile trenches were carried, and
24 hours later the redoubt was stormed. On the
23rd a strongly fortified system of trenches east
of Courcelette was captured and we advanced on
a front of about half a mile. The day before
(September 22) at nightfall a violent German
attack west of Mouquet Farm had been driven
back by our fire with heavy losses. In the
course of the 22nd our guns had destroyed 10
hostile gun-pits and damaged 10 others, while
five ammunition dumps were blown up. A
squadron of 50 aeroplanes the same day
bombed an important railway junction. Two
trains loaded with ammunition were smashed
and many violent explosions caused. Railway
works and sidings elsewhere and aerodromes
and other points of military importance also
received attention. As a consequence of aerial
duels, three enemy machines were destroyed,
five damaged severely and others driven to
earth. Our loss was five machines.
Meantime, on September 22, the French had
pushed a little nearer to the doomed village-
fortress of Combles. On the northern slopes of
^ i
FRENCH RED-CROSS MEN WAITING IN A TRENCH OUTSIDE COMBLES
296
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
the hillock beyond the wood of Anderlu, towards
the road from Maurepas to Fregicourt, the
enemy had converted into a small fortress a/i
isolated house in front of Combles and close to
the road. The machine-guns in it held up the
French advance. After an attack very ably
executed the house was surrounded and carried
by assault. Ninety-seven men and three officers
were captured. Simultaneously between Fregi-
court and Priez Farm the French stormed
German trenches on the east slope of the
Combles ravine. The enemy's endeavours to
hinder the French movements in this direction
by renewed counter-attacks between Priez
Farm and Rancourt were repulsed by curtains
of shell fire.
By this date the total of the prisoners cap-
tured by the Allies in the Battle of the Somme
had swelled to over 55,800, of which 34,050
had been taken by the French.
Preparations were now being made by the
Allies to fight another battle similar to that of
September 15-16. It was preceded by aerial
enterprises on a large scale and by bombard-
ments of almost incredible intensity. The
French wrecked 25 enemy machines on
September 23, we seven. The same day five
bombing raids against railway stations on the
German lines of communication were success-
fully executed by the British. In the course of
an air fight one of our airmen collided with his
opponent. The German plane fell to the
ground, while ours, after a vertical descent of
several thousand feet, was righted and returned
safely, the pilot flying over 30 miles with an
almost uncontrollable machine. Our losses on
the 23rd were five machines.
Among other noteworthy incidents at this
date, the celebrated French airman Guynemer
brought down his seventeenth and eighteenth
hostile machines, and on the 24th Captain de
Beauchamps in the " Ariel " and Lieutenant
Daucourt executed one of the most daring
flights on record. For the first time Essen,
the great military manufactory of Germany,
was bombed in broad daylight. The workshops
of Krupp were defended by no fewer than 250
anti-aircraft guns, and numerous German aero-
planes were naturally on the watch to intercept
raiders. Nevertheless, the intrepid Frenchmen
succeeded in dropping twelve bombs on Essen
and in returning safely to their base. Captain
de Beauchamps, who was not 29 years old,
had for many months been commanding the
squadron " des As " stationed on the eastern
front of the French lines. He had had under
him Guynemer and other distinguished pilots,
BRITISH FIELD BATTERY CROSSING A FORD.
[Official photograph.
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAB.
297
including Daucourt. Of his then recent ex-
ploits the destruction o£ a Fokker on April 7
and of aDracheonMay22, 1916, had caused him
once more to be cited in an Order of the Day.
The night before the visit of De Beauchamps
and Daucourt to Essen a fleet of Zeppelins, pro-
bably 12, had crossed to England. Two were
destroyed in Essex, while they did no material
injury to us.*
As for the Allied bombardments north and
south of the Somme which had commenced on
the 23rd, a French artillery officer remarked :
" A terrible drama is being enacted on the
Somme. I have been through the whole of
the Verdun battle and I have been two months
here, but I have not seen anything like the
havoc wrought by the Allied artillery yester-
day. It surpasses anything I have witnessed."
It speaks for the stubborn courage of the
Germans that on Sunday, September 24, while
their trenches were being inundated with
high-explosive shells, they took the offensive
at several points. A British post east of
Courcelette was assaulted ; three attacks were
delivered west of Lesboaufs against our men
and the French garrison of the Abb6 Farm, and
troops in trenches south of it had to withstand
a violent assault. These efforts on the part of
the enemy were all unavailing.
Monday, September 25, was the anniversary
of the Battle of Loos, which now seemed as
remote an event as the Battles of Le Gateau,
the Marne, and Ypres. It was a beautiful,
clear autumnal day. Not a cloud was hi the
sky ; a golden haze rose from the fields and
crept over the ruined villages and the litter of
what once were woods. Anticipating from the
frightful violence of the bombardment that the
Allies were about to renew their general
offensive between Thiepval and the Somme,
the Germans dispatched in the early morning two
flocks of aeroplanes to reconnoitre. They were
peppered with shrapnel, met in mid-air by our
aeroplanes, and driven back followed by our
pursuing airmen, who, with the observers in the
" Ruperts " (kite balloons), directed the fire of
our artillery. The balloons, iridescent in the
sun-light, seemed like aerial monsters decked
with glittering trappings for some State occasion.
The plan of General Fayolle and Sir Douglas
Haig was to break farther into the lines of the
enemy between the Albert-Bapaume road and
the Somme. Should success attend their efforts,
Sir Hubert Gough was the next day to storm
* See Vol. X., p. 192.
Thiepval and the ridge behind it. The whole
night-long guns of all calibres had been firing
incessantly.
At 12.30 p.m. the final bombardment before
the infantry attack opened. The din was in-
describable. Perhaps four times as many guns
LIEUT. GUYNEMER.
as had been in action along the whole front of
the great Battle of Liao-Yang in the Russo-
Japanese War were concentrating their fire
on a belt of ground only about 14 miles in
length. Most of those guns were immensely
more powerful than any employed by Oyama
or Kuropatkin, and the front of battle was very
much shorter. At the end of 10 minutes the
deafening noise slightly diminished. The
infantry combat had begun.
At the Battle of Loos-Vimy the efforts of the
Allies had not been properly co-ordinated, the
French attacking several hours after the British.
No such mistake was made on this occasion.
The tension was applied simultaneously to
every link in the German chain of fortified
positions. Several systems of trenches between
the Bapaume-Peronne chaussee and the Canal
du Nord were carried by the French, who
arrived in places at the banks of the canal.
East of the road the French captured Hill 1 30,
south-east of Bouchavesnes, and Hill 120 to .the
north-east of that village. Gradually the
•298
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
FRENCH SOLDIERS ENTRENCHED IN A SHELL-HOLE OUTSIDE COMBLES.
Germans were being thrust back into the valley
of the Tortille. Still more important, Ran-
court, due east of Combles, was taken. Situated
on the southern side of a bare narrow plateau,
one of the highest points in the neighbourhood,
it dominated the great wood of St. Pierre
Vaast, the edge of which ran about 500 yards
to its east. Part of Rancourt was traversed
by the Bapaume-Peronne highway ; the re-
mainder of the village was clustered about a
road through Fregicourt to Combles. From
the centre of Rancourt a narrow ravine des-
cended to the wood, in the hollows of which the
Germans had installed batteries bombarding
the French lines from the Priez Farm to
Uouohavesm's. This ravine bristled with
machine-guns. With the capture of Rancourt,
which formed, as it were, the main link between
the wood and Combles, the fall of Combles
could not long be delayed. The only com-
munication now connecting it with the rest of
the German Hues was the road which ran up-
wards through Fregicourt across the Bapaume-
Perouin' highway to Sailly-Saillisel. As will
shortly be related, the last of the other roads
by which the garrison of Combles could be
supplied with food an<l munitions hud been cut
by tint British when they stormed Morval.
Fregicourt, ft hamlet of 10 houses with a
chapel in it, still remained to be taken. On
the 24th our Allies pushed up to the southern
side of it, and evicted the Germans from their
powerful organizations between Fregicourt and
Hill 148, which is on the northern edge of
Rancourt. Thus the connexion of Combles
with Sailly-Saillisel was snapped and, as the
British were by now in Morval, there was no
longer any road by which the garrison of
Combles could be reinforced. The enemy's
sole access to the village was by a narrow
ravine twisting north-eastwards to Sailly-
Saillisel and the Bapaume-Peronne highway.
This ravine was under the fire of the Allied
artillery, machine-guns and rifles.
During the night the French continued their
advance on Combles, from which the Germans
were dragging some of their guns up the
ravine, down whose centre ran a little stream
While four French aeroplanes armed with guns
tired 82 shells on the convoys and enemy's
organizations in front of Sailly-Saillisel and in
the wood of St. Pierre Vaast, the infantry of
our Allies stormed Fregicourt. Patrols des-
cended the slopes towards the Combles ravine
and reached and seized the cemetery of this
town, situated at the point where the route
from Sailly-Saillisel reaches the western mouth
of the ravine. Other Allied detachments
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
299
moved up to the southern edge of Combles.
One of them captured a trench at the south-
west end and in it a company of Germans.
The unwouuded prisoners taken already
amounted to 800. Violent counter-attacks
delivered at nightfall against the French right
between the Bapaume-Peronne highway and
the Somme, with a view to forcing the French
to suspend their movement on Combles, had
been bloodily repulsed.
It is now time to describe the operations on
the 25th of Sir Henry Rawlinson's army,
which prolonged the Allied line from the wood
of Leuze above Combles on the west to Martin -
puich. Among Sir Henry Rawlinson's ob-
jectives were the villages of Morval — which,
as we have seen, was on one of the roads used
by the Germans to supply Combles — of Les-
boeufs to the north-north-west of Morval on
the Ginchy-Le Transloy road, and of Gueude-
court farther down the slope on the way to
Bapaume. A belt of country about 1,000
yards deep curving round the north of Flers,
which is south-west of Gueudecourt, to a
point mid-way between Flers and Martinpuich,
was also to be cleared of the enemy. The
battle-front was six miles long.
Morval, it will be recollected, stands on the
height north of Combles, which lies below it at
the bottom of the valley. With its subterranean
quarries, trenches and wire entanglements, it
was a formidable obstacle. The Germans still
held part of the wood of Bouleaux, north of the
wood of Leuze. Their machine guns lined two
trenches, " Lemco " and " Bovril," south-west
of Morval, and two sunken roads leading from
the village to Lesboaufs. After the tremendous
bombardment already described the British
infantry, at 12.30 p.m. on the 25th, advanced
to the attack. The enemy expected that the
wood of Bouleaux would be assaulted, but our
efforts at this point were confined to seizing two
trenches west of it. Nearly at right angles to
these was an embankment pitted with deep
dug-outs, held by a large force equipped with
machine-guns and minenwerfer. Here the
[Official phalLgraph.
GERMAN GUN EMPLACEMENT AT
COMBLES.
SHATTERED GERMAN WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS AT COMBLES.
800
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
•
THE MAIN STREET OF COMBLES.
fighting went on half way through the afternoon.
Finally the dug-outs were cleared, and 80
prisoners and five minenwerfer captured, to-
gether with a great store of shells. After dark
patrols entered Bouleaux Wood, which was
being evacuated by the Germans owing to the
result of the struggle in Morval.
Meanwhile, north-east of the wood our troops
simultaneously advanced on both sides of the
Ginchy-Morval road. The northern sector of
Morval gave little trouble. At the approach of
our bombers the garrison surrendered. In the
southern sector there was more resistance. The
Germans manfully defended the " Lemeo " and
" Bovril " trenches and a trench cut from the
eastern end of the village in a quarter circle to
the road to Fregicourt. As the British were north
and the French in the Fregicourt region south
of them the position of these brave men was
untenable and they began to dribble off in the
direction of Sailly-Saillisel.
The British troops to the left of the detach-
ments assaulting Morval were equally successful.
Exposed to severe machine-gun fire they seized
the road from Morval to Lesbocufs and stormed
into the latter village.* Some of the men swept
up the road to Le Transloy, others encircled the
village, from the ruined chateau in which
machino-guns for a time continued their fire.
Between Lssbceufs and Gueudecourt eight
• A captured German Army Order, dated September
21. emphasized the importance at that time of the
n.i-ition ut L-tlxeufs a^ "the last protection of the
artillery, which must in no circumstances be lost."
German battalions attempted to stem the
British advance but were quite unable to do so.
" My men," said a Baden officer, " would not
stand. I could not make them fight ; they had
had enough."
The attack on Gueudecourt did not yield such
good results. At the point where the Ginchy-
Gueudecourt and Flers-Lesbo;ufs tracks cross
one another a German redoubt barred the way.
In the neighbouring shell-craters groups of
Germans with machine-guns assisted its garri-
son.
, Before the village on the west and southern
sides there were two trenches strongly fortified
and protected with barbed wire. They were
known as Grid Trench and Grid Support. The
Ginchy-Gueudecourt road crossed them just
below the village in a deep ravine, which at this
point forked, one branch passing up the
western, the other up the eastern, side of Gueude-
court. Across both branches of the ravine went
the road from Le Transloy to Eaucourt
1'Abbaye. In Gueudecourt itself were machine-
gun posts and numbers of defended shell-holes
and hidden strongholds.
Advancing from the line held by them east of
Flers our men closed on Gueudecourt. The
German artillery in the background deluged
them with shells, and the redoubt at the cross-
roads swept the advancing infantry with
machine-gun fire. From a redoubt at the
junction of Grid Trench with another trench a
hail of bullets proceeded. This redoubt was
eventually carried by a bombing party, but at
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
301
nightfall we had not succeeded in storming
Gueudecourt. West of this place Sir Henry
Rawlinson's troops secured the fortified belt
.ilready referred to between Flers and Martin-
puich. Apart from the failure to capture
Gueudecourt, victory had everywhere attended
the efforts of the Allies. Slowly but surely they
were passing from the basin of the Somme into
that of the Scheldt.
During the night of the 25th-26th the
struggle went on. The sky was lit up from below
by white flares, throwing a vivid light over
parts of the battlefield and showing the rims of
the shell -craters snowy white. Combles, a dark
spot in the middle of the semi-circle of fiery
explosions caused by the Allied artillery,
seemed deserted.
While the French stormed Fregicourt and
descended into the cemetery and the eastern
houses of the ruined town and reached those to
the south, our troops picked their way down
from the wood of Leuze and through the
abandoned wood of Bouleaux. At 3.15 a.m.
on the 26th a strong patrol with machine-guns
"CEUX SONT LES ANGLAIS!"
The meeting of British and French in the village of Combles, September 26, 1916.
802
Till-: Tl.MI-:s HISTOUY OF THE WAR.
reached the railway which ran from the Somme
up the valley and ended in Combles. Through
the gloom they saw figures approaching them.
One of these drew near and reconnoitred.
"Ceux sont les Anglais ! " he cried. The
Allies had joined hands in Combles.
This town, which before the war had con-
tained 3,000 inhabitants, had been, as it
were, an arsenal for the Germans at the
Battle of the Sominc. Most of the stores had
been previously removed, but more than
1,800 rifles, four flammenwerfe.r, and thousands
of rounds of artillery ammunition and of
grenades were taken by the British alone.
Fighting continued in the ruins and the eaves
under the village, but the whole town was
soon entirely cleared of living Germans.
The dead lying in heaps bore witness to
the terrible effects of the fire of the Allied
guns.
Besides taking their share in the capture of
Combles, the French in the afternoon of the
2tith seized a small wood north of Fregicourt
half-way to Morval, and also the greater part
of the enemy's fortifications from this wood
RUINS OF COMBLES CHURCH.
to the western border of the wood of St.
Pierre Vaast.
Uith the seizure of Morval and Leebceufs,
almost the whole of the high ground between
the Albert-Bapaume and Peronne-Bapaumc
roads came finally into the possession of the
Allies. The Germans in the apex of the
triangle Albert - Bapaume -Peronne were every-
where under the observation of the British
posted on the captured heights. But on the
Peronne-Bapaume road the enemy was still
entrenched on Hill 148, just north of Ran-
court, and on Hill 153, east of Morval. These
hills were parts of a winding ridge, cruciform
in shape, on which Sailly-Saillisel and Saillisel,
practically one village, were built. The road
to Bapaume crossed the ridge and went through
Sailly. It then descended to Le Transloy, ro.se
again at Beaulencourt, and thence descended
to Bapaume. The villages of Morval and Les-
bceufs were on the eastern slopes of Hill 154,
north of Ginchy, and were separated from
Sailly-Sallisel by the ravine up which most of
the garrison and guns in Combles had been
withdrawn.
In the early hours of Tuesday, September 26,
the advance on Gueudecourt was resumed. A
Tank had been brought up in support of
the infantry. It was especially useful at the
point where Grid Trench and Grid Support
crossed the Ginchy road in the ravine, and in
reducing a strong post at the south-east end of
the village. When this fell Gueudecourt was
COMBLES, AS THE ALLIED ARMIES FOUND IT.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
303
CHEERING A "TANK.'
[By permission, from the official Ancre film.
speedily entered, and 650 prisoners were taken.
While our men were rounding them up the
Tank proceeded into the open country, and,
something going wrong with its machinery,
it was surrounded by the Germans, who pep-
pered it with bombs, shot at every chink in it,
•even climbed on its roof, and hammered at it
with the butts of their rifles, the crew mean-
time being engaged inside in repairing the
Tank and shooting down its assailants, who
made no impression on it. Possibly the Tank
might have been captured had not its plight
been perceived by our infantry who, issuing
from Gueudecourt, rescued it. Some 250 to
300 dead Germans lay around the Tank,
evidences of its effective fire.
Cavalry patrols pushed beyond the village.
Our line from Morval to Gueudecourt now ran
parallel with the Bapaume-Peronne road.
In the afternoon the Germans debouching
from Le Transloy flung themselves on our
trenches between Gueudecourt and Lesbceufs.
Checked by shell and rifle fire they were
charged with the bayonet and flung back in
utter confusion. Another counter-attack was
directed on the eastern corner of Courcelette
from the warren of German trenches between
the sunken Courcelette-Le Sars road and the
Albert-Bapaume highway. It was temporarily
successful, the enemy penetrating the out-
skirts of the village. The British troops rallied,
and bayoneted and bombed the intruders, and,
following in pursuit, began to clear out the
Germans from their dug-outs.
Between the British and the Peronne-
Bapaume road still lay the large village of Le
Transloy, from which the counter-attack
already ^narrated had issued. To reach Le
Transloy and the highway our troops would
have to move down bare slopes and then into
and up the western face of the ravine under
the fire of the enemy on the Sailly-Saillisel
ridge. Nevertheless, with the Allies also in
Combles and the French in Rancourt, the
German hold on the road north of Rancourt, on
the wood of St. Pierre Vaast and on Sailly-
Saillisel was becoming every hour more
precarious.
To take Bapaume, the capture of which
would have a psychological, as well as a
strategical, effect on the war, it was not, how-
ever, necessary to move from the heights down
the highway. At Gueudecourt we were but
three miles from the edge of this important
town. In the night of the 26th-27th, Sir
Henry Rawlinson pushed his troops from
Flers on Eaucourt 1'Abbaye, on the road from
Gueudecourt to Le Sars, through which village
runs the Albert-Bapaume highway, and during
the 27th we carried trenches north of Flers
on a front of 2,000 yards, and gained a foothold
to the east of Eaucourt 1'Abbaye. Our lines
304
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
TRENCH MORTARS FOUND IN COMBLES VILLAGE.
in the apex of the triangle Albert -Bapaume-
Peronne now resembled a wedge pointed to-
wards Bapaume.
By nightfall on September 25, the results of
the offensive conducted by Generals Fayolle
and Rawlinson had been so great and the
resulting position of our forces so favourable,
that Sir Douglas Haig decided that the moment
had now arrived for Sir Hubert Cough to push
on northward in the direction of the Ancre,
and drive the enemy out of Thiepval and off
the main ridge behind that village. As the
ridge commanded the valley of the Ancre it
had been fortified with peculiar care by the
Germans, some of whom were still on the edge
of Mouquet Farm. In Thiepval, the 180th
Regiment, composed of Wurtembergers, had
been placed as early as September 1914, when
the race for the sea was beginning. An apple
orchard before the village formed an advanced
work. At the southern end of the ruins was a
great pile of red bricks and raw earth — all
that remained of a chateau occupied by a
German tenant l>rt'»r<- the war. It is signifi-
cant that, according to report, its large cellars
had been made before the opening of hostilities.
These cellars were the central point of a vast
labyrinth of tunnels. All served for shelters
and storehouses. A sunken road, with passage-;
to dug-outs along its course, ran northward
from the middle of Thiepval towards the
cemetery, which as usual was a fortress in
itself. On the bare ridge behind and to the
north of it, at a thousand yards distance, was
the Schwaben Redoubt, an irregular oval
measuring nearly 700 yards long by 300 wide,
built in the fork of the roads leading from
Thiepval to St. Pierre Divion and Grandcourt,
both villages on the Ancre. A thousand yards
east of it, and connected with the Schwaben
Redoubt by the Hessian Trench, was the Stuff —
or Stufen — Redoubt, garrisoned by the l.Vinl
German regiment. These fortifications were
furnished with innumerable underground
shelters. From the western end of the
Schwaben Redoubt a maze of trenches de-
scended steeply to the ruins of St. Pierre Divion.
Well-timbered alleys connected the Schwaben
and Stuff Redoubts with the village of Grand-
court in the valley below, and a couple of
hundred yards north of the Stuff Redoubt was
another redoubt called " The Mound." The
whole face of the ridge down to the Ancre had
been hollowed out by the Germans during
their two years' occupation. The size of the
caves constructed by them may be gathered
from the fact that one used as a dressing
station and hospital contained 125 beds.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
305
From the vicinity of the Stuff Redoubt a
trench called " The Regina " ran eastwards,
parallel with the Albert -Bapaume chausseo
to the road which proceeds northwards out of
Le Sars to Pys and Miraumont, the village
next to Grandcourt going up the Ancre.
Between Thiepval and Courcelette,- lower down
the up-slope of the ridge and to the north of
Mouquet Farm, which, as previously mentioned,
was not completely cleared of the enemy, was
the Zollern Redoubt.
It may be imagined how formidable were
the barriers from the Zollern Redoubt and
Thiepval upwards still barring our way to the
valley of the Ancre, from St. Pierre Divion
eastwards. The whole of the works were
heavily wired, and the lines of approach to
this position were swept by the fire of German
batteries from the high ground north of the
Ancre.
When, on July 1, the Ulster troops had, in
spite of their great gallantry, vainly assaulted
its western face, the enemy was brimming over
with confidence in his own courage and skill and
in the supremacy of German military engineer-
ing. He had not yet seen villages as elaborately
fortified as Thiepval wrested one by one from
his grasp. By September 26, judging from
letters found on soldiers of the German 180th
and 153rd Regiments, the nerves of many of
the men hidden in the dug-outs on the Thiepval
ridge were shaken. " We must reckon," wrote
a soldier of the 180th Regiment on ther morn-
ing of Sir Hubert Gough's offensive, " with
FIRING THE BOMB.
the possibility of an attack at any moment, and
we are in a tight corner. The British now have
aerial torpedoes, which have a frightful effect."*
* Large trench bombs, or possibly Stokes bomb.-.
Another soldier of the 180th Regiment put
his ideas on paper (apparently a little later on
the same day) :—
We relieved a machine-gun crew who had the only
entrance to their dug-out knocked in by a shell after a
HEAVY FRENCH TRENCH KOMB.
gas bomb had fallen in it. You cannot imagine what
misery this is. Our company commander was gassed,
and is now in hospital. The bombardment has begun
attain at a rate to make a man dizzy. I think we shall
soon have either to get out or be taken by the
British.
Men of the 153rd Regiment, which was
holding the Stuff and Zollern Redoubts and the
outskirts of Mouquet Farm, were equally
despondent. Four days before — on September
22 — one of them wrote : —
In case of attack we are not in a position to defend
ourselves, much less to attack — the rifles have been
dragged through the mud and are useless. All we have
are bayonets and hand grenades, but I think if the
306
THE TIMES HIFtTOEY OF THE WAP.
" T.mimie- " came over MO one would put up a figlu ;
I he ni'-n would •.'lixlly go over to them.
And on September 25, when Sir Henry Rawlin-
snu awl General Fayolle were making their great
push and Sir Hubert Oough was preparing his,
the following was penned by another man of
the same regiment : —
\\e arv ul>out an hour from the trenches, 36 of us in a
duii-out. It is not surprising to hear that men are
mining, for they are torn to piece" ; many are buried and
never get out again. Tt would be better if German
women and girls could be here, for the war would scou
he over then.
It was from the South, from the Wunderwerk
to Mouquet Farm, that Sir Hubert Gough, on
the morning of the 2(ith, delivered his attack.
The capture of Courcelette, east of the Zollern
redoubt, had appreciably lightened his task.
After a very severe bombardment our troops,
following behind the ever-advancing barrage
and accompanied by Tanks, came over the
parapets of their trenches at 12.30 p.m. The
right wing, passing by the few Germans still
hidden beneath the outbuildings of Mouquet
Farm, whose influence by this time was of but
little moment, made for the Zollern Redoubt
in three successive waves. As they charged
forward they were unexpectedly attacked in the
rear by enemy machine-guns which had been
suddenly hoisted to the surface at some out-
building of the farm. A working party of
pioneers who happened to be near dropped their
tools, and headed by a young officer and
followed by other units, rushed for the guu
emplacement and forced a way into th<; dug-
outs. For six hours a desperate struggle went on
in the tunnels and chambers below the farm,
which stopped all attention of the garrison to
outside matters. Finally our men emerged with
.">(> German privates and an officer taken
prisoners. Meanwhile the Zollern Redoubt had
been stormed and prepared for defence by our
men.
In Thiepval itself the struggle was of the
fiercest. From the apple orchard machine-guns
played on the advancing infantry, while streams
of bullets proceeded from the chateau, the-
sunken road and the cemetery. Passing round
the eastern side of the village our bombers got
between it and the cemetery and then turned
back and entered Thiepval from the northern,
end. Slowly the surface of the ruins was
conquered, but no impression could be made on
the chateau. Suddenly, amid wild cheering
from our men, a Tank hove in sight, its guns
WITHIN A HUNDRED YARDS OF THIEPVAL.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
307
BRITISH ADVANCE TO ATTACK.
firing their hardest. A hail of shot pattered
ineffectually on its sides ; bombs burst on them
but did not penetrate. Nothing could stop its
onward movement. It charged the mound of
red-brick and earth ; and the garrison of the
isolated chateau despairingly surrendered.
Another Tank which had rendered good service
reached an obstacle over which it could not
climb. It halted and became for the nonce a
stationary fort.
The Wurtembergers driven from the surface
took refuge in their tunnels and caverns, and
for hours the fight went on with bomb, knife
and bayonet. Loud cries mingled with the
sound of the exploding bombs gave testimony
to the deadly nature of the struggle. Night fell
but brought no cessation of the contest. By the
light of electric torches our men hunted the
enemy from one lair into another, and it was
not till 8.30 a.m. on Wednesday the 28th that
Thiepval was finally in our hands. The Germans
had believed that it was impregnable. It had
been defended, not by raw levies, but by some
of those troops who in August, 1914, had swept
victoriously through Belgium and who had had
many months in which to prepare their strong-
holds without much interruption by fighting.
The cemetery of Thiepval, the Schwaben
Redoubt, and the Stuff Redoubt, with the
trenches binding them together, had still to be
carried before the summit of the Thiepval
salient would be securely held. From this chain
of fortified works the enemy descended again
and again into the ruins of the village, each time
being beaten back with heavy loss. On the 27th
we resumed the offensive. The south and west
sides of the Stuff Redoubt were carried, together
with the trench connecting it with the Schwaben
Redoubt. During the afternoon the latter was
assaulted and, in spite of desperate resistance,
the southern face of it was captured and our
patrols pushed to the northern face and towards
St. Pierre Divion. The next clay (September 28)
our guns concentrated on the cemetery of
Thi'pval, the Schwaben Redoubt, and the
neighbouring work known as the Crucifix. A
Times correspondent who was present gave a
graphic description of the barrage of gun-fire
and the subsequent assault : —
Beyond the little company of ragged trees and mottled
patch of ground which are all that there is of Thiepval
we saw the region of the Cemetery — marked by another
small company of tattered tree-stumps — and all the rise
beyond where the Crucifix was and the Redoubt lay,
disappear in an instant behind the dreadful veil. The
barrage lifted for a moment, and we knew that the
infantry were going into that hell of smoke and fire and
death. We saw the cloud spread northward as our guns
increased their range to positions beyond, and, as the
wind drifted the smoke away, the region on which our
storm had first broken came out peacefully into th«
sunlight again. Our men had gone beyond it.
Presently on that same region the enemy's shells began
falling — sure sign that it was our ground now and not his
— and still the tide of battle moved on. Ever northward
the curtain of our bursting shells passed steadily, until it
engulfed only the farther side of the Redoubt and down
to the German first line on the Ancre ; and there it hunt;.
Between it and us the enemy's shells dropped in increas-
ing numbers, on Thiepval, on the ground which our men
808
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
309
had just swept over, and at largo over tho middle distance
and the foreground of the picture. But always the
centre of the fight hung at the farther side, where the last
slope from the high ground of the ridge goes down to
the valley.
Well into the afternoon we watched, and then went
to meet the wounded, to seek prisoners, to find anyone
who could tell us of what was happening behind the pall.
But I still know nothing definite beyond what we saw
ourselves. We broke through the position at the
Cemetery and stormed into the Redoubt. Fighting
there appears to be still going on. All the ground from
here down to the valley is a maze of trenches, the German
front line which he has held for two years and all the
support lines and communication trenches and strong
points with which in that time he has supplied himself.
Among these trenches and along the front line the struggle
still rages, and British soldiers are finishing the task,
half done yesterday, which Germany for two years has
Bapaiime, and, in places, but two miles from
the Bapaume-Peronne highway, a section of
which from Rancourt southwards to beyond
Bouchavesnes had been secured by our Allies.
On the evening of September 27, it having
been discovered that in the neighbourhood of
Courcelette we had broken through the last line
of the German entrenched positions, some
Canadian cavalry were promptly dispatched to
Pys, a hamlet between the Ancre and Le Sars,
the last village fortress blocking the approach
to Bapaume by the Albert-Bapaume road.
Two lieutenants and 24 troopers proceeded
straight up the road itself. The next morn-
CANADIANS ADVANCING
[Canadian official photograph.
WITH PICKS AND SHOVELS READY TO DIG
THEMSELVES IN.
believed that no troops could ever do. Whether they
have yet succeeded or not, and wHether this last corner
of the ridge is ours, we shall know to-night.
When the sun set the ruins of the cemetery
were in the possession of the British, and we
had also penetrated into the Schwaben
Redoubt.
By the 28th the prisoners captured by the
British in the fortnight's fighting amounted
to 10,000. Sir Hubert Gough and Sir Henry
Rawlinson had reached most of their objectives.
Almost the whole of the summit of the ridge
from above Thiepval to Morval and beyond
were in the possession of the British. We
looked down on the valley of the Ancre from
the south side, we were within three miles of
ing two patrols located Germans in Dastre-
mont Farm, which was a mile beyond our
trenches and 300 yards south-west of Le Sars,
on the Albert-Bapaume road. There was a
skirmish, in which one Canadian was killed
and a second wounded. Another patrol dis-
covered enemy units between Le Sars and Pys,
and still another threaded its way across the
Regina trench, which ran north-west of Cource-
lette and parallel to the Bapaume road nearly
as far as Le Sars, but was driven back by
snipers. As a consequence of the reports
furnished by the Canadian cavalry, a Toronto
battalion on Thursday, September 28, advanced
a thousand yards to the north-east of Cource-
lette, while a New Brunswick battalion estab-
810
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
lished itself close to the south of the Regina
trench. A Montreal battalion also took part
ill these operations, the machine-guns of a
Brigade 'protesting its flank. German details
counter-attacking were wiped out by the fire
of the latter. The Borden Battery assisted.
Three of its guns were hit, and some casualties
incurred.
While the Canadians at the point of junction
between the armies of Sir Hubert Gough and
Sir Henry Rawlinson were wedging themselves
in north of the Albert-Bapaume road, the
Germans to the west of Courcelette clung
desperately to the northern edge of the Thiepval
salient. On the 28th, when the fine weather
broke up and rain began to fall we had, as
already described, captured the Thiepval
cemetery, and broken into the southern face
of the Schwaben Redoubt. During the night
of the 28th-29th the Germans shelled heavily
the lost positions, and our bombers were at
work on the remainder of the redoubt and in
the Hessian trench, which connected it with
the captured Stuff Redoubt.
The next day, Friday, September 29, rain
fell in torrents, but the fighting still went on
at these points. A counter-attack drove us
from a section of the Hessian trench, but
later in the day this was recovered. A single
company in the morning had stormed Destre-
mont Farm, which formed an advanced post
to Le Sars. Four miles away to the east Sir
Henry Rawlinson's troops had occupied 500
yards of enemy trenches in the direction of
the Bapaume-Peronne road, while between
Morval and Fregicourt our Allies were
approaching that chaussee. Morval had been
handed over to the French in order to facilitate
their advance on Sailly-Saillisel.
The activity exhibited by the Allied artillery
w~as maintained on Saturday, September 30.
The German guns replied to the best of their
ability during the night of September 29-30,
heavily shelling our battle-front south of the
Ancre. It was the prelude to violent counter-
attacks in the vicinity of the Stuff Redoubt
and the Hessian trench. The last of them was
delivered at 5 a.m. on September 30. At noon
we again advanced and gained the whole of
the trench with the exception of a small
section which was attached to the sunken road
to Grandcourt on the Ancre. This road had
been entrenched and enemy reinforcements
were constantly ascending it from (Irandcourt
IS!
11
LOADING UP LIMBERS WITH AMMUNITION.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
311
HOWITZER IN ACTION ON THE ANCRE.
[Of/id il photograph.
to aid the Germans in the Schwaben Redoubt,
Hessian trench and Begina trench previously
referred to. On the French front progress had
been made north of Bancourt by grenade
fighting.
Up to this date the gains of the British since
September 14 had been as follows : *
The number of prisoners captured had
swollen to 26,735. We had secured 27 enemy
guns, 40 trench mortars and over 200 mitrail-
leuses. Of the 38 German Divisions — which
at full strength would have numbered about
450,000 infantry— no less than 29 had had
to be withdrawn in an exhausted or broken
state. The half -moon of upland ground south
•of the Ancre with every height of importance
had been carried ; we had now direct observa-
tion to the east and north-east ; and the enemy
had been driven back upon his fourth line
behind the low ridge just west of the Bapaume-
Peronne road between Bapaume and Le
Transloy.
The importance of the three months' offensive
was, however, not to be judged solely by the
distance advanced, but had to be gauged by
the effect upon the German numbers, material
and moral. Hindenburg had been obliged since
September 15 to reinforce the Crown Prince of
Bavaria with twelve new divisions or roughly
* See further Official Summary of October 3, published
iu The Times of October 5.
100,000 infantry, of which seven divisions had
been launched against the troops of our New
Army. The enemy had used up his reserves
in repeated costly and unsuccessful counter-
attacks without causing the Allies to relax
their steady and methodical pressure. Shelled,
bombed and bayoneted from villages, woods and
trenches which their engineers had fondly
believed they had rendered impregnable, the
Germans were at last beginning to doubt the
gain of any decided victory. Some extracts
from letters or diaries found on prisoners at this
time will show their feelings. One unfortunate
wrote : —
We are actually fighting on the Somme against the
English. You can no longer call it war, it is mere
murder. . . . The slaughter at Ypres and the battle
in the gravel pit at Hulluch were the purest child's play
compared with this massacre, and that is much too mild
a description.
We are here now on the Somme in such an artillery
fire as I have not experienced — indeed, no one has in
the whole war. Cover there is none ; we lie in a shell-
hole and defend ourselves to the last man. He who
comes out of this fire can thank God. It's frightful ;
such a murder here.
I have not been through anything like it in the whole
war. It may well be called sheer hell. It is unendurable.
Another in hospital said : " We are already sick
of the damned war. . . . My feeling about it
is such that if I am to go back I shall serve for
three weeks and then get ill again, for there is
no object in fighting any more." Here is a
picture of the conditions under wliich some of
812
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
SOME OF THE PRISONERS.
the garrisons of the subterranean fortresses
were living : —
i
The gallery in which we now are is tolerably well
constructed. ... In it are also a machine gun and its
crew of four men, two sentries, one wounded, two men
with carrier pigeons, two men who have lost their way —
altogether 29 men. The gallery is full from top to
bottom. There are two men sitting on every other step
of the stairs. The air is fearfully bad and hot, as there
is no proper ventilation. . . . We have to live here
for four days. Several of us were ill, and fresh air was
not to be had. We dare not stick our heads outside the
entrance, for enemy airmen are continually on the
watch, and the artillery sweeps the entrances with
shrapnel.*
Most of the prisoners complained of the
superiority of the Allied airmen.
There are no trenches in the front-line position. The
men lie to a large extent in shell-holes. The enemy
aviators descend to a height of about 80 metres and
fire on them with machine-,'runs and signal with horns.
The enemy's aviators are far superior, especially in
numbers. Our airmen are powerless and are put to flight
as soon as the enemy machines approach our trench
lines.
Occasionally a German relieved his mind with
hysterical and comic abuse : —
\\ e will not span- our insolent, villainous enemy, but
destroy everything that e.imt-s into our hands, for the
• •owardly blackguards see that they cannot do anything
with us in the trenches, mid so now their aircraft have
to fly to our towns and there destroy our poor innocent
women and girls — a very shameful proceeding on the
* Mriiu-hrxlr.r f;-i,,rilinn.
part of the cowardly blackguards, and one which will
stand to their credit later on. But, thank God, we can
say that we have not led our Fatherland against poor
women and children, but with an iron fist have raised
our weapons in the fight against the venomous hosts of
our enemy and have nobly and justly defended our
Fatherland, and so that we hope a victorious and lasting
peace may ensue.
No doubt the slaughter of unoffending British
citizens on land by Zeppelins or on sea by
submarines was, in this egregious person's eyes,
commendable. But he howls like a whipped
dog when his own people suffer.
As a matter of fact, however, our airmen
never intentionally bombed civilians. They
had other work to do. "For every enemy
machine," wrote the British Headquarter Staff
on October 3, " that svicceeds in crossing our
front it is safe to say that 200 British machines
cross the enemy's."
The French military authorities, alto
summed up the situation at the end of Septem-
ber, 1916. They pointed out that at the time
of the commencement of the Somme offensive
the Oermans had possessed two main lines of
fortifications. The first, from 500 to 1,000
yards in depth, was based on the powerfully
organized positions of Thifpval, Ovillers-la-
Boiselle, Fricourt, Mametz, Curlu, Frise on the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
313
Somme, Dompierre, Fay and Soyecourt, and
consisted of a series of parallel trenches —
usually three in number — between which were
innumerable shelters for men, machine-guns
and ammunition. Behind it came a second
line of positions from Orandcourt on the
Ancre, through Pozieres, the two Bazentins,
Longueval, Guillemont, Maurepas, and across
the Somme to Herbecourt, and from Herbe-
court southwards through Assevillers and
Belloy en Santerre to Ablaincourt. Between
the first and second lines were in places systems
of intermediate trenches, and along the whole
front of the second barrier ran wide barbed-
wire entanglements. Farther back were • a
series of other organizations constructed during
the battle.
Such had been the tremendous obstacles
GERMANS, CAPTURED BY THE FRENCH, PASSING THROUGH A TRENCH
UNDER THE EYES OF THE BRITISH.
311
THE TIMES HISTOPV OF THE WAP.
encountered by the British and French on the
25 miles front. Nearly all the first and the
greater part of the second of the lines had been
carried between July 1 and July 6. Between
July 6 and September :i the remainder of the
Official photograph.
DRAWING WATER FOR COOKING.
second line Had been occupied. From Septem-
ber 3 onwards the Allies had continued their
offensive, constantly proving their superiority
over the enemy. Between -Inly 1 and Septem-
ber 17, the French alone, continued, the -icpcrt,
, DINNER-TIME ON THE ANGRE.
(Official fkoloirafh.
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
315
had taken 30,000 unwouiided and 4,500
wounded prisoners, and had captured 144 guns
of which more than half were heavy pieces,
a number of trench mortars, about 500 machine-
guns, vast quantities of shells and a captive
balloon. The Allies had conquered a zone of
territory considerably greater than that won
by the Germans after six months' fighting at
the Battle of Verdun. Up to September 17,
no less than 67 fresh divisions and 17 fresh
battalions had been opposed to them. The
greater part of these divisions and battalions
September 17, or with the operations of General
Micheler's Army between Ablaincourt and
Chilly. Since September 17 the French,
north of the Somme, had, as related, captured
Rancourt, and they were now on the outskirts
of Sailly-Sailiisel, while General Micheler's
thrust eastwards had rendered it more and
more difficult for the enemy to maintain himself
in the area west of the Somme from Ablain-
court through Barleux to Peronne. In the
Biaches region, General Fayolle's troops were
already in tho south-western environs of
SORTING THE' MAIL FROM HOME.
[Official phjtograph.
had been drawn from sectors where no battle
was in progress. " The Battle of the Somme,"
said the French report, " has destroyed the
German will to conquer before Verdun. As the
Somme battle has developed the German
attacks on Verdun have become weaker and
weaker, and the German troops that were
concentrated before the great French eastern
fortress have ebbed away regularly toward the
Somme. Better still, with the development
of the Somme battle the enemy before Verdun
soon changed from the offensive to tho
defensive."
The French report, it will be perceived, did
not deal with the momentous fighting since
Peronne, and from the east of Clery and from
Bouchave, nes they were within striking distance
of Mont St. Quentin, the northern key to the
city. The points of the blades of, as it were,
a pair of scissors, which crossed at Frise, on
the Somme, were closing, and Peronne, like
Bapaume, might be expected in the near
future to be cut off and compelled to surrender.
Whether, however, Peronne and Bapaume
were secured mattered comparatively little.
In this warfare of attrition the great question
exercising the minds of the Staffs on both sides
was how to reduce the opponent's effectives.
Until the enormous forces yet at the disposal
of Hindenburg had been materially reduced
sir,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
•
'
INDIAN CAVALRY DISPATCH RIDER COMING BACK FROM FLERS.
Road-makers are at work among the wreckage of a wood.
by casualties it was idle for the Allies to expect
decisive victories. The Frankfurter Zeitnni/
of September 27 boldly asserted that' in strategy
the Entente had won nothing. This was a
criticism derived from the study of old wars,
when battles were decided by piercing positions
or outflanking them. .But, by September,
1916, the test to be applied when considering
the result of a battle was almost an arith-
metical one. Had the balance of effectives,
weapons, and munitions shifted as a result of
the struggle ? Applying this test to the
Battle of the Somme from July 1 to Sep-
tember 30 the answer was unequivocal. The
writer in the Frankfurter Zeitung might allege
that Hindenburg's calm course had not
" swerved a hair's breadth from its intended
path " ; but if that were true, why had the Batt le
of Verdun subsided and the Germans, after t heir
prodigious losses, abandoned their offensive ?
The movements of the German forces in the
Western theatre of war during the Battle of
the Somme also told a significant tale. At this
epoch the enemy appears to have had in the
field 1!).'! divisions, of which 117 consisted of
three. .">7 of four regiments, the remaining 1!»
being of various si/.es. One hundred and
(\\enty-four divisions had l>een stationed on
the Western front. Xow, at the beginning
of the Battle of the Somme. from .Inly 1
to .July" '.I. the 2f> miles long line of en-
treiH-hiMcnts had been held by 18 divisions.
From the 10th to the .-ml of July, 15 of
them were withdrawn and replaced by 12
fresh ones. In the last week of August no
fewer than 26 divisions were shuffled from
one position to another on the front of battle,
and in the third week of September six di visions
were brought up to the Somme from other
positions between Ostend and Miilhauscn,
and seven divisions retired and six divisions
which were resting displaced. Simultaneously
two divisions were withdrawn from the Verdun
region. One wns sent into Champagne. and
the other into Belgium.
It is obvious that if Hindenburg had not
been obliged by dire necessity lie would never
have imposed the immense labour involved in
moving these masses of troops to and fro,
especially when his object was not to fight an
offensive but a defensive battle. It must,
moreover, be remembered that the extra-
ordinarily complicated character of the lines
north and south of t'he Somme rendered ifc
most inadvisable suddenly to send new troops
to garrison them, hi the struggles of enrlii r
periods otlieers and men could quickly under-
stand the features of a posit ion which they \\ere
called upon at a moment's notice to oeeii|>\.
but here the nuv/.es of tunnels and treneho>.
and the thousands of dug-outs, required to
be studied for days before their tactical value
could be fully appreciated. To rush men
ignorant of the locality into the labyrinthine
entrenchments was to court disaster.
The truth was that the initiative in the
Western theatre had at last passed from the
Germans to the Allies.
CHAPTER CLXXVI.
PERSIA AND THE WAR.
PERSIA AND ITS POPULATION — AN OUTLINE OF PERSIAN HISTORY — THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH
CONNEXION — THE SHERLEYS — JOHN ELTON — PERSIA AND THE NAPOLEONIC WARS — TREATY OF
TURKOMANCHAI RUSSIA AND INDIA NASIR-UD-DlN THE BENEFITS OF 'BRITISH INTERVENTION —
BRITISH CONCESSIONS — MURDER OF NASIR-UD-DIN — " SISTER MU/.AFFER " — REVOLUTION OF
1906 — THE CONSTITUTION — DEPOSITION OF MOHAMED ALT — THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION
OF 1907 — THE SPHEBES OF INFLUENCE — POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES — KVENTS FROM 1909 TO 1914 —
REGENCY OF NASIR-UL-MULK — MR. SHUSTER'S MISSION — RETURN OF MOHAMED ALI — GERMAN
INTRIGUE — PERSIAN " NEUTRALITY " IN 1914 — TURKISH INVASION AND THE GERMANS IN PERSIA —
MILITARY EVENTS IN 1915 AND 1916 — SIR PERCY SYKES'S MARCH — PERSIA AFTER Two YEARS
OF WAR.
IN an earlier .chapter, " The Invasion of
Chaldea," * some pages were devoted
to an account of the British connexion
with the Persian Gulf, extending over a
period of three centuries. This touched the
fringe of a larger question — the relations
between Great Britain and the ancient kingdom
of Persiar — but touched only the fringe of it ;
for though the northern shore of the Gulf is
mostly Persian territory the southern shore
is not, and the control by Great Britain of
these waters and shores is mainly a maritime
question, which could therefore be best
treated separately. The present chapter will
deal with Persia as a whole, and its connexion
with the war.
In the first place it may be desirable to say
a few words about the geographical position
of Persia, and about the character of the
country and its population.
Between the Mediterranean on the west and
the frontier of India on the east lie the terri-
tories of three considerable Powers — Turkey,
Persia, and Afghanistan. These territories
cover a tract 2,500 miles in breadth, of which
Persia occupies the central portion — a block
900 miles broad. It is bounded on the north
* Vol. III., Chap. LII.
Vol. XI.— Part 139.
by Russia and the Caspian, on the south by
the waters of the Persian Gulf and Arabian
Sea ; and its area is more than five times that
of the United Kingdom.
The conformation of Persia is remarkable,
for the bulk of the country consists of a vast
plateau, with an average height of nearly
4,000 feet above the sea, surrounded by lofty
ranges of mountains. This plateau is called
by the Persians themselves Iran, or the land of
the Aryans, and it is known by this name
throughout Asia. The classical name Persis
was derived from Parsa, now Fars, the most
famous province of Iran. Naturally a country
of such extent is not one uniform tableland.
Large parts of it are comparatively low-lying
desert, possibly once an inland sea ; its surface
is broken in other parts by rugged highlands,
or by lakes of immense size ; and beyond the
encircling mountain ranges, near the northern
and southern seas, there are districts which
have a character of their own, entirely different
from that of the central tract. Nevertheless,
the description given above may be regarded
as approximately accurate. Somewhat the
same configuration of country may be found in
Spain and South Africa.
The climate of the great central plateau is
317
818
THE TIMES H1STOEY OF THE WAR.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
319
in many respects agreeable. The average
rainfall is small — perhaps not more than
10 inches, and the air is extraordinarily dry
and clear. In summer the heat is often
great, over 100° F. in the shade ; hut owing
to the dryness it is not, as a rule, oppressive.
In winter there is hard frost for some months'
with occasional falls of snow ; but the sky is
generally cloudless, and the air exhilarating-
The scenery in its own way is beautiful, for
though the greater part of the plateau is stony
and bare the clearness of the atmosphere
gives vast distance ; and the mountains and
plains take exquisitely pure shades of colour.
in Shiraz, where it somewhat resembles sherry.
Indeed Xeres is said to have derived its vine and
its name from Shiraz. Mulberries abound, and
pomegranates, apple orchards are common, and
melons of various kinds are cultivated in great
quantities. The peach, nectarine, apricot, fig,
orange, and many other fruits are believed to
have come to Europe from Persia. Dates are
grown in the low country near the sea. The
flowers of Persia are as varied as the fruits.
Almost all that can be grown in Europe can be
grown in Persia, and it is difficult to imagine
anything more beautiful than a Persian garden
in spring and early summer. Violets line the
ON THE KARUN RIVER.
[Murray Sftwart.
The great white cone of Damavand, rising
from the blue range of the Elburz, may be
seen against the northern sky from the plains
a hundred and fifty miles away. More-
over the plateau is not all bare. Among
the mountain ranges are grassy valleys and
stretches of woodland watered by clear snow-
fpd streams ; and even on the plains, where
water has been brought down from the flanks
of the ranges by underground channels, the
picturesque villages are surrounded by green
fields, and shaded by lofty poplars and planes.
The soil of Persia, where water can bo
obtained, is in many parts extremely fertile.
It produces excellent wheat and other cereals,
tobacco, cotton, beet, and fruit of many kinds.
In some parts of the country grapes are almost
as common as blackberries in England, and the
village streets may be seen roofed with vines.
Good wine is made in various provinces, notably
water runnels in countless numbers, and are
followed by iris and lilac and laburnum and
roses. Blackbirds and nightingales sing day
and night, and the crested hoopoe and blue
jay build in the trees and walls. Wild flowers,
too, abound in the mountain valleys.
Practically there are no navigable rivers in
Persia. The torrents which pour down from
the mountains in spring with the melting of the
snows lose themselves in the dry plains of the
central plateau, where the unclouded sun causes
strong evaporation. One river, the Karun,
breaks from the western mountains and joins
the Shatt al Arab in its course to the Persian
Gulf, but even the Karun is navigable by largf
vessels for a short distance only — about 1 1 0 miles
— and it does not belong to Persia proper — the
plateau of Iran — for it takes its rise in one
of the encircling ranges. The inland rivers,
such as they are, were evidently at one time
320
THE TIMES H1XTOHY OF THE WAR.
utilized freely for irrigation, and .-i-c so even
now to some extent ; but the main resource
oi' the country for this purpose is the winter's
snowia.ll. This not only covers and directly
nourishes the crops, but fills the flanks of the
mountains with water, which is tapped a-id
drawn away by underground irrigation channels,
or " kenatx," often many miles in length.
The population of Persia is small for so large
a country, probably not more than ten millions,
if as much ; and though the numerous ruined
cities and irrigation works seem to suggest that
the population was once much greater, this is
now disbelieved by those best qualified to judge,
A BOUNDARY PILLAR ON THE TURCO-
PERSIAN FRONTIER.
who doubt whether it ever exceeded fifteen
millions. The present population consists of
two main divisions — the dwellers in the cities
and villages of the plains, and the nomad tribes-
men who wander about with their black tents
anil flocks and herds between their summer and
winter quarters. These nomads form perhaps
a quarter of the total population, and hold on a
more or less independent tenure the mountain
tracts into which they retire for the summer,
though they all call themselves Iranis and own
t he suzerainty of the Shah. They are of various
races, chiefly Turks, Lurs, Kurds and Arabs.
Some of the nomads are of good fighting stock,
though without discipline ; and indeed it may
be said that the .Persians in general make
ellieient soldiers, for they are a hardy, frugal
race, capable of enduring much exposure and
fatigue. They are withal amenable to disci-
pline, not wanting in courage, and remarkably
intelligent.
The trade of Persia is small. In old days.
when the immensely rich commerce of the far
east used to flow to the markets of Europe
through Persia, the country gained greatly by
it, and became itself the seat of considerable
wealth ; but this state of tilings has long passed
away, and Persia is now a poor country, with a
total foreign trade of probably less than ten
millions sterling. Even its modern silk trade has
almost perished, and its once flourishing towns
and trade roads bear every mark of decay. Xor
does there seem to be any immediate hope of a
revival of prosperity.
Nevertheless, it is evident that a large
country so situated, and in some ways so
favoured by Nature, can never, in spite of its
small population and its poverty, be a negli-
gible quantity in the politics of the East ; and
a study of its history shows that, in fact,
it has from the earliest times proved itself
capable of becoming, not once but. again
and again, the centre of a mighty empire.
Nothing in the records of the past is more
striking than the part which Iran has played
among the nations of the world, and unless this
is understood the present importance of the
country, decadent as it seems, can hardlv be
RUINED PALACE IN THE FORGOTTEN
CITY OF KOH-I-KOUADJA, IN SEISTAN
realized. Persia may be now merely a great
nominis umbra, but it enjoys throughout Asia,
on account of its ancient power and civilization
and culture, a prestige which should not be
undervalued. It would be impossible within
the limits of a chapter to do more than glance at
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
321
THE FORESHORE AT BUNDER ABBAS.
the salient points of Persian history, but this
much at least must be done.
It may be said that Persian history emerges
from the glittering mists of Irani legend some-
thing more than five hundred years before
Christ, when Britain was an almost unknown
island inhabited by Celtic tribes. Then a great
conqueror and king, Cyrus, established himself
in Southern Persia, and, first subduing the
Modes of the north, carved out for himself an
empire stretching from tho frontiers of India to
the shores of the Mediterranean. His son Cam-
byses added Egypt to the Persian dominions,
and not many years later Darius crossed into
Europe and made himself master of Thrace and
Macedonia. How he and his son Xerxes were
repelled at Marathon and Salamis, and Greece
was saved, all the world knows. Then gradu-
ally the strain of distant conquests told upon
Persia, and after the dynasty of Cyrus had
lasted two hundred years Asia ceased to prevail
over Europe. In the fourth century before
Christ Alexander the Great swept back the
Persians to their own country, and broke to
pieces the first Persian Empire.
1
PIER AND CUSTOMS HOUSE AT BUNDER ABBAS.
Leva! Frastr.
139-2
822
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
For five hundred years after that time Persia,
though not the colossal power she had been,
set phiyed tin important part in the affairs of
the world. Under the kings of the dynasty of
Seleucus, Alexander's general, she was still
great ; and then, under the Parthian kings,
sprung from the country about her north-
eastern frontier, she carried on a long and not
unequal contest against the power of Rome,
SULTAN AHMED, SHAH OF PERSIA.
whose dominion had extended into Western
Asia. The Parthians established their capital
outside Iran, at Ctosiphon on the Tigris, and
they were finally overthrown riot by the
Romans but by the Persians themselves, who
ruse ngain-it them two hundred years after the
beginning of our era.
Then once more a purely Persian dynasty
knitted supreme posver in Iran. This dynasty.
the " Sassanian," ruled Persia for about four
hundred years, and raised her to a height of
strength and glory such as few nations had ever
attained. While Britain was a Roman pro-
vince the Persian kiii'*s maintained, as the
Parthians had done, a long-standing warfare
against the Roman posver, and they even on
one occasion took captive a Roman Emperor.
Their line endured through the early centuries
of Christianity, and fell only when, in the
seventh century, the new faith of Mahomed
suddenly burst upon the world.
The Persian Kmpire was then almost as
extensive as ever, and its wealth was great, but
misrule and decay had set in ; and though the
Arabs, swarming out of their desert sands in all
the fervour of their first enthusiasm, found
Persia blocking their road to the eastward,
with the capital of her dominion still at Ctesi-
phon, she was no longer the virile and efficient
power she had hitherto been. There was some
severe fighting, for the Moslems were greatly
outnumbered, but Ctesiphon fell, and after a
few years Iran itself was completely subdued.
The religion of Zoroaster, himself a Persian, was
then, and had been for many centuries, the
prevailing faith, but most of the Persians now-
embraced Isla-n.
It would be impossible to follow in any detail
the course of Persian history during the earlier
centuries of Mahomedan rule in Asia. At first
Persia was merely an outlying province of the
Moslem Empire, and was ruled by governors
under the Arab Caliphs. Then, about, the
middle of the eighth century of our era,
Baghdad, which was close to Ctesiphon, became
the capital of the Caliphate, and the influence
of Persia began to assert itself at the neu -Court.
Though conquered, Iran was far more civilized
than her conquerors, "and there opened an era
of culture, toleration, and scientific research,"*
which bore witness to the intellectual superiority
the Persians hail established throughout Western
Asia.
That superiority remained for several hun-
dred years tin- main glory of the ancient
kingdom. As the military power of the
Caliphate declined Persia became the prey of
various conquerors and dynasties, mostly
foreign, none of sxhom raised the country
to its old imperial rank. But during that
period literature, science, and art made at
times surprising progress, and Persia was never
perhaps greater or so great in the influence
which she exercised on the culture of other
countries — from India to Spain. Her literary
« -Mui- : --111' Cali|,h.-ite."
THE TIMES HISTORY VF THE WAE.
823
eminence may perhaps be judged from the
fact that the Persian writer best known to the
western world, Omar Khiyam, who died in
1123, is regarded in his own country as not
entitled to a place in the front rank of Persian
literature.
About the year 1500, after the throne of
Iran had been occupied by Turks, Tartars,
Uzbegs, and others, including conquerors like
Chengiz Khan and Tamerlane, a native Persian
dynasty, that of the Sufi or " Sophi " kings,
established itself and won for the national
religion, the Shiah branch of the Moslem faith,
a recognized place in the world. The fourth
monarch of tliis line, Shah Abbas, ascended the
throne in 1585, and held it for 40 years,
being thus a contemporary of Queen Elizabeth
in England and the great Akbar in India.
Shah Abbas more than held his own against the
formidable power of Turkey on the west, and
also reconquered the country on the east nearly
up to the frontiers of India. Nor was he only
or mainly a conqueror. He ruled Persia with
firmness and justice, and raised it to a great
height of prosperity. The remains of the
roads and other public works which he con-
structed are to be found even now all over
the country, and the splendour of his capital
at Ispahan became famous throughout the
world. Envoys and travellers from the fore-
most countries of Europe came to pay their
respects to the " Great Sophi," and Iran again
held up her head as one of the most powerful
and magnificent of the nations. More than
twenty centuries had passed since the rise of
the first Persian Empire, and though the
dominions of Abbas were not as extensive as .
those of Cyrus they still stretched from Baghdad
and Mosul to Kandahar. The influence of
Iran stretched much farther, for throughout
the Mogul Empire of India the very language
of the Court and the camp was Persian, and
Persia was the model in literature and the
arts.
For a hundred years after the death of Shall
, Abbas his dynasty remained on the throne, but
it produced no other great ruler, and early in
the eighteenth century its power had greatly
declined. The Turks had come forward again
on the west ; Russia, though still distant,
was beginning to threaten the northern pro-
vinces ; in the ea=t Kandahar was lost ; in the
south the Arabs of the Gulf were harassing
the Persian shore: ; and throughout Persia
the old military spirit seemed to have faded
away. Finally, in 1722, the Afghans from the
east invaded the country, and after one
half-hearted stand near the capital, the Shah
gave up his crown to the Afghan leader. It
seemed as if the greatness of Iran had fallen
for ever.
Yet within the next twenty years Persia
had once more risen from her ashes, and not
only resumed her place among the great nations
of the East but found among her people a man
who could lead her armies from victory to
victory and make her again, for a short
space at least, the centre of a mighty empire.
MIRZA MEHDI KHAN.
Persian Minister in London,
The story of this revival is one of the most
romantic in the long course of her national
life. It cannot be told here at length ; but
in a few words it was as follows. Five years
after the Afghans took Ispahan a Persian
robber chief of Turcoman descent, Nadir
Kuli, who had gathered about him a body of
hardy freelances, became aware of the small
number of the invaders and determined to
expel them. Attaching himself to one of the
Shah's sons he was soon joined by considerable
numbers of Persians, and within three years,,
after some fierce fighting, he had destroyed
the Afghans and gained for himself a great
824
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
reputation. He then turned on the Turks,
defeated them in some bloody battles,
and carried his arms to the Caucasus. The
Russians, who had occupied some Persian
districts in the north, now withdrew from then1,
and Iran was free. The grateful Persians
thereupon raised Nadir to the throne. In
three years more he had conquered Afghanis! an
and marched into India, where he overthrew
the Mogul Emperor and took Delhi, returning
with colossal plunder. Then he invaded
Central Asia, and subdued both Bokhara and
Khiva. By 1740 his conquests were as exten
aive as the territories afterwards overrun by
Napoleon in Europe. Unhappily Nadir Shah's
character then rapidly deteriorated, and he
became a rapacious and bloody tyrant. At
jast, in 1747, execrated by the Persians, whose
idol he had been, he was murdered, and his
dominions fell to pieces. His reign lasted
almost exactly the same time as Napoleon's.
After his death Iran passed through a period
of turmoil, until in 1794 a capable but blood-
thirsty eunuch named Aga Mahomed, belong-
ing to the Kajar tribe, made himself master of
the throne, which had been in dispute between
several pretenders. His first act was to invade
the northern province of Georgia, which had
declared itself independent under one of Nadir
Shah's generals, and now sought the protection
of Russia. The greater part of Georgia was
reduced, and the Persians once more became
masters of Tiflis and Erivan ; but a Russian
army of 40,000 men advanced into the country,
and it would have gone hard with the Persians
but for the fact that at this juncture the Empress
Catherine died, and her troops were withdrawn.
The rest of Persia had meanwhile submitted to
the eunuch king, and Iran was reunited.
Then followed his assassination, after a short
reign of three years ; but in spite of some
revolts his nephew and heir, Fath Ali, succeeded
without much difficulty in making himself
Shah, and the dynasty of the Kajars was firmly
established. It has lasted until now.
So far, in this short sketch of Persian history,
no reference has been made to the connexion
between Persia and Great Britain. It. may
now be desirable to show at what points
the two countries came into contact, and
in what circumstances a connexion which was
at first slight and transitory became close and
permanent.
The Persians, as mentioned above, had in
early times embraced the teaching of Zoroaster ;
but always deeply interested in religious
thought, they had also welcomed Christianity,
and in the sixth century the Persian Church
was very active. It is said that at this
time a Persian bishop named Ivon visited
England, and that the name St. Ives is
derived from him.* Seven hundred years
* Sykes, History of Persia.
SHIRAZ: THE GATE OF BAGH SHAH.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
825
later, during the reign of Edward L, after
some correspondence between the Courts of
Persia and England, Geoffrey de Langley was
sent to Persia on a mission, but no complete
account of this is known to exist. Again, in
the reign of Henry IV., the conqueror Tamer-
lane, then in possession of Persia, wrote a letter
offering free commercial intercourse, and the
draft of King Henry's reply has been preserved-
Both letters were carried by an English friar
preacher resident at Tabriz. But these com-
munications seem to have had no tangible
result, and until the time of the Sophi kings
England and Persia had practically no, con-
nexion with each other. Then, the spirit of
adventure at sea having been stirred in England,
and a lucrative trade opened tip with Russia.
Anthony Jenkinson, Captain General of the
Muscovy Company's fleet, was instructed to
open up commercial relations with Persia
as well. This he proceeded to do, and
starting from Moscow in 1561, three years
after Queen Elizabeth came to the throne of
England, he reached Persia, and was received
by the then Shah, Tahmasp. The trade
which he established did not last long, for Persia
was at the moment passing through a period
of revolt and anarchy. Moreover, the storms
and pirates of the Caspian Sea made voyages
extremely dangerous. In 1581, therefore, the
venture was abandoned. But it had shown
the way to our people, and had attracted
much attention in England, as is proved by the
literature of the time ; and before the close
of the century a fresh attempt was made
to get into touch with Persia. This time
it was made not by merchants, but by
" gentlemen adventurers," and with remarkable
success. There are few episodes in the history
of the English connexion with the East morn
interesting than the story of the visits of
Sir Anthony Sherley and his brother, Sir Robert,
to the Court of Shah Abbas, and of the influence
which they exerted over the young monarch.
It will be found related by Sykes,* who attri-
butes to the work of the two brothers the
friendly spirit with which Europeans have been
treated ever since in Persia. It will suffice
to say here that Sir Anthony Sherley found the
Shah's Army consisting entirely of tribal
horsemen, who could not hope to face unaided
the trained and disciplined army of the Turks,
then the best in Europe. Sherley's suite
included a cannon founder, and some batteries
* History of Persia.
of artillery were now added to the Persian
forces, several thousands of regular infantry
being also formed and (rained. Such was the
confidence which Sherley had sxicceeded in
inspiring that he was now sent by Shah Abbas
as Persian Ambassador to the Courts of Europe,
in order to invite their cooperation against
Turkey. He did not apparently have much
success in this mission ; but his brother, Sir
Robert— who remained in Persia — became
NADIR SHAH.
From a painting formerly in the possession of
Sir John Malcolm.
Master General of the Persian Army, and
greatly distinguished himself in several success-
ful campaigns against the Turks, which ended
in leaving Shah Abbas master of Kars, Mosul,
Baghdad, and many other places far beyond
the frontier of his original possessions. It may
justly be claimed, therefore, that Englishmen
had some part in the success of this great king
and conqueror, who raised Iran to a position
such as she had never occupied since the
Mahomedan conquest. Meanwhile, also, the
English, coming from India, had established
themselves on the shores of the Persian Gull,
and in 1622, acting with the Persians, they
wrested from the Portuguese the great fortress
of Hormuz, which for a hundred years had
secured to Portugal the command of these
seas, and of the lucrative trade between India
326
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
[Loval Frasir.
OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF THE GOVERNOR OF BUSHIRE, THE PRINCIPAL PORT
OF PERSIA.
and Europe by this ancient route. - Practically
the fall of Hormuz was the beginning of
England's control of the Gulf, which has con-
tinued until now. That control was not taken
from the Persians, who were no sailors and
never held it, but was established with their
consent and cooperation.
From this time until the reign of the con-
queror Nadu* Shah there is no striking feature
in the history of -the British connexion with
Persia ; but it is satisfactory to find that in
that last period of Persian greatness Englishmen
made themselves respected and honoured as
they had been in the days of Shah Abbas.
The most prominent among them, the one
who gained the confidence and favour of the
Persian monarch, was a man who, like Jenkinson
two hundred years earlier, came to Persia in
the interests of trade. In 1739, while Nadir
Shah was absent on his expedition to India,
and his son was ruling Persia on his behalf.
one John Elton determined to revive, if possible,
the English trade with Persia by way of Russia,
Taking a cargo of goods to Resht on the
Caspian, he was well received, and obtained
a " farman " or order couched in the most
favourable terms. Returning to Knglnnd, he
obtained support for a scheme by which the
Caspian Sea was to be made the base of a trade
with Persia, Bokhara, and Khiva. The
Russian Government raised no objection,
and in 1742 two ships, built in Russian terri-
tory, were laqnched on the Caspian. They
were the best ships yet seen on that sea — vessels
" of good oak, regularly built, well fitted,"
armed with some small guns, and flying the
English flag. But before long they, not un-
naturally, aroused the jealousy of the Russians,
who feared for their own trade, and when, in the
following year, Elton was persuaded to enter
the service of Nadir Shah, who had now
returned to Persia, the Russians becamo
actively hostile. It was a curious position,
and not wholly connected with trade. The
fact was that Nadir had been foiled not lone
before by the mountain tribes of the Caucasus,
whom he was trying to subdue, and he thought,
quite rightly, that with a fleet on the Caspian
he would be able to turn the range. It would
also have strengthened his position greatly
in the Turcoman country to the east of the
Caspian. Elton was therefore appointed
Chief Naval Constructor, and given the title
of Tamal Beg. This was the first occasion
on which a Persian monarch had shown that
he understood the value of sea power. Not
only did Nadir attempt to become master of
the Caspian in the north, but he determined
to dominate also the Persian Gulf, and actually
launched a small squadron on these southern
wnters. How great an effort this entailed
may be judged from the fact, that Nadir
transported timber from the Caspian forests
for something like eight hundred miles, right
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
327
across Persia. His deatli soon afterwards
put an end to Persian naval enterprise ; but
it was a fine conception. Elton meanwhile,
with infinite toil and against heart-breaking
opposition, had succeeded in building and
launching on the Caspian a twenty-gun ship.
He survived his great master for some years,
and remained in- Persia until he was killed in a
local rebellion. But the Russians put an
end to the English trade across their territory,
and little now remains of that venture but the
fascinating volumes in which one of our
traders, Jonas Hanway, has described his
extent and of vast commercial importance.
To strike her there, and deprive her of the rich
Eastern trade which had built up her wealth
and power, as it had built up the wealth and
power of every nation in turn which had become
master of it, seemed to him the best if not
the only way of bringing her to her knees.
At the close of the eighteenth century h«
was, therefore, turning over in his mind vast
schemes of invasion by land across Western
Asia, and meanwhile supporting as far as he
could the Indian powers still hostile to her.
One means of raising trouble against her was
[Laval Frastr.
BRITISH RESIDENCY, BUSHIRE.
travels in Persia, and the state of the Court
and country during the latter days of Nadir
Shah.
Nevertheless the British connexion with
Persia was not to be limited for long to the
factories in the Persian Gulf ; and when it
revived it was to become not only political
in character but permanent. The immediate
reason for its revival was the far-sighted
ambition of the great Napoleon, who had long
recognized the fact that the vulnerable point
of England was her empire in India, not
yet fully consolidated, but already of great
to incite the then ruler of Afghanistan to
invade the plains of India as Nadir Shah
had done, and either directly or indirectly
this means was tried. Lord Wellesley, then
Governor-General in India, received warning
from the Afghan ruler that the invasion was
contemplated, and, conscious of the danger
that such an attack might disturb many of the
Indian powers, L,ord Wellesley tried, with
success, to induce the young Shah to bring
pressure on the Afghan ruler. But this was
not all. It became known that France and
Russia had actually agreed upon a scheme of
323
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.I If.
joint invasion, under which a Franco-Russian
force was to march from the Caspian by way
of Persia and Afghanistan, and persuade these
powers to cooperate. In 1800, therefore, an
officer from India, Captain Malcolm, arrived
in Bushire, charged with the negotiation
of an agreement by which the Shah, Fath AH,
was to undertake to keep up the pressure
on Afghanistan, to exclude French influence
from his country, and to grant increased
facilities for British trade. Malcolm, a man of
remarkable character and capacity, was com-
pletely successful in his mission, and a satis-
factory agreement was concluded.
In the meantime the Russians had again
turned their attention to Georgia, and in the
same year that Malcolm was at Teheran, which
had now become the Persian capital, the pro-
vince was formally annexed. Though it had
been rather a tributary than a part of tho
Persian dominions, this was a serious blow to
Persia ; and after two or three years spent in
preparing an army the Shah determined to
make war. In 1804 hostilities began, and at
first the Persians had a measure of successt
The Russians were repelled from Erivan, and
suffered some further checks. But the Shah
had been well aware of tho danger he was run-
ins; in committing himself to hostilities with so
powerful an enemy, and he had done his best
to obtain help from England. Hi.s overtures
were not successful, the British Government
being slow in corning to a decision ; and in his
disappointment the Shah at last made up his
mind to throw in his lot with the French, who
had been trying for years to win him over
In 1807 an envoy was sent to Napoleon, and
found him at Tilsit. An agreement was then
concluded by which the French and Persians
were to join hands against Russia, and the Shah
further consented to cooperate with the French
in an attack upon India. Thus by the pro-
crastination of the British all the results of
Malcolm's mission had been thrown away.
Not only this, but in the same year a French
general, Gardonne, appeared in Persia with a
large staff, and set to work to organize the
Persian Army. The Peace of Tilsit between
France and Russia had meanwhile been con-
cluded, and, to the deep disappointment of the
Shah, nothing had been said about the restora-
tion of Georgia. But it is believed that
Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander then dis-
cussed the project of a joint invasion of India,
BOAT ON THE CASPIAN SEA.
F Murray Stwaft,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
3-29
PERSIAN SOLDIERS ON PARADE.
and there seems to be no doubt that Napoleon
hoped to arrange an alliance with Persia against
England. How much value he attached to this
scheme may be judged from the fact that he at
one time contemplated sending his brother
Lucien to represent him at Teheran. It must be
admitted that at this juncture Persia had
regained a position of considerable importance
among the nations.
Her position was perhaps not raised by the
events of the next twenty years. The Russian
campaign went badly in the end, owing to the
incompetence of the Heir Apparent, who was in
command, and in 1813 the Persians signed a
treaty surrendering not only Georgia but many
other districts and towns. On the other hand,
the years 1808 to 1814 witnessed a series of
negotiations between Persia and England,
which ended, after some rather unseemly
wrangles between rival British missions, in a
treaty which secured to Persia a considerable
yearly subsidy, the promise of British aid in
case of aggression upon her territories, and some.
other advantages. From this time a British
Legation was established in Teheran, Persia
thereby becoming entitled to direct diplomatic
intercourse with the Court of St. James, instead
of having to deal with the Governor-General of
India. The arrangement was probably a mi.-.-
take from the British point of view, but it was a
gain of status for Persia. Moreover, such hostili-
ties as occurred between Persia and her old
enemies the Turks and Afghans during the next
few years ended with a fair measure of success on
her part. But unluckily the strong feeling
against Russia which had been aroused by her
success in the former war, and by other circum-
stances, led the Persians in 1826 to enter upon
a war of revenge. They had at first consider-
able successes, but, as before, they were
soundly beaten in the end, and the war was
closed by the Treaty of Turkomanchai, 1828,
which marked the beginning of a new era,
for not only did Persia make further cessions
• of territory, but she agreed to concede to the
Russians various extra-territorial privileges
which were inconsistent with the entire
independence of the country, and gave an
opening for much interference in the future^
From this time dates the ever-increasing
influence which Russia has exercised not only
over the policy but over tha internal affairs of
Persia. The terms of the Treaty led other
European Powers to base their relations
with Persia upon a similar footing, but the
geographical and military position of Russia
secured to her a special predominance which
nothing since has permanently shaken.
The Treaty had another effect. The Per-
sians, deeply mortified by the loss of prestige
139 — 3
830
THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAll.
'
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
331
involved in their cessions on the north-western
side of their country, turned their eyes elsewhere
ia the hope of finding compensation. Turkey
was too strong to he attacked with much hop*1
of success, and the natural result was that the
Persians began to push out eastward, with the
view of regaining their old possessions in the
country lying between them and India. This
tendency was encouraged by the Russians, who
found it convenient to divert the thoughts of
the Persians from their western borders, and
were, moreover, not disinclined to let England
feel that, any action on her part which crossed
Russian interests in Europe could be countered
by threats to the security .of the British do-
minions in Asia. Great Britain was not slow to
recognize that a new situation had arisen, and
that any extension of Persia eastward, with
Russian support, must have an undesirable, if
not dangerous, effect upon her position in India,
for the Indians, accustomed to irruptions, from
the north-west, looked to that quarter with
constant apprehension or hope. From this
time began the feeling among British states-
men in India and England that Russia had
now taken the place of France as a menace to
India — a feeling which, with the gradual
advance of the Russians in Central Asia,
became stronger and stronger until it led to
an acute and ceaseless conflict of policies
between the two Powers. And one main field
for that conflict was Persia, which was the
greater and the more 'powerful of the two
countries lying between the Russian and Indian
frontiers.
The Persians soon entered upon their eastern
advance, and in 1833 they laid siege to Herat.
But in the following year, before the place had
fallen, the long reign of Path Ali shah was
ended by his death, and the operations in
Afghanistan wore for the time interrupted.
It is a curious circumstance that at this
• timo the Persian Army in the west was com-
nianded by a Scottish artillery officer, Sir
Henry Lindsay Bethune, who, coming to
Persia with Malcolm, had been for several
years in the Persian service, and had greatly
distinguished himself in the Persian war
against Russia. The new ruler, Mahomed
•Shah, marched from Tabriz upon the capital
with a considerable force under this officer,
a-id though revolts broke ovit in various
provinces, he succeeded, after a victory gained
by his British General, in completely establish-
ing his power. He was helped in doinc
so byan Englishman, Rawlin^on. who had
lately come to Persia as member of a British
military mission.
The Russians had cooperated with the
British in supporting Mahomed Shah's claim
to the throne ; but it soon became evident
that they were not disposed to welcome the
British mission, which was on a considerable
scale, all arms of the Service being represented.
Nor, in spite of the help he had received from
the British, did the Shah show any inclination
to treat the mission with favour. The officers
composing it were, on the contrary, opposed
[Lovat Frasfr.
IN THE GROUNDS OF THE BRITISH
RESIDENCY, BUSHIRE.
and thwarted by the Persians, and after three
or four years they all left the country.
Meanwhile, in 1837, the Shah marched
upon Herat. The place was besieged, and
would almost certainly have fallen but for
the arrival in disguise of a young English officer,
Eldred Pottinger, who filled the defenders with
his own indomitable courage, and repeatedly
beat off the Persian attacks. In the following
spring the British and Russian . Ministers,
McNeill and Simonich. both joined the Royal
camp, the former doing his best to persuade
the Shah to raise the siege, the latter giving his
personal aid and that of a battalion of Russian
deserters. The Shah now threw himself entirely
332
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
VIEW AT MOHAMMERAH.
[If may
into the hands of the Russians, and McNeill
withdrew from the camp ; but after a final
desperate assault had been repulsed, with
great loss to the Persians, and the British had
made a hostile demonstration in the Persian
Gulf, the disheartened monarch abandoned the
siege. The whole episode raised the reputation
of the British and for the time lowered that of
the Russians, but it had the effect of bringing
to a head the rivalry of the two Powers, who
from "that time forward were regarded through-
out Asia as open antagonists, -if not as open
enemies.
It led, too, to a most unfortunate expedition
into Afghanistan from India on the part of
Great Britain, but that did not directly concern
Persia, and need not be discussed here.
Lord Palmerston, who was then in power
in England, had throughout given to the
British representative a loyal support which
wits proof against all the intrigues and attacks
of the Shah, and set a good example to future.
British Governments, not always followed.
But the Shah, though forced to abstain from
a policy of open hostility towards Great
Britain, remained deaf to all good advice,
and when he died in 1848 he left the country
in a deplorable condition — the treasury empty,
the army unpaid and discontented, and the
administration in complete disorder.
Mahomed Shah was succeeded by his son
Nasir-ud-Din, a boy 16 years of age, whose
accession was undisputed. According to cus-
tom he had been Governor of the northern
province of Azarbaijan, the inhabitants of
which are mainly of Turk descent, and speak
Turki, not Persian. The army was largely
recruited from this province. As the ruling
dynasty was itself sprung from a Turk tribe,
the Kajars, and had throughout relied upon
its Turk troops, it was always subject to out-
breaks of discontent on the part of the Persian^
proper, who regarded themselves as a superior
people. But the position had been more or
less accepted, and on this occasion no revolt
occurred.
The young Shah, nevertheless, had his
troubles to face, and at the beginning of his
reign the country was considerably disturbed
by the Babis, a new sect whose doctrines seenied»
harmless enough in so far as they were com-
prehensible. There were some Babi risings,
and an attempt on the Shah's life, followed by
some horrible punishments and massacres.
Whatever their faults the Babis showed the
most heroic courage, as Persians often do, ami
gained much sympathy by it.
Soon afterwards occurred the Crimean Wrr.
and this resulted in a serious breach between
Persia and Great Britain. The Russians had
sought the aid of the Persians against their
old enemies the Turks, while from Great .
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
333
Britain and Franco, to whom the Shah made
overtures, he received what he resented as the
rather contemptuous advice to remain neutral.
He did so, but his Government got up a quarrel
with the British Minister, Mr. Murray, who was
grossly insulted, and eventually broke off rela-
tions as McXeill had done. In the following
year, 1856, a Persian Army once more marched
upon Herat, which, having no Pottinger
within its walls, was at last taken and re-united
to the Persian dominions. The British Govern-
ment felt that this action could not be condoned,
and sent a force to the Persian Gulf ; but tho
maintenance of Persia as a buffer between
Russia and India having now become a fixed
part of British policy, no attempt was made
NASIR-UD-DIN.
Shah of Persia, 1848-1896, the last of the autocratic rulers of the country.
334
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
at a serious war of conquest. Still, some troops
were landed near Bushire, and a Persian force,
which attacked them, was beaten at Khushab.
The British, under Sir James Outram, then took
Mohammerah and Ahwaz on the Karun, the
Persian Government, meanwhile, having already
sued for peace and signed a Treaty at Paris,
by which they agreed to evacuate Afghanistan
and recognize its independence. The terms
imposed by the victors were extraordinarily
mild, and the result was to improve British
relations with Persia.
It was fortunate that the British Government
had taken the Persian aggression so lightly,
for a few months later the sudden storm of the
Sepoy mutiny broke upon India, and it would
have been a grave embarrassment if a British
force had then been locked up in Persia.
Sykes. who refers to this point in his History,
observes incidentally that the Persian War led
to the introduction of " khaki " — some Persian
troops clothed in this dust-coloured uniform
having been almost invisible at a distance.
Khak is the Persian word for dust 'or earth.
Not long afterwards began the great advance
on the part of the Russians in Central Asia
which caused so much apprehension in India
and lias so seriously affected the situation of
Persia. At the time of the Crimean War the
Russians had not subdued the mountaineers
of the Caucasus, and in Central Asia they
had practically obtained no footing at all.
Between them and the northern frontiers of
Eastern Persia and Afghanistan Say the terri-
tories of the Central Asian Khanates of Kho-
kand, Bokhara and Khiva, and the Turcoman
desert — all sparsely .inhabited tracts, but vast
in extent. Checked by the result of the
Crimean War from further expansion in other
directions, Russia now set to work to stamp
out. finally the resistance of the Caucasian
tribes, and that being at last effected, she was
free to throw her weight eastward. By 1805
she had beaten the first of the Khanates,
Khokand, anil after capturing Tashkent had
formed in that direction her frontier province
of Turkestan. This led the Ameer of Bokhara
to take the offensive against her, with the
result that he also was defeated, and lost in
18(i8 the famous city of Samarkand In the
A COSSACK REGIMENT IN PERSIA.
THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAE.
835
following year Russia occupied two points on
the Eastern coast of the Caspian, against the
strong protests of Persia. From there she
could threaten the Turkomans of the desert,
arid, on the other side of the desert, the remain-
ing Khanate, Khiva. Provocation was not
wanting, and in 1873 Russian columns
pushed out from north and south aud closed
upon Khiva, which was taken. The Khanates
were now all gone, and only the nomad Turko-
mans of the desert remained to defy her.
Against them she gradually worked forward
from the Caspian along the northern border of
Persia, and after suffering one severe defeat
at their hands she won her way in 1881 to their
poor stronghold at Geok Tepe. A heroic but
hopeless resistance followed, and the fort was
stormed. Awed by the slaughter there, the
rest of the Turkoman country submitted, and
by 1884 Central Asia was in Russian hands.
Thus in five and twenty years from the fall of
the Caucasus the Russians had pushed forward
a distance of a thousand miles and were on the
border of Afghanistan. The effect upon Persia
was immense. Her prestige was greatly im-
paired by her exclusion from the Turkoman
country, which she had often penetrated, and,
what was far more important, Russian territory
now marched with her whole northern border —
from end to end. It is true that she was
thereby protected from Turkoman raids, which
had been a terrible affliction to her in the past
It is true also that Russia had effected her con-
quests with very small forces, and \vas still weak
in Central Asia — where she could not dispose
of 50,000 men. But that weakness would
disappear with time, and Persia was now
enveloped.
In the meantime England had not been
wholly negligent of her interests in Persia, and
though she did not strengthen her military
position she had in various ways established
a considerable influence in the country. Per-
haps the most striking enterprise in which she
engaged was the introduction of telegraphs.
During the Indian Mutiny the need of direct
telegraphic communication between England
and India had been severely felt, and it was
decided that a line should be carried across
Persia from the Turkish frontier to Bushire,
whence a cable was to be laid down the Persian
Gulf. There was much opposition from
Persian officials and local tribes, but by the
end of 18f>4 the first single line had been com-
pleted, a performance which reflected great
credit upon the British officers and men by
whom the work was done. A Jew years later
a thorough double line was constructed from
London to Teheran, across Germany and
Russia, the Indo-European Telegraph Com-
pany carrying on the line to India. The great
trunk lines led to the extension of telegraphs
all over Persia, under a Persian Minister of
A LESSON IN THE KORAN.
Telegraphs with an English adviser. Persia
had thus not only been opened up to com-
munication with foreign countries, but had
been greatly helped in the control of her own
provinces. Throughout, the country the Britisli
telegraph officials became a power for good in
many ways, and their work was greatly appre-
ciated. It was of incalculable value to Persia.
Another great benefit conferred upon the
country by British intervention was the
definition of the Persian frontiers on the east
— first between Persia and Baluchistan, and
later between Persia and Afghanistan in the
disputed district of Seistan — -by the first Director
of Telegraphs in Persia, Sir Frederick Golclsmid.
These settlements were made in the early
'seventies, and were afterwards completed by
missions under Sir Thomas Holdich and Sir
Henry MoMahon. A small but increasing
trade was thus opened up between India and
Persia by way of Seistan.
886
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
The later part also of the reign of Nasir-ud-Din
Shah was marked by considerable developments
in the relations between Great Britain and
Persia. It was a time of continued and growing
rivalry between Russia and England. Notwith-
standing this rivalry, which led to the constant
thwarting of British schemes by Russian in-
fluence, Great Britain obtained from the Shah
some useful concessions, which were beneficial to
both sides. Tn 1888, largely owing to the energy
of the British Minister, Sir Henry Drumond
Wolff, the Shah agreed to open to commercial
navigation the lower part of the Karun river.
The value of this concession was vastly exag-
sMerable trade was developed, arid the adjacent
country greatly benefited, so that "the recent
history of the Karun Valley adds yet another
pacific triumph to the long list already won by
the officials and merchants of Great Britain."
Another concession, grunted in 1880, was for
the foundation of a British bank, to be called
the Imperial Bank of Persia, with the exclusive
right to issue notes. This institution had at first
many difficulties to overcome ; but it proved
to be of the greatest use to all classes of Persians,
and to the Persian Government itself.
A third British concession was less for-
tunate. This was the grant to a company
ON THE RIVER KARUN.
t.Viirra;.
gerated by the British public, for, as before
remarked, the river is navigable for little
moro than a hundred miles, and does not
reach the plateau of Persia at all. Also the
concession was marred by the proviso, a
proviso not only destructive but opposed to
British Treaty rights, that no buildings were
to be erected on the banks of the river, such as
coal stores, warehouses, shops, caravanserais ;
workshops, etc. In spite of all this, chiefly by
the tact and persistence of Messrs. Lynch Bros.,
who opened up a new road from the old capital
at Ispahan across the mountains to the river,
and ran steamers for a time at a loss, a con-
in 1890 of entire control over the produc-
tion and sale of tobacco in Persia. This
concession affected not only tobacco growers
and sellers, but the whole people, men and
women alike, for in Persia everyone smokes.
Its terms aroused general indignation, and
t \ entually the chief religious authority published
an order by which smoking was wholly forbidden
throughout the country. The order was im-
plicitly obeyed, except, so far as is known, by
one man, the Minister of Telegraphs, whose
friendship for the English was so great that ho
gallantly sat on his open balcony in the capital
smoking his " kalian." No one else dared to do
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
837
so, and as disturbances were breaking out the
Shall cancelled the concession, agreeing to pay
a sum of £500,000 to the company as com-
pensation
The state of affairs in Persia during the next
five years, the closing years of the Shah's life,
and of the old order in Persia, was not. entirely
free from trouble ; but it was one to which
many Persians must have since looked back
with deep regret. The independence of Persia
was ostensibly complete, and the Shah was an
absolute monarch, with no constitutional limits
whatever to his power over the property and
lives of his subjects. In practice the treaty with
the Russians and subsequent events had some-
what impaired Persian independence, and the
Shah's sovereign rights within his kingdom were
limited by two circumstances which he could
not afford to disregard — namely, the possibility
of popular revolt against oppression, and the
power of the priesthood, who administered a
large part of the law and had great influence in
other ways. Nasir-ud-Din, a. thoroughly virile
man, was in many respects a strong ruler. Well
built and well featured, he lived an outdoor
life, was an extraordinarily good shot, and if, as
was said, he loved wine and women, he always
kept himself in vigorous health. He was also a
man of exceptional intelligence and knowledge.
Like the Tudors, he knew when to yield, and
could do so ungrudgingly, which made him all
the stronger. He had behind him the experience
of more than forty years on the throne. It must
be admitted that he had his faults : he was
somewhat rapacious and selfish, putting his own
pleasures first and leaving the administration
of the country too much to others, whom he
well knew to be corrupt if not incapable. The
Persian Army, which long after the beginning of
the century had been capable of making a good
fight against Russian troops, and had generally
held its own against the Turk and the Afghan,
was now practically non-existent— a few
thousand men without pay or discipline or
modern arms. The only efficient force in Persia
was a small body of so-called Cossacks, officered
by Russians, which had been formed in 1882,
after Great Britain had declined to lend
officers for a similar purpose. The country
was badly ruled, the practice being to put up
to auction every year the farm of the several
provinces, and leave the Governors to recoup
themselves as they pleased for the sums tliey
had paid to the Shah and his officials. The
customs were also farmed, and tho collection of
the royal land taxes was left to a body of men
over whom there was no supervision. Under
such a system it may easily be understood that
Persia was being steadily impoverished, and
that the imperial revenue was small. It
amounted to less than a million and a half
sterling, and the Treasury was always in
difficulties for ready money. The real head of
the administration was Asghar Ali, the Prime
Minister, or Sadr Azem, who had held the post
for some years and thoroughly understood how
to manage his royal master. A man of low birth,
but of singularly attractive manners, and in
his way strong and adroit, the Sadr Azem had
\EllioU & Fry.
SIR PERCY SYKES.
Formerly British Consul-General at Meshed.
Author of " A History of Persia." Restored order
in Southern Persia in 1916.
become extremely powerful. He was popular
with Europeans, for he was merry and pleasant
and entertained lavishly. Nor was he unpopular
with Persians in general. But he was a man of
the old school,~with no capacity for administra-
tion, thoroughly corrupt, and, with all his out-
ward bonhomie, unscrupulous and vindictive to a
rare degree. " Sui profusus, alien! appelens," he
drew from the farm of the customs and many
other sources an income far larger than that of
any European Prime Minister, and had become
a man of great wealth.
Nevertheless, the condition of Persia under
the last of its autocratic kings was not alto-
gether ah unhappy one. The country no
338
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
MAIN GATE OF THE CITY OF TEHERAN.
longer had power to stand by itself against
foreign aggression ; but it was held up by the
rivalry between England and Russia, and main-
tained an apparent independence by steadily
playing oft one Power against the other.
Except the annual payment due to the Tobacco
Company, Persia had no national debt what-
ever, and this amounted only to a few months'
revenue. The people were misruled, but were
able to protect themselves against intolerable
oppression by turbulent action against their
weak governors, and their material condition
was not one of real hardship. Accustomed
from time immemorial to the autocratic rule
universal in the East, and feeling no desire for
representative institutions or other Western
luxuries, such as a pure judicial system,
and roads and railways, they had no great
cause of complaint. Nor did they greatly
complain. There was murmuring at times
and occasional disorder ; but, on the whole,
they liked their gallant old Shah ; and with
their sunny climate, and cheap food, and not
too much hard work, they passed their time
!uipi)ily enough. Their firm conviction was that
everything Persian was immeasurably superior
to everything foreign, and all they really wanted
was to be left in peace.
The relations between the two rival Powers — •
England and Kussia — were at that time
watchful, mid more or less antagonistic.
The geographical and military position of
Russia gave her by far the stronger hand in
tliis game ; but the position of England
was not wholly unsatisfactory. It might, if
the British hand had been boldly played,
have become much more so, for in 189."» a
change of government in England had raised
great hopes in Persia, and the old Shah, always
in want of money, had made overtures for an
arrangement by which in return for a loan
he would have placed himself to a great extent
in British hands. But the credit of Persia
in the English market was then very low, and
the loan, small as it was, could not be raised
without a guarantee, which, though the security
was ample, the British Government would not
give. The proposal therefore fell through,
the Shah was deeply disappointed, and the
chance was lost, never to recur. Still England
retained much weight in Persia. The Germans,
already bent upon a great scheme of develop-
ment eastward, through Turkey, were begin-
ning to show considerable interest in Persia
as well, and had nearly succeeded in obtaining
a concession for an important road between
the Turkish frontier and Teheran ; but as yet
they had practically no influence. Nor had
any other European Power. As it was said,
" In Persia England and Russia play the
game, the others look on and mark the
points."
Such was the condition of affairs when in
May, 1896, Persia was .startled and shocked by
the news that the Shah had been murdered.
Some years earlier he had expelled from the
country a Persian named Jamal-ud-din, who
had made a name for himself in Europe and
elsewhere as a Musulman preacher and reformer.
One of this man's disciples, deeply impressed
by his teaching and his wrongs, had determined
to kill the Shah, and taking advantage of His
Majesty's visit to a mosque near Teheran, had
shot him through the heart as he was about to
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
839
kneel down in prayer. Nasir-ud-din cried out
" Ai Khuda ! " (" Oh, God ! ") and fell forward
— dead. The Sadr Azem, who was with him,
at once had the body carried to a closed car-
riage, and giving out that the Shah was only
slightly wounded, drove hack to the Palace
at Teheran. From there he sent word to the
British and Russian representatives, who soon
afterwards joined him ; and with their help
arrangements were made for the succession
of the Heir Apparent, who, according to custom,
was at Tabriz as Governor of Azarbaijan.
It was a critical moment, for there were at the
capital several regiments of troops who had
received no pay for years, and had lately shown
a threatening spirit. One of the Shah's sons
was Commander-in-Chief, but in this emergency
he refused to take any action, and applied for
protection to the British and Russian Lega-
tions. The Prime Minister, however, acted with
spirit and promptitude. Money for the pay-
ment of the Persian troops was supplied by
the British Bank, and distributed immediately ;
the Cossack regiment, under its Russian
officers, was called out to patrol the town ;
and in the morning, when the news of the
Shah's death became known, all was in order.
A few weeks later the new Shah, Muzaffer-
i
THE KOTAL PASS, ON THE ROAD
FROM BUSHIRE TO SHIRAZ.
ud-din, arrived in Teheran and quietly suc-
ceeded to the throne.
Weak in character, and not strong in health,
he created from the first an unfavourable
BRITISH CONSULATE IN THE TOWN OF BUSHIRK.
\Lcrat Frascr.
340
THE TIMES HISTOPY Of THE WAR.
impression in Teheran. Such was his fear of
sharing liis father's fate that lie had not th.>
courage to make a public entry into his capital ;
bat halted some miles out. *!<!•• anil stole into
his palace in the dead of night. This excited
the open derision of the Persians who, what-
ever some may think, are not wanting in
courage themselves, or inclined to forgive the
want of it in, their rulers. From that moment
" Sister Muzaffer," as they called him, had lost
caste with his people, and he never regained
it.
Yet in spite of his weakness, perhaps in part
because of it, his reign was an important one
in the history of Persia. It was the reign in
which autocratic rule passed away from the
country after 25 centuries, and her people
received their first Constitution.
It would not be easy to explain in full the
causes which led to the new order of things.
But briefly it may be said that from the time
SHAH MUZAFFER-UD-D1N.
the Shah came to the throne his one leading
idea seemed to be the procuring of large sums
of money to lavish on extravagant foreign
tours, or on his favourites. When he had
dissipated in this way such treasure as he had
inherited from his father, and the family
domains, his only resource was a foreign loan.
He did make an effort to reform the Customs
administration by the introduction of Belgian
controllers, and this step was in a measure
successful, but it did not supply his immediate
SHAH MIRZA MOHAMED ALL
wants. In Great Britain, owing to the refusal
of the British Government to give a guarantee,
money was not. to be got ; and in 1900 the
Shah turned to the Russians, from whom he
received on severe terms two loans aggregating
about four millions. The money was mostly
squandered, and the loans proved disastrous to
the country, for they were the forerunners of
several more, which hopelessly embarra^snl
the Persian finances and aroused a violent feel-
ing of resentment among the Persians. They
also led to a Perso-Russian Customs agreement,
which was very unfavourable to Persia an: I,
incidentally, to British trade. Then began,
with remarkable suddenness, a popular outcry
for various administrative changes. Few, if
any, of the Persians appeared to know exactly
what they wanted ; but a strong spirit of ills-
content with the old order, and of desire for
something else, had undoubtedly permeated
the nation. How it had come no one could
tell. As one eminent Persian said, " None of
us know. It seems to have risen out of the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
341
ground." It may have been due in part to the
fervent preaching of Jamal-ud-din. Then
the result of the Russian war with Japan
produced an extraordinary effect upon the
Persians, who imagined that whatever the
Japanese could do would be easy for them
— whether it were to defeat a great military
Power or to reform a system of government.
Altogether, the spirit of unrest and self-asser-
tion was aroused, and under the guidance of
some men. who had been in Europe, the new
feeling took the form of a demand for a Con-
stitution, a demand which, strange to say,
received considerable support from the priest-
hood. After the Shah had made one concession
after another, and some twelve or fourteen
thousand Persians had taken " bast " — sanc-
tuary— in the British Legation — a common
method in Persia of bringing pressure to bear
on a Government — Muzaffer-ud-din finally
gave way, and in August, 190(5, he signed a
paper granting the people a National Assembly.
Two months later the Assembly was formally
opened by the Shah in person, though no
members had yet been elected but those for
the city of Teheran. Then the Assembly pro-
ceeded to draw up a written Constitution
on Western lines ; and in January, 1907, this
was signed and ratified by the Shah and his
Heir Apparent. A few days later the Shah died.
Thus, with a suddenness which was astound-
ing to all concerned, the Persians found them-
selves in possession of the rights and liberties
which five years before no one among them
would have dreamt of receiving, or desiring.
It may perhaps be mentioned here that during
tho reign of Muzaffer-ud-din, in 1903, the
Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, paid a visit to
the Persian Gulf, which was of some import-
ance, particularly in connexion with the per-
sistent efforts of Germany for five years past
to gain a footing on the coast of this sea. In
these efforts she was helped by the Turks. Lord
Curzon's attitude towards the question of the
Persian Gulf had always been a decided one,
and his visit was of much advantage to British
interests.
Muzaffer-ud-din was succeeded by his son,
Mohamed Ali, and it very shortly became evi-
dent that the new Shah, though he had signed
the Constitution, had not the smallest intention
of abiding by his word. Arrogant even beyond
the wont of his family and wanting in self-con-
trol, he entered at once upon a course of action
which could only end in disaster. While the
feeling in favour of the National Assembly
increased daily throughout the country, takinsr
various forms, some of them legitimate enough,
some violent and indefensible, Mohamed Ali
seemed determined 4.0 stamp out the whole
movement and become an absolute monarch
like his ancestors. One of his first acts was
to call back to Teheran his grandfather's old
Minister, Asghar Ali, who was known to be reac-
tionary in his views, and was consequently
murdered by an ardent " Nationalist." The
British and Russian Legations, now acting
together, gave the Shah good advice, which
he practically disregarded. Matters went from
ABDUL KASS1M, NAS1R-UL-MUI K,
Regent during the youth of Shah Sultan Ahmed.
bad to worse. There was fighting in Tabriz, and
in Teheran itself, where the National Assembly
was broken up by shell fire. Finally, in 1909,
when the Russians had pushed troops into
Tabriz, and to within a hundred miles of
Teheran, for the protection of Europeans,
" Nationalist " forces, including a contingent
from the great Bakhtiari tribe, marched upon
the capital, and, skilfully outmanoeuvring the
Shah's troops, made themselves masters of it.
The Shah was deposed by the National Assem-
bly, and his son Ahmed, a boy elevrii years of
age, was put on the tlirone.
Meanwhile the famous Convention of 1907
between Russia and England had come into
342
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.U!.
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
843
force, and had been published in Persia. As
everyone knows, the purpose of this agreement
was to bring to an end the long rivalry between
the two Powers in Asia, and with that object to
define their respective spheres of influence. So
far as Persia was concerned, the two contracting
Governments agreed to respect the integrity and
independence of the country ; but in order to
avoid future misunderstandings regarding their
interests Persia was divided into three zones —
Russian, Neutral, and British — within which
the two Powers were to act on certain specified
lines.
The idea of ji friendly understanding between
England and Russia was not a new one. It had
often been more or less vaguely put forward.
for that general understanding. Russians then,
and for many years longer, regarded the twen-
tieth century as theirs, and were unwilling to
fetter themselves by further positive engage-
ments. It was not until after the Russo-Japanese
War, and the changes of feeling it brought about
in Russia, that a general understanding became
possible. As Lord Lansdowne said in the
House of Lords in 1907, " until lately we know-
that she kept us at arm's length."
As to the specific terms of the Convention,
its critics had no difficulty in showing that,
especially with regard to Persia, the British
Government had made a very indifferent bar-
gain. •Practically the whole of southern Persia,
up to 'and including the line froya Kerman-
ISPAHAN: THE GREAT SQUARE, ABBAS MOSQUE AND NAGAREH KHANA.
and for thirty years it had found a consistent
advocate in Sir Alfred Lyall, who had published
a series of papers dwelling upon the evils of
the existing antagonism in Asia between two
nations " whose interests undoubtedly point
towards amity and concordant views in Europe."
His argument throughout was that " Russia and
England cannot be perpetually manoeuvring
against each other in Asia if they desire to act
together in Europe," and he never ceased to
urge the advantages of a formal agreement,
or to deprecate the excessive distrust of Russia
which then prevailed among Englishmen.
Sir Alfred Lyall had been Foreign Secretary
in India, and his views had become the doctrine
of the Indian Foreign Office, with the result
that in 1886, after a joint Boundary Com-
mission, there was signed an agreement be-
tween Russia and England which defined the
northern border of Afghanistan. This wa= the
first step towards the general underttftQdiag
of 1 907. But in 1 886 the time had not vet come
shah by Hamadan, Ispahan and Yezd to
the Afghan border, had till then been regarded
as well within the field of British influence
and British trade, which extended far be-
yond that line. The line itself was now
placed within the Russian zone, and most of
the country to the south of it was made neutral,
not British. Though Russian trade and Rus-
sian influence were gaining some ground they
were not in a position to justify such a partition
as this, for, as The Times afterward* pointed out,
British interests lay " almost exclusively in the
neutral zone and not in the British sphere."
When the Convention was signed, its effect
in Persia was great, perhaps greater than in any
part of Asia. The Persians then for the first
time found that they could no longer rely upon
the rivalry of which they had m:vlc so much
use. This was a severe s,hoek. and created much
alarm. It made the Convention very unpopular
throughout the country. This unpopularity
was greatly increased by the partition of
344
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Persia into /.ones of influence, over the head and
without the knowledge of the Persians them-
selves. Coming at a time when Persia was
stirring with revolutionary feeling, and with
jealousy of foreign interference, on account of
the loans and customs agreement, the Con-
vention was in fact deeply resented, especially
by the " Nationalists." The resentment was
perhaps especially strong against England,
which was regarded as having withdrawn her
support from Persia ; and resentment was
mingled with something like contempt when
it was seen that the British had apparently
surrendered their long-standing position in
so doing. But in considering the Persian ques-
tion there can be no use in shirking the obvious
fact that the Convention lowered the prestige
of England in that country, while arousing
resentment against both of the Powers after-
wards allied in the Great War.
It may be observed here that the supposed
reason for the acceptance by the British Govern-
ment of a British zone so completely inconsis-
tent with the established position of England
in Persia was that this zone included all the
territory which the Commander-in-Chief in
India, then Lord Kitchener, was prepared to
defend by force of arms. If this was in fact
THE FIRST ARMOURED GAR
Persia by consenting to a partition which con-
fined their sphere of influence to a small tract,
chiefly desert, in the south-east, while giving
to Russia all tho northern half of the country
and neutralizing the rest. It was felt that such
an arrangement could only bo due to conscious
weakness.
These facts in no way proved that the
Convention was on general grounds a bad one.
Its aim and scope were something very much
larger and more important than the feeling
of tin- Persians, or the political standing of
< Ireat Britain in Persia, and if to obtain a
general understanding with Russia our Govern-
ment shoue:! snme disposition to accept terms
less favourable than they had a right to expect,
.they were not perhaps greatly to be blamed for
(RUSSIAN) SEEN IN TEHERAN.
the reason for the arrangement, it can hardly be
regarded as anything more than an indifferent
excuse for an indifferent bargain.
Nor can there be much question that during
the seven troublous years which elapsed be-
tween the signing of the Convention- and
the outbreak of war, while the Persians
were trying, under great difficulties and
with no great success, to work out the
problem of turning a corrupt and inefficient
despotism into a well -governed constitutional
State, Great Britain seemed to accept a some-
what undignified position, supporting the action
of Russia even when that action seemed hardly
fair to Persia, or considerate to Grea,t Britain
herself. One instance may bo cited, the case of
Major Stokes. In that instance the American
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
345
[From Shusttr's " Strangling of Persia."
RUSSIAN AND PERSIAN OFFICERS OF THE "COSSACK BRIGADE."
Treasurer-General, whom the Persian Govern-
ment had appointed to reorganize their finances,
selected Major Stokes, Military Attache in the
British Legation, as the fittest person to com-
mand a new gendarmerie which it was proposed
to embody. It wa^ in the circumstances a
rather risky step to take, as the British Foreign
Office seems to have felt ; but when Mr. Shuster
pressed it their reply was that before accepting
the appointment Major Stokes must resign his
THE RUSSIAN GENERAL BARATOFF (IN UNIFORM) AT THE RECEPTION BY
THE SHAH IN THE PALACE AT TEHERAN.
The marble throne can he seen in the background.
346
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE SHAH OF PERSIA INSPECTING A RUSSIAN AEROPLANE AT TEHERAN.
(The Shah is the second figure from the left.)
commission in the Indian Army. Major Stokes
and the Persian Government naturally regarded
this reply as giving assent, and acted upon it.
Then Russia objected, on the ground appa-
rently that a British subject should not he
employed in such a position within the northern
/.one, and the British Foreign Office advised
Persia to yield to the objection, though in theniy
Persia was independent and entitled to rnalce
I lie appointment. The Times commented upon
the vacillation shown on this occasion, and
observed that the " affair reflected no credit
on either the British or the Russian
Foreign Office?." It certainly was not calcu-
lated to raise British prestige in Persia.
There were too many instances of the kind,
and the general impression left upon the
mind of any one reading the newspapers and
blue books of the time would probably be that
as the British Government had shown a some-
THE TIMES HISTOSY OF THE WAR.
347
what excessive complacency in agreeing to the
terms of the Convention, so they afterwards
showed a somewhat excessive complacency in
carrying it out. Still it may be admitted thf-t
without the Convention the state of affairs in
Persia might have been even worse than it
became with the Convention in force, and in
any case the general understanding with
Russia bore invaluable fruits elsewhere. -It is
mainly from that point of view that the Con-
vention must always be judged. Its effect un-
doubtedly was to bring Russia and England
together, and put an end to an antagonism
which had long threatened the pence not only
of Asia but of the world.
To return to the course of affairs in Persia
after the deposition of Mohamed Ali Shah. It
5>eems useless to do more than give a very brief
summary of events between 1909 and 1914.
During that time the government of the country
was carried on largely in accordance with the
views of the Mejlis or National Assembly, a
body which contained in its ranks some unques-
tionably patriotic and enlightened men who
were doing their best for the country, but con-
tained also, as was only natural, many members
who showed no sign of practical abilit\r to
understand the new conditions, and some who
were reactionary and corrupt. From the young
RUSSIAN OFFICERS AND (on the
right) THE BRITISH ATTACH^ AT
KERMANSHAH.
Shah of course no help could be expected ; and
the Regents appointed to control the adminis-
tration, one of whom, Nasir-ul-Mulk, was a man
of European education and high character,
found that their powers were insufficient to
enable them to do their work effectively. There
GUNS CAPTURED BY THE RUSSIANS AT KERMANSHAH.
848
THE TIMES H1STOEY OF THE WAR.
MIRZA HASSAN KHAN, G.C.M.G.
Mushir-ed-Dowleh. Special Envoy, and several
times Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime
Minister.
was great need of money, for during the dis-
orders of the last two years the collection of
taxes had been practically abandoned, and the
Mejlis was very reluctant to raise any foreign
loans. The army, with the exception of the
small Cossack Brigade under its Russian officers,
was unpaid and utterly inefficient. It had for
many years been very small in numbers, and
now it had for all practical purposes ceased to
exist. All over the country disorder had
broken out, and it increased year by year. The
roads in the south, and indeed in most parts,
became thoroughly unsafe, and all trade suffered
severely. In 1910 the state of things in this
respect was such that the British Government
thought it desirable to inform the Persians that
unless they restored order within three months
the task would have to be undertaken by levies
under British-Indian officers — a proposal after-
wards wisely abandoned. In the following
year, Nasir-ul-Mulk being Regent, some serious
attempts were made to improve the situation.
A capable and honest American, Mr. Shuster,
\v;is put in charge of the Treasury, which was
not only empty but owed a considerable sum in
arrears. He did some excellent work, but, not
thoroughly understanding the situation, he
unfortunately came into conflict with the
Russians, who, after a few months, called for his
dismissal, and sent an ultimatum to the Persian
Government containing this and other demands.
They were perforce accepted, for a Russian
force was within a hundred miles of the capital.
About the same time some Swedish officers were
brought into the country to raise a gendarmerie
for the restoration of order on the trade routes
and elsewhere.
But the situation was now complicated by
the landing in Persia of the ex-Shah Mohamed
Ali, whose adherents raised trouble in various
districts and threatened to advance on the
capital. One of them, Arshad-ud-Dowleh,
actually did advance to within forty miles of it,
with a force consisting mainly of Turcomans.
He was met by a smaller body of Nationalist
troops, who defeated him and took him prisoner.
Then followed a pathetic scene which recalls
in some measure the story of Drake and
Doughty. The vanquished general, who had
been wounded, was courteously treated by the
Nationalist chiefs. They attended to his
wound, let him have all he wanted, and kept
THE ZIL-ES-SULTAN,
Great-Uncle of the Shah.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE
349
him in friendly conversation for some hours of
the night. Then, against his entreaties, the
meeting broke up, and early the next morning
he was led out to execution. Asking that his
body might be sent to his wife in Teheran,
and that a locket he was wearing should be
buried with him, he stood up with his eyes un-
bandaged and received a volley from the firing
party. He fell, but only one bullet had struck
him, and a second party was told off to finish
the work. When all was ready he rose to his
knees and again faced the line of rifles, calling
out as he did so, " Long live Mohamed Ali
Shah." Then he fell dead. It was a death
which showed that courage and loyalty are to
be found among Persians. Arshad-ud-Dow-
leh's defeat saved Teheran, and practically
destroyed the ex-Shah's chance of regaining
his throne.
About the same time two or three squadrons
of Indian cavalry were sent up to Shiraz. This
place being over a hundred miles from the sea
by a difficult mountain road, flanked by wild
tribesmen, the step was not a wise one ; and
MIRZA HASSAN KHAN.
Mohtasham-es-Saltaneh. Several times Minister of
Foreign Affairs ; also held portfolios of Finance,
Interior and Justice.
MIRZA MOHAMED ALI KHAN, G.C.V.O.
Ala-es-Saltaneh. Some years Persian Minister in
London ; Foreign Minister and Prime Minister.
it proved unfortunate, for the regiment could
do nothing in such a country and was soon
practically shut up. After remaining in a false
position for a year or more and losing a British
officer and some men killed, it was withdrawn,
not without danger. The Russians at that time
had about 13,000 men in the north of Persia,
who could protect themselves.
So matters went on, the country becoming
more and more disturbed, until the southern
roads were practically closed and British trade
at a standstill, while the so-called Government
at Teheran made little or no effort to restore
order. The Swedish officers did raise a certain
number of men for their gendarmerie, but under
great difficulties for want of money, and
eventually with no great success. Except in the
capital, where the Cossack Brigade and a strong
body of Bakhtiari tribesmen kept matters quiet,
and in the provinces occupied by Russian
troops, there was little security for property or
life. Nor was the situation improved by the
action of the Germans, who ever since the
Russian defeats in the Japanese War had become
more active in their policy, and were now
working steadily in various ways to take
advantage of the popular feeling against
350
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
KASVIN.
England and Russia. In 1914 they had acquired
considerable influence with some of the people
about the Government, and others. Such was
the condition of affairs in Persia in the summer
of that fateful year. Persia was too disorganized
and weak to take any serious part in a great
war, but her geographical position and the
anarchy that prevailed throughout the country
made her a fine field for the intrigues and
military action of others. It may be added that.
while Germany was working in her customary
method among the Persians, their old enemies,
the Turks, had during I he recent years of
disorder encroached at various points upon the
western frontier, and, though a mixed Com-
mission was at work upon a general settlement
of the line, the Turks were in possession of
considerable tracts of Persian territory.
Shortly after the outbreak of war the Persian
Government declared its neutralitv. It was
TABRIZ
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
351
hardly in a position to act otherwise. No
doubt there was now among a large section
of the people a feeling of hostility towards
Russia and England. There was also, per-
haps, considerable sympathy for the Turks as
a Musulman Power taking up arms against
the infidel. On the other hand, though Russia
was withdrawing some of her troops for service
elsewhere, she was still capable of striking a
swift blow at the capital ; and England, in
spite of her rather feeble proceedings during the
last few years, could be dangerous if roused.
Moreover, both Russia and England still hai
many friends or partisans in the country. And
Turkey, though a Musulman Power, was deeply
hostile to the Shiah faith. Public opinion,
therefore, was by no means unanimous.
Finally, Persia, with all her glorious past and
all the national self-esteem which was the result
of it, had no army and no money. It was better
for her, therefore, to stand aside if possible and
run no risks. Perhaps her decision to do so, if
indeed she had come to any real decision, was
strengthened by the prompt action taken by
England in landing a force on Turkish soil at
the head of the Persian Gulf and taking Basra.
It will be remembered by those who have read
an earlier chapter of this History, " The
Advance towards Baghdad," that the taking of
Basra was soon followed by the dispatch of a
brigade to occupy Ahwaz in Persian territory
and protect the British oil wells.* Both to
north and south, therefore, Persia had Allied
troops within her borders, and in some strength.
The fact, unpalatable as it might be, counselled
prudence.
But if Persia remained on the outbreak of war
ostensibly neutral, her territory was to become
the scene of varied fighting, though not on a
very large scale. A chapter of this History,
entitled " The Intervention of Turkey," des-
cribed the situation in 1914 at the point close
to Mount Ararat where the frontiers of Russia,
Turkey and Persia come together, and gave an
account of the manner in which the Turks
opposed to the Russian army of the Caucasus
triod to turn the Russian left by marching
through Persian territory on Tabriz. f This
important town was taken at the beginning of
1915 by a small Turkish force, with the help of
some thousands of Kurd horsemen, the Persians
making no effective resistance ; but before the
end of January the Russians, who had evacua-
* Vol. X. ('hapt«r clviii.
t Vol. III. Chapter xlix.
ted the place, returned and expelled the
invaders. After this reverse, and some minor
reverses which followed it, the Turks apparently
gave up the hope of acting effectively in the
extreme north of Persia, and resolved to throw
their weight farther south upon the British at
Ahwaz and, if possible, upon the main road
running from the Baghdad province to the
Persian capital, by way of Kermanshah and
Hamadan. This was the road by which they
could best work upon the interior of Persia, in
cooperation with their German allies, and
THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.
perhaps even create a diversion against England
in Afghanistan. The Germans were ready to do
their share. They had in Kermanshah a Consul,
Schiinemann by name, who was well supplied
with money and had been working energetically
among the surrounding tribes. They had also
at Ispahan, in the centre of Persia, an un-
official agent, Pugen, who was doing all he
could to raise trouble and to persuade the
ignorant inhabitants that the Germans, in-
cluding their Kaiser, had embraced the Moslem
faith. This individual dressed himself in
Persian attire, wore an armlet inscribed with
the Musulman Kalarna, or profession of faith,
and was generally daring and picturesque.
In the capital itself were the German Minister,
Prince Reuss, the Austrian Minister, and
the Turkish Ambassador, al! apparently able to
dispose of unlimited money and considerable
852
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
quantities of arms. And elsewhere, in Shiraz, in
Yezcl, in distant Herman, even in Afghanistan,
German agents were busily spreading their
fables about German victories and the speedy
advent of a Turco-German army of invasion.
Jn Afghanistan these efforts failed, the Ameer
Habibullah remaining staunch to his alliance
BRITISH REFUGEES ON THE ROAD
FROM ISPAHAN.
with England; but, liberally backed with
money and rifles, they had no small effect upon
the imaginative Persians.
The result of the propaganda was soon
seen. During the year 1915 the Turks, fully
occupied with the British at Ahwaz, who
drove them over the border, seem to have
sent no regular troops into the centre of the
country ; but in the spring small bodies of
irregular horse crossed the frontier to Kerman-
shah, and soon afterwards trouble broke out
at many points. First the Russian Vice-
Consul at Ispahan was murdered. In July, as
far south as Bushire, a body of nomad tribes-
men in Gennan pay prepared an ambush for a
British patrol, and two British officers were
killed. A month or so later the German
Schunemann, having collected a force some
hundreds strong, waylaid on the road to
Hamadan the British and Russian Consuls at
Kennanshah, and the gendarmerie giving
them no help, they were compelled to retire. On
September 1 the British Consul-General r.t
Ispahan, Mr. Grahame, an officer who had
exceptional sympathy for the Persians, was
fired upon and wounded. A few days after-
wards the British Vice-Consul in Shiraz, a
Persian himself, was attacked and died of lii-i
wounds. The Times of September 10, com-
menting upon these occurrences, wrote that
the chaotic anarchy in Persia had become
chronic.
" Persia is now one great Alsatia. Bands
of brigands roam the country districts looting
indiscriminately, and. of ten adding murder to
their lesser crimes. In the few cities and
towns some semblance of authority is still
maintained, usually by the strongest local
official, who pays very little heed to such orders
as reach him from the capital. The gendar-
merie, commanded by Swedish officers, a force
which was never a great success, is losing such
grip as it ever had, and the men are disaffected
because they can get no pay. . . . Turkish
irregulars have ravaged Persian territory far
and wide in the Lake Urmia district, without
[Elliott and Fry.
COLONEL W. F. O'CONNOR.
British Consul-General at Shiraz, made prisoner
by the Germans.
incurring any marked disapproval from the
Teheran Government. The confusion extends to
the capital, where the youthful Shah exercisivs
little control, and Ministries succeed one
another with even more frequency than usual.
Corruption is rife, as of old, and many Minis-
ters and Deputies have yielded to the temp-
tations of the German gold lavishly spent
among them. . . . The new factor in the
Persian situation is, indeed, the ubiquity and
audacity of the Gennan agents, who peram-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
353
bulate the country with plentiful supplies of
cash and rifles, and do their best to promote
confused and muddled hostilities. . . . Ger-
man Consuls, with the aid of machine-guns and
mercenaries locally enlisted, have not hesi-
tated to attack the Consular representatives of
Great Britain and Russia. . . . The German
Legation at Tehsran, and the Gentian Consulates
at Ispahan, Kennanshah, and elsewhere, are
stated to have become armed camps. . . . The
Persian Government professes to be helpless,
mid probably is so."
This was an unpromising state of affairs, but
worse was to come. A few days later the
British and Russian community in Ispahan
found the condition of the town so threatening
that with the concurrence and help of the
Persian authorities they left for the capital,
more than two hundred miles away, where
there seemed to be a better chance of security
* •
Then the Swedish officer in command of the
gendarmerie disbanded the force, as he could
get no pay for it, though the British and Russian
Governments more than once lent some money
for the purpose. Even hi the capital things
were not going well. Early in November, 1915,
it was known that there was a considerable
force of Europeans and Persian mercenaries
in the German and Austrian Legations ready
for action ; that some of the more violent
members of the National Assembly were in
German pay : and that the Germans and
Turks were trying to induce the Persian
Government to enter into an agreement for
combined hostilities against Russia and
England. There were rumours that the Shah
and his Government were hesitating, and con-
templating withdrawal to Ispahan. So critical
was the condition of affairs that Sir Edward
Grey made a statement in the House of Com-
mons referring to the proposed agreement,
and a Russian force advanced to within a few
miles of Teheran in order to protect the Legations.
Then the German, Austrian and Turkish
representatives left the capital and marched
some miles down the road to the south. They
had with them the leader of the " Democratic "
party in the National Assembly and other
officials, and they confidently hoped that the
Shah would follow. On November 15 there
was a close trial of strength between the
hostile Powers, and for hours the fate of Persia
hung in the balance. At Shah Abdul Azim,
six miles away, where old Nasir-ud-din Shah
had been murdered twenty years before, the
Ministers of the Central Powers waited in full
uniform, with a great part, perhaps half, of
the National Assembly, and the disbanded
gendarmerie and other troops in parade order
under German, Turkish, and Swedish officers.
In Teheran were the British and Russian Minis-
ters, doing their best to dissuade the Shah from
leaving his capital. The young ruler, still
hardly more * than a boy, seemed completely
PRINCE HENRY XXXI OF REUSS,
German Minister at Teheran.
unable to come to a decision, and asked
piteously for advice from all about him. The
majority of his Ministers seemed to be in favour
of his going, and assured him that they repre-
sented the feeling of the people, as perhaps
they did. On the other hand, one or1 two of
them, notably the Farman Farma, a prince of
the Kajar house, stood staunchly by the
cause of the Allies. At last, after much painful
hesitation, the Shah decided that he would
remain in Teheran, and, to the intense dis-
appointment of the assemblage awaiting him
by the mosque on the southern road, word
came that they need not expect him. The
Russian and English Ministers were assured
that for the future the attitude of the Persian
Government would be one of " benevolent
neutrality," and the dramatic crisis was over.
354
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE (I.I/,1.
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
355
Soon afterwards the Farman Farma was
appointed Prime Minister, and for the time,
so far as the Persian Government was con-
cerned, all seemed to be going well from the
point of view of the Allies.
Nevertheless, all was not going well in the
country A few days before the scene at
Teheran a body of the disbanded gendarmerie at
Shiraz broke into open revolt, and led by sonic
of its Swedish officers, surrounded the British
Consulate. The Consul, Major (afterwards
Colonel) O'Connor, having no troops at his
disposal, was made a prisoner, and with him
the few British in the place. The women
were sent away to the port of Bushire, where,
after some threatening demonstrations, they
arrived in safety. The Consul and his com-
panions were marched away and handed over
to some local khans who were under the
influence of a German ex-Consul, a certain
Herr Was.smuss, who had distinguished him-
self by the energy of his intrigues. They
were not released for several months. The
German Minister with his following, mean-
while, took up a position at Kum, about a
hundred miles from the capital, and from there
carried on his irregular warfare. There were
risings, brought about by his people, to the
west near Hamadan, and far away to the
east in Yezd and Kermaii, where, it is said, the
insurgents murdered a cousin of the well-
known Indian Mohamedan leader, His Highness
the Aga Khan.
The news of the British repulse at Ctesiphou
in Mesopotamia strengthened the hands of
the Germans ; and before long their armed
adherents in Persia, including some Turkish
irregular horse, amounted to something like
15,000 men. But their success, such as it
was, did not last long. In Bushire the British
had now firmly established themselves, ami
there was a strong revulsion of feeling in their
favour in the southern districts, while in the
north the Russians struck some telling blows.
The force they could spare for Persia was
small : but in December they broke up a
dangerous rising near the capital, and after
defeating a Turco-German force on the main
Turkish road they took Hamadan. A few
days later, on the 21st, another Russian column
took Kum, the German headquarters, the
Minister and his motley assemblage making
no stand ; and before the end of the year
the Russians had pushed down the road to
the town of Kashan, threatening the centre
of fanaticism and disaffection at Ispahan
itself.
In the following year, 1016, the tide of affairs
in Persia turned still more strongly in favour of
the Allies. On the western side of the country
there was some fighting between the Russians
and Turks upon the main road before men-
tioned, a road which has been the scene of
fighting and the highway of trade from time
immemorial. By it, for thousands of years,
caravans bore the riches of the Far East to the
capitals of the ancient Empires in Mesopotomia
and the shores of the Bosphorus ; and by it
countless armies marched to and fro — westward
. [Elliott &• Fry,
SIR CHARLES MARLING,
British Minister at Teheran.
and eastward. By it Darius retreated before
Alexander the Great, and the Arabs carried
the victorious banners of Islam into the centre
of Asia. It was now to see the ebb and flow
of battle in the greatest war of all time. The
armies engaged were, it is true, small in com-
parison with the armies of old days, for the
main fields of the war were far away ; but
Turks and Russians were to fight 011 that classic
ground. The first success was with the Turks,
who, flushed with their success against the
British at Ctesiphon, pushed forward across
the border early in the year, occupied Kerman-
shah, and advanced to the neighbourhood of
Hamadan, the Ecbataiia of the Greeks. In the
month of March the Russians advanced in
their turn, drove back the Turks, and got as
356
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
far as Kerind, only 150 miles from Baghdad.
About the same time their southern column
arrived at Ispahan and re-established the
Allied Consulates in the old capital of Shah
Abbas. Soon afterwards the German Emperor
telegraphed to " the Commander-in-Chief of
the Persian National Army," in reality the
leader of a small force of Persian rebels, and
announced that General von der Golt/, and other
German officers were being sent to help him.
It does not appear that they ever arrived ;
but about this time the energetic Schiinemann,
with the leader of the Democrats in the National
Assembly and other German adherents, were
captured by a local chief and sent to Teheran.
Then the Turks pushed forward once more,
retook Kermanshah, and apparently in the
course of the autumn got to a point 250 miles
beyond the Persian frontier, where they were
again checked.
Meanwhile in the south of Persia the British
had been doing thek share. Not only had they
cleared the country about Ahwaz, and estab-
lished themselves firmly at Bushire, but they
had sent into the country to the south-east a
detachment under a British officer, Sir Percy
Sykes, formerly Consul at Kerman. Be-
ginning his career 25 years before as a subal-
tern of British cavalry, Sykes soon developed
a taste for exploration and other work outside
the limits of regimental duty, which led to his
being employed in Persia. At Kerman, and
afterwards as Consul-General in Meshed, he
remained for more than 20 years. A man
of remarkable energy, physical and mental,
and an equally remarkable capacity for gaining
the goodwill of the Persians, he became, in
course of time, the first authority in all matters
connected with the country. He travelled
all over it, made himself thoroughly acquainted
with its people, and wrote some books about it
which were full of varied information. His
History of Persia, in particular, showed deep
study, and was a work of the greatest value.
Some time after the war had broken out, and the
state of Persia had become what has been de-
scribed, His Majesty's Government decided to
send Sykes, who had then left Persia, to restore
order in the disturbed districts of the south and
east. Going out to Bunder Abbas early in 19 1 (i
with the rank of Brigadier-General and the task
of raising a body of Persian military police, he
pushed up to his old post at Kerman, set
matters right there, and then marched across
the country disturbed by the Germans to
Yezd, Ispahan, and Sliiraz. The length of the
march was over a thousand miles, and the
dill lenities great, for the whole country had been
in anarchy for months and the tribes were now
armed with German rifles. Apparently, General
Sykes was successful in restoring order through-
out the country east of Ispahan ; and, arrived
there, he was instructed to raise his force of
. tribal levies to a total of 11,000 men, the
arrangement being that the Russians were to
raise a similar force for service in the northern
half of the country. This arrangement seems
,to have been made between the three Govern-
ments of Persia, Russia, and Great Britain ;
and to have formed part of a wider agreement
by which the Russian and British Governments
undertook to help Persia in reorganizing her
finances and her administration. The terms
of the agreement would appear to show that
the provisions of the Convention of 1907 were
wisely modified to recognize the fact that the
special interests of Great Britain lie more
in the neutral zone of that Convention than
in the British zone.
At the end of the second year of the war
the condition of affairs in Persia was on the
whole promising. The Persian Government
had shown a more friendly disposition. The
mischief done by the Germans had been largely
counteracted. Order had been restored in
many parts, and arrangements had been made
which gave some hope of general improvement.
But the Turks remained in possession of largo
tracts of Persian territory in the north, and it
was by no means certain that the German
evil had been wholly extirpated. Until some
crushing blow struck by the Russians in Asia
Minor, or by the British in Mesopotamia,
should break the power of Turkey in the
East, and put an end once for all to Turkish
military action across the Persian frontier,
the situation in Persia would not be secure.
Whether in any case Persia could ever again
become a really independent kingdom, standing
by her own strength, was very doubtful.
The Iran of Cyrus and Shah Abbas had fallen
low indeed ; and, however much Englishmen
might wish to see her restored to something
like the position she had held for twenty-five
centuries, the hope of such a revival could not
be a confident one.
CHAPTER CLXXVII.
THE END OF AMERICAN
NEUTRALITY.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY — THE CONTROVERSIES WITH GERMANY
FROM MAY, 1915, TO JANUARY, 1917 — ANALYSIS or THE SUBMARINE WARFARE DISPUTES — THE
DEUTSCHLAND INCIDENT — GERMAN DEFIANCE — UNITED STATES BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
— GERMAN AGENTS AND THEIR CRIMES — THE GERMAN PROPOSAL OF ALLIANCE WITH MEXICO —
THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY AND AMERICAN OPINION — PRESIDENT WILSON'S RE-ELECTION — His
PEACE NOTE — AMERICAN PACIFISM' AND ALOOFNESS EXAMINED — THE TRADE DISPUTES WITH
GREAT BRITAIN — ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS — LOANS TO THE ALLIES — CHARITABLE SERVICES — THE
LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE — THE " PREPAREDNESS " MOVEMENT — THE MEANING OF AMERICAN
INTERVENTION.
ON February 3, 1917, exactly two and
a half years after the beginning
of the Great War, Mr. Woodrow
Wilson, who in the previous Novem-
ber had been re-elected President of the United
States of America, announced to Congress that
diplomatic relations with the German Empire
had been severed. On April 2 the President
asked Congress to declare that a state of war
existed between the United States and Germany.
By April 6 the Administration resolution had
passed both Houses. Thus ended the long
period of American neutrality, and the present
chapter reviews the history of the eighteen
months that preceded the rupture of relations
with Germany, a period which, whatever might
be the consequences of American intervention
in the war, must be reckoned as one of the
most important in American history. This
period witnessed the beginning of the evolution
of the United States from an isolated and self-
centred country into a World-Power.
/ Before the war the United States never had
a real foreign policy save the negative policy
implied by the Monroe doctrine. " Leave us
alone in our hemisphere," America virtually
Vol. XL— Part 140.
said to Europe, " and we will not meddle in
your affairs." True she had in the previous
twenty years fought with one European coun-
try, and had joined with others in trying to
stabilize the affairs of China ; but the freeing
of Cuba was not unconnected with the
moral and political obligations imposed
by the Monroe doctrine — the protection
of New World Republicanisms from the anti-
democratic tendencies of old-world monarchies.
The acquisition of the Philippines was acci-
dental and incidental, and John Hay's promul-
gation of the open door in China was little
more than a passing demonstration of altruism.
As a contribution to permanent policy it did
not rank much higher than America's earlier
naval crusades against the pirates of Algeria
and the buccaneers of the Barbary Coast.
Even its author regarded it mainly as a diplo-
matic tour de force ; and President Wilson, by
withdrawing from participation in the Six
Powers loan in China at the beginning of his
administration, relegated it to the limbo of
abandoned policies.
In August, 1914, the old tradition against
any sort of entanglements in Europe — the
357
858
THE TIMES' HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
tradition that made the United States enter
the Algeciras Conference in 1906 on the express
understanding that their interest in the Morocco
complication was and would remain purely
academic — had been reinforced by the acces-
sion to power of a Government of orthodox
Liberal tendencies. So far as his official
actions showed, Mr. Wilson had no more idea
of the ultimate significance to the world of the
JAMES MONROE,
Secretary of State under James Madison, at the
time of the Declaration of War with the United
Kingdom in 1812, afterwards President. Author
of the famous " Monroe Doctrine."
later and more obviously sinister manifesta-
tions of the Prussian' spirit than Gladstone,
and some other British statesmen, had of
its earlier manifestations. Not only was
there no official crystallization of the best and
most virile American opinion in the shape of
a protest against the rape of Belgium, but the
President proclaimed, on August 19, 1914, that
the United States ought to remain neutral in
thought as well as action. " The United
States." he said, "must be neutral in fact aa
well as in na/ne during these days that arc to
trv men's souls. We must be impartial in
thought as \voll as in action, must put a curl)
upon our sentiments as well as upon every
transaction that might be construed as a
preference of one party to the struggle before
another."
A comparison of such a view with Mr.
Wilson's proposal two and a half years late?
for American participation in a League to
Enforce Peace gives some idea of the educa-
tional effect of the war upon the United States,
or rather the educational effect of Prussian
lawlessness and savagery. The contrast is
the more striking when the proposal is read
in the light of the progress that even before
the rupture with Germany had been made
towards a growing popular demand for universal
military service of some kind and for an ade-
quate fleet. In his message to Congress in
December, 1914, the President virtually ignored
the war as being of no concern to the United
States. In his second inaugural Address bt
March 5, 1917, he specifically stated that the
reactions of the war had definitely proved thnt
the United States could no longer live aloof.
From the time of the sinking of the Lusitania
in May, 1915, down to the German Proclama-
tion of "Barred Zones," of February 1, 1917,
it was with Germany that American diplomacy
and American public opinion were chiefly
engaged. The Lusitania incident and its
aftermath of diplomatic exchanges, in which
the cynicism of Berlin was only equalled by
the patience of Washington, have been sketched
in a previous chapter.* War, or at any rate
n rupture of relations, was averted because
neither side wanted it. Berlin quibbled, pro-
crastinated, and beclouded the controversy in
every possible way. The President forbore to
force the pace because, as a Liberal, he disliked
the idea of war, because he knew that the
country was not ready for war, and because he
felt that he could best serve the cause of
humanity by remaining neutral. And the
Lusitania was but one of many incidents.
The White Star liner Arabic foundered on the
morning of August 19, 1915, Sworn evidence
submitted to and afterwards published by the
State Department in Washington made it
perfectly clear that she was deliberately sunk
by a German torpedo.
The defence of the German Government in
their Note to the American Government dated
September 7, was that the commander of the
criminal subn avine " became convinced " that
the steamer had the intention of attacking and
* See Vol. V., chapter Ixxxix.
THE TIMES 'HISTORY OF THE WAR.
859
ramming him, - because the Arabic, when
approaching the place where he was preparing
to sink by shell fire the Dunsley, a previous
victim from which the crew had escaped, after
altering her course pointed directly towards the
submarine. The German Government, con-
tinued the Note, regretted that Americans
should have perished, but refused to acknow-
ledge liability. They would, however, arbitrate
if the United States liked. On September 14
the American Government submitted to Berlin
evidence that convincingly rebutted the Ger-
man accusation against the Arabic. Berlin,
though it afterwards sought to make good its
case by voluminous argument, saw that the
game was up and changed its tactics. On
October 5 Count Bernstorff wrote to Mr.
Lansing, the American Secretary of State, a
letter to the effect that the orders given to
submarines to eschew passenger ships " had
been made so stringent that a recurrence of
incidents similar to the Arabic case is con-
sidered out of the question." The German
Government, Count Bernstorff continued, were
convinced that the submarine commander
really thought he was going to be rammed ;
but they did not feel that they could im-
pugn the word of the British officers of the
Arabic that such an intention never entered
their heads, and hence could only regret and
disavow the act and promise to pay indemnity
for American lives lost. This offer Mr Lansing
accepted on behalf of the President.
Hardly had a crisis over the Arabic been
averted than on November 7 the Italian liner
Ancona was sunk by a submarine flying the
Austro-Hungarian flag. The circumstances of
the sinking as recorded by Mr. Lansing in his
note of December 6 were particularly brutal.
The vessel was fired upon and sank while
passengers were still on board vainly waiting
to be taken into the boats. " The Government
of the United States," said Mr. Lansing, " con-
siders that the commander of the submarine
violated the principles of international law and
humanity . . . (by a) wanton slaughter of
defenceless non-combatants." Therefore Aus-
tria-Hungary, if she valued the continuance of
good relations with the United States, must
disavow the crime and punish the responsible
officers. Vienna's answer was characteristically
impertinent. If the United States, it said in
effect, really had to write so sharply, they might
at any rate have the courtesy to designate the
source from which they got their information.
Also, what had the rulings for the conduct of
submarine warfare which they had laid down in
their correspondence with Germany got to do
with Vienna, which had no authentic record of
that correspondence ? The Ancona case was
a case for discussion, not -for vituperation. Mr:
Lansing countered by showing that the Aus-
trian Admiralty had admitted that the Ancona
had been torpedoed while passengers were still
on board and bv renewing the demands of his
SIR CECIL SPRING-RICE, G.C M.G.
G.C.V.O.,
British Ambassador to the United Stales.
first Note. Vienna came back with a long
rigmarole giving its version of the case and
talking about the need of further investigation.
Before the controversy could be developed the
Persia was sunk with equal barbarity. By
this time the Central Powers had realized that
they had nothing much to fear from the Presi-
dent's indignation, that in fact he wanted to
keep the peace as much as they did at that time.
As a result, the Persia incident, like the Ancona
case, and indeed the Arabic case, was obliter-
ated behind a veil of lies, misrepresentations,
and plausible half-promises about reformed
behaviour.
Berlin characteristically tried to take an ell
when she had been given an inch. The Wil-
helmstrasse was virtually certain that, provided
Germany conducted submarine warfare with a
show of carefulness, and provided that she
360
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
SUBMARINES BUILT IN AMERICA FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, INTERNED
BEFORE DELIVERY AT CHARLESTON NAVY YARD.
avoided spectacular crimes involving the whole-
sale slaughter of Americans, or the obviously
illegal sinking of large ships, the President
would not live up to his determination, pro-
claimed at the time of the proclamation of the
first submarine blockade in February, 1915,
and repeated after the sinking of the Lusitania,
to uphold the rights of neutrals and the laws of
humanity as well as to protect the lives and
property .of his nationals. Not content with
THE "PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH," GER-
MAN AUXILIARY CRUISER, INTERNED
AT NEWPORT NEWS.
She ran into port with passengers from several
ships which she had sunk.
this considerable victory for " frightfulness,"
Berlin tried to go a step farther and to use the
submarine campaign to embroil the United
States with Great Britain.
At the beginning of February, 1916, it was
announced that Germany had " surrendered "
in the Lusitania controversy. The chief object
of the President had been to get Germany to
disavow the act — that is to say, to admit that it
was an illegal accident. His second object had
been to secure some sort of reparation. His
third object had been, by using the Lusitania
as the leading submarine case, to pin Germany
down to a definite promise that she would reduce
her barbarities to such a minimum that the
United States would be able to continue on
terms with her.
The Germans allowed the President to win
his third and, incidentally, his chief object —
on paper. They repeated their pledge that
unarmed merchantmen should not be sunk
without warning and unless the safety of the
passengers and crew had been assvired, provided,
of course, that the vessel did not try to escape
or resist. Regarding disavowal, Germany
refused to depart from her position that sub-
marine warfare was a justifiable retaliation
against the British blockade, but admitted that
it was wrong to imperil the safety of neutrals.
She offered to pay a full indemnity for American
victims on the Lusitania, whose death she
"greatly regretted." The "surrender" was
not received with much enthusiasm. Stalwart
opinion, which in the East especially had been
crowing increasingly bitter at the President's
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
861
patience in face of successive atrocities, con-
demned him for his readiness to accept blood-
money for the murder of Americans. Scepti-
cism was expressed as to the sincerity of
German guarantees of safety in the future.
The loophole left by the provision that mer-
chantmen might still be sunk if they tried to
resist or escape search could, it was pointed out,
be enlarged indefinitely by the cynics of Berlin.
But such criticism was inevitable. What
surprised people was the silence of the Presi-
dent's supporters in Washington. They seemed
nervous and preoccupied. There was no effort
to display the compromise as a " diplomatic
triumph." The cat did not remain long in the
bag.
Berlin's retreat was purely strategic. At
about the same time that Count Bernstorff
" yielded " over the Lusitania, Mr. Lansing
had forwarded to the Allied Governments a
Note suggesting that, owing to the changed
methods of maritime warfare, merchant ships
ought not to be armed for defence. After
registering his dislike of the German habit of
killing non-combatants, Mr. Lansing said that
he did not feel that a belligerent should be
deprived of the proper use of submarines in
the interruption of enemy commerce. They
should, of course, obey the laws of visit and
search ; but so fragile were they that they would
have great difficulty if merchantmen were
allowed to carry any arms- whatsoever.
Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against
enemy commerce on the high seas had been conducted
with cruisers carrying heavy armaments. Undsr these
conditions international law appeared to permit a
merchant vessel to carry an armament for defensive
purposes without losing its character as a private com-
mercial vessel. This right seems to have been pre-
dicated on the superior defensive strength of ships of
war, and the limitation of armament to have been
dependent on the fact that it could not be used effectively
in offence against enemy naval vessels, while it could
defend the merchantmen against the generally inferior
armament of piratical ships and privateers.
The use of the submarine, however, has changed
these relations. Comparison of the defensive strength
of a cruiser and a submarine shows that the latter,
relying for protection on its power to submerge, is
almost defenceless in point of construction. Even a
merchant ship carrying a small calibre gun would be
able to use it effectively for offence against a submarine.
Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from
the main trade channels of the seas, and privateering
ha* been abolished. Consequently, the placing of
L'uns on merchantmen at the present day of submarine
warfare can be explained only on the ground of a purpose
to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines
and to prevent warning and visit and search by them.
Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel would
seem to have the character of an offensive arma;
mcnt. . . .
It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and
reciprocally just arrangement if it could be agreed by
the opposing belligerents that submarines should be
caused to adhere strictly to the rules of international
law in the matter of stopping and searching merchant
vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, and
removing the crews and passengers to places of safety
before sinking the vessels as prizes of war, and that
merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be
prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament
whatsoever.
In prssenting this formula as a basis for conditional
declarations by the belligerent Governments, I do so
in the full conviction that your Government will con-
sider primarily the humane purpose of saving the lives
of innocent people rather than the insistence upon a
doubtful legal right which may be denied on account
of new conditions.
:SiI^ii: -
[Brooklyn Eagle.
"WILL THE SCRAP OF PAPER HOLD?"
Mr. Lansing's suggestion constituted a com-
plete abandonment of American policy, which,
as defined in a memorandum from Mr. Bryan
to Count Bernstorff, dated September 19, 1914,
was that merchant ships might be armed for
defence in a strictly limited fashion, one gun,
calibre not to exceed 6 inches, to be mounted
abaft with a small quantity of ammunition
and without expert gunners to serve it. Ameri-
can opinion received the Note with consterna-
tion. The conservative American Press warned
the President that to treat armed merchantmen
as warships would be a breach of neutrality and
that the idea of depriving vessels of their only
means of defence against the murderous attacks
of submarines was, to put it mildly, unfair. Some
newspapers — e.g., the Philadelphia Ledger on
140—2
362
THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.
February 13 — went further and accused the
State Department of having deliberately pur-
chased the so-called surrender of Germany
over the Lusitania by a promise to try to force
us to disarm our merchant ships. The accusa-
tion gained weight from the behaviour of
Count Berristorff, who went .•about rubbing
his hands with glee. " From this time forward,"
he was reported to have said, " all maritime
controversies will lie between the Allies and the
United States." There is no reason to believe
that, the State Department struck any such
bargain. The facts of the case seem to have
GERMAN SUBMARINE UNDER REPAIR.
been that it was temporarily deceived by
Count Bernstorff's plausible argument that, if
vessels were armed, and if, as he had reason to
believe, they sometimes shot at submarines on
sight, submarines could not approach to hail
them and therefore could not live up to his
side of the Lusitania bargain. The period
of the State Department's aberration was short.
The surprise, not to say the indignation, of
the Allies was conveyed to the President so
authoritatively from London that he instructed
Mr. Lansing to abandon his suggestion. Count
Bernstorff was discomfited but not beaten. His
efforts to embroil the United States and Great
Britain had failed ; but it might still be pos-
sible for Germany by a mixture of " fright-
fulness " and diplomatic chicanery so to work
upon American opinion as to enable her to
continue her career of piratical assassina-
tion
Before the failure of their first effort, the
German Government had transmitted to Wash-
ington on February 11, 1916, a lengthy Memo-
randum accompanied by exhibits in the shape of
a list of Allied vessels alleged to have attacked
submarines offensively, copies of instructions as
to the handling of guns alleged to have been
captured on British vessels, and various other
documents, which were either unconvincing or
harmless, to prove that we were using our
armed merchantmen deliberately to destroy
well-meaning submarines and were rapidly
increasing the number of our armed ships.
The Memorandum said : —
In the circumstances set forth above, enemy mer-
chantmen armed with guns no longer have any right
to be considered as peaceable vessels of commerce.
Therefore the German naval forces will receive orders,
within a short period, paying consideration to the
interests of the neutrals, to treat such vessels as bel-
ligerents.
The German Government brings this state of affairs
to the knowledge of the neutral Powers in order tha>,
they may warn their nationals against continuing to
entrust their persons or property to armed merchantmen
of the Powers at war with the German Empire.
The Memorandum reached Washington at
the end of February, simultaneously with the
inauguration of Germany's new submarine
campaign, which, though conducted on the
hypothesis that no merchant ships would be
sunk without due regard for life unless they
tried to attack or escape, was nothing but the
old practice of irresponsible murder under a
new charter of piracy. Germany merely relied
upon the allegation in her Memorandum about
the promiscuously offensive propensities of our
vessels to becloud the issue should Americans
suffer. Had not the Arabic trouble been tided
over by statements that the ill-fated liner was
preparing to ram ? Need any greater difficulty
be expected if, in the e^ent of another disaster,
the submarine captain had a report promptly
written for him showing that the victim was
about to attack or trying to escape ?
Germany over-estimated the President's
patience and the desire of his advisers to be
neutral at all costs. She proceeded too fast and
too ostentatiously on her rake's progress. She
torpedoed the Norwegian barge Silius almost
before the State Department had digested
Berlin's latest Memorandum. The Silius inci-
dent raised doubts, but before they could be
resolved a far worse offence plunged the whole
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
3G3
submarine controversy back into the melting-
pot. On March 24 a Teutonic torpedo blew
the bows off the French Channel steamer
Sussex. Americans were killed and wounded,
and the lives of others were jeopardized.
Washington was more worried than at any
time since the Lusitania tragedy. The public
was aroused, especially in the East, though it
patriotically forbore to do anything that would
force the President's hand.
The President acted with his usual poise.
After due delay to collect information, he asked
Germany for her explanation. The explanation
was characteristically unsatisfactory and it
arrived only after the torpedoing of the Eagle-
Point. Manchester Engineer, Englishman, Ber-
windvale, and of the Red Cross steamer Portugal
in the Mediterranean had enhanced the fear
that Prussian promises were still not worth the
paper they were written on. It asserted that
the Sussex had been taken for a mine-layer
and enhanced the blatancy of the he not only
with a quantity of meticulously deceptive
details but with pictures comparing the Sussex
with the imaginary mine-layer. This extra-
ordinary document Washington rebutted with
convincing details, supported by affidavits, in
a Note dated April 18. It recapitulated the
whole history of the submarine controversy ,
laid stress upon its patience, politely indicated
a suspicion that Berlin had not been acting in
good faith, and regretted that it would have to
break off relations if there were more atrocities.
The commanders of the Imperial Government's
undersea vessels have carried on practices of such
ruthless destruction which have made it more and
more evident as the months have gone by that the
Imperial Government has found it impracticable to put
any such restraints upon them a.s it had hoped anci
promised to put. Again and again the Imperial Govern-
ment has given its solemn assurances to the Government
THE SUSSEX BEFORE AND AFTER
SHE WAS TORPEDOED.
of the United States that at least passenger ships would
not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly per-
nutted its undersea commanders to disregard these
assurances with entire impunity. As recently as Febru-
ary last it gave notice that it would regard all armed
merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed
naval forces of its adversaries and deal with them as
with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging
itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed
and to accord security of life to their passengers and
crews ; but even this limitation their submarine com-
manders have recklessly ignored.
Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral
ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have
been destroyed, along with vessels of belligerent owner-
ship in constantly increasing numbers. . . . Great
liners like the Lusitania and Arabic and more passenger
boats like the Sussex have been attacked without a
moment's warning, often before they have even become
aware that they were in the presence of an armed ship
of the enemy, and the lives of non-combatants, passengers
and crew have been destroyed wholesale and in a manner
which the Government of the United States cannot but
regard as wanton and without the slightest colour of
justification. No limit of any kind has, in fact, been set
to their indiscriminate pursuit and destruction of
merchantmen of all kinds and, nationalities within the
waters which the Imperial Government has chosen to
designate as lying within the seat of war. The roll of
Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus
attacked and destroyed has grown month by month
until the ominous toll has mounted into hundreds.
The Government of the United States has been veiy
patient. ... It has made every allowance for unprece-
dented conditions and has been willing to wait until the
facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only
one interpretation.
It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to
say to the Imperial Government that that time has come.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
THE GERMAN "COMMERCIAL" SUBMARINE " DEUTSCHLAND " AT BALTIMORE.
It has become painfully evident to it that the position
it took at the very outset is inevitable — namely, the use
of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's com-
merce is, of necessity, because of the very character of
the vessels employed, and the very methods of attack
which their employment of course involves, utterly
incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-
established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and
the sacred immunities of non-combatants.
If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to
prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against
vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without
regard to what the Government of the United States
must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of
international law and the universally recognized dictates
of humanity, the Government of the United States is at
last forced to tho conclusion that there is but one course
it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should
now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of
its present methods of submarine warfare against
passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government
of the United States can have no choice but to sever
diplomatic relations with the Central Empires altogether.
This action the Government of the United States con-
templates with tho greatest reluctance but feels con-
strained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights
of neutral nations.
On April 19, the President appeared before
Congress and read a paraphrase of the Note,
which was greeted with emphatic approval by
the Legislature and by the whole country.
The Sussex Note was in point of fact most
important. It put the issue plainly before
Germany. In it the President reverted to the
only sound principle upon which the submarine
controversy could be conducted. He insisted
that Germany should behave herself on the
seas in the interests not only of American life
and property but of international right and
decency. He took, in fact, the same line as he
had taken after the assassination of the
Lusitania but which he seemed to desert in his
later Lusitania Notes and in his treatment of
the long string of Teutonic crimes between the
Arabic and the Sussex. During that time
scant attention was paid to the sinking of
merchantmen of neutral or belligerent nations,
provided no American citizen was injured ; and
there can be no doubt that this seeming willing-
• ness to allow a certain latitude for illicit warfare
had bred in Germany n strong conviction that
the United States would put nothing more
efficacious than words in the way of an almost
unlimited use of the submarine. This belief
the Sussex Note shook considerably. It took
Germany by surprise. If left her no choice
but to climb down and to hide her discomfiture
behind a characteristic veil of bluster about the
illegalities of the British blockade and of
blarney about her willingness to make peace
if only the overweening ambitions and hatreds
of the Allies would let her. That was the gist
of the cumbrous and offensive Note of May 4.
The Note, however, did contain radical con-
cessions to the American point of view.
As far as it lies with the German Government, it wishes
to prevent things from taking such a course. The
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
365
German Government is prepared to do its utmost to
confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration
to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also
insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which
the German Government believes itself, now as before,
to be in agreement with the United States.
The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies
the Government of the United States that the German
naval forces have received the following orders : In
accordance with the general principles of visit and search
&nd destruction of merchant vessels recognized by
international law, such vessels, both within and without
the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk
•without warning and without saving human lives, unless
these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.
But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to
fight for her existence, shall, for the sake of neutral
interest, restrict the use of an effective weapon if her
enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods
of warfare violating the rules of international law. Such
a demand would be incompatible with the character of
neutrality, and the German Government is convinced
that the Government of the United States does not think
of making such a demand, knowing that the Government
of the United States has repeatedly declared that it is
determined to restore the principle of the freedom of
the seas, from whatever quarter it is violated.
Accordingly the German Government is confident
that, in consequence of the new orders issued to its
naval forces, the Government of the United States will
now also consider all impediments removed which mav
have been in the way of a mutual cooperation towards
the restoration of the freedom of the seas during the war
as suggested in the Note of July 23, 1915, and it does
[American Prtss Association.
AN AMERICAN SUPER-DREADNOUGHT: THE U.S. SHIP "ARIZONA."
86G
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
not doubt that the Government of the United States
will now demand and insist that the British Government
shall forthwith observe the rules of international law
universally- recognized before the war as they are laid
down in the Notes presented by the Government of the
United States to the British Government on December
28, 1914, and November 5, 1915. Should the steps
taken by th? Government of the United States not attain
the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity
followed by all belligerent nations, the German Govern-
ment would then be facing a new situation, in which it
must reserve itself complete liberty of decision.
After a period of indignant cogitation
American official and public opinion decided
MR. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
Assistant Secretary to the U.S. Navy.
to accept the " concessions " thus conveyed,
with the explicit proviso that it was to be
clearly understood at Berlin that the American
Government could not " for a moment enter-
tain, much less discuss, a suggestion that
respect by German naval authorities for the
rights of citizens of the United States upon the
high seas should in any way or in the slightest
degree be made contingent upon the conduct of
any other Government affecting the rights of
neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility
in such matters is single, not joint ; absolute,
not relative." (Note of May 8, 1916 )*
A lull in the submarine campaign ensued.
But it lasted only a few weeks, and it soon
became apparent that Germany had reverted
* For the effects in Germany of the Sussex crisis
and the fall of Admiral von Tirpitz, sec Vol. IX. p. 370.
to her policy of torpedoing everything she could
in any way she could, with the exception of a
liner upon which American passengers might
be presumed to be and of vessels flying the
American flag. By October 1, 1016, it was
announced by the British Admiralty that of the
262 vesseb destroyed since the Sussex at least
15 had been attacked without warning. The
State Department, however, reported officially
that in nono of these cases had anything been
found that could be taken as proof of the
violation of Germany;s promise of May 4. The
United States was in fact slipping back, as she
did after the Lusitania, into the narrow national
principle that nothing concerned her unless the
lives of her nationals were Jeopardized Again
encouraged by her attitude, and irritated and
worried probably by the success of the British
offensive on the Somme, Germany gradually
increased the scope of her operations.
Her first move was to try to paralyse Ameri-
can self-respect by a strong dose of " frightful-
ness." During the summer of 1916 Americans
had been electrified by the sudden appearance
MR. FRANK L. POLK,
Counsellor to the State Department and
Acting Secretary of State.
at Baltimore of a German ocean-going mercan-
tile submarine, the Deutschland, under the
command of Captain Koenig. The visit, it was
clear, impressed people immensely with the>
possibilities of the submarine. On October 7
it was followed up by the arrival in the harbour
of Newport, which besides being a fashionable
sea-side resort is also a naval station, of a
submarine flying the German naval flag and
armed with the regular torpedo tubes and
guns. On October 8, after having been visited by
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAE.
8G7
the admiring representatives of official and naval
Newport (not only the officers but also its crew
seemed to be men especially picked on account of
their physical appearance and linguistic attain-
ments), and probably after exchanging with the
German Ambassador, who was at Newport, all
sorts of useful information, the U 53 left New-
port within the prescribed 24 hours. Within
48 hours of her departure she sank within sight
of the American coast six ships — four British,
one Dutch, and one Norwegian. In each case
the submarine commander warned his victims,
and thanks to the help of American war vessels
all lives were saved.
MR. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the United States Na^y.
The incident made a vast sensation. Friends
of the Allies were indignant that the U 53
should have been allowed to come into Newport
and communicate with Count Bernstorff. They
pointed out that, in deference to an American
protest against the hovering of British and
French cruisers in American waters which had
been registered during the preceding winter, the
Allied warships had greatly curtailed their
activities in the Western Atlantic, and that the
United States Government had thus indirectly
facilitated the commerce-destroying mission of
the U 53. There was even greater indignation
at the way in which American war vessels
seem to have acted as tenders to the German
submarine, rescuing the lives it imperilled and
thus enabling it to ply its work within the limits
of humanity imposed by President Wilson.
So strong were the feelings aroused that the
American Navy Department, hearing that they
had spread to high quarters in England, pre-
pared a letter setting forth the real facts
for the informal use of the American Ambas-
sador in London. The letter was addressed
to Mr. Polk, the Counsellor of the State
Department, by Mr. Franklin Roosevelt, the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and dated
November 18, 1916. The salient passages of
this document, which satisfactorily disposed of
MR. NEWTON D. BAKER,
United States Secretary for War.
an unpleasant incident, are here published for
the first time :
I am particularly sorry that anyone in the British
naval service believed that the American Navy would
act unneutrally towards thero.because of the exceedingly
pleasant relations and good feeling which have heretofore
existed between the two services. I think 1 may say
this with perfect propriety, because it is simply a recog-
nizod fact that the relations between the British naval
service and our own have always been of the most
friendly nature.
It would seem trom Mr. Page's letter that it is believed
in London that one of our destroyers obeyed the demand
of the German submarine commander to move his ship
and thereby facilitate the destruction of one of the mer-
chantmen, and that we have not been frank in giving
all the facts. May I say that there ha? been no reason
at any time why all the facts should not be published,
and that the only reason for confining ourselves to a
general statement that we had been in every way
368
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
neutral was because we did not realize that any more
detailed statement by the Navy Department would be
of the slightest interest either to the British Government
or the general public.
However, as the misinformation in regard to this
particular episode does seem to exist, I am only too
glad to give you the real facts of what occurred. On
the morning of October 8 the Naval Radio Station at
COUNT BERNSTORFF,
German Ambassador to the United States
from 1908 to 1917.
Newport, Rhode Island, received a S O S call from the
s.s. West Point. The West Point stated that she was
10 miles south-south-west of the Nantucket Lightship.
On receiving this information, and in compliance with
the well-known and time-honoured custom that has ever
characterized seamen in responding to the call of sea-
faring people, orders were given to the destroyers then
in the harbour immediately to proceed to the assistance
of the vessel. These, orders were promptly carried out
by all the destroyers then in the harbour. On reaching
the vicinity of the Nantucket Lightship it was discovered
that a German submarine had already sunk the \\V-i
Point, and that tho crew of that vessel had been safely
landed on tho Lightship and information was received
from several other vessels that they wore being attacked
by a submarine. The destroyers naturally went to the
vicinity of these various vessels in order to render such
a-<-iistance to the crews and passengers as tho dictates
of humanity might necessitate under the conditions.
Special emphasis should be laid on tho fact that the sea
was at that time smooth, and that in the case of vessels
which wore abandoned at any distance from tho Light-
ship the German submarine was careful to tow the boats
containing tho personnel up to within easy reach of the
Lightship. It does not seem possible to contend, in tho
light of what actually occurred, that any of tho passengers
or crews were in clanger at any time.
Among the vessels which had been stopped by the
submarine was the Dutch vessel Bloomersdyk. She
had been stopped late in the afternoon and her personnel
had been directed to abandon her before G.30 p.m.
These orders were carried out and her officers and crew
abandoned the ship, the submarine in tho meantime
standing over to another ship which had been stopped
several miles away. Several destroyers wont to tho
vicinity of the Bloomersdyk and two of them, the U.S.S.
McDougal and the U.S.S. Benham, received numbers of
tho crew of tho Bloomersdyk on board, taking then] out
of the Bloomersdyk's boats. The Benham had been
lying within a few hundred yards of the Bloomersdyk,
receiving a portion of the officers and crow on board,
and having determined that there were no additional
persons still left on board tho Bloomersdyk was proceed-
ing to got under way to return to Newport in accordance
with instructions. At this time the German submarine
returned to the Bloomersdyk and actually did signal to
the Benham requesting her commanding officer to
move a little farther off in order that there might be no
possibility of injury to the Benham or her personnel
and stating that he was about to sink the Bloomersdyk.
However, at the time this message was received tho
Benham had accomplished the purpose for which she
was in the locality — i.e., receiving on board a portion
of the crew of the Bloomersdyk and ascertaining if there
wore any additional people still on board — and was in
the act of departing quite without regard to tho move-
ments of the German submarine or her signalling.
There was thus no occasion to regard, and no regard was
given to the actions of the submarine.
GERMAN EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON,
Count Bernstorff's official residence.
I have gone over every report and have, further,
made uersonal investigations, and I must tell you frankly
that I cannot by the widest stretch of imagination see
anything but absolute propriety in the action of the
commanding officer of the U.S.S. Benham. The points
to remember in regard to this particular episode are that
this Dutch ship was abandoned by her officers and crew ;
that ,tho officers and crew were in the ship's boats in a
smooth sea and within two or three miles of the X tin-
tucket Lightship ; that the Benham, not for the purpose
of saving their lives — for they were in no danger — but
to give them comfort and assistance, took some of them
on board near tho abandoned ship ; that she ascertained
that no additional persons remained on the Bloomersdyk,
and that having completed this duty she went about
her businr-s in regular course. She did not leave the
Bloomersdyk in obedience to the signal from the German
submarine ; she did not leave the Bloomersdyk earlier than
she would have ij the German submarine had not signalled ;
she did not leave the Bloomersdyk until her duty had been
fully completed*
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
369
This must be th; case referred to in London, because
I can find no record of a signal being made by the
German submarine in the case of any of the other
merchant ships sunk.
Another thing not generally known at the
time was that, although the United States
made no formal protest against the ventures of
the U 53, the President did in point of fact
scope of German submarine illegalities, how-
ever, increased steadily. On October 26 the
British ship Rowanmore was attacked and
destroyed by gunfire. There was no loss of
life, but the two Americans and five Filipinos
on board stated that the submarine shelled the
life-boats as the crew were taking to them.
MR. JAMES W. GERARD.
United States Ambassador in Berlin from 1913 to 1917.
summon Count Bernstorff to his country resi-
dence in New Jersey and tell him that he could
not tolerate their repetition. That, it may be
stated incidentally, was the only time that the
President saw Count Bernstorff during the war
save on purely formal occasions.
The exploit of the U 53 was not repeated,
partly, perhaps, in consequence of the Presi-
dent's firmness. In European waters the
On October 26 the Marina was sunk in circum-
stances that are sufficiently well known, and
six of the Americans on board were lost.
Then followed the attack on the American
steamer Chenung and the loss of 17 Americans
on the Russian. The State Department in none
of these cases did more than investigate, and
it looked for a time as if the President had
forgotten the fine stand which he had taken in
140 3
370
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
871
his Sussex Note. But he had not forgotten
He was only biding his time for another
decisive stroke, and on January 31, 1917, he
got his opportunity.
Towards the end of 1916 rumours had
reached Washington in common with other
capitals that Germany was contemplating a
renewal of promiscuous submarine barbarity.
It was recognized that the various more or less
overt bids for peace which she had been making
betokened a desperation which was bound to
cause an explosion of " frightfulness." Presi-
dent Wilson had recognized this himself when
he caused Mr. Lansing in his Peace Note of
December 18 to say :
" The terms upon which it [the war] is to be
concluded they [neutrals] are not at liberty, to
suggest ; but the President does feel that it is
his right and his duty to point out their inti-
mate interest in its conclusion, lest it should
presently be too late to accomplish the greater
things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the
situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly
hard to endure, be rendered altogether in-
tolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be
done civilization itself which can never be
atoned or repaired."*
The explosion came as soon as it had pene-
trated even the Prussian skull that the Allies
were to be beguiled neither by the crocodile
tears of Berlin nor by President Wilson's
well-intentioned pleadings for the prompt
re-establishment of a " warless world." It
took the form of a publication on January 31
of a notice that from February 1 onwards the
submarines, after granting a short respite to
neutral vessels, would torpedo everything in
sight in the waters around the British Isles and
France and in the Mediterranean. The Note,
after some hypocritical platitudes about Teu-
tonic solicitude for the independence of small
nations and the " freedom of the seas," an-
nounced that, in view of England's brutally
illegal use of sea-power, which pressed upon
neutrals as hard as upon her enemies, Germany
must —
abandon the limitations which it has hitherto imposed
on itself in the employment of its fighting weapons at
sea.
Trusting that the American people and its Government
will not close their eyes to the reasons for this resolution
* The American Peace Note of December 18, 1916,
which is referred to here and in the following pages in
connexion with President Wilson's views and policy,
will be found in Chapter CLXXX. which deals with the
whole peace discussion initiated by the German Note
of December 12, 1910.
and its necessity, the Imperial Government hopes that
the United States will appreciate the new state of affairs
from the high standpoint of impartiality, and will also
on their part help to prevent further misery and a
sacrifice of human lives which might bo avoided.
While I venture, as regards details of the projected
war measures, to refer to the attached memorandum, I
venture at the same time to express the expectation that
the American Government will warn American ships
against entering the barred zones (Sperryebiete) described
in the annexe and its subjects against entrusting
passengers or goods to vessels trading with harbours in
tne barred zones.
In the annexe to the Note Berlin added
insult to promised injury by telling the United
[From the New York "Wcrld."
"THE SANDS ARE RUNNING LOW."
States that she might send one ship a week to
England provided that it was painted, as one
American commentator expressed it, until it
was " striped like a convict," and followed a
prescribed route.
The effect of the Note was instantaneous.
American amour propre was stung to the quick.
From one coast of the continent to the other
there arose a clamour of indignation which two
days later (February 3) the President crystal-
lized in an address to Congress announcing that
he had handed Count Bernstorff his passports
in accordance with the promise that he had
given during the Sussex dispute. After recall-
ing to members of the Congress the corre-
spondence that passed at the time, he said :
I therefore directed the Secretary of State to announce
to his Excellency the German Ambassador that all
diplomatic relations between the United States and the
German Empire are severed and that the American
Ambassador in Berlin will immediately be withdrawn,
and, in accordance with this decision, to hand to his
Excellency his passports.
Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the German
Government, this sudden and deeply deplorable renun-
ciation of its assurance given to this Government at one
of the moments of most critical tension in the relations
of the two Governments, I refuse to believe that it is the
intention of the German authorities to do in fact what
872
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
they have warned us they will fool at liberty to do. I
cannot bring myself to feel that they will indeed pay no
regard to the ancient friendship between their people and
our own, or to the solemn obligations which have been
exchanged between them, and destroy American ship*
and take the lives of American citizens in wilful prosecu-
tion of the ruthless naval programme they have
announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt
acts on their part can make me believe this even now.
If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety
and prudont foresight of their purpose should unhappily
prove unfounded, if American ships and American lives
should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders,
in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable
understandings of international law and the obvious
dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming
again before Congress to a=k that authority be given to
me to use any means that may be necessary for the
protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecu-
tion of their peaceful, legitimate errands on the high sea«.
I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all
Neutral Governments will take the same course. We do
not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German
Government. We are sincere friends of the German
people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the
Government which speaks for them. We shall not
believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are
obliged to believe it, and we purpose nothing more than
reasonable defence of the undoubted rights of our people.
We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to
stand, true alike in thought and action, to the imme-
morial principles of our people which I have sought to
express in my address to the Senate only two weeks ago.
We seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty, justice,
and Unmolested life.
These are bases of peace, not pf war. God grant that
wo may not be challenged to defend them by acts of
\vilfnl injustice on the part of the Government o!
Germany.
Count Bernstorff was handed his passports
the same day. Mr. Gerard left Berlin, but not
until he had been characteristically detained
by the German Government and vainly brow-
beaten in the hopes that he might commit his
Government to giving up the German ships
laid up in American ports in case of war, and
to the granting of various privileges to German
citizens in the U.S. in the same contingency.
The Austrian Ambassador — the notorious Dr.
Dumba's successor, Count Tarnowski — was
allowed to remain in Washington, although he
was never officially received by the American
Government, and the American Ambassador,
Mr. Penfield, in Vienna, pending a clear
definition as to Austria's attitude regarding
her particular policy ; but it was generally
taken for granted that the President had
definitely made up his mind that lawless-
ness which, according to figures issued a little
later by the State Department, had cost
232 American lives had to cease.
If Prussian maritime frightfulness brought
to an abrupt termination the first chapter of
MR. GERARD'S HOME-COMING, MARCH 16, 1917.
On bis left is Mr. John B. Stanchfield, Chairman of the New York Reception Committee, and
the nearer figure in front is Mr. Clarence H. Mackay.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
373
the history of the relations of the United States
and Germany during the war, other factors
had powerfully contributed to the same end.
All through 1915 and 1916 American exaspera-
tion had been steadily rising against the blatant
activities of German agents and propagandists.
Their activities fell into two classes — political
and criminal. The general idea of Berlin was,
first to keep the United States neutral as long
as possible ; secondly, to gull the public into
demanding that the President should cut his
policies according to the Prussian pattern —
agitate for peace when the Germans wanted it,
place an embargo upon the export of munitions
to the Allies, and take a strong line against our
blockade generally, etc. ; thirdly, to impress
the American imagination with the reality of
Prussian " frightfulness " and actually to injure
her trade with the Allies by sabotage, the blow-
ing up of munition factories, the crippling of
means of transportation, etc. ; fourthly, to
use the United States as a base for belligerent
operations for the extension of sabotage to
Canada, for the promotion of Indian and
Irish unrest, for espionage in France and
England, for the smuggling of contraband,
and very probably for the furnishing of sub-
marines with supplies during the later phases of
the war, just as commerce-destroying cruisers
had been supplied to some extent during the
early phases of it. It was also clear that Count
Bernstorff and his agents were all along preparing
difficulties for the United States in the American
hemisphere should it be necessary to deflect
American attention from the Old World. In
Mexico there was a campaign to stir up Carranza
against the United States, generally to keep
revolution seething, and to cripple if possible
by those and other means the Tampico oil
fields, whence the British Fleet drew valuable
supplies. Nor was there any reasonable doubt
but that German cash and intrigue helped in
the outbreak of the revolution in Cuba in
February, 1917, and were continually active
in other Latin - American countries for
the behaviour of which the United States
were more or less responsible, if only
because of their proximity to the Panama
Canal.
All this and much besides was brought out
in the most dramatic way possible by the
revelation, after the rupture, of the German
Government's effort through the German
Minister to Mexico, the ex-Dragoman, Herr von
Eckhardt, to arrange with Mexico and, if
possible, with Japan for an offensive alliance
against the United States.
Congress was debating a Bill to give the
President power to enforce his plans for " armed
neutrality " against Germany — to supply Ameri-
can merchant ships with guns — and to take such
other steps as might be necessary to secure for
his nationals their rights on the high seas
Pacifists, spurred on by the walking delegates
of the Teutonic propaganda, were working
GENERAL CARRANZA,
To whom Germany addressfd the proposal for
an alliance with Mexico.
up a huge opposition, and it seemed doubtful
whether the President would get the national
sanction for steps which it was deemed that
the rupture with Germany and the barbarity
of the Prussian submarines rendered well-nigh
indispensable. So the Administration sprang
upon the public part, at any rate, of a docu-
ment which had been intercepted on its way to
Mexico. The document speaks for itself :
(Authentic copy of the German Foreign Minister's
note to the German Minister in Mexico.)
Berlin, Jan. 19, 19 IT.
On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine
warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention
to endeavour to keep neutral the United States of
America.
If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance
on the following basis with Mexico : That we shall make
war together and together make peace. We shall give
general financial support, and it is understood that
Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory of New Mexico,
Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for
settlement.
You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico
874
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAX.
AMERICAN SUBMARINES.
of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is
certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the
United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico,
on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan
suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same
time, offer to mediate between Oermany and Japan.
Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico
that tho employment of ruthless submarine warfare now
promises to compel England to make peace in a few
months.
ZIMMERMAN.
The revelation set opinion ablaze. A dozen
pro-Germans, pacifists, or provincial fools
in the Senate managed to prevent the passage
of the Armed Neutrality Law before the dis-
solution of Congress on March 4, but public
opinion was so aroused by this and sub-
sequent revelations of German intrigue and
of the activities of their Irish and Hindu tools
that it would have heartily supported the
President in any immediate action against
Germany within the limits of his constitutional
powers.
The whole history of German propaganda,
spying, and agent-provocateur work in the
United States was suddenly thrown into
ominous and obvious perspective. Incidents
hitherto but half understood were mar-
shalled and their cumulative significance was
grasped. The United States, it was seen, was
festering with spies. Her industrial and com-
mercial organizations, her relations not only
with the Allies but with her Latin-American
neighbours were seen to be ubiquitously
threatened.
There is n& space here to go into the wlioli-
of the unsavoury history of the business. Its
earlier stages, the New York World's revelations
regarding Teutonic plans for capturing the
American Press in the summer of 1915, the
dismissal of Dr. Dumba owing to the proof
afforded by papers seized from the American
journalist Archibald in the autumn of that
year that the Austrian Ambassador was impli-
cated in plots to cause strikes in American
munition works, have already been described.*
They were followed in December, 1915, by the
recall of Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed, tho
German military and naval attaches. Their
recall came as the result of the accumulation of
an immense mass of evidence that they and
their agents were plotting for the destruction of
munition factories, for the arrangement of
sabotage in Canada, for the fomentation of
» See Vol. V., Chapter LXXXIX.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
375
Indian unrest, for the blowing up of Allied
ships, and that they were the directors
of a large organization for the forgery and
stealing of American passports for the use
of spies like Lody and Kuepferle. Its imme-
diate cause was the trial and conviction in New
York of Dr. Karl Buenz, a Prussian agent
masquerading as a director of the Hamburg-
Amerika line, and some of his employees on a
charge of filing false clearance papers for the
tenders of German cruisers at the beginning of
the war. It appeared that Boy-Ed was,
among other things, the treasurer of the whole
precious organization, and that von Papen had
specialized in the destruction of munition
factories. After the State Department had
asked for and secured their recall, the President
in his annual address to Congress, on Novem-
ber 7, 1915, took for the first time official notice
of the delinquencies of the German plotters and
especially of their German-American assistants.
Having alluded to their activities, without
mentioning names, he said :
America has never witnessed anything like this before,
and never dreamed it possible that men sworn into har
own citizenship, men drawn out of the great free stock.*,
such as have supplied some of the best and strongest
elements of that little but now heroic nation that in the
high tlay of old staked its very life to free itself from every
entanglement that had darkened the fortunes of older
nations and set up a new standard here, that men of
such origins and such choices of allegiance would ever
turn in malign reaction against the Government and
people who had welcomed and nurtured them and seek
to make this proud country once more a hotbed of
European passion. A little while ago such a thing would
have seemed incredible, because it was incredible. We
made no preparation for such a contingency. We would
have been almost ashamed to prepare for it, as if wo
were suspicious of ourselves and our own comrades and
neighbours.
But the ugly and incredible thing actually has coma
about, and we are without adequate Federal laws to
deal with it. I urge you to enact such laws at the
earliest possible moment, and I feel that in doing so 1
am urging you to do nothing lees than to save the
honour and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures
of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out,
They are not many, but they are infinitely malignant.
and the hand of our power should close over them at
once. They have formed plots to destroy property,
they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality
of the Government, and they have sought to pry into
every confidential transaction of the Government in
order to serve interests alien to our own.
The President's demand for better laws was
characteristically ignored by Congress until
after the departure of Count Bernstorff, a year
later. All through the winter the German
propagandists and plotters kept up their work.
Now it was a case of lurid advertisements of
British brutality in starving German babies ;
now it was support of Count Bernstorffs
AMERICAN SAILORS.
376
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR,
diplomacy by efforts to gull or blackmail
Congress into fomenting trouble over our
arming of merchantmen and otherwise to
embarrass the President ; now it was a spasm
of manufactured agitation against our blockade
or the formation of some Irish-German-
American society for the confusion of the
common enemy.
All this was of considerable educational
value, and prepared the way for the next
MR. ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War in the McKinley Cabinet,
Secretary of State in the Roosevelt Cabinet.
sensation. On April 18, 1916, indictments
were returned against von Papen on charges of
furnishing money, electric generators, fuses,
and wires for the destruction of the Welland
Canal in Canada. His unofficial successor,
von Igel, was simultaneously arrested in New
York and his papers seized. A day later, while
the President was reading to Congress a para-
phrase of his Sussex Note, it was announced
that the papers revealed plots of the highest
importance and that Count Bernstorff wished
to obtain diplomatic immunity for them. The
State Department ironically replied that the
Ambassador might have any or all the papers
if he would officially recognize them as Embassy
property. The papers were not published,
apparently because they implicated certain
well-known Americans with German ten-
dencies ; but the incident increased popular
suspicion. Von Igel, .though indicted, was
afterwards allowed to accompany Count Bern-
storff back to Germany. Then followed the
Presidential campaign of 1916, in which the
German propagandists still further lost caste
by their unsuccessful efforts to form a German
party and to blackmail the candidates.
Thus by the time of the rupture, despite the
fact that their attitude after it showed that the
majority of German-Americans were loyal, just
as the result of the Presidential election showed
that they voted mainly as Americans and not
as Germans, the American public had been
made " receptive " as to the significance of the
German spy menace. Proof of that was given
not only by the meticulous preparations which
were made against riots, but by the way in
which the publication of the Zimmerman letter
was followed by an hysterical outpouring
of apprehension and speculation, often accom-
panied by wonderful stories about German
activities in Cuba, Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua,
of submarines in the Gulf of Mexico, etc. The
President's patient treatment, both of the Ger-
man plotters within his gates and of the
German pirates without his gates, thus received
one great justification. Had not time and
opportunity been given Dumba, von Papen,
Boy-Ed, and other officials like Franz Bopp,
the German Consul-General In San Francisco,
indicted, in January, 1917, for conspiracy to
destroy railways and munition factories in the
United States and Canada, to advertise their
baseness, had not there been a never-ending
stream of indictments and convictions on similar
counts of unofficial agents like von Igel, Fay,
van Horn, and others, had not the disloyal
German-American leaders been given such
copious opportunities • of proving their dis-
loyalty, had not the American pacifists been
given equal opportunity of betraying th<> fact
that they were prompted by German lies as
well as by their own ignorant sentimentalist n,
had not the opportunity arisen of circumstan-
tially unveiling Prussian plots in Mexico and
elsewhere, had not these and other tiling-;
been allowed to happen, the President might
well have found himself with a. divided country
behind him after breaking with Germany on
account of her piracy upon the seas, with the
safety of which the greater part of the American
people hardly realized that they had any real
concern until the end.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
877
Rightly or wrongly, he thought that patience
afforded the best chance of securing practical
unity of opinion in favour of a firm policy,
should such a policy be forced upon him.
But this consideration did not protect the
President from a running fire of criticism by
a certain section of his coimtrymen. As has
been shown in a previous chapter, long-sighted
Americans, so soon as they recovered from
the shock of the cataclysm of August. 1914,
realized not only that the Prussian menace
deserved the positive reprobation of the whole
of civilization, but that, if Pan-Germanism
succeeded in clamping upon Europe its odious
domination, it would be merely a question of
time before it tried to engulf the Western
hemisphere. By such people the President's
demand for neutrality of thought as well as of
action was condemned, at first privately, as
bad politics as well as bad ethics. There was
a feeling that he should have protested in the
name of civilization against the rape of Belgium
and other Prussian crimes, with the double
object of showing the Allies where his Govern-
ment stood and of educating his countrymen
to a sense of their ultimate responsibilities,
both selfish and altruistic. It was not known
then that, in point of fact, the President did
at least protest in an autograph letter to the
Kaiser against many of those crimes. All that
the public saw was a policy of apparently
" ice-cold " neutrality.
Indignation against this policy began to
get the better of patriotic discretion after the
President's failure to obtain immediate repara-
tion for the Lusitania. It grew, after he passed
the Arabic by, until by the winter of 1915-16
it had captured a formidable section of thought-
ful opinion. The President was accused of
being careless of the honour and interests of
the country. He was accused of weakening
tho national fibre by encouraging his country-
men to shirk responsibilities and to be content
to wax rich from war trade, while the Allies
THE GERMAN SHIP "VATERLAND"
INTERNED AT NEW YORK.
NEW YORK POLICE GUARDING THE PIER WHERE GERMAN LINERS WERE
INTERNED.
378
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
bled for the principles which the makers of
America had also fought to maintain. He was
accused of drugging self-respect by phrases,
of being " brave in words and irresolute in
action," of sending ultimatums and then
being " too proud to fight," a phrase which has
become a " byword for derision and contempt
of the Government of the United States."
Mr. Root, in the speech from which the above
quotations are taken (it was delivered in
February, 1916, before the New York State
Republican Convention), went so far as to say
that under a President " by temperament and
training" inadequate for the great task wliich
ami when our Government failed to make those words
good its diplomacy was bankrupt.
The Pn sidciit's apparent advocacy of a
" drawn " wnr produced similar criticism a
\vnr later. Stalwart friends of the Allies,
knowing that they were determined to fight it
out and not make -peace when they were just
coming to the top of their strength, accused him
of playing a German game and of being false
to the best interests of civilization.
There can be little doubt that, as was shown
above, the President did suggest peace partly
because he feared that a continuance of the
war would produce, as it did produce, more
THE CAPITOL, WASHINGTON,
he was called upon to tackle the country was
" blindly stumbling towards war."
Our diplomacy [he continued] has dealt with symptoms
and ignored causes. The great decisive question upon
which our peace depend* is the question whether the rule
of action applied to Belgium is to be tolerated. ' If it
is tolerated by the civilized world, this nation will have
to fight for its life. There will be no escape. That is
the critical point of defence for the p^ace of America.
When our Government failed to tell the truth about
IVIgium, when it lost the opportunity for leadership of
the moral sense of the American people, it lost the
power which a knowledge of that leadership and a sympa-
tlictic response from the moral sense of the world would
have given to our diplomacy. When our Government
failed to make any provision whatever for defending its
rights in case they should be trampled upon, it lost the
JIOU.T which a belief in its readiness and will to maintain
its rights would have given to its diplomatic representa-
tions. When our Government gave notice to Germany
that it would destroy American lives and American
ship-i at its peril, our words, which would have been
potent if sustained by adequate preparation to make
tham good, and by the prestige and authority of tlm
moral leadership of a great people in a great cause, were
treated with contempt which should have been foreM'« ri ;
THE SEAT OF CONGRESS.
promiscuous submarine barbarities, and hence
all sorts of complications and possibly war for
the United States. But there is also reason to
believe that in producing his Peace Note he
wished to show the Allies that if they made a
just peace they could rely on his doing every-
thing possible to get the United States to
support that peace against future assaults by
the unrighteous. Even that fine idea, as
afterwards enunciated in his Peace League
address to the Senate, did not disarm his
stalwart and conservative enemies. Mr. Roose-
velt, after the Note had been before the public
for a fortnight, voiced a considerable opinion
when he urged its recall for the following
reasons :
The Note, he said, was not only dangerous but pro-
foundly mischievous, because it took no account what-
ever of the most serious causes of offence that had been
given to the United States and had invited an insincere
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
879
and improper bidding for our support. Nor is this all.
The Note takes up positions so profoundly immoral
and misleading that high-minded and right-thinking
Americans, whose country this Note places in a thor-
oughly false light, are in honour bound to protest.
minded man who loves the peace of righteous-
nesii.
Elsewhere the President says that at some unknown
date in the hereafter the American people intend to
safeguard the rights of small nationalities against big
PRESIDENT WILSON.
For example, the Note says, " Thus far both sides
eeem to bo fighting for the same thing." This is palpably
and wickedly false. To say that the Germans, who
trampled the Belgians under the heel and are at this
moment transporting 100,000 Belgians to serve as State
slaves in Germany, are fighting for the same things as
their hunted victims, is not only a falsehood but a callous
and most immoral falsehood, shocking to every higb-
and ruthless nations. Unless this is sheer hypocrisy
let the President begin now, and in such case let him
promptly withdraw this Note, which has given comfort
and aid only to the oppressors of Belgium, and in which
he did not dare to say one word in behalf of Belgium's
rights.
Perhaps the most preposterous absurdity is the state-
ment that the United States is ready and eager to
380
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
guarantee the peace of the world. The spectacle of the
President trying by the aid of Mr. Daniels and Mr.
Baker [respectively the Secretaries of the Navy and of
War] to guarantee the peace of any nation under the
sun against a single powerful and resolute foe is a.s comic
as anything ever written by Artemus Ward. If his
words meant anything they would mean hereafter that
we intend to embark on a policy of violent meddling
in every European quarrel and in return invite the Old
World nations violently to meddle in everything
American. Of course, as a matter of fact, the words
mean nothing. The President is nervously backing
away from Carranza at the very time he is fulminating
these vague threats and uttering these vague promises
in reference to the formidable military Powers engaged
tin a great death wrestle.
The best crystallization of the school of
thought that opposed the President's patience
and aspirations for peace (and it must be
admitted that the disciples of this school con-
stituted the bulk of far-sighted and thoughtful
Americans) was, however, contained in the
WHEREAS, We believe that the Monroe Doctrine and
even tho territories of our own country have boon, and
now are, an avowed aim of Prussian aggression, and that,
in the event of the success of the Teutonic Powers, tho
next attack would be made against the United Stair- ;
and
WHEREAS, Without undertaking to approve all tho
acts of the Entente Allies in the present War, we hold
that the Republicanism of Franco and tho Democracy
of England are united in contending for those rights
of the people and those ideals of humanity which are
essential to the preservation of civilization ; and
WHEREAS, We believe that neutral nations look to tha
United States as the leading Power that should maintain
the principles of international law and defend the sacred
principles of humanity, that the people of these nations
are convinced of the righteousness of tho Allied cause,
but hesitate to declare themselves, and that action by
the United States would have a potent influence upon
hesitant neutrals and would tend materially to shorten
the war, to save further sacrifice of human life, and to
assure the more speedy triumph of law and justice ;
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the safety and honour of the American
people and their duty to defend and maintain the rights
PRESIDENT WILSON REVIEWING NEW JERSEY STATE TROOPS.
resolutions of the American Rights Committee
formed in 1916 under the auspices of Mr
George Haven Putnam, who had himself
fought and suffered for the cause of Liberty
during the Civil War. The resolution ran as
follows :
WHEREAS, We hold that Prussian Imperial Militarism
has brought about the subjection of the people of Ger*
many to an ambitious and unscrupulous autocracy and
the corruption of the ancient German ideals through a
dream of World-dominion ; and
WHEREAS, We believe that the success of thr> scheme
(if this Prussian Autocracy means tin- crushing of friendly
nations and the subjection of their peoples to a bruta1
and cruel military rule ; and
WHEREAS, We believe that, intoxicated with the mili-
tary successes of 1864, 1866, and 1870, and by the
wonderful development of the economic strength of the
country, the ambitious of Prussian leaders have ex-
pended until they have culminated in a World-war for
imperial domination ; and
WHEREAS, This war ht\s been conducted by Prussia
and her Allies with piM<-tires of unprecedented barbarity,
including the kilting, under oHirial orders, of thousands
of non-combatants, women, and children, and including
the crowning atrocity of the Armenian mu-s;)<.Tes : and
of humanity require us to approve the cau«e for which
the Entente Allies are fighting, and to extend to these
Allies by any means in our power, not only sympathy,
but direct cooperation at the proper time, to the end
that government of the people, by the people, for the
people, shall not perish from the earth ; and
Resolved furth-r, That in spite' of the unwarranted
ilt-st ruction of American lives, there should be between
the American people and the German people no enmity,
and that, when the Germans shall abjure, with the dream
of empire, the pernicious ideals of their present rulers,
tho Americans will rejoice to come again into fellowship
with them in the work of advancing the true ideal- of
justice, humanity, and civilization.
How came it that such authoritative out-
pourings of advice and such weighty attacks
upon his policy influenced the President neither
directly nor indirectly through popular opinion ?
There could, it was clear, be nothing in common
between American Republicanism and the
militarist doctrines of modern Prussia ; and as
to Germany's translation of those doctrines
into practice — had it not evoked a chorus oi
indignation from otie end of the country to the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
381
ba.rbarou.s SfUff
bar if
I rnuif,
I MUST '
[C/HCfl£o Dally Hews.
' GOING BACK— TIME TO BEAT SOME PLOUGHSHARES INTO SWORDS."
other ? Their own experiences of 1914 made
it easy for British observers to solve the
paradox. The President hesitated because he
was trying to translate into policy not the
views and aspirations of one section of the
country or of society, however well justified he
might in his inmost soul consider them, but
what he believed to be the wishes and instincts
of the mass of his countrymen.
As was indicated at the beginning of this
chapter, the war found the United States in
the midst of an engrossing process of domestic
reform. Rather more than a year earlier she
had substituted for the conservative regime
of the Republicans a Democratic Government
of pronounced Liberal tendencies, with Mr.
Wilson at its head. The same thing had
happened as happened in England seven years
earlier. A conservatism of a vaguely Im-
perialistic complexion had, thanks mainly to-
- its inability to produce certaiA domestic
reforms, given place to a Liberalism which felt
that to justify itself it had to sacrifice every-
thing to the enactment of these reforms. The
extra-American responsibilities engendered by
the war with Spain were resented or forgotten.
There was a serious movement to give to the
Philippines the deadly gift of premature
independence. The American foot against the
open door in China was summarily withdrawn.
The Army and Navy were allowed to
'' slump." American responsibility towards
the weaker Latin-American neighbours was
vitiated by that spirit of ignorant and feeble
'THE FINAL ANSWER."
[Chicago Daily News.
882
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
!
THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1916.
Mr. Hughes, the Republican Candidate, addressing the crowd from the railroad car at Grand Pass,
Oregon, August 24, 1916.
idealism which must be accounted the chief
cause of the tragedy of Mexico. Trained
diplomatists were, especially in the Western
hemisphere, irresponsibly displaced by the
spoilsmen.
There never had been a time when American
eyes were turned more generally inwards. The
old tradition of isolation was revived. In a
famous speech at the beginning of his administra-
tion the President had even attempted to
give a twentieth-century twist to the Monroe
doctrine. That instrument had originally been
called into being to protect the nascent Repub-
licanism of the Western world against the
Holy Alliance. Monarchies had long ceased to
threaten ; but, the President proclaimed in
effect, the Old World could still impede the
untrammelled development of the New World.
Raids by the organized capitalism of this era
could be just as subversive of the development
of weak Republics as the monarchical raids
which his predecessors had feared. Therefore
the great European investor in backward Latin-
American countries should be discouraged.
Adherence to the forms of Anglo-Saxon Govern-
ment would help their Governments just as
effectively as bargains with capitalists for the
building of railways and opening up of new
territory.
The United States was, in short, as unpre-
pared for the repercussion of the war as she
well could be. The average as opposed to the
educated voter did not understand that the
causes and course of a European contest could
concern him as closely as anyone. President and
farmer agreed that the United States could
best be true to her traditions and sentimentally
Liberal aspirations if she remained au dessus
de la melee. To considerations of tradition and
instinct there were also added considerations
of expediency. It was at first feared that
there might be trouble from the German
element of the population and among the
American representatives of other belligerent
races, should the United States not officially
balance her neutrality. Had not the President
actually hinted as much in his neutrality
proclamation ? There was also, as war trade
grew up, as Americans began to use their
privilege as neutrals to export to the belli-
gerents, a more material sanction for the
status quo. The country, it was rather illogically
argued, was prosperous with peace, mainly, of
course, owing to trade in munitions of war with
the belligerents, so why risk a change for the
worse or, at any rate, the unknown ? The war
was regrettable, the crimes of Prussia were
abominable : but all the United States had to
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAK.
383
see to was that her rights should be respected
by botli sides, especially her commercial rights,
the enjoyment of which would incidentally
enable her to send much-needed supplies to the
Allies. She would then be powerful and inde-
pendent enough at the end of the war to act as
an " honest broker " in the interests of per-
manent peace.
Such was and such remained, down to and
even after the rupture with Germany, the funda-
mental point of view of the masses, especially
in the West, upon which Mr. Wilson relied for
the support of his Government and policies.
The Presidential canvass of 1916 and its result
in November of that year made that indisput-
ably obvious. The Republican candidate, Mr.
Hughes, was chosen by a party dominated by
Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Root, and the other
stalwarts whose criticism of the President's
course is stated above, Mr. Wilson made his
fight against Mr. Hughes quite frankly upon
the issue of peace and prosperity with the
Democrats, war and ruin with the Republicans.
Mr. Hughes did not dare take up the challenge.
He realized that it would be impossible to
educate the people up to a sense of what his
supporters regarded as the world-responsibili-
ties of the United States. He relied upon stock
issues and his party organization, and was
beaten by the vote of the West ; the East, the
chief home of the " stalwarts," went almost
solidly for him. The President was re-elected
because the majority of the people, besides
liking his Liberalism, were grateful that he
should have kept them out of the war, con-
fident that he would continue if possible to
tread the pacific path, and not at all afraid that,
as his conservative critics said, he was weaken-
ing the fibre of the country, lowering its
prestige abroad, or endangering its future as a
World Power.
The President's victory was, nevertheless,
not a victory of the peace-at-any-price group.
That group, even before the rupture with
Germany, was comparatively weak. It was
scattered over the country in small contingents,
and it may be doubted whether, without the
help of Irish-American and German-American
NEW ENGLAND GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE AT BOSTON ON WAR DEFENCE,
FEBRUARY, 15, 1917.
Left to right : Mr. Carl E. Milliken (Maine), Mr. Henry W. Keyes (New Hampshire), Mr. Horae;
F. Graham (Vermont), Mr. Samuel W. McCall (Massachusetts), Mr. Marcus H. Holcomb (Connecticut).
384
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
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385
propagandists, it would have made its voice
heard in the national councils. Its representa-
tives were to be found in small bands in the
university towns with which the United States
is dotted. They would show up in certain force
at religious meetings. They were stronger in
Socialist and social reform circles. But they
•did not materially influence the organizations
•of the regular parties. Despite the political
influence of Mr. Bryan, the Germans usually
had some difficulty in finding, during a crisis,
enough American assistants in Congress to give
a convincing American colour to their agitations.
It was rather the peace-at-almost-any-price
vote that determined the election — the result
of the feeling of pacifically inclined provincials,
untrained to realize causes which justify the
obvious sacrifices of war, that a statesman
so successful in domestic politics and reform
work as the President, so obviously cautious
in his foreign policy, so obviously bent upon
serving American interests when it came to
action, however much he might discuss the
necessity of making sacrifices for the sake
of broader interests, was the man to guide
the country, if anybody could, with peace and
honour through the troublous years before it.
It w a . a state of mind which British observers
can understand. The development of Ameri-
can thought and policy during the two years
between the sinking of the Lusitania and the
disappearance from Washington of the German
Embassy, resembles in some respects the
changes in the attitude of large masses of the
British people which took place during the
first black days of August, 1914. The British
•crisis was short because the danger was patent
and insistent ; the American crisis was long
because the danger was to the mass of the
people neither patent nor insistent. Not
only was the fundamental issue at stake
loosely grasped, but Americans are not, like
the English, a seafaring race. To those
who dwelt in the centre of the continent the
maritime crimes of Germany were as remote
as were the Armenian atrocities to dwellers in
the manufacturing towns of the Midlands or
the glens of the Highlands. What did it
matter to the fanner of the Mississippi Valley
if the Lusitania was sunk so long as he could
market his corn in Minneapolis or Chicago ?
San Francisco lies farther from New York than
does London ; and it is impossible to travel
for days across the American continent with
its millions of acres of rich and sequestered
farmlands, its teeming provincial towns whose
contact with the outside world usually consists
of rivalry with near neighbours and a vague
jealousy of more distant ones, its never-ending
prairies, its mountains encompassing between
themselves isolated communities as large as 'a
European country, with its diverse interests
and climates, with its endless string of local
newspapers (each serving a radius perhaps
larger than England, but nevertheless an
infinitesimal fraction of the country, and dedi-
cated almost entirely to local intelligence)
without experiencing a sense of remoteness, of
national amorphousness such as no European
State can produce.
Nor was it only the tradition and practice of
aloofness and the accident of the ascendancy
of Liberalism at Washington that made the war
remote to the average citizen almost beyond the
bounds of perspective. With one great Euro-
pean Power and with one alone had the United
States during her infancy, during her adoles-
cence, and at the great crisis of her maturity
had relations calculated to leave lasting impres-
sions. For France at the beginning of the war
there was an outpouring of sympathy in which
admiration at the gallantry of the sister repub-
lic was reinforced by memories of French aid
during the revolutionary war. But gratitude
to Lafayette and his companions was not
sufficiently deep, the significance of the Anglo-
French alliance was not sufficiently patent to
obliterate memories of our treatment of Ameri-
can shipping during the Napoleonic wars, of
the resultant Anglo-American struggle of
1812-14, and of the lack of sympathy with the
North shown by influential classes in England
during the fight for the preservation of the
Union and the abolition of slavery. Such
memories had been kept green, to an extent
which would surprise those whose knowledge
of Anglo-American sentiment is confined to
Pilgrims' dinners and other international
amenities or derived from intercourse with
representatives of the sophisticated East, by the
widespread use, at any rate until quite recently,
of school histories in which our disagreements
were consistently distorted, by the anti-British
prejudices of the powerful Irish population,
by the more insidious work of the American
branch of the pro-German propaganda, and by
other factors, some of them economic and some
social, into which it is unnecessary to go.
During the Boer War gratitude for Great
Britain's most useful sympathy with the United
386
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
AMERICAN COAST DEFENCE GUNS.
States while she was fighting Spain was for-
gotten in an almost general outbreak of invective
against the " brutal British." Of the persecu-
tion of a weak State in this war we could not be
accused ; but directly it became evident that
our blockade of the Central Powers would
bear heavily upon neutrals, and would have to
be enforced on the broad principles of inter-
national law rather than by a pedantic adhesion
to obsolete precedents, sympathy with- our
cause could not long prevent a certain suspicious
questioning of our methods which German
agents worked day and night to increase.
The earlier stages of the discussion regarding
our various Orders in Council and regulations
against the trade of the enemy with the outside
world should be familiar to the readers of this
history. It is proposed to trace here merely
the way in wliich in its late stages the con-
troversy, by forcing the Government to balance
its policy of neutrality and to appear to set off
British misdemeanours against Prussian crimes,
revived in the public mind inherited suspicious
of British maritime methods, and thus took
the edge to some extent off indignation with
Prussian savageries. The blockade policy of
the Allies may be summarized as a compre-
hensive attempt to starve Germany through
the control of the high seas by the British Navy,
so far as was compatible with international
equity. It was based upon the fundamental
principle of Anglo-Saxon law that old rules
shall be adjusted to meet new conditions, a
principle which, during their contest with the
Confederacy, the Northern States had used
ruthlessly to strengthen their at one time none
too effective blockade of the Southern States.
Among other rules which the Northern States
developed was that, originally laid down by
Lord Stowell : that contraband may be seized
even if destined for neutral ports, provided
that the captor could prove that its ultimate
destination was the enemy forces. Perhaps the
chief American charge was that, to meet
changed conditions, we developed this rule
still farther. In view of the obvious fact that,
both in law and practice'- .-the whole popula-
tions of the Central Powers were in effect
waging war against us, we did extend, after
some hesitation, the doctrine of continuous
voyage to virtually everything. Besides enor-
mously increasing the list of commodities
treated as absolute contraband, we instituted
by degrees a system of rationing neutral
countries contiguous to Germany. The system
was* based, roughly, upon the difference be-
tween the normal imports of those countries
and their normal exports of imported com-
modities to the Central Powers. To this
system the United States objected in various
Notes. She contended that she had the right
to trade freely in innocent goods with all
neutrals. The ultimate fate of those goods
was a question to be settled between the
importing nations and Great Britain ; and
American shipments ought not to be detained
on presumption that they were eventually
meant for enemy consumption (American Note
of October 21, 1915). Nor could they be de-
tained on the assumption that we had estab-
lished an effective blockade. No blockade,
it was argued, could be effective in view of
the fact that tho blockading fleet did not
control the Baltic. Without such control, any
THIS TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
387
so-called blockade, it was maintained, was
unequal as between Scandinavian neutrals and
other neutrals. Tt was further denied that
any interpretation of international law allowed
us to extend the blockade to the North Sea
coast of those same Scandinavian countries
(Note of October 21, 1915), while the British
prize court procedure and other things were
also the subject of a running controversy.
Attacks upon the law of the British policy
were accompanied by attacks upon its execu-
tion. The Fleet was accused of exercising its
right of visit and search in an illegal way. In
view of the size and unwieldiness of the cargoes
of modern merchant, ships, the practice of visit
and search at sea was early abandoned in
favour of the practice of bringing vessels into
port for search. Against this the United
States Government protested on the double
ground of illegality and .inconvenience. They
again refused to admit that changed conditions
justified new practices. There were many
complaints, some of them probably unjustified,
of undue length of detention while ships were
examined. It was alleged that our insistence
upon making neutral vessels call at our ports
to have their cargoes examined or to pick up
sailing instructions through dangerous areas
was used to facilitate the illegal detention,
examination, and sometimes suppression of
mails between neutral countries. Two Notes
were sent the Allies on the subject, on January
4 and May 24, 1916. The protests they con-
tained were based primarily upon the fact that
before the war there were signs of a tendency
to treat first-class mail matter as immune
from seizure on the high seas. At first it was
even maintained that the Allies had no right
even to seize paper values (that position was
abandoned in the second Note), and there
were many complaints of the unfair way in
which American business had been hampered
by the detention or loss of letters (as well as
by the detention of and censorship of cables —
another well-aired grievance), and even of the
detention of diplomatic correspondence.
British municipal and Imperial trade regu-
lations also caused heartburnings. At an early
period of the war it was decided to prohibit
the export from the component parts of the
Empire of various staple commodities. This
embargo hit many American manufacturers
rather hard. The woollen manufacturers relied
largely upon Colonial wool, and to give another
instance, the metal trades needed plumbago
from Ceylon for crucibles and tin from the
Straits Settlements for other purposes. Im-
mediately a great outcry went up. As we were
clearly within our rights in disposing of our own
products as we liked, the Government could
not protest. Nevertheless, wishing to make
things easy for the United States, we allowed
certain quotas of the forbidden materials to
go to American manufacturers, provided that,
they guaranteed that these would not be re-
exported or find their way as finished products
to the enemy. The arrangement naturally
involved restrictions rather irritating to the
free American spirit, and it was not long before
COAST DEFENCE GUN : THE BREECH.
the Germans began to spread the idea that our
supervision was really part of a scheme for the
control of American trade after the war. A
similar attack was, during the summer of 1916,
made upon our " black list," the name given to
our published statutory list supplying British
firms with a list of people and firms in neutral
countries with which they were not to trade
on account of suspicion or proof of enemy
relationship. It was clear that here also the
British Government had a perfect right to
supervise the trade connexions of their nationals.
But again there was the cry of intent to capture
American trade for post-bellum purposes, and
this time the American Government joined in
it. Brushing aside the explanation officially
offered by Downing Street, the American State
Department, in a -Note dated July 28, 1916,
388
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
-warned Great Britain in " the gravest terms "
that it was manifestly out of the question that
the Government of the United States should
acquiesce in such methods in restraint of neutral
commerce.
Intrinsically none of these and other trade
•disputes was really serious. There was never
any disposition visible on the part of the
American authorities to hamper us. The most .
that they seemed to expect was the removal of
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON.
The official residence of the President.
petty and irritating restrictions Thus the
main blockade controversy lapsed during 1916,
after we had improved and expedited our
methods of examining vessels, and had shown
by our general attitude that we wished to spare
neutrals as much as was compatible with the
exigencies of the military situation. The con-
troversy over the detention of mails was sub-
stantially relieved by similar means, and no
effort was made to underline annoyances with
our " black list " by anything more grave than
sharp Notes. The persistent German-fomented
.agitation that the United States should retaliate
by placing an embargo upon the export ' of
munitions and food to the Allies was stoutly
ignored. No difficulties, except on one occasion
(and then there was a quick attempt to make
amends), were placed in the way of loans to
the Allies. Washington, in fact, acted against
us rather for effect than for result. Its nationals
•came hurrying to it with protests which it
could not ignore. German -American traders
were on the qui vivc for an excuse to accuse it
of lax neutrality ; and in regard to the blockade
controversy the weight of American legal
opinion was that, whatever our ethical justifica-
tion, our policy and practices could not in point
of fact be justified by law.
The constant airing of grievances against,
" British abuse of sea-power " had nevertheless
its influence upon public opinion. In educated
circles it was recognized that the United
States had been equally high-handed during her
civil war and that we had an equally strong
moral justification for high-handedness in this
war ; but among the masses the lingering
memories of our treatment of American ship-
ping during the Napoleonic wars tended to
produce distorted views. This the German
propagandists were quick to realize. British
" navalism," they proclaimed, was what the
United States had really to fear. It pervaded
the world. Germany's Militarismus, even
admitting that it existed, concerned only
Europe, and with Europe the Western Repub-
lics had no concern.
Only some great leader of men, could even
with the help of German atrocities and German
insults, have aroused the American people to
the pitch where they might have sloughed off
overnight the incubus of tradition and sub-
stituted for their aloof and individualistic
conception of a national destiny a realization
of the need of a positive international
policy. And that statesman was not forth-
coming. A Liberal of the Mid-Victorian type,
Mr. Wilson had steeped himself in th3 study
of domestic reform to ths exclusion of all
illuminating interest in international affairs.
He was, during his first term of office, a faithful
disciple of that Liberal conception of Govern-
ment which decrees that administrations shall
follow public opinion and try to give the voters
what they are supposed to want and not neces-
sarily what is good for them and the country.
The result was that apathy regarding the
fundamental issues of the war reacted from
the beginning upon Mr. Wilson's policy and
Mr. Wilson's policy encouraged apathy. Pro-
foundly impressed by the latent moral, and
obvious economic, strength of the great aggrega-
tion of people under his charge, the President
seemed for a long time to believe that he could
afford to let them carelessly ensue the peace
and prosperity that he promised them and at
the correct moment throw the weight of their
unimpaired strength on the side of a Liberal
peace. Educated by years of authority in
the peaceful cloisters of a venerable university,
a student almost exclusively of Anglo-Saxon
Government, he could not bring himself to
believe for an equally long time that anything
so grossly materialistic and so barbarously
ambitious as the German spirit could really
have possessed a nation. The contest, he
seemed to say in many of his utterances upon
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
it, had bred an unreal state of affairs : had
produced passions and thrown up leaders that
were really foreign to the characters of the
combatants. After peace these passions would
disappear and their effects would be forgotten,
if only somebody with authority kept his head
and spoke the healing word.
Hence Mr. Wilson's persistent pressure for
an early peace until Germany upset his plans
in January, 1917. The Prussian militarists,
he thought, had had their lesson and had pro-
bably lost their teeth. Europe, therefore,
should compose her quarrels without more
bloodshed. A continuance of the war could
only produce ineradicable bitterness with
probably another Balance of Power and a peace
insecurely based upon force, upon the armies
of France, Russia, and Italy on the continent,
THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. WILSON ATTENDED BY MILITARY
AND NAVAL ATTACHES AND SECRET SERVICE MEN.
390
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
and upon the British fleet by sea, instead of
upon the sanction of a kind of international
Liberalism under which the masses would
refuse to be killed or impoverished upon the
altar of international rivalry and distrust
To preserve his influence towards such a peace,
patience was indispensable, and if German
militarism was abominable, it had also to be
remembered that British navalism could be
rather high-handed. The President conse-
quently looked with some favour upon German
generalizations about the "freedom of the
seas," or rather, there is reason to believe,
the German embroidery of what, so far a< this
war was concerned, was originally his idea. If,
he was understood to have represented to the
WALL STREET, THE FINANCIAL CENTRE OF NEW YORK.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
891
Powers some time before he broke with Gei-
many, if there must be more wars, then let
it be' agreed that neutrals shall not suffer,
that the danger of war be " localized." Let
all commerce in whatsoever bottoms be free
upon the high seas, save only absolute contra-
band— i.e., manufactured munitions of war
and presumably gold and its equivalents.
The people, misled by the assiduous mis-
representations of the Prussian propaganda, did
not know that the President when he talked
about the " freedom of the seas " was dreaming
a dream of which English Liberals may still have
shamefaced recollections. They thought that
he was directly attacking our blockade. The
issue of the war was thus still further darkened,
and the tendency to draw back from things
not properly understood was encouraged.
Such are perhaps the main reasons, combined
with things like the Irish muddle — for American
sympathy is always with Celtic Ireland — why
the bulk of the American people and their
Government seemed to the other Anglo-Saxon
races somewhat slow in grasping, 'as a whole,
the meaning of the war, and why even after the
rupture with Germany they hesitated to take
the seemingly logical step of " getting into the
war with both feet " and joining the Allies off-
hand in their bonded determination to fight
till the Prussian menace was crushed. They
were, however, passing or ephemeral reasons.
Obsolete traditions cannot for ever withstand
the onrush of changed circumstances ; political
theories cannot dam indefinitely the current
of the development of a great and virile nation.
If Prussian brutality drove the United States
in 1917, first, to a spectacular abandonment of
the course of neutrality she had mapped out
for herself in 1914, and then into war itself,
other forces were during the intervening years
working steadily to render the abandonment of
neutrality lasting. There was first the com-
mercial reaction of the war upon American
business. In 1914, at the outbreak of the war,
Americans got their first object lesson of how
closely they were connected economically with
Europe. The dislocation of Lombard Street was
felt equally in Wall Street. Values fluctuated,
exchange went heavily against the dollar,
foreign trade was upset. Six months later their
second lesson began. The Allies had by then
realized that the war was going to last in-
definitely and that they would require an
indefinite amount of supplies, especially artil-
lery and munitions, for the manufacture of
which Germany had had the sinister foresight
to provide. As the British fleet controlled the
sea, recourse was immediately had to the
United States.
The result of this commercially is best
explained by the following table :
EXPORTS FROM UNITED STATES.
1913 1915 1916
United $ $ $
Kingdom 590,732,398 1,108,122,530 1,754,420,408
France .. 153,922,526 500,792,248 860,839,308
Russia .. 25965,351 125,794,954 309,450,738
Italy .. 78,S75,043 269,723,561 303,533,921
Germany 351,930,541 11,777,858 2,260,634
Austria-
Hungary 22,244,599 104,525 61,771
It will be seen that the increase in exports to
the Allies far more than counterbalanced,
especially during 1915 and 1916, the loss of
trade with the Central Powers. The exports
consisted mainly, of course, of war material,
raw and manufactured, and food. Immense
sums were simultaneously lent to the Allies
after the autumn of 1915, largely for
credits in New York with which exports could
be financed. Otherwise the rate of exchange
threatened in August, 1915, to go to pieces ;
the Allies, indeed, as it was, had to export gold
to unprecedented amounts, and the United
States gradually became glutted with it.
The following is a list of loans to the Allies
floated in the United States up to January,
1917:
Anglo-French 5-year 5 per cent, on 51
per cent, basis $500,000,000
British 2-year 5 per cent, collateral loan
on 5 1 per cent, basis 250,000,000
British 3- and 5-year collateral loan at
5J per cent, and 5'85 per cent. . . 300,000,000
French 3-year collateral loan on 5| per
cent 100,000,000
French commercial credits .. .. 170,000,000
British banks extended loan . . . . 50,000,000
Miscellaneous credits »75,000,000
City of Paris 5-year 6 per cent, on 6' 30
per cent, basis 50,000,000
Bordeaux 3-year 6 per cent, on 6J per
cent, basis 20,000,000
Lyons 3-year 6 per cent, on 6| per cent.
basis 20,000,000
Marseilles 3-year 6 per cent, on 6J per
cent, basis 20,000,000
London Metropolitan Water Board 1-
year 6 per cent, discount . . . . 6,400,000
Canada :
Dominion 5-, 10- and 15-year 5 per cent. 75,000,000
Dominion 2-year 5 per cent 20,000,000
Provincial .. .. .. .. 57,500,000
Municipal 69,000,000
Newfoundland 3-year 5 per cent. . . 5,000,000
Russia 3-year loan 50,000,000
Russia 5-year 5 J per cent. .. .. 50,000,000
Italy 1-year 6 per cent 25,000,0( 0
Total $1,912,900,000
* Estimated. Includes $25,000,000 credit for grain
purchases.
302
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
PRESIDENT WILSON (ia centre) HEADING THE "PREPAREDNESS PARADE" (JUNE 14, 1916).
A demonstration in favour of preparedness for all eventualities.
At the same time immense amounts
of
American securities held in Europe were sold
back to the United States so as to provide the
belligerents with ready money. In 1913,
according to official computations, the net
American foreign indebtedness, funded and
floating, was $6,500,000,000; at the begin-
ning of 1917 it was reckoned at half that
sum.
Such a change in the balance of trade and
finance could not but have a great effect upon
public opinion. While, for reasons not uncon-
nected with lack of foresight and local know-
lodge on the part of the Allied Governments,
the early loans were not well distributed
through the country, the sudden appearance of
large amounts of foreign paper inade people
study with a close practical interest European
conditions and prospects. Similarly, the
immense growth of war trade, besides causing
interest in the war, gave sane Americans a
stake in after-the-war conditions. It was
recognized that war exports were ephemeral ;
that, therefore, if a serious industrial dislocation
was to be avoided, fresh and permanent
markets must be found after peace.
The charitable service of the United States
Government and of great American organiza-
tions to the war-stricken was another thing
that simultaneously worked for the abandon-
ment of academic neutrality. Mr. Gerard's
great efforts on behalf of the British prisoners
in Germany gave a soul -stirring object-lesson
of what American "service to humanity"
meant in practice. The magnificent achieve-
ments of Mr. Hoover and his American Staff in
Belgium, and the constant appeals for money
sent out to support their organization, brought
home, as nothing else could do, the crying need
for the organization of the world so that such
crimes as the obliteration of nations should be
rendered impossible. The work of the Rocke-
feller Foundation and of the American Red
Cross in Serbia, the attempted work of the
Rockefeller Foundation in Poland, its activities
on behalf of the Armenians and other oppressed
peoples in Turkey, the untiring appeals of the
Red Cross and countless other bodies for funds
for general war relief, all increased the sense of
American responsibility in the affairs of the
world, slowly, perhaps, as is shown by the
comparatively small contribution in money for
which the United States was responsible, but
steadily and with cumulative effect.
During 1910 the indignation of the average
educated and thoughtfully inclined American
with what he deemed the initial weakness and
obscurantism of the President's attitude towards
the war bore fruit, moreover, in two important
directions, and in both cases the President,
realizing that inconsistency is often the better
part of statesmanship, took up the fruit and
blessed it.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
893
On June 17, 1915, there was founded at a
meeting in Independence Hall at Philadelphia,
by a small band of thoughtful men an organiza-
tion called the League to Enforce Peace. Its
creation was mainly due to the feeling, created
by the President's elusive handling of the
Lusitania incident and the outrage involved
upon the rights of humanity, that the time had
come for the United States to sea to it that
never again should they allow their love for
peace and isolation to obliterate their sense of
responsibility when those rights were challenged
by force. The object of the League was de-
scribed by its President, Mr. Taft, as follows :
All the world is interested in preventing war in any
part of the world. Neutrals are so subject to loss, to
injury, and to violation of their rights, that they have
a direct interest in preventing war, and so direct is their
interest that we may well hope that international law
may advance to the point of developing that interest
into an international right to be consulted before war
begins between neighbours. The central basis of the
plan which we respectfully recommend to the authorities
who shall represent our Government in any world
conference that will necessarily follow the peace is
that the Great Powers of the world be invited to form
a League of Peace, which shall embody in the covenant
that binds its members the principle just announced,
to wit, that every member of that League has a right
to be consulted before war shall be perpetrated between
any two members of the League ; or to put it in another
way, that the whole League shall use its entire power
to require any member of th.3 League that wishes to
fight any other member of the Leagu?, to submit the
issue upon which that member desires to go to war to
a machinery for its peaceful settlement before it does
go to war.
It is not proposed, the League points out in its circular,
finally to restrain nations from going to war, if they are
determined to do so, nor to bind them to comply with
any decision a judicial tribunal or a council of conciliation
may make ; but merely that before they resort to arms,
thereby disturbing the social fabric and the order of
the whole world, and inflicting irreparable injury upon
neutrals, they shall state their case before an impartial
body and before the world, and give time to have it
considered on its merits.
If the controversy is of a nature which can be settled
by the principles of law and equity, it is proposed that
it shall go before a bench of judges. If it is one which
can be adjusted only by mediation and compromise, it
is suggested that it shall be referred to a mediation board.
In comparison with projects for a world state, it is a
short step in advance that is urged ; but it is one which
is believed to be attainable, and which, if adopted, would
make war extremely improbable.
During 1916 the membership and influence
of the League to Enforce Peace grew by leaps
and bounds. Few, perhaps, expected that its
ideals would be realized, but it was hoped that
it would afford a nucleus for an agitation which
the President would be unable to ignore. The
expectation was justified. On January 6, 1916,
the American Institute of International Law
PRESIDENT WILSON (WITH MRS. WILSON) REVIEWING THE "PREPAREDNESS PARADE."
After marching from the Peace Monument to the Capitol at its head.
394
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
adopted five resolutions which were at the time
taken as a direct animadversion by the leading
lawyers of the country upon the President's
official indifference to the rape of Belgium and
other German assaults upon international
right. The resolutions follow :
1. Every nation has the right to exist, to protect and
to conserve its existence ; but this right neither implies
the right nor justifies the act of the State to protect
itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of
unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending States.
2. Every nation has the right to independence in the
sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness
and is free to develop itself without interference or con-
trol from other States, provided that in so doing it does
not interfere with or violate the just rights of othar
States.
3. Every nation is in law or before law the equal of
every other State composing the society of nations, and
all States have the right to claim and, according to the
Declaration of Independence of the United States, to
assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate
and equal station to which the laws of nature and of
nature's God entitle them.
4. Every nation has the right to territory within
donned boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over this territory and all persons, whether native or
foreign, found therein.
5. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations
is entitled to have that right respected and protected
by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative,
and the right of one is the duty of all to observe.
Stimulated presumably by such criticism and
such a lead, the President in the soring of 1916
began to modify his attitude of stu lie 1 aloof-
ness. The United States, he proclaimed, in one
of his campaign speeches, could never again
afford to remain neutral in a war which threat-
ened the pillars of civilization. In accordance
with this view, he caused to be written into the
platform of his party at its nominating con-
vention at St. Louis a foreign policy plank
which, after an allusion to the time-honoured
American doctrine of laissez-faire isolation,
continued :
But the circumstances of the last two years have
revealed necessities of international action which no
former generation can have foreseen. We hold that it
is the duty of the United States to use its power, not
only to mafee itself safe at home, but also to make secure
its just interests throughout the world, and, both for this
end and in the interest of humanity, to assist tho world
in securing settled peace and justice. Ws believe that
every people has the right to choose the sovereignty
under which it shall live ; that the small States of the
world have a right to enjoy from other nations the same
respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial
integrity that great and powerful nations expect and
insist upon ; and that the world has a right to be free
from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin
in aggression or disregard of the rights of peoples and
nations ; and we believe that the time has come when
it is the duty of the United States to join with the
other nations of the world in any feasible association
that will effectively serve those principles, and to
maintain inviolate the complete security of the high,
way of the seas for the common and unhindered use of
all nation^.
MEN OF THE "AMERICAN LEGION" TRAINING AT THE CANADIAN CAMP
AT VALCARTIER.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
395
In his speech accepting renomination as the
Democratic Presidential candidate, Mr. Wilson
re-emphasized these aspirations. During the
campaign he returned to them again and again,
and six weeks after his re-election he took the
first opportunity of offering them not as a
personal or party doctrine but as a national
policy.
The famous American Peace Note of Decem-
ber 18, 1916, while generally interpreted at
home and abroad as an effort to prevail 'upon
the Allies to consider the possibility of a " drawn
war " such as the American pacifists were
agitating for and German statesmen scheming
for, was, as has been observed above, perhaps
primarily intended .as an official advertisement
of the President's desire to have the
world know that he was prepared after the
war to try to throw American influence on the
side of a lasting and just peace. After stating
that the aims of the belligerents as expressed
by the statesmen were confusingly similar, he
affirmed that the United States had an intimato
interest in the conclusion of the war lest it
should " presently be too late to accomplish the
greater thing that lies beyond its conclusion."
He suggested an immediate opportunity for the
comparison of the terms which must precede
those " ultimate arrangements for the peace of
the world which we all desire and in which the
neutral nations as well as those at war are ready
to play their responsible part."
A month later, on January 22, 1917, the
President returned to the charge in his address
to the Senate in which he urged the belligerents
to make a " liberal peace," a " peace without
victory," i.e., a peace without the ruthless use
of victory, the equitable results of which the
United States would feel justified in joining
with them to guarantee.
The project for participation in a Peace
League evoked vehement opposition in Con-
gress and without. There was much talk, some
of it from authoritative quarters, about the
folly of abandoning the old policy of avoidance
of entangling alliances. That, of course,
reflected the Western and popular view, and
its insistence indicated that the President
would have a long fight to get his aspirations
translated into national policy. Opposition in
more stalwart and educated circles came
from another angle. What, asked people like
Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root, was the use of the
President proclaiming his readiness to share in
the police responsibilities of the world when he
GENERAL LEONARD WOOD,
Before the War, Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Army.
had not even had the foresight to provide an
army capable of policing Mexico.
Such criticism was partly factious, partly
factitious and largely ignorant. Next to the
growth of the Peace League idea the most
notable domestic product of the anxious period
between the sinking of the Lusitania and the
challenge thereby given by a European Power
to the rights of the United States, and the
logical result of the President's treatment of
that and subsequent incidents nearly two years
later, was the growth of the " preparedness "
movement, as the agitation for military effi-
ciency was called. The first sign of this growth
was the creation by General Leonard Wood,
the Lord Roberts of the American movement
for universal service, in the summer of 1915, of
camps in New York State at which Americans
of the upper and middle classes could obtain
from officers of the regular army, and by working
with real soldiers, some preliminary training
as officers. In the summer of 1916 these camps
were extended to the West and Middle West,
where they also met with great success. Their
extension was accompanied by the formation of
various bodies, like the American Security
League, dedicated to the popularization of the
idea, which was supported with remarkable
alacrity by representative commercial bodies
like the United States Chamber of Commerce.
896
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Partly because lie feared that his Republican
opponents might make capital out of the move-
ment in the campaign of that year, the President
slough ;d off during 1916 his original Libera'
prejudices against military training and arma-
ments. Besides making speeches in the
interests of preparedness, he facilitated by his
support the passage of a Navy law with a
building programme calculated to give the
United States, now the fourth naval power in
the world, the second place in the list in three
years, and providing for the building of swift
battle cruisers, of which the fleet as yet had none,
and a large fleet of submarines, with which it
was inadequately supplied. Finally, just after
the rupture with Germany, he allowed his
Secretary of the Navy to send to Congress the
draft of a Bill providing for a year's service for
all boys at the age of 19.
True, the whole movement, like the naval
and other preparations which followed the
departure of Count Bernstorff, was conceived
in a defensive spirit ; but studied in the light
of the President's advocacy of the Peace League
idea and the growing popular conviction that
things like the tremendous rise in commodity
prices caused by the war, like the tie-up of
American shipping by the German submarine
blockade in February and March, 1917, and
even the inconveniences of our more humane
blockade did prove that the United States
could not, after all, for ever continue to turn
the wrong end of the telescope upon Europe,
it assumed an immense significance. Like
ourselves, the Americans are not an easy race
to move. In their own vernacular, they " re-
quire to be shown." But once they are
" shown," it is not in their nature to hang back
in the tackling of new problems. The impor-
tance of the opening years of the war was that
they demonstrated the futility of an ostrich-
like policy towards international law-breakers
of the Teutonic type. They showed Americans
that, in these days of swift communication and
cosmopolitan trade and finance, policies that
answered perfectly in the days of George
Washington and Alexander Hamilton, and are
still workable in peaceful times, become but
snares and delusions during war. They showed
that, if the Great Republic was to hold the
high place she claimed in the moral judgment
of mankind, she must quit the calm pursuit of
a fugitive and cloistered virtue for the strenuous
vindication of Justice and of Liberty, joining
the great hosts who daily fought and died for
the ideals she cherished, and, with them,
sealing her testimony to righteousness in
sacrifice, in anguish, and in blood.
CHAPTER CLXXVIII.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (VI
POSITION AT END OF SEPTEMBER, 1916 — -OPERATIONS DURING OCTOBER — THE OFFENSIVE OF
OCTOBER 7 — SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DISPATCH — COMBINED FRANCO-BRITISH OPERATIONS —CAPTURE
OP SAILLY— BAD WEATHER — NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE — BATTLE OF THE ANCRE— CAPTURE OF
BEAUMONT HAMEL — LAST PHASE OF THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME — REASONS OF THE ALLIED SUCCESS
— THE NEW CONDITIONS OF WARFARE — -THE GERMAN DEFEAT.
FROM the line held by the British on
September 30, 1916, the ground sloped
gently downwards to a shallow valley
which ran north-westward from near
Sailly-Saillisel — the immediate objective of
the French from Morval and Rancourt — past
Le Transloy and Ligny-Thilloy, then westward
south of Irles, where it narrowed into com-
paratively abrupt slopes ; at Miraumont it
joined the valley of the Ancre. From the
Thiepval-Morval ridge a series of long well-
marked spurs ran down into the first-named
shallow depression. The most important of
these was the hammer-headed one immediately
west of Flers. At the end of it, just oast of
the Albert-Bapaume road and north-east of
Le Sars was the ancient tumulus, some 50 feet
high, known as the Butte de Warlencourt.
Another spur ran from Morval north-north-
westwards towards Ligny and Thilloy, villages
north-east of the Butte .de Warlencourt
forming the southern slope of the depres-
sion just described, and on it lay the German
fourth position. To get within assaulting
distance of this it was necessary to carry Le
Sars and the two spurs, which were held in
strength, every advantage having been taken
of sunken roads, buildings, and the undulating
nature of the country. Le Sars itself was
strongly fortified ; to its east was an agglomera-
tion of trenches round Eancourt 1'Abbaye ;
and to its north-west the ground to Pys and
Miraumont contained numerous artificial
Vol. XL— Part 141 397
obstacles. At Petit Miraumont, on the south
bank of the Ancre, began the Regina trench,
which ran from the neighbourhood of the Stuff
Redoubt nearly to Le Sars. Destremont Farm
was already in our hands. But before Bapaume
could be reached this further formidable
barrier had to be overcome.
During the night of September 30-October 1
the French were bombing south-east of Morval
and along the banks of the Somme towards
Peronne. At the other end of the battlefield,
north of the river, the enemy was dislodged by
Sir Hubert Gough's troops from ground near
the Stuff Redoubt and wo increased our gains
at Schwaben Redoubt, only a minute fragment
of which remained imtaken.
Between Neuve Chapelle and Ypres no less
than sixteen raids wore successfully carried
out, and a number of prisoners taken, and some
progress was made in the area to be attacked
the next day.
It was on Sunday, October 1, in rainy
weather, while the French were moving out of
Morval and Rancourt and capturing trenches
in the direction of Sailly-Saillisel, and our guns
were bombarding Le Transloy, that the
Canadians from the Courcelette region attacked
the Regina trench and Sir Henry Rawlinson's
troops advanced on a front of some 3,000 yards
from the Albert-Bapaume road, north-east of
Destremont Farm, to a point east of Eaucourt
1'Abbaye. The 1st and 2nd Marine Regiment?
of the 2nd German Division had been brought
898
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
[Official phutograpk.
THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT.
In the foreground a light railway for transporting ammunition and supplies.
clown from the Belgian coast, so hard put to it
were the German leaders owing to the terrible
losses which their troops had sustained in the
Battle of the Somme. They replaced the 26th
Regiment of the 7th (Magdeburg) Division in
the Regina trench. From the Lille district the
17th Regiment of the 6th (Bavarian) Division
had also been summoned to help defend the
Bapaume region. After the customary intensive
bombardment the attacks were delivered at
3.30 p.m. The sailors fought stubbornly, but
the Canadians pushed up a German trench
running north-westward nearly to its junction
with the Regina trench, which itself was
entered in several places. Fighting there went
on well into the night, attack and counter-
attack succeeding one another. The Canadians
succeeded in establishing themselves at a point
1,200 yards north of Courcelette in the direction
of the Hessian trench but were ejected from a
section of the Regina trench. This operation
was in the nature of a demonstration to protect
the troops moving on Le Sars and Eaucourt
1'Abbaye from being attacked in flank ; the
serious business of the day consisted in the
drive to be undertaken towards Bapaume.
The foremost line of trenches between Sir
Henry Rawliiison's men and Le Sars and the
ruined abbey was of old construction. It had
been made before July 1, at a date when the
whole system of defence of the region had been
planned. A second trench, 50 yards or so behind
the first, was of more recent construction.
Both trenches were well-wired and furnished
with dug-outs. A mill east of Le Sars and west
of the abbey had been fortified. The chapel and
the deep crypts and cellars of the monastery
were alive with machine-gunners, and garrisoned
by the 17th (Bavarian) Regiment. At 3.30 p.m.
our men went over the parapets. In five
minutes they had seized the first trench before
Le Sars. The barrage lifted and, following in
its wake, the British charged for the second
entrenchment. Weakly defended, it was
speedily taken, and patrols pushed forward
into and beyond Le Sars. For a moment it
looked as if the village would be carried with
little loss, but as the evening drew on German
reinforcements poured into it down the
Bapaume-Albert road and the operation of
reducing Le Sars had to be postponed.
Simultaneously with' the movement on
Le Sars, infantry had advanced from the
north-east and south-east on Eaucourt
1'Abbaye. Tha. Abbsy was protected on the
north-east by two lines of trenches, of which
the outer one was known as Goose Alley.
Neither offered any serious resistance, and by
nightfall our men had established themselves on
a line which ran from the northern end of the
buildings due east and west, connecting with
our positions to the north-west of Factory
Corner, parallel with the German trench from
the Butte de Warlencourt to the outskirts of
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
399
Gueudecourt. They even captured and hold
positions farther to the north on the country
road to Le Barque and west of it. On this, the
right of the attack, the gain was from 1 ,200 to
1,500 yards.
The assault on the trenches south of the
Abbey was less successful. It was held up by
barbed wire and machine-guns. Two Tanks,
however, arrived on the scene. One of them
stuck in the mud and became a stationary
fortress. The crew left her later, and the
Commander was wounded. Two of the crew
remained with him in a crater and stayed there
for a couple of days. The other Tank tore
through the entanglements and went along the
borders of the trenches, crushing or shooting
down all who came in its way. Our troops, with
the aid of the Tanks, were soon ensconced in
the southern outskirts of the Abbey, where they
remained, though drenched to the skin. They
were now violently attacked from the direction
of Warlencourt. Throughout the night the
•struggle went on, and by the morning of
October 2 the Abbey was finally cleared out.
While these events were proceeding, cavalry
patrols pressed on towards Pys and Warlen-
court. They reported on their return that they
had reached " fresh fields, gnsen trees, and
untouched villages " behind the enemy's linos.
They had ridden over some empty trenches and
had found open country between the Cource-
lette-Warlencourt road and Pys. " It is a very
cheering thing," said an officer, " to find that
you have got past the great network of trenches.
Even the horses want to go on when they feel
that once more they have firm ground under-
foot."
On Monday, October 2, the enemy counter-
attacked with great violence and succeeded
in recovering Eaucourt 1'Abbaye. We, in our
turn, improved our positions north and east
of Courcelette and south-west of Gueude-
court. The French, in the night of October
1-2, had carried a trench east of Bouchavesnes
and taken some prisoners. During October 2,
they made further progress in this direction,
and south of the Somme repulsed a German
attack between Vermandovillers and Chaulnes.
In the night of October 2-3, their barrages
and machine-gun fire drove back German
columns attempting to debouch" from the
Wood of St. Pierre Vaast.
On the Sunday and Monday President
Poincare and the French Minister of War,
A WASH IN A SOMME SWAMP.
filial phalogiafli.
141—2
400
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
General Roques, visited the Allied battle-
front. On this occasion the President deco-
rated Sir Hubert Gough with the insignia of
Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour.
Rain had now been falling for two days, and
the operations were almost brought to a stand-
still. Fighting for Eaucourt 1'Abbaye, how-
ever, continued, and by the evening of October 3
it finally passed into our hands. The same
day the French drew nearer to Sailly-Saillisel,
capturing an important trench north of Ran-
coiirt, and took 120 prisoners, including three
officers.
On Wednesday, October 4, in heavy rain,
the Germans attempted a bombing attack
between Eaucourt 1'Abbaye and Gueudecourt.
It was driven off, the enemy abandoning his
wounded. The French completed the capture
of the powerful lines of German trenches
between Morval and the Wood of St. Pierre
Vaas^ They captured 200 prisoners, includ-
ing 10 officers. At 8 a.m. three companies
had bombed the enemy out of the Brunswick
Trench, and one company had rushed over the
double line of trenches west of the Morval-
Fregicourt track. Nine 88 mm. guns had thus
been s'ecured. The way to the northern end
of the St. Pierre Vaast woods, which covered
nearly two miles of country, and acted as a
centre from which German attacks radiated,
was now open, and the western face of the
woods could be assaulted from Rancourt.
South of the Somme the Germans violently
bombarded the French works in the region
of Belloy-en-Santerre, and there was can-
nonading near Assevillers. The next day the
enemy's artillery was particularly active south
of the Somme, chiefly in the Barleux-Belloy-
Deniecourt sector and about Quesnoy, which
lay north-west of Roye The French, in the
course of the day, repulsed a counter-attack on
the trenches captured north of Fregicourt,
and we repulsed two enemy attacks in the
Thiepval area. North of the Schwaben Redoubt
our guns caught bodies of Germans on the
move and inflicted heavy losses on them. The
rain had now ceased, but the ground was so
soft and muddy that operations on a large
scale were impossible.
Friday, October 6, the day before another
forward move on the part of the Allies, passed
in comparative quietude, but we captured the
ARTILLERY OFFICER DIRECTING GUN-FIRE BY MEANS OF DATA ^RECEIVED
BY WIRELESS TELEGRAPH.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
401
A GERMAN HOWITZER LEFT BEHIND.
[Official
mill between Le Sars and Eaucourt 1'Abbaye.
During the previous night we had. advanced
north-east of the Abbey. East of Loos, where
three raids were carried out, and east of Armen-
tieres, the British discharged gas. This dia-
bolical invention of the enemy had reacted on
him. It enabled the Allies with little effort
to keep the Germans on the alert at almost
any point of their long line of battle and so
to disturb their calculations. Not having the
command of the air, they could never be
certain that a gas discharge would not be
followed by an attack of infantry which had
been secretly concentrated beliiud the cylinders.
The French on the 6th advanced slightly
eas'j of Bouchavesnes. Otherwise there was
little to report from the Somrne front. It
was the lull before another determined advance
by the Allies.
During this period our aeroplanes patrolled
far behind the German lines, fought aerial
duels, swooped down on trains and attacked
German depots and troops. The following
incidents extracted from reports of the Royal
Flying Corps are illuminating :
October 1. — On the evening of September 30 one of
our patrols encountered miny hostile machines. A
formation of seven Rolands near Bapaume was dis-
persed, two of them being driven down out of control.
On October 1 Captain " A " drove down two patrolling
machines out of control near Gommecourt. He after-
wards waited and attacked three hostile machines
which came up from a neighbouring aerodrome. He
forced one to land and dispersed the remainder.
Lieutenant " B " and Lieutenant " C," when taking
photographs, were attacked by seven Rolands. The
attack was driven off with the assistance of two of our
patrolling machines, who joined the fight. One of the
Rolands fell in a nose dive and was seen to plunge to
earth.
October 10. — Lieutenant " D " and Lieutenant " E "
had six encounters between 7 a.m. and 8.45 a.m. while
on-artillery patrol. In an encounter with three L.V.G.'s
one German machine dived emitting clouds of smoke,
having been engaged at 20 yards range. The remaining
machines declined close combat.
Second Lieutenant " F," in the course of an encounter
with several hostile machines, had all the controls of his
machine, with the exception of tho rudder, shot away.
His machine turned a somersault and was wrecked ; the
pilot was -unhurt.
A highly successful bombing raid was carried out
against railway trains and stations at Queant. Cambrai.
and Bapaumo at about 1 1 p.m. on the night of tho
10th inst. A train entering Cambrai was attacked and
wrecked, a bomb being observed to hit the first carriage
behind the engine. The second bomb hit tho station
buildings, whereupon all the lights were extinguished.
Second Lieutenant " G " fired a drum of ammunition
from 1,400 feet at a closed touring car. The car
immediately stopped and three people got out of it
and ran away.
On Saturday, October 7, it was decided that
Sir Henry Rawlinson's'Army should move still
farther forward between Destremont Farm and
Losboeufs, and that General Fayolle's left wing
should advance from Morval through Rancourt
to Bouchavesnes on Sailly-Saillisel. Le Bars,
the last considerable village on the Albert -
Bapaume Road, was to be stormed, the British
salient between Destremont Farm and Lesboeufs
402
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
rendered less pronounced, while the ridges on
the road from Lesboeufs to Le Transloy, and
the approaches to Sailly-Saillisel astride the
Peronne-Bapaume road, were to be gained.
Le Sara was held by the 4th Ersatz and the
[Caiadiat official photograph.
A BURSTING SHRAPNEL SHELL.
ground behind Eaucourt 1'Abbaye by the 6th
(Bavarian) Divisions. So uncertain did the
German commanders consider the outcome of
another struggle with the victorious British
that these two Divisions were deployed on a
front of less than 3,000 yards. The succession
of blows delivered by the Allies since July 1
had forced the enemy to resort to massed
defence as well as massed attack.
The offensive had been fixed for a little before
2 p.m. Though the rain had ceased and the
weather was comparatively fine, the ground in
places resembled a morass and the craters were
mostly filled to the brim with water. During
the night the Germans had delivered an un-
successful bombing attack north-east of Eau-
court 1'Abbaye. The British advance was
preceded by the customary violent bombard-
ment which churned up the ruins of Le Sars
and knocked the Butte de Warlencourt behind
it into a shapeless mass. When the guns lifted
the Canadians from the Courcelette-Destremont
Farm line again attacked the points in the
Regina trench not yet held by xis and the
quadrilateral formed by the junction of the
Below and Gallwita double line of trenches
between Pys and Le Sars. The village of Le
Sars itself was assaulted on two sides, from
Destremont Farm and from Eaucourt 1'Abbaye,
which with its mill house had formerly been a
strong German position. Le Sars consisted of
a street of wrecked houses, crossed midway by
the sunken road connecting it with Eaucourt
1'Abbaye. A redoubt, the Tangle — walled and
cemented — blocked the approach to Le Sars on
the east ; 1,200 yards north-west of the village
were a strongly fortified quarry and chalk-pit.
The ground between Le Sars and the Abbey
dipped into a hollow or gully running northward
almost up to the Butte de Warlencourt. This
gully was swept by machine-guns from the
neighbourhood of the tumulus. In craters
before and on the flanks of the village were
German snipers, who held their ground despite
the fact that some of them were up to their
armpits in water. The whole area swarmed
with ^hostile machine-gunners, riflemen and
bombers. But to the troops who ha.d stormed
the Thiepval-Morval ridge the obstacles in the
low-lying ground before Bapaume appeared
almost insignificant. At two in the afternoon
the British infantry went over the parapets
and, undeterred by bullets, bombs, shells, and
the huge projectiles lobbed at them by inineii-
wp.rf"r, advanced up the Albert-Bapaume road
and to the left and right of it on the village and
the strong points in its vicinity. At the first
rush our men reached the sunken road, and
waited till our guns had operated on the houses
beyond it. The barrage again lifted and then,
with grim determination, the British, supported
by those attacking from Eaucourt 1'Abbaye
and its mill, burst through the village and dug
themselves in 500 yards or so nearer Bapaume
across the highway. " The British," said a
captured sergeant of the German 361st Regi-
ment, " fought like tigers."
Meanwhile a desperate struggle had gone on
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
403
between Le Sars and Eaucourt 1'Abbaye. The
machine-gunners in the Tangle mowed down
our infantry, the survivors of which were forced
to fling themselves face downwards on the
muddy soil. Once more the Tanks justified
their inventors. One of these huge machines
made its appearance and splashed its way up
to the redoubt. In vain the Germans flung
bombs at it. From each flank its guns fired into
the Tangle, which was speedily carried. Only in
the hollow leading to the Butte de Warlencourt
were the Bavarians able to resist the British
onset. When, night fell the enemy there were
maintaining a precarious hold on this narrow
salient. The quarry and chalk-pit north-west
of Le Sars were gained the next morning and
counter-attacks of the Germans during the
night of the 7th and at 5 a.m. on the 8th on the
Schwaben Redoubt above Thiepval were
heavily repulsed. The troops employed by
the enemy were drawn from the 110th and
lllth Regiments.
Thus the operations on the 7th between the
Schwaben Redoubt and Le Sars had been
brilliantly successful. East of the Butte de
Warlencourt we had pushed forward on Le
Barque and Ligny-Thilloy ; to the right of
Gueudecourt we had penetrated the enemy's
trenches to a depth of 2,000 yards ; and north-
east of Lesboeufs we had gained a footing on
the crest of the long spur which screened the
defences of Le Transloy. Nearly 1 ,000 prisoners
had been captured iu the fighting and the
enemy's losses in killed and wounded had 'been
very heavy. Unfortunately rain fell on the
evening of the 7th and prevented us from
pursuing our onward progress.
Simultaneously with the advance of Sir
Henry Rawlinson's infantry the French, after
a devastating bombardment, moved on Sailly-
Saillisel from the west and south. They had
in front of them the Karlsbad, Teplitz and
Berlin trenches and the well-organized fringe
of the eastern end of the St. Pierre Vaast
Woods. Beyond these trenches the enemy
had constructed a very strong fortress on the
western edge of Sailly-Saillisel Chateau, and
close to the Peronne-Bapaume road was a
redoubt known as " The Bluff " which had to
be taken. At 2 p.m. the French left their
[Official photograph.
PRISONERS FROM THE LESBOEUFS DISTRICT.
A Tank is seen in the distance.
404
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
trenches. A company recruited from the
Parisian districts of the Temple and Belle-
ville, and known as the " Belleville Boys," had
I..-.-M deputed to storm "The Bluff." They
3rossed 300 yards of destroyed trenches and
shelters and came under machine-gun fire.
The moment for assaulting " The Bluff " had
come. A non-commissioned officer described
what followed :
The Lieutenant called me, saying : " Now is the
time for us to use our wits. Take your section to turn
the Bluff. Crawl within 20 yards of the first trench, and
.i> soon as you are ready to attack I will fall upon the
Bochos with the remainder of the company." So I,
with 40 men, made for the spot selected, going forward
by six-foot bounds and, thanks to the craters, only
lo-ting two comrades. Then I gave the agreed signal and
we leapt into the trench. A fierce fusillade on my
right told me that the Lieutenant also was busy. I
wi>h you could have seen my little " Belleville Boys "
bayoneting the- Boches. Then they rushed on to help
their comrades, who were engaged in a hot struggle with
a Silesian battalion. They were fighting like lions,
blowing a path through the enemy's ranks with grenades.
At 10 minutes past 3 Sailly Bluff was ours and the blue
and white colours of the " Belleville Boys " were flutter-
ing joyfully on the summit.
Elsewhere the Germans, taken by surprise,
offered little resistance, and soon after 3 p.m.
the French had reached all their objectives.
They were within a couple of hundred yards of
the twin villages.
Fearing that Sailly-Saillisel would be at
once attacked, the German commanders
packed into automobiles of every description
troops hastily withdrawn from other parts of
their line and sent them post haste to the
north of the village. Their presence was at
once reported by observers in aeroplanes, and
the French heavy guns discharged on them a
hurricane of shells with great effect. By
nightfall the troops of Genera! Fayolle had
carried their line forward over 1,300 yards
north-east of Morval ; they crowned the
western slopes of the Sailly-Saillisel ridge,
and, as mentioned, were on the Peronne-
Bapaume road within 200 yards of the southern
entrance of Sailly. East of the road they
were tnsconced in the western and south-
western fringes of the St. Pierre Vaast Wood.
Over 400 prisoners, including 10 officers, with
15 machine-guns, had been captured.
The next day'(Sunday, October 8) the German
reinforcements sent to support the garrison of
Sailly-Saillisel were flung against the French
positions in front of Morval. Wave after wave
advanced to the attack, only to bo shattered
by the rafales from the " 75 " guns. Not
a single living German reached the French
[Official phat^grapK.
WOUNDEn GERMAN PRISONERS AT A BRITISH DRESSING STATION
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
405
[French official photograph.
A GERMAN SNIPER'S POST OCCUPIED BY A FRENCH MARKSMAN.
trenches. Meanwhile the aerial squadrons of.
our Allies were particularly active. They
bombed the Bois des Vaux, due east of the
Bois St. Pierre Vaast and the village of Mois-
lains to the south of it.
On .the British front, besides the fighting
round the Schwaben Redoubt already referred
to, there was an engagement north of the
Courcelette-Warlencourt road where we gained
ground, and we also advanced south-west of
Gueudeeourt. North of the Ancre-Somme
battlefield Irish, Midland, and Yorkshire
troops had during the night executed successful
raids in the Loos, Givenchy and Fauquissart
(north of Neuve Chapelle) areas. Against these
achievements the Germans could only set the
recovery on the evening of the 8th of a
small portion of their lost trenches north
of Lesboeufs.
On Monday, October 9, in somewhat drier
weather, while raids were being carried out in
the regions of Loos and fifeuville St. Vaast,
we successfully discharged gas at different
points north of the Ancre, and our patrols
were able to enter the enemy trenches and secure
prisoners. During the night our troops had
progressed east of Le Sars in the direction of
the Butte de Warlencourt, and in the course
of the afternoon of the 9th we attacked 1,000
yards east of the Schwaben and north of the
Stuff Redoubt. Round "The Mound," a
redoubt on the edge of the ridge descending
towards the Ancre Valley, there were some
fierce encounters, ending in our taking 200
prisoners, including six officers. In the Le
Transloy region our artillery dispersed a party
of the enemy which had ventured into the
open. The French the same day repulsed an
enemy attack starting from a salient of the
St. Pierre Vaast Wood to the east of Rancourt,
and shortly afterwards a reconnaissance de-
bouching from a small wood to the north-east
of Bouchavesnes was dispersed by machine-
gun fire.
At this point it will be well to consider the
tactical situation between the Ancre and the
Somme created by the series of victories gained
by the Allies since July 1. It was well ex-
plained in Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch of
December 23 as follows :
With the exception of his positions in the neighbour-
hood of Sailly-SailliseJ, and his scanty foothold on the
northern crest of the high ground above Thiepval, the
enemy had now been driven from the whole of the ridg3
lying between the Tortille and the Ancre.
Possession of the north-western portion of the ridge
north of the latter village carried with it observation
over the valley of the Ancre between Miraumont and
Hamel and the spurs and valleys held by the enemy on
the right bank of the river. The Germans, therefore,
made desperate efforts to cling to their last remaining
40(5
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
FRENCH CATERPILLAR TRACTORS.
[French official photograph.
trenches in this area, and in the course of the three
weeks following our advance made repeated eounter-
attacks at heavy cost in the vain hope of recovering
the ground they had lost. During this period our
gains in the neighbourhood of Stuff and Schwaben
Redoubts were gradually increased and secured in readi-
ness for future operations ; and I was quite confident
of the ability of our troops, not only to repulse the
enemy's attacks, but to clear him entirely from his
last positions on the ridge whenever it should suit my
plans to do so. I was, therefore, well content with the
situation on this flank.
Along the centre of our line from Gueudecourt to the
west of Le Sars similar considerations applied. As we
were already well down the forward slopes of the ridge
on this front, it was for the time being inadvisable to
make any serious advance. Pending developments
elsewhere all that was necessary or indeed desirable was
to carry on local operations to improve our positions and
to keep the enemy fully employed.
On our eastern flank, on the other hand, it was im-
portant to gain ground. Here the enemy still possessed
a strong system of trenches covering the villages of Le
Transloy and Beaulencourt and the town of Bapaume ;
but, although he was digging with feverish haste, he
had not yet been able to create any very formidable
defences behind this line. In this direction, in fact, we
had at last reached a stage at which a successful attack
might reasonably be expected to yield much greater
results than anything we had yet attained. The resist-
ance of the troop.> opposed to us had seriously weakened
in the course of our recent operations, and ther? was no
reason to suppose that the effort required would not
be within our powers.
This last completed system of defence, before Le
Transloy, was flanked to the south by the enemy's
positions at Sailly-Saillisel, and screened to the west by
the spur lying between Le Transloy and Lesboeufs. A
necessary preliminary, therefore, to an assault upon it
was to secure the spur and the Sailly-Saillisei heights.
1'ossession of the high ground at this latter village
would at once give a far better command over the
ground to the north and north-west, secure the flank
of our operations towards Le Transloy, and deprive the
enemy of observation over th-^ Allied communications
in the Combles Valley. In view of the enemy's efforts
to construct new systems of defence behind the Le
Transloy line, it was dosirable to lose no time in dr.ilin^
\\ it h t he situation.
Unfortunately, at this juncture, very unfavourable
weather set in and continued with scarcely a break
during the remainder of October and the early part of
November. Poor visibility seriously interfered with the
work of our artillery, and constant rain turned the mass
of hastily dug trenches for which wo were fighting into
channels of deep mud.
The epuntry roads, broken by countless shell craters,
that cross the deep stretch of ground we had lately
won, rapidly became almost impassable, making the sup-
ply of food, stores, and ammunition a serious problem.
These conditions multiplied the difficulties of attack to
such an extent that it was found impossible to exploit
the situation with the rapidity necessary to enable us to
reap the full benefits of the advantages we had gained.
None the less, my right flank continued to assist the
operations of our Allies against Saillisel, and attacks
were made to this end, whenever a slight improvement
in the weather made the co-operation of artillery and
infantry at all possible. The delay in our advance,
however, though unavoidable, had given the enemy time
to reorganize and rally his troops. His resistance again
became stubborn, and he seized every favourable
opportunity for counter-attacks. Trenches changed
hands with great frequency, the conditions of ground
making it difficult to renew exhausted supplies of bombs
and ammunition, or to consolidate the ground won, and
so rendering it an easier matter to take a battered trench
than to hold it.
Such, in short, were the considerations which
determined the future Allied movements
between the Ancre and the Somme. It
remains to be seen how Sir Douglas Haig's
plans were eventually carried out.
By Tuesday, October 10, the advance beyond
the Stuff Redoubt had enabled us to push our
line forward east of that point and to carry it
eastward and a little to the north to about half-
way between Le Sars and Warlencourt. In
the vicinity of Grandcourt, west of Le Sars,
German infantry in the open were dispersed
by our artillery on the 10th. Otherwise the
day was uneventful for the British. It was
very different with the French. South of
the Somme between Berny-en-Sariterre and
Chaulnes on a front of over three miles they ad-
vanced to the attack. Their line ran from Berny
southwards to Hill 91 and thence in a westerly
direction towards Deniecourt. A few hundred
yards east of Deniecourt it swerved to the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
407
south-west in front of Soyecourt and Vermando-
villers and then proceeded to a point a few
hundred yards west of Chaulnes. The German
position in the area formed a salient and the
object of General Micheler was to expel the
Germans from it. They were strongly en-
trenched in the hamlet of Bovent, the villages
of Ablaincourt and Pressoire and in the woods
round Chaulnes. General von Kothen, defend-
ing the salient, had been strongly reinforced
and believed that his Silesian " shock " troops
were capable of resisting any attack. The 44th
Reserve Division and a Division of Wurtem-
bergers had been sent to his assistance, and the
23rd Saxon Division was held in readiness
against unexpected eventualities.
During Monday the French artillery bom-
barded the selected sector with their usual
thoroughness; Among other targets which had
been in the last week struck by the French guns
was an observation -post in an orchard at
Bovent, six feet high and constructed of great
blocks of reinforced concrete. It resembled
the conning-tower of a battleship, and at its
top there were two narrow slits, through which
observers could watch the French lines or
machine-guns could fin,. Eight rooms, 30 feet
deep, with numerous concealed exits sur-
rounded the tower. So long as the summer
lasted this observation post was hidden by the
foliage of the trees and undergrowth. But in
October it had become visible and a French
artillery lieutenant had noticed that the orchard
contained some structure unusual in orchards
He promptly directed the " 75 " guns to clear
away the surrounding trees and bushes and the
naked grey concrete of the tower was revealed.
The attention of the big guns was then drawn
to this formidable obstacle. Projectile after
projectile burst on it. Still the tower, although
becoming more and more ragged, resisted.
A salvo of' gas shells was next discharged.
The gas being heavier than air descended
into the subterranean shelters. Finally a
huge shell burst a few yards to the left
of the tower, opened a hole in the ground
about 15 feet deep, hurled great masses of
concrete into the air, which fell and blocked the
exits. When Bovent on Tuesday was captured
a French soldier squeezed his way down into
the cavern below the tower and found 30
Germans, including two colonels, lying dead
[Official photograph.
A GERMAN PRISONER LENDS A HELPING HAND TO A BRITISH
DISPATCH KIDER.
141—3
408
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
409
with their gas-masks on and apparently un-
wounded. Two of them had been playing
chess when the gas caught them, and the table
was laid for dinner.
The effect of the French bombardment was
to shake the nerves of the Germans, who on
Monday evening, in anticipation of an offensive,
replied with copious barrages and tear shells.
It was not, however, till Tuesday that the
attack was really delivered. One column,
starting from the woods outside Deniecourt,
carried the hamlet of Bovent after a short and
fierce struggle. A second column from Ver-
mandovillers assaulted Ablaincourt. Five
times they carried the village and five times it
was recovered by the enemy, to whose aid the
23rd Saxon Division had been rushed up in
motor lorries. At the end of the day the
northern and western outskirts of Ablaincourt
were in the possession of the French. Farther
to the south our Allies progressed to within
200 yards of Pressoire. A third column from
Lihons deployed and attacked the Chaulnes
Woods, bristling with entanglements and
machine-guns and garrisoned by a brigade of
Wurtembergers, who were finally chased
away. The prisoners taken in the fighting
amounted to over 1,700.
During the day bivouacs and cantonments
in the vicinity of Peronne, the Tergnier aviation
sheds, the railway stations of St. Quentin and
Guiscard and the Wood of Porquericourt, had
been bombed by French aeronauts and there
had been 14 aerial duels between French and
German airmen south of the Somme, and 44
north of it. Four German machines were
brought down and six others injured. A train
running between Offoy and Ham was attacked
with machine-gun fire. The British aeroplanes
destroyed two gun emplacements and damaged
others. They penetrated well behind the
German lines and bombed with good effect
railway stations, trains and billets. Two of
our machines engaged seven hostile aeroplanes,
destroyed one, damaged two, and dispersed
the rest. Four British machines were lost.
The next day (Wednesday, October 11) the
enemy attempted to retake the Chaulnes Wood
and was repulsed after violent hand-to-hand
fighting. The struggle still went on in Ablain-
court 'and began round the sugar refinery of
Genermont, east of Bovent. North of the
Somme, in the evening and throughout the
night, bombing encounters took place along
the Morval-Bouchavt'snes front, especially on
the edge of the St. Pierre Vaast Wood. The
German 68th Infantry Regiment and 76th
Reserve Infantry Regiment put up a fierce
resistance. North of Courcelette the British
artillery stopped an attack and elsewhere dealt
effectively with hostile infantry mustering in
the background.
In dull weather on Thursday afternoon,
October 12, Sir Henry Rawlinson and General
[Frenih official phctog'apK.
ARMY TELEPHONE STATION ON THE
SOMME:
Fayolle launched an offensive between Le Sars
and Bouchavesnes against the troops of General
Sixt von Armin, General von Boehn and
General von Gamier. No progress was made
in the vicinity of the Butte de Warlencourt,
but south of Ligny-Thilloy, east of Gueudecourt
and Lesboeufs, our line was advanced. Between
Lesboeufs and Le Transloy the gain was about
1,000 yards and we approached to within
500 yards of the cemetery of the last-named
village. The enemy appeared to have been
410
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
about to advance when our offensive began,
for there had been a considerable accumulation
of troops in their trenches, as was shown in
some of them north-east of Gueudecourt,
which were found to be packed with the dead
and dying. Two hundred prisoners besides
numerous machine-guns were secured. During
the night a German attack north of the Stuff
Redoubt was repulsed. Meanwhile the French
«-iprpcl some email successes west of Sailly-
Su'llisel, and Sir Hubert Gough pushed forward
GENERAL VON BOEHN.
A German Commander on the Somme.
round the Schwaben Redoubt, capturing 300
prisoners, belonging to the German 110th
Regiment.
Apart from a skirmish north of the Stuff
Redoubt little that was noteworthy occurred on
the British front during Friday, October 13, but
there was considerable activity in the Morval,
Bouchavesnes, Ablaincourt and Chaulnos
sectors. A German attack with flammen-
werfer resulted in the capture of some parts of
trenches at the outskirts of the St. Pierre Vaast
Wood.
On Saturday, October 14, Sir Hubert
Cough's troops advanced their line well
to the north and west of the Schwaben Redoubt
and cleared two German communication
trenches north of the Stuff Redoubt for a
distance of nearly 200 yards, capturing two
officers and 303 privates. The French bom-
barded the Sailly-Saillisel position and south of
the Somme again joined battle with the enemy.
On October 14 our Ally, who had progressed
on the Malassise Ridge between Bouchavesnes
and Moislains, beat back after desperate
fighting masses of Germans counter-attacking
in Ablaincourt. At the close of the day the
French line ran through the ruins of the village.
Between Ablaincourt and Barleux, which lies
in a hollow, our Allies had dug deep into the
German lines. The sugar refinery on the
Ablaincourt-Genermont road had been pulver-
ized by 15-inch and 16-inch howitzers and it
was carried with little loss, and from Bovent
the French entered Genermont, which fell after
an hour's fighting, 250 Germans of the 150th
Prussian Regiment being captured. When the
sun set the French were only a few hundred
yards from the villages of Fresnes and Mazan-
court. Farther to the north, starting from the
Berny-Barleux road, the Colonial Division,
commanded by the heroic General Marchand,
who with Kitchener had prevented France and
Great Britain from playing into the German
hands over the Fashoda affair, brought the
French line nearer to the heights of Villers-
Carbonnel, the batteries on which covered the
Barleux -Chaulnes road. A Silesian detachment
in a ruined work barred the way. It was sub-
merged by the waves of the Colonial infantry.
GENERAL VON GARNIER.
A German Commander on the Somme.
In places five lines of trenches had to be carried.
They were crammed with German corpses,
among which surviving bombers, riflemen and
machine-gunners, rendered desperate by the
fact that they were fighting with their backs
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
411
to the marshy Somnie, fought with great
courage. After a terrible struggle, reminiscent
of the scenes in Charleroi when the Colonial
troops had at the opening of the war crossed
bayonets with the Prussian Guardsmen, the
position was taken and the French front
extended in depth from six to eight hundred
yards. It now overlapped Barleux, and turned
the heights of Villers-Carbonnel.
Unwounded German prisoners to the number
of 1,100, including 19 officers, had been taken
in the Belloy-Ablaincourt sector. The counter-
attacks of the enemy in the evening were
all beaten off. The French aeroplanes splen-
didly cooperated in the fighting. The clouds
were but 600 feet from the ground, and they
had flown close to the enemy's barrages.
One machine returned riddled with over 200
bullets. North of the Somme two pilots
had attacked the enemy in his trenches with
machine-guns.
The next day (Sunday, October 15), while the
Colonials repulsed a German attack at the
St. Eloi Wood, south-east of Belloy, and the
British in the morning advanced slightly north-
east of Gueudecourt, the attack on Sailly-
Saillisel was delivered. For forty hours the
villages and their outworks had been systema-
tically pounded. The cemented trenches
east of the Tripot work had been obliterated ;
(he redoubt on the Morval road had been
wrecked and its defenders buried in the ruins.
Afterwards the French countsd, in a vast under-
ground chamber there, the corpses of 200
asphyxiated Germans. On the evening of
Sunday the bombardment ceased and Sailly
was assaulted.
This village is traversed by the Peronne-
Bapaume highway, on the west side of which
lie the chateau, a chapel, and half of the
village. The road from Morval crosses the
highway just south of the chateau. East of
Sailly, through Saillisel, runs a road branching
off from the highway to the village of Roc-
quigny, due east of Le Transloy. One French
column, starting from north-east of Rancourt
up the highway, attacked the chateau from the
south. A second column entered the park of
the chateau from the north-west and stormed
ths ruined chapel, which was stubbornly
defended by a machine-gun section. A third
column, after passing two lines of trenches,
descended on the village from the north and
isolated it from the garrison of Le Transloy.
Long and terrible was the fighting for the
chapel and chateau. The Germans disputed
every inch of the ground, but were finally
driven helter-skelter through the underground
passages connecting these buildings with the
houses along the Peronne-Bapaume highway.
GENERAL MARCHAND.
In command of the Colonial Division of the
French Army of the West.
After the chapel and chateau had fallen the
contest continued in the western half of the
village, which ran for 800 yards north and
south. In the meantime the British had
during the night repulsed with heavy loss a
strong flammenwerfer attack at the Schwaben
Redoubt delivered after 'heavy artillery pre-
paration, and a small hostile bombing attack
north of Courcelette.
412
THF TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
[French official photograph.
BRITISH GUNNERS, WEARING GAS MASKS, LOADING A FIELD GUN.
On Monday, October 16, the French con-
solidated the position gained by them in
Sailly, repulsed a violent counter-attack east
of Berny-en-Santerre, carried a small wood
and captured two guns of 210 mm. and
one of 77 mm. between Genermont and Ablain-
court.
During the next day (October 17) the
French, whose aeroplanes fought 65 duels, in
the course of which five German machines
were put out of action, heavily repulsed
counter-attacks east of Berny and Belloy and
bombarded the portion of Sailly-Saillisel still
in the possession of the Germans. In the
morning the enemy forced his way into the
ruins between the chapel and the central cross-
roads. He was promptly expelled, and to-
wards sunset three more counter-attacks from
the north and east were repulsed. In thick
and murky weather on October 18 the clearing
out of the Germans from the rest of Sailly was
undertaken. An enormous concentration of
guns had been ordered by General Fayolle.
" It seemed incredible," said The Times corre-
spondent, " that there could be so many guns
and so much ammunition in the world, and
still more impossible to believe that any sort of
defence could possibly stand up against the
hurricane of shell for more than a few minutes."
The German artillery was completely out-
classed. Faintly, through the mist, about
11.45 a.m., red balls of fiery light announced
to the German gunners that the French infantry
was leaving its trenches and dug-outs. The
garrison, composed of mixed elements of the
1st Bavarians, the 16th Division, and the
2nd Bavarians, received but little assistance in
the nature of barrages. By noon the action
was over, and the enemy, leaving behind him
masses of dead and wounded, had been ejected
from the whole of Sailly, and from the ridges
north-west and northeast of the village.
Again and again, accompanied by waves of
asphyxiating gas and the fire-spoutingyZowmett-
u-erfer, the frantic Germans were hurled at
their relentless foe. No fewer than 20
attacks in mass formation were delivered
and repulsed Across a fiercely disputed
outbuilding German corpses formed a ram-
part three feet high.
The completion of the conquest of Sailly
was not the only memorable event of October 18.
South of the Somme the French, under Generals
Lacapelle and Cugnac, rushed the whole of the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
413
German front-line trenches between La Maison-
nette and Biaches, defended by troops of the
llth Reserve Division. Five officers, 24o
privates, and several machine-guns were
captured, and the German batteries across
the Somme, near Doingt and Bussu, were
silenced. A German advance at 5 a.m. against
a French trench east of Berny-en-Santerre
had also failed to achieve its object. Some
enemy parties entered the French lines and
were promptly bayoneted. The waves of men
following on behind them were caught in
barrages, and fell back in disorder, leaving
numbers of their comrades dead on the
ground.
The same day at 3 a.m. Sir Henry Rawlinson
had pushed forward on the Butte de Warlen-
court, to the north-east of Gueudecourt and
beyond Lesboeufs. Aided by a Tank the
British secured a further section of the Grid
and Grid Support trenches. Some 150 prisoners
were captured. A counter-attack in the Butte
de Warlencourt region was repulsed.
On Thursday, October 19, the French
attacked and captured the village of Saillisel,
which straggled 1,400 yards on either side of
the Sailly-Moislains road. The eastern half of the
village was secured after half an hour's fighting,
and a struggle then began for a ridge 400 feet
high flanking the village between the Peronne-
Bapaume road and the road to Rocquigny.
By the end of the day the French line before the
St. Pierre Vaast Wood formed a semi-circle
from Sailly to between Rancourt and Boucha-
vesnes. East of the wood the Germans still
held the Vaux Wood, behind which ran the
Tortille. But the enemy's batteries on the
ridges north-west and north-east of SaillyT
Saillisel which had raked our troops advancing
from Lesboeufs on Le Transloy had been dis-
lodged, and his batteries on the high ground
towards Le Mesnil were under the direct fire of
the French guns. But for the abominable
weather it is probable that Bapaume would
have been speedily captured by the Allies in
1916. Unfortunately, in the words of Sir
Douglas Haig, " the moment for decisive action
was rapidly passing away, while the weather
showed no signs of improvement. By this
time," he added, " the ground had already
become so bad that nothing less than a prolonged
period of drying weather, which at that season
of the year was most unlikely to occur, would
suit our purpose."
For the moment, indeed, it seemed that
fortune would favour the Allies. A spell of
fine, hard weather set in on Friday, October 20 .
SAILLY: RUINS OF A HOUSE FORTIFIED BY THE GERMANS.
INSET: REMAINS OF THE CHATEAU.
414
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Advantage of the changed conditions «.i-
promptly taken by our airmen.
The number of combats in the air on October
20 exceeded 80. Seven enemy machines were
seen to crash down or to fall out of control, and
there can be no doubt that some which were
driven down by our airmen were wrecked in
landing. Three of our airmen were killed,
three reported missing, and five wounded.
The communiques record at least two instances
of conspicuous pluck and endurance. Second
Lieutenant " S," though mortally wounded by
machines having withdrawn, C'nptain " D," the
leader of our formation, tried to complete his
reconnaissance, accompanied by only two
escorting machines. He was again attacked,
and another of our machines retired, with
engine and propeller damaged. Captain " D "
then fought his way homeward, surrounded by
hostile machines, and landed safely.
Nor were the French aviators inactive.
Seven German machines were brought down,
Lieutenant Herteaux increasing his "bag" to
ten. During the night 41 bombs of 120 mm.
SHELLS FOR THE 15-IN. HOWITZERS.
[Official photograph.
giui fire, brought his machine and observer
safely back to his own aerodrome. He died of
his wounds next day. Lieutenant " S," though
wounded in the head at the beginning of a
combat in which he and Second Lieutenant
" G " were opposed to six German machines,
continued to fight for a considerable time and
drove down one of the enemy machines out of
control. Six of our machines, while taking
photographs, were heavily attacked by anti-
aircraft guns, and, soon after, by twelve
hostile fighting machines. One of our machines
was brought down by the enemy to his line*.
and another brought to land behind our lines,
with the pilot severely wounded. The enemy
were dropped on the stations of Noyon and
Chauny, and later a train between Appilly and
Chauny was bombed. The enemy cantonments
and the bivouacs in the region of Nesle and
Ham, and the aviation grounds at Matigny
and Slez were also hit.
Saturday, October 21, was another day of
battle. On the 20th the Germans had delivered
an ineffectual attack against the Schwaben
Redoubt. Another in the early morning of the
21st was repulsed, five officers and 79 privates
being captured. Shortly after noon, preceded
by a tremendous bombardment, Sir Hubert
(lough's Army advanced on a line of some
5,000 yards between Schwaben Redoubt and
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
415
Le Sare. Our line towards the Ancre was
pushed forward from :01 to 500 yards;
advanced posts to the north and north-east of
the redovibt were secured and most of the Stuff
and Regina trenches captured. Over 1,000
prisoners were taken, a figure only slightly
exceeded by our casualties.
In the meantime the Germans renewed their
desperate efforts to recover Sailly-Saillisel.
verse. Near Belloy that day General Marohand,
who had been badly wounded at the Battle of
the Champagne Pouilleuse, was slightly in-
jured. He refused to relinquish his command.
Finally, on the 21st, the French mastered the
Bois Etoile north of Chaulnes from its western-
edge to the central cross-roads. They captured
250 prisoners and beat off an attack of part of
the Chaulnes garrison which had issued from
LOADING A HEAVY BRITISH HOWITZER.
[Official photograph .
Three regiments of the 2nd Bavarian Division
were flung at the ruins after artillery prepara-
tions of an extremely violent character.
Barrages and machine-gun fire .broke the waves
of the assaulting infantry. Thrice they came
forward and thrice were they driven back.
South of the Somme at 2 p.m. the Germans
with flammenwerfer attacked the positions
recently lost by them between Biaches and La
Maisonnette. The struggle was peculiarly
bitter in the Blaise Wood, in some trenches
north of which the enemy obtained a footing.
At all other points they met with a bloody re-
the village to support the Saxons garrisoning
the wood.
On Sunday, October 22, the French extended
their gains west of Sailly-Saillisel, south of the
Somme. The Germans attacked the French
positions in the wood north of Chaulnes. The
attack was repulsed with heavy losses. At
1 p.m. the Germans again advanced on the
French trenches on the southern end of the
wood, but only to be driven back, leaving
behind them a litter of dead and wounded, and
losing numerous prisoners ; in the previous
attack alone 150 had been captured.
416
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
The next day (October 23) the Germans, who
before dawn had attempted to raid our trenches
in the Gommecourt region, massed south of
Grandcourt, on the Ancre, as if they intended
to commence a counter-attack on the Regina
trench. This movement was at once notified
to our artillery, and the British gunners hurled
high explosives and shrapnel at the enemy, who
speedily dispersed. About the same time Sir
Henry Rawlinson's troops, in conjunction with
the French, pushed forward east of Gueudecourt
and Lesboeufs. The rain had increased during
the night, and numerous German trenches —
Dewdrop, Rainbow, Hazy, Misty, Sleet, Frosty,
Zenith, Orion, Spectrum — and the craters were
full of water.
The object of this minor operation was to
straighten the British front before Le Transloy.
The Germans had dug two lines of trenches in
front of the village embracing the cemetery on
the Lesboeufs road. Behind them were many
machine-gun emplacements, giving a wide field
of fire against the British and against any
French troops moving on Le Transloy down
the Peronne-Bapaume road, who had to pass
over an average distance of 1,200 yards of No-
BR1TISH TROOPS REPELLING A STRONG COUNTER-ATTACK.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
417
OFFICERS OBSERVING FROM A CAPTURED TRENCH.
[Official ph-.tigraph.
Man's Land. The fighting which ensued was of
a confused character. One strip of trench
changed hands no less than five times, and a
group of gun pits, in which the guns had been
replaced by machine-guns, was obstinately
attacked and obstinately defended.
Details of the 64th Brandenburg Regiment,
the regiment which took Douaumont in
February, 1916, and of the 24th Bavarian
Regimen^, which had carried Fort Vaux, with
Hamburgers and Hanoverians, strove des-
perately to keep the British from approaching
nearer to Le Transloy, the most formidable of
the village fortresses still blocking the road to
Bapaume. Nevertheless, at nightfall, we had
captured over 1,000 yards of trenches, while the
French had made appreciable progress north-
east of Morval in the direction of Le Transloy.
Nothing occurred worth recording on
October 24 and 25. The rain continued to
pour down, converting low-lying portions of the
battlefield into a quagmire. But on Thursday
the 26th there was a sudden liveliness. The
British raided enemy trenches north-east and
south of Arras, and in the morning, after a pre-
liminary bombardment, the Germans attacked
the Stuff' Trench. They were driven off with
considerable loss, leaving 41 prisoners in our
hands. An attempt of the enemy to recover
the Abb6 Wood, south of Bouchavesnes, was
unavailing.
Heavy rain once more fell on Friday,
October 27, and the operations on both sides
were, apart from the never-ceasing artillery
duels, suspended.
On Saturday, October 28, our artillery
shelled the Germans out of some strong points
north-east of Lesboeufs. As the enemy
emerged from his hiding places he came under
a murderous fire from our infantry. Several
important trenches passed into our hands, and
about 100 prisoners were captured.
On Sunday, October 29, we made a further
forward movement in the same region, and the
French by advancing 300 yards north-west of
Sailly, parallel with the Bapaume Road,
brought their front into line of our new positions.
But in the afternoon they suffered a some-
what serious reverse to the south of the Somme.
Their progress between Biaches and La Maison-
nette had seriously alarmed the German com-
manders, for our Allies were almost in the out-
skirts of Peronne, and threatened Barleux from
the north. Accordingly, at 3 p.m., the 360th
Regiment, composed of Berlin and Branden-
burg men, whose advance had been preceded
418
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
[Official (holograph.
PAGKMULES CARRYING AMMUNITION TO THE TRENCHES.
by an unusually severe bombardment, was
launched at the farm of La Maisonnette.
Other troops attacked on both sides of the farm,
and the assaulting masses were accompanied
by a liberal supply of flammsnwerfer. For a
time the French, supported by their artillery,
held their own, but during the night the enemy
was once more in the farm. It was claimed
by him that he captured 412 men and 15
officers. All efforts, however, to drive the
French from Hill 97 failed. The next day the
French as an offset to this reverse carried a
system of trenches north-west of Sailly-Saillisel.
On Wednesday, November 1, the Germans,
after a vigorous bombardment and discharges
of poisonous gas, attacked Sailly-Saillisel.
Seven battalions drawn from different divisions
were launched against the village on the north
and east. Xo fewer than six attempts were
made by the enemy's columns to force their
way in ; but apart from a small success the
German efforts were abortive. In the after-
WATERING HORSES BEHIND THE BATTLE-FRONT.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
419
noon the Allies took the offensive in this
region. North-east of Lesboeufs the French
captured two trenches and made 125 prisoners,
while the British gained some ground between
Lesboeufs and Le Transloy. Another attack,
made by the French to the south-east of
Saillisel, secured them a strongly organized
system of trenches on the western outskirts
of the wood of St. Pierre Vaast.
On November 2, in despite of heavy rain,
more ground was gained by the French between
Lesboeufs and Sailly-Saillisel ; the total
Vaast Wood. The attack was shattered by
curtain and machine-gun fire.
On Sunday, November 5, according to the
German Higher Command, the British and
French " began a gigantic blow against the
Army front of General von Below." According
to the same veracious account, " the troops of
the various German tribes, under Generals
von Marschall, von Deimling, and von Gamier,
tenaciously resisting, inflicted on the enemy
a severe defeat." The real facts were as
follows :
[French official photograph.
GERMAN GUNS AND FLAME-THROWERS CAPTURED BY THE FRENCH.
prisoners captured on the 1st and 2nd amounted
to 736, including 20 officers, and a dozen
machine-guns were also taken. The net
re-suit of the righting was that the British were
within 200 yards of Le Transioy, which was
also threatened by the French from the
south.
On Friday, November 3, the enemy counter-
attacked the British east of Gueudecourt and
were beaten back, suffering heavy losses and
losing four machine-guns. The Germans left
behind them over 100 dead and 30 prisoners.
On November 4 the Germans vainly en-
deavoured to expel the French from the
trenches on the western edge of St. Pierre
In the morning of the 5th the troops of Sir
Henry Rawlinson moved towards the Butte
de Warlencourt and seized the heights east of
Le Sars and north-east of Gueudecourt on a
front of 1,000 yards, approaching some 400
yards nearer to the Butte. For a short time
the Butte passed into our power ; but during
the night the Germans drove us back. In the
Lesboeufs region we captured what was
known as the Hazy Trench, and reached a
point almost at the further edge of the minor
ridge running northwards before Le Transloy.
In the meantime the French, from the south of
Le Transloy to the South of St. Pierre Vaast
Wood, took the offensive. Between Lesboeufs
4-30
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
and Sailly-Saillisel they progressed in the
direction of Le Traiisloy. Issuing from Sailly
they reconquered the greater part of Saillisel
and works to the south of it ; then attacking on
three sides at once the St. Pierre Vaast Wood,
they captured three trenches defending the
northern corner of the wood, and the whole of
the hostile position on the south-western
GENERAL MAISTRE.
A French Commander under General Micheler.
outskirts. All through the afternoon German
reinforcements from Moislains struggled hard
to regain the lost ground ; but by 4 p.m. they
were beaten, and another attempt in the
evening made by them was also driven back.
Over 600 prisoners, including 15 officers, were
taken by the French.
On November 7, in an almost incessant
deluge of rain, the French scored another
brilliant success, this time south of the Somme.
Bretons and Parisians of General Micheler's
Army, under the command of Generals Anthoine
and Maistre, issued at 9.45 a.m. from Gener-
mont sugar refinery, from the Serpentine
Trench south-east of Vermandovillers, and from
the northern spur of Chaulnes Wood. The
two lines of concreted trenches, forming the
outwork of the long Germania trench which ran
a^ far south as Hyencourt-le-Grand, were at
once captured, all the occupants being either
killed or taken prisoners. Similarly, the Ger-
mans between the south of Pressoire and
Chaulnes Wood received short shrift. Only
in Ablaincourt and Pressoire itself did the
Germans put up a good fight. During the pre-
liminary bombardment they had taken refuge
in their subterranean chambers, and as soon as
the attack began they came to the surface and
played their machine-guns on the French
attacking waves. In the southern portion of
Ablaincourt a severe struggle took place
A stack of houses defended by Bavarians were
thrice taken and retaken. In the church a
Bavarian company fought almost to the last
man. The cemetery, 500 yards east of the
village, was also the scene of fierce encounters ;
it was carried at the point of the bayonet.
Between Ablaincourt and Pressoire a single
French company routed a whole Prussian
battalion. By nightfall the French had secured
Pressoire and were on the outskirts of Omie-
court. They had captured hundreds of
prisoners and a position from which their
guns could command the plateau of Villers-
Carbonnel, the batteries on which prevented
the French from taking Barleux.
The weather had now somewhat moderated ;
it remained dry and cold, with frosty nights
and misty mornings. Final preparations were
pushed on by Sir Douglas Haig for the attack
which he proposed to deliver on the Ancre.
On November 9, while fighting continued round
Saillisel and south of Pressoire, the British
remained quiescent — at least so far as their
infantry was concerned. The day was, how-
ever, rendered memorable by a great aerial
battle, in which a squadron of 30 British
aeroplanes engaged from 36 to 40 German
machines. The action took place between
9 a.m. and 10 a.m. north-east of Bapamne.
Near the Villa of Mory close to Vaulx-Vrau-
court, the British, who were on a bombing
expedition, sighted the enemy's squadron.
Some of our machines were at a higher level
than the enemy. They plunged down to
join their comrades in the engagement
which was fought some 5,000 feet above the
ground. For twenty minutes among the
clouds there was an inextricable tangle of
darting, swirling machines. Four of ours wen-
lost, six of the enemy were sent to earth, and
the whole enemy formation broke and scattered.
Our airmen bombed Vaulx-Vraucourt and
returned home unmolested.
On the 10th the French captured more
trenches north-east of Lesboeufs, and in
Saillisel repulsed a counter-attack.
The next day, in the early hours of the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
421
morning, the Canadians attacked troops of the
Prussian Guard and Saxon Regiments holding
the Farmers Road, an easterly extension of
Regiiia Trench, on a front of 1,000 yards;
.60 prisoners, including four officers, were taken!
An unpleasant interruption to our line had
been removed, and we were close upon the
strong German position running immediately
in front of Pys and Warlencourt. On the same
day the French seized the north-eastern and
south-eastern outskirts of Saillisel, but the
Germans still maintained themselves in the
easternmost houses of the village. South of the
Somme, at 2.30 p.m. the enemy with flammen-
werfer attacked in the neighbourhood of Denie-
court. He was beaten back with heavy losses.
On November 12 there was a lull on the
British front, but the fighting went on in Saillisel.
which finally passed into the possession of our
Allies, who captured 220 men and seven officers,
with eight machine-guns. South of the Somme
the Germans, attacking south-east of Berny,
succeeded in entering some advanced trenches
but were immediately driven out by a counter-
attack.
Before the winter set in Sir Douglas Haig
determined to strike a last blow at the almost
shattered line of the Germans now running
from the east of Arras to Peronne. The main
ridge between the Schwaben Redoubt and
Sailly-Saillisel being now in the hands of the
Allies, it was possible to attack successfully
from the west and south the enemy's salient
on both sides of the Ancre. Since the ineffectual
assault by the British on July 1, Sir Hubert
Gough's troops had step by step crept towards
the hamlet of St. Pierre Divion on the left and
the village of Beaucourt-sur-Ancre on the right
bank of the river. They *vere well within
assaulting distance of the maze of vast dug-outs,
caverns and trenches which were all that was
left of Beaumont Hamel ; Beaucourt, higher
up the Ancre, was situated in a hollow. North
of Beaumont Hamel the plateau up to the village
of Serre was also strongly organized. Before
the western edge of Beaumont Hamel, down to
and across the low ground before our linas, ran
successive lines of trenches. So thick were the
rusty wire entanglements — in places five tiers
deep, each often 8 feet high and 90 to 1 20 feet
wide — that from a distance they looked like a
belt of brown ploughed land. Behind the
trenches and entanglements the face of the
slope beyond in the crease of the hills and the
LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR E. A. FANSHAWE,
K.C.B.
In command of the Fifth Army Corps.
banks of the Ancre was pierced everywhere with
the entrances to the caverns and dug-outs.
From the road through Beaumont Hamel to
the Ancre a deep forked ravine descended to
the enemy's front line trench, where the
extremities of the prongs, as it were, of the
ravine ended. It was known to us from it?
shape as the " Y " ravine and was 1,000 yards
or so long. At these western points the prongs
were 30 feet and more in depth, with precipitous
sides that in places almost overhung. Below
the bottom of these gullies in the ground, caves,
some of them large enough to hold a battalion
and a half of men, had been constructed, and a
tunnel ran back to the fourth line trenches. In
caves and tunnels the enemy lay absolutely
safe from shell-fire. The ruins of the village of
Beaucourt on the right bank of the Ancre were
not furnished with underground works com-
422
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP.
[Official t
BRINGING IN RIFLES AND EQUIPMENT FROM NO-MAN'S LAND.
parable with those of Beaumont Hamel and
its vicinity, but deep dug-outs there provided
accommodation for the masses held in reserve.
Equally formidable were the defences of the
hamlet of St. Pierre Divion on the south bank
of the river. Starting from four recessed and
sheltered entrances on the river level a great
galley ran back some 300 yards into the hill.
Then it branched and from the ends of the
branches passages and steps led up to the
communication and other trenches on the
Thiepval ridge west of the Sehwaben Redoubt.
This network of tunnels and caverns, some of
which were used as hospitals, formed perhaps
the largest collection of underground case-
mates yet discovered. These works formed
one immense fortress with a front of nearly
five miles lying astride the Ancre from the
Sehwaben Redoubt to Serre. At the end
of October an additional Division — the 223rd,
one of Hindenburg's newly constructed divisions
— had been added to the garrison. The 2nd
(iiuird Reserve Division was on the north of
the Ancre ; it was supported by troops of
the 12th, 55th, 58th, 62nd, and 144th Divisions.
Kor the attack on the 3,000 yards of entrench-
ments and burrows south of the Ancre and of
the 5,000 yards north of the river only troops
recruited in the British Isles were employed.
It was a good trial of strength between them
and the inhabitants of Germany.
At a o'clock on the morning of November 11,
the preliminary bombardment of the Ancre
fortress had begun. It continued with bursts
of great intensity until the morning of No-
vember 13. The acres of barbed wire en-
tanglements by then had melted away, and the
surface works had been knocked to pieces.
The assault was fixed for 6 a.m. It was
preceded by a sudden and very effective
barrage fire. A dense fog covered the ground,
and the fog coupled with the darkness prevented
the Germans from perceiving that our men wen-
concentrating before their positions in un-
usually large numbers. Consequently the
operation partook largely of the nature of a
surprise South of the Ancre our troops
between the western end of the Regina Trench,
700 yards north of the Stuff Redoubt and the
Sehwaben Redoubt, attacked the formidable
enemy trench known as " the Hansa line,"
which ran unevenly north-westward down to
the Ancre just opposite Beaucourt and de-
scended on St. Pierre Divion. By 7.20 a.m.
our objectives east of the hamlet had been
reached and the garrison hemmed in between
our troops and the river were isolated. At
7 a.m. the number of prisoners captured was
greater than that of the attacking force. Soon
after St. Pierre Divion and its caverns and
tunnels fell. In this area alone nearly 1,400
prisoners were taken by a single Division at
the expense of less than 600 casualties. A
Tank had rendered considerable assistance
preceding the infantry. The new ground won
was a wedge-shaped piece 3,000 yards in
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
423
extreme length tapering to an acute angle
where it reached Regina Trench.
North of the river the enemy offered a more
stubborn resistance. The British Naval Di-
vision had been allotted the task of storming
the enemy's position from the Ancre to the
" Y " Ravine. The extreme right of the
Division went with a rush across the level of
the valley bottom. The centre had to attack
diagonally along the slope of the hill and the
extreme left to mount the highest point of the
crest. At the top of the slope, some 500 yards
from the Ancre, and invisible owing to being
hidden in a recess, was a redoubt comprised of
three deep pits with concrete emplacements for
machine-guns, which could fire almost flush
with the surface of the ground in all directions.
This redoubt was situated between the first and
second trenches. While the extreme right of
the Naval Division swept up the valley, the
right centre was hung up round the redoubt.
The left of the Division, however, stormed the
ridge, joined hands with the extreme right, and
formed up on the Beaumont Hamel-Beaucourt
road. There they remained for the rest of the
day and during the night, while the redoubt
and other strong points were being reduced.
At 3 a.m. on November 14, a Tank arrived
near the redoubt. Unable to reach it, the crew
got out and trained their machine-guns on it.
The survivors of the garrison — 360 unwounded
men — surrendered and the advance on Beau-
court of the men of the Naval Division pro-
ceeded, the same Tank or another accompany-
ing our infantry. After a quarter of an hour's
fighting the village was captured, and at day-
light our men were digging themselves in on
its further side. The Division in the two days'
fighting had taken 1,725 prisoners and advanced
2,000 yards on a front of 1,200.
Meanwhile a Scottish Division had been
busy in the " Y " Ravine and at Beaumont
Hamel. At all points except at the entrances
to the prongs of the ravine, the Scottish in-
fantry broke over the German defences without
a check. Some of them descended into
Beaumont Hamel, and before midday were
over the site of the village and the entrances
of the caverns beneath it. The " Y " Ravine
was the theatre of a long and bloody contest.
It was attacked from the north and south. At
a point just beyond the fork of the " Y " the
Scots tumbled down the precipitous sides,
bombing and bayoneting the Germans in this
BRITISH AND FRENCH SOLDIERS CLEANING UP CAPTURED TRENCHES AT
ST. PIERRE DIVION.
424
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
open cutting. Simultaneously the western
entrances of the ravine were attacked and
farther up towards the Beaumont Hamel -
Ke.'iucourt road other parties of Scots flung
themselves into the chasm. The surviving
( Germans fled over the crest of the ridge or
took refuge in their subterranean laire, from
which they were gradually evicted. The
Scots, as a whole, took 1,400 prisoners and 54
machine-guns. Farther north the enemy's
first-line system for a distance of half a mile
beyond Beaumont Hamel was also in our hands.
Opposite Serre the attack was not pressed
end in the middle of November, being brought
to a termination by the bad weather, and
henceforward to the end of the year there was
no really important fighting, although of minor
skirmishing there was no cessation, and we
still continued to make some little but con-
tinuous progress. On November 15 the gains
of the two previous days on the Ancre were
consolidated and further gains made. One
division advanced a mile on the north side
of the river and took a thousand prisoners
at the cost of only 450 casualties. South of
the Ancre the ground raptured east of the
ermission, from the Ojjtcial Ancre Film.
SCOTTISH TROOPS ADVANCING TO THE ATTACK.
owing to the morass-like character of the ground
to be traversed. On the morning of November
14 our line was extended from Beaucourt
to the north-west along the road across the
southern end of the Beaumont Hamel spur.
We had now secured the command of the
Ancre on both banks of the river at the point
where it entered the enemy's lines. On the
evening of the 14th, Sir Douglas Haig was able
to report that he had captured over 5,000
prisoners in the battle of the Ancre. The
-erious reverse which we had suffered on July 1
at this part of the field had been wiped out.
On the 14th a successful advance had also
been made east of the Butte de Warleneoiirt,
•100 or 500 yards of the " Grid Trench " being
taken from details of the Prussian 1st Guard
Reserve Division.
Active operations practically came to an
Butte de Warlencourt was secured, and the
enemy massing for a counter-attack was
dispersed by our artillery fire. The next day
there was considerable fire from the German
artillery north and south of the Ancre, but
without any appreciable result ; and the
same was the case between Le Sars and Gueude-
court. On the other hand our guns caused
several explosions in the German positions.
The British front was also extended to the
east from Beaucourt along the north bank of
the Ancre. The enemy, however, managed to
ivgnin a part of the ground near the Butte de
Warlencourt, which hail been captured from
him on the 14th.
Our airmen assumed ae.tive operations against
the Germans. Two important junctions on
their lines of communication, places on their
railways, billets and aerodromes were attacked
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
425
with bombs and machine-gun fire both by
night and day. It must be admitted that
the enemy displayed more enterprise than
usual, but he lost three machines on the
British side of No Man's Land and two on
his own, while five more were compelled to
descend to earth in a damaged condition.
Our own loss was three aeroplanes. By this
time (since September 13) we had taken 6,190
prisoners, against which he had no appreciable
offset.
On Saturday, November 18, further progress
was made on both sides of the Ancre, but
mostly on the south, where we gained some
500 yards on a front of about 2£ miles and
reached the outskirts of Grandcourt. On the
right bank of the river we advanced about
three-quarters of a mile to the north-east of
Beaucourt, capturing the Bois de Hollaiide.
Altogether 258 prisoners were taken.
During these days the French had also been
heavily engaged. On November 7 they had
captured the important points of Ablaincourt
and Pressoir to the north of Chaulnes. It was
not till the 15th, after a two days' bombard-
ment, that the Germans made any attempt to
recapture this portion of their lost position.
A very serious fight then ensued, and at one
time they managed to gain a footing in the
eastern part of Pressoir, but they were re-
pulsed at all other points with great loss.
A like fate befel them north of the Somme.
Here regiments of the Prussian Guards attacked
from Lesboeufs to the south of Bouchavesnes.
They managed to capture the northern corner
and western fringe of the St. Pierre Vaast
Wood, but were beaten back all along the rest
of the front attacked. On the other hand, the
French progressed on the northern spur of the
St. Pierre Vaast Wood. On the 16th tha
Germans claimed to have entered Saillisel in
the morning, but by the evening they lost it
again, and were also turned out of Pressoir.
It was a severe repulse for three German
Divisions in ,which they suffered very heavy
losses. On the 16th French airmen fought
54 engagements with German aeroplanes,
and during the night, they dropped a ton and
a half of bombs on a railway station and
aviation park
General Headquarters reported that on the
22nd the enemy's aeroplanes showed more
enterprise, <and some of them crossed the
British lines. Three fell into our hands, and a
[Uy permission, /rum Hit Official Ancre tilm.
PRISONERS FROM BEAUMONT HAMEL.
42G
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
RUINS OF BEAUMONT HAMEL CHURCH.
ii in! fhnlc.^raph.
fourth was driven down behind the German
line — one of ours was missing. On the 23rd
twelve of our machines attacked an enemy
formation of twenty, and dispersed it. One of
them was destroyed and several driven down
damaged ; all of ours returned safely. But
in other fights, where our men destroyed four
of the enemy's, we lost three.
The weather was now very bad, and the
struggle was confined to the artillery with a
few spasmodic efforts in the shape of trench
raids and a little work by the airmen.
Thus the struggle went on till the end of the
month. Nor did December bring any increase
in military enterprise on either side, although
on the 12th the German report was that the
artillery activity again temporarily increased.
It was backed up by an infantry attack on the
French line south of Roye. A few small
parties managed to enter our Ally's trenches,
BEAUMONT HAMEL.
[Official f holograph.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
427
but they were driven out by a bomb attack,
and the position was completely re-established
Our trench raids were continued along the
whole line held by the French and ourselves.
They produced a certain tale of prisoners,
and many of the German dug-outs were
injured.
The end of 1916 found the Allies in the
Western Theatre of War in a position far
different from that which they had held
twelve months before. Above all, the pro-
destruction of the military forces of the Central
Powers. Thus the war, both on the Eastern
and Western Fronts, formed part of the general
plan for the defeat of the Germans. Nor could
the Austro- Italian Front be left out of the
Allied Commanders' calculations. In this
theatre by the beginning of June the Austrians
had made considerable impression on the Italian
line. Plainly, therefore, the situation required
fresh, determined, and united efforts on the
part of the Allies.
The Russians, for their part, in the campaign
[Official fltctograpn.
QUIET RESTING-PLACE BEHIND THE TRENCHES.
gress made in the last half of the year had
been great.
It is true that the Germans in February,
1916, had begun their attack on Verdun,
and they had continued their assaults with
sometimes varying success, but, on the whole,
with substantial progress, and it became
evident in the days of late spring that some
3ounter blow must be delivered by the Allies
to relieve the pressure on this important point.
Moreover, it was necessary not to look upon
the different campaigns in Europe as isolated
efforts without relation to one another, but
rather as forming parts of one scheme for the
which they opened at the beginning of June
won most decided successes over the Austrians,
and led to the transfer of considerable German
forces from the Western to the Eastern Theatre
of War. This was advantageous, but more
was needed. The British and French leaders
therefore determined on a combined offensive
at the end of the month to pin the Germans
to that part of the front of operations and
prevent them from aiding the Austrians with
troops whether against the Russians or Italians.
The Macedonian operations were at this time
only a minor consideration.
The Allied offensive would fulfil two other
428
fHK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL
objects. It would relieve the pressure on
Verdun, and, at the same time, inflict such
I c >sses, both in men and material, on the Germans
in France as to diminish their strength, while
the moral effect of driving them from positions
which they had fortified in the past iwenty
months and believed to be impregnable could
not fail to be great. .No systematic and com-
bined effort had yet been made against them on
a large scale, extending over a considerable
stretch of country, but now the time had come
when it could be undertaken with considerable
prospect of success. When, with inferior
numbers, both of men and guns, the Allies had
held their own against their opponents, they
had still contrived to win isolated successes,
and the attacks of the Germans had been
without a lasting or striking result. But by
the middle of 1916 both British and French
had equipped themselves with an adequate
artillery, and the preponderance in guns no
longer lay with their opponents. The supplies
of ammunition were large and allowed the
continuous bombardment of -the German
lines, while the British Infantry had been
enormously increased. France, too, had
strengthened her armies, and both Allies
were now capable of carrying out a definite
and continuous offensive against the German
positions. Their preparations during the last
months had put, indeed, a very different
complexion on the situation. No longer
were they in any inferiority with regard to
weapons ; on the contrary, both in numbers
and efficiency they were better off than were
Germans. This has been clearly shown in
the previous chapters dealing with the opera-
tions on the Western Front. It seems probable
that the German* had some idea of a limited
offensive in tin r-ai!\ summer, for on May 21
an attack had been made by the Germans on
our positions on the Vimy Ridge and south
and south-east of Souchez, and they had gained
some ground. But as their success was of
no strategic or tactical value, Sir Douglas Haig
came to the conclusion that it was better to
take up a fresh position a little to the rear of
the original line rather than use up troops in a
counter-attack who could be better employed
in the larger operatipn he had in view.
On June 2 the enemy made a determined
attack on a front of over a mile and a half
from Mount Sorrell to Hooge, and succeeded
in penetrating our line to a depth which, at its
A MEAL AMONGST THE WRECKAGE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH.
429
MOVING A FIELD-GUN TO A NEW POSITION
[Official
greatest, measured some . 700 yards. As the
Germans in the southern part of the captured
position commanded the British trenches more
to the rear, it was therefore necessary to expel
them from it. This was done on June 13 by
a well-planned and well-executed counter-
stroke and the original trenches were recovered.
The Germans showed no further symptoms of
passing to the offensive, and neither one nor
other of these affairs in any way delayed the
preparations for the grand attack shortly to
be undertaken.
It has been seen how successful the Somme
operations were. The pressure on Verdun had
been relieved, the main German Army had
been pinned to the Western front of operations
and its strength had been considerably worn
down. The sketch annexed shows graphically
the gain of ground made, but this was not the
only gauge by which success was to be esti-
mated : rather was it to be found in the
captures of prisoners and in the large number
of weapons won. From July 1 to November 18,
when active operations practically ceased,
38,000 officers and men had been taken,
besides 29 heavy guns, 96 field guns and
howitzers, 136 trench mortars and 514 machine
guns.
Still more important was the great damage
which had been inflicted on the German moral.
The evidence as to this point was indubitable.
Time after time in the various encounters it
had been noticed that the Germans no longer
Fought as well as they had done earlier in the
war. It is certain that this is to be attributed
to the fact that in hand-to-hand encounters
they found they were opposed by better men.
No soldiers can go on for any considerable
time recognizing this fact without suffering
deterioration
But there were other reasons for the Allies'
great success. In the contest of nations
iCommgcourt
/•• ^Bucquoy
Hebuterne
REFERENCE . ~~ ' fv 'xXXVv-N W* XT "^a*
Babble Line Julyl*-— ^XXv^^rERONNE
Grouno
SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE GROUND
GAINED BY THE BRITISH AND FRENCH
IN THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.
which began in 1914 the destructive power of
fire had been enormously developed. It had
been remarked in former wars of recent date
that they had become less bloody. For this
the main reason was that, while improved
weapons had increased losses at the actual
points of contact, the same intensity along
the whole line of battle which characterized
the encounters of earlier time wa* no longer
430
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
seen. Moreover, the great sources of loss,
disease and hardship, due to want of food
and exposure, were better in hand. But in
this titanic struggle, although medical science
had practically abolished epidemic disease
from the armies and largely diminished the
loss from exposure, the unprecedented
progress in the power of weapons had
enormously increased the destruction of life
on the battlefield. Moreover, there was
another contributing factor — the continuous
nature of the struggle. Before the supply of
food and ammunition had been rendered so
much easier by the increased facility of loco-
motion due to liberal construction of railways,
good roads and the introduction of the auto-
mobile, there were constantly occurring pauses
THE STOKES BOMB-THROWER.
in the fighting, and battles were comparatively
infrequent. In this war, whether during the
time the operations took place in the open
country or during those which were made up
of the attack and defence of a fortified position,
there was hardly any intermission. Day after
day, unless the weather entirely stopped
operations, there were encounters of a more or
less ardent nature, and always there was some
artillery work.
The struggle on the ground was supplemented
by the struggle in the air, which had a very
important influence on the conduct of war.
If two large armies are in juxtaposition with
one another, both sides have great difficulty in
concealing their strategic movements from one
another. For the aeroplanes, with their long
range, can ascertain easily what movements of
troops are going on behind the enemy's front, ,
provided they are not stopped by the enemy's
machines. The reconnoitring duties in front
of the army had been largely transferred from
the cavalry to the aviators, and it is just as
important in the employment of airmen
as formerly in the employment of horse-
men to ensure the predominance of the recon-
noitring arm — i.e., the resistance of the other
side must be disposed of just as, formerly,
FITTING FUSES TO STOKES BOMBS.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
481
the enemy's cavalry had to be torn away
before the duties of reconnaissance could be
properly carried out. It is plain that under
modern conditions the difficulty of executing
strategical movements such as Xapoleon em-
ployed in the Marengo campaign, or Wellington
in 1813, must be very much greater, besides
which the size of armies, when whole nations
are in arms, makes such brilliant movements
still more difficult. Fortunately for the Allies
both British and French airmen at the time of
the Battle of the Somme proved themselves
superior on the whole to those of Germany.
When we entered on tne scene of action in the
year 1914 our soldiers were necessarily armed
and trained on the ideas then in vogue. They
had a good rifle, a moderate equipment of
machine-guns, possessed in their guns weapons
which were more powerful than those of other
field artilleries, and rather more numerous than
the officially published endowment of the
German Army. But hardly had • the war
begun when it was seen that Germany had
given to her army far more machine-guns,
and had brought far heavier guns into the
field and in greater numbers than we had
expected to meet. This put us at first at a
great disadvantage, but the almost super-
human exertions we made in order to overcome
it brought about in due time a complete
change. Our heavy guns were more numerous
and more copiously provided with ammuni-
tion ; we had brought the factory on to the
FlG.I.
Company Column.
FIG. 2.
Broad Column.
GERMAN INFANTRY COLUMNS.
In the Company Column the three sections are
one behind the other at nine paces distance. The
Broad Column consists of the four Company
Columns of the Battalion with intervals of five
paces between them.
battlefield to take part in the struggle. The
number of machine-guns had been enormously
increased, and the infantry had been provided
with the Lewis gun, technically a machine-
gun, but in reality an automatic rifle which
one man can carry and manipulate, and which
yet gives a fire equal to that of 25 rifles. This
THE STOKES BOMB-THROWER AND
ITS INVENTOR.
This illustration shows how easily the arm can be
carried.
weapon was also largely used in our aeroplanes,
for which its light weight rendered it peculiarly
suitable. The cavalry, too, was provided
with machine-guns, because so much of its
fighting had to be done on foot. Great use
had been made of grenades in the trench warfare,
and our trench mortars — i.e., the weapons
which hurl bombs of various sizes at a very
high angle of fire for a comparatively short
distance — were distinctly superior to those of
the enemy. Grenadiers had been revived, and
formed an integral part of every company.
The special form known as the Stokes mortar
or howitzer had undoubtedly, by its rapid fire,
produced a great impression on the Germans.
All these inventions and improvements enor-
mously increased the amount of fire on the
modern battlefield. The old doctrine of hus-
banding ammunition had given way to the more
rational view — expend as much as you can,
provided a reasonable effect is obtained from
it. This, of course, involved enormous supplies,
^.idi as in 1914 were undreamt of. War had
become largely a question of material. No
soldiers, however good, could succeed without it.
432
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
TROOPS RESTING BEHIND A SHELTERED BANK.
[Official photograph.
It is a curious thing that just when fire had
been rendered more intense, when the great
object of rationally manoeuvred infantry was
to use formations which offered as little target
as possible, compatible with a proper develop-
ment of fire power, without which it would
have been impossible to advance against a well-
defended position, the Germans should have
harked back to the worst type of French
tactics of a hundred years before. Large and
dense columns were then found impossible on
the battlefield, but they were seen once more
in the German Army. There had always been
a certain school in it which believed in them,
arid they were employed fairly frequently on
the battlefields in France, causing frightful
losses, and never succeeding unless the troops
attacked were on the point of going back, and
so were unable to bring sufficient fire to bear
on them.
The narrative has shown that the Allies
really obtained the results they sought for in
the Battle of the Somme. But it was scarcely
to be expected that the Germans would in
any way admit this. On the contrary, the
newspapers, the General Headquarters and the
German people claimed that they had won the
battle.
The German Headquarter Staff at the end
of December declared that " the great battle
of the Somme was actually ended. Since
the last infantry attacks failed lamentably
over four weeks ago the fire of the French
and British artillery had also diminished to
such an extent that it became possible for the
defenders to rebuild their defences, which at
places only consisted of shattered trenches
and shell craters. These four weeks of relative
calm, which the exhausted assailants were
forced to allow the defenders, have, once and
for all, sealed the fate of the Somme Battle ! "
A few months later the Germans were scuttling
back as hard as they could from a position
which, according to Iheir own statements,
had been restored to its pristine strength !
CHAPTER CLXXIX.
THE
RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1916:
(II.) TO FALL OF BUKAREST.
THE STRATEGIC POSITION IN OCTOBER, 1916 — THE PASSES LEADING INTO RUMANIA — FIGHTING
IN THE TORZBURG AND PflEDEAL PASSES ENEMY OFFENSIVE ON THE MOLDAVIAN FRONTIER —
RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENTS — KRAFFT VON DELMENSINOEN ATTACKS THE RED TOWER PASS — ENEMY
ADVANCE IN THE VULCAN PASS — RUMANIAN VICTORY AT TARGUL-JIU — FIGHTING IN THE DOB-
KUDJA — GENERAL SAKHAKOFF IN COMMAND — GERMAN ADVANCE IN THE Jiu VALLEY — FALL OF
CRAIOVA — MACKENSEN CROSSES THE DANUBE — CONCENTRIC ADVANCE AGAINST THE ARGESH LINE
— BATTLE OF NEAJLOVU — RUMANIAN DEFEAT — EVACUATION OF BUKAREST — GERMANS ENTER THE
CITY.
THE Austro -German counter-offensive
against Rumania falls into four
marked stages. Its first task was
to clear Transylvania and regain
control of the semi-circle of railway in the
Upper Maros and Aluta valleys which runs in
eastern and southern Transylvania almost
parallel to the Rumanian frontier and at a
short distance from it. As was pointed out in
Chapter CLXXIII., this railway gave to an
Austrian offensive against the Rumanian
frontier a very consideraV le strategic advantage,
because a Rumanian army attempting to defend
the frontier of its country did not dispose of
any similar convenient lateral communications.*
The Austro-German offensive began about
the middle of September and succeeded in
recapturing the whole of Transylvania by
October 14. Thenceforth, the Rumanians had
to fight at the gates of their own country, in
the Carpathian passes. The enemy offensive
against Rumania was opened by a simultaneous
attack practically along all the roads and
passes which lead across the frontier range ;
it was in the interest of the German Command
to force our Allies to disperse their force* along
* Cf. p. 201.
Vol. XI — Part 142.
the entire line. The German Command with
the help of its much superior system of lateral
railways could then shift the main weight of
its offensive with incomparably greater speed
than the Rumanians could achieve in read-
justing their dispositions to the movements
of the enemy.
Three distinct sectors may be distinguished
within the battle-line along the frontier range,
each of them based on one railway connecting
Transylvania with Rumania. The Moldavian
sector centring round the Gyimes pass with
minor ramifications in the Tolgyes, the Bekas,
the Uz and the Oitoz passes, had been assigned
during the Rumanian offensive of September.
1916, to the Fourth Rumanian Army under
General Presan. The region of the six passe*
south of Kronstadt, between the Busau rivor
in the east and the Fogaras mountain range
in the west, which may be described as the
central group of passes, constituted the main
front of the Second Rumanian Army ; its
most important artery of communication was
the road and railway which run from Bukarest
and Ploeshti over the Predeal Pass. The
Second Rumanian Army, which at the out-
break of the War was commanded by General
433
434
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Averescu, had for about a month remained
under the leadership of General Crainiceanu,
whilst Genera! Averescu was in charge of the
Rumanian operations in the Dobrudja ; by
the middle of October, when the position on
the Transylvanian front had become most
critical, he was transferred back to his old
command, and a short time afterwards was
entrusted with the supreme command of all
the Rumanian armies. The third sector within
the Carpathian front, the northern border of
Wallachia, was the field within which operated
the First Rumanian Army under General Culcer.
Its centre lay round the Red Tower Pass in the
Aluta Valley, where the railway from Hermann-
stadt to Rimnic and Slatina crosses the frontier ;
its secondary centres lay in the Vulcan and
Szurduk passes at the head -waters of the
Jiu river, and near Orsova on the Danube at
the meeting-point of Rumania, Serbia and
Hungary. The disposition of the Rumanian
armies along this front remained in its main
outlines, even after the retreat from Tran-
sylvania, what it had been at the outbreak of
the war. But the Rumanians, having lost
considerably during the first seven weeks of
the campaign and being faced by an enemy
much superior in numbers and still more in
artillery and other war material, were in sore
need of help. This they were soon to receive
from Russia. Whilst the battle was still
proceeding along the frontier range the Rus-
sians gradually took over the northern part
of the Moldavian sector, thereby enabling the
Rumanians to concentrate the Fourth and
Second Armies for the defence of the angle
between Moldavia and Wallachia. Also the
defence of the Dobrudja front was gradually
taken over by the Russians.
The German counter-offensive under General
von Falkenhayn in Transylvania had proceeded
from west to east, starting about the middle
of September in the Streiu Valley south of
Hatszeg, then proceeding to Hermannstadt
and the Red Tower Pass (which it reached
towards the end of September), and finishing
in the battle of Kroristailt (about October 10).
Concurrently with it the Austro-Hungarian
armies under General von Arz advanced from
central and northern Transylvania against the
western frontier of Moldavia. Important forces
had, of course, been left behind by the Germans
in front of the Red Tower Pass in order to
guard against a possible Rumanian counter-
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FOOD CONVOY IN THE TRANSYLVANIAN ALPS.
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
485
RUMANIAN TROOPS ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT.
stroke which might have cut Falkenhayn' s
connexions with his base in the Hungarian
plain. Yet it was natural that the first attack
against the Rumanian defences in the passes
should have been delivered in the direction in
which the main armies of Falkenhayn and Arz
were moving — i.e., against the central group
of passes south of Kronstadt and against the
Moldavian frontier. After these attacks had
met with failure, but the enemy offensive
which followed against western Wallachia had
succeeded, the German semi-official comment
tried to make out that it had never been the
intention of their Supreme Command to break
through in the south-eastern passes, but that
this had always been a mere mano3uvre which
aimed at attracting and binding Rumanian
forces in an area other than that singled out
for the main attack. The truth of the matter
was probably this : that the German Supreme
Command acted on a plan which, if successful,
would have given them an overwhelming
victory, but which, even if only partially
carried out, yet gave them the means of achiev-
ing remarkable though less overwhelming
successes. Falkenhayn's attack south of Kron-
stadt opened about October 12 ; by October 15
it attained its full development. Concurrently
with it Mackensen reopened his offensive in
the Dobmdja, taking the crossings of the
Danube at Cernavoda and Hirshova for his
objective. These two combined movements
threatened to pierce Rumania through the
laiddle, somewhere along the line of the river
Jalomitsa or of the Busau. It would have cut
off practically the whole of Wallashia with
the capital of Bukarest from all connexion
with Moldavia and Russia. In fact, if fully
successful it would probably have proved the
greatest feat of arms of the war. These at-
tempts, though they failed to achieve their
major objective, yet proved of pre-eminent
strategic value. Mackensen, even after having
been driven back for some distance by the
Russian counter-offensive in the first half of
November, still retained command of the central
belt in the Dobrudja and of the Cernavoda-
Constanza railway, thus depriving the Ru-
manians of an important line of communi-
cation whereby supplies could be brought up
from Russia by way of the Black Sea ; he
further lengthened considerably his front
along the Danube, and every lengthening of the
battle-line was to the disadvantage of the
Rumanians, who were now entirely on the
defensive. Finally, by forcing the Russians
to undertake a counter-offensive in the northsrn
Dobrudja and at the Wallachian end of the
Cernavoda bridges, he compelled them to
direct into that theatre of war reinforcements
which might otherwise have been used on the
Transylvanian border. In the passes south
of Kronstadt Falkenhayn forced his way to
a distance varying from 5 to 15 miles ; it is
clear that a further advance at that rate could
not have yielded any decisive results within
the short time which the German* had for
their operations against Rumania. Yet the
436
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
DEFENDING THE MAIN ROAD FROM KRONSTADT TO BUKAREST IN THE
PREDEAL PASS.
advance was sufficient to bind considerable
Rumanian forces in these passes. When,
towards the beginning of November, the main
weight of the German offensive was shifted
to Western Wallachia, our Allies found it
impossible to detach any troops from southern
Moldavia or from the central passes for the
defence of the Jiu and Aluta valleys. Had
they done so, the German Command might
have resumed its original attempt at piercing
Rumania in the district where the salient of
south-eastern Transylvania protrudes towards
the Central Dobrudja, and in view of their
inferiority in communications the Rumanians
would probably not have been able to follow
up the movement with sufficient speed to
avert disaster. The First Rumanian Army-
was therefore told that it could not expect help
from the other groups, but must battle
exclusively with its own forces. So it did
for a while with remarkable success The
first battle of Targul-Jiu (October 24 to
October 30), in which unfortunately General
Dragalina lost his life, was one of the most
brilliant victories won by the Rumanians
during the second stage of the enemy's counter-
offensive. But a fortnight later the German
attempt at debouching from the Vulc-an Pass
into the Wallachian plain was repeated with
infinitely stronger forces by the Army Group
of General von Kiihne. On November 18.
after more than a month of fighting in tho
passes, the Germans forced a gate into Ru-
mania and by November 21 reached the town
of Craiova m the centre of tho Wallachian
plain.
With the breakdown of the Rumanian
defences along the frontier ridge begins the
third and shortest stage of the German offen-
sive, the conquest of Wallachia up to Bukarest.
Any attempt to stop the invasion east of the
Bukarest-Ploeshti line would have been doomed
to failure. The position in the enormous
salient of Wallachia, sandwiched in between
Transylvania and Bulgaria, had always been
one of considerable difficulty. Now that the
Germans had forced their way into its centre,
and were' advancing along the line which
forms the backbone of the railway system in
Wallachia, the position became untenable.
For a large part of the Rumanian forces which
held the two parallel flanks along the Car-
pathian range and along the Danube, the roads
and railway in the centre of tho Wallachian
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
437
plain were both the purveyors of supplies and
the only convenient line of retreat No
considerable forces could now be placed on the
flanks to maintain their defences intact at any
cost, because a reverse in the centre might
easily have cut 'them off in their isolated ad-
vanced positions. On the other hand none of
the many river lines which traverse the Walla-
chian plain from north to south could have
been held if the flanks were not sufficiently
covered. The problem of holding Wallachia
west of the Argesh was thus a vicious circle,
and the Rumanians had to think of how to
effect their retreat from the salient of which
the defences were crumbling rather than of
arresting the invasion of their country by the
enemy. From the west the Army Group of
General von Kiihne, supported by the Cavalry
Corps under General Count Schmettow, was
pressing its advance, whilst on the Traiisyl-
vanian frontier the Army Group of General
Krafft von Delmensingen was debouching
from the Red Tower Pass, and that of General
von Morgen from the Torzburg and the Pre-
deal. Meantime, in the last week of November,
on the southern front Field-Marsha! von
Mackensen had thrown his left wing across the
Danube, effecting a junction with the armies
of General von Falkenhayn. The so-called
Danube Army under General von Kosch
crossed round Sistovo and Zimnicea, leaving
the Dobrudja front in charge of the Third
Bulgarian Army under General Nerizoff. On
November 30 Mackensen himself took over
the supreme command of the vast array of
generals and armies wliich were approaching
the base of the Wallachian salient. There,
on the Argesh, the first serious resistance was
offered by our Allies to the enemy advance..
Help from Russia was forthcoming : Russian
troops were arriving in considerable force ; it
seemed that successful resistance had now
become possible. Had it not been for the
indolence, in one case even the criminal indo-
lence, of some subordinate commandei-s, maybe
the German offensive would have been arrested
on that line. With the loss of the batt!6
and the line of the Argesh and the enemy
occupation of Bukarest on December 6 opens
the fourth stage of the Austro-German
offensive against Rumania during which the
evacuation of Wallachia and of the Dobrudja
was completed and the battle-front was with-
drawn to the Sereth line. The enemy advance
was finally brought to a stop about the middle
of January, 1917, on a line running close to the
frontier of .Moldavia from the north down to
the Gyimes Pass, and then from about Agas in "
the Trotus Valley to Vadeni, south of Galatz,
the town of Okna remaining in the hands of
the Rumanians, but Focshani coming just
within the lines of the enemy.
South of Kronstadt six important passes open
into Rumania within a sector which, as the
LIEUT.-GENERAL KRAFFT VON
. DELMENSINGEN.
In command of the German Aluta-Group.
crow flies, measures only about 45 miles. Across
the most westerly of them, the Torzburg, runs
the high road to Dragoslavele and Campolung.
South-west of the old-Saxon colony of Rosenau
and its " Peasants' Stronghold " — wherein in
past ages the settlers used to take refuge at the
approach of Turkish armies — the road leaves
the wide, open fields of the Burzenland, and
rises towards the Carpathian Alps. From the
Knights' Castle, which crowns the high ledge
of rock above Torzbach, one catches a last clear
142—2
438
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
view of the plain ; then the road recedes
between the dark mountains and climbs by
winding serpentines on to higher and higher
levels. In between a maze of heights, above
deep ravines and their rumbling waters, through
primeval forests of firs and pines the narrow
road runs towards the continually receding
sombre mass of the main ridge. One might
almost despair of reaching it, but the mountain
tops which have been left behind sink one by
one to lower levels, clouds fill the ravines, the
forests recede, and over open mountain-sides
one approaches the rocky summits which sur-
rest, the other continuing to the south-west,
towards Campolung, the terminus of the railway
from Piteshti. Besides this railway four other
lines meet at Piteshti, the most important rail-
way junction in Rumania west of Ploeshti and
Bukarest. Some minor mountain roads which,
near the town of Torzburg on the northern
slope of the pass, branch off from the main
highway rejoin it between Dragoslavele and
Targovishte, but south of Rosenau not a single
convenient lateral track connects it with the
neighbouring road and pass of the Predeal.
The wild, pathless Butzegi Mountains, which
JJn
fa
C3ria Homeric
\ . Slaniku
marnic Bertea
oC&rhurtesri
ValenideMunfce
Scale oF Miles.
MAP OF THE EAST WALLACHIAN PASSES.
The scene of the German attempts to cut off the \\alluchian salient.
round the Torzburg Pass. Having crossed the
main ridge the wanderer sees stretching before
him several heavy, parallel mountain walls, the
spurs of the Fogaras Mountains, of which the
main part extends due east and west, but which
in this region bend towards the south-east. Far
away, beyond the valleys in which the villages
of Rucar and Dragoslavele lie hidden from
him, his eye may catch at sunset the distant
gilded cupolas of the stately Byzantine
churches of Campolung.
The road across the Torzburg is one of the
lu'st which lead into Rumania, and is equal in
quality to that of the Predeal. At Dragoslavele
it divides, one branch following to the south the
River Dambovitsa, on whose banks lies Buka-
rise to a height of about 8,000 feet, intervene
between the two.
Through the Predeal or Toivos Pass leads the
shortest and most direct road from Kronstadt
to Ploeshti and Bukarest, and the only railway
which crosses the frontier within the central
groups of passes. Near Bacsfalu the road and
railway leave the long-drawn street of the Seven
Villages and turn off into the narrow valley of
the Tomos, a tributary of the Aluta. They
repeatedly cross and recross the narrow gorge
of the river in search of even ground between
the steep, wooded slopes of the Schuler Moun-
tain ( 6,000 feet high) in the west, and the slightly
higher Hohenstein in the east. Beyond the
village of Tomos the frontier ridge bars the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
489
THE PRINCIPAL STREET IN PREDEAL.
Showing effects of the German bombardment.
southern entrance of the defile, extending like a
high causeway between the mountains on both
sides. The level of the ridge slowly drops from
the east across the wide open top of the Csaplyat
towards the depression, where in the midst of
magnificent, old pine forests the road and
railway cross the Predeal Pass at a height of
about 3,300 feet. At the end of the last ser-
pentine the silhouette of a building rises against
the sky-line — the last, most northerly house of
Predeal, the well-known Rumanian health-
resort. Placed in the midst of beautiful pine-
forests, on the southern slope of the frontier
ridge, Predeal consisted almost entirely of
villas, owned by rich or well-to-do Bukafest
families who used to retire there in the summer
to escape the heat and dust of the Wallachian
plain. It was to be now the first object on
Rumanian soil on which the furor Teutoni^uK
could vent itself ; although an open town of
little strategic importance — the main Rumanian
defences were placed on the hills which dominate
the pass, and not across the road — it was day
after day bombarded by the enemy artillery.
Dr. Blasel, as an eye-witness, put on record in
the Vienna Ncue Freie Presse of December 20,
1916, a description of Predeal after the Ruma-
nian forces had been withdrawn to the second
line of heights and the Germans and Magyars
had entered the town. " In the course of the
war I have seen in Galicia and in Poland many
towns which had suffered complete destruction,"
writes Dr. Blasel in his admiring commemora-
tion of frightfulness, " but these had suffered
mainly from conflagration, whilst Predeal has
been completely shot to pibces. There is not
a single house which does not show the results
of a few well-aimed shots. The roofs of the
turrets slant sharply, other roofs which had
been covered with tiles are changed into skele-
tons— the tiles broken by shrapnel have fallen
down and only the rafters remain. Half of the
railway station is destroyed, and also the villa
of Bratianu (the Rumanian Prime Minister) has
been hit several times. The intensity of the
bombardment can be seen also in the forest in
front of Predeal — its trees are changed into
match-wood, not a single branch remains un-
scarred."
" The northern part of Predeal has been
demolished," wrote the correspondent of the
Frankfurter Zeitung under date of October 25,
in an even more outspoken strain of jubilation,
" the villas and summer residences of Bukarest
society — some of them very elegant indeed —
are desolate ruins. The villa of Bratianu has
been turned into mere wreckage and
rubbish."
The second and main defensive position of
the Rumanians in the pass ran south of the
440
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
town of Predeal. The road and railway
descend from the frontier ridge into the narrow
gorge of the Prahova Valley, enclosed on
both sides by the massif of the Clabucetu
mountains, which overtower by far the pass
and its heights. The Baiu (4,600 feet) in the
west and the Taur (5,000 feet) east of the
Prahova were like guarding bastions which
with its western tributary, Cerbul, lies the
industrial settlement of Azuga. Whilst the
battle still raged for the frontier ridge its
railway station, in its central position near the
junction of the valleys, served as the terminal
depot for the Rumanian troops in the Predeal
sector. The spacious buildings of its factories,
their yards and storehouses contributed to make
THE KING OF RUMANIA AND M. BRATIANU.
barred the road to an enemy advance to the
south. Nor could this position have been
turned, as its flanks were fully protected by
the Omul ("The Man") mountain group
(8,100 feet) and the Rus (6,600 feet). Beyond
it, south of the Clabucetu range, where the
Prahova River is joined from the east by the
Azuga, and a short distance above its junction
it a suitable military base. A very consider-
able number of the factories at Azuga, which
used the wood of the surrounding forests
(sawmills, paper-mills, etc.), were owned by
Austro-Hungarian firms, whose employees
had thus been able before the war to traverse
the frontier range in all directions, to record
or even map out convenient tracks, to mark
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
441
trees, etc. — all, of course, " exclusively with a
view to business." It would be instructive
to know how many of them in October, 1916,
returned as army officers to their familiar
haunts.
Seven miles south of Azuga, in the shadow
of Mount Sinai, with its old Greek-Orthodox
monastery (founded in 1083) and its magni-
ficent Byzantine church, lies Sinaia, the summer
capital of Rumania. A modern town., had
grown up there since about 1880, when the
Royal Palace was built on the hill below the
monastery ; the foreign legations, members
of the Rumanian Government and the society
of Bukarest used to gather here in summer.
The exterior of the Palace itself is sumptuous
rather than beautiful ; it is one of those struc-
tures which imitate mediaeval German castles
and which, fashionable some thirty years before
the war, disfigure many a European town even
beyond the frontiers of Germany. The interior,
however, contained most magnificent halls
filled with treasures of art, both Oriental and
European (the picture gallery included work-s
of some of the best-known old masters). In
the hope of loot the Germans, when they reached
Sinaia towards the end of November, refrained
from bombarding the castle.
Following from Kronstadt and Baesfalu the
main street of the Seven Villages — the home of
a quaint, isolated, mongrel tribe, the so-called
Csango-Magyars — one approaches the village
of Altschanz where the road forks, one branch
M. BRATIANU'S VILLA AT PREDEAL.
running to the Predelus or Altschanz, the other
to the Bratocea Pass. The roads are bad, the
hills covered with moors, the valleys narrow
and marshy. These two passes, as well as the
Tetar and the Busau Pass, never assumed in
the operations of the autumn of 1916 the
importance which attached to the Torzburg
and the Predeal, although even they were the
PREDEAL STATION AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.
442
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE MONASTERY OF TISMANA.
In the Jiu Valley.
scene of many a lively content, of enemy
attempts to advance and Rumanian counter-
movements.
The first attack against Rumanian territory
south of Kronstadt was delivered in the Torz-
burg Pass. On October 8 the enemy had
reached the town of Torzburg, and on the 10th
the frontier ridge. After engagements fought
round Giuvala the Rumanians were obliged to
withdraw on Rucar, some six miles beyond the
frontier. The enemy had thus got well below
the highest level of the pass and was threatening
to debouch into the high, rolling country round
Campolung. The central of the three mountain
walls which intervene between the Pass and
Campolung became now the scene of daily
battles. Soon the Germans recognized that
they would not be able to break through by
frontal attacks, and attempts were, therefore,
made to turn from the flanks the Rumanian
defences astride the Dambovitsa Valley.
These attempts led to an extension of the front
on both sides of the pass — the usual develop-
ment of mountain warfare whenever it tends
to assume a more or less stationary character.
West of the road to Campolung the enemy had
reached by the end of October the village of
Lireshti, but by a brilliant counter-attack
it was recaptured by the Rumanians on October
28. The fighting in this region continued
without slackening throughout the first half
of November, but in spite of the most strenuous
efforts made during the week November 11-17,
on the day when the gate into Western Wallachia
was forced by the enemy at Targul-Jiu (Xovem-
ber 18), below the Torzburg Pass his most
advanced outposts stood only a few miles
south of the Dragoslavele-Lireshti line. It was
only under the pressure of the German advance
from the west that General Averescu's troops
evacuated in the last days of November the
hotly contested positions in front of Campolung.
In the Predeal Pass the Rumanian troops
belonging to the Second Bukarest Army Corps
had slowly withdrawn on to the frontier range,
which they reached on October 12-13. The
Germans and Magyars followed up their retreat
and on October 12 began to bombard the bare
heights of the Csaplyat. The bombardment
was followed up on October 14 by infantry
fighting, but in spite of heavy sacrifices the
enemy achieved very little. By capturing the
Csaplyat he gained part of the frontier ridge,
only to find himself under cross fire from the
Rumanian lines which extended on the ad-
joining wooded heights in the west and from
their positions on the Clabucetu mountain-
range. Even three days later the Germans
had not yet entered the town of Predeal,
and merely continued from a distance their
work of destruction. On October 20 an
THE TIMEti HISTORY (JF THE WAR.
448
attempt was made by them to turn the posi-
tions west of the pass by pushing forward
from the Csaplyat against the mountain-group
of the Taur ; it failed completely. Then the
enemy resumed his slow and steady operations
against the town of Predeal. On October 23,
after an entire day of fighting, the Germans and
Magyars entered it and captured the railway
station, but it was not until two days later, and
after some more severe fighting with the bayonet
and hand grenades, that the last Rumanian
detachment withdrew from the southern out-
skirts of Predeal. Meantime th« battle was
steadily developing in the eastern sector of the
Clabucetu mountains. This also was fighting
after having reached the frontier range — his
main forces had advanced for a distance of only
about four miles beyond it. The following week
witnessed further fighting in the mountains
west of Azuga and Busteni, but hardly any
progress by the enemy. As an attempt to
break through into the VVallachian plain, the-
operations in the Predeal district had thus
proved a failure. It was admitted from semi-
official German sources that " the Rumanian
defends his country with unsparing energy."
More varied, though by no means more
encouraging for the enemy, were the results of
his offensive against . the western frontier of
• t
.'
4USTRIAN MACHINE-GUN POSITION ON THE WALLACHIAN BORDER.
in detail — for particular ravines, woods, slopes
or summits. The enemy was straining his
forces to the utmost, as it was from here that
he aimed the chief blow or threat against
Rumania. Yet his progress was extremely
slow. It was not until October 26 that the
Magyar Honveds had captured the Taur ; on
the next day the German troops extended their
line to the southern slopes of the Clabucetu
Azugii, thus outflanking from the east the cen-
tral Rumanian positions round the town of
Azuga. Another four days of fighting, several
sore reverses and even more costly advances
were the price which the enemy had to pay for
the conquest of the western bastion on the
Predeal-Azuga road, the mountain group of the
Baiu. By November 4 — i.e., fully three weeks
Moldavia. When the Fourth Rumanian Army
under General Presan, conforming with the
general retirement, withdrew to the Rumanian
frontier, its forces divided into two main
groups. The northern retreated into the moun-
tains round the Tolgyes and the Bekas Pass,
thus covering the access to the Upper Bistritza
and to the town of Bicaz, the terminus of the
railway line which at Bacau branches off from the
main railway in the Sereth Valley ; the southern
group had to protect in its retreat the line which
connects the Transylvanian with the Moldavian
railway system. This railway runs through the
Trotus Valley and crosses the frontier range by
the Gyimes Pass ; on the Rumanian side down
to the town of Oneshti it continues for more than
30 miles in the proximity of the frontier
444
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
O
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
445
receding hardly anywhere to a distance of more
than 10 miles. A number of valleys and roads
from Transylvania open into the Trotus Valley
above Oneshti, thus giving access to the chief
Rumanian lines of communication in the rear of
the Gyimes Pass ; hence the strategic impor-
tance which attached to the minor passes south
of the Gyimes, most of all to those of the Uz
and the Oitoz.
Violent fighting began in these two passes on
October 14. Positions were lost and gained,
but in the main the Rumanians maintained
themselves in close proximity to the frontier
range, or even on the range itself, inflicting
reverses and serious losses on the enemy, who
continued his attacks. In the Gyimes Pass the
enemy was more successful at first. After
severe fighting round Palanka (October 13-15)
he reached on the 17th the village of Agas, thus
penetrating the Trotus Valley for about seven
miles from the frontier. The next day he
attempted a farther advance, but soon found
himself in serious straits. Whilst one Rumanian
detachment counter-attacked from the direction
of Goioasa, another, having crossed Mount
Lampris, took near Agas his forces in the flank.
The Austrian troops had to retire hurriedly,
losing almost 1,000 prisoners, 12 guns and
numerous machine-guns. Having then failed
to force his way through the Trotus Valley, the
enemy resumed the offensive in the Uz and
Oitoz Passes, but wherever he succeeded in
advancing he was soon again thrown back by
the Rumanian troops under the brilliant
leadership of General Presan. The Bukarest
communique of October 26 thus sums up the
results of that fortnight of battle on the western
frontier of Moldavia : " After violent combats,
the enemy has everywhere been repulsed beyond
the frontier. He now occupies but a small
portion of territory between the Sultza and
Trotus valleys and a small insignificant portion
of the Uz Valley. His losses are very heavy."
Meantime both sides were bringing up rein-
forcements. Towards the end of October
Bavarian troops made their appearance north
of Oitoz, and in the course of the following
month the group of divisions under the German
General von Gerok, which in September had
defended in Galician Podolia the line of the
River Narayovka (south of Bzhezhany) was
transferred to Transylvania, taking up positions
on the right wing of the First Austro-Hungarian
Army under General von Arz On the side of
our Allies a steady concentration of the
Rumanian forces to the south was proceeding,
the northern group of passes on the Moldavian
frontier being taken over by the Russians.
The Austro-Hungarian troops followed up
by three main roads the retreat of the right
wing of General Presan's Army. Their most
northerly group advanced through the Maros
Valley to Toplitsa, and then by Borszek and
Hollo against the Tolgyes Pass ; the central
group marched from Libanfalva on Putna,
joining from there in the attack against the
Tolgyes ; the third group followed the road
from Parajd to Gyergo St. Miklos, and then
advanced down the Bekas Valley against the
Bekas Pass Throughout the second half of
October the Rumanian troops, much inferior
in numbers, had to defend their positions on
the frontier range against the steadily increasing
pressure of the enemy ; a piercing of the
Rumanian line in this sector would have
seriously compromised the cooperation with
the adjoining Russian forces. But gradually
reinforcements were arriving from General
Lechitsky's Army, and in the first days of
November the Rumanian troops completely
withdrew from the north-western corner of
Moldavia. The Russian regiments which took
over the defence of the Tolgyes and the Bekas
Passes were under the command of General
Count Keller, who, after many famous feats in.
the earlier stages of the war, had specially
distinguished himself during the Russian in-
vasion of the Bukovina and south-eastern
Galicia in the summer of 1916. His army
corps included some of the best-known regiments
of Orenburg and Terek Cossacks, and also some
Circassian horse The use of cavalry regiments
in mountain warfare might seem at first sur-
prising, but then these were riders and horses
whose homes were in the mountains of the
Ural and the Caucasus. " Minor encounters
with them have repeatedly proved the im-
petuosity and daring of these Cossacks," wrote
the correspondent of the Pester Lloyd from the
Headquarters of the First Austro-Hungarian
Army under date of November 16. " There
are no deserters among them.. They fight for
life and death." Again and again these unique
horsemen from the mountains succeeded in
slipping through the Austrian line, carrying on
their disconcerting activities in the rear of the
enemy forces. On November 5 the Russians,
partly in order to cover the regrouping of
forces which was then proceeding, delivered a
short offensive stroke across the Tolgyes Pass
H2— 3
446
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
against Hollo and Putna. The Austrian
formations broke up, leaving 15 officers, 800
men and eeven machine-guns in the hands of
our Allies. But again the excellent system of
railways and roads in his rear saved the enemy
from serious disaster German reinforcements
were hurried up in hot haste by train and by
motor lorries ; artillery was moved along the
roads at the speed of 12 miles an hour. On
November 8 the fresh forces came into action
4f?'"'' " •"•''•'•'•'''"''••" •
PlETROAsAy::';«,'-$i
Calimaneshti
•••// 9
MAP OF THE ALUTA DEFILE.
both on the Hollo and the Putna front, and our
Allies withdrew to the frontier heights. The
Tolgyes Pass remained in the hands of the
Russians.
Although with a view to the disposition of
forces the Red Tower Pass was included in the
area of the western Wallachiaii army, strate-
gically it stood in close connexion with the
central group of passes south of Kronstadt.
From Piteshti two railway lines extend against
the Transylvanian frontier, one to the north-
east with its terminus at Campolung, at the
foot of the Torzburg Pass, the other to the
north-west with its terminus at Curtea de
Argesh. The distance from Curtea de Argesh
to Rimnie Valcea, the southern mouth of the
Aluta defile, of which the Red Tower Pass
marks the northern end, amounts to only about
15 miles. But there was as yet in the autumn
of 1916 no direct railway connexion either
from the Red Tower Pass or the Torzburg to
Piteshti, only the roundabout route by way
of the centre of the Wallachian plain — the
projected railway line from Calimaneshti to
Curtea de Argesh had not been carried out.
It seems that a concentric movement against
Piteshti from the Aluta Valley by way of
Salatrucul and Curtea de Argesh, and from
the Torzburg by way of Campolung, had been
schemed by the German Supreme Command as
the first blow against Rumania. The capture
of Piteshti, the junction of all the main railways
of western Wallachia, would have been a
victory only second in greatness to a successful
piercing of Rumania along the Busau line.
This, however, could have been achieved only
by a lightning blow, as the pre-eminent im-
portance of the objective, the facilities which
the Rumanians possessed for concentrating
forces on Piteshti, and lastly the great diffi-
culties in an advance from either pass rendered
the chance of systematic operations against
Piteshti, resulting in a conquest of Wallachia
during the autumn of 1916, as slender as was
that of the advance due south of Kronstadt.
But whilst the pressure in the Predeal region
bovmd the main Rumanian forces in a district
from which transfers to the west required con-
siderable time, an offensive against Piteshti
would have left them in a central position
between the Jiu sector in the west and the
Predeal in the east. Attempting a surprise,
Falkenhayn pushed forward the group which
marched against the Torzburg across the Per-
san Mountains even before he had fought at
Kronstadt the main battle against the Second
Rumanian Army, and as soon as the pass had
been forced by the troops under General von
Morgen, General Krafft von Delmensingeii
threw his main forces into an advance from
the Red Tower Pass across the mountains
against Curtea de Argesh.
Anyhow, an advance south of the Red Tower
Pass could not have been attempted along the
Aluta. The gorge through which the river
breaks its way for some 30 miles south of
Caineni is iiripregnable to a frontal attack.
Most of it can hardly be called a valley ; it is
much rather an enormous rift in the mountains
filled by the stream which, insignificant in the
dry season, swells to the size of a wild torrential
river in spring and autumn. The road and
railway cling to the rocky walls of the defile,
and at many places have to pierce them by
tunnels or by grooves blasted out in their side.
Only where other streams join the Aluta does
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
447
its bed open out into small basins yielding
space for villages or towns. At such junctions
lie Caineni, Racovitsa, Golotreni fat the
confluence with the Lotru) and Calimaneshti.
It was only across the mountains on both
sides and then down the valleys of the con-
fluents of the Aluta that the consecutive
sectors of the defile could be captured by the
enemy.
When, after the battle of Hermannstadt,
in the last days of September, 1916, General
von Falkenhayn continued with his main
Bavarians — and of two Austro • Hungarian
mountain brigades. On the left flank th«
second Austro-Hungarian Mountain Brigade
was ordered to advance by the mountain-track
which crosses the Moscovul Pass at a height
of almost 7,000 feet, and then down the
Topologu Valley against Salatrucul. In the
centre the Alpine Corps advanced between the
Aluta and the Topologu south of Mount Surul,
ready to press forward along the road from
Caineni to Salatrucul as soon as the Austrian?
should have outflanked from the east the
THE ALUTA VALLEY AND MONASTERY OF COZ1A.
force the advance to the east, he left in front
of the Red Tower Pass a group of divisions
under the command of General Krafft von
Delmensingen to protect his right flank in
the Sibin and Fogaras Mountains. During the
first half of October their task consisted in
holding the frontier range and preparing the
ground for a farther advance. On October 15,
the day on which, in the district south of
Kronstadt, Rucar was entered and the attack
against the town of Predeal begun, General
von Krafft, having received reinforcements,
resumed tho offensive. The attacking force
consisted of the German Alpine Corps— mainly
Rumanian forces in that district. West of
the Aluta the 10th Austrian Mountain Brigade
was to press forward across the Pietroasa and
the Veverita Mountains into the valley of the
Lotru, thus covering the right flank of the
Army Group which had Curtea de Argesh for
its objective. The Austrian troops to whom
the most difficult and most risky task had been
assigned — namely, to force their way across the
Fogaras range into the Topologu Valley- — suc-
ceeded in advancing in two days across the
pass and in capturing Hill 2313 to the west
of it. By the night of October 18 their advance
had carried them across the mountain pass of
448
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
A FIELD TELEPHONE.
the Poiana Lunga and Frunto (about 5,000 feet
high) and they reached the slopes facing
Salatrucul. Here, however, they were met by
Tlumanian forces advancing both from the
Aluta and the Argesh valleys. By this con-
verging movement, carried out with great
skill and determination, our Allies almost
succeeded in encircling arid cutting off the
Avistrian brigade. It was only owing to the
arrival of considerable German reinforcements
from the north, and to the fact that a very
heavy snowfall and intense cold had nsmpererl
the development of the Rumanian operations
in their last stages, that the Second Austrian
Mountain Brigade escaped capture. Similarly
the attempt of the other Austrian Mountain
Brigade on the western bank of the Aluta
failed to achieve its purpose. Having crossed
Mount Robu, the enemy was met on tho
Pietroasa range by infantry detachments from
the 13th Rumanian Division, and thrown back
with considerable losses. The German Alpine
Corps, which was to have advanced in the
centre after the Rumanian positions on both
sides of the Aluta had been outflanked by
the two Austrian Mountain Brigades, does not
seem to have come into serious action during
this first unsuccessful offensive south of the
Red Tower Pass.
In the last days of October the offensive was
resumed, and this time the Germans opened
their operations across the mountains bordering
on the eastern side of the Aluta defile. By
October 28 a German detachment consisting
of Mecklenburg and Hanoverian troops had
turned by way of the Boia Mare Valley the
Mormonta Mountain east of Caineni and then
by a concentric attack had conquered the
mountain itself. From the captured positions
on the Mormonta they continued their offensive
against the chain of heights north of the
valley which extends between the villages of
OFFICERS OF THE KING OF RUMANIA'S BODYGUARD,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
449
A WALLACHIAN VINEYARD.
Racovitsa and Titeshti, and reached that
•valley by the end of October.
A period of incessant fighting ensued. The
First Rumanian Army Corps, which from the
beginning of the war had formed the so-called
Aluta Group, had been reinforced by part of
ttie Fourth Army Corps, which had previously
been included in the Fourth Army but had now
been released from the Moldavian frontier by
the Russians having taken over its northern
sectors. Towards the end of October the
first German attack from the Vulcan Pass
into the Jiu Valley had been defeated, and the
second and even more serious attempt was
being prepared during the . first fortnight of
November. Under these circumstances it was
essential for the Germans to pin the Rumanian
forces in the Aluta region to the defence of
their own sector and to prevent, or at least
delay, the dispatch of reinforcements from
there to the Jiu. Moreover, in case the forces
which were to attack again in the Jiu Valley
succeeded in reaching the plain, it was of the
greatest importance for the further develop-
ment of the operations that the group attacking
in the Aluta district should have reached posi-
tions from which it could soon establish effective
.cooperation with the forces invading Wallachia
from the west. During the first fortnight of
November the battle south of the Red Tower
Pass was raging on a wide front from the
Upper Argesh and Mount Poiana Lunga in
the east to Mount Pietroasa and the Upper
Lotru in the west. Between November 6 and
November 9 the Germans conquered the
heights of Sate and Fruntu, and lastly the
highly important mountain group of the Cozia,
which from the west overtowers the Aluta
defile and faces the entrance into the Lotru
Valley. Our Allies counter-attacked at once
and by November 1 1 had reconquered th<
position on Mount Fruntu, but it proved im
possible to develop any farther this initia.
success. Whilst the Germans under Genera
von Krafft had received reinforcements ex>
ceeding a division, the Rumanian Command,
faced by disaster in the Jiu Valley, sawitsell
compelled at the last moment to detach a
considerable force, which was sent to the west
across the mountains in the hope that by
attacking the left flank of the enemy, who was
debouching into the Jiu Valley, it might yet
save the position at the western end of Wal-
lachia. Thxis weakened, the Aluta group had
to give ground ; its retreat was hastened still
more after the defeat on the Jiu had proved
450
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
decisive. By November 18 the Germans had
reached the valley and road which run from
Suitsi to Calimaneshti.
GENERAL VON KNEUSSL.
In Command of the llth Bavarian Division.
The joy of success was no doubt marred for
General von Krafft's Army Group by the fact
that in an encounter fought on November 7,
the Bavarian Life Guards, which formed part
of the brigade of General von Epp in the
Alpine Corps, had lost a highborn officer,
Prince Henry of Bavaria, a nephew of the
King. In the moment of death, fully conscious
that the death of a prince was more important
than that of thousands of ordinary men, he
was reported to have murmured the words
noblesse oblige. The quotation was considered
by all loval Germans so appropriate to the
greatness of the moment that thev readily
overlooked the fact that a member of a German
Royal House used an enemy language to the
last.
During the month which followed on the
battles fought in the Streiu Valley and in the
Hatszeg Mountains only minor encounters took
place on the frontier range west of the Szurduk
Pass. About the middle of October the llth
Bavarian Division, under General von Kneussl,
which at the beginning of the month had still
stood on the Stokhod in northern Volhynia,
was moved to Transylvania and assigned
positions on the frontier range south of the
valley of the Silu Romanesca. On October 23
General von Kneussl's force, supported by an
Austrian mounted brigade and one division of
German cavalrv, began its advance to the south,
the 'extreme left wing advancing from the
Vulcan Pass through the Jiu Valley, whilst the
farthest westerly detachment followed the
Bistritza. In the centre four groups were
advancing on Sambotinul, Rugii, Valarii and
Dobritza with a view to an ultimate concentra-
tion in the Jiu Valley between Bumbeshti and
Targul-Jiu. During the first few days the
German plan seemed to develop with consider-
able success. General Dragalina, who had
hitherto led the First Rumanian Division at.
Orsova and who succeeded General Culcor in
AN AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FIELD-GUN IN THE CARPATHIANS.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
451
the command of the entire First Army * on the
very day on which the Germans opened their
offensive in the Jiu districts, had only inferior
numbers with which to meet the enemy attack
The Rumanian forces in that sector consisted of
the 21st Mixed Brigade, under Colonel Jippa,
composed of 7J battalions of infantry and four
batteries, and of two other minor detachments
which comprised together six battalions of
infantry and three batteries ; one of them was
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Obogeanu,
the other by Lieutenant-Colonel Trusculescu.
Aluta Group. These forces were then dis-
tributed in the following manner: the 21st
brigade had to guard the mouth of the Szurduk
defile at Bumbeshti and, deploying on the Jiu
line to south of Sambotinul, to attack the left,
flank of the German troops which were advanc-
ing in the centre. The other two detachments
of the original Jiu Group were to hold thf>
centre from Turcinesti to Rashovitsa. The
forces brought up from the Aluta were formed
into a general reserve north-east of Targul-Jiu
The detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel
mmamaum
RUMANIANS CROSSING A PONTOON BRIDGE.
Aware of the supreme danger with which a
successful German offensive in this district
threatened the entire Wallachian front, and in
view of the fact that the First Rumanian
Army had no reserves at its disposal, General
Dragalina at once ordered a detachment
of four battalions, one squadron and two
batteries to be sent from the Orsova Division,
and the Danube detachment, composed of
5J battalions, to be brought up from th«
* Genera! Dragalina was succeeded in the commana
of the First Division at Orsova by Colonel Anastasiii,
who in the succeeding operations was fully to justify this
choice.
Dejoianu which by forced marches was coming
up from Orsova was ordered to counter-
attack vigorously with part of its effectives the
German troops which were a'dvancing on the
extreme right of the enemy line, and at the same
time to attack with its remaining strength the
thus uncovered flank of the central German
group. The leading idea of this disposition was
to form a kind of semi-circle round the advanc-
ing forces of the enemy and to counter-attack
him in front and fall upon his flanks before his
different detachments which were moving along
separate mountain roads and tracks had
effected a junction. The events of the next few
452
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAI!
u
tn
H
M
CS
O
U.
a
oa
en
W
ad
O
S
as
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
458
days brilliantly justified the plan, but it was
not given to General Dragalina to carry out
the operations on the Jiu. On the first day of
the German advance, after having inspected
the most exposed positions of his troops, he
hurried back to the rear to make further
dispositions. Although the quickest way passed
very close to the German lines he decided to
take this and drove through the fire of the
German machine-guns. Two bullets hit him
in the arm, which had finally to be amputated ;
the. operation was. performed too late and
General Dragalina died on November 9. The
command on the Jiu passed immediately to
General Vasilescu, and in the command of the
First Army Dragalina was succeeded by
General Petala.
By October 27 the Germans had reached
almost on the entire length between Dobritza
and Bumbeshti the road at the foot of the
Vulcan Range, and had even crossed it in the
east and in the centre. On the morning of
October 27, to forestall the Rumanian attack
from the east, they attempted a descent across
the Jiu Valley in the rear of the Rumanian
detachments which guarded the southern mouth
of the Szurduk Pass. The attempt was de-
feated, and the Germans, having been thrown
back beyond the Jiu, withdrew in disorder on to
Sambotinul and the hill to the north of it.
During tha.t action Sub-Lieutenant Patrascoju,
from the 7th Company of the 18th Regiment,
advanced at the head of his unit to the village
of Arsuri, driving out the enemy and capturing
two 4-inch howitzer batteries which belonged to
the 21st Regiment of Bavarian artillery. The
guns were immediately put into action against
the enemy, rendering excellent service. On the
same day the Rumanians had to encounter an
even more determined enemy attack in front
of Turcinesti. At 7 a.m. the Germans began
their descent into the Jiu Valley, and 2J hours
later they reached the river. Here they were
met by a counter-attack from the Rumanian
right centre, driven back with considerable losses
in men and material, and pursued until 5 p.m.,
when torrential rains and darkness prevented
further operations. Meantime, near Rashovitsa
the left Rumanian centra was engaged in H
fierce battle which remained doubtful till about
1.30 p.m. ; it was then decided in favour of our
Allies by the appearance of troops from the
Orsova detachments in the flank and rear of
the German forces. Their positions were
captured about 2 p.m., and 400 prisoners and
12 machine-guns were taken. The remaining
German troops in that district withdrew in
haste. On the extreme left flank, in the valley
of the Bistritsa, the Rumanians were not able
to make any considerable headway, but had.
to remain satisfied with containing the enemy
forces. Meantime an enemy unit had succeeded
in penetrating in the centre and in throwing
themselves over the bridge on the road which
approaches Targul-Jiu from the west. A
battalion of militia from Gorj which was posted
near the bridge was taken by surprise, yet
supported by a scratch force from Targul-Jiu,
held out till 4.30 p.m., when help sent up from
MAP ILLUSTRATING THE FIGHTING
NORTH OF TARGUL-JIU ON OCTOBER 27.
the left centre and from the Orsova Group
enabled them finally to defeat the German
move. The enemy had to retire, leaving
prisoners in the hands of the Rumanians. An
order was found on them to " take possession
of Targul-Jiu on October 27 at two o'clock in
the afternoon."
On the next day, October 28, the Rumanian
advance continued along the entire front ; the
enemy columns had been attacked before they
had effected a junction, the cooperation
between them was as yet weak, and no general
reserve was in existence to intervene at the
points of danger. On this day the most violent
fighting took place on the hill south of Horez ;
towards the close of the day the Bavarians were
forced to retire, leaving in the hands of our
Allies eight guns, two machine-guns, consider-
able stores of munitions and supplies and nine
Rumanian guns which had been lost on October
24. On October 29 the work of the preceding
two days was continued, the Rumanians driving
back the Germans into the mountain defiles.
The pursuit continued till November 1 ; the
total number of enemy dead buried by the
454
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Rumanians amounted to more than 1,500,
\vliile the number of prisoners exceeded 1,600.
" The battlefield which I visited to-day," wrote
the special correspondent of The Time..? under
date of November 8, " presents a remarkable
spectacle. Burnt motor-cars, rifles, bayonets
and saddles are spread over the field, and
hundreds of crosses mark the places where the
Bavarians are buried." On the very eve of
MAP OF THE NORTHERN DOBRUDJA.
the defeat the German Emperor had congratu-
lated General von Kneussl's " gallant troops on
their success."
About the middle of October the positions
of the amiies which faced each other in the
Dobrudja were still approximately the same
which had been taken up by them towards
the end of September, after Mackensen's
forces had been defeated in their attack
against the Rashova-Tuzla line. It seems
that originally our Allies planned to follow up
the rout of the enemy by a counter-offensive
on a large scale. In the fir.st days, of October
fighting developed along the entire Dobrudja
front, and several marked successes were won
by the Rumanians, especially in the district
south of Toprosari On October 3 they took
the enemy positions at Amzacea, capturing
seven guns, more than 1,000 prisoners amf
much war material. In connexion with these
operations a few Rumanian battalions had on
October 1 crossed the Danube at Rahovo,
between Tutrakan and Rustchuk. But in
view of the increasing enemy pressure in
Transylvania, the offensive in the Dobrudja
was abandoned, the troops which had crossed
the Danube were withdrawn, and no further
serious fighting developed in that theatre of
war, until simultaneously with Falkenhayn's
attack against the central passes, Mackensen
resumed his offensive against the Cernavoda-
Constanza line.
During the first half of October reinforce-
ments consisting of two Turkish and one
North German division had reached Mackensen.
The German division, which included some
crack regiments of Pomeranian infantry, and
was supported by Bulgarian cavalry and a
very powerful concentration of heavy artillery,
was directed against the district of Toprosari,
in the eastern half of the Dobrudja front.
The Turks stood on the extreme right enemy
wing near the sea ; the Bulgarian infantry
was distributed all along the line. On the side
of our Allies, whose effectives south of the
Danube had been weakened by recent with-
drawals for the Transylvanian front, the
Russians stood in the centre, the Rumanians
on the two wings ; the district round Toprosari
was held by Rumanian forces and by the
Serbian division under General Zhivkovitch.
After a prolonged bombardment the enemy
opened his offensive on October 19, capturing
on that day some hills south-west of Tuzla
and south of Toprosari. Here, however,
his attacks met with a most dogged resistance.
Although Tuzla was lost on October 20, and
the enemy, under the personal direction of
Field-Marshal von- Mackensen and his Chief
of Staff, General von Tappen, was attacking
incessantly with much superior forces, the
Rumanians and Serbs at Toprosari main-
tained their positions for another 24 hours,
fighting on two fronts, and inflicting very
severe losses on the enemy. They evacuated
Toprosari on October 21, about mid-clay,
having been completely outflanked from the
east ; on the same day the enemy got within
six miles of Constanza. Simultaneously with
the fighting round Toprosari another battle
was fought in the centre, near Copadinu on
the railway leading to Dobritch. Here also
our Allies had to give ground and withdrew
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
455-
CONSTANZA.
The Rumanian Port on the Black Sea.
on Megidia. On the same day (October 21)
the enemy reached the trans-Dobrudja railway
at a point east of Murfatlar, about 20 miles
west of the coast. The connexion between
Cernavoda and Constanza was cut, and the
latter, Rumania's largest port, had to be
abandoned. From October 21 the town
was under gunfire, and on October 22 the
last refugees left Constanza. But the autho-
rities gallantly stuck to the work of getting
stores away by railway, road, and sea. The
grain elevators and the stores of cereals, flour,
naphtha, kerosene, and benzine, which there
was no time to remove, were burnt. Finally,
on October 23, the troops began to retire,
fighting rearguard actions against ail enemy
of superior force. They were well supported
by the Russian flotilla, which did not leave the
bay until the harbour, with everything useful'
to the enemy, was in flames. On Sunday
night (October 23) Bulgarian cavalry and
infantry, supported by German troops, entered
Constanza, but in that seaport, with docks
covering an area of 150 acres and with a trade
amounting to 1,250,000 tons a year, all the
booty they could boast of was 500 (presumably
empty) railway trucks and several locomotives.
On the same day (October 23) the Fourth
Bulgarian Division occupied Megidia, half-way
between Cernavoda and Constanza ; on the
left wing, close to the Danube, our Allies had
to abandon their lines in front of Rashova,.
thus conforming to the withdrawal in the
centre and on the right wing. The position
round Cernavoda was becoming untenable.
The Rumanians withdrew after having de-
GRAIN WAREHOUSES AT CONSTANZA.
456
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
GENERAL COUNT SCHMETTOW.
In command of the German Cavalry Corps.
stroyed the bridge, and on October 25 the
First Bulgarian Infantry Division entered
the town of Cernavoda. During the next
few days our Allies continued their retreat.
On October 26 they had retired beyond Hir-
shova and Casapkioi, about 25 miles north
of the Cernavoda-Constanza railway, and by
the 29th had reached a front extending from
Ostrov to Babadag. Here, in the broken hills
of the Northern Dobrudja, our Allies rallied
their forces and arrested the advance of the
enemy. He had failed to reach in time the
northern crossings of the Danube at Machin,
Isaccea and Tulcea, and was thus unable
to prevent the Russians from sending reinforce-
ments to the hard-pressed troops in the
Dobrudja. The reinforcements were coming,
and were soon to turn the tide of events.
On November 1, General Sakharoff. the
victor of Berestechko and Brody, hitherto
commander of the Eleventh Russian Army, was
appointed Chief Commander of the Allied forces
in the Dobrudja. About a week later he opened
his counter-offensive, which to the enemy
came like a bolt from the blue. " Russian
reinforcements, composed of excellent troops,"
wired The Times correspondent from Bukarcst
under date of November 8, " are fighting with
great energy, ably supported by Rumanian
forces. General Sakharoff, in a stirring address,
exhorted his men to advance always, and
never to retire." " On the front of the Army
Group of Marshal von Mackensen, in the
Northern Dobrudja," reads the German official
communique of November 9, " advanced recon-
noitring detachments, in accordance with their
instructions, avoided all engagements with the
enemy infantry " — a most eloquent description
of a hurried retreat. Our Allies were at their
heels, and the Danube Squadron was harassing
their flank. Yet even so the Germans and
Bulgarians found time for their usual work of
destruction ; in their retreat they were setting
fire to towns and villages. On November 9
the Russians regained the important Danube
crossing of Hirshova, and in the centre of the
Dobrudja they reached the villages of Muslu and
Casimcea. On the same day a vigorous attack
from Feteshti, the Wallachian end of the
Cernavoda bridge, carried the Russian forces to
Dunarea (the Danube station) in the inundation
belt of the Danube, about two miles west of
Cernavoda. The Russian advance to the
south, towards the centre of the Dobrudja, still
continued for a few days. By November 23
it attained a line extending from Boascic, on
the Danube, some seven miles north of
Cernavoda, to Lake Tashavlu on the coast of
the Black Sea, some 1 5 miles north of Constanza.
The enemy had lost his hold on the convenient
crossing of Hirshova, and of the Cernavoda
bridge he retained merely the farthest eastern
end. These two gates into Rumania, through
which he threatened a flank attack against
eastern Wallachia at the very time when its
defences were being breached in the west, were
closed to him. But our Allies failed to regain
the Cernavoda-Constanza railway. Before they
had been able to break through the lines which
the enemy had begun to construct north of it
immediately after having captured the railway,
the fateful decision was reached in the west, in
the second battle of Targul-Jiu. Whatever
forces could be spared from the Dobrudja
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
46?
BUCOVETIGH, IN THE JIU VALLEY.
had to be hurried to Wallachia in an attempt
yet to arrest the enemy advance against
Bukarest.
The Gennans had not given up the game for
lost when defeated south of the Vulcan Range
in the last days of October. At Targul-Jiu
they decided to make their greatest and final
attempt at forcing a gate into Rumania at
the only time when they could spare consider-
able forces for their operations in that theatre
of war. The 41st Prussian Division, under
General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, was brought
up from Volhynia, where about the middle of
October it had taken part in the battle of
Korytnitsa. Further, the 109th Prussian
division, a cavalry division and a Magyar
Honved brigade were included in the group
of General von Kiihne, which assumed the
offensive in the Vulcan Mountains. The de-
feated llth Bavarian Division under General
von Kneussl was left as a reserve to the troops
which had now taken over its task in the Jiu
Valley. Lastly an independent cavalry corps,
consisting of the 6th and 7th German cavalry
divisions, was added to the enemy forces in
that region, and the Austrian brigade under
Colonel von Szivo, which had hitherto held the
positions on the Cerna west of Orsova, was
ordered to cooperate with the attacking
German forces. The German cavalry corps,
which was to play a considerable part in the
invasion of Rumania, stood under the command
of General Eberhard Count Schmettow,
one of the best-known Prussian cavalry com-
manders. .\ member of a family in which
army service has been a tradition, he had served
in different cavalry regiments of the Guard
and Cuirassiers, and from 1901 to 1903 had
been first aide-de-camp to the famous chief
of the German General Staff, Field -Marshal
von Schlieffen. General von Falkenhayn came
down himself to Petroseny on November 10-
to watch the development of the operations.
Meantime General Krafft von Delmensingen,
late Chief of the Bavarian General Staff and
now Commander of the German Aluta Group,
and General von Morgen, commanding in the
central group of- passes south of Kronstadt,
were ordered to resume with all force their
attacks against Wallachia. In short, the
German Army Command concentrated all its
best forces and its best leaders for the new
attack against Rumania. To the vast array
of forces gathered west of the Vulcan Pass the
Rumanians could oppose only the very much
depleted First Division at Orsova and the
Army Group at Targul-Jiu, whose effectives
were even weaker than they had been during
the first German attack.
LIEUT.-GENERAL VON MGRGEN.
In command of the German forces south of
Kronstadt.
458
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
FETCHING WOOD IN THE CARPATHIANS.
The fortnight following on the defeat of the
Bavarian Division was used by the Germans
for improving still further the roads and paths
across the Vulcan mountains, and especially
in devising contrivances which would enable
them to move heavy artillery across the
frontier ridge. The front singled out for attack
was very much enlarged, and extended from
the Moldevisu Mountain in the east for some
20 miles to the Upper Motru Valley in the west.
The plan of operations was as follows : Two
German divisions opened on November 10
the .attack in the Jiu district, one between the
Vulcan and the Szurduk Pass, the other east
of the Szurduk. The smaller groups which
were to advance through the mountains
farther west were not pushed forward far
toward the plain until the issue was decided by
the main concentration of forces on the Jiu.
The Germans were careful not to repeat the
ill-starred experiment of General von Kneussl.
Only farthest to the west an Austro -Hungarian
group advancing into the Upper Mortu Valley,
where the Rumanians had hardly any troops,
pressed forward at a quick pace with a view
to outflanking the Rumanian positions round
Targul-Jiu.
On November 10 the mountains Garnicelui,
Plesa, and the Moldevisu on both sides of the
Jiu were occupied by the Germans. On the
next day the advance on the German right wing
was pressed still farther with fair success ; but
in the east, north of Bumbeshti, our Allies
were able to arrest for a while the enemy
advance on positions provided with armoured
forts. These, which, as a matter of fact, were
obsolete in their structure, were captured by
the Germans on November 13 after they had
brought into action their heavy howitzers.
At Bumbeshti the Germans gained the terminus
of the railway from Craiova ; this line did not
originally lead beyond Targul-Jiu, but had been
recently extended. By the night of Novem-
ber 13 the enemy had reached the position
which, astride the Jiiv Valley, extended from
Valari past Sambotinul to Borcaciu. This
line lay only some six miles north of the town
of Targul-Jiu, which was entered by the enemy
on November 15. The Rumanian forces with-
drew to positions which ran from Copaceni,
south-west of Targul-Jiu, to the river Gilort
in the east. Meantime a Rumanian relief
force was coming up by forced marches from
the Aluta Valley along the road from Rimnic
Valcea. But before this column could reach
the hard-pressed forces in the Jiu Valley, the
battle was fought, and on November 17 the
positions between the Jiu and the Gilort were
forced by the enemy. The Rumanian front in
western Wallachia had been left without any
reserves, and now that these last defences had
been broken through there was no sufficient
force to resist the enemy, who on a wide front
was advancing to the south and to the east.
By November 19 the Germans reached, in the
centre Filiasa, the junction of the railways
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
459
from TarguI-Jiu and Orsova ; in the west
Strehaia, on the River Motru ; in the east
Baleshti, on the Oltetz ; whilst farther north
another detachment advanced by Candalesti
.against the Aluta, thus covering the left flank
.of the troops which , were advancing to the
.south. As soon as the road to Targul-Jiu had
been opened the cavalry corps of Count
Schmettow was pushed forward to the south
to turn the flank and get into the rear of the
Rumanian forces which were still resisting east
of the Jiu Valley, and also to clear of Rumanian
troops the district between the Jiu and the
river Motru. It subsequently rejoined the
Army-Group of General von Kiihne in the region
of Craiova.
About the same time the brigade of Colonel
von Szivo was reinforced by German cyclists
And infantry and ordered to advance along the
Danube. But the small Rumanian Orsova
Group under Colonel Anastasiu stubbornly
maintained its positions at the Iron Gates and
its hold on the river traffic. It was not until
November 25 that it evacuated the town of
.Orsova and began its retreat in a south-
easterly direction, a real, new Anabasis. Cut off
from the main Rumanian forces, this detach-
ment, about 7,000 men strong, tried to escape
the grip of the overwhelming German forces and
to regain connexion with its own armies, whilst
all the time harrying the enemy rear. The
retreat lasted more than three weeks, and
carried them as far as the Aluta Valley. It was
not until December 7, the day after the fall of
Bukarest, that they surrendered at Caracalu,
having by their courage and determination
earned the esteem and praise even of the enemy.
" Amidst continuous fighting and delivering
repeated counter-attacks," says the German
official report, " the Orsova Group withdrew
slowly towards the south-east." "It resisted
and fought for the honour of its arms," says
another passage of the account ; for indeed its
enterprise, in so far as it aimed at rejoining the
main Rumanian forces, was from the very
outset doomed to failure.
On November 21 East and West Prussian
infantry from the 41st Division and a Cuirassier
Regiment from Count Schmettow's Corps
entered the town of Craiova ; the Rumanians
had evacuated it, carrying away all their
artillery material, including several heavy guns.
The enemy forces had now emerged from the
belt of wooded hills which extend at the foot of
the Carpathian range and reached the lowlands
of Wallachia. The rich wide plain stretched
before them ; only here and there small,
unimportant undulations of the ground rise in
A COMMUNICATION TRENCH.
460
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
461
the open country, which gently, almost inappre-
ciably, slopes from west to east. Its level above
the sea, which round Craiova amounts to an
average of about 400 feet, falls to 200 feet in
LIEUT.-GENERAL VON KLJHNE.
In command of the German Army in Western
Wallachia.
the east, and by a more sudden drop to the south
to only 40-100 feet in the marshy valley of the
Danube. Craiova, in the centre of Western
•or Little Wallachia, is its capital and in peace-
time the headquarters of the First Rumanian
Army Corps. It is the junction of eight high-
roads and of four railways leading to Slatina,
'Targul-Jiu, Turnu Severin and Calafat (on the
left bank of the Danube, opposite the Bulgarian
town of Vidin), and is the centre of the grain
trade of one of the richest agricultural districts
in Europe. Fifty millionaires (in francs) are
reported to have resided at Craiova before the
war, a fact of which the Germans now quickly
availed themselves to impose on the town a
•contribution of about two million pounds
sterling. The numerous old " Boyar " palaces
and the rich residences of merchant families
testify to the length of Craiova's history, whilst
their names, derived from various regions of
Europe and Asia, speak of its varied character.
Also in recent years foreign immigrants came
in large numbers to Craiova and the surround-
ing district ; of unnaturalised Austrians and
Hungarians alone Little Wallachia counted
before the war no less than 30,000, a valuable
asset for the enemy when he invaded the
country.
From Craiova the enemy offensive continued
against the Aluta Valley. The Army Group of
•General von Kiihne was ordered to advance
against the sector Dragashani-Slatina, the
Cavalry Corps of Count Schmettow against the
front between Slatina and Caracalu. Their
movements were naturally quick, as they
advanced where there was no serious force to.
resist them ; the weak detachments which had
not been able to hold the mountain passes
against the array of German armies, and the few
reinforcements which the Rumanian Command
was able to throw into the Wallachian plain,
could fight only rearguard actions covering a
regrouping farther east. By November 23
the cavalry of Count Schmettow had reached
Caracalu and the bridgehead of Stonoeshti, a
few miles east of it, the troops of von Kiihne
had crossed the Pesteana River and were
approaching Dragashani, whilst in the centre
both groups were converging towards Slatina
and the railway bridge whereby the railway
from Piteshti to Craiova crosses the Aluta. A
group of small hills on the eastern bank of the
Aluta favoured the defence. Here the Ru-
manians put up a determined resistance,
repelling repeatedly with heavy losses the
German attempts at forcing the river passage.
But their forces were not sufficient to hold the
river line in its entire length, and the enemy,
not being able to break through at Slatina,
A STREET IN CRAIOVA.
462
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
transferred the weight of his attack to Caracalu
and Stonoeshti. Having crossed the Aluta at
that ooint, Count Schmettow's forces pressed
forward to the east against Rosiori de Vede.
whilst General von Kiihne advanced to the
north against the flank of the Rumanian forces
which held the bridgehead of Slatina. They
had no choice but to withdraw, having first
GENERAL VON KOSCH.
In command of the German Danube Army in
Wallachia.
blown up the railway bridge and destroyed all
the stores of cereals at Slatina ; by November 27
the entire Aluta line was abandoned by our
Allies. In the ten days following on the second
battle of Targul-Jiu the enemy columns had
traversed distances varying from 60 to 140 miles.
The advance was executed with such a speed
and with such a disregard of precautions, as was
but natural in a movement of that kind, that
had there been but a few divisions in reserve in
Central Wallachia capable of counter-attacking
vigorously the flank of the Germans whilst they
were descending into the plain near Craiova or
whilst they were wheeling towards the Aluta, the
position might yet have been saved. Once the
two groups which advanced through the plain
had reached a front facing due east, their posi-
tion became strategically very much superior
to that of the Rumanian forces. The flanks of
the German forces in the plain now rested on
Transylvania and Bulgaria, whilst the northern
flank of our Allies in Wallachia was threatened
by the Group of General Krafft von Delmen-
singen from the Red Tower Pass, and their left
flank was exposed to attacks of a new enemy,
the Army Group of General von Kosch, which
Mackensen had thrown across the Danube.
During the night and early morning of
November 23 the army of Field-Marshal von
Mackensen began to cross the Danube in the
neighbourhood of Sistovo. About the same
time minor attempts were carried out at other
points, largely in order to mislead the Ruma-
nians concerning the point chosen for the main
crossing. The Germans had command practi-
cally of the entire river-line. Their aiiillery
by far outranged that of the Rumanians,
and dominated the Danvibe, seriously hampering
the activities of the Rumanian river monitors
and protecting those of the Austrian flotilla
and the auxiliary German craft. Further,
the supremacy in the air, which the small
number of Rumanian and of Allied aviators,
brought up to Rumania since the outbreak of
the war, coxild not dispute with the Germans,
enabled the enemy to keep close observation
on the movements of the Rumanian troops in
the open lowlands north of the Danube, whilst
the Rumanians remained in the dark concerning
the enemy preparations for the crossing of the
river. These preparations had, as a matter of
fact, been carried on for a very considerable
time. The many branches and lakes also into
which' the Danube; divides on its southern
bank and which on that bank form Bulgarian
territorial waters offered favourable condi-
tions for the work. The islands and banks
are covered by dense shrubbery, an effec-
tive screen against' observation from the
low northern bank. Whilst yet at peace
with Rumania the Austrians and Germans
had, in sight of the Rumanian river guards,
in July, 1916, sent bridging material down the
Danube to sectors of the Bulgarian shore,
which had been singled out as favourable for
an offensive against Rumania. The Austrian
Danube flotilla, which in the summer of
1916 was hovering close to the Bulgarian banks
of the Danube, was not removed to the north
of the Iron Gate, as was stated at the time, but
lay hidden in the Blene Channel near Sistovo.
Here the work on the construction of pontoons,
ferries, of different parts of a bridge, which
could subsequently be constructed within a day,
was going on incessantly. As soon as the
German invasion of western Wallachia had
materialised and their forces begun their
advance to the west, Field -Marshal von
Mackensen was to throw a considerable part of
his army across the Danube. The time when
the German armies were approaching the line
of the Aluta was considered most appropriate
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
46$
RUMANIAN CAVALRY ON THE NORTH BANK OF THE DANUBE.
for a crossing in force at Sistovo. This town,
the terminus of a Bulgarian railway, lies about
25 miles east of the line of the lower Aluta,
which Count Schmettow's forces were just
approaching. It was so advanced that a
crossing of the river by the enemy seriously
threatened the flank and lines of retreat of
any forces which the Kumanians might gather
on the eastern bank of the Aluta, but was
yet sufficiently near to the district reached
by the German forces which advanced from
the west, to secure a safe and speedy junction
between the two armies.
On November 19 the German long-range
batteries opened a bombardment across the
river. During the night of November 22-23,
after the enemy artillery had silenced the
much weaker Rumanian guns, the Danube
was suddenly covered with enemy craft which
had hitherto lain hidden in the channels
and lakes on the Bulgarian bank. Steam
ferries carried the first German detachments*
across the river, and as soon as they had
gained a firm foothold on the opposite side
a pontoon bridge was thrown across it and
then strengthened by the Austrian engineer*
according to the so-called " Herbert " system.
Its structure was such as to admit the transport
even of heavy artillery. The passage was
effected at the same place at which the Russians
had crossed the river in 1877, but whilst 40 years
earlier technical resources were as yet so little-
A BRIDGE OVER THE ARGESH.
464
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR
developed that the work had taken fully 33
days, in 1910 a river about 1,000 yards wide was
bridged in 18 hours. The enemy operations
were very much favoured by the weather
prevailing in the Danube region towards the
end of November. It had been thawing for a
few days and the air was mild, almost warm,
but the water of the Danube was cold with
melted snow ; the warm air over the cold water
was naturally filled with dense fog. The first
crossings of the river could thus be effected
under cover.
By November 26 an entire army-group
composed of German, Bulgarian and Turkish
troops had reached the Rumanian bank of
the river and deployed fan-like towards the
north. It was led by General von Kosch,
who, at the outbreak of the war, had been in
command of the 10th Prussian Division at
Posen. By November 26 his troops stood
before the gates of Alexandria. Meantime
the landing operations were extended in both
directions ; in the west, detachments of
inferior troops used only for service behind the
lines were moved across the Danube into the
occupied parts of Wallachia to relieve the
invading armies of the care of the districts
in their rear. At Corabia, in the centre,
Bulgarian cavalry was thrown across the
Danube to co-operate with Count Schmettow's
forces. At Samovita, at the terminus of the
railway from Sofia, a crossing had been effected
on the same day as at Sistovo. Finally,
some 30 miles east of Sistovo, opposite the
town of Ru-:tehuk, the terminus of Bulgarian
railways from Tirnova and from Varna, artillery
preparations were begun for crossing tin
Danube only some 30 miles due south of Buka-
rcst. On November 27 the Bulgarians crossed
the river and occupied the town of Giurgevo.
Soon nothing was left of the once prosperous
town. "The view of the gaping ruins of
Giurgevo is simply gruesome," wrote the
special correspondent of the Vienna Arbeiter-
Zeitung under date of December 16, 1916 —
his name was Hugo Schulz, and his feelings
Bulgaro-German. " Giurgevo had first become
the target of heavy artillery during the artillery
duel which had been proceeding from bank to
bank, and whatever had survived it perished
during the capture and the street fighting
which took place in the town. The Bulgarians,
who take the war against Rumania as an
entirely personal matter, gave way to their
bitter hatred and did the work whole-heartedly.
Whatever had been spared by the flames, the
I
OLTENITZA ON THE ARGESH.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
465
A WAR CORRESPONDENT'S GAR FORDING A STREAM DURING THE RETREAT
OF THE RUMANIANS.
Bulgarians utterly destroyed in their wrath."
In the further invasion of the country they vied
with the Germans in looting and devastations.
Indeed, " requisitioning " was done under the
highest auspices and based on a definite theory
that " Rumania should pay in full the expenses
of its own invasion." German military cor-
respondents, in their utter absence of all moral
sense, have left in many dispatches plentiful
testimony of the way in which their armies
exploited the country ; no less interesting is
the complacency with which these authorised
eye-witnesses watched their procedure. Even
Herr Schulz of the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung,
whom his Socialist views might have endowed
with sympathies extending beyond the borders
of his own country, watched the spoliation
and misery of the Rumanian peasant with the
higher philosophical calm. " Our troops could
not possibly have marched at this rate had not
Rumania so much cattle, so . many geese,
pigs and poultry. The Wallachian plain is
covered with thriving villages very different
from the poor hamlets in the mountains on
the northern border of the country. The
invading forces live here in great style . . ."
As to the feelings of the Rumanian peasant,
Herr Schulz consoles himself and his Socialist
leaders in another dispatch by saying that
" after all the war is not a philanthropic
institution and least of all in enemy country " — •
especially when the Germans and Bulgarians
are the invaders, he might have added with
good justification.
November 25 approximately marks the
beginning of the concentric enemy advance
in the direction of the river Argesh, which
extends in front of Bukarest across the Wal-
lachian plain. The army-group under General
von Morgen, on the extreme left of the German
line, finding it impossible to break through
along the road from Predeal to Ploeshti — it
did not reach even Sinaia until December 5 — •
directed its main forces towards Campolung
and entered it on November 29. Their success
in that region was due not to any superiority
over the opposing Rumanian forces, but to the
pressure exercised by the neighbouring German
army-group from the direction of the Red
Tower Pass. In view of the enemy advance
in the district of Dragashani, Slatina, and
Caracalu, the Rumanian Aluta Group had had
to retire from its position in the mountains,
466
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
AUSTRIAN HUSSAR GAMP IN RUMANIA.
.and on November 25 the troops of General
Krafft von Delmensingen had reached Rim-
•nic Valcea and Tigveni (in the valley of the
Topologu). In front of Curtea de Argesh the
<rearguards of the Rumanian First Army
offered a determined resistance, and it was
•not until November 27 that the Germans
•captured this important railhead at the foot
•of the main Carpathian range. By the night of
November 27 the enemy line extended from
Darmaneshti, in the valley of the Domna,
past Dragani, on the road from Rimnic to
Piteshti, past Vatasesti to Isvoru, south-east of
.Slatina and some 75 miles west of Bukarest.
On November 29 the enemy entered Piteshti,
in the rear of the Campolung Group, which had
now to retreat through the Dambovitsa Valley
towards Targovishte. Meantime, in the centre,
,the army-groups of General von Kiihne and
Count Schmettow continued their advance to
.the west, whilst south-west of Bukarest the
growing forces of Germans, Bulgarians, and
Turks under General von Kosch had reached,
on November 27, a line which extended from
Giurgevo past Draganesti towards the upper
course ol the Vedea river
To meet the attack of the enemy the
Rumanians had re-distributed their forces,
•concentrating them in two main groups north-
west and south-west of Bukarest. They had
been enabled to do so by the plentiful help
which they were now receiving from Russia.
The entire Moldavian front had been taken
over by the Russian armies so as to enable the
Rumanians to fill the gap which had opened up
between the Carpathians and the Danube after
the Germans had broken through at Targul-Jiu
and invaded the Wallachian plain. The armies
of General Lechitsky and General Kaledin.
of Lutsk fame, were now covering the western
frontier of Moldavia, and by assuming the
offensive against the Austrian forces in the
beginning of December deprived them of the
initiative in that sector of the front. For the
enemy also had concentrated troops in that
region, evidently intending to debouch from
the mountains into Moldavia ; had he suc-
ceeded in reaching the Sereth line, his movement
would have seriously compromised, if not
completely cut off. the retreat of our Allies
from Wallachia. Besides the First Austro-
Hungarian Army under General von Arz.
which had been concentrated mainly in the
southern parts of the Moldavian plain, our
Allies had to face in the northern sectors the
7th Austro-Hungarian Army under General
von Kovess. The Russians had also taken
over practically the entire defence of the
Dobrudja. which now rested in the hands of
General Sakharoff. Finally, Russian troops
were beginning to appear even in the plain
south of Bukai-est. The Rumanian armies,
now under the supreme command of General
Averescu, were distributed in the following
manner: the Second Army continued to hold
the passes south of Kronstadt, whilst the
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
467
First Army was holding the region of Piteshti,
west-north-west of Bukarest. South and
south-west of Bukarest a new group of divi-
sions, including parts of what had previously
been the 3rd and 4th Armies, was constituted
under the leadership of General Presan, who
had previously highly distinguished himself
as Commander of the 4th Army. Whilst on
the northern and north-western front it was
the intention of the Rumanians merely to
contain the enemy forces, south-west of
Bukarest our Allies proposed to assume the
eshti. It was on this line that General Presan
had decided to meet the enemy advance, and
the next day saw the opening of his counter-
offensive. The forces under his command were
grouped in the following way : south-east
of Bukarest, between the town and the Danube
the 40th Russian Division was advancing
to the west ; due south of Bukarest stood a
Rumanian detachment under the command
of General Jancovescu ; next to it, south-
west of Bukarest. the 21st Division ; the
right wing of General Presan's forcss was
RUM 4NIAN FIELD KITCHENS NEAR PLOESHTI.
offensive, to outflank from the north the
German Army of the Danube under General von
Kosch and to press it back against the Danube.
By November 29 the Army of General von
Kosch, composed of North-German, Bavarian,
Bulgarian, Turkish, and Austro-Hungarian
troops, had reached a line extending from
Gumantzi, past Calugareni to Comana on the
river Neajlovu, a railway station about half
way between Giurgevo and Bukarest — i.e.,
only some 16 miles from that city. About
the same time its left wing crossed the Piteshti-
Giurgevo railway in the valley of the river
Glavaciocul. On November 30 the enemy
forced a crossing of the Neajlovu near Mihal-
formed of two groups, one consisting of the
9th and 19th Divisions previously employed
in the Dobrudja, the other of the 2nd and 5th
Divisions. It seems to have been the intention
of the Rumanian Command to advance on the
extreme right wing a strong force which would
have pushed its way in between the Danube
Army and the German centre. The plan was
perfectly sound, and came very near being
realised. If fully successful, it would have
resulted in a veritable disaster for the German
right wing. On December 1 the Rumanian
troops threw the advanced enemy forces back
across the river Neajlovu, defeated on the
Glavaciocul the Turkish division which moved
4G8
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
o
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THE TIMES HLSTOBY OF THE WAR.
on the extreme left wing of the army-group of
General von Kosch and also the main body of
the Germane-Bulgarian forces in the region of
Ghimpati and Mihalesti, driving them towards
the south and capturing 30 guns and a few
thousand prisoners. Following up this initial
victory our Allies succeeded in encircling part
of the German forces and the position of the
enemy seemed already hopeless when at the
last moment a Turkish division appeared
in the rear of General Presan's troops instead
of a Rumanian division. — this failed to come
in time. For a second time Mackensen,
by his impetuous tactics, had come very
near suffering defeat, and again, as in the
Battle of Lodz in 1914, he was saved by
the fact that a subordinate commander on
the side of our Allies failed to play his part
in the battle. Following on the arrival of the
Turkish division further German reinforce-
ments made their appearance and the situation
changed completely. The Rumanians found
themselves surrounded in the district north of
Calugareni, the group composed of the 2nd
and 5th Divisions broke and retired in disorder
in the direction of Bukarest ; of tho 9th ani
19th, two of the best Rumanian Divisions,
only remnants succeeded in fighting their way
through to the rear. General Presan's right
wing, which only on the previous day had won
such a signal success, now suffered a crushing
defeat. Many of the details of the battle are
bound to remain for ever moot points of
history. Even the reports given out from
the best-informed quarters seem to co.ntra-
dict one another on certain points, and much
of the confusion which surrounds the actions
of December 2 and December 3 is not likely
ever to be unravelled. The Germans claim
to have found in possession of two staff officers
belonging to the 8th Rumanian Division,
whom they captured on December 1 at Ratesti
(on the Piteshti-Bukarest road), orders which
disclosed to them the nature of the Rumanian
strategic plan. They further claim that,
having thus found out that the Rumanian
forces were all concentrated in two groups
and that no serious counter-attacks or resist-
ance need have been expected in the centre,
their Command immediately decided to break
up the army-group of General von Kiihne
which operated in that region ; its left wing,
including the 41st Division under General
Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, wheeled towards
the north against the left flank of the Rumanian
armies which were holding the region of Piteshti
and Targovishte. The right wing of the group,
including the llth Bavarian Division and also
Austro-Hungarian troops, wheeled in the
opposite direction, turning its face to the south,
and thus came up on the right flank of General
Presan's forces. Meantime the cavalry of
Count Schmettow drew a screen across the
German centre. This may or may not be part
of the true history of the double battle fought
on the river Argesh north-west and south-west
of Bukarest. One thing, however, is certain —
that even so it would not have resulted in a
decisive defeat had it not been for the indolence
of certain Rumanian subordinate commanders
and the downright negligence of one of them,
a certain General Sosescu who was a naturalized
German, and whose original name had been
Sosek. He was subsequently court-martialled,
cashiered, and condemned to imprisonment.
The Rumanian chief commander, in the battle
south-west of Bukarest — also called the battle
of the Neajlovu — General Presan, conducted the
battle in a way which did him honour and no
blame for the defeat attached to him. In
acknowledgment of the distinguished work
done by him he was soon after the battle of
Neajlovu appointed Chief of the Rumanian
General Staff.
Meantime, on the north-western front the
enemy forces were advancing down the Argesh,
the Dambovitsa and the Upper lalomitsa valleys
against a line extending from Gaeshti past
Targovishte to Valea Lunga. The Rumanian
troops under Generals Petala and Lombru were
holding out bravely, but, overwhelmed by the
superior German forces, had to give way, and
withdrew in the direction of Titu, the junction
of the railways from Piteshti and Targovishte.
Also here our Allies suffered much from defects
in their organization. At one time during the
retreat a situation arose from which consider-
able gain might have accrued to the Rumanians.
One of their divisions succeeded in getting into
the rear of the enemy, but this information
did not reach the commanding general until it
was too late, when the main army had already
withdrawn across a river and blown up the
bridge. The Germans continued advancing
on the entire front. With the capture of
Targovishte they reached the edge of the
Rumanian oilfields and the lateral road which
leads to the east in the direction of Ploeshti.
They had hopes of rich booty and great captures.
Neither was to materialize.
470
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
RUMANIANS RETIRING ACROSS THE RIVER ARGESH.
By December 4 all hope of holding Bukarest
was entirely abandoned, and the Rumanian
troops were withdrawing towards the east
through the whole width of Eastern Wallachia.
There had never been any intention of holding
Bukarest itself as a fortress. It is true the city
is surrounded by an impressive girdle of
detached works composed of 18 large forts
and an equal number of smaller forts and
batteries. These are situated at distances
from the centre varying between three and
seven miles and are separated by intervals not
exceeding three miles. Even the principal
line of resistance, therefore, amounted to a
length of about 50 miles, and it was calculated
that at least 120,000 men would have been
required to hold the fortress. But the most
important of these defences had been organized
so far back as 1886 and were completely
obsolete. Even the experiences of the Austrian*
THE RUMANIAN RETREAT: AN IMPROVISED BRIDGE.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
471
in Przemysl, where they had an immense
superiority of artillery over the besieging
Russian forces, can hardly have encouraged
the Rumanians to try to hold Bukarest. It
would have been sheer folly to shut up an army
of such size in a fortress of an obsolete type,
insufficiently supplied with artillery. If the
Germans were spreading news for a fortnight
before the fall of Bukarest about the greatness
of the fortress and its importance, this was
partly due to a desire to make the most of the
expected capture, and partly in order to enable
the German command to indulge in the de-
the Danube at Sistovo reached the city.
This news had fallen like a thunderbolt on the
capital, and the authorities received the order
to evacuate it as soon as possible. " The first
few days which followed after the evacuation of
the town," wrote an eye-witness, " will remain
deeply engraved in the memory of the in-
habitants. The cry ' The Germans are coming ! '
filled the population with terror, and everybody
tried to escape. The word ' overcrowded '
only inadequately describes the state of the
trains. Prices like £80 were offered for
carriages to Ploeshti, which is distant some
THE OILFIELD AT MORENI.
struction of an open town. On December 3
the Rumanian Government promptly counter-
acted that propaganda by declaring officially
that " well before the commencement of the
war, as is known to our enemies, Bukarest was
deprived of the character of a fortress, and
when the danger of occupation presented itself
steps were taken for the evacuation of the city
by the military elements, but not by the civil
population, which has been enjoined to remain
in the city."
The evacuation of Bukarest began on the
day when the news of the enemy having crossed
30 miles from Bukarest." The Ministers,
the Allied Legations and the banks were
transferred to Jassy, and by a Royal Decree
the meeting of the Rumanian Parliament was
postponed and Parliament was ordered to re-
assemble at Jassy. On December 1 the last
members of the Cabinet left Bukarest. The
thunder of the invaders' guns could be already
distinctly heard in the city, but the panic
which had at first broken out in the town
gave place to a feeling of depression and
resignation. The streets were patrolled by
troops for the purpose of maintaining order.
472
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
As a matter of fact this was not necessary,
as life seemed to have become completely
paralyzed in the gay and busy city. On
Monday, December 4, a terrific report awoke the
capital. The arsenal had been blown up by
the authorities. With the destruction of this
establishment the last hopes of the Bukarest
population were gone. There could be no
doubt regarding the future.
On December 5 Field-Marshal von Mackensen
sent an officer under the flag of trucj into
Bukarest, calling upon it to surrender. He
came back in the early morning of the following
day with the report that there waa no fortress
of Bukarest and no commander, and that the
impressive ceremony for which the Field -
Marshal had been preparing coxild not be
enacted. On the same day the Germans entered
the city, Mackensen with his staff taking up
headquarters in the Royal Palace. But the
day on which they entered the capital was
dark with smoke and the night which f"l lowed
was illuminated ; the flames and the smoke
were rising from the burning oil-tanks and
wells in the district of Ploeshti. One of the
richest regions of the world was being destroyed
in order to prevent the enemy from getting the
much -coveted oil. This was the work of
Colonel Norton Griffiths, M.P., who acted with
extraordinary speed, energy and courage.
On December 4 General Tiilff von Tschepe
und Weidenbach, at the outbreak of the war
Commander of the 8th Rhenish Army Corps
at Koblenz, was appointed military Governor-
General of the occupied districts of Rumania.
Austrian and Bulgarian Vice-Governors were
placed under him. He was instructed by
German headquarters to use Rumanian lar.d
in the same way as Belgium and Poland had
been used. To him these words contained a
very material meaning, for at the head of the
8th Army Corps he had taken part in that first
invasion of Belgium which will for ever remain
a stain on 'the honour of the German nation.
He was now explicitly instructed to try to
provide from Rumania the needs of the Central
Powers which were " illegally cut off " from
the High Seas by Great Britain. That he
should not be able to do so had, however, been
seen to by the Allied Commanders. On the
fall of Bukarest, General von Heinrich, pre-
viously Governor of Lille — hence, also an
experienced man — was appointed Military
Governor of Bukarest. One of the first acts
of the German administration was an ingenious
edict whereby a heavy war tax was levied from
the capital. The circulation of pap -r money
was forbidden, unless marked as German, for
which 30 per cent, of the value of the notes was
demanded.
Meantime, the German and Austrian Press
was busy spreading throughout the world
allegations to the effect that enemy troops
had been welcomed in the capital of Rumania
The true explanation of whatever facts there
were for that allegation can be found in a
despatch from Dr. Koester published in the
Vienna Arbeiter-Zeilung and dated December,
1916. Bukarest, he says, is really judged by
its main street, and what happens in this half-
mile, with its theatres, cinemas and cafes, is
described as representing its public opinion.
" It is natural that the Germans, Austrians
and Hungarians resident in the town are now
pushing forward in this half-mile an 1 that
many who had hitherto kept siknt now
suddenly have rediscovered their Gern.an
hearts."
CHAPTER CLXXX.
THE GERMAN PEACE CAMPAIGN
OF DECEMBER, 1916.
SITUATION IN GERMANY, AUGUST, 1916 — STOCK-TAKING IN BERLIN — MILITARY DISAPPOINTMENTS
AND NEW POLICY — DISMISSAL OF FALKENHAYN AND APPOINTMENT OF HINDENBURG — BELGIAN
DEPORTATIONS — " FREEDOM " AND CONSCRIPTION FOR THE POLES — THE AUXILIARY SERVICE
LAW — PEACE OR " RUTHLESS " SUBMARINE WARFARE — ORIGINS OF THE PEACE CAMPAIGN —
THE GERMAN NOTES OF DECEMBER 12 — BOASTS OF VICTORY — THE AMERICAN PEACE NOTE —
SCANDINAVIAN AND Swiss NOTES — GERMAN REPLY TO UNITED STATES — ALLIES' REPLY TO ENEMY
POWERS — GERMANY AND NEUTRALS — ALLIES' REPLY TO UNITED STATES — THE BELGIAN NOTE —
MR. BALFOUR'S DISPATCH TO WASHINGTON — GERMANY AND THE ALLIES' TERMS — MR. WILSON'S
SPEECH TO THE SENATE — GERMAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF " UNRESTRICTED " SUBMARINE WARFARE —
PERFECT PIRACY — GERMANY DEFIES THE WORLD.
ON several occasions during the first
two years of war German diplomacy
tested the firmness, now of one and
now of another, of the Entente
Powers by suggestions of peace which were con-
veyed through neutral channels with varying
degrees of definiteness. While, however, there
were periods in 1915 and at the beginning of
1916 when both the German Government and
the German public seriously believed in the
possibility of a separate peace with one or other
of the Allies, the year 1916 was a year of
dwindling hope. As has already been observed,
the German peace talk merely strengthened
the determination of the Allies.* The assault
on Verdun was a costly military failure ; it
was also a political disaster. As the dis-
tinguished German historian, Professor
Meinecke, explained in the Frankfurter Zeitung
on December 31, 1916, the political origin of
the undertaking against Verdun was the belief
that it would " prove to the French that they
could no longer win, and that they would do
» Vol. IX., p. 361 foil.
Vol. XI.— Part 143 473
better to end a war which had lost all prospects
for them." The collapse of the German
" politico -military idea" was followed by the
tremendous Battle of the Somme, which
deprived Germany of the initiative and taught
her, in particular, that she no longer held the
superiority in organization and material.
Germany was compelled to review the whole
situation afresh, and to prepare for greater
efforts than any she had yet made, and to do
so in full recognition of the fact — to quote
Professor Meinecke's lucid statement — that
she could no longer look for military decisions
" in the full peace-compelling sense," and that
she must fall back upon " the idea that the
sacrifices demanded by the continuation of the
war no longer bear any relation to the military
results which can still be expected, and that it
is statesnvanlike, intelligent and wise to abandon
the intention of destruction, which after all
does not lead to destruction, and to seek a
reasonable compromise."
At the end of August German anxieties were
increased by the intervention of Rumania and
474
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
the Italian declaration of war on Germany,
and Berlin at once set about a general military
and political stock-taking. The results were
only gradually disclosed, and the sequence of
events was calculated to obscure the character
and purpose of the German decisions. They
were, first, to reorganize the supreme command,
especially by making Marshal von Hindenburg,
in name at least, military dictator ; secondly, to
increase German man -power, especially for the
purposes of the munitions industry, by a new
HERR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG ON
HIS 60th BIRTHDAY (NOV. 29, 1916).
He is seen walking in the Garden of the
Reichskanzlerpalais with his Under-Secretary,
Herr Wahnschaffe.
form of industrial conscription in Germany, by
the deportation of the able-bodied civilian popu.
lation of Belgium, and by the proclamation of
a sham kingdom in Russian Poland as a step
to conscription of the Poles ; thirdly, to prepare
by the speediest possible construction of sub-
marines and training of crews for the intro-
duction of "ruthless" submarine warfare
against England ; and, fourthly, to initiate
proposals of peace, which, if they did not
achieve direct success, might serve as justi-
fication— certainly in German eyes, and con-
ceivably in neutral, and especially American,
eyes — for the new submarine campaign. It
has already been seen (Chapter CLXXVII.) how
the efforts to entangle the United States in the
peace intrigue led speedily, as. soon as Germany
proceeded to disavow her pledges regarding
submarine warfare, to the American rupture of
diplomatic relations, and then to the American
declaration of war. It is now necessary to
review the peace campaign itself, to sketch
the developments in Germany of which the
peace campaign formed an essential part, and
to record the important and far-reaching
declarations of policy which it produced.
The first move in the new direction was the
announcement on August 30, 1916, that General
von Falkenhayn, who had supplanted Count
Moltke at the end of 1914, had been removed
from the office of Chief of the Great General
Staff, that Field -Marshal von Hindenburg had
been appointed " Chief of the General Staff
of the Field Army," and that Hindenburg's
chief supporter and adviser, General von
Ludendorff, had been given the new appoint-
ment of " First Quartermaster-General." The
disgrace of Falkenhayn was ostentatious
punishment for the disastrous Western Cam-
paign of 1916, and Falkenhayn was promptly
sent away to deal with Rumania, for whose
intervention his strategy was held responsible ;
politically, Falkenhayn's fall was a triumph
for the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Beth-
m-ann-Hollweg, against whom he had intrigued
almost as persistently as had Admiral von
Tirpitz. Henceforward the Hindenburg-
Ludendorff combination was to be supreme.
It was notorious, in all circles that knew any-
thing of the truth, that Ludendorff was the
brain of the partnership, and that Hinden-
burg's " genius " was mainly the creation of
the Berlin Press Bureau. But Hindenburg —
" the victorious protector of the Eastern
front," as the Kaiser called him in the Order
announcing his appointment — was the idol of
the people, and his name was as svire to justify
fresh sacrifices as to cover a multitude of
failures. As The Times observed, the Hinden-
burg legend had endvired more persistently
than anything else in German public opinion ;
it had developed a veritable Hinderiburg
mania, and the Government rightly calculated
that the country would accept almost anything
that was proposed on Hindenburg's authority.
The first task of the new regime was to
reorganize and expand all possible resources in
men and munitions. It was decided to
initiate legislation which would * give the
military authorities effective control of labour
outside the limits of the obligation to perform
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
475
military service, and plans were made to secure
special rations for the labour employed in war
industries. As the economic pressure on Ger-
many increased, the idea of the military
authorities was to feed the army first and the
war workers second, and to leave the " useless "
civil population what remained. On Sep-
tember 27 Hindenburg, in a letter which was
not published until nearly two months later,
wrote to the Imperial Chancellor :
Your Excellency knows what tremendous tasks face
our munition industry if a successful result of the war
is to be attained. The decisive factor is the solution of
the labour problem, not only as regards the numbers of
workpeople, but specially as regards the provision of
ample food to enable each individual to put forth his
maximum effort. ... It does not seem to me to be
sufficiently recognized everywhere among the officials
that the existence or non-existence of our people and
Empire is at stake. ... It is impossible for our working
people to maintain 'their fuir strength if they do not
succeed in obtaining a sufficient supply of fat, allotted
to them on a proper basis. . .' .
I beg your Excellency most urgently to impress upon
all Federal Governments, administrative and communal
authorities, the seriousness of the situation, and to
demand that they shall use every means to provide
sufficient nourishment for our munition workers, and
unite all the leading men of all parties as leaders of the
Army at home behind the plough and the lathe to work
together and arouse the furor Teutonic.ua among the
tillers of the soil- as well as among the townspeople
and munition workers.
While Hindenburg and his subordinates were
working out their schemes of reorganization,
the Imperial Chancellor was educating the
Reichstag and, as afterwards appeared, plot-
ting peace schemes with the Kaiser. In the
middle of October there was an outburst of
vague peace talk in the Reichstag, which was
informed by the Chancellor that the military
THE KAISER, HINDENBURG AND LUDENDORFF IN CONFERENCE.
476
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
[By special permission from "Punch" of January 24, 1917-
"I AM THE MAN!"
situation was "grave and difficult," but that Kaiser had on October 31 written the following
Hindenburg and Ludendorff were full of con- letter from the Neues Palais, Potsdam, to the
fidence. As for the peace scheme it wa , Imperial Chancellor :
announced in Berlin on January 15, 1917, My DEAR BKTHMANN>_I havo since been turnins
aftor the peace campaign had failed, that the <mr conversation thoroughly ovt-r in mv mind. It
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
477
is clear that the peoples of the enemy countries, kept
in -a morbid war atmosphere, and labouring under
lies and frauds, and deluded by fighting and hatred,
possess no men who might be able, or who might have
the moral courag), to spiak the liberating word.
To make the proposal for peace is a moral deed,
which is necessary, in order to free the world, including
neutrals, from the pressure which weighs upon all.
Such a deed requires a ruler who has a conscience, who
feels that he is responsible to God, who has a heart for
his own people, and for those of his enemies, who,
indifferent as to any possible wilful misinterpretation
of his action, possesses the will to free the world from
its suffering*. I have the courago. Trusting in God,
I shall dare to take this step. Lay the Notes before me
soon and prepare everything.
(Signed) WILLIAM I.R.
When this characteristic document was
published, doubts were expressed as to its
authenticity, or, at any rate, as to its date.
In reality the letter of October 31 shows how
nicely calculated was the whole German
operation. Six weeks elapsed before the
Chancellor was ready, in the light of the
Emperor's "conscience" and "responsibility
to God," to produce the " deed " which was
" to free the world from its sufferings." There
was much to be done in the interval — -much
that was worthy of the heart that had " bled
for Louvain " and was now moved by the
sufferings both of the German people and of
enemy peoples. At precisely the same moment
when he was ordering the Chancellor to prepare
peace proposals the Kaiser had sanctioned the
new man-power scheme, the Belgian deporta-
tions, and the cunning proclamation of the
"freeing of Poland." The period between
the end of October and the middle of December
was occupied in carrying out this "Hinden-
burg programme."
On October 29, two days before the Kaiser
wrote his " peace " instructions to the Chan-
cellor, it was announced that General von
Stein had been brought home from the Somme
to be Prussian Minister of War, in place
of General Wild von Hohenborn ; it was
openly stated that Stein's appointment was
due to the necessity of overhauling^ the
Berlin organization in the light of the new
experiences to which the German Army had
been introduced in the West. Secondly, there
was established within the Ministry of War
an entirely new War Bureau (Kriegsamt),
under a Wurtemberg general, Groner, who
had hitherto been Director of Field Rail-
ways. The War Bureau was to deal with " all
matters connected with the general con-
duct of the war, the provision, employment,
and feeding of the workmen, and the pro-
vision of raw materials, arms, and munitions,"
and to be responsible for all matters connected
with the supply of drafts to the Army. It was,
in fact, a belated imitation of the British Minis-
try of Munitions, but at the same time a Man-
Power Office, and, under the stress of the
economic situation, it had to concern itself
with the feeding of the munition workers and
their families as well as with the supply of raw
materials.
GENERAL GRONER,
Chief of the "War Bureau" of the Prussian
Ministry of War.
The new War Bureau at once began a cam-
paign on behalf of industrial conscription, the
proclamation at Warsaw was taken to herald
the raising of a " Polish Army " on the side
of the Central Powers, and the Belgian deporta-
tions were carried on with extreme energy
and brutality. As the Berlin Tdgliche Rund-
schau candidly observed on November 23 :
In everything which has been done and initiated in
the way of organization since Hindenburg's appoint-
ment we feel a single will. The solution of the Belgian
unemployment problem (sic), the creation of a Polish
army, the reorganization of our munitions system, and
the proclamation of a compulsory Labour Law, are
things procesding from a single root and a single will.
The German Government was, indeed, in
all things — whether in Belgium, Poland, or
Germany — entirely under Prussian military
orders.
143—2
478
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
The German man-power scheme ultimately
took shape in a Patriotic Auxiliary Service
Bill, as it was called, which was introduced
on November 24 and rapidly passed by the
Reichstag. The new law provided that " every
As a proof of "democracy" the .Inscription
"DEM DEUTSCHEN VOLK"
("To the German People") was placed on the
front of the Reichstag in 1916.
male German, from the completion of his
seventeenth to the completion of his sixtieth
year, is, in so far as he has not been summoned
to service with the armed forces, liable to
patriotic auxiliary service during the period of
the war." Patriotic auxiliary service was
defined as consisting, " apart from service in
Government offices and official institutions,
in particular in service in war industry, in
agriculture, in the nursing of the sick, and in
organizations of every kind of an economic
character connected with the war, as well as
in other undertakings which are immediately
or indirectly of importance for purposes of the
conduct of the war or the provision of the re-
quirements of the people." The control of
the scheme was entrusted in Prussia to the
War Bureau, and in the States — Bavaria,
Saxony, and Wurtemburg — which still enjoyed
a measure of military independence, to organi-
zations established on the lines of the Prussian
War Bureau. Thus, at the beginning of
December, there had been imposed upon the
thorough system of military service a thorough
system of compulsory labour in Germany and
of slavery in the occupied territories. At the
same time the construction of submarines was
proceeding apace, and every effort had been
made to beguile American and other neutral
opinion. Germany was now ready to offer
the world the blessings of a German peace. As
>\ preliminary to the operations the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow,
resigned office at the end of November, and
was succeeded by the Under-Secretary in the
Foreign Office, Herr Zimmermann. According
to some accounts, Herr von Jagow was unable
to stomach the Belgian deportations and the
proposed defiance of the whole civilized world ;
according to others he was dismissed as unfit
for the work in hand.
On December 12 the Kaiser issued
following order to the German Army :
the
Under the influence of the victory which you have
pained by your bravery, I and the Monarchs of the
three States in alliance with me have made an offer
of peace to the enemy. It is uncertain whether tha
object to which this offer is aimed will be reached.
You will have meanwhile, with God's help, to continue
to resist and defeat the enemy.
The Kaiser addressed the same order " to
my Navy, which in the common fight has
loyally and effectively staked all its strength."
On the same day the Imperial Chancellor
appeared in the Reichstag, which had been
specially summoned, and announced that the
following Note had that morning been trans-
mitted by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bul-
garia, and Turkey to all the enemy Powers :
The most formidable war known to history has been
ravaging for two and a half years a great part of the
world. That catastrophe, which the bonds of a common
civilization more than a thousand years old could not
stop, strikes mankind in its most precious patrimony;
it. threatens to bury under its ruins the moral and
physical progress on which Europe prided itself ut the
dawn of the twentieth century. In that strife Germany
and her Allies, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, have given
proof of their indestructible strength in winning COH*K!< i '•
able successes at war. Th3ir unshakable lines resist
ceaseless attacks of their enemies' arms. The r.'rent
diversion in the Balkans wa< speedily and victoriously
thwarted. The latest events have demonstrated that
a continuation of the war cannot break their resisting
power. The general situation much rather justified
their hope of fresh successes. It was for the defence
of their existence and freedom of their national develop-
ment that the four Allied Powers were constrained to
take up arms. The exploits of their armies have brought
no change therein. Not for an instant have they
-wrrvfd from the conviction that the respect of the
rights of other nations is not in any degree incompatible
with their own rights and legitimate interests. They do
not seek to crush or annihilate their adversaries. Con.
scious of their military and economic strength and ready
to carry on to the end, if they must, the «t niggle that is
forced upon them, but animated at the same time by
the desire to stem the flood of blood and to bring the
horrors of war to an end, the Jour allied Powers propose
to enter eren now into peace negotiation*. They feel sure
that the propositions which they would bring forward,
and which would aim to assure the existence, honour,
and free development of their people-, would bo such 'as
to serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace.
//, notwithstanding this offer of peace and conciliation
the struggle should continue, the four allied Powers on
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
479
resolved to carry it on to an end, while solemnly dis-
claiming any responsibility before mankind and
history.*
The German Note to enemy Powers was also
* The text quoted is that of the Note actually delivered
to the British Government by the American Ambassador
jn London. It was an inaccurate and incomplete
translation, for which the German Foreign Office was
responsible, of the original French. The passages
printed in italics were as follows in the original : —
" Dans cette lutte 1'Autriche-Hongrie et sas allies :
PAIlemagnc, la Bulgarie et la Turquie, ont fait prsuvo
communicated to the Vatican, together with
the following appeal to the Pope :
The reasons which prompted Germany and her allies
to this step are manifest. For two years and a half
de leur force indestructible en remportant des succes
considerables sur des adversairea superieurs en nombre
et en materiel de guerre."
" Les quatre Puissances alli6es proposent d'entrer
dea -d -present, en negociations de paix."
" Si, malgre' cette offre de paix et de conciliation, la
lutte devait continuer, les quatre Puissances a)li£es sont
determiners a la conduire jusqu'»i une fin rirlnricttje."
HERR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG ON
DECEMBER 12, 1916.
(1) The Imperial Chancellor. (2) Admiral von Capelle, Secretary of State for the Navy. (3) Herr
Helfferich, Minister of the Interior. (4) Herr Zimmermann, Foreign Secretary. (5) Herr Kaempf,
President of the Reichstag.
430
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
a terrible war has boon devastating the European
Continent. Unlimited tiva-iires of civilization have
been destroyed, extensive areas have been soaked
with blood, millions of brave soldiers have fallen in
battle, and millions have returned home as invalids.
Grief and sorrow fill almost every house. Not only
upon belligerent nations, but also upon neutrals the
destructive consequences of the gigantic struggle
weigh heavily. Trade and commerce carefully built
up in years of peace have been depressed. The best
forces of the nations have been withdrawn from the
production of useful objects. Europe, which was
formerly devoted to the propagation of religion and
civilization, which was trying to find a solution for social
problems, and was the home of science and art and all
peaceful labour, now rssembles an immense war camp
in which the achievement* and works of many decades
are doomed to annihilation.
Germany is carrying on a war of defence against
the enemies who aim at her destruction. She fights
in order to assure the integrity of her frontiers and the
1. jerty of the German nation in the right which she
claims to develop freely her intellectual and economic
energies in peaceful competition and on an equal footing
with other nations. All the enemies' efforts are unable
to shatter the heroic armies of the allies that protect
the frontiers of their countries. Strengthened by the
Certainty that the enemy shall never pierce the iron
wall, those fight'ing on the front know that they are
supported by the whole nation, which is inspired by
love for its country, ready for the greatest sacrifices,
and determined to defend to the last extremity the
inherited treasure of intellectual and economic work
and social organization and the sacred soil of the country.
Sure of our own strength, but realizing Europe's sad
future if this war continues, seized with pity in the
face of the unspeakable misery of humanity, the German
Empire, in accord with her allies, solemnly repeats
what the Chancellor already declared one year ago,
that Germany is ready to give peace to the world by
setting before the whole world the question whether or
no it is possible to find a basis for an understanding.
Since the first day of his Pontifical reign his Holiness
the Pope has unswervingly demonstrated in a most
generous fashion his solicitude for the innumerable
victims of this war, has alleviated the sufferings and
ameliorated the fate of thousands of men injured by
this catastrophe. Inspired by the exalted ideas of
his ministry, his Holiness seized every opportunity in
humanity's interest in order to bring to an end so
sanguinary a war. The Imperial Government is firmly
confident that the initiative of the four Powers will
find a friendly welcome on the part of his Holiness and
that the work of peace can count upon the precious
support of the Holy See.
In his speech the Imperial Chancellor boasted
of the military situation, of the overthrow of
Koumania, of the " heroic deeds " of the German
submarines which were threatening the enemy
with" the spectre of famine," and finally of
the Auxiliary Service Law which had given
Germany " a new offensive and defensive
bulwark." Germany, he said, went steadily
forward, always " ready to fight for the nation's
existence, for its free and safe future," and
" always ready to stretch out her hand for
peace." He enlarged especially upon the
Kaiser's " deep moral and religious sense of
duty towards the nation and beyond it towards
humanity." They would await the reply of
their enemies " with the calm which is given
to us by our exterior and interior strength
and clear conscience." And he concluded :
On a fateful hour we have taken the fateful decision ;
it is drenched with the blood of hundreds of thousands
of our sons and brothers who have given their lives
for the security of home. In this struggle of the peoples,
which has unveiled all the terrors of earthly life and at
the same time all the greatness of human courage
HERR ZIMMERMANN.
Appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
1916.
in a fashion never yet seen, the wit of man and the
hand of man cannot avail to the very end. God will
help. Fearless and upright we will follow our path,
determined for \var, ready for peace.
The German Note was immediately hailed
in all parts of the world as an attempt to place
the Allies in a false position with regard to
neutral opinion. In all the Allied countries
it was considered that the German " offer "
was insincere, and the only fear was that
Germany might in some way profit by the
appearance of readiness to end the war. " I
have not the right," said the French Premier,
M. Briand, in the Chamber on December 13,
" to express myself with regard to the German
proposals exce'pt in full accord with our Allies,
but I have the right to warn the country against
the possible poison of such attempts. The
proposal is that we should negotiate a peace.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
481
Yes, but Serbia, Belgium, and Roumania are
invaded, and the crime is unchastized. It is a
step designed to trouble our consciences. Herr
von Bethmann-Hollweg says : ' It is not we
who wanted this horrible war. It was forced
upon us.1 To that I reply for the hundredth
time : ' You were the aggressors, and whatever
you may say the facts prove it, and the blood-
shed is on your heads, not on ours.' It is my
right to denounce this trap." From Russia
came the most emphatic denunciations of the
German manoeuvre, and the Duma on December
15 unanimously passed a resolution in favour
of " a categorical refusal by the Allied Govern-
ments to enter under present conditions into
any peace negotiations whatever." The Duma
declared that " a lasting peace will be possible
only after a decisive victory over the military
power of the enemy, and after the definite
renunciation by Germany of the aspirations
which render her responsible for the world war
and for the horrors by which it is accompanied."
Meanwhile all the German diplomatists, and
especially Count Bernstorff in Washington,
were busily pretending that Germany meant
even more than she said; that, if only the
belligerents could be brought together at a
conference, it would be found that Germany's
HERR VON STUMM,
Uoder-Secretary of the Foreign Office.
" terms " were extremely reasonable ; and, in
particular, that the only roal obstacle woul.l
be British pretensions in regard to sea power.
The truth, of course, was that Germany was
not proposing peace, but a conference in which
she hoped that the general desire for peace
would enable her to achieve her aims.
In England Mr. Lloyd George had become
Prime Minister on December 7. Owing to
illness he did not meet the House of Commons
until December 19. He then said that the
Allies had "each of them separately and
independently arrived at identical conclusions."
It was well that France and Russia should have
given the first answer : " The enemy is still
on their soil ; their sacrifices have been greater."
BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE-HADDEN-
HAUSEN.
Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office,
formerly German Minister in Bukare&t.
The Prime Minister then quoted the famous
words of Abraham Lincoln spoken under
similar conditions : " We accepted this war
for an object, and a worthy object, and the war
will end when that object is attained. Under
God I hope it will never end until that time."
Mr. Lloyd George proceeded :
There has been some talk about proposals of peace.
What are tho proposals ? There are none. To enter
at the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself
victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals
she proposes to mako, into a conference, is to put our
heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of
Germany.
The Prime Minister recalled the Napoleonic
wars, and the way Napoleon used to appear
" in the garb of the angel of peace " — especially
when he needed time and his subjects showed
symptoms of fatigue and war weariness.
" Invariably the appeal was made in the name
of humanity ; and he demanded an end to
bloodshed at which he professed himself to be
horrified, but for which he himself was mainly
responsible. Our ancestors were taken in
once, and bitterly they and Europe rued it."
Mr. Lloyd George reaffirmed the terms of the
Allies as " restitution, reparation, guarantee
against repetition," and went on to expose
482
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE GERMAN PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM OF POLAND: STUDENTS'
PROCESSION AT WARSAW.
the hollowness of the German pretence. Finally
he declared :
Now that this great war has been forced by the Prussian
military leaders upon France, Russia, Italy, and our-
selves, it would be folly, it would be cruel folly, not to
see to it that this " swashbuckling " through the streets
of Europe to the disturbance of all harmless and peaceful
citizens shall be dealt with now as an offence against the
law of nations. The mere word that led Belgium to her
own destruction will not satisfy Europe any more. We
all believed it. We all trusted it. It gave way at the
first pressure of temptation, and Europe has been
plunged into this vortex of blood. We will, therefore,
wait until we hear what terms and guarantees the
German Government offer other than those, better than
those, surer than those which she so lightly broke, and
meanwhile we shall put our trust in an unbroken army
rather than in a broken faith.
Forty-eight hours after Mr. Lloyd George
had spoken the whole world was astonished
by the publication of a Note addressed to all
the belligerent Powers by the President of the
United States, anil suggesting that an early
occasion should be sought for an avowal of
their respective views as to the terms upon
which the war might be concluded. The Note
as communicated by the American Ambassador
in London was dated December 20, and ran
as follows :
The President of the United States has instructed
me to suggest to tho Government of his Britannic
Majesty u course of action with regard to the present
war which he hopos that his Majesty's Government
will take under consideration, as suggested in the most
friendly spirit and as coming not only from a friend,
but also as coming from the representative of a neutral
nation, whose interests have been most seriously
affected by the war, and whose concern for its early
conclusion arises out of a manifest necessity to determine
how best to safeguard those interests if the war is to
continue.
The suggestion which I am instructed to make the
President has long had it in mind to offer. He is
somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular
time, because it may now seem to have been prompted
by the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It is
in fact in no way associated with them in its origin,
and the President would have delayed offering it until
those overtures had been answered but for tho fact that
it also concerns the question of peace and may best
be considered in connexion with other proposals which
have the same end in view. Tho President can only
bog that his suggestion be considered entirely on its
own merits and as if it had been made in other cir-
cumstances.
The President suggests that an early occasion be
Miuuht to call out from all the nations now at war
such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms
upon which the war might be concluded and the arrange-
monts.which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee
against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict
in the future as would make it possible frankly to
compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken
to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve,
or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in
any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no
desire to determine the method or the instrumentality.
One way will be as acceptable to him as another if only
the great object he has in mind be attained.
He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact
that the objects "which the statesmen of the belligerents
on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
488
the samej as stated in general terms to their own people
and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights
and privileges of weak peoples and small States as
secure against aggression or denial in the future as the
rights and privileges of the great and powerful States
now at war. Each wishes itself to be made secure in
the future, along with all other nations and peoples, .
against the recurrence of wars like this, and against
aggression or selfish interference of any kind. Each
would be jealous of the formation of any more rival
leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amidst
multiplying suspicions ; but each is ready to consider
the formation of a league of nations to ensure peace
and justice throughout the world. Before that final
step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary
first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms
which will certainly safeguard the independence, the
territorial integrity, and the political and commercial
freedom of the nations involved.
In the measures to be taken to secure the future .
paace of the world the people and the Government
of the United States are as vitally and as directly
interested as the Governments now at war. Their
interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve
the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril
of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of
any other people or Government. They stand ready,
and even eager, to cooperate in the accomplishment
of these ends when the war is over with every influence
and resource at their command. But the war must
first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be
concluded they are not at liberty to suggest ; but the
Prssident does feel that it is his right and his duty to
point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest
it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater
things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation
of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure,
be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than
all, an injury be done civilization itself which can
never be atoned or repaired.
The President, therefore, feels altogether justified
in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a com-
parison of views as to the terms which must precede
those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world
which all desire, and in which the neutral nations as well
as those at war are ready to play their full responsible
part. If the contest must continue to proceed towards
undefined ends by slow attrition until one group of
belligerents or the other is exhausted, if million after
million of human lives must continue to be offered up
until on the one side or the other there are no more to
offer, if resentments must be kindled that can never cool
and despairs engendered from which there can be no
recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of
free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.
The life of the entire world has been profoundly
affected. Every part of the great family of mankind
has felt the burden and terror of this unprecedented
contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can
be said in truth to stand outside its influence or to be
safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the con-
crete objects for which it is being waged have never
been definitely stated.
The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has
been said, stated those objects in general terms. But,
stated in general terms, they seem the same on both
sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of
either side avowed the precise objects which would, if
attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had
been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture
what definite results, what actual exchange of guaran-
tees, what political or territorial changes or readjust-
ments, what stage of military success even, would bring
the war to an end.
It may be that peace is nearer than we know ; that
the terms which the belligerents on the one side and
PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM OF POLAND : ORGANIZED STREET SCENES
IN WARSAW.
484
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are
not so i rreconcilable as some have feared ; that an
interchange of views would clear the way at least for
conference and make the porraanent concord of the
nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of
nations immediately practicable.
The President is not proposing peace ; he is not
even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that
sounding* be taken in order that we may leafn, tlm
neutral nations with the belligerents, how near th«>
haven of peace may be for which all mankind long-;
with an intense and increasing longing. He believes
that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which
ho seeks will be understood by all concerned, and he
M. CAMILLE DECOPPET,
President of the Swiss Republic in 1916.
confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new
light into the affairs of the world.
The place of this remarkable Note in the
evolution of American policy has already been
denned, and it has been seen why Mr. Wilson
suggested peace. He did so partly because he
thought it his duty to make a powerful effort
at this stage to avert the consequences to the
United States which he already foresaw, if
the war were continued — submarine " ruth-
N 'ssi icss " of a still more complete kind on the
part of Germany, followed inevitably by rupture
of relations with Germany by the United
States, and probably by war. He also desired
to give the Allies emphatic assurance that, if
peace could be obtained, he would do every-
thing possible to guarantee American support
of that peace against future assaults.* Mr.
* See Chapter C'LXXVH., pag<- 378.
Wilson's attitude was in some respects very
like that of Sir Edward Grey when, on the very
eve of war with Germany, he was pleading for
Utopian ideals which might be realized if only
"this present crisis" were "safely passed,'
and urging upon the German Imperial Chan-
cellor (dispatch to Sir Edward Goschen, July
30, 1914) that " the one way of maintaining
the good relations between England and Ger-
many is that they should continue to work
M. EDMOND SCHULTHESS,
President of the Swiss Republic in 1917.
together to preserve the peace of Europe."
Germany was as certain to defeat the one hope
as the other, and the United States acted
as Great Britain had acted ; but seen in
retrospect the effort of the American Presi-
dent in 1916 was, perhaps, not less defensible
than the effort of the British Foreign Secretary
in 1914.
When, however, Mr. Wilson's Note surprised
the world it was impossible for the enemies of
Germany to see it in that calm light. What
could be better calculated to assist German
diplomacy ? How could the peoples of all
the countries that were staking their all for
liberty fail to be shocked by the apparent belief
of the President that the objects on both sides
were " virtually the same " ? What could
seem to them more unjust than Mr. Wilson's
cold " impartiality " ? Little wonder that all
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
485
the peoples of the Entente countries endorsed
the phrases of Mr. Bonar Law : " What Presi-
dent Wilson is longing for we are fighting for.
Our sons and brothers are dying for it, and we
mean to secure it. The heart of the people of
our country is longing for peace. We are
praying for peace, a peace that will bring
back in safety those who are dear to us, but a
peace which will mean this — that those who
will never come back shall not have laid down
their lives in vain."
The American Note was followed almost
immediately by two other communications to
the belligerents — a Note from Switzerland,
presented on December 22, and a Note from
the three Scandinavian Governments, presented
on December 29. The Scandinavian repre-
sentations were little but a formal reminder
that Denmark, Norway and Sweden were, as
they said, not wanting in " their duty to their
own people, as well as to humanity," and an
expression of their "warmest sympathy with
any efforts tending to end all the sufferings
and losses, moral as well as material, which
are being continually incurred."
The Swiss Note was, perhaps, more signifi-
cant. In the first place it stated that the
Swiss Federal Council, " inspired by the ardent
desire to see an early cessation of hostilities,"
had " got into touch " with President Wilson
" five weeks " before and the Note said :
The generous personal initiative of President Wilson
will not fail to awaken in Switzerland a deep echo.
Faithful to the duties which the strictest observation
of neutrality imposes upon her, united by the same
friendship to the two groups of Powers at present at war.
isolated in the middle of the frightful struggle of peoples,
seriously threatened and struck in her spiritual and
material interests, our country longs for peace.
Switzerland is ready .to aid "with all her feeble strength
in putting an end to the sufferings of the war which she
sees going on every day — the interned, the seriously
wounded, and the repatriated. She is also desirous to
assist in the fruitful collaboration of the peoples. . . .
She would consider it a happy duty to work even in the
most modest measure towards the rapprochement of thf
nations at war and the establishment of a lasting peace.
The Swiss Note gave the Allies at least a
welcome opportunity to declare (January 17,
1917) that "the whole world knows Switzer-
land's generous efforts to lighten the sufferings
of the interned, the severely wounded, the
people ejected from their homes, to all of
whom the most devoted care has been given."
Thus, to return to the main issues, the
Allies were in presence of proposals from their
SWITZERLAND PROVIDES AN ASYLUM FOR BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR.
The illustration shows the mixed German Swiss Commission before which the prisoners about to be
exchanged were brought for a second and final examination. The standing figure marked with an X
is Prince Max of Baden.
143—3
486
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
enemies and recommendations from the United
States. Before they could reply to their
enemies Germany hastened (December 25) to
register her reply to Mr. Wilson :
Thie high-minded suggestion made by the President
of the United States of America in order to create a
basis for the establishment of lasting peace has been
received and considered by the Imperial Government in
the friendly spirit in which it is expressed.
In the Presidents communication the President
points out that which he lias at heart and leaves open
the choice of the road. To the Imperial Government an
immediate exchange of views seems to be the most
appropriate road in order to reach the desired result.
It begs, therefore, in the sense of the declaration made
on December 12, which held out a hand for peace
negotiations, to propose an immediate meeting of dele-
gates of the belligerent States at some neutral place.
The Imperial Government is also of opinion that
the great work of preventing future wars can be begun
only after the end of the present struggle of nations.
It will, when the moment shall have come, be ready
with pleasure to collaborate fully with the United
States in this exalted task.
The insolence of this communication was
clear enough. " Coolly, skilfully and com-
pletely," observed the New York Times, " the
Germans have turned the Wilson Note to their
own ends." They had totally evaded the
issue, and could hardly have stated more
plainly that for Germany the neutral Powers
[/'Vow the \ienna "JffcfAfff
PEACE AND JOHN BULL.
Peace : " This year I will not allow myself to be put cff any longer, Mister John."
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
487
were tools, whose only acceptable service was
to assist Germany in bringing her enemies to
conference. The German plan was to refuse
to state terms, and, as the New York Tribune
put it, to " blackmail President Wilson by the
threat of a German submarine campaign into
an endorsement of the German proposals of a
conference of the belligerents. ' ' Henceforward ,
at any rate, it was certain that the whole
German manoeuvre was doomed to failure. It
remains to describe the momentous pronounce-
ments to which it gave rise — pronouncements
which reflected the whole' truth of the situation
after two and a half years of war, and marked
out. in clear lines the road along which the
civilized world had still to travel to its goal of
liberty and peace.
The Allies' reply to the enemy Powers was
communicated by the French Government on
December 30, 1916, to the American Ambas-
sador in Paris. The following was the official
English translation, with the insertion in some
passages of the original French and a more
faithful English rendering :
The Allied Governments of Russia, France, Great
Britain, Japan, Italy, Serbia, Belgium, Montenegro,
Portugal, and Rumania, united for the defence of th •
freedom of nations and faithful to their undertaking:
not to lay down their arms except in common accord,
have decided to return a joint answer to the illusory
peace proposals which have been addressed to them by
the Governments of the enemy Powers through th.i
intermediary of the United States, Spain, Switzerland,
and the Netherlands.
As a prelude to any reply, the Allied Powers feel
bound to protest strongly against the two material
assertions made in the Note from the enemy Powers,
the one professing to throw upon the Allies the responsi-
bility of the war, and the other proclaiming the victory
of the Central Powers. •
The Allies cannot admit a claim which is thus untrue
in each particular, and is sufficient alone to render
sterile all attempt at negotiations.
The Allied nations have for 30 months been engaged
in [subissent — have had to endure] a war which they had
done everything to avoid. They have shown by their
actions their devotion to peace. This devotion is as
strong to-day as it was in 1914 ; and after the violation
by Germany of her solemn engagements, Germany's
promise is no sufficient foundation on which to re-
establish the peace which she broke.
A mere suggestion, without statement of terms, that
negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace.
The putting forward by the Imperial Government of a
sham \_pr6tendue — pretended] proposal, lacking all
substance and precision, would appear to be less an offer
of peace than a war manoeuvre.
It is founded on a calculated misinterpretation of Hi.-
character of the struggle in the past, the present, and
the future.
As for the past, the German Note takes no account
of the facts, dates, and figures which establish that the
war was desired, provoked and declared by Germany
and Austria-Hungary.
At the Hague Conference it was the German delegate
who refused all proposals for disarmament. In July,
1914, it was Austria-Hungary who, after having addressed
MR. W. G. SHARP,
United States Ambassador in Paris.
to Serbia an unprecedented ultimatum, declared war
upon her in spite of the satisfaction which had at onc->
been accorded. The Central Empires then rejected all
attempts made by the Entente to bring about a pacific
solution of a purely local conflict. Great Britain sug-
gested a Conference, France proposed an International
Commission, the Emperor of Russia asked the German
Kmperor to go to arbitration, and Russia and Austria-
Hungary came to an understanding on the eve of th •
conflict ; but to all these efforts Germany gave neither
answer nor effect. Belgium was invaded by an Empire
which had guaranteed her neutrality and which has had
the assurance to proclaim that treaties were "scraps of
paper " and that '* necessity knows no law.*'
At the present moment these sham [prdtcndues —
pretended] offers on the part of Germany rest on a
" War Map " of Europe alone, which represents nothing
more than a superficial and passing phase of the situa-
tion, and not the real strength of the belligerents. A
peace concluded upon these terms would be only to the
advantage of the aggressors, who, after imagining that
they would reach their goal in two months, discovered
after two years that they could never attain it.
As for the future, the disasters caused by the German
declaration of war and the innumerable outrages com-
mitted by Germany and her Allies against both belli-
gerents and neutrals demand penalties [sanctions — retri-
bution], reparation, and guarantees ; Germany avoids the
mention of any of these.
In reality these overtures made by the Central Powers
are nothing more than a calculated attempt to influence
488
THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.
the future course of the war, and to end it by imposing
a German peace.
The object of these overtures is to create dissension
in public opinion [troubler Fopinion — disturb opinion]
in Allied countries. But that public opinion has, in
spite of all the sacrifices endured by the Allies, already
given its answer with admirable firmness, and has
denounced the empty pretence [ride — emptiness] of the
declaration of the Enemy Powers.
They have the further object of stiffening public
opinion in Germany and in the countries allied to her ;
one and all, already severely tried by their losses, worn
BARON BEYENS,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
out by economic pressure and crushed by the supreme
effort which has been imposed upon their inhabitants.
They endeavour to deceive and intimidate public
opinion in neutral countries whose inhabitants have long
•since made up their minds where the initial responsibility
rests, have recognized existing responsibilities, and are
far too enlightened to favour the designs of Germany
by abandoning the defence of human freedom.
Finally, these overtures attempt to justify in advance
in the eyes of the world a new series of crimes — submarine-
warfare, deportations, forced labour and forced enlist-
ment of inhabitants against their own countries, and
violations of neutrality.
Fully conscious of the gravity of this moment, but
•qually conscious of its requirements, the Allied Govern-
ments, closely united to one another and in perfect
sympathy with their peoples, refuse to consider a pro-
posal which is empty and insincere.
Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible
so long as they have not secured reparation of violated
rights and liberties, recognition of the principle of
nationalities, and of the free existence of small states ;
so long as they have not brought about a settlement
calculated to end, once and for all, forces [causes —
causes] which have constituted a perpetual menace to
the nations [qui depuis si longtemps onl menact lea
nations — which have so long threatened the nations 1
and to afford the only effective guarantees for the future
security of the world.
In conclusion, the Allied Powers think it necessary to
put forward the following considerations, which show
the special situation of Belgium after two and a half years
of war.
In virtue of international treaties signed by five
great European Powers, of whom Germany was one,
Belgium enjoyed, before the war, a special status
rendering her territory inviolable and placing her, under
the guarantee of the Powers, outside all European
conflicts. She was, however, in spite of the.sr trvatir-
the first to suffer the aggression of Germany. For this
reason the Belgian Government think it necessary to
define the aims which Belgium has never ceased to
pursue, while fighting side by side with the Entente
Powers for right and justice.
Belgium has always scrupulously fulfilled the duties
which her neutrality imposed upon her. She lias taken
up arms to defend her independence and her neutrality
violated by Germany, and to show that she remains
faithful [el pour rester fidele — and to be true] to her
international obligations. On August 4, 1914, in the
Reichstag, the German Chancellor admitted that this
aggression constituted an injustice contrary to the laws
of nations and pledged himself in the name of Germany
to repair it.
During two and a half years this injustice has been
cruelly aggravated by the proceedings of the occupying
forces, which have exhausted the resources of the
country, ruined its industries, devastated its towns and
villages, and have been responsible for innumerable
ma-sacres, executions, and imprisonments. At this
very moment, while Germany is proclaiming peace and
humanity to the world, she is deporting Belgian citizens
by thousands and reducing them to slavery.
Belgium before the war asked for nothing but to live
in harmony with all her neighbours. Her King and her
Government have but one aim — the re-establishment of
peace and justice [droit — right]. But they only desire
[desire only] a peace which would assure to their country
legitimate reparation, guarantees, and safeguards for the
future.
The reply of the Allies was received in
Germany with a great exhibition of indignation.
The Government organs were shocked by its
" shallowness," " levity," " mendacity," and so
on, and declared in a shrill chorus that proud
and injured Germany could answer 'such
insults only with the sword. " We have done
what we could," said the German Imperial
Chancellor to the Berlin correspondent of the
Vienna Neue Freie Presse, " to spare the world
further bloodshed. If the New Year has not
brought us nearer to peace, that is the fault of
our enemies." Ultimately (January 11) Ger-
many sent out a fresh Note to the United
States, Spain and Switzerland, saying that in
view of the form in which the Allies had
couched their rejection of the peace proposal a
reply to them was "impossible," but that the
German Government "thinks it important to
communicate to the neutral Powers its view of
the state of affairs."
This time the German Government declared
that " history " should be left to judge the
origins of the war. Germany and her Allies,
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
489
" who were obliged to take up arms to defend
their freedom," now regarded this aim as
" attained." On the other hand the enemy
Powers were aiming, " among other things," at
" the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and several
Prussian provinces, the humiliation and dimi-
nution of Austria-Hungary, the disintegration
of Turkey, and the mutilation of Bulgaria."
The Note proceeded :
Our enemies describe the peace offer of the four
allied Powers as a war manoeuvre. Germany and her
allies most emphatically protest against such a falsi-
fication of their motives, which they openly stated.
Their conviction was that a just peace acceptable to
all belligerents was possible, that it could be brought
about, and that further bloodshed could not be justified.
Their readiness to make known their peace conditions
without reservation at the opening of negotiations
disproves any doubt of their sincerity.
Our enemies, in whose power it was to examine the
real value of our offer, neither made any examination
nor made counter-proposals. Instead of that, they
declared that peace was impossible so long as the
M BRIAND PRESENTING TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN THE
OF THE BELGIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE REPLY OF THE
ALLIES TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE NOTE.
490
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
491
restoration of violated rights and liberties, the acknow-
ledgment of the principle of nationalities, and the free
existence of small States were not guaranteed. The
sincerity which our enemies deny to the proposal
of the four allied Powers cannot be allowed by the
world to these demands if it recalls the fate of the
Irish people, the destruction of the freedom and inde-
pendence of the Boer Republics, the subjection of
Northern Africa by England, France, and Italy, the
suppression of foreign nationalities in Russia, and,
finally, the oppression of Greece, which is unexampled
in history.
There was then a long dissertation on the
abandonment of the Declaration of London,
the "starvation campaign against Germany,"-
the wickedness of " the extension of the war
to Africa," and finally an insolent attack on
Belgium, on the ground especially that she did
not accept the German proposal that the
German armies should march through Belgium
unopposed.
A similar Note was sent out from Vienna, the
chief difference being that Austria-Hungary
slandered Serbia as Germany slandered Belgium.
Those Teutonic protestations made little or
no impression in foreign countries ; they were,
indeed, only intended to divert attention in
the Central Empires themselves from the
detailed statements of the policy and aims of
the Allies which were now forthcoming. On
January 10, 1917, M. Briand handed to Mr.
Sharp, the American Ambassador in Paris, the
following reply from the Allies to Mr. Wilson's
Note :
1. The Allied Governments have received the Note
delivered to them on November 19 in the name of
the United States Government. They have studied
it with the care enjoined upon them both by their
accurate sense of the gravity of the moment and by their
sincere friendship for the American people.
2. In general, they make a point of declaring that
they pay homage to the loftiness of the sentiments
inspiring the American Note, and that they associate
themselves wholeheartedly with tho plan of creating
a League of the Nations to ensure peace and justice
throughout the world. They recognize all tho advan-
tages that would accrue to the cause of humanity and
civilization by the establishment of international
settlements designed to avoid violent conflicts between
the nations — settlements which ought to be attended by
the sanctions necessary to assure their execution, and
thus to prevent fresh aggressions from being made
easier by an apparent security.
3. But a discussion of future arrangements designed
to ensure a lasting peace presupposes a satisfactory
settlement of the present conflict. Tho Allies feel a
desire as deep as that of tho United States Government
to see ended, at the earliest possible moment, the var
for which the Central Empires are responsible, and which
inflicts sufferings so cruel upon humanily. But they
judge it impossible to-day to bring about a peace that
shall assure to them the reparation, the restitution, and
the guarantees to which they are entitled by the aggres.
sion for which tho r3sponsibility lies upon the Central
Powers — and of which the very principle tended to under-
mine- the safety of Europe — a peace that shall also permit
the establishment upon firm foundations of the future of
the nations of Europe. The Allied nations are con-
scious that they are fighting not for sflfish interests,
but, above all, to safeguard the independence of peoples,
right, and humanity.
4. The Allies are fully alive to and deplore the losses
and sufferings which the war causes neutrals, as. well as
belligerents, to endure ; but they do not hold them-
selves responsible, since in no way did they desire or
provoke this war ; and they mak-3 every effort to lessen
such damage to the full extent compatible with the
inexorable requirements of their defence against the
violence and the pitfalls of the foe.
5. Hence they note with satisfaction the declaration
that as regards its origin the American communication
was in no wise associated with that of the Central
Powers, transmitted on December 18 by the United
States Govt* rnment ; neither do they doubt the resolve
of that Government to avoid even the appearance of
giving any, albeit, only moral, support to the responsible
authors of the war.
6. The Allied Governments hold themselves bound to
make a stand in the friendliest yet in tho clearest way
against the establishment in the American Note of a
likeness between the two belligerent groups ; this like-
ness, founded upon the public statements of tho Central
Powers, conflicts directly with the evidence, both as
regards the responsibilities for the past and the guaran-
tees for the future. In mentioning this likonoss Presi-
dent Wilson certainly did not mean to associate himself
with it.
7. If at this moment there bo an established historical
fact, it is the aggressive will of Germany and Austria to
ensure their mastery over Europe and their economic
domination over the world. By her declaration of war,
by the immediate violation of Belgium and Luxemburg,
and by the way she has carried on the struggle, Germany
has also proved her systematic contempt of every
principle of humanity and of all respect for small States ;
in proportion as the conflict has developed, the attitude
of tho Central Powers and of their Allies has been a
continual challenge to humanity and to civilization.
Noed we recall the horrors that accompanied the in-
vasion of Belgium and of Serbia, the atrocious rule laid
upon the invaded countries, the massacre of hundreds
of thousands of inoffensive Armenians, the barbarities
committed agaiast the inhabitants of Syria, the Z. ppolin
raids, upon open towns, the destruction by submarines
of passenger steamers and merchantmen, even undsr
neutral flags, the cruel treatment inflicted upon prisoners
of war, the judicial murders of Miss Cavell and of Captain
Fryatt, the deportation and tho reduction to slavery
of civil populations ? The accomplishment of such a
series of crimes, perpetrated without any regard for the
universal reprobation they aroused, amply explains to
President Wilson the protest of the Allies.
8. They consider that the Note they handed to the
United States in reply to the Gorman Note answers the
question put by the American Government, and forms,
according to the words of that Government, " an avowal
of their respective views as to the terms on which the
war might be concluded.'* Mr. Wilson wishes for more :
he desires that the belligerent Powers should define, in tho
full light of day, their aims in prosecuting tho war. The
Allies find no difficulty in answering this request. Their
war aims are well known ; they have been repeatedly ,
defined by the hoods of their various Governments.
These war aims will only be set forth in detail, with all
tho compensations and equitable indemnities for harm
suffered, at the moment of negotiation. But the
civilized world knows that they imply, necessarily and
first of all, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and
Montenegro, with the compensations due to them;
the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in
Russia, in Rumania, with just reparation ; the reorganize-
492
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
tion of Knrope. ^narnnteeii by a slut)!-1 regime and based
at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to
full security and liberty of economic development
possessed by all peoples, small aud great, and at the same
time upon territorial conventions and international
settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers
against unjustified attack ; the restitution of provinces
formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish
of their inhabitants ; the liberation of the Italians, as
also of the Slavs, Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from
foreign domination ; the setting free of tho populations
GENERAL VON STEIN,
Prussian Minister of War.
subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks ; and ths
turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as
decidedly foreign to Western civilization.
9. The intentions of his Majesty the Emperor of
Russia in regard to Poland have been clearly indicated
by the manifesto he has just addressed to his Armies.
10. There is no need to say that, if the Allies desire
to shield Europe from the covotous brutality of Prussian
militarism, the extermination and the political disap-
pearance of the German peoples have never, as has been
pretended, formed part of their designs. They dcsir.
above all to ensure peace on the principles of liberty ami
justice, and upon the inviolable fidelity to international
engagements by which the Government of the United
States have ever been inspired.
11. United in the pursuit of this lofty aim, the Allies
are determined, severally and jointly, to act with all
their power and to make all sacrifices to carry to a
victorious end a conflict upon which, 1 hey arc convinced,
depend not only their own welfare and prosperity but
the future of civilization itself.
Together with the joint Reply of the Allies
to President Wilson, an additional Note from
Belgium was, in the presence of Baron Beyens,
Belgian Minister' for Kmrign Affairs, delivered
to the American Ambassador. The1 principal
passages rim as follows :
As much a- Air. Woodrow Wilson, the Royal Govern-
ment \vimlcl \vi~li to see this war come to an end as soon
us possible.
But the President seems to think that tin- statesmen
in the two ho-tile eamps are pursuing the same war
aims. The example of Belgium unhappily demonstrates
that this is not the case. . Unlike the Central Powers,
Hi Itiiinn luis never aimed at conquest. The barbarous
manner in which the German Government has treated
and still treats the Belgian nation does not admit
of any supposition that Germany will make it her
care to guarantee for the future the rights of weak
peoples which she has not ceased to trample under foot
ever since the war that she let loose began to ravage
Europe.
On the 'other hand, the Royal Government notes with
pleasure and with confidence the assurance that the
United States impatiently await the moment to cooperate
in the measures which will be taken, after peace, to pro-
tect and guarantee small nations against violence and
oppression.
Until Germany delivered her ultimatum, Belgium's
sole aspiration was to live on good terms with all her
neighbours ; towards each of them she discharged with
scrupulous loyalty the obligations imposed on her by her
neutrality. How was she rewarded by Germany for the
confidence she showed ? Overnight, without plausible
warrant, her neutrality was violated, her territory was
invaded, and th? Imperial Chancellor, in announcing to
the Reichstag this violation of right and of treaty, was
compelled to admit the iniquity of such an act and to
promise that reparation would be made. But the
Germans, after occupying Belgian territory, showed
themselves no more observant of tho rules of interna-
tional law or of the provisions of The Hague Conventions.
They exhausted the resources of the country by exac-
tions as heavy as they were arbitrary : they d<>libern ely
ADMIRAL VON HOLTZENDORFF,
Chief of the German Admiralty Staff.
ruined its in-hist ries, destroyed whole towns, and put
to death or imprisoned a considerable number of in-
habitants. Even now, while they loudly proclaim their
dcsiro to put an end to the horrors of the war, they
aggravate the rigours of the occupation by carrying
Belgian workmen into slavery by thousands.
If there' is a country that is entitled to say that it
took up arms in order to defend its existence, that
country assuredly is Belgium. Compelled by force to
fight or to submit to dishonour, she passionately desires
that an end may be set to the unheard-of sufferings
of her population. But she could accept only a peace
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
493
that assures to her, together with equitable reparation,
securities and guarantees for the future.
Finally, the Belgian Government expressed
" the legitimate hope that, at the final settle-
ment of this long war, the voice of the Entente
Powers will find in. the United States a unani-
mous echo to claim for Belgium, the innocent
victim of German ambition and of German
greed, the rank and position that are marked
out for her among the civilized nations, by
virtue of her blameless past, by the valour of
her soldiers, by her fidelity to b/mour, and
by her people's remarkable aptitude for
work."
Reference has already been made to the
attitude of Switzerland and the Scandinavian
States towards Mr. Wilson's Note to the
belligerents. The Spanish Government, for
its part, published on December 30 a reply to
the United States which disclosed the fact that
on December 22, after communication of the
American Note to the belligerents, the United
States had directly invited Spain to make a
demarche on her own account. Spain refused,
and rather pointedly expressed " the opinion
that, now that the President of the United
States has taken this initiative and the different
impressions which it has produced are already
known, the demarche which the United States
invites Spain to make would not be effective,
all the more as the Central Empires have
already expressed their firm intention that the
t conditions of peace should be concerted be-
tween the belligerent Powers alone." The
Spanish Government " suspended its action
and reserved it for a moment when the efforts
of all those who desire peace can have greater
utility and efficacy than they have now,
supposing that at that moment there were
reason to believe thart its initiative or inter-
vention might have good results."
So much for the official pronouncements of
the various Governments. But no account of
them would be complete without the inclusion
of a dispatch which Mr. A. .J. Balfour, now
Foreign Secretary in Mr. Lloyd George's ad-
ministration, addressed to the British Ambas-
sador at Washington, in sending him a trans-
lation of the Allied Note to the United States.
"This powerful and lucid development of the
main points in the case of the Allies," observed
The Times, "brings out the intimate logical
connexion of the terms which they have laid
down with impressive cogency and force. It
possesses all the superiority in reasoning and
in form which the product of a single intelli-
gence, belonging to the first order, enjoys over
a composite production, retouched to satisfy
the criticisms of many different minds." Mr.
Balfour wrote :
I gather from the general tenor of the President's
Note that, while he is animated by an intense dssire that
peace should come soon, and that when it conAs it should
be lasting, he does not, for the moment at least, concern
himself with the terms on which it should be arranged.
His Majesty's Government entirely share the President's
ideals : but they feel strongly that the durability of the
peace must largoly depend on its character, and that
COUNT ROMANONES,
Spanish Prime Minister in 1916.
no stable system of international relations can be
built on foundations which are essentially and hopelessly
defective.
This becomes clearly apparent if we consider the main
conditions which rendered possible the calamities from
which the world is now suffering. These were the
existence of a Great Power consumed with the lust of
domination, in the midst of a community of nations ill
prepared for defence, plentifully supplied, indeed, with
international laws, but with no machinery for enforcing
them, and weakened by the fact that neither the
boundaries of the various States nor their internal con-
stitution harmonized with the aspirations of their
constituent races, or secured to them just and equal
treatment.
That this last evil would be greatly mitigated if the
Allies secured the changes in the map of Europe outlined
in their joint Note is manifest, and 1 need not labour
the point.
It has been argued, indeed, that the expulsion of the
Turks from Europe forms no proper or logical part of
this general scheme. The maintenance of the Turkish
Empire was during many generations regarded by states-
men of world-wide authority as essential to the main*
494
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
GERMANY'S NATIONAL
EFFORT.
Above : Men at work in a gun-finishing
shop at Essen.
Below : Women workers in a turning
shop at Diisseldorf.
Inset : A hydraulic press for shell
making.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
495
tenanee of European peace. Why, it is asked, should
the cause of peace be now associated with a complete
reversal of this traditional policy ?
The answer is that circumstances have completely
changed. It is unnecessary to consider now whether
the creation of a reformed Turkey mediating between
hostile races in the Near East was a scheme wliich, had
the Sultan baen sincere and the Powers united, could
ever have been realized. It certainly cannot be realized
now. The Turkey of " Union and Progress " is at least
as barbarous and is far more aggressive than the Turkey
of Sultan Abdul Hamid. In the hands of Germany it
has ceased even in appearance to be a bulwark of peace,
and is openly used as an instrument of conquest. Under
German officers Turkish soldiers are now fighting in
lands from which they had long been expelled,' and a
Turkish Government, controlled, subsidized, and sup-
ported by Germany, hai been guilty of massacres in
Armenia and Syria more horrible than any recorded in
the history even of those unhappy countries. Evidently
the interests of peace and the claims of nationality
alike require that Turkish rule over alien races shall,
it possible, be brought to an end ; and we may hope that
the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute
as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of
Alsace-Lorraine to France, of Italia Irredenta to Italy,
or any of the other territorial changes indicated in the
Allied Note.
Evidently, however, such territorial rearrangements,
though they may diminish the occasions of war, provide
no sufficient security against its recurrence. If Germany,
or, rather, those in Germany who mould its opinions
and control its destinies, again sot out to dominate the
world, they may find that by the new order of things
the adventure is made more difficult, but hardly that it is
made impossible. They may still have ready to their
hand a political system organized through and through
on a military basis ; they may still accumulate vast stores
of military equipment ; they may still perfect their
methods of attack, so that their more pacific neighbours
will be struck down before they can prepare themselves
for defence. If so, Europe when the war is over will be
far poorer in men, in money, and in mutual good will
than it was when the war began, but it will not be
safer ; and the hopes for the future of the world enter-
tained by the President will be as far as ever from
fulfilment.
There are those who think that, for this disease, inter-
national treaties and international laws may provide
a sufficient cure. But such persons have ill learned the
lessons so clearly taught by recent history. While
other nations, notably the United States of America and
Britain, were striving by treaties of arbitration to make
sure that no chance quarrel should mar the peace
they desired to make perpetual, Germany stood aloof.
Her historians and philosophers preached the splendours
of war : power was proclaimed as the true end of the
State ; the General Staff forged with untiring industry
the weapons by which, at the appointed moment, power
might be achieved. These facts proved clearly enough
that treaty arrangements for maintaining peace were
not likely to find much favour at Berlin ; they did not
prove that such treaties, once made, would be utterly
ineffectual. This became evident only when war had
broken out : though the demonstration, when it came, •
was overwhelming. So long as Germany remains the
Germany which, without a shadow of justification, over-
ran and barbarously ill-treated a country it was pledged
to defend, no State can regard its rights as secure if
they have no better protection than a solemn treaty.
The case is made worse by the reflection that these
methods of calculated brutality were designed by the
Central Powers not merely to crush to tho dust those
with whom thny were at war, but to intimidate those
•with whom they were still at peace. Belgium was not
only a victim — it was an example. Neutrals were
intended to note the outrages which accompanied its
conquest, the reign of terror which followed on its occupa-
tion, the deportation of a portion of its population, the
cruel oppression of the remainder. And lest nations
happily protected, either by British fleets or by their
own, from German armies should suppose themselves
safe from German methods, the submarine has (within
its limits) assiduously imitated the barbaric practices
of the sister service. The War Staffs of the Central
Powers are well content to horrify the world if at the
same time they can terrorize it.
If, then, the Central Powers succeed, it will be to
methods like these that they will owe their success.
How can any reform of international relations be based
COUNT CZERNIN,
Appointed Austrian Foreign Minister in 1916.
on a peace thus obtained J Such a peace would repre-
sent the triumph of all the forces which make war certain
and make it brutal. It would advertise the futility of
all the methods on which civilization relies to eliminate
the occasions of international dispute and to mitigate
their ferocity.
Germany and Austria made the present war inevitable
by attacking the rights of one small State, and they
gained their initial triumphs by violating the treaty-
guarded territories of another. Are small States going
to find in them their future protectors, or in treaties
made by them a bulwark against aggression ? Terrorism
by land and sea will have proved itself the instrument of
victory. Are the victors likely to abandon it on the
appeal of the neutrals ? If existing treaties are no m ore
than scraps of paper can fresh treaties help us ? If tha
violation of the most fundamental canons of international
law be crowned with success, will it not be in vain that
the assembled nations labour to improve thsir code t
None will profit by their rules but the criminals who-
break them. It is those who keep them that will suffer*
Though, therefore, the people of this country share
to the full the desire of the President for peace, they do
not believe that peace can bn durable if it be not based
on the success of the Allied cause. For a durable peace
can hardly be expected unless three conditions are
fulfilled. The first is that the existing causes of inter-
national unrest should be, as far as possible, removed
or weakened. The second is that the aggressive aims
496
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers
should fall into disrepute among their own peoples.
The third is that behind international law, and behind
all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hos-
tilities, some form of international sanction should be
devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor.
These conditions may be difficult of fulfilment. But
we believe them to be in general harmony with the
President's ideals and we are confident that none of
them can be satisfied, even imperfectly, unless peace
b« secured on the general lines indicated (so far as
Europe is concerned) in the Joint Note. Therefore it is
that tliis country has made, is making, and is prepared
to make sacrifices of blood and treasure unparalleled in
its history. It bears these heavy burdens not merely
that it may thus fulfil its treaty obligations, nor yet
that it may secure a barren triumph of one group of
nations over another. It bears them because it firmly
believes that on the success of the Allies depend the
prospects of peaceful civilization and of those interna-
tional reforms which the best thinkers of the New
World, as of the Old, dare to hope may follow on the
cessation of our present ralumit i 's.
Immediately after the publication of the
Reply of the Allies to President Wilson, the
Kaiser addressed the following proclamation
to the German people :
Our enemies have dropp3d the mask. After refusing
with scorn and hypocritical words of love for peace
and humanity our honest peace offer they now, in their
reply to the United States, have gone beyond that,
and admitted their lust for conquest, the baseness of
which is further enhanced by their calumnious asser-
tions. Their aim is the crushing of Germany, the dis-
memberment of the Powers allied to us, and the enslave-
ment of the freedom of Europe and the seas under the
same yoke that Greece, with gnashing teeth, is now
enduring. But what they in thirty months of the
bloodiest fighting and unscrupulous economic war
could not achieve they will also in all the future not
accomplish.
FRL. LUDERS,
Head of the Women's Department of the
Prussian "War Bureau."
BARON VON FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN.
Deputy-Chief of the German General Staff, 1916.
Our glorious victories and our iron strength of will
with which our fighting people at the front and at
home have born all hardship and distress, guarantee
that also in ths future our beloved Fatherland has
nothing to fear. Burning indignation and holy wrath
will redouble the strength of every German man and
woman, whether it is devoted to fighting, work, or
suffering. We are ready for all sacrifices. The God
who planted His glorious spirit of freedom in our brave
people's heart will also give us and our loyal alli?s,
tested in battle, full victory over all the enemy lust
for power and rage for destruction.
This proclamation and the flood of similar
utterances which were now emitted from
Germany were no doubt sincere enough in
the sense that Germany was much disgusted
by the Allies' frank ' definition of their aims
in prosecuting the war. The statements of
the Allies were, indeed, of the most damaging
kind, and the German peace manoeuvre as
such had failed ignominiously. But although
the failure was unpleasantly ignominious,
German expectation of direct success had
always been extremely faint. The main object
was to clear the political decks for more
" ruthless " prosecution of the war. Germany
was about to throw out her final challenge to
the world. She was aware that she was now
staking everything. In view especially of the
experiences of Belgium, Serbia and Rumania,
it was improbable that any of the other European
States would intervene at this stage. But,
for the rest, it was " Central Europe " against
the world, and Germany was risking the whole
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
497
of the Germanic structures which she had so
painfully built up in the United States, in
South America, and in the Far East. There
could be no better evidence of the German
view than the astounding instructions sent
from Berlin to Count Bernstorff in Washington
for transmission to the German Minister in
Mexico.* Herr Zimmermann, the new German
Foreign Secretary, was writing, it must be
remembered, on January 19, while Germany
was nominally on the most friendly terms with
the United States. He already announced
that " unrestricted " submarine warfare would
of an alliance with Persia in 1807 ! As for
the intended proposal to Japan, it could bo
appreciated only by the German Government
which during the spring and summer of 1914
had been trying to prepare for its coming war
by securing Japanese neutrality, and by the
German people which had seriously believed
at the beginning of August, 1914, that Japan
had declared war on Russia.
Whether or not President Wilson was
already aware of the true character of German
policy, he continued calmly on his course.
On January 22 he delivered a speech to the
FUNERAL OF THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH OF AUSTRIA, KING OF HUNGARY.
He died on November 21, 1916.
begin on February 1 ; he declared that
Germany " intended to endeavour to keep
neutral " the United States ; and yet he was
already prepared, " as soon as it is certain that
there will be an outbreak of war with the
United States," to make a definite alliance
with Mexico, and to invite Japan to desert her
Allies. Seldom in the history of diplomacy
had there been such a combination of cyniei^'ii
and folly ; when Herr Zimmermann was
criticised in the Reichstag, the National
Liberals cited Frederick the Great and Napoleon
in his defence — especially Napoleon's proposal
* For the text of the Notj see Chapter CLXXVIII.,
p. 373.
Senate which, in spite of its apparent irrelevance
to the events that were immediately impending,
must be recorded here as one of the most
memorable State papers in the history of the
time. Mr. Wilson said :
On December 18 last I addressed an identic Note
to the Governments of the nations now at war requesting
them to state, more definitely than they had yet been
by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which
they would deem it possible to make peace.
I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of
oil neutral nations like our own, many of whose most
vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy.
The Central Powers united in a reply which stated
merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists
in conference to discuss terms of peace.
The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely
and have stated, in general terms indeed, hut with
498
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WALt.
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
499
sufficient dofiniteness to imply details, tho arrange-
ments, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they
deem to be the indispeasabb conditions of a satisfactory
settlement.
We are much nearer a definite discussion of the
peace which shall end the present war. We are that
much nearer tho discussion of the international concert
which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In
every discussion of the peace that must end this war
it is taken "for granted that peace must be followed by
definite concert of the Powers which will make it vir-
tually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever
overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every
sane and thoughtful man, must take that for granted.
I have sought this opportunity to address you because
I thought that I owed it to you, as the council asso-
ciated with me in the final determination of our inter-
national obligations, to disclose to you without reserve
the thought and purpose that have been taking form in
my mind with regard to the duty of our Government
in the days to come, when it will be necessary to lay
afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace
among tha nations.
It is inconceivable that the people of the United
Slates should play no part in that gr^at enterprise.
To take part in such a service will be the opportunity
for which they have sought to prepare themselves
by the very principles and purposes of their polity
and the approved practices of their Government ever
-since the days when they set up a new nation in tho
high and honourable hope that it might in all that it
was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They
cannot in honour withhold the service to which they arc
' now about to be challenged. They do not wish to with-
hold it. But they owe it to themselves and to th j
othor nations of tho world to state the conditions und^r
which they will feel free to render it.
That service is nothing less than this : To add their
authority and their power to the authority and force of
other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout
the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long
postponed. It is right that before it comes this Govern-
ment should frankly formulate the conditions upon
which it would feel justified in asking our people to
approve its formal and solemn adherence to a league for
p. -ace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.
The present war must first be ended, but we owe
it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of
mankind to say that, so far as our participation in
guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a
great deal of difference in what way and upon what
terms it is ended.
The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end
must embody terms that will create a poace that is
worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will
win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that
will serve the several interests and immediate aims of
the nations engaged.
We shall have no voice in determining what those
terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voico
in determining whether they shall be made lasting
or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant ; and
our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential
as a condition precedent to permanency should be
spoken now, not afterwards, when it may be too late.
No covenant of cooperative peace that does not
"ncludo tho peoples of the New World can suffice to
keep the future safe against war ; and yet there is only
one sort of peace that tho peoples of America could
join in guaranteeing. Tho elements of that peacu
must be elements that engage the confidence and
satisfy the principles of the American Government,
elements consistent with the political faith and the
practical convictions which the peoples of America have
once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.
I do not mean to say that any American Government
•would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of
peace the Governments now at war might agree upon .
or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might
be, I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace
between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belli-
gerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make
peace secure.
It will b? absolutely necessary that a force be created
as a guarantor of the permanency of tho settlement so
much greater than tho force of any nation now engaged
or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no
nation, no probable combination of nations, could faff
or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is
to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the orga-
nized major force of mankind.
The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will
determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee
can be secured. The -question upon which th>^ whole
CARL, EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA AND
KING OF HUNGARY.
future peace and policy of tho world depends is this :
Is tho present a struggle for a just and secure peace or
only for a new balance of power ? If it bo only a
struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee,
who can guarantee the stable equilibrium of the new
arrangement ? Only a tranquil Europe can bo a stable
Europe. There must bo, not a balance of power, but a
community of power; not organized rivalries but an
organized common peace.
Fortunately we have received very explicit aifurancos
on this point.
The statesmen of both of tin group: of na'ions now
arrayed against one another havo said, in terms that
could not bo misinterpreted, that it was no pirt of tho
purpose they had in mind to cruih thoir antagonists.
But the implications of these assurances may not bo
equally clear to all — may not be the same on both sides
of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt
to set forth what we understand them to be.
They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without
victory.
I beg that I may be permitted to put my own inter-
pretation upon it and that it may be understood that
no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking
500
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.
only to face realities, and to face them without soft
concealments.
Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a
victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would
be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at intolerable
sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter
memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not
permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace
between equals can last — only a peace the very principle
of which is equality and a common participation in a
common benefit. The right state of mind, the right
feeling between nations is as necessary for a lasting peace
as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory
or of racial and national allegiance.
The equality of nations upon which peace must be
founded, if it is to last, must be an equality of rights :
the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor
security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social
development should be guaranteed to all peoples who
have lived hitherto under the power of Governments
devoted to a taith and purpose hostile to their
own.
I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an
abstract political principle which has always been held
very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty
in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken
of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly
incli-pensable — because I wish frankly to uncover
realities.
Any peace which does not recognize and accept this
principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon
the affections or the convictions of mankind. The fer-
ment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and
constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize.
THE KAISER'S "PEACE VISIT" TO KING OF BAVARIA AT MUNICH,
DECEMBER 12, 1916.
imply a difference between big nations and small ;
between those that are powerful and those that are
weak. Right must be based upon the common strength,
not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon
whose concert peace will depend.
Equality of territory or of resources there, of course,
cannot be ; nor any other sort of equality not gained
in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of
the people themselves. * But no one asks or expects
anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is
looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoi-es of
power.
And t hero is a deeper t hi ng involved t nan even equality
of right among organized nation".
No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not
recognize and accept the principle that, Governments
derive all their just powers from the consent of the
governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand
peopN-s about from poientate to potentate as if thev
were property.
I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture
upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are
agreed that there -hould be a united, independent, and
autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable
The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and
there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion,
where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a .sense of
justice, of freedom, and of right.
So far as practicable, moreover, every great people
now struggling towards a full development of its resources
and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to
the great highways of the sea.
Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory
it no doubt can be done by the neutralization of direct
rights of way under the general guarantee which wil!
assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrange-
ment no nation need be shut away irom free access to
the open patlis of the world's commerce.
And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact
be free. The freedom of the seas is the sine qua non ot
peac.?, equality, and cooperation.
No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many
of the rules of international practice hitherto thought
to be established may be necessary in order to make tho
seas indeed free and common in practically all circum-
stances for the use of mankind ; but the motive for :--"ch
changes is convincing and compelling. There can bo
no trust or intimacy between the peoples of th^ world
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi.
501
without them. The free, constant, unthreatened inter,
course of nations is an essential part of the process of
peace and of development. It need not be difficult either
to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the
Governments of the world sincerely desire to come to
an agreement concerning it.
It is a problem closely connected with the limitation
henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and
maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for
peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their
policy to it as they have planned for war and made
ready for pitiless contest and rivalry.
The question of armaments, whether on land or on
sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical
[From " Ulk," January 12, 1917.
"THE EXTINGUISHED LAMP OF PEACE."
German soldiers are represented in pursuit of the Powers which have refused the Germin peace
proposal, and as determined now to "thrash" them.
of naval armaments and the cooperation of the navies
of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe,
and the question of limiting naval armaments opens the
wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limiui-
tion of armies and of all programmes of military prepara-
tion. Difficult and delicate as these questions arc, they
rmi^t be faced with the utmost candour and decided in
a spirit of real accommodation, if peace is to come with
healing in* its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot
be had without concession and sacrifice.
There can be no sense of safety and equality among
tho nations if great and preponderating armaments are
question connected with the future fortunes of nations
tind of mankind.
I have spoken upon these great matters without
reserve and with the utmost explicitness, because it has
seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning
desire for peace was anywhere to find voice and free
utterance.
Perhaps I am the only person in high authority
amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to
speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an
individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the
responsible head of a great Government, and I feel
502
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
[From "Laslige Blatter."
"THE BLOCKADE OF THE CHANNEL."
"England is becoming more and more like a
mouse-trap."
confident that I have said what the people of the United
States would wish me to say.
May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in
effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in
every nation and of every programme of liberty ? I
would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass
of mankind everywhere who have yet had no place
or opportunity to speak their real hearts out con-
cerning the death and ruin they see to have coma
already upon the persons and the homes thay hold
most dear.
And in holding out the expectation that the people
and Government of the United States will join the other
civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the perma-
nence of peace upon such terms (as) I have named I
speak with the greater boldness and confidence because
it is clear to every man who can think that there is in
t his promise no breach in either our traditions or our
policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that
we have professed or striven for.
I am proposing, as it were, that the nations shoulil
with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monro--
as the doctrine of the world : that no nation should seek
to extend its polity over any other nation or people, bu-
that every people should be left free to determine its
own polity, its own way of development, unhindered,
unthroatcned, unafraid, the little along with the grea'
and powerful.
I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid
entangling alliances which would draw them into com-
p. 'lit ions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and set-
IKh rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences
intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance
in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same
-'•n-e and with the same purpose all act in common
interest ami are free to live their own lives under a
common protection.
I am proposing government by the consent of the
governed ; that freedom of the seas which in internationa!
conference after conference representatives of the people
of the United States have urged with the eloquence of
tlmsK who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and
that moderation of armaments which makes of armies
and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument
of aggression or of selfish violence.
These are American principles, American policies. We
could stand for no others. And yet they are the prin-
ciples and policies of forward-looking men and women
everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened
community. They arn the principles of mankind am'
must prevail.
Meanwhile Germany was completing her
preparations. On the evening of January 31
the American Ambassador in Berlin, Mr.
Gerard, was summoned to the Foreign Office,
and was informed that at midnight — this was
just three and a half hours' notice ! — Germany
would " abandon the limitations which she had
hitherto imposed on herself in the employ-
ment of her fighting weapons at sea." Herr
Zimmermann produced the Memorandum
designating " barred zones (sperrgebiete) around
Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in the
Eastern Mediterranean," and a new Note to
the United States. The Note began with a
reference to Mr. Wilson's speech to the Senate,
declaring cynically that " the guiding lines
of this important declaration agree, to a large
extent, with the principles and wishes which
Germany professes." Germany would " sin-
cerely rejoice if peoples like those of Ireland
and India now obtained their freedom." The
Note then referred to the German peace
proposals, and declared that they had failed
"owing to the lust of conquest of their
opponents who desire to dictate peace."
There was then a long denunciation of the
[l-'rt.m " >"im/>'t. iystmj.
" Mister Neptune, the Germans are in the
Athntic!"
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
508
THE HOSPITAL SHIP "LANFRANG"
Torpedoed on the South Coast without warning, April 17, 1917. The hospital ship " Donegal "
was sunk on the same day.
Allies, and especially of the British Empire,
and the Note proceeded :
Every day by which the terrible struggle is prolonged
brings new devastations, new distress, new death.
Every day by which the war is shortened preserves on
both sides the lives of thousands of brave fighters, and
is a blessing to tortured mankind. The Imperial
Government would not be able to answer before its own
conscience, before the German people, and before history,
if it left any means whatever untried to hasten the end
of the war.
With the President of the United States it had hoped
to attain this aim by negotiations. After the attempt
to reach an understanding was answered by the enemy
with the announcement of intensified war, the Imperial
Government, if it desires in the higher sense to serve
humanity and not to do a wrong against its own country-
THE HOSPITAL SHIP "GLOUCESTER CASTLE"
Sunk without warning in the Channel on the night of March 30-31, 1917.
504
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAJL
[By special permission from "Punch," January 3, 1917.
GRETCHEN: "Will it never end? Think of our awful responsibility before humanity."
HANS : "And these everlasting sardines for every meal."
men, must continue with all its weapons the battle forced
on it anew for existence.
On February 1, 1917, the German Govern-
ment completed its proclamation of piracy
by an announcement, accompanied by all
manner of lying allegations, that it would
" henceforth tolerate no hospital ship " in
defined areas, and would treat hospital ships
in .such areas as belligerents.
Thus Germany reached the inevitable results
of the policy upon which she had embarked
five months before, under stress of the campaign
of 1916 and the decline in her fortunes which
was marked especially by the Battle of the
Somme. She had dragged her Allies along
with her, but she had defied the world, and the
world was not slow to take up the challenge.
" If the peace offer," wrote Professor Delbriick,
the Berlin historian, in the Preussische Jahr-
bucher for February, 1917, " had brought us
peace negotiations, I should have welcomed
it very heartily, because I believe that, in
view of the present war situation, we should
have been able to achieve everything necessary
for Germany. But of a truth we can welcome
also the powerful stimulus to the war-will on
our side, as well as the uncertainty and confusion
which we have produced among our enemies."
It was a very Prussian calculation, which only
omitted the other side of the account — that,
to use a phrase which Mr. Lloyd George
subsequently applied to' the intervention of
America, the civilized world had come to learn
that " it is no use waving a neutral flag in the
teeth of a shark," and that it was necessary
" to put down this pest once and for ever."
There was no longer any remnant of doubt
about Germany's utter insincerity. In announc-
ing the new submarine policy to the Reichstag
on January 31, the Imperial Chancellor, Herr
von Bethmann-Hollweg, who had hitherto
posed as a defender of the principles of civiliza-
tion against the doctrines of pan-German
" ruthlessness," avowed that he had never
opposed " unrestricted " submarine warfare
except on grounds of temporary expediency.
When he had resisted, and defeated, the
demands of Tirpitz in the spring and summer
of 1916, he had done so only because the new
submarine policy was not " ripe." Now
Germany was ready, and " must, therefore,
not wait any longer."
That was the real spirit underlying the
German peace campaign, which was initiated
in the name of the Kaiser's " conscience "
" moral courage," and " responsibility to God."
Germany, in the Kaiser's phrase, had " dropped
the mask."
END OF VOLUME ELEVEN.
INDEX TO VOLUME XI.
Ablaincourt : fierce fighting in,
409, 420 ; French advance
on, 293
Afghanistan, failure of German
intrigue in, 352
Aircraft : Allied, on the Somme,
October, 1916, 409, 414,
420, 424-426 ; on the Wes-
tern Front, 120, 130, 131,
141, 146, 295-297 ; Septem-
ber, 1916, 291 ; October,
1916, 401 ; German pri-
soner's diary quoted on,
120 ; French aviator drops
bombs on Essen, 296 ;
German attacks on mer-
chant ships, 174, 175, raids
on Bukarest, 235, 236
Aluta Valley : description of,
446 ; fighting in, 446-448
American Neutrality, The End
of, 357-396 : see " United
States "
Amphilrite, trawler, shelled by
German submarine, 180
Ancona, correspondence between
America and Austria-Hun-
gary on the, 359
Ancre : Battle of the, 421-427,
Sir Douglas Haig on, 424 ;
British feints on the, 132,
133 ; British preparations
for the attack on, 420 ;
Germans repulsed to the
south of the, 291, 293
Ancre and Somme, British posi-
tion between, Sir D. Haig's
dispatch, 405
Anthoine, Gen., commander
under Gen. Micheler, 420
Antiseptics : see . " Medical
Work "
Aosta, Duke of, in command f
Italian Army in Carso 0 •
fensive, 240
Arabia, fishermen's work during
sinking of, 193 ; heroism
of crew and passengers on
the, 172, 173
Arabic, German defence of sink-
ing of, 358, 359
Argesh, River : Bulgaro-Ger-
man advance on, 465-469 ;
fighting on, 469
Armin, Gen. Sixt von, 409
Armoured cars, description of
various, 279 ; see also
" Tanks "
Artist, torpedoed, 165
Are, Gen. von, advance against
Moldavia, 434, 466
Asian, Gen. : in command of
3rd Rumanian Army, 205 ;
replaced by Gen. Averescu,
218
Asquith, Mr. H. H., visits
Somme Front, 141
Avchencrag, sunk, 167, 168
Australia, wheat crop, transport
of, 110, 111
Averescu, Gen. : in command of
Rumanian Armies, 203, 434,
466 ; relinquishes command,
209 ; recalled to command
on Transylvanian Front,
233 : transferred from
Transylvania to the Do-
brudja, 218
B
Balfour, Rt. Hon. Arthur J.,
dispatch to America re
Peace proposals, 496 ; on
the Admiralty Transport
Department, 82, 83
Balkans, Italian co-operation in
the, 274
Baltn, Norwegian steamer, cap-
tain taken prisoner, 166
Basarabescu, Gen., attempt to
reach Tutrakan, 215
Bavaria, Crown Prince of, at-
tempts to pierce Gen.
Fayolle's lines on Western
Front, 294, 295
Bavaria, Prince Henry of, death.
450
Beauchamps, C'apt. de, French
aviator, exploits of, 296,
297
Beaumont Hamel, capture of,
424
Belgian Deportations, 36, sanc-
tioned by the Kaiser, 474,
477
Be'gium under German Rule,
Sept.. 1914-Oct., 1916, 1-
40 ; Banking. German con-
trol of, 27-29 ; " Bulletin
of Laws and Decrees for the
Occupied Belgian Terri-
tory " published, 5 ; Cen-
sorship, 19, 21 ; decrees,
various, 6-10, 13-17, 28-33 ;
espionage, 9; "Flemish
Movement," 21-23, 26 ;
frontiers, security of, 17,-
escape of Belgians across,
18 ; German requisitions
in. 32, 33, 35, 36 : hostages,
taking of, 10. 11 ; "Mili-
tary Tribunals," introduc-
tion of, 7-10 ; priestf ,
murder of, 2 ; proclamr-
tions issued in various di: -
tricts, 36-40 ; refugees, r -
turn of, and German pledg s
to, 11-14; war contribi -
tions imposed on populr-
tion, 30 ; Zones, division
into, 3, 4
Below, Gen. von, on the Somme.
419
Beresford, Lord, on the Mercan-
tile Marine, 171
Bernstorff, Count : handed his
passports, 371, 372 ; letter
to Mr. Lansing on the
Arabic quoted, 359 ; on
the submarine warfare con-
troversy in U.S.A., 362
Berny - en - Santerre, French
carry, 140
Berthelot, Gen., arrives in Ru-
mania with French military
mission, 234
Beseler, Gen. von, pledges to
returned Belgian refugees,
12
Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr von,
peace schemes organization,
475-477 ; on unrestricted
submarine warfare, 504 ;
speech on peace proposals
in the Reichstag, 480
"Bismuth Emetine," use of, 70
Bissing, Gen." von : succeeds
Gen. von der Goltz in Bel-
gium, 6 : administration,
7 ; opens " Flemish Univer-
sity " at Ghent, 2f> ; various
505
decrees issued by, 6, 14, 16,
19, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36
"Black List," British, irritation
in U.S.A., 387
Blaikie, Capt., taken prisoner
from the Caledonia, Govern-
ment action, 166
"Blockade," British. U.S.A.
controversy, 380-388
Boehn, Gen. von, 409
" Bombarde," Italian, descrip-
tion of, 238
Boroevich, Gen., Army Order to
Austrian troops on the
Isonzo, 247
Bouchavesnes, French take, 149,
309 ; fighting in region of,
294
Bouleaux Wood : fighting in,
299 ; Germans evacuate,
300
Bovent, French capture, 407,
409
Briand, M., o'n German peace
proposals, 480
Brioche, French take, 149
British Naval Division, on the
Ancre, 423
British Navy, R.N.R. skippers
and fishermen, personnel,
177
Brixham Fishing Fleet, sub-
marine raid on, ISO
Browning, Dr., research work on
antiseptics, 50 ; discovery
of " Flavine," 52
Bukarest, air attacks on, 235,
236 ; evacuation of, 471 ;
Mackensen enters, 472 ;
Rumanian redistribution
round, 466
Bulgaria : declares war on Ru-
mania, 213 : Bulgarians in
Dohrudja, 213-223
Bumbeshti, Germans enter, 45S
Burghele, Brie.-Gen. G., ap-
pointed Secretary General
to Rumanian Ministry of
War, 233
Busa Alta, Italians take first
peak of, 271
Bushire, British established in,
355
Byng, Sir Julian, in command of
Canadian Corps on Western
Front, 290
Cadorna, Gen., plans in Italian
offensive 1916. 239, 266
Caledonia, Anchor liner, sunk by
German submarine, Captain
taken prisoner, 166
California, heroism of crew, 172
Calvario, Monte, Italians storm,
245
Campolung : Germans enter,
465 ; Rumanians evacuate
positions at, 442
Caracalu : Count Schmettow's
cavalry reach, 461 ; Ru-
manian Orsova group sur-
renders at, 459
Carranza, Gen., German pro-
posal to for alliance* with
Mexico, 373
Carso, description of country,
252-255; Italian offensive
in the, Aug.-Uec., 1916,
237-266 ; Italian push on
the (Sept. 14, 1916), 255,
506
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.
(Oft. and Nov., 1016), 257-
266
Carson. Sir Edward : on arming
ships, 170 : on transport
statistics, 159 ; tribute to
the Merchant Service, 161
Cavallazza, Italian* occupy, 269
Pavell. Nurse Edith, execution
of, 10
Cerebro-Spinal Meningitis : see
•• Spotted Fever "
Cernavoda, Bulgarians enter,
456
Cernavoda Bridge, strategic im-
portance of,' 216, 221
Chaulnes Wood : French enter,
130 ; French attacks in,
409
Chenung, attacked by German
submarine, 369
Chilly, French take, 139
Christescu, Gen., succeeds Gen.
Averescu in the Dobrudja,
233
City of Birmingham, torpedoed,
162, 163, 165
Clan MacLeod, sunk by German
submarine, 171
Clery-sur-Somme, French take,
136
Coal, export problem to Italy
and France, 95, 96
Columbian, sunk, 166
Com hies : Allies advance on,
139, bombard, 150; close
in on, 298, take, 302 ;
French advance on, 293,
295
Combles Valley, French attack
on, 136
Constanza : Bulgaro - German
advance on, 454 ; Ru-
manians abandon and Ger-
mans enter, 455
Cosmagnon, Italians take
trenches on the, 272
Courcelctte : Canadians attack,
283, take, 290; fighting
near, 295 ; " Tanks " at
2S9, 290
Crainiceanu, Gen., in command
of Rumanian Second Army,
223, 434
Craiova, Germans enter, 459
Crni Hrib (the Black Hill),
Italians occupy, 251
Cugnac, Gen., on the Soinme,
412
Culcer, Gen., in command of
Rumanian First Army, 203,
434 ; replaced by Gen. Ion
Dragalina, 233
Curtea de Argesh, Germans
capture, 466
Curtis, Capt., description of life
in German submarine, 166
Curzon, Lord : appointed Chair-
man of Shipping Control
Committee, 91 ; on Govern-
ment's Shipbuilding efforts,
108 ; on requisitioning of
ships, 82 ; on shipping
losses during the War, 85
Cymric, sunk, 173
D
Dakin's solution : introduction
of, 45 ; use of, 46, 47, 50, 51
Danube : Macfcensen's forces
cross at Sistovo, 462—165 ;
Rumanians cross at Rahovo,
454
Dciiriling, Gen. von, on the
Somme, 419
Delbriick, Professor, on German
Peace Note, 504
Delvillo Wood : British attack
on "Mystery Corner" in,
284 ; fighting in, 124, 125,
128, 130
Denit-court, French take, 293
Director, Harrison liner, pursued
by German submarine, 170
Doberdo, Italians in, 251
Dobritch, Bulgarians enter, 214
Dobrudja : description and his-
tory of, 219-221 ; Allied
counter-offensive in the,
223 ; enemy defeated in,
223 ; Mackensen's offen-
sive in, 435, 454-457 ;
Rumanian resistance at
Lipnitsa and Kara Orman,
217 ; Sakharoff's counter-
offensive, 456 ; strategical
position, 199
Dorme, Adjutant, German aero-
planes brought down by,
120, 121, 131, 146
Dragalina, Gen. Ion : advances
against the Cerna Line,
213 : in the Jiu Valley,
450-452 ; succeeds Gen.
Culcer as commander of
Rumanian First Army, 233 ;
death from wounds at
Targul-Jiu, 436, 453
Duport, Gen., Chief of French
General Staff, 294
Dysentery : research on problem
of carriers, 67-71 ; use of
" Bismuth Emetine," 70
E
Eaucourtl'Abbaye : Britishgain
foothold at, 303, take and
lose, 398, 399, recapture,
400
Eclchardt, Herr von. instructed
to attempt Alliance between
Germany and Mexico, 373,
374
Epp, Gen. von, in Rumania, 450
Espionage, in U.S.A., 374-376
Essen, French drop bombs on,
296
F
Fajti Ridge, Italians take, 263
FalfemontFarm : British attack
on, 133 ; reoccupied by tl e
Germans, 136
Falkenhayn, Gen. von, German
counter-offensive in Ru-
mania, 434 ; in command
in Jiu Valley, 457 ; in
Transylvania, 226, 231 ;
dismissal of, 474
Farman Farma, Price, Prime
Minister of Persia, loyalty
to Allies, 353
Fassa Alps : description of
Passes in the, 268 ; Italian
advance on the, 267-272
Favolle, Gen. : advance on
Sailly - Saillfeel, 401,
403-404 : at Maurepas,
136 ; attack on St. Pierre
Vaast Wood, 293 ; dis-
positions in attack on
Combles and Sailly-Sailli-
sel, 152-155
Filiasa, Germans enter, 458
Fishermen and the War 'II. 1
177-196 ; acts of heroism
by, 187 : prisoners of war.
care of, 194 ; Ijcill of
Honour. 187 ; services ren-
(Icn-rl to Arabic passengers.
193 ; special funds and
agencies for, 194-196
Fhunmenuerfer, on the Somme,
146
" Flavine," discovery of, 52
Flers : British advance on, 283,
286, take, 286, 287 ; New
' Zcalajiders in Fighting at,
286, 287 ; "Tanks '.' in ad-
vance on, 281, 282, 285, 286
Fogaras : Austro - Hungarian
frightfulness in, 235 ;
Rumanians enter, 223 ;
Rumanians evacuate, 231
Franz Fixcher. coasting collier,
sunk by Zeppelin, 175
Frcgicourt, French storm, 298
G
Gaeln, sunk, 16s
Gamier, Gen. von, 409 ; on the
Somme, 419
Gas attacks, British, on the
Somme, 401
Gavnnescu, Lt.-Col. 0., 233
Genermont : fighting at, 409 ;
French capture, 410
George, King, tribute to the
Merchant Service, 161
Gerard, Mr. James W., in-
formed of Germany's sub-
marine policy, 502 ; leaves
Berlin, 372
Gcrd'i, used by Germans as a
decoy, sunk, 168
German Army : Divisions em-
ployed at Battle of the
Somme, 316; reorganiza-
tion, effects in Transyl-
vania, 224
Germany : announcement of un-
restricted submarine war-
fare, 502, 504 ; controversy
with United States — see
" United States " ; Indus-
trial reorganization, 474,
475 ; Man Power scheme,
Patriotic Auxiliary Service
Bill introduced and passed,
478 ; situation in 1016 re-
viewed, 473, 474
Gerok, Gen. von, in Rumania,
445
Ghent University, reopened by
Gen. von Bissing, 24, 25
Ginchy : British bombard, cap-
ture, and lose, 135, again
assault, 130, take, 141-144 ;
fighting at, 125, 127;
Officer's letter on, 125;
German counter-attacks,
146; Irish at, 142-145;
prisoners taken at. 144. 145
Giurgevo, Bulgarians occupy,
464
Glavaciocul, River, fighting on
the, 467
Colt?, 1'ield- Marshal von der,
first German Governor-
General in Belgium, various
decrees, 4, 6, 19, 27, 36
Gorizia, Italians enter, 248
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
507
Gorizia Line, positions on the,
242
Gough, Gen. Sir Hubert : attack
on Thiepval, Courcelette
and Martinpuich, 150-152,
283 ; advance on Thiepval,
121,304; insignia of .Grand
Officer of the Legion of
Honour conferred on, 400
Grahame, Mr., British Consul-
General at Ispahan, at-
tacked and wounded, 352
Grandcourt, British reach out-
skirts of, 425
Great Britain : history of con-
nexion with Persia, 324-
335 ; Shipping, see " Ship-
ping "
Grey, Sir Edward, on Persia, 353
Griffiths, Col. Norton, destroys
oil wells at Ploeshti, 472
Groner, General, Chief of " War
Bureau " of Prussian Minis-
try of War, 477
Gueudecourt : British advance
and entry into, 300, 302
Guillemont : British take, 134,
135 ; Prussian Guard de-
feated at, 134, 135
Guynemer, Lieut., French avia-
tor, exploits on Western
Front, 296
Gyimes Pass, righting in the, 445
Haig, Gen. Sir Douglas : dispo-
sitions in advance on Mor-
val, 152, 153 ; dispatches
on the position between the
Ancre and Somme quoted,
405, 406 ; on the fighting,
Sept. 15-16, 1916, 291 ;
replies to Gen. Joffre's con-
gratulations, 292
Hallbjorg, sunk, 176
Hamadan, Russians take, 355
Hatszeg, Rumanian advance on,
213
Heinrich, General von, appointed
Military Governor of Buka-
rest, 472
Hermada Ridge, Austrian de-
fences on the, 265, 266
Hermannstadt : Austro-Hun-
garians evacuate, 211 ;
Battle of, 226 ; Gen. Mano-
lescu defeated at, 226 ;
German captures at, 230
High Wood : fighting at, 141,
289 ; German attack at,
129 ; Sir Hubert Gough's
attack on, 283
Hill 76, French take, 149
Hill 120, French take, 297
Hill 121, French take, 127, 128
Hill 130, French take, 297
Hill 145, French take, 148
Hindenburg, General von, ap-
pointed Chief of General
Staff, 474 ; letter on muni-
tions industry quoted. 475
Hobokon, British bomb ship-
building yards at, 131
Hopfcr, General, proclamation
in Tournai, 37, 29
Hopital Farm, French capture,
136
Hospital ships, German an-
nounce war on, 504
Hughes, Mr., difficulties of Aus-
tralian wheat transport,! 10,
111
lancovescu, General, appointed
to Rumanian General Staff
233, 467
Igel, Herr von, arrested in New
York, 376
Inchcape, Lord, appointed
Chairman of Ports Con-
gestion Committee, 87
Isonzo : Austrian retreat on the,
248 ; Italian advance on
the, 240-257 ; preparations
for offensive on the, 239
Ispahan, British and Russian
community leave, 353
Italian Army : force arrives in
Salonica, 274 ; strength, in-
crease at end of 1916, 273
Italian offensive in the Carso,
Aug. -Dec., 1916, war with
Germany, 237-276 ; cap-
tures in Aug., 247, 251 ;
preparations for, 238, 239
Italy : declares War on Ger-
many, 274-276 ; Govern-
ment, Balkan muddle, criti-
cism, 273, 274 ; munitions,
supply organization, 273
Jagow, Herr von, resigns office
as Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, 478
Japan, German attempt to em-
broil with U.S.A., 374, 497
Jassy, Rumanian Government
transferred to, 471
Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John, tri-
bute to Merchant Service,
161
Jiu Valley : German advance in,
457-459 ; fighting in the,
450-454
Joffre, General, congratulations
to General Haig on the vic-
tories of Sept. 15 and 16,
1916, 292
Jostoff, General, death, 213
Jugo-Slav Division, in the Dob-
rudja, 218
K
Kaiser, The : letter to Beth-
mann-Hollweg on Peace
schemes quoted, 476, 477 ;
order to Army and Navy on
Peace quoted, 478 ; procla-
mation to German people
after refusal of peace pro-
posals, 496
Kaledin, General, on the Molda-
vian frontier, 466
Keller, General Count, in com-
mand of Russian armies in
Moldavia, 445
Keogh, Sir Alfred : organizes
campaign against spotted
fever, 53 ; on typhoid fever,
72
Kerind, Russians at, 356
Kermansh&h, Turks retake, 355,
356
Kezdi - Vasarhely, Rumanians
capture, 211
Kilpurney, sunk, 167
King Stephen, trawler, finds
£19 in North Sea, 175
Kirchbach, General von, on the
Somme. 146
Kiseloff, General, in command of
Bulgarian Divisions in at-
tack on Tutrakan, 214
Kneussl, General von, attacks in
Jiu Valley, 450-454, 457
Kosch, General von, in command
of German Danube Army,
437 ; crosses Danube, 462-
464 ; on the Neajlovu line,
467
Kothen, General von, in com-
mand of German defence
round Chaulnes, 407
Kovess, General von, on the
Moldavian Frontier, 466
Krafft von Delmensingen, Gen.,
in command of Alpine
Corps at Hermannstadt,
227 ; in Rumania, 437 ;
advance on Red Tower
Pass, 446-450 ; in ths
Aluta Valley, 457, 462 ;
reaches Rimnic Valcea, 466
Kronstadt : Battle of, 232;
Falkenhayn's attack on,
435 ; German Magyar Army
enters, 232 ; Rumanians
take, 211
Kiihne, Gen. von, in Rumania,
436 ; advance in Wallnchia,
437 ; on Slatina, 461 ;
offensive in Vulcan Pass,
457
Kum, Russians take, 355
i!9 (Zeppelin) found in North
Sea, 175
Lacapedle, Gen., on the Somme,
412
La Maisonette, Germans re-
capture, 418
Lansing, Mr. : correspondence
with Count Bernstorff on
the Arabic, 359 ; Note con-
cerning sinking of Ancona
quoted, 359 ; Note to Allies
deprecating the arming of
merchant ships, 361
Law, Mr. Bonar, on President
Wilson's Note of Dec. 20,
1916, 484
Lechitsky, Gen., in command
of 9th Russian Army, 205 ;
on the Moldavian Frontier,
466
Le Forest, French storm, 136
Le Priez Farm, French take, 149
Le Sars, British attack and take,
398, 402
Lesbceufs : British enter vil-
lage of, 300, 302
Le Transloy, fighting in front of,
416, 417
Leuze Wood : bombardment of,
135 ; British take, 136
Ligny-Tilloy, British advance
on, 403
Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. David :
further import restrictions,
92 ; visits the Somme, 148 ;
on German Peace proposals,
481
Lokvica : Austrian resistance
in, 259 ; Italians occupy,
260
Lombru, Gen., on the Argesh,
469
508
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Ludendorff, Gen. von, appointed
First Quartermaster Gene-
ral, 474
Lupesco, Gen. A., 233
Lusitania, controversy bet\ een
Germany and U.S.A. ior-
cerning, 360
Liittwitz, Baron von, Militi ly
Governor of Brussels, 6
Lynx, trawler, shelled by Gel-
man submarine, 180
Lytton, Lord, on submai ne
warfare, 169
M
Mackensen, Field-Marshal von :
in the Dobrudja, 213, 435,
454-456 ; defeated, 223 ;
enters Bukarest, 472
Maclay, Sir Joseph : appointed
Shipping Controller, 96 ;
forms Committee to advise
on shipbuilding programme,
103
Macnamara, Dr. : on policy of
Admiralty in losses from
submarines, 182; on the
Merchant Service, 173
Maistre, Gen., Commander under
Gen. Micheler, 420
Maloja, mined off Dover, 174
Manolescu, Gen., in Command
of Rumanian Army ad-
vancing against Hermann-
stadt, 209, defeated at, 226
Marchand, Gen. : in command
of French Colonial troops
on the Somme, 410 ;
wounded, 415
Marina, torpedoed, 173, 369
Marr eres Wood, French enter,
136
Marschall, Gen. Baron von, on
the Somme, 146, 419
Martinpuich: British take, 289 ;
fighting near, 295 ; Sir
Hubert Cough's attack on,
283
Maurepas, French take, 127, 128
Max, Burgomaster, deported to
a Silesian fortress, 36
Medical Research Committee's
work on antiseptics, 50 ;
on dysentery, 68 ; on
spotted fever, 54
Medical Work and the Health of
Armies (II.), 41-76; Anti-
septics, research work on,
41-52 ; dysentery carriers,
research upon, 67-71 ; epi-
demic jaundice, 73, 75, 76 ;
" Flavine," discovery of,
52; "Spotted Fever," ic-
search work on, 52-67 ;
typhoid fever, 71 ; typhus
in Siberia, 73
Meinecke, Prof., on the situation
in Germany at end of 1!)I6,
473
Mercantile Marine, the Work of
the (II.), 157-17H : air at-
tacks on the, 174 : arming
of ships increased, 169, 170 ;
awards granted for heroism,
158 ; Germans seize cap-
tains of the, 166; impor-
tance of, 158 ; King George
and Sir J. Jellicoe, tribute
to, 161 ; Dr. Macnamara
on, 173 ; Lord Beresfordon,
171 ; transport statistics,
159
Merchant ships : arming of,
Mr. Lansing's Note to Allies
deprecating, 361 ; German
Note to U.S.A. on arming
of, 362 ; unarmed, Ger-
many's pledge not to sink,
360
Mercier, Cardinal : German
pledges to re returned Bel-
gian refugees, 12 ; pastoral
letter, 39, 40
M -'sor, Austro-Hungarians re-
pulsed at, 213
Mexico, German proposal of
Alliance, document quoted,
373, 374, 497
Micheler, Gen. : at the battle of
the Somme, 139 ; attack
on Bovent, Ablaincourt,
and Pressoire, 407 ; dis-
positions south of the
Somme, 155, 156
Mines and mine-laying by Ger-
man submarines, 173, 174 ;
mine-sweeping in the North
Sea, 179
Moldavia: defence of, 466 ; Ger-
man offensive against, 443-
446; Russian reinforcements
on, 445
Money, Sir Leo : appointed
Parliamentary Secretary to
Ministry of Shipping Con-
trol, 97 ; on functions of
Shipping Controller, 98 ;
on requisitioning of ship-
ping, 82 ; statement on
shipbuilding programme,
quoted, 105, 106
Monfalcone : Italian feint at,
240 ; Italians take Hill 85.
245
Morgen, Gen. von, 437, 446 ;
commanding south of
Kronstadt, 457 ; enters
Campolung, 465
Morval : British storm, 298,
302 ; fighting in front of,
404 ; Sir Douglas Haig's
dispositions, 152
Mouquet Farm : Anzacs capture,
133 ; Canadians take
trenches (Sept., 1916), 289 ;
fight for defences round,
128, 291, 292 ; Prussian
Guard defeated at, 132, 133
Mowe, German raider, 175
N
Nad Logem, Italians storm, 251
Neajlovu, River, Rumanian of-
fensive on, 467, victory,
468, defeat, 469
Nerizoff, Gen., in command of
Third Bulgarian Army, 437
North Wales, torpedoed, 162
Nova Vas : fighting near, 250 ;
Italians take, 257
o
O'Connor, Col., taken prisoner
by the Germans at Shiraz,
355
Oitoz Pass, fighting in, 445
Omiecourt : French on the out-
skirts of, 420 ; French
take, 136
Omsk, sunk, 167
Oppacchiasella, Italians take*
251
Orsova, Rumanians enter, 213 ;
evacuate, 459
Orsova Group (Rumanian), re-
sistance and surrender of,
459
Oslavia, Italian attack on, 244.
245
Panama Canal, closing of, effect
on shipping, 85
Paneveggio, Italians occupy, 269
Paper Imports, reduction, 92
Pasubio, Italian local offensive
on the, 271
Peice Campaign of Dec., 1916,
German, 473-504 ; Allies'
refusal to enter into negotia-
tions, 481, 482; Kaiser';
Order to Army and Navy
quoted, 478 ; Mr. Balfour's
dispatch to Washington,
493-496 ; Notes : see
" Peace Notes."
P ace Notes : American : Mr.
Lansing's Note of Dec.,
1916, quoted, 371, 395,
President Wilson's, Dec.,
1916. 482-484, Note, criti-
cism on, 378-380, Allies'
reply, 491, Belgian addi-
tional reply, 492. 4!)3.
German reply, 485, 486,
Neutral attitude towards,
493; German: Dec. 12.
1916, quoted, 478 ; Allies'
reply, 487, 488 ; German
indignation at reply and
further Note, 488, 491 ;
Prof. Dclbruek on, 504 ;
German appeal to Vatican,
479, 480 ; Scandinavian.
485 ; Swiss, 485
Pecinka, Italians push towards
summit of, 258 ; take, 260
Peronne, position of, at end of
Sept., 1916, 315
Persia and the War, 317-356 ;
after two years of war, 356 ;
Anglo-Russian Convention
(1907), 341-347 ; geography
and topography, 317-320;
German intrigue in, 349-
355 ; history, 321-324 ; his-
tory of British connexion
with, 324-335 ; neutrality
of (1914), 350; operations
in 1915-16, 355, 356; Shah
of, German attempt to
induce him to leave Teheran,
353 ; Turkish invasion of,
352
Petala, Gen.,, succeeds Gen.
Dragalina" 453 ; on the
Argesh, 4fi9
Pctroseny, Rumanians occupy,
213 ; evacuate, 225
Piteshti, Germans enter, 466
Pcttitti, Gen., in command of
Italian force in Salonika,
274
Ploeshti, oil wells destroyed at,
472
Podgora, Austrian defences on,
242, 243 ; fall of, 245
Poincare, President, visit to
Allied Front, 399 ; confers
honours on Sir Hubert
Gough, 400
Poland, Russian, German at-
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
509
tempt to conscript Poles,
474, 477
Pope, The : German Peace Note,
479-480
Predeal, Germano-Magyar entry
into, 443
Predeal Pass, Battle of the, 439-
443
Presan, Gen., appointed Chief
of Rumanian General Staff,
469; in command of Fourth
Rumanian Army, 205, 433,
443 ; in Eastern Transyl-
vania, 223 ; opens offensive
on River Neajlovu, 467 ;
defeated, 469
Pressoir : fighting in, 425 ;
French advance on, 409 ;
take, 420
Priez Farm, fighting at, 294
Provident, trawler, attacked by
German submarine, 180
Prussia, Prince Eitel Friedrich
in command of 1st Division
of Prussian Guard on
Western Front, 121
Prussian Guard, defeated at
Thiepval, 123 ; at Guille-
mont and Mouquet Farm,
132-135
Putman, Mr. George H., 380
Pys, Canadians in, 309
Q
Quast, Gen. von, on the Somme,
146
E
Rancourt, French take, 298
Rap pahan nock, torpedoed, 161
Rawlinson, Gen. Sir Henry :
advance on Flers, 283 ; on
Ginchy and Guillemont,
133 ; on Morval, 154 ; on
Le Sars, 398, 401-403 ;
attack on Flers, 127 ; on
Ginchy, 127, 141 ; on Les-
boeufs, Gueudecourt and
Morval, 299 ; takes and lose s
Butte de Warlencourt, 419
Red Tower Pass, Germans at-
tack the, 228, 446-450
Refugees, Belgian, return to
Belgium, German treatment
of, 11-14
Regina Trench. Canadians at-
tack. 397, 398
Reuss, Prince of, Austrian Minis-
ter in Persia, 351
Rimnic Valcea, Germans reach,
466
Roosevelt, Mr., on President
Wilson's Peace Note, 378-
380
Root, Mr. Elihu, on American
neutrality, 378
Roques, Gen., visits Western
Front, 400
Rowanmore, torpedoed, 369
Rumania : French Military Mis-
sion under Government
transferred to Jassy, 471 ;
Gen. Berthelot, arrival in,
234, 437-439 ; passes and
communications, 201; stra-
tegical position on entry
into war, 197
Rumania. Queen of, article on
Dobrudja quoted, 220
Rumanian Army : commands,
changes, 233 ; equipment,
insufficiency of, 203; re-
grouping of, 466, 467 ;
strength, 202 ; weakened
on the Transylvanian Front,
211
Rumanian Campaign of 1916
(I.) Transylvania, 197-230 ;
(II.) To Fall of Bukarest,
433-472 ; retreat of First
Rumanian Army from. Her-
mannstadt, 226 ; Rumanian
captures. 233 ; Russian help
in the, 434, 437 ; strategic
position in Oct., 1916, 433 ;
Transylvania, invasion of,
weakness of Rumanian
plans, 205, 208, 209
Rumanian Front : description
of, 199 ; Austro-Hungarian
forces on the, strength, 207,
208
Runciman, Mr. Walter, hand-
ling of the shipping problem,
78, 91 ; limitation scheme
of prices and freights, 96 ;
restriction of imports, 92 ;
on shipbuilding, 104 ; on
the work of the Merchant
Service, 158, 159
Runciman, Sir Walter, on ship-
ping profits, 95
Russian, sunk, 369
Russian Army, in Rumanian
campaign, 218, 219, 434,
437, 445, 454-456, 466
Russian Navy, cooperation with
land forces at Constanza,
4,r>5
S
Sabotino Ridge : description of,
242 : Italians storm (Aug.
6, 1916), 244
Saillisel, French capture, 413,
420, 421
Sailly, Germans driven from,
412
Sailly - Saillisel : French ad-
vance on, 403 ; attack, 411,
412 ; on the outskirts of,
315 ; Gen. Fayolle's dis-
positions, 152 ; Sir D. Haig
on tactical importance of,
406
Sailly-Saillisel Ridge, French
take western slope of, 404
St. Pierre Divion, fall of, 422
St. Pierre Vaast Wood : capture
of trenches on outskirts of,
410 ; French advance on,
293 ; German fortification
of, 155
St. Quentin, Mont, strategic
position of, 150
Sakharoff, Gen., appointed
Chief Commander of Allied
Forces in the Dobrudja,
456
Salonika, arrival of Italian
troops in, 274
San Grado di Merna, Italians
reach and take, 256
San Mauro, Italians take, 244
San Michele Ridge, Italians
take, 245
San Valentino, Italians take, 244
Saxons in Rumania. 234
Schacht, Dr. Hjalmar, in Bel-
gium, 28
Schellenberg : Germans attack,
228; Rumanians enter, 211
Schmettow, Gen. Count, 437 ;
at Caracalu, 461 ; in the
Jiu Valley, 457, 459 ; on
the Argesh, 469
Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, Gen.
in command of 41st Prus-
sian Division in Rumania,
457 ; on the Argesh, 469
Schiinemann, Herr, German
agent in Persia, 351, 352;
captured and sent to
Teheran, 356
Schwaben Redoubt, British
fighting round, 410
Science and the Health of
Armies (II.), 41-76
Sepsi-St. Gyorgy, Rumanians
capture, 211
Serbian Division in the Dobru-
dja, 218
Setonia, British steamer, sunk
by German submarine and
captain taken prisoner, 166
Shipping : Archangel, ice con-
ditions, 85 ; Australia,
wheat crop transport, 110,
111 ; building programme,
Committee formed to ad-
vise Shipping Controller,
102 ; Canada, construction
in, 107, 108 ; changes in
the load-line, 98 ; control of
frozen meat industry, 86 ;
Controller of Shipping
appointed, 96 ; cooperation
of Controller and Ship-
building Employers' Federa-
tion, 102 ; freights, ad-
vance of Italian and French
coal, 95, 96, 115, rise in,
80, 85, 94 ; insurance,
new scheme, 116 ; Inter-
Allied Chartering Execu-
tive formed, 115; Licen-
sing Committee appointed,
87-89, work of, 89 ; Neu-
trals, question of British
port facilities for, 114, 115 ;
Panama Canal, effect of
closing on, 85 ; Ports, con-
gestion, 83-85, Committee
appointed, 87 ; requisi-
tioning by the Admiralty,
78-80 ; Requisitioning Com-
mittee for carriage of food
, stuffs, 89 ; standardized
ships, 98-102 ; The Times
article quoted, 99, 101 ;
tonnage, increased pro-
duction of, 104-106 ;
United States, output, 106
Shipping Problem, Aug., 1914-
Feb., 1917, 77-116
Silistria : Ninth Rumanian
Division at, 215 ; Ruman-
ians evacuate and Bul-
garians enter, 216
fiilius, torpedoed by German
submarine, 362
Simonescu, Gen., in command
of Fourth Rumanian
Division, 223
Sinaia, Germans reach, 441
Slatina, Germans take, 462
Sober, Austrians repulsed at,
258
Somme, Battle of the (IV.),
117-156, Sept., 1916 (V.).
277-316, (VI.), 397-432 ;
Allied line on Sept. (i.
510
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
1916, 136, 139; British
advance on Sept. 21-22,
295 ; British and French
captures to end of Sept.,
1916, 296, 311 ; fighting on
Sept. 15, 1916, 277, 282-
287 ; French captures
during, 314, 315, in Sept.,
1!HI>, 293-297; French
officer's description of, 297 ;
Gen. Micheler's new army
at. 139 ; German Divisions
employed at, 316 ; Ger-
man fictitious reports on,
128, 419 ; German
" moral " on the, 117, 129,
311, 312; German regi-
mental orders on position
on Sept. 15, 1916, 156 ;
results at end of Sept.,
1916, 312-316 ; review of
Allies' achievements, 427-
432 ; Sir D. Haig's dis-
patch quoted on bad
weather, 406, on position
between Ancre and Somme,
405, 406 ; " Tanks " at
Eaucourt 1'Abbaye, 399,
403
Sosescu, Gen., imprisoned for
negligence in Rumanian
Campaign, 469
Southporl. incident, 176
Soy^court, French capture, 139
Spain, attitude towards Ameri-
can Peace Note, 493
Spotted Fever : carrier problem,
65-67 ; research work on,
52-65
Staabs, Lieut. -Gen. von, in
command of German and
Magyar regiments in the
Strein Valley, 225
Standard Ship Building Com-
pany, formation of, 101
(see Shipping)
Stein, Gen. von, appointed Prus-
sian Minister of War, 477
Strathness, fight with German
submarine described, 170
Straussenberg, Gen. Arz von,
in command of Austro-
Hungarian forces on Ru-
manian Front, 208 ; in
Transylvania, 230
Strein Valley, German attack on
Rumanian positions, 225
Stuff and Regina trenches, Sir
Hubert Gough takes most
of, 414
Submarines, German : 1749, ex-
ploits of and description of
life in, 166 ; UC5, capture
of, 174 ; UC12 captured by
Italians, 174
Submarine warfare ; disputes
between United Stales and
Central Powers. 359-372 ;
inr! hods employed by the
Germans, 107, 108 ; new
German campaign an-
nounced (Jan. 31, 1917),
371, 504
Sussex, American threat to sever
relations with Germany,
Note quoted, 363, 364
Swedish Prince, sunk, 168
Sweveghem, Belgian resistance
at, 36, 39
Switch Trench, British take, 284,
285
Sykes, Sir Percy, mission in
Persia, march from Bunder
Abbas to Ispahan, 356
S/.ekels : see " Magyars "
S/.i kely-Udvarhely, Rumanians
evacuate, 233
S/.ivo, Col. von, in command of
Austrian Brigade in the Jiu
Valley, 457, 459
Taft, Mr., President of League to
Enforce Peace organization,
393. 394
" Tanks " : description of, 278-
280 ; at Courcelette, 289,
290, Eaucourt 1'Abbaye,
399, 403, Flers, 285, 287,
Gueudeeourt, 303 ; in tin-
fighting on the Western
Front, 280-282 ; on the
Anere, 423
Tappen, General von, Chief-of-
Staff to Mackensen, 454
Targovishte, Germans capture,
469
Targul-Jiu : Rumanian victory
at, 436, 453, 454 ; second
Battle of, 458 ; Germans
enter, 458
Tarnowski, Count, Austrian Am-
bassador in Washington,
372
Teal, German air attack on, 174,
175
Theodor, M., deported to Ger-
many, 36
Thiepval : bombardment of
Hindenburg, Koenigstrasse
and Lemberg trenches, 122,
123 ; British assault on,
150-152 ; British feint at,
132 ; description of re-
doubts at, 304 ; fighting
round, 119 ; letters of the
German garrison quoted,
305 ; Prussian Guard de-
feated at, 123 ; struggle for,
306 ; taken by the British,
307, 310 ; The Times Cor-
respondent on capture of,
307, 309 ; Wilts and Wor-
cesters at, 121-123 ; " Wun-
derwerk " position at, 150 ;
fighting in, 151, 152
Thiepval-Stufen Redoubt, Brit-
ish attack on, 283
Tisza. Count Stephen, on the mi-
preparedness of Rumania,
208
Tognola Ridge, Italians occupy,
268
Tomos Pass, fighting in, 210
Toprosari. fighting at, 454
Torzburg, Germans enter, 232
Torzburg Pass, Battle of the, 442
Tosheff, General, in command of
Third Bulgarian Army, 214
Trade: imports restricted, 92;
paper imports, Royal Com-
mission appointed, 92
Transylvania : German counter-
offensive in, 224 ; passes
and railways in, 206, 207 ;
Rumanian invasion of, 197-
236; Rumanian 1st, 2nd
and 4th Armies retreat
from, 231-234 ; strategical
and political considerations,
201, 202 ; objectives, 205
Transyfvanian Alps, Rumanians
cross, 210
Trotus Pass, fighting in, 445
Tiilff von Tschepe und Weiden-
bach, General, Military
Governor-General of occu-
pied districts of Rumania,
472
Tutrakan : Germano-Bulgarian
attack on, 214 ; surrender
of, 215
Tuzla, Rumanians lose, 454
Typhoid Fever, treatment of, 71
Typhus Fever, ridding Serbia of,
73
U
Vnione, sunk, 169
United States : Ancona Note
quoted, 359 ; commercial
and financial effects of the
War, 391, 392 ; declares
Waron Germany, 357 ; Ger-
man agents and propagan-
dists in, 373-376 ; President
Wilson's address in Con-
gress quoted (Nov. 7, 1915),
375 ; German intrigue in
Mexico, effect on, 374 ;
Great Britain, " Blockade "
controversy, 386 - 388 ;
Irish influence in, 385 ;
irritation with British
" Black List," 387 ; League
to Enforce Peace, resolu-
tions, 394 ; Lusitania con-
troversy, Germany's surren-
, der, 360 ; merchant ships,
arming of, German Note,
362, Great Britain's atti-
tude, 362, opinion on Mr.
Lansing's Note on, 361 ;
Monroe Doctrine and For-
eign policy, 357 ; neutrality,
end of, 357-396 ; Peace
Notes (Dee. 18, 1916), Mr.
Lansing's quoted, 371, 395,
President Wilson's, 482-
484, effect produced on
Allies, 484 ; Persia sunk
by submarine, 359 ; " pre-
paredness " movement, 395;
Presidential Election, 1916,
383 ; President Wilson's
speech on International re-
lations after the War (Jan.
22, 1917), 499-502, German
reply, 502, severs relations
with Germany, 371 ; sub-
marine war, controversies
with Germany, May 1915-
Jan. 1917, 358-372 ; Sussex
incident, Note to Germany
threatening severance of
relations, 3fi3, 364, German
reply, 304-366 ; £753 and
action of American Navy,
Mr. Franklin Roosevelt's
Memorandum, 367 - 30!) ;
£753 arrives at Newport,
366-369, sinks six ships
within sight of American
coast, 367 ; Wilson's neu-
trality policy and American
opinion, 377-383
United States Navy, action in
case of f/53, Mr. Franklin
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
Roosevelt's Memorandum,
367
Uz Pass, lighting in, 445
Va! Cismon, Italian move on the,
268
Vallarsa, Italians attack, 272
Vallone, Italians cross the (Aug
10, 1916), 249, 251
Valona Zone, Italian advance in,
274
Val Pellegrino, Italian advance
down, 269
Vasilescu, General, takes over
command on the Jiu, 453
Veliki Hribach, Italian-; take,
260
Vermandovillers : fighting at,
139-141 ; French in fighting
at, 293, progress at, 139
Vertojbica. Italians advance to
the, 248
Vipacco, Italians occupy line of,
265
Vulcan Pass: German advance
in the, 450 ; Germans reach,
225 ; Rumanian counter-
attack in the, 226
w
Wallachia, German invasion of,
437-442
Warlencourt, Butte de : British
advance on, 413 ; take and
lose, 419 ; fighting round,
402, 405
Wedge Wood, British occupy,
136
Westminster, torpedoed, 161, 162
Wild von Hohenborn, Gen.,
dismissal of, 477
Wilson, President Woodrow :
address to Congress on
severance of relations with
Germany, 371, 372 ; ad-
dress in Congress (Nov. 7,
1915) on German agents
quoted, 375 ; announces
relations severed with Ger-
many, 357 ; campaign
speech quoted, 394 ; on
America's neutrality, 358 ;
Peace Note (text) 482-484 ;
re-election of in 1916, 383 ;
speech on international re-
lations after the war (Jan.
22, 1917), 497-502, German
reply, 502 ; warning . to
Count Bernstorff on f/53
incident, 369
Wood, Gen. Leonard, Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army, 395
Wounds, treatment of, 43-52
Wright, Sir Almroth, research
on wounds, 41
" Wunderwerk " position, Brit-
ish take, 151, 152
z
Zayonchkovski, Gen. : in com-
mand of Allied Forces in
the Dobrudja, 219 ; opens
counter-offensive, 223
Zeppelins : see i!9
Znivkoviteh, Gen., in command
of Serbian Division at Top-
rosari, 454
Zimmermann, Herr von, ap-
pointed Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, 478 ;
attempted alliance of Ger-
many and Mexico, 373, 374,
497
Zollern Redoubt, British take
the, 306
ILLUSTRATIONS IN VOLUME XI.
PLACES.
PAGE
Algiers, The Pasteur Insti-
tute at 63, 64, 65, 66
Aluta River, Rocks of
Trajan . . . . 230
Aluta Valley . . . . 447
Antwerp . . . . 4, 12, 13
Argesh River, The 463, 464, 470
Baltic Exchange, London 105
Beaumont Hamel . . 426
Bsrlin . . . . 474, 479
Bistritz, The " Golden
Valley " . . 208, 209
Bland-Sutton Institute,
London . . 46, 51, 53
Bligny, Sanatorium at . . 68
Brussels, Palais de Justice 3, 9
Bucovetich . . . . 457
Budapest . . . . . . 498
Bukarest . . . . . . 452
Bunder Abbas . . . . 321
Bushire . . 326, 327, 331, 339
Cairo Railway Station . . 49
Carso Plateau 255, 256, 258, 266
Caspian Sea, View on the 328
Charleston Navy Yard . . 360
Chateau Davignon . . 26
Chaulnes Wood . . . . 142
Combles .. 295, 298, 299, 300,
302, 304
Constanza . . . . 455
Coureelette, Capture of the
Sugar Refinery at . . 288
Cozia, Monastery of . . 447
Craiova . . . . . . 461
Curlu Cemetery .. .. 155
Diisseldorf . .
Essen
Fajti Ridge
Falfemont Farm . .
Fogaras Valley, The
PAGE
. 494
. 494
. 264
137
, 232
Ghent 24
Gorizia 250, 252, 253, 254, 263
Gradisca and the Isonzo . . 255
Guillemont . . . . 135
Hermannstadt .. .. 211
Hospital ships Oloucester
Castle and Lan/ranc. . 503
Hull, Fish Dock . . . . 194
PAGE
North Shields, Fish Market 1 84
Ispahan
34-3
Dinant
Dorna Vatra
5
198
Karun River . . 319, 336
Kasvin 350
Koh-i-Kouadja, Seistan . . 320
Kotal Pass, The . . . . 339
Liverpool . . . . . . 110
Lloyd's Underwriters'
Room, London .. 115
Lokvica, Ruins of . . 265
Lowestoft Quay . . . . 187
Maurepas . . . . 128, 129
Mohammerah . . . . 332
Monfalcone . . 241, 244, 248
Monte Calvario .. .. 247
Monte Sabotino . . . . 243
Moreni, The Oilfield at . . 471
Munich 500
Namur Citadel . . . . 25
Neuilly, American Hos-
pital at . . . . 42
New York, Wall Street . , 390
Oltenitza . .
.. 464
Panama Canal . . . . 102
Pasubio, Summit of . . 273
Predcal .. .. 439,441
Predeal Pass . . . . 436
Resht, Road to Teheran 330
Sailly 413
Shiraz, The Gate of Bagh
Shah 324
Silistria 220
Somme, Cavalry Lines on
the (Sept., 1916) .. 308
Somme Front 398, 399, 409, 42?
Tabriz 350
Teheran . . 338, 344, 345
Thiepval .. .. 119,120
Tismana, The Monastery 442
Turco-Persian Frontier . . 320
Tutrakan 214
Uskub
74
Valcartier, Canadian Camp 394
Valona . . . . 274, 275
Vermandovillers, Trenches
at 293
Warsaw . . . . 482, 483
Washington, The Capitol 378
Washington, The German
Embassy .". .. 368
Washington, The White
House . . . . 388
Ypres 2
512
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
PORTRAITS.
PAGE
Afghanistan, The Amir of 351
Aosta, The Duke of . . 240
Austria, Carl, Emperor of
498, 499
Averescu, Gen. . . . . 205
Baden, Prince Max of . . 485
Baker, Mr. Newton D. 367, 384
Baratoff, On 345
Bavaria, The King of . . 500
Bernstorff, Count . . . . 368
Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr
von . . . . 474, 479
Beuxin. Lieut. . . . . 62
Beyens, Baron . . 488, 489
Biasing, Gen. von . . 7, 17
Blaikie, Capt. James .. 166
Boehn, Gen. von . . . . 410
Bratianu, M 440
Briand, M. . . . . 489
Burleson, Mr. Albert S. 384
Bussche- Hadden - Hausen ,
Baron von dcra .. 481
Capollc, Adm. von . . 479
Carranza, Gen 373
Carrel 1, Dr. Alexis . . 46
Christescu, Gen 235
Culcer, (Jen. . . . . 206
Czernin, Count . . . . 495
Daniels, Mr. Josephus 307, 384
Decoppet, M. Camille . . 484
Delmensingen, Lieut. Gen.
Kraft von . . . . 437
Duport, Gen 294
East, 2nd Eng. C.E. .. 188
Fanshawe, Lieut. -Gen. S.'r
E. A 421
Fayolle, Gen. . . 141, 153
Freytag-Loringhoven,
Baron von . . . . 496
Gamier, Gen. von . . 410
Gerard, Mr. James W. 369, 372
Goltz, Field- Marshal von
der 4
Graham, Mr. Horace F. . . 383
Gregory, Mr. Thomas W. 384
Groner, Gen 477
Guynemer, Lieut. .. 297
Haig, Sir Douglas . . 147
Helffcrich, Herr . . . . 479
PAGE
Hindenburg, Field-Marshal
von . . . . . . 475
Holcomb, Mr. Marcus H. 383
Holtzcnrlorff, Admiral von 492
Houston, Mr. David F. . . 384
Hughes, Mr. Charles E. . . 382
Hungary, Carl, King of . . 499
lancovescu, Grn.
Inchcape, Lord
Joffre, Gen.
234
78
147
Kaernpf, Herr . . .. 479
Kaiser, The . . 475, 500
Kesson, Mr., of the Cali-
fornia . . . . 170
Keyes, Mr. Henry W. . . 383
Kirchbach, Gen. von . . 152
Kneussl, Gen. von . . 450
Kosch, Gen. von . . . . 462
Kiihne, Lieut.-Gen. von. . 4IH
Lane, Mr. Franklin K. . . 384
Lansing, Mr. Robert . . 384
-Lewis, Mr. F. W. . . 89
Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. D. 117
Ludendorff. Gen. von . . 475
Liiders, Frl. . . . . 496
McAdoo, Mr. William <;.. . 384
McCall, Mr. Samuel W. . . 383
Mackay, Mr. Clarence H. 372
Maistre, Gen 420
Marchand, Gen. .. .. 411
Marling, Sir Charles . . 355
Marschall, Gen. Baron von 149
Mercier, Cardinal . . 14, 15
Micheler, Gen. .. .. 154
Milliken, Mr. Carl E. .. 383
Monroe, .Mr. James .. 358
Morgen, Lieut.-Gen. von 457
Nicholls, Mr. Edward F... 114
O'Connor, Col. W. F.
352
Persia, Sultan Ahmed, Shah
of .... 322, 346
The Shah and hiS
Ministers . . 342
Abdul Kassirn, Nasir-
ul-Mulk.. .. 341
Mirza Hassan Khan,
Mohtasham • es -
Saltaneh 349
PAGE
Mirza Hassan Khan,
Muihir-ed-Dowleh 348
Mirza Mi-hdi Khan .. 323
Miiv.a Mohamed Ali . . :i4(l
Mirza Mohamed Ali
Khan, Ala - es -
Saltaneh . . 34!)
Muzaffer-ud-Din . . 340
Nadir Shah . . . . :iL>r>
Nasir-ud Din . . 333
Zil-es-Sultan, The . . 348
Pillar, Capt 180
Polk, Mr. Frank L. .. 366
Raemaekers' Cartoons. !!<•-
productions of 20, 34, 40
Redfield, Mr. William C. . . 384
Reuss, Prince Henry XXXI
of :{.-,:»
Romanones, Count .. 4!»3
Roosevelt, Mr. Franklin D. 366
Root, Mr. Elihu . . . . 376
Rumania, King Ferdi-
nand of . . 217, 440
Rumania, The Queen of. . 218
Rumania, The Crown
Prince of . . . . 217
Schmettow, Gen. Count . . 456
Schulthess, M. Edmond . . 484
Sharp, Mr. W. G.. . 487, 489
Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil . . 359
Stanchfield, Mr. John B. :!72
Stein, Gen. von . . . . 492
Stokes, Mr. Wilfred .. 431
Stumm, Herr von . . 481
Sykes, Sir Percy . . . . 337
Thomas, M.
147
Wahnschafle, Herr . . 474
Wilson, Chief Eng. F. P.. . 188
Wilson, Mr. William B. . . 384
Wilson, President Wood-
row 370, 379, 380, 389,
392, 393
Wilson, President Wood-
row, and his Cabinet 384
Wilson, Mrs. Woodrow 389, 393
Wood, Gen. Leonard . . 395
Zayonchkovski, Gen.
Zimmermann, Herr
. . 221
479, 480
MAPS AND PLANS.
PAGE
Aluta DeBle, The . . 446
Austro - Italian Frontier,
Key Map . . . . 238
Belgium, Territory occu-
pied by Germans .. 16
Courcelette and Flers, Cap-
ture of .. .. 282
Distinguished Service Cross 158
Distinguished Service Medal 158
Dobrudja, The . . .. 2l(i
Dobrudja, The Northern 454
PAGE
Fassa Alps, Fighting in .. 268
German Infantry Columns 431
Gori/ia and the Cavsii .. 240
Gorizia, Austrian Defences
Of L'»L'
Guillemont and Giiichy,
Operations around . . 134
Medical Diagrams, 50, 54,
56, 57, 67, 70, 75
Peronnc D!.-,lrict . ,
Persia
138
318
PAGE
Rumania, Fighting North
of Targuf-Jiu (Oct. 27,
1916) 453
Somme, Battle of the,
Ground Gained . . 429
Transylvania .. .. 204
Tutrakan, Approaches to 213
Wallachia 460
Wallachian Passes, The
East 438
" Wunderwerk " (near
Thiepval), Plan of The 151
D
501
T5
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