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Full text of "Tractatus de bello, de represaliis et de duello"

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V 



X 



THE 

CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 

GENERAL EDITOR OF THE SERIES 

JAMES BROWN SCOTT 

Member of the Institute of International Law 
Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 



De Bello, De Represaliis et De Duello 

BY GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO 
EDITED BY THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND 



PREFACE OF THE GENERAL EDITOR 

THE Carnegie Institution of Washington has undertaken the 
republication of the leading classics of International Law. 

One reason for the undertaking is the difficulty of procuring 
the texts in convenient form for scientific study ; the libraries in 
the United States have been searched with the result /that few of 
the earlier works were to be found. . Another reason is that some 
of the works selected for republication have never been translated 
into English. The American publicist is therefore at a disadvantage 
in consulting works of admitted authority, and when found they 
are, as it were, sealed books to all but trained Latinists. The 
specialist is thus forced to rely upon summary statements and 
references to them to be found in treatises on International Law, 
or is driven to examine them in European Libraries, often a difficult 
task, while the general reader is practically barred from the stores 
of knowledge locked up in the earlier works on the Law of Nations. 
The same difficulty exists in Latin America, Japan, and in a lesser 
degree in many European countries. 

Eminent publicists, European and American, who have been 
consulted as to the usefulness of the plan to republish the Classics, 
have endorsed the project and have pledged their personal co- 
operation. The works to be included in the series have not only 
been approved but suggested by them, so that the undertaking is 
international in scope, in selection, and in execution. 

The underlying principle of selection has been to reissue those 
works which can be said to have contributed either to the origin 
or to the growth of International Law, and the term classic has 
been used in the broad rather than in the narrow sense, so that 
no work will be omitted which can be said to have contributed to 
the origin or growth of the Law of Nations. The masterpieces 
of Grotius will naturally be the central point in the series, but the 
works of his leading predecessors and successors will likewise be 
included. The text of each author will be reproduced photographi- 
cally, so as to lay the source before the reader without the mistakes 

a 2 



IV 

which might creep into a newly-printed text. In the case of the 
early authors the pi phed text will be accompanied by a 

\t whenever that course shall seem desirable. An Intro- 
duction will be prefixed to each work, giving the necessary bio- 
graphical details and stating the importance of the text and its place 
in International Law ; tables of errata will be added, and notes 
deemed necessary to clear up doubts and ambiguities or to correct 
mistakes in the text will be supplied. Variations in successive 
editions of the text published in the author's lifetime will be noted, 
but little or nothing in the nature of historical commentary will 
be furnished. 

Each work will be accompanied by an English version made 
expressly for the series by a competent translator. 

It is hoped that the series will enable general readers as well as 
specialists to trace International Law from its faint and unconscious 
beginnings to its present ample proportions and to forecast with 
some degree of certainty its future development into that law which 
Mirabeau tells us will one day rule the world. 

The present volume, containing the tractate by Legnano, entitled 
De BeUo, De Reprcsaliis et De Duello, written in 1360, is edited by 
the distinguished publicist Thomas Erskine Holland, from an 
original manuscript discovered by him at Bologna, dating appar- 
ently from the lifetime of the author. 

JAMES BROWN SCOTT. 

H. D.C., ftbnuuy 19, 1917. 



TRACTATUS 

De Bello, De Represaliis et De Duello 

by 



Giovanni da Legnano 

l.U.D. ' 

Professor of Civil and Canon Law in the University of Bologna 



EDITED BY 

THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND 

One of His Majesty's Counsel 
I.C.D. Bologna and Oxford 

Sometime Professor of International Law in the University of Oxford 
Late President of the Institute of International Law 




PRINTED FOR THE CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON 
AT THE Or FORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1917 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 



PAGE 

I. INTRODUCTION ix 

1. Biographical ......... x 

2. Bibliographical . . . . . . . . xxi 

3. With special reference to the work edited .... xxvii 

II. COLLOTYPE OF THE BOLOGNA MANUSCRIPT, with Editor's Prefatory 

Note i 

III. THE TEXT OF THE SAME, as extended and otherwise revised by the 

Editor, with his Prefatory Note ...... 67 

IV. A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT, as so extended and revised, by 

J. L. Brierly ......... 207 

V. A REPRODUCTION OF THE FIRST (imperfect) EDITION OF THE WORK, 

with a Prefatory Note by the Editor ..... 375 

VI. LISTS OF AUTHORITIES (i) cited by the Author, (2) consulted by the 

Editor 455 



INTRODUCTION 



THE work of Legnano, now for the first time printed in its 
integrity, was the earliest attempt to deal, as a whole, with the 
group of rights and duties which arise out of a state of War. 

No one will be surprised to find that the author, although hailed 
by his contemporaries as " a second Aristotle," foremost in every 
branch of learning, was far from sharing in the clear-cut views upon 
the scope and nature of the "laws of war" to which international 
jurists, after more than five centuries of subsequent discussion, have 
at length attained. He includes in his treatise much that would now 
be regarded as belonging to dogmatic theology, to moral philosophy, 
or to the code of honour, and relies in support of his statements upon 
quotations from the Bible, from the Corpus Juris Civilis, the Corpus 
lurisCanonici, and the Feudal Customaries, which, at the present day, 
would be treated as irrelevant. 

The interest of the book is, indeed, largely due to its remoteness 
from modern conceptions. It marks the terminus a quo from which 
the literature of the subject had to start, in order to arrive at the 
terminus ad quern which has so far been reached. In the progress of 
the centuries, and thanks to the labours of a long succession of great 
writers and statesmen, the Law of War, in common with the rest of 
International Law, has been disentangled from theology, ethics, the 
legislation of Justinian, the precepts of the canonists, and feudalism, 
all of which usefully contributed to its earlier development, and has 
been placed upon its true foundation, the consent of the states com- 

b 



x INTRODUCTION 

posing the " Family of Nations," as evidenced by consistent courses 
of conduct, or by generally accepted conventions.* After these 
preliminary observations, we may proceed to a detailed account of 
Legnano's life and writings. 



A Biography of the Author. 

It was probably as early as the thirteenth century that a family 
deriving its name from the small town of Legnano became resident 
in the neighbouring great city of Milan, where it continued to be of 
importance for several centuries, f It was there that, early in the 
fourteenth century, Giovanni da Legnano (lohannes de Lignano) 
first saw the light. His father, Giacomo, bore the title of Conte 
degli Oldrendi. 

The young Giovanni, after studying philosophy and the liberal 
arts, and paying some attention to medicine, as also to astrology, 
in which he always continued to take much interest, devoted himself 
seriously, at Bologna, under the guidance of Paolo Liazari, to what was 
to be the work of his life ; graduating eventually, at an earlier date than 
has been generally stated, as Doctor of both the Civil and the Canon 
Laws. There is reason to suppose that the subsequent residence of 
the " Milanese " Legnano at the University town was not unconnected 
with the change which took place in the government of Bologna in 
the year 1350, when the Pepoli family, wearied out by the hostility 
of the citizens, whom they had oppressed, and of the Pope, whose 
rights, acknowledged by Taddeo Pepoli ten years previously, they 
had persistently ignored, were glad, in consideration of a payment of 
220,000 gold florins, to part with the " Signoria" to Giovanni Visconti, 
Archbishop of Milan. J In any case, it is in 1350, when Legnano is 
first authentically heard of, that we find him acting under the 
authority of the Visconti as member of a commission for the recall 
of citizens who had been banished from Bologna by the preceding 
regime, and as entitled, under the^ame authority, to receive an annual 
salary of thirty-seven florins, sixteen solidi, for a year's lectures. He 

* On all this, further remarks will be found in part I II of this Introduction, p. xxxi. 

t See the pedigree at p. xviii infra. 

J Cf. Filippo Bosdari, Giovanni da Legnano, Bologna, 1901, p. i. 



BIOGRAPHICAL xi 



is already described as a " Legum Doctor." * In the following year 
he is described as " Doctor Utriusque luris," and was duly elected by 
the University to a Readership in Canon Law at a salary of sixty lire. 
In 1355 he was employed in missions to Venice and elsewhere, f and 
in 1358 already occupied the post, which he held for many years 
afterwards, of Advocate for the Franciscan Convent. J Though a 
Lecturer, he does not appear to have been a full Professor till 1360, 
when he succeeded to the chair of Civil Law vacated by Spinelli, 
becoming Professor of Canon Law a few years later. 

Legnano's first literary effort seems to have been of an astrolo- 
gical character, treating of a conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn. 
It was doubtless, however, at an early date that he began to 
write those copious commentaries upon the Decretum, Decretals 
and Clementines, of which subsequent canonists speak somewhat 
slightingly.il But his great reputation rests more largely upon the 
important part which he played in public affairs, and upon those 
of his writings which deal, from a scientific point of view, with 
questions, suggested by the events of his own time, as to the 
respective rights of the Popes and Emperors ; the relations between 
the civil and ecclesiastical powers generally ; the special relations 
between the two powers in the cities of the Romagna, notably in 
Bologn* ; the validity of the election of Pope Urban VI ; and the 
rules which ought to govern the wars by which Italy was, in his 
days, so constantly devastated. 

The story of Legnano's activity, practical and literary, with 
reference to these questions, falls naturally into three chapters, 

* Ibid., Appendices I and II. In 1352 his salary for lectures on the Decretum is 
fifty librae. In 1353 he is to receive the same sum for lectures on the Sext, and, 
by order of Archbishop Visconti, two hundred florins for lectures on the Decretum. 
Ibid., Appendices III, IV, V. 

f Ibid., Appendix VI. 

J Fantuzzi, V, p. 28. 

See infra, p. xxi, in Part II of this Introduction, treating of the writings of 
Legnano. 

|| e. g. Cardinal Zabarella, in his commentary on the Clementines, after men- 
tioning various previous commentators, goes on to say : " Subinde lo. de Lignano, 
dominus meus, multos ex praemissis in unum collegit, quos saepe nimium decurtavit. 
Sed, quod magis improbatur a compluribus, non apto retulit ordine, ita ut a paucis 
eius lectura commendetur. Et huic diligentia defuit non probitas. Fuit enim omnium 
sui temporis longe princeps." Imola, another pupil, is quoted to the same effect by 
Oudinus and Pancirolus. Cf. Schulte II, p. 257. 



xii INTRODUCTION 

covering respectively : (i) the reigns of Popes Innocent VI and 
Urban V (1352-70) ; (2) the reign of Gregory XI (1370-8) ; (3) the 
earlier years of the reign of Urban VI (1378-83). By all these Popes 
he was held in great esteem. 

(i) 

The misgovernment of Bologna by Giovanni Visconti da Oleggio, 
on behalf of Archbishop Giovanni Visconti, whose son he was reported 
to be, had led to negotiations, ending in an arrangement by which 
Pope Clement VI, in the last year of his life (1352), had agreed that the 
Visconti should remain in power at Bologna for twelve years. Oleggio 
had continued to act on their behalf, but in 1356 had declared himself 
to be independent of them. By the year 1360, however, his position 
had become intolerable. He was hated by the citizens, and was 
alarmed to hear that Barnabo Visconti was preparing a large army 
to expel him from the city. He resolved, as the readiest way of 
escape from his difficulties, to hand the place over to the ecclesiastical 
power, and accordingly sent messengers to Cardinal Albornoz, who 
had already reduced much of the Romagna to obedience to the Pope, 
and was now marching northwards from Rome, offering, on terms 
favourable to himself, to surrender Bologna to the Cardinal, as being 
rightfully church property. 

Albornoz, after ascertaining that Innocent VI considered the 
arrangement made by his predecessor, although it would have still 
had four years to run, to be no longer in force, accepted Oleggio' s 
offer, and sent his nephew to take possession of the city, into which 
he made his own state entry on the first of October. On January 20 
of the following year the forces of Barnabo Visconti were beaten off 
in a great battle outside the walls. A subsequent defeat induced 
Barnabo, in return for certain concessions, to surrender to the Pope 
the Visconti pretensions over Bologna. 

So much it has been necessary to say of the events of 1360 in 
order to explain the genesis of the work now reproduced, for it was 
in that year that Legnano composed, or more probably only com- 
pleted, his book De Bello, and presented it to Albornox, with a very 
fanciful dedicatory preface, probably after the Cardinal's triumphal 
entry into the city.* As so presented, the work seems to have been 

* Or, possibly, while Albornoz was waiting with his army, till he could receive 
from Avignon a reply to his inquiry as to the continuing force of the agreement < if 1552. 



BIOGRAPHICAL xiii 

entitled De Civitate Bononice et de Bello. Its composition was sug- 
gested, as the author tells us, by the imminence of an attack upon the 
city by a powerful army, doubtless that of Barnabo Visconti. While 
submitting what he has written to the better judgement of the 
learned, Legnano thinks that it may be found a useful exercise for 
students.* 

In the Preface he touches upon six (?) episodes in the rebellion 
of Bologna against the Papal power, occurring between the years 1350 
and 1360, stating his intention to deal with them in three essays, to be 
entitled respectively " De Marte," " De love," and " De Saturno." He 
has now composed as the first of these essays, the treatise " De Bello," 
and hopes hereafter to deal in the second, "De love," with the Church 
and its government, and in the third, " De Saturno," with the Empire, 
especially in respect of its dominion, ecclesiastical and temporal, f 

The esteem in which Legnano was held by Urban V may be 
gathered from Bulls of 1364, 1369, and 1370, J granting lands to him, 
and ordering additions to his salary. The Pope also made him a 
present of a handsome set of robes. Not unnaturally, Legnano 
testified his admiration for Urban in an oration delivered in 1371, 
which is still extant. It is interesting to find him in 1366 purchasing 
from the executors of his predecessor, Spinelli, a lecture-room, with 
the Professor's chair and benches for students, complete. Two years 
later, the dignity of Count Palatine was conferred upon him by the 
Emperor Charles V.l| 

(2) 

Another chapter of Legnano's life opens, and closes, with the 
Pontificate of Gregory XI (1370-8), during which he was largely 
occupied with maintaining a good understanding between Bologna 
and the Papal See. In 1371 we find him employed in drawing the 
deeds conveying a Pepoli palace to the Pope for the reception of his 
newly-founded "Collegium Gregorianum ; " and in January, 1376, 
he was acting as advocate in a suit between a Convent and a Hospital.^] 

* For a detailed account of the work, see Part III of this Introduction. 

t These promises were, in substance, fulfilled in wortfs mentioned in Part II of 
this Introduction, infra, at pp. xxii-xxviii, viz. the De FletuEcdesiceand theDeluribus 
Ecclesia in civitalem Bononiee. Cf. Speranza, Alberico Gentili, 1910, pp. 31, 37. 

t See them in Fantuzzi, Notizie, V, p. 30. 

Also houses in the parish of S. Giacomo dei Carbonesi. Fantuzzi, V, p. 29. 

II The Bull is set out in Bosdari, p. 75. f Cf. Bosdari, pp. 37 and 97. 



xiv INTRODUCTION 

On March 19 of that year, Bologna, exasperated by the conduct of 
the Legate, Cardinal G. del Noelletti, and emulous of the resistance 
of Florence to the ecclesiastical power, proclaimed itself a Republic 
and adopted, amid scenes of wild enthusiasm, a red flag embroidered 
with the word Libertas, which word figures in the city arms to 
this day. Gregory retaliated by sending an army to devastate the 
neighbourhood ; whereupon Legnano, together with Girolamo 
d'Andreae, was despatched to Avignon to explain matters. This he 
did so effectually that the Pope, convinced that the rebellion had 
been caused by the misgovernment of his legate, pardoned Bologna, 
which was, however, not inclined to accept his proffered clemency. 
It was probably then that Legnano composed his longest work, 
De luribus ecclesice in civitatem Bononiensium, to show that in tetn- 
poralibus, as well as in spiritualibus, the papal authority was supreme 
over the cities of the Romagna.* In 1377 he was again sent to nego- 
tiate, on behalf of the city, with Gregory, who had now once more 
adopted Rome as the seat of the government of the Church, and was 
spending the summer at Anagni. Legnano's efforts were this time 
crowned with complete success. Under an arrangement to last five 
years, the city returned to its allegiance to the Pope, to whom it was 
to pay 10,000 golden florins annually. The Pope, on his side, granted 
several petitions of the citizens, with one of which, asking for a Vicar 
"che fosse amatore della citta," he complied by appointing to that 
high office Giovanni da Legnano. j This was on December 13, 1377, 
and the event was celebrated by processions which lasted three days. J 
So great was the popularity of the new Vicar that, on January 15 
of the following year, the Council of 400, by 363 against 6 votes, 
conferred upon him and his descendants the citizenship of Bologna, 
and this event was again joyously celebrated. 

* In this work Gregory is spoken of as hodiernus. Much space is devoted to 
a refutation of the Imperialist views of Dante, as also to the many erroneous meanings 
given to the word Libertas. For a full account of its contents, with copious 
extracts, see Luigi Rossi, Dagli Scritli inediti di Giovanni da Legnano. Bologna, 
1898, pp. 20-51. The work contains allusions to the treatise De Bella, ibid., p. 25. 

t Alidosi, p. 367. The wish of the citizens as to a Vicar is somewhat differently 
recited in the papal grant, as having been for one "qui sit zelator status ecclesiae et 
domini nostri et gratus populo Bononiae." Bosdari, App., p. 105. 

J Ghirardacci, Hist. Bon., II, p. 368. 

The tcnns of the decree are printed, from the archives, in Ghirardacci, Ibid. 
P 369- 



BIOGRAPHICAL xv 

(3) 

With the death of Gregory XI, on March 27, 1378, and the 
election of Urban VI, on April 8, begins another, and the last, chapter 
of the story of Legnano's life. The French Cardinals, who formed a 
great majority of the sacred College, becoming dissatisfied with their 
choice, declared the election void, as having been induced by the 
threatening attitude of the Roman populace, and seceded to Anagni, 
with a view to a new conclave. A strong letter of remonstrance* 
addressed by Legnano, on August 18, to Cardinal Peter de Luna 
(afterwards anti-pope, as Benedict XIII) failed to prevent the 
election, on September 30, of the first of a long line of anti-Popes, 
in the person of Clement VII ; thus inaugurating the " Great Western 
Schism." 

Legnano, a consistent supporter of the validity of the former 
election, was thereupon sent by his fellow-citizens to salute the right- 
ful Pope at Rome, and to ask for three favours from him. These, 
including the creation of a Bolognese Cardinal, were all granted, and 
Legnano returned the bearer of two red hats, which, on behalf of 
Urban, he presented amid scenes of great rejoicing, one to Caraffa, 
the Archdeacon of the city, and the other to Bishop Mezzavacca, on 
their promotion to the Cardinalate. The oration made by him is 
still extant. | It was, perhaps, on the occasion of this first embassy 
that the Pope declared that he would have retained Legnano at 
Rome, but that in the absence of so great a man the schools of Bologna 
would have been left desolate. Urban is said also to have offered to 
make him a Cardinal, provided that his wife would retire to a convent, 
which she declined to do.J In 1379 Legnano completed a tractate 
in defence of Urban's election, entitled De Fletu Ecclesice, which the 
Pope forwarded to the University of Paris, where it provoked various 
replies, among them one from the Abbot of St. Vedast's, entitled 
De planctu bonorum, consisting of a dialogue between a doctor of 

* Partially printed by Raynaldus, t. xvii, sub anno 1378, No. 30. It mentions 
an astrological warning of an approaching schismatical movement, which had been 
previously sent by the writer to Pope Gregory. Cf. Fantuzzi, V, p. 35. 

f See extracts in Oudinus, p. 1073, who refers to the Codice Colbertino, t. iii, 
No. 815. 

J A. da Budrio, on the "De conversatione coniugatorum," Decret. iii, 32, quoted 
by Fantuzzi, V, p. 34. Legnano's reply to this offer is set out in Pancirolus, " nolle se 
sanguinem pauperibus destinatam bibere, sed ex sudore manuum victurum," &c. 



xvi INTRODUCTION 

Bologna and one of Paris. A second tract, Pro Urbano, was said by 
Legnano's opponents to contain things " valde venenosae, licet super- 
hciales ct non reales." * In what seems to have been an independent 
1 realise, the De multiplui genere monarchic^, there occurs an interesting 

rence to the early \\orkDeBcllo. Legnanosays that In- had in that 
work treated of war generally, and of its species, without discussing the 
manner of practically carrying it on, which he now proceeds to do. f 

The author of these Treatises, who was, not unnaturally, "molto 
caro " to the Pope, was, in 1380, again sent on an embassy to him, 
together with Baldus ; and a curious report is preserved of a con- 
\er>ation which took place between these two great jurists, while 
stopping at an inn in the neighbourhood of St. Peter's, upon the 
subject of the papal election. J Legnano's services were acknowledged 
in 1381 by a renewal for one year of his nearly expired appointment 
as the Pope's Vicar in Bologna. He was once more at Rome as 
Ambassador on behalf of his fellow citizens in 1382, but died, after 
a >hort illness, at hi> own house, on February 16 of the year following. 
Whether or no he fell a victim to the plague, which in that year 
carried off so many of his distinguished colleagues, is not certain. 

On February 18 Legnano was honoured by a State funeral, 
attended all shops remaining closed by Cardinal Caraffa, by the 
city authorities, and by his colleagues in the Professoriate. He was 
buried in the Church of St. Domenico, where his fine monument, the 
work of two celebrated Venetian sculptors, had been erected in his 
liie-tinie, "in St. Domenico's chapel, above the door on the right, "|| 
where it was still standing at the end of the eighteenth century. ^f It 
has since sustained great injury, but portions of it may still be seen in 
the Museo Civico of Bologna. They have been somewhat arbitrarily 
combined, as will appear from the accompanying photograph. 

* This is textually printed in Raynaldus, t. xvii, App. I. 

f " Viso de politia tempore pacis conservanda, restat videndum de politia 
bcllica,"&c. Rossi, Dagli Scritti inediti, p. 58. An epitome of the whole treatise is 
given in pp. 51-9 of that work. 

J Oudinus, p. 1074. Cf. Savigny, Geschichte, VI, p. 273. 

It is even recorded that the doctors of Civil Law took part in the procession, 
although it was in honour of a Canonist. Fantuzzi, V, p. 37. 

|| Pancirolus, p. 439. 

^ " Ancheoggiesiste," wrote Fantuz/.i, in 1786, V, p. 37, and Favolini, in 1797. 
< )n the monument, cf. Vassari, Operc I, p. 444 ; Bosdari, p. 80 ; and Cavazza, Le 
Scuole dell' aniico studio bolognese, 1896, p. 102. 





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BIOGRAPHICAL xvii 

There can be no doubt that the group of listening scholars were 
on the left hand of the monument, balanced by a similar group on the 
right hand, the faces of both groups being upturned towards a bust of 
Legnano surmounting the whole. The inscription must have been 
placed below this central figure. The coat of arms, so often repeated, 
officially described as " Di rosso spaccato d'argento col leopardo 
illeonito d'oro ambulante verso il capo, ed un corallo di rosso verso 
la punta dello scudo," is supposed to have been that of the De 
Oldrendis. The inscription, as still fully legible to Fantuzzi, ran as 
follows : 

Frigida mirifici tenet hie locus ossa lohannis. , 

Ivit in astriferas mens generosa domos. 
Gloria Legnani. Titulo decoratus utroque 

Legibus et sacro canone dives erat. 
Alter Aristoteles, Hippocras erat, et Tholomei 

Signifer, etherii noverat astra poli. 
Abstulit hunc nobis inopinae sincopa mortis. 
Heu dolor. Hie mundi portus et aura iacet. 
Anno MCCCLXXXIII Die 
xvi mensis Februarii. 

Hoc opus fecerunt lacobellus et Petrus Paulus fratres. 
loanne Lignano Bononiae docente.* 

From Legnano's will, made on March 27, 1376, f before starting 
on his journey to Avignon, and from a long codicil made on February 

* These, not impeccable, Latin verses may be translated as follows : " This place 
holds the cold bones of wondrous John. His liberal intellect has departed to the 
starry habitations : all the glory of Legnano. He was enriched with degrees both in 
the civil and the canon laws. A second Aristotle, a Hippocrates was he, and equipped 
with Ptolemy's signs, he knew the stars of the sky. We were deprived of him by a 
stroke of unexpected death. Alas, the sorrow of it. Here lies the harbour and the 
breeze of the world. 

In the year MCCCLXXXIII the 

i6th day of February. 

This work was executed by lacobello and Pier Paolo brothers, while Giovanno 
Legnano was teaching at Bologna." The last two lines of the Latin are now almost 
illegible. 

t He had married, before making the will of 1376, Novella, daughter of Federico 
(son of Giovanni) Andreae, by whom he then already had a daughter Antonia, and a 
son Battista. Novella survived him, and was one of his executors. Mistakes as to the 
identity of Novella are numerous, and it is perhaps still not quite clear whether she was 
the daughter of a son, or of an adopted son of the same name, of Giovanni Andreae. 

c 



XV111 



INTRODUCTION 



15, 1383, the day before his death,* we learn many particulars as to 
the members of his family, and as to the considerable property left 
by him in Legnano and Milan, as well as in Bologna. In the case of 
his son Battista dying without issue, which did not happen, he left 
funds for a " Collegium studiosorum," with preferences for duly 
qualified candidates belonging to certain localities and families, which 
remind us of foundations nearer home. The following pedigree, 
constructed from various authentic sources, may serve for the 
identification of members of the family mentioned in this Intro- 
duction, or elsewhere : 



Giovanni Andreas =^- Milancia 
(the famous jurist, 
ob. 1348) 



Giovanni Calendrini = Novella Federico 
(an adopted (who lectured 
son of Giov. for her father) 
Andreae. 
A jurist, 
ob. 1365) 



Girolamo da Legnano 
(conte degli Old rend i) 



Giacomo da Legnano 
(conte degli Oldrendi) 



Giovanni 



Novella =F GIOVANNI DA 
LEGNANO 



Princivallo Bianco 



I 



Battista 



Antonia 



Marco Giovamello 
(a natural son. 
Canon & LL.D., 
Hanged, 1391) 



Cortello 



Gughelmo 



Giorgio 



'>lo Antonio 

(Lettore 1470. Editor of 

the De Bella, as published in 

1477, t;. infra, p. xxviii) 



Antonio Maria 

(In his will, 1512, a<l<K in 

Giovanni's legacies for a 

College at Bologna) 



Alessandro 



Giovanni II = Francesca Fendazza 
(had 31 children) 

* Both will and codicil are textually set out by Bosdari, App.. V XXV" and 
XXVI. He is described in the Codicil as formerly of the chapel of S. Proculus, now 
of the chapel of S. Jacobus de Carbonensibus. 



BIOGRAPHICAL xix 

On law-suits which arose between the children of Guglielmo and 
Giorgio under the Will of Giovanni, see Pancirolus, De claris legum 
interpretibus. The Milan Legnani, publishers of the De Bello in 1514, 
claim relationship with the author. A Captain Alessandro Legnani, 
in 1587, enlarged the house near the church of S. Giacomo into a 
palazzo, which passed by the marriage of Teresa Legnani, in 1772,* 
to the Campeggi family, from whom it was purchased by the Pizzardi, 
and was eventually sold to the Railway, f Girolamo, the last of the 
Legnani family at Bologna, died in 1805. In 1750 Donato Legnani 
took the name Agucchi, and this branch of the family is still repre- 
sented through females. Cf. Filippo Bosdari (who is thus descended) 
in his Giovanni da Legnano, 1901, pp. 53, 62 ; Rossi, Scrittori Bolo- 
gnesi, 1888 ; Pancirolus, 1593 ; Alidosi, 1620 ; Ghirardaccius, 1669 ; 
Oudinus, 1722 ; Argelati, 1745. 

The following epitaph (perhaps only suggested) upon Paul 
Anthony Legnano, by Emilius Romanus, his contemporary, occurring 
in a codex of the fifteenth century, is cited by Fantuzzi : J 

Lignani iuvenis Pauli monumenta supersunt 
Consultum poterant quanta decere senem. 

Cura frequens studii vitam rapuitque deditque, 
Hie cineres. Animus summa quietus habet. 

Giovanni da Legnano, while enjoying the esteem and confidence 
of four Popes in succession, was also generally respected and beloved. 
He was especially dear to the people of Bologna, as "amatore della 
Repubblica e de' poveri." Several writers enlarge upon his humility, 
at the time when, as Papal Vicar, he was practically " Signore di 
Bologna," in declining to take precedence of the Anziani or Gonfa- 
lonieri. "Anzi con grandissima modestia e riverenza sempre si 
mostro humile e benigno a tutti in tutte cose, ascoltando le cause 
altrui con amorevole pazienza, virtu che veramente lo fecero grande- 
mente essere amato." IJ He was, however, not inclined to put up 
with any unmerited slight, as appears from an often-repeated story 

* On which see Verses in the BiUiografia Bolognese, II, 10996. 

f See Bosdari, who refers to a collection of Legnani papers preserved by the 
Malvezzi Campeggi family. 

% IX, p. 140. 

The vote of citizenship, set out in Bosdari, App. XVI, p. in, recites the 
important services of Legnano to Bologna. 

|| Ghirardacci, Hist. Bonon., II, p. 368. Cf. Alidosi. 



xx INTRODUCTION 

to the effect that, with a mind intent upon philosophical problems, 
he was frequently neglectful of his dress, which led to his being 
given the lowest place at a certain wedding party. He thereupon 
sent for a purple gown, which he proceeded to deposit on the seat 
which ought to have been his, exclaiming " You worship fine clothes, 
here you have them," and so left the room, while all the company 
blushed.* 

For the vast reputation of Legnano, as teacher, writer, and man 
of action, it will suffice to call a few only of the many witnesses 
who speak of him as having been a universal genius, the glory of 
his age. 

lohannes Garzon, for instance, writing about 1450, after men- 
tioning some of Legnano's merits, continues : " Haec me in earn 
sententiam impellunt ut existimem aetatem illam lohanne de 
Lignano nih'il vidisse praestantius. Qui astrologiam atque oratoriam 
cum iuris civilis scientia coniunxisset, nullum me vidisse memini. 
Addo rerum humanarum peritiam." 

" Alter Aristoteles sui temporis vocari promeruit. Andreas 
Siculus ' maximum et illustrem capitaneum sacrorum canonum, 
legum, et philosophise ' vocavit eum," says Freherus, writing in 
1558. 

Somewhat later in the same century, Pancirolus writes : " Omnes 
disciplinas tenuisse creditus est, praeterea divini humanique iuris 
scientiam. Philosophise naturalis disciplinae, arti medicine etiam, 
et astronomiae, antea incubuerat . . . interpretum iuris Pontificii 
princeps habitus est." f 

With Gentili begins a more critical appreciation of our author. 
In his De lure Belli (1598), 1. I, ch. ii, speaking of the civil lawyers 
who have written upon his subject, he says : " Equidem praeter 
Lignani paucula huius tractatus, et aliorum nonnulla sparsim, legi 
nihil, et ea non absque fastidio legi omnia. Sic sunt apta minus, 
minusque splendida : ut praeteream illud, esse in eorum libris 
quamplurimum non de bello, et de belli iure adversus hostem, sed 
de re militari, et legibus cum cive et milite nostro." And Grotius, 
De lure Belli (1625), Prolegomena, section 37, speaking of the earlier 

* Pancirolus, p. 438. 

f The MS. Cronaca Bolognctli, in the Biblioteca Comunale, goes so far as to say : 
" Era dottore in legge e in tutte le altre scienze del mondo, e si diceva chc in quel 
tempo non si trovava uno pan a lui fra i Cristiani." Bosdari, p. 78: 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL xx i 

theologians and jurists (mentioning Lignanus) who have treated of 
the subject, censures most of them for having mixed up and confused 
" sine ordine, quae naturalis sunt iuris, quae divini, quae gentium, 
quae civilis, quae ex canonibus veniunt." 



II 

The Writings of Legnano. 

The importance attached by his contemporaries to any ex- 
pression of Legnano's views, whether didactic or controversial, is 
sufficiently attested by the rapid multiplication of all his works in 
manuscript copies, which can alone account for these having found 
their way to widely distant European libraries. Printing was, of 
course, unknown in Legnano's time, but in the following century 
not a few of his productions were by means of the new art made 
generally available. 

The list of writings which follows is derived from many sources, 
and is fuller than that supplied by any single authority. Pains have 
been taken to make it as complete as possible, since it illustrates not 
only the career and character of Legnano, but also the movement of 
thought in the Italy of his day. Of only a few of these works can the 
composition be assigned to particular dates ; it has therefore been 
thought best to group them here according to the subject-matter 
with which they deal.* 

i. ASTROLOGICAL. 

Figura delle grande Costellazione, ovvero Congiunzione di Saturno 
e di Giove nel segno dello Scorpione I' anno dull' Incarnazione di Christo 

* Fantuzzi, Scrittori Bolognesi, t. v, p. 28, follows the order in which the writings 
occur in the Vatican MS. No. 2639. 



xxii INTRODUCTION 

MCCCLV, a di xxii del mese d' ottobre, secondo le consider azione de messer 
Giovanni da Legnano, sopra quella dando el giudizio stto. (MS. No. 343 
in the Laurentian Library at Florence, according to the Abate L. 
XiiiK lies, in his work Del vecchio e nuovo gnomone Fiorcntino, 1757.) 

De Cometa, compiled in April, 1368, in which month the Comet 
appeared. (MS. Vatican 2639.) 

Cf. the historical portions of the Preface to the DeBello, and much 
in Legnano's other writings. 



2. THEOLOGICAL. 

De Christo : De Deo : De Antichrislo : De Angelis. (MS. 
Vatican.) Contains passages from Ovid and Virgil, and interprets 
astronomical occurrences as prophetical of the Incarnation. 

Vigilium maicstatis divines, compositum per magistrum omnium 
scientiarum, etc., lo. de Lignano, beginning " Primo tractaturus de 
Deo Patre." (MS. at St. Mark's.) * 



3. ON CANON LAW.f 

Commentaries and Disputations upon the Decretum, Decretals and 
Clementines, &c. Of a Disputation on some Extravagantes of 
John XXII, it was said "est melius quam unquam fecit de iure 
Canonico." (MSS. are in the Cathedral Library at Padua, and in the 
Libraries of the Spanish College and of the Istituto at Bologna.) 



4. SPECIAL TREATISES ON THE SAME. 

De Interdicto ecclesiastico, dated 1359, " tempore interdicti gene- 
ralis et suspensionis studii." (MSS. at the Vatican and at Turin.) 
Printed, Mediolani, without printer's name or date, together with the 
De Censura, with a note " Scriptus in Generali Concilio Basiliensi, 
per me lo. Tollenor de Dyedem, A.D. 1436." Also in the Tractatus 
TractatuUm of 1549, t. xv * fl- 2 45. an d m tna * of 1584, t. xii, 
fol. 335- 

* See Valentinclli's Catalogue, III, p. 42, and Fantuzzi. 

t For a special account of Legnano's canonical writings, indicating the libraries 
in which MSS. of them respectively may be found, and which of them are accessible 
in print, see Schulte, Geschichte des Canonischen Rechts, ii, p. 257. 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL xxiii 

Tabula remissoria de Inter dictis ecclesiasticis. Printed in Trac- 
tatus Tractatuum of 1549, t. xvi, fol. 246, and of 1584, t. xiv, 
fol. 336. 

De Censura ecclesiastica, dated 1361. (MS. at the Vatican, 
St. Germain, and Basel.) Printed at Milan (with the De Interdicto), 
also in Tr. Tr. 1549, t- xvi, fol. 227, and 1584, t. xiv, fol. 307. 

De Beneficiorum ecclesiasticorum pluralitate, iussu domini 
Urbani V (circa 1365). Printed at Louvain by John of Westphalia, 
1475 (a copy is at Lambeth) ; at Paris by Peter de Caesaris, M.A. 
and John Stol, 4to, s.d. ; again at Paris in 1512, and at Milan 
in 1515. Also in Tr. Tr. 1549, t. xv, fol. 127, and 1584, t. xv, Pars ii, 
fol. 558. 

De Horis Canonicis. Printed in Tr. Tr. 1549, * xv > fl- 4 11 . an d 
1584, t. xv, Pars ii, fol. 558. (Qu. whether at Rome, by Barthol. 
Guldinbeck, in 1475 ?) 

De Celebratione Missae, Repetitio c. dignum, De Cele. Miss., Cle. 
(i. e. Clementinarum lib. Ill, Tit. xiv, c. 2). Printed at Pavia by 
lo. Ant. de Biret and Franciscus Ghyrardengus, 1488. 

De Appellationibus. (MS. at University of Leipsic.) 

De Arbore consanguinitatis. (MS. in the Vatican.) 



5. ON CIVIL LAW. 

De Permutatione. 

De Emptione et Venditione ad cerium tempus. (MS. at the Univer- 
sity of Leipsic.) 

6. RELATING TO BOLOGNA. 

De Civitate Bononice et De Bello, 1360. 

See p. xii, supra, and Part III of this Introduction, infra, p. xxvii. 

De luribus ecclesice in civitatem Bononice (circa 1373). (MSS. in 
the libraries of the city of Bologna, and of St. Mark's, Venice.) See 
Valentinelli s Catalogue, III, p. 42, and extracts in Rossi, Scritt. 
inediti, pp. 25-51. It contains allusions to the De adventu Christi, 
Somnium, and notably to the De Bello, v. supra, p. xiii, n., infra, p.xxv. 

Oratio, on delivery of the Red Hats in 1378. (MS. in Biblio- 
theque Nationale.) Extracts are printed by Oudinus, p. 371, and 
Raynaldus, t. xvii. 



xxiv INTRODUCTION 

7. ON WAR, REPRISALS, AND THE DUEL. 

It is not unlikely that before producing the work in which these 
three topics are treated in combination (see Part III, p. xxvii of 
this Introduction) Legnano had treated of each of them separately. 
He seems thus to have treated of " War " only, in his De Civitate 
Bononits et de Bella (ibid.). 

The Biblioteca Comunale of Bologna possesses several MSS. of 
the De Duello, viz. MSS. 894 and 2115 of the seventeenth century, 
and, in the University Library (?), B. 1483 and B. 1470 (entitled 
" lohannes de Lignano et lacobus de Castillo De Duello ") ; B. 1483 
and B. 1470 of the eighteenth century. 

The De Represaliis was printed separately at Pavia by Christo- 
phorus de Canibus in 1484 ; and again, in the same place, in 1487, 
without a printer's name. 

The Tractatus peregrinus de Duello, loh. de Lignano Mediola- 
nensis, " nuper inventus in lucem per magistrum lo. de Lignano, 
eius agnatum," was printed " ad utilitatem posteriorum," by 
Ulrichus Sinzenzeler (as appears by his mark, and the letters V.S.) 
at Milan, s.d. 4to. It was reprinted, " Mediolani, apud Alexandrum 
Minutianum, impensis loh., lacobi et fratrum de Lignano, A. D. 1508, 
fol." 

For later reprints of the last-mentioned two works, see infra, 
p. xxix. 

8. ON MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

De Amicitia, circa 1365. (MSS. at St. Mark's, at Turin, and at 
St. Peter's Coll., Cambridge.) Printed at Bologna, by Hugo de 
Rugeriis, in 1492. Also in Tr. Tr. of 1549, t. xvii, fol. 2, and of 1584, 
t. xii, fol. 227. 

De Pace. (MS. in the Bibliotheque Nationale.) 
De virtutibus generatim : " Circa circulos virtutum." (MSS., as 
also of the following treatises, at the Vatican and at St. Mark's.) 
De iustitia ; De vitiis religioni oppositis ; De pietate ; De observantia ; 
De obedientia ; De gratia ; De retributione ; De ingratitudinc ; De 
fortitudine (begins : " viso de lustitia, videndum est de Fortitudine, 
et licet tractavimus de Bello, tamen adhuc reassumam ibi secundum 
tractatum de Temperantia ") ; De conlinentia ; In Aristotelis Politi- 
corum lib. i, ii, Hi.* 

* See Valcntinelli's Catalogue, 111, p. 4.2, and Kossi, ScriU. incdtit, pp. 51-63. 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL xxv 

De Multiplier genere Monarchies. (In the Venice MS.) Contains 
a reference to the De Bella. It discusses the Politics of Aristotle, 
and has something on naval warfare.* 

Circulum (Economic. (In the Venice MS.) f 

Circulum Politicorum. (In the Venice MS.) A commentary on 
Books I and II of Aristotle's Politics, f 



9. ON THE GREAT WESTERN SCHISM. 

Epistola ad Cardinalem de Luna, August i8th, 1378. X (MSS. at 
the Vatican and in the Bibliotheque Nationale.) Partly printed by 
Raynaldus, t. xvii, Nos. 30-35. 

De Fletu ecclesice (Tractatus pro Urbano), written in 1379. (MSS. 
at the Vatican and at St. Mark's.) Partly printed by Raynaldus, 
M.S., No. 38. 

Pro Urbano tractatus secundus. (MS. in the Bibliotheque 
Nationale.) Printed by Raynaldus, t. xvii, Appendix. 



10. Among the writings of Legnano preserved in a MS., No. 2639, 
of the Vatican Library, is a treatise with no title, commencing : J 
" Audite somnium per quod vidi solem et stellas, Genes, xxxvii." 
Citations from Levit. xix and Deuteron. xix immediately follow. 
The body of the work consists of a long dialogue between a clericus 
and a miles upon the respective prerogatives of the Pope and the 
Emperor. It is dedicated to the Pope, and ends : " somniatum 
MCCCLXXIII, nocte vi Feb., scriptum die x Martii." 

This treatise has remained in manuscript. Not so a distorted version of it, 
which, since it is dedicated not to the Pope, as an argument in favour of Papal 
claims, but, at fulsome length, to King Charles V of France (1364-80), in support 
of lay governments, must have been put together, perhaps secretly, by its 
unknown writer, very shortly after the date of the original upon which it is 

* See Valentinelli and Rossi, ibid, 
't Ibid. 

J From fol. 226. 

So Fantuzzi, t. v, p. 43. This Somnium is a quite different work from the 
Vigilium, attributed to Legnano in Valentinelli's Catalogue of the Library of St. 
Mark's, t. iii, p. 42. See supra, p. xxii. 

d 



xxvi INTRODUCTION 

modelled.* It found its way into print, in both Latin and French, rather more 
than a century later, as the Somnium Viridarii, or Le Songe du Vcrgier. 

In Latin we find : Somnium. Aurcm dc ntraqiie potentate libellits, taiifionili 
c/ spirituali, Somnium Viridarii niincitpatus, formam tenens dialogi, in quo miles 
e{ clericus de ambarum iurisdictionum disputabant potestate. Cui Repertorium 
annectitur ab .Kgidio Daurigny recollectum. Op. et diligentia lacobi Pouchin, 
sumptibus vero et expensis Galioti Dupre, Parisiis, 4to, I5i6.f This edition is 
reprinted as " ab auctore incerto," in the Tractatus Tractatuum of 1549.+ 

A slightly different text is printed by Goldast in his Monarchia Komani 
Imperii (1612). It is entitled Philothei Achillini, consiliarii Regis, Somnium 
Viridarii, de iurisdiclione regia et sacerdotali. It commences : " Audite som- 
nium quod vidi," Genes, xxxvii, &c., is dedicated to Charles V of France, and 
ends : " Liber Somnii Viridarii, cuius utilitas fuscos usque celebratur ad Indos, 
hie finem capit optatum." 

There is no doubt that the attribution of the work to Filoteo Achillini 
(born in 1466 and died 1538), author of the poem // Viridario, and founder of 
an Academy similarly entitled at Bologna, || is a mere piece of mystification. 

In French : 

The earliest edition, entitled Le Songe du Vergier, " lequel parle de la 
disputation du clerc et du chevalier," is adorned with pictures, one of which 
represents a King (Charles V), on either side of whose throne are Queens, 
symbolical of the spiritual and temporal powers, another, a professor lecturing. 
It ends : " imprime par Jaques Maillet 1'an mil. cccc quatre vintz et onze, 
le 20 jour de mars." 

This edition is reprinted in the Traitez des Droits de I'Eglise Gallicanc, 

MDCCXXXI.]f 

Somewhat later appeared another edition of the Songe du Vergier, except 
in size identical with the former, and with the same illustrations, " imprime 

* A MS. of it is said to exist in a catalogue, ending in 1468, of S. Sulpice in 
Bourges. See Traitez, as mentioned below. 

t The Royal Privilege speaks of it as " nouvellement imprime." It was placed 
in the Index (ordered at the Council of 1544) where viridarius is mistakenly 
supposed to be the name of the writer. 

J T. xiv, fol. 200-60, in double cols. 

T. i, fol. 58-229. Goldast's Preface contains a discussion on the always dis- 
puted question of the authorship of the Somnium, and gives a long list of writers by 
whom it has been cited. 

|| For this information as to the real Achillini, I am indebted to Professor 
A. Sorbelli, of Bologna. 

K T. ii. Prefixed to this treatise is a Dissertation upon its authorship : " C'est 
un enigme," says the writer, " fort au-dessus de ma porUV . . . je n'ai point chez moi 
le Sphinx, comme le disoit Ciceron." But he disbrli. vrs in its attribution to Philippe 
de Maisieres, and others. Like most of those who have dealt with the question, he 
seems never to have heard of Legnano. 



THE DE BELLO xxvn 

a Paris par Le petit laurens, pour venerable homme Jehan petit, libraire, 
demeurant a Paris, en la rue St. Jacques, a 1'ensigne du lyon d'argent," 4to, 
(1500). On the half-title is the device of Jehan Petit, a tree, supported by two 
monkeys.* 



III. 

The work now reproduced. 

It was, as we have already seen, f in the year 1360, while Bologna 
was threatened with attack by the army of Barnabo Visconti, that 
Giovanni da Legnano composed, or more probably only completed, 
the treatise upon War, which he afterwards presented, with a dedi- 
catory Preface, to Cardinal Albornoz, entitling it De Civitate Bononite 
et de Bello. Whether, in this its original form, the treatise dealt with 
Reprisals and the Duel, as well as with War, is uncertain. There can, 
however, be little doubt that the author's essays upon all three topics 
were at some time or other combined by himself into one work, thence- 
forth known as his Tractatus De Bello, De Represaliis et De Duello. J 
Of this work manuscripts are to be found in the following libraries : 

At Bologna, in the Biblioteca Comunale dell' Archiginnasio. MS. 
B. 1393 is of the fourteenth century, approximately of 

* Some copies of this edition bear " Jehan Alisot, libraire, demeurant a Angier." 

f Supra, p. xii. 

J For the separate histories of the Essays De Represaliis and De Duello, see 
supra, p. xxiv. 

For much of what follows, as to manuscripts and editions, I am indebted to 
the kindness with which my enquiries have been answered by Librarians of the 
Bibliotheque Nationale at Paris, of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, of the Ambro- 
siana at Milan, of the R. Biblioteca Nazionale at Turin, but most of all to the 
Librarian of the Biblioteca Comunale dell' Archiginnasio di Bologna, Professor Albano 
Sorbelli, and to his learned colleague Professor Giuseppe Brini, who have been most 
helpful in many other ways to the present publication. 



xxviii INTRODUCTION 

the year 1390. A reproduction of this MS. occupies pp. 1-65 
of the present volume. Also an eighteenth-century copy of 
the table of contents of the Vatican MS. 2639. 

At Rome, in the Vatican Library. MS. Reg. Suec. 1873, Lat. 
No. 369 (2639), of the fifteenth century, contains, it seems, 
all three treatises, but omits much of the Pro&tnium. 

At Turin, in the Biblioteca Nazionale, there is a MS., G. I. 17, of 
the fifteenth century, lacking the Procemium. It is mutilated, 
breaking off near the end of Represalice. 

At Paris, in the Bibliotheque Nationale, is a MS., No. 12467 (from 
the Bibliotheca Colbertina), probably of the earlier fifteenth 
century. 

At St. Germain ; so Montfaucon, p. 1127 d. 

At Bale ; so Fabricius, and Montfaucon, p. 613 b. 

A translation into Italian by Paulus Antonius de Lignano, 
mentioned by Argelati (ii, Part I, p. 168), doubtless remained in MS., 
and seems to have disappeared. 



About the year 1477, the above-named Paulus Antonius de 
Lignano, great-grandson of the author,* prepared for the press this 
work of his ancestor. In so doing he took great liberties with the 
text, suppressing most of the prefatory matter, which may, not un- 
naturally, have struck him as somewhat fanciful, omitting also some 
sections and paragraphs of the main treatise, while interpolating 
throughout explanatory remarks of his own, which might well have 
been dispensed with. Of the text, as thus manipulated, editions, 
copies of all of which are extremely rare, were printed as follows : 
At Bologna, per Henricum de Colonia, ad instantiam Sigismundi 
de libris, MCCCCLXXVII, 6 Kal. Ian. It occupies, in double 
columns, 75 pages of a folio volume which has no general 
title, containing eighteen legal treatises, all dated between the 
years 1477 and 1493, the first of which is headed : "Clarissimi 
iurisconsulti D. Lanfranchi de Oriano solennis utilis quoti- 
dianus et practicabilis tractatus de Arbitris. Additis multis 
aliis questionibus clarissimorum doctorum." Legnano's work 
is reproduced at the end of the present volume from the 

* See the pedigree of the family, supra, p. xviii. It would seem that a MS. of his 
additions exists in the Bibliotheque Nationale. 



THE DE BELLO xxix 

All Souls copy of this very rare collection, as is explained 
infra, pp. xxxvii and 375. 
At Pavia, per Franciscum de Ghirardengis, MCCCCLXXXIV, die 

xxvin maii, fol. 

Again at Pavia, per Christophorum de Canibus, MCCCCLXXXVII, 

die ult. maii, fol. There is a copy at Turin, commencing : 

' Tractatus elegans De Bella, De Represaliis et De Duello : 

clarissimi interprets domini lohannis de Lignano Bononien- 

sis, in celeberrimo Bononiensi Gymnasio actu legentis, cum 

additionibus domini Pauli de Lignano, eius pronepotis." 

At Milan, per loh. Angelum Sinzenzeler, impensis lohannis lacobi 

et fratrum de Lignano, cum additionibus domini Pauli de 

Lignano (s. d. circa 1500). 

Again at Milan, apud fratres de Lignano, MDXV, cum tractatu 

Paridis de Puteo de eadem materia. 
Also at Turin, MDXXV, 4to. 

The De Bello, with the De Represaliis, but without the dedica- 
tory Preface, and without any of the matter added by Paul Antony 
Legnano, is printed (as " nunc primum in lucem editus " !) in 
vol. xvi, from fol. 371, of the Tractatus Tractaiuum of 1584, which 
had also printed the De Duello, with the additions, separately in 
vol. xii, from fol. 281. This last-mentioned tract had already 
appeared in vol. xii, from fol. 281, of the edition of 1549 f the 
Tractatus. On the earlier separate editions of the two last-named 
treatises, see supra, p. xxiv. 



The Contents of the work. 

The Procemium contains a good deal of curious matter, most of 
which is omitted even in those printed editions which contain some 
of it. It begins with an elaborate and over-fanciful dedication to 
Cardinal Albornoz, whose exchange of his peaceful duties at the 
Papal Court for the command of armies is likened to the action of 
Ahab, King of Israel, who " changed his raiment and went into the 
war." Bologna, the seat of knowledge of all kinds, especially of 
law, and capital of the states of the Holy Church, is likened to 
Jerusalem, the throne of the Lord. Like Jerusalem, Bologna had 
been severely punished for her sins, but looks for deliverance to the 



xxx INTRODUCTION 

Cardinal, to whom the treatise, concerning Bologna and the War in 
which he is engaged, is offered by the writer. 

Legnano then sketches the history of Bologna between the years 
1350 and 1360, under six heads,* of which the first relates to the 
cession of the city by Giovanni Pepoli to Giovanni Visconti, Arch- 
bishop and Lord of Milan. The second deals with the rule of the 
viper brood, f of the Archbishop, i. e. of his three nephews, Matteo, 
Galeazzo, and Barnabo, and of their representative, Giovanni 
Visconti de Oleggio. The third deals with Oleggio's assertion of his 
independence. The fourth describes the misfortunes which hence 
resulted, and the fifth the recovery of Bologna by Albornoz to the 
see of Rome. The sixth, if such there be, seems to consist of visionary 
peeps into the future of the city. Throughout this sketch the Arch- 
bishop is described as " Filius Saturni," his nephews as " the three 
vipers," the Pope as " lupiter," Albornoz as " Frater lovis." 
Oleggio as " Mercurius," Bologna as " Taurus," an army as " Mars." 
Full information is given as to the position of the heavenly bodies 
at the date of each event, J and, as has been already explained,! the 
author indicates, with reference to each of the three periods into 
which he divides his subject, the book by which he proposes to illus- 
trate it. Of these, only the De Betto had, as yet, been written. 

After this long exordium we come to the treatise De Betto itself 
(pp. i and 67, infra). It consists of three " Principal Treatises," the 
first and second of which are quite short, dealing respectively with 
the definition of " War," and with the classification of its species. The 
third " Principal Treatise " occupies the rest of the work, dealing at 
length, in^its six sections, with the several species of war, viz. : 

I . Heavenly Spiritual War, arising from the rebellion of Satan 
(chaps, iii-vi). 

II. Human Spiritual War, i. e. the conflict between morality 
and self-interest (chaps, vii-viii). 

III. Universal Corporeal War, i. e. war in the usual sense of the 
term, considered under six heads (chaps, ix-lxxvii), treating respec- 
tively of : (i) the justifiability of war (chaps, x, xi) ; (2) those by, 

* The Bolognese MS. says six, tin Vatican MS. five. 

t The viper occurs in the Visconti arms. 

% Dr. Kambaut, the Radcliffe Observer at Oxford, has been good enough to look 
at the positions so attributed to the sun, moon and planets in the zodiacal signs, and 
pronounces them to be practically com Supra, p. xiii. 



THE DE BELLO xxxi 

and against, whom war may be waged (chaps, xii-xvi) ; (3) the 
elements of warfare (chaps, xvii-xxx), with excursuses upon the 
cohort, legion, &c., upon the mutual duties of troops and commanders, 
and, at tedious length, upon courage and the list of virtues generally ; 
(4) the rights and duties of troops who are obliged to serve, or who 
do so voluntarily, from various motives, and in particular as to the 
service of stipendiaries, whose position is discussed at inordinate 
length (chaps, xxxi-lviii) ; (5) plunder, prisoners, stratagems, and 
other incidents of warfare (chaps, lix-lxxv) ; (6) the seven kinds of 
wars (chaps. Ixxvi-lxxvii), without mention that these kinds had 
been already so distinguished in the previous century by St/Thomas 
Aquinas in the Sec. Secundce, Quaestio 40, and by Henry of Segusia 
(Hostiensis) in lib. i. rubr. 3 of his Aurea summa. 

IV. Corporeal Private War, in self-defence (chaps. Ixxvii-cxxi). 
V. Corporeal Private War, in defence of the State (the ""mysti- 
cal body "), i. e. Reprisals (chaps, cxxii-clxvii). 

VI. Corporeal Private War, for clearing one's character, i. e. the 
Duel (chaps, clxviii-clxxiv). 



Estimate of the work. 

It must be abundantly clear, from the preceding analysis of the 
work, that what would now be considered to be questions of Inter- 
national Law occupy but a small place in it. Putting aside Tracts I 
and II, upon " Spiritual War, Celestial and Human," as also Tracts 
IV, V, and VI, devoted to the several species of "Private Corporeal 
War," viz. "Self-defence," "Reprisals," and the " Duel," we may 
concentrate our attention upon Tract III, the longest of all, which 
deals with War properly so called, described by Legnano as "Uni- 
versal Corporeal War." 

Even here, the author is primarily a canonist, astrologer, theo- 
logian, and moralist ; constantly preoccupied with the claims of the 
Papacy and the exceptional position of the clergy. In support of his 
arguments he quotes occasionally from Greek and Roman writers, 
but his pages are throughout crowded, one may perhaps also venture 
to say disfigured, by a superfluity of references to the civil and canon 
laws, while his style, here as elsewhere, is not unfrequently open to 
the criticism of Rabelais upon that of the Glossators, as " latin de 



xxxii INTRODUCTION 

cuisinier et mannitt u.\, non de jurisconsulte." At the same time, 
the work throws much light upon fourteenth-century views and 
practices, as, for instance, the employment of German mercenaries, 
the treatment of Jews and Saracens, the rivalry between Popes and 
Emperors, the recognition of clergy and laity as forming " two 
peoples " ; and, intermingled with all this, we do find much that is 
recognizable as appertaining, in a rudimentary way, to an Inter- 
national Law of War. We are thus justified in looking upon Legnano's 
book as being the first in which an attempt is made to deal with that 
subject as a whole. He discusses the lawful causes of War, the 
authority by which it may be declared, the distinction between war 
and reprisals, the distribution of booty, the employment of stratagems, 
the treatment of prisoners, of non-combatants, of enemy troops who 
have surrendered and, in particular, of enemy commanders. It will 
be noticed that he has here nothing to say as to hostilities carried on 
at sea, a topic which he, however, appears to have handled subse- 
quently.* 

His quotations from Roman classics are scanty, but he shows a 
wide acquaintance with the, already translated, writings of Aris- 
totle, to whom he always refers merely as " the Philosopher." His 
citations of the Fathers are for the most part derived from the Corpus 
luris Canonici, which indeed, with the jurists who comment upon it, 
is his chief source of inspiration, f He is, of course, also familiar with 
the Corpus luris Civilis, with the Feudal Constitutions, and with the 
Lex Lombarda. 



It is a pleasure, as well as a duty, to express my gratitude for 
assistance received, in the performance of what has been a by no 
means easy task, from my friends Professors Brini, Da Costa and 
Sorbelli of Bologna, especially from the last named, in his capacity 
of head of the library of the University and City. I am also 

* In the De muUiplici gentre monarchic, see Rossi, Dagli Scritti incditi, p. 59. 

f He relies constantly, as might be expected, upon Causa XXIII, De re militari 
el de bello, and Causa XXXIII, Qusestio iii, De paenitentia, of the second Part of the 
Decretum ; upon the Title, De Treuga et Pace, in the Decretals, lib. V, tit. 34 ; and 
upon the titles inscribed De Homicidio, in the Decretals, lib. V, tit. 12, in the Sexl, 
lib. V, tit. 4, and in the Clementines, lib. V, tit. 4: also upon a long list of canonists, 
and upon the Sccunda Secundte, Quaestio 40, of St. Thomas Aquinas. See the 
Index of Authorities, infra, p. 457. 



INTRODUCTION xxxiii 

indebted to the authorities of many other public libraries, for 
information courteously supplied in response to my enquiries ; and 
to Dr. Rambaut, for kindly ascertaining the general correctness of 
the astronomical statements occurring on pp. 73-78 of the extended 
text. I have been fortunate, for a second time, in securing the 
valuable services, as translator, of my friend Mr. Brierly, and, not 
least, in having been permitted by the Carnegie Institution to 
entrust the production of a work abounding in technicalities to the 
artistic accuracy of the Oxford University Press. 

T. E. HOLI^ND. 
May ii, 1917. 



TRACTATVS DE BELLO 

d. lo. de Lignano de Mediolano Juris Vtriusque Doct. 



Collotyped by the Oxford University Press from a photograph of 

the thirteenth-century manuscript, B. 1393, preserved in the 

Biblioteca comunale dell' Archiginnasio di Bologna 



(See the Editor's Prefatory Note which follows) 



PREFATORY NOTE 



THE original intention of the Carnegie Institution was to adopt 
for its edition of the De Bella the text of the Treatise as first published. 
Having ascertained that the first edition of the work appeared at 
Bologna in 1477, the editor procured its reproduction from a very 
rare volume, lent for the purpose by All Souls College to the Oxford 
University Press. 

His further enquiries, however, addressed to many European 
libraries, resulted in the receipt of information, courteously supplied 
by Professor Brini of Bologna, in March, 1912, as to a manuscript 
of the Treatise, believed, on good evidence, to have been written in 
the lifetime of the author. It was thereupon decided to make this 
manuscript the foundation of the present edition, and to relegate 
the very imperfect and much altered version of it, printed in 1477, 
to the end of the volume, to which it may be regarded as a sort 
of Appendix, commencing at p. 375 infra. 

In a letter to the editor of February 13, 1913, Professor A. 
Sorbelli, the accomplished librarian of the Biblioteca Comunale 
dell' Archiginnasio di Bologna, wrote as follows : 

' II nostro interessantissimo manoscritto e indubbiamente il piu 
antico e il piu autorevole dell' opera del Legnano. Da un esame accu- 
rate che ho fatto, e dal giudizio di parecchi competenti, si pu6 fissar 
la data del manoscritto nostro (B. 1393) al finire del secolo xiv, e cioe 
intorno al 1390. A circa questo anno corrispondono la "littera", o 
scrittura, che e Bolognese, e percio assai nota qui ; la filigrana della 



xxxviii EDITOR'S PREFATORY NOTE 

carta che, come pu6, confrontando il Briquet, stabilirsi, e appunto 
a un di presso di quell' anno o di due a tre anni addietro ; ed il 
confront con altri manoscritti datati.' 

He goes on to confirm the early date assigned to the manuscript by 
an inscription placed upon it by a notary of Bologna, Rolandus de 
Castellanis, who was living in 1420, to the effect that he had bought 
it from lo. Bitini de Brissia, executor of Luca Cantarelli. 

The pages which follow were collotyped by the Oxford University 
Press from a photograph of the manuscript taken at Bologna in 1912. 

For the text, as ' extended ' and otherwise revised by the 
editor, with his explanatory note prefixed, see infra, pp. 67-205. For 
Mr. Brierly's English Translation of the same, see infra, pp. 207-374. 

T. E. H. 



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ftctncul 

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~* 




IOHANNIS DE LIGNANO 

Tractatus de Bello 



The text of the Bologna Manuscript, MS. Miscell. B. 1393, 
as "extended" and otherwise revised 

by 
The Editor 



(See the Prefatory Note which follows) 



[I] 



PREFATORY NOTE 

THE preparation of the " extended " text which follows has cost 
the editor, even with the preliminary aid of an expert in the 
decipherment of contractions (Miss E. Barker), a very serious ex- 
penditure of time and labour. 

To begin with, he had to break up the continuous wording of the 
manuscript into punctuated paragraphs, using capital letters where 
called for. Then began the far more serious work of correcting the 
mistakes of the original copyist, and of checking, and re-writing on 
a uniform system, the endless quotations made by the author from 
the Bible and the Civil and Canon Laws. The biblical quotations, 
curiously enough, proved to be the most faulty. The, much more 
numerous, legal citations were generally right, but needed endless 
typographical amendment in order to render each distinguishable from 
its neighbours, and its parts distinguishable inter se. The following 
statement will explain the difficulties of the task, and the steps taken 
to surmount them. It may also not be unwelcome to readers un- 
familiar with Civil and Canon Law. 

The mediaeval method of citing the Civil Law is comparatively 
simple. First comes a mention of the collection from which the quo- 
tation is taken, whether from Justinian's Digest, Code, Institutes, or 
Novels, or from the Libri Feudorum ; indicated respectively by " ff.", 
" C.", " Inst.", " Authent.", or " Feud.". Next comes a clue to the 
' Title " of the Digest, the Code, or the Institutes, indicated by setting 
out its head-line. Last comes a mention of the specific " law " to 
which reference is made, indicated, as a rule, not by its number within 
the " Title " but by its initial, or catch, words. Citations from the 
Novels or the Feudal laws are somewhat differently managed. 

The system of the Canon Law is more complex. The large col- 
lections, cited by Legnano, are: the " Decretum Gratiani", the 
" Decretales Gregorii Papae IX ", the " Liber Sextus Decretalium ", 
and the " Constitution es dementis Papae V ". The two last named 
collections are respectively indicated by " Lib. VI " and " Clem.", 
but the source of citations from the " Decretum " or " Decretals " has 
to be inferred otherwise than from abbreviated descriptions of those 
works, except that the " Decretals " are sometimes indicated by the 
word " Extra ". 

The Decretum consists of three " Books ", the first of which con- 
tains 101 " Distinctiones " ; the second 36 " Causae ", each sub- 

69 



70 PREFATORY NOTE 

divided into " Quaestiones " ; the third, entitled " De Consecratione ", 
contains 5 "Distinctiones". References are made to Book I by 
" dist." or " di.", preceded by a numeral ; to Book II by "q.", pre- 
ceded and followed by a numeral ; to Book III by the words " De 
Consecratione," "dist." or " di.", followed by a numeral. References 
to the Decretals, Sext, and Clementines, without any mention of the 
" Books " into which they are divided, specify merely the " Title " 
in question, indicated only by its head-line, e. g. " De lureiurando", 
or " De Sent. Excomm.", with which the canonist is presumed to 
be familiar. 

The ultimate reference in the case of Book I of the Decretum 
is to a " canon ", in the other cases to a " chapter ", and is made as a 
rule by setting out the initial, or catch, words of the canon or chapter. 

The preceding statements must not be taken as exhaustive, e. g., 
the third Quaestio of Causa 33 constitutes an independent treatise, 
entitled " De Poenitentia ", consisting of several Distinctiones, and is 
so quoted. 

In this " extension ", pains have been always taken to commence 
the head-line of a " Title " with a capital letter ; to distinguish be- 
tween " canons " and " chapters " ; to print the catchwords of the 
ultimately cited " lex ", " canon ", or " chapter ", in italics ; and to 
mark the termination of each quotation, where it does not end a sen- 
tence, by a semicolon. It is hoped that the search for a quoted pas- 
sage may have thus been rendered, to a reader armed with the indices 
of catchwords to be found in good editions alike of the Corpus luris 
Civilis and the Corpus luris Canonici, not prohibitively difficult. Such 
wrong references as have been detected have been sometimes indi- 
cated by a mark of interrogation, (?) ; sometimes they have been 
enclosed in brackets [ ], after which the right reference has been 
inserted. 

The original treatise is not divided into chapters, but, for con- 
venience of reference, the chapter divisions occurring in the print of 
1477 have been inserted in brackets, so far as they are applicable, in 
the margin of this extension. 

T. E. H. 



INCIPIT TRACTATVS DE BELLO DOMINI 
IOHANNIS DE LIGNANO 

DE MEDIOLANO IVRIS VTRIVSQVE DOCTORIS 



REx Israel mutavit habitura et ingress us est bellum," iii Regum xxii 
capitulo. Israel est solium Domini et, ut scribitur leremiae iii cap., 
" vocabunt Israel solium Domini." Et hoc est patrimonium sanctae Romanae 
Ecclesiae, cuius caput est lerusalem, id est alma civitas Bononiae, quae vere 
vocari potest lerusalem. Nam in ipsa quorumcunque scibilium, et maxime 
iuris, dilucidata est veritas. De hac scribitur, Zachariae viii cap., " Vocabitur 
lerusalem Civitas veritatis." Haec " formosa sicut lerusalem," Cantici vi 
capitulo. De hac etiam clamat Propheta, Sophoniae i cap., " scrutabor lerusa- 
lem in lucernis " ; et Actuum v cap., " Replevistis lerusalem doctrina vestra." 
De hac etiam scribitur Apocalypsis xxi cap., " Vidi Civitatem sanctam lerusa- 
lem," et ibidem xxi cap., " Ostendit mihi Civitatem sanctam lerusalem de- 
scendentem de ccelo," id est Bononiam. Et vere de ccelo descendit, Cum ibi 
fons veritatis, iurium quae adeo per ora principum promulgantur, viii di., quo 
iure ; C. De longi temporis praescriptione, 1. ultima. De hac scribit Apostolus 
ad Hebraeos xii cap., " Civitatem Dei viventis lerusalem ccelestem." Et idem 
Apostolus ad Galatas iv cap., " Quae autem sursum est lerusalem libera est." 
De hac etiam scribitur, ii Paralipomenon vi cap., " Elegi lerusalem ut ibi foret 
nomen meum." 

Verum etiam, permittente Altissimo, et superius disponentibus corporibus, 
haec Civitas Bononiae, ut lerusalem, ad extremum mutata est et devastata, et 
propter inhabitantium delicta innumera, odia mutua, diu comminatus est 
Altissimus ipsius destructionem, ut scribitur [ludicum xxix] iv Regum xxi 
cap., " Delebo lerusalem sicut deleri solent tabulae." De insidiis inhabitantium 
scribitur ii Paralipomenon xxv cap.,* " Descenderunt insidiae in lerusalem." 



* In fine, " tetenderunt ei insidias in lerusalem." 

71 



72 DE IVRE BELLI 

Et propter superbiam inhabitantium comminatus c^t Dominus per Prophetam, 
dicens, " Computrescere faciam superbiam ludae et superbiam lerusalem 
multam," leremiae xiii capitulo. Et propter hanc clamat Propheta contra in- 
habitantes, dicens: "Dabo lerusalem in acervos arenae." Et alibi propter 
hoc clamat Propheta, dicens, " Ponam [lerusalem] Samariam quasi acervum 
lapidum," Michaeae i capitulo. Et propter hoc clamat Propheta contra nutritos 
in ea, dicens, " Contristatis lerusalem nutricem vestram," Baruch iv capitulo. 
Et propter hoc, scilicet inhabitantium excessus, factum est ut exercitus regis 
Babyloniae obsident lerusalem. leremiae xxii capitulo. Et propter hoc 
factum est quod scribitur Ezechielis v cap., " Haec est lerusalem in medio 
gentium," id est hostium. Poenae causa factum est etiam quod scribitur 
Threnor. i cap., " Facta est Jerusalem sicut quasi polluta." 

Alma igitur ci vitas Bononiae vere lerusalem nuncupatur, et caput solii, 
id est patrimonii, sanctse matris Ecclesis. Rex autem actu regens et gubernans 
est Reverendissimus in Christo pater et dominus, dominus Egidius, misera- 
tione divina Sabinensis Episcopus. Hie enim mutavit habitum et ingre^u- 
est bellum. Nam de throno pacifico, id est sac ratissimo Collegio Cardinalium, 
et de latere dextro sanctissimi Papae Innocentii Sexti destinatus est ad recu- 
perationem lerusalem, id est patrimonii penitus deperditi, et ni ipsius recupera- 
tione mutavit habitum. Nam, relicta pontifical! quiete, ingressus est bellum, 
et bellum forte ut princeps serenissimus. Nam ante ipsum non erat Rex in 
lerusalem, ut scribitur ludicum [xxii] xxi cap., " in diebus illis non erat Rex." 
Et propter ea dixit Dominus ad eum, scilicet dominum Egidium, " misi te 
regere super populum Domini," ludicum ix capitulo^. Et ipse dicere pott >! 
" elegit me Dominus ut essem Rex," primo Paralipomenon, xxviii capitulo. 
" Et ipsum constituit Dominus Regem super universum Israel," i Paralipo- 
menon xii capitulo <". Et iste " Rex surrexit de solio Domini," lonae iii capitulo. 
Et bene ingressus est bellum et feliciter. Nam ut allatus ala duplici, scilicet 
summae prudentiae et fortitudinis inclitae, omnia iura sacrosanctae Romanae 
Ecclesiae, tyrannice usurpata, de nihilo produxit ad esse, de tenebris ad lucem, 
ut dici possit quod de nihilo aliquid fecerit, Genesis i cap., et lex unica in prin- 
cipio, C. De rei uxoriae actione. Vere igitur, ut Rex Israel, mutavit habitum et 
ingressus est bellum. 

Quia igitur Rex Israel, id est patrimonii, et maxime civitatis, Bononiae, 
quae est vere caput patrimonii, et quae, sic ut supra dictum est, de extremo ad 
extremum deducta, mutavit habitum et ingressus est bellum, et hoc diebus 
nostris, immo et pendet, satis videretur incongruum hoc sub silentio penitus 
pertransire. 

Idcirco ego, lohannes de Lignano de Mediolano, minimus inter ceteros 
iuris utriusque doctor, ad vos Reverendissimum in Christo patrem et dominum 
meum, dominum Egidium, miseratione divina Episcopum Sabinensem in 
partibus Italia:, pro sancta Romana Ecclesia Vicarium Generalem, et verum 
Regem lerusalem, transmittendum concepi tractatum facere de lerusalem, id 



DE CIVITATE BONONIAE 73 

est de civitate Bononiae, et de Bello, quod habitum mutando estis ingressus, 
hoc ordine. Nam de civitate Bononiae ponam sex causas implicantes quae 
acriter contingerunt dictam civitatem, ab anno domini MCCCL usque ad 
MCCCLX, maxime propter quae insurrexit dominii mutatio, et cum quotis 
temporum et aspectibus annorum circa meridies dierum quibus haec con- 
tingerunt, non autem horarum. Et haec appono quia in aliquibus tractatibus 
intendo iuris metas excedere, explicando aliqua quae forte evenient, et cuilibet 
causae submittam unum tractatum vel plures, ut occurret. Aliquos tractatus 
transibo sub silentio, aliquos explicabo, unum solum exnunc publicabo, vide- 
licet tractatum De Bello, promittens, Domino annuente, singulos tradere expli- 
cates, tempore congruo, et causa cessante inhibitionis, supplicans eidem Reve- 
rendissimo Patri ut imbecillitatem intellectus supportare dignemini; et hoc, ut 
modicum suscipere exordium, corrigendum si placuerit et reformandum, iuxta 
gentilium Sapientis auctoritatem : " Exiguum munus, etc." Descendo igitur 
ad themata, et ex causa ponam in figura. Et ecce. 



SEdente love clavigero, clementiam * Sexto ferente, super cathedram pisca- 
toris, ex eius edicto praepropere Mars f accessit, ut libere ingrederetur 
viride et floridum Tauri pabulum. J Hoc fuit annis Domini MCCCL, die viii 
lulii. Tune Sol in Cancro, Grad. xxiii, Min. xxxii. Luna cum Leone, Grad. 
xxviii, Min. xxi. Draco capite geminabat, Grad. xxvi, Min. ix. Saturnus in 
Ariete, Grad. xxvi, Min. xxxii. lupiter cum Cancro, Grad. xxviii, Min. li. 
Mars in Libra, Grad. xi, Min. xviii. Venus retrogradabat in Cancro, Grad. 
xxix, Min. xx. Mercurius Venerem sequebatur in Cancro, Grad. ix, Min. x. 
Et tune altissimus filiorum Saturni, circulum || gestans a love.^j interius 
viperatus, ex limbis lateralibus tribus ** altis viperis exsurgentibus, a septen- 
trione descendens, intercedente Mercurio ff lovem, cum Marte pervenit in 
pabulo, et in pastorem perpetuum gregis Taurini exstitit assumptus.JJ Et 
hoc fuit annis Domini MCCCL, die xxiv Octobris, Sole . . , Luna in Cancro, 
Grad. ix, Min. 1, Saturno in Ariete, Grad. xxii, Min. xix, love in Leone, Grad. 
xviii, Min. xiii, Marte in Sagittario, Grad. xxiii, Min. xxxii, Venere in Virgine, 
Grad. xxv, Min. xx, Mercurio in Libra, Grad. xxi, Min. xxv, Capite Draconis 
in Geminis, Grad. xx, Min. xix, Cauda, etc. 

Post temporis lapsum, operante lovis clementia, necnon et circulo |||| 
quern Saturni filius ab eo susceperat, factum est quod Saturni films lovem in 
pabulo verbaliter suscepit,^ et ipsum primum gregis pastorem recognovit. 



* id est, Clemente Papa VI regnante. ** id est, tribus nepotibus scilicet M. B. et G. 

( id est, exercitus comitis Romandiolae pro ff id est, dominus Johannes de Pepoli. 

Ecclesia. It id est, in dominum est electus. 

t id est, Bononiam. id est, Papa Clemente. 

id est, Archiepiscopus Mediolanensis. |||| id est, pontifical! dignitate. 

|| id est, dignitatem pontificalem. flU id est, Archiepiscopus Pap am in dominum 
II id est, Papa. recognovit. 



74 DE IVRE BELLI 

Hoc fuit annis Domini MCCCLII, die vii SepU-mbris, Sole in Virginc, Grad. 
xxiii, Min. x, Luna in Virgine, Grad. ii, Min. xxx, Capita in Tauro. Grad. 
xiv, Min. xvii, Saturno in Tauro, Grad. xxiv, Min. xxvii, love in Virgiiu , 
Grad. xxix, Min. xvii, Marte in Sagittario, Grad. vi, . . . Min. xx, Vent-re in 
Virgine, Grad. ii, Min. viii, Mercuric in Libra, Grad. xxvii, Min. . . . 

Ecce Taurus hoc tempore modico trinum contraxit matrimonium, nee 
rrubuit, vivente coniuge, nunc hunc nunc ilium meretricali more appetendo 
prorumpere, ut did possit de te quod scribitur Isaiae [iii] i cap. " quomodo facta 
est merctrix civitas fidclis plena iudicii ? lustitia habitabat in ea, nunc autem 
homicidia. Argentum versum est in scoriam. Vinum tuum mixtum est aqua. 
Principes tui infideles, socii furum. Omnes diligunt munera, sequuntur re- 
tributiones. Pro pupillo non iudicant. Causa viduae non ingreditur ad eos. 
Propter hoc ait Dominus exercituum fortis Israel, Heu ego consolabor super 
hostibus et vindicabor de inimicis meis, et convertam manum meam ad te, et 
excoquam ad purum scoriam tuam, et auferam omne stannum tuum et resti- 
tuam iudices tuos, sicut fuerunt prius, et consiliarios tuos, sicut fucrunt anti- 
quitus. Post haec vocaberis civitas lustitiae." Sic contingit et continget de te 
Taure, cum tripartitus fiet semicirculus, surget quies, fluet motus, senectus est 
obstans, sed vitiorum iuventus hoc operatur. 

Huic causae subicio tres tractatus : unum de Marte, id est de Bello. Istum 
publico. Alium de love, id est de Ecclesia, et ipsius gubernatione per pastores 
suos, et per aspectus narrates, quis exitus ipsius prosperitatis et adversitatis, 
maxime respectu huius temporis, patrimonii. Alium dc Saturno, id est de 
Imperio ct ipsius gubernatione per proceres hodiernos, et quis exitus prosper! 
et adversi, maxime respectu regiminis ecclesiastici et teraporalis Italici, licet 
aliqualiter transcendant metas iuris. Hos tamen nunc non publico, ut praedixi, 
donee cesset causa urgens. 



Secunda Causa. 

POst hoc, Saturni filio combusto,* elevatis tribus supra nominatis viperis.t 
Saturnum aquilinum { in cordis centre gestantibus, et combusti thronum 
ascendentibus, ipsi indivisim in pabuli pastores || suscipiuntur, Et hoc fuit 
annis Domini MCCCLIV, die xi Octobris. Tune librabat Sol Grad. xxvi, Min. 
xxii, Luna rugiebat cum Leone, Grad. xvi, Min. xlv, Draco caput tegebat in 
Ariete, Grad. iii, Min. Iviii, Saturnus geminabat, Grad. xxiii, Min. xxiv, lupiter 
librabat, Grad. xxii, Min. xvii, Mars in Capricorno, Grad. xxv, Min. iv, Venus 
luxuriabat in Scorpione, Grad. xvi, Min. xiv, Mercurius in Scorpione, Grad. xi, 
Min. xlvi, Draco caput tegebat in Tauro m , Grad. iii, Min. lix. 



* id est, mortuo Archicpiicopo. $ id est, suocrdentibus Archiepiscopo. 

f id est, nepotibui. || id est, in dominot Bononiensrs. 

t id est, aquilam imperialcm. 



DE CIVITATE BONONIJE 75 

Post parum temporis, sorte posita super hereditate combust!,* maior 
ex viperis f in pabulum solus elevatur. Hie non do quotam, quia non pondero 
ad sequentia. Post haec, Mercurius, { a viperis penitus exterminari perti- 
mescens, intra pabulum ut pastor assumitur. Ecce hoc tempore brevissimo hie 
Taurus, luxuria furens, aliud trinum matrimonium contrahere non erubuit. 
Et quia sic luxuria furens in totuplici contrahendo contubernio, naturam pur- 
gabilis excessisti luxuriae, pluit Dominus super te sulfur et ignem a Domino 
de coelo, et subvertit te, et omnem contra te regionem et habitatores, et omnia 
virentia terras, ut scribitur Genesis xix capitulo. Cum linea recta semicircu- 
labitur quid tibi curvum est rectificabitur. Hoc autem fuit annis Domini 
MCCCLV, die xvii Aprilis, Sole in Tauro, Grad. v, Min. vii, Luna in Geminis, 
Grad. xxviii, Min. xxxi, Capite in Piscibus, Grad. xxiii, Min. xlix/Saturno in 
Geminis, Grad. xx, Min. xvii, love in Sagittario, Grad. xxii, Min. xv, Marte in 
Geminis, Grad. v, Min. xxi, Venere in Tauro, Grad. xxvii, Min. xix, Mercurio in 
Ariete, Grad. xi, Min. xxii. 

Huic secundae causes subicio tractatus de temporali dominio universaliter 
infra Imperium, tractando ipsius originem, ipsius species, divisionem, suc- 
cessionem, modum gubernationis et conservations, explicando unumquodque 
regimen, a minimo usque ad summum, in toto universo, ultra iuris metas, 
explicando qualiter secundum varietatem climatum mundi variantur mundi 
regimina, et qualiter in eisdem climatibus, variatis superiorum motibus et 
aspectibus, variantur mundi regimina, nam aliquando tyrannides, aliquando 
populus, aliquando principatus naturalis, communi et vulgato sermone, ut 
latissime prosequar, in prosecutione huius tractatus. 



Tertia Causa. 

POst hoc, evanuit vipera maior, et Mercurius || recognovit sequentem ^f 
in pabulo. Hoc fuit annis Domini MCCCLV, die xxvii Septembris (? >, 
Sol cum Capra salibat, Grad. xiv, Min. xlvi, Luna mordebatur a Scorpione, 
Grad. xxiii, Min. xxxi, Draco piscabatur cum Capite, Grad. x, Min. xix, Satur- 
nus cum Cancro, Grad. ii, Min. xlv, lupiter cum Capra pascebat, Grad. vii, 
Min. xxxiii, Mars morsum patiebatur Scorpionis, Grad. xxi, Min. xli, Venus 
cum Capra, Grad. i, Min. liii, Mercurius Venerem praecedebat super Capra, 
Grad. xviii, Min. Iv. Ecce, inverecunde Taure, novum aliud matrimonium sic 
instantanie non erubuisti contrahere, sed parum post hoc, huic dato libello ** 
repudii, O. revolvit ad A., et rediit cum Mercurio. ft Et hoc fuit anno Domini 
MCCCLVI, die xi Februarii, et tune Sol piscabatur, Grad. oW, vii, Min. Ivii, 
Luna geminabat, Grad. xvii, Min. Ivi. Caput Draconis erat repletum Piscibus, 



* id est, diviso dominio Archiepiscopi. || id est, dominus lo. de Olegio. 

t id est, dominus M. f scilicet dominum B. 

t id est, dominus lohannes de Olegio, dubitans ** id est, repulso domino B. 

mor i. ft id es t> dominus lo. de Olegio dommium 

id est, mortuus est dominus M. reassumpsit in solidum. 

[2] 



76 DE IVRE BELLI 

Grad. viii, Min. ix, Saturnus cum Cancro retrocodebat , firad. o, Min. xliv, 
lupiter saltabat cum Capra, Grad. xvi, Min. . . . Mars Sai;itt;mi ferebat, 
Grad. xviii, Min. Ixiv, \Ynusaquamspargebat, (irad. xxiv, Min. Iviii Men urius 
piscabatur, Grad. o, Min. xxxviii. Inhonestum visum est Tauro binos simul 
coniuges . . . Vtilius fuisset Tauro binos simul pati . . . quam per tot con- 
tubernia divagari. Et quia sic divagata es, tibi continget quod scriptum t->t : 
" Adducet Dominus super te gcntem de longinquo et dr extremis finibuv terra-, 
in similitudinem aquilaa volantis cum impetu, cuius linguam intdligm- mm 
possis, gentem procacissimam quae non deferat seni nee misereatur parvulo, et 
devoret fructus iumentorum tuorum ac fruges terrae tuae, donee intrn-as, et non 
relinquat tibi triticum et vinum et oleum, armenta bovum, et gregcs ovium." 
Haec allocutus est Dominus ad populum praevaricantem, ut scribitur Deuteron. 
xxviii ca]>itulo. Cum quatiTnarium resolvetur intcrnarium tune tibi In t 
mobile fissum. 

Huic causae subiungo tnutatus de concessione et rerognitionc dominii 
temporalis, explicando varios modos penes varietatem dominiorum et >n- 
cedentium ct recij)i-ntium. 

* 

Ouarta Causa. 

POst haec, constante matrimonio Mercurii cum Tauro,* flores et viriditas 
pabuli taurini fuerunt regnante love clavigero, innm intium Sexto fe- 
rente, totaliter exsiccati.f et hoc fuit annis Domini MCCCLVII, die xii Apri- 
lis. Tune Sol erat cum furibundo Tauro, Grad. o, Min. xlvi, Luna fundebat 
Aquas, Grad. v, Min. xxix, Draco caput sub unda tegebat, (irad. iii <-' ', Min. 
xxxviii, Saturnus cum Cancro, Grad. xv, Min. xvi, lupiter natabat in Aquis, 
Grad. xxvi, Min. xxiii, Mars geminabatur, Grad. xv, Min. xiv, Venus ludebat 
cum Piscibus, Grad. xxi, Min. xx, Mercurius cum Tauro, Grad. xi, Min. xxxii. 
O Taure inverecundc, haec poena fuit antiqui et temerarii tui divortii a coniuge 
qui tecum constante matrimonio auxit dotes tuas, te acutis cornibus super 
quadriennium elevando et de septentrione versus merediem latissimo solio 
praeficiendo. Sed furore impatiens, facto divortio, ruptis cornibus corruisti. 
Et, quia sic elatus, inquit Dominus ad te Taurum : " eo quod datum est cor 
tuum quasi cor Dei, idcirco adducam super te alienos robustissimos gentium, 
1 1 nudabunt gladios suos super pulchritudinem sapientiae tuae et polluent deco- 
rem tuum, et interficient et trahent te, et morieris in introitu occisorum in corde 
maris. Numquid dicens loqueris, Deus ego sum, coram intt i fu ientibus te, cum 
sis homo non Deus ? in manu occidentium te, in maim alicnorum, morieris, quia 
ego locutus sum, inquit Dominus," ut haec scribuntur Ezeclm-lis xxviii capitulo. 
Cum lob cornibus Tauri medebitur, quod in centro est ad sphaerae concavum 
nducetur. Huic causae adiungo tractatum De Ecclesiastic -a (Ynsura, circa 
singulas species ipsius tractatus explicando singulariter. 

* id ct, prz*idente domino lohanne dc Olcgio. 

f id cst, latum fuit interdictum divinorum ct tutpcnsio stuilii in civitate Bononisr. 



DE CIVITATE BONONI^E 77 

Quinta Causa. 

POst base iterum depascente Mercuric, f intra pabulum Tauri secundo 
viperatus f in filium Saturni per adoptionem assumptus,J Martem 
motu veloci, ut Tauri pabulum ingrederetur propere destinavit, qui plures 
gradus lucidos et diurnos ipsius est ingressus.|| Finaliter, operam dante 
Mercuric ^j altissimus lovis frater,** ab eo pontificalia, a Saturno imperialia, a 
Martc bellica, supra ceteros Ecclesiae cardines gestans, Martem f| directum 
praeveniendo, intra pabulum est susceptus,J| ut circulo primae causae revoluto. 
Sicut tune motum velocem tarde gradiens praevenit in termino, sic nunc vice 
versa volantem reptilem praecessit, sed tune praeveniens virilius occupavit. 
Circumflexus circumflectetur, tandem vix eidem clavibus aperietur, clavibus 
clauditur. Anterius non negligat claviger quod posterius, alis ten&is volatile, 
tendit ad astra. Requirit rugientem ut emittat rugitum Saturnus. Retro- 
gradus nititur erigi. Volatus non attinget astra, sed terrea circumspiciet, 
rugitus non longe sonum, nee Saturnus erigetur ad summujn. Tibi, Taure, 
insperata net quies. Quintus in Zodiaco difformiter motus ut quiesceret donee 
radiis iungatur, nee circumflectetur sinet. Ab auge iam motus, per circum- 
ferentiam epicirculi fluens efficitur unius. Prius circumvolet, post circumvol- 
vetur, ruiturus post non sublevetur. Volatilium multiplex reducetur, et unum 
vidi volantem ad astra plumis contingentem et ima. Vidi castrametantem 
ubi non pugna, caveat ne post mox fiat una. Post vidi alterum angelum 
volantem in manibus tenentem evangelium. Saturnus, in circular! epicirculo 
de opposito deductus, ad augem retrogradando de auge deducetur ad assem. 
Quod imum transduxit in summum, quod summum circumducet in imum, 
surget Leo grandis et mixtus sonitu scindens pacifer venia tritus. Concutiet 
fossa, reducet summum ad ima, sparsa redigentur in chaos, ut ex ipso astra 
derivarunt in troncos. Non lugeat Taurus cum vicinus quietis speretur 
eventus. Currus transvehitur, bobus punctis occa subitur.. Catuli pascuntur, 
uni primum vel alteri sequens astute. Vidi plumata in nido minuto, imper- 
fecto, niveo, corvino. Scindetur nidus et solium obtinet unus qui fuit trinus, 
post binus sextus et unus. Erigitur tutus, titubabat alter, et ecce nullus. 
Video duos primos cceli consiliarios ad grande colloquium accessuros. Fiet 
colloquium in loco humido et venenoso. Ibi tractabitur ut mundus inferior 
concutiatur. Ibi tractabitur ut in mundo sectetur. Ib tractabitur ut mundi 
principatus permutetur. Ibi tractabitur ut Ecclesia periclitetur. Ibi tracta- 
bitur ut pestilentiae et fames eleventur. Ibi tractabitur ut regio maritima con- 
quassetur. Ibi tractabitur ut mundi princeps in sede permutetur, net magna 
concussio. Tres autem inferiores consiliarii in alio angulo anteriori eiusdem 
domus eodem tempore colloquentur adinvicem, et multa de mundi dispositione 
disputabunt, et dimnient, et hsec colloquia fient annis Domini MCCCLXV de 

* id est, dominus lohannes de Olegio. II id est, pluribus fortibus comitatus. 

t id cst, dominus B. II id est, dominus lohannes de Olegio. 

t id est, vicarius imperialis effectus. ** id est, dominus Egidius, domini Papa: legatus. 

id est, magnum exercitum ut civitatcm ap- tt id est, exercitum domini B. 

prehcnderet transmisit. ti id est, in dominum Bononiae atsumptus. 



;8 DE IVRE BELLI 

mense Octobris. O Taure, oportet te attentum esse ac cornibus paratum, cum 
mxindi f ulgor in stabulo tuo subumbrabitur, nee negligas. Et net hoc MCCCLX 1 
die v Maii. Haec in grandi colloquio et multiformi tractarunt planetae, de 
quibus in themate dixi. Haec varii operantur revolutionum aspectus, et 
signandum est aliud in matrimonium Tauri. Nam annis revolutis quibus 
mense et die divertit, repulso O.,* eisdem reintegravit recepto S.f 

O Taure, motu pergens multiformi, cum motus sit ordinatus ut termi- 
netur in quiete, tibi inest ut motus terminctur in motum, et regulariUr in 
deteriorem. Tibi finis motus est principium motus. Tibi quiesccre est moveri, 
nunc imitando gentilcm Catonem, qui repudiatam reassumpsit, regrcdiendo 
unde diverteres, inquietis terminum dirigere confidebas. Sed adhuc est ut 
movearis donee Altissimo placuerit stabilem tibi fingere modum. Ingressus 
est plene lovis frater annis Domini MCCCLX, die primo Aprilis. Tune Sol 
cum Ariete, Grad. xix, Min. xxiv, Luna librabat, Grad. xi, Min. xxi, Draco 
cum Capite sagittabat, Grad. xvii, Min. xxxvi, Saturnus rugiebat cum Leone, 
Grad. xxv, Min. viii, lupiter cum Tauro, Grad. xxi, Min. xviii, Mars pi 
batur, Grad. vi, Min. xxiii, Venus Martem piscando praeibat, Grad. x, Min. 
h'i, Mercurius in Ariete, Grad. xvi, Min. x. Huic iungam gesta Paeis, cum 
facta fuerit. Et faciam tractatum singularem De Pace. Taure, infirmaris non 
plectorice, sed cathocinie, et vere cathocinie, quia humorum difformitas et 
excessus in quali diu provisum est in quanto, sed fervor in quali speras mc'di- 
corum plurcs sunt, ut tibi medelam afferant. 



INCIPIT TRACTATVS DE BELLO 

[c*p. i.j In tractatu Belli sic procedam : 

Primo, ponam descriptionem Belli Humani, de quo prim -ipaliter tractaturus 

sum, in genere. 

Secundo, dividam Bellum per membra. 
Tertio, prosequar singula membra. 



Quid sit Bellum, cl qualiter dcscribahir ? 

Bellum sic describitur. Bellum est contentio exorta proptcr aliquid dis- 
sonum appetitui humano propositum, ad dissonantiain t -\< -ludendam tcndens. 

Dixi " contentio." Haec ponitur ut genus, nam sub se continet et bclli- 
cam contentionem et alias quascumque ut 1. s usque, fin., ff. De aqua pluv. 
arcenda. Dixi " propter dissonum," et est causa unde oritur quaelibet con- 

* id et, Hottlenii legato. f Sabincnti legato. 



DE DIVISIONE BELLI 79 

tentio. Dixi " appetitui humano," ad differentiam brutorum. Dixi " ad 
dissonantiam," etc., et est causa finalis cuiuslibet belli, nam quodlibet bellum 
tendit finaliter ad tollendam displicentiam quaa fuit belli introductoria, et sic 
fiunt bella propter pacem, xxiii, q. i, noli. 



De divisione Belli, et qualiter dividatur. 

[Cap. n.] 

Secundo, Bellum sic dividitur. Bellum aliud Spirituale, aliud Corporale. 

Spirituale aliud Cceleste, aliud Humanum. Spirituale Cceleste est de quo 
habetur lob, xiv capitulo (?) . Humanum est de quo scribitur Ad Romanes vii 
cap., ibi " video aliam legem repugnantem legi mentis meae " ; xxxii, q. v, 
si Paulus. 

Corporale aliud est Vniversale, aliud Particulare. De Vniversali habetur 
ff. De captivis, quasi per totum ; xxiii, q. i, et q. ii. 

Particulare aliud fit ob tutelam corporis sui et rerum, et de hoc habetur ff. 
De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim; ff. De vi et vi ar., 1. i, vim vi; et ff. Ad leg. 
Aquil., 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter ; et 1. i, C. De vi ; et cap. olim, De restit. 
spol. ; et in Clem., sifuriosus, De homicidio. 

Aliud fit ob tutelam corporis mystici, vel eius partis, propter defectum 
iurisdictionis, quod " Represalias " nuncupatur, de quo in Authent., ut non fiant 
pignorationes ; et De iniuriis, Lib. VI. Aliud fit propter contumaciam re- 
sistentis iurisdictioni iudicis, de quo in 1. qui restituere, ff. De rei vindicatione. 

Aliud fit propter purgationem, quod " Duellum " appellatur, de quo C. 
De gladiatoribus, 1. una ; et De pugnantibus in duello, per totum titulum. 
Verum est quod posset dividi prima divisione per iustum et iniustum, sed in 
his modicum insistendum, et singula membra singulariter sunt explicanda ex 
ordine suo. 

Et primo de Bello Spirituali Ccelesti, brevissime illud explicando, et sic 
de singulis. 



Ordo Tractatuum. 

Tractabo igitur de Bello Spirituali Ccelesti. 

Secundo, de Spirituali Humano. 

Tertio, de Corporali Vniversali. 

Quarto, de Particulari, quod fit ob tutelam corporis sui. 

Quinto, de Particulari, quod fit ad defensam mystici corporis, quod 
" Represaliae " nuncupatur. 

Sexto, de Particulari, quod fit ad purgationem, quod " Duellum " nuncu- 
patur. 



8o DE IVRE BELLI 



De Spiritual! Hello Calesti. 

[Cap. ii. ] 

Redeundo ad singula, dico quod cceleste bellum instirrexh propter ingra- 
titudinem insurgentem propter defectum nssionis m carifctis impressae a ( 
tore, in intelligent iam inter ceteras sublimion in creatam. Et huic non con- 
gruit dcscriptio superius data. Vbi scicndum est juod, ut inquit (ircgorius 
in Moralibus, ab initio crcationis angelicae nature, Altissimus omnium creator 
crcavit Luciferum ceteris angelicis intelligentiis cmincntiorcm. Nam ipsius 
primatus non fuerunt inferiores cedris in paradiso Dei, ut scribitur Ezcchiclis 
\\xi, abietes, platani, non aequarunt [firmitatem] summitatem nee frondibus 
eiu>, nain ipse speciosus factus in multis cundensisquc frondibus dicitur, quia, 
praelatum ceteris legionibus, tanta f " ilium spiritus pulchritudinis reddidit, 
quanta et supposita angelorum multitudo decoravit. Ista arbor in paradis< Dei 
tot quasi condensas frondes habuit quot sub sc positas supernorum spirituum 
legiones attendit. Hie fuit signaculum Dei similitudinis. Fuit iste sic creatus 
ceteris eminentior, sit ut et cetera foramina habuit praeparata ad caritatcm 
suscipiendam. Nam hie a principle conditionis suae capax caritatis cst cou- 
ditus, quia si replcri voluissct [samtibus] sumptibus f<) angt-lic is, tamquam 
positis in regio ornamento lapidibus, ]x>t \iisset inhaercrr, M'd caritatcm proptor 
superbiam non assumpsit. Si enim caritatis auro sc penetrubilnn prsebuisscl , 
sanctis angelicis sociatus, in ornamento regie lapis scissus numsisset. Habuit 
ergo foramina, sed superbise vitio caritatis auro non sunt repleta. 

Quia igitur ceteris iste eminentior fuit, ut signaculum similitudinis Dei 
creatus, nee caritate propter superbiae vitium repleri voluit, idcirco peccans, 
sine venia damnatus est, quia magnus sine comparathme creatus fuit, igitur 
propter hoc de paradiso eiectus, ut prolixe et pulcherrime videri potest in cap. 
principium enim, De Pcenit., di. ii. Et fuit Gregorii, ut praedixi. Et hoc fuit 
Spirituale Coeleste Bellum, circa quod, ut praemisi, parum in.sistendum. tamrn, 
quia dixi ipsum ceteris eminentiorem, est attcndendum quod quagdam sunt 
collata angelis in principio creationis suae communiter, sed differenter, quaedam 
communiter, sed indifferenter. Collata communiter stcl differenter fuerunt 
naturae sive substantial subtilitas, intelligentiae perspicacitas, liberi arbitrii 
habilitas. Haec tamen differenter, nam quidam sunt in substantia subtiliores, 
quidam in intelligentia perspicaciores, quidam libertate arbitrii habiliun-. 
( "llata autem communiter sed indifferenter fuerunt spiritualitas, indissoln- 
bilitas, indivisibilitas, immortalitas. 

In his omnes parificantur, et per hoc intelliges quibus Lucifer fuerit ceteris 
eminentior, quia in collatis communiter sed differenter. 

Est etiam attendendum quod Diabolus fuit exaltatus JH-I naturalem 
praerogativam, de qua dictum est. exaltatus est etiam propter vii tdiam quam 
habet contra homincm aliquando in bello quod gerit contra ipsum, mule scribi- 
tur in Psalmo, " Exaltasti dexteram deprimeutium cum." quam victoiiam 
timens David dicebat, " Illumina oculos meos ne unqviam obdormiam in 
morte, ne quando dicat inimicus meu>. pKcvalui adversus cum." Exaltatns 
est etiam propter superbiam, unde dictum est ei " clevatum est cor tuum in 



DE SPIRITVALI BELLO CCELESTI 81 

decore tuo," cum ipse dixit, " ascendam in ccelum, et p>onam thronum meum 
ad aquilonem, et ero similis Altissimo," Isaiae xiv capitulo (?) . 



Qualiter Spirituale Bellum Cceleste est metrum et mensura Spiritualis [Cap. i 

Humani Belli. 

Hoc igitur fuit Spirituale Bellum quo eiectus fuit Lucifer de paradiso 
Altissimi, et forte ex illo habuit ortum Spirituale Humanum. Nam in uno- 
quoque genere est de venire ad unum, quod sit primum et mensura eorum quae 
sunt in communi genere. In genere igitur repugnantise bonorum contra mala 
est devenire ad primum. Primum sunt principia, principium autem virtutis 
est Altissimus, principium autem vitiorum et princeps est Diabolus^ Ipsorum 
igitur pugna est primum et mensura cuiuslibet inferioris pugnae spiritualis 
humanas. 



De naturali deductione Spiritualis Belli corporum ccelestium ad ic ap . v.j 

bella terrestria. 

Et forte, naturaliter loquendo, bella corporalia terrestria habent bella 
ccelestia correspondentia, nam, ut dicit Philosophus, necesse est hunc [modum] 
mundum contiguum esse superioribus lationibus, ut omnis virtus inde regatur, 
primo Metaphysicorum, et secundo Cosli et Mundi. Omnis igitur actus inferior 
corporeus dirigitur a superccelestibus, et ibi est pugna, id est repugnantia vir- 
tualis, insurgens propter diversitatem corporum ccelestium, et maxime plane- 
tarum, quae plus apud cuncta operantur quam fixae, et diuersitatem aspectuum, 
situum, et motuum eorumdem. Quibus forte attentis, non foret bene possi- 
bile mundum esse sine bello. Et forte non esset peccatum, secundum semitas 
naturalium et astrologorum, tenere mundum non posse diuturnari sine bello 
et cum sola pace, quod sic posset aperte demonstrari. 



Qualiter secundum theologos et naturales philosophos necessario sit [Cap. 

dare helium. 

Positis causis sumcientibus et necessariis productivis alicuius effectus, 
necesse est poni ipsum effectum, sed belli ponuntur causes sufficientes et neces- 
sario productorias, ergo necesse est ponere ipsum bellum. Probatur maior. 
Nam effectus assequitur causam suam quoad esse productivum et destructi- 
vum, i, q. vii, quod pro remedio ; i, q. i, quod pro necessitate ; Iv di., priscis ; 
Ixi di., neophitus ; i, q. i, detrahe ; De baptis., debitum. Probatur minor. 
Nam secundum semitam naturalium impossibile est ccelum stare, Physicorum 
vii et viii, immo ipsius motus est perpetuus, et corpora ccelestia ex sui natura 
operantur in hasc inferiora effectus repugnantes, et haec effectuum repugnantia 
insurgit hie inferius propter varietatem aspectuum corporum ccelestium et 
motuum ipsorum, quod patet ex sensatis. Nam, stricte in proposito dedu- 



82 DE IVRE BELLI 

cendo, propter vurium COfrespqpdentiain corporum e<i-!eMiuin, te in pore con- 
structionis civitatum snnt reperta- < ivitates naturaliter K <>ilin liabentes, et sic 
amicae, sic genealogiae, sic et particulares homines qui se naturaliter odio 
habcnt, non praeccdontibus de mentis hinc indc, sic et naturaliter se diligentes. 
Cum igitur bella oriantur propter odia et dissonantias appetituum, haec autem 
necessario producentur a motibus corporum ccelestium, quae semper et n< 
sario operantur, infcrtur bella fore de necessario, attenta necessitate materialis 
et corporeae naturae. Fateor tamen quod potentia naturalis non n ssitatur 
directo, et per se immo resistere posset Hinc est quod inquit Ptolemaeus in 
libro Centum Verborum " anima sapiens dominatur astris, quis est ille regu- 
lariter, et laudavimus eum," fateor tamen, si theologi secus sentiant. me 
subicere, in omnibus quae eos contingunt, eorum correctioni. 

De hoc tamen bello nihil intendo tractare, quia nimis foret iuris metas 
excedere. 

Causae autem theologiae, propter quas non est pax universalis in orbe, 
sex solent reddi. Prima, quia non puniuntur maleficia, Ecclesiastic! iv rapi- 
tulo. Secunda, abundantia rerum temporalium, Genesis [iii] xiii cap., fact a i >( 
rixa inter pastores Abraham et pastores Loth ; lacobi v, unde bella et lites, 
etc. Tertia, quia non occupamur in pugna contra Daemonem, ideo non pug- 
namus ut homines, Isaiae xxviii cap., " percussimus fcedus cum morte et cum 
inferno " ; ad Ephesios [v] vi, " non est colluctatio adversus carnem." Quanta, 
quia non considcramus damna guerrae in qua perdimus animam et corpus et 
divitias, leremiae Ivi^ capitulo. Quinta, quia non ponderamus eventum belli, 
qui est dubius, primo Regum xii. Sexta, quia non servamus praecepta ])< i 
leremiae iii cap.'-', " utinam attendisses mandata mea, etc." 

Ex praedictis igitur infertur duplex spirituale bellum cceleste. Primum, 
Creatoris contra Luciferum ipsum, propter defectum caritatis in superbiam 
delatum, penitus de throno ccelesti ad centrum terrae deducendo. Et illud 
fuit momentaneum, de quo lob xiv cap., ubi supra. Secundum, virtualis 
repugnantia corporum motuum et aspectuum coelestium, introductoria for- 
malis repugnantiae in haec inferiora, propter quae introducuntur inferiora bella, 
et hoc est continuum et successivum. A primo, theologice loqucndo, dependet 
spirituale bellum et humanum, quod provcnit ex repugnantia intellectus ad 
sensum. Nam Princeps Malorum persuadet et inducit ad vitia, ut deorsum 
emergat, ad [Romanos vii] Ephesios vi^, Princeps autem Bonorum econtra 
ut ad superna elevet. A secundo autem dependet bellum corporale humanum , 
immo etiam spirituale humanum, naturaliter loquendo, ut infra proximo trac- 
tatu discutietur. 



De Spiritual! Humane Hello, sccundum theologiam. 

[Cap. vii 1 

Bellum Spirituale Humanum potest explicari theologice et moraliter. 
Theologice, est contentio exorta propter invidam repugnantiam Diaboli con- 
tra rationabilem creaturam, habens fomitem a peccato primi parentis. Et de 



DE SPIRITVALI HVMANO BELLO 83 

hoc bcllo spiritual! loquitur Apostolus ad [Romanes vii] Ephesios, vi cap., 
sic inquiens, " Induite vos armaturam Dei ut possitis stare adversus insidias 
Diaboli." Et ilia armatura sunt virtutes et bona opera quibus homines arman- 
tur contra vitia, xi, q. iii, qui resistit. Insidias autem Diaboli sunt innumera- 
biles, nam, ut inquit Johannes Papa, " Habet enim mille nocendi modos, nee 
ignoramus astutiam eius. Conatur namque a principio ruinae suae unitatem 
Ecclesiae rescindere, caritatem vulnerare, sanctorum operum dulcedinem invi- 
dias felle inficere, et omnibus modis humanum genus pervertere ac perturbare. 
Dolet enim satis et erubescit caritatem, quam in ccelo nequivit habere, homines 
constantes ex luti materia in terra tenere. Vnde oportet, quantum fragilitati 
nostrae conceditur, ut omnes aditus nocendi eius versutiae muniamus, ne mors 
ingrediatur per portas nostras." Haec habentur xvi, q. ii, cap. yisis. Sic 
alibi pulcherrime scribit Hieronymus ad lovinianum, sic inquiens, " Sic in 
malis atque peccatis semina sunt incentiva et perfectio Diaboli. Cum viderit 
nos supra fundamentum Christi aedificasse faenum, ligna, stipulam, tune sup- 
ponit incendium. ^dificemus ergo aurum, argentum, et lapides pretiosos, 
et attemptare non audebit, quamquam et in hoc certe non sit secura possessio, 
sedet quippe leo in insidiis, ut in occultis interficiat innocentem, et vasa figuli 
probat fornax, homines autem iustos temptatio tribulationis." Haec sunt 
transumpta De Poenit., di. ii, cap. si enim, circa medium. Alibi etiam scribit 
Alexander Papa in haec verba, " Nam Diabolus non cessat circuire quasrens 
quern devoret, et quaerens quern ex fidelibus perdat, et maxime illos quos 
ardentiores in servitio Salvatoris eique familiares invenerit." Haec sunt tran- 
sumpta iii, q. i, nulli, et cap. verum^>, originaliter [Lucae xi et v capp.] (?) ; 
prima Petri v. Et habuit hoc bellum fomitem a peccato primi parentis, non 
ut a causa positiva, sed ut a causa sine qua non. Nam si non fuisset peccatum 
primi parentis, ad nihilum fuisset haec pugna. 



De Spirituals Humane Bella, secundum moralem philosophiam. [Cap. vi.] 

Moraliter autem intelligendo, et secundum semitam philosophorum lo- 
quendo, Spirituale Humanum Bellum est contentio exorta propter repugnan- 
tiam rationis ad sensitivum appetitum. Vbi sciendum quod secundum Philo- 
sophum, secundo De Anima, Anima habet quinque potentias, scilicet, vegeta- 
tivam, sensitivam, appetitivam, intellectivam, et, secundum locum, motivam. 
Appetitiva dividitur in sensitivam et rationalem. Idem Philosophus, i Poli- 
ticorum, quod anima dominatur corpori principatu disposito, id est in ordine 
ad servum, id est sicut dominus servo. Intellectus autem dominatur sensui 
principatu regali, id est in ordine ad liberos, hoc est dicere quod anima domina- 
tur corpori sicut dominus dominatur servo. Intellectus autem dominatur sensui 
sicut superior subdito tamen libero. Vlterius attendendum quod intellectus 
dicitur rationalis, quia in se ipso habet formaliter rationem, appetitus autem 
sensitivus dicitur rationalis, non quia in se ipso habeat rationem, quia sunt 
potentiae distinctae formaliter, sed dicitur rationalis quia in homine est aptus 

[3] 



84 DE IVRK BELLI 

natus obcdiro ration!, irratiunalis autt-ni. (juia poti-st mm obcdiiv rationi, 
vi-1 ponit exchisionem rationis formaliter. His pncmissis, evidrntcr appaivl 
quod appetitus sensitivus humanus aliquando obviat rationi, aliquando obodit 
rationi. Vbi obviat, est bellum et repugnantia. Vbi obedit, est pax et ron- 
cordia. Exemplum patet in magno mundo ubi omnia inferiora sunt apta nata 
obedire superioribus. Hinc est quod inquit idem Philosophus, primo Meta- 
physicorum et secundo Coeli, necesse est hunc mundum esse contiguum supe- 
rioribus lationibus ut omnis virtus inde regatur, et tamen aliquando non 
obediunt propter indispositionem materiae, et inde fiunt aliqua praeter inten- 
tionem agentium superiorum, ut monstra, sic sensitivus appetitus, ut inferior, 
aptus est obedire. Hinc est quod dicit idem Philosophus, secundo De Aninia 
tractatu, de moto et de movente, si intellect/us moveat appetitum sensitivum, 
t-t ipse eidem obediat, motus est naturalis, ac si sphaera superior moveret 
inferiorem. Si autem econtra, tune motus non est naturalis ac si sphaera 
inferior moveret superiorem. Exemplum patet in monarchia civili, nam 
aliqui sunt subditi repugnantes principibus suis. Exempla huius repugnantise 
tolle in continente et in incontinente. Nam et in continente appetitus sensitivus 
inclinat in excessivum, utpote inordinatum cibum, potum, vel aliquid simile. 
Ratio discat illud fugiendum, ut nocivum, et tamen in continente vincit intel- 
lectus et ratio, et proprie continentia non est virtus moralis firmata, nam, ut 
inquit idem Philosophus, in virtuoso omnia consonant. Vnde cum, ex multis 
et frequentibus actions, in appetitu sensitivo firmata fuerit promptitudo quae- 
dam, inclinans ipsum appetitum sensitivum in bonum, et conformiter rationi, 
tune proprie est virtus. In incontinente autem patens est haec rcpugnantia, 
sed ibi vincit appetitus sensitivus, nee ilia dicitur vitium firmatum, donee ex 
frequentibus actibus ita assueverit inclinarc in malum, quod sine aliqua repug- 
nantia nunc semper inclinet. Haec repugnantia proprie censetur helium spiri- 
tuale humanum, loquendo moraliter. De hac repugnantia etiam loquitur 
Apostolus ad Romanes, vii capitulo. " Video aliam legem rcpugnantem le^i 
mentis meae " ; transumptive, xxxii, q. v, si Paulus. DC hac etiam rcpugnanl ia 
scribitur vi di., sed pensandum ; De constitutionibus, nam concupisccntiam. 
Et de hoc spiritual! bello loquitur Gregorius, xxiii, q. i, >iisi bclla. In li.u 
autem repugnantia ab adolescentia regulariter est inclinatio in malum, nam 
omnis aetas ab adolescentia prona est in malum. Genesis viii cap. ; xii, q. i, 
omnis atas. Et ratio consuevit multiplex assignari. Prima quia malum 
potest quis per se, bonum autem non sine gratia. Alia est propter fomitrm 
originalis peccati impellentem ad malum. Alia quia facilius pervenerit ad 
malum quam bonum. Nam bonum consistit in mcdio essentialiter, vitia amVm 
in extremitatibus, ad medium autem transitur unica via recta, ad extremum 
autem multiplicitcr. Alia quia plura sunt impedimenta boni quam mali. Alia 
quia non fit bonum nisi cum iudicio rationis, qua adolescentes parum vigent, 
propter offuscationem organorum corporalium. Et hanc credo veriornn 
rationcm. Hoc dc Bello Spiritual!, circa quod plura possent tractari. Sed 
prsetermitto, quia transcenderent metas iuris, in quibus minus quam possibile 
sit intendo distendere. 



DE BELLO CORPORALI VNIVERSALI 85 

De Vniversali Corporali Bella. iCap. .i 

Tertio, tractaturus de Bello Vniversali Corporali, ipsius tractatum expli- 
cabo per quastiones : 

Primo, quo iure ortum et inductum sit bellum. 

Secundo, quibus liceat indicere universale bellum, subiungendo contra 
quos. 

Tertio, quae sint aggregantia bellum, explicando, per modum summae, 
actus licitos et illicitos personarum bellum aggregantium, et formando quas- 
dam quaestiones circa ipsa. 

Quarto, quae sint persona; qua; artari possunt ad bellum, et quod de 
accedentibus non astrictis. 

Quinto, de his spoliis quae hunt in bello, et aliis quibusdam qliae in bello 
fiunt. 

Sexto, per modum tabulae ad instructionem canonistae, de quaestionibus 
contingentibus materiam belli. Vbicunque in Corpore luris Canonici tracta- 
tum fuerit per Glossatores et Doctores, remittam. 

Quo iure ortum habuit Bellum Vniversale Corporate. [Cap. 1.1 

Redeo ad primum, et primo quaero quo iure ortum habeat Bellum Vni- 
versale Corporale. Solutio. lure divino et iure gentium. lure divino, et 
probatur losuae viii ; primo Regum xvi capitulo. lure gentium, ff. De iustit. et 
iure, 1. ex hoc iure. 

. Qualiter iure divino ortum habuit bellum universale corporale. 

Dixi quod bella orta sunt iure divino, ubi sciendum quod bella nedum 
domino permittente, immo positive concedente, inducta sunt. Et hoc demon- 
strari potest, nam omnis facultas tendens in bonum adeo positive nedum per- 
missive derivatur. Sed facultas belli indicendi iusti tendit in bonum, ergo a 
Deo positive provenit. Probatur maior, nam " omne datum optimum et 
omne donum perfectum desursum est descendens a Patre [hominum] lumi- 
num," lacobi i ; i, q. ii, quern pio. Probatur minor, nam indictio belli iusti 
et bellum iustum tendit in bonum, nam tendit in pacem et quietem universi. 
Hoc probatur auctoritate Augustini ad Bonifacium, sic inquientis ; " non 
enim bellum quasritur ut bellum exerceatur, sed bellum geritur ut pax quaera- 
tur." Subdit, " Esto ergo bellando pacificus, ut eos quos expugnas ad pacis 
utilitatem vincendo perducas." Habentur xxiii, q. i, noli. Est igitur finis 
belli pax et tranquillitas universi. Ergo infertur a Deo originaliter et positive 
provenisse. Confirmatur. Nam omnis actus punitivus malorum a Deo pro- 
venit, sed indictio iusti belli est actus punitivus malorum et rebellium. Ergo 
a Deo positive provenit. Probatur maior. Nam scribitur, " mihi vindicta[m], 
ct ego rctribuam," [Proverbiorum xxii c.]; [xxiii, q. i, cap. item cum in 
Proverbiis] ; et alibi, " meaest ultio et egoretribuam," Deuteronomii xxxii ; 
ad Hebraeos x ; ad Romanes capitulo [xiii] xii. Probatur minor auctori- 



86 DE IVRE BELLI 

tate Augustini, in Sermone De puero centurionis. xxiii, q. i, para/us, ver. mint 
corripiendo. Immo per hanc inductionem com ludi poet tin ologice dr i.< 
sario in universe fore malos et rebellcs, nam maiestati divirue insunt actus prie- 
miativi bonorum et punitivi maloruni. ut scribitur, " nullum bonum, etc." 
Tune, illo praemisso, posset sic induci, posito actu necessario, ponitur obiectum 
tcrminativum illius actus. Hoc probatur per verba 1'liilnsophi libro ii De 
Anima, nam posito actu visionis ponitur obiectum visibilc. Item et uctu 
auditionis posito, ponitur obiectum audibile. Posito igitur a pdndpiocreatioois 
mundi actu punitive in Deo, necessario ponitur obiectum punibile, et tale est 
Malum, ut supra deductum est. Confirmatur primum principale. Nam <>miii* 
actus per quem tollitur nocendi facultas a Deo positive provenit. Sed indictio 
belli iusti est huiusmodi. Probatur hoc auctoritate Augustini, sic inquientis, 
" Bella geruntur ut adpietatis, iustitiae societatem victis consulatur." Subdit, 
" nam cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur, utilius vincitur, quoniam nihil est infe- 
licius felicitate peccantium, qua poenalis nutritur impunitas, et mala volunl;is, 
velut hostis interior roboratur." Haec habentur xxiii, q. i, paratus, ver. ac per 
hoc. Confirmatur. Omnis potestas est a Deo, iubente vel permittente, 
ergo potestas bellica sic provenit, sed non solum permittente sed et iubente. 
Ergo iubente. Probatur principale, ad Romanes xiii ; transumptive, xxiii, q. i, 
quid culpatur. Quid plura ? Nonne hoc patet, inspectis mundi generationi- 
bus ? Nam a principio creationis mundi usque ad tempora Noe Deus per se 
ipsum, et sine ministro, malos exterminabat, ut patet de Cain et Abel, et qui- 
busdam aliis regibus, ut scribitur Genesis iv et v capitulis. Per se igitur bella 
induxit punitiva et malorum exterminativa. Infertur igitur ex praemissis bella 
iure divino inducta originaliter. Figuraliter, immo forte naturaliter, demon- 
strari posset. Nam ut inquiunt naturales, homo est parvus mundus, et sicut 
fit gubernatio in parvo mundo, sic in toto universali, similitudine tracta, ut 
inquit Philosophus viii Physicorum, ac in regimine naturali corporis constat 
quod ubi nullus est humorum excessus, nulla est rcbellio repugnans conserva- 
tioni et durationi naturali. Vbi autem humorum excessus propter inordina- 
tam regimen, tune pugna naturae tendentis in conservationem contra excessum 
tendentem in destructionem, et in pugna aliquando sufncit naturalis potentia 
ad correctionem repugnantiae, aliquando est impotens, propter excessum 
morbi, et tune est opus extrinseeo remedio, utpote medicamine >,i]>iente natu- 
ram veneni, repugnantis tamen morbo. Sic directe in magno mundo. Nam 
aliquando in regione et plaga mundi nullus est rcbellium exressus. et tune nulla 
pugna, immo uniformitcr tendit ipsius gubernatrix Natura ' < miservationcm. 
Aliquando est excessus rebelliuin. i< ndeiitium in destructionem gubernationis 
inservationis, et tune aliquando Natura per se corrigit, ut monitionibus, 
exhortationibus, et aliis placationibus, et tune non est opus bello, nee medi- 
camine vcncnoso. Aliquando in tantum exccssit morbu-. <|u<id opus est mcdi- 
caminc vencnoso, penitus materiam morbi exthpante, et tale medicaineu est 
l>elluin eradieativum et exteniiiuaiivum maloium. SK igilur in p.uvu inundo. 
rccurrit (?) proj)t( i defn turn virtutis interioris ad iiiedinmi, qui operatur n 



QV IVRE ORTVM ? 87 

dio extrinseco et venenoso, sicut in magno mundo gubernator generalis, qui 
est Altissimus Creator, et est medicus universi, tendens in ipsius conserva- 
tionem et gubernationem, cum in tantum excreverunt humores tendentes in 
destructionem universi, vel partis eius, Dei iustitia [excessiva et ulterius im- 
portabilia] l?) respectu conservationis monarchiae mundanae, utitur remedio bel- 
lico, ut exterminet vitia et excessus, et discensia (?) reducatur ad terminum tem- 
peramenti. Et, sicut in corpore humano isti humorum excessus fiunt circa 
membra singula corporis humani, et etiam distrosio i? insurgit, aliquando prop- 
ter humoris unius excessum, quandoque alterius, sic in universo, circa singulas 
regiones et mundi plagas, quae sunt membra magni mundi, fiunt hi vitiorum 
excessus, quae repugnant ipsius gubernationi, et aliquando in uno, aliquando 
in alio, secundum vitiorum varietates. Et sic contingit plagas ^undi ali- 
quando infirmari propter vitiorum excessum, quae quandoque sic excedunt 
quod opus est medicamine eradicativo, quo eradicabuntur aliquando boni cum 
malis, sicut medicina evellit etiam mixtim bonos cum malis. Immo aliquando 
propter dictum excessum penitus exstinguuntur, ut mors contingit etiam in 
singularibus suppositis, quod patet ex sensatis, nam regiones infinitae propter 
haec sunt penitus exstinctae et inhabitabiles redditae. Infinita possent recitari 
exempla, hoc idem contingit in genealogiis et in regiminibus, quae etiam mi- 
nuuntur et penitus exstinguuntur. Et licet haec dicta sint sic figuraliter, tamen 
textibus legis divinae apertissime demonstrantur, nam, ut legitur Genesis xix 
cap., propter excessivum morbum Sodomae Deus usus est medicamine bellico 
et eradicativo contra Sodomam, Gomorram, Seboim, Segor, et Oleale, licet 
duae perierint propter vicinitatem, ut De Pcenit., di. i, cap. sed continue ; et 
cap. clerici, De excessibus praelat. ; et in Authent., ut non luxu. contra naturam, 
circa fin. coll. vi. Possent induci innumerabilia exempla. De isto etiam 
medicamine bellico, scribitur losuae viii cap., nam ibi Dominus Noster iubet 
[ad lesum nave] ut constituat sibi retrorsum insidias.idestinsidiantesbellatores, 
ad insidiandum hostibus. Et Augustinus, in libro Quaestionum super verbis 
losuae, " lusta autem bella definiri solent quae ulciscuntur iniurias," id est 
delictorum excessus. Et subdit, " sic gens vel ci vitas plectenda est quae vel 
vindicare neglcxerit quod a suis improbe factum est." Subdit, " sed hoc 
genus belli sine dubio iustum est quod Deus imperat, qui novit quod cuique 
fieri debeat." Non dicit " permittit," immo "imperat." Subdit "in quo 
bello dux exercitus, vel ipse populus, non tarn auctor belli quam minister Dei 
iudicandus est." Et sic clare demonstratur Deum, ut medicum altissimum, 
et conservatorem universi, bella imperare, ut eradicentur delicta. Haec 
habentur transumpta xxiii, q. ii, Dominus Noster. De hoc etiam bello et 
medicamine eradicativo scribitur i Maccabaeorum v cap., et Deuteronomii 
cap. ii ; ubi ex mandate Dei filii Israel bella geruntfur] contra Armoraeos, quod 
etiam tractat Augustinus in libro Numerorum, et habetur transumptum xxiii, 
q. ii, cap. notandum sane. De hoc etiam scribitur ludicum v cap., ibi " elegit 
I )< .minus nova bella." Loquitur de his eradicantibus vitiorum excessibus. 
Scribitur etiam [losuae] Isaiae xxx, ' Et bellis praecipuis expugnabit," tan- 



88 DE IVRE BELLI 

i|u;un bellator. De his eradicantibus scribitur ctiani i Ma> aki-unim iv tap.. 
" Confortamini et bellate." Scribitur etiam leremiae xx cap., " Dominus est 
imrum tanquam bellator." Hieronymus super Sophoniam pulcherrime hoc 
describit, dicens, " Si quis fortitudincm latronis vel piratae enervat et infirmos 
reddit, prodest illis sua infirmitas, debilitata enim membra quibus prius non 
bene utebantur a malo opere cessabunt." Conclusio est Hieronymi quod 
sanantur vitiosi si eruatur morbus quo membra infecta in malum dispone- 
bantur, et hoc fit bello eradicativo. Haec habcntur xxiii, q. iii, cap. si quis 
fortitudincm. Hoc apertc demonstratur per id quod scribitur Lucae [viij \ii, it 
ad Hebraeos xii p) dicit Dominus, " Servus qui nescit voluntatem doniini sui 
et facit digna plagis, vapulabit paucis, servus autem (jui scit voluntatem do- 
mini, et facit digna plagis, vapulabit multis." Excedens igitur recepit plagas 
a Domino. Haec sunt transumpta xxiii, q. iv, cap. ea vindicta. Hinc legitur 
quod Elias multos affecerit morte prima manu, et igne divinitus impetrando, 
i v Kegum i cap. ; et cap. ea vindicta. Deinde xxiii, q. [v] iv, sic scribitur de aliis 
tompore veteris legis, iii Regum xvii et xviii cap. ; sic scribitur quod vt il 
Petri, apostolorum principis, Ananias et uxor eius mortui ceciderunt, Actuum 
iv capitulo. Transumptive habetur xvii, q. i, Ananias; xxiii, q. [v] iv, 
ca vindicta, in fine. Et de hoc bello eradicante, pulchre loquitur Gregorius 
ad Brunehildam Francorum reginam, sic inquiens, " Ne si, quod non credimus, 
divinae ultionis iracundia sceleratorum fuerit actione commota, belli pest is 
interimat quos delinquentes ad rectitudinis viam Dei praecepta non revocant " ; 
xxiii, q. iv, si [vos] quos. Nonne inquit Dominus ad Moysen ; " maleficos non 
patieris vivere ", Exodi xxii capitulo? Moyses etiam, qui legem acceperat a 
Domino, cultores idoli morte punivit, Exodi xxxii capitulo. Samuel etiam 
mandate Doniini Agag regem pinguissimum in frusta occidit, i Regum xv 
capitulo. Transumpta habentur xxiii, q. v, cap. hinc apf>aret. Dominus etiam 
^Egyptios fluctibus submersit, Exodi xi v cap. ; Israelitarum cadavera prostravit 
in Eremo, Numerorum xiv capitulo. Transumpta habentur xxiii, q. v, quid ergo. 
Intinita possent super hoc demonstrando induci exempla veteris et nova legis 
divinse, sed haec sufficiant ut ex his narratis sufficiat concludere bella originali- 
ter ortum habuisse ex Jure divino, et non solum Dei permissione, immo et 
positive ab ipso, ut mundi gubernatore et medico vitiorum eradicativo, prop- 
ter salutem et mundi conservationem, et cum in hunc finem tcndant h;cc bellica 
remedia, ut supra clare deductum est, propter hanc autem [distrasiam | <" et 
vitiorum multiplicorum excessum in universi destructione progrediente, ex 
sensatis apparet altissimum Creatorem, tcmporibus retroactis, i-t lioc eradi- 
cativo remedio usum fuisse, nam regna et mundi regimina quam plura sunt 
l>t nitus enervata et quam plura remissa. Quid de Troianorum [assensu] 1 -' ? 
Quid de Graecorum imperio ? Quid de Romanorum universo dominio ? Par- 
tes Italia: temporibus nostris febriunt et subiciuntur examini. Medidna 
paratur alicubi minorativa, alicubi eradicate itante ad summum, quo- 

rum habitudines sunt fallai <>, iuxta ilc>< trinam peritissimi Hipporratis, junno 
Aphorismoium. Hanc rcgionem deduxcrunt ail niutum, ut Altissimus con- 



QVO IVRE ORTVM ? 89 

gruam exhibeat medicinam, de cuius humores in quanto et quasi in tempera- 
mento plus discant.f cumque ex pulmentudine fiunt evacuationes, sanet, iuxta 
doctrinam eiusdem^. Haec autem conclusio, videlicet quod bella proveniant 
a Deo, positive et originaliter demonstrari posset, attento divinas maiestatis 
uniformi et perpetuo instrumento. Nam altissimus omnium Creator, median- 
te coelesti machina, in hanc terrestrem machinam naturaliter operatur, licet 
supernaturaliter. Immediate ubi vult spiret et influat, sed naturaliter loquor, 
iuxta dictum peritissimi Philosophi, primo Meteororum, et secundo Coeli, 
necesse est hunc mundum contiguum esse superioribus lationibus, ut omnis 
virtus inde regatur. Influit igitur Altissimus naturaliter in haec inferiora, 
mediante coelesti et sphaerico corpore, illud autem totum corpus operatur, 
mediante motu et lumine, ut inquit idem Philosophus. Et, quia in ipsa tota 
machina coelesti sunt partes diversarum virtutum in influendo, ut puta sphse- 
rarum varietas, stellarum errantium et fixarum diversitas, a quibus propter 
varietatem naturarum et motuum dependet effective omne genitum et cor- 
ruptibile ; idcirco quaelibet contrarietas et naturarum diversitas, repugnantia 
hie inferius insurgens, dependens est desuper. Ex quo statim infertur quod, 
cum repugnantia et difformitas sunt inductoria bellorum, quod bella inde 
oriantur, immo experientia docet quod, propter uniformitatem et difformita- 
tem aspectuum tempore nativitatis, insurgunt inter homines naturales dilec- 
tiones et naturales inimicitiae. Hoc quilibet experitur, nam quis diliget statim 
cum viderit, nullis mentis praecedentibus, et sic odio habebit, nullis demeritis 
praecedentibus. Sic inter civitates et villas et castra insurgunt dilectiones et 
odia naturaliter, propter uniformitatem et difformitatem aspectuum tempore 
constructionis earum, et sic insurgunt odia et bella, influentia coelesti, sic 
et amicitia et paces, sic inter provincias. Haec autem coelestis natura, me- 
diante motu, est productiva generationis et corruptionis, in his inferioribus 
augmenti et diminutions, nedum in singularia supposita, immo in singulas 
mundi plagas, nam ex hac superna natura plagae habitabiles factae sunt in- 
habitabiles, et econtra. Nam, iuxta doctrinam Philosophi, ubi mare fiet 
aridum, ubi aridum net mare, ex hac naturarum repugnatione ac disposi- 
tionum, ex qua rixae, contentiones, bella particularia et universalia insurgunt. 
Haec, propter motuum et aspectuum varietatem, quaedam exaltat, quaedam 
exstinguit, et quaedam deprimit, mutat mundi regimina universalia et particu- 
laria. Et hoc demonstrari potest, nam, posita causa sufficient! productiva 
alicuius effectus, necesse est ilium effectum produci, nisi adsit aliquod extrin- 
secum impedimentum productionis, sed natura coelestis continue difformatur 
motu et aspectu, et ipsius partes sunt difformes ex sui natura in influendo. 
Ergo necesse est produci hos effectus repugnantes et difformes cum non sit 
quod impedire possit, et per hoc inferri posset quod naturaliter necesse est 
esse bella, nee aliter procederet naturaliter mundi gubernatio. Protestor 
tamen quod licet hoc coelestis natura operetur in haec inferiora, non tamen 
per se et directo intellectu humano, immo durat libertas arbitrii, ut in cap. 
Nabuchodonosor, xxiii, q. iv, et cap. de Tiriis ; et De Pcenit., di. ii, cap. sicut 



90 DK TYRE BELLI 

cnnn ; et Philosophus iii Ktliicoruni. Sod oprratur in organo virtutum scn- 
Mtivarum, quaj nrepta influent ia ailniinistrant intrll tuin, sic per indirertuni 
inlhiit. Hinc est quod seribitur in libro Centum Yerbonim, " aniina sapiens 
dominatur astris." Sed quia hoc tractare nimis clongatur a terminis iuris, 
non ulterius circa hanc dcductionem insisto, scd sufiiciat illatum ex predict is 
et demonstratum, bella provenisse a Deo positive et effective, licet ex hoc 
ultimo inferatur, non immediate, sed mediante machina ccelesti, naturaliter 
]HTando. 



[cp.x!.i Qualiter iure gentium ortum ttabuerit helium univcrsale corporate. 

Dixi secundo quod bella cognita sunt iure gentium. Hie tamcn con- 
sidero quod, licet dicant iura quod bella sint introducta iure gentium, ut 
Isidorus, i di., ius gen. ; et Hermogenianus iurisconsultus, in 1. ex hoc itirc, 
ff., De iustit. et iure; tamen credo quod bella ortum habuerint non solum 
ex aequitate naturalis humanae intelligcntiae creatae, immo primordialiter < x 
dispositione naturae naturantis, non solum influentis secundum actus humanos, 
immo super quibuscunque animantibus et etiam inanimantibus, ut sit verum 
dicere quod bella habeant ortum a iure naturali, etiam ut distinguitur a iure 
gentium. Quod qualiter differat probat tcxtus, in 1. i, ius gen., et ins tia/it- 
rale, et 1. ex hoc iure, ff. De iustit. et iure ; et i di., ius naturalc. cum sua glossa, 
et cap. ius naturale. Quod hoc sit verum sic ostenditur. Ex principiis natu- 
ralibus cuilibet enti naturali create est insita inclinatio naturalis ad exclu- 
sionem cuiusque repugnantis sure naturali dispositioni. Hoc patet inducendo 
in singulis naturalibus simplicibus et mixtis, nam aqua; insitum est resisterc 
igni, et econtra, propter repugnantiam qualitatum. Sic in singulis dementis, 
sic in mixtis, induci posset maxime hoc quod patet in brutis, ubi, ex naturali 
repugnantia complexionum, unum inclinatur naturaliter ad occisionem altcrins, 
et econtra, sic in rationali creatura insita est inclinatio a natura, etiam cir- 
cumscripto intellectual! dictamine, ad profugandum quodcunque sibi rcpug- 
nans. Quod hoc sit verum, ratione probatur, nam natura omnium creatornm 
productiva non minus debuit esse sollicita in conservatione rationabilis creatura; 
quam ccterorum productorum, cum ipsa sit nobilior, ut cap. cum infirm itas, 
De pcen. et remiss. ; et 1. sancimus, C. De sacrosanctis eccles. ; et cap. Inn- 
imago, xxxiii, q. v ; et propter ipsam, ut finem, omnia infra globum lunarem sint 
producta, ut 1. inpecudum,fi. Deusuris. Si igitur natura induxit inclination in 
naturalem in ceteii- < ivatis ad quaecunque sibi contraria ]>rofuganda, quanto 
magis hoc debuit in rationabili creatura? Hoc idem sensualiter patet per 
singula supposita discurrcndo, nam quilibet hoc in se ipso CXJH ritur, si hoc IN 
principiis naturalibus hominibus insitum est, ergo ex hac inclinatione naturali 
primordialiter habuit ortum bellum, cum bellum, ut supra descriptum est, sit 
contentio exorta propter tollcndam repugnantiam. Infertur ergo quod ilia 
contentio quae oritur propter tollendum dissonum et repugnans conservalioni 
suae fundamentaliter habct ortum a principiis naturalibus, et sic in iure naturae, 



QVIBVS ET CONTRA QVOS 91 

prout distinguitur a iure gentium. Sed statim dices, hsec destruunt textus qui 
dicunt ex iure gentium oriri, ubi advertendum quod, licet a iure naturali 
inducta sit ilia inclinatio naturalis, circumscripta naturali intelligentia, tamen 
inclinatio ilia regulatur per dictamen rationis et intelltgentiae naturalis, sicut 
dicimus in singulis actibus qui debentur hominibus naturaliter, circumscripto 
intellectu, utpote inclinatio ad cibum et potum et coitum. Ista hominibus 
competunt naturaliter, et tamen in homine regulariter dictamine rationis, 
quod non est in brutis, qua carent illo dictamine. Sic igitur credo fuisse men- 
tem illorum textuum, videlicet quod regulatio illius inclinationis, introductae 
a principiis naturalibus, insurgat ex iure gentium, id est ex aequitate generali 
naturalis intelligentiae, sed ipsa inclinatio est de iure naturali. Hoc probat 
glossa in 1. ex hoc iure, ft De iustit. et iure ; et i di., ius gent. Nam glossa 
utrobique super verbo " bella " exponit iusta ; et sic intelligit de inclinatione 
regulata per dictamen rationis. Et licet dicant textus quod ex iure gentium 
insurgunt bella, non tamen credo falsum dicere bella, id est illas regulatas 
inclinationes, habere ortum a iure civili et a iure canonico. Nam ius civile 
et ius canonicum non dicunt aliam aequitatem quam sit aequitas a iure gen- 
tium. Immo sunt (? > ipsa aequitas iuris gentium, nam omne ius consistit in 
quadam rectitudine, et inde ius dictum est, ut i di., ius generate. Sed ius 
civile et canonicum sunt rectitude vitas et aequitas iuris gentium. Sed addunt 
supra rectitudinem illam quandam explicationem, nam ius legale et canonicum 
habent specificare et explicare rectitudinem et aequitatem iure gentium, quan- 
doque earn interminando per modos congruos, quandoque applicando ad 
varies actus, quandoque determinando per varies eventus. Haec omnia pro- 
bantur per textum in 1. ius civile, ff. De iustit. et iure. Nam dicit ibi textus, 
" Ius est quod nee in totum a naturali vel gentium recedit, nee per omnia ei 
servit. Jtaque cum aliquid addimus vel detrahimus iuri communi, ius pro- 
prium est, id est civile facimus." Est ergo verum dicere quod bella sunt de 
iure civili et canonico, id est de ipsa rectitudine, quae est ius civile et canoni- 
cum. Nee obstant textus statim allegati, quia ilia rectitude, nihilo addito vel 
detracto, ius gentium nuncupatur. Et sic loquuntur iura statim allegata, sed, 
cum aliquid additum vel detractum est, tune civile vel canonicum nuncupatur, 
nulli tamen dubium quin ius civile et canonicum circa bella supra dictamen 
rationis generalis aliquid addant. Ex praedictis infertur quo iure bella orta 
fuerunt. 



Quibus primo et principaliter, et quo iure, et contra quos, bellum indicere [Cap. 

liceat universale. 

Secundo quaere quo iure licitum sit Ecclesiae indicere bellum contra inn- 
deles, et invadere terras eorum, et propter hoc indulgentiam concedere, cum 
iura in contrarium disponere videantur, nam nihil ad nos de his qui foris sunt, 
ii, q. i, multi. Etiam quia origine possessiones et iurisdictiones sunt apud eos. 
Nam Deus per totam rationabilem creaturam hoc produxit, nam apud bones 

[4] 



92 DE IVRE BELLI 

et malos facit solein uriri, Maltlia-i v et vi ad finem ; ctiain quia ad fidem 
cogendi non sunt. cum omncs alii non incorporati sint relinquendi arbitrin 
suo, xlv distinct., de ludeeis. Immo, (juod plus est, dimitti potest inlulcli iuris- 
dictio super converses ad fidem, dummodo non nimis gravet, prima ad Timo- 
theum, vi capitulo. Secundo loco, ut clare liqueat, est attendcndum quod hie 
oportet primo praemittere quae tetigi in materia represaliarum in principle, 
scilicet unde Ecclesia habuerit iurisdictionem, et etiam unde Imperator, quae hie 
non prsemitto quia ibi plene tactum fuit. Quo sic supposito, oportet etiam attrn- 
dere quod in eadem civitate sub eodem rege sunt duo populi, et secundum duos 
populos duae vitae, et secundum duas vitas duo principatus, et secundum dims 
principatus duplex iurisdictionis ordo. Eadem civitas est ecclesia, unns Ke\ 
c-,t Christus, duo populi sunt clerici et laici, duae vitae, spiritualis et carnalis, 
ct duo principatus, Sacerdotium et Imperium, tamen unum est principale, 
scilicet Pontificatus. In quod fit alterius resolutio, alias frivole demonstraret 
Philosophus xii Metaphysicorum, concludens unitatem Creatoris, sic demon- 
strans ; multitude principatuum, mala t-ntia, volunt male disponi, unus 
princeps, sic directe in proposito, etiam quia in quolibet entium gener 
dare unum primum, quod sit metrum et mensura omnium aliorum, ut idem 
Philosophus. vSic in monarchia tota est devenire ad primum, ergo sic etiam 
in naturalibus est devenire ad primum movens immobile, ut idem Philosophus, 
I'hysicorum vii et viii. Tale non potest esse Imperium respectu Pontificatus. 
Praetermitto infinita. Sunt haec allegabilia. Sufficiat ergo inferrc quod unus 
est Dominus orbis, vii, q. i, in apibtts ; ix, q. iii, citncta f>cr munduw, et cap. 
per principalcm; ff. Ad. leg. Rhod. de iact., 1. deprccatio. Et iste est Papa, 
lit hie non solum super fideles, immo etiam super infideles habet iurisdictio- 
nem, quod luce clarius demonstrating nam Christ us super omnes habuit pote- 
statem, unde in Psalmo : " Deus iudicium tuum regi da." Si Christus habuit , 
non fuisset diligens paterfamilias, si, Petro constitute vicario suo, curam non 
(limisisset, quod ncfas est dicere. Etiam Petro tradidit claves regni roelorum, 
dicens, " Quodcunque ligaveris, etc." Matthsei xvi. Et alibi, " Pasce oves 
meas," lohannis ultimo. Sic igitur Papa de hire habet iurisdictionem super 
infideles, licet non de facto. Hinc est quod si gentilis, habens solum legem 
naturae, pcccat contra legem naturae, puniri possit per Papam. Nam scribitur 
<n -nesis xix cap. quod Sodomitae puniti sunt a Deo, ergo ct Vicarius Dei hoc 
poterit. Idem etiam si colant idola, nam naturale est Creatorcm colere et non 
Minis. Item etiam poterit punirc ludaeos, si faciant contra legem suam 
in moralibus, et non puniuntur a praelatis suis. De christianis non est dubium 
quin punire possit, si faciant contra legem cvangclii. Ex quibus infertur quod 
Papa, tanquam vcrus Priixvps, potest bellum indicerc infidelibus, et indul- 
gentias concedere propter recuperationem terras sanctae, et maxime terra; con- 
secratae nativitate Christi, habitatione ct morte eiusdem, ubi non colitur Chri- 
stus sed Mahometus. Item terra sancta victa fuit post mortem Christi iusto 
bello per Imperatorem Romanum, qui post spoliatus fuit per infideles. Idcirco 
licitum est Papae recuperare ratione principatus quem obtinet. In aliis autem 



QVIBVS ET CONTRA QVOS 93 

terris quae non sunt consecratae, nee Imperium vel Ecclesia habuit iurisdictio- 
nem, de facto potest Papa facere praeceptum quod non molestent christianos 
subditos. Alias potest eos per sententiam privare iurisdictione sua, et per hoc 
quae, ut in pluribus tracta sunt de his, quae notavit Innocentius, De voto, quod 
super his. Patet solutio ad primo quaesitum, scilicet de iustitia belli indicti ab 
Ecclesia contra infideles, ex quo infertur iustificatio belli indicti per Impera- 
torem contra hostes. 



Evidentiale. Et-discutitur qui sunt Imperatores contra quos bellum [Cap 

indicere liceat. 

Vbi sciendum est quod duo sunt populi, scilicet populus Rpmanus et 
extraneus. De populo Romano, primo sunt omnes qui in totum obediunt 
Imperio Romano, nam populus accipitur pro toto Imperio, ut lex Romana, 
Ad municipalem. Quidam non obediunt in totum, sed in aliquibus, ut quia 
vivunt legibus Imperil et fatentur ipsum dominum orbis, ut sunt civitates Lom- 
bardiae, et similes, et isti sunt de populo Romano. Nam cum in aliquibus 
iurisdictionem exerceat, ut 1. si prius, De aqua. pluv. arc. ; et ibi notandum. 
Quidam sunt populi qui nullo modo obediunt Imperatori, nee vivunt Imperil 
legibus, sed dicunt se hoc facere ex privilegio, ut sunt Veneti, quia asserunt se 
hoc facere ex privilegio. Et isti etiam sunt de populo Romano, qui praecario 
hoc tenent ab Imperatore, et ipse revocare potest quandocunque voluerit, 
ut 1. si quis in principio, ff. De legat., iii. Praeterea illud privilegium eis 
concessum debet esse accommodatum ut non priventur civilitate Romana, ff. 
De captivis, 1. in bello, si quis servum. Quidam sunt populi qui non obediunt 
Imperatori, et asserunt hoc sibi competere ex contractu, ut sunt provinciae 
subditse Romanae Ecclesiae, quae asserunt sibi competere ex donatione Con- 
stantini et aliorum Imperatorum, et isti etiam sunt de populo Romano, nam 
Ecclesia ibi exercet iurisdictionem quam habebat Imperium, unde non desi- 
nunt propterea esse cives Romani. Idem dico de regibus qui non fatentur se 
subditos Imperatori, ut rex Franciae, Angliae, Hispaniae, et similes, qui asse- 
runt hoc sibi competere ex privilegio vel praescriptione. Et per hoc infero 
quod omnes gentes fere quae obediunt sanctae matri Ecclesias sunt de populo 
Romano, et si quis diceret Imperatorem non esse dominum, diceret contra 
textum Evangelii, cum dicitur " exiit edictum a Caesare Augusto, etc." 
Populi autem extranei sunt qui non fatentur Imperatorem dominum, ut 
Graeci, qui dicunt suum Imperatorem esse Dominum. Item Tartari, qui 
dicunt Grancanem esse dominum, et Saraceni qui dicunt suum esse dominum. 
Inter istos tamen est differentia, nam quidam sunt nobis foederati, ut Grseci 
contra Turcos, quidam cum quibus habemus pacem, ut sunt Tartari, nam 
mercatores nostri vadunt ad illos et sui ad nos, quidam sunt cum quibus nihil 
facere habemus ut ludasi, quidam sunt cum quibus habemus guerram actualem 
ut sunt Saraceni, et hodie, cum Turcis. Infertur ergo quod, cum Imperator 
sit princeps saecularis, superiorem non habens in saecularibus, nisi forte, ut 



94 DE IVRE BELLI 

dixi, quod ipse potest indicere bellum contra hostes sues, et qui sint, post 
statim patuit. Et hoc est bellum de quo loquitur lex hostes, ft. De captivis ; 
et De verbor. significatione. Et in hoc vindicat sibi locum bellum, ergo indi- 
citur a populo Romano vel Imperatore, adeo quod, si Imperator indicat 
bellum aliquibus civitatibus Italiae rebellibus, vindicat sibi locum effectus pub- 
lici belli, quia idem si repugnetur Officiali Imperatoris, vel Papa, non propter 
Imperatorem vel Papam. 



(C*p.iT.i An aliis a principe bellum indicere liceat universale? 

Et qusero numquid ah'is a principe liceat bellum indicere universale. 
Solutio. Non licet sine principis auctoritate, nam nemini sine principis 
licentia licet anna portare, C. Vt usus armorum, in rubro ; et glossa in 
Authent., De mand. princ., coll. iii ; in Authent., De armis, coll. vi. Et est 
ratio, nam nemini sine principis licentia licet violare iura principum. lus 
autem violat qui, sine iuris sollemnitate manu regia, ius sibi dicit, ubi habeatur 
copia ius dicentis, idcirco sine eius auctoritate non licet. Soli ergo Principi 
competit sua auctoritate, cum non habeat superiorem, ad quern recurrat pro 
iustitia consequenda. Hodie tamen quia sunt populi non recognoscentes 
superiorem de facto, non requiritur superioris auctoritas, cum non recogno- 
scant. Immo tota die bella indicuntur a populo contra populum, nullo alio 
requisito. 



[cp.ir.] An bellum motum per Imperatorem contra Ecclesiam sit iustum, et an 

teneantur subditi ei in hoc obtemperare ? 

Secundo quaeritur numquid bellum quod movet Imperator contra Eccle- 
siam sit iustum, et teneantur subditi ei in hoc obtemperare. Videtur quod sic 
quia sit principis auctoritate vel mandato, ergo, etc. Etiam, quia duae sunt 
iurisdictiones, De iudiciis, novit ; Qui filii sint legitimi, causam, et cap. per 
venerabiUm ; De appell., si duobus. Etiam quia in pertinentibus ad armorum 
usum subditi tenentur obedire Imperatori, etiam schismatico, [i] xi, q. iii, [lulii] 
lulianus. Solutio, contrarium est verum, nam Imperator est advocatus Eccle- 
siae, et tenetur earn defendere, idcirco non potest earn impugnare, De natis ex 
libero ventre, cap. unico ; De restit. spol., conquerente. Immo indicendo bellum 
contra Ecclesiam meretur perdere privilegium indicendi bellum, cum illo 
abutatur, xi, q. iii, privilegium ; De decimis, suggestum ; ut puniatur in quo 
deliquit, DC translatione, quanta, tie autem. Immo talis pertinacia in 
Principe non distal ab haeresi, De haereticis, excomtnunicamus, i, i ; et ibi 
notandum. Etiam quia Papa superior est, nam examinat Imperatorcm ipsum, 
reprobat et deponit, De elect., vcncrabilem ; De re iudic., ad apostolka, lib. vi. 
In hoc igitur casu non tenentur subditi iuvare Imperatorem contra Ecclesiam, 
imino econtra. Et potest Papa absolvere cos a vinculo fidelitatis, xv, q. vi, 



DE AGGREGANTIBVS BELLVM 95 

nos sanctorum, et cap. iuralos ; et nota De haereticis, excommunicamus ; i, De 
poenis, cap. ult. ; Et de hoc per Hostiensem, De resti. spoliatorum, olim. 



Quid iuris, cum Papa movet bellum contra Imperatorem ? (Cap. vi.i 

Quarto quaeritur quid econtra si Papa indicat bellura contra Impera- 
torem ? Solutio patet per praecedentia, nam si Papa indicat bellura contra 
Imperatorem schismaticum, haereticum, vel alias usurpantem iura et liber- 
tates ecclesiarum, omnes fideles tenentur iuvare Papam, et etiam vassalli 
Imperatoris possunt absolvi a iuramento quo tenentur, vel declarari non 
teneri, ut cap. iuratos, et cap. nos sanctorum, xv, q. vi. 



De aggreganlibus bellum, et ipsum perficientibus. [Cap . xvii] 

Tertio restat videndum de aggregantibus bellum, et ipsum perficientibus, 
et quas etiam in ipso fieri debeant. 



De legione et cohorts, et qui et quot numero in eis requiruntur. 

In bello sunt legio, et habet vii millia c pedites, et septingentos xix equites, 
sunt cohortes, et quaelibet cohors xx alas. Milliaria habet pedites mille cv, 
equites cxxxv. Quinquagenaria habet quingentos quinquaginta quinque pedi- 
tes, et equites Ixvi. Ita notat glossa, ff. De his qui not. infam., 1. ii. Haec 
igitur et dux et ordo faciunt bellum, sumendo bellum pro multitudine apta 
et ad bellandum praeparata, non autem pro actu bellandi. Duo tamen princi- 
paliter fundant bellum, scilicet arma et vires. Haec dividuntur in tres partes, 
equites, pedites, et classes. Nam equitibus campi, classibus maria et flumina 
peditibus colles, urbes, plana abrupta, servantur. Hinc infertur quod pedites 
magis sunt necessarii reipublicae quam equites, quia possunt undique prodesse. 



Qualiter milites se debeant habere in bello, et cui obediant, et a quibus [C 

abstinere preecipiuntur ? 

Milites autem in bello sic se habere debent, ut servent iuramentum quod 
praestiterunt, nam iuraverunt se strenue omnia facturos quae praeceperit Impe- 
rator et nunquam deserturos militiam nee mortem recusaturos pro defensa 
reipublicae, ut ff. Ex qui. caus. maiores, 1. paen. ; et C. De his qui non implet. 
stipend., 1. i, lib. x. Eorum ducibus debent obedire, ut 1. cottatores, in prin- 
cipio. Nam cum a Kepublica amantur et aluntur, solis debent insistere utili- 
tatibus publicis, et esse in numero militiae, ut armorum quotidiano exercitio 
ad bella se praeparent, ut 1. milites, C. De re militari. Et sic debent ducibus 



96 DE IVRE BELLI 

obtemperare quod, si contra praeceptum eorum aliquid fecerint, etiam bene, 
nihilominus capita puniuntur, fi. De re milit., 1. desertorem, in bello. Absti- 
nere debent ab agrorum cultura, animalium custodia, mercimoniorum quaestu. 
Aliena non peragant negotia, ad civiles curas non accedant, alioquin militia 
et eius privilegiis nudabuntur, C. De re milit., 1. nemo milites, et 1. qui mill- 
tares ; C. De locat. ct cond., 1. milites ; C. De procur., 1. militem. Non 
emant praedia ubi militant, et tempore quo militant, etiam nee alieno nomine, 
alioquin fisco vindicantur. Si tamen ante missionem non molestantur, post 
non inquietabuntur. Fallit ilia regula ubi fiscus distrahat eorum bona paterna, 
et ubi ex haereditate quaerunt. Hoc autem inductum est ne studio culturae a 
militia avocentur. Haec habentur f. De re milit., 1. milites. 



[c*p.*ii. Q Uee pertineant ad qfficium duds belli? 

Ad ducem autem belli pertinet militibus parcissime commeatum dare, 
equos militares extra provinciam duci non permittere, milites in castris reti- 
nere, ad armorum exercitationem producere, ad opus privatum, piscatum, 
venatum, non mittere, claves portarum suscipere, vigilias circumire, frumen- 
tationibus commilitonum interesse, frumentum probare, mensurae fraudem 
coercere, delicta castigare, querelas commilitonum audire, valetudinarios in- 
spicere. Haec habentur in 1. officium, &. De re militari. Ad eius etiam perti- 
net officium in virentes fluminis ripas legionem ponere, et ut nullus omnino 
aquam fluminis polluat, neve abluendo equorum sudorem publicos oculos 
maculet, sed procul in inferioribus partibus fluminis id facere permittat. Haec 
habentur C. De re milit., 1. ingentis. Ad ipsius etiam officium pertinet castra 
ponere ubilignorum, pabuli, aquae copia habetur, et, ut diutius commorandum 
sit, loci salubritas eligatur, ne mari sit vicinus, aut altior locus qui ab advtr?a- 
riis captus possit efficere. Considerandum etiam ne torrentibus inundari con- 
sueverit campus. Haec Vegetius, De re milit., lib. i, cap. xx. Ad eius etiam 
officium pertinet secundum numerum militum munire castra, ne maior multi- 
tude constipetur, neve paucitas in latioribus ultra quam oportet cogatur 
extendi. Ad bonum etiam ducem pertinet locum in quo dimicandum rst 
noscere, qui quanto superior fuerit utilior iudicatur. Quod si victoriam de 
peditibus sperat contra milites hostium, loca inaequalia, aspera, montuosa debet 
eligere, si autem econtra, loca plana, patentia, neque silvis neque paludibus 
impedita. Haec Vegetius lib. iii, cap. xiii, De re militari. Ad officium ducis 
pertinet de contractibus et delictis militum cognoscere, quod etiam pertinet 
ad specialem magistrum militum, ut 1. magistcriie, C. De iurisd. omn. iudic. ; 
et 1. tarn cottatores, C. De re militari. 



DE FORTITVDTNE 97 

Qualiter varie puniuntur milites prout varie delinquent ? [Cap, 

Varie autem puniuntur milites ut varie delinquunt. Nam aut commit- 
tunt delicta propria aut communia. Et in propriis puniuntur pcena militari, 
et augetur poena gradu saepe militiae, ut 1. ii, if. De re militari. Punitiones 
autem sunt pecuniaria castigatio, munerum interdictio, ignominiosa de exer- 
citu missio, gradus deiectio. In metallum autem, vel opus metalli, non depu- 
tantur, sed decapitantur, non enim pro milite sed pro hoste reputatur, ff. De 
re milit., 1. iii, i et is qui, et 1. proditores. Capite autem puniuntur qui 
praeposito manus intulerint, qui inobedientes fuerint, qui spectantibus ceteris 
prior fugam arripuerit, exploratores qui secreta nuntiant hostibus, caligatus 
qui metu hostium infirmitatem simulavit, qui commilitonem gladio vulneravit, 
qui sine causa se vulneravit, vel mortem sibi conscivit. Secus si'vitae taedio, 
vel doloris impatientia, nam tales infamia notantur, per vinum autem vel 
lasciviam lapsis militia mutatur. Qui non defendit praepositum suum, cum 
potuit, capite punitur. Ei qui non potuit parcitur. Haec habentur ff. De re 
milit., 1. omne delictum, et 1. iii, fin. Item qui explorationi obviavit, hosti- 
bus insistentibus, aut qui de fossato recedit, capite punitur, etiam si rem bene 
gesserit, ff. De re milit., 1. iii. Item miles turbator pacis capite punitur, ff. 
De re milit., 1. iii. Item si concitavit atrocem seditionem. Desertor tempore 
belli capite punitur, tempore pacis equitis gradu repellitur, pedes militiam 
mutat, ff. De re milit., 1. non omnes. Non omnes tamen desertores puniendi 
sunt aequaliter, sed haberi debet ratio gradus, ordinis, stipendiorum, et alia- 
rum circumstantiarum. Qui excessit spatium commeatus, ut emansor vel 
deserter reputatur. Habetur tamen ratio dierum quibus tardius vel citius 
rediit, vel si impediment aliquo detentus, ff. De re milit., 1. iii, fin., et 1. qui 
commeatus, et 1. non omnes. Habetur etiam ratio ante actae vitae. Emansor 
est qui diu vagatus a castris ad ipsa rediit, desertor qui per prolixum tempus 
vagatus ad castra reducitur, ut 1. iii, emansor, ff. eod. titulo. Desertor, si in 
urbe inveniatur, capite punitur, alibi si ex prima desertione captus iterate 
deserat, capite punitur, ff. eod. tit., 1. non omnes. Desertorum defunctorum 
bona confiscantur, C. De re milit., 1. iv. 

De fortitudine, et ipsius natura, et qua fortitude dicaiur moralis, et qua non, [Cap. 
et qua fortitude bellum ducat ad finem rectum, et quce non. 

Sed quia dictum est quod fortitude et arma fundant bellum principaliter, 
et quia in iure non discutitur natura fortitudinis explicite, expedit quod ipsius 
natura aliqualiter explicetur. Et quaero primo an fortitude sit virtus moralis, 
et apparet quod non. Nam fortitude est dispositio corporalis, ut 1. i, C. De 
athletis, lib. xi ; ff. De his qui not. infam., 1. athletes ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. qua 
actione, si quis in colluctatione ; De pugn. in duello, per totum ; C. De gladia- 
toribus, 1. una ; De torneamentis, per totum. Ergo non est virtus moralis, 
cum dispositio corporalis differat ab habitu seu dispositione animae, et ipsa 
sit inferior gradu, De pcen. et rem., cum infirmitas ; xii, q. i, pracipimus ; xxiv, 



9 8 DE IVRE BELLI 

q. iii, s habes : C. De sacrosanctis eccles., 1. sancimus. Sorunclo sir. Omnis 
virtus raoralis est conicctatrix in passionibus ct opcrationibus, ut probat Philo- 
sophus, ii Ethicorum. Sod fortitude cst coniectatrix in mcclio, ut idem Philo- 
sophus, iii Ethicorum. Tertio sic. Quod non est una virtus, non est virtus, 
immo virtutes, quia pluralis locutio ad minus duorum numero cst contenta, 
ff. De testi., 1. ubi nunterus ; causa iv, q. iii, ubi numerus ; et regula pluralis, 
De reg. iur., lib. vi. Et confirmatur per dictum Philosophum, primo Elen- 
chorum, nam eadem est definitio praepositionis et unius praepositionis, sed 
fortitude non est una virtus. Probatur haec minor. Nam una virtus opponi- 
tur duobus vitiis extremis, ut xli di., sape ; De consuetudine, ex parte. Sed 
fortitudini opponuntur quatuor extrema, scilicet intimiditas et timiditas, timor 
et audacia, et defectus in audendo, qui est innominatus, ut probat textus iii 
Ethicorum. Oppositum probat Philosophus, iii Ethicorum. Pro solutione 
quaestionis est advertendum quod fortitude sumitur aequivoce pro fortitudine, 
quae idem est quod robur corporis, et fortitudine, quae est virtus moralis. 
Prima est potentia qua quis potest movere, ut probat Philosophus, primo 
Rhetoricorum, et utraque requiritur in bello, et sic sumpta fuit generaliter, 
cum dixi quod fortitude, seu vires et arma, fundant bellum, cum utraque 
requiratur. Sed de prima, quae est robur corporis, non est dubium quod non 
est virtus moralis, per supra allegata, sed de secunda procedit quaestio, et ilia 
est virtus secundum quam nos bene habemus circa timorem et audaciam in 
bellicis pericuh's. Et de ista prosequamur, quia prima est plana lippis et ton- 
soribus. Pro intellectu autem fortitudinis animae, est attendendum quod in 
audendo et timendo contingit excedere et deficere, et utrobique male agere. 
Contingit et medie se habere, et sic virtuose. Differt tamen audacia a timore, 
nam audacia est passio appetitus irascibilis, secundum quern inclinamur ad 
aggrediendum terribilia. Timor inclinat ad fugiendum, ut quilibet experitur 
in seipso, sed utrumque contingit bene agere et male, nam si quis videret x 
armatos et solus aggrediretur eos, male ageret, et si non fugeret male agori-t, 
et sic male, circa aggressuram, et male, circa timorem. Sic etiam in timendo 
(juis excedere potest, ut ecce si sunt centum homines in castro, et non videant 
nisi centum, si fugiant, male agunt. Sic etiam non aggrediendo, ut si viderint 
spoliari civitatem, si non aggrediantur, male agunt. Sic vides excessum in 
non timendo cum expedit, in timendo cum non expedit, in aggrediendo cum 
non expedit, et non aggrediendo cum expedit, et sic habes vitia extrema, auda- 
<i;im et timorem, et utrobique gradum ut supra. Vlterius est notandum quod 
ubicunque est reperire CXO-.-MIIU extn-morum vitiosum et vituperabilem, ibi 
-t reperire medium bonum et laudabilem, quia si totum esset malum et vitu- 
perabilem, non posset dici quod defectus est vituperabilis, nam defectus dice- 
ictur defectus mali, et sic non foret malum. Expedit igitur quod in medio 
sit bonum cuius respectu unum dicatur malum excedendo, aliud deficiendo. 
Ex his inferuntur duae conclusiones pro solutione quaestionis. Prima, quod 
fortitudo animae est virtus moralis. Secunda, quod est una virtus. Probatur 
prima, nam omnis habitus electivus medii laudabilis est virtus moralis. Fmti- 



DE FORTITVDINE 



99 



tudo est huiusmodi, ergo probatur maior per locum a definitione, quae argu- 
mentatio est valida in iure, ff. De reg. iur., 1. omnis definitio ; ff. Depositi, 
1. i in prin., et 1. bona fides, eod. titulo. Sic autem definit Philosophus virtutem 
moralem, ii Ethicorum. Probatur minor, nam fortitude est habitus electivus 
medii circa timorem et audaciam, ut probat idem Philosophus, iv Ethicorum. 
Confirmatur. Ilia est virtus moralis quae generatur in nobis ex more, id est 
consuetudine, et hinc appellatur moralis. Fortitudo est huiusmodi, ergo pro- 
batur maior per locum a causa formali, quae argumentatio est valida in iure, 
ff. Ad leg. Falc., 1. si is qui quadringenta , qucedam; ff. Locati m , 1. rei, 
opere ; ff. De verborum sign., 1. czdificia, perfecisse, et 1. qua forma, eod. 
tit. ; i, q. i, detrahe ; De bapt., debitum. Probatur minor. Nam, in actu 
bellico propter pericula, appetitus sensitivus inclinat hominem ad/fugam, ut 
dicit Philosophus, ubi in bellicis vindicat sibi locum ira, quae est impetuosa et 
sic nos inclinat ad extrema vitiosa. Virtus autem, quae est promptitudo appe- 
titus rationalis, inclinat ad medium, et ilia promptitudo generatur ex actibus 
iteratis, alias non delectabiliter operaremur, et sic non esset virtus, cum in 
virtuoso nulla debeat esse appetituum repugnantia, ut idem Philosophus, ii 
Ethicorum. Et sic patet prima conclusio, videlicet quod est virtus moralis. 
Secunda conclusio est quod est una virtus. Quidam hoc sic probant, timor et 
audacia sunt passiones contrariae, fortitude est virtus media, ergo est tantum 
una. Consequentia probatur. Nam unumquodque agens, intendens ad aug- 
mentum unius contrariorum, tendit ad remissionem alterius. Et sic virtus 
mjnuens timorem auget contrarium, et econtra. Confirmatur. Virtutes 
morales fortificantur a fine, sed unicus est finis, ergo unica est virtus. Primum 
patet per locum a causa finali, quod est validum argumentum in iure, 1. unius, 
si senus, ff. De quaestionibus, 1. ult. ; ff. De decur., 1. generaliter ; C. De 
episc. et cleric. ; causa xvi, q. i ; et cap. cum cessante, De appell. ; et cap. etsi 
Christus, De iureiurando. Patet secundum. Nam finis fortitudinis in belli- 
cis est bonum commune. Et si aliquis bellat propter lucrum, non est fortis, 
immo avarus. Alii dicunt aliter, videlicet quod timor et audacia non sunt 
passiones contrariae. Hoc probant sic. Timor et audacia se compatiuntur 
in eodem respectu eiusdem, ergo non sunt contraria. Tenet consequentia, quia, 
posito uno contrariorum, removetur reliquum, ff. De instit., 1. sed si pupillus, 
si institoria ; ff. De reg. iur., 1. ius nostrum ; 1. hac verba, De verb. sig. ; in 
Authent., De mand. princ., coll. iii ; xxxii di., hospiliolum, cum similibus. 
Primum patet. Nam quis propter bonum honestum vult bellare, sed timet 
propter Deum, etiam quis aggreditur, et sic audacia, et tamen timet ne laeda- 
tur, et sic timor. Ista opinio est contra textum Philosophi, ii Rhetoricorum, 
nee valet ipsorum ratio, nam delectatio et tristitia secundum omnes sunt con- 
traria, et tamen idem delectari potest et tristari circa eundem actum. Tolle 
in adulterio delectatur quis propter sensualitatem, sed tristatur propter in- 
honestatem. Sic de proiciente merces in mari propter tempestatem, sic in 
proposito quis timet propter malum praesens, audet propter spem. Prima 
igitur opinio verior, unde Albertus tenet quod licet sint quatuor extrema, ut 
[5] 



ioo DE IVRE BELLI 

supra, tamen non sunt nisi duplicis mods. Nam quicunque inclinatur ad bene 
audendum non timet, et quicunque non inclinatur ad bene timendum non 
audet, et sic infert unicam virtutem. Alii dicunt quod non sunt nisi duo 
extrema, nam si aliquis nihil timet, nimis audet, et sic timor et audacia sic 
faciunt unum extremum. Sufficiat ex praedictis concludere quod fortitude, 
quae est unum principale fundans bellum, ut sumitur pro corporis robore, non 
est virtus moralis, sed, ut sumitur pro virtute animae, est virtus moralis, et 
una, et haec est ilia quae bellum ad finem rectum perducit. 



xn.) An fortitude sit virtus cardinalis. 

Visum est de fortitudine quae fundat bellum principaliter, quae est virtus 
moralis et una. Sed quia hunc tractatum dirigo ad Cardinalem, quaero utrum 
haec sit cardinalis. Apparet quod non, nam magnanimitas non est virtus cardi- 
nalis, ergo nee fortitude. Tenet consequentia per locum a maiori, qui est 
validus in iure, ut 1. i, C. De neg. gest. ; ff . De senatoribus, 1. qui indignus ; 
C. De sacrosanctis eccles., Authent., multo magis ; ff. Sol. matrim., 1. ex diverse, 
i; C. Deepi. et cle., 1. si qua per calumniam; xxxii, q. v, si Paulus ; viii, q. i, 
si ergo ; vi, q. i, imitare ; xl di., qucelibet ; De elect., cum in cunctis. Sed magis 
videtur inesse quod magnanimitas sit virtus moralis quam fortitude, quia nobi- 
lior et maior, ut dicit Philosophus in Ethicis, tractatu de magnanimitate. 
Patet primum, videlicet, quod magnanimitas non sit cardinalis, quia tune 
cardinales forent plures quatuor. Solutio sic. Tota humana conversatio 
non versatur circa fortitudinem, ut cardinem, ergo non est cardinalis, quia 
inde cardinalis nuncupatur. Tenet consequentia per locum ab etymologia, qui 
est validus in iure, ff. De rebus creditis, 1. ii, appellata ; in procemio ff., disci- 
puli; C. De episc. et cler., 1. decernimus; ff. De verb, sig., 1. tugurii, 1. lugu- 
rium m , eod. tit. ; ff. De legatis iii, 1. librorum, quod si papyrus ; xxi di., cleros ; 
xvi, q. i, si cupis ; et cap. cum secundum, De praebendis. Patet primum. Nam 
fortitude versatur solum circa pericula bellica, sed pauci ducunt vitam suam 
cum bellicis periculis. Ergo. In contrarium apparet auctoritate communiter 
loquentium, qui istam ponunt in numero cardinalium, inter quos est Seneca, 
qui fecit tractatum specialem, et Tullius in Rhetoricis dividebat virtutem in 
has quatuor, ut cardinales. Et haec argumentatio ab auctoritate est valida in 
iure, C. De sum. trinit. et fid. cathol., Epistola, inter claras ; C. De bonis quae 
liber., 1. cum mult a ; ff. De rer. div., 1. in tantum, cenotaphium. 



icp. i.iii.j Vnde et qualiter quatuor principales virtutes dicantur cardinales ? 

Pro evidentia et solutione quaestionis, primo est videndum unde et qualiter 

virtutes dicantur cardinales. Vbi sciendum quod, secundum Albertum, quod, 

it cardines call sunt poli antarcticus et arcticus, super quibus movetur 



DE FORTITVDINE 101 

coelum, et car dines ostiorum et portanim super quibus revolvuntur, sic, a 
simili, virtutes illae dicuntur cardinales, super quibus versatur tota conversatio 
humana, et quas si quis habet, dicitur simpliciter bonus, et sine ipsis, non. Sic 
etiam domini Cardinales inde, iudicio meo, nomen sumpserunt, nam ipsi sunt 
mundi cardines, super quibus tota mundi gubernatio revolvitur et fingitur, et 
ad ipsos spectat sustentare totum pondus mobilis gubernationis, et motui ipsius 
fixum praestare fomentum. Duobus polis numero contenta est ccelestis natura, 
et sufficiunt, stabiles sunt, et immobiles firmant ordinem motus, non deviant 
a loco fixionis humani generis. Monastica gubernatio quatuor cardinibus 
fuit contenta, et sufficit. Si inde unde numerus, unde varietas, unde infirmitas, 
unde tanta a centro distantia, attenta causa, non est nomen arbitrii, tamen 
libertas causa? posset fingere modum. Sed quia de cardinalatu dixHn tractatu 
De Ecclesiastica Censura, nunc pertranseo, sed redeo ut discutiam principale 
propositum. Et quia iure, ut dixi, non bene ad plenum explicatur natura vir- 
tutum moralium cardinab'um, aliquantulum et succincte, propter fortitudinem 
explicandam, de ea tractabo. 



Quid sit virtus ? 

Sciendum est quod, ut dicit Philosophus, virtus est habitus electivus, et 
ut idem Philosophus assent, ii Rhetoricae, omne quod est cadit sub electione, 
sed eligibile est triplex. 



De Iriplici specie boni, et qualiter virtutes cardinales a bono eliciuntur. (Cap 

Bonum utile, bonum delectabile, et bonum honestum, et ista bona sunt 
per electionem appetibilia et fugibilia, et omnes virtutes morales circa ista tria 
versantur. Explicemus unumquodque. Et primo bonum utile, circa quod 
versatur virtus altero de tribus modis, aut expendendo, aut accipiendo, aut 
conservando. Plures actus electivos non experitur homo in seipso, et ista 
deductio ab experientia est valida in iure, ut probatur in proremio ff., circa 
princ. ; in Authent., De monachis, circa fin. col. i ; ff. De legat. iii, 1. si chorus, 
his verbis ; C. De vet. iure enucl., 1. ii, qua omnia ; De elec., quam sit, Lib. 
VI. Si expendendo, hoc contingit dupliciter, aut enim expendit sua aut aliena. 
Si expendit sua, tune circa ista expendendo versatur virtus liberalitatis et mag- 
nificentiae, et vitia opposita, scilicet, avaritia et prodigalitas, parvicentia et 
vannasia. Si autem non sint stfa, tune potest distribuere illis quorum sunt, et 
tune est iustitia, ut ff. De iust. et iur., 1. iustitia ; et Instit., eod. tit., iustitia ; 
xii, q. ii, cum devotissimam ; aut distribuit illis quorum non sunt, et tune est 
iniustitia, ut iuribus statim allegatis, a contrario, quod est validum argumen- 
tum, ut 1. i, huius rei, ff. De offi. eius cui mand. esf iurisdictio ; 1. si per pro- 
curatorem, ignorantes, ff. Mand.; et cap. cum a-postolica, De^his quae fi. a 
prselat. ; et cap. cum virum, De conversione coniugatorum. In non reddendo 



102 DE IVRE BELLI 

his quorum sunt, homo dicitur simpliciter malus. xiv, q. vi, si res ; De usuris, 
cum tu ; fi. De usurp., 1. sequitur, [cum] quod autem. Patet quod iustitia est 
cardinalis, quia non habendo ipsam circa distributionem eorum quae sua non 
sunt, homo est simpliciter malus, sed liberalitas et magnificentia, quae consistunt 
circa distributionem eorum quae sua sunt, non sunt cardinales, quia quis male 
distribuendo sua, non est simpliciter malus, sed bene diceretur fatuus, et sic 
habes unam cardinalem, scilicet, iustitiam, circa expeditionem utilis boni. Si 
autem virtus moralis versetur circa bonum utile in accipiendo, hoc contingit 
dupliciter. Nam aut accipit quae sua sunt, vel debita, aut aliena, et sibi non 
debita. Si sua, vel sibi debita, et a quibus non debet, peccat contra liberalita- 
tem et magnificentiam, non tamen est simpliciter malus. Si autem accipiat 
aliena, talis est simpliciter malus. Hinc est quod contra talem sunt iuris 
remedia, ut interdicta, Vnde vi bon. rapt., ut ff. et C., per illos titulos Furti, et 
condictiones ex legibus et canonibus quae in singulis casibus explicantur secun- 
dum varietatem actuum. Et sic per explicationem huius secundi actus, scilicet, 
acccptionis circa bonum utile, apparet quod iustitia obtinet cardinalatum, non 
autem liberalitas sive magnificentia, cum, per oppositum iustitiae, dicatur sim- 
pliciter malus, non autem per oppositum liberalitatis vel magnificentise. Si 
autem versetur virtus moralis in retinendo bonum utile, hoc etiam contingit 
dupliciter, aut retinet et conservat sua, aut retinet aliena. Primo casu reti- 
nendo quae sua sunt, et nulli dando, peccat contra liberalitatem et magnificen- 
tiam, nee talis est simpliciter malus, et si instes, si dives videat pauperem et 
indigentem et ad mortem, et nihil det, peccat mortaliter. Responded potest 
quod tune retinet non proprium sed commune, cum tempore talis necessitatis 
sit fienda communio, ut probat Clemens vi rationibus, xii, q. i, dilcciissimis, et 
Augustinus, ut transumitur viii di., quo iure, et i. Si autem quis retinet 
aliena, simpliciter est malus, et iniustus appellatur, si invito domino retineat, 
et remedia iuris sunt prodita, de quibus supra. Circa igitur bonum utile, elicis 
unam solam virtutem cardinalem, tam in distribuendo, quam accipiendo, quam 
conservando, quia per ipsius oppositum homo est simpliciter malus. Cardi- 
nalis est iustitia, non cardinales sunt liberalitas et magnificentia, et hoc clarum. 
Dicebam secundo quod erat secundum bonum delectabile, circa quod 
versatur virtus moralis, et circa hoc versatur dupliciter, aut largiendo aut acci- 
piendo. Si largiendo, sic sunt virtutes quae sunt in ludis, ut cum aliquis largi- 
tur aliis, habet delectationem. Et huiusmodi sunt amicitia, affabilitas, et 
eutrapelia. Istae autem virtutes non sunt cardinales, quia non sunt de neces- 
sitate humanae naturae, quia multi sunt magni et virtuosi qui in talibus nesciunt 
se bene habere. Si autem suscipiendo, et hoc dupliciter, aut enim versatur 
principaliter circa delectabile, tune dicitur simpliciter malus, et appellatur 
intemperantia, et dico se male habere excedendo, nam insensibilis, qui non 
delectatur, non est simpliciter malus, sed excedens, et sic habes temperantiam 
quae obtinet cardinalatum, quia per eius oppositum quis est simpliciter malus, 
et est de necessitate humanae conservationis. Si autem versetur simpliciter 
circa tristabile, et hoc dupliciter, nam est quoddam tristabile quod aptum est 



DE FORTITVDINE 



103 



movere ad iram, et tune versatur mansuetudo, haec non est cardinalis, quia 
non est necessarium quod quis irascatur, sed per actum remittitur quominus 
transeat ad actum secundum exteriorem iniustitiae. Si autem transiret ad 
actum exteriorem, tune diceretur iniustitia. Si autem est tristabile, quod 
aptum est movere ad timorem, tune est fortitudo. Nam, sicut ille est simpli- 
citer malus qui non vult sustinere terribile propter bonum virtutis, et sic forti- 
tudo est virtus cardinalis, et hoc de bono delectabili. 

Dicebam ulterius quod erat tertium bonum, scilicet, honestum, et tale est 
triplex. Quoddam pertinet ad virtutem cognoscitivam, et hae sunt virtutes 
intellectuals, et haec sunt scientia, sapientia, intellectus, ars, et prudentia. 
Quoddam pertinet ad virtutem interpretativam, ut veracitas et falsitas. Quod- 
dam pertinet ad artem appetitivam. / 

Capiamus secundum membrum, scilicet pertinens ad virtutem interpre- 
tativam, et dico quod ista veracitas spectans ad virtutem interpretativam non 
est virtus cardinalis, quia non reddit hominem simpliciter bonum, nee eius 
vitium simpliciter malum. Vitium enim magis oppositum est iactantia. Sed 
iactator est triplex, est enim iactator simplex, et iste est gratia delectationis, 
alter gratia honoris, alter gratia lucri. Sola prima iactantia opponitur directe 
veracitati, aliae autem ingrediuntur aliam speciem vitii. Nam primus solum 
peccat quia est mendax, sed mendacium est duplex, nam est mendacium quod 
est simplex falsa significatio vocis, et de illo dixi quod directe opponitur vera- 
citati. Aliud est falsa significatio vocis, cum intentione fallendi, et illud facit 
simpliciter hominem malum, et incidit in speciem iniustitiae. Et has et alias 
species mendaciorum prosequitur Augustinus in libro De Mendacio. Tran- 
sumptive habetur xxii, q. ii, cap. primum capitale. Aliud est, ut dixi, bonum 
honestum pertinens ad virtutem appetitivam. Et hoc dupliciter. Aut essen- 
tialiter, et talia sunt virtutes morales de quibus supra tactum est. Aut signifi- 
cative, et talia sunt laus, bona terrena, et circa istud bonum honestum est 
magnanimitas et philominia (?) , et tales non sunt virtutes cardinales. Nam 
etiam multi sunt virtuosi qui non appetunt honores quibus sunt digni. Si autem 
loquamur de bono honesto quod spectat ad virtutem cognoscitivam, tune sunt 
virtutes intellectuales, ut scientia, intellectus, ars, prudentia. Primae tres non 
sunt cardinales, quia non sunt de necessitate vitae humanae, sed prudentia est 
de necessitate boni. Immo impossibile est aliquem esse virtuosum sine pru- 
dentia. Nam prudentia regulat ceteras virtutes. 

Ex his infertur qualiter fortitudo, propter quam fit sermo, est virtus 
cardinalis. Et apparet qualiter sunt quatuor, elicitae ex triplici bono appe- 
tibili et fugibili, et triplici virtute animae meae, scilicet, iustitia, temperantia, 
fortitude, et prudentia, quae, nedum cardinalis, immo inter ceteras obtinet 
papatum et principatum. 

Fuit aliqualis discursio, sed sim supportatus, quia non reputavi propter 
iuristas, nee aliter, explicare naturam fortitudinis, de qua est principalis sermo. 



104 

icp. MY.) Quoinwio el qualitcr gins possil did fnrtis in bello. 

Consequenter quaeritur an aliquis possit did fortis, etiam si non fiu-rit 
exercitatus circa pericula mortis in bello. Apparet quod sic, nam fortitude 
est necessaria bonitati humanae, cum sit cardinalis, ut supra proxima quae- 
stione, quae bonitas human, i haberi potest sine exercitio bellico. Ergo conse- 
quentia probatur per locum a coniunctis, ut ff. De neg. gest., 1. atqui natura ; 
iv di., denique ; vi di., nunc de superfluitatc. Primum patet per notata supra 
proxima quaestione. Item Tullius dicit quod fortitude est considerata peri- 
culorum susceptio et laborum perpessio. Hoc autem potest esse sine bellico 
actu, ergo probatur consequentia per locum a consequent! destructo, quod est 
validum argumentum in iure, ff. De rebus creditis, 1. ii, ii ; C. De furt., 1. apud 
aniiqiios, ver. quam ; ff. De in integr. restit., [nemo] non vidctur. Opposituin 
dicit Philosophus, iv Ethicorum. Et propterea hoc continetur in sacramento 
militis, cum attingitur, scilicet, non evitare mortem, ut 1. paen., ff. Ex quibus 
causis maior. ; et 1. i, C. De his qui non implc. stip., lib. [xi] x. Pro solutione 
quaestionis est attendendum quod fortitude sumitur generaliter pro omni fir- 
mitate animi, et haec est generalis ad omnes virtutes, nam animi inconstantia 
vituperatur et a iure reprobatur, xxxii, q. v, horrendus ; De iureiurando, qucm- 
admwlum ; ff. De adulteriis, 1. si uxor ; ff. De decur., 1. p. ; ff. De neg. gest., 
1. paen. ; regula (?//('</ scmcl, vi regula mutarc, De reg. iur., Lib. VI. Et hoc modo 
non foret dubium quin talis possit fortis esse sine periculo bellico. Sumitur 
etiam stricte prout virtus specialis, quae est inclinans ad aggrediendum et ex- 
spectandum pericula, pro fugiendo malo culpae. Vnde triplex est malum, noxium 
quod opponitur utili, triste quod opponitur delectabili, culpa quod opponitur 
honesto. Bonum autem animae quod est honestum est praeferendum bono utili 
et delectabili, sicut anima rationalis praeferenda est corpori, xii, q. i, prtecipi- 
mus; xxiv, q. iii, si habes ; C. De sacrosanctis ecclesiis, 1. sancimus; De poenit. 
et rem., cum infirmitas. Ex hoc infertur quod tres sunt virtutes morales neces- 
sariae ad hoc, ut quis dicatur bonus et virtuosus. Vna quae praefigat animum 
ad praeferendum bonurn^ honestum utili, et haec est iustitia, Instit. eodem, 
iustitia ; xii, q. ii, cum devotissimam. Alia firmans animum ad praeferen- 
dum bonum honestum delectabili, et haec est temperantia, ut vi di., sal pcn- 
sandutn, pal. ; et De constit., nam concupiscentiam. Alia firmans animum 
ad sustinendum passiones magis quam incurrendum malum culpae, et haec est 
fortitude, ut C. De athlet., 1. una, lib. x ; C. De his qui non implet. stip., 
1. i, eodem libro ; vii, q. i, hinc etiam. Et haec est fortitude de qua est 
sermo. Et merito hae dicuntur cardinales, quia sunt de necessitate bonitatis 
humanae, et quaelibet istamm custodit scipsam et quamlibet aliarum. Tolle 
exemplum. Mulier temptata de adulterio per promissiones se defendit per 
temperantiam, ff. De rit. nup., 1. palam ii. Si temptetur per terrorem, ista est 
fortitudo, xxxii, q. v, [Lucretiam] proposito, Lucretidm, et [cap.] [fieri] non 
Potest fieri et [cap.] finge, de pudicitia ; xxxiv, q. i, non satis. Si autem 
temptetur per munera, ab ista se defendit per iustitiam, xii, q. ii, cum devotis- 
simam. Potest etiam exemplar! de fortitudine, nam si propter timorem se de- 



DE FORTITVDINE 105 

fendit, dubitat ' ab ista se defendit per fortitudinem, ut in cap. [Lucretiam] 
proposito, et [cap.] finge, de pudicitia, xxxii, q. v. Si temptatur propter 
delectabilia, tune defendit temperantia, xxxii, q. v, non potest, et cap. nee 
solo, et cap. qui viderit, et cap. non mcechaberis. Si propter munera, tune de- 
fendit iustitia, quia iniustum est vendere bonum honestum tanquam spirituale 
i, q. [i] ii, quam pio ; De simonia, per totum. Si falsis rationibus, tune de- 
fendit prudentia, et sic una cardinalium firmat animum, ut praeferatur bonum 
honestum utili, ut iustitia, alia ut praeferatur delectabili, ut temperantia, alia 
ad sustinendum tristia propter bonum tuendum et malum culpae excludendum, 
ut fortitude. Prudentia autem ceteras regulat, sic debet esse in cardinalibus. 



Vlterius est sciendum quod Bellum sumitur dupliciter. 

Vno modo pro actu bellandi hinc inde, ut sumitur ff. De capt. et postlim. 
revers., 1. in bello, et 1. postliminium ; C. De gladi., 1. unica, lib. xi. Alio 
modo sumitur pro qualibet exspectatione corporalis periculi, etiam si non sit 
actualis invasio, et hoc si periculum esset cui posset verisimiliter resisti, alias 
non esset bellum, ut in latrone suspendendo et alio iustitiando. 

Si bellum capiatur pro actuali invasione hinc inde facta, fortitude non 
est solum circa ilia pericula, quia tune non esset cardinalis, cum multi sint 
virtuosi qui non sunt in talibus exercitati. Si autem sumatur secundo modo, 
tune fortitude versatur circa ilia pericula generaliter, sicut dicimus in muliere 
quae sustinet pericula propter tuitionem castitatis. Ibi non est bellum primo 
modo sumptum, sed secundo sic, et tamen est fortitude. Notandum tamen 
quod fortitude non est circa quaelibet pericula bellica. Nam, si aliquis invadat 
alium et defendat se, non est fortis, quia tune canis esset fortis fortitudine. 
Sed quando sustinet pericula tellica propter evitare malum culpae, tune est 
fortis. Vnde dicit Philosophus quod non est fortis propter necessitatem, hinc 
etiam causa xxiii, q. iv, N abuchodonosor , et cap. de Tyriis ; De Poenit., dist. 
ii, sic enitn. Tune concluditur solutio quaestionis propositae cum quaeritur an 
fortitude sit circa pericula mortis et bellica, et dicendum quod non, ut exem- 
platum est in muliere. Secundo modo, quod extremus actus fortitudinis sit 
circa mortis pericula, dicendum quod sic, quia virtus est circa difficile. Tertio 
modo, quod inclinet ad sustinendum mortis periculum, si casus occurrat, et 
dicendum quod sic, quia virtus extenditur circa ultimum potentiae, primo Cceli 
et Mundi. 

Quis sit principalior actus fortitudinis in bello ? [Cap.v.] 

Sed quaeritur quid sit principalius fortitudinis bellantium, an exspectatio 
hostium, an aggressus eorum ? Et videtur quod aggressus sit principalior 
actus fortitudinis. Primo, quia, ut inquit Philosophus, ii Ethicorum, tractatu 
de liberalitate, virtuosius est dare quam recipere. Scribitur etiam Ecclesia- 
stici iv cap., " Non sit manus tua porrecta ad accipiendum, et ad dandum 



106 DE IVRE BELLI 

collecta." Hinc est quod scribitur, " Beatius est dare quam accipere," xvi, 
q. i, pradicator ; et De celebr. missar., cum Martha ; De donat., cap. i. Ergo, 
a simili, virtuosius est aggredi quam exspectare, quia aggrediens dat, exspec- 
tans recipit. Praeterea virtuosius est bene facere quam bene recipere, ut idem 
Philosophus. Probatur. Nam si melius est facere quam pati in genere virtu- 
tum, ergo bene facere meb'us quam bene pati. Consequentia tenet per locum 
a connexis, quod est validum argumentum in iure, ff. De neg. gest., 1. atqui 
natura ; iv dist., dcniquc ; vi dist., quia de superfluitatc. Sed aggrediens bene 
dat, exspectans bene recipit, ergo virtuosius aggredi. Praeterea melius est 
bene operari quam non operari turpe, iuxta illud non sufficit abstinere a malo, 
nisi et bonum faciamus, nam et illud, scilicet, bene operari bonum, meliorem 
ducit finem cum in actibus is finis ponderetur, et ab illo fiat denominatio. Con- 
sequentia tenet per locum a fine, qui est validus in iure, ut ff. De ritu nupt., 1. 
si quis ; ff. De iur. fisci, 1. non inlelligitur , si quis palam ; ff. Communia praed., 
1. receptum ; ff. De auro et arg. legat., 1. et si non sint, perveniamus. Sed 
aggredi est bene operari, exspectare est non operari turpe, id est non fugere, 
ergo virtuosius aggredi quam exspectare. Prasterea id virtuosius est quod est 
difficilius. Nam et legis responsum aliter non emanat nisi super difficili et 
dubitabili, ut 1. quod Labeo, ff. De Carbon, edicto ; et 1. i in fin., ff. Ad 
municipalem. Sed aggredi est difficilius quam exspectare, nam homo fessus 
exspectare potest, non autem aggredi. Probatur maior per eundem Philo- 
sophum, tractatu de fortitudine, nam actus fortitudinis specialiter est circa 
difficilia et terribilia. Praeterea, illud virtuosius quod amabilius, nam actus 
virtutum de sui natura sunt amabiles, ut idem Philosophus, et probatur hoc 
De pcenit., dist. ii, ergo, et cap. corpus, et cap. proximos. Sed aggredi est 
amabilius. Quam plures utilitates affert reipublicae, et plura in eodem genere 
praevalent paucioribus, in Authent., De consan. et uter. frat., in princ. ; De 
sent, excom., cum pro causa ; iii, q. iv, Engeltrudam ; De offi. delegat., pruden- 
tiam, in princ. ; quia inimicos expellere est utilius quam ipsos exspectare. 
Praeterea illud virtuosius quod est laudabilius, quia virtus moralis est bonum 
laudabile, sed aggredi est laudabilius quam exspectare. Nam regulariter plus 
laudantur aggredientes quam fugientes. In contrarium est textus Philosophi, 
iii Ethicorum, tractatu de fortitudine, ubi dicit quod principalior actus forti- 
tudinis est sustinere. Idem tenet ibi Albertus et Custratius. 

Pro evidentia huius quaestionis est advertendum quod secundum dicta- 
men rectae rationis non est semper aggrediendum, nee semper fugiendum, nee 
semper exspectandum, nam quandoque expedit aggredi, quandoque fugere, 
quandoque exspectare. Ex quo apparet quod fortitudinis triplex est actus, 
scilicet, aggressura, fuga, et exspectatio. Et quod aliquando fugiendum sit 
forti, patet ratione, nam pericula supra hominem sunt fugienda. Si enim unus 
solus vellet aggredi mille, vel ipsos aggredientes exspectare, non esset fortis, 
sed audax et temerarius, ut idem Philosophus ibidem. Triplex est ergo actus 
fortitudinis, scilicet, aggressus, fuga, et exspectatio. Et inter istos minimus 
est fuga. Hoc probatur. Nam ille actus est inter ceteros minimus qui inter 



DE FORTITVDINE 107 

ceteros est minus difficilis, cum ars et disciplina sint circa difficilia. At fugere 
est facilius quam aggredi vel exspectare. Ergo. Praeterea ille actus est mini- 
mus. Assimilatur vitio peiori. Probatur per locum ab extremis, qui est 
validus in iure, if. Communi divid., 1. arbor ; et 1. una, ff. Si quis ius die. non 
obtemp. ; et 1. qucerilur, ff. De stat. hominum. Sic est in proposito. Nam 
per fugam assimilatur timori, quod est peius vitium quam sit audacia, ut idem 
Philosophus, ibidem. 

Secundo dico quod exspectatio est actus principalior. Hoc probatur, 
nam virtuosius est bene facere bonum quam bene recipere bonum. Ergo vir- 
tuosius est bene pati malum quam bene facere malum. Tenet consequentia 
per locum a contrariis, qui est validus in iure, ff. De act. emp., 1. lulianus, 
procurator ; ff. De instit., 1. sed si pupillus, si institoria ; ff. De verb, sig., 
1. hcec verba. Sed aggrediens bene facit malum aggresso, exspectans autem 
bene recipit malum ab aggrediente. Praeterea ille actus est principalior qui 
est dimcilior. Hoc pluries supra probatum est. Sed exspectatio est difficilior 
quam aggressus. Probatur hoc. Nam si fiat aggressus, fit in modum fortio- 
ris, et cum spe de evadendo, alias recta ratio non dictaret aggressum, si non 
esset spes evasionis. Sed exspectatio fit in modum minus fortis erga fortio- 
rem. Sed difficilius est bene se habere cum fortiori quam cum minus forti, 
ut claret. Confirmatur. Nam in exspectando oportet moderari timorem 
magnum cum tristitiis corporalibus. At aggrediendo non expedit tantum 
moderari timorem. Ergo. 

Praeterea exspectatio et sustinere denotant diuturnitatem et perseveran- 
tiam, et in genere boni quod diuturnius melius, De Poenit., dist. iii, inisor ; De 
Pcenit., dist. ii, pennata, et cap. non revertebanlur ; ff. De in rem vers., 1. si 
pro patre, et versum. Sed aggressus denotat quendam impetum parum 
durabilem provenientem ab iracundia, ut 1. si adulterium, imperator, ff. 
De adulter. ; et C. eod. tit., 1. Gracchus ; et regula quod calore, ff. De reg. 
iuris. 

Praeterea exspectatio facit pericula mortis esse praesentia, et ilia tune 
difficilia et timibilia, ut Philosophus, ii Rhetoricae. Ergo. 

Infertur igitur exspectationem actum principaliorem fortitudinis, licet 
vulgares non recte iudicantes, contrarium sapiant. Si autem, quod praedixi, 
fugam actum (?) fortitudinis [videtur] obstare, quod in hoc tractatu scripsi supra 
in articulo de pertinentibus ad ducem et milites, ubi dixi quod milites servare 
debent iuramentum quod iurarunt, non fugere, etc. 

Solutio patet ex iam dictis, nam ubi sunt pericula supra hominem, fugien- 
dum est, xxiii, q. iv, displicet, lohannis viii, Matthaei x, transumptum, vii, 
q. i, hoc observandum. Vbi autem sunt pericula non supra hominem, sed est 
aliqualis spes, tune procedunt statim dicta. Ad allegata in contrarium patet 
responsum, discurrendo per singula, uno tamen addito, videlicet, quod vul- 
gares plus laudant et amant aggredientes quam exspectantes. Hinc est quod 
dicit Philosophus ibidem, nihil prohibet milites stipendiaries in civitatibus 
utiliores esse quam viros fortes, nam illi ad modicum lucri vitam mutant, et 

[6] 



DE IVRE BELLI 

fugiunt et aggrediuntur sine dictamine rationis, viri autem fortes nee fuginnt 
nee aggrediuntur sine dictamine rationis. 



Quot generibus fortitudinis quis utatiir in hello? 

Sed quaero, quot generibus fortitudinis utatur quis in bello ? Solutio. 
Sex sunt similitudines verae fortitudinis, quae cst virtus moralis sita inter auda- 
ciam et timorem, et istis sex utuntur milites in bellis. 

Prima qua aliqui viriliter in bello aggrediuntur propter gloriam et hono- 
rem, videntes quod tales solent laudari, et timidi vituperari, et de hac C. De 
re milit., libro xii ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. qua actione, JH colluctatione ; De 
pub. iudic., per totum. 

Secunda quae appellatur politica, qua aliqui sunt fortes propter timorem 
poenae corporalis vel pecuniariae, quae imponi consuevit timidis et fugientibus 
in bello, et ista vocatur politica, quia inter cives, et talis servilis est, De Poenit., 
distinct, ii, sicut secta. 

Tertia est quae vocatur militaris, qua homines sunt fortes, quia sciunt 
artes bellandi, sicut Teutonici et alii experti stipendiarii. Hanc inducit expe- 
rientia, rerum magistra, ff. De leg. iii, 1. servis, ornatricibus ; et cap. quam 
sit, De elect., Lib. VI ; et, ut dicit Philosophus in tractatu De Fortitudine, stipen- 
diarii pugnant cum aliis, sic armati cum inermibus. Et isti faciles sunt ad 
aggrediendum, et faciles ad fugiendum. Hodie tamen facilius se expediunt, 
quia levant digitum et trahunt barbutas< B , et se reddunt, et statim dimittuntur, 
ut est mos eorum inter se. 

Quarta est qua utuntur aliqui propter furorem, nam furor est res 
impetuosa ad pericula, et iste aliquando iuvat in bellis, quia homines sunt 
audaciores, et hanc inducit impetus iracundiae, ut 1. si adiiltcriiim, impera- 
tores, ff. De adulter. ; et 1. Gracchus, C. eodem titulo, et 1. quod calore, ff. 
De reg. iuris. 

Quinta, qua aliqui utuntur propter spem. Nam aliqui propter spem 
victoriae viriliter aggrediuntur. Ibi enim praeponderat spes potentiae sensi- 
tivae rationi, De constit., nam concupisccniiam ; vi dist., sed pensandunt. 

Sexta est propter ignorantiam, nam aliqui aggrediuntur vel exspectant, 
ignorantcs pericula quae imminent, qui tamen fugerent hoc scito. Ibi non 
videt quid agat, ad instar infantis, C. De fals. mone., Li; ff. Ad leg. Corn, 
de sica., 1. si infans. 

Istis fortitudinibus milites regulariter utuntur in bellis. Inter istas autem 
fortitudines, si vis videre quae magis attingit virtuti, debes attendere quod 
omnes istae sunt similitudinariae fortitudinis verae. Nam in vera fortitudine, 
sicut in qualibet virtute, oportet quod opus fiat scienter. Nam ignoranter 
operantium nulla est virtus, quia prudentia, quae est habitus intellectus, regu- 
lare debet omne opus virtutis. Secundo, debet eligi. Tertio, quod eligatur 
propter bonum intrinsecum virtutis, non autem propter bonum extrinsecum. 



DE FORTITVDINE 



109 



Quarto, quod operetur firme et durabiliter. Quinto, quod delectabiliter. 
Sexto, quod opus debet esse difficile, nam ars sit circa difficilia. Haec omnia 
requiruntur in vera fortitudine, circa aggressum, vel exspectationem alicuius 
terribilis et difficilis. Per hoc patet quae supra dictarum magis assimilatur 
verae fortitudini, et quae non. Nam omnes praeter ultimam assimilantur in eo 
quod scienter, et sic ultima est minime similis in hoc, quod eligens. Alias con- 
veniunt cum vera, praeter illam quae fit ex furore. In eo autem quod propter 
bonum intrinsecum, omnes deficiunt a vera, nam prima est propter bonum 
extrinsecum, utpote gloriam, alia propter fugam pcenae, alia propter lucra et 
stipendia, alia propter spem vincendi. Prima autem politica, quae est propter 
honores et gloriam, magis assimilatur verae propter finem honorabiliorem. 
Nam honores sunt significativi virtutum, et isti plus operantur, /tendendo ad 
bonum publicum, nam virilius bellis insistunt, ut exemplat Philosophus de 
Hectore in bellicis sic se habente. 



An fortis in bello potius debeat mortem exspectare quam fugere ? [Ca P .x*viii.j 

Tertio quaero, an fortis in bello aliquo casu magis debeat mortem ex- 
spectare quam fugere de bello, ubi per fugam evadere posset. Et videtur 
quod non sit mors exspectanda, nam illud magis eligendum quod est delecta- 
bilius, et illud minus quod minus, primo Rhetoricas dictum est Philosophiae. 
Sed est delectabilior vita quam mors, ergo eligibilius fugere et vivere quam 
exspectare et mori. Oppositum videtur dicere Philosophus, iv Ethicorum, 
tractatu de fortitudine, et iii, tractatu de voluntario et violento, et etiam trac- 
tatu de magnanimitate, ubi dicit quod prius est moriendum quam aliquid turpe 
committendum. 

Solutio. Pro evidentia quaestionis est advertendum quod quaestio potest 
habere duplex fundamentum ; unum veritatis et fidei, ut supponamus aliam 
vitam et beatitudinem. Et secundum hoc fundamentum quaestio non haberet 
grande dubium, nam si aliquis pugnaret contra infideles, et propter fugam 
suam multi perirent fideles, et solus salvaretur, tune praeeligenda esset ex- 
spectatio et mors. Et est ratio, nam fugiendo consequitur vitam corporalem, 
exspectando, moriendo corporaliter, consequitur vitam animae, quae est sine 
comparatione nobilior, ergo praeeligenda. 

Secundum fundamentum potest esse naturalium et viventium secundum 
legem naturae, ut non supponatur ulterior vita, et tune quaestio habet dubium 
et opiniones varias. Aliqui dicunt quod mors exspectanda contingere potest 
multipliciter. Vno modo, quod evidenter certum sit mortem evenire debere 
cum exspectatione, nee spes sit de salute nisi cum fuga. Alio modo, quod 
licet sit aliqua evidentia mortis, tamen spes aliqua haberi potest de vita sine 
fuga. Isto secundo casu, dicunt intelligendas auctoritates Aristotelis et alio- 
rum philosophorum, qui dicunt quod magis moriendum, id est, viriliter pugnan- 
dum. Primo autem casu dicunt nullo modo mortem exspectandam. Probant 



no DE IVRE BELLI 

hoc sic, nam de duobus mails minus malum est eligendum, xiii dist., ncrvi ; et est 
principium in moralibus. Sed minus malum est fugere quam exspectare et mori. 
Quod sit minus malum probatur, nam illud est minus malum per quod pau- 
ciora bona perduntur quam illud per quod plura, sed in morte omnia tollun- 
tur, in Authent., De nupt., deinceps ; et secundo Physicorum. In fuga perdi- 
tur solum bonum fortitudinis moralis. Ergo. Praeterea, si melius esset mori, 
hoc esset quia mori esset actus virtutis, sed hoc est falsum, nam actus virtutis 
vel est felicitas, vel ad actum felicitatis tendens. Sed more est felicitatem 
destruens. Ergo. Praeterea si hoc casu eligenda esset mors, hoc esset quia 
fortitude, quae est virtus moralis, ad hoc inclinaret. Sed hoc est falsum, nam 
virtus moralis non tendit ad corruptionem naturae, immo ad conservationem 
ipsius. Nam ad hoc factae sunt leges, iv dist., facke sunt ; sed mors tendit ad 
destructionem, in Authent., De nupt., deinceps. Praeterea, si hoc quis 
deberet magis eligere, aut foret propter bonum proprium aut alienum. Non 
propter proprium, quia in morte omne bonum exstinguitur, ut supra tactum 
est. Non alienum, quia non tantum bonum alteri potest quaerere quantum sibi 
perdit, cum se plus ahis debeat diligere, ut 1. presses, C. De servit. et aqua. 
Confirmatur. Nam secundum veritatem et fidem apparet quod virtuosissimi 
mih'tes fugiebant in bello, ut tempore Caroli Magni. 

AUi dicunt totum econtra, scilicet, quod potius exspectandum et morien- 
dum quam fugiendum. Et hoc probant. Nam quilibet scit de necessitate se 
moriturum esse, si ergo moriatur fortis, non perdit nisi id in quo credit mortem 
praesentem differre a futura. Sed istae non differunt in hoc quod est amittere 
bona virtutis et conservare, sed differunt in hoc quod est diutius retinere et 
minus diu. Tune arguunt sic, illud eligibilius est in quo plura bona ad- 
quiruntur, et pauciora perduntur, sic est in proposito. Ergo. Probatur haec 
minor. Nam si moriatur, quaerit actum fortitudinis, qui est nobilissimus. Si 
fugit, nihil quaerit, nisi continuationem prius habitorum donee duret vita, et 
sic quaerit tempus. Confirmatur. Nam certum est quod consistentes circa delec- 
tationes corporales magis eligerent modico tempore vivere delectabiliter quam 
longo pcenaliter, ergo sic in delectationibus animae hoc potius est eligendum. 

Opinionem primam credo veram, nam, ut dixi in alio articulo. actus 
fortitudinis sunt aggressus, fuga, et exspectatio. Nam non semper insequen- 
dum, nee semper fugiendum, nee semper exspectandum, immo cum dictamine 
rationis. 



icp.i.) An miles una cum comitiva sua viriliter in hastes prorumpens, et ipsos totalitcr 
confringens, contra mandatum duds, sit capite puniendus ? 

Quarto quaeritur, pone dux exercitus mandavit ne quis prorumperet in 
hostes sub pcena capitis. Quidam strenuissimus miles, cum magna comitiva 
mUitum quibus praeerat, contra mandatum ducis, prorupit in hostes, et ipsius 
strenuitate totahter hostibus conflictum dedit. Quaeritur an capite puniendus 
sit. Et videtur quod sic, nam dicit textus, in bello, qui rem prohibitam a ducc 



DE DVCE CAPTO in 

fecit, aut mandata non servat, capita punitur, etiam si rem bene gesserit, ff. 
De re militar., 1. desertorem, in bello. Probatur per iura quae volunt 
astrictos obedientia ad ipsam teneri, ff. Mandati, 1. si remunerandi, si 
[pignus] passus">, et 1. sed Proculus ; ff. Ad Macedon., 1. sed etsi, ii (?) ; 
ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. si servus servum, et si puerum ; C. De neg. gest., 1. 
ult. ; cum similibus. Confirmatur. Nam malum non excusatur propter bonum 
quod sequitur, Ivi dist., can. undecunque ; De Pcenit., dist. i, non sufficit. Con- 
firmatur. Nam facta non sunt ab eventu notanda, xv, q. i, ilia, et cap. non est ; 
xxiii, q. v, de occidendis ; ff. De neg. gest., 1. sed an ultra, i ; ff. Mand., 
1. qui mutuam, sumplus ; ff. De contraria tut., 1. iii. Ergo ab hoc eventu 
insigni non net notatio, immo ab obedientia prsevenienti. 

In contrarium videtur. Nam propter peritiam et factum insigne effectua- 
liter perpetratum remittitur pcena, qua? alias imponi deberet, aliquid attemp- 
tanti contra legem vel mandatum principis. Probat textus ff. De pcenis, 1. 
ad bestias ; xxii, q. ii, cap. quceritur cur Patriarcha. 

Solutio. Audio quod dominus Ricardus Malumbra terminavit quod 
delinquens propter peritiam magnam pcenam evadit per dictani 1. ad bestias; 
et induci poterat dictum cap. quceritur cur Patriarcha. Tamen illam opinionem 
non credo veram, immo aperte est contra textum 1. desertorem, in bello, 
ff. De re militari. Nee obstant iura in contra allegata, nam aliud est quern 
non incidere pcenam legis vel hominis, aliud est post poenae commissionem 
ipsam a principe remitti posse. Ilia iura non probant quominus pcena com- 
mittatur, sed bene probant ipsam a principe posse remitti, et sic supponunt 
illam commissam, ut probat uterque textus, si bene inspiciatur. 



An dud belli capto sit venia concedenda ? tcap. 

Quinto quaaritur, pone dux belli capitur ab hostibus, numquid ei est venia 
concedenda an veniat puniendus ? Et videtur quod venia sit concedenda per 
cap. noli in fin., xxiii, q. i. Ecce textus, " Sicut debellanti et resistenti vio- 
lentia debetur, sic victo vel capto venia conceditur." Hoc probatur, nam dicit 
textus quod tenetur quis parcere hosti suo, ii, q. [vi] v, quanta, in fine. Ecce 
textus, " quia sicut in contumacia persistentibus severos nos esse convenit, sic 
humiliatis et pcenitentibus locum venise negare non debemus." 

In contrarium videtur, nam captus efficitur servus hostium, ut 1. hastes, 
et 1. hastes, ff. De captivis et ff. De verb, significatione. 

Solutio. Credo primam partem veram, videlicet, quod venia sit con- 
cedenda humiliate et resistere nolenti, nisi per venise concessionem pacis per- 
turbatio timeatur, tune enim venia plectendus est. Hoc probat textus in cap. 
noli, in fin., ibi dum dicit, " maxime in quo perturbatio non timetur," et 
exponit Hugo, et Archidiaconus, " maxime," pro " tantum," ut sit sensus 
liters, quod solum sit concedenda venia ubi non timetur pacis perturbatio, alias 
non. Et fertur quod per illam expositionem Carolus fecit amputari caput 
Conradino. 



ii2 DE IVRE BELLI 

[Cap. xi.) Dt his qui tcnentur ad bellum accedere, el de accedentibus non astrictis. 

Quarto videndum restat de his qui tenentur ad bellum accedere, et quid 
de accedentibus non astrictis ? 

An, a domino molo iusto betto, teneantur vassalli accedere propriis sumptibus ? 

Et quaeritur primo, an, si dominus moveat iustum bellum, teneantur vas- 
salli accedere cum armis et equis et in expensis propriis. Et videtur quod sic, 
quia vigore iuramenti tenentur iuvare dominum, ut xxii, q. v, de forma ; Inno- 
centius, in cap. sicut, De iureiur., tenet quod non tenetur, nisi ex pacto speciali 
ad hoc sint obligati, cum ipsi non teneantur ad munera personalia. Conclude 
in hoc quod vassalli de iure non tenentur, nisi ad ea quae continentur in cap. 
de forma, xxii, q. v ; nisi ex speciali conventione ad illud obligentur ut. 



[OM>. xii.) An subditi uni baroni, movcnti guerram contra regem suum, teneantur ipsum 

baronem iuvare contra regem. 

Secundo quaero, pone quod Baro Regis Hispaniae moveat guerram ipsi 
regi, et mandet omnibus hominibus suis ut iuvent ipsum in bello contra Regem, 
numquid tenentur, cum iuraverint ipsum iuvare contra omnem hominem. 
Et videtur quod sic, nam grave est fidem fallere, Qui cleri. vel voventes, 
veniens, et cap. sequenti ; 1. i, fi. De consti. pecunia. Etiam verba generaliter 
probata generaliter sunt intelligenda, ff. De legat. praestan., 1. i, generaliter. 
Etiam quia iuramentum astringit, nisi a iuramento absolvantur, xv, q. vi, cap. 
ii et iii. Contrarium est verum, nam Baro movens guerram Regi incidit in 
legem lul. maiestatis, 1. i et 1. ii, fi. Ad leg. lul. maiest. ; vi, q. i, verum, 
versus quisquis cum militibus ; Ixxix dist., cap. ii. Nam Rex Hispaniae est 
princeps in regno suo. Etiam opera non fert qui ad peccandum iuvat, xiv, q. 
vi, si res ; nee prasceptum illius ipsos excusaret, ff. De oblig. et act., 1. servus ; xi, 
q. iii, non semper, et cap. qui resistit, et cap. si dominus. Nee sacramentum ad 
hoc ligat, quia non est inventum ut sit iniquitatis vinculum, xxii, q. iv, inter 
cetera ; De iureiur., cap. i, Lib. VI ; faciant quae notantur in cap. petitio, De 
iureiurando. 



[Cp.iii.) An subditi uni baroni, mwcnli gncrnmi alteri banmi, tcncanlur ipsum primo, 
an regem moventcm guerram alteri regi, iuvare, utriusquc 
mandato uno concursu recepto ? 

Tertio quaeritur, Baro Regis Hispaniae movet guerram alteri Baroni, 
Rex Hispaniae movet guerram regi Granatje. Baro mandat hominibus quu- 
tenus iuvent ipsum ; Rex autcm mandat li^U in ut iuvent eum ; et concununt 
mandata. Quern primo iuvare tenentur ? 

Videtur quod primo Baronem, nam Baroni sunt subiecti ratione iidelitatis 
et ratione iurisdictionis, in Authent., DC quaestore, si vero, Coll. vi. Regi 



DE VASSALLIS 113 

autem sunt subiecti ratione iurisdictionis generalis tantum, et sic duae rationes 
vincunt unam, in Authent., De consang. et uter. frat., i ; De re iudic., cum 
ezterni, Lib. VI ; xiii dist., can. i. 

In contrarium videtur. Nam vocati a Rege sunt vocati ad maius tri- 
bunal, et sic praeferendum, ff. De re iudic., 1. contra pupillum, fin. ; xviii 
dist., si Episcopus. Etiam quia Rex vocat pro communi bono et defensa 
coronae, et sic iure gentium obediendum, ff. De iustitia et iure, 1. veluti ; i 
dist., ius gentium; xxiii, q. iii, fortitudo, et q. viii, cap. omni, et cap. si nulla. 
Nam pro defensione patrise licitum est patrem interficere, ff. De relig. et 
sumpt. fun., 1. minime. Et haec vera. 



An vassallus nonlegius duorum dominorum, uno concursu requisitus, 
utrumque vel alterum, et quern, iuvare teneatur ? 

Quarto quaeritur, quid de vassallo nonlegio duorum, quod esse potest 
ratione diversorum feudorum, De supl. negl. praelat., grandi, Lib. VI. Si 
uterque dominorum simul requirat eum ut iuvet ipsum in bello, tenetur utrum- 
que, an alterum, et quern, iuvare ? 

Apparet quod neutrum, cum concursu se impediant, ff. De usufr., 1. 
quotient ; De Poenit., dist. i, hoc idem, vers. Christus ait ; xxi, q. i, cap. i. 

Apparet quod utrumque, alias perdet feudum, quia difncultas praesta- 
tionis ex parte promissoris non perimit obligationem, ff. De verb, obi., 1. 
continuus, illud. Item potest quis duobus dominis servire, ut ff. De operis 
libert., 1. duorum. Ouidam dicunt locum esse gratificationi, exemplo servi 
duorum dominorum, qui si viderit utrumque dominum interfici, iuvare poterit 
quern voluerit, ff. Ad Silianum, 1. si quis in gravi, si cum omnes. Alii dicunt 
quod iuvabit priorem dominum, et cui primo iuravit, ut in Vsibus Feudorum, 
De prohib. feud, alien., 1. imperialem, illud ; ff. Locati, 1. in operis; C. Qui 
potiores in pign. hab., 1. ii. Nam priorem fidelitatem servare tenetur, 1 
di., quia sanctitas tua ; Qui cleri. vel vov., veniens. 

Tutius tamen est quod primo serviat personaliter, secundo per substi- 
tutum, si hoc patiatur natura feudi, C. De caduc. toll., 1. una, sin autem. 
Nee obstat quod iuravit secundo, salva fidelitate primi, quod est de natura 
hominis nonlegii, quia serviendo secundo per substitutum non nocet primo, 
quod salvatum fuit in iuramento secundi. 



An vassallus teneatur iuvare dominum contra patrem, vel pater [Cap. 

contra filium ? 

Quinto quaeritur, an vassallus teneatur iuvare dominum contra patrem, 
vel pater contra filium. Glossa format quaestionem, xxii, q. v, cap. de forma, 
et tenet quod sic. Nam filius solum vinculo naturae obligatus est patri, sed 
vassallus domino vinculo iuramenti, ut in praeallegato cap. de forma. Hoc 



H4 DE IVRE BELLI 

probat textus in Vsibus Feud., in cap. quemadmodum feud, amit. Glossa 
aliqualiter sentit contrarium, in cap. quoniam milites, xi, q. iii. Putarem pon- 
derandam qualitatem impendendi subsidii. 

An civis duarum civitatum teneatur unam iuvare contra aliam ? 

Sexto quaeritur, an civis duarum civitatum teneatur iuvare unanf contra 
aliam. Solutio. Die ut dictum est in vassallo duorum dominorum. 



y4n vassallus, vocatus a domino, teneatur ipsum sequi in partibus ultramarinis 

ad pugnandum contra barbaros ? 

Septimo quaeritur, dominus vult ire ad partes remotas, pone ultra mare, 
ad pugnandum cum barbaris, numquid vassallus, vocatus ab eo, teneatur ipsum 
sequi ad bellum ? Solutio. Si dominus est talis status et conditionis quod 
praedecessores sui et ipse consueverunt illuc accedere, et vassalli ipsum sequi, 
et tune tenetur exemplo liberti, qui tcnetur ad operas consuetas, ff. De operis 
lib., 1. opere, et 1. paen. ; ff. De pign. act., 1. [qui] vel universorum. Praestabuntur 
tamen a domino sumptus moderati, arbitrio boni viri. Si autem sit talis qui 
non possit nee consuevit, tune secus, ff. De operis lib., 1. quod nisi, fin. ; ff. 
De arbit., 1. si cum dies, si arbiter. Haec etiam tangit Speculum in Speculo, 
tit. De feudis, ipsum. 



[cp.xvii.] An servi teneantur ttbique sequi dominum ad bellum ? 

Octavo quaeritur de servis, an teneantur sequi dominum ubique ad bel- 
lum. De his non est dubium, cum in eos dominus plenam habeat potestatem, 
dummodo non nimis saeviat in eos, ff. De his qui sunt sui vel alien, iuris, 
1. i et ii. 

[Cap.mvm ] An liberti vocati teneantur sequi palronum ad bellum ? 

Nono quaeritur, quid de libertis ? Solutio. Liberti tenentur ad operas 
solitas, nee insolitae possunt eis imponi, ff. De operis lib., 1. quod nisi, si 
vag. W ; ff. De procur., 1. sed haec, ii. 



[cp.xxi>.] An agricolte vocati teneantur sequi dominum ad bettum ? 

Decimo quaeritur, quid de agricolis, an vocati ad bellum a dominis acce- 
dere teneantur ? Solutio. Agricolae dividuntur in ascripticios et censitos. 
Ascripticii dicuntur per scripturam solo astricti, unde in adventiciis duas inter- 
veniunt scripturae, una ad constituendum, alia ad probandum. Prima qua 
promittunt domino soli nunquam a solo recedere, alia qua profitetur se ascrip- 
ticium, et de his scripturis in 1. scimus, C. De agric. et censitis. Et inter hos 



DE SVBDITIS 115 

et servos paene nulla est differentia, ut 1. ne diu, C. eod. titulo. Et dico paene, 
quia differunt, quia servus alienari potest cum peculio, et sine, ut denuo 1. 
ne diu ; ascripticius non sine solo, ut 1. ii, C. eod. titulo. Item ascripticii citra 
domini voluntatem ordinari possunt in possessionibus quibus ascripti sunt, in 
Authent., De sanct. episc., ascripticios ; servi autem non. Item ascripticii, 
sciente et tacente domino, contrahunt matrimonium, nee conditionem mutant, 
ut C. De agricol. et censitis, 1. ult. ; servi autem contrahentes, scientibus domi- 
nis et tacentibus, liberantur a servili conditione, ut in Authent., De nupt., 
si vero. Ex quibus luce clarius apparet quod ius quod habent domini in 
ascripticios est ius relatum ad possessiones quibus ascribuntur. Et sic appa- 
ret quod provocati a domino ad extranea onera personalia, non artantur, nisi 
ex conventione aliud sit inductum. Censiti autem sunt qui certaa rei annuatim 
prsestandae constituti sunt, C. Ouib. caus. coloni, 1. ii. Etiam in hoc differunt 
ab ascripticiis, quia ascripticii sunt ascripti ad incertam rem praestandam, puta 
tertiam vel quartam fructuum, isti autem certae rei ; et de his infertur ut 
supra. Per hoc infertur quod nee coloni nee inquilini necessario artari possint. 



An confederates possit dominus vocare ut ipsum iuvent in bello ? [Cap. i 

Vndecimo quaeritur, quid de confcederatis et colligatis, numquid dominus 
poterit confcederatos provocare ad bellum ut ipsum iuvare teneantur ? Solu- 
tio. Confcederati sunt plene liberi, licet ad aliqua teneantur ex pacto, ut 1. 
non dubito, ff. De captivis. In his tamen ponderanda est conventio, et con- 
ventionis modus, ut ad unguem servetur, ff. Depositi, 1. i, si convenitur ; 
et 1. i, De pactis. 

An subditi ratione iurisdictionis tantummodo teneantur ad bellum accedere ? [Cap. 

Duodecimo quaeritur, quid de his qui ratione iurisdictionis tantummodo 
sunt subditi, non autem sunt vassalli ? Solutio. Tales accedere tenentur, nee 
agent ad deperdita, quia hoc faciunt ex debito. Fallit hoc regulare dictum in 
quibusdam personis quae excusantur a muneribus personalibus, quorum qui- 
dam excusantur aetate, ut minores et senectute gravati, ut C. Qui aetate, in 
rubro et nigro ; quidam infirmitate, ut C. Qui morbo, per totum ; quidam 
liberorum numero, ut C. Qui numero liber., per totum ; quidam propter 
professionem, ut C. De profess, et medic. ; quidam sexu, ut mulieres, et con- 
similes. Alias stat regula. 



De personis non astrictis ad bellum, liber e accedentibus. [Cap.xm.] 

Haec autem dicta sunt de his personis quae sunt qualitercumque astrictae. 
Restat videre de personis plene liberis ad bellum provocatis. Pro cuius 
evidentia, est attendendum quod accedentibus ad bellum non necessitate nee 

[7] 



n6 DE IVRE BELLI 

debito necessario, nam cle debito accedentibus supra tactum est. Ouidam 
accedunt plena liberalitafe ; quidam accedunt quia tenentur ad antidora ; qui- 
dam accedunt propter gloriam quaerendam et consequendam in bello ; quidam 
accedunt quia locant operas suas, si contractus locati appellari potest, ut sti- 
pendiarii ; quidam accedunt solum animo spoliandi, ut nuncupati " Sacco- 
manni," quasi manu arripientes et sacco deferentes, et de his videamus. Et 
primo de primis, ut de plene libere accedentibus. 

An libere accedentes obligent sibi ilium in cuius servitium vadunt, etc.? 

Et primo quaeritur numquid accedentes libere ad bellum obligent sibi 
ilium in cuius servitium vadunt, si damnum incidunt, utpote si in bello perdant 
arma, equos, sive capiantur, sive etiam eundo ad bellum sive redeundo ? Solu- 
tio. Hie est attendendum quod accedentes libere aliquando accedunt prius 
vocati et rogati a dominis, aliquando motu proprio, non requisiti a dominis. 
Si accedunt vocati a dominis, tune habent actionem mandati contra dominum, 
si sic, ut supra dictum est, contingat, aliquid ipsos perdere, nisi appareat quod 
causa pietatis, humanitatis, vel parentelae, hoc faciant, xxiii, q. iii, non [in- 
ferenda] in inferenda ; xi, q. iii, si dominus, et cap. lulianus. Si autem opponas, 
et dicas dominum non teneri, quia talia perdunt casu fortuito, de quo quis non 
tenetur, De homici., Johannes; C. De pign. act., 1. qua fortuitis. Solutio. Iste 
est casus fortuitus qui potuit et debuit praevideri, quia verisimiliter haec 
contingunt in bellis, quia dubius est eventus belli, et ita notat Innocentius 
in cap. sicut, De iureiurando. 

[c*p.iiii.] An commodatarius teneatur commodanti equos et arma in bello 

deperdita resarcire ? 

Secundo quaeritur, quid de commodante tali arma et equos pro eundo ad 
bellum, numquid, si perdantur, teneatur commodatarius commodanti ? Et 
videtur quod sic, argumento supra proximo a simili, cum hoc etiam praevideri 
potuerit, ut supra. Solutio. In hoc casu secus, secundum Innocentium, et est 
ratio differentiae, quia in hoc casu commodatarius non excessit fines, quia non 
est usus nisi ad usum ilium ad quern initus est contractus, idcirco non tenetur, 
ff. Commod., 1. si ut certo, sed interdum. In mandate autem, licet praescirc 
potuerit quod perdere verisimiliter potuerit, tamen sciebat actionem mandati 
sibi competere, quia illud evenit ex natura contractus. Et haec semper proce- 
dunt, nisi ex pacto special! aliud sit inductum. 



icp. xr.] An conductor teneatur locatori equos et arma in bello deperdita resarcire? 

Tertio quaeritur quid de locante equos et arma ? numquid, si perdantur 
in bello, aget locator contra conductorem ? Solutio. Die ut supra in commo- 
dante, quia non aget, quia ad hoc conduxit, nee fines excessit, ff. Locat. et con- 
duct., 1. si quis domum. 



DE ACCEDENTIBVS 117 

A n provocans contra spoliatorem provocati ad bellum accedentis agat vi C Ca P- ilv -] 

bonorum raptorum ? 

Quarto quaeritur, quid si provocatus ad bellum, in itinere accedendo ad 
eius subsidium, spolietur armis, et equis, et aliis rebus suis ? Dictum est quod 
mandans tenetur mandatario, sed numquid aget mandans contra spoliantem 
vi bonorum raptorum, vel furti ? Apparet quod sic, quia eius interest, quia 
tenetur actione mandati mandatario. Solutio. Ei contra spoliantem non com- 
petunt actiones illae. Et est ratio, quia vi bonorum raptorum competit illi in 
cuius bonis erant rapta, ff. Vi bon. rapt., 1. ii, hac actione. Actio enim vi 
bonorum raptorum, vel furti non competit nisi illi qui habuit dominium, vel 
possessionem, vel detentationem, vel aliquod ius in re, ut est ille cui obligata 
erat res pignori, et nondum tradita, ff. De prescript, verb., 1. s*i gratuitam, 
si quis ; ff. De furt., 1. si is qui rent, et 1. is cui. Spoliatis, ergo, competunt hse 
actiones, poterunt tamen agere actione mandati contra mandantem, et man- 
dans, cum solvent, facere sibi cedi actiones contra spoliantem, et tune aget 
iure cesso, ut procurator constitutus in rem suam, C. Mand., 1. paen., et 1. fin. 
Hoc etiam tenet Innocentius in praeallegato capitulo, sicut, De iureiurando. 

An non vocati ad bellum, sed proprio motu accedentes, obligent sibi ilium in [Cap. xivi.] 

cuius servitium vadunt ? 

Quinto quaeritur de accedentibus non provocatis, sed motu proprio. 
Solutio. Si animo donandi, est clarum, ut puta pietatis, humanitatis, vel 
parentelae. Tales non agent, xxiii, q. iii, non [inferenda] in inferenda; xi, 
q. iii, si dominus, et cap. lulianus. Si autem animo obligandi eum cuius 
negotia gerunt, tune agent actione negotiorum gestorum, et sufncit utiliter 
coeptum, ff. De neg. gest., 1. sed an ultra. 



An non vocati ad bellum, sed proprio motu accedentes et utiliter proficiscentes, [Cap. 
obligent sibi ilium, etiam renitentem et contradicentem, in 

cuius servitium vadunt ? 

Sexto quaeritur quid de accedentibus proprio motu, contradicentibus 
tamen illis in quorum subsidium vadunt, numquid tales agent si utiliter inci- 
piant, et feliciter impleant, ut magis procedat quaestio ? Apparet quod sic, 
ad similitudinem illius qui trahit aliquem invitum de domo ruitura, xxiii, q. iv, 
ipsa pietas. Etiam quia invito concedi potest beneficium, xlv dist., et qui 
emendat. Etiam quia videtur fuisse insanae mentis contradicendo ne iuvetur, 
ff. De condi. instit., 1. quidam ; De Pcenitentia, dist. iii, adhuc instant; sic tenet 
glossa in medico medicante alicui contra voluntatem suam. Hoc notat Ixxxiii 
dist., in summa. Contrarium credo in casu proposito per 1. ult., C. De neg. 
gest. ; nee propterea reprobo glossam, immo credo, quod verum dicat in infirmo 
et medico, quia infirmus praesumitur insanae mentis, cum non vult absolute 
curari. Sed iste qui contradicit huic, ne veniat ad bellum pro succursu suo, non 
pnesumitur insanae mentis, nam possibile est quod non conndit de eo, et 



n8 DE IVRE BELLI 

dubitat ne prodat ipsum. Nee credo quod glossa procedat in casu in quo 
infirmus bene vellet sanari, sed nollet istum, immo potius alium, tune iudicio 
meo non procederet glossa, nee hoc probant allegata supra. Hoc de accedenti- 
bus libere. 

[Cp.i>iii] De accedentibus quia tenentur ad antidora, an tales agant contra ilium 

quern iuvant ? 

Restat videre quid de his qui vadunt quia tenentur ad antidora, ut puta 
quia simile, vel aliud, subsidium recepit ab eo. Numquid tab's aget contra 
ilium quem iuvat ad deperdita, ut supra ? Solutio. Si sic vadit, ut thema 
supponit, vadit animo dissolvendae obligationis naturalis, quae tamen non potest 
deduci in civilem, nee de ea excipi potest in iudicio. De qua ff. De petit, 
haered., 1. sed si lege, consuluit ; De testamentis, cum in officiis. Et sic infertur 
quod vadat non animo obligandi, cum idem actus uniformiter sumptus non 
possit parere contraries effectus, ff. De verbor. obh'gat., 1. si quis ; ff. De 
condict. indebiti, 1. cum pars, heres, et 1. cum heres. Et si dicas hie non 
est opus dissolutione, quia nulla nata obligatio efficax ad agendum, vel excipien- 
dum, et sic non potest dissolvi, quod non est, ff. De iniusto, rupto, irrito facto 
testam., 1. nam; idem quod De desponsatione impuberum, cap. ad dissolvendum. 
Solutio. Licet non sit nata obligatio efficax ad agendum vel excipiendum, ut 
supra dictum est, tamen nata est talis naturalis quae dissolvi potest per antidoti 
recompensationem, ut iuribus statim allegatis, et iste animus dissolvendi 
impedit nativitatem obligationis, cum in obligatione requiratur animus, ut 
1. obligationum, ff. De oblig. et act., et 1. nonfigura, eodem titulo. 



(Cap. xifcj D C accedentibus propter gloriam consequent} aw. 

Restat videre de accedentibus propter gloriam consequendam in bello. 

An tales obligent sibi ilium in cuius subsidium vadunt ? 

An tales obligent sibi ilium ad cuius succursum accedunt. Solutio. Si 
ob hoc solum accedunt, non obligant, nam aut dominus teneretur actione man- 
dati, aut neg. gestorum. Non mandati, cum nullum intervenerit mandatum, 
ut supponitur in themate quaestionis propositse, nee actio mandati oritur nisi 
intercedentc mandate, nam h'cet aliqui dicant quod actio mandati oriatur ex 
culpa vel dolo intervenientibus, iam suscepto mandate, tamen requiritur prae- 
cedentia mandati, ut I. i, ff. Mandati. Vel si dicas quod oriatur ex contractu 
praecedenti, quod verius, sicut alias dicimus in contractibus innominatis, ut I. ex 
placito, [ff.] C. De rerum permutatione. Non negotii gesti, quia non accessit 
animo gerendi negotia illius, immo propria, licet in vim consequential alterius 
negotia gerat, et sic nee ilia competet. 



DE CLERICIS 119 

De accedentibus quid locant operas suas. tcp. i.] 

Restat videre de his qui locant operas suas, vel verius assumuntur per 
electionem, constitute salario. 

An tales agant contra conductor es ? 

An locatores agant contra conducentes ? Solutio. Tales locant operas 
et rem, et ideo si conductor utatur solum ad id ad quod conducuntur, non 
tenetur, ut 1. si quis domum, ff. Locati et conducti ; et hoc nisi aliud speciale 
pactum interveniat, vel consuetude aliud inducat, ut est in Italia, scilicet, quod 
prsestantur emendae equorum deperditorum in servitio conducentis, alias stat 
regula, ut supra deductum est. 



De accedentibus animo spoliandi. An talibus competat actio P [Cap. 11.] 

Restat etiam videre de his qui accedunt animo derobandi, et de his non 
est dubium quod talibus non competit actio, cum super re turpi nulla inducatur 
obligatio, ff. De verbor. obligation., 1. veluti, et 1. generaliter ; et* 1. siexplagis, 



An clerici ad bellum accedere possint ? [Ca 

Vlterius est videndum quid de clericis, an, scilicet, possint ad bella acce- 
dere ? Hanc quaestionem terminavit Gratianus, xxiii, q. viii, convenior ; ut 
glossa ibi recitat in summa. Circa hoc fuerunt opiniones variae, nam aliqui 
dicunt quod clerici possunt uti armis defensionis, non autem impugnationis, et 
sic bellare propter defensam. Alii quod omnibus armis, dummodo impug- 
nent in continenti, et pro seipsis tantum defendendis, et non pro aliis, et pro se 
in necessitate inevitabili positis, De homicidio, cap. ii ; xxiii, q. viii, convenior ; 
et eadem causa et q. i, in principio. Si autem alias evadere possunt, tune non 
possunt, ut cap. suscepimus, De homicidio. Alii dicunt quod auctoritate 
Papse possunt, alias non. Gandulphus tenet quod personaliter bellare non 
possunt, sed per alios possunt. Idem videtur sentire Gratianus, xxiii, q. i, 
in registro. 

Concludendo in hoc puncto, clerici vocati a Papa possunt accedere, nam 
penes Principem est auctoritas bellandi, xxiii, q. i, quid culpatur ; eadem 
causa et q. ii, cap. i, et q. iii, cap. Maximianus. In bello autem eis non 
est licitum occidere etiam paganum propter metum irregularitatis, possunt 
tamen alios confortare ad bellum, ut pugnent, immo et lapides et alia 
proicere, dummodo ex eorum ictibus nulli occidantur. Ita notat Inno- 
centius, De restit. spol., olim ; et cap. sententiam, Ne cler. vel monachi. Vocati 
ab aliis, maxime principibus sascularibus, bellare non debent. Pro defensa 
autem propria, ubi aliter evadere non possunt, licitum est etiam occidere, 
etiam sine metu irregularitatis, ut in Clem., si furiosus, De homicidio. Et 

* Supplendum 'Ad legem Aquiliam,'. 



120 DE IVRE BELLI 

bene dice defensa propriae persons, secus si defendat alium etiam in continent!, 
ut patrem, fratrem, et similes personas. Nee huic obstat quod notat Innocentius, 
in cap. s vero, i, De sent, excom. ; ubi tenet quod percutiens clericum hoc 
casu non est excommunicatus. Nam irregularitas contrahitur etiam sine 
culpa, ut in iudice iuste occidente, li dist., cap. i ; et nota in cap. inter opera, 
De sponsalibus. Excommunicatio autem non contrahitur sine culpa, immo 
oportet quod praecedat diabolica persuasio, xvii, q. iv, si quis suadente ; ita 
notat Clem., in dicto cap., sifuriosus. 

An autem imputari possit clerico qui non fugit, sed exspectat invasorem 
et ipsum se defendendo interficit ? Videtur quod imputari debeat, per textum 
illius dementis, cum dicit, " qui mortem aliter vitare non poterat " ; proba- 
tur per 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter, ff. Ad leg. Aquil. ; unde sumpta est p) 
dicta dementis. Et hoc ad exemplum Salvatoris, qui fugit in ^Egyptum, 
xxiii, q. iii, i. Et hoc notat Bernardus in cap. suscepimus, De homicidio. 

Contrarium credo per 1. in eadem, ff. Ex quibus causis maiores ; nam 
ibi aequiparantur haec duo, non posse recedere, et sine dedecore non posse. 
Fortius movet, quia in fuga posset occurrere periculum, utpote si caderet, quod 
frequenter occurrit in fuga, unde non debet se tali periculo exponere, Vt lite 
non contestata, accedens, ii. In hoc tamen credo ponderandas singulas cir- 
cumstantias, utpote periculum fugae, qualitatem personae fugientis, et inva- 
dentis, ut si propter fugam verisimiliter mortis periculum incideret, tune non 
sit imputandum, alias sic. 

An stipendiarii in Alamannia assumpti, constitute salario per conduccntcm, 
agant contra eum qui, dum veniunt, etc. ? 

Quid si stipendiarii sunt assumpti, constitute salario habentes nrmam per 
vi menses, de Alamannia, ut veniant ad serviendum Itah'co, et, dum veniunt, 
Italicus pcrdit statum suum totaliter, numquid stipendiarii agent ad salarium ? 



[Cp. iiii.j An stipendiarii assumpti de Alamannia per civitatem Italicam, salario 

constituto per annum, qui dum venirent, ciritas tyrannicc 
occupata cst, agant ad salarium totum, etc. ? 

Quid si stipendiarii sunt assumpti de Alamannia per civitatem Italicam, 
constituto salario. habentes nrmam per annum, et interim dum sunt in itinere 
veniendi, civitas occupatur per tyrannum violenter, numquid agent stipm- 
diarii ad salarium totum, aut pro rata, vel ad quid ? Et videtur quod ad 
totum, et videntur textus hoc probare, C. De annonis [et protocolis] m , 1. i ; 
C. De agent, in rebus, 1. matriculant ; C. De prox. sacr. scrinior., 1. si quis in 
sacris ; C. De primipilo, 1. i ; ff. De legat., 1. legatum ; ff. De var. et extra, 
cognitionibus, 1. i, divus. 

In contrarium, quod pro rata, videntur textus, C. De erog. milit. annon. ; 
1. his scholaribus, et 1. p. in fin. ; et 1. post duos, C. De advoc. divers, iudiciorum. 



DE STIPENDIARIIS 121 

Solutio. Hie non debetur pecunia ex contractu puro, immo debetur ex 
dispositione legis, quia sunt elect! ad officium, et ex dispositione legis munici- 
palis datur salarium. Sic ergo non est mere contractus locati et conducti. Et 
in talibus est attendendum quod aliquando aliqui eliguntur ad officium quod 
requirit laborem, ubi datur salarium pro labore principaliter, ut sunt stipen- 
diarii. Aliquando eliguntur ad officium ubi datur salarium non solum pro 
labore sed quia attenditur probitas intellectus et scientiae, ut est in potesta- 
tibus et similibus. Quandoque eliguntur ad officium, et datur salarium pro 
utroque, scilicet, et pro labore, et pro probitate intellectus et scientiae, ut in 
legatis. 

Primo casu, datur pro rata temporis quo serviunt, ut 1. paen., C. De erog. 
milit. annonae. Secundo casu, si una prsestatio tantum erat, tune totum 
datur, ut 11. allegatis in contrarium. Si autem non erat una praestatio, habere 
debet pro anno quo incepit officium, ut 1. post duos, C. De advoc. divers, 
iudiciorum. 

Tertio casu, aliquando datum in remunerationem laboris et prudentise est 
indivisibile, ut in advocatis, doctoribus, et legatis, et tune datum totum, ut 
supra. Aliquando est divisibile, ut in contestabili banderiae, nam ibi uterque 
eligitur, scilicet, industria et labor, et recipiunt divisionem tune, ut stipendiarii 
recipient pro rata, ut industries! et ratione industries electi habent totum, 
distinguendo, ut supra. 

Est dare quartum casum, ubi quis eligitur ad dignitatem principaliter, 
ut domesticus Principis. Tune habet totum, ut 1. si quis in sacris, C. De proxi. 
sacr. scri. ; et 1. matriculant, C. De agent, in rebus ; et 1. i, De principibus. 
Et transit salarium ad haeredes, C. De domesti. et protect., 1. fin., lib. xii. 
Per hoc solvitur quaestio de Comite Lando, capitaneo societatis latrunculorum, 
assumpto pluries per dominos Italicos ad stipendium, facta firma certi tem- 
poris, et constitute salario. 



An in principio vel in fine cuiuslibet mensis solvi debeat stipendiariis ? tcap. HVJ 

Vlterius quaeritur quando debeat solvi stipendiariis, an in principio 
cuiuslibet mensis an in fine. Glossae aliquse videntur in advocate qui etiam 
militat, ut 1. advocati, C. De advoc. divers, iudicio., quod debeatur a prin- 
cipio. Hoc tenet in 1. i, divus, ff. De extraordin. cognitionibus. Idem sentit 
in 1. properandum, in honorariis, C. De iudiciis ; et 1. qui operas, i, ff. Locat. 
et conducti. Contrarium tenet in 1. i, C. De principibus, lib. xii. Solutio. 
Aliquando datur pecunia magis pro sumptibus quam pro mercede laboris, 
et tune debetur in principio. Tolle exemplum in legatis, probatur hoc, ff. 
De legationibus, 1. legatum; ff. Hand., 1. si vero non remunerandi, si 
[mandalo] mandavero ; C. De legationibus, 1. ii, lib. x. Aliquando debetur 
pecunia pro mercede laboris, et tune ponderari debet quid actum sit expresse 
vel tacite, nam si tacite actum sit, tune videtur quod in principio. Ecce talis 



122 DE IVRE BELLI 

est qui non potest exhibere operas promissas nisi sibi detur pecunia, tune 
videtur actum tacite quod debcatur in principio, tune cnim semper inspicimus 
quod vcrisimilius est, ff. De regul. iur., 1. semper in stipulationibus. Si autrm 
non apparet ista verisimilitudo, tune ex obligationibus quae descendunt ex 
contractu salarium debetur in fine temporis, ut notandum in 1. eadem, C. Locat. 
et conduct. ; et notanda ff. De stip. servorum, 1. si servus communis Mavii, 
finalis. Si autem debeatur ex dispositione legis electis ad officia, de quibus 
supra, ut in proposito, tune, si est unum tantum salarium, tune in initio debet 
praestari, ut 1. i, divus, ff. De var. et extraor. cognitionibus. Et si intelliguntur 
glossae hoc sentientes, aut est annuum vel menstruum, ut in stipendiary's de 
quibus loquimur, qui habent vii florenos in mense proposita, et tune debetur 
in principio, ut 1. post duos, C. De advoc. diver, iudic. ; et 1. i, C. De principibus, 
lib. xii. Puto tamen quod stipendiarii non habeant effectualiter nisi pro rata 
temporis quo serviunt, ut supra deductum est, et residuum teneantur restituere, 
etiam ubi per casum extrinsecum insurgat impedimentum. 



[Cap. IT.) An stipendiarii, se absentantes tempore aliquo, etiam de licentia domini, 

perdant salarium pro tempore illo ? 

Quid si stipendiarii pendente tempore stipendii recedunt aliquo tempore, 
numquid pro illo tempore perdent stipendium, et pone quod cum licentia 
domini ? Solutio. Hie advertendum quod operae aliquando limitantur re- 
spectu temporis non certificati. Tolle in advocatis ecclesiae, qui habent tan- 
tum salarium pro qualibet causa qua occurret ecclesiae illo anno, et tune non est 
dubium quod est una obligatio propter unum factum ad quod inducitur, licet 
praestationes possint esse plures. Idcirco totum debetur, ut praeallegata, 1. i, 
divus, ff. De extraor. cognitionibus. Aliquando operae sunt limitatae re- 
spectu certificati et certi temporis, ut in doctore assumpto ad legendum librum 
certum, tempore certo. Et tune aut promittitur totum salarium simul, sed fit 
distributio solutionis per partes temporis, et tune etiam una obligatio, ut supra, 
ut 1. lecta., ff. De rebus creditis. Aliquando fit annua vel menstrua, et tune 
sunt tot obligationes quot menses, ut 1. post duos, et tune non habet pro toto 
tempore, immo singulis mensibus quibus servit cedunt dies obligationum 
singularum. 

(Cap. M.J An stipendiarii, qui culpa sua nolunt servire toto tempore firmce sua, perdant 
stipendium totius temporis, aut pro eo tantum quo non servierunt ? 

Quid si culpa sua nolunt servire toto tempore, an perdent salarium totius 
temporis, sic quod nihil habeant etiam pro tempore quo servierunt, an solum 
perdere debeant pro tempore quo non serviunt ? Solutio. Quaedam sunt 
officia, ad quae quis eligitur, quae sic sunt individua quod aliquo omisso resi- 
duum nihil relevat, et in talibus totum perditur. Tolle exemplum in legatis, 



DE SPOLIIS ET CAPTIVIS 123 

ut C. De legationibus, 1. ii. Quaedam sunt officia quse sunt quoad hoc sic 
dividua, quod aliquo omisso residuum relevat. Tolle exemplum in potestate 
in stipendiario. Tune non reddit totum, sed solum pro tempore future, tenetur 
tamen pro future tempore ad interesse, ut si nihil intersit, nihil solvat, ff. 
Locat. et conduct., 1. si fundus, versiculus [verisimilis] similiter ; et not. in 
1. Mavia, ff. De annu. legatis. 



An stipendiarius possit servire per substitutum ? [Cap. MI.] 

Quid si velit servire per substitutum ? Apparet quod non possit, quia 
electa industria personae, ut 1. inter artifices, ff. De solut. ; 1. una, C. De caduc. 
tollend. ; et cap. ult., De offic. delegat., et cap. is cui, eod. tit., Lib. VI. In con- 
trarium videtur, quia potest quis per alium quod per se, ut regula potest quis, 
cum similibus. Solutio. Debet ponderari modus assumptionis, nam ali- 
quando dominus vel civitas assumit contestabilem, cui dat banderiam et sti- 
pendium, et contestabilis debet sibi eligere sub banderia quos voluerit, et tune 
non currit quaestio inter civitatem et stipendiarios, quia civitas nihil eligat nisi 
industriam et laborem contestabilis, ipsi tamen tenentur. Aliquando civitas 
eligit sibi stipendiarios quos reponit sub singulis banderiis, et tune in contesta- 
bili eligitur industria et opera. Ex capite industriae non posset dare substitu- 
tum, ut iuribus statim allegatis. In stipendiariis eligitur tantum opera et labor, 
tune in his quorum opera eligitur, et non industria, potest quis dare substitu- 
tum, ut notat Innocentius, in cap. cum Bertholdus, De re iudicata. Hostiensis 
ibi contrarium. Credo opinionem Innocentii veriorem, ponderatis iuribus 
statim allegatis, et eorum mente. Tutius tamen est quod fiat cum consensu 
domini, ut salvetur utriusque opinio. 



An stipendiarius perdat stipendium tempore quo infirmatur ? [Cap. h-m 

Quid si stipendiarius infirmetur ? Solutio. Servire videtur, ut debeatur 
salarium, ut 1. si heres, Stichus ro , ff . De statuliberis. 



De spoliis et capturis quce sunt in bello. An aliquis capiens in bello efficiatur [Cap. i 
dominus personce captce et rei, et an sit locus postliminio ? 

Quinto videndum restat de spoliis et capturis quae in bello fiunt. 

Et primo quaeritur, an in bello aliquid capiens efficiatur dominus personae 
captae et rei, et an sit locus postliminio ? Solutio. In bello publico, auctori- 
tate Principis inducto, de quo supra dictum est, haec omnia procedunt, nam 
capiens efficitur dominus, capti efficiuntur servi, ut 1. hastes, ff. De captivis ; et 
1. hostes, ff . De verb, significatione. Si autem bellum non sit ex edicto Principis, 
licet alias iustum, ut cum sit pro defensa rerum suarum, tune si ille qui bellum 
indicit habet iurisdictionem super eo pro quo bellum indicit, potest statuere 
8 



124 DE IVRE BELLI 

quod quilibet capiens aliquid in bello illo efficiatur dominus rerum captarum, et 
personam detineat donee praesentet superior!. Ita tenet Innocentius in cap. 
SICK/, De iureiurando, remittens super hoc ad notam in cap. a nobis, De sent, 
excommunicationis. Subdit Innocentius quod, si non fecerit aliquam consti- 
tutionem, poterit ilium damnare de invasione facta infra fines suae iurisdic- 
tionis, ut in Authent., qua in provincia, C. Vbi de crim. agi oporteat. Subdit 
quod, si bellum indicens nullam habet iurisdictionem, sed solum defendit se et 
bona sua, tune non b'cet sibi invasorem suum capere, et captum detinere, quia 
solum licet sibi se defendere, tamen cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae, C. 
Vnde vi, 1. i ; De restit. spoliat., olim. Subdit quod, si invadat res invasoris 
sui, quod invasori non competit vi bonorum raptorum, nee iniuriarum, quia 
obstat exceptio pans criminis. Haec omnia, ut dixi, notat Innocentius in cap. 
sicut, De iureiurando. Primum dictum Innocentii puto verum indistincte, 
quia dominus propter delictum per constitutionem suam potest quem privare 
dominio rei suae et in alium transferre. Secundum autem dictum non credo 
verum indistincte. Immo credo quod, si civitas non recognoscens superiorem 
de facto indicat bellum alii, etiam non recognoscenti, et sic quaslibet sit hostis 
populi Romani, quod, sine aliqua constitutione, ibi vindicet locum quod in 
bello indicto ex edicto Principis, nam hoc evenit ex iure gentium antiquis 
moribus introducto, salvo quam de personis, quia modernis temporibus non 
procedit quod capti in bellis istis emciantur servi nee vendantur, nee in talibus 
locus est hodie postliminio. Tertium dictum legendo, illam decretalem ali- 
quando reprobavi per rationem illam. Nam spoliatus ante omnia est resti- 
tuendus, nee opponi potest exceptio criminis, ut in cap. in literis, et cap. item 
cum quis, De restit. spoliatorum. Non ergo excipiet primus spoliatus de 
crimine, nee de alio etiam maiori. Nunc scribendo credo salvari posse glossam 
Innocentii duobus modis. Primo, quia non loquitur Innocentius in casu in 
quo spoliatus ultimus intentat interdictum Vnde vi, immo loquitur in casu 
in quo intentat Vi bonorum raptorum, vel Iniuriarum, quae, ut claret, multum 
differunt. Vel die quod Innocentius non intelligit quod opponatur exceptio 
criminis in modum criminis, sed in modum alterius spoliationis, de qua excipi 
potest contra agentem etiam interdicto Recuperandae, ut repellatur exceptione 
spoliationis, ut probat textus in cap. super spoliation* , De ordine cognitionum. 



[Cap. u.) An capti in bello duarum civitatum efficiantur servi, et dominium 

eorum quaratur ? 

An in istis bellis quae facit una civitas contra aliam possint dici hostes, 
ut servi efficiantur capti, et dominium eorum quaeratur ? Apparet quod 
non, ut 1. si quis ingenuam, in fin., ff. De captivis. In contrarium videtur, 
nam quaelibet civitas per se facit populum, et sic videtur quod sint hostes, sicut 
populus Christianus et Saracenus. Solutio. Quando est contentio inter duas 
civitates quae sunt sub eodem domino, non est locus captivitati et postliminio, 



DE INSIDIIS 125 

ut 1. si quis ingenuam, ff. De captivis. Sed quando est contentio inter duas 
civitates quae non recognoscunt superiorem, et pono, ut tollatur omne dubium, 
quod quaelibet sit hostis Imperil, quia rebellis, tune iure gentium, antiquis mori- 
bus introducto, est locus captivitati et iuri postliminii, sed secundum mores 
moderni temporis, et consuetudines antiquitus observatas inter Christianos, 
quantum ad personas non servatur postliminium, nee venduntur personae, nee 
servae efficiuntur. 



An capta in hello ejficiantur capientiitm ? [Cap. i 

An capta in bello efficiantur capientium ? Et videtur quod sic, per 1. 
si quid in bello, ff. De captivis. Contrarium videtur probare 1. si captivus, eod. 
titulo. Solutio. Lex si quid in bello loquitur in rebus mobilibus, cfontraria de 
immobilibus, sed opponitur, scilicet, quod mobilia publicentur, ut cap. dicat, 
xxiii, q. v. Solutio. Dico quod efficiuntur capientis, sed tenetur ea assignare 
duci belli, qui distribuet secundum merita. Et haec vindicant sibi locum in his 
in quibus non habet locum postliminium, ut 1. ii, ff. De captivis. 



An in bellis sit licitum insidiari ? [cp- '') 

Vlterius quaeritur, an in bellis sit licitum uti insidiis ad victoriam con- 
sequendam. Videtur quod sic, nam inquit Augustinus in libro Quaestionum, 
" Cum bellum iustum suscipitur, utrum aperte pugnet quis, an insidiis, nihil 
ad iustitiam interest." Hoc probatur per id quod habetur losuae viii capitulo. 
In contrarium videtur, nam scribitur Deuteronomii xvi, " Quod iustum est 
iuste exsequeris." Sed per insidias exsequi est iniuste exsequi, cum sapiat 
dolum, et taliter agitata per actionem de dolo rescinduntur, ut ff. De dolo ; C. 
eod. tit., per totum. Praeterea insidias repugnant felicitati, et rumpunt fidem 
quae servanda est etiam hosti, ut Augustinus ad Bonifacium, et transumptum 
in capitulo, xxiii, q. i, noli ; xxxiii, q. v, quod, Deo pan consensu. Praeterea scri- 
bitur Matthaei vii cap., " Quse vultis ut faciant vobis homines, vos eisdem 
facite," et in principle Decretorum. Et hoc observandum ad omnes proximos. 
Cum igitur nullus vellet insidias sibi fieri, ergo nee aliis facere debet. Solutio. 
Hie attendendum est quod proprie insidiae dicuntur, quae tendunt ad fallen- 
dum aliquem, sed dupliciter contingit aliquem falli, verbo, vel facto, alterius. 
Vno modo, si dicatur falsum, ut decipiatur, vel ut aliquid promissum non 
attendatur, et tune sic utendo insidiis semper est illicitum, nam inter hostes 
sunt quaedam fcedera quae servanda sunt, ut inquit Ambrosius in libro De 
Officiis. Alio modo potest falli, dicto vel facto nostro, quia non aperimus 
sibi propositum nostrum nee secreta nostra. Et hoc modo licet fallere, nam 
nee semper secreta Sacrae Scriptura sunt pandenda, ne irrideant, iuxta illud 
Matthaei [x] vii cap., " Nolite sanctum dare canibus." Immo hoc est praecipuum 
mandatum inter militaria documenta, ut secreta non revelentur hostibus, et 
sic etiam determinat Beatus Thomas, Secunda Secundse, quaestione xl ; et glos., 



126 DE IVRE BELLI 

xxiii, q. tf, cap. dominus, dicit indistincte, uti posse, dummodo non rumpamus 
fidem, ut cap. noli, eadem causa, et q. i. Hoc idem tenet glossa in cap. utilem, 
xxii, q. ii ; allegat canon, in mandatis, xliii dist. ; ff. De captivis, 1. nihil interest ; 
C. De commerc., 1. ii ; xiv, q. v, dixit ; De consecra., dist. ii, dixit dominus. 



[cp. Mil.] Ah infestis licitum sit bellare ? 

Consequenter quaeritur, an in festis sit bellandum ? Et videtur quod non, 
nam festa sunt inducta ut quis vacet divinis, De consecra., dist. ii, pronun- 
tiandum ; De feriis, cap. ult. ; C. eod. tit., 1. dies, et 1. ultima, et probatur 
Exodi xx capitulo. Praeterea Isaiae Iviii cap., reprehenduntur qui in diebus 
iciunii repetunt debita, et committunt lites, pugno percutientes. Multo magis 
igitur in festis bellantes sunt reprehendendi. Praeterea nihil inordinate agen- 
dum est ad vitandum temporale incommodum. Ergo. Praeterea videtur 
text, in cap. i, De treug. et pace. 

In contrarium videtur, nam legitur primo Maccabaeorum ii cap., " Cogi- 
taverunt laudabiliter dicentes, omnis homo qui venit ad nos in die belli, in die 
Sabbatorum pugnemus adversus eum." Solutio. Beatus Thomas, Secunda 
Secundae, tjuaestione xl, tenet quod in festis bellari possit, necessitate urgente, 
ipsa autem cessante, cessandum est, quod probat per id quod habetur lohannis 
vii cap., " Mihi indignamini, qui totum hominem sanavi in Sabbato ? " Et 
sic infert medicos medicari posse propter salutem privatam hominis, multo 
magis autem procuranda est utilitas publica. Goffredus et Hostiensis, in cap. 
i, De treug. et pace, dicunt quod die lovis non est bellandum, quia Dominus 
ilia die ascendit ad coelos, et ccenam fecit cum discipulis, De consecra., dist. i, 
porro; et De consecra., dist. [ii] iii, literis. Die Veneris non, propter reveren- 
tiam passionis Domini ; die Sabbati non, quia discipuli ea die latitaverunt 
propter metum ludaeorum, et quia corpus Domini latuit in sepulchre, De 
consecra., dist. iii, Sabbato. Die Dominico non, quia fere omne insigne fecit 
Dominus ilia die, Ixxv dist., quod die, et propter reverentiam resurrectionis. 
Credo ponderandam necessitatem urgentem, ut supra tactum est. Textus 
Nicolai Papae est in cap. si nulla, xxiii, q. viii. 



rcp. iiir.) An consecutus in bello totum suum interesse possit iterum adversarium, etc. ? 

Consequenter quaeritur, quid si aliquis in bello consecutus est totum inter- 
esse suum, an iterum possit in iudicio con venire adversarium suum, vel adhuc 
possit bellum indicere contra eum ? Videtur quod iterum convenire possit, 
nam captum in bello est pcena contumaciae, ergo nihilominus agere potest, ff. 
De tab. exhib., 1. locum, paenultima. Item res non est soluta pro debito, 
immo in bello quaesivit dominium, xxiii, q. v, dicat; et q. vii, si de rebus; ff. 
De acquir. rer. dom., 1. naturaliter. Item quia contra contumacem iurari 



DE REBVS ECCLESI^E 127 

potest in infmitum, ff. De rei vind., 1. qui restituere. Glossa in cap. dominus, 
xxiii, q. ii, tenet contrarium, per regulam bona fides, ff . De reg. iuris. 

Ego non credo glossam veram indistincte, immo distingui debet an ab 
eodem, an ab aliis. Si ab eodem, procedat opinio lohannis, si ab aliis, aut 
habentibus causam ab eo, et tune idem, ut C. De evict., 1. emptori ; vel haberet 
regressum contra primum, ut C. De usur. rei iudic., 1. ii, finali. Alias autem 
licitum est pluries idem solvi, ut 1. iii, condemnatio, ff. De tab. exhib. ; et 
Instit., De legat., si res. Sic notat glossa in regula bona fides, ff. De reg. iur. ; 
et ita etiam notat lo. [Fauc.] Fauentinus (?) in dicto cap. dominus. 



An morientes in bello salventur ? , [Cap. i 

An morientes in bello salventur ? Solutio. Morientes in bello Ecclesiae 
pro ipsius defensione consequuntur creleste regnum. Hoc probant duo textus 
specialiter, cap. omni, xxiii, q. viii, et fuit Leonis Papae directum ad regem 
Francorum ; et cap. omnium, xxiii, q. v, et fuit Nicolai directum exercitui Fran- 
corum. Decedentes autem in aliis bellis alias iustis, etiam salvantur, dum- 
modo decedant sine mortali ; si autem in bello illicito, et cum illo solo mortali 
decedant, pereunt, De Pcen., dist. v, fratres. 



An pro rebus et possessionibus ecclesice liceat bello corporali bellare, etc. ? [Cap. i 

An liceat bello corporali defendere possessiones ecclesiae, et super hoc 
convocare milites ? Planum quod sic. Probant textus xxiii, q. iii, cap. Maxi- 
mianus ; xv, q. vi, auctoritatem ; Ixiii dist., Adrianus ; xxiii, q. viii, cap. igitur, 
et cap. hortatu ; et glossa magistra. in capitulo auctoritatem, xv, q. vi. Probat 
textus in cap. dilecto, De sent, excom., Lib. VI. 



An liceat episcopis ad bellum accedere sine licentia Papa? [Cap.bmi.i 

An liceat episcopis ad bellum accedere sine licentia Papse? Dicunt qui- 
dam indistincte quod non, per canones, qui videntur hoc expresse dicere, xxiii, 
q. viii, quo ausu, et cap. si vobis, et cap. si quis episcopus. Licet ilia capitula 
habeant varies intellectus, tamen hoc credo verum, si vocentur, vel sponte ad 
bella aliena, maxime saecularia, accedant, secus si defendant iura sua. 



An prtzlati pro temporalibus qua tenent ab Imperatore, etc.? [Cap. i*viiy 

An praelati pro temporalibus quse tenent ab Imperatore teneantur solvere 
tributum pro bellis ab eo indictis ? Et dicendum quod sic, ut probatur xxiii, 
q. viii, si, ecce, cum duobus sequentibus, usque ad quamvis. 



128 DE IVRE BELLI 

[Cap. iiu.i An cap/is in hello iusto sit miscrandum ? 

An captis in bello iusto sit miserandum ? Dicendum quod sic, nisi par- 
cendo timeatur perturbatio pacis. Probatur in cap. noli, xxiii, q. i, in fin., et 
per illud capitulum expositum, nt intelligebat Hugolinus, fuit amputatum 
caput Conradino. 

(Cap.iM.] An Ecclesia debeat indicere bellum contra ludcsos? 

An Ecclesia bellum debeat indicere contra ludaeos ? Dicendum quod 
non, cum ubique parati sint servire, nee persequantur Christianos. Secus de 
Saracenis, qui Christianos persequuntur. Hie est textus xxiii, q. viii, dispar, 
et ibi notat glossa quod nee etiam Saracenis forent indicenda, nisi Christianos 
persequerentur. 

[cp. ixxL] An degentes in bello qui pugnare non possunt, etc.? 

An degentes in bello, qui pugnare non possunt, gaudeant immunitatibus 
bellantium ? Et die quod sic, dummodo alias consilio sint utiles, ut nota in cap. 
ex multa, De voto. 

icap. Uiii.] An liceat prtelatis ratione temporalis iurisdictionis, etc.? 

An liceat praelatis ratione temporalis iurisdictionis bella indicere, et eis 
interesse, et alios hortari ad prcelium ? Et die quod sic, ut notat Innocentius 
in cap. quod in dubiis, De prenis. 



An liceat prcelato pro iniuria subditi, etc.? 

An liceat praelato pro iniuria subditi sui, de qua non fit iustitia, bellum 
indicere, et alios quam iniuriantes in bello capere ? Et die quod sic, ut notat 
Innocentius in cap. dilectis, De appellat. ; et cap. sicut, De iureiurando. 



icp. buir.) An delegatus Papa possit bellum indicere? 

Hoc est dicere, an possit invocare brachium saeculare ? Quaestio est vul- 
gata, et tractatur in cap. significasti, De offic. deleg., per Innocentium. 



icp. LOT.] An bella indicia per Ecclesiam contra excommunicatos sint meritoria? 

An bella quae indicit Ecclesia contra excommunicatos sint meritoria ? Et 
dicendum quod sic, et in illis licitum est praelatis ct singulis hortari alios ad 
pugnandum. Probant textus xxiii, q. v, ad omnium, et cap. sequcnti ; ct q. viii, 
cap. igitur, usque ad ecce; et q. iv, cap. sicut excellentiam. 



DE GENERIBVS BELLORVM CORPORALIVM 129 

Quot sint genera bellorum corporalium ? [Cap. ivi.j 

Consequenter quaeritur, quot sint genera bellorum corporalium, de quibus 
reperitur in iure expressum. Solutio. Septem reperiuntur iure expressa. 

Primum Romanum appellatur, quod fideles contra infideles, et hoc 
iustum est. De haereticis, excommunicamus, ii. Et dicitur Romanum quia 
Roma caput fidei, xxiv, q. i, hcec est fides, et cap. quoniam; De summa Trin., 
cap. paenultima. Et sic potest intelligi 1. hostes, ff. De captivis. 

Secundum, quod fit auctoritate iudicis legitimi, habentis merum imperium 
contra contumaces et rebelles, ut 1. continet, ff. Quod met. causa ; 1. iii et 1. 
iv, ff. De iurisd. omn. iudic. ; C. Ne quis in sua causa, 1. una. Et hi proprie 
non dicuntur hostes, nam quod de suo ad nos pervenit nostrum efficitur. Non 
autem e converse sic intelligitur, 1. v, in pace, ff. De captivis. , 

Tertium dicitur bellum praesumptuosum, quod faciunt iudici inobe- 
dientes, De Pcen., dist. iii, i, ad finem; De maiorit. et obed., cap. si quis 
venerit; ff. De rei vind., 1. qui restituere; ff. Ne vis fiat ei qui in pos. missus, 
1. iii ; C. De sedititiosis, 1. i, in fine. 

Quartum dicitur bellum, quod licitum est quandocunque iuris auctoritate 
concedatur. Et est licitum quoad ilium cui conceditur, ut xxiii, q. ii, cap. si 
dominus ; De sent, excom., si vero i, nee ille; C. Quando lie. unicuique sine 
iudi. se vindicare, 1. i et 1. ii ; et etiam proximi et vicini, ut De sent, excom., 
dilecto, Lib. VI. 

Quintum, illicitum, quoad illos qui hoc faciunt contra iuris auctoritatem, 
ut qui se defendit contra iudicis auctoritatem et iuris, ut De sent, excom., per- 
pendimus, et cap. contingit, et cap. in audientia. 

Sextum, voluntarium, quo utuntur principes saeculares nostri temporis 
sine principis auctoritate. Et hoc iniustum, quia nee sine principis auctoritate 
licet arma portare, C. Vt armor, usus, in rubro et nigro, lib. [xii] xi ; in Authent., 
De man. prin., collat. iii ; in Authent., De armis, collat. vi. Immo contra 
facientes incidunt in legem luliam maiestatis, ff. Ad leg. lul. maiest., 1. iii. 

Septimum dicitur necessarium et licitum, quod faciunt fideles, iuris aucto- 
ritate se defendendo contra ipsos invadentes, nam vim vi repellere licet, ff. 
De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim, cum similibus. De his per Hostiensem, De homi- 
cidio, pro humani, Lib. VI ; per Archidiaconum, in cap. iustum, xxiii, q. ii. 

Ex his infertur quae bella sint licita, et quae illicita. Nam licita dicuntur 
ratione indicentis, illius contra quern, rei, et causae, et iuris permittentis. Illi- 
cita econtra. Causa autem una generaliter iustificat, scilicet, contumacia in- 
iuste resistentis. Cum enim ab eo qui obnoxius est iustitia haberi non potest, 
tune licet bellum indicere, nam in subsidium recurritur ad illud suffragium, 
xxiii, q. i, quid culpatur, et cap. noli; xxiii, q. viii, si nulla ; ff. De usuf., 1. si 
ususfructus. Et de hoc, scilicet quod sit licitum, notatur per Innocentium, De 
resti. spol., cum olim, i ; per Hostiensem, in Summa, De treu. et pace, quid 
si iustum; per Beatum Thomam, in Secunda Secundae, quaestione xl, articulo 
primo, secundo, et tertio ; per ^Egidium, in libro De regimine principum, in 
fine. 



130 DE IVRE BELLI 



V 



tcp.i.ii.) De Bella Particular! quod Jit ob tutelam sui, et est quart us tractatus 

tertii principalis. 

"Iso supra, tertio proximo principal! tractatu, de Bello Vniversali Corpo- 
rali, restat nunc, quarto, videre de Bello Particular! quod fit ob tutelam 
sui, et in ipsius tractatu sic procedam. Nam primo demonstrate, quid sit. 
Secundo, quot sint species eius. Tertio, quo ordine inductum sit. Quarto, 
quibus liceat. Quinto, contra quos. Sexto, pro quibus liceat. Septimo, quali- 
ter liceat. Octavo, quis sit ipsius finis. 

icp.iTiii.j Quid sit Particular e Bettum ? 

Circa primum, cum quaeritur, quid sit bellum ob tutelam sui particulariter 
indictum, dico quod est " contentio exorta propter difforme humano appetitui 
praesentatum ex violentiae particularis illatione proveniens, ad ipsius exclu- 
sionem tendens." Haec probantur mentaliter per textum, 1. id vim, ff. De 
iustit. et iure ; et 1. [qui\ scientiam, qui cum aliter, ff. Ad leg. Aquil. ; et 1. i, 
C. Vnde vi ; et 1. iii, si quis, ff . De vi ; et cap. olim, De resti. spol. Et dixi 
" contentio," nam contentio ponitur pro genere, ut posita est in definitione 
belli generaliter sumpti, ut supra primo tractatu in principio. Secundo dixi 
" exorta propter difforme," etc., et illud ponitur loco differentiae, nam per 
hoc differt a bello universal! et aliis speciebus belli. Tertio dixi " ad ipsius," 
etc. Hoc est causa finalis ipsius belli. 



icap. iio Quot sint species Particularis Belli ? 

Circa secundum, cum quaeritur, quot sint ipsius species, dico quod sunt duae, 
nam quoddam iustum, quoddam iniustum, ut etiam divisi Bellum Vniversale. 
Bellum autem Particulare iustum est duplex, nam quoddam fit propter tutelam 
veri corporis, vel adhaerentium, sive contingentium verum corpus. De hoc 
in praesenti tractatu discutiam. Aliud fit propter tutelam corporis mystici, 
vel partis, ut dicimus in universitate, quae appellatur corpus, et singuli appel- 
lantur membra et partes, ff. Quod cuiuscunque univer., 1. i ; ff. Ad municip., 1. 
quod maior ; ff. De in ius vocand., 1. sed si hac, qui manumittitur ; De excess, 
praelat., 1. cum dilecta, et ibi nota. Si igitur universitas propter defensam 
civis sui ab extraneo oppressi, deficiente iustitia iudicis opprimentis, bellum 
indicat, hoc appellatur " Particulare propter tutelam mystici corporis, sive 
partis," et hoc appellatur " Represalia," de qua in Authent., Vt non fiant 
pignor., per totum ; De iniur., cap. uno, per totum, Lib. VI. Et de hoc bello 
dicetur infra tractatu proximo. Bellum autem iustum, particulare, ob tutelam 
veri corporis indictum, est contentio exorta propter difforme humano appe- 
titui praesentatum, proveniens ex illatione violentiae particularis a privata vel 
publica persona, extra officium iniuste inferente, ad ipsius exclusionem ten- 
dens, cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae, ut haec probantur in 1. i, C. Vnde vi ; 
cum ibi nota. Iniustum autem est ubi praedicta, vel aliquod praedictorum, 
dcfkiunt, ut in [praecedentibus] sequentibus declarabitur. 



DE BELLO PARTICVLARI 131 

Quo iure introductum sit particulare bellum ? [Cap- 

Circa tertium, cum quaeritur, quo iure hoc proveniat, et competat, glossa 
quae est in 1. ut vim, ff. De iustit. et iure, super verbo "iure," dicit "iure 
fori, non iure coeli." Si glossa intelligit quod iure fori proveniat hoc bellum, 
credo quod glossa non dicat verum. Si autem glossa intelligit quod iure fori 
indici possit impune, credo quod glossa dicat verum. In eo autem quod glossa 
dicit " non iure coeli," credo quod glossa dicat falsum. Redeo ad singula, et dico 
quod bellum ob tutelam sui provenit a iure naturali, non autem a iure positive, 
civili vel canonico. Quod hoc sit verum probatur sic. Nam natura pro- 
ductiva cuiuscunque tendit in ipsius conservationem, donee se extendunt vires 
naturalis agentis, et nititur in expulsionem cuiuscunque contrarii, et si secus 
contingat, hoc contingit propter defectum virium naturaliter agentis", et super- 
abundantiam agentium in contrarium. Nequaquam autem hoc contingit ex 
intentione agentis naturalis, productivi et conservativi, immo contra inten- 
tionem, cum semper contrariis resistat, quantum potest. Hoc patet ex sen- 
satis, inducendo per singula naturalia. Nam in elementalibus quae agunt et 
patiuntur adinvicem hoc patet. Nam passum resistit agenti, et reagit in 
ipsum, solum ad finem conservations sui esse, et destructionem agentis in con- 
trarium. Et agens corporale materiale semper agendo repatitur, ut inquit 
Philosophus, iii Physicorum, et secundo De generatione. Hoc patet in istis 
inanimatis, hoc in plantis, nam privata ipsarum natura tendit in conserva- 
tionem ipsarum et vitam, et contrariorum expulsionem, hoc in brutis, et 
quare non sic in rationali creatura hoc contingat, immo fortius cum ipsa 
ceteris sit nobilior, et in ipsam, ut finem, alia ordinentur, ff. De usuris, 1. 
in pecudum (?) . Provenit ergo defensa ex instinctu naturali. Hoc probat tex- 
tus in Clem., pastoralis, ceterum, De sententia et re iudicata. Ibi dicit textus, 
" defensionis quae a iure provenit naturali." Hoc sentire videtur glossa quae est 
in 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter, ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam. Ibi dicit glossa, " iura per- 
mittunt eo ipso quod non prohibent." Hoc probat textus in 1. itaque, ff. Ad leg. 
Aquiliam. Ibi dicit textus, " adversus periculum naturalis ratio defendere per- 
mittit." Conclude igitur ex hoc passu quod hoc bellum, restringendo ad indictum 
ob tutelam corporis sui, provenit ex iure naturali et ipsius instinctu, sed ius 
positivum approbat, vel non prohibet, ut dicit glossa in 1. scientiam, qui cum 
aliter. Nam aliqua provenientia instinctu naturae iura positiva puniunt, ut 
patet in carnali copula ; nam simpliciter coitus provenit ex naturali instinctu, 
sed tamen quosdam coitus damnat lex. Et in hoc ius positivum limitat et 
qualificat actus provenientes a iure naturali. Sic in singulis actibus a natura 
provenientibus, nam naturaliter quis appetit cibum et potum, et tamen lex 
canonica limitat. Nam quosdam cibos certis temporibus inhibet. Verum est 
quod lex positiva etiam qualificat modum defensae, ut patet in 1. i, C. Vnde 
vi ; et patebit per infra notanda. Concluditur igitur hoc provenire a iure 
naturali, sed approbate a iure positive, tam civili quam canonico, et etiam 
qualificato et modificato eodem. Et in hoc forte salvari potest glossa quae 
est in 1. ut vim, ut sic intelligatur, 
[9] 



132 DE IVRE BELLI 

Secundo dicebat glossa, " non hire coeli." Videtur sontirc glossa quod 
iurc divino non pcrmittatur vim vi repellere. Pro hac opinionc glossae videntur 
facere textus, nam scribitur Lucae vi, " Si quis te percusserit in unam maxillam, 
praebe ei et aliam " ; xxiii, q. i, in principio. Scribitur etiam " Si quis angaria- 
verit te mille passus, vade cum eo duo millia," [lohannis vi, et] Matthaei v. 
Scribitur etiam ad Romanos, xii cap., " non vos defendentes, sed date locum 
irae." Christus etiam dixit Petro volenti eum defendere, " Converte gladium 
tuum in vaginam," Matthaei xxvi ; et habentur xxiii, q. i, in principio. Haec 
potuerunt movere glossae ad tenendum quod non liceat iure poli. Sed credo 
quod glossa non dicat verum, quod aperte demonstrari potest. Et primo sic. 
Ille actus est licitus iure divino qui est consonus caritati, sed defensa suiipsius 
est huiusmodi. Ergo. Probatur maior, nam caritate posita, excluditur quilibct 
actus lege divina reprobus, cum ipsa se non compatiatur cum reprobo, cum 
sit ipsa fundamentum cuiuslibet b'citi. Probantur haec De Pcenit., dist. ii, [si\ 
radicata, et cap. caritas est, ui mihi videtur. Et secundum in cap. quia radix, 
distinctione eadem, probatur minor. Nam praecipuus actus caritatis est dili- 
gere proximum sicut seipsum, ut in canonibus proximis, et cap. caritas est, 
proinde, De Pcenit., dist. ii, ergo implicat dilectionem sui, et sui conserva- 
tionem, si sic, ergo defensam. Ergo iure poli licet seipsum defendere. Praeterea 
lege divina licitum est proximum defendere a morte etiam contra voluntatem 
suam. Ergo multo fortius iure divino licet seipsum defendere. Consequentia 
tenet per inducta supra proximo. Probatur antecedens per textus xxiii, q. iv, 
ipsa pietas, et cap. displicet. Praeterea lex divina inhibet quern voluntarie 
tcndere ad destructionem suiipsius. Hoc solum intendo et dico. Hoc solum 
intendo, nam si ordinate tendat in aliud lege divina approbatum, licet illud con- 
sequendo consequenter sequatur destructio, hoc non est inhibitum, utpote quis, 
ut consequatur statum beatitudinis aeternae affligit corpus suum, nulli dubium 
quin afflictio sit corporis destructoria, tamen non tendit in hoc finaliter, sed 
in fugam vitiorum carnalium, et consecutionem status aeterni. Sic etiam dici 
posset de trucidatis voluntarie propter fidem catholicam, nam ipsi non inten- 
dunt finaliter ad destructionem sui corporis, immo defensam fidei, [quam] 
pro qua voluntarie exponunt se morti temporali, quod licet lege divina, sed 
se non defendens a morte, cum potest, se voluntarie occidit et in destructionem 
sui tendit, ergo lege divina inhibitum. Probatur maior, nam lege divina 
damnati reputantur qui sic seipsos occiderunt, ut dicimus de luda, et similibus. 
Probatur minor, nam se non defendens a morte, cum potest, nee subsit aliquis 
de casibus antedictis, nee hoc proveniat ex pusillanimitate, sui mortem appetit, 
et per alium se occidit, et sic perinde ac si per seipsum, iuxta regulam " qui per 
alium," ut regula qui per alium, De reg. iur., Lib. VI. Praeterea lex divina non 
destruit totaliter actus provenientes a iure naturali, sed ipsos modificat et 
refraenat. Hoc patet per singulos discurrendo, nam non penitus inhibet cibum 
et potum, non copulam, nee similia, sed ipsos actus modificat et refraenat, ex- 
tremitates reiciendo, medium approbando, ut etiam lex moralis, ii Ethicorum, 
iii et iv. At si lex divina inhiberet totaliter defensam suiipsius, cum actus ille 



QVIBVS PERSONIS LICET? 133 

proveniat ab instinctu naturae, totaliter destrueret actum naturae, quod est 
absurdum, ut supra. Praeterea lex canonica hoc permittit, ergo divina non 
inhibet. Probatur antecedens per De restit. spol., cap. olim ; et Clem., pasto- 
ralis, ceterum, De re iudic. ; clarius per Clementem, si furiosus, De homi- 
cidio. Consequentia tenet, nam lex canonica subalternatur legi divinae, et sic 
sibi invicem contra dicere non possunt, nam in eundem tendunt finem, licet 
varie. Nam lex canonica tractat de gubernatione monarchiae mundanae, ut 
societas humana conservetur in universe, quod etiam tractat lex civilis, sed 
canonica ulterius tendit, scilicet, disponendo et praeparando ad statum aeternae 
beatitudinis, in quam tendit lex divina, et sic necesse est, indemnitate finis 
attenta, omne inhibitum lege divina fore inhibitum lege canonica. Et sic, 
praetermissis aliis quae infinita possent induci, restat concludendum quod glossa 
non dicat verum, cum dicit jure cceli non permitti defensam suiipsius. 

Ad auctoritates autem in contrarium inductas respondetur, ut respondet 
magister Gratianus, xxiii, q. i, his ita. Respondetur, videlicet, quod intel- 
ligantur de interiori cordis praeparatione, non autem de interiori ostensione 
corporis, nam interius debet humilitatem cordis habere, ut probat Augusti- 
nus in Sermone de puero centurionis, sic inquiens, " Paratus debet esse," etc. 
Vide in cap. paratus, xxiii, q. i. 

Ex his infertur tertium, videlicet, unde insurgat hoc bellum, et quo iure 
permittatur. 



Quibus pcrsonis liceat hoc particulare bellum indiccre ? 

Circa quartum, videlicet, quibus competat et liceat, est videndum. Pro 
cuius evidentia praemitto quod aliud est quaerere quibus competat defensa sui- 
ipsius, et aliud est quaerere quibus competit bellum supra definitum, inductum 
propter defensam. Si quaeramus cui competat defensio, dico quod omnibus 
entibus naturalibus genitis et corruptibilibus. Et dico genitis et corruptibili- 
bus, nam corporibus ccelestibus non competit defensio, propterea quia non 
possunt pati ab aliquo contrario agente, cum ilia corpora non sunt receptiva 
peregrinarum impressionum, ut ait Philosophus, secundo Creli et Mundi, cum 
sint sine materia quae est materia generationis et corruptionis, ut ibidem. Et 
sic non est opus defensa, cum sint impassibilia. Omnibus autem materialibus 
competit ex principiis naturalibus defensio, cum sint passibilia, et provenit ilia 
defensio ex iure naturali, quod est vis quaedam insita rebus, similia de similibus 
procreans. Nam similia procreando conservat seipsam in specie quod fieri 
non potest perpetuo individualiter, et etiam individualiter agendo nititur cor- 
rumpere contrarium sibi resistens et econtra. Et iste est primus modus iuris 
naturalis, de quo glossa in can. ius naturale, i distin. ; et notari consuevit in 1. i, 
ius naturale, ff. De iustit. et iure. Sic ergo sui defensio competit quibus- 
cunque materialibus naturaliter, et provenit ex viribus a natura cuilibet enti 
insitis, ut quilibet posset sensualiter inducere, per singula naturalia discur- 
rendo. Si autem quaeramus quibus competat bellum supra definitum, tune dico 



134 DE IVRE BELLI 

quod solis hominibus, ct non aliis, quod probat definitio belli, quam dixi, " dif- 
forme appetitui humano propositum," etc. Et hie quaerendum an omnibus 
hominibus competat. 

[c*p.taraii.) An clericis competat hoc helium indicere ? 

Et prime quaero an clericis liceat et competat hoc bellum indicere. Quod 
clericis non liceat probatur per cap. suscepimns, De homicidio ; et per can. 
seditionarios, xlvi dist. ; probat textus xxiii, q. viii, cap. i et cap. cum a ludais, 
cum capitibus sequentibus, usque ad cap. his. Ita respondetur. Probatur per 
cap. convenior, eadem causa et quaestione. Quod h'ceat, probatur per cap. 
olim, De restitution, spol. ; et cap. si vcro, et cap. ex tenorc, De sent, excom. ; 
i dist., IMS naturale ; ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim ; ff. De vi, 1. iii, si quis. 
Clarior textus in Clem., sifuriosus, De homicidio. Super hoc fuerunt opiniones 
quas recitat glossa, xxiii, q. i, in summa, et eadem causa ; et q. viii, in summa ; 
nam aliqui dixerunt quod nulli, etiam laico, licet vim vi repellere repercutiendo, 
sed bene impediendo. Hanc opinionem reprobat Clemens, si furiosus, De 
homicidio. Alii, quod laicis licet repercutere, clericis non, et haec eodem morbo 
laborat". Alii dicunt quod, si vis inferatur personae, licitum sit vim repellere, 
etiam repercutiendo, et clericis. Hoc probat Clem., si furiosus, si adsint ilia 
de quibus in dicto Clemente. Si autem rebus inferatur, tune secus. An autem 
hoc secundum sit verum, infra subicietur. Hugo noluit dicere quod in nulla 
necessitate positus, etiam si aliter evadere non possit, non debet alium occidere, 
immo potiusdebet se permittere occidi. Ita notavit in can. dehis, 1 distinctionis. 
Glossa ibi notat contrarium ; et in cap. sicut dignum, De homicidio. In hoc 
non insisto, quoniam, ut dixi, est textus in Clem., si furiosus, De homicidio, et 
si non foret textus super hoc expresse disponens, pro vel contra, hoc esset 
tenendum per rationes quas induxi ad probandum, hoc non esse inhibitum 
lege divina. 

ica p .isiii.l An, elsi clerico liceat se defcndcre etiam occidendo, hoc sibi liceat in ecdcsia? 

Secundo quaero, an, si liceat clerico sc sic defendere, etiam repercutiendo 
et occidendo, an hoc sibi liceat in ecclesia ? Et videtur quod non, nam licet 
lex permittat generaliter certos actus, inhibentur tamen ratione loci, unde gene- 
ralis permissio restringitur per specialem provisionem, ut 1. sanctio Icgum, ff. 
De poenis ; 1. alimenla, basilica, ff . De alim. leg. ; 1. uxorem, felicissimo, ff . 
De legat., iii ; et cap. pastoralis, De rescriptis. Sufficit regula gencri, Lib. 
VI. Quod autem multi actus lege permittantur generaliter, qui tamen specia- 
liter interdicuntur, probat textus in cap. decel, De immun. eccles., Lib. VI; et 
cap. vendentes, i, q. [i] iii. Ergo sic in proposito, et multo fortius, cum per hunc 
actum possit pervenire ad pollutionem ecclesiae, ut cap. proposuisti, De con- 
seer, eccles. vel altaris; et cap. unico, eod. tit., Lib. VI. Prasterea rixae et con- 
citationes sunt generaliter interdicts in ecclesiis, ut cap. deed, statim allegato. 



AN CLERICO CELEBRANTI ? 135 

Ergo ct hie actus, cum sit species rixae. In contrarium iura hoc permittentia 
generaliter loquuntur, ergo sic sunt intelligenda, ut 1. i, generaliter, ff. De 
lega. praestandis. Hanc partem credo veram, cum iste actus insurgat ex iure 
naturali, nee reprobet lex divina, et ratio iuris hoc inducentis subsit generaliter, 
non habita distinctione locorum. Nam hoc induxit ius naturale, ut seipsum 
conservet quantum durant vires principiorum naturalium, et haec ratio subest 
in ecclesia sicut alibi. Ad inducta in contrarium facile est respondere, nam illi 
actus inhibiti in ecclesia vel sunt de natura sui de genere malorum, vel sunt de 
genere permissorum, ut contractus. Tamen ipsorum exclusio, ne fiant in 
ecclesia, propter moram grande non inducit periculum, cum extra ecclesiam 
aeque fieri possint ad libitum contrahentium, cum sint a principle voluntatis, 
ut 1. sicut, C. De act. et obligationibus. At in proposito, si non liceret in 
ecclesia vim vi repellere, ecce promptum periculum, quia statmv f aciliter oc- 
cidetur. Ad ah"ud, cum dicitur, sequi posset pollutio. Solutio. Fortius est 
consideranda hominis conservatio, cum sit irrestaurabilis, quam ecclesia, quae 
reconciliari potest. Et forte dici posset quod ad hoc, ut polluatur, requiritur 
effusio sanguinis iniuriosi, ut nota in cap. unic., De consecra. eccle. vel altaris ; 
Lib. VI. 



An liccal clerico celebranti invaso se defender c, ct Decider c t ct sic continuato [Cap. ixiv.i 

officio celebrare ? 

Tertio quaero, quid de clerico celebrante, an ei sit licitum dimisso officio, 
si invadatur, se defendere, et occidere, et numquid, si sic se defendendo occi- 
deret, licitum sit, continuato officio, celebrare ? Pro primo apparet quod non 
debeat divertere ab officio, immo ipsum teneatur exsequi donee possit, viden- 
tur textus vii, q. i, Mud, et cap. nihil. Praeterea temporaha sunt postponenda 
spiritualibus, xii, q. i, prcecipimus ; De pcenis et rem., cum infirmitas ; C. De 
episcop. et cler., 1. sancimus. In contrarium probant textus, nam propter 
impedimentum corporale superveniens, officium inchoatum dimittitur inex- 
pletum, et propterea provident iura ne solus sit sacerdos in ecclesia ubi subest 
facultas bonorum temporalium. Probant textus in capitulis statim allegatis ; 
vii, q. i, illud, et cap. nihil. Vt unus suppleat continuando, ubi alter dimisit, 
De consecratione, dist. ii, cap. ult. ; nisi oratio missae sit ccepta et non completa, 
quia tune alter reincipere tenetur, cum ilia non recipiat divisionem, ut in bap- 
tismo et ordine, ut xxiii dist., quorundam, et ibi nota glossam, et in cap. nihil, 
etiam notanda glossa. Sed si aliquis invadat celebrantem, ut ipsum occidat, 
hie evenit impedimentum celebranti immo periculum mortis, ut claret, ergo 
licitum praetermittere, et, per consequens, se de periculo sibi occurrenti, si 
potest, expedire, etiam occidendo. Ad allegata in contrarium facile est re- 
spondere, nam licet spiritualia sint prseponenda temporalibus in genere, tamen 
celebratio spiritualium hoc casu non est praeponenda, cum hoc casu, propter 
damnum irreparabile, lex hoc permittat quod non contingit in spiritual! post- 
posito, quia per alium restaurari potest, vel eundem, periculo excluso. De 



136 DE IVRE BELLI 

secundo, sine argumentis dico, quodsi etiam occiderit, se defendendo, quod 
poterit reassumpto officio celebrare, dummodo affucrint ilia de quibus loquitur 
Ofin., si furiosus. Nam nullum peccatum, cum hoc fecerit legis auctoritatr, 
ruins auctoritate nemo peccat, ut in cap. qui pcccat, xxiii, q. iv ; unde nullain 
irregularitatem incidit, ut in praedicta Clem., si furiosus. Ergo nullum videtur 
subesse imj>edimentum quin possit celebrare, ut probat Clemen., statim 
inducta. 



tc*p.iM*>.) An baptizanti, ordinanti, confirnianti, inungenti, ct singula sacramcnta 

conferenti, invasis, licihim sil collationem illorum 
sacramctt/orum postponere inchoatam ? 

Quarto, sic posset quaeri, argui, et solvi, de baptizante, ordinantc, inun- 
gente, etiam in singulis sacramentis, an sit licitum illorum collationem post- 
ponere, etiam si inchoaverit propter tutelam sui ? Et in omnibus die ut supra. 



[Cap. !!.] -4' pradigcnda sit tnorsW invasi saccrdotis, cum pucntm in mortis arliculo 

baplizat, an vita eetcrna ipsius pncri, tic deccdat 
sine baptismatc ? 

Quinto quaero, sacerdos baptizat puerum, qui est in mortis periculo, et 
incidit invasio sacerdotis, ut occidatur, quid praeeligendum de iure, an pern- 
cere collationem sacramenti, ne decedat puer sine baptismo, et ipse sacerdos 
occidatur, vel econtra, praeeligendum mortem propriam evadere, et permit- 
tere puerum mori sine baptismate ? Sic forma quaestionem de sacerdote dif- 
ferente corpus Christi infirmo in extremis laboranti. 

Pro primo apparet quod sacerdos potius debeat se permittere occidi quam 
puerum sine baptismate mori. Nam si puer inoritur sine baptismate moritur 
aeternaliter, ut probat Augustinus ad Petrum Diaconum, De consecrat., dist. 
iv, firmissimc, et cap. regcncrantc, eadem dist., et cap. ntilla, eadem dist. 
Probat Apostolus ad Ephesios iv cap., propter delictum unius omnes in 
damnatione. Sic originale peccatum, cuius effectus non est exstinctus per 
sacramentum baptismatis, inducit damnationem aeternam, sed sacerdos solum 
temporaliter moritur, si alias necessariis ad salutem aeternam imbutus, sed 
mors temporalis postponenda est spirituali. Sic arguit Augustinus, xxiii, q. 
iv, displicct, et cap. ipsa piclas ; ergo potius debet sacerdos eligere mori, ut 
puer in aeternum non pereat. Praeterea inter duo mala minus malum est eli- 
gendum, xiii dist., nervi Icsliculorum, cum similibus ; at minus malum est mors 
temporalis quam aeterna, ut cap. ipsa piclas, et cap. displicct, xxiii, q. iv. Et 
mors pueri est aeterna, ut cap. firmissimc, et cap. ntilla, et cap. rcgcncranlc, 
De consecr., dist. iv. Mors autem sacerdotis est temporalis, ergo praseligenda. 
Praeterea praecipuus actus caritatis est quod quis proximum diligat sicut seip- 
sum, De Pcenit., dist. ii, proximos, et [cap.] proindc, et caj). caritas csl, ut milii 
i-idctur. At hir sacerdos, si pra.-eligat salutem aitcrnam i>uero vita; sua- tempo- 



AN BAPTIZANTI ? 137 

rali, non diliget ipsum sicut seipsum, et sic caritate carebit, quod probatur. 
Nam vita aeterna sine comparationc praecellit vitam temporalem. Ergo prae- 
eligendo vitam temporalem sibi vitae aeternae proximi multo magis se diligit 
quam proximum, et sic remanet caritate vacuus. Praeterea illud praeeligendum 
est ad cuius productionem pauciora mala sequuntur, sed ad mortem sacer- 
dotis minus malum sequitur quam ad mortem pueri sine baptismate, ergo 
praeeligenda mors sacerdotis. Probatur maior. Nam haec est regula in mora- 
libus, quod plura mala, ceteris paribus, deteriora sunt paucioribus, et magis 
fugienda. Probatur in can. nervi, xiii distinctionis. Probatur minor, nam 
si eligatur sacerdotis vita, sequuntur duo mala, scilicet, mors aeterna pueri, 
ut supra deductum est, et neglectus curae animarum, quod mortale, ut in can. 
cum sit ars, De aeta. et qualitate. Si autem praeeligatur mors temporalis 
sacerdotis, non sequitur nisi illud malum, scilicet, temporalis mors, quod, 
etiam attenta qualitate actus in se, sine comparatione minus malum est morte 
perpetua, ergo inferendum ut supra. 

In contrarium videntur textus qui loquuntur generaliter, concedendo cui- 
libet faqiiltatem se defendendi in casu necessitatis. Sufficit Clem., si furiosus, 
saepius allegata. Confirmatur per iura quae dicunt caritatem incipere a seipso, 
ut 1. presses, C. De servit. et aqua ; et cap. petitio, De iureiurando. 

Solutio. Pro evidentia huius quaestionis et solutionis eiusdem est exami- 
nare casus indubitatos. Nam sunt casus indubitati in themate proposito. 
Ecce si ponamus quod puer per alium, etiam laicum vel mulierem, baptizari 
posset, esto quod sacerdos diverteret a sacramenti collatione, non esset dubium 
quod sacerdos deberet praeeligere salutem suam, ubi enim verisimiliter puer 
posset vivere usque ad expeditionem periculi, et hoc verisimiliter constaret, 
non haberem quaestionem dubiam, quominus sacerdos haberet praeeligere salu- 
tem suam, nee rationes inductee concludunt contra hunc casum. Si poneremus 
quaestionem in adulto, non autem in infante, qui adultus, licet non suscipiat 
baptismum fluminis, tamen decedet, si veram habeat fidem cum baptismate 
fluminis. Adhuc non haberem quaestionem dubiam, immo dicerem, ut supra, 
praeeligendam salutem sacerdotis. Sed quaestio procedit in puero, de quo con- 
stat quod morietur sine baptismate, si sacerdos divertat. Vel quaestio pro- 
cederet in dubio, ubi, videlicet, de hoc probabiliter dubitaretur. 

In primo casu, videlicet, ubi de hoc constaret, crederem praeeligendam 
mortem sacerdotis temporalem, per iura supra inducta, et fundor per ea quae 
habentur, vii, q. i, hoc etiam, vers. cum vero specialiter. A contrario, et 
quod ibi notat glossa. Nam ubi solus praelatus quaeritur, nee ecclesia potest 
esse tuta, eo fugiente, exponere debet se morti pro ipsa, ut ibi. Haec maxime 
procedunt in proprio sacerdote et parochiano, et movent me rationes supra 
ad hoc inductae. 

Vbi autem foret dubium probabile de morte vel de vita pueri, usque ad 
expeditionem periculi, et constaret de morte presbyteri, nisi diverteret, adhuc 
crederem praeeligendam mortem sacerdotis, cum in incertis non certus locus 
sit coniecturis, ut 1. continuus, illud, ff. De verbor. obligationibus. Vbi 



138 DE IVRE BELLI 

autem probabilc dubium foret hinc inde, crcderem, ut supra primo membro 
hoc, in sacramento baptismatis. 

In corpora autem Christi, si vcra esset glossa quae est in cap. quod in It, 
De poenis et remiss., quae dicit viaticum non esse sacramentum necessitatis, 
tune quaestio non esset multum dubia. Sed ilia glossa non est vera, immo alia 
glossa notat contrarium in cap. veniens, De transaction., in prima glossa, et 
ilia est vera, ut notat De sacrament, non iterand., super rubrica. Probare 
videtur textus in cap. omnis, De poen. et remissionibus. Tamen adhuc, hoc 
supposito pro vero, quod sit sacramentum necessitatis, adhuc dicerem prae- 
eligendam vitam temporalem sacerdotis. Moveor ex hoc, quia etiam si quis 
decedat sine corpore Christi, ubi per eum non stetit, et non contempsit, non 
moritur aeternaliter, sicut in baptismo. Idcirco in hoc casu non concludercnt 
rationes supra inductae. Idem dicerem in sacramento pcenitentias, quia etiam 
sine oris confessione decedens, ubi per eum non stetit, sola contritionis virtus 
salvat eum, ut notat De pcenit., dist. i ro , in summa, et in his ita. Idem per 
onmia dicerem in sacramento unctionis. 



ap. i*Yii.] An monacho liceat se defendere sine licentia abbatis sui ? 

Sexto quaero, numquid monacho liceat se sic defendere sine licentia praelati 
sui ? Videtur quod non. Nam monachus non vibrat, nee vibrare debct 
actum volitivum, nisi de licentia praelati sui, quia sine ipsius licentia caret velle 
et nolle, xii, q. i, nolo, et cap. non dicatis ; De electione, quorundam, et cap. 
si religiosus, Lib. VI; et Clem., religiosus, De procuratoribus. At iste actus 
defensae provenit a mero hbertatis arbitrio, quia potest etiam nolle, ergo non 
poterit sine licentia praelati. Praeterea monachus est mortuus mundo, xvi, 
q. i, Monachi, et cap. placuit ; ergo sibi non competunt actus t< ndentes ad 
defensionem vitae. Praeterea monacho interdict! sunt actus etiam in bonum 
tendentes sine licentia praelati sui, ut sunt vovere, peregrinari, et similes actus, 
per iura statim allegata. In contrarium videtur, nam defensio corporis sui 
provenit ex instinctu naturali, nee reprobatur lege divina nee altera, ergo licet 
monacho, cum quantum ad naturales actus non sit mortuus, sed solum quoad 
civiles actus, ut iuribus supra inductis. 

Solutio. Credo quod, si monachus sine periculo moras possit se defendere 
cum licentia praelati sui, ipsam petere debet. Hoc probant iura inducta ad 
primam partem. Si autem non possit licentiam praelati petere, quia non est 
praesens, et periculum est in mora, tune poterit sine In t utia praelati. Moveor 
ex hoc, quia iste actus est iure naturali inductus, quern praelatus non posset sine 
causa totaliter interdicerc, immo forte nee Papa, cum natura hoc induxerit, 
nee in his subditus tenetur praelato suo, sicut si totaliter, et sine causa, inter- 
diceret cibum et potum. Movet me glossa quae est in cap. non dicalis, xii, q. i. 
Nam quaerit ibi glossa an liceat monacho facere eleemosynam pauperi, fame 
morienti nisi subveniatur ei, sine licentia praelati, et tenet quod sic. Nam hoc 



AN BANNITIS ? 139 

casu necessitatis tenetur, si providere potest alterius vitae per actum alias inhi- 
bitum sibi, quanto magis providere poterit vitae suse per actum sibi a naturali- 
bus insitum. Non video quare, immo dicit Raymundus in summa De negot. 
saecularibus, sed quaritur circa hoc, quod, si abbas inhiberet, ipse facere 
debet, quia tune non obediet homini sed Deo, viii dist., quo iure. 



An servo liceat se defenders sine iussu domini sui ? [Cap.ix 

J ots.\ 

Septimo quaeritur, numquid liceat servo sic se defendere sine iussu domini 
sui ? Videtur quod non. Nam actus servorum pro nullis habentur, ut 1. 
[servus] servum, C. De rei vind. ; et 1. vix certis, ff. De iudic. ; et 1. si quis mihi 
bona, iussum, ff. De acquir. haereditate. In contrarium videtuf, nam hodie 
mors servorum non est in potestate dominorum, ut 1. i, ff. De his qui sunt sui 
vel ali. iuris. Confirmatur. Nam actus naturales non potest totaliter dominus 
interdicere servo, per quorum interdictionem servus pereat, ut 1. supra prox. 
allegata. Solutio. Vt supra proximo dictum est de monacho. 



An bannitis, qui per statuta civitatum quandoque impune occidi possunt, liceat [Cap. 

se defendere ? 

Octavo quaeritur, numquid illis quos licitum est occidere impune, utpote 
bannitis, de quibus aliquando disponunt leges municipales, quod impune 
offendi possint, licitum sit se defendere ? Videtur quod non. Nam, si a 
privato iuste inferatur violentia, non licet se defendere, ut 1. iv, ff. Ad legem 
Aquiliam. At hie iuste infertur, quia lege auctorizante, ut 1. iuste, ff. De acquir. 
possessione. Confirmatur. Si violentia inferatur a publica persona, non licet 
se defendere, ff. De iniur., 1. iniuriarum, i ; ff . De rei vindic., 1. qui restituere, 
At hie iste gerit vicem publicae persona?, nam lex facit ipsum ministrum, per- 
mittendo privato ipsum punire, et hoc potest lex, scilicet, dare iurisdictionem 
privato, ut 1. et quia, ff. De iurisd. omn. iudic. ; et cap. primo, Ne praelati 
vices suas, ubi notatur. Ergo infertur huic non licere se defendere. 

In contrarium videtur, quia hie est privatus, immo etsi foret publica 
persona, apparet iniuste inferri violentiam cum inferatur iuris ordine non 
servato, et sic iniustitia ordine attento, ut 1. prolatam, C. De sent. ; et cap. 
quoniam contra, De probationibus. 

Secundo, puto ponderanda verba legis, nam aliquando lex permittit 
aliquid, quia nullo iure prohibetur, ut xxxi, q. i, hac ratione. Aliquando 
lex permittit aliquid contra constitutiones humanas, ut contrahere olim in 
quinto gradu, ut xxxv, q. iii, qu&dam. Tertio modo lex permittit tolerando, 
non quia faciat actum alias illicitum licitum, sed actum illicitum, manentem 
illicitum, non punit, ut dicit textus in can. denique, iv distinctione. Nam come- 
dentes carnes in media nocte Dominicae carniprivii non puniuntur, et dicit 

[10] 



140 DE IVRE BELLI 

tcxtus permitti, id est, non puniri propter multitudinem ct scandalum, sic alias 
permittitur adulterium, ut vitetur homicidium, xxxiii, q. [i] ii, si quod verius; 
ct tamen adulterium non fit licitum per legem sic permittentcm, sed, actu ma- 
nente illicito, poena remittitur. Sic in proposito, si lex permittat tolerando, et 
poenam remittendo, actu manente illicito, propter odium banniti, tune crederem 
bannito licere se defendere, nee hunc articulum concludunt supra allegata. Si 
autem lex permitteret positive faciendo actum de illicito licitum, tune secus. 
Et isti modi permissionis notantur per glossam, iii dist., omnis autem lex. 



icp.iniz.] Contra quos liceat hoc particulare helium indicere ? 

Circa quintum, videlicet, contra quos hoc particulare bellum competat, 
est videndum. Et circa hoc quaeritur de pluribus. 

An liceat contra superior em suum ? 

Et primo quaeritur, an licitum sit alicui hoc bellum indicere contra supe- 
riorem suum ? Et glossa in 1. ut vim, ff. De iustit. et iure, dicit quod non ; 
per 1. qui restituere, ff. De rei vindic. ; et 1. iniuriarum, i, ff. De iniuriis. 
Probat textus in cap. qui resistit, xi, q. iii. Ego non credo quod glossa dicat 
simpliciter verum, sed credo distinguendum. Aut constat quod iniuste agit, 
aut constat quod iuste, aut dubitatur. Primo casu, credo resistendum, ut 1. 
prohibitum, C. De iure fisci ; et 1. devotum, C. De metatis. Et hoc maxime 
cum aliquid extra officium suum agit, ad ipsum non exspectans. Secundo casu 
non est resistendum, ut 1. qui restituere, ff. De rei vindic. ; et 1. qui iniuriarum, 
i, ff. De iniuriis. Tertio casu non est resistendum nisi tale sit factum quod 
non possit post tempus restaurari. Nam talia facta pro infectis haberi non 
possunt, ut 1. in bello, facli, ff. De captivis. Nam in talibus lex inhibens 
appellari ante definitivam permittit appellari, ut notatur in 1. ante sententia 
tempus, C. Quor. app. non recipiuntur. 



An liceat contra iudicem, etiam si iniuste aliquid agat? 

Secundo quaerit glossa in dicta lege, ut vim, quid si index, aut potestas, 
aliquid iniuste agat ? Respondet Martinus quod non est resistendum, per 
legem iniuriarum, i, ff. De iniuriis ; sed conveniet magistratum durante 
officio, si est de minoribus, vel finite otficio, si est de maioribus, ut ff. De iudic., 
1. pars litcrarum ; et 1. iii, ff. Quod met. causa. Hanc glossam non credo 
veram in facto irreparabili. Pone quod iudex invadat me, ut occidat, et est de 
maioribus magistratibus, numquid exspectandum sit donee finiatur officium ? 
vel, si est de minoribus, debetne exspectari donee porrigatur querela coram 
praeside ? Absit, quia talia facta, ut supra dixi, sunt irretractabilia, ut praedicta 
1. t'w bello, facti, ff. De captivis. 



CONTRA QVOS ? 141 

An liceat filio contra patrem ? [Cap. 

Tertio quaeritur, numquid licitum sit filio contra patrem. Videtur quod 
non, propter ius patriae potestatis, ut C. De pat. potest., per totum. Confirma- 
tur. Nam non licet filio contra se, ergo nee contra patrem, cum censeantur 
una persona, ut C. De impub. et aliis substit., 1. ult. ; Instit., De inutil. stip., 
ei qui ; C. De agric. et censi., 1. cum scimus ; in Authent., De iureiurando 
a moriente praestando, i. In contrarium videtur. Nam haec defensio pro- 
venit a iure naturali, ut probatum est supra, in tertio membro principal!, nee 
aliqua lege reprobatum, immo qualibet approbatum, ut ibi deductum fuit. 
Ergo patria potestas, iure civili inducta, illud ius filio competens non tollit, 
cum iura naturalia civilibus non tollantur. Instit., De iure nat. gent, et civili, 
naturalia ; v dist., ius naturale. 

Solutio. Dico quod, si pater aliquid agat contra filium, corrigendo in 
his quae permittuntur ex iure patriae potestatis, non excedendo, quod non liceat 
filio se defendere, quia in hoc ius civile quod induxit patriam potestatem 
limitat ius naturale, quod fieri potest, ut supra deductum est. Si autem pater 
aliquid agat contra filium, excedendo sibi concessa ex iure patriae potestatis, 
tune crederem licitum sibi defendere. Et haec procedunt in filio degente in 
potestate patris, in emancipate enim minor est quaestio. Ad inducta in con- 
trarium patet solutio per iam dicta. 



An liceat monacho contra abbatem suum ? [Cap. KM.] 

Quarto quaeritur, numquid monacho hoc liceat contra abbatem ? Videtur 
quod non, nam monachus caret vibramine voluntatis sine licentia abbatis sui, 
xii, q. i, nolo, et cap. non dicatis ; De statu monach., cum ad monasterium. Sed 
iste actus provenit ex imperio voluntatis, cum possit nolle, nee his intervenit 
licentia praelati, immo tacita et ficta contradictio, quae plus operatur quam ver- 
balis, ff. De aedilit. edict., 1. si tamen, ei quod ; ff. De legi., 1. de quibus, in 
fine ; De appellationibus, ad audientiam, et cap. ut nostrum, et cap. dilecti. 
Confirmatur. Nam monachus mortuus est mundo, xvi, q. i, monachi, et cap. 
placuit ; et Authent., ingressi, C. De sacrosanctis ecclesiis. Ergo sibi non corn- 
petit actus defensionis vitae mundanae. 

In contrarium apparet. Nam iste actus provenit ex iure naturali, nulla 
lege positiva reprobate, licet modificato. Ergo non denegatur monacho, qui, 
licet sit mortuus civiliter, non tamen naturaliter, ut iuribus supra allegatis. 
Solutio. Si praelatus contra monachum aliquid attentet de his quae permit- 
tuntur a iure communi, in corrigendo et similibus, vel ex constitutionibus 
ordinis, tune monacho non licet resistere, immo nee hoc casu audiretur appel- 
lans, ut De appell., cum speciali, et cap. de prior e. Si autem praelatus aliquid 
attentet contra monachum in his quae non pertinent ad officium suum, iure 
vel constitutionibus modificatum, tune licet se defendere, maxime in his qua 
propter moram periculum ingerunt, utpote si abbas monachum invaderet, ut 



142 DE IVRE BELLI 

ipsum subito occideret, quid miri cum etiam monacho liceat abbatem impetere, 
accusando, si aliquid contra debitum agat, ut cap. ex parte, De accusat., et 
cap. cum dim, eod. titulo. 

lcp.TciiLi An liceat servo contra dominant ? 

Quinto quaeritur, numquid hoc liceat servo contra dominum. Apparet 
quod non, cum omnimodo potestas sit domini contra servum, ut 1. i, ff. De 
his qui sunt sui vel alieni iuris. Confirmatur. Nam servus tenetur dominum 
prceh'antem iuvare, alias punitur, ut 1. si quis in gravi, fi, De S. C. Silaniano. 
Ergo ipsum impugnare non potent, ut cap. uno, De nat. ex lib. ; et cap. con- 
qucerente, De restit. spol. ; ff. Si servit. vind., 1. altius; ff. De condic. indebit., 
1. frater a Jratre ; xxvi dist., una tantum ; xxv dist., can. ult. ; xvi, q. i, Silve- 
ster ; ff. De fideiuss., 1. tutor ; ff. De admin, tut., 1. quotiens. 

In contrarium apparet. Nam hodie restricta est potestas dominorum in 
servos, ut 1. i, ff. De his qui sunt sui vel alieni iuris. Nam hodie non habent 
potestatem trucidandi, nee acriter eos affligendi. Ergo. Solutio. Vt dictum 
est de monacho, si dominus aliquid attentet contra servum in his quae iura 
permittunt, non licet servo se defendere. Nam in hoc limitatur actus a iure 
naturali proveniens a iure positive, limitante potestatem dominorum in servos. 
Si autem attentet aliquid ultra quam a iure permissum est, tune secus, quia 
in his, licet servi non sint agniti quoad actus civiles, tamen quoad actus natu- 
rales sic, qualis est iste. 

Per hoc solvuntur consimiles quaestiones. Numquid vassallo contra 
dominum ? Numquid discipulo contra magistrum ? Numquid militi contra 
praepositum ? Numquid uxori contra maritum ? Vniformi solutione solvun- 
tur, ut, si attentetur quod ius permittit, non licet se defendere. Si autem 
ultra, et contra iuris debitum, tune secus, ut supra plene tactum est. Ex his 
breviter infertur contra quos, ex regula supra dicta, possent quaestiones infi- 
nitae solvi. 

lc P . iv.] Pro quibus personis liceat hoc particulare bettum indicere ? 

Circa sextum est videre, videh'cet, pro quibus liceat ? et primo circa per- 
sonas pro quibus licitum sit. Et pono indubitatum quod pro defensa sui 
ipsius. Hoc probat textus in 1. ut vim, ff. De iustit. et iure ; et 1. i, vim vi, 
ff. De vi ct vi armata ; et 1. iv, Ad leg. Aquil. ; et 1. scientiam, qui cum 
aliter, eod. tit. ; clare in Clemen., i, De homicidio. De aliis vero infra 
quseritur. 

[Cap. ICT.J A n liceat patri pro filio ? 

Et primo quaero, an liceat patri pro filio ? Expediendo parum dubia 
sine argumentationibus, dicendum quod sic. Nam pater filium ut seipsuin 
diligit, ut 1. isti quidem, ff. Quod met. causa. Nam propter hoc perpetua- 



PRO QVIBVS PERSONIS ? 143 

tur in 32vo, ff. De verb, sig., 1. liber mum, in fine ; etiam quia una persona 
censetur, ut C. De impub. et aliis substit., 1. ult. ; in Authent., De iureiur. a 
moriente prsestito, in principle ; Instit., De inutil. stip., ei quern. Hoc 
clarum. Idem econtra, scilicet, filius pro patre. 



An liceat marito pro uxore ? [Cap. 

Secundo quaeritur, numquid hoc liceat marito pro uxore ? Clarum est 
quod sic, nam iniuria uxori irrogata est irrogata marito, et iniuriarum actio 
sibi competit, immo et sponso, ut 1. item apud, [si sponsum] sponsum, ff. De 
iniuriis. Et marito licitum est occidere vilem repertum adulterantem cum 
uxore, ut 1. marito, et 1. capite quinto, ff. De adulteriis ; et 1. Gracchus, C. 
eod. tit. ; immo et fabulantem monitum, per iura Authenticorum, nee incidit 
in capitulum si quis suadente, xvii, q. iv. Ob hoc iniciens manus violentas in 
clericum, ut cap. si vero, nee ille, De sent, excommunicationis. 



An liceat pro fratre, sorore, et aliis coniunctis personis ? 

Tertio quaeritur, quid pro fratre et sorore et aliis coniunctis personis, et 
non coniunctis ? Et glossa in 1. ut vim, ff. De iustit. et iure, dicit ponderan- 
dam affectionem. Allegat 1. isti quidem, ff. Quod met. causa ; et 1. cum ser- 
vus, ff. Mandati. Alii volunt dicere quod pro omnibus coniunctis licet. Pro- 
bant sic, nam si quis iniuriatur uni coniuncto, omnibus iniuriari videtur, licet 
non competat aliis iniuriarum actio, ut 1. lex Cornelia, in prin., ff. De iniuriis. 
Confirmant, nam pro defensa rerum licet vim vi repellere, ut 1. i, C. Vnde vi ; 
et 1. iii, eum igitur, ff. De vi et vi armata. Et licitum est volenti vim vi 
repellere, pro defensa rerum, amicos et coniunctos convocare. Ergo licitum 
est amicos et coniunctos iuvare. Et sic concludunt pro coniuncto indistincte 
hoc licere. Haec opinio confirmari videtur. Nam homo homini ofncium 
debet, ut 1. cum servus, ff. De servis exportandis. Ergo ex illo officio iuvare 
licet. Confirmatur per 1. addictos, C. De appell. ; melius, per 1. non tantum, 
ff. De appell. ; ubi etiam extraneus pro condemnato in criminali appellat, etiam 
ipso nolente. Probatur per 1. iii, C. De liberali causa. Dominus lacobus 
Buttrigarius in 1. ut vim, distinguit in hunc modum. Aut ego, ut ego, sine 
mandate iniuriati, volo defendere iniuriatum, et possum per viam iuris, non 
autem facti. Et sic intelliguntur 11. statim allegatae, addictos, non tantum; 
et 1. iii, C. De lib. causa. Aut volo hoc facere, non ut ego, sed mandante 
iniuriato, et tune potero etiam per viam facti, ut 1. iii, eum igitur, ff. 
De vi et vi arm. Alii distinguunt. Aut illi erant in comitiva iniuriam passi, 
et possent tune propulsare iniuriam persons eius illatam. Argumentum, 1. 
item apud, si quis [virginem] virgines, ff. De iniuriis. Alias non, ut tenet 
glossa indistincte in 1. i, Vnde vi, ubi Cinus hanc opinionem recitat in ante- 
paenultima quaestione. Alii, ut lacobus de Ravennate, dicunt indistincte quod 



144 I>E IVRE BELLI 

licet. Ratio. Nam negotia mea possunt iuvari per alium, ut 1. i, if. De negot. 
gestis. Multo fortius et persona iuvari poterit, cum persona rebus praefera- 
tur, ut 1. sancimus, C. De sacrosanctis ecclesiis. Allegat pro casu, 1. Gracchus, 
C. De adulterio ; et, si dicas, ibi fuit filius, solvit per 1. liber homo, fi. Ad leg. 
Aquiliam. Non obstat 1. cum fundum, fi. De vi et vi armata. Nam ibi ex 
intervallo voluit, quod etiam non licuisset per se. Non obstat, secundum eum, 
1. ut vim, fi. De iustit. et iure ; ubi dicit " ob tutelam sui corporis." Respon- 
det per 1. si servus, fi. De servis exportandis. Hanc opinionem videtur sequi 
Cinus in 1. i, C. Vnde vi, in quaestione antepaenultima. 

In his tot et tantorum, crederem ponderandum, quia mixtim formavi 
quaestionem de coniunctis et extraneis, quod quaeri potest, an liceat coniuncto 
vel extraneo alterius violentiam vi repellere, sicut liceret propriam, ad evi- 
tandam poenam irregularitatis, si sit clericus vel laicus, hoc casu occidens vel 
mutilans. Potest etiam quaeri de utrisque, an licitum sit, ut non incidant aliam 
poenam legis vel canonis. Si quaeratur de primo, dico casum esse in Clement., 
si furiosus, De homicidio, quod solum evitat poenam irregularitatis, si hoc 
faciat seipsum tantummodo defendendo, non autem alium, etiam patrem vel 
filium. Hoc probat textus, dicens, " Idem censemus de illo qui, mortem 
aliter vitare non valens, suum occidit vel mutilavit invasorem." Loquitur 
ergo de suo, non autem de invasore alterius. Hoc ibi etiam notat glossa 
super verbo " suum." Hoc ergo casu reputo planum, ut ibi. Si autem quaera- 
mus an liceat, ut vitentur aliae pcenae legales vel canonicae, et tune distingue. 
Aut loquimur de pcena excommunicationis, si hoc casu percutiat clericum, 
violentiam alterius repellendo vi, et tune dico cum Innocentio quod, si defendat 
patrem, matrem, uxorem, filium, vel fih'am, evadit sententiam excommunica- 
tionis. Allegat ipse 1. isti quidem, fi. Quod met. causa ; et 1. i, si vir, fi. De 
S. C. Silaniano. Et est ratio differentiae inter hunc casum et praacedentem, nam 
irregularitas contrahitur etiam sine dolo, ut est videre in iudice iuste occidi 
mandante, li dist., qui in aliqiio. Sed, in excommunicatione per ilium canonem 
lata, requiritur diabolica instigatio, ut cap. si quis suadcntc, xvii, q. iv. In 
extraneis autem non evadit poenam illius canonis, etiam si milies mandato 
iniuriati hoc fecisset. Aut loquimur de alia poena personali vel pecuniaria, et 
tune distinguo, aut volentes vim repellere a violentiam passo, aut sunt con- 
iuncti aut extranei. In coniunctis, die, ut glossa in 1. ut vim, ff. De iustit. et iure ; 
earn limitando per 1. in privatis, ff. De iudic. ; et 1. lex Cornelia, in princip., 
ff. De iniuriis. Aut loquimur de extraneis, et tune aut illi extranei erant deputati 
pro comitiva violentiam passi, et tune licet, ut 1. item apud Labeonem, s quis 
[virginem] virgines, fi. De iniuriis ; aut non erant deputati pro comitiva, et tune 
aut volunt ex intervallo repellere, et non possunt, ut 1. cum fundum, fi. De vi et 
vi arm. ; quia nee ipse propriam sic repellere posset. Et hoc de defensa facti. 
Defensam autem iuris facere possent etiam ex intervallo, ubi iura hoc permittunt, 
ut L non tantum, fi. De appell. ; et 1. iii, De liber, causa ; et 1. addictos, C. De 
appellationibus. Et per hoc non puto veram opinionem Domini lacobi Buttri- 
garii, qui dicit quod indistincte defensam iuris facere possunt. Nam hoc 



PRO QVIBVS PERSONIS ? 145 

indistincte non est verum. Nam sunt casus in quibus tertio non licet actionem 
seu accusationem proponere pro iniuriam passo. Tollo exemplum regulare 
in privatis delictis. Sic ergo solum ubi iura permittunt. Si autem volunt 
incontinenti repellere, tune distinguerem cum Domino lacobo. Aut advocantur 
per violentiam passum, et tune licet. Nam licet violentiam passo advocare 
amicos pro defensa rerum, ut 1. iii, sum igitur, ff. De vi et vi armata ; ergo 
pro defensa personae, quae prasponderat, ut 1. sancimus, C. De sacrosanct, 
ecclesiis. Aut non advocantur, et tune licet. Textus est in cap. dilecto, De sent, 
excom., Lib. VI. Pro hoc faciat xxiii, q. iii, non inferenda, et cap. fortitude; 
De sent, excom., quanta. Faciant notata in 1. ii, C. De commerc. et mercatori- 
bus. Et sic in hoc credo veram opinionem lacobi de Ravennate. Textus 
est in pradicto cap. dilecto. Nam dicit ibi textus, " et cum liceat cuilibet suo 
vicino vel proximo, pro repellenda ipsius iniuria, suum impartiri auxilium." 



An quis teneatur quern defender e ne occidatur ? [Cap. x 

Quarto quaeritur, quis videt quendam occidi nisi iuvet ipsum, an teneatur 
ipsum iuvare ? Videtur quod sic, per 1. necare, ff. De agnoscendis liberis. 
Confirmatur hoc ex officio quod debet homo homini, ut 1. servus, ff. De servis 
exportandis. Hoc confirmatur. Nam error cui non resistitur approbari vide- 
tur, Ixxxiii dist., error, et can. consentire, et can. quid enim. Nam licitum est 
alicui pretium recipere, ut metum illatum alteri excutiat, ut ff. Quod met. 
causa, 1. metum, sed licet. Confirmatur. Nam in quibusdam casibus hoc 
est speciale, quod quis teneatur alium sic iuvare, ff. De S. C. Silaniano, 1. i, 
hoc autem; et 1. ult., C. eod. titulo. Ergo contrarium ius commune, ff. Ad 
municipalem, 1. i ; et 1. ius singulare, ff. De legibus. Glossa tenet quod iuvare 
tenetur verbo non facto, regula culpa, ff. De reg. iuris. Nee obstat officium 
quod debet homo homini, quia illud debet sine periculo sui, ut 1. habet, ff. 
De oper. lib. ; et 1. Nepos Proculo, ff. De verbor. significatione. 



Quinto quceritur de his qui tenentur violentiam ab aliis propulsare. [Cap. xd* 

Et circa hoc quaeritur de pluribus. 

An vassattus teneatur iuvare dominum suum ? 

Et primo de vassallo quaeritur. Et non est dubium quia tenetur iuvare 
dominum, alias perdit feudum, ut in Vsibus Feudorum, Quae fuit prima 
causa beneficii amittendi, cap. prima autem causa, item qui dominum, et 
sequenti. 

An servus teneatur iuvare dominum suum ? [Cap. c.j 

Secundo quaeritur de servo, et quod teneatur iuvare dominum est textus 
in 1. i, hoc autem, ff. De S. C. Silaniano ; et 1. ult., C. eod. titulo. 



146 DE IVRE BELLI 

An miles Ifticahir defender e preepositum belli ? 

Tertio quaeritur de praeposito belli, et quod teneatur iuvare praepositum 
belli, si potest, alias capitc punitur, cst textus in 1. otnnc dclictum, ff. De re 
milit. ; et 1. iii, fin., ff. eodoin. 



IC.P.CH.] An vassallus videns dominum invasum ex una parte, patrem ex alia, etc. ? 

Quarto quseritur, vassallus videt dominum invasum ex una parte, patrem 
ex alia, uterque pariter est in mortis periculo, nisi iuventur, nee iuvare potest 
nisi alterum, quern iuvabit, patrem an dominum ? Glossa quas est xxii, q. v, dc 
forma, dicit quod vassallus tenetur iuvare dominum contra filium proprium. 
Inducit, quia filius tenetur patri iure naturae, sed vassallus domino vinculo 
iuramenti, ut in Vsibus Feudorum, Quas fuit prima causa benefic. amittendi, 
cap. uno. Et secundum hoc foret decisa quaestio, quia teneretur iuvare domi- 
num cui plus astringitur. In hac quaestione dicerem contrarium. Et moveor 
ex hoc, nam nlius tenetur patri ex vinculo naturali, ex quo ab eo progenitus est. 
Tenetur et vinculo civili, quia sub eius potestate patria, domino autem tenrtur 
vinculo civili tantum, ut praedicto cap. de forma, xxii, q. v. Sed duo vincula 
vincunt unum in Authent., De consanguin. et uterin. fratribus, in principio. 
Confirmatur ratione prioritatis obh'gationis, nam prius est vinculum paternum 
vinculo dominico. Ergo primo ipsum iuvare tenetur, ut 1. potior, et 1. qui 
balneum, ff. Qui potior. in pign. habeantur. Confirmatur. luramentum 
praestitum domino intelligitur salvo vinculo praecedenti, nam ius alteri quas- 
situm non tollitur per secundam obligationem, ut dicta 1. qui balneum, et 1. 
potior. Confirmatur per cap. petitio, De iurciurando. Nam iurando domino 
de ipsum iuvando, non intelligitur iurasse sic quominus seipsum prius iuvet 
quam dominum, quia haec prima caritas, ut 1. prases, C. De servitutibus. Sed 
pater est eadem persona cum filio iuris fictione, ut 1. ult. cum concordantiis, 
C. De impub. et aliis substitutionibus. Ergo. 



icp An clericus videns episcopum suum invasum ex una parte, patrem ex alia, 

uterque pariter, etc. ? 

Quinto quaeritur, pone clericus videt episcopum suum invasum ex una 
parte, patrem ex alia, uterque pariter est in mortis periculo nisi iuventur, nee 
iuvare potest nisi alterum, quern iuvabit, episcopum vel patrem carnalem ? 
Hostiensis in cap. gravem, De excess, prselat., arguit ex verbo " fratri " quod 
ibi ponitur, quod plus astringuntur patribus spiritualibus quam carnalibus. 
Pro hoc facit cap. ii, De translatione. Si ilia opinio esset vera, soluta foret 
quaestio. Sed tamen in hac quaestione credo, ut supra proxima quaestione 
induce, cap. fin. m De postulatione. Nam ibi dicit textus, " si postulaverit 
contra Ecclesiam, et non pro suis, perdit beneficium," ergo e contrario pro suis 



PRO QVIBVS REBVS ? 147 

posset. Induce, cap. petitio, De iureiur. ; inducendo ut supra proxima quae- 
stione induxi, et faciant motiva supra proxima quaestione inducta, et glossa in 
cap. pittacium, xxx, q. iii, super verbo " multo magis," tenet quod in exhibi- 
tione temporalium magis tenemur patri carnali quam spirituali. In exhibitione 
autem reverentiae, econtra. Idem notat glossa xxx dist., can. i. Faciant quae 
notantur Ixxxvi dist., non satis; et can. quiescamus, xlii distinctione. 



fro quibus rebus licitum sit bellum indicere ? [ Ca p. civ.] 

Quia visum est supra hoc membro, an, et pro quibus personis, liceat hoc 
bellum indicere, nunc autem subsequenter quaeritur, an et pro rebus defen- 
dendis licitum sit etiam hoc bellum indicere ? Et circa hoc quaeritur de 
pluribus. 

An liceat pro rebus iuste possessis ? 

Et primo de rebus iuste possessis, et de his non est dubium. Textus est 
in 1. i, C. Vnde vi. Probatur in 1. iii, si quis autem, vers. eum igitm (?> . Alias 
est , ff. De vi et vi armata ; et cap. olim, De restit. spoliatorum. 



An liceat pro rebus iniuste possessis ? [C cv -, 

Secundo quaeritur, an pro rebus iniuste possessis hoc liceat ? Glossa in 
1. i, C. Vnde vi, hoc tractat. Et videtur quod non, a contrario sensu illius 
textus, quod est validum argumentum, ut 1. i, huius rei, ff. De offic. eius cui 
mand. est iurisd., et cap. cum virum, [De convers. coniugatorum] De regu- 
laribus ; et can. hospitiolum, xxxii distinctione. In contrarium videtur per 
textum, 1. i, qui vi a me, ff. De vi et vi arm. ; et 1. cum fundum, eodem tit. ; 
et 1. si cum exceptione, Pedius, ff. Quod met. causa. Solutio. Pro hac 
legum apparenti contrarietate, glossa in dicta 1. i dat plures solutiones. 
Primo, quod ibi subaudiatur " maxime," et tune cessat contrarium, quia etiam 
pro vitiosa possessione licet. Secundo, solvit quod iungatur principium legis 
cum fine, ut dicatur, " recte licet." Sed tune obstat quod dicit lex in medio 
" sine vitio." Ergo, a contrario, secus, ubi cum vitio. Tertio, quod iuste 
possidenti semper licet, sed vitiose possidenti non licet semper. Nam si domi- 
nus incontinenti veniat, non licet vitioso possessori sibi resistere, ut 1. iii, 
eum igitur, ff. De vi et vi armata. Quarto, exponendo recte, id est, non vi, 
non clam, non precario, et haec non placet glossa. Sed lacobus de Ravennate 
sequitur earn, quantum ad eum qui vult propulsare, ut si violentia inferatur 
ab eo a quo vitiose possidet, licet incontinenti, non autem ex intervallo. Si 
autem ab alio vitiose possideat, tune quandocunque licet. Et hoc est quod 
dicit lex, quod adversus extraneos vitiosa possessio prodest, ff. Vti possid., 1. 
H ; ff. De acquir. poss., 1. ultima ; ff. Si servit. vind., 1. loci corpus, com- 



148 DE IVRE BELLI 

petit. Hie videtur sentire lacobum quod clandestinum possessorem licitum 
sit mihi expcllere, si a me clam possideat, quia clandestina possessio est vitiosa, 
ut ff. De acquir. poss., 1. cum quis. Pro hac opinione facit 1. si servus, fi. 
Quod cum eo. Hanc opinionem videtur sentire glossa, ff. Vti poss., 1. i, 
interdictum, in medio magnae glossae ibi, " nee tamen volo," etc. Dinus ibi 
tenet contrarium, cum nulla lege hoc reperiatur cautum, quod clandestinum 
possessorem liceat mihi expellere. Praeterea dicit lex, " vim vi repellere licet," 
sed qui clandestinam ingreditur, non infert vim, cum differant clandestina et 
violenta, ut 1. clam possidere, qui ad nundinas, ff. De acquir. possessione. 
In precario autem possessore procedere posset opinio lacobi, post denegatam 
restitutionem. Nam tune enim videtur spoliare dominum, ut notatur in 1. 
-ilia, C. De acquir. possessione. 

In hac opinionum varietate crederem secundam solutionem glossae fore 
veram, quam etiam sequitur Petrus de Bellapertica in dicta 1. i, earn tamen 
sic ampliando, " Aut ego volens vim propulsare, iuste possideo, aut iniuste. 
Si iuste, aut volo incontinenti et cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae, et possum, 
ut dicta 1. i ; et 1. i, vim vi, ff. De vi et vi arm. ; aut ex intervallo, et tune 
non possum, ut 1. iii, si quis autem, vers. eum igitur, ff. De vi et vi armata. 
Secundo casu, scilicet cum iniuste possideo, aut possideo iniuste a te, contra 
quern volo vim propulsare, aut ab alio. Si a te, tune aut vi, aut clam, aut 
precario. Si vi, tune aut statim venis, ut recuperes, et non licet mihi re- 
sistere, et sic intelligitur, 1. i, a contrario sensu, C. Vnde vi." Et iste est verus 
et rectus intellectus illius, si bene ponderatur, una cum allegatis in contrarium. 
Si autem venis ex intervallo, tune licet resistere, quia nee tibi ex intervallo 
licet recuperare, auctoritate propria, immo incideres pcenam 1. si quis in tan- 
lam, C. Vnde vi ; et intellige ex intervallo, ut notat glossa ff. De vi et vi arm., 
1. iii, eum igitur. Si autem non possideo vi, sed precario, tune post dene- 
gatam restitutionem licitum est tibi incontinenti vim vi repellere, nee licet mihi 
resistere. Nam denegando videor spoliare, ut 1. vitia, C. De acquir. poss. ; 
et tune procedit quod vim vi repellere licet, ante autem denegatam non pro- 
cederet, licet possem revocare precarium, ut 1. cum precarium, ff. De pre- 
cario. Si autem possideo clandestine a te, tune quidquid dicat glossa in 1. i, 
interdictum, ff. Vti poss., et lacobus de Porta Ravennate, in 1. i, C. Vnde vi. 
Credo cum Dino quod non sit licitum tibi me expellere, sed licet tibi ingredi 
et si te non admisero, extunc sit violenta, ut 1. clam, qui ad nundinas, fi. De 
acquir. poss. ; et tune procederet. Si autem non possideo vitiose a te, sed a 
tertio, tune licet mihi contra te, quandocunque volentem mihi violentiam in- 
ferre, vim vi repellere, ut 1. Fulcinius, quid si adversus, ff. Ex quibus ca. 
in poss. eatur. Haec dixi, salvo iudicio tot et tantorum super hoc dubio dispu- 
tantium, subiciendo dicta quorumcunque correctionibus veritatem perqui- 
rentibus. 



AN CONTRA CLERICVM ? 149 

An, etsi liceat res defendere, defendens etiam cum moderamine inculpates tutelts, [Cap. cvi.i 
si occidat, vel mutilet, evitet pcenam irregnlaritatis ? 

Tertio quaeritur, numquid vim vi repellendo circa res suas, si contingat 
vim repellentem occidere, vel mutilare, vim inferentem, evitet pcenam irregu- 
laritatis ? Et pono ubi hoc faciat cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae, quid alias 
non praecederet quaestio. Et videtur quod evitet. Nam pro defensa personae, 
evitat pcenam illam, ut in Clem., si Juriosus, De homicidio. Ergo pro defensa 
rerum probatur consequentia. Nam iura permittentia vim vi repellere pari- 
ficant personam rebus, quia utroque casu licet, ut 1. i, C. Vnde vi ; et 1. i, 
vim vi, ff. De vi et vi arm. ; et 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter, ff. Ad legem 
Aquiliam. In contrarium facit dicta Clemen., si furiosus, De homicidio. 
Nam ibi textus loquitur stricte de occisione vel mutilatione occisoris et sui. 
Et hanc credo veram, et moveor ex hoc. Nam irregularitatem contrahit quis 
occidendo vel mutilando, et sine dolo, ut patet in iudice, li dist., qui in aliquo ; 
et casu occidente, ut notat 1 dist., de his ; et cap. sicut dignum, De homicid. ; 
et cap. sententiam, Ne cler. vel monach. ; et cap. in archiepiscopatu, De rapto- 
ribus. Quilibet igitur occidens qualitercunque irregularis efficitur, nisi in 
casibus exceptis a iure. Cum igitur excipiatur casus defenses, intelligetur ille 
casus stricte et modificate, ut ius excipit cum sit ius exorbitans, et sic stricte 
intelligendum, ut regula quce a iure, De reg. iur., Lib. VI. 



An pro rebus suis defendendis contra clericum, excommunicationem incidat, ic ap . 

manus iniciendo ? 

Quarto quaeritur, an pro rebus suis vim vi repellendo contra clericum 
incidat excommunicationem, manus iniciendo ? Apparet quod sic, per capi- 
tulum si quis suadente, xvii, q. iv ; et cap. nuper, cum ibi notatis, De sent, 
excommunicationis. Confirmatur. Nam incidit pcenam irregularitatis, ut 
supra proxima quaestione. Ergo et hanc, cum ambae sint pcenae spirituales, et 
facilius quis incidat excommunicationem quam irregularitatem, ut claret. 
Solutio. Innocentius in cap. olim, De restit. spoliatorum, tenet quod non 
incidat excommunicationem vim vi repellens, si alias, nisi manus iniciendo, non 
possit vim repellere, et hoc faciat cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae. Hanc 
opinionem credo veram, et moveor, quia et quis incidat excommunicationem 
per manus iniectionem in clericum violentam, debet subesse diabolica persua- 
sio, quod probat textus in cap. si quis suadente diabolo, xvii, q. iv. Et si bene 
discurras per iura infligentia pcenam excommunicationis propter manum iniec- 
tam, non invenies quod manus iniecta in clericum hoc casu sit aliqua de manibus 
de quibus iura exprimunt sic puniendo. Nam iura puniunt manum violentam, 
ut praedicto cap. si quis suadente, xvii, q. iv; et De sent, excom., pet totum. 
Haec non est talis, immo est violentiae repulsoria. Puniunt temerariam, ut in 
cap. contingit, De sent, excommunicationis. Haec non est talis, immo discreta 
lege permittente, puniunt quasi violentam manum, ut cap. nuper, eod. titulo. 



150 DE IVRE BELLI 

Haec est vera man us et permissa. Puniunt necem, ut cap. univcrsitatis, ut 
cum mandatur percuti ; et cap. cum quis, eod. tit., Lib. VI. Puniunt animum, 
ut dicto cap. cum quis, ut cum ratum habet suo nomine factum. Puniunt neg- 
lectum, ut cap. quanta, eod. titulo. Hie nihil de praedictis. 

Ad allegata in contrarium facile est respondere. Ad canonem s; quis 
suadente, est responsum per supra dicta. Ad id quod dicitur de irreguhuit 
clara est ratio differentiae. Nam excommunicationem nemo incidit sine dolo, 
irregularitatem sic, de quo dicitur, ut notat glossa, in Clem, si furiosus, saepius 
allegata in paenultima glossa. 



[c P .criH.) An p ro re b us defendendis, vocatis amicis, licitum sit subsidiinn impcndcrc ? 

Quinto quaeritur, an licitum sit, pro repulsa violentiae circa res, advocarc 
amicos, et eis licitum sit subsidium impendere ? Glossa in 1. iii, eum igitur, 
ff. De vi et vi armata, notat quod sic ; etiam illata violcntia in rebus. Et hanc 
credo veram, et moveor. Nam, ut dicunt iura, licitum est obviare errori, ubi 
obviari potest. Alias non obvians consentire videtur, Ixxxiii dist., error, et * 
cap. qui consentit, cum cap. sequenti. Igitur licitum est amicis in hoc iuvare 
proximum suum, ut supra dictum est, quia hoc provenit ex radice caritatis, ut 
cap. proximos, De Pcenit., dist. ii. Et si hoc licitum est, statim solvitur quae- 
stio qua quaeri posset, an incidat excommunicationem manus iniciens in cleri- 
cum, sic violentiam propulsando, pro rebus proximi. Quia non incidit, cum 
non sit aliqua de punitis a canone, immo est permissa. 



(C* P . rii.] An pro rebus licitum sit contra omnes vim vi repeUere contra quos licitum est 

pro personis ? 

Sexto quaeritur, an pro rebus licitum sit contra omnes vim vi repellere 
contra quos licitum est pro personis ? Solutio. Quod sic, in personis qua; 
valent habere bona, ut excludam servos, monachos, et similes. Fateor tamrn 
quod moderamen tutelae diversificari debet, attenta varia personarum quali- 
tate. Nam aliter, et mitius, contra patrem quam contra penitus extrancuni, 
et sic de singulis quae consideranda venirent, inspectis singulis circumstantiis, 
cum non sint haec iure limitata, ut 1. i, ad finem, ff. De iure deliber. ; et cap. 
de causis, De offic. iud. delegati. 



(Cap.cz.) An pro rebus depositis vel cotnmodalis liccat rim ri rcpcllcrc ? 

Septimo quaeritur, an pro rebus depositis et commodatis Mt licitum vim 
vi n prllnv ? Et videtur qviod non, per 1. i, C. Vnde vi, quae loquitur de pos- 
sessis, et iuste. At haec non possidentur per commodatarium vel depositarium, 
ergo non licet in hi> vim vi repellere. Solutio. In his et similibus, vindicat 

* Sfpplenium " xi, q. iii.". 



QVALITER LICITVM ? 151 

sibi locum quod liceat vim vi repellere, nam pro talibus interdictum vi bono- 
rum raptorum competit depositario, vel commodatario, si haec sint rapta, ut 1. 
prcetor ait quce est lex, in hac actione, ff. Vi bonorum raptorum. Ergo multo 
magis ipsis defensa conceditur, ut regula invitus, cui damus, ff. De reg. 
iuris ; et 1. una, ff. De fonte ; regula qui ad agendum, De reg. iur., Lib. VI ; 
etiam quia isti tenentur. Ergo. Non obstat 1. i, C. Vnde vi, quia licet loqua- 
tur in possessione, non tollit tamen quominus in aliis detentatis, pro quibus 
iura detentantibus actiones concedunt, ut supra. Vel die quod verbum " pos- 
sidere " sumitur large, ut implicet iustam detentationem, ut 1. officium, ff. 
De rei vindic. ; et nota in cap. pastoralis, De causa possessionis et proprietatis. 



Qualiter liceat hoc particulare bellum indicere ? [Cap. ci.) 

Circa septimum principaliter quaesitum, videlicet, qualiter sit licitum vim 
vi repellere ? est videndum. 

Quomodo licitum sit vim vi repellere cum moderamine inculpatce tutelce ? 
Et huic respondet textus quod licet cum moderamine inculpatae tutelar. 

Quid sit " moderamen inculpatce tutelar," et qua in eo requirantur ? 

Sed in dubium revocatur quid velint haec verba, hoc est, quas sunt ilia 
quae requiruntur ad hoc moderamen ? Communiter doctores dicunt quod sunt 
ilia quae aequivalent illatae violentiae, in qualitate armorum, in cursu temporis. 
Item aequivalentia in ipso actu violento ne alias excedendo censeatur vindicta, 
sed circa hoc dubitatur. 



An liceat vili et debili cum ense se defendere contra fortem et robustum, pugno [Cap. ii.j 

tantum percutientem ? 

Et primo pone fortis et robustus homo vult me percutere pugno, ego sum 
vilis, qui non possum resistere pugno. Numquid liceat mihi defendere me cum 
ense ? Videtur quod sic, quia aequalitas ubique est ponderanda, ut 1. ult., C. 
De fruc. et lit. expen. ; et 1. si cum dies, ff. De arbitr. ; regula in iudiciis, De 
reg. iuris, Lib. VI. In contrarium videtur. Nam, si quis vult mihi violenter 
surripere, et ego, viribus corporis impar, ipsum percutio cum ense, impune 
iam fieret compensatio corporis ad rem, quod esse non debet, ut 1. ult., C. De 
sacrosanct, ecclesiis. 

lacobus de Arena distinguit, aut quis vult propulsare violentiam illatam 
personae, aut illatam rebus. Primo casu, licet et cum armis et qualitercunque, 
si res aliter reparari non potest, ut 1. si quis, De appell., Codicis. Nam si 
possum occidere furem ubi non cognosce, et si non potest mihi in rebus furatis 
provideri per iudicem, ut 1. furem, ff. Ad legem Corneliam de sica. ; multo 
magis licet occidere ubi persona aliter salva esse non posset. Secundo casu 



152 DE IVRE BELLI 

quando pro rebus, tune aut violentia rebus illata per viam iudicii reparari 
potest, et tune non licet qualitercunque, inimo cum qualitate armorum, non 
autem factorum, quia non debeo personam percutere pro defensione rei, ubi 
tiam aliter salva esse non possit, dummodo per viam iudicii reparari possit. 
Si autem per iudicium non potest reparari, tune licet qualitercunque defen- 
dere, etiam personam occidendo, ut 1. furem, ff. Ad legem Corneliam de 
sicariis. Et sic intelligitur 1. i, C. Vnde vi ; et 1. iii, eum igitur, ff. De vi 
et vi arm. Sic igitur intcllige moderamen inculpatae tutelae. 



[Cap. iii.] An, etsi liceat incontinenti se defendere, quomodo intelligatitr 

illud " incontinenti " ? 

Secundo quaeritur circa concursum temporis, quia dicunt textus quod 
debet fieri " incontinenti." Quaeritur quando intelligatur " incontinenti." 
Aliqui dicunt fieri incontinenti, si fiat in ipsa flagrantia facti, si autem fiat iam 
illata iniuria, tune debet iudicem adire. Alii dicunt incontinenti fieri etiam 
si fiat post, antequam divertat ad actus extraneos, ut 1. quod ait, in fine, ff. 
Ad leg. lul. de adulteriis. lacobus et Petrus distinguunt. Aut loquimur de 
violentia illata personae, et tune dicitur repelli incontinenti, si fiat in ipsa fla- 
grantia facti. Sic intelligitur 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter, ff. Ad leg. Aquil. ; 
1. ut vim, ff. De iustit. et iure. Aut loquimur de violentia illata rebus, et 
tune dicitur incontinenti repelli, etiam post flagrantiam facti, dummodo diver- 
tat ad actus extraneos, ut ff. De vi et vi armata, 1. qui possessionem ; et 1. iii, 
eum igitur, eodem titulo. Ratio diversitatis est. Nam illata iniuria per- 
sonae non potest amplius restaurari, sed res ablata recuperari potest, et sic non 
facta diversione ad actus extraneos, etiam si amicos quaerat, et redeat ut recu- 
peret, dicitur incontinenti, ut notat glossa in dicta lege iii, [igitur] eum igitur, 
ff. De vi et vi armata. Sic intellige moderamen in concursu temporis. 



[Cap. iv.| De aquivalentia in ipso actu violento. Qualiter fieri dcbeat? 

Tertio quaeritur de moderamine in aequivalcntia in actu violento, vide- 
licet, quia fieri debet ad defensionem, non autem ad vindictam. Et licet varie 
scribatur, totum hoc ponderari debet inspectis conditionibus personarum. 



icap.cir.) An vindicasse videar, non defendisse, si spoliatorcm meum de possessione mea 
expuli, qui, antequam expellerem eum, satisdare volebat 
de possessione restituenda ? 

Quarto quaeritur, quis expulit me de possessione, et post expulsionem 
paratus est satisdare de restituenda, si appareat eum iuste non fecisse, sed 
nihilominus ipsum expcllo, numquid videor fecisse ad vindictam ? Glossa 



QVALITER LICITVM? 153 

tenet quod sic, in 1. i, C. Vnde vi ; sed communiter glossa reprobatur. Nam 
non debuit se committere illi fragili cautioni, ff. Ad Treb., 1. quia poterat, 
et 1. nam quod, cum similibus. 



An paratum ad me percutiendum exspectare debeam, vel eum prcevenire ? V^t- cxvi -l 

Quinto quaeritur, numquid, si videam aliquem paratum ad percutiendum 
me, an debeam exspectare quod me percutiat, an debeam praevenire. Glossa 
in dicta 1. i arguit pro et contra, et determinat quod non debeam exspectare. 
Petrus dicit glossam intelligendam habita distinctione personarum, nam aliqui 
sunt audaces et prompti ad percutiendum, et tales non sunt exspectandi, aliqui 
timidi, et tales non sunt statim praeveniendi, et sic modificat glossim argutam, 
1. i, C. Si quis Imperatori maledixerit. 



An miles quern vicinus aggreditur, censeatur vim vi repellere, si exspectet et [Cap. vii.j 
percutiat, cum alias fugere valeat ? 

Sexto quaeritur, quidam egregius miles est aggressus a vicino suo, et 
evadere posset fugiendo, tamen, reputans sibi ad vituperium, exspectat, et 
resistit, et percutit, numquid censeatur vim vi repellere ? Apparet quod non, 
per 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter, ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam. Moderni doctores 
tenent contrarium per 1. in eadem, ff. Ex quibus caus. maiores. Nee obstat 
qui cum aliter, quia iste non poterat evadere sine periculo famae suae et honoris 
sui, qu32 non possunt per iudicem reparari, ut 1. lulianus, ff. Si quis omissa 
causa testamenti. 



An si vulneratus, post vulnera insequatur vulnerantem, et ipsum percutiat, puniri 
debeat ut dolosus, vel ut culpabilis ? 

Septimo quaeritur, quidam vulneratus, post vulnera insequitur vulneran- 
tem, et ipsum percutit, quod non licet, ut 1. si ex plagis, i, et 1. qua actione, 
si in colluctatione, ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam ; numquid punietur ut dolosus, an ut 
culpabilis ? Quidam dicunt quod ut culpabilis, quia inconsultus calor vitio 
calumniae caret, ff. Ad S. C. Turpil., 1. i, qu&ri ; ff. Ad leg. Corn, de sica., 
1. [iii] iv, cum quidam ; ff. De pcenis, 1. respiciendum, delinquunt. Alii dicunt 
quod ut dolosus, cum se vindicare non debuerit. lacobus de Arena dicit 
primam opinionem humaniorem, ff. De pcenis, 1. interpretatione ; ff. De reg. 
iur., 1. in totum ; secundam rigidiorem, C. De iniur., 1. si non convicii. Credo 
primam veriorem, etiam de iure, per iura prius allegata. 



154 DE IVRE BELLI 

[Cap. nix. i An violentia illata persona possit per amicos propulsari ? 

Octavo quaeritur, numquid violentia illata pcrsonae possit per amicos 
propulsari, sicut illata rebus, ut notat glossa in enm igitur. Glossa in 1. i, 
C. Vnde vi, dicit quod non, per 1. cum fundum, fi. De vi et vi armata. Alii 
distinguunt, aut amici erant in comitiva violentiam passi, aut non. Primo 
casu, licet, per 1. item apud Labeonem, si quiz virgines, ff. De ininriis. 
Secundo casu, non licet. lacobus de Arena tenet indistincte quod licet. Nam 
si negotia nostra possunt per alios iuvari, ut I. i, ff. De neg. gest., multo magis 
persona, quae rebus praefertur, ut 1. sancimus, C. De sacrosanct, ecclesiis. Pro- 
bare videtur textus in 1. Gracchus, C. Ad legem luliam de adulteriis. Non 
obstat 1. cum fundum, quia ibi mandabatur ex intervallo, quod non liceret 
etiam principal!. Huic opinioni obstat textus 1. ut vim, ubi dicit textus " ob 
tutelam sui corporis," et Clem., si furiosus, De homicidio. 



(Cap.m.| An serviens, de mandato domini sui, ipsius uxorem interficiens excusetur ? 

Nono quaeritur, pone quidam mandavit servienti suo quod uxorem suam, 
quam habebat suspectam de adulterio, occideret, alias ipsum occideret, ser- 
viens interfecit, numquid excusatur ? Videtur quod non. Nam potius debet 
omnia mala pati quam malo consentire, ut 1. isti quidem, in fine, ff. Quod met. 
causa. Videtur textus in 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter, ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam. 
In contrarium facit 1. ut vim, ff. De iustit. et iure ; nam hoc fecit ob tutelam 
sui corporis. Ergo. lacobus de Ravennate distinguit, aut mulier erat alias 
peritura, aut non, ut 1. si quis fumo, ff. Ad leg. Aquil. ; et 1. si alius, est et 
alia, ff. Quod vi aut clam. Petrus tenet indistincte servientem excusari, quia 
fecit ob tutelam sui corporis, ut 1. uf vim ; etiam quia caritas incipit a seipso, 
ut 1. presses, C. De servitut. et aqua ; item quia licet proprium sanguinem redi- 
mere, ut 1. transigere, C. De transactionibus. Ego crederem distinguendum. 
An servienti incumberet necessario mortis propriae periculum, nisi uxorem 
mandantis interficeret, et tune crederem opinionem Petri veram. An foret 
ab'qualis spes salutis, etiam domino resistendo, et tune contrarium crederem, 
per iura supra allegata. 



ICap. cxxi.) @ MIS Sl '* fi n * s Pftfticularis belli ? 

Circa ultimum principaliter quaesitum, videlicet, quis sit finis huius belli ? 
Quaestionis huius patet solutio per supra dicta. Nam conservatio suiipsius 
et bonorum est finis huius belli, et in hoc finah'ter tendit, et propter hoc est 
permissum, ut clare patet per supra deducta. 



DE REPRESALIIS 155 

Quintus tractatus tertii principalis, scilicet, de Particulari Bella quod fit ob [Cap. cxxii.] 
defensam corporis mystici, quod " Represalice " nuncupatur. Vnde et a 
quo ortum habuerint Represalice, et propter quid insunexerint ? 

Ampliando aliqualiter quaesitum et materiam represaliarum, praemit- [Cap.omii.] 
tarn fundamentum, propter quod insurrexerunt represaliae. Quo praemisso, 
examinabo causas examinandas. Ecce Altissimus Creator a principle creavit 
ccelum et terram, et quae in eis sunt, necnon angelicam et humanam naturam, 
spiritualia et temporalia, et ipsa per seipsum rexit, et homini quern creavit 
praecepta dedit, et transgredienti pcenam imposuit, Genesis ii capitulo. Quali- 
ter autem per seipsum rexerit apparet, nam per seipsum, et non per ministrum, 
delicta puniebat. Nam Cain, Lamech, et quosdam alios reges, punivit, ut 
legitur Genesis iv et v capitulis. Et haec mundi gubernatio processit usque 
ad tempora Noe. A tempore autem Noe crepit mundum regere p'er ministros, 
quorum primus fuit Noe, de quo quod fuerit rector populi apparet. Nam 
Dominus commisit sibi gubernationem et administrationem areas, Genesis v 
et vi capitulis. Et per arcam significatur Ecclesia. Et qualiter Dominus Noe 
et filiis commiserit gubernationem legitur Genesis ix capitulo, et, licet Noe 
sacerdos non fuerit, legitur tamen officium sacerdotis exercuisse, antequam 
leges populo darentur, Genesis viii capitulo. In hac autem gubernatione et 
vicaria successerunt Patriarchae, Reges, et ludices, qui fuerunt pro tempore in 
regimine populi ludaeorum. Et ilia duravit usque ad Christum, qui fuit natu- 
ralis Dominus et Rex Noster, de quo legitur in Psalmo, " Deus iudicium tuum 
regi da." Ipse autem Christus duo luminaria dimisit in terris, luminare maius 
et diurnum, scilicet, Summum Pontificem, luminare minus et nocturnum, scili- 
cet, Romanorum Principem, quibus commisit administrationem et guberna- 
tionem mundi, uni in spiritualibus, et alteri in temporalibus. Tempore primi- 
tive, quo Dominus per seipsum gubernabat, non fuit opus represaliis, cum per 
Dominum iustitia exhiberetur. Tempore Noe et successorum, in regimine 
populi ludaeorum, non fuit opus represaliis, cum per ministros iustitia exhi- 
beretur, et subditi de populo recognoscerent superiorem cui obtemperabant. 
Tempore praecedente Summorum Pontificum et Romanorum Imperatorum, 
cum omnes subiciebantur et de iure et de facto, non erat opus represaliis, cum 
per principes, iuris ordine servato, iustitiae complementum exhiberetur. Post- 
quam autem Imperium paulisper crepit exinaniri, adeo quod sint qui de facto 
nullum recognoscunt superiorem, et per eos iustitia negligitur, idcirco fuit 
opus subsidiario remedio, deficientibus ordinariis, quibus exstantibus, ad illud 
nullatenus recurrendum, ff. De minor., 1. in causes ; ff. De oper. nov. nunci., 1. 
in provinciali. Istud autem remedium extraordinarium ortum habuit ex iure 
gentium. Nam est quaedam species belli liciti. Nam licitum est ob tutelam 
corporis sui arma movere, ff . De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim ; C. Vnde vi, 1. i ; De 
restitut. spoliat., cap. olim ; et nedum corporis sui privati et individualis, immo 
et mystici. Nam universitas est unum corpus, cuius partes sunt singuli de 
universitate, ff. Quod cuiuscunque universit., 1. i ; et sic universitati licitum est 
defendere partes sui corporis. Habuit etiam ortum a iure divino, ut legitur 

[12] 



156 DE IVRE BELLI 

xxiii, q. ii, cap. Dominus Nosier. Ex praedictis omnibus infcrtur propter quid 
insurrexerit istud remedium. Nam, finaliter, ut iustitia debitum sortiretur 
effectum, occasionaliter, propter defectum remedii, insurgens a neglectu gu- 
bernantium et rcgentium populos, et carentia recognitionis superiorum de 
facto, quo tempore fuerit opus hoc extraordinario remedio. Ex quo infertur 
quod etiam hodie raro hoc remedium locum sibi vindicat. Nam, negligente 
iudicc saeculari, recursus habendus est ad ecclesiasticum, De foro competenti, 
ex tenore, et cap. licet, et cap. ex parte ; Qui filii sint legitimi, per venerabilem ; 
licet etiam de facto male obtemperetur. Quibus sic praediscussis, restat 
examinandum quae sint causae represaliarum, videlicet. 



|Cap.civ.| De cansis represaliarum. 

Quae sit causa productiva ? Quae formalis ? Quae finalis ? Videndum 
est etiam de quibusdam quaestionibus circa hoc concurrentibus. 

De causa efficiente, sive productiva, represaliarum. 

Ad primum, quae sit causa productiva, hoc est quaerere, quis possit indi- 
cere represalias. Hie attendendum est quod, ut supra dictum est, nulla lege 
positiva, canonica vel civili, disponitur represalias indici debere. Nam 
utraque lege disponitur modus consequendi effectus iustitiae. Immo inhibitum 
est occupare rem propriam, C. Vnde vi, 1. si quis in tantam ; et 1. exstat. ff. 
Quod met. causa. Immo etiam haec expresse inhibentur lege civili et canonica, 
ut in Authent., Vt pign. non fiant ; et cap. uno, De iniur., Lib. VI. Sed defi- 
cientibus iuris positivi remediis, ad hoc fuit habendus recursus, ut fiat belli 
indictio, ne depereat iustitia. Haec autem belli indictio spectat ad ilium solum 
qui superiorem non habet, ut 1. hostes, ff. De captivis. Nam habens supe- 
riorem auctoritate propria, non potest violare iuris remedia. Ille ergo indi- 
cere potest qui superiorem non habet, et de iure, vel de facto. Expedit etiam 
quod ille contra quem indicuntur non habeat superiorem, vel si habet, negligat 
iustitiam facere. Ex quo quidam inferunt quod potestas civitatis, quae non 
recognoscit superiorem de facto, non possit indicere, nisi specialiter habeat in 
mandatis, sed haberi debet recursus ad universitatem, apud quam est plenum 
ius, et eius auctoritate indicentur. Istud non credo verum, ubi universitas 
transtulerit omnimodam potestatem in rectorem, nam tune potest totum quod 
universitas, sicut dicimus in habente generalem cum libera, ut 1. procurator 
qui, ff. De procuratoribus. Secus, si limitatam. Inferunt etiam quodsi Comes, 
Marchio, vel similis, subditus est Principi, quod sine Principis auctoritate 
indici non poterunt, argumentum praedictae regulae quam tradidit in cap. olim, 
i, De restit. spoliatorum. Et haec procedunt loquendo de iure communi. Nam, 
si loquamur secundum dispositionem iurium municipah'um, secundum quae con- 
ceditur facultas indicendi represalias, illi indicere poterunt quibus a lege muni- 
cipali conceditur. Et haec, ut dixi, conceduntur propter urgentem necessitatem, 



DE CAVSIS REPRESALIARVM 157 

sicut aliquando propter necessitatem concedit ius civile facultatetn alicui ius 
sibi dicendi, ff. Quae in fraudem cred., 1. ait prator, si debitor em ; ff. Quod 
vi aut clam, 1. alius, bellissime. Ex praedictis inferri potest quo iure petatur 
indictio represaliarum. Nam si vigore statuti concedantur condictiones, ex 
lege hoc petitur, ff. De condict. ex lege, 1. una. Si autem loquamur secundum 
dispositionem iuris communis, dicunt quidam quod nee actio nee officium inten- 
tatur. Ratio. Nam solo iure gentium haec facultas conceditur, quo iure omnia 
expediebantur via regia, ff. De orig. iuris, 1. ii, in principio. Sic dicunt hodie 
requiri manum regiam, secundum statuta divina et iure gentium. Hoc non 
credo verum. Nam licet facultas non sit nisi servetur modus traditus. Nam 
primo debet recurri ad remedia ordinaria, quibus deficientibus, ad hoc recur- 
ritur, et hoc constare debet iudici requisite, ut indicat represalias, et, si ille, 
contra quern petuntur, monitus comparuerit, auditur pro defensut (sic) , et infra 
dicetur, et sequitur sententia, qua pronuntiatur indicendas, vel non. Quarto 
fuit opus actione vel officio, nam secundum modum petitionis formari debet 
sententia, ut 1. ut fundum, ff . Communi divid. ; et cap. licet Heli, De simonia. 
Confirmatur. Nam licet de iure gentium haec facultas processerit, tamen de 
iure civili approbata est, ex mente ipsius, licet non verbis expressis. Nam est 
ex mente iuris civilis, immo etiam ex verbis, quod contra rebelles et inobe- 
dientes iuri procedatur manu militari, ut 1. qui restituere, ff. De rei vindica- 
tione. Et sic proditum est remedium implorationis officii, ut ad hanc manum 
militarem recurratur, remediis opportunis deficientibus. 



De causa mater iali represaliarum. [Ca P .xv.] 

Restat examinare causam materialem. De materiali ergo causa est viden- 
dum, de materia in qua, de materia circa quam, de materia contra quam, quae 
est obiectum, et de materia ex qua. 

Quid sit materia in qua ? 
Materia in qua est persona vel suppositum, cui haec facultas conceditur. 

Quid sit materia circa quam ? 
Materia circa quam sunt res circa quas facultas haec conceditur. 

Quid sit materia contra quam ? 

Materia contra quam, sive obiectum, est suppositum contra quod conce- 
ditur, ut puta civitas, vel alia universitas. 

Quid sit materia ex qua ? 
Materia ex qua est causa ex qua haec facultas conceditur. 

Redeundo ad examinationem, quaere quibus conceditur haec facultas re- 
presaliandi. Solutio. Civibus conceditur, propter rationem superius tactam. 



158 DE IVRE BELLI 

Nam cives sunt pars mystici corporis, id est, civitatis, ut 1. i, ff. Quod cuius- 
cunque universitatis. Hinc appellata est civitas, quasi civium unitas, ut nota- 
tur in cap. si civitas, De sent, excom., Lib. VI. Et, ut supra deductum est, 
licitum est cuilibet defendere corpus suum, ut 1. ut vim, ff. De iustit. et iurc ; 
et 1. i, C. Vnde vi. Et hoc procedit tarn in corpore mystico quam in indi- 
viduali. Hie quaestiones occurrunt. 

An incolis represalia concedantur ? 

Et primo quaeritur an incolis concedi debcant. Quidam hie distinguunt, 
an incolae subeant onera, et tune concedi debeant ; an non subeant, et tune 
concedi non debeant. Ratio secundi membri. Nam qui non sentit onus, nee 
commodum sentire debet, ut 1. manifestissimi, sed cum in secundam, C. De 
furtis ; regula secundum naturam, ff. De regul. iuris ; et regula qui sentit, Lib. 
VI. Probatur per 1. qui sub prcetextu, C. [De episc. et clericis] De collegiatis 
lib. xi ; et [1. i, C.] ff. De collegiis [lib. xii], collegia si quafucrint illicita. Probatur. 
Nam non habet quis privilegia dignitatis, nisi re ipsa ipsam gesserit, C. De 
consulibus, 1. nemini, lib. xii ; [C.] ff. De excusat. [tut.], 1. sed et milites, 
[quoniam] quessitum ; ff. De testam. mil., 1. paenultima. Hanc opinionem 
non puto veram indistincte, immo puto distinguendum sic. Aut incola non 
subit onera propter eius contumaciam, quia requisitus non vult subire, ut 
tenetur. Nam inter civitatem recipientem quem ad incolatum et incolam, tacite 
oritur quidam contractus ultro citroque obligatorius, quo incola tenetur 
subire onera, ff. Ad municip., 1. i, et 1. incola ; et civitas tenetur ad eius pro- 
tectionem, ut 1. illicitas, ne potentiores, ff. De offic. praesidis. Et hoc casu, 
si denegat adimplere contractum ex parte sua, nee civitas tenetur ipsum 
defendere, nee ille hoc petere potest, ut 1. lulianus, offerri, ff. De act. empti. 
Aut incola non subit onera, quia super hoc privilegiatus est a civitate, qua 
hoc onus remittere potuit, ut 1. si quis in conscribendo, C. De pactis ; et De 
episcop. et cleric., vel a Principe. Et tune incolae concedi debent, nam privilegia 
concessa in eorum favorem redundare non debent in eorum laesionem, C. De 
legibus, 1. quod favor e ; regula quod, ob gratiam, Lib. VI. Et haec intelligas de 
privilegiato post assumptionem. 



lcp.cYi.) An civibus non subicctis iurisdictioni civitatis, et alias non facientibus 

factiones, sint indicendte represalice ? 

Secundo quaeritur, an civibus non subiectis iurisdictioni civitatis, et alias 
non facientibus factiones, sint indicendae repraesaliae. Quidam distinguunt, 
an non sint subeuntes subiecti ex privilegio, ut clerici, ut 1. ii et Authcnt., 
statuimus, C. De episcop. et cleric. ; an propter dignitatem saecularem, ut 1. ii, 
C. Vbi senat. vel clarissimi ; ff. De vacat. mun., per totum ; et talibus sunt 
concedendae, an non subeant propter contumaciam, et tune non. Ratio primi, 
ne redundet in eius laesionem quod in favorem inductum est, et quia in civibus 
ex nativitate perficitur obligatio inter ipsum et civitatem, quae non potest 



QVIBVS CONCEDVNTVR? 159 

mutari, ff. Ad municip., 1. assumptio. Secus in incola, quia in incola non 
perficitur nisi per receptionem, ut 1. i, E. Ad municipalem. Ratio secundi est 
propter contumaciam suam, ut ff. Ex quibus cau. maior., 1. sed etsi per pree- 
torem, sed si dum. 



An civi per conventionem concedantur represcdice contra civitatem originis ? [Cap.oavU.] 

Tertio quaeritur, an civi per conventionem concedantur represaliae con- 
tra civitatem originis ? Apparet quod non, nam ubi ex aliquo facto ius mihi 
quaeritur, si illud fiat meum, non obligor, ut 1. sed et si quis, et regulariter, 
ff. De usufruct, legato. Sed si fiat iniuria huic civi civitati originis, quaeritur 
ius indicendi represalias, ergo contra earn non competit. Confirmatur. Quia 
civitas originis praefertur, ut 1. assumptio, ff. Ad municipalem. Confirmatur. 
Nam civitas originis poterat in subditum suum statuere, antequam efficeretur 
civis alterius per conventionem, nee civitas per conventionem potest conqueri. 
Confirmatur a simili usufructuarii, qui nuntiare potest novum opus omnibus 
praeterquam domino, ut 1. i, in fine, ff. De oper. nov. nuntiatione. Confirmatur 
a simili. Nam, habens Publicianam illam, intentat contra omnes praeterquam 
contra dominum, ff. De Publiciana, 1. ult. Probat textus in 1. de iure, ff. 
Ad municipalem. Nam de his quae aguntur inter civem et civitatem solum 
coram iudice illius civitatis agi debet. Confirmatur. Nam remedium extra- 
ordinarium est, ut supra probatum est, extraordinaria autem remedia non 
dantur filio contra patrem, C. Qui et advers. quos, 1. finali. Sed maior est 
potestas civitatis in civem quam patris in filium, ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ii ; et 
ff. De captivis, 1. postliminium, filius; ff. De castrensi peculio. 

In contrarium probatur. Nam si duo habent eundem subditum, uterque 
potest defendere adversus iniuriam quae ab alio infertur. Nam civitas punit 
patrem offendentem filium, ff. De patri. l?) , per totum. Confirmatur. Nam 
si duo habent ius in re, licet unum ius sit debilius alio, tamen habens ius debi- 
lius agit contra habentem ius potentius, si damnificat rem in qua concurrunt 
ilia duo iura, ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. item Mela, fin., et 1. si dominus servum, 
eodem titulo. Confirmatur. Nam si duo sunt domini eiusdem servi, si unus 
in eum delinquat, potest per alium coerceri, ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. i. Confirma- 
tur. Nam pro iniuria repellenda licet convocare amicos, ff. De vi et vi armat., 
1. iii, eum igitur ; et De homicid., significasti ; De sent, excom., dilecto, Lib. VI. 
Solutio. Quidam dicunt indistincte quod possint indici, et ratio est quia 
facultas indicendi represalias succedit in locum deficientis iurisdictionis. Sed 
si civitas civem offendit, licitum est superiorem adire, ut 1. metum, animad- 
vertendum, ff. Quod met. causa. Ergo deficiente iurisdictione locus est re- 
presaliis. Probatur per 1. sed si ex dolo, ff. De dolo. Confirmatur. Nam 
quaelibet potestas censetur legitima potestas, cum quis bene utitur, non autem 
cum spoliat, ut 1. ei qui fundum, si tutor, ff. Pro emptore ; ff. De furt., 1. 
interdum, qui tutelam, et sic dicunt procedere hinc inde allegata. Ego non 
puto hanc conclusionem sic indistincte veram, sed puto distinguendum an 



160 DE IVRE BELLI 

iniuria irrogata a civitate originis insurgat ex facto precedent! conventionem, 
per quam effectus est civis alterius civitatis, an insurgat ex post commisso. 
Primo casu, non possunt concedi represaliae per civitatem conventionis. Nam 
oportet quod sit pars corporis defendendi, tempore quo iniustitiam patitur. 
Nam ad novam civitatem non transit hoc ius, ff. De servo corrupto, 1. doli, 
fin. ; ff . Depositi, 1. i, si servus ; et 1. quacunque, ff. De oblig. et actionibus. 
Per quae infertur quod facto civi per conventionem post iniustitiam factam 
non debent concedi represaliae. Secundo casu procedit praedicta solutio. 



An civibus et habitis pro civibus, licet limitate, represalite concedantur ? 

Quarto qusritur, quid de civibus et habitis pro civibus, limitate tamen ? 
Ecce potestas civitatis quoad quid est civis, ut 1. cives, C. De incolis. Stipen- 
diarii etiam, ubi merentur stipendium conveniuntur, ut 1. municipes, fin., ff. 
Ad municipalem. Scholares etiam quoad quid, ut protegantur a rectoribus 
civitatum, ut in i, De pecunia constituta ff. ; et Authent., habita, C. Ne fil. pro 
patre. Numquid talibus represaliae sunt concedendae ? Quidam dicunt quod 
pro his, et in his in quibus habentur pro civibus, limitatae sunt concedendae 
represaliae, ut si scholari fiat iniuria in spectantibus ad studium, et militi in 
spectantibus ad militiam, in aliis non, cum in aliis non reputetur de corpore. 



(Cap. cii.j An civibus unius civitatis, qui pacto vel statute tractantur ut cives alterius 

civitatis, per eandem concedi possint represalice ? 

Quinto quaeritur, an, si ex pacto vel statute cives unius civitatis tractari 
debeant ut cives alterius, ipsis concedi debeant represaliae per civitatem in qua 
tractari debent ? Solutio. Ponderanda sunt verba pacti et statuti, nam per 
ilia verba tractentur ut cives, non efficiuntur cives, ut 1. . . . '-"'^ appellatione, 
ff. De verb, significat. ; et ibi notandum, et ibi per lacobum de Arena. Ilia 
igitur verba intelliguntur ut tractantur in his quae de iure communi fieri 
debent, ut 1. ei qui fundum, si tutor, ff. Pro emptore. Ita solvunt quidam. 
Hanc conclusionem non credo veram, immo credo ipsis indici debere. Nam 
fateor quod per ilia verba non est effectus civis, sed ei debentur quae debentur 
civi. Nam hoc probant verba a quibus recedi non debet, nee eorum proprio 
significato, ff. Qui et a quibus, 1. prospexit ; ff. De leg., iii, 1. non aliter ; et 1. 
i, is qui navem, ff. De exercitoria. Sibi ergo concedantur quae civi conce- 
duntur, at illi conceduntur represaliae ut supra deductum est. Ergo. Nee 
obstat quod dicitur quod sibi concedi debent quae de iure communi competunt, 
nam hoc remedium, servata debita forma, non est a iure communi inhibitum. 



icp. cm.] De materia circa quam. 

Restat videre de materia circa quam conceduntur, hoc est de rebus, et 
hoc est clarum. Nam in rebus mobilibus et immobilibus illorum contra quos 
conceduntur, quae repertas fuerint in territorio civitatis concedentis. Sed circa 
hoc quasri potest de pluribus. 



CONTRA RES 161 

An contra res eorum qui capi non possunt vigor e represaliarum indici 

possint represalice ? 

Et primo, an contra res eorum qui capi non possunt vigore represalia- 
rum indici possint represaliae ? Solutio. Si sint personae quae capi non pos- 
sunt, propter inhabilitatem insurgentem ratione aetatis, vel furoris, vel con- 
similium, tune in eorum res exerceri poterunt represaliae, ff. De in ius vocando, 
1. satisque ; in Authent., Vt nulli iudicum, necessarium. Si autem in per- 
sonas exerceri non possunt, propter quandam praerogativam eis a Jure conces- 
sam, ut sunt scholares et ambasciatores, tune nee etiam contra res eorum quas 
deferunt, necessarias pro studio vel ambasciata, non poterunt exerceri, in aliis 
autem sic, ut ff. De publican., 1. si publicanus. Per hoc infertur solutio alte- 
rius quaestionis tritae, ambasciator vel scholaris defert secum res aliorum, num- 
quid in eas exerceri poterunt represaliae ? Die quod non, si sint eis necessariae, 
ut equi et similia, ut 1. censoria, ff. De verb, significatione ; aliter sic. 



An represalice simpliciter indictee exerceri possint contra bona existentia in iCa P .Ki.] 
territorio civitatis contra quam sunt indictee, ut capiantur et 
reducantur in territorium civitatis indicentis ? 

Secundo quaeritur, an represaliae simpliciter indictee exerceri possint 
contra bona existentia in territorio civitatis contra quam sunt indictee, ut 
capiantur et reducantur in territorium civitatis indicentis ? Quidam dicunt 
quod non, quia " extra territorium," etc., ut 1. extra territorium, ff. De iuris- 
dictione [omn. iud.] ; et 1. cum unus, is cuius, ff. De rebus auctor. iudic. 
possidend. ; et cap. ii, De constit., Lib. VI. Praeterea ingredi territorium alie- 
num conceditur causa maioris tumultus. Ergo in dubio non videtur conces- 
sum, ut 1. non est singulis, ff. De reg. iuris. Hanc conclusionem non credo 
veram, nam propter defectum iurisdictionis recurritur ad manum regiam, 
deficiente formula ius sollenniter dicendi, et sic ubique hoc fieri potest, quia 
ubique licitum est cuilibet defendere corpus suum, ut 1. ut vim, ff. De iustit. 
et iure ; et 1. i, C. Vnde vi. Etiam in simplici et generali concessione verba 
debent operari generaliter, ut proferuntur, ff. De leg. praestan., 1. i, gener ali- 
ter ; etiam contingeret represalias nihil operari, ut si contra civitatem distan- 
tem, cuius cives nihil haberent, nee cives accederent in civitate indicente. 
Sic ergo intelligantur, ut in omnem eventum aliquid operari possint, ff. De 
legat., primo, 1. si quando ; ff. De reb. dub., 1. quotiens ; De reg. iur., 1. 
quotiens. 

An, si una civitas inducat represalias contra aliam, potest Rector civitatis [Cap. aaii.j 
indicentis, scribendo Rectori civitatis contra quam, exercere 
represalias in res ibi situatas ? 

Tertio quaeritur, an, si una civitas indicat represalias contra aliam, pos- 
sit Rector civitatis indicentis, scribendo Rectori civitatis contra quam, exer- 
cere represalias in res ibi situatas ? Dicunt quidam quod, licet in executione 



162 DE IVRE BELLI 

sententiae hoc contingat, ut 1. a divo Pio, ff. De re iudicata, i ; et 1. cum utn<s, 
i, De rebus auct. iudic. poss. ; tamen hoc casu non. Et est ratio. Nam in- 
dictio represaliarum est quoddam particulare bellum, ad quod non potest quis 
compellere alium nisi subditum, ut in Vsibus Feudorum. Hie finitur lex 
Conradi, cap. domino. Sic dicere non credo. Nam supponit quod in execu- 
tione sentential possit iudex lator sententiae compellere iudicem bonorum, 
etiam non subditum, ad exsequendum, quod est falsum, quia par in parem non 
habet imperium, ff. De arbi., 1. nam magistraius ; ff. Ad S. C. Trebellianum, 1. 
ille a quo, tempestivum ; De elect., cap. innotuit. Male tamen facit qui non 
exsequitur, adeo quod propter hoc convenietur coram superiore suo, nam donee, 
servata iuris dispositione, iustitia suum consequi potest effectum, non debent 
offendi iuris regulae. In neutro igitur casu vindicat sibi locum compulsio, sed 
utroque casu honeste faciet exsequendo, quia sicut non deficiente iurisdictione 
requisitus debet exsequi, sic, deficiente iurisdictione, cum recurritur ad repre- 
salias, iuvare debet, licet compelli non possit. In civitatibus autem foederatis, 
de quibus in 1. non dubito, ff. De captivis, hoc fatentur de piano. 



[cp. cmiii.) De materia contra quam. 

Restat videre de materia contra quam, quod proprie appellatur subiec- 
tum, circa quod plura quaeruntur. 

An represalice, indictee per unam civitatem contra homines alterius civitatis, 
exerceri possint contra incolas illius civitatis ? 

Et primo quaeritur, an, si civitas Mediolanensis indixit represalias con- 
tra homines Bononienses, vel de Bononia, represaliae exerceri possint contra 
incolas civitatis Bononiae ? Solutio. Ista verba " Bononienses " et " de 
Bononia " idem important, ff. De excus. tut., 1. sed reprobari, amplius, 
et ibi glossa. Sed ista verba " homines Bononienses " respiciunt municipes, 
ut 1. i, ff. Ad municipalem ; et verbum " municeps " est genus ad cives et 
incolas, ut notat C. De incolis, 1. cives. Probat textus ff. Ad municipalem, 
1. filii, municeps. Ergo, inferendo de primo ad ultimum, sequitur quod, 
ex natura verborum, contra incolas exerceri possint represaliae. Et haec vera, 
quando incolae subeunt onera, ut 1. i, Ad municipalem. Secus, si non subeunt. 



|cp.cxniT.) An, eodem themate retcnto, puta si una civitas indixerit represalias contra 

homines alterius civitatis, exerceri possint contra 
eosdem, alibi morantes ? 

Secundo quaeritur, retento eodem themate, ut puta si civitas Mediolanen- 
sis indixerit represalias contra homines de Bononia sive Bononienses, an exer- 
ceri possint contra Bononienses alibi morantes. Quidam dicunt quod sic, quia 



CONTRA QVOS ? 163 

origo non mutatur, ut 1. assumptio, ff. Ad municipalem. Alii distinguunt, an 
indicantur contra homines de provincia, et tune non exercentur contra alibi 
morantes, quia non censentur de provincia, ut 1. provinciales, ff. De verbor. 
signific. ; aut contra homines de una civitate, et tune procedit prima opinio. 
Tertii distinguunt an alibi morentur, tamen intra eandem provinciam, et tune 
contra illos exerceri possunt, aut in alia provincia, et tune secus, per ea quae 
notat glossa in 1. in adoptionem, C. De adoptionibus. Quarti dicunt quod, 
secundum propriam significationem vocabuli " alibi morantes," censentur 
Bononienses, sed secundum communem usum loquendi secus, et communis 
usus loquendi praevalet, ff. De legat., iii, 1. librorum, quod tamen Cassius ; et 
sic contra istos non poterunt exerceri. Alii dicunt quod contra Bononienses alibi 
morantes, onera tamen subeuntes Bononiae, poterunt exerceri. Si x autem non 
subeant, secus, 1. i, ff. Ad municipalem ; et 1. (? > si duas, sed et reprobari, 
amplius, ff. De excusationibus ; et 1. cum scimus, in fine, C. De agric. et censitis. 



An represalia exerceri possint contra cives vel incolas alicuius civitatis, onera [Cap. 
eiusdem subeuntes, qui etiam sunt cives alterius civitatis ? 

Tertio queeritur, an possint exerceri represaliae contra cives vel incolas 
Bononienses, onera subeuntes Bononiae, qui etiam sunt cives Mediolani. Vide- 
tur quod possint contra eos exerceri. Nam si potest civitas indicere contra 
non subditum, multo fortius contra subditum. Confirmatur. Nam proprie- 
tarius potest petere ut usufructuario denegetur ius utendi propter contuma- 
ciam suam, et econtra, ut 1. si proprietarius, et 1. hoc amplius, si cum, et 
sequenti, ff. De damno infecto. A simili ergo hie, in duabus civitatibus in 
eundem civem ius praetendentibus. In contrarium tenent indistincte. Ratio. 
Nam hoc ius succedit in locum deficientis iurisdictionis. Sed civitas in civem 
suum bene potest iurisdictionem exercere, ergo non subicietur represaliis, ut 1. 
i, utique, ff. Si quis test. lib. esse iussus. Praeterea civitas tenetur defen- 
dere civem suum, ergo represaliae indictae non artabunt eum, ut 1. vindican- 
tem, ff. De evictionibus. Praeterea, si quis Mediolanensis artaretur, tune civi- 
tas sic concedens videretur contra seipsam, contra id quod habetur, ff. De 
iur. fisci, 1. in fraudem, neque. Hanc conclusionem non credo veram indi- 
stincte. Immo si de facto non possit artare civitas civem suum, etiam civem 
civitatis contra quam indicuntur represaliae, optime contra eum exercebuntur 
represaliae, nam propter defectum iurisdictionis indicuntur, ut supra pluries 
tactum est. Sed de iure non debet iurisdictio deficere, cum de iure omnes 
subiciantur Principi, ff. Ad leg. Rhod. de iact., 1. deprecatio ; ix, q. iii, cap. 
cuncla per mundum, et cap. per principalem. Sed de facto deficit, quia de 
facto non recognoscunt. Sicut igitur de facto deficere potest cum^non subditus 
iniuriatur, sic et de iure subditus de facto resistere potest, et sic recurri potest 
ad remedium extraordinarium. Fateor tamen quod subditum non artabunt, 
donee specialiter contra subditum processum fuerit iuris ordine servato, nee 
processus sortiri possit effectum propter facti rebellionem. 

[13] 



164 DE IVRE BELLI 

icp. orarii An contra [mililcs] mulieres <" exerceri possint represaliee ? 

Quarto quaeritur, an in [milites] mulieres ^ Bononienses exerceri pos- 
sint ? Apparet quod sic, nam in eis habet locum postliminium, ut 1. i, C. De 
[captivis] postlitninio reversis. Contrarium est verum, nam in persona capi 
non possunt, C. De offic. eius qui vicem alic. iud. obtinet, Authent., sed hodie; 
et C. De execut. rei iudicatae, Authent., sed novo iure. Et ilia facultas, concessa 
a iure gentium, debet intelligi civiliter, ff. De servit., 1. si cut. 



[Cap.nrii.| An contra clericos et alios, etiam clericos coniugatos, exerceri 

possint represaliee ? 

Quinto quaeritur, an contra clericos Bononienses possint exerceri ? Tex- 
tus est quod non, in cap. uno, De iniur., Lib. VI. Quid de clericis coniugatis? 
De his dicendum est, ut cap. uno, De iniur., Lib. VI. 



An Episcopo, negligente facere iustitiam de clericis suis, cum haberi non 

potest ad superiorem recursus, quia Episcopus est schismaticus, 

possint indici represaliee contra clericos eosdem 

per iudicem seecularem ? 

Sexto quaeritur, an, si Episcopus negligat facere iustitiam de clericis 
suis, nee haberi potest recursus ad superiorem, quia Episcopus est schismati- 
cus, an possint contra clericos indici represaliae per iudicem ssecularem ? Qui- 
dam in hoc dubitant. Nee est dubitandum, quia laicis nulla concessa est pote- 
stas contra clericum, qualitercunque delinquentem, ut cap. contingit, et cap. 
in audienlia, De sent, excom. ; et cap. si iudex laicus, eod. tit., Lib. VI. Pote- 
runt ergo coerceri per superiorem suum, et poterit haberi recursus ad iudicem 
saecularem per viam invocationis, ut cap. i, De offic. iud. ord. ; xxiii, q. v, 
regum, et cap. administrator es, et cap. principes. 



.) A n contra Bononienses, vel alios studentes Bononiee, euntes Paduam pro 

studio, exerceri possint represaliee ? 

Septimo quaeritur, an contra Bononienses euntes Paduam pro studio pos- 
sint exerceri, vel etiam studentes Bononiae ? Textus est quod non, in Authent., 
habita, C. Ne fil. pro patre ; et hoc vindicat sibi locum, si studeant iura in 
locis privilegiatis, privilegio studii, secus autem si in aliis studeant iura, ut in 
prooemio, ff. ''', hcec autem tria. In aliis autem facultatibus ubique doceri 
potest, ut 1. si duas, cum autem <*>, ff. De excusationibus. Et quod dictum est 
de scholaribus, idem dicas de scriptoribus, ct de bedellis et accedentibus causa 
scholarium. Arguit 1. i, ff. De milit. testam. militis ; et 1. una, De bon. poss. 



CONTRA QVOS ? 165 

ex testam. militis. Idem de patre et aliis agnatis qui irent ad videndum filium 
et agnatum in studio, ff. De iudiciis, 1. ii, item, in glossa super verbo 
" venerit." 



An contra ambasciatores indici possint represalia ? [Cap. 

Octavo quaeritur, an contra Bononienses ambasciatores possint exerceri ? 
Solutio. Non poterunt, ut 1. fin., De legation. ; ff. De iudic., 1. ii, legatis, 
et nota C. De iurisd. omn. iud. et de foro competenti, cap. finali. 



An contra euntes ad nundinas, ad Sanctum lacobum, vel alias ad alium locum (Cap. c*i.] 
indulgenticz. Item an contra navigantes, et an contra illos qui 
in ius vbcari non possunt, et multis aliis casibus, 
exerceri possint represalia ? 

Nono quaeritur, an contra Bononienses euntes ad nundinas possint exer- 
ceri ? Textus est in 1. una, C. De nundinis, quod non. An contra Bono- 
nienses euntes ad Sanctum lacobum, vel aliam peregrinationem, possint exer- 
ceri ? Respondeo, non, ut De cleri. peregri., per totum ; et cap. si quis Romi- 
petas, xxiv, q. iii ; C. Communia de success., Authent., omnes ; ibi libere. Idem 
de euntibus ad locum indulgentiae, propter tenendum hospitium, vel aliquid 
simile, in servit'ium accedentium pro indulgentia. An contra Bononiam navi- 
gantes, qui vi ventorum deferuntur ad civitatem indicentem, exerceri pote- 
runt ? Respondeo, non, per Authent., navigia, C. De furtis. Ad idem, C. 
De naufragiis, 1. i, [lib. xi]. An etiam contra illos qui in ius vocari non possunt 
poterunt exerceri, qui enumerantur in 1. ii, ff. De in ius vocando ? Respondeo, 
non. Ratio. Nam si forent condemnati, non possent capi, multo minus pro 
delicto vel debito alterius, hoc fieri potent. Ex quo infertur quod, si Bono- 
niensis eligeretur in potestatem Mediolani, ibi non posset detineri vigore re- 
presaliarum. Idem si Bononiensis iret ad civitatem Mediolani propter funus 
consanguinei. Idem in similibus casibus, qui enumerantur in dicta leg. ii, ff. 
De in ius vocando. 



An contra Bononiensem potestatem, Mediolani ibi iniustitiamfacientem, [Cap. c 
possint concedi represalite ? 

Decimo quaeritur, an contra Bononiensem potestatem, Mediolani ibi 
iniustitiam facientem, possint concedi represaliae ? lacobus de Belvisio, in 
Authent., Vt non fiant pignor., tenet quod sic, per 1. i, ff. Quod quisque 
iuris. Alii distinguunt, an fecerit talem iniustitiam pro qua conveniri non 
possit officio durante, vel sit talis qui conveniri non possit, ut 1. pars 
literarum, ff. De iudic. ; et 1. nee magistratus, ff. De iniuriis ; et tune 
non possunt indici. Finite autem officio, poterunt indici, prius requisite 
syndicatore, nee debet requiri iudex civitatis suae, quia ibi non debet con- 



i66 DE IVRE BELLI 

vcniri ratione tails commissi, C. Vbi de ratiociniis agi oportet, 11. i et ii ; et 
C. Vt omnes tarn civil, quam militates, 1. i ; et in Authent., Vt iudi. sine 
quoque suff., necessitate. Si autem tales sint qui conveniri possunt, tune 
poterunt indici. Hanc solutionem non puto veram in hoc secundo membro, 
nam represaliae indicuntur in defectum iurisdictionis deficientis. Si ergo 
durante officio conveniri possunt, et in loco commissi, ut in 1. ii, C. Vbi de 
ratiociniis ; et Vt omnes tarn civil, quam militares, 1. i ; ad quid est opus repre- 
saliis ? Nee puto veram in primo membro, ubi dicitur quod finito officio pos- 
sunt indici, nam finito officio possunt conveniri, et iuris forma servari. Ergo 
non est opus hoc remedio. Fateor tamen quod utroque casu, ubi per viam 
iuris non posset arceri, recurrendum esset ad represalias, et hoc casu non est 
requirendus iudex civitatis propriae, quia super hoc non potest ius facere per 
iura superius allegata. 

icap.aiii.] An contra officiates potestatis, vel rectoris, iniustitiam facientis, indici 

possint represalia ? 

Vndecimo quaeritur, an contra officiales potestatis, vel rectoris, iniusti- 
tiam facientis, possint indici represaliae ? lacobus de Belvisio tenet quod sic. 
Alii dicunt hoc verum, ubi officiales expresse iuraverunt ffl rectorem ad facien- 
dam iniustitiam, ut C. De advoc. diver, iud., 1. per hanc ; C. De excus. milit., 
1. paen., lib. x^. Si autem officiales expresse contradixerunt, non possunt 
contra tales indici, 1. quoniam, C. De appellationibus. Si autem officiales nee 
consentiunt nee contradicunt, quia absentes vel ignorantes, tune etiam non 
possunt, ut 1. i, in princ., ff. De magistr. conveniendis. Si autem sint prae- 
sentes, nee consentiant nee contradicant, tune si sint officiales deputati ad 
merum officium, qui non vocantur ad consilia, ut sunt notarii et socii et taber- 
narii, tune etiam contra tales non poterunt indici, ff . De magistr. conveniendis, 
1. i. Et ratio. Quia non possunt resistere, ut C. Vt omnes tarn civil, quam 
militares, 1. i, officium. Si autem sint officiales assumpti ad consulendum, 
contra illos poterunt indici. 



[c*p.cxim.) An contra Consults, Prior es, civitatis, iustitiam facere denegantes, indici 

possint represalia ? 

Duodecimo quaeritur, an contra Priores, Consules, civitatis, denegantes 
facere iustitiam, possint indici ? lacobus de Belvisio dicit quod sic. Alii 
dicunt hoc verum contra praesentes, secus tamen contra absentes, quia contra 
eos, ut Consules, indici non poterunt, ut 1. i, in princip., ff. De magistr. 
conveniendis. 

(Cp. niiv.) An contra singulares personas, penitus innocents, proptcr delidum domini, 
vel alterius privati, de quo iustitia non fit, indici possint represalia ? 

Tertiodecimo quaeritur, an contra singulares personas possint indici, qua? 
sint penitus innocentes, propter delictum domini, vel alterius privati, de quo 



CONTRA QVOS ? 167 

non fit iustitia ? lacobus de Belvisio dicit quod non, quia non debet quis gra- 
vari pro delicto alterius, Regula non debet, De reg. iuris., Lib. VI. Alii contra, 
per cap. dominus, xxiii, q. ii. Nam sententia interdict! puniuntur singuli, etiam 
innocentes, ut cap. si sententia, De sent, excom., Lib. VI. Etiam in bello iusto 
capiuntur innocentes, sed represaliae sunt quoddam bellum particulare, etiam 
licet captus sit innocens, tamen civitas habet ius in eum, et hoc videtur servari. 



An contra homines subditos, quoad quid, uni civitati, non autem plene, possint [Cap. 

indici represalice ? 

Quartodecimo quaeritur, an contra homines subditos, quoad quid, civi- 
tati Bononiae, non autem plene, indici possint represaliae ? Solutio. Si sint 
civitates vel universitates simpliciter suppositae civitati Bononiae, sed ex pacto 
habent aliquas exceptiones vel iurisdictiones, contra istas indici non poterunt, 
quia non sunt subditae quae sunt liberae, sed quoad quaedam se subiecerunt. Et 
contra istas, propter delictum domini habentis eas subiectas, non indicentur 
represaliae, quia sunt liberae, ut 1. non dubito, ff. De captivis ; sed propter 
delictum dictarum civitatum, indici poterunt represaliae, sicut et bellum licitum 
fieri potent. 



An contra cerium genus hominum, facer e iustitiam denegantium, indici icap. 

possint represalice ? 

Quintodecimo quaeritur, an contra certum genus hominum, iustitiam fa- 
cere denegantium, represaliae possint indici ? et dicendum quod sic, servata 
forma. 



De materia ex qua. [Cap. ivii.j 

Restat videre de causa material! ex qua insurgunt represaliae. Et est 
defectus iurisdictionis. Nam primo debet requiri iudex, qui si negligat, nee 
haberi potest recursus ad superiorem, tune concedi possunt. Sed circa hoc 
quaeri potest de pluribus. 

An requiri debeat iudex ut iustitiam facial, antequam represalice concedantur ? (Cap. c*iviii.] 

Et primo quaeritur, quis debeat requirere iudicem ut iustitiam faciat ? 
Solutio. Pars iniuriam passa, et iudice negligente, debet adire Rectorem 
civitatis propriae, et facere fidem de requisitione et neglectu, et petere ut 
iterate requirat ut iustitiam faciat, et tune, eo negligente, poterunt indici. 
Quod autem requiratur partis requisitio probatur in Authent., Vt differ, 
iudices, in princip., coll. iii. 



i68 DE IVRE BELLI 

ic*p. nii..j A n iudex ininriam passi, qui non audet litigare in civitate iniuriam inftrcntis, 
possil scribere, ut in alias iurisdictionem proroget, vel arbitros eligat ? 

Secundo quaeritur, an, si pars dubitaret litigare in civitate iniuriam in- 
fcrentis, propter eius potentiam, an iudex suus possit scribere ut in alios pro- 
roget iurisdictionem, vel eligat arbitros iure civili pro certis personis, utpote 
miserabilibus ? Hoc clarum quod sic, ut 1. i, in fine, C. Quando Imperator 
inter pup. vel viduas. lure canonico hodie latius permissum est per cap. 
staiutum, cum vero, De rescriptis, Lib. VI, quoad articulum impetrationis. 



icp. ci.) Quis iudex requiri debeat ut iustitiam facial ? 

Tertio quaeritur, quis iudex requiri debeat ut iustitiam faciat ? Solutio. 
Primo debet requiri iudex civitatis iniurantis, et tune, si negligit iustitiam 
facere, adibit proximum superiorem, quo deficiente, adibit Principem, in 
Authent., Vt differ, iudic., in principio. Quibus omnibus deficientibus indi- 
centur represaliae per civitatem propriam, quae succedit in locum deficientis 
iurisdictionis. Si autem non negligit, sed iniustitiam facit, pronuntiando 
inique, tune si civitas habeat iudicem appellationis deputatum ad ipsum, per 
appellationem adibitur, et si non habeat, indicentur represaliae. Nam est 
quid imputari civitati quae non deputavit iudicem appellationis. Sin autem 
duo iudices appellationum iniustitiam fecerint, tune videtur pars destituta 
omni subsidio, cum non liceat tertio appellari, nee videntur posse indici repre- 
saliae, cum non defecerit iurisdictio. Sed dici potest quod, si ob gratiam partis 
inique pronuntiaverunt, tune peti potent restitutio, ut 1. prcefecti pratorio, ff. 
De minoribus. Si autem ob gratiam illorum qui regunt, tune parti tenerentur 
ad interesse, ut C. Ne liceat potent., 1. i ; et De his qui potent., 1. i ; et sic ad 
interesse tenentur actione in factum, ff. Pro socio, 1. nee quidquam. Si autem 
inique lata sit ex solo iudicis motu, tune est destituta omni subsidio, ut supra 
deductum est. 

IC*P. di.) Qualis iniustitia requiratur, ut represalite concedaniur ? 

Quarto quaeritur, qualis iniustitia requiritur ut represaliae indicantur ? 
Solutio. Pro modico non indicuntur, cum hoc sit remedium extraordinarium, 
quod non datur pro modico, ut 1. scio, ff. De in integr. restit. ; et 1. si oleum, 
ff. De dolo. Requiritur etiam quod totaliter sit ius laesum. Secus, si partiali- 
ter, ut 1. quotient, C. De preci. Imperat. offerendis. Nam totaliter iustitiam 
non facit, C. De sends fugit., 1. mancipia; et 1. iv, in eum, ff. De damn, 
infecto. 



ic*p. ciaj Quando dicatur non posse haberi copia superioris, ut sit locus represaliis ? 

Quinto quaeritur, quando dicatur non posse haberi copia superioris, ut 
sit locus indictioni represaliarum ? Solutio. Vbi non potest haberi de iure, 
nee de facto, tune est opus represaliis, ut cap. dominus, xxiii, q. ii ; et 1. nullus, 



QVIS POTEST IMPEDIRE ? 169 

C. De ludseis. Si autem de iure haberi potest, non tamen de facto, quia non 
obediunt, tune idem. Si autem haberi potest de facto, non de iure, ut quia 
tyrannus occupavit, tune die ut notat Innocentius in cap. nihil, De electione. 
Si autem haberi potest de iure, sed difficile est haberi de facto, utpote Impera- 
tor cum sit valde distans, et pars est pauperrima, tune etiam locus est repre- 
saliis, ff. De pig. act., 1. si servos; ft. De divers, [et] temp, praescriptionibus. 



De causa formali. [Cap. 

Restat videre de causa formali, et haec est duplex, nam est forma indi- 
cendarum, et est forma exercendarum. Forma autem indicendarum implicat 
formam defensionis illius contra quern indicuntur, et circa hoc etiam de pluri- 
bus quaeritur. 

Quo iure represalicz concedantur ? 

Et primo quaeritur, quo iure concedantur. Hie dicunt aliqui quod con- 
cedantur per illos qui non recognoscunt superiorem. Ab illis hoc peti non 
debet iure actionis, nee per officium, sed debet requiri manus regia, per quam 
omnia expediebantur, ut 1. ii, ff. De orig. iuris. Solum enim illud requiritur 
quod ius gentium requirebat, scilicet, quod causa propter quam conceduntur 
sit vera, salvis tamen defensionibus illi contra quem, cum hoc sit iuris naturalis, 
ut in Clem., pastoralis, ceterum, De re iudicata ; et habenti represalias suf- 
ficit ostendere concessionem sine alio processu. Et recte praesumuntur cetera 
agitata, nam instar est sacrilegii disputare de iudicio Principis, ut 1. disputare 
[sacrilegii], C. De crimine sacrilegii. Et haec vera in territorio concedentis, 
verum quia gens contra quam conceduntur uti posset eodem iure, per titulum 
Quod quisque iuris. Et finaliter ex pacto de hoc deberet^ cognoscere, ut puta 
arbitri, vel alii. Incumberet onus probandi illi cui sunt concessae servata fore 
ea quae iure gentium requiruntur. Ideo tutius est quod fiat processus, et.in 
scriptis redigatur. Et hoc tenet Archidiaconus in cap. unico, De iniuriis, Lib. 
VI. Nam tenet quod praecedere debet monitio et sententia super neglectu, et 
ita sentit Guido, Concordensis episcopus. Si autem represaliae petuntur ab 
illis quibus hoc concessum est a statutis, tune si statutum tradit ordinem, ille 
debet servari. Si autem nullum tradit ordinem, tune, quia facultas conce- 
dendi represalias procedit a jure civili, cum statuta sint ius civile, ut 1. omnes 
populi, ff. De iustit. et iure ; tune debet implorari officium officialis, libellus 
porrigi, pars citari, et procedi ut disponunt iura. 



Quis comparere possit ad impediendum ne represaliee indicantur ? [Cap. ciiv.) 

Secundo quaeritur, quis comparere possit ad impediendum ne indicantur ? 
Solutio. Quilibet cuius interest, De testib., cap. veniens ; De re iudi., cap. cum 
super. Interest autem populi contra quem indicuntur, sic ut, habens manda- 



J?o DE IVRE BELLI 

turn, admittetur, et quilibet de populo sine mandate admit tetur, quia cuiuslibet 
interest, ff. De novi oper. mint., 1. in provinciali, fin. Admittentur etiam 
illi qui sunt de populo indicentis, quia interest ne iniuste indicantur, ne eodem 
iure utantur contra cos, ff. Quod quisque iuris, in rubro, et per totum nigrum. 



[Cap. civ.) Qua defenses competunt illi contra quern indicuntur ? 

Tertio quaeritur, quae defensae competunt illi contra quem petuntur ? 
Solutio. Competit exceptio, quod petens non habet ius petendi, vel ratione 
personae, vel iuris incompetentis, vel quod paratus est emendare, ut cap. Domi- 
nus Noster, xxiii, q. ii. An possit pacto renuntiari huic iuri ? Ecce eligitur 
Rector civitatis Bononiae qui iurat non petere represalias contra civitatem, 
numquid obstabit exceptio renuntiationis ? Solutio. Si passus est iniuriam 
propter iniquam condemnationem, tune, quasi in modum appellationis, recur- 
ritur ad iudicem proprium, in locum deficientis iurisdictionis, sed sic renun- 
tiari potest appellationi, ut 1. ult., C. De temp, appellationum. Si autem 
passus sit iniuriam, tune pactum nullum operatur effectum, quia remitteretur 
dolus futurus, ut 1. si unus, illud, ff. De pactis ; et 1. convenire, ff. De pact, 
dotalibus. 



[Cap. rivi i Qualiter constabit de iniustitia facia, vel ea denegata ? 

Quarto quasritur, qualiter constabit de iniustitia facta, vel ea denegata ? 
Solutio. Per acta primi iudicis, vel per testes, et requiri potest primus iudex, 
ut faciat copiam actorum, et si non faciat, hoc est iniustitiam facere, ut 1. ii, 
C. Vt lite pendente. 



tcp. civil.] An, si aliqua capiantur vigore represaliarum, detineri valeant, ut ex primo 

decreto, an secundo ? 

Quinto quaeritur, an, si aliqua capiantur vigore represaliarum, detineri 
valeant ut ex primo decreto, an ex secundo. Solutio. Si indictae sunt repre- 
saliae, parte citata et comparente, et lata fuerit super hoc sententia, tune ea 
detinentur ex causa iudicati, ut ff. De re iudic., 1. a divo Pio. Si autem non 
compareat, tune primo dabitur licentia, ut capiat ex primo decreto, ut affectus 
taedio veniat, et si contumax perse veraverit, tune dabitur licentia detinendi ex 
secundo decreto. 



icp. eww.j De forma exercendi represalias. 

Restat videre de forma exercendi represalias indictas, et circa hoc quse- 
ritur de pluribus. 



DE PERSONIS ET REBVS CAPTIS 171 

An liceat illi cui sunt concessa represalice, auctoritate propria, vel per 
ministros concedentis, capere homines contra quos indicuntur ? 

Et primo quaeritur, an liceat illi cui sunt concessse represaliae auctoritate 
propria, vel per ministros capere homines contra quos indicuntur ? Solutio. 
lacobus de Belvisio tenet quod non licet auctoritate propria capere personas 
nee res, sed iudiciaria, ut 1. miles, ff. De re iudicata. Supplent quidam hoc 
verum, si potest haberi copia iudicis, alias auctoritate propria licebit, ff. Quae 
in fraud, cred., 1. ait prcetor, si debitor em ; C. De decur., 1. generali. Et 
hoc puto verum. Ponderari tamen debet modus facultatis concessae, et ille 
servandus, De rescriptis, cum dilecta ; et 1. diligenter, ff. Mandati. 



An personas et res capias teneatur capiens prcesenlare iudici, vel sibi retinere? [Cap.ciu.j 

Secundo quaeritur, an personas captas et res teneatur capiens praesentare 
iudici, an possit retinere sibi ? Solutio. lacobus de Belvisio tenet quod tene- 
tur praesentare iudici, per 1. non est singulis, ff. De regul. iuris ; ne riant 
illicitae exactiones, ut 1. illicitas, ff. De offic. praesidis. Alii dicunt hoc pro- 
cedere in personis captis, quae debent ad iudicem duci, ut 1. generali, C. De 
decur. ; et coll. x m , De pace iuramento firmata. Res autem capientur ex 
causa iudicati, vel ex primo vel ex secundo decreto, ut supra tactum est, et 
remanebunt penes capientem, ut 1. is cuius, qui legatorum, ff. Vt in poss. 
legatorum. Et pro hoc non est plus necesse ire ad iudicem, nam sufficit prima 
concessio. In his omnibus puto ponderandam formam concessionis. 



An res captce vigor e represaliarum vendantur, et qualiter, vel in solutum [Cap. 
accipiantur, vel eestimentur ? 

Tertio quaeritur, an et qualiter res captae vigore represaliarum vendan- 
tur, vel in solutum accipiantur, vel aestimentur ? Solutio. Dicunt quidam 
quod iudicis auctoritate venduntur, ut 1. miles, ii, ff. De re iudicata. JEsti- 
matio net per iudicem, ut 1. ii, C. De iure dot. ; impetrandum. et in computa- 
tione net deductio impensarum, ff. Ad leg. Falc., 1. in quantitate ; et 1. sci- 
mus, in computatione, C. De iure deliberandi. Et in his etiam puto atten- 
dendam formam concessionis, ut supra. 



An diebus feriatis indictte represalice exerceri possint ? [Cap.cii.j 

Quarto quaeritur, an diebus feriatis indictee represaliae exerceri possint ? 
Solutio. In diebus feriatis propter hominum necessitatem, exerceri possunt, 
sicut executiones sententiarum, ut c. ult., De iudiciis. Si autem sunt feriati ob 
reverentiam Dei, tune dicunt aliqui hoc fieri posse in casu, ne contingat depe- 



172 DE IVRE BELLI 

rire totam concessionem, ut puta si illi contra quos conceduntur sint (t) , et non 
veniant nisi diebus feriatis. Allegant 1. i et 1. ii, ff. De fer. ; et 1. ii, C. eod. 
titulo. Alias non, per 1. dies, C. De fern's. Hanc conclusionem non credo 
veram in hoc secundo mcmbro. Nam capta occasione represaliarum capiun- 
tur aut ex primo, autex secundo, decreto, aut causa iudicati, ut supra deduc- 
tum est. Et haec omnia inhibentur tempore sic feriato, ut 1. dies, statim alle- 
gata. Etiam lex ponit specialiter, in feriis inductis propter hominum neces- 
sitatem, ut in casibus illis procedi possit illis diebus, ut 11. i et ii, ff. De feriis. 
In feriis autem inductis propter reverentiam Dei, nihil cxcipitur, ergo standum 
regulae. 



(cp.chm.| 5,' q u { s S g t ve i res capias, vigore represaliarum velit defendere, qualis 

cognilio adhibeatur ? 

Quinto quaeritur, si quis vult se defendere, vel res captas, vigore repre- 
saliarum, qualis cognitio adhibeatur ? Solutio. Dicunt quidam quod, si facta 
est plena executio, ut quia res venditae vel in solutum datae, tune est opus ordi- 
naria cognitione, nee audietur omcium implorans, ut 1. a divo Pio, si post 
addictum, ff . De re iudicata. Si autem non sit executio plene facta, sed pencK t , 
tune potest omcium iudicis implorare, per quod net editio actorum, vigore 
quorum indictae sunt represaliae, et potent opponere defectum iuris illius cui 
sunt concessae, et inhabilitatem personae, et alia, de quibus supra tactum est. 
Allegant 1. ii, C. De edendo ; et 1. ii, C. Vt lite pendente ; et 1. i, ff. De 
edendo. Et net super hoc summaria cognitio. Hanc conclusionem non credo 
veram in hoc secundo membro. Nam si sint indictae represaliae, parte citata, 
et comparente, et in iudicio persistente, tune clarum quod dicta conclusio non 
procedit, quia illae exceptiones veniebant proponendae a principio, nee opponi 
possunt post sententiam, ut 1. peremptorias, C. Sent, rescindi non posse ; et 1. 
si quidem, C. De except. ; et cap. pastoralis, eod. tit., Extra. Si autem indictae 
sunt, parte per contumaciam absente, ex primo vel secundo decreto, ut lapsus 
anni in reali, tune idem, quia non audietur nisi per viam ordinariam, ut 1. si 
finita, si plures, ff. De damn, infecto ; et 1. consentaneum, C. Quomodo et 
quando iudex, et ibi nota ; et cap. contingit, De dolo et contumacia. In primo 
autem decreto procedere posset. 



ic*p. chHi.j De remediis exacti. 

Huic membro adiungitur de remediis exacti. Et circa hoc de pluribus 
quaeritur. 

A n exacto competat regressus contra ilium propter cuius debitum vel 
delictum exactus est ? 

Et primo quaeritur, an exacto competat regressus contra ilium propter 
cuius delictum vel debitum ? lacobus de Arena tenet in 1. ii, ff. De verb, 
oblig., quod ei succurritur contra ilium propter cuius indictae sunt represaliae. 



DE IVRE COMMVNI NON PERMISSIS 173 

per 1. nam et Servius, De neg. gest. ; ff. Nautae caup. stabul., 1. licet, fin. ; 
ff. De his qui deiec. vel effus., 1. si vero, cum autem. Alii dicunt contra, 
per glossam 1. si quis dolo, i, ff. De reg. iuris. Nam iste non est exactus 
propter ilium privatum, immo propter iudicem, qui iustitiam denegavit, vel 
iniustitiam fecit. Dicunt ergo quod aut est exactus iudex quia fecit iniustitiam, 
et tune iudici non succurritur, ut dicta 1. si quis dolo, aut est exactus iudex, quia 
neglexit iustitiam, et tune succurritur contra ilium de quo requirebatur iustitia, 
ut C. De exact, trib., 1. missi, in fine lib. x. Aut exactus est tertius de populo, 
et tune procedit opinio lacobi, ut 1. licet, in fine, ff. Nautae caup. stabul., etc. 



An exacto succurratur contra Rector em, sicut contra debitor em principalem ? ic op . 

Secundo subsequenter quaeritur, an exacto succurratur contra Rectorem, 
sicut contra debitorem principalem, ut supra dictum est ? Solutio. Primo 
conveniendus est debitor principalis, et si non est solvendo, tune Rector, cum 
ipse etiam debitor fiat, iustitiam denegando. Quod hie ordo sit servandus 
probatur ff. De magistr. conven., 1. i, in princip. ; et C. De conven. fisci debi- 
toribus, 1. quoniam. Vltimo pervenitur ad officiales, qui, cum possent com- 
pellere Rectorem ad iustitiam, neglexerunt, ff. De tut. et rati. distrahendis, 1. 
i, nunc tractemus. 



An captus vigor e represaliarum possit auctoritate propria homines illius [Cap. 

civitatis caper e in qua fuit captus ? 

Tertio quaeritur, an captus vigore represaliarum possit auctoritate pro- 
pria homines illius civitatis capere in qua captus fuit. Et videtur quod sic, per 
totum titulum, ff. Quod quisque iuris. Contrarium est verum, nam titulus, 
Quod quisque iuris, vindicat sibi locum in iuris executione, ut si una civitas 
indixit represalias iniuste contra aliam, hoc idem licet alii contra primam. 
Non autem loquitur in executione facti, ut, si spoliavi te, liceat tibi spoliare 
me, quia sic permitteretur vindicta. Contra id, ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. scien- 
tiam, qui cum aliter. Recurrat ergo ad civitatem suam, et petat represalias 
contra illam civitatem in qua captus fuit. 



A n per statuta represalice concedi possint, in casibus alias iure communi [Cap. cixvi.j 

non permissis ? 

Quarto quaeritur, an per statuta represaliae concedi possint, in casibus 
alias non permissis iure communi ? Solutio. Civitas contra terras plene 
subditas concedere potest, etiam in casibus non permissis lege communi, sed in 
terras liberas, vel etiam confoederatas, de quibus loquitur, 1. non dubito, ff. 
De captivis, non potest. Ratio. Nam in concessione represaliarum, vertitur 
in causae cognitione de iniustitia facta, vel iustitia denegata, et in hoc una 



174 DE IVRE BELLI 

civitas non potest statuere contra aliam, quia " par in parem," etc. Secundo 
vertitur, an haberi possit copia superioris denegantis iustitiam facere. Et de 
hoc nihil potest una civitas contra aliam statuere. Nam non posset statuere 
quod indicantur represaliae, non requisite superiore denegantis iustitiam. 
Nam hoc esset tollere iurisdictionem superioris, De iureiurando, venientes. 
Tertio requiritur auctoritas superioris indicentis, et ipsa non recognoscens supe- 
riorem est ilia cuius auctoritas requiritur, et de hoc statuere potest civitas quod 
ea non requisita, et quod unus pro dcbito alterius capiatur, C. De omni agro 
deserto, 1. i, lib. xi ; sicut statuitur in casibus quod uxor pro debito viri te- 
neatur, C. In quibus [modis] causis pign. contrahitur, 1. satis ; et films pro 
patre, ut C. De primipilo, 1. fin., lib. xii. 

An statutum civitatis, quo cavetur quod filius teneatur pro patre delinqucntc, 

possit exerceri contra filium existentem extra territorium 

civitatis concedenlis ? 

Quinto quaeritur, an statutum civitatis, quo cavetur quod filius teneatur 
pro patre delinquente, possit exerceri contra filium existentem extra territo- 
rium civitatis concedentis. Solutio. Aut filius erat natus tempore delicti 
commissi a patre, et tune aut quaeritur, numquid fieri possit executio statuti 
contra filium alibi existentem. Et non potest, ut 1. a divo Pio, paenult., ff. 
De re iudicata; et 1. cum unus, [cum is] is qui, ff. De rebus auctor. iudi. 
possidendis. Aut quaeritur, numquid condictione ex illo statute agi possit 
contra eum. Et potest, quia actio ipsum .sequitur cui competit, C. De longi 
temper, praescriptione, 1. finali. Haec vera, nisi filius ante delictum commissum 
contraxisset alibi domicilium, vel inde foret ratione antiquae originis, quia tune 
ilia civitas, ut praeveniens, posset ilium defendere ab illo statute. Si autem 
filius natus sit post commissum delictum, tune non agetur contra ilium. Nam 
statutum intelligitur de filiis tune habitis, ff. De noxal., 1. in delictis, si ex- 
traneus ; ff. De milit. testamento, 1. [si] Titius. Idem dice si statutum habet 
quod unus de villa teneatur pro delicto alterius. Effectus de novo homo illius, 
non tenetur pro debitis antiquis, ut C. De decur., 1. providendum ; et nota 
Dinum in 1. incola, ff. Ad municipalem. 



] An per pactum licite fieri possit ut unus pro alio teneatur ? 

Sexto quaeritur, an per pactum possit fieri licite ut unus teneatur pro 
alio ? Solutio. Per pactum privatorum expressum, non ; in Authent., Vt 
non fiant pignorationes. Etiam si paciscatur quod exigatur alius in quo habet 
ius, ut C. Ne filius pro patre, per totum. Et licet hoc non possit dominus, 
iudex tamen domini poterit facere capi homines sic conditionatos. 



DE DVELLO 175 

De Bella Particulari quod fit ad purgationem, quod " Duellum " nuncupatur. [Cap. 

Restat nunc videre de Duello, in cuius tractatu, primo quaeram quid sit 
Duellum ? Secundo, quot sint species Duelli ? Tertio, quo iure sit permis- 
sum, et quo inhibitura ? Quarto, propter quid sit permissum, et propter quid 
inhibitum ? Quinto, pro quibus causis licitum sit duellum ? Sexto, inter quos 
sit licitum ? Septimo, qualiter duellandum ? 



Quid sit duellum ? [Cap. 

Circa primum dico quod Duellum est pugna corporalis deliberata hinc 
inde duorum, ad purgationem, gloriam, vel odii exaggerationem. Dixi 
" pugna." Hoc ponitur ut genus. Dixi " deliberata hinc inde." x Hoc poni- 
tur ad differentiam pugnae quae fit ad necessariam defensam sui, de qua in 1. 
ut vim, ff. De iustit. et iure ; et 1. i, C. Vnde vi ; et 1. i, vim vi, ff. De vi et 
vi arm. ; et 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter, ff. Ad leg. Aquil. ; et cap. olim, i, 
De restit. spoliat. ; et Clemen., si furiosus, De homicidio. Nam in pugna ilia 
non est deliberatio ex parte aggressi regulariter, sed ex parte aggredientis 
tantum, vel neutrius, ut probatur in dicta Clemen., si furiosus. In Duello 
autem est utriusque deliberatio. Dixi " duorum," quia tune proprie Duellum 
nuncupatur, adhaerendo etymologise vocabuli, Instit., De donat., est et aliud ; 
xvi, q. i, si cupis ; xxi dist., clews ; De praebend., cum secundum. " Pugna 
duorum," ad differentiam contractuum qui inter duos celebrantur, ex mutuo 
partium consensu, ut Instit., De obligationibus, cum rescriptis sequentibus. 
Et dixi " corporalis," ad differentiam pugnae iudiciariae, quae fit etiam inter 
duos, utpote actorem et reum, ut 1. rem non novam, patroni, C. De iudic., 
et 1. properandum, eod. tit. ; et cap. forus, De verbor. signification . Nam 
ibi non contenditur viribus corporis, sed iuribus, ut iuribus statim allegatis. 
Dixi " ad purgationem, gloriam, vel odii exaggerationem." Nam per hoc 
tangitur finis, et eliciuntur species Duelli, ut infra sequitur. Concluditur 
igitur descriptio Duelli in genere, per supra dicta. 



Quot sint species Duelli ? 

Circa secundum est advertendum quod Duellum, ut supra describitur, 
sumitur generaliter, et, ut tetigi in fine descriptionis, species Duelli eliciuntur 
per verba posita in fine, nam tres sunt species Duelli. Fit enim Duellum aut 
propter odii exaggerationem, aut propter gloriam in publico consequendam, 
ex viribus corporis, aut propter purgationem alicuius criminis iniuncti. 

Qualiter duellum fit propter odii exaggerationem ? 

Propter igitur odii exaggerationem fit, cum aliqui solo odio originaliter 
naturali, et naturalitate singular!, quae apud naturales " forma specifica " 
appellatur, inducuntur ad se invicem exterminandos. Et de hoc Duello non 



I7& DE IVRE BELLI 

reperio aliquid iure cautum, sed ex principiis naturalibus hoc evenit, ut statini 
prosequar, et quia sensual! experientia hoc est comprobatum. 



Qualiter duellum fit propter gloriam in publico consequendam ? 

Fit et, secundo, propter gloriam in publico consequendam, ut in publi- 
cis spectaculis, cum duo vires corporeas variis modis experiuntur. Et de hoc 
reperio iure cautum, et civili et canonico. Lege civili, ut 1. hac actione, si 
quis in cottuctatione, fi. Ad leg. Aquil. ; et 1. una, C. De glad, toll., lib. xi ; 
[C.] ff. De re iudic., 1. commodis; fi. De his qui not. infam., 1. athlete; C. De 
athletis, 1. i ; C. Quae res pign. obi. poss., 1. spem ; ff. De donat., 1. dona- 
tiones. Nota glo. Instit., De haeredit. quae intest. defer., interdum. Lege 
canonica, De clericis pugnantibus in duello. Licet etiam ibi fiat propter pur- 
gationem, De tornea.ni., per totum. Licet non sit proprie Duellum, sed pan- 
cratium, ut 1. hac actione, si quis in colluctatione, ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam. 



Qualiter duellitm fit propter purgationem alicuius criminis iniuncti? 

Fit et tertio, propter purgationem, scilicet, cum aliquod crimen alicui 
imponitur, et ad probationem provocans, forte carens aliis probationibus, vel 
etiam non carens, offert se probaturum viribus corporeis, duello suscepto, et 
provocatus sic se purgat. Et de hoc habetur etiam iure cautum, De cler. pugn. 
in duello, ut supra allegavi ; De purga. vulgari, per totum ; ii, q. v, quasi per 
totam illam quaestionem ; et in Lombarda, ut ibi prosequar, cum illud nu in- 
brum discutiam. 



lcp.ciKi.| Quo iure sit permissum, et quo inhibitum, Duellum ? 

Circa tertium, videlicet, quo iure sit introductum duellum ? Expedit 
singulas species duelli supra positas explicare, declarando circa singulas quo 
iure inducantur, et quo inhibeantur. Et primo de duello proveniente propter 
odii naturalis exaggerationem, ubi sciendum quod hoc duellum introductum 
est iure naturali, ut sumitur ius naturale pro instinctu naturae, proveniente ex 
scnsualitate ad aliquid appetendum, ut sumitur in secundo suo signincato, ut 
notat glossa, i dist., ius naturale; et 1. i, ius autem naturale, ff. De iustit. 
et iure. Et ipsum duellum est inhibitum iure naturali, ut sumitur ius naturale 
pro instinctu naturae, proveniente ex rationabili intelligentia, qua? appellatur 
naturalis aequitas. Et est tertius modus iuris naturalis, ut dicto canone, ius 
naturale. Est etiam inhibitum iure naturali, continente praecepta moralia 
It^'is divinae, ut sumitur quarto modo, ut canone statim allcgato. Est etiam 
inhibitum hoc duellum iure positive, scilicet, canonico et civili. Expedit enim 
Miiijula demonstrare. 



DE DVELLO PROPTER ODIVM 177 

Qualiter duellum quod fit propter odii exaggerationem sit introductum iure 

naturali, sumpto pro instinctu naturce, proveniente ex 

sensualitate ad aliquid appetendum ? 

Dixi quod hoc duellum est introductum iure naturali, ut sumitur pro 
instinctu naturae, proveniente ex sensualitate ad aliquid appetendum. Hoc 
sic demonstratur. Quidquid est productivum causae immediatae alicuius 
effectus, per consequens est productivum illius effectus. Sed istud ius natu- 
rale, originaliter inclinans ad sic appetendum, est causa inductiva huius 
sensualis appetitus ad duellandum. Ergo est causa duelli inductiva. Pro- 
batur maior. Nam imprimens sufficienter in causam causae productivae sic 
remote, imprimit in effectum, ff. Ad leg. Corn, de sicar., 1. nihil/, C. eod. 
tit., 1. si quis necandi ; i di., studeat ; et can. si quis viduam ; De homi- 
cidio, de cetera, et cap. presbyterum. Probatur minor. Nam ex naturali 
dispositione, proveniente a principiis naturalibus, et superioribus et infe- 
rioribus, provenit in hominibus varia appetitus incb'natio. Nam circum- 
scripto quolibet merito, vel demerito, tibi naturaliter placebit quod mihi 
displicet, et econtra, et ex naturali dispositione quis, circumscripto accidental! 
quocunque, diligit et odit. Quilibet hoc experiri potest in seipso. Sed causa 
huius est prompta, attentis corporibus coelestibus. Nam, si aliqui, tempore 
natalium in momento natalium, habeant uniformem correspondentiam con- 
figurationis ccelestis, et principia paterna conferment in complexionibus, procul 
dubio sunt amicissimi naturaliter. Sic si repugnantes, hinc inde sunt inimicis- 
simi. Nam ab uniformi causa debet insurgere uniformis effectus, C. Ad leg. 
Falc., 1. ult. ; ff . Ad leg. Aquil., 1. illud ; ff . De fonte, 1. i ; De constit., translate ; 
et cap. inter corporalia, De translat. [praelatorum] episcoporum. Et tamen est 
hie attendendum quod haec inimicitia naturalis inter hominem et hominem, 
ut praedixi, provenit ex singulari naturali dispositione, quae " forma specifica " 
apud naturales nuncupatur. Nam, attenta naturali dispositione speciei hu- 
manae, inter homines debet esse amicitia, propter uniformitatem complexionis 
relatae ad formam humanam, et propter ea dicunt iura quod inter hominem 
et hominem est officium humanitatis, hinc inde impendendum, ut 1. si servus, 
in fine, ff. De servis expor. ; et 1. officio, C. De neg. gest., et ibi glossa. Et sic 
non insurgit hoc ex naturali dispositione speciei, quia hoc naturaliter non est 
reperire, si quis recurrat per species singulas animalium. Nam inter singulas 
species brutorum est quoddam foedus coniunctionis et cohabitationis ; propter 
uniformitatem complexionis relatae ad formam specificam. Sed inter speciem 
et speciem quandoque est extremum repugnantiae, inductorium ad alterius 
exterminationem, ut est in accipitre et avibus aucupabilibus, murilega et 
muribus, canibus et leporibus. Et sic de singulis. Provenit igitur hoc ex 
quadam repugnantiae individuali dispositione principiorum superiorum et 
inferiorum. Effectum quilibet in se experitur. Ilia tamen dispositio non 
inducit regulariter immediate duellum, sed per medios actus ad quos propere 
proveniunt, sed tamen credo quod tanta posset esse repugnantia individualis 



178 DE IVRE BELLI 

dispositions, quod subito ad id provenirent. Et hoc provcnit cum reguntur 
sola sensualitatc, et nullo rationis vibramine. Ex his apparet conclusum 
qualiter hoc duellum introductum est hire naturae, sic sumpto. 



ic*p.ciii | Qualiter duellum, quod fit propter odii exaggerationem, sit inhibition iure 
naturali, sumpto pro rcUionabili intelligentia, et iure 
divino, canonico, et civili. 

Restat videre quod dicebam secundo circa hoc membrum. Dicebam 
cnim, quod hoc erat inhibitum iure naturali, sumpto pro rationabili intelli- 
gentia, et sic iure gentium et iure naturali, prout continet prascepta moralia 
legis divinae, et iure canonico, et civili. Hoc luce clarius demonstrari potest, 
incipiendo a lege divina. Nam hoc est unum de praeceptis decalogi, " non 
occides," et sic lege divina inhibitum, et hoc est regulare praeceptum. Et si 
detur instantia de lephte, qui occidit filiam, nee tamen peccavit, lege divina, 
ludicum [v] xi cap. ; xxii, q. iv, unusquisque ; xxiii, q. v, si non licet ; et de Sam- 
sone, qui multos et se occidit, ludicum xvi cap. ; xxiii, q. v, si non licet ; non 
obstat, quia haec facta fuerunt Spiritus Sancti inductione, ut scribit Augustinus 
in libro primo De civitate Dei. Transumptive habetur in cap. si non licet, 
xxiii, q. v. Sic igitur lege divina inhibitum est per illud praeceptum " non 
occides," Deuteronomii v capitulo. Est etiam inhibitum lege canonica, De 
homicid. voluntario ; 1 distinc. , quasi per totum ; xxiii, q. v, si non licet. Est 
etiam inhibitum iure civili, ff. Ad leg. Corn, de sicar. ; et C. eod., per totum. 
Et si dicas ilia iura inhibent homicidium voluntarium, et sic hoc genus duelli, 
ex quo illud provenit, sed homicidium proveniens a duello, introducto ex 
naturali dispositione, non est voluntarium, ex quo naturaliter est intro- 
ductum, ergo ilia iura non astringunt hunc casum. Solutio est prompta. 
Nam, licet naturalis dispositio corporea hoc introducat, tamen naturalis 
intelligentiae dictamen disponit in contrarium. Cui obtemperandum est, 
nam ilia naturalis dispositio non necessitat, immo manet liberum arbitrium, 
xxiii, q. iv, De Tyriis ; et cap. Nabuchodonosor ; et cap. sicut enim, De Poenit., 
dist. ii ; et Philosophus, iii Ethicorum. Immo et astrologi, hoc efficacius 
demonstrantes, hoc idem asserunt. Vnde inquit Ptolemaeus, in Centiloquio, 
in verbo decimo, " anima sapiens dominatur astris." Sic igitur, licet dispo- 
sitio corporea proveniat a naturali principio, tamen naturalis intelligentia 
manet, et in contrarium disponit. Sic did posset de singulis generibus vitio- 
rum moralium. Nam naturaliter singuli homines ad singula inclinantur 
vitia, ut quidam superbi, quidam luxuriosi, quidam avari, et sic de singulis. 
Nee tamen excusantur, quia precise non necessitantur, ut cap. Nabuchodono- 
sor, xxiii, q. iv. Hinc est quod dicit Philosophus, iii De anima, tractatu de 
motu, quod inter appetitum sensitivum et intellectualem est quandoque re- 
pugnantia. Nam sensitivus tendit in unum, intellectivus in alium, et, si intel- 
lectus vincat sensum, motus est rationabilis et naturalis, sisut si sphaera supe- 
rior moveat inferiorem. Si autem econtra fiat, motus est contra naturam, ac 



DE DVELLO PROPTER GLORIAM 179 

si sphaera inferior moveat superiorem, licet enim motus sensus proveniat a 
natura, inclinando in vitium, tamen fit contra naturam, nisi obtemperet sensus 
intellectui, ut subditus domino suo, ut idem Philosophus, primo Politicorum. 
Est etiam hoc genus duelli inhibitum iure natural! , ut sumitur pro naturali 
intelligentia, quod idem est quod ius gentium. Hoc probatur sic. Nam ex 
naturali intelb'gentia insurgit communis et naturalis sequitas, disponens in con- 
servationem Vniversi, et inde habuit ortum ius positivum, immo, ut verius 
loquar, sunt ipsamet aequitas iuris naturalis, aliquo addito vel detracto, ut 1. 
ius civile, ff. De iustit. et iure. Cum igitur haec naturalis aequitas tendat in 
conservationem Vniversi, ergo reprobat hominis exterminationem, quae est 
tendens ad mundi destructionem ; et dico de exterminatione tendente ad mundi 
destructionem. Nam quaedam, quorundam hominum, exterminationes ten- 
dunt ad mundi conservationem, ut puta cum mali exterminantur. 'Nam prop- 
ter hoc interest reipublicae, ut puniantur, ut ff. De publ. et vecti., 1. licitatio ; 
ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. it a vulneralus, in fine ; ff. De fideiuss., 1. si a reo ; De 
sent, excom., ut famce. Ex his aperte concluditur qualiter hoc genus duelli 
est inhibitum iure divino, iure gentium, canonico, et civili. 



Qualiter duellum quod fit propter gloriam introductum sit iure naturali, [Cap. ci*xiii.i 
sumpto pro instinctu natura ex sensualitate proveniente. 

Restat de duello quod fit propter gloriam victoriae quod fit in publico 
spectaculo, quo iure introductum est, et quo inhibitum. Et dico quod hoc 
genus duelli est introductum iure naturali, ut sumitur in secundo suo signifi- 
cato, scilicet, pro instinctu naturae proveniente ex sensualitate, sed est inhibi- 
tum iure naturali, sumpto pro iure gentium et iure divino. Est etiam inhi- 
bitum iure canonico et civili, modificative tamen, ut statim subiciam. Decla- 
remus singula. Dixi quod erat introductum iure naturali, sumpto in secundo 
suo significato. Hoc probatur, ut dictum est supra proximo membro. Nam 
sensualis inclinatio proveniens a principiis naturalibus induxit ad experientiam 
virium corporalium solum ad gloriam consequendam. Ergo inducit hoc 
genus duelli inde proveniens, cum producens causa producat effectum, ut iuri- 
bus statim allegatis in superiori membro. Hoc tamen genus duelli est minus 
detestabile primo genere, attento utriusque fine. Nam primum genus duelli 
fit propter exterminationem finaliter, occasione inimicitiae naturalis manentis. 
Hoc autem non fit necessario ad exterminandum, sed vincendum, quod con- 
tingere potest sine exterminatione. Ergo hoc minus detestabile, cum actus 
hominum distinguantur propter fines intentos, ff. De furtis, 1. verum, et 1. 
qui iniurice ; ff . De [fal.] furtis, 1. qui ea mente ; xv, q. vi, cap. i ; xiv, q. v, 
quidquid ; De sent, excom., cum voluntate. Hinc est, quod inquit Philoso- 
phus, iv Ethicorum, qui fornicatur cum muliere ut pecuniam inde detrahat 
non moechia, sed avarus. Sic igitur, fine ponderato, hoc minus detestabile 
illo. Confirmatur. Primum genus insurgit ex odio, quod in se detestabile est 

[15] 



i8o DE IVRE BELLI 

si sine causa rationabili proveniat, ut in proposito. At hoc genus duelli sine 
odio provenit. Nam et naturales amici duellabant in spectaculo ad finem 
gloriae consequendae. Confirmatur. Illud est minus detestabile quod minus 
distat a naturali aequitate, sed hoc secundum genus duelli minus distat a natu- 
rali aequitate. Ergo. Probatur maior. Nam detestatio et approbatio ac- 
tuum provenit a naturali aequitate, super qua fundantur inhibitiones et per- 
missiones iuris, ut 1. ius civile, ff. De iustit. et iure ; et can. ius naturale, i di- 
stinctione. Probatur minor. Nam hoc duellum non distat ab aequitate iuris 
naturalis, nisi quia ex illo sequi posset hominis occisio, qui actus tendit in de- 
structionem Vniversi, super qua aequitate fundatur inhibitio legis novae civilis, 
ut 1. una, C. De gladiat., lib. xi. Cum tamen lege veteri non esset facta inhi- 
bitio, quia sic se occidentibus remittebantur actiones, ut 1. [hac] qua actione, 
si quis in colluctatione, ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam. Sed primum genus distat a 
naturali aequitate. Prime, quia tendit ad necessariam alterius vel utriusque 
exterminationem. Distat etiam in fomite odii, quod naturalis aequitas abhor- 
ret, si sine causa insurgat. Ergo detestabilius. Confirmatur. Illud est detesta- 
bilius quod in totum nocet et in.nullo prodest, illo quod partim prodest et par- 
tim nocet. Sed primum genus in totum nocet, et in nullo prodest, hoc autem 
secundum partim prodest. Maior clara. Nam actus denominantur lauda- 
biles et vituperabiles ratione laudabilitatis finis, et ipsius vituperabilitatis, 
cum finis in talibus ponderetur, ut ff. De ritu. nupt., si quis in senatorio ; ff. 
De iure fisci, 1. non intelligitur , si quis palam ; ff. De iudiciis, 1. cumfuriosus. 
Minor probatur. Nam primum genus fit solummodo propter extermina- 
tionem mutuam, et hoc nocet, secundum autem fit in publico spectaculo 
propter laetitiam et recreationem populi. Et ob hoc ludi permittuntur et 
spectacula, C. De spectacul. et scaenic. et lenon., per totum titulum, excepta 
1. fin., lib. xi ; et C. De expen. ludor., 1. una. Est Graeca constitutio. Ex 
his infertur hoc genus duelli introductum iure naturali, sumpto in secundo 
suo significato, et ipsum fore minus detestabile primo genere. 



ic*p. ciniv.) Qualiter duellum quod fit propter gloriam inhibitum sit iure divino. 

Restat videndum quomodo hoc genus duelli est inhibitum. Et dicebam 
ipsum inhibitum iure divino, iure gentium, et iure positive, canonico, vide- 
licet, et civili. Quod autem iure divino sit inhibitum, probatur. Nam cum 
aliquid aliquo iure inhibctur, inhibetur etiam omne id per quod pervenitur ad 
illud. Sed iure divino inhibetur homicidium, ad quod pervenitur per hoc 
genus duelli. Ergo. Probatur maior per 1. oratio, ff. De sponsal. ; ff. De 
fideius., 1. cum lex ; C. De usuris, 1. eos, in fine ; C. De usuris rei iudic., 1. ult. 
in fine ; ff. De pet. haered., 1. sed si lege, item veniunt; ff. De mino., 1. iii, 
sed utrum. Minor probatur, Deuteronomii v cap., " Non occides," quod 
autem per hoc genus duelli perveniatur ad homicidium, luce clarius est. Con- 
firmatur. Ille actus a iure divino inhibetur qui est alienus a fonte caritatis, 



DE DVELLO PROPTER GLORIAM 181 

sed hoc genus duellandi est huiusmodi. Ergo, etc. Probatur maior, nam 
caritas est fundamentum omnium virtutum, et exclusiva vitiorum, De Pcenit., 
dist. ii, caritas est, et cap. ergo, et quasi per totam primam partem illius 
distinctionis ; et sic alienum a caritate sapit naturam peccati, et sic inhibitum 
iure divino. Probatur minor. Nam caritas est dilectio Dei et proximi sicut 
suiipsius, ut cap. proximos, De Pcenit., dist. ii ; sed duellans in spectaculo 
duellat ut devincat proximum, et sic non diligit. Ergo inhibitum iure divino. 



Qualiter duellum, inhibitum propter gloriam consequendam, prohibitum 

sit iure gentium. 

Dicebam etiam quod erat inhibitum iure gentium. Hoc sic" probatur. 
Ille actus est inhibitus iure gentium qui est tendens in destructionem Vniversi. 
Hoc genus duellandi est huiusmodi. Ergo. Maior probatur. Nam aequitas 
naturalis, super qua fundatur ius gentium, tendit in conservationem et augmen- 
tum Vniversi, ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. i, ius naturale ; et 1. ex hoc iure, ff. eod. 
titulo. Probatur minor. Nam hoc genus duellandi tendit in destructionem 
et exterminationem hominis, qui est nobilissima pars Vniversi, immo est finis 
productorum, ff. De usuris, 1. in pecudum ; ergo inhibitum iure gentium. Con- 
firmatur. Ille actus est inhibitus iure gentium, qui est repugnans praeceptis 
naturalis aequitatis, quae est ipsum ius gentium, vel ipsius fundamentum. Hoc 
genus duellandi est huiusmodi. Ergo, etc. Maior probatur. Nam omne 
illud est iure gentium inhibitum cuius contrarium est praeceptum, cum con- 
trariorum sit eadem disciplina, ff. De his qui sunt sui vel alien, iuris, 1. i ; 
Instit., eod. tit., in princip. ; xxxii dist., hospitiolum. Probatur minor. Nam 
hoc est unum de praeceptis iuris gentium, quod quis non locupletetur cum aliena 
iactura, ut 1. nam hoc, ff. De condic. indebiti ; et regula locupletari, De regul. 
iur., Lib. VI. Hoc etiam est unum praeceptum iuris gentium, quod tibi non vis 
fieri, alteri non facias, ut in principio Decretorum, sed hoc genus duellandi 
repugnat utrique praecepto. Et primo, primo prsecepto, Nam duellans quaerit 
gloriam de vituperio socii et proximi, etiam sibi fieri hoc nollet, ergo inhibitum 
iure gentium. Confirmatur. Ille actus est inhibitus iure gentium qui est 
species belli iniusti. Hoc genus duellandi est huiusmodi. Ergo. Probatur 
maior, nam bellum iustum solum est introductum iure, ut 1. ex hoc iure, ff. 
De iustit. et iure ; et 1. Aostes, ff. De captivis. Minor patet. Nam hoc non 
est indictum auctoritate Principis, nee propter necessariam defensam. Ergo. 
Ex his infertur hoc genus duellandi inhibitum iure gentium. Sed statim 
praedictis opponetur sic. Hoc genus duellandi fit propter experientiam 
fortitudinis, quae fortitude est virtus moralis, immo et cardinalis. Sed virtutes 
morales, nee earum exercitia, sunt inhibita iure gentium. Ergo non procedunt 
statim allegata. Quod autem hie sint actus verae fortitudinis, quae est virtus 
moralis, patet. Nam in hoc genere duellandi fit exspectatio et aggressus. 
Solutio. Pro evidentia huius contrarii est attendendum quod reperitur 



i82 DE IVRE BELLI 

fortitude vera, quae est virtus moralis et cardinalis, et ilia, nee eius operatio, 
sunt inhibita iure gentium. Sunt etiam fortitudines similitudinariae, de 
quibus Philosophus, iv Ethicorum. tractatu de fortitudine, quae similitudi- 
nariae participant actus aggrediendi et exspectandi, et sunt quinque. Nam 
aliqui aggrediuntur propter timorem pcenz, quia fugientes de bello puniuntur. 
Quidam aggrediuntur propter experientiam artis bcllandi, ut stipendiarii. 
Et isti, ut faciliter aggrediuntur, sic faciliter fugiunt, ut inquit Philosophus, 
ubi supra. Quidam aggrediuntur propter iram, non deliberantes periculum. 
Quidam aggrediuntur propter spem, non credentes subesse periculum, nee alias 
aggressuri, si existimarent subesse periculum. Quidam aggrediuntur propter 
gloriam mundi consequendam, quia fortes laudari solent, timidi autem 
vituperari. Istae sunt quinque fortitudines, similitudinarias ad veram forti- 
tudinem, quae est vera virtus moralis, et cardinalis existit. Ad hoc autem 
quod sit vera fortitude, requiruntur hae conditiones, videlicet, quod operetur 
quis scienter, nam opus ignoratum non est opus virtutis, quia prudentia 
debet regulare omne opus virtutis. Secundo requiritur, quod eligens. Tertio 
requiritur, quod eligat propter hoc, id est, propter bonitatem et honestatem 
operis in se, non autem propter aliquid extrinsecum. Quarto, requiritur 
quod operetur firmiter et delectabiliter. Omnes similitudinariae, de quibus 
supra, deficiunt secundum plus et minus a vera. Omnes tamen deficiunt 
in hoc, quia, operantes secundum illas, non operantur propter se, id est, propter 
bonitatem et honestatem operis. Sic in proposito. Isti operantes aggrediendo 
et exspectando in hoc genere duelli, hoc faciunt propter gloriam, non autem 
propter bonitatem ct honestatem actus in se, nee etiam hie operantur circa 
quod debent. Haec colliguntur ex his quae tractat Philosophus, iv Ethicorum, 
tractatu de fortitudine. Ex praedictis igitur infertur hoc genus duellandi 
inhibitum iure gentium. 



Qualiter duellum quod fit propter gloriam inhibitum sit iure cuiionico et civili. 

Dicebam hoc duelli genus inhibitum iure canonico et civili. lure cano- 
nico est clarum, cum imitetur, quoad prohibitionem et permissionem, tra- 
mites legis divinas, qua hoc duellum est inhibitum, ut supra deductum est. 
Probat etiam nibrum et nigrum, De pugnan. in duello, licet ibi ponatur cleri- 
cis, quia idem in omnibus. Melius probat titulus De torneamentis, ubi dece- 
dentibus in torneamentis denegatur sepultura. Hoc ergo clarum. Sed de iure 
livili qualitor sit inhibitum, hie aliqualiter est insistendum, quia lege vetcii 
Digestorum videtur permissum genus hoc duelli. Probat textus ff. Ad leg. 
Aquil., 1. hac aelione, si quis in colluctalione sive in pancratio ; ubi apparet 
cessare actionem poenalem contra ocridt nti in in hoc duello ubi pugiles colluc- 
tantur. Lege nova Codicis videtur inhibitum, ut probat textus C. De gladiat., 
1. una, lib. xi. Quid ergo dicemus ? Dicemus ne legem veterem esse corrcctam 
per novam, ut 1. non est novum, ff. De legibus. Hie puto attendendum quod 



DE DVELLO PROPTER GLORI AM 183 

potest fieri pugna non cruenta, ubi non tenditur ad sanguinis effusionem, ut 
cum aliqui brachiis colluctant, vel similibus modis, et hoc genus colluctandi 
non reperio inhibitum iure civili, nee veteri nee novo, immo iure novo permit- 
tuntur spectacula, propter populi recreationem, ut C. De spectac., per totum 
titulum, excepta L lenones, lib. xi ; et C. De expen. ludorum, per totum eun- 
dem librum. Potest .et fieri pugna tendens ad sanguinis effusionem, ut in 
torneamentis et in duello ad mortem tendente, et ista sine dubio iure novo 
Codicis est inhibita, ut C. De gladiat,, lib. xi, et ratio prohibitionis est tacta, 
ubi probatum est ipsum inhibitum iure divino et iure gentium. Lege autem 
veteri apparet permissum, ut 1. hac actione, si quis in colluctatione, ff. Ad 
leg. Aquiliam. Sed fortissime instabis sic. Tu dicis, hoc duellum prohibitum 
iure gentium, sed ius civile non est alia aequitas ab aequitate iuris gentium, 
immo est ipsamet aequitas iuris gentium, addens specificationerfi et limita- 
tionem ipsius, ut 1. ius civile, ff. De iustit. et iure ; ergo si est inhibitum iure 
gentium, non poterit esse permissum iure civili, alias ius civile repugnabit iuri 
gentium. In hoc contrario dubitavi, sed ponderavi verba, si quis in col- 
luctatione, et mentem quam credo fuisse legislatoris. Et pro evidentia pon- 
dero quod reperitur triplex permissio. Quaedam est permissio simplex, quas 
est remittens et indulgens pcenam, de qua habetur iv dist., denique, nam, ut 
ibi notat glossa, ibi fit remissio poenae, non culpae. Secunda permissio est quae 
tollit impedimenta eius quod permittitur, ut dicit textus quod ludaei permittun- 
tur habitantes inter nos, nam tolluntur impedimenta, impedientia ne possint se- 
cundum eorum ritus habitare nobiscum, ut xlv dist., qui sincera. Reperitur et 
tertia permissio, quas praestat iuvamen actui qui permittitur, secundum quod 
dicimus quod ecclesia aliquando permittit clericum occidi a iudice saeculari, 
praestando iuvamen, quia ipsum positive tradit, ut cap. cum non ab homine, 
De iudic. ; et cap. ad falsariorum, De crim. falsi ; et cap. novimus, De verb, 
significatione. Secunda permissio addit supra primam, quia impedimentum 
tollit, quod non faciebat prima, immo solum pcenam remittebat. Tertia addit 
supra secundam, quia praestat iuvamen actui permisso, quod non faciebat 
secunda, immo solum impedimenta tollebat. Nunc verba applicando ad pro- 
positum, si bene pondero, si quis in colluctatione, ibi textus remittit pcenam 
Occident! in colluctatione, et subditur ratio, quia non fit iniuriae causa. Erit 
igitur permissio prima pcenae remissoria, sed nullibi reperio cautum iure quod 
hoc duellum sit permissum secunda vel tertia permissione. Haec autem non 
repugnant quod ius gentium inhibeat, et civilis lex poenam remittat, nam lex 
civilis, imponens poenam pro homicidio, imponit propter dolum, et sic, quia 
hie dolus abest, lex civilis poenam remittit, ut supra inductum est. Ex his 
infertur circa hoc genus duelli, quo iure inhibitum sit, et quo iure permissum. 



Propter quid permissum, et propter quid inhibitum, sit duellum ? 
Circa quartum membrum, quo quaerebatur propter' quid sit permissum 
et propter quid inhibitum, est videndum de duello quod fit gratia purgationis, 
quo iure sit inhibitum et quo permissum. Et hoc proprie et stricte " duellum " 



184 DE IVRE BELLI 

apud vulgares nuncupatur. Et dico quod duellum est inhibitum iure divino, 
et hire gentium, et iure positive. Canonico, indistincte. Civili, regulariter, 
sed iure Lombardo in casibus permittitur, ut subdam, cum illos discutiam. 

Qualiter duellum purgatorium inhibitum sit iure divino, 

Quod iure divino inhibitum sit hoc duellum, probatur sic. Ille actus est 
inhibitus iure divino per quern fit Dei temptatio. Sed hoc duellum est huius- 
modi. Ergo. Probatur maior per illud prasceptum, " Non temptabis Do- 
minum Deum tuum." Probatur minor, nam tune temptatur Deus, cum per- 
quiritur aliquid contra naturam, quod non est producibile, nisi miraculo 
divino, sic est directe in hoc duello purgationis. Nam naturale est quod for- 
tior et ingeniosior vincat minus fortem, et minus ingeniosum. Nee, econtra, 
fieri potest ordine naturali, sed aliquando minus fortis et minus ingeniosus 
fovet iustitiam, et per duellum quaerimus ut victoriam obtineat, et eius iustitia 
declaretur. Sic igitur Deus temptatur, ut miraculum faciat. Confirmatur. 
Ille actus est inhibitus iure divino qui est adinventus fabricante diabolo. Hoc 
duellum est huiusmodi. Ergo. Probatur maior. Nam nihil commune Dei 
ad Diabolum, lucis ad tenebras. Minor probatur per cap. Mennam, ii, q. v, 
et cap. consuluisti, eadem causa et quaestione. Confirmatur. Ille actus 
est inhibitus iure divino per quern innocens damnatur. Hoc duellum est 
huiusmodi. Ergo. Probatur maior. Nam Deus non vult damnari inno- 
centem, xxii, q. ii, cap. quceritur. Probatur minor per cap. significantibus, De 
purg. vulgari. Ergo. 

Qualiter duellum purgatorium inhibitum sit iure gentium. 

Secundo dixi, hoc duellum inhibitum iure gentium. Hoc probatur >ic. 
Ille actus est inhibitus iure gentium qui repugnat naturali aequitati, super qua 
fundatum est ius gentium. Sed duellum purgationis est huiusmodi. Ergo. 
Patet maior. Probatur minor. Nam dictat aequitas iuris gentium delinquen- 
tes puniri, insontes absolvi. At in hoc duello contingit quandoque econtra. 
Ergo inhibitum iure gentium. Etiam repugnat illi prascepto " quod tibi non 
ius," in principio Decretorum. 

Qualiter duellum purgatorium inhibitum sit iure canonifo. 

Dixi et ipsum inhibitum iure canonico. Hoc claret De purg. vulg., per 
totum ; De pugnan., per totum ; ii, q. v, a capitulo consuluisti usque ad finem 
quaestionis. Et rationes possent reddi quae redditae sunt ad probandum quod 
sit inhibitum iure divino, cum ius canonum imitetur prohibitiones et permissio- 
nes legis divinae. Confirmatur. Et per hoc probatur etiam quod iure civili sit 
inhibitum. Nam actus ille est inhibitus iure positive, per quern fit exclusio ob- 
servantiae iuris positivi. Hoc duellum est huiusmodi. Ergo. Probatur maior. 
Nam si observantia est mandata a lege positiva, ergo observantiae. exclusio est 
inhibita, ut, sicut propositum in proposito, ita oppositum in opposite, ff. De his 



DE DVELLO PVRGATORIO 185 

qui sunt sui vel al. iur., 1. i ; Instit., eod. tit., in princip. ; xxxii dist.,hospitiolum. 
Probatur minor, nam iure positive introductas sunt actiones, tarn civiles quam 
criminates, et tota forma iudiciaria, per quam proceditur ad iura partium 
declaranda, ut 1. properandum, C. De iudiciis ; Authent., offeratur ; et 1. una, 
C. De litis contest. ; et 1. prolatam, C. De sentent. et interloc. omn. iudic. ; et 
cap. quoniam contra, De probationibus ; ut unicuique reddatur quod suum est, 
xii, q. ii, cum devotissimam ; et 1. iustitia, ff. De iustit. et iure ; et iustitia, 
Instit., eod. titulo. Sed duellando haec observantia penitus excluditur. Ergo 
hoc duellum est iure positive inhibitum. Confirmatur. Ille actus est iure 
positive inhibitus per quem partibus iustitia denegatur, sed hoc duellum est 
huiusmodi. Ergo. Probatur maior, quia ad hunc finem promulgata sunt 
iura positiva, divinitus per ora principum, ut 1. ult., C. De long, tempo, 
prescript. ; viii dist., quo iure ; xvi, q. i, placuit. Probatur miner, nam per 
hoc duellum aliquando contingit innocentem succumbere in duello, et sic sibi 
iniuriam irrogari, et aliquando contingit nocentem obtinere, et sic non fit 
iustitia provocanti. Ex his infertur hoc genus duelli quod fit propter purga- 
tionem et criminis impetitionem fore inhibitum iure positive ; canonico, in- 
distincte ; civili, regulariter. 

Qualiter duellum purgatorium iure civili regulariter sit inhibitum. 

Dixi etiam regulariter iure civili inhibitum hoc duellum. Fallit tamen 
in duobus casibus per Legem Frederici, De pace tenenda et eius violatoribus, 
ut puta, si quis intra tempera pacis hominem occiderit, et constet de homicidio, 
punitur prena capitali, ut fractor pacis, nisi per duellum probare voluerit quod 
hoc fecerit se defendendo, et est ille specialis casus quo duellum est in optione 
rei. Alter casus, si intra tempera pacis vulneraverit, punietur, nisi probare 
voluerit quod hoc fecerit se defendendo. Hi duo casus habentur De pace 
tenenda et eius violatoribus, 1. una, primus in si quis hominem infra pacem, 
secundus in si quis alium, in eadem lege. In aliis autem casibus permittitur 
iure Lombardorum, ut infra prosequar. Ex his concluditur tertium principale 
membrum huius tractatus, scilicet, quo iure sit duellum introductum, et quo 
inhibitum, distinguendo singulas species duelli. Per praedicta igitur patet 
explicatio quarti membri videlicet, propter quid inhibitum, et propter quid 
permissum. Nam duellum primum omni iure est inhibitum, et nullo permis- 
sum, et propter quid supra apparuit. Sic de secundo, et sic de tertio, singula 
tacta singulis membris ad hoc propositum reducendo. 



In quibus casibus duellum purgatorium permittatur ? [c P . chi.] 

Circa quintum principale, videlicet, in quibus casibus permittatur duel- 
lum, est videndum. De prima specie dictum est quod nullo casu. De secunda 
specie dictum est qualiter. De tertia specie nunc videndum, cum ilia iure 
Lombardo pluribus casibus permittatur, et solum circa tertiam speciem insi- 
stendum usque ad finem tractatus. 



186 DE IVRE BELLI 

Oualitcr duellum f>nrgatorium iurc J.ombardo in xx casibus /tcrmittatur. 

Quaerendum est igitur, quibus 'casibus hoc duellum permittatur, ultra 
duos supra notatos, qui habentur in Lege Fredcrici, De pace tenenda et eius 
violatoribus ? Solutio. Permittitur duellum in crimine legis luliae maiestatis, 
ruin quis alium impetit super illo crimine, ut in Lombarda, De publicis crimi- 
nibus, 1. si ^is, et est ultima. Fit secundo, cum dicitur uxorem conciliatam 
in mortem viri, ut in Lombarda, De consilio mortis, 1. si mulier, et est ultima. 
Fit et tertio, in iniuria cucurbitationis, ut si quis aliquem vocaverit " cucur- 
bitam," ut in Lombarda, De conviciis, 1. si quis alium. Fit et quarto casu, 
de homicidio commisso intra treugam, ut in Lombarda, De homicidio, 1. qui 
infra treugam. Fit quinto, pro homicidio commisso in absconso, ut in Lom- 
barda, De homicidio, 1. liber homo. Fit sexto, in crimine parricidii, si dicatur 
commissum propter cupiditatem bonorum ipsius, ut in Lombarda, De parri- 
cidio, 1. ult., in fine. Fit septimo, de furto commisso a servo, si dominus 
negaret servum suum fecisse furtum, ut in Lombarda, De furtis, 1. si quis 
alium, et fuit lex convalcosiana, secundum quosdam. Fit octavo, in crimine 
adulterii, ut si quis accusetur adulterasse uxorem alterius, ut in Lombarda, De 
adulterio, 1. iii. Fit nono, si quis dicat aliquam mulierem adulteratam, et sic 
probare velit, ut in Lombarda, De iniur. mulier., 1. ii, incipit si quis puellam. 
Fit decimo, si dicatur quem malo ordine possedisse rem mobilem sive immo- 
bilem xxx annis, ut in Lombarda, De prescript., 1. si quis alium. Fit unde- 
cimo, inter contraries testes, ut in Lombarda, De testi., 1. si quis cum alter o ; 
quod procedit si producantur ab utraque parte, si autem ab eadem parte, ncn 
fit duellum. Nam aut actor probat, et condemnatur reus, aut nihil probat, et 
absolvitur reus. Sed si ab utraque parte producantur, et cetera sint paria, 
tune fit duellum. Fit duodecimo, propter debitum paternum, contra filium 
negantem, ut in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, et in quibus casibus 
pugna prohiberi vel fieri debeat, 1. si ^wis post mortem. Et verus intellectus 
illius legis est quod intelligatur debitum ex maleficio. Fit tertiodecimo, prop- 
ter incendium, si agatur contra malefactorem, ut in Lombarda, Qualiter quis 
se defen., etc., 1. si quis alium. Non autem fit si agatur contra conciliatorem, 
ut in Lombarda, De consiliis illicitis, 1. una, in fine. Fit quartodecimo, pro 
adulterio, ut si maritus dicat uxorem suam adulteram esse, ut in Lombarda, 
Qualiter quis se defendat, etc., 1. si quis uxorem. Fit quintodecimo, si maritus 
suspicetur quod quis turpiter se habuerit cum uxore, et intelligit lex turpiter 
tangendo, ut in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, etc., si quis amodo. Fit 
et sextodecimo pro periurio, ut in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, etc., 
1. de furto. Fit septimodecimo, etiam duellum pro investitura, ut si quis 
dicat se primo investitum, et de possessione eiectum, et alius dicat idem, ut 1. 
de investitum. Fit octavodecimo, pro deposito negate, ut si depositum sit 
ultra solidos xx, ut 1. si quis pro se. Fit nonodecimo, si dicatur quod aliquis 
cartam per vim extorserit, ut 1. si ^is dixit, in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se 
<li fcndat, etc. Vicesimo et ultimo, fit duellum pro libertate petita a servo, 
ut 1. si serous. Quidam dicunt quod ilia lex fuit convalcosiana. 



QVALITER FIAT DVELLVM ? 187 

Inter quos iniri debeat duellum ? [c ap . 

Circa sextum principale, videlicet, inter quos iniri possit duellum, est 
videndum. 

Qualiter duellum purgatorium inter principales regulariter fieri debeat ? 

Et dico quod hoc habet regula, attento iure Lombardo, quo duellum per- 
mittitur in casibus supra narratis, quod duellum sit inter principales. Sed ilia 
regula fallit in octo casibus. Primus, si iuvenilis aetas impediat. Secundus, 
si aetas decrepita, nam in ea labor et dolor. Tertius, si innrmitas aliqua duel- 
lare prohibeat. Isti tres casus habentur in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se de- 
fendat, etc., 1. quacunque lege ; et De parricidio, 1. ultima. Quartus est, si 
servus, qui est in quasi possessione servitutis, proclamat in liberta'tem, tune 
dominus duellat per campionem, ut in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 
etc., 1. si quis servus propter appetitum. Quintus, si ecclesiastica sit persona, 
ut puta clericus, vel Comes, causas habent adinvicem, vel cum aliis, tune 
pugnant per campionem, ut in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. finali. 
Sextus, ubi mulier accusatur de adulterio, ut in Lombarda, eod. tit., 1. si quis 
uxorem. Septimus, si testes actons sunt contrarii testibus rei, tune testes 
actoris debent assumere unum campionem, et testes rei assumere alium, ex 
testibus met. ^ ut in Lombarda, eod. tit., 1. si quis cum altero. Octavus, 
si servus accusetur de furto, ut in Lombarda, De furtis, 1. si servus, dum de 
furto. Hodie tamen de consuetudine permittitur cuilibet habere campionem. 



Qualiter fiat duellum ? [Cap . ^j, 

Circa septimum principale, scilicet, qualiter fiat duellum, est videndum. 

Qualiter duellum purgatorium ad instar sit iudicii contentiosi ? 

Et hie praemitto quod duellum est redactum ad instar iudicii contentiosi, 
nam sicut in iudicio contentioso sunt actor, reus, iudex, instrumenta causam 
instruentia, per quae, largo modo sumpta pro quibuscunque causam instruen- 
tibus, ut 1. i, ff. De fide instrum., fit veritatis declaratio, ut feratur definitiva 
sententia, sic in duello sunt actor et reus, ut puta provocans et provocatus, 
iudex, instrumenta, utpote arma, quibus se invicem percutiunt. Nam sicut 
in iudicio contentioso quis alium convincit testibus, scripturis, et confessioni- 
bus, ut De restit. spol., cum ad sedem, sic in duello arrm's corporalibus con- 
vincit, ut sicut in primo sic convictus est, in casu condemnationis, sic a simili 
convictus in hoc. Ad similitudinem igitur iudicii contentiosi quserendum est 
de hoc iudicio, scilicet, duellari. 



[16] 

~- 



i88 DE IVRE BELLI 

(Cap. cixxtx.) An iuramentiim de astu inter duellantcs sit pr&standum d per quern ? 

Et primo quaere, utruin iuramentum de astu sit praestandum, et an per 
provocantem et provocatum, an per alterum, et per quern ? Et iuramentum 
de astu in hoc iudicio idem est quod iuramentum de calumnia in iudicio con- 
tentioso fori civilis vel ecclesiastici. Et videtur quod uterque iurare debeat. 
Nam iuramentum de calumnia praestatur in iudicio contentioso per acton m 
et reum, ut 1. i et 1. ii, C. De iur. calumn., et Authent., principalcs, eod. tit. ; 
Extra., eod. tit., per totum. Ergo hie a simili, cum sit eadem ratio, et ric 
eadem iuris dispositio, ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. iUud ; C. Ad leg. Falc., 1. ult. ; 
De constitut., translate ; cum similibus. Solutio. Hie fuerunt opiniones 
variae, attento iure Lombardo. Vna fuit opinio, et fertur quod fuit Mantua- 
norum, quod in hoc iudicio duellari praestatur sacramentum de astu ab utroque, 
tarn ab actore quam a reo, et sic, secundum eos, corriguntur omnia iura loquen- 
tia de sacramento de astu non praestando. Adducunt, quod habetur in Lom- 
barda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. mentio. Sed ilia lex habet quatuor intdl<v 
tus. Vnus, quod intelligatur in testibus contrariis, ut potius fiat duellum quam 
periurent. Secundus, quod intelligatur in duobus contendentibus se possidere, 
ut potius duellent quam deirent. Tertius, quod intelligatur in eo contra quern 
iuratum est, quod furtum commiserit, et ille vult iurare contrarium. Quartus, 
cum duo litigant coram iudice, et unus iuravit de lato iuramento, et alter vult 
iurare contra. Horum sententia reprobari videtur, quia non est hoc cautum 
iure, immo contrarium, ex parte rei, ut solus actor iuret, ut in Lombarda, 
Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. si quis alium astu. Fallit ubi fit duellum propter 
contrarietatem testium, ut in Lombarda, De testi., 1. fin. ; et Qualiter quis 
se defendat, 1. si quis cum alio. Secunda fuit opinio Domini Caroli Bene- 
ventani, qui voluit distinguere an quis veniat ad duellandum in causa ipsum 
totaliter contingente, aut prorsus aliena, an principaliter aliena, secundario sua. 
In primo casu, utpote cum quis provocat aliquem super furto, vel incendio, 
sibi facto, vel adulterio uxoris suae, tune refert aut provocando dicit, " tu com- 
misisti," aut dicit, " suspicor quod commiseris." Primo casu, debet iurare rem 
ita esse. Secundo casu, debet iurare quod iustam habet suspicionem, et cum 
provocat ratione suspicionis, debet addicere causam suspicionis, utpote quod 
ipsum viderit loqui cum uxore sua, et sic de aliis. Si autem provocat ad duellum 
in causa aliena, id est, non propter aliquid commissum contra se, sed contra 
alium, utpote cum provocat super criminc laesae maiestatis, tune, cum accedat, 
ut testis, debet iurare sic esse, ut praestatur iuramentum testis, ut C. De testi., I. 
iurisiurandi ; De testi., cap. tuis, et cap. cum nuntius ; cum similibus. Et sic 
dicit in reo, ut iuret rem sic non esse. Haec opinio, quoad sacramentum rei, 
reprobatur, ut supra proxima. Tertia fuit opinio, et fertur fuisse Papiensium, 
videlicet, quod ex parte rei et provocati nullum praestari debeat iuramentum, 
sed ex parte actoris. De actore probatur in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 
1. si quis astu. De reo probant. Nam reus tenetur ad alterum duorum, vel 
pugnet, vel si renuit, condemnetur. Sic igitur iuramentum pro parte rei nihil 
operatur, et sic ut superfluum resecandum, 1. ampliorem, in refutatoriis, C. De 



DE CAMPIONIBVS 189 

appel. ; 1. non cogendum, Sabinus, ft. De procuratoribus. Quarta fuit opinio, 
et fuit cuiusdam Alberti, qui voluit dicere quod actor semper iurat praeterquam 
in crimine laesae maiestatis, et testibus contrariis, et investitura praedii. In 
reo concordat cum aliis, praeterquam cum Papiensibus. Et hoc credo in actore 
verum, quod regulariter praestet, praeterquam in casibus de quibus supra. Et 
est ratio ut compellatur reus se purgare, non praecedente aliquo iudicio contra 
eum. Immo volunt iura, ad minus praecedere infamiam, et deficientibus pro- 
bationibus exponitur purgationi, De purgat. canon., per totum ; ii, q. iv, per 
totum ; De accusat., qualiter, ii, et ibi notandum. Sic igitur iure Lombardo, 
quo duellum permittitur in casibus supra enumeratis, ad minus ex parte actoris 
praecedat iuramentum, et iuramentum debet esse conforme provocationi, ut 
si provocat de rei existentia, sic iuret si de suspicione, sic etiam iuret ut etiam 
differentia notatur inter iuramentum calumniae et veritatis, ut", unum de 
credulitate, aliud de veritate, ut dixit dominus Carolus. In reo autem non 
concipio rationem necessitatis iuramenti. 



An uni parti data campione, in casibus a iure permissis, licitum sit alteri parti 

dare campionem ? 

Secundo quaero, numquid si alicui partium detur campio, in casibus per- 
missis a iure Lombardo, qui sunt octo, ut supra notavi, an tune liceat alteri 
parti dare campionem ? Solutio. Hie fuerunt opiniones variae. Aliqui 
dicunt quod sic. Allegant quod habetur in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defen- 
dat, 1. quicunque. Fallit in casu ubi servus contendit contra dominum. 
Secunda fuit opinio, quod alteri parti non liceat. Tune et est ratio. Nam 
lex tune in tribus casibus permittit, ergo denegat in aliis, ut ff. De legi., 1. ius 
singulare ; ff. Ad municip., 1. i ; ff. Solut. matrimon., 1. si cum dotem ; C. De 
procur., 1. maritus ; De translatione praelatorum, cap. inter corporalia ; cum 
similibus. Ego credo hie ponderandum quod in hoc [refert] differt hoc iudi- 
cium duelli a iudicio contentioso, nam in iudicio contentioso regulariter quis 
per alium litigat, et propter hoc inventus est procuratorum usus, ut ff. De 
procurat., 1. i, et [1.] usus; sed in duello regulariter solum per se, et in hoc 
aequiparatur iudicio criminali, in quo non intervenit procurator ad causas 
causae allegandas, ff. De public, iudic., 1. paenult., qui ad crimen ; et 1. 
servum quoque, publice, ff. De procurat. ; et cap. licet, et cap. veniens, De 
accusationibus. Et est ratio, quia in persona (?) procuratoris non potest ferri 
sententia condemnatoria, quia innocens ; in personam domini, non, quia absens, 
ff. De poenis, 1. absentem ; sic directo in duello, nam in duello duellantes ad 
prostrationem personarum tendunt, ut ex hoc eliciatur veritas per hoc genus 
probationis. Et sic regulariter non intervenit campio, praeterquam in casibus 
permissis. Si igitur emergat casus dandi campionis ex parte unius, et non 
emergat ex parte alterius, ille solus dabit campionem. Si autem utrinque 
emergat casus, uterque dabit, nisi dicas propter aequalitatem hinc inde servan- 



DE IVRE BELLI 

dam, ubi licitum uni det alter, ut 1. terminate, C. De fruct. et lit. expcnsis; 
De mutuis petit., cap. i, et per totum titulum ; regula non licet, De regul. iur., 
Lib. VI ; et hoc sapit aequitatem, sed prius dictum verius de rigore iuris. 



lc*p.cUiL] Qualiter in casibus hinc inde, cum conceditur campio, fiet ipsorum datio 

et concessio ? 

Tertio quaero, qualiter in casibus hinc inde, cum conceditur campio, net 
ipsorum datio et concessio ? Solutio. Hie pondero quod, sicut in foro conten- 
tioso causa peroratur, sic per campiones in iudicio duellari, et sic infero quod, 
sicut in iudicio contentioso fieri debet aequa advocatorum distributio, ut 1. 
providendum, C. De postul., sic, ubi hinc inde fit campionum concessio, debet 
fieri ipsorum aequa distributio. In principalibus autem duellantibus non est 
ponderanda aequalitas, vel inaequalitas, cum causam propriam propriis viribus 
corporis sponte ad exitum perducant. 



leap. chxiii.] An quilibet admittatur pro campionc ? 

Quarto quasro, an quilibet admittatur pro campione ? Solutio. Vt dic- 
tum est, hie aequiparatur campio advocate, sicut igitur quilibet admittitur ad 
postulandum, nisi sit prohibitus, ut 1. i, ff. De postul. ; sic quilibet admittitur 
ad officium campionatus, nisi repellatur a iure. Repellitur autem fur, ut in 
Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. si ut campionem. Et est ratio, quia 
infamis, ff. De furt., 1. non potest ; et si succumbit, praesumitur] ratione proprii 
delicti succumbere, sic et alii criminosi gravibus criminibus irretiti, ratione 
praedicta. 



(Cap. cUxxiii.] In cuius electione sit duellum ? 

Quinto quasro, in cuius electione est duellum ? Solutio. Kegulariter in 
electione actoris, sicut dicimus in iudicio contentioso. Hoc habetur in Lom- 
barda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. si quis amodo. Fallit in crimine laesae 
maiestatis, ubi ex necessitate cogitur duellare, et si aliquis dixerit " argam," 
ut in Lombarda, De publicis criminibus, 1. fin. ; et in Lombarda, De iniur. 
mulier., 1. ii. 



(Cap. riuiiv.i Qualiter ordinetur duellum ? 

Sexto quaero, qualiter ordinari debeat duellum ? Solutio. lure non est 
cautum, sed consuetudine observatur, quod eligatur locus parvus amplus in 
< i\ itate vel extra, qui locus circumcirca claudatur chordis, ita ut, misso banim, 
nullus audeat intrare nisi duellantes, nee audeat tumultum facere, propter* 



DE ARMIS 191 

quern altera pars offendi posset. Et iudex erit ibi, in loco ut videre possit 
utrumque duellantium, et qualiter unus alium recipiat, ut finaliter iudicet in 
duello an quis succubuerit. 

Quibus armis duellari debeat ? [Cap. 

Septimo quaero, quibus armis duellari debeat ? Solutio. lure Lom- 
bardo permittuntur scuta, fustes, ut in Lombarda, De testi., 1. si quis cum 
altero ; et Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. mentio ; et haec debent esse aequalia et 
a iudice praestari. 

An si arma, seu fustes, unius duellantium frangantur, vel cadant, [Cap. 

debeant alia dari P 

Octavo quaero, quid si arma, seu fustes, unius duellantis frangantur, vel 
cadant, an debeant alia dari. Et videtur quod sic. Nam dicit textus quod 
pugna debet fieri cum fustibus et scutis, ut in Lombarda, Qualiter quis se de- 
fendat, 1. mentio ; et in Lombarda, De testi., 1. si quis cum altero ; sed nisi 
alia darentur, non fieret cum fustibus. Ergo. Confirmatur. Nam fustes in 
duello aequiparantur testibus et instruments in iudicio contentioso, sed in foro 
contentioso fit multiplicatio productionis testium et instrumentorum, etiam 
si aliquorum dicta frangantur ante publicationem et notitiam dictorum, ut in 
Authent., De testi., si vero ; De testi., fraternitatis ; et Clemen., testibus, 
eod. titulo. Quidam hoc tenent in frangente, secus si cadant, quia tune debet 
imputari fortunae suse. Alii dicunt quod in nullo casu sunt praestanda, sed 
imputari debet fortunae suse. Alii dicunt stari consuetudini super hoc. Ego 
credo opinionem secundam fore veram, scilicet, quod non sint alia praestanda, 
sive cadant, sive frangantur, nisi aliud habeat consuetude quae operari potest 
effectum, ut lex ff. De legi., 1. de quibus ; C. Quae sit long, consue., 1. ii ; xi 
dist., consuetudinis ; i dist., consuetudo. Et est ratio. Nam in duello, ut dixi 
in principio tractatus, quaeritur aliquando quid contra naturam, ut quod minus 
fortis, et quod minus industriosus, vincat fortiorem et magis industriosum, 
quod aliquando contingat casu intercedente. Ergo uterque duellantium dimit- 
tendus est subiectioni casuum quibus se libere exposuerunt, alias transiret 
natura duelli ad purgationem indicti. Confirmatur. Nam, si diceremus dari 
nova arma, ubi caderent, sic a simili diceremus duellantem cadentem sublevari, 
quod est absurdum. Nam'propter hos casus, aliquando contingit potentiorem 
succumbere, et in hoc demonstratur iudicium divinum. 



Quis duellantium primo percutere debeat ? . ! Ca P- 

Nono quaero, quis in duello prius percutere debeat ? Et videtur quod 
provocans, nam hoc iudicium duellare est simile iudicio contentioso, ut supra 
tactum est saepius. Sed in iudicio contentioso actor primo porrigit libellum 
reo, et postea reus respondet, ut in Authent., offeratur, C. De lit. contestat. ; et 



192 DE IVRE BELLI 

cap. i, De libel, oblatione. Ergo a simili, provocans primo percutiet provo- 
catum. In contrarium videtur, reus favorabilior est, ut 1. Arrianus, fi. De 
obi. et act. ; et regula faivrabiliores, fi. De regul. iur. ; regula in pcenis, eod. 
tit., lib. vi. Solutio. Credo primam partem veram, nee obstant allegata in 
contrarium, quia ilia iura loquuntur in finibus iudiciorum, cum non restat nisi 
definitiva sententia, quia tune favendum est reo. Sed circa principia faven- 
dum est actori, ut 1. si quis intentions ambigua, fi. De iudic. ; et 1. inter slipu- 
lantem, i, ff. De verb, obligationibus. Vel dici posset quod hie non est ser- 
vandus ordo, sed locus est praeventioni vel etiam concursui. 



(Cap. cimvii, i An dueUum, prima die non terminatum, sequenti die possit tcrminari? 

Decimo quaer,o, an, si duellum terminari non possit prima die, possit ad 
sequentem diem deferri ? Solutio. Dico quod sic. Dico enim donee finiatur 
instaurandum est. 

ic*p .ciuxix.] An succumbens in duello condemnctur in cxpcnsis ? 

Vndecimo quaero, numquid succumbens in duello debeat in expensis con- 
demnari adversario ? Solutio. Ad similitudinem iudicii contentiosi, quo 
victus victori condemnatur in expensis, ut 1. properandum, SIM autem, C. De 
iudiciis ; et 1. terminate, C. De fruct. et lit. expens. ; et cap. finem, De dolo 
et contum. ; cap. calumniam, De prenis. Posset sic in duello dici " victus vic- 
tori," etc. 

leap, cxc.j An provocans in duello succumbens puniaiur pccna talionis ? 

Duodecimo quaero, an provocans in duello succumbens puniatur pcena 
talionis ? Solutio. Ad similitudinem iudicii criminalis contentiosi, ubi im- 
ponitur pcena talionis accusanti succumbenti, ut cap. super his, De accus. ; 
et cap. licet, eod. tit. ; et 1. fin., C. De accusat. ; sic in duello, cum duellatur 
propter crimen puniendum ad publicam vindictam. 



|c*p.cci) An provocatus ad duellum propter crimen, succumbens et condemnatus, possit 
de eodem crimine in iudicio contentioso accusari ? 

Tertiodecimo quaero, an provocatus ad duellum propter crimen, succum- 
bens et condemnatus, possit de eodem crimine accusari in iudicio contentioso ? 
Solutio. Posset dici quod, cum hire civili duellum purgatorium non approbe- 
tur, immo penitus reprobetur, ut 1. una, C. De glad., lib. xi ; et de Jure cano- 
nico, ut in De pugnant. in duello ; et De purg. vulg., per totum, ut etiam supra 
in principio tractatus tactum fuit. Haec definitio, lege reprobata, paret praeiu- 
dicium iuridicae discussion!, et sic non obstat cum de delicto eiusdem saepius 
non sit quaerendum, ut 1. licet, in fine, ff. Naut. caup. stabul. ; et cap. de his, 
De accusat. ; quia ilia iura loquuntur, cum prior cxaminatio et discussio fuit 
iuridica, et sic infertur quod absolutoria lata in duello non parat exceptionem 



AN PROVOCANS POSSIT DESISTERE ? 193 

rei iudicatae, accusare volenti in iudicio contentioso. Haec vera, nisi con- 
suetudo regionis aliud induceret, ut, videlicet, servaretur lus Lombardum, 
secundum cuius dispositionem consecutus sum hunc passum, et sic limitandae 
sunt solutiones praecedentium quaestionum. 



An provocans ad duellum propter crimen publicum, desistens a duello, incidat [Cap. 

pcenam Turpiliani ? 

Quartodecimo qusero, numquid provocans ad duellum propter crimen 
publicum, desistens a duello, incidat poenam Turpiliani ? Et videtur quod sic, 
ad instar criminalis iudicii contentiosi, ut 1. i, si quis autem, ff. Ad Turpi- 
lianum. Solutio. lure communi non procederet quaestio, cum iure communi 
sit reprobatum hoc iudicium, ut supra. Sed, iure quo permissum, posset dici 
ex eadem aequitate ipsum puniendum, et dico arbitrio iudicis, cum non sit iure 
expressa, De offic. iudicis delegat., cap. de causis, in fine ; ff. De iur. delib. w, 
1. i. Poenam tamen Turpiliani non credo ipsum incidere, cum poenae sint 
restringendae, ut 1. cum quidam, ff. De lib. et posth. ; et pcente, De Posnit., 
dist. i ; regula in pcenis, De reg. iuris, lib. vi. Haec, ut dixi, iure Lombardo 
procedunt. Nam iure communi, recedens a duello non punitur, immo talis 
legi obtemperat, et prosequens facit contra legem. 

An provocans ad duellum iure Lombardo possit desistere cum licentia iudicis ? (Cap. 

Quintodecimo quaero, numquid provocans ad duellum iure Lombardo 
possit desistere cum licentia iudicis ? Apparet quod sic, ad instar accusantis 
abolitionem impetrantis, ff. Ad Turpil., 1. abolitio, et 1. si quis interveniente, 
et 1. Domitianus ; C. De abolit., per totum. Solutio. lure communi hoc 
clarum, quia sine abolitione, et bene facit. lure Lombardo credo etiam quod 
iudex ex causa concedere potest, ad instar accusatoris, ut supra allegatum est. 



An provocans ad duellum desistere possit sine pcena ante litem contestatam ? [Cap. 
Item et quando in duello dicatur Us contestari ? 

Sextodecimo quaero, an provocans ad duellum desistere possit sine poena 
ante litem contestatam, et, cum hoc, etiam quaero, quando, proportionaliter in 
iudicio contentioso, in duello lis dicatur contestari ? Et videtur quod ante 
sine pcena possit desistere. Nam ante litem contestatam non dicitur quis 
" agere," sed " agere velle," ut 1. amplius, ff. Rat. rem haberi. Ergo ante 
desistere poterit. Confirmatur. Nam ante litem contestatam desistenti par- 
citur, ff. De in ius vocando, 1. quamvis. Ergo. Confirmatur, per 1. sine 
metu, C. De adulter. ; et ff., 1. miles, socer, eod. tit. ; et 1. qucesitum, ff. Ad 
Turpilianum. In contrarium facit 1. in senatus, qui post, ff. Ad Turpilia- 
num, ubi probat textus quod desistens ab accusatione ante litem contestatam 
incidat in Turpilianum. Idem' probat 1. paenult, C. De calumniatoribus, 



194 DE IVRE BELLI 

Solutio. Haec quaestio praesupponit alterius quaestionis decisionem, scilicet, 
quando lis proportionaliter contestari dicatur in hoc iudicio duellari. l.t 
videtur quod post unam percussionem actons, et aliam rei, quia in iudicio 
contentioso sic fit contestatio per petitionem et contradictionem secutam, ut 1. 
rem non novatn, patroni, C. De iudiciis ; et Authent., offeratur, C. De litis 
contestat. ; et cap. uno, eod. tit., Extra. Sed prima percussio habetur loco 
libelli, secunda percussio, quae fit a reo, est contradictio, ergo sic fit litis con- 
testatio. Contrarium credo verum, scilicet, quod fiat litis contestatio, cum 
provocat, asserendo quod crimen commiserit, et ille negat. Quod hoc sit 
verum patet. Nam post litem contestatam praestatur iuramentum de calum- 
nia, in Authent., Vt litigantes iurent in exordio litis, in princip. ; et 1. ii, C. De 
[iuramento calumniae] iurehirando propter calumniam. Sed duellantes, post 
hanc verbalem provocationem et contradictionem, iurant de astu, ut supra 
deductum est. Incipit ergo duellum a verbali proclamatione, sed percussurae 
habentur, loco probationum per testes et instrumenta, quae fiunt post litem 
contestatam, Vt lite nan contestata, per totum. Et sic modifica solutionem 
quaestionis qua quaesivi quis primo percutere debeat. Hac solutione praemissa, 
principalis quaestio incidit in quaestionem illam, an poena Turpiliani vindicet 
sibi locum ante litem contestatam. Et glossae sunt contrariae. Vna est in 1. 
[si] miles, socer, fi. De adulteriis, et fuit Hugolini, et tenet quod non incidat. 
Alia est in 1. i, C. Ad Turpilianum, quae tenet quod incidat, et fuit Azonis, et 
illam credo veram per 1. in senatus, qui post, fi. Ad Turpilianum ; et per 
Authent., qui semel, C. Quomodo et quando iudex. Tamen dicit Petrus quod 
accusator paenitere potest antequam reus citatus veniat ; sic intelligit 1. quasi- 
tum, fi. Ad Turpilianum. Et simili modo habetur solutio praemissae quaestionis, 
loquendo de iure Lombardo, ut supra. Deo gratias. 

Explicit tractatus De Bello compilatus per me, lohannem de Lignano 
de Mediolano, minimum juris utriusque doctorem, in studio Bononicn- 
si, MCCCLX, pendente forti exercitu contra civitatem, qui causam 
dedit tractatui, ut Scholaribus tune causa foret exercitii, Doctorum 
autem subiceretur correctioni. Deo gratias. Amen. 



TABVLA TRACTATVS 

TRactatus iste De Bello prima sui divisione dividitur in tres partes princi- [Cap. i 
pales, quarum ultima in sex tractatus dividitur et subdividitur, prout 
tibi per tabulam istam clarius infra demonstrabitur, rubricellis suis suo ordine 
collocatis. 

Prima pars principalis. 

/ 
Quid sit Bellum, et qualiter describatur ? 



Secunda pars principalis. [Cap. HJ 

De divisione Belli et qualiter dividatur. 



Tertia et ultima pars principalis 
ponit ordinem tractatuum, et dividitur in sex principales tractatus. 

Primus tractatus. 
De Spirituali Bello Coelesti. 

Qualiter Spirituale Bellum Cceleste est metrum et mensura Spiritualis 
Humani Belli. 

De naturali deductione Spiritualis Belli corporum coelestium ad bella 
terrestria. 

Qualiter, secundum astrologos et naturales philosophos, necessario sit 
dare bellum. 



Secundus tractatus. 



De Spirituali Humano Bello, secundum theologiam. [Ca PP . HI -vi 

De Spirituali Humano Bello, secundum moralem philosophiam. [Ca PP . vii, v 



Tertius tractatus, [Cap. i 

scilicet, De Vniversali Corporali Bello, 
et iste dividitur in sex tractatus. 

[17] 195 



196 DE IVRE BELLI 

icp. *.) Primus tractatus, scilicet, quo iure introductum sil ? 

Qualitcr iure divino ortum habuerit Bellum Vniversale Corporale ? 
icp. ii.) Qualiter iure gentium ortum habuerit Bellum Vniversale Corporale ? 



iiv.) Secundiis tractatus tertii principalis, scilicet, quibus liceat helium 

indicere universale ? 

Quibus primo et principaliter, et quo iure, et contra quos, belluin indi- 
cere liceat universale ? 

icp. iv.] An bellum motum per Imperatorem contra Ecclesiam sit iustum, et an 
teneantur subditi in hoc obtemperare ? 

[dp. xri ] Quid econtra Juris sit, cum Papa, scilicet, movet bellum contra Impera- 
torem ? 



(cp. xvii.] Tertius tractatus tertii principalis, scilicet, qua sint aggregantia bellum ? 

De legione et cohorte, et qui et quot numero in eis requirantur ? 
[Cap.*.] Qualiter milites se habere debeant in bello, et cui obediant, et a quibus 

abstinere praecipiuntur ? 

[Cap xi.) Quae pertineant ad officium ducis belli ? 
[Cap. .] Qualiter varie puniuntur milites, prout varie delinquunt ? 
[Cap. i ] De fortitudine, et ipsius natura, et quse fortitude dicatur moralis, et quae 

non, et quae bellum ducit ad finem rectum, et quae non ? 
[Cap. MM.) An fortitude sit virtus cardinalis ? 
[Cap. iii.) Vnde et qualiter quatuor principals virtutes dicantur morales ? 

Quid sit virtus ? 
[Cap. xxv 1 De triplici specie boni, et qualiter quatuor cardinales virtutes eliciantur 

a bono ? 

[Capp.v,Mvi.] Quomodo et qualiter in bello quis possit dici fortis ? 
[Cap. vii.) Quis sit principalior actus fortitudinis ? 

Quot generibus fortitudinis quis utatur in bello ? 

(Cap . .iii.| An fortis in bello potius debeat mortem exspectare quam fugcn- ? 
(Cap. ix.| An miles unacum comitiva sua viriliter in hostes prorumpens, ct ipsos 

totaliter confringens, contra mandatum ducis, sit capite puniendus ? 
[Cap. >.] An duci belli capto ab hostibus sit venia concedenda ? 

Quartus tractatus tertii principalis, et dividitur in duas sui principales paries. 

(Cap. ii.] Prima pars, scilicet, qui teneantur ad bellum accedere ? 

An a domino, moto iusto bello, teneantur vassalli ad bellum accedere 
propriis expensis ? 

icap..ii| An subditi uni baroni moventi guerram contra regem suum, teneantur 
iuvare ipsum baronem contra regem ? 



DE VNIVERSALI CORPORALI BELLO 197 

An subditi uni baroni, moventi guerram alter! baroni, teneantur ipsum [c ap . xxxiii. 
prime, vel regem, moventem guerram alteri regi, iuvare utriusque mandate 
uno concursu recepto ? 

An vassallus non legius duorum dominorum, utrumque vel alterum, et [Cap. xxxiv. 
quern, iuvare teneatur ? 

An vassallus teneatur iuvare dominum contra patrem, vel pater contra [Cap. xxxv.] 
filium ? 

An civis duarum civitatum teneatur iuvare unam contra aliam ? 

An vassallus vocatus a domino teneatur ipsum sequi in partibus ultra- [Ca P . xxxvi. 
marinis, ad pugnandum contra barbaros ? 

An servi teneantur ubique sequi dominum ad bellum ? leap, xxxvn. 

An liberti, vocati, teneantur sequi patronum ad bellum ? [Cap. xxxvm 

An agricolae, vocati, teneantur sequi dominum ad bellum ? [c ap . xxx. 

An confederates, seu colligates, possit dominus provocare ut ipsum [Ca P . *i.] 
iuvent in bello ? 

An subditi, ratione iurisdictionis tantum, teneantur ad bellum accedere ? tcap.ii.] 

Secunda pars, scilicet, de personis non astrictis ad bellum libere accedentibus, et tc P . xiii.j 

dividitur in sex principales partes. 

Prima pars, scilicet, de libere accedentibus. 

An libere accedentes obligent sibi ilium in cuius servitium vadunt, si dam- 
num inde patiantur ? 

An commodatarius teneatur commodanti equos et arma in bello deper- [Cap. xiiii.j 
dita resarcire. 

An conductor teneatur locatori equos et arma in bello deperdita re- [c ap .xiiv.] 
sarcire ? 

An provocans contra spoliatorem provocati, ad bellum accedentis, aget l Ca P- xiv.j 
vi bonorum raptorum, vel furti ? 

An non vocati, sed proprio motu accedentes, ad bellum obligent sibi [Ca P . xivi.] 
ilium in cuius servitium vadunt ? 

An non vocati, sed proprio motu ad bellum accedentes, et utiliter profi- [Ca P . xivii.j 
cientes, obligent sibi ilium renitentem et contradicentem in cuius servitium 
vadunt ? 

Secunda pars de accedentibus, quia tenentur ad antidota. t^p- * Iviii -J 

An talis agat contra ilium quern iuvat ? 

Tertia pars de accedentibus propter gloriam consequendam. [Ca P . xiu.] 

An tales obligent sibi ilium in cuius subsidium vadunt ? 

Quarta pars de accedentibus, quia locant operas suas. [Ca P . i.j 

An tales agant contra conductores ? 



198 DE IVRE BELLI 

[Cap. H.) Quinta pars de acccdentibus aninto spoliandi. 

An talibus actio competat ? 

ICP- >") Sexta pars. 

An clerici ad bellum accedere possint ? 

An stipendiarii in Alamania, constitute salario per conducentem, agant 
contra eum, qui dum venirent, amisit totaliter statum suum ? 

[Cap.Hii] An stipendiarii assumpti de Alamania per civitatem Italicam, consti- 
tute salario per annum, qui dum venirent, ci vitas violenter occupata est per 
tyrannum, agant ad salarium in totum, aut pro rata, vel ad quid ? 
[cp. iiv.; An quando solvi debeat stipendiariis, an, scilicet, in principio cuiuslibet 

mensis, an in fine ? 
[Cap. u.] An stipendiarii se absentantes, etiam de licentia domini, aliquo tempore, 

perdant salarium pro illo tempore ? 

[cp.ivi.] An si stipendiarii culpa sua servire nolint toto tempore firmae suae, per- 
dant stipendium totius temporis, an tantum pro tempore quo non servierint ? 
[Cap. iriL] An stipendiarius servire possit per substitutum ? 
[Cap. iriiij An stipendiarius perdat stipendium tempore quo infirmatur ? 



[Cap. HX.J Quintus tractatus tertii principalis, scilicet, de spoliis et capturis qua 

fiunt in bello. 

An aliquid capiens in bello efficiatur dominus personae captas et rei, et an 

sit locus postliminio ? 
(Cap. ix.j An capti in bello duarum civitatum efficiantur servi, et dominium eorum 

quaeratur ? 

[Cap. hi.] An capta in bello efficiantur capientium ? 
(Cap. uii.) An in bellis licitum sit insidiis uti ? 
[Cap. MIL] (Desunt hie verba " an in festis licitum sit bellare ? ".) 
[Cap. iiiv.] An consecutus in bello totum suum interesse, possit iterum adversarium 

in iudicio convenire, vel bellum iterate contra eum indicere ? 
[Cap. hn'.} An morientes in bello salventur ? 
[Cap.ui.] An pro rebus et possessionibus Ecclesiae corporali bello bellare liceat, et 

super hoc mih'tes convocare ? 

leap, iirii.) An liceat episcopis ad bellum accedere sine licentia Papae ? 
[Cap.hriu.1 An praelati pro temporalibus, quae tenent ab Imperatore, teneantur sol- 

vere tributum pro beUis ab eo indictis ? 
[Cap. ii.] An captis in bello iusto sit miserendum ? 
[Cap. ix.i An Ecclesia bellum debeat indicere ludaeis ? 
[Cap.ii.j An degentes in bello, qui pugnare non possunt, gaudeant immunitatibus 

bellantium ? 
[Cap. iii.] An liceat praelatis ratione temporalis iurisdictionis bella indicere, et eis 

interesse, et ad bellandum alios hortari ? 



DE BELLO PARTICVLARI 



199 



An liceat praelato, pro iniuria subditi sui impunita, bellum indicere, et [Cap. iiii.) 
alios quam iniuriantes capere ? 

An delegatus Papae possit indicere bellum, id est, invocare brachium I C! >P- '') 
saeculare ? 

An bella indicta per Ecclesiam contra excommunicates sint meritoria ? [Cap. ivj 



Sextus et ultimus traciatus tertii principalis per modum tabula, scilicet, quot [Cap. ixi.] 
sint genera bellorum corporalium de quibus reperitur in iure expressum ? 



Quartus tractatus tertii principalis, scilicet, De Bello Particulari qaod fit ob l<-' a p- ' 
tutclam sui, et dividitur in octo sui paries principals. 



Prima pars. 
Quid sit particulare bellum ? [Cap. i 



Secunda pars. 
Quot sint species particularis belli ? [Cap. i 



Tertia pars. 
Quo iure inductum sit particulare bellum ? [Ca |M][ , 



Quarta pars, 
scilicet, Quibus liceat hoc particulare bellum indicere ? tcap. ixxxi.] 

An clericis competat hoc bellum indicere ? [Ca P . ixxxii.) 

An cum liceat clerico se defendere, etiam occidendo, hoc sibi liceat in reap. ixxxiii.) 

ccclesia ? 

An liceat clerico celebranti invaso se defendere et occidere, et si sic con- [Ca P . ixxxiv.) 

tinuato officio celebrare ? 

An baptizanti, inungenti, confirmanti, ordinanti, et singula sacramenta [Ca P ;ixxxv.] 

conferenti invasis, licitum sit collationem illorum postponere inchoatam ? 

An praeeligenda sit mors^ invasi sacerdotis, cum puerum in mortis articulo [Ca P . ixxxvi.j 

baptizat, an vita aeterna ipsius pueri, ne sine baptismo decedat ? 

An monacho liceat se defendere sine licentia abbatis sui ? [Ca P . ixxxvii.) 

An servo liceat se defendere sine iussu domini sui ? [Ca P . ixxxvii *,> 

An bannitis, qui quandoque per leges municipales occidi impune possunt, [Cap. i*viii.]| 

liceat se defendere ? 



DE IVRE BELLI 



ICap. Uxxii.) 



[Cap. *c.) 

(Cp. ici.J 

[Cap. *<*.] 

(Cap. xciii | 

(dp. iciv.) 



Ouinta pars, 

scilicet, Contra quos liceat hoc particulare bellum indicere ? 
An liceat contra superiorem suum ? 
An contra iudicem, etiam si iniuste aliquid agat ? 
An filio contra patrem ? 
An monacho contra abbatcm ? 
An servo contra dominum ? 



leap. *c.) 

[cp. vii 

[Cap. xc 

[Cap. *ci. 

[Cp. c. 

leap. ci. 

[Cap. en. 



|cap.ciii.] 



Sexta pars, 

scilicet, Pro quibus liceat hoc particulare bellum indicere, 
et dividitur in duas sui paries principals. 

Prima pars, scilicet, pro quibus personis liceat ? 

An liceat patri pro filio ? 

An marito pro uxore ? 

An pro fratre, sorore, et aUis coniunctis personis ? 

An quis teneatur quern defendere ne ab alio occidatur ? 

An vassallus teneatur iuvare dominum suum ? 

An servus teneatur defendere dominum suum ? 

An miles teneatur defendere praepositum suum ? 

An vassallus videns dominum invasum ex una parte, patrem ex alia, 
utrumque pariter in mortis articulo nisi iuventur, nee iuvare potest nisi alte- 
rum, quaeritur quern iuvabit ? 

Quid iuris, eodem themate retento, in clerico, qui videns episcopum 
suum invasum ex una parte, patrem ex alia, utrumque pariter in mortis arti- 
culo nisi iuventur, nee iuvare potest nisi alterum, quaeritur quem iuvabit ? 



(Cap. i. v i Secunda pars, scilicet, pro quibus rebus liceat ? 

An liceat pro rebus iuste possessis ? 
leap. .] An pro iniuste possessis ? 
[Cap. cvi.j An et si liceat res defendere, defendens etiam cum moderamine incul- 

patae tutelae, si occidat vel mutilet, irregularitatem incurrat ? 
icap.cvii.] An, pro rebus suis defendendis contra clericum, excommunicatiom in 

incidat manus iniciendo ? 
leap. iii.) An pro rebus defendendis vocatis amicis licitum sit subsidium impen- 

dere ? 
icap.cn.) An pro rebus defendendis licitum sit sic contra omnes vim vi repellere, 

sicut contra quos licitum est pro personis ? 
[Cap. ex.) An pro rebus depositis vel commodatis liceat vim vi repellere ? 



IC.p. cmi.) 



Septima pars, 

scilicet, Qualiter liceat hoc particulare bellum indicere ? 
An liceat cum moderamine inculpats tutelae ? 
Quid sit moderamen inculpatae tutelae, et qua; in eo rcquirantur ? 



DE REPRESALIIS 201 

An liceat vili et debili cum ense se defendere contra fortem et robustum [Ca P .c*ii.] 
pugno tantum percutientem ? 

An et si liceat incontinenti se defendere, qualiter intelligatur illud [Cap. cxiu.] 
" incontinenti " ? 

Qualiter intelligatur aequivalentia in ipso actu violento ? [Cap. iv.j 

An vindicasse videar, non defendisse, si spoliatorem meum de posses- tc ap . cxv.] 
sione mea expuli, qui ante satisdare volebat de possessione restituenda. 

An paratum ad me percutiendum exspectare debeam, vel eum praevenire ? [Cap. cxvi.j 

An miles quern vicinus aggreditur censeatur vim vi repellere, si exspectet [Ca P .vii.) 
et percutiat, cum tamen alias fugere posset ? 

An si vulneratus post vulnera insequatur vulnerantem, et ipsum percu- [c ap .cxviii.] 
tiat, quod tamen non licet, puniri debeat ut dolosus, vel ut culpabilis ? 

An violentia illata personae possit per amicos propulsari -feicut illata [Ca P . cxix.i 
rebus ? 

An serviens, de mandate domini sui, uxorem ipsius interficiens, ex- [Ca P . cxx.j 
cusetur ? 



Octava et ultima pars quarti tractatus tertii principalis. '^P- c '-i 

Quis sit finis particularis belli ? 



Quintus tractatus tertii principalis, [Cap. 

scilicet, De Particular! Bello quod fit ad defensam mystici corporis, quod 
" Represaliae " nuncupatur, 

et dividitur iste tractatus, prima sui divisione, in duas paries principales. 

Prima pars ponit unde, et a quo, ortum habuerunt represaliee ? (Cap. c 

Secunda pars, scilicet, de causis represaliarum. De causa productiva sive ICP- 

efficiente represaliarum. 

Tertia pars, scilicet, de causa materiali, et dividitur in quatuor paries iCa P . 

principales. 

Prima pars, scilicet, de materia in qua. 

Quid sit materia in qua ? 
Quid sit materia circa quam ? 
Quid sit materia contra quam ? 
Quid sit materia ex qua ? 

Quibus personis concedatur facultas represaliandi ? 
An incolis represaliae concedantur ? 

An civibus non subiectis Jurisdiction! civitatis, et alias non f acientibus [Ca P . c 
factiones, sint indicendae represaliae ? 



202 DE IVRE BELLI 

icp. cii.i An civi per conventionem concedantur represaliae contra civitatem 
originis ? 

ic*p.c.iiii An civibus, et habitis pro civibus, limitatse tamen, represalias concedan- 
tur ? 

icp. cix.i An civibus unius civitatis, qui pacto vel statute tractantur ut cives alte- 
rius civitatis, per eandem concedi possint represaliae ? 

(Cap. em.) Secunda pars, scilicet, de materia circa quam. 

An contra res eorum qui capi non possunt vigore represaliarum possint 

indici represaliae ? 
[Cap.cji.] An represaliae, simpliciter indictae, exerceri possint contra bona existen- 

tia in territorio civitatis contra quam sunt indictae, ut capiantur et reducantur 

intra territorium civitatis indicentis ? 
iCap. CM*!).] An si una civitas indicat represalias contra aliam, possit rector civitatis 

indicentis, scribendo rectori civitatis contra quam, exercere represalias in res 

ibi situatas ? 

(Cap. cxMiii.i Teriia pars, scilicet, de materia contra quam. 

An represaliae indictae per unam civitatem contra homines alterius civi- 
tatis, exerceri possint contra incolas illius civitatis ? 

[Cap.civ.] An represaliae, indictae per unam civitatem contra homines alterius civi- 
tatis, exerceri possint contra homines illius civitatis alibi morantes ? 
iCap.cxw.) An represaliae exerceri possint contra cives vel incolas unius civitatis, 

onera subeuntes eiusdem, qui etiam sint cives alterius civitatis ? 
(Cp.rxxxvi.] An contra mulieres exerceri possint represaliae ? 

icap.cxxxvii.1 An contra clericos non coniugatos, item et an contra coniugatos, exerceri 
valeant represaliae ? * 

An episcopo, negligente de clericis suis iustitiam facere, nee haberi pos- 
sit recursus ad superiorem, possint indici represalite contra clericos eosdem 
per iudicem saecularem ? 
(Cap. cxuviii.] An contra Bononienses, vel etiam alios studentes Bononiae, euntes Pa- 

duam pro studio, exerceri possint represaliae ? 
(Cap. emit.] An contra ambasciatores exerceri possint represaliae ? 

[Cap.cxij An contra euntes ad nundinas, ad Sanctum lacobum, vel ad alium locum 
indulgentiae, item an contra navigantes, et an contra illos qui in ius vocari 
non possunt, et in multis aliis casibus, exerceri valeant represaliae ? 
icap.r*ii.i An contra Bononiensem potestatem, Mediolani ibi iniustitiam facientem, 

possint represaliae concedi ? 
[cup. r.iii.] An contra officiates potestatis vel rectoris, iniustitiam facientes, possint 

represaliae indici ? 
icp. oiiii.) An contra consules, priores, civitatis, iustitiam facere denegantes, possint 

indici represaliae ? 

icp. c*uv.i An contra singulares personas, penitus innocentes, propter delictum do- 
mini, vel alterius privati, de quo non fit iustitia, indici possint represaliae ? 



DE REPRESALIIS 203 

An contra homines, quoad quid tantum, non autem plene, uni civitati [Cap. adv.] 
subditos, indici possint represaliae ? 

An contra certum genus hominum, facere iustitiam denegantium, indici [Ca P . ivi.] 
possint represaliae ? 

Quarta pars, scilicet, de materia ex qua, qua insurgit ex defectu iurisdictionis, [Ca P . cxivii.i 
quia primo requiri debet iudex antequam represalice concedantur. 

An requiri debeat iudex ut iustitiam faciat antequam represaliae conce- [Cap. aiviii.) 

dantur ? 

An iudex iniuriam patientis, qui non audet litigare in civitate iniuriam [C P . iu.j 

inferentis, possit scribere, ut in alios iurisdictionem prorogent, vel arbitros 

eligant ? 

Quis iudex requiri debeat ut iustitiam faciat ? tca P . ci.i 

Qualis iniustitia requiratur, ut represaliae indicantur ? [Ca P . cii.i 

Quando dicatur non posse haberi copia superioris, ut locus sit represa- [Cap. cin.j 

liarum indictioni ? 

Quarta pars principalis, scilicet, de causa formali, et dividitur in duas [Ca P . ciuij 

paries principals. 

Prima pars, scilicet, de forma indicendarum represaliarum. 

Quis comparere possit ad hoc, ne indicantur represaliae ? [c ap . ciiv.i 

Qualitef constabit de iniustitia facta, vel ea denegata ? tca PP . civ, civ 

An si aliqua capiantur vigore represaliarum, detineri valeant, ex primo ica?. ci.] 
decreto, an secundo ? 

Secunda pars, scilicet, de forma exercendi represalias. ic*p. civiii.i 

An liceat illi cui sunt concessae represaliae, auctoritate propria, vel per 
ministros concedentis, exerceri ? 

An personas et res captas teneatur capiens iudici prsesentare, vel sibi [Ca P . ciix.i 
retinere ? 

An res captae vigore represaliarum vendantur, vel in solutum accipiantur, [Cap. ci*.] 
vel aestimentur ? 

An diebus feriatis possint represaliae exerceri ? [Ca P . cixi.j 

An, si quis vult se defendere, vel res captas, qualis cognitio adhibeatur ? [Ca P . cixii.) 

An exacto competat regressus, contra ilium propter cuius debitum vel [Ca P . cixuLi 
deh'ctum exactus est ? 

An exacto succurratur contra rectorem sicut contra debitorem princi- [Cap. cixiv.] 
palem ? 

An captus vigore represaliarum possit, auctoritate propria, homines [Ca P . cUv.j 
illius civitatis capere in qua captus fuit ? 

An per statuta represaliae concedi possint in casibus aliter a iure non per- [Ca P . ci.] 
missis ? 

[18] 



204 



DE IVRE BELLI 



An statutum civitatis quo cavctur quod filius teneatur pro patre delin- 
quente possit exerceri contra filiiun existentem extra territorium civitatis 
condentis ? 
tcap. cbmi.) An per pactum possit licite fieri quod unus teneatur pro alio ? 



(Cap. clxviii] 



Sexlus et ultimus tractatus tertii principalis huius operis, 
scilicet, De Particular! Bello quod fit ad purgationem, quod " Duellum " 

nuncupatur, 
et dividitur, prima sui divisione, in septem paries principals. 



Quid sit Duellum ? 



Prima pars. 



icp. ci.j 



[Cap. cii.] 



Secunda pars, scilicet, quot sint species Duelli ? 
Qualiter duellum fit propter odii exaggerationem ? 
Qualiter fit duellum propter gloriam in publico consequendain ? 
Qualiter fit duellum propter purgationem alicuius criminis iniuncti ? 

Tertia pars, scilicet, quo iure sit inductum et quo inhibitum ? 
Quah'ter duellum, quod fit propter odii exaggerationem sit introductum 
iure naturali, sumpto pro instinctu naturae, proveniente ex sensualitate ad ali- 
quid appetendum ? 

[Cap.ciii.j Qualiter duellum, quod fit propter odii exaggerationem, sit inhibitum 
iure naturali, sumpto pro rationabili intelligentia, et sic iure gentium et 
divino, canonico et civili ? 
[Cap. el..] Qualiter duellum, quod fit propter gloriam, sit inductum iure naturali, 

sumpto pro instinctu naturae ex sensualitate proveniente ? 
(Cap. ciniv.] Qualiter duellum, quod fit propter gloriam, sit inhibitum iure divino ? 

Qualiter duellum, quod fit propter gloriam, sit inhibitum iure gentium ? 
Qualiter duellum, quod fit propter gloriam, sit inhibitum de iure cano- 
nico et civili ? 



[Cap. 



[Cap. cinm.) 



(Cap. civii.) 



Quarta pars, scilicet propter quid duellum purgatorium sit pertnissum, et 

propter quid prohibitum ? 

Qualiter duellum purgatorium inhibitum sit iure divino ? 
Qualiter duellum purgatorium inhibitum sit iure gentium ? 
Qualiter duellum purgatorium inhibitum sit iure canonico ? 
Qualiter duellum purgatorium sit inhibitum regulariter iure civili ? 

Quinta pars, scilicet, in quibus casibus pcrmiltatur duellum purgatorium ? 
Qualiter duellum iure Lombardo in viginti casibus permittatur ? 

Sexta pars, scilicet, inter quos iniri possit duellum ? 
Qualiter duellum purgatorium inter principales regulariter fieri debeat ? 



DE DVELLO 205 

Septima et ultima pars, scilicet, qualiter fiat duellum. [Cap. cix*vm.] 

Qualiter duellum purgatorium ad instar sit iudicii contentiosi ? 

An iuramentum de astu inter duellantes sit prastandum, et per quern ? [Cap. ciix.] 

An uni parti campione dato, in casibus a iure permissis, liceat etiam [Ca P . CUM.] 

alteri parti dare campionem ? 

Qualiter, in casibus hinc inde, cum campio conceditur, net ipsorum datio [c P . cixu 

et concessio ? 

An quilibet admittatur pro campione ? [ Ca P- <=i-] 

In cuius electione sit duellum ? [Cap. cimiu.] 

Qualiter ordinetur duellum ? [Cap- cixniv.] 

Quibus armis duellari debeat ? icap. <=UHV.] 

An, si arma seu fustes unius duellantium frangantur, vel cadant, debeant [Cap. cimvi.j 

alia dari ? 

Quis duellantium prius percurrere debeat ? ( Ca P- 

An duellum, prima die non finitum, sequenti die terminari possit ? (Cap. cinxv 

An in duello succumbens in expensis condemnetur ? [Cap. ciixxi 

An provocans in duello, succumbens, puniatur poena talionis ? [Cap. c .j 

An provocatus ad duellum propter crimen, succumbens et condemnatus, [Cap. cxci.] 

possit de eodem crimine accusari in iudicio contentioso ? 

An provocans ad duellum propter crimen publicum, desistens a duello, [Ca P . mcii.] 

incidat posnam Turpiliani ? 

An provocans ad duellum iure Lombardo possit de iudicis licentia de- [Cap. aciii.] 

sistere ? 

An provocans ad duellum possit, sine poena, ante litem contestatam de- [Cap. cxdv.i 

sistere, item an, et quando, in duello dicatur lis contestari ? 

Explicit Tabula super libello tractatus De Bello Domini lohannis 
de Lignano. Deo gratias. Amen. Amen. Amen. 



THE TRACTATUS DE BELLO 

Of Giovanni da Legnano 

Translated from the preceding extended text 

by 
James Leslie Brierly, M.A., B.C.L. 

Fellow of Trinity College and 

Late Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford 

Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law 



HERE BEGINS THE TREATISE ON WAR OF GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO 
OF MILAN, DOCTOR OF THE CANON AND OF THE CIVIL LAW. 

" The King of Israel changed his raiment and entered into war," i Kings, 
ch. xxii. Israel is the throne of the Lord, and, as it is written in Jeremiah, 
ch. iii, " they shall call Israel the throne of the Lord." And this is'the patri- 
mony of the Holy Roman Church, whose head is Jerusalem, this kindly city of 
Bologna, which may truly be called Jerusalem. For in her is manifested the 
truth of all things knowable, and especially of law. Of her it is written in 
Zechariah, ch. viii, " Jerusalem shall be called a city of truth." She is " comely 
as Jerusalem," Song of Solomon, ch. vi. Of her also the Prophet exclaims in 
Zephaniah, ch. i, " I will search Jerusalem with candles " ; and in Acts, ch. v, 
" ye have filled Jerusalem with your doctrine." Of her also it is written in 
Revelation, ch. xxi, " I saw the holy city, Jerusalem " ; and in the same 
chapter, " he shewed me the city, the holy Jerusalem, descending out of heaven," 
to wit, Bologna. And truly she has descended out of heaven, since there is the 
fountain of truth, of the laws which indeed are promulgated by the mouths of 
princes, dist. viii, quo iure ; C. De longi temporis praescriptione, the last law. 
Of her the Apostle writes to the Hebrews, in ch. xii, " the city of the living God, 
the heavenly Jerusalem." And the same Apostle, in Galatians, ch. iv, says, 
' ' But Jerusalem which is above is f ree. ' ' Of her also it is written in 2 Chronicles, 
ch. vi, " I have chosen Jerusalem, that my name might be there." 

But with the permission of the Most High and by the disposition of the 
heavenly bodies, this city of Bologna, like Jerusalem, has been utterly changed 
and devastated, and for the innumerable offences of her inhabitants, and their 
mutual hatreds, the Most High has long threatened her destruction, as it is 
written in 2 Kings, ch. xxi, " I will wipe Jerusalem as a man wipeth a dish." 
Of the conspiracy of the inhabitants it is written in 2 Chronicles, ch. xxv,* 
" a conspiracy descended on Jerusalem." And because of the pride of the 
inhabitants the Lord threatened by the mouth of his Prophet, saying, " I will 
mar the pride of Judah and the great pride of Jerusalem," Jeremiah, ch. xiii. 
And because of this pride the Prophet exclaims against her inhabitants, saying, 
" I will make Jerusalem heaps of sand." And in another place a Prophet 
exclaims because of this, saying, " I will make Jerusalem as an heap of stones," 
Micah, ch. i. And because of this a Prophet exclaims against those that were 
nursed in her, saying, " ye grieved Jerusalem, that nursed you," Baruch, ch. iv. 

* At the end, " they made a conspiracy against him in Jerusalem." 

209 



210 THE LAW OF WAR 

And because of this, that is, because of the excesses of the inhabitants, it came 
to pass that the armies of the King of Babylon besieged Jerusalem, Jeremiah, 
ch. xxii. And because of this, that which is written in Ezekiel, ch. v, came to 
pass, " This is Jerusalem in the midst of the nations," that is, in the midst of 
her enemies. By way of penalty there has come to pass also that which is 
written in Lamentations, ch. i, "Jerusalem has become as a woman denied." 

Therefore the kindly city of Bologna is rightly called Jerusalem, and the 
head of the throne, that is of the patrimony, of the Holy Mother Church. But 
the king who in fact rules and governs her is the Most Reverend Father and 
lord in Christ, the lord Egidio, by divine compassion Bishop of Sabina. For 
he changed his raiment and entered into war. For he was appointed from the 
throne of peace, that is, from the most sacred College of Cardinals, and from 
the right hand of the most holy Pope Innocent VI, for the recovery of Jerusalem, 
that is, of the patrimony which had been utterly lost ; and in its recovery he 
changed his raiment. For he left the pontifical peace and entered into war, 
into strong war like a most serene prince. For before him there was no king 
in Jerusalem ; as it is written in Judges, ch. xxi, " in those days there was no 
king." And for that reason the Lord said to him, that is, to the lord Egidio, 
" I have sent thee to rule over the people of the Lord," Judges, ch. ix^. And 
he himself may say, " the Lord chose me to be king," i Chronicles, ch. xxviii. 
" And the Lord set him as king over all Israel," i Chronicles, ch. xii > . And 
" the king arose from the throne of the Lord," Jonah, ch. iii. And he entered 
into war well and prosperously. For like one borne on the two wings of highest 
wisdom and illustrious bravery, he brought all the rights of the Holy Roman 
Church, which had been tyrannically usurped, from nothingness into existence, 
from darkness to light, so that it may be said that he has created something 
out of nothing, Genesis, ch. i ; and C. De rei uxoriae actione, the single law, at 
the beginning. Truly, therefore, like the King of Israel, he has changed his 
raiment and entered into war. 

Because, therefore, the King of Israel, that is of the patrimony, and above 
all of the city of Bologna, which is indeed the head of the patrimony, and which, 
as was shown above, was brought from extremity to extremity, changed his 
raiment and entered into war, and this war is in our own days, and is even 
still pending, it would seem somewhat unfitting to pass it over in complete 
silence. 

So therefore I, Giovanni da Legnano of Milan, the least of all doctors of 
the canon and civil law, have conceived a treatise to be dedicated to you, the 
Most Reverend Father in Christ and my lord Egidio, by divine compassion 
Bishop of Sabina in the parts of Italy, Vicar General for the Holy Roman 
Church, and true King of Jerusalem, concerning Jerusalem, that is, the city of 
Bologna, and concerning the war into which, changing your raiment, you 
entered, in the following order. I shall set forth six cases touching the city of 
Bologna, which have keenly concerned that city, from the year of our Lord 
1350 up to 1360, especially those whcrefrom a change of government arose, 



BOLOGNA 211 

together with the marks of the seasons and the aspects of the years about 
noon-time of the days on which these things befell, but not the aspects of the 
hours. And I add these things because I intend in some treatises to exceed 
the bounds of law, explaining some things which will perchance happen ; and 
to each case I shall devote one treatise or more, as occasion demands. Some 
treatises I shall pass over in silence, others I shall explain in detail. I shall 
publish one only at the present time, a treatise on War, promising, if the Lord 
will, to expand and deliver them severally at a fitting time, and when the cause 
of the prohibition ceases, and praying the same Most Reverend Father to deign 
to overlook the poverty of my intellect, and to accept this poor exordium, to be 
corrected and reformed as it shall please you, according to the authority of the 
Wise Man of the Gentiles, " a poor gift," &c. I pass, then, to my subjects ; 
and I shall set them forth from the cause in a figure. 



While Jupiter the key-bearer, the Sixth bearer of clemency, 2 was sitting 
on the seat of the fisherman, Mars 3 by his command hastily approached, that 
he might freely enter into the green and flowery pasture 4 of Taurus. This was 
in the year of our Lord 1350, on the 8th day of July. The Sun was then in 
Cancer, 23 32' ; the Moon was with Leo, 28 21' ; the Head of Draco was in 
Gemini, 26 9' ; Saturn was in Aries, 26 32' ; Jupiter with Cancer, 28 51' ; 
Mars in Libra, 11 18' ; Venus was retiring in Cancer, 29 20' ; Mercury was 
following Venus in Cancer, 9 10'. And then the tallest of the sons of Saturn, 5 
bearing a circlet 6 from Jupiter, 7 full of vipers within, with three tall vipers 8 
springing from his sides, descending from the north on the intercession of 
Mercury, 9 came with Mars into the pasture, and was chosen perpetual shepherd 
of the Taurine herd, that is to say, was elected lord. And this was in the year 
of our Lord 1350, on the 24th day of October, the Sun . . . ; the Moon in Cancer, 
9 50' ; Saturn in Aries, 22 19' ; Jupiter in Leo, 18 13' ; Mars in Sagittarius, 
23 32' ; Venus in Virgo, 25 20' ; Mercury in Libra, 21 25' ; the Head of 
Draco in Gemini, 20 19' ; his Tail, &c. 

After a lapse of time, by the working of the clemency 10 of Jupiter, and of 
the circlet n which the son of Saturn had received from him, it came to pass 
that the son of Saturn received 12 Jupiter in the meadow with words, and recog- 
nized him as the first shepherd of the herd. This was in the year of our Lord 
1352, on the 7th day of September ; the Sun in Virgo, 23 10' ; the Moon in 
Virgo, 2 30' ; the Head in Taurus, 14 17' ; Saturn in Taurus, 24 27' ; Jupiter 

in the reign of Pope Clement VI. 8 i. e., his three nephews, Matteo, Bernabo, and 



fo the Church. i. e ., Giovanni da Pepoli. 



the army of the Count of the Romagna Galeazzo. 



[19] 



Bologna. 10 i. e., Pope Clement. 

the Archbishop of Milan. n i. e., the priestly dignity. 

the priestly dignity. l * i. e., the Archbishop recognized the Pope as 

the Pope. lord. 



212 THE LAW OF WAR 

in Virgo, 29 17' ; Mars in Sagittarius, 6 20' ; Venus in Virgo, 2 8' ; Mercury 
in Libra, 27 . . .'. 

Now, behold, in this short time Taurus contracted a triple wedlock, and 
blushed not, his spouse still living, to break forth into illicit desire now for this 
and now for that one, so that there may be said of you that which is written 
in Isaiah, ch. i, " How is the faithful city full of judgement become an harlot ! 
Righteousness lodged in it, but now murderers. Thy silver is become dross, 
thy wine mixed with water. Thy princes are rebellious, and companions of 
thieves. Every one loveth gifts, and followeth after rewards. They judge not 
the fatherless, neither doth the cause of the widow come unto them. Therefore 
saith the Lord, the Lord of hosts, the mighty One of Israel, Ah, I will ease me 
of mine adversaries, and avenge me of mine enemies ; and I will turn my hand 
upon thee, and purely purge away thy dross, and take away all thy tin ; and 
I will restore thy judges as at the first, and thy counsellors as at the beginning : 
afterward thou shalt be called the city of righteousness." So it happens and 
will happen concerning thee, O Taurus, when the semicircle shall become 
tripartite, peace arise, and motion flow ; age resists, but a youth of vices brings 
this to pass. 

To this case I devote three treatises : one on Mars, that is on War, and 
this I publish ; another on Jupiter, that is on the Church, and its government 
by its pastors, and by the aspects mentioned, showing what is the issue of its 
prosperity and adversity, and especially in regard to this present time, of the 
patrimony ; another on Saturn, that is on the Empire and its government by 
the rulers of to-day, and what is the issue of its prosperity and adversity, 
especially in regard to ecclesiastical and temporal rule in Italy, although in 
some ways these things pass the bounds of law. The last two, however, I do 
not publish at present, as I said before, until the urgent reason ceases. 



Second Case. 

After this, when the son of Saturn had been consumed with fire 13 and the 
three vipers 14 above mentioned had been raised up, bearing Saturn of the 
eagles 1S also in the centre of their heart, and ascending the throne of him who 
had been consumed, 16 they were received indivisibly as shepherds into the 
pasture." This was in the year of our Lord 1354, on the nth day of October. 
At that time the Sun was in Libra, 26 22' ; the Moon . . . with Leo, 16 45' ; 
Draco was covering his Head in Aries, 3 58' ; Saturn was in Gemini, 23 24' ; 
Jupiter was in Libra, 22 17' ; Mars in Capricorn, 25 4' ; Venus was wantoning 
in Scorpio, 16 14' ; Mercury in Scorpio, n 46' ; Draco was covering his Head 
in Taurus, 3 59'. 

11 i. e., the Archbishop being dead. " i. e., succeeding the Archbishop. 

14 i. c., his nephews. " i. e., as lords of Bologna. 

11 i. e., the imperial eagle. 



BOLOGNA 213 

After a little time, the lot was cast for the inheritance 18 of liim who had 
been consumed with fire, and the elder of the vipers 19 was raised alone into 
the pasture. Here I give no mark, because I do not regard it as important for 
what follows. After this, Mercury, 20 fearing he might be utterly exterminated 
by the vipers, was taken within the pasture as a shepherd. See now how, in 
this short space of time, Taurus, raging in wantonness, blushed not to contract 
another triple wedlock. And because thou didst so rage in the wantonness of 
manifold concubinage, and therein didst exceed all wantonness that admits 
of expiation, the Lord rained upon thee brimstone and fire from the Lord out 
of heaven, and overthrew thee, and all the region over against thee and the 
inhabitants, and all the green things which grew upon the ground, as it is 
written in Genesis,, ch. xix. When a straight line shall be semicircular, then 
that which is crooked shall be made straight for thee. Now this was in the year 
of our Lord 1355, on the I7th day of April. The Sun was in Taurus, 5 7' ; 
the Moon in Gemini, 28 31' ; the Head in Pisces, 23 49' ; Saturn in Gemini, 
20 17' ; Jupiter in Sagittarius, 22 15' ; Mars in Gemini, 5 21' ; Venus in 
Taurus, 27 19' ; Mercury in Aries, 11 22'. 

To this second case I append treatises on temporal dominion throughout 
the world under the Empire, treating of its origin, its species, division, succession, 
mode of government, and conservation ; explaining each single government, 
from the lowest to the highest, in the whole world, beyond the bounds of law ; 
explaining how the governments of the world vary according to the variety of 
its qlimates, and how in the same climates the governments of the world vary 
with the varied motions and aspects of superior bodies, for sometimes they are 
tyrannies, sometimes democracies, sometimes natural principalities ; using 
common and popular language, in order that in the prosecution of this treatise 
I may follow the subject to its farthest limits. 



Third Case. 

After this the elder viper a vanished, and Mercury 22 recognized the next 23 
in the pasture. This was in the year of our Lord 1355, on the 27th day of 
September ; the Sun was leaping with Capra, 14 46' ; the Moon was being 
bitten by Scorpio, 23 31' ; the Head of Draco was in Pisces, 10 19' ; Saturn 
was with Cancer, 2 45' ; Jupiter was grazing with Capra, 7 33' ; Mars was 
bearing the bite of Scorpio, 21 41' ; Venus was with Capra, i 53' ; Mercury 
was preceding Venus over Capra, 18 55'. And now, behold, shameless 



u i. e., the dominion of the Archbishop was a i. e., the lord Matteo died, 

divided. " i. e., the lord Giovanni del Olegio. 

" i. e., the lord Matteo. i. e., the lord Bernabo. 
10 i. e., Giovanni, lord of Olegio, fearing death. 



214 THE LAW OF WAR 

Taurus, thou didst not blush at once to contract another new wedlock, but soon 
afterwards the spouse was given a bill of divorcement, 84 O. revolved to A. and 
returned with Mercury. 25 And this was in the year of our Lord 1356, on the 
nth day of February ; at which time the Sun was in Pisces, 7 57' ; the Moon 
was in Gemini, 17 56' ; the Head of Draco was fill. ,1 with Pisces, 8 9' ; Saturn 
was withdrawing with Cancer, o 44' ; Jupiter was leaping with Capra, 16 . . .' ; 
Mars was bearing the Arrow, 18 64' ; \Ymis was sprinkling Aqua, 24 58' ; 
Mercury was in Pisces, o 38'. It seemed shameful for Taurus . . . two spouses 
at the same time. ... It had been better for him to endure the two together . . . 
than to wander through so many illicit unions. And because thou didst so 
wander, there shall happen to thee that which is written, " the Lord shall bring 
a nation against thee from far, from the end of the earth, as swift as the eagle 
flieth ; a nation whose tongue thou shalt not understand ; a nation of fierce 
countenance, which shall not regard the person of the old, nor shew favour to 
the young : and he shall eat the fruit of thy cattle, and the fruit of thy land, 
until thou be destroyed : which also shall not leave thee either corn wine, or 
oil, or the increase of thy kine, or flocks of thy sheep." Thus spake the Lord 
to His disobedient people, as it is written in Deuteronomy, ch. xxviii. When 
four shall be resolved into three, then shall that which is fixed for thee become 
movable. 

To this case I append treatises on the grant and recognition of temporal 
dominion, explaining the various modes according to the variety of dominions, 
and of those who grant and receive them. 



Fourth Case. 

After this, while the marriage of Mercury with Taurus 26 was subsisting, 
the flowers and greenness of the Taurine pasture, during the reign of Jupiter 
the key-bearer, the Sixth bearer of innocence, were utterly dried up ; 27 and this 
was in the year of our Lord 1357, on the lath day of April. The Sun was then 
with raging Taurus, o 46' ; the Moon was pouring Aquae, 5 29' ; Draco was 
covering his Head under the wave, 3 38' ; Saturn was with Cancer, 15 16' ; 
Jupiter was swimming in Aqua, 26 23' ; Mars was in Gemini, 15 14' ; Venu> 
was playing with Pisces, 21 20' ; Mercury was with Taurus, n 32'. O shame- 
less Taurus, this was the punishment for that old and rash divorce of thine 
from thy spouse, from her who, while the marriage with thee subsisted, in- 
creased thy dowry, raising thee on sharp horns for a space of more than four 



M i. e., the lord Bernabo was driven out. ** i. c., an interdict on divine services and a 

** i. c., the lord Giovanni del Olegio reastumcd suspension of studies in the city of Bologna were 

the sole dominion. declared. 

M i. e., while the lord Giovanni del Olegio was 

in power. 



BOLOGNA 215 

years, and setting thee on the broadest throne from the north towards the 
meridian. But thou in impatient rage didst divorce thy spouse and fall with 
broken horns. And because thou wast so lifted up, the Lord said unto thee, 

Taurus, " because thine heart is lifted up, like the heart of a god, therefore 

1 will bring strangers upon thee, the terrible of the nations : and they shall 
draw their swords against the beauty of thy wisdom, and they shall defile thy 
brightness, and they shall kill thee and drag thee down ; and thou shalt die 
the deaths of them that are slain in the midst of the seas. Wilt thou yet say 
before them that slay thee, I am God, when thou art a man and not God ? 
By the hand of them that slay thee, by the hand of strangers, thou shalt die, 
for I have spoken it, saith the Lord." This is written in Ezekiel, ch. xxviii. 
When Job shall be healed by the horns of Taurus, that which is in the centre 
shall be turned to the concave of the sphere. 

To this case I append a treatise on Ecclesiastical Censure, explaining its 
several kinds in separate treatises. 



Fifth Case. 

After this, while Mercury 28 was again browsing within the pasture of 
Taurus, the second viper 29 adopted by Saturn as a son, 30 hastily urged Mars 
with swift motion to enter the pasture of Taurus, 31 . . . Finally, by Mercury's 32 
contrivance, the most high brother 33 of Jupiter, receiving the papal insignia 
from him, the imperial from Saturn, the warlike from Mars, pre-eminent above 
all the other " hinges " of the Church, forestalling swift Mars, 34 was received 
within the pasture ; 3S and so the circle of the first case completed its revolution. 
. . . [Here follow twenty-three lines of which the text is practically unintelligible.'] 
I see two foremost counsellors of heaven about to come to a grand conference. 
The conference will be held in a damp and poisonous place. There they will 
treat of the shaking of the world below. There they will treat . . . There they 
will treat of change in the government of the world. There they will treat of 
danger to the Church. There they will treat of the raising up of pestilences 
and famines. There they will treat of the shaking of the region of the sea. There 
they will treat of the changing of the prince of the world in his seat, of the 
making of a mighty commotion. But three lower counsellors in another 
anterior corner of the same house will converse together at the same time, and 
many things they will dispute and determine concerning the disposition of 
the world, and these conferences shall be in the year of our Lord 1365, in the 



28 i. c., the lord Giovanni del Olegio. 3i i. e., the lord Giovanni del Olegio. 

** i. e., the lord Bernabo. M i. e., Egidio Albornoz, the papal legate. 

30 i. e., appointed imperial vicar. 31 i. e., the army of the lord Bernabo. 

31 i. e., sent a great army to seize the city. 35 i. e., was chosen lord of Bologna. 



216 THE LAW OF WAR 

month of October. O Taurus, it behoves thee to be ready and prepared with 
thy horns, for the brightness of the world will be overshadowed in thy stall, 
and do not thou disregard it. And this shall be in the year 1361, on the 5th day 
of May. Of these things the planets treated in grand and multiform conference, 
of which I have spoken in my treatise. These things the various aspects of 
their revolutions bring to pass, and there is to be noted another wedlock of 
Taurus. For with the revolution of the years, on the month and day on which 
he turned aside by expelling O., 38 he has begun anew by receiving S. 37 

O Taurus, proceeding with multiform motion, though it has been ordained 
that motion should end in rest , it is in thy heart that motion should end in motion, 
and ordinarily in worse. For thee the end of motion is the beginning of motion. 
For thee to be at rest is to be moved, and now, imitating the gentile Cato, who 
took again her whom he had divorced, and returning whence thou didst turn 
aside, thou wast trusting to reach the end of unrest. But still thou shalt be 
moved, until it please the Most High to fashion for thee a stable habit. The 
brother of Jupiter fully entered in the year of our Lord 1360, on the ist day 
of April. The Sun was then with Aries, 19 24' ; the Moon was in Libra, 
li 21' ; the Head of Draco was in Sagittarius, 17 36' ; Saturn was . . . with 
Leo, 25 8' ; Jupiter was with Taurus, 21 18' ; Mars was in Pisces, 6 23' ; 
Venus was going before Mars in Pisces, 10 52' ; Mercury was in Aries, 16 10'. 

To this I shall append the deeds of peace, when they shall have come to 
pass. And I shall compose a separate treatise on Peace. . . . 



HERE BEGINS THE TREATISE ON WAR. 

[Ch. i.] 

In the treatise on War I shall proceed as follows : 

First, I shall give a description of Human War, concerning which I shall 

principally treat, in genus. 
Secondly, I shall divide War into heads. 
Thirdly, I shall pursue the several heads. 



What War is, and how it is to be described. 

War is described thus : It is a contention arising by reason of something 
discordant offered to human desire, tending to exclude the discordancy. 

I said " contention." This I give as the genus, for it contains in itself 
both warlike contention and all other contentions ; ff. De aqua pluv. arcenda, 
1. si usque, last section. I said " by reason of something discordant," and 
this is the cause whence any contention arises. I said " to human desire," to 

** i. e., the legate of Ottia. ' i. e., the legate of Sabina. 



DIVISION OF WAR 217 

differentiate it from a contention of brutes. I said " to exclude the discor- 
dancy," &c., and this is the final cause of any war ; for any war tends finally 
to destroy the displeasure which introduced it,*and so wars are made for the sake 
of peace ; xxiii, q. i, noli. 



Of the Division of War, and how it is to be divided. 
[Ch. ii.] 

Secondly, War is divided thus : It is either Spiritual or Corporeal. 

Spiritual War is either Celestial or Human. Celestial Spiritual War is 
that referred to in Job, ch. xiv (?) . Human is that of which it is written in the 
Epistle to the Romans, ch. vii, " I see another law warring against the law of 
my mind " ; xxxii, q. v, si Paulus. 

Corporeal War is either Universal or Particular. Universal War is referred 
to in ff. De captivis, throughout ; xxiii, q. i, and q. ii. 

Of Particular War one form is waged for the protection of one's own body 
and property, and this is referred to in ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim ; ff. De 
vi et vi ar., 1. i, vim vi ; and ff. Ad legem Aquiliam, 1. scientiam, qui cum 
aliter ; and C. De vi, 1. i ; and De restit. spol., ch. olim ; and Clem., De 
homicidio, si furiosus. 

Another is waged for the protection of a mystical body, or a part of it, on 
account of a defect of jurisdiction ; this is called " Reprisals," and is referred 
to in Authentics, ut non fiant pignorationes ; and Sext, De iniuriis. 

Another is waged on account of the contumacy of one who resists the 
jurisdiction of a judge ; ff . De rei vindicatione, 1. qui restituere. 

Another is waged for " compurgation " ; this is called "Duel"; C. De 
gladiatoribus, the single law ; and De pugnantibus in duello, the whole title. 

It is true that our first division might be into " lawful " and " unlawful " 
war ; but on these little need be said, and the several heads must be explained 
severally in their order. 

And first of Celestial Spiritual War, explaining it very briefly, and so of 
each in turn. 



Order of the Treatises. 

I shall treat therefore of Celestial Spiritual War. 

Secondly, of Human Spiritual War. 

Thirdly, of Universal Corporeal War. 

Fourthly, of Particular War for the protection of one's own body. 

Fifthly, of Particular War for the defence of a mystical body, which is 

called " Reprisals." 
Sixthly, of Particular War for " compurgation," which is called " Duel." 



2i8 THE LAW OF WAR 

Of Celestial Spiritual War. 
[Ch. iii.] 

Returning to these subjects severally, I say that Celestial War arose 
because of ingratitude arising from a defect in the impress of charity 
stamped by the Creator on an intelligence the most sublime of all created 
intelligences. And with this the description given above does not agree. Here 
we must know, that, as Gregory says in the Moralia, in the beginning of the 
creation of the angelic nature the Most High Creator of all created Lucifer to be 
more eminent than the other angelic intelligences. For his pre-eminence was 
not lower than the cedars in the garden of God, as is written in Ezekiel, ch. xxxi, 
" the fir trees, the plane trees did not equal his strength, nor his branches ' ; 
for he is described as " made fair in the multitude of his thick branches," 

He was the seal of the similitude of God. He was therefore created more 
eminent than the rest, as he had also other openings prepared for the admission 
of charity. For from his first creation he was made capable of charity ; and 
had he but consented to be filled therewith, . . . but he chose not charity because 
of pride. For had he shown himself penetrable to the gold of charity, he would 
have remained among the holy angels, a cut stone in a royal diadem. He had 
then the openings, but because of the vice of pride they were not filled with the 
gold of charity. 

Inasmuch, therefore, as he was more eminent than the rest, as being 
created the seal of the similitude of God, and yet he would not be filled with 
charity because of the vice of pride, therefore he sinned and was condemned 
without pardon, because he was created great without comparison ; therefore 
for this he was cast out from paradise, as may be seen at length and in most 
noble words in De Pcenit., dist. ii, ch. principium enini. The passage is by 
Gregory, as I said above. This was the Celestial Spiritual \Yar, upon which, 
as I said before, I shall say but little ; yet as I said that Lucifer was more 
eminent than the rest, we must note that certain qualities were conferred on 
angels at their first creation, in common but in different degrees, and certain 
others in common but indifferently. Those which were conferred in common 
but in different degrees were subtlety of nature or substance, clearness of 
intelligence, ability of free will. Yet these qualities they have in different 
degrees ; for some are more subtle than others in substance, some are clearer 
in intelligence, some are freer of will. The qualities conferred in common but 
indifferently were spirituality, indissolubility, indivisibility, immortality. In 
these all are made equal ; and by this you will understand in what respects 
Lucif' r via- ini'iv ( mint nt than the rest, becaust lie was more eminent in the 
qualities that are conferred in common but in different degrees. 

We must note, too, that the Devil was exalted by natural prerogative, of 
which it has 1 ccn said that he was exalted also because of the victory which he 
sometimes has against man in the war which he wages against him, whence it is 
written in a Psalm, " Thou hast exalted the right hand of them that oppress 



CELESTIAL SPIRITUAL WAR 219 

him." David feared this victory when he said, " Lighten my eyes lest I sleep 
the sleep of death, lest mine enemy say, I have prevailed against him." He 
was exalted, too, because of pride, whence it was said to him, " Thine heart was 
lifted up because of thy beauty " ; for he himself said, " I will ascend into heaven, 
and will set my throne to the north ; and I will be like the Most High," Isaiah, 
ch. xiv. 



How Celestial Spiritual War is the mete and measure of Human 

Spiritual War. 

[Ch* iv.] 

This, then, was the Spiritual War whereby Lucifer was cast out from the 
paradise of the Most High, and perhaps from it Human Spiritual War had its 
origin. For in every genus it is possible to arrive at one thing which is the first 
and the measure of all things within the common genus. So in the genus of 
the conflict of good against evil we may arrive at the first thing. The first thing 
is the beginnings ; but the beginning of virtue is the Most High, and the begin- 
ning and the prince of vices is the Devil. Their conflict, then, is the first thing 
and the measure of any lower human spiritual conflict. 

Of the natural influence of the Spiritual War of celestial bodies on 

terrestrial wars. 
[Ch. v.] 

Now it may be, if I may speak in terms of natural philosophy, that ter- 
restrial corporeal wars have celestial wars corresponding to them ; for, as the 
Philosopher says, this world is necessarily in contact with the higher motions, 
in order that all virtue may be directed thence ; Metaphysics, i, and De Ccelo 
et Mundo, ii. Every lower corporeal act, therefore, is directed by celestial ones 
above, and there is a conflict above, that is to say, virtual opposition, springing 
from the diversity of the celestial bodies, and especially of the planets, whose 
influence is more all- pervading than that of the fixed stars, and from the diversity 
of the aspects, positions, and motions of the same. Perhaps if we observe these 
we shall see that the world could not well be without war. And perhaps it 
would not be wrong, according to the teachings of natural philosophers and 
astrologers, to hold that the world could not continue without war and with 
peace alone, which might clearly be shown as follows. 



How, according to theologians and natural philosophers, it is necessary to 
assume the existence of war. 

[Ch. vi.] 

If the sufficient and necessary productive causes of any effect are estab- 
lished, the effect itself must necessarily be established ; but the sufficient and 
necessarily productive causes of war are established, therefore war itself must 

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220 THE LAW OF WAR 

necessarily be established. The major premise is proved. For an effect follows 
its cause as regards being productive and destructive ; i, q. vii, quod pro 
remedio ; i, q. i, quod pro necessitate; dist. lv, priscis ; dist. Ixi, neophitus ; 
i, q. i, detrahe ; De baptis., debitum. The minor premise is proved. For 
according to the teaching of natural philosophers it is impossible for the 
heaven to stand still. Physics, vii and viii ; on the contrary its motion is 
perpetual, and the celestial bodies by their own nature work opposing effects 
upon these lower bodies, and this opposition of effects arises here below by 
reason of the variety of the aspects of the celestial bodies and their motions, 
as our sensations show us. For, to deduce the proposition strictly, by reason 
of the varied correspondence of the celestial bodies at the time of the construc- 
tion of states, some states are found hating one another naturally, others are 
friendly or akin ; and so too there are men who hate one another naturally, 
not because of preceding deserts on one side or the other, and others who love 
one another naturally. Since, therefore, wars arise by reason of hatreds and 
discordances of desires, and these are necessarily produced by the motions of 
the celestial bodies, which are always and necessarily active, we infer that there 
will necessarily be wars, having regard to the necessity of material and cor- 
poreal nature. I admit, however, that natural power is not directly neces- 
sitated, and of itself might even resist. Hence the saying of Ptolemy in the 
Centiloquium, " the wise soul dominates the stars, . . . and we have praised 
him." I confess, however, that if the theologians think otherwise, I submit 
myself, in all that concerns them, to their correction. 

Of this war, however, I do not intend to treat, because it would be to 
exceed the bounds of law too far. 

Now six theological causes, which prevent there being universal peace on 
the earth, are usually given. The first is because offences are not punished, 
Ecclesiasticus, ch. iv. The second is the abundance of temporal things, Genesis, 
ch. xiii, " there was a strife between the herdmen of Abraham and the herdmen of 
Lot " ; James, ch. [v] iv, "whence wars and disputes," &c. The third is because 
we are not occupied in the fight against the Devil, so that we do not fight like 
men, Isaiah, ch. xxviii, " we have made a covenant with death and with hell " ; 
Ephesians.ch. vi, " we wrestle not against flesh." The fourth is because we do not 
consider the losses of war, in which we lose life and body and riches, Jeremiah, 
ch. Ivi &. The fifth is because we do not weigh the issue of war, which is doubtful, 
i Samuel, ch. xii. The sixth is because we do not keep the precepts of God, 
Jeremiah, ch. iii' 7 ', " would that thou hadst hearkened to my commands," &c. 

We see, then, from what I have said, that celestial spiritual war is two- 
fold. The first is the war of the Creator against Lucifer himself, springing from 
defect of charity turned into pride, drawing him down from his celestial throne 
to the centre of the earth. And this war lasted but a moment ; see Job, ch. xiv, 
above. The second is the virtual opposition of the motions and aspects of 
celestial bodies, which introduces formal opposition in these lower bodies, 
whereby the lower wars are introduced, and this is continuous and successive. 



HUMAN SPIRITUAL WAR 221 

On the first, in terms of theology, depends Human Spiritual War, which pro- 
ceeds from the opposition of intellect to sense. For the Prince of Evil persuades 
and induces to sin, that he may draw us down, Ephesians, ch. vi ; but the 
Prince of Good, on the contrary, strives to raise us upwards. On the second 
depends Human Corporeal War, and even Human Spiritual War, to speak in 
the terms of natural philosophy, as will be discussed in the treatise next 
following. 



Of Human Spiritual War, according to Theology. 

[Ch. vii.] 

Human spiritual war may be explained theologically and morally. 
Theologically it is a contention arising by reason of the envious opposition 
of the Devil against a reasonable creature, having its impetus in the sin of 
our first parent. And of this spiritual war the Apostle speaks in Ephesians, 
ch. vi, saying, " Take unto you the armour of God, that ye may be able to 
withstand the deceits of the Devil." And this armour is the virtues and good 
works wherewith men are armed against the vices ; xi, q. iii, qui resistit. Now 
the deceits of the Devil are innumerable, for, as Pope John says, " he has a 
thousand ways of injuring, and we know his cunning. For from his first fall 
he tries to break the unity of the Church, to wound charity, to poison the sweet- 
ness of holy works with the gall of envy, and in all manner of ways to pervert 
and perturb the human race. For he is sorely troubled and shamed that men 
formed of clay should keep charity on earth, which he could not have in heaven. 
Hence ought we, so far as our frailty will allow, to fortify all approaches of 
injury against his cunning, lest death enter by our doors." These words are 
in xvi, q. ii, ch. visis. So in another place Jerome writes most beautifully to 
Jovinian in these words, " Thus in evils and sins are the inciting seeds and the 
working of the Devil. When he sees that we have built on the foundation of 
Christ hay, wood, and stubble, then he applies fire. Let us build therefore gold, 
silver, and precious stones, and he will not dare to attack ; although even in 
this is no sure possession, for the lion lurks in ambush, that he may kill the 
innocent in the secret places, and the furnace proves the potter's vessels, but 
just men are proved by the temptation of tribulation." These words are taken 
from De Poenit., dist. ii, ch. si enim, about the middle. In another place, too, 
Pope Alexander writes in these words : " For the Devil does not cease to go 
about seeking whom he may devour, and seeking whom of the faithful he may 
destroy, and especially those whom he finds more ardent in the service of the 
Saviour and devoted to Him." These words are taken from iii, q. i, nulli, and 
ch. verum, originally from i Peter, ch. v. And this war had its impetus in the 
sin of our first parent, not as a positive cause, but as a necessary one. For if 
our first parent had not sinned, this conflict would have come to naught. 



222 THE LAW OF WAR 

Of Human Spiritual War, according to Moral Philosophy. 

[Ch. viii.] 

Now Human Spiritual War, if we understand it in a moral sense, and speak 
after the manner of philosophers, is a contention arising by reason of the opposi- 
tion of reason to sensitive appetite. Here we must note that, according to the 
Philosopher, in De Anima, ii, the soul has five potentialities, vegetative, sensi- 
tive, appetitive, intellectual, and, according to place, motive. The appetitive 
is divided into sensitive and rational. The same Philosopher, in Politics, i, 
shows that the soul dominates the body with a rule disposed or ordered like that 
of a master over a slave. But the intellect dominates the sense with a royal 
rule, that is, a rule ordered over free persons ; that is to say, the soul dominates 
the body as a master his slave, but the intellect dominates the sense as a superior 
dominates one who is subject to him, though free. Further, we must observe 
that the intellect is called rational because it formally contains reason in itself ; 
but the sensitive appetite is called rational, not because it contains reason in 
itself, for they are formally distinct potentialities, but it is called rational 
because in man it is created ready to obey reason, and irrational because it is 
capable of not obeying reason, or formally admits of the exclusion of reason. 
From these premises it clearly appears that sensitive human appetite sometimes 
resists reason, and sometimes obeys it. When it resists, there is war and opposi- 
tion ; when it obeys, there is peace and concord. The example in the great 
universe is clear, where all lower things are created apt to obey the higher 
things. Hence the saying of the same Philosopher in Metaphysics, i, and in 
De Ccelo, ii, that this world is necessarily in contact with the higher motions 
in order that all virtue may be thence directed, and yet sometimes it does not 
obey because of the disarrangement of matter, and thence come things contrary 
to the intention of the superior agents, such as monsters ; so the sensitive 
appetite, being lower, is apt to obey. Hence what the same Philosopher says 
in De Anima, ii, about that which is moved and that which moves, that if the 
intellect moves the sensitive appetite, and is obeyed by it, the motion is natural, 
as it is when a higher sphere moves a lower. But if the contrary, then the 
motion is not natural, as if a lower sphere were to move a higher. The example 
in a civil monarchy is clear, for some subjects oppose their princes. Consider 
the examples of this opposition in the continent and the incontinent man. For 
even in the continent man the sensitive appetite inclines to excess ; for example, 
to inordinate food, drink, or the like. Reason teaches that excess is to be 
avoided as injurious, and in the continent man intellect and reason prevail ; 
so that, properly speaking, continence is not an established moral virtue, for, 
as the same Philosopher says, in the virtuous man all things are harmonious. 
Hence, when, after many and frequent acts, a kind of readiness has been 
established in the sensitive appetite, inclining the sensitive appetite itself to 
the good, and to conformity with reason, then virtue really exists. But in the 



UNIVERSAL CORPOREAL WAR 223 

incontinent man this opposition is obvious, but in him the sensitive appetite 
prevails ; yet his incontinence is not called an established vice until, after 
frequent acts, it has become so accustomed to incline to evil that it now always 
inclines that way without any opposition. This opposition is what we mean by 
Human Spiritual War in the strict sense, speaking in the terms of moral philo- 
sophy. Of this opposition, too, the Apostle speaks to the Romans, ch. vii, 
" I see another law warring against the law of my mind " ; quoted in xxxii, 
q. v, si Paulus. This opposition is also referred to in dist. vi, sed pensandum; 
De constitutionibus, nam concupiscentiam. And Gregory speaks of this 
spiritual war in xxiii, q. i, nisi bella. Now in this opposition there is regularly, 
from youth upwards, an inclination to evil ; for every age, from youth up- 
wards, is prone to evil ; Genesis, ch. viii ; xii, q. i, omnis cetas. And many 
reasons have been assigned for this. The first is because one can do evil of 
oneself, but good only by grace. Another is on account of the impetus of 
original sin which impels us to evil. Another is because evil is easier than good. 
For good consists essentially in a mean, but vices in extremes ; and there is 
only one straight way to the mean, but many ways to the extreme. Another 
is because there are more obstacles to good than to evil. Another is because 
good can only be done with the judgement of reason, in which young men are 
deficient, because of the darkening of their bodily organs. And this I believe 
to be the true reason. So much of Spiritual War, as to which more might well 
be written ; but I pass it by, because it would overstep the bounds of law, to 
which, as far as possible, I intend to confine myself. 



Of Universal Corporeal War. 
[Ch. ix.] 

In the third place, as I am to treat of Universal Corporeal War, I shall set 
forth my treatment of the subject in the form of questions : 

Firstly, by what law war had its origin and introduction. 

Secondly, who may declare universal war, and against whom it may be 
declared. 

Thirdly, what are the means of making war, briefly explaining what 
acts are lawful and what unlawful in persons making war, and formu- 
lating certain questions on those subjects. 

Fourthly, what persons may be compelled to fight, and of those who 
participate in a war without compulsion. 

Fifthly, of the spoils of war, and of certain other incidents of war. 

Sixthly, by means of a table for the instruction of the canonist, of questions 
touching the matter of war. Whenever a subject has been treated in 
the Corpus luris Canonici by the glossators and doctors, I shall omit it. 



224 THE LAW OF WAR 

By what law Universal Corporeal War had its origin. 
[Ch. *.] 

I return to my first question, and I ask by what law Universal Corporeal 
War had its origin. Solution. By the divine law and the law of nations. By 
the divine law ; this is proved by Joshua, ch. viii ; I Samuel, ch. xvi. By the 
law of nations ; ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ex hoc iure. 



How Universal Corporeal War had its origin in Divine Law. 

I said that wars arose by divine law ; here we must note that wars wen- 
introduced not only with the permission, but by the positive allowance, of the 
Lord. And this may be proved ; for every power tending to good is so derived 
positively, and not merely permissively. But the power of declaring lawful 
war tends to good ; therefore it proceeds positively from God. The major is 
proved ; for " every good gift and every perfect gift is from above and cometh 
down from the Father of lights," James, ch. i ; i, q. ii, quern pio. The minor 
is proved ; for a declaration of a lawful war and a lawful war itself tend to 
the good, for they tend to the peace and quiet of the world. This is proved by 
the authority of Augustine to Boniface, who says, " war is not sought that war 
may be practised, but war is waged that peace may be sought." He adds, 
" be therefore peaceful in war, and by your victory lead those whom you over- 
throw to the blessings of peace." These words are in xxiii, q. i, noli. The end 
of war, then, is the peace and tranquillity of the world. Therefore we conclude 
that it proceeded originally and positively from God. This is confirmed : For 
every act punishing evil persons proceeds from God, but the declaration of 
a lawful war is an act punishing evil and rebellious persons. Therefore it 
proceeds positively from God. The major is proved thus : For it is written, 
' To me belongeth vengeance, and I will repay " ; [Proverbs, ch. xxii] ; [xxiii, 
q. i, ch. item cum in Proverbiis] ; and in another place, " vengeance is mine, 
and I will repay," Deuteronomy, ch. xxxii ; Hebrews, ch. x ; Romans, ch. 
[xiii] xii. The minor is proved by the authority of Augustine in the Sermon 
on the Centurion's Son, xxiii, q. i, paratus, at the words nam corripiendo. 
We might even infer from this reasoning that it is theologically necessary that 
there should be evil and rebellious persons in the world ; for in the divine 
majesty are acts rewarding the good and punishing the evil, as it is written, 
" nullum bonum," &c. Further, on that assumption it might be argued thus, 
that, assuming an activity, there must necessarily be assumed an object of 
that activity. This is proved by the words of the Philosopher in DC Anima, 
book ii ; for, assuming an act of vision, a visible object must be assumed. So 
too, assuming an act of hearing, an audible object must be assumed. Assuming, 
therefore, from the first creation of the world, an act of punishment in God, 



ITS ORIGIN IN DIVINE LAW 225 

it is necessary to assume an object of punishment, and that is Evil, as I showed 
above. The first principal proposition is confirmed : For every act whereby 
the power of injuring is taken away proceeds positively from God. But a 
declaration of lawful war is such an act. This is proved by the authority of 
Augustine, who says, " Wars are waged in order to bring the vanquished to the 
fellowship of piety and justice." He adds, " For defeat is beneficial to one 
from whom it wrests the power to do iniquity, since nothing is more unhappy 
than the happiness of sinners, which nourishes penal impunity, and strengthens 
the evil will, like an enemy within." These words are in xxiii, q. i, paratus, 
at the words ac per hoc. This is confirmed : All power is from God, by His 
command or permission ; therefore warlike power proceeds from Him, but it so 
proceeds not only by His permission, but also by His command. Therefore He 
commands. The principal proposition is proved ; Romans, ch. xifi ; quoted in 
xxiii, q. i, quid culpatur. In short, is not this clear if we regard the generations 
of the world ? for from the first creation of the world down to the times of Noah, 
God by His own act and without assistant was destroying the evil, as appears 
from the story of Cain and Abel, and certain other princes, in Genesis, chs. iv 
and v. Of Himself, therefore, He introduced wars to punish and destroy the 
bad. We conclude therefore, from the premises, that wars were originally 
introduced by divine law. Metaphorically, or rather perhaps naturally, it 
might be demonstrated thus : For as the natural philosophers say, man is 
a small world, and as government goes on in the small world, so it does in 
the universal whole, if the analogy be traced, as the Philosopher says in Physics, 
book viii ; and in the natural ordering of the body it is clear that, when there 
is no excess of humours, there is no rebellion opposed to natural conservation 
and duration. But when there is excess of humours arising from disordered 
control, then there is a struggle of nature tending to conservation against 
excess tending to destruction ; and in the struggle the natural power is some- 
times strong enough to correct the opposition, sometimes it is powerless because 
of the excess of the disease, and then there is need of an extrinsic remedy, of 
a medicament partaking of the nature of poison, but of one which is opposed 
to the disease. So exactly in the great world. For sometimes, in a territory 
and region of the world, there is no excess of rebellious persons, and then there 
is no conflict, or rather the guiding hand of Nature tends uniformly to its 
conservation. Sometimes there is excess of rebellious persons, tending to the 
destruction of government and of conservation, and then sometimes Nature 
corrects it of itself, by monitions, exhortations, and other soothing processes, 
and then there is no need of war, or poisonous medicament. Sometimes the 
disease has advanced so far that a poisonous medicament is needed, extirpating 
the matter of the disease entirely, and such a medicament is a war to eradicate 
and exterminate the bad. So, then, in the small world, when the inner 
virtue fails we turn to a doctor, who operates by a remedy which is extrinsic 
and poisonous, just as in the great world the general governor, who is the 
Most High Creator, and the doctor of the universe, tending to its conservation 



226 THE LAW OF WAR 

and government, when the humours which tend to its destruction or the 
destruction of a part of it have grown so great . . . uses the remedy 
of war to exterminate vices and excesses, and to reduce ... to the proper 
temperature. And as in the human body these excesses of humours attack 
the several members of the human body, and even dissolution begins, 
sometimes because of excess of one humour, sometimes of another, so in 
the universe the several territories and regions of the world, which are 
the members of the great world, are attacked by these excesses of vices, 
which oppose its government, sometimes in one place, sometimes in another, 
according to the varieties of vices. And so it happens that the regions 
of the world are sometimes weakened by excess of vices, which sometimes 
grow so great that there is need of a medicament which will eradicate the good 
with the bad, just as medicine, too, drives out good and bad together. Nay, 
sometimes this excess leads to utter extinction, like death in individuals, as 
we may see for ourselves ; for innumerable regions have been utterly extin- 
guished and rendered uninhabitable for these reasons. Innumerable examples 
might be cited ; and this same thing happens in families and governments, 
which also are reduced and utterly extinguished. And though what I have 
said has been metaphorical, yet it is most clearly proved by texts of the divine 
law ; for we read in Genesis, ch. xix, that on account of the excessive disease 
of Sodom, God used the eradicatory medicament of war against Sodom, 
Gomorrah, Zeboim, Zoar, and Admah, though two of these perished because 
of their neighbourhood; De Poenit., dist. i, ch. sed continue; De excessibus 
praelat., ch. clerici ; and Authentics, coll. vi, ut non luxu. contra naturam, near 
the end. Innumerable examples might be cited. This medicament of war, too, 
is referred to in Joshua, ch. viii, for there our Lord orders Joshua to lay himself 
an ambush behind, that is, to set warriors in ambush to lie in wait for the 
enemy. And Augustine, in the Liber Quaestionum, says of the words of Joshua, 
" Wars are called lawful which avenge injuries," that is, excesses of offences. 
And he adds, " So a people or a city must be made to suffer which has neglected 
to punish the wrong-doing of its own men." He adds, " but this kind of war 
is undoubtedly lawful, because God, Who knows what is every man's due, 
ordains it." He does not say " permits," but " ordains." He adds, " in such 
a war, the general of the army or the people itself should be regarded not so 
much as the author of the war as the minister of God." And thus it is clearly 
proved that God, as the most high doctor and preserver of the universe, ordains 
wars in order that offences may be rooted out. These passages are quoted in 
xxiii, q. ii, Dominus Nosier. Of this war and eradicatory medicament it is also 
written in i Maccabees, ch. v, and Deuteronomy, ch. ii, where, by the command 
of God, the sons of Israel wage wars against the Amorites ; and Augustine also 
treats of it in the book of Numbers, quoted in xxiii, q. ii, ch. nolandum sane. 
Of it also it is written in Judges, ch. v, " the Lord appointed new wars," 
referring to wars which eradicate excesses of vices. Isaiah, too, writes in 
ch. xxx, " and in battles of shaking will he fight," like a warrior. Of those who 



ITS ORIGIN IN DIVINE LAW 227 

eradicate, it is written also in i Maccabees, ch. iv, " take heart and fight." 
And in Jeremiah, ch. xx, also it is written, " The Lord is with me as a warrior." 
Jerome, on Zephaniah, describes it most beautifully in the words, " if a man 
enfeebles the strength of a robber or a pirate and renders them weak, their 
weakness advantages them ; for the weakened members, which formerly they 
used ill, will cease from evil works." Jerome's conclusion is that the vicious 
are made healthy by the expulsion of the disease which disposed their infected 
members to evil, and this is done by an eradicatory war. This passage is xxiii, 
q. iii, ch. si quis fortitudinem. This is clearly proved by what is written in 
Luke, ch. xii, and in Hebrews, ch. xii, where the Lord says, " That servant 
which knows not his lord's will and commits things worthy of stripes, shall be 
beaten with few stripes ; but that servant which knows his lord's will and 
commits things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with many stripes." So he 
who exceeds received stripes from the Lord. This passage is cited in xxiii, 
q. iv, ch. ea vindicta. Hence we read that Elijah put many to death by his own 
hand and with fire obtained from heaven ; 2 Kings, ch. i.; and ch. ea vin- 
dicta. Further, in xxiii, q. iv, it is so written of others in the time of the old 
dispensation ; i Kings, chs. xvii and xviii ; and so it is written that Ananias 
and his wife fell dead at the words of Peter, the chief of the Apostles ; Acts, 
ch. iv. This is quoted in xvii, q. i, Ananias ; and xxiii, q. iv, ea vindicta, at 
the end. And Gregory has a beautiful passage about this eradicating war, 
written to Brunhilda, queen of the Franks, in which he says, " lest, if, because 
of our unbelief, the anger of the divine vengeance should be stirred by the acts 
of the wicked, the plague of war should destroy sinners whom the precepts of 
God do not recall to the path of rectitude " ; xxiii, q. iv, si quos. Does not 
the Lord say to Moses, " thou shalt not suffer malefactors to live " ? Exodus, 
ch. xxii. Moses, too, who had received the law from the Lord, punished the 
worshippers of the idol with death ; Exodus, ch. xxxii ; and Samuel, by the 
Lord's command, hewed in pieces Agag, the richest of kings ; i Samuel, ch. xv. 
These passages are quoted in xxiii, q. v, ch. hinc apparel. The Lord also 
drowned the Egyptians in the waves ; Exodus, ch. xiv ; and he scattered the 
corpses of the Israelites in the desert ; Numbers, ch. xiv. These passages are 
cited in xxiii, q. v, quid, ergo. Innumerable examples might be cited to prove 
this from the old and the new divine dispensations ; but these are sufficient to 
establish the conclusion that wars originally had their origin in divine law, and 
not merely by God's permission, but rather positively from God Himself, as 
the governor of the world, and the doctor who eradicates its vices, for the sake 
of the salvation and conservation of the world, and because these remedies of 
war tend to this end, as I clearly showed above : and we can see for ourselves 
that, because of this . . . and excess of manifold vices in the advancing 
destruction of the universe, the Most High Creator in times past used this 
eradicatory remedy ; for how many kingdoms and governments of the world 
have been utterly destroyed, how many brought low ? What of the empire 
of the Trojans ? or that of the Greeks ? or the universal dominion of the 

[21] 



228 THE LAW OF WAR 

Romans ? Parts of Italy in our own times are in fever and are being subjected 
to trial. The medicine is being prepared ; . . . according to the doctrine of the 
most learned Hippocrates, in the first book of the Aphorisms. . . . But this 
conclusion, that wars proceed positively and originally from God, might be 
proved by observing the uniform and perpetual instrument of the divine 
majesty. For the Most High Creator of all works through the mediation of 
the celestial frame on this terrestrial frame naturally, howbeit supernaturally. 
When He wills, He inspires and influences it immediately ; but I speak in 
terms of natural philosophy, following the saying of the most learned Philo- 
sopher, in De Meteoris, i, and De Coelo, ii, that it is necessary that this world 
should be in contact with the higher motions, in order that all virtue may be 
directed thence. Therefore the Most High influences naturally these lower 
regions by the mediation of a celestial and spherical body, while that whole body 
works by the mediation of motion and light, as the same Philosopher says. 
And because in the whole celestial frame itself there are parts which have 
virtues of diverse influence, as the variety of spheres, the diversity of wander- 
ing and fixed stars, on which, by reason of the variety of their natures and 
motions, every created and corruptible thing effectively depends, therefore a 
certain contrariety and diversity of natures, an opposition arising here below, 
is dependent on that above. Whence it may be at once inferred that, as opposi- 
tion and difformity are the causes introducing wars, wars arise thence ; and 
more, experience teaches that uniformity and difformity of aspects at the 
time of birth give rise to natural affections and natural enmities between men. 
This any one may experience ; for one will love another at sight, with no 
antecedent merits, and one will hate another in the same way, with no ante- 
cedent demerits. So affections and hatreds arise naturally between cities and 
towns and camps, on account of the uniformity and difformity of aspects at 
the time of their construction ; and so from celestial influence arise hatreds, 
and wars, and friendship, and peace, and it is the same between provinces. 
But this celestial nature, by the mediation of motion, is productive of genera- 
tion and corruption, of growth and diminution in these lower things ; and 
its influence is felt not only on single things below, but on whole regions of 
the world, for by this higher nature habitable regions have been made unin- 
habitable, and uninhabitable habitable. For, according to the teaching of the 
Philosopher, when the sea shall become dry, . . . from this opposition of natures 
and dispositions from which arise quarrels, contentions, wars particular and 
universal. This opposition, on account of the variety of motions and aspects, 
exalts some, extinguishes others, depresses others, and changes the governments 
of the world, universal and particular. And this may be proved ; for if the 
sufficient productive cause of any effect is established, the effect must needs 
be produced, unless something extrinsic is present to hinder its production ; 
but the celestial nature is continually changing in motion and aspect, and its 
parts differ by their own nature in influence. Therefore these opposed and 
different effects must needs be produced, since there is nothing to hinder them, 



ITS ORIGIN IN THE LAW OF NATIONS 229 

and from this we might infer that wars must needs be in the course of nature 
and that otherwise the government of the world would not proceed naturally. 
Yet I protest that although the celestial nature has this effect on these lower 
things, yet it does not work of itself and directly upon the human intellect, 
but the freedom of the will endures ; xxiii, q. iv, ch. Nabuchodonosor, and ch. 
de Tiriis; De Pcenit., dist. ii, ch. sicut enim; and the Philosopher, Ethics, iii. 
But it works on the organ of the sensitive virtues, which receive the influence 
and direct the intellect, and thus its influence is indirect. Hence what is 
written in the Centiloquium, " the wise soul dominates the stars." But inas- 
much as to treat of this subject would take me too far from the bounds of law, 
I say no more about this conclusion ; but let it suffice that we have inferred 
and proved, by what has been said, that wars have proceeded from God posi- 
tively and effectively, although the last discussion shows us that they came 
not immediately, but by the mediation of the celestial frame, by the operation 
of natural causes. 



How Universal Corporeal War had its origin in the Law of Nations. 

[Ch. xi.] 

I said, secondly, that wars were recognized by the law of nations. Now 
here, although the laws say that wars were introduced by the law of nations 
as, for instance, Isidore, dist. i, ius gen. ; and the jurist Hermogenianus in 
ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ex hoc iure yet I think that wars had their origin not 
only in the equity of natural human created intelligence, but primordially in 
the disposition of creative Nature, which influences not only human actions, 
but all other things animate and inanimate also ; so that it is true to say that 
wars have their origin in natural law, even as distinguished from the law of 
nations. As to how these differ, I may refer to ff . De iustit. et iure, 1. i, ius gen., 
and ius naturale, and 1. ex hoc iure ; and dist. i, ius naturale, with the gloss 
thereto, and ch. ius naturale. That this is true may be shown thus : Natural 
first principles have implanted in every created natural entity a natural in- 
clination to exclude everything opposed to its natural disposition. This is 
clear if we look at particular natural entities, simple and mixed ; for resistance 
to fire is implanted in water, and resistance to water in fire, because of the 
opposition of their qualities. This which is true of single elements might be 
shown to be true of things mixed ; but it is especially clear in the brutes, where, 
from a natural opposition of complexions, one is inclined naturally to kill 
another, and the other to kill it. Thus, in a rational creature Nature has 
implanted an inclination, even circumscribing the dictates of the intellect, to 
hunt whatever is repugnant to itself. That this is true, reason shows ; for 
Nature, the producer of all created things, must be not less solicitous in the 
conservation of a rational creature than of its other products, since the former 
is itself nobler ; De pcen. et remiss., ch. cum infirmitas ; and De sac. sane, 
eccles., 1. sancimus ; and xxxiii, q. v, ch. hcec imago ; and for its sake, as the 



230 THE LAW OF WAR 

end, all things below the lunar globe were produced ; ff. De usuris, 1. I'M pecudum. 
If, therefore, Nature has implanted a natural inclination in all other created 
things to hunt whatever is opposed to themselves, how much stronger must 
this inclination be in a rational creature ? The same thing is clear to our 
senses if we examine particular instances, for any one experiences this in himself, 
if this instinct is implanted in men by natural first principles ; and therefore 
war had its origin primordially in this natural inclination, since war, as above 
described, is a contention arising for the sake of destroying opposition. We 
may infer, therefore, that this contention which arises for the sake of destroying 
what is discordant and opposed to one's own conservation has its origin funda- 
mentally in natural first principles, and so in the law of nature, as distinguished 
from the law of nations. But you will say at once that this conflicts with the 
texts which say that it arises from the law of nations ; but as to that, we must 
observe that, although this natural inclination is introduced by natural law, 
our natural intelligence being limited, yet the inclination is regulated by the 
dictates of reason and natural intelligence ; just as we say of particular acts 
which are proper to men by nature, their intellect being limited, such as the 
inclination to food and drink and sexual intercourse, that these acts are natural 
to men, and yet in a man they are regulated by the dictates of reason, which is 
not the case with the brutes, for they lack that dictation. So, then, I believe 
that the meaning of those texts was that the regulation of that inclination, 
introduced by natural first principles, arises from the law of nations, that is, 
from the general equity of natural intelligence, but the inclination itself is 
from natural law. This is proved by the gloss on ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ex hoc 
iure ; and dist. i, ius gent. For the gloss in both passages to the word " wars " 
adds, by way of explanation, " lawful," and so understands the text to refer 
to an inclination regulated by the dictates of reason. And although the texts 
say that wars arise from the law of nations, yet I do not think it false to say 
that wars, that is, these regulated inclinations, have their origin in the civil 
law and in the canon law. For the civil and the canon laws do not speak of 
an equity different from the equity of the law of nations ; rather they are 
that equity itself, for all law consists in a kind of rectitude, and that is why 
it is called " ius " ; dist. i, ius generate. But the civil and the canon laws are 
the rectitude of life and the equity of the law of nations. But they add to 
that rectitude a kind of explanation, for they have to specify and explain the 
rectitude and equity of the law of nations, sometimes by limiting it in suitable 
modes, sometimes by applying it to various acts, sometimes by determining 
it by various events. All these points are proved by the text in ff. De iustit. 
et iure, 1. ius civile. For the text there says " the civil law is a law which 
is neither wholly distinct from natural law or the law of nations, nor wholly 
subordinate to them ; and so when we add anything to or take anything 
from the comnlon law, we make it special, that is, civil, law." It is therefore 
true to say that wars come from the civil and the canon laws, that is, from 
rectitude itself, which is the i ivil and the canon laws. Nor are the texts just 



WHO MAY DECLARE IT ? 231 

cited opposed to this, because that rectitude, with nothing added or taken 
away, is called the law of nations. And so the laws just cited say ; but when 
something has been added or taken away, then it is called civil or canon law ; 
no one, however, doubts that the civil and canon laws do add something on 
the subject of wars to the dictates of general reason. The foregoing discussion 
shows us in what law wars had their origin. 



Who, first and chiefly, may declare Universal War, and by what Law, and 

against whom .- 
[Ch. xii.] 

I ask, secondly, what law allows the Church to declare war against 
infidels, and to invade their territories, and to grant indulgence on 
this account, since the laws seem to ordain the contrary ; for those who 
are outside the Church are nothing to us ; ii, q. i, multi. Also by origin 
their possessions and jurisdictions belong to them. For God so arranged 
throughout the whole rational creation, for he makes the sun to rise on the 
just and on the unjust ; Matthew, chs. v and vi, at the end. Also men are 
not to be compelled to the faith, for all others who have not been incorporated 
are to be left to their own will ; dist. xlv, De ludceis. And what is more, 
jurisdiction may be delegated to the infidel over those who are converted to 
the faith, provided it do not burden them too heavily ; i Timothy, ch. vi. In 
the second place, to make the matter clear, we must observe that I ought 
here, in the first place, to set out the matters which I have treated on the 
subject of reprisals at the beginning, namely, whence the Church had its 
jurisdiction, and also whence the Emperor had his ; but I do not set out 
these matters here, because they have been fully treated there. On this 
understanding, then, we ought also to observe that in the same community 
and under the same king there are two peoples, and for the two peoples two 
lives, and for the two lives two governments, and for the two governments 
a twofold order of jurisdiction. The community is the Church, the one King 
is Christ, the two peoples are the clergy and the laity, the two lives are the 
spiritual and the carnal, and the two governments are the priesthood and the 
Empire ; but of these one is supreme, namely, the Papacy, to which the other 
is subordinated. Otherwise the argument of the Philosopher in Metaphysics, 
book xii, showing the unity of the Creator, would be absurd. He says that 
a multitude of governments, evil entities, tend to be ill-disposed, therefore 
there is one head ; and so precisely in the question before us ; also because, 
in any class of entities, it is possible to postulate one that is first, which is the 
mete and measure of all the others, as the same Philosopher shows. So in 
a whole monarchy it is possible to arrive at the head ; and so, too, in natural 
objects it is possible to arrive at the primary motionless motive power, as 
the same Philosopher shows in Physics, books vii and viii. The Empire cannot 



232 THE LAW OF WAR 

stand in such a relation to the Papacy. I pass over innumerable arguments, 
and merely cite the following, which will suffice to show that there is one Lord 
of the earth : vii, q. i, in apibi4s ; ix, q. iii, cuncta per mundum, and ch. per 
principalem ; ff. Ad leg. Rhod. de iact., 1. deprecatio. And he is the Pope. He 
has jurisdiction not only over the faithful, but also over infidels, as is shown 
more clearly than day ; for Christ had power over all, whence the passage 
in the Psalm: "O God, give thy judgement to the king." If Christ had it, 
He would not have been a loving father, if, when He constituted Peter His 
vicar, He had not entrusted the charge to him, which it is sinful to suppose. 
Also He handed to Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven, saying, " what- 
soever thou shalt bind," &c. ; Matthew, ch. xvi. And in another passage, 
" Feed my sheep," in the last chapter of John. So, therefore, the Pope, as a 
matter of law, has jurisdiction over infidels, though not as a matter of fact. 
Hence it is that if a barbarian, who has only the law of nature, sins against the 
law of nature, he may be punished by the Pope. For it is written in Genesis, 
ch. xix, that the Sodomites were punished by God ; therefore the Vicar of God 
also has this power. The same, too, if they worship idols ; for it is natural 
to worship the Creator and not His creatures. So, too, he may punish Jews, 
if they act contrary to their own law in matters of morality, and are not 
punished by their governors. There is no doubt that he may punish Christians, 
if they act contrary to the law of the Gospel. From all this we infer that the 
Pope, like a true prince, may declare war against infidels, and grant indul- 
gences for the recovery of the Holy Land, and especially of the land consecrated 
by the birth of Christ, by His habitation, and death, where Christ is not wor- 
shipped, but Mahomet. Also, the Holy Land was conquered, after the death 
of Christ, in a lawful war by the Roman Emperor, who was afterwards robbed 
of it by the infidels. Therefore the Pope may recover it by reason of the princi- 
pality which he holds. But in other lands which are not consecrated, and 
where neither the Empire nor the Church had jurisdiction, the Pope may 
in fact command that they do not molest their Christian subjects. Otherwise 
he may by a judgement deprive them of their jurisdiction, and thereby . . . 
which Innocent noted, De voto, quod super his. The solution of the first 
question is clear, namely, of the justice of a war declared by the Church against 
infidels ; and from this may be inferred the justification of a war declared by 
the Emperor against enemies. 



Evidential. And a discussion as to who are the emperors against whom war 

may be declared. 

[Ch. xiiL] 

Here we must note that there are two peoples, the Roman people, and 
strangers. To the Roman people belong, first, all who are in complete obedience 
to the Roman Empire, for the people means the whole Empire ; Ad munici- 



AGAINST WHOM DECLARED ? 233 

palem, I. Roma. Some are not in complete, but only in partial obedience to it, 
as when they live according to the laws of the Empire and admit the Emperor 
to be lord of the earth, like the cities of Lombardy and the like ; and these, 
too, belong to the Roman people, since it exercises jurisdiction in some matters ; 
De aqua pluv. arc., 1. si prius ; and this passage should be noted. There are 
some peoples who neither obey the Emperor nor live according to the laws of 
the Empire at all, but say that they have this position by privilege, like the 
Venetians, who assert that they have it by privilege. These, too, belong to 
the Roman people, because they hold their privilege at the will of the Emperor, 
and he can revoke it whenever he will ; ff. De legat., iii, 1. si quis in principle. 
Moreover this privilege, when granted to them, ought to be so ordered as not 
to deprive them of Roman citizenship ; ff. De captivis, 1. in bello, si quis 
servum. There are other peoples who do not obey the Emperdr and assert 
that they have this immunity by contract, like the provinces subject to the 
Roman Church, which assert that it belongs to them by the gift of Constantine 
and other Emperors ; and these, too, belong to the Roman people, for the 
Church exercises there the jurisdiction which the Empire had, and hence they 
do not on that account cease to be Roman citizens. I say the same of the 
kings who do not admit that they are subjects of the Emperor, as the King 
of France, of England, of Spain, and the like, who assert that they are inde- 
pendent by privilege or prescription. And by this I conclude that almost 
all nations which obey the Holy Mother Church belong to the Roman people ; 
and any who should say that the Emperor is not lord would be contradicting 
the text of the Gospel, when it says, " there went out an edict from Gesar 
Augustus," &c. But there are foreign peoples who do not admit that the 
Emperor is lord, like the Greeks, who say that their emperor is lord. So, too, 
the Tartars say that Grancanes is lord, and the Saracens say that their emperor 
is lord. Among those peoples, however, there is a distinction, for some of them 
are allied to us, as the Greeks against the Turks ; there are others with whom 
we are at peace, like the Tartars, for our merchants go to them and theirs 
come to us ; there are others with whom we have no dealings, like the Jews ; 
and others with whom we are at actual war, like the Saracens, and to-day, the 
Turks. We infer, then, that, since the Emperor is the secular head, having no 
superior in secular matters, except perhaps in the instances I have mentioned 
he may declare war against his enemies ; and who these are was clear from the 
passage immediately following. And this is the war which is spoken of in 
ff. De captivis, 1. hastes ; and De verbor. significatione. And herein war claims 
its place, and therefore it is declared by the Roman people or Emperor, so that, 
if the Emperor declares war on any rebellious cities of Italy, that war ranks 
as a public war, because to resist an official of the Emperor or of the Pope, 
if the resistance is not in the name of the Emperor or the Pope, is one and 
the same thing. 



234 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether universal war may be declared by others than a prince ? 

[Ch. xiv.] 

I ask whether universal war may be declared by others than a prince. 
Solution : It may not be declared without the authority of a prince, for 
no one may bear arms without a prince's licence ; C. Vt usus armorum, 
in red; and the gloss on Authent., De mand. princ., coll. iii ; and on 
Authent., De armis, coll. vi. And the reason is that no one may violate the 
laws of princes without the prince's licence. But one who, without the 
solemnity of law, with kingly authority, makes law for himself, when he 
might resort to a lawgiver, does violate the law ; therefore it is not lawful 
without the prince's authority. The prince, then, alone may declare war 
by his own authority, since he has no superior to whom he may resort to obtain 
justice. To-day, however, because there are peoples who do not recognize a 
superior in fact, the authority of a superior is not required, since they do not 
recognize one. Nay, every day wars are declared by one people against 
another, without asking the leave of any one. 



Whether war tnade by the Emperor against the Church is lawful, and whether 
subjects are bound to obey him therein ? 

[Ch. xv.] 

The second question is whether a war which the Emperor makes against 
the Church is lawful, and whether subjects are bound to obey him therein. 
It appears so, because it is by the authority or command of the prince ; there- 
fore, &c. Also because there are two jurisdictions ; De iudiciis, novit ; Qui 
filii sunt legitimi, causam, and ch. per venerabilem ; De appell., si duobus. Also 
because subjects are bound to obey the Emperor in matters concerning the 
use of arms, even if he be schisnjatic ; xi, q. iii, lulianus. Solution : The 
contrary is true, for the Emperor is the Church's advocate and is bound to 
defend it ; therefore he may not attack it ; De natis ex libero ventre, the single 
chapter ; De restit. spol., conquer ente. Moreover, by declaring war against the 
Church he deserves to lose the privilege of declaring war, since he abuses it ; 
xi, q. iii, privilegium ; De decimis, suggestum ; so that he may be punished 
for his offence ; De translatione, quanta, ne autem. Nay, such obstinacy in 
the prince does not differ from heresy; De haereticis, excommunicamus, i, i ; 
and this passage should be noted. Also because the Pope is his superior ; for 
he examines, reproves, and deposes the Emperor himself ; De elect., venerabi- 
lem ; Sext., De re iudic., ad apostolicee. In this case, therefore, subjects are 
not bound to help the Emperor against the Church, but rather the contrary. 
And the Pope may absolve them from the bond of fealty ; xv, q. vi, nos 
sanctorum, and ch. iuratos ; and note De haereticis, excommunicamus ; De pcenis, 
last chapter ; and in this matter, Hostiensis, De resti. spoliatorum, olim. 



MEANS OF MAKING WAR 235 

What is the law when the Pope makes war against the Emperor ? 

[Ch. xvi.] 

The fourth question is what, on the other hand, if the Pope declares war 
against the Emperor ? The solution appears from what precedes ; for if the 
Pope declares war against an Emperor who is schismatic, heretic, or otherwise 
usurping the rights and liberties of churches, all the faithful are bound to help 
the Pope, and even vassals of the Emperor may be absolved from the oath 
which binds them, or may be declared not to be bound ; xv, q. vi, iuratos, and 
ch. nos sanctorum. 



Of the means of making war and carrying it on. , 

[Ch. xvii.] 

Thirdly, it remains to consider the means of making war and carrying 
it on, and also what should be done in actual war. 



Of the legion and the cohort, and who and how many are required therein. 

In war there are legions, and a legion has seven thousand one hundred 
foot-soldiers, and seven hundred and nineteen horsemen. There are cohorts, 
and a cohort has twenty companies. A " milliaria " cohort has one thousand 
one hundred and five foot-soldiers, and a hundred and thirty-five horsemen. 
A " quinquagenaria " cohort has five hundred and fifty-five foot-soldiers, and 
sixty-six horsemen. So the gloss notes in ff. De his qui not. infam., 1. ii. 
These, then, with a general and discipline, make a war, taking war in the 
sense of a multitude apt and prepared for war, and not merely of the act of 
making war. But the two chief foundations of a war are arms and strength. 
These are divided into three parts, cavalry, infantry, and fleets. For cavalry 
protect the plains ; fleets, the seas and rivers ; and infantry, the hills, cities, 
and steep plains. Hence we may infer that infantry are more necessary to the 
commonwealth than cavalry, because they are useful everywhere. 



How soldiers should conduct themselves in war, whom they should obey, and from 
what they are commanded to abstain. 

[Ch. xviii.] 

Now soldiers should so conduct themselves in war as to keep the oath 
which they have taken ; for they have sworn that they will strenuously perform 
all the orders of the Emperor, and will never desert their service, nor shrink 
from death in the defence of the commonwealth ; ff. Ex qui. caus. maiores, 
the last law but one ; and C. De his qui non implet. stipend., book x, 1. i. They 

[22] 



236 THE LAW OF WAR 

ought' to obey their generak ; 1. collatores, at the beginning. For since the 
commonwealth cherishes and supports them, they ought to devote themsch v- 
to the public interests alone, and do their service by preparing themselves 
for war by the daily practice of arms ; C. De re militari, 1. milUes. And so they 
ought to obey their generals, because, if they disobey their commands, even 
in a good cause, they are punished with death none the less ; ff. De re milit., 
1. desertorem, in bello. They ought to abstain from the cultivation of the land, 
from the care of animals, from trade in commodities. They should not manage 
the business of other people, nor engage in civil duties ; otherwise they will be 
deprived of their service and its privileges ; C. De re milit., 1. nemo milites, and 
1. qui militares ; C. De locat. et cond., 1. milites ; C. De procur., 1. militcm. They 
should not buy lands in the places where they serve, and at the time of their 
service, not even on another's account ; otherwise they are forfeited to the 
treasury. However, if they are not disturbed before their discharge, they will 
not be interfered with afterwards. There 'are exceptions to this rule when the 
treasury is administering the insolvent estate of their parents, and when they 
claim by inheritance. The reason of the rule is that they may not be distracted 
from their military duties by agricultural pursuits. See ff. De re milit., 1. 
milites. 



What belongs to the office of a general in war ? 

[Ch. xix.] 

A general in war should be very sparing in giving supplies to his troops ', 
should not allow the military horses to be taken out of the province ; should 
keep his troops in camp, train them to the practice of arms, not send them 
on his private business, fishing, or hunting ; should carry the keys of the gates, 
go round the watches, concern himself with the foraging of his troops, approve 
their food, punish fraudulent measurement, chastise offences, hear the com- 
plaints of the troops, inspect the sick. On these matters see ff. De re militari, 
1. officium. It is also his duty to place his legion on the green banks of a river, 
and to see that no man pollutes the water of the river in any way, or offends 
the public eye by washing off the sweat of horses, but to permit this to be done 
at a distance in the lower parts of the river. See C. De re milit., 1. ingentis. 
It is also his duty to pitch the camp where there is plenty of wood, fodder, 
and water ; and for a stay of any length, he should choose a healthy place not 
too near to the sea, or an elevated place not likely to be captured by the enemy. 
He should consider, also, whether the field is wont to be flooded by torrents. 
For this see Vegetius, De re milit., book i, ch. xx. It is also his duty to fortify 
the camp according to the number of his men, that a large number may not 
be too confined, nor a small number obliged to extend itself too widely. A good 
general will also recognize a place in which to fight, which is considered better 
the higher it is. But if he hopes for victory against the enemies' soldiers 
from his infantry, he should choose places which are uneven, rough, and hilly ; 



PUNISHMENTS OF SOLDIERS 237 

if not, places which are level and open, and not impeded by woods and marshes. 
See Vegetius, De re militari, book iii, ch. xiii. It is a general's duty to take 
cognizance of the contracts and delicts of his men ; but this is also the duty 
of the special " magister militum " ; C. De iurisd. omn. iudic., 1. magisterice ; 
and C. De re militari, 1. tarn collatores. 



How soldiers are punished differently, according to their different offences. 

[Ch. xx.] 

Now soldiers are differently punished, according to their different offences. 
Their offences are either special or common. And in their special o'ffences they 
are punished by military penalties, and the penalty is often increased with the 
grade of service ; ff. De re militari, 1. ii. The punishments are pecuniary fines, 
deprivation of rewards, ignominious discharge from the army, degradation 
of rank. A soldier is not condemned to the mines, nor to work in the mines, but 
is beheaded ; for he is regarded, not as a soldier, but as an enemy ; ff. De re 
milit., 1. iii, i, and is qui, and 1. proditores. Death is the punishment for those 
who lay hands on an officer, who are disobedient, who are the first to take to 
flight in the sight of the others ; for spies who betray secrets to the enemy ; 
for malingerers who feign illness from fear of the enemy ; for those who wound 
a comrade with a sword, who wound themselves without cause, or attempt to 
commit suicide. Not however if they do so from weariness of life or impatience 
of pain, for these are made'" infamous " ; whereas those who offend through 
drunkenness or lust are discharged from the service. One who does not defend 
his officer when he could do so is punished with death. One who could not is 
spared. See ff. De re milit., 1. omne delictum, an'd 1. iii, last section. Also one 
who refuses to go scouting when the enemy are pressing on, or who retires from 
a trench, is punished with death, even if he acted with good intention ; ff. 
De re milit., 1. iii. Also a soldier who disturbs the peace is punished with death ; 
ff. De re milit., 1. iii. Also one who stirs up a serious sedition. A deserter in 
time of war is punished with death ; in time of peace a horseman is degraded, 
a foot-soldier is discharged ; ff. De re milit., 1. non omnes. Not all deserters, 
however, should be punished equally ; but regard should be had to their 
rank, length of service, and other circumstances. One who goes beyond the 
space for foraging is regarded as an absentee or a deserter. But the number of 
days by which he has returned sooner or later is taken into account, or any 
obstacle which may have detained him ; ff. De re milit., 1. iii, last section, and 
1. qui commeatus, and 1. non omnes. His previous record is also taken into 
account. An absentee is one who has wandered from the camp but returned 
to it ; a deserter is one who, after wandering for a long time, is brought back 
to camp ; ff . same title, 1. iii, emansor. A deserter, if found in a city, is punished 
with death ; if found elsewhere, and if he deserts again after being captured 



238 THE LAW OF WAR 

in his first desertion, he is punished with death ; ff. same title, 1. now 
omnes. The goods of d. are confiscated after their death ; C. De re 

milit., 1. iv. 

Of fortitude and its nature, and when fortitude is to be called moral and when not, 
and when fortitude conducts war to a right end, and when not ? 

[O . xxi.] 

But as it has been said that fortitude and arms are the chief foundations 
of war, and as in law the nature of fortitude is not explicitly discussed, it is 
desirable that its nature should to some extent be explained. And I ask, first, 
whether fortitude is a moral virtue ; and it appears that it is not. For forti- 
tude is a disposition of the body ; C. book xi, De athletis, 1. i ; ff. De his qui 
not. infam., 1. athleta ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. qua actione, si quis in colluctatione ; 
De pugn. in duello, throughout ; C. De gladiatoribus, the single law ; De 
torneamentis, throughout. Therefore it is not a moral virtue, since a disposi- 
tion of the body differs from a habit or disposition of the soul, and is itself 
inferior in degree; De pren. et rem., cum infirmitas ; xii, q. i, pracipimus ; 
xxiv, q. iii, si habes ; C. De sacrosanctis eccles., 1. sancimus. Secondly, it 
seems to be a moral virtue. Every moral virtue aims at a mean in feeling and 
action, as the Philosopher proves in Ethics, book ii ; but fortitude aims at a 
mean, as he also shows in Ethics, book iii. Thirdly, that which is not a virtue 
is not virtue, but rather virtues, since the plural number is satisfied by the 
number two at least ; ff. De testi., 1. ubi numerus ; causa iv, q. iii, ubi numerus ; 
and De reg. iur., book vi, rule pluraUs. And this is confirmed by the Philosopher, 
in the Elenchi, book i, for the definition of preposition and of a preposition is 
the same, but fortitude is not a virtue. This minor premise is proved. For 
a virtue is opposed to two extreme vices ; dist. xli, stepe ; De consuetudine, 
ex parte. But four extremes ire opposed to fortitude, namely, fearlessness and 
timidity or fear, and audacity and deficiency in audacity, which has no proper 
name, as the text shows in Ethics, book iii. The Philosopher proves the 
opposite in Ethics, book iii. For the solution of the question we must observe 
that the meaning of " fortitude " is equivocal ; it may refer either to the forti- 
tude which is the same thing as strength of body, or to the fortitude which is 
moral virtue. The first is a power which enables one to move a thing, as the 
Philosopher proves in Rhetoric, book i ; and both kinds are required in war ; 
and so when I said that fortitude, or strength, and arms are the foundations 
of war, I used the word generally, since both kinds are required. But as to 
the first, which is the strength of the body, there is no doubt that it is not moral 
virtue, for the reasons given above ; but as to the second, the question must 
be continued ; and it is the virtue which makes us behave aright in the matter 
of fear and audacity in the dangers of war. Let us pursue this kind of fortitude, 
for the first is plain to the blear-eyed and to barbers. Now for the understanding 
of the fortitude of the soul, we must observe that, in the matter of daring and 
fearing, one may exceed or fall short ; and in either case one acts wrongly. 



FORTITUDE 239 

One may also keep oneself to the mean, and so act virtuously. Audacity, 
however, differs from fear ; for audacity is a feeling of the irascible appetite, 
inclining us to attack what is terrible. Fear inclines us to flee, as any one may 
experience in himself. But either may be a good or a bad act ; for if a man 
were to see ten armed men and attack them alone, that would be a bad act ; 
and if he were not to flee, it would be a bad act, bad as regards the attacking, 
and also bad as regards fear. So, again, a man may exceed in fearing ; as, 
for instance, if there are a hundred men in a fortified place, and they see only 
a hundred men against them and flee that is a bad act. So, too, by not 
attacking ; as if they see a city being spoiled and do not attack that is a bad 
act. So you have illustrations of excess in not fearing when fear is expedient, 
in fearing when fear is not expedient, in attacking when attack is not expedient, 
and in not attacking when attack is expedient ; and so you have-the extreme 
vices, audacity and fear, and degree in each case, as above. Further, it is to be 
noted that, wherever we find vicious and blameable excess of extremes, there 
we may find a mean which is good and laudable ; because if the whole were 
bad and blameable, we could not say that the defect was blameable, for the 
defect would be a defect of bad, and so would not be bad. It is right, there- 
fore, that in the mean there should be a good with respect to which one quality 
is said to be bad by exceeding, another bad by falling short. From these argu- 
ments, two conclusions for the solution of the question may be inferred. The 
first is, that fortitude of the soul is moral virtue. The second, that it is a virtue. 
The first is proved ; for every habit of choosing a laudable mean is moral 
virtue. Fortitude is such a habit ; therefore the major is proved by the argu- 
ment from definition, which is a valid argument in law ; ff. De reg. iur., 1. 
omnis definitio ; ff. Depositi, 1. i, at the beginning, and same title, 1. bona fides. 
But the Philosopher so defines moral virtue in Ethics, book ii. The minor is 
proved ; for fortitude is a habit of choosing the mean with regard to fear and 
audacity, as the same Philosopher proves in Ethics, book iv. The argument 
is confirmed thus : Moral virtue is that which is bred in us by " mos," that is, 
by custom, and that is why it is called " moral." Fortitude is so bred in us ; 
therefore the major is proved by the argument from the formal cause, which 
is a valid argument in law ; ff. Ad leg. Falc., 1. si is qui quadringenta, qucedam ; 
ff. Locati^, 1. rei, o-pere ; ff. De verborum sign., 1. cedificia, perfecisse, and 
same title, 1. quce format ; i, q. i, detrahe ; De bapt., debitum. The minor is 
proved. For in an act of war the sensitive appetite, on account of the dangers, 
inclines a man to flight, as the Philosopher says, and in war anger, which is 
an impetuous feeling and so inclines us to vicious extremes, claims a place for 
itself. But virtue, which is a rational promptitude of the appetite, inclines us 
to the mean ; and this promptitude is bred by repeated acts ; otherwise we 
should not act gladly, and so it would not be virtue, since in the virtuous man 
there ought to be no opposition of appetites, as the same Philosopher says in 
Ethics, book ii. And so the first conclusion is clear, namely, that fortitude is 
moral virtue. The second conclusion is that it is a virtue. Some authorities 



240 THE LAW OF WAR 

prove this as follows : Fear and audacity are opposite feelings ; fortitude is 
the virtue between them ; therefore it is only one. The consequence is proved 
thus : For every agent which tends to the increase of one of two opposites, 
tends to the decrease of the other. And so virtue which decreases fear, in- 
creases the opposite, and conversely. This is confirmed thus : Moral virtues 
are fortified by their end ; but the end is single ; therefore the virtue is single. 
The first point is clear by the argument from the final cause, which is a valid 
argument in law ; ff. De quzestionibus, 1. unius, si servus ; ff. De decur., 1. 
generaliter ; C. De episc. et cleric. ; causa xvi, q. i ; De appell., ch. cum cessante; 
and De iureiurando, ch. etsi Christus. The second is clear. For the end of 
fortitude in war is the common good. And any man who makes war for the 
sake of gain is not brave, but rather avaricious. Others hold a different view, 
and say that fear and audacity are not opposite feelings. They prove it thus : 
Fear and audacity are compatible with one another in the same respect of the 
same thing ; therefore they are not opposites. The consequence holds, 
because, if one of two opposites is established, the other is excluded ; ff. De 
instit., 1. sed si pupillus, si institoria ; ff. De reg. iur., 1. IMS nostrum ; De 
verb, sig., 1. fuec verba ; Authent., coll. iii, De mand. princ. ; dist. xxxii, 
hospitiolum ; and similar passages. The first point is clear. For a man may 
well wish to make war for the sake of what is good and honourable, and yet 
fear because of God ; or he may make an attack, and thus audacity is present, 
and yet fear that he may be injured, and thus fear is present. This opinion 
is against the text of the Philosopher in Rhetoric, book ii, nor is their reasoning 
valid, for pleasure and pain are opposites in all cases ; and yet the same act 
may give the same man both pleasure and pain. For example, in adultery 
the sensual enjoyment may give pleasure, but the dishonour, pain. So of one 
who throws merchandise overboard into the sea because of a storm ; and so 
in the case in hand the man fears because of the evil present, and dares because 
of his hope. The first opinion, therefore, is the truer ; and hence Albertus 
holds that, although there are four extremes, as above, yet they only indicate 
two characters. For whoever is inclined to dare rightly, does not fear ; and 
whoever is not inclined to fear rightly, does not dare ; and so he infers a single 
virtue. Others say that there are only two extremes ; for if a man fears 
nothing, he dares too much, and so fear and audacity make one extreme. 
Suffice it to conclude from the foregoing discussion that fortitude, which is 
one of the chief foundations of war, taken in the sense of strength of body, 
is not moral virtue ; but taken in the sense of a virtue of the soul, it is moral 
virtue, and a single moral virtue ; and it is this which conducts war to a 
right end. 

Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue ? 

[Ch. xxii-l 

We have discussed the fortitude which is a chief foundation of war, and 
have seen that it is moral virtue and a single virtue. But as I address this 



THE CARDINAL VIRTUES 241 

treatise to a Cardinal, I ask whether it is a cardinal virtue. It appears that 
it is not. For magnanimity is not a cardinal virtue ; therefore fortitude is 
not. The inference holds by the argument from the major, which is valid 
in law ; C. De neg. gest., 1. i ; ff. De senatoribus, 1. qui indignus ; C. De sacro- 
sanctis eccles., Authent., multo magis ; ff. Sol. matrim., 1. ex diverse, i ; C. 
De epi. et cle., 1. si qua per calumniam ; xxxii, q. v, si Paulus ; viii, q. i, si 
ergo ; vi, q. i, imitare ; dist. xl, qucelibet ; De elect., cum in cunctis. But there 
seems to be more moral virtue in magnanimity than in fortitude, because it 
is nobler and greater, as the Philosopher says in Ethics, in the treatise on 
magnanimity. The first point is clear, namely, that magnanimity is not cardinal, 
because then there would be more than four cardinal virtues. The solution 
is this : The whole of human conduct does not turn on fortitude, like a hinge ; 
therefore it is not a cardinal virtue, because the word " cardinal'" is derived 
from " cardo," a hinge. The consequence holds by the argument from ety- 
mology, which is valid in law ; ff. De rebus creditis, 1. ii, appellata ; ff. in 
procemio, discipuli ; C. De episc. et cler., 1. decernimus ; ff. De verb, sig., 1. 
tugurii; same title, 1. tugurium W; ff. De legatis iii, 1. librorum, quod si papyrus; 
dist. xxi, cleros ; xvi, q. i, si cupis ; and De praebendis, ch. cum secundum. 
The first point is clear. For fortitude has to do only with the dangers of war ; 
but few men pass their lives in the company of such dangers. Therefore, etc. 
The contrary is supported by the authority of common speech, which places 
it among the cardinal virtues, and Seneca, who wrote a special treatise on it, 
agrees with this ; and Cicero, in the Rhetoric, divided virtue into these four 
as cardinal. And this argument from authority is valid in law ; C. De sum. 
trinit. et fid. cathol., Epistola, inter claras ; C. De bonis quae liber., 1. cum 
multa ; ff. De rer. div., 1. in tantum, cenotaphium. 



Why and in what sense the four principal virtues are called cardinal ? 

[Ch. xxiii.] 

As evidence for the solution of the question we must first consider why 
and in what sense they are called cardinal. Here we must note that, according 
to Albertus, just as the antarctic and the arctic poles are the hinges on which 
the heaven moves, and the hinges on which its doors and gates revolve, so, 
by analogy, those virtues are called " cardinal " on which the whole of human 
conduct turns, which if a man possesses, he is called simply " good," and 
without which he is not good. So, too, in my opinion, the lords Cardinals are 
so called because they are the hinges of the world, on which the whole govern- 
ment of the world is revolved and fashioned ; and to them it looks to sustain 
the whole weight of its moving government and to supply the appointed im- 
petus for its motion. The celestial sphere is content with two poles, and these 
are enough ; they are stable and immovable ; they strengthen the order of 
its motion and do not deviate from the place where the human race is fixed. 



242 THE LAW OF WAR 

Monastic government was content with four hinges, and these sufficed. If, 
when we look for the cause of number, variety, infirmity, our great distance 
from the centre, we have no name for it, yet the freedom of the will might 
supply some kind of cause. But as I have spoken of the Cardinalate in my 
treatise on Ecclesiastical Censure, I pass by the subject now, and return 
to discuss the principal question. And because law, as I said, does not fully 
explain the nature of the cardinal moral virtues, I will give some brief treatment 
of it in order to explain fortitude. 



What is virtue ? 

We must know that virtue, as the Philosopher says, is a habit of choice, 
and as he also lays down in the second book of the Rhetoric, everything that 
exists falls under choice, but that which may be chosen is threefold. 



Of the threefold species of good, and how the cardinal virtues are derived 

from the good. 

[Ch. xxiv.] 

The good includes the expedient, the pleasurable, and the honourable ; and 
these goods may be either sought after or avoided by choice ; and all moral 
virtues have to do with these three. Let us explain each in turn. And first the 
good which is expedient, with which virtue is concerned in one of three ways, 
either by bestowing it, or by receiving it, or by preserving it. A man experi- 
ences in himself no acts of choice other than these ; and this inference from 
experience is valid in law, as is proved in ff . in procemio, about the beginning ; 
Authent., coL i, De monachis, about the end ; ff. De legat. iii, 1. si chorus, 
his verbis ; C. De vet. iure enucl., 1. ii, qua omnia ; Sext, De elac., quatn sit. 
As to bestowing the expedient, this happens in two ways ; for a man bestows 
either what is his own or what is another's. If he bestows what is his own, then 
the virtues of liberality and magnificence are practised, and the vices opposed 
to them, namely, avarice and prodigality, meanness and vulgarity. But if he 
bestows what is not his own, then he may either distribute it to those to whom 
it belongs, and this is justice ; ff. De iust. et iur., 1. iustitia ; and Instit., same 
title, iw.s/i'/i'tf ; xii, q. ii, cunt devotissimam ; or he may distribute it to those 
to whom it does not belong, and this is injustice, as appears from the converse 
of the laws just cited, which is a valid argument ; ff. De offi. eius cui mand. 
est iurisdictio, 1. i, liuius rei ; ff. Mand., 1. s per procuratorem, ignorantes ; 
and De his quae fi. a praelat., ch. cum apostolica ; and De conversatione con- 
iugatorum, ch. cum virum. In not rendering things to those to whom they 
belong a man is said simply to be " bad " ; xiv, q. vi, si res ; De usuris, cum tu ; 
ff. De usurp., 1. sequitur, quod autcm. It is clear that justice is cardinal, because 



VIRTUE 243 

if a man has not justice when he distributes what is not his own, he is simply 
" bad," whereas liberality and magnificence, which concern the distribution 
of what is one's own, are not cardinal, because one who distributes his own 
ill, is not simply " bad," but might well be called " foolish " ; and so you have 
one cardinal virtue, justice, concerned with the bestowal of the good which is 
expedient. Again, if moral virtue is concerned with the act of receiving the 
expedient, this may occur in two ways. For a man either receives what is his 
own or owing to him, or what is another's and not owing to him. If he receives 
what is his own or owing to him, and from one from whom he ought not to 
receive it, he sins against liberality and magnificence, yet he is not simply 
" bad." But if he receives what is another's, he is simply " bad." Hence the 
law gives remedies against such a person, such as the interdicts, " Vnde vi bon. 
rapt." ; ff . and C., under that title ; actions of theft, and condictions, in accor- 
dance with laws and canons which are explained in each case according to the 
variety of acts. And so by an examination of this second act, namely, the act 
of receiving the good which is expedient, it appears that justice has a cardinal 
character, whereas liberality and magnificence have not, since the opposite 
of the just man is called simply " bad," whereas the opposite of the liberal or 
magnificent man is not. Again, if moral virtue is concerned with the act of 
retaining the good which is expedient, this also may happen in two ways ; for 
a man retains and preserves either what is his own, or what is another's. In 
the first case by retaining what is his own, and giving it to no one, he sins 
against liberality and magnificence ; but such a man is not simply " bad," 
although, if you press the question, a rich man who sees a poor man dying of 
want and gives him nothing, sins mortally. The answer may be that he then 
retains what is not his own, but common, since at a time of such need there 
should be community of goods, as Clement proves by six reasons, xii, q. i, 
dilectissimis, and Augustine, quoted dist. viii, quo hire, and i. But if a man 
retains what is another's, he is simply " bad," and is called " unjust," pro- 
vided that he retains it against the owner's will ; and the law provides remedies 
against him, as to which see above. So in the matter of the good which is 
expedient, you arrive at one sole cardinal virtue, in distributing, in receiving, 
and hi preserving it, because its opposite makes a man simply " bad." 
Justice is cardinal ; liberality and magnificence are not cardinal ; and this 
is clear. 

I said in the second place that there was a second kind of good, the pleasur- 
able, with which moral virtue is concerned ; and it is concerned with it in two 
ways, either by bestowing it or by receiving it. In the matter of bestowing it, 
there are the virtues which are found in games, when one bestows pleasure 
on others. And such are friendship, affability, and wit. But these virtues 
are not cardinal, because they are not necessary to human nature, because 
many persons are great and virtuous who do not know how to conduct them- 
selves aright in such matters. As to receiving the pleasurable, this also may 
happen in two ways ; for either a man is chiefly concerned with what is 

[23] 



244 THE LAW OF WAR 

pleasurable, and then he is called simply " bad," and the quality is called 
" intemperance " ; and I mean that a man is " bad " by exceeding, for the 
" insensible " man, the man who takes no pleasure, is not simply " bad," but 
the man who exceeds is ; and so you have temperance as a cardinal virtue, 
because its opposite makes a man simply " bad," and temperance is neces- 
sary to human preservation. But if he is simply concerned with what is 
sorrowful, this again may happen in two ways ; for there are some sorrowful 
things which are apt to stir a man to anger, and then " gentleness " comes 
in ; but this is not cardinal, because it is not necessary that a man should be 
angry, but he is saved by the act from passing to the second external act of 
injustice. But if he should pass to the external act, then it would be called 
injustice. But there are also sorrowful things whose effect is to inspire fear, 
and then fortitude comes in. For as the man who will not bear what is terrible 
for the sake of the good of virtue is simply " bad," fortitude is a cardinal virtue. 
So much as to the pleasurable good. 

I said, further, that there was a third good, the honourable, and this is 
threefold. One kind concerns " cognizant " virtue, and these are the intellec- 
tual virtues ; and they are knowledge, wisdom, intellect, art, and prudence. 
Another concerns " interpretative " virtue, involving questions of veracity 
and falsity. Another concerns " appetitive " art. 

Let us take the second form, that which concerns interpretative virtue. 
I say that the veracity which regards interpretative virtue is not a cardinal 
virtue, because it does not make a man simply " good," nor does its vice make 
him simply " bad." For the vice opposed to it is rather " boastfulness." But 
the boaster is of three kinds : for he may be a simple boaster, one who boasts 
for the sake of pleasure ; or one who boasts for the sake of honour ; or one who 
boasts for the sake of gain. The first kind of boasting alone is directly opposed 
to veracity ; the others approach another kind of vice. For the first man sins 
only because he is mendacious ; but there are two kinds of mendacity : for 
there is the mendacity which is a simple false signification of the voice,. and of 
that I have said that it is directly opposed to veracity ; the other is a false 
signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving, and that makes 
a man simply " bad," and falls under the head of injustice. Augustine, in his 
book " De Mendacio," treats both of these and of other species of mendacity. 
It is quoted in xxii, q. ii, ch. primunt capitalc. Another form of the honourable 
good is, as I said, that which concerns appetitive virtue. And it concerns it 
in two ways. Either " essentially," and such are the moral virtues which 
I mentioned above. Or " significatively," and such are glory, and worldly 
goods ; and the virtues concerned with this form of the honourable good are 
magnanimity and , and these are not cardinal virtues. For many 

men are virtuous who do not desire tin honours whieh they deserve. But if we 
speak of the honourable good which concerns cognizant virtue, then there are 
the intellectual virtues : knowledge, intellect, art, prudence. Hie first three 
are not cardinal, because they are not necessary to human life ; but prudence 



THE BRAVE MAN 245 

is necessary to the good. Nay, it is impossible that any one should be virtuous 
without prudence ; for prudence regulates the other virtues. 

These considerations show us how fortitude, which is the object of the 
discussion, is a cardinal virtue. And we see how they are four in number, and 
deducible from the threefold good which may be either sought after or avoided, 
and the threefold virtue of the soul, namely, justice, temperance, fortitude, 
and prudence, which last is not only cardinal, but is head and chief among 
them all. 

This has been in some measure a digression ; but I may be excused, because 
I have not presumed for jurists alone to explain the nature of fortitude, which 
has been the principal subject of the discussion. 



How and in what sense a man may be called " brave " in war. 

[Ch. xxv.] 

My next question is whether a man may be called " brave," even though 
he has not been trained in the dangers of death in war. It appears that he 
may ; for fortitude is necessary to human goodness, since it is cardinal, as 
I showed in the last question, and human goodness is possible without warlike 
training. Therefore the consequence is proved by the argument from con- 
junction ; ff. De neg. gest., 1. atqui natura ; dist. iv, denique ; dist. vi, mine de 
superfluitate. The first point is clear from the citations to the last question. 
Also Cicero says that fortitude is the deliberate facing of dangers and endurance 
of hardships. But this is possible without any warlike act ; and so the con- 
sequence is proved by the argument from consequence destroyed, which is a 
valid argument in law ; ff. De rebus creditis, 1. ii, ii ; C. De furt., 1. apud 
antiques, the word quam ; ff. De in integr. restit., [nemo] non videtur. The 
Philosopher says the contrary in the fourth book of Ethics. And this is why 
the oath of the soldier contains a promise not to shrink from death ; ff. Ex 
quibus causis maior., the last law but one ; and C. book x, De his qui non 
imple. stip., 1. i. For the solution of the question we must observe that the word 
" fortitude " is commonly used to denote all firmness of mind, and this is a 
quality common to all the virtues ; for inconstancy of mind meets with re- 
proach and with the reprobation of law ; xxxii, q. v, horrendus ; De iure- 
iurando, quemadmodum ; ff. De adulteriis, 1. si uxor ; ff. De decur., the last 
law but one ; ff. De neg. gest., the last law but one ; De reg. iur., book vi, rule 
quod semel, and rule mutare. And in this sense there could be no doubt that 
a man might be brave without meeting the dangers of war. But the strict 
meaning of " fortitude " is, a special virtue which inspires a man to meet and 
await dangers for the sake of avoiding the evil of dishonour. Now the bad is 
threefold : the injurious which is opposed to the expedient, the sorrowful which 
is opposed to the pleasurable, dishonour which is opposed to the honourable. 
But the good of the soul which is honourable is to be preferred to the expedient 



246 THE LAW OF WAR 

and the pleasurable goods, just as the rational soul is to be preferred to the body ; 
xii, q. i. prtecipimus ; xxiv, q. iii, si habes ; C. De sacrosanctis ecclesiis, 1. san~ 
cimus ; De poenit. et rem., cum infirmitas. This leads us to the conclusion 
that there are three moral virtues which are necessary before a man can be 
called good and virtuous. There is one which fixes his mind to prefer the honour- 
able to the expedient, and this is justice ; Instit., iiisti/ia ; xii, q. ii, cum 
devotissimam. Another strengthens his mind to prefer the honourable to the 
pleasurable, and this is temperance ; dist. vi, pal., sed poisandum ; and De 
constit., nam concupiscentiam. Another strengthens his mind to bear sufferings 
rather than incur the evil of dishonour, and this is fortitude ; C. book x, De 
athlet., the single law ; C. De his qui non implet. stip., 1. i, in the same book ; 
vii, q. i, hinc etiam. And this is the fortitude which is the subject of our 
discussion. And these are rightly called cardinal, because they are necessary 
to human goodness, and any one of them defends itself and any one of the 
others. Take an example. A woman tempted to adultery by promises defends 
herself by temperance ; ff. De rit. nup., 1. palam ii. If she is tempted by terror, 
she defends herself by fortitude ; xxxii, q. v, [Lucretiam] proposito, Lucretiam, 
and [ch.] [fieri] non polesl fieri and [ch.] finge, dc pudicitia ; xxxiv, q. i, 
non satis. But if she is tempted by rewards, she defends herself therefrom 
by justice ; xii, q. ii, cum devotissimam. Fortitude may also be illustrated 
in this way ; for if she hesitates on account of fear, she defends herself by 
fortitude ; xxxii, q. v, ch. [Lucretiam] proposito, and [ch.] finge, de pudicitia. 
If she is tempted by the pleasurable sensations, then she defends herself by 
temperance ; xxxii, q. v, non potest, and ch. nee solo, and ch. qui viderit, and 
ch. non mcechaberis. If by rewards, then she defends herself by justice, because 
it is as unjust to sell the good which is honourable as that which is spiritual ; 
i, q. ii, quam pio ; De simonia, throughout. If she is tempted by false reasons, 
then she defends herself by prudence ; and so one of the cardinal virtues 
strengthens her mind to prefer the honourable to the expedient, namely, 
justice ; another, to prefer it to the pleasurable, namely, temperance ; another, 
to bear sorrows for the sake of guarding the good and excluding the evil of 
dishonour, namely, fortitude. But prudence regulates the others, and so ought 
to be included among the cardinal virtues. 



// is further to be noted that war is undertaken in two ways. 

[Ch. xxvi.] 

It is undertaken in one way because of an act of war on one side or the 
other; ff. De captivis, 1. in bcllo, and 1. postliinininm ; C. book xi, DC gladi., 
the single law. It is undertaken in another way because of an expectation 
of bodily danger, even without actual attack, but only if there should be 
a danger which might probably be resisted ; otherwise it would not be a war, 
just as it is not war when a robber is hanged or any one else is brought to justice. 



ACTS OF FORTITUDE 247 

If war is undertaken for an actual attack on one side or the other, fortitude 
is not concerned with those dangers only, for then it would not be cardinal, 
since many men are virtuous who have had no training in such dangers. But 
if it is undertaken in the second way, then fortitude is concerned with those 
dangers generally, as we say of a woman who faces dangers in order to protect 
her chastity. In her case there is no war in the first sense, but in the second 
there is, and yet fortitude is present. We must note, however, that fortitude 
is not concerned with all warlike dangers. For if one man attacks another and 
defends himself, he is not brave ; otherwise we should have to say that a dog 
is brave and shows fortitude. But when a man faces warlike dangers for the 
sake of avoiding the evil of dishonour, then he is brave. Hence the Philosopher 
says that a man is not made brave by necessity ; hence, also, cause xxiii, q. iv, 
Nabuchodonosor, and ch. de Tyriis ; De Poenit., dist. ii, sic enirn. Thus we 
reach a solution of the question proposed when we ask whether fortitude is 
concerned with the dangers of death and war; and we must say that it 
is not, as was illustrated in the case of the woman. In a second sense, 
inasmuch as the extreme act of fortitude is concerned with the dangers of 
death, we must say that it is, because virtue is concerned with what is diffi- 
cult. In a third sense, inasmuch as it inclines us to meet the danger of death, 
should occasion arise, we must say that it is, because virtue extends to the 
limits of a man's power ; De Coelo et Mundo, book i. 



Which is the chief act of fortitude in war ? 

[Ch. xxvii.] 

But I ask, which is the chief act of fortitude in those who are at war, 
awaiting the enemy, or attacking them ? And it seems that attack is the chief 
act of fortitude. Firstly, because, as the Philosopher says in the second book 
of the Ethics, in the treatise on liberality, it is more virtuous to give than to 
receive. Also it is written in Ecclesiasticus, ch. iv, " let not thine hand be 
stretched out to receive, and closed when thou shouldest repay." Hence the 
text, " it is more blessed to give than to receive " ; xvi, q. i, prcedicator ; and 
De celebr. missar., cum Martha ; De donat., ch. i. Therefore, by analogy, 
it is more virtuous to attack than to await, because one who attacks gives, and 
one who awaits receives. Moreover it is more virtuous to do well than to receive 
well, as the same Philosopher shows. This is proved thus : For if it is better 
to do than to suffer in the virtues generally, it follows that it is better to do 
well than to suffer well. The consequence holds by the argument from con- 
nexion, which is a valid argument in law ; ff. De neg. gest., 1. atqui natura ; 
dist. iv, denique ; dist. vi, quia de superfluitate. But he who attacks gives well, 
he who awaits receives well ; therefore it is more virtuous to attack. More- 
over, it is better to do well than not to do ill ; and in this connexion it is not 



248 THE LAW OF WAR 

enough to abstain from evil, unless we also do good ; for this act of doing good 
leads to a better end, since in actions it is the end that is weighed, and from 
that the action takes its name. The consequence holds by the argument from 
the end, which is valid in law ; ff. De ritu nupt., 1. si quis ; ff. De iur. fisci, 
1. non intelligitur, si quis palam ; ff. Communia praed., 1. receptum ; ff. De 
auro et arg. legat., 1. et si non sint, perveniamus. But to attack is to do well. 
to await is not to do ill, that is, not to flee ; therefore it is mmv virtuous to 
attack than to await. Further, that which is more difficult is more virtuous. 
For even an opinion on a law is only given on a difficult and doubtful matter ; 
ff. De Carbon, edicto, 1. quod Labeo ; and ff. Ad municipalem, 1. i, at the end. 
But to attack is more difficult than to await ; for a tired man can await, but 
he can not attack. The major is proved by the same Philosopher, in the treatise 
on fortitude, for an act of fortitude is specially concerned with what is difficult 
and terrible. Moreover, that which is more lovable is more virtuous ; for acts 
of virtue are by their nature lovable, as the same Philosopher says ; and this 
is proved by De Poenit., dist. ii, ergo, and ch. corpus, and ch. proximo*. But to 
attack is more lovable. And observe how it brings more advantages to the 
commonwealth, and more things in the same genus are preferred to fewer : 
Authent., De consan. et uter. frat., at the beginning ; De sent, excom., cum pro 
causa ; iii, q. iv, EngeUrudam ; De offi. delegat., prudentiam, at the beginning ; 
because to expel the enemy is more useful than to await them. Moreover, a 
thing which is more praiseworthy is more virtuous, because moral virtue is a 
praiseworthy good ; but to attack is more praiseworthy than to await. For, 
as a rule, those who attack are more praised than those who flee. To the 
contrary is the text of the Philosopher in Ethics, book iii, in the treatise on 
fortitude, where he says that the greater act of fortitude is to endure. Albertus 
and Custratius hold the same opinion on the point. 

By way of evidence on this question, we should observe that, according 
to the dictates of right reason, it is not right always to attack, nor always to 
flee, nor always to await ; for sometimes it is expedient to attack, sometimes 
to flee, sometimes to await. From which it appears that acts of fortitude 
are threefold ; namely, attack, flight, and waiting. And that a brave man 
should sometimes flee is obvious by reason, for one should flee from dangers 
which are beyond a man's strength. For if one man alone should wish to 
attack a thousand, or to await their attack, he would not be brave, but 
audacious and rash, as the same Philosopher says in the same passage. Acts 
of fortitude, then, are threefold ; namely, attack , flight, and waiting. And 
among these the least is flight. This is proved thus : For an act which is 
less difficult than others is the least of those acts, since art and discipline are 
concerned with difficult things. But to flee is easier than to attack or await. 
Therefore, &c. Moreover, an act which is assimilated to a worse vice is the 
i act. This is proved by the argument from extremes, which is valid in law ; 
ff. Communi divid., 1. arbor ; and ff. Si quis ius die. non obtemp., 1. i; and 
ff. De stat. hominum, 1. quarilur. So it is in the case proposed. For by flight 



ACTS OF FORTITUDE 249 

a man is assimilated to fear, which is a worse vice than audacity, as the same 
Philosopher says in the same passage. 

Secondly, I say that waiting is the more important act. This is proved ; 
for it is more virtuous to do good aright than to receive it aright. Therefore 
it is more virtuous to suffer evil aright than to do it aright. The consequence 
holds by the argument from opposites, which is valid in law ; ff. De act. emp., 
1. lulianus, procurator ; ff. De instit., 1. sed si pupittus, si institoria ; ff. De 
verb, sig., 1. hcec verba. But one who attacks does evil rightly to the attacked, 
whereas one who awaits an attack, suffers evil rightly from the attacker. 
Further, an act which is more difficult is more important. This has been 
proved above many times. But waiting is more difficult than attacking. This 
is proved thus : For if an attack is made, it is made after the manner of one 
who is stronger, and with the hope of escaping ; otherwise, if ttlere were no 
hope of escape, right reason would not dictate an attack. But in waiting, it 
is the less strong who awaits the stronger. But it is more difficult to conduct 
oneself rightly in face of a stronger than in face of one less strong, as is obvious. 
This is confirmed thus : For in waiting, one has to control great fear amid bodily 
sufferings. But in attacking, one need not control so great a fear. Therefore, &c. 
Further, waiting and enduring denote continuance and perseverance, and 
in the genus of what is good that which is more continuing is better ; De 
Poenit., dist. iii, irrisor ; De Pcenit., dist. ii, pennata, and ch. non revertebantur ; 
ff. De in rem vers., 1. si pro patre, et versum. But attack denotes an impetus 
of short duration proceeding from anger ; ff. De adulter., 1. si adulterium, im- 
perator ; C. same title, 1. Gracchus ; and ff. De reg. iuris, rule quod calore. 

Moreover, waiting brings one face to face with the dangers of death, 
and they are then difficult and fearful, as the Philosopher says in Rhetoric, 
book ii. Therefore, &c. 

We infer, then, that waiting is the more important act of fortitude, 
although .the vulgar, who judge incorrectly, are of the contrary opinion. But 
if what I said about flight being an act of fortitude appears inconsistent 
with what I wrote above in this treatise, in the article on the duties of 
a general and soldiers, where I said that soldiers ought to keep the oath by 
which they have sworn not to flee, &c., the solution is clear from what has 
already been said ; for where dangers are beyond a man's strength, he ought 
to flee ; xxiii, q. iv, displicet ; John, ch. viii, Matthew, ch. x, quoted vii, q. i, 
hoc observandum. But where dangers are not beyond a man's strength, but 
there is some small hope, then what I have just said holds. The answer to the 
citations to the contrary is clear if we run through them singly ; but we must 
add one thing, which is, that the vulgar applaud and love those who attack 
more than those who wait. Hence what the Philosopher says on the same 
subject, that nothing prevents hired soldiers being more useful in states than 
brave men, for the former barter their life for a trifling gain, and flee and attack 
without the dictation of reason, whereas brave men neither flee nor attack 
without the dictation of reason. 



250 THE LAW OF WAR 

Haw many kinds of fortitude are practised in war ? 

But I ask, how many kinds of fortitude are practised in war ? Solution : 
There are six likenesses of true fortitude, which is a moral virtue between 
audacity and fear, and these six are practised by soldiers in war. 

The first is that which inspires men to attack manfully in war for the 
sake of glory and honour, seeing that men applaud those who do so, and blame 
the timid ; and on this see C. book xii, De re milit. ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. qua 
actione, in colluctatione ; De pub. iudic., throughout. 

The second, which is called " political," is that which makes men brave 
because of the fear of bodily or pecuniary punishment, which is imposed on 
the timid and those who flee in war ; and this is called " political," because it 
is found among citizens, and such fortitude is servile ; De Pcenit., dist. ii, 
sicut secta. 

The third is that which is called " military," by which men are brave 
because they know the arts of war, like the Teutons and other expert mer- 
cenaries. Experience, the mistress of things, induces this kind of fortitude ; 
ff. De leg. iii, 1. servis, ornatricibus ; and Sext, De elect., ch. quam sit ; and 
as the Philosopher says in the treatise on fortitude, mercenaries fight with 
others like armed men with unarmed. And they are ready to attack and ready 
to flee. To-day, however, they extricate themselves more easily, because they 
lift a finger and pull down visors, and they surrender, and are dismissed at once, 
as is their custom among themselves. 

The fourth is the fortitude inspired by rage ; for rage is a thing that 
impels men to danger, and it is sometimes helpful in war, because men are 
bolder, and the impulse of anger induces this kind of fortitude ; ff. De adulter., 
1. si adulterium, imperatores ; and C. same title, 1. Gracchus ; and ff. De reg. 
iuris, 1. quod calore. 

The fifth is that which hope inspires ; for some men attack manfully 
because of the hope of victory, for in them the hope of power is stronger 
than the sensitive reason ; De constit., nam concupiscentiam ; dist. vi, sed 
pensandum. 

The sixth arises from ignorance ; for men sometimes attack and await 
in ignorance of the dangers which threaten them, who would nevertheless flee 
if they knew of them. In this case a man is like an infant, and does not see 
what he is doing ; C. De fals. mone., 1. i ; ff. Ad leg. Corn, de sica., 1. si infans. 

These are the kinds of fortitude ordinarily practised by soldiers in war. 
But if you wish to know which among them approaches most nearly to virtue, 
you should observe that they are all merely likenesses of true fortitude ; for 
in true fortitude, as in any virtue, the act must be done consciously. For there 
is no virtue in those who act in ignorance, because prudence, which is a state 
of the intellect, ought to control every act of virtue. Secondly, virtue must be 
chosen. Thirdly, it must be chosen because of its own intrinsic goodness, and 
not because of any extrinsic good. Fourthly, the act must be steadfast and 



DUTY OF A BRAVE MAN 251 

lasting. Fifthly, it must be done gladly. Sixthly, it should be difficult, for art 
concerns difficult things. All these qualities are required in true fortitude, 
whether in attacking, or in awaiting anything terrible and difficult. These 
considerations show us which of the above more nearly resembles true fortitude, 
and which does not. For all except the last resemble it in being conscious, 
and so the last is least like it in this point. In the point of being deliberately 
chosen, the others agree with true fortitude, except that which arises from rage. 
But in the need for being chosen for its intrinsic goodness, they all fall short 
of true fortitude ; for the first is chosen for an extrinsic good, namely glory, 
another for the sake of avoiding a penalty, another for gain and pay, another 
for hope of victory. But the first, or " political," fortitude, which is chosen for 
honours and glory, is nearer to true fortitude, because of its more; honourable 
end. For honours are significant of the virtues, and such men do more towards 
the public good, for they devote themselves more manfully to wars, as in the 
example given by the Philosopher, of Hector, who conducted himself thus in 
affairs of war. 



Whether a brave man in war ought to await death rather than to flee ? 

[Ch. xxviii.] 

Thirdly, I ask whether a brave man in war ought in some cases to await 
death rather than to flee from the war, when by flight he might escape it. And 
it seems that he should not wait for death ; for one ought to choose that which 
is more pleasurable rather than that which is less so, as the Philosopher says 
in Rhetoric, book i. But life is more pleasurable than death ; therefore, flight 
and life should be chosen, rather than waiting and dying. The Philosopher 
seems to say the contrary in Ethics, book iv, in the treatise on fortitude, and 
in book iii, in the treatise on the voluntary and the involuntary, and also in 
the treatise on magnanimity, where he says that a man should die rather than 
commit a base act. 

Solution : We must observe for our guidance that the question may have 
a double foundation. One is the foundation of truth and faith, based on our 
belief in another life of blessedness. And according to this foundation the 
question would not admit of serious doubt ; for if a man were fighting against 
the infidels, and if his flight would cause the death of many of the faithful and 
save himself alone, then he should rather choose to wait and die. And the 
reason is, that by fleeing he wins his bodily life, whereas by waiting and meeting 
the death of the body, he wins the life of the soul, which is without comparison 
nobler, and therefore to be chosen. 

The second foundation of the question concerns those who live according 
to the law of nature, without belief in a future life ; and then the question 
admits of doubt and various opinions. Some say that the death to be expected 
may happen in many ways. In one case it may be quite certain that death 
must happen if a man waits, and there may be no hope of safety except in 

[24] 



252 THE LAW OF WAR 

flight. In another case, although there may be some probability of death, yet 
there may be some hope of life without flight. In this second case they say 
that a man should observe the authority of Aristotle and other philosophers, 
who say that he ought rather to die, that is. to fight like a man. But in the 
first case they say that he ought in no wise to wait for death. They prove 
this by the argument that of two ills the less should be chosen ; dist. xiii, nervi ; 
and this is a first principle of morals. But flight is a less ill than waiting to 
die. That it is a less ill is proved by the argument that a thing which causes 
the loss of fewer good things is a less ill than that which causes the loss of 
more ; but death destroys everything ; Authent., De nupt., deinceps ; and 
Physics, book ii. In flight, the only good thing lost is moral fortitude. There- 
fore, &c. Moreover, if it were better to die, it could only be because to die is 
an act of virtue ; but this is false, for an act of virtue either is happiness, or 
tends to an act of happiness. But death destroys happiness. Therefore, &c. 
Moreover, if in this case death ought to be chosen, it would be because fortitude, 
which is a moral virtue, inclined to this course. But this is false, for moral 
virtue does not tend to the corruption of nature, but rather to its conservation. 
For laws have been made with this object ; dist. iv, facUe sunt ; but death 
tends to destruction ; Authent., De nupt., deinceps. Moreover, if a man 
ought rather to choose this course, it would be for the sake either of his own 
good or of another's. It is not for his own, because death extinguishes all good, 
as was shown above. It is not for another's, because he cannot win for another 
as great a good as he loses for himself, since he ought to love himself more than 
others ; C. De servit. et aqua, 1. presses. The conclusion is thus confirmed. 
For it appears that the most virtuous soldiers used to flee in war, without 
sacrificing truth and faith, as in the time of Charles the Great. 

Others hold exactly the opposite view, namely, that a man ought to wait 
and die rather than flee. And they prove it thus : For any man knows that 
he must needs die ; therefore, if he dies bravely, he only loses that in which he 
believes a present to differ from a future death. But these two do not differ 
in any matter of losing or preserving the good things of virtue, but only in 
retaining them for a longer or shorter time. They also argue that a thing 
whereby more good things are acquired and fewer lost is more to be chosen ; 
and so it is in the case proposed. Therefore, &c. This minor premise is proved 
thus : For if a man dies, he wins an act of fortitude, which is most noble. If 
he flees, he wins nothing, save a continuance of what he had before as long as 
his life lasts, and so he wins time. The conclusion is thus confirmed. For it is 
certain with regard to the pleasures of the body that men would rather choose 
to live a short time pleasurably than a long time in pain ; therefore this should 
rather be chosen where the question concerns the pleasures of the soul. 

I believe the first opinion to be true, because, as I said in another article, 
the acts of fortitude are attack, flight, and waiting. For a man should not 
always be pressing on, nor always fleeing, nor always waiting ; he should rather 
follow the dictation of reason. 



DUTY OF OBEDIENCE 253 

Whether a soldier should be punished with death, who bravely charges the enemy 
with his company and utterly routs them, contrary to the commands of 

the general ? 

[Ch. xxix.] 

Fourthly, I ask this : Suppose the general of an army has commanded 
that no one should charge the enemy on pain of death. A certain very active 
soldier, with a large company under him, contrary to the general's command, 
charged the enemy, and by his activity utterly routed them. The question is, 
whether he should be punished with death. And it seems that he should ; 
for the text says that in war one who does a thing forbidden by the general, 
or disobeys his commands, is punished with death, even if what he does turns 
out well ; ff. De re militar., 1. desertorem, in bello. This is proved by the laws 
which secure that persons bound to obey should be held to obedience ; ff. 
Mandati, 1. si remunerandi, si [j)ignus] passus <?) , and 1. sed Proculus ; ff. Ad 
Macedon., 1. sed etsi, ii ?) ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. si servus servum, et si puerum ; 
C. De neg. gest., last law ; and similar passages. It is thus confirmed : For an 
evil is not excused because of a good which follows from it ; dist. Ivi, unde- 
cunque ; De Pcenit., dist. i, non sufficit. It is also confirmed thus : For acts 
are not to be judged by the event ; xv, q. i, ilia, and ch. non est ; xxiii, q. v, 
de occidendis ; ff. De neg. gest., 1. sed an ultra, i ; ff . Hand., 1. qui mutuam, 
sumptus ; ff. De contraria tut., 1. iii. Therefore the signal event in this case 
will not be considered, but rather the preceding obedience. 

Arguments to the contrary are these : A penalty which ought otherwise 
to be imposed on one who attempts a thing forbidden by a law, or by the com- 
mand of the prince, is remitted for the sake of skill and a great service effectively 
rendered. This is proved by ff. De poenis, 1. ad bestias ; xxii, q. ii, ch. quceritur 
cur Patriarcha, 

Solution : I hear that the lord Richard Malumbra determined that an 
offender should escape, for his great skill, the penalty imposed by the said law 
ad bestias ; and the ch. quceritur cur Patriarcha might also be quoted. Yet 
I do not think that this opinion is true ; nay, it is obviously contrary to the 
text ff. De re militari, 1. desertorem, in bello. Nor do the laws cited to the 
contrary conflict ; for it is one thing that a man should not incur a penalty 
imposed by a law or by a man, another thing that after the penalty has been 
incurred it may be remitted by the prince. Those laws do not prove that the 
penalty is not incurred ; but they rightly prove that it may be remitted by 
the prince, and so they assume that it has been incurred, as both texts prove, 
if properly examined. 



Whether quarter should be granted to the general of a war when captured ? 

[Ch. xxx.] 

Fifthly, I ask this : Suppose the general of a war is captured by the enemy, 
should quarter be granted to him, or should he be punished ? And it seems 



254 THE LAW OF WAR 

that quarter should be granted, by xxiii, q. i, ch. noli, at the end. For example, 
the text, " as violence is rightly meted out to one who fights on and resists, 
so quarter is granted to the vanquished or the captured." This is proved, for 
a text says that one is bound to spare one's enemy ; ii, q. v, quanta, at the 
end. For example, the text, " because, just as it is right that we should be 
severe on those who persist in their contumacy, so we ought not to refuse pardon 
to the humbled and the penitent." 

An argument to the contrary is that a captive becomes the slave of the 
enemy ; ff. De captivis, 1. hostes ; and ft De verb, significatione. 

Solution : I believe the first statement to be true, namely, that quarter 
should be granted to one who humbles himself and does not try to resist, unless 
the grant of quarter gives reason for fearing a disturbance of the peace, in which 
case he must suffer. This is proved by the text in ch. noli, at the end, where 
it says, " especially when disturbance is not feared " ; and Hugo and the 
Archdeacon explain that " especially " is used for " only," so that the sense 
of the passage is that quarter is to be granted only when disturbance of the 
peace is not feared, and otherwise not. And it is said that on that interpreta- 
tion Charles caused Conradin to be beheaded. 



Of those who are bound to participate in war, and of those who 
participate without being bound. 

[Ch. xxxi.] 

Fourthly, it remains to consider those who are bound to participate in 
war, and those who participate without being bound. 



Whether vassals are bound to participate at their own expense, when 
a lawful war is begun by their lord ? 

And I ask, first, whether, if a lord begins a lawful war, his vassals are 
bound to join in it with arms and horses, and at their own expense. And it 
seems that they are, because they are bound by the force of their oath to help 
their lord ; xxii, q. v, de forma. Innocent, in De iureiur., ch. sicut, holds that 
they are not bound, unless they have undertaken this obligation by special 
agreement, since they are not bound to render personal services. Conclude on 
this point that vassals are not bound by law, except to the duties contained 
in xxii, q. v, ch. de forma, unless they have undertaken the obligation by special 
agreement. 



PARTICIPATORS IN WAR 255 

Whether the subjects of a baron, who begins a war against his king, are 
bound to help the baron against the king ? 

[Ch. xxxii.] 

Secondly, I ask this : Suppose a baron of the King of Spain begins a war 
against the king himself, and commands all his men to help him in the war 
against the king, are they bound, when they have sworn to help him against all 
men ? And it seems that they are, for it is a serious thing to break faith ; Qui 
cleri. vel voventes, veniens, and the following chapter ; ff. De consti. pecunia, 
1. i. Also general words are to be understood generally ; ff. De legat. praestan., 
1. i, generaliter. Also because an oath is binding, unless one is absolved from 
it ; xv, q. vi, chs. ii and iii. The contrary is true ; for a baron who begins a 
war against the king breaks the lex lulia maiestatis ; ff. Ad leg v lul. maiest., 
1. i, and 1. ii ; vi, q. i, verum, the words quisquis cum militibus ; dist. Ixxix, 
ch. ii. For the King of Spain is the prince in his own kingdom. Also, one who 
helps another to sin does not give help at all ; xiv, q. vi, si res ; nor would his 
command excuse them ; ff. De oblig. et act., 1. servus ; xi, q. iii, non semper, 
and ch. qui resistit, and ch. si dominus. Nor does the oath bind to this, because 
it was not meant to be a bond of iniquity ; xxii, q. iv, inter cetera ; Sext, De 
iureiur., ch. i ; and the notes to De iureiurando, ch. petitio. 



Whether subjects are bound to help first a baron who begins a war against 

another baron, or the king who begins a war against another 

king, both commands being received at the same time ? 

[Ch. xxxiii.] 

My third question is this : A baron of the King of Spain begins a war 
against another baron, and the King of Spain begins a war against the King 
of Granada. The baron summons men to help him ; but the king summons 
the same men to help him ; and the summonses are simultaneous. Whom 
are they bound to help first ? 

It seems that they should first help the baron, for they are his subjects 
by reason of fealty and by reason of jurisdiction ; Authent., coll. vi, De quae- 
store, si vero. But they are the king's subjects only by reason of his general 
jurisdiction, and so the two reasons prevail over one ; Authent., De consang. 
et uter. frat., i ; Sext, De re iudic., cum ceterni ; dist. xiii, can. i. 

To the contrary is the argument that persons summoned by the king 
are summoned to a higher tribunal, and so this summons should be preferred ; 
ff. De re iudic., 1. contra pupillum, last section ; dist. xviii, si Episcopus. Also 
because the king summons them for the common good and the defence of the 
crown, and so they are bound by the law of nations to obey ; ff. De iustitia et 
iure, 1. veluti ; dist. i, ius gentium ; xxiii, q. iii, fortitude, and q. viii, ch. omni, 
and ch. si nulla. For in defence of one's country it is lawful to kill a father ; ff. 
De relig. et sumpt. fun., 1. minime. And this is the true view. 



256 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether the non-liege vassal of two lords, summoned by both at the same time, 
is bound to help both, or one, and if so, which ? 

[Ch. xxxiv.] 

My fourth question concerns a non-liege vassal of two lords, a case which 
may arise by reason of different fiefs ; Sext, De supl. negl. praelat., grandi. 
If each of the lords requires him at the same time to help him in war, is he 
bound to help both, or one, and if so, which ? 

It appears that he need help neither, since the two claims cancel one 
another by their coincidence ; ff. De usufr., 1. quoticns ; De Pcenit., dist. i, 
hoc idem, words Christus ait ; xxi, q. i, ch. i. 

It appears that he must help both ; otherwise he will lose his fief, because 
a difficulty of performance on the part of the promisor does not discharge an 
obligation ; ff. De verb, obi., 1. continuus, illud. Also, a man can serve two 
masters ; ff. De operis libert., 1. duorum. Some say that he may choose, on 
the analogy of the slave of two masters, who, if he sees both masters being 
killed, may help which he likes ; ff. Ad Silianum, 1. si quis in gravi, si cum 
omnes. Others say that he must help that master to whom he first took an 
oath ; Vsus Feudorum, De prohib. feud, alien., 1. imperialem, illud ; ff. Lo- 
cati, 1. in operis ; C. Qui potiores in pign. hab., 1. ii. For he is bound to keep 
the earlier fealty ; dist. 1, quia sanctitas tua ; Qui clcri. vel vov., venicns. 

It is safer, however, for him to serve the first personally, and the second 
by means of a substitute, if the nature of the fief allows this ; C. De caduc. toll., 
the single law, sin autem. Nor does it matter that his oath to the second saved 
his fealty to the first, which is of the nature of a non-liege man, because by 
serving the second by means of a substitute he does not injure the first, which 
was what the oath to the second saved. 



Whether a vassal is bound to help his lord against his father, or a father 

against his son ? 

[Ch. xxxv.] 

My fifth question is whether a vassal is bound to help his lord against his 
father, or a father against his son. The gloss on xxii, q. v, ch. dc forma, puts 
the question and holds that he is. For a son is bound to his father only by the 
tie of nature, but a vassal is bound to his lord by the tie of an oath ; see the 
chapter de forma, above cited. The text in Vsus Feud., ch. qucmadnwdum feud. 
amit., proves this. The gloss on xi, q. iii, ch. quoniam milites, somewhat 
inclines to the contrary view. I should think that the quality of the assistance 
to be rendered should be considered. 



PARTICIPATORS IN WAR 257 

Whether a citizen of two states is bound to help one against the other ? 

My sixth question is whether a citizen of two states is bound to help one 
against the other. Solution : Apply what was said of a vassal with two lords. 



Whether a vassal summoned by his lord is bound to follow him in parts 
beyond the sea to fight against barbarians ? 

[Ch. xxxvi.] 

My seventh question is this : A lord wishes to go to remote parts, say 
beyond the sea, to fight with the barbarians ; is a vassal, summoned by him, 
bound to follow him to the war ? Solution : If the lord is of such status and 
condition that his predecessors and he himself have been accustomed to make 
such expeditions, and his vassals to follow him, then the vassal is bound, on 
the analogy of the freedman, who is bound to render the usual services ; ff . De 
operis lib., 1. opere, and the last law but one ; ff. De pign. act, 1. [qui] vel univer- 
sorum. A reasonable allowance for moderate expenses, however, will be made 
by the lord. But if his status is such that he cannot and has not been accus- 
tomed to make such expeditions, then the answer is the contrary ; ff. De 
operis lib., 1. quod nisi, last section ; ff. De arbit., 1. si cum dies, si arbiter. 
This subject is also treated in Speculum in Speculo, tit. De feudis, ipsum. 



Whether slaves are bound to follow their lord to war everywhere ? 

[Ch. xxxvii.] 

My eighth question is whether slaves are bound to follow their lord to 
war everywhere. About them there is no doubt, since the lord has full power 
over them, provided he does not treat them with excessive cruelty ; ff. De his 
qui sunt sui vel alien, iuris, 1. i and 1. ii. 



Whether freedmen, when summoned, are bound to follow their 
patron to war ? 

[Ch. xxxviii.] 

My ninth question concerns freedmen. Solution : Freedmen are bound 
to render the usual services, and unusual services cannot be imposed on them ; 
ff. De operis lib., 1. quod nisi, si vag. < ?) ; ff. De procur., 1. sed haec, ii. 



258 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether cultivators, when summoned, are bound to follow their lord to war ? 

[Ch. zxxix.] 

My tenth question is whether cultivators are bound to go to war when 
summoned by their lords. Solution : Cultivators are divided into " ascripticii " 
and " censiti." Those who are bound to the soil by a written document are 
called " ascripticii," and two documents are concerned, one to constitute, the 
other to prove, their status. By the first they promise the lord of the soil 
never to depart from it ; by the other they confess themselves " ascripticii " ; 
and as to these documents see C. De agric. et censitis, 1. cum scimus. And 
between these and slaves there is practically no difference ; C. same title, 1. ne 
diu. And I say " practically," because they do differ in this, that a slave may 
be alienated either with his " peculium " or without ; 1. ne diu ; an " ascrip- 
ticius," only with the soil ; C. same title, 1. ii. Also, " ascripticii " may be 
ordained, even without the consent of their lord, in the possessions to which 
they are " ascripti " ; Authent., De sanct. episc., ascripticios ; but slaves 
may not. Also, " ascripticii " contract a marriage, with the knowledge and 
silence of their lord, without changing their condition ; C. De agricol. et censitis, 
last law ; but slaves who contract marriage, with the knowledge and silence 
of their lords, are freed from the servile condition ; Authent., De nupt., si 
vero. From this it is as clear as day that the right which lords have over 
" ascripticii " is a right related to the possessions to which they are " ascripti." 
And so it appears that, if they are summoned by the lord to extraneous 
personal services, they are not bound to obey, except by special agreement 
to that effect. " Censiti," however, are those who are bound to render some- 
thing certain annually ; C. Quib. caus. coloni, 1. ii. They also differ from 
" ascripticii " in this, that " ascripticii " are bound to render something 
uncertain, for instance, a third or a fourth of the fruits, whereas " censiti " are 
bound to render a thing certain ; and our conclusion in their case is as above. 
We may infer from this that neither " coloni " nor " inquilini " can be compelled. 



Whether a lord may summon those who are allied with him 
to help him in war ? 

[Ch. xl.] 

My eleventh question is whether a lord may summon those who are allied 
and leagued with him to war, so that they will be bound to help him. Solution : 
Allies are fully free, although they are bound to certain things by agreement ; 
ff. De captivis, 1. non dubito. In these cases, however, the agreement and the 
mode of agreement must be considered and observed to the letter ; ff. Depositi, 
1. i, si convenitur ; and De pactis, 1. i. 



VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATORS 259 

Whether those who are subjects by reason of jurisdiction only 
are bound to participate in war ? 

[Ch. xli.] 

My twelfth question concerns those who are subjects by reason of juris- 
diction only, and are not vassals. Solution : They are bound to participate, 
nor will they have an action to recover their losses, because they act under 
an obligation. There is an exception to this rule in the case of certain persons 
who are excused from personal services, of whom some are excused on the 
ground of age, as minors and old people ; C. Qui aetate, in red and black ; some 
by infirmity ; C. Qui morbo, throughout ; some by the number of their 
children ; C. Qui numero liber., throughout ; some because of their profession ; 
C. De profess, et medic. ; some by their sex, as women, and so on v Otherwise 
the rule stands. 



Of persons not bound, who voluntarily participate in a war. 

[Ch. xlii.] 

What I have said relates to persons who are in some sort bound. It 
remains to consider persons fully free who are summoned to war. In this 
inquiry we must observe that we confine ourselves to persons who go to war 
from no necessity or obligation, for those who go under obligation have been 
treated above. Some go out of mere generosity ; some because they are bound 
to return a service ; some to seek and win glory in war ; some because they 
let out their services as mercenaries, if this can be called a contract of letting ; 
some go simply in the hope of booty, like the so-called " saccomanni," persons 
who seize " manu," with the hand, and carry off in a sack ; and these persons 
we must consider. And first let us take the first class, those who go absolutely 
voluntarily. 

* 

Whether those who voluntarily participate place him in whose service they go 
under an obligation to themselves, &c. ? 

And my first question is, whether those who voluntarily participate in a 
war place him in whose service they go under an obligation to themselves, if 
they incur loss ; as, for instance, if they lose their arms in the war, or horses, 
or are taken prisoners, even in going to or returning from the war. Solution : 
Here we must observe that voluntary participators are sometimes first sum- 
moned and asked by their lords ; sometimes they join on their own motion, 
without being so summoned. If they are summoned to go by a lord, then 
they have an " actio mandati " against him, if, as I said above, they happen 
to lose something, unless it appears that they are acting from a sense of duty, 
or humanity, or relationship ; xxiii, q. iii, non in inferenda ; xi, q. iii, si dominus, 
and ch. lulianus. If you object, and say that the lord is not bound, because 
such loss is caused by accident, for which no one is liable, De homici., lohannes; 

[25] 



260 THE LAW OF WAR 



C. De pign. act., 1. qua fortuitis, the answer is that it is an accident which 
might have been and ought to have been foreseen, because such events are 
probable in wars, because the issue of war is doubtful ; and so Innocent notes 
in De iureiurando, ch. sicut. 



Whether a borrower is liable to the lender to replace horses and 
arms lost in war ? 

[Ch. xliii.] 

My second question is, What if a man lends another arms and horses to go 
to war, and they are lost ; is the borrower liable to the lender ? And it seems 
that he is, by analogy with the last argument, since this, too, might have 
been foreseen, as above. Solution : In this case he is not liable, according to 
Innocent ; and the reason of the difference is that in this case the borrower 
did not exceed the terms of the contract, because he only put them to the use 
for which the contract was entered into, and so he is not liable ; ff. Commod., 
1. si ut certo, sed interdum. But in " mandatum," although a man might 
have known beforehand that he might probably lose them, yet he knew that 
an " actio mandati " would lie, because that follows from the nature of the 
contract. And this is always the rule, unless it is excluded by a special 
agreement. 

Whether a hirer is liable to a letter to replace horses and arms lost in war ? 

[Ch. xliv.] 

My third question is, What of one who lets out horses and arms ? if they 
are lost in war, will the letter have an action against the hirer ? Solution : 
Apply what I said of the lender ; the letter will have no action, because the 
hirer hired them for this purpose, and he has not exceeded the terms of the 
contract ; ff. Locat. et conduct., 1. si quis domum. 



Whether, if one man summons another to a war, and the other is robbed on his 

way to the war, the summoner can sue the robber by the 

" actio vi bonorum raptor um " ? 

[Ch. xlv.] 

My fourth question is, What if a man who has been summoned to a war is 
robbed of his arms, horses, and other things on his way to give assistance ? 
I have said that the " mandator " is liable to the " mandatarius," but has 
the " mandator " an action " vi bonorum raptorum," or an action of theft, 
against the robber ? It appears that he has, because his interests are affected 
by the robbery, inasmuch as he is liable to the " mandatarius " in an " actio 



VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATORS 261 

mandati." Solution : These actions are not competent to him against the 
robber. And the reason is that the " actio vi bonorum raptorum " is only 
competent to the person upon whose goods the robbery was committed ; ff. Vi 
bon. rapt., 1. ii, hac actione. For the " actio vi bonorum raptorum," or the 
action of theft, is only competent to one who had ownership, or possession, 
or detention, or some right in the thing, as has one to whom the thing was 
pledged and not yet delivered ; ff. De prsescript. verb., 1. si gratuitam, si quis ; 
ff. De furt., 1. si is qui rem, and 1. is cui. The persons robbed, therefore, have 
these actions, but they will be able to sue the " mandator " by an " actio 
mandati," and the " mandator/' when he has paid, will be able to call for 
a cession of the actions against the robber, and then, after the cession, he may 
sue, as a " procurator in rem suam " ; C. Hand., the last law but one, and the 
last law. This is also the view of Innocent in the chapter above cited, De 
iureiurando, sicnt. 



Whether those who are not summoned to a war, but go of their own motion, 
place him in whose service they go under an obligation to themselves ? 

[Ch. xlvi.] 

My fifth question regards those who go without being summoned, and of 
their own motion. Solution : If they go with the intention of making a gift 
of their services, for example, from a sense of duty, or humanity, or relationship, 
the case is clear. Such persons will not have an action ; xxiii, q. iii, non in 
inferenda ; xi, q. iii, si dominus, and ch. lulianus. But if they go with the 
intention of putting the person in whose affairs they engage under an obligation, 
then they will have the " actio negotiorum gestorum " ; and it is enough if the 
enterprise has been effectively begun ; ff. De neg. gest., 1. sed an ultra. 



Whether those who are not summoned to a war, but go of their own motion and 
make an effective start, place the person in whose service they go under an 
obligation to themselves, even though he may object to and forbid their going ? 

[Ch. xlvii.] 

My sixth question is, What if persons go to a war of their own motion, but 
after being expressly forbidden by those to whose assistance they go ? Will 
such persons have an action, if they effectively begin the service, and if they 
complete it successfully, to carry the question further ? It appears that they 
will, on the analogy of one who drags an unwilling person out of a falling 
house ; xxiii, q. iv, ipsa pietas. Also, a benefit may be conferred on a man 
against his will ; dist. xlv, et qui emendat. Also, to forbid a man to help one 
seems to show that the other was mad ; ff. De condi. instit., 1. quidam ; De 
Prenitentia, dist. iii, adhuc instant; so the gloss holds of the doctor who treats 
a person against his will. This is noted in dist. Ixxxiii, in the summary. I 



262 THE LAW OF WAR 

believe the contrary in the present case, because of C. De neg. gest., the last 
law ; but I do not on that account reject the gloss ; I believe that it is true of 
the sick man and the doctor, because a sick man is presumed to be mad, if he 
does not wish to be absolutely cured. But a man who forbids another to come 
to a war for his assistance, is not presumed to be mad, for it is possible that 
he does not trust him, and suspects that he may betray him. Nor do I believe 
that the gloss would apply to a case in which a sick man was anxious to be 
well healed, but did not wish for that doctor, but for another ; then, in my 
opinion, the gloss would not apply, nor do the passages cited above prove that 
it would. 

So much for those who participate voluntarily. 



Of those who participate because they are bound to return a service. Whether such 
persons may have an action against the person whom they help ? 

[Ch. xlviii.] 

It remains to consider those who go because they are bound to return 
a service, for instance, because they have received the like or other assistance 
from the person whom they help. Will such a person have an action to recover 
his losses as above, against the person whom he helps ? Solution : If he goes 
in the way our case supposes, he goes with the idea of discharging a " natural " 
obligation, which, however, cannot be transformed into a " civil " obligation, 
nor used as an " exceptio " in a trial ; ff. De petit, hatred., 1. sed si lege, constt- 
luit ; De testamentis, cum in qfficiis. And so we infer that he does not go 
with the intention of imposing an obligation, since the same act uniformly 
undertaken cannot bear contrary effects; ff. De verbor. obligat., 1. si quis ; 
ff. De condict. indebiti, 1. cum pars, si heres, and 1. cum heres. And if you 
say that there is no need to discharge this obligation, because no obligation 
upon which either an action or an " exception " could be founded was ever 
created, and that which does not exist cannot be discharged, ff. De iniusto, 
rupto, irrito facto testam., 1. nam, and De dispensatione impuberum, ch. ad 
dissolvendum, the solution is this : Although no obligation upon which an 
action or an " exception " could be founded was created, yet, as I said above, 
there was created a " natural " obligation capable of being discharged by 
a return of service ; see the laws just cited ; and this intention of discharging 
prevents the creation of an obligation, since intention is required in obligation ; 
ff. De oblig. et act. ; 1. obligationum ; and same title, 1. non figura. 



Of those who participate for the sake of winning glory. 
[Ch. xlix.] 

It remains to consider those who participate for the sake of winning glory 
in war. 



PARTICIPATORS IN WAR 263 

Whether such persons place the person to whose assistance they go under 
an obligation to themselves ? 

Do such persons place the person to whose succour they go under an 
obligation to themselves ? Solution : If this is their sole object in going, 
they do not ; for the lord would be liable either in an " actio mandati " or an 
" actio negotiorum gestorum." He cannot be liable in an " actio mandati," 
since no mandate was given in the circumstances supposed by our question, 
and an " actio mandati " does not lie without a preceding mandate ; for 
although some say that an " actio mandati " lies for negligence or deliberate 
wrongful act, when a mandate has once been undertaken, yet the preceding 
mandate is always required ; ff. Mandati, 1. i. Or if you say that, the " actio 
mandati " requires a preceding contract, that is more correct, as I show else- 
where in dealing with the " innominate " contracts ; C. De rerum permutatione, 
1. ex placilo. Again, he cannot be liable in an " actio negotiorum gestorum," 
because the other did not come with the intention of engaging in his affairs, but 
rather for his own purposes, although, as a necessary consequence, he does 
engage in them-; and so the " actio negotiorum gestorum " will not lie either. 



Of those who participate because they let out their services. 

[Ch. 1.] 

It remains to consider those who let out their services, or, more accurately, 
those who are voluntarily enlisted at an agreed salary. 

Whether such persons have an action against their hirers ? 

Have the letters an action against the hirers ? Solution : Such persons 
make a contract of " locatio operarum et rei " ; and therefore, if the hirer 
uses them only for the purpose for which they are hired, he is not liable ; 
ff. Locati et conducti, 1. si quis domum ; and this is so, unless there is a special 
term in the contract, or a custom to the contrary, as there is in Italy, namely 
that compensation should be given for horses lost in the service of the hirer ; 
otherwise the rule stands, as above. 



Of those who participate with the intention of getting booty. Whether an action 
is competent to such persons ? 

[Ch. li.] 

It remains also to consider those who go with the intention of plundering ; 
and as to them, there is no doubt that no action is competent to them, since no 
obligation arises from a dishonourable transaction ; ff. De verbor. obligation., 
1. veluti, and 1. generaliter, and 1.* si ex plagis. 



Supply Ad legem Aquiliam. 



264 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether clerks may participate in war ? 
[Ch. lii.] 

Further, we must see whether clerks may participate in wars. This question 
was determined by Gratian, xxiii, q. viii, convenior ; as the gloss there recites 
in the summary. There have been various opinions on it. For some say that 
clerks may use arms of defence, but not of offence, and so may make a defensive 
war. Others say that they may use all kinds of arms, provided that they 
attack at once, and only in defence of themselves, and not of others, and when 
they are placed in a position of imperative necessity ; De homicidio, ch. ii ; 
xxiii, q. viii, convenior ; and the same cause, q. i, at the beginning. But if they 
can escape by other means, then they may not ; De homicidio, ch. suscepimus. 
Others say that they may only do so with the authority of the Pope. Gandul- 
phus holds that they may not make war in person, but may do so vicariously. 
Gratian seems to be of the same opinion ; xxiii, q. i, in registro. 

We may conclude this question by saying that clerks summoned by the 
Pope may participate ; for the prince has authority to make war ; xxiii, q. i, 
quid culpatur ; same cause, q. ii, ch. i, and q. iii, ch. Maximiaims. But in a war 
they may not kill even a pagan, because of the fear of " irregularity," though 
they may encourage others to fight, and may even hurl stones and other missiles 
provided that none are killed by their shots. This is noted by Innocent, De 
restit. spol., olim ; and Ne cler. vel monachi, ch. sententiam. If summoned by 
others, especially by secular princes, they ought not to go to war. But for 
their own defence, when they cannot escape by other means, they may even 
kill, even without fear of " irregularity " ; Clem., De homicidio, si furiosus. 
And I say defence of their own person advisedly ; it is otherwise if they are 
defending another, even on the instant, such as a father, a brother, and the like. 
The note of Innocent in De sent, excom., ch. si vero, i, where he holds that one 
who strikes a clerk in this case is not excommunicated, is not in conflict with 
this. For " irregularity " is contracted even without fault, as where a judge 
puts a person to death lawfully ; dist. Ii, ch. i ; and note on De sponsalibus, 
ch. inter opera. But excommunication is not incurred without fault ; indeed 
it must be preceded by some persuasion of the devil ; xvii, q. iv, si quis 
suadente ; so Clement notes in the chapter quoted, si furiosus. 

But can a clerk be blamed who does not flee, but waits for one who is 
attacking and kills him in self-defence ? It seems that he must be, by the text 
of Clement, where he says " who could not avoid death by other means " ; this 
is proved by ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. scicntiam, qui cum aliter, whence the passage 
in Clement was taken. And this is following the example of our Saviour, who 
fled into Egypt ; xxiii, q. iii, i. And this is noted by Bernard in De homicidio, 
ch. suscepimus. 

I believe the contrary to be true on the authority of ff. Ex quibus causis 
maiores, 1. in eadcm ; for there these two things, not to be able to withdraw, 
and not to be able to withdraw without dishonour, are treated as the same. 



MERCENARIES 265 

I am confirmed by the consideration that danger might occur in flight, for 
instance, if he were to fall, as often happens in flight, and therefore he ought 
not to expose himself to such a danger ; Vt lite non contestata, accedens, ii. 
But in this I think we must weigh all the circumstances, the danger of flight, 
the quality of the person fleeing, and of the person attacking, so that, if by flight 
a man would probably incur a danger of death, then he is not to be blamed ; 
otherwise he is. 



Whether mercenaries enlisted in Germany, at a fixed salary by one who hires 

them, will have an action against one who, while 

they are on the way, &c. ? 

[Ch. liii.] 

Suppose mercenaries have been enlisted, at a fixed salary, with an engage- 
ment for six months, to come from Germany to serve an Italian, and, while 
they are coming, the Italian loses his status absolutely ; can the mercenaries 
bring an action for their salary ? 

Whether mercenaries enlisted in Germany by an Italian city, at a fixed salary 

yearly, if the city is seized by a tyrant, while they are on the way, 

may bring an action for their whole salary, &c. 

Suppose mercenaries have been enlisted in Germany by an Italian city, 
at a fixed salary, with an engagement for a year, and while they are on the 
way, the city is forcibly seized by a tyrant ; can the mercenaries bring an 
action for the whole salary, or for a rateable part, or for what ? The following 
texts seem to prove that they can claim the whole : C. De annonis, 1. i ; C. De 
agent, in rebus, 1. matriculam ; C. De prox. sacr. scrinior., 1. si quis in sacris ; 
C. De primipilo, 1. i ; ff. De legat., 1. legatum ; ff. De var. et extra, cognitionibus, 
1. i, divus. 

On the contrary, the following texts seem to show that they can only 
claim a rateable part : C. De erog. milit. annon., 1. his scholaribus, and the last 
law but one, at the end ; C. De advoc. divers, iudiciorum, 1. post duos. 

Solution : In this case the debt does not arise from a pure contract, but 
rather from a disposition of a law, because the men are appointed to an office, 
and the salary is given by the disposition of a municipal law. Hence it is not 
merely a contract of " locatio conductio." And in such cases we must observe 
that persons are sometimes appointed to an office which requires labour, 
where the salary is given primarily for the labour ; and this is the case with 
mercenaries. Sometimes they are appointed to an office where the salary is 
given not for the labour only, but because high intellect and knowledge are 
required, as in magistracies and the like. Sometimes they are appointed to 
an office, and the salary is given for both ; that is to say, both for the labour, 
and for high intellect, and knowledge, as in the case of ambassadors. 



266 THE LAW OF WAR 

In the first case, it is given rateably according to the time of service rendered ; 
C. De erog. milit . annonae, last law but one. In the second case, if a single act 
was done in performance, then the whole is due ; see the laws quoted above 
to the contrary. But if there was no performance at all, he ought to have the 
salary for the year in which he entered on the office ; C. De advoc. divers, 
iudiciorum, 1. post duos. 

In the third case, what is given as remuneration for labour and skill is 
sometimes indivisible, as in the case of advocates, doctors, and ambassadors ; 
and then the whole is given as above. Sometimes it is divisible, as in the case 
of the constable of the standard ; for there the man is chosen on both grounds, 
for his skill and for his labour, and these admit of division ; so that mercenaries 
will receive a rateable part, whereas skilled persons, chosen by reason of their 
skill, have the whole, the distinction being as above. 

I may add a fourth case, where a man is chosen primarily for rank, as the 
attendant of a prince. Then he has the whole ; C. De proxi. sacr. scri., 1. si 
quis in sacris ; C. De agent, in rebus, 1. matriculant ; De principibus, 1. i. And 
the salary passes to his heirs ; C. book xii, De domesti. et protect., last law. 
This solves the question of Count Landi, captain of a company of brigands, 
who was several times engaged as a mercenary by Italian lords, with an engage- 
ment for a fixed time and at a fixed salary. 



Whether mercenaries ought to be paid at the beginning or at 
the end of a month ? 

[Ch. liv.] 

A further question is, When ought mercenaries to be paid, at the beginning 
or at the end of a month ? There are some glosses dealing with an advocate 
who also acts as a soldier, which seem to show that it is due at the beginning ; 
C. De advoc. divers, iudicio., 1.. advocati. This is supported by ff. De extraordin. 
cognitionibus, 1. i, divus ; C. De iudiciis, 1. properandum, in honorariis; 
and ff. Locat. et conducti, 1. qui operas, i. C. book xii, De principibus, 1. i, 
is to the contrary. Solution : Sometimes money is given rather for expenses 
than as the pay for labour, and then it is due at the beginning. Take as an 
illustration the case of ambassadors ; ff. De legationibus, 1. legatum; ff. Mand., 
1. si vero non remunerandi, si mandavero ; C. book x, De legationibus, 1. ii. 
Sometimes money is due as pay for labour, and then we must consider the 
intention of the parties, express or implied ; for if there was an implied inten- 
tion to that effect, then it seems that it is due at the beginning. For instance, 
if a man cannot perform his promised services unless money is given him, 
then it appears to have been impliedly agreed that it should be due at the begin- 
ning, for in such cases we always look for what is the more probable ; ff. De 
regul. iur., 1. semper in stipulationibus. But if this probability does not appear, 
then the rule is, that in obligations arising out of contract the salary is due at 



MERCENARIES 267 

the end of the time ; C. Locat. et conduct., 1. eadem ; and ff. De stip. servorum, 
1. si servus communis Meevii, last section. But if the money is due by disposi- 
tion of law to persons appointed to office (as to whom see above), as it is in the 
present case, then, if there is one single salary, it should be paid at the beginning; 
ff. De var. et extraor. cognitionibus, 1. i, divus. And if the glosses to this 
effect are noticed, the salary may be either annual or monthly, as it is in the 
case of the mercenaries of whom we are speaking, who have seven florins a 
month, and then it is due at the beginning ; C. De advoc. diver, iudic., 1. post 
duos ; and C. book xii, De principibus, 1. i. I think, however, that mercenaries 
cannot retain it except rateably for the time for which they serve, as I showed 
above ; and they are bound to restore the residue, even when the impediment 
is caused by an extrinsic event. 



Whether mercenaries who absent themselves for a time, even with the 

licence of their lord, lose their salary for that time ? 

[Ch. lv.1 

Suppose that mercenaries during the time of their service withdraw for 
a time ; will they lose their pay for that time ? And suppose that they do so 
with the licence of their lord ? Solution : We must observe that services are 
sometimes defined with respect to a time that is not specified. Take the case 
of advocates of a church, who have a fixed salary to cover any cause which 
may affect the church during the year ; in that case there is no doubt that 
there is a single obligation, because there is a single duty imposed, although 
there may be several acts of performance. Therefore the whole sum is due ; 
see the passages cited above ; ff. De extraor. cognitionibus, 1. i, divus. Some- 
times services are defined with respect to a specified and fixed time, as in the 
case of a learned doctor employed to read a certain book in a certain time. 
And then either the whole salary is promised at once, although payment may 
be distributed over the period ; and even then there is a single obligation, 
as above ; ff. De rebus creditis, 1. lecta. Or sometimes payment is made by 
the year or by the month, and then there are as many obligations as there are 
months ; 1. post duos ; and payment cannot be claimed for the whole time, 
but the instalments become payable severally for each month of service. 



Whether mercenaries, who wilfully refuse to serve the whole time of their 

engagement, lose their pay for the whole time, or only 

for that which they have not served ? 

[Ch. Ivi.] 

Suppose they wilfully refuse to serve the whole time, will they lose their 
salary for the whole time, so that they will have nothing even for the time which 
they have served, or should they only lose it for the time they do not serve ? 

[26] 



268 THE LAW OF WAR 

Solution : There are some offices to which a man is appointed, which are so 
indivisible that if one thing is left undone, the rest is of no avail, and in such 
cases the whole salary is lost. Take the example of ambassadors, C. De lega- 
tionibus, 1. ii. There are other offices which are divisible to the extent that, 
if one thing is left undone, the rest is of value. Take the example of a mer- 
cenary. He need not return the whole, but only the part attributable to the 
future ; yet he is liable for any damage caused by his refusal to serve in the 
future, so that if no damage is caused, he pays nothing ; ff. Locat. et conduct., 
1. sifundus, verisimilis; and notes on ff. De annu. legatis, 1. Mavia. 



Whether a mercenary may serve by a substitute? 
[Ch. Ivii.) 

What if he wishes to serve by a substitute ? It appears that he cannot, 
because he was enlisted for his personal skill ; ff. De solut., 1. inter arti- 
fices ; C. De caduc. tollend., the single law ; and Sext, De offic. delegat., 
the last chapter, and ch. is cui. On the other hand, any one can do by another 
what he can do by himself ; rule potest quis, and similar passages. Solution : 
The mode of appointment should be considered ; for sometimes a lord or a city 
appoints a constable, and gives him a standard and pay, and the constable has 
to enlist for himself those whom he will have to serve under the standard; 
in this case no question runs between the city and the mercenaries, because 
the city enlists nothing except the skill and labour of the constable, yet the 
mercenaries are themselves bound. Sometimes a city enlists mercenaries for 
itself and places them under the several standards, and then it chooses a con- 
stable for his skill and services. In respect of skill, a man could not give 
a substitute, as appears by the laws just cited. The mercenaries are chosen 
only for their services and labour ; and persons who are chosen for services, 
and not for skill, may appoint a substitute, as Innocent notes in De re 
iudicata, ch. cum Bertholdus. Hostiensis has an opinion to the contrary in 
that passage. I think Innocent is right, having regard to the laws just cited 
and their true intent. But it is safer to do it with the lord's consent, so that 
both opinions may be respected. 



Whether a mercenary loses pay during the time when he is ill ? 

[Ch. Iviii.] 

What if a mercenary is ill ? Solution : He is deemed to be serving, so 
that his salary is due ; ff. De statuliberis, 1. si hcres, Stichus m . 



SPOILS OF WAR 269 

Of spoils and captures in war. Whether one who makes a capture in war becomes 

owner of the person or thing captured, and whether the doctrine of 

" postliminium " applies ? 

[Ch. lix.] 

Fifthly, it remains to consider spoils and captures made in war. 

And in the first place I ask whether one who captures anything in war 
becomes owner of the person or thing, and whether the doctrine of " post- 
liminium " applies. Solution : In a public war, made by the authority of 
a prince, which I have discussed above, this is so. For the captor becomes 
owner ; the persons captured become slaves ; ff . De captivis, 1. hostes ; and ff . 
De verb, sigm'ficatione, 1. hostes. But if the war does not proceed from the 
edict of a prince, although it may be otherwise lawful, as when it is in defence 
of one's own property, then, if he who declares war has jurisdiction over him on 
whose account he declares it, he may decree that any one capturing anything 
in the war shall become owner of things captured, and shall detain persons until 
he can present them to his superior. So Innocent holds in De iureiurando, ch. 
sicut, referring on this subject to the note on De sent, excommunicationis, 
ch. a nobis. Innocent adds that even without making any decree, he may 
condemn him for invading the bounds of his jurisdiction ; Authent., qua in 
provincia, C. Vbi de crim. agi oporteat. He adds that if the person declaring 
war has no jurisdiction, but is merely defending himself and his property, 
then he may not capture and detain the assailant, because he is only allowed 
to defend himself, and that only within the limits of justifiable defence ; C. 
Vnde vi, 1. i ; De restit. spoliat., olim. He adds that if he attacks the property 
of his assailant, the assailant cannot succeed in an " actio vi bonorum raptorum" 
nor in an " actio iniuriarum," because he may be met with an " exceptio paris 
criminis," setting up a like offence on his own part. All this, as I said, is noted 
by Innocent in De iureiurando, ch. sicut. I think Innocent's first statement is 
true without qualification, because a lord may punish an offence by a decree 
depriving a man of the ownership of his property and transferring it to another. 
But I think the second statement requires qualification. I think, rather, that 
if a state which recognizes no superior in fact, and so is an enemy of the Roman 
people, declares war on another, which also recognizes no superior, no decree 
is required, any more than in a war declared by edict of the prince ; for this 
rule comes from the law of nations, which is derived from ancient customs, 
except that the part which concerns persons no longer holds, because in modern 
times persons captured in wars of that kind do not become slaves and are not 
sold, and the doctrine of " postliminium " does not apply in such cases to-day. 
On reading his third statement, I have sometimes been led to disapprove of 
that decretal for the following reason : One who has been despoiled is entitled, 
above all things, to restitution, and the " exceptio criminis " cannot be set 
up against him ; De restit. spoliatorum, ch. in literis, and ch. item cum quis. 
The person first despoiled, therefore, will not be able to set up the " exceptio 



270 THE LAW OF WAR 

criminis," nor any other even more stringent " exceptio." Now, as I write, 
I think that Innocent's gloss may be saved in two ways. First, because 
Innocent does not speak of a case in which the person last despoiled brings the 
interdict " unde vi " ; he speaks, rather, of a case where he brings the " actio 
vi bonorum raptorum " or the " actio iniuriarum," which are obviously vt TV 
different. Or, secondly, we may say that Innocent does not mean that an 
" exceptio criminis " in the strict sense is set up, but an " exceptio " alleging 
the other's act of spoliation, which is allowed even against one who brings a 
" recuperative " interdict, so that he may be defeated by an " exceptio spolia- 
tionis," as the text in De ordine cognitionum, ch. super spoliatione, proves. 



Whether persons captured in a war between two states become slaves, and 
whether ownership is acquired over them ? 

[Ch. lx.) 

When one state makes war against another, can men be called " enemies," 
in the sense that if captured they will become slaves, and ownership over them 
be acquired ? It appears not ; ff. De captivis, 1. si quis ingenuam, at the end. 
On the contrary, a state of itself makes a people, and so it appears that they 
are " enemies," just as are the Christian and the Saracen peoples. Solution : 
When the dispute is between two states which are under the same lord, the 
rules of captivity and " postliminium " do not apply ; ff. De captivis, 1. st quis 
ingenuam. But when it is between two states that do not recognize a superior 
and I assume, to remove all doubt, that one is an enemy of the Empire, as 
being rebellious then, by the law of nations, which is derived from ancient 
customs, the rules of captivity and "postliminium " apply, except that, according 
to the customs of modern times, and the practices observed among Christians 
from an early age, " postliminium " does not apply to persons, and persons 
are not sold, and do not become slaves. 



Whether filings captured in war become the properly of the captors? 

[Ch. Ixi.] 

Do things captured in war become the property of the captors ? It set ins 
that they do, by ff. De captivis, 1. si quid in bello. The contrary seems to be 
proved by the same title, 1. si captivus. Solution : The law si quid in bello 
speaks of movable things ; the law opposed to it of immovables. But it is 
objected that movables become public property ; xxiii, q. v, ch. dicat. Solu- 
tion : I say that they become the property of the captor ; but he is bound to 
assign them to the general of the war, who will distribute them according 
to deserts. And this rule applies wherever the doctrine of " postliminium " 
does not apply ; ff. De captivis, 1. ii. 



STRATAGEMS 271 

Whether trickery is allowed in wars P 

[Ch. Ixii.] 

A further question is whether one may use trickery to win victory in wars. 
It seems that one may ; for Augustine says, in the book of Quaestiones, " when 
a lawful war is undertaken, justice has no concern with the question whether 
one fights in the open or by trickery." This is supported by Joshua, ch. viii. 
To the contrary seems to be what is written in Deuteronomy, ch. xvi, " that 
which is just shalt thou follow justly." But to follow a thing by trickery 
is to follow it unjustly, since it savours of deceit, and such practices are 
restrained by the " actio de dolo " ; ff. De dolo ; C. same title, throughout. 
Moreover, trickery is opposed to happiness, and it breaks the faith, which should 
be kept even with an enemy ; see Augustine to Boniface, quoted in xxiii, q. i, 
ch. noli; xxxiii, q. v, quod Deo pan consensu. Moreover, it is written in 
Matthew, ch. vii, " whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even 
so to them," and in the beginning of the Decretum. And this rule must be 
observed towards all our neighbours. Since, therefore, no one would wish 
trickery to be used to himself, it follows that he ought not to use it to others. 
Solution : We must observe here that the word " trickery " properly means 
anything which tends to deceive another ; but there are two ways in which 
a person may be deceived by the word or act of another. One way is if a false 
statement is made in order that another may be deceived, or in order that 
some promise may not be observed, and such a use of trickery is always un- 
lawful ; for between enemies there are certain bonds which must be observed, 
as Ambrose says in the book De Officiis. In the other way, a man may be 
deceived by our words or acts merely because we do not disclose to him our 
intentions or our secrets. This mode of deceit is lawful ; for not even the secrets 
of Holy Scripture are at all times to be disclosed, lest men scoff at them, accord- 
ing to the passage in Matthew, ch. [xjvii, "Give not that which is holy unto the 
dogs." Moreover, it is a special instruction among military documents, that 
secrets are not to be revealed to enemies, and so, too, the Blessed Thomas lays 
down in the Second book of the Second part, question xl ; and the gloss on 
xxiii, q. ii, ch. dominus, says without qualification that we may use this kind 
of deceit, provided we do not break faith ; same cause, q. i, ch. noli. The gloss 
on xxii, q. ii, ch. utilem, is to the same effect ; it quotes dist. xliii, can. in man- 
datis ; ff . De capt., 1. nihil interest ; C. De commerc., 1. ii ; xiv, q. v, dixit ; De 
consecra., dist. ii, dixit dominus. 



Whether it is lawful to make war on feast days ? 

[Ch. Ixiii.] 

The next question is whether one may make war on feast days. And 
it seems that one may not, for feast days were introduced in order that one 
might have leisure for divine things ; De consecra., dist. ii, pronuntiandum ; 



272 THE LAW OF WAR 

De feriis, last chapter ; C. same title, 1. dies, and the last law ; and this is 
supported by Exodus, ch. xx. Moreover, in Isaiah, ch. Iviii, those who claim 
debts on days of fasting, and engage in quarrels, smiting with their fists, are 
reproved. Much more, then, should those who make war on feast days be 
reproved. Further, no irregularity may be committed in order to avoid a 
temporal inconvenience. Therefore, &c. Moreover, the text of De treug. et 
pace, ch. i, seems to confirm this view. 

On the contrary side, we read in i Maccabees, cli. ii, " they took counsel 
laudably saying, Whosoever shall come against us to battle on the sabbath 
day, let us fight against him." Solution : The Blessed Thomas, in the Second 
book of the Second part, question xl, holds that one may make war on feast 
days in case of urgent necessity, but on the necessity ceasing, one must cease 
from the war ; and he supports this by the passage in John, ch. vii, " are ye 
angry at me, because I have made a man every whit whole on the sabbath 
day ? " And so he argues that doctors may heal for the sake of a man's private 
health, but the public advantage is an object of much greater importance. 
Goffredus and Hostiensis, in De treug. et pace, ch. i, say that on Thursday 
wr should not make war, because on that day the Lord ascended into Heaven, 
and made the supper with the Disciples ; De consecra., dist. i, porro ; and De 
consecra., dist. ii, literis ; nor on Friday, out of reverence for the Passion of the 
Lord ; nor on Saturday, because the Disciples on that day hid for fear of the 
Jews, and because the body of the Lord lay in the sepulchre : De consecra., 
dist. iii, Sabbato ; nor on Sunday, because the Lord did almost all His notable 
acts on that day ; dist. Ixxv, quod die ; and out of reverence for the Resurrec- 
tion. I believe that the urgency of the necessity must be considered, as men- 
tioned above. The text of Pope Nicholas is in xxiii, q. viii, ch. si nulla. 



Whether one who has recovered in a war the whole of his 
loss, may still, &c. ? 

[Ch. Ixiv.] 

The next question is, What if a man has recovered in a war the whole 
of his loss ; may he still bring an action against his adversary, or may he 
still declare war against him ? It seems that he may bring an action ; for 
what is captured in war is the penalty of contumacy, and so it would seem 
that he may bring an action none the less ; ff. De tab. exhib., 1. locum, the 
penultimate section. Also, the thing was not paid in satisfaction of a debt, 
but the ownership of it was obtained by war ; xxiii, q. v, dicat; and q. vii, 
si de rebus ; ff. De acquir. rer. dom., 1. naturaliter. Also because, against one 
who is contumacious, an oath may be taken an unlimited number of times ; 
ff. De rci vind., 1. qui restituere. The gloss on xxiii, q. ii, ch. dominus, holds the 
contrary, on the authority of ff. De reg. Juris, rule bona fides. 

I do not think that the gloss is true without qualification, but a distinction 
should be drawn according as the loss was recovered from the same person 



WAR AND THE CHURCH 273 

or from others. If from the same, the opinion of Johannes holds ; if from others, 
or . . . , and then the rule is the same; C. De evict., 1. emptori; or he might 
have a right of recourse against the first ; C. De usur. rei iudic., 1. ii, the last 
section. But otherwise it is allowable for the same debt to be paid several times 
over; ff. De tab. exhib., 1. iii, condenmatio ; and Instit., De legat., si res. 
So the gloss notes on ff. De reg. iur., rule bona fides; and so, too, notes 
lo. Faventinus p) on the ch. dominus, already quoted. 



Whether those who die in war are saved ? 
[Ch. Ixv.] 

Are those who die in war saved ? Solution : Those who die in a war for 
the defence of the Church obtain the heavenly kingdom. Two texts in par- 
ticular prove this, xxiii, q. viii, ch. omni, which was addressed by Pope Leo to 
the King of the Franks; and xxiii, q. v, ch. omnium, which was addressed by 
Nicholas to the army of the Franks. But those who fall in other lawful wars 
are also saved, provided they die without mortal sin ; but if they fall in an 
unlawful war, though that be their only mortal sin, they perish ; De Pcen., 
dist. v, fratres. 



Whether it is lawful to wage corporeal war on behalf of the property 
and possessions of the Church, &c.? 

[Ch. Ixvi.] 

Is it lawful to defend the possessions of the Church by corporeal war, 
and for this purpose to assemble troops ? Obviously it is. It is proved by 
the texts xxiii, q. iii, ch. Maximianus; xv, q. vi, auctoritatem ; dist. Ixiii, 
Adrianus ; xxiii, q. viii, ch. igitur, and ch. hortatu ; and the gloss magistra on 
xv, q. vi, ch. auctoritatem. Also by the text of Sext, De sent, excom., ch. dilecto. 



Whether bishops may go to war without the licence of the Pope ? 

[Ch. Ixvii.] 

May bishops go to war without the licence of the Pope ? Some say they 
may not, without any qualification, on the authority of canons which appear 
to lay this down expressly ; xxiii, q. viii, quo ausu, and ch. si vobis, and ch. si 
quis episcopus. Though those chapters admit of various meanings, yet I 
think this is true, if they are summoned, or if they join of their own accord in 
the wars of others, particularly secular wars ; otherwise, if they are defending 
their own rights. 



274 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether prelates, for the temporalities which they hold from the 
Emperor, 6-c.P 

[Ch. lxviii-1 

Are prelates bound to pay tribute for the temporalities which they hold 
from the Emperor for wars declared by him ? We must say that they are, as 
is proved by xxiii, q. viii, ecce, with the two following sections, down to 
quamvis. 

Whether mercy should be shown to persons captured in a lawful war? 

[Ch. bux.] 

Should mercy be shown to persons captured in a lawful war ? We must 
say that it should, unless by sparing them there is fear of a disturbance of 
the peace. This is proved by xxiii, q. i, ch. noli, at the end ; and on the 
authority of that chapter, as understood by Hugolinus, Conradine was be- 
headed. 



Whether the Church should declare war against the Jews ? 

[Ch. Ixx.] 

Should the Church declare war against the Jews ? We must say not, 
since everywhere they are prepared to serve, and do not persecute, Christians. 
Otherwise of the Saracens, who do persecute Christians. This is the text. 
xxiii, q. viii, dispar; and the gloss there notes that it would not be necessary 
to declare war even against the Saracens, if they did not persecute Christians. 



Whether those who attend in a war, but who cannot fight, G-c.? 

[Ch. Ixxi.] 

Should those who attend in a war, but who cannot fight, enjoy the im- 
munities of combatants ? Say that they should, provided that they are useful 
in counsel in other ways ; see the note on De voto, ch. ex multa. 



Whether prelates, by reason of temporal jurisdiction, may, &c.? 

[Ch. Ixxii.] 

May prelates declare wars, and take part in them, and encourage others 
to battle, by reason of their temporal jurisdiction ? Say that they may, as 
Innocent notes in De pcenis, ch. quod in dubiis. 



KINDS OF CORPOREAL WAR 275 

Whether a prelate, for the injury of a subject, may, &c. ? 

[Ch. Ixxiii.] 

May a prelate declare war for an injury done to his subject, for which 
justice is not done, and capture in the war persons other than the wrong- 
doers ? Say that he may, as Innocent notes in De appellat., ch. dilectis ; and 
De iureiurando, ch. sicut. 

Whether the Pope's delegate may declare war ? 

[Ch. Ixxiv.] 

That is to say, may he invoke the secular arm ? The question has been 
much discussed, and is treated in De offic. deleg., ch. significasti, by Innocent. 



Whether wars declared by the Church against excommunicated 
persons are meritorious ? 

[Ch. Ixxv.] 

Are wars which the Church declares against excommunicated persons 
meritorious ? We must say that they are, and it is lawful for prelates and 
individuals to encourage others to fight in them. This is proved by the texts 
xxiii, q. v, ad omnium, and the following chapter ; and q. viii, ch. igitur, down 
to ecce; and q. iv, ch. sicut excellentiam. 



How many are the kinds of corporeal wars ? 

[Ch. Ixxvi.] 

The next question is how many are the kinds of corporeal wars which are 
recognized in law. Solution : Seven kinds are recognized by law. 

The first is called " Roman," and is that which the faithful wage against 
the infidels ; and this is lawful ; De hsereticis, excommunicamus, ii. And it is 
called Roman, because Rome is the head of the Faith ; xxiv, q. i, hcec est fides, 
and ch. quoniam ; De summa Trin., the penultimate chapter. And in this 
sense may be understood ff. De captivis, 1. hostes. 

The second is that which is made on the authority of a lawful judge, 
having mere jurisdiction against the contumacious and rebellious ; ff. Quod 
met. causa, 1. continet ; ff. De iurisd. omn. iudic., 1. iii, and 1. iv ; C. Ne quis 
in sua causa, the single law. And these are not strictly called enemies, for 
although that which we acquire from them becomes ours, yet the converse is 
not true ; ff. De captivis, 1. v, in pace. 

The third is called " presumptuous " war, and is that made by persons 
who disobey a judge ; De Pcen., dist. iii, i, at the end ; De maiorit. et obed., 
ch. si quis venerit; ff. De rei vind., 1. qui restituere; ff. Ne vis fiat ei qui in 
pos. missus, 1. iii ; C. De seditiosis, 1. i, at the end. 

[27] 



276 THE LAW OF WAR 

The fourth is the war which is lawful whenever it is allowed by authority 
of law. And it is lawful as regards the person to whom the authority is given ; 
xxiii, q. ii, ch. si dominus; De sent, excom., si vero, i, nee ilk ; C. Quando 
lie. unicuique sine iudi. se vindicare, 1. i, and 1. ii ; and also his relations and 
neighbours ; Sext, De sent, excom., dilecto. 

The fifth, which is unlawful, is war made against the authority of law, as 
where a man defends himself contrary to the authority of a judge and of the 
law ; De sent, excom., perpendimus, and ch. contingit, and ch. in audientia. 

The sixth, or " voluntary " war, is that which the secular princes of our 
time make without the authority of the emperor. And this is unlawful, because 
without the authority of the emperor it is not even lawful to bear arms ; C. book 
xi, Vt armor, usus, in red and black ; Authent., coll. iii, De man. prin. ; 
Authent., coll. vi, De armis. Moreover, those who do so violate the lex lulia 
maiestatis ; ff. Ad leg. lul. maiest., 1. iii. 

The seventh, which is called " necessary " and lawful war, is war made 
by the faithful, when they defend themselves by the authority of the law 
against those who attack them ; for to repel force by force is lawful ; ff. De 
iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim, and similar passages. On these subjects see Hostiensis, 
Sext, De homicidio, pro humani ; and the Archdeacon, xxiii, q. ii, ch. iustum. 

From this we see what wars are lawful, and what are unlawful. For 
wars are said to be lawful by reason of the person declaring them, the person 
against whom they are declared, the thing, and the cause, and the law which 
allows them ; and they are unlawful in the converse cases. But generally 
there is one justifying cause, the contumacy of one who resists unlawfully. 
Forwhen justicecannot be had from one who is liable, then war maybe declared, 
for recourse is had to that instrument for help ; xxiii, q. i, quid culpatur, and 
ch. noli ; xxiii, q. viii, si nulla ; ff. De usuf., 1. si ususfructus. And on this 
question of what wars are lawful, there are notes by Innocent, De resti. spol., 
cum olim, i ; by Hostiensis, in Summa, De treu. et pace, quid si iustum; by 
the Blessed Thomas, in the Second book of the Second part, question xl, the 
first, second, and third articles ; and by ^Egidius, in the book De regimine 
principum, at the end. 

Of particular war which is waged in self-defence ; being the Fourth Treatise 
of the Third Principal Part. 

[Ch. Ixxvii.] 

Universal corporeal war having been considered above, in the third pre- 
ceding principal treatise, it now remains to consider, fourthly, particular war 
which is waged in self-defence ; and in treating it I shall proceed as follows : 
I shall first show what it is. Secondly, how many are its kinds. Thirdly, 
by what authority it was introduced. Fourthly, who may use it. Fifthly, 
against whom. Sixthly, on whose behalf. Seventhly, in what manner. 
Eighthly, what is its end. 



PARTICULAR WAR 277 

What is particular war ? 

[Ch. Ixxviii.] 

As to the first question, what is the war declared " particularly " in 
self-defence, I say that it is "a contention arising on account of something 
alien presented to human desire, proceeding from the infliction of particular 
violence, and tending to its exclusion." This definition is supported in sub- 
stance by the text of ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. [qui] 
scientiam, qui cum aliter ; C. Vnde vi, 1. i ; ff . De vi, 1. iii, si quis ; and De 
resti. spol., ch. olim. I said " contention," for contention is taken as the genus, 
as it was in the definition of war undertaken generally, in the first treatise 
above, at the beginning. Secondly, I said " arising on account of something 
alien," &c. ; this supplies its differentia, for herein it differs from universal 
war, and other species of war. Thirdly, I said " tending to its exclusion." 
This is the final cause of the war itself. 



How many are the kinds of particular war ? 

[Ch. Ixxix.] 

As to the second question, which asks how many are its kinds, I say 
that they are two ; for I divide it into " lawful," and " unlawful," as I also 
divided universal war. But lawful particular war is of two kinds. For one 
kind is waged in defence of the true body, or what belongs to or concerns 
the true body. This I shall discuss in the present treatise. Another kind is 
waged in defence of a mystical body, or a part of it, meaning a community, 
which is called a body, and the individuals who compose it are called its limbs 
and parts ; ff. Quod cuiuscunque univer., 1. i ; ff. Ad municip., 1. quod maior ; 
ff . De in ius vocand., 1. sed si hac, qui manumittitur ; De excess, praelat., 1. cum 
dilecta, and the note on that passage. If, therefore, a community declares war 
in defence of one of its citizens, who is oppressed by a stranger, in default of 
justice being rendered by the judge of the oppressor, this is called " Particular 
War in defence of the mystical body, or a part of it " ; and this is called 
" Reprisals," as to which see Authent., Vt non fiant pignor., throughout ; 
Sext, De iniur., the single chapter, throughout. And this war will 
be discussed in the treatise next following. But lawful particular war, 
declared in defence of the true body, is a contention arising on account of 
something alien presented to human desire, proceeding from the infliction of 
particular violence by a private or public person, acting unlawfully outside 
his office, tending to its exclusion, within the limits of justifiable defence ; and 
this is supported by C. Vnde vi, 1. i, with the note on that passage. But it is 
unlawful when the foregoing conditions, or any of them, are wanting, as will 
be shown in the following discussion. 



278 THE LAW OF WAR 

By what law was particular war introduced ? 
[Ch. Ixxx.] 

As to the third question, which asks from what law this war proceeds, 
and what law makes it competent, the gloss on ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim, 
on the word " iure," says, " by the law of the courts, not by the law of hravrn." 
If the gloss means that this war proceeds from the law of the courts, I think 
that the gloss is not true. If it merely means that the law of the courts allows 
it to be declared, I think it is correct. But when the gloss says, " not by the 
law of heaven," I think it is false. I return to the particular points ; and I 
say that war in self-defence proceeds from natural law, and not from positive 
law, civil or canon. And that this is true may be proved as follows : For the 
nature that produces a thing tends to its conservation, so long as the strength 
of the natural agent lasts, and strives to expel anything hostile to it ; and if 
this is not so, the cause is a failure of the strength of the natural agent, and an 
excess of those acting against it. But this is not caused by intention of the 
natural agent, productive and conservative, but contrary to intention, since 
it always resists its opposites, so far as it can. This is obvious from experience, 
if we argue by natural instances. For it is obvious in the elements, which act 
and are acted upon in turn. For a thing acted upon resists the thing acting, 
and reacts upon it, solely to the end of its own conservation, and the destruction 
of the thing acting against it. And a material corporeal agent is always acted 
upon in acting itself, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the Physics, 
and the second of De generatione. This is obvious in inanimate things, such 
as plants, for their special nature tends to their own conservation and life, 
and to the expulsion of their opposites ; and also in animals, and why not 
also in a rational creature ? in whom, rather, the process is even more marked, 
because the creature himself is nobler, and other things are ordained to his 
service, as their end ; ff. De usuris, 1. in pecudum. Defence, therefore, pro- 
ceeds from natural instinct. The text of Clem., De sententia ct re iudicata, 
pastoralis, ceterum, supports this. The text there speaks of defence which 
proceeds from natural law. This seems to be the meaning of the gloss on ff. 
Ad leg. Aquiliam, 1. scientiam, qui cum alitcr. The gloss there says that the 
laws permit, in that they do not forbid. This is supported by the text of 
ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam, 1. itaque. The text there says that natural reason allows 
one to defend oneself against danger. I conclude therefore, from this reasoning, 
that this war, limiting it to war declared in defence of one's person, proceeds 
from natural law and one's own instinct, but that positive law approves it, 
or does not forbid it, as the gloss on 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter, says. For some 
things which proceed from natural instinct are punished by positive laws, as 
in carnal intercourse ; for intercourse, as such, proceeds from natural instinct, 
yet some unions are condemned by statute. And in this positive law limits 
and qualifies acts which proceed from natural law. So in other instances of 
acts proceeding from nature ; for one naturally desires food and drink, and 



LAWFULNESS OF PARTICULAR WAR 279 

yet the canon law limits this desire. For it forbids certain foods at certain 
times. It is true that positive law also qualifies the mode of defence, as appears 
in C. Vnde vi, 1. i, and as will appear in the citations below. We conclude, then, 
that this war proceeds from natural law, but that it is approved by positive 
law, both civil and canon, and also qualified and regulated by them. And 
perhaps if understood in this way the gloss on 1. ut vim may be saved. 

Secondly, the gloss said, " not by the law of heaven." The gloss seems 
to mean that the divine law does not allow violence to be repelled by violence. 
This view of the gloss seems to be supported by certain texts ; for it is written 
in Luke, ch. vi, " unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the 
other " ; xxiii, q. i, at the beginning. It is also written, " whosoever shall 
compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain " ; Matthew, ch. v. It is also 
written in Romans, ch. xii, " avenge not yourselves, but rather give place 
unto wrath." Christ also said to Peter, when he wished to defend Him, " put 
up again thy sword into his place," Matthew xxvi ; quoted in xxiii, q. i, at the 
beginning. These passages might move us to agree with the gloss in holding 
that it is forbidden by the law of heaven. But I think that the gloss is wrong, 
as may be clearly shown. And first as follows. An act which is consonant with 
charity is lawful by divine law, and defence of oneself is such an act. There- 
fore, &c. The major is proved ; for charity excludes any act which is at 
variance with divine law, since it is incompatible with such an act, being itself 
the foundation of everything that is lawful. This is proved by De Pcenit., 
dist. ii, [si] radicata, and ch. caritas est, ut mihi videtur. And the second point, 
the minor premise, is proved by the same " distinctio," ch. quia radix. For 
the chief act of charity is to love one's neighbour as oneself, as appears in the 
next canons, and De Pcenit., dist. ii, ch. caritas est. proinde ; therefore it 
implies self-love and self-conservation, and if so, self-defence. Therefore the 
law of heaven allows one to defend oneself. Moreover, the divine law allows 
one to defend one's neighbour from death, even against his will. Therefore 
much more does it allow one to defend oneself. The consequence follows by 
the reasoning last given. The antecedent is proved by the text in xxiii, q. iv, 
ipsa pietas, and ch. displicet. Moreover, the divine law forbids a man volun- 
tarily to strive after his own destruction. What I mean by that is merely 
this : that if he duly strives after some other thing approved by the divine 
law, even though in gaining that thing self-destruction follows as a consequence 
that is not forbidden ; as where a man, in order to obtain the state of eternal 
blessedness, afflicts his own body, no one doubts that the affliction is destructive 
of the body, yet this is not its final end, but the avoiding of carnal vices, and 
the obtaining of the eternal state. The same might also be said of those who 
have allowed themselves to be slain for the sake of the catholic faith ; for their 
final purpose is not the destruction of their body, but the defence of the faith, 
for the sake of which they voluntarily expose themselves to temporal death, 
which the divine law allows. But one who does not defend himself from death, 
when he can, voluntarily kills himself and compasses his own destruction ; 



280 THE LAW OF WAR 

and so this is forbidden by divine law. The major is proved ; for those who 
kill themselves in this way are regarded as condemned by the divine law, as we 
say of Judas and those like him. The minor is proved ; for one who does not 
defend himself from death, when he can, and does not come under the cases 
above mentioned, and does not fail to do so merely from cowardice, desires 
his own death, and kills himself by another's hand ; which is just as if he killed 
himself by his own hand, according to the rule qui per alium, Sext, De reg. 
iuris. Moreover, the divine law does not absolutely forbid acts which proceed 
from natural law, but modifies and controls them. This is clear from illustra- 
tions ; for it does not altogether forbid food and drink, or sexual intercourse, 
or the like, but modifies and controls those actions, rejecting extremes, and 
approving the mean, as does the moral law also ; Ethics ii, iii, and iv. But if 
the divine law were absolutely to forbid self-defence, since that action proceeds 
from an instinct of nature, it would absolutely destroy an act of nature, which 
is absurd, for the reasons given above. Moreover, the canon law allows it ; 
therefore the diyine law does not forbid it. The antecedent is proved by De 
restit. spol., ch. olim; Clem., De re iudic., pastoralis, ceterum ; and more 
clearly by Clement, De homicidio, si furiosus. The consequence holds ; for 
the canon law is interchangeable with the divine law, and so they cannot 
contradict one another ; for they tend to the same end, though in different 
ways. For the canon law treats of the government of the earthly kingdom, 
that human society may be preserved in the world, which is also the subject 
of the civil law ; but the canon law goes further, for it disposes and prepares 
for the state of eternal happiness, to which the divine law leads ; and so it is 
necessary, if we observe the identity of their end, that everything which the 
divine law forbids, should be forbidden by the canon law. Accordingly, we 
may pass over other arguments which might be adduced without number, and 
conclude that the gloss is not correct in saying that the law of heaven does not 
allow self-defence. 

To the authorities cited to the contrary, the true answer is that given 
by Gratian in xxiii, q. i, his ita. The answer is, that they arc to be understood 
to refer to the inner preparation of the heart, not the conduct of the body ; 
for a man ought to have humility of heart within, as Augustine shows in the 
Sermon on the Centurion's Son, when he says, " a man ought to be prepared," 
&c. See xxiii, q. i, ch. paralus. 

This discussion gives us the answer to our third question as to whence 
this war arises, and what law allows it. 



What persons may declare this particular war? 
[Ch. Ixxxi.] 

We must consider the fourth question, namely, Who may declare it ? 
On this subject I begin by saying that it is one thing to ask who may defend 
himself, and another to ask who may declare the war above defined, the object 



WHO MAY DECLARE IT ? 281 

of which is defence. If we ask to whom defence is allowed, I say that it is 
allowed to all natural created and corruptible beings. And I say " created 
and corruptible," because it is not allowed to the heavenly bodies, because 
they cannot be acted upon by any hostile agent, since their bodies are not 
receptive of foreign impressions, as the Philosopher says in De Coelo et Mundo, 
book ii, since they are not composed of the matter which is the matter of 
generation and corruption. And so there is no need of defence, since they 
cannot suffer. But to all material things defence is allowed by natural first 
principles, since they are accessible to suffering ; and such defence proceeds 
from natural law, which is a force inborn in things, creating like from like. 
For by creating its like a thing preserves itself in its kind, which cannot be 
done for ever in the individual ; and also by its individual action, it strives to 
destroy its opposite, which resists it, and conversely. And this is the first 
mode of natural law, as to which see the gloss on dist. i, can. ius naturale ; and 
it is commonly noted in ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. i, ius naturale. So, then, 
self-defence is allowed naturally to all material things ; and it proceeds from 
the strength placed by nature in any being, as any one may perceive by his 
senses by taking natural illustrations. But if we ask who may make the war 
above defined, then I say that men only may do so, and not other creatures, 
as the definition of the war proves, when I said, " something alien presented 
to human desire," &c. And now we must ask whether all men may make it. 



Whether clerks may declare this war ? 

[Ch. Ixxxii.] 

And first, I ask whether clerks may declare this war. That clerks may 
not do so is proved by De homicidio, ch. suscepimus ; by dist. xlvi, can. sedi- 
tionarios ; and by the texts of xxiii, q. viii, ch. i, and ch. cum a ludceis, with 
the chapters following, down to ch. his. Such is the answer given. It is proved 
by ch. convenior, in the same cause and question. That they may do so is 
proved by De restitution, spol., ch. olim ; De sent, excom., ch. si vero, and 
ch. ex tenore ; dist. i, ius naturale ; ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim ; ff. De 
vi, 1. iii, si quis. The text in Clem., De homicidio, si furiosus, is clearer. On 
this there have been the opinions recited by the gloss on xxiii, q. i, in the 
summary, and the same cause, q. viii, in the summary ; for some have said 
that no one, not even a lay person, is allowed to repel force with force by striking 
back, but only by preventing. This opinion is disapproved by Clement, De 
homicidio, si furiosus. Others say that laymen may strike back, but not 
clerks, and this view suffers from the same defect. Others say that if force is 
used to a person, it is lawful to repel it, even by striking back, and even for 
clerks. This is approved by Clem., si furiosus, provided the conditions which 
he mentions are satisfied. But if the force is used to things, then the answer 
is otherwise. But whether this second statement is true, I shall discuss below. 



282 THE LAW OF WAR 

Hugo refused to say that a man ought in no circumstances, however great the 
necessity in which he was placed, and even if he could not escape by any other 
means, to kill another, but rather to allow himself to be killed. He has a note 
to this effect on dist. 1, can. de his. The gloss there notes the contrary ; and on 
De homicidio, ch. sicut dignum. I do not insist on this, since, as I said, there 
is the text in Clem., De homicidio, sifuriosus; and even if there were no text 
on the subject, expressly deciding it for or against, we should be led to the same 
conclusion by the reasons which I adduced to prove that it is not forbidden 
by divine law. 



Whether, although a clerk may defend himself even by killing another, 

he may do this in a church ? 

[Ch. Ixxxiii.] 

Secondly, I ask whether, if a clerk may defend himself in this way, even 
by striking back and killing another, he may do this in a church. And it seems 
that he may not ; for although a law may permit certain acts generally, yet 
they may be forbidden by reason of the place, so that the general permission 
is restricted by the special provision ; ff. De poem's, 1. sanctio legum ; ff . De 
alim. leg., 1. alimenta, basilica; ff. De legat. iii, 1. uxorem, felicissimo ; 
and De rescriptis, ch. pastoralis. Sext, rule generi, suffices. That many acts 
are permitted generally by a law, which are none the less forbidden in special 
circumstances, is proved by the texts of Sext, De immun. eccles., ch. decet ; and 
i, q. [i] iii, ch. vendentes. So, therefore, in the case proposed, and much more, 
since this is an act by which the church may be polluted ; De consecr. eccles. vel 
altaris, ch. proposuisti; and Sext, same title, the single chapter. Moreover, 
quarrels and brawls generally are forbidden in churches ; ch. decet, just cited. 
Therefore this act must be forbidden, since it is a kind of brawl. To the con- 
trary, it may be urged that the laws which permit it speak in general terms, 
and therefore they ought to be so understood ; ff. DC lega. praestandis, 1. i, 
generaliter. This part I believe to be true, since the action arises from 
natural law, and it is not disapproved by divine law, and the reason of the 
law sanctioning it is of general application, without distinction of places. 
For natural law introduced it in order that a man might preserve himself as 
long as the strength of natural first principles lasts, and this reason applies 
in a church as much as anywhere else. It is easy to answer the authorities 
cited to the contrary, for the acts forbidden in a church are either acts which, 
from their nature, belong to the class of bad acts, or which belong to the class 
of permitted acts, such as contracts. Yet their exclusion from a church does 
not cause great danger on the ground of delay, since they may be performed 
equally well outside the church, at the pleasure of the contracting parties, 
since they have their origin in the will of the parties ; C. De act. et obliga- 
tionibus, 1. sicut. But in the present case, if a man were not allowed to repel 
force with force in a church, the danger would be immediate, because he would 



PARTICULAR WAR AND THE CHURCH 283 

easily be killed at once. As to the other argument, that pollution might 
follow, the solution is this : The preservation of a man, which cannot be 
restored, is more to be considered than a church, which may be resanctified. 
And perhaps we might say that, for a church to be polluted, the spilling of 
the offender's blood is necessary ; see the note on Sext, De consecra. eccle. vel 
altaris, the single chapter. 



Whether a clerk, attacked in the act of celebration, may defend himself, 
and kill his assailant, and so continue to celebrate the office ? 

[Ch. Ixxxiv.] 

Thirdly, I ask whether, if a clerk is attacked in the act of celebration, 
he may leave the office, defend himself, and kill the assailant ; and whether, 
if he kills him in thus defending himself, he may continue to celebrate the 
office. As to the first point, it appears that he ought not to leave the office, 
but that he is bound to perform it as long as he can ; see the text in vii, 
q. i, illud, and ch. nihil. Moreover, temporal things are to be postponed to 
spiritual ; xii, q. i, preecipimus ; De pcenit. et rem., cum infirmitas ; C. De 
episcop. et cler., 1. sancimus. The contrary view is supported by other texts ; 
for an office begun may be left uncompleted because of some physical impedi- 
ment supervening, and for that reason the laws provide that the priest should 
not be alone in a church where there is a store of temporal goods. This is 
proved by the texts in the chapters just cited ; vii, q. i, illud, and ch. nihil. 
The object of this is that one man may take the place of another and continue 
the celebration, when the other has left it ; De consecratione, dist. ii, the last 
chapter ; unless the words of the mass have been begun and not completed, 
because then he is bound to begin again, since they must not be divided, as 
in baptism and ordination ; dist. xxiii, quorundam, and note the gloss there, 
and ch. nihil, where the gloss should also be noted. But if a man attacks the 
celebrant, to kill him, this is an impediment, nay, it is clearly a mortal danger 
to the celebrant ; and therefore he may leave the office, and consequently may 
rid himself of the danger threatening him, if he can, even by killing the assailant. 
The authorities quoted to the contrary are easily answered ; for although 
it is true, as a general rule, that spiritual things are to be preferred to 
temporal, yet in this case the celebration of the spiritual office is not to be 
preferred, since the law allows this, on account of the irreparable damage that 
would follow, and it does not result in the postponement of the spiritual office, 
because the office may be completed by another, or by the same celebrant, 
after the danger has been averted. As to the second point, I say without 
arguments that if he does kill the assailant in defending himself, he may 
resume the celebration of the office, provided the conditions mentioned in 
Clem., si furiosus, are satisfied. For what he has done is no sin, since he did 
it by the authority of the law, and by that authority no man sins ; xxiii, q. iv, 

[28] 



284 THE LAW OF WAR 

ch. qui peccat ; hence he does not commit an irregularity ; see the passage 
of Clem., si furiosus, above cited. So there seems to be no impediment to 
prevent him celebrating, as Clement proves in the passage quoted. 



Whether one who is attacked while baptizing, ordaining, confirming, anointing, 
or celebrating the several sacraments may postpone the celebration of those 
sacraments, though begun ? 

[Ch. btxxv.] 

In the fourth place, the same question, arguments, and solution apply 
to one who is baptizing, ordaining, anointing, or celebrating the several 
sacraments. May he postpone their celebration for the sake of his own 
protection, even if he has begun it ? And in all these cases the answer is the 
same as above. 



Which is to be preferred, the death of a priest who is attacked while he is baptizing 
a child at the point of death, or the eternal life of the child, lest he should die 
without baptism ? 

[Ch. Ixxxvi.] 

My fifth question is this : A priest is baptizing a child who is at the 
point of death, and an attack is made on him with intent to kill him ; which 
should he rightly choose, to finish the celebration of the sacrament, that the 
child may not die without baptism, and himself to be killed ? or, on the 
contrary, should he choose to save his own life, and to allow the child to die 
without baptism ? In the same way, put a question of a priest delaying the 
Body of Christ to a sick person at the point of death. 

As to the first question, it appears that the priest ought rather to allow 
himself to be killed than the child to die without baptism. For if the child 
dies without baptism, he dies eternally, as Augustine proves, writing to Peter 
the Deacon, De consecrat., dist. iv, firmissime, and ch. regenerante, and ch. 
nulla, in the same " distinctio." The Apostle shows, in the Epistle to the 
Ephesians, ch. iv, that all are condemned for the offence of one. Thus original 
sin, if its effect is not extinguished by the sacrament of baptism, leads to 
eternal damnation ; but the priest only dies temporally, provided that he 
has the other requisites for eternal salvation ; but temporal death is to be 
accounted less than spiritual. So Augustine argues ; xxiii, q. iv, displicet, 
and ch. ipsa pietas ; therefore the priest should rather choose to die, in order 
that the child may not perish eternally. Moreover, of two evils the less is 
to be preferred ; dist. xiii, nerui testiculorum, and similar passages ; but 
temporal death is a less evil than eternal ; xxiii, q. iv, ch. ipsa pietas, and ch. 
displicet. And the death of the child is eternal ; De consecr., dist. iv, ch. 
firmissime, and ch. nulla, and ch. regenerante. But the death of the priest 



PARTICULAR WAR AND THE CHURCH 285 

is temporal, and therefore to be preferred. Moreover, the greatest act of 
charity is that one should love one's neighbour as oneself ; De Poenit., dist. ii, 
proximos, and proinde, and ch. caritas est, ut mihi videtur. But if this 
priest should prefer his own temporal life to the eternal salvation of the child, 
he would not be loving him as himself, and so would lack charity, as is proved. 
For eternal life excels temporal life beyond all comparison. Therefore, by 
preferring temporal life for himself to the eternal life of his neighbour, he loves 
himself far more than his neighbour, and so abides without charity. Moreover, 
that course which is followed by the fewer evils is to be preferred ; but the 
death of the priest is followed by a less evil than the death of the boy without 
baptism ; therefore the death of the priest is to be preferred. The major is 
proved. For the rule in morals is this, that more evils, other /things being 
equal, are worse than fewer evils, and more to be avoided. This is proved by 
dist. xiii, can. nervi. The minor is proved ; for if the priest's life should be 
preferred, two evils follow, namely, the eternal death of the child, as I showed 
above, and neglect of the cure of souls, which is a mortal sin ; De aeta. et 
qualitate, can. cum sit ars. But if the priest's temporal death should be pre- 
ferred, only one evil follows, namely, temporal death, which, if regard is had 
also to the quality of the act in itself, is beyond comparison a less evil than 
perpetual death ; and so we must conclude as above. 

The contrary view seems to be supported by the texts which speak in 
general terms of allowing any man to defend himself in case of necessity. 
I need only quote Clem., si furiosus, a passage often cited above. This is 
confirmed by the laws which say that charity begins with oneself ; C. De 
servit. et aqua, 1. prases ; and De iureiurando, ch. petitio. 

Solution : In the examination and solution of this question we must 
examine cases which are free from doubt. For there are such cases in the 
problem before us. Thus, if we suppose that the child might be baptized 
by another, even a layman or a woman, in case the priest should leave the 
celebration of the sacrament, there would be no doubt that the priest ought 
to prefer his own safety ; for where the child might probably live until the 
danger had been dealt with, and where this is practically certain, I should 
consider it beyond all question that the priest should prefer his own safety ; 
nor do the reasons cited conclude the case to the contrary. Let us suppose 
the question to arise, not in the case of an infant, but of an adult, who, though 
he does not receive the baptism of water, will none the less die, if he has the 
true faith, with the baptism of water. Still I should not consider the question 
doubtful, but I should rather say, as above, that the safety of the priest should 
be preferred. But we have to discuss the case of a child who is certain to die 
without baptism, if the priest leaves the ceremony. Or the question might be 
doubtful, where there was a probable doubt on the matter. 

In the first case, where the matter is certain, I should consider that the 
temporal death of the priest should be preferred, on the authority of the 
laws above cited ; and I base my opinion on vii, q. i, hoc etiam, the words cum 



286 THE LAW OF WAR 

vero speciality, arguing from the converse case, and the note of the gloss there. 
For where the question is of a single bishop, and the church cannot be pre- 
served if he flees, he ought to expose himself to death for its sake, as in the 
passage cited. This applies with great force to the case of a priest and his 
own parishioner, and I am moved to this conclusion by the reasons above 
given. 

But where there is a reasonable doubt whether the child will die or will 
live until the danger is over, whereas the death of the priest, if he should 
not leave the ceremony, is certain, I should still think that the death of the 
priest is to be preferred, since, when matters are uncertain, there is no certain 
place for conjecture ; ff. De verbor. obligationibus, 1. continuas, illud. But 
where there is reasonable doubt on both sides, I should be of the same opinion 
as in the first case above, as regards the sacrament of baptism. 

But in the sacrament of the Body of Christ, if the gloss on De pcenis et 
remiss., ch. quod in te, which says that the viaticum is not a sacrament of 
necessity, were true, then the question would not be very doubtful. But 
that gloss is not true, and is contradicted by another gloss on De transaction., 
ch. veniens, the first gloss ; and the latter is true, as is noted on De sacrament, 
non iterand., in the rubric. The text of De posn. et remissionibus, ch. omnis, 
seems to support this. Nevertheless, even assuming it to be true that it is 
a sacrament of necessity, I should still say that the temporal life of the priest 
should be preferred. I am moved by the consideration that, even if a man 
dies without receiving the Body of Christ, the omission not being his own 
fault, nor due to his contempt, he does not die eternally, as in baptism. For 
this reason the present case is not concluded by the reasons above given. I 
should say the same of the sacrament of penance, because a man who dies 
even without oral confession, where this is not his own fault, is saved by the 
virtue of repentance alone, as is noted in De Poenit., dist. i' ;) , in the summary, 
and in his ita. I should say exactly the same of the sacrament of unction. 



Whether a monk may defend himself without the licence of his abbot ? 

[Ch. Ixxxvii.] 

Sixthly, I ask whether a monk may defend himself without the licence 
of his superior. It seems that he may not. For a monk does not meditate, 
and ought not to meditate, an act of volition, except by the leave of his 
superior, because without his leave he lacks the faculty of willing and not 
willing ; xii, q. i, nolo, and ch. non dicatis ; Sext, De electione, quorundam, 
and ch. si religiosus ; and Clem., De procuratoribus, religiosus. But this 
act of defence proceeds from mere free choice, because a man can choose 
not to defend himself ; therefore he may not do so without the leave of his 
superior. Moreover, a monk is dead to the world ; xvi, q. i, Monachi, and 



PARTICULAR WAR AND THE CHURCH 287 

ch. placuit ; therefore acts which tend to the defence of life are not com- 
petent to him. Moreover, even acts which tend to good are forbidden to 
a monk without the leave of his superior, such as making vows, travelling 
abroad, and the like, by the laws just cited. An argument to the contrary 
is that the defence of one's own person is an act arising from natural instinct, 
and not disapproved by law divine or other ; therefore it is lawful for a monk, 
since he is not dead to natural acts, but only to civil acts, as appears from 
the laws above cited. 

Solution : I think that if a monk can obtain the leave of his superior to 
defend himself without the delay being dangerous, he ought to ask it. This 
is proved by the laws cited in the first part of the discussion. But if he can- 
not obtain the leave of his superior, because the latter is not present, and 
there is danger in delay, then he may defend himself without the leave of 
his superior. My reason is, that this is an act allowed by natural law, which 
the superior could not without cause absolutely forbid, perhaps even the 
Pope could not, since nature has sanctioned it, and in these matters he is not 
regarded as being subject to his superior, any more than he would be if the 
superior were absolutely and without cause to forbid him food and drink. 
I rely on the gloss on xii, q. i, ch. non dicatis. For the gloss there asks 
whether a monk may give alms to a poor man who will die of hunger, unless 
he receives aid, without the leave of his superior, and it holds that he may. 
For he is bound, in a case of necessity like this, to provide, if he can, for the 
life of another by an act otherwise forbidden to him ; how much more, then, 
may he provide for his own life by an act dictated to him by nature ! I see 
no reason why he should not ; and Raymond even, in the summary of De 
negot. saecularibus, sed quaritur circa hoc, says that if the abbot should 
forbid him, he still ought to do it, because then he would be obeying, not 
man, but God ; dist. viii, quo iure. 



Whether a slave may defend himself without the command of his master ? 

[Ch. Ixxxvii 



The seventh question is, whether a slave may defend himself in this 
way without the command of his master. It seems that he may not. For 
the acts of slaves are deemed null ; C. De rei vind., 1. seruum ; ff. De iudic., 
1. vix certis ; ff. De acquir. haereditate, 1. si quis mihi bona, iussum. On 
the contrary, at the present day masters have no power of death over their 
slaves ; ff. De his qui sunt sui vel ali. iuris, 1. i. This is confirmed. For a 
master cannot absolutely forbid natural actions to his slave, if the prohibition 
would cause the death of the slave ; see the law last above cited. Solution : 
as in the last chapter in the case of a monk. 



288 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether persons outlawed, who may sometimes, according to the statutes 
of states, be killed with impunity, may defend themselves ? 

[Ch. Ixxxviii.] 

The eighth question is, whether persons whom any one may kill with 
impunity, such as outlaws, concerning whom municipal laws sometimes 
ordain that they may be attacked with impunity, may defend themselves. 
It seems that they may not. For if violence is lawfully inflicted by a private 
person, it is not lawful to defend oneself ; ff. Ad legem Aquiliam, 1. iv. 
But here it is lawfully inflicted, because a law gives authority ; ff. De acquir. 
possessione, 1. iuste. This is confirmed thus : If violence is inflicted by a 
public person, it is not lawful to defend oneself; ff. De iniur., 1. iniuriarum, 
i ; ff. De rei vindic., 1. qui restituere. But here the private person is in a 
quasi-public position ; for a law makes him its servant by allowing him to 
punish ; and a law can do this I mean, it can give jurisdiction to a private 
person ; ff. De iurisd. omn. iudic., 1. et quia ; and Ne prselati vices suas, ch. i, 
where the point is noted. Therefore, we may infer that it is not lawful for 
him to defend himself. 

To the contrary is the argument that this is a private person ; and even 
if he were a public person, it appears that violence is inflicted unlawfully when 
it is inflicted without the due course of law being observed ; C. De sent., 
1. prolatam ; and De probationibus, ch. quoniam contra. 

Secondly, I think the words of the law must be considered ; for some- 
times a law permits a thing in the sense that no law forbids it ; xxxi, q. i, 
hoc ratione. Sometimes a law permits a thing contrary to human ordinances, 
as formerly to contract a marriage in the fifth degree ; xxxv, q. iii, qucedam. 
In a third sense, a law permits a thing in the sense that it tolerates it ; it does 
not make an act otherwise unlawful lawful, but it does not punish an unlawful 
act which remains unlawful, as the text says in dist. iv, can. dcnique. For 
those who eat flesh at midnight of Sunday are not punished ; and the text 
says the act is permitted, meaning that it is not punished because of the numbers 
and the scandal. So in other cases adultery is permitted, in order to avoid 
homicide ; xxxiii, q. iii, si quod verius ; and yet adultery is not made lawful 
by the law which permits it in this sense, but the act remains unlawful, and 
only the penalty is remitted. So in the case proposed ; if the law permits the 
act in the sense of tolerating it, and remitting the penalty, the act remaining 
unlawful, because of the odium attached to the outlaw, then I should think that 
the outlaw may defend himself ; and the citations given above do not conclude 
this question. But if the law should permit the act in the sense of positively 
making it lawful instead of unlawful, then the answer would be different. 
These modes of permission are noted by the gloss on dist. iii, omnis autem lex. 



AGAINST WHOM DECLARED ? 289 

Against whom may this particular war be declared ? 

[Ch. Ixxxix.] 

We must consider the fifth question, which is, against whom this par- 
ticular war is allowed. And as to this, many questions arise. 



Is it lawful against a superior ? 

And the first question is, whether a man may declare this war against 
his own superior. The gloss on ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim, says not ; it is 
based on ff. De rei vindic., 1. qui restituere ; and ff. De iniuriis, 1. iniuriarum, 
i. The text of xi, q. iii, ch. qui resistit, supports this. I think that the 
gloss, as it stands, is not quite accurate, but that a distinction must be 
drawn. Either it is clear that the superior is acting unlawfully, or it is 
clear that he is acting lawfully, or there is a doubt. In the first case, I think 
resistance should be offered ; C. De iure fisci, 1. prohibitum ; and C. De 
metatis, 1. devotum. And this is especially so when what he does is something 
outside his office, not concerning himself. In the second case, resistance 
should not be offered ; ff. De rei vindic., 1. qui restituere ; and ff. De iniuriis, 
1. qui iniuriarum, i. In the third case, it should only be offered if what 
has been done is something which cannot later be repaired. For such things, 
when once done, cannot be regarded as undone ; ff. De captivis, 1. in bello, 
facti. For in such cases the law which forbids an appeal before final judge- 
ment allows an appeal, as is noted in C. Quor. app. non recipiuntur, 1. ante 
sententics tempus. 



Is it lawful against a judge, even if he acts unjustly ? 
[Ch. xc.] 

Secondly, the gloss on the said law, ut vim, asks, What if a judge or 
magistrate acts unjustly ? Martinus answers that no resistance should be 
offered, relying on ff . De iniuriis, 1. iniuriarum ; but action should be brought 
against the magistrate, during his term of office if he is one of the lower magis- 
trates, or after it is over if he is one of the higher ; ff. De iudic., 1. pars lite- 
rarum ; and ff. Quod met. causa, 1. iii. I do not think this gloss is true where 
the act is an irreparable one. Suppose that a judge attacks me with the 
intention of killing me, and that he is one of the higher magistrates, am I to 
wait until his term of office is over ? or, if he is one of the lower magistrates, 
must I wait until my complaint can be brought before the president ? Certainly 
not ; because such acts, as I said above, are irremediable ; ff. De captivis, 1. in 
bello, facti. 



290 THE LAW OF WAR 

7s it lawful for a son against a father? 
[Ch. xci.] 

The third question is, whether it is lawful for a son against a father. 
It seems that it is not, because of the right of " patria potestas " ; C. De pat. 
potest., throughout. This view is confirmed. For a son may not attack 
himself, therefore he may not attack his father, since they are regarded as 
one person ; C. De impub. et aliis substit., the last law ; Instit., De inutil. 
stip., ei qui ; C. De agric. et censi., 1. cum scimus ; Authent., De iureiurando 
a moriente pnestando, i. To the contrary is the argument that this mode 
of defence comes from natural law, as I proved above in the third principal 
part ; and it is not disapproved by any law, but rather approved by all, as 
I there showed. Therefore " patria potestas," being an institution of civil 
law, does not destroy this right belonging to a son, since natural rules are 
not destroyed by civil. Instit., De hire nat. gent, et civili, naturalia ; dist. 
v, ius natural c. 

Solution : I say that if a father does something to the son to correct 
him, the act being one that is permitted by the right of " patria potestas," and 
does not exceed that right, the son may not defend himself, because herein 
the civil law which introduced " patria potestas " limits natural law, which 
it can do, as I showed above. But if the father does something to the son 
which exceeds the rights allowed him by " patria potestas," then I should 
think that he may defend himself. And this applies to a son living in " patria 
potestas " ; for if a son has been emancipated, the question is simpler. The 
answer to the citations to the contrary appears from what has already been 
said. 



7s it lawful for a monk against his abbot ? 

[Ch. xcii.] 

The fourth question is, whether it is lawful for a monk against his 
abbot. It seems that it is not, for a monk cannot exercise his will without 
the licence of his abbot ; xii, q. i, nolo, and ch. non dicatis ; De statu monach., 
cum ad monasterium. But this act is controlled by the will, since the monk 
can refrain from it ; and the superior does not give his licence, but rather 
a tacit and implied prohibition, which has more weight than a verbal one ; 
ff. De aedilit. edict., 1. si tamen, ei quod ; ff. De legi., 1. de quibus, at the end ; 
De appellationibus, ad audientiam, and ch. ut nostrum, and ch. dilecti. This is 
confirmed thus : For a monk is dead to the world ; xvi, q. i, monachi, and ch. 
placuit ; and Authent., C. De sacr. sanct. ecclesiis, ingressi. Therefore an 
act in defence of his earthly life is not competent to him. 

On the other hand, it appears that this act proceeds from natural law, 
and that no positive law disapproves of it, although it is limited thereby. 
Therefore it is not denied to a monk, who, though he is civilly dead, yet is 



AGAINST WHOM DECLARED ? 291 

not so naturally, as appears from the laws above cited. Solution : If the 
superior attempts to do something to the monk which the common law allows 
him to do, by way of correction or the like, or in accordance with the rules 
of the order, then the monk may not resist ; nor in this case should he even 
be heard on appeal ; De appell., cum speciali, and ch. de prior e. But if the 
superior attempts to do something to the monk which does not belong to his 
office, as regulated by law or by the rules of the order, then he may defend 
himself, especially where delay would be dangerous, as if the abbot should 
attack the monk to kill him on the spot ; which is only natural when we 
remember that a monk may even lay an accusation against an abbot, if he 
does anything contrary to his duty ; De accusat., ch. ex parte, and same title, 
ch. cum olim. 

Is it lawful for a slave against a master ? 

[Ch. xciii.] 

The fifth question is, whether it is lawful for a slave against a master. 
It appears that it is not, since a master has absolute power over a slave ; 
ff. De his qui sunt sui vel alieni iuris, 1. i. This is confirmed thus : For 
a slave is bound to help his master in war ; otherwise he is punished ; ff. De 
S. C. Silaniano, 1. si quis in gram. Therefore he may not attack him ; De nat. 
ex lib., the single chapter ; and De restit. spol., ch. conquarente ; ff. Si servit. 
vind., 1. altius ; ff. De condic. indebit., 1. frater a fratre ; dist. xxvi, una 
tantum ; dist. xxv, the last canon ; xvi, q. i, Silvester ; ff. De fideiuss., 1. tutor ; 
ff. De admin, tut., 1. quotiens. 

To the contrary : At the present day the power of masters over slaves 
has been restricted ; ff. De his qui sunt sui vel alieni iuris, 1. i. For to-day 
they have no power to put them to death, nor to treat them with extreme 
severity. Therefore, &c. Solution : As I said of the monk, so here, if the 
master attempts to do something to the slave which the laws permit him to 
do, the slave may not defend himself. For in this an act which proceeds 
from natural law is limited by positive law, which limits the power of masters 
over slaves. But if he attempts to do something which is beyond what the 
law allows, then the answer is otherwise, because here, although slaves are 
not recognized as regards civil acts, yet as regards natural acts they are, and 
this is a natural act. 

This helps us to the solution of similar questions. Is it lawful for a 
vassal against his lord ? a pupil against his master ? a soldier against his 
officer ? a wife against her husband ? These questions admit of a uniform 
solution, which is, that if the act attempted is one which the law permits, 
defence is not lawful. If it goes beyond this, and is contrary to legal duty, 
then otherwise, as I showed fully above. This brief discussion shows us 
against whom defence is lawful, and the rule above given will solve an infinite 
number of questions. 

[29] 



292 THE LAW OF WAR 

On behalf of what persons is it lawful to declare this particular war ? 

[Ch. xciv.] 

The sixth point which we have to consider is this : On whose behalf 
is it lawful ? And first as to the persons on whose behalf it is lawful. And 
I take it as undoubted that it is lawful in defence of oneself. This is proved 
by the text of ff. De iustit. et hire, 1. ut vim ; and ff. De vi et vi armata, 1. i, 
vim vi,; and Ad leg. Aquil., 1. iv ; and the same title, 1. scientiam, qui cum 
aliter ; and clearly in Clemen., De homicidio, i. Other cases are examined 
below. 

Is it lawful for a father on behalf of his son ? 

[Ch. xcv.] 

And first I ask whether it is lawful for a father on behalf of his son. 
Treating subjects which admit of no doubt without arguments, we must say 
that it is. For a father loves his son as himself ; ff. Quod met. causa, 1. isti 
quidem. For the son carries on his personality into the future ; ff. De verb, 
sig., 1. liber orum, at the end ; also because they are regarded as one person ; 
C. De impub. et aliis substit., the last law ; Authent., De iureiur. a moriente 
prsestito, at the beginning ; Instit., De inutil. stip., ei quern. This point is 
clear. Equally so is the converse case of a son on behalf of his father. 



Is it lawful for a husband on behalf of his wife ? 

[Ch. xcvi.] 

The second question is, whether it is lawful for a husband on behalf 
of his wife. Clearly it is, for an injury inflicted on a wife is inflicted on the 
husband, and he may bring an " actio iniuriarum " for it ; and even a be- 
trothed person may do so ; ff. De iniuriis, 1. item apud, [si sponsum 
sponsum]. And a husband may kill a wretch found committing adultery 
with his wife ; ff. De adulteriis, 1. marito, and 1. capite quinto ; C. the same 
title, 1. Gracchus ; even one who gossips with her after being warned, according 
to the Authentics, and he does not contravene xvii, q. iv, si quis suadente. 
As to one who lays violent hands on a clerk for this cause, see De sent, 
excommunicationis, ch. si vero, nee ille. 

Is it lawful on behalf of a brother, sister, and other relations ? 

[Ch. xcvii.] 

The third question is, whether it is lawful on behalf of a brother, a 
sister, and other relations, and persons who are not related. And the gloss 
on ff. De iustit. et hire, 1. ut rim, says that the affection should be considered. 
It quotes ff. Quod met. causa, 1. isti quidem ; and ff. Mandati, 1. cum servus. 



DEFENCE OF PERSONS 293 

Others prefer to say that it is lawful on behalf of all relations. Their argu- 
ment is, that if a man does an injury to one relation, he is regarded as doing 
it to all, although the others cannot bring the " actio iniuriarum " ; ff. De 
iniuriis, 1. lex Cornelia, at the beginning. They confirm this view by the 
argument that it is lawful to repel force by force in defence of property ; 
C. Vnde vi, 1. i ; and ff. De vi et vi armata, 1. iii, eum igitur. And one who 
wishes to repel force by force in defence of his property may summon his 
friends and relations. Therefore he may help his friends and relations. And 
so they conclude that it is lawful on behalf of a relation, without any qualifica- 
tion. This opinion seems to be confirmed. For man owes a duty to man ; 
ff. De servis exportandis, 1. cum servus. Therefore, in accordance with that 
duty, he may help him. This is confirmed by C. De appell./l. addictos ; 
better by ff. De appell., 1. non tantum ; where, too, a stranger appeals on behalf 
of a person condemned in a criminal trial, even against that person's wish. 
This is supported by C. De liberali causa, 1. iii. Jacobus Buttrigarius, on the 
law ut vim, draws the following distinction : Either I desire to defend the in- 
jured person of my own motion, and without request from him, and I can do 
this by way of legal process, but not by an act ; and in this sense are under- 
stood the laws just quoted, addictos, non tantum, and C. De lib. causa, 1. iii ; or 
I desire to do this, not of my own motion, but at the request of the injured 
person, and then I may do so even by an act ; ff . De vi et vi armata, 1. iii, eum 
igitur. Others draw a distinction. Either the assistants belonged to the 
company of the injured person, and then they might repel an injury inflicted 
on his person ; the proof of this is in ff. De iniuriis, 1. item apud, si quis 
virgines ; otherwise they may not, as the gloss on Vnde vi, 1. i, lays down 
without qualification, where Cinus quotes this opinion in the antepenultimate 
question. Others, like Jacobus of Ravenna, say without qualification that 
it is lawful ; and they give this reason : Another may help me in my affairs ; 
ff. De negot. gestis, 1. i. Much more may he help my person, since the person 
is to be preferred to things ; C. De sacrosanctis ecclesiis, 1. sancimus. He 
quotes in support C. De adulterio, 1. Gracchus ; and if you say that in that case 
at was a son, he meets the difficulty by ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam, 1. liber homo. 
No difficulty is raised by ff . De vi et vi armata, 1. cum fundum. For there 
the person wished to act after an interval of time, which even the injured 
person himself would not have been allowed to do. No difficulty is raised, 
according to him, by ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim, where it says, " for the 
protection of one's own body." He meets this by ff. De servis exportandis, 
1. si servus. This opinion seems to be followed by Cinus in C. Vnde vi, 1. i, 
in the antepenultimate question. 

In this conflict of authority, I should think we ought to consider, inas- 
much as I have framed the question to refer indifferently to relations and 
to strangers, whether a relation or a stranger may repel violence done to 
another with force, as he might violence to himself, while avoiding the 
penalty of irregularity whether it be a clerk or a layman who kills or wounds 



294 THE LAW OF WAR 

another in this case. A question may also be asked, in both cases, whether 
they may do so without incurring some other penalty of statute or canon. If 
we take the first question, I say that according to Clement., De homicidio, 
s furiosus, a man only avoids the penalty of irregularity if he does the 
act in defence of himself, not in defence of another, even a father or son. 
The text shows this by the words, " we hold the same of one who, not being 
able to avoid death otherwise, kills or wounds his own assailant." It speaks, 
then, of his own assailant, not of the assailant of another. This is also noted 
by the gloss there on the word " suum ". In this case, then, I think the 
answer plain, as it is in the text. But if we ask whether he may act in this 
way, and avoid other penalties, statutory or canonical, we must first make 
a distinction. Either we speak of the penalty of excommunication, if a man 
strikes a clerk in this way, in the act of forcibly repelling violence done to 
another ; and then I agree with Innocent that, if he is defending father, 
mother, wife, son, or daughter, he escapes the sentence of excommunication. 
He quotes ff . Quod met. causa, 1. isti quidem ; and ff . De S. C. Silaniano, 1. i, 
si vir. And the reason of the difference between this case and the one 
preceding is, that irregularity may be contracted even without wrongful 
intention, as may be seen where a judge gives a lawful order for a man to be 
put to death ; dist. li, qui in aliquo. But excommunication under that canon 
requires an instigation of the devil ; xvii, q. iv, ch. si quis suadente. But if 
the person is assisting a stranger, he does not escape the penalty of that canon, 
though he may have acted at the request of the injured person a thousand 
times over. Or we may speak of another penalty, personal or pecuniary ; and 
then I draw a distinction, according as those who desire to repel force from one 
who has suffered violence are related to him or are strangers. If they are 
related, I follow the gloss on ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut rim; limiting it by 
ff. De iudic., 1. in privatis; and ff. De iniuriis, 1. lex Cornelia, at the beginning. 
If they are strangers, then they may either be members of the company of the 
person who suffered the violence, and then it is lawful ; ff. De injuriis, 1. item 
apud Labeonem, si quis virgines ; or they may be not members of his company, 
or they may desire to repel the violence after an interval, and then they 
cannot do it ; ff . De vi et vi arm., 1. cum fundum ; because not even the injured 
man himself could do so. What I have said applies to defence by act. But 
they might make a legal defence even after an interval, where the laws allow 
this ; ff. De appell., 1. non tantum ; De liber, causa, 1. iii ; and C. De appella- 
tionibus, 1. addictos. And for this reason I do not think that the opinion of 
Jacobus Buttrigarius is true, when he says without qualification that they 
may make a legal defence. For this is not true without qualification. For 
there are cases in which a third party may not bring an action or an 
accusation on behalf of one who has suffered injury. I take an ordinary 
example in private delicts. So, then, it is true only where the law allows it. 
If, however, the defenders desire to repel the violence at once, then I should 
draw the same distinction as Jacobus. Either they are summoned by the 



DEFENCE OF PERSONS 295 

person who has suffered the violence ; and then it is lawful. For one who 
suffers violence may summon his friends to defend his property ; ff. De vi et 
vi armata, 1. iii, eum igitur ; therefore he may do so to defend his person, 
which is far more important ; C. De sacrosanct, ecclesiis, 1. sancimus. Or 
else they are not summoned, and then it is lawful. The text is in Sext, De 
sent, excom., ch. dilecto. This is supported by xxiii, q. iii, non infer enda, and 
ch. fortitude ; De sent, excom., quanta. Also by the notes on C. De commerc. 
et mercatoribus, 1. ii. And so I think that in this matter the opinion of Jacobus 
of Ravenna is true. The text is in ch. dilecto, already cited. For the text 
there says, " since any one is allowed to give his help to his neighbour or 
relation, to repel an injury from him." 



Whether a man is bound to defend another against being killed ? 

[Ch. xcviii.] 

The fourth question is, whether one who sees that another is about to 
be killed unless he helps him, is bound to help him. It seems that he is by 
ff. De agnoscendis liberis, 1. necare. This is confirmed by the duty which one 
man owes to another ; ff. De servis exportandis, 1. servus. It is confirmed 
again thus : An error which is not opposed seems to be approved ; dist. 
Ixxxiii, error, and can. consentire, and can. quid enim. For one may receive a 
reward for relieving another from duress ; ff. Quod met. causa, 1. metum, sed 
licet. This is confirmed thus : In some cases there is a special provision that 
a man is bound so to help another ; ff. De S. C. Silaniano, 1. i, hoc autem ; 
and C. the same title, the last law. Therefore the common law is the converse ; 
ff. Ad municipalem, 1. i ; and ff. De legibus, 1. IMS singulare. A gloss holds 
that a man is bound to help by word, but not by act ; ff. De reg. iuris, rule 
culpa. Nor is the duty which one man owes to another an objection, because 
he only owes it if he can act without danger to himself; ff. De oper. lib., 1. habet; 
and ff. De verbor. significatione, 1. Nepos Proculo. 



The fifth question relates to those who are bound to defend others from violence. 

[Ch. xcix.] 

And as to this many questions arise. 

Whether a vassal is bound to help his lord ? 

And the first question relates to a vassal. And there is no doubt that he 
is bound to help his lord ; otherwise he loses his fief ; see the Usus Feudorum, 
Quae fuit prima causa beneficii amittendi, ch. prima autem causa, item qui 
dominum, and the following section. 



296 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether a slave is bound to help his master ? 
[Ch. c.] 

The second question relates to a slave ; and it is clear that he is bound 
to help his master, from the text of ff. De S. C. Silaniano, 1. i, hoc autem ; 
and C. the same title, the last law. 



Whether a soldier is bound to defend an officer in a war ? 

[Ch. ci.l 

The third question relates to an officer in a war ; aTid it is clear that 
a soldier is bound to help him, if he can ; otherwise he is punished with death ; 
see the text of ff. De re milit., 1. omne delictum ; and ff. the same title, 1. iii, 
the last section. 



Whether a vassal, seeing his lord attacked on one side, and his 

father on the other, &c. ? 

[Ch. cii.l 

The fourth question is this : A vassal sees his lord attacked on one side, 
and his father on the other, and each is equally in mortal danger unless 
he is helped, and the vassal can help only one of them ; whom should he 
help, his father or his lord ? The gloss on xxii, q. v, de forma, says that a 
vassal is bound to help his lord against his own son. The argument is that 
a son is bound to his father by the law of nature, but a vassal is bound to 
his lord by the bond of his oath ; Vsus Feudorum, Quae fuit prima causa 
benefic. amittendi, the single chapter ; and according to this the question 
would be decided, because he would be bound to help the lord, to whom he 
is more closely bound. On this question I should say the opposite. And 
I am moved by the consideration that a son is bound by a natural bond to 
the father, of whom he was begotten. He is also bound by a civil bond, 
because he is under his " patria potestas " ; but he is bound to his lord by 
a civil bond only, as appears from xxii, q. v, ch. de forma, already quoted. 
But two bonds are stronger than one ; Authent., De consanguin. et uterin. 
fratribus, at the beginning. This is confirmed by reason of the priority 
of the obligation, for the paternal bond is prior to that of the lord. There- 
fore he is bound first to help his father ; ff. Qui potior. in pign. habeantur, 
1. potior, and 1. qui balneum. This is confirmed thus : The oath to the 
lord is understood to save any precedent obligation ; for a right acquired 
by one person is not destroyed by a second obligation ; see the passages 
quoted, 1. qui balneum, and 1. potior. It is also confirmed by De iureiurando, 
ch. petitio ; for in swearing to help his lord, he is not taken to have sworn not 
to help himself before his lord, because that is his first duty ; C. De servi- 



DEFENCE OF PROPERTY 297 

tutibus, 1. prases. But by fiction of law the father is the same person as the 
son ; C. De impub. et aliis substitutionibus, the last law, with others to the 
same effect. Therefore, &c. 



Whether a clerk, seeing his bishop attacked on one side, and his father on 
the other, each being equally, &c. ? 

[Ch. cm.] 

The fifth question is this : Suppose a clerk sees his bishop attacked on 
one side, and his father on the other, and each is equally in mortal danger 
unless he is helped, and the clerk can help only one of them ; whom should 
he help, the bishop or the carnal father ? Hostiensis, on De excess, praelat., 
ch. gravem, argues from the word " fratri," which is there used, that clerks 
are more closely bound to their spiritual, than to their carnal fathers. He 
supports this by De translatione, ch. ii. If that opinion were true, the 
question would be solved. But on this question my own view is the same as 
on the last. I cite De postulatione, the last chapter P). For the text there 
says, if a clerk brings an action against the Church, and not on behalf of his 
own kindred, he loses his benefice ; therefore it is clear that he might do so 
on behalf of his own kindred. I cite De iureiur., ch. pelitio, arguing as I did 
on the last question ; and I am moved by the reasons given in the last question ; 
and the gloss on xxx, q. iii, ch. pittacium, on the words " multo magis," holds 
that in rendering temporal services we are more bound to a carnal father than 
to a spiritual. But in rendering reverence, the contrary is the case. The 
same point is noted by the gloss on dist. xxx, can. i. This is supported by 
the notes on dist. Ixxxvi, non satis ; and dist. xlii, can. quiescamus. 



For what things is it lawful to declare war ? 
[Ch. civ.] 

As we have considered above in this part of our subject whether, and 
for what persons, it is lawful to declare this war, our next question now is, 
whether it is also lawful to declare this war for the defence of things ? And 
many questions arise about this. 



Whether it is lawful for things lawfully possessed ? 

And first as to things lawfully possessed ; and as to these there is no 
doubt. The text is in C. Vnde vi, 1. i. It is supported by 1. iii, si quis autem, 
the words eum igitur. Besides these, there is a section in ff . De vi et vi armata ; 
and De restit. spoliatorum, ch. olim. 



298 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether it is lawful for things unlawfully possessed ? 
[Ch.cv.] 

The second question is, whether it is lawful for things unlawfully pos- 
sessed. The gloss on C. Vnde vi, 1. i, treats of this question. And it seems 
that it is not, arguing from the converse sense of that text, which is a valid 
argument ; ff. De offic. eius cui mand. est iurisd., 1. i, huius rei ; De regulari- 
bus, ch. cum virum ; and dist. xxxii, can. hospitiolum. Arguments to the 
contrary are afforded by ff. De vi et vi arm., 1. i, qui vi a me ; and the same 
title, 1. cum fundum ; and ff . Quod met. causa, 1. si cum exceptione, Pedius. 
Solution : For this apparent conflict of the laws, the gloss on the said 1. i gives 
several solutions. The first is, that the word " maxime " is to be understood 
there ; and this gets rid of the contradiction, because it makes it lawful even 
for a wrongful possession. The second is, that the beginning of the law is to 
be taken with the ending, so that it reads, " recte licet." But the objection to 
this is that the law says in the middle, " sine vitio." Therefore it implies that 
the result would be different when the possession is " cum vitio." The third 
is, that it is always lawful for a lawful possessor, but not always for a wrongful 
possessor. For if the owner should come at once, a wrongful possessor may 
not resist him ; ff. De vi et vi armata, 1. iii, eum igitur. The fourth is, that 
the correct interpretation is, " neither by force, nor secretly, nor by licence " ; 
but this gloss is not approved. Jacobus of Ravenna, however, follows it so 
far as concerns one who wishes to defend his possession, so that if force is used 
by the person from whom the other is wrongfully detaining the possession, the 
other may defend it at the time, but not after an interval. But if he is wrong- 
fully detaining it from another, then he may defend it at any time. And 
this is what the law means by saying that wrongful possession is good against 
strangers; ff. Vti possid., 1. ii ; ff. De acquir. poss., the last law; ff. Si 
servit. vind., 1. loci corpus, competit. Here Jacobus seems to think that 
I may eject a clandestine possessor, if his clandestine possession is against 
me, because clandestine possession is wrongful ; ff. De acquir. poss., 1. 
cum quis. For this opinion he cites ff. Quod cum eo, 1. si servus. This 
opinion seems to be shared by the gloss on ff. Vti poss., 1. i, interdictum, in 
the middle of the big gloss on that passage, " nee tamen volo," etc. Onus 
there holds the contrary, on the ground that no law can be found which provides 
that I may eject a clandestine possessor. Moreover, the law says I may repel 
force with force ; but one who enters clandestinely does not use force, since 
secrecy and force differ ; ff. De acquir. possessione, 1. clam possidere, qui ad 
nundinas. The opinion of Jacobus might be true of a possessor by licence, 
after he has refused to restore possession. For then he appears to be robbing 
the owner, as is noted in C. De acquir. possessione, 1. vitia. 

In this variety of opinions, I should think the second solution of the 
gloss would be true ; and this is also the one followed by Petrus de Bellapertica, 
on the said 1. i, who, however, amplifies it as follows : "I, who wish to repel 



DEFENCE OF PROPERTY 299 

force, possess either lawfully, or unlawfully. If lawfully, either I wish to repel 
it at the time and within the limits of justifiable defence, and this I can do ; see 
the said 1. i ; and ff. De vi et de vi arm., 1. i, vim vi ; or after an interval, and 
then I cannot do it ; ff. De vi et vi armata, 1. iii, si quis autem, the words eum 
igitur. In the second case, that is to say when I possess unlawfully, either I 
possess unlawfully as against you, whose force I wish to repel, or as against 
another. If against you, then my possession is either forcible, or secret, or by 
licence. If forcible, then either you come to recover it at once, in which case 
I may not resist you, as appears from C. Vnde vi, 1. i, if we argue from the con- 
verse sense." And this is its true and correct meaning, if it is rightly considered, 
together with the passages cited to the contrary. But if you come after an 
interval, then I may resist you, because you may not recover it/on your own 
authority after an interval, and you would even incur a penalty by doing so ; 
C. Vnde vi, 1. si quis in tantam ; and understand the phrase " after an interval " 
in the sense given by the gloss on ff. De vi et vi arm., 1. iii eum igitur. But 
if my possession is not forcible, but by licence, then after I have refused to give 
it up you may at the time repel force with force, and I may not resist. For by 
my refusal I am deemed to rob you ; C. De acquir. poss., 1. vitia ; and from 
that it follows that you may repel force with force ; but before my refusal, you 
may not, although I may revoke the licence ; ff. De precario, 1. cum precarium. 
But if my possession is clandestine as against you, then whatever the gloss on 
ff. Vti poss., 1. i, interdictum, and Jacobus of Ravenna on C. Vnde vi, 1. i say, 
I agree with Cinus that you may not eject me, but you may enter, and if I do 
not admit you, my possession thereupon becomes forcible ; ff. De acquir. poss., 
1. clam, qui ad nundinas ; and then you may eject me. But if my possession 
is not wrongful as against you, but as against a third person, then if you try 
to use violence against me at any time, I may repel your force with force ; ff. 
Ex quibus ca. in poss. eatur, 1. Fulcinius, quid si adversus. I have put 
forward these views with all respect to the opinion of the many distinguished 
persons who dispute on this doubtful point, submitting the opinions of all alike 
to corrections which seek after truth. 



Whether one who has a right to defend property, and defends it within the 

limits of justifiable defence, escapes the penalty of irregularity , 

if he kills or wounds another ? 

[Ch. cvi] 

The third question is whether, if a man, in repelling force with force in 
defence of his own property, happens to kill or wound the assailant, he escapes 
the penalty of irregularity. And I suppose him to act within the limits of 
justifiable defence ; otherwise the question would not arise. And it seems that 
he does escape it. For one who is defending his person escapes that penalty ; 
Clem., De homicidio, sifuriosus. Therefore the conclusion applies to the defence 
of property. For the laws which allow force to be repelled with force do not 

[30] 



300 THE LAW OF WAR 

distinguish between \H rs<>n and property, but ;illo\v it in either case ; C. Vmle 
vi, 1. i ; and ff. De vi et vi arm., 1. i, vim vi ; and ff. Ad legem Aquiliam, 1. 
scientiam, qui cum aliter. Opposed to this is the passage in Clemen., De 
homicidio, si furiosus, quoted above. For the text there speaks strictly of the 
killing or wounding of one who is himself a killer. And I think this view is 
true, for the following reason : For a man commits irregularity by killing or 
wounding, even without a guilty intention, as appears in the case of a judge ; 
dist. li, qui in aliquo ; even by killing accidentally, as is noted in dist. 1, de his ; 
and De homicid., ch. sicut dignum ; and Ne cler. vel monach., ch. sententiam ; 
and De raptoribus, ch. in archiepiscopatu. Any one, therefore, who kills in 
any manner whatsoever, becomes " irregular," except in the cases excepted 
by law. So when the case of defence is excepted, the exception must be under- 
stood strictly and in a limited sense ; for the law makes an exception only when 
the law is anomalous, and so the exception is to be strictly understood ; Sext, 
De reg. iur., rule qua a iure. 



Whether a man incurs excommunication by laying hands on a clerk, in 
defence of his own property ? 

[Ch. cvii.] 

The fourth question is, whether a man incurs excommunication by laying 
hands on a clerk in repelling force with force, in defence of his own property. 
It appears that he does, by xvii, q. iv, ch. si quis suadente ; and De sent, ex- 
communicationis, ch. nuper, with the notes to that passage. This is confirmed. 
For he incurs the penalty of irregularity, as in the last question. Therefore 
he should incur this too, since both are spiritual penalties, and one incurs 
excommunication more easily than irregularity, as is obvious. Solution : 
Innocent, in De restit. spoliatorum, ch. olim, holds that one who repels force 
with force does not incur excommunication, provided that he cannot repel it 
otherwise than by laying hands on the assailant, and that he acts within the 
limits of justifiable defence. I think this opinion true ; and my reason is, that 
to incur excommunication by the violent laying of hands on a clerk, there must 
be present the persuasion of the devil, as is proved by the text of xvii, q. iv, 
eh. si quis suadente diabolo. And if you rightly examine the laws which inflict 
the penalty of excommunication on one who lays hands on another, you will 
not find that the laying of hands on a clerk in this case is one of the cases for 
which the laws declare this penalty. For the laws punish violence ; xvii, q. iv, 
ch. st quis suadente, already quoted ; and De sent, excom., throughout. This 
is not violence, but repelling violence. They punish recklessness ; De sent . 
excommunicationis, ch. contingit. This is not such; indeed, by permission 
of a separate law, they punish it as if it were violence; the same title, cli. 
nuper. This is an honourable and permitted act. They punish murder, as when 
instructions are given for a man to be smitten ; ch. universitatis ; and Sext, 



DEFENCE OF PROPERTY 301 

the same title, ch. cum quis. They punish intention, as when one ratines what 
was done in one's name ; ch. cum quis, above. They punish negligence ; the 
same title, ch. quanta. Here none of these conditions is present. 

The citations to the contrary are easily answered. The answer to the 
canon si quis suadente has been given above. As to what is said about irregu- 
larity, the reason of the difference is clear. For no one incurs excommunica- 
tion without wrongful intention ; but one may incur irregularity, as to 
which see the penultimate gloss on Clem., si Juriosus, often quoted above. 



Whether one may summon one's friends to help in the defence of 

one's property ? 

[Ch. cviii.] 

The fifth question is, whether one may summon friends to repel violence 
done to one's property, and whether they may give help. The gloss on ff. De 
vi et de vi armata, 1. iii, eum igitur, notes that this is allowed, even when the 
violence is done to property. I think this is true ; and my reason is, that one 
may oppose an error, as the laws say, wherever it is possible to oppose it. 
Otherwise, one who does not oppose seems to consent to it ; dist. Ixxxiii, error, 
and * ch. qui consentit, with the following chapter. Therefore friends may help 
their neighbour in this, as I said above, because to do so proceeds from the 
root of charity ; De Poenit., dist. ii, ch. proximos. And if this is allowed, the 
question is at once solved which might ask whether a man incurs excommunica- 
tion by laying hands on a clerk, while defending the goods of a neighbour 
against violence. Because he does not incur it, since this is not one of the things 
which are punished by the canon, but rather permitted. 



Whether, in defending property, one may repel force with force against all 
those against whom one may use force in defending persons ? 

[Ch. cix.] 

The sixth question is whether, in defending property, one may repel 
force with force against all those against whom one may use force in defending 
persons. Solution : One may do so, among persons capable of holding property ; 
I exclude slaves, monks, and the like. But I admit that the limits of defence 
ought to vary with the various quality of persons. For one should act differently 
and more gently against a father than against an absolute stranger ; and so 
with each relationship which comes up for consideration, all the circumstances 
are to be regarded, since these are not denned by law ; ff. De iure deliber., 
1. i, at the end ; and De offic. iud. delegati, ch. de causis. 



Supply xi, q. iii. 



302 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether one may repel force with force in defence of things 
deposited or lent ? 

[Ch. ex.] 

The seventh question is, whether one may repel force with force in defence 
of things deposited and lent. And it seems that one may not, by C. Vnde vi, 
1. i, which speaks of things possessed, and rightly. But these things are not 
" possessed " by a borrower or deposit ee ; therefore he may not repel force 
with force in such cases. Solution : In these and the like cases we claim that 
a man may repel force with force ; for the interdict " vi bonorum raptorum " 
is allowed to a depositee or a borrower if such things are forcibly seized ; ff. Vi 
bonorum raptorum, 1. prator ait qua est lex, in hac actione. Much more, then, 
is a right of defence allowed them ; ff. De reg. iuris, rule invitus, cut damus ; 
and ff. De fonte, the single law ; Sext, De reg. iur., rule qui ad agendum ; also 
because they are under a liability. Therefore, &c. C. Vnde vi, 1. i, is not 
opposed to this, because although it uses the phrase " in possessione," yet it 
does not exclude other forms of " detention," for which the laws allow actions 
to the detainers, as above. Or we may say that the word " possidere " is to be 
taken in a wide sense, to include lawful detention ; ff. De rei vindic., 1. officium ; 
and the note on De causa possessions et proprietatis, ch. pastoralis. 



How may this particular war be declared ? 
[Ch. cxi.] 

We must consider the seventh principal question, which is, how force may 
be repelled with force. 



How may force be repelled with force within the limits of 
justifiable defence ? 

And the text answers this by saying that it is allowed within the limits of 
justifiable defence. 

What are the " limits of justifiable defence," and what is 
required therein ? 

But the meaning of these words is ambiguous ; what are the conditions 
required for these limits ? Doctors agree that they are those which equal the 
violence inflicted, in quality of arms, and in length of time. Also there must 
be equivalence in the violent act itself, lest, by exceeding, it be regarded 
as revenge ; but this is a doubtful point. 



LIMITS OF JUSTIFIABLE DEFENCE 303 

Whether a poor and feeble man may defend himself with a sword against 
a strong and vigorous man who strikes him only with the fist ? 

[Ch. cxii.] 

And in the first place suppose a strong and vigorous man strikes me with 
his fist, and I am a poor fellow who cannot stand up to him with the fist. May 
I defend myself with a sword ? It seems that I may, because equality is 
always to be regarded ; C. De fruc. et lit. expen., the last law ; ff. De arbitr., 1. si 
cum dies; Sext, De reg. iuris, rule in iudiciis. On the other hand, if a man 
tries to rob me by violence, and I, being no match for him in strength of body, 
strike him with a sword, that would be compensation on a person for injury to 
property, which ought not to be ; C. De sacrqsanct. ecclesiis, the last law. 

Jacobus de Arena draws a distinction. One wishes to repel either violence 
to the person, or violence to property. In the first case I may use arms and 
any means whatsoever, if matters cannot otherwise be set right ; C. De appell., 
1. si quis. For if I may kill a thief when I do not recognize him, or when I 
cannot get a judge to help me as to the stolen goods ; ff. Ad legem Corneliam 
de sica., 1. fur em ; much more may I kill a man when that is the only way of 
saving my person. In the second case, of violence to property, either the violence 
done may be redressed by resorting to law, in which case I may not defend my 
property in any way I like, but only with certain arms, and not with acts, 
because I ought not to strike a person in defence of a thing, even when the thing 
cannot be saved in any other way, provided the wrong is capable of being 
redressed by law. But if it is not, then I may defend my property in any way 
whatsoever, even by killing the assailant ; ff. Ad legem Corneliam de sicariis, 
1. furem. And in this sense is understood C. Vnde vi, 1. i ; and ff. De vi et vi 
arm., 1. iii. \ eum igitur. Understand, therefore, the phrase "the limits of 
justifiable defence " in this sense. 



Assuming that a man may defend himself" incontinent," in what sense 
is the phrase " incontinenti " to be understood ? 

[Ch. cxiii.] 

The second question relates to the passage of time, because the texts say 
that it must be done " incontinenti." What does this phrase mean ? Some 
say that an act is done " incontinenti " if it is done while the offence is being 
actually committed, but if the injury has already been inflicted, then we ought 
to resort to a judge. Others say it is done " incontinenti " even if it is done 
afterwards, before one turns to other business ; ff. Ad leg. lul. de adulteriis, 
1. quod ait, at the end. Jacobus and Petrus draw a distinction. Either we speak 
of violence to the person, and then we are said to repel it " incontinenti " if 
we do so during the actual commission of the act. In this sense is understood 
ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter ; De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim. Or 
we speak of violence to things, and then we are said to repel it " incontinenti " 



3<X| THE LAW OF WAR 

even after the commission of the act, provided we do so before turning to other 
business ; ff. De vi et vi armata, 1. qui possessionem ; and the same title, 1. iii, 
eum igitur. The reason of the distinction is, that injury to the person cannot 
afterwards be repaired, but a thing taken away can be recovered ; and so if 
one has not turned to other business, even if one seeks one's friends and returns 
to recover the thing, one is said to act " incontinenti," as is noted by the gloss 
on ff. De vi et vi armata, 1. iii, eum igitur, already quoted. Understand the 
limitation in the passage of time in this sense. 



Of equivalence in the act of violence itself. How should the act be done ? 

[Ch. cxiv.] 

The third question relates to limitation in the matter of equivalence in the 
violent act ; that is to say, it must be defensive, not vindictive. And although 
the subject is treated in various ways, it should be considered throughout in 
relation to the conditions of the persons. 



Am I deemed to have acted vindictively, and not defensively, if I have expelled 
my despoiler from my possession, when, before I expelled him, he offered 
to give security for the restoration of possession ? 

[Ch. exv.J 

The fourth question is this : A man has expelled me from possession, 
and after the expulsion he is prepared to give security for its restoration, 
if it should appear that he has not acted lawfully ; but none the less I expel 
him ; am I deemed to have acted vindictively ? The gloss on C. Vnde vi, 
1. i, holds that I am ; but the gloss is generally disapproved. For one ought 
not to trust oneself to that weak security ; ff. Ad Treb., 1. quia poterat, and 
1. nam quod, and similar passages. 



Whether I ought to await one who is prepared to strike me, or to 

anticipate him ? 

[Ch. cxvi.] 

The fifth question is whether, if I see a man prepared to strike me, I ought 
to wait for him to strike me, or to anticipate him. The gloss on 1. i, quoted 
above, argues for and against, and determines that I ought not to wait for him. 
Petrus says that in interpreting the gloss we must distinguish between persons. 
For some are bold and ready to strike, and such persons are not to be waited 
for ; others are timid, and these are not at once to be anticipated ; and in this 
way he limits a clear gloss ; C. Si quis Imperatori maledixerit, 1. i. 



LIMITS OF JUSTIFIABLE DEFENCE 305 

Whether a soldier attacked by his neighbour is deemed to repel force with force if he 
waits for him, and strikes him, although he might run away ? 

[Ch. cxvii.] 

The sixth question is this : A good soldier is attacked by his neighbour, 
and might avoid him by running away ; but thinking shame of that, he waits 
for him, resists him, and strikes him ; is he deemed to repel force with force ? 
It appears that he is not, by ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam, 1. scientiam, qui cum aliter. 
Modern jurists hold the contrary, on the authority of ff. Ex quibus caus. 
maiores, 1. in eadem. The section qui cum aliter is not inconsistent, because 
the man could not avoid him without injury to his own repute and honour, 
which are things that cannot be repaired by a judge ; ff. Si quis omissa causa 
testamenti, 1. lulianus. 



If a wounded man, after the wounds have been inflicted, pursues his assailant, and 
strikes him, should he be punished as " malicious," or as " culpable " ? 

[Ch. cxviii.] 

The seventh question is this : A wounded man, after the wounds have 
been inflicted, pursues his assailant, and strikes him, which is not lawful ; 
ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam, 1. si ex plagis, i, and 1. qua actione, si in colluctatione ; 
is he to be punished as " malicious," or as " culpable " ? Some say as " cul- 
pable," because an unpremeditated heat does not involve " calumnia " ; ff. 
Ad S. C. Turpil., 1. i, quceri ; ff. Ad leg. Corn, de sica., 1. iv, cum quidam ,' 
ff. De prenis, 1. respiciendum, delinquunt. Others say as " malicious," since 
he ought not to have revenged himself. Jacobus de Arena says that the first 
view is more humane ; ff. De posnis, 1. interpretatione ; ff. De reg. iur., 1. in 
totum ; and the second is stricter ; C. De iniur., 1. si non convicii. I think the 
first is truer, even as a matter of law, on the authority of the laws first cited. 



Whether violence to (he person may be repelled by friends ? 

[Ch. cxix.] 

The eighth question is, whether violence to the person may be repelled 
by friends, like violence to things, as the gloss on eum igitur notes. The 
gloss on C. Vnde vi, 1. i, says not, on the authority of ff. De vi et de vi armata, 
1. cum fundum. Others draw a distinction. Either the friends were attendant 
on the person who suffered the violence, or they were not. In the first case 
it is lawful ; ff. De iniuriis, 1. item apud Labeonem, si quis virgines. In the 
second case it is not lawful. Jacobus de Arena holds that it is lawful in any 
case. For if others may help us in our affairs, as appears from ff. De neg. 
gest., 1. i, much more may they help our person, which is preferred before 



306 THE LAW OF WAR 

things; C. De sacrosanct, ecclesiis, 1. sancimus. The text of C. Ad legem 
luliam de adulteriis, 1. Gracchus, seems to support this. The law cumfundum 
is not inconsistent, because there the mandate was given after an interval, 
which would not be lawful even for the principal. The text of 1. ut vim is opposed 
to this view, when it says " for the protection of one's own person," and Clem., 
De homicidio, si furiosus. 



Whether a slave is excused, who kills his master's wife on the order 

of his master ? 

[Ch. cxx.] 

The ninth question is this : Suppose a man orders a slave to kill his wife, 
whom he suspects of adultery, and threatens that otherwise he will kill the 
slave, and the slave kills her ; is he excused ? It seems that he is not. For 
one ought to bear all evils rather than consent to evil ; ff. Quod met. causa, 
1. isti quidem, at the end. This seems to be supported by ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam, 
1. scientiam, qui cum aliter. To the contrary is ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim ; 
for he did the act in defence of his own person. Therefore, &c. Jacobus of 
Ravenna draws a distinction. Either the woman would have perished in any 
case, or she would not ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. si quisfumo ; and ff. Quod vi aut 
clam, 1. si alius, est et alia. Petrus holds that the slave is excused in any case, 
because he did it in defence of his own person ; 1. ut vim ; also because charity 
begins with oneself ; C. De servitut. et aqua, 1. presses ; also because it is 
lawful to redeem one's own life ; C. De transactionibus, 1. transigere. I should 
think a distinction ought to be made. If the danger of his own death would 
inevitably befall the slave unless he killed the wife of his master, then I should 
think the opinion of Petrus true. If there should be some hope of his safety, 
even if he resisted his master, then I should be of the contrary opinion, on the 
authority of the laws above cited. 



What is the end of particular war ? 

[Ch. cxxi.] 

As regards the last principal question, which is, What is the end of this 
war ? the solution of this question is clear from what has been said above. 
For the preservation of oneself and of one's property is the end of this war, 
and this is its final tendency, and the reason why it is allowed, as clearly 
appears from the arguments above. 



REPRISALS 307 

The fifth treatise of the third principal part, treating of particular war which 
is waged in defence of the mystical body, and called Reprisals. 

[Ch. cxxii.] 

Whence and in what have Reprisals their origin, and why were they introduced ? 

[Ch. cxxiii.] 

As I shall deal in some detail with the question and matter of reprisals, 
I will first set forth the foundation upon which the introduction of reprisals 
rests. Having done so, I will examine causes which need examination. 

Now the Most High Creator in the beginning created the heaven and the 
earth, and the things which are in them, and angelic and human nature, spiritual 
things and temporal things, and ruled them in His own person ; and to man, 
whom He created, He gave precepts, and on the transgressor He imposed a 
penalty ; Genesis, ch. ii. And how He ruled them in His own person is apparent, 
for He punished offences Himself, and not by a minister. For He punished 
Cain, Lamech, and certain other princes, as we read in Genesis, chs. iv and v. 
And this government of the world proceeded down to the times of Noah. But 
from the time of Noah He began to rule the world by ministers, of whom the 
first was Noah ; and that Noah was the ruler of the people is clear. For the 
Lord committed to him the government and administration of the Ark ; 
Genesis, chs. v and vi. And by the Ark is signified the Church. And we read 
in Genesis, ch. ix, how the Lord committed the government to Noah and to 
his sons ; and although Noah was not a priest, yet we read that he exercised 
the office of priesthood, before laws were given to the people ; Genesis, ch. viii. 
But in this government and vicariate succeeded Patriarchs, Kings, and Judges, 
who were for a time rulers over the people of the Jews. And that government 
lasted to the time of Christ, Who was our natural Lord and King, of Whom 
we read in the Psalm, " O God, give thy judgement to the king." But Christ 
Himself put two lights on the earth a greater light for the day, which is the 
supreme Pontiff, and a lesser light for the night, which is the Emperor of the 
Romans, to whom He committed the administration and government of the 
world, to the one in spiritual matters, and to the other in temporal. In the 
early time, when the Lord governed in His own person, there was no need of 
reprisals, since justice was administered by the Lord. In the time of Noah and 
his successors in the government of the people of the Jews, there was no need 
of reprisals, since justice was administered by ministers, and subjects among 
the people recognized a superior whom they obeyed. In the early days of the 
supreme Pontiffs and the Roman Emperors, when all were in subjection both 
in law and in fact, there was no need of reprisals, since the complement of 
justice was administered by princes, with observance of the due order of law. 
But when the Empire began gradually to be exhausted, so that now there are 
some who in fact recognize no superior, and by them justice is neglected, the 
need arose for a subsidiary remedy, when the ordinary remedies fail, but which 



308 THE LAW OF WAR 

is on no account to be resorted to when they exist ; ff. De minor., 1. in causes ; 
ff. De oper. nov. nunci., 1. in provinciali. But this extraordinary remedy had 
its origin in the law of nations. For it is a form of lawful war. For it is lawful 
to take arms in defence of one's own body ; ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut rim ; 
C. Vnde vi, 1. i ; De restitut. spoliat., ch. olim ; and not only in defence of 
one's private and individual body, but also of the mystical body. For a com- 
munity is one body, whose parts are the several members of the community ; 
ff. Quod cuiuscunque universit., 1. i ; and so a community may defend the 
parts'of its own body. It had its origin, too, in divine law, as we read in xxiii, 
q. ii, ch. Dominus Noster. From all that has been said, we may infer the reason 
of the introduction of this remedy. For its final object is that justice may 
obtain its due effect, and its occasion is when there is a failure of remedy, 
arising from the neglect of those who govern and rule peoples, and the absence 
of recognition of superiors in fact, at which time this extraordinary remedy 
is needed. From this we infer that even to-day this remedy rarely claims 
a place. For if the secular judge neglects his office, recourse is to be had to the 
ecclesiastical ; De foro competenti, ex tenore, and ch. licet, and ch. ex parte ; 
Qui filii sint legitimi, per venerabilem ; although he also is in fact ill obeyed. 
After this preface, it remains to examine what are the causes of reprisals, as 
follows. 



Of the causes of reprisals. 

[Ch. cxxiv.] 

What is the efficient cause ? the formal cause ? the final cause ? We 
must also consider certain questions arising on this subject. 



Of the efficient, or productive, cause of reprisals. 

The first question, What is the productive cause ? is the same thing as 
asking who may declare reprisals. Here we must observe that, as was said 
above, no positive law, canon or civil, ordains that reprisals should be declared. 
For both laws ordain a mode of obtaining the effects of justice. It is even for- 
bidden to seize one's own property ; C. Vnde vi, 1. si quis in tantam ; and ff. 
Quod met. causa, 1. exstat. Moreover, they are even expressly forbidden by 
civil and canon law ; Authent., Vt pign. non fiant ; and Sext. De iniur., the 
single chapter. But when the remedies of positive law fail, it lias been necessary 
to resort to this device of a declaration of war, lest justice should perish. But 
this declaration of war belongs only to one who has no superior ; ff. De captivU. 
1. hostes. For one who has a superior cannot violate the remedies of law on his 
own authority. Therefore only one who has no superior, both in law and in 
fact, may declare reprisals. Also he against whom they are declainl should 



THE CAUSES OF REPRISALS 309 

have no superior, or, if he has, that superior should neglect to do ustice. From 
which some people infer that the magistrate of a state which recognizes no 
superior in fact, cannot declare reprisals unless he is specially empowered 
to do so, but that recourse should be had to the community, with whom the 
full sovereignty resides, and they should be declared on its authority. I do 
not think this is true where a community has transferred all power to a ruler ; 
for then he can do anything that the community can do, as we say where the 
ruler has general and unlimited power ; ff. De procuratoribus, 1. procurator qui. 
Otherwise, if the power transferred is limited. They also argue that if a count, 
margrave, or the like is subject to the Emperor, reprisals cannot be declared 
without the Emperor's authority, arguing from the rule mentioned above in 
De restit. spoliatorum, ch. olim. And this holds if we speak of common law. 
For if we speak according to the disposition of municipal laws, according to 
which the right of declaring reprisals is allowed, we must say that those persons 
may declare them to whom a municipal law grants the right. And they are 
granted, as I said, on the ground of urgent necessity, just as sometimes the 
civil law, on the ground of necessity, grants a man the right to take the law 
into his own hands ; ff. Qua? in fraudem cred., 1. ait prater, si debitorem ; ff. 
Quod vi aut clam, 1. alius, bellissime. From what has been said, we may infer 
by what law a declaration of reprisals is obtained. For as " condictions " are 
granted by force of a statute, so this privilege is obtained from a law ; ff. De 
" condict v ex lege, the single law. But if we refer to the disposition of the common 
law, some say that neither the action nor the office is intended. Their reason 
is, that this power is granted only by the law of nations, and that by that law 
all things were directed by the power of a king ; ff. De orig. iuris, 1. ii, at the 
beginning. So they say that to-day the hand of a king is required, according 
to the divine statutes and by the law of nations. I do not think this is true. 
I admit that there is no power unless the traditional form is observed. For 
recourse must first be had to the ordinary remedies, and only if they fail, to 
this remedy ; and this should be ascertained by a judge who is asked to declare 
reprisals ; and if the person against whom they are claimed appears after notice 
given, he is heard for the defence, as will be shown below, and judgement follows, 
either awarding or refusing the declaration. Fourthly, the action or the office 
was necessary, for the form of the judgement ought to follow the mode of peti- 
tion ; ff. Communi divid., 1. ut fundum ; and De simonia, ch. licet Heli. This 
is confirmed. For although this power proceeded from the law of nations, yet 
it has been approved by the civil law, by implication, though not by express 
words. For the civil law implies, or rather it expressly declares, that rebels 
and those who disobey the law may be proceeded against by military force ; 
ff. De rei vindicatione, 1. qui restituere. And so it has provided a remedy by 
way of request to a magistrate to allow recourse to be had to this military force, 
when the appropriate remedies fail. 



3io Till LAW OF WAR 

Of the material cause of reprisals. 

[Ch. cxxv.] 

It remains to examine the material cause. As to the material cause, then, 
we must consider the " matter in which," the " matter about which," the 
" matter against which," or the object, and the " matter from which." 

What is the "matter in which"? 

The " matter in which " is the person or subject to whom this power is 
granted. 

What is the "matter about u'hich "? 

The " matter about which " is the things about which this power is 
granted. 

What is the "matter against which" ? 

The " matter against which," or the object, is that against which it is 
granted, as, for instance, a state, or other community. 

What is the " matter from which"? 
The " matter from which " is the cause from which the power is granted. 



Returning to the examination, I ask to whom this power of taking reprisals 
is granted. Solution : It is granted to citizens for the reason given above. 
For citizens are a part of the mystical body, that is, of the state ; ff. Quod 
cuiuscunque universitatis, 1. i. Hence the state is called " civitas," as being 
a unity of " cives," as is noted in Sext, De sent, excom., ch. si civitas. And, as 
was shown above, any man is allowed to defend his own body ; ff. De iustit. et 
iure, 1. / vim ; and C. Vnde vi, 1. i. And this is true alike of the mystical and 
of the individual body. As to this questions arise. 



Are reprisals to be granted to residents? 

And the first question is, whether they ought to be granted to residents. 
Sorne authorities draw a distinction here, and say that if the residents bear the 
burdens of the state, then reprisals ought to be granted to them ; if they do 
not, then they ought not to be granted. The reason of the second statement is, 
that one who does not share a burden ought not to share a benefit either ; 
C. De furtis, 1. manifestissimi , sed cum in secundam; ff. De regul. iuris, rule 
secundum naturam ; and Sext, rule qui sentit. It is supported by C. [De episc. 



THE RIGHT TO REPRISALS 311 

et clericis] De collegiatis, book xi, 1. qui sub prcetexlu; and ff. [C.] De collegiis 
[book xii, 1. i], collegia si quce fuerint illicita. It is further supported by the rule 
that a man does not enjoy the privileges of an office, unless he has in fact held 
it; C. book xii, De consulibus, 1. nemini ; [C.] ff. De excusat. [tut.], 1. sed et 
milites, qucesitum; ff. De testam. mil., the penultimate law. I do not think 
this opinion true without qualification, but I think a distinction must be made 
as follows. Either a resident bears no burdens by reason of his contumacy, 
because, although called upon, he will not bear them, as he is bound to do. For 
between a state which admits a man to reside and the resident, there arises an 
implied contract, binding on both sides, whereby the resident is bound to bear 
burdens ; ff. Ad municip., 1. i, and 1. incola ; and the state is bound to protect 
him ; ff. De offic. praesidis, 1. illicitas, ne potentiores. And in this case, if he 
refuses to fulfil the contract on his side, the state, for its part, is not bound to 
defend him, nor can he demand that it should ; ff. De act. empti, 1. lulianus, 
offerri. Or, again, the resident bears no burdens because the state, which 
was able to remit the burden, has conferred this privilege on him ; C. De pactis, 
1. si quis in conscribendo ; and De episcop. et cleric., vel a Principe. And then 
reprisals ought to be granted to the resident, for privileges granted in his 
favour should not result in injury to him ; C. De legibus, 1. quod favor e ; 
Sext, rule quod ob gratiam. And you must understand this to refer to a 
privileged person after the assumption of his privileges. 



Whether reprisals should be declared for citizens who are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of a state, and are otherwise not part of it ? 

[Ch. cxxvi.] 

The second question is, whether reprisals should be declared for citizens 
who are not subject to the jurisdiction of a state, and are otherwise not part 
of it. Some authorities draw a distinction. If they are excepted from the 
jurisdiction by privilege, like clerks ; Authent., 1. ii ; C. De episcop. et cleric., 
statuimus ; or because of secular rank ; C. Vbi senat. vel clarissimi, 1. ii ; ff. 
De vacat. mun., throughout ; reprisals should be granted them. If they are 
not subject by reason of their own contumacy, then reprisals should not be 
granted. The reason of the first statement is, that a privilege introduced in 
their favour should not result in injury to them, and because among citizens 
an obligation is formed at birth between the citizen and the state, which cannot 
be changed ; ff. Ad municip., 1. assumptio. Otherwise with a mere resident, 
because in his case an obligation is formed only by his admission ; ff. Ad muni- 
cipalem, 1. i. The reason of the second statement is their own contumacy ; 
ff. Ex quibus cau. maior., 1. sed etsi per prcstorem, sed si dum. 



312 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether reprisals should be granted to a citizen " by cvm-cnlion " against 

the state of his origin ? 

[Ch. cxxvii.j 

The third question is, whether reprisals should be granted to a citi/ni 
" by convention " against the state of his origin. It appears that they should 
not ; for where I claim a right from some fact, I am not under a liability if 1 
acquire the right ; ff. De usufruct, legato, 1. sed ct si quis, et regulariter. But 
if an injury is done to this citizen, the state of his origin acquires a right of 
declaring reprisals ; therefore reprisals cannot be declared against it. This view 
is confirmed by the rule that the state of origin is preferred ; ff . Ad municipalem, 
1. assumptio. Also by the consideration that the state of origin might have 
legislated for its own subject, before he became a citizen of the other state by 
convention, and his state by convention cannot complain. It is confirmed by 
the analogy of the usufructuary, who may make an " operis novi nuntiatio " 
to all except the owner ; ff. De oper. nov. nuntiatione, 1. i, at the end. It is 
confirmed by a further analogy. For one who has the Publician action may use 
it against all except the owner ; ff. De Publiciana, the last law. The text of 
ff. Ad municipalem, 1. de iure, supports this. For the relations between a citi/.cn 
and a state should be put in suit only before a judge of that state. This is 
confirmed. For reprisals are an extraordinary remedy, as I showed above; 
but extraordinary remedies are not given to a son against a father ; C. Qui et 
advers. quos, the last law. But the power of a state over a citizen is greater 
than that of a father over a son ; ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ii ; and ff. De captivis, 
1. postliminium, filius ; ff . De castrensi peculio. 

The contrary view is supported by the consideration that if two have the 
same subject, each may defend him against injury inflicted by the other. For 
a state punishes a father who offends against his son ; ff. De patri., throughout. 
This is confirmed thus : For if two have rights over a thing, although one right 
may be weaker than the other, yet the man who has the weaker right may 
bring an action against the man who has the stronger, if he injures the thing 
in which those two rights meet ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. item Mela, the last section ; 
and the same title, 1. si dominus scrvum. It is confirmed thus : For if two men 
are owners of the same slave, and one does him a wrong, he may be restrained 
by the other ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. i. It is confirmed thus : For, to repel an 
injury, friends may be summoned ; ff. De vi et de vi armat., 1. iii, eum igitur ; 
and De homicid., significasti ; Sext, De sent, excom., dilccto. Solution: Some 
authorities say without qualification that reprisals may be declared, their 
reason being that the power of declaring reprisals takes the place of defective 
jurisdiction. But if a state injures a citizen, he may appeal to a superior ; 
ff. Quod met. causa, 1. metum, animadvertendum. Therefore, when jurisdiction 
fails, there is a place for reprisals. This is supported by ff. De dolo, 1. sed si ex 
dolo. It is confirmed thus : For any power is deemed to be legitimate, when 
it is rightly used, but not when it is used for spoliation ; ff. Pro emptore, 1. 



THE RIGHT TO REPRISALS 313 

ei qui fundum, si tutor ; ff. De furt., 1. inter dum, qui tutelam ; and so they 
say the citations on one side and on the other hold. I do not think this conclu- 
sion is true in this unqualified form ; but I think we must distinguish between 
cases where the injury inflicted by the state of origin arises from some act 
prior to the convention, whereby the man became a citizen of the other state, 
and cases where it arises from something done afterwards. In the first case, 
reprisals may not be granted by the state of convention. For the man ought 
to be a part of the body to be defended, at the time when he suffers the injustice. 
For this right does not pass to the new state ; ff. De servo corrupto, 1. doli, the 
last section ; ff . Depositi, 1. i, si servus ; and ff. De oblig. et actionibus, 1. 
qucecunque. From which I infer that reprisals ought not to be granted to one 
who becomes a citizen by convention after the injustice is committed. In the 
second case, the solution above given holds. 



Whether reprisals should be granted to citizens, and to those who are 
regarded as citizens, but whose citizenship is limited ? 

[Ch. cxxviii.] 

The fourth question concerns citizens and those who are regarded as 
citizens, but whose citizenship is limited. As to the power of a state to determine 
who is a citizen, see C. De incolis, 1. cives. Even mercenaries are included, when 
they earn pay ; ff. Ad municipalem, 1. municipes, the last section. Also students, 
to the extent that they receive protection from the rulers of states ; ff . De 
pecunia constituta, i ; and Authent., habita, C. Ne fil. pro patre. Are reprisals 
to be granted to such persons ? Some say that limited reprisals should be 
granted on their behalf, and in those matters in which they are regarded as 
citizens, as where an injury is done to a student in matters regarding his studies, 
and to a soldier in matters regarding his service ; but not in other matters, 
since in other matters they are not regarded as members of the body. 



Whether a state may grant reprisals to the citizens of another stale, who 
by agreement or statute are treated as its own citizens ? 

[Ch. cxxix.J 

The fifth question is whether, if by agreement or statute the citizens of 
one state ought to be treated as citizens of another, reprisals should be granted 
to them by the state in which they ought to be so treated. Solution : The 
words of the agreement and statute are to be weighed. For those words say 
they are to be treated as citizens ; they do not make them citizens ; ff. De 
verb, significat., 1. ... appellatione ; and the note there by Jacobus de Arena 
should be observed. Those words, then, are understood as meaning that they 
are treated as citizens in matters belonging to the common law ; ff . Pro emptore, 



314 THE LAW OF WAR 

1. ei qtd fundum, si tutor. This is one solution. I do not accept this conclusion, 
and I even believe that reprisals should be declared for them. For I admit that 
those words do not make a man a citizen, but they give him a right to all that 
the citizen has a right to. For this is proved by the words, which ought not to 
be departed from, nor deprived of their proper meaning ; ff. Qui et a quibus, 1. 
prospexit ; ff. De leg., iii, 1. non aliter ; and ff. De exercitoria, 1. i, is qui 
navem. Hence, there should be granted to him all that is granted to a citizen ; 
but reprisals are granted to a citizen, as I showed above. Therefore, &c. Nor 
is this inconsistent with saying that there should be granted to him all that 
belongs to a man by the common law ; for this remedy, if the due formalities 
are observed, is not forbidden by the common law. 



Of the " matter about which." 
[Ch. cxxx.] 

It remains to consider the " matter about which " they are granted, 
which is property ; and this is clear. For they affect the property, movable 
and immovable, of those against whom they are granted, which is found in 
the territory of the state which grants them. But in regard to this many 
questions may be raised. 



Whether reprisals can be declared against the property of those whose persons 
cannot be seized on the strength of reprisals ? 

And firstly, can reprisals be declared against the property of those whose 
persons cannot be seized on the strength of reprisals ? Solution : If they are 
persons who cannot be seized on account of some difficulty caused by reason 
of age, or madness, or the like, then reprisals can be executed against their 
property ; ff. De in ius vocando, 1. satisque ; Authent., Vt nulli iudicum, ncccs- 
sarium. But if they cannot be executed against the persons because of some 
privilege allowed .them by law, as in the case of students and ambassadors, 
then the reprisals cannot be executed on the property necessary for their 
studies or embassy, which they bring with tin 'in, but on their other property 
they may ; ff. De publican., 1. si pvblicanus. This also affords a solution of 
a third question : If an ambassador or a student brings with him property 
belonging to others, can reprisals be executed against this ? We must say that 
they cannot, if the things are necessary to them, as horses and the like ; ff. De 
verb, signification, 1. ccnsoria ; otherwise they can. 



EXECUTION OF REPRISALS 315 

Whether a simple declaration of reprisals may be executed against property exist- 
ing in the territory of the state against which the reprisals are declared, so 
that it may be seized and brought into the territory of the state declaring 
them ? 

[Ch. cxxxi.] 

The second question is, whether a simple declaration of reprisals may be 
executed against property existing in the territory of the state against which 
the reprisals are declared, so that it may be seized and brought into the territory 
of the state declaring them. Some say it may not, because the property is 
" outside the territory " ; ff. De iurisdictione [omn. iud.], 1. extra territorium ; 
and ff. De rebus auctor. iudic. possidend., 1. cum unus, is cuius ; and Sext, 
De constit., ch. ii. Moreover, to enter the territory of others is' allowed to 
be a cause of greater disturbance. Therefore, as the point is doubtful, it does 
not seem to be allowed ; ff. De reg. iuris, 1. non est singulis. I cannot accept 
this conclusion ; for resort is had to the royal authority on account of a failure 
of jurisdiction, because the formula of a solemn judgement has failed ; and 
accordingly this may be done anywhere, because a man may anywhere defend 
his own body ; ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim ; and C. Vnde vi, 1. i. Also, in a 
simple and general grant the words ought to operate generally according to 
their tenor ; ff. De leg. praestan., 1. i, generaliter ; also the result might be 
that reprisals would have no effect, as when they are used against a distant 
state, whose citizens have no property in, and do not come to, the state declaring 
them. Hence the declaration must be understood in a sense in which it may 
have its effect in any event ; ff. De legat., i, 1. si quando ; ff. De reb. dub., 1. 
quotiens ; De reg. iur., 1. quotiens. 



Whether, if one state declares reprisals against another, the ruler of the state 

declaring them, after writing to the ruler of the other, may execute 

the reprisals against property situated there ? 

[Ch. cxxxii.] 

The third question is whether, if one state declares reprisals against 
another, the ruler of the state declaring them may, after writing to the ruler 
of the other state, execute the reprisals against property there situated. Some 
authorities say that, although this may be done in execution of a judgement ; 
see ff. De re iudicata, 1. a divo Pio, i ; and De rebus auct. iudic. poss., 1. cum 
unus, i ; yet in this case it may not. And their reason is this : For a declara- 
tion of reprisals is a form of particular war, to which no one can compel 
another unless he is a subject : Vsus Feudorum, Hie finitur lex Conradi, ch. 
domino. I do not believe that this is the correct meaning. For it supposes that 
in the execution of a judgement the judge who gives the judgement can compel 
another judge, even one who is not a subject, to execute it, which is false, 
because equal has no power over equal ; ff. De arbi., 1. nam magistratus ; ff. 

[32] 



3i6 THE LAW OF WAR 

Ad S. C. Trebellianum, 1. itte a quo, tcmpestivum ; De elect., ch. innotuit. 
None the less, the other does wrong if he does not execute it, so that he may be 
proceeded against before his superior on that account ; for as long as justice 
can obtain its effect by observing due process of law, the rules of law should not 
be broken. Hence, in neither case is there a question of compulsion, but in 
each case the other will act rightly if he executes the judgement : because, 
just as when there is no failure of jurisdiction he ought to execute a judgement 
on request, so, when there is a failure of jurisdiction, and reprisals are resorted 
to, he ought to assist, though he cannot be compelled. But in federated states, 
as to which see ff. De captivis, 1. non dubito, this is clearly admitted. 



Of the "matter against which." 

[Ch. cxxxiii.] 

It remains to consider the " matter against which " reprisals may be 
executed, which is properly called the subject, as to which many questions 
arise. 



Whether reprisals, declared by one state against the men of another, may be 
executed against residents of that state ? 

And the first question is whether, if the state of Milan has declared re- 
prisals against the Bolognese, or the men of Bologna, the reprisals may be 
executed against residents in the state of Bologna. Solution : The words 
" Bolognese " and " men of Bologna " have the same meaning ; ff. De excus. 
tut., 1. sed reprobari, amplius, and the gloss there. But the word " Bolognese " 
means the burgesses ; ff. Ad municipalem, 1. i; and the word " burgess " is 
the genus of " citizen " and " resident," as is noted in C. De incolis, 1. cives. 
This is supported by the text of ff. Ad municipalem, Lfilii, municeps. There- 
fore, arguing from the first to the last, it follows from the nature of the words, 
that reprisals may be executed against the residents. And this is true, when 
residents bear the burdens of the state ; Ad municipalem, 1. i. Otherwise, if 
they do not. 



The same subject continued ; whether, if one state has declared reprisals 

against the men of another state, they can be executed against men 

of that state living elsewhere ? 

[Ch. cxxxiv.] 

The second question, which continues the same subject, is whether, if, 
for instance, the state of Milan has declared reprisals against the men of 
Bologna or against the Bolognese, they can be executed against Bolognese 
living elsewhere. Some authorities say they can, because the place of origin 



EXECUTION OF REPRISALS 317 

is not changed ; ff. Ad municipalem, 1. assumptio. Others make a distinction 
according to whether the reprisals are declared against the men of a province ; 
and then, they say, they cannot be executed against those who live elsewhere, 
because they are not considered to belong to the province ; ff. De verbor. 
signific., 1. provinciates ; or against the men of a single state ; and then the 
first view prevails. A third party make a distinction according to whether the 
persons are living elsewhere, but within the same province ; and then, they say, 
the reprisals may be executed against them ; or in another province ; and then 
they may not. They rely on the reasons noted in the gloss on C. De adoptioni- 
bus, 1. in adoptionem. A fourth party say that according to the proper meaning 
of the word, those who live elsewhere are regarded as Bolognese ; but according 
to the common use of speaking, they are not, and the common use prevails ; 
ff. De legat., iii, 1. librorum, quod tamen Cassius ; and so reprisals cannot be 
executed against them. Others say they can be executed against Bolognese 
who live elsewhere, but who are subject to the burdens of Bologna. But if 
they are not subject, then otherwise ; ff. Ad municipalem, 1. i ; ff. De excusat. 
tut., 1. si duas, sed et reprobari, amplius ; and C. De agric. et censitis, 1. cum 
scimus, at the end. 

Whether reprisals can be executed against the citizens or residents of a state, who 
are subject to its burdens, but are also citizens of another state ? 

[Ch. cxxxv.] 

The third question is, whether reprisals can be executed against citizens 
or residents of Bologna, who are subject to the burdens of Bologna, but who 
are also citizens of Milan. It seems that they ran be executed against them. 
For if a state can declare reprisals against one who is not its subject, much more 
may it declare them against a subject. This is confirmed. For an owner 
may claim that a usufructuary should forfeit his right of use on account of 
his misconduct, and conversely ; ff. De damno infecto, 1. si proprietarius, and 
1. hoc amplius, si cum, and the following section. Similarly then here, where 
two states claim jurisdiction over the same citizen. Some hold the contrary 
opinion without qualification. Their reason is, that this right takes the place 
of defective jurisdiction. But a state can well exercise jurisdiction over its own 
citizen ; therefore he will not be subjected to reprisals ; ff. Si quis test. lib. 
esse iussus, 1. i, utique^. Moreover, a state is bound to defend its own 
citizen ; therefore reprisals, if declared, will not constrain him ; ff. De evictioni- 
bus, 1. vindicantem. Moreover, if a Milanese were to be constrained, then the 
state making the grant of reprisals would appear to be acting against itself, 
contrary to ff . De iur. fisci, 1. in fraudem, neque. This conclusion I cannot 
accept without qualification. Nay, if a state cannot in fact constrain its own 
citizen, who is also a citizen of the state against which reprisals are declared, 
they will most properly be executed against him ; for they are declared because 
of a failure of jurisdiction, as has often been said above. But as a matter of law, 



3i8 THE LAW OF WAR 

jurisdiction ought not to fail, since in law all are subject to the emperor ; ff. 
Ad leg. Rhod. de iact., 1. deprecatio ; ix, q. iii, ch. cuncta per mundum, and ch. 
per principalem. But in fact it fails, because in fact men do not recognize him. 
Therefore, just as in fact jurisdiction may fail when a non-subject does a wrong, 
so, too, one who in law is a subject may resist in fact, and so resort may be had 
to the extraordinary remedy. I admit, however, that they will not constrain 
a subject until he has been specially proceeded against by due process of law, 
and the process is ineffective because of his actual rebellion. 



Whether reprisals can be executed against [soldiers] women ? 

[Ch. cxvi.] 

The fourth question is, whether they can be executed against the [soldiers] 
women of Bologna ? It appears that they can, for the doctrine of postliminium 
applies to them ; C. De [captivis] postliminio reversis, 1. i. The contrary 
is true, for they cannot be seized in person ; C. De offic. eius qui vicem alic. 
iud. obtinet, Authent., sed hodie ; and C. De execut. rei iudicatae, Authent., 
sed novo iure. And that power, allowed by the law of nations, ought to be 
understood according to the civil law ; ff. De servit., 1. si cui. 



Whether reprisals can be executed against ckrks and others, even 

married clerks ? 

[Ch. cxxxvii.] 

The fifth question is, whether they can be executed against Bolognese 
clerks ? The text says not, in Sext, De iniur., the single chapter. What 
about married clerks ? As to them we must follow Sext, De iniur., the single 
chapter. 

Whether, when a bishop neglects to do justice on his clerks, and recourse cannot 

be had to his superior, because the bishop is schismatic, reprisals can be 

declared against the same clerks by a secular judge ? 

The sixth question is whether, if a bishop neglects to do justice on his 
clerks, and recourse cannot be had to his superior, because the bishop is schis- 
matic, reprisals can be declared against the clerks by a secular judge. Some 
authorities are doubtful on this point. We need have no doubt, because the 
laity have been granted no power over a clerk, however delinquent ; De sent, 
excom., ch. contingit, and ch. in audientia ; and Sext, the same title, ch. si 
iudex laicus. They may therefore be coerced by their superior, and recourse 
may be had to a secular judge by way of invocation ; De offic. iud. ord., ch. i ; 
xxiii, q. v, regum, and ch. administrator es, and ch. principes. 



EXECUTION OF REPRISALS 319 

Whether reprisals can be executed against Bolognese students, or other 
students of Bologna, on their way to Padua for study > 

[Ch. cxxxviii.] 

The seventh question is, whether they may be executed against Bolognese 
going to Padua for study, or even against students of Bologna. The text 
says not, in Authent., Ne fil. pro patre, ch. habiia; and this applies if they 
study law in privileged places, by the privilege of the university, but not if 
they study law in other places ; ff. In procemio, hcec autem tria. But in other 
faculties the instruction may be given anywhere ; ff. De excusationibus, 1. si 
duas, cum autem. And what has been said of students, applies also to writers, 
and bedels, and others who go for the sake of the students. This is proved by 
ff. De milit. testam. militis, 1. i ; and De bon. poss. ex testam. militis, the single 
law. It also applies to a father and other relatives going to see a son and rela- 
tive in the university ; ff. De iudiciis, 1. ii, item, in the gloss on the word 
" venerit." 

Whether reprisals can be declared against ambassadors ? 

[Ch. cxxxix.] 

The eighth question is, whether they may be executed against Bolognese 
ambassadors. Solution : They may not ; De legation., the last law ; ff. De 
iudic., 1. ii, legatis; and note C. De iurisd. omn. iud. et de foro competent!, 
the last chapter. 

Whether reprisals can be executed against those who are going to a festival, to 
the Church of St. James, or to other place of indulgence ; also whether they 
can be executed against those at sea, and against those who cannot be summoned 
into court, and in many other cases ? 

[Ch. cxJ.] 

The ninth question is, whether they may be executed against Bolognese 
on their way to a festival. The text in C. De nundinis, the single law, says 
not. Can they be executed against Bolognese on their way to St. James' or 
on another pilgrimage ? I answer, no ; De cleri. peregri., throughout ; xxiii, 
q. iii, si quis Romipetas ; C. Communia de success., Authent., omnes ; there 
fully. The rule is the same for those going to a place of indulgence, because of 
the hospitality and the like which should be shown to persons going for an 
indulgence. Can they be executed against persons sailing to Bologna, who are 
carried by the wind to the state declaring them ? I answer, no ; Authent., 
navigia, C. De furtis. To the same effect, C. book xi, De naufragiis, 1. i. Or 
can they be executed against those who cannot be summoned into court, who 
are enumerated in ff. De in ius vocando, 1. ii ? I answer, no. The reason is, 
that if they should be condemned, they could not be seized ; much less could 



320 THE LAW OF WAR 

this be done for the wrong or debt of another. From which it follows that if 
a Bolognese were appointed to an office at Milan, he could not be detained 
there on the strength of reprisals. So, too, if a Bolognese were to go to the city 
of Milan for the funeral of a relative. So, too, in similar cases which are 
enumerated in ff. De in ius vocando, 1. ii, already quoted. 



Whether reprisals can be granted against a Bolognese magistrate of Milan, 

who does injustice there ? 

[Ch. cxli.] 

The tenth question is, whether reprisals may be granted against a Bolognese 
magistrate of Milan, who does injustice there. Jacobus de Belvisio, on Authent., 
Vt non fiant pignor., holds that they may, on the authority of ff. Quod quisque 
Juris, 1. i. Others draw a distinction. The injustice done may be one for which 
he cannot be sued during his office, or he may be a magistrate who cannot be 
sued ; ff. De iudic., 1. pars liter arum; ff. De iniuriis, 1. nee magistrates ; and 
then they cannot be declared. But when his office is finished, they can be 
declared, if leave has first been asked of the syndic ; nor ought resort to be had 
to a judge of his own state, because he ought not to be sued there for an act of 
this kind ; C. Vbi de ratiociniis agi oportet, 1. i, and 1. ii ; and C. Vt omnes tam 
civil, quam militares, 1. i ; and in Authent., Vt iudi. sine quoque suff., neccs- 
sitatem. But if he is a person who can be sued, then reprisals may be declared. 
I do not accept the second part of this solution, for reprisals are declared to 
supply a failure of jurisdiction. If, therefore, he can be sued during his office, 
and in the place of the offence ; C. Vbi de ratiociniis, 1. ii ; and Vt omnes tam 
civil, quam militares, 1. i ; why are reprisals necessary ? Nor do I accept the 
first part, where it says that reprisals may be declared when the office is finished; 
for when the office is finished, he may be sued, and the form of law observed. 
Hence this remedy is not necessary. I admit, however, that in either case, 
where there is no legal means of coercing him, recourse might be had to reprisals; 
and then it would not be necessary to resort to a judge of his own city, because 
such a judge has no jurisdiction in the case by the laws above cited. 



Whether reprisals can be declared against the officials of a magistrate or 

ruler who does injustice? 

[Ch. cxlii.] 

The eleventh question is, whether reprisals may be declared against the 
officials of a magistrate or ruler who does injustice. Jacobus de Belvisio holds 
that they may. Others say that this is true where the officials have expressly 
taken an oath to the ruler to commit the act of injustice ; C. De advoc. diver, 
iud., 1. per hanc ; C. book x, De excus. milit., the penultimate law< ? >. But if 



EXECUTION OF REPRISALS 321 

the officials have expressly opposed it, reprisals cannot be declared against 
them ; De appellationibus, 1. quoniam. But if they neither consent nor oppose, 
because of absence or ignorance, then, too, reprisals cannot be declared ; ff. De 
magistr. conveniendis, 1. i, at the beginning. But if they are present, and 
neither consent nor oppose, then, if they are officials appointed to a mere 
office, who are not called to the counsels of the ruler such as notaries, and 
associates, and accountants then, too, reprisals may not be declared against 
them ; ff. De magistr. conveniendis, 1. i. And the reason is because they 
cannot oppose ; C. Vt omnes tarn civil, quam militares, 1. i, officium. But if 
they are officials admitted to counsel, reprisals may be declared against them. 



Whether reprisals can be declared against the consuls and the leaders of a 
state, who refuse to do justice ? 

[Ch. cxliii.] 

The twelfth question is, whether they can be declared against the leaders 
and consuls of a state, who refuse to do justice. Jacobus de Belvisio says that 
they may. Others say that this is true only when such persons are present, 
but not if they are absent, because reprisals cannot be declared against them 
in their capacity of consuls ; ff . De magistr. conveniendis, 1. i, at the beginning. 



Whether reprisals can be declared against private persons, who are absolutely 

innocent, because of an offence of their lord, or of another private 

person, for which justice is not done ? 

[Ch. cxliv.] 

The thirteenth question is, whether they can be declared against private 
persons, who are absolutely innocent, because of an offence of their lord, or of 
another private person, for which justice is not done. Jacobus de Belvisio 
says not, because a man ought not to be punished for another's offence ; Sext, 
De reg. iuris, rule non debet. Others take the opposite view, on the authority 
of xxiii, q. ii, ch. dominus. For individuals, even though innocent, are punished 
by a sentence of interdict ; Sext, De sent, excom., ch. si scntentia. Also, in 
a lawful war innocent persons are made prisoners, but reprisals are a kind of 
particular war ; also, although a prisoner may be innocent, yet the state 
has jurisdiction over him ; and this seems to be the rule. 



Whether reprisals can be declared against persons who are partially, but 
not fully, subject to a state ? 

[Ch. cxlv.] 

The fourteenth question is, whether reprisals can be declared against 
persons partially, but not fully, subject to the state of Bologna. Solution : 



322 THE LAW OF WAR 

If the states or communities are merely dependent on the state of Bologna, but 
have certain exceptions or jurisdictions by agreement, reprisals cannot be 
declared against them, because states which are free, and have merely sub- 
mitted themselves in certain respects, are not subject. And reprisals will not 
be declared against them because of the offence of the lord who has them in 
subjection, because they are free ; ff . De captivis, 1. non dubito ; but reprisals 
can be declared for an offence by these states, just as war, too, may lawfully 
be made against them. 

Whether reprisals can be declared against a certain class of persons, 
who refuse to do justice ? 

[Ch. cxlvi.] 

The fifteenth question is, whether reprisals can be declared against a 
certain class of persons, who refuse to do justice. And we must say that they 
can, if the due form is observed. 



Oftlie " matter from which." 

[Ch. cxlvii.] 

It remains to consider the material cause from which reprisals arise. And 
it is a failure of jurisdiction. For in the first instance a judge ought to be 
applied to ; and if he neglects to deal with the matter, and recourse cannot be 
had to a superior, then reprisals may be granted. But as to this many questions 
may be asked. 

Whether a judge ought to be required to do justice, before reprisals 

are granted? 

[Ch. cxlviii.] 

And the first question is. Who ought to require a judge to do justice ? 
Solution : The party who has suffered the injury ; and if the judge neglects 
to give redress, he ought to apply to the ruler of his own state, and make oath 
of his requisition and the judge's neglect, and ask the ruler again to require 
the judge to do justice ; and then, if he neglects, reprisals may be declared. 
But that a requisition from the party is required, appears in Authent., coll. iii, 
Vt differ, iudices, at the beginning. 



Whether, when a man who has suffered an injury dares not litigate in the state 

of the person inflicting the injury, his own judge may write, asking to have 

the jurisdiction transferred to others, or arbitrators chosen ? 

[Ch. cxlix.] 

The second question is whether, if a party should hesitate to litigate in 
the state of the person inflicting the injury, because of that person's influence, 



MATERIAL CAUSE OF REPRISALS 323 

his own judge may write, asking to have the jurisdiction transferred to others, 
or arbitrators chosen by the civil law applying to certain persons in misfortune. 
It is clear that he may ; C. Quando Imperator inter pup. vel viduas, 1. i, at the 
end. By canon law to-day a wider permission is given by Sext, De rescriptis, 
ch. statutum, cum vero, as regards the article of request. 



What judge ought to be required to do justice ? 
[Ch. cl.] 

The third question is, What judge ought to be required to do justice ? 
Solution : In the first place, a judge of the state of the wrong-doer ought to 
be required ; and then, if he neglects to do justice, the injured party will apply 
to the next superior ; and if he fails, he will apply to the prince ; in Authent., 
Vt differ, iudic., at the beginning. If all these fail, reprisals will be declared by 
his own state, which succeeds to the place of the jurisdiction which has failed. 
But if the judge does not neglect to do justice, but does injustice by pronounc- 
ing an unjust judgement, then, if the state has a judge of appeal appointed 
over him, he will be applied to by way of appeal ; and if it has not, reprisals 
will be declared. For some blame must be imputed to a state which has not 
appointed a judge of appeal. But if two judges of appeals do injustice, then 
it seems that the party is without any remedy, since no third appeal is allowed ; 
nor does it appear that reprisals may be declared, since there has been no 
failure of jurisdiction. But it may be said that if they pronounced unjust 
judgements from favour to the other party, then " restitutio in integrum " may 
be claimed ; ff. De minoribus, 1. prcefectiprcetorio. But if the reason was favour 
to the rulers, then they would be liable to the party for the loss caused him ; C. 
Ne liceat potent., 1. i ; and De his qui potent., 1. i ; and accordingly they are 
liable for the loss in an "actio in factum"; ff. Pro socio, 1. nee quidquam. But 
if the unjust judgement arose from the judge's sole motion, then the party 
is without any remedy, as I showed above. 



What degree of injustice is required before reprisals will be granted ? 

[Ch. cli.] 

The fourth question is, What degree of injustice is required before reprisals 
will be declared ? Solution : They are not declared for a slight cause, since 
this is an extraordinary remedy, which is not given for slight cause ; ff. De in 
integr. restit., 1. scio ; and ff. De dolo, 1. si oleum. Also, a complete failure of 
justice is required. Otherwise, if the failure is partial only ; C. De preci. 
Imperat. offerendis, 1. quotiens. For reprisals do not completely do justice ; C. 
De servis fugit., 1. mancipia ; and ff. De damn, infecto, 1. iv, in eum. 

[33] 



324 THE LAW OF WAR 

When is it to be said that resort to a superior is impossible, so that an 
occasion arises for reprisals ? 

[Ch. dii.] 

The fifth question is, When is it to be said that resort to a superior is 
impossible, so that an occasion arises for a declaration of reprisals ? Solution : 
When it is impossible both in law and in fact, then reprisals are necessary ; 
xxiii, q. ii, ch. dominus ; and C. De ludaeis, 1. nullus. But if it is possible in 
law, but not in fact, because they do not obey, then the answer is the same. 
But if it is possible in fact, but not in law as, for instance, because a tyrant 
has seized the government then follow the note of Innocent on De electione, 
ch. nihil. But if it is possible in law, but difficult in fact for instance, when 
the Emperor is far away, and the party is very poor then, too, occasion 
arises for reprisals ; ff. De pig. act., 1. si servos ; ff. De divers, [et] temp, 
praescriptionibus. 

Of the formal cause. 

[Ch. cliii.] 

It remains to consider the formal cause ; and this is twofold : for there 
is the form of declaring, and the form of executing, the reprisals. But the form 
of declaring them involves the form of defence of the party against whom they 
are declared ; and on this, too, many questions arise. 



By what law reprisals are granted ? 

And the first question is, by what law they are granted. Here some say 
that they are granted by those who do not recognize a superior. They should 
not be claimed from such persons by right of action, nor through an office ; 
but the royal power, whereby all things were disposed, should be invoked ; 
ff. De orig. iuris, 1. ii. For all that is required is that which the law of nations 
required, namely, that the cause for which they are granted should be true, 
without prejudice, however, to the defences of the person against whom they 
are granted, since this belongs to natural law ; Clem., De re iudicata, pastoralis, 
ceterunt ; and it is enough for one who has obtained reprisals to show the 
grant, without other process of law. And there is a presumption that every- 
thing has been duly done, for it is like sacrilege to dispute a judgement of the 
prince ; C. De crimine sacrilegii, 1. disputare. And this is true in the territory 
of the authority granting the reprisals, though the nation against whom they 
are granted might retaliate ; ff . Quod quisque iuris. And finally, any agreement 
on the subject ought to be recognized ; for example, to submit to an arbitrator 
or other person ; and the burden of proving that all things required by the 
law of nations have been duly observed would rest upon the person to whom 



FORMAL CAUSE OF REPRISALS 325 

the reprisals are granted. Hence it is safer to have a legal process, and to reduce 
it to writing. This is the view of the Archdeacon in Sext, De iniuriis, the single 
chapter. For he holds that monition and sentence after the refusal ought to 
precede ; and Guido, Bishop of Concordia, agrees. But if reprisals are claimed 
by persons to whom the right has been granted by statutes, then, if the statute 
prescribes an order, that order ought to be observed. But if it prescribes no 
order, then, inasmuch as the power of granting reprisals proceeds from civil 
law, since statutes are civil law ; ff. De iustit. et hire, 1. omnes populi ; then 
the office of an official ought to be invoked, a statement of claim delivered, 
the party cited, and proceedings taken as the laws ordain. 



Who may appear to oppose the declaration of reprisals ? 

[Ch. cliv.] 

The second question is, Who may appear to oppose the declaration ? 
Solution : Any one who has an interest ; De testib., ch. veniens ; De re iudi., 
ch. cum super. But the people against whom they are declared have an interest, 
so that any person instructed on their behalf should be heard ; and any member 
of the people should be heard, even without instructions, because all have an 
interest ; ff. De novi oper. nunt., 1. in provinciali, the last section. Also members 
of the people of the state declaring reprisals should be heard, because they are 
interested in preventing an unjust declaration, for fear of retaliation ; ff. Quod 
quisque iuris, in-the red, and the black throughout. 



What defences are allowed to one against whom they are declared ? 

[Ch. civ.] 

The third question is, What defences are allowed to one against whom 
reprisals are claimed ? Solution : He may plead as an " exceptio," that 
the claimant has not the right to claim, either by reason of some personal 
incapacity, or of incompetency of the jurisdiction, or because he is ready to 
make amends ; xxiii, q. ii, ch. Dominus Nosier. Can this right be renounced 
by agreement ? For example, suppose a ruler of the state of Bologna is 
elected, who swears not to claim reprisals against a state, will this renuncia- 
tion be available by way of " exceptio " ? Solution : If the claimant has 
suffered an injury by reason of an unjust condemnation, then he must resort 
to his own judge, by way of appeal, to supply the failure of jurisdiction ; 
but an appeal may be renounced in this way ; C. De temp, appellationum, 
the last law. But if he has suffered an injury, then the agreement has no 
effect, because a wilful wrong would thereby be remitted by anticipation ; 
ff. De pactis, 1. si unus, illud ; ff. De pact, dotalibus, 1. convenire. 



326 THE LAW OF WAR 

How the commission of injustice, or the denial of justice, is to be proved. 

[Ch. dvi.] 

The fourth question is, how the commission of injustice, or the denial 
of justice, is to be proved. Solution : By the records of the first judge, or 
by witnesses ; and the first judge may be required to produce his records, and 
if he does not do so, that is an act of injustice ; C. Vt lite pendente, 1. ii. 



Whether, if property is seized on the strength of reprisals, it may be detained, 

by virtue either of the first decree, or of the second ? 

[Ch. clvii.] 

The fifth question is, whether, if property is seized on the strength of 
reprisals, it may be detained, by virtue of the first decree, or of the second. 
Solution : If, on the declaration of reprisals, the party was cited and ap- 
peared, and judgement was given on the matter, then it is detained by virtue 
of the judgement ; ff. De re iudic., 1. a divo Pio. But if he does not appear, 
then, in the first place, licence to seize will be given by the first decree, in 
order that the annoyance may induce the party to appear ; and if he remains 
contumacious, then licence to detain will be given by the second decree. 



Of the form of executing reprisals. 

[Ch. clviii.] 

It remains to consider the form of executing reprisals declared, and 
on this many questions arise. 



Whether one to whom reprisals are granted may, on his own authority, or 

by the servants of the magistrate granting them, seize persons 

against whom they are declared ? 

And the first question is, whether one to whom reprisals are granted 
may, on his own authority, or by servants, seize persons against whom they 
are declared. Solution : Jacobus de Belvisio holds that he may not seize 
persons or property on his own authority, but only by judicial authority ; 
ff. De re iudicata, 1. miles. Others add that this is true only if recourse can 
be had to a judge ; otherwise he may act on his own authority ; ff. Quae in 
fraud, cred., 1. ait prestor, si debitor em ; C. De decur., 1. generali. And 
I think this true. Yet the conditions of the grant should be weighed and 
observed ; De rescriptis, cum dilecta ; and ff. Mandati, 1. diligen/er. 



FORMAL CAUSE OF REPRISALS 327 

Whether one who seizes persons and property is bound to present them to 
the judge, or may retain them for himself? 

[Ch. clix.] 

The second question is, whether one who seizes persons and property 
is bound to present them to the judge, or may retain them for himself. Solu- 
tion : Jacobus de Belvisio holds that he is bound to present them to the 
judge ; ff. De regul. iuris, 1. non est singulis ; the object being to prevent 
illegal exactions ; ff. De offic. prsesidis, 1. illicitas. Others say that this applies 
to persons captured, who ought to be brought before the judge ; C. De decur., 
1. generali ; and coll. x (?) , De pace iuramento firmata. But property will 
be seized by reason of the judgement, on the strength either ef the first 
or of the second decree, as was explained above, and will remain with the 
captor ; ff. Vt in poss. legatorum, 1. is cuius, qui legatorum. And for this 
there is no more need to go before a judge, for the first grant suffices. In all 
these matters I think the form of the grant should be weighed. 



Whether property seized on the strength of reprisals should be sold, and 
how, or whether it should be accepted in payment, or be valued ? 

[Ch. clx.] 

The third question is, whether and how property seized on the strength 
of reprisals should be sold, or whether it should be accepted in payment, or 
be valued. Solution : Some authorities say it is sold by the authority of 
a judge ; ff. De re iudicata, 1. miles, ii. A valuation will be made by the 
judge on request ; C. De iure dot., 1. ii ; and in arriving at the amount an 
allowance will be made for expenses ; ff. Ad. leg. Falc. 1. in quantitate ; and 
C. De iure deliberandi, 1. scimus, in computatione. And in these matters, 
too, I think that the form of the grant should be observed, as above. 



Whether a declaration of reprisals can be executed on holidays ? 

[Ch. clxi.] 

The fourth question is, whether a declaration of reprisals can be exe- 
cuted on holidays. Solution : They can be executed on days which are holidays 
because of human needs, just as judgements can ; C. De iudiciis, the last law. 
But if the days are holy out of reverence to God, then some authorities say 
that this may be done to prevent the loss of the whole grant, for instance, 
if the persons against whom they are granted are .... and only come on holidays. 
They quote ff. De fen, 1. i, and 1. ii ; and C. the same title, 1. ii. Otherwise not ; 
C. De feriis, 1. dies. I cannot accept the second part of this conclusion. For 
things seized on the occasion of reprisals are seized by virtue either of the first 



328 THE LAW OF WAR 

or of the second decree, or on the strength of the judgement, as was shown 
above. And all these are forbidden during such holidays ; 1. dies, already 
quoted. Also the law specially lays down that on holidays held for human 
needs, proceedings may be taken in those cases ; ff. De feriis, 1. i, and 1. ii. 
But on days which are holy out of reverence to God, no exception is made, 
and therefore the rule must be observed. 



// a man wishes to defend himself, or properly seized on the strength of 
reprisals, what jurisdiction should be invoked ? 
[Ch. clxii.] 

The fifth question is, If a man wishes to defend himself, or property 
seized on the strength of reprisals, what jurisdiction should be invoked ? 
Solution : Some authorities say that if a full execution has been made if, for 
instance, the property has been sold or given in payment then the ordinary 
jurisdiction is the proper one, and a man will not be heard if he invokes 
the extraordinary ; ff. De re iudicata, 1. a divo Pio, si post addictum. But 
if full execution has not been made, but is still pending, then he may invoke 
the extraordinary jurisdiction of the judge, which will cause an extract to 
be made of the records on the strength of which the reprisals were declared, 
and he may set up a defect in the claim of the person to whom they were 
granted, or a personal incapacity, or any of the other pleas which were 
mentioned above. They cite C. De edendo, 1. ii ; and C. Vt lite pendente, 
1. ii ; and ff. De edendo, 1. i. And on this, summary jurisdiction will be done. 
I cannot accept the second part of this conclusion. For if, when the reprisals 
were declared, the party was cited, and appeared, and took the usual steps 
in the proceedings, then it is clear that this conclusion cannot stand, because 
those " exceptions " should have been put forward from the first, and cannot 
be raised after judgement ; C. Sent, rescindi non posse, 1. peremptorias ; and 
C. De except., 1. si quidem ; and Extra., the same title, ch. pastoralis. But 
if, when they were declared, the party was contumaciously absent from the 
first or second decree, then the result is the same as that caused by the lapse 
of a year in a real action, because he will not be heard except by the ordinary 
procedure ; ff. De damn, infecto, 1. si finita, s plures ; and C. Quomodo et 
quando iudex, 1. consentaneum, and the note there ; and De dolo et contu- 
macia, ch. contingit. But it might be allowed at the first decree. 



Of the remedies of the person from whom the exaction is made. 

[Ch. clxiii.] 

The remedies of the person from whom the exaction is made belong 
to this part of the subject. And on this many questions arise. 



REMEDIES FOR REPRISALS 329 

Whether the person from whom the exaction is made has a remedy against 
the person for whose debt or wrong it was made ? 

And the first question is, whether the person from whom the exaction 
is made has a remedy against the person for whose wrong or debt it was 
made. Jacobus de Arena holds, on ff. De verb, oblig., 1. ii, that he has a 
remedy against the person on whose account reprisals were declared ; De neg. 
gest., 1. nam et Servius ; ff. Nautae caup. stabul., 1. licet, the last section ; ff. 
De his qui deiec. vel effus., 1. si vero, cum autem. Others say the contrary, 
on the authority of ff. De reg. iuris, 1. si quis dolo, i. For he suffered the 
exaction, not because of the private person, but because of the judge who 
denied justice, or did injustice. They say, therefore, that either the judge is 
the person from whom the exaction is made, because he did injustice, and then 
the judge has no remedy ; 1. si quis dolo, above ; or because he neglected to 
do justice, and then he has a remedy against the person of whom justice was 
required ; C. book x, De exact, trib., 1. missi, at the end. Or, thirdly, he is 
one of the people, and then the opinion of Jacobus holds ; ff . Nautae caup. 
stabul., 1. licet, at the end, &c. 



Whether the person from whom the exaction is made has a remedy against the 
ruler, as well as against the principal debtor ? 

[Ch. clxiv.] 

The second question is, whether the person from whom the exaction is 
made has a remedy against the ruler, as well as against the principal debtor, 
as was shown above. Solution : The principal debtor must first be sued ; 
and if he is not solvent, then the ruler, since he, too, himself becomes a debtor 
by refusing justice. That this order must be observed appears from ff. De 
magistr. conven., 1. i, at the beginning ; and C. De conven. fisci debitoribus, 
1. quoniam. Lastly, resort may be had to the officials, who might have obliged 
the ruler to do justice, but neglected to do so ; ff. De tut. et rati. distrahendis, 
1. i, nunc tractemus. 

Whether a person seized on the strength of reprisals may, on his own 

authority, seize persons belonging to the state in 

which he was seized ? 

[Ch. clxv.] 

The third question is, whether a person seized on the strength of reprisals 
may, on his own authority, seize persons belonging to the state in which he 
was seized. And it seems that he may, from ff. Quod quisque iuris, the whole 
title. The contrary is the true view ; for the title Quod quisque iuris applies 
in the execution of law, as, for instance, if one state has unlawfully declared 



330 THE LAW OF WAR 

reprisals against another, the other may do the like against the first. But it 
does not apply in the execution of an act and say that if I have robbed you, 
you may rob me, because that would be allowing retaliation. Against this, 
ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. scienliam, qui cum aliter. He must return, therefore, 
to his own state, and demand reprisals against the state in which he was seized. 



Whether reprisals can be granted by statutes, in cases not otherwise 
permitted by the common law ? 

[Ch. elxvi.] 

The fourth question is, whether reprisals may be granted by statutes, 
in cases not otherwise permitted by the common law. Solution : A state 
may grant them against countries fully subject to itself, even in cases not 
permitted by the common law ; but not against countries which are inde- 
pendent, or even allied, as to which see ff. De captivis, 1. non dubito. The 
reason is, that a grant of reprisals depends on the determination of a cause 
about injustice done, or justice denied, and in this one state cannot make 
rules against another, because " like against like," &c. Secondly, it depends 
upon whether recourse can be had to a superior of the party refusing to do 
justice. And on this matter one state cannot make rules against another. 
For it could not make a rule that reprisals should be declared, without appeal 
having been made to the superior of the party refusing to do justice. For 
that would be to destroy the jurisdiction of the superior ; De iureiurando, 
venientes. Thirdly, the authority of the superior who declares the reprisals 
is required, this authority being one which does not itself recognize a superior ; 
and on this a state may rule that, without that authority being appealed to, 
one person may be seized for another's debt ; C. book xi, De omni agro deserto ; 
just as there is a rule that in certain cases a wife is liable for the debt of her 
husband; C. In quibus [modis] causis pign. contrahitur, 1. satis; and a son 
for his father ; C. book xii, De primipilo, the last law. 



Whether a statute of a state, which ordains that a son is liable for the wrong 

of his father, may be executed against a son living outside the 

territory of that state ? 

The fifth question is, whether a statute of a state, which ordains that 
a son is liable for the wrong of his father, may be executed against a son 
living outside the territory of that state. Solution : Either the son was 
born at the time of the father's wrongful act ; and then either the question is 
whether the statute can be executed against the son living elsewhere, and it 
cannot ; ff. De re iudicata, 1. a divo Pio, the penultimate section ; and ff. De 
rebus, auctor. iudi. possidendis, 1. cum unus, [cum is] is qui ', or the question 



THE DUEL 33i 

is whether a " condiction " can be brought against him on the statute ; and it 
can, because an action follows the person against whom it lies ; C. De longi 
tempor. praescriptione, the last law. This is true, unless the son had acquired 
a domicile elsewhere before the commission of the wrong, or was absent by 
reason of a domicile of origin, because then the other state, as having priority, 
might protect him from the statute. But if the son is born after the com- 
mission of the wrong, then no action will lie against him. For the statute must 
be understood to refer to sons then existing ; ff. De noxal., 1. in delictis, si 
extraneus ; ff. De milit. testamento, 1. [si] Titius. My answer is the same, 
if the statute ordains that one citizen is liable for the wrong of another. A 
person newly become a citizen is not liable for old debts ; C. De decur., 1. 
providendum ; and note Dinus on ff. Ad municipalem, 1. incola. , 



Whether it may lawfully be agreed that one person is to be liable for another ? 

[Ch. clxvii.] 

The sixth question is, whether it may lawfully be agreed that one person 
is to be liable for another. Solution : By express agreement of private persons, 
no ; in Authent., Vt non fiant pignorationes. Even if one agrees that another 
over whom one has jurisdiction is to be liable ; C. Ne films pro patre, throughout. 
And although a lord cannot do this, yet the lord's judge may cause persons of 
such a condition to be seized. 



Of particular war waged for compur gallon, which is catted the " duel." 

[Ch. clxviii.] 

It remains now to consider the duel, in treating of which I shall first ask 
what a duel is ; secondly, how many kinds of duel there are ; thirdly, by what 
law it is allowed, and by what forbidden ; fourthly, for what reason it is 
allowed, and for what forbidden ; fifthly, for what causes a duel is lawful ; 
sixthly, between whom it is lawful ; seventhly, how it should be waged. 



What is a duel ? 

[Ch. clxix.] 

As regards the first question, I say that a duel is a corporeal fight between 
two persons, deliberate on both sides, designed for compurgation, glory, or 
exaggeration of hatred. I said a " fight." This is the genus to which it belongs. 
I said " deliberate on both sides." This distinguishes it from a fight in neces- 
sary self-defence, as to which see ff . De iustit. et iure, 1. ut vim ; C. Vnde vi, 1. i ; 
ff. De vi et vi arm., 1. i, vim vi ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. scientiam, qui cum 
aliier ; De restit. spoliat., ch. olim, i ; and Clemen., De homicidio, si furiosus, 

[34] 



332 THE LAW OF WAR 

For in a fight of that kind there is ordinarily no deliberation on the part of the 
attacked, but only on the part of the attacker, or on the part of neither, 
as appears from Clemen., si furiosus, just cited. But in a duel there is 
deliberation on both sides. I said " between two persons," because a fight 
is then properly called a duel, following the etymology of the word; Instit., 
De donat., est et aliud ; xvi, q. i, si cupis ; dist. xxi, cleros ; De praebend., 
cum secundum. " A fight between two persons," to distinguish it from 
contracts formed between two persons by mutual agreement of the parties ; 
Instit., De obligationibus, with the rescripts following. And I said 
" corporeal," to distinguish it from a judicial fight, which also takes place 
between two persons, as plaintiff and defendant ; C. De iudic., 1. rem 
non novam, patroni ; and the same title, 1. properandum ; and De 
verbor. significatione, ch. forus. For there the contest is not fought by 
the strength of the body, but by the laws ; see the laws just cited. I said 
" designed for compurgation, glory, or exaggeration of hatred " ; for this 
touches the end, and indicates the kinds of duel, as follows below. This, then, 
concludes the description of the genus of duel. 



How many kinds of duel are there ? 

[Ch. clxx.] 

As regards the second question, it must be noted that the duel, as above 
described, is regarded generally, and, as I suggested at the end of the descrip- 
tion, the kinds of duel are indicated by the words placed at the end ; for there 
are three kinds of duel. For a duel is fought either for exaggeration of hatred, 
or to win public glory by the strength of the body, or for the compurgation of 
some accusation brought. 

How a duel is fought for exaggeration of hatred. 

It is fought then for exaggeration of hatred, when men are induced by 
mere hatred, natural in its origin, and of that singular naturalness which 
natural philosophers call the " specific form," to exterminate one another. 
And I do not find that tliis duel is regulated by legal rules ; but it springs 
from natural first principles, as I shall at once show, and because it is approved 
by sensual experience. 

How a duel is fought to win public glory. 

It is fought, secondly, to win public glory, as in public spectacles, when 
two men prove their bodily strength in various ways. I find that this form of 
duel is regulated by both civil and canon law. By civil law : ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 
1. hoc actions, si quis in colluctatione ; C. book xi, De glad, toll., the single 
law ; C. De re iudic., 1. commodis ; ff. De his qui not. infam., 1. athlctce ; C. 



THREE KINDS OF DUEL 333 

De athletis, 1. i ; C. Quae res pign. obi. poss., 1. spem ; ff. De donat., 1. dona- 
tiones. Note the gloss on Instit., De haeredit. quae intest. defer., interdum. 
By canon law : De clericis pugnantibus in duello. But there it is also for 
compurgation ; De torneam., throughout. But it is not properly the duel, but 
the " pancratium " ; ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam, 1. hac actione, si quis in colluctatione. 



How a duel is fought for the compurgation of an accusation. 

It is also fought, thirdly, for compurgation ; that is to say, when an 
accusation is laid on a person, and the party challenging to the proof, either 
with or without other proofs, offers to prove it by his bodily strength, and a 
duel is fought, and the person challenged " purges " himself in this' way. And 
this also is regulated by law ; De cler. pugn. in duello, cited above ; De purga. 
vulgari, throughout ; ii, q. v, the whole question ; and in the Lombard law, 
to which I shall return when I discuss that part of the subject. 



By what law is the duel permitted, and by what forbidden ? 

[Ch. clxxi.] 

As regards the third question, namely, by what law the duel is introduced, 
it is well to explain the several kinds of duel above set forth, showing, as to 
each, by what law it is permitted, and by what forbidden. And first, of the 
duel which arises on account of exaggeration of natural hatred, as to which 
we must understand that this duel was introduced by natural law, in the sense 
of an instinct of nature proceeding from sensuality to some desired object, 
this being the second signification of the term, as the gloss notes on dist. i, 
IMS naturale ; and ff . De iustit. et iure, 1. i, ius autem naturale. And the duel 
itself is forbidden by natural law, in the sense of an instinct of nature proceeding 
from rational intelligence, which is called natural equity. There is also a third 
meaning of natural law ; see the canon quoted, ius naturale. It is also forbidden 
by natural law in the sense of the law containing the moral precepts of divine 
law, which is a fourth meaning of the term ; see the canon just quoted. This 
duel is also forbidden by positive law ; that is to say, by canon and civil law. 
Each of these points must be proved. 



How the duel which is fought for exaggeration of hatred is introduced by natural 
law, in the sense of an instinct of nature, proceeding from sensuality towards 
some desired object. 

I said that this form of duel is introduced by natural law, in the sense of 
an instinct of nature, proceeding from sensuality towards some desired object. 
This is demonstrated as follows : Whatever is productive of the immediate 
cause of an effect is consequently productive of that effect. But this natural 



334 THE LAW OF WAR 

law, originally inclining towards such desire, is the inducing cause of this 
sensual desire for duelling. Therefore it is the inducing cause of the duel. The 
major premise is proved. For whatever sufficiently imprcss< > itself on the 
cause of the productive cause thus remotely, impresses itself on the effect ; 
ff. Ad leg. Corn, de sicar., 1. nihil; C. the same title, 1. si quis nolandi ; dist. i, 
studeat ; and can. si quis viduam ; De homicidio, de cetera, and ch. presbytcrum. 
The minor premise is proved. For from natural disposition proceeding from 
natural first principles, both higher arid lower, come the various inclinations 
of men's desires. For, if any personal merit or demerit is eliminated, that 
which displeases me will naturally please you, and conversely ; and it is from 
natural disposition, if any accidental quality is eliminated, that a man loves 
and hates. Any one can test this in himself. But the cause of this is easily 
discovered, if we observe the celestial bodies. For persons who, at the tin 
their birth and at the moment of their birth, have a uniform corresponded e 
of the heavenly configuration, and whose paternal origins agree in complexion, 
are undoubtedly by nature the firmest friends. So if these signs are repugnant, 
they are one another's bitterest enemies. For uniform effect must follow from 
uniform cause ; C. Ad leg. Falc., the last law ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. illud ; ff. 
De fonte, 1. i ; De constit., translate ; and De translat. episcoporum, ch. inter 
corporalia. And yet here we must note that this natural enmity between man 
and man, as I said before, proceeds from a singular natural disposition, which 
natural philosophers call " the specific form." For if we observe the natural 
disposition of the human species, there ought to be friendship between men, 
on account of the uniformity of complexion related to the human form ; and 
on this account the laws say that between man and man there is a duty of 
humanity, to be observed on one side and the other ; ff. De servis expor., 1. 
si servus, at the end ; and C. De neg. gest., 1. officio, and the gloss there. And 
so this does not arise from the natural disposition of the species, because \\< 
do not find it existing naturally if we refer to the several species of animals. 
For between the several species of brutes there is a sort of treaty of union and 
cohabitation, because of the uniformity of complexion related to the specific 
form. But between species and species there is sometimes the extremity of 
repugnance, inducing one to exterminate the other ; for instance, between 
hawks and birds that are good for fowling, cats and mice, dogs and hares 
and so on. It proceeds, therefore, from some individual disposition of repug- 
nance of first principles, higher and lower. Any one may experience the effect 
in himself. Yet this disposition does not ordinarily induce a duel immediately, 
but only through intermediate acts to which the persons quickly proceed, 
though I believe that the repugnance of individual disposition might be so 
strong that men might proceed to a duel at sight. And this happens when men 
are ruled by sensuality alone, and not by any consideration of reason. From 
this discussion we may infer how this form of duel is introduced by natural 
law, understood in the sense explained. 



THE DUEL OF HATRED 335 

How the duel which is fought for exaggeration of hatred, is forbidden by natural 
law, in the sense of rational intelligence, and by divine law, canon law, and 
civil law. 

[Ch. clxxii.] 

It remains to consider what I said in the second place on this subject. 
For I said that this duel was forbidden by natural law, in the sense of rational 
intelligence, and therefore by the law of nations ; and by natural law in so far 
as it contains the moral precepts of the divine law ; and by canon law, and 
civil law. This may be demonstrated more clearly than day, beginning with 
the divine law. For one of the precepts of the Decalogue is, " Thou shalt not 
kill " ; and thus it is forbidden by the divine law, and this is the ordinary rule. 
And if the instance of Jephthah be cited, who killed his daughter, and yet did 
not sin, by divine law ; Judges, ch. xi ; xxii, q. iv, unusquisque ; xxiii, q. v, 
si non licet ; and of Samson, who killed many persons, and himself ; Judges, 
ch. xvi ; xxiii, q. v, si non licet ; they prove nothing to the contrary, because 
these acts were inspired by the Holy Spirit, as Augustine writes in the first 
book of the De Civitate Dei, quoted in xxiii, q. v, ch. si non Heel. So, therefore, 
it is forbidden by divine law by the precept, " Thou shalt not kill " ; Deutero- 
nomy, ch. v. It is also forbidden by canon law ; De homicid. volunt., dist. i, 
throughout ; xxiii, q. v, si non licet. It is also forbidden by civil law ; ff. Ad 
leg. Corn, de sicar. ; and C. the same title, throughout. And if you say that 
those laws forbid voluntary homicide, and therefore the kind of duel from which 
voluntary homicide arises, but that homicide arising from the duel which is 
introduced by natural disposition is not voluntary, being introduced naturally, 
and that therefore those laws do not conclude this case, the solution is ready 
to hand. For although it is introduced by a natural bodily disposition, yet 
the dictates of natural intelligence dispose to the contrary. And the latter 
should be obeyed ; for the natural disposition does not compel, but the will 
remains free ; xxiii, q. iv, De Tyriis ; and ch. Nabuchodonosor ; and De Pcenit., 
dist. ii, ch. sicut enim ; and the Philosopher, Ethics, iii. Even astrologers too, 
who demonstrate this more effectively, assert the same. Hence Ptolemy says, 
in the Centiloquium, tenth phrase, " a wise soul dominates the stars." So, 
therefore, although the bodily disposition proceeds from a natural first principle, 
yet natural intelligence remains, and disposes to the contrary. So it might be 
said of the several kinds of moral vices. For particular men are naturally 
inclined to particular vices : some are proud, some luxurious, some miserly, 
and so on. Yet they are not excused, because they are not actually compelled ; 
xxiii, q. iv, ch. Nabuchodonosor. Hence the saying of the Philosopher in De 
anima, iii, the treatise on motion, that between sensitive and intellectual 
appetite there is sometimes opposition. For the sensitive tends in one direc- 
tion, the intellectual in another ; and if the intellect prevails over sense, the 
motion is rational and natural, as if a higher sphere moves a lower. But if the 
contrary happens, the motion is contrary to nature, as if a lower sphere moves 



336 THE LAW OF WAR 

a higher ; for although the motion of sense proceeds from nature, inclining to 
vice, yet it is contrary to nature, if sense does not obey intellect, as a subject 
its lord, as the same Philosopher says in the first book of the Politics. This 
kind of duel is also forbidden by natural law, in the sense of natural intelligence, 
which is the same thing as the law of nations. This is proved as follows : For 
common and natural equity springs from natural intelligence, disposing it to 
the conservation of the universe ; and thence positive law had its origin, nay, 
it would be truer to say, it is itself the equity of natural law with some additions 
or omissions ; ff. De iustit. et hire. 1. ius civile. Since, therefore, this natural 
equity tends to the conservation of the universe, it reprobates the extermina- 
tion of a man, which is a thing tending to the destruction of the world ; and I 
speak of extermination tending to the destruction of the world, because the 
extermination of some men tends to the conservation of the world, for instance, 
when bad men are exterminated. For on this account it is in the interest of the 
commonwealth that they should be punished ; ff . De publ. et vecti., 1. licitatio ; 
ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. it a vulneratus, at the end ; ff. De fideiuss., 1. si a reo ; De 
sent, excom., utfamce. From this discussion we may clearly infer how this kind 
of duel is forbidden by divine law, by the law of nations, by canon law, and 
by civil law. 

How the duel which is fought for the sake of glory is introduced by natural 
law, in the sense of an instinct of nature proceeding from sensuality. 

[Ch. clxxiii.] 

It remains to consider what law introduced, and what forbids, a duel 
fought for the sake of the glory of victory at a public spectacle. And I say 
that this kind of duel was introduced by natural law, in the second signification 
of the term that is to say, an instinct of nature proceeding from sensuality 
but that it is forbidden by natural law in the sense of the law of nations and 
the divine law. It is also forbidden by canon law and civil law with qualifi- 
cations, however, as I shall show presently. Let us demonstrate each of these 
statements. I said that it was introduced by natural law in its second significa- 
tion. This is proved by the arguments set forth in the last section. For sensual 
inclination proceeding from natural first principles induced to the trial of bodily 
strength merely to win glory. Therefore it induces this kind of duel which 
proceeds from that cause, since a producing cause produces its effect ; see the 
laws cited in the last section. This kind of duel, however, is less hateful than 
the first kind, if we regard the end of each. For the first kind of duel has 
extermination for its end, by reason of abiding natural enmity. But the present 
kind does not necessarily lead to extermination, but to victory, which may be 
won without extermination. Therefore it is less hateful, since men's acts are 
distinguished according to the ends intended ; ff. De furtis, 1. verum, and 1. qui 
iniuries ; ff. De [fal.] furtis, 1. qui ea mente ; xv, q. vi, ch. i ; xiv, q. v, quidquid ; 
De sent, excom., cum volunlate. Hence it is that the Philosopher says in Ethics, 



THE DUEL OF HONOUR 337 

iv, that one who commits fornication with a woman that he may get money 
thereby, is not an adulterer, but a miser. It follows, therefore, that if we 
weigh the end, this kind is less hateful than the former. This is confirmed by 
the following consideration : The first kind arises from hatred, which in itself 
is detestable, if it arises without reasonable cause, as it does there. But this 
kind of duel arises without hatred. For even natural friends would fight duels 
at a spectacle to the end of winning glory. It is confirmed as follows : A thing 
which is less far removed from natural equity, is less hateful ; but this second 
kind of duel is less far removed from natural equity. Therefore, &c. The 
major premise is proved. For detestation and approbation of acts proceed 
from natural equity, on which are founded the prohibitions and permissions 
of the law ; ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. IMS civile ; and dist. i, can. ius nafurale. The 
minor premise is proved. For this duel departs from the equity of natural law 
only because the killing of a man might follow from it, which is an act tending 
to the destruction of the universe, upon which equity the prohibition of the 
new civil law is founded ; C. book xi, De gladiat., the single law. But it was 
not prohibited by the old law, because proceedings against persons killing one 
another in this way were remitted ; ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam, 1. [hac] qua actione, 
si quis in colluctatione. But the first kind is far removed from natural equity. 
In the first place, because it tends to the necessary extermination of one or 
both. It differs also in being inspired by hatred, which natural equity abhors, 
if it arises without cause. Therefore it is more detestable. This is confirmed 
as follows : That which is wholly injurious and beneficial in nothing, is more 
hateful than that which is partly beneficial and partly injurious. But the 
first kind is wholly injurious, and beneficial in nothing ; but this second kind 
is partly beneficial. The major is clear. For acts are classed as laudable and 
blameworthy by reason of the laudability and blameworthiness of their ends, 
since in such matters the end is weighed ; ff. De ritu nupt., si quis in senatorio ; 
ff. De iure fisci, 1. non intelligitur , siquispalam ; ff. De iudiciis, 1. cumfuriosus. 
The minor is proved. For the first kind has for its sole object mutual extermina- 
tion, which is injurious ; but the second takes place in a public spectacle for 
the pleasure and recreation of the people. And this is why games and spectacles 
are permitted ; C. book xi, De spectacul. et scaenic. et lenon., the whole title, 
except the last law ; and C. De expen. ludor., the single law ; a Greek consti- 
tution. This discussion leads to the conclusion that this kind of duel was intro- 
duced by natural law, in the second signification of the term, and that it is 
less hateful than the first kind. 



How the duel which is fought for the sake of glory is forbidden 
by divine law. 

[Ch. clxxiv.] 

It remains to consider how this kind of duel is forbidden. And I said that 
it was forbidden by divine law, by the law of nations, and by positive law, 



338 THE LAW OF WAR 

that is, by canon law and civil law. Now that it is forbidden by divine law 
may be proved thus : For when a thing is forbidden by any law, everything 
which leads to that thing is also forbidden. But homicide is forbidden by 
divine law, and this kind of duel leads to homicide. Therefore, &c. The major 
premise is proved by ff. De sponsal., 1. oratio ; fi. De fideius., 1. cum lex ; C. De 
usuris, 1. eos, at the end ; C. De usuris rei iudic., the last law, at the end ; ff. De 
pet. haered., 1. sed si lege, item veniunt ; ff. De mino., 1. iii, sed utrum. The 
minor is proved by Deuteronomy, ch. v, "Thou shalt not kill." But that 
this kind of duel leads to homicide is clearer than day. This is confirmed 
as follows : An act which is alien from the fountain of charity, is forbidden 
by divine law; and this kind of duelling is so alien. Therefore, &c. The 
major is proved ; for charity is the foundation of all the virtues, and excludes 
the vices ; De Pcenit., dist. ii, cantos est, and ch. ergo, and the first part 
of that "distinctio" throughout; and so a thing which is alien from 
charity savours of the nature of sin, and is therefore forbidden by divine 
law. The minor is proved. For charity is the love of God, and of one's 
neighbour as oneself; De Poenit., dist. ii, ch. proximos; but one who fights 
a duel at a spectacle fights in order to conquer his neighbour, and so loves him 
not. Therefore it is forbidden by divine law. 



How the duel which is fought for the sake of glory is forbidden 
by the law of nations. 

I said, too, that it was forbidden by the law gf nations. This is proved 
as follows : An act which tends to the destruction of the universe is forbidden 
by the law of nations. This kind of duelling is such an act. Therefore, &c. The 
major is proved as follows : Natural equity, on which the law of nations is 
founded, tends to the conservation and increase of the universe ; ff. De iustit. 
et iure, 1. i, ius naturale ; and ff. the same title, 1. ex hoc iure. The minor 
is proved thus : This kind of duelling tends to the destruction and extermina- 
tion of a man, who is the noblest part of the universe, nay, who is the end of 
things created ; ff. De usuris, 1. in pecudum ; therefore it is forbidden by the 
law of nations. This is confirmed thus : An act which is opposed to the pre- 
cepts of natural equity, which is the law of nations itself, or its foundation, 
is forbidden by the law of nations. This kind of duelling is so opposed. There- 
fore, &c. The major is proved thus : Everything whose opposite is commanded 
is forbidden by the law of nations, since the same rule applies to opposites ; 
ff. De his qui sunt sui vel alien, iuris, 1. i ; Instit., the same title, at the beginning ; 
dist. xxxii, hospitiolum. The minor is proved thus : It is one of the precepts 
of the law of nations, that a man is not to be enriched at another's expense ; 
ff. De condic. indebiti, 1. nam hoc ; and Sext, De regul. iur., rule locupletari. 
It is also a precept of the law of nations, that you should not do to another 
what you do not wish to be done to yourself ; see the beginning of the Decreta ; 



THE DUEL OF HONOUR 339 

but this kind of duelling is opposed to both precepts. And in the first place, 
it is opposed to the first precept because the duellist seeks glory from the 
disgrace of his fellow and neighbour, and he would not wish this to be done to 
himself ; therefore it is forbidden by the law of nations. This is confirmed 
thus : An act which is a kind of unlawful war is forbidden by the law of nations. 
This kind of duelling is so. Therefore, &c. The major is proved, because only 
lawful war has been introduced by law ; ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ex hoc iure ; 
and ff . De captivis, 1. hostes. The minor is obvious. For a duel is not a war 
declared by the authority of a prince, nor for necessary defence. Therefore, &c. 
From this we may infer that this kind of duelling is forbidden by the law of 
nations. But the following objection will at once be raised to the foregoing 
arguments. This kind of duelling takes place for a test of fortitude, and 
fortitude is a moral virtue, nay, even a cardinal virtue. But neither moral 
virtues nor their exercise are forbidden by the law of nations. Therefore the 
conclusions just reached do not stand. But that there are, here, acts of true 
fortitude, which is a moral virtue, is obvious. For in this kind of duelling 
there are waiting and attack. Solution : In the examination of this contrary 
conclusion we must observe that there is a true fortitude, which is a moral and 
a cardinal virtue, and that neither it nor its operation is forbidden by the law 
of nations. There are also counterfeit forms of fortitude, as to which see the 
Philosopher, Ethics, iv, treatise on fortitude, which participate in the acts of 
attacking and awaiting, and are five in number. For some men attack on 
account of the fear of punishment, because those who flee from a war are 
punished. Others attack on account of their experience in the art of war, as 
mercenaries ; and these, as they readily attack, so they readily flee, as the 
Philosopher says in the passage above cited. Others attack on account of 
anger, without weighing the danger. Others attack on account of hope, not 
believing in the presence of danger, and would not attack if they thought 
that danger was present. Others attack for the sake of winning the world's 
applause, because it is usual to praise the brave, and to scorn the timid. These 
five qualities are counterfeit imitations of true fortitude, which is a true moral 
and cardinal virtue. But for true fortitude these conditions are required ; 
namely : that a man should act knowingly, for an act done in ignorance is 
not an act of virtue, because prudence ought to control every act of virtue ; 
secondly, he must act from choice ; thirdly, he must choose the act for its own 
sake, that is to say, for the sake of the goodness and worth of the act in itself, 
and not for the sake of something extrinsic to it ; fourthly, he must act firmly 
and gladly. All the counterfeit forms mentioned above fall short, more or less, of 
the true form. But they all fall short in this, that those who act according to 
them, do not act for the sake of the act itself, that is, for the sake of its goodness 
and worth. So in the case proposed ; those who do the acts of attacking and 
awaiting in this kind of duel, do them for the sake of glory, not for the sake 
of the goodness and worth of the act in itself ; nor, again, are they acting 
herein in performance of any duty. These arguments are collected from the 

[35] 



340 THE LAW OF WAR 

Philosopher's treatise on fortitude, Ethics, iv. We may conclude, therefore, 
from the foregoing, that this kind of duelling is forbidden by the law of 
nations. 



How the duel which is fought for the sake of glory is forbidden by canon 

and civil law. 

I said that this kind of duel is forbidden by canon and civil law. Clearly 
it is so by canon law, since that law, in its prohibitions and permissions, 
imitates the paths of divine law, by which this duel is forbidden, as I showed 
above. It is also proved by De pugnan. in duello, the red and black, although 
there clerks are referred to, because the same rule applies to all. It is better 
proved by the title De torneamentis, where burial is denied to those who die 
in tournaments. This, then, is clear. But how it is forbidden by civil law 
must be considered at some length, because this kind of duel seems to have 
been allowed by the old law of the Digest. This is proved by the text of 
ff . Ad leg. Aquil. , 1. hoc actione, si quis in colluctatione site in pancratia, where 
it appears that a penal action does not lie against one who kills another in 
a duel of pugilists. It appears to be forbidden by a new law of the Code, as 
is proved by the text of C. book xi, De gladiat., the single law. What, then, 
shall we say ? Shall we say that the old law has been amended by the new ? 
ff. De legibus, 1. non esl novum. Here I think we should observe that a fight 
is not necessarily bloody, where it does not tend to the shedding of blood, as 
when men wrestle with their arms, or the like ; and I do not find that this 
kind of wrestling is forbidden by the civil law, either old or new ; nay, the 
new law even permits spectacles for the recreation of the people ; C. book xi, 
De spectac., the whole title, except 1. lenones ; and C. the same book, De ex- 
pen, ludorum, throughout. But a fight may tend to the shedding of blood, as 
in tournaments and in a duel to the death ; and this is undoubtedly forbidden 
by the new law of the Code ; C. book xi, De gladiat. ; and the reason of the 
prohibition is suggested when it is proved that it is forbidden by divine law, 
and by the law of nations. But it appears to be permitted by the old law ; 
ff. Ad leg. Aquiliam, 1. hac actione, si quis in colluctatione. But perhaps you 
will make the following objection. You will say that this duel is forbidden 
by the law of nations ; but the civil law is not an equity different from the 
equity of the law of nations ; it is the equity of the law of nations itself, with 
details and limitations of its own added ; ff. De iustit. et iure, 1. ius civile ; 
therefore, if it is forbidden by the law of nations, it cannot be permitted by 
the civil law ; otherwise the civil law will be opposed to the law of nations. 
I have hesitated at this opposition ; but I have weighed the words, si quis 
in colluctatione, and the intention which I believe the legislator to have had. 
And by way of evidence I observe that permission may be of three kinds. 
It may be a simple permission, which remits and waives a penalty ; dist. iv, 
dcnique; for, as the gloss there notes, a remission of penalty, not of blame, 



THE DUEL OF COMPURGATION 341 

is there made. The second form of permission removes the obstacles to that 
which is permitted, as the text says that Jews are permitted to dwell among 
ourselves, for the obstacles which hinder them from being able to dwell with 
us according to their rites are removed ; dist. xlv, qui sincera. A third form 
of permission is also found, which assists the act which is permitted ; for 
example, we say that the Church sometimes permits a clerk to be put to death 
by a secular judge, by affording assistance, because it actually hands him 
over, De iudic., ch. cum non ab homine ; De crim. falsi, ch. ad falsariorum ; 
and De verb, significatione, ch. novimus. The second form of permission adds 
something to the first, because it removes an obstacle, which the first did not, 
for it only remitted a penalty. The third adds something to the second, 
because it assists the permitted act, which the second did not, for it only 
removed obstacles. Now to apply the words to the case in point, if I rightly 
understand the section, si quis in colluctatione, the text there remits the 
penalty on one who kills another in a wrestle, and it adds the reason, which 
is that the injury is not intentional. The permission given will therefore be 
the first form, which remits a penalty, but I nowhere find the law providing 
that this duel is permitted by the second or third forms of permission. But 
there is no opposition if the law of nations forbids, and the civil law remits 
the penalty ; for the civil law, which imposes a penalty for homicide, imposes 
it for an intentional act ; and so, as intention is here wanting, the civil law 
remits the penalty, as shown above. From this discussion we may infer by 
what law this kind of duel is forbidden, and by what it is permitted. 



For what reason is the duel permitted, and for what is it forbidden ? 

[Ch. clxxv.] 

In the fourth division of the subject, which asks for what reason it is 
permitted, and for what forbidden, we must consider what law forbids, and 
what permits, the duel of compurgation. And this is properly and strictly 
called " duel " in ordinary usage. And I say that the duel is forbidden by 
divine law, and by the law of nations, and by positive law. By the canon 
law, without exception. By the civil law, as a general rule ; but it is permitted 
in certain cases by the Lombard law, as I shall show when I discuss them. 



How the duel of compurgation is forbidden by divine law. 

That this duel is forbidden by divine law is proved as follows : An act 
which is a temptation of God is forbidden by divine law. But this duel is so. 
Therefore, &c. The major is proved by the precept, " Thou shalt not tempt 
the Lord thy God." The minor is proved ; for God is tempted when anything 
against nature, which is not possible except by a divine miracle, is asked of 



342 THE LAW OF WAR 

Him, as it is directly in this duel of compurgation. For it is natural that 
a stronger and more skilful man should conquer a less strong and less skilful ; 
nor can the contrary happen in the natural order of things. But sometimes 
the less strong and less skilful has justice on his side ; and by the duel we ask 
that he may obtain the victory, and his justice be declared. So, therefore, 
God is tempted to work a miracle. This is confirmed thus : An act which is 
invented by the contrivance of the Devil is forbidden by divine law. This 
duel is so. Therefore, &c. The major is proved. For nothing is common to 
God and the Devil, to light and darkness. The minor is proved by ii, q. v, ch. 
Mennam; and ch. consuluisti, in the same cause and question. This is con- 
firmed thus : An act by which an innocent person is condemned, is forbidden 
by divine law. This duel is such an act. Therefore, &c. The major is proved. 
For God does not wish the innocent to be condemned ; xxii, q. ii, ch. quterilur. 
The minor is proved by De purg. vulgari, ch. significantibus. Therefore, &c. 



How the duel of compurgation is forbidden by the law of nations. 

Secondly, I said that this duel is forbidden by the law of nations. This 
is proved as follows : An act which is opposed to natural equity, on which 
the law of nations is founded, is forbidden by the law of nations. But the 
duel of compurgation is such an act. Therefore, &c. The major is clear. The 
minor is proved ; for the equity of the law of nations dictates that offenders 
should be punished, the innocent acquitted. But in this duel the reverse 
sometimes occurs. Therefore it is forbidden by the law of nations. It is 
also opposed to the precept, " quod tibi non ius," at the beginning of the 
Decreta. 



How the duel of compurgation is forbidden by canon law. 

I said that it was also forbidden by canon law. This is clear from De purg. 
vulg., throughout ; De pugnan.. throughout ; ii, q. v, from ch. consuluisti to 
the end of the question. And the same reasons might be given which were 
given to prove that it is forbidden by divine law, since canon law follows the 
prohibitions and permissions of divine law. This is confirmed. And this 
proves also that it is forbidden by civil law. For an act which excludes the 
observance of positive law is forbidden by positive law. This duel does so. 
Therefore, &c. The major is proved. For if an observance is ordained by 
positive law, it follows that the exclusion of the observance is forbidden ; for 
as one rule governs one case, the opposite rule governs the 'opposite case ; 
ff. De his qui sunt sui vel al. iur., 1. i ; Instit., the same title, at the beginning ; 
dist. xxxii, hospitioltim. The minor is proved ; for positive law has provided 
actions, both civil and criminal, and a whole judicial system, whereby it pro- 
ceeds to declare the rights of parties ; C. DC iudiciis, 1. propcrandum ; Authcnt., 



THE DUEL OF COMPURGATION . 343 

offeratur ; C. De litis contest., the single law; C. De sentent. et interloc. omn. 
iudic., 1. prolatam; and De probationibus, ch. quoniam contra; so that every 
man may receive his due ; xii, q. ii, cum devotissimam ; ff . De iustit. et iure, 
1. iustitia ; and Instit., the same title, iustitia. But duelling utterly excludes 
this observance. Therefore this duel is forbidden by positive law. This is 
confirmed thus : An act whereby justice is denied to parties is forbidden by 
positive law ; but this duel is such an act. Therefore, &c. The major is proved, 
because positive laws are promulgated to this end by divine permission through 
the mouths of princes ; C. De long, tempo, prescript., the last law ; dist. viii, 
quo iure ; xvi, q. i, placuit. The minor is proved, because in this duel it 
sometimes happens that the innocent falls, and thus a wrong is inflicted on 
him ; and it sometimes happens that the guilty prevails and so justice is not 
done to the challenger. This discussion leads to the conclusion that this kind 
of duel, the object of which is the compurgation of an accusation, will be 
forbidden by positive law ; by canon law, without exception ; by civil law, 
as a general rule. 

How the duel of compurgation is forbidden by civil law, as a general rule. 

I said, also, that as a general rule this duel is forbidden by civil law. 
It is allowed, however, in two cases by the Lex Frederici, De pace tenenda 
et eius violatoribus ; for example, if a man kills another in times of peace, 
and there is no doubt about the homicide, he is punished by capital punish- 
ment as a breaker of the peace, unless he wishes to prove by a duel that he 
did the act in self-defence, and this is a special case in which the accused has 
an option of the duel. The other case is, that if a man wounds another in 
times of peace, he will be punished, unless he wishes to prove that he did it 
in self-defence. These two cases are in De pace tenenda et eius violatoribus, 
the single law, the first in si quis hominem infra pacem, the second in si quis 
alium, in the same law. But the Lombard law allows it in other cases, as 
I shall show below. This concludes the third principal part of this treatise, 
on the question what law introduced the duel, and what law forbids it, the 
several kinds of duel being distinguished. From the above, therefore, the 
explanation of the fourth part is clear, namely, for what reasons it is forbidden 
and permitted. For the first duel is forbidden by every law, and permitted 
by none ; and the reasons have appeared above. So in treating of the second, 
and of the third, I reduce the several matters debated in the several parts to 
this proposition. 



In what cases is the duel of compurgation permitted ? 

[Ch. clxxvi.] 

We must consider the fifth principal head, namely, in what cases the 
duel is permitted. Of the first kind, I have said that it is permitted in no 



344 THE LAW OF WAR 

case. Of the second kind, I have said in what sense it is permitted. We must 
now consider the third kind, since the Lombard law permits it in several 
cases, and devote the rest of the treatise to this third kind alone. 



How the Lombard law permits tlu duel of compurgation in twenty cases. 

We must ask, then, in what cases this duel is permitted, besides the two 
noted above, which are found in the Lex Frederici, De pace tenenda et eius 
violatoribus. Solution : Duel is permitted on a charge under the lex lulia 
maiestatis, when one man brings that charge against another ; Lombarda, 
De publicis criminibus, 1. si quis, the last law. Secondly, when a wife is charged 
with having been privy to the death of her husband ; Lombarda, De consilio 
mortis, 1. si mulier, the last law. Thirdly, in the wrong of " cucurbitatio," if 
one calls another " cucurbita " ; Lombarda, De conviciis, 1. si quis alium. 
The fourth case is where a homicide is committed during a truce ; Lombarda, 
De homicidio, 1. qui intra treugam. The fifth is for a homicide committed by 
stealth ; Lombarda, De homicidio, 1. liber homo. The sixth is in a charge of 
parricide, if it is said to have been committed out of desire for the dead man's 
goods ; Lombarda, De parricidio, the last law, at the end. The seventh con- 
cerns a theft by a slave, if the master should deny that his slave committed 
the theft ; Lombarda, De furtis, 1. si quis alium, which, according to some, 
was a law " convalcosiana." The eighth is on a charge of adultery, as if one 
is accused of having committed adultery with another's wife ; Lombarda, 
De adulterio, 1. iii. The ninth is if a man says that adultery has been com- 
mitted with a woman, and wishes to prove it in this way ; Lombarda, De 
iniur. mulier., 1. ii, si quis puellam. The tenth is if it is said that a man has 
wrongfully possessed a movable or immovable thing for thirty years ; Lom- 
barda, De praescript., 1. si quis alium. The eleventh is between conflicting 
witnesses ; Lombarda, De testi., 1. si quis cum altero ; which is allowed if the 
witnesses are called by opposite parties ; if by the same party, there is no duel. 
For either the plaintiff proves his case, and the defendant is condemned, or 
he proves nothing, and the defendant is acquitted. But if they are called by 
opposite parties, and in other respects the sides are equal, then a duel takes 
place. The twelfth case is for a father's debt, against a son who denies it ; 
Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, et in quibus casibus pugna prohiberi vel 
fieri debeat, 1. si quis post mortem. And the true meaning of that law is that 
it refers to a debt arising from delict. The thirteenth case is for arson, if 
action is brought against the wrong-doer ; Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defcn., 
etc., 1. si quis alium. But a duel does not take place if action is brought against 
an accessory ; Lombarda, De consiliis illicitis, the single law, at the end. The 
fourteenth is for adultery, as if a husband says that his wife is an adulteress ; 
Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, etc., 1. si quis uxorem. The fifteenth 
is if a husband suspects that another has misconducted himself with his wife ; 



THE DUEL IN LOMBARD LAW 345 

and by misconduct the law means carnal intercourse ; Lombarda, Qualiter 
quis se defendat, etc., si quis amodo. The sixteenth is for perjury ; Lombarda, 
Qualiter quis se defendat, etc., 1. de furto. The seventeenth case is a duel for 
" investiture," as when one man says that he was invested first, and was 
ejected from possession, and another says the same ; 1. de investitura. The 
eighteenth is for the denial of a deposit, as where more than twenty solidi 
have been deposited ; 1. si quis pro se. The nineteenth is where a man is 
accused of having extorted a charter by violence ; Lombarda, Qualiter quis 
se defendat, etc., 1. si quis dixit. The twentieth and last case is a duel on 
a claim for a slave's freedom ; 1. si servus. Some say that this law was 
" convalcosiana." 

X' 

Between whom should a duel be fought ? 

[Ch. clxxvii.] 

We must consider the sixth principal head, namely, between whom a duel 
may be fought. 

How the duel of computation should generally be fought between principals. 

And I say that the rule of the Lombard law, which allows a duel in the 
cases above mentioned, is that a duel should be between principals. But to 
this rule there are eight exceptions. First, if youth forbids it. Second, if 
the decrepitude of age, for therein is labour and pain. Third, if some infirmity 
prevents a party from fighting a duel. These three cases are found in Lom- 
barda, Qualiter quis se defendat, etc., 1. quacunque lege ; and De parricidio, 
the last law. The fourth is if a slave, who is in the quasi-possession of servitude, 
claims his freedom ; then the master fights by a champion ; Lombarda, 
Qualiter quis se defendat, etc., 1. si quis servum propter appetitum. The fifth 
is if the person is ecclesiastical ; for instance, where clerks or counts have 
causes against one another, or against others ; then they fight by champion ; 
Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, the last law. The sixth is where a woman 
is accused of adultery ; Lombarda, the same title, 1. si quis uxorem. The 
seventh is if the witnesses of the plaintiff contradict the witnesses of the defen- 
dant ; then the witnesses of the plaintiff should choose a champion, and the 
witnesses of the defendant another . . . (?) ; Lombarda, the same title, 1. si 
quis cum altero. The eighth is if a slave is accused of theft ; Lombarda, De 
furtis, 1. si servus, dum de furto. To-day, however, by custom any one is 
permitted to have a champion. 



How is a duel to be fought ? 

[Ch. clxxviii.] 

We must consider the seventh principal head, namely, how a duel is to 
be fought. 



346 THE LAW OF WAR 



How the duel of computation is modelled on a contentious trial. 

And here I premise that a duel is modelled on a contentious trial ; for 
just as in a trial there are plaintiff, defendant, judge, instruments supporting 
the case, by means of which, taken in the wide sense as including everything 
which supports the case ; ft De fide instrum., 1. i ; a declaration of the truth 
is arrived at, so that a definite judgement may be pronounced, so in a duel 
there are plaintiff and defendant, that is, challenger and challenged, judge, 
and " instruments," that is, arms, with which the parties strike one another. 
For just as in a trial one party convicts the other by means of witnesses, 
documents, and confessions ; De restit. spol., cum ad sedem ; so in a duel he 
convicts him by bodily arms ; and as in the trial one is convicted in the event 
of condemnation, so in like manner one is convicted in the duel. We must 
therefore examine this trial by duel, on the analogy of a contentious trial. 



11 "hether an oath " de astu " should be taken in a duel, and by whom ? 

[Ch. clxxix.] 

And first I ask whether an oath " de astu " should be taken, and whether 
by the challenger and the challenged, or by one of them, and by whom ? 
Now an oath " de astu " in this trial is the same thing as an oath " de calumhia " 
in a contentious trial in a civil or ecclesiastical court. And it appears that both 
should swear an oath. For the oath " de calumnia " is taken in a contentious 
trial by the plaintiff and the defendant ; C. De iur. calunm., 1. i, and 1. ii ; 
and Authent., the same title, principals ; Extra., the same title, throughout. 
So in like manner here, since there is the same reason, there is the same dis- 
position of law ; ff. Ad leg. Aquil., 1. illud ; C. Ad leg. Falc., the last law ; 
De constitut., translate; and similar passages. Solution : There have been 
various opinions on this point, if we regard the Lombard law. One opinion, 
said to have been that of the Mantuans, was that in this trial by duel an oath 
" de astu " is taken by both parties, both plaintiff and defendant ; and 
according to them, all laws which speak of not taking the oaith " de astu " 
are amended. They cite Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. mentio. But 
that law has four possible meanings. One, that it refers to conflicting wit- 
nesses, that there should rather be a duel than they should perjure themselves. 
The second, that it refers to two persons claiming to be in possession, that they 
should fight a duel instead of giving up possession. The third, that it refers 
to one against whom an oath that he has committed theft has been taken, 
who wishes to swear the contrary. The fourth, when two persons are litigating 
before a judge, and one swears that he has taken an oath, and the other wishes 
to swear the contrary. Their view seems to be disapproved, because the law 
did not require an oath from the defendant, so that the plaintiff only takes an 



TRIAL BY DUEL 347 

oath ; Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. si quis alium astu. There is 
an exception when a duel is fought because of a conflict of witnesses ; Lom- 
barda, De testi., the last law ; and Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. si quis cum 
olio. A second opinion was that of Carolus Beneventanus, who wished to 
distinguish between one who comes to the duel in a cause entirely concerning 
himself, and one who comes in a cause directly concerning another, or con- 
cerning another primarily and himself only secondarily. In the first case, 
as when a man challenges another for theft or arson done to himself, or 
adultery with his wife, he says it is material to note whether the challenger 
says, " you have committed," or " I suspect that you have committed." In 
the first case, he ought to swear that the thing is so. In the second case, he 
ought to swear that he has a just suspicion ; and when he challenges-on grounds 
of suspicion, he ought to adduce the reason of his suspicion ; for instance, 
that he saw the man speaking with his wife, and so on. But if a man challenges 
another to a duel in a cause which concerns another that is, not for any 
wrong committed against himself, but for one against another, as when a man 
challenges on a charge of treason then, when he comes forward as a witness, 
he ought to swear that the thing is so, just as a witness takes an oath ; C. De 
testi., 1. iurisiurandi ; De testi., ch. tuis, and ch. cum nuntius ; and similar 
passages. And so he says that the defendant should swear that the thing 
is not so. This opinion, so far as it concerns the oath of the defendant, is 
disapproved, as I showed just now. A third opinion, said to have been that 
of the Papienses, was, that no oath should be taken by the defendant and 
the challenged, but only by the plaintiff. As to the plaintiff, this is proved by 
Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. si quis astu. As to the defendant, 
it is proved thus : The defendant is bound to one of two things, either to 
fight, or, if he refuses, to be condemned. Therefore an oath on his part has 
no effect, and so should be omitted as superfluous ; C. De appel., 1. ampliorem, 
in refutatoriis ; ff . De procuratoribus, 1. non cogendum, Sabinus. A fourth 
opinion, which was that of a certain Albertus, was that the plaintiff always 
takes an oath except on a charge of treason, and when witnesses are in conflict, 
and on a question of the investiture of an estate. As to the accused, he agrees 
with the others, except with the Papienses. And I believe it is tnie that the 
plaintiff takes an oath as a general rule, except in the cases above mentioned. 
And the reason is, that the defendant may be compelled to clear himself, 
although there is as yet no judgement against him ; but the laws indeed require 
that he should at least be " infamis," and then, if his proofs fail, he is liable 
to compurgation ; De purgat. canon., throughout; ii, q. iv, throughout; De 
accusat., qualiter ii, and this passage should be noted there. So, then, by the 
Lombard law, which permits a duel in the cases above enumerated, an oath, 
at least on the part of the plaintiff, should precede ; and the oath should 
conform to the terms of the challenge, so that, if the challenge asserts a fact, 
he should swear to a fact ; if a suspicion, he should swear to this, just as 
a difference is noted between an oath " de calumnia " and an oath " de 
[36] 



348 THE LAW OF WAR 

veritate," the one asserting belief, the other a fact, as Carolus pointed 
out. But as to the defendant, I can conceive no reason for an oath being 
necessary. 



Whether when one party has a champion in the cases allowed by law, the 
other party may have one too ? 

[Ch. clxxx.] 

Secondly, I ask whether, if one of the parties has a champion, in the 
cases allowed by the Lombard law, which are eight in number, as I noted 
above, the other party may then have a champion too. Solution : There 
have been various opinions on this question. Some authorities say that he 
may. They cite Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. quicunque. There 
is an exception in the case where a slave contends against his master. A 
second opinion was that the other party may not. The reason given is this : 
For the law allows a champion in three cases ; therefore it refuses it in others ; 
ff. De legi., 1. ins singulare ; ff. Ad municip., 1. i ; ff. Solut. matrimon., 1. 
si cum dotem ; C. De procur., 1. maritus ; De translatione pralatorum, ch. 
inter corporalia ; and similar passages. I think that here we must observe 
that this trial by duel differs from a contentious trial in this, that in a con- 
tentious trial a party is ordinarily represented by another, and for this reason 
the use of " procurators" was introduced; ff. Deprocurat.,1. i, [and 1.] MSS ; 
but in a duel the party ordinarily appears in person, and in this a duel resembles 
a criminal trial, in which a " procurator " does not appear to plead the cause ; 
ff. De public, iudic., the penultimate law, qui ad crimcn ; and ff . De procurat., 
L servum quoque, publice ; and De accusationibus, ch. licet, and ch. veniens. 
And the reason is, that sentence of condemnation cannot be pronounced on 
the procurator, because he is innocent ; nor on the principal, because he is 
absent ; ff. De pcenis, 1. absentem. It is exactly the same in the duel ; for 
duellists fight to overthrow one another, in order that the truth may be elicited 
by this mode of proof. And so, as a rule, a champion does not appear, except 
in the permitted cases. If, then, a case arises in which one party has the right 
to a champion, but the other has not, the former alone will have a champion. 
But if both parties have the right, they will both have champions, unless we 
are to say that in order to preserve equality on the two sides, wherever one 
is allowed a champion the other may have one too ; C. De fruct. et lit. expensis, 
1. terminalo ; De mutuis petit., ch. i, and throughout the title ; Sext, De regul. 
iur., rule non licet ; and this latter view is more equitable ; but the former, 
which observes the rigour of the law, is more correct. 



DUEL BY CHAMPIONS 349 

How are champions to be given and assigned in cases where both 

parties are allowed them ? 

[Ch. clxxxi.] 

Thirdly, I ask, How are champions to be given and assigned in cases 
where both parties are allowed them ? Solution : Here I observe that cham- 
pions in a trial by duel are like advocates in a contentious court, and so I infer 
that, just as there ought to be an equal assignment of advocates in a conten- 
tious trial; C. De postul., 1. providendum ; so there ought to be an equal 
assignment of champions when both sides are allowed them. But when the 
principals fight, equality or inequality is not to be regarded, since they conduct 
their own case to an issue by their own bodily strength. / 



Whether any one may be allowed as a champion ? 

[Ch. clxxxii.] 

Fourthly, I ask whether any one may be allowed as a champion. Solution : 
As was said above, a champion is here like an advocate ; and therefore, just 
as any one is admitted to plead, unless he is a prohibited person ; ff. De postul., 
1. i ; so any one is admitted to the office of champion, unless he is disqualified 
by law. But a thief is disqualified ; Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 
1. si ut campionem. And the reason is, because he is " infamis " ; ff. De furt., 
1. non potest ; and if he is defeated, it is presumed to be by reason of his own 
wrong-doing ; so, too, other persons convicted of grave crimes are disqualified 
for the same reason. 



In whose election is the duel ? 

[Ch. clxxxiii.] 

Fifthly, I ask, In whose election is the duel ? Solution : As a rule, it is 
in the election of the plaintiff, on the analogy of a contentious trial. See 
Lombarda, Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. si quis amodo. There is an exception 
in a charge of treason, where the plaintiff may be compelled to fight ; and 
where one has used the expression " arga " ; Lombarda, De publicis criminibus, 
the last law ; and Lombarda, De iniur. mulier., 1. ii. 



How is the duel to be ordered ? 

[Ch. clxxxiv.] 

Sixthly, I ask, how the duel ought to be ordered. Solution : The law does 
not ordain, but custom prescribes, that a small but ample place should be 
chosen, in the city or outside ; and this place should be enclosed with ropes, 



350 THE LAW OF WAR 

so that, when the word is given, no one except the duellists may presume to 
enter, nor to make a disturbance, which might distract one of the parties. 
And the judge will be there, in a place whence he can see both combatants, 
and how one meets the other, in order that at the end he may pronounce 
whether one has been defeated in the duel. 



With what arms should the duel be fought ? 

[Ch. drav.] 

Seventhly, I ask with what arms the duel should be fought. Solution : 
The Lombard law allows shields and clubs ; Lombarda, De testi., 1. si quis 
cum altero ; and Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. mentio ; and these ought to be 
equal and presented by the judge. 



Whether, if the arms or the club of one of the combatants are broken, or 
fall, others ought to be given him ? 

[Ch. cboocvi.] 

Eighthly, I ask whether, if the arms or the club of one combatant are 
broken or fall, others ought to be given him. And it seems that they ought. 
For the text says that the fight is to be with clubs and shields ; Lombarda, 
Qualiter quis se defendat, 1. mentio ; and Lombarda, De testi., 1. si quis cum 
altero ; but if others should not be given him, it would not be with clubs. 
Therefore, &c. This is confirmed. For clubs in a duel are like witnesses and 
documents in a contentious trial ; but in a contentious court witnesses and docu- 
ments may be produced again, if the testimony of some of them is lost before 
publication and the making up of the depositions; Authent., De testi., si 
vero ; De testi., fraternitatis ; and Clemen., the same title, testibus. Some 
authorities agree to this if the arms are broken, but not if they fall ; for then, 
they say, the mishap should be imputed to the luck of the party. Others say 
that in no case are fresh arms to be given, but that any mishap is a matter of 
luck. Others say that the matter depends on custom. I think that the second 
opinion is true ; that is to say, that other arms should not be given, whether 
the first set fall, or are broken, unless there is a custom which can operate 
to the contrary ; ft De legi., 1. de quibus ; C. Quae sit long, consue., 1. ii ; dist. 
xi, consuetudinis ; dist. i, consuetudo. And the reason is this: For in a duel, 
as I said at the beginning of the treatise, we sometimes ask for what is contrary 
to nature, namely, that the less strong and less active of the parties should 
defeat the stronger and more active ; and this sometimes happens by the 
intervention of chance. Therefore each of the combatants should be left to 
submit to the chances to which they have freely exposed themselves ; otherwise 
the character of the dud of compurgation would be lost. This is confirmed. 



PROCEDURE IN THE DUEL 351 

For if we should say that new arms should be given, when the old arms fall, 
then by the like reasoning we should say that a combatant who falls should 
be raised up, which is absurd. For by these chances it sometimes happens 
that the stronger is defeated, and herein the judgement of heaven is shown. 



Which of the combatants ought to strike first ? 

[Ch. clxxxvii.] 

[ Ninthly, I ask, Who ought to strike first in a duel ? And it seems that the 
challenger should ; for this trial by duel is like a contentious trial, as I have 
often mentioned above. But in a contentious trial the plaintiff first delivers 
his " libel " to the defendant, and the defendant replies later ; C. De lit. con- 
testat., in Authent., offeratur ; and De libel, oblatione, ch. i. Therefore, by 
parity of reasoning, the challenger will first strike the challenged. On the 
other side is the argument that greater favour is to be shown to the defendant ; 
ff. De obi. et act., 1. Arrianus ; ff. De regul. iur., rule favorabiliores ; Sext, the 
same title, rule in pcenis. Solution : I think the first view is true, notwith- 
standing the citations to the contrary, because those laws refer to the end of 
the trial, when there remains only the definitive judgement; because then it is 
true that the defendant should be favoured. But at the beginning the plaintiff 
is to be favoured ; ff. De iudic., 1. si quis intentione ambigua ; and ff. De verb, 
obligationibus, 1. inter stipulantem. Or we might say that no order is to be 
observed in this, but that the combatants should be allowed to anticipate one 
another, or even to strike at the same time. 



Whether a duel not ended on the first day, may be ended 
on the following day ? 

[Ch. clxxxviii.] 

My tenth question is, whether, if a duel cannot be ended on the first day, 
it may be adjourned to the following day. Solution : I say that it may ; for 
I say that it should be renewed until it is finished. 



Whether one who fails in a duel is to be condemned to pay costs ? 

[Ch. clxxnx.] 

My eleventh question is, whether one who fails in a duel ought to be 
condemned to pay his adversary's costs. Solution : On the analogy of a con- 
tentious trial, in which the vanquished is condemned to pay the victor's 
costs ; C. De iudiciis, 1. proper andum, sin autem ; C. De fruct. et lit. expens., 
1. terminato ; De dolo et contum., ch. finem ; De poem's, ch. calumniam ; so 
in the duel we might say, " victus victori," &c. 



352 THE LAW OF WAR 

Whether, if the challenger fails in a duel, he is to be punished by the 
penally of retaliation ? 

[Ch. cxc.] 

My twelfth question is, whether, if the challenger fails in a duel, he is to 
be punished by the penalty of retaliation. Solution : On the analogy of a 
criminal contentious trial, where the penalty of retaliation is imposed on the 
accuser if he fails; De accus., ch. super his; the same title, ch. licet; and 
C. De accusat., the last law; so in a duel, when it is fought for public 
vindication, to punish one who has made an accusation. 



Whether one who has been challenged to a duel on account of an accusation, and 

has been defeated and condemned, may be charged with the same 

accusation in a contentious trial? 

[Ch. cxci.] 

My thirteenth question is, whether one who has been challenged to a duel 
on account of an accusation, and has been defeated and condemned, may be 
charged with the same accusation in a contentious trial. Solution : It might be 
said that he may, since the civil law does not approve, but utterly disapproves, 
of the duel of com purgation ; C. book xi, De glad., the single law ; and so does 
the canon law ; De pugnant. in duello ; and De purg. vulg., throughout ; as 
I have often pointed out above, at the beginning of the treatise. This phrase, 
" disapproved by law," precludes juridical discussion, and therefore it is no 
objection to say that the wrongful act of a person is not to be enquired into 
more than once ; ff. Naut. caup. stabul., 1. licet, at the end ; and De accusat., 
ch. de his ; because those laws refer to a case in which the former examination 
and discussion have been juridical, and so we may conclude that an acquittal 
by duel does not give rise to an " exceptio rei iudicatae " against one who 
wishes to bring an accusation in a contentious trial. This is true, unless the 
custom of the district is to the contrary, so that the Lombard law, for 
instance, is to be observed, whose disposition I have followed herein ; and the 
solutions of the preceding questions are to be limited accordingly. 



Whether one who challenges another to a duel on account of a public accusation, 
and withdraws from the duel, incurs the Turpilian penalty ? 

[Ch. cxcii.] 

My fourteenth question is, whether one who challenges another to a duel 
on account of a public accusation, and withdraws from the duel, incurs the 
Turpilian penalty. And it seems that he does, on the analogy of a criminal 
contentious trial ; ff. Ad Turpilianum, 1. i, si quis autem. Solution : At 
common law the question would not arise, since the common law disapproves 
of this mode of trial ; see above. But, according to the law which allows it, 



CHALLENGE TO THE DUEL 353 

we might say that on the same equitable grounds the man should be punished ; 
and I say that the matter is in the discretion of the judge, since the law is 
silent ; De offic. iudicis delegat., ch. de causis, at the end ; ff. De iur. delib., 
1. i. But I do not think he incurs the Turpilian penalty, since penalties are 
not to be enlarged ; ff. De lib. et posth., 1. cum quidam ; and dist. i, De Poenit., 
pcence ; Sext, De reg. iuris, rule in pcenis. These conclusions, as I said, 
proceed from Lombard law. For, at common law, one who withdraws from 
a duel is not punished ; nay, he obeys the law in doing so, and breaks it if 
he goes on. 

Whether one who challenges another to a duel by Lombard law may withdraw 

with the leave of the judge ? 

[Ch. cxciii.] 

My fifteenth question is, whether one who challenges another to a duel 
by Lombard law may withdraw with the leave of the judge. It appears 
that he may, on the analogy of a prosecutor asking for discontinuance ; 
ff. Ad Turpil., 1. abolitio, and 1. si quis interveniente, and 1. Domitianus ; C. De 
abolit., throughout. Solution : At common law this is clear, because he may 
withdraw without discontinuance, and he does right to do so. By Lombard 
law, too, I think that the judge may allow it for good reason, on the analogy 
of a prosecutor, quoted above. 



Whether one who challenges another to a duel may withdraw without penalty before 
joinder of issue ? and also when should issue be said to be joined in a duel ? 

[Ch. cxciv.] 

My sixteenth question is, whether one who challenges another to a duel 
may withdraw without penalty before joinder of issue ; and herein I also 
ask what is the point of time in a duel which corresponds to joinder of issue 
in a contentious trial. And it seems that he may withdraw before that time 
without penalty. For before joinder of issue one is not said to be "bringing 
an action," but to be " intending to bring an action " ; ff. Rat. rem haberi, 
1. amplius. Therefore, up to that time he may withdraw. This is confirmed. 
For before joinder of issue one who withdraws is excused ; ff . De in ius vocando, 
1. quamvis. Therefore, &c. It is confirmed by C. De adulter., 1. sine metu ; 
ff. the same title, 1. miles, socer ; and ff. Ad Turpilianum, 1. qucesitum. In 
the opposite sense is ff. Ad Turpilianum, 1. in senatus, qui post, where the 
text proves that one who withdraws from an accusation before joinder of 
issue is liable to the Turpilian penalty. To the same effect is C. De calum- 
niatoribus, the penultimate law. Solution : This question presupposes the 
decision of another question, namely, what is the point of time in this trial 
by duel which corresponds to joinder of issue. And it seems to be after one 



354 THE LAW OF WAR 

blow of the plaintiff, and one of the defendant, because in a contentious trial 
issue is joined by the claim and the defence which follows it ; C. De iudiciis, 
1. rem non nbvam, palroni ; C. De litis contestat., Authent., offcratur ; and 
Extra., the same title, the single chapter. But in a duel the first blow takes 
the place of the claim ; the second, which is by the defendant, is the defence ; 
and so issue is thus joined. I believe, however, that the true view is, that issue 
is joined when one party challenges, asserting that the other has committed 
the crime, and the other denies it. And it is obvious that this is the true view. 
For the oath " de calumnia " is taken after joinder of issue ; Authent., Vt 
litigantes iurent in exordio litis, at the beginning ; and C. De iureiurando 
propter calumniam, 1. ii. But combatants in a duel take the oath " de astu " 
after this verbal challenge and contradiction, as I showed above. Therefore 
the duel begins with the verbal proclamation, but the blows correspond to 
the proofs by witnesses and documents, which come after joinder of issue ; 
Vt lite non contestata, throughout. And so we must modify the solution of 
tin.- question in which I asked who should strike first. If we adopt this solution, 
the principal question becomes a question whether the Turpilian penalty 
applies before joinder of issue. And the glosses are conflicting. There is one, 
by Hugolinus, on ff. De adulteriis, 1. si miles, socer, which holds that it does 
not apply. There is another, by Azo, on C. Ad Turpilianum, 1. i, which holds 
that it does ; and this I believe to be true, by ff. Ad Turpilianum, 1. in scna/us, 
qui post ; and C. Quomodo et quando iudex, Authent., qui semel. Yet Petrus 
says that the accuser may change his mind up to the time when the defendant 
appears after citation ; he so understands ff. Ad Turpilianum, 1. qucesitum. 
And in like manner we may reach a solution of the previous question, speaking 
of the Lombard law, as above. Thanks be to God. 

End of the treatise on War, compiled by me, Giovanni da Legnano 
of Milan, least worthy of the doctors of canon and civil law, in 
the University of Bologna, in the year 1360, at a time when a strong 
army lay before the city, which furnished the cause of my treatise, 
that it might provide a matter of exercise for the students at that 
time, but be submitted to the correction of the doctors. Thanks be 
to God. Amen. 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 

[ch. ;.] 

This treatise on War, in its first division, is divided into three principal 
parts, of which the last is divided into six treatises, and subdivided as will 
be made clear to you by the table below, which arranges its titles in their 
order. 

First principal part, 

What war is, and how it is to be described. 



Second principal part. 

[Ch.ii.] 
Of the division of war and how it is to be divided. 



The third and last principal part 
gives the order of the treatises, and is divided into six principal treatises. 

First treatise.. 
Of celestial spiritual war. 

How celestial spiritual war is the mete and measure of human spiritual 
war. 

Of the natural influence of the spiritual war of celestial bodies on terrestrial 
wars. 

How, according to astrologers and natural philosophers, it is necessary 
to assume the existence of war. 



Second treatise. 

[Ch. iii-vi.] 

Of human spiritual war, according to theology. 

[Chs. vii, viii.] 

Of human spiritual war, according to moral philosophy. 



[37] 



356 THE LAW OF WAR 

Third treatise. 

[Ch.ix.] 

Of universal corporeal war. 
divided into six treatises 

First treatise : On the law whereby it is introduced. 
[Ch. x.] 

How universal corporeal war had its origin in divine law. 

[Ch. .] 
How universal corporeal war had its origin in the law of nations. 



Second treatise of the third principal treatise : On who may declare 

universal war. 

[Cta. xii-xiv.] 

Who first and chiefly may declare universal war, and by what law, and 
against whom ? 

[Ch. xv.] 

Whether war made by the Emperor against the Church is lawful, and 
whether subjects are bound to obey him therein ? 

[Ch. xvi.] 

What, on the other hand, is the law, when the Pope makes war against 
the Emperor ? 



Third treatise oj the third principal treatise : Of the means 
of making war. 

[Ch. xvii.] 

Of the legion and the cohort, and who and how many are required therein. 

[Ch. xviii.] 

How soldiers should conduct themselves in war, whom they should obey, 
and from what they are commanded to abstain. 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 357 

[Ch. xix.] 

What belongs to the office of a general in war ? 

[Ch. xx.] 
How soldiers are punished differently, according to their different offences. 

[Ch. xxi.] 

Of fortitude and its nature ; and when fortitude is to be called moral, and 
when not ; and when fortitude conducts war to a right end, and when not. 

/ 

[Ch. xxii.] 

Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue ? 

[Ch. xxiii.] 

Why, and in what sense, the four principal virtues are called cardinal. 
What is virtue ? 

[Ch. xxiv.] 

Of the threefold species of good, and how the four cardinal virtues are 
derived from the good. 

[Ch*. zxv, xxvi.] 

How, and in what sense, a man may be called brave in war. 

[Ch. xxvii.] 

Which is the chief act of fortitude ? 

How many kinds of fortitude are practised in war ? 

[Ch. xxviii.] 

Whether a brave man in war ought to await death rather than to flee ? 

[Ch. xxix.] 

Whether a soldier should be punished with death, who bravely charges 
the enemy with his company, and utterly routs them, contrary to the commands 
of the general ? 

[Ch. xxx.] 

Whether quarter should be granted to the general of a war, when captured 
by the enemy ? 



358 THE LAW OF WAR 

Fourth treatise of the third principal treatise, divided into 
two principal parts. 

First part : Who are bound to participate in a war ? 
[Ch. xxxi.] 

Whether vassals are bound to participate in a war at their own expense 
when a lawful war is begun by their lord ? 

[Ch. xxxii.] 

Whether the subjects of a baron, who begins a war against his king, are 
bound to help the baron against the king ? 

[Ch. xxxiii.] 

Whether subjects are bound to help first a baron who begins a war against 
another baron, or the king who begins a war against another king, both com- 
mands being received at the same time ? 

[Ch. xxxiv.] 

Whether the non-liege vassal of two lords is bound to help both, or one, 
and if so, which ? 

[Ch. xxxv.] 

Whether a vassal is bound to help his lord against his father, or a father 
against his son ? 

Whether a citizen of two states is bound to help one against the other ? 

[Ch. xxxvi.] 

Whether a vassal summoned by his lord is bound to follow him in parts 
beyond the sea, to fight against barbarians ? 

[Ch. xxxvii.] 

Whether slaves are bound to follow their lord to war everywhere ? 

[Ch. xxxviii.] 

Whether freedmen, when summoned, are bound to follow their patron 
to war ? 

[Ch. xxxix.] 

Whether cultivators, when summoned, are bound to follow their lord 
to war ? 

[Ch. xl.] 

Whether a lord may summon those who are allied or leagued with him 
to help him in war ? 

[Ch. xli.] 

Whether those who are subjects by reason of jurisdiction only are bound 
to participate in war ? 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 359 

Second part : Of persons not bound to participate in war, who do so voluntarily ; 

divided into six principal parts. 

First part : Of those who participate voluntarily. 
[Ch. xlii.] 

Whether those who voluntarily participate place him in whose service 
they go under an obligation to themselves, if they incur loss thereby ? 

[Ch. xliii.] 

Whether a borrower is liable to the lender to replace horses and arms 

lost in war ? 

[Ch. xliv.] 

Whether a hirer is liable to a letter to replace horses and arms lost in war ? 

[Ch. xlv.] 

Whether, if one man summons another to a war, and the other is robbed 
on his way to the war, the summoner can sue the robber by the " actio vi 
bonorum raptorum," or the action of theft ? 

[Ch. xlvi.] 

Whether those who are not summoned, but participate in a war of their own 
motion, place him in whose service they go under an obligation to themselves ? 

[Ch. xlvii.] 

Whether those who are not summoned, but participate in a war of their 
own motion, and make an effective start, place the person in whose service they 
go under an obligation to themselves, though he objects to and forbids their 
going ? 

Second part : Of those who participate because they are bound to return a service. 

[Ch. xlviii.] 

Whether such a person has an action against the person whom he helps ? 

Third part : Of those who participate for the sake of winning glory. 

[Ch. xlix.] 

Whether such persons place the person to whose assistance they go under 
an obligation to themselves ? 

Fourth part : Of those who participate because they let out their services. 

[Ch. 1.] 
Whether such persons have an action against their hirers ? 



360 THE LAW OF WAR 

Fifth part : Of those who participate with the intention of getting booty. 

[Ch. li.] 
Whether an action is competent to such persons ? 

Sixth part. 
[Ch. lii.] 

Whether clerks may participate in a war ? 

Whether mercenaries enlisted in Germany at a fixed salary by one who 
hires them, have an action against one who, while they are on the way, has 
absolutely lost his status ? 

[Ch. liii.] 

Whether mercenaries enlisted in Germany by an Italian city, at a fixed 
salary yearly, may bring an action for their whole salary, or for a rateable part, 
or for what, if the city is seized by a tyrant, while they are on the way to it ? 

[Ch. liv.] 

Whether mercenaries ought to be paid at the beginning of a month, or 
at the end ? 

[Ch. lv.] 

Whether mercenaries who absent themselves, even with the licence of 
their lord, for a time, lose their salary for that time ? 

[Ch. ivi.] 

Whether, if mercenaries wilfully refuse to serve the whole time of their 
engagement, they lose their pay for the whole time, or only for the time which 
they have not served ? 

[Ch. Ivii.) 

Whether mercenaries may serve by a substitute ? 

[Ch. Iviii.] 

Whether a mercenary loses his pay during the time when he is ill ? 



Fifth treatise of the third principal treatise : Of spoils and captives 

made in war. 
[Ch. lix.] 

Whether one who makes a capture in war, becomes owner of the person 
or thing captured, and whether the doctrine of " postliminium " applies ? 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 361 

[Ch. be.] 

Whether persons captured in a war between two states become slaves, 
and whether ownership is acquired over them ? 

[Ch. Ixi.] 

Whether things captured in war become the property of the captors ? 

[Ch. bdi.] 
Whether the use of trickery is allowed in wars ? 

[Ch. Ixiii.] 

[Desunt verba : Whether it is lawful to make war on feast days ?] 

[Ch. Ixiv.] 

Whether one who has recovered in a war the whole of his loss, may still 
bring an action against his adversary, or again declare war against him ? 

[Ch. Ixv.] 
Whether those who die in war are saved ? 

[Ch. Ixvi.] 

Whether it is lawful to wage corporeal war on behalf of the property and 
possessions of the Church, and for this purpose to assemble troops ? 

[Ch. Ixvii.]* 
Whether bishops may go to war without the licence of the Pope ? 

[Ch. Ixviii.] 

Whether prelates are bound to pay tribute for the temporalities which 
they hold from the Emperor, for wars declared by him ? 

[Ch. Ixix.] 

Whether mercy should be shown to persons captured in a lawful war ? 

[Ch. Ixx.] 

Whether the Church should declare war on the Jews ? 

[Ch. Ixxi.] 

Whether those who follow a war, but cannot fight, enjoy the immunities 
of combatants ? 

[Ch. Ixxii.] 

Whether prelates may declare wars, and take part in them, and encourage 
others to war, by reason of their temporal jurisdiction ? 



362 THE LAW OF WAR 

[Ch. Ixxiii.] 

Whether a prelate may declare war for an injury done to his subject, which 
is unpunished, and capture persons other than the wrong-doers ? 

[Ch. Ixxiv.] 

Whether the Pope's delegate may declare war ; that is to say, invoke the 
secular arm ? 

[Ch. Ixxv.] 

Whether wars declared by the Church against excommunicated persons 
are meritorious ? 



Sixth and last treatise of the third principal treatise, in the form of a table : On 
how many are the kinds of corporeal wars which are recognized in law. 

[Ch. 



Fourth treatise of the third principal part : Of particular war which is waged 
in self-defence, divided into eight principal parts. 

[Ch. Ixxvii.] 

First part. 

[Ch. Ixxviii.] 

What is particular war ? 



Second part. 
[Ch. Ixxix.] 

How many are the kinds of particular war ? 



Third part. 

[Ch. Ixxx.] 

By what law particular war was introduced. 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 363 

Fourth part : 

[Ch. Ixxxi.] 

Who may declare this particular war ? 
[Ch. Ixxxii.] 

Whether clerks may declare this war ? 

[Ch. Ixxxiii.] 

Whether, since a clerk may defend himself, even by killing another, he 
may do this in a church ? 

[Ch. Ixxxiv.] 

Whether a clerk, attacked in the act of celebration, may defend himself, 
and kill his assailant, and so continue to celebrate the office ? 

[Ch. Ixxxv.] 

Whether one who is attacked while baptizing, anointing, confirming, 
ordaining, or celebrating the several sacraments may postpone their celebra- 
tion, though begun ? 

[Ch. Ixxxvi.] 

Which is to be preferred, the death of a priest who is attacked while he 
is baptizing a child at the point of death, or the eternal life of the child, lest 
he should die without baptism ? 

[Ch. Ixxxvii.] 

Whether a monk may defend himself without the licence of his abbot ? 



[Ch. Ixxxvii W.] 

Whether a slave may defend himself without the command of his master ? 

[Ch. Ixxxvii:.] 

Whether persons outlawed, who may sometimes by municipal laws be 
killed with impunity, may defend themselves ? 



Fifth part : 
Against whom may this particular war be declared ? 

[Ch. Ixxxix.] 

Is it lawful against a superior ? 

[Ch. xc.] 

Is it lawful against a judge, even if he acts unjustly ? 
[38] 



364 THE LAW OF WAR 

[Ch. xd.] 

Is it lawful for a son against a father ? 

[Ch. xcii. 

Is it lawful for a monk against an abbot ? 

[Ch. xciii.] 

Is it lawful for a slave against a master ? 



Sixth part : 

For what causes is it lawful to declare this particular war ? 

divided into two principal parts. 

[Ch. xciv.] 

First part : On behalf of what persons is it lawful ? 
[Ch. xcv.] 

Is it lawful for a father on behalf of his son ? 

[Ch. xcvi.] 

For a husband on behalf of his wife ? 

[Ch. xcvii.] 

On behalf of a brother, sister, and other relations ? 

[Ch. xcviii.] 

Whether a man is bound to defend another against being killed by a third ? 

[Ch. xcix.] 

Whether a vassal is bound to help his lord ? 

[Ch. c.] 

Whether a slave is bound to defend his master ? 

[Ch. ci.] 

Whether a soldier is bound to defend his officer ? 

[Ch. di.] 

If a vassal sees his lord attacked on one side, and his father on the other, 
each being equally in mortal danger unless he is helped, and the vassal can only 
help one of them the question is, Whom should he help ? 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 365 

[Ch. ciii.] 

The same subject continued : What is the law if a clerk sees his bishop 
violently attacked on one side, and his father on the other, each being equally 
in mortal danger unless he is helped, and the clerk is able to help only one of 
them the question is, Whom should he help ? 

Second part : For what things is it lawful ? 

[Ch. civ.] 

Whether it is lawful in defence of things lawfully possessed ? 

[Ch. or.] x 

In defence of things unlawfully possessed ? 

[Ch. cvi.] 

Whether one who has a right to defend property, and defends it within the 
limits of justifiable defence, incurs irregularity, if he kills or wounds another ? 

[Ch. cvii.] 

Whether a man incurs excommunication by laying hands on a clerk, in 
defending his own property ? 

[Ch. cviii.] 

Whether one may summon one's friends to help in defending one's property ? 

[Ch. cix.] 

Whether, in defending property, one may repel force with force against 
all those against whom one may use force in defending persons ? 

[Ch. ex.] 

Whether one may repel force with force in defending things deposited 
or lent ? 



Seventh part : 

How may this particular war be declared ? 
[Ch. ad.] 

Whether it is lawful within the " limits of justifiable defence " ? 

What are the " limits of justifiable defence," and what is required therein? 

[Ch. cxii.] 

Whether a poor and feeble man may defend himself with a sword, against 
a strong and vigorous man who strikes him only with the fist ? 



366 THE LAW OF WAR 

[Ch. cxiii.] 

If a man may defend himself " incontinent!," in what sense is the phrase 
" incontinent! " to be understood ? 

[Ch. cxiv.] 

What is the meaning of " equivalence in the act of violence itself " ? 

[Ch. ocv.] 

Am I deemed to have acted vindictively, and not defensively, if I have 
expelled my despoiler from my possession, when he first offered to give security 
for the restoration of possession ? 

[Ch. ocvi.] 

Whether I ought to await one who is prepared to strike me, or to anticipate 
him ? 

[Ch. cxvii.] 

Whether a soldier, attacked by his neighbour, is deemed to repel force with 
force, if he waits for him, and strikes him, although he might run away ? 

[Ch. cxviii.] 

If a wounded man, after the wounds have been inflicted, pursues his 
assailant, and strikes him, which is not lawful, should he be punished as 
" malicious," or as " culpable " ? 

[Ch. cxix/l 

Whether violence to the person may be repelled by friends, like violence 
to things ? 

[Ch. cxx.] 

Whether a slave is to be excused, who kills his master's wife on the order 
of his master ? 



Eighth and last part of the fourth treatise of the third principal part. 

[Ch. cxxi.] 

What is the end of particular war ? 



Fifth treatise of the third principal part, 

[Ch. cxxii.] 

Of particular war waged in defence of the mystical body, which is called 

" Reprisals," 

and this treatise is divided, in its first division, into two principal parts. 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 367 

[Ch. cxxiii.] 

The First part sets out whence, and in what, reprisals had their origin. 



[Ch. cxxiv.] 

Second part : Of the causes of reprisals. Of the productive or efficient 

cause of reprisals. 



Third part : Of the material cause, divided into four principal parts. 
First part : Of the " matter in which." 

[Ch. cxxv.] 

What is the " matter in which " ? 

What is the " matter about which " ? 

What is the " matter against which " ? 

What is the " matter from which " ? 

To what persons is the power of taking reprisals to be granted ? 

Are reprisals to be granted to residents ? 

[Ch. cxxvi.] 

Whether reprisals should be declared for citizens who are not subject to 
the jurisdiction of a state, and are otherwise not part of it ? 

[Ch. cxxvii.] 

Whether reprisals should be granted to a citizen " by convention," 
against the state of his origin ? 

[Ch. cxxviii.] 

Whether limited reprisals should be granted to citizens, and to those who 
are regarded as citizens ? 

[Ch. cxxix.] 

Whether a state may grant reprisals to the citizens of another state, who 
by agreement or statute are treated as its own citizens ? 

Second part : Of the " matter about which." 
[Ch. cxxx.] 

Whether reprisals can be declared against the property of those whose 
persons cannot be seized on the strength of reprisals ? 

[Ch. cxxxi.] 

Whether reprisals, simply declared, can be executed against property in 
the territory of the state against which they are declared, so that it may be 
seized and brought within the territory of the state declaring them ? 



368 THE LAW OF WAR 

[Ch. cxxxii.j 

Whether, if one state declares reprisals against another, the ruler of the 1 
state declaring them, on writing to the ruler of the state against which they 
are declared, can execute the reprisals on property there situated ? 

Third part : Of the" matter against which." 

[Ch. cxxxiii.] 

Whether, if one state has declared reprisals against the men of another 
state, they can be executed against residents of that state ? 

[Ch. cxxxiv.] 

Whether, if one state has declared reprisals against the men of another 
state, they can be executed against men of that state living elsewhere ? 

[Ch. cxxxv.] 

Whether reprisals can be executed against the citizens or residents of 
a state, who are subject to its burdens, but are also citizens of another state ? 

[Ch. cxxxvi.] 

Whether reprisals can be executed against women ? 

[Ch. cxxxvii.] 

Whether reprisals can be executed against unmarried clerks, and also 
whether they can be executed against married clerks ? 

Whether, when a bishop neglects to do justice on his clerks, and recourse 
cannot be had to his superior, reprisals can be declared against the same clerks 
by a secular judge ? 

[Ch. cxxxviii.] 

Whether reprisals can be executed against Bolognese students, or even 
against other students of Bologna, on their way to Padua for study ? 

[Ch. cxxxix.] 

Whether reprisals can be executed against ambassadors ? 

[Ch. cxl.] 

Whether reprisals can be executed against those who are going to a 
festival, to the Church of St. James, or to other place of indulgence ; also 
whether they can be executed against those at sea, and against those who 
cannot be summoned into court, and in many other cases ? 

[Ch. cxli.] 

Whether reprisals can be granted against a Bolognese magistrate of Milan, 
who does injustice there ? 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 369 

[Ch. cxlii.] 

Whether reprisals can be declared against the officials of a magistrate 
or ruler who does injustice ? 

[Ch. cxliil.] 

Whether reprisals can be declared against the consuls and the leaders of 
a state who refuse to do justice ? 

[Ch. cxliv.] 

Whether reprisals car be declared against private persons, who are 
absolutely innocent, because of an offence of their lord, or of another private 
person, for which justice is not done ? 

[Ch. cxlv.] 

Whether reprisals can be declared against persons who are partially, but 
not fully, subject to a state ? 

\ 

[Ch. cxlvi.] 

Whether reprisals can be declared against a certain class of persons who 
refuse to do justice ? 

[Ch. cxlvii.] 

Fourth part : Of the " matter from which," which arises from a failure of juris- 
diction, because a judge ought first to be appealed to, before reprisals are granted. 

[Ch. cxlviii.] 

Whether a judge ought to be required to do justice, before reprisals are 
granted ? 

[Ch. cxlix.] 

Whether, when a man who suffers an injury dares not litigate in the 
state of the person inflicting the injury, his own judge may write, asking to 
have the jurisdiction transferred to others, or arbitrators chosen ? 

[Ch. d.] 

What judge ought to be required to do justice ? 

[Ch. cli.] 
What degree of injustice is required, before reprisals will be granted ? 

[Ch. clii.] 

When is it to be said that resort to a superior is impossible, so that an 
occasion arises for the declaration of reprisals ? 



370 THE LAW OF WAR 

Fourth principal part : Of the formal cause, divided into two principal parts. 

[Ch. cliii.] 

First part : Of the form of declaring reprisals. 

[Ch. cliv.] 

Who may appear, to oppose the declaration of reprisals ? 

[Ch$. civ, clvi.] 

How the commission of injustice, or the denial of justice is to be proved 

[Ch. clvii.] 

Whether, if property is seized on the strength of reprisals, it may be 
detained, by virtue either of the first decree, or of the second ? 

Second part : Of the form of executing reprisals. 

[Ch. clviii.) 

Whether one to whom reprisals are granted may execute them on his 
own authority, or by the servants of the magistrate granting ihem ? 

[Ch. clix.] 

Whether one who seizes persons and property is bound to present them 
to the judge, or may retain them for himself ? 

[Ch. chc.] 

Whether property seized on the strength of reprisals should be sold, or 
whether it should be accepted in payment, or be valued ? 

[Ch. clxi.] 

Whether a declaration of reprisals can be executed on holidays ? 

[Ch. cbrii.] 

If a man wishes to defend himself, or property seized, what jurisdiction 
should be invoked ? 

[Ch. clxiii.] 

Whether the person from whom the exaction is made has a remedy 
against the person for whose debt or wrong it is made ? 

[Ch. clxiv.] 

Whether the person from whom the exaction is made has a remedy 
against the ruler, as well as against the principal debtor ? 

[Ch. clxv.] 

Whether a person seized on the strength of reprisals may, on his own 
authority, seize persons belonging to the state in which he was seized ? 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 371 

[Ch. clxvi.] 

Whether reprisals can be granted by statutes, in cases not permitted 
by law ? 

Whether a statute of a state, which ordains that a son is liable for the 
wrong of his father, can be executed against a son living outside the territory 

of that state ? 

[Ch. dxvii.] 

Whether it may lawfully be agreed that one person is to be liable for 
another ? 



Sixth and last Treatise of the third principal part of this work : Of" Particular " 

war waged for compurgation, which is catted "the Duel" , divided, in its first 

division, into seven principal parts. 

[Ch. clxviii.] 



What is a duel ? 



First part. 

[Ch. clxix.] 



Second part : How many kinds of duel are there ? 

[Ch. clxx.] 

How a duel is fought for exaggeration of hatred. 

How a duel is fought to win public glory. 

How a duel is fought for the compurgation of an accusation. 



Third part : By what law is the duel permitted, and by what forbidden P 

[Ch. clxxi.] 

How the duel which is fought for exaggeration of hatred is introduced 
by natural law, in the sense of an instinct of nature, proceeding from sensuality 
towards some desired object. 

[Ch. clxxii.] 

How the duel which is fought for exaggeration of hatred is forbidden 
by natural law, in the sense of rational intelligence, and so by the law of 
nations, and by divine law, canon law, and civil law. 

[Ch. clxxiii.] 

How the duel which is fought for the sake of glory is introduced by 
natural law, in the sense of an instinct of nature proceeding from sensuality. 

[39] 



372 I HE LAW OF WAR 

[Ch. clxxiv.] 

How the duel which is fought for the sake of glory is forbidden by 
divine law. 

How the duel which is fought for the sake of glory is forbidden by the 
law of nations. 

How the duel which is fought for the sake of glory is forbidden by canon 
and civil law. 



Fourth part : For what reason is the duel of compurgation permitted, and 

for what is it forbidden ? 

[Ch. clxxv.] 

How the duel of computation is forbidden by divine law. 

How the duel of compurgation is forbidden by the law of nations. 

How the duel of compurgation is forbidden by canon law. 

How the duel of compurgation is forbidden by civil law, as a general rule. 



Fifth part : In what cases is the duel of compurgation permitted ? 

[Ch. clxxvi.] 

How the Lombard law permits the duel of compurgation in twenty cases. 



Sixth part : Between whom may a duel be fought ? 

[Ch. clxxvii.] 

How the duel of compurgation should generally be fought between 
principals. 



Seventh and last part : How is a duel to be fought ? 

[Ch. clxxviii.] 

How the duel of computation is modelled on a contentious trial. 

[Ch. clxxix.] 

Whether an oath " de astu " should be taken in a duel, and by whom ? 

[Ch. clxxx.] 

Whether, when one party has a champion in the cases allowed by law, 
the other party may have one too ? 



A TABLE OF THE TREATISE 373 

[Ch. clxxxi.] 

How are champions to be given and assigned in cases where both parties 
are allowed them ? 

[Ch. clxxxii.] 

Whether any one may be allowed as a champion ? 

[Ch. clxxxiii.] 

In whose election is the duel ? 

[Ch. clxxxiv.] 

How is the duel to be ordered ? 

[Ch. clxxxv.] 

With what arms should the duel be fought ? 

[Ch. clxxxvi.] 

Whether, if the arms or the club of one of the combatants are broken, 
or fall, others ought to be given him ? 

[Ch. clxxxvii.] 

Which of the combatants ought to strike first ? 

[Ch. clxxxviii.] 

Whether a duel not ended on the first day may be ended on the following 
day ? 

[Ch. clxxxix.] 

Whether one who fails in a duel is to be condemned to pay costs ? 

[Ch. cxc.] 

Whether, if the challenger fails in a duel, he is to be punished by the 
penalty of retaliation ? 

[Ch. cxci.] 

Whether one who has been challenged to a duel on account of an accusa- 
tion, and has been defeated and condemned, may be charged with the same 
accusation in a contentious trial ? 

[Ch. cxcii.] 

Whether one who challenges another to a duel on account of a public 
accusation, and withdraws from the duel, incurs the Turpilian penalty ? 



374 THE LAW OF WAR 

[Ch. cxciii.] 

Whether one who challenges another to a duel by Lombard law may 
withdraw with the leave of the judge ? 

[Ch. cxciv.] 

Whether one who challenges another to a duel may withdraw without 
penalty before joinder of issue ? Also whether, and when, issue should be 
said to be joined in a duel ? 

End of the Table to the book of the treatise on War of Giovanni 
da Legnano. Thanks be to God. Amen. Amen. Amen. 



TRACTATUS 

De Bello, De Represaliis et De Duello 

Domini lohannis de Lignano, 
cum additionibus Domini Pauli de Lignano 



Impressus Bononiae, ad instantiam Sigismundi de libris, per me 

magistrum Henricum de Colonia, xvi die Kal. Ian., Anno 

a Domini incarnatione millesimo quadringentesimo 

septuagesimo septimo. 

Laus Deo 



(See the Editor's Prefatory Note which follows) 



PREFATORY NOTE 

THE pages which follow are a reproduction by the Oxford 
University Press of Giov. da Legnano's work, as first printed, in 
1477, with many omissions and interpolations due to its editor, 
Paolo Antonio da Legnano, great-grandson of the author. 

The original is included in a rare volume, having no general 
title-page, for the loan of which I was indebted to All Souls College, 
containing eighteen legal treatises, dating from 1477 to 1493, by 
various authors. The first of these treatises, printed at Milan in 
1483 by Elldericus Sinzenzeler, is headed by the words : " Clarissimi 
iurisconsulti D. Lanfranchi de Oriano solennis utilis quotidianus et 
practicabilis tractatus de Arbitris. Additis multis aliis questionibus 
clarissimorum doctorum." 

T. E. H. 



379 



tracutua dejbeQd.cklUprefalita i<k 
Duello domini Jobannis de lignano cti ad 
ditiraibw domini &aulidc lignaao. 



5n regum xiii. opfrad . 

eft folium domini. 6 tut 
fcribftur jxremun cipi-uocabunt pfrael b 
lium domini.i hoc ell patrimonium fanctc 
Ttomancccckfic cuiuacaputeft yernfolcn 
idefttima Ciuitaa Bonomc queucrc uc^ 
uri poCeft jtrufakm.'flam in ipfa quorum' 
ciiqjfcibiluim mm me iuris ditucidata eft 
ueritas.De hoc fcribicur sacbarie viii.c. no 
Cibitur jTcr u: alcm Cwttas ucruatts.hcc for 
mob ficut jvrufalem canti.vuu.dc IMC tti 
am climat propixta fopbi.Ua.fcrutator jx 
rufalem in luce n actoii t.a.rcpicfti jreriu 
f ilan doctrina noftri.r dc bac etti (rribu 
turapoca.rii.c.wdi GuiUtcm fancti jpe- 
ruiilcm t ibidem iii- oftedit mibc ciuitatc 
(inccam ^crulaUm dcfccdcntc dc celo.i.bo 
nonum i acre de cdodcTceadit cu ibi fona 
uoriutis iuriu quc adco per art prmcipum 
jnuilsicur Tiii.di.quo iurc. L.dc lon.tcp. 
pKfcrip.l.ptnuIti-debac lu'ibic apfua ad c^ 
tocos lii.c.Ciuit ate oci uiuctts. jtrufilt o> 
Uftcm. t c idc^ apl'ua ad 5ala.iiiUC.QjK out 
furfuin c pcrufikm litxra Cit.dc luc etia Icri 
birw palipon vtca. Ugi pcrufakm ut ibi fo 
ret noncn mea.iKTom ctcni pmittentc altif 
flmoi fiipcriusdifponentibas corpojtb'bcc 
ciuitas nonu ut j^ml'ilcm id cxtrcmum 
muuta eft i de uaflata i poptcr in babuL 
tiumoclicuin muocrtodia mutua comini 
conitMtua cit iltutunus ipius octractloncin 
ut fcri jitur iudicu xxix .c.dcldw fcrufalcm 
fioit ixlcri (blent ttbolc dc infidiis in habit aU 
rium (cribitur ni.palipo.xrv.c. Dcfcendc^ 
raat inudk in jrcrufaltm i pptcr fupcrbitm 
in babitintiiim cominatua at per pzopbctaj 
diccnte copnQcfccrc faciam iupcrbiam itida. 
i fupcrbum jrtruiakm multi j^erc. xiu.c j. 
t ptopur boc clamat ptopbcta p7optcr in 
habitants diccna dabo yaaMan miter noa 
barcne i alibi p:optcr hoc clamat pzopix ti 
diccna ponam pcruialcm quafi iccrmi Upidd 
mibcc.i.C3.tp?optarlMC clamat propixta 
contra rjutnccsin^a.diccns cotriftatiape 
rufakm nutriccm ucftram. barutb^uarto . 
ttppterl>xfiinbabiuntiuciuiTu3 factit 
dluterercituababilonu rcgnum obftdcrat 
vcrulaUm jxrc.xxii.c.1 p boc hctu eft qtf 
fcribic c^tculia v.c.i eft jxrufaUm i media 
Bcnna-n.i.bo^ium pcnc tamcn faaum eft i 
etiim quo J fcribic trcnay..i.c.facta e 
dlcnficatpuloou 



oie acre rmilaic nuncupitur t capot foltui 
piimonii Icc.'Roe cccl'ic.'Rci tut ktu regcfl 
i gubcrn.ina eft reiKKndttfunusin crifto pr 
i diTs.ajminus cgidiu j mtlcraticnc diuint 
abincn.epusjsic ct mutautt habit urn 1 in 
grciluacft bcllum. TUm cc trona pxifico-t. 
ucratiiTime colkgio Cardtnalium 1 0" latcre 
ccxtro fanctiifimo papc Jnnoc.vi. deftinat' 
eft id rtcupationcm perufalem.upatrimonil 
pcnitusOcpcrditi i in ipTusVccupcrattone 
mutauit btbitu.ltam rdicta potificati getc i 
grelTus eft belluni i bcllum forte ut priccpa 
ItrcnuuTimus. Ham ante ipfum non erac 
rex fn jxrul'akm ut fcrilxi.ini.c. Jn dieb> 
illts ncn erat rex i pptcrea Quit due ad cii 
r.dilm$idiamm(literc5cm (up populum 
diii. :Judit.ii.c.tipkdiccrepot. tie 
git me duo ut clTem rex pmo p alipo .xxfiu* 
c.t t Lie rex iurrcut Odblio diu -3o-iii.c. 
t hcnc ingrefiuo eft Ixllum i felicitir.11a> 
ur alat.dupl'r.f.lliine p.'udcntic i rbrtitudia 
inclice oia iura fac re fanctc cccleHe Komane 
tu'amdc ulurpite dc nbdo.pduxit ad eiTe d 
tcnetoia ad lucem ut dici polfit 9> de uibilo 
aiiquid (tcerat gcn.i.ca.i .I.unica in p:tn.C 
Oc rei uio.act.Uerc igit 1 Her jrl'rael miu 
tauit habitnm i ingrcflus eft bcllum. Quia 
igit rcc p'racl.i.patrimonii t quc fit ut.a. 
Dictum tftoccxtrciro ad crtremu Ocduc^ 
ta mutanit bobitum i ingrtitua eft Ixllum i 
bee diebus nollru pnmo ut pcndet fatia ut 
dec incogruum bee tub iiicntio penkuo ptri 
In ejdcirco ego jfobanes Oc lignanc De Bo 
noniamim' icer ccteros turis utriuiijj ooc 
toes ad U03 ptatum d n j meum dfy cgidiunt 
tf albwnocio d citite jcefi mtf atoc dina epj 
toabuien.in partibua jrtalie pzo (ancta r53 
ccclclu uicarium gcncrakmn ucrum regcm 
jrerufalcm trinfmtttcndo coctpi tractatum 
friure oc leruJalem i DC ciuitatc Bononie. 
i ilb quod mutido cftis ingiclTus boc o.v 
dine.nam oc ciuitatc Bononie ponaj fcx cau 
fas implicantea quc acritcr contingerunt di 
ctam ciuitatcm. M .^illcri.ccc.l. afcv ad 
2Dil{c.ccc.lx.maximequc infurrcxtt co.mi 
nii mutatio.1 ci quorumcunqj tepcnum i 
fptctibu-j an norom contra mcridicsdicrum 
quibua bee contigcrunt no autem bjiarunu 
n bcc appono.q? in atiquibus tracutibuain 
tc Jo iurii3 mctta t laderc -cxplirjdo aliqua 
quc tote cucment t cuilibet ca A fob mate 
rta unum tract atom uel plurcs ut occurrcC 
tliquoa trac tatua tranlibo fub file tio aliquoa 
cxplicando.unum folu nunc publicaboutdc^ 
licet tractatum DC bcllo p:omittcna domino 
inucnte Tingulos trader e explicatoa tempo 
re cogrno i cauta ceuante ibtbttionte. &up 
pUcuna tidcm reuerenditi'imo.p.ut imtxctU 
Utatcm intcllcaua fupportare dignctur. i 
boc ut modicum lufcipcexoidium corrigcn^ 
dd ft piacuerit t rcfomundum iuxta gctiliii 
lapicntic autorimJ^xiguum munue :c Iu 

I 



380 



poofcr* CM Jpmt flBBono.BKit ver* 
Won97trufalembic captfarprociukate 
fed eto no infctaa <j> per qHtnor lento fine 
intellect*} facn foripcara erponitur p bi- 
ftoricom per one res ad lirteram gefta red 
taorperalegaicuinper qucmibtttbalto 
fumitur intdlectiup.T tropotojfajm i mo 
ratew per cpiem mores caiantar peranigogi 
cum ab ana quod eft fur lum per qoe celeftta 



amcftciuitJ3.utinboc rractatu.capanrfe 
cuJvd alcgicnm fcripturam.fanctaecck 
fuxnottturiccundu-ntropoiogiim fignifl' 
at qwUbct fiddem tiam fccundum anago, 
giom Hgnificat curia cdeftcm. "boc notuic 
bofti.Jo.an.t.d.ant.in.c.i.in. .i.oc facra 
oncrune'i oe (ingolia ibi aUegantur iuri ut 
ce5to,in.ca.ktuniumlrxvi.dt.i glo.in.c. 
nonne irrw.dL la pomkra nimirom 
ipmaouaiMwdklC^ Bono.oefccndit ce 
coo cam bononk ooantor tura qae dtp p 
bj pnndpamfmolgantur.'nain inftinctu 
fpiritua Cincti tnacnti func cinoncs.a.ub 
Ucorcd rrv.q.U.fi.ea.q.i ci. c.fi quia'di 
aconae.l.di.i in a.fi iOce.di.pcr d.ibb.in 
c . in ciaitttc oc ufaris cum Ugca que sppeL 
Untur facriri/Ttmc ibi mintKfkntur. Llcgea 
C.oc Iegifau8.i bcntilTunc fnnt.U.tf .s ua 
riia i eto2di.?gni.i bononie noti rcddanc 
inn per quorum inttrpxtationcm mundaa 
illunin itur - td obedtcndum ceo icius mu 
niltria utu fobkctotum intommtur ut i au 
tcn.biu.C.ncfiliao(nopatre iper abb.ia 
c.fi.tnfi.bonomectiam tonaod fciliccc-nt 
UginturlcgeaqiK Tunt com ccintnotaan 
lji.ff.oc Ic^ib 1 1 per abb.pofl doc.inx.quia 
cs nvrjiftria m.d.c.ilU noaoc pigtu . 11am 
(dim bononie nuniMtintar i ocdarantur 
minditadioini.c.ccquibafdjm xxrvii.dt. 
potfemoa per bcrculcm alie.de legali fcic ti i 
Bind quod par aceronem fcribitnr fm i o. 
Dane p ralo Ucinio B*cfaia.pocta.1ljm o^ 
rtre res n;^ tempontm funt .necp etatti om 
nium.nccpbcozumbccftudu dokfcentii 
gont fcnectutej oblettint pjop;iaa rcscu 
nmctdocriia pjofugiom atcy fblaciom p?c 
bent deUctant tomi.non' impediunc fotis/ 
pernottant-noWcum .peregrinantor . rafti 
caotnr . 

CtpTn pruiuinu 

T! tracratu bdli fie pwccdam . 
ptimoponant txfaiptbDtm bel 
li bumani defa^; ptidpiUter trie 
tttnraa in gentre. Sccundo diuidd bellum 
per mcm!na.Cardo piokquar fingola man 
bit. ftcllum fie defcribitur.Bdlu5 eft co 
tcptioejco: tapper alt ^d dtfonii sppetimi 
biioo ppoitii t ddi'Toaitii er duiedi tcdea 
oi ti conuntio bx panic at genua Tiam t 
(ubfecontinet ibdlicamc5tftiontia!u3 
t.l.fuifcp.f .fi.ix aqua plo.arctn 



Oiri jppttr oWonum T tfl cJoCa unde eoitur 
contctio diti appedtui btiano ad D:iam b?tix 
to^ Din ad Diibmmtiam tc.i ilta tit caufa 
finilie cuui(ltb5 lxlli.lb.ii qolibet Ullii ten 
Oit.ftnaliCiT ad colkndjm Difplicentiim quo 
fuit belli mtroducrosU i fit iut bella pptcr 
paam.itui.q.i.noli. Uultum rim 'bloat 
pjuus mtUB cum nemo tocc turn qd fit bellii 
mtlTus fdtrit Oiftinirc time biI.i.l.unio.C. 
dc cadu.to'.len.Oicit cj> bellum ell pditio ak 
i corpis allegtt glo. m.l.i.C.ut publice led 
tk li .rii.fed bee *! potius fonat in cifectu 
beili ip in diffinit ionem bcUi.ru pondera <j 
bellum portk fie Otffintn non ttmcn fp?eta 
Oiffimtcv- paui mcibdlun eft qucda; animi 
generollras o?ta ad tmuritm ppull'andi ud 
ad uindtctim mttrcndim ar.tct-irtiii.q. 
i.in funu. Jn quo autc {nuus mcuo dicit 
^fumtpptcrpicembella adde lullium Oc 
offtc'ia ii.i.pdidtem quare I'ufcipieda bells 
fun t cqdcm ob com cam ut fine iniuria i pace 



QfJL 

cundo belluii fie diuidic belld 
aliud fpua!e altnd tpale-Spuile 
aliud celefte attud buanum >pi 
rituale celetle eft D quo babe t Job.xiiii.'bu 
manum eft Ot quo fcribit ad rom.vii. 5bi ui 
dt alum legm repugnantcm tegi metis mce 
vi-d i.e. teftamcntum. CorpaU aliud eft 
nniuerfale aliud pt iculirc de uniiurfali babe 
tui-.ff.dc optii poftil.rcucrf ql p totum t 
xxii Lq.i.t xni - f^trticularc aliud eft ob 
tutclam corpi 9 fui i reft dc boc bibet .ff . 
dcniiui ar.l.i.f.vim vi.rf.ad.l.aquir.l. 
(ciam.^.qui cum aliter i.l.i.C* vndc vi. i 
cu)lim dc refti.fpolij.i in clem. ft furiofus 
bomicio*. 9liud fit ob tutclam cozpia mit 
tict uel cios ptiappter dtfectum iurtfdtctio 
nio que rcpnl'ilic nuncupanf dc quo in au' t. 
t nan font pignorattoncsi de iniuf.c.i.li. 
tl. 3 liud At ppter contumatiam rcfiften 
tium iurifdicrioniiudicisdc quo in.I.q refti 
tucrc.ff.dc ret vcn. Bliudfitpptcrpur^ 
gitunem quod duellum appdlat dc quo .C. 
dc gladiatorfaw.l. viu U.ri.7 ti pugnatib* 
in duelbp totum t irulum. Vky. eft quod 
poffct diuidi pzima dinifio p tuftum i iinfbi 
S>ed in bis modicum inftftendum ^ fingub 
mcmteafingrrfunferplicddaero:dint fuo 
t pnmo dc beflo cclclliali celefti tucuitftmc 
illud erplicaho i fie dc fingulia . tracta 
bo ijitur pzimodcbello I'puili celefti. &e 
cundo dc fpiriruali celefti buma no.Icrtio ti 
coTpaliuniucrfali. Quarto depticulariqo 
fit ob tutclam cotpis fui.Qui to dc pticulari 
quod fit ob deftnfam mifttci coTpie qo rcpn 
&licnuncuplt.i=7trtodcp.irticulari quod 
fttadpurgarioncmquodduclJum nuncupac 
Cwnira diuifionem belli non fpxta diuilioc 
pnui met quam oio ncceffariuj eft kg pprcr 



381 



vilerlt belta Tbrima crat romanti Sccudii 
ojdmcm fractal' tamen boffi.dicebat quod 
iudicuie tertiu pufuinptuojum Quarnili 
citumQuintutemerariu Stiru uolurariu 
Septimii ntceflariu que'fequit Jo.an.in.c. 
i.de bomid.li. vi. "boHi-banc diuiftonc? 
pofutt in films dt trcugi t pace. . quid fit 
iullum.d-sbb-i moderni in.c.ficur i.J.Oe 
tare iuran.fcqmitur bofti.iubdir tame abb. 
g> portet did 9 bellum quoddam eft pwpii 
quoddam inp?op.'iu<n dcctaransibi aliquid 
fit bellum pjopiium i impjcuium. DC d^ 
niftone Wli uide in fumm i gb.auq.ii.uide 
auctozcm.J.in.c.lxrti . 



Cdomdo adringula.dico<j>ce* 
Idle txllum iniurrcrit pjopter f 
gjatinidinem furgentem ppter 
txftctum fictions cariutia impjerts a crea 
to* m lucifcrum cuj intelligent!! inter ccte 
roe fubUmtai creatu. t talc non congiuit 
DcicrlpciofufxriiWidjts.ubi fciendii $ ut in 
quit Qxgoiiud in moralibns.aLiniCio CTeati 
ontsangelice nature aldiTtmusentm crea.. 
toi creauir lucifirum cctti is angel iciaintcl 
liSentiiseminetiorc.Tlam ipruispiimat* no 
faeruntinferiouace4]ifcilic5t paradilboci 
ut fcribttur c^cbklia 51 .abietes pUntauk A 
tqiorunt fummitatem nee frondibus eiua ^ 
tUm ipk fpeciofus fKtus i mnUis condefifq; 
frondibasdiatur.qjpjcbtum ceterislesio 
nibus tanta ilium fpintua pulcbritndia qua 
u t fuppofita angelorum nialtttudo cccoia^ 
uitjftc arbo) in paradifo oA toe quad coden 
{bsffondcsbabuitquot&ib fcpoTttas fuper^ 
nomm Ipirituii legionca attendant, bic fuit 
bgnacalii oci fuk itte Tic crat' atezif t mir.c 
tto?ficut TcctiTaflnaminalubuit ppuata 
ad ciriutem fofcutendam .'Tlambic apiia 
cips? condinonis lue capar uritatis eft con 
ditud qaafi rcplcri uolmiTci ftatibua angelia 
tanc^ tn regno pofitb omamcnto Upidib-' po 
tuiifet inbcrcre.lcd caritatcm pwptcr luccr 
biam non olfumpfit ji cnij caritati auro pe 
netrabiu it preboiitet Hinctis anijdis fociat 
inotnamcntor^tolapidid fixua imnfufct. 
bibutt ergo fo jamiu. fc d lupcrbic uicio caru- 
tace auro non fun t repkta. Quii utc cc 
teria emincntk niit ut ugnaculu Ibiilitudt 
nijCctcratns.nccantateproptcr fuper^ 
bieuiciumrcpleriuoluit. jdcircopcccla 
fine uenia dimpnitus.qj magnns .fint ccpa- 
ratione dimpnitua fuit. 3gitur pzoptcr hoc 
cc paradifo eiectus ut pzohre i pulcbcrrime 
oidertpdtin.c.pnncipiumeui3.ix pcnt.di. 
it.i fuit >e5oiii ut dtiu t boc fait fpale cc 
lede bclU.Circaqo utpmiliparu infutcda 
JTamcn qaii dixi ipfhm CCKI is emtnctiorc 
ft atteudendu cp qucdam funt colbta age 
Us in (nicipio creationid fuc colter fed diftc 



renter qucdam indifTerenter fed coiter.Coi 
ter fed drifter fucrunt natnrc Gue lubliitk 
&abtilitad7nteUigeriafrofpiacita8 XU 
bcriarbimibjblttas "bcctame dirftrunt. 
Tlim quidam funt infuWbntu fubtiliorea 
qutdam in intilligcntia pfpiutioiea quidam 
libcri arfaitr ii abUkaes-Colltta autem cotter 
fed indrntcr fueront fpiritualius indiltoliu 
tditas idiuifibilitas imwulitas. 3nj)ia oca 
purincantur. t pbx tntcUigco in gbuo lu- 
cifcr fuit cminentitt quia in coUaLcoiter fj 
drnterjSftettamartendedum $> diabolua 
fuit cxalatus p ntturalem progatiua t> qua 
dictum eftJ^Mltatuselt ctiimpptu uio 
toiiam quam babet contra bomine aUquado 
in bello 3> gcrit contra ipfum undc fcribttur 
exaltafti cuteri ocpimentiu earn qua uict o 
rum Omens dauid dicebat. jllumiiuocoloa 
meoe ne unqua obocnmiain in mojte nc^do 
dicatuiimicusmeus pualui aducrfua cum- 
xaltatue eft etiam pptcr fupbia uno dUx 
tomeftdi Jl<uatumtftctuuminde- 
COK too aim ipfe dixiu Sfcendam 'in u 
turn T ponam trpoum mcum ad aglonem t 
ero ttmilia alriJTimo-yfetejclu-c. tupc-de 
ra g> diabolus fua I upbu eiectus eft cc celot 
11am p fuam conditionc minime fed per hi 
uoluntatem tictus eft malua at in.c.g cpua 
i iiii.di.1 fie non debuit c.tcufari cu lilxru j 
babuit arbttrinm i bodic etum babet fed ad 
modun tantu ficut angcli babcnt ad bonum 
tan tii fed boiea ad bonnm i ad malu5 ut no. 
ui die to.c.quicpua vide toc.Tmaiimc co 
mtnum ibb.in.c.i.cc fiima trim, n fide a. 
1 fci in.c.i.di- g> dtmoncs bcne a dco creatt 
erant boni fed ipTl p le facti bint malfbomo 
fo diaboli fugsdlionc pt ccaui t. t pondera 
ctiam 9> dtaboloa non fuit eiectue a b^atit u- 
dinc titum quam tutic babebat t ab ilia rutt 
etiam eiectua ad qmm bobcndant erat crea 
tua.c^r bts omnuV . xivii.q.ii.'foomo enij 
qui eft inter cetera animalia liinte imbeciUi 
tads indicia fcirc nfbi! fine doctnna no fa^ 
ri non ingrtdi non uefii B?cuitcr rftbtl alind 
a nitura conlegt 5> flere i at quafl fiimum 
bonum contepnerc uidc.it at^> altifl'lmii di, 
ftathodk qua pens eiuapuniat lupbu duu 
bdi penam cognofcendo qui fua fupjxa a en 
ria c ejcpullua cckfti o pni . di.u.i . c.jjd ergo 

CipTm.iiii . 

DC igitur fait fpirituik bcllitj 

in quo eiectus ifuit luciwr depa 

r.idiio alcuTuni.i tote tn illo 01 

turn babuit fpit itualc bumannnu nam i uno 

qaocg genere eft deuenire ad tinum quod It c 

ptimum i menhir a cozum que font in coma 

nigcnere. Jngenere igitur repuguantic 

bonim contra maU eft deoenire ad pjimora 

tiiimum font ptincipia. phncipium autem 

uicioiuj eft pnucepa i diaboluo. iptwu "go 



382 



1 mofcri cmaftibrt tnfe - 
lions pMgnei>afit)Uu0 bunucj frondo 
ri 9 ucrum dl qMd ptcAcK 'pMMda mc> 
rmmocham in pxfcnti oiri longe mtfa con 
tinniM nobis tnfcrunt btUum in.c.(piriG 
(nctne cc confccra.di Xlmk fcribirur tiuc 
f.B.q.xiuq. dfabdi bona fcpirtime Went con 
ocrtcre in nulum i in clectts macuUm po 
nerc.nam cdTontqnippe qaererequoeex 
fiddibospcrdint n miameifloe qawardc 
tiatcs in (ermtto on drant at in.c.naKi du- 
bium.iiLq.i.n ipfe lathanas tranfrigurat fc I 
tngdam lucignt homines occiput ut fa.c.e 
pifcopi xxxi.q.v.bjbct'em^ mille moJoe no 
cendl quibua ctiam ntifur.cjiifia.xu.q.u.di 
tolas cnim UtiiK cwmjtur fait pater men 
(bcnquJamendiciamdiritncqiu^ moric, 
mimfedmtufictitdiifctttcBbjmimi mi 
lam bibctur in ncterildbmentp in gcneLf 
doc.c.dampium' DC fummi ttini.i nurime 
bbJn penal.co ) ..g'o.in.cj.i.q.i.in euinge^ 
domloqaitur men Jiciam ct ft loquirur.qi 
nrnidar eft i pater mcndacit-Hsm i diabo 
la 3 in jidct bomint 1 1tmpcr eum'decipcre ni 
titur fecundum dominnmbb.iu.c4i.ne ck 
ud mo.fii t cnim pnncipiu noftre furtire dip 
nitionis nilt per lignum literati fuitfcmug. 
Jim dubolus dicitnr bomo ab enentu q nia 
ccuicit bcmincm fecundum gb-in.c.ii. cc e/- 
kc.nim ucrum dl uicifTie bominon fed per 
tlti/Ttmi dnguincm foiifc recuperatnm cm fit 
pienti dubiunufcd (at fnpatu uicit ct iam fe 
ipfiun.qi fait a parsdifo ckctus com fuisfox 
ciis. ruir cqnilcm ciccta txcimi angdonim 
pars at no.rri.q-i.in.cj. OCCUK erant qoe 
psradil'o crnlea incternom qua Ugitur fti 
UK One uenu dampmtos.o; pcnc- di.ii.m.c 
piincipiamfiutMKn&gtcitatcnu fblertia 
fuia infidiis mul t i bqueatur boc i tcterrima 
mujido.tt<fto2Kuego txuil'oclignano 
q> cuperem diWm t ctfe can jpo at doctoi 
cinit gentium . 



C forte ritionabilitcr loqutndo 
bella coipoalia terrcft r it bebct 
belb okftia CMfetpondentia. 
Itam didt chi .txccrte (ft bone mundu conti 
yxao tSk upcr ialbus Utronibua ut omnia 
btaaindc rcgitnr pjimomttroni i fecun 
do cdi.1 mondi omnis i^itur actuo inferioi 
corpoKae dihgitur a fujxr cddbbua. i U 
eft pagM.i.rcpugmcia uirtuilia.7nfur5e3 
proptcr diucrCtstrm cxaporum ceUftinm i 
mirime pUnttarum apt) ctiaa opcrantur ^ 
fiir i cfaerfiutcm afpcctuum fitmiimora 
qaibua fte atentis. no tot 



CjpTm.tl. 

Ofu ia ciia fufficit tib' i necefTi 
riis nccc t poi ipfii effec nLj 
bdli ponunt cauie fmfictenf ca ntcclTario p^ 
ductojje ergo necelfe eft pcmcre tpfum btlln j 
pb*t maioi.Ttlm cffcctna artequit caufa? fu 
m qaoid eife pductiou5 1 ocftrucriottm.L 



di.prifd8.lri.c.n'.i.q.t.0etrabe O'baptifmo 
Debitum pbai minor -Tlam f m fcmitam nt> 
mraliom unpolfibilc eft celum ftare pbiconi 
vii.T.xiii.)?mmo ipfuia mot? ppetuua T col 
proa celdlu ex (in natura opanf in ba ink 
rion cffcctuorcpugnantea t erccitiui repa 
gnanti i infurgit bic iofirius ppter uarict& 
tern afpectuam owpoy cekftinm 1 motuaj 
ipfaf ^.pjtxfenCiti*. Him ftricte in p 
pofito Ot-dncen Jo .ppter vsriam camfpo** 
cknt jam corpof ukftium tpe conftructcia 
chtitatam lunt reptc ciuiraree natorattttr 
fc odio habcntes -i fie amice i fie gendogie 
fie i particuliresbomines gk naturalitcr 
odio babcnt non pcedt nribugt) mentis bic 
inde fie i naturalitcr fe]diligcnte& Cum 
igicSdUtRtanc jppter oOia i dilfonantiaa 
appetitnum bee autem necefforio pdocanf 
motibus ovpos cdrftiom quc temp i necef 
fario opanf infer falls fox o" necelTario ate 
tancceffitaunaturaltfli coipoxe nature 
iatco: tamcn 9 potcntia rationale non ne 
<etTitat oirecto i p k fmmo rcfiftcrc poitit 
hinceft(>Dicitptoleroeiwintibio centum 
wrbof 9nima fapiens dominabit' aftru 93 
eft tile regiAiriter t Uodabimat eti g> teftet 
tamcn fi tlxulogi fecna fcntiant me fufaiccre 
inlomnintjqueeoacontingutecn conecd 
oni. beboctamenbcUonihilintedotrac 
tare quu nimb foret meas metis excedere 
Caotc antem tbtokxpe pptcr qnte no e pax 



bcoc po(IibI mandd ertic fine bdlo.i font R 
ctct peccatnm Iccundora femiua natoriliaj 
i iiirdoyjtm\ centre mandu; non po(Te di 
pact quod ftcap 



qoia non paniunt makftcia ealtfufti.iiii.c. 
fecconda babundantu res tpalium gencf 
rii.c.fjtta eft riu inter po&xes atcaara 
n paftoKa loth, terta ga non occnpamor 
4npi>5na contra Dcmoocm idnonpognam' 
at homines jHik .xxvtit.c. pcutfunus cm 
mcote i in inferno ad cpfoefecs-uii- "Pon eft 
confultatio aduer Qis carncm. Quarta quk 
non confiderimna dapna guerre in qua pdl 
mod annum i ccopaa i dLiriaa-^ere. Ivt. 
c.Qmnto quia non confidcramos euentnm 
bdli qoi eft dubtus.ii.rcgum.xii.c. &cxti 
qua nS f uamue pccpta Oei.jrrt.iii.c. xtini 
ettcndtltes mandata mea.ic. x pdictia 
igitur (nfcrc duplex fpnak bcttum cclefte pi 
mum crcato:is contra Incikp tpfa^pptcr tf 
fcctii ctritatis in fupbii datum penitoe de 
trono ccL-fti ad cent^ tcire.t illud futt de 
quo 7ab.sttB.cibi top xirtudie repugn jtu 



383 



iu t afpectuuceleftiuintrofJuc 
toiia fotmalia rcpugnantie tivbec infcrioJJ. 
pjoptrr qua intKidacuntur inferioa bdla i 
hoc n continmj i fuccerftua a prin. tbeolw 
ce!oquendo.t3bboep:ocediti Kpendel 
rpirituale bellum i bumanum qnod perueit 
ex rcpugnantia intellcctne ad fenfum. TUm 
p: inccpa nulonim perfuadc t 1 in ducir ad ui 
cia ut/mtrgat ad "Raprincepaautem bono 
rum t contra ot ad fuper na cleue t . a fee an do 
autemJrpcndet bdlam ccrpcnale bumanum 
material! tcr loqucndo ut.) -proximo tracta 
tu ducutktur. t>otcli qoUqj mediocri^ 
ter p.'udcna cognofart proaunm mcum oma 
fcicntba pcaluifle at fuia apparct in opcrib' 
tdco in v.i TI. ca.tranko fimplkitcr cu ei' 
toctrina Ugitnr in biftoitid 9> com qmntna 
mnrinslouoUuatts UgumDctart prefab 
confiikbarorad fariumicaielramquibuic 
fcientic dcdiri ertnt confulrojca rdcicbant 
nhde 015 bic pioauus excedit lore ractaa ad 
ram mauscm mcum me rcmitto. feed dam 
allegat fei cau&a propter qnas cddit bdla 
dicaa hoc uohri(Tcglo-3o.an.ui.cajpcftoU- 



Caprm.vit. 

Rom FpirituaU bnmanum pot 
trplicantixolo^cen mcsilu 
tcr. Ibcoloycccft contents 
tjoa.p7opttnnuidiatm zcpugmnti j d 
aboS contra rationabilem crcatoram babea 
tmicemapecutopiifflipaunda. tcc 
hoc bello ipiri tuali loquitur apTos ad ro.rii. 
ca.fic inqukne mduite ooe armatur j eci ut 
utportitisfbre adutrfoa infidUadiaboli. 
t ilia armatura font uircutcs i bona opera 
quibiB Iwminea armantor contra aicia xi.q 
iii.qui rtfiftir.^nfidic auton diabdi font uv 
numcrabiUa-Quam iquit iobannea t>apa bt 
bet cni-n millc nxend*. modos necignoum' 
lituciam ciua-Conacur namcy a psincipb rn 
ine fue tmitatem cddtem refcindere carita 
tern nulncrarc (anctwum opcrum dulcedicj 
(nuidct {die miicere ne fkrcnt.i omnil/ mo 
die bumanum genua perucrtcre ac per turba 
re aolct enim fcientk i erobefcit caritat c; 
qui in alo neqaiuit babcre bominea conftan 
tea cr luti materia in terra tcnere. Unde c, 
pcBUt 5> qoatenue fagiatari conceduur at 
omnes audit' noitri nocendi ei' uerfucie mu 
niamas tic mo28 ingxdiatuT perpojtasno> 
ftraa.'bcc babentur rfi.q.it.uina 1 1 ali 
bipulcfxrrimt fcribtt pcre.ad iontanu lie In 
qakn3-S>ic in iliiaatqj oeccatis femina no 
ftra font intcntiua t pcrfticio dkboluCum 
niOent nos fapra fundamentii edificafte fenfi 
(lipola ligna-tunc fupponit Jnandiom edifi 
camas ergo aur am argcittu lapides pxciotof 
i ccmptare non audcbit qutc in hoc cor re 
DO 6t lecara podcdio. &edct qutppe ko in I 



lidiisut inoccuttis interficiatuinocentcm 
i uafa figuli probat foinax . bominea acton 
iuftos tcmptatio tribubtionnio . "bee 
funt tranlTumptioc pe.di.ii.capitu.11 enim 
circa medtum.BIibi etiam fcribit alex^mfcr 
papa in bee ^ba.tlam diabolus no ccflat cir 
cuirc quercns quern ccnotet i queres qnoa 
ei tidclibuo pdst i maxime illoe quoa arde 
t io7C8 in r dirio falua toife ciqj familiarcs inx 
Denerit.lJcc font trilTumpt jin.q-.i.nullui 
.^m oiigiaTr Iua.xuxxviii.ca. c babott 
hoc pecatum fomitc a pecato pjimi pntia 
non autem a caufa poTitiua fed ut a caufa (v- 
ne qua aliter crtc non pototfTet. Ham fi non 
fuiiTct peccatiim p:imi pntia ad nibihi fuilTet 
bee pngna.Dic ut Otxi fup in.iiiuc. t app 
bo diiftnitccm belli fra tbcologw bic rclataj 
per jauum mcum. 



Dnlitcr autem inttlligendum . 
t fm fcmitam pboa ioqueftdo 
fpuaU bumanum faellum r ft con* 
ttntiocxoJta.pptcr repugnant : am roia ad 
fcnfum appeti tiuii \bi I'cicndum g> fm pkim 
fo Oc anima.3nim j babet gncy potentias.f. 
vegetatiuam fcnfitiaam appetitiuam inUlkc 
tintm n f m locum motiaam. SppetitinO 
dinidic in fenfttiuam i roabJrm.Jdcm phis 
pjimopoiltticof dicit9>anima dnat cotpi 
piincipatu difpol'itiao in o:di nc ad PUUJTI .i.fi 
cut Ofia hic.3nttllecru8 autcj dnat ur fenfui 
principatu rcgali-i.m ozdine ad liberoe hoc 
eft Okcre q> anima Oriaf cpi al ficu$ ona 
fuo Intellecf aiit diuc fenfui fioit fupcrioi 
cum fubdito libcros. Oltcriua at tcndcdu 
cf intellectas dictt roalia non quia in fcipfo 
bobcat rocm qa funt potcntu diftincte fbtx 
mali tcr fed dick roalis non quia (nCupkba 
bat roem ga funt potentk difttn c tt fbimix 
liter fed dtcit roalis quis in bomine eft apt' 
natoeobedn-racicniirrationabtlis quiapot 
non obedire roi uel ponit ciciuftonem ronia 
fonnzltter. 'bbpmiffte eutdenter apparet 
9>appetitusftnfitiuosl]uanus3tiqfi obuiat 
roi SUqnado obedit roinbi obuiat eft bel!u$ 
i repugnantia obi cbtdit eft pax t ponduu 
rcplumpj inmiijnomundij afaiomnuin 
fcrwi funt aptt rejtB obedire fupio.'te' latio 
nibudutcMYtusmdertcat. tcumaliqn 
non obcdiunt ppter diifpc.f ttoem matcrie i 
indt fiun t aitqua pter intt utionem agctium 
fupic at monftra. trie fenfi tiuus appc^ 
tituBBtinftrk eft aptue obedire bic eft g> 
dk.fJws it P anima tractata oc motu t ma 
nente li inteUectns moueat appcrituj (cu fiti 
uum i ipfc eidem obediat motua eft nafalia 
ac ft fpcra fnpio? monerct inferiorem^ in^ 
autem ccouf motua tune non eft naturalu 
ac fi fpj inferior moueret tnftriore. jccpld 
pat; in monarcbu ciuili. Ham slig (unt 

4 



fuMiti repasnintca prtncibus futa.e 
buius rnpajnintie colfr inconcinente.TUm 
in incontinence appettcua fcnfitiuu3incliat 
in eiceffttti utpate in oidinicum cibum po^ 
tun utl aliquid (imile.'Ratio diaat illud fu^ 
gkndim ut uocraii i incontinence ainciti 
tcUcctu.i rack) i p?opiie continentia non 
eft uirruj moralis fojmata.nam ut (quit idc 
pbiia in'uirtuolb aninu coulon.it. unde cum 
cr mulcts i frequentibur. actibua in apperL 
tu fcoficiuo ftrmata merit p?omptitudo quc- 
dam indinans ipfum apprtitum fenfituu in 
bonum t comoimiur roi tune propju c uir 
tna. 3n incontinence tute patens eft bee 
repugiuntu.fedtbi.uincit appericua fenfiti 
uw ncc ilia dicitur uicium firmatum donee 
it freq jentibos acetous in titum aiTucuerit 
incliiurc bcllum fpintmlc bumanum toque 
do inorilitcr. DC repu;nantu etiam loq^ 
tur apt us id roma.vti.uidco a!ium.l.repu5x 
nintem legi mentis met trinitumpCe ntii. 
q.n.ted pcnfandum tkconlti.nim cocupiO 
antum t a: hoc fpiricuali bello loquif g:e^ 
goitus iviu.q.i.nil'i bello. Jnbic iutt> re 
pugmntii ab ido'cl'centia rcguli eft inclina 
tio in rnalum.nim omnis era^ ab adolelcen 
tia piona cit in ttulum jenci'u? vi'i.ca. tii.q. 
LMinisctJs.JEt ratio confueuit mulitplez 
aiTignari. jiina op iratu^ pot quie per fe bo 
num intern fine gratia. 3lu eft px>pter tomi 
tcm cuiginalis peccati unpellctem ad malum 
Blu q> facilius ad nulum bonum.Tlam con 
fiftit in medioelfcntialiter. uicia autem i cr 
trtmitntibuj.ad medium aut trlfttur tmica 
uu.Sdcrtremumiutemmultiplcr.^liaq? 
plura (unc impedimctaboni $ ma!t.9ha qz 
non fit bonum nili cu tudkio r aton ia. q ado 
Ufctntcspsrum uiocnc poptcr offufcatioej 
oiginoruin i.o3po?alium. t credo ucrioiem 
ritiontn tec DC bUo(pirifiuliqt> circa 
pJun poftit trtctari. fed pzetermittp q? traf 
ctntorcnt metis iurk? in quibos minus qoi 
portibtte fit intrude diicedere. tranicocti 
pioiuuomeo i nrionea quc We allcgantur 
per eu quire a dolefcentu fic^magia pwna id 
malum q> id bonum alle^at ctu proanuo me 
us in p:obe.cle.in.ii.dum glo.ibi dicit q> per 
fcnfuaUtJtfm ippetimuoarkctabilia cojpoji 
i fogimas nociaa.n ponit ett am pjoau-' me 1 



CapTm is. 

rcio rraccaturusl'um oc bello 

uniuer(alico:poU.i ipiuetric 

Utuam explicate p qonea.pjimo 

quo mv ojtu i induccum fit bellii. Sjeciido 

quib'jaliceit indicere uniuerfale bellii. Tub 

iungmdo contra quos.tercio quc fmt tye 

gltia.bcUii expUcando p modu ftue act ; lid 

toaTdlicitospfonani bellii ag^cgitiu. c 

fomindo quifdam qoca circa ipi'j. Quarto 



quc Tint pjbnt qut accedcre pcffi nt ad bdlu 
fc t quid ci accidetibua non aftrictie. Quito 
cc bis fpoliia que faint in bello i alii* qbufdi 
qix in bello faint. &ejcto p modum tabulc 
p inftructoc csnonifte Oc queftionib' con- 
tin:ntfbu6 maceriam belli ulncucy in cpe 
iuris cn6ict rractatum fuent p glai txic. 
remittent. Opere pitciii eft ut fequamtir 
diinlnnem belli vniuerfatu? co:palia traditi 
P jMuom meum hie qa cius o: dine tg bcm' 

.Ca. x. 

deo ad piimom. t p?imo qro 
quo iure oKum lubuit bdlu xni 
uerlale. iooTo mv diutno i inf 
gentium ftiuino ut pbat 3o.viii.p?imo regu 
vi.c.iuvgemiu.ff. ccinfti. i iute.l.ex hoc 
iurc. txxi <j> betla ojta func iure oiuino 
obi fcie ndum eft q> bella nedum dno pmittc 
tefmmoporitiueconcedentem introduces 
funt i hoc Oemonftran poreft. lUmomnis 
ficultas tendens in bonum a cvo poTitiue ne 
dum pmiifmc ctriuat J5ed facultaa belli in, 
ducendi tufti tendit ad bonu ergo a Oeo pofi 
tiue piunit ,pbat mib.v 11am omne datum 
optimum t omne Ponum pfcctum oel'urfum 
eft Defcendens a patre luminum . Jaco.i.i.q. 
i.<p pie. t^Jobst mine?. Tbm indactio bel 
li iufti i txllum tultum tendit ad bonn^.lli 
tendit ad pacem i qutctem vniuerfi hoc p* 
bat auctomace Buguft. ad fionihcium He 
inquiens. lion entm bellum querit ut bt\ 
(urn ctcrceat led bellum qtierit ur pax qrt 
T [ubditftoergobelljndopactfica6 utcos 
quoBerpu^nasadpscisutilitatem vinccdb 
pduc8t3.t>ccl5abtr'.rxui.q.nolt. ftigit 
finis belli pax i tranqllitaa vniuerfi ergo in 
feruntadeoaigtnaliter i pofitiuc puenulci 
Confirmtt mm omnu actua puniriu' malo 
ruma dco pnenit.Scd inductio belli iufti c 
punitmusmalof i rebellijm ergo a Oeo po 
fitiue pucn it. 6 :obt nuu*. Him fciibic 
mibi ui.-i diet am i ego retribaam ^uer.xxii. 
i .xtiii.q.i. 'item cum in puerbiis i libi 
mca c vlcio i ego retrJbua Oaitrono.xxxii. 



aut.ttuguftini in f mone Oe puero ccturicta 
xxiii-q.i.parat* ^.non cajjipjendo pnmo p 
bine inducticncmcondudi port; tjxologicc 
Oe neceifino in uniucrfofore maloe T itbeL 
ka. 11am maieftati Oiirine infunt .ict' pie 
mut iui bonoti i puniatiiii nulo^ ut Icribic 
Jnt ellecru bonnm.tc. Tune illo pjemiiTo 
pofTet dc induci poUto accu neceiTario panic' 
obuctum terminatiuus illiusactnt3boc > pbJ 
tur p\'bapbdol'opbili.ii.0c aninu. llani 
pofitoactutirionis ponit obiectam nifibik. 
3 tcm i acruauditionispofito ponit obiectu 
uddxle po&tocrgo a pimcipto crcatow muV 
Oiactupunitiuo in Oeo neccd'ario ponit do, 
iectu" punibile T tale eft malii ut .u.dictu cit 



385 



Confirms pMmump:mdpa!e. tlamomnia 
actuap quern tolUt'nocendt ficultaa idea 
pofitiuc puenit. >ed indue tio belli iufti eft 
buiufmodt.pjobatur bee aut.sug.tk inqnie- 
tiabelU geruntur ut ad pietatis tufticie fa- 
cietatem uictus confoUtur.Subdit.na com 
IkentU Iniquitatis capitur-utilia uincttur 
qm nibil ell fJidus felicitate peccant iu; q 
pcnalia nutritur impunitas i maUnoliitaa 
uelut interim boftiaroboiatur. "foec babent 
xriii.q.i. v'.at .per boc. Confirmatur omnis 
potcllu eft a ceo iubente uel pcrmittente . 
rsifjtclbs txllica fie pwacnit fed non t> 
lumpcrmittente. fed lubente ergo iubente. 
fuobitur pjmcipaliter'ad roma.x ui.tranfup 
riiKxiiii.q.i.quidcuIpatur. D.'u:dplura 
mm ut boc pattt infpectis mundi.'gcncrat to 
tub as.llam a pnncipw creationis miidi ufqj 
ad tempon noe ecus per feipm t fine miftro 
maloa males exterminabat ut pat 5 DC cbajti 
1 lamccb i quibui'djm'aliis regibus ut fcri- 
btnirgenc.im.xivui.ca.p:r(i: ergpbellain 
duxtt panitiua T maknm exterminating. 
Sntatur ergo ex p:cmtiTie bello iurc diuino I 
dacta iMiginalitcr fyuralircr . jrmmo fone 
Kmonftrari poiTct.tlam inqutunt naturalef 
boc eft paraua mundus T lie fit gutxrnatto i 
poo mundo fie in toto uniuerfo Umili tudine 
tricra.ut inquit pb j' viii.pbi. i in regione 
naturalisccspoJiBbumaniccflat^ ubtnul 
lua tfi. bumotum (xce(Tus nulla eft rebellio f 
pugnana conieruattoni naturali.ubi aiit bu- 
moJumexceiTuspJoprcrinoidinacUin rcgu 
nem tune pagiu nature tcndcnt is in cofcr^ 
uationem contra exceltum tendentem in Dfx 
ftructioncm i in pugna. aliqiudo fufficit na 
turalidpotenuaidcojrcctioncm repugnan 
tie.aliquando eft impotcns p;opter excciTu j 
mozbi i tune eft opus cxtimfeco remcdio . 
utpotc medkaminc fapiente naturam neneni 
repugruntia cum rnnbo. Sic indirecteto 
magno mundo.Tlan aliquando in regione i 
plagi mundi nullos eft rebellinm cxceltus i 
tune nulla pugna jnnmo unifomiter tendit 
tpfiasgubcrnatr ix naturam conferuationc 
aiiquandoeft excetTue rebellinm tendenni 
in Dcftructionem gubernationis i conicrua 
tionb i aliia placaticmbus i tone non eft 
opua bello nee medicaie uencnofe. Sliqn m 
Untnn excelTit mcsbus g> opua eft medicaie 
venenolb pcnittio mater u mo?bi exftirpahte 
t talc medtcamen eft beUumcradiutiuum 
1 extermination; malof . t>ie igitur in poo 
mundo recurru ppter detcctum vtotis infe 
rvia ad modicum q cquipst remedb extrl 
fcco n venenofo.&ic in magno mundo gOx 
bnnatot gencralia qui eft a! tufimus aeatoi 
i eft medicus aniuerft tendens in ipfuis con 
fenutoe f gubernatoe cum intantum excre 
oount humoKs tendentes in ocftructionem 
vmuerfi ucl ptia ciul'dem .i.uicia excelTim 1 
Itcrius impwtabilia refpectu conhiatwnw 



monarcbk mundane utif remedio bellico nt 
exterminet vicia i excciTua ut difcrofta re- 
dacat id urminos tcmpamenti.fet (teut in 
cojpc bununo ifti bumof exceiTue fiunt ctr- 
ca membza fingula co:pis bumant i etii difx 
crofia infurgit aliqoldo ppter bumcaes vni 7 
exceiTuum qncu alterius. ic in vniuerfa 
ftngulas regionee t mundi plagaa que fun t 
meinbsa msgni mundi fiunt hie vicio^t ex^ 
cedusquc repugnant ipfius c:iibcrnationi i 
alrqn in uno aliqn in alio fm ulcios: uarteta 
teai ftccontingit pbgas mundi inhrmari 
fpter viciof cxcelTus que qfiq,- fie cxcedut 
g> opus eft medicamine eradicatiuo quo era 
dtcabun t aliquado bont cum malia ficut me- 
dkina eucllit etiam mixtim bonoa cu malia 
ymmo ppter Dictum excelTum penit* extig 
uitutmojocontingitetum inungularibiia 
fuppofitia qt> patee ex fenfatia nam regicnw 
infinite ppter boc funtpenrtua extinete i 
inbabicabiles redditc. Jnfinita portent re 
citari excmpla "boc idem conttngit in gene 
logiia i in regiminibuaxiue ctiam minrit'nt 
penitua ocftciant. t licet bee Tint diets 
fie figurafr tamen textibaa legia diuine ap- 
tilTimc Oimonftrant. TUm ut legit genef 
jcijc.c.ppier exceiTiutun mozbii fodomie Oc' 
ufus eft medicamiue billico i eradicatiuo ?t 
&odomam.&obori.&egar.i leale.licet 
doe perirent ppter vieinitate utt>e pe.dU. 
5.. fed continuo i .c.cl'ici Oe excel. p?ela. i 
in aut.ut non luxurknt cotra nitura circa 
fi.colr.yii- extent induci inniiera excm 
pU Oe ifto etiam medtumme bellico. j OHK. 
vui.c. 11am Ibi &iia noftrr iubet ad Jelum 
nouc uc conftit uat Hbi retrnftpn infidiia 1 
infidianteebeUatcreaadinfidiandii bcftib 7 
t a a^uft.in lib w qonum fup v'bis jofue. 
5ufta ante bell* diffinirt Iblcnt que Yicifcut 
iniuriaa n Oclictof exceil'ue. t fubdit gea 
ucl ciuita-o pleetenda eft que uel uindieare 
negUxerit qo a fuis impiobe f.ictum c.ub 
dirfj boc gen' belli fine dubio iuftum eft qo' 
imperat qui nouit quod cuiq; fieri Kbeat.no 
dicit pcrmittit pnmo imperat . Srubdi t in 
quo bello dux exercitua uel ipfe populue non 
UmactoJ belli ^miniftercei iudicanduee 
t fie dare ocmonftratur ccum i medicum 
alttflimuoi conferuatotem untuerfi bella im 
pare i eradi &dicta.'boc babentur t rail'iip 
n xxiii.q.ii. tominue'nofter.' De boc ec 
bello i medtcamine craducatiao Tcribii ma 
cbabeozum T.CJ.I CCTtrono.esp_ii. ubi ex 
mandato oci filii ifrael bclia gelterunt cctra 
amezcoa quod ettam traetat augu.in lib?o 
mu. t babetur tranlTumptum xxin .q.ii.ca 
notandum.&anetx boc etiam fcrtbituriu 
dtcumv.ca.ubiekgit tx>minuc nouabclU 
loquitur tt bie erradicantibue uickuumci 
tt(Tu8.&cribitur etiam yfak cxxx.i beliia 
pcipuiaexpugnaoat logtur 0' bieeradicatib' 
cribitur etiam in iDacbabeoJU iJiLca.C5 



386 



totsmmi t bdlttt. Gcribicur ctti 
x x.a.aomiiMB eft muii t*n> bcllatw.)* 
ttmk (apcr (ofbmom prfdwrimc txc fcri 
HtdkwsfiquiBfanKtaemlatroBia uTpir 
rttc enamcnt i infirmod pjodeft illis wi i 
flttatr enim m dr quibna non 



bene metmndir malo oprre celTubunt. C5 
clofc) eft ierontmi 9 Ibnanc mciofi ft cernic" 
moribwqttortieaitwinfcctain nuludilpoc 
bantnr ibpcfifbdloeradicatioo^'becfai 
b:nmr i mi. q.tii.ca. fi qni fotituiinc bee 
pcrtc acmonftratur luce vii.id cbrcoe xii . 
diat n tominna (era 1 qm'nefcir aabkatcm 
tt>mini fui tcit digna p'.agia uipulabitpiu 
cia.^cru' autejn qui fti{ aoluntate5 somf 
nt fui i non ficir digna 



cedeiMigitnr.recipit plagis a asmino. bee 
fuiutraniTumptaxxiiiq.v.ea uindicta. 
ft ic legitur <j> ellas maltos afftcerit mate 
pwpza nunn i igiK dimnitus impetrato iiii 



&tc fciibitur cc aliia tanpoK ncttris kgfe 
iin'.rcgam xxilj.i.)5fitil.ca. &ic fcribtar 
puirbumpcmapTonim principia aniniw 
i uro? CUB tradidcrunt actoii iiii.a. rranf 
fumptmc bi'xcnr ivii.q.i. aniniis xviii.q. 
V.M uindicta in finc.Dc hoc beflo cr jdica> 
ttuo palcbrc loquitur g:cgo:iU8 ad arunicb! 
dim francoJum rcgin am fie inqokne ne fnj> 
on crcdimiB diinnc ukkmia iraoindufce 
Ur jtoJum Qne accioru comota belli pcdia tf 
tcrri-nac quosKlinqucntedad rccfitudinia 
uum cci pjcapra non renocant xxiit.7). v. 
ft q-joe inquit nonne comin ' ad mopkn mi 
Uftcop no picurifl uiiure exodtxxii-/Do^ 
fesrttwiqai Itgcm acctpcrat a tomtnocul 
totes Idoli oololc puniri ut uodi xxiti.ca- 
>a nucl ctiain mand jto Domini agnc rcgcj 
pinguilfinum in fruftra confcidit i regum. 



bine apparet.Do-nmne erum cgiprios flucti 
tma fubmerfit exodi xiiii.ca. Jfribelitarum 
oidiucr.1 poftrauit in bermjo.nume.xiiu.c 
tranlTumpta batxntur xxai.q .v. quid ergo 
JnSmta po.'Tunt fupcr hoc ocmonftrsndo in 
duciexempla arterial uouelegia diuinc. 
Scd be c fufftclut.ut ex bia enumeratuj l'uf> 
ftciit conclu iircbclla oHginaltter 02015 fao^ 
buiile ex lure diuino i non folam cci pmik 
ftone jmmoi pofitiue ab iplb mundi gubcr- 
na ten t mcdko u!cb?U5 cradicat iuo p?opter 
filutcmji mundi conlcnwion^.t cum in 
bunc fincm tendunt belli ca rcmedia ut fupia 
dare dictum eft. fciopter bane autemde 
traftam i uicioium multiplicatum exceduj 
inaniuerfiocftructionem p7og?edient<5 ex 
fcnfatis ipparet altilftmum creatorcm tempo 
ribua retro teds i boc eradicattuo remcdto 
ufum foifte. Tim rcgni i mundi regimix 
lu q-aim plma penitua eneruati at quim 
plura remilt) quid roranonm a/ienfu 
quid DC grccof Jmpio Quid ot romanojum 



TniucrfoWminiopjrtceltalk tcmpobw 
noftri-j febkunt i fubiciunt cximini medi, 
cina parat aticubi minoiattoa alien! cradica 
du(xercitatci>idluinumquc2a3 babitudi 
BesfuntfalUcesiutrt axtrinam pitiiftmi 
ffxcjiio i anpborilmo? bine reguDcm di 
ouxft ad mofum ut alt iltimus congruam ad 
bixit mcdicinam ut cuius bumoiee in qnato 
i qu Uu tempi men to plus cum qui ex pleni- 
tude merit c uicuatio fanct iuxta tott rtni 
eiufdcm. 1x~c mtcm x'.ufio uidelicct cf> 
bdlapueniantatMopotulune io?iginaliter 
Ocmonftriri poiTet atento Oiuinc mitcfbtia 
vniwmi t ppttuo minillerio. Tla 5 altilTt 
mue omnium crtatoj mtdiante akftintcbi 
na in bine terrcftrem madn'nam nttaraltta 
opa t fed fupnaturaliter imcdiate ub'i uu'.t fpi 
rat i infiuj t ted naturalitcr loquw Dictum 
pttiiftmi pbi t>:imo metbauiftce i fo celi.ne 
ccrte eft bunc mundum contiguum clfe I'upio 
rib' btionitad ut omnre 'feu 3 mde rcgator< 
3 nfluitaltiiTimua natural r in Ixc inferior 
mediantc ccldti i fperico co?pe.3Hud autcj 
totum co:pusop3t mediante motu i lumine 
ut inquid idem pl9. t quia in ip!a tots 
micoiiu cclciti funt ptce Oiucrf^ iitutum 
influendoutputa Up.itim uirietatee fteilip 
erratium i nxaf diuerfitas a quibua^prer 
uarictatem naturaru; i motimm fepcndet 
effcctnu omne gcnitum i cottuptibilc. 3d 
circo quclib; contrarictas i nat uraf Oiucr 
ute i repugnantia Me mfcruis infurgcna t> 
pendenseftOefuper. xquolbtimmfa 
tnr4>cum repugnantii t Diftnmirao Tint 
o;dinato:ra belief feu introductcma 5. bella 
inde ozianc jruuno expicn tia Oocet 9> ppter 
vnifjimititcnnoirfctfmitatc al'pectuuu tpe 
nitiuititis infurgunt inter 1 famines natura 
Its dikctdee i n ales inimicitie.'boc qlibct 
expi t ."ihm quta Oiltgct ftstum cum uidcrit 
nullis meritid pcedetibus i fie odio babrbit 
nuilis cc mentis pjeadcribua-Siic tnter ci 
uitates t villas i oftrj infurgunt Dilcoea 
natura'.iui' ppter vnitwrnitatcm t diffor^ 
mitaccm afpectuumtempoie conftructbnia 
earum i fie infurgunt odu i bcllacx infiu 
entu Cclefti. &ic 1 amidcic T paces 
inter p:ouinciaj. 'Ixx autem celcftia 
naturi mediante motu eft p:oductiua gene 
ratioms n corrupt ionia i bis infcrio:iixis au 
gumentii diminurionunedum fingularu 
mppoTita v-mmo in fmgulae mundi pligas . 
11am ex bic fuperna natura plage babitabi 
lee i econtra iuxta doctrinam pbi.ubi mare 
fiet aridum ubi aridum fict nure.x bac ni 
turarum repugnantia i difpofitionumcx q 
rite contenttonea i bulb porticularia i u 
niucrf jlia infurgunt bee p.'optcr motuum i 
afpeetuum uartetttcm.qucdjm exoltatque 
dam cxtinguit i quedam JcpJcmit.rDntat 
mundi rcgu uniucrfalu i particularii . 
IcbttOcmooftraripotcTt TUmpofiuci 



387 



fuflcieri pJictiuaaUcuiuaeffectns ntccffc 
eft ilium erfcctii.pdati nil! iilk aliquodei 
trinfecum impedimentum pductionis. S$ 
natura celeftts ?tinet diftemal'r motn i iT> 
pectn i ipfiua ptea funt oiffomea ex natuf 
fui tnflacdo ergo necclTc eft pdaci bos effcc 
tus rcpagn antes i diffoimcs cum non fit 9* 
impedmpoffct. fit hoc inferri pctfct na> 
turoli tcr neceffc eft eft; belli, nee alitcr pio 
cedera naturalker mundi gubertutio fit* 
fta tamen licet 3* bee celeftis natnra oper 
tur in bee Inferior non Umen oc perfc t di 
recto in intdlcctuj Irjmanum pi mo durat 
libcrtas srbirrii ut in-ca. nabucbodonofw. 
xxiii.q.iiii-i ca.oe tiniatoepe.di.ii.ca. 
ficut enim t pbiia in etbi.Sed opcrat in ox 
gana aircatum fenfitiuaram que recepta (flu 
entia adminiftrant intellntui. 1 1 fie per in 
dircctumimUiitbiceft$> fcribitnr inlitno 
centum oerbomm.Bninu fapiens dominabi 
turjftru. fecdqubhoctriccarcnimise^ 
Jon^tur a Krmima iuria non ultcri' crca 
b jnc ccdactionem tnfifbx@ed fufficbt tlfa 
tarn c % pxdtctis t ccmonftrat urn txlla p:o 
BtnifTc a dec pofiuue i dfcctiiK licet er boc 
uldmoinftrtturnon in mediate micbin^a 
Idmnataralitcropcrando. Jnquofcribit 
p?oauo3 mtaa tbcolojrce in.r .ca-po(Tc coclu 
ui nccdfaib tee maloa i rebeUoa K. fcribic 
tamcn rxiii.qucftio.v.in capitu.no iblu5 f 
bonum eft cite rcmonca quia funt ultous ire 
dci in bia qoi milum optrantur . nam per na 
bttcbodonofo: i per antbiocum i per pnnci 
pes romanoium t per nonuUoa rcgcs genri 
lium popnlam ifrabeltdcom delinqacntc cU 
tiiTunusaliqtuodopuniutut p belle fcrtbic 
mbzoiiud tranrtumptiue xxii^.v-in ca.lt 
TUmptonentisfatxiicnum defutnator aL 
tarectoram ca.fi Ixrct icua.it. q.vii-i in.c 
i.ca .cula i q Klbonc in v . ft quid plura p 
proauum meum fcribitur fcribani doctote* 
in ca/c.d: tee c5pe.i.refbant g> ocua a pn 
cipio creiuit cdtim i terram n omnia qoe i 
eid I'unt anylicnm n bonunim natnri.fpiri 
tuiliai no IpiritualU i bx rcjcit p feipbirn 
pieccpta o:iit i tranfjrediend pen! impo 
bit per ftipm fcilicj ade i euc.pnniik cba/ 
yn i quotda^ olios ofque ad noc . tempoie 
Oena cepit revere per miniftros t noc fuit 
oui deiu Bedk giibernationem arcbe i i bac 
rectoib lucceifer un t patriarch-: re#a t alii 

00 nini boc dor auit ul tj ad Criftom qui fm t 
ntturalia dommua t in nicarium poftea 
conftttuit pctrum per ilia ucrba Io ea petr' 
t 6iper bane petram edit" icabo ecdeOas ma 

1 tibi dabo clauea re^ni celo7um.11oca i.c. 
in none xrt.dt .riiii.q.i. loquitur, item du 
tliric acope fpiritum (anctii quonim rtrnife 
rida peccata reautentor eia 3o. r r .c.sd tf 
monluandam $> petroot cipiti fcojfuj dixit 
pare pifccoata mesa io.nlnnoca. tlk 
noWt 0(0 deo j 9> pttraa fwKa. omnibue i 



diet ccpbas ct capatpsindpiam ixii.dlce 
ters qae in boc ca.dicunmr p pjowum me- 
wimibipiobtntnr. 

CapTmxi 



Itilecando g>E^lI orta (unt 
lore gcnrium bic tamcn ?fidera 
<j> licet dicant inra o^ txlla Tint 
introducta iuregentinm ut }7fidus.i.di. 
ins gentium t bermogeman' iurifconfultua 
in.l.ex boc turc.ff. Oc inftui iurc tfi credo 
g> bella oztum babucrint non fblum ex cgta 
tc nitora[ humane intclligtotk i create 
ymmopmojdiilitercr difpofuionc nature 
lutorentia non I'olum injluentis fup act' bo 
nsnoa ymmo fup qui jfoiq* animttie T it 
inanimatia ut fit ne^ dicer c g> bobcant bell a 
crtum a inre nali eoam ut djrtingait a iurc 
gentium (j. qhccr Oirterant flat tex-in.l.i. 
^.ii)9 gentium i.^.ius nale i.l.ex hoc ture 
ff.ix iufti.n tore i pma oi.lue n*k cum liu 
glo.i.c.iusnale.Qtfbociitferu^ftcondit 
cxpiinciptisniUbuscuiuflitxt nali create 
eft inftta nilis inclinatio ad exdufionem cu 
tufoicy repuguantia fue nali difpoitoi hoc p5 
inOuccndo in lingulia na turalibus funplicu 
boa i itiixcia.Tbm aquc infitum eft ignt re- 
Gftere i econr ppter repugnantiam qualits 
turn fie in fingolie eUmcntie fie in mixtia id 
ouci ponent bee 9> p5 in bnitia ubi tx nali 
repugnantu compkxionum xuum inclinat 
nifr ad occiiionem altcrius i econtra ftcut 
in rfcli crratura infita eft inclinat io a tiaf a 
etiam circufcripto intdlectnalt dictamine 
ad pfugandurp qdciicp fibi repognana quod 
bocfit-f roe.pbai. Ttamnaturaomnid 
creatof pdiictiua non minus Oebuit efle fbl 
iKita in f uationc rationabillfl creature 9 ce 
tero^ com ipla ceteria fit nobilioi ut. c. cum 
inftrnuuaOe pe.i remiif .i.l.fanccim'.C. 
Oc facrofanc.tcde-7 .c.lx-c imago.xxxii.q. 
w.i .ppter ipiam omnia infra glofauj luinare 
font pducta ut. 1- 3n pecudum .(f. DC ufuv. 
Si igti natura induxit i ndinationemtiSle j 
in ceteita aeatnrid ad quaky fibi cotraria 
p:of Uganda qnanto magia boc Oebuit in ru 
btlicreatura hoc idem fenfualiter patct per 
fmgnlafuppofitadiioirrendo. Tlam glibj 
bx in (eipto cxptt fiboc ex princtpiis n.iluV 
bominib' infitum eft ergo ex bac indinat ice 
nali pnwjdinarr babuit ratum helium. Cum 
bcllam ut Tupia furiptum eft fit contcntio ex 
oita .ppter tolUndam repugnantum. 5n 
fjrc ergo g> ilia contentio que wit ,ppter tol 
UndumOi/Tonumi repugnana conleruatoi 
foe fundamen taliter babuit oitu" a principiis 
nalibua ut fie a inre n.ie put diftingutt a iuf 
gentium. &ed ftatim diaa bee odtruut 
ttxt 7 qui Oiuit ex iure geft.oziri vbi aduer 
tendum 9> licet a Jure nali inducta lit ifta in 
clinatio nllis ctr oifcripu nali intelligent!! 



c indfamb ilk regulsf p oictamc roe 
i intelligent* naturalie ficut dicim' in fin 
gdn Kdfaw qa octxncur bonu nifaus n itn > 
ralittr orcumfcripto tnulkuu utppte 
indinatio a i cibttm i potum t coTtum ifta 
bjminibus competent nituralitor i tamcn 
infantine rcgoLuttcr dictaminc rationis qd 
nan cft'in piut u quo arent fllo dicumtnc. 
tc ergo credo faille mentem ilto:um tcr., 
tu$ uiddiat g inclmatio Situs inclirutioia 
inrroducte a pnncipiis naturaUbua infurgit 
ex iurcgcntumuux cquitate generali ratio 
maintd%:ntif.Sedg>ipfa indinatio ik 
dc jgrc naturali boc piobat g!o .in. l.cx hoc 
uirc.ff.oc iufti.1 iure i.U duintgentium . 
Ham gLwitrobictt ponic fie ifta nertn fie in 
tcUigit cc indinotione rcgulata per dictaro 
nnonia.t UCct dkunt Krtua q> tx iurege 
nun inforgunt bdU no tamen credo blfam 
dkcrc bdU idcft illaa indinataa.indintiox 
neabobotoitnmiiureciuilii icanontco 
tUm his ctuik i IDS unonicum no dicunt 
alum cquiutcm qutm fit equttts iurifgtnti 
nm.'lbm otnnc ius confiftit in qoadam rec- 
t itudinc i indc tua dictum c ur.i.di. ius nt 
c jrak.^cd iua ciutle 1 anontcu5 funt rec 
titudo uite i cquitas iurifgentium. &td (i 
addunt 1'up.u rccritudincm illim aliquaic ex 
pkunonc tune dicitur ius ctuik uel canoni 
cu n.nim iua Ifgalc i ius canonicum babcc 
Ijxafiure explicarc rccticudinem i equiu 
tern uiritgcntium quandocp cam Kttrmina^ 
do ad uarioe actoa quandoqj octcrmintndo 
pa* uarios cucntusJxc omnu p:obantur per 
tcrUn.Liusciuiie.ff.O^iulli.i iure.Iamcn 
dicic ibi tcxtua toe ciutle dt 9* nee in totuj 
aiuturaliiKlfjoitiumiuredifcrcpat nccp 
omnu d kruit ita^i cum allquid addinws [ 
DctraiMmns luri comuni.ius p?op:iu.i.ciuilc 
facimas.ft ergo uerum diarc 9> bdla func 
cv iure ciuili i canonico.i.cc ipfa rcctiudinc 
quc eft ius ciuilc i canonici|5 T)ec ob(t5c 
K r cu-j llatlm allcgati.quia ills rectitudo ni 
biloaddiroud cccracto htf^cnttum nuncu 
pitur.fct flc loquiitur iura ftatim alkgata. 
&cd cum atiquid additum ml cctractum c 
One ciuik ml canonicum nuncupatur.TIul 
liQmca dabtan qoooiim iua ctmle i cincv 
ion circa btlta lupu dktamen rarioie ge 
ncralisaliqutd aodant^xptedictisinltrrur 
quo iure belli otta fucrint . frmuup me' 
in hoc.ca. tenet 9> bella cnta iuncta dtTpofiti 
one nature natnrantis no a turegent ium r i 
men bar.n baLt alii antiqui i modcrnt in 
Lex hoc iurc.ff.oc iuftt.i iure tenent t iure 
gentium otta funt bclla per ilium tex-docj 
^.iu^cntium.tnlh.oc iufti.i iure t doc.in 
ca.ta^cntium.udi.pio iltie fjcit.nam dtcto 
denotat caulam i mtdiati.l.i.f .fi.tx iccdto 
ruaMfirt.fcd Jtcitur per iunicoTultumcx 
boc nregentium oJta funt txlla. rgo 
<j> fiuus meus multom fapieter 



loqaif magi0 alte afpickn Jo $ iuriftc i cj x 
noniflc T qd.l-ei Kx iure Oclx.it iutdligi 
pwuripfcintelligitardiaTemua conr iura 
TI jm fie ut pmedcre i bibcre eft coe omniuj 
BninMlium ita etiam cuilibj animati ctia bia 
toeftinfuanJilisindinario ad exiluTioncm 
cuiuloicvidetpu^nintwfiK nili difpoitioi 
ergo boc non conucnit fb!i Ixxnint nimif fi 
non uidet padere ex iure gentium (5 ymmo 
ex iure naturali pmcuo ^ hoc fit vcf in bnt 
tis fbtt in. l.i. J. cum anetc8.ff.ft quadra, 
pauoic fccutc dicaf. 

CM* 

cundoqucro quo tare lidtum 
fit bcltnm contra infideleei in 
uadcre terraseof i pprcr hoc 
indulgentiam concedere cuiur 
Incotririum Difponere uideanc. Ill nihil 
ad nos Oe bis qui fee id funt.ii.q.i.multi etii 
quia oiigtne poiTefTiones i iunfdictixs funt 
pud eoa.nam Oeus ppter totam roalem ere 
atu;am bee pduxit TUm apud bonos tmax 
lod facit folcm 021:1. Z1?attxi v.i xi.ad fine 
etiam qui ad ftdon aggregati no funt cu til 
a[ omnes inco?pati fmt rclinqndi irbitrio 
xlv.di.oc mdeis ymmo qDplus eft Ptmitti 
poteft infidcli iar il'dicrio fup conucrfoe ad fi 
Oem Ounodo non nimis grauet "Oiimo ad 
tbimocb.vt.c.scroTo ut dare liquea eft atte 
pendum9>bicoponetpmictcre que tetigi 
in matorii rcpnlaliaf in prin.f.undc ctian: 
bobcat mrifdicttoncm i etiam vnt> Jmpotot 
que bic ptermitto quia ibi pUne tactum fuit 
Quo ftc pl'uppofitoaiam attcndendum 9 in 
ttdanciuitatefubcodemrege TuntOuopo- 
pulit rm duos populoa due vitcifm Ouaa 
vitas duoa pjincipat ' i f m Duos pzincipax 
tus oupiex iurifdictionid ado. adcm ci 
uitaseft ccdeiu.Unus rex eft ips. Duo po 
pali funt c[ici i laj? ci.Due uite font fpcialu 
i carnalis. Duoprincipatus faccrdotium t 
impium Umen vnum dt pjtncioale.f.pontu 
ficatus 3n quo nt refoTo alteriu* a[ FruioU tf 
monftraret pbua.xii.metbipbif.concludena 
vnitatem acatob fie Demoftrds multitudo 
p?incipanium mala entia male uolunt Difpoi 
Tnua ergo pjtnops Pic dicit etiam in^pofi 
to qa in quolify cnttum gcnerc eft dare unuj 
piimum g> fit nut^ i mcnlura omniii altop 
ut idem pbus Tie in monarcbta tota eft Oeue 
nbc ad (uimum mouens unobile ut tdc> pinis 
pbiftcoy vit.i viii.taU non poteft cffc ?mpi 
om refpectu pontificatud ptermitto mnnita 
fuper boc allcgabilia. Suificiat ergo inrcrrc 
<f vnuseft Dominuaoibtfl rii.qoe.i.in apib' 
ii.q.iii.cuncta per mundum i.c.p p:incipa 
lem.ff.ad.l.Kod.dc.iictu.l.Oepcatio t ifte 
eft papa i boc non folum fup fiddes pnmo 
ettam fapinftdelcsbalxtiurifdictofm quod 
ciarius oemonftrat. Tlam xps taper omnea 



bsbmt poteftate tndcinpWmk&cusiudi 
cium tuum regi Oi ?i r pa bibuit no fuufet 
diligena patcrromi.fi petro coniteuro vica- 
no I'uo curam non oimifulet q> nepbaseft di 
cere com petro tradiditclauesdicens qbV 
cikfc tig jiKrU.ic iDatbd xvi.1 alibi pafce 
oms mas io.ultimo. Sic tat ur p.ip.i bibet 
b iureiu2ii'4ictionemfuperinfide!e;3 licet n 
tc fact o.'binc eft q> gentiles babentes folu 
legem nature peccant contra legem nature 
poniri poterunt per pipam. 11am fcribic ge- 
ne fu xix.ca.g* bdomitt puniti Hit a deo cr- 
go t uicarms oei bee potcrir.Idcm fi cotant 
idola . n im luturale dt cratozcm colcrc 4 
DO creaturas.3dem potent ctiam punire UL 
deos fi bciunt contra legcm fium in moult 
bus i no puniuntur a pjelatis fuis. r de 
rpisni3 no eft dubium quin punui potfint II 
ficianc contra Itgcm eusngdu. r quibua i 
knot Q> p jpa tan ucrus princcpa pot Ixl- 
I urn tndiccre infiddtbos n indulgentiis con 
cedcre pjoptcr recupcrtiorK5 terre fincu 
i nuiime tcrrc confecrate natiuitate tpi 
bibccatione i mo; re eiufdcm ubi non colitur 
cbriftudfedmacbjmctus. 3 tern terra fac 
ta uicta fait poft mo.' tern r pi iufto bcllo per 
Jmperacawn Ronuimimqui poftfpoliatua 
fuit per inndilea. 5dcircolicitumeft{upe 
rccuperare ration e pnncipatuj quod optU 
nuit . 5n aliis autcm urris quc non fun c 
conlccrau ncc impcrius nee ccclcfiahobuit 
lurildict bncm d facto poccft pipa facerc 
pKccptu> i cbzniianos iubdttoj al poteft coa 
per fcntrntiam piiuarc turil'dictionc foi.t c 
per bee aide que ut in pluribuj tncu (tint 
Oe bis que nojnno.dc uoto <j> (uper bid pi 
tct fbtutio ad primum qwlitum fcilicct 6 iu 
facia belli induct! ab ccclcfia contra inftdc 
Us. tiqaoinfcrtur lultificitio belli in' 
Ouctiper 3mpcnto2cm contra bodes. 
De bu q bic oicuntur per proiuum mcuj 
tur.iit.l.boftc9.ff. de ciptiuu i poTtliminb 
rcucrlis.red remittit a J dicta Jnno.in.c.g* 
fupj bis dc uoto.i bal.in.l .er boc lore. ff. 
d: iuilt.t iure.Jdem (kit in Ucturt anti- 
qua t commas abb.i alii in.c. I'icut . f .0 iu 
re turtn.te paritcr remittit ad dicta Jnno. 
piimo non eft dubiu 4> ciuitatcs que fucrut 
languinc ch?Uti confccrate non dcbent in 
mantboseffe inftddmncummulti Jmpcra 
tcata acquifuerunt ouminio cbnfti-inojutn 
pzopter IMS ciuitates recuperandas a frapa 
teoeris potelt bcllum ioici boc cocludit to* 
tt fcola iurucanonici uidc bjr.in.l.xpiania 
C.oe p.iganU.Oeinde mno.in dicto.c.^ fa 
per bi 3 co;idudic 9> infiddes Ucite tenet w 
mmu K pjincipjtus i alia bona . q? no eft 
diftinctio pi'ona* apud ocum i fine caul's n 
Ddxntaipunismoldbri.fKec tmcntj> 
ft tnfideUs xlinqmmt p ipi-pxefl bcllum in 
Dtcere contra eo j-Sed bjfti. tenet if ft in * 
ftdelca non rccognofcunt Ofim ccclefx Ucicc 



poffuut bonis fpoluri fed fi recognofcunt to 
mtnum ecckfk i xpiinis non tunt in&fti 
poflct fententia toller art. Jnno. jjbat' in -c. 
di^ptr xriii.q. viii-opi.Mli.indcr nous ,ppc 
tei.cum gto.in.c.ll Oe rekas .xxiii. q. vti. 
Iu pondcraqDeftetincducnkns^tnfidef 
diim non rccognofccret i gjudere t ea Dig^. 
nitate g> ciTet alicuiue ciuitarb rominM ii 
eis inter dicte funt Oignitates ut bjbe t in .1 
fLCOe iudeis i ibi bar. llullus cnim pot 
babere imifdtctioncm tempo2ale5 nifi fit xpi 
anus bar.in rub:ica de iulti.n iure glo.in.l. 
fifpadonem.^.iowtc.rf.cv-cxcu.tu. &ed 
bene poflict ftato in ciuitatibua babere ppu 
i non debcrent moLcftar i led qb poflent ba 
bere ali^ncm ptincipatum boc no feteoz nee 
oliqti cominiu ciuicatis quia ,tuiic tobercc 
vim dijiiicatis. ibonderamtantumin^tuj 
pcoauud mcus dkit q> infidcles dclinquc tea 
puniunt p ptpam i lie (cquii 5nnoc.in dcd 
C)> fup bis qui videt tot am iuritdictocm in 
fidelium attribucrc pipe 9> nonuidetxe^ 
fro dutn abb.ibi 11am eium funt lab ronu 
no 3mpb ut.c.de mdeis T.C.DC pagania per 
totum die quedam dint crimina ccckfiftica 
i comiffa per infideles i punien t per popam 
9 ut^miifa funt peos crimina noetlaftica 
1 punient p jmpaco:em rm diim abb .ibi 1 
poA'et dici diuifum Jmpium cum joue ccbr. 
babet ramcnpe.Dc ancba.in reg.ea que in 
ti-<f concludit g> tcclefia dcbj infidcles pu 
nirc vide tuminum abtun.c.gaudemusccdi 
uoz.vtde abb.in.c.oc inAdeubus K confang. 
i affmi.i an papiiiiu-i Uycoa infideles la- 
beat mnldicrioiicm vide diim abb-in.c.conx 
I'uluit Oeappcl. 11m infideles imediate fut 
tub tempali cominto ut y Jo.in in dicto.c. 
5udemu3 p abb.in.c . in nonullia Oe iudeis. 
vide abb.in.c.p mifabtlem K vfia vide glo. 
in clen.pma a: tcftibiu in v.pncipu glo. in 
de.li.oc rc.tudi.in vo rpiani slo.fi-in clc.fi. 
iudeia vUc.c.^tituit j vii.q-iiii.i ibi ^U 



Cbfl, 

Bi fcL-ndumcft <}> duo funt po 
pu!i.f:romanus i populusetne^ 
ua.De populo roJiint pamo oca 
qui in totum obcdiunt j mpio romano. llaj 
populus accipttur p toto jmpio ut .l.roma. 
ad municipales. Quidam non obcdiunt in 
totum.fed in aliquibus ut qui uiuut legibua 
imperil t fktentur ipfum cominum o:bie uc 
funt ctuitares lombardie t fimilea. n ifti fiit 
in populo romano. llamcuminaliquibus 
iurifdictbnem excrccit ipfam retinet ut.l. 
fi piius dc aqua plu.arccn.i ibi no.Quidam 
(unt popaii qui nullo modo obcdiunt impera 
to?i nee uiuut imperil legibus.fed'dicunt boc 
f jcere ex pjiuilcgio ut uenc t i qui alTerunt k 
boc facerc ex pjiuilegio-S t ifti c turn funt d 
populo romano. q i pwario boc tenet ab im 



pmtox i ipToreuoureporeftqff oolnmt 
ut-I.ftqoieinpon.ff.dcUgi.iii. t>xrtm 
filed poHtfjium eie concelTum dcbet cfTcac* 
cdmodatum at nan piiucnt cunttK ronuna 



dM font popaUqtti non obedfantjmpatori 
urteiunt hoc fibi competerr er contractu 
utfunrpuincicromineeccrie que alterant 
hoc fibi competere ex wnitione Conftltini 
i ilionun }mpatoni. t ifti ettam font tf po 
polo romino.Tlam eccUria ibl erercet imifx 
dfctione qui babcbot 3mpiU5 vnd 11 Oefinut 
popccra dfc dutt fortuni. Udcmdicorf 
regfeaa qui no hitentor fc (ubditus imperix 
tori at rex francie Snglk 'bjrfpanie i li 
lea qui ilterunt hoc fibi competere ex print. 
Icgio ad piefcr iptione . t per hx infcro 
3> omncs grntcs fcre qut obediiit fanctc ma 
Cre ecdefte He font tx popalo romino e 
i qafa diceret Jmpcratttem non clTt domi^ 
mm dkatt contra tertum nungdii.dum 
diot etht edictum i ccfare Ztugufto. TSapu 
li antem ertrinti funt qui no f jtentur tmpc 
racorcm dominum ut pd qui dicuntToum 
inpcratoKm tlfc tominum. iJron tirtL- 
ri qui dicnnt gzancincm dfe cominom. t 
brrtccnt qni dicnnt dTe fin txxnimim Ibidi 
lumjntcr iftos tomen eft dtfftrtntia -flam 
qnidjtmftmtnobisfafcratiutgxd contra 
ti>irco9.Qutdfm cam'qnibus bitxmus pt* 
can at funt tirttrinam meratorcs noftri 
uiduntadiftoanfuiadnod. Qoida tint 
cum quibus nibfl fictre Nbcmoe ut iudci. 
Quidim funt cam qafcoegaerram ictuale 
ut funt farraceni i hodk cu turd)ia. Jn, 
knar ergo 9* com p2inccpa fit (ccularis fu^ 
per wxm non hibene in fccularibua ntfi for 
u at dirt 9> ipie pot indBcere bellum contra 
boftcs fuos i qui font poft fhtim patuir.t 
hoc eft bcQam DC quo loqnitar.UhodesUf .tf 
cipriuis t de ufrJig.l.bofks t in hoc nedi 
ut libi locum beBam quod tnducitur i popa 
lo romino of onpcratoje adco q> fi imperato2 
bdkit odium cmltatibus aliqnibus italic re 
Wlibue uendkat fibi locum cffcc tus public! 
belli, q? tDem ft rcpugnttur off icbli impcra 
toidudpapcnonpjoptcr impcritwcm ,utl 
papora adungucbar.in.l.hoftea. decap 
ttea i poftliminio rcnerfns fcquitur ad qtf 
bkpKdiatur per pxmim rncom. 

CapTmriiiL 



id alfoi pjind 

pe licet bellum indtcere uniucr 
feikioolutio no licet fine pin 
dp automate. Tlamnemini fine pincipia 
Kondalket arma ptare.ut. Cut nfus ar 
ia rtho i tiffo.i ^o-ln anLtJ mi. 



oUat qui fine oris folcmpnttate maimgia 
ins fibi picttubibabctur copia iue dicetla 
iddrco fine etue aun to:i tate non licet Soli 
ergopjincipicompetittoaauctoritate cum 
non babeat fupcriorem ad quern recurratp 
iufhcia. toodie tamen quia funt populi non 
recognofccntcs fuperkncm de facto non re 
quiritur in QUs fnpcriotts anctomaa o> non 
recognofcantpunototadkbcUa inducun 
tur a populo cotra ppfm nlFo xojito.pffnno 
dictum ^aui tnd p. ea que uoluit oldra in c5 
filio.ccxxxt.incipicntc ut etuatx quo qucri 
taraliqualienoticJanc.ubi dtiit yficutin 
aationefactaimpato:iiielab impatorefi 
reqoirk' infinaatto ot in autjdem eft -Coc 
tDna.no.gio.in.l.pe.c.ri. ?ta crit in Unax 
tione regie feu alterius comini DC facto trnc 
Os locum impatojis in terra fuis alfat.d.l. 
pf t-uide io.an.tn addic-fpeUn ti. Oe inftrS 
rum edicoe .^.poJJo in ultima addic.n io.d 
pio.m.c.cum contingat Oetare iaran. in 
penft-carta t aliquid p bal -in.I.fcim-'.C- 4 
tna.uiJc.c.p venerabilem qui Wit fmr le, 
gittimi uide lur.m.l.i.Oc Oecre.Occu.U.x 
invcoT.vidc.d.abb.m.c.fupquibutdim De 
v.figni.tn.iii.coir.arfaipfimultumlate in 
repeti.mca.I.ccturio.ff.oe vulga.i pup.nc 
t pondera 9> Ulod qd bic oicit per pauum 
meum appjobat p.d.abb.in.c.0iem i .). oe 
bare iuran.in .liiUor.videt de meu 3nnoc. 
in.c.olimOereftit.^olL 



pTtndpi coflajd t in aut^k armis.$. 
coUa.xi.-t eftrado nam nemhn One pinci 
pb licentb licet hra uUare. Jura piiadpd 



Iccriusqoero nugbdellnmqd 
pnouet 3mpato: con? ecclefii 
lit iu( tum i teneaut fubditi ei in 
tec obtcmperare xidct 9. fie ga 
fit p:incipia auc.uel mandate ergo i c. tia 
quia Oat iarifdictionee Oe iuOi.c.nouit qui 
filii fmt Ic.cij i.c per Vcncrabikm Oe appT 
fi duobuj etum qua in pcrtincnttbue ad ar 
mop ufum fubditi Ocbcnt t tcnent obedire 
tmpcratoii ctiam fcifmatico . i.q. iii. 5oT. 
&oTo contrarium eft uqr. TIam imperotoi 
eft aduocatus eccf te i tenet earn Ocfendcrc 
idcirr o no poteft ejm impu^nare de utis ex 
libcro wn.c.vno de rcfti.fpoli.c. coqYente 
ymmo bducendo Ixllum contta ecclefiam 
incrct perdere puilegium tndicendi bellum 
cum illo abutac.ii.q.iu.pailegiu de decimia 
fuhgeftum ut punbt in quo delioquit ti tnf 
ac.qunto.f .ne lutom )muno talia ptinacia 
in pnncipe non diftat ab btti de hereticis ex 
cmpli6camua.i.f.i.-i ibino.Hdisquu pap 
fuperioteft .TUm eraminat impcratore ipj 
repiobat i deponit o elect.xneraUc 0' re 
iudi . apfi . li.vi. 7nboc i^ttur cafu non 
tenentur fubditi iouare unpenroxm cotra 
ecclefiam pnmoe central pot popaibW 
oerc coea uinculo fidelitadsr*. q.vi. noa 
(mxonm i.u.inretoa n nota oc brreticM 



39 1 



excoranmamna.pcpe.c.11. 

a pjoamw meo qjomodo pcteft Jntpenoa 
induccrc bdlom contra pjpira i (ubditi ba 
bcbjnt d obedire. bicaa (ecundum 3o.an.i 
boftuitca.oiim Dircfti fpoli. Oone impcra^ 
tojeftbomoiniquiis i peccatwmoninwfe 
non cojrigit fed pern commitnt i tandem 
excomunicstur per papam i omnu cotemp 
niter n mooet bettom p:opter hoc contra ec 
clefunt n condudunt polka cum pjoauoo 
meo bic <j> non fit iuftum bellum.Uiie tomi 
num abb.tn.ca.ficut i.J.oc jure iuran.i vi, 
co.Luidj oominam abbat. in capitulo ncnit 
teiudic. 

Cunt 

Lteriiiaqncruur qnidecontra 

fipipi inducat bellum contra 

Smperatorcm fcii'nuticum here 

ticum oel alias ofurpantem iura 

1 liberates ecclefurum omnes fiddea t cnc 

tor inrare papam n etiam uafalli imperatcu 

ris abfdui poffunt a ioramcnto quo taunt 

oel KcUrari non teneri ot ca.noa fanctoni 

n o.tnraroe xviii.q. Vi. la ponderi qi 

idem tenet tominus abbas in.ca. ficuc t J* 

K tore IUT .in vi.coll .tde.ca. ucnaabikm 

be clcctts i in ca.pzo bumani oc bomici. 

docin ca.cr 0dltsdede.no refi.bodic 

tit quod bibctur in cctraiugante boniucii 

qnc incipit onam (anctam . 

GuxriL 

Itcriuadl uidcndum DC aggie 
Sannboa i ipfum bellumpxftci 
enttousqooipie fieri ocbeant. 
Jnbdiofunt Ugio.i bbct kp/- 
tern mSU centuin pedttea i (cpdngctos six 
euukca.Suit cotxMtca i quelib^ cobonba 
bet xx. alas. tt prims uocatur miliaria. t 
babetpeditcamilklLequitescxxxi. fee 
cunda qumgcncutria dicitur i hibj l-ci.ira 
no.glo.ff .x bid qui no.in u-Lti. in piin.ixx 
igitur i dur i o?do faciontbeUun famine 
doptomultkadineapU i ab beUumpxp* 
tanonautempcraaabdlandu Dootam 
(niucipaliur rundin t bcllum fcilicet arma 1 
mrcs. btc diuidttur in tres partea. cquitta 
ptditesi claatB-Tlameqairibue ampiclif 
fibas marini i flumini. peditiboa coIUs or 
bco plans arbuta fcruentur *bincin(drtu> 
cf> peditea msgts font ncalfiril ret puUtce 
qoameqattea q> pofTont undiqj pjodelk. 
Cupondcrabar.fequitur .d.l.ti.'alkgat 
bic per pjoauommettmi alii doc. ipofca 
dtcas 9> pedttea i equkca babet k ut exec 
dentia excdfa refpecta babito ad quilitatc 
tempo2U3 1 loci.ar^lo.l.apud antiquoe.C. 
cc far.com (unilibua.&c legione uidc slotam 
in.c.i-nt fedt uocan . 



5lites autem in bello" fie fe babe 
re ocbeant at lenient inramctu 
quod pieftiterant.tlam iurent 
Te fbrennuc omnia facturos q 
piecipit impcrato: i nun tcfertoroa mill 
ciam ncc moTtemrecaTaturoepoc&nfard 
poblice.fT.ex quibus.ca.ma.Lpcnu.C.dc bia 
qui non imp!c.fti.I.p2ima libo-x. onnn 
dncibua Kbent obedire at lege coilatoKS 
inpjinctpio . 71am com a re publtca 
amantur -. alantur folia cxbent inttftere 
urilitititaa i etk in nnrnero mtlitk ut arnto 
ram quotiduno cxcrcitio ad bella fe pparet 
ur.l. militca.C.Oc K.milita.i fie Oebct da 
cibuaobtemparc^fi contra pceptumeof 
fcceriut ettim bcne r.ibibminus capitepu<> 
niinf.tf.Ocrc-mili.l.OcPtorcm.^.in hello. 
Sbftinere Oebent ab aggof cultura animali 
umcofbittmercimonuquefbi aliena non 
peragant ncgocia.S d ciuilea cur Ja non at* 
cedant altoqoin militia i etus piimlegiia 
nudabunt t oc re.mili.Lnemo mUites.C.d 
pjocuf.l. militcm. Tlon emant predia ubi 
militant i tempe quo militant nee eti^ali 
cno non molefiant toft non inquiet sbunt 
gallic ilia regula ubi nfcbos oiftrabit coium 
bona paternal ubi ex bereditateqoerunt 
hoc autem inducrum eft nc Ibjdio culture a 
militia adoocent bee babenf.ff. de ze.mili.l. 
nulitea. tender a 3. fex font necelTana 
in milicr . t>jimo ut non fit negotiate!* Jtc 
3> pilot fjcrimentum pergenium piincipis 
9> mortem reipubl.caafa non euitabk.3tem 
cnfisd cingat. Jtemftigma.(.notpti)lka 
Oebct eis in bracbiis inftgi 1 infer ibi i poni 
l.iu.C.o" fibticc.ite i nuoaliop poi i fcribi 
Oc bis per glo.in oi.LpcTt.i per glo. in ru* 
twica mlti.be tlnulitia vide glo. pmam.ii. 
q.i.in.c.pbibct i ea q bfft r.Ufi-C.locaftt 

Cap.xix. 

Dducem autem belli pertinet 
militibua parcuTunc comeatam 
dare equoa militarea extia pjo^ 
uint iam due i non per mitten: mi 
u'tes in caftrts rctincrc ad armoium exercu 
tationcm pduccre ad opus piioatam pifcatii 
venir um non mittere claocs ponarum fufci 
pere vigUtas ctrcuire rurmcntationi comilU 
lonum in tererte frumentum menfure fraude 
cobercere cklicta caftigare querelas comili 
tonum audirc valitudinsnoa tnfpicere 'bee 
babcnt in.l-officium.ff.de re miUta. 3d 
eiua etiam pertinet oftuium iu vircntia flu- 
minis ripaa Ugtonem pone re. t ut omnino 
nullus aquam polluat ne at abluendo qucou 
fudoxm puWicce oculos macultt fed pzocul 
in inferioJibuo partibus fluminis id facere p^ 
mktat.'bcc bobcDt'.C.dc re miiU. ingtntu 



392 



3d ipfiw eriim offictam pminct calrra po* 
nmubilignoppabnliaqiKCopijbaba-i ut 
diutuM comoianda> fit lod TilatKita* eligi 
tur mire fit mcinos got attiot locus qui ab 
HoerlariiscaptuspoiVit cfhccre. Confix 
dcundum ctiam nc r<s:;ntiba3 intidari con 
fucuent campus hoc wgctius dc re mili.l.i. 
c.ir. Sdciuaetiamofffciuinprrttnetfin 
names militam caftramentari caftra nc mi 
b:ma!titadjconllipct nee ne pwciraain 
litioiita? altn q> opoitet rogaf ertcdi.Hd 
bonum ctiam daccm ptinct in quo loco du 
micandam eft nofccrc qui quanro fupcrio; 
fjerit uti'io; iadicat <j> ft uictoiia; o" pcditib 1 
fpcrac contra militca boftium Ioc in cqusu 
lu afpera montuob ocbct eligcre.Stn aute 
ccontralocapUnipotcntia nccy films nci^ 
paUidtbuaimpedica-bcc ue*ciM.iii.c.riii. 
cv re mili.~boc ad offidum ducts pertinent 
d fpecialem magiftcriu milirum ut.l.magU 
fterie.C.tx iure om.iudi.T.l.t cola.K re mi 
li. lbondcri()>ccu5durccbctomntiqtK 
fiint in hdlo qoe fuut cufa uoluptatboidia 
tt MtRtirt ut pcregir puWtua coincli' flipio. 
i alii impmtoiesefficiantnr dari i no cw 
licsti ut noftrb legitur in bifto:iio m3 rime 
in uilcrioin.ca.ocmilitari difdplina.Ciru 
multa i mm ddxt edit doc tua impcrata be, 
ftcsftrire.p-'cfidia igitare nibil mctncrc ni, 
(i tarpon ftmem bjTtmc? t tlbtcm iuxta pa 
ti bumi rcquicfccrc codem in t cpo:c in opia 
T bbojem roUerare per faluftmm iugartio 
Inpitmisimpetatca fciencu ret milliraris 
ocbet pollerc ciceroin o?atione p:o pomptio 
Undc ocg(Ctu3 de re milit jri dictt nullos c 
qixm opcutest aet plun ucl mdioa fcire q> 
imptratorcm Cuius aoctrina debct omnib' 
ptxktit futucctia.llam turpceflpatncioui 
roignojartio8mqTrfctur.l.ii.^. ferui* 
auttm fulpicius .ff.dc o:igine Lai is deb; ee 
litrerarua. TlamfoticueeftdiccrcCafo^ 
plus r<i pnHtce pjodeft qui difciplhum mili 
nre confuTt cum li'is. Ham' fecundum utge 
cium lih.a.iu-libri bonam impcratwcm c5 
uenit nofarc jpfiim locum in quo dunkadu 
eft.fc t alii uide dt'qnibua ibi . 3 tern cicero ( 
o;jtionc pompeiana fie loquitur uirtuteoim 
pitoiKuulsocrttexilbmantur fc5 labor in 
ncgottisfoititudoin periculis. induftrb in 
agendo.ccleritaeinconfitendo confcilium 
iopiouidtndo. 

CtpTm ex- 

9rieautem puniuntur militia 

ut lurk ddinqnut-namut con 

mittunt dclicta pjopjia aot coia 

t in profciis puniuntur pent 

milltari i igct pent gzadu (epe milieu: ut.L 

ii.ff.de re milita. ^unitioncs autem font 

petunUf caftigstio. Jntarbiu; inter die 

do i$nommt miftto ab crercitu mifTio gad> 



ttticctiojn metillum ante^ ucl opoe mctalli 
non Oepurat kd Oecapit it non enim pio mi 
(in fed p:o bolte reputant.ff.de re mili.l.ii. 
^.i.i.$.l3qut.T.l.pditcoe0. Capiteaut 
pnniunt qui ppofito manus tntnknt qui in^ 
otxdicntcs fatrint qui I'pectintibu.' ceterig 
pjio; fu^5 arripaerit eiploiatoiea qui fccre 
ta nuntiant boftiuw qal mctu boftium mhr^ 
mintcm fimuUnt quikomiUronc5 gladio \ul 
nerauit qui fine caufa f< vulncrauic uel my. 
tern bbi confciuit feeua fi vite tedio ucl doJo 
ria in patitntia. tlam take infamu uont 
Tberviimmautcm autpcr bfcuilam lapfue 
mi!i tii mot at qui non dcfendit ppofttum fud 
cum potult capitc punitqui non potult i pai 
citur. "bee babcrur.ff.dt re mili4. omne 
deJictumi.l.iii.^.fi. Jtemquierplo^ato 
r ctaiiuit boftibua infiftentibue aut de foffa 
to reccdic capire punitur etiam fi rcm bene 
gdTcrit.ff.de re milU.hu Jton fi cdcita- 
uit ttrocem fcditioncm dclcrto; tcmpc belli 
capitc punitur tcmpc pacts equisgradu re> 
pdllt ptdcsmtlitiam mutat.ff.de re militg.l. 
non omncs tamen drfroa puniendi font e 
qualirer (; baberi debct ratio gradua rodinia 
ftipr ndioiz i aliarum eircumdantiarum qui 
exud'it pifcui comcatus ut cmanfbz uel Oc^ 
fertoi rcpntatni Iwbct tamen ro quibus tar x 
dius ucl citiud rediit ucl ft impkmcntoaliv 
quo-ff.de n mili.l.'fi.f .fi.i.l. qui corneat* 
T.L non omnca.'babtt ctiam ro ante acte 
xitc. fcmafcu eft qai diu vaganw a caftris 
ad ipii rcdut deftrto: qut pluu tempos \a, 
gttus td caftra rcducit.l Jii.remanfcz.ff. eo 
cUferto; fi in urbc inueniatur capitc punitur 
alibi fie c pnma delcrrionc eaptus iterate dc 
fcratcapiUpumf.ff.e.ti.l.non omncs defer 
toium dcfanctof bona confifcafur.C. de re 
mil i- |>ondcra 9- afensffe arma grue eft 
crimcn i (intfc eft tiftrtioni i bac fi omnia 
arnu alwniuit. Si vo tibtik IK! bumcrale 
alicnauit.vbcnhue a-dendusfft.&i *>Jori 
cam fcutum ^ gladium dcfertoii ipfc eft firm 
Lquicomctad (pacium.ff.de re militari. 5n 
omnibaoqacbicdicunc per pauum mcum. 
T^arccndum tamen eft tironibus.l.iu. f . (I 
plarea.ff.e-ti.T to-l.qui cumuno.$.fi.e.ri 
itcrito delincjret ic. ut ibi. 

Cap.rxL 

d qub dictu eft fup in.c.jrvii. 

pttrito ibi ulterirecft uidenduj 

dt as^rcgatibus ic. in fine cap. 

i)> fbnitudo ucl uircs t arma fu 
dint bellum fuincipalitcr i quia in uue non 
difcudtur natura totitudinis erpliciteei^ 
pcdit o/ tpfiua lutur* aliqualitcr cxplicetur 
i per modicoj qucftiones cum quibus ciua 
natura conclu Jatur. 1 1 quero primo an 
fcutitudo fit virtus moialis i apparct op no 
Ham fatkudo eft difpofitio cwpalis uf.l.i. 



393 



C.dt Mblct.li.xit.di bia g no.infa.I.atHete 

ff.id.Uquil.quaactione.^.fiqutein collu 

catione de pug.in duello .per totii.C.degla 

duto. Li. ergo non eft uirtuemoralis ciidil 

pofttio ccrponlis differ at ab babitu feu difpo 

fitione anime i fie infmo2 fftdu.dc depeni 

i rcmif.l.cum infirmitas xti.q. i.pcipim* 

xiiiii.qjiii.ft>abt8.C Jc facroianc-iccie.!. 

fanctimas. &ecundo Ac cmma ain' mo 

raits eft conUctatr ix in pafi'iombuo i open 

tionibua ut p2ob.it pbtia ii.ettnco.Scd foiti 

tudo dl coniectatrix in medio ut idem pbi. 

ergo, tercio ftc g> non eft una uiruio .no 

eft utrtuu ymmo uirtutea . q pluralis bca 

tioao minus duozum numcro eft contents. 

if.de tclti.l. ubt nunurns i regula pluralis. 

de regu.iur.li.vi.JEt confirmatur per dictii 

pi5i.p2imodfnco2um.Tlam eadein eft diff mi 

tio p2opo2 tionia i unius pzopofitionia op tot 

tirudo no fit una utrtus ptobii bic muwj.ni 

una uirtus oppomtur duob 9 uiciia eitremia 

lit xll.di.lepc de confuc. ex ptc . >ed foil 

tirudini opponu ntur quacuu 'cxtrema kill 

cet intimiditaa i timitaa times n audatia. 

i dcfc ecus in audendo qui eft ignozites at 

p2obat tex i ctb.Oppodtu pjobat pbi.iiixtbi 

ro folutione queftkmiaeft aduertendum 

9> fb2titudo fumitur equiuoce p2o fortUudie 

que idem eft 3>robo*apojisi fatirudine 

que eft uirtus mo2lis. p2ima eft 'potentia q 

quis potcft moaert utpobat pbtis p:imc rex 

tb. lutraqjreperiturinbdloi fie lump 

ta fuit generaliter cum dixi q> toitudo leu 

utrcs i ar ma f undant bellum cum utraq; re 

quiratur fed oc (ima que eft robot ccvpoiia 

no eft dubium 9> no elt uirtus mozalis p fax 

pja allrgata.Std oc lecunda pocedit qo t 

ilia eft uirtua fecundum quam nos bene ba^ 

bemus circa timcecm i audaciam in bellicia 

per Uulis T K fta pzoftq uamur qz [ima eft 

plana in modis t tempoitbua. f>rointtL 

Itctuautcmfoititudintsanimeeft attende 

dendum <p in audcndo i timendo contingit 

cxerccrc i ceficere i utrobiqi male agere. 

ContingU i medic fe babcre i fie uirtuo 

k. Diflfcrt tamcn audacia a timote . 11am 

udacijeftpul'ioapprtitua irracionabilia fe 

cundum quern inclinsmua ad ag2edtendum 

terribilu.timor tndinat ad fugicndum i Q 

libet exper i tur in fcipb.fed utract< cbntingic 

bcne agere i malc.llam (i quis uidcret axe 

armatos i foloa iggxderetur eos . mak cir 

ca aggtelTuram i male circa timoiem agerct 

Sic etiam in timendo quid exccdere pottft 

utcxemplum ft fint centum homines inagiit 

i no uideant nui centum i rugiu t male caf. 

feic etiam 110 as^cdkndout fiuideritfpo 

lure ciuitateafi non aggiedUtur male agut 

t fie aides cxceffum in no timendo cum ex 

pcdtt-in timendo cum expedit.in agg2cdie 

do cum noexpedit i no aggrediendocuec 

pcdit.t*lic bobea uicia cxtrema audacia i 



ttmorcm i utrobtci,; gradum ut fup.CQterl 
us e notandii cj> ubiciiq? i Kpirc cxcefTu ex 
tremof viciofum i vitupabflem ibi eft repif 
medium bonum i laudabilon qfi efTet totum 
malum i vitup. abtle. tl<n poffet oici f 
Oefectus eft vicupabilis. Ham Oefectua 
Oiceret' Oeftctua mali i fie non foret maloj 
xpcdi t igif cj> in mcdio fit bonum cuius re 
fpectu vnum Oicac malum cxccdendo aliud 
Oenckndo. /Exbisinfcruntouequeftccs 
leu due conclufiones p fblutoe qois. Nima 
<f fo2titudo animc dt vtus mo2iilia. cC)a 
9>eft^avtrtu3.pbsturpjima. Tlamomnia 
babitua electiuus mcdii ! wdabilia eft uirtua 
mmalis fed f t itwdo eft buiufmoi ergo ptu t 
maicu 9 locum a Oiffinitione que argumcw* 
tio eft valida in iure.ff .oc rcg. iuv.ff.6 polli 
l.i.in pan.i.l.bonafide6.e.ti.Sicautem 
difftnit pbiia <tutem mc2aUm t'm ctbi.pbac 
minoi.tlam tetitudo eft batrit us intellects 
uua mcdti circa timoran tjaudaciam ut $* 
bat pixie.iii.etbicof . Confirmatur ilia eft 
^ruemojaliaque generic innobts in mac 
idcftconfuetudine 1 1xcappellatur mcaalia 
f o! t itudo eft buinfmodi ergo ic^bat maioi 
p locum a caufa totnali que argumcntatio c 
valida in iure.ff .ad.l.fal.l. fi is qui quadra* 



... ....... 

figni.l.edificia.$.perfectiiTime T.I. q toma 
e.tu.q. i.cctralx OC baptu wbitum. t>2obac 
minca.Tlam in actu bellico pzopter pcrioita 
ppctttus tenfttiuua inclinat bomincm ad tu 
685 ut dicit pbus ubt in bellicts vendicat fibi 
locii its i ad ca que funt impetuola t Tic nos 
inclinat ad extrems xiciofa ttus autem que 
eft pmptitudo appetitus rat ionabilis incliat 
ad medium i ilia pnptitudo general ex V^ 
tibus iteratis alias non ddccubilem oparef 
n fie non effet virtus cum in virtuofo nulls 
debttedeappetituum rcpugnantta ut idem 
plwsfcooetbi.ipatetpjimacondurio vib 
lictt 9> eft virtns moftlis. Sf cunda coci'o 
eft cj> eft vna firtua.Quidam Ixx fie ybtnt 
rimoz i audacia funt paifiones central ie 
foiticudo eft uirtua media ergo eft tantum 
una confeqtuntia ^batur.llam unum qnod 
q^agensintendens ad argumentum umua 
contrariop tcndit ad remi luone j alterius i 
fie ^tua minucns timoum augct cotrarium 
ilecontra.Confirmat uirtutes mojalca Ipc* 
cificanturafinefeedunicue eft finis ergo 
onica eft uirtuo.1i>Jimu5 patet per toeii ca 
ftnali quod eft ualidum in iure a.l. vnius.^. 
fi Puu8.ff.oe con!U.l.ulrim8.ff.scecuv.Uge 
neraliter.C.oc cpi.i cleri. xvi- q.i.c . cum 
cellfante oc appeLi.c.i fi xpuaK iure iur.pj 
fco'm. 11am finis foinrudtnta in bellicis e 
bonum corpoit i fi nfs bellat pptcr lucrum 
non dt fa t is j?mmc auarus.3lii dteunt al'r 
uiddket q> timta i audacia non funt palfio- 
nes contrarie hoc pbatur ftc. 3-imo? i au* 
Oacia Te compatinntur in code refpcctu eiuf 

b 



304 



Otm ergo non font contraro tenet jkqntt 
qi pjfito uno coatrariona rcaonctur rdt, 
qnu.ff .oc tnfti.Lfcd ft pupilliu. f fi inftito* 
ru.ff.arigu.iw.l.iuanoftram-i.l.bcc v"* 
ba.ff.oc acrbo.fig.io tuc.cc nun.f .ii.coLiii 
* xii.di.bofpkksum cum fu Cwmam pit 5 
MM qob pwpCcr bon om boneftum bdlare 
led timer pnjptcr dampnum cttam quid jgie 
ditur i fie audacia.i non timet ne Icdatur 
i tlmoj.t Tic ifta opuft contra tmu5 pbi 
(ccundo retbo-nec ualct jpknom ratio, mm 
Ddegario T triftitia tcundum omnesdnt 
contram i eanwn idem ockctaripot n tru 
(hri circ.i cundcm actum.toilc in adulterio 
Klectatarpioptcr fcnfiulicattm.t fictcp 
bibitionc nurcca in nuri p:optcr tempcfti- 
tem.Sic in pwpoTito quis tim? piopter nu 
lampxlenaaadetpwpterfpein fcnma 
fetar opi.uerin.nnde tlbertua tenet g> licj 
not qoatuoi ertrcm j at fupra non tame fat 
rift duplices. nam quknnq? ichnatur ad be 
ne aodendum non timcLt quicunqt non tn 
dtnaturadfxiuaiidcndiimnoniudeM fie 
infer t un i cam uirtutem. 3 Lit dicunt q> a 
funt nib Duo c ctrema.TIa5 Pi aliqufa nihil ti 
met ntmis audet.t Tic timo: i audjcu raci 
nnt fit unum citremum (p fufficiit p:t di 
ctb conclodere g> fo:dtudo quc eft unu pri 
cipakfundandlxUum ut iumitur p?o coipo*- 
risroboienonc/t uirtns moolis.fed utfa 
micnr p;o nirtute anime i uirtus moialia eft 
una.^tbccfftiruqnc bcllum adtmcmrm 
pjoductt. tfjnncnjanfffltitudofituir 
cue nunalis tangu pbi.optimc in ilutbico. 
t Octatitudine uide tulium li.i.tx offkia 
in u.in quo de ca tractat quod quidam ca. 
iacipit incdligendum cftauttmcumpjopo 
PiU Tint genera qoatuot 2C.uide fane turn tbo 
Rmm in ftcunds fccundc qoeftkme cuiii.p 
totum i ttxologi in iiLlcntetiaru di.iixi. 

CipTm xiii . 

Jfum eft oc todtudine que fun 
dant bdlurn pnncipjlicer que e 
uirtua mozalis i una.Scd quia 
tractatum dirigo id'Cardinalc 
Ouerotttram bee fit cardinalb apparet g> ft 
nam magninimitaa no eft uirtua cardinalia 
ergo ncc foititudo tenet cofequentia per lo 
cam a maioai qui eft utlidua in iurc'ut legc.i 
C .oc neg.geftff.oc (enatoJ-qui in dignns-C. 
oc tcro.tanccccLaut.multo magis faljna. 
Us diatrfa.$.i.C.qp.i ckJ.fi qua p a 
lompniam ijiiuq.T.fipaulua vULq.LTur 
90-Mi.q.ijn mare xl.Ouqudilxt tc decked 
in canctia.&d magis uidttur incffc q> ma, 
gnanimitaa fit uirt' mcoalia 9 totitudo cp 
obilun t main at Oick pbos in etbicis tra 



arduulw cp tone 
cird/atki ferax plarce iia .Sdutio fie to 



ti human* connerfttw non oerfatur circt 
forntudine ut cardine-ergo non eft urdia 
IUq? indt cardiiulid nuncupjtor. tcnet*co 
fequenria per locum ab ctbimo!ogia.qi eft ua 
lidos in iurc.ff.fi ccr.pe.Uii. $. appellata in 
< pbcio.ff.$.DifcipalLC.t>'cpt.i clerLLOeccr 
nim'.ff.o'aer.fig.l.rigurii.t.t.i .l.Uxornj 
j.p fi papir .xxi.on.clero3.rci-q.i.fi cup. 
n.c.cumfmt)cp.aen.patetp;imom. TUm 
fbttitodoucrfaf Hum circa picala bellica. 
&td piuci ducunt uitam foam cum bellicia 
picaliaergo. Jncontrarinm apparet auc- 
totitate comunitcr loquentium qui iftam po 
nunt in nomero cirdi nalinm inter qooe eft 
leneca qui fecit tractatum fpeciatem i toll' 
inrctboiicis diuidebat uirtntcs inbaa.uii. 
cardiales i bee ar.sb auetwitatc eft ualida 
in iurc.C.tf fiima trui fide catbo-cpTa iter 
claraa.Ct$ bo.q< li.l.ca mlta.ff.0 re.di-l.ix 
nm..5cnotopui. Cxmdera ga t5 ^tutfcus 
his quatuo? pzicipilibia fatia p'jellc tractat 
li.i.oPficionim fit mentio per gb.in cle.i.te 
fummi trini.i fide catbo. T fubdit ibi qoe 
oiantur virtutes tbeologicc i pondcra Ci 
ccroncm in li.iit.r<tbo:ico:nm ad extrcmum 
ubi tractat quid fit piudcntia 5uftiria fotix 
tudot moiftia.nampJudentiacftcalJidt 
tag qae roe quadam poteft Oclectom tabcre 
bonorum i maloium i appellat (nud^ntti 
multarum rerum memoria i ufue plunuj ne 
gociwum 3ufticia eft cquitac iusvnicuiqae 
tri'aucns f o:ticudo eft rerun magnarum ap 
petitio i rcrum butnilium contcntio i labo 
ria cum utilitatie roe perptfu.XDoddtu c 
in animo conttncna mixkrado cupiditatum 
i Oe bie ctiam l)ibet in.c.cx l*3-xx viii.q. ii 
vide glo.in aiit.ut omnee obediant iudk ibuf 
in pjin.t t pondera quid fit virtus qma vt' 
dtbabitne elections fm pbos ut refert bic 
poaaua mcus-flam virtus eft que babente 
pjoftat t opiuciusbonum reddit fm pbum 
gte.fi.in de.p](ma Oe fumma trini.i fide ca 
tbo.Scd Cicero hoc fctfo andqnoiii retbo- 
r ico? Oicit i}> v'tus eft animi babitus nataf 
modo atq; roi con(cntaoeud i bify quatuoi 
ptea.f.pndentiam tufbtlam fodtudinem t 
tempantiam i oiffinit ringularitcr eas i po 
nit carom pteo. Dicunt emm ^tutes quad 
virnm tucrca i pfcruantee a uiciie f m glo. 
in dc.p.-iiii De fumma trint.i fide catboli. 
t pondcra <j> <jtos aliqn capitur p fine at 
bibct in-LUgb ^tua-ff-Oe legibus 

Cap-xxiiL 

fto tuidc t ia i foToe qdis ptbne 

eft vidcndum unde t quue uir^ 

tuteadicanturCardinales Ubi 

fciedum f m albertu 5. ficut car^ 

dines celt font poli uidelicj anurdcus i ar 

ticos Taper qutbus mouetur cdu? i cardies 

boftiorum i portarum fupcr quibua rcuoluu 



395 



tur . Sic a fimi! i uirtutes i!k dicuntur cardi 
nalcs fuper quibua uerlatur tots conucrlatio 
bornaiu i quas i (i quisbabs dicitur fimpli 
citer bonus i in ipfia non. Sic etiatn oo^ 
mini cardi n.ilcs inde iudicbmco nome flip 
fcrunt.nam ipfi (ant miidi car dines quibus 
tote mundi gubcrnato reuoluitur i fingitur 
i adipicwipcctatlubftcntirc totumpond' 
mobttis gobernationia t mot um ipfius fiium 
pnrftsrc fomentum dodns polls numero co 
tenta eft celeftis macbcnj i futficiunt (bbi,. 
les.firmant or dint5 motuo non ccuian t a lo 
co fixionie humani generis monaliica gu^ 
bnnato quatuctt cardinibns fuit concent* i 
fnfficit.Si inde unde numerua undc uarte^ 
tas-unde infirmitas.undt tanta a centro di 
ftautia a tanta Tuple dicimua earn non eft no 
menarbttrii. Scd q? ee cardinalatu dixi 
In tractatu Oe ecclefiafiici ccnfura nunc per 
trsnfeo ut reddam ut dilcutiim pjincipale p 
pofitum.t t q: iure ut dixi non plene exphx 
caturadpknum naturalium aliquantulutn 
fucdncte piopter fottitudinem expltcandaj 
A eo tractate . 

Capl'm riiiii. 

Ckndu5 eft ergo 9>utdtcitpbL 

airtuscftbabitus electiuusuti 

dem pbad aiterit fecundo rctbox 

rice oe quod eft cadit fub electi 

one .1 eligibilc eft triplex o." triplici (pccic 

benc pioucmena.uidclicct bonum utile.bomi 

deUctabite i bonum boneftum. t tfta funt 

per clectbncm appctabilii i fugabtlta.n oca 

nirtutes morales circa ifta tria uerfantur. 

xplicemuri unum quodq;. tt primii bo 

num uti'.c circa quod ucrfetur ui;tusiltero 

de tribus modie.aut expendendo.aut accipi 

endo-aut confcruando fMuresactuselec 

tion is non experttur homo in fcipfo i ifta d 

ducdo ab experiencia ualida eft in iurc i p 

bitur in pzolxmio.ff .circa p.'in.in aut b mo 

nac.urca pjin.fli.de le.iU-l.fi dwiua.f big 

nerbb i de oeteri iure cnuck.l.ii.$.que oia 

de ekct.^ fit li. vi.*i cxptndcndo hoc con 

tingit duplic i ter . ?3ut enim (tpendit fua at 

aliena.&i expeudit (ua tune circa ifta expc 

dcndo uiitua l&ra' icatis i magniftccntia. 

utciaoppoftta fciliut auaritia i pzodigaiitao 

pcruificcntis i bcninuntia. fein autcm 

non funt fua tune potcft difbibucre illisquo 

rum funt t tune eft iufticU ut.ff.de iufti.t 

iure.l.iufticia i infti.e.$.iu!ticu.ii.q.ii.cii 

dcuotiiTima.But diftribuit illis quorum no 

font t tune eft in Ulrica ut in iuribna ftati 

allegatU a contrario quod eft ualidum iigu 

mentum ut .I.i.$.buiu6 rci.lf.de offi.ei' cut 



tes.ff.de man Jati.t.c.cnm' apTicam de bis 
qo: nut a p.i .c .oi mni.o couer.piuga .i no 
redden Jo i Ilia quorum funt iwmo die it fim^ 



pliclter malts xxiii.q-vi.fi rta Oe ufuris cu 
tu.ff.oe ufuf .l.fequit.$.ct; an patet g> iufti^ 
cia eft cardinalis quia non fabendo ipam cir 
ca dtftrtbutionem cozum que fua non funt bo 
eft fimplicttcr malus.Sed libcrtas i magni 
ficentu que confiftunc circa diftributione; 
co:um que funt fua non funt fua non funt ca 
dinalcs quia quis male diftribuendo fua non 
eft fimpliciter mains fed benc Okie fstuus. 
i ftc btbcs anam cardtnalem.f.iuftitia circa 
expeditioncm iuutilisboni.Sinaute uirtuf 
mroslis vlatur circa annum utile in accipie 
do boc con tingit dupfr . Tlam aut acciptt 
que fua (unt uel dcbita uel aliena n fibi non 
Oebita.t ft fua uel fibi Orbits t a quibus no 
Oebetpetat contra liberaltutcm magnincc 
tiam.Tbn f amen eft fimpfr milus.'binc eft 
9. contra taltm funt iuris rcmedia intro, 
ducta wde t\. vi-bo.rap.ff^i .C-pa iUoa ti 
tulos furti.i dc condic.cx-1- 1 canoibusq 
in fmgulis eafibudexpUcintur f m uarietate 
actuum t fie p eiplicat ioncm unius ri actus 
f-except oia circa bonu utile apoet Of iuftitia 
obtinc t cirdnaiitum non autem liberalitas 
fine magnificentia com per oppofitum iurti- 
tk dieatur fimpfr malus non autcm p oppcv 
fitum libcralitatis uel magnificcn. &inaute 
Vfetur uirtus monlie in retinendo bonii uti 
le boc ctiam eontmgit dupUciter.But rett 
net i conferuet fua aut rrtinet aliena. p?imo 
cafu retinendo que fua funt i nulli dando p 
det contra liberalitatem i nugnificcntiam 
nee tails eft fimpliciter malus - 1 1 ft tnftes 
Sidmeavidcnt p.iupercm indigentem ad 
mo:tem i nibil det peecat moualircr rfidc 
ri poteft 'j. tune retinet non piopzium f<; eoc 
cum tcmpc tails necelfitatis fit fienda ?mu^ 
nio ut ptiat clemcns kr roibua.xti.q.i.dilec 
tiflimuB i a