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THE TRIUMPH
OF UNARMED FORCES
1914-1918
A Friend in Need
Germany. Who said ' God punish England ! ' ? God hless England, who
lets us have the sinews of War.
[From " Punch."
THE TRIUMPH
OF UNARMED FORCES
(1914-1918)
An account of the transactions by which Germafiy during
the Great War was able to obtain supplies
prior to her collapse under the pressure
of economic forces
BY
Rear-Admiral M. W. W. P. CONSETT,
C.M.G.
NAVAL ATTACHE IN SCANDINAVIA IQIS-igig
NAVAL ADVISER TO THE SUPREME COUNCIL I92O
ASSISTED BY
Captain O. H. DANIEL, R.N.
^7 '<'^^-
LONDON
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE
14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C. 2
1923
Printed in Great Britain.
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO THOSE
WHO FOUGHT AND FELL UNDER
THE BRITISH FLAG DURING
THE GREAT WAR
PREFACE
With the causes that led to the outbreak of the
Great War (1914-1918) this book is not concerned.
That our statesmen did everything possible to avert
the catastrophe is accepted as historical fact. Nor
could this country honourably have held aloof. The
war, however, was prolonged far beyond the limits of
necessity. It is the causes that led to the undue
protraction of this struggle that are made the subject
of examination and comment in this book : for the
exhaustion of war destroyed the fruits of victory by
bringing economic defeat alike to victor and vanquished
in the battle of arms.
When Germany drew the sword in August, 1914, it
is beyond all reasonable doubt that its work was to
be short, sharp and decisive; and that it was to be
returned to its scabbard — for a time — pending pre-
paration for a future task. It is certain that Germany
was neither prepared nor equipped for a struggle of
four years' duration.
" If we don't get to Paris in thirty days, we
are beaten," Wangenheim had told me in August,
and, though his attitude changed somewhat after
the battle of the Marne, he made no attempt
to conceal the fact that the great rush campaign
had collapsed, that all the Germans could now
look forward to was a tedious, exhausting war, and
that all which they could obtain from the existing
vii
viii PREFACE
situation would be a drawn battle, " We have
made a mistake this time," Wangenheim said,
" in not laying in supplies for a protracted
struggle; it was an error, however, that we shall
not repeat. . . ." ^
England's entry and the battle of the Marne had
placed all hope of an early decision for Germany out
of the question ; and the problem with which Germany
was faced from the very beginning was an economic
one : she was not self-supporting, and the supplies
upon which she depended for feeding, clothing and
munitioning her armies, and for supporting her civil
population, had to come from oversea.
The four years' Great War was a struggle for the
mastery of these supplies. The essence of war, it is
generally held, lies in the application of force, and
in the acts of unbridled violence to which licence
is given. But in 1914-1918 the clash of arms, the
destruction of cities and even the passing subjugation
of smaller nations were not the sole determining
factors of an issue in which one half of the more highly
organised nations of the earth sought to impose its
will upon the other half. In a war of lesser magnitude
and shorter duration, and with the seas open, they
might have been. The real struggle itself was un-
accompanied by any single act of violence; yet it
was more deadly in its passive relentlessness than the
military forces and engines of war, on which the
whole attention of the world was exclusively riveted.
For more than two years Germany maintained
an unequal economic struggle with us : she suffered
famine, but she won through. In 1917 she sealed
1 " Secrets of the Bosphorus," by H. Morgenthau, American
Ambassador at Constantinople. Hutchinson.
PREFACE ix
her own doom by declaring war upon all merchant
vessels in the waters round the British Islands; for
by this act trade with the outside world overseas
was virtually stopped. British trade with Germany's
neutral neighbours, which had continued throughout
the war, ceased. America entered the arena and
Germany was reduced to starvation : her troops left
the fighting line in search of food.
It is the story of this unseen economic struggle that
is here told. The story is as yet an unrecorded
chapter in the history of the war. The very existence
of the struggle is probably unsuspected by the majority
of Englishmen.
The oversea supplies that reached Germany came
mainly through Scandinavia ^ and Holland, passing
through two stages in their journey : one by sea and
one by land.
Taking these stages in order; over a certain part
of neutral trade we possessed belligerent rights,
sanctioned by international law, treaty and con-
vention. The rules of naval warfare under which we
had fought in the past gave us great power over
neutral trade with the enemy ; but at our own sug-
gestion they had been made to suffer fundamental
alteration in the long period of peace following on
the Napoleonic wars, which ended in the early part
of the nineteenth century : much of our belligerent
1 For convenience' sake, when speaking of Scandinavia the
author includes Holland in addition to Norway, Sweden and
Denmark.
The remarks on oversea supplies to Scandinavia apply generally
in principle to suppHes to European countries bordering on the
Mediterranean littoral. Neither these countries nor Holland,
whose economic conditions resemble those of Denmark, have
therefore been treated separately. The supplies through the
Mediterranean were of far less importance than those through
the North Sea.
X PREFACE
power had been voluntarily surrendered; and the
Navy, on the strength of which the power to enforce
these rights depended, had therefore been rendered
partially impotent. During the war, and while the
enemy was receiving the benefit of our surrendered
rights, a series of efforts was made to retrieve them
and to bring into use the rules of the past for the
conduct of our naval warfare. This policy brought
us into conflict with America. The new rules, of our
own making, are chiefly contained in the Declaration
of Paris (1856) and the Declaration of London (1909).
Having passed the scrutiny of the British fleet and
found sanctuary in Scandinavia, merchandise, in its
second stage, was free from further belligerent inter-
ference. Nevertheless there were at our command
very powerful and effective coercive measures by
which it could be controlled, and which could not be
disregarded with impunity. Oversea supplies came
not only from neutrals, but from Great Britain and
her Allies, including, it is to be remembered, Japan.
Scandinavia was herself dependent upon oversea
supplies for her industrial and economic existence.
But she was dependent largely upon certain products
of the British Empire and especially upon British
coal. With our own goods we were free to do as we
wished. Had there been certainty that our supplies
would neither reach nor indirectly benefit Germany,
there was every reason that trade with Scandinavia
should have been encouraged. But from the very
beginning goods poured into Germany from Scandi-
navia, and for over two years Scandinavia received
from the British Empire and the Allied countries
stocks which, together with those from neutral
countries, exceeded all previous quantities and literally
saved Germany from starvation.
PREFACE xi
Our trade with Scandinavia was conducted and
justified on the accepted security of guarantees that
Germany should not benefit by it : here it is sufficient
to say that this security was worthless.
A two-fold form of economic pressure could thus
be brought to bear upon Germany : that by belligerent
right, to which recent custom applies, in a generic
sense, the term " blockade " ; and that by the control
of goods from the British Empire and Allied countries.
It had been the author's wish to avoid meddling
with subjects whose discussion is recognised to be the
exclusive monopoly of lawyers ; but during the course
of a three years' struggle by correspondence on the
subject of the supplies that reached Germany he was
given to understand that there stood insuperable
difficulties in the way of taking preventive measures
for their restriction; and, of these difficulties, that
the chief lay in the attitude of America towards the
subject of maritime rights.
It must be pointed out that maritime rights are
slippery and elusive affairs and not very amenable to
amateur treatment. They rest upon an international
legal basis and lend themselves, from their ambiguity,
to the most extravagant form of quibbling. They are
admirably adapted to contradictory interpretation :
and it was thus that they were interpreted by
American and English lawyers according to their
interests. If the American conception of maritime
rights was alleged by H.M. Government to constitute
an obstacle in the way of their conducting the
blockade of Germany with greater vigour, and of
preventing excessive supplies from reaching her, it
would have been a bold man that would have
ventured to challenge this assertion.
It is partly for these reasons that the chapters
xii PREFACE
dealing with the correspondence that took place
between H.M. Government and the Government of
the United States have been included. The author
has confined himself to a few cursory comments on
the rival claims of the combatants during the course
of the struggle. Unfortunately, before the climax
has been reached, both combatants disappear from
the paper, leaving it to the choice of fancy to
pronounce upon the issue.
But during the course of this battle over our right
to interfere with American trade — for that was the
casus belli — ^the dispute assumed an unexpected and
significant phase.
America, who had been very closely pressed on the
subject of the alleged injury caused by our operations
to her export trade, turned sharply round and re-
quested information on the subject of British trade.
While we were invoking the aid of maritime law in
support of our right of interference with American
commerce, we were ourselves competing in trade with
America. American displeasure was understood dur-
ing the war; but the cause behind it was not. It
is not alone from the light thrown on this subject
by the American correspondence that the author
attributes the friction with America directly to our
competitive trading : the nature of many of the
commercial transactions that came under his personal
observation in Scandinavia, not to speak of the
personal opinions of Americans themselves both
during and after the war, give strong support to
this view.
It was not the friction caused by our trade and the
consequent attitude of America towards the subject
of our maritime rights ; but it was chiefly our trade
itself with Germany's neutral neighbours that under-
PREFACE xiii
mined the power of the fleet, succoured our enemies
and nearly led to our defeat.
During the debates that took place in the Houses
of Parliament on our blockade policy great solicitude
was shown by H.M. Government for the Scandinavian
neutrals, whose cause was pleaded with considerable
eloquence in support of their claim to our good offices
in respect of trade.
But the sufferings of the Scandinavian communities
were not caused by the naval operations of Great
Britain, nor by the belligerent operations of any
country : they were the direct result of the deliberate
actions of their own people, who sent their goods to
the lucrative markets of Germany.
The war brought to Scandinavia a period of un-
precedented prosperity. During 1915 and 1916 she
received supplies in excess of all previous quantities.
There was a double irony in the situation : for
although it was through our own trade only, whose
ostensible object here was the mitigation of hardship,
that the neutral profiteer was enabled to conduct
his thriving business, yet the scarcity thus produced
in the neutral country was attributed by the suffering
people to the harsh conditions of the British blockade.
There was a time when meat was so scarce in Copen-
hagen that butchers' shops had to be closed down :
special fast trains packed with fish, the staple article
of diet among many of the Danes, carried it to
Germany when fish was unprocurable in Denmark;
incidentally, be it mentioned, the trains were run on
British coal and the fishing tackle was supplied by
Great Britain : Swedish spindles were idle when the
wharves and quays of Swedish ports were choked
with cotton for Germany : and coffee, the favourite
beverage of the Swede, was unobtainable in Swedish
xiv PREFACE
restaurants at a time when Sweden was exporting
large quantities to Germany.
Germany's propinquity placed the Scandinavian
States in a position that gave trading in any circum-
stances the character of a very hazardous enterprise,
in which any doubt should have been resolved in
favour of our fighting forces ; but the magnitude of
the traffic with Germany was notorious, and it left
no room for doubt that it was the pure growth of all
Scandinavian oversea importations.
It is most difficult to reconcile statements made
from time to time by H.M. Government on this
subject. Thus, at one time, when the country was
uneasy on account of the extent to which supplies
were being allowed to reach Germany, we are given
to understand that not much was going through
neutral countries ; ^ and at another, when the
occasion required it, as it did during the diplomatic
discussion with America in order to establish a claim
for interfering with her trade, we learn that "it is
common knowledge that large quantities of supplies
have . . . passed to our enemy through neutral
ports " ; and that they— the ports — " have, in fact,
been the main avenues through which supplies have
reached the enemy." ^
Without apparent discourtesy to either one side or
the other it is not possible here to make appropriate
comment.
Moreover, the policy of H.M. Government towards
these neutrals did not conduce to the good under-
standing which it was desired should be established
* From speech of Lord Robert Cecil quoting Lord Faringdon,
who had visited Scandinavia. (See Part II, Chap. XIII.) ParHa-
mentary Debates, No. 153, p. 3194, 26th January, 1916.
2 Cd. 8234, p. 24. H.M. Government to U.S. Government.
PREFACE XV
with them. The neutrals were proof against flattery,
which they assessed at its correct value : they took
our goods, and such of them as could be spared, if not
sold to Germany, they used for Germany's benefit.
The author, who served as Naval Attache in
Scandinavia for six years, including the four years
of war, can, he thinks, speak with some knowledge
as to the general trend of Scandinavian opinion on
the blockade poUcy of this country. It was, in his
opinion, the universal belief that, should England
become involved in a European war, Scandinavia
would have to be prepared to make sacrifices. That
all supplies from England would be cut off was not
expected; but it was felt certain that the bare
requirements of domestic consumption would in no
case be exceeded.
The prestige of this country probably never stood
at so high a level, and our naval strength was never
greater than in August, 1914. With the help of our
Allies we were in a position of advantage which the
most extravagant optimism could never hope again
to reach. If the name of England was not uttered
with bated breath, it was mentioned with real respect.
But when war broke out the extent of our traffic, which
helped to swell the stream that poured into Scandi-
navia, amazed the Scandinavians. It was equally
injurious as well in its moral as in its material effects,
for it gradually stimulated the belief that necessity
quite as much as philanthropy lay at its roots. Our
prestige waned, and the belief was encouraged that
it was no longer England but Germany that was to
be feared.
Trade with Scandinavia continued unchecked for
over two years : agreements by which neutrals en-
gaged that Germany should not benefit by our trade
xvi PREFACE
were openly and continuously violated : representa-
tions, containing clear, authentic statements of facts,
supported by trustworthy analyses of figures relat-
ing to the manner in which the raw materials and
finished products from oversea passed in identical or
similar form through Scandinavia to Germany, were
disregarded.
When Germany was in the grip of famine and food
riots had to be put down by the military, disaster
was averted only by the prodigious supplies that
passed into the country through Scandinavia. It is
true that direct trade with Germany was forbidden,
and that certain restrictive measures for the pre-
vention of indirect trade were provided for by
municipal legislation. Such measures, however, were
inadequate : they proved to be no protection against
their abuse. Moreover, the ulterior and dangerous
uses to which almost all merchandise can be put in
war time by a neutral bordering on enemy territory
are multitudinous, and little appears to have been
understood of the potential power for harm possessed
by merchandise when it had reached Scandinavia;
or of the manner in which it affected the economic
situation of Germany, which it was the object of the
blockade to exploit to our advantage.
The leverage that the control of our own supplies,
especially coal, gave us, had it also been combined
with a knowledge of the needs and the resources of
other nations, was a weapon that could not have been
resisted. I There is probably no case in history in
which the economic forces at the disposal of a nation
on the outbreak of war have been so great as those
that this country held in August, 1914.
It was only when, from sheer necessity, really
effective pressure was brought to bear, both from the
PREFACE xvii
full exercise of our maritime rights and the right
to control the distribution of the products of our
own Empire, that the position of Germany— always
desperate — became hopeless.
Whatever may be thought of the views of the author,
it may be stated that his proposals for preventing
supplies from reaching Germany were all carried out
after the war had been in progress for two and a half
years.
Although our entry into the war came as an un-
welcome surprise to Germany, yet it was a contingency
for which she had made certain well-considered
preparations. General von Bernhardi in his " Germany
and the Next War "—a pre-war publication, referring
to which General Ludendorff ^ says, " It would have
been better if it had never been written " — observes,
" It would be necessary to take further steps to
secure the importation from abroad of supplies
necessary to us, since our communications will be
completely cut off by the English."
Bernhardi's view, which, like that of the Scandi-
navians, had been based upon England's naval record
of the past, was wrong. But, that Germany should
be able to obtain her supplies in war time, especially
food and the raw materials for munitions, due
provision had been made.
In 1909 there had been drawn up at Germany's
suggestion a set of rules by which commerce in war
time was given so great a measure of freedom as to
render the power of our fleet, through which the right
over commerce was exercised, almost useless. Wonder
and mystery seem to have accompanied the Declara-
tion of London, which contains these rules, throughout
1 " My War Memories." By General Ludendorff.
b
xviii PREFACE
its career from the time of its inception up to the
date of its final renunciation. It was brought into
being in secrecy; its provisions, when known, were
examined; and reasons so clear, forcible and con-
vincing were brought to bear against it as to be
unassailable. It was rejected by the House of Lords
as being redolent of German suggestion and dangerous.
Yet when this country became embroiled in war with
Germany the Declaration of London, unratified and
long considered dead, leaped into life, defied its
detractors and started on a career of disaster which
continued until the 7th July, 1916, the date on which
it met its doom.
On 24th April, 1916, in a Memorandum presented
to the U.S. Government it is stated : —
The United States Government will, it is
believed, agree with His Majesty's Government
that no belligerent could in modern times submit
to be bound by a rule that no goods could be
seized unless they were accompanied by papers
which established their destination to an enemy
country. ... To press any such theory is tanta-
' mount to asking that all trade between neutral
ports shall be free, and would thus render
nugatory the exercise of sea power and destroy
the pressure which the command of the sea
enables the Allies to impose upon their enemy. ^
Article 35 of the Declaration of London tells us
that the ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to
the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to
the port of discharge of the goods.
The one statement was made in war time, the other
1 Cd. 8234.
PREFACE xix
in peace time : the latter under German suggestion,
the former under German coercion.
There are one or two words, however, to be said in
favour of the Declaration of London : they come from
Germany and will be found duly recorded. They
furnish unimpeachable evidence of the tenacity with
which Germany was prepared, at least in one case,
to cling to her plighted word.
In Part I an attempt has been made to present to
the reader a short account of the origin and history
of the laws of sea warfare, and of the principal changes
that they have suffered up to 1914, in so far only as
these matters may help to a better understanding of
the real nature of the war in which we were engaged,
and serve as a fitting, and, it is hoped, not uninteresting
introduction to Part II.
The subject matter of Part II, which deals with the
transit of oversea supplies to Germany during their
second stage, refers to transactions that came under
the author's personal observation and were embodied
in his reports. After political considerations and
the relative economic conditions of Great Britain,
Germany and Scandinavia have been briefly outlined,
the vicissitudes through which the passive forces at
our command passed before they were placed in
harness and their power was vindicated are illustrated
by copious examples; which also serve to show the
evil effects that were brought about by Britisli trade
with Scandinavia upon the blockade of Germany.
Such being its general features, the author would
lay stress upon the necessity, to which this book seeks
to give special prominence, for a realisation of the
conditions under which we in these Islands live. We
live mainly upon supplies that are brought to us from
oversea; and the condition of existence is the
XX PREFACE
security of these supplies. Until the waters recede
from our coasts and our boundaries are in territorial
connection with the continent of Europe, our market-
ing must be done under the protection of the Navy.
It is improbable that this country will soon again
attain to the same position of naval supremacy that
it held in August, 1914. The financial strain of the
four years' struggle has depleted our resources and
placed out of the question any present prospect of
quick recovery; but all other considerations must
yield to the paramount one of our existence, which is
threatened if our sea-power is not upheld. Sea-power,
with its adjunct air-power, cannot be bartered for
the illusory advantages of paper security — those
" rotten parchment bonds " spoken of by the poet,
whose words have been borrowed to grace the half-
title to Part I.
The Navy, we are told, has been reduced to help
to avert national bankruptcy. It is devoutly to be
hoped that when the country is in funds again
immediate attention will be given to the safety of these
Islands and the security of our hearths and homes.
The substance of what has been said on the subjects
of the Declarations of London and Paris has been
derived mainly from the two works of the late Mr.
Thomas Gibson Bowles, M.P., " Sea Law and Sea
Power " (John Murray) and " The Declaration of
Paris of 1856 " (Sampson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd.).
In the death of Mr. Gibson Bowles the country
lost one of the stoutest champions of its national
rights. A great part of his life had been devoted to
a study of our sea history, and Mr. Gibson Bowles—
himself a thorough and practical seaman — possessed
a knowledge of maritime law and the meaning of sea-
power greater, probably, than that of any living
PREFACE xxi
man. It was due almost solely to the untiring
exertions of Mr. Gibson Bowles that the Declaration
of London was not ratified. For his public services
the country, and the Navy in particular, owes him a
debt which, alas ! can now only be acknowledged
by the homage rendered to his memory.
The author has greatly appreciated the help and
encouragement that he received from many quarters,
and especially from officers of the Royal Navy, during
the writing of this book.
To Mr. Hugh Birrell, in particular, he would express
his grateful thanks for the very laborious work of
compiling a large part of the statistical information
upon which Part II of this book chiefly relies for any
value it may possess, and for the assistance Mr.
Birrell kindly gave in other directions.
To make the book more acceptable to the general
public its dimensions since it was first completed
have been greatly reduced. The work was seriously
retarded by the author's appointment early in 1920
as Naval Adviser to the Supreme Council in Paris.
It would have been further delayed but for the help
of Captain O. H. Daniel, R.N., a friend and old ship-
mate of the author's. Unfortunately, Captain Daniel's
co-operation could not be obtained at a time to have
enabled it to make an earlier appearance.
M. W. W. P. C.
Brawiih Hall,
Thirsk.
I2th March, 1923.
CONTENTS
CHAP.
PREFACE
PART I. AN ENCHAINED NAVY
I. INTRODUCTORY
II. THE RULES OF NAVAL WARFARE
III. THE FLEET ....
IV. THE REPRISALS ORDER
V. AMERICAN AND BRITISH TRADE
VI. AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS MARITIME RIGHTS
PAaE
vii
3
6
15
22
42
53
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
PART II. TRADING WITH THE ENEMY
INTRODUCTORY .......
SCANDINAVIA: ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC FEATURES
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ....
^W-AXj •■••••■•
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE
HOW GERMANY WAS SUPPLIED WITH FISH
HOW GERMANY OBTAINED HER EXPLOSIVES
LUBRICANTS .......
METALS
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES ....
CEMENT TRAFFIC WITH HOLLAND
SOME FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
HIS majesty's GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE
FINAL ... ...
APPENDIX .......
INDEX ........
71
75
91
113
133
154
166
180
190
210
232
245
253
273
279
337
XXUl
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND
DIAGRAMS
VAQS
A FRIEND IN NEED ...... Frontispiece
[Reproduced by kind permission of the proprietors oj "Punch")
THE CHIEF MOURNER ..... Facing 14
{Reproduced by kind permission of the proprietors of " Punch ")
MAP SHOWING BALTIC APPROACHES ....,, 71
CURVE SHOWING DENMARK'S EXPORTS OF FOODSTUFFS TO
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND GERMANY AND AUSTRIA . 152
CURVE RELATING TO THE SCANDINAVIAN FISH TRAFFIC . 158
CURVE SHOWING DENMARK'S VEGETABLE OIL IMPORTS . 178
CURVE SHOWING DENMARK'S LUBRICATING OIL IMPORTS , 188
CURVE SHOWING TOTAL SCANDINAVIAN EXPORTS OF FOOD-
STUFFS 263
CURVE SHOWING SCANDINAVIAN EXPORTS OF FOODSTUFFS
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND GERMANY AND AUSTRIA . 296
XXIV
PART I
AN ENCHAINED NAVY
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,
■ • • • • • •
Whose rocky shore beats back the envious siege
Of watery Neptune, is now bound in . . .
With inky blots, and rotten parchment bonds.
King Richard II.
B
PART I
AN ENCHAINED NAVY
CHAP. PAGE
I. Introductory ....... 3
II. The Rules of Naval Warfare .... 6
III. The Fleet 15
IV. The Reprisals Order ...... 22
V. American and British Trade . . . .42
VI. America's Attitude towards Maritime Rights , 53
THE
TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
1914-1918
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
The freedom with which all nations in peace time
can engage in their lawful sea-borne trade, in war time
becomes subject to certain recognised limitations under
powers vested in a belligerent. These powers, which
are referred to collectively as " maritime rights," can
be asserted only through sea-power : they are there-
fore mainly the prerogative of the stronger belligerent.
Germany, for instance, had the full right to stop the
supplies of munitions that reached us from America,
but she was unable to exercise it. It is therefore the
aim of the stronger naval Power to retain a maximum
control by belligerent right over commerce in war
time : it is for the lessening of such belligerent control
and for its being regulated by international agreement
that the weaker naval Power strives.
There are thus two distinct and antagonistic sets of
belligerent interests in maritime rights : the interests
that w^ould secure the uninterrupted flow of sea-borne
supplies free from the right of interference by an
enemy; and those that would have them subject to
all possible belligerent control. These are broadly
the interests respectively of the European continental
3
4 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
nations on the one hand, and of Great Britain, the
island Power, on the other. Into the separate interests
of individual States in this subject it is not necessary
here to enter. A belligerent will find that a law or rule,
which at one time may operate to his advantage, in
other circumstances will favour his enemy : a right,
too, which favours a nation as a belligerent may do
him untold harm as a neutral, and vice versa.
In addition to the general conflicting nature of the
interests of opposing nations in war time, and to the
particular conflict of our own individual interests with
those of our European neighbours in respect of the
control of sea-borne supplies, there are the separate and
distinctive interests of neutrals to be considered. It
is obvious that if the operations of naval warfare could
be exclusively confined in their effects to the belli-
gerents concerned, there could be no restraints upon
the use by one belligerent of all possible means at his
disposal for injuring his adversary. But they cannot.
The prosperity of nations is founded upon an inter-
trading relationship : belligerent operations at sea
have as their sole ulterior offensive object the stoppage
of all supplies to the enemy : the normal flow of
neutral oversea commerce, upon which neutral pros-
perity depends, is interrupted ; belligerent and neutral
interests come into harsh conflict, and the right to
employ the full resources at the disposal of a belli-
gerent becomes subject to restrictions due to the just
recognition of neutral rights.
It is the object of the rules of naval warfare to
determine and define these restrictions. The diffi-
culty of conciliating the opposing interests of neutral
and belligerent is one of the first magnitude and
delicacy : no one can read the American correspond-
ence without becoming impressed with this fact — nor,
INTRODUCTORY 5
it is thought, without becoming more impressed with
the futihty of ever hoping to concihate them. The
rules have at all times been fruitful sources of friction
between neutral and belligerent : they will always so
be. On the outbreak of war on a scale such as that
of the recent one, the whole civilised world becomes
involved, and the diplomatic war between belligerent
and neutral is scarcely less momentous in the gravity
of its issues and the possibility of its consequences than
the conflict of the nations themselves that are under
arms. A belligerent would not willingly add to the
number of his enemies, nor would a neutral wish to
become involved. Neither the one nor the other will
unduly press his views upon his diplomatic opponent.
Germany failed to recognise this necessity in arguing
debatable points with America, with whom later she
became embroiled by a culminating act of open
defiance of rules the propriety of whose observance
had never before been questioned.
The rules of naval warfare are thus seen to be an
expression of maritime rights, which may signify
either the rights of neutrals or the rights of belligerents,
the former being the passive and the latter the active
expression of these rules.
Until the year 1856 the code of rules which had
received tacit general acknowledgment, though not on
all occasions universal acceptance, was based upon the
traditional usage of the sea, precedent and general
first principles of equity. These rules are not con-
tained in any printed publication; they are referred
to generally as the " Law of Nations."
In 1856 they suffered a fundamental change : in
1909 existing belligerent rights were further restricted
and, moreover, were hampered with conditions that
deprived them of most of their value to this country.
CHAPTER II
THE RULES OF NAVAL WARFARE
The three principal rules, sanctioned by the Law
of Nations, under which naval warfare was conducted
in the past, referred to the right of visit and search,
blockade and the capture of enemy goods at sea.
By the right of visit and search a belligerent war
vessel was empowered to hold up and board any
merchant vessel for the purpose of verifying her
nationality, examining her papers and searching her
cargo for contraband. The only modification suffered
by this rule during the war was that, for safety's sake,
the search was carried out in harbour instead of at
sea. This innovation was challenged, but unsuccess-
fully, by America.
By the right of blockade a belligerent Power may
forcibly prevent any neutral merchant ship from either
entering or leaving an enemy port by stationing a
cordon of ships off such port. Such blockade is recog-
nised only when it is really effective, i. e. when the
number of ships that form the cordon is sufBciently
large to ensure there being no reasonable possibility
that a ship shall be able to pass through unseen.
The old law of blockade, which will be spoken of
more fully in another chapter, was of but little use to
us during the war owing to the effective long range of
modern guns and the dangers from submarine, mine
and aircraft.
We come to the third rule, the most important of all
6
THE RULES OF NAVAL WARFARE 7
and that wliich lias suffered the greatest change. A
belHgerent originally had the right to capture and
confiscate enemy property wherever found upon the
high seas. This right, which extended to the capture
of enemy property in neutral ships, was frequently
disputed.
The first to challenge the old law and to make a
serious attack upon it were the Dutch. Towards the
middle of the seventeenth century they put forward
a new principle by which enemy commerce on the
high seas received immunity from risk of capture
when carried in neutral ships. This principle sought
justification on the ground of its being identified with
the sovereign rights of neutrals, upon which, so it was
alleged by the Dutch, the application of the principles
of the old law constituted an encroachment.
The Dutch arguments and principles were all con-
tained in condensed form in the neatly packed formula
"Free ship, free goods." This formula was launched
on the world, elevated to the dignity of a doctrine
and accepted by the Dutch school as a sound and
exhaustive exposition of the Law of Nations in all
matters relating to the subject of enemy property on
the high seas. Not being easy of comfortable refuta-
tion, this doctrine held the field until a formidable
rival appeared unexpectedly upon the scene. This
was " Enemy ship, enemy goods," which argued that
if the character of the cargo was to be determined
by the nationality of the ship, then neutral cargoes
on board enemy ships must partake of an enemy
character.
Both these propositions may be perfectly sound,
although in our personal opinion they are not; for if
one belligerent cannot protect his own property on the
high seas it seems only right that it should become
8 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
lawful prize to the other belligerent ; bearing in mind
that the dispute, in which property at sea plays the
most vital part, has by both belligerents been referred
to the arbitrament of the sword and not to the good
offices of the neutral. Be this as it may, the point is
that, Dutch doctrines notwithstanding, we asserted
our right and maintained it. Neither Frederick the
Great of Prussia in 1752, nor the armed neutralities of
Catherine of Russia in 1780 and 1800, succeeded in
establishing their claim to the new doctrine in the
face of the uncompromising resistance that it met with
from our statesmen and seamen of those days; and
on the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War the
old law received almost universal acknowledgment.
But in 1856, after the Crimean War, we committed
ourselves to the fatal act of setting our signature to
the Declaration of Paris, Art. II of which paraphrases
the Dutch doctrine as follows : —
The neutral flag covers enemy's merchandise
with the exception of contraband of war.
The immunity given by this Article to the general
bulk of sea-borne merchandise struck a blow at the very
heart of our sea-power. It is true that the protec-
tion which this Declaration gave to enemy commerce
was given also to British; but this protection, being
already provided for in our case by our fleet, extended
only to the commerce of our enemies, and struck a vital
blow at our sea-power.
Continental nations stand on an entirely different
footing from that of Great Britain with regard to the
security of their oversea supplies : they have there-
fore been compelled to seek protection for them in
paper agreements. The illusory nature of a security
that rests upon the assumed inviolability of a bond is
THE RULES OF NAVAL WARFARE 9
supplied by Germany's actions during the war when,
from the very outset, she violated Belgium's neutrality
and proceeded to the perpetration of successive acts
in contravention of every written and unwritten law
that stood in the way of her objective.
In signing an agreement that will give alike to us
and to others immunity to commerce from capture,
or the transfer of naval power to international legal
instruments, the whole of the advantage accrues to
our potential enemies. This fact should always be
borne in mind by those who live on islands, and have
powerful and bellicose military nations as neighbours
across the water.
" I believe," said the late Lord Salisbury, speaking
in the House of Lords on 6th March, 1871, " that since
the Declaration of Paris, the fleet, valuable as it is for
preventing an invasion of these shores, is almost
valueless for any other purpose." The hampering
effect of the Declaration of Paris upon the power of
England at sea may be judged from the fact that we
found it absolutely necessary so early in the war
as on the 11th March, 1915, to renounce its provisions
completely in principle, though not in law, by our
Reprisals Order of that date.
More than half a century elapsed before the next
great surrender was made. The Declaration of Paris
made it very important to us that the right over
contraband goods should be as complete as possible.
But during the nineteenth century very revolutionary
changes had taken place in the conditions under which
naval warfare had previously been conducted.
In the Napoleonic days the operations of war were
confined almost exclusively to the armed forces, par-
taking somewhat of the nature of a gladiatorial com-
bat. The civil population existed practically as a
10 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
separate entity ; its concern with the war was but sHght
(it is understood, however, that it was always allowed
to pay taxes), and, as a military asset, it was almost
negligible. There was, therefore, no real necessity for
stopping supplies to the civil population.
Nations, too, in those days were nearly self-support-
ing and dependent far less than they are now upon
sea-borne supplies. The contraband list was therefore
small and simple, and there was then no difficulty in
determining the contraband character of goods. As
for evidence of proof that contraband found on board
a ship was destined for the enemy, that was an
equally simple matter to determine; for, there being
no adequate land transport across adjoining neutral
territory, a neutral port did not afford facilities for
contraband traffic, and enemy ports only needed to be
considered. But the operations of war have felt the
full force of the impetus launched by the advent of
steam; and the amazing fertility with which the
resources of science and invention have been harnessed
and adapted to these operations has greatly con-
tributed to the enlargement of the contraband list.
During the Great War, when the whole of the civil
population became merged in the military, strictly
non-contraband goods formed but an insignificant
part of the bulk of merchandise.
The growth of railways and the facilities that they
afford for the conveyance of goods between enemy and
adjacent neutral territory has also added immeasur-
ably to the difficulties of stopping the contraband
traffic : for the complicated problem had to be faced
of discriminating between bond fide neutral goods
and goods destined for the enemy; both being con-
traband and both being stowed cheek by jowl in the
hold of a ship that discharged its cargo in a neutral
THE RULES OF NAVAL WARFARE 11
port ; where neutral and enemy, as frequently as not,
had a common interest in adding to existing complica-
tions brought about by the invention of steam.
The question, therefore, of determining what goods
should be regarded as contraband and how they should
be proved to have an enemy destination became very
complex.
The tribunal to which such matters and all questions
affecting the validity of captures at sea are referred
is the national Prize Court of the belligerent. The
judgments of Prize Courts have always been based
upon a review of the evidence available and in accord-
ance with precedent and the teachings of international
jurists.
The Declaration of London arose out of a proposal
by Germany for the establishment of an International
Court of Appeal from the decisions of Prize Courts.
The functions of our Prize Courts were thus to be
handed over to an alien tribunal. This could not,
fortunately, be done without the authority of Parlia-
ment. The Naval Prize Bill, embodying the German
proposal, was therefore introduced : it passed the
House of Commons, but, mainly through the untiring
energy and patriotic devotion of the late Mr. Gibson
Bowles, it was thrown out by the Lords ; who, by this
wise act, freed the country from the grave danger
during the Great War that all decisions in the matter
of prize and legality of our belligerent operations at
sea should be made the subject of appeal to a foreign
Court; a Court sitting in secret session, and to the
impartiality of whose findings there would inevitably
attach the taint of suspicion, arising from the conflict-
ing interests of the represented Powers, prejudicial, in
their residual effect, to our own.
It was necessary that the new Court should have a
12 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
law to administer. For this purpose a conference of
ten States was convened in London in 1908; and the
result of its deliberations is contained in the Declara-
tion of London 1909, to the contraband clauses of which
our remarks will be chiefly confined.^
The Declaration of London contains two lists : one
of absolute contraband, which comprises articles of
exclusive military utility such as guns and explosives ;
and one of conditional contraband, such as food, fuel
and clothing, which are necessary for the civil popula-
tion as well as for military purposes. There is also a
Free List which contains articles that cannot be made
contraband.
Now contraband in its very nature is not susceptible
of being so listed, for the contraband character of
goods must depend upon circumstances of varying
conditions, such as time and place : there may at
one time be a scarcity and at another a sufficiency of
any particular commodity; which, again, might be
obtainable or not according to the relationship of a
belligerent with adjoining neutrals. But it is the Free
List that constitutes the most mischievous feature here ;
for although the raw materials for our manufactures
are to be found on this list, it also includes the
ingredients from which munitions and the most potent
forms of explosives are made, e. g. raw cotton, nitrates,
metallic ores, ammonia, oil seeds and rubber.
Turning to the question of evidence of proof, the
Declaration of London lays down certain presumptions
of guilt. These presumptions assume a bond fide
character to ships' papers : they seriously fetter the
jurisdiction of Prize Courts, and are so simple of
evasion as almost to amount to a notification of how
the smuggler may avoid risk to his venture. Article 35
1 See Appendix, p. 281.
THE RULES OF NAVAL WARFARE 13
virtually places conditional contraband on the Free
liist, for the mere fact of its being discharged in a
neutral port is held to give it an innocent character.
Matters might well have been worse, for in the
instructions to Sir Edward Fry, 12th June, 1907, it is
stated that H.M. Government were ready and willing
to abandon the principle of contraband, thus allowing
oversea trade in neutral vessels between belligerents
on the one hand and neutrals on the other to continue
during the war without any restriction, subject only
to its exclusion by blockade from an enemy's port.
This project was overruled.
The Declaration of London, though not ratified, was
adopted on the outbreak of war, and ran its course
until it was superseded by the Maritime Rights Order.
Referring to the restrictions upon the right of
blockade imposed by the Declaration of London, the
Hamburger Nachrichten of 13th June, 1909, ingenu-
ously observes, " in Germany we have received these
decisions with exceptional pleasure."
For later pronouncements we call upon Admiral von
Tirpitz and the late Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg.
From Admiral von Tirpitz : — ^
The kernel of our altogether too humble answer
to America, which was dispatched on Feb. 17th,
1915, lay in the invitation to the American Govern-
ment to find a way of ensuring the observation of
the Declaration of London by the English, with
the suggestion that in that case the German
Government would be ready to follow out the
logical results of the new situation thus created.
That meant of course that in that case we
should abandon the use of the submarines not
1 Admiral von Tirpitz's Memoirs.
14 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
merely in the barred zone, but also against enemy
vessels.
Germany's submarines had not on the whole been
doing badly, but they had not quite the same
numbing effect that the Declaration of London alone
possessed.
From the late Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, German
Chancellor : —
" Of special interest," says Mr. Cababe,^ " in
this connection is the statement of the German
Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in July
1916, to the American journalist, Mr. W. B. Hale,
as reported in The Times of July 11th, 1916.
' There was,' said the Chancellor, ' another De-
claration of Independence which history will
record as of import no less significant than the
document signed at Philadelphia on July 4th,
1776 — the manifesto issued by the Great Powers
of the world upon the freedom of God's ocean to
the people of whatever clime who set sail upon its
bosom on lawful errands. The proclamation of
the freedom of the seas is known as the Declara-
tion of London. It was subscribed to in London,
of all places in the world, on February 26th, 1908.
To its enunciation of principles ten nations placed
their " John Hancocks." ' " ^
^ " The Freedom of the Seas." By Michael Cababe. John
Murray.
2 That is, signatures. John Hancock was the first to inscribe
his name on the Declar-ation of Independence.
The Chief Mourneu
[From "Punch."
CHAPTER III
THE FLEET
An Admiralty Memorandum published in 1910 stated
that : —
The really serious danger that this country has
to guard against in war is not invasion, but
interruption of trade and destruction of our
mercantile marine.
• •••••
There was a time when this country was self-sup-
porting and our fleet existed only for defence against
invasion ; but with the growth of our Empire and our
dependence upon foreign trade for our existence, the
main role of the Navy has been transferred to the
protection of our commerce and long lines of com-
munication, and its size has increased to meet new
requirements. On sea-borne supplies these islands
depend for their existence : our continental neigh-
bours are not to such an extent dependent upon them
for theirs. In addition to their land communications
extending over Europe and Asia, they have facilities
for obtaining supplies from oversea sources through
neutral ports ; we have none : our only neighbour
is the sea. It is a mere truism, therefore, to say that
our existence depends upon our ability to give security
to our sea-borne supplies — that is to say upon our
Navy. To us naval disaster signifies irretrievable
national ruin; to our neighbours it has a far less
limited meaning.
15
16 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The fleet has an offensive and a defensive purpose to
fulfil. The advent of the submarine and its rapid
development since 1914 — tliough not before— has had a
serious influence upon the original offensive function
of a fleet, whose direct and immediate object is to
destroy the enemy fleet. ^
The destruction of the enemy fleet, however, is only
the means to a certain end; it is the removal of a
barrier that stands in the way of attack upon enemy
commerce.
As a protection to its commerce an enemy fleet is
rendered equally useless if, as was the case with the
German High Sea Fleet, it can be confined to its
harbours.
Having gained its immediate objective by removing
the barrier or rendering it useless, the victorious fleet
is in a position to reap the fruits of victory. If, how-
ever, there is no commerce upon which to prey, or if
it is under the protection of treaty, the destruction
of the enemy fleet — still speaking of it only as a barrier
or screen — has been little more than a Pyrrhic victory :
it has been the destruction of so many lives and so
much material; and the intrinsic loss suffered by
the enemy, as measured by the standard of war values,
has not been of great importance.
The significance of this offensive function of our
fleet lies in its exposure of the only spot in the enemy's
armour that is vulnerable from the sea; namely, his
sea-borne supplies. It is true that w^e ourselves are
far more dependent upon sea-borne supplies than any
continental nation ; but in our own special case these
supplies are safeguarded by our fleet.
We turn to the main defensive function of the fleet,
which consists in the protection of our commerce and
1 The submarine is briefiy discussed later on in this chapter.
THE FLEET 17
trade routes. We have bits of empire scattered all
over the world and our lines of communication must be
kept free from attack by units of the enemy fleet. A
sufficient force must therefore be available for dealing
with details that may be encountered anywhere in the
various oceans, any one unit of which has the power
to inflict incalculable injury on our mercantile marine,
as witness the exploits of the "Emden" and
" Moewe."
The defensive function of the German fleet, which
was confined to the protection of German commerce,
was undertaken in the first place by the Declaration
of Paris, which gave the greater part of German com-
merce the protection of the neutral flag. Germany's
commerce was further protected by our adoption of
the Declaration of London, which made the capture
of contraband exceedingly difficult, and in other ways
weakened the power of our fleet.
There is no record in history in which a fleet has
carried out the work of blockade so efficiently as did
the British fleet in 1914-1918 : the number of ships
that escaped its unceasing watchfulness was negligible ;
the effectiveness of the work of the Navy was, unfor-
tunately, seriously impaired by the release of many
ships without the authoritative sanction of the Prize
Courts. This matter was affected in no way whatever
by the existence of the German High Sea Fleet, whose
proper function it was itself to protect the sea-borne
supplies of the German armies and to prevent our
fleet from holding them up.
If the reader would know who won the battle of
Jutland, let him make inquiry in the first place as
to the objects that each of the contending fleets had
in view, and then as to the results of the fighting as
they affected those objects. He will find that the
18 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
object of the German fleet was to obtain command of
the sea with the special purpose of giving security to
Germany's sea-borne suppHes, which had then passed
from the state of being a pressing need to that of
being a vital necessity to her; with the further object,
also, of cutting our communications with France and
preventing reinforcements from crossing the English
Channel. He will find that the object of the British
fleet was to prevent these purposes from being
achieved.^ He will find also that, as a result of the
battle of Jutland, the blockade of Germany was
unaffected; that the number of ships which escaped
the vigilance of our fleet was as negligible after as
before the battle; that our communications with
France were maintained; and that our transports
passed to and fro in perfect security under naval escort
— one or two only were lost by direct enemy action
throughout the war. These results are further accen-
tuated by the pregnant fact that the German fleet
never again challenged our sea-supremacy, although
the German nation was in the grip of starvation.
Although the German High Sea Fleet was unable to
justify its existence as a protection for its commerce
and as a menace to our trade and communications
outside the Baltic, nevertheless as a " fleet in being "
it exercised a far-reaching influence on the fortunes of
the war ; mainly in two respects : it enabled the
Baltic trade to be kept open and, by containing the
British Grand Fleet, it prevented the latter from
operating elsewhere. Sweden was to Germany in a
lesser degree what America was to us; and the
destruction of the German fleet would have given us
^ This was its immediate and imperative object. But the
British objective was also, if possible, to destroy the German
fleet, which was a serious obstacle in the path of other operations.
THE FLEET 19
command of the Baltic. These considerations furnish
a good instance of the meaning of sea-supremacy.
With regard to the submarine : the German fleet,
it is said, seldom or never went to sea; and, after
Jutland, it did not again put in an appearance. This
is not quite the case.
A fleet, as has been shown, has an offensive and a
defensive part to play. The submarine has placed
this distinction in a very clear light. In the case of
Germany the two functions are to be seen in the two
separate arms of her fleet— her High Sea Fleet, whose
part during the war was mainly a passive one, and
her under-water fleet. It was the offensive function
of the fleet that this under-water fleet was called upon
to perform, and the success achieved by the German
submarine placed this country in a critical situation.
The submarine was always at sea, and could prey
upon our commerce direct by evading the barrier
which alone gave it shelter. Commerce therefore
could be, and was made its immediate objective.
The German submarine fleet had no opposing fleet
to destroy, and the barrier that we erected was of
necessity an extemporised one, consisting of under-
water obstructions, mines and explosive charges from
surface or aircraft. We also developed the sense of
hearing the submarine, but the enemy came very close
to dealing us a mortal blow before the fortunes of war
turned finally in our favour.
The limitations imposed by international law upon
belligerent rights include the obligation on the part
of a belligerent to respect life in all interference with
commerce. By treaty contraband goods only are
liable to capture, subject to the antecedent procedure
of visit and search being carried out and to subsequent
Prize Court proceedings being taken. The German
20 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
submarine in its attack upon our commerce brushed
aside all moral and legal obligations and sank ships at
sight. Had Germany bound herself by any code of
law, either moral or legal, this weapon would have
been almost useless : it is unlikely that she would
have succeeded in bringing into her ports a single
prize. But she nearly effected her purpose. Inter-
national law and treaty did not protect us from
Germany, but we allowed them to protect Germany
from us. This is a lesson it is well should be taken
to heart.
The German submarine campaign has at least, it is
hoped, served some useful purpose. It has taught us
the futility of relying upon treaty obligations for the
protection of our commerce and our food supplies;
it has brought home to us in a very practical manner
our dependence, as an island kingdom, upon sea-borne
goods and the necessity for effectively safeguarding
them ; it has taught us that bread is not always to be
obtained by the simple process of sending round to the
baker's, nor through the sweat of the brow alone;
it has to be fought for, and bled for, and died for.
The protection of our commerce against the prob-
able engines of war of the future does not come within
the scope of this work as a matter for discussion. We
have only this to say about it. If our commerce is to
rest for its protection upon treaty obligations, and
if modern Declarations of Paris and Declarations of
London are again to be foisted upon us, it is to be
hoped that they will be backed up by the most power-
ful material forces that can be devised by the wit of
man; that our ablest men will be invited to apply
themselves whole-heartedly and unremittingly to the
investigation and solution of this problem; and that
no question of money shall be allowed to stand in the
THE FLEET 21
way of attaining success.^ Mistakes, which nearly cost
us our hves, are apt to occur, as has been seen, when
deahng with international law and treaty; but no
such mistakes have yet been made when it has been
our fleet with which an enemy has had to deal. At
the present moment we are living with a halter round
our necks.
In 1914 the submarine menace existed, but not as
a serious danger. Before it had time to assume the
formidable dimensions that marked its rapid develop-
ment in the later stages of the war, Germany, had
we exercised our maritime rights unfettered by the
Declaration of London and abstained from trade in
dangerous areas, would, we think, have succumbed to
our sea-power.
1 The munificent gift of £100,000, recently made by Sir Alfred
Yarrow to the Royal Society, for the purpose of promoting
scientific research was accompanied by a letter in which Sir
Alfred Yarrow states : — " It is doubtful whether even yet it has
been realised how completely this country would have been at
the mercy of our antagonists in the late war had it not been for
the research work done by our scientific men before the war and
during its course."
CHAPTER IV
THE REPRISALS ORDER
The causes that predisposed the official mind to a
policy in antagonism to the requirements of national
defence are to be found in the false sense of security
into which the nation had been lulled during the long
period of peace following on the close of the Napoleonic
Wars. The sinister and intermittent omens of war,
the ominous rumblings which came from Agadir, the
widening of the Kiel Canal, the increase of the German
Army, but, in particular, the expansion of the German
Navy were among the many disquieting warnings
which, though unheeded by this country, were clearly
appreciated by France. While Germany was making
open preparation for the coming struggle, the fear of
precipitating a crisis would override considerations
governing the necessity for meeting it. It is impossible
to conceive how by word or deed, were they never so
rash, consequences could have befallen the world more
appalling than those which it has suffered by the
indulging of a reluctance to incur the displeasure of
a political rival or provoke the wrath of a friendly
though powerful State. The road to office was seen
to lead along the pleasant path of economy, and in
the artificial atmosphere of peace political judgment
became warped.
Thus it came about that the possibility of our
becoming a belligerent in the impending struggle was
made subordinate to a desire to remain neutral. In
22
THE REPRISALS ORDER 28
this desire, or belief, are to be found the reasons for
framing the rules discussed in a previous chapter.
Under these rules immense wealth would have been
amassed by the carrying trade brought to our mercan-
tile marine — by far the largest in the world — in a
European war in which this country was neutral.
But when war broke out, hypothetical considerations
had to yield to facts : the belief that this country
was to be neutral was shattered by the fact that she
was a belligerent and, moreover, that Germany was
our foe. In these circumstances the adoption of the
Declaration of London (which had given birth to the
expression " Sea Law made in Germany "), with slight
modifications, cannot be defended. The Convention
was the work chiefly of Viscount Grey (then Sir Edward
Grey).
The greatest cataclysm in the recorded history of
nations has left to the world an impression of unsur-
passable deeds of prowess ; and many a new name will
be found inscribed on history's honoured page : but
the topmost heights of fame remained unsealed ;
and the Great War is linked with the memory of no
towering personality by which its fortunes were
pre-eminently dominated.
The Prime Minister, who, with Viscount Grey, shared
and courageously accepted the responsibility of com-
mitting this country to war, was Mr. Asquith, to whose
skill in debate, profound learning and inimitable
mastery of stately phrase we would respectfully pay
our meed of homage. Nevertheless, as Prime Minister
in the opening and early stages of the war, he will, we
think, be best remembered for the magnificent things
he said. There is, we feel sure, no living statesman
who has said finer things than has Mr. Asquith. The
graceful ceremonies of the art of statesmanship could
24 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
not possibly have been in better keeping or in more
accomplished hands. No one has ever obtained
greater value from words. However depressed we
might become under the news of successive reverses,
Mr. Asquith kept our jaded spirits constantly revivi-
fied. In the heyday of their career the effect of some
of his more telling phrases was nothing short of
stupendous. The country got the belief firmly
rooted into its very system that it could not, while
such things lasted, be beaten. No more wry faces
were then to be seen at the breakfast table. The
morning papers were eagerly scanned, not so much
with a view to ascertaining what Germany had done
as to learn what Mr. Asquith had said. Under the
effect of the words which poured from the Premier's
lips the country became fairly hypnotised. But
unhappily the propaganda work of his enemies began
to make itself felt; and the mind of the country
slowly but surely became impregnated with its deadly
poison. The belief got about that Mr. Asquith's
ordnance was defective; that Oxford in time of war
is no match for Krupp's, and that the language of
Woolwich should be given a trial. We often picture
Mr. Asquith as pondering over the words of Merlin : —
That, if to-night our greatness were struck dead,
There might be left some record of the things we said,
and making provision for such an emergency. Think
of the record there would have been left us.
His successor, Mr. Lloyd George, is also a master of
words and, in particular, of metaphor. But he special-
ised also in deeds. Probably no man contributed a
greater individual share to the winning of the war
than Mr. Lloyd George. So vast, however, were its
ramifications that it was beyond the power of any one
THE REPRISALS ORDER 25
man to grapple with the meaning and significance of
many of its aspects. Even the superhuman energy
and will-power of Mr. Lloyd George himself were not
sufficient for such an herculean task. His labours,
moreover, were identified only with the military and
political side of the struggle ; and we venture to say,
with diffidence, that the part played by economics
failed of necessity to gain the attention of his already
fully-occupied thoughts. We do not for a moment
think that the haunting spectre of " Too late," which
dogged and crippled our every effort to meet emergency
after emergency as it arose, was known, or even so
much as suspected, by the Premier to be associated
with any causes other than the uncertainties insepar-
able from all prognostics relating to military opera-
tions. He could not have been aware — of this we
feel convinced — that the German fighting forces were
sustained by ourselves, and that the munitions that
reached Germany were brought over to her in ships
which passed as freely through the waters of the
English Channel and North Sea as those that carried
our own troops; and that our Navy was these ships'
common protection. He did not understand why it
was that his feet were always in the clay.
The Fates were in ironic mood when they retained
at the head of Foreign Affairs in August, 1914, another
great personality, the author of the Declaration of
London. In striking contrast to the previously
formed views of Viscount Grey on the subject of con-
traband is the action taken after the opening of
hostilities. The Free List was gradually unloaded,
and goods were gradually moved up to the two lists
of contraband until in the course of time these
lists contained most of the principal articles of mer-
chandise of contraband character. The want of
26 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
organisation (which is frankly admitted), the inabiUty
to seize conditional contraband, and the difficulty of
discriminating between bond fide neutral goods and
goods with an enemy destination left us powerless to
exercise effective control over sea-borne traffic. Such
cargoes as were sent in for adjudication, before being
brought to the Prize Courts, were subjected to a
preliminary filtering process at the hands of a Contra-
band Committee, whose work was admirably carried
out. But as this work was to free neutral traffic from
all avoidable delay and inconvenience, it was clearly
prejudicial to our interests by tending to the release
of guilty cargoes.
The best part of the 3,000,000 tons of Germany's
mercantile shipping was locked up in German or
neutral ports, and German trade was carried on in
neutral ships under Art. II, Declaration of Paris.
The situation as regards German trade was as
follows : Direct trade to German ports (save
across the Baltic) had almost entirely ceased,
and practically no ships were met with bound
to German ports. The supplies that Germany
desired to import from overseas were directed to
neutral ports in Scandinavia, Holland, or (at
first) Italy, and every effort was made to disguise
their real destination.^
Goods poured into Germany via the neutral ports
for several months until circumstances arose which
enabled certain measures to be taken to bring the
traffic under some sort of control.
In March, 1915, an attempt was made to cut off all
commerce with Germany by applying the " principle "
of the law of blockade but departing from the letter
1 Cd. 8145.
THE REPRISALS ORDER 27
of the law. The measures adopted by H.M. Govern-
ment were framed as an act of reprisal against
Germany.
The specific offence against international maritime
law that led to the drafting of the Reprisals Order ^
was Germany's declaration that the English Channel,
the north and west coasts of France and the waters
round the British Isles were a " war area " ; and
that all enemy ships found in that area would be
destroyed, and that neutral vessels might be exposed
to danger.
Articles I and II of the Reprisals Order are framed
for the purpose of cutting off all commerce through
German ports.
External commerce consists of imports and exports.
Exports have for a belligerent but one purpose to
fulfil— to pay for imports. They represent in other
respects a useless dissipation of energy. In Germany's
case exports were probably not of prime importance,
for she had made arrangements with Scandinavian
banks for making payment on a money basis. In any
case imports were of far the greater importance to
her. Now with regard to the imports through
Germany's own ports, we are in fact told in the
" Statement of the Measures adopted to Intercept
the Sea-borne Commerce of Germany " that " direct
trade to German ports (save across the Baltic) had
almost entirely ceased, and practically no ships were
met with bound to German ports " : Articles I and II,
therefore, appear to leave our power over the important
part of enemy commerce, i. e, his contraband imports,
much the same as before.
Articles III and IV attempt to stop all commerce
with Germany through neutral ports.
^ See Appendix.
28 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Article III deprives conditional contraband of the
immunity from capture which it previously possessed
when destined for discharge at a neutral port.
In other respects the power conferred by these
articles that was not previously possessed is that of
stopping the import of non-contraband goods through
neutral ports; which would seem to be a useless
dissipation of energy.
The Reprisals Order is lenient to the point of tender-
ness to the enemy. The full force of its severities in
the unnecessary interference with and detention of
property which it is not intended to confiscate is
felt by the neutral.
The Reprisals Order, which marks an epoch in the
war, is of a very revolutionary character : it brought
us into sharp conflict with America. A technical
blockade could not be declared in practice in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Declaration of London,
which states that a blockade must not extend beyond
the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the
enemy ; and that the blockading forces must not bar
access to neutral ports or coasts.
For these reasons, therefore, the Reprisals Order did
not profess to declare a blockade; its object was to
intercept enemy commerce by an adaptation of the
law of blockade.
There are two entirely different principles govern-
ing the two laws by which enemy commerce can be
captured. With the law governing the capture of
contraband we have already dealt. Contraband law
requires that active measures be taken by a belligerent
in order to effect the capture of contraband; and
that the capture be submitted to the adjudication of
the Prize Court for the determination of its validity.
By the law of blockade a belligerent has the right to
THE REPRISALS ORDER 29
cut off all communication with the whole or any part
of an enemy coast. By this law the absolute and prior
right of a belligerent to operate against the territory
of his enemy is placed before the trading interests of
the neutral world, which suffer from this blockade
operation. A belligerent has the right to say, " No
one shall enter this port or approach this stretch of
coast-line : it is the port or coast-line of my enemy."
Under protest from America the word " blockade,"
which had been advisedly omitted in the drafting of
the Reprisals Order, was uttered : " for this end, the
British fleet has instituted a blockade. . . ." ^
Thus a definite legal basis for discussion, which
did not exist before, was provided; and it is from
the standpoint that a legally constituted blockade is
in operation that the Reprisals Order was argued.
It was a most unfortunate change of standpoint that
the justified retaliatory character of the measures
should have been abandoned.
In a U.S. despatch of 2nd April, 1915, it was pointed
out as " novel and unprecedented features " of our
blockade that it embraced neutral ports and coasts
and barred access to them ; and further that the risks
and liabilities placed upon neutral shipping were a
distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of neutrals.
In reply. Viscount Grey (23rd July, 1915) contended
that a belligerent violated no fundamental principle
of international law by applying a blockade " in such
a way as to cut off the enemy's commerce with foreign
countries through neutral ports if the circumstances
render such an application of the principle of blockade
the only means of making it effective." ^
Admiring as we do the masterly manner in which
the many points raised by America in this controversy
1 Cd. 7816. 2 cd. 8233.
30 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
were met by H.M. Government and the Foreign
Office, we are unable to see how this point of view
can be sustained : for it amounts to asserting a right
to blockade neutral ports. Blockade law is very short
and clear; and the principle of the law seems all to
be contained in the letter of the law. In other laws
principles may be applied by which the letter only
suffers and not the spirit ; e. g. where ships are taken
into port for searching them in safety the neutral's
interests suffer very little injury. But the claim to
change the principle of the law of blockade after the
manner of the Reprisals Order is a claim to alter the
law radically and to alter it to the great prejudice of
neutrals' interests.
We are interfering with no goods with which
we should not be entitled to interfere by blockade,
if the geographical position and the conditions of
Germany at present were such that the commerce
passed through her own ports.
But they were not such, and America argued on
conditions as they existed.
We find two sets of conditions, viz. firstly, that we
cannot blockade Germany's ports by preventing com-
munication with them by our armed forces — which is
the condition of blockade— because Germany's own
military measures prevent our doing so; secondly,
that of the three parts that comprise enemy commerce,
i. e. absolute contraband, conditional contraband and
non-contraband, it is the first only of these three over
which we have any real hold.
But how was this state of affairs brought about?
The conditions here were created by ourselves; con-
ditional contraband by the Declaration of London is
virtually non-contraband, and non-contraband enjoys
THE REPRISALS ORDER 31
immunity from liability to capture under Article II of
the Declaration of Paris. We invoke the protection of
the Law of Nations, which we voluntarily surrendered
in 1856 and 1909, in respect of the capture of enemy
property under law other than that of blockade when
the law serves our interests ; but the law of blockade,
which furthers the interests of our enemy, we find
defective; and we invoke principles that are alien to
it to take the place of surrendered rights.
Viscount Grey further contends that the one prin-
ciple which is fundamental and has obtained universal
recognition is that, by means of blockade, a belligerent
is entitled to cut off by effective means the sea-borne
commerce of his enemy. ^
If America had thought the same, there would have
been no ground for discussion; and it is permissible
to suggest that this is more a question of opinion than
of fact. The blockade, as already stated, is, in our
opinion, a measure directed against enemy territory.
Its object is certainly to cut off trade with the enemy;
but to do so the belligerent must seal up the enemy's
port : if he cannot do this, then the port is open to
neutrals. If neutrals do not wish to use this port,
it does not prevent a belligerent from exercising his
right to blockade it to his heart's content if he wishes
to do so; but the fact that neutrals do not use such
port does not give the right to a belligerent to follow
up the neutral with his blockade and transfer and
apply it to neutral ports : blockade law simply
lapses, and other laws come into operation — the laws
governing the capture of enemy property at sea, and
the rules governing trade with neutral ports in war-
time, which we declared by Royal Proclamation that
we would comply with. It is unfortunate for the
1 Cd. 8233.
32 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
blockader but has its compensations from the point
of view of the blockaded. It is hardly to be expected
that America would acquiesce, to the infinite injury
of her own interests, in our proposed rejection of
principles to which we had agreed in peace time,
because in war time we found they did not suit us.
Not only was the validity of the so-called blockade
challenged, but the jurisdiction conferred by the
Reprisals Order on our Prize Courts was pronounced
by America to be illegal.
Under the rules of the Reprisals Order special pro-
vision is made for the investigation of neutral claims
in respect of goods placed in the Prize Court. The
anomalous position is created here that a jurisdiction
for determining claims in respect of action taken
under the provisions of the Reprisals Order rests for
its authority on the Order itself. The Order in Council
is made valid by the King in Council. The claims
preferred by neutrals rest on the alleged invalidity of
the Order : they dispute the very rule that the Prize
Court is administering, and give rise to the question :
Are Prize Courts bound by Orders in Council ?
America's attitude towards this question is thus
stated : —
The Government of the U.S. cannot recognise
the validity of proceedings taken in H.M. Prize
Court under restraints imposed by the municipal
law of Great Britain in derogation of the rights
of American citizens.^
The Declaration of London is valid only by virtue of
an Order in Council (20th August, 1914). Were our
Prize Courts bound by this Order ? The importance of
this matter is our excuse for quoting at some length.
1 Cd. 8238.
THE REPRISALS ORDER 33
As illustrating further the attitude adopted by
the judges of British Prize Courts towards these
two sources of law, the municipal legislation of
its Sovereign on the one hand and the principles
of international law on the other, I should like
to refer your Excellency to a classical passage
in the judgment of Lord Stowell in the case
of the " Fox," in which that famous judge
observed : —
" In the course of the discussion a question
has been started. What would be the duty of
the Court under Orders in Council that were
repugnant to the law of nations ?
" It has been contended on one side that
the Court would at all events be bound to
enforce the Orders in Council ; on the other,
that the Court would be bound to apply the
rule of the law of nations adapted to the
particular case in disregard of the Orders in
Council. . . . This Court is bound to admin-
ister the law of nations to the subjects of other
countries in the different relations in which
they may be placed towards this country and
its Government. That is what others have
a right to demand for their subjects, and
to complain if they receive it not. This is
its unwritten law, evidenced in the course of
its decisions, and collected from the common
usage of civilised States. At the same time,
it is strictly true that, by the Constitution of
this country, the King in Council possesses
legislative rights over this Court, and has
power to issue orders and instructions which
it is bound to obey and enforce; and these
D
34 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
constitute the written law of this Court.
These two propositions, that the Court is
bound to administer the law of nations, and
that it is bound to enforce the King's Orders
in Council, are not at all inconsistent with
each other, because these orders and instruc-
tions are presumed to conform themselves,
under the given circumstances, to the prin-
ciples of its unwritten law. They are either
directory applications of these principles to
the cases indicated in them ; cases which, with
all the facts and circumstances belonging
to them, and which constitute their legal
character, could be but imperfectly known to
the Court itself; or they are positive regula-
. tions, consistent with these principles, apply-
ing to matters which require more exact and
definite rules than those general principles
are capable of furnishing. The constitution
of this Court, relatively to the legislative
power of the King in Council, is analogous to
that of the Courts of common law, relatively
to the Parliament of this kingdom. These
Courts have their unwritten law, the approved
principles of natural reason and justice;
they have likewise the written or statute law,
in Acts of Parliament, which are directory
applications of the same principles to par-
ticular subjects, or positive regulations con-
sistent with them, upon matters which would
remain too much at large if they were left to
the imperfect information which the Courts
could extract from mere general specula-
tions. What would be the duty of the
individuals who preside in these Courts, if
THE REPRISALS ORDER 35
required to enforce an Act of Parliament
which contradicted those principles, is a
question which I presume they would not
entertain a 'priori ; because they will not
entertain a lyriori the supposition that any
such will arise. In like manner, this Court
will not let itself loose into speculations,
as to what would be its duty under such
an emergency; because it cannot, without
extreme indecency, presume that any such
emergency will happen. And it is the less
disposed to entertain them, because its own
observation and experience attest the general
conformity of such orders and instructions
to its principles of unwritten law."
The above passage has recently been quoted
and adopted by the President of the Prize Court
in the case of the " Zamora." ^
In the opening sentences here it is stated in simple
language that a Prize Court is bound to administer
the unwritten Law of Nations to the subjects of other
countries. But the classical part of this passage
(which we assume to be the remainder of it) seems
clearly either to be at variance with this decision,
or to have no direct bearing upon the question which
it sets out to answer.
The question is : What is the duty of a Prize Court
—to obey an Order in Council or to disobey it under
circumstances which make it repugnant to the Law
of Nations ?
We are told that a Prize Court is bound to obey
such orders, which constitute the wi'itten law of the
Court ; and that there is no inconsistency in its being
1 Cd. 8234.
36 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
called upon to administer both the written and the
unwritten law, because the orders and instructions of
the former " are presumed to conform themselves " to
the principles of the latter.
But they are not presumed to do this. The question
to be answered specifically presumes the opposite.
There would be no question at issue if it did not.
How, too, can the analogy, which is drawn here, of
the relationship between the Courts of Common Law
and Parliament be held appropriately to illustrate the
relationship between Orders in Council and Prize
Courts? To point the analogy it must in the first
place be assumed that an Act of Parliament does
" contradict those approved principles " of natural
reason and justice which constitute the unwritten
law of the Courts of Common Law; for it is on the
supposition that Orders in Council contradict the
principles of the law administered by Prize Courts,
and on that supposition alone, that this judgment was
delivered, or that there was any need for its being
delivered. ,
It is argued — or rather presumed — that the supposi-
tion would not be entertained in Courts of Common
Law, and that it would be extremely indecent to
presume that such an emergency would arise in the
Prize Courts. The presumption, nevertheless, is made ;
and it is scarcely sufficient a reply to America to say
that it is indecent to make it.
Further, the analogy does not consider the funda-
mental difference which distinguishes Prize Courts
from Courts of Common Law. Neither Parliament nor
the King in Council has jurisdiction over the subjects
of a foreign State : the analogy would hold good only
if such jurisdiction did exist. A British subject cannot
challenge the law of his own country; but the Head
THE REPRISALS ORDER 87
of a Foreign State can challenge the British law when
applied to his own subjects. The sovereign rights of a
State extend only over the subjects of that State, and
not over those of another State. The fact that in the
opinion of one State it may be indecent to contest this
view will not prevent another State from contesting
it. America disregarded propriety in the interests of
her own citizens, and brought the issue to one as
between the Heads of two States on the question of
sovereign rights; and with undeniably good reason.
The officers appear to find their justification in
the Orders in Council and regulations of His
Majesty's Government, in spite of the fact that
in many of the present cases the Orders in Council
and the regulations for their enforcement are
themselves complained of by claimants as con-
trary to international law. Yet the very Courts
which it is said are to dispense justice to dissatis-
fied claimants are bound by the Orders in Council.
The principle, the note adds, has recently been
announced and adhered to by the British Prize
Court in the case of the " Zamora." ^
Our comments, it must be noted, criticise the reply
which the Foreign Office, quoting a famous judge,
makes to America on a matter relating to a disputed
right in a claim over enemy property ; a right through
which it was this country's only hope to end the war
successfully.
There is another passage — also from the classics —
which, though not entirely free from all trace of
obscurity in respect of the exact conclusions that may
safely be drawn from it, was, nevertheless, accepted
1 Cd. 8284.
88 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
as a model of perspicuity, wisdom and learning. We
take the liberty of quoting it : —
" My name's Jack Bunsby ! " (Commander of
*' Cautious Clara ").
" And what I says," pursued the voice, after
some deliberation, " I stands to."
• • • • • •
The Captain nodded at the auditory, and
seemed to say, " Now he's coming out. This is
what I meant when I brought him."
" Whereby," proceeded the voice, " why not?
If so, what odds ? Can any man say otherwise ?
No. A wast then ! "
When it had pursued its train of argument to
this point, the voice stopped, and rested. It then
proceeded very slowly, thus :—
" Do I believe that this here Son and Heir's
gone down, my lads? Mayhap. Do I say so?
Which ? If a skipper stands out by Sen' George's
Channel, making for the Downs, what's right
ahead of him ? The Goodwins. He isn't forced
to run upon the Goodwins, but he may. The
bearings of this observation lays in the applica-
tion on it. That an't no part of my duty. Awast
then, keep a bright look-out for'ard, and good
luck to you ! "
In this case also the world, though a smaller one,
listened with breathless interest, drank deep of the
waters of wisdom, and (though there were sceptics)
felt much refreshed.
We are convinced that the Commander of the
THE REPRISALS ORDER 39
*' Cautious Clara " before being conveyed to Brig Place,
where judgment was delivered, had made himself
acquainted with the same famous passage that Viscount
Grey uses for clinching his argument with the United
States of America.
The *' Zamora " case stood thus : the " Zamora " (a
Swedish ship) was carrying copper, which is contraband
of war, from New York to Stockholm. The ship
was brought in and her case was made the subject of
Prize Court proceedings. Pending the final decision of
the Court the President of the Admiralty Prize Court
made an order giving permission to the War Office
to requisition the copper, which was then in the
custody of the Marshal of the Court. The rules of the
Prize Court, under which this order was given, derive
their authority from Orders in Council. The order
was appealed against, and the Lords of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council decided that there
was " no power in the Crown by Order in Council to
prescribe or alter the law which the Prize Courts
have to administer."
The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council was given in April, 1916, whereas the reference
to the *' Zamora " case in the American correspondence
is dated 31st July, 1915, at which time Viscount Grey
was citing the decision of the President of the Prize
Court in support of his argument in ignorance of the
impending appeal and the reversal of the decision by
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The importance of the judgment delivered in the
appeal in the " Zamora " case can scarcely be
exaggerated.
How it should come about that our Prize Courts
should have been unaware of the state of the law they
were administering, and that it should have been left
40 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
for the casual circumstance of the " Zamora " judgment
to give to the Law of Nations the clear and natural
meaning and independent character which only — as
stated in the first part of Lord Stowell's judgment,
quoted by Viscount Grey — it is susceptible of bearing,
is a great mystery. The wrong procedure had appar-
ently been in operation to Germany's advantage from
4th August, 1914, to 7th April, 1916.
But this mystery is only one of a series in which
our Prize Courts were enshrouded. We have made
inquiries as to whether the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council had any part in the drafting of orders
upon whose validity in international law it might
become their duty to pronounce; or if their views
were elicited as to the probability of the orders
becoming the subject of international dispute; and,
if so, as to the consequences that would be likely to
ensue. We are advised that they were not; they
simply acted as umpires. So, in this curious game that
was being played, it was the umpire only who knew
the rules; and the umpire, apparently, would speak
only when spoken to.
The Reprisals Order, besides provoking the resent-
ment of America, is open to further very serious
criticism.
The order seems to be admittedly illegal, for Mr.
Asquith stated that it was not intended that our
efforts should be " strangled in a network of juridical
niceties " ; an expression which, without such illegal
meaning being assigned to it, can have no meaning
whatever.
To the objection that the U.S. " cannot submit to
the curtailment of its neutral rights by these measures,
which are admittedly retaliatory, and therefore
illegal," H.M. Government state :—
THE REPRISALS ORDER 41
But although these measures may have been
provoked by the illegal conduct of the enemy, they
do not, in reality, conflict with any general
principle of international law, of humanity, or
civilisation ; they are enforced with consideration
against neutral countries, and are therefore
juridically sound and valid. ^
It is not easy to understand why these very orthodox
and legal measures should be described as retaliatory.
No other legal measures have been so described, e. g.
Orders in Council of 20th August and 29th October,
1914. But it is incomprehensible why measures that
were considered to be juridically sound and valid, and
that did not conflict with any general principle of
international law, should not have been put in force
on the outbreak of war.
1 Cd. 8284.
CHAPTER V
AMERICAN AND BRITISH TRADE
On the outbreak of war America stood aloof for a
few months to watch events, and was " not disposed,
in view of the unexpected outbreak of hostihties
and the necessity of immediate action, to prevent
contraband goods from reaching the enemy, to judge
this poUcy harshly or protest against it vigorously."
We are bound to confess that this disposition took
strong hold of her in December, when the American
Ambassador's first despatch to Viscount Grey was
penned; nor was it easily to be shaken off.^
The main ground of America's complaint was
founded on the alleged serious injury caused by our
naval operations to her export trade : the situation
was described as pitiful to the commercial interests
of the United States and as threatening financial
disaster to steamship and insurance companies. Here
we find H.M. Government on firm ground.
Viscount Grey, in his reply, quoted such figures as
were available in respect of American exports in
support of the contention that it was not the action
1 The American Ambassador, the late Mr. Walter H. Page,
was as staunch a friend to us during the war as he was loyal
a servant to his own country. It has recently been proposed
to commemorate his ser^dces by a suitable memorial to be erected
in the neighbourhood of Westminster. Among the signatories
of the memorial appeal, in which Mr. Page is described as " one
of the best friends Great Britain ever had," are the present Prime
Minister and three of his predecessors.
42
AMERICAN AND BRITISH TRADE 43
of H.M. Government in particular, but the existence
of a state of war and consequent diminution of
purchasing power and shrinkage of trade, that was
responsible for adverse effects upon trade with
neutral countries.
Here are some of Lord Grey's figures, admittedly
incomplete, and not put forward as conclusive : — ^
November 1913 November 1914
Dollars Dollars
Exports from New York for : —
Denmark
558,000
7.101,000
Sweden ....
377,000
2,858.000
Norway ....
477,000
2,318,000
Italy ....
2.971,000
4,781,000
Holland ....
4,389,000
3,960,000
The export of copper up to the end of the first three
weeks of December is as follows : —
1913 1914
Italy 15,202,000 lb. 36,285,000 lb.
Norway -v
Dl^mTrk • • • ^'271.000.. 35,347.000,,
Switzerland J
" With such figures," it is stated, " the presumption
is very strong that the bulk of the copper consigned
to these countries has recently been intended, not for
their own use, but for that of a belligerent who cannot
import it direct."
Of a total of 773 ships which had left the U.S.
for Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Italy
between the 4th August, 1914, and 3rd January, 1915,
only forty-five had been temporarily detained to enable
particular consignments of cargo to be discharged
for the purpose of Prize Court proceedings, and only
eight had been placed in the Prize Court.
1 Cd. 7816.
44 THE TRIUMPH OF XmARMED FORCES
It is further shown from an examination of the
general statistics for the export of all merchandise that
there had been a decline in the export trade of the
U.S. before the war, the effect of which had been
" not to increase but practically to arrest the decline
of American exports which was in progress earlier in
the war."
The first paragraph of a circular issued by the
Department of Commerce at Washington on 23rd
January, 1915, (which is noted by H.M. Government
" with great satisfaction ") is then quoted. This
circular speaks of the marked improvements in
America's foreign trade, the figures for which (in
millions of dollars) were as follows : —
August
September .
October
. 110
. 156
. 194
November .
. 205
December .
. 246
Further figures show that the total volume of the
trade of the United States with Scandinavia and
Holland had increased by 300 per cent.
The conclusions that are drawn from an examina-
tion of these figures seem to us to be fully convincing.
The naval operations of this country were certainly
not directed against our own trade with America,
yet the exports to Great Britain fell during the first
four months of the war to the extent of 28,000,000
dollars; whereas the American exports to neutral
countries and Austria increased by over 20,000,000
dollars.
Further figures are given which suggested, as stated
by Lord Grey, that a substantial part of the American
AMERICAN AND BRITISH TRADE 45
trade was trade intended for enemy countries going
through neutral ports by routes to which it was
previously unaccustomed. The only comment made
by the United States upon these figures was to point
out that their comparative values failed to take into
account the increased price of commodities resulting
from a state of war, or to make any allowance for
the diminution in the volume of trade which the
neutral countries in Europe previously had with the
nations at war; a diminution which compelled them
to buy in other markets.
It must be pointed out here that it was (very pro-
perly) on the ground that our operations interfered
very seriously indeed with American trade that
America challenged the legality of the measures we
employed; it was therefore very important that she
should herself bring forward figures clearly disproving
the facts to which those produced by Lord Grey
pointed; or else that it should be shown that by
reason of the incompleteness of these figures (which
is admitted), or for other reasons, which should be
given, the value of Lord Grey's figures was discounted,
and the conclusions which he drew from them were
erroneous. This is not done ; and with regard to the
statement of a general vague nature quoted above,
it may be said that the diminution in the volume of
neutrals' trade owing to the war is an argument which
would certainly seem to have force, though it does
not necessarily vitiate the results sought, to be in-
dicated : but as to comparative values' failing, as
it is stated, to take into account the increased price
of commodities resulting from a state of war, we turn
to the figures produced by Lord Grey and taken from
American official documents showing the fall, in
terms of money, of American exports to Great Britain
46 THE TRIUIVIPH OF UNARMED FORCES
and her Allies, and compare them with the figures
showing the rise of exports to neutral countries and
Austria.
The figures are as follows : —
Total Exports 1st August to 30th November (in Thousands
OF Dollars)
Great Britain and Allies
Neutral countries
1913
316,805
103,401
1914
288,312
123,802
(Austria- Hungary
is unavoidably included.)
The significant purpose of the figures here was to
show the rise in the one case and the fall in the other ;
and although it is not to a comparison of America's
ante-war and war total exports that they are applied,
they nevertheless illustrate the fact that it is only in
the matter of the degree of magnitude of the results they
show, and not in the general conclusions themselves
to be drawn from the comparison, that they would
be affected by any increase in price of the commodities
whose value they represent.
But, turning to the specific case in which objection
is taken to this method of drawing comparisons,
that is to say to the employment of this method for
the purpose of illustrating the effect of the war on
the export trade of the U.S., it is permissible, in view
of the immense differences shown in the figures
referring to America's exports, to doubt whether,
even if the increased price of commodities had been
taken into consideration, the object of making the
comparison would have been destroyed : moreover,
we note that the same method is employed by America
herself : for her Department of Commerce at Washing-
ton— whose statements, by the way, are allowed to pass
unreproved by the American Ambassador— in order
AMERICAN AND BRITISH TRADE 47
to indicate a marked improvement in the foreign
trade of x4merica, draws comparisons between the
monetary values of her exports for the months of
November 1913 and 1914, and for the months of
December 1912, 1913 and 1914.
America's case in this important matter is not
sound. The pitiful situation in which the U.S. found
herself is one, we venture to think, for which some
other countries would not have been unwilling to
exchange places with her.
With regard to the detention of shipping in the
search for contraband, it is pointed out that, as
against the eight vessels placed temporarily in the
Prize Courts (referred to on p. 43), twenty-five neutral
vessels had been reported as having been destroyed
by mines on the high seas, and that " there was far
more reason for protest on the score of belligerent
interference with innocent neutral trade through
the mines scattered by the enemy than through
the British exercise of the right of seizing contra-
band."
While Lord Grey had been scrutinising figures
dealing with the American export trade, America
had turned her attention to the subject of our own
trade.
On 3rd June, 1915, the American Ambassador, at
the request of the American Consul-General in London,
asked for information regarding the amount of raw
cocoa and preparations of cocoa exported from Great
Britain to Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and
Italy during the four months ending 30th April, 1915,
as compared with the same period of 1914 and
1913.
The following is from a summary of the figures
sent in :—
48 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
ExpoBTS TO Sweden, Holland, Denmjlrk, Norway and Italy
Baiv Cocoa
1913
1914
January
February .
March
April .
260,361 lb.
116,868 „
137,423 „
415,816 „
2,626,687 lb
1,628,173 „
4,060,428 „
3,903,633 „
The despatch containing this information is dated
16th July, 1915. On 22nd July the following tele-
gram was sent by the British Ambassador at
Washington to Lord Grey : —
Mr. Lansing draws serious attention to increase
in export from United Kingdom to Northern
European ports since the war which have formed
the subject of unfavourable reports from the
United States consul-general in London. Ger-
mans here are said to make use of these facts
to create ill-feeling by circulating allegations
that England is preventing American oversea
trade with neutral countries in Europe with a
view to capture this trade for herself, and that
we are ourselves exporting the very goods which
we have seized from Americans.^
On 13th August Lord Grey called the attention of
the American Ambassador to this matter by letter;
and statistics were furnished in which a comparison
of the American exports with those of the United
Kingdom during the first five months of 1915 was
shown to be favourable to the United States. The
results of this comparison we note with less concern
than the extensive trade itself with Scandinavia and
Holland, in view of the open knowledge that it was
through these countries that Germany got her supplies ;
that the scale of such supplies, as officially admitted,
1 Cd. 8233.
AMERICAN AND BRITISH TRADE 49
was unprecedented; and that the guarantees for
preventing the suppHes from reaching the enemy, as
pointed out on more than one occasion by the author,
were worthless. It could hardly be expected that
America would look on unconcernedly while such
things were taking place, and acquiesce in our claim,
on the score of a privileged extension of belligerent
rights, to interfere with her own legitimate trade with
these countries. Nor can the fact be overlooked
that the circumstances which led to these disclosures
excluded the possibility of withholding them. We
incline to the view that it is not by comparisons that
these transactions are to be judged so much, perhaps,
as by their morality.
Disregarding the periods covered by the trans-
actions and the figures for the various commodities
and dealing only with the question of comparison,
we are told that there was in the case of : —
Cotton . . .6 times an increase of American over British
Lubricating oil . 5 ,, ,, „ „
Tobacco . . . twice „ „ „
Cocoa . nearly 1| times „ „ „
Other commodities show similar comparisons
favourable to the U.S. trade.
In many cases, we are told, increases in United
Kingdom re-exports were due to the fact that the
products of British India and colonial products
which formerly went direct to continental ports, such
as Hamburg, Rotterdam or Copenhagen, were sent to
the United Kingdom, and thence distributed to old
customers in Scandinavia and the Netherlands. Says
Lord Grey : —
Everything in the statistics I have quoted
tends to show that the mercantile community
E
50 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
of the United States has made profits pro-
portionately equal to or greater than those of the
mercantile community of Great Britain, in respect
to all those demands which have inevitably arisen
in Scandinavia and the Netherlands as a con-
sequence of the closing of German ports. ^
The closing of the German ports diverted German-
destined goods to neighbouring neutral ports. The
demands that had arisen in Scandinavia and the
Netherlands were to meet the requirements of
Germany. While we were endeavouring to stop
the American part of this traffic, we learn with some
surprise that the mercantile community of Great
Britain were trading pretty much to the same extent
as America — and to all intents and purposes with
the enemy; for trade with Germany's neighbours
was trade with Germany, as will be made clear in
Part II.
With regard to the goods that passed to Hamburg,
Rotterdam and Copenhagen from the British Empire,
they passed through in peace time. The alteration
of the route owing to the war may have affected
customs returns and official statistics relating to the
British exports of these goods; but no explanation
is given for the export itself of merchandise to the
dangerous Scandinavian and Dutch areas in war
time; nor can the interests even of old customers in
Scandinavia be held to be paramount over the interests
of the British Empire, which demanded the stoppage
to these States of all supplies that might reach and
benefit our enemy. How could it be otherwise but
that to the extent that the Scandinavian and Dutch
requirements were satisfied by one country, by so
1 Cd. 8233.
AMERICAN AND BRITISH TRADE 51
much the less would they require to be satisfied by
another country? To the extent that we supplied
these European neutrals with commodities, by so
much the less would American supplies be required
by them.
Yet while straining the international code in favour
of our maritime rights and adversely to American
interests, we refrained from adopting the full legis-
lative powers that we possessed over the commerce
of this country.
"It is a matter of common knowledge," we are
told by America, " that Great Britain exports and
re-exports large quantities of merchandise to Norway,
Sweden, Denmark and Holland, whose ports, so far
as American commerce is concerned, she regards as
blockaded."
We draw very particular attention to the following
passage in one of the United States despatches : —
Before passing from the discussion of this
contention as to the presumption raised by
increased importations to neutral countries, my
Government desires to direct attention to the
fact that His Majesty's Government admit that
the British exports to those countries have also
materially increased since the present war began.
Thus Great Britain concededly shares in creating
a condition which is relied upon as a sufficient
ground to justify the interception of American
goods destined to neutral European ports. ^
On what possible ground of equity could pre-
sumptions of enemy destination be applied to Ameri-
can cargoes in face of so manifestly inequitable
a practice on our part? We were fighting for
1 Cd. 8234.
52 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
presumptions of proof of enemy destination : we
had them fully and firmly established by admirable
reasoning : they are thrown into hopeless confusion
by America's tu quoque references to our own trade. ^
The good-will of this powerful and friendly neutral,
which it was most important that we should secure,
was not best obtained by asking her to regard us as a
neutral in respect of our own trade but as a belligerent
in respect of hers.^
^ See also Appendix for extract from a letter on this subject
written by the author in December, 1918, to Sir Esme Howard,
British Minister at Stockholm.
2 The following extract is taken from " The Life and Letters of
Walter H. Page," by Burton J. Hendrick (Heinemann) : —
" The situation was alarming for more reasons than the
determination of Germany to force the peace issue. The State
Department was especially irritated at this time (September,
1916) over the blockade. Among the ' trade advisers ' there was
a conviction, which all Page's explanations had not destroyed,
that Great Britain was using the blockade as a means of destroy-
ing American commerce and securing America's customers for
herself."
CHAPTER VI
America's attitude towards maritime rights
The methods, challenged by America, by which
we sought to obtain presumptive evidence of enemy
destination for imposing a contraband character
upon cargoes bound for neutral ports was justified
by H.M. Government on the ground that new devices
for despatching goods to the enemy must be met
by new methods of applying the fundamental and
acknowledged principle of the right to intercept such
trade.
Consignments of meat products, we learn, were
addressed to lightermen and dock labourers, to a
baker, to the keeper of a small private hotel and to
a maker of musical instruments. Several thousands
of tons of such goods were documented for a neutral
port and addressed to firms which did not exist there.
At one time, when it was found necessary to hold
up certain cargoes of cotton on their way to Sweden,
it was discovered that though the quays and the
warehouses of Gottenberg were congested with cotton,
there was none available for the use of the spinners
in Sweden. Nor did ships' papers convey any
suggestion as to the ultimate destination of goods.
The position in which this country found itself
during the war was in some respects analogous to
that of the United States in the American Civil War.
This fact was not lost sight of in the correspondence,
and it was brought to bear with considerable force.
53
54 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Into the able and learned disquisition on the all-
important subject of evidence of proof of contraband
we have not space to enter. The official despatches
show the ability with which our case was maintained
in the teeth of very powerful opposition.
In an appendix to the U.S. note of 5th November,
1915, particulars are furnished regarding vessels
detained by the British authorities. The length of
time during which each vessel was detained is given,
and various alleged irregularities are noted. The
number of offences committed, that is to say the
number of vessels to which reference is made, is about
420. The work that must have been entailed in
the drawing up of this record is rewarded with the
following notice : —
These lists are a strong testimony to the vigour
and effectiveness with which the naval forces
are carrying out the measures which the Allies
have deemed it necessary to take against the
commerce of their enemies.
Perhaps the most striking conclusion which
can be drawn from these lists is the rapidity
with which the vessels are released and the very
small amount of loss and inconvenience to which
they are, as a rule, exposed.^
The firm ground on which H.M. Government and
the Foreign Office had established themselves is here
abandoned : for the matter referred to is clearly one
of congratulation for neutrals and the enemy and not
for this country ; moreover, the release of these ships
would seem to show the futility of the vigorous
action taken by the Navy.
1 Cd. 8234.
AMERICA AND MARITIME RIGHTS 55
It was not with London alone that Washington
found herself in correspondence on this subject : we
imagine that her diplomats were engaged in similar
business with Berlin, whence, as is known, came
angry protests against America's contraband traffic.
It must be remembered that a neutral State is under
no obligation to interfere with the contraband traffic
of its citizens, who deal in it at their own risk. It
was for Germany to prevent the munitions from
America from reaching England : the matter was
one as between London and Berlin only. America
had to bear the weight of Germany's displeasure,
and the contraband traffic of her citizens was not
calculated to conciliate German prejudices.
If America was a thorn in our side, Germany was
a greater thorn in America's side; and America's
lot was not an enviable one. This, possibly, may
account for what, we cannot but think, was an utter
inability on the part of America to see that this war
was a conffict between human beings with human
passions : she seemed to see in it only a test of
rules : before speaking she looked to see what said
the book. The old law in its letter obviously could
not apply to the conditions of modern warfare;
although in its broadly accepted meaning in many
cases it could. But this was not to be allowed.
America herself seems to have been a little uncertain
as to the justice of the grounds of some of her pro-
tests : for instance, in our search for contraband we
are told that " mere suspicion is not evidence " ^ on
which to justify seizures and detentions of American
ships : but at a later date, when it was desired to
magnify the concessions enjoyed by a belligerent, we
are told : "... it is even conceded the right to
1 Cd. 7816.
56 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
detain and take to its own ports for judicial examina-
tion all vessels which it suspects for substantial
reasons to be engaged in un-neutral or contraband
service, and to condemn them if the suspicion is
sustained." ^ This, however, is a very slight and
perhaps an excusable inconsistency of which there
are certainly not many instances.
America was least happy when enacting the role
of self-appointed referee. For instance, when our
ships were being sunk wholesale and in open defiance
of law; when they were sunk without the required
formality of visit and search and of preliminary
inquiry being observed; when no quarter was given
to innocent passengers, including women and children ;
and when, moreover, we stood fair to lose the war
by these illegal practices, America sees and reviews
the matter thus : —
If the course pursued by the present enemies
of Great Britain should prove to be in fact
tainted by illegality and disregard of the prin-
ciples of war sanctioned by enlightened nations,
it cannot be supposed, and this Government
does not for a moment suppose, that His Majesty's
Government would wish the same taint to
attach to their own actions, or would cite such
illegal acts as in any sense or degree a justifica-
tion for similar practices on their part in so far
as if they can affect neutral rights.^
The implied doubt as to the actual fact of Ger-
many's notorious atrocities, and the terms in which
the most barbarous acts ever perpetrated by a
1 Cd. 8233.
AMERICA AND MARITIME RIGHTS 57
so-called civilised nation are referred to as possibly
being " tainted with illegality," can hardly be
expected to be viewed by those against whom
Germany's acts were directed with the same cold
philosophy and serene detachment that characterised
the unimpassioned utterances of America.
We cannot but regretfully reflect upon what
would have been the attitude of the late Mr. Roose-
velt towards these German outrages; for neutral
shipping was being sunk as well as British.
The passage we have quoted was, we suppose,
technically correct : nevertheless we regard it as
furnishing an infelicitous example of a set deter-
mination on the part of America to identify herself
only with a conception of the written letter of the
law; a conception limited to the circumstances con-
templated by the law at the time that it was written.
There seems to have been an inability to realise that
where right is transparently being abused it must so
continue to be abused but for interference from
human agencies; for laws cannot alter themselves.
Neither Law of Nations nor convention ever sanc-
tioned, nor was ever intended to sanction, the taking
of innocent life ; nor did they ever contemplate that
their literal meaning should be held to condone the
violation of their unwritten implied principles. None
will dispute this; nor will the facts of the outrages
themselves be disputed. But the spirit of the law
found but little human championship at White
House, whose uncompromising and stubborn atti-
tude in one or two instances seemed incapable of
yielding to any form of reason.
Although the British operations were proved not
to have acted injuriously upon the normal American
export trade, that is far from saying that they did
58 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
not prevent an abnormal increase in trade due to the
abnormal requirements of Germany.
Both in America and in some of the northern
European countries huge fortunes were amassed
during the war; it was the amassing of this wealth
that evoked the determined opposition to anything
that stood in the way of its attainment. This is not
said in disparagement of the motives for this opposi-
tion ; for such motives are common to all nations :
nor would such a suggestion have any meaning; for
if there were no neutral interests affected, there
would be no necessity for neutral opposition; and,
moreover, it is for no other purpose than the pro-
tection of neutral trade and neutral interests that
international maritime law exists. No matter what
measures might have been adopted to prevent con-
traband from reaching Germany, it was to have been
expected that they would be met with the full force
and weight of international law ; for the stoppage of
contraband was the stoppage of a goodly part of
neutral commerce. Official opposition was directed
against method : it had to be ; bvit behind it was the
thing itself— the delivery of the goods. The neutral
wished to get his goods to market ; and if a belligerent
prevented him from doing so, it would be in the
prevention itself and not in the method by which it
was brought about that the germ of objection would
lie. Such at least is our view, though H.M. Govern-
ment thought differently : —
The wording of this summary suggests that
the basis of the complaint of the United States
Government is not so much that the shipments
intercepted by the naval forces were really
intended for use in the neutral countries to
AMERICA AND MARITIME RIGHTS 59
which they were despatched, as that the despatch
of goods to the enemy countries has been frus-
trated by methods which have not been employed
by belhgerent nations in the past.^
The summary referred to is the following : —
I believe it has been conclusively shown that
the methods sought to be employed by Great
Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy
destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports
and to impose a contraband character upon such
cargoes are without justification; that the
blockade, upon which such methods are partly
founded, is ineffective, illegal and indefensible;
that the judicial procedure offered as a means
of reparation for an international injury is
inherently defective for the purpose; and that
in many cases jurisdiction is asserted in violation
of the law of nations.^
Up to this point in the debate honours may be
said to have been easy. The consummate skill with
which thrusts have been dealt and parried by both
sides must compel admiration. But the debate, like
our blockade, had its " novel and unprecedented
features." Lord Grey had brought his figures to
bear with irresistible force on the subject of America's
export trade, but America adopted the plan of
severely ignoring them, and, moreover, produced
four pages of ships, each ship with its offence, date
and place shortly recorded. H.M. Government,
who enter the lists at this stage, treat the ships much
on the lines of the American plan, but greatly
improved; for the ships are made to speak up for
1 Cd. 8234.
60 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
ourselves : and the valuable midnight oil has been
burned in vain. We were lost in amazement at the
masterly ingenuity of this stroke, for the sight of
this formidable fleet had filled us with misgivings.
But now America, who has already been badly
shaken over the Bunsby episode, receives a thrust for
which, as far as we are aware, there is no known
defence.
The paragraph quoted above shows that the
American summary had evidently been very carefully
examined by H.M. Government, who could make
neither head nor tail of it. It suffers from the bad
defect of vagueness; a weakness (very noticeable in
the American utterances) which H.M. Government are
not slow to detect. But they are disposed to show
a friendly disposition towards America : they do not
contradict, nor are they rude : they simply tell America
that they understand her complaint to be something
quite different from what America herself understands
it to be, and what, to the best of her ability, she
states it to be ; and that they are going to argue on
this understanding.
It must not be supposed that this correspondence
contains many oversights due to the haste with
which it was conducted : the present reply of H.M.
Government, 24th April, 1916, referred to an American
despatch of 5th November, 1915. In any case, even
if America had chosen to cable back a message, she
must have seen the utter futility of such a proceeding ;
and, indeed, the futility of any measure which could
possibly prevent H.M. Government from placing its
own construction upon anything America might
choose to say. America had got her neck fairly into
a noose, and had no more chance of getting it out
than she had of avoiding getting it in. In this
AMERICA AND MARITIME RIGHTS 61
diplomatic battle, as in maritime law, we searched for
" principles " : and here was one worth the finding.
Possibly this discovery may have caused America to
resign, for no further despatches are published.
Two or three facts which emerge from the American
correspondence will, it is thought, be generally
admitted. America's objections to the Reprisals
Order are, in the first place, most difficult to refute.
Her contention that our naval operations were
destroying her export trade is disproved outright by
figures ; but her implied charges against our own
trade are unfortunately only too well founded.
On this subject we invite the reader's careful
attention to what has been said in our introductory
chapter, where it will be found that maritime rights
refer exclusively to trade, and concern the rules for
its control in time of war.
Let him then approach the correspondence with
America and note this : that the stoppage of oversea
supplies to Germany {i. e. to Scandinavia and Hol-
land) was imperatively demanded by our national
safety; that it was on this ground alone that H.M.
Government debated with America to the extreme
allowable limits of diplomacy the strict rules relating
to the rights of belligerents; and that in doing so
they made the fullest acknowledgment that it was
only in the economic reduction of Germany that there
lay any hope of defeating her. Let him particularly
take note that it was not on the stoppage of American
trade only, but on that of all trade, that our national
safety depended; and that the attention of H.M.
Government is called to this significant fact by
America.
Let him put himself in America's place and, regard-
ing the origin of belligerent rights as concessions to a
62 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
belligerent at the expense of a neutral solely to
enable him to injure his enemy, he may well question
the soundness, or even the justice, of the law, which
places the belligerent under no legal obligation to
apply its principles to himself.
The question of our own trade with the Scan-
dinavian neutrals did not form the subject of debate
in the Houses of Parliament on any single occasion,
either in respect of its benefit to Germany directly
or indirectly, or with regard to its bargaining power.
Discussion focussed on the subject of others' property,
not of ours. Those who pointed to America as the
obstacle in the way of our blockade of Germany
cannot have been aware of the intense feeling of
resentment against this country that was aroused in
America by the magnitude of our trading transactions,
and that it was herein that lay the origin of America's
stubborn opposition.
American feeling generally was, we believe, strongly
sympathetic towards us and towards the Allied cause.
There was, it is true, a section of the population of
America which was pro-German; but that section
was not representative of America : its pro-German
sympathies were partly the direct outcome of the
work of German agents, who abounded in the
country; they were partly spontaneous sympathies.
The offers from important firms of American exporters
on the outbreak of war testify in a practical way to
the real regard in which we were held. A mutual
respect between Great Britain and America has
existed since the time when the United States ceased
to be a British colony : it is a respect which has
sprung from an honesty of purpose and from the
straightforward dealing which has always charac-
terised the transactions between the two countries.
AMERICA AND MARITIME RIGHTS 63
But it was with official America that we had to
deal during the war; with the America that was
neutral, not only to Great Britain and her Allies,
but to Germany and her Allies. Washington could
not identify herself with the views either of the one
or the other of the belligerents. We imagine that
in the correspondence that passed between Berlin
and Washington German views on international
maritime law are reflected in some of the protests
that reached London from Washington. It may
be taken for granted that there was no single
action of Germany's that escaped the notice
of America. America well knew what were Ger-
many's ambitions, what her methods — that they
were tainted with illegality, but that it could not be
said so by America — and what were the momentous
consequences involved in her own future were
Germany to realize her aspirations, and obtain
dominion over Europe and the waters of the Atlantic.
Her own fortunes were closely identified with the
fortunes of this country : and nothing short of
wanton disregard of her national susceptibilities or
her sovereign rights could have caused her to with-
hold in her own interests all support, moral and
material, that her neutrality would legitimately
allow. The official despatches are firm and in parts
curt in tone : but they are marked throughout on
both sides by a fine courtesy and frankness of expres-
sion, and with a punctilious regard for the traditional
amenities of diplomatic discussion, well calculated to
soften the asperities of bitter controversy : conten-
tious debate was conducted on the common ground
of friendship. The arrogant conduct of Germany
towards America is too well known to need recapitu-
lation here. Both from the German embassy at
64 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Washington and from Berlin came blunder after
blunder, both in phrase and in the exercise of the
faculty of discernment : disillusionment came to
Germany too late. America was moved neither by
veiled threat nor open taunt from her stiff attitude
of neutrality, except on one occasion, in April 1917,
which Germany has good cause to remember. We
will say this for Germany : her inordinate desire for
new enemies seemed to have amounted to a positive
passion. Having exhausted all the possibilities of
Europe, she turned her eyes westwards. The im-
portunity with which she pressed her right to a
prior claim on America's services — a claim which
was finally acknowledged — would alone, it might be
thought, have rendered abortive any similar claim
we might ourselves have preferred, had we wished
to do so. That the friendly relations between Ger-
many and America were continuously in a highly
attenuated state admits of no question : the risk of
a rupture was an ever-present reality; and the cir-
cumstances of the war did not favour the supposition
that this risk could at the same time be held to
exist in the relationship between America and Great
Britain. Such a supposition is belied by America's
own national interests, by her private interests, by
traditional friendship, and by the part that America
took later on in the war.
That America in April, 1917, took up arms against
Germany is true; but " is the noble Earl quite sure
that the U.S. would be on our side at this moment
if we had outraged her feelings at the beginning of
the war by treating her in an inconsiderate or cavalier
manner ? " ^
Thus the Marquess of Lansdowne on 4th July,
^ Parliamentary Debates, No. 58, p. 789.
AMERICA AND MARITIME RIGHTS 65
1917. Of this we cannot be sure, but had the Gordian
knot of trade been cut on the outbreak of war there
would, we submit, have been neither time, opportunity
nor above all cause for America's displeasure to
foment : for Germany's neutral neighbours could
not support themselves without the resources of the
British Empire; much less could they have rendered
assistance to Germany.
That America did not view with marked favour
our methods of conducting naval warfare we are
ready to admit after reading what she said : nor does
an analysis of the methods we employed give any
special reason for surprise that this should be so;
but that technical matters alone of international law
were the cause of friction with America, and that
America stood in the way of our stopping supplies
from reaching Germany cannot be accepted as a
correct presentment of the case. By the exercise of
maritime rights we could and we did stop a certain
proportion of Germany's supplies : with America's
good-will we could have stopped a larger proportion;
but we also held a very powerful weapon in our hands
which international law could not touch, a weapon
more potent than the fleet, though useless without
it; this was the weapon of economic advantage.
Some particulars of the traffic that clogged the
broad open neutral highway leading into German
territory during the first years of the war before full
use was made of our economic weapon, which finally
brought such disastrous results to Germany, will be
found in Part II.
PART II
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY
<<
/ hope I may he pardoned if these Discoveries inclined me
a little to abate of that profound Veneration which I am naturally
apt to pay to Persons of high Rank, who ought to be treated with
the utmost Respect due to their sublime Dignity, by us their
Inferiors.''^
Swift.
PART II
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY
CHAP. PAQB
^ I. Introductory ....... 71
II. Scandinavia : Economic and Strategic Features 75
III. Political Considerations ..... 91
IV. Coal , . . . . . . . .113
V. Danish Agricultural Produce . . . 133
VI. How Germany was supplied with Fish . .154
•VII. How Germany obtained her Explosives . . 166
VIII. Lubricants . . . . . . .180
IX. Metals 190
X. Miscellaneous Commodities .... 210
XI. Cement Traffic with Holland . . . 232
•» XII. Some Financial Transactions .... 245
* XIII. His Majesty's Government and the Blockade . 253
XIV. Final 273
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
Scandinavians were not slow to discover that the
reality of war could be faced with far greater composure
than the prospect.
Candles and other illuminants, fuel and foodstuffs,
had been hastily acquired to meet a shortage, especi-
ally in coal, anticipated from the impending naval
operations of Great Britain : but when war broke out
coal and merchandise poured into Scandinavia in
greater quantities than ever before, and the energies
of all concerned were directed to the work of handling
the cargoes that came crowding in on to the wharves
of Copenhagen, Gottenberg, Christiania and other
ports, loading them on to German trucks and receiving
payment. The slight assistance that Great Britain
was able to offer in the way of supplies of coal for
hauling the trucks to and from Germany was greatly
appreciated, particularly by the Germans.
The Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden and
Denmark, during the war were technically neutral,
and formed bases of supplies for Germany. Denmark
is in direct territorial communication with Germany,
and although Sweden is cut off from Denmark by a
narrow strip of water, communication is maintained
by train-ferry services, thus virtually completing the
direct connection between Germany and the three
Scandinavian States.
No difficulties stood in the way of the transport of
goods from Scandinavia to Germany. Local steamers
71
72 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
plied to and fro in the Baltic for many months with
immunity from risk, but the operations of British
submarines later on in the war stopped during a
short period the contraband traffic in these waters.
Having seen what powers were possessed and
acquired to prevent goods from reaching the Scan-
dinavian ports and Germany from oversea, we turn
now to other means possessed by Great Britain and the
Allies of controlling the oversea traffic to Scandinavia
and restraining the Scandinavian States from disposing
of their goods to Germany.
Scandinavia, whence Germany obtained the bulk of
her supplies, depended for her own economic and
industrial existence upon oversea importations, over
the British and Allied portions of which we had full
control, and part control over the remainder.
The chief objections to an embargo on all British
exports on the outbreak of war were the moral
obligation, under appropriate safeguards, to continue
a trading relationship with friendly States, and the
obvious advantage of trade to ourselves. But there
was also the question of expediency. Here both
economic and political considerations are involved.
An embargo on British exports might be met with
counter measures of a similar character. How would
the Allies stand if such measures were put in force by
Scandinavia ? Could they have carried on the war
with any good prospects of success ? The counter
measures raise a counter question : How would
Germany stand as to her prospects of success with
only the existing resources of Scandinavia upon which
to draw, supplemented by such others as could be
obtained from oversea in face of the determined efforts
of Great Britain to stop them ? On whose side would
the economic advantage remain in an economic
INTRODUCTORY 73
struggle between Great Britain and her Allies and
Scandinavia ? It will be seen that the advantage was
immeasurably in favour of Great Britain.
As to the political expediency of imposing an
embargo, if the resentment that would undoubtedly
have been provoked throughout the Scandinavian
States by such measures were the only evil to be
reckoned with, then we should have had to endeavour
to support the weight of Scandinavian displeasure.
But there was more. There were two main political
questions to be considered. How would the course of
the war be affected if Sweden joined our enemies or if
Germany were to occupy Denmark ?
A consideration of the possible political conse-
quences to which the adoption of drastic measures,
however lawful in themselves, might expose us, leads
to the conclusion that Germany would inevitably
have been the loser from any change of the status
quo in Scandinavia. This assumption is made in the
succeeding chapters when discussing many of the
transactions that are there recorded.
One of the chief difficulties with which H.M. Govern-
ment had to contend in their lawful control over sea-
borne goods was to distinguish between bond fide
neutral trade and trade carried on with the enemy.
The exercise of belligerent rights bore with consider-
able severity upon genuine neutral trade. Neutral
importers were glad, therefore, in exchange for the
certain and expeditious delivery of their goods, to
give guarantees that the latter should not reach or
benefit the enemy. Such agreements were made with
representative associations of merchants, and certain
classes of goods were protected by the guarantee
of neutral Governments that they should not be
re-exported. Since, however, neutral Governments
74 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
reserved to themselves the right to grant exemptions
from such prohibitions, the prohibitions themselves
were of very little value.
Examples of the abuses to which guarantees were
exposed are given particularly in the case of the
Danish traffic with Germany, which, after coal, ranks
first in importance among the commodities, British,
Allied and neutral, that have been selected to illus-
trate the effect of our trade policy and administration
during the first two and a half years of the war.
The figures for the year 1917 in the Scandinavian
statistics ^ are the best testimony to the power of our
unarmed forces after they had been placed in harness.
1 See Appendix.
CHAPTER II
SCANDINAVIA : ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC FEATURES
Denmark is an agricultural country, and many
years ago her agricultural industry was organised for
the supply of her own needs. She is one of the few
countries in Europe that can be made self-supporting.
With the growth of Great Britain's requirements
for butter, bacon, eggs and dairy produce in general
the Danish agricultural system was re-adjusted and
the land so developed as to meet Great Britain's
needs. A great industry was thus built up, based
almost entirely upon British markets. In order to
satisfy Great Britain's requirements, it was necessary,
the soil of Denmark being of an indifferent quality, to
import immense quantities of fertilisers for the soil,
and fodder and cake for the stock. In addition, the
land, which in former times had been used for growing
wheat for domestic consumption, was now used for
pasturage and for growing maize, oats and rye for
feeding cattle : it therefore became necessary to
import large quantities of foodstuffs to make up the
deficiency. Thus there was created an entirely arti-
ficial state of affairs, whereby the over-stocked land
became entirely dependent upon oversea supplies;
and the country, instead of growing its own food,
became largely dependent, especially for farinaceous
foods, upon imports from oversea. Were these
imports to have been stopped, then the land allotted
to the live-stock which the imports maintained would,
75
76 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
after the live-stock had been disposed of, be available
for growing the natural foods required by the people.
Denmark, therefore, in time of stress had nothing to
fear from threat of starvation — she could always manage
to exist. Other countries could not, and Denmark
was singularly favoured in this respect.
Of the Danish produce exported, the quantity taken
by Great Britain before the war was about 60 per cent. ;
Germany took about 25 per cent., and other countries
the remaining 15 per cent. Looking at the question
of the disposal of Denmark's produce during the war
from the broad point of view as to what was fair to
Great Britain and equally fair to Denmark, it was only
just to Denmark that her trade should not suffer from
the vicissitudes of war; it was also just from the
point of view of Great Britain and Germany that Den-
mark should not favour the one at the expense of the
other ; and, if she did so, that she should be subjected
to all lawful pressure from the country that suffered.
With regard to Denmark's trade, it never flourished
so much as during the first two years of the war.
In the matter of trade, therefore, Denmark had done
more than full justice to herself. In the matter of the
distribution of her produce, the figures 60 per cent,
and 25 per cent, for Great Britain and Germany
suffered a very rapid and significant change. The
state of affairs will best be understood from the follow-
ing table, which shows the number of tons of food lost
by England and gained by Germany from Denmark
during the years 1915, 1916 and 1917 as compared with
1913.
Lost by England Gained by Germany
1915 . . . 59,356 150,854
1916 . . . 100,654 190,781
1917 . . . 154,331 l 73,360
Total . . 314,341 414,995
SCANDINAVIA 77
It must be noted that not only was Germany favoured
in the matter of the percentage of the produce of
Denmark, but also in the matter of the absolute
quantities to which the percentage applied, and which,
during the war, were very much in excess of those
prior to the war.
Thus it came about that Great Britain, who com-
manded the avenues of approach to Scandinavia, who
possessed the largest mercantile fleet for carrying
purposes in the world, who had acquired also the
control of the greater part of the Norwegian shipping,
and whose home and colonial possessions, together with
those of her Allies, contained stocks of goods indis-
pensable to Scandinavia, should find these resources
insufficient to attain any result better than that shown
in the above table.
Denmark's fishing industry was unimportant to
Great Britain as compared -with Norway's. From
Norway we took about 50,000 tons of fish a year
before the war, whereas Denmark sent us only some
4,000 to 5,000 tons. Denmark's best customer was
Germany, who took about 25,000 tons of fish a year.
Fish constituted a very important item of food in the
restricted German diet, and as its value to Great
Britain was comparatively slight, it was an industry
that she could afford to " kill " without the fear of
bringing any evil consequences upon herself.
The lines upon which the Danish fishing industry
was conducted resembled closely those of the agricul-
tural industry. The bulk of Denmark's fish went
to Germany, Great Britain supplying the fishing
materials, which in this case corresponded to the fodder
and fertilisers that she supplied for agricultural
purposes.
Danish shipping worked mainly in Germany's
78 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
interest during the war. In 1914 Denmark possessed
a mercantile fleet of 750,000 tons gross, and although
prolonged negotiations took place to press Danish
shipping into the Allied service, they were not
successful.
The principal shipping company in Denmark was
the East Asiatic. It was this company's ships that
made the long journeys, and brought over the fodder
and fertilisers, and the oil beans from the Far East.
It is noteworthy that not one of the ships of this
company was sunk by a submarine throughout the
war. In 1916, in spite of the dangers of the sea, the
East Asiatic Company was able to pay a dividend of
30 per cent.
. Denmark's principal exports to Great Britain were
agricultural produce and a mineral known as cryolite,
which is used in the manufacture of aluminium for
Zeppelins.
During the years 1915, 1916 and 1917 about 22,000
tons of cryolite reached Denmark from Greenland,
British coal, it is almost needless to say, being used
for its transport. After being refined in Denmark — a
simple process which could have been carried out quite
well in England— the bulk of the cryolite was exported
as follows : —
ExpoET 01" Ceyolite feom Denmaek
Years 1915, 1916 and 1917
Germany 7,000 tons
France 4,200 „
England 3,700 „
In addition to the above, Sweden received a
considerable amount (the quantity is not known :
probably about 2,500 tons), the bulk of which was
undoubtedly used for the benefit of our enemies.
SCANDINAVIA 79
Very little pressure would have compelled Denmark
to forgo this traffic altogether, when the whole amount
could have been brought to England for distribution
as we thought best.
Although we were not dependent upon Denmark
for agricultural produce, Denmark was dependent
upon oversea supplies from the Allies and neutrals
for coal, cereals, fodder and fertilisers, animal and
vegetable oils and fats, petroleum for lighting and
power, fishing gear, cotton and cotton piece goods,
wool and woollen goods, copper, tin, tanning materials,
rubber, binder-twine (for harvesting) and groceries
of all sorts.
Germany sent Denmark potash manures, steel for
shipbuilding, steel rails, wheels and axles, coke, dyes,
chemicals and medicines.
SWEDEN
Sweden is a forest and mining country. Unlike
Denmark, she was not self-supporting, but depended
to a large extent upon supplies from oversea; she
obtained very little from Russia. Her chief industries
are the production of paper, cellulose and timber,
and the mining of iron ore. Her fishing industry is
much on the same scale as Denmark's : agriculture is
on a much smaller scale.
Sweden's greatest asset was her iron ore.
Ludendorff speaks of the " paramount importance "
of the iron ore from Sweden, and says, " Had England
won such a battle " (meaning a naval victory) " she
would have made it almost impossible for us to import
iron ore from Sweden and the submarine warfare could
never have assumed proportions so dangerous to
herself."
/
80 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The high-grade steel used, among many other
purposes, in the construction of submarines, came in
large quantities from Sweden. When war broke out
Germany was deprived of her supplies of Spanish and
French ores. The Spanish ores run very high in iron,
and their loss was a serious blow to Germany. This
loss was made good by the Swedish imports, which
increased at once in 1915.
Germany took from 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 tons a year
/ of iron ore from Sweden; this represents a quantity
of metal for which a far larger quantity of ore in
Germany would have had to be mined, varying with
the rates of the German to the Swedish percentage of
iron contained. Germany, to obtain the equivalent
value of Sweden's ore, would have had to employ two
or three times the number of men employed by
Sweden : hence the value of Sweden to Germany.
The haulage of the ore from the mines to the coast
was carried out to a large extent by the Swedish rail-
ways with British coal; its further transport by
steamer across the Baltic was also (certainly for the
two first years) effected by British coal.
Nothing would have hastened the end of the war
more effectively than the sinking of ships trading in
ore between Sweden and Germany in the Baltic, or
by economic pressure brought to bear on the Swedish
ore industry.
The greater the importance of any commodity to
Germany, the less importance it would be made to
assume through the subtle German propaganda
agencies, which formed one of the most insidious and
effective weapons in her armoury. This is particu-
larly well illustrated in the case of her shortage of iron
ore. When, at the beginning of 1918, negotiations
were on foot for the restriction of Swedish ore to
V
SCANDINAVIA 81
3,000,000 tons per annum, it came to the knowledge
of H.M. Government, " on good authority," that
Germany held sufficient to meet her requirements for
two years. The German refusal to entertain the
Swedish proposal under pressure from Great Britain
was on this account set down as a matter of prestige,
and the point was waived by us. I had myself also
received information to the same effect, and, it is
more than probable, from the same authority as
H.M. Government. It came from a patriotic Swede,
who was himself financially interested in the export
of iron ore to Germany, and whose business it was to
represent Germany's stock of iron ore as very large
and Swedish importations as of but little account. I
had previously formed the opposite view, a view which
was confirmed in a very unexpected and wonderful
manner a few weeks later, full particulars being sent
to H.M. Government. At that time not only was the
Swedish ore of great importance, so far as it concerned
the German steel industry, on account of the high
quality of the ore and the furnace arrangements in
Germany, but it was intimately connected with the
question of man-power, than which nothing was of
greater importance to Germany in the later stages of
the war.
In the southern part of Sweden there is an extensive
tract of land which is given up to agriculture. Although
short of foodstuffs, Sweden exported meat and other
foodstuffs to Germany, her agricultural system being
framed for the purpose of the export of butter, meat,
bacon and pork which it produced.
By suitable pressure Sweden could ha;Ve been com-
pelled to adjust her agricultural system during the
war to meet the food requirements of the country,
thus saving valuable shipping space allocated to the
o
82 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
use of imported cereals and other foodstuffs, throwing
Sweden more on her own resources and reducing the
quantity of food available for export to Germany.
The following table shows the export of food from
Sweden to the United Kingdom and Germany and
Austria during the years 1913-1917 : this table
includes cattle, fish, pork and bacon, meat, milk,
cheese, butter and eggs :—
To U.K.
To
Germany and Austria
1913 .
. 26,567 tons
37,043 tons
1914 .
. 28,526 „
56,685 „
1915 .
8,563 „
104,203 „
1916 .
115 „
90,835 „
1917 .
• • """■
16,451 „
The subject of fish is dealt with fully in Chapter VI.
Before the war the United Kingdom took some
5,000 tons of fish yearly from Sweden. In 1914 this
quantity dwindled down to 1,950 tons and then to
nothing. Germany's supplies from Sweden were as
follows : —
1913 30,000 tons
1914 43,000 „
1915 53,000 „
1916 51,000 „
In respect of Sweden's agricultural produce and
foodstuffs, which depended upon oversea imports, it is
seen that the pre-war percentages were not maintained ;
supplies to the United Kingdom virtually ceased,
whereas Germany received, not only the balance, but a
largely increased quantity of foodstuffs ; for Sweden's
total supplies to Great Britain and Germany in 1913
was (roughly) 63,000 tons, but in 1915 this total was
112,000 tons.
His Majesty's Government were advised that Sweden
was practically independent of wheat supplies from
oversea. As against this view, however, there was
SCANDINAVIA 83
very good evidence from other quarters to the
opposite effect.
When war broke out there were in the Baltic some
sixty-five AlUed vessels, mainly British, of about
150,000 tons gross. At that time the scarcity of
shipping was not felt and the necessity for clearing
this tonnage was not realized. The ships were there-
fore laid up for the time. Presently, however, ship-
ping space had become very valuable, and it was
desired to free the tonnage laid up in the Baltic.
Although the entrance to the Baltic had been mined,
there was a small passage known as the Kogrund Pass
on the S.W. coast of Sweden through which this ship-
ping could have been navigated with safety. To
prevent it from leaving the Baltic the Kogrund Pass
was mined, presumably by order of Germany, though
the point is immaterial. So pressing had become the
demand for shipping that Sweden was unable to
maintain her imports in sufficient quantity to enable
her to supply Germany's requirements ; and so urgent
had these requirements become that about 450,000 tons
of Scandinavian tonnage was engaged in bringing
supplies from America and elsewhere to Scandinavia
free from German attack.
At this time Germany was staking her chances of
victory entirely upon the depletion of shipping. She
was sinking ships at sight, whether passenger, cargo or
hospital ships : she was running imminent risk of
adding America to the number of her enemies : she
had induced Sweden to commit the almost hostile
act of mining her territorial waters, that Allied ship-
ping might not be released; no consideration, there-
fore, short of necessity would, it may be assumed,
have induced her to agree to the release of this Baltic
shipping. Nevertheless the Baltic shipping was
84 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
released in exchange for about 85,000 tons of wheat,
which just sufficed to enable the Swedish industrial
machine to struggle on and saved the State from being
compelled to accept almost any terms that the Allied
Powers cared to impose.
Mr. Dahlberg, the Swedish Minister for Agriculture,
in a public speech delivered in September, 1917,
referred to the serious position with regard to food-
stuffs, aggravated by the lack of fuel and illuminants.
He advised his audience to indulge in no illusions as
to the impending food situation. During the next
twelve months, said Mr. Dahlberg, Sweden could not
reckon on more than 50 per cent, of bread corn or
40 per cent, of fodder actually needed. If it should
prove that cereal supplies upon which the authorities
were counting were withheld, the position was such
that Sweden might regard herself as lost.
This ingenuous confession was extorted from Mr.
Dahlberg by the necessity of having to stimulate the
farmers to the production of cereals for home con-
sumption instead of other foodstuffs for German
export. It was in violent contrast to the beliefs held
by the British Minister and H.M. Government and
so carefully fostered by Sweden to buttress the
counterfeit foundations upon which they rested.
Being wrongly informed of the economic situation
of Sweden, we bribed her with food to obtain our ship-
ping. Our shipping could and should have been
released with the bare knowledge alone of Sweden's
situation : with this knowledge and with our power
there was nothing in reason in addition to the ship-
ping that could not have been extorted from the
country.
In addition to food Sweden supplied Germany with
munitions, iron ore, sawn timber, zinc, steel wire,
SCANDINAVIA 85
machinery, electric motors, and many important
metals : probably also with torpedoes and torpedo
air cylinders.
Sweden's mercantile fleet in 1914 amomited to about
1,000,000 tons gross : of this, only one or two ships
were pressed into the Allied service.
Among the most important of Sweden's require-
ments from the Allies and neutrals were : —
Coal, cereals, lubricants, petroleum, fodder and
fertilisers, cotton and woollen goods, animal and
vegetable oils and fats, copper, lead, tin, tanning
materials, bleaching powder, jute, rubber and groceries.
Germany sent Sweden potash manures, iron and
steel for building purposes, steel rails, wheels and
axles, conduit pipes (for conveying water under pres-
sure), coke, electrical machinery, dyes, chemicals and
medicines.
Sweden's principal exports to Great Britain were
timber, pit-props and wood goods, paper and wood
pulp, iron and steel (including tool steel) and ball-
bearings, ferro-silicon and butter.
Regarding the economic balance as between Great
Britain and the Allies and Sweden, Great Britain
was very favourably placed. Sweden possessed no
single commodity deprived of which Great Britain
would suffer more than inconvenience. During the
war, when the Swedish supplies of pit-props and paper
fell short, the deficiencies were made good either at
home or from the resources of the Empire or from
neutral sources. This was also the case with steel and
ball bearings. Sweden had nothing that was vital
to the Allies, whereas, in addition to coal, Great
Britain's large control over the raw materials for
agricultural purposes was a source of great power.
S6 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
NORWAY
Fish, wood and the production of cellulose and
paper are Norway's principal industries. Like Sweden,
she is a forest country, and, in the south, part of her
soil is appropriated for the purpose of agriculture
for export : hence fodder, fertilisers and cereals are
among her principal imports from oversea.
The Norwegian fish industry is one of the largest
in the world. It comprises the two separate operations
of canning and exporting as fresh, dried or canned.
The cans in which fish are packed are of tin, and the
preservative used is either olive oil or tomato pulp.
Hence tin, olive oil and tomato pulp play a very
important part in Norway's economic life, and it was
to Great Britain that Norway looked as the main
guarantor of these and other requisites for her fishing
industry. Her export trade in fish was dependent
almost entirely upon coal, with which also we supplied
her; the coal being used to boil down the fish for the
extraction of the oil. In South Georgia and South
Shetland (in the South Atlantic) are situated the bases
of the most valuable whale fisheries in the world.
These fisheries belong to Great Britain, but in nearly
all cases the fishing concessions are held by Norwegians
at our pleasure.
The Norwegians are a seafaring nation whose
interests are closely identified with those of Great
Britain. The gross tonnage of Norway's merchant
shipping in 1914 was 2,400,000 tons, or a ton per head
of population : no other nation has so relatively large
a merchant fleet. With this vast amount of tonnage
on the waters it was in the interests of Norway to
fall in with the views of the nation in command of
the seas : national interests and traditional friend-
SCANDINAVIA 87
ship — the coastal population of Norway was pro-
British almost to a man — ^^both favoured a sympathetic
attitude to British shipping policy, and H.M. Govern-
ment were successful in obtaining control of practically
the whole of the Norwegian shipping, the only notable
exception being the Norwegian-American line, which
was under Government subsidy; there was, however,
an agreement with H.M. Government with regard to
this line.
In addition to our success in the shipping policy,
two important agreements were made with Norway
respecting fish and copper, by which the supplies to
Germany were greatly restricted.
Germany benefited from Norway's foodstuffs : she
also obtained minerals on a modest scale, copper
pyrites and nickel being the most important.
Smuggling was checked, though not prevented; nor
would it have been possible entirely to defeat the ends
of the army of German agents that infested the
country.
Although our economic policy did not reach the
standard of idealism and did not, and could not,
prevent the leakage of important supplies, yet it
enabled Great Britain and the Allies to reap far greater
benefit from Norway's resources than did Germany.
From the Allies and neutrals Norway imported as
her principal items : —
Coal, cereals, fodder and fertilisers, animal and
vegetable oils and fats, petroleum, tin, fishing gear,
cotton, wool, rubber, electrolytic copper, salt and
groceries.
From Germany she took much the same as did
Sweden.
Her principal exports consisted of fish and fish oil,
timber, pit-props and wood goods, paper and wood
88 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
pulp, ferro-silicon, calcium carbide and cyanamide :
and nitrates.
The whole of Scandinavia contained but one article
of vital importance : this was the nitrates of Norway,
on the supply of which the French at one time
depended for 90 per cent, of their ammunition.
These nitrates gave Norway a very powerful economic
advantage, which, had she been sympathetic to the
German cause, would have proved an exceedingly
formidable obstacle in the way of successful
negotiations.
As in the case of Sweden and Denmark, so also did
Norway depend for her industrial existence largely
upon British coal, of which she took from 2,500,000
to 3,000,000 tons a year.
In Copenhagen the German was at home, in Stock-
holm he was not comfortable, but in Christiania he
was out of his element.
It will be conceded that the British Empire possessed
very real and very great economic advantages over
Scandinavia, and through Scandinavia over Germany.
The ideal policy was to keep all commodities of
whatever description, but particularly foodstuffs, out
of Germany. Failing this, the next best thing to do
was, if commodities had to go into Germany, to see
that as far as possible it was as component parts, and
not as finished articles, that Germany received them,
so that Germany should have to expend labour, i. e.
man-power, of which she was so short, and land in
producing the article required.
In addition to economic, Scandinavia possessed
important strategic assets in her command of the
entrance to the Baltic. The Baltic enabled Germany
SCANDINAVIA 89
to import war material and foodstuffs from Sweden,
for which the train-ferry services were inadequate.
Sea transport in the Baltic was a very present help
and relief to the congested Scandinavian and German
transport systems. The Baltic forms a water route to
Russian ports and provides a direct means of keeping
open communication with Russia : from these advan-
tages we were cut off. It is approached by three
possible channels, known as the Sound, the Great
Belt and the Little Belt. Of these, the Great Belt
forms the main channel for heavy draught vessels, and
was the only one of the three navigable to our fleet.
During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian fleet
under Admiral Rahsjastvensky, and, later, Admiral
Nebogahtoff's squadron, were not only allowed free
passage by Denmark through the Great Belt, but the
services of a Danish pilot were placed at the Russian
Admirals' disposal : in 1854 the British fleet also
passed through under Sir Charles Napier.
Denmark's first act in August, 1914, was, under pres-
sure from Germany, to mine and block this channel to all
traffic and to undertake the work of guarding it. This
act was, as far as is known, unresisted by Great Britain,
whose fleet was thus prevented from entering the Baltic.
The Little Belt is a narrow and tortuous deep-water
channel whose southern end is controlled by Germany :
for this reason it was impracticable of navigation to
Allied shipping. Its main channel and northern
approaches are within Denmark's control. Denmark,
however, who had blocked the Great Belt and closed
the Baltic to the British fleet, did not mine the
Little Belt, which was thus made a safe and magnifi-
cent channel for the exclusive use of the German
fleet. It proved to be a valuable alternative route for
German submarines.
90 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The Sound carries a depth of water sufficient for
the vessels that trade in the Baltic, but not for the
British fleet. With the Great Belt closed, it was the
only alternative route for Allied shipping. Although
Germany was prepared to block the southern
approaches to this channel, which, these approaches
being outside territorial waters, she was entitled to do,
the necessity for doing so did not arise until British
submarines penetrated into the Baltic. A very
elaborate arrangement of mines, nets and under- water
obstructions was then laid down in the deep waters of
the southern approach. The defences were guarded
by German destroyers, gunboats and other craft, all
of which were based upon Denmark, from whom
supplies on a very handsome scale were received. The
supplies, it need scarcely be said, had come, directly
or indirectly, through the British fleet.
There still remains a little gate of which Sweden
possessed the key : this is the Kogrund Pass, a
Swedish extension of the German mine-field. The
circumstances under which this gate was locked have
already been given.
The German obstructions and the Swedish mine-
fields were not closed barriers ; they were free for the
passage of ships through " gates " opened only at the
will of their guardians.
Thus the main strategic features of Denmark and
Sweden in their command of the entrance to the Baltic,
and thence to the command of the German Baltic
trade and of the Allied Baltic communications with
Russia, were already in German hands. They were
lost to us : they could therefore be disregarded as
factors having any place in the considerations govern-
ing the exercise of economic pressure.
CHAPTER III
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Lord Grey, speaking of the functions of the
Foreign Office on 26th January, 1916, said :—
What is the work the Foreign Office has to
do? The Foreign Office has to do its best to
retain the good-will of the neutrals. Now, sup-
posing you know at the Foreign Office that
the War Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry
of Munitions, and perhaps one or more of our
Allies are specially anxious that you should
maintain open communication with some par-
ticular neutral country for strategical reasons, or
for the sake of supplies which you get from them.
We are constantly being told that certain supplies
which come from abroad are absolutely essential
for the Ministry of Munitions. The Board of
Trade know that certain other supplies from
abroad are absolutely necessary to carry on the
industries of this country. The business of the
Foreign Office is to keep the diplomatic relations
such, that there is no fear of these supplies being
interfered with.^
That is one point of view, but the necessity in which
Scandinavia stood of the good-will of Great Britain
and of the produce of her Empire is overlooked. The
1 Parliamentary Debates, No. 153, p. 3131. 26th January,
1916.
91
92 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
demands of the German Minister of Munitions and
the German Board of Trade made it necessary to
Germany that the diplomatic relations of Scandinavia
should be kept open with the Power through whose
good-will only it was possible for Scandinavia to
obtain supplies and to send them to Germany. It
was surely not beyond the resources of Sheffield and
America to supply the steel ball-bearings which were
obtained from Sweden. Our own trees were felled
to supply a deficiency in the timber of Scandinavia,
and besides the fact that Denmark's food was not
necessary to us, it was only capable of being grown
by the raw materials that we allowed into Denmark
and which could as well have produced food on our
own soil.
The nitrates of Norway excepted, there was nothing
else, relatively, of importance to the Allies that
Scandinavia alone could give us.
In considering what were the possible political
consequences that would be likely to result from the
application of economic pressure, there are two
contingencies which may be ruled out of court as not
coming within the sphere of practical politics. Under
no circumstances was it ever likely that Sweden
would take sides against Germany or Norway against
the Allies : of the general Scandinavian sympathies
it may be said that Sweden was pro-German, Norway
was pro-English and Denmark was pro-Danish. The
only possibilities that have to be considered are a
German invasion of Denmark and a declaration of
war by Sweden against the Allies, together with the
possibility that in either case Norway would become
involved.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 93
DENMARK
The military assistance that could be given by any
of these States would be available only at a sacrifice
of the man-power by which their resources were
developed and became of advantage to Germany.
This question in no case arises with regard to
Denmark.
Wherein lay the possibility that Germany might
send an army of occupation into Denmark? What
would be its object ? And what the consequences ?
Denmark was Germany's larder, Sweden her work-
shop. Denmark's agricultural and fishing industries
were worked at high pressure for Germany throughout
the war : both these industries depended for their
existence upon oversea supplies. Denmark's shipping
worked mainly in Germany's interests : the whole
country, as neutral, was working at its maximum
efficiency : an occupation of the country would have
retarded production, not promoted it ; it would have
worked against the existing forces, not with them.
With an enemy in occupation of Denmark, her
territorial waters and her ports become hostile, that
is to say the whole of Denmark's imports become
subject to the confiscable penalties of blockade : her
accumulated stocks will last for some months, after
which the Danish population and the army of occupa-
tion will have to subsist on the resources of the
country, supplemented by such supplies of a very
precarious nature as can be obtained through Norway,
who, if also involved — and this must be considered —
would finally shut the door on the only remaining
possible source of supplies. Germany, bear in mind,
who was in the grip of starvation, and who was at her
wits' end to know how to stave off famine, was
94 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
receiving from Denmark about 300,000 tons of food a
year (in 1915 and 1916).
It must be pointed out that, in much the same
measure that Germany should lose, we ourselves
should gain.
Germany, besides being cut off from Denmark's
resources in food, munitions and man-power, and
having to make good the deficiencies elsewhere, would
have to draw upon her military 'personnel for the
necessary troops; she would have to lengthen her
lines of communication and supplement the Danish
diet with supplies from the scanty stocks for her own
half-starved people. It seems incredible that an
invasion of Denmark could ever have seriously been
contemplated by Germany, or that it should have been
seriously entertained as a possibility by responsible
authority : it was, however, made the pretext for
Danish requests for supplies on the ground that only
by propitiating Germany could this alleged danger
be averted. But why avert this danger? If the
danger was real and an invasion of Denmark would
bring trouble only to that country and Germany, it
would constitute the best reason for withholding
supplies from Denmark, and for turning the Danish
pretext to our own account until Denmark should
see fit to recognise our prior right over Germany to
preferential treatment in the distribution of her
agricultural produce.
If the danger was not real, surely we could do as we
wished until at least it was real.
On two grounds only could the possibility of
invasion be entertained : the threat of a landing by
the Allies on the Danish peninsula would have had to
be met : but since this contingency never arose it
may be dismissed. The other ground has some small
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 95
claim to plausibility. The immense sacrifices that an
invasion would entail would not at once be felt, and
if Germany could have been reasonably certain of
obtaining a decision before the effects of Denmark's
being cut off from her raw materials were felt, she
might have thought it worth while to seize the
existing Danish stocks. Obviously, though, unless
she were faced with certain starvation without these
additional supplies, this supposition had no special
place outside the general argument given above.
What strategic advantages were there to justify
a German occupation of Denmark ?
Denmark had closed the Baltic to Germany's
enemies and she had kept it open (by not mining the
Little Belt) to Germany herself. Reflect upon what
the use of the Little Belt meant to Germany; the
greater the pressure off Kiel or the Heligoland Bight
from mines or other causes, the greater became the
importance of the waters of the Little Belt as a means
of egress or ingress for Germany's ships, especially
submarines and destroyers, and, indeed, for her High
Sea Fleet if necessary. Denmark was already bled
of her main strategic advantages : Germany had
obtained them as a gift, and incidentally not a word
of protest appears to have been raised by us against
this flagrant breach of neutrality on the part of
Denmark. An invasion of Denmark would certainly
have strengthened Germany's hold over the approaches
to the Baltic, but at what a cost ! What Germany
obtained from Denmark she obtained and held with-
out the expenditure of a single shot or the sacrifice
of a single man. She obtained all these priceless
advantages, not by the preponderance of military
strength or the application of economic pressure, but
by the benevolent neutrality of Denmark.
96 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
As already said, the idea of invasion may be dis-
missed when Germany was receiving 300,000 tons of
food a year from Denmark. With regard to its
possibiUty at a later date, Ludendorff says : —
Only with extreme regret could we refuse to
pronounce in favour of unrestricted submarine
warfare on the ground that, in the opinion of
the Imperial Chancellor, it might possibly lead to
war with Denmark and Holland. We had not
a man to spare to protect ourselves against these
States, and even if their armies were unac-
customed to war, they were in a position to
invade Germany, and give us our death blow.
We should have been defeated before the effects,
promised by the Navy, of an unrestricted U-boat
campaign could have made themselves felt.
The discussion, however, afforded an oppor-
tunity of overhauling our defensive arrangements
on the Danish and Dutch frontiers.
Here, then, was Germany actually in fear of being
attacked by this ferocious little State, who had been
representing the extremity of her peril as a pretext
for drawing upon us for supplies with which to
conciliate a hungry and bloodthirsty neighbour.
Denmark's recent history is a sad and unfortunate
one. She has never forgiven us for bombarding
Copenhagen in 1801, nor for remaining a passive
spectator to the filching of Schlesvig-Holstein by
Germany in 1864. Hatred of Germany is ingrained
in the very soul of the Dane. There is no love lost
among any of the Scandinavian States, and the truth
about any one of them during the war was best
arrived at by searching for it outside : but the
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 97
Danish hatred of Germany was a truth to be dis-
covered best in Denmark. Since 1864 this aversion
had become very intense, and when war broke out
Denmark felt she could trust nobody, her past
experience telling her that it was to herself only she
must look for salvation unless Great Britain should
assume the role of protector, a circumstance which the
existing situation did not favour.
Denmark's population in 1914 was about 2,800,000.
Her army existed for defensive purposes only; the
rank and file are smart and well disciplined, being
under fine and efficient officers. It was said that
no Danish soldier would level his rifle against an
Englishman : whether or not this was the case, we
undoubtedly held his respect. With my personal
impressions of the Danes this book is not concerned :
this, however, I must record, that nowhere is there
to be met a greater unaffected courtesy and kindliness
of disposition than among all Danes, whatever the
class to which they may belong.
SWEDEN
There was one reason why the political consequences
that might attend the exercise of economic pressure
in the case of Sweden could not be lightly disregarded
— it was Germany's wish and Sweden's wish that they
should not be : but better reasons than this there
were none, bearing in mind always the economic
advantages we possessed and Sweden's dependence
upon oversea supplies.
Sweden was frankly pro-German (politically) : she
was Germany's protege. From her German patron
she had learned the lesson that there were two dangers
H
98 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
to be apprehended and to be guarded against in case
of war : from the East an invasion by Russia, and
from the West the seizure of a base on her west coast
by Great Britain; but Germany had also taught her
that it was to her, Germany, that Sweden would have
to look for protection in the hour of danger.
Much as Sweden liked Germany, the friendship was
of a platonic character only. It might have ripened
into a closer tie if Germany could have convinced
Sweden that she would emerge victoriously from the
war into which she herself had so callously plunged
Europe. But Sweden, although she very properly
stuck to her powerful patron throughout, was obliged
to consider the possible alternative of Germany's
being defeated ; in which case it would be to England
that she would have to look for protection. Thus,
with the future shrouded in uncertainty, it was in
Sweden's interest to remain neutral, and she had to
trim her sails to the uncertain breezes.
The political outlook with regard to Sweden was
embarrassed by Sweden's geographical position as
standing athwart the direct line of communication
with Russia. The main line through the Black Sea
had been finally cut off by the exploits of the
** Goeben " and " Breslau." There was an alterna-
tive means of communication by the lengthy trans-
Siberian railway with its terminus at Vladivostok in
the Far East; and precarious facilities were afforded
through the port of Archangel in the White Sea when
not frozen. During 1917 a military railway was
completed joining Murmansk in the Kola Gulf— the
only Northern Russian port that is not icebound
in the winter — with the Russian railway system.
Reindeer transport was largely resorted to, and the
Russian supplies were maintained on a moderate
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 99
scale in face of the almost superhuman difficulties
that were encountered in this bleak and inhospitable
region. But the Swedish was the best remaining
route.
Thus it came about that we found ourselves
enmeshed in negotiations with Germany's friendly
neighbour on the question of transit of stores to
Russia, Germany's unfriendly neighbour.
The whole question of the transit of stores through
Sweden, which was placed in the hands of a private
Company, the " Transito," was made one of the
greatest difficulty to us, though Germany encountered
no difficulties in the transit of her goods : transit to
Russia for us was allowed only when the " compensa-
tion " was deemed adequate — that broadly and fairly
states the case.
The sacrifices that were made for the Swedish
transit were enormous, though the traffic itself was
comparatively unimportant in amount and much
of it was diverted to Germany. Sweden herself
supplied Russia with munitions. To enable her to do
so, certain raw materials were allowed into Sweden
which otherwise would have been withheld : Sweden,
obtained them only on the pretext that they were
required for Russia. For instance, in Norway a firm
under French control, the Norske Hydro-Elektrisk
Co., of Notodden, produced concentrated nitric acid,
most of which went to Sweden. A certain Swedish
firm which worked in important war material for
Germany took part of the nitric acid; and when the
question was raised as to whether the acid should be
allowed into Sweden, we were informed that the firm
was supplying large quantities of materials to Russia.
This was doubtful, but it could not be disproved.
We knew for certain that Sweden was sending war
100 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
material to Germany, and we knew for certain that
Sweden said she was sending war material to Russia;
but that was as far as our knowledge went, and
it just fell short of satisfying curiosity in a slight
particular affecting the journey ings of the Russian
stores only.
I pressed for Russian statistics, that every trans-
action might be verified. Russia was our ally, and
there was every reason in the Allied interests that these
statistics should be produced; but they were not.
Of this it can be said that a certain quantity of war
material from Sweden reached Russia. I can safely
assert that a certain amount did not : it reached
Finland, whence it returned and was sent over to
Germany. So it was with the stores that we sent
in transit. The forwarding agent of the Transito
Company took receipts from the agents in Finland :
but the Finns were not very particular about their
accounts; nor were the Russians to whom they were
rendered. The rascality and all-round corruption
connected with these stores is well-nigh incredible :
I have personally met and spoken to one or two of
these Finnish agents, and am tolerably well acquainted
with the devious methods of this fraternity and the
intermediate agencies through which the goods were
diverted to Germany. Across the Gulf of Bothnia
a service of motor-boats might be seen running their
cargoes of Russian stores back to Sweden.
Mr. James W. Gerard, U.S. Ambassador at Berlin,
in his " Face to Face with Kaiserism," referring to
this traffic, says : —
Smuggling is winked at, and at Lulea, on the
Swedish coast near the head of the Gulf of
Bothnia, great quantities of rubber, block tin
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 101
and oil arrive from Russian Uleaborg across the
Gulf.
The French wanted to send a consul to Lulea,
but their request was refused, doubtless because
the Swedish authorities did not care to have any
official foreigners see this traffic.
Not only was Russia miserably armed — her soldiers
fought with sticks and fists at times — and therefore
was it necessary to supply her with military equip-
ment, but from the very first there was a strong
peace-party in the country.
Were Russia to have been cut off from supplies
through Sweden, disaffection would have been en-
couraged among the Russian troops, inclining Russia
to abandon the Allied cause and to make a separate
peace. Of the negotiations that took place for a
separate peace something is said in another chapter :
they were brought to nought by the unflinching
loyalty of his late Majesty the Czar.
The possibility that Sweden might throw in her
lot with Germany was skilfully exploited by Germany
and Sweden, and the apprehensions that were enter-
tained in the Legation and at home had their origin
in German propaganda. The air in Stockholm was
constantly charged with rumours the general purport
of which was that Sweden had her hand on her sword,
which was kept sheathed only by imports. Repre-
sentations made by the Russian Minister could not
be disregarded by the British Minister, on whom the
responsibility for the consequences would rest. If
the Russian Minister pressed for stores and munitions
to be hastened through Sweden to meet a possible
emergency, it is reasonable that Sir Esme Howard
should not have felt justified in suggesting a policy
102 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
that would delay the transit of supplies through
Sweden.
With regard to the possibility of Sweden's attacking
Russia, as already said, Germany had not reckoned
upon the entry of Great Britain into the war.
Our entry completely changed the political situation
in Scandinavia : it made Sweden and Germany
dependent upon us for supplies. Had the war been
a purely military one, and a short one, Sweden might
have employed her well-trained and well-disciplined
troops to better advantage than turning out iron ore
for Germany : they would have been a formidable
force to be reckoned with on the Russian frontier;
but to attack Russia during the Great War was to
declare war upon England.
The only other case in which Germany might have
required the use of Sweden's army was in the event
of there being declared a real and absolute blockade :
in which case adjacent neutrals would have been
useless as dumping grounds and workshops. This
contingency, however, had been provided for by
Germany in the event of a naval war by the Declaration
of London.
Sweden, let us suppose, has declared war. The first
thing that strikes us is that, if such a contingency had
arisen, we should have been sending military goods
into a country with which at any moment we might
be at war — Denmark was also a dangerous zone in this
respect. The effect of this policy was to give Sweden
the ability to conduct a campaign only by means
of the stocks thus accumulated in the country : for
British coal would be at once stopped and her in-
dustries would live only so long as the existing stocks
held out except for help from Germany. Sweden would
be cut off from all supplies under British control :
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 108
her army on a war footing would draw all the man-
power from her mines and industries : she would be
useless to Germany as a workshop : Germany would
lose the best part of 5,000,000 tons of iron ore a year
and the food with which Sweden supplied her: in
addition, she would have to feed and clothe Sweden.
Sweden has her hereditary enemy Norway to watch.
A force of (say) 100,000 men— half her army— would
have to be detached for this purpose, and a further
force would have to be despatched to the west coast,
i. e. away from the Russian frontier, to meet a possible
British descent there. The seizure of a Swedish
base would place us in a favourable position off the
Sound and give us command of the entrance to the
Baltic : it would restore to us part of the strategic
value of these waters.
With Sweden's entry into the war there must also
be considered the great probability of Norway's
entry on the side of the Allies, and of the ensuing
consequences. The magnificent harbours of Norway
would become available for the British fleet, her
territorial waters would be closed to the passage of
the German U-boats, and the command of the waters
of the Skagerrak and Kattegat would close the back
door to Kiel, making the North Sea the only available
route for German ships. The maintenance of a
Norwegian base and the protection of its lines of
communication would absorb shipping and naval
forces employed in other services : but this notwith-
standing, Norway's entry would give greatly increased
striking force to our Navy and would accentuate the
risk to all German war vessels that put to sea. With
all these hard facts and possibilities staring her in the
face it was not probable that Sweden would embark
upon a venture beset with grave risks, of dubious
104 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
advantage even if successful against Russia, but in
which failure would entail certain and irreparable
disaster.
Important as it was to the Entente Powers that
communications with Russia through Sweden should
be kept open, it was of far greater importance to
Germany and to Sweden that Sweden should remain
neutral : which she did. Outside Sweden the fantastic
rumours that were put in circulation were treated
with open derision : but they were taken very
seriously at Stockholm, where it was difficult to make
headway against the ingrained idea that Sweden
was a very bellicose nation. Rumours of an invasion
of England were frequently heard, but they were most
prevalent at a time preceding big operations on the
Western front : they kept an army at home.
By the Swedish Constitution war can be declared
only by consent of the Ricksdag (Swedish Parlia-
ment). A " neutral diplomat " — I regret this
discretion, which is unwillingly forced upon me — who
knew many members of the Ricksdag, stated that the
majority were by no means pro-German. " I can't
make out," he said to me on one occasion, "what
is the cause of the British anxiety." Indeed, outside
Stockholm nobody could.
I expressed the opinion throughout the war, and I
hold it now, that Sweden had never at any time either
the intention or the power to take up arms : to have
done so would have thrown the whole of Scandinavia
into a hopeless state of turmoil ; whereas, look where
you will, and it will be seen that, German rumours
apart, all other evidence tends to show that Germany's
policy, her intentions and her interests, from the
first to the last day of war, were to maintain the
status quo in Scandinavia, and that her only hope of
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 105
victory lay in the successful accomplishment of this
policy, which, it must be remembered, also brought
to Sweden great wealth.
Of the Swedes, the Court, the Services and the
upper classes, as well as the official and professional
classes and the Conservative party, were strongly pro-
German. Men from these classes had to a large extent
received their education and training in Germany;
they had imbibed Germ'an habits and customs,
adopted German fashions, taken Germany for their
model and become thoroughly Germanised. There
were, however, many Swedes in high positions who
loathed the German and all his works. The poorer
classes, who are very intelligent, had, on the other
hand, strong pro- Ally sympathies, sympathies which
were also shared by many of the mercantile classes
and leading men of science. The thoughts of these
were turned towards America, to which country
their brothers had emigrated to make their fortunes,
and where one day they hoped to join them. Exist-
ence under the thraldom of German government was
held in abhorrence by these, whereas the free in-
stitutions of Great Britain and America made strong
appeal to their imaginations and sympathies. Many
Swedes offered their services to us during the war.
Sweden's population in 1914 was about 5,500,000.
The Swedes are a scrupulously clean people, well set
up, with a fine carriage and the dignified air proper
to the pride of race which the Swede possesses in an
intense degree.
The Napoleonic-Potsdam air occasionally to be
encountered in the streets of Stockholm was probably
an importation from Prussia, and doubtless now has
been put aside for the time being.
106 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
NORWAY
Norway, who was our best friend, and from whom
there were no poUtical consequences to be feared,
received the worst treatment of the three Scandinavian
States at the hands of the British Government. A
suggestion has been advanced that if Norway had
thrown in her lot with us Sweden would have given
passage to German troops through her territory.
Even if Germany had possessed the troops to spare
for such a purpose, nothing was more improbable than
that the high-spirited Swedes, whose affection for
Germany was really nothing stronger than a political
preference, would for a moment have tolerated a
German soldier on the soil of Sweden. Norway is
Sweden's hereditary enemy; in no circumstances
would these two countries be found fighting side by
side ; and the political consequences of any disturb-
ance of the status quo in Scandinavia that should
embroil Norway could not but have been favourable
to the Allies. There is little else to the purpose to
be said on this subject. It was the opinion of staff
officers in Norway that Sweden would take up arms
with the object only of attacking Norway, who in
1905 threw off the Swedish yoke and became an
independent sovereign State, for which Sweden has
never forgiven her.
Towards the latter end of the war Norway mined
her territorial waters, thus completing that stupendous
operation, chiefly the work of America, of laying down
a mine barrier across the North Sea.
Norway's population in 1914 was about 2,400,000.
The bulk of the people were strongly attached to the
Allied cause, about 70 per cent, of the Norwegians
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 107
and the whole of the fishing community being
pro-British.
Norway's small navy is smart, efficient and well
disciplined : her army, however, cannot be regarded
as a reliable instrument of war.
Norway was the only country in which we succeeded
in establishing Consuls. In Sweden there were diffi-
culties, which, however, might easily have been
overcome.
One of the first matters that engaged my attention
on the outbreak of war was the appointment of Consuls
or Consular Agents of British nationality to the
principal ports of Scandinavia. With the suppression
of the Scandinavian statistics the services of Consular
Agents became a matter of national importance ; and,
moreover, with the progress of the war and the growth
of an abnormal trade relationship between Great
Britain and Scandinavia, as between belligerent and
neutral, the necessary work of supervision that our
interests required became far too great for the
Legations to cope with. In the early part of 1915 I
wrote home, pointing out the desirability of having
a Consul or Vice-Consul de carriere at every port of
importance. With regard to Sweden, a Consul-
General was subsequently appointed to Gottenberg,
and a British Consul to Malmo, but already at Gotten-
berg there was established a fairly efficient Consulate,
and our interests were well represented at Malmo.
These appointments, therefore, brought about very
little change, and no reliable information about trade
could be obtained in Sweden throughout the war.
108 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Having made a cursory review of the assets,
economic, strategic, political and diplomatic, we can
now assemble our arguments and take stock.
Economic are with us, political are with us, strategic
are against us, but the two former still stand to our
good, having been considered with the accepted loss
of the strategic assets. Diplomacy must regretfully
be placed to the debit side of the account.
Norway's nitrates, by a great piece of good fortune,
did not chance to be in Sweden, or nothing could then
have saved us under the diplomatic treatment to
which assuredly they would have been subjected.
Ludendorff ranges himself on our side in these
arguments, but, above all, subsequent facts give the
coup de grace to the supposition that any obstacle ever
stood in the way of applying all economic pressure at
our command with any risk except to our enemies.
For when America had entered the arena and the
Scandinavian States were cut off from all supplies
that were not necessary to them, nothing happened to
disturb the status quo in Scandinavia : it was, indeed,
made the more stable ; for nothing further was heard
either of Swedish threats or of the German invasion
of Denmark. Nor was it America's entry that gave
us the power to cut off supplies; for our power
to say " Yea " or " Nay " had long before been
demonstrated, notably in the case of the wheat that
had reached SAveden only at our pleasure, and of the
petroleum that was cut off from Denmark (see Chapter
VI). America may have put us on a certain allowance
of maritime rights — not by any means an ungenerous
one — but she never put any obstacle in the way of our
stopping our own produce from reaching Scandinavia.
When war broke out Scandinavians and the British
and foreign Legations began to take in supplies :
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 109
there was every reason to think that Scandinavia in
all seriousness expected trouble from us. Such little
assets as she possessed she naturally turned to the
best account. Denmark was insinuating, Sweden
blustering, both scheming : but these States were not
made to prove what they should say until necessity
compelled it. In Sweden's case the political situation
was to some extent complicated by the Russian transit,
and at least there was a military question to be
considered ; but in Denmark's there was none.
With Germany in occupation of Denmark, and with
Sweden allied to Germany, we should have suffered
certain economic losses, but only temporarily : the
Danish and Swedish coasts being hostile territory,
Germany would have been permanently cut oif from
all outside sources of supply and her days would have
been numbered.
To Sweden's threat to join Germany the proper
reply was " Join."
To Germany's threat to invade Denmark the proper
reply was " Invade."
There is no action that can be placed to the credit
of these two neutral States entitling them to con-
siderate treatment at the hands of the Allies. The
suppression of the Scandinavian statistics, the out-
come of the Malmo meeting, was a well-directed blow
at the Allies calculated to keep them in ignorance
of the Scandinavian traffic with Germany.
Malmo is a port on the west coast of Sweden where
towards the end of 1914, at Sweden's suggestion, but
at Germany's instigation, the three Scandinavian
Kings with their Ministers for Foreign Affairs met in
secret conclave. Norway's part was purely formal.
Germany had made very efficient arrangements
before the war for the regular delivery of goods from
110 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
oversea, and her most sanguine expectations had
probably been more than reaHzed. It was necessary
that knowledge of the Scandinavian traffic with
Germany should be withheld. With characteristic
German thoroughness the Malmo meeting was con-
vened and a bolt from the blue was shot. The edict
went forth that no further Scandinavian statistics
were to be published during the war. This order
enabled Scandinavia to conduct her trade behind
a screen, and emphasised the importance that
Germany, Sweden and Denmark attached to the
necessity for concealment.
The Malmo decision was in order: there was no
breach of neutrality committed : it told us merely
what was the character of the neutrality of Sweden
and Denmark.
Many readers will recall with horror the stranding
of one of our submarines on an outlying shoal off
Copenhagen, and how fifteen of her crew were killed
by fire from a German destroyer either on Danish
soil or while swimming helplessly about in the water.
The survivors were interned by the Danish Govern-
ment in fear of Germany; the British Government
failed to obtain their release, although this cowardly
and shocking outrage was in flagrant violation of
international law. By the Danes themselves it was
regarded as an indelible disgrace to their flag.
The case of the Swedish cipher messages, which
brought Sweden to the verge of a rupture with America,
will also be fresh in many readers' memories.
During the war it was discovered — it is said by
America — that the Swedish Minister at Buenos Aires
had received in cipher from the German Charge
d'Affaires, Count Luxberg, messages which were
forwarded by the Swedish Minister to the Foreign
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 111
Office in the guise of official Swedish messages. From
Stockholm they were sent under similar false guise to
Berlin. Through the good offices of Sweden messages
were transmitted from Berlin to the German repre-
sentative at Buenos Aires and communications through
Swedish official agency were established with most
parts of the world.
An extract from one of these messages runs as
follows : —
I beg that the small steamers " Oran " and
" Guazo "... which are now nearing Bordeaux,
with a view to changing flags, may be spared if
possible, or else sunk without a trace being left
(spurlos versenkt). — Luxberg.
In another message the amiable Count recommends,
as regards Argentine steamers, either compelling
them to turn back, sinking them without leaving any
trace or letting them through.
It was in the highest degree probable that the
Swedish Foreign Office knew that these messages
referred to submarine piratical operations against the
Allied naval and mercantile forces, which Germany
was doing her utmost to destroy. It appears, how-
ever, that this practice had been going on since the
early days of the war, that it was known to H.M.
Government and that formal promises had been
obtained from Sweden to discontinue it. The affair
expended itself on paper. It led to the removal of
the Head of the Swedish Foreign Office, who, however,
was shortly afterwards appointed as Minister at
Vienna, one of the most coveted posts in the Swedish
Diplomatic Service. It is only fair to say that among
Swedes this affair of the cipher messages was universally
reprobated.
112 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The foregoing incidents are placed on record for
the purpose, not of perpetuating their memory for
all time, but only that they may be recalled when
the emotions are apt to be too strongly stirred by
allusions to the pitiable lot of the " weaker " States.
CHAPTER IV
COAL
In addition to supremacy at sea we held the next
greatest and most effective weapon for use in war
time in our hands — coal-power.
Scandinavia has no coal. Prior to August, 1914,
the Scandinavian countries imported annually about
10,000,000 tons of coal, practically all of which came
from the United Kingdom. The following figures for
1913, which was a normal year in the Scandinavian
coal trade, will illustrate the exact position : —
Total imports .... 10,308,238 tons
of which 9,813,389 were from the United Kingdom
and 354,917 from Germany.
Very early in the war Germany began to suffer
from a shortage of coal. Anticipating a short war,
she had accumulated large surface stocks from which
it was her intention to have covered her increased
war requirements; and, based upon this considera-
tion, many men engaged in the coal trade, both on
the surface and below, were sent to join the colours.
But the war on the two fronts entailed such an
enormous and unforeseen strain upon Germany that
her estimated war requirements in respect both of
coal and men were soon found to be inadequate, and
German coal exports to Scandinavia decreased both
in quantity and quality soon after the commence-
ment of hostilities.
I 113
114 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The shortage of coal in Germany soon became a
question of extreme gravity. Italy was making
insistent demands for German coal in return for
sulphur and other commodities of great war value.
Moreover, it was necessary for Germany, in order to
conserve her gold, and thereby prevent an adverse
exchange, to export as much as possible to the Scandi-
navian countries in return for their imports of food,
iron ore and other commodities. But the most
serious aspect of the case was that, as the war pro-
gressed, certain firms in Scandinavia on account of
their dealings with Germany were placed on our Black
List ; ^ they were thus unable to obtain British coal.
It became obvious therefore to Germany, that as
time went on it would be absolutely necessary to make
good the deficiencies caused by the withdrawal of
British stocks.
When matters were rapidly approaching a crisis
Germany found partial relief in Belgium. In pre-war
times Belgium produced about 23,000,000 tons of coal
per annum, and since none of the mines had been
destroyed or even damaged, the normal production
of Belgian coal depended only upon the reorganisation
of Belgian labour. This work was carried out by
the Germans very thoroughly, and by the end of
1915 the production of coal in Belgium was not far
short of the pre-war output.
In this way Germany was able to extricate herself
from a very difficult situation, and in September,
1915, cargoes of Belgian coal began to reach Scandi-
navia. That the Scandinavians were aware of the
fact that the coal they were importing came from
Belgium admits of no doubt. Indeed, with the view
of putting a stop to the traffic, Scandinavian officials
^ The Statutory Black List was a sort of commercial " Coventry."
COAL 115
were warned on several occasions that on the return
of the Belgian Government to Brussels they might
possibly be compelled to compensate the rightful
owners.^
As will be seen from the following figures, the
amount sent to Scandinavia gradually increased until
1916, when, on account of the increasing shortage
in Germany due to loss of man -power, it decreased.
Without doubt Germany made every effort to
supply Scandinavia — especially Sweden and Denmark
— with as much coal as possible ; yet, in spite of all
the advantages to be gained by exporting coal, the
Germans were able to make only the following contri-
butions, nearly the whole of which came from Belgium,
towards Scandinavia's annual requirements of over
10,000,000 tons :—
1915 1916 1917
Coal .... 1,200,000 2,920,000 1,480,000
Coal briquettes . . 240,590 885,781 300,827
The figures for Belgian coal, which do not include
any by-products such as coke and briquettes, are as
follows : —
1915 1916 1917
881,425 2,617,885 1,129,682
These figures, however, convey but little meaning
because the value of coal for industrial and commercial
purposes depends altogether upon its quality.
Reports are almost unanimous in stigmatising the
Belgian coal that Germany sent to Scandinavia as
little better than worthless rubbish for steam-raising
purposes unless mixed with British : to use it at all
furnaces had to be altered. Consumers complained
that it could not be used in steamers, locomotives
1 See Chapter on Finance, pp. 246, 247.
116 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
or manufactories ; in some cases ships that had bunk-
ered with Belgian coal and put to sea had to return
for British.
Up to the spring of 1916 no coal expert had been
sent to Scandinavia, and, pending his appointment,
I endeavoured to carry out the necessary work myself.
Without the help of powerful Scandinavian friends
of strong British sympathies, this would have been
impossible. Special and excellent sources of informa-
tion were available to me, and most of the reports
that I sent home on the subject of coal have since
been confirmed by the evidence of German writers.
The following extract from the Aberdeen Journal
by a curious coincidence came under my notice when
the above paragraph was being written. It bears out
the substance of my reports. The vessels referred to
had gone to Belgium during the great coal strike in
1921 :—
ABERDEEN FISHING
FOREIGN COAL USELESS FOR STEAM-RAISING
The local vessels which went across recently
to Belgium for bunker coal are not likely to
repeat the experiment. The stuff with which
they were supplied, at a cost of £2 18,9. per ton,
was found to be absolutely useless for steam-
raising purposes, and went up the funnel at an
alarming rate.
The " P. Fauum " (Messrs. Stroud and Connon)
had her bunkers filled at Ghent some days ago,
and intended making a trip to Iceland before
returning, but, finding that four miles an hour
was the speed limit, she had to return to port
without having commenced fishing operations.
It took the vessel two days to make the voyage
home.
COAL 117
German coal may be classed roughly as West-
phalian and Silesian. Westphalian is good coal though
inferior to Welsh : with the exception of a few cargoes
its export ceased entirely during the war, Scandinavia
being supplied with Silesian and Belgian coal only,
and of the worst quality. The calorific value of this
coal according to expert reports was about 50 per
cent, of the normal value of English " smalls " ; it
was possible to burn it only when mixed with British
coal in the proportion of three parts British to one
part German. Many cargoes were said to contain
a large percentage of earth, and in most cases they
were 10 per cent, short in weight.
In addition to coal Germany sent Scandinavia
briquettes. These were of bad quality, but, unlike
the Belgian coal, they could, though of low calorific
value, be made to burn alone : of all the fuel exported
by Germany the briquettes were the best of a bad lot.
The other source of coal, America, was inaccessible
to Scandinavia on account of distance, freights and
scarcity of shipping : either British or German
(including Belgian) coal had to be taken.
Frequent reference is made by General Ludendorff
in his " Memoirs " to the importance of exporting
coal to neutrals. It may therefore be assumed that
the quantity of coal obtained by Scandinavia from
German sources was the maximum.
Up to the year 1914 the Scandinavian countries
had been accustomed exclusively to use British coal,
which is by far the best in Europe.
The boilers in all classes of their men-of-war were
designed for burning Welsh coal, their railway loco-
motive boilers for English coal, and in the large
industrial works — for instance, the majority of the
pulp and paper mills— the furnaces were arranged
for English " smalls " (called in the trade " D.C.B.,"
118 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Yorkshire Slack, Newcastle Prime and Broomhill
Smalls). Moreover, many large works in Scandinavia
had installed patent mechanical stokers, which neces-
sitated the use of small coal for which the furnace
arrangements were designed. There was hardly an
industry, large or small, in the three countries that
was not entirely dependent upon coal, and, what is
more important, upon British coal. The following
is a list of some of the consumers in Denmark, an
agricultural country, who were dependent upon British
coal : State railways, gas works, electrical light and
power stations, manufacturers of food such as lard,
dairy produce, meat and fish conserves, breweries and
oil mills. It is from the gas and electrical power
stations that manufacturers of meat and fish preserves
and tinsmiths engaged in preparing the tins for con-
veying the food abroad chiefly obtained heat and power.
Indeed the economic life of Denmark depended almost
entirely upon British coal.
Without discussing the situation in Norway and
Sweden in detail, it may be stated that these countries
in spite of water-power were perhaps even more
dependent than Denmark upon British coal.
Great as was our power within these three countries
it can hardly have been exceeded by the power we
could bring to bear from without by withholding
British coal from Scandinavian ships throughout the
world. If properly applied no Scandinavian ship-
owner could withstand bunker pressure. The bigger
the shipping company the more vulnerable it became.
In coal, therefore, we had a fine, efficient and up-to-
date weapon : not for any arbitrary and indiscriminate
use against friendly, or rather be it said non-belliger-
ent, States, but for lawful use against our enemies
and for self-preservation.
COAL 119
There can be no doubt whatever that Scandinavians,
who expressed their opinions quite openly, expected
British coal supplies to be cut off abruptly, or at least
to be issued only under strict conditions and in limited
quantities. They were well aware that complete
industrial and military disorganisation would rapidly
ensue from the adoption of any drastic coal measures.
Yet scarcely any use outside bunker pressure was
made by us of this incomparable asset. It is true that
as the war progressed coal pressure was gradually
brought to bear; but with the progress of the war
knowledge and experience combined with good organ-
isation helped our enemies to overcome obstacles
which in its early stages would have been insurmount-
able. It was in the very first days that the curtail-
ment of coal supplies would have had its most deadly
effect. Circumstances were favourable. The great
strikes in England had caused prices to rise, merchants
and consumers were waiting for a drop, and stocks
in Scandinavia had fallen below the normal. These
stocks rapidly regained bulk. British coal poured in
freely, Sweden alone obtaining in September, 1914,
633,000 tons — a seventh of her whole yearly require-
ments— although H.M. Government appeared to ex-
pect that she would join Germany. The amounts
obtained by the three States in the last four months
of 1914 were all above the average, Sweden's supply
exceeding that for any period of four months in the
past.
Coal was supplied without there being imposed any
restrictions on its use; the trade in coal continued as)
in peace time. Moreover, soon after the outbreak of
war, Scandinavian ships, using British bunkers, com-
menced to pour goods into Germany via Scandinavian
ports. These goods came from all parts of the world.
120 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
For instance, a ship bringing cotton to Sweden from
America bunkered with British coal before leaving
Scandinavia, and returned for the next cargo with the
least possible delay. As a Norwegian shipowner said
to me, " This is a splendid game, in fact the finest I've
ever played. I can almost pay for a new ship every
trip across the Atlantic."
It is impossible to overestimate the loss of power
and prestige which this policy entailed, especially
when it is remembered that these countries expected
nothing.
After the war had been in progress for three or four
months rumours were heard that, in the event of coal
supplies from England failing, Scandinavia would be
able to cover her requirements from Germany. These
rumours, which originated in most cases in Sweden,
were difficult to refute, the more so because they re-
ceived credence at the British Legation in Stockholm.
In the early part of 1915, seeing the trend that events
were taking, and feeling certain that these rumours
were put in circulation by Germany in order to prevent
Scandinavians from forming the impression that so
far as coal was concerned they were completely
in our power, I took up the coal question in earnest.
Evidence had to be collected from various places
in Germany — from the German Press, Swedish coal
importers and consumers, captains of ships visiting
German ports, and in short from every source avail-
able. The information obtained from all these sources
was embodied in a series of exhaustive reports, which
commenced in March, 1915, and continued well on into
1917.
The evidence collected confirmed fully what has
already been said with regard to German coal — its
wretched quality, its short weight and the insuperable
COAL 121
difficulties of transport and man-power experienced
by Germany in providing even such meagre supplies
as were possible.
This evidence was not accepted by H.M. Govern-
ment, who continued to supply Scandinavia with coal
in strict accordance with the directions contained in
German rumours.
Early in 1915 steps were taken by the British Lega-
tion in Christiania to control the use of British coal
in Norway in order that ships trading to German
ports should not use it, and that firms working for
the enemy should not be able to obtain it. Once
started, the organisation for this control was gradually
perfected until at the end of the year it was almost
impossible for a ton of coal to escape the vigilance
of the Legation. One of the most astute commercial
men in Norway, and probably Norway's largest fish
exporter, who had been engaged exclusively from the
outbreak of war up to about August, 1916, in supplying
Germany with fish, had on that account, in the early
days of coal control, been placed on the Black List,
where he remained until August, 1916. He then left
the German camp and, coming over to our side,
rendered us great services in connection with the
purchase of Norwegian fish. Some time after his
removal from the Black List he stated to a British
Foreign Office official, w^io had come to Norway in
connection with the Norwegian Fish Agreement,
that in spite of his being on the Black List, with the
exception of coal he had been able to obtain all the
commodities he desired. Coal he had never been
able to obtain.
As a result of the efficient control of British coal in
Norway several important factories and workshops,
which formerly exported part of their output to
122 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Germany, ceased to do so, and a considerable amount
of shipping was therefore diverted from German to
British trade. At the same time the relations between
the British Legation and the coal importers were
excellent. The Legation drew up lists, which were
kept corrected up to date, of reliable coal merchants
and firms importing for their own use. The Licensing
Authorities in England had only to adhere to those
lists in order to safeguard British interests. Unfor-
tunately, much of the work of the Legation was at
times rendered useless owing to the fact that licences
were granted — some freely — to coal importers on the
Black List and other firms not on the list of consignees
compiled by the Legation.
The success of the coal control in Norway was due
in large measure to the fact that from the very
beginning it was made quite clear to the Norwegian
importers that transactions with German coal mer-
chants would debar them from receiving British aid.
Success was also due to the fact that the control was
entirely in the hands of the British Legation.
The total amount of coal from German sources
exported to Norway from the beginning of the war
up to the end of 1917 was only about 160,000 tons,
the greater part of which went to one shipowner who
ran a line of four or five ships between Norway and
Germany.
Although Swedish industries were in the main work-
ing for Germany, yet no attempt to establish control
of coal in Sweden was made until the end of 1915.
Sweden's intractable attitude had decided H.M.
Government in June, 1915, to send a mission to Stock-
holm for negotiating certain commercial agreements.
The very presence of this English mission in Stock-
holm after the many affronts we had received from
COAL 123
Sweden showed clearly— and this was quick to be
noticed in other neutral countries— the success of the
Swedish high-handed policy. Soon after the arrival
of the Mission in Stockholm rumours were circulated
to the effect that Germany had promised Sweden
600,000 tons of coal : later the Swedish Government
announced that arrangements had been made with
Germany whereby Sweden would receive coal from
Germany to the amount of 400,000 tons per month
and that it was possible that this supply might com-
mence in August. Had this been true it would have
meant that Sweden could have covered her whole
annual requirements independently of England.
Again I instituted exhaustive inquiries. All the
evidence collected went to show that these German
promises were hollow and made for the purpose of
strengthening the position of Sweden, and therefore
of Germany, at the conference table. The result of
these German promises and Swedish threats was
that H.M. Government lost faith in the power of
British coal to wring concessions from Sweden. In
1915 Sweden got considerably less, it is true, than her
normal quantity, but the one million tons of coal and
the quarter of a million tons of briquettes which she
received from Germany in that year just enabled the
British coal to be eked out. These half measures
had enabled Swedish consumers gradually to adapt
their furnaces to the use of the mixed German and
British coal; they had driven them also to the adop-
tion of other expedients such as the burning of wood
and the economising of coal where possible : thus
the benefit of prompt application of coal pressure
was lost.
During 1916 an endeavour was made to establish
some sort of control in Sweden, but the control never
124 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
became effective. The absence of British Consuls of
British nationaUty on the Swedish coasts made it
impossible to ascertain to what extent British coal
was being made use of in Swedish ports for bunkering
purposes.
During the period when Sweden was supplied with
these millions of tons of British coal the official view
prevailed that she might at any moment have joined
Germany.
About the beginning of 1916 a foreign expert in
coal, after making a tour of Sweden, stated that : —
but for supplies having reached Sweden from
England during the last six months the situation,
now difficult, would have been desperate. Yet
little apprehension as regards the future existed,
as quite piteous appeals to ship pit-props had been
received from England, and the coal importers
expected to be able to get much more favourable
terms in exchanging props for coals than hitherto.
Towards the end of 1916 it became apparent that
the principal exports from Germany, including coal,
were rapidly decreasing. It was no secret in Scandi-
navia that these reduced exports were due to lack
of man-power in Germany. During 1917 German
supplies became scantier : the total export of coal
from Germany to Sweden in that year amounted to
600,000 tons, and 300,000 tons of briquettes, in each
case almost exactly one-third of the amounts exported
in 1916. Obviously pretence could then no longer
avail, and, although undeserved, another opportunity
occurred for England to compel obedience from Sweden
to her wishes. T.Our coal controlled the transport of
Sweden's valuable iron ore, yet it was not until the
spring of 1918 that any serious attempt was made
COAL 125
to compel Sweden to reduce her exports to Germany.
Our efforts were unsuccessful, and Germany received
all she required to the end of the war through the
prodigal supplies of coal from her foolish and gullible
enemy.
" I found it very difficult," says Ludendorff, " in
May and June, 1917, when we were under the influence
of the great Entente offensive in the West and the
extraordinary high rate of wastage it involved, to
weaken the army further by releasing 50,000 workmen
at the request of the Coal Controller. . . . The army
never recovered the men thus released, and labour
output even fell off considerably. That was, of course,
a heavy blow to us."
On 4th July, 1917, in the course of a speech on the
blockade in the House of Lords, Lord Milner said
(in all good faith) : —
n
At the same time it must be remembered that
Germany has means of pressure, too. To give
only one instance, the industries of some of the
neutral countries adjacent to Germany are almost
entirely dependent upon coal supplies from Ger-
many for their continued activity. Germany is
able to furnish them with coal at very much more
favourable rates than they can get it from this
country, and in that and in other respects
Germany is just as well able to bring pressure
to bear on them to induce them to send their
goods into Germany as we are to bring pressure
to bear on them to try and prevent their sending
those goods into Germany.^
While Lord Milner was making this speech the
1 Parliamentary Debates, No. 53, p. 784, 4th July, 1916.
126 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Swedish Government informed H.M. Government
that she would hke to obtain from the United Kingdom
100,000 tons of coal a month, freight being £15 to £20
per ton.
In Denmark the control of British coal was
placed in the hands of the Danes.
About June, 1915, H.M. Government sanctioned
the establishment in Copenhagen of what was known
as the " Coal Bureau." To the formation of this
bureau, which was composed of Danes, I was strongly
opposed. In the first place the bureau was extremely
popular in Denmark : that in itself was a very bad
sign. The popularity was due entirely to the fact
that it was free from British supervision. But its
most objectionable feature appeared to be that
responsibility for observing conditions of sale was
shared to a certain extent by both the bureau and the
merchant, who would therefore have a mutual interest
in preventing irregularities from coming to our know-
ledge. During the first four months of its existence
not one firm had been denounced by the bureau
for not complying with conditions of sale : in Norway
there had been several.
A great effort was made to establish a coal bureau
in Norway on the same lines as the Danish bureau.
Investigation brought it to our knowledge that the
moving spirits in this project were black-listed firms
and two prominent pro-German Norwegians, one of
whom was heard to remark, with a sad appreciation
of its Utopian character, what an impetus such an
arrangement would give to their trade with Germany.
In August, 1916, i. e. two years after the opening of
hostilities and fourteen months after the establish-
ment of the Coal Bureau in Copenhagen, a British
Consul was sent out from England to make investiga-
COAL 127
tions. In addition to the universal use to which our
coal was put in furtherance of the Danish trade with
Germany, the Consul reported that the evasion of
guarantees under which coal was supplied was looked
upon as " good sport," and that the breaking of a
bond was justified by profits made out of Germany.
^Consumers could purchase as much British coal as
they cared to pay for, and were under no obligation
not to use it for any purpose that might be to the
advantage of the enemies of the Allies.
The above, be it again said, is from a report made
two years after the outbreak of war.
With Denmark there was only one question to be
considered : Was she supplying Great Britain with
agricultural produce in appropriate quantity? If
not, there was a practical reply without even a risk.
The results achieved by the Coal Bureau in
Copenhagen ^may be seen from the following tables : —
British coal received by Denmark (in tons).
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
3,034,240 3,059,162 3,130,642 2,305,409 856,037
Danish food (in tons) received by
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
United Kingdom . 256,754 277,579 197,398 156,100 102,423
Germany and Austria 123,547 134,105 274,401 314,328 196,907
The lavish supplies of British coal to Denmark
became so notorious as greatly to increase the diffi-
culties of exercising coal pressure in Norway. Nor-
wegian shipowners and other coal consumers in Nor-
way, while admitting that we were within our rights
in looking after our own interests, bitterly resented
our action in exerting coal pressure only against
themselves.
Throughout the war, and particularly during the
128 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
first two years, large numbers of German railway
trucks were to be seen in all three countries. These
trucks were hauled to and from Germany with British
coal. According to various newspaper reports the
State railways were handling so much traffic to and
from Germany that local requirements had frequently
to be neglected. Not only were we actively assisting
German trade in Scandinavia, but we were performing
valuable transport service for the enemy and supply-
ing him with the British man-power employed to
win this coal from the mines, transport it to the coast,
and thence across the North Sea at a time when ship-
ping was scarce and had never possessed greater
value.
Gas coal, of which we have almost a monopoly in
Europe, was also supplied to Scandinavia during the
war in very large quantities. The problem that here
presented itself was how to control the gas and the
by-products. Very little could be done with the gas,
though a limited control was partly established in
Norway.
Of the by-products only the liquid ones, tar and
ammoniacal liquor, were of military importance, both
being used for the production of high explosives :
the latter is also used as a fertiliser.
In December, 1915, I suggested that these by-
products should, as a condition for obtaining gas coal,
be held at our disposal. This proposal bore no fruit
until March, 1917 : until then our enemies obtained
most of the benefit from the by-products.
A limited control over tar was established by ob-
taining Government prohibition of its export. The
disposal of ammonia was by far the more important
question, being intimately connected with the ex-
plosive supplies of France and England.
COAL 129
In Norway there is a large works, the Norsk Hydro
Co., which obtains nitrogen from the air. This
company during the war was mider French direction,
and almost the whole of the output of nitrate of lime
and nitrate of ammonia — both very valuable ingredi-
ents for high explosives — went to Great Britain and
her Allies. At one time the French were dependent
upon the Norsk Hydro Co. for 90 per cent, of
their explosives. In order to produce the large
quantities of nitrate of ammonia, the Norsk Hydro
Co. required a very large quantity of ammonia.
They obtained the greater part of this ammonia from
cyanamide and the balance direct from England in
the form both of ammoniacal liquor and sulphate of
ammonia.
The cyanamide was produced in Norway by an
English company, the whole of whose output, with the
exception of what was sent to the Norsk Hydro Co.,
was sent to England, where it was urgently required
for the production of ammonia.
In England ammonia is produced almost entirely
from coal in gas works. As the war progressed and
coal miners were sent to join the colours the supply
of ammonia and coal-tar produce became more and
more difficult, until finally the Controller of Coal
Mines issued an appeal to the gas industry with a
view to increasing production.
Since Great Britain was supplying large quantities
of gas coal, which could not be obtained elsewhere,
to the gas works in Scandinavia, and since all gas
works of any size produce ammoniacal liquor, it was
clearly in our interests that all the ammonia recovered
in Scandinavia, or a large part of it, should be sent to
the Norsk Hydro Co. in order to take the place of the
English supplies. No steps, however, were taken
130 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
in this matter until 1917, when, the export of gas
coal from England to Scandinavia having fallen by
550,000 tons, the question was no longer of great
importance.
In the meantime, during the years 1915 and 1916
only about 700 tons of ammoniacal liquor, out of a
total production in Scandinavia of 18,000 tons,
reached the Norsk Hydro Co. The whole of this
700 tons came from Norway. All the remainder was
sold as in peace time, the great bulk of which was used
in the form of sulphate of ammonia by Danish
agriculturists.
The position may roughly be summed up by quoting
an extract from a letter which I wrote to Sir Ralph
Paget, H.M. Minister at Copenhagen : —
It seems to me that when we are so hard pressed
these valuable by-products should, in return for
our coal, be placed at our disposal in order to
help us to kill Germans, instead of being used
by neutrals as a fertiliser for producing, amongst
other things, grease for our enemies from which
they obtain glycerine for their explosives in order
that they may kill Englishmen.
The total amount of British coal exported to
Scandinavia, from the outbreak of war up to the end
of the year 1917, was 21,632,180 tons.
The total amount of German and Belgian coal
and coal briquettes exported to Scandinavia during
the same period was 7,196,208 tons.
In addition to the above, Scandinavia, during the
same period, obtained from England 1,317,000 tons
of coke, and from German sources 14,149,603 tons
of coke.
A few words about coke.
COAL 131
Certain sorts of coke are used in blast furnaces for
melting iron and steel, but, with this exception, it
is of no use for industrial purposes and cannot take
the place of coal for steam raising in any of the great
industries. Its chief use is for household purposes,
especially in connection with central heating.
Out of the 14,000,000 tons of coke that Germany
sent to Scandinavia, 10,840,000 tons went to Denmark
during the years 1915, 1916 and 1917. This is a very
large amount, and therefore needs some explanation.
Throughout the war the German Government was
haunted by the fear of food shortage. Denmark and
Holland were the principal adjacent food-producing
neutrals, and it was therefore of great importance
for the Germans to maintain the good-will of these
two countries.
It is not intended to enter into the particulars of
the pretty story connected with the achievement of
this object. Briefly stated, the Germans bought the
extremist Press and the labouring classes with coke,
hundreds of thousands of tons of which were given
away or sold at a nominal price. This coke was used
for household purposes, particularly in Copenhagen
and other closely-populated areas in Denmark,
Such are the principal features connected with the
subject of coal.
Our success in the great struggle depended almost
entirely upon two factors: (1) man-power; (2) the
blockade. That is to say, upon utilising the working
capacity of our population to its utmost extent for
war purposes, and upon pitilessly reducing the enemy's
productivity and resources of every kind by means of
the blockade.
Our policy in respect of the export of coal conflicted
with both these conditions. It resulted in a large
132 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
portion of our man-power being employed indirectly
for the benefit of the enemy ; and in assisting, in spite
of the blockade, to maintain the enemy's productivity
and to carry out service which was indispensable to
him.
It was not until 1917 that the full pulverising
effect of the superb weapon that Nature herself had
placed in our hands was made felt and the blockade
of Germany became effective.
CHAPTER V
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE
The decisive economic battle was fought in Scan-
dinavia, but the centre of effort throughout was
Denmark.
Germany's first concern was to exploit the strategic
possibilities of the ground and see what could be done
to turn them to good account. As has already been
seen, she obtained all the strategic advantages that
Denmark and Sweden possessed. From Denmark
she obtained the key to the main entrance to the
Baltic; from Sweden the key that closed the
approaches entirely.
To Copenhagen as her diplomatic representative
she sent Rantzau, one of the most efficient and astute
of her public servants, whose services to his country
were afterwards rewarded by his being appointed
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Head of the
British Mission in Copenhagen on the outbreak of
war was Sir Henry Lowther, who in August, 1916,
was succeeded by Sir Ralph Paget.
The Naval Attache's position in Scandinavia was
unique in that, being accredited to the three Scan-
dinavian countries and free to travel from one capital
to another, he had opportunities possessed by no
other Englishman of keeping in touch with current
opinion throughout the whole of Scandinavia. During
the war I availed myself fully of this freedom of
movement and visited the three capitals periodically.
133
184 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
My headquarters were at Christiania, whence soon
after hostihties broke out I proceeded to Copenhagen.
For the predictions of Bernhardi bade fair to
become fulfilled. The Allied armies were being
pressed back by the Germans, merchandise was
pouring in from oversea to Scandinavia and through
Denmark into Germany. The trend that events
were taking and were likely to be taking in the
future was made unmistakably clear very soon after
the outbreak of war by many signs, but particularly
by the abnormal and heavy traffic in horses and cattle
from Denmark. During the last six months of 1914
Denmark alone sent to Germany 68,000 horses in
excess of the normal number. I had been urged by
many Scandinavians and by members of the Allied
Legations to use my influence to get this traffic with
Germany stopped, or controlled and kept within
normal bounds so far as this might be possible. To
this end I proceeded to Copenhagen and discussed
matters with the British Minister, but was unable to
obtain the necessary figures relating to the Danish
imports from the United Kingdom and the distribution
of the Danish produce to the United Kingdom and
Germany. Without some definite and trustworthy
data on which to work it was impossible to attack
the Danish traffic. I succeeded, however, after the
lapse of many months, in procuring from a private
source a batch of figures, untabulated and roughly
recorded on several sheets of foolscap, showing the
actual quantities of food sent by Denmark and
landed in various ports of the United Kingdom
between 1st October, 1914, and 30th September,
1915. The work of disentangling this mass of
figures, getting them into intelligible form and
sifting them so that what was necessary might be
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 135
separated from what was unnecessary occupied much
time, pressure of other work preventing me from
deahng with them except at odd moments : ^ and
it was not until 1st February, 1916, that I was able
to embody the result of my labours in a report,
which was duly forwarded to the Foreign Office.^
Attached to this report were two tables,^ one of
which showed an all-round heavy drop in our supplies
of Danish produce, and the other that it was an
increasing one. Further, since the Danish produce
was proportionate to the fodder and fertilisers that
were imported, the decrease in the produce sent to the
United Kingdom should have indicated a correspond-
ing decrease in the imports of the fodder and fer-
tilisers. But the latter were seen to have increased in
quantity since the outbreak of war, thus accentuating
the significance of the losses suffered by the United
Kingdom. It would therefore appear that as scarcity
and consequent high prices increased in Germany, so
did the exports of agricultural produce to England
decrease.
The importance of these figures lay in their pro-
viding clear proof for the first time that since the
outbreak of hostilities Germany had been favoured
in the distribution of Danish produce which oversea
imports alone had made possible. The produce to
us should, in view of the increase in the import of
raw materials to Denmark, have been greater than
the pre-war supplies. Had these supplies only been
^ 1 had no assistants. The French Naval Attache had two.
2 The importance with which my report was regarded by the
Foreign Office is amply borne out by the official intimation I
received to the effect that instead of being sent through Christi-
ania it should have been addressed to Sir H. Lowther at Copen-
hagen in accordance with paragraph 6 of the instructions issued
to Naval Attaches upon their appointment.
* See Appendix.
136 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
maintained there would have been legitimate ground
for complaint : but the quantities fell short of the
pre-war figures, and by the substantial amount of
50 per cent, or thereabouts. The figures referred to
a few items only : they might fairly have been
assumed to indicate the scale on which the Danish
traffic with Germany was being conducted.
In the summer of 1915, when the question of coal
control arose, it had been represented by the British
Minister that as only a comparatively small portion
of Danish agricultural produce found its way to
Germany, it was not considered desirable, in spite of
the fact that British coal was being used in the
agricultural co-operative factories in Denmark, to
force the Danish agriculturists to forgo their German
trade : nevertheless the facts brought to light by
my report did not lead to the imposition of coal
restrictions. The terms of the agreement, however,
under which Danish imports were allowed into the
country formed the subject of negotiations during the
greater part of 1916.
Trading agreements with neutrals were sound in
principle, but not in practice. The Danish agree-
ments suffered in many cases from serious defects
in their drafting, which was ambiguous; they did
not set out in full and precise terms the meaning to
be attached to certain vital phrases such as " bene-
fiting the enemy " ; so that in many cases they
contained loopholes which enabled the sole purpose
of an agreement to be frustrated without departing
from the letter of the agreement. Was Denmark
properly entitled to receive a consignment of one sort
of foodstuffs which would release another sort for
export ? The thousands of live cattle that Denmark
exported to Germany every week contained the raw
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 137
materials for many articles, especially leather goods :
was Denmark to be supplied with raw hides, boots
and shoes, thus enabling her to export the cattle
which otherwise would have been required for her
own leather needs? The fodder and fertilisers that
were sent to Denmark were the raw materials of the
agricultural produce itself and the soil itself of Den-
mark; they represented the basic root of Denmark's
soil and of everything produced by the soil. If
imported goods were to be allowed to release other
goods, what purpose was served by attaching any
condition to their importation ? For the principle
on which agreements were based had in view the
restriction of supplies to an amount necessary only
for the neutral's home requirements and the pre-
vention of abnormal traffic with Germany.
What was the security on both sides in these
Agreements ?
The steady arrival of ships and cargoes in the ports
of Denmark was Denmark's security for Great
Britain's pledge : that was good security. The
British security, however, rested on the somewhat
slippery ground of good faith on the part of those
who guaranteed that imported goods should not
benefit the enemy.
The system of rationing, which was an extension
of the principle of agreements, was an unjustifiably
generous one, being based upon Denmark's require-
ments before the war when these requirements in
their turn were based upon British markets. But
since the outbreak of war our share of the Danish
produce had fallen by 25 per cent. During the last
six months of 1914 Denmark had sent 68,000 horses
to Germany in excess of the normal number. Horses,
when in work, require in addition to other things
188 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
about 10 lb. of oats a day : these horses, therefore,
released in the following year about 120,000 tons of
oats for other purposes. The abnormal export of
other live-stock further very much reduced the
amount of fodder necessary for their upkeep. These
matters were not taken into account. It was the
common interest both of Denmark and Germany that
the principle of rationing should be defeated; and
agreements, which left matters such as the above
undefined, merely provided these countries with the
means of furthering their own interests. Germany
reaped such benefits from the abuses to which they
were open as enabled her to stem the tide of starvation
and to pull through 1916 and 1917. In some respects
she gained more than Denmark : for whereas Den-
mark consumed the imported raw materials, Germany
obtained the finished article produced on Denmark's
soil by Danish labour.
The negotiations that took place with representa-
tives of the Danish agricultural industries had in
view an improvement in the relative distribution of
the Danish produce to Great Britain and Germany.
The chief of these delegates and their recognised
spokesman was Mr. Andersen. Mr. Andersen was a
gentleman who had risen to a position of extraordinary
influence in Denmark, where, from his great wealth,
great business ability and diverse interests, he was
known as the uncrowned king. He was managing
director of the East Asiatic Company, one of the two
most important shipping companies in Denmark,
whose ships brought over oil seeds from the Far
East and were so fortunate as not to suffer any loss
from torpedo attack during the war. He had very
influential friends both in London and Germany, but
in Denmark it was he himself who was the fount of
influence.
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 189
I had not availed myself of the many invitations
with which I had been privileged to become personally
acquainted with ]\Ir. Andersen. To the neglect of
such opportunities may possibly be due the profound
ignorance in which I remained steeped throughout
the war of the value of Danish agricultural produce
as it affected the respective interests of England and
Germany.
Mr. Andersen in 1915 proceeded to Petrograd in
the cause of general peace, for which Germany at
that time was negotiating. His disinterested services
on the occasion of this delicate mission were referred
to by the German Chancellor as endeavours made
by a " highly-deserving man."
It is remarkable that, according to the evidence of
the late General von Falkenhayn and the then
Imperial Chancellor, the late Herr von Bethmann-
Hollweg, Germany was also negotiating at this time
for a separate peace with Russia. With these
negotiations, however, Mr. Andersen was in no way
connected, a fact to which the late German Chan-
cellor himself has borne testimony. The incident is
mentioned only because it is not thought to be
generally known that two independent sets of negotia-
tions for different types of peace were taking place
simultaneously.
Mr. Andersen with other delegates visited London
in the spring and summer of 1916, and was received
by Lord Robert Cecil, the^Minister of Blockade. The
result of the discussions that took place led to a change
favourable to Great Britain, as promised, in the dis-
tribution of the Danish produce : but this improve-
ment during the summer of 1916 left matters in a
most unsatisfactory state.
Denmark at this period was still receiving imports
greater, in respect of many important items, than
140 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
she had received before the war, and for the transport
of which nearly all the coal and part of the tonnage
was provided by Great Britain. This enormous
access of wealth and trade had enabled her to expand
her food industries and even to open up new ones.
In the first seven months of 1916 the absolute quan-
tity of agricultural produce, not including lard, horses
or fish, that Denmark exported to Germany was
close upon 117,000 tons. The meat export alone
during this period, 62,561 tons, was sufficient to
furnish about 1,000,000 meat rations per day
throughout the seven months on the scale of the
current German Army ration.
The Danish population suffered hardships, not
from our blockade, but because the Danish farmers
sold to Germany and the Danish Government was
powerless even to retain sufficient supplies in the
country for domestic consumption. Cows in calf
were sent to Germany for slaughter until the Govern-
ment prohibited this traffic. Three hundred butchers'
shops were closed down in Copenhagen alone.
In reply to a memorandum which I wrote on this
subject it was pointed out by the Foreign Office that
the double difficulty of interfering with the sea-borne
trade between Denmark and Germany on the one
hand, and, on the other, of adequately safeguarding
the carriage of produce to the United Kingdom
on board Danish vessels appeared to have been
disregarded.
The trade in agricultural produce between Den-
mark and Germany was partly across the land
frontier and partly by sea. With regard to the sea-
borne trade of Denmark, it would not only have been
difficult but futile for the Navy to have attempted
to stop it; moreover, Danish coastal traffic with
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 141
Germany could be carried on inside territorial waters.
The only method of using naval forces for stopping
Danish supplies to Germany was by preventing raw
materials from reaching Denmark. No naval diffi-
culties, however, stood in the way of seeing that
faith was kept by the Danes respecting the conditions
under which they received their goods.
As to the difficulty of safeguarding the carriage
of produce to the United Kingdom, there was the
altei'native land route to Christiania, Bergen and
Trondhjem. The Norwegian traffic was carried on
by this route : it was used by Germany herself,
and later it was in fact used for the carriage
of Danish produce, which was shipped from the
Norwegian ports under escort across the North Sea.
There was also a possible route through Swedish and
Norwegian territorial waters : this route, however,
was not to be recommended.
In August, 1916, the thread of negotiations was
taken up by the new Minister, Sir Ralph Paget, with
whom I discussed the whole question of the Danish
exports to Germany.
The war had now been in progress for two years.
Supplies were still pouring into Germany, and the
result of the efforts of two years to get them stopped
had proved to be unavailing.
I again visited Copenhagen in the autumn and
urged upon the Minister the necessity of recom-
mending the adoption of measures which had formed
the subject of my official, semi-official and private
correspondence during the war. The principal points
upon which I had always laid stress were : that the
1913 basis of rationing was unsound; that our
imports were indirectly feeding the Germans, and
that the principle of " releases " should be carefully
142 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
scrutinised with a view to the adoption of measures
for the prevention of the obvious and glaring abuses
to which they were open; that a German invasion
of Denmark was improbable and in any case not a
matter to be feared ; that no action of ours, however
drastic, was likely to provoke Germany to take
retaliatory measures by interfering with the Danish
produce boats to England ; and, even if it should do
so, that there existed alternative protected routes.
With regard to the threatened invasion of Den-
mark (colloquially referred to in Scandinavia as the
" invasion bogey "), this fear was of a periodic
character, synchronising as a rule with great scarcity
in Denmark : it was a sure draw, and the invasion
was only to be averted by plenty of replenishments
from the United Kingdom.
These matters formed the subject of very lengthy
and detailed discussion between us. I succeeded
ultimately in gaining the support of the British
Minister, who finally accepted my views and expressed
his approval of them in unequivocal terms which left
me in no doubt of the sincerity of his beliefs.
It then became necessary to take steps for fore-
stalling the resistance with which these novel pro-
posals would be met when they became known to the
Danish delegates. To this end Mr. Andersen was
forthwith warned by the Minister of a probable
impending change in our blockade policy and of its
nature. A Dane, like other sensible people, will
always submit philosophically to circumstances that
cannot be avoided. It is only fair to the Danes to
say that hitherto no attempt had been made to
impose our will upon them, and that, as Danes, they
were perfectly justified in sending their goods to the
best market. Mr. Andersen on receiving warning
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 143
would not be slow to make up his mind as to the
best course to be pursued; and the classical case of
the Danish Mr. Hobson in circumstances resembling
so closely those with which Mr. Andersen was now
confronted would doubtless commend itself to him
as a precedent which it would be wise to accept as a
guide.
That Mr. Andersen did adopt some such line of
reasoning was soon made abundantly clear by the
conciliatory spirit shown at the next meeting, when
the question of the revision of the existing agreement
was discussed by Danish and British representatives.
Up to this time, December, 1916, the opinion had been
held — or rather it had been tendered — that any reduc-
tion of exports of agricultural produce to Germany
would be both difficult and dangerous : and then
difficulty and danger disappeared as if by magic.
But when negotiations were again resumed with
a view to the embodiment of new and amended terms
in the Danish agreement, trouble again arose. Dis-
cussion hinged largely upon the meaning of " Danish
bond fide home requirements " ; by which the Danes
took it to be understood that so long as imports were
not re-exported there could be no objection to their
receiving supplies without limitation, and irrespective
of the quantity of home-grown produce that was
released for export : that is to say that the Danish
policy was to continue to trade with Germany and
to resist the imposition of any restrictions that inter-
fered with it; whereas the only raison d'etre of the
agreement was to restrict supplies to Germany
through Denmark, on which account the rationing of
imports should take into consideration Danish exports
to belligerent countries similar to, if not identical in
kind with, the article rationed. The Danes expected
144 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
us to acquiesce in a suggestion which entailed supply-
ing " bunkers," the result of British labour, and in
allowing Danish exporters to do a profitable trade
with Germany at our expense. They expected us to
view with favour the employment of valuable shipping,
which Germany was destroying, to carry these
unnecessary commodities to Denmark.
Negotiations continued : but time slipped away.
A contributory cause to the change in the Danish
view above recorded, and one which caused the British
Minister more astonishment than it caused me, was the
electrifying news carried on the wings of ubiquitous
rumour that Sir Edward Carson (now Lord Carson)
was to take the place of Viscount Grey at the Foreign
Office. None better knew than the Head of the
Danish delegation what that change would have
portended. But when this report proved to be false,
courage returned; the Dane again became his old
original self and resisted the proposed terms of the
new Agreement.
So matters went on until the early part of lOlT,
when a set of circumstances arose which placed the
whole situation in a new light.
On 1st February, 1917, Germany's campaign of
unrestricted submarine warfare was opened. In the
words of the Kaiser : "I command that unrestricted
U-boat warfare shall be instituted with the utmost
energy on 1st February."
There seems to have been a tacit understanding
between Denmark and Germany that the Danish
ships trading with England should not be molested
provided they did not carry cattle or fish, and that
fodder and fertilisers were allowed to pass through
our blockade. Germany, as compensation for the
immunity from interference that the Danish shipping
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 145
obtained, received the meat, lard and miscellaneous
imports, in addition to a heavy and disproportionate
percentage of dairy produce.
As the war progressed England began to feel the
shortage of food which she had enabled Denmark to
supply to Germany : she became dependent in an
increasing degree, accentuated by the heavy losses
to shipping, upon Danish supplies : the economic
advantage which she had held in the early stages of
the war had to a great extent been dissipated; and
she was unable to foil either the Danes or the Germans
in their attempts to turn the changed circumstances
of the situation to their own account unless, accept-
ing all risks, she declined to be a party to further
negotiations.
The effect of cutting off fodder and fertilisers at
any time would have been the necessary slaughter
of cattle and pigs that could no longer be fed : this
would immediately have led to an increased supply
to Germany, lasting, according to the Danish delegates,
for about three months.
It was thoroughly realised at home that at this
time, February, 1917, the coming three or four months
were to be a very critical period for Germany. The
U-boat campaign for the moment settled automatically
the question of Scandinavian supplies : but Germany
now viewed with good hope the possibility of obtaining
a decision before being overtaken by starvation.
Germany had seen the situation slowly but surely
change to our disadvantage : she had seen the havoc
that her submarines had wrought on our shipping
and imports : and to us her warfare had brought
home our dependence upon the sea for our supplies.
Shortage was felt in England and losses could not be
made good : the position had become an anxious
146 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
one ; and Germany reckoned that, were she to devote
all her energies to the sinking of ships bound for our
shores, she would in from six to nine months be able
to compel our surrender.
When the U-boat warfare was proclaimed con-
sternation reigned in shipping circles. The first
effect of the campaign was to cause the Danes to
stop their service of ships carrying produce to the
United Kingdom, the Scandinavian traffic became
precarious and uncertain, and in blockading us
Germany had blockaded herself; for imports could
now only reach Denmark at far greater risk than
had previously been encountered.
In order to meet our pressing demands for produce
negotiations took place between Denmark and Ger-
many, and an arrangement was made by which, in
return for British coal to Denmark, Germany would
allow three boats with agricultural produce to leave
Denmark once a week for Aberdeen and to return
during the following week. This arrangement in-
volved, it will be observed, a modification of the
German blockade. In deciding upon her policy of
unrestricted submarine warfare Germany had taken
extraordinary risks; she had defied all recognised
law and almost wantonly provoked America to
hostility : but she had made careful calculations ;
she had measured the effect of her ordinary sub-
marine activities on our shipping and supplies, and
had reckoned that the new piratical submarine
operations would enable her to achieve her object of
starving us before she herself should be overtaken
by starvation or by retributory measures which her
unlawful action might provoke. She must starve us,
but to do so she must act quickly. Yet we find
Germany consenting to an arrangement imperilling
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 147
the principal condition of success of her new sub-
marine campaign. In sanctioning Danish suppHes to
England Germany was lengthening the limited period
in which the successful accomplishment of her aim
could be brought about ; she was staking her chances
of victory upon starving us, yet she was virtually
sending us supplies.
Why?
The real truth would seem to have been that
although Germany hoped, and many Germans
thought, that the new U-boat warfare would reduce
us to starvation, yet nobody could feel quite sure
about it : it is known that grave misgivings on the
subject were entertained in Germany; and since
failure, were the extreme risk to be taken of having
suppHes of fodder and fertilisers to Denmark cut off,
would spell disaster, it seems probable that more
cautious counsels were allowed to prevail and that
this risk was not accepted : Germany therefore
allowed us some scraps from Denmark's larder as a
premium on her life insurance.
Our own position amounted to this : that the
housekeeper could not buy all she wanted. We had
become inconvenienced by shortage and had been
rationed : but England compared to Germany was
a land of plenty. Denmark's food was important,
but not vital to us as it was to Germany. The Board
of Trade pressed for Danish supplies, and necessity
had begun to define our policy. We were not free,
as in the early days of the war, to ignore the existence
of Denmark, for our economic weapon had become
blunted. But the position that did not seem to be
thoroughly appreciated was that Germany wished to
make a bargain with us. To consent to the German
proposal was to admit that Germany could dictate
148 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
the terms to us on which we should receive supplies :
nevertheless the proposal was accepted. Thus it had
at last come about that by surrendering our maritime
rights before the war and trading with the neighbours
of our enemy during the war, and in rejecting pro-
posals in which the present position was clearly
foreshadowed and the principle of indiscriminate
trading with Scandinavia was denounced, we had
been brought to the inglorious position in which
Germany, herself in the throes of starvation, could
yet, after two and a half years of war, command the
necessary replenishments for Denmark's soil and
stock through our fleet, and could and did impose a
definite limit upon the supplies that we received
from Denmark. In 1917 we were reaping what we
sowed in 1915 and 1916 when we were building up
great food industries and establishing them at the
gates of Germany.
The situation that had been created was truly
extraordinary. Towards the end of February some
thirty ships with cargoes of fodder for Denmark,
which had been detained at home, were ordered to
be released. It was very important at this critical
juncture that Denmark should not have this fodder
and that Germany, if possible, should be made to
experience the effects of her new submarine campaign.
Arising out of representations that I made to the
British Minister at Copenhagen on this matter, tele-
graphic correspondence passed between the Legation
and the Foreign Office, the latter being advised that
if there was no objection to about 1,250,000 of
cattle, pigs and horses going to Germany during the
next few months fodder and fertilisers could be
stopped altogether.
It will not be disputed that if Germany could have
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 149
obtained an early decision and could have been
certain of obtaining it, and that if these supplies
were necessary to her, it would have been wise to
continue sending Denmark the raw materials neces-
sary to prevent the slaughter of animals and their
export to Germany. The military situation has been
discussed in a previous chapter : it was reviewed at
considerable length at this juncture during the war :
this ground will not be re-traversed; the conclusions
arrived at were that a descent upon Denmark became
more and more improbable as the later stages of the
war were reached, and that in no case could Germany
have gained by such an operation; and further that
at no time had Germany ever any reason for placing
hopes upon an early and certain success.
As to the length of time that Denmark's capital
would last, I have it on the authority of well-informed
Danes that Danish supplies if Germany invaded
Jutland would only bring a passing relief, estimated
as likely to last only for three months : but con-
jecture on this point must give place to knowledge
as derived from subsequent events ; for when supplies
were afterwards cut off, the Danish exports to Ger-
many gradually dwindled away, and in 1918 up to
the date of the Armistice they had become negligible.
Denmark pressed for fodder and fertilisers for
certain ostensible reasons; but she knew that if her
imports were stopped her pig industry must be
smashed almost at once, and that her cattle industry
must suffer seriously and could not long survive.
The general effect would be to stop agricultural
exports.
The large stocks in Denmark, it must be pointed
out, had been made possible only by the continued
supply of raw materials into this dangerous zone.
150 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The official view is taken that the import of fodder and
fertiUsers into Denmark must be continued in order
to prevent these stocks from reaching Germany.
The position would thus seem to have been created
that Denmark's agricultural industry must be kept
going indefinitely simply because we dare not stop
imports : our enemies must be supplied with food
that they shall not ransack the larder that we our-
selves have stocked. When, in 1914, the blockade
could have been enforced and sure ruin brought to
Germany, open trade was conducted with Scandi-
navia. In August, 1914, Germany could not be
blockaded by reason of the attitude of America to-
wards the subject of maritime rights; but in March,
1917, it would seem to have been the restive cattle
and pigs of Denmark, which were held in leash by
the British Minister, that stood in the way. It will
be observed that the right and the power to stop
the fodder to Denmark are left to be understood,
America constituting no obstacle to the exercise of
this power, the only consideration being a question
of expediency.
The following unsolicited testimony from an un-
known German friend was brought to the notice of
the Foreign Secretary in support of the measures
which I had proposed with regard to the Danish
fodder ships.
A German submarine on 1st March, 1917, sank
without warning in the North Sea the Norwegian
ship " Gurre." She then turned her attention to
an English ship, but was driven off by gun-fire,
after which she captured and took into port as prize
the Norwegian ship " Livingstone " with a cargo of
saltpetre.
The submarine then approached the Danish ship
DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 151
" Holthe " (Captain Hansen), On learning, how-
ever, that the " Holthe " was carrying a cargo of
oil-cake to Denmark the commander of the submarine
allowed her to continue her journey, informing her
captain that " the oil-cake will benefit us just as
much as you, and you can thank your lucky stars
you have such a cargo." It was certainly sometimes
difficult to distinguish friend from foe.
The telegram announcing the intention to release
thirty ships with fodder and fertilisers followed close
on the heels of grave disclosures concerning the
conduct of officials responsible for carrying out the
terms of agreement under which Danish pork was
exported. Although the home markets in Denmark
had been unable to obtain from the butchers the
quantity of pork to which they were entitled, it was
discovered that in December and January alone
36,000 carcasses of swine in excess of the quantity
allowed by arrangement between the British and
Danish Governments were exported to Germany.
This gave a surplus income of 6,000,000 kroner
(about £350,000) for division among private and
co-operative butchers.
Adverting to the report of an inquiry which was
held on this matter, a Danish paper, the Extrabladet,
wrote as follows : —
->
The Commission's report does not present any
satisfactory solution; but the most satisfactory
feature, of which there is no word in the finding,
is, we have reason to believe, that in spite of the
affair our good relations with other countries,
and not the least with England, have been
preserved. As Lord Robert Cecil a few days
ago explained in the House of Commons on the
152 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
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DANISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 153
part of the Government, he could express his
full satisfaction with Denmark's conduct touch-
ing her obligations. This rolled away many a
heavy stone from our hearts at home here.
That which stood behind this export affair like
a heavy black threatening shower, was our
constant anxiety that it would compromise our
commercial position to an irreparable extent.
From such a misfortune we escaped.
In September, 1917, I wrote as follows to the
Minister of Blockade : —
Dear Lord Robert Cecil,
I hope you will excuse the liberty I am taking
in forwarding to you the enclosed report on
Denmark.
It was given to me by an American diplomat
and is written by a Mr. Conger, the representative
in Denmark of the Associated Press.
I may mention that I have never met or
corresponded with Mr. Conger, and for this
reason the report appears to me to be of par-
ticular interest, containing as it does such
striking confirmation of various reports written
by me on the same subject during the last
eighteen months.
Please believe me,
Yours very truly.
The report, slightly abridged, is to be found in the
Appendix.
CHAPTER VI
HOW GERMANY WAS SUPPLIED WITH FISH
The fishing industry of Norway is by far the largest
and most important of those in Northern Europe.
In 1913 Norway's total export of fish was about
330,000 tons, as against 40,000 to 50,000 in the case
of Sweden and Denmark.
Before the war a large quantity of this fish was
taken by the Latin countries — Brazil, Cuba, Portugal,
Spain, the Argentine and Italy — to meet the demands
of fasting days and festivals ; but on the outbreak of
hostilities, owing to the special requirements for freight-
space and to the general dislocation of trade, a large
surplus of fish was thrown on the market. It was
almost certain that Germany, to whom such large
quantities of food and fish-oil would have been
invaluable, would endeavour to obtain these surplus
supplies; it would also have paid Norway to serve
Germany at very remunerative rates, possessing, as
she did, direct rail communication from her seaports
to Germany.
Fish during the first two years of the war was the
principal article of diet in German trains and restau-
rants; the fish-oil was very valuable on account of
the glycerine — an explosive ingredient — which it con-
tained; fish-guano and fish-meal were also produced.
The whole of the Scandinavian industries when
war broke out felt themselves to be on a very pre-
carious footing. Nobody knew Avhat was going to
happen ; and in particular it was realised that if coal
154
GERMANY SUPPLIED WITH FISH 155
was not forthcoming from us, it would not be obtain-
able elsewhere; and without coal the industries must
collapse. But the fishing industries depended for their
maintenance not only upon coal, but upon many
other articles such as petroleum, tin, olive oil, tomato ,
pulp and fishing gear, which, if not in every case an j
exclusive monopoly of Great Britain's, were mainly \
under her control.
Such, at any rate, was the view taken by the
Norwegians and especially by the coastal population,
which had a wholesome respect for our Navy, and
would have hailed with relief any arrangements by
which their livelihood could be ensured and the spectre
of uncertainty removed. It is true that the high
prices commanded in the German market offered a
very alluring bait to the Norwegian fishermen; but
the Norwegians recognised that before selling their
fish to the Germans the formality of alluring the fish
themselves out of the water would first have to be
attended to; and that without the good-will and
practical sympathy of Great Britain this would be no
easy matter. The moment and the circumstances
immediately following the outbreak of war could not
have been more favourable for acquiring the Nor-
wegian catch by purchase in return for a guaranteed
supply of all fishing accessories.
In Christiania H.M. representatives kept themselves
in close touch with the leaders of the fishing industry ;
they ascertained the prospects of success that might
be expected to attend negotiations for purchase, and
reported favourably.
It is believed that these sound proposals failed to
gain the support of the Treasury; and, as in other
cases, notably in those of cotton and copper, an
opportunity was thrown away of saving millions of
156 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
money, and at the same time of cutting off a very-
substantial part of Germany's food and oil, on the
supply of which her ability to continue the struggle
in a large measure depended.
In August, 1916, the proposals made two years pre-
viously were carried out, and a Fish Agreement was
concluded with Norway by which the greater part of
the Norwegian catch was obtained by purchase but
at three times the cost of the 1914 offer.
The result of the failure to conclude this Agreement
at an earlier date may be judged from the following
figures : —
EXPOETS TO GeEMANY AND AUSTEIA IHOM NORWAY (TONS)
1913 1914 19151 1916,1 1917
78,771 67,746 161,409 194,167 82,948
To have obtained the full benefit of the Fish Agree-
ment with Norway it was necessary that the Danish
and Swedish fish industries should also have received
close attention, and that suitable pressure should have
been exerted to bring Denmark and Sweden into line
in the matter of the disposal of their fish.
Let us look into the figures.
The Swedish and Danish fish industries during the
war were very closely connected with each other :
they may therefore be considered together.
EXPOBTS TO GeBMANY AND AUSTBIA (TOKS)
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
Sweden . . 30,308 43,298 63,406 51,113 7,820
Denmark . 25,516 32,968 66,569 106,694 38,841
Total . . 55,819 76,266 119,975 157,807 46,661
The figures for the years 1914 and 1917 throughout
these statistics do not serve well for purposes of
1 These include the diverted fish for Latin countries.
GERMANY SUPPLIED WITH FISH 157
general illustration, 1914 being two-thirds a peace
year, and 1917 two-thirds a year in which America
was fighting on the side of the Allies.
A comparison of the totals for 1915 and 1916 with
the total for 1913 would seem to obviate the necessity
for entering into any explanation of the significance
of these figures.
The exports of these countries to the United
Kingdom were as follows : —
1917
1913
1914
1915
1916
Sweden
Denmark .
4,745
3,932
1,951
2,704
5,303
1,902
Total . . 8,677 4,655 5,303 1,902 —
Comparing the total supplies during 1915, 1916
and 1917 with those of 1913 in the cases of the United
Kingdom and Germany, we find that the United
Kingdom's grand total for the three war years is
1,400 tons odd less than the quantity received in
1913 : Germany's grand total is 268,624 tons more.
The figures are as follows : —
1913
1915, 1916 and 1917.
United Kingdom
GJennany
8,677
. 55,819
7,205
324,443
It is not suggested that the country that supplied ,
the fishing gear should by right and without regard i
to other considerations receive all the fish; but it is
suggested that such a country should have cared \
more for its own interests than to allow its enemies '
to receive forty-six times the amount received by]
itself. In addition to the whole of the cutch and
blue vitriol — articles used for repairs and preservative
purposes — we also supplied Denmark with practically
all the fishing nets, yarn and rope.
158 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
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GERMANY SUPPLIED WITH FISH 159
Ftshing-Nets and Yarn for Repairs supplied to Denmark (tons)
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
United Kingdom . 39 65 133 213 135
Germany ... 78 72 — — 10
In 1915 and 1916 a special effort, it will be observed,
had to be made to meet the German requirements of
120,000 and 158,000 tons : hence our supplies of
fishing-nets to Denmark in those two years, which
were about 350 and 500 per cent, greater than in
1913.
Copenhagen is a city intersected with canals in
which in normal times may be seen the tank boats
containing the live fish for sale — fish being a staple
article of diet among the Danes. Fish became the
scarcer as the war progressed, until eventually it
was practically unobtainable in Denmark. To secure
supplies, especially for the poor, legislation was passed,
but without effect; for the spirit of the regulations
was evaded by technical loopholes to which unfor-
tunately the regulations were open.
The radical cure was the stoppage of petroleum,
the propellant used by the fishing boats. By an
agreement which we had with the Danes a sufficient '
supply of petroleum was ensured them under guarantee
that the fish should not be sent to Germany; but
guarantees in the absence of supervision over the fish j
traffic were literally useless.
The scarcity of fish became so acute that the matter
was taken up by the Danish Press; but neither the
public exposure of this scandalous traffic nor personal
protests availed to get it stopped. Any laxity in
administration in one country was apt to exercise an
evil influence upon the neighbouring States. The
abuse by the Danes of their guarantees was made the
subject of protest by the Norwegians. To know what
--^i
160 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
was going on in any one of these Scandinavian
countries it was only necessary to make inquiries in
one of the others. Norway knew very well and very
accurately what Denmark was receiving from us and
what she was sending to Germany : she did not like
this differentiation of treatment, which on the face of
it was unjust, and by which she suffered in pocket.
In the ordinary course of my work I interviewed
very many Norwegian merchants, coal importers,
shipping agents and others who would come to the
Legation on the business of obtaining redress for
alleged grievances, usually in connection with our
coal, of which for the best of reasons they had been
refused supplies. These men were all amenable to
reason : they were very bitter on the subject of
Denmark, who, they urged with equal truth and
justice, obtained not only as much British coal as she
wished, but was allowed to make use of it in mills
and factories that worked in Germany's interests.
The centre of disturbance according to these Nor-
wegians was Aarhus, where we should be able to
verify their statements and see Danish ships running-
goods to Germany on British coal.
I proceeded to Copenhagen, saw the Minister, and
again urged the necessity for having some British
officials sent to Denmark. This led to the appoint-
ment of a Vice-Consul, Mr. Thirsk, to Aarhus in April,
1916.
Mr. Thirsk was a shrewd man of business, and besides
having an open mind he had also an independent
one : his hobby was hard work ; he had never before
held any official post — I think he had been a journalist.
He arrived on the scene of his labours filled with an
insatiable curiosity and with the set determination to
detect and expose abuses. We all have our faults :
GERMANY SUPPLIED WITH FISH 161
the aptitude for acquiring facts together with the
happy talent for recording them would have made
Mr. Thirsk's selection for the post he occupied quite
an ideal one but for a most improper prejudice which
he seemed to entertain against our enemies.
Although it was the subject of coal that had brought
Mr. Thirsk to Denmark, he soon found himself
immersed in the business of fish, grain, oil, fatty
acids, petroleum and guarantees. For the present
we are concerned with the subject of fish only.
There was a Department with offices in Londoriu
whose special business it was to deal with the restric-"
tion of supplies to the enemy. Commander Leverton-
Harris, R.N.V.R., the Head of this Department
(R.E.S.D.), had arrived in Christiania in the summer
of 1916 to conduct the negotiations for the conclusion
of the Fish Agreement with Norway. We discussed
together the subject of the Danish fish traffic with
Germany. Commander Leverton-Harris was unaware
of the flourishing state of this traffic, and of the
injurious compromising effects it would have upon
any economic measures that might be taken by the
Department which he represented : the fact that the
fishing industry depended in any way upon British or
British-controlled supplies came, as he frankly con-
fessed, as a great surprise to him. He asked me to
communicate further and full particulars to him :
this request I complied with, and I particularly asked
that immediate action might be taken on his return
for getting supplies of petroleum stopped. i
On Commander Leverton-Harris's departure I again
visited Copenhagen and requested that Mr. Thirsk
might be directed to institute inquiries at certain
fishing centres and to report. Mr. Thirsk visited
several ports in Jutland, interviewed Danish fishermen,
M
162 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
agents and Customs officials, personally checked the
quantities of fish in wagons bound for Germany and
spared no pains in his efforts to arrive at facts, which
he recorded in a series of reports of unusual interest
and importance.
He found the fishing fraternity very reticent : they
appeared to have something to conceal. Special fish
trains ran regularly to Germany, and at times the
resources of the railways could scarcely meet the
requirements of the fish traffic.
With regard to petroleum, which was supplied to
Denmark under guarantee that the fishermen should
have only a limited supply, Mr. Thirsk tells us that
these guarantees were not worth the paper on which
they were printed, and that petroleum could be
obtained in unlimited quantities. The Danes them-
selves recognised that the United Kingdom would be
justified in safeguarding her o"\vn interests by pre-
venting fish from reaching Germany; they admitted
that the trade was dishonest in view of the guarantee
they signed that petroleum should not be used to
the advantage of the enemies of the Allies. Fishers
acknowledged their indebtedness to Great Britain for
the supply of petroleum and fishing gear and gave
Mr. Thirsk the impression that were the petroleum
stopped as a result of their breaking their bond, they
would accept it as a just punishment. Mr. Thirsk
recommended that the supply of petroleum to Danish
fishermen should be stopped at once and discontinued
until the Danish Fishers' Union arrived at some
definite and satisfactory decision as to the control of
the traffic.
Not only did Mr. Thirsk strongly advocate the
adoption of any measures necessary for the restriction
of fish supplies to Germany, but he pointed out that
GERMANY SUPPLIED WITH FISH 163
such measures, if successful, would be welcomed by
the Danes themselves. ^
Mr. Thirsk's reports bring us to the end of 1916.
Truth is certainly stranger than fiction. That we
should be supplying the Danish fishermen with all
necessaries ; that the fishermen should be sending
practically the whole of their catch to Germany;
that the Danes themselves should not be able to
obtain one of their principal articles of diet ; that the
fishermen should be able to obtain unlimited quantities
of petroleum without hindrance from the British
authorities, who could kill the industry if they felt so
disposed without infringing international right or dis-
regarding national moral obligations; that all this
should be taking place without any serious effort to^
stop it, was both strange and true : but I confess
that it came as a surprise to me to learn that it was
with a heavy heart and an uneasy conscience that
the fishermen plied their trade; that they disliked
breaking their guarantees ; and that they would really
have been happier to have had their guilty souls
shriven by H.M. Government by the cutting off of
their petroleum supplies. A disinterested person
might have been excused for thinking that British
and Danish interests might perhaps have had some-
thing in common.
When Commander Leverton-Harris left Norway I
kept him well posted in the latest fish news from
Denmark, and, to guard against the possibility of the
originals' miscarrying or being unavoidably delayed,
I sent him copies of Mr. Thirsk's reports, for which
he professed himself as being profoundly grateful. The
letters of Commander Leverton-Harris, who was Lord
Robert Cecil's (the Blockade Minister's) right-hand
man, in the early stages of our correspondence
164 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
breathed hope in every line : the only defect to be
found in them was that they failed to stop the Danish
fish from continuing to reach Germany. The reports
were in his opinion " most interesting " ; they were
" very admirable " ; they had engaged his close atten-
tion, and he hoped the Foreign Office would follow
certain of my suggestions ; Lord Robert was looking
into the matter, and so on. Presently, however, the
fire of enthusiasm began to burn down, and difficulties,
which had been smouldering, threatened to burst into
flames. The fish problem was found to be " one of
the most difficult to deal with " ; the work of the
R.E.S.D. was daily becoming more exacting and
difficult : in short, it soon became clear that the
Danes were to be allowed to have their way in the
matter of the fish. With regard to coal pressure, on
which I had always laid great stress, arrangements
were already in contemplation for discussing this ques-
tion, which might therefore be said to be approaching
its ante-penultimate stage.
More letters passed ; and the order to stop supplying
petroleum to the Danish fishermen was at last given
by the Foreign Office on 30th November, 1916. (This
order was not carried out until some ten days later.)
Germany had in the meantime got into Roumania,
and although one of the finest pieces of individual
work performed during the war was the destruction
of the Roumanian oil wells, it is possible that it did
not prevent Germany from drawing off a quantity of
oil, which enabled her to send small supplies to
Denmark. This, however, is doubtful. As to Ger-
many's ability to have supplied petroleum at an earlier
date and to have continued the supplies on an adequate
scale, there is good reason for supposing that she
could not have done so except at a sacrifice she could
GERMANY SUPPLIED WITH FISH 165
ill afford to make, even for the fish of which she
stood so much in need : to have compelled such a
sacrifice would in itself have been well worth while;
but if the order to stop petroleum, which could have
been given at any time, had failed to achieve the
desired result of stopping the fish traffic, economic
pressure could have been exerted through fishing gear
and coal.
Correspondence on the subject of Mr. Thirsk's
reports will be found in the Appendix.
CHAPTER VII
HOW GERMANY OBTAINED HER EXPLOSIVES
Oleaginous substances, which include many oil-
seeds, nuts and beans, assumed a special importance
during the war from their potential value as explosive
substances, of which glycerine is the principal
ingredient.
In former days, when the population in northern
countries was much smaller, the agricultural and
fishing industries were able to cover the requirements
of the people in regard to oils and fats both for edible
and technical purposes. As time went on and the
populations increased, these industries were no longer
able to supply the demand, and it became necessary
to import vegetable and animal oils and fats from
oversea. Oil-seeds and nuts, from which vegetable
oils and fats are pressed, grow only in countries where
there is an abundance of sun ; that is to say, in tropical
or sub-tropical countries such as the East Indies,
Argentina, parts of the United States, Egypt and
West Africa.
The bulk of the tallow imported into Europe comes
from Australia, South America and the United States ;
America supplies most of the lard and other animal
greases.
Parts of the British Empire, producing as they do
large quantities of oil-seeds and nuts, tallow and fish-
oils, play a very important part in the world's produc-
tion as a whole. During the years previous to the war
166
EXPLOSIVES FOR GERMANY 167
this trade had assumed enormous proportions, espe-
cially in England, which held the foremost position in
the world in this industry; but Hamburg, Copen-
hagen and Rotterdam were also large centres; and iti
therefore became of great importance that a close watch
should be kept over the imports of vegetable and
animal oils and fats into Denmark and Holland, and
that measures should be taken to prevent Germany
from drawing upon these countries for supplies to
meet the requirements of her lost markets. ^
These oils and fats, both vegetable and animal, are
used in normal times principally for food, soap, candles,
lubricants and fuel ; but in war time their importance
is much enhanced on account of the glycerine which
they contain. Towards the end of 1915 the Germans
discovered a process by which glycerine can be pro-
duced from sugar ; this process, though exploited on a
large scale in Germany, remained a secret until after
the war. With this exception glycerine is produced
entirely from vegetable and animal oils and fats.
The importance attaching to this glycerine ingredient
may be judged from the fact that during the war in
the zone of the British Armj^ all scraps of meat were
carefully collected that the fat might be removed and
used for the extraction of glycerine.
Most of the home-grown produce of Scandinavia and
Holland consists of fatty substances. Before the war
Germany obtained from these countries only very
small quantities of oleaginous foods, such as butter,
bacon, pork and fish-oils; but half her supply of
butter came from the markets of Siberia, w^hich were
closed on the outbreak of war. England, on the other
hand, obtained large quantities of these foods from
Scandinavia and Holland : British markets had built up
the Danish industries and England was Denmark's best
168 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
customer. Any increase of Germany's supplies from
these countries would therefore be at our expense.
The situation, then, to be anticipated on the out-
break of war was that Germany would endeavour to
obtain maximum quantities of foodstuffs, and that
these foodstuffs should be charged with fat— that is to
say, with explosive ingredients ; that Scandinavia and
Holland would, in the interests of their trade, increase
these home-grown supplies, with the special view to
their containing abundance of fats ; and, to this end,
that the import of raw materials for agricultural
purposes would be based upon their suitability for
meeting the ultimate requirements of Germany for
explosives.
For nearly three years Germany and her neutral
neighbours succeeded in realising their wishes. Den-
mark was supplied with vegetable oils and fats and
oil-cake from the British Empire far in excess of the
quantities she had obtained from us in peace time, and
which were urgently required in the United Kingdom
for increasing the productivity of the country and for
enabling the foodstuffs we had lost from Denmark to
be replaced.
During those fateful years, 1915 and 1916, it is
regretted that no protest should have been made by
the Legation in Copenhagen against the increased
traffic to Germany, which was justified on the ground
that the imports of fodder and fertilisers had shown
a yearly increase before the war. But the important
fact was overlooked that this increase was due to the
steadily increasing demands of Denmark's largest
customer, England, for her agricultural produce; and
that since the outbreak of war a large part of the
produce properly belonging to us had been going to our
enemies.
EXPLOSIVES FOR GERMANY 169
In view of our policy towards neutrals, and par-
ticularly towards Denmark and Holland, it is not
surprising that on 9th May, 1917, Herr von Batocki,
the German Food Dictator, speaking in the Reichstag,
should say : " Our reserves in fat, regarding which
we mostly depend on imports, will last for a long
time."
Dr. Helfferich, German Secretary of State for the
Interior, is much more brutal : —
In certain very important classes of goods
our neighbouring neutrals were able to replace
entirely the dropping out of the enemy countries
and the neutral countries from which we were cut
off, and even to increase our total supplies. This
applies especially to the animal products trade,
which was developed to a high efficiency in
Holland and Denmark. . . . Naturally the neigh-
bouring neutrals, whom we have to thank for
these important contributions to our domestic
economy, were not in the position to increase
their output overnight in the degree necessary to
furnish so material an extra supply for Germany.
Some other customers, domestic or foreign, must
have suffered for the benefit of Germany.
So it was in fact. And the customer who went
short was for the most part— ENGLAND ! !
Which is quite true : but how the Doctor does
shout— and not a word of thanks. • <^---'— ^ • -^o^^^^
During the course of the war it became clear that
Denmark was disposing of oils far in excess of the
quantities credited to her in the British official
statistics. In the beginning of 1917 it was impossible
170 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
to reconcile reports received from various sources out-
side the British Legation in Denmark with the infor-
mation given in our statistics. The position was
thoroughly mystifying, and very disquieting, so much
so that I went carefully through the whole of the
entries relating to oils in the Danish Section of the
British statistics for the years 1913 to 1916, but with-
out finding any apparent reason for assuming that
discrepancies existed.
In turning to the oil-seeds and nuts imports, how-
ever, the sought-for explanation was found. These
seeds and nuts in the statistics were tabulated without
there being given any oil values to them. Entering
further into this question I obtained values of the
various seeds, copra, earth-nuts, hemp-seed, linseed,
palm kernels, rape, sessamum, soya-beans and others,
in terms of oil and oil-cake (or fodder) ; and with this
data translated the quantities of oil-seeds and nuts
into their respective constituent values of oil and oil-
cake, of which no mention was made in the statistics.
The following table will illustrate the position : —
Summary of Vegetable Oil Imports to Denmark
1913 1914 1915 1916
Edible oils . . . 14,839 9,288 10,844 8,686
Technical oils . . . 1,722 1,792 2,000 1,518
Totals shown by statistics . 16,561 11,080 12,844 10,104
^ Oil values of imported oil- \
seeds not shown in British I 31,648 39,821 58,805 60,975
statistics . . . j
Totals .... 48,209 50,901 71,649 71,079
Increases over 1913 .... 2,692 23,440 22,870
1 These quantities, it will be observed, are in 1915 and 1916
about five times greater than the amounts with which Denmark
is credited; that is to say, that Denmark was receiving a stated
amount of oil, but in addition she obtained an unrecorded amount
of five times as much.
EXPLOSIVES FOR GERMANY 171
Of the above the following came from the United
Kingdom and British Empire :—
1913 1914 1915 1916
Edible oils . . . 290 728 1,730 312
Technical oils ... 146 588 1,369 986
Oil values of imported oil-
seeds .... 5,459 9,736 17,547 12,239
Totals .... 5,895 11,052 20,646 13,537
The oil-cake or fodder values of the imported oil-
seeds to Denmark, which had also been omitted from
the official statistics, i are as follows ; —
1913 1914 1915 1916
Oil-cake from oil-seeds . 81,283 105,343 155,274 146,207
Of the above, the following "j
SSgdomTndBritis'Jt;' 13,112 23,304 42,207 32,985
pire ■'
By importing their vegetable oils in the seed the
Danes obtained large quantities of oil-cake for fatten-
ing cattle : an arrangement which suited them admir-
ably. The export of cattle, thus fattened, which went
on hoof from Denmark to Germany, attained the
proportions shown as follows : —
1913 152,357
1914 187,438
1915 250,843
1916 305,031
Compare the import of soya-beans and copra to
Denmark before and during the war : —
,Q,_/ Soya-beans .... 100,781 tons
^^^'^(^ Copra 55,168 „
iqirJ Soya-beans ..... 102,537 „
^^^^'tCopra 42,342 „
300,828
j>
Average 1915, 1916 .... 150,414
Average 1911, 1913 .... 68,208
^ Resulting from a report which I made on this matter later
tables of statistics showed the fodder value and the oil value of
all oil-seeds.
172 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
It should be noted that the whole of the copra
came from British colonies and the soya-beans from
Manchuria.
It is little wonder that H.M. Government had
difficulty in prevailing upon the Japanese Govern-
ment to prohibit the export of soya-beans to neutrals
engaged in supplying foodstuffs to our enemies when
our own colonies were supplying these neutrals with
copra.
Copra contains a large proportion of oil, and was
a very dangerous commodity to allow into a country
that was supplying our enemies with grease : yet in
the years 1915 and 1916 Denmark imported 97,510 tons
of copra. This means roughly 20,000 tons of oil and
70,000 tons of oil-cake.
In two years, therefore, the imports of one com-
modity alone from our own colonies released to our
enemies 20,000 tons of grease, and in addition sup-
plied 70,000 tons of fattening material for cattle
exported to our enemies.
Further, it should be noted that a large part of
these soya-beans and copra were brought from the
Far East with British coal.
Lard is a substance from which glycerine is ex-
tracted. Under an agreement with the American
packers we allowed the importation of a certain
amount of American lard for the use of the Danish
margarine factories. This lard, which was more
suitable than the Danish for the manufacture of mar-
garine, released Danish lard for export to Germany.
"If it has been so arranged," wrote the British
Minister at Copenhagen, referring to the contract, " we
cannot now go back on our word and stop the import."
This would seem to imply that there was some point
of honour involved here. Setting aside the fact that
EXPLOSIVES FOR GERMANY 178
the import of lard was eventually stopped, the parties
to business contracts are protected by substantial
legal penalties attaching to breach of contract : in
the case of this lard it could with advantage have been
bought by us; and, moreover, it was received by
Denmark only on condition that it should not benefit
our enemies.^
Another invaluable source of fat was offal. The offal
of almost every beast killed in Denmark was exported
to Germany. Factories had been established near the
frontier for the extraction of grease and fat : yet
Denmark was allowed to import large quantities of
edible oils for her own use, while exporting at the same
time large potential supplies of oils and fats available
for home consumption.
Among the most important ingredients for the manu-
facture of explosives are : —
(a) Sulphuric acid,
(b) Nitric acid,
(c) By-products of coal,
(d) Glycerine.
(a), (b) and (c) Germany herself could supply, but
glycerine is a product of the fishing and agricultural
industries, and Germany depended upon Danish
supplies for making good her deficiencies.
It was not cattle that Germany required, but fat
cattle, and the Danes, that their cattle might come up
to the German standard, spared no pains in the care
they bestowed upon them, feeding them on [the most
fat-producing food procurable.
The growing of fodder depended upon the quanti-
ties of fertilisers imported and the amount of land
available. The available fodder-producing land in
* For letter on this subject, see Appendix.
174 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
turn depended upon the amount of cereals imported.
If sufficient cereals were imported for human food the
whole of the land became available for pasture or the
cultivation of fodder. During the war Denmark's
imports of cereals decreased, thus reducing the amount
of land available for growing fodder from the necessity
of having to sow cereals on it; but the increased
imports of fodder-stuffs more than compensated for
this reduction in the fodder-growing area of the
country.
Now the fodder-stuffs used in Denmark consisted of :—
(a) Maize and meal,
(b) Oil-cake and meal,
both of which possess great fattening value : also of
(c) Bran, peas and beans,
which are much inferior to (a) and (b).
The import of (a) and (b) increased during the war ;
(c) decreased ; but the total amount of fat-producing
fodder imported into Denmark in 1916 was greatly in
excess of the average in 1911-1913. The position was
aggravated by the fact that the abnormal export of
horses and cattle to Germany since the outbreak of
war would allow the remaining stock to receive its
normal ration on a total quantity of imported fodder-
stuffs less than the pre-war quantity. It is estimated
that 200,000 tons of fodder were economised in this
way in 1916, and used for fattening stock to serve
Germany's special purposes.
The imports of fodder to Denmark, as has been
said, were steadily increasing before the war ; but that
was because the exports of agricultural produce to
England were increasing. Nor could these increased
imports be accounted for by the food requirements of
EXPLOSIVES FOR GERMANY 175
the population; for the figures show that so far as
human food is concerned the imports, with the excep-
tion of cereals, had increased; and imports as a
whole, including fertilisers, had been well maintained :
the productivity of the country had, therefore, been
maintained on its pre-war basis.
We turn again to Mr. Thirsk's reports. During his
rounds of the Danish ports he went, with character-
istic thoroughness, into the movements of grain, oil
and cattle-fattening products ; the matters that came
under his personal observation may be accepted as
typical of the transactions that were taking place
throughout Denmark. It must be remembered that
the ostensible aim of our blockade policy was to prevent
Scandinavia, and in particular Denmark, from import-
ing more than she required for domestic consumption,
and to restrict her trade with Germany.
Many Danish merchants and exporters faithfully
carried out their obligations not to use imported
goods for the benefit of the enemy ; and Mr. Thirsk, in
the spirit of impartiality with which he pursued his
investigations, is careful to cite such cases as came
under his observation : at the same time it has to be
remembered that infringement of the regulations, if
discovered, carried risks which would not lightly
be incurred; and although the love of virtue may
have moved many manufacturers to refuse tempting
German offers, the fear of the consequences of a breach
of guarantee would undeniably have tended to swell
the ranks of the virtuous.
Mr. Thirsk's reports, as in the case of fish, are full
of cold incontrovertible facts. All the grains with
which he deals are found to be largely " in excess."
The imports of maize and oil-cake for June, July and
August, 1916, at Aarhus — to take a random selection —
176 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
are 19,616 tons in excess of the quarterly average for
the three years preceding the war. So huge were the
accumulated stocks in Danish ports that it was
common to see whole cargoes, which had been dis-
charged on the vacant spaces near the docks, protected
from the weather by waterproofs lent by the Danish
State Railway for the purpose.
Mr. Thirsk was anxious to obtain the percentage of
dairy produce exported respectively to the United
Kingdom and Germany, but this was Denmark's
secret, and, as it was guarded by the substantial penalty
of 20,000 kroner for divulging it, it would seem to have
been something well worth keeping from us; at the
same time it gives a clue as to what was in the minds
of Sweden and Denmark at the conference which took
place at Malmo in December, 1914.
The impression created on Mr. Thirsk by all those
with whom he came in contact — importers, dealers,
farmers and dairymen — was that a period of unpre-
cedented prosperity was being experienced. Although
grain and cattle-feeding products arrived under
guarantee not to be re-exported, and were, moreover,
further protected by the Danish export prohibition,
yet the traffic was ruled entirely by the high prices
obtainable in Germany : only an insignificant per-
centage of the products of these imports, i. e. of meat
and dairy produce, was sold in Denmark, the prices
having risen to the German figure, which to most
Danes was prohibitive. It was the popular convic-
tion in Denmark that Great Britain was the cause of
these high prices, not by reason of any obstacle that
was put in the way of importing articles, but because
there was no prohibition on the export to Germany of
the finished product of the imports, t. e. of meat and
dairy produce.
EXPLOSIVES FOR GERMANY 177
Butter, bacon, eggs and even cattle were, in Mr.
Thirsk's opinion, the finished product of the foodstuffs
imported by Denmark. He properly regarded their
export to Germany as being in contravention of the
fodder and foodstuffs prohibition, and thought that
the fodder and foodstuffs that reached Denmark were
very excessive.
There were stocks of grain, fodder and cattle -
fattening products warehoused at Aarhus sufficient to
supply normal needs for some months. Such was
the state of Denmark in 1916; and it may be con-
cluded that Mr. Thirsk was not one of the " experienced
officials " who were " of opinion that practically no
commodities of military importance are now being
imported in quantities appreciably above the amounts
legitimately required for home consumption." ^
Nearly all the chief towns in Jutland were visited
by Mr. Thirsk, who found much the same conditions
existing as at Aarhus. All convenient storehouses
were filled to overflowing, and new and commodious
warehouses had been erected to meet the increasing
need for accommodation that had arisen since the out-
break of war. In short, all evidence pointed to the
fact that the quantities of grain and fattening products
allowed into Denmark, including immense amounts
from the British Empire, were in excess of her proper
and normal requirements and were being used for
Germany's benefit. Mr. Thirsk obtained his informa-
tion under difficulties : Danish official sources were
denied him, and he was obliged to limit his investiga-
tions to such knowledge as could be gleaned from
chance acquaintances, from Danish firms and from
close personal observation. He was, I believe, at
that time the only Englishman in Denmark outside
^ Parliamentary Debates, No. 158, p. 3189.
N
178 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
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EXPLOSIVES FOR GERMANY 179
Copenhagen, and his opinions were, to the best of my
belief, based entirely upon independent inquiry and
observation.
Fats are synonymous with explosives. It is not
possible to separate the fatty from the other ingredients
of all the commodities containing fat that reached
Germany. Nor is it possible diagrammatically to
show the war value of fats : to Germany they were the
breath of her life.
The graph on the opposite page is a fair example of
the scale on which supplies reached Scandinavia in
the early years of the war.
\
CHAPTER VIII
LUBRICANTS
To record all the rascality in which the transactions
in lubricants were involved during the war would
require a goodly-sized volume.
Lubricants were one of those indispensable com-
modities of which Germany at all times stood much
in need, but especially in 1915 and 1916, when she
found it so difficult to obtain them.
Mr. J. W. Gerrard, the American Ambassador in
Berlin, recorded in his war diary in December, 1915 :
" Probably the greatest need of Germany is lubricating
oil for machines, etc."
Ludendorff makes frequent references to the diffi-
culty of obtaining lubricants : " Lubricants presented
us with some of our greatest problems. . . . Rouman-
ian oil was of decisive importance," etc., etc. ; all of
which agrees with the evidence on the subject that
was to be gathered in Scandinavia both from travellers
returned from Germany and from official quarters.
In 1915 Germany was offering 1,800 marks (about £90)
for a barrel of oil whose market value in Denmark was
125 kroner (about £7).
The figures in the Scandinavian statistics (see
Appendix) tell the same tale as the figures for most
other commodities which we controlled during the war,
and therefore require no special notice.
I had not been vastly interested in the matter of oil
until the summer of 1915, when I received a communi-
cation from an anonymous correspondent, who signed
180
LUBRICANTS 181
himself " X Y," to the effect that a German steamer,
which he named, was then lying alongside a jetty in
the Free Harbour loading " Morris Fatbacks " and
barrels with lard; and that a Swedish steamer was
also there loading oil barrels. My correspondent
reminded me of some of the previous history of this
latter vessel and, with regard to the former, observed,
" I wish you had a submarine." This was on a
Friday morning.
The Free Harbour receives goods in transit only;
goods, that is to say, which are not for consumption
in Denmark and are not subject to tariff or customs
duties.
In the afternoon I proceeded to the Free Harbour,
where I saw barrels of vacuum oil, wagon oil and heavy
engine oil being loaded on board these ships. These
barrels bore the initials of a well-known firm in Stock-
holm, which was then importing oil in large quantities
under guarantee that it should not reach Germany.
It was this class of oils of which Germany stood greatly
in need.
I reported the matter to the Legation, who com-
municated with the Danish Foreign Office and
Ministry of Marine. A search was ordered to be
carried out on board the German steamer, but since
no precautions were taken until Sunday morning to
guard against the possibility that the oil might be
discharged on to the immense uncovered stock from
which the barrels had been shipped, the report, which
exonerated the ship, must be considered worthless.
Of the sincerity of the Danish high officials and of
their desire to give all possible assistance there is no
question : all were most sympathetic and courteous :
nevertheless no oil was discovered and the ship left.
The Customs officials did not enter actively into the
182 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
matter until Saturday morning, the ship in the mean-
time remaining under the supervision of the Free
Harbour authorities, who were responsible for the
prevention of irregularities.
In reply to inquiries from the Foreign Office con-
cerning the bond fides of the firm which was implicated
in this business, it has been reported by the Legation
that its connection was an innocent one. Inquiries
on the same subject had, however, elicited the reply
from the British Minister at Stockholm that since the
outbreak of war the firm had assumed a German
connection. This information was not mentioned in
the telegram from Copenhagen.
Transactions similar to the above had been made
the subject of official reports on more than one
occasion, but to no effect.
The Swedish steamer mentioned by my anonymous
correspondent was boarded by the Germans when fully
laden with heavy lubricating oils belonging to the
firm in question and taken to Swinemunde. It was
afterwards stated in the Swedish papers that she had
arrived in Stockholm and that her cargo had not been
touched. Inquiries failed to trace this oil and, as
happened also in the case of another ship, it is probable
that the barrels were returned though the oil certainly
was not.
Earlv in 1916 another Swedish steamer left the Free
Harbour at Copenhagen bound for Gottenberg and
other Swedish ports. This same firm had loaded her
with some 2,200 barrels of the best lubricating oil, a
fact which had been brought to the notice of the
Legation authorities in plenty of time, it is thought,
for inquiries to be made and steps taken to prevent
what subsequently occurred. The steamer after
clearing was promptly captured by the Germans and
taken to Swinemunde. When questioned, and being
LUBRICANTS 183
uncertain as to how much was known to us about
this deal, the firm's representative admitted to 1,200
barrels ; he could not, of course, know that it would
fall into German hands, and he assured us that the
Germans would return it. The Danish newspapers
made very light of such trivial incidents as this, a
three-line reference to the effect that the S.S. " So-and-
so " had been held up laden with a general cargo being
deemed quite sufficient to meet the requirements of
the case. Many papers suppressed all reference to
these transactions.
As to the warning that was given to the Legation,
this came from a certain person who stated that if
any questions were raised he was prepared to swear
an affidavit to the fact. Moreover, a report had been
received from a Danish Government official that ships
of the same line to which the steamer in question
belonged, when on voyage between Copenhagen and
Stockholm, were invariably taken into a German port
by the patrol : yet the above firm was allowed to
forward oil by this line.
Said a certain shipowner to me : —
I shall never forget the first declaration I ever
asked for, and which gave me a very good insight
into the whole business. In 1914 one of my ships
was bringing over a cargo of oil from the States
to Copenhagen, and as I was getting a bit anxious
about her I thought I would have a declaration
from the consignee that the oil was not going to
Germany. In reply to my inquiries he said he
would sign anything I liked, and accordingly I
sent him the declaration form, which he signed and
returned. The ship arrived safely at Copenhagen
and every drop of that oil was transhipped and
sent straight on to Germany.
184 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
There were three ways available to firms for sending
their oil over to Germany.
(1) By allowing German ships to go alongside their
" heaps " in the Free Harbour at Copenhagen, where
they would pick up the oil at moments when the
vigilance of the " authorities " should be relaxed.
From one or two of the specimens I saw of these
authorities I did not gather that it would be a matter
of insuperable difficulty to find such moments, or
even the means of creating them artificially.
Concerning this trick a friend wrote : —
A report has reached me that consignments of
oil from New York consigned to are reach-
ing Germany through the intermediation of
Mr. residing in this town.
The oil, which is in barrels, is marked " in
transit at buyer's expense," and addressed
Nykjebing, Gottenberg and other ports. The
barrels are brought down to the wharf ostensibly
for shipment on vessels sailing for neutral ports,
but on the other side of these are moored vessels
bound for Lubeck and other German ports. The
barrels are merely passed across the decks of the
vessels which are supposed to receive them, and
placed on board the vessels bound for Germany.
(2) By sending it to Sweden and obtaining guaran-
tees against its re-export from Swedish buyers.
It would be insulting to anybody's intelligence to
credit him with the belief that such guarantees were
of any earthly value : this is not to mention the fact
that the guarantees were not legally binding in Sweden.
At the beginning of August, 1915, we knew that large
quantities of oil had gone to Germany via Malmo from
Denmark.
LUBRICANTS 185
(3) By sending it round to Stockholm to be inter-
cepted by the Germans.
With regard to this artifice, Sweden, if she wished,
could (and under protest from us did) institute Prize
Court proceedings. I can, however, recall no case in
which any oil was proved by us to have been returned
by Germany. As before said, barrels were returned,
but they were not broached by any Englishman.
As an example of this method some 7,000 barrels of
machine oil arrived in Copenhagen early in 1916 from
Philadelphia. They all bore the mark of the importing
firm above referred to ; 1,500 of them were distributed
to various oil firms in Copenhagen, and 4,000 were
loaded on board a Swedish steamer which left the
Free Harbour a few days later for Stockholm. The
casks were labelled variously : Malmo, Gottenberg,
Stockholm, Christiania, Bergen and other ports.
After being dumped at Stockholm, they would be
transhipped and forwarded on the line of route of
German destroyers.
The ship that had brought the oil then left for
another cargo. All this oil came from an American
company for which the same importing firm was agent.
The procedure adopted to get Swedish consign-
ments of oil over to Germany was as follows : a
consignment is proposed for a Swedish consignee, whom
we will call Mr. X, a merchant residing in Gottenberg
or any port on the west coast of Sweden. The Lega-
tion is asked by telegram if Mr. X is a reliable con-
signee : probably many other names are included
in the telegram for other descriptions of merchandise.
It was not possible that the Legation could, without
efficient consular representation, report on the trust-
worthiness of individuals scattered about the country.
In this case Mr. X may be a bo7id fide consignee :
but if he can sell his oil to Germany and make a
186 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
swinging profit, naturally he will do so. The oil is
landed in Gottenberg. Part of it reaches Germany
through the ordinary process of smuggling, and part
leaves by special licence which the Government can
grant for goods on the prohibited list of exports ; but
the bulk of the oil is disposed of by sending it round
to Stockholm on the east coast. It is probably inter-
cepted by the Germans during its passage ; or if not
it reaches Stockholm in safety. Mr. X has an agency
at Stockholm whose sole business it is to re-tranship
the oil and send it to sea to give the Germans further
chances. The Customs authorities, having dealt with
the oil at Gottenberg, are not interested in it at
Stockholm or at other Swedish ports.
This third method was discovered independently
by H.M. Government themselves. When war broke
out a new Legation at Stockholm was being built.
Hundreds of pounds worth of stores, chiefly very fine
and up-to-date electric fittings for the new Legation,
were being sent round by sea from Gottenberg to
Stockholm. They were promptly captured by the
Germans, placed in the Prize Court and condemned.
There was probably no commercial harbour of
greater importance during the war than that of
Copenhagen. It had a large trade of its own, which
increased the difficulty of bringing to light cases of
illicit trading. The main stream of goods to Germany
passed through Danish ports and over Danish terri-
tory, and Copenhagen's part in the fight for our lives
was the most important in Scandinavia. It is possible
that the nature of all the transactions such as those
recorded in this chapter were not brought to the
knowledge of the Minister, but, however this may be,
the measures taken for safeguarding our interests and
checking abuses fell far short of legitimate expectations.
LUBRICANTS 187
It had at one time been the custom to report all
irregularities such as those that have here been
recorded to the Legation ; but this zeal unfortunately
had died down. To detect abuses it was very neces-
sary that the wharves should be visited; yet the
Vice-Consul at Copenhagen had incurred official dis-
pleasure for performing this important duty and had
been ordered not to frequent the wharves.
I visited Copenhagen periodically, but Germany
could not be fought single-handed.
There was considerable delay in the publication of
the Scandinavian statistics after the war. I had
been looking forward with considerable interest to a
quiet study of the accounts. Agricultural produce
held first place in my curiosity ; but lubricants ran it
very close, the Danish exports to Germany being the
first item to which I turned. I had drawn a blank :
they were not given. I wondered what Denmark had
to say about her re-exports to Norway and Sweden;
I therefore next looked up these figures, which were
confessed. I then compared Denmark's statements
with those of Norway and Sweden as to what they had
received from Denmark. The object in making these
comparisons was to ascertain if Denmark had been
charging Norway with oil which had been sent to
Germany ; in which case the Norwegian figures would
be less than the Danish. The figures are :—
1915 1916 1917
Denmark re-exports to Norway 1,120 1,140 1,131 metric tons
Norway imports from Denmark 990 569 488 „ „
which would seem to suggest that Germany had friends
in Denmark.
In the case of Denmark and Sweden glaring dis-
crepancies would not be expected, because Sweden
188 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
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LUBRICANTS 189
herself sent all the oil she could to Germany. The
figures are : —
1915 1916 1917
Denmark to Sweden . . 2,127 2,622 68 metric tons
Sweden from Denmark . 3,353 2,896 288 „ „
Re the 15,000 tons that passed in transit through the
Free Harbour of Copenhagen, I can only say (confess-
ing to the full the weakness of the line of argument)
that I think some of it may have found its way to
Germany.
To finish with this subject let me quote from a
speech made by Lord Robert Cecil on 26th January,
1916 :—
There was some criticism of what was going
on in Denmark, and the Foreign Office was urged
some weeks ago to deal with the matter. . . .
We requested Sir Alexander Henderson (now
Lord Faringdon) to go out, and he was asked to
see whether there was any truth in the sugges-
tions and charges made against the Legation.
I am very glad to say that I have had several
long talks with Lord Faringdon, and he assured
me that there is not a word of truth in these
allegations. On the contrary, the Government
areremarkably well served by their Ministers. . . .^
The blind eye of Nelson was used on a certain
historic occasion of glorious memory off Copenhagen.
Another case of defective vision at the same place will
be found recorded in another chapter with a view to
its being assigned its proper place in history.
1 Parliamentary Debates, No. 153, p. 3189
CHAPTER IX
METALS
Copper
What Wangenheim and the other Germans
saw in the situation was that their stocks of
wheat, cotton and copper were inadequate for
a protracted struggle ..." next time we shall
store up enough copper and cotton to last for
five years." ^
The average of the world's total production of
copper in 1914-1915 was about 1,250,000 tons. Of
this America produced rather more than 250,000
and Germany about 40,000 tons, an amount quite
inadequate for her requirements. Copper was of
inestimable value to Germany : it is a metal that
enters into every phase of naval and military warfare.
Copper was not made contraband until 29th October,
1914; prior to that time Germany obtained immense
supplies from America through Italy and Scandinavia.
Of the three Scandinavian countries, Norway was
the only one that produced copper : her home pro-
duction was comparatively unimportant in amount
so far as export was affected and as compared with
Sweden's export : Sweden, having no home pro-
duction, depended upon her imports.
To get an idea of the nature of the copper trans-
actions that were taking place in Scandinavia let us
^ " Secrets of the Bosphorus," by H. Morgenthau, American
Ambassador at Constantinople. Hutchinson.
190
METALS 191
have a look at some of the figures from the Scan-
dinavian statistics. Take Sweden. The Swedish
imports for 1913 and 1914 were (in tons) :—
1913 1914
9,559 12,455
Her exports to Germany and Austria were :—
1913 1914
1,215 3,960
It was not until towards the end of 1914 that the
Scandinavian countries slammed the door to their
statistics in our face.
The Swedish traffic in copper was common know-
ledge in Scandinavia, and the details of it in 1914
were known to H.M. Government. There were many-
possible effective retorts to the Malmo meeting,
which was convened by Sweden at Germany's instiga-
tion; and if Sweden — in particular — thought it well
to withhold from us information without which it
was well-nigh impossible to gauge the effect of our
measures for blockading Germany, then the duty
of safeguarding our own interests became one of
imperative necessity.
If it had been known that Sweden was not sending
copper to Germany in excess of her pre-war consign-
ments, there would have been no valid reason (on this
account) to have withheld our own supplies. If there
had been uncertainty about the Swedish transactions,^^
British supplies should have been stopped. But if
Sweden chose to send copper to Germany exceeding
three times the amount she sent before the war —
which she did — and if we knew of this— and we did
know of it— to have stopped our own supplies to
Sweden would of itself have been too insufficient a
192 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
measure to meet the case; and Sweden should have
been referred to Germany for her coal. But the
British exports of copper to Sweden were doubled,
as is seen by the following figures : —
Beitish Exports of Copper to Sweden (tons)
j 1913 1914 1915
517 710 1,085
No time was lost in Norway in endeavouring to
bring the Norwegian copper supplies under our
control. On 12th December, 1914, the export of
copper, with the exception of the home production,
was prohibited by the Norwegian Government; and
on the same day proposals were made by the British
Minister, for consideration by the Home authorities,
for acquiring the Norwegian output by purchase.
On 2nd January, 1915, these proposals were still
under consideration, and remained so until 6th
February, when it was requested that an expert in
copper might be sent out as soon as possible with a
view to arranging terms of purchase. As with the
Norwegian fish, so with copper, the purchase fell
through. No expert was sent out for many months,
and the copper, which could have been bought at the
price of about £50 a ton (the proof of this is to be
found in the archives of the Legation), was fetching
before the end of the war £150 a ton in the open
market, which price H.M. Government paid for it.
Norwegian copper was of no especial value to us
during the war : there were other sources open to
us; but it was of vital importance to the fortunes
of the Allied cause that Germany should not have it.
Like all other commodities it had two values : the
one being its own market value to us for our own
use ; and the other its value to Germany, i. e. the
METALS 193
price that Germany was prepared to pay for it, and
which it was therefore worth our while to pay to
prevent Germany from obtaining it.
In the latter part of 1916 pressure was brought to
bear upon Norway by which it was made possible
for copper agreements to be drawn up with that
country and with Sweden. Norway's copper in its
native non-electrolytic form could not be consumed
in the country, and electrolytic copper cable was
urgently required for the country's development.
Shipping facilities were refused by us for Norwegian
consignments of copper cable until the Norwegian
Government consented not to export copper except
as agreeable to our wishes. These copper agreements
undoubtedly struck a heavy blow at the enemy.
There are no serious faults to be found in the
Norwegian figures : Norway's exports to Germany
and Austria were : —
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
685
406
1,573
1,229
18 tons
The inflated figures in 1915 and 1916 are accounted
for by our failure to purchase Norwegian home
products.
Denmark shows a clean sheet in her copper trans-
actions. The destination of the 5,000 tons odd that
passed in transit through the Free Port of Copen-
hagen has not been revealed. This is Denmark's
secret (and Germany's).
Zinc
Before the war most of our supplies of zinc were
obtained from Germany and Belgium, but when war
broke out our requirements were covered mainly by
America. America sent us refined zinc, but not quite
194 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
enough. To supply the deficiency zinc ore was
obtained from Australia, and sent to Norway and
Sweden for refining : it was then returned to us as
refined zinc.
Zinc enters largely into the manufacture of
munitions, and the Ministry of Munitions was a
Department a call from which could not be dis-
regarded : it can be conceived that considerable
pressure could be brought to bear upon H.M. Govern-
ment to keep all sources of supply open. Sweden
was one such source : hence the anxiety to avoid
trouble with Sweden and the tendency to overlook
Sweden's anxiety to avoid trouble with Great Britain.
The refined zinc that Sweden sent to us was as
follows : —
1915 1916 1917
747 4,113 2,365 tons
The other Scandinavian source, Norway, sent us : —
1915 1916 1917
4,373 12,765 7,600 tons
It will scarcely be denied that the combined efforts
of America and Norway would have been able to rise
so far to the occasion as to increase the output of
zinc by the amount of Sweden's contribution and
thus have removed one of the many sources of
anxiety from the mind of the Foreign Secretary in
his desire to retain the good- will of Sweden.
The transactions that took place in zinc with
Germany furnish an admirable indication of the
dearth of German man-power and the necessity for
conserving it.
The total world's supply of zinc in 1913 was about
993,000 tons, of which :—
METALS 195
Germany produced 280,000 tons
Belgium „ 195,000 „
U.S.A. „ 315,000 „
British Empire produced 62,000 „
Germany and Belgium between them were before
the war the largest producers of zinc in the world :
they were also very large exporters. Yet during
the war Germany imported large quantities of this
metal. The want of man-power made itself felt in
all German industries : it prevented Germany from
supplying the needs of Scandinavia and Holland in
coal and cement (see Chap. XI); and it compelled
her to import large quantities of sulphite and sulphate
pulp (see under " Cotton " p. 221). Germany would
take any manufactured article that was useful for
war purposes. I have seen large quantities of sawn
timber going to Germany from Sweden during the
war, though Germany's forests could supply timber
in abundance.
Lord Devonport, who rendered conspicuous service
to the country by his searching and able criticisms
of our blockade policy, stated during the course of a
speech in the House of Lords on 22nd February,
1916,^ that since the beghining of the year there had
gone direct from Rotterdam to Belgium 20,000 tons
of zinc ore. The ore was sent to Liege, where there
was one of the biggest spelter-producing companies
on the continent. This, of course, was under German
control, and, therefore, the zinc ore which we allowed
to go into Rotterdam went openly to a place where
it was converted into spelter and circulated all over
Germany. The ore, too, was of that very quality
which Germany required in the preparation of
hydrogen gas for the inflation of her Zeppelins.
1 See Parliamentary Debates, No. 3, pp. 118, 119.
196 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Nickel
The follo^\'ing extract is taken from the " Seventh
Report from the Select Committee on National
Expenditure " of 21st December, 1920 :—
Our Sub-Committee on the Board of Trade
and other Offices have made prolonged investi-
gation into the question of the dealings of His
Majesty's Government with various Nickel Com-
panies during and smce the ^^•ar. They have
taken evidence on the subject from the Board
of Trade and from the Secretarv of the Mond
Nickel Company, Limited. We beg to report
as follows : —
Early in the war His Majesty's Government
deemed it on military grounds ad\dsable to enter
into certain arrangements with the Kristiansand
Nikkei Raffineringswerk and with at least one
other Norwegian company. The total expendi-
ture in this coimection was £1,030,000. Into
the military and diplomatic aspects of these
transactions om- Sub-Conmiittee have not
deemed it any part of their duty to inquire.
They are, however, definitely of opinion that on
purely commercial grounds the arrangements
concluded and the payments consequently made
cannot be defended.
The negotiations with the Kristiansand Nikkei
Raffineringswerk have unfortunately involved
His Majesty's Government not only in large
immediate expenditure but in further liabilities
which, unless they can be annulled, will entail a
heavy loss to the Exchequer.
In order to facilitate these negotiations with
METALS 197
the Kristiansand Nikkei Raffineringswerk His
Majesty's Government concluded with the British
America Nickel Corporation a trading contract
under which His Majesty's Government agreed
to take nickel ore from that Corporation over a
period of ten years from 1917, the Corporation
having the right, if they wish to sell their nickel
to His Majesty's Government, to put 6,000 tons
a year to the Government at market prices in
deliveries of equal quantities per month. On
the other hand, the Government have under this
contract the right, in reduction of that put, to
call for the deliverv of 1.000 tons of nickel a
year at a fixed price of £125 a ton. Irrespec-
tively of this contract. His Majesty's Government
subscribed in the year 1917 for 3,000,000 dollars
six per cent. First Mortgage Gold Bonds in the
British America Nickel Corporation at a cost
of £620,000. The Corporation undertook to pay
interest on this loan at the rate of six per cent.
per annum and to repay the principal in five
annual instalments from 1st January, 1920.
Up to the present time there has been no
delivery of nickel under the contract mentioned
in the preceding paragraph; and, as a fact, the
world-supply of nickel has been, and is at present,
in excess of the demand. No interest on the
loan of £620,000 has been paid, nor any instal-
ment of the redemption of the loan.
As the British America Nickel Corporation
have failed to carry out their agreement, we
recommend that an immediate effort be made
to recover as much of the capital as practicable,
and in particular that no further liability be
incurred in the matter.
198 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The military, diplomatic and other aspects of these
transactions will be briefly given here.
Nickel is a very hard metal of universal use in the
manufacture of steel, and especially of steel arma-
ments, to which it imparts strength : it is, moreover,
a metal for which no substitute has yet been
discovered.
The ore from which nickel is obtained is to be found
in very few countries, and the only outside source
from which Germany could obtain it during the war
was Norway. Germany's own stocks of nickel were
meagre, and during the war she called in nickel coins,
nickel steel and manufactured nickel articles in
general use : the Norwegian ore became indispensable
to her.
There was only one factory in Norway that pro-
duced nickel in any important quantity, the Kristian-
sand Nikkei Raffineringswerk, known as the K.N.R.
This company was under contract to supply Germany
with a certain monthly quantity, which would appear
to have been about 60 tons. Norway's total nickel
exports, practically all of which went to Germany,
were as follows : —
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
594
696
760
722
442 tons
An agreement was drawn up by H.M. Government
with the K.N.R. with the object of limiting the
export of nickel to Germany. For this agreement
H.M. Government paid the sum of £1,000,000. The
particulars of the agreement are not accurately known ;
but the limit agreed upon as the maximum quantity
to be exported was, there is good reason to suppose,
about 80 tons a month. This limit appears to have
been arrived at on information supplied to H.M.
METALS 199
Government that the K.N.R. could produce 1,500 tons
of nickel a year. My own information on this point,
taking the efficiency of production at the company's
own estimate, was that 1,300 tons was a liberal
allowance to make; but without supplies of nickel
ore from New Caledonia, which ceased soon after the
outbreak of war, the maximum production would be
somewhere about 720 tons a year — possibly a little
more.
Thus a million pounds was paid to prevent the
K.N.R. from supplying Germany with nickel greatly
in excess of the works' capacity : it was paid for a
contract that bound us not to interfere with the
supply of nickel to Germany. The negotiations with'
the K.N.R. were conducted by H.M. Government
independently of the Legation, which, by suitable
pressure, could have prevented the export of the
larger part of the nickel to Germany, or could have
stopped the production of the nickel itself.
This agreement led to H.M. Government's being
involved in transactions with the British America
Nickel Corporation; and the question that comes
uppermost in the mind is. Who were the advisers of
H.M. Government in these transactions, and why
were the latter carried through without reference to
the Legation in Christiania, which had been so
successful in other directions in making Germany
feel the pressure of our blockade?
The representations that I made (officially) with
the view of getting the nickel traffic stopped led to
nothing; nevertheless on the 3rd May, 1917, the
K.N.R, had sent almost its last consignment of nickel
to Germany : it met its doom at the hands of the
Norwegians themselves.
The indefensible sinkings of Norwegian ships by
200 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
German submarines, the loss of life they caused, and
the sufferings endured by survivors in open boats
created in Norway a deep and bitter feeling of enmity
towards Germany. This feeling found expression in
a petition by the Mates' Union to the Storthing for
the cessation of all nickel exports to Germany, on
the ground that nickel was the metal used in the
construction of torpedoes; and soon afterwards,
towards the end of April 1917, a very envenomed
attack upon the K.N.R. was made by the Norwegian
Press, including newspapers of all shades of political
opinion.
In the fourth paragraph of the extract quoted on
p. 197 from the Report on National Expenditure,
allusion is made to the British America Nickel Cor-
poration. This Corporation's interests were closely
identified with those of the K.N.R. The managing
director of the British America Nickel Corporation,
Mr. James Hamet Dunn (now Sir James Dunn, Bart.),
was then in Copenhagen. Conceiving it possible that
Mr. Dunn might be interested in the attitude of the
Norwegian Press towards the K.N.R., I forwarded
to him without delay a cutting from one of the
Norwegian papers, almost immediately on receipt of
which Mr. Dunn proceeded to Christiania : but to no
purpose; for soon after his arrival, in May 1917, the
K.N.R. works were practically destroyed by fire.
This untoward event settled the question of nickel
for the time. But when the incident had been
forgotten the work of rebuilding the K.N.R. com-
menced at once; and the company stated that full
production would again be possible in January 1918.
A second agreement was drawn up by H.M. Govern-
ment on much the same lines as the original agree-
ment ; but again the Norwegians came to our rescue :
METALS 201
for just before the new works were completed a
second Press campaign was launched, no less violent
than its predecessor of the spring. Bowing to
pressure of public opinion the Norwegian Government
intervened, and the K.N.R., instead of nickel, was
compelled to produce electrolytic copper, of which
Norway stood in need.
The effect of the fire at the K.N.R. works was to
reduce the export of nickel in 1917 to 442 tons.
Besides the benefit that Germany obtained from the
direct import of Norway's nickel, she profited exten-
sively from the use that Sweden made of nickel in
her steel manufactories, which were worked in
Germany's interest. The Swedish statistics are as
follows : —
Imports (Metric Tons)
1913 1914
1915
1916
1917
Total 150 136
United Kingdom and British Empire 27 60
504
328
125
78
40
16
Exports (Metric Tons).
Total 1 —
Germany and Austria . . — —
70
70
30
30
7
7
In 1915 the United Kingdom sent to Sweden more
than twice her pre-war imports; of Sweden's total
import of 504 tons in 1915, 70 tons were sent to
Germany. The greater part of this quantity was
virtually sent by us, the remaining 434 tons being
used in the country for Germany's benefit in the
manufacture of war materials. We sent Sweden twelve
times the amount of nickel in 1915 that we did in
1913.
When the first agreement was drawn up with the
K.N.R. a very large sum of money was paid for an
object which it did not achieve, and which could have
202 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
been effectively achieved by the resources at the
command of the British Legation in Christiania.
This agreement, however, was made in circumstances
of stress when nickel was wanted, and when there
was not time for the same careful financial and
commercial scrutiny to be made before the transac-
tion was concluded as there would have been in
normal circumstances. But in the case of the second
Agreement the circumstances were very different.
There were no facts connected with the K.N.R.
having either a military, a financial, a diplomatic or
a doubtful bearing on the known and the suspected
transactions in which the company was involved
that were not brought by me to the notice of the
proper authorities. This information included, in
addition to what has been narrated here, such matter
as must have made it clear that military and financial
interests, that is to say the State interests and those
of the private individual, were in conflict, and that
the former were in danger. H.M. Government were
well aware of the influence commanded in Norway
by the British Legation, and of the beneficial results
of the firm control that had been acquired and exer-
cised over Norwegian private interests through the
medium of British-controlled imports. Again, with
greater pertinacity, the questions press themselves
upon the mind : On whose advice was it that this
consideration should have been overruled, and that,
in the light of the knowledge in possession of H.M.
Government, arrangements should have been made
whereby Germany was assured of the greater part of
Norway's output of nickel ? And that the nickel com-
pany should have been paid by H.M. Government
for sending the nickel to Germany?
The trucks that carried the nickel from the mines
METALS 203
to the factory were hauled by British coal : lubricat-
ing oil, canvas (for diaphragms) and food were all
controlled by us. When the K.N.R. works were
destroyed by fire the work of reconstruction could
have been prevented or seriously impeded by " black-
listing " the firm, as it was the practice to do with
all other firms that worked against British interests.
In place, however, of such salutary action, a second
agreement was drawn up. Let it be made clear that
the expenditure of a million pounds is not cavilled
at : it is the one bright feature in these transactions ;
it was worth the expending for a fling at the enemy :
but everything else here recorded, and much, more-
over, not recorded,, jg^iiaXfiJlv^ejiin very ugly obscurity.
Tin
Tin is a product of the British Empire, and is
found in large quantities in the Straits Settlements.
It is a commodity which enters into the manufacture
of cans for the preservation of foodstuffs, and on this
account is of great military importance.
In all the Scandinavian countries tin assumed vast
importance during the war. In Norway it entered
essentially into the " canning " and the condensed
milk industries, of which the canning industry was
by far the more important. When war broke out
there were in Norway large accumulated stocks of
the finished cans (the ordinary sardine tin is known
in the trade as a " can ") for packing fish, in addition
to stocks of tin plate; at first there was little that
could be done to prevent these stocks from being
made use of for packing the fish and enabling it to
be sent to Germany : this partly accounts for the
large Norwegian exports to Germany in 1915. In the
204 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
packing of fish either olive oil or tomato pulp is used
as a preservative, the oil itself being a fatty sub-
stance of high nutritive value : in some of the
countries bordering on the Mediterranean it is
extensively used with bread by the poorer classes
as a staple article of diet. Pressure was gradually
brought to bear on the " black canners " — a name
given to those who worked in Germany's interest —
by withholding supplies of tin, olive oil and tomato
pulp. To circumvent these measures other means
had to be devised for obtaining the fish : in this the
Germans and the black canners were partly — but
only partly — successful. Instead of tin, cases of
enamelled iron were used : these were made in Ger-
many and sent to Norway. The black canners had
great difficulty in finding an efficient substitute for
the olive oil and tomato pulp; they ultimately used
a substance known as " fish bouillon," which, how-
ever, was of far less value than the oil and tomato
pulp.
The effect on Germany of the control exercised by
the Legation was two-fold : it stopped the supplies
of tin and olive oil from reaching her — a result which
alone was well worth the achieving; but it also
made her work for her fish. Germany had to expend
man-power in making the enamelled cases, which
would not stand the same wear and tear as would
the tin cans; she also lost the nourishment of the
olive oil : in both cases she suffered a loss in military
efficiency. It is to be noted that the canned goods
exported by Norway to Germany included those
which were packed in the German enamelled cans.
The great German purchasing agency, the Z.E.G.,
had its agents established throughout Norway.
These agents had full knowledge of all measures
METALS 205
taken by the British authorities to prevent Norwegian
supplies from reaching Germany; it was no easy
work to make headway against the opposition of this
powerful and influential organisation, which had
unlimited funds at its disposal : nevertheless neither
the Z.E.G. nor the black canners were able success-
fully to withstand the pressure brought to bear for
defeating their ends. Though the black canners
searched every hole and corner in Norway, not an
ounce of tin was there to be found. Most of these
canners were brought round gradually to work in
the British interest, and those who did so were able
to ply their trade as in peace time.
It was the same in the condensed milk trade;
but here the traffic was stopped almost at once.
Norway's exports to Germany and Austria were as
follows (in tons) : —
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
447 249 100 4 —
whereas our own supply was well maintained : it
was : —
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
2,957
2,773
2,917
1,329
7,359
Most of the remainder of the condensed milk was
sent to our Allies.
Condensed milk has great military value : it will
keep well, is easily handled and is very nutritious.
When the condensed milk supply was cut off from
Germany by our control of tin, fresh milk was sent
to her in bottles. Fresh milk, being perishable, was
of far less military value than condensed milk : never-
theless it was a very important article of food and
it was not well that Germany should have it. Atten-
tion was therefore turned to the Norwegian glass
206 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
bottle-making factories, which depended for their
working upon British coal : and coal was withheld
from all firms that supplied bottles to milk exporters.
The result was immediate and effective.
The figures for milk (sterilised, including cream)
are as follows : —
NoRWEGiAK Exports (Tons)
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
To Germany and Austria
. 282
173
257
498
—
To the United Kingdom
. 427
1,310
1,685
1,469
1,261
The figures of the exports to Germany and Austria
do not appear to reveal the effect of the coal pressure
that was exerted; this effect would have been very
apparent if pressure had not been applied, and the
figures could then have been seen for the Norwegian
exports. Germany obtained the above compara-
tively small quantities probably by sending her own
bottles to Norway.
The bottle-makers were rather more difficult to
deal with than the black canners : for whereas the
canners had no case whatever, the bottle-makers
could point, with considerable truth, to the injury
to the community that would be caused by inter-
ference with the milk supply of Christiania and other
towns. The health of the inhabitants, it was urged,
was at stake and the importance of milk to children
was paramount. Complaints poured in from all
quarters, representatives of firms being sent to the
Legation primed with every form of protest that
reason could suggest. In some cases, it is to be
feared, reason suggested very strong language, but
on the whole a moderate tone prevailed, and in many
cases it was only necessary to explain the cause of
the trouble for these men to go away satisfied. They
METALS 207
could have British coal, but it must not be used in
the service of our enemies. Reason soon brought
these men over to our side and no calamity overtook
the women and children of Christiania. Many of
these Norwegians enjoyed working in our service
when they knew that our measures were directed
against Germany and not against Norway.
Denmark's principal tin industry was concerned
with the manufacture of tins for the export of butter
to tropical climates. On the outbreak of war this
trade in butter ceased, and Denmark's requirements
of tin correspondingly decreased : but her supplies,
which came almost entirely from the British Empire
during the war, did not. The Danish imports were
as follows : —
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
From all countries . . 329
From the United Kingdom and
British Empire . ,172
379
261
339
317
471
466
240 tons
228 „
Her exports were practically nil.
The tin with which we so prodigally supplied Den-
mark was very largely used in the manufacture of
cans for " Goulash " (known also under the more
polite-sounding title of " Conserves "). Goulash was
esteemed a great luxury in Germany : so much so
that its export rose from 131 tons in 1913 to 16,000
tons in 1915 and 19,000 tons in 1916. It is due to
the rapid growth of the trade in Goulash that the
Goulash baron owes his title and renown.
Our tin was also used for making and maintaining
in repair the milk cans that carried milk to Germany.
The quantity of milk carried by these cans rose from
457 tons in 1913 to 3,000 and 8,000 tons respectively \
in 1916 and 1917 : so that on the whole Germany
did not do so badly out of our tin trade.
208 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Denmark, it is true, sent us considerable supplies
of condensed milk; but these supplies were slightly
below the pre-war round figure : and, moreover, it
was to meet the requirements of this branch of the
tin trade that a part of our pre-war supplies to
Denmark was specially allocated. Seeing that Den-
mark's total requirements during the war would be
the less from the loss of a large part of her oversea
export trade, it follows that by continuing the import
of pre-war quantities she had always a large balance
available for other purposes : she had also accumu-
lated stocks of tin and cans on hand when war broke
out; and since Denmark did not export any of her
tinned butter to her old customers she must have
used it in the country for Germany's benefit.
Let us see what we were doing to help Germany in
Sweden.
Swedish Imports (Metkic Tons)
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
Total ....
From the United Kingdom
British Empire
. 1,082
and
. 735
Exports
1,481
1,130
4,189
3,693
996
972
308
163
Total ....
To Germany and Austria .
. 86
2
517
306
3,454
3,180
35
35
28
28
Sweden was Germany's workshop, and what she
did not send direct to Germany she used mainly in
Germany's interests. And what did she send to
Germany? Before the war nothing: in 1915 more
than 3,000 tons, corresponding to the quantity she
received from Great Britain in that year, and which
was five times the amount she received from us
before the war.
Tin serves as a good example of the potential war
value as distinct from the ordinary commercial value
METALS 209
of commodities. Tin affected Germany's food sup-
plies; copper, zinc and nickel affected chiefly her
munition supplies. The metals that we sent and
allowed to be sent to Scandinavia were food and
munitions for Germany. The transactions in metals
spoken of in this chapter are, I venture to think,
scarcely consistent with the accepted canons of
economic warfare in which our existence was at
stake. They militated against good results achieved
by economic pressure in other directions, and furnish
examples of the various contributory causes which
retarded the calamity that ultimately overtook the
German Empire after these un-warlike transactions
had been stopped.
CHAPTER X
miscellaneous commodities
Tea— Coffee— Cocoa
In the debate in the House of Commons on
26th January, 1916, Commander Leverton Harris,
R.N.V.R., in the course of a speech (described by
Lord Grey as " most interesting and full of know-
ledge "), tells us that while we should keep out things
they (the Germans) really needed— such as articles of
military or economic value— by letting them have
luxuries we were really doing them harm. It was
interesting to find that while we were trying to keep
certain classes of goods out of Germany the German
Government was also trying to keep out the same
goods. The difficulty lay in deciding exactly what
goods Germany should be allowed to receive ; whether,
for example, tea and cocoa should be included, and
he had changed his mind more than once about tea.
All imports into Germany had to be paid for by
exports or by gold.^
It is difficult to approach this curious thesis in
serious vein except on the supposition that Germany
possessed several years' stocks. It would have been
interesting and instructive to obtain expert opinion
as to the value of tea and cocoa from some of our
own men, preferably from those who had just
returned from the water-logged trenches of Flanders
1 Parliamentary Debates, No. 153, pp. 3121, 3122, 26th January,
1916.
210
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 211
in winter time : I venture to think that their expe-
rience would have enabled them to form a tolerably
correct opinion as to whether tea and cocoa had any
military value.
Viewed from the rationing of neutrals' point of
view, everything that is eaten or drunk, including
alcohol, is produced from the land; and therefore all
such imports into a neutral country release either
some other form of food or drink — or land, which
would yield other produce available for export. Let
us suppose that all tea, coffee and cocoa were withheld
from Denmark : some substitutes for these com-
modities would have to be found, and the Danes
would be forced to consume more beer, milk or soups.
More of these latter commodities would have to be
produced : for beer more fodder, which is used in the
brewing, would be required; an increase of milk
would be obtainable only at the sacrifice of butter;
and by consuming more soups there would be the
less meat and vegetables for export, and therefore
more land would have to be given up for the pro-
duction of meat and the cultivation of vegetables.
We will look into the question of our trade in tea,
about which the mind had changed more than once.
The figures would seem to indicate that these processes
of mental metamorphosis on the net balance inclined
very strongly in favour of the trade in this superfluous
luxury.
Exports from the United Kingdom (tons) to : —
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
Russia .
Sweden .
Norway
Denmark
. 5,080
109
78
370
1,521
168
123
1,970
2,995
469
194
4,528
2,090
2,952
176
1,602
90
2
7
105
(2,000 lbs. = 1 ton except Russia = 2,240)
These figures at first sight would suggest that
212 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Germany received through Denmark alone from the
United Kingdom several thousands of tons of tea
during 1914-1916, Denmark's total imports from all
countries in 1913 being only 539 tons, which figure
rose to 4,528 tons in 1915 from Great Britain alone.
It cannot, of course, be asserted that all the surplus
tea went to Germany, but it is certainly not easy to
account for it in any other way; seeing that Sweden,
Norway and Russia are charged separately with their
consignments, and that Germany is the only possible
remaining customer.
Lord Grey drew the attention of the United States
to the fact that the dislocation of trade on the outbreak
of war would cause diversion of traffic which would
be reflected in abnormal trade figures shown in
statistics. It is possible that the inflated figure of
4,528 tons in 1915 and other figures noticeable in the
table may be attributable in part to some such cause.
The British and the Scandinavian statistics on tea
are so widely divergent that it is useless attempting
to draw more than general conclusions from them;
but an inference that can be drawn with certainty is
that large quantities of unspecified amount reached
Germany through Scandinavia, and principally through
Denmark.
Denmark and Sweden acknowledge to the following
receipts from all countries : —
1913 1914
1915
1916
1917
Denmark 539 608
Sweden . . . .233 212
1,481
250
1,250
496
211
96
The Danish exports were : —
To Germany ... 3 90
„ Sweden ... 17 27
590
33
220
142
-
and Sweden sent Germany 161 tons in 1916.
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 213
The facts of which we can be quite certain are these :
on Denmark's own admission she received from us
tea for her own use, i. e. tea not in transit, in 1915
and 1916 of an amount between two and three times
greater than that she received in 1913. She exported
to Germany very substantial quantities during the
war, whereas her pre-war export was neghgible.
Great Britain sent to Scandinavia immense quantities
of tea whose ultimate destination cannot be traced,
but which probability strongly suggests reached
Germany. Indeed if the above quoted extract from
the speech of Commander Leverton Harris is to be
taken as seriously reflecting the considered views of
H.M. Government, there disappears any point to be
laboured in the discrepancies shown in the figures :
for the Foreign Secretary accepted the view that,
with regard to tea and cocoa, it was uncertain whether
Germany was not herself trying to prevent these
commodities from reaching her : in the case of tea,
at one time it was thought that she was; but at
another time that she was not : the conclusion to be
arrived at is that tea was being sent to Germany
against her will; and the deduction to be drawn
from the figures is that it was successful in reaching
her.
Another anonymous communication reached me one
day. I think it was from some honest Danish steve-
dore : (we had, fortunately, many friends, rich and
poor, among the Danes). If I wanted to know what
was going on would I come down to the wharves ? I
went. This was during the height of the great tea
" ramp " in March, 1916. All the wharves in Copen-
hagen were choked with cases of tea, a large part of
which was from our colonies en route to Germany.
There was a good deal of China tea, but most of it
214 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
was from Ceylon. It was being piled up in cases
mountains high by stevedores.
Exstruere hi monies ad sidera summa parabant.^
Some of my colleagues were on the scene, and the
face of one of them was a very interesting study in
sardonics.
On 4th April, 1916, I wrote as follows to the
Admiralty :—
Having put a check on cocoa and coffee, tea is
now the game. All the wharves at Copenhagen
are covered with very large quantities of tea.
The Consul and I walked along the quays among
thousands of cases. I must confess to a feeling
of degradation when I see all this stuff, a large
part of which comes from our own Colonies, en
route to Germany. There is a very large quantity
of China tea, but the greater part is Ceylon.
Who is at the bottom of this business ? To me
it is quite incomprehensible. There is a shortage
of tonnage and yet here we are allowing tea, a
most bulky substance, to be shipped from the
Far East in enormous quantities to comfort our
enemies. Is it any wonder that we are called
hypocrites ?
As to sending tea to Germany for the purpose of
extracting gold, if Norwegian fish, Danish agricultural
produce and even Swedish iron ore failed to achieve
this object it is not likely that an article of no military
value would stand any better chances of success.
In an action that was brought against a firm of tea
merchants for exporting large quantities of tea to
Copenhagen without taking adequate measures to
secure that it should not reach Germany, the Attorney-
General for the Crown said {Times, 4th April, 1919) : —
1 Ovid on teas, etc.
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 215
It would be shown that the total exports of
the firm to Denmark about the time, i. e. from
6th November, 1915, to 8th January, 1916, of
tea were 708 tons, and of that 514 tons were
sent to Caroe alone. On the other hand, the
pre-war consumption of tea for the whole of
Denmark for the year was only 491 tons. The
defendants, therefore, exported to Denmark in
two months to one consignee alone one and a
half times a whole year's pre-war supply. . . .
The defendants sent to Caroe for further forms of
guarantee ; at the same time they said that they
were under the impression that Caroe was reviving
a connection with Russia.
On the point of law raised in the case the defendants
succeeded and a subsequent appeal made by the Crown
failed. In the course of the final proceedings Lord
Justice Scrutton made the following observations : —
It was clear that the goods consigned to Caroe
did go to Germany, and it was also clear that
the defendants suspected that goods were going
to Germany. The course which they adopted
was (1) to tell the Government the names of
their customers and to ask whether any of them
were suspicious. But they did not tell the
Government what they knew : and the Govern-
ment did not necessarily know how large their
shipments to Caroe were as compared with the
previous shipments to him and their shipments
to other customers; (2) they took declarations
from Caroe. The form of declaration which Caroe
usually gave was either that the tea was " for
home trade only " or " will not be re-exported
216 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
by me." Both of these forms left the obvious
loophole that Caroe should make a sale in Den-
mark to someone who would then re-export, and
Caroe did not seem anxious to extend his declara-
tion, nor were the defendants pressing to see
that he did so extend it.
If the appeal had succeeded it would not have
brought back the tea from Germany. The case is
quoted here as illustrating the simplicity of trading
with the enemy. The responsibility for allowing tea
to leave the country in any quantity rested with tea
merchants, not with the Government. The guarantee
against re-export was appraised as to its worth not
by the Government or the British Legation, but by
the tea merchants* The only deterrent to trading in
this and in other merchandise was a penalty in case
of proof that regulations had been infringed. The
regulations were of so lax a character that trade
could be carried on with an immunity from risk in
most cases that made it quite worth while to accept
the risk in all cases. When Germany wanted goods
she had merely to signify her pleasure to Denmark,
and to leave it to that country to furnish the means
of providing them, which caused her no trouble
whatever.
The quantity of cocoa that Germany received was
so prodigious that she converted it into sweets and
sold them to the Scandinavian countries.
In 1915 Sweden alone imported 15,880 tons of
cocoa as against 1,668 tons in 1913. Of this 15,880
tons (from British statistics) it is not possible to trace
the quantities that went to Germany.
According to British statistics Denmark received in
1915 21,387 tons of cocoa, of which 4,719 came from
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 217
the United Kingdom; we sent her more than twice
her pre-war import.
The difference in the total imports to Scandinavia
as charged in the Scandinavian statistics and the
British statistics is partly accountable to the fact
that Scandinavian countries did not give credit to
supplies in transit. The ultimate destination of the
immense supplies that were sent to Scandinavia must
remain a matter for conjecture, in which Germany
cannot be ignored.
Coffee is the universal and favourite beverage in
Sweden. When shiploads of coffee were to be seen in
the docks en route to Germany, not a peck of it at
one time could be obtained in the Swedish cafes.
The coffee exports from the United Kingdom were
as follows : —
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
To Sweden . . 922 1,266 2,137 1,063 20
„ Norway . . 337 847 2,029 2,522 1,868
„ Denmark . . 234 925 3,149 3,204 1,740
With which record we will leave the subject of
these useless beverages, and pass on to Beer. £ ,, u.. •
Beer
The following appeared in German orders in the
early summer of 1917 : —
Strict orders
Regarding the representations which have been
made on the part of the breweries that they were
not able to fulfil their remaining obligations up
to time in respect of deliveries to the army in
the field on account of the lack of barrels, coal,
rolling stock, workmen or other causes, the com-
218 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
missariat will naturally make every effort as far
as possible to be of assistance; but it must be
unconditionally insisted upon that the full quan-
tities of beer guaranteed are forwarded to the
termini arranged by the commissariat. This un-
conditional demand is made because the deliveries
of beer to the troops in the field have already
been restricted to the utmost, and it is of first
importance that the fighting troops must in all
cases be supplied with beer even though in
restricted quantities.
The breweries were further warned that necessary
measures would be taken to meet cases of negligence,
and that such breweries would not be allowed to
share in the approaching harvest.
Germany was in a bad way at that time, and there
was extreme shortage in tea, coffee, cocoa, bouillon
and milk. It need hardly be said that Denmark
threw herself most gallantly into the breach, and sent
Germany some additional 5,000 or 6,000 tons of beer
in 1916 and 1917. The exports are as follows : —
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
Total . . . 4,779 5,328 7,070 9,859 6,729 tons
Germany . . 51 30 841 6,146 5,673 „
United Kingdom . 2,580 2,710 1,441 552 4 „
To enable her to do this she had to stop our supplies,
which therefore became scarcer : beer at home had
already begun to show a tendency to increase in
price, and a rather more pronounced one to disguise
its identity. For the brewing of beer, malt or malt
substitutes are required, i. e. corn, rice, or maize, or,
generally, fodder materials. These came through our
blockade and were under our control : Denmark's
breweries were worked with our coal, which Germany
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 219
herself was unable to supply. Shortly it came to
this : that the German troops were badly in need of
beer; in order to meet the demand of the German
troops we adulterated our own beer, raised its price,
and reduced its quantity : we honoured Denmark's
demand for fodder and, Germany herself being unable
to meet the Danish requirements for coal, we ourselves
supplied her with that commodity ad lib.
In 1917 we were quite satisfied with 4 tons of beer
instead of 2,600 : Germany received about 6,000
instead of 50 tons.
Cotton
In an obituary notice, which appeared in Nature, it
was said of the late Mr. Bertram Blount that " he
appeared to be exhausted by his successful struggle
in 1915 to bring cotton within the list of contraband
goods."
The late Sir William Ramsay, who was untiring in
his efforts to get an embargo on cotton, in a letter to
a friend of mine, written in July, 1915, said : " We
are still struggling to get cotton declared contraband."
When war broke out Germany concentrated her
efforts — especially as she anticipated (wrongly) being
cut off from jute, a product of our Indian Empire —
on obtaining all the cotton she could. The success
that she achieved may be judged from one or two
figures from the Scandinavian and the British
statistics.
Sweden's total imports of cotton (raw, carded and
waste) rose from 24,800 tons in 1913 to 123,200 tons
in 1915. Of this the supply from the United Kingdom
and the British Empire, which was 1,940 tons in 1913,
rose to 10,300 in 1915 (we were doing our best), and
220 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Sweden's export to Germany and Austria increased
from 236 tons in 1913 to 76,000 tons in 1915. British
statistics place the Swedish imports at even a higher
figure. In the case of Norway our pre-war suppUes
of 460 tons in 1913 increased to 6,600 in 1915 ; and
Denmark, who received only 14 tons in 1913, was
supplied with 3,000 tons in 1915 and 6,000 tons in 1916.
The total quantities (in tons) of cotton waste, raw
cotton and yarn that were supplied by us to Norway,
Sweden and Denmark from 1913 to 1917 were as
follows : —
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
6,195
7,431
33,374
18,560
7,534
None of the above figures include piece goods,
which are given below (for convenience) in millions of
yards, and represent the supplies from the United
Kingdom and the British Empire :—
Piece Goods
1913
1914
1915
1916
191'
To Sweden .
„ Norway .
„ Denmark
. 13
. 17
. 16
11
16
22
12
22
32
21
37
46
20
27
41
Denmark in 1916 received in piece goods alone a
quantity equivalent to over 16 yards per head of her
j population.
(Holland received over 100,000 tons more cotton in
1915 than in 1913.)
The effect of declaring cotton contraband (8th
August, 1915) can be seen most clearly from the
Swedish statistics, which show a fall in her total
imports of 123,000 tons in 1915 to 29,000 in 1916 :
the Swedish exports to Germany and Austria in 1915
were 76,000 tons; in 1916 they had vanished to zero;
and there they remained.
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 221
Up to the time of the recent war nitrocellulose was
invariably made of cotton ; and although experiments
were carried out by Germany with the view of finding
a possible substitute, they were not successful.
When Germany was cut off from cotton she was
obliged to fall back upon a pulp made from wood
fibre, and known as sulphite pulp. There is a sulphite
pulp and a sulphate pulp. The sulphite pulp was
used for the manufacture of explosives, and the
sulphate pulp for sandbags and for general military
and commercial purposes for replacing cotton. The
effect of declaring cotton contraband is seen in the
figures of Sweden's exports of these two classes of
pulps to Germany : —
1915 1916 1917
Sulphite .... 33,600 60,000 90,500 tons
Sulphate .... 21,600 88,400 91,700 „
Most of the largest pulp mills of Sweden are fitted
with " mechanical stokers " adapted specially for the
burning of British coal; and it was British coal to a
large extent that was used by the Swedish mills :
further, for every 18 tons of these pulps that were
produced about 15 tons of coal had to be used.
Although Germany is a great manufacturer of wood
pulps, yet during the war she was unable to develop
these industries — ^perhaps it would be more correct to
say that it was with difficulty she could keep them
going— because, although she had large forests, the
felling of timber and the carrying of it to the mills
was a drain upon her man-power beyond her resources :
nor was there the man-power for mining the coal
necessary for working the mills. Every ton of
imported cotton or imported pulp was a saving of
man-power to Germany, where cotton was most strictly
222 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
rationed : nothing in the cotton line was to be bought
or sold in the shops without authority. When the
great demand for cotton arose not an ounce of
chemical pulp was obtained from Norway's mills,
which also depended upon British coal.
Our cotton transactions during the war are not
inconsistent with the Foreign Secretary's expressed
\ wishes before the war that the " contraband list should
be made as small as possible " : nor with the views
of the humane part of the population of these islands
(that is to say, of the part that was engaged in trade)
that war should be confined to the armed forces and
that trade should go so as usual with everybody
else.
For further particulars the reader is referred to the
frontispiece of this book.
Binder Twine
Binder twine is a strong cordage used with reaping
and binding machines. To an agricultural country
like Denmark, which was dependent for her twine
upon supplies from oversea, it was one of the most
important of all commodities, and particularly so
because reaping and binding machines are labour-
saving devices. Before the war the Danes imported
every year at harvest time a very large quantitj^ of
cheap labour from Poland. This and all external
sources of labour were cut off when war broke out :
binder twine then assumed a greatly enhanced value.
Again, so far as is known, it had not been found
possible to use wood fibre instead of hemp as a basis
in the manufacture of this twine, which must be of
small diameter but capable of standing a heavy strain.
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 223
The figures for imports, taken from the British
statistics, are as follows : —
From the British Empire .
„ foreign countries
1916
Tons
1,135
1,235
1917 (Jan, to Sept.)
Tons
156
1,442, of which 1,403 were from U.S.
Total ....
Average 1911-1913 .
2,370
1,463
1,598
1,098
It will be noticed that dm'ing 1916, when the exports
of agricultural produce from Denmark to Germany
were continually increasing, the imports of binder-
twine were allowed to exceed the pre-war average by
38 per cent. ; and practically half of the whole amount
came from the British Empire.
One of the most influential and efficiently conducted
concerns in the world is the American International
Harvester Company. The agent of this company in
Denmark would be fully alive to all our transactions
in binder-twine : the nature of these transactions
would therefore not be slow to reach Washington.
Implicated, as we ourselves had been, in this traffic,
we were not in a position at the end of 1916 to ask
the United States to reduce their imports during
1917. It is not, therefore, surprising to find that
although during the period January to September
1917 our own exports had been reduced to 156 tons
those of America show a substantial increase, bringing
the total imports to Denmark during 1917 to an
amount largely in excess of the pre-war average.
That a demand for binder-twine during 1916 had
not arisen by reason of any shortage of commodities
of a similar nature is shown from the imports of
" ropes, string and other cordages " for that year,
which were as follows : —
224 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Tons
From the British Empire .... 1,281
„ foreign countries .... 432
Total 1,713
Average 1911-1913 1,154
These imports, it will be noticed, also exceeded the
pre-war average : they were supplied almost entirely
by the British Empire for the maintenance of the
Danish fishing industry at a time when the whole of
that industry was mobilised in the German service.
By our own trade in 1916, which had stimulated
America to increase hers in 1917, we had forfeited
any moral right to speak to America on the subject.
Flax and Jute
Many trades at home were threatened with semi-
extinction by the supplies of raw materials that were
sent to neutrals. Mr. Ernest S. Brown in a letter to
the Morning Post on 28th March, 1918, quotes the
case of the Irish linen industry, which was so vital to
our air offensive. The occupation of Belgium seriously
affected the supplies of flax with which the linen
industry is fed ; and with the fall of Riga in September,
1917, practically the whole of the world's supply of
flax became the monopoly of the enemy. The linen
industry, in which 70,000 people in the north of
Ireland alone were engaged, affected indirectly some
two hundred other trades, as, for instance, book-
binding, saddlery and boot-making; yet in spite of
the shortage of flax and of the fact that the Irish flax
crop of 1917 was the worst for ten years, huge con-
signments containing flax in the shape of yarns, piece
goods and linen thread were allowed to leave the
country. It was not until January, 1918, that the
authorities awoke to the stern realities of the situation,
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 225
which had become so desperate that an Order in
Council was pubhshed forbidding all exports.
" The inevitable panacea," says Mr. Brown, " to
cover departmental blunders, in the shape of a
Committee, has been appointed to investigate in
all its bearings the question of increasing the
supply of flax within the British Empire; but
probably before the Committee has even reported
the shortage will be so acute that it will be
necessary for us to issue licences to trade with
the enemy. This ignominious device was resorted
to by Mr. McKenna when we were destitute of
dyes in 1915. Quite apart from the commercial
aspect, the shortage is more serious just now, as
the supply of flax is almost as important as that
of shells. The German Press is jubilant over the
acquisition of this vast supply of raw material,
in the shape of flax from Courland, and states
that ' it adds immensely to the wealth of Ger-
many, and makes her more independent than ever
before of foreign countries.'
5 5J
Speaking of jute Mr. Brown tells us that our exports
to Scandinavia during the war were so excessive as to
place the home trade in a very precarious position.
" For the next six or seven years," he says,
*' when the British housewife deplores the loss of
her napery she will have to console herself with
the elevating thought that its absence is due to
the ' humanitarian principles ' upon which the
blockade was run by Viscount Grey and his
successor. Lord Robert Cecil."
226 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Hides and Skins
During the war Denmark exported close on 1,000,000
head of Hve cattle to Germany. With the 200,000
tons of meat and fat for explosives represented by
these exports we are not here concerned, but with
the question of leather only. Hides and leather are
the principal raw materials for boots and other articles
of military equipment : boots were worn by German
troops when marching as a protection for the feet :
this discovery was made in 1917.
Hides and leather were to be obtained by Germany
by importing either cattle on hoof or the raw hides
and tanned leather : it is clear that the less we sent
to Scandinavia the less would be available for re-export
to Germany. By withholding hides, leather, boots
and tanning materials from Denmark and Sweden,
those countries would be compelled to use their own
hides : but even so they could not make use of them
for the purposes of leather without tanning materials.
During the war Great Britain supplied Denmark
not only with very large quantities of hides, skins,
leather and tanning materials, but also with boots
and shoes, thus enabling Denmark not only to con-
tinue the export of cattle on hoof, which had com-
menced in the early days of the war, but also to send
thousands of tons of the raw materials, and many
hundreds of tons of leather, boots and shoes. One of
the ingredients of tanning material is a substance
known as Quebracho, of which we sent Denmark 400
tons in 1915 as against 100 tons in 1913. We further
accommodated the Danes by sending them hair, glue
and fats such as oleo and lard, all of which are com-
ponent parts of the beasts that Denmark exported to
Germany.
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 227
Except in respect of live cattle, the export of which
was on a far smaller scale than Denmark's, Sweden's
traffic in leather materials and goods was greatly
facilitated by British importations. During 1915 and
1916 Sweden sent to Germany 3,470 and 2,664 tons
respectively of boots and shoes : the boots were of
military pattern and for the use of the German Army,
and the above figures represent for these two years
over 4,500,000 pairs. During the same period, in
addition to the boots, Sweden sent to Germany and
Austria nearly 50,000 head of cattle on hoof, 6,000
tons of hides and skins and more than 2,000 tons of
tanning materials and tanning extracts. This traffic
was assisted by 2,800 tons of hides and skins and
3,400 tons of tanning materials and extracts which
Sweden received during 1915 and 1916 from the
United Kingdom and the British Empire.
Fertilisers
A word or two about Denmark's method of obtaining
fertilisers.
Although the exports of agricultural produce from
Denmark to the United Kingdom continually de-
creased and those to Germany increased, yet until
1916 the export of artificial manures (chiefly basic
slag, sulphate of ammonia, superphosphates and Chile
saltpetre) from the United Kingdom to Denmark
steadily increased. The figures are as follows : —
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
23,296
28,153
33,659
380
11 tons
When our supplies to Denmark were cut off in
1916 the Danes resorted to other methods of obtaining
fertilisers from us.
Of the 33,659 tons wc sent to Denmark in 1915,
228 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
24,650 consisted of the valuable fertiliser super-
phosphate, which is made by dissolving raw phosphatic
minerals in sulphuric acid. The phosphate rock in
1916 was obtained by Denmark from Algiers and
Tunis, and the sulphur ingredient from the Rio Tinto
mines in Spain. These mines are entirely under
British direction, the Rio Tinto Company being a
British company with head office in London. These
ingredients were converted into superphosphates in
the Danish Superphosphate Factory.
The following figures show how matters were
arranged : —
Phosphate Rock
Imports (Tons)
1913 1914 1915 1916
From Grermany .... 3,225 — — —
„ the United Kingdom . . 15,757 23,325 5,300 nil
„ Algiers and Tunis . . 65,875 49,301 58,238 108,866
Please note the figures in italics.
Pyrites (containing the sulphur ingredient) was
obtained from the Rio Tinto company in the following
amounts : —
1913 1914 1915 1916
12,193 17,937 28,933 18,253 tons
The phosphate rock appeared only in the French
statistics, and the pyrites in the Spanish statistics;
these transactions were therefore unlikely to become
known to those who were not privy to them. As for
our French compatriots-in-arms, they had themselves,
in emulation of our example, taken very kindly to
trading with Scandinavia (though on a much more
modest scale than we did); they would not be likely
to sever their connection as our compatriots-in-trade
without better reasons than we were in a position to
supply them with.
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 229
Professor Somerville, Sibthorpian Professor of Rural
Economy, Oxford,^ pointed out that the wheat
area of the United Kingdom was not of sufficient
extent to absorb our exports of sulphate of ammonia :
our failure, he stated, to use this invaluable fertiliser
on our land was equivalent to the loss of several
hundred thousand tons of shipping. The state of our
shipping during the war had reached a perilous stage ;
and several hundred thousands of tons of it was no
trifle of an amount to lose the use of. By utilising
supplies of ammonia not only would the strain on
shipping have been greatly reduced, but a large part
of our staple foodstuffs, thus produced at home, would
have been freed from the risks to which all oversea
supplies were exposed.
Yet in 1915 and 1916, 294,000 and 259,000 tons
respectively of sulphate of ammonia was exported,
part of it to countries from which we received no
foodstuffs in return, and part to countries that were
working mainly in the interests of our enemies.
The adoption of the Sibthorpian Professor's scheme
would, as far as is known, have entailed no risk of
compromising our relations with America.
Space forbids making mention of many other com-
modities, the transactions in which all tell the same
tale. If the reader should care to study the summary
of supplies in the Appendix he will find it to contain
much information of melancholy interest. Suffice it
to say that although the power of our unarmed forces
was finally and fully vindicated, yet the curves of
supplies to Germany, which are shown on the diagrams
in this book, would have taken their downward
direction at a very much earlier date had our
^ This may be taken by the uninstructed reader to mean that
the Professor knew what he was talking about.
230 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
forces been placed in harness on the outbreak of
war.
A few words remain to be said about prohibited
exports.
There was an impression widely prevalent in
England that goods placed by the Scandinavian
Governments on the list of prohibited exports were
thereby prevented from leaving the country. This
was not the case. Government licences were issued
for a variety of reasons, chief among which were :
political pressure; pressure brought to bear by trade
combinations ; in exchange for goods urgently required
from Germany, such as aniline dyes, electrical
machinery, steel angles and plates and medicines;
and lastly through German diplomatic pressure.
These licences were dispensed with a free hand,
and it is needless to say that they deprived the
prohibition regulations of the Governments of prac-
tically all value. It was common to see in the adver-
tisement columns of the Danish Press announcements
by Danish importers of goods for sale ; these announce-
ments, that intending purchasers should be relieved
of all anxiety on the score of being unable to dispose
of goods on the prohibited export list, were accom-
panied by the notification in bold type " EXPORT
LICENSE ARRANGED."
I sent home a sheaf of Danish newspapers containing
this unblushing evidence of the worthlessness of export
prohibitions. Owing to representations which I made
on this subject the accusing legends were soon after-
wards withdrawn from the advertisement columns of
the newspapers.
Stocks of goods, which had been proscribed by
Government export-prohibition regulations, would in
most cases have been sent to Germany before the
MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES 231
date on which the regulations came into force, the
date, if necessary, being advanced to meet the con-
venience of exporters. Prior to such date Germany-
would have organised successively regular drives in
tea, coffee, soap, lard, copper, oil and other com-
modities. The neutral felt justified in assuming that
at the worst, when the country had been denuded of
a particular commodity and our attention had been
directed to the matter, he would not appeal in vain
for supplies necessary for his own needs.
Prohibited exports were regarded by the smuggler
in a peculiar sense as his lawful game.
Smuggling was rife in Denmark throughout the
war, especially in rubber : here the smuggler proved
a real friend in need to Germany.
The Danish smugglers worked in connection with a
gigantic smuggling centre in Helsingborg, a town on
the Swedish side of the northern approach to Copen-
hagen. One captured smuggler admitted to 10,000
cycle tubes to his credit in a short space of time;
and another had earned a round half million kroner
(about £28,000) during six months. A cycle tube
which in Denmark cost from four to five kroner was
sold for fifteen kroner on the Swedish side of the
Sound, and the cost of automobile tyre covers increased
from 300 to 2,000 kroner.
All surplus rubber was passed along to Germany
by the smuggler. Our trade in rubber (and not in
rubber alone) gave rise to what may be described as
an undesirable though quite natural feeling of com-
mercial jealousy on the part of the French; it pro-
voked rivalry : French motor-tyre makers conceived
that they were not getting their proper share of the
Scandinavian rubber trade : this was true ; and it
was unpleasant that it should be true.
CHAPTER XI
CEMENT TRAFFIC WITH HOLLAND
In 1917 British cement in very large quantities
was shipped to Holland. In October of that year
the matter was thrust upon the public notice by a
report to the effect that this cement was re-exported
from Holland to Belgium, where it was used in the
construction of German defences. This report ap-
peared to receive reliable confirmation from the front
in a letter to The Times from an officer of the R.F.A.
containing the following extract : —
Having just read the protest of the members
of the Baltic Shipping Exchange against the
shipment of cement to Holland, I have no doubt
that it will interest them and others to know that
the pill-box in which I now write, and which was
built by the enemy, is made of British cement.
This I know by a small tin label which was dis-
lodged from the middle of a thick wall by a shell ;
the label was embossed in English.
Public indignation was aroused by this report,
questions were asked in the House of Commons, and
meetings were held in the City to demand the stoppage
of the cement traffic.
On 20th November, 1917, Lord Robert Cecil,
Minister of Blockade, appointed a Committee, under
the presidency of Admiral of the Fleet, the Honour-
able Sir Hedworth Meux, " to inquire whether it is
desirable that the export of cement from this
282
CEMENT TRAFFIC WITH HOLLAND 233
country to Holland should be resumed when the
general embargo on exports to Holland is raised,
and if so, on what conditions."
The export of cement to Holland had been pro-
hibited on the 8th October except under licence, for
reasons, we are told, in no way connected with the
agitation. The case, as stated by the Committee,
is as follows : —
Two theories appear to have been put forward
to support the contention that the export of
cement from the United Kingdom to Holland
is dangerous and undesirable. One was that
British cement was re-exported from Holland to
Belgium, and there utilised for the construction
of German defences. The other theory, advanced
by Mr. A. R. Miles, of A. R. Miles and Company,
ship and insurance brokers, and a member of
the Baltic Exchange, was that the cement ex-
ported to Holland from the United Kingdom
relieved Germany of the necessity of supplying
equivalent quantities, and therefore enabled her
to send proportionately more to the front. These
theories are not on the face of them incompatible ;
indeed, the arguments in favour of the former
have been used by advocates of the latter, even
though they attach no credence to the alternative.^
With regard to the first theory it was proved con-
clusively both from the legends on the tin label and
from chemical analysis of the cement that the latter
was not British : this theory was therefore rejected.
We pass to the second theory, viz., " that by per-
mitting these exports from this country, the Foreign
Office was releasing equivalent quantities of cement
1 Cd. 9023.
234 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
in Germany, for utilisation in military works, which
must otherwise have been sent to Holland."
Mr. Miles had already been in communication with
the Foreign Office, whose views are quoted by the
Committee. They are : —
(a) That there was a surplus of cement in
Germany which, in order to maintain her trade
and support her exchange, Germany was able
and eager to export to contiguous neutrals.
(b) That in any case the guarantees, under
which alone cement may be exported to Holland
from the United Kingdom, preclude the possi-
bility of re-export to Germany or Belgium.
(c) That so long as Germany continues to
export cement to neutrals, it is not conceivable
that she should have insufficient for her own
military purposes.
{d) And that, as in these circumstances the
export of cement to Holland from the United
Kingdom cannot benefit Germany in any way,
it is desirable to continue such export both in
the very pressing interest of our own exchange,
and also in order to increase economic pressure
on Germany by lowering through competition
the prices obtainable for German cement.
With regard to (d) the conclusion that is drawn is,
of course, correct if the assumption on which it is
based is correct ; that is to say if the views contained
in (a), (6) and (c) are correct. Of these (b) refers to
the possibility of direct re-export to Germany which
was rejected by the Committee. The implicit faith
of the Foreign Office in guarantees is not justified by
any security which our goods in Scandinavia were
supposed to receive under this form of safeguard.
CEMENT TRAFFIC WITH HOLLAND 235
The Committee, speaking of the Netherlands Over-
sea Trust (N.O.T.), say : *' It seems to the Committee
highly improbable that such a commodity as cement,
which to be of any value must be obtained in con-
siderable quantities, should escape discovery while
other goods of a more elusive character are detected
and stopped." Nevertheless, 36,000 carcases of
swine, whose coefficient of elusiveness is probably
not higher than that of cement, managed successfully
to evade the vigilance of the Danish authorities. ^
With this reservation (b) may be eliminated, which
leaves (a) and (c) only to examine. These points are
taken up by the Committee.
The Committee tell us that the main feature of
Mr. Miles's argument was that Germany, in order to
obtain Holland's produce, was under a definite
necessity of keeping Holland supplied with cement,
which was necessary for maintaining her dykes and
drainage system in repair to prevent the incursion
of the sea.
It is properly pointed out that Mr. Miles's argument
would only have weight when Germany's ability to
supply Holland, after meeting her own needs, fell
short of Holland's indispensable requirements.
This being the case it is only necessary to know :—
(1) What was Germany's cement-producing capacity
during the war?
(2) What were Germany's military requirements ?
With regard to (1) the Committee point to the fact
that Germany is the largest European producer of
cement for export, and that during the war she had
continued to export certainly to Holland and Denmark,
perhaps also to Norway.
^ See p. 151.
236 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The facts are that Germany sent to Norway far
more cement than to Denmark and Sweden. Both
Sweden and Denmark before the war produced and
exported large quantities of cement : Norway pro-
duced none : she obtained her supphes from Germany
and Denmark.
The impetus given to trade after the outbreak of
war was the cause of considerable industrial develop-
ment in Scandinavia, necessitating the building of
new and enlargement of old workshops and ware-
houses, in the construction of which large quantities
of cement were required. As the war progressed,
a shortage of coal in Sweden and Denmark, but es-
pecially in Denmark, seriously crippled the cement
industry and reduced the normal output of cement.
But the Scandinavian requirements continued to
rise. The result was that the Swedish and Danish
cement manufacturers were unable to fulfil their for-
ward contracts, especially in South America; exports
from Denmark to Norway fell away almost to nothing ;
and the comparatively small amounts that the Scandi-
navian countries had been accustomed to import
from Germany became of considerable importance,
especially to Norway.
In the case of Norway it is seen that her imports
of cement from Germany were far in excess of the
pre-war figures.
But Norway's case was exceptional : she was the
only Scandinavian country from which nickel could
be obtained, and nickel was, as Dr. Helfferich tells
us, vital to Germany. The increase in the German
exports to Norway are also partly to be accounted
for by the loss of the Danish supplies during the war.
The Committee make no reference to these facts.
They go on to say : —
CEMENT TRAFFIC WITH HOLLAND 237
Of her (Germany's) pre-war exports of cement,
amounting in 1913 to over 1,100,000 metric tons,
less than 250,000 metric tons were taken by
countries to which she can still send it. Thus
to meet her military requirements she has a large
excess balance on her normal output, while in
addition to this she has the extensive resources
of Belgium upon which to draw.
These figures leave it to be supposed that Germany
had a surplus of, say, something like 1,000,000 tons
of cement (including the Belgian output) to meet her
military requirements, assuming her output to have
come up to the pre-war figure. But the output of
cement was, as pointed out by the Committee, affected
by three main factors during the war : labour, trans-
port facilities, and coal. These factors are disposed
of by the Committee as follows : —
As regards labour, the Committee are advised
that the manufacture of cement requires mainly
a low grade of labour, and is unlikely to be very
seriously curtailed by the lack of man-power in
Germany. Transport difficulties are certainly
great in Germany at present, and no doubt coal
shortage would tend to diminish the production
of cement if there were more pressing or more
lucrative employment for the coal. The Com-
mittee have, however, been unable to obtain any
evidence that any of these difficulties have
reached a pitch at which supplies to neutrals
have had to be drastically reduced. On the
contrary, a report recently received shows that
Germany is able to maintain her export of cement
to Denmark. . . . The Committee are satisfied
that the curtailment of output, though realised
238 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
to some extent, is still far from the point at which
Germany would be compelled to draw on external
sources of supply (apart from Belgium) to meet
her military requirements.
These matters are taken more seriously in other
quarters ; Ludendorff, for instance, tells us that man-
power caused him the gravest anxiety, especially
during 1916 and afterwards : —
As early as September, 1916, the Chancellor
received the first demands of G.H.Q. for the ruth-
less requisition of all our man-power. We in-
sisted emphatically on the point of view that in
war the powers of every citizen are at the disposal
of the State, and that accordingly every German
from fifteen to sixty should.be under an obliga-
tion to serve, an obligation which, with certain
limitations, lay on women too.
The low grade of labour required in the manufacture
of cement was a grade of labour which Germany's
military commanders were straining every effort, but
unsuccessfully, to obtain. The lowest grade of labour
is sufficient to direct a bayonet, fire a gun or hurl a
hand-grenade, but it was not to be had.
Coal in Germany could not be obtained for want
of man-power. Three tons of coal at least are re-
quired in the production of ten tons of cement. Fifty
thousand men in the later stages of the war had to
be withdrawn from the fighting line to work in the
coal mines. The loss of this man-power, according
to General Ludendorff, was the direct cause of the
ultimate collapse of Germany.
There was no question of Germany's capacity for
CEMENT TRAFFIC WITH HOLLAND 239
producing cement : there was raw material enough
for an output to meet her requirements; there was
enough coal in the mines of Westphalia to supply all
Scandinavia : but neither coal nor cement would
produce and transport itself, and man-power and
transport had to be provided.
Man-power was indispensable; coal was indispens-
able; cement was indispensable; but Holland's food
was also indispensable. Germany could not get goods
from Scandinavia for nothing; she had to maintain
her export trade as best she could. Man-power
governed her exports; and man-power, scarce as
it was, had to be produced for this purpose. The
difficulties that Germany must have experienced in
complying with the demands for cement from Scandi-
navia and Holland will be realised by a scrutiny of
the figures showing her exports of potash manures.
These manures, which require no treatment before
export, and from which Germany ultimately obtained
considerable benefit in the shape of food, fell from
127,078 tons in 1913 to 73,988 tons in 1917.
The decline in the German export trade at the end
of 1916 (on which subject H.M. Government were
kept fully informed), of which the marked shrink-
age in the export of potash manures here given is an
example, is at least strongly suggestive evidence of
Germany's inability, in view of other urgent calls
upon her man-power, to supply Holland with her
full requirements of cement; and the coincidence of
the decrease of Germany's exports of all commodities
to all neutral countries at the same time that the
demand in Holland for British cement arose gives
very strong colour to the supposition that the Dutch
were told by Germany that they must obtain their
cement elsewhere. As things stood the benefits that
240 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Germany was receiving from Holland far outweighed
those that we were obtaining.
The export of cement from the United Kingdom
to Holland was as follows : —
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
4,916
20,838
4,118
1,304
48,930 metric tons
All these matters are overlooked in the report of
the Committee.
We pass on to (2) : What were Germany's military
requirements ?
There are two official publications dealing with the
transit traffic across Holland of materials, especially
sand and gravel, susceptible of employment as military
supplies (Cd. 8693 and 8915). A few words on the
subject of this correspondence may be of interest.
Cement is one of the essential ingredients in the
production of concrete, which the Germans used in
immense quantities for the construction of fortifica-
tions in Flanders. Other ingredients are sand and
gravel, which were brought down the Rhine in barges
from Germany to Belgium, passing through the Dutch
inland waterways en route.
The Netherlands Government admitted the traffic
to be illegal if the cargoes were intended to be used
for military purposes, but not otherwise. The Dutch
determined this point by the simple expedient of
requiring Germany to issue " certificates of peaceful
usage " for each cargo, a formality with which Ger-
many readily complied. The Dutch themselves made
an estimate of the peaceful requirements for Belgium
of sand and gravel, fixing it at 75,000 tons a month.
The Dutch accounts were audited by a German
expert and, as a result, the monthly quantity of sand
and gravel allowed transit through Holland was
CEMENT TRAFFIC WITH HOLLAND 241
changed from 75,000 tons a month for July and August
(which the Dutch blandly informed us was a mistake),
to 420,000 tons, the latter figure being still consider-
ably below the German estimate.
It may here be mentioned incidentally that, in one
case at any rate, a cargo covered by a German " certifi-
cate of peaceful usage " had been ascertained by the
Netherlands Government, after it had succeeded in
passing into Belgium, to consist of arms and ammuni-
tion concealed under gravel.
German and Dutch experts (at the invitation of the
former) then proceeded in company on a tour of
inspection of the Belgian ground in order to verify
the basis on which the German calculations had
been made. The Netherlands Government decided,
on the strength of the report of their representative,
that the German certificates of peaceful usage were
quite genuine, and henceforth would no longer lie
under the stigma of suspicion.
A French expert, M. Tur, Inspecteur general des
Travaux Publics, examined the Netherlands report
and found in it inaccuracies of figures and exaggerated
bases of calculation. He made his own estimate of
the annual requirements of Belgium, based upon
statistics of her previous needs. M. Tur's conclusion
was that " there was no justification for the Nether-
lands Government to allow a single ton of sand or
gravel to pass into Belgium on the plea that it was
required for works of a pacific character."
Although Germany's absolute requirements of
cement are not to be acciu:ately measured by the
extent of the traffic in sand and gravel, this traffic
may at least be accepted as furnishing trustworthy
data for concluding that they were in excess of the
output that Germany was capable of producing for
242 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
military purposes, taking into consideration the state
of her man-power, coal and transport.
Between 1st January and 15th August, 1917, some
3,000,000 tons of sand and gravel passed from
Holland into Belgium.
In an Enclosure to a Foreign Office despatch of
30th October, 1917 (Cd. 8693), it is stated :—
Next there is the certain knowledge that the
German demands for these supplies for direct
military objects, such as fortifications, is enormous,
and there is the evidence that the concrete used
for such fortifications is derived from material
which comes from Germany.
The main ground taken by the Committee for draw-
ing the conclusion that Germany's output of cement
was in excess of her military requirements is the fact
of her exportations to Scandinavia : but the circum-
stances of this trade receive no examination and,
moreover, cause is confused with effect. Germany's
export of cement did not necessarily or even probably
argue a superabundance of that commodity for ordinary
trading purposes, as the Committee would themselves
seem to think; but, conversely, in our opinion, Ger-
many's dearth of man-power, without which cement
could not be produced, coupled with the known fact that
her man-power was used for trading in cement in
spite of its dearth, must be regarded as pointing to
the logical conclusion that the resources of the Scandin-
avian States were one of the chief military necessities
of Germany, for which a sacrifice of man-power in
the production of cement had to be made.
On the last page of their report the Committee
say :—
CEMENT TRAFFIC WITH HOLLAND 243
On the evidence, therefore, the Committee
have no hesitation in recommending the immedi-
ate resumption of the export of cement to Holland
when the political situation permits, and they see
no reason for applying to it any more drastic
conditions than those in force at the time when
the export was suspended ;
whereas on a previous page one of the " less obvious "
though more important reasons for sending cement
to Holland was advanced on the ground of its
" political desirability."
Cement is the only commodity that formed the
subject of inquiry on the general question of our trade
during the war. The circumstances that gave rise
to this inquiry were much the same as those that led
to Lord Faringdon's being sent to Scandinavia in
1915. The Committee's conclusions appear to be
at variance with the established fact that our trade
was the very life-blood of Scandinavia and Germany.
They are based upon false premises and are in disregard
of a large mass of important evidence to which the Com-
mittee had access but which they did not make use of.
Nor is it understood how, knowing the scarcity of
labour and difficulties of transport in Germany, know-
ing also the intimate connection that the official corre-
spondence on the traffic in sand and gravel bore
to the subject into which the Committee had been
appointed to inquire, H.M. Government — or their
representative — could have accepted a report in which
only perfunctory reference to these matters is made,
and in which certain omitted facts tending strongly
towards conclusions the reverse of those arrived at
by the Committee were fully known to H.M. Govern-
ment.
244 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
There is a vital fact which has been overlooked in
this report. The cement that we sent to Holland cost
us coal, shipping-space and labour. When this cement
was landed in Holland, so long as Holland was using
cement and her only alternative source of supply was
Germany, the British cement released German man-
power and substituted for it British man-power.
CHAPTER XII
SOME FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
The export of goods from the United Kingdom and
the British Empire has been justified on the two-fold
ground that even if they reached our enemy either
directly or indirectly they would draw gold from
him; and further that they would, as in the ordi-
nary nature of trade, effect an improvement in the
exchange.
The following observations are confined mainly
to the first of these suppositions, where it must be
assumed that the goods in question were of no military
value, and that the Germans themselves did not
appreciate the necessity for conserving their gold
reserves in war time.
There were, as has already been pointed out when
speaking of tea, coffee and cocoa, scarcely any goods
that did not possess military value during the war:
the surest test of this value was their acceptance or
rejection by Germany.
It became known very early in the war that the
Germans were fully alive to the importance of con-
serving their gold. Our attention was sometimes
directed to this matter by the efforts, frequently
successful, which were made by Germany to obtain
for herself gold balances held by some of the South
American States in Scandinavia and Holland. Again,
the large supplies of food and other commodities,
which Scandinavia and Holland exported to Germany
245
246 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
during the war, far exceeded in value the coal, dyes,
chemicals, iron and other goods which Germany
exported to Scandinavia and Holland. The Germans
did not pay off the adverse balance in gold, the amount
of gold exported by Germany to Scandinavia and
Holland during the war being insignificant; but
instead, German Government bonds were deposited
with several banks in neutral coimtries. These banks
then opened credits for the Germans for an amount
equal to a certain proportion of the face value of the
German bonds on deposit. Merchants, and especially
ship-owners in neutral countries, were making large
profits from their dealings with the Entente Powers
and North and South American neutrals, all of which
transactions were on a gold basis. There was thus
a great influx of gold to Scandinavia and Holland, not
from Germany but from the Entente Powers and
particularly Great Britain; the Scandinavian and
Dutch banks, finding themselves with large liquid
assets, were therefore able to open credits for Germany.
The amounts of these credits at the time of the
Armistice were as follows : —
Denmark 154,000,000 kroner
Sweden 193,000,000 „
(15,000,000 dollars)
Norway 72,000,000 kroner
Holland 66,000,000 florins
At the rate of exchange current in 1918 this repre-
sented a sum of nearly 45 millions sterling.^
^ These loans were all repaid by the end of 1921. In view of
Germany's having defaulted in respect of her payments due to
the Allied Powers under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles,
these repayments do not appear to be consistent with a proper
regard for the just claims of the Allied Powers. Allied interests
have clearly been subordinated to those of States some of which
showed a notoriously benevolent neutrality towards our late
enemy, and to all of which the war brought prosperity. As
ERRATUM
Page 246—
Denmark
Sweden .
Norway .
Holland .
154,000,000 kroner
193,000,000 „
and 15,000,000 dollars
72,000,000 kroner
66,000,000 florins
SOME FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 247
Throughout the war I made repeated efforts to get
some sort of control estabUslied over the activities
of neutral banks, but without success. Even after
America's entry in April, 1917, financial pressure was
withheld although combined action would have proved
irresistible. It is thought that the Foreign Office in
justification of their policy took the view that they
had not the support of American opinion; and that
pressure on neutral banks, according to financial
authorities, would prejudice the chances of obtaining
a loan in neutral countries.
There were, however, many British officials in
Scandinavia, in addition to myself, who regarded this
latter view as ill-founded, seeing that our enemies
were not only continually obtaining credit from
neutral banks, but even so late as 1918 had raised
a loan in Norwav. Moreover, certain neutral banks
were known to have rendered enormous services to
enemy countries in assisting the exportation of
merchandise, well knowing that much of this mer-
chandise had been imported under guarantee for
consumption in a neutral country.
Some features connected with this question of
finance were very disquieting. For instance, certain
neutral financiers, who were known to be on the best
of terms with our enemies, and who had amassed great
wealth during the war by furnishing them with
supplies, were throughout the war treated with
marked favour when visiting England. One of these
gentlemen, who, on account of his dealings with the
Germans, became a pariah even in his own country,
far as is known these repayments have been made without protest
from the Alhed Reparations Commission and in disregard of
Belgium's prior claim to re-imbursement by the Scandinavian
States in respect of her stolen property — to wit her coal, to
which reference has been made on pp. 114, 115.
248 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
would boast during the war of the kindness extended
to him in England by British officials : among such
tokens of kindness mentioned by him was a dinner
which he had attended in London at the private
residence of a British Under-Secretary of State.
Again, some of these neutral financiers were not
only large shareholders in, but directors of a London
bank, and conversely certain British financiers were
interested in Scandinavian banks. British and
Scandinavian private interests were thus united by
a golden link, and in time of trouble Scandinavian
financiers could rely with confidence upon their
British confreres for all necessary support.
So secure was the banking business considered that
some black-listed firms in Scandinavia reconstructed
themselves as banks and insurance companies and,
having done so, felt perfectly secure from any pressure.
The feeling of uneasiness referred to above was not
relieved by certain financial transactions, which took
place during the year 1918, between the United
Kingdom and Scandinavia.
At that time the Germans were making great efforts
to obtain large quantities of British and American
paper money.
American officials in Scandinavia formed certain
views with regard to the uses to which the Germans
intended to put this British and American paper
money. Although they did not consider the grounds
upon which they based their opinions as conclusive,
they were nevertheless unanimous in holding it a
duty to prevent the Germans, if possible, from
realising their desires; and, as on this account the
export of American paper currency from America
was strictly forbidden, it is clear that the American
Government shared this view.
SOME FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 249
It may be presumed that H.M. Government took
the other point of view, for large sums of money in
British paper currency were allowed into Scandinavia
and were actually carried by the British Foreign
Office messengers; again it would appear that the
American officials, at any rate in Scandinavia, were
taken completely by surprise when they discovered
that British paper currency was reaching Scandinavia.
The profits from its sale to the Germans reached, I
think, the colossal figure of 50 per cent., and some
American firms requested the American War Trade
Board to grant them facilities which would enable
them to develop this business. All requests were met
with a flat refusal : moreover, applicants were in-
formed that if they had anything to do with the
business they would be reported to the United States
Government.
The questions that naturally arise are the
following : —
Whose money was the Foreign Office messenger
carrying ?
Who suggested this business to the Foreign Office ?
Into whose pockets did the profits go ?
The answers to these questions would be interesting.
It would also be interesting to know why this matter
was never referred to in the Weekly Bulletin of
Information issued.
In November, 1917, I had discussed the question
of bank control in neutral countries with Lord Robert
Cecil, who appeared to share my views on the subject.
Time slipped away : our enemies, buttressed by
Scandinavian finance whose power we could have
smashed, were enabled to command available supplies.
The following extract is from a letter I wrote to
Lord Robert Cecil on 28th April, 1918 :—
250 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
As you were actively interesting yourself in
the matter I naturally hoped that it would be
dealt with promptly and effectively, and my
hopes were raised still further when I found
that the information necessary for the purpose
was being collected under your instructions at
this (Christiania) Legation at the beginning of
this year.
It is with all the more regret, therefore, that
I find that we are at the present still without
any control at a time when the enemy is making
great efforts to obtain large quantities of our
own and the American paper currency.
As showing how helpless we are here to prevent
our enemies from achieving their object, I may
mention that this afternoon I met an American
official who told me that one of the Norwegian
banks held a considerable amount of American
paper currency and he could not see how we
could prevent them from selling this to the
Germans.
I have, during the last year, frequently heard
it stated that no Scandinavian bank could exist
I if its connections with Paris, London and New
York were cut off. I have never heard state-
ments of this sort seriously challenged. It would
appear, therefore, as though we had a power-
ful weapon for use against our enemies which
at present we are not using. This point of
view appears to be confirmed by the fact that
in every case so far in which we have taken
coercive action against a bank in Sweden or
Norway the result has been that our demands
have been immediately complied with.
I am under the impression that Lord Robert Cecil
SOME FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 251
himself was strongly in favour of bringing pressure
to bear against neutral banks and that as Minister
of Blockade he exerted his influence to achieve that
object. In spite of this, however, no such pressure
was exerted and our enemies continued to obtain
great financial support from all neutral countries up
to the end of the war.
With regard to the subject of the Exchange, in war
time this is not governed by the same factors that
operate in peace time, when it largely depends upon
the balance between exports and imports. In war
time exchange depends largely upon prestige, and
prestige depends upon many factors which in the
aggregate represent, as it were, the moral and material
strength and position of a country.
To the neutrals, living as they did in what may
be called the zone of the economic war, the most
important of these factors was the conduct of the
blockade : any action therefore on our part that
enabled our enemies to obtain goods of any sort
weakened our prestige, and adversely affected our
exchange.
It can safely be assumed that almost everything
the neutrals obtained from the British Empire during
the war benefited our enemies either directly or
indirectly : in other words, those goods increased the
holding-out power of our enemies.
In conclusion it can be said with certainty that
the export of goods directly or indirectly to enemy
countries, or the export of goods to neutrals which
benefit our enemies in any way, cannot be justified
or excused on any grounds other than those of
military expediency. On the contrary, this traffic,
besides being grossly unfair to our Allies and our
fighting forces, lowered our prestige in neutral
countries, and gave hope and strength to our enemies.
252 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Finance was indeed a rod to conjure with and tighten
our economic grip over Germany. It was one of the
most potent of our unarmed forces, and essentially
a British weapon. But it had commenced to show
signs of rust before being brought into use. Even
then, however, as is instanced particularly in the case
of the Norwegian copper and fish agreements, its
work was good. It spurred our enemy into paroxysms
of impotent wrath. Can there be any doubt but that
a bold Treasury policy by which many of the supplies
that reached Germany through Scandinavia could
have been acquired by purchase would have helped
materially to precipitate the end, besides saving
untold millions to the exchequer?
CHAPTER XIII
HIS majesty's government and the blockade
Towards the end of 1915 a Member of Parliament,
Sir Alexander Henderson, visited Scandinavia and
Holland in order to make independent inquiries on
behalf of H.M. Government on the subject of the
supplies that were reaching Germany through those
countries.
The general feeling of exhilaration experienced on
receipt of this news was much as what might have been
expected on receiving tidings of a great victory. The
war was felt already to have been shortened : but as the
matter was talked over wood was touched as a precau-
tionary measure against unpleasant surprises, which are
so apt to follow on the heels of brilliant expectations.
Whether it was that our expectations had been over-
sanguine, or that the wood was of poor quality, or that
the touches had been given with too light a hand that
was the cause of our precautionary measures' mis-
carrying, the charm in any case did not work success-
fully.
The cause of this inquiry was the growing feeling
of alarm that had sprung up at home, and was reflected
in the columns of the Press, in public meetings and
in questions in the Houses of Parliament, that proper
use was not being made of our naval power.
Sir Alexander Henderson came, saw and reported,
and became Lord Faringdon, under which title he
will now be referred to.
258
254 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
As to what Lord Faringdon saw and heard, enough
has already been said of what was taking place in
Scandinavia, and especially in Denmark, for enabling
a fair idea to be formed of what should be the prob-
able result of inquiries directed to the detection of
abuses.
Lord Faringdon' s report, on which the future and
especially 1916 so much hinged, did not represent the
facts as reported to Lord Faringdon by myself, or
as reported by me officially through the British Lega-
tion to the Foreign Office ; or as disclosed by official
statistics published after the war : all of which showed
that the Scandinavian trade with Germany at the
time of Lord Faringdon's visit was on an unpre-
cedented scale. Referring to this visit Lord Faring-
don stated in the House of Lords on 23rd February,
1916, that with regard to contraband he was con-
vinced that but little was passing and that neutrals
were doing their best to regard their obligations.^ To
this statement I must strongly demur, being convinced
that they were disregarding them; the Danish fisher-
men themselves told us that they were doing so, and
almost went so far as to ask us to see that they were
made to regard their obligations. By others breaches
of faith were regarded as " good sport."
In Denmark, we are told, the organisations at work
were under thoroughly responsible and honest men.
Nobody will doubt that there are as many honest
men in Denmark as in any other country, but this
assurance does not satisfactorily dispose of the subject
under immediate discussion, which had to do with
hundreds of thousands of tons of foodstuffs and mer-
chandise thought to have been passing through neutral
countries into the territory of our enemies and for
1 Parliamentary Debates, No. 4, p. 155, 23rd February, 1916.
GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE 255
which facts and figures were both available. This
traffic together with the news of successive reverses
had caused a feehng of consternation to come over
the country. Goods placed on the prohibited list
of exports, to which reference is made, found them-
selves on a very slippery inclined plane with elevated
end in Denmark and foot in Germany, the releasing
mechanism being worked by the smugglers.
Lord Faringdon considered that the Government
were to be congratulated on the way they had dealt
with many difficulties, and they deserved encouraging
support. H.M. Government appeared to be of the
same opinion.
Lord Grey thought on the whole that the report
was very satisfactory. Lord Robert Cecil was en-
couraged not only by the reports from Germany, but
by the fact that Lord Faringdon had said that not
much was going through neutral countries.^ Lord
Faringdon quotes the figures for butter we received
from Denmark in 1915 as an instance of the loyal
disposition many neutrals were showing to Great
Britain.^
As to this, compared with 1913, welost from Scandi-
navia and Holland, butter : —
In 1915 .... 33,238 tons ^
„ 1916 .... 51,795 „ I 160,948 tons
„ 1917 .... 75,915 „ J
though in margarine we gained from Holland 105,726
tons during the same period. (Our margarine from
Scandinavia was an unimportant quantity.) The
net loss to England in butter and margarine was over
50,000 tons, whereas Germany gained in butter alone
140,000 tons.
1 Parliamentary Debates, No. 153, p. 3194, 26th January, 1916.
2 Ibid., No. 4, p. 155, 23rd February, 1916.
256 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
However, the true state of the disposition of each
of the Scandinavian neutrals at that time (adopting
a similar unit of measurement to Lord Faringdon's)
can now be shown exactly.
Norway's Disposition
As expressed in metric tons of food sent
1913
1915
1916
To the United Kingdom
To Germany and Austria .
61,464
81,538
69,512
182,630
35,701
215,593
Denmark's
Disposition
To the United Kingdom
To Germany and Austria .
256,754
123,547
197,398
274,401
156,100
314,328
Sweden's
Disposition
To the United Kingdom
To Germany and Austria .
26,567
37,043
8,563
104,203
115
90,835
The above figures are from the countries' own
official statistics : they include meat, fish, dairy
produce, eggs, lard and margarine : they do not in-
clude vegetable oils, beer, fish oil, tea, coffee, cocoa,
horses, fruit and vegetables. If these latter items
were included the situation would show up much
worse. Live cattle have been reckoned as running
to 200 kilos, or about 441 lb. per head; whereas the
Danish fat cattle would be nearer 250 kilos., which
would make a difference of over 12,000 tons in 1915
and more in 1916.
Take the above figures for Denmark for 1915.
They show that by comparison with 1913 we lost
59,356 tons of food, whereas Germany gained 150,854.
Here is a batch of figures which show what was
going on at the time that Lord Faringdon was making
his investigations. The figures for 1916 are given
in order that the claimed improvements towards the
GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE 257
end of 1915 may be correctly appraised. They should
be compared with 1913.
Exports from Dejjilvrk to Germany (Metric Tons)
(From Danish oflScial statistics)
1913
1915
1916
Fish
. 25,516
66,569
106,694
Meat conserves .
131
16,022
19,758
Cheese
57
3,886
4,344
Eggs
1,160
12,466
20,422
Fats
72
6,474
6,794
Butter
. 11,317
37,455
36,891
The export of purely Danish butter to Germany was
in 1913 less than 2,000 tons. The figure 11,317
includes re-exports of Swedish and Russian butter,
of which there was a considerable transit across
Denmark before the war.
1913 1915 1916
Fish oil 1,631 3,017 1,518
Bone fat 1,080 2,529 2,165
Coffee 81 2,339 1,574
Denmark, be it noted, was able to send these
amounts to Germany after satisfying her own
requirements.
1913
1915
1916
3
590
220
—
764
106
Tea .
Cocoa
The above figures are exclusive of the goods which
passed through the free port of Copenhagen. ^ Being
Danish figures they may be regarded in all cases as
safe minimums; and since no smuggled goods are
included, the 1915 and 1916 figures probably fall short
in their aggregate total by 40 or 50 per cent, of the
traffic they stand for.
9
See Appendix, p. 315.
^58 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
With regard to Holland Dr. Helfferich gives a few
figures which are of interest : —
The export from Holland to Germany and
England in one or two commodities for which
the two countries competed during the war
developed as follows : —
Butter
(All in metric tons)
1913 1915 1916
England 7,900 2,500 2,200
Germany 19,000 36,700 31,500
Cheese
England 19,100 8,400 6,800
Germany . .' . . .16,100 63,300 76,200
PoBK AND Bacon
England 34,000 7,600 10,300
Germany 11,000 55,100 24,100
Eggs
England . . . . . 5,800 7,800 800
Germany . . . . . 15,300 25,200 36,400
Summary
England 66,800 26,300 20,100
Germany 61,400 180,300 (a) i 169,200(fc)i
England lost .... 40,500 46,700
Germany gained . . . 118,900 107,800
Germany was thus able substantially to increase
her importation from the Netherlands of these
commodities so important for the feeding of the
people and the supplying of the army, while
at the same time England had to be content
with a largely reduced supply.
Although the above figures were not known to Lord
Faringdon at the time of his visit to Scandinavia,
yet the evidence in support of the facts that they stand
^ Reference to (a) and (b) is made on p. 266.
GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE 259
for was so abundant that it could not but obtrude
itself upon the notice of any casual observer, nor
fail to carry conviction where there was a desire to
be convinced. The one and only object of the Malmo
meeting was to prevent the figures for the Scandi-
navian trade from becoming known.
I was privileged when Lord Faringdon was in
Christiania to give him my own views. I placed him
in possession of certain information of a confidential
character which only the importance of his mission
and the war justified my doing; he knew in what
quarter to go to obtain reliable information and he
also knew where and why a certain discount should
be allowed. With regard to the traffic with Germany
I gave him the results of my personal observation
and the reports of foreign Legations. I referred him
to the congested state of the railways and ferries and
brought the Malmo meeting and its meaning to his
knowledge. I cannot but regard it as exceedingly
unfortunate that the situation as it really existed
should have failed to reveal itself to the distinguished
politician appointed by H.M. Government to report
upon it to them.
In February, 1916, important debates concerning
the conduct of the blockade took place in the Houses
of Parliament. Replies to criticisms of the Govern-
ment policy appeared to show that the supplies which
were reaching Germany were far less than was sup-
posed, that they were being effectively arrested, and
that there was no power in the hands of the Govern-
ment of which full use was not being made. That
there was inevitable leakage was admitted, nor was it
possible to prevent it. Special attention was invited
to the position of neutrals and the question of neutral
rights, to which a very indulgent recognition was
260 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
extended. With regard to the bulk of the importations
into Scandinavia and Holland, certain commodities
were selected, and figures were given which would
appear to show that the measures taken for arresting
the main stream of the traffic from neutral countries to
Germany had been successful : public confidence was
further strengthened by a frank admission of past errors
and by the hopeful view that was presented of future
prospects.
First, as to neutrals.
Europe was ablaze. Tucked away in the north-
west corner were three or four small neutral States,
untouched by the general conflagration but in whose
flames they were threatened to become enveloped.
The danger of getting singed or burned came not from
England but from Germany : of this these States
were only too well aware; Belgium had already been
consigned to the flames and not so much as a word
of protest had been heard from Scandinavia and
Holland. Neutral States situated as were these, in
the sense of their having either the hope of preserving
or the power of enforcing the same relationship
towards Germany that existed in the normal circum-
stances of peace, could not expect to stand in the same
relationship as in peace time with the Powers that were
at war with Germany : for neutrality has no meaning
if it is partial; and in the case at least of Denmark
and Sweden both these States were the tools of Ger-
many, the one the passive or unresisting and the other
the willing one. Their relationship with Germany
was one of benevolent neutrality; and in the same
measure that Germany had gained by a partial
surrender of the neutral rights of these States we had
lost by it. Although we held these neutral States in
the palms of our hands, yet until the year 1917 the
GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE 261
lawful pressure that was brought to bear against them
was insignificant.
There is a dignity in the eloquence of some of the
tributes that were paid to these neutrals and a chival-
rous regard for the susceptibilities of a weaker State,
which is felt to be peculiarly appropriate as coming
from the greatest maritime Power; and but for
the war it would certainly have been in the very worst
taste to have set to work deliberately to endeavour
to destroy the good effect that such words must have
upon all right-minded people. With all that has
been said as applying to that part of the community
of neutral States which suffered innocently from the
calamity of war there can be no dispute that everybody
must find himself in whole-hearted agreement. This
solicitude for neutrals in theory was admirable, though
cynics have been heard to say that it may have sprung
from a desire to advertise a high moral standard. Be
this as it may, it was a luxury that could not be afforded
in war time. These neutrals, moreover, showed scant
regard for our belligerent rights, though they showed
a very nice appreciation of their own neutral rights :
nor could they complain that they had been altogether
left out in the cold, for America had voluntarily taken
over the duties of championship on their behalf, and
it was to America that any complaints should properly
have been addressed. We entered into this conflict
in vindication of Belgium's rights : Belgium was the
representative of these northern European neutrals.
We fought Germany for these neutrals' cause. There
was no single instance of a sign of gratitude having
been shown for our disinterested and fateful action,
nor any instance where the moral obligations under
which these neutrals were placed were found to have
been held superior to self-interest.
262 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The neutrals did not by any means regard themselves
as proper objects for pity ; nor, truth to tell, did I, who
was for four years living amongst them ; nor did any
member known to me of the Allied Legations. Denmark
sent her most astute men to England for the express
purpose of depicting the country as suffering from the
harsh effects of our blockade and fear of German
invasion; and by such misrepresentations to extort
a pittance from our compassion. In this she suc-
ceeded beyond the hopes probably of her wildest
dreams.
It is impossible not to note the hyper-sensitive
feeling for neutrals' rights which is expressed by the
Government during these debates, and to compare
it with the historic statement to which reference has
already been made that " it was not intended that
our measures should be entangled in a network of
juridical niceties." The sentiments here expressed are
in direct opposition to each other : but they were very
convenient each to its own occasion.
Neutral susceptibilities, which were spoken of at
Westminster, though having their seat formally estab-
lished in the neutral heart, were not completely cut off
from all means of communication with the neutral
pocket ; to which, indeed, there would seem to have
been a convenient and not unfamiliar route. Looking
at this matter from the " powerful State " point of
view, it is a little puzzling to know what are the par-
ticular advantages of being in the position of a power-
ful State, if the weaker State is never to feel this
power except as an increment to its own; and when
and where the power is to be made use of, if not on
perfectly lawful occasions in war time, and where it
can best be made felt. Let it also be remarked, to
finish with these parentheses, that while these neutrals
GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE 263
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264 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
fought for wealth and obtained it from us, we were
fighting for and sacrificing our lives.
Turning now to facts and figures, the Marquess of
Lansdowne in his speech in the House of Lords on
22nd February, 1916, sets out to illustrate the manner
in which progress is being made as precautionary
measures begin to operate. Cotton is selected.
Take the import of cotton to Scandinavia and
Holland. The figure for 1913 is 73,000 tons.
The figure for 1915 is 310,000 tons. That is a
very alarming figure — an increase nearly fourfold.
But if you make the comparison as I conceive
it ought to be made, and compare the year, not
as a whole, but month by month, you will find
— I put it in this way for convenience sake —
that in the last six months the figure for 1915
was 52,000 tons and for 1913 was 49,000 tons.i
That is certainly one way of looking at this matter.
Let us put down these figures and make them clear : —
1913 Tons
Total = 73,000
Last six months = 49,000
Therefore first six months = 24,000
1915 Tons
Total = 310,000
Last six months = 52,000
Therefore first six months = 258,000
All these figures, it was stated, required extremely
careful scrutiny before any conclusions were based
upon them. Subject to this reservation there is
another conclusion to be based upon the above figures :
for by making a comparison of the first six months
of 1915 with the same period for 1913 the result is not
1 Parliamentary Debates, No. 3, p. 98, 22nd February, 1916.
GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE 265
as 52,000 to 49,000 but as 258,000 to 24,000; and the
conclusion to be drawn from these latter figures is
that the situation stood in need of improvement.
On a fair balance of the lessons to be learned from
these two sets of figures it would seem that the 310,000
tons, which it was sought to show was not an alarming
figure for 1915, was in reality more alarming than was
supposed. Lard and other commodities are also
dealt with on the same lines.
If you are to make a fair comparison in regard
to these figures it is quite obvious that you ought
not to compare the figures for the whole of the
year 1915 with the whole of the year 1913, but
that you should take the figures month by month
during the year and see how the matter was
progressing as our precautionary measures began
to operate.
The figures for the commodities which were selected
for the purpose of illustrating this method of judging
the effect of the Government blockade measures
showed the improvements which were sought to be
shown : and, taking the figures generally for the year
1916, they show an improvement on those for 1915,
though not in all cases. But is the decrease of the
1915 figures rightly to be regarded as an improvement
having regard to the magnitude itself of the 1916
figures ? Is any set of figures to be viewed favourably
because it shows an improvement on a preceding set ?
Take Dr. Helfferich's figures on p. 258.
Looking at what England lost and Germany gained,
the figures, it must be confessed, make the position
look rather blue and do not show up as well as they
might for our blockade. But if we compare the total
food that Holland sent to Germany in 1915 with the
266 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
total for 1916 in order to see how matters were
progressing as our precautionary measures began to
operate, these figures may be examined with a con-
siderable feeUng of satisfaction at the progress indi-
cated. Thus {by tells us of great all-round improve-
ments in 1916 over (a) in 1915 : but it is important
in looking at these figures that the eye should not
be allowed to wander over to the left : a downwards
movement would be fatal.
The importations into Scandinavia during 1915
were on a scale generally of unparalleled dimensions,
and our blockade to establish its pretensions to any
real meaning could not but have brought about a
decrease in 1916 of these importations. But such
decrease is in itself far from showing that the im-
provement is not erroneously so claimed, comparisons
with 1913 being the only criterion by which the
effectiveness of the blockade is to be judged. Such
comparisons are unfavourable in the case of a large
number of commodities, excluding most foodstuffs.
But the supreme test of the blockade of Germany
lay in the quantity of foodstuffs which she was
prevented from obtaining; and the worst feature of
our trading with Scandinavia was the assistance she
derived from it in enabling food to be produced and
exported. When our entry into the war appeared
to be probable, Germany at once turned her attention
to the question of her food supplies.
On August 2nd, 1914, Geheimrat Frisch, who after-
wards became the director of the Zentral-Einkaufs-
Gesellschaft (Central Purchasing Corporation), came
to Hamburg, in order to inform Ballin, at the request
of the Ministry of the Interior, that the latter felt
very anxious in regard to the quantity of food actually
to be found in Germany, which, it was feared, would
GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE 267
be very small, and that it was expected that a great
shortage would arise after a very brief period. He
therefore asked him to use his best endeavours in
order to secure supplies from abroad. A Hamburg
firm was immediately requested to find out how much
food was actually available in the country, and al-
though the figures obtained were not quite so bad as
was expected, steps were taken at once to remedy
the deficiencies by importing food from neutral
countries.^
The year 1916 was the most critical year of the war
in that Germany had begun to feel the pinch of starva-
tion ; and it required comparatively little pressure,
which it was well within our power to apply, to
precipitate disaster.
Germany had hoped to have brought about a
separate peace with Russia by the end of 1915, and had
reckoned upon the success of her negotiations for
ameliorating her food situation. Her efforts came to
nothing : but she had taken other steps to meet the
dark menace of famine by building up and elaborating
a vast organisation whereby she acquired foodstuffs
from overseas (including, be it said, ourselves) through
the agency of certain prominent Scandinavian and
Dutch profiteers; it was solely due to the success of
these arrangements and our neglect to frustrate them
that she was able to continue the struggle. At the
beginning of 1916 we were about to enter the period
in which the greatest risk was justified in any measures
necessary for stopping supplies to Germany, more
especially in view of the impending new submarine
menace which ultimately brought America into the
war.
^ From " Albert Ballin," by Bernhard Huldermann. Cassell
& Co.
268 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The supplies that reached Germany in 1915 helped
her through 1916; but the 1916 supplies were far more
important to her. Constant references are made by
Ludendorff to the famished condition of Germany,
which was critical in the pre-harvest periods of 1916
and 1917. It is clear that but for the supplies obtained
from Roumania after the invasion of that country,
Germany would have been brought to her knees; in
1917 she was again saved by supplies from the Ukraine.
In 1916 there was just sufficient food and munitions
to enable Germany to continue the struggle ; but there
was no margin. An effective blockade in combination
with an embargo on British exports in 1915 and 1916
could not have failed to have brought about Germany's
collapse before Russia's and before Roumania had
taken the field.
" A three years' war was only possible," says
Ludendorff, " because we had in Germany abund-
ant coal, and so much iron and food that together
with what we could obtain from occupied territory
and neutral countries, we could, by practising
the most rigid economy, manage to exist in spite
of the hostile blockade. . . . The importance
in war of coal, iron and food was known before
this war ; but how absolutely decisive they would
become was only demonstrated to all the world
as hostilities proceeded."
Copious examples are also given of the physical and
moral effect on the German people of the strangling
hunger-blockade and enemy propaganda " and of the
" inconceivable hardships suffered and endured in
the four long years of war." But the most significant
of all the admissions made by German writers is,
perhaps, that during the great German advance on
GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE 269
the Western Front in April, 1918, certain divisions had
failed to show any inclination to attack ; the troops
would stop round captured food supplies, while
individuals stayed behind to search houses and farms
for food.
" The ' silent pressure of sea-power ' gives one to
think," says von Tirpitz; who adds, "As Herr von
Hydebrand said in 1911 in the Reichstag, ' England
is the enemy.' "
The effect of our blockade, inadequate as it was,
caused such widespread distress throughout Germany
that it was not possible for Germany to conceal it.
The physical and moral deterioration that set in
among the German people from want of food was
proclaimed publicly in the columns of the neutral
Press, and by authentic accounts from the pens of
neutral travellers : it is confirmed and authenticated
now by German writers. Although it is not known
by what margin Germany escaped early destruction,
the margin was small; and it was the additional sup-
plies that she received through us that kept this
margin continually open and destroyed all hopes of
an early peace.
The foodstuffs (not including certain oils, beer, tea,
coffee, cocoa, horses and several other articles of diet)
received from Norway, Sweden and Denmark by
Great Britain and Germany are as follows : —
Great Britain
Germany
Tons
Tons
1913 .
1915 .
1916 .
344,785
275,473
191,916
252,128
561,234
620,756
Germany also received immense quantities from
Holland, in addition to substantial quantities of
smuggled goods.
270 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
The following statement was handed in to Lord
Milner by me at an interview which he was so good
as to accord me in November 1917 : —
An ExAivrpLE of Sea Power as Applied to Denmark
STATEMENT OF THE NUMBER OF TONS OF FOOD LOST AND GAINED BY ENGLAND
AND GERMANY WHEN COMPARED WITH THE AVERAGES OF 1911, 1912
AND 1913
Butter 1915
1916
Eggs 1915
1916
Bacon 1915
1916
Meat 1915
1916
Fish 1915
1916
Sheep 1915
1916
t by England
Gained by Germany
Tons
Tons
16,499
20,981
23,359
22,826
7,455
11,216
16,330
19,253
17,031
31,231
36,541
16,194
463
26,990
491
25,393
—
23,000
—
77,000
—
1,511
—
803
118,169
276,398
This statement shows that during 1915 and 1916
Germany had therefore obtained nearly 300,000 tons
of food from Denmark, mostly of a greasy nature, in
excess of her pre-war amounts. During the same
period we had lost over 100,000 tons, the whole of
which was taken by Germany. The real situation,
therefore, shows a gain to Germany during the two
years of 400,000 tons of food from Denmark alone.
Lard is not included in the above statement. In 1916
Germany obtained from Denmark about 7,000 tons :
Great Britain nil.
" Returns " — to quote from one of the Government
speeches — " have sometimes been compiled with
an obvious inability to grapple with the arithmetic
of the case."
There are no arithmetical faults in tlie above figures
I
GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOCKADE 271
that would lessen the significance of their meaning,
which is : that whatever favourable inferences are
to be drawn from figures quoted by H.M. Government
in the case of certain commodities, such inferences are
not to be applied to the bulk of the general merchandise
which passed through our fleet into Scandinavia :
that in respect of foodstuffs which reached Germany —
and they could only reach Germany through importa-
tions into Scandinavia of raw and other materials —
there is no real improvement to be pointed to as our
precautionary measures operated : on the contrary the
1915 total is more than double that of 1913, and the
1916 exceeds even the 1915 total. Their further \
meaning is that these excessive supplies to Germany
together with those that passed through Holland
were in all probability more than enough, had they
been withheld, to have sounded Germany's death knell
at an early date, having regard to the views expressed
by the highest German authorities on the critical
condition of their country at successive stages of the
war. ^
The above figures are, I think, the best test by which
are to be judged the results achieved by the greatest
maritime Power in the world at a time when, in the
zenith of her naval strength and efficiency, she was
engaged in a deadly economic struggle against an
almost defenceless enemy.
Our miserable and inglorious trade prolonged the
war : a stricken world, for now over four years, has
been pursued by its nemesis ; which still derides the
efforts of puny humanity to restore in its ranks
the order so wantonly committed to the forces
of disruption.
It is profitless to dwell upon the past. It is diffi-
cult, however, altogether to obliterate the sad thought
272 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
of the prosperity that this country would now be
enjoying had victory been assured early in the war
by the timely application of those forces whose latent
power has perhaps been thrown into even stronger
relief by the grim difficulties over which they
ultimately triumphed.
CHAPTER XIV
FINAL
America took the field in April, 1917. The Govern-
ment proposals as to America's blockade policy were
contained in instructions to Mr. Balfour (now Earl
Balfour), who proceeded to the U.S.A. to discuss the
question of combined action. These proposals, so far
as I am aware, were not communicated by H.M.
Government to the Legations in Scandinavia : accord-
ing to the statements of Americans, Norway was to
be mulct of many of her importations from the United
States, including cereals, metals and important com-
modities necessary to her industries, unless she made
very serious reductions in her normal export trade
with Germany.
The only burden to be imposed upon Denmark was
that the supply of fodder should be regulated with a
view to obtaining pre-war percentages and amounts
in respect of the distribution of Danish agricultural
produce to Great Britain and Germany.
Suitable pressure was to be brought to bear
upon Sweden by the restriction of supplies from the
United States with a view to the question of Russian
transit compensation and the Anglo-Swedish draft
agreements being placed on a satisfactory footing.
Swedish food exports to Germany had to be reduced,
and a reasonable proportion of Swedish shipping
placed at the disposal of the Allies.
The proposals with regard to Denmark, bearing in
mind the prosperity that the war had brought to that
T 273
274 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
country at our expense, were the least, surely, that
should have been adopted in August, 1914. They
were admitted by the Danes themselves in 1916 to
be reasonable. Compare them with the treatment to
be meted out to Norway, who befriended us throughout
the war. The best comment upon these proposals is
to be found in the attitude of America herself, who,
after some months, instituted a strict embargo on all
unnecessary commodities to Scandinavia and Holland.
We followed America; and an uninstructed observer
might be excused for supposing that the blockade of
Germany was undertaken by England at America's
suggestion. Supplies to Germany gradually fell away,
until in 1918 they dried up. The blockade was two
and a half years late.
Summing up what has been said in the foregoing
chapters, the effect of British trade was to stimulate
the Scandinavian industries. Broadly, it was the
Scandinavian native produce that reached Germany,
and the supplies from oversea, whether British or
British-controlled, that either released Scandinavian
supplies or made it possible for them to be produced.
Thus, it was the Danish agricultural produce, the fish
and the fats that reached Germany, but it was the
fodder and fertilisers, the fishing gear and the petro-
leum, and the oil-seeds from oversea that enabled
these commodities to be obtained.
British coal was a vital cog in the Scandinavian
industrial machine. It was not so much a commodity
as a source of irresistible power. It was dispensed with
a lavish hand and with but little regard for its war
value. It was our prime source of economic pressure,
and it was used to good purpose in Norway and by
H.M. Government, when necessary, against neutral
shipowners. It was not, however, made to serve the
FINAL 275
ends of diplomacy in our negotiations with Sweden,
nor was it used for bargaining purposes during the
protracted and sterile parleys that formed so con-
spicuous and sorry a feature in our policy towards
Denmark.
Fish was a product of Scandinavia. In the case of
the Danish fish the quantity of British fishing acces-
sories that reached Denmark was comparatively small,
but the amount of Danish fish that they enabled
Denmark to send to Germany was immense.
The policy of trading, which was justified on the
two-fold ground of the benefit to the exchange and our
obligations to neutrals, would not seem to have been
fairly balanced against the succour that it brought to
our enemies. This country was rich and could afford
to make sacrifices. Yet when the war had been in
progress for nearly three years and our finances were
becoming unstable, trade was stopped and the ques-
tion of the "improvement of the exchange" was
put to one side. As to our obligations to neutrals, there
were also obligations to ourselves to be considered.
Neutrals were protected by international law. No
Scandinavian neutral has successfully challenged the
legality or, I think, even the propriety of any
belligerent action of ours.
Perhaps the strongest indictment of our blockade
policy and of our administration in Denmark is to
be found in Mr. Thirsk's reports. We made trading
agreements with neutrals under, professedly, appro-
priate safeguards. But no provision was made by the
appointment of consular officers for supervising and
reporting upon the working of arrangements so vital
to the success of the objects that they had in view :
nor were the necessary measures taken locally for the
detection of abuses or the observance of guarantees.
276 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Reference to this subject has been made (with some
reluctance) under " Lubricants " which, together with
" Nickel " and " Finance," possess certain features
that distinguished them from the remainder of the
commodities that have been dealt with.
I reported fully and repeatedly upon the supplies
that were reaching Germany and upon the necessity
of far greater stringency in the granting of trade
licences. The matters touched upon in this book form
a small part only of the subjects of my correspond-
ence. In the summer of 1917, when in England, I
waited upon the Minister of Blockade, Lord Robert
Cecil. One of the subjects to which I drew particular
attention was binder-twine (see page 222). The other
was the importation of oil-seeds into Denmark. On
my return to Scandinavia I learnt that the further
import of soya-beans had been stopped by telegram.
My written reports had dealt fully with both these
subjects; I must own, therefore, to feeling more
astonished than flattered that so very important a war
measure should have been withheld until chance
opportunity had made it possible to represent verbally
what already had been reported through the ordinary
official channel.
The Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Office at
this time, and probably its most gifted member, was
Sir Eyre Crowe, with whom also I discussed the
blockade. The Foreign Secretary is the titular and
responsible Head of his Department, but his appoint-
ment is political : he changes with a change of Govern-
ment, whereas the Permanent Secretary remains.
The titular Head is known to the public, but the pre-
siding genius is never heard of. The Foreign Secretary
speaks, but his gifted subordinate prompts. The
Permanent Secretary must have seen a good many of
FINAL 277
my despatches; but the potential value of certain
commodities — the particular ones to which I refer being
greasy substances— and their intimate relation to the
man-power of Germany were at that time unsuspected
by him.
On the first page of the Scandinavian statistics we
find that Scandinavia's total exportation of foodstuffs
in 1915 was 239,794 tons more than in 1913 : that,
whereas before the war Great Britain received 92,657
tons more than Germany and Austria, this excess was
changed to a deficit of 285,761 tons in 1915, and
428,840 tons in 1916. In these figures several items
of foodstuffs, including immense quantities of veget-
ables, are not included.
In the French war against China in 1885, foodstuffs
(rice) were declared by the French Foreign Minister to
be contraband. Prince Bismarck himself endorsed the
French action, and in 1892 Count von Caprivi gave his
support to the view that it was legal to capture food-
stuffs and raw materials indispensable for the enemy's
industries. And, lest there be any lingering doubts
in the reader's mind of the wisdom of these obscure
authorities, let us hasten to inform him (with the full
weight of the plural number) that this is precisely the
view that we ourselves take.
The difficulties with which H.M. Government and
those burdened with the responsibility of conducting
the blockade of Germany were surrounded were with-
out doubt very great. But from first to last no effort
was spared to ascertain the exact particulars of all
transactions by which the Scandinavian countries were
enabled to supply our enemies, and to press upon the
authorities the adoption of measures by which this
traffic could be kept within the limits to which
ultimately it was confined.
278 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
I must be pardoned, therefore, if, having given
examples of the transactions referred to and having, I
trust with fairness, examined the grounds on which
H.M. Government justified their poHcy, I have con-
ceived it proper to regard these matters as of pubHc
interest. Although we had a resourceful and deter-
mined foe to contend with and could not have it all
our own way during the economic struggle in which
we were engaged, and although in the conduct of the
blockade there were certain features which — as the
title of this .book seeks to indicate — it would serve no
useful purpose now to recall, yet the failure to prevent
supplies from reaching our enemies on a less immoderate
scale than that recorded stands, I think, in need of
fuller explanation than has yet been given.
Copies of all my official and semi-official reports in
addition to 'precis of conversations on the subject of
the blockade were sent to the Admiralty, who gave
the full weight of their support to the views which
I expressed throughout the war in circumstances,
sometimes, of considerable difficulty.
This book has been written to but little purpose if it
has failed to make clear that the unarmed forces with
which it deals rest, for their power of being applied,
upon naval and air supremacy; and that there is no
security for the sea-borne supplies upon which we
mainly depend for our existence except in our Navy
and its sister Service, the Royal Air Force.
APPENDIX
PAQK
I. Declaration of London : Contraband Clauses . 281
II. The Reprisals Order : Principal Articles . . 282
III. An American Report upon Denmark . . . 283
IV. Tables showing Exports of Agricultural Pro-
ducts FROM Denmark to Great Britain . . 286
V. Extracts from Correspondence : —
(1) Naval Attach^ to H.M. Minister, Stock-
holm 287
(2) Naval Attach^: to H.M. Minister, Copen-
hagen . . .... . 289
(3) Naval Attache on Mr. Thirsk's Reports . 290
(4) Naval Attach^ to Admiralty . . . 293
(5) Miscellaneous 295
VI. Summary of Supplies (taken from Scandinavian
Statistics) 297
I. From the Declaration of London
Article 30. — Absolute contraband is liable to capture
if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to
or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of
the enemy. It is immaterial whether the carriage of
the goods is direct or entails transhipment or a
subsequent transport by land.
Article 31. — Proof of the destination specified in
Article 30 is complete in the following cases : —
(1) When the goods are documented for discharge
in an enemy port, or for delivery to the armed
forces of the enemy.
(2) When the vessel is to call at enemy ports only,
or when she is to touch at an enemy port or
meet the armed forces of the enemy before
reaching the neutral port for which the goods in
question are documented.
Article 32.— Where a vessel is carrying absolute
contraband, her papers are conclusive proof as to the
voyage on which she is engaged, unless she is found
clearly out of the course indicated by her papers and
unable to give adequate reasons to justify such
deviation.
Article 33. — Conditional contraband is liable to
capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the
armed forces or of a government department of the
enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances
show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the
purposes of the war in progress. This latter excep-
tion does not apply to a consignment coming under
Article 24 (4).
281
282 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Article 34. — The destination referred to in Article 33
is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to
enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in
the enemy country who, as a matter of common know-
ledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy.
A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned
to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other
place serving as a base for the armed forces of the
enemy. No such presumption, however, arises in the
case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these
places if it is sought to prove that she herself is
contraband.
In cases where the above presumptions do not arise,
the destination is presumed to be innocent.
The presumptions set up by this Article may be
rebutted.
Article 35. — Conditional contraband is not liable to
capture, except when found on board a vessel bound
for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy,
or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is
not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.
The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to
the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to
the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found
clearly out of the course indicated by her papers, and
unable to give adequate reasons to justify such
deviation.
II. The Principal Articles of the " Reprisals
Order " are as Follows : —
I. No merchant vessel which sailed from her port
of departure after the 1st March, 1915, shall be allowed
to proceed on her voyage to any German port.
II. No merchant vessel which sailed from any
German port after the 1st March, 1915, shall be
allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on
board laden at such port.
III. Every merchant vessel which sailed from her
APPENDIX 283
port of departure after the 1st March, 1915, on her
way to a port other than a German port, carrying
goods with an enemy destination, or which are enemy
property, may he required to discharge such goods in a
British or alhed port.
IV. Every merchant vessel which sailed from a
port other than a German port after the 1st March,
1915, having on board goods which are of enemy
origin or are enemy property may be required to
discharge such goods in a British or allied port.
III. An American Report upon Denmark
Copenhagen,
August lUh, 1917.
I beg to present the following report and con-
clusions on the question of Regulation of American
Exports to Denmark.
Since the question of the regulation of American
Exports to Denmark became acute I have been
approached at various times with requests and
suggestions to present to the American public
through The Associated Press the Danish side
of the case, viz. propaganda matter to show the
desirability and necessity of a continuance of
American exports to this country. I refrained from
touching the subject, however, first because the
Danish censorship prevented any impartial presen-
tation of the matter and secondly because I believed
that the Danish presentation of the case was not
only incorrect and one-sided but was calculated, if
published in the United States, to embarrass the
policy of the American Government.
I ultimately learned that a systematic attempt
was being made to put this purely Danish inter-
pretation of the situation before the American
public through other Press media, even after the
general policy of the President had been decided
upon, that articles were being launched in Danish
284 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
papers as an indirect means of getting them into
the American press and that the Danish commercial
commission in the United States was being given
opportunity to get its side of the situation before
the Government and pubHc unhampered by any
counter-representation of facts in despatches from
here. I therefore beheved that the State Depart-
ment might appreciate the information and con-
clusions of a correspondent who has had six months'
opportunity to study the Danish export situation
and, from a long residence in Germany during the
war, to know how much that country is benefiting
from imports received from Denmark and other
contiguous neutral countries under the present
conditions.
The arguments which the Danish Government
seeks to use to obtain a modification of American
policy and on which the above-mentioned propa-
ganda is based may be roughly classified as the
" Starvation,''^ " Economic Ruin " and " German
Danger " pleas; viz. that
(a) the population of Denmark will go hungry
unless the United States permits the export of food
to Denmark;
(h) a cessation of imports of fodder and other
raw materials for Denmark's meat and other indus-
tries will involve an unjust and unprincipled inter-
ference with Denmark's economic life and reduce
the country to poverty; and
(c) a cessation of Denmark's present exports of
meats, fats, fish, butter, eggs, etc., to Germany
may bring about a German invasion of Denmark.
My opinion, based upon my knowledge of condi-
tions in Denmark and Germany, was that all three
conclusions were erroneous or fallacious.
Mr. Conger tells us that Denmark's home-grown
supplies of food, if properly rationed, were sufficient
for the needs of the population ; and that her agricul-
tural industry had become a " manufacturing industry
APPENDIX 285
for the conversion of imported materials into meat,
fats and other agricultural products for export."
With regard to the Danish agreements Mr. Conger
finds that all testimony is practically unanimous that
the Danes loyally held to the letter (this word being
underlined) of their arrangements with England. He
adds, however, that there was no doubt that the Danes
had been very clever in securing a form which would
permit them to export to Germany the greatest
possible quantities of the things desired by Germany ;
and that they had been very quick to take advantage
of loopholes left in the agreements through careless-
ness or negligence. As an example he refers to the
disposal of the slaughter-house offal, about which
nothing is said in the agreements. From this refuse,
rich in desired fats, Germany boasted of getting a
large amount of neatsfoot oil, so indispensable for her
torpedoes, in addition to large quantities of fat for
commercial use.
" Smuggling prohibited exports out into Germany
is one of the most flourishing industries in Denmark."
Particulars are given.
Germany reaped immense benefit from the traffic
that took place in fruit, and which received hardly any
attention from us. Mr. Conger comments on the
importance of this item in the German war dietary.
What I myself have described as the " invasion
bogey " Mr. Conger refers to as the " German buga-
boo." He says : "I am firmly convinced that the
German authorities, up at least to the time of my
departure from Germany, had utterly no desire to
invade Denmark or to extend the theatre of war if
this could possibly be avoided."
Mr. Conger's views are summed up as follows : —
(A) All exports of fodder-stuffs, such as maize,
oil-cake, etc., to Denmark should be stopped.
(B) Denmark can and should be required to
subsist her own population, imports only of such
articles of foreign origin as tea, coffee, etc., as cannot
286 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
be produced or substituted in the country being
permitted and then only in rigidly limited quantities.
(C) Fuel oil, kerosene, gasoline and other articles
used in the industries should only be supplied in
rigidly limited quantities for indispensable pur-
poses and under rigid guarantees that no materials
thus supplied should be used in industries such as
fishing, the product of which results to the benefit
of Germany.
(D) Ingredients for chemical fertilisers should be
supplied only in so far as Denmark applies her
agricultural products to home consumption.
IV. Exports of Agricultural Products
FROM Denmark to Great Britain
FROM 1st Octobeb, 1914, TO 30th September, 1915, compared with
COREESPONDING PERIOD 1913-1914
{Returns after BOth September, 1915,
are not yet available)
Article.
1st Oct., 1914,
to
Previous Tear.
Amount of
30th Sept., 1915.
Butter (casks)
1,483,719
1,760,724
277,005
Butter (cases)
32,749
50,687
17,938
Pigs' heads (tierces)
17,908
37,817
19,909
Feet (cwt.) .
36,828
45,268
8,440
Lard (cwt.)
1,358
28,178
26,820
Other oflfal (cwt.) .
46,214
56,237
10,013
Mild cured heads (cwt.) .
7,133
12,140
5,007
Bacon (bales)
1,191,581
1,203,393
11,812
Comparison of the Same Exports
DTJRING THE PERIOD IST APRIL, 1915, TO 30tH SEPTEMBER, 1915
1st AprU, 1915,
Article.
to
Previous Year.
30th Sept., 1915.
Butter (casks)
689,952
910,797
220,845
Butter (cases)
19,344
25,630
6,286
Pigs heads (tierces)
2,085
23,347
21,262
Feet (cwt.)
16,975
25,229
8,254
Lard (cwt.) .
—
13,824
13,824
Other offals (cwt.) .
16,856
28,421
11,565
MUd cured heads (cwt.) .
2,484
6,331
3,847
Bacon (bales)
427,091
636,056
208,966
APPENDIX 287
V. Extracts from Correspondence
1. Naval Attache to H.M. Minister ^ Stockholm.
The following extract is from a letter I wrote in
December, 1918, to Sir Esme Howard, British Minister
at Stockholm : —
It may not be generally known in official circles,
but it is nevertheless a fact that among a large
section of American business men very bitter feeling
exists against England because they believe that
during 1915-16-17 while interfering with American
exports to Scandinavia and Holland we were our-
selves exporting to these countries similar goods
which either reached the enemy directly or indirectly.
For instance they say that, while we refused to
allow the International Harvester Company to
supply Denmark with agricultural machinery,
British agricultural machinery was reaching Den-
mark and in some cases was being discharged from
ships straight into German railway trucks for transit
to Germany. They also considered that we had
no right to interfere with their exports of oil-seeds
and the products of these seeds, seeing that during a
period of two years our imports of copra to Denmark
from British Colonies were three times greater
than the pre-war average. Again, in view of the
fact that British coal was being used in Danish
dairies working for Germany, the Americans do not
consider that we were justified in any way in inter-
fering with the imports of oil for internal combustion
engines required for Danish fishing craft, especially
as the export of fish from Denmark to Germany was
a pre-war trade, whilst the export of Danish butter
to Germany was entirely a war venture.
I could quote many other instances to show that
the Americans have very substantial reasons on
account of our blockade policy during 1915-17 for
treating us with suspicion. Unfortunately the bad
feeling then engendered was revived quite recently
288 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
for two reasons. In the first case the representa-
tive of the American Singer Co. in Norway found out
that although, on account of various difficulties and
formalities put in the way — letters of assurance,
etc. — it was impossible for the firm to carry on their
business with Scandinavia, yet sewing-machines
were being exported from England to Scandinavia
subject to no restrictions whatever. It is curious
and also very regrettable that we should have come
up against the International Harvester Company
and the Singer Company, two of the most powerful
and well-organised concerns in America. The second
case is far the more serious one and is known to have
made a very bad impression amongst members of
the War Trade Board, who are all business men.
The particulars of this case, which refers to traffic
in paper currency, will be found in the Chapter on
Finance in Part II.
The military operations of the war were common
to America and our Allies, but the blockade was
particularly our own, and for this reason it was of
the greatest importance that, in order to set a good
example, our own hands should have been abso-
lutely clean. Unfortunately it was well known to all
our Allies and to the Americans in Scandinavia that
we were ourselves competing with neutrals in
supplying the enemy. It is obvious therefore that
we were never in a position to approach even our
Allies with a view to restricting imports to Germany
— far less America when she was a neutral — without
causing friction. If the statistics of imports to
Denmark for the year 1917 are carefully studied any
uninstructed person would be tempted to assume
that we had started the blockade at America's
suggestion.
APPENDIX 289
2. Naval Attache to H.M. Minister ^ Copenhagen.
The following letter on the subject of lard is refen ed
to in Chapter VII, p. 173.
British Legation,
Christiania,
November 21st, 1916.
Dear Sir Ralph,
I'm afraid we look at this matter— lard — from
quite a different point of view.
I have never advocated the reduction of the
imports but their complete and immediate cessation.
The large amounts which came in last year are
surely no justification for 1,000 tons coming in this
year up to the end of September. On the contrary
I should have thought this was an excellent reason
why it should have been stopped months ago.
You say Germany only gets 40 per cent, of Den-
mark's total production. I think if we were in the
trenches or in the North Sea we should consider
this a lot.
Ten parts of lard yield approximately 1 part of
glycerine by weight. The 1,000 tons we have
already allowed into Denmark, in order to release a
similar amount to our enemies, means therefore that
the Germans have obtained 100 tons of glycerine.
From one part of glycerine, two parts of nitro-
glycerine are obtainable. As the German propul-
sive powder for heavy ordnance contains one-third
of nitroglycerine our benevolence has furnished
our enemies this year, under one heading alone, with
600 tons of gun ammunition.
It seems to me unnecessary to follow this further,
but I will only say once more that this traffic is by
no means insignificant to our fighting forces.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) M. W. P. Consett.
u
290 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
3. Naval Attache on Mr. Thirsk^s reports.
In December, 1916, a communication from one of
H.M. Ministers reached me, in which my action in
foi'warding copies of Mr. Thirsk's reports to Commander
Lcverton Harris, the Director of the Department
of Restriction of Enemy Supphes, was adversely
criticised.
The grounds upon which I justified my action were
set forth in a letter of which the substance of some of
the extracts is as follows : —
As I told you during my last visit I have sent
copies of all Mr. Consul Thirsk's reports on the
fishing industry not only to Commander Leverton
Harris but to Admiral De Chair, the Naval Assistant
to the Minister of Blockade, and also to the
Admiralty.
My reason for doing this was because I wished to
stop the large and increasing supply of food to our
enemies, and I feared that these valuable reports
might be delayed in transmission or possibly might
not be forwarded at all. Moreover, I was certainly
under the impression that in war time no harm
could possibly arise if reports such as these fell —
without delay — into the hands of officials such as I
have named above.
When Commander Leverton Harris came to
Christiania in July, I urged him to take up the
question of the export of fish from Denmark to
Germany. He then told me he had been under the
impression that the amount being exported was
unimportant. At that time, and during the first
nine months of the year, the fish exports to Germany
were continually increasing and averaged the large
amount of 8,000 tons per month, and, although
Great Britain was supplying the materials without
which the fishing industry could not have pros-
pered, the Director of one of the Government
APPENDIX 291
Departments charged with the duty of restricting
supphes reaching the enemy was actually unaware of
these important facts, although we had been at
war almost two years.
Under these circumstances I considered it my
duty to leave no stone unturned in order to ensure
that this valuable information should become as
widely and quickly known as possible in various
Government Departments.
I wish to make it quite clear that I have never
communicated directly or indirectly with Mr. Consul
Thii'sk, either officially or privately, nor have I ever
spoken to him, nor have I ever even seen him.
It would be interesting to know the dates on
which all of Mr. Consul Thirsk's reports, not only
those on fish, have reached His Majesty's Legation
and the dates on which they reached the Foreign
Office. I am sure that some of the reports forwarded
by me reached London some weeks before the same
reports forwarded by the Legation. I am also
under the impression that one or more of Mr. Consul
Thirsk's reports written months ago have not yet
reached the Foreign Office.
Before closing this despatch I would like to
mention that not long before the war I spent, in
company with three other Englishmen, several days
amongst the fishing craft based on Skagen both at
sea and in harbour, and was able to get a very good
idea of the industry in all its details at the principal
fishing port in Denmark. The things that struck
me most were : —
1. That most of the boats at Skagen were Swedish.
2. That a large amount of fish was landed at
Skagen which went direct to Germany by train.
3. That all the boats were dependent to a large
extent on petroleum, even their winches being
worked off the main motor.
4. That the boats were exceedingly well found in
gear of all sorts.
292 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
All this information was given — not once but
many times, especially during the first months of
1916 — ^to H.M. Legation, but I could get no interest
taken in the matter.
On July 18th and other days, during conversa-
tions with Commander Leverton Harris at Chris-
tiania, I gave him full details about the fishing at
Skagen and begged him to use his influence to
have oil and other requisites cut off from fishermen
whose catch went to Germany.
Petroleum allowed into Denmark, in accordance
with an agreement drawn up between His Majesty's
Government and Danish oil merchants, was not cut
off from fishermen in Danish waters until December
12th, although the whole of the catch had been going
for months to Germany in increasing quantities.
Between July 18th and December 12th I estimate
that at least 40,000 tons of fish reached Germany
via Denmark, of which probably 20,000 to 30,000
tons might have been stopped if action had been
taken in July. Nor is this all. A fish agreement
was drawn up in 1916 between His Majesty's Govern-
ment and the Swedish Government, but as there
was no stipulation therein that the Swedish boats
should land their catch in Sweden it is obviously
not worth the paper it is written on.
It should be observed that during 1916 the fish
rations to the German Army had been gradually
increased.
I requested that a copy of my despatch might be
forwarded to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State so that it might be clearly understood that
my action, although perhaps technically wrong, was
dictated solely with a view to preventing supplies
from reaching the enemy.
It was not until December that any notice was
taken of my technical irregularities, although it was
in August that I forwarded the first of Mr. Thirsk's
APPENDIX 298
despatches for which the Head of the R.E.S.D. pro-
fusely thanked me. The irregularity would seem
to have been discovered towards the latter stages of
my correspondence with this Department : when, that
the correspondence should not prove to be the sterile
one it promised and a mere record of polite words, I
wrote in such terms as seemed best calculated to attain
this end : not without some measure of success, I trust,
seeing that the petroleum was stopped.
4. Naval Attache to Admiralty.
The following extract is from a memorandum which
I drew up on the day of my arrival in England in May,
1917, before leaving the Admiralty : —
To those who have not lived, as the writer has
lived during the last five years, in Scandinavia, I
would ask, What is the impression likely to be created
on the minds of thoughtful Scandinavians and
especially Staff Officers who have studied the science
of war and have seen immense quantities of goods
reaching Scandinavia through our blockade, know-
ing that Scandinavia herself has been exporting
similar goods, or the products of the goods to our
enemies ? So far as I am able to judge, the impres-
sion created is that we are not taking the war
seriously, and may ourselves be finally defeated.
Various Government Departments have warned
us from time to time that they must have certain
commodities from Scandinavia — the Board of Trade,
food; Munitions Department, cryolite, steel of
various sorts, refined zinc, etc., etc., and this has
been advanced as a reason for not putting pressure
on these countries; but during the whole duration
of the war German munitions have been obtaining
far greater benefits from Scandinavia than British
munitions ; we have, in fact, kept the Scandinavian
machine running greatly to Germany's advantage.
294 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
No doubt it is satisfactory to be able to pose as
the champion of small nations, but in order to cham-
pion any cause it is necessary to maintain one's own
life, and so far as Scandinavia is concerned the very
people whom we are supposed to be championing
have throughout been assisting our enemies in an
endeavour to defeat us.
The blockade, emanating as it does from sea-
power, is essentially a naval question, and I submit
that Naval and Military attaches, who alone, among
the members of the British Legations, have made a
study of war, are particularly qualified to express
an opinion on this subject. I have therefore con-
sidered it to be my duty to write reports from time
to time dealing entirely with the blockade question.
In the autumn of 1916 Sir Ralph Paget assumed
the duties of British Minister at Copenhagen. Early
in October we discussed the blockade together at
great length, and Sir Ralph Paget then asked me
if I would put my views on paper in the shape of
a memorandum. This I did, and on reading it
through Sir Ralph Paget asked me if he might alter
some of the wording in order to make it more
palatable in official circles. To this I consented :
several passages were altered by Sir Ralph Paget
himself and can be seen to-day on the draft in
his own handwriting. This memorandum did not
meet with the approval of the Foreign Office.
At various times subsequently I have forwarded
despatches dealing with the blockade question, all
of which have met with the approval of the Head of
the Mission.
I consider that, as Germany is still at the present
time obtaining more supplies of all sorts from
Scandinavia than we are, the time has now arrived
when a full inquiry should be held into the question
of the blockade, and that all the documents con-
nected therewith, including private letters referring
to the Naval Attache, may be produced.
APPENDIX 295
5. Miscellaneous.
The following short extracts are culled from some
very interesting letters written in October, 1917, by a
member who occupied a high position in a Govern-
ment department in London and had throughout the
war revolved in the orbit of maritime rights and
international law.
I readily admit embargoes on Denmark appear
to be panning out exactly as you predicted and that,
except for a continued export of cattle of second and
third grade and of fish to Germany, all exports to
Germany of home produce should be stopped this
winter and next year.
This Department became convinced last winter
that, provided the war was not to end in the summer
1917, the stoppage of imports would have the effect
you predicted, and would be wise from the purely
blockade point of view. We did not get hold of
this view, I frankly admit, as soon as you did.
I do not defend the policy of the Board of Trade
which, in order to push British trade and keep up
the Exchanges, refused to put a large number of
articles on our prohibition list in spite of our
repeated requests— the only method of giving the
Government control over the profit-making instincts
of private traders. It was this that led to the
unfortunate forwarding of British goods to Germany
which you saw on the Copenhagen docks.
The following is from a Danish naval officer : —
I cannot help saying to you how much we Danish
naval officers sympathise with you in having to live
as you do amongst these people who are making
fortunes in supplying your enemies with food when
the officers and men of the Navy to which you belong
are risking their lives in trying to blockade your
enemies. We know also as naval officers that your
views on these matters are sound from the war point
of view.
296 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
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APPENDIX 297
VI. Summary of Supplies
The figures in the following tables have been taken
from the official Scandinavian statistics.
The dislocation of trade owing to the war in many
cases vitiates the value of figures for the purposes of
comparison. It is to be noted, however, that goods in
transit, that is to say goods that were not used for
domestic consumption, were not credited in the Scan-
dinavian accounts. A comparison, therefore, of the
total imports before the war with the total imports
during any subsequent year will stand good.
The statistics show generally the immense quanti-
ties of merchandise that passed into Scandinavia in
the critical years 1915 and 1916 : in many cases these
quantities exceeded the pre-war amounts. The year
1917 shows at a glance in nearly all cases the effect of
the blockade after it had been rigidly enforced.
Compare in many cases the total importations from
the United Kingdom in 1913 with those in 1915 and
1916. Compare also the Scandinavian exports to
Germany and Austria for the same periods.
There are several discrepancies between : —
(a) The official figures of the Scandinavian
countries,
(h) The figures compiled by the British Custom
House as to exports from the United King-
dom, and
(c) The figures compiled by the War Trade
Statistical Department.
Frequently the total imports from all sources in the
importing country's returns fall short of the exports
from England alone to those particular countries, as
recorded either by the Customs Department or the
W.T.S.D. This has probably arisen from the rule
under the Customs regulations of the Scandinavian
countries by which a consignment of imported goods
may on arrival be declared to be " in transit." Again
298 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
the delay in clearing consignments of imported goods
out of bond, in some cases running into a matter of
several months, has caused wide discrepancies to
appear in the statistical accounts respectively of the
exporting and importing country.
GRAND SUMMARY
Metric Tons of Food
1913.
1914.
1915.
1916.
1917.
From
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Norway-
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
To the United
Kingdom.
61,464^
26,567 - 344,785
256, 754 J
53,715^
28,526 [ 359,820
277,579j
69,512^
8,563 \ 275,473
197,398j
35,70n
115^91,916
156, 100 J
69,680)
— [ 172,103
102,423j
To Germany and
Austria
81,538^
37,043 \ 252,128
123,547j
71,5861
56,685 [ 262,376
134,105j
182, 630 1
104,203 I 561,234
274,401 J
215,593^
90,835 \ 620,756
314,328j
101,847)
16,451 [ 315,205
196,907j
In this table the following are included : Meat of all sorts,
produce, eggs, lard, margarine.
It does not include : Vegetable oils, beer, fish oil, bone fat,
cocoa, horses, sjTup and glucose, fruit, vegetables.
Total
596,913
622,196
836,707
812,672
487,308
fish, dairy
coffee, tea.
DENMARK
Table Showing the Export of Food from Denmark to the United
Kingdom and Germany and Austria during the Years 1913-17
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
To the United
Kingdom
Tons
256,754
277,579
197,398
156,100
102,423
To Germany
and Austria
Tons
123,547
134,105
274,401
314,328
196,907
N.B. — The foodstuffs included in above table are the same as shoMTi on
next page.
DANISH STATISTICS
299
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300 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Table Showing the Number of Tons of Food Lost by England and
Gained by Germany from Deniurk during the Years 1915, 1916
AND 1917 WHEN Compared with 1913
Lost by England Gained by Germany
1915 . . . 59,356 150,854
1916 . . . 100,654 190,781
1917 . . . 154,331 73,360
Total . . . 814,341 414,995
In the above table the following are included : Meat ; tripe ; pigs' head
and feet ; slaughter-house offal ; fish ; meat conserves ; extract of meat ;
milk (condensed, skimmed, sweet and dried); cream; butter; cheese;
eggs and egg albumen; fats (including lard, margarine, oleo-margarine and
premier jus).
N.B. — Live cattle are included in meat at 200 kilos, per head.
Danish Statistics
Export of live cattle (number of head)
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
Germany and Austria . 152,080 187,438 250,839 305,026 300,339
Tons of meat . . 30,416 37,488 50,168 61,005 60,068
AH other countries . . 284 46 4 5 4
Exports of other live animals are insignificant.
Live cattle may be taken at 200 kilos, of meat per head.
Meat (all kinds except fish, game and conserves, excluding tripe, casings,
pigs' heads and feet and offal)
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria . 20,388 24,070 69,410 38,699 23,718
United Kingdom . . 124,511 143,486 101,750 84,812 68,845
Imports
United Kingdom . . 194 176 1,107 175 9
Iceland .... 2,740 2,313 2,486 1,104 —
Tripe, Casings, Pigs' Head and Feet and Slaughter-House Offal
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria . 5,484 6,918 9,690 10,820 14,279
United ICingdom . . 10,200 12,552 4,216 43 —
Hides and Skins (all kinds — untanned)
Imports : tons
All countries . . . 9,810 8,310 6,459
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 619 413 289
Exports (including re-exports)
Germany and Austria . 9,754 9,262 4,815
Norway and Sweden . 1,703 1,937 1,237
In transit Free Port . — 8,800 2,650
4,158
1,891
276
217
4,167
528
1,016
1,776
503
19
DANISH STATISTICS
301
All countries .
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Lbathek (all kinds)
Imports : tons
1913 1914
1,468 1,284
Germany and Austria
Norway and Sweden
In transit Free Port
70
74
1915
1,481
94
Exports (including re-exports)
47 289 21
. 390 348 300
— 269 850
1916
1,540
142
1917
734
31
4
1
229
95
44
4
Boots and Shoes
Imports : tons
All countries .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
•
295 260
22 34
230
56
180
66
84
49
Germany and Austria
Norway and Sweden
In transit Free Port
Exports (including re-ex
— 97
11 12
— 73
Hatb (horse, cattle and
ports)
496
29
100
pigs)
209
11
44
1
2
All countries .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
•
Imports : tons
498 385
6 5
584
43
373
31
47
Germany and Austria
Norway and Sweden
In transit Free Port
kinds)
(ali
Exports :
536 427
54 62
— 220
454
86
160
721
60
53
229
136
Glue and Gelatine (all kinds)
Imports : tons
All countries .
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Germany and Austria
Norway and Sweden
In transit Free Port
83 480
634
666
231
4 9
20
239
130
Exports :
11 3
6 29
- 260
9
20
110
24
23
73
5
1
Fish (all kinds, excepting conserves)
Imports : tons
Norway and Sweden . 8,239 10,542 28,433 36,483
AH others . . . 16,636 20,511 19,782 8,939
7,252
6,734
302 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
Germany and Austria . 25,516 32,968 66,569 106,694 38,841
United Kingdom . . 3,932 2,704 5,303 1,902 ~
Conserves (except milk and extract of meat)
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria . 131 6,676 16,022 19,758 10,587
United Kingdom . . 88 72 66 110 18
Extract of Meat (Bouillon cubes)
Exports : tons
Germany and Austria . — — 15 2,635 2,209
United Kingdom . . — 1 2 13 23
J^ Milk (condensed and dried)
Exports : tons
Germany and Austria . 30 183 601 625 1,426
United Kingdom . . 2,749 1,826 2,650 2,441 817
Cream
Exports : tons
Germany and Austria . 28,517 15,313 674 2,530 125
United Kingdom . . — — — — —
Milk (sweet and skimmed)
Exports : tons
Germany . . .457 370 481 2,975 5,077
United Kingdom . . — -=- — — —
Bttttee
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria . 11,317 9,430 37,455 36,891 21,594
United Kingdom . . 87,272 88,932 65,402 57,041 31,295
Imports : tons
Total all countries . . 14,104 9,676 3,735 221 —
Cheese
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria . 57 316 3,886 4,344 5,332
United Eangdom . . 2 6 9 — —
Imports : tons
All countries . . .679 486 394 145 17
DANISH STATISTICS
303
Eggs
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Gfermany and x\ustria
United Kingdom
All countries .
United Kingdom
All other countries
1913 1914 1915 1916
1,160 1.308 12,466 20,422
28,000 28,000 18,000 9,738
Imports : tons
2,606 2,350 1,418 344
Egg- Albumen
Imports : tons
— 14 472 114
286 195 794 320
1917
13,482
11,425
136
6,806
427
6,794
37
1
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria , 2 7 490 ^
Fats (including lard, neutral lard, margarine, oleo- margarine and premierjus)
Imports : tons
All countries . . . 7,766 9,178 15,016
Imports fiom the United
Kingdom . .532 451 1,155
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria . 72 58 6,474
Sweden ... 40 1,932 1,695
1,478
159
2,168
23
Vegetable Oils (all edible oils, including compound lard)
Imports : tons
From the United Kingdom 290 728 1,730 312 27
All countries . . . 14,839 9,288 10,844 8,586 2,039
Exports : tons
Germany and Austria . 960 1,260 1,237 — —
Vegetable Oils (all technical kinds, including soya oil)
Imports : tons
All countries .
From the United Kingdom
1,722 1,792
146 588
2,000
1,369
1,518
986
629
410
Germany and Austria
Sweden
United Kingdom
Exports : tons
357 1,518
1,666 3,091
557 1,185
Soap
6,847
5,558
902
315
90
All countries .
From the United Kingdom
Imports : tons
216 193
293
146
317
234
179
100
Germany and Austria
Exports : tons
2 1
7,988
112
—
^ Chiefly re-export — probably of goods from the United Kingdom.
304 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Total export .
Germany
United Kingdom
Total all countries .
From the United Kingdom
and British Empire
Total all countries .
From the United Kingdom
and British Empire
Total all countries .
From the United Kingdom
and British Empire
Total all countries .
From the United Kingdom
and British Empire
Total all countries .
From the United Kingdom
and British Empire
Total all countries .
From the United Kingdom
and British Empire
Total all countries .
From the United Kingdom
and British Empire
Beer (all sorts)
Ex-ports : tons
1913 1914
1915
1916
1917
4,779 5,328
61 30
2,580 2,710
7,070
841
1,441
9,859
6,146
552
6,729
5,673
4
Linseed
Imports : tons
19,979 23,627
33,267
37,147
6,529
5,413 3,798
7,310
2,247
—
Rape-seed
Imports: tons
2,148 645
1,352
1,319
—
— 92
842
113
—
Sessamum-Seed
Imports : tons
4,017 6,122
9,333
18,360
—
— 1,223
2,983
850
—
Hemp-Seed
Imports : tons
752 1,220
1,139
64
71
44 81
175
64
15
Soya-Beans
Imports: tons
48,068 74,643
104,747
98,996
31,095
— 2,918
COPEA
Imports : tons
33,686 32,767
13,095 22,473
Palm Kernels
Imports : tons
595 1,832
55,018
46,835
41,550
41,550
12,558
12,449
19
960
DANISH STATISTICS
305
Total all countries .
From the United Kingdom
and British Empire
Eaeth-Nuts
Imports : tons
1913 1914
3,665 4,308
1915
9,223
1,495 1,609
1916
9,746
1917
Total all countries
Oat3
Imports : tons
61,805 54,839
3,160
119
975
Total all countries
Babley
Imports : tons
42,740 52,295 108,366 23,866
10,138
Total all countries
Maize
Imports : tons
404,875 266,405 692,813 450,164 240,822
Total all countries
Oil- Cakes (all kinds)
Imports : tons
594,798 445,954 566,982 471,794 153,314
Other Fodders (including bran, oil-cake meal, broken rice, etc, but not
hay or straw)
Imports : tons
Total all countries . . 69,102 61,536 64,989 25,324 2,768
Oil Values of Imported Oil- Seeds
Linseed (40 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . . 8,000 9,452 13,308
United Kingdom and
British Empire
All countries .
United Kingdom
British Empire
All countries .
United Kingdom
British Empire
All countries .
United Kingdom
British Empire
2,160 1,520
2,920
Rape-seed (43 per cent.) : tons
. 920 279 580
and
— 38 361
Sesame (57 per cent.) : tons
. 2,291 3,488 5,318
and
— 695 1,705
Hemp-seed (35 per cent.) : tons
. 262 427 399
and
15 28 61
14,860
900
567
47
10,465
484
21
21
2,612
24
5
306 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Soya- Beans (20 per cent.) : tons
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
All countries . . . 9,620 14,920 20,940 19,800 6,220
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . — 600 — — —
N.B. — These beans came from Manchuria, which is under Japanese
jurisdiction.
Cofra (25 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . . 8,425 8,200 13,750 10,387 3,150
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 3,275 5,625 11,700 10,387 3,112
N.B. — All the remainder came from Allied Colonies.
Palm Kernels (50 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . . 300 900 — — —
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 9 480 — — —
Earth-nuts (50 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . . 1,830 2,155 4,510 4,875 —
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . — 750 800 — —
Totals
All countries .
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Edible oils
Technical oils
Oil values of imported oil
oil seeds
Totals ....
Increases over 1913
Of the Above the Following came from the United Kingdom
AND British Empire
Edible oils .
Technical oils
Oil values of imported oil
seeds ....
Totals ....
1 Of this total, 1,300 tons only came from the U.S.A. The remainder,
except 2,000 tons, all came from the United Kingdom and British Empire
and Allied countries.
31,648
39,821
58,805
60,975
12.006
5,459
9,736
17,547
12,239
3,117
r OF Vegetable Oil Imports
14,839
1,722
9,288
1,792
10,844
2,000
8,586
1,518
2,039
629
16,561
11,080
12,844
10,104
2,668
31,648
39,821
58,805
60,975
12,006
48,209
50,901
71,649
71,079
14,674 *
2,692
23,440
22,870
290
146
728
588
1,730
1,369
312
986
27
410
5,459
9,736
17,547
12,239
3,117
5,895
11,052
20,646
13,537
3,554
DANISH STATISTICS
307
Oil-cake Values op Imported Oil Seeds
Linseed (60 per cent.) : tons
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
All countries . . . 12,000 14,175 19,959 22,287 3,917
United Kingdom and
British Empire , . 3,253 2,278 4,390 1,347 —
Rape-seed (57 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . . 1,228 366 772 752 —
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . — 54 481 66 —
Sesame (43 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . . 1,726 2,634 4,015 7,895 —
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . — 528 1,278 366 —
Hemp- seed (65 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . .490 793 740 43 47
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 29 53 114 43 10
Soya-Beans (80 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . . 38,448 59,723 83,807
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . — 2,318 —
Copra (75 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . , 25,261 24,567 41,268
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 9,820 16,848 35,135
Falm Kernels (50 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . . 295 932 —
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 10 480 —
Earth-nuts (50 per cent.) : tons
All countries . . . 1,835 2,153 4,713
United Kingdom and
British Empire , . — 745 809 — —
Totals
All countries . . . 81,283 105,343 155,274 146,207 38,247
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 13,112 23,304 42,207 32,985 9,347
79,196 24,875
31,163
31,163
4,871
9,408
9,337
Oats
Barley .
Maize
Oil-cake
Oil-cake from oil-seeds
Various
Total .
Imports of Fodder-stuffs
61,805 54,839 3,160 119
42,740 52,295 108,366 23,866
404,875 266,405 692,813 450,164
594,798 445,954 566,982 471,794
81,283 105,343 155,274 146,207
69,102 61,536 64,989 25,324
975
10,138
240,822
153,314
38,247
2,768
1,254,603 986,372 1,591,584 1,117,474 446,264
308 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Germany
Total all countries
Germany
Tallow (raw and melted)
Imports : tons
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
42 18 — — —
. 144 158 372 205 8
Exports : tons
. 552 918 1,480 44 777
Germany
Total all countries
Fish Oil (including cod-liver oil)
Imports : tons
22 5 —
. 3,400 3,031
Germany and Austria
Sweden
3,433 2,149 1,148
Exports : tons
1,631 2,247 3,017 1,518 336
409 399 29 178 235
Bone Fat (and other technical animal oils and fats)
Germany
Total all countries
Gei,*many and Austria
Imports : tons
126 79 1
208 950 1,053
Exports : tons
1,080 1,375 2,529
145
2,165 2,673
Total all countries .
Germany
Sweden
Total .
Total all countries
Germany
Sweden
Total .
Coffee
Imports : tons
20,528 18,463
30,626
38,506
24,068
23, 5U
14,184
13,651^
Re-exports : tons
81 711
2,882 1,936
4,179 3,963
2,339
4,216
9,793
1,574
2,866
6,251
141
Tea
Imports : tons
539 608
1,481
5,315
1,250
1,6J^9
211
131^
Re-exports : tons
3 90
17 27
73 187
590
33
803
220
142
773
20
i From British statistics.
DANISH STATISTICS
809
Cocoa Beans
Imports : tons
1913 1914
1915
1916
1917
Total all countries .
•
2,069 2,361
4,666
21,387
3,441
3,805
2,970
3,702 1
Germany . . .
Sweden
Total .
•
Re-exports : tons
— 387
7 17
17 439
764
485
1,676
106 none shown
115
Fishing -Nets and Yarn foe.
Fishing-Nets
Germany
United Kingdom
Total all countries .
•
Imports : tons
78 72
39 65
159 218
133
142
213
214
10
135
146
Petroleum for Lighting and Power
Germany
United Kingdom
U.S.A. .
Total all countries .
•
Imports : tons
10,513 4,340
2,853 1,517
107,194 101,414
134,536 128,929
734
124,805
127,964
832
123,092
124,014
6,697
168
49,050
66,010
Neutral countries (total) .
Re-exports : tons
31,307 22,381
21,745
13,241
199
European Hemp
All countries .
United Kingdom
•
Imports : tons
1,634 1,600
76 139
Indian Hemp
739
262
251
826 2
All countries .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
•
and
•
Imports : tons
1,274 970
762 777
ML4NILLA Hemp
2,049
1,760
2,215
2,212
193
177
All countries .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
Imports : tons
340 342
816 159
875
684
1,189
1,102
57
57
Yarn of
" Linen and the Like "
( ? including thread)
All countries .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
•
Imports : tons
486 413
10 88
249
152
231
197
94
79
^ From British statistics, ^
726 from Russia.
310 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Yarn of Cocoa-nut Fibre ( ? including rope)
Imports : tons
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
All countries . . .935 718 1,041 1,135 87
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 277 231 1,010 1,094 87
All countries .
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Cutch
Imports : tons
65 42
17
14
195
138
Germany and Austria
Norway and Sweden
Transit Free Port .
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
92
1
11
77
77
2
2
Blue Vitriol (Copper Sulphate)
Tons
All countries . , .267 266 365
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 202 210 350
110
Pyrites
All countries .
Spain .
Imports : tons
. 28,776 35,980 49,064
. 12,193 17,937 28,933
Burnt Pyrites
40,676
18,253
34,527
Germany
Sweden
Exports : tons
. 11,928 10,656 7,202
, 7,802 8,393 14,335
Lubricating Oil
Imports : metric tons
7,671
20,417
1913 1914 1915
1916
1917
Germany
United Kingdom
U.S.A. .
Total all countries .
, 1,200 886 37
145 238 550
. 2,217 3,236 9730
. 5,557 5,360 10,490
7
326
10,696
11,045
14
92
5,937
6,067
Norway
Sweden
Germany
Re-exports : metric tons
1,120 1,140
— — 2,127 2,622
— — none shown
1,131
68
DANISH STATISTICS
311
Binder Twine
Imports : metric tons
Germany
United Kingdom
U.S.A. .
Total all countries .
1913 1914
111 442
581 984
785 430
. 1,605 2,041
1915
1
792
976
2,050
1916
3
936
1,425
2,370
1917
138
1,380
1,518
Gtermany
Re-exports : metric tons
— 12 45
none
shown
Horses and Foals
1
Germany and Austria
Total all countries .
Imports : head
. 2,788 2,351
. 18,054 19,885
30
7,775
82
3,940
44
131
Germany and Austria
Total all countries .
Exports : head
. 27,276 95,338
. 27,913 95,710
257
264
16,077
16,100
34,155
34,217
Germany
United Kingdom
Total (all)
Coal (exports insignificant)
Imports : tons
. 189,211 131,321 109,713 508,116 644,060
. 2,931,094 3,046,678 3,116,658 2,295,023 824,762
. 3,152,576 3,226,957 3,232,498 2,814,820 1,473,911
Germany
United Kingdom
Total (all)
Coke
Imports : tons
124,611 147,209 2,526,398 4,523,609 3,789,213
2,213,914 2,109,930 1,587,492 1,527,488 397,393
2,391,603 2,260,430 4,114,140 6,053,542 4,186,607
Germany
United Kingdom and
British Empire
Total all countries .
Fertilisers
Phosphate Rock
Imports : tons
3,225 —
15,757 23,325
55,875 49,301
Superphosphate
Imports : tons
45,923 62,804
Germany
United Kingdom and
British Empire 13,680 18,946
Total all countries . . 110,155 142,883
5,300
58,238
108,864 1 8,429 *
24,270
83,060
3
19,461
10,420
^ From Algiers and Tunis.
2 French.
312 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Basic Slag
Imports : tons
1913 1914
59 45
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 8,754 11,031
1915
1916
Germany
United
British
Total all countries
8,955 11,077 —
Grermany
United Kingdom and
British Empire
Total all countries .
Grermany
United Kingdom and
British Empire
Total all countries .
59
282
Bone-meal
Imports : tons
21
214
12
1,420
222
1,683
761
Germany
Grermany
United Kingdom and
British Empire
Total all countries .
Germany
United Kingdom and
British Empire
523
695
149
Germany
Germany
United Kingdom and
British Empire
Total all countries .
Greenland
1917
35
1,252
1,137
Artificial Nitrates
Imports : tons
5,066 11,781 3,879
Rc'exports : tons
— 1,021 —
Chile Saltpetre
Imports : tons
20,206 29,414 —
^ijg 2 918
35,049 42,743 42*066 34,949 39,601
Sulphate of Ammonia
Imports : tons
502 645 — — —
49
Exports : tons
2,791 1,923 _ _ _
Potash Manures
Imports : tons
26,084 23,617 24,264 51,909 20,989
26,100 23,674 24,267 51,961 20,989
Cryolite
Imports : metric tone
8,451 7,373 5,801 10,922 5,897
DANISH STATISTICS 313
Ex'ports : metric tons
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
Grermany . . . 1,505
United Kingdom and
British Empire 1,040
France . . . .1,785
Norway and Sweden . 463
1,303
1,108
638
781
2,800
1,676
529
735
2,900
1,122
1,548
1,870
1,248
899
2,130
1,016
Wool (all kinds except waste and shoddy)
Imports : tons
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 279 298
Faroes and Iceland . 805 830
Total all countries . . 1,465 1,408
538
871
3,256
876
3
1,475
208
26
401
Exports : (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria . 105 533 493
Norway and Sweden . 225 228 398
217
176
40
Cotton (raw)
Imports : tons
United Eangdom and
British Empire . . 14 100 3,463 6,059 914
Total all countries . . 6,009 4,820 7,205 8,191 2,934
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria .3 5 — — —
Norway and Sweden .7 8 50 31 9
Woollen Yarn (all kinds)
Imports : tons
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 872 809 1,048 1,559 833
Total all countries . . 1,935 1,498 1,182 1,678 853
Exports (including re-exports) : tons
Germany and Austria .3 11 1 1 1
Norway and Sweden .8 5 7 3 1
Cotton Yarn (all kinds except for fishing-nets)
Imports : tons
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 791 792 1,817 2,717 1,963
Total all countries . . 1,749 1,812 2,491 2,931 2,026
Exports to Germany and Austria : Nil
Rubber
Imports : metric tons
All countries . . .115 262 333 404 126
United Kingdom and
British Empire . .67 213 293 iOl 122
314 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Exports (including re-exports) : metric tons
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
Germany and Austria . 69 203 8 3 —
Norway and Sweden . 86 126 210 284 493
From Free Port, going to
foreign countries . — 172 220 — —
N.B. — Rubber includes " regenerated rubber " and guttapercha and balata,
MoTOB AND Cycle Tyres and Tubes
Imports : metric tons
All countries ... 549 595 446 503 338
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 127 205 292 378 203
Exports (including re-exports) : metric tons
Germany and Austria . — — — — —
Norway and Sweden . 56 56 70 5 —
From Free Port, going to
foreign countries . — 700 51 33 —
Rosin
Imports : metric tons
All countries . . . 1,547 1,388 2,253 2,082 670
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 1 53 1,029 625 61 .
Exports (including re-exports) : metric tons
Grermany and Austria . — 2 — — —
Norway and Sweden .3 5 — — —
From Free Port, going to
foreign countries . — 1,057 183 1,684 —
Tin
All countries .
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Imports : tons
329 379 339
172 261 317
471
466
240
228
Exports (including re-exports) : metric tons
Germany and Austria . — — — —
Norway and Sweden .23 33 — —
In transit Free Port . — 91 14 2
—
Copper
All countries .
British Empire
Imports : tons
3,267 2,873 3,271
174 228 410
3,480
249
2,519
3
Exports
Germany and Austria
Norway and Sweden
In transit Free Port
1 (including re-exports) : tons
— 2 23
299 78 125
— 4,762 362
25
72
145
2
40
217
DANISH STATISTICS
QuEBKACHO Extract (liquid form)
Imports : tons
315
1913 1914
1915
1916
1917
All countries .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
•
2,307 1,762
108 268
Exports : tons
745
417
174
10
15
12
Germany and Austria
Norway and Sweden
In transit Free Port
•
57
— 2,360
1,660
26
19
Othee Solid Extracts (this includes quebracho and apparently all solid
extracts from woods except Gambier and Cutch)
All countries .
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Imports : tons
98 645 3,320
— 144 1,758
Exports (including re-exports) : Nil
3,874 1,110
Free Port to Copenhagen (transit from foreign country to foreign
country)
Tons
1914
1915
1916
1917
Pork and bacon
4,050
11,800
398
—
Other meat .
700
2,160
201
—
Casings ....
. 1,600
3,200
46
—
Butter ....
. 1,530
986
—
—
Eggs ....
2,470
430
21
—
Fat ... .
8,800
12,120
741
—
Oleo-margarine and premier jus
} 1,730
5,100
181
10
Margarine
450
560
16
—
Fish (all kinds except conserves
) 9,004
7,107
791
1,874
Coffee ....
2,800
19,500
5,500
—
Tea ....
800
1,650
952
—
Cocoa beans .
2,350
26,150
1,320
27
Wool ....
700
380
11
7
Cotton ....
3,353
3,160
5
Binder twine and sail rope
1,876
2
6
—
Hides and skins
8,800
2,650
1,001
18
Fish oil ...
2,490
4,000
—
12
Lubricating oil
260
7,340
(8,160) 1
380
" Unspecified " oils
16,000
5,200
1,688
172
Vegetable oils (specified) .
707
2,376
809
300
Soap ....
64
140
99
50
^ Not separately given : all kinds of mineral oil.
316 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
SWEDEN
Table showing the Export of Food from Sweden to the United
Kingdom and Germany and Austria ditring the Years 1913-1917
To the United
Kingdom
To Grermany
Austria
Tons
Tons
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
26,567
28,526
8,563
115
37,043
56,685
104,203
90,835
16,451
In the above table the following are included : cattle ; fish ; pork and
bacon; meat; meat conserves; milk; cheese; butter; eggs.
From Sweden to the United Kingdom
Exports : tons
1913
1914
1915
1916
Cattle .
—
—
—
Fish .
4,745
1,951
—
—
Pork and bacon
2,740
9,165
746
—
Meat
235
192
26
—
Meat conserves
20
20
11
4
Milk .
167
118
19
—
Cheese . . . .
—
13
—
Butter .
15,749
14,317
6,862
60
Eggs .
2,911
2,750
899
51
Total
26,567 28,526 8,563
115
From Sweden to Germany and Austria
Total
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
Cattle (including calves)
Exports : metric tons
. 8,451 16,034 7,298
. 3,180 5,474 4,761
2,720
2,665
1917
Exports : tons
Cattle . . . .
3,180
5,474
4,761
2,665
528
Fish
30,303
43,298
53,406
51,113
7,820
Pork and bacon
703
2,160
16,936
14,093
4,760
Meat
2,306
3,015
8,954
3,905
2,641
Meat conserves
108
1,567
6,107
3,027
453
Milk .
109
—
823
1,486
55
Cheese . . . .
—
15
276
—
Butter .
310
1,083
9,730
12,823
—
Eggs
24
73
3,210
1,723
194
37,043 66,685 104,203 90,835 16,451
535
528
SWEDISH STATISTICS
317
Fish
Exports .
: metric tons
1913
1914 1915
1916
1917
Total .
Grermany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 44,962
. 30,303
. 4,745
Imports :
55,058 59,742
43,298 53,406
1,951 —
metric tons
56,885
51,113
11,653
7,820
Total .
United Kingdom
. 58,646
. 2,270
55,505 52,942
3,383 721
39,875
17,967
Pork (including bacon)
Exports ,
; metric tons
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 7,908
703
. 2,740
Impoiis .
14,723 18,917
2,160 16,936
9,165 746
: metric tons
14,113
14,093
4,766
4,760
Total .
United Kingdom
. 2,613
1,844 2,810
— 10
1,690
25
6,624
Meat (all other kinds except conserves)
Exports : metric tons
Total .... 4,915 7,530 11,692 4,980
Germany and Austria . 2,306 3,015 8,954 3,905
United Kingdom
235
192
26
Total
United Kingdom
Imports :
metric tons
2,010
1,245
514
181
203
199
197
5,761
2,641
158
Meat Conserves (all kinds, including fish)
Exports : metric tons
Total ,
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 450 1,931 6,754
. 108 1,567 6,107
20 20 11
Imports : metric tons
3,213
3,027
4
464
453
Total .
United Kingdom
. 570 486 460
87 113 75
Milk (including dried milk)
Exports : metric tons
450
12
298
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 2,026 2,554 3,860
109 — 823
167 118 19
Imports : metric tons
1,495
1,486
57
55
Total .
United Kingdom
94 52 60
15
5
318 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Cheese
Exports : metric tons
1913 1914 1915
Total • .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
3 31 284
— 15 276
. — 13 —
Imports : metric tons
Total .
United Kingdom
. 550 346 620
1916
129
1917
548
Butter (including margarine)
Exports :
metric tons
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 19,670
310
. 15,749
19,032 18,850
1,083 9,730
14,317 6,862
13,020
12,823
60
Imports :
metric tons
Total .
United Kingdom
563
• — ^
826 1,035
308
58
Eggs (and
egg products)
Exports :
metric tons
Total .
. 3,227
3,282 4,974
2,042
Germany
United Kingdom
866
7,149
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 3,227 3,282 4,974
24 73 3,210
. 2,911 2,750 899
2,042
1,723
61
194
194
Imports : metric tons
Total .
United Kingdom
•
. 2,847 1,669 4,154
86
Horses
Exports : No. of head
614
11
1,863
Total .
•
. 6,837 12,631 12,725
22,357
11,241
6,924 12,020 22,317 11,216
Animal Oils and Fats (including stearin, tallow, olein)
Imports :
metric tons
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
•
and
•
7,326
1,023
Exports :
8,449 8,966
1,138 2,131
metric tons
7,656
2,104
1,083
273
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
•
1,194
693
34
1,494 1,352
786 962
28 39
879
876
696
685
SWEDISH STATISTICS
319
Vegetable Oils and Fats
Imports : metric tons
Total ....
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Total ....
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
Total .
United Kingdom
Total .
Germany and Austria
1913
28,053
1914 1915
27,934 38,807
1916
19,478
1917
801
4,738
5,745 8,475
1,808
283
Exports :
181
• metric tons
876 2,334
714 1,778
2,099
1,954
50
50
Syrup and Glucose
Imports : metric tons
10,313 13,594 7,692
7,449 9,549 3,791
Exports : metric tons
— 2 1,796
— — 1,784
8,118
929
12
Total .
United Kingdom
Total .
Germany and Austria
Coffee (raw and roasted)
Imports : metric tons
. 34,240 29,358 40,233
94,051
. 1,318 1,212 1,027
S,163
Exports : metric tons
13 431 3,943
— 51 1,273
Cocoa (beans and powder)
Imports : metric tons
38,359
50,906
223
1,121
3,524
3,328
757
8,569
6,675 1
556
29^
Total ....
1,668
1,940
4,568
3,401
646
15,880
2,726
188^
United Kingdom
53
379
1,371
348
1
5,992
354
1
Exports
.• metric tons
Total ....
10
146
2,352
11
—
Germany and Austria
112
Tea
2,265
6
Imports
; metric tons
Total ....
233
212
250
496
96
718
5,022
1
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
126
167
198
433
40
628
S,018
1
From British statistics.
320 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Exports : metric tons
Total .
Germany and Austria
1913 1914 1915
2 2
Cranberbies
1916
161
161
1917
Total .
Germany and Austria
Exports : metric tons
. 3,174 3,084 3,571
. 3,011 2,847 3,430
1,844
1,756
723
715
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
Total .
Germany and Austria
Cotton (raw, carded and waste)
Imports : metric tons
. 24,886 25,480 123,185
and
1,940 2,807
10,297
Exports : metric tons
831 6,032 78,178
236 4,685 76,259
28,862
552
55
7,093
176
Total ....
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Total ....
Germany and Austria
Hemp
Imports : metric tons
4,004
4,081 5,899
3,290
1,788
529
640 1,154
585
5
Exports :
3
metric tons
80 479
58 428
382
355
—
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
Total .
Germany and Austria
Total ....
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Total ....
Germany and Austria
Wool (all kinds, excluding waste)
Imports : metric tons
and
5,944 4,459 4,952
7,236
1,342
3,205 2,576 917
1,541
1
Exports : metric tons
74 32 686
21 10 686
29
29
—
Cotton Yarn
Imports : metric tons
1,303 1,290 1,331
1,106
657
757 749 975
Exports : metric tons
474
1
671
202
1,729
1,201
876
89
40
551
12
SWEDISH STATISTICS 321
Hides and Skcns (all kinds except furs)
Imports : metric tons
1913
1914 1915
1916
1917
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
. 14,130
a,nd
688
10,713 14,420
865 2,725
7,725
75
1,150
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
Exports :
. 10,811
. 5,053
446
metric tons
12,870 6,388
5,905 3,227
325 105
5,410
2,809
14
56
27
Boots and Shoes
Imports : metric tons
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
•
41 59 57
3 4 11
Exports : metric tons
49
6
2
Total .
Germany and Austria
•
•
10 192 4,556
— 142 3,470
Sausage Casings
Imports : metric tons
2,828
2,664
26
15
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
1,077 897 2,324
16 20
Exports : metric tons
828
528
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
«
697 1,172 2,518
484 702 1,883
— — 30
1,177
1,059
1,155
1,080
BuBBEK (raw and waste, including guttapercha)
Imports : metric tons
Total .... 1,201 1,131 1,216
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 420 324 754
1,347
928
494
Exports : metric tons
Total .... 671 680 571
Germany and Austria . 76 111 120
788
487
1,235
618
Rubber (manufactures, all kinds)
Imports : metric tons
Total .... 1,009 954 582
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 239 215 221
611
241
180
13
Exports : metric tons
Total .... 678 682 395
Germany and Austria . 129 135 13
Y
245
—
322 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Glycerine (
raw and refined)
Imports :
metric tons
1913
1914 1915
1916
1917
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
335
and
51
358 472
20 29
283
303
Total .
Germany and Austria
Exports :
. 184
. 178
Resin (inc
Imports :
metric tons
129 154
97 132
luding shellac)
metric tons
124
83
40
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
. 7,077
and
89
Exports
4,558 6,728
502 2,341
; metric tons
8,987
1,369
97
14
Total .
Germany and Austria
8
•
813 939
519 669
3,137
2,944
1,390
1,348
Tobacco (raw and manufactured)
Imports : metric tons
Total ....
United Kingdom .
4,768 3,660 3,740
259 238 178
4,812
199
4.959
194
Total ....
Germany and Austria
Exports (metric tons)
49 72 77
Soap (all kinds)
78
6
Total ....
United Kingdom
Imports : metric tons
374 302 606
240 191 430
954
616
313
179
Total ....
Germany and Austria
Exports : metric tons
36 23 3,399
2,946
Candles
957
928
2
Total ....
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Imports : metric tons
23 27 145
139
69
46
11
Total
Germany and Austria
Exports : metric tons
35 483 924
422 890
4
—
SWEDISH STATISTICS
323
Lubricants (aU kinds)
Imports : metric tons
1913
1914 1915
1916
1917
Total .
United Kingdom
Denmark
. 24,727
902
15,865 44,467
809 2,006
— 3,353
24,680
212
2,896
7,635
206
288
Total .
Germany and Austria
Exports :
576
metric tons
207 737
— 476
1,364
1,334
634
630
Total
United Kingdom
Total .
Austria and Grermany
Petroleum (for light and power)
Imports : metric tons
. 157,557 129,836 106,958 139,769
5,689 4,684 4,455 2,033
Exports : metric tons
5,070 4,523 2,048 1
— — 52 —
44,448
18
Total .
Germany and Austria
Total .
United Kingdom
Total .
United Kingdom
Total .
United Kingdom
Spirits
Exports : thousands of litres
. 360 540 3,799
16 68 3,184
159
Coal (all kinds)
Imports : metric tons
4,878,854 4,626,932 3,835,687 4,036,452
4,654,675 4,385,947 2,723,980 1,659,005
Coke
Imports : metric tons
495,866 449,576 1,220,161 1,296,446
261,132 296,584 91,750 27,599
1,503,757
696,666
520,311
8,435
Coal Briquettes
Imports : metric tons
24,737 15,146 240,590 885,781
— — — 5,152
300,827
Fodder Materials (except hay and straw)
Imports : metric tons
Total .... 184,506 144,503 165,115 80,255
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 11,699 11,898 13,793 —
33,602
Exports .
metric tons
Total .
. 2,134
623
21
1,700
Germany and Austria
—
102
1,700
324 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
LiKSEED AND RaPE-SEED
Imports : metric tons
Total ....
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Germany and Austria
1913
1914 1915
1916
1917
29,789
25,227 30,347
26,526
232
550 8,132
785
—
Exports :
■ metric tons
698
103 —
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire
and
Raw Phosphates (all kinds)
Imports : metric tons
123,250 90,864 39,105
56,266 63,224 3,530
85,927 1,752
Total .
(Jermany and Austria
Cyanamide
Exports : metric tons
— 4,754 16,553
— 3,644 16,203
19,323
19,302
2,915
2,915
Basic Slag
Exports : metric tons
Total .... 21,169 14,428 11,440
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 13,842 8,856 11,400
1,545
(
GrUANO AND SlMILAE MATERIALS
Exports : metric tons
Total .
Grermany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 663 553 1.168
. 357 144 1,053
• ' ' ^"^
Bone and Horn Meal
Exports : metric tons
230
170
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 254 496 1,584
. 187 392 50
1,47^
25
1,191
Total .
Germany and Austria
Calcium and Barium Carbide
Exports : metric tons
. 13,587 12,714 14,809
. 2,039 1,669 1,922
14,710
2,499
12,930
6,469
SWEDISH STATISTICS 325
Saltpetre (all kinds)
Imports : metric tons
1913
Total .... 33,891
Norway and Denmark . 714
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . —
1914
1915
1916
1917
U,656
37,371
37,393
18,600
3,268
9,065
5,536
2,610
Borax and Boric Acid
Imports : metric tons
Total .
United Kingdom .
. 590 590 1,035
. 253 295 759
571
299
222
129
Total .
Germany and Austria
Exports : metric tons
4 9 435
— — 324
Nickel Salts
88
75
—
Total .
Germany and Austria
Exports : metric tons
— 1 194
— — 124
—
—
Tanning Materials (all kinds, dry)
Imports : metric tons
Total .... 6,422 3,834 2,584 2,501 —
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 12 895 376 349 —
Exports : metric tons
Total .... 1,033 1,349 1,601 121 587
Germany and Austria . 200 634 1,216 — —
Tanning Extracts (all kinds)
Imports : metric tons
Total .... 9,158 6,598 11,856 4,962 397
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 1,303 1,250 3,424 329 —
Exports : metric tons
Total .... 987 924 2,322 524 1,282
Germany and Austria . 426 282 936 95 564
Ferkomanganese and Ferrosilicon (all quantities)
Exports : metric tons
1913 1914
Total .... 9,575 10,047
Germany and Austria . 2,703 5,357
1915
1916
1917
10,802
16,246
17,983
5,472
10,362
14,082
326 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Ferrotungsten and Ferromolybdenum
Exports : metric tons
Total .
Germany and Austria
Total ....
United Kingdom and
British Empire .
Total ....
Grermany and Austria
914
1915
1916
1917
1
34
13
11
—
34
11
11
1913
Lead (unmanufactured)
Imports : metric tons
1,660
2,427 1,984
2,972
70
608
1,116 1,780
567
—
'iJxports
369
190
; metric tons
398 563
124 563
359
346
540
519
Copper (unmanufactured, plate, bar)
Imports : metric tons
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
9,559
517
12,455 13,396
710 1,085
11,257
106
3,729
5
Total .
Germany and Austria
•
Exports :
1,400
1,215
metric tons
4,313 2,483
3,960 2,304
1,758
1,334
519
184
Nickel
Imports
; metric tons
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
150
27
136 504
60 328
125
78
40
16
Total .
Germany and Austria
•
Exports :
1
Imports :
metric tons
— 70
— 70
Tin
metric tons
30
30
7
7
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
and
1,082
735
1,481 4,189
1,130 3,693
996
972
308
163
Total .
Germany and Austria
•
Exports :
86
2
metric tons
517 3,454
306 3,180
35
35
28
28
Iron Ore (including concentrates)
Exports : metric tons
Total .... 6,439,750 4,787,314 5,992,215 5,538,641 5,818,499
Germany and Austria . 4,977,395 3,677,671 5,124,235 4,298,586 4,861,498
United Kingdom
672,836 441,978 499,454 846,222
SWEDISH STATISTICS
327
Pyrites
Exports : metric tons
1913 1914 1915
1916
1917
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 500 3,444 39,998
. 100 3,229 39,164
Burnt Pyrites
Exports : metric tons
14,003
13,992
29,800
29,799
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
. 40,795 39,643 53,095
. 36,113 35,501 50,484
72,400
70,360
56,490
56,490
Asbestos (raw)
Imports : metric tons
Total .
United Kingdom
British Empire .
. 705
and
31
414 506
— 134
315
179
8
Total .
Germany and Austria
Exports :
metric tons
— 259
— 257
39
39
29
19
Sulphate Pulp (dry and wet)
Exports : metric tons
Total .
Germany and Austria
. 98,738
. 14,801
96,419 113,223
8,636 21,601
148,628
88,356
129,215
91,686
Cement
Exports :
metric tons
Total .
Germany and Austria
United Kingdom
British Empire
. 137,073
450
540
Imports :
39,346 60,534
— 680
metric tons
77,717
4,651
Total .
United Kingdom
Germany
. 12,119
.' 7,920
14,769 15,540
8,685 10.565
15,325
10,357
5,220
5,088
328 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
NORWAY
Table showikg the Export of Food fbom Norway to the United
Kingdom and Germany and Austria during the Years 1913-1917
(metric tons)
To the United
Kingdom
To Grermany and
Austria
Tons
Tons
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
61,464
53,715
69,512
35,701
69,680
81,538
71,586
182,630
215,593
101,847
In the above table the following are included : Cheese, butter, margarine,
milk (condensed and sterilised), game, canned goods, fish.
From Norway to the United Kingdom
Exports: tons
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
Cheese .
10
11
7
4
Butter .
1,057
676
823
300
—
Margarine
340
231
158
67
—
Milk (condensed)
2,957
2,773
2,917
1,329
7,359
„ (sterilised)
427
1,310
1,685
1,469
1,261
Game .
214
73
97
37
—
Canned foods
9,156
9,376
12.273
9,265
13,698
Fish
. 47,303
39,265
51,552
23,230
47,362
Total
61,464 53,715 69,512 35,701
69,680
From Norway to Germany and Austria
Exports : tons
1913 1914 1915
1916
1917
Cheese
1
4
115
Butter
2
4
265
147
—
Margarine
32
15
—
— .
Milk (condensed)
447
249
100
4
— .
„ (sterilised)
282
173
257
498
Game
124
63
88
71
2
Carmed foods .
1,879
3,332
20,396
20,706
18,897
Fish
78,771
67,746
161,409
194,167
82,948
Total
81,538
71,586
182,630
215,593
101,847
NORWEGIAN STATISTICS
329
All countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
United Kingdom
All countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
United Kingdom
All countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
United Kingdom
AH countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
United Kingdom
Canned Goods (all kinds)
Exports :
■ metric tons
1913
1914 1915
1916
1917
. 30,994
34,919 51,669
38,595
39,874
. 1,879
3,332 20,396
20,706
18,897
439
636 4,166
177
454
. 9,156
9,376 12,273
9,265
13,698
3 (all kinds other than canned)
Exports .
: metric tons
. 323,716
281,917 370,735
338,323 1
204,039 1
. 78,771
67,746 161,409
194,167
82,948
. 50,461
63,016 85,951
40,090
19,732
. 47,303
39,265 51,552
23,230 1
47,362 1
(including
codliver oil and whale oil)
Exports .
: metric tons
. 24,386
45,077 38,727
18,575
3,454
. 12,527
27,666 31,258
14,582
2,015
. 1,235
1,102 5,038
101
33
. 2,815
2,960 1,002
3,024
398
Cheese
Exports
; metric tons
. 185
227 308
50
—
1
4 115
—
10
8 82
4
—
10
11 7
4
All countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
United Kingdom
All countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
United Kingdom
BUTTEB
Exports : metric tons
1,064 714 1,636
466
2 4 265
147
532
13
1,057 676 823
300
Maegaeine
Exports : metric tons
598 480 396
337
32 15 —
—
12 15 46
120
340 231 158
67
^ These would be much larger if the United Kingdom had imported the
fish bought under the Fish Agreement, which, however, remained stored in
barrels in Norway.
330 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Milk (condensed)
Exports : metric tons
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
All countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
United Kingdom
. 15,319
447
264
. 2,957
14,405
249
306
2,773
11,384
100
602
2,917
8,064
4
31
1,329
7,853
5
7,359
Milk (sterilised, including cream)
Exports : metric tons
All countries .
. 4,283 5,509
6,188
6,724
2,472
Germany and Austria
282 173
257
498
—
Denmark and Sweden
— —
—
—
—
United Kingdom
427 1,310
Game
1,685
1,469
1,261
Exports : metric tons
All countries .
. 446 192
335
152
2
Germany and Austria
. 124 63
88
71
2
Denmark and Sweden
. 100 51
147
43
—
United Kingdom
. 214 73
97
37
—
PoEK (including bacon and ham)
Imports : metric tons
All countries .
Denmark and Sweden
All countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
2,773
516
3,505 2,952
1,336 56
5,927
106
5,110
8
Exports :
1,240
metric tons
1,239 228
11
1
1,233
1,224 205
6
Lard (including other animal fats except butter and margarine)
All countries .
United Kingdom
All countries .
Imports : metric tons
. 1,531 1,562 2,195
53 94 43
Exports : metric tons
1 35 42
(No details of destination)
2,474
2,340
16
Horses (No, of head)
Exports :
All countries .
. 416 4,590
1,176
1,584
14
Germany and Austria
— —
—
—
—
Denmark ahd Sweden
, 415 4,588
1,175
1,578
14
United Kingdom
— 2
1
—
—
NORWEGIAN STATISTICS
331
Vegetable Oils (other than olive, linseed, rape and palm oils)
Imports : metric tons
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
All countries . . . 8,881 8,877 15,224 13,451 13,433
United Kingdom . . 3,037 2,672 1,971 1,184 84
Exports (including hardened oils) : metric tons
All countries ... 641 1,909 6,349 1,554 —
(No details given of destination)
Linseed, Rape-seed and Palm Oils
Imports : metric tons
All countries .
United Kingdom
. 1,807 1,667 2,821
987 1,009 2,590
Olive Oil
1.186
1,057
2.041
565
All countries .
United Kingdom
Imports : metric tons
. 1,092 2,428 5,778
3 1 69
3,353
6
1,752
29
Animal Oils and Fats (including tallow, fatty acids and fish-oils)
Imports : metric tons
All countries . . . 9,698 10,511 13,051 14,169 12,533
United Kingdom . . 1,455 1,300 2,999 2,817 488
Exports as above, including hardened whale fat, but excluding fish oils.
7,078 132
All countries
. 7,274 19,279 20,842
(No details given of destination)
Soap
Imports : metric tons
All countries .
United Kingdom
. 700 800 916
. 610 704 832
544
460
1,324
747
AH countries .
Germany
Exports : metric tons
18 22 579
363
Coffee
152
140
— ■
All countries .
Imports : metric tons
. 13,672 11,898 24,125
24,126
14,954
United Kingdom and
British Empire
All countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
440
938 1,725
Exports :
metric tons
285
330 4,641
4,490
181
7
40 23
37
—
257
267 4,505
4,227
1
332 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Fishing- Nets
Imports : metric tons
All countries
1913 1914 1915
1916
1917
14 43 38
32
16
(No details given of origin)
All countries
All countries
Germany
Fishing- Nets (all materials for)
Imports : metric tons
. 124 130 300 604 319
(No details given of origin)
Exports (locally manufactured) : metric tons
. 103 119 26 32 17
2 18 11 — —
All countries
CUTCH AND GaMBIER
Imports : metric tons
. 241 225 808
(No details of origin given)
851
289
Hemp
Imports :
metric tons
All countries .
. 3,433
4,058 4,417
3,015
3,357
United Kingdom
and
British Empire .
. 1,239
1,540 2,801
1,055
469
Germany
897
591 37
—
Linen and Hemp Yaen (all kinds, including rope)
Imports : metric tons
All countries .
United Kingdom
Germany
. 2,189 2,100 1.550
374 310 455
560 439 111
Sailcloth (cotton and linen)
2,094
822
4
2,348
885
269
All countries .
. 402 362 411
563
400
(No details given of origin)
Peteoleum for Lighting and Power
Im.ports : metric tons
All countries . . . 79,252
87,268
55,945
103,902
51,343
Germany and Austria . 1,859
655
17
206
4,844
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 2,945
2,870
732
1,257
257
Denmark . . . 4,432
1,360
2,363
315
NORWEGIAN STATISTICS
333
LuBEiCANTS (including vaseline, etc.)
Imports :
metric tons
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
AU countries .
United Kingdom
Denmark
Germany and Austria
. 7,567
. 1,413
508
. 2,916
6,467
1,491
433
1,763
10,373
1,349
990
13
10,725
1,525
569
4
6,058
806
488
221
Cotton
Imports : metric tons
All countries . . . 3,986 6,581 11,137 5,497 3,688
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 462 2,906 6,615 3,162 1,048
All countries
Exports : metric tons
(No details given)
643
Cotton Yarn
Imports : metric tons
All countries . . . 2,017 2,002 2,232 2,711 1,980
United Kingdom and
British Empire . . 1,259 1,311 1,794 2,582 1,897
All countries .
United Kingdom
Germany
Coal
Imports : metric tons
2,276,808 2,504,602 2,758,506 2,467,551 1,059,465
2,227,620 2,441,892 2,648,105 2,328,974 981,980
10,306 18,046 20,347 92,663 38,872
All countries .
United Kingdom
Germany
Coke
Imports : metric tons
205,616 259,358 336,438
145,131 203,247 200,182
24,242 20,857 112,042
365,204 167,016
237,403 124,805
116,059 39,798
All countries
■ Nickel
Exports : metric tons
. 594 696 760 722
(No details. Practically all went to Germany)
442
All countries .
Germany and Austria
Denmark and Sweden
Copper
Exports : metric tons
2,811
685
1,320
3,059
406
1,919
2,984
1,573
1,411
1,789
1,229
541
1,980
18
1,734
334 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Zinc
Exports : metric tons
1913 1914 1915
1916
1917
All countries .
. 10,538 16,517 22,617
(No details of export)
Tin
Imports : metric tons
28,149
18,394
All countries .
. 661 332 1,029
741
99
United Kingdom
. 359 139 898
600
98
Tinned and Galvanised Ieon Plates
Imports : metric tons
All coimtries .
United Kingdom
. 34,020
. 31,611
Fish and
Exports
28,239 41,199
25,572 37,869
Whale Guano
; metric tons
29,288
18,104
9,805
6,188
All countries .
. 14,214
13,449 10,865
6,447
1,372
13,003
12,620
10,755
10
210
88
Fish Meal (including whale-meat meal)
Exports : metric tons
All countries . . . 8,927 8.978 10,441 5,935
Germany and Austria . 5,364 7,634 9,289
Denmark and Sweden
352
8.978
7,634
45
562
5,915 —
All countries .
Skins and Hides
Imports : metric tons
7,131 5,910 6,090
5,816 3,101
Exports : metric tons
All countries . . . 7,201 7,958 2,731 7,124 996
(Details of country of destination are not available. Germany got the
bulk of the skins of marine animals — seals, etc. Sweden got a good deal
of the rest.)
Nitrate of Lime
Exports : metric tons
All countries . . . 70,926
75,175
38,608
46,001
35,932
Grermany and Austria . 45,237
51,649
19,089
19,805
16,279
Denmark, Sweden and
HoUand . . . 8,977
15,219
10,184
1,132
2,542
United Kingdom and
France . . .13,612
5,519
8,367
25,063
17,110
NORWEGIAN STATISTICS
335
NiTBATE AND AmMONIA
Exports : metric tons
1913 1914
1915
1916
1917
All countries . . . 9,107 11,958
Germany and Austria . No details
Denmark, Sweden and
Holland ... „
United Kingdom and
France ... „
26,458
4,495
279
17,832
59,639
517
120
41,357
63,578
347
56,159
NlTKATE AND NiTRATE OF SODIUM
Exports : metric tons
All countries . . . 10,220 9,262 14,870
Germany and Austria . No details 4,862
Denmark, Sweden and
HoUand ... „ 3,302
United Kingdom and
France . . . „ 5,814
20,892
3,117
1,586
14,714
26,247
300
1,069
24,271
Ieon Ores, Concentrates and Briquettes
Exports : metric tons
AU countries . . . 568,762 467,795 425,892
Germany . . . 264,457 265,623 123,134
United Kingdom . . 211,146 184,429 253,941
404,700
152,453
251,982
197,834
135,814
56,830
Pyrites
Exports : metric tons
All countries . . . 425,876 360,228
Germany . . . 40,892 60,729
United Kingdom . . 138,134 91,693
466,759
210,452
75,254
253,361
84,510
21,844
212,908
4,105
50,770
All countries
Molybdinite
Exports : metric tons
5 87 101
(No details of destination available)
140
201
All countries
Chrome Ore
Exports : metric tons
20 12 763
(No details of destination available)
2,737 2,395
Exports : metric tons
All countries .
1 557 2,002
996
673
Germany
No details 1,077
—
—
Denmark and Sweden
591
738
519
United Kingdom
179
20
96
336 THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES
Ferroselicon
Exports : metric tons
1913 1914
1915
1916
1917
All countries .
Germany
Denmark and Sweden
United Kingdom
. 6,322 6,144
No details 641
584
. „ 1,994
Calcium Carbide
9,307
3,290
554
2,626
i
25,255
8,997
1,670
5,515
29,449
13,578
385
6,013
Exports : metric tons
All countries .
Germany
Denmark and Sweden
United Kingdom
. 66,910 63,722
. 20,875 20,317
681 593
. 9,267 17,000
Cyanamide
79,480
19,836
732
16,983
58,432
29,823
1,098
18,130
46,066
24,386
3,692
15,836
Exports : metric tons
All countries .
Grermany
United Kingdom
. 22,110 13,719
. 12,188 5,462
. 3,598 3,061
Aluminium
24,609
5,314
7,903
13,151
10,172
2,312
1,320
Exports : metric tons
All countries .
Germany
. 2,177 2,942
. 806 350
2,883
3
4,488
87
7.600
1
United Kingdom
France
and
41
725 1,858 4,339
5,222
INDEX
Aaehus, food stocks, 175, 176, 177
Administration, British :
Denmark, 138, 141, 144 et seq.,
169 et seq., 180 et seq., 224
Norway, 121 et seq., 192, 199,
205 et seq., 222
Sweden, 191, 194, 227
Agreements, trading (see also guaran-
tees), 73, 74, 136, 137, 275
abuse of, 151, 292
copper, 193
Danish, 136 e^ seq.
fish, 156, 292
nickel, 197, 198, 200, 202
Air-power, xx, 278
Algiers, phosphates, 228
Aluminiiun, 78
America :
American Civil War, analogy, 53
coal, 117
correspondence, diplomatic, with
London, 5, 55 et seq.
Denmark, report upon, 283 et seq.
entry into war, 273
Germany :
atrocities, 56, 57
claim acknowledged by America,
64
relations with, 55, 63, 64
Great Britain :
British trade, strictures on, 47,
61
feeUng towards, 62, 287
friction with, causes, xii, 57, 58,
65, 288
mining operations, North Sea,
106
naval operations, strictures on,
59
poHcy, attitude towards,
53 et seq., 150
Prize Courts, criticisms of, 32, 36,
37
Reprisals Order,attitude towards,
28, 29, 32
Trade, 42 et seq.
British trade, comparison with,
48, 49, 51
naval operations, effect on,
42, 44
embargo on taking field, 274
Scandinavia, as affected by, 108
American International Harvester
Company, 223, 287, 288
Ammonia, 128, 129, 130, 229
Andersen, Mr. S., 138, 139, 142, 143
Archangel, 98
Argentine, 111, 166
Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., 23, 24, 40
Australia, zinc, 194
Balfour, Earl, 273
BalUn, Herr, 266
Baltic, approaches blocked, 89, 90
communications, 89, 90
German command of, 90
shipping, British, locked up in, 83,
84
submarines, British, in, 90
Baltic Shipping Exchange, 232
Banks, neutral, 246, 247, 248. See
also Finance.
Batocki, Herr von, 169
Beer, 217 et seq.
Belgium, 260, 261
cement, 232 et seq.
coal, 114, 115, 116
Scandinavian debts, 247
zinc, 193, 195
Belligerent operations, object, 4, 5,
rights, ix, 4, 5, 73. See Maritime
Rights.
Bergen, oil, 185
Bemhardi, Gen. von, xvii, 134
Bethmann-HoUweg, Herr von, 13,
139
Binder twine, 222 et seq., 276
Bismarck, Prince, contraband, 277
Black List, statutory, 114, 121
Blockade, America, proposals, 273
enforced 1917, 274
generic use of term, xi
Grey, Viscount, on, 29, 30, 31
H.M. Government and, 259 et seq.
lapse of under modem conditions, 6
law of, 28 et seq.
Minister of, 139. See Cecil, Lord R.
moral considerations, 251, 288
policy, criticisms, 141, 142, 287
Scandinavian views, xiii, 140
technical, 0, 28
Blount, Mr. B., 219
Board of Trade, 91, 147, 293, 296
Bothnia, Gulf of, traffic in stores, 100
337
338
INDEX
Bowles, T. Gibson, xx, 11
Breslau, the, 98
British. See Great Britain.
Brown, E. S., 224
Bunker, pressure, 118, 119
Bunsby, Jack, 38
Cabab6, M., 14
Caprivi, Count von, on contraband,
277
Caroe, tea (litigation), 215
Carson, Lord, 144
Catherine of Russia, Law of Nations, 8
Cecil, Lord R., 139, 151, 163, 189, 225,
255, 276
cement, 232
correspondence. Naval Attach^,
153, 250
finance, 249, 250
neutrals, xiv
Cement, traffic with Holland, 232
et seq.
Christiania. See Legation.
Coal, 113 et seq.
American, 117
Belgian, 114, 115, 116
briquettes, 117, 124
British, abuse of, 71, 80, 128, 136,
140, 172, 203, 287
power of, 274
uses in Denmark, 160
uses in Scandinavia, 111 et seq.,
124, 125, 155
bunker pressure, 118, 119
by-products, 128
coke, 130, 131
control, Denmark, 126, 127
Norway, 121, 122
Sweden, 120, 122, 123
Controller of Mines, 125, 129
gas coal, 128, 129
German, 117, 120, 121
shortage, 113, 114, 124
Cocoa, America, 47, 48
Scandinavia, 216
Communications :
Baltic, 89
Denmark, 71, 141
Norway, 154
Russia, 98, 99
Scandinavia, 71, 141
Sweden, 98, 99, 104
Concrete, Germany, 240
Conger, Mr., 151, 283 et seq.
Consuls, 107, 124, 126, 275
Contraband :
absolute, 12, 281
action, outbreak of war, 25
Committee, 26
conditional, 12, 13, 28, 281, 282
Contraband — (contd).
Declarations of London and Paris,
9, 30, 31
foodstuffs, 277
Foreign Office views before war, 13
Free List, 12, 25
history and growth of, 9, 10
law of, 28
Lists, 12, 25
neutral views, 58
presiunptions of proof, 10, 11, 12,
281
traffic, 53 et seq.
value of, 58
Copenhagen, 159, 213. See Legation.
Consul, 214
Free Harbour, 181 et seq., 257
importance, 167, 186
Vice-Consul, 187
Copper, 190 et seq.
Agreement, 193
electrolytic, 201
Copra, 170, 172
Cotton, 219 et seq., 264
Courland, 225
Crowe, Sir Eyre, 276
Cryolite, 78, 293
Dahlberg, Mr., 84
De Chair, Admiral Sir Dudley, 290
Declaration of London, x, 281, 282
adoption, outbreak of war, 13, 23
Contraband and Free Lists, 12
German pronouncements upon, 13,
14
Germany, advantages to, 17, 102
reception in England 1909, xvii,
xviii
supersession by Maritime Right*
Order, 13
validity, 32
Declaration of Paris, x, 8
Germany, protection to, 17, 26
repudiation, 9
Salisbury, late Lord, on, 9
sea-power, influence upon, 8, 9
Denmark. See also Copenhagen.
Agreements, 136 et seq., 285
agrictiltural industry, 75, 93, 134
et seq.
produce, distribution of, 76,
135, 139, 266, 270, 274
American report upon, 283 et seq.
army, 97
cattle, export, 174, 226, 227
coal, 126, 127
commodities, transactions in. See
also below Fatty substances,
beer, 217
binder twine, 222, 223
INDEX
339
Denmark, commodities — {contd.)
cement, 236
cocoa, 216, 217
copper, 193
cotton, 220
cryolite, 78
milk, 208
tea, 211, 212, 213
tin, 207, 208
communications, 71, 141
Copenhagen {see wider)
delegates, 138, 139, 142, 143
East Asiatic Company, 78
economic features, 75 et eeq., 93
exports, 78
fatty substances, 168, 169, 284, 285
butter, 207, 208, 257
cattle, 171, 173, 174
goulash, 207
lard, 172
margarine, 172
offal, 173
fertilisers, 227 et seq., 286
fish, accessories from Great Britain,
157, 274, 290
Danish Fishers' Union, 162
guarantees, abuse of, 159, 162
industry, 77, 93, 156 et scq., 286,
291
petroleum, 159, 162, 164, 292
scarcity in country, 159
fodder and fertilisers, 137, 145, 148,
168, 174, 274
food stocks, excessive, 175, 176,
177
Free Harbour, Copenhagen, 181
et seq.
Germany :
invasion possibilities, 93 et seq.,
142, 285
relations with, 95, 96, 144, 216
guarantees, abuse of, 127, 159, 162
horses, 134, 137, 138, 174
imports, 79, 136
invasion rumours, 96, 142, 285
Legation, British, 168, 181, 182,
183, 216
military situation, 148
national characteristics, 97
negotiations with England, 136,
138, 141 et seq.
neutrality, violation of, 89, 90, 95,
110
policy, 143
political factors, 93 et seq.
population, 97
pork scandal, 151, 235
prosperity, 76, 140, 176, 177
rationing, 137, 138, 141, 143, 285,
286
Denmark — {contd.)
" releases," principle, 137, 138, 141,
142
shipping, 77, 78, 93, 144
slaughter of stock, 145, 148
strategic features, 89, 90, 95
Devonport, Lord, zinc, 195
Dunn, Sir J. H., Bart., 200
East Indies, oil seeds, 166
Economic advantage, weapon of, 65,
145, 147
conditions, Scandinavia, 75 et seq.
Great Britain's preponderating
strength, xvi, 88, 108
pressure, reasoning, 234
struggle, the war, vii, viii, ix
Egypt, oil seeds, 166
Embargo, America, on taking field,274
British, discussed, 72
declared 1917, 274
Etnden, German " raider," 17
England. iSee Great Britain.
England, the enemy, 269
England ! the friend, 169
Exchange, improvement of, 114, 234,
245, 251, 275
Explosives, 166 et seq.
fats, value as, 166, 167, 179, 289
Germany's arrangements for, 108,
173
ingredients, 128, 129, 166 et seq.,
173
Exports and Imports, 27. See Table,
Appendix, and under separate
countries.
Falkenhayn, Gen. von, 139
Faringdon, Lord, xiv, 189, 243, 253
et seq.
Fats, 166, 167, 274. See also under
Denmark.
Fertilisers, 227 et seq.
Finance, 245 et scq.
American views, 248, 249
Exchange, 114, 234, 245, 251
Foreign Office transactions, 249
German transactions, 245, 246
neutral banks, 246, 247, 248
paper money, traffic, 248, 249, 250
Finland, stores traffic, 100
Fish, 154 et seq. See also under Den-
mark.
Agreements, 156, 292
Germany, value to, 154, 159
guarantees, abuse of, 159, 162, 292
petroleum supplies, 159, 162, 164,
292
Scandinavian indastries dependent
upon Great Britain, 155, 157
340
INDEX
Flandera cement, 240
Flax, 224, 225
Fleet, 15 et seq.
British, efficiency, 17, 54
main defence, xx, 15, 16, 17,
278
protection for enemy supplies,
25
German, 17, 18, 95
Foreign Office :
America, correspondence with, 42
et seq.
bend Germany to their will, 213
finance, 249
functions of, 91
guarantees, faith in, 234
reports of Naval Attache, 135, 140,
294
France, explosives supplies, 88, 128
Frederick the Great, 8
Free ship, free goods, 7
Frisch Geheimrat, 266
Fry, Sir E., 13
Gerard, Mr. J. W., 100, 101, 180
Germany :
America, relations with, 55, 63, 64
atrocities, 56, 67
Baltic, blocks Sound, 90
command of, 193
beer, 217
British Naval Attach^, supported
by, 150, 151
trade, allegations, 48
cement, 232 et seq.
coal, shortage, 113, 114, 115, 117,
124
concrete, 240
critical period 1917, 145, 268
Danish produce, 76, 135
Denmark, invasion possibilities, 142
relations with, 144
explosives, arrangements for, 168,
173
exports, 27, 79, 85, 124, 239
fats, requirements, 168
fish supplies, 167, 159, 204, 290
Fleet, High Sea, 17, 18, 95
use of Danish waters, 89
food shortage, 131, 217, 267, 268,269
imports, 27
man-power, dearth of, 113, 124,
125, 194, 195, 238, 239
manures, export, 239
mistakes by, viii, 64
munitions, 3, 25, 209, 289
nickel, 198 e< seq.
oil transactions, 182 ef seq.
oversea supplies, dependence on,
viii, X
Germany — [contd.)
propaganda, 80, 101
Scandinavia, political aim,73,92,104
shipping, 26
submarines, 19, 20, 144, 146, 147
Sweden, relations with, 103, 123
trade, outbreak of war, 26, 27
war, disregard of rules, 5
unprepared for long, vii
Glycerine, 166, 167, 172
Ooeben, the, 98
Gottenberg, 63, 182, 185, 186
Great Britain. iSee also H. M.
Government.
Colonies, oil seeds, 172
Denmark's best customer, 168
dependence upon, 145
financial transactions, 247, 248
food shortage, 147
Germany, tacit understanding, 146,
147
resources, 77, 271
shipping, value of, 229
trade, evil effects, 148, 160, 271
et seq. See Trade.
Grey, Viscount, of Fallodon, 23, 25,
35, 144, 210, 212, 226, 255
America, 42 et seq.
Blockade, 29, 30, 31
Declaration of London, 25
Foreign Office, functions, 91
Prize Courts, 39
Guarantees, abuse and worthlessness
of, 159, 162, 183, 184, 215, 216
Hamburg, trade centre, 167
Hansen, Captain, 137
Helfferich, Dr. G., 169, 236, 258,
263
Helsingborg, smuggling, 231
Henderson, Sir A. See Faringdon,
Lord.
Hendrick, Mr. B. J., 52
H.M. Government :
Blockade, 259 et seq.
cement, 243
coal to Scandinavia, 119, 121
copper purchase, 192
fish, 163, 164
Japanese Government, 172
neutrals, tributes to, 259 et seq.
nickel, 199, 202
Scandinavia, attitude towards, xiii,
XV
Sweden, food, 82, 83, 84
Holland, cement, 232 et seq.
cotton, 220
fats, 167, 168
foodstuffs, 258
supplies to Germany, 270
INDEX
341
Howard, Sir Esme, 52, 101, 287.
See Legation, Minister.
Huldermann, Mr. B., 267
Hydebrand, Herr von, 269
Imports. See Table, Appendix, and
under separate countries.
Imports and Exports, 27
Italy, coal, 114, 190
Japan, x, 172
Jute, 219, 224, 225
Jutland, battle of, 17
Kogrund Pass, mined, 83, 90
Labour, British, 131, 132, 144. See
also Germany : man-power.
Lansdo^vne, Marquess of, 64, 264
Lansing, Mr., 48
Lard, 172, 270, 289
Law of Nations, 5, 6, 31 et seq., 57,
58
Leather goods, 226, 227
Legation, H.M., Christiania, 121, 122,
160, 199, 202, 204, 206
Copenhagen, 148, 168, 181 ct scq.,
216, 291, 292
Stockliolm, 101, 120, 185
Leverton-Harris, Commander,
R.N.V.R., 161, 163, 210, 213,
290, 292
Licences, coal, 122
Prohibited Export, 186, 230
trading, 186, 225
Liege, zinc, 195
Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. D., 24, 25
Lowther, Sir H. See Legation, Min-
ister.
Lubricants, 180 et seq.
Ludendorff, Gen., 108
coal, 117, 268
Denmark, invasion, 96
food shortage, 268, 269
iron, 79, 268
lubricants, 180
man-power, 125, 238
Luxberg, Coimt, 110, 111
Malmo meeting, 109, 110, 176, 191,
259
Manchuria, oil seeds, 172
Man-power, British, 131, 132, 144.
See Germany : labour.
Maritime rights, xi, 3, 4
America, attitude towards, 53
et seq., 150
surrender of (British), x, 148
Maritime Rights Order, 13
Mame, battle of, viii
McKenna, Mr. R., 225
Meux, Admiral of Fleet Hon. Sir H.,
232
Miles, Mr. A. R., 233, 234, 235
Milk, 205 et seq.
Mihier, Lord, 125, 270
Minister, British, Christiania. See
Legation.
Copenhagen, 133, 142, 148, 172,
186. iSee also Legation, Low-
ther and Paget.
Stockholm, 52, 84, 101, 182. See
also Howard, Legation.
Moewe, German " raider," 17
Morgenthau, Mr. H., viii, 190
Munitions, American supplies, 3
German, protected by British
Fleet, 25
Ministry of, 91, 194
Murmansk, railway, 98
Napier, Sir Charles, 1854, 89
Naval Attache :
Admiralty, 278, 293 et, seq.
Blockade, Minister of, correspond-
ence, 153, 250, 276
British Minister, Copenhagen, 134,
141, 142, 148, 289, 294
coal, 116, 120
Copenhagen, visits to, 134, 141,
180 et seq., 213
Danish agricultural produce, 134,
135, 139
Faringdon, Lord, 259
reports to Foreign Office, 135, 140,
294
testimony from unknown German
friend, 150, 151
Navy. See Fleet.
Nebogahtoff, Admiral, 89
Nelson, Lord, 187
Netherlands Oversea Trust, 235
Neutral-8 :
H.M. Government, solicitude for,
xiii, xiv, XV, 259 ct seq.
interests, 4, 5
international law, protected by, 58,
275
loyal dispositions, 255, 250
rights, 4, 5, 259 ct scq.
trade, 73, 74
New Caledonia nickel, 199
Nickel, 196 et seq., 236
Agreements, 197, 198, 200, 202
British American Nickel Corpora-
tion, 197, 199, 200
K.N.R., 196 et seq.
Report of Select Committee, 190
Nitrocellulose, 221
342
INDEX
Norway :
agriculture, 86
army, 107
cement, 236
coal, 121, 122
communications, 154
Consuls, 107
copper, 190, 192, 193
cotton, 220
economic features, 86 et seq.
exports, 87
fish industry, 86, 154 e< aeq.
imports, 87
industries, principal, 86, 203 ct seq.
Legation, British, 121, 122, 199,
203, 204, 206
Legational control, 203 et seq.
military considerations, 103
mining territorial waters, 106
nickel, 196 et aeq. See Nickel,
nitrates, 88, 92, 108
Norsk Hydro Co., 129, 130
Elektrisk Co., 99
political, 103, 106
population, 106
shipping, 86, 122
Offal, 173, 285
Oil, illicit transactions, 180 et seq.
Oil seeds, 166, 167, 170, 171, 274, 287
Orders in Council, 41
validity, 32, 35, 36, 39
Oversea supplies :
control of, 12
Germany, stages to, ix
dependence on, viii, x
Great Britain and Continental, 8, 15
value to, 229
Scandinavia, dependence on, 72
value of, 274
Page, Mr. W. H., 42, 45
Paget, Sir R., 130, 133, 141, 142, 289,
294. See Legation, Minister.
Peace negotiations, 101, 139
Petroleum, 159, 162, 164, 274, 292
Philadelphia (U.S.), oU, 185
Poland, labour, 222
Privy Council, Judicial Committee
of, 39, 40
Prize Courts, Contraband Committee,
26
functions, 11
jurisdiction, 32 et seq.
Orders-in-Council, 32 et seq.
Prohibition, export, abuse, 216, 230
exemption licences, 186, 230
Neutral Governments, 73, 74
Property, enemy, right of capture, 7
Pulp, 221
Pyrites, 228
Quebracho, 226
Rahsjastvensky, Admiral, 89
Ramsay, Sir W., 219
Rantzau, 133
Rationing system, 137, 138, 141, 143,
211
Releases, principle, 137 et seq., 211,
233, 234
Reparation Commission, Allied, 247
Reprisals Order, 27 et seq., 282, 283
blockade, 28
Declaration of Paris, 9
legality of ? 40, 41
Prize Courts, 32 et seq.
Restriction of Enemy Supplies De-
partment, 161, 164, 290, 291,
293
Riga, fall of, 224
Rights. See Belligerent, Maritime,
Neutral.
Rio Tinto Company, 228
Roosevelt, ex-President T., 57
Rotterdam, trade centre, 167, 195
Roumania, 180
food supplies, 268
Germany enters, 164
oil wells destroyed, 164
Rubber, 231
Russia :
communications, 89, 98, 99
Czar, H.M. the late, 101
peace negotiations, 101, 139
party, 101
Sweden, relations with, 98 et seq.
tea, 215
transit of stores, 99, 100
Salisbury, late Lord, Declaration of
Paris, 9
Scandinavia. See also Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, Trade.
British blockade, xiii, xv, 7 1
coal, dependence on, 119
prestige, xv
Government, attitude to-
wards, xiii, xiv, XV
communications, 71, 141
economic appreciation, 108, 109
dependence on Allies, x, 92,
118, 124
German political aims, 73, 92, 104
traffic, 7 1
oversea supplies, 72
political considerations, 73, 92, 104,
108
shipping, immune from German
attack, 83
INDEX
343
Scandinavia — [contd.)
statistics, suppression of, 109
strategic features, 88, 89
sjmapathies, 92
Schlesvig-Holstein (18fi4), 96
Scrutton, Lord Justice (tea), 215
Sea-power, xx, 18, 19, 269
Shipping. See under countries con-
cerned.
British, in Baltic, 83
Siberia, butter, 167
Smuggling, 231, 255, 257, 285
Somerville, Professor, 229
Soya beans, 170, 172, 251
Spain, phosphates, 228
Statistics. See Appendix.
oil-seeds, innovation, 170
Scandinavian, pubHcation after
war, 187
suppression of, 109
Stockhohn, oil, 182, 183, 185. See
Legation.
Stowell, late Lord, 33 et seq.
Straits Settlements, tea, 203
Submarine -s, 16, 19
British, operations of, in Baltic,
72
destruction of, Copenhagen,
110
German, warfare, 79, 103, 144, 146,
147, 150, 151
Sweden :
agricultural industry, 81, 82
army, 103
coal, 120, 122, 123
cipher messages, 110, 111
copper, 190, 191, 192
commodities, transactions in :
cement, 236
cocoa, 216
coffee, 217
cotton, 219 ef seq.
leather, 227
tea, 212
communications, 98, 99, 104
Consuls, 124
Customs, 186
economic features, 79 et seq.
exports, 85
fish agreement, 292
fishing industry, 79, 82, 156, 291
food shortage, 83, 84
Germany, supphes to, 84, 85, 208
relations with, 123
value to, 80
imports, 85
industries, 79
iron ore, 79 et aeq., 102, 103, 124
Legation, British, 120, 185
Malmo meeting, 109, 110
Sweden — {contd. )
miHtary considerations, 98, 102,
103
mining territorial waters, 83
national characteristics, 105
neutrality, violation of, 83, 110,
111
pit-props, 124
political considerations, 97 et seq.
population, 105
Ricksdag, 104
Russia, stores, 99 et aeq,
shipping, 85
allied, locked up, 83, 84
statistics, suppression of, 109
strategic features, 90
sjinpathies, 97, 98, 105
Transito Company, 99, 100
Swinemimde, 182
Tea, 210 et seq.
lawsuit, 214, 215
Territorial waters, 141
mining of, Danish, 89
Norwegian, 106
Swedish, 83
Thirsk, Mr., Vice-Consul, Aarhus,
160, 162, 175, 275, 290, 291
Tin, 203 et seq.
Tirpitz, Admiral von, 13, 269
Trade. See also under separate
countries.
Agreements (see under)
Belligerent interests in, 73
Board of, 91, 147, 293, 295
British :
American views, xii, 62
comparison with American, 48,
49, 50
embargo, 72, 268
evil results of, 148, 150, 224, 228,
231, 271, 274, 275
Germany, value to, 243
influence on American, 50, 51
on war, xii, xiii
with Scandinavia, xv, 266
German, 26, 27
guarantees {see under)
H.M. Government, difficulties, 73
licences, 186, 225, 230
neutral interests, 73
oversea supplies (see under)
Prohibition, export, 73, 74, 188,
216, 230
Tiuiis, fertilisers, 228
Tut, M., French Inspector-General
Public Works, 241
U-boat. See Submarine,
Ukraine, food supplies, 268
344 INDEX
United Kingdom. iSee Great Britain. Yarrow, Sir A., 21
Visit and Search, right of, 6 Zamora, 35, 37, 39
Vladivostock, 98 Z. E. G., 204, 205, 266
Zeppelins, 78, 195
Wangenheim, Baron von, vii, viii, 190 Zinc, 193 et acq., 293
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