Truth and error; or, The science of intellection

LIBRARY

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Class

M

TRUTH AND ERROR

TRUTH AND ERROR

OR

THE SCIENCE OF INTELLECTION

BY

J. W. POWELL

CHICAGO

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

(IXJNDON: KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & Co.)

1898

COPYRIGHT BY

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING Co.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, 1898

(All rights reserved)

TO

LESTER F. WARD

PHILOSOPHER AND FRIEND, I DEDICATE
THIS BOOK

C

CONTENTS

CHAP.

I. Chuar's Illusion . . . . • .

II. Essentials of Properties

III. Quantities or Properties that are Measured .

IV. Kinds or Properties that are Classified

V. Processes or the Properties of Geonomic Bodies

VI. Generations or Properties of Plants .

VII. Principles or Properties of Animals

VIII. Qualities

IX. Classification

X. Homology

XI. Dynamics

XII. Cooperation

XIII. Evolution

XIV. Sensation

XV. Perception .......

XVI. Apprehension

XVII. Reflection .

XVIII. Ideation

XIX. Intellections . . .

XX. Fallacies of Sensation

XXI. Fallacies of Perception

XXII. Fallacies of Apprehension .....

XXIII. Fallacies of Reflection

XXIV. Fallacies of Ideation

XXV. Summary

Index

PAGE

i
9

20

31
42
64

74
98
109
133
152
168
183
207
226
237
251
264
278
307
335
352
374
39i
413
425

TRUTH AND ERRO*

OF THE

UNIVERSITY
CHAPTER I.

CHUAR'S ILLUSION

IN the fall of 1880 I was encamped on the Kaibab
plateau above the canyon gorge of a little stream.
White men and Indians composed the party with me.
Our task was to make a trail down this side canyon,
which was many hundreds of feet in depth, into the
depths of the Grand Canyon of the Colorado. While
in camp after the day's work was done, both Indi-
ans and white men amused themselves by attempt-
ing to throw stones across the little canyon. The
distance from the brink of the wall on which we
were encamped to the brink of the opposite wall
seemed not very great, yet no man could throw a
stone across the chasm, though Chuar, the Indian
chief, could strike the opposite wall very near its
brink. The stones thrown by others fell into the
depths of the canyon. I discussed these feats with
Chuar, leading him to an explanation of gravity.
Now Chuar believed that he could throw a stone
much farther along the level of the plateau than
over the canyon. His first illusion was thus one very
common among mountain travelers — an underesti-
mate of the distance of towering and massive rocks

2 TRUTH AND ERROR

when the eye has no intervening objects to divide
the space into parts as measures of the whole.

I did not venture to correct Chuar's judgment, but
simply sought to discover his method of reasoning.
As our conversation proceeded he explained to me
that the stone could not go far over the canyon, for
it was so deep that it would make the stone fall
before reaching the opposite bank ; and he explained
to me with great care that the hollow or empty space
pulled the stone down. He discoursed on this point
at length, and illustrated it in many ways: "If you
stand on the edge of the cliff you are likely to fall ;
the hollow pulls you down, so that you are compelled
to brace yourself against the force and lean back.
Any one can make such an experiment and see that
the void pulls him down. If you climb a tree the
higher you reach the harder the pull ; if you are at
the very top of a tall pine you must cling with your
might lest the void below pull you off. ' '

Thus my dusky philosopher interpreted a subjec-
tive fear of falling as an objective force; but
more, he reified void and imputed to it the force of
pull. I afterward found these ideas common among
other wise men of the dusky race, and once held a
similar conversation with an Indian of the Wintun
on Mount Shasta, the sheen of whose snow-clad
summit seems almost to merge into the firmament.
On these dizzy heights my Wintun friend expounded
the same philosophy of gravity.

Now, in the language of Chuar's people, a wise
man is said to be a traveler, for such is the metaphor
by which they express great wisdom, as they suppose
that a man must learn by journeying much. So in
the moonlight of the last evening's sojourn in the

CHUAR'S ILLUSION 3

camp on the brink of the canyon, I told Chuar that
he was a great traveler, and that I knew of two other
great travelers among the seers of the East, one by
the name of Hegel, and another by the name of
Spencer, and that I should ever remember these
three wise men, who spoke like words of wisdom,
for it passed through my mind that all three of these
philosophers had reified void and founded a philoso-
phy thereon.

* Concepts of number, space, motion, time and
judgment are developed by all minds, from that
of the lowest animal to that of the highest human
genius. Through the evolution of animal life,
these concepts have been growing as they have
been inherited down the stream of time in the flood
of generations. It is thus that an experience has
been developed, combined with the experience of all
the generations of life for all the time of life, which

-" makes it impossible to expunge from human mind
these five concepts. They can never be canceled
while sanity remains. Things having something
more than number, space, motion, time and judg-
ment cannot even be invented; it is not possible
for the human mind to conceive anything else, but
semblances of such ideas may be produced by the
mummification of language.

Ideas are expressed in words which are symbols,
and the word may be divested of all meaning in
terms of number, space, motion, time and judg-
ment and still remain, and it may be claimed that
it still means something unknown and unknow-
able; this is the origin of reification. There are
many things unknown at one stage of experience
which are known at another, so man comes to believe

4 TRUTH AND ERROR

in the unknown by constant daily experience ; but
has by further converse with the universe known
things previously unknown, and they invariably
become known in terms of number, space, motion,
time and judgment, and are found to be only com-
binations of these things. It is thus that something
unknown may be conceived, but something unknow-
able cannot be conceived.

No man conceives reified substrate, reified essence,
reified space, reified force, reified time, reified spirit.
Words are blank checks on the bank of thought, to
be filled with meaning by the past and future earn-
ings of the intellect. But these words are coin signs
of the unknowable and no one can acquire the cur-
rency for which they call.

Things little known are named and man speculates
about these little-known things, and erroneously
imputes properties or attributes to them until he
comes to think of them as possessing such unknown
and mistaken attributes. At last he discovers the
facts; then all that he discovers is expressed in the
terms of number, space, motion, time and judg-
ment. Still the word for the little-known thing
may remain to express something unknown and
mystical, and by simple and easily understood proc-
esses he reifies what is not, and reasons in terms
which have no meaning as used by him. Terms
thus used without meaning are terms of reification.

Such terms and such methods of reasoning become
very dear to those immersed in thaumaturgy and
who love the wonderful and cling to the mysterious,
and, in the revelry developed by the hashish of mys-
tery, the pure water of truth is insipid. The dream
of intellectual intoxication seems more real and more

CHUAR S ILLUSION 5

worthy of the human mind than the simple truths
discovered by science. There is a fascination in mys-
tery and there has ever been a school of intellects
delighting to revel therein, and yet, in the grand
aggregate, there is a spirit of sanity extant among
mankind which loves the true and simple.

Often the eloquence of the dreamer has even sub-
verted the sanity of science, and clear-headed, simple-
minded scientific men have been willing to affirm
that science deals with trivialities, and that only
metaphysics deals with the profound and significant
things of the universe. In a late great text-book on
— physics, which is a science of simple certitudes, it is
affirmed :

4 'To us the question, What is matter?— What is,
assuming it to have a real existence outside our-
selves, the essential basis of the phenomena with
which we may as physicists make ourselves ac-
quainted?— appears absolutely insoluble. Even if
we become perfectly and certainly acquainted with
the intimate structure of what we call Matter, we
would but have made a further step in the study of its
properties; and as physicists we are forced to say
that while somewhat has been learned as to the
properties of Matter, its essential nature is quite
unknown to us. ' '

. As though its properties did not constitute its
essential nature.

So, under the spell of metaphysics, the physicist
turns from his spectroscope to exclaim that all his
researches may be dealing with phantasms.

Science deals with realities. These are bodies
with their properties. All the facts embraced in this
vast field of research are expressed in terms of

6 TRUTH AND ERROR

number, space, motion, time and judgment; no
other terms are needed and no other terms are
coined, but by a process well known in philology as
a disease of language, sometimes these terms lapse
into meanings which connote fallacies. The human
intellect is of such a nature that it has notions or
ideas which may be certitudes or fallacies. All the
processes of reasoning, including sensation and per-
ception, proceed by inference; the inference may
be correct or erroneous, and certitudes are reached
by verifying opinions. This is the sole and only
process of gaining certitudes. The certitudes are
truths which properly represent noumena, the illu-
sions are errors which misrepresent noumena. All
knowledge is the knowledge of noumena, and all
illusion is erroneous opinion about noumena. The
human mind knows nothing but realities and deals
with nothing but realities, but in this dealing with
the realities — the noumena of the universe — it
reaches some conclusions that are correct and others
that are incorrect. The correct conclusions are certi-
tudes about realities; the incorrect conclusions are
fallacies about realities. ' Science is the name which
mankind has agreed to call this knowledge of reali-
ties, and error is the name which mankind has agreed
to give to all fallacies. Thus it is that certitudes are
directly founded upon realities ; and fallacies alike all
refer to realities. In this sense then it may be stated
that all error as well as knowledge testifies to reality,
and that all our knowledge is certitude based upon
reality, and that fallacies would not be possible were
there not realities about which inferences are made.
Known realities are those about which mankind has
knowledge ; unknown things are those things about

CHUAR'S ILLUSION 7

which man has not yet attained knowledge. Scien-
tific research is the endeavor to increase knowledge,
and its methods are experience, observation and
verification. Fallacies are erroneous inferences in
relation to known things. All certitudes are de-
scribed in terms of number, space, motion, time
and judgment; nothing else has yet been discov-
ered and nothing else can be discovered with the
faculties with which man is possessed.

In the material world we have no knowledge of
something which is not a unity of itself or a unity of
a plurality ; of something which is not an extension
of figure or an extension of figure and structure ; of
something which has not motion or a combination of
motions as force ; of something which has not dura-
tion as persistence or duration with persistence and
change.

In the mental world we have no knowledge of
something which is not a judgment of consciousness
and inference ; of a judgment which is not a judgment
of a body with number, space, motion and time.
Every notion of something in the material world
devoid of one or more of the constituents of matter
is an illusion; every notion of something in the
spiritual world devoid of the factors of matter and
judgment is a fallacy. These are the propositions
to be explained and demonstrated.

In the following chapters an attempt will be made
to show that we know much about matter, and
although we do not know all, all we know is about
matter in its essentials of number, space, motion,
time and judgment, or that we know of matter in its
four essentials and of mind as consciousness exhib-
ited in judgment and concepts, but always this mind

8 TRUTH AND ERROR

is associated with matter. In doing this we shall
endeavor to discriminate between the certitudes and
fallacies current in human opinion.

In the intoxication of illusion facts seem cold and
colorless, and the wrapt dreamer imagines that he
dwells in a realm above science — in a world which as
he thinks absorbs truth as the ocean the shower,
and transforms it into a flood of philosophy. Fever-
ish dreams are supposed to be glimpses of the un-
known and unknowable, and the highest and dearest
aspiration is to be absorbed in this sea of specula-
tion. Nothing is worthy of contemplation but the
mysterious. Yet the simple and the true remain.
The history of science is the history of the discovery
of the simple and the true ; in its progress fallacies
are dispelled and certitudes remain.

CHAPTER II

ESSENTIALS OF PROPERTIES

On the threshold it is necessary to state certain
scientific conclusions which I accept. These are the
four great doctrines taught by modern science. I
accept the atomic theory that the constitution of
bodies is explained as a numerical combination of
ultimate smaller particles. I accept the modern
doctrine of morphology, that forms in different kinds
of bodies exhibit homologies that express degrees of
relationship. I accept the modern doctrine of the
persistence of motion as the proper explanation of
the correlation of forces. I accept the modern
doctrine of evolution, that higher bodies are derived
from lower. In accepting these doctrines I try to
embrace them in all their logical results, some of
which may seem strange to my readers. I shall
propound the hypothesis that consciousness inheres
in the ultimate particle, and attempt to show that it
harmonizes the principles of psychology.

The four great doctrines of modern science which
I have enumerated were originally guesses, but they
have largely been accepted by scientific men because
they explain the phenomena of the universe to which
they relate. The chaos of scientific phenomena
collected in vast catalogues of facts are seen to be
explained by these laws.

The chemical theory may be denominated the
persistence of units; the morphologic theory the
persistence of extensions; the dynamic theory the

9

IO TRUTH AND ERROR

persistence of speeds ; the evolutionary theory the
persistence of existence.

There are systems of stars, and every system is
a body. The one to which our earth belongs is well
known, for the solar system is the theme of the
venerable science of astronomy. The earth itself is
composed of four grand bodies: an outer envelope
of air or atmosphere, a middle envelope of water or
hydrosphere, an inner envelope of rock or litho-
sphere, and the grand central nucleus or centre-
sphere. Neglecting the two outer envelopes and
considering only the stony crust, we find that it is
composed of many bodies or formations and these of
rocks, while there are many plants and animals, and
all again are divided into grains, crystals or cells,
and the grains, crystals or cells are divided into mole-
cules, and molecules are composed of other mole-
cules, until at last chemical atoms are reached ; so
it is discovered that the universe is a hierarchy of
bodies.

The universe is a hierarchy of bodies composed of
bodies and these again composed of bodies in a vast
succession as they are reduced by analysis. When
we come to discuss the relations of these bodies to
one another it will be convenient and conduce to
exact expression if we make a distinction between
bodies and particles, and speak of a body when we
wish to consider it as a unit and then speak of its
particles when we wish to speak of the parts of
which it is composed. A body, therefore, is a body
of particles which are many in one, the one being a
body; the many particles severally may be bodies
composed of particles, that is, one composed of
many. The solar system is a body of particles, the

ESSENTIALS OF PROPERTIES II

particles being the stars of which it is composed; the
earth, one of these particles, may be considered as a
body, when its particles will be the air, the water,
the stony crust and the central nucleus; then the
air may be considered as a body composed of many
particles, the water may be considered as a body
composed of particles, the stony crust as a body
composed of particles, and finally the nucleus as a
body composed of particles. In this sense it will be
understood we sometimes speak of something as a
body and again of the same thing as a particle. A
body and its particles are reciprocal. When we
consider a body as composed of particles we con-
sider internal relations, but when we consider the
particles severally their relations to one another are
external. Thus a body has internal relations and
external relations, and every particle of the body
also has internal relations and external relations, if
it is composed of parts.

A substance is an aggregation of like particles in
one body or a number of bodies. Bodies are com-
posed of substances. For example, the air is a
substance which is again composed of substances;
the water is a substance, and this water is oxygen
and hydrogen and contains in solution many other
substances. In the envelope of rock a great variety
of substances are discovered; then there are vege-
tal and animal substances. Thus in the hierarchy
of bodies there is discovered to be a hierarchy of
substances, extending from elements to protoplasm.
The vast multitude of substances have so far been
resolved into about seventy seemingly simple sub-
stances, but there is reason to believe that they are
to be still further resolved into one primordial

12 TRUTH AND ERROR

substance, which is called matter. Matter, then, is
the ultimate substance into which all other sub-
stances which constitute the bodies of the universe
are resolved ; and matter may be of one primordial
kind, or it may be of seventy kinds, more or less.

Bodies are resolved into more and more simple
and homogeneous substances, and it is the theory of
some chemists that ultimate analysis will resolve
them into one simple kind, so that every particle
will be like every other particle in all its properties.
Matter, then, is the ultimate kind of particle into
which all bodies may be analyzed, and different
kinds of matter are different aggregations of the one
kind. The different kinds of matter made different
by different aggregation are different substances,
and the different substances are aggregations of
matter by incorporation.

An army is composed of men, but there are pla-
toons, companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, and
corps in the army. So it is organized or incorporated
into a hierarchy of units. The platoon is one as
a platoon, composed of a plurality of men ; the com-
pany is one as a company but a plurality of platoons ;
the battalion is one as a battalion but a plurality of
companies ; the regiment is one as a regiment but a
plurality of battalions ; the brigade is one as a bri-
gade but a plurality of regiments ; the division is one
as a division but a plurality of brigades; the corps
is one as a corps but a plurality of divisions. Now
we understand the fundamental property of numbers
as many in one. The platoon differs in the property
of number from the individual ; the company differs
in the property of number from the platoon, and
the battalion differs in the property of number

ESSENTIALS OF PROPERTIES 13

from the company; and the same is true of all the
units in the hierarchy.

These units of different orders have different prop-
erties of space ; the platoon occupies more space in
the field than the individual soldier ; the company
occupies more space than the platoon ; the battalion
more space than the company ; and the same is true
of the other units in the hierarchy. If we have two
armies exactly alike in a hierarchy of units and
spaces, then any two corresponding units and spaces
in the hierarchy would be similar. In speaking of
the bodies of the universe it is necessary sometimes
to speak of the corresponding unit in the different
bodies, and we call them substances. The oxygen in
one molecule of water is the same in all molecules
of water, and we call all units a substance. Every
body of water is composed of molecules of water, and
there are many bodies of water, and we call bodies
of water a substance. We thus designate as one sub-
stance all like units of matter.

This is very simple. It is merely a statement of
the resolution of more compound bodies into simpler
bodies and of more compound substances into
simpler substances. It is the dissection of bodies in
parts and the analysis of substances into elements.

The ultimate particle found in any substance may
be still further resolved in consideration. Every
body, whether it be a stellar system or an atom of
hydrogen, has certain fundamental characteristics
found in all. These are number, space, motion and
time, and if it be an animate body, judgment. They
shall here be known as properties, and to them
attention must now be turned.

Let us first consider with what things one inanimate

14 TRUTH AND ERROR

particle is endowed. First, it must have unity.
There must be one, or it does not exist. Second,
it must have extension, for without extension it
does not exist. Third, it must have speed, for it
cannot have motion without speed, nor can it have
force without motion, and a particle of matter not
in motion is unknown. The body lying upon the
ground at rest is not without motion, for it has the
motion of the earth about its axis and the motion of
the earth about the sun ; it also has a motion of its
molecules and atoms, which is heat and structural
motion. If the body which is lying upon the ground
is moved the motions are deflected and it is impos-
sible to discover that any motion as speed is added
to them. Rest is only the absence of molar motion.
Fourth, the same particle of matter must have per-
sistence, for persistence is necessary to its existence.
Here persistence is used to mean continued exist-
ence.

I shall attempt to demonstrate the proposition
that every particle of matter has consciousness, and
hence the fifth property here called judgment, but
shall reserve the discussion of the subject to a later
part of the work.

One ultimate particle must have essentials that it
may exist, but they are all comprehended in one
particle. If we consider the essentials separately
we call it abstraction ; if we consider them conjointly
we call it comprehension, and the terms abstraction
and comprehension will be used in these senses only.

These essentials are simple and wholly unlike one
another. There is nothing in unity like extension,
nothing in extension like speed, nothing in speed
like persistence. There is no possible way of

ESSENTIALS OF PROPERTIES 15

deriving one from another. We cannot derive
extension from unity, but extension must be con-
comitant with unity; extension and unity are con-
comitant in one particle. We cannot derive speed
from extension, but the thing which has speed must
have extension. We cannot derive persistence from
speed, but that which has persistence must have
speed. So we may run through all permutations of
these essentials and find them wholly unlike one
another and discover no possible way of deriving
one from the other. Notwithstanding their total
unlikeness, they are never dissociated so that one
exists without the other; they may be considered
separately but cannot exist separately. They cannot
be analyzed and the unity placed in one box, the
extension in a second, the speed in a third, the per-
sistence in a fourth; but they may be considered
separately, and this is abstraction as distinguished
from analysis. Bodies may be dissected, substances
may be analyzed, essentials may be abstracted in
consideration.

The essentials are indissoluble in every particle.
Where there is no unit there is no extension, no
speed and no persistence. Where there is no speed
there is no unit, no extension, no persistence.
Where there is no persistence there is no tmit, no
extension and no speed. If any of the essentials of
a particle of inanimate matter be taken away, the
matter disappears. A particle is the essentials of
which it is composed, and it has no other substrate.
It exists in its essentials, and its essentials exist in
it, and neither existence is separate. The notion of
a particle of matter as a substrate of essentials, or as
something to which the essentials adhere or inhere

1 6 TRUTH AND ERROR

and from which they may be taken away, leaving
behind the particle, which is not a unit, an extension,
a speed and a persistence, is a pseud-idea, the
result of mythologizing, where the word is taken to
represent more than the sum of the essentials of the
object to which it is applied. A unit is a unit of an
extension, a speed and a persistence. An extension
is an extension of a unit, a speed and a persistence.
A speed is a speed of a unit, an extension and a
persistence. A persistence is a persistence of a unit,
an extension and a speed.

Think of properties as number, space, motion and
time ; then consider the things which must exist if
these properties exist and you have the essentials, as
the term is here used. Thus think not of number,
but of unity ; think not of space, but of extension ;
think not of motion, but of speed ; think not of time,
but of persistence, and you have the essentials them-
selves.

This chapter is designed to define the essentials of
an inanimate particle, and to show in what sense the
terms for the essentials are used. The mathemati-
cian might say that A stands for unity, B for exten-
sion, C for speed, D for persistence, E for conscious-
ness, and you would not find fault. Should he for-
mulate an equation you would not quarrel with him
about his symbols, because he uses A for apples, B
for bushels, C for cents, D for. division, and E for
equality to show the equity of a transaction repre-
sented by F. Let me use my symbols in my manner,
if you would understand my demonstration. Unity
means one, extension means exclusive occupancy of
space, speed means change of position, persistence
means continuance in time.

ESSENTIALS OF PROPERTIES 17

The statement might be left to stand by itself, yet
I think it best to explain why I use these terms.
About the term unity no one will cavil.

For extension the term impenetrability has been
used, but it has a negative connotation which I wish
to avoid. I once thought of using dimension, but I
soon found that I must use it in another sense in dis-
cussing measure. Then I thought of space. Now,
space has a metaphysical use in which it is synony-
mous with vacuum or void and from which I wish to
rescue it. So I concluded to use the term extension
to signify exclusive occupancy of space, and to use
space itself for the extension of positions of extensions,
which also includes the extension of the medium
which makes up the space. Let this be made clear. As
the terms are here used the particles of the walls of this
box have extension, and the particles of air which it-
contains have extensions, and the particles of ether
within the air have extensions, but the space of the
box includes the extensions of the box, the exten-
sions of the air, and also the extension of the ether.
I may speak of the space of the box and refer only
to the position of the particles of the box and I may
then speak of the space of the box as the sum of the
extensions of the walls, air, and ether. It may be
that the walls of the box have minute apertures in
which air exists, so that all the air is not excluded
from the wood, and it is certain that the ether is not
excluded from the wood. And it may be that there
are interspaces between the particles of wood, air and
ether. Therefore even the wood of the box must
be described in terms of space, not in terms of
extension. When we come to discuss extension
itself, we find ourselves considering mass, so that

l8 TRUTH AND ERROR

mass and extension are here nearly synonymous;
but mass is used as the measure of extensions, while
space is the dimensions of related positions. Mass
is the measure of the numbers of particles of exten-
sion, but units of space are measured with units of
length.

I use the term speed because in modern physics it
has exactly the meaning which I desire. The popu-
lar meaning of velocity is just what I need, but in
physics velocity means rate of speed and also rate
of deflection and the term is needed for that purpose.

I use the term persistence because the term time
or the term duration means persistence and change
or they may mean the measure of states separated
b)T change, while the term persistence is free from
these implications.

If the terms are understood we are ready to pro-
ceed to another stage of exposition.

Essentials are comprehended in the same particle,
and we shall call them concomitants. We shall not
say that one essential is related to another in the
same particle, but they are concomitant with one
another, though the essential of one particle may be
related to the essential of another particle. A unit
may be related to another unit, an extension may be
related to another extension ; but the unit and the
extension in the same particle are not related to each
other but concomitant with each other, and these same
distinctions must be observed with all the essentials.
The task before us in this chapter is the exhibition
of the concomitants of particles and relations of
essentials, concomitants inhering in every particle,
the relations arising by reason of the relation of
particles to particles.

ESSENTIALS OF PROPERTIES 1$

The student who follows my argument must first
become accustomed to the discrimination between
concomitancy and relativity. Relativity is the
relation of one particle or body to another; con-
comitancy is the coexistence of one property with
another in the same particle or body.

Having deduced or discovered four essentials or
concomitants in every particle of matter, we have
yet to determine whether these are all, and for this
purpose we are compelled to assemble in a passing
review all of the bodies of the universe. TO do this
it becomes necessary to discover in what manner
these four essentials become properties as quantities
and kinds, for we have quantitative properties and
classific properties. Having discovered how the
essentials become properties, we can then go on in the
review of the universe of bodies.

CHAPTER III

QUANTITIES OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE MEASURED

Two short chapters must now be presented which
will be found rather dry, but they must be mas-
tered if the subsequent chapters are to be under-
stood. The principles therein stated are the A, B,
C, of the work — the multiplication table of our logic.
I beg of my reader not to be deterred from their
careful consideration by reason of their simplicity.

I

The universe is a concourse of related bodies com-
posed of related particles. Every relation must
exist between two or more particles or bodies, and
every particle or body is related to every other par-
ticle or body directly or indirectly. The universe is
a hierarchy of bodies, and thus there is a hierarchy
of relations. A relation cannot exist independent of
terms. We may consider a relation abstractly, but
it cannot exist abstractly. To affirm a relation the
terms must be implied. When an abstract is reified,
that is, supposed to exist by itself independent of
other essentials, and the illusion is entertained that
there is something independent of the essentials
which support them, a mythology is created so sub-
tle as to simulate reality. So when relations are
reined and supposed to exist independent of terms,
the mind is astray in the realm of fallacies. When
it is discovered that rest is only a relation, the mind
is prone to believe that nothing exists but relation,

QUANTITIES OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE MEASURED 21

for we have often discovered that which we thought
was absolute was in fact relation; but rest is a
relation between terms which are absolute. The
internal or molecular motions of the body at rest
have a certain relation to the external or astronomic
motions of the body which are changed when the
body is given molar motion, but the absolutes still
remain, though deflected.

Human beings are molar bodies, and have a deep
interest in one another as such and in the other
molar bodies with which they are associated. Molar
bodies and their relations are the first bodies dis-
covered by primitive man, and his converse with the
external world at first seems to be wholly with molar
bodies. Molar bodies are those in which he first
discovers relations and with which he first consciously
and purposely associates, and they become the type
of the others. Molecular bodies are known as such
only to science. The stellar bodies are first believed
to be molar bodies, and it is long before the cor-
poreal structure of the earth is discovered as a body
of great magnitude associated with other bodies more
nearly commensurate with them, as the sun, moon
and stars.

Of the internal relations of molecular bodies
little is known even yet, and in the same manner of
the internal relations of stellar bodies, but little is
yet known. Our ideas of molecular and stellar
bodies are largely ideas of their individuality, or as
units related to units of the same order, while their
constituent units scarcely receive consideration. In
the mechanical or molar world the relations of parts
are immeasurably more numerous than the parts
themselves. Not only are rocks multifarious and the

22 TRUTH AND ERROR

imperfect embodiments of air and water multifa-
rious, but special classes of embodiments are dis-
covered as plants and animals distributed over all
the earth in multitudinous kinds with multitudinous
relations, and men as molar bodies are related to one
another and in all of these relations men are funda-
mentally interested.

Relations, therefore, are so great in number and
so many in kind that the subject of relations is apt
to overwhelm the mental powers, for man discovers
that in his reasoning he is forever dealing with
relations far more than directly with the bodies
themselves. In this manner he discovers that the
world is a congress of molar bodies that are related
to one another through their properties ; when they
are analyzed into related particles or synthesized
into related bodies, relation seems to swallow all
else, so that philosophers often assume and some-
times affirm that all that is known of the universe is
these relations, and finally that the universe is
only a system of relations and the substantiality of
the universe is denied. The universe thus becomes
a universe of relations without terms. The con-
founding of concomitancy with relativity is a cause
of inextricable confusion — a snare to the intellect
and a vice of logic. Unity and extension are con-
comitant but not related, while one unit may be
related to another unit and one extension may be
related to another extension. Concomitancy and
relativity must always be distinguished or there can
be no sound psychology. The antithesis of this
doctrine is sometimes held, which is an affirmation
that the siibstrates of the universe are unknown
reifications of number, space, motion, time and

QUANTITIES OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE MEASURED 23

judgment. About unknown and unknowable things
any assertion may be made, and all philosophies that
are founded upon these reifications are therefore
philosophies of disputation, as no two are alike.
That which some great mind imposes upon his
generation is by a succeeding generation gradually
found to be more or less erroneous, and new philos-
ophies are thus forever springing up, the one not
founded upon the other; but gradually from gen-
eration to generation science establishes some things.

The relations which we are now to consider are
those which are discovered when bodies are con-
sidered as particles. Quite a new class is discovered
when we consider bodies as bodies.

As every particle of inanimate matter is a com-
bination of four essential factors there are four classes
of relations, namely: relations of plurality, relations
of position, relations of path and relations of change,
and these are all concomitant in number, space,
motion and time. The same fact may be expressed
in this manner. Relations of number are founded
upon pluralities; relations of extension are founded
upon position; relations of motion are founded upon
trajectory; relations of time -are founded upon
change. Thus we have four classes of relations that
must exist between particles. Then bodies have inter-
nal relations of particles and external relations when
the body is considered as a particle in a higher body.

II

In a former chapter we spoke of the essentials of
a particle of matter and considered them separately.
Now we must consider them as they are related.
There is a multeity of units, and plurality is founded

24 TRUTH AND ERROR

upon units. The units are the terms that are related
to constitute a plurality. A unit is unrelated or
absolute in unity, that is, its unity does not depend
upon others, but a plurality is dependent upon a
number of related units; for example, the plurality
may be ten ; then ten as a plurality depends upon
the units of which it is composed ; nine is also a
plurality, but it depends only upon nine units. A
plurality is therefore a relation of units considered
as a sum. Unity is constant only in ultimate
particles. Bodies are combined, dissolved again
and recombined, making variable units of plurality.

I am writing on a sheet of paper ; it is one. With
a match it is ignited and disappears; it is many. It
was many before the conflagration, but many in
one. After the combination these molecules though
disembodied as a sheet of paper are still related to
one another by all the concomitants, but now their
more immediate relations are with the other particles
of the molecules in which they are combined, while
the new bodies thus formed have relations to one
another of a higher degree or order in the corporeal
world, for fixed internal relations constitute incor-
poration. Incorporation consists in the establish-
ment or fixation of internal relations. When a body
is disincorporated its particles dissolve their relation
as one and assume relation with others to constitute
new bodies or enlarge other bodies.

There is a great variety of relations between
numbers. Numbers in nature are unified in orders
of various kinds. The orders thus developed are
multitudinous and quite beyond human comprehen-
sion. As the several units are compounds of individ-
uals of lower units they are related to one another in

QUANTITIES OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE MEASURED 25

infinite ways, as one is a multiple or sub-multiple of
another. Thus we have one-fourth, one-half, equal
to, twice, four times, etc. Mass is a sum of units
measured in terms of force, and such units may
become constituent parts in higher orders of units.
One number is thus a measure of another. Out of
these relations ratios and proportions arise. It seems
unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the relations
of numbers, as they are developed in the science of
arithmetic and algebra.

Ill

Extension is exclusive occupancy of space. As
there is more than one extension, and every one
excludes all others, there is relative position. Thus
we have positions derived from many extensions.
Position is the relation of one extension to another.
Space is founded on extension, for if a particle had
no extension it could not be an element of space ; a
plurality of particles, each having extension, con-
stitutes space. If the}'- are in juxtaposition the space
is the sum of their extensions. If they are separated
by a medium, as for example an intervening fluid,
the space is marked by their position and in this
sense is related position ; position, therefore, depends
upon relation, but there can be no related positions
if the extensions are annihilated. Extension is abso-
lute, position is relative and space is absolute in
extension and relative in position ; extension is con-
stant or persistent in ultimate particles.

In space one particle may be related to another in
distance and in direction. These relations give rise
to geometry and trigonometry and are the relations
chiefly dealt with in astronomy.

26 TRUTH AND ERROR

In order that space may be discussed mathematic-
ally it must be reduced conventionally to number;
this is done through the agency of measure. Then
units of measure are devised giving rise to fractions
and whole numbers, multiples, and sub-multiples,
when it becomes amenable to the operations of
mathematics.

IV

Speed exists in the unit of extension whether there
be other units or not ; speed, therefore, is unrelated
or absolute. But the extended unit having motion
must also have path, which is a change of position
to others and variable by collision with others. It
is thus relative. Speed is constant in the ultimate
unit, which will be demonstrated in a subsequent
chapter; but path is change of position in relation
to others, and motion therefore is absolute in speed
and relative in path.

There is persistence or indestructibility in the
fundamental unit of extension and motion, but this
unit changes its relation to other units in position
and also in trajectory; the persistence is absolute
and constant, the change relative and variable.

Motions are related to one another in direction and
also in the positions of trajectories. Directions may
differ in innumerable ways and paths may have
innumerable deflections and thus trajectories may
have innumerable variables. In order that direction
and trajectory may be treated mathematically it
becomes necessary to devise methods for the measure-
ment of directions which are expressed in degrees
and of lengths which are expressed in various
measures. By these conventions motions are

QUANTITIES OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE MEASURED 27

reduced to spaces and spaces to numbers, all giving
an inconceivably great number of relations. But
there are no motions without particles in motion, and
there are no speeds without particles having speed,
and there are no trajectories without particles having
trajectories. There is no path without a particle
having the essentials of a particle.

The science of the mathematics of motion deals
with the speed of one and its trajectory, the speed
of another and its trajectory, and of their collisions,
and for this purpose it has to deal with the measure
of their relations, and forever relation is considered
and thus an illusion is sometimes produced, when
motion itself seems to be wholly relation. Every
particle of matter is in motion, and while this motion
is absolute it is also relative. There can be nothing
relative which is not also absolute, nor can there be
anything absolute which is not also relative, and
motion being thus absolute and relative it is quite
proper to affirm this of motion, but it is not correct
to affirm that motion is a relation any more than it is
correct to affirm that motion is an absolute, if by these
assertions it is implied that motion is one rather than
the other ; but if these assertions are made with regard
to one correlative implying the other, then they are
both correct. It is better form of speech to say that
motion is absolute or relative when it is desired to
call attention to one factor or the other, rather than
to say that motion is an absolute or a relation.

The motion of particles is of such a nature that
paths must impinge, and then collisions arise which
give rise to impulse, or collision by which paths are
deflected.

As bodies are incorporated in molecules of higher

28 TRUTH AND ERROR

and still higher orders, and through various molar
forms as crystals, rocks, cells, phytons, plants, organs
and animals and on into stars and systems of stars,
each embodiment appropriates a part of the motion
of its several particles or atoms. The molecules of
the lowest orders have their motions, the molecules
of the second order have their motions, the cell and
the crystal have their motions, the earth has its
motion and the stellar system has its motion.

The speed of every particle of matter is the sum
of all the speeds of the bodies in which it is incor-
porated. Speed can never be increased or diminished
in an ultimate particle; it may be increased or
diminished in any one of its embodiments, but only
by deflecting the motions in its other embodiments.
This point is vital to a clear comprehension of the
philosophy of science and is worthy of further
illustration from the fact that it becomes necessary
to rid ourselves of an illusion of sense. I see a bird
perched upon a tree, then I see it flying through the
air to perch upon another tree. The bird seems to
have motion between the trees which it did not seem
to have while perched on the one or the other; but
the molecules of the bird before the flight had the
motion of vitality, and in moving from tree to tree
the trajectory of these multifarious minute mo-
tions are all deflected. The millions of millions
of molecular motions had their trajectories changed.
The bird itself was moving with the earth about its
axis and with the earth about the sun, and with the
sun about a point in Hercules. This is its astro-
nomical motion. The change in the trajectory of the
millions of millions of molecules was only the equiv-
alent of the change in the trajectory of the astronom-

QUANTITIES OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE MEASURED 29

ical motion of the bird. We know that all of these
trajectories are changed; we do not know that the
velocity or rate of speed of any particle of the bird's
body was increased or diminished. If Newton's third
law of motion, that action and reaction are equal, is
true in the exact terms in which he stated it, then
we must affirm that the speed of no particle was
changed but only its trajectory. We do not see the
astronomical motions of the bird nor its molecular
motions. We do see the molar motions in flying
from tree to tree and thus an illusion is produced
that motion can be created or destroyed by the bird,
and the persistence of motion seems to be a fallacy
and the correlation of forces a fiction. We do not
see the creation, continuance and annihilation of
motion in the bird, but the deflection of astronom-
ical and molecular motions as known by scientific
investigation. This discussion is designed to show
that motion is not a relation, but that one motion
may be said to be related to another or related to
any selected position.

V

Time is persistence and change, the persistence
being absolute because it exists in the particle inde-
pendent of other particles, and constant, for the par-
ticles cannot be annihilated. Change is relative, in
that it inheres in the relations of the particles, and it
is also variable, for particles are constantly changing
their relations of position to each other by occupying
a succession of positions. Thus time is absolute and
relative, constant and variable.

The earth as a body changes the position of its
particles by rotation upon its axis and thus passes

30 TRUTH AND ERROR

through a series of daily events. It also as a particle
changes its position in relation to the sun in a series
of annual events. The position of the same body at
one time may be related to the position of that body
at another time; that is, its space relations may
change.

As the motion of one body in its space element
may become the measure of the motion of another
body in its space elements, so the motion of one body
in its time element may become the measure of
another body in its time element. While particles
are related to one another in number, space and
motion, these relations are constantly changing so
that they are also related in time ; that is, particles
are related to each other through their changes. A
particle unmodified in its individuality may pass
through a succession of changes by reason of its own
proper motion determined by the motion of other par-
ticles. As the orbit of the moon around the earth may
become the measure of the orbit of the earth around
the sun, so the day may become the measure of the
year. We have now found that numbers, spaces, mo-
tions and times are properties which can be measured,
and through measurement which is conventional they
can be investigated. We shall hereafter see how
large a part of the scientific research pursued by man
is occupied with these subjects. Quantity is the
reciprocal of something else which is usually called
quality, but in the course of this discussion it will
be found that the term quality is badly chosen, that
the real reciprocal of quantity is kind or class.

CHAPTER IV

KINDS OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE CLASSIFIED

Having considered the nature of the properties of
a discrete particle of matter by reason of its own
existence and the existence of others, we have now
to consider how these relations are developed by
incorporation. Still it is necessary only to draw upon
the common stock of knowledge and deduce from it
legitimate results which are easily understood. We
have shown that the ultimate discrete particles are
related to each other through pluralities, positions,
paths and changes, and we have now to consider
another method of association, for particles of matter
are incorporated, and enter into fixed associations
with one another by affinity, the nature of which has
never been explained, although the association is
well known. Every particle of matter under certain
conditions seems to be able to choose its associate,
and a group of such particles that have mutual
affinities become compounded into that which is
usually denominated a molecule. This association
of particles in a molecule is not easily dissolved under
ordinary conditions, yet if special conditions are pro-
vided the association is fickle and old combinations
are dissolved that new combinations may be formed.

Then molecules enter into association with one
another without cohesion in gases, with feeble
cohesion in liquids, and a more tenacious cohesion

31

32 TRUTH AND ERROR

in solids. A body thus considered of like molecules
is called a substance.

II

In the combination of particles into molecules and
other bodies, an interesting development of the
properties is observed. Such a combination pro-
duces a new unit of a higher order. Here we find a
new unity made such by combination, and it must be
observed that it depends upon a plurality combined
in one. It is therefore a new kind of unit. Thus a
kind is developed by the combination of a plurality
of units into one — a process familiar in the conven-
tional units of arithmetic, where ten units of the
lower order make one of the next higher order. That
which is accomplished by convention in arithmetic,
is accomplished by incorporation in nature. In this
manner by combination the quantitative property of
number in the particle becomes the classific prop-
erty or kind in the molecule, and as there is a hier-
archy of molecules and every one considered as a unit
may become a particle in a higher order, we are
compelled to consider it in this double and relative
capacity, as one of many and as many in one. A
molecule in its internal aspect appears as many; in
its external aspect as one. Thus we have incor-
porated units, and these may be incorporated in a
still higher order, and on indefinitely. There are
many bodies of a kind and they constitute a class.
Thus a class is a series or sum of a kind.

Ill

Ultimate particles, by reason of their extension and
position , give rise to space ; when they are incorpo-

UNIVERSITY

or

•^ *^r

KINDS OR PROPERTIES THAr^tftfi^LASSIFIED 33

rated positions are established in relation to one
another, and thus a form is constituted. It is thus
that space is developed into form by incorporation.
It is seen that the particles of the molecule considered
as such exhibit space with extension and position,
while the molecule or other body also exhibits figure
and structure. If we view the body from within
as composed of particles, space is presented; if we
view it from without as a body, form is presented.

Again, this same molecule may become a particle
in a higher order of molecules, when it will exhibit
space characteristics, and a higher molecule will
exhibit form characteristics. Thus space is the
reciprocal of form.

In my room there are desks, chairs, book-cases,
books and many other articles. Their relations of
position are relations of space. Were all these
articles consolidated into one, so that one could not
be moved without moving all, their relations would
become relations of form. Contemplate a pile of
cannon-balls; the relations of these balls to one
another are relations of space ; combine them into
one body in such a manner that they will move
together as one, their relations of space become rela-
tions of form also.

IV

It has already been asserted that a particle cannot
lose speed. When we contemplate a molecule com-
posed of particles in which relative positions are fixed,
we are compelled to develop the thought one stage
farther and conceive of them as still retaining their
speeds. The concept of particles with relative posi-
tions fixed, and every one retaining its motion, can

34 TRUTH AND ERROR

be realized by a consideration of facts presented by
celestial bodies. The earth and moon revolve about
a common axis which is within the periphery of the
earth, and each retains its own speed while the
relative position of each is preserved. But the sun
and the earth revolve together about a common axis
in the same manner, and the relative positions are
preserved, while the relative position of the moon to
the sun is indirect through the mediation of the
earth. In like manner it can be shown that the rel-
ative positions of all the members of the solar system
are preserved directly or mediately by a system of
motion. Now, the solar system may be considered
as the type of a molecule in which the particles
retain their speeds and have their relative positions
fixed by deflection in the motion of revolution. Yet
the concept is not complete; for every one of the
members of the solar system is rotating about its
own axis. So that there is a complex system of
motions within the solar system by which the orbs
are kept within the theater of the system itself, even
though the system as a unit may be revolving about
some other point in the heavens ; and the fixity of
position of celestial particles is fixity of space rela-
tions about axes of revolution.

We do not know that the particles of a molecule
move within the sphere of the molecule by a system
of rotations and revolutions, though such a system
can be conjectured; but whatever the system may
be, it must accomplish the same results by confining
a certain portion of the speeds of the particles within
the theater of the molecule by a system of deflec-
tions, and, whatever may be the motion of the mole-
cule itself in relation to other molecules, the speed

KINDS OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE CLASSIFIED 35

of the particle must be partly taken up within the
molecule, and it must then be divided between
internal motion and external motion. Let us vivify
this concept into greater distinctness.

Imagine a particle moving to and fro in vibration
at the rate of millions of vibrations a second; the
sphere of this motion is measured by the amplitude
of the vibration. If the deflection is something less
than one hundred and eighty degrees at both extrem-
ities of the vibration and on the same side, the particle
will move off in the direction normal to the vibration.
Its motion in the new direction increases inversely
with the angle of deflection, until it reaches ninety
degrees.

Now consider the speed of the particle in vibration
when the deflection is one hundred and eighty
degrees ; then the total speed is represented in the
vibration, but when the particle is moved in a direction
normal to the vibration, the speed of the vibration is
less by the amount of speed taken up in the new
motion; thus the speed of the particle is divided
between its two motions. In this manner we may con-
ceive of the speed of the ultimate particle as being
divided among the speeds of the bodies of a hierar-
chy in which the particle is incorporated. What we
have shown about the speed of a particle in rectilineal
motion is true of it in all forms of curvilineal motion.
When one molecule collides with another each has
its path deflected inversely proportional to its mass,
for its mass is the sum of its particles, every one in
motion and having a path of its own, and all of the
particle paths must be deflected to a greater or less
degree in order that the molecular path may be
deflected. The force, therefore, with which one

36 TRUTH AND ERROR

body deflects another and by which it resists deflec-
tion itself is the sum of the motion of its particles.
Force, therefore, is a compound of motions. Thus
motion in the particle becomes force in the molecule
or other body. But the molecule itself may become
a particle in a higher molecule, when its force
becomes a motion which again must be composed.

V

We have now to consider the development of time
by incorporation. It has been seen that time is per-
sistence and change. The endless persistence of the
particle is interrupted by changes in its relation to
other particles, but when these relations are incor-
porated and become established as kinds, forms, and
forces, time undergoes a development, for it then
becomes causation as antecedent and consequent, or
cause and effect. In ultimate particles collisions
result in deflections and the changes which occur
relate to paths; but the particles themselves are
unmodified. When bodies are considered another
set of relations are generated. With every collision
the body may be modified, and a succession of these
collisions may ultimately produce a great change.
The change which bodies undergo in this manner is
called causation. Thus, a body may be deformed or
broken up, it may grow or decay when cause and
effect are involved. Whatever happens to a molecule
is distributed to its particles and is observed in its
particles. If, now, we discover an effect and desire
to learn its cause, we find the effect distributed to
all of the particles which constitute the molecule and
must go outside the molecule for its cause. This is
what is known as the infinite regressus of causes.

KINDS OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE CLASSIFIED 37

The total cause of any event to a molar body stretches
out through all the earth, and as the earth is a
particle in the solar system the total cause embraces
the sun and its planets and their satellites. Now,
when we are considering an event as an effect, we
are considering it as a change in the individual, but
when we are considering the total cause of the
change, we are considering the environment. The
effect again becomes cause, which proceeds onward
as a multiplication of causes distributed to all the
environment. In the regressus of causes the total
cause is multifarious ; but we may from time to time
consider any one of the effects of the total cause as
the cause which may be varied in the production of
an effect ; then out of the effects of the total cause
the one selected may be known as the special cause.
This is the cause to which reference is made in com-
mon speech. An effect is observed in the explosion
of gunpowder. We may consider the cause as the
instability of the compound, the ignition of the
powder with a match, or the purpose of the mis-
chievous boy, etc. In like manner we may go on in
an indefinite regressus to catalogue the causes of the
explosion. When I am considering the conduct
of the boy I attribute the cause to him ; when I am
considering the flame I attribute the cause to the
flame; when I am considering the constitution of
the powder I attribute it to the explosiveness of the
substance. These are special causes as distinct
from the total cause. Man comes to consider cause
in this manner for a practical reason, for he inter-
feres in causation for his own ends, and is forever
searching for the most economic means of changing
events

38 TRUTH AND ERROR

I am not familiar with any discussion of causation
equal to that of John Stuart Mill in his work on
Logic ; but he failed to distinguish causation as an
abstraction from force, form and kind. In his chap-
ter on the Composition of Forces, he says:

" I shall give the name of the Composition of Causes to the
principle which is exemplified in all cases in which the joint
effect of several causes is identical with the sum of their sepa-
rate effects.

"This principle, however, by no means prevails in all depart-
ments of the field of nature. The chemical combination of two
substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with
properties entirely different from those of either of the two
substances separately, or of both of them taken together. Not
a trace of the properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is observable
in those of their compound, water. ' '

In the chemical union of oxygen and hydrogen a
new kind is produced as water. Here we have com-
position of kind; when causes are composed new
conditions are developed ; thus the oxygen and the
hydrogen are found under new conditions of incor-
poration. In these new conditions there is a change
in space relations, so that water occupies less space
than the gases of which it is composed; thus the
composition of kinds gives rise to the composition
of conditions, but is not itself the composition of
conditions as an abstraction. To discuss the com-
position of conditions it is necessary to discuss the
very things to which Mill refers when he speaks of
the development of new properties.

Heretofore we have used the terms total cause
and special cause and have shown that the special
cause is that one of a multiplicity of causes which is
considered. Recurring to the illustration used
before, it will be remembered that the cause of the

KINDS OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE CLASSIFIED 39

explosion might be considered as the constitution of
the dynamite, or it might be considered as the spark
by which the powder was ignited, or it might be con-
sidered as the act of the incendiary, and in this man-
ner we obtain the infinite regressus of causes. The
considered cause may be any one near or remote in
the infinite regressus. When any one is selected all
the others become conditions ; hence we have a cause
and its conditions. So cause is related to effect and
cause is also related to condition.

At this moment a man is climbing to the roof of
my house. The cause of his climbing is a breach in
the roof which he intends to repair. The cause of
his climbing is his intention ; the cause of his climb-
ing is my request ; the cause of his climbing is my
knowledge of the breach in the roof; the cause of his
climbing is the information given me by another
that my roof leaks ; the cause of his climbing is his
desire to earn a fee; the cause of his climbing is his
desire to purchase food ; the cause of his climbing is
his love of his family; the cause of his climbing is
the hunger of his children. So we may go on for-
ever to enumerate remote and distinct causes, and
when we consider any one of them, the others
become conditions which must be assumed as neces-
sary to the operation of the selected cause.

We have considered teleologic causes; now we
must consider genetic causes. The man falls from
the roof. The cause of his falling is the misstep he
makes; the cause of his falling is gravity; the cause
of his falling is the greater distance of the roof than
the surface of the earth to the center of the earth ;
the cause of his falling is the ascent to the roof;
the cause of his falling is his coming to make repairs.

40 TRUTH AND ERROR

If any one of these conditions had been omitted he
would not have fallen, and we can go on to multiply
these conditions to an indefinite degree and discover
that if any one was omitted this particular case of
falling would not have occurred.

Why is one condition selected rather than another?
This question might be answered by referring to the
seriality of thought, which is the name for the law by
which many things cannot be considered simulta-
neously. To comprehend all of the causes it is neces-
sary to consider them separately ; and while this is
not a complete answer, it must be considered as an
important condition to be understood that the answer
itself may be understood. Man himself is a causa-
tor, and changes the currents of events in himself
and in external nature. All human activities are
designed to interfere with the course of natural
events. Man bent upon the modification of events is
forever intent upon the discovery of the most easily
variable cause, and no small proportion of his
energies are devoted to this discovery, and the inven-
tion of the way by which his discoveries may be
made of avail. Hence it comes that particular
causes are selected as those of most interest. Every
act performed by man, every word spoken is an
interference in the laws of causation and is designed
as such. The artisan who repaired my roof inter-
fered in the laws of causation by making the repair,
but this interference can only be accomplished by
the substitution of a new cause.

VI

We have now discovered that there is an additional
property of the inanimate particle when it is incor-

KINDS OR PROPERTIES THAT ARE CLASSIFIED 41

porated, and that this is affinity. All we know of
affinity is that it is the choice of one particle for
another as its associate or is their mutual choice.
Here we are introduced to the multitudinous
phenomena of affinity, which can be explained only
as choice. We must yet go on to consider other
bodies than molecules to obtain a clearer idea of the
nature of affinity itself.

VII

Class is the reciprocal of number. It is class in
the body as kind and series, and it is number in the
particle as unity and plurality. Form is the recip-
rocal of space, which is form in the body as figure
and structure, and it is space in the position of the
extensions of the particle. Force is the reciprocal of
motion ; it is force in the body as action and passion ;
it is motion in the particles as speed and path.
Causation is the reciprocal of time; it is causation
in the body as cause and effect ; it is time in the
body as persistence and change.

Number, space, motion and time are concomitant
as they inhere in the same particle ; kind, form, force
and causation are concomitant because they inhere
in the same body. These distinctions are radical,
and must be firmly grasped if the argument herein
presented is to be understood.

CHAPTER V

PROCESSES OR THE PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES

The particles and bodies of the universe are funda-
mentally classified in six groups, as follows: (i) the
particles of the ether, the science of which I call
ethronomy; (2) the bodies and particles of the
stars, the science of which is astronomy; (3) the
bodies and particles of the earth, the science of
which I call geonomy ; (4) the bodies and particles
of plants, the science of which I call phytonomy; (5)
the bodies and particles of animals, the science of
which I call zoonomy; (6) the bodies which are
invented by men, the science of which I call
demonomy.

I shall not write special chapters about ethronomy
and astronomy, and shall consider demonomy in an
incidental way and reserve it for a future volume;
but I must devote a chapter severally to geonomy,
phytonomy, and zoonomy, in order that we may dis-
cover something more about the nature of affinity
and see if there are other properties which will
require for their explanation more than the five
essentials.

I

The earth is composed of four bodies surrounded
by the ether.

First, there is a central nucleus constituting the
principal mass.

Second, there is a crust of structurally disposed

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 43

rock surrounding- the nucleus, the thickness of which
is comparatively small.

Third, there is an aqueous body surrounding the
rocky crust, through which the islands rise, the
largest of which are called continents. On these
islands there are many lakes and rivers which ramify
into innumerable brooks, creeks and rills.

Fourth, there is an aerial mantle of air extending
to a limit which is not well determined.

Fifth, these four bodies, one outside the other, in
succession, are surrounded by the ether.

The earth is thus composed of encapsulated globes
enclosing a nucleus and bathed in ether, to desig-
nate which certain definitive terms are needed. I
shall, therefore, speak of the nucleus, the rocky
crust or crust, the aqueous envelope or envelope,
and the aerial mantle or mantle, and shall call them
all spheres. For the sake of clearer distinction,
these spheres may be called (i) the centrosphere ;
(2) the lithosphere; (3) the hydrosphere, and (4) the
atmosphere. It must be observed tftat the ether is
common to all of the celestial bodies, and perhaps
penetrates them as it does the earth.

The centrosphere is the chief mass and has a
density of 5.6. By reason of this great specific
gravity, which is about twice that of the rocky crust,
it is often supposed to be metallic. Geologic facts
in a vast system lead to the induction that the
centrosphere does not exist in the solid state ; if it is
metallic the weight reduces it to a trans-solid con-
dition. To this condition the form of the earth testi-
fies, as it is an oblate spheroid assuming the figure
of a fluid under the combined action of gravity and
rotation. These are facts which have led physicists

44 TRUTH AND ERROR

to conclude that it must have a rigidity said to be
equal to that of steel. This rigidity may be explained
as a function of its rotation, revolution, and molec-
ular motion, when the physicist and the geologist
would be in substantial accord.

The theory of a metallic centrosphere seems ade-
quately to account for the trans- solid state, as the
metals are found to flow under pressure; but the
molten material which from time to time is brought
to the surface from the interior of the earth never
reveals this metallic constitution. It may be that
there is a zone of matter beneath the structural rock
and overlying the metallic nucleus which is pene-
trated by heat, now here, now there, and only these
molten rocks are extra vasate d ; or it may be that
the solid state is limited by heat in one direction and
by pressure in the other in such manner that all
rocks flow under great pressure as do the metals.

The stony crust has been revealed by direct pene-
tration to a depth of more than six thousand feet,
but it is indire'ctly revealed in many regions to a
much greater depth, perhaps in extreme cases to
fifty or sixty thousand feet.

The islands of dry land have all been beneath the
sea at some time or other, and all show that they
have been submerged more than once, some more
frequently than others. During that portion of the
history of the crust, which is the theater of geological
investigation, these periods of submarine condition
in one region always appear to be contemporaneous
with periods of subaerial conditions in some other
region. Thus there seem to have been regions of
dry land and regions of ocean bottom coexisting with
a large predominance of oceanic area.

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 45

The aqueous envelope covers the rocky crust over
about three-fourths of its surface, and has an average
depth of about twelve thousand feet, though in
extreme cases the bottom of the sea is more than
five miles below its surface, while in some few cases
mountains rise to more than five miles above the
level of the sea. It is certain that we are now able
to study rocks which were deposited at depths much
greater than that of the mean depth of the ocean,
and there are many cases where rocks found on the
summits of high mountains are known to have been
deposited at great depths beneath the sea. Great
regions of country are at one time submarine, and
at another subaerial. These oscillations of upheaval
and subsidence are oft-repeated in geological his-
tory, and the swing of oscillation seems to have been
in some regions tens or scores of thousands of feet
where they reach the maximum, and to be only tens
or scores of feet at the minimum, so that the surface
of the earth, in so far as it has been studied geolog-
ically, is found to give evidence of oscillations of
level varying in these quantities.

These variations are geographically heterogene-
ous : one region may have its oscillation on a small
scale, another on a large scale, the minor oscillations
forming distinct geographical series and the major
oscillations forming distinct geographical series;
that is, one region has been subject during geo-
logical time only to minor oscillations, and another
during the same time to major oscillations.

We must now more fully consider the nature of
these movements. Sometimes upheaval is by anti-
clinal flexure, where the rocks are lifted along a line
of upheaval and caused to dip away on either side in

46 TRUTH AND ERROR

gentle or abrupt slopes which are sometimes beauti-
fully curved; but such an upheaval often seems to
be accompanied by a subsidence on the flanks.
Symmetrical anticlinal flexures are not very common,
but often one side slopes gently while the other is
abruptly deflected. This abrupt slope is especially
subject to rupture, in which case faults are substi-
tuted for flexures. Thus a block which dips gently
in one direction has its margin, on the side of a
fault, displaced as an abrupt escarpment. Blocks
formed in this manner often careen upon their edges,
so that the strata may become vertically disposed or
quite overturned where the lower formed strata are
found on top. Between careened blocks and flexed
blocks no line of demarcation can be drawn: the
same block in different parts of its course may be
bent or broken, and the flexed blocks themselves be
quite overturned. The rocks which are upheaved
or depressed by faulting and flexing, one or both,
are always found to be ruptured in line of the faults
or flexures, and also transversely to them. This
rupture is often minute, so that the sheets of rock
are faulted and jointed and thus found in blocks of
varying dimensions, but all very minute as com-
pared with the widely spread formations from which
they are broken. Thus the whole system of rocks,
of igneous and aqueous origin alike, are broken into
blocks by faults and ruptures, and still further
divided by planes of deposition, so that the structural
crust is a system of fragments sometimes with an
area of many yards, other times with an area of
fractions of inches. When we compare these blocks
with the great area of the structural crust we find
that it is but an accumulation of blocks that are to

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 47

the formations what grains of sand are to the blocks.
We must now realize that the structural crust
nowhere has a continuous coherence; that faults,
joints, and partings render it a vast body of minute
and loosely accumulated fragments. All of this
upheaval and subsidence with flexures, faults, joints,
and partings seem to have been brought into this
condition by intermittent convulsions often exhibited
in earthquakes.

Having contemplated the lithosphere as a body
moving in upheaval and subsidence, and shown
what is about the maximum and minimum of these
oscillations and their paroxysmal character, we are
prepared to consider the structure of this crust.

In all geological ages volcanic eruptions have
occurred and rocky material from the depths has
been brought to the surface. Such appearances of
lava at the surface have been very common in human
history, and they appear to have been just as com-
mon in all the geological ages revealed by science.
Lavas vary in chemical and mineralogical constitu-
tion, but this variation is within narrow limits. All
of the mineral substances known to mankind appear,
but are intimately mixed as minute ingredients.
Lavas, therefore, are intimate mixtures of many sub-
stances, the average of which falls within narrow
limits. It would appear from our present knowledge
that the primordial surface of the earth was cooled
lava and that lava has been erupted from time to
time through all of the great geological ages.

Upon these cooled surfaces a new crust of rocks
from below and rocks from above appears to have
been spread. Wind waves and tidal waves are for-
ever beating the lands and undermining the cliffs

48 TRUTH AND ERROR

and distributing the materials beneath the sea.
Then atmospheric agencies disintegrate the rocks
and the rains wash the sands into the streams, which
carry them into the lakes and into the sea. By
many cognate processes the lands are worn down
and the sea bottoms built up ; the amount of detritus
thus accumulated in zones about the meandering
shores is great, so that in regions of maximum
activity formations are accumulated thousands of
feet in thickness.

The winds contribute to the material which falls
into the sea; plant life also furnishes its quota;
accumulations of vegetation are ultimately con-
solidated among the formations as beds of coal ; and
animal life adds to the marine formations, for corals,
shells, and bones are all brought to be buried in the
sand, and often extensive formations of calcareous
matter are thus produced. From these sources the
sedimentary rocks are brought to be mingled with
the eruptive rocks and intercalated among them,
while in turn they are thrust between the sedimen-
tary rocks.

Layers of rock of sedimentary origin appearing as
strata are commingled with other masses of rock of
volcanic origin which come from the interior. Some-
times the lava flows under or between the sedimen-
tary strata. When great masses of lava are found
in these conditions they are called lacolites. Thinner
sheets are called intrusive rocks. Beds poured over
the surface are called coulees. The floods of lava
come through fissures and fill them both below and
above coulees, intrusions, and lacolites ; such fissure
formations are called dikes. Where the lava comes
forth in volcanoes, the orifices are filled with molten

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 49

rock which consolidates and are then called chim-
neys. Great bodies of lava are ejected by some
volcanoes as scoria and ashes, and often the ashes
are minutely comminuted; the expulsion of such
material is doubtless due to the production of gases
and vapors, especially of steam, and the com-
minution is probably due to the explosive actions of
particles of water expanded into steam. Great vol-
canic cones are often formed by the piles of scoria
and ashes which are extravasated, and the ashes
themselves when highly comminuted are drifted by
the wind, sometimes far away from the locus of
eruption. Beds of ashes and scoria formed in this
manner are called tuff. So the bodies of rock formed
by eruption are commingled with the bodies formed
by sedimentation, and all are known as formations.
Both the sedimentaries and the eruptives undergo a
further change, which to a greater or less extent
obscures their origin, for the original formations are
metamorphosed, that is, recrystallized and lithified ;
so that the planes of sedimentation are partly or
largely obscured and the beds of lacolites, intrusive
sheets, coulees, dikes, chimneys, and tuffs have a
new structure imposed upon them, and are then
known as metamorphic rocks.

An attempt has been made to define formations ;
now they must be considered in a new light.

The land areas have always been subject to
degradation by rains, rivers, and waves, and the
materials washed from the land have been carried
into the sea and there deposited ; thus the continu-
ance of dry land area is comparatively ephemeral.
Not only are the lands degraded in this manner, but
when they reach the level of the sea they continue

50 TRUTH AND ERROR

to subside; when above the sea they are speedily
unloaded, but when brought to the level of the sea
or nearly so the islands, though having their loads
discharged, continue to sink. The regions which
have received the detritus of the islands and are thus
loaded by them, are elevated into the island or con-
tinental condition; thus land areas rise to be un-
loaded and then sink, while oceanic areas are loaded
and then rise to become land areas. The extent of
this upheaval and subsidence and the vertical move-
ments, involved together with the vast transporta-
tion of material from land to sea, seems to be enor-
mous when we contemplate the almost silent and
unseen agencies by which it is accomplished.

In considering large areas of the surface of the
earth, as, for example, the great continents or zones
of archipelagoes, we reach certain generalizations of
prime significance.

Regions of great denudation are also regions of
great deposition, regions of great eruption, regions
of great upheaval and subsidence, and also regions
of great flexure and fracture ; thus denudation and
deposition, eruption and displacement (as subsidence
and upheaval and as fracture and flexure) are corre-
lated in this manner: that where there is more of
one there is more of all; where there is less of one
there is less of all.

Geologists have found no law, condition, or cause
by which to explain these phenomena of the earth's
crust as the law of gravity explains the constitution
of celestial systems. The search for this law has
been almost exclusively in one direction, under the
hypothesis of a cooling and contracting earth, but
with the lapse of time it has been found inadequate.

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 51

Attempts have been made to compute the amount
of contraction supposed to result from the wrinkling
of the crust of the earth in anticlines and synclines.
It seems to entirely fail quantitatively. Contraction
does not seem to be an explanation of all or even the
chief phenomena which we have briefly set forth.
When this hypothesis was considered, flexion
seemed to be the chief method of displacement ; now
we know that fracturing and faulting is the chief
method in regions of maximum action. When
inclined rocks are studied they seem to have been
stretched, as evidenced in the elongation of particles
transverse to the strike, and they seem further to
have been stretched by the opening of fissures and
joints. Altogether it may be affirmed that displace-
ment does not teach the doctrine of a contracting
earth, or, if that statement is too strong, it does not
give evidence of a sufficient contraction necessary to
the hypothesis, and it also fails to explain the
concomitant phenomena.

With this hypothesis another is associated, namely,
that the centrosphere of the earth is metallic, for
which no vestige of inductive evidence has yet
appeared ; and the stupendous fact remains that the
centrosphere has more than twice the density of the
crust. All eruptive rocks which come into the pur-
view of science are found to have an average con-
stitution which is about the same as that of the sedi-
mentary rocks. It is found by experiment in the
industrial arts that under pressure metallic and
other substances flow; and geology teaches that all
of the other rocks are secularly deformed under
differential pressures, so that rocks highly metamor-
phosed in this manner are twisted, contorted, and

52 TRUTH AND ERROR

kneaded into new shapes. Finally, there is now
abundant geologic evidence to show that the faulting
near the surface appears as flexure at greater depths,
and finally that flexure appears as molecular read-
justment at still greater depths, expressed in slaty
structure where the particles of the rocks are rear-
ranged in parallel planes.

The metals of the normal condition have great
density, but in a pure condition are found only in
exceedingly minute quantities ; all the other rocks
have a small density. If we now assume that all rocks
flow tinder pressure, that the critical point is vari-
able and that the modulus of compression is also
variable, being greater for the lighter rocks and less
for the heavier, and that this modulus is greatly
accelerated at the critical point, we have a law
which will regiment the facts of geonomy as the facts
of astronomy are marshaled by the law of gravity.

Under this theoretic law of the accelerated mod-
ulus of compression at the critical point for different
substances, subsidence and upheaval are explained.
The reassumption of constitutional structure in
crystallization and glassy lithification necessitates
expansion, and thus upheaval is explained. When
lands rise and are denuded, the process of relithifica-
tion in the centrosphere continues upheaval and
exposes the lands to further upheaval, and this proc-
ess goes on until an equilibrium is reached at the
epoch when the land is brought to the level of the
sea by degradation. On the other hand, as land is
loaded the subjacent crust rocks are brought within
the zone of accelerated compression, and this proc-
ess continues while the loading continues until it is
brought to a close at the epoch when the land area

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 53

from which the detritus is taken is brought to the
level of the sea and transportation ended so that load-
ing ceases.

Universal contraction by cooling must still be
postulated as an agency for the destruction of
equilibrium, or perhaps we may find this agency in
astronomical conditions; but some such agency is
necessary for the continuation of the process. But
the changing of material from the interior to the sur-
face and the changing of load from one district to
another by transportation under the law of the accel-
erated modulus of compression is the principal
agency of upheaval and subsidence.

This doctrine was proposed several years ago by
myself, but has received little attention except
among a few geologists engaged in this branch of
research ; from its reception by these gentlemen I
am encouraged to repropound it.

The hydrosphere requires a little further con-
sideration. The water evaporates from the surface
aided by a variety of conditions which cannot here
be considered ; as vapor it floats in the air ; then the
rocks by atmospheric agencies are reduced to dust
and blown by the winds and seized by the vapor, so
that particles often become the nuclei of raindrops.
The falling of the water restores the particles of
dust to the crust. On the other hand the water
penetrates the rocky crust by the innumerable
fissures which have already been described and along
the partings of the rocks and among the sands of
which they are composed. In a condition of vapor it
is probable that it penetrates through all of the
stony crust. Thus it falls into the earth by streams,
by capillary channels, and into the metamorphic

54 TRUTH AND ERROR

masses at great depths, where it assumes the role of
an agent of rearrangement in crystallization. There
is much evidence to show that this finally becomes
the agent of explosion when the rocky masses are
thrust by the weight of superincumbent rock into
the centrosphere, for this seems to be the explana-
tion of the tufaceous material thrown out by vol-
canoes. This penetrating water becomes the agent
of another process which goes on in the crust on a
vast scale, for the waters, especially when they
become thermal, dissolve certain substances and
redeposit them as they are evaporated above and as
they become waters of crystallization below.
Especially are the metals treated in this manner,
giving rise to metallic lodes by solution in the water
and their subsequent evaporation and crystallization.
The formation of mineral lodes in this manner is
a long but interesting chapter in the story of geology.
We now have a condensed but perhaps sufficient
account of the structure of the earth in spheres and
their interaction in the production of formations.
We must now consider these formations abstractly
in the light of the essentials as they are changed in
relations of quantities and categories into formations.

II

In the deeply seated rocks substances are trans-
muted by recomposition, secularly accomplished by
changes in heat and changes in pressure which pro-
duce chemical reactions. As the rocks sink under
the materials piled upon them by extravasation and
deposition, they are faulted and jointed, and this
permits the water to flow in underground courses ;
these flowing waters dissolve certain substances on

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 55

their way down, and deposit them again, filling the
joints and fault seams with deposits accumulated
from higher grounds. As the upper and lower sur-
face of the crust is approached the rate of change in
the substances is increased until these surfaces are
reached. At the upper surface the disintegrated
rocks form an overplacement of soils which undergo
such chemical reaction that the substances of vegetal
life are produced. This material, exposed for longer
or shorter periods, is transported by streams to lakes
or to the sea and sinks to the bottom, where it is
recombined into various substances, especially as
carbonate of lime, chloride of sodium, other salts,
clay and coal. All of this transmutation is a numer-
ical change in the relation of the atoms to the mole-
cules of the substances developed. Let us call it
metalogisis.

The new substances which appear in the changes
wrought by the agencies which have been described
are segregated in the deeply seated rocks as crystals.
Those which are formed in the fissures appear as
bodies of ore and those that are washed from the
surface and deposited at the bottoms of lakes and
seas are arranged in strata, but as the waters them-
selves dissolve the substances of the surface they are
often recombined and crystallized. Thus it is that
the new substances are segregated and the new mass
of comminuted material has the new kinds developed
in this manner, separated more or less distinctly from
the kinds of the original mass. Thus metalogisis is
the genesis of new kinds and their segregation by a
succession of changes.

Thus we see that in the processes that go on in the
crust of the earth new kinds of substances are

56 TRUTH AND ERROR

developed and new kinds of formations produced,
and the chemist finds these substances to be
arranged in series, and the geologist finds that sedi-
mentary formations are arranged in series. So in
geonomy, kinds are developed into series.

Ill

With the change in kind comes the change in form
which is accomplished by minute increments. When
the mineral substances are recombined in the deeply
seated rocks they are slowly metamorphosed by
recrystallization and rearrangement in slaty struc-
ture. The ores are deposited in mineral lodes and
to some extent crystallized. The sedimentary for-
mations are arranged in layers or strata, and are
thus seriated. Heavier and larger materials are
sooner deposited, lighter and smaller materials are
slowly thrown down, and the currents of the water
carry them farther away from the shore ; thus there
is an assorting process which is still farther extended
by the deposition of materials in solution. In this
manner the structure of the rocky cellate is con-
stantly undergoing metamorphosis.

The slates are seriated a,nd the sedimentary strata
are seriated. Thus kinds are seriated as forms
revealed in structure and figure. The elements of
structure are set forth in a more elaborate form in
structural geology when slaty structure, lode struc-
ture and stratified structure are the themes, and
where flexures, faults, fractures and displacements
are set forth in describing the structure of moun-
tains, plateaus, hills and plains as slates, lodes and
strata, giving figure to the topographic features and
the endless variety and beauty of the topographic

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 57

landscape. This figure is revealed in valleys with
stream channels and canyons.

In plains that are sometimes baselevels being
asymptotic and sometimes surmounted with monad-
nock elevations, in plateaus with abrupt escarpments
and fringing hills, in mountains which are often
systems of ridges carved by gorges into peaks or
elevated as volcanic cones, all spread with a parterre
of forest, meadow, field and flower through which
flow rivers, creeks, brooks and rills, where cataracts
and cascades are found and where fountains issue
from the rocks and lakes are nestled that mirror the
vegetal-clad shores ; while away to the polar region
the ice gathers, and the glaciers break into icebergs
and float down the sea, or following the land, carve
valleys and build moraines. All these things and
many more constitute the theme of physiography,
which is a description of the figure of the oblate
spheroid. A succession of changes of form we call
metamorphosis.

IV

In the change which comes in the development of
the rocky cellate, forces become energies ; that is,
pari passu with metalogisis and metamorphosis there
is metaphysisis ; and metaphysisis is energy and
work as reciprocals. The same fact is sometimes
expressed in another form. The spherical members
of the earth and the formations of which the crust is
composed exhibit strains and stresses in their interac-
tion and these strains and stresses produce changes.
The varying heat of the ether by contraction and
expansion rends the rocks and is an agency for their
disintegration. The ether evaporates the water, the

58 TRUTH AND ERROR

wind carries it about and fills the air with dust, and
the dust and vapor again fall to the earth as rain,
and the falling becomes a process of disintegration in
part, but mainly an agency for the transportation of
material of the rocky cellate by sheets of water into
streams and by streams into the larger bodies.
Then gravity acts as a process, throwing the load of
transportation to the bottom in assorted layers.
Then the percolating waters exhibit new processes of
transmutation. With all of this there go the proc-
esses of strains and stresses in the rocks themselves,
some formations being relieved of pressure and
others having pressure added, and all these work
their changes. Then there are the processes of
extravasation consequent upon the relief and addi-
tion of the strains and stresses.

All of the processes which are here but partly
enumerated are intermittent. The ethereal proc-
esses change hourly and daily with the longitude,
and vary with the latitude. The winds blow and are
calm; evaporation goes on until critical conditions
are reached when storms fall ; floods are also vari-
able, and floods produce effects in geometrical ratio.
The pressures of formations have their accelerations
intermittent, so that stresses are revealed by earth-
quakes, and the fractures caused by earthquakes pro-
duce the channels for eruption, and add to pressures
and stresses.

There is a change in hydrostatic pressure of such
importance that it must not be neglected. The
waters that are wedged between the stony blocks
and thrust into pervious strata and absorbed into all
of the rocks by processes of crystallization are sub-
ject to the same intermittent activities.

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 59

Again, on the streams of great floods, great blocks
are loaded, and as these blocks become larger they
are the more efficient as hammers in the corrasion
of stream channels both vertically and laterally ; so
that glaciers load themselves with rocks and become
the agencies of corrasion by which valleys are carved.

All of these processes are the work of gravity,
heat, light, electricity and magnetism, and combined
they produce a set of chemical changes which, as a
mode of motion, we call chemism, which must be dis-
tinguished from affinity, for affinity means choice,
while chemism means energy, and valency expresses
numerical proportions. Heat produces expansion,
gravity produces contraction in the materials of the
rocky crust, and, conjoined, they produce chemism.
This geochemism is the fundamental energy.

Stresses and strains are produced in celestial
bodies as exhibited in their spheroidal structure, but
chemism appears in the particles of which celestial
bodies are composed, and at present we cannot
study these particles in any other celestial body than
that of the earth ; chemism is a new mode of motion
exhibited to us only in the earth, though we may
conjecture that it exists in other globes if we could
examine into their geonomy. A succession of
changes of force is metaphysisis.

V

We have next to consider a succession of causes
and a succession of effects. The rill rolls down the
declivity ; by the process of corrasion a channel is
cut, and this effect is a continuous deepening of the
channel. The cause is a process and the effect is a
process; a serial causation, therefore, is a double

60 TRUTH AND ERROR

process, one of cause and the other effect. The
water on its way down the rill transports the abraded
rocks ; thus there is a constant process of cause in the
flowing of the water, and a constant process of effect
in the transportation of the load. When the rill
reaches the foot of the declivity by the change of
grade in the stream it is no longer able to cany the
load, and it is deposited. The constant process of
discharge from the water results in a constant proc-
ess of deposition upon the bottom. It is in this
manner that causation is continuous, and such a cau-
sation is a double process. A serial force is a process.
In energy the work done by force is proportional to
the time in which the force acts, but in the process
this law does not necessarily obtain, for cause is not
wholly a question of force but it is also a question
of form and kind.

The rate at which the stream corrades its channel
is due in part to the mass of the water and the
declivity of the stream, that is, energy, but it is
also dependent upon the form of the rocks and their
chemical constitution. If they are easily disinte-
grated they are loaded the more, and the sedimentary
particles as the instruments of corrasion are multi-
plied. Much depends upon the constitution of the
rocks. If they dissolve in minute particles they
corrade less ; if the particles are larger they corrade
more. Thus the rate of corrasion is a function of
force, of form and of kind, and hence there can be
no equality between the work done as an effect and
the energy as a cause. Again in transportation of
the material the rate of transportation depends upon
the rate at which the supply is furnished, and not
upon the force of the waters, for the supply is load

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 6 1

and the load adds its own weight to the gravitating
energy. The condition of fineness in the particles
constituting the load will greatly aid transportation ;
the larger particles will sink sooner, the smaller
particles will be carried farther; the deposition will
in one place be of large particles, another place of
small particles ; hence a new effect is produced, that
of sorting the material. It has already been shown
that causes are multifarious and run into an infinite
regressus, and between no one of these causes and
the effect does there exist the relation of equality,
and because the causes are disparate from the effect
there can be no equality between the cause and
effect.

This is one of the strange fallacies often met,
and its origin lurks in the term action and reaction
when bodies in motion collide. A and B are two
bodies in motion; they impinge and are mutually
deflected. Now if we consider A before the deflec-
tion and after it, we have the two directions sepa-
rated by an event. The same is true of B before the
collision and B after it. At the collision there is a
double cause involved in the incident motions of A
and B before the collision, and a double effect in
their reflected motions. As force there is a mutual
action and reaction, then there is equality existing
between them. As cause and effect there is a mu-
tual causation. The angle of incidence equals the
angle of deflection ; that is, there is equality between
angle and angle as relations of form ; but this is not
a relation of cause and effect as such. We must find
the cause of the collision, and then we may find
what the collision causes. Change the conditions in
the two particles; let one of them be easily crushed

62 TRUTH AND ERROR

and the other not, then one ball will rebound and
the other will be shattered. Now action and reac-
tion as force will still be equal, but cause and effect
will be different conditions ; one body has its course
changed, the other body is shattered into fragments,
and these fragments take different courses. Thus it
is seen that between cause and effect equality can-
not be asserted. There is no equality between a
word of command and prompt obedience to the com-
mand. There is no equality between sunrise and
the opening of the morning-glory; there is no
equality between the story of the Bonnie Brier Bush
and my emotion. It is always abuse of logic to
assert that equality exists between cause and effect,
although the first mode of causation has that charac-
teristic as change of direction.

When we consider force as force there is always
equality between action and reaction ; but when we
consider force as cause, then no relation of equality
exists between it and effect. A unit of force may
raise a hundred pounds to a given height ; two units
of force may raise two hundred pounds to the same
height. Thus the work is proportional to the force ;
but we are not considering a relation between forces
but a relation between cause and effect. When in
lifting the weight we consider it as an effect and
wish to refer to its causes, they are found to be in
the machinery by which the effect was produced, in
the application of the force to produce the effect,
and in the origin of this force. That is to say, when-
ever we are examining the relation between cause
and effect we are examining into conditions or states
and not into equalities or inequalities of force.
When a weight of a hundred pounds is raised a unit

PROPERTIES OF GEONOMIC BODIES 63

of altitude, the effect is a new position, and the force
employed, which was one of the causes of the new
position, is an action equal to the lifting of the
weight as reaction. But the cause might have pro-
duced a very different effect than that of lifting the
weight ; the effect might have been the breaking of
the rope ; then the cause is the force and the effect
the fracture. Cause and effect are not relations
of force to force, form to form, nor kind to kind, but
they are relations of time to time as they are affected
by force, form and kind. There can be no cause
without force, form and kind; that is, we cannot
analyze cause but can only abstract it. We cannot
put cause in one basket, force in a second, form in a
third, and kind in a fourth ; and this is only a repeti-
tion of what I have said about unity, extension,
speed and persistence.

A process of causality is here called metagenesis
and a series of changes are produced.

We have now seen that the four essentials are still
represented in the processes of geonomic bodies, and
we also see the action of affinity in these bodies,
and affinity itself is never revealed except as choice.

CHAPTER VI

GENERATIONS OR PROPERTIES OF PLANTS

We are yet to follow properties through higher
degrees of relativity. For this purpose it becomes
necessary to examine the relations exhibited by
plants in metabolism, growth, vitality, and heredity.
Plants are not wholly disparate bodies, but rise by
a discrete step or degree in relativity not exhibited
in ethronomy, astronomy and geonomy. So that
not only are the properties in those realms found in
this new realm, but in addition a new set of relations
which we denominate generations. We have, there-
fore, to examine those characteristics by which plants
are distinguished from geonomic bodies, of course
in only a general and summary manner.

In plants new kinds appear by chemical recomposi-
tion. A new substance, protoplasm, is constituted,
being organized of many molecules of different
kinds, which again combine with other substances.
These molecules seem to be still further arranged in
different proportions, by which the new plant sub-
stances become many; the formation of these sub-
stances is called assimilation.

The many substances of plant tissue have a
secular development which is growth in size and
form. The period of existence of the plant body is
limited, and at death returns to simpler conditions ;
this return is decay, and belongs to the grade of proc-
esses. In growth the plant undergoes a change of

64

GENERATIONS OR PROPERTIES OF PLANTS 65

increasing relativity, and in decay returns to a
simpler state of relativity.

During growth, which is an increase of form and
structure by a succession of changes, it also exhibits
a new mode of motion, which is vitality or life, and
the cessation of this activity is death, when the plant
returns to the geonomic world by decay. But
assimilation, growth and life are continued from one
generation to another, and imply time from period
to period. This time is occupied in making changes,
and causation is metagenesis. Now a new element
of time appears, for by producing germs and thus
multiplying individuals like itself the same stages of
metabolism, growth and life observed in the parents
are repeated in the offspring. This new element is
heredity, in which the offspring inherits the poten-
tiality of the parent as it is restricted within certain
narrow limits to careers of metabolism, growth and
vitality similar to that of the parent.

Thus generations are generations of processes.
The processes are assimilation, construction and
destruction, growth of form and structure, vitality
exhibited in endosmosis and exosmosis, and finally
processes are repeated by heredity represented by
parents and children.

In this grade of concomitants it must be observed
that there can be no assimilation without growth,
no growth without vitality and no vitality without
heredity.

Indeed, as we go on to contemplate the concom-
itants that appear by increasing relations, it becomes
more and more evident that one cannot exist with-
out the others, and that abstraction must always be
distinguished from analysis. It becomes possible to

66 TRUTH AND ERROR

treat the whole process of plant formation as assimila-
tion or as growth or as life or as heredity, and yet
we distinguish these concomitants in thought. If
we treat of the assimilation of plants, the phytology
of plants, the vitality of plants or the heredity of
plants through germs, we seem to take the whole
subject in view, for the concomitants are not dispa-
rate but only abstract in consideration.

II

I define constructive assimilation as the building
up of protoplasm, a compound composed of many
molecules, and I define differentiating assimilation
as the recombination of protoplasm into other sub-
stances which are simpler compounds. These sim-
pler substances are composed not only of some of the
molecules of protoplasm itself, but also of other sub-
stances, and are used for various purposes in the
economy and structure of the plant. In these re-
combinations a surplus of substance is found which
is excreted by the plant in two ways : first, as water
which is imbibed and used as a vehicle for other sub-
stances, for the amount of water is in excess of the
amount ultimately used in the tissue of the plant,
and is excreted by transpiration ; and second, as car-
bon-dioxide, for the oxygen of the air unites with an
excess of carbon, and it is then excreted by respira-
tion. Thus protoplasm is the basis of the tissues of
the plant; but to make these tissues it must be
recombined into different substances which are
newer compounds, and new substances not found in
protoplasm are necessary therefor. The water which
is necessary for protoplasm is furnished together
with an additional amount which becomes the

GENERATIONS OR PROPERTIES OF PLANTS 67

vehicle for the new substances, and the surplus is
excreted. In the building of new substances oxygen
from the air is needed to dispose of some of the car-
bon, and this office is accomplished by respiration.
Imbibition of water by the roots furnishes the
material for assimilation both constructive and
differentiating, while respiration in the leaves fur-
nishes the oxygen necessary for certain chemical
changes. We must now consider the substances
produced by assimilation.

The plant is a chemical laboratory of exceeding
complexity, where all of the operations are carried
on with marvelous deftness and delicacy, and with a
system of chemical paraphernalia adapted to the
operations of microscopic life. The entire plant is
engaged in these operations as long as life lasts,
sleeping in partial rest by night and hibernating in
semi-torpidity during the winter, but carrying on its
operations in full vigor when the sun is genial.
Assimilation deals with particles so minute that even
the eye of the microscope cannot see them, and they
can be known only when aggregated in masses as
material for use or as products, but the operations
are carried on particle by particle in such a manner
that what is and what becomes reveal the method
of becoming only to the eye of reason; thus ulti-
mately all chemical knowledge is the product of
inference. Nevertheless this inferred knowledge is
erected upon a foundation of consciousness as
revealed by the senses, and the ultimate proof of the
validity of the inferences is the multiplication of facts
as they are accumulated in vast numbers by history
and attested by the verification of prophecy ; finally,
as the facts are resolved into laws their congruity is

68 TRUTH AND ERROR

made evident. The love of truth born of the gene-
rations of thinking minds forever engaged with the
materials of consciousness in the process of inference,
ultimately establishes a habit and love of truth that
submits every judgment to the tribunal of congruity,
the court of equity which every man erects in his
own soul. This is the supreme court of judgment.

History may decide and prophecy may confirm,
but these decisions are annulled if the court of con-
gruity finds them contradictory. Experience in the
laboratory may pile up facts, prophecy in the
laboratory may be fulfilled in multitudinous cases;
biit under the decrees of the court of congruity if
any incongruity appears the chemist is turned again
to his experiments, resting assured that somewhere
his facts or theories are wrong, and he plunges into
his labors to reach peace only when congruity is
found. To a man who has not devoted his life to
chemical research and has familiarized himself only
to a limited extent with the history and theories of
chemistry, the vast body of experiments, the innu-
merable verifications of prophecies and the congeries
of congruities which have developed since Dalton
propounded the atomic theory are such a monument
of accomplishment by inference and verification
that they appear as a pyramid of truth.

The fact to which especial attention is called is
this : That the laboratory reveals in the substances
of plants innumerable new kinds and these new
kinds are found in series.

Ill

The plant is a laboratory for the evolution of many
substances ; but as the particles of which they are

GENERATIONS OR PROPERTIES OF PLANTS 69

composed have number and as they are arranged in
numerical, that is, molecular orders, they have at
the same time extension, and their arrangement
implies that they are placed in forms. Thus having
considered generations of kinds, we are led to the
consideration of generations of forms, and the forms
which we have to consider are forms of cells, forms
of tissues, forms of phytons and forms of plants.
Plants also exhibit forms of crystals ; the crystalliza-
tion is fundamentally a theme of geonomy, so on the
very start of this subject we are confronted with the
fact that the plant exhibits the concomitants of lower
relativity, but for present purposes we may neglect
them.

The normal and developed cell has three concen-
tric envelopes which may be called blasts, the whole
enclosing a nucleus, so that the structure which we
found in the earth as spheres is repeated here as
blasts. These are the exoblast, mesoblast, and
endoblast. Some plants are single cells, other
plants are aggregates of loosely attached cells joined
together as threads or as webs of threads as in the
slimes, but in plants of a little higher grade these
webs are consolidated by a woof of plant tissue as
in some of the lichens and seaweeds.

The tissues are consolidated and modified cells.
Then tissues are differentiated, exhibiting different
structures; different structural tissues are again
related and modified for the performance of func-
tions as phytons and the phytons are systematized
to constitute the plant, but the phytons are differen-
tiated for special functions and we have the roots for
imbibition, the leaves for respiration and tran-
spiration, the circulatory apparatus for transporta-

70 TRUTH AND ERROR

tion, the floral phytons for reproduction and the
protecting apparatus for the external covering of
plants.

A system of phytons constitutes the higher plants.
In the history of plant life the morphology of plant
phytons is an important part of the science of
botany, for the forms of phytons undergo a suc-
cession of changes, the investigation of which vies
in importance with that of the chemical development
of kinds to which we have heretofore alluded.
When the different classes of plants are examined
in this respect, the succession appears in the develop-
ment of classes, those plants of the lower classes
passing through morphologic stages which are
repeated in higher classes and continued to still
higher stages, so that the plants of the highest class
practically include all of the stages in succession as
exhibited in the order of the lower classes. While
some research has been devoted to this subject, much
more requires to be done.

IV

That which we call chemism is one of the con-
comitants of process and is here transmuted into
vitality. Vitality is chemism internally controlled
by the plant in obedience to the laws of heredity,
and externally controlled by heat, gravity, and strain
which produces stresses. Thus vitality is a new
mode of motion. We must here remember that
motion as speed is inherent and constant in the
particle and that motion as path is always determined
from without, but the particles within the body are
all external to one another, and therefore the direc-
tion of motion which is internal to the body is in

GENERATIONS OR PROPERTIES OF PLANTS 71

obedience to the laws of heredity, and the direction
of motion which comes from without the body is
heat, gravity and strain. Heat and its modification
as light and perhaps as electricity and magnetism
play an important role in vitality, which has been
subject to much investigation by the observation of
nature and artificial experimentation. The vitality
of the plant is accelerated by heat, and becomes
torpid when it is insufficient. Certain chemical proc-
esses, like that of the production of chlorophyll, are
dependent upon light. Doubtless gravity exerts a
direct influence upon the functions of the plant, but
this influence has had inadequate examination.
Stress and strain are exhibited as endosmosis and
exosmosis, exhibited to us in the circulation of fluids
through the membranes of the cells, and is an
important theme in the physiology of plants.

V

As the plant germinates the motions of its par-
ticles in change are directed by the preexisting con-
stitution of the germs ; assimilation, therefore, is a
directed motion, and as changes in assimilation and
growth proceed the continued motion of vitality is
controlled by antecedent conditions. In this manner
the plant must pass through the same phases of
assimilation and growth through which the parent
proceeded; thus conditions are imposed which con-
stitute causation; but there are other causes than
those inherited, for the germ may not grow at all ; it
may not get footing in the soil, it may not find
sufficient moisture, or the moisture may not contain
other necessary ingredients. When it starts the
frost may nip it, the sunlight may fail it because of

72 TRUTH AND ERROR

an overhanging shade, herbivorous animals may
devour it, man may dig it up. All of a multitude
of conditions are necessary that a plant may mature ;
and these causes may be traced to the ultimate sup-
ply of food, as effecting the assimilation, to external
forms which cast destructive shadows or protect
from destruction, or they may be traced to external
forces, so that there are heredity conditions and
environmental conditions.

The plant is thus subject to inexorable conditions
by its inheritance, and these conditions restrict its
growth to the course pursued by its ancestors ; but
heredity is not the only factor of causation involved ;
the environmental factors may succeed in prevent-
ing, arresting or modifying the development of the
plant. When the plant arrives at maturity and pro-
duces other germs, they also are subject to the laws
of heredity ; but the inheritance which they receive
has accumulated in the development of the parent.
Thus as generations pass there is secular develop-
ment.

VI

Metabolism implies affinity, and again we have the
problem of its nature in plants. It has often been
surmised, and sometimes taught, to be choice. It
seems to be the same thing in plant life, but there
are other phenomena which appear in plants which
suggest that the ultimate particles have not only the
power of choosing their atomic and molecular associ-
ates, but they also seem to have the power to a
limited degree to choose the attitude of their phytons
toward external objects in space. Thus certain
phytons seek the soil where they may perform the

GENERATIONS OR PROPERTIES OF PLANTS 73

function of roots, and others seek the air where they
may perform various functions in the plant life.
These subaerial phytons seem to be able to direct
their course toward different objects, when they
require support, as in the case of climbing plants,
and the leaves seem to be able to open or close in
order to adjust themselves to conditions of light and
darkness. The investigations into these functions
of the plant are numerous and interesting, but they
have been pursued mainly with the purpose to
account for them as of a mechanical nature. Yet
the problem remains : Have the plant elements the
property of choice? If they have such a property
they must also have consciousness.

We find in plants the same essentials: unity,
extension, speed, and persistence as they are com-
pounded into the properties of number, space,
motion, and time, and as they are further developed
as time, form, force, and causation ; we also find the
fifth property of affinity, which now seems to be
choice even more plainly than we have found it in
other bodies.

CHAPTER VII

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS

We are yet to consider a higher degree of rela-
tivity than that exhibited in the bodies which we
have heretofore examined. This higher degree is
the discrete degree observed in animals. Plants have
assimilation, which is both constructive and differ-
entiating. In animals this rises to a high degree
of relativity in that assimilation, both constructive
and differentiating, is coincidently accompanied
by destruction of the part that is reconstructed.
The plant assimilates until its growth is com-
plete, except in the higher plants in which the leaves
drop from time to time and are returned to the
inorganic world, and except in the same higher
plants germs are given off which may be returned
to the inorganic world, or continue as new plants
when new plants are developed, but the trunk of the
plant remains while it grows, and is returned to the
inorganic world only when it dies. The animal
assimilates and coincidently with this assimila-
tion gives up a part of its material to the inorganic
world. This is what I call metabolism, which is
both constructive and differentiating of the material
wrought into the structure of the body, while at the
same time a part of the material of this structure is
disintegrated and returned to the inorganic world.
Thus the animal dies in part that it may live as an
individual, and if it ceases to die in part it ceases to
live, and when it ceases to live through death, it dies

74

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 75

altogether and returns to the inorganic world. In
other words we may say that in the plant phytons
are dropped and renewed, but in the higher animals,
organs which are homologous to phytons are not
dropped and renewed, with minor exceptions,
although molecules of the organ are discarded and
coincidently new molecules take their place. By
metabolism, therefore, we mean something higher
than assimilation by a discrete degree of relativity.

So the animal grows not only by molecular
additions to its substance, through which its size is in-
creased, and whereby structural material is added,
but the structure of the animal itself is constantly
undergoing a change. Throughout the whole ani-
mal body a reconstruction is forever in progress;
and this continues even after growth ceases as long
as life lasts. This is the new principle of form, which
is reconstruction.

Every particle of matter has speed, which cannot
be increased or diminished, but the particles of
inanimate matter seem mutually to direct one
another's paths except in the case of incorporation,
when they seem to be directed by affinity, the nature
of which is not fully explained. The animal has a
new power by which it determines its own path as a
body ; thus it can direct its own course. The animal
is encompassed by an environment out of which it
cannot pass but within which it can move as it
chooses. With some animals this environment is the
atmosphere, with others it is the hydrosphere, while
other animals are fixed to the rocky sphere and have
their movements greatly restricted in the hydro-
sphere or the atmosphere. Of those animals that have
three degrees of freedom in the two outer spheres

76 TRUTH AND ERROR

many are restricted by climatic conditions. The
mode of motion by which animate bodies are capable
of this higher degree of motion I call motility,
which is self-directed molar motion or self-activity.

As this self-directed molar motion appears in the
animal it enlarges its theater of action, being able
to seek a new theater in which its self-activity may
be employed. Thus the animal, no longer confined
by a narrow environment, is able to invade a new
region and exercise itself there. The animal can go
from one environment to another in search of new
conditions, changing the environment by its activi-
ties and taking advantage of the new environment
by receiving the effect which the new environment
produces. It is necessary for the plant to remain in a
fixed environment and to act only when it is acted
upon, but the animal may seek an environment more
congenial and conducive to its wants, or ideals of
good ; thus it may escape evil on the one hand or
acquire good on the other. It may choose its activi-
ties. This I call self -activity, which is force of a
higher degree of relativity than that observed in
plants by a discrete degree.

The animal, like the plant, has heredity, and its
ancestors are the causes of its activity from which it
cannot wholly escape. Its self-activity is therefore
only within the compass of its hereditary activity;
but while it has hereditary activity it is also subject
to environmental actions, which are also causes from
which it cannot escape. But as it chooses its environ-
ment within degrees of freedom, the environment
is not wholly inexorable. Thus if food does not
come to the animal the animal may go to the
food. When the storm comes it may escape its

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 77

action "by seeking shelter, and in multitudinous ways
it may choose the activities in which it was engaged,
and choose the actions of others to which it will sub-
mit.

The lower forms of plants multiply by subdivision,
but in the higher plants they multiply by sexual con-
jugation, the different sex organs being produced in
the same plant or in different plants. In these
higher plants the conjugation is adventitious in that
the pollen must be carried by the wind or by insects
or other agencies from the male to the female plant.
But the higher animals have the power of choosing
their mates, so that the continuance in generations
is controlled by volition.

In plants, male and female germs, as particles,
conjugate or choose one another. In the higher
animals male and female bodies conjugate as bodies.
This conjugation is accomplished by the mutual
choice of the individuals as bodies, and the mutual
choice of the individuals as bodies involves the con-
sciousness of both, and this consciousness must have
expression, and this expression is language. Hence
reproduction in animals is dependent upon the
mutual choice of animals, which choice is expressed
in language in some form or other. Here we have
a discrete advance in degree of relativity in repro-
duction which we call expression.

In animals we clearly find a fifth property which
we cannot ignore, and which ultimately we shall find
to be strangely like affinity. This property of the
animate body permits it to form judgments about the
nature of environments, and then it may form judg-
ments about the good and evil of these environments
in relation to itself. Judgments grow into concepts

78 TRUTH AND ERROR

as judgment is added to judgment by experience.
Thus a body of judgments is formed concerning
every object in the environment which grows by
increments of judgments. These concepts, which
are the creation of the animal, constitute the fifth
principle which we have to consider. We have there-
fore metabolism, reconstruction, motility, expression
and conception with which to deal in the considera-
tion of animal bodies.

These five principles exist in the lowest protozoa
or unicellular animals. The evolution of animal life
is the development of organs of metabolism, recon-
struction, motility, reproduction and conception.

The five systems of organs are concomitant in the
same animal body. They are also concomitant in
every organ of the body, so that when we describe
organs it becomes necessary to consider their con-
comitants. An organ may have the function of one
concomitant, but it has the essentials of all the con-
comitants, for they cannot be dissociated, as we have
many times seen. A certain part of the matter of
the body is set apart to perform a specialized office
for the other parts ; and this specialization is accom-
plished by assigning a function to the essentials or
concomitants severally. It is thus that there are five
systems of organs; the first for metabolism, the
second for reconstruction, the third for motility,
the fourth for reproduction, and the fifth for con-
ception. Thus we have the digestive apparatus, the
circulatory apparatus, the motor apparatus, the gen-
erative apparatus and the conceiving or thinking
apparatus. These apparatuses are completely con-
comitant with one another; so that every organ of
the body, whatever function it may peform, must

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 79

also perform the other four functions in an ancillary
manner. When we are considering an organ we
are compelled to consider a dominant function with
four ancillary functions; or it may be stated in
another way: an organ cannot act but in a coopera-
tive way with other organs. Thus while the essen-
tials are concomitant in every particle of matter they
are also concomitant in every cell, in every organ,
and in every body. If the expression may be per-
mitted, nature reasons as men reason, abstractly,
but is always cognizant that abstractions can be real-
ized only in the concrete. Thus the mouth is one of
the organs of the digestive system ; but it also has
ancillary organs of circulation, motility, reproduction
and conception. The eye is an organ of the con-
ceiving apparatus, but it has ancillary organs of
digestion, circulation, motility, and probably of
reproduction. The animal itself is an organ in a
society of animals. Society is the culmination of a
hierarchy of organs of lower grade, and every organ
in every grade of the hierarchy has ancillary organs.
Without entering into these subjects at length, we
must give a description of these organs and func-
tions of the animal with such elaboration only as our
present purpose demands.

II

Again in this higher realm of relativity we are
forced to consider the numerical relations of ultimate
particles in a hierarchy of molecules which appear in
kinds of substances. For present purposes we may
not delay the argument for the purpose of setting
forth the metabolic processes of digestion and excre-
tion by which vegetal food is wrought into animal

80 TRUTH AND ERROR

bodies in all the kinds of animate things ; we may
simply illustrate the facts necessary for this argument
as they are derived from the higher animals. Diges-
tion begins with mastication and a special substance
is developed in the salivary glands to elaborate the
food. Then the food is carried to the stomach, where
another special substance is furnished by the liver.
Finally the materials of the food are digested, exclud-
ing such indigestible substances as are taken into the
stomach, and the selected and prepared food is the
blood, which bears a relation to the animal analogous
to that which protoplasm does to the plant. Out of
the blood all of the tissues are wrought, each in its
kind, and every tissue is a kind of its own, and there
are kinds of kinds, so that the animal organism is a
chemical laboratory engaged during the existence of
the animal in building up more complex substances
and tearing them down into more specialized sub-
stances, and this is metabolism, or zoochemistry.
When the animal dies decay supervenes as a chemi-
cal process. The metabolic organs, therefore, are
the organs of digestion which prepare the food for
the blood, the organs of secretion which furnish
material to aid digestion, and the organs of excre-
tion. The science of the chemistry of animate sub-
stances is yet in its infancy and the kinds appearing
in the animate realm are at the present stage of
research vicariously represented by forms. We
must therefore consider them as factors of morphol-
ogy. The blood is composed of serum, which is the
vehicle of transportation. In this serum there float
erythrocytes or red corpuscles, which are unicellular
organisms into which much of the food has been
converted and which is the material for reconstruc-

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 8l

tion. Thus the tissues of the animal are reconstructed
out of unicellular organisms. In the blood there
are also leucocytes and other unicellular organisms.
We cannot enter into a discussion of the functions
which these additional organisms perform, but go on
to remark that the red corpuscles are built into the
tissues of the animal or stored temporarily in fatty
structures which are subsequently used in the tissues.
In so far as these red corpuscles are incorporated into
the tissues by molecular rearrangement, and in so far
as they are decorporated by molecular arrangement,
we have metabolism ; while in so far as this produces
a change of form, reconstruction is involved. Here
the rearrangement of molecules by number becomes
structural arrangement in form, for in a body kinds
and forms are concomitant.

Ill

The blood prepared by the organs of metabolism
is delivered to the organs of reconstruction. These
are the blood-vessels, consisting of the heart, veins,
arteries, and capillaries, by which the material is
transported and distributed to the parts where recon-
struction is carried on. Thus there is a system of
organs for reconstruction.

That which we found in the geonomic realm as
spheres and in the phytomic realm as blasts, we here
find in the zoonomic realm as derms, and we have the
ectoderm, esoderm, and endoderm as encapsulating
bodies, with a concentric nucleus. These cells
are modified as they are combined into larger cells,
but the cellular structure is still preserved in organ
and individual. The metabolic organs or those of
digestion, secretion and excretion are compound

82 TRUTH AND ERROR

nuclei inclosed in cellular sacs ; sometimes these sacs
are greatly elongated so as to be tubular, but in
general the organs of digestion and excretion have
a cellular form with permanent compound nuclei or
with passing nuclei when they are conduits to con-
tents.

In the circulatory system of organs the same der-
mal structure is observed with its triune elements.
In the heart there is a compound nucleus, but in the
artery or vein the nucleus is passing content, and in
the higher animals there is a vast system of ramify-
ing tubes, which are duplicated as arteries and veins
directly connected in the heart, and functionally
connected with the capillaries.

In the activital or muscular system every organ is
a fascicle of muscles, and each member of the fasci-
cle has a dermal structure. The nucleus of the
heart is a compound muscular organ of this charac-
ter, whose function is to impel the blood; muscular
tissue undergoes important metamorphoses, becom-
ing tendonous and osseous for a variety of mechani-
cal purposes. Tendons are dermal in structure,
and bones are sacs enclosing nuclei of osseous
tissue.

It was in the bony structure that homologies of
form were first discovered, and the homologies of
the vertebrate skeleton was at one time the sole theme
of morphology. Of especial interest were the trans-
formations that were discovered in the vertebrae in
the development of limbs and cranium ; but the sub-
ject of morphology has passed out of this stage into
a wider field embracing all realms of nature. Only
of late has it appeared in the morphology of forma-
tions and land features.

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 83

The reproductive cells are compounded into organs
still preserving the typical structure.

It is in the organs of sense that the most mar-
velous changes of form are discovered. The metabolic
sense organs are thrown into two not thoroughly
differentiated groups known as the sense of taste and
smell ; but these groups seem to be continuous, that
is, without a well-marked plane of separation; the
one group, that of taste, taking cognizance of liquids,
the other, that of smell, taking cognizance of vapors.
The organs of touch are distributed throughout the
skin; these are primarily the sense organs of form.
The sense of stress or pressure seems to be in or
immediately under the skin ; the sense of duration
or time is the sense of hearing, and the sense of
ideation is the sense of seeing. The homologies of
mouth and nose, skin, muscle, ear and eye, are yet
imperfectly known ; though much research has been
bestowed upon them they are difficult to under-
stand. Thus there are homologies of form in all the
hierarchy of organs, for they all have the dermal
structure.

IV

There are five modes of motility called functions ;
these are the functions of the metabolic, circulatory,
muscular, reproductive and reasoning organs, as
heretofore set forth. Metabolism continues as long
as animate life continues, but is increased when the
special function of the organ is stimulated ; that is,
both anabolism and catabolism increase in the organ
by increase of its special function, but metabolism
wanes as special function wanes.

The reasoning function may increase or retard the

84 TRUTH AND ERROR

other functions, though it cannot wholly inhibit their
action nor can it increase their action beyond certain
limits. This fact is well known to psychologists and
physiologists. It seems to be accomplished by the
promotion of metabolism.

Here we are confronted with a problem met before
concerning the nature of affinity which we have not
been able to solve. If it were permitted to hold the
doctrine which has been entertained by some great
minds that every particle of matter has judgment,
the question would be solved and affinity would be
conscious choice. Affinity is often expressed as
choice and many chemists have held this doctrine.

Next we have to consider how molar motion in
the individual is self -directed. We have seen that
molar motion is accomplished by compound organs.
These organs are found in pairs, so that one acts
against the other. We have seen, too, that the
mind can accelerate metabolism and the mind can
direct the motion of the animal. Now let us sup-
pose that the mind can accelerate anabolism in one
muscle and catabolism in its opposing muscle, and
we have a very simple explanation of the nature of
the self -direction of muscular energy — the nature of
the mechanism by which the animal may walk to
the east or west at will. That muscles are in pairs
is an anatomical fact, and that the one contracts while
the other relaxes is a physiological fact, and that
the mind somehow controls this muscular activity at
will is a psychologic fact, and the whole thing is
rendered simple and clear by the doctrine that
anabolism in one muscle and catabolism in its
opponent are each under the control of mind. But
the mind of the cortex does not consciously choose

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 85

the association of the several particles involved in
metabolism. The affinity which is involved in
metabolism must be the choice of the particles
themselves, in obedience to commands issued by the
organism of unicellular particles of which the body
is composed, these ultimately acting in obedience to
the command of the cortical consciousness. Metab-
olism is controlled by the central mind in some
manner or other. Believing this we must infer that
the particles of the muscles are conscious as units in
a hierarchy of organs which at the other pole is the
cortical consciousness. Here we first reach the
facts the explanation of which seems to require
the hypothesis that consciousness primarily inheres
in the ultimate particle. If this hypothesis is
accepted, we have the fundamental doctrine of
psychology.

Science has demonstrated that motion cannot be
created or destroyed. Mind, therefore, cannot
create motion but only direct it. Mind directs the
motion of the body by directing the motion of the
organs of locomotion, and these are directed by the
device of opposing muscles — the one being contracted
and the other relaxed. So the choice of the animal
is delegated to the choice of the organ, and the choice
of the organ is delegated to the choice of the mus-
cles. The muscles, therefore, must have the power
of choice, which it also delegates to molecules.
Therefore the molecules must have choice. We
know that every unicellular organism of the blood is
an independent animate being, with consciousness
and choice. These independent animate beings are
incorporated in the tissues of the animal having
self-activity. We must therefore suppose that they

86 TRUTH AND ERROR

retain their choice and consciousness, and the same
choice seems to be exercised by every particle of
the molecule ; if so, animate existence as conscious-
ness and choice is universal in every particle of
matter.

The human body is a hierarchy of conscious bodies.
In this hierarchy the lower members are controlled
by the higher members. The lowest members are
ultimate particles and the highest member is the
cortical body. Now the cortical body controls all
the others in the hierarchy and it ought to receive
intelligence from all the others, for the conscious-
ness of the particle is transmitted to the cortex, and
the will of the cortex is transmitted to the cortical
body, but only those which require regulation by it.
Not all of the judgments of the cortical body, but only
those of the particles which need regulation in a
particular part, are transmitted to special particles.
The government of the human body in all its
hierarchy of bodies is strictly analogous to the gov-
ernment of a nation where the governing body of
the nation is not cognizant of all which the individ-
uals do, but it receives intelligence about the way
they do in respect to those things which it attempts
to control and it controls the individual only in those
actions which are necessary to the welfare of the
body politic. Thus the cognition and volition of the
controlling body is but partial. There is local con-
sciousness and local self-government. We will find
some confirmation of this doctrine as we proceed,
but its final elaboration will be more fully made in a
subsequent work. Stated in our own terms, this
is the doctrine of modern scientific physiology and
psychology.

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 87

V

As in the geonomic realm so here in the animate
realm there are processes. As in the phytonic realm
so in this there are generations; now causation
appears under a new aspect as development. The
animal is composed of organs and these organs
develop as they are exercised under the stimulus of
mind, for while they are cooperative one part of a
system may be developed at the expense of another,
so that one organ in a congeries of organs may have
great development while another organ in the same
congeries may be neglected and ultimately in a series
of generations may become atrophied. There is a
law which finds its chief expression in this realm
where one organ of the same system may be
developed, while another may be atrophied. This
may be stated as follows : progress in unification in
organs of the same function is progress in rank.
There is another law, the correlative of this ; it is that
the differentiation of functions with distinct organs
is progress in rank.

The mechanical causes of force, form, and kind
are conditions that are genetic, while the conditions
of conception are teleologic. The teleologic condi-
tions are concomitant with the genetic conditions.

VI

It seems probable that every particle of matter has
consciousness and choice; certain it is that every
particle of animate matter has these properties. In
the animal body all of the particles cooperate and
for this purpose a special nervous system is provided.
In this system there is a congeries of cells, whose

88 TRUTH AND ERROR

function is conception, connected by another con-
geries whose function is association. The conceiv-
ing cells are ganglia, the associating cells are
medullary or fibrous. A group of such gray cells is
connected with other groups by white fibers, and
finally all of the ganglia are connected with all other
animate cells of the individual by fibers. Thus the
nervous system is a congeries of ganglionic organs,
connected with and presiding over the other systems
of organs. The fibers are connecting lines between
the outer systems of organs and the special ganglia
of the organs. These ganglia are grouped in the
hierarchy of nervous organs by intervening fibrous
nerves until they reach the master ganglion of the
brain, which is the cortex. There is a peculiarity
of the nervous system in the relation between the
cells of the ganglia and the fibers of the connecting
nerves, in that the fascicles of fibers are not struc-
turally continuous with the ganglionic cells. Thus
when a feeling starts in the end organ and is pro-
duced by its activity, it is carried along the fibers
through the hierarchy of ganglia to the central
cortex; the intervening ganglia may continue its
transmission to the cortex or, as it seems, may inhibit
it; or when, as in a dream, the system is relaxed, the
impulse may go astray among the cells of a ganglion,
and may be transmitted by unwonted fibers to the
cortex at some incongruous point, for the cells of the
ganglion constitute a shunting or directive apparatus
by which impulses from one region are directed to
others throughout the system. Now all of the met-
abolic, circulatory, motor, and reproductive organs
are themselves organs for the initiation of impulses
to the nervous system, and the ganglia of this nervous

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 89

system, especially the cortex, are organs for the
initiation of impulses that are conducted by the
fibrous nerves to the metabolic, circulatory, motor,
and reproductive organs. A ganglion seems to have
the power to distribute these impulses to such point
in the peripheral organs as they may select, but the
central ganglion or cortex cannot directly reach the
peripheral organ, but only through the intermediate
ganglia in the hierarchy. An impulse emanating in
the cortex is delivered to its nearest ganglion in the
line in which it should go; this ganglion in turn
directs it to another or to any group of end organs.
Thus all of the systems of congeries of organs of
which the body is composed are' put in relation to
the cortex. An impulse which originates in any
organ of the complex system when transmitted to a
ganglion I call a feeling impression.

Having seen the nature of the apparatus by which
the other organs are put into communication with
the ganglionic organs, and finally with the cortex
through feeling impressions, it becomes necessary to
exhibit the apparatus of the nervous organism which
exists to connect the cortex and subordinate gan-
glia with the world external to the periphery of
the body.

This apparatus consists in the sense organs and
the fibrous nerves by which they are connected with
the cortex. For the sense of taste and smell, which
are metabolic, we have two organs that are not very
well differentiated in structure, nor are they well
differentiated in function, although they seem to be
more thoroughly differentiated by the nature of the
stimuli; for taste the object must be reduced to the
fluid state, and for smell it must be reduced to the

90 TRUTH AND ERROR

vapor state. Both of these organs have their nervous
bodies connected by fibers with the central ganglia.
The mouth and the nose are simple organs for the ac-
cumulation of sense stimuli, single in the one case and
partially double in the other, but the nervous
organs to which they lead and which they unify are
many.

In the skin-covering of the body there are many
tactual organs, which are unified through the con-
tinuity of the skin itself, yet they seem to be dispa-
rate not only in organ but in function. They are
also connected with the cortex, but through ancil-
lary ganglia, which are themselves ancillary brains.
Touch is the primary organ of form.

There also seem to be organs of pressure either
in the skin or immediately beneath it, though they
have not been clearly made out. The fibers of the
muscles themselves may be the end organs of
the motor system, and it may be that nerve fibers
everywhere accompany muscular fibers. Thus we
know that the motor system is connected usually
through ancillary ganglia with the cortex. The end
organs of this system, be they the muscles themselves
or specialized parts of them, are the organs for con-
veying to the cortex impressions of muscular force.

For the sense of hearing there are two organs for
gathering the impulses which are propagated through
the atmosphere, but in each there are many nerve
organs. They are also connected with the cortex by
their fibers. The semicircular canals seem in man
to convey only feelings, but in aquatic animals it is
probable that they are true sense organs, and convey
sense impressions brought to them through the
medium of the water. The ear is the primordial or

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS QI

fundamental sense by which time is conveyed to
the cortex.

The eye is the organ for conveying sense impres-
sions that are received from objects at a distance
through the medium of the ether. Primarily or
fundamentally it is the organ by which the conscious
movements of other bodies are conveyed to the cor-
tex.

In man and probably in many of the lower animals
all of these senses are highly vicarious. This is pre-
eminently the case with the eye. This organ, by
reason of its self-activity, is peculiarly adapted to a
great variety of vicarious functions, for it can adjust
itself to direction through its muscles or by accommo-
dation to distances and degrees of light. The faculty
by which the eye moves and accommodates itself,
together with the rapid vibration of ether particles,
renders it possible to receive many sense impressions
which come to it with a speed which is for all prac-
tical purposes instantaneous. For these reasons and
for others that hereafter will be set forth, the eye is
a universal organ of sense impression.

The ear also is highly adapted to vicarious func-
tions, the air being the medium whose vibrations are
rapid, though to a less degree than those of the ether.
In the early history of mankind, when language was
chiefly oral speech, the ear was rapidly developed in
vicarious functions, especially in the function of con-
veying the properties of mind observed in other
human beings, for by this organ men learn that other
human beings have ideas and emotions like their own.

The motor sense also seems capable of becoming
highly vicarious, for those persons who are deprived
of sight and hearing can yet through the aid of this

92 TRUTH AND ERROR

sense obtain a knowledge of the world which they
can neither see nor hear; and what is more wonder-
ful still, they can yet gain a knowledge of the ideas
and emotions of their fellow men. The other senses
in a still lower degree are vicarious.

It will be seen that I do not consider the tempera-
ture feeling to be a sense or to have sense organs.
The temperature feeling seems to be the feeling of
the functions of the circulatory system in degrees
when it partially congeals the blood, or increases its
fluidity, and is a feeling like that of a burn when it
injures the skin. The distinction which is made
between a feeling impression and sense impression
is fundamental, and must be considered when here-
after the nature of cognition is discussed.

VII

Essentials are comprehended in the same particle,
and are thus concomitant, and related in different
particles, and are thus correlative. As particle is
related to particle, so unit is related to unit, extension
to extension, speed to speed, and persistence to per-
sistence. Now we have discovered another property
in bodies, which we have found in inanimate bodies
as affinity or choice, and in animate bodies as con-
sciousness and choice. There can be no choice with-
out consciousness. Consciousness is to choice what
unity is to plurality, what extension is to position,
what speed is to path, and what persistence is to
change ; that is, consciousness is the absolute, choice
is the relative.

Thus for every absolute we find a relative; for
every constant a variable. Unity as an absolute has
plurality for its relative; extension as an absolute

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 93

has position for its relative ; speed as an absolute has
path as its relative ; persistence as an absolute has
change for its relative, and consciousness as an abso-
lute has choice for its relative.

Unity and plurality constitute number, the unity
being absolute and constant, while plurality is
related and variable; this is the fundamental defi-
nition of number.

Space is composed of extension and position, the
extension being absolute and constant, the position
relative and variable. This is the fundamental
definition of space.

Motion is speed and path, the speed being absolute
and constant, the change relative and variable ; this
is the fundamental definition of motion.

Time is persistence and change, the persistence
being absolute and constant, the change relative and
variable ; this is the fundamental definition of time.

Judgment is consciousness and choice, the con-
sciousness being absolute and the choice relative;
this is the fundamental definition of judgment.

Let us further consider these properties to bring
out another phase of the subject. Unity is the sub-
strate, foundation, ground or condition of plurality,
for without units there can be no pluralities. Unity,
therefore, is independent of plurality, but plurality
is dependent on unity. There are many particles
that have extension or space occupancy ; thus there
are many positions. Extension is the substrate,
foundation or ground of position, for the several
positions depend on the several units having exten-
sions that exclude one another in the occupancy of
space. Speed is the substrate, foundation, or ground
of path, for every speed produces a path, or in other

94 TRUTH AND ERROR

terms, every path is dependent on a speed. Every
unit having extension and speed has persistent
duration ; but as these units change in position and
also change in trajectory, they could not change if
there were not something that persisted through
change. Persistence, therefore, is the substrate,
foundation or ground of change. Consciousness is
the substrate or ground of choice, for if there is
no consciousness there can be no choice. Thus
it is that in every one of the properties there is a
substrate or a support and that which is supported,
or, in other terms, a ground and that which is
grounded, or in still other terms, a foundation and
that which is founded, and finally an independent
and a dependent. This is but another way of say-
ing that in every one of the properties there is a sub-
strate and a dependent. The substrates are unity,
dimension, speed, persistence and consciousness ; the
dependents are plurality, position, path, change, and
choice.

It will be seen that we can call a particle a unit or
we may call it an extension, or a speed, or a persist-
ence, or a consciousness, and these several names
refer to the same particle because it has the five con-
comitant essentials.

In the foregoing presentation the nature of the
properties has been deduced from knowledge, with
which every intelligent person is possessed, and
which rests upon the experience of the race. No
recondite induction or deduction has been necessary,
but only the statement of known facts in proper
sequence has been required to understand the nature
of the five properties, except in the case of judgment,
which is made analogous by hypothesis.

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 95

This is the result at which we have arrived in the
foregoing discussion.

One particle by itself has unity, extension, motion,
persistence, and if animate, judgment; but by reason
of others it has plurality, position, path, change and
choice. What it has by itself we call its essential
concomitants; what it has by reason of others we call
its relations. Concomitants with relations we call
properties, and as the essentials are concomitant the
properties are concomitant; hence the number can-
not be absorbed by one, the space by a second, the
motion by a third, the time by a fourth, and the
judgment by a fifth. Properties, then, are concom-
itant and relational.

The theory of hylozoism, which I have presented
in this chapter, is very old, and has had many illus-
trious champions. When alchemy was developed
into chemistry a great impetus was given to it. The
discovery by Darwin and the masterly advocacy of
evolution by Spencer, through which the doctrine of
the survival of the fittest was established, for a time
gave a decided check to the theory. The blow
struck by Spencer was especially efficient, for Spencer
resolved all of the properties into force with a clear-
ness which left no room to doubt his meaning.

A host of scientific men following Darwin and
accepting the doctrine of the survival of the fittest
have found it to be inadequate as a single theory of
evolution. There are other laws, especially one
expounded by Lamarck. I myself have set forth a
new doctrine of evolution as that of culture, and in a
subsequent chapter of this work I shall set forth the
doctrine of evolution in which I shall attempt to
prove that the fundamental law of evolution is the

96 TRUTH AND ERROR

law of affinity by which bodies are incorporated,
and hence that evolution is primarily telic.

In the five fundamental realms of nature, ethereal
particles are numerically related and numbers are
organized. Stellar particles are related in numbers
and forms, and forms are organized. In geonomic
bodies forces as well as forms and kinds are organ-
ized. In plants causations are organized as genera-
tions as well as forces and forms and kinds. In
animals concepts are organized as well as causations,
forces, forms and kinds. In every one of these sys-
tems there is a special differentiation and integration
of organs ; so the entire body is organized in a hier-
archy of organs. This may be stated in another way.
In ethereal bodies, which are probably ultimate par-
ticles themselves, numbers are organized. In the
stars numbers and spaces are organized. In the
geonomic bodies numbers, spaces, and motions are
organized. In plants numbers, spaces, motions and
times are organized. In animals numbers, spaces,
motions, times, and judgments are organized. Or
again, it may be stated in another way. In ethereal
bodies units are organized. In stellar bodies units
and extensions are organized. In geonomic bodies
units, extensions and speeds are organized. In
plants units, extensions, speeds and persistences are
organized. In animals units, extensions, speeds,
persistences and the consciousness of many particles
are organized. While every particle in the universe
has consciousness and choice and hence judgment,
it is only in animals that we find judgments
organized as concepts. Only animals have reason.

The various doctrines of hylozoism heretofore
presented in the history of philosophy, conscious-

PRINCIPLES OR PROPERTIES OF ANIMALS 97

ness and reason have been confounded. The terms
mind and reason are nearly synonymous. Reason-
ing is a process, as we shall hereafter show, and mind
is that which reasons. Thus these two terms refer
to the same thing, the one when it is considered as
a process of an organism, the other considering it
as an organism. Reason is a function of animal
organism. Every particle has consciousness, only
animals have reason.

CHAPTER VIII

QUALITIES

There is another class of relations which here
require careful consideration. They will be called
qualities. Sometimes the words property and quality
have been considered synonymous, while the words
quality and class or category are often used as syn-
onyms. Perhaps the distinction now made between
properties and qualities has never been set forth.
I think that the foregoing chapters will have made
clear to the reader the sense in which the* term prop-
erty has been used. These properties in the five
realms of nature, namely, the ether, the stars, the
rocks, the plants, and the animals, all subserve
human ends or purposes, which may be considered
as good or evil. In this manner qualities arise, while
terms denoting these qualities are found in all
languages. These quality terms have the charac-
teristic of being more or less vague, in that they may
instantly change with the point of view. Some
illustrations will be given to make this distinction
plain. Number is a property. Here are five apples
and the number cannot be changed without adding
or substracting therefrom, but the five apples may
be few or many by a change in the point of view.
Five apples in a tray at a dinner board where twelve
persons are sitting are few, but upon the plate of one
of the guests are many. Thus it is that a number
may become few or many by some circumstance or

purpose in view. Few are thus qualities, while five

98

QUALITIES 99

is a property. A barrel of apples on a table would
be many or very many ; in the cellar plenty ; in the
warehouse when the steamer is seeking a cargo it
would be few, and the merchant would not be con-
sidered untruthful if by a figure of speech he affirmed
that he had none.

Again, extension and form are properties, but they
may easily become qualities where there is some
purpose in view. A pin may be large or small in
relation to the hole which it is to fill in the timbers
of a house ; the same pin may be too large for one
purpose and too small for another. The watchmaker
uses a pin so small that it can be seen only with
care, and yet it may be large or too large for the
purpose intended. A hill in the Park Mountains
would be called a mountain in the Catskills, and
a mountain in the Park would be called a hill in the
Himalayas. Thus properties are transformed into
qualities by ideal circumstances.

The railway train is fast to the man who is driving
an ox-team, but the train is slow to the mother who
is on her way to the death-bed of her child. An old
man may say at one moment that the day is long,
and in the next that life is short. To the laborer
who is bent on his task the hum of the machinery is
scarcely heard, but on his couch at night the tick of
his clock is loud. The razor is beautiful and good
in the hand of the skilful barber, but it is ugly and
dangerous in the hands of an assassin ; thus proper-
ties are transmuted into qualities by human ideas.
Red is beautiful in the rose, ugly in the spot of
blood on the floor. The sheen of sable in the ousel
is beautiful, but the sheen of sable on the carrion-
loving buzzard is ugly. If all serpents were harm-

IOO TRUTH AND ERROR

less, gentle and intelligent, their lithe forms and
gliding motions would be beautiful. If robins were
poisonous their red breasts would be symbols of
horror. If the red lightning and the crimson cloud
could change relations to men's ideas of good and
evil, the one as the harbinger of summer rain and
the other as a visit of death, the lightning would be
a thing of beauty and the cloud a terror.

The coming of the rain may be welcomed by the
husbandman who has planted his field of corn; it
may be unwelcome to the belated traveler. Time is
long and weary to the invalid on the couch of pain ;
time is short and joyous to the child in the park.

It is thus that properties become qualities through
our ideals, through the purposes which we have in
view. There is no difficulty in distinguishing
between qualities and properties as they have here
been defined. Properties are not qualities and quali-
ties are not properties, but qualities are founded
upon properties. Properties are qualities when they
are considered teleologically. It is right, therefore,
to say that properties are real in the sense that they
are grounded on matter and that qualities are ideal
in the sense that they are dependent for their exist-
ence upon the mind. When we reflect upon these
facts nothing can be more simple. The distinction
can be discovered without difficulty and it would
seem that there need be no confusion between prop-
erties and qualities as here defined. To affirm prop-
erties is to affirm inseparable concomitants of matter,
but to affirm qualities is to affirm things that change
with the point of view. I see a man suddenly push
another upon the street, and think it rude, and am
indignant. The next moment I see that he saved

QUALITIES 101

him from falling into a pit, and in an instant the
quality of the act is changed, and I call it wise and
kind, while the activity as property remains the
same.

From the days of Aristotle to the last book of
philosophy, substance and the properties of which
it is composed, bodies as compounded substance and
hence compounded properties, relations and com-
pounded relations, qualities, and compounded quali-
ties all have been under discussion, and attempts
have been made to define them.

; These distinctions, which seem simple and are
simple when understood, and may be understood by
every intelligent man, have led to tomes and libraries
of discussion and disputation not always friendly
and charitable. There are those who affirm that
qualities and properties are all one as ideal ; there
are those who affirm that qualities and properties
are all one as real or material. And thus we have an
idealistic philosophy and a materialistic philosophy.
A few idealists have gone so far as to affirm that not
only qualities but properties, bodies and relations
are ideal ; that there is no material or real world
which exists except as it is created by the mind and
that all these things exist only in mind.

The difference between qualities and properties
was vaguely seen by Aristotle, but seems to have
been unrecognized by Plato. In modern times we
find Locke, with a clearness never before exhibited,
giving the distinction between properties and quali- /
ties, though he called them all qualities, but the \
names used are of little moment. He divided quali-
ties into primary and secondary; what are here
called properties he called secondary qualities. But

102 TRUTH AND ERROR

at his time the nature of force was unknown and the
laws of evolution or time were undiscovered and
many of the properties of force and change were
relegated to his second class and confounded with
what are here called qualities. Then he added a
third class which he called powers ; so the properties
of force were divided between secondary qualities
and powers. Dropping his term as primary and
secondary qualities, and using the terms properties
and qualities in their stead, it is proposed briefly to
explain the errors into which Locke fell. In his
time his errors were excusable ; at the present time
they are inexcusable. All of this can now be set
forth and the truth demonstrated as simply and
clearly as a proposition in Euclid, and it must be
understood if modern science is to be understood,
for upon these simple, self-evident propositions all
modern science is founded. Since Locke all later
writers, so far as my reading extends, instead of clear-
ing away Locke's errors have piled up a mountain of
new fallacies. To reduce these questions to their
simple elements it becomes necessary to go back to
Locke.

The correlation of forces which has its ground in
the persistence of motion was unknown in Locke's
time, though Locke himself affirmed it. In his dis-
cussion he clearly set forth that numbers are primary
qualities — i.e., properties; but he does not see that
kinds are derived from number and also are prop-
erties. He clearly explains that extension and all
the properties of form derived therefrom are prop-
erties. He clearly sees that motions are properties,
but he does not see the relation between motions
and forces, so he places some of the forces in the

QUALITIES 103

second class of qualities and thus includes them in
what we call qualities, while others he includes
among powers. Thus classes, forces and durations
were practically left in the second class and among
powers. The nature of the first class he clearly
understood and explained, and finally he refers the
second class of qualities and powers also to a founda-
tion or substrate in qualities of the first class, or prop-
erties. His second class of qualities he included
with pains and pleasures, which are true qualities.
He clearly saw that good and evil, however expressed
as pleasures, satisfactions, joys and delights, or as
pains, discomforts, dangers and horrors, formed
another class of attributes. But with them he
grouped classes, though he does not make this plain;
but he does make it plain that he grouped many forces
and many changes in his second class of qualities.

Since Locke's time this classification has been
modified mainly in the direction of his errors. More
and more have properties been considered as quali-
ties, and a school of idealists has sprung up who hold
that all properties are qualities in the sense in which
these terms are here used. At the same time a
school of realists has sprung up who hold that there
are no qualities, but only properties, as these terms
are here used. By what course of reasoning did
Locke lapse into error? On carefully examining
this matter it will be seen that while he did not dis-
cuss the whole question fully and left much unsaid
that should have been said, he clearly understood his
position ; yet it will be seen that he stumbles over
those properties of force that are revealed to us
through the senses of seeing, hearing, and smelling.
He clearly saw that the bodies revealed to us

104 TRUTH AND ERROR

through these senses do not act directly as bodies
upon the self, but in the case of seeing and
hearing through media and in the case of smelling
through the action of minute particles dissevered
from the bodies. At least all this may be justly
gathered from his statement, though he is not always
clear upon these points. It is fair to Locke to credit
him with this degree of insight into the truth. He
believed that in seeing there must be a medium
between the body perceived and the perceiving mind,
but he did not clearly understand it as the universal
ether. In his time the existence of the universal
ether was a doubtful doctrine in the history of
science. Locke denied the validity of the actio in dis-
tans in his first publications, and he never retracted,
but under the influence of the supposed opinions
of Newton in regard to the attraction of gravity,
Locke affirmed that he was not prepared to assert
that God could not do things in any way he pleased.
Had he known what we now know, that Newton used
the term attraction in a metaphoric sense, and no
more believed in actio in distans than did Locke
himself, he would not have made this apparent con-
cession to the opinions of Newton.

It still remains, however, that Locke believed
and taught that certain properties of force (espe-
cially those manifesting themselves to the senses
above mentioned) and many properties of change
are qualities and do not exist as properties or
primary qualities. Fallacies of force and change
were still current in his time, for the correla-
tion of forces through the persistence of motion
was unknown and untaught, and the fallacies of
evolution were yet to be dispelled. This state of

QUALITIES 105

things has passed away, and no man who now under-
stands light or heat will call it a quality in the sense
in which the term is here used, but a property
inherent in matter itself. At first view it seems
strange that Locke fell into this error in the case of
sound, but it must be remembered that in his time
the kinetics of gas was unknown, and although Locke
and his predecessors for two thousand years had
understood that sound was a mode of motion, yet it
was very vaguely or inadequately explained.

Locke's contemporaries and successors have but
added to the confusion in which the subject was left
by himself. Spencer takes up this subject for discus-
sion in three chapters of his Psychology under the sub-
ject of static, dynamic, and statico-dynamic attributes.
We first note that he replaced Locke's term of quali-
ties by another, namely, attributes. He did not dis-
cuss Locke's classification, but that of Hamilton,
which is much more vague than that of Locke, but
Hamilton, like others, had introduced a third class
between the primary and the secondary, which was
called secundo-primary. Spencer adopted this three-
fold classification, but used the terms static, dynamic,
and statico-dynamic. It will be remembered that
Spencer was a Monist, and believed that the primor-
dial unity is based on dynamics or reified force. With
him all the properties, and in them he included
qualities, manifest only the primordial force. This
was his first error. His second error was to neglect
number and to consider class as classification, or a
process of the mind, and not a property of bodies
discovered "by the mind. Then he presented his
two classes, one based on dynamics and the other
on statics, but statics is not the other to dynamics,

106 TRUTH AND ERROR

but the other to change; state and change are the
reciprocals of time. The reciprocals of force are
action and passion or action and reaction. You may
read Spencer on this subject with great care many
times, as I have, and you will see that he himself is
vaguely conscious of this illogical proceeding and
affirms that he uses the term statics with an especial
meaning devised for his own purpose; but under
dynamics he appears to include change, although he
purports to be the philosopher of evolution, and
under statics he includes a part of the properties of
duration and change and a part of the properties of
number and class and of extension and form. It is
thus that the confusion introduced by Locke in his
discussion, due to the ignorance of his time, was still
further increased by Spencer, and his three chapters
on the attributes of matter constitute a monument
of errors. An erroneous classification is the bane of
science, for it throws phenomena into false relations
and makes that which is simple appear to be complex,
difficult, profound and even unknowable, as Spencer
believed.

Locke's ''Essay" introduced a new theme into
philosophy, which at last comes down to us in the
form of epistomology. It seeks to discuss the activi-
ties of mind and the certitudes of its conclusions.
Berkeley seized upon Locke's explanation of vision
and amplified it. Neither Locke nor Berkeley clearly
saw that the properties of bodies discovered by the
several senses are integrated by conception in such
a manner that one sense impression becomes a sym-
bol or mark of all the properties belonging to the
body which are known to the mind; that a light
impression, a sound impression, a taste impression

QUALITIES 107

or a smelling impression are by conception trans-
formed into symbols of the body perceived with all
its properties. Failing to understand this in its
full significance, and science not having explained
the nature of light, heat and other forces, all forces
were by Berkeley considered to be qualities as the
term is here used, and then he made a further step,
that all properties are but qualities, and have their
existence only in the mind. Thus it was that
Berkeley robbed us of the beautiful world, but
with a literary skill that is alluring; he was not
a vulgar highwayman crying, " Stand and deliver!"
but a knight of the green wood who courteously
invoked our assistance in yielding to him our
treasures.

Hume took up the same problem and with sturdy
blows destroyed the world, and reason was crushed
in its fall. Then in Germany Kant, Schelling, Fichte
and Hegel essayed to solve these problems; Kant
leaving behind a monument of criticism erected into
antinomies where truth and certitude are lost.
Fichte carried the whole subject to its logical con-
clusion by reducing it to an absurdity. It was a
simple demonstration the meaning of which he never
knew, dying in a mist of reification. Hegel, see-
ing the contradictions of Kant and Fichte and accept-
ing their conclusions, developed the most elaborate
and artificial philosophy ever presented in the
history of human thought — a philosophy of contradic-
tion, a scheme of the negative by which it was
attempted to show that words are divine, but the
world is finite and contradictory, and that every
proposition affirmed of the world contains within
itself its own contradiction, and that words must be

v

r

I08 TRUTH AND ERROR

believed and that sensation, perception, understand-
ing, and reflection create phantasms.

So these problems have come down to us. In the
meantime an army of scientific men have been at
work clearing1 away the fallacies of imperfect reason
by designed and skilful investigation. Mysterious
forces have been resolved into their simple elements
as the motion of matter in collision, and the metagen-
eses of the world have been resolved, and the laws
of evolution formulated, and the subject is once
more taken up by Spencer with a literary skill equal
to that of Berkeley or Plato, and with the powers of
an advocate never excelled. The attributes or things
which may be attributed to an object are properties
and qualities. It was the distinction between prop-
erties and qualities that the Greeks sought to
characterize as noumena and phenomena. Noumena
are the properties of bodies as they are in them-
selves, while phenomena are the qualities of bodies
and the fallacies which we entertain concerning them.
But when in later times noumena were held to be
occult or mysterious substrates, then science adopted
the term phenomena as synonymous with properties.

Qualities give rise to emotions, for qualities are
good and evil. All properties may be considered as
good or evil in relation to man's wants. The emo-
tions are founded upon the cognition of good and
evil. We are not in this volume to set forth the
good and evil of environment, nor their cognition as
emotions. All of this subject must be treated in a
subsequent volume. In this volume we are endeavor-
ing to explain, first, what are properties and bodies,
and how they are cognized. This brief reference
to the cognition of qualities must here suffice.

• CHAPTER IX

CLASSIFICATION

The science of number is natural, for units and
pluralities are found in nature, but measure is con-
ventional, for conventional units of measure are
used in order that undiscovered numbers may be
represented by their equivalents in computation, for
while we may not be able to discover the number of
natural units in a body we may be able to measure
its form in conventional units of extension, and for
some purposes of computation these units serve the
desired purpose.

There are other computations which are not prop-
erly subserved by the measurement of form. Here
we measure the force which the body exerts through
the action of gravity and determine its mass in units
of weight, and these mass units serve the same pur-
pose in our computations that higher units of num-
ber would serve if we were able to count the parti-
cles. Thus the science of number is natural, but the
device of measure is conventional. It serves a useful
purpose in that it enables us to represent by num-
bers certain facts about bodies which we are not able
to discover as natural numbers by reason of their
multiplicity and minuteness ; so we assume that one
concomitant property represents the others. This
we measure. We do not search with the microscope
for atoms and count them, but we consider their
forms as extensions or their forces as masses and

reason about the artificial numbers derived there-
log

110 TRUTH AND ERROR

from by measurement with the same degree of
certainty that we would have if we should actually
count the particles. Thus meas'ure is devised in
order that we may consider numbers when the actual
numbers are concealed from observation. That
every property is concomitant with all others is thus
assumed as the fundamental doctrine of mathematics
where quantitative reasoning is held to be exact and
irrefragable. All this depends upon the law that
the essentials are persistent in the particle.

While measure is thus conventional there is still
another conventional usage in the science of mathe-
matics. In natural units bodies are the higher
units of particles, the particle and the body are units
of different orders, and the different orders of units
in nature are thus coextensive with all the bodies of
the universe. Thus there is an infinite system of
orders of numbers; but man devises a numerical
system where a definite plurality is considered as a
higher unity, and such a system serves him a valu-
able purpose as a labor-saving device for the mental
faculties. He cannot stretch his mind to the con-
cepts of natural units of particles in natural higher
units of bodies, but he creates a representative sys-
tem, so that the multiplicities of nature, which are
infinite, may be representatively considered by the
finite mind.

In conventional number the units of different
orders are compounded symmetrically in constant
ratios. Early in the history of language, while it
was largely gesture speech, the fingers of one or
both hands or the fingers and toes were used as an
abacus by which numbers were told off ; and this led
to a habit which has continued and developed so

CLASSIFICATION III

that in the various languages of the world it is found
that the number five, the number ten or the number
twenty has been used as the normal ratio between
conventional orders. Of the three methods the
decimal has been retained in civilization as the one
used in enumeration, computation and notation. By
this device a plurality of units are arranged in a
system of orders, ten units constituting the first
order, ten of these the second, etc. In this manner
numbers are classified as kinds in series for the
purpose of convenient counting. Counting is a
compound process of two coordinate elements; one
determines the kind, the other the series, and
determination of kind logically precedes enumera-
tion. The kind must first be determined and then
seriated. The kinds may be natural or conventional,
one or both, and the series may be natural or
conventional, one or both. When we count horses
in the field we count a natural kind, but we seriate
only those in the field as a conventional series. We
must not confound horses with stumps if we are to
get a valid sum. We may place stones, blocks of
wood and fragments of paper as marks of sites
where trees are to be planted, but we classify them
not as stones, blocks of wood, and fragments of
paper, but as marks. In this case the kinds are
conventional. Conventional counting and classifica-
tion differ in this respect only that in counting the
series is conventional, while in classification the
series is natural. In counting the all of the kind is
the all of our purpose; in classification the all is
the all of nature. Then we must remember that in
mathematics, number is taken as the representative
of the other concomitant properties of quantity and

112 TRUTH AND ERROR

that they are reduced to number by measurement,
while in classification kinds are used to represent
the other properties and they are reduced to
kinds by logical convention. While in conventional
counting we consider kinds in series, so in classifying
the bodies and properties of nature we are com-
pelled to consider kinds in series.

It was more than a chance that produced the
decimal system, for the universe is pentalogic, as all
of the fundamental series discovered in nature are
pentalogic by reason of the five concomitant proper-
ties. The origin of the decimal system was the
recognition by primitive man of the reciprocal
pentalogic systems involved in the two hands of the
human body, and the pentalogic properties are
always in pairs. While the properties are five, they
are manifested in reciprocal pairs.

The universe is not an endless series of infinitesi-
mal variables, but it is a universe of divergent series
which spring from an ascending series as branches
spring from a trunk. In the branches the extreme
variation appears in the extremities of the divergent
branches, but the branches are not linked to one
another by these peripheral extremities but by
their trunk connections, and the grand advance
in nature is made as an ascending series as by a
trunk.

When we study a group of plants or animals that
are intimately related, as, for example, the members
of an order, and compare them with the members of
another order, the two orders are found related not
by their highest members but by their lowest. It is
thus that two branches of phytonomic or zoonomic
species are found related to each other by discover-

CLASSIFICATION 113

ing the synthetic form which belonged to the
ascending or trunk series.

Synthetic forms are often extirpated by time, and
to a large extent living species are found in well-
demarcated groups, this demarcation being the
clearer by reason of the extirpation of the synthetic
types of the trunk, while the branch groups diver-
gently elongate until an extreme differentiation is
found. Sometimes whole branches are extirpated
and thus are found as fossils. Species multiply by the
splitting of branches and each new branch consitutes
a lineal series of individuals which are separated by
the extirpation of the main branch ; while the main
branch remains the new branches are held as
varieties.

The true method of classification, therefore, is not
by invention but by discovery.

The growth of a mineral is a progressive change
by internal metamorphosis of the molecules. The
growth of the individual plant is accomplished by
successive additions of particles, and is thus a serial
kind, while the growth of the individual in the
animal is accomplished not only by a constant
addition of particles, but also by a concomitant
subtraction of particles ; the individual is doubly a
serial kind.

A species is a series of connected individuals
differing from one another by minute distinctions
but differing from other species by gaps; such a
group is the lowest demarcated class. A variety is
an inchoate species not marked by gaps or discrete
degrees. Species are further classified in hierarchies,
when the species becomes one of a series of species.
The production of a species is nature's method of

114 TRUTH AND ERROR

summating a series, and a production of any higher
class is still another method of more distinctly
summating' a series of series. Series spring* from
the division of trunks, and may be traced back to
their origin; classification, then, becomes seriation
of species in such a manner as to exhibit their origin
in less differentiated species.

The kinds of nature considered in the series of
nature are classes, and these are regrouped in hier-
archies which are systems of classes. Every science
of such a grand group of bodies gives rise to a
special science and thus we have systematic miner-
alogy, systematic botany and systematic zoology.

We have seen that the other properties of a particle
when treated in the science of mathematics require
conversion into terms of number. Space properties
are measured by conventional units, and are thus
reduced to number. Motion or force properties are
measured in terms of space and these again are also
expressed in number. Times are measured in terms
of motion, the motion in terms of space and the
space reduced to terms of number. It is thus by the
device of measure that all the other properties of
matter are reduced to number for the purpose of
verification. Abstract mathematics is therefore the
science of number, but applied mathematics is the
utilization of the laws of mathematics in concrete
investigation by the device of measure, while chem-
istry is the science of natural orders of number.

Now, that which is true in the conventional science
of mathematics finds its analogue in the natural
sciences, for all the other properties of bodies are
reduced to kinds for the purpose of logic. Forms
are explained as kinds, forces as forms and then as

CLASSIFICATION 115

kinds, and finally causations are reduced to forces,
the forces to forms and these forms to kinds. Thus
all the natural categories are reduced to kinds, as
quantitative properties in mathematics are reduced
to conventional numbers.

It is for practical reasons that man has reduced all
other properties to numbers, for as counting can be
accomplished only by classification, so properties can
only be treated in mathematics when they are
reduced to number by measure. Counting serves to
determine the extent of a conventional group, while
classification serves to determine the extent of a
natural group.

Language is impossible without classification, for
most words are class words. It therefore becomes
necessary in the arts, both industrial and linguistic,
to classify, and mankind through all the history of
culture has been engaged in classification. But the
reduction of the other properties to kinds does not
reduce the whole of science to classification any
more than the reduction of quantities to number
reduces all verification to mathematics. There is
still a logical verification independent of mathemat-
ical verification, and there are still forms, forces and
causations to be considered, although for deductive
logic it is necessary to reduce them to kinds.

Kinds as species become orders of kinds or classes,
and are thus multiplied. When kinds are considered
two correlates are found which cannot be expunged ;
likeness and unlikeness; and when considered in
this manner they are classes. A fundamental like-
ness is discovered in all bodies, for all bodies are
composed of matter.

In mathematics bodies are considered in their

Il6 TRUTH AND ERROR

quantitative properties, which are number, space,
motion, time, and, in animate bodies, judgment.
But in systematic science bodies are treated as
categories, which are kinds, forms, forces, causa-
tions, and, in animate bodies, concepts. So, in
mathematics, while quantitative properties are
reduced to number, in the natural sciences properties
are reduced to kinds. The analogy between syste-
matic science and mathematical science is perfect,
and both are partly conventional. As it is neces-
sary to reduce properties to number in order to treat
them mathematically, so it is necessary to reduce
properties to kinds in order to treat them logically.

Bodies are composed of particles, and the elemen-
tary particles are probably alike. They have been
reduced to about seventy kinds by chemical analysis.
Logical analysis reduces them to one kind, and if it
i$ valid then they are alike in being composed of one
substance with like properties. If only the chemical
analysis is valid, then there are seventy kinds, but
they are alike in having the same properties, and
unlike only in having different quantities or propor-
tions of these properties. All bodies have a funda-
mental likeness in essentials, and a contingent
unlikeness in relations. Every physical body is like
every other physical body in its essentials and unlike
in its relations.

The natural classes which exist and those which
have existed in the past (for the processes of extir-
pation have always existed in the world) have a
meaning for us in expressing the agencies which
have been at work in producing the present stage of
the world, for every gap represents some event of
history. Planes of demarcation are thus landmarks

CLASSIFICATION 1 17

of history to guide in research. As bodies have
appeared and disappeared upon the stage of time
and the actors changed with every act, a history of
transcendent interest is involved, for in the dis-
covery of classes we may restore the history of the
earth.

It is seen that classification is the discovery of
kinds in series. If classification is discovery, classes
are not conventional but natural. In any stage
of classification, while yet all of the attributes are
not known, there may be imperfections in distin-
guishing kinds in series; the kinds depend upon
properties, but all the properties may not be known,
and there may be gaps in our knowledge of the
series, so that imperfect knowledge is imperfect
recognition of kinds in series; therefore, classifica-
tion is always tentative by reason of imperfect
knowledge.

When a classification is once established upon a
logical basis, it need not undergo dissolution to be
reclassified, for when the germs of classification are
established on a logical basis it has but to grow with
increasing knowledge.

While classification may grow it will always be
recognized that there is but one system, as the indi-
vidual is but one individual, though he may grow
from infancy to maturity. The classification of
which we speak is genetic, and while but one may
exist that one may undergo changes on the way to
perfection.

The test of classification is this : First, within the
class all of the individuals must constitute an
unbroken series, with a beginning and an ending,
each class demarcated by a gap or discrete degree.

Il8 TRUTH AND ERROR

Second, the classes themselves must be seriated with
the least possible gaps. Third, the series thus pro-
duced must be traced to convergence. A classifica-
tion guided by these three laws is valid, when all the
facts are known, and it is relatively valid when
these laws are observed in the consideration of the
known facts. The goal of the science of classifica-
tion is to discover kinds in series and coordinate
series of kinds in systems, and systems again in
series.

In every perception there is a semblance of
dichotomous classification of that of which the ego is
aware, as distinguished from the environment.
Such a process is involved in the first act of judg-
ment, and continues to the end, but it is simply
distinguishing the object of judgment from its
environment or the world outside of the object. In
perceiving the horse, the horse is distinguished
from the rest of the environment, and in order that
this may be expressed in speech some logicians
speak of the horse and the non-horse, the tree and
the non-tree, the house and the non-house. This is
but a method of naming, but that which is expressed
is the whole world except that which is included
under the positive name. By this expression we
must not conceive that the non-object in any way
negates the object, nor that the object denies the
existence of the non-object, but must consider the
particle "non" as a device in naming. This method
of naming is accomplished by another method in
modern biological science when it speaks of the
individual and the environment. In logic this
method of naming has led to much confusion, and in
the logic of Hegel it has led to strange absurdities,

CLASSIFICATION 119

all of which are cleared away when the non-individ-
ual is called the environment.

This semblance of dichotomous. classification has
led to many errors, for the habit has been formed and
philosophers have sometimes diverted the method
from its use in perception and attempted a dichoto-
mous classification of the universe. It has rarely
been suggested as a complete system, but it has been
practically used by many in this manner, and is still
so used. Thus, we hear of space and matter as if
space were not one of the properties of matter ; we
hear of motion and matter as if motion were not one
of the properties of matter; we hear of time and
matter as if time were not one of the properties of
matter, and we hear of thought and matter as if
thought were not one of the properties of animate
matter. Would a sane person speak of the horse
and head, the horse and body, the horse and legs,
the horse and tail, and then consider the horse as
one thing, the head, body, and tail as other things?
Yet this is the error of those who consider matter as
one thing and properties as other things. All such
methods are not only vague and idle, but pernicious
in that they deform all the concepts involved.

There is another method of dichotomous classifica-
tion just as pernicious, exhibited in the attempt to
classify the properties of matter as dynamic and
static, which was Spencer's classification. Here
forces and causations are classified in one group as
dynamics, and kinds, forms, and thoughts as statics ;
thus the distinction between causations and force as
categories are confounded, as also the distinction
between kinds, forms, and thoughts. For some pur-
poses of discussion a schematization may be of

I2O TRUTH AND ERROR

more or less value, but it easily degenerates into
illogical classification, especially when it becomes
the foundation of a philosophy. This classification
is a relic from an earlier stage of philosophy when
properties were confounded with qualities, and both
properties and qualities were classified as primary
and secondary, with sometimes a third class as
secundo-primary.

There are only five properties, quantitative and
categoric. As abstractions they are wholly unlike
one another, but in the concrete they are identical,
for every particle of matter and every body com-
pounded of particles has number, space, motion,
time, and, if it be an animate body, judgment. The
properties, therefore, are phases of the same body,
and their abstraction must be pentalogic. In the
science of mathematics the four properties are
always recognized by every physicist. During the
latter half of the present century the fifth property has
been clearly recognized in the new science of psycho-
physics, which seeks to measiire mental operations
and treat psychology mathematically. In this field
of modern research a large body of literature is
already developed.

Mill, in his work on Logic, groups phenomena in
a dichotomous scheme as the simultaneous and the
successive; this is not a logical classification of
phenomena, but simply a device in naming. Other
writers divide phenomena into the coexistent and
sequent, using other terms for Mill's scheme, while
Mill himself used it as a classification, and thereby
fell into many errors of logic. Spencer used it also,
but legitimately.

Names are developed before classes are logically

CLASSIFICATION 121

distinguished, and, although naming involves a
mode of classification, many devices of naming are
very illogical methods of classification, but still con-
venient in schematization ; a schematic name, there-
fore, must always be distinguished from a classific
name.

Often the term physical is used to distinguish cer-
tain properties from those which are called intel-
lectual. This is not a logical classification of
properties, but a convenient schematization which if
understood as a classification leads to error. It
always leads to error when the abstract property of
judgment or conception is held to be a substance,
and to exist apart from time, motion, space, and
number, or from causation, force, form, and kind.
Then thought becomes a ghost.

As classes are found in nature and discovered by
science, so groups are also produced by art for a
purpose. As the products of nature are used in art
a regrouping may arise which has in view only the
characteristics of the things of nature and art as they
are utilized in art. The builder recognizes the
group of building materials as a class of things in
which he is especially interested; the mariner the
group of stores which he must provide for his voy-
age ; the traveler his outfit which he must carry in
his trunk. Such groups can be illustrated to an
indefinite extent. They are always dichotomous on
the plan of perception which groups things into the
perceived this and the not this, or the individual and
the environment. The two groups are composed
of heterogeneous things, as they are known in natural
classification, selected for a purpose and distin-
guished from those not selected.

122 TRUTH AND ERROR

In the presentation of a theme the speaker or
writer is prone to arrange his material in a scheme
which may be very wise for the purpose intended for
distinct presentation and clear understanding. Such
a piece of valuable literature may live, and the
schematization may be taken as a classification with
disastrous results. Schematization is valuable for
ephemeral purposes, but classification has enduring
value. The author who uses a valid classification as
a schematization is always clear, while the author
who uses a schematization which is not a valid classi-
fication thereby introduces an element of confusion.

Before the rise of science artificial and natural
classes were often confounded. This especially
appears in the development of names. Among
many tribes of Indians things are classified into the
standing, sitting, and lying; or into standing, sit-
ting, lying, and moving, which is a classification by
attitudes. In other languages things are classified
by their states. A fundamental classification existed
among the Greeks as the four elements, earth, air,
fire, and water.

As science first develops, classes are based on
inadequate characters; that is, a few characters only
are taken as the basis, as in the Linnean classifica-
tion of plants. But as science progresses, classes are
discovered which more thoroughly express the facts ;
to these classes names are given, and the names as
they are thus classed are the names of the things
classed and the metaphoric names of the concepts
of the classes.

Now we must consider identity and difference.
Mineral bodies are identical in having the four
properties of number, space, motion, and time, and

CLASSIFICATION 123

by hypothesis, judgment; but they differ in rela-
tions. An organic body undergoes a secular change
in kind, form, force, causation, and by hypothesis,
conception, and differs from itself at different times
in these respects. At different times the same body
in part is identical in its different phases and in part
different; thus there is identity and difference in the
individual at different times.

In the plant there is the same identity as in the
mineral, but there is an additional difference, for the
plant grows by minute increments through the addi-
tion of new matter.

The animal has the same identity and difference
as the plant; but it has other differences, for the
substance of the animal grows and decays coinci-
dently. The same animal is not composed of the
same identical substance from time to time, but only
of the same kind of substance, for its food is con-
tinuously assimilated and used in function and dis-
charged as new food is absorbed.

But there is another identity to be explained,
namely, class identity, for the member of a class is
identical with every other member of the class in
some respects, and different from every other mem-
ber of the class in other respects. In minerals the
individuals are identical in being composed of the
same substance, and different in being composed of
different quantities of the same substance. The
individuals of a class of plants are identical in sub-
stance, but different in quantity and in history. In
animals the individuals are identical in kind of sub-
stance, different in quantity and history, and also
different in that their substance undergoes a secular
change by absorbing new substance and throwing

124 TRUTH AND ERROR

off the old. In common ideation animals differ in
other respects from plants and minerals, in that
they are animate bodies, and have the property of
judgment or consciousness.

The same body is relegated to different classes in
a hierarchy of classes by the consideration of differ-
ent degrees of identity. The fewer but more funda-
mental the identities the greater the number of the
individuals in the class; the fewer the number of
variables and the less fundamental the variables, the
smaller the number of individuals within the class.
Following the methods of classification as bodies are
found in nature, the same object is found to fall
within different classes, which constitute a hierarchy.
Thus every object has its identities grouped in a
hierarchy of classes. A horse is identical with all
other horses in certain attributes, but it is also iden-
tical with all animals in a fewer number of attributes,
though it may be considered as an object. No horse
exists solely as an animal ; but it may be considered
only as an animal, that is, we may consider those
properties which make it an animal. No horse
exists which is only a vertebrate, but we may con-
sider only those characteristics which make it a
vertebrate. No horse exists only as a mammal, but
we may consider only those characteristics which
constitute the mammal. No horse exists only as a
horse, but we may consider those characteristics
which constitute the horse and still there will remain
the characteristics which distinguish it from other
horses. Thus, in the different groups into which
the horse is thrown in the series, we may consider
its different attributes in every class, but it is only a
method of consideration. This is a concrete world,

CLASSIFICATION 12$

and objects are concrete in all their classes, and no
entity or body exists which corresponds solely to the
class to which the object belongs.

A fallacy has tainted philosophy from the early
history of civilization to the present time through
the entanglement which has arisen from considering
an object as belonging to different classes. It has
been supposed that there is an entity which repre-
sents the class as distinct from every individual of
the class to which the characteristics of the individual
adhere. This nothing which has been entertained
by philosophers is a fallacy. It is an easy thing
to be lost in the maze of speculation about classes
in which fallacies fill the mind and obscure the real
world. Abstraction is simply a method of considera-
tion useful and necessary in cognition, but to sup-
pose that the things which we consider abstractly
have a disjunct existence is to enter the realm of
metaphysical illusions.

In early society the origin of names was not
understood, and often names were believed to be
properties, especially when properties were consid-
ered as qualities. When the characteristics which
belong to a kind and make it a kind were considered
as the attributes of distinct entities, called essences,
then the name was considered to be one of these
essential attributes or properties by which the class
was designated. Thus a fallacy was made to breed
a fallacy, and the two fallacies grew up together and
are often connected, and how can you dispel the
fallacy of essence without dispelling the fallacy of
inherent name? Thus a pair of ghosts stalk the
world together, and fight each other's battles. How
these ghosts waltzed in the dance of philosophy

126 TRUTH AND ERROR

seems a marvelous feat — a Tarn O'Shanter dance of
warlock and witch.

It is not strange that those who believe in a sub-
strate of substance should also believe in an essence
of kind; then this essence becomes the noumenon,
and the characteristics of class become the
phenomena ; this dream is the reality of metaphysic ;
the knowledge of science is the identification of
phenomenon with noumenon.

It has already been asserted that classification is a
tool of logic; and this assertion now requires demon-
stration. The first law of deduction may be formu-
lated in the following terms: whatever is true of
anything is true of its class identity. Inductive
reasoning is the discovery of the members of a class ;
that is, it is classification ; deductive reasoning is the
application of the first law of reason as given above.

A drop of water is analyzed and found to be com-
posed of oxygen and hydrogen in certain propor-
tions; other analyses verify this conclusion. Now,
by the first law of deduction every drop of pure
water in the sea, on the land, and in the air has a
like composition ; but in every drop of water found
in nature there are other substances, and for the
analysis of the water these substances are eliminated.
Now I take water from a spring, and though satis-
fied that water is oxygen and hydrogen in certain
proportions, yet in this water there are other sub-
stances for which I must seek, and by induction I
discover them. Induction is here the discovery of
the nature of pure water and other kinds of water,
and as these facts are learned by induction the sev-
eral kinds are classified, and then the first law of
deduction applies to each class. Induction is the

CLASSIFICATION 127

discovery of class, and thus the discovery of the
law ; deduction is the application of law.

All laws may be reduced to this form, and are but
variants of it. There is nothing occult or wonderful
in the nature of law; law is just as simple as relation,
just as simple as persistence, just as simple as speed,
just as simple as extension, just as simple as unity.
In scientific philosophy the process of reasoning
reduces the complex to the simple. In metaphys-
ical philosophy the attempt is made to explain the
simple in terms of the complex.

Many errors have arisen in respect to the nature
of classification, of which two are of such importance
to our present work as to require elucidation. It
has been held by some that classes are inventions
and not discoveries, especially by those who have
reified and personified the world as pure mind.
Some who have not fallen into this error have still
considered classes as artificial, invented for the pur-
pose of economizing thought, and that real classes
are found only because all of the units are not
apprehended, and that classification is thus a prod-
uct of ignorance and an infirmity of language. To
a mind having infinite comprehension classification
would be unnecessary; the whole would be grasped
in mind simultaneously. Now ideas are evolved
serially, hence it becomes necessary to take them
one by one as they come and to group them and
regroup them in hierarchies, for while the bodies of
which they are ideas are presented to the mind
serially of themselves, they exist in systems of
hierarchies, and they are thus presented in nature
in a hierarchy of bodies of different orders.

The things of this world are presented to the senses

128 TRUTH AND ERROR

in a chaos of phenomena. At every glance of wak-
ing life we see a number of heterogeneous colors and
a number of heterogeneous bodies. While this goes
on we hear a number of heterogeneous sounds arising
from heterogeneous bodies. At the same time we
smell heterogeneous odors from heterogeneous
bodies, and taste heterogeneous flavors from
heterogeneous bodies, and touch heterogeneous
surfaces of heterogeneous bodies, and discover
heterogeneous forces in heterogeneous bodies,
perhaps all in one second of time; but as the
instances come new sensations come in the most
heterogeneous manner, and the things presented
to the senses seem to constitute a chaos. Out of
this chaos a cosmos arises, for sensation, which is
the fundamental faculty of the mind, is classification.
This classification is fundamentally mechanical.
The eye sees the colors and classifies them, the ear
hears the sounds and classifies them, the nose smells
the odors and classifies them, the tongue tastes the
flavors and classifies them, the touch feels the sur-
faces and classifies them, the muscular sense feels
the forces and classifies them, and behold, all of
these sensations are wrought into systems as if by
magic !

In one chapter we considered bodies as particles,
and 'found that we were discussing quantitative
properties, as number, space, motion, time, and judg-
ment. In another chapter we considered particles as
incorporated, and found ourselves to be dealing with
categoric properties, as kinds, forms, forces, causa-
tions, and concepts. Then in another chapter we
discussed the reincorporation of bodies as they are

CLASSIFICATION 129

revealed in geonomy, and found ourselves dealing
with both quantitative and classific properties. In
another chapter we discussed methods of reincor-
poration in plants, or the bodies of phytonomy, in
which we were compelled again to consider quanti-
tative and classific properties. Finally, a chapter
was devoted to a third method of the reincorpora-
tion of bodies as they are revealed in zoonomy, and
again we were led to consider both quantitative and
classific properties.

Here it becomes necessary to more clearly dis-
tinguish those bodies which we have called molar,
for the term has been used in a somewhat restricted
sense which should be understood. By a molar
body we mean one which is revealed to the senses
without the use of instruments such as the telescope,
the microscope, the spectroscope, or the crucible,
aided by computation and logical ideation.

All geonomic bodies are molar bodies, and so are
plants and animals. Savage and barbaric men sup-
posed the stars to be molar bodies, while ethereal
bodies were wholly unknown, their manifestations
being interpreted as phenomena due to molar bodies.
Thus the concepts of mankind were first compounded
of judgments about molar bodies, or such as were
supposed to be molar, and intellection progressed in
this manner until the dawn of civilization and the
invention of instruments of research, mathematical
computation and logical ideation.

Man seems to occupy a position in the world mid-
way between extremes of magnitude. On the one
side there are bodies which are vast systems of stars
like the solar system, and these are revealed by the
employment of instruments as aids to vision, and

I^O TRUTH AND ERROR

are further revealed by careful investigation as
magnitudes are measured and computed; on the
other hand there are magnitudes that are so minute
that they are revealed only by the microscope and
other methods of investigation, especially in chem-
istry where molecules and atoms appear, and are
further revealed when we investigate the nature of
the ether and find ourselves immersed in the contem-
plation of magnitudes that are lost in immeasurable
numbers. Between these extremes we find molar
bodies that are revealed to the senses as bodies with-
out the supplementary devices. Thus we use the
terms molar, stellar, and molecular to designate in a
general way the magnitude of bodies as they are
compared with the magnitude of our bodies and the
means by which these comparative magnitudes are
determined.

When we go on to discover stellar bodies we find
that we observe them from our standpoint by con-
sidering their quantitative properties, that is, con-
sidering them as particles, and ultimately find that
these stellar particles are combined in systems.
Again, when we investigate the minute constitution
of bodies we also consider them as particles, and
deal with quantitative properties, and through the
quantitative properties discover their forms as struc-
ture and figure. Thus it is that in the minute and
vast alike, in stars and in molecules, in systems and
ethereal particles, science is interested chiefly in
quantitative properties, and through them classific
properties are revealed.

Plants and animals, which are molar bodies by our
definition, first come to be investigated in modern
or national civilization when they are treated as

CLASSIFICATION 131

kinds and classified ; but as we discover their kinds
we discover relations of form, force, causation, and
mentation, and a multitude of appliances for research
are developed.

In these realms research deals with categoric
properties, and reduces all phenomena to kinds, and
the ultimate expression of all knowledge is classifica-
tion verified by quantification. In plants bodies are
reduced to particles when a minimum of computa-
tion can be used. So animals are reduced to par-
ticles by research, and again computation can be
used. The goal reached by research is the particle,
the way traveled is by classific logic, while in
etheronomy and astronomy the goal reached is the
body, and the road pursued is mathematical compu-
tation. In geonomy both methods of research are
used. The quantitative and categoric methods of
research are conventional. Quantities are measured
by conventional or artificial methods, with artificial
or conventional units. Kinds are also in the same
sense and by equivalent processes selected as the
representative of forms, forces, causations and men-
tations in order that classification may proceed and
logical results be reached. Thus logic and mathemat-
ics are reciprocal methods of procedure in the cogni-
tion of the world. The mathematical method is chiefly
deductive, the logical method is chiefly inductive,
but they cannot be separated. There is no deduc-
tion without its reciprocal induction, and there is no
induction without its reciprocal deduction. Deduc-
tion is abstraction which posits induction, and induc-
tion is abstraction when deduction is posited. Deduc-
tion and induction cannot be carried on apart, for
deduction is dependent upon induction, and induction

132 TRUTH AND ERROR

is dependent upon deduction, and the attempt to dis-
sever them leads the mind into a fog of speculation
where men are lost on the shoreless sea of meta-
physics or the endless trail of unrelated facts.

CHAPTER X

HOMOLOGY

Extension may be defined as exclusive occupancy
of space. The particles having extension exclude
others from that extension, and thus extension has
also been called impenetrability. The particle hav-
ing motion changes its position to occupy space
vacated; hence, change of position is always
exchange of position. As the particles are all in
motion at an inconceivable rate of speed, one evacu-
ates its position as another enters.

The idea of a plenum of substance was entertained
by philosophers in the early history of civilization.
Gradually this was abandoned by many, but lately it
has been revived as best explaining the phenomena
of the ether, and countenance is given to the
hypothesis by the demonstration that molecular
bodies have internal motions and interspatial ether.

Space is the relation of extension which particles
bear to one another in position, when considered
without regard to their incorporation in a higher
body. If the particles be not ultimate a medium of
smaller particles is intercalated. Space, therefore,
is the extension of positions.

While space is the relation of positions, positions
and relations must vanish if the extensions vanish.
These relations may be relations of direction, or they
may be relations of distance, but as particles are in
motion the relations of direction are changed. In
the same manner the relations of distance may

133

134 TRUTH AND ERROR

change. Thus the boy and the dog may change
relation of direction, when one or both move, and
they may or may not change relations of distance at
the same time. These space relations do not
change by reason of intervening bodies. The boy
may be a yard from the dog though a wall inter-
venes.

When positions are considered as established by
incorporation, forms are observed having the rela-
tions of the particles established, and these estab-
lished relations constitute structure and figure ; thus
form is figure and structure. When space becomes
form, extension becomes figure and position becomes
structure.

By incorporation particles retain in a qualified
degree their space relations ; that is, the space rela-
tions must be fixed within such limits that the incor-
poration is preserved, for if dissolution supervenes
form relations are dissolved. Still, form relations
are not fixed with such rigidity as to prevent internal
motion. A body may still remain a body within
certain degrees of temperature, passing through
stages of bulk by contraction and expansion, but if
the expansion is increased beyond the critical point
the body is dissolved.

We consider bodies as particles when we consider
their space relations, and we consider them as forms
when we consider their corporeal relations as units.
Habits of thought are formed in such a manner that
some bodies are usually considered as particles,
while other bodies are usually considered as bodies.
By like habits of thought it is customary to consider
the solar system, not as a body, but as an assemblage
of orbs, for the science of astronomy has not yet sue-

HOMOLOGY 135

cessf ully attacked the problem of the relation of the
solar system to other stellar systems. When a body
is considered as an individual in shape and structure,
form is presented ; but when a body is considered as
a community of particles, space is considered. Thus
it is seen that what is called space in the relations of
particles, is called structure in the relations of form.
In this treatise the term space is never used to
denote the void — the nothing — but is always used to
denote something real; so that space relations are
the reciprocals of structure relations.

When we consider stars as such they are bodies,
the particles of which are molecules. If we could
study them as molecules they would present rela-
tions of structure; so we may conceive of such rela-
tions, though we cannot actually observe them ; but
we can observe the figures of the bodies. Stars are
embodied into systems when they, in turn, become
particles and have space relations to one another;
this is structure from the standpoint of the system,
but the systems as bodies have form as figure and
structure. Here in the celestial realm is found a
series or hierarchy of individuals and communities.

When we come to the study of the earth as a
body, we find it composed of four particles: the
atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the lithosphere, and
the centrosphere. When we consider it as a body we
consider form and structure ; when we consider the
spheres as particles their relations are those of space,
one above another; thus in the body there is form,
in the particles there is position, and that which is
position in the particle constitutes structure in the
body.

Again the stony crust or lithosphere may be con-

136 TRUTH AND ERROR

sidered as a body when its particles are formations
of igneous, aqueous, aerial, vegetal, and animal
origin. Then as a form its structure is derived from
its formations, which are related to one another in
structure.

The formations may be considered as bodies ; then
the blocks of which they are composed, called rocks,
are particles. The structure of the formation is the
arrangement of the rocks ; the relations of the rocks
to one another are relations of structure. We may
consider rocks as bodies, and omitting ill-defined
granulation and incomplete crystallization and also
omitting for the present purposes the consideration
of the substances of which the rocks are composed,
we may consider rocks as bodies with particles of
molecules; then the form of the rock is its structure
of molecules; the relation of the molecules to one
another in position is structure. Omitting various
molecular stages in the hierarchy, we find atoms as
the particles of molecules, the molecules having
form in figure and structure and the atoms having
space in their relations of positions to one another.
Thus in the geonomic realm there is found a hierarchy
of individuals and a hierarchy of communities.

The sciences of geonomy are divided usually into
two correlative groups, called geography, in which
five departments are pretty well recognized, namely,
ethereal geography, stellar geography, aerial
geography, hydrographic geography, and land
geography ; and geology, composed of five well recog-
nized sciences: chemistry, mineralogy, dynamics,
structural geology, and paleontology. What I have
called geography is approached from the standpoint
of quantitative properties, while those sciences which

HOMOLOGY 137

I have called geology are approached from the
standpoint of categoric properties. This division
into two groups is well recognized when the one is
considered as deductive and the other as inductive, or
when the one is relegated to the physical division,
the other to the natural history division.

We may consider a plant as a body; then the
phytons of which it is composed are particles. A
phyton may be considered as a body, then the cells
are considered as particles ; in turn, the cell may be
considered as a body, then its blasts may be consid-
ered as particles. Then a blast as the nucleus may
be the body whose particles are molecules, and the
molecule as a body has atoms for its particles. Thus
there is a hierarchy of bodies and of particles in the
plant realm in which the bodies have form while the
particles have space. We do not aspire to a treatise
on botany, but stop to consider only certain facts
which are essential to this argument ; a consideration
of the higher plants will serve our purpose. Certain
phytons are modified to become roots, which are the
organs devoted to the absorption from the earth of
the materials which are to be woven into the plant ;
other phytons become the stem for support; others
the branches for expansion; others the leaves for
respiration ; others pistils and stamens for reproduc-
tion, while others become floral envelopes for their
protection. Every group of phytons in the plant,
therefore, has a separate function, and is an organ.
All of these organs, except those for reproduction,
have functions relating to the metamorphosis of the
individual ; but the floral envelope and seed organs
are devoted to reproduction. This development of
phytons into organisms and organs leads in the study

138 TRUTH AND ERROR

of botany to the consideration of the homologies of
the organs. Reproduction in the plant makes a vast
stride from ontogeny to phylogeny. Here we are
introduced to the subject of heredity. Plants are
multiplied in vast numbers and the offspring inherit
likeness from parents; this inheritance is put at
usury, so that each heir inherits the entire posses-
sions of the legator, and wealth is multiplied by
bequest. Then the legatee places his wealth at
usury, and with its increments bequeaths it to every
individual who is a legatee: so organs and organisms
are developed.

The simplest plants are protophytes and unicel-
lular; but these unicellular bodies are still more
highly organized in the higher protophytes when
unicellular bodies are connected with one another
by vegetal threads which are themselves unicellular
bodies metamorphosed by elongation, as in the
slimes. The protophytes are simple cellate bodies
which multiply by fission, and growth itself becomes
reproduction.

The cells themselves are organized into tissues
and the tissues are arranged in form as planes and
combinations of planes. In combining, the planes
are sometimes arranged about stems of trunks.
These are the thallophytes. The entire thallophyte
is a cell with structural parts as nucleus endoblast,
mesoblast and exoblast.

In the thallophytes growth is chiefly marginal to a
plane. Reproduction is not a division of the whole
plant into new plants, but is a division of only por-
tions of the plant which are organs of reproduction.
Spores are thrown off from the surface of the repro-
ductive organ.

HOMOLOGY 139

Systematic botanists seem to be agreed in placing
the bryophytes below the pterodophytes.

In the bryophytes a nucleated cylinder is produced
which grows mainly by elongation. Special organs
of reproduction appear with many devices for the
preservation of the spores and their distribution over
the soil. In the nature of these reproductive organs
I find evidence of high rank. The leaves also are
not mere fronds or expansions of the body, but are
highly differentiated leaves.

In the pterodophytes the thallophytic structure in
planes is still predominant, but roots are developed,
the bodies are of more or less cylindrical form, and
thallophytic leaves are often found as fronds. The
reproductive organs are more highly differentiated.
In some the margins of fronds are reflexed to make
seed vessels, in others segments of fronds or entire
fronds are transformed and there are other methods
of forming seed vessels. In all a great variety of
seed vessels are found, all exhibiting comparatively
simple transformation; the cellate structure of the
entire plant is still preserved, though greatly
metamorphosed.

The spermatophytes are the flowering plants. In
this sub-kingdom the seeds are no longer mere spores,
but are plant bodies with microscopically developed
forms. The entire plant preserves the cellate
structure, while all the organs of the plant are of
cellular structure.

The forms of plants are seriated three times:

First, there is the series through which the indi-
vidual plant passes. Now the forms exhibited in the
individual plant at different stages of growth may
be compared with the forms of plants of the same

140 TRUTH AND ERROR

species taken at different stages of growth, and the
same results reached without waiting for the growth
of one plant.

Second, we may study different species of plants
and compare them with some one taken as a stand-
ard ; but this should be a plant of the highest struc-
ture. Then in comparing plants of lower structure
with it, it will be found that the stages marked in
the growth of the higher plant are represented by
stages in the order in which the record has been kept
in the higher.

Third, a record has been kept in the tome of
geology by which the forms of plants have been
recorded, not in the language of symbols, but in the
language of the forms themselves as fossils. While
knowledge of this record is incomplete, in so far as
it has been read, it agrees with the individual records
and the class records.

The cell of the plant has a structure consisting of
a threefold capsule or wall and a nucleus. The seed
of the plant has the same structure with the three-
fold wall or epidermis and nucleus, and the cellular
structure is preserved in the plant itself, which
retains its envelope of bark divided into three layers
which contain a nucleus. We have already found
that the earth has a cellate structure, in the air,
the sea, the land, and the nucleus ; the elements of
this structure we have called spheres or cellates.
We call the structural elements of the cell, the seed
and the plant, blasts or cellates.

Some plants are single celled. These have many
forms, but one form is homologous with another,
that is, it is composed of the same structural ele-
ments. The cells are compounded into phytons and

grow into different forms, but one phyton is homol-
ogous with another ; then phytons are compounded,
and still higher plants are produced which are
metamorphosed into different forms ; but one higher
plant is homologous with another. Phytons being
composed of cells are homologous with cells, and
higher plants being composed of phytons are homol-
ogous with phytons, and thus with cells; that is to
say, the discovery of homologies in plants is the
discovery of the morphologic elements of which they
are compounded. As they are compounded, cells
are differentiated, and when they are compounded
into phytons differentiated cells make differentiated
phytons, then differentiated phytons make differ-
entiated higher plants.

In plants there is another set of homologies in the
position of the leaves, which is revealed to us in the
science of phyllotaxy.

Metamorphosis is growth and decay. One body
cannot grow unless another body decays ; one crystal
cannot increase in size unless some other yields its
particles for that purpose; one plant cannot grow
unless molecules of water and other substances are
used to constitute the molecule of protoplasm ; one
animal cannot grow unless some other animal or
some plant dies ; thus metamorphosis is decay of one
and growth of another.

Development which supervenes upon metamor-
phosis is the production of cooperative organs all
necessary to the life, growth and reproduction of the
individual, and these organs have different powers,
which in physiology are called functions. The exer-
cise of functions is accomplished by metabolism,
which is the recombination of chemical particles so

142 TRUTH AND ERROR

that new particles come to take the place of those
rejected. In this exchange particles do not lose
speed, but all have their directions changed. That
which is required for present consideration is that
exercise stimulates the exchange. Now, activity of
function increases metabolism ; total rest from activ-
ity retards metabolism, and continued rest will ulti-
mately cause atrophy ; thus the form of the animal
is transformed, for the slow changes that occur in
this manner are transmitted to offspring, and if the
offspring continue the process, growth or decay are
continued in the next generation, and on through many
generations, producing results as varieties and fin ally
species, as organs are developed and extirpated.

We have now to consider animals and the organs
of which they are composed in the transmutations
through which they pass as illustrating the subject
of morphology.

There are five great classes of animals: Protozoa,
Radiata, Mollusca, Articulata, and Vertebrata.
The Protozoans are unicellular or simple combina-
tions of cells. Above the Protozoa, animals are
organized on four different plans of structure, but
they are all compounded of cells, though many of
the cells are greatly modified. In these modifica-
tions the cellate structure reappears as a funda-
mental homologue in every organ of all of the higher
animals, and it is still found in the animals them-
selves. The phytons of plants are the homologues
of organs in animals. There may be many phytons
serving the same functions in plants, as there may
be many organs serving the same function in ani-
mals ; but in animals, as functions are differentiated,
kinds of organs are multiplied and the number of

HOMOLOGY 143

organs performing the same functions is diminished
from the lower to the higher organism.

In animals the fundamental homologies are found
when we discover that all organs are dermal. We
cannot stop here to make an exposition of this sub-
ject throughout the whole animal kingdom, but will
confine ourselves to one small group of vertebrates,
namely, the mammals.

First, there are organs of nutrition, constituting all
those that take part in the digestion, secretion, and
excretion of food. Second, organs of circulation, by
which the food when prepared for assimilation is
distributed to the tissues. Third, organs of locomo-
tion, constituting the muscular, tendonous, and
osseous systems. Fourth, the reproductive organs.
Fifth, the organs of mentation, constituting the
nervous system.

The organs of digestion which prepare the food
are severally sacs and tubes, and conjointly they
constitute a system of sacs and tubes, but in this
system locomotion must be accomplished, and hence
a muscular system is attached to the digestive
system. Thus all the organs of digestion are cellate
in that they have the cellate elements, for they are
composed of encapsulated parts, or inclosing or
inclosed envelopes.

The circulating organs are all found to be cellate
as tubes or sacs, one or both. In this system
extreme variations are found; in the veins and
arteries the tubular structure is carried to its
highest development, while in the gall, the liver,
and the lungs, the sacate form is observed; while
the heart is a muscular organ it is still provided with
tubes and sacs.

144 TRUTH AND ERROR

In the muscular system every distinct muscle has
a cellate structure, and they are compounded into
groups on the cellate plan. Muscles when consid-
ered in phytogeny are found to develop into tendons
and tendons into bones; the same development is
discovered to a limited degree in ontogeny, so that
muscles, tendons and bones are homologous. The
cellate structure of bones is conspicuous, for they all
have the periosteum and nucleus.

In the reproductive systems both sacs and tubes
are found, all of cellate structure.

In the nervous system the differentiation between
sacs and tubes is carried to its highest degree. The
nerves proper are all tubular cellates. In the lowest
units they are cellate, and they are compounded as
cellates. In the ganglia they are sacate, and are
compounded as sacs. Certain of the ganglia have
osseous protection as vertebrae, and every vertebra is
a cellate structure as a bone with elaborate differ-
entiation in morphology. The vertebrae that have
united to form the cranium are extremely differ-
entiated as morphologic elements, but the most
extreme of morphologic elements is found in the
organs of sense, every organ having a distinct form,
and all preserving the cellate structure.

Then the systems of organs which we have just
described are themselves compounded into systems,
of which hint has already been given. While this
subject is vast and tempting, the purpose is sub-
served merely by giving a few illustrations ; and we
must forego systematic treatment. In the mouth
there are found elements of the digestive apparatus :
the circulatory apparatus, the muscular apparatus, as
muscles, tendons, and bones, and perhaps elements

HOMOLOGY 145

for reproductive purposes and certainly apparatus
for mental functions in the sense of taste. Perhaps
in all parts of the body all the five functions are per-
formed by apparatus provided for the purpose.
Finally, the entire animal has a sacate and tubular
structure, and is thus a grand cellate of a high order
of compounding.

The cellate homologies of the man are repeated in
all mammals, while the same facts can be seen in
birds, reptiles, batrachians and fishes, for all the
pentalogic classes present a vast hierarchy of homol-
ogies, which illustrate the theme of morphology.
Nor does the subject end with vertebrate morphol-
ogy, for the theme is illustrated in the homologies
found through articulates, mollusks, radiates, and
protozoa. That which we find in the pentalogic
classes of plants we find also in the pentalogic classes
of animals — a vast hierarchy of homologies.

Perhaps the great field yet to be cultivated in
morphology is in the study of the articulates,
especially among insects. The sudden transforma-
tions which they undergo in their life history permit
the examination of morphologic stages to such an
extent that morphology can be studied with all its
multitudinous phenomena, and a wealth of science
has already been accumulated as a heritage for the
army of scientists necessary to give us a complete
account of the insects of the world, among whom
are found tribes that vie almost with men in demotic
development.

We now see how homologies are extended from
atom to organism. There are homologies discovered
in the atoms, which has given rise to the theory that
the atoms discovered in the seventy substances are

146 TRUTH AND ERROR

not ultimate particles, and it must be remembered
that it rests only upon the validity of reasoning from
homologies, but that all deductive reasoning is based
on homologies; it may, therefore, be impossible to
reach an inductive demonstration of the complete
homology of ultimate particles, but the deductive
reasoning is perfect. Then molecules which cannot
be seen and cannot be manipulated as individual, but
can be discovered only by chemical apparatus, are
found by analysis and synthesis to exhibit many
homologies, and the science of chemistry undertakes
this enterprise.

The earth is a cellate body, and from facts
revealed by astronomy it is confidently affirmed that
the stars are cellate bodies. Finally, homologies
are found in plants and animals; thus there is a
hierarchy of homologies throughout the universe
which constitute a continuum, and logically no plane
of demarcation can be discovered which constitutes
an absolute gap. The continuum is not completely
demonstrated by induction, but is abundantly
demonstrated by deduction.

Homologies have a high development in the
organization of demotic bodies discovered in the
animals, especially as they are represented among
the higher insects, but more fully illustrated in the
organization of human society. The forms of
organization are various. In the tribes of the world
families are organized into clans, and clans into
phratries, and phratries into tribes, and tribes into
confederacies. In passing from savagery to barbar-
ism, the clan becomes the gens. In all the multi-
tudinous forms of tribal society, homologies have
been discovered. In the family husbands and

HOMOLOGY 147

wives, parents and children are found, and some-
times grandparents and more remote kindred are
included. In the gens consanguineal kinship is
reckoned in the female line ; in the tribe it is reck-
oned in both male and female lines, and ties of
affinity are observed. In the confederacy conven-
tional kinship is recognized, and other homologies
exist in multitudinous ways. For example, relative
age is recognized in the family, in the clan or in the
gens, in the tribe and in the confederacy, and to
carry out the homology age is often determined by
convention.

In national organizations another set of homologies
are founded on those of tribal organization. Thus,
in the United States we have the family, the town-
ship, the county, the state, and the nationality, and
homologous units are found in all civilized govern-
ments.

Whenever two or more bodies are homologous
they are identical, though they may at the same time
be different. Homology in form is thus trfe
reciprocal of likeness in kind, so that homologies
fall under the same law with kind, and it may be
affirmed that whatever is true of an object is true
of its homologue in so far as they are identical, which
is but another statement of the law already given in
classification, that whatever is true of a thing is true
of its class identity. We have seen that there is a
vast system of homologies extending throughout the
universe, commencing with perfect homology in the
simple element; but gradually differences appear,
becoming more marked as compounding proceeds
and differentiation is more marked, that is, there is
successive progress in variation from the simple to

14 TRUTH AND ERROR

the compound, and this variation appears as increas-
ing complexity. As things become compound they
also become complex.

In the foregoing chapters an attempt has been
made to show the relation which exists between
extension and unity, position and plurality, space
and number, form and kind, together with meta-
morphosis and metalogisis. Now it remains to show
the relation between organism and class, together
with a general statement of the relation between
morphology and classification. It has been shown
that a class is a series of kinds, and as a series it is a
disjunct group in a more extended series. It has
also been shown that a form undergoes a meta-
morphosis, and that an organism in its history repre-
sents a hierarchy of metamorphisms as exhibited in
homology. Now, we must observe that through
morphology classes are multiplied, for not only are
kinds and series classified, but forms are also syste-
matically grouped.

To investigate the structure of plants we dissect
them, and find that when the limit of cell structure
is reached and molecular structure appears, we are
compelled to pass from dissection to chemical
analysis. The highest molecule is protoplasm, but
the protoplasmic molecule is composed of molecules
of still lower orders until atoms are reached, when
chemical analysis fails and only logical anatysis
seems possible.

In investigating the homologies of plants and plant
structure we are thrown back upon the discovery of
likeness and unlikeness, or, in other terms, of
identity and difference ; and we reason about plants,
as these identities and differences have been dis-

HOMOLOGY 149

covered. The discovery of these identities and
differences is induction, the application of the laws
discovered is deduction.

What, then, is the significance of all these facts,
and why should we gather them from the highways
of morphology but for the lesson which they teach,
that all forms of animals, plants, rocks, and stars are
traced to the substrate of extension in the particle?
Extension traced through all its complicated rela-
tions of space, form, metamorphosis and organism is
found to be the ultimate substrate of them all.

Many extended particles incorporated in many
bodies have relations of position, space, form,
metamorphosis and organization, all of which are
included under the term morphology. These rela-
tions cannot exist by themselves, but can only be
considered by themselves, for relations of morphol-
ogy are concomitant with relations of classification,
dynamics and evolution in the concrete world.
Bodies can be analyzed only into particles, and the
particles still retain their properties, which may be
considered abstractly. If I were called upon to
nominate the fundamental error in the logic of
transcendental philosophy I should name it the fail-
ure to recognize the distinction between analysis
and abstraction. The failure to see this distinction
seems to have led Pythagoras to found a philosophy
upon number; it surely led Plato to found a philos-
ophy on form; it seems to have led Aristotle to
found a philosophy on force, and without doubt
Spencer fell into this error ; while it led the Scholas-
tics to found a philosophy upon being, and finally it
led the Idealists to found a philosophy upon thought.
Thus the five properties of matter have every one in

150 TRUTH AND ERROR

turn been taken as the substrate of a philosophy, and
as the substrate was an abstract the philosophies
have been abstractions. Metaphysics has been the
attempt to found a philosophy upon an abstract unit,
but science is the attempt to found a philosophy
upon a concrete unit.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to make
a summary exposition of the science of morphology,
for the purpose of showing the certitudes which
inhere in the science as distinguished from the
illusions of mythology defended by speculative
philosophy. In transcendental metaphysics the
realities of the world are held to be phenomena in
the sense that they are illusions, and are distin-
guished from noumena, which are the realities. Sci-
ence deals with phenomena, and scientific men hold
that phenomena are realities and noumena in the
sense of occult substrates are illusions. Transcen-
dental philosophy deals with noumena, and holds
them to be realities, and deems phenomena to be
illusions.

This is the issue between science and speculation,
and the contest is war to the knife of logic against
war to the blade of dialectic; but the knife has
form, while the blade has void.

In science one noumenon is space, the reciprocal
of form ; the corresponding noumenon in metaphysic
is space as void. Void space is a natural fallacy
to men in savagery, while yet the presence of
the ambient atmosphere is unknown, and the
surface of the earth seems to be an empty theater
for breath, wind, and storm existing as disparate
bodies having a ghostlike existence. Having
imagined an empty space, it still continues to exist

HOMOLOGY 151

in mythology as a void for the theater of gravity,
heat, light, electricity and magnetism, after the air
itself has been discovered and understood by all
civilized men. Now that this notion is dispelled
there is no void within the ken of man. All known
interspaces have been resolved into forms. If in the
depths of the infinitesimal void spaces exist between
the particles of ether, it may be well to await their
discovery ere we characterize them by assigning
properties to nothing.

CHAPTER XI

DYNAMICS

A citizen of a township must obey the laws of the
township. The same person is also a citizen of the
county subject to the laws of the county, a citizen
of the state subject to the laws of the state, a citizen
of the United States subject to the laws of the
United States, and finally he is a citizen of the
world, subject to international law. Thus a man
belongs to a hierarchy of governmental incorpora-
tions in which he may demand rights and must per-
form duties of allegiance.

In the same manner every atom of matter in the
lowest body exists in a hierarchy of bodies. An
atom of hydrogen exists in the molecule of water.
The same atom exists also in the sea, the earth-
moon body, the solar system, and the galaxy. Now
this atom of hydrogen partakes in the specific or
special mode of motion of every body in this
hierarchy. We may consider the motion of the
atom of hydrogen in the atom itself, if it is a com-
pound body as some chemists suppose ; then we may
consider it in the molecule, then in the tide, then in
the earth in rotation, then in the earth-moon body
on an axis within the earth, then in the earth in rev-
olution in the solar system, and then in the galaxy
with the solar system, and if there be a system of
galaxies we may consider it in such body.

This atom has components of path in an atom, in
a molecule, in the tide, in the earth, in the earth-

152

DYNAMICS 153

moon body, in the solar system body, in the galaxy
body, and finally in another system which includes
the galaxy, if there be such a system. If we con-
sider the path of an atom in any one of the incor-
porations in the hierarchy, we can describe it in
terms of dimensions of space, as space is limited by
the periphery of that particular body ; but when we
attempt to describe its motion in two different mem-
bers of the hierarchy, we are compelled to enlarge
our conception of space, for the path of a particle in
the atom is modified by its path in the molecule.
Then if we consider the path of the atom in the tide
we must still further modify our concept of it ; then
if we consider also the path of the atom in the ter-
restrial motion about the axis of the earth, we must
again modify our concept of it ; then if we consider
also its path in the earth-moon body, the solar sys-
tem body, and the galaxy body, we have at last a con-
cept of the path of the atom in a hierarchy of bodies.
If we desire, therefore, to conceive of the path fol-
lowed by the atom of hydrogen directed by all its
incorporations combined, we must imagine it
determined by all bodies of the hierarchy, and thus
to be spiral or vortical. I shall hereafter call this
path a hierarchal path.

Descartes conceived this path to be vortical, and
taught that the ether in moving in a vortical path
carried with it the celestial bodies, and thus
explained their revolution. I believe that he prop-
erly conceived the nature of the path which a par-
ticle describes in a hierarchy of bodies, but of the
cause of this path he was in error when he considered
that the whole body of ether describes the same path
in a vortex.

154 TRUTH AND ERROR

We may describe the motion of a particle in any
one of its incorporations, neglecting it in the other
members of the hierarchy, and such a description is
legitimate if it be understood as motion in the one
incorporation ; or we may describe the motion of a
particle in two incorporations, but in order to do so
it is necessary to use the terms of the space of the
higher incorporation. This plan must be continued
through all the incorporations if we try to describe
all of the deflections of path which are experienced
by the atom. If we consider the path of a particle
of matter in every one of the hierarchy of bodies
severally, we get as many systems of motion as there
are bodies, and they seem, when thus narrowly and
imperfectly considered, to be incongruous ; but when
we consider all of these paths concomitantly as
hierarchal motion in terms of the space of the high-
est body, they are made congruous.

Every particle in the universe is in motion, which
motion is probably constant in rate of speed.
Motion is not only speed, but also path. While
the speed in the ultimate particle is constant, the
path is variable in direction. This is the proposi-
tion I am trying to maintain.

Of ponderable matter, as it is found in terrestrial
and celestial systems, all particles are making a
grand excursion of the universe. There is no star
that does not proceed on this journey, nor is there
any body of matter in the earth which does not
proceed with the earth in its journey. Ethereal mat-
ter does not seem to proceed in this manner from
position to position throughout the universe, but the
motion of each particle seems to be confined to an
environment of other particles, and vibrates back and

DYNAMICS 155

forth or around and around within its narrow envi-
ronment. A particle of ponderable matter never
returns to the position which it occupies at any one
instant of time, so far as we can determine by rea-
soning. Every position occupied by a particle is
instantaneously evacuated, and another particle,
either of ponderable matter or of ethereal matter,
takes its place.

As there is a hierarchy of bodies, and as there is
a hierarchy of paths for every particle of ponderable
matter, so there is a hierarchy of freedoms of motion.
Take three rods, fasten them together by their cen-
tral points so that they extend in coordinate direc-
tions. The three rods will constitute a body of rods,
and although the three are incorporated, that is,
fixed to one another, the body has three degrees of
freedom. Fix the ends of these rods to a stone
quarry, and the three-rod body becomes a com-
ponent part of the earth body, but still has three
degrees of freedom. Then the same three-rod body
has three degrees of freedom in the earth-moon
body, the solar system body, and the galaxy body.
Now we are compelled to believe, by reasoning
based on facts observed in modern time, that the
molecular bodies and the atomic bodies of the three-
rod body have every one three degrees of freedom.
This reasoning in molecular science is no less cogent
than that in astronomical science, for chemistry
gives the same freedom to atoms and molecules that
astronomy gives to stars and systems.

We are compelled to conceive of the rigidity of the
solid state as the homologue of the astronomical
state, and as we know that the rigidity of the
astronomical state is a mode of established motion,

156 TRUTH AND ERROR

so we conclude that the rigidity of the solid state is
a mode of established motion. Thus the concept is
made that man stands between two realms of bodies,
the vast or astronomical and the minute or molec-
ular, and that which is observed in astronomy is
repeated in chemistry. The astronomic world is the
correlative of the molecular world. If there is no
gap in this reasoning every particle of matter has a
constant rate of speed which is subdivided among
the paths of the hierarchy of incorporations to which
it belongs. To this form we are compelled to reduce
the concept of the persistence of motion or the cor-
relation of forces; for if speed is constant in the
atom the forces of the universe are correlative, or,
to use a better term, are reciprocal. This conclusion
that speed is constant in the particle is necessitated,
and hence is valid if we accept the fundamental doc-
trine of modern chemistry that bodies are composed
of discrete particles.

Motion can be diverted in any body of the
hierarchy without increasing the speed of the
particle. Nature never seems to add to or to sub-
stract from the speed of the particle, although the
motion of a molar body may seem to be derived from
another body so long as we consider only the molar
motion. But when we consider the motion of the
particles of the body in their higher and lower incor-
porations, we find that the apparent added motion is
deflection. This is illustrated in the earth-moon
body when it rotates about its axis, and thus deflects
the motions both of the earth and the moon in their
common paths around the sun. So, if a body sus-
pended above the earth falls to the earth, its path
with the earth in its course is deflected, and the path

DYNAMICS 157

of the earth in its course is also deflected. In a fall-
ing body we observe not only the deflection of ter-
restrial motion, but the falling body itself is
composed of molecules and atoms which are in
motion, and the earth also is composed of molecules
and atoms in motion, and these paths are also
deflected by the falling of the body. The deflection
of their terrestrial motion is but the reciprocal of their
deflection in molecular motion. When a body, say
of water, loses heat it gains the strength of structure,
which is a force, and hence a mode of motion which
it exhibits as ice. The body does not transmit its
speed of particle to another body, but only induces a
corresponding change in that other body from solid
strength or rigidity to heat motion by deflecting
molecular paths. Thus motion as speed cannot be
dissipated. When water is evaporated the particles
of vapor which are produced still have the same
amount of motion as speed, and when water and
carbonic acid are built into wood, their motion
remains as the solid strength of the wood in another
mode of molecular path. Here we see that rigidity
or solid strength is a mode of motion as path. Thus
it is that motion as speed is persistent in the particle,
but as path it is variable.

Every particle in the wooden ball rolling on the
floor has astronomical path, molecular path, and
molar path. Consider one of these particles moving
with the three kinds of motion as three constituents
of path, and we realize that its speed is very
great, and that the path which it traverses is greatly
composite ; that is, composed of deflected parts, in a
hierarchy of bodies. If such a particle had its com-
posite path straightened into a right-line path it

158 TRUTH AND ERROR

would quickly pass out of the sphere of the solar
system from whatever point within the system it
might start, and in whatever direction the right-line
path extended. But the molecule remains within
the solar system because its stellar path is composite,
and it remains within the ball because its molar path
is composite, and it remains within the molecule
because its molecular path is composite.

When the ball was started molar path was devel-
oped, and when it stopped that molar path was
ended. We must not suppose that molar motion
as speed came out of nothing and vanished into
nothing. We resort to preexisting molecular motion
to explain it. We say that the molar motion was
derived from the molecular motion of the hand that
set the ball rolling, and that it was transformed into
molecular motion in the wall which destroyed the
molar motion. In making this explanation we
assume that motion as speed went out of the hand
into the ball, and then out of the ball into the wall.
Is this true? Was the speed of the molecular motion
in the hand diminished and the speed of the molec-
ular motion in the wall increased? Did motion as
speed go out of the hand into the ball? There was a
change in the motion of the hand, and a change in
the motion of the ball. In what did this change
consist? We know that in part at least it consisted
in a change of paths. The molecular paths in the
hand must have had their directions changed, and
the molecular paths in the ball must have had their
directions changed. Is this change of direction all,
or is there a transference of speed so that one loses
while the other gains? The whole problem is nar-
rowed to this issue : That which we call acceleration

DYNAMICS 159

pertains wholly to deflection, or in very small part
to speed, as loss of speed by one and gain by
another.

There is still another set of relations to be con-
sidered. A body is composed of particles ; in order
that they should remain within the sphere of the
body their paths must be composite, and in order
that their paths may be composite there must be a
sufficient number of internal collisions to deflect
them and retain them within that sphere. If the
body itself is moved the paths of the several par-
ticles in the average must thus be rendered less
composite ; that is, the number of collisions must be
diminished. The motion of the body as such, there-
fore, is accomplished by diminishing the deflections
within the body, and thus straightening their paths.
The translatory motion of a body is a straightening
of the paths of the particles of which the body is com-
posed.

Imagine a man walking in a circle of ten feet
radius. The sphere of his motion is within the cir-
cumference. He may soon walk a mile and never
be more than twenty feet away from any given point
in the circumference ; change his direction so that
his path is straightened, and he may soon be a mile
away. A body of men walking in a circle remain
together as a body within the circumference of the
circle as it moves with the earth ; change their paths
to a cycloid directed to a distant point, and the body
of men will move away in that direction; change
their paths to parallel right lines, and as a body they
may soon be a mile away and still in a circle. A
division of an army may be maneuvering in a field
as divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, com-

l6o TRUTH AND ERROR

panics, and platoons, and yet remain in the same
field enclosed by a wall ; without walking the indi-
vidual men with any greater speed you may march
them to another twenty miles away, and they will
lie down to rest at night with no less fatigue
than if they had been maneuvering in the enclosed
field.

In the same manner the molecules of the wooden
ball are in motion within the theater of the ball, so
that they do not pass beyond its boundaries; yet
impose upon each molecule a change of direction in
such a manner that they all move a little more in
one course, and a translation of the ball is affected
by a change of direction in the motion of its constit-
uent molecules, and the ball still remains as an
incorporated body. It is thus possible to explain the
molar motion of the ball as a change in direction of
the motion of its molecular parts, without assuming
an increase of speed in the parts, but only a develop-
ment of speed in the body by the deflection of its
particles. By such an assumption the molar motion
perceived by vision would be legitimately derived
from the molecular motion known by higher reason,
and appear as a change of direction in the molecular
motions of the ball. No motion as speed would be
created or destroyed, while the apparent molar
motion would be explained by a change of direction
in molecular motions, very minute as compared with
the composite paths of the several molecules and
atoms.

When we consider the total motions of the atoms
of the ball shot from a cannon's mouth, an incon-
ceivably small change of direction in the motion of
every atom, as compared with the complexity of its

DYNAMICS l6l

path, would fully account for the flight of the ball as
projected by dynamite.

Now we know of deflection and that it arises from
collision, and we know of no other change in motion.
Acceleration as increase of speed cannot, in the
nature of the case, be demonstrated, for it may always
be explained as deflection, and can never be
explained without deflection. If acceleration is
explained as deflection, it is explained by referring
it to a known cause, and adequately explained.

It is illegitimate to assume an unknown and
unknowable cause when a known cause is sufficient
for the explanation. We may, therefore, affirm that
the acceleration of a body is the deflection of its
particles.

At the Brooklyn meeting of the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science in 1894, I read
a paper on this subject, in which I tried to demon-
strate that motion is constant in the particle. In
the foregoing statement I have put this demon-
stration in another form. I now propose to give
it in a new form by the method of reductio ad
absurdum.

Newton taught that inertia is resistance to change
of state, either as rest or direction of motion, and
Newton also referred to the ambiguity of the term
rest without pointing out the nature of this ambi-
guity. We have seen from the foregoing discussion
that rest is absence of molar motion, and that molar
motion is created by deflecting molecular motion.
Hence the acceleration of a body is reduced to the
deflection of its particles, as we have already seen.
Following Newton, it is taught in the text-books of
physics that inertia is resistance to deflection and

162 TRUTH AND ERROR

acceleration; therefore, reduced to the simplest
terms, inertia is resistance to deflection.

PROPOSITION

When two bodies collide their particle paths are
deflected, but their particle speeds are unchanged.

First, assume that one body, A, has the mode of
motion called rest, and that after the collision it has
molar motion; then its molecular motions are
deflected. Then assume that their speeds are
accelerated ; then the particle motions of B also must
be deflected and accelerated, if action and reaction
are equal in deflection and speed. Therefore,
motion as force is created, which is absurd. But
Newton's law says that action and reaction are equal
and in opposite directions; therefore, action and
reaction result only in particle deflection.

Second, assume that A is at rest, and that at col-
lision B is brought to rest, and thus that B has the
speed of its particles diminished; then motion as
force is annihilated, which is absurd, but action and
reaction being equal as deflection no speed is lost to
either.

Third, assume that the particles of A are deflected
and their speed accelerated, and that the increase of
particle speed in A is derived from the particle
speed of B ; then action and reaction as speed are
not equal, but while both are equally deflected A
has more speed, B less, and the more equals the less,
with opposite signs. Then A after collision, having
more speed than B after collision, has more inertia,
which is absurd ; therefore, when bodies collide their
particle paths are deflected, but their particle speeds
are unchanged.

DYNAMICS 163

Let this argument be stated in brief:

First, the tendency of modern investigation is to
explain all forces as derived from modes of motion.
Great progress has been made in this direction, and
the theory is widely accepted.

Second, all understood forces are collisions.

Third, if all forces are collisions the motions from
which they result obey the third law of motion, that
action and reaction are equal and in opposite direc-
tions. By this law it is seen that no motion as speed
can be lost or gained by any particle of matter.

Fourth, by collision paths can be changed, but
motion as speed cannot be transmitted by one par-
ticle to another.

Fifth, in starting or stopping molar motion there
is an apparent creation and annihilation of motion,
but this appearance is known to be an illusion. It
is known to be in part deflection, and can all be
thus explained ; and if the third law of motion is
valid it is thus explained.

It must clearly be understood that the* above argu-
ment does not deny that molar motion as speed can
be created or destroyed ; it simply affirms that molar
motion cannot be created from nothing, and that it
cannot be annihilated, but that it comes from molec-
ular motion and returns to molecular motions. Every
particle of which we have knowledge is a constituent
of many bodies in a hierarchy of bodies, and what is
here affirmed is that the acceleration of a body in
speed is deflection of its particles, that the particles
themselves are not accelerated in speed, and further
that embodiment itself is always a result of deflec-
tion in the particle embodied. A molar body may
have its molar motion increased or diminished in

164 TRUTH AND ERROR

speed by deflecting its molecular motions. If the
speed of a molar body be changed, the direction of
its molecular particles must necessarily be changed.
This proposition is self-evident. The third law of
motion is equally simple. The law here demon-
strated affirms that acceleration in one embodiment
is deflection in another, and it makes valid Newton's
law, which would be an absurdity were the law here
demonstrated untrue ; and if untrue, the persistence
of motion is an absurdity, and with it the persistence
of energy falls to the ground.

When the concept of persistence of speed in the
particle is once gained, there follows from it a series
of corollaries which are demonstrations of axioms of
scientific experience, but which otherwise have no
demonstration. The following are examples:

PROPOSITION

Gravity, as inversely proportional to the square of
the distance, is persistent in the mass.

Assuming* that force is motion and gravity force,
then if the particle can lose any of its speed it can
lose gravity, which is absurd ; and if in the collision
of a body speed is transferred from its particles to
the particles of another body, then the other body
must weigh more, which also is absurd; therefore,
gravity, as inversely proportional to the square of the
distance, is persistent in the mass.

Speed is not a property which can run away by
leaping from one particle to another and from one
body to another; it is not an occult something — a
mystery, a nothing. It is the speed of a particle.

We have seen that when particles in motion have
incident paths they collide and their paths are

DYNAMICS 165

deflected; hence, all motion is directed motion.
Collision or impulse is the first mode of force in
which action and reaction are exhibited. Then we
note how right-line paths are divided into com-
ponents by collision, becoming deflected paths;
then how by systematic collisions they may be
developed into revolution. Then we consider that
particles may be incorporated in a body with their
several particles revolving around a common center,
and this revolution of the particles is rotation of the
body. Thus by incorporation the motions of
particles may be correlated by rotation and revolu-
tion, as exhibited in celestial bodies.

In the case of two stellar orbs revolving about a
common center, as the earth and the moon, it is plain
that gravity causes the deflection of both bodies
inversely proportional to their masses. Here
acceleration is chiefly deflection, being positive at
perigee and negative at apogee. So, in the revolu-
tion of the sun and the earth about a common axis,
acceleration is chiefly deflection, being positive at
perihelion and negative at aphelion. Thus we have
a well-known astronomical example of acceleration,
and find it deflection and increase or decrease of
bodily speed, and now we must refer this accelera-
tion of speed in the body to deflection in the par-
ticles of which it is composed.

It is taught in astronomy that in the revolution of
a planet the area of the radius vector is equal for
equal times. This doctrine is made simple and plain
when the nature of acceleration is understood.

In an ethereal medium of particles moving with a
persistent speed, two bodies will mutually intercept
collisions with the ethereal medium inversely pro-

l66 TRUTH AND ERROR

portional to the square of their distance apart, which
is an explanation of the law of gravity, and is the
theory of La Sage in terms of motion.

On page 642, Vol. iv, article 22, of Bowditch's
translation of La Place's Mechanique Cdeste it is
stated :

"If gravitation be produced by the impulse of a fluid
directed towards the center of the attracting body, the preced-
ing analysis, relative to the impulse of the solar light, will give
the secular equation depending on the successive transmission
of the attractive force."

After proving this proposition and obtaining the
secular equation of the attracting body from the
successive transmission of gravity, the cause of
the moon is discussed, and La Place decides that:

"We must suppose that the gravitating fluid has a velocity
which is at least a hundred millions of times greater than that
of light; or at least we must suppose, in its action on the moon,
that it has at least that velocity to counteract her gravity
towards the earth. Therefore, mathematicians may suppose,
as they have heretofore done, that the velocity of the gravi-
tating fluid is infinite."

The theory of La Sage is stated in terms of a fluid
transmitted from one body to another. We now
know that waves, not fluids, are transmitted in the
case of heat and light, and in a like manner gravity
as deflection must be considered as wave action or
vibration in some form. With these principles the
instantaneous action of gravity is simple and self-
evident, for speed is not transmitted, but only
deflection is caused.

Every particle has constant motion as speed which
cannot be increased or diminished, and the absurdity
of perpetual motion should be called the absurdity

DYNAMICS 167

of perpetual collision between two bodies without
other deflection. The particles collide because of
impinging paths ; they are deflected and their paths
are turned apart, and they cannot be made to collide
again until other external collisions bring their
paths together. If the particle A is deflected after
one collision, to be once more deflected, another col-
lision is necessary. It is thus that the absurdity of
perpetual collision can be simply demonstrated.

After such an analysis the doctrine of virtual
velocities is self-evident ; and there are many other
consequences of this law which, properly under-
stood, would make many propositions of physics self-
evident.

Motion as speed is constant in the particle. The
particle, of whatever order it may be in the mem-
bers of the hierarchy, is accelerated by deflecting its
particles. The principles or laws of dynamics are
all corollaries of this fundamental law ; hence dynam-
ics may be taught as a deductive science. Thus
we have the mathematics of number, the mathe-
matics of space, and the mathematics of motion, all
fundamentally deductive sciences.

CHAPTER XII

COOPERATION

We have already discovered the nature of motion
in its absolute as speed and its relative as path. The
speed of the ultimate particle has never been
measured; but bodies as such have their specific
speeds and one is greater than another. Speed of
a body is the rate at which it changes its position,
regardless of the change of position of its particles
to one another. The speed of one body may be
taken as the measure of the rate of speed of another,
and the process used gives rise to the formula of
L-j-T. The length of path is divided by the time in
which it is traversed. Thus to convert motion into
number it must first be converted into terms of
space.

We have discovered, in preceding chapters, the
transmutations which motions undergo by incor-
poration when they become forces. In order that
they may be treated mathematically, it is necessary
that they should be resolved into the quantitative
categories and expressed in numbers. This resolu-
tion is accomplished by measurement, and different
formulae are employed which in mathematical science
are called the equations of acceleration, force,
impulse, energy and power. They are all devices
for reducing force to motion and motion to number.

In molecular bodies motions are correlated in a
manner yet unknown, but molecules are known to
have interior motions exhibited in response to

1 68

COOPERATION 169

motions in the ether as its particles impinge on
ponderable matter. The correlated structural
motions of the molecule may be transmuted by col-
lision with ethereal particles and be converted into
heat — a mode of motion — so that which is structural
motion will appear as heat, and if the transmutation
is carried to a sufficient degree the structure of a
molecular body will be destroyed, for by heat mol-
ecules are reduced to lower molecules or to atoms.
Thus what appears in the molecule as structural
motion appears in the particle as heat ; and when
disparate particles are incorporated in a molecule
heat becomes molecular or structural motion. This
may be stated in another way. By incorporation
vibratory motion becomes structural motion; by
decorporation structural motion becomes vibratory
motion. We know that in stellar systems that which
is structural motion in the system is vibratory or
rhythmic motion in the particle ; and we may con-
ceive that stellar rhythms might be so modified in
elongation or other ways that the structure of the
system would be destroyed. Hence we may con-
jecture that in the molecule the rhythms of the
particles become the structure of the molecule when
these rhythms are systematic. There is much in the
phenomena of motion which suggests that such is the
case. In a previous chapter a brief statement was
made to exhibit the universality of rhythm. That
structural motion is always systematic vibration
seems worthy of acceptation as a working hypothesis.
The form of force known as energy may appear
in another phase as a succession of distinct forces
impinging upon a single body producing effects which
remain with that body. Energy in this phase is

I 70 TRUTH AND ERROR

called process; thus a succession of waves of air may
beat upon a tree and then action and reaction are
successively involved in vibration. It is a process
by which gravity deflects the stars into revolutions
and it must always be a process by which particles
are deflected while they are incorporated in bodies.
A multitude of processes appearing in inorganic
nature have already been exhibited, while processes
which appear in the vegetal realm were noted.

In nature processes are developed into modes of
force known as powers. The meteor falls upon the
earth and acts as a hammer. Boulders are carried
by streams and act as hammers and produce effects
as such which the particles acting separately could
not produce. Thus collisions which might result
simply in deflection if the particles acted severally,
produce fracture when they act conjointly. Particles
may produce pressure when they act separately, but
when they act conjointly pressures may lead to
rupture. By the device of the lever forces are
multiplied in effect without increase or diminution
of force as such ; the same is true in the pulley, the
wedge and the screw.

All directed motions are motions subjected to con-
ditions. These conditions are causes which produce
effects, so that the consequent condition differs
from the antecedent condition; that is, the effect
differs from the cause. Two bodies collide and their
paths are deflected ; the antecedent direction differs
from the consequent direction. Thus forces are
motions subjected to causes which produce changes
of condition which we call effects. Here we see
again that there can be no motion without causation,
and while they cannot exist apart, they can be

COOPERATION 171

considered separately; but the separation is only
ideal.

It is now proposed to give an outline of the forces
as they appear in the different realms of nature to
exhibit the universality of cooperation.

In the ethereal realm we recognize light, magnet-
ism, heat, gravity and electricity. These are usually
known as motions which are measured in amplitude
and rate, and the kinds are distinguished as numeri-
cally different rates of vibration. Thus classification
is directly resolved into enumeration, and again num-
ber is kind. This is illustrated in the classification of
light as colors which depend upon rates of vibration.

Something more than motion is manifested by the
ether.

Light is the expression of ether as number and
kind in the colors. Magnetism is the expression of
space and form in position and direction. Heat is
the expression of motion as force. Gravity is the
expression of time as causation. Electricity is the
expression of affinity as electrolysis. When the
electric discharge is manifested by the electric
sparks or the flash of lightning, it is manifested as
light. Thus ether manifests the pentalogic con-
comitants both in quantitative and classific properties.

It manifests these properties by producing effects
on ponderable matter, which effects appear to the
senses and to the reasoning faculties as exhibiting
quantitative and categoric properties ; for example,
light exhibits number to the mind, and when analyzed
by the prism it exhibits color or kinds of light.
Magnetism exhibits space relations in polarity and
form relations in attraction. Heat exhibits motion
in the particles of bodies as vibrations which may be

172 TRUTH AND ERROR

increased in amplitude until the incorporation of the
body is destroyed, when only space relations appear.
Gravity manifests itself in pressure as continuous
action, which appears as acceleration of speed in the
falling body and as the cause of the fall. Electrol-
ysis exhibits decorporation or the dissolution of the
bonds of affinity, and reincorporation 6r the estab-
lishment of new bonds of affinity.

In the ethereal realm particles in inconceivable
numbers cooperate in the production of effects in
multiplied ways.

In the stellar realm the ethereal forces are found,
for the stars exhibit the phenomena of light, mag-
netism, heat, gravity and electricity through the
medium of the ether, not only because the ether
surrounds the stellar bodies, but also that it seems to
permeate them.

There are molecular forces believed to exist in
stars as chemism ; but the theater upon which their
action may be studied is on the surface of the earth.

The forces exhibited in stars and in the systems of
which the stars are particles are centripetal and
centrifugal, as rotatory and revolutional. Gravity
is a force which acts upon stellar bodies through a
medium and which is transmuted into rotation and
revolution and is again manifested in the figures of
the bodies of the solar system, for they have the
spheroidal form.

Thus the ether cooperates with the stellar orbs by
transmitting light, magnetism, heat, gravity and
-electricity from one to another. These transmis-
sions are made not by extracting them from one orb
and transporting them to another as if they were
bodies, but by inducing the motions in ether by which

COOPERATION 173

they are expressed, which in turn are induced by the
ether in the body receiving them as an effect the
cause of which is in the emitting body. In the
language of the sciences of the ether the five ethereal
concomitants are called radiant forces, but perhaps it
would conduce to sound reasoning if they were des-
ignated radiant causations.

So also in the celestial realm body cooperates with
body. The orbs of the solar system cooperate with
one another in producing the solar system itself as a
body, and they cooperate with one another through
the medium of the ether in radiant causation as
reciprocal cause and effect.

In the terrestrial realm the spherical bodies coop-
erate with one another in producing strains and
stresses which induce chemical reaction, and thus are
the cause of the special mode of motion which we
call chemism. So sphere cooperates with sphere,
formation with formation, roc"k with rock, molecule
with molecule in the reincorporation of mineral sub-
stances, which is a reincorporation of forces as well
as of forms.

Molecules of air cooperate with molecules of air
in a wind. Molecules of water cooperate with mole-
cules of water in a rain ; molecules of air and water
cooperate in a storm, while molecules of air, water
and particles of dust cooperate with one another that
vapor may be transformed into water antecedent to
the storm. Molecules of water cooperate with
molecules of water to constitute the stream, the cur-
rent, the wave and the glacier, while molecules of
rock cooperate in the boulder as it grinds its way,
cooperating with other rocks in corrading the
channel.

174 TRUTH AND ERROR

The terrestrial spheres cooperate with one another
in all geological processes. Upheaval and sub-
sidence with flexure and faulting are produced by
the cooperation of the nucleus in yielding to pressure
derived from the building of formations with material
transported by the river, which was disintegrated by
the action of rain which fell as storm blown by the
wind caused by unequal temperatures induced by the
ether caused by the heat of the sun. Endless illus-
trations can be given of cooperation in the terrestrial
realm.

In the vegetal realm by the cooperation of pro-
toplasmic particles chemical force is transformed
into vital force and processes cooperate with one
another in the same body. The process of absorp-
tion by the rootlets cooperates with the process of
transportation to the leaves, and here they both
cooperate with the process of transpiration, and
these cooperate with the processes of osmosis in the
redistribution of the materials to the growing parts,
and these again cooperate with the process of
assimilation where the growth takes place, and all
of these processes cooperate with the process of
reproduction by which the seed is formed.

Beside the cooperation in production above noticed,
an additional cooperation is discovered in the higher
forms, where individuals cooperate as sexes in their
reproductive function. The vegetal forces cooperate
with terrestrial forces in the disintegration of rocks
into soils, in which function they also cooperate with
chemism, gravity, and ethereal force. Thus coopera-
tion in the vegetal realm extends throughout the
universe.

In the zoonomic realm all other forces of nature

COOPERATION 175

cooperate with the forces of animal life to accomplish
motility. That the organism itself is a system of
cooperating powers in which the function of every
organ is necessary to the continuance of the func-
tion of the others is commonplace doctrine.

First we note that metabolism consists of two
correlative systems, one of anabolism, the other of
catabolism ; that is, the one builds up, the other tears
down. They are not only correlative, but to a large
extent they are contemporaneous. In fact, there can
be no building up without tearing down ; that is, no
placement which is not displacement, except that
material may be stored adjacent to organs as fatty
substances, to be used as needed after it has thus
been stored.

In the animal body functional cooperation becomes
still more efficient by more thorough specialization,
when multiple like organs of like functions are
eradicated.

In animal life the body is moved by the differ-
entiated movements of its component parts. The
body as a particle moves by impact from external
influences in the higher incorporation of the earth,
but it also moves as an individual by the differentia-
tion of its own internal movements ideally deter-
mined. This force is motility as it is exhibited in
all locomotion, by which we mean all motions of the
parts of the body which are directly related to the
environment by which the whole body or any part
of the body may be carried from one place to
another.

Through motility the property of judgment
becomes the guide of the animal body, determining
the movements of the parts, stimulating the function

176 TRUTH AND ERROR

of one organ, inhibiting the function of another and
causing them all to cooperate to a mentally deter-
mined end. Judgment thus controls function and
through it produces locomotion, by which the parts
of the body are changed in relation to one another,
and by this power of changing the place of parts
the power of changing the place of the whole is
accomplished in the more restricted sense expressed
by the term locomotion. Thus we make a distinc-
tion between vitality as a method of molecular
motion and motility as a method of organic motion
directed by opposing or correlative muscles, motility
being thus directed by contraction and relaxation,
which results in all forms of locomotion. In this
manner food is masticated, swallowed, and moved
along the intestinal canal and delivered to the cir-
culatory system by appropriate muscles ; then it is
taken up by the circulatory system and moved by
the heart with certain accessory muscles, and as
the circulation proceeds excretory materials are
discharged, all by appropriate muscles. There are
also muscles for the movement of the limbs, all
adapted to locomotion. Then there are muscles
necessary for the reproductive functions and finally
there are muscles for the movement of organs of
sense. All of the motions thus indicated in a sum-
mary manner are the result of the forces which we
call motility to distinguish it from vitality, which is
molecular force. Motility is controlled by metab-
olism, and is the metabolism of opposing muscles
where one contracts and the other relaxes. The
reason for explaining contraction and relaxation in
this manner was set forth in a previous chapter.
We thus see how the processes of metabolism and

COOPERATION 177

motility cooperate. We also see that all of the
organs of one system, as that of digestion, or that of
circulation and excretion, cooperate. We also see
that systems cooperate with systems. Finally it
must be noted that all of the other systems cooperate
under the direction of the nervous system, and are
thus obedient to mind, being under the control of
volition, which is choice of activity, which is the choice
of affinity — the mutual selection of particles of
matter for molecular association. If all of this
reasoning is valid, affinity is molecular choice in the
animate body, and we may hence conclude that all
affinity is molecular choice, as it seems to be, for
chemists who do not ignore affinity never find any
other way of rendering the facts into language. So
that affinity is practically synonymous with selection.
I will to cross the street, I will to walk, I will to set
the organs of walking in motion, and I accomplish
it by controlling the affinities of molecules in metab-
olism. Thus a system of organs has been developed
by which muscular metabolism may be accomplished
by a constant supply of new material for anabolism,
and a constant discharge of waste material by catab-
olism.

We cannot conceive or express these facts in any
way except by teleologic concepts. It is now a
fundamental doctrine of evolution that the organism
is developed through the accumulation of effects by
individuals in successive generations. Not that each
individual in the hereditary line has such a concept
of the future that he could foretell the ultimate result,
but that he had such a concept of the immediate
future that he purposely planned and executed
immediate action, and while a perfect state was not

178 TRUTH AND ERROR

known so that every action was the right action for
the ultimate benefit of the race, yet the judgments
of action were usually judgments of immediate
benefit to be derived, and these judgments resulted
in action, whether good or evil, for of necessity they
were followed by action without waiting for their
verification by experience. We have already seen
that judgments of intellection do not become judg-
ments of cognition until they are verified. Judg-
ments of action result in immediate action, and are
verified after the act only when they appear as senti-
ments of good or evil to control the will.

Let us see how this control of the functions is
accomplished, and what part the different portions
of the system take in the mental activities as they
control the mechanical action. The brain seems to be
the organ of mentation, but there are ganglia in the
different mechanical organs which take a subordinate
part in the general system of mentation in locally
controlling motility by exciting or inhibiting activity.
It is not necessary that the brain should deal with
every muscle, but only with general ideas of action,
while the ganglia control the details of activity, for
there is a hierarchy of authorities which ramify to
every cell particle in the system. Thus the brain
has the means of inciting metabolism in every
particle of the body. This is the machinery of habit
by which customary actions are rendered apparently
automatic. By an analogous process of reasoning
we must conclude that every particle of matter in the
system has judgment as consciousness and inference,
and that these judgments are transmitted by the
sensory nerves to ganglia in a collecting hierarchy
which finally reaches the brain. The organs of sense

COOPERATION 179

sending their judgments by the sensory nerves from
the exterior, the organ of feeling from the interior,
and we are compelled to infer that every particle of
matter in the animate body has judgment ; and that
in the organs of sense they have judgments of cog-
nition, but in the mechanical organs they have judg-
ments of good and evil. Then we may consistently
infer that the ganglia are organs of conception, and
we come back to the statement that the brain is the
organ of mentation, which does not deal with judg-
ments individually, but only witlj concepts.

In reaction animals cooperate with plants, rocks,
orbs and ethereal bodies. The systems of coopera-
tion of which we have made mention are developed
into a higher sphere, and a new mode is discovered
in human activities, as every man cooperates with
his environment. We have seen how in motility the
internal motions of the body are converted into
external motions by deforming the body itself. By
motility as expressed in locomotion, the animal body
can change the relation of its parts, and thus of the
whole body in relation to external parts, while all
such changes of relation are in obedience to mind.
The animal body, therefore, can move itself in rela-
tion to external bodies in a limited manner, and can
thus impinge upon them and cooperate with external
bodies at will.

In the cooperation of animal with animal, societies
are organized. These societies are highly developed
and best illustrated in human life. Men, through
activities, cooperate with other men. We thus have
a vast assemblage of cooperations, but in these activi-
ties the man must necessarily cooperate with plants,
rocks, orbs, and ether as well as with other men.

l8o TRUTH AND ERROR

The activities in which men engage are all designed
to accomplish purposes, and in order that these ends
may be reached, man invents by minute increments
sundry agencies by which they may more adequately
be reached. In order that we may understand this
subject, consider the purposes to be accomplished.
By a careful examination of all human activities and
the purposes directly subserved, it will be found that
they are naturally grouped in five classes. First,
man pursues pleasure, and those things which give
him pleasure are sought. These are the ambrosial,
decorative, athletic, divinatory, and fine-art pleas-
ures. Second, man naturally pursues welfare in length
of life and abundance of health, and seeks to avoid
disease and death. By these are produced those
activities which are called industries. Under indus-
tries we have to consider kind, form, force, history
and purpose. Third, for pleasure and welfare man
has found it well to associate, and to promote these
associations he finds it necessary to regulate conduct.
He therefore naturally pursues justice, and that
gives rise to institutions which are constitutive,
legislative, executive, operative, and judicative. This
leads to a fourth form of activity, which again divides
into two forms, activity of expression and activity of
reception. Thus it is that man invents languages
which are emotional, gestural, oral, written, and
technical. Fifth ; but man in the pursuit of pleasure,
welfare, justice and expression discovers that he
makes many mistakes, and that pain, misery, injus-
tice and misunderstanding are secured instead of the
desired ends. He thus finds it advisable to pursue
wisdom, and organizes the necessary agencies.
Therefore these are the agencies for the increase and

COOPERATION l8l

diffusion of knowledge, observation, acculturation,
education, publication and research ; for this diffusion
it becomes necessary to teach and to learn; so
research and instruction appear and become pursuits
of life for wisdom. These pursuits of wisdom imply
both teaching and learning.

Now, we have pleasure, welfare, justice, expres-
sion, and wisdom as the purpose of the five grand
classes of activities. These activities are indis-
solubly associated, for it is found that one end
cannot be accomplished without accomplishing them
all. The act which is designed for pleasure becomes
pain if it does not conduce to welfare; the act
designed for welfare may decrease life if justice is
not secured. The pursuit of justice may result in
injustice if truth is neglected. The end pursued for
truth may lead to error if wisdom is not reached.
All of the permutations between pleasure, wel-
fare, justice, expression and wisdom may be ex-
amined, and forever it will be found that they
are indissolubly connected, and must cooperate
in order that the end may be reached by the in-
dividual.

At the same time the individuals have their
activities differentiated, so that the labors of every
man are to a greater or less extent distinguished
from the labors of every other man in every organ-
ized society. All of this differentiation of labor upon
which the highest civilization depends illustrates in
the most forcible manner the nature of cooperation,
for society itself is organized upon the theory of
cooperating activities.

In these activities men not only cooperate with
one another, but they individually and collectively

l82 TRUTH AND ERROR

cooperate with nature, and thus external nature is
made to assist man.

The club is but an instrument to cooperate with
the hand to increase its efficiency. The flail is biit
a club with a handle for increased efficiency. The
thresher is but a group of clubs placed upon a
cylinder and made to revolve to increase efficiency.
The snow-shoe is but an addition to the foot to
increase its efficiency. The sled is but an improved
snow-shoe. The wagon is but an improved sled,
and the railroad train but an improved wagon. The
lens is but an improvement to the eye, and the
telescope is but an improved lens, and the microscope
still another improved lens. There would be no end
to the illustrations which could be cited to show the
manner in which the arts of man cooperate with one
another and with man himself.

CHAPTER XIII

EVOLUTION

We are now to consider what happens to particles
with the passage of time. At the outset we must
consider what it is that has persistence and change.
The particle has five manifestations as five essential
concomitants or constituents: unity, extension,
speed, persistence, and consciousness. As all the
concomitants inhere in one particle and the particle
is unity, extension, speed, persistence, and conscious-
ness, the concept of a particle not having all of these
essentials is a pseudo-idea. If any one of them is
taken away from a particle it is annihilated, for there
is nothing else in the particle but these essentials.
They constitute the particle.

By abstraction we consider essentials severally, and
when we consider the relation of particles we still
consider the relation of essentials severally. The
relations of essentials are properties. One con-
comitant in one particle cannot be related to the
same concomitant in another particle without a
relation existing between the other concomitants of
the particles ; that is, there cannot be a relation of
one unity to another without a relation of one exten-
sion to another, one speed to another, one persistence
to another, and one consciousness to another, if the
particles be animate. If we go on to consider per-
sistence abstractly, we must still remember that the
persistence is the persistency of a unity, an extension,
a speed, and a consciousness. But between these

183

184 TRUTH AND ERROR

persistent concomitants there are relations, and these
relations are changeable ; so when we consider per-
sistence and change, it is the persistence of particles
of essentials and change of relations of particles of
essentials. Only relations are changeable, essentials
are persistent.

By abstraction we consider essentials severally,
and when we consider the relation of particles we
still consider the relation of essentials severally. If
we go on to consider persistence abstractly, we must
still remember that the persistence is the persistence
of a unity, an extension, a speed, and a con-
sciousness.

He who cannot distinguish between concomitancy
and relativity cannot follow this argument and cannot
understand its fundamental doctrines. He who can-
not follow up this distinction in all of its logical
results under the conditions of complexity which are
exhibited in the various bodies of the universe con-
sidered by scientific men, had better devote his time
to metaphysical speculation where logical distinctions
are confused and fine-spun theories of the unknown
are the substance of philosophy; for scientific men
deal with simple facts, though they may be tangled in
relations, while metaphysicians confessedly deal in
speculation about the unknown and boldly affirm
that realities are fallacies. When a scientific man
speaks of phenomena, he speaks of the manifestations
of reality; when a metaphysician speaks of phe-
nomena he speaks of manifestations of the unknown
reality of which he dreams, while, he deems that
the realities of the scientific man are creations of
fancy. In science all knowledge is verity and all
fallacies are false inferences. In metaphysics all

EVOLUTION 185

knowledge is illusion which manifests in a vague
way an unknown reality.

If particles could exist without speed there would
be no change and no motion ; or if there was but one
particle with speed there would be only rectilineal
motion, but as there are many particles with speed
they collide and deflect one another ; deflected speed
is directed motion. The first phase of directed
motion is thus change of direction in free particles.
Here we have persistence in speed and change in
direction by which persistence is divided into
portions by events of collision, and this manifests
time. There could be no time without motion, and
no motion without space, and no space without
number. The first or simplest manifestation of
time is the division of motion into parts by events.
This gives us the simplest concept of time known to
science, and whenever in science time is considered,
some motion is divided into parts by events. Thus
the motion of the earth about the sun is divided
into annual parts by events, and the motion of
the earth on its axis is divided into daily parts by
events.

By the incorporation of particles into bodies the
speed of the particle is divided into parts, one part
of the speed inhering in the particle as internal
motion, another part inhering in the particle as
external motion of the body. The speed of the
particle is composed of internal speed and external
or corporeal speed.

In bodies we consider the corporeal speed, and one
body may have greater speed than another, although
one ultimate particle cannot have greater speed than
another. It is the speed of one body measured in

l86 TRUTH AND ERROR

terms of the speed of another by which time is
usually determined.

Particle speed is persistent or eternal. Corporeal
speed can continue only while the body remains
incorporate. So essentials are co-eternal in the
particle, but are co-etaneous in the body.

When we consider the collision of one body with
another we may consider the action as a force, and
if the particles remain without change of incorpora-
tion, action and reaction are exhibited as mutual
deflection. "When we neglect the nature of this
deflection we are considering the forces involved,
but if we consider results and compare the paths of
the bodies before collision with the paths after
collision, we pass from the consideration of force to
/ causation, for the cause of their collision was their
incident paths and the effect of collision their
reflected paths.

Thus the study of time as exhibited by bodies
leads to the study of causation. So in causation
we have more highly related time. If we consider
relations of persistence and change in the particle,
we consider it as time, but if we consider it in the
body we consider it as causation. Time and causa-
tion are thus reciprocal.

- There are different kinds of natural bodies besides
the one ethereal body of all ethereal particles ; (i)
the celestial bodies of molecular particles; (2) the
te'rrestrial bodies or spheres of petrologic particles,
in which certain of the molecular particles are for-
ever undergoing reincorporation ; (3) vegetal bodies
which are still more ephemeral and reincorporated
from the mineral kingdom to exist only for a time and
then to be returned to the mineral kingdom ; (4) ani-

EVOLUTION 187

mal bodies which are incorporated from the vegetal
kingdom ; (5) societies which are ideally incorporated.

In this incorporation they exhibit successions of
causations; but causations are processes, and one
abstract process cannot exist without the concomitant
processes — that is, there can be no processes of
causation without processes of force, form, and kind,
together with processes of mind.

We know little of the reincorporation of stars, but
we know much about the reincorporation of rocks,
plants, animals, and societies. The study of incor-
poration and reincorporation is evolution from the
standpoint of causation, which in turn is the study
of time.

The consideration of the totality of changes occur-
ring in the universe is evolution. These changes can
all be resolved into changes in the position of the
ultimate particle of matter. Directed changes in
position lead to incorporation, then incorporation is
succeeded by reincorporation, and the totality of
these changes is the totality of evolution. Starting
with this concept we may be able to redefine evolu-
tion in a more satisfactory manner at a later stage.

If there were no motion there would be no time
but only persistence. If there were no incorporation
and reincorporation there would be no evolution but
only time as it is exhibited in the ethereal particle.
At the very outset, then, we have to consider incor-
poration in the association of one chemical particle
with another.

The theater of the motion of every ethereal particle
must be circumscribed by the theater of the adjacent
particles ; we are logically prohibited from any other
conclusion. When particles unite with one another

l88 TRUTH AND ERROR

in constituting a body, so that the speeds are divided
into internal and external motions, by virtue of the
external motion, they may change their space rela-
tions to external particles. In order that there may
be bodies with changeable environment the particles
must, by some means or another, associate. The
first cause or method of evolution is choice ; the first
effect of evolution is change of environment.
From this datum point we may go on to dis-
cuss the evolution of the laws or methods of
evolution.

Affinity is choice of association in atoms and
molecules by which new kinds are developed by the
development of new orders of units through their
incorporation into one body. This is illustrated in
the conventional numbers where the ten units of
one order constitute one of a higher order. Again,
the bricks of a house, thousands in number, con-
stitute one house in a body of a higher order. Now
the atoms of a molecule are associated by affinity,
which surely resembles choice of association, though
it may be the choice of dominant particles or mutual
choice ; but in the bricks which constitute the house
their association is the choice of volition in the
builder, by the choice of activities in the control of
his muscles. This choice of activity still relates
back to a choice in the reciprocal processes of me-
tabolism, which again is affinity. Thus external
choice is controlled by mind through internal choice.

The primal law of evolution seems to be psychic.
We shall call it the law of affinity and define it as
the choice of particles to associate in bodies. The
facts observed in the chemical incorporation of
particles into bodies are explained by this hypothesis,

EVOLUTION 189

but they remain the same whether the explanation
be valid or invalid, that is, whether we consider
affinity to be due to psychic choice or to some
unknown mechanical property.

By the incorporation of atoms into molecules
particles become bodies which react in collisions
with the environment in a new manner; thus bodies
can perform functions which particles cannot perform.
This leads us to the consideration of incorporation as
organization, when functions and organs as con-
comitants are transmuted together. Molecules,
because they are incorporated numbers, are organ-
ized numbers, or in other terms, chemical organiza-
tion by incorporation is numerical organization.
Now we must see what these new functions or
reactions are.

Molecules of substances are aggregated into stellar
bodies by their mutual reactions through the gravitat-
ing medium — the ether. Thus a second method of
evolution is developed which is known as adaptation
to environment. By this method not only are the
celestial bodies incorporated into higher units, but
their forms are subsequently controlled by the same
law when they yield to the forces of the environ-
ment as spheroidal figures, rotating and revolving as
fluid bodies. Stars are evolved under the law of
adaptation to environment and remain under its
control in their changing figures through the history
of their revolutions.

Under this law stars change their environment,
passing through a succession of positions in a cycle
of revolution. This seems to be a valid statement
of the changes brought about by the incorporation
of atoms into molecules, and their further incorpora-

TRUTH AND ERROR

tion into stars, and their still further incorporation
as stars into systems.

In celestial bodies we know only of the fluid state
of matter as revealed by astronomy. While there may
be solid bodies in the other orbs, as in the earth,
astronomical investigation does not reveal them to
research as solids; such solid bodies are recognized
to be studied only in the earth, where they are
revealed as rocks, and if they may exist in the other
orbs the science of astronomy does not deal with
them. The forms of the stellar bodies are those
assumed by fluids under the force of gravity. The
stars themselves are particles in systems which are
bodies of a higher order. Events are discovered in
the motions of the celestial orbs and exhibited in a
great variety of ways as set forth in the science of
astronomy.

Thus states of motion are divided into events of
motion. The states are represented by rotation of
body, which is the revolution of particles, while
events are marked by phenomena which attend the
rotation and revolution. These are phenomena of
time, or persistence and change. Then the heavenly
bodies are constantly changing their relations to one
another, and a vast system of perturbations are
discovered. Motion at apogee differs from motion
at perigee, motion at aphelion differs from motion
at perihelion, and a great variety of perturbations of
path are revealed. Here we study causation.
Finally, the genesis of the heavenly bodies is studied
as their evolution.

LaPlace was the founder of this department of
astronomy. The researches in this realm had
revealed the common direction of motion in the orbs

EVOLUTION 191

of the solar system, the small eccentricities of path,
the inclination of the orbits, and the conservation of
areas. Reasoning- that contraction would accelerate
rotation and hence oblateness, he conceived the
hypothesis of the evolution of the solar system on
the theory of the radiation of heat into solar space
from a nebulous mass. He conceived that this mass,
revolving in an orbit, constantly accelerating and thus
constantly increasing- its oblateness, would thus
gradually retire by attraction from an external ring
of matter which would ultimately break up into one
or more orbicular bodies.

Since the time of LaPlace his method of account-
ing for satellites as a breaking up of rings has been
questioned, and facts have been discovered that give
ground to the conjecture that other methods of
separation into bodies by fission are not only possible
but even probable. This new doctrine arises from
the investigation of binary stars. It will be observed
that LaPlace 's theory was an attempt to harmonize
many diverse laws discovered by induction and
verified by deduction, by accounting for them all by
one fundamental doctrine of evolution, which is no
other than the adaptation of every particle of matter
to the conditions imposed upon it by every other
particle in the environment. Under this hypothesis
LaPlace promulgated a doctrine of evolution which,
in its fundamental elements, has remained to the
present, notwithstanding the tests of observation and
recomputation to which it has been submitted,
though minor components of the doctrine are ques-
tioned.

There is still another assumption of LaPlace that
must now be questioned, as it is unnecessary to his

IQ2 TRUTH AND ERROR

argument and incongruous with facts herein demon-
strated; his assumption is that heat is radiated into
space and that it leaves the cooling body to join
external bodies. All of this was quite compatible
with the concept in vogue in his time, when heat
corpuscles were supposed to be itinerant from body
to body. Now we know that heat is not a special
form of matter, but is only a deflection of the
motions of the particles of matter whose speeds are
constant, and that one body causes heat in another
but does not yield heat as speed of particles so that
it loses what the other gains. While the heat of one
body induces heat in another, no motion as speed
leaves the cooling body, but its reaction transmutes
the heat motion into the structural motion of the
body and that reaction which we call the transfer of
heat from one body to another is in fact its equili-
bration through mutual transmutation.

Thus, by the theory of LaPlace, the chemical
changes proceeding in the combination of atomic
particles existing in the nebulous mass were
accelerated by gravity until they were consolidated
into stellar bodies, the process being a succession of
recombinations in molecules of higher orders.

In the geonomic realm three so-called states of
substance are found: the ethereal, the fluid, and the
solid. All of these states are conditions of incorpora-
tion. Gases may become liquids and liquids may
become solids, and vice versa, by progressive incor-
poration and reincorporation. These states of sub-
stance often exhibit interesting critical points in which
secular changes are accelerated by sudden meta-
genesis, especially at critical points of temperature
and pressure. Thus changes of state are secular

EVOLUTION 193

metageneses accelerated in sudden metageneses.
Everywhere and forever the states are changing by
events and the geonomic realm is forever in flux.
The winds are in motion, the waters are in waves,
tides and currents, and the waters themselves are
evaporated and move in clouds through the air and
are condensed into streams that flow into the great
bodies of water and into the ocean itself. The fluid
waters are transformed into solid, and the solid are
gathered at high altitudes and high latitudes into
great bodies of ice that are forever growing, melt-
ing, and moving forward. The solid rocks are forever
undergoing geologic changes under the stress and
strain produced ; thus molar metamorphosis is forever
in progress. The rocks are carried from the land
to the sea and the sea-bottoms are upheaved, while
mechanical changes are forever in progress through-
out the solid envelope. States appear to be changed
into other states only by events which come in
winds, storms, earthquakes, and fires.

That which we are to note as germane to this argu-
ment is that there are three states of matter involved
in the study of geonomy : the ethereal state in which
the phenomena of heat and electricity are observed,
the fluid state, and the solid state in which the
especial phenomenon of the geonomic orb — the earth
— is observed. As in the stars we are compelled to
discuss ethereality, terrestrial heat, light, electricity,
magnetism, and gravity, together with centripetal and
centrifugal force and fluidity, so in the geonomic
realm we must study not only the same subjects,
but must also consider the solid condition with the
stresses and strains involved and the metageneses
that appear through chemism.

194 TRUTH AND ERROR

In the ethereal realm we know of the ethereal
state ; in the stellar realm we know of the ethereal
and the fluid states ; in the geonomic realm we know
of the ethereal, the fluid, and the solid states.

In the study of the earth a differentiation is found
in the air, the sea, the land, and the nucleus. They
are also integrated by the rotation of the earth, which
is the revolution of its particles. The air is imper-
fectly differentiated into winds. The waters are
differentiated into seas with gulfs, lakes with bays,
and rivers with creeks, brooks, and rills. Then the
waters are evaporated and differentiated into vapor,
and these vapors become clouds and the clouds
become rains. Then the waters that were evapo-
rated into vapor and condensed into rain are also
frozen into snow and ice, and ice itself plays an
important part in the mechanical changes wrought
upon the surface of the earth. Then the solid
sphere is differentiated into formations, and the
formations into rocks or blocks, and these again into
crystals and grains; then the rocks are ground by
the running waters and blown by the winds and
distributed through the air and over the land as dust.
They are also carried by the waters into the sea and
deposited in formations, and finally they are carried
in solution by the interpenetrating waters into the
crevices of the rocks, by which blocks are parted.
Finally, fluid masses from the molten interior are
thrust into the rocks in dykes, chimneys, and
lacolites, and spread over the surface in coulees,
cinders, and dust. All of this commingling of
materials results in a recombination of substances
ever found to be more and more highly com-
pound. At the surface of the earth these changes

EVOLUTION 195

are still further multiplied in the production of
soils, which is accomplished by the wash of rains,
the grinding of ice, the chemical decomposition
of the rock, especially aided by heating and
cooling, together with the disintegration that
arises from the action of plants and animals upon
the soil, and by the commingling of their bodies
with it, so that a highly compound mass of particles
is produced, known as the soil. This soil is the
theater of chemical changes by which the more
highly compound molecules are developed, necessary
directly to vegetation and indirectly to animal life.
As chemical compounds are more sensitive to change,
mineral forms are more sensitive to metamorphosis,
and as mineral and molar forms are changed proc-
esses are multiplied and become more efficient in
the production of change. Thus the new law of
evolution which we find in the geonomic realm, is
the acceleration of change by increasing hetero-
geneity. Tt may be called the method of hetero-
geneity.

The law of affinity and the law of adaptation
found in the astronomic realm also pertain to the
geonomic realm. But to them there is added this
new law of heterogeneity. Thus an incessant meta-
logosis, metamorphosis, and metaphysisis results
in universal, constant, and multifarious metageneses.

As substances become more compound they
become less stable, and acceleration of heterogeneity
is the acceleration of metagenesis.

In the phytonomic realm, that is, in plants, a
fourth state of substance is found. This is the vital
state, for plants have life. Substance in the fluid
and solid states is taken up by the plant through the

196 TRUTH AND ERROR

medium of the ethereal state exhibited in light and
heat and metagenetically changed into the fourth
state as vitality. These metagenetic changes are
known as assimilation, by which the plant is pro-
duced. Plant growth is secular, and the materials
pass through the fluid state into the living state,
which is growth; the plant may then dissolve
secularly by decay, or by sudden change in com-
bustion.

We cannot understand the plant without a con-
sideration of all the four states of matter and all the
four changes of matter which occur therein as events.
As the plant grows, minute molecules are added ; as
the plant decays, minute molecules are taken away,
as the vital changes observed.

Vitality as a state first finds expression in the
continued growth of the plant, and a still higher
expression in the heredity of the species, for the state
is continued from plant to germ through the germ in
life and growth to reproduction, where it again
appears in the new germ. Thus we are compelled to
consider the vital conditions of heredity. The meta-
genetic changes of the individual are bequeathed to
its posterity, and the environmental changes of the
individual are wrought into its structure and these
again are bequeathed within more or less restricted
limits. Thus in the study of the plant we study a
new state of substance, and new changes are here
events in the history of the individual, transferred
by heredity to its offspring. In the consideration
of the development of germs into adult individuals,
the accomplishment of the process is ontogeny.
In the consideration of the development of indi-
viduals in generations by which the race is

EVOLUTION 197

evolved, we may consider the result reached as
phylogeny.

In this realm the law of the acceleration of evolu- v
tion is the one discovered by Darwin and known as the
survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence.
Plants multiply by germs, and more germs are
produced than can possibly find room on the surface
of the earth when developed into adults. Plants
multiply by hundreds, thousands, hundreds of thou-
sands and perhaps even millions; some must perish
by inexorable conditions, and the few that arrive at
maturity are those best adapted to the local environ-
ment where they live; but the germs themselves
have their environments changed by mechanical
agencies, as on winds, waves and streams, and they
are often carried about by animals. This change of
environment modifies the plants themselves in such
a manner that varieties are developed which ulti-
mately become species.

The evolution of plants is fundamentally chemical
under the law of affinity; it is accelerated by
adaptation to environment; it is then subject to the
law of acceleration by heterogeneity, and evolution
is still further accelerated by the survival of the
fittest.

In animal life a fifth state of substance is found
which I call motility. In this state all the other
states are found: ethereal, fluid, solid, and vital.
Changes which occur as events in the history of
motility are collisions and metageneses in the
ethereal, fluid, solid, and vital states, but to them is
added a series of changes which are expressed in
motility. In the animal, anabolism and catabolism
are contemporaneous, as the animal has coeval

198 TRUTH AND ERROR

growth and decay; anabolism and catabolism then
become metabolism. The dual processes of meta-
geneses, which are evolution and dissolution, are now
combined so long as life lasts. In rest, and especially
in sleep, anabolism may progress at a greater rate
than catabolism; in exercise, and especially in violent
exercise, catabolism may prevail, but neither can
wholly cease while the motile state endures. Here,
in the state of motility, ontogeny appears in the
individual and phylogeny in the race.

In attempting to define the states of substance a
precaution is necessary. It must be understood that
the states of matter do not always appear to be
separated by hard and fast planes of demarcation ;
and so far as we can assert with confidence, there
seems to be a gap between ether and ponderable
matter, though a complete recognition of the ether
is but an event of the present day. The gaseous
and liquid states are included in the fluid state.
Between the fluid and the solid states intervening
conditions are found.

It is known that no perfect distinction can
be made between the solid and the vital state.
There are those who believe that an impassable
barrier exists between them, but this doctrine is
rapidly being dispelled; indeed it is no exaggeration
to say that scientific men rather confidently believe
that the barrier is soon to be thrown down. That
the barrier between vitality and motility has been
overthrown is believed by many biologists, though
there are still those who believe that the apparent
consciousness of plants as exhibited in a great
variety of phenomena can be explained as mechanical
phenomena. If this lingering belief be true, the

EVOLUTION 199

barrier still exists ; but there is no ontogenic barrier
even if there be a phylogenic barrier.

In the motile state of matter the special law of
evolution was discovered by Lamarck. It is the law
of effort, and may be stated as the development of
organs by exercise and their extirpation by disuse.
It must be remembered that all the other laws of
evolution apply to the animal and that this new law
is added in the motile state. Sometimes the law of
heredity is called a law of evolution, but in fact it
is the law of the continuation of species both vegetal
and animal, and is not a law of evolution.

In the animal the law of 'affinity still appears
in metabolism as fundamental, for by metabolism
the development of the organ is accomplished and
without it there could be no effort.

The animal is adapted to environment by many
ways, especially in the development of agencies for
accommodation to climate, as in the down of birds,
the fur of animals, and in various protective devices as
external coverings exhibited in the shells and shards
of the lower animals. But the animal adapts itself to
environment in another manner: endowed with
locomotion, it seeks a favorable environment best
adapted to protection and best adapted to supply
stores of food.

The animal is still subject to the law of hetero-
geneity, for the multiplication of heterogeneous
characteristics adapts it to heterogeneous conditions
of environment, and so the limitations to the multi-
plication of adults are largely thrown down.

The animal also is subject to the law of survival,
for notwithstanding the utilization of every possi-
ble environment for every variety, there is yet

200 TRUTH AND ERROR

an overmultiplication of individuals, which must
perish.

Upon these laws supervenes the law of effort
by which organs are developed on various lines for
various conditions of environment, and the result of
this organic evolution leads to the survival of those
best adapted. In animal life evolution is by affinity,
adaptation, heterogeneity, survival, and effort.
The first of these methods is the basis while the
others are successive accelerations, so that the
changes wrought in the animal are progressive in
geometrical ratio by the compounding of all the
factors.

Another factor in evolution appears in the organ-
ization of demotic life which may be observed among
those of the lower animals in which societies are
found, appearing among mankind and becoming the
chief factor in civilized life. It is a method of
evolution to which inadequate attention has been
given, and the failure to recognize it has led to mis-
apprehension of the nature of human evolution and
to preposterous claims for the efficiency in mankind
of the laws of evolution found among lower animals.
This mode of evolution, therefore, needs more
elaborate presentation than that which we have
already given for the other laws. By man in
civilization the law of effort is transmuted into the
law of culture, the method of invention; that is,
the effort is designed effort for the purpose of
improving human conditions. The chemical law
still remains valid, but the exercise of organs is ever
from age to age. century to century, and even
decade to decade concentrated upon one special
system of organs. Of the five systems, that which

V

EVOLUTION 201

has the function of thought and which is the nervous
system is ever more and more exercised, until metab-
olism itself is accelerated to such a degree that the
changes in the nervous system are far more rapid
than in either of the other four systems. Thus
human evolution comes to be mental evolution, and
this mental evolution is the product of culture by
invention.

The law of culture transforms and then absorbs
the law of adaptation, the law of heterogeneity, the
law of survival, and finally the law of effort. In
what manner this transformation and absorption
are effected must be explained. In man adaptation
to environment is transmuted into the adaptation of
environment to man. Man is not adapted to food,
but food is adapted to man by culture. New foods
are developed until many are used. The animals
which furnish food are cultivated and multiplied
under the direction of man. Vegetal foods are
in like manner multiplied and cultivated in vast
fields, vineyards, orchards, and gardens, and new
varieties are forever developed by the skill of man.

Man is not adapted to the environment of climate,
but he adapts the climate to himself; when it is too
cold he kindles a fire, and he protects himself when
away from the fire by clothing ; when it is too wet
he covers himself with a roof ; when it is too windy
he protects himself with walls; thus man does not
develop down like the birds, or wool like the
mammals, or carapaces like the turtles. Man does
not develop fins for life in the water, but he con-
structs boats that he may dwell on the sea. Man
does not become a climber to live on the trees, but
he ascends the trees on ladders and he fells the trees

202 TRUTH AND ERROR

for temples. Man does not seek shelter among the
rocks, but he quarries the rocks and builds palaces.
Man does not burrow in the ground, but he molds
and burns the clay and constructs marts of trade.
Man does not develop eyes that he may live in the
dark, but he invents lightning light that night may
become day. The illustrations of the change of
adaptation from man himself to the environment
may be found in endless profusion. There is a
change wrought in man by all these agencies, but it
is a change in his mind exhibited in the develop-
ment of the organ of mind and the concomitant
development of thought.

The law of heterogeneity undergoes a like trans-
formation. Upon the things in the environment
which are useful to man the law of heterogeneity is
concentrated. Domestic animals are multiplied in
variety, and cultivated plants are changed until their
native forms are lost and the new forms are multi-
plied beyond enumeration. Fabrics for clothing
are produced and garments are made ; materials for
house structure are differentiated from the materials
of nature, and dwellings, storehouses, marts, and
temples are constructed in a multiplicity of forms.
Tools and machines are differentiated from natural
material; all the powers of nature are specialized
for man's purposes; the whole progress of mankind
is a succession of differentiations or specializations of
the materials of nature to become the works of art.

The law of survival also undergoes a profound
modification. Men are no longer subject to the
vicissitudes of natural environment where winds
may congeal their limbs, where floods may over-
whelm them with death, and where disease may

EVOLUTION 203

carry them away in multitudes. These agencies
still act and have their victims, but the inventions of
man are ever becoming more potent for the pres-
ervation of life. There was a time when drought
in a narrow belt of country might produce a famine
and when the people of such regions might perish ; but
no more famines can occur, for railroads link all
fields to every man's farm. There was a time when
a blizzard might destroy a tribe ; but now a storm
may sweep in vain from the boreal zone about the
dwellings of civilized men, for man constructs his
home against these vicissitudes.

Human providence is more potent than flood,
more potent than drought, more potent than wind.
The man of intellect wields a power that giants
cannot exercise.

The differentiation of animal species found in the
lower world is replaced as a new method of progress
is evolved. The animals differentiate into biotic
species. This tendency seems to have prevailed in
the early and more animal history of mankind, for
the records of these forms are still preserved in
types of men, as exhibited in the conformation of
the skeleton and especially in the cranium ; it is also
exhibited in the color of the skin, the structure of
the hair, the attitude of the eyes, the conformation
of the face, and in other ways. But there is no
black, or white, or tawny species, there is no straight
or woolly-haired species, there is no horizontal or
oblique-eyed species, there is no blue-eyed or black-
eyed species, there is no broad or long-skulled
species, but these characteristics are now inter-
mingled in inextricable confusion — the result of the
admixture of streams of blood. Thus the method of

204 TRUTH AND ERROR

differentiation of animal species has been reversed
in the case of man. That in which men now differ
is intellectual power, but fools are not necessarily
blue-eyed and wise men black-eyed. The traits in
which men differ are moral, but honest men are not
necessarily broad-skulled or rogues long-skulled.

The law of adaptation in the lower animals and
in plants was made efficient by a high rate of
multiplication, but in civilization this rate is
diminished, so that man has not even yet crowded the
earth and no land has been inhabited so densely as
to press upon the capacity of the land to produce
food. Famines have occurred only by improvidence,
and the poor starve by neglect. The effort of
mankind for sanitation, the healing of wounds and
the curing of diseases, is the endeavor of mankind to
repeal the law of nature when the environment is his
destruction ; thus this law of adaptation to environ-
ment for the preservation of the few among the lower
animals, is made inefficient by the slow rate of the
multiplication of men and is replaced by human
effort to preserve and prolong life.

There is an environment to which men are
adapted; it is the environment of culture. Most
men speak the language of the people among whom
they were born. Every man seeks a vocation to
adapt himself to the vocations of others, that by his
special labor he may acquire the most of the special
labors of others; so he adjusts himself to the
industrial conditions by which he is surrounded.
From the cradle to the grave his intellectual advance-
ment is dependent largely upon his intellectual
environment, and he suits that environment to his
purpose.

EVOLUTION 205

Man cultivates his physical powers by exercise
in the industries and in a variety of athletic sports, in
the same manner as do the lower animals, and he
invents new methods of physical training; but he
also and chiefly develops methods of intellectual
training, instruction and research, to which the
schools, the libraries, the journals, and the systems
of research abundantly attest. No, the laws of
brute evolution have been repealed by substitution
and the new ways are methods of culture. The
laws of nature unmodified by man produce horns,
claws, fangs, and poisons for attack, with armor,
cowardice, and deceit for defense. Culture replaces
these brutal devices; smiling fields, cheerful homes,
and all the products of civilization are derived from
the inventions of man himself. As the generations
come each inherits from his predecessor and adds to
the patrimony by self-activity. That which the self
can accomplish is multiplied by all which the
social environment produces. Man is not only an
heir to the past generations, but he cooperates in the
activities of the present, and when he dies he
bequeaths the intellectual wealth which his self-
activity has acquired in cooperation with all his
contemporaries of the world.

In the natural world evolution is primarily by
incorporation and reincorporation. This incorpora-
tion is by affinity. We have shown that affinity is
explained as the consciousness and choice of ulti-
mate particles. When we reach animate beings in
which affinity is mind, the Lamarckian law of effort
becomes potent in evolution until men are developed
and the five forms of culture are invented. Molec-
ular reincorporation by heredity now goes hand in

206 TRUTH AND ERROR

hand with culture or self-activity modified by social
environment.

Evolution as a process is the development of new
kinds with their concomitant forms, forces, causa-
tions and ideations by the multiplication of the
relations of causation.

CHAPTER XIV

SENSATION

We must here recall the distinction between feel-
ing and sensation set forth in a former chapter.
Feeling is cognition of effect upon self and gives
rise to the emotions, while sensation is the cognition
of the external cause of a sense impression and gives
rise to intellection.

I feel light as an effect, but I see its cause in the
luminant or the reflector. I attend to its effect, if
it is too brilliant, or I attend to its cause, if I am
interested in the cause. When I attend to the effect,
it is a feeling; when I attend to the cause, it is a
sense impression. An explosion occurs; the effect
upon my ear is painful. If I attend to it I have a
feeling, but if I wish to know its cause and attend to
it, I have a sensation. Thus feeling and sensation are
reciprocal. The more the feeling, the less the
sensation; the more the sensation, the less the
feeling. This is an old doctrine in a new form.
The old doctrine of psychology is this: that feeling
and cognition are inversely proportional; as we go
on the old statement will be found faulty, and the
new statement, that feeling and sensation are
reciprocal, will be found correct.

An object impinges upon my organ of taste. If
its taste is pleasant or unpleasant and I attend to that
as an effect, it is a feeling, but if I attend to the
object- as a cause, it is a sensation. The organ of

taste is in the portal to the metabolic organs. The

207

208 TRUTH AND ERROR

taste of the object is pleasant or unpleasant, as I
perceive by eating. Now, suppose that I am select-
ing apples for the purpose of putting the sweet in
one basket and the sour in another. I am attending
now to a property of the object through its effect
upon the subject. Its effect upon the subject is
emotional, but considered as a property of the
object, it is intellectual. It is thus that an organ
of feeling is transmuted into an organ of sense
which reveals the property of the body.

The feeling of the circulation, which is variable
by temperature and thus a feeling of heat, is devel-
oped into the sense of touch, and the sense of touch,
which reveals the property, performs the vicarious
function of revealing the body touched.

The feeling of strain is developed into the sense
of stress, and the sense of stress reveals the body
producing the stress.

A feeling of vibration occurs when the medium, as
water or air, is agitated in such manner as to pro-
duce sound. This feeling is especially produced in
the self by speech ; the origin of speech is the calling
of the mate, which call is made by one and heard
by the other, and hence heard by both.

Thus the feeling of sound develops into the sense
of hearing, which is the sense of causation ; for the
primordial ego, in the race and in the individual
alike, first cognizes causation as speech and dis-
tinguishes it from force, for it can cause another to
act by speech and it is conscious that it can be caused
to act by speech.

The feeling of motion in self results whenever we
are conscious of the will to move. Thus the Will to
move is the cause of the feeling of molar motion

SENSATION 209

itself, and the feeling of motion is developed into
the sense of vision by which motion is primordially
and naively interpreted as the sense of conception.
The feeling of motion is developed into the sense
of seeing, for we feel molar motion and feel that
that is caused by will, and primitive man naively
infers that all molar motion is caused by will ; hence
he infers that all molar bodies have will.

The senses are vicarious feelings. *

I have already defined consciousness in the particle
as awareness of self, as a unit, an extension, a speed,
and a persistence, for this is the hypothesis upon
which I am working. For human psychology it

* In this work only such a review of science is intended as is necessary
for the development of an epistomology. In order to accomplish this I have
attempted to set forth the properties of bodies in their reciprocal aspect as
bodies and particles, or as internal and external relations. I have not con-
sidered it necessary or appropriate to enter into a minute discussion of the
facts and principles of all the sciences severally. For example, the develop-
ment of the senses from the feelings receives but brief mention. To set
forth the ontogeny and philogeny of the senses would require a separate
work. In my consideration of the development of the sense of hearing I
have followed Frederic S. I^ee, more perhaps than any other physiologist,
though I have consulted several other authors on the subject. In stating
my conclusions I have necessarily refrained from citing authorities, as I do
not enter into these subjects except to make broad generalizations. But
since this chapter was written I have received an abstract of a paper read
by Dr. I,ee before the British Association (published in the Report of that
Association for 1897) , in which I find that he briefly but clearly propounds
the doctrine that the feeling of equilibrium is developed into the sense of
hearing. I quote the abstract in full.

THE EAR AND THE I,ATERAI, I,INE IN FISHES.

BY FREDERIC S. I*BE, PH.D.

The chief morphological facts upon which the theory of the origin of the
ear from the system of the lateral line is based are similarity in structure
of the adult organs, in innervation, and in ontogeny. Physiology seems
able to present at least circumstantial evidence in favor of this theory. The
author has investigated the functions of the ear and the sense-organs of
the lateral line in fishes.
The Ear.— The results may be tabulated as follows :—

Functions of the Ear. Sense-organs.

I. Dynamical functions in )1. Rotary movements. Cristae acusticee

recognition of. J 2. Progressive movements. Maculae acusticae

2IO TRUTH AND ERROR

needs not that the theory be extended to the ulti-
mate chemical particle, but the doctrine is demon-
strated to the extent that the animate cellular
particle is conscious. Now I wish to consider con-
sciousness as awareness of the part which a particle
takes as a cause or effect in the production of a
judgment.

When a sapid substance impinges upon my organ
of taste I am conscious of an effect. When a body
touches me I am conscious of an effect. When a
sound impinges on my ear I am conscious of an
effect. When a body presses upon my muscles I
am conscious of an effect, and when a color strikes

"»- Position in space. Macula acustic*.

The above functions are divisions of the general function of equilibration:
the sense-organs of the ear deal with the equilibrium of the body under all
circumstances, both in movement and at rest.

In vertebrates above the fishes we must add to the above :
III. Auditory functions in £4. Vibratory motions. Papilla acustica
recognition of. ..... ) basilaris.

Experiments by the author and by Kreidl prove that fishes do not
possess the power of audition. Hence the ear in fishes is purely equilibra-
tive in function.

2. The Lateral Line.— Simple cutting of the lateral nerve or destruction
of the lateral organs does not seem to affect equilibrium. But destruction
of the organs, combined with removal of the pectoral and pelvic fins, causes
marked lack of equilibrium, manifested by uncertain, ill-regulated move-
ments ; removal of fins alone has no pronounced effect.

Central stimulation of the lateral nerve causes the same compensating
movements of the fins as does stimulation of the acoustic of the opposite
side. These results make it probable that the organs of the lateral line are
equilibrative in function, and are employed in the recognition of currents
in the water and of movements of the body through the water. The results
of Bonnier and of Fuchs are in harmony with this.

This was probably the primitive function. By the inclosure within the
skull of a bit of the lateral line and the differentiation and refinement of
its sense-organs, a more perfect organ of appreciation of movement, and
hence of equilibrium, was evolved in the ear. Along with the appearance
of laud animals a portion of this organ became still more differentiated and
refined, and, as the papilla acustica basilaris, acquired the power of
appreciating the movements that we call sound. Thus equilibration and
audition became associated in the same organ.

SENSATION 211

my eyes I am conscious of an effect. In these
cases consciousness in a judgment is awareness of
effect on itself, but it is the consciousness of the
particle which is transmitted to the cortex.

See how this is developed. Consciousness is
awareness of the part which self takes in the pro-
duction of a judgment, either as a cause or as an
effect. Thus I am conscious of the cause when I
act upon another, and I am conscious of the effect
when another acts upon me, and I am conscious of
both cause and effect when I act upon myself, as
when I touch my head with my hand. Here there
are two pairs of correlates, self and other, together
with cause and effect, and we must distinguish an
active consciousness from a passive consciousness.
I call it an active consciousness when I am con-
scious of being a cause, and a passive consciousness
when I am conscious of experiencing an effect.
This distinction must be firmly held.

Consciousness in this stage is awareness of the
terms of causation, but they are not immediately
related, for cases of active and passive consciousness
occur usually at different times and under different
circumstances. But there are some occurrences
where the active and the passive elements are
immediately connected in succession; this hap-
pens when I act on myself. In this manner the
primitive mind learns of causation as composed of
cause and effect, in the order of antecedent and
consequent.

When I am conscious of an effect I infer a cause
as an external object. When I taste I infer that I
taste some other thing or object; when I smell I
infer that I smell some external thing; when I am

212 TRUTH AND ERROR

touched I infer that I am touched by some external
thing; when I am pressed I infer that I am pressed
by some external thing; when I hear I infer that
I hear some external thing, and when I see I infer
that I see some external thing. This something
we call the object, and the mental act we call
inference. A consciousness and an inference pro-
duce what I call a judgment, but this is an imperfect
account of the process ; let us know it all.

A sense impression does not constitute a sensation,
but a sensation is compounded of sense impressions.
Let us say that I have had many sense impressions
of different kinds. Now suppose that I have one of
taste; how shall I classify it with former sense
impressions? Evidently they must be recalled and
compared, and I choose one for this purpose. This
choosing of a past sense impression and comparing
it with a present sense impression and deciding that
they are alike, I call a judgment.

These things are necessary to a primitive judg-
ment. First, a sense impression; second, a con-
sciousness of that impression; third, a desire to
know its cause; fourth, a choice of a cause; fifth,
a consciousness of the concept of that cause ; sixth,
a comparison of one conscious term with the other ;
and seventh, a judgment of likeness or of unlikeness.
Stated in another manner, the judgment has these
elements, a consciousness of a sense impression on
the one hand, and a consciousness of another which
is chosen, and the two are compared and found to be
alike or unlike as the case may be, and a judgment
is made. In still another manner a judgment may
be defined as the comparison of a present event
with a past event in which consciousness is twice

SENSATION 213

involved ; in the first an impression causes conscious-
ness; in the second a choice causes consciousness,
when the two are compared and a judgment made of
likeness or unlikeness, which is identification and
discrimination.

Choose a taste and you will recollect a taste;
choose an odor and you will recollect an odor;
choose a touch and you will recollect a touch ; choose
a pressure and you will recollect a pressure ; choose
a sound and you will recollect a sound; choose a
color and you will recollect a color.

To choose is to revive in memory, for choice is the
cause of the revival which is the effect. You cannot
think of all sense impressions or sensations at one
time, but choose any one of them and you will
recollect that one. Inference, therefore, is guessing
or choosing, or in another light it may be called
interpreting. We shall hereafter see that this
choosing is not random guessing.

The babe tastes milk ; tastes it again and makes a
judgment that the milk which it tastes now is like
the milk which it tasted before; then it tastes
vinegar and makes a judgment that it is unlike the
previous taste. It continues to taste milk and
vinegar and discriminates between the two. Its
judgment of likeness is repeated in the case of the
milk and repeated in the case of the vinegar and
these judgments are consolidated, so that the present
judgment of likeness is a judgment of likeness to
some of the previous cases and of unlikeness to others.
The mind does not recall every example to con-
sciousness and compare them severally with the
present one, but it recalls the like in a consolidated or
fused group if the judgment is that of likeness.

214 TRUTH AND ERROR

This process of consolidating or fusing judgments
I call conception.

It has been said that an inference is not a random
guess. The guess is always dictated by something
in experience as some collateral circumstance,
expectation, or interest. We shall hereafter see
that interest is the chief, if not the sole, agency in
determining the choice.

But some judgments are not valid. A taste may
be subjective, due to some disease of the organ of
taste ; then the judgment is a fallacy.

Suppose that my skin is diseased, and that I have
a feeling which I mistake for a sensation and infer
that something touches me; this subjective effect,
which I here call a feeling, must be distinguished
from a sense impression or it will lead to an erro-
neous judgment. I may have a feeling in the ear, as
when I take an overdose of quinine, and if it is con-
founded with a sense impression a fallacy is
produced. Feelings of this kind are sometimes
known as subjective sensations, and they must
always be clearly distinguished from sense impres-
sions.

Here we reach a dilemma ; a judgment has been
formed, but it may be a fallacy or a certitude. How
shall we know? Something else is needed; this is
verification. In sensation verification is accom-
plished by repetition. But this is an imperfect
method, for in abnormal conditions repeated
erroneous judgments may be made. While the
method usually serves the purpose, sometimes it fails
and a higher verification is dependent upon another
faculty of judgment by another sense.

Verification depends upon the ability of a judg-

SENSATION 215

ment to coalesce with other judgments in concepts ;
that is, it depends on its conceivability. If a judg-
ment is incongruous with previous judgments it can-
not be conceived and is held for confirmation or
rejection. The class may at once be discovered and
the right concept enlarged, or it may wait until
another like judgment is made, when a new concept
will be generated.

Primary consciousness is in the end organ, but it is
transmitted by fibrous nerves to the ganglion and
finally to the cortex ; when it comes to the cortex,
the individual, or the ego, is conscious of the same
impression. Each ganglion in the hierarchy forms
a distinct judgment. The cortex certainly forms
judgments for itself and combines them with con-
cepts. The action of the cortex must be concomitant
with the making of a judgment, and as the judgment
must coalesce with the concept, the part of the cortex
involved must be structurally modified thereby.
Thus it is that a record is made of a judgment when
it coalesces with a concept. The record then is
physiological, as memory is physiological, and judg-
ment and conception are thus the psychological
abstracts of concomitant processes of the brain.

A judgment once formed remains in memory as
an effect on the organ of mind ; another like judg-
ment revives it, or in more common language, it is
recollected. Memory as retention is not a phenom-
enon of the fifth property called judgment, but of the
fourth property called time; but recollection is
revival in consciousness and is an intellectual proc-
ess. To distinguish the fifth property from all the
others we may call judgment intellectual and the
other properties mechanical. It must be remem-

2l6 TRUTH AND ERROR

bered that the judgment cannot exist without the
mechanical properties, that is, there can be no judg-
ment without retention or memory. A judgment
cannot persist as a pure judgment, for its duration,
which is called memory or retention, depends upon
the time property of a body which must also have
motion, space, and number.

In experimental psychology the mechanical con-
comitants are the units with which judgments are
measured. The science also deals in experiment
with the conditions in the object under which judg-
ments are formed. It may be that here it finds its
most fruitful field as a co-worker with introspection.
Experimentation, physiology, and introspection are
the methods of psychology. Alone they fill the
world with fallacies; cooperating they give a valid
psychology. Introspection has had the field to itself
since the days of Aristotle and has filled the world with
hallucinations. In these later days science comes
with two new methods which, conjoined with the old,
give promise of a new and better psychology.

In the compounding of judgments by sensation, if
one consciousness is inferred to be like another then
the present sense impression recalls that other.
Thus the judgment of sensation is the judgment of
likeness. A succession of judgments of this kind
are consolidated in a concept and every additional
sense judgment verifies the past sense judgment.
When the present sense impression revives a past
like sensation, it usually recalls it as integrated and
differentiated. For example, I hear a sound and
cognize it as a sound by recalling past sounds in a
consolidated group, but in this case it may be a shrill
cry. Another sensation of the same character may

SENSATION 217

occur, the two being separated by a longer or a shorter
interval ; in this case I not only recognize the sound
as such but also recall the former cry, so that I not
only classify the cry among sounds, but also classify
the cry among cries.

Every sense mechanically abstracts the impressions
which it receives as distinguished from the impres-
sions received from other senses. The eye abstracts
sense impressions of light, the ear abstracts sense
impressions of sound, the nose abstracts sense impres-
sions of odor, the mouth abstracts sense impressions
of taste, the skin abstracts sense impressions of
touch, the muscles abstract sense impressions of
force, as stress and strain, etc.

It does not comport with our present purpose to
examine, either anatomically or physiologically, the
nature of the senses themselves ; we are simply trying
to find out what a sensation is when we consider it
as one of a group of like judgments forming a
concept.

We see that the sensations are abstracted in that
every sense organ recognizes a single property and
that for every organ there is a fundamental property.
Then we see that the sense impression coming into
one organ is classified as like or unlike ; thus the eye
recognizes distinctions of light, the ear recognizes
distinctions of sound, the nose recognizes distinctions
of odor, the mouth recognizes distinctions of flavor,
and the touch recognizes distinctions of texture.
The muscular sense, or sense of strain, recognizes
distinctions of force, and it is thus that sensation is
abstraction and classification.

Kind is directly cognized by the sense of taste
and odor. The same objects that are cognized by

2l8 TRUTH AND ERROR

these senses may also be cognized by the other
senses, and while they do not give direct deliver-
ances of kind, they give deliverances which become
symbols of kind. We cannot taste the kind when
we touch the pear, but we can recollect it. We do
not taste the pear when we weigh it in the hand,
but we may recollect its taste. When standing
under the pear-tree we hear the pear fall ; we cannot
taste it, but we may recollect its taste. When we
see the pear upon the tree we do not taste it, but we
may recollect its flavor. Thus the primary sense of
kind is taste, and the other senses become vicarious
senses of taste. We need a term for this faculty and
shall use apperception to signify this cognition of
different properties by one sense. Like all other
terms of psychology, this one has been used in
many senses with a tendency to universal meaning,
but I shall use apperception to signify the union of
judgments of disparate properties discovered by
disparate senses. I have used concomitancy and
comprehension to signify the union of disparate
properties in one particle or body; in the same
manner I use apperception to signify the union of
judgments of disparate properties in one particle or
body. This may be stated in another way. The
development of taste is only the development of a
cognition of an attribute, but all the five attributes
or properties of bodies are concomitant, and though
primarily recognized by disparate senses they are
finally recognized as concomitants in bodies, and
when a body is cognized by one sense it recognizes
all of the properties of the body primarily discovered
by the other senses. Thus in cognizing the property
of a body by taste or smell, we may re-cognize the

SENSATION 219

body itself with all its properties. In this manner
one sense becomes vicarious for the others. This
faculty we have called apperception.

We may consider a being so lowly that all its
judgments are confined within the sphere of good or
evil in the objects of the environment as they are
related to itself as food. But if its fixed life were
developed into a freely moving life, it would be
guided in its search for food by an auxiliary sense
of kind; this is the sense of smell. The primary
sense is the sense of taste, but it has an auxiliary
sense by which it discovers the same properties, for
odors and flavors are the same, though gathered
from the environment by disparate organs.

Verified judgments of sensation are cognitions of
kind. Sense impressions of a kind are consolidated ;
this consolidation comes by experience and produces
a concept; thus we have a concept of a particular
color as distinguished from sound, or of sound as
distinguished from strain, or of strain as distin-
guished from touch, or of touch as distinguished
from taste. Sensation, therefore, produces concepts
of kind, and the correlates of likeness and unlikeness
are involved. We may define sensation as the
cognition of properties as kinds in their effects, and
it is a compound of judgments; and a judgment is a
combination of a sense impression, a consciousness,
a choice, a concept, and a comparison.

Such judgments as we have hitherto considered in
this chapter are not the only judgments of kind
which are formed by the mind. When a judgment
is once formed and recorded in the structure of the
brain, it may be recalled as a collateral suggestion
of a sense impression, or by the will itself, and when

220 TRUTH AND ERROR

thus recalled it may be compared with other concepts,
and other new judgments of kind may thus be pro-
duced. The elements of a judgment of this kind
are, first, the choice of a past concept; second, the
consciousness of it; third, the choice of another
concept; fourth, a consciousness of it; fifth, the
comparison of one with the other. The products of
these five factors will constitute a new judgment.
Thus the constitution of the judgment still remains
the same, but it begins with a recollection instead of
with a sense impression. Thus judgments of kind
are presentative and representative. Presentative
judgments are inductive; representative judgments
are deductive. By presentative judgments we accu-
mulate facts; by representative judgments we gener-
alize them under the law that whatever is true of an
object is true of its serial or class identity.

An apple has the taste of an apple, the odor of an
apple, the texture of an apple, the pressure of an
apple, the sound of an apple when it falls on the
ground, and the color of an apple when it is seen.
Thus we have five methods of distinguishing an
apple from a stone, a bush, or a bird. It will be
noticed that I consider taste and smell not as
disparate senses to distinguish disparate properties,
but as varieties of one sense for the sake of dis-
tinguishing the same property. Thus we have five
senses for discovering a body as a kind, and when a
body is discovered as a kind by one of the senses
this discovery may be verified by one or all of the
other senses.

First we may verify a judgment of one sense
impression by repeating the same impression, and
finally we may verify what one sense impression

SENSATION 221

successively affirms by an appeal to another sense.
In deductive or representative reasoning the method
of verification is at first by congruity of concepts,
but when concepts are not congruous they may be
referred back to presentative reasoning; this is
experimentation. All generalizations or deductive
conclusions may be referred back to experimentation
for verification.

We may now give a more adequate definition of
sensation. Sensation is a process of forming a
judgment of number or of kind and of verifying the
same. Verification is accomplished by repetition of
the sense impression, or by referring the impression
made on one sense to the court of another sense.
In a case of judgment of number as distinguished
from its correlate kind, man has devised a special
method of verification known as measurement, which
gives rise to the psychologic science of mathe-
matics, which is also defined as the science of
quantity. The judgment of number is verified by
enumeration or counting.

We have found five classific properties: kind,
form, force, causation, and conception, derived from
the essentials by incorporation, and that the kind is a
relative unit, the form a relative extension, the force
a relative speed, the causation a relative persistence
and the conception a relative consciousness.

There are no particles which are not found in
bodies, and all bodies are composed of particles. The
quantitative properties are found when we consider
particles. Classific properties are found when we
consider bodies. Thus quantitative properties and
classific properties are reciprocals, and in each set
there are five concomitants. The logician considers

222 TRUTH AND ERROR

classes, the mathematician quantities; they thus
view the universe from reciprocal sides; the one
classifies, the other computes. Four of the categories
are found in inanimate bodies, unless our hypothesis
is valid. All five are certainly found hi animate
bodies. They all coexist and cannot be dissevered,
so that when one is cognized the others are implied,
and when they are all considered as kind they are
subject to logical reasoning. In order that they
may be subject to mathematical reasoning, kind
must be resolved into number, form into space,
force into motion, causation into time and concept
into judgment, and then as properties they can all
by substitution be represented by number, and thus
computation is possible. It is only in the new
science of psycho-physics that judgments are treated
mathematically.

We may speak of a body without overtly affirming
its properties, but they are implicitly affirmed or
posited. The term posit is here used to mean the
indirect assertion of something by directly asserting
some other thing essential to it and in whose exist-
ence it is involved.

The word matter is the name of a collection of
particles and every particle is a combination of
essentials. The concept of matter has passed through
the crucible of human experience and the most
thorough and profound scientific investigation. All
human knowledge, all scientific research, all ideation,
and all logical expression are founded on this con-
cept. To deny the reality of matter is to murder
reason.

It may be well to recapitulate what has here been
taught concerning substrates.

SENSATION 223

First, we have shown that the essentials of prop-
erties are their substrates severally; unity is the
substrate of number, extension is the substrate of
space, speed is the substrate of motion, consciousness
is the substrate of judgment.

Second, we have shown that the quantitative
properties are the substrates of the categoric proper-
ties; number is the substrate of kind, space is the
substrate of form, motion is the substrate of force,
time is the substrate of causation, and judgment is the
substrate of conception.

Third, it has been shown that a particle and its
essentials are one and the same thing, and that
ultimate particles constitute the substrate of bodies.
These self-evident propositions make the concept
of substrate simple and clear.

The doctrine of bodies and properties herein
expounded is simple. When it is compared with the
metaphysical discussions of number, space, motion,
time, and judgment, and the categories derived from
them, which are kind, form, force, causation and
conception, it will be a surprise to discover how
tomes have been reduced to pages by eliminating
fallacies. Censorious persons have sometimes
accused the vender of beverages of adding water
to wine. Brokers use this dilution of wine as a
metaphor and speak of watered stock. It is astonish-
ing how the vintage of science has been watered by
the venders of speculation.

When the similar sense impressions come to an
organ, relations of likeness are discovered; but when
dissimilar sense impressions act upon the same sense
their unlikeness appears. In this manner the sense
impressions coming to the same organ are classified.

224 TRUTH AND ERROR

Then disparate sense impressions come to disparate
organs, as light to the eye, taste to the mouth, etc.
The same object may produce disparate sense im-
pressions to disparate organs, so that at one time the
object is a color, at another time it is a sound, at
another it is an odor, at another it is a pressure, at
another it is a touch, and at still another it is a
taste. In this manner different manifestations of
the same object are brought to the senses and
integrated or unified as coming from one object, that
is, the self learns that one object may have different
manifestations; thus the apple exhibits color, sound,
pressure, touch, taste, and odor. In this manner
concepts are formed of different manifestations of
the same body; thus sensation is the cognition of
different properties in one body which is considered
as a kind.

The self, having discovered the union of these
manifestations in one body or particle, quickly learns
that when one property is observed the others may
be expected; thus the color becomes the symbol of
the apple and it is known by sight, or the sound
becomes the symbol of the apple and it is known by
sound, the texture becomes the symbol of the apple
and it is known by touch, the flavor becomes the
symbol of the apple and it is known by taste, the
odor becomes the symbol of the apple and it is known
by smell. This is the recognition of an object by
some one of its properties manifested to a sense and
taken as the symbol of the object itself with its
other manifestations and known as the cause of a
sense impression. As the particle can be designated
by naming any one of its essentials, so the body can
be named by any one of its properties, and so also

SENSATION 225

it can be recollected by any one of its properties.
In perception a form becomes the nucleus of a con-
cept which is recollected when a sense impression
recalls it.

The lower animal, desiring to gather food for its
offspring, and having the sense of touch as well as
taste, could utilize its sense of touch in gathering
food by the cognition of its form without resort to
the sense of taste and yet it could verify touch by
taste.

CHAPTER XV

PERCEPTION

It has been shown that there is a faculty of the
mind, by which judgments and concepts of kind are
produced, which has been called sensation. It is
now proposed to demonstrate that there is a faculty
of the mind by which judgments and concepts of
form are produced which will be called perception.
It is difficult to select a term for this purpose. It
might be best to coin one, but the term perception
seems to be more often used in this sense than in
any other. There is a general sense in which it is
used to denote all intellections, and there is a general
sense in which it is used to designate all presentative
judgments, but I use it to designate the making
of judgments both presentative and representative,
and also of concepts of form.

We must now set forth the process of perception
as judgment. Here again we have a sense impres-
sion, a consciousness, a choice, a concept, and a
comparison as the foundation of a judgment. The
judgment or inference is that the two compared
are caused by objects having the same or a similar
form. In making the judgment there must be a
discrimination and an identification. The mind
having an object presented to it by a sense impres-
sion must choose some other concept of a form sup-
posed to be like this form and compare the two and

226

PERCEPTION 227

make a judgment of likeness or of tmlikeness as the
case may be. We thus see that the external form
determines the internal judgment of form.

Like a judgment of sensation, a judgment of per-
ception may be a certitude or a fallacy. If it is
a fallacy it must be corrected, and if a certitude it
must be verified. If the form were determined by
consciousness there would be no need of verification,
but as it is external, verification is necessary. A
judgment of perception is imperfectly verified by
repetition, for if the likeness is discovered a second
time the judgment may be supposed valid, though
the same conditions for error may still exist.

In perception, as in sensation, one judgment is
certified by another of a disparate sense. If I taste
and touch the apple I am sure that it is an apple, or
if I taste, touch, and see the apple there is still
further verification.

A sense impression of light falls on my eye and I
infer that it was caused by a horse of which I had a
previous concept. The inference or choice of this
cause recalls this concept and I conclude that the
impression and the memory consciousness are alike.
The concept of the horse was the concept of a form ;
thus the cause was conceived as a form. Perception
is cognition of the cause of a sense impression, con-
sidered as a form.

When we have recognized an object many times,
the process of judging seems to be abbreviated by
the cancellation of the act of choice; certain it is
there is no conscious act of choice and apparently
the judgment follows immediately upon the con-
sciousness of the sense impression. This cancella-
tion of some of the elements of a judgment is

228 TRUTH AND ERROR

particularly observable with sense impressions of
vision when introspection seems to reveal no inter-
mediate elements. It is only in cases where original
judgments are made and those where there is some
obscurity in the sense impression, that all of the
elements of the judgment are revealed. This
phenomenon of apparent cancellation of elements of
judgment that are made in the act of perception
cannot too strongly be emphasized. Not only are
elements frequently obscure or entirely lost, but
whole groups of judgments seem to be canceled in
the stream of thought.

That which has been called the choice, the guess,
or the hypothesis, is not a random choice but is a
choice which arises from experience.

I am wandering on the shore of the lake. Weary
with a long walk, I climb to the summit of a rock,
from which vantage ground I hope to obtain a
better view while resting. In climbing I grasp the
angle of a boulder over my head and immediately
feel a pain thrilling through my nerves. From the
sensation of touch I gather other knowledge, as I
think that I have cut my finger on the sharp edge of
a crystal. From where I stand I cannot see the
crystal, but my knowledge of these rocks is such
that I know that sharp crystals of feldspar sometimes
protrude from them, and I think of it as such. My
mind neglects the effect upon myself to discover its
cause — a sharp crystal on the rock — and I have made
a discovery. It is my present knowledge of boulders
and crystals that guides me to this discovery.
Without knowledge of this kind I might give some
other interpretation to the sensation. If a moment
ago I had seen a rattlesnake crawling over the grass,

PERCEPTION 229

I might have made a false interpretation and fancied
myself wounded by the fang of a serpent. Or sup-
pose I had seen a sweet-brier growing over the
rock ; then I might have concluded that my wound
was from a thorn. This same sense impression,
under different conditions of knowledge, may have
different interpretations. The true interpretation
is reached only because there already exists in my
mind the related facts necessary to correct inter-
pretation. The inference, therefore, is controlled by
previous knowledge, and, in this case, guided to the
truth.

Sitting upon the rock and gazing around the lake,
my eye follows the meandering of the shore, and
I readily distinguish the blue waters from the green
banks. This perception is much like that by which
the crystal was discovered. Let us see in what
respect it is the same and in what respect it is
different. In the one there was a sense impression
of touch and a feeling impression of pain in my ringer
when the nerve was pricked, and in the other a
sense impression on my eye when the nerves were
touched by light, but no feeling of pain. The light
reflected from the waters beats upon my eye and
produces an effect, but I do not think of the sense
impression as an effect, but only of its cause. The
mind goes out beyond the consciousness to the object
which produces it.

In the group of mental operations by which the
crystal is recognized the particular feeling of pain
is conspicuous ; but in the operations by which the
water is discovered, the beating of light does not
cause a feeling as a pleasant or as an unpleasant effect.
The discovery of blue waters and green banks can-

230 TRUTH AND ERROR

not be made without previous knowledge. Suppose
that I have never seen water — that I have suddenly
been transported from some mythic land where
basins of glass are embosomed in the landscape;
with only such knowledge in my mind I think of a
beautiful sheet of glass, and, though erroneous, the
interpretation is believed as true, unless I submit it
to verification.

Or suppose that I climb to the top of a mountain,
where bays and inlets are thrust into the land. On
arriving at the summit I look about, and the
mountain seems to be an island. From the foot of
the mountain on every side there seems to be a
stretch of gray water. After a time a breeze starts
up, and the water seems to be agitated in great
waves, and at last the waves are driven away in
tumultuous cloudlets. Now the blue lake stretches
from the foot of the mountain on one side and
valleys and hills from the other. My first inference
was a fallacy; my second inference is a certitude.

I look along the shore again, and I see a white
object on the water. What really happens is that
arranged light reflected from the distant object beats
upon the nerve of my eye, which differs from other
light entering it. I do not stop to observe the effect
on me, but my mind is occupied with the external
cause. I am just from the seaside, and have been
watching the gulls soaring through the air and
gathering flotsam. I interpret the beating of this
white light as caused by the reflection of light by a
gull. I believe I see a gull ; but it moves not, and
I doubt the veracity of my vision. Looking again
with care, I believe that the cause of this beating is
a white boulder with its crest emerging from the

PERCEPTION 231

water. Satisfied with this interpretation, my
attention is directed to a boy coming down to the
shore. As a sansculotte he wades into the water
and follows the floats of a net until he comes to the
white object which was to me first a bird and then
a boulder. Now I make the true inference and see
that the white object is a white cloth — a signal on
the top of a stake to mark the fishing ground — and
verify it. The facts uppermost in my mind caused
me to make false interpretations, each of which I
could not verify, and rested satisfied only when I
made an inference that was verified. As perception
by touch is the interpretation of a sense impression,
so perception by sight is the interpretation of a sense
impression. Here again we have an interpretation
which gives a judgment of the external cause of the
sense impression.

Still sitting on the rock, I hear a noise. It is but
waves of air beating upon the nerves of my ear;
but I go beyond the consciousness and turn my head
in the supposed direction of the sound, expecting
to see a man coming in the distance ; for have I not
heard his voice? At this I am disappointed; and
yet it does not seem strange, for I have made erro-
neous interpretations many times. I continue to
watch the fisherboy in the river below. The noise
is heard again, and this time it is the caw of a raven
in a distant tree. I have chosen the right cause.
I muse on this error. Why is the voice of a crow
mistaken for the voice of a man? Because I am
expecting my friend who stopped by the way where
blooming plants attracted his interest. A false
interpretation of a consciousness often comes from
expectancy. In this manner the deluded victims of

232 TRUTH AND ERROR

the thaumaturgic seance are made to see and often
to hear the very spirits of the dead and to find con-
firmation of fond belief. The human mind can
discover any wonder the imagination can picture,
however unreal or impossible it may be, if expect-
ancy first be wrought to the requisite intensity.
All perception is by interpretation, but the data by
which we interpret are memories, and correct inter-
pretation depends upon the right guessing in the
first instance and ultimately on verification; once
more we have verification necessary to cognition.

Inductive or presentative perception having been
set forth, it is now required to explain deductive or
representative perception. A concept of perceptive
judgments may be brought into consciousness by an
effort of the will or adventitiously by association,
and this concept of form may be compared with
other concepts of form and a representative judg-
ment made about two concepts, both of which are
recalled from memory.

Thus from the storehouse of memory we may take
up by choice the innumerable concepts therein and
make new judgments and combine them into con-
cepts. These representative concepts can all be
traced back to presentative elements.

A representative judgment of perception, like that
of sensation, has five elements. Instead of the con-
sciousness of the sense impression we have the
consciousness of a concept brought about by an act
of choice arising from association or exercise of the
will. Then a second concept must be chosen or
recollected, and then we must have a consciousness
of this second concept, and when the one concept is
compared with the other a judgment is formed.

PERCEPTION 233

In presentative judgments we compare an impres-
sion consciousness with a memory consciousness.
In a representative judgment we compare a memory
consciousness with another memory consciousness.
In both cases we judge of likeness or unlikeness
between the terms compared. In presentative judg- •
ments we discover facts and classify them; hence
presentative judgments are inductive. In making
representative judgments we discover laws and apply
them ; hence representative judgments are deductive.

We may now more adequately define perception
as the process of making a judgment about form or
its reciprocal space, and of verifying the same so as
to produce a cognition. Verification is accomplished
by repetition, by the same sense, by submitting the
judgment to another sense, that is, by congruity of
judgments or by submitting it to experimentation,
which is also by congruity of judgments, or by
submitting the judgment of form as its reciprocal
space to measurement and computation, which is
only another method of verification by congruity of
concepts.

A strange confusion is found among some meta-
physical writers in confounding the presentative
judgment with image forming. Touch is the primal
sense of form, but other senses perform the same task
vicariously. As taste and odor are the senses by
which we discover kind and the concept of form
becomes the symbol of the kind, so on the other
hand while touch gives us form the kind may become
the symbol of the form. Now the sense of vision is
highly adapted to the performance of this symbolic
or vicarious function. The image which is cast upon
the retina is but arranged color with an outline

234 TRUTH .AND ERROR

which is interpreted by vision to be the mark, sign,
or symbol of a form, and the perceived image is a
judgment. It is thus from vision that we derive
symbolic judgments of form, and the judgment which
we make is the image of the form. In vision the
judgment of form is but one of the judgments we
make ; and there are as many kinds of judgments of
form as there are organs of sense. Now the meta-
physical doctrine which makes images and ideas to
mean the same thing as presentative and representa-
tive judgments doubly confuses the subject, for
thought is a succession of judgments of all kinds and
image making is a presentative judgment of vision.

We more often make the form the symbol of the
other properties of a body than any of its other
properties. While form is primordially cognized by
touch, and touch is the final arbiter in verification of
judgments of form, yet vision is more facile in
making such judgments and multitudes of judgments
of form are made through the sense of vision where
one is made by the sense of touch ; notwithstanding
this the judgments of vision are greatly subject to
error and often require verification.

It is due to facile cognition and recognition of form
by vision that the forms of bodies become symbols
of all their properties. Bodies through their forms
subserve many purposes, but they also subserve
many purposes through their kinds and through the
other properties which inhere in them, as forces,
causes, and concepts. But we seem often to cognize
them first as form. We see the forms of a thousand
apples, peaches, or pears, where we taste but one, and
so we habitually know apples, peaches, and pears by
their forms; so we know all plants by their forms,

PERCEPTION 235

but few by their tastes and odors; so also we know
all animals by their forms and but few by their
tastes and odors, though it would seem that the dog
knows many more things by their odors ; most rocks
are known by their forms, few by their tastes;
altogether bodies are known as forms much more
than as kinds, forces, causes, and concepts, all of
which is due to the fact that vision reveals form with
such marvelous rapidity, while the medium of ether
is unrecognized in making presentative judgments,
and is discovered only through a long course of
history in the development of representative judg-
ments. It is not strange, therefore, that early
metaphysical reasoning made such a profound dis-
tinction between impressions and ideas and confused
judgments of form with images by reaching the con-
clusion that all presentative judgments are images
pictured upon the retina. We paint images and the
art is coetaneous with human culture. What we do
by art in painting it was supposed that nature does
in light upon the retina, and this is true within
certain limitations, but the picture upon the retina
must be judged like the picture upon the canvas,
and in both cases the arranged colors are but symbols
of form which is primarily learned by touch.

In forming deductive judgments of perception,
that is, judgments of form, we may find that our
concepts are incongruous, that one judgment con-
tradicts the other. When this is the case one or the
other must be erroneous; we are then thrown back
upon experimentation for a verification of the past
judgments of which these concepts are composed.
Experimentation thus becomes the great agency in
time for clarifying concepts and for purging them

236 TRUTH AND ERROR

from error, that the inductive basis for deductive
reasoning1 may be sound.

It has been seen how a stream of sense impres-
sions pours into consciousness a body of symbols,
which are there organized into systematic knowl-
edge. Clouds assemble, change their hues and
vanish ; storms devastate the land and tempests vex
the sea; the waters of the sea are lifted into the
clouds, and the clouds themselves gather about the
mountains and roll as river torrents in return to the
sea; continents, islands, and mountains are up-
heaved, rains and rivers carve them into wonderful
forms ; volcanoes endeluge the land and trouble the
sea; geologic formations are built and destroyed;
the mountains, hills, plateaus, plains, and valleys are
covered with the verdure of life ; the air, the land,
and the waters teem with animal forms; man him-
self is distributed over all land between the ice-
formed walls of the polar regions — all the multitudi-
nous objects of the cosmos are forever signalling to
the human soul through vision and demanding its
attention. Now one is seen, and now another ; now
one is heard, and now another; now one signals with
fragrance, and now another; now one signals with
flavor, and now another ; and now one beckons with
tactual signs, and now another ; and the human soul
gathers all these symbols into one gigantic body
known as the human mind. The external world is
thus coined into symbols, and of these symbols the
foundations of mind are laid, and of these symbols
the walls are constructed, and of these symbols the
dome is reared, until the temple of the soul is per-
fected— a symbol structure built in every soul by
the phenomena of the universe.

CHAPTER XVI

APPREHENSION

It has been shown that there is a faculty of the
mind by which bodies are cognized as kinds, which
has been called sensation. It has further been
shown that there is a faculty of the cognition of
bodies as forms, which has been called perception.
It is now designed to demonstrate that there is
a faculty of the mind by which bodies are cognized as
forces, and this faculty I shall call apprehension.

A satisfactory term for this faculty is not found
in the language. The term understanding has vaguely
been used in this manner, but so many meanings
for the term are in use that it cannot well be
employed. The term apprehension also has several
meanings, the most common of which is a synonym
for fear, as when I affirm that I apprehend danger.
I shall use the term apprehension as restricted
solely to the judgment -of force. Apprehension,
then, is the name of the mental process of cognizing
force in all its modes. In order that my argument
may proceed I must have a term which will be
taken with this meaning and with it alone.
'Whether I choose the term wisely or unwisely is
another question.

Man is conscious of his own force, and he infers
force of other bodies because of their effects when
they impinge upon himself, being conscious of these
effects. Then he discovers the forces of molar
bodies in the change wrought by their impinging

upon one another.

337

238 TRUTH AND ERROR

It has already been shown that man is primarily
interested in the environment. The primitive man
first becomes interested in what he supposes to be
the environment of molar bodies by which he is
surrounded. A vast multitude of these bodies are
molar, and stellar bodies are at first supposed to be
molar, while molecular bodies are unknown, and the
world is supposed to be composed of molar bodies.
Then human concepts are all of molar bodies and
their properties.

In a judgment of apprehension, there are the
same pentalogic elements that hitherto we have
observed in judgments, namely, a consciousness of
a sense impression, a choice of a concept, a conscious-
ness of that concept, a comparison of one con-
sciousness with the other, and a judgment which
identifies or discriminates in affirming them to be
alike or unlike as the case may be. The concept
chosen is a concept of force. A judgment of
apprehension must primordially follow a judgment
of perception, just as a judgment of perception must
primordially follow a judgment of sensation. This
is the primordial order in which these judgments
occur.

If we judge of external force in two bodies, before
there can be a judgment of apprehension, there
must be a plurality of judgments of perception as in
perception there must be a plurality of judgments of
sensation. When two bodies act upon each other a
change occurs in both. In order that a judgment of
their actions upon each other may be formed, there
must be judgments of perception ; the two bodies
must be perceived. Then their action is inferred
from the changes which they undergo; but it is

APPREHENSION 239

impossible to have this judgment without the ante-
cedent perceptions.

Let us consider a judgment of apprehension in
what seems to be its simplest form. A pressure on
self is experienced. Here there must be a sense
impression which produces a consciousness, a dis-
crimination, a choice, a recollection, and a conscious-
ness of a concept out of which arises a judgment of
simple sensation. Then we consider the cause as a
form, and judgment of it is a perception. Then we
consider it as a force in a process, and it is a judg-
ment of apprehension. Thus a judgment of appre-
hension is one of a series of judgments, the first of
sensation, the second of perception, and the third of
apprehension.

We become expert in making judgments. Hav-
ing made and verified them, cognition becomes
recognition, and recognition seems to be a very
simple process, for the pentalogic elements do not
arise in the cortical consciousness. The fact is well
known that judgments of intellection as well as
judgments of action are made instantaneously with
precision, when they have previously been made
with halting labor, occupying much time; still we
are compelled to the conclusion that judgments of
apprehension can occur only after judgments of
perception, and these only after judgments of sensa-
tion, although these several judgments all have
pentalogic elements.

There seems to be in the mind or cortex a power
by which logically antecedent judgments are can-
celled after they have once been made, thus saving
time and thought. This cancellation of the ele-
ments of judgment we have hitherto observed,

240 TRUTH AND ERROR

and shall be reminded of it hereafter. This is the
psychical phenomenon known as intuition.

Judgments of energy and work are primarily
derived from muscular sensation or the sense of
stress and strain. There is consciousness of stress
when other bodies press upon us, and a conscious-
ness of strain when our bodies press upon others.
The consciousness is but a consciousness of change
in self, but there is always an inference in a judg-
ment. When I act I am conscious of the action as a
cause, and infer the effect ; when another acts upon
me I am conscious of the effect and infer the cause.
But here we do not pause to treat of the conscious-
ness of strain, but only the consciousness of stress.

The faculties of intellection, which we have
called sensation, perception, and apprehension, are
connate ; that is, they are contemporaneous growths
as concepts, but not contemporaneous judgments.
The judgments of sensation must precede the judg-
ments of perception, and these precede the judg-
ments of apprehension. The last judgment formed
may seem to follow upon the sense impression itself.
It is the power which seems magical to the untrained
psychologist ; the power of reaching a conclusion by
previously gained knowledge. It is the power
which we call habit in another realm of psychology,
as when the trained pianist strikes many notes
simultaneously in rapid succession. Here we
observe that the successions of the mind are more
rapid than the fingers, for the successive acts of will
for every finger are interpreted by simultaneous
muscular acts. It is the power by which the intel-
lect considers many judgments in such rapid suc-
cession that they appear to be simultaneous.

APPREHENSION 241

Heretofore, in discussing sensation, perception,
and apprehension, the effect has been subjective
and the cause objective, but in apprehension these
relations of cause and effect are sometimes reversed,
and the cause may be subjective and the effect
objective. I am conscious not only when another
strikes me, but I am conscious when I strike another.
Here we have a consciousness of cause, and the
effect is inferred. I am conscious of a flavor when
I eat an apple, and I am conscious of an act per-
formed by myself when I bite it. I was conscious of
an effect of color when I saw it, and I was conscious
of an effect upon myself when I touched it; I
was conscious of an act when I turned my eye to it,
and I was conscious of an act when I grasped it.
Thus there is always an emotion connected with an
intellection and there is always an intellection with
an emotion. But we are not now considering emo-
tions; we are considering intellections only. We
cannot consider intellection without positing emo-
tion. With this statement we go on to consider the
subject of the intellections, our present purpose
being simply to discover an epistomology for the
intellections. In another book we shall treat of the
epistomology of the emotions.

Here again we must call attention to another very
important fact, viz., that the individual mind is
only one of many minds, and that it is only one of a
still greater number of bodies — that there is myself
and the environment, and that there is yourself and
the environment, and that you are a part of my
environment, and that I am a part of your environ-
ment. Thus every body in turn is a self with an
environment. The wind acts on me, and I act on

242 TRUTH AND ERROR

the wind, the tree acts on me, and I act on the
tree ; but the wind acts on the tree and the tree on
the wind, and these actions are all processes. The
action of the wind on the tree and the tree on the
wind come into my judgment, and these processes
are cognized ; but the cognition of the action of the
wind on the tree and that of the tree on the wind is
inferred by their actions severally upon me. I see
the leaves on the tree stir in the wind, but I am not
conscious that the wind stirs the leaves. I am
conscious that the light from the tree impinges upon
my eye, and infer the tree and the wind with all the
processes involved. Thus it is that the cognition of
action and reaction between objects in the environ-
ment is a very complex process of reasoning, for
cognition of the interactions of the objects of the
environment are composed of a vast congeries of
judgments.

Force must not be confounded with causation,
although there can be no causation without force,
nor can there be force without form, nor can there
be form without kind; but abstractly causation and
force are wholly disparate. A sledge impinges on a
tree ; the sledge strikes the tree and the tree strikes
the sledge; action and reaction are equal, and
in both vibrations are set up which are visible in
the tree but invisible in the sledge, though none
the less real. Now, when I consider action and
reaction, I am considering force; but the sledge
makes a visible indentation on the tree. When I
am considering this indentation, I am considering
an effect; perhaps the sledge changes some of the
relations of its particles in crystallization; when I
consider this effect upon the sledge I am consider-

APPREHENSION 243

ing causation. Suppose that, instead of striking the
tree with a sledge, I strike it with an ax, then the
blow produces a cut; and when I consider the
difference between a cut of a sharp ax and
the indentation of a sledge, I am compelled to con-
sider differences of causation, and though the force
of the blows are equal, the forms of the cause are
unequal. The blow on the tree causes both vibra-
tion and indentation. Thus there are two effects,
but only one blow. The blow on the sledge is
vibration and crystallization; but there are two
effects, but only one blow. When we consider the
nature of the blow as action and reaction, we are
considering force ; but when we consider the effect
we are considering causation. Action and reaction
are simultaneous, cause and effect are sequent.

All intellection is abstraction; he who cannot
accomplish and hold firmly an abstraction cannot
psychologize.

Apprehension is both presentative and represent-
ative, or inductive and deductive. If we look upon
apprehension from the standpoint of its initial
element, it is either presentative or representative ;
but if we look upon it from the standpoint of result
as reason, it is inductive or deductive. The choice of
a concept of deduction is always initiated by chpice
of another concept instead of a sense impression.
This choice of a concept may be the one made in a
presentative or other judgment, for judgments may
follow judgments in extended succession, all initi-
ated by one sense impression, but connected in the
succession by links of recollection. From one point
of view these may be called discursive judgments,
and from another associated judgments. In waking

244 TRUTH AND ERROR

hours the mind cannot cease to make judgments.
If sense impressions are neglected, recollected con-
cepts take their place. The mind may be turned
loose to make excursions by steps of judgments into
a field where fancy leads ; but the path of the mind
in making judgments may be directed by the will to
the accomplishment of a purpose, in which case the
judgments instead of being discursive are volitional.
Representative judgments, therefore, are discursive
or volitional.

I see a bird flit from one bough to another. If
my mind is free to pursue my meditations, I may
recall the bird that I saw yesterday, and this may
recall a nest of blue eggs, and this may recall the
blue scarf of my little daughter, and I may go on in
this manner to make discursive judgments; but I
may be watching the movements of the bird for the
purpose of studying its habits, and my judgments
may be controlled by my will. In experience we
pass from presentative to representative judgments,
back and forth, with instantaneous rapidity and
great irregularity. So we pass from discursive to
volitional judgments instantaneously and irregularly.

Judgments become cognitions only when they are
verified. Judgments of sensation are verified by
submitting them to other senses, and then they are
subjected to perception for further arbitrament.
Judgments of perception are submitted to appre-
hension for verification, but judgments of appre-
hension are verified by a faculty which we have
hitherto not discussed. We must now set forth the
office of apprehension in verifying judgments of
perception.

Forms are not properly conceived until we know

APPREHENSION 245

their function. We may have a vague concept of a
form without knowing its function, but the elements
of its structure are not fully grasped until we dis-
cover their relations to function. Thus our per-
ceptions of form are not only verified by our
apprehensions of function, but the observation by
which it is discovered is often dependent upon the
effort to apprehend function. An obscure stigma
on the pistil of a plant might be wholly unobserved
by the man who is not acquainted with the office of
the pistil, but the botanist is sure to perceive it. The
painter perceives muscles with certainty when he
observes them in action. It is thus that perception
is verified by apprehension.

In the human race, knowledge commences by
the cognition of molar bodies; as culture advances
knowledge is extended to stellar bodies in the
direction of the vast, and to molecular bodies
in the direction of the minute. On the other
hand, knowledge has not only been extended into
the vast and the minute, but it has also been ex-
tended into the compound and complex as exhibited
in plants and animals. This distinction has long
been recognized in a vague way by including
certain sciences under the term natural history,
and other sciences under the term physics. The
real distinction between these sciences, however, is
this: that the natural history sciences consider
quantities or properties that can be measured. In
ethronomy and astronomy we consider properties
that can be measured, and ultimately arrive at classi-
fication; but in phytonomy and zoonomy we first
consider properties that can be classified, and finally
resort to their measurement. In geonomy the

246 TRUTH AND ERROR

sciences are broadly grouped into two classes,
namely, geography and geology; the geographic
sciences are sciences of measurement, the geologic
sciences are sciences of classification. Thus we
have quantitative and classific sciences. This is the
old distinction of metaphysics between quantitative
and qualitative things when properties are con-
sidered as qualities. We have already seen in the
chapter on qualities the nature of this error and are
ready to rescue the term quality'from the ambiguity
into which it fell when it was considered as synony-
mous with class, kind, or category.

The so-called qualitative sciences, therefore, are
more properly designated as the classific sciences.
This broad distinction between the classific and the
quantitative sciences deserves some further consider-
ation. In the deductive sciences there must be some
reason why we first look for quantity — why we come
to study the ether, the stars, and geography quantita-
tively, and geology, plants, and animals classifically
or categorically. We know absolutely nothing of
kinds of ether, but only of the properties of ether
as belonging to one kind. We know of no method
by which we can change the particles of ether into
kinds. We know of but few kinds of stars, and we
know of no method by which we can change the
kinds of stars. There are but few kinds of air and
of water, and these differences are only varietal, not
specific, and the elements of mathematical geog-
raphy are established mainly beyond the interfer-
ence of man. We wish to adjust our conduct to
these established facts, and hence we wish to know
the facts. I do not propose to change the rising and
setting of the sun, but I do wish to measure the

APPREHENSION 247

times when they may be expected and the length of
the day and the night. I do not propose to change
the gravity inherent bet ween the several stars of the
solar system, but I do wish to measure the force of
gravity between star and star, that I may adjust my
conduct to established facts when I make the ephem-
eris for the guidance of the navigator. I do not pro-
pose to change the atmosphere, but I measure it by
determining its barometric quantities, the pressure
of its winds, and the quantity of moisture which it
contains. In the same way I measure the super-
ficial extent of the sea and the depths at which
the rocks are found, that I may adjust my conduct
while navigating the sea to the facts therein discov-
ered. Now, we could go on to illustrate these facts
in a multitude of ways, and in an endless procession,
and find in all those realms of science, which I have
indicated by calling them physical or quantitative,
that I am interested in quantities as a dweller upon
the earth.

In the quantitative sciences there are few kinds,
but many of a kind. Induction is the discovery of
a kind ; deduction is the application of the laws of a
kind to the individuals which are included in the
kind. The quantitative sciences are deductive, for
deduction predominates in their study. It is thus
that the physical sciences, ethronomy, astronomy,
and geography are quantitative and deductive, and
that which interests us most in these realms of
bodies is their quantities, for though it is impossible
to change their kinds, it is possible to adjust our-
selves advantageously to their quantities.

In geology, phytonomy, and zoonomy there are
many kinds; thus there are many mineral species

248 TRUTH AND ERROR

and few individuals of a species as compared with
the individuals of air and water; there are also
many kinds of plants and comparatively few of a
kind. Deduction is based upon the law that what is
true of one of a kind is true of all of a kind, but
where there are many kinds and few individuals,
attention must be given more to the discovery of
the kinds than to the application of the laws to indi-
viduals; hence in these sciences our attention must
relatively be occupied with the discovery of kinds
and less occupied with the application of laws. But
more : Man by culture undertakes to change kinds,
forms, forces, causes, and concepts. By the arts of
constructive or synthetic chemistry and metallurgy,
he makes many new kinds. By a great variety of
arts he makes many new forms, shaping the rocks,
plants, and animal substances into a variety of tools,
utensils, machines, and fabrics. In a vast multi-
tude of ways he seeks to change the forms of bodies
which he discovers in rocks, plants, and animals,
and can accomplish his purpose only by changing
the kinds.

So man tries to change the forces of nature into
modes which he can control, and all of these
changes which he brings about upon the face of
nature depend upon his recognition of causes and
the wisdom of his selection of the nature of the
cause; while he is thus employed in changing the
kinds of things in nature, he is forever building up
and changing his concepts, and all of this change
when resolved to its simplest statement is change of
kinds. Thus in the geologic, phytonomic, and
zoonomic realms, man is primarily interested in
kinds and only secondarily in quantities; in the

APPREHENSION 249

products of his cultural activities he is equally inter-
ested in kinds and quantities. It is here that induc-
tion and deduction meet on equal grounds, for the
arts are equally inductive and deductive.

Presentative reasoning is thus chiefly classific and
inductive, while representative reasoning is chiefly
quantitative and deductive.

Now we see why bodies are symbolized as kinds
rather than as forces, for forces are recognized as
processes. We think of the force of a form rather
than of the form of a force. All of the senses are
under the control of and associated with muscles, so
that we cannot taste an object without employing
the muscles of the mouth, and when we designedly
smell an object we must imbibe its vapor in the air
through the action of our muscles by inhalation. We
cannot touch an object without employing our
muscles by extending the organs of locomotion, as
hands or feet, though the object may touch us
independently of our self-activity. So pressure is
apprehended by us as stress or strain ; the muscles
of the ear are strained when we intently listen ; the
eye is especially under the control of a system of
muscles, so that it becomes the special organ for
the cognition of motion. We do not see motion
chiefly because of the passing of the image across
the retina, but because the eye, through its muscular
apparatus, adjusts the point of vision of the image
upon the retina to the moving body. Thus, while
force is primordially cognized by the muscular
sense, even motion comes to be cognized by the mus-
cular sense when it adjusts the organ of vision to mo-
tion. This is one of the characteristics of vision which
eminently adapts the sense to vicarious faculties.

250 TRUTH AND ERROR

We may now give a more adequate definition of
apprehension. Apprehension is the process of form-
ing a judgment about force, or its reciprocal, motion,
and of verifying it so as to produce a cognition.
The difference between a cognition of motion and of
force inheres mainly in the method of verification.
The various methods of verification are funda-
mentally dependent upon congruity of concepts.
Again, apprehension as a process of intellection may
be defined as the cognition of force.

CHAPTER XVII

REFLECTION

We have now to describe that faculty of the intel-
lect by which concepts of causation are produced.
It will be remembered that the essential, constant,
or absolute of this property is persistence, that the
relative is change, and from the two time is derived;
then, as motion becomes force through the collision
of particles, time becomes causation as antecedent
and consequent, or cause and effect ; then, causation
becomes metagenesis, and metagenesis becomes
heredity, and heredity becomes evolution.

Words are used with many meanings, but in
science we are compelled to use them with one
meaning. All psychological words are singularly
ambiguous, because they are used as tropes to such
an extent as to conceal their fundamental meaning.
It is necessary to select a word to signify the cogni-
tion of causation, or cause and effect, in the various
phases of time and evolution, and I select the term
reflection for this purpose. The term may also have
a meaning synonymous with contemplation, but I
select it with the meaning which is involved in it as
a sign for the cognition of causation.

Once more it may be well to remind the reader
of the total unlikeness of the properties of matter,
so that they can not be classified. Things can be
classified that are partly alike and partly unlike, but
properties are totally unlike. We may consider

properties separately, but this is abstraction, not

251

252 TRUTH AND ERROR

classification, and we may schematize the properties.
Fundamentally, we reason by abstraction because we
consider properties severally. By reason of the total
unlikeness of disparate properties, the most funda-
mental and clearest distinctions in psychology are
those which we make when we call a faculty the
cognition of a property. Reflection is one of those
faculties because, as the term is here defined, it is
the cognition of the property of causation.

Reflection, also, has the pentalogic elements, but
in the inference the choice is of a concept of causa-
tion. These pentalogic elements are a conscious-
ness of a sense impression, a choice, a concept, a
comparison, and the judgment of likeness or of
unlikeness.

Reflection is one of a series of judgments, and by
its place in the series others are presupposed or
posited. The series, so far as it has been built up,
is composed of sensation, perception, apprehension,
and reflection. I see an oak, and may make a judg-
ment of sensation and conclude that it is green. I
see an oak, and I may make a judgment of percep-
tion and conclude that it is a tree. I see an oak,
and may make a judgment of apprehension, and
conclude that its leaves and branches are in motion ;
I see an oak, and make a judgment of reflection and
conclude that the motion in the tree is caused by
the wind. These judgments differ from one another
in the nature of the concept recalled, and these
concepts differ in degrees of compounding.

Why do I make a judgment of sensation? Because
I wish to note the color which I am painting. Why
do I make a judgment of perception? Because I
wish to seek the shade of the tree? Why do I make

REFLECTION 253

a judgment of apprehension? Because I am looking
for birds. Why do I make a judgment of reflec-
tion? Because I wish to note the direction of the
wind. Here again we see that the particular
inference which we make depends upon the choice
of a concept, and that this choice of the concept
depends upon our purpose.

The concepts of reflection are compounded of
judgments of causes and effects of events. Thus
by reflection the relations of time are compounded
into the relations of causation, and then these are
compounded into relations of metagenesis, and these
are compounded into relations of heredity, and
these are compounded into relations of develop-
ment, and these are compounded into relations of
evolution.

It will be seen that the concepts of causation are
exceedingly compound. In the practical affairs of
life, events are of profound importance, for the
events of yesterday affect the events of today, and
those of toda^- will have a consequence in the
events of tomorrow; thus life is a constant dis-
cipline.

The time of which we speak is not void time, but
the time of states and events, for of void time we
know absolutely nothing, and language fails to
express any concept of void time, and any reifica-
tion of it is a pseudo-idea — a mythological notion.

It must be understood that, as the cognition of
form comes by experience, so cognition of force
comes by experience. Cognition of form antedates
the cognition of energy only in the sense that the
full knowledge of form is necessary before there is
full knowledge of force ; the experience upon which

254 TRUTH AND ERROR

they both depend is contemporaneous. This may
be stated in another way to be made clear. Cogni-
tion of kind by sensation arises with a certain degree
of experience; cognition of form arises with a
higher degree of experience; cognition of force
arises with a still higher degree of experience ; but
judgments of kind, judgments of form, and judg-
ments of force are accumulated contemporaneously.
So concepts of causation succeed concepts of force ;
but the judgments of causation are contemporaneous
with the judgments of force, form, and kind, and
there can be no judgments of causation without
judgments of force, form, and kind.

Here we arrive at a paradox, as it seems, to those
who fail to comprehend the nature of causation.
Consider a valley down which a river runs. There
can be no river without a valley, yet the river has
caused the valley. You affirm that the river has
carved the valley, which seems to be a paradox;
there must have been a valley in order that the
water should be gathered into a stream; and that
the river presupposes or posits the valley.

You explain that a small tract of land is gradually
left bare by the retiring sea, that is, the land is slightly
upheaved; the rain falls upon the land and carves
channels, the tract of land is extended, new chan-
nels are formed and the old channels are deepened ;
still the upheaval goes on with increasing dry land,
multiplication of channels, deepening of channels,
and the widening of channels into valleys, and this
continues until at last a great area of land is upheaved
from the sea, and the rains have carved channels
and the channels have coalesced again and again
until a great valley is formed through which a river

REFLECTION 255

rolls. The river in the process of its growth has
carved a valley, and the enlarging land has at last
caught water enough to fill a river; the growth of
the valley and of the river are contemporaneous, but
the forming of the valley logically succeeds to the
falling of the rain and the flowing of the river with
its lateral streams ; that is, effect succeeds cause.

This is the metaphysical fallacy which mistakes
an effect for a primordial cause, and practically says
that the valley existed before the river, for it gathers
the rain which constitutes the river. The valley
was from the first, but the river is caught by the
valley from the rain which falls. Examine the
doctrine of presupposition in metaphysics, and in
every case a fallacy will be found.

In this manner the experiences of sensation, per-
ception, and apprehension are connate, they spring
up together, and yet concepts of sensation precede
concepts of understanding, and concepts of appre-
hension precede concepts of reflection. One part of
the doctrine of presupposition, as it is put in
metaphysics, is a fallacy, and is replaced by the
doctrine of causation, which explains that that which
was supposed to be antecedent is consequent, or that
which was supposed to be cause is effect. This is
the great contribution made by science in demon-
strating the laws of evolution. Another part of the
metaphysical doctrine is erroneous in assuming that
the concomitants or properties are derived one from
another, one school affirming that all of the
properties are derived from force, the other that
they are all derived from intellection.

There is a valid concept involved in the use of the
term presupposition, so often occurring in meta-

256 TRUTH AND ERROR

physics, for when one property is considered
abstractly the others are known to exist ; though not
overtly affirmed, they are implied, and presup-
position used in this manner and understood in this
manner would be just as good a term as implication
or concomitancy ; the term presupposition leads
astray when it suggests the further idea that the
things implied are antecedent things, instead of
antecedently known things.

Judgments of evolution are constituted in the
same manner as other judgments, and to become
certitudes they must also be verified. But judg-
ments are consolidated as habits of thought; thus
we come across the phenomena of intuition. When
the mind makes one judgment and uses other
knowledge which was derived by previous judgment
to make a new judgment apparently far remote
from the first, this new judgment is said to be a
judgment of intuition, for the steps seem to be
cancelled in reflection, and the long course of
reasoning is made to appear as a direct result.

I see the track of a man in the sand. The left
track is full, the right track shows only the impres-
sion of the toe. I see the one and then the other,
and I infer that the man was lame and walked upon
his right toe. John Smith is lame, and I infer that
John Smith has walked along the trail. John Smith
lives at a distance; I have heard that his mother is
ill, and that he has been sent for, and I infer that
he has passed along the trail to the home of his
mother. Thus a series of judgments flash through
my mind when I see the half footprint, and so
speedily do these judgments arise in succession that
the intervening steps seem to be cancelled from

REFLECTION 257

intellection, and I appear to infer from the foot-
print directly to the visit of John Smith to his
mother; but in fact I have carried on a series of
judgments derived from elements of knowledge that
have been recalled by the sight of the footprint.

This reasoning in series by unrecognized steps is
intuition. It is the same old story of habit. Cer-
tain kinds of reasoning, like certain kinds of mus-
cular activity, come by frequent repetition to be so
easily accomplished that the processes involved are
unrecognized by the mind. Perhaps this can be
explained by the theory that in recalling one con-
cept we recall others with which it is associated,
reviving them as they are woven into the structure
of the cortex by the act of choice. All judgments
of causation are more or less serial in this manner,
and as most of them are habitual they become
intuitive. For this reason it is often more difficult
to analyze judgments of reflection than judgments
of apprehension ; and more difficult to analyze judg-
ments of apprehension than judgments of percep-
tion ; but by careful attention to the subject and by
the acquisition of skill in introspection, it can always
be discovered that every judgment of reflection is
founded upon a consciousness and involves an infer-
ence which recalls a compound concept, and to
reach the stage of certitude it must be verified.
Finally, it must be remembered that intuition,
which is supposed by careless thinkers to be occult,
is in fact developed by experience. Such is the
nature of presentative judgments of reflection.

We have yet to consider representative judgments
of reflection. Again, we see that as presentative
judgments follow upon sense impression, so repre-

2$8 TRUTH AND ERROR

sentative judgments follow upon choice, and the
choice may be discursive or volitional. The dis-
cursive choice is sporadic, and by following such
concepts the stream of thought is directed in a
meandering course that flows to nowhere ; but the
choice for a fixed purpose, in which there is an
interest, leads to results that influence the conduct
of life. The presentative judgments of reflection
are removed from the sense impression by intui-
tional or by more deliberate judgments of sensation,
perception, and understanding, so that the judg-
ments of reflection, both presentative and repre-
sentative, are more deliberative than of the lower
faculties.

When both cause and effect are external, the
judgments of them are mediated by other judgments,
the causes of which are external and the effects
internal ; hence the judgments of external cause and
effect are still further removed from sense impres-
sion, so that there is again another degree of delib-
eration. It is this characteristic that has led to the
selection of the term reflection to designate the
faculty, and although the reflective judgment may
never have been defined as it has been here, yet this
definition will serve to reveal the unconscious wis-
dom of the selection of the term in current speech.
In judgments of original cognition the pentalogic
elements can always be discovered by introspection,
but in the judgments of recognition it is difficult to
discover them in the cortical consciousness. When
cognition is fairly accomplished recognition there-
after becomes instantaneous.

Audition is the primordial sense of causation.
Sound comes to us through a medium, and primor-

REFLECTION 259

dial man has no knowledge of this medium ; he does
not recognize the ambient air. Thus he thinks that
sound is something emitted from bodies, just as
Newton believed that light was something emitted
from bodies, and Plato that forms were emitted from
bodies. So the savage looked about him for the
cause, and often the cause as a form he could not see,
and as he knew nothing of molecular force he formed
no concepts of force in relation to sound ; so his con-
cepts of sound were concepts of cause until he could
discover the cause as a form. It was thus that con-
cepts of cause were primitively generated in the
mind of man. Hearing is also the sense by which
time, the reciprocal of cause, is first conceived.
We must remember that properties are concomitant,
and though the faculties operate abstractly in that
they primarily conceive properties as abstract, yet
the indissolubility of the concomitants compels us to
consider the manifestation of one property as the
symbol of all others. In this manner the senses all
become vicarious, and we make judgments with one
sense that we might make with another. Of all the
primordial senses we have hitherto discussed as the
primal sense of a faculty, that of hearing is the most
facile to perform the functions of the others, though
we shall hereafter observe that seeing is the grand
vicar of the senses.

Judgments of reflection are verified by the judg-
ments of a higher faculty, but they themselves are
used to verify the judgments of lower faculties.
Motion and force are expressed in rapidly passing
events, but causes produce effects that remain;
causes and effects are states ; forces are events that
separate states; hence it is that the judgments of

260 TRUTH AND ERROR

understanding are relegated to those of reflection
for verification.

I suppose that I see a woodpecker tapping a tree.
I look and see the fresh pit made, and my judgment
is confirmed. I obtain the glimpse of an animal
running through the forest, and think it to be a
wolf. I come to the spot where it was supposed to
be, and the tracks of a deer are seen, and so I cor-
rect my judgment. Thus a higher judgment will
serve as a verification of a lower.

Judgments may be measured. I judge of a dis-
tance, and find, when the distance is measured, the
error of the judgment. I do not find the error of
the line measured, but only the error of the judg-
ment made. So, whenever we make a judgment of
length or distance or size or weight or mass, or
what not, we measure our judgments by measuring
the what-nots judged. All judgments are liable to
error, and cognition comes only with verification.
In quantitative judgments the liability to error is
infinite as that term is used by mathematicians, and
all judgments must be verified unless the amount
of error may be neglected.

In scientific research verification is often by
measurement. Counting itself is measuring, and
the sum is the number of units which the measured
body contains, and these units are units of a kind.
It is only in counting that the units are natural ; all
other units are conventional in that something other
than the thing measured is taken as the unit or
standard. I measure time by the revolution of the
earth, by the revolution of a hand on the dial of
a clock, or by the flow of water from a clepsydra.
Thus one measurement is mediated by another, and

REFLECTION 261

different standards are taken. The nature of
measurement is well understood except in so far as
it relates to psychological phenomena; in this
realm metaphysicians seem wholly to misconceive
its nature. I cannot measure the number of the
ultimate particles of a body by counting them, but I
may measure the relative number of its atoms by
weighing it. I do not determine its force, but its
mass only, when I weigh the body, for the total
force in the body is the sum of its motion in all its
incorporations. A pound of powder has much more
force than that which is measured as a pound.
What we really arrive at in weighing a body is the
proportionate number of its particles. I may meas-
ure the length of the wall by counting the brick
lengths in the wall. I cannot measure this stick by
counting the number of particles as atoms, mole-
cules, or cells which constitute its length, but I use a
conventional unit, say an inch, and I find it ten
inches long. Had I taken some natural unit I
might have found it, say, ten million molecules in
length. Now, what have I measured? Only the
distance which separates the positions of the mole-
cules in its termini, but I have not measured the
extension of any of the molecules, for probably they
are separated by interspaces filled with ether, and
may be with air. It is thus that I measure space.
I cannot measure form, for form is internal structure
and external shape.

I have a body which is of very irregular shape,
and hence I cannot well determine its extension in
three dimensions, but I put it into a beaker of
water, and determine how much it displaces, and
measure that; thus, while I do not measure the

262 TRUTH AND ERROR

body itself, I measure its equivalent. Now this
leads us logically to the statement that of the five
concomitants in every particle or body every one
can be measured, and it is only necessary to meas-
ure one property to have a measure of them all.
But more than this, I must measure one property in
terms of another; thus, I measure motion in terms
of space or length, and I measure speed in terms of
length and time. We must remember that meas-
urement is always a conventional process to serve a
purpose, and the way in which we measure a thing
is by some device for the purpose, and the purpose is
always the relation of the thing measured to some
other thing. I measure force as motion, so I meas-
ure the force of the cause in its effect, and measure
the effect in space elements. I measure a judgment
by measuring the thing of which the judgment is
made ; thus, I judge of a distance, and may measure
the distance to determine the amount of error in my
judgment. It is in this manner that I can measure
judgments.

I cannot longer dwell on this subject to set
forth the devices by which judgments are meas-
ured, but must content myself with the statement
that the attempt to measure judgments has but
recently been made, and that already there are
many devices. All of the properties can be reduced
to or considered as number. Space can be con-
sidered as number, when its elements are counted
in natural units, or it can be considered as num-
ber when its elements are measured in conven-
tional units. Motion can be considered as space,
and then as number. Time may also be considered
as motion, then as space, and finally as number;

REFLECTION 263

judgments may be considered as time, and time as
motion, and motion as space, and space as number.
The device by which the other properties are con-
sidered as number is measurement, and measure-
ment is experimentation.

We are prepared to give a more adequate defini-
tion of reflection. Reflection is the faculty of
cognizing causation. Again, we may define it as
the process of making a judgment about causation
or its reciprocal, time, which judgment must be veri-
fied to become a cognition.

CHAPTER XVIII

IDEATION

We have seen that consciousness is one of the
essentials of an animate particle ; that sensation is
the first mental property or faculty of an animate
body ; that perception is the second mental property
or faculty of an animate body; that apprehension is
the third mental property or faculty of an animate
body; and that reflection is the fourth mental prop-
erty or faculty of an animate body. Now, we have
to consider the fifth mental property or faculty of
an animate body. We form judgments about con-
sciousness and choice, and about judgments and
concepts; that is, we cognize mind. We need a
term to express the forming of judgments about
judgments, or of cognizing cognitions. For this
purpose I shall use the term ideation. Ideation,
therefore, as the term is here used, is the act of
making judgments about judgments which, when
verified, are cognitions.

We are conscious of our own judgments, but we
infer the judgments of others. We may find the
judgments of others to be like those we have already
formed, or we may find that they are new to us.
These new judgments we may accept or reject.
When speech is developed and education is insti-
tuted, acception comes to play a very important role
in mental acquisition.

Judgments of ideation are connate with all other
judgments, but they are compounded of them and

264

IDEATION 265

represent higher degrees of relativity; hence it is
more difficult to trace them into their constituent
judgments, yet trained introspection accomplishes
this feat.

Before the laws of evolution were discovered and
an absolute difference between man and the lower
animal was supposed to exist, it was often affirmed
that this distinction consists in the absence in the
brute of knowledge about mind, that only man
knows himself to be a thinking being, or, as we are
here using the term, only man has the faculty of
ideation. This is one of the affirmations which men
are ready and prone to make before they learn that
cognition is verified judgment, and that our judg-
ments are guesses, while guesses are often more
current than certitudes. With this idea was associ-
ated another, namely, that animals do not reason,
but have instinct, there being no realization of the
fact that certain practical judgments are repeated
so often that they become intuitive as acts become
habitual. Instinct or intuition and habit will
require further consideration in a subsequent book.

We must now develop a little further the nature
of the faculty of ideation, by considering the process
of forming judgments of ideation. I hear a voice,
and by experience know that its tone expresses
surprise. Thus I form a judgment of an emotion in
another. I am confronted with an antagonist on a
field of battle, and see him point his howitzer at the
column of troops in which I move, and infer that he
has a deadly purpose. The lower animal makes
judgments of ideation in this manner, and uses
these judgments in guiding its own conduct. With
mankind in higher culture this faculty is greatly

266 TRUTH AND ERROR

developed. All words are signs of concepts, and all
combined words that express thought are judgments,
and the symbols of ideas, both spoken and written,
constitute the pabulum of higher culture. Thus we
not only cognize the intellections of others, but at
the same time we accept their judgments as judg-
ments of our own.

Ideation, as the term is here used, is a cognition of
intellections in that manifestations of intellections
are cognized by forming concepts of them. In sensa-
tion manifestations are conceived as expressions of
kind. In perception they are conceived as expres-
sions of form; in apprehension they are conceived
as expressions of force ; in reflection they are con-
ceived as expressions of cause and effect; in idea-
tion they are conceived as expressions of mind.

The constitution of the judgment which has
already been exhibited four times must here be
repeated. It appears as a consciousness of a sense
impression, a choice, a reproduction of a conscious-
ness of a concept of ideation, which, by comparison,
make a judgment of ideation. The concept which
is reproduced by the choice, is still more highly com-
pound than in the lower grades of cognition, for the
acts which animate bodies perform are first inter-
preted as kinds, then as forms, then as forces, then
as causations, and finally as concepts. The series is
complete when the judgment of ideation is made.

Like all other judgments, those of ideation are
presentative and representative; representative
judgments are discursive and volitional. There is
no need to repeat the discussion setting forth the
nature of judgments in these respects.

Vision is the primordial sense of ideation. We

IDEATION 267

see the motions in others, which I have heretofore
called self-activity, and interpret them as symbols
of soul. By soul I mean all intellectual and emo-
tional judgments made by the animate being. The
individual is conscious of the judgments made by
himself, but he infers the judgment made by others.
The judgments that others make are inferred from
the signs which others make. I see the leaves
tremble, the clouds move, the rain fall, the river
flow, and innumerable motions in the mineral world ;
but I do not consider them as signs of intellect and
emotion. There are other signs, however, which I
observe in animate beings, and especially in human
activities, which I do interpret as marks of soul.
These signs are those which are produced only by
those bodies which, being animate, have motility.
The nature of this motility we have elsewhere
explained and we have called it self-activity, which
must not be confounded with self-motion, for self-
motion is inherent in every particle, while self-
activity is self -directed motion in a body.

Only animate bodies have this self-activity. But
according to our hypothesis the ultimate particles of
inanimate bodies have self-activity in so far as they
manifest choice or affinity, while plant bodies seem
to have self-activity in their cells. Neglecting this
hypothesis, animate bodies certainly have conscious-
ness and choice in their cells. Now, as one inanimate
body has inherent motion in its several particles,
which are organized in a hierarchy of bodies, the
inanimate body cannot be deflected except by col-
lision with another body, but the animate body can
deflect its own motion as a body by metabolism, and
by deflecting its own motion as a body it can deflect

268 TRUTH AND ERROR

the motion of others. It is this power in the ani-
mate body of deflecting its own motion at will and of
deflecting the motions of others by colliding against
them at will, which is the sign or mark of mind in
those bodies to which we attribute mind, and
which exhibit more and more the purpose and
ability to convey concepts to others, until among the
higher animals a conventional sign language is pro-
duced, which becomes oral in the higher animals, but
oral and written speech in man. Without words
only emotions can be conveyed, whereas with words
intellection can be exchanged. Gesture language
may become gesture speech, oral language oral
speech, and picture writing written speech. It is
with this higher condition of language as speech
that we are chiefly interested in ideation. Every-
thing in nature has manifestations which may be
interpreted, but only animate beings purposely con-
vey concepts to one another.

Ideation is reenforced by other demotic agencies
than those of speech. The pleasures, the industries,
the institutions, and the opinions of mankind, are all
expressed as human activities, and manifest the con-
cepts by which they are produced; but we need not
dwell on the subject here.

Through the agency of language we discover the
fifth property of bodies. When we are interested in
them and interest grows apace we may wish to
know what those bodies say instead of what they
are ; it is then that language becomes speech, but
culture continues to advance and speech becomes
designed or purposeful instruction. Then all the
appliances of instruction are developed until one of
the principal occupations of mankind is the giving

IDEATION 269

and receiving of instruction and the acquiring of
concepts from one another, in which process the
instructor is more instructed than the pupil, for the
speaker in the organization of that which is spoken
learns more than the hearer.

Now the eye, by its peculiar construction with
apparatus for accommodation to distance and direc-
tion, is especially adapted to the reception of sense
impressions that imply self-activity, hence it is the
primary sense organ for the faculty of ideation. While
its fundamental function is ideation, by reason of the
concomitance of properties it becomes a vicarious
organ for others.

Every one of the sense organs becomes an organ
for and of the faculties. In the first stage of mind,
while the organs of taste and smell are primarily
the organs of sensation, the other organs interpret
the sense impressions coming to them as symbols
of flavor. In the second stage, while touch is the
primary organ of form, the sense impressions coming
to the other organs are interpreted as symbols of
form. In the third stage the muscular sense is the
primary organ of understanding, but all the other
organs interpret the sense impression coming to
them as symbols of forces. In the fourth stage, while
the organ of audition is the primary organ of reflec-
tion, all the other organs interpret the sense im-
pressions coming to them as symbols of causation.
In the fifth stage, while the eye is the primary
organ of ideation, all the other organs may interpret
the sense impressions coming to them as if they
were symbols of concepts.

We have seen how the judgments of the lower
faculties are verified by the higher, but now ideation

270 TRUTH AND ERROR

is the court of last resort. In the structure of the
mind incongruous judgments throw the machinery
of reason out of gear. So many judgments have
been found fallacious by every individual in the race
of men, and fallacious judgments have led to such
dire disasters, and have been repeated so often in
matters of profound moment, as well as in matters
of superficial consequence, that there has grown up
a habit of mind by which incongruity of judgments
is taken as a signal that danger lurks in the way.
The mind cannot rest content with an incongruity.
It is the ultimate spur to all intellectual activity, for
we may forego the pleasures of the mind when we
know that others may be enjoyed, but of tentimes we
cannot neglect the dangers of false judgments. We
must make a practical solution of every incongruous
judgment at the time, but every intelligent man
yearns for an ultimate solution, thus the world is on
the qui vive for knowledge as for the breath of life.
Those who teach the doctrine of the unknowable
offer stones for bread and vipers for fish.

All our concepts must be congruous ; the demand
for congruity is inexorable. A man may accept a
verbal explanation of the facts of science and believe
that he has a world of congruous concepts, but
experience will find incongruity, which he may con-
ceal for himself in a jugglery of words, but others
will detect it when they are announced.

This final faculty in verification resorts to the
multitudinous concepts of which the mind is pos-
sessed and when one is incongruous with others it
demands a reinvestigation of that one. Sometimes
the one is right and the many are wrong, and the
multitude must be made to establish congruity with

IDEATION 271

one, but meanwhile the one multiplies until it
becomes the many and the fallacious judgments the
few.

All scientific research is a process of reinvesti-
gating our concepts and of adjusting them to the light
which has been shed upon them by some broader
generalization than we have been wont to make.
We gain a concept by induction and immediately
we apply it in a multitude of ways by deduction, and
in making these applications we discover our fal-
lacious judgments and go on forever to readjust our
concepts. Thus there is trial and failure, trial and
failure, until at last there is trial and success ; then
a new vista is opened into the universe.

The sensations, perceptions, apprehensions, reflec-
tions, and ideations of the individual are not
exhausted by an enumeration of these derived by
the individual in his converse with nature. From
his ancestors he inherits the powers of thought, with
his organism, which is expectant and apt in judg-
ment and conception. It is ready for this work, as
it has been developed through untold generations of
ancestral life, and apt, as it has been trained by the
experience of untold ages. With the power and
skill thus developed it is able to deal with and
rationally idealize an immeasurable body of facts
which it cannot discover for itself — facts gathered
in other lands by other minds and conveyed to it by
the agency of language.

The landsman may learn from the mariner, the
dweller in the valley from the mountaineer, the
denizen of the forest from the denizen of the prairie,
and he who dwells where tropical hurricanes wash
the coral reefs with the waves of the sea, may learn

272 TRUTH AND ERROR

from him who dwells among the cliffs of ice and
sees the bergs of crystal plunged from their glacial
homes into the depths of the sea. This process of
forming judgments we call acception.

In converse with nature, man transforms or inter-
prets symbols of sense impressions into concepts of
sensation, perception, apprehension, reflection, and
ideation. In contact with these natural symbols he
devises a new world of symbols with which he inter-
prets concepts of others. Still they are judgments
founded upon the five factors or constituents of
bodies, and nothing more enters into them. So we
still find mind dealing with number, space, motion,
time, and judgment, or their reciprocals kind, form,
force, causation, and concept.

Words themselves are of great assistance to idea-
tion in that they symbolize with one word great
groups of judgments which we call concepts. Thus
it is that the ego is diverted from the material world
to the ideal world, and caused to dwell abstractly
upon judgments and their compounds. Perhaps
abstraction is more nearly complete in the considera-
tion of judgments and their compounds than in the
consideration of times and their compounds, motions
and their compounds, spaces and their compounds,
and numbers and their compounds. In fact, this
abstraction is so thorough that conception is often
supposed to have perfect independence of matter,
although no conception or judgment is known which
is not a concomitant of matter.

A crude speech is developed by all animal life —
a general sign language by which every animal
holds converse with the members of its own species.
This general sign language is inherited by man and

IDEATION 273

gradually developed by him ; but oral speech soon
leads the way in the development of a still higher
language. This oral language is invented by minute
increments born of experience; finally, written
language is developed from lowly beginnings in
picture writings — first, words are developed, and
these words are grouped in sentences, and this group-
ing reacts upon the words themselves until parts of
speech are developed, for, in primeval languages,
there are no parts of speech as organs of the sentence,
as we now understand this term.

Words are signs of concepts, not of judgments,
for every word stands for an assemblage of judg-
ments, and to express a judgment it is necessary to
formulate a proposition. Yet we cannot get away
from sensation, perception, apprehension, reflection,
and ideation. The words themselves are spoken or
written, and sense impressions are necessary to pro-
duce the changes in self upon which consciousness
is founded, for consciousness, as we use the term, is
awareness of change in self. Thus the spoken word
is a sound impression upon the organ of hearing;
the written word a light impression upon the organ
of vision, and the impression becomes a symbol for
sensation, or a symbol for perception, or a symbol for
apprehension, or a symbol for reflection, or a symbol
for ideation. So all words are symbols for ideation,
but the symbols are conventional — invented by man-
kind for the purpose as an addition to the natural
symbols. Not that languages are invented as fully
developed, but the elements of every language and
the combinations of these elements are invented by
minute increments. To understand the word itself
it is necessary that there shall be a consciousness

274 TRUTH AND ERROR

and an inference leading to a judgment that the
word is such or such, as a sound or a written symbol,
and the whole process by sensation and perception
must be repeated with every word in order to dis-
tinguish it as a word. Then perception, apprehen-
sion, and reflection are all employed in confirming a
judgment about the meaning of the word, and no
word has any meaning until it is interpreted into
concepts of number, space, motion, time, or judg-
ment, one or all.

Here we have especially to note that acception
becomes not the sole but the chief agency for the
development of the concepts of mind.

And now on symbol wings as magical words, the
soul flies to all the realms of the universe, learning
not only of the worlds of space and time, but
penetrating into the arcana of other souls.

By the invention of speech man has acquired an
inexhaustible resource from which to draw ideas,
but by this artificial method dangers are involved.
Imagination often outruns the ideas expressed in
words, producing illusions, but usually harmless
illusions. My friend tells me of a cove carpeted
with rare flowers. I listen and in my mind a brook
tumbles in a cascade from a cliff above and the cove
seems a deep narrow gorge with fringing rocks and
trees standing at the foot of the cliffs. I even per-
ceive in my fancy the pathway by which it is reached,
and measure off its distance in my mind's eye.
Unexpectedly we come upon the brook. I had
imagined it to be much farther off. Thus I had
misinterpreted the statement of my friend. We
turn up by its bank into the glen. As we enter the
cove, instead of finding a narrow glen, with tower-

IDEATION 275

ing walls and overhanging rocks, I see a stretch of
pasturage land inclosed by rocks that are broken
back in hills, and up the valley beyond the pasturage
lands there is a deserted cabin. Near the cabin a
great spring gushes from the foot of the rock, and
about it trees grow. While my companion gathers
flowers I muse. How strange that his words created
so vivid a picture in my mind, and that this picture
should be wholly the creation of my own imagina-
tion, having no counterpart in the reality ! I fancied
a narrow cove with towering cliffs, tall trees, and a
cataract. It is a semicircular glen with broken
walls of rock, grass-land and a great spring.

Words are signs of ideas to be interpreted by the
imagination of the hearer, and a true or a false inter-
pretation may be given them, depending upon the
knowledge already existing in the mind of the
hearer.

There is a constant tendency to learn words with-
out meanings, or words with vague meanings,
and to use them with a semblance of expressing
ideas. No word is properly understood when it
does not stand for an idea about one or more of
the concomitants of body or about the relations
of these concomitants. Here we have a crucial test
for the legitimate use of a word; if it does not
express a number, a space, a motion, a time, or a
judgment, or their reciprocals as kind, form, force,
causation, or concept of a body or a relation of one
body to another, it expresses a pseudo-idea. A
word used to express an idea of an unknown thing
may become legitimate by the unknown becoming
known, but a word used to express an unknowable
thing is blank voice. The habit of learning words

276 TRUTH AND ERROR

without learning the ideas for which they stand is
worse than an inanity — it is a vice, for the mind
is irresistibly led into the practice of informing such
words with vague and misleading meanings. Select
any word in common usage to express the leading
ideas in the metaphysical discussion of the nature
of the universe, and follow it where it occurs many
times, and you can invariably discover that it is used
with many meanings wholly incompatible with one
another, and the foundation of these meanings will
be discovered to be something unknowable — a noth-
ing, an abstract attribute reified as having concrete
existence. Teach the word cat to a child who has
never seen a cat and it will imagine a hobgoblin.

Words often have many meanings; learn these
many meanings of many concepts, put them together
as one compound idea and you have an absurdity;
but such is often the method of metaphysical reason-
ing. Akin to this is to use the word as a metaphor
and then to forget the metaphor. See how Hegel
uses the word mediation. A mediator is one who
comes between others ; the ether mediates the light
between the sun and the earth ; the air mediates the
sound between the voice and the ear; so the messen-
ger mediates the message, and the term properly
means to bear from one to another. A man may
bear his own letter to his friend and by a figure of
speech may be said to be his own mediator. But
when you forget the figure of speech and call the
man a mediator who acts upon another you have
used the word illegitimately, and when you go still
further to speak of the action of a person upon him-
self as mediation, you have reduced the term to an
absurdity. Such are the methods of ontologic

IDEATION 277

reasoning as distinguished from scientific reasoning,
which holds words to single and invariable mean-
ings. "If thine eye be single the whole body is full
of light." It is not strange that Hegel rendered
the world into terms of multitudinous contradictions.
It was the trick of tricks, the juggle of juggles, to
play such pranks with the terms of philosophy.

CHAPTER XIX

INTELLECTIONS

I shall now review the doctrines set forth in these
chapters on the five faculties and make a more com-
prehensive statement of certain fundamental prin-
ciples.

In this volume psychology is treated only as a
system of intellections, while the emotions are
neglected. The subject matter is the beginning of
an epistomology or theory of cognition, which will
require another volume for its completion, when a
volume of psychology will follow.

It has been set forth that consciousness is self-
consciousness. When the self is conscious of an
effect on self it infers a cause, and when it is con-
scious of being a cause it infers an effect. In the
simplest judgment causation is involved — one of the
terms being a cause, the other an effect. When con-
sciousness is of the effect, the inference is of the
cause, and we have a judgment of intellection.
When the consciousness is of the cause, the inference
is of the effect, and we have a judgment of emotion.
When the cause and the effect are both internal we
have an emotion. I use the term consciousness solely
as awareness of self and not in its general significa-
tion as cognition. We cannot be conscious of an ex-
ternal object, but we are conscious of our judgments
of external objects. In the case of the animate body,
which has conscious particles acting on one another, it

may be conscious of both cause and effect in the

278

INTELLECTIONS 279

body, because the particles of the body are external
to one another, and the ganglia, with their con-
necting fibrous nerves, constitute the organism by
which the consciousness of the particles is ultimately
transmitted to the cortex. Thus there is a con-
sciousness of the cortex, a consciousness of the sub-
ordinate ganglia, and a consciousness of the particles ;
so that when the self acts on self there are both con-
sciousness and inference.

The cause at one time is considered as a kind, at
another time as a form, at another a force, at
another a causation, and at another time as a concept,
giving rise to five faculties of intellection, as
follows : First, cognition of kind, which is the faculty
of sensation; second, cognition of form, which is
the faculty of perception ; third, cognition of force,
which is the faculty of apprehension; fourth, cog-
nition of causation, which is the faculty of reflection ;
and, fifth, cognition of conception, which is the
faculty of ideation.

If this doctrine is true then, fundamentally, we
cognize by properties which we find to be concom-
itant in particles and bodies, and thereby reach a
cognition of particles or bodies. It will be seen
that judgments are fundamentally abstractions, but
that comprehension gives them concrete validity.
In the first stage they are judgments, in the second
stage they are cognitions.

A judgment is a process of elements. First,
there is a consciousness of a sense impression. Second,
there is a desire to know its cause; that is, what
produced it; what can the impression signify?
Third, there is a guess or a choice of some external
object as its cause, which revives the consciousness

280 TRUTH AND ERROR

of the concept of the object chosen. Fourth, this
second consciousness is compared with the first. Fifth,
a judgment is made of likeness or unlikeness
between the terms compared. The first cause, when
it is sense impression, is an act of something in the
environment, but when it is a reproduction it is a
self-activity. The second cause is always a self-
activity.

All judgments are judgments of cause and effect.
The consciousness may be of the effect and the
inference of the cause, or the consciousness may be
of the cause and the inference of the effect, or the
consciousness may be of the effect and of the cause
when self acts on self, and then the inference is of
their relation, one to the other. Again, both cause
and effect may be external, when there will be two
judgments, each one of which will contain a con-
sciousness and an inference, and their relation to
each other as cause and effect will be by inference.
Thus inference may be in the second, or higher
degree.

There are two of the psychic elements in a judg-
ment that demand further consideration. These are
consciousness and choice. Here consciousness is
awareness of an effect, the cause of which is an act
of the external world thrust upon self at the present
time, or upon self at sundry past times. The
inference, or interpretation, is a choice of, or guess
at, the cause. Thus consciousness is of self, but
choice or inference is of the object.

. I have spoken of the choice as a guess or an
hypothesis, but in cognition it is always an invention,
and as an invention it requires the conscious time
of deliberation. The mind always invents the cause,

INTELLECTIONS 281

and it is because it is an invention that it must be
verified; but in recognition the invention is already
made and the process of judgment no longer requires
deliberation. It is this absence of deliberation which
makes multitudes of judgments practically instan-
taneous, or intuitive. No scientific man can make
practical additions to knowledge who is not an
inventor of hypotheses. One of the sine qua non
conditions of successful research is the power of
inventing hypotheses ; another of these sine qua non
conditions is verification, but experimental verifica-
tion also requires invention.

That a primitive judgment requires much time is
learned only by careful introspection. So many of
our judgments are recognitional instead of being
cognitional, that judgments usually appear to be
instantaneous. In defense of this doctrine I may be
permitted to cite my personal experience. For
many years I was engaged on an exploring expedition
where all the features of the landscape were new to
me and my companions. Mountains, hills, rocks,
plains, valleys, streams, all were new. I was con-
stantly discoverng new plants, new animals, and
strange human beings, as Indians. During all these
years the fundamental doctrines of psychology often
constituted the theme of my thoughts and the sub-
ject with which I beguiled the weariness of travel.
It was thus that I learned to distinguish the elements
of a primordial judgment and to distinguish cogni-
tional from recognitional judgments. In later years
reconnoissance was developed into survey, and my
time was devoted largely to structural geology. For
every phenomenon there was always a hypothetical
explanation, and such guesses were all found value-

282 TRUTH AND ERROR

less unless verified. Thus it was that the doctrine
of a primary judgment and the doctrine of verifica-
tion grew up with me. More than that, I discovered
that my associates in the work of research depended
upon hypothesis and verification ; and before my field
work was done the universal doctrine of cognition
herein presented was abundantly confirmed.

Let us look further into the judgment relating to
cause and effect in the external world. A judgment
about an object may be combined with another
judgment about another object, and a third judg-
ment of causation arises, which is about things objec-
tive. For example, I see a man strike another and
cause pain in that other. I must make two judg-
ments of perception to see the men, a judgment of
understanding to see the force, a judgment of reflec-
tion to see the effect, and perhaps another judgment
of perception to realize the pain. While this maneu-
ver is passing in the field many other events are
occurring under the eye, the ear, and other senses,
and the many judgments combine in the verification
of the judgment formed of the maneuver. Thus
judgments are verified. See what a number of
concepts are aroused in this case and how much
more complex it is than a simpler judgment of
sensation, or even of perception.

What we have to note here is the distinction which
has to be made between a judgment of causation,
which is a highly compound judgment, and the part
which causation plays in all judgments — even the
simplest.

A judgment of causation is a very distinct thing
from the property of causation in the formation of
a judgment. In a judgment of sensation I reach a

INTELLECTIONS 283

conclusion about a property, say of taste, but I do
not consider the cause as a cause but as a kind. So,
in a judgment of perception I consider the cause as
a form ; in a judgment of apprehension I consider the
cause as a force ; but in the judgment of causation I
consider the cause as a cause. Now, the very same
phenomenon may be considered in any one of these
lights, but the inference in the several cases will be
different and the concepts aroused will be different.
Which one of the judgments will be made will
depend on my interest or the line of thought on
which I am engaged. The reader can not be too
careful in thoroughly mastering the distinctions
between the five classes of judgment, and between
the role of causation in making a judgment, and a
judgment of causation. In the judgment of sensation
I think about the kind ; in the judgment of perception
I think about the form ; in the judgment of appre-
hension I think about the force ; but in the judgment
of reflection I think about the causation as cause or
effect.

Let us now see how cognition is judgment and
verification. What things are necessary that I may
know that a body has touched me? First, I must
be conscious of an effect on self; second, I must
infer that something exercises a force that must
have produced this change by collision, and the
something is a cause and I have a judgment. This
judgment may then be verified by my vision when
I see the body. The change in self may have been
produced by an irritation of the skin due to some
disease. What I supposed to have been touch might
have been an illusion, but seeing the body as it
touched me the verification is made and a certitude

284 TRUTH AND ERROR

is produced. Again, I might have seen the body
approach and feared that it would touch me, and
expectant of the touch, I might have inferred the
touch when really the touch was not accomplished.
In this case there was a consciousness by the
sense impression in vision, but an inference which
was only an illusion. Two or more acts of conscious-
ness producing the same judgment verify one another.

How must I know that a knife has cut me? First,
I am conscious of a change or effect in self; second,
I infer that something has produced that effect as a
force and I have a judgment. In order that the
cognition may be complete this hypothesis must be
verified. I may verify the cutting by seeing that
the gash is made, and I may verify the knife by see-
ing or touching the knife. In the one case I have a
certitude that I have been cut, and in the second
case, a certitude that I have been cut with the knife,
and these certitudes verify each other. I might
have seen the knife move near to my hand and
inferred that it cut me, and an illusion might thus
have arisen that I was cut ; but the consciousness of
the effect of the knife upon my hand, together with
the consciousness of the knife by vision, produce
judgments that confirm each other.

How do I recognize that some one has spoken?
First, I am conscious of a change in my organ of
hearing. I infer that it is the sound of a voice. I see
the person's lips move, and it is confirmed and I have
a certitude. I might have seen the lips move without
hearing the sound, and inferred that a sound was
made, which would have been an illusion ; but in the
hearing of the sound and the seeing of the move-
ment of the lips, each verifies the other.

INTELLECTIONS 285

How do I cognize the flavor of an apple? My taste
and my vision of the apple verify each other. How
do I cognize the odor of a rose? By smelling and
seeing, and the common judgment is verified.

In these cases judgments verify one another. All
verification is founded on congruence of judgments.
It is thus that one sense verifies another. Now,
that which we have specially to note at this stage of
the argument is that verification is founded on con-
gruence of judgments. Every cognition involves a
judgment and its verification, and the verification
is founded on the congruence of judgments, one with
another of a higher grade.

In the lower stages of the development of mind,
verification is sometimes by repetition, oftener by
submitting the judgment to verification by another
sense ; but in the higher stages of the development
of mind, verification is by experimentation. We
go on from generation to generation with unverified
judgments and suppose that our concepts are com-
posed of cognitions, when in fact they are composed
of fallacious judgments. For untold generations
men believed the earth to be flat, and that
bodies fall to the earth in a line normal to this flat
plain. But there were certain phenomena which
were inexplicable, and men invented the hypothesis
that the earth is a spheroid and that bodies fall
toward the center of the earth, and it accounted for
so many facts relating to the motions of the heavenly
bodies that the hypothesis led to a vast amount of
scientific research, and was verified. Now at last
we cognize the motion of the heavenly bodies in
part at least. For ages man believed the heavenly
bodies to be molar, that is, to be movable by man at

286 TRUTH AND ERROR

his will, moving from east to west along the face of a
solid domed sky, and they supposed them to return
from west to east under the ground, and it required
ages to invent another hypothesis — that of a system
of spheres revolving in orbits concentric to the sun.
This hypothesis was an invention made by many
men. It was a demotic, not an individual invention.

The various judgments formed about an external
object are combined into a concept of that object,
and this concept is aroused from memory by infer-
ence whenever a sense impression is received and
attention is paid to it in judgment. One sense impres-
sion becomes an agency for reviving many judg-
ments previously made about the object causing the
sense impression. It is thus that a sense impression
becomes symbolic, and judgment in such cases is
symbolic. The concomitant properties of an object
severally manifest themselves to different senses,
and when one property is manifested by one sense
impression, it becomes the symbol of all other
properties inhering in the object and known by the
observer. Properties can not exist apart, as the
constant multitudinous experiences of each indi-
vidual attest. There is no one who can form a
judgment who does not take it for granted that the
concomitants, however unlike they may be, can not
exist apart. Symbolism is not mere poetry that
obscures reason, but it is a logical method of time-
saving thought. Judgment itself is by symbolism,
in which the manifestation of one property is inter-
preted as a symbol of all the properties known about
the object.

A force is manifested as a force and it is also
manifested as a cause, for there can not be a force

INTELLECTIONS 287

without it also being a cause, any more than there
can be a force which is not a form, or a form which
is not a kind. In nature forces are often observed
in multitudes. There are many particles of air that
stir the leaf and there are many leaves that are
stirred by one wind, but in the particles of the wind
one multitude follows another in succession. So
there are many drops of rain that fall on many
grains of soil, and a succession of a multitude of rain-
drops constitute the rain. Process in its simplest
form is the collision of two bodies that meet and
act on each other in action and reaction, but this
action and reaction is also cause and effect; thus
causation and force are concomitant. But in appre-
hension we consider only force ; another intellectual
faculty is engaged when we consider causation.

When one body collides with another, different
things may happen. First, both may be deflected;
second, both may be deformed ; third, both may be
broken; fourth, both may be heated; fifth, both
may chemically be changed. Usually the total
effect is two or more of these changes. Finally, any
one of these effects may be experienced by one body
and not by the other. Thus we see that although
action and reaction are equal, cause and effect
can not be equal, as they are not of the same kind.

Judgments of reflection seem to be especially
subject to error and as such to be compounded into
false concepts and to be long entertained as such.
In the act of making the judgment there must be
judgments of bodies impinging on one another, lead-
ing to judgments of apprehension. Then one of
many effects must be considered as due to one of
many causes, and the many effects referred to the

288 TRUTH AND ERROR

many causes in turn, in order that all of the effects
may properly be distributed to all of the causes.
Thus reflection is an exceedingly complex subject.

The process is comparatively simple when one
body collides with another, but when a multitude
of bodies collide with one, the process is not so
readily understood, and when a multitude of bodies
collide against a multitude of bodies, as of winds
against leaves, the process of disentangling causes
and effects or antecedents and consequents, is still
more involved. The difficulty may not appear at
first glance, but an investigation into historical
instances shows that frequently cause is mistaken
for effect and effect for cause. It is not uncommon in
savagery to attribute winds to trees. A common
error of this kind is discovered in the minds of most
persons, for it is widely believed that forests are the
cause of rains. An interesting book has been
written, widely read, and popularly approved, which
is based on the assumption that the aridity of desert
lands is due to the absence of forests.

A stream of judgments flow through the mind.
As the ego has self -activity it changes its position
in the environment at will and a different environ-
ment plays on the senses at every change in the
position of the ego. Then by different senses the
environment solicits the attention simultaneously by
all. Thus attention is solicited by more sense
impressions than it can attend to, and it chooses for
attention those which serve a temporary or more
sustained purpose. Those serving a temporary
purpose give rise to what has been called by Kant,
the practical reason ; those serving a sustained pur-
pose, the pure reason.

INTELLECTIONS 289

Presentative judgments that originate in sense
impressions, are often followed by representative
judgments, and these are either discursive or voli-
tional. Hence we see that the judgments which
we make are exceedingly multitudinous and hetero-
geneous. But all of these judgments are assembled
in concepts by more temporary or more permanent
purposes. What judgments can be made are deter-
mined by the environment; but what judgments
the mind selects to make are determined by the
purpose. Thus the ego is the creature of environ-
ment and self-activity. The stream of judgments
is thought, and thought is controlled by self-activity
and environment.

It may be well to further consider the process of
combining judgments by reflection.

I am wandering by the river. Why should the
river here suddenly pass from a narrow gorge to a
wide-spread plain and be transformed from a narrow
to an expansive stream? And why should the turbu-
lent waters above become so quiet below?

I climb a rock to study the problem. The bluffs
standing back from the river, converge at this point
and seem as if they would join hands across the chasm
through which the river plunges. Here the bluff is
a cliff and the edges of sandstone strata outcrop in
the escarpment, and I observe with care the suc-
cession of rocks from the bottom to the top of the
cliff. But a robin flies down and perches on a
willow near by, and in an instant cliff and geology
vanish from my thought ; I see a turkis egg and a
nest in the apple-tree of my garden, and my
daughter is shouting a song of childish joy in my
mind's ear, for this she did, not many weeks ago.

290 TRUTH AND ERROR

In thought I am at home once more. Then home
vanishes and I see the robin again flitting from
bough to bough, and as it moves my eyes follow it
until it is in a line between myself and the cliff, and
the sight of the cliff brings back my geologic
problem. I see the red sandstone below, the brown
shales between and the white sandstones above, and
recognize the succession as being similar to one seen
before. If so, the summit of the cliff must be
crowned by a limestone. Yes, there is the limestone
with its angular outlines, in contrast with the round
reliefs of the sandstone. I am one step farther in
my problem. I put the facts of the succession
together and say this is a Carboniferous cliff. I
know these rocks.

In climbing I hear a noise. In an instant I inter-
pret it as the voice of a friend, and turning about,
find I am right. I hasten to announce my discovery,
but he holds a flower aloft, waving it in triumph.
That wand banishes the cliff with its succession of
beds from my mind, and I see a bluebell drooping
from its delicate stem and ringing a chime of
cerulean beauty. In a twinkling of an eye my mind
travels a thousand miles, and I am climbing the
gray sandstone cliff which rises in the midst of the
valley of Illinois river and is known as "Starved
Rock." The miles my soul has traveled are only
equaled by the time over which it has returned. I
am a young man again, and I burst into a song:

"It's rare to see the morning bleeze
Like a bonfire frae the sea."

Why do I sing that song? It was on my tongue
when I found my first bluebell on "Starved Rock."

INTELLECTIONS 291

My friend bids me follow him. At one moment
I am thinking of the cove, at another I am listening
to the voice of my friend, and at still another I am
watching the way over which we walk; and now
and then my mind wanders away home and where
not. Now my attention is attracted to a footprint
in the sand. From its shape I know it was made
by a deer. Thus I make an inference beyond my
perception. The track is the sign of something
else. I see other tracks; they are arranged along
our course in pairs several feet apart. By this
arrangement I infer that the deer was leaping, as if
fleeing from danger, and I imagine that the deer
has been startled at our approach. This is an
erroneous inference, for my friend tells me that he
roused the deer as he came down the path some
time ago. And as we still walk I study the rocks,
and discover that a limestone forms the floor of the
valley below ; and then I discover by its contained
fossils that it is the same formation as the one which
crosses the summit of the cliff. The valley lime-
stone was broken from the cliff limestone and
dropped down by what geologists call a fault, and
the fall or throw of the fault is more than a
thousand feet. And now I discover the origin of
the cascades in the canyon above and the broad and
quiet flow of the river below. The last dropping of
the sandstone by the fault decreased the declivity of
the stream in the valley and increased the declivity
of the stream above the valley, where it comes down
through the canyon. All this is reasoning. It is a
series of judgments controlled by will for a course
of reasoning on a theme for which I have a per-
manent interest, interrupted by a multitude of

292 TRUTH AND ERROR

adventitious judgments that are made by reason of
temporary interest.

We sit down by the spring and my friend spreads
the lunch on a fallen tree trunk, and away goes my
mind to the bank of the Grand river in central
Colorado, and I see a prostrate pine, and an emerald
lake near by, and on the shore, cliffs of granite,
and beyond, a snow-clad mountain, and about its
summit the gathered clouds, and the sheen of clouds
and snow-fields blends with stretches of forest and
crags and peaks of towering grandeur. Years ago
I was there, and the feast on this log brings back the
feast on that log, with its attendant glories of
mountain scenery. From that scene I am called
back by the bidding of my friend to eat. Then a
bird comes down to the fountain, and I am engaged
in watching its coy advances to the water. And so
my mind passes instantaneously from one object to
another — now engaged in observing things present,
now listening to the voice of my friend, now occupied
in expressing my thought to him, now calling up
some scene from afar ; but ever thinking. On goes
the stream of thought.

I eat of the turnover, and observe from the taste
that it is made of blackberries ; and then I think of
the blackberry patches over which I strayed in child-
hood on the hills of southern Ohio, and of my com-
panion, Charles Isham, who was killed at the battle
of Shiloh. And I talk of battles, till my friend speaks
of bread and butter. Thirst causes me to go to the
spring, and' I quaff from its crystal fountain, and
listen to the jests hurled at me by my friend, and
laugh at his wit. Still on goes the stream of
thought.

INTELLECTIONS 293

We have eaten the lunch and gathered the plants,
and return home. On the way a sharp, buzzing
sound thrills me with horror. I know it as the
warning of a rattlesnake. It is a familiar sound to
me, for I have found many of these serpents in the
wilderness. I look about, and there it is, coiled in
the grass. With my cane I strike it a blow, and then
another, until it stretches its length on the ground,
dead. From the inanimate reptile I pluck the rattles.
There are nine on its tail, which it was wont to ring
when danger approached — discordant bells whose
ringing is a symbol to the woodsman that reptilian
hell is lurking near the pathway.

We have reached the river bank, and separate ; I
climb about it in search of fossils. Soon I discover
carboniferous fossils in the rock at the foot of the
cliff, and climbing up beside the stream I discover
limestone rocks which have come down from the
summit of the cliff, and see the same fossils. My
explanation of the origin of the cliff, the rapid
descent of the river from above, the narrow channel
through which it runs, the valley below, and the
broad expanse of quiet water, is verified. Now, in
my reasoning about the fall of a river into a quiet
reach, I used concepts of form in the nature of the
channel, and concepts of form in the structure of
the rocks. I also used concepts of time in the
succession of the rocks, and I reached a conclusion
or judgment as to the cause of the rapid which was
a judgment of causation, and I confirmed this judg-
ment by reaching the same conclusion from the
story of the fossils that I had reached from the story
of the geological structure ; so concepts verify con-
cepts. On careful examination it will always be

294 TRUTH AND ERROR

found that judgments of causation are verified by
the congruence of concepts.

The stream of thought is composed of a series of
widely diverse elements, or mentations, that are
judgments, all differing among themselves. Now,
it is impossible for the mind to dwell on any one of
these elements. You cannot think of a scratch long ;
the mind immediately passes to something else —
another sight or sound. Consciousness, which is
awareness of a change in self, is the absolute, the
independent of thought and that on which inferences
are founded; and consciousness is awareness of a
succession of impulses on self or by self, that flow
with the rapidity of thought that seems almost to
vie with the rapidity of air collisions in sound.
Hence consciousness is serial, and inferences are
serial, and judgments are necessarily serial; but
thought must go on. Gaze into the eye of my lady
and think of its sapphirine hue ; in a moment you
think of something else — the sable curtain, the coy
glance, perchance the cerulean heaven, or the deep
blue sea. It is impossible to hold your mind for
more than a moment on the blueness of the eye;
the thought must go on. But on to what? is the
question. Tell me in the case of any individual the
laws which govern the procession of his thought,
and I will tell his name, be it sage or fool. There
is always a nexus between contiguous elements in
the stream of thought. Sometimes it is mere
adventitious association. The thing seen or heard
has at some previous time been associated with
something else. The touch is associated with the
mother's stroke on childish curls; the taste of that
particular fruit is associated with an occasion of

INTELLECTIONS 295

joy; the perfume of smoke is associated with the
burning forest; the song is associated with some
scene of glee; the robin is associated with the
cottage home. But the nexus of association is not
always adventitious. It is often controlled by an
established design. With the fool, adventitious
relation is the principal nexus of thought in the pro-
cession; with the sage, logical relation is the chief
nexus.

The links of relation in the chain of thought are
not always apparent to the thinker himself. Steps
in the procession of reasoning are often canceled ;
the mind passes, by great bounds, from one to
another. When the steps in the course of logical
reasoning have been taken many times, the mind
finds it unnecessary to tread the ground again and
again, with slow and measured pace, but it springs
from point to point, and the greater reasoners make
the greater leaps. This is a fact well known to
scientific men, but it gives to the procession of
mentations those characteristics which cause the
greatest wonder to men, and which have led to
many of the errors of psychology.

By reflecting on the past and comparing it with
the present, we prophesy of the future and often
our prophecies are confirmed. By day we prophesy
of the night, and the night comes; at night we
prophesy of the morning, and the morning comes.
As the days, weeks, months, and years go by we
learn by experience of the changes wrought in self
and infer changes yet to be wrought. By experience
we discover the changes wrought in others, and by
inference judgments are formed of changes yet to
be wrought. It is by experience that -we learn of

296 TRUTH AND ERROR

all the changes in environment. The skies change ;
the seasons change ; the river was low yesterday, it
is a raging torrent today. The acorn bourgeons
with leaflets, it sends rootlets into the earth and
stem and branch into the air; it grows from week
to week, month to month, year to year, and under
our experience it becomes a tree. The child is
born, it grows to be a lad, a youth, a young man, a
vigorous adult, an old man, and the judgments
formed are compounded into ideas of becoming. It
is thus by reflection that a vast multitude of judg-
ments are compounded into ideas of the changes
wrought by time, and reflection becomes the special
process of cognizing metagenesis. As on the wings
of perception all lands are viewed, so on wings of
reflection all times are conned. The illimitable
past and the illimitable future are all painted on
the canvas of now by the artist of reflection.
Things that have been and things to be are
emblazoned on the panorama of reflectional concept.

Thus we have ideas of sensation or classification,
ideas of perception or integration, ideas of under-
standing or cooperation, and ideas of reflection or
history, all derived from the germs of sense impres-
sion as they have been made on the mind of the
individual in moments, hours, days, and years.

A boulder cannot move from the bank into the
swift channel in order that it may journey down the
stream, but a man may travel from the distant hill
to voyage on the river. The leaf cannot flutter in
the air unless the air is sweeping by, and the air
cannot move as a breeze without antecedent con-
ditions of temperature. Every action is self-action
and every passion is self-passion, but the action of

INTELLECTIONS 297

one must have its correlate in the action of another,
and the passion of one must have its correlate in
the passion, of another. In this respect animate
bodies have a property which separates them from
inanimate bodies, in that they perform actions
which are self-directed, and in that they have
passions that are self-chosen. The animal may
choose to enter the current or it may choose to
expose itself to the wind, and it may act for these
purposes by placing itself under the proper condi-
tions. Heretofore we have attempted to use the
term activity in this sense as a chosen act. By such
activities design or purpose is expressed. I see a
bird fly from tree to tree and think of it as an
activity prompted by design. I see a leaf blown
from one tree to another and I see an act not
determined by choice. All this is intended to make
clear the distinction between activities and acts and
to show that activities are manifestations of mind.
The animate body is conscious of mind, and through
the manifestations of , mind with others it is led to
infer that they also have minds.

In the history of metaphysical philosophy the
doctrine of presentative and representative judg-
ments has undergone some strange vicissitudes.
The distinction seems first to have been formulated
by the terms impressions and thoughts, presentative
judgments being called impressions and representa-
tive judgments thoughts. Spencer refers to the
same distinction when he speaks of vivid impres-
sions and faint impressions. Others have considered
presentative judgments as instinctive or intuitive,
for such judgments are often made instantaneously
and without apparent consciousness of previous

2p8 TRUTH AND ERROR

judgments. The nature of intuition we have
already set forth. Kant also believes that repre-
sentative judgments are controlled by forms of
thought preexisting in the mind and not derived
from experience, in which all judgments are molded.
He supposes the mind to be endowed with the
knowledge of space as empty space and of time as
empty time, and that the ego fills the empty space and
empty time with forms of thought. Thus the meta-
physicians have always failed to discover the nature
of a judgment with its pentalogic elements, in which
both consciousness and choice appear with compari-
son, which completes the judgment. They also fail
to discover that a present ative judgment is only
initiated by a sense impression, and that the ego must
still recall past impressions in a concept to make
the judgment complete, and they also fail to discover
that the representative judgment is initiated by
recalling a past concept and comparing it with
another concept of past judgments.

I see a worm crawling on the ground ; the worm
causes a sense impression. I might stop to consider
its color and have a judgment of sensation, or I
might consider its form and have a judgment of
perception, or I might consider its motion and have
a judgment of understanding, or I might consider
its cause as an egg and have a judgment of reflec-
tion, or I might consider that the motion itself is
directed molar motion and hence manifests mind in
the worm ; then I would have a judgment of idea-
tion. Any one of these judgments can be made from
the same sense impression, and my interest, my pur-
pose, my choice determines the nature of the judg-
ment made. But when made it needs verification.

INTELLECTIONS 299

If the judgment as a sensation is valid and there is a
color, if the judgment of perception is valid and
there is a form, if the judgment of understanding
is valid and there is a motion, if the judgment of
causation is valid and there is an object developed
from an egg, then there is left for consideration the
validity of the judgment of ideation, for the worm
may not be moving by its own volition but it may
be dragged by an ant. Its motion must be due to
an animate and designing cause, which may inhere
in the worm itself or in another which is unknown
to me, for it is molar motion caused by mind, and in
order that I may verify my judgment of mind in the
worm I must determine that it is living and free
to use its own judgment; such verification comes
only by the comparison of concepts. As ideation
is the compounding of concepts, so verification in
ideation is the comparison of concepts.

In sensation, perception, understanding, and
reflection, concepts are developed by the consolida-
tion of judgments. In ideation we have a faculty
by which judgments are added to judgments to con-
stitute concepts and which then continues its power
of forming judgments by combining concepts with
concepts and forever forming new concepts thereby,
while at the same time the power thus developed
of comparing concepts with concepts is leading to a
re-formation of the concepts themselves by the
elimination of fallacies, for when concepts by com-
parison with concepts are found to be incongruous,
the mind refuses to accept them as valid and seeks
for the source of error. We must, therefore, dis-
cover the means by which concepts are compared
with concepts.

300 TRUTH AND ERROR

We must now shoulder the task of explaining the
laws of symbolism or association, which have been
assumed from time to time and partially explained
in this discussion.

It has been shown how concepts are formed as
groups of judgments in sensation, perception,
apprehension, and reflection, and how ideas develop
simultaneously. We are now to show how they are
compounded with one another, and how in this
process incongruous ideas are adjusted by the
elimination of judgments that are fallacies, for judg-
ments must ultimately die if they do not fit in their
proper places.

That which I have sometimes called symbolism
and that which I have sometimes called association
are the same thing. When a sensation which is
the result of a sense impression caused by one
attribute of a body, is taken as a symbol of the body
itself with all its attributes, it becomes a symbol of
all with which it is associated. When a sense
impression gives rise to a judgment of force it recalls
many other judgments of force and thus becomes a
symbol of other things. When a judgment of cause
is formed it also becomes a symbol of other causes.
Sense impressions are directly used by the mind in
this manner in sensation, perception, apprehension,
reflection, and ideation, and it is thus that ideas
are primarily associated. The memories of judg-
ments are recalled by other judgments, as we have
seen, so that not only do judgments which arise
from sensations recall other judgments, but these
other judgments recall still other judgments, and
thus there is recollection in the second degree ; and
these revivals may go on from degree to degree to

INTELLECTIONS 30!

an indefinite extent. All of these facts have been
illustrated.

As we judge by comparing- concepts with other
concepts or with impressions, one judgment by a
faculty is associated with other judgments by the
same faculty, and as one property is concomitant with
all the others, one property becomes a symbol of
all the others, so that there is association by com-
parison of concepts and association by symbolism.
Hence all our judgments are associated.

The quantitative properties are the reciprocals of
the categoric properties, for the one is the reciprocal
of the many which compose the one. The one is a
kind, and the many is another kind, and the one kind
is the reciprocal of the many kinds. So the one
form of the body is the reciprocal of the many
extensions of the particles. The one motion of the
body is the reciprocal of the many motions of the
particles, hence the one force of the body is the
reciprocal of the many motions of the particles, for
the force of the body is the reciprocal of the motion
of the particles. The one time of the body is the
reciprocal of the many times of a particle, hence the
one causation of the body is the reciprocal of the
many times of the particles. The one judgment of
the body is the reciprocal of the many judgments
of the particles, hence the one concept of the body
is the reciprocal of the many judgments of the
particles.

Judgments of quantitative bodies are reciprocal
judgments of classific bodies, hence they are
associated by reciprocality. Judgments of one
property are concomitant with judgments of another
property, therefore they are associated by con-

3O2 TRUTH AND ERROR

comitancy. Now judgments associated by concomi-
tancy are often intuitive in the sense in which that
term is used here ; so judgments associated by
reciprocality are often intuitive. But there are
many judgments that are associated not by con-
comitancy or reciprocality, because they are chosen
when we make judgments ; of those chosen some are
volitional, some discursive. The discursive associa-
tions are those usually recognized as such, and again
we have association by kind or likeness, by form, by
force, by causation, and by concept. Thus it is that
the ego remembers by pentalogic properties. Thus
association is the law of memory.

Units are associated with units, numbers with
numbers, kinds with kinds, series with series, classes
with classes, and all are associated in nature and
considered in classification. Then extensions are
associated with extensions, spaces with spaces,
forms with forms, metamorphoses with meta-
morphoses, organisms with organisms, and all these
are interassociated and these associations are con-
sidered in morphology. Then speeds are associated
with speeds, motions with motions, forces with
forces, energies with energies, powers with powers,
cooperations with cooperations, and all of these
modes of motion are interrelated or associated and
all are considered in dynamics. Again persistencies
are associated with persistencies, times with times,
causations with causations, metageneses with meta-
geneses, developments with developments, and they
are all interrelated and considered in evolution.
Finally, sensations are associated with sensations,
perceptions with perceptions, apprehensions with
apprehensions, reflections with reflections, and idea-

INTELLECTIONS 303

tions with ideations, and all are considered in intel-
lection and are represented by words. Then numbers,
spaces, motions, times, and judgments are associated,
and kinds, forms, forces, causations, and concepts
are associated, and the quantitative properties are
associated with the categoric properties. There is
a congeries of associations in which all of the con-
tents of the mind are associated as fast as we cognize
the bodies of the universe in their properties and
relations.

Certain special associations of discursive thought
have received special attention and various attempts
have been made to account for them, while the
multitudinous associations of thought have been
neglected. This partial discussion of the subject
has led to the classification of the associations of
memory and two laws have been formulated:
the one called the law of likeness, and the other
the law of contiguity. They have also been
formulated as three or more; but the essential
nature of association has failed to receive
attention because the five associated properties
of matter have not clearly been understood; all
of these methods, about which scarcely two psycholo-
gists agree, have been inadequate to properly set
forth the subject. Especially do we notice that
contiguity in space has been confounded with im-
mediate succession in time by the habit of using a
word with two meanings, and thus, confounding
succession with position. Particularly intensive
associations by which striking events are recalled,
because of the deep effects made on the mind, have
been observed by thoughtful men for more than
twenty centuries. In moods of contemplation a

304 TRUTH AND ERROR

judgment recalls some remote judgment which was
startling at the time, and as we go on from moment
to moment, recalling a multitude of things by a
multitude of associations, this special instance is
thrust on the mind and we stop to consider it. I
see a rock which more or less resembles another
which I once saw and now recall, together
with an event which at that time made an
impression on my mind; a man fell over the
cliff. I smell the odor of burning brush in the way-
side field and T suddenly recall the odor of the fire
which I kindled for burning brush-piles on my
father's farm. I taste the flavor of a nut and I recall
the time when I threw to my shouting companions
the walnuts from a wayside tree. Such startling
revivals, often repeated, challenge attention, and
though thoughtful men have given much attention
to the phenomena, it has resulted in a very imperfect
psychology of association and symbolism.

Once more the attention of the reader is called to
the relations which exist between the five essentials
and which are then found in the five properties,
then found in the five categories, then found in the
five properties of change, then in the five properties
of life, then in the five properties of mind. Kinds
are not alone classified, but forms, forces, qualities,
and concepts are classified. Morphology considers
not only forms, but it also considers kinds, forces,
causes, and concepts. Dynamics considers not only
forces, but it also considers kind, forms, causes, and
concepts. Evolution considers not only causes, but
it considers kinds, forms, forces, and concepts ; and
ideation considers not only concepts, but it also
considers kinds, forms, forces, and causes, and the

INTELLECTIONS 305

difference between these five concomitants is the
point of view when every one of the essentials and
its derivatives is considered abstractly. As they
cannot exist abstractly, the mind cannot overtly con-
sider an abstraction without tacitly informing1 it
with concrete existence.

The error of metaphysic is the confounding of
abstraction with analysis by assuming that abstrac-
tions have separate existence. If the argument has
not made this point clear it has failed of its purpose.
The habits of thought engendered by the study of
abstract mathematics often leads the mathematician
into the very same pitfalls into which the meta-
physician stumbles.

The manifestations of properties are symbols,
because one becomes the representative of all the
others in the body manifested. When animate beings
develop the faculty of reading these symbols, they
are said to be able to read the expression of the
emotions and are themselves expert in the expres-
sion of emotions. Gradually these expressions
become more and more artificial as animals advance
in culture, until at last a conventional language is
devised. This is speech, which is practiced by the
lower animals, but which is much more highly
developed in man. Natural symbolism thus becomes
conventional symbolism, and words are signs of con-
cepts. A wholly conventional symbolism is thus
devised, the symbols being symbols of concepts.
Now, men practically and overtly consider their
concepts and a language is a vast reservoir of con-
ventional symbols used for this purpose. There is
no human language so crude that it does not have
tens of thousands of such symbols, which, put together

306 TRUTH AND ERROR

in propositions or sentences, have the power of
expressing all the judgments which the people who
use the language are able to make. We now see
the enormous development of ideation which man
has accomplished by the invention of language.

A judgment is expressed in a proposition by con-
ventional language. Unfortunately, in grammar,
subject and object have a different meaning from
that which they have in psychology. In grammar
the subject means that something about which an
affirmation is made, and the predicate means that
which is affirmed of the subject, while object has
various meanings in grammar. Until the terms of
grammar are made to conform with the terms of
psychology, there must always be some confusion.
Formal logic is the logic of grammar, and the pur-
pose for which it was devised was success in dis-
putation. Scientific logic is the logic of kinds, and
it is of scientific logic that we speak in this essay.
The logic of which we speak is the logic of reason-
ing, not the logic of grammar.

The methods of comparing judgments and con-
cepts are innumerable, and every judgment is an act
of comparison, and we are forever judging for the
purposes of discovering congruities ; an incongruous
judgment acts upon a healthy mind as a moral
irritant. If this and this judgment do not agree, it
is an evidence of ignorance and a suggestion of
imbecility. There is no other motive that clings to
man so long as the desire for wisdom.

CHAPTER XX

FALLACIES OF SENSATION

The certitudes which we have tried to demonstrate
have given rise to a host of fallacies which have
played a strange role in the history of opinions and
which from time to time have vitiated science itself.
Civilization began with science when it commenced
with verification by experimentation. Verification
soon led to the dissipation of fallacies ; then it was
discovered that things are something more than
what they seem to be to our simplest judgments.
Kinds are something more than kinds, they arex
forms; forms are something more than forms, they x
are forces ; forces are something more than forces, v
they are causations ; in animate bodies causations are x
something more than causations, they are concepts. ^
When we know all about a body we must know all
of its properties and these can only be discovered
by investigation, and science is the result of this
investigation ; but before we acquire knowledge we
entertain fallacies. The early philosophers, discover-
ing that partial knowledge is inadequate to the
expression of the whole truth, thought to characterize
the whole truth by calling it noumenon, and they
thought to characterize partial truth by calling it
phenomenon. This was a wise and legitimate dis-
tinction, but the time came when certain delusions
were held to be sacred'and a belief in them necessary
to a good life ; so they thought by the legerdemain of
language to prove that delusions were the noumena

307

308 TRUTH AND ERROR

and all knowledge only phenomena. But scientific
men took up the phenomena or unexplained proper-
ties of bodies and by investigation increased knowl-
edge as science, and reduced phenomena or partially
explained properties to noumena or more fully
explained properties. To a great extent they
dropped the term noumenon and held to the term
phenomenon, and expressed the opinion tacitly or
overtly that a phenomenon is but still a phenomenon
whether it be properly or improperly explained, and
they held it their province to explain phenomena and
they called the explanation of phenomena, science.
In modern times those who hold that noumena are
inexplicable, that is, unknown and unknowable
properties, call themselves metaphysicians. Those
who hold that phenomena are knowable and seek by
investigation to know them, call themselves scientists.
Such schematizing of philosophers as metaphysicians
and scientists is necessarily imperfect, for some
philosophers are both metaphysicians and scientists.
There are many who are metaphysicians when they
wear their holiday dress, and scientists when they
wear the garb of labor. Metaphysical reasoning can
be more clearly demarcated from scientific reasoning,
for scientific reasoning may always be known by its
demand for verification. We may make a mistake
in sensation because of its obscurity or by referring
it to a wrong sense. The sense impression may be
obscure itself, as when a sound barely passes the
threshold of consciousness, or a sight which is
obscure by reason of the twilight, or it may be
obscure by reason of preoccupied attention; thus I
may fail to attend to a sound or a sight because my
attention is elsewhere engaged. I do not hear the

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 309

speaker because I am attending to a sight, or I do
not see a sight because I am listening to what another
person is saying. All of such missensations are
easily corrected by ordinary methods of verification,
but often we neglect them, as we deem them of no
importance. I shall call all such errors of judgment,
missensations, and group them in a higher class
which I shall call illusions.

When a youth, as I was breaking prairie with an
ox team, my labor was interrupted by a rattlesnake,
and during the day I saw and killed several of these
serpents. At one time the lash of my whip flew
off. In trying to pick it up I grasped a stick. The
fear of being bitten by a snake and the degree of
expectant attention to which I was wrought, caused
me to interpret the sense impression of touch as
caused by a rattlesnake. This was a missensation of
touch. At the same time I distinctly heard the rattle
of the snake ; this was a missensation of audition.

I make a distinction between a sense impression
and a , feeling impression. A sense impression is
one made upon the end organ of a sense by an
object exterior to the body; a feeling impression
is one made upon an organ of feeling which is
metabolic, circulatory, motor, reproductive, or
cognitional. A feeling impression arises as a
result of the functioning of the organ and is usually
distinguished as being subjective. The mind may
err in considering a subjective impression as objec-
tive, when an hallucination will be produced. We
thus divide fallacies of sensation into two groups,
missensations and hallucinations. Missensations are
easily corrected ; hallucinations cannot be corrected
while the person who makes them is in the condition

310 TRUTH AND ERROR

of mind tinder which they originate, for they are
produced under abnormal conditions and so long as
these conditions prevail similar hallucinations will
occur, for hallucinations occur in the dream state,
the intoxication state, the disease state, or other
abnormal states. We will see the significance of this
statement when we proceed to discuss hallucinations.
Missensations are at first presentative and they
remain only until corrected by verification ; hallucina-
tions are false presentations and cannot be tested
by the verification of the persons who make them.
To the mind that forms the habit of believing in
hallucinations they come to the persons as recog-
nitions and have the instantaneous effect of recog-
nitions.

Here we must distinguish clearly between a fallacy
of sensation and a fallacy of feeling. A soldier in
the suspense which precedes the battle, when sharp-
shooters are now and then picking off a man, may
have his gun or his clothing touched by a rifle ball
and in the suspense of the occasion may imagine
that he has received a severe, perhaps a deadly
wound, and may shriek with pain. The fallacy of
being struck is a fallacy of sensation, but the
fallacy of having pain is a fallacy of feeling.
Similar cases are often witnessed on the frontier,
where men experience an adventurous life. Now,
we are not treating of fallacies of feeling, but of those
of sensation. An hallucination is the antithesis of
the one -I have just given; it is the error which
arises by interpreting a feeling impression as if it
were a sense impression; but a fallacy of feeling
consists of interpreting a sense impression as a feel-
ing impression.

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 31!

In a former chapter it was explained that a judg-
ment of intellection is a judgment of the cause of a
sense impression, and that a judgment of emotion is
a judgment of the effect of an impression. The
feelings, therefore, tell of effects upon self, and the
senses tell of the causes of these effects. This dis-
tinction is important to a clear understanding of the
nature of fallacies.

Parish has assembled a great body of "Hallucina-
tions and Illusions," which are in convenient form
for reference. As his treatment of the subject is
better than any I have elsewhere seen, I shall liberally
avail myself of the material which he has gathered.
Notwithstanding Parish's disclaimer, he still exhibits
a tendency to explain psychological phenomena by
a reference to its physiological concomitant. As
there can be no psychology without its concomitant
physiology, this is quite legitimate, but the practical
conclusions at which he arrives still require explica-
tion in terms of abstract mind. He uses a geomet-
rical scheme for the purpose of setting forth the
facts of physiology. Such a scheme may have an
expositional value to make us realize the facts which
have been discovered in the anatomy of the nervous
system, but it is easily abused. We know that the
nervous system is composed of ganglia of cells, con-
nected by nerves composed of bundles of fibers,
and that the ganglia are found in hierarchies
connected by these nerve fibers, which finally
terminate in the organs of life, where they are
distributed throughout the system, and also at
the periphery, where they terminate in end organs
supplied with various mechanical devices. The
nerve fibers that connect with a ganglion are not

312 TRUTH AND ERROR

structurally continuous with the cells of the ganglion,
so that a sense impression or a feeling impression is
conveyed from one ganglion to another by fibers
which are discontinuous at the ganglion. This
permits of a shunting or diversion of an impulse in
many directions through the nervous system, a
ganglion being a shunting or diverting mechanism.
The paths of which Parish, together with many
other authors, speaks, are the fibers and cells. Now,
I submit that a simple statement of the fact is much
more readily comprehensible than any geometric
scheme which any physiologist has devised. The
concept of a nervous system composed of sensory and
vital organs connected by nervous fibers with nervous
cells for a shunting apparatus, is one easily realized
by the mind. It must be remembered that this
discovery was not available until of late. When we
come to explain the physiology of the nervous
system we must explain also the anatomy of the
nervous system, and finally this leads us to an
explanation of the metabolism of the nervous sys-
tem. Hence conception has its concomitants in
physiology, anatomy, and metabolism, and as the
physiology of the nerves is a process which also
involves time in its evolution, we may characterize
conception in terms of evolution, physiology,
anatomy, or metabolism, but a psychologic treatment
of the subject requires that the conception should
ultimately be treated in terms of psychology. I
shall, therefore, treat all fallacies in terms of
psychology. I shall assume that both sense impres-
sions and feeling impressions may go astray in
passing from the end organ to the cortex, because
the fibrous nerves are not structurally connected

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 313

with the ganglionic nerves, so that, tinder certain
conditions, they may be directed to any portion of
the cortex by the will acting normally or abnormally.

Every cell in the human body is a seat of con-
sciousness, while the nervous system is the organ of
inference. All the bodily organs are related to one
another through the structure of the nervous system,
the fibers of which permeate all the organs,
collect sense and feeling impressions from them,
and transmit them by fibrous nerves to the ganglionic
nerves, where such impressions are woven into con-
cepts to be ultimately returned to the motor
apparatus. In this conception I suppose that an
hallucination involves not only the central organ in
the cortex, but it also may involve a subordinate
ganglion or an organ of sense or feeling.

We have divided fallacies of sensation into missen-
sations and hallucinations. The exposition already
made relating to missensations will, perhaps, be
sufficient for practical purposes, but hallucinations
will require further consideration.

In discussing hallucinations there are no sense
impressions to be considered, but there are feeling
impressions which are interpreted as if they were
sense impressions. The interpretation seems always
to be made by the faculty of perception. We have,
therefore, to discuss hallucinations as false percep-
tion based on feeling impressions; consequently, in
order to consider their cause in feeling impressions,
we shall illustrate by instances of fallacious percep-
tions which are specters.

Esquirol distinguishes hallucinations from illusions
by considering hallucinations as *' subjective sensory
images" which arise without the aid of external

314 TRUTH AND ERROR

stimuli, and illusions as the false interpretation of
external objects, but he does not clearly distinguish
between sensation and perception, which we have
attempted to make clear. In the same manner
Parish has fallen into confusion; Sully makes the
distinction but he classifies illusions in a manner
which we cannot follow. I shall therefore treat
the subject as demanded by the standpoint obtained
in considering the five-fold faculties of the intellect
as hitherto set forth.

In sensation we hear sounds that are caused by
objective bodies; thus a bell agitates the air and
we hear it, but we may have a disturbance of the
physiological function of the ear, due it may be to
the influence of a drug or perhaps to a disease of
the organ. Now, such a subjective impression or
functioning of an organ of sense we call a feeling
impression, and when we consider it to be objective
we hallucinate or have an hallucination.

In a highly nervous state men mistake the motor
feeling of speech for the sound of speech, as if
caused by another or objective person. A subjec-
tive irritation of the skin may be mistaken for the
objective crawling of an insect over the skin. A
polypus in the nose may produce a disturbance in
the function of the nose which is interpreted as an
odor. A man may smell paradisic odors or mephitic
stenches by reason of disease in the olfactory organ.
In the same manner diseases produce hallucinations
of the gustatory sense.

The literature of hallucination in large part is the
literature of pathology, although the occurrence of
hallucinations has often been recorded in biographic
literature, in which there are many notable examples.

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 315

Socrates had hallucinations of a demon who fre-
quently warned him of impending evil. Savonarola
saw the heavens open and a sword appear on which
was the inscription Gladius Domini super terrain.
Luther had an auditory hallucination when on the
stairs at Rome he heard the words, "The just shall
live by faith. " Cromwell had his greatness foretold
him by an apparition. At first it may be difficult to
state whether such fallacies are hallucinations proper
or only missensations. As we go on with the subject,
however, we may find reason to believe them genuine
hallucinations.

When a patient with peritonitis declares that a
church congress is being held inside of her and says
that she can feel it in the abdomen, no one knows
what a congress in such a locality would feel like,
but the patient mistakes it for a sense impression
and hence it is an hallucination. Should the patient
imagine that she hears the speeches of the contend-
ing parties in the congress, then of course there
would be an auditory hallucination.

A so-called census of hallucinations has been made
at the instigation of the Society for Psychical Research
which is really a list and description of hallucinations
which have occurred in recent times to such people as
the promoters of the enterprise could induce to tell of
them. It is probable that there is no person who
has not frequently experienced them. Many of
these are now on record, constituting quite a body
of hallucinations. The purpose for which these
records were made seems to have been the desire
to prove that hallucinations are often veridical and
hence give evidence of some unknown or hitherto
unrecognized method of communicating ideas, except

316 TRUTH AND ERROR

in folklore, when such communications are attrib-
uted to the interference of disembodied spirits in the
affairs of mankind or an extra sense called telepathy
by an organ not yet discovered. Those who believe
in ghostly manifestations will find abundant evi-
dence of them here, while those who believe in
telepathy will gain confirmation of their doctrines.
In the meantime those who still hold them to be
hallucinations or specters will explain them as
psychologic errors.

Parish in his work on Hallucinations and
Illusions considers those of the S. P. R. catalogue
with others which have been recorded by medical
experts or derived from general literature. He
endeavors to show that all hallucinations and illu-
sions are phenomena of dissociation. Dissociation is
manifestly abnormal association, and association is
about synonymous with conception as we have used
the terms.

When awake we may have hallucinations when-
ever our nerves are unduly excited or when we are
in any abnormal condition, as from fatigue.

Hallucinations are a constant phenomenon of ecstasy, where
they arise out of one-sided mental activity and intense con-
centration on single groups of ideas, conjoined with lowered
sensibility. The best known cases are those of religious
ecstasy, but religious ideas do not invariably furnish the
material for "ecstatic vision." Philosophers, artists, and
others whose habit of mind tends to deepen certain channels
of thought, are also liable to such visitations. Any and every
object of longing or desire, no matter how trivial, grotesque,
or perverse, may become the object of ecstasy. — (P. 38.)

Emanuel Swedenborg was privileged to behold God himself.
Engelbrecht relates how he was carried by the Holy Spirit
through space to the gates of hell, and then borne in a golden
chariot up into heaven, where he saw choirs of saints and

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 317

angels singing round the throne, and received a message from
God, delivered to him by an angel. — (P. 39.)

The multitudinous hallucinations recorded in his-
tory, like that of the demon of Socrates and those
referred to in the former part of this chapter, are
probably all hallucinations of ecstasy. Hallucina-
tions are fundamentally classed by the sense
deceived. Thus we have gustatory, tactual, motor,
auditory, and visual hallucinations. Of gustatory
and olfactory hallucinations, Parish says:

Where hallucinations of taste have been noted they are
mostly nauseous or poisonous (arsenic, copper, filth), and
frequently give rise to refusal of nourishment, or it may be
to continued spitting. In the early stages of paralysis, on the
other hand, gustatory hallucinations of an agreeable nature
are sometimes reported, the patient perhaps describing the
enjoyment of all the various dishes of an imaginary menu.
Olfactory hallucinations are, on the whole, infrequent, and are
seldom of an agreeable character. The experiences of the
patient who declared he smelt all the perfumes of Arabia and
the East are exceptional, for hallucinations of this sense are,
generally speaking, associated with delusions about bodily
foulness, and odors of corruption and corpses, due to visceral
disturbances. Le"lut reports the case of an insane woman who
declared that the pestilential odors she perceived arose from
corpses buried in certain vaults under the Salpetri£re. Some-
times, haunted by the fear of being murdered, the sufferer
perceives everywhere the fumes of charcoal, noxious gases,
and particles of poisonous dust. Olfactory hallucinations sel-
dom appear alone, but are generally associated with other
sensory fallacies. Some authors consider that they belong
more to the early stages of insanity. They are frequently
found in association with local disease of the ovaries, and of
the reproductive organs in general. — (Pp. 28, 29.)

Fallacies of touch seem usually to be represented
by hallucination of external bodies crawling on the

3l TRUTH AND ERROR

skin when in fact no such bodies exist. Hallucina-
tions of insects, mice, and snakes are frequent.

There is not much to note concerning hallucinations of the
tactile sense. . . .

It is only when a darkened intelligence "seizes upon them as
a basis for a new conception of the ego and the environment, ' '
that they become of primary significance. But such signifi-
cance may always be attributed to an hallucination of either of
the higher senses, though opinion is divided as to which of
these two senses plays the greater part. — (Pp. 29, 30.)

Hallucinations of pressure are more common than
those of touch. In the dream state the walls of the
building of a room may seem to contract until the
sleeper is in a nightmare of trouble with the com-
pression. These hallucinations are also common in
certain diseased conditions.

Hallucinations of audition are very commonly
caused by inflammation of the inner ear.

The sufferer hears taunting or insulting voices calling after
him in the street, and making injurious insinuations about him,
or sometimes unseen speakers incidentally let fall words which
confirm his forebodings. — (P. 23.)

A kind of auditory hallucination worthy of special note is
"audible thinking," wherein the patient hears his own thoughts
spoken aloud, and imagines that they can be heard by every-
body, or else hears them repeated or dictated to him by an
imaginary being. Fallacious perceptions of the other senses
are also not uncommon. Many sufferers see the persecutors
who torment them from a distance by means of magnetic and
electrical apparatus. They entertain kings and princesses,
and receive angels' visits ; all these hallucinations occur in a
state of full consciousness. — (P. 24.)

Gall relates the case of a minister of state who constantly
heard insulting words whispered into his left ear ; and in the
more recent literature of the subject such examples are no
longer rare. According to Krafft-Ebing, the unilateral voices

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 319

are heard better when the other ear is closed — when, for
instance, the patient is lying on it. — (P. 32.)

While walking alone she hears a voice calling her, she turns
round, there is no one. While she is at her work familiar
voices speak in her ear. She hears them on both sides, but
chiefly on the right. — (P. 35.)

Hallucinations are ... a frequent cause of violent and
criminal acts ; for instance, in hallucinatory insanity, epilepsy,
hysteria, and somnambulism, and especially in delirious states
(alcohol, morphia, cocaine, and typhus-delirium). Thrown
into a paroxysm of terror by the phantoms which threaten
him, or obsessed by his "voices," the sufferer snatches up a
weapon and perhaps commits a murder or sets fire to the house.
Or, again, despairing of escape from the enemies who pursue
and mock him, he puts an end to his sufferings and his life at
the same time, and often in a skilful and cunningly planned
manner. — (P. 34.)

Tactual, auditory, and visual hallucinations most
frequently occur on the hemianesthetic side.

Hallucinations of vision are more common than
those of any other sense.

Thus Herr Von M told me that when taking his usual

afternoon walk he used to see regularly on reaching a certain
spot the head of the squadron returning from their daily
exercise, and crossing the street at some little distance in front
of him. One day when he had seen this as usual it occurred to
him to wonder why the rest of the troops did not follow, and
he soon discovered that the cavalry he had seen on this
occasion were phantoms. — (P. 190.)

Some years ago, a friend and I rode — he on a bicycle, I on a
tricycle — on an unusually dark night in summer from Glenda-
lough to Rath drum. It was drizzling rain, we had no lamps,
and the road was overshadowed by trees on both sides,
between which we could just see the sky-line. I was riding
slowly and carefully some ten or twenty yards in advance,
guiding myself by the sky-line, when my machine chanced to
pass over a piece of tin or something else in the road that made
a great crash. Presently my companion came up, calling to

320 TRUTH AND ERROR

me in great concern. He had seen through the gloom my
machine upset and me flung from it. — (Pp. 191, 192.)

Gregory mentions the case of a patient in whom the seizure
was always preceded by the apparition of a hideous old woman
in a red cloak, who advanced and struck him on the head with
her cane, whereupon he fell to the ground in convulsions. In
another case the devil appeared in a shadowy form. Some-
times the apparitions are less frightful. Conolly tells of a
patient who saw, in the last few moments before loss of con-
sciousness, pleasant landscapes spread out before him. — (P. 33.)

For example, the commonest visual hallucinations (in which
black and red play a leading part) are black rats, cats, snakes,
and spiders, shining stars, fiery spheres, and so on. But these
do not remain motionless. Either they go diagonally across
the patient's field of vision, in which case they proceed from the
hemianaesthetic side; or else (generally) they come from be-
hind the patient, hasten past, and disappear in the distance.
In this case also the apparitions occur on the hemianaesthetic
side. . . These premonitory hallucinations haunt the sufferer
even by day, but in the night they become much more per-
sistent and vivid, and what was only a passing vision before,
develops into a long scene, in which the patient is called upon
to take a part. — (P. 35.)

Sufficient illustrations have perhaps been given
to exhibit the fundamental classification of hallucina-
tions. Were I writing a treatise on hallucinations
rather than a condensed account of the subject, every
class should be sub -classified by the agency through
which they are produced. This classification would
give us, (i) the hallucinations of dreams, (2) the
hallucinations caused by subverted sensation or
ecstasy, under which are included the phenomena of
crystal vision, (3) the hallucinations of suggestion
or hypnotism, (4) the hallucinations of intoxicants,
(5) the hallucinations of disease.

In sleep the senses are dormant while the func-
tions of life continue. Sense impressions are only

OF THE

UNIVERSITY

FALLACIES "&FSENSATION 32!

instantaneous, but feeling impressions endure as
long as the cause acts, although they may become
dulled by repetition or unrecognized by habit. It is
well known that a sense impression may give rise to
a feeling if it is too intense. It is an old doctrine
of psychology that sensation is inversely proportional
to feeling, and it remains true to this extent, that a
sense impression may be neglected, that is, we may
not consider the cause though we may consider the
effect, when the impression will give rise to a feel-
ing. In the dream state sensation lies dormant
and feeling has the psychic field to itself.

In sleep sense impressions frequently impinge
upon the organs: lights appear in the darkened
room, sounds are made which produce some slight
effect upon the ear, and to the sleeping person there
come many tactual impressions, all of which are
interpreted as feelings and produce hallucinations
because feelings are so intimately associated with
external objects ; these are feeling hallucinations.

On the other hand if on a cold night the clothing
is partially removed from the body the feeling of
discomfort is quite likely to produce an hallucination.
Drops of water falling upon the face of the sleeper
may have the same effect.

The bedcover pressing on the arm is embraced as a mistress
or felt as a heavy weight ; a dream of being impaled, that is to
say, of standing on a stake, the point of which was thrust
through the foot, has been known to arise from the pressure of
a straw lodged between the toes ; a covering which has slipped
to the ground is sometimes a source of great embarrassment,
when it causes us to dream of appearing half clad in the street
or at a social gathering ; or it may call up visions of skating,
Alpine travels, Polar expeditions, and these again may sud-
denly end in the feeling of falling into a gulf, due to a slight

322 TRUTH AND ERROR

alteration of the sleeper's position in bed. Gregory, when he
had a hot-water bottle at his feet, dreamed that he was climb-
ing Etna and walking on hot lava. Purkin je says : "If our
hand has become numb by pressure, in the dream-state it may
appear as something strange and gruesome touching us, and if
the whole side is affected, we imagine that a strange bedfellow,
whom we cannot get rid of, is stretched beside us. — (Pp. 54, 55.)

The influence of position during sleep is generally exhibited
in one of the following ways: (i) The position of a member
may be perceived more or less correctly, but suggest an atti-
tude; for instance, if the foot is stretched and bent back it
suggests the dream of standing on tip-toe to reach something ;
(2) the strained position may be taken to be part of a move-
ment and the dreamer seem to be dancing on his toes; (3) the
movements may appear to be executed by some one else; (4)
sometimes the movements seem to be impeded; (5) the
affected member may be changed in the dream into some animal
or inanimate object of analogous form; (6) sometimes the
dream-perception of the member gives rise to abstract ideas,
which it symbolizes; for instance, the perception of several
fingers may give rise to dreams of numbers and calculations.
-(P- 55-)

A mustard plaster on the head may cause a man
to dream of an Indian conflict in which he is
scalped, as I have observed.

Thus Herrmann, when suffering from an attack of colic,
dreamed that his abdomen was opened, and an operation per-
formed on the sympathetic nerve. Others dream of going up
for examinations. The house-wife dreams she is giving a
party, and that all her dainties are burnt up, and so on. —
(P. 56.)

An individual directed his servant to sprinkle his pillow
sometimes after he was asleep (leaving the choice of the par-
ticular night to the servant) with a perfume which he had only
used during a certain stay in the country, but to which he had
then taken a great fancy. On those nights he visited again in
his dreams the scenes associated in his mind with the perfume.
The occurrence of imaginary tastes and smells in dreams is
very rare, so much so that it has been altogether denied by

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 323

many observers. Still a few cases have been reported. —
(P- 54-)

Hallucinations of ecstasy often arise with persons
engaged in profound abstract thought. Philosophers,
poets, literary men, generals, and divines are pecu-
liarly subject to them. Extreme ethical emotions are
apt in begetting hallucinations. It is through all of
these cases that the world's literature is replete with
accounts of hallucinations. Perhaps every great
man has had them.

We have abundantly affirmed and illustrated the
doctrine that sense impressions are instantaneous,
and the judgments which we form from sense
impressions are instantaneous, while feeling
impressions endure while the cause acts. It
is possible for us to concentrate the attention
upon the impressions received by one organ,
but if we fixate the attention on an interrupted suc-
cession of like impressions we overthrow or subvert
judgment. As we must at every instant go on to
form a new judgment, the supposed concentration of
attention sets the mind adrift to follow feeling
impressions wherever they may lead. This sub-
verted sensation I call ecstasy.

We make a multitude of judgments of recognition
at one glance of the eye about the room which we
occupy, or over the landscape when we are out of
doors. Now, if we can fixate the attention of the eye
or the ear and abstract the mind from all other sense
impressions, hallucinations may be produced. This
secret has been an open one to those who have
practiced divination in the departed centuries.
There is a vast body of literature on the subject,
though it relates chiefly to the abstraction of vision.

324 TRUTH AND ERROR

Even as I write, the boys on the street are crying"
the New York papers and tempting purchasers
with stories of divination by crystal vision.

In crystal vision the percipient attempts to occupy
his mind in the contemplation of a constantly
renewed sense impression, while the mind in fact is
recalling concepts from memory which he ascribes
to hallucinatory objects in the glass; that is, he
forms judgments of things not seen but remembered
by suggestion from feeling impressions. We may
express this idea in still another way. In crystal-
vision experiments the mind of the percipient is
engaged in recalling memories which may be
determined by the feelings or may arise at random,
for it is impossible for the waking mind to cease
operations. As the thing expected or looked for in
the glass does not appear, these memory images are
projected into the glass.

The percipient strives to banish all conscious thought from
his mind, and fixes his gaze continuously on a "Braid's
crystal," a burning glass in a dark frame, a glass of water or
some similar reflecting object. Many persons after gazing
thus for some time begin to see pictures in the crystal, the
spire of the parish church perhaps, or familiar faces. — (P. 63.)

An eye-witness relates the following anecdote of
an occurrence in Egypt :

His curiosity was excited by Mr. Salt, the English Consul-
General, who, on suspecting his servants of theft, sent for a
magician. Mr. Salt himself selected a boy as seer, while the
magician occupied himself with writing charms on pieces of
paper which, with incense and perfumes, were afterwards
burned in a brazier of charcoal ; then, drawing a diagram in
the boy's right palm, into the middle of which he poured some

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 325

ink, he bade him look fixedly into it. After various
visions had come and gone, the form of the guilty person
appeared to the boy, and was recognized by the description he
gave. On being arrested, the thief thus strangely convicted
confessed his crime.— (P. 64.)

Just as visual images may be called up by gazing on a shin-
ing object, so by placing a sea-shell to the ear it is possible to
induce auditory hallucinations. I therefore class such
hallucinations with crystal visions, which they resemble in
their content. This analogy is borne out by cases like that of
the lady who, if she listened to the shell after a dinner-party,
generally heard repeated, not the conversation of her "lawful
interlocutor" to which her attention had been directed, but the
talk of her neighbors on the other side, which she had not
consciously noted at the time.— (P. 70.)

All modes of ecstatic hallucination are of this
character. It is the abstraction of attention to the
particular object while waiting" for a judgment of
cognition or recognition to come through the intel-
lectual faculties, while instantaneous judgments con-
tinue to be made through the emotional faculties.
The consideration of this fact leads us to restate
that which may seem already to have been abun-
dantly affirmed, that the vital organs of metabolism,
circulation, motility, and reproduction are the end
organs of feeling, while in the nervous system we
find organs of feeling and intellection.

The third class of hallucinations comes from the
land of suggestion. Much of the intellectual activity
of mankind is acception, or the receiving of judg-
ments made by others through the agency of speech ;
words are heard or seen that express judgments
which we accept as valid. So much of intellectual
life is of this character that we are trained in the
ability of acception. This ability runs astray with
some persons because there goes not with it the

326 TRUTH AND ERROR

habit of constant verification. The speech of human
beings must be verified in the same manner that
natural language in presentation and representation
must be verified. He who accepts the judgments of
others without intellectual verification is eminently
qualified for hypnotic suggestion.

There are some people so nai've in their inter-
pretation of expressed judgments as to suppose that
what is told them must be either truth or falsehood,
not being able to distinguish a fallacy from a lie.
This simplicity in weighing the judgments of others
is highly conducive to the development of hypnotic
intellects.

Frau U., an innkeeper's wife, forty-five years of age, an
extremely suggestible subject (so much so that while awake a
mere assurance that she could not move her limbs deprived her
of all power of movement), was hypnotized by me, and the
post-hypnotic suggestion given that each time A. , who was pres-
ent, should cough, a fly would alight on her brow. The hal-
lucination was realized ; at each cough of A. 's she raised her
hand to her forehead and looked up into the air as though
watching a fly. This did not prevent her, however, from con-
tinuing with animation her conversation with me on the
preparations for her daughter's approaching marriage. Her
prompt reaction to suggestions given in ordinary life rendered
her post-hypnotic suggestibility valueless as a test of her state
of consciousness.

Bernheim communicates the following case of a young girl,
of unusual intelligence, and free from hysterical tendency: I
arranged that on waking she should see an imaginary rose.
She saw it, touched and smelt it, and described it to me ; but
knowing that I might have given her a suggestion, she asked
me if the rose was a real or imaginary one, adding that it was
quite impossible for her to tell the difference. I told her that
it was imaginary. She believed me, and yet found that by no
effort of the will could she make it disappear. "I can still see
and touch it," she said, "as though it were natural; and if you

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 327

were to show me a real rose beside it, or instead of it, I should
not be able to tell the one from the other." All this time she
was thoroughly awake, and talked quietly with me about the
apparition. — (P. 62.)

In a former chapter it was stated that the cor-
puscles of the blood are unicellular organisms and
that the red corpuscles are built into the system, so
that every part is composed of unicellular organisms.
Each of these organisms is endowed with the rudi-
ments of life and mind which they take with them
into the human system. The phenomena of hypno-
tism reenforce the discoveries of physiology and
confirm the doctrine that the entire body is the seat
of consciousness and that the nervous system con-
stitutes the special apparatus of inference. This
leads us to a theory of multiple seats of conscious-
ness which is demonstrated by the phenomena of
hypnotism, a tempting subject which we are com-
pelled to ignore by reason of the limitations of our
argument.

Hallucinations caused by intoxicants are well
known. Those occurring through the immoderate
consumption of alcoholic drinks are most common.

The hallucinations . . . are generally of a
depressing nature, and terrifying impressions predominate.
True, sweet voices are sometimes heard, melodies delight the
ear, and fair landscapes appear before the eyes, but this sel-
dom lasts long, monsters and serpents take the place of
flowers, and the visions shift about and are mingled together.
Vermin, reptiles, etc., appear in great numbers, such for
instance as the rats, cats, snakes, mice, and monkeys, which
fill the visions of delirium tremens. Thus Brierre de Boismont
found among twenty-one cases — three of them severe — twenty
in which hallucinations of vermin and such creatures were
seen swarming over the bed and up the walls. Other sensory

328 TRUTH AND ERROR

delusions of a purely fantastic nature are not lacking. Some-
times black men appear who grimace and threaten, then climb
the walls, or vanish up the chimney. In other cases the
visions arise out of the daily occupations of the patient, or out
of his past experience. — (Pp. 41, 42.)

In addition to alcoholic beverages many drugs
produce hallucinations, as opium, hashish, santonin,
etc. Among the tribes of the western plains of the
United States a cactus known as peyote is widely
used in their religious rites. The plants themselves,
when made into decoctions or when eaten as dried
fruit, produce a variety of effects, among which are
those of color vision. Dr. Theodate Smith, an expert
in experimental psychology, has furnished me with
the following memoranda of an experiment on her-
self in the use of the peyote. Earlier trials produced
in part very disagreeable effects and in part exces-
sive motor excitement, but after repeated trials
color visions came only when she placed herself
under some restraint from motor activity ; then there
appeared a set of retinal effects in a succession of
dissolving views which she described to an attendant
who was charged with making a record of her
words.

The following is an extract from this record:

Branches of coral, in color a deep, beautiful blue.

Flattened forms of coral shape, deep purple changing to red
with ruby red tips.

An electric fountain, many colors.

Colors of a peacock's tail, form somewhat indistinct.

Flashes of light over the whole retinal field; predominant
color a wonderful intense green.

Flower forms — quantities of violets, yellow in color, flicker-
ing light over them, also yellow.

Deep opal-blue rings running outward from a center and in
constant motion.

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 329

Beautiful green light, like light in an electric fountain ; no
special form.

A complex Grecian pattern, deep blue with white dots sug-
gesting snowflakes over it.

This changes through many tints of blue to turquoise blue ;
the form becomes a bowl and pitcher ornamented with gold.

A ship with square sails on the bluest ocean, intensely
blue.

Blue aureoles encircling everything as I half open my eyes
in dim light.

Strings of beads of many colors.

Embroidered leather with rainbow colors flickering over it as
if from a stained-glass window.

Nine leaves of silvery gray conventionalized.

Cat's fur, but colored blue and white.

The blue becomes lines and forms, the outline of a big
centipede.

Venetian glass, amethyst tinted, shades from light to dark,
wavy lines running through it, forms not distinct.

An escutcheon, quarterings of blue, steely blue, a shield with
lines; around the shield four swallow tails. These enlarge,
cover and finally blot out the shield.

A shining laurel leaf.

A beautiful chandelier, richly jeweled and blazing with
light.

A stained-glass window, red, blue, and amber, colors rich
and deep, forms not well defined.

A crazy quilt, pretty but very crazy. A transparent flexible
lily shape, with wavy lines running through it like bird-of-
paradise feathers ; no color in the form itself, but it seems to
float in the midst of colored light.

Phosphorescent fishes' eyes.

Fish scales of wonderful green, changing to shell shapes in
the green light.

A picture of an arctic sunset, with silver rays rising from it,
and far off on the edge an aureole of beautiful blue.

A ceiling from which hang ribbon cards of every color.

A camel with gorgeous trappings, with a palm tree behind
him.

Embroidery of red chrysanthemums, variously mixed with
pale pinks and yellows.

330 TRUTH AND ERROR

All of the North American tribes have intoxicants
that produce hallucinations, but they supplement
these intoxicants with many rites such as dancing,
singing, ululation, the beating of drums, and the tor-
menting of the body by various painful operations,
all designed to produce ecstatic states and the con-
sequent hallucinations.

Among all tribal men many hallucinations are sup-
posed to be veridical, as some are supposed to be
by certain members of the Society for Psychical
Research. So tribesmen resort to the agencies
which produce both hallucinations and illusions to
obtain a view of the world about them, of the past
and of the future, in order that their conduct may be
governed by this superior knowledge.

Had our psychologists attempted to make a
"census of waking hallucinations in the sane"
among the North American Indians they would
have found a hundred per cent, ready to testify in
their favor. It is the universal belief in savagery,
for in that stage of culture all men produce hallucina-
tions for divination — for which times and seasons are
regularly appointed and systematic means employed.
But the savage always recognizes that some visions
are not veridical. False spirits may have testified
or some evil being may by black art have vitiated
the ceremony or the percipient may have been
unable to properly read the communication, for
communications arc told in ambiguous terms. It
is very interesting to read these communications
recorded in the annals of the Society, for we find
that after all it is often necessary to wait for a time
to discover an event which will fit the halluci-
nations.

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 331

With the hallucinations already considered, those appearing
in the course of acute somatic diseases, and as a result of them,
seem naturally to be classed. Here, as in the delirious states
associated with intoxication, the swarming of the hallucinations
is characteristic. This resemblance is not accidental. Tndeed,
the delirious states of somatic disease may, in part at least, be
referred to intoxication. But of no less importance are the rise
of temperature, acceleration of metabolic processes, and dis-
turbances of circulation in the brain cavity (first, active
hypersemia; later, in enfeebled action of the heart, venous
stasis), the importance of which is indicated in typhus, for
instance, by the parallelism between the violence of the
delirium and the temperature curve. The initial hallucinatory
visions of typhus, smallpox, and intermittent fever, occurring
before the other causes have had time to act, are on the other
hand to be attributed to the direct influence of the specific
virus of the fever, as also the afebrile delusions, sometimes
occurring in intermittent fever in place of the fever attack, and
the visual and auditory hallucinations which are observed in
smallpox between the eruptive fever and the fever of the
suppurating stage.

Hallucinations also occur in the decline of the disease, dur-
ing the period of convalescence. First they appear singly, in
association with those of the fever, and are often recognized
by the patient as such and concealed from those around him.
But soon they overmaster the sufferer, and delirious states are
developed, or states resembling hallucinatory insanity, in
which visions of corpses, death's-heads, mocking voices, and
offensive olfactory and gustatory hallucinations play a part.
Of an equally distressing nature are most of the sensory
fallacies of collapse-delirium, and those which sometimes pre-
cede death. In tuberculosis, on the other hand, they are often
of an agreeable nature, corresponding to the euphoria which is
so characteristic of this disease. — (Pp. 48-50.)

The most frequently quoted of all sense-deceptions are those
of insanity. Some authors have sought to divide them accord-
ing to their origin into "idiopathic, " those which are primary
but which may also occur in secondary consensual morbid
states, and "symptomatic," those which occur only as a sec-
ondary symptom of insanity. In any case a distinction ought
to be drawn between sporadic hallucinations not associated

332 TRUTH AND ERROR

with particular emotional states, and hallucinations which
reflect the ruling mental tone. This distinction has prog-
nostic importance, since observation seems to prove that hallu-
cinations depending on certain morbid emotional states are
capable of disappearing with them, whilst independent hallu-
cinations seldom admit of cure, and pass over into the state of
secondary psychical weakness.

The particular forms of insanity in which hallucinations
most frequently occur are such as are associated with dream-
like beclouding of the intellect. Thus they are a frequent phe-
nomenon of amentia, but are seldom seen in acute dementia
with its deep-reaching paralysis of the higher psychical
functions. Opinion as to the frequency of sensory hallucina-
tions in melancholia has altered very much of late years,
chiefly because of the altered meaning of the term, and because
cases previously classed under melancholia are now referred to
other groups. Thus, while hallucinations were at one time
regarded as frequent phenomena of this state, they are now
held to be rare, or altogether absent from it. In mania hal-
lucinations only appear when there is clouding of conscious-
ness, and are generally vague and indistinct. On the other
hand, illusions are frequent, and mistakes of identity are
specially characteristic of this state, though not absent from
other forms of insanity. Snell, who devotes an article to them,
is of opinion that the confusions are not so much caused by
mere resemblance, but that a general psychological law lies at
their root; that the patient is powerless to escape from the
familiar thought-channels, and therefore grafts his new impres-
sions on to his old opinions and ideas. In folie circulaire
hallucinations occur in the maniacal period in association with
profound mental disturbance, but as regards their occurrence
in the melancholic phase opinion is again divided.

Delusional insanity and Paranoia, on the other hand, abound
in hallucinations, so much so that some forms classed under
this head are designated "hallucinated insanity'' (hallucina-
torischer Wahnsinri), and "paranoia hallucinatoria. " The
sense-deceptions of delusional insanity are vivid in their
externalization, and resemble in their content the fixed ideas
which they embody. In cases which end in mental decay the
hallucinations frequently persist long. In depressive mono-
mania they are more fragmentary and vague, but are often

FALLACIES OF SENSATION 333

kept alive by distressing dreams. . . . The sufferer hears
taunting or insulting voices calling after him in the street, and
making injurious insinuations about him, or sometimes unseen
speakers incidentally let fall words which confirm his forebod-
ings.—(Pp. 20-23.)

The physiological conception of memory is that
concepts are impressed upon the brain and the nerv-
ous system as elements of structure. Memory is
thus a function of structure. The revival of con-
cepts is recollection; such revival is accomplished
by a sense or feeling- impression, but a sense or feel-
ing impression is a force or mode of motion which is
utilized by conditions so that the central conscious-
ness or consciousness of the brain is subject to con-
ditions which we call causation. Thought is
therefore explained physiologically by the late
discovery that sense and feeling impressions traverse
paths along the fibrous nerves which are diverted by
the ganglionic nerves to different tracts of the
brain, where concepts are recorded as structural
elements. Thus hallucinations are explained by
referring them to the mechanism of the brain and
showing how by such mechanism incongruous con-
cepts may be aroused by defects in its working.

Now we are prepared to reaffirm that a judgment
of sensation must be verified to become a cognition,
for if a judgment of sensation is an hallucination there
is no cognition. Many of our sensations may be
verified by repetition, and it is often the case that
this method establishes their verity.

The hallucination caused by subjective audition
cannot be disproved by a repetition of the hallucina-
tion caused by an injury to the middle ear. An
hallucination which is a color vision cannot be

334 TRUTH AND ERROR

shown not to be veridical in this manner, for it may
continue while the intoxication lasts. The ultimate
test of the verity of a sensation is an appeal to a
higher faculty of the mind, which is perception,
that yet requires explication.

The person who had an hallucination of a church
congress in her stomach was not in a condition to
appeal to a higher faculty. Before she realizes that
she has an hallucination her malady must be cured.
The man who believes in ghosts when he has an
hallucination of his dead child appearing to him in
the cerements of the tomb can best be shown that
it is an hallucination by curing the malady in his
understanding.

CHAPTER XXI

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION

We have found that sense impressions cause
events of consciousness which produce judgments by
recalling concepts of sensation, such concepts being
reinforced and developed by the addition of new
judgments. Judgments of perception still employ
the same sense impressions in the construction of
new concepts of form, while concepts of form are
recalled when a judgment of form is made. A new
concept of form is constituted by the increment of a
new judgment of form. Therefore concepts of
sensation are concepts of kind, while concepts of
perception are concepts of form. As a judgment of
sensation must always precede a judgment of per-
ception, the same sense impression which gives rise
to a judgment of sensation will, in the maturer mind
of the infant, also give rise to a judgment of percep-
tion; therefore we are compelled to reconsider the
sense impressions from which perceptions arise.
Having already found how judgments of perception
are considered and how such judgments are verified,
we have now to exhibit in what manner there comes
into existence a multitude of judgments of percep-
tion which are never verified, and yet are entertained
in the mind as if they were veridical.

Fallacies of perceptions are errors of judgment
respecting forms. Such judgments may occur
through unverified judgments of sensation, and the

335

336 TRUTH AND ERROR

fallacy is repeated in a higher state of mind. Judg-
ments, when they are first made, are of slow
growth, but when once made, by repetition they
become habitual and do not arise in the corticle con-
sciousness.

The human mind cannot perceive form without first
sensing kind. On the other hand it seems almost
impossible to sense a kind without at the same time
perceiving a form, though we may pay attention to the
kind or to the form at will. In our discussion of
fallacies of sensation, we have tried to pay attention
to the kind, but we have found that kinds were
usually expressed as forms. The experimental
observer, Miss Smith, not only spoke of colors as
dissolving in succession, but at the same time the
colors themselves were explained as forms. Most of
the fallacies of sensation which we have cited in this
discussion, most of those which appear in the general
literature of the subject, and most of those which
occur in experience are not only hallucinations of
sensation, but they are also specters of perception,
because the human mind rarely senses an object
without at the same time perceiving the object.
When I see the color of the rose, I see the rose as a
form. When I see the color of the cloud, I see the
cloud. When a word is pronounced in my hearing
I hear the sound as a sound, perceive the person in
the other room represented vicariously by the voice,
and at the same time hear the word as a word and
as a symbol of meaning. In general, the description
of a sensation is best accomplished in terms of per-
ception.

We must know things as kinds before we know
them as forms, and we must first judge of things as

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION 337

kinds before we judge of them as forms. But when
we already know things as kinds, we can re-cognize
them as kinds by instantaneous judgments, and at
once go on to cognize them as forms, or to make judg-
ments about them as forms. In a former chapter,
fallacies of sensation were often described in terms
of perception, for they seem always to produce
fallacies of perception, and in the state of mind
under which they are produced it is the forms, not
the kinds, which are of chief interest to the sub-
ject.

There are many misperceptions ; so common are
they as to be scarcely noticed. If a person will
observe his own thoughts from moment to moment,
he will be surprised at the number of fallacious per-
ceptions which he makes, some of which are immedi-
ately corrected, others are corrected after lapse of
time, and probably many others that are never cor-
rected, because of their insignificance in the practical
affairs of life. These errors of judgment are espe-
cially common in audition and vision, the two senses
most highly vicarious. A sound may be obscure by
reason of its faintness, or by reason of diverted
attention. Sight may be obscure by reason of the
twilight, or it may be obscure because attention is
elsewhere directed. All such impressions may be
veridical or may be fallacious. If I am intently
listening for a sound I may interpret a sight for a
sound; if I am intently looking for an object, I may
interpret a sound for a sight. If I am intently
listening for a particular sound and hear another, I
may interpret it for the one I was expecting ; if I am
intently gazing in expectation of seeing one object,
and another falls upon the field of vision, I may see

TRUTH AND ERROR

in it the one for which I was intently gazing. These
are all misperceptions.

I draw nine black lines on white paper, as shown
in Fig. i, and you see them as lines on paper.
Now close one eye, and lift the page horizontally
nearly to the height of the eye, and these lines will
appear as pins. By a little manipulation you can
see them now as pins and now as lines. You
know they are not pins, yet you see them as pins;

Fig. i.

that is, you have formed a habit of interpreting
sense impressions like those made by the lines
when they are in certain attitudes as marks or
symbols of standing objects set as pins, stakes,
men, or trees, and so thoroughly established is
this habit that such an attitude of lines may be
interpreted as standing objects when they are not,

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION 339

Fig. 2.

340 TRUTH AND ERROR

and you will affirm that they are lines at one time
and standing objects at another. This is one of the
standard illustrations of misperception. Now will
be understood the statement when it is affirmed
that only color is manifested to the eye by the
object, and that when such a judgment is formed it
may or may not be valid, but that the color is inter-
preted as a symbol of the object in a judgment of
perception.

Before me as I write there is a steam register,
which is covered with a tablet composed of bars with
interspaces, the bars being arranged in patterns; a
drawing of a portion of this tablet is illustrated in
the accompanying diagram Fig. 2.

Looking upon it in the ordinary position in which
a book is read it appears as a pattern of bars ; turn
the top of the book to the left in such a manner as to
see the bars obliquely, and it appears as a collection
of crates or boxes inclined one upon another ; turn
it again so that the direction of sight is changed
ninety degrees from the first position, and you can
see it as a series of steps like a stairway, every tread
having a series of reentrant angles. Again, we see
that in vision nothing but color as in a flat is given to
consciousness, and that form comes by interpretation
or inference. Deftness in inference is acquired by
practice ; that is, it is the result of experience. We
come to interpret lines in this manner as meaning
form by the experience of every moment of waking
life, and inherit the skill from a long line of
ancestors, so that our powers of perceiving formed
in this manner are both inherited and habitual, or,
as I prefer to say, both instinctive and habitual, and
that which is both inherited and habitual is intuitive.

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION 341

Light and shade are interpreted as deftly as lines,
and we can see forms without other colors, so that a
portrait which you know is only light and shade, is
a symbol of the form and expression of a human
face. But there are other colors both in nature and
in art, and we instinctively and habitually interpret
all colors as forms; but sometimes we see colors
without seeing forms. The illusions of inference by
the interpretation of lines in vision have been the
subject of much investigation in psycho-physics,
which is one branch of scientific psychology. But
adequate experiments have not yet been made in
light and shade, and in other colors when not repre-
sented by lines. The doctrine dates back to the
days of Berkeley, who set forth the nature of percep-
tion in vision in such manner that it has become a
classic, though he afterward devoted his energies to
the propagation of fallacies in metaphysics and tar-
water.

From time to time during the last thirty years, I
have studied the nature of perception in myself and
in others. Especially have I studied it as a mental
phenomenon in the untutored Indians of North
America. On every hand these facts have
appeared: first, that every perception as a judgment
involves an interpretation; second, that perceptions
may be true or erroneous, as inferences are valid or
invalid ; and third, ' that visual perception itself is
acquired by experience.

Among the Indians, I have found that at first lines
are not easily interpreted, so that pictures in lines
do not seem to represent forms; but the power of
interpreting forms by lines is rapidly gained. I
have found also that the power of interpreting light

342 TRUTH AND ERROR

and shade is great in the savage for natural objects,
but must be cultivated for unknown objects of art.
And, again, I have found that the power of inter-
preting the miscellaneous colors of pictures is well
developed when they represent things with which
they are already familiar, but that it is necessary to
familiarize them with things to develop the power
of interpreting unknown forms.

Again, in topographic maps, relief is represented
usually by light and shade in hachnres, but in the
best maps relief is represented by lines which follow
the contour at equal intervals of altitude. Such
maps cannot be read by the inexperienced man, but
he can develop the power so that a contour map will
seem to be a picture of mountains and valleys and
of hills and dales. Experience has taught me that
this power is more easily gained and greatly assisted
by representing relief in one color and drainage in
another, as in blue; for when the knowledge that
water is blue is represented in the map as blue, it
will carry the streams down and aid in the percep-
tion of the relief.

From the illustrations which have been given it
will perhaps be made clear that perception is the
interpretation of a symbol, and that the power of
interpretation comes by experience. We are con-
stantly perceiving with all our senses, but sounds
and sights are the most abundant, coming in hosts
with every minute of wakefulness, and a habit of
interpretation is formed which is conjoined with an
inherited aptness. External forms do not come to the
eye or the ear as consciousness, but only to the mind
as inferences. Habitual judgments of the mind
which are illusions because unverified, may occur

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION 343

again and again in millions of cases, and the repeti-
tion but confirms the illusion, and such intuitive
illusions can hardly be dispelled even by overwhelm-
ing knowledge, but the truth and the error will
appear side by side and be entertained as verities,
and the mind will search for some metaphysical
explanation of them. As a last resort of logic, it
will assume the existence of a mystery, and be con-
firmed in the doctrine that the universe is contradic-
tory.

Our forefathers called the sky a firmament. It
was believed to be a solid which presented a surface
toward us, and this misconception is universal
among barbaric and savage people. By the Indian
the sky is supposed to be ice, or some other crystal-
line solid, and it does appear to be a surface, in
spite of our knowing that it is not. This arises from
the fact that we always discover color on surfaces,
and when surfaces are removed usually colors are
changed. We have thus as individuals and as a
race in all generations habitually considered color to
be a symbol of surface. That which is habit in the
interpretation of a sense impression contradicts that
which we have learned by various operations of
reasoning from other sense data. Thus habitual
illusions often contradict certitudes, as they may be
discovered by the higher forms of reason, and we
often entertain certitudes and fallacies as if
co-existent, and the world seems to be contradictory.
These judgments have a curious effect on the mind,
for the contradictory judgments may both be
held in a vague way to be certitudes and still in a
vague way to be fallacies, until finally this is
explained by a theory, that both are unknown and

344 TRUTH AND ERROR

unknowable noumena which are manifested by
deceptive phenomena. So habits of judgment are
formed which are difficult to eradicate.

To unverified perception the rainbow as a form
with a surface has been established, because of the
habit of interpreting color as a mark of surface ; this
fallacy is common, perhaps universal. The clouds
often seem to be painted upon the sky, or to be
moving along the sky, but the trained meteorologist
in time learns to distinguish clouds as forms, and
discovers fleeting figures in them, and he still further
discovers the relative position of clouds by recogniz-
ing the near from the far, and yet, to the untrained
observer, there still lingers an element of fallacy.

It was long believed that the earth has ends,
corners, foundation, and a flat upper surface. When
it was discovered that the earth is a spheroid, the
illusion of up and down as components of direction at
right angles to a flat plane was dispelled, and a con-
cept substituted of down toward the center and up
from the center. While a few grasped the idea, the
many still held to the old, and now, after more than
two thousand years, there are people who have not
mastered the concept.

One man sees the disc of the moon when it is
riding high as having the size of the top of a teacup,
another as large as a cartwheel. But the moon will
seem to be larger than a barn if it is seen behind a
distant barn, or it may seem to be as large as a great
mountain when it rises behind such mountain, and
yet every intelligent man knows the moon to be
2,162 miles in diameter. As the moon rides the
heavens, it seems to be this side of the surface of the
sky, although we know that there is no such surface.

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION 345

Such habitual judgments of space and form seem to
contradict our knowledge. When knowledge con-
tradicts primitive and habitual judgments, there is a
pseudo- belief in both, and the universe seems con-
tradictory.

The sun appears to us as a mile or two away, but
we know that it is ninety-three millions of miles away.
The sun seems very much nearer to us when it rides
high in the heavens than when it comes up behind a
near hill, or when it rises behind a distant mountain
with intervening plains. What we know and what
appears seem to contradict each other; and anti-
nomies are invented to explain these contradictions.

By a natural process of fallacious judgment, the
idea of space as void is developed as an existent
thing or body. This is the ghost of space — the crea-
tion of an entity out of nothing. I may remove the
furniture from the room, it is still filled with air; I
may remove the air from the room, it is still filled
with ether. We may suppose it possible to remove
the ether, then nothing — void — remains, but man has
no means by which to accomplish the feat, and we call
the air and the ether space. The space of which we
speak is occupied ; it is the space inclosed by the walls,
occupied by air and ether. We may measure its
dimensions by measuring the walls, but we cannot
measure the void. We can by no possibility con-
sider non-space or void as a term of reality; we
can consider only the walls as the real terms. If we
reason about it mathematically and call it x, the
meaning of the x in the equation is finally resolved
by expressing it in terms of body as they are repre-
sented by surface. This non-space has no number ;
it is not one or many in one — it is nothing. It is not

346 TRUTH AND ERROR

extension as figure or structure — it is nothing.
Void space should be called voidable space, as void-
able by one set of extensions when filled by another.
The fallacy concerning space is born of careless
naming. No harm is done by this popular mis-
perception of space until we use it in reasoning as a
term of reality ; then the attributes of space may be
anything because they are nothing. Such space is
the occult noumenon, the reified void. This is the
space of Kant, and usually the space of metaphysic.
It is the reification of "pure" property, void of all
extension which can have no relations ; that which
is without relation is non-existent.

When I consider the distance from here to San
Francisco, I may think of the plateaus, mountains,
hills, and valleys which have to be surmounted and
crossed in traversing the distance, or I may think of
the days required to make the journey. Yet I imply
or posit the plateaus, mountains, hills, and valleys ;
so when I consider the distance to the sun I posit
the spacial particles which intervene, though I may
cancel their consideration, but if I affirm that space
as nothing intervenes I affirm a fallacy. By calling
it a five days' journey I do not annihilate the
topography.

In the earlier stages of culture, when there was no
knowledge of air and ether, this was the judgment
of mankind, but I must not go on repeating this
judgment when I know the truth. If the primeval
judgments are held to be veridical, and scientific
judgments also to be veridical, then the world is
contradictory. Metaphysicians formulate these
erroneous judgments and scientific judgments as
antinomies.

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION 347

Misperceptions have been discussed sufficiently for
present purposes as exhibiting the characteristics of
illusions. I go on to discuss specters which are
derived from hallucinations in order to set forth the
characteristics of delusions.

It will not be necessary for us to rediscuss all the
hallucinations set forth in the last chapter, but it
may be well to recall some of them as illustrating
these principles.

Fallacies of sensation in the metabolic sense seem
rarely to produce fallacies of perception. If they do
arise they are vague. It is rarely, indeed, when
they are produced that the deceived mind refers
them to distinct objects as forms, but in extreme
cases deceptive forms appear, especially in the
case of odors, as when the subject refers such
odors to the bodies of the dead, as the woman
who referred the pestilential odors which she
believed she sensed to the corpses buried under the
Salpetriere.

Usually the fallacies of touch produce illusions
which the deceived subject attributes to some form
of object which touches the skin ; commonly these
objects are insects.

In my study of the literature of hallucinations, I
find but few hallucinations of the sense of pressure ;
yet there are a few, as when people dream or
insanely imagine that they are enclosed by walls
which are ever becoming narrower and thus com-
pressing them.

To the person who has all of the senses, most of
the hallucinations occur in audition and vision,
because of the function which spoken and written
language performs in the ideation of these senses.

348 TRUTH AND ERROR

Hallucinatory sounds often produce phantasmal
words spoken by spectral persons.

The spectral person may be the self, or it may be
another or a congress of others. When the voices of
others are falsely perceived as persons, these others
are specters.

Specters may be classified by senses deceived, and
subclassified by the agencies through which they are
produced. The class of specters derived from
hallucinations of vision we will treat as thus sub-
classified, for the purpose of illustrating the doctrine.

When the nervous system is relaxed in slumber so
that sense impressions carried by the fibrous nerves
are directed by the ganglionic nerves at random to
different portions of the cortex of the brain, sense
impressions are produced upon that organ which
result in dreams, and the imagination of the sleeper
revels in wonderland. As these are of nightly
occurrence, and all men dream, the ghosts of dream-
land that fill the sleeping life are remembered in
many a revery of the waking life.

In the culture reached at the stage of tribal
society, images reflected by the water or other shin-
ing objects are supposed to be ghosts. Echoes are
also referred to ghosts. Thus there is an explana-
tion given to the common phenomena of reflected
sights and sounds by attributing them to the ghosts
which appear in dreams.

Hallucinations of ecstasy always seem to produce
phantasms or specters of vision. Hence the specters
seen by the great men of the world who have had a
weight of affairs to contemplate — too great for their
mental faculties ; hence the specters seen by divines
and poets. Such ghosts can be summoned readily

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION 349

by those phenomena which we have classified under
the general designation of crystal vision, for the
mind seems able by an effort of will to abstract
attention from sense impressions in a fixed gaze
upon a bright object, and then to be deluded with
false judgments about such bright objects, seeing
in the bright object itself many strange forms which
are recalled from memory and projected into many
incongruous relations of space. The phantastic
images of the Braid's crystal are thus ghosts sum-
moned from the vasty deep of hallucination.

The hallucinations of hypnotism make men see
things which do not exist, and prohibit men from
seeing things upon which their eyes are turned,
when the patient is under the influence of the words
or of the suggestions of a dominant operator.

Chloroform, ether, peyote, and many other drugs
bring us hallucinations under conscious experimenta-
tion. But there are many intoxicants. In tribal
society intoxicants are used for the purpose of
producing hallucinations ; in modern society alcohol
is used as a beverage to produce gustatory pleasure ;
but in whatever way intoxicants are used hallucina-
tions are produced. The hallucinations of obscure
vision, reinforced by the hallucinations of dream-
ing, reinforced by the hallucinations of hypnotism,
are still reinforced by the hallucinations of intoxi-
cation, until ghosts are the common property of
mankind, and only through scientific training is the
mind able to banish them. But these ghosts, while
they affect the lives of many sane people, do not
take entire possession of them.

When, however, the mind is diseased, the halluci-
nations of sane life take possession of the person.

35° TRUTH AND ERROR

The poor soul possessed by hallucination becomes a
prey to melancholia, hysteria, and dementia. But
the mind of the superstitious man, who is ever
recalling the phantasms born of hallucination, is
exploiting upon the brink of the sea of hallucination
into which he may plunge by insanity. While
ghosts may be smelled, touched, or heard, yet they
are more commonly seen for vision is the most ideal-
istic sense.

In the realm of ghosts there are five provinces —
the land of dreams, the land of ecstasy, the land of
suggestion, the land of intoxication, and the land
of insanity. In tribal society ghosts of animals
prevail, while in civilized society ghosts of men pre-
vail. If you were talking to a savage about some
unusual occurrence, he would tell you how he had
been warned by a bear, that a hummingbird had
appeared, that a rattlesnake had crossed his way,
that an eagle came to him in his dreams. Homer's
ghosts all appear as deities in the guise of human
beings.

For twenty centuries metaphysic has been in
search of the noumenon — the thing-in-itself. For a
long time it spoke with disrespect of scientific
research, but in modern times it patronizes science
as a very useful adjunct to metaphysic by showing
how specters, as phenomena, symbolize noumena.
The assumptions of metaphysic as it patronizes
science would be the richest jest of civilization had
they not their equal in the ridicule they make in
considering realities as base-born, belonging only
to the lower world where men live, while meta-
physic is supposed to dwell in a region of sublime
thought.

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION 35!

We have defined ghosts as fallacies of hallucina-
tion conceived as forms. Those who believe in
ghosts define them in some other way. Milton may
be considered one of the best authorities on ghosts :

for spirits when they please

Can either sex assume, or both ; so soft

And uncompounded is their essence pure ;

Not tied or manacled with joint or limb,

Nor founded on the brittle strength of bones,

Like cumbrous flesh ; but in what shape they choose,

Dilated or condens'd, bright or obscure,

Can execute their airy purposes,

And works of love or enmity fulfill.

Shakspere does not believe in ghosts, but he
knows how they are seemingly produced by hypno-
tism.

Ham. — Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you make
of me. You would play upon me ; you would seem to know
my stops; you would pluck out the heart of my mystery; you
would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my com-
pass ; and there is much music, excellent voice, in this little
organ, yet cannot you make it speak. 'Sblood! do you think I
am easier to be played on than a pipe? Call me what instru-
ment you will, though you can fret me, you cannot play upon
me.

Enter Polonius.

God bless you, sir !

Pol. My lord, the queen would speak with you, and
presently.

Ham. Do you see yonder cloud, that's almost in shape of a
camel?

Pol. By the mass, an 'tis like a camel, indeed.

Ham. Methinks, it is like a weasel.

Pol. It is backed like a weasel.

Ham. Or, like a whale?

Pol. Very like a whale.

Ham. Then, will I come to my mother by and by. They
fool me to the top of my bent. I will come by and by.

CHAPTER XXII

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION

Fallacies have been divided into two grand
divisions, which we have called illusions and delu-
sions. It will be remembered that we are reclassify-
ing illusions and delusions, each into five classes.
Of the illusions we have already set forth the mis-
sensations and the misperceptions, and of the
delusions we have set forth the hallucinations and the
specters. In considering fallacious apprehensions
we discover misapprehensions and phantasms. Let
us first set forth the nature of misapprehensions.

We are conscious of pressure when bodies impinge
against us, and we are conscious of push when we
impinge against other bodies ; we are therefore con-
scious of energy both from an active standpoint and
from a passive standpoint. But the energy of which
we are conscious is that of molar bodies. We must
here recall the fact that knowledge begins in the
race and also in the infant with the cognition of
molar bodies. To the primitive or nai've appre-
hension, motion is an effect of a cause, and this
cause is considered as something which acts on
another and produces motion in self, in order to act
on that other, and it may also produce motion in
that other. It was long before man cognized that
force is itself motion and motion is force. Primitive
man formed the habit of considering motion as an
effect of force. He was conscious that he could

352

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 353

exercise force, and discovered that it could produce
molar motion. He knew nothing of molecular
motion, or that the force which he exercised was
derived from molecular motion, so he considered
force and motion as disparate properties ; this is the
primordial misapprehension.

Erroneous judgments once made may be repeated
in perpetuating fallacies, for this constant repetition
of fallacious judgments is intuition, and there seems
to be something sacred about intuition. A world of
metaphysic is built on this foundation, that habitual
or intuitive judgments are the primordial endow-
ments of mind. A myth is invented to explain a
fallacy, then the myth becomes sacred and the
moral nature is enlisted in its defense.

The stars were seen to move along the firmament,
or surface of the solid, from east to west, as men
move along the surface of the earth at will. But
the heavenly bodies move by constantly repeated
paths, and so primitive man invents myths to
explain these repeated paths. For example, the
Utes say that the Sun could once go where he
pleased, but when he came near to the people he
burned them. Tavots, the Rabbit-god, fought with
the Sun and compelled him to travel by an appointed
path along the surface of the sky, so that there
might be day and night. It is an offense to the
religion or moral sentiment of the Ute to question
this explanation.

The man is conscious that he can move himself,
though he is not conscious that the molecular
motion in his body is motion, but he is conscious
that it produces the effect of molar motion, and he
calls this unknown something force. In what man-

354 TRUTH AND ERROR

ner this molecular motion of the particles of the
body is transmuted into molar motion of the body, is
not known except by a few scientific men who see
that molecular motion of the particles is transmuted
into the molar motion of the body through the
metabolism of the muscle, and that this motility
or self-activity is controlled by the will which
controls the choice or affinity of the molecules of the
muscles.

This primordial misapprehension is universal to
mankind in tribal society, and universal in explain-
ing all motion. Although not formulated in this
manner, it is practically believed that motion, which
is simple and well known, is the medium between
occult force as one force acts on another. This is a
very natural error in the stage of culture to which it
pertains.

We speak of the sun, the moon, and the stars as
rising and setting, and when the sun rises we conceive
it in such terms of speech, but in fact the earth in its
daily rotation turns toward the sun. Under favor-
able circumstances I can see the earth turn toward
the sun, down in the front when looking at the sun,
and up as my back is turned. I have often experi-
mented in this manner with both the sun and the
moon, when I have been traveling on the desert,
and I can see their rising and setting as the rotation
of the earth. I assure you it is a marvelous revela-
tion. It seems like riding on a Ferris wheel. It is
just such revelations as these that a man must
experience when he discovers new truths in
science. When the fallacy wholly vanishes and the
verity appears in all its meaning, it is impossible to
conceive a fallacy; but when the fallacy and the

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 355

verity are both believed, we believe contradictions
or antinomies.

Phenomena are expressed in words before they
are properly understood; when they come to be
known the facts do not properly fit them. I speak
of the path of the heavenly orbs extending from
east to west, but the fact is that the earth revolves
from west to east. The metaphysician takes
propositions to express judgments, as they are
formed before the phenomena are properly under-
stood by science, to be valid, and then finding that
which science ultimately discovers, takes it also
to be valid, and discovers in the world a set of con-
tradictions.

Consider a tower a thousand feet high, from which
there projects an arm so that a cannonball falling
from it will strike the ground outside of the base
of the tower. Now let a ball be dropped from this
arm, and you say it falls to the ground in a straight
line. This is not true; the cannonball and the
earth both have the motion of the earth in rotation
about its axis; the path of the cannonball, there-
fore, has two components, one in the direction of
rotation and another in the direction of fall. Its
path, therefore, is in the direction of fall and rota-
tion. This is not all of the path of the ball : it is
moving in revolution with the earth and the moon ;
it is also moving in revolution with the orbs of the
solar system about the sun as the center ; it is also
moving with the solar system about some point in
the galaxy. It falls to the earth, therefore, in a
vortical or spiral path, because the earth itself is
moving in such a path. For some purposes it is
necessary only to consider this movement of the

35^ TRUTH AND ERROR

earth as a straight line, because only this component
of path must be considered when we consider the
change of the ball in relation to objects on the earth,
when the real path of the cannonball seems to
contradict the considered path, and we have an
antinomy.

You say that the book lying on the table is at rest,
and you conceive rest as a motionless state. But this
is not true ; the book which lies on the table has the
motion of the earth on its axis, and it has also the
motion of the hierarchy of celestial bodies, and it has
also the motion of a hierarchy of molecular bodies.
Rest, therefore, is only motion parallel to the other
bodies of this room, and if you deflect its other
motion, so that it is no longer parallel to the other
bodies, you produce molar motion. If you still hold
that rest is a motionless state, and then apprehend,
as you do, that the book is in motion when at rest,
you believe contradictions. These contradictions
are antinomies. One or other of every antinomy is
a fallacy.

If I have set forth the nature of antinomies clearly, I
am prepared to set forth the fallacy of Kant's second
antinomy. This fallacy consists in holding that
there is some force which is not motion, but struc-
ture. It is the failure to conceive properly that all
bodies are composed of discrete particles which are
incorporated by modes of motion, and the failure
also to conceive that there is a hierarchy of bodies
in which the particle itself is a constituent and that
the particle partakes of all the motion of the bodies
in which it is incorporated, so that the motion of
the particle is vortical. No matter how large or how
small the particle may be, it exists in an environ-

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 357

ment of other particles with which it collides; and
by reason of its environment its tendency to a
rectilineal path is made vortical, and whenever this
vortical path is disturbed by an unwonted collision,
it has a tendency to be straightened. Thus the
cannonball falling has its path to the earth deflected
to one somewhat more in a right line. In order that
this statement may more clearly be understood, it
requires a further development of the motion of a
particle in a hierarchy of bodies. If we can attain to
this concept, then the fundamental doctrines of
physics are self-evident.

The misapprehensions relating to the forces of
molecular bodies linger much longer than those
relating to stellar bodies. Only in late years have
we learned that heat is a mode of motion, that light
is a mode of motion, that electricity is a mode of
motion, and a few physicists still believe that gravity
is an occult force. Although the law of the per-
sistence of energy or the correlation of forces is
established, yet a few apprehend gravity to be an
occult force, as attraction and repulsion involving
actio in distans; yet gravity, when it is understood
as a mode of motion, is so simple that all of its
laws can be derived by the Euclidean process from
the law of the persistence of energy.

There yet remain certain properties or bodies as
forces which usually are not conceived as modes of
motion. Inertia and rigidity are the two most
important. If they are deprived of their occult
attributes, all other forces fall into line as modes of
motion. Inertia, as defined by Newton, is resist-
ance to deflection of motion, or resistance to acceler-
ation, positive or negative ; but when we remember

TRUTH AND ERROR

that a body has the internal motion of its parts, and
properly conceive that these motions are deflected
when the body is accelerated, inertia becomes simple
as resistance to deflection. When we conceive that
inertia is resistance to deflection, it becomes a
proposition, easily comprehended, that rigidity is
resistance to the differential deflection of the
molecular parts of a body. Every one of its minute
parts must be moved if the body is moved, and the
regional parts as distinguished from the molecular
parts cannot be moved without fracturing the body.
Thus we see that rigidity can be explained simply
as a mode of motion without resort to occult force.

I am riding in a railway coach. The world
moves by. Houses and men are on the wing, land-
scape and animals are in flight, yet all this motion
in the external world is an illusion which I soon
learn to correct. I and my railway coach are the
moving bodies. Every time I look out of the window
I correctly interpret the motion in this manner. My
coach stops at a railway station, and the trains near
me move. Now, I have formed a habit of inter-
preting the passing of outside bodies as motion in
myself and the coach, and when the trains outside
move I infer that I and my coach move, and so
strong is this inference that I am impelled to look
for some verification before I can decide in which
body the molar motion inheres, for the contradictory
judgments are both intuited.

It has been demonstrated by science that motion
is persistent — cannot be created or annihilated — and
the demonstration has been accepted by a great
body of scientific men. Antecedently to this demon-
stration Newton had propounded three laws of

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 359

motion, one of which is that action and reaction are
equal and in opposite directions. In this law the
persistence of motion or the indestructibility of
energy was implied, but at first its full significance
was not understood, perhaps not even by Newton
himself.

In the "Principia" his first chapter is a series of
definitions, the third of which is as follows:

"The visinsita, or innate force of matter, is a power of resist-
ing, by which every body, as much as in it lies, endeavors to
persevere in its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving
uniformly forward in a right line.

"This force is ever proportional to the body whose force it is,
and differs nothing from the inactivity of the mass, but in our
manner of conceiving it. A body, from the inactivity of
matter, is not without difficulty put out of its state of rest or
motion. Upon which account this vis insita may, by a most
significant name, be called vis inerticz, or force of inactivity.
But a body exerts this force only when another force impressed
upon it endeavors to change its condition, and the exercise of
this force may be considered both as resistance and impulse ; it
is resistance, in so far as the body for maintaining its present
state, withstands the force impressed ; it is impulse, in so far as
the body, by not easily giving way to the impressed force of
another, endeavors to change the state of that other. Resist-
ance is usually ascribed to bodies at rest, and impulse to those
in motion; but motion and rest as commonly conceived are
only relatively distinguished, nor are those bodies always truly
at rest which commonly are taken to be so."

In the last clause it is apparent that Newton him-
self was conscious of an illusion in the common con-
ception of the term rest, and it is plain from his
entire discussion that his term inertia stood for real
force, although many scholars since his time have
denied this proposition. Had Newton discovered
the real nature of what he called vis inerticz, the

360 TRUTH AND ERROR

"Principia" would have been simplified, as it has
been since his time, by definitions given to momen-
tum, energy, force, and power. But even these
newer definitions can be revised and the subject
presented in a simpler manner.

Vis inertia ', or inertia, is a component of real force,
inherent in every particle of matter as speed of
motion, which can be changed in direction only
through the agency of collision. The explanation of
Newton's third law of motion in this manner
changes the ideas of motion as they have hitherto
existed in philosophy. Motion as speed is inherent,
and not something imposed from without. If,
indeed, this be true, then much reasoning in scien-
tific circles must be revised, for it has far-reaching
results.

In every mind the term rest seems to imply
absence of motion, and thus to have a negative con-
tent. This implication still properly remains with
the term, and while rest does not mean absence of
all motion, it still means absence of molar motion.
To the ancients, it meant absence of all motion, and
this is the fallacy, but it still means absence of molar
motion. My pulse beats as the heart beats and the
blood flows. The book on my desk is pulseless ; that
is, it is devoid of that motion of blood impelled by the
heart at every beat ; still it has motion, though not
pulse motion; so the book which lies on the desk
has motion, but not molar motion. As the book is
not devoid of motion because it has no pulse, so it is
not devoid of motion because it has no molar motion.

Molar motion is the only motion that can be
seen directly by the eye without instrumental aid.
These molar motions have been so often inferred

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 361

and verified that the concept is intuitional in every
human mind. The concept of stellar motion has
also been verified, and the concept is intuitive with
some but not with all minds, but the concept of
stellar motion has the same validity as the concept
of molar motion. The concept of molecular motion,
though not intuitional to most people, is just as valid
as that of stellar or molar motion.

Concepts of molar, stellar and molecular motion
are formed in precisely the same manner by the
consolidation of verified judgments. The distinction
is not between sense judgments and intuitive judg-
ments, but between verified and unverified judg-
ments, for intuitive judgments may themselves be
fallacious.

If I seem to dwell on this point and elaborate the
explanation, it is because the illusion of a motion-
less state must be dispelled before other facts in
relation to motion can properly be considered.

An unquestioned fallacy exerts a vital influence on
all modes of thought to which it may relate, and
engenders a spirit of defense that easily develops
into antagonism.

In Spencer's "First Principles," the third chapter
is on ultimate scientific ideas. In the seventeenth
section he says:

"A body impelled by the hand is clearly perceived to move,
and to move in a definite direction : there seems at first sight
no possibility of doubting that its motion is real, or that it is
towards a given point. Yet it is easy to show that we not only
may be, but usually are, quite wrong in both these judgments.
Here, for instance, is a ship which, for simplicity's sake, we
will suppose to be anchored at the equator with her head to the
west. When the captain walks from stem to stern, in what
direction does he move? East is the obvious answer — an

362 TRUTH AND ERROR

answer which for the moment may pass without criticism. But
now the anchor is heaved, and the vessel sails to the west
with a velocity equal to that at which the captain walks. In
what direction does he now move when he goes from stem to
stern? You cannot say east, for the vessel is carrying him as
fast towards the west as he walks to the east; and you cannot
say west, for the converse reason. In respect to surrounding
space he is stationary; though to all on board the ship he
seems to be moving. But now are we quite sure of this con-
clusion?"

Then he goes on to discuss the motions of molar
bodies on the surface of the earth as related to the
rotation of the earth on its axis, the revolution of
the earth about the sun, and the revolution of the
solar system about some point in the heavens lying
in the direction of Hercules, but he neglects the
molecular motion within the molar body itself. In
this discussion he is evidently under misapprehen-
sion, which has already been explained and the
certitude demonstrated. This certitude is that the
acceleration of a body in its proper motion is deflec-
tion of its particles. Thus, when a ship is moving
in one direction at a certain rate, and the captain
is walking from stem to stern at the same rate, his
body is deflected by the ship as molar motion in one
direction and by motility in the opposite direction ;
that is, there is a double system of deflection of the
particles of his body that compensate one another.
The whole subject is thus explained as a double
deflection, and all the mystery is solved.

Later in the section Spencer says:

"Another insuperable difficulty presents itself when we con-
template the transfer of Motion. Habit blinds us to the
marvelousness of this phenomenon. Familiar with the fact
from childhood, we see nothing remarkable in the ability of a

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 363

moving thing to generate movement in a thing that is station-
ary. It is, however, impossible to understand it. In what
respect does a body after impact differ from itself before
impact? What is this added to it which does not sensibly
affect any of its properties and yet enables it to traverse
space? Here is an object at rest, and here is the same object
moving. In the one state it has no tendency to change its
place ; but in the other it is obliged at each instant to assume a
new position. What is it which will for ever go on producing
this effect without being exhausted? and how does it dwell in
the object? The motion you say has been communicated. But
how? — What has been communicated? The striking body has
not transferred a thing to the body struck ; and it is equally
out of the question to say that it has transferred an attribute.
What then has it transferred?"

How simple the explanation! Motion as speed
cannot be transferred, but motion as path may be
deflected.

Then he goes on to demonstrate the absurdities of
transferring motion as speed from one body to
another, and he finally says :

"Thus neither when considered in connection with Space, nor
when considered in connection with Matter, nor when con-
sidered in connection with Rest, do we find that Motion is truly
cognizable. All efforts to understand its essential nature do
but bring us to alternative impossibilities of thought."

In this argument he assumes that the transference
of motion is the transfer of speed, but we have
demonstrated that the transference of motion is only
the transfer of direction by change in the paths of
each, which is simple and can be understood by a
boy. But the transfer of motion as speed leads to
curious and contradictory conclusions, some of
which Spencer develops. Here he is reasoning
about a fallacy, something which does not exist, and
something which is not only unknown, but unknow-

364 TRUTH AND ERROR

able, as he affirms. In all of part first of the "First
Principles," wherever he discusses scientific subjects,
he deals with fallacies and assumes non-existent
things borrowed from the history of metaphysical
opinion, all involving contradictions, and as no
explanation of them can be given, assumes that
they are unknowable ; still he affirms that they are
known as something relative which he explains as
something known in a symbolic manner. Now,
these fallacies are all represented in literature, and
have words by which they are known, but they are
symbols of fallacies when improper meanings are
given to them, but symbols of certitudes when
proper meanings are implied. In all the history of
metaphysic I know of no better illustrations of
reasoning about fallacies than are here found in this
first part, • for the propositions are stated with singular
clearness; they are never presented in obscure
rhetoric, nor are they enforced by an appeal to moral
sanctions.

Spencer is right. The doctrine that motion as
speed can be transferred from one particle to
another is incomprehensible, or, to use his language,
is unknowable, or, to use my language, it is absurd.
We must not believe incomprehensible, unknowable,
or absurd things. Since the days of Euclid, we are
accustomed to the doctrine of reductio ad absurdum
in scientific logic. If we can reduce a proposition
to absurdity we reject it.

Spencer goes on in the same chapter to a con-
sideration of force. He says:

"On lifting a chair, the force exerted we regard as equal to
that antagonistic force called the weight of the chair ; and we
cannot think of these as equal without thinking of them as like

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 365

in kind ; since equality is conceivable only between things that
are connatural. The axiom that action and reaction are equal
and in opposite directions, commonly exemplified by this very-
instance of muscular effort versus weight, cannot be mentally
realized on any other condition. Yet, contrariwise, it is
incredible that the force as existing in the chair really
resembles the force as present to our minds. It scarcely needs
to point out that the weight of the chair produces in us various
feelings according as we support it by a single finger, or the
whole hand, or the leg ; and hence to argue that as it cannot
be like all these sensations there is no reason to believe it like
any. It suffices to remark that since the force as known to us
is an affection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force
existing in the chair under the same form without endowing
the chair with consciousness. So that it is absurd to think of
Force as in itself like our sensation of it, and yet necessary so
to think of it if we realize it in consciousness at all."

The force in the chair is molecular force ; the force
in the arm is vital force, partly transmuted into
motility, and in the act of lifting the chair molecular
force is transmuted into molar force; force in the
chair is one mode of force, and in the arm another
mode of force ; but they are equal, and action and
reaction take place, producing effects in opposite
directions. The chair moves up, and the man and the
earth move down. Of the force in the arm the man
is conscious ; of the force in the chair he is cognizant,
that is, it is learned by combined judgments through
inference. But Spencer has never analyzed judg-
ment; he does not distinguish between conscious-
ness and inference, sometimes using consciousness in
the sense in which science must use it, but oftener
using it in the sense of cognition, and always con-
founding the two meanings, he rests under the fal-
lacy of the double meaning in consciousness, and
reifies it as cognition itself. But the illusion which

366 TRUTH AND ERROR

especially concerns us here inheres in his notion of
force. With him force is the ultimate property into
which all other properties are resolved, for he seems
to resolve kind into force, but of this I am not sure ;
plainly, he resolves extension into force, by attempt-
ing to show that our knowledge of extension is
derived from force, not seeing that there can be
no knowledge of force without a knowledge of
form — that the two are indissoluble properties.

Spencer is supposed to be the philosopher of evo-
lution, and that is his grand theme, but he resolves
change into force, not seeing that there can be no
change without force, and no force without change.
He seems to resolve judgment under the term con-
sciousness, or under the term mind, into force,
though his doctrine on this subject is obscure ; but
with great emphasis and great reiteration, he denies
that judgment as mind or consciousness or cogni-
tion can be rendered in terms of motion. In this
respect he is sound. With him motion is derived
from force, not force from motion, and from this
force he derives change and persistence ; the absolute
of change he explains as persistence of force. Then
he derives extension from force, and vaguely derives
kind from force, and leaves force standing as the
substrate of the substrate — the substrate of that
which we call matter or substance. Then he argues
that extension as a reality must be resolved into
void space, and he affirms, without attempting to
demonstrate it, that time, as persistence and change,
must be resolved into void time, so that with three
fallacious entities — void space, void time, and the
resolution of all of the attributes of substance into
void force — he has three nothings, three voids,

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 367

three illusions, with which he deals in the first part
of his book ; and reasoning about these illusions he
comes to the conclusion that they are unknowable,
but that they are also known in a symbolic manner,
and how known in a symbolic manner we have
already shown — that it consists in using terms in an
illegitimate manner.

It is a dangerous doctrine to claim that we know
something because we can talk about it, for we can
talk about fallacies and hypotheses as well as about
certitudes. Fallacies coined into words or coined
into concepts are still fallacies.

In the third chapter of the second part, beginning
with the 46th section, Spencer says:

"That sceptical state of mind which the criticisms of Philos-
ophy usually produce, is, in great measure, caused by the misin-
terpretation of words. A sense of universal illusion ordinarily
follows the reading of metaphysics ; and is strong in proportion
as the argument has appeared conclusive. This sense of univer-
sal illusion would probably never have arisen, had the terms used
been always rightly construed. Unfortunately, these terms
have by association acquired meanings that are quite different
from those given to them in philosophical discussions ; and the
ordinary meanings being unavoidably suggested, there results
more or less of that dreamlike idealism which is so incongruous
without instinctive convictions. The word phenomenon and
its equivalent word appearance, are in great part to blame for
this. In ordinary speech, these are uniformly employed in
reference to visual perceptions. Habit, almost, if not quite,
disables us from thinking of appearance except as something
seen ; and though phenomenon has a more generalized mean-
ing, yet we cannot rid it of associations with apearance, which
is its verbal equivalent. When, therefore, Philosophy proves
that our knowledge of the external world can be but phenom-
enal— when it concludes that the things of which we are con-
scious are appearances ; it inevitably arouses in us the notion
of an illusiveness like that to which our visual perceptions are

368 TRUTH AND ERROR

so liable in comparison with our tactual perceptions. Good
pictures show us that the aspects of things may be very nearly
simulated by colors on canvas. The looking-glass still more
distinctly proves how deceptive is sight when unverified by
touch. And the frequent cases in which we misinterpret the
impressions made on our eyes, and think we see something
which we do not see, further shake our faith in vision. So that
the implication of uncertainty has infected the very word
appearance. Hence, Philosophy, by giving it an extended
meaning, leads us to think of all our senses as deceiving us in
the same way that the eyes do ; and so makes us feel ourselves
floating in a world of phantasms. Had phenomenon and
appearance no such misleading associations, little, if any, of
this mental confusion would result. Or did we in place of
them use the term effect, which is equally applicable to all
impressions produced on consciousness through any of the
senses, and which carries with it in thought the necessary
correlative cause, with which it is equally real, we should be in
little danger of falling into the insanities of idealism."

Here the confusion which arises from fallacy,
together with the contradictions involved, are fit-
tingly set forth; but our philosopher accepts the
fallacies and indorses the contradictions, and finally
speculates with the difference in meaning between the
terms phenomenon and appearance, and he adopts
the philosophy of noumenon and phenomenon, and
makes the noumenon to stand for the thing in itself
the occult force, which he supposes to be void
substance and void motion. While Spencer reasons
about nonentities or fallacies in his first part, he
sets forth many important principles in the second
part, but they are all more or less vitiated by
fallacies.

How shall we rid ourselves of these fallacies?
There is one simple rule. All contradictory con-
cepts must be examined to discover the judgments
that lead to contradictions, when correct reasoning

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 369

will eliminate the incongruous. We may always
know that concepts are incongruous or contradictory
when they lead to a belief in the unknowable.
Belief in the unknowable is pessimism about reason
and is an evidence of fallacy. Fallacies can be eradi-
cated only by a thorough examination of the con-
cepts involved. The final fallacy on which the
philosophy of the contradictory rests can be cor-
rected only by systematic verification of the ele-
mentary judgments of which it is composed, and
thus by eliminating the errors.
In the 5oth section, Spencer says:

"It is a truism to say that the nature of this undecomposable
element of our knowledge is inscrutable. If, to use an
algebraic illustration, we represent Matter, Motion, and Force,
by the symbols, x, y, and z; then, we may ascertain the values
of x and y in terms of z; but the value of 2 can never be found :
2 is the unknown quantity which must forever remain
unknown ; for the obvious reason that there is nothing in which
its value can be expressed. It is within the possible reach of
our intelligence to go on simplifying the equations of all phenom-
ena, until the complex symbols which formulate them are
reduced to certain functions of this ultimate symbol ; but when
we have done this, we have reached that limit which eternally
divides science from nescience. ' '

But his letters stand for fallacies ; the certitudes
should be represented by A, B, and C, then C
should be resolved into B, and B into A, as one of
the known concomitants of matter.

Bear with me in the reiteration of a fundamental
illustration. A and B are particles that collide
because they have incident paths. When they
collide action and reaction are instantaneous and
equal, and no speed is lost in either, but when we con-
sider the antecedent and the consequent as cause and

37° TRUTH AND ERROR

effect, we consider the angle of incidence and com-
pare it with the angle of reflection, and find them
equal. If the angle of incidence is 90 degrees, the
angle of reflection is 90 degrees, and the particles
return reversely by the paths in which they
approached. If the angle of incidence is less than
90 degrees, the angle of reflection is less than 90
degrees. If the angle of incidence is one degree, the
angle of deflection is but one degree. In all of these
cases the force remains equal, and in all of these cases
the effect remains equal to the cause, but the force
cannot be said to be equal to the cause or to the effect,
for the cause is angle of incidence, and the effect is
angle of reflection. This simple explanation of the
difference between causation and force is a complete
refutation of all of Spencer's philosophy of the
unknowable. It is also a complete refutation of the
doctrine of the dissipation of motion, which he
accepts and uses as fundamental to the explanation
of evolution.

This is an illusion which we must not neg-
lect. When it is held that motion as speed can
leap from one body to another, the doctrine of the
dissipation of motion is invented. When the heated
iron cools, it is supposed that the iron yields its
motion as speed, and dissipates it into surrounding
objects, and especially into the ether; it was not seen
that the thermal motion in the body is transmuted
into another mode of molecular motion still within the
body, as exhibited in strength and rigidity. From
this fallacy logical consequences are derived when
it is held that the sun is dissipating its motion
because it is a cooling body. For does not the
motion of the sun as heat come through the ether to

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 371

the earth, and to all other external bodies? Yes, but
not as motion, but as cause. Path of motion, not
speed of motion, is communicated. The different
modes of heat and of light in the ether are not differ-
ent modes of speed, but different modes of trajectory.
Whether the sun can continue to shine is not a ques-
tion of the dissipation of motion as speed, but a
question of the transmutation of one form of motion,
called heat, into another form of molecular motion
in the body itself. If the conditions for transform-
ing1 heat into another mode of motion are not favor-
able to this transmutation, then the sun may still
continue to shine and make the planets glad.

Let me suggest, merely as an hypothesis, some
reasons for believing that the sun will not go out.
On the earth we discover four partially differentiated
bodies : air, water, rocks, and the great central body.
Geologists have established the theory that this
great central body is in a trans-fluid condition, due
to pressure, and that thus its heat cannot be trans-
muted into structural motion. Now the s.un is a
much larger body than the earth, and for this reason
the materials in its outer crust have high specific
gravity, and by reason of this higher specific gravity
the solid crust must always be thinner, and perhaps
this thinner crust cannot be supported against the
stresses and strains produced by the stellar motion
of the sun, and the stresses and strains developed in
the crust itself and coming from the molten nucleus.
It may be that the sun's spots, changeable as they
are, give evidence of the breaking down, remelting,
and reforming of this thin and variable crust.

I do not present this exposition as anything more
than an hypothesis, but perhaps it may be considered

372 TRUTH AND ERROR

worthy of an examination by those better equipped
for the investigation. If we are to accept the per-
sistence of energy, we must accept the persistence
of motion; if we are to accept the persistence of
motion, we are compelled to accept the persistence
of motion as speed in every particle. Much scien-
tific speculation needs revision.

We must now turn our attention to the fallacies
of apprehension, which are derived from hallucina-
tions, and which first become specters, and then in
the stage of apprehension become phantasms. By
contemplating hallucinations as phantasms, another
stage in the development of delusion is produced.
When we consider specters in action we consider
phantasms.

When we dream we often go abroad, and the
specters of our dreams are engaged in activities. It
is from this phenomenon that the primitive mind
reaches the conclusion that our ghosts may leave the
body. Primitive men realize in others, and believe
of themselves, that the body remains quiescent in
sleep, and to account for the actions of the specters
of the dream they conclude that the ghost can leave
the body. When this false judgment becomes
habitual — i. e., that the property of conception or
judgment can depart from the body and sustain an
independent existence, without number, space,
motion, and time, or in reciprocal terms, without
kind, form, force, and causation — then the specters
of dreams may have a separate existence away from
the body, as shades, subtle forms, or occult person-
ages.

Among tribal men these occult personages usually
leave the body by the portal of the nostrils, and

FALLACIES OF APPREHENSION 373

return to it by the same gateway. There is a vast
amount of lore concerning ghosts and the circum-
stances under which they leave the body. Stories of
ghosts that leave when the body sleeps ; stories of
ghosts that leave when the person is absorbed in
deep contemplation, and the ghost snatches the
opportunity to make a journey by itself; stories
when ghosts leave the body for the purpose of gain-
ing information in distant parts; stories of ghosts
that are sent on journeys by hypnotic suggestion;
stories of ghosts that have wended their way to a
distant land on wings of magic, at the will of the
intoxicated shaman ; and stories of ghosts that have
permanently left the body and thus have produced
insanity, are abundant in the folk-lore of super-
stitious people. In the same manner the ghosts of
others may come to us in our dreams, and be their
cause. They may come to us in states of ecstasy,
and make us perform many wonderful deeds ; they
may come to us in hypnotism and become foreign
tenants of the body to do their own sweet will;
they may come to us in states of intoxication and
perform antics in our bodies and revel in delight, for
in insanity they take more permanent possession of
the body, and our lives will be controlled by foreign
residents. It is thus that the actions of men are
attributed to ghosts — perhaps wise actions when they
go out and return to us with information from the
external world; perhaps foolish actions when they
take possession of us while our ghosts are away. It
is in this manner that many of the mysteries of
existence are explained.

CHAPTER XXIII

FALLACIES OF REFLECTION

Fallacies of reflection are fallacies of time and
cause, and they may be classed as misreflections and
myths. The misreflections are a fourth group of
illusions and the myths a fourth group of delusions.

Fallacies concerning time are analogous to those
concerning space. Time is persistence and change.
It is not blank time, it is a time of something that
exists, not the time of something that does not
exist. It is the time in which all existence persists
and in which it changes. The seed is developed on
the apple-tree. Its time is the period of its existence
as a germ, but the germ itself was developed by the
incorporation of molecules. The molecules existing
as particles in the air were transformed into the
seed, but the molecules persisted before the seed was
formed. The persistence is eternal in the atom
so far as we know, but it is changeable from its state
in the air or the water into its state in the seed, so
its persistence is partly taken up while in the seed
state. The seed is planted and becomes a tree by
addition of other particles from the air and the
water, and the eternal persistence of all the particles
is occupied for a period in the state of the tree.
Now, the existence of the molecules in the air and
the water, and their existence in the seed, and their
existence in the tree, and finally their existence as
water and air, when the tree is reduced to another

374

FALLACIES OF REFLECTION 375

state by decay, is a permanent existence, while the
temporary existence is in the seed and the tree.

Before man knew that the seed was a continued
existence of particles, and that the tree was a con-
tinued existence of particles, it was supposed that
the time of these existences was limited, and that
there was a blank time. Out of this nothing, some-
thing was created, and these creations were in
continual change, which were called fluxes or becom-
ings. The real nature of persistence not being under-
stood there was assumed to be a persistence which was
blank, and the blank was called time. But persist-
ence, not being known, though called time, was
held to be the thing-in -itself, which indeed it was in
part, and it was called noumenon. When the noume-
non was discovered, the idea of blank time was still
retained and it was still noumenon, while the real
persistence was called a phenomenon. Now it is
apparent that this blank time is a fallacy. It was
thus, as in this case, that all unknown things, when
they came to be known, were transferred to the
things which were called phenomena ; and the blank
things were still called noumena. Thus noumenon
was a word originally valid, an x in logical com-
putation, whose value was to be determined; but
ultimately it came to mean a something which could
not be determined — not only an unknown but an
unknowable thing, and a knowable thing was held to
be only appearance and was called phenomenon.

My horse is stolen, by whom I know not, and I
say there is a thief, but as I do not know this thief
I call him a noumenon. But the detectives capture
him and he is sent to prison; now the thief
becomes a phenomenon, for he is apparent — he

376 TRUTH AND ERROR

may be seen in the jail. Now, suppose that I had
talked about this noumenon, when he was unknown,
in a conglomeration of attributes — as an uncanny
man, as a vicious man seeking- another that he may
devour him, as a man of seven heads and ten horns ;
but now I find him only a poor misguided man with
the vice of cleptomania or the greed for possession
which made him a criminal, but without multiple
heads or multiple horns. Having discovered my
fallacy in this case I still retain the notion of
existence of such a thing as I had imagined, and I
continue to believe in it and still call it a noumenon.
In the same manner every noumenon of metaphysics
can be traced back to the original fallacy- entertained
by mankind and still supposed to exist as a reality
in the universe. When all of these illusions are
considered we have the world of occult noumena —
the theater of idealism.

Kant explained his occult space, not as a property
of physical nature, but as a form of the mind, what-
ever that may be. In the same manner his occult
time was not an existence in physical nature, but also
was a form of the mind. He had not the insight to dis-
cover that such forms are fallacies, like the dome of
the sky in the mind of an ignorant man; still, he
had the logical integrity to see that such space
and time are incongruous with a space of extension
and position and a time of persistence and change,
and he boldly followed his logic in formulating a set
of antinomies, or contradictions, both of which he
seems to have believed as valid.

Kant himself was accustomed to speak of ideas as
forms ; that is, to speak of one abstract concomitant
in terms of another abstract concomitant. For

FALLACIES OF REFLECTION 377

science this habit is fatal. Tropes are good as
poetry, but vicious as terms in propositions of logic.
Systems of cosmology originate in this manner. In
tribal society the earth is made polar from east to
west. About this Occidental and Oriental pole a
system of worlds is projected — a world of the east,
a world of the west, and, at right angles to these, a
world of the north and a world of the south, a world
of the zenith, and a world of the nadir, with a mid-
world which is a plane with sides and corners. All
the lower tribes of mankind believe in such a world,
and there are expressions used in civilized society
which are survivals from this stage 'of belief. To
primitive man these worlds are the realities of his
cosmology, and he uses these supposed realities as
nuclei for many concepts. For example, he formulates
social laws as the laws of the east, the laws of the
west, the laws of the north, the laws of the south,
the laws of the zenith, and the laws of the nadir.
Crosses, swastikas, and formulated statements are
alike made to conform to this scheme. In some-
what later culture, when a somewhat clearer con-
cept of the midworld exists, and the east, west,
north, and south have been explored, but the zenith
and the nadir are yet unknown, there still remains a
midworld, a heaven above and a hell beneath. Laws
and principles are formulated as heavenly or hellish.
The transformation of seven worlds into three con-
stitutes one of the most interesting chapters in the
history of human opinion. In the seven-world
scheme, method of statement becomes a method of
philosophy. This fact has abundant illustration.
It is the primal vice of classification which was set
forth in the chapter on classification.

TRUTH AND ERROR

By a curious mode of expression often, perhaps
universally, found in savage society, time is con-
sidered to be four-cornered because we measure
time in terms of space. We say the sun rises in the
east and sets in the west, and that at midday it is in
the zenith and at midnight it is supposed to be in
the nadir. Some savages will tell you that time is
four-cornered, others will tell you that time is
round, but that there are four cardinal points of time.
Four-cornered time is a firmly established notion
among savage and barbaric tribes. Thus time is
formulated as if it were space. Many modern
physicists mythologize in this manner about motion,
being unable to distinguish motion as an abstract
property, because motion is formulated in terms of
space and force in terms of parallelograms.

Thus a scheme of expression becomes a scheme of
reality. When a three- world scheme is substituted
for the seven-world scheme, the four worlds are
transformed into four substances, as earth, air, fire,
and water. Hence the cardinal points of compass
become the cardinal substances. The habit of
relegating all animals, all plants, all properties, and
all qualities to the seven worlds, is continued under
the new scheme by making a something like a
classification between properties and qualities, and
transmuting the properties and qualities to sub-
stances or attributes of substances and qualities, to
world beings and attributes of world beings.
Properties are grouped in fours because there are
four horizontal corners of the world, and qualities
are grouped in fours because there are four vertical
corners of the world as evidenced by time. Thus
a scheme of expression becomes a scheme of philos-

FALLACIES OF REFLECTION 379

ophy. Wet and dry, cold and hot, constitute a
scheme of cardinal properties; earth, air, fire, and
water, a scheme of cardinal substances; justice,
prudence, temperance, and fortitude, a scheme of
cardinal virtues.

It is an error of this nature into which Kant fell
when he considered space and time as forms of
thought. The habit of expressing thought in terms
of form led him to the conclusion that space and
time, as disparate properties, are identical with
thought as a succession of judgments, instead of
being concomitant with thought. But more than this,
it was the void form and the void space which Kant
supposed to be forms which we are compelled to use
as a priori elements of reason when we consider
form and state.

Fallacies of cause occur in every hour of waking
life. We attribute effects to wrong causes. We
are especially liable to this from the fact that both
cause and effect are conditions, and causation is a
change of condition from an antecedent to a con-
sequent. The conditions of every causation are
multifarious as we look at them in a regressus of
causes or a progressus of effects, and as the mind of
the individual can make but one judgment at a
time, it may be that the one of the causes or effects
which is considered, is in fact a trivial element in the
causation, for in all our language we are accustomed
to speak of one of the causes as the special cause,
for it must be the special one in consideration.

Forces are often processes in which a multitude
of unseen objects produce a seen effect, as when
many molecules of air strike upon a tree which
bends before the blast, or when many raindrops, that

380 TRUTH AND ERROR

can scarcely be seen where they fall and are wholly
unseen by the man who beholds the river, create
a flood that endeluges a valley.

Some instances of this kind produce fallacies that
are widely entertained; they are misreflections that
substitute the effect for the cause. One illustration
of this group of fallacies must suffice for us here.
Some years ago there was published an interesting
and well written book, the theme of which was the ori-
gin of deserts, giving a pessimistic view of the world,
in which it was represented that desert conditions
are increasing, and that wide regions of country have
already been laid waste as deserts, because mankind
interferes with the operations of nature by destroy-
ing the forests, and that if forests were restored
rainfall would be increased. In this manner effect
was taken for cause.

The most subtle fallacy about causation consists
in mistaking it for another property, either as force
on the one hand or as thought on the other.
Force, cause, and conception — or motion, space, and
judgment — are disparate properties but concomitant
in every particle and body of the universe. This has
been the burthen of our theme from the chapter
on essentials, in which it was affirmed, to the present
one, and all our demonstrations have had this end in
view.

He who cannot clearly distinguish between ab-
stract and concrete, or between body and property,
is certain to fall into mysticism. Mill and Spencer
in the late years, like Aristotle in ancient time,
confounded causation with force or energy, while
Kant and all the school of metaphysicians confound
both cause and force with thought.

FALLACIES OF REFLECTION 381

Evolution is a succession of changes which are
in time and require time for their accomplishment.

The ancients believed and the tribes believe that
kinds, forms, and forces come out of nothing and
return to nothing. This is the primal fallacy of
causation. Modern science has demonstrated that
kinds, forms, and forces come from something else
and vanish into something else. It is only today
that this is universally accepted by scientific men,
while even at the present time millions of those who
inhabit the earth still believe in creation from
nothing. We shall not attempt to recount the
multitude of fallacies which have existed and which
still linger in scientific circles. We have already set
forth the one most important to our argument, that
is, that motion is created by or comes out of some
occult force which is not itself motion, and the
other form in which motion is supposed to leap or
creep, or in some other manner to be transferred
from one body to another. An acrobatic motion is
the last ghost of force.

We now come to the second part of our chap-
ter, the discussion of myths. Mythology is
the history of ghosts. Ghosts are specters, and
we have seen what strange acts they commit
as phantasms, when they leave the body and
travel abroad in the world and return again to
the body, or when from abroad they enter the body
to take possession of it in the absence of its owner.
In savage society authority is wielded by the oldest
man, who thus by superior age, natural or conven-
tional, becomes the chief. In the same manner the
dwellers in ghostland are ruled by tribes ; the pro-

382 TRUTH AND ERROR

genitor, prototype, or elder animal of the tribe is its
chief.

Now we are to consider what it is that ghosts have
done — how they have acted in the theater of the
universe. Strange to say, we find it well recorded,
for ghosts have had more complete recognition than
men in all ancient history. Ghosts, as a race, have
passed through interesting stages of history. All
changes are in time and require time to become
discrete quantities of change that may be recognized.

Hence it is that in the evolution of ghosts we
have to consider their transmutation from one to
another as it appears when we consider them
separated by many centuries of time. We are
unable to find the distinction in the race of ghosts,
if we consider them yesterday and again today, or
last year and again this year, or even last century
and again this century; but when we consider
them as they appear in the stages of culture which
are designated as savagery, barbarism, monarchy,
and democracy, we find discrete degrees of evolution.

It is only in such considerations that planes of
demarcation can be discovered. I shall therefore
consider ghosts as they appear in savagery, barbar-
ism, monarchy, and democracy, or to use more
common terms, civilization and enlightenment.

In savagery the ghosts are zoomorphic. All lower
animals, stones, bodies of water, the sun, the moon,
and all the stars are supposed to be animals. The
universe is a universe of animals living in the seven
regions. All of these animals have ghosts which can
leave their bodies and journey through the world,
and at will inhabit other bodies, when they find them
vacated by their proper ghosts. It is thus that the

FALLACIES OF REFLECTION 383

primitive mythology is a theory of animal ghosts.
What these ghosts can do in their proper bodies is
easily seen, though it is very wonderful ; but what
they do when they leave their proper bodies is
mysterious or occult.

To the savage, lower animals seem to have
attributes and to perform deeds that are more
wonderful than those of human beings. The ser-
pent is swift without legs, the bird can revel where
man cannot go — through void space with wings.
The fish can inhabit the water and run with fins ; no
human being can do this. The spider can spin a
thread and travel on it; all that he has to do is to
spin the thread from his own body and travel
wherever he wills as it is unwound. The rivers are
born of rain and roll into the sea which never
increases. The winds are created by the breath of
beasts or rise from under the wings of birds from
nothing. The stars can fly like birds and shine like
fire. So the savage man considers the molar bodies
of the world, which are all animals like himself, to
have many magical or occult attributes which are
very wonderful. But the wonderful things which
they do are not attributed to their bodies, but to
their ghosts. The body of a man lies inert when
he sleeps, but his ghost cannot sleep, it travels about
the world when his body is at rest. The bodies of
the rocks are inert, but when they sleep at night
their ghosts shine in the heaven as the aurora
borealis. If you strike one rock with another you
can see its ghost as a spark of fire. When the clouds
gather they are the ghosts of water; when angry
they shine with lightning light, and when pleased
the clouds shine as rainbows. These illustrations

384 TRUTH AND ERROR

will serve to show how thoroughly, in the notion of
the savage, ghosts and bodies are differentiated.

The universe being considered as bodies and
ghosts, and the bodies being considered as inert and
the ghosts as active principles, we have the fundamen-
tal theory of savage reasoning. We can do nothing
except as it is done by our ghosts. We cannot cause
anything to be done by others except by controlling
their ghosts. Words cause other human beings to
do things, and their words cause us to act. The
words of the mother cause action in the babe ; the
voice of the babe causes the mother to act. The
voice of the bird brings its mate to its side, or the
voice of its mate takes the bird to its side. The
primeval concept of causation is the notion that
words produce effects, and that effects are caused by
words. The bird flies to its mate ; the flying of the
bird is considered the action of the bird, but when it
flies in response to the call of its mate the call
seems to be the cause of its flight. It is the special
cause ; primitive man has no insight into the many
causes that are involved. It is from this primeval
concept of cause as some special condition, that is
developed through the ages, when in a higher
civilization we consider the special cause as if it was
the total cause. Now mythology, having ghosts as
actors, secures their action by causes, and explains
the phenomena of the universe as the activities of
ghosts acting through body by verbal causation.
In savagery words are the ordinary observable
causes and constitute the primal cause.

We do not know the languages of the other
animals, we can speak to them only through signs
or symbols. Great is that man who can talk to

FALLACIES OF REFLECTION 385

ghosts. The symbol which he uses is called a
mystery. In the Ute language it is pokunt; in the
Siouan language it is wakanda; in the Algonquian
it is manito. All tribal languages have a word
which signifies the mystery, which can be used as a
symbol to cause the action of ghosts. The concept
is born in savagery of a mysterious cause which
has power over ghosts, which again have powers
over bodies, and so the universe is a realm of bodies,
ghosts, and mysteries, or unknown tongues.

The mystery, called by various names among
American tribes, is usually translated "medicine, " for
the early missionaries found the people appealing to
the mystery to heal disease, for diseases are supposed
to be ghosts of animals. As the mystery is some-
thing which must act as a word, it must be something
which will suggest to the ghost that which is wanted.
Hence there arises the doctrine of signatures, which
means among the tribesmen much more than the
signatures of medicines, by which we are to learn
what medicines are good for diseases — it primarily
means what signatures can be made to convey our
commands to ghosts. As ghosts are all animals in
savagery, how can we talk to the ghosts of animals?
This leads in savagery to the symbols which con-
stitute the paraphernalia of altars. In savagery
every object on the altar is a sign to ghosts of what
men wish when they perform ceremonies. They
pray to the ghosts for rain, and to make sure that
the ghosts will understand what they mean, they
refer them to cloud symbols. When they pray for
corn they place ears of corn upon the altar. When
they pray that the corn shall ripen and become hard
they place crystals of quartz upon the altar. In

386 TRUTH AND ERROR

various ways signatures are used by the priests in
invoking the aid of ghosts. Those persons who
have power over ghosts are medicine men or priests,
and attain great influence and sometimes are greatly
feared. If they use their power for evil, they are
wizards and are killed. If they use their power for
good, they may be made chiefs.

Primarily the name given to a body designates
some property of that body. After a time the name
itself becomes the property of the body, and finally
the name becomes a mythical body. These stages
in the development of words can be discovered in
many of the languages of America, doubtless in
them all ; it is the transmutation which Max Miiller
calls a disease of language.

In the second stage of culture, called barbarism,
animals have been domesticated and thus by more
intimate acquaintance with animals the lower
animals are dethroned and human animals are
exalted. All animals and other molar beings which
are supposed to be bodies movable by human beings,
are still held to have ghosts, but their rulers are
ghosts of human beings and the great phenomena of
nature are personified as human beings; the sun,
moon, and stars are exalted in this manner; the
seas, the rivers and the mountains are likewise
personified. All the most important phenomena of
the universe as they are known to man are personi-
fied. The rising and the setting of the sun, or the
dawning and the gloaming, are personified as well
as the sun itself. The rainbow also is personified.
Fire is personified. The ghosts are no less multi-
tudinous, but some are exalted above the others, and
those promoted in this manner are deities of higher

FALLACIES OF REFLECTION 387

rank. To these deities are attributed the important
events of the worlds. But there are many minor
ghosts; the worlds are full of them, born of the
ages.

Now, in barbarism ghosts are still the actors in
the worlds and they are caused to act by signs, and
tribesmen still continue to ransack the earth for
signatures. Men still hold in love or fear those who
have the lore of ghost science. The chiefs or head
men or ancestors of the ghosts are greatly revered
as gods, and common folk ghosts take part in the
affairs of the worlds, and mythology is the history of
their doings. These folk-talks elaborately portray
the life of men and ghosts and the potency of signs.

The ceremonies of supplication which still con-
tinue from savagery, are believed to have still more
potency by reason of the sacrifices that have become
more and more important in the estimation of the
people as time has advanced. In savagery the
ceremonials are chiefly terpsichorean : music and
dancing were the agencies by which the attention
of the ghosts was obtained. While in savagery the
pouring of oblations and the presentation of the
corn were signs of what was desired, and all the
paraphernalia of the altar that represented the
thing for which men prayed were merely significant
of the things men wanted, in this higher stage men
have come to believe that the good things which
men want are the good things which the ghosts want,
only they want the ghosts of the good things, not
their bodies. So the altar of signatures gradually
becomes the altar of sacrifice. Hecatombs of beeves,
bottles of wine, all the first fruits of the harvest,
everything the ghost desires, even human beings,

TRUTH AND ERROR

may be sacrificed upon the altar. If after this state-
ment my reader will consult the Odyssey he will there
find the most vivid portrayal of barbaric philosophy
that has been preserved to us from antiquity.

In despotism, or the third stage of social organiza-
tion, ghosts are still more exalted, in that the
psychic characteristics of men are personified.
Certain of the gods of barbarism gradually become
representatives of certain psychic characteristics, and
we have the stage of psych otheism, and there is a
god of War, a god of Love, a god of Hate, a god
of Commerce, and many other major deities; but
there is a second class of deities representing what
are supposed to be secondary attributes of human
and divine ghosts. It is in this stage that we
observe the transmutation of words into gods. The
concepts of which words as signs are personified,
as Max Miiller has abundantly shown. "In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was God. " A
development of cosmology which begins late in bar-
barism is more thoroiighly carried out. The cardinal
worlds are wholly thrown out of mythology and the
midworld has a world above or a heaven, and a world
below or a hell. The midworld becomes the sole
theater for the development of ghosts by birth.
These ghosts, born in the midworld of human beings,
are the ghosts of the external world which of ttimes
visit the earth. The three worlds of the stage of
despotism constitute the fundamental schematism of
the philosophy of the period. Institutions are of
heaven or of hell, opinions are of heaven or of hell,
and in all philosophy the schematism prevails. But
in this midworld the ghosts of heaven and the
ghosts of hell take part with the embodied ghosts

FALLACIES OF REFLECTION 389

of men in all of the affairs of the world. Every-
where there is a ruler, a despot — a commander-in-
chief of the hosts of heaven and the hosts of hell ;
while on earth in the midworld it becomes the
ambition of every despot or emperor to become the
sole ruler. The ghosts born on earth depart to the
upper or the lower regions, where they are forever
separated by an impassable barrier, and life on earth
is but a probation in which ghosts are selected for
the other world ; hence the chief purpose of life in
the body is attained by securing a happy life in
ghostland.

During all this stage in mythology the ghost-gods
are affected by psychological considerations. The
supreme being in every religion of despotism is
especially influenced by the opinions of his followers.
Their opinions of the supreme being must be sound,
and worship is by faith in spirit and in truth. Thus
worship is fiducial. The supreme being is supposed
to take delight in the opinions of his followers
and in the expression of those opinions as formulated
in creed and especially as formulated in ceremony.
This mythical stage gives rise to a vast body of
folk-lore, which is distinguished from mythology
proper by the belief in a ghostly, supreme being.
The midworld is still the theater of ghosts who come
from the world above and the world below and
sometimes dwell for a time in this world and take
part in the affairs of men. These ghosts are
especially amenable to deeds of necromancy, the
more refined form in which the doctrine of signatures
is held. If my reader will carefully study Tasso in
"Jerusalem Delivered," he will there find recorded
one of the best accounts extant of the necromancy

39° TRUTH AND ERROR

of the despotic age. The publications of the various
folk-lore societies of the world are rapidly putting
these superstitions on record.

I shall refrain from discussing the fourth stage of
ghost-lore. In very modern times it has assumed a
special phase which is called spiritism, and attendant
upon the theory of spiritism there is developed a
claim for a scientific explanation of spiritism in the
theory of telepathy, which I cannot wholly overlook
and do not wish to ignore, but on that phase which
is specially represented in religion I purposely
remain silent, lest I should antagonize, with my own
opinions, the views of others about religion, and thus
enter a field of theological disputation. Yet without
expressing personal opinions about the evolution of
religion, which I have elsewhere done, I shall content
myself with only one paragraph upon the subject.

From the doctrine of signatures there has grown
the science of modern surgery and medicine. I do
not despise the early efforts of mankind to relieve
their sufferings, even though they entertained many
fallacies ; but I rejoice in the outcome of this effort
as it is exhibited in modern medicine. Astrology
was necromancy at one time, but has become astron-
omy in modern times, and I look upon the efforts
which were made in former times by astrologists as
the planting of the germs of the celestial science.
So I look upon mythology with no feelings of hatred,
for it seems to me to have made great strides in the
science of religion or ethics, out of which shall come
a purified science of God, Immortality, and Free-
dom.

CHAPTER XXIV

FALLACIES OF IDEATION

Fallacies of ideation constitute a fifth grade, which
are illusions and delusions. In the order heretofore
followed, we shall first speak of illusions, and then
of delusions.

The Schoolmen speculated much on the nature of
kinds, and finally reached the conclusion that that
which makes a thing a kind is its essence, i. e., that
which is essential to its existence as a kind, like
others of its kind, but different from other kinds.
All of this is quite true, but it adds nothing to knowl-
edge, except that it might be given as a definition of
a word. For a long time definitions were consid-
ered very good explanations.

When chemistry was yet alchemy, attempts often
were made to discover the essence of things, and,
in particular, it was a favorite method to extract
kinds, and these extracts were called essences. So
the kind or essence of a thing discovered in this
manner was supposed to be its essential quality, as
this term was then used. We have a record of this
superstition, as it existed in the days of alchemy, in
the extracts of the apothecary shop, which are often
called essences. Rose-water was the essential
extract of the rose, violet-water of the violet, and
men were pleased with the idea that they could
make of that which constitutes a thing or kind a
decoction for a lady's dressing table.

391

392 TRUTH AND ERROR

Fallacious theories of kind have high antiquity.
It has already been set forth that a classification of
properties and qualities is made in tribal society by
a schematization of worlds. Not only were molar
bodies, which were supposed to be animate, classi-
fied in this manner into seven categories, but all
attributes of bodies were in like manner classified.
We have already seen how space properties gave rise
to a cosmology of seven regions. We have also seen
how motion was explained as the self-activity of
molar bodies, and that the heavenly bodies, which
were supposed to be molar bodies, are in motion by
appointed paths established by conflict in war, and
given spacial or world directions, and that force was
considered as will and the cause of motion.

We also have seen the manner in which time was
considered as an attribute of space. We likewise
have seen the development of the seven worlds into
three, as the midworld, the zenith, and the nadir
worlds.

Here we must pause for a time to explain some-
thing more of the nature of this transmutation.
The change developed in later barbarism and earlier
civilization was wrought by the increase of geo-
graphical knowledge. During this period there grad-
ually was developed a notion of the land, or mid-
world, as a plane from which mountains and hills
stand in relief, surrounded by the sea. Thales
gives us such an account, as do many others. All
the mythology of the time assumes the existence of
the midworld as an island surrounded by an ocean.
During the same epoch in human culture the unseen
atmosphere was discovered. As the cardinal worlds
were gradually abandoned, these properties and

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 393

qualities of bodies that had previously been classi-
fied in the world scheme, came to be classified by a
very natural change, as attributes of molar bodies.
The schematization still remained fourfold, but
molar bodies were considered as kinds, composed of
four occult substances — earth, air, fire, and water.
Thus, the four regions were transmuted into the four
substances. Greek philosophy began with this
theory, and there is abundant evidence that other
races entertained the same doctrine.

Thus, the most ancient philosophy of civilization
started with a theory of three worlds and four sub-
stances. We must now rapidly trace its develop-
ment through five stages, during a period of more
than twenty centuries, as it is revealed to us in the
history of metaphysic as distinguished from science.

We must consider a little further the misunder-
standings of ideation. Every man for himself
verifies the current judgments which he makes in
relation to practical affairs. If our judgments were
not verified until after they are acted on, the race
would be overwhelmed by disaster. We have
already seen that erroneous judgments vie in multi-
plicity with valid judgments. If a man should act
on erroneous judgments, they would lead him into
such mistakes that, almost every hour in the day, he
would perform some act causing irreparable mis-
chief. The food which he selects must be properly
chosen, but the many things which he might select
for food, which are injurious, or even deadly, out-
number the articles which should constitute his
proper food. The snares, the pitfalls, the precipices,
the floods, which beset his path, are so many that
his way must carefully be chosen. The forces which

394 TRUTH AND ERROR

are encountered, as men, beasts, and natural powers,
are so many that he must constantly avoid antago-
nisms. Life is a perpetual exercise of choice.
Judgments that are made must be verified in prac-
tical affairs, lest the race should become extinct.
So, in the making of our judgments, we form a habit
of verifying them before we proceed to act.

The immediate judgments of practical life must be
verified, but the judgments which we make about
future events may be postponed, and, practically,
they are postponed in tribal society. But men come
at last to seek for the verification of judgments
which are more and more remotely practical, for
they also are found to involve ultimate welfare.
Then science is born, for science is knowledge, or
verified judgments. When science is born, civiliza-
tion begins. If judgments are incongruous, some-
where there must be error. This is the method of
discovering error, which is habitual or intuitive in
mankind, developed from infancy in the individual,
and developed in the race from generation to gener-
ation, through the whole period of animate existence.
It is the most profound intuition of the human mind.

With civilization there springs up a philosophy of
monism, which is a philosophy of the error involved
in judgments that are incongruous. The key to the
meaning of that which we call ancient philosophy is
found in the attempt to discover a unifying principle.

Through the centuries this has been the quest of
wise men. The seemingly multitudinous properties
and qualities of body must be reduced to some
unifying principle. As the individual first guesses
and then verifies, as already set forth in the chapters
on intellection, so the race, at one time and another,

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 395

guesses, chooses, selects some one property to which
all other properties may be reduced as the unifying
principle.

This quest started at the beginning of civiliza-
tion, when four substances, earth, air, fire, and
water, were held to be the elements of which all
bodies are composed. Civilization inherited a con-
troversy from barbarism about these substances.
The substances themselves were derived from the
cardinal points, and the brotherhoods of the tribe
were organized to represent these cardinal points.
Each brotherhood claimed for itself an origin in the
cardinal point from which it was named, and hence
there was a perennial controversy between the
brotherhoods as to the most noble or honorable of
these origins. Now, in tribal society, the most noble
or honorable is the eldest, for that is the method of
expressing nobler ; elder and nobler are synonymous,
for the elder has dominion in tribal society. In the
beginning of Greek philosophy, the *PXJ , the first,
held dominion, and was hence the most honorable.
The controversies about the most honorable of the
points of the compass, the one which should hold
dominion, the one which was the first, held over into
the stage when the cardinal points were considered
as substances, and hence the Greeks inherited the
controversy about the first, or *(>xn , of the ele-
ments. Now, another method of expressing this
idea is that the first is the grandfather, so that it is
customary in tribal society to speak of the chief as
the grandfather. The totemic head of the tribe is
often called the grandfather, as is also the totemic
head who is the first of the tribe, or the one from
which all the other members are derived. These

396 TRUTH AND ERROR

doctrines are thoroughly ingrained in the habits of
thought and the methods of expression current in
tribal society, and inherited by national society.
Hence, we find, in the study of Greek philosophy,
which primarily is cosmology, the first, or aPXj , of the
elements still to be the subject of dispute, and the
first is taken as the one from which all others are
derived, and hence to have dominion, and so the
most honorable.

At last, there arose a philosopher who cleared his
imagination of the fallacies of kinds, as earth, air,
fire, and water, and made the bold hypothesis that
all things are ultimately founded, not on kind, but
on its reciprocal, number, for Pythagoras was a mathe-
matician. Then began the theories of reified abstrac-
tions, the theories by which the properties of bodies
are unified as a foundation for monistic philosophy.

There is so much of truth in the philosophy of
Pythagoras, that when we consider the universe as
composed of properties that can be measured, and
that by measure all properties are reduced to num-
ber, then all properties can be considered as number.
Counting on the human abacus had now been devel-
oped into the science of reasoning by conventional
numbers, and, having discovered that sound is a
numeric.al relation of vibrations of the air, and carry-
ing his magical philosophy into all his ways and
thoughts, but not clearly understanding the nature
of measure itself, that it is the rendering of one
property into the terms of another, until all of the
properties are reduced to number, he conceived the
doctrine that the universe is a world of numbers ; and
so it is, but it is much more than a world of num-
bers, as we. have abundantly seen.

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 397

Pythagoras is said to have taught this doctrine.
This is not known from records left by himself, but
mainly from records which come from his immediate
successors. The literature of the Pythagorean phi-
losophy is meager, yet, from the little that remains,
it seems to have been a theory of the origin of all
other properties from number.

In mathematics, the science of verification is space
reduced to number; motion is reduced to space, and
then to number; and, finally, time is reduced to
motion, and motion to space, and space to number;
and all of these conventional reductions are accom-
plished by the device of measure. But, in the doc-
trine of Pythagoras, number seems to have been held
as the substrate of properties. It is the patriarch of
the illusions of metaphysical philosophy ; its vener-
able form is gray with the mystical shadows of
twenty-five centuries. This may be denominated the
fallacy of Pythagoras.

Plato taught that form is the substrate of all
properties. This he did with such literary skill that
he held the judgment of mankind for many cen-
turies. He not only taught that form is the substrate
of physical properties, but also of thought. To him
thoughts were forms given off by objects floating in
the empyrean and taken into the mind, and his
exposition of this doctrine transferred the word idea
from the realm of space to the realm of mind. A
monument to this fallacy still exists in the use of the
term idea for a notion in every modern language of
civilization. This may be denominated the fallacy
of Plato.

Aristotle rejected the Pythagorean and Platonic
fallacy, but entertained one of his own. He reified

TRUTH AND ERROR

energy or force, which is derived from motion, and
taught that this energy is the substrate of all proper-
ties. Now, while this seems to have been his doc-
trine, yet it must be remembered that Aristotle was
a careless writer, heedless of the niceties of expres-
sion, and unconscious of the necessity for using
scientific accuracy in terms. It seems possible to
refer to Aristotle as an authority for many of the
fallacies which have been entertained in metaphysic,
and philosophers usually reverence him as the
Master. If I were called on to point out the funda-
mental doctrine of Aristotle, I should cite his theory
of energy, so I call this the fallacy of Aristotle. As
his exposition of the subject is not very lucid, and as
men may honestly controvert any statement made of
his doctrine, it seems better to look for another
master of this doctrine. In Spencer, we have a
philosopher who rivals Plato in literary skill. In
Spencer's "First Principles," where he lays the
foundation of his philosophy, he sets forth the doc-
trine in no uncertain terms. Motion is derived from
force, extension also is derived from force, and,
finally, all of the properties are held to have force as
their substrate. If the reader will consult Spen-
cer's "First Principles," part n, chapter in, he
will there discover his method of explaining proper-
ties. The chapter is entitled, "Space, Time, Matter,
Motion, and Force." He not only derives all the
properties, but all bodies, from force, and then
describes force as something unknown and unknow-
able ; so, in the name of science, he meets the meta-
physician on his own ground, and sets forth his
doctrines with a deftness and simplicity with which
the dealer in mystery cannot vie. Spencer not only

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 399

entertains the fallacy that properties are derived from
an unknown and unknowable force, but he makes
force the substrate of all relations, and then affirms
that we know only of relations, and that their substrate
is the unknowable; but still more, he accepts the
Kantian illusions of a void space and a void time.

Then, time was held to be the unifying principle
of all properties and bodies. This reification was
designated by the term being, taking the participle of
the asserting word to be, but using it in its secondary
sense as signifying to exist. My reading does not
furnish me with the knowledge necessary to say who
first clearly propounded this doctrine, but it was
almost universally entertained by scholastic meta-
physicians. Let us, then, denominate this the
scholastic fallacy.

It appears that Plato and Aristotle have been
recorded more generously than other philoso-
phers of Grecian history. The authority which they
wielded seems not to have permitted the revival of
the Pythagorean fallacy which they successfully dis-
pelled, while the Aristotelian fallacy had no ex-
tensive following until modern times, when, under
the lead of Spencer, the great modern master, it has
been extensively taught.

But, of all these fallacies, that of the reification of
time has, perhaps, had the greatest following; it is
the philosophy of Ontology. It has one variety
which almost equals in importance Ontology itself.
This variety of the species is the metaphysic of
becoming, or, as it is sometimes called, the meta-
physic of essence, which has many phases, the most
important of which is that the essence of a thing is
that into which it will develop.

400 TRUTH AND ERROR

Thus, the philosophy of bodies assumed the phase
of substance and properties. How long it held the
judgment of mankind is shown when we remember
that even Newton himself believed light to be
corpuscular emanations from bodies. The last
vestige of this doctrine remains when it is supposed
that motion jumps from one body to another; and
this doctrine is accompanied by another which affirms
that path is motion itself. This doctrine of essence
is the doctrine which Hegel, in the third chapter of
his "Phenomenology of Spirit," sets forth as one of
the inadequate judgments of men, which is prop-
erly understood only when the external world is con-
sidered as a form of thought. There is a curious
error prevalent in scholastic times, which is the
fallacy of substrates. It was involved in the philos-
ophy of Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, when one
of the properties was held to be the substrate of all
the others. But it had a long history, and assumed
many phases, one or two of which must briefly be
set forth.

It was the theory that substance, or substrate, or
essence, by whatever name it may be denominated,
is porous, and that properties emanate from its
pores ; that substance gives off an inexhaustible sup-
ply of properties. Plato thought that properties
were given off from the substance of bodies as forms.
For a long time it was held by philosophers that
force was thus given off from bodies as subtle emana-
tions.

In this stage of speculation, properties were called
accidents, and the theory of bodies took this phase.
Bodies are composed of substance and accidents;
the accidents may come and go, but the substance

t

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 4OI

remains. John Locke put this subject in a nut-
shell:

"They who first ran into the notion of accidents, as a sort of
real beings that needed something to inhere in, were forced to
find out the word substance to support them. Had the poor
Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted
something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance, he
needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to
support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant: the word
substance would have done it effectually. And he that
inquired might have taken it for as good an answer from an
Indian philosopher, — that substance, without knowing what it
is, is that which supports the earth, as we take it for a
sufficient answer, and good doctrine from our European phil-
osophers,— that substance, without knowing what it is, is that
which supports accidents. So that of substance, we have no
idea of what it is, but only a confused, obscure one of what
it does. . . .

4 'So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion
of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea
of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what sup-
port of such qualities which are capable of producing simple
ideas in us ; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If
any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein color or
weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid
extended parts; and if he were demanded what is it that
solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much
better case than the Indian before mentioned, who, saying that
the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what
the elephant rested on; to which his answer was — a great
tortoise : but being again pressed to know what gave support
to the broad-backed tortoise, replied — something, he knew not
what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words
without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children:
who, being questioned what such a thing is, which they know
not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something:
which, in truth, signifies no more, when so used, either by
children or men, but that they know not what ; and that the
thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no
distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and

402 TRUTH AND ERROR

in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the
general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but
unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which
we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without some-
thing to support them, we call that support substantia; which,
according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English,
standing under or upholding. ' '

It is this something, we know not what, of
which Locke speaks, that has come to be designated
in metaphysic as noumenon, while the accidents of
his time have come to be designated as phenomena.
By the Greeks, the fish, seen by its ripple in the
water, is called a phenomenon ; after it is caught and
the fish itself is seen, instead of the ripple, it is
called a noumenon. In modern metaphysic, both
are called phenomena. The multitudinous proper-
ties of bodies can all be resolved into the five essen-
tials which we have set forth; these are the
noumena, while the multitudinous phenomena are
the relations of particles or bodies to one another.
Noumena are constant or absolute ; phenomena are
relative or variable. This leads us to the discussion
of the delusions of ideation.

During the stages of opinion which were char-
acterized by a belief in the Pythagorean, Platonic,
Aristotelian, and Scholastic fallacies, as they have
been described above, science and metaphysic pro-
ceeded together, hand in hand, in search of the
truth, though the science of reality was clouded with
the metaphysic of fallacy. But now science and
metaphysic part company. In this new stage, not
only does metaphysic reify, substantialize, or
hypostasize the essentials or noumena of conscious-
ness, but it adopts the ghost theory, for the psychic
property is considered as a ghost which can leave

!

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 403

the body and return to it. The completed stage of
the ghost theory is idealism. Opposed to idealism
or the ghost theory of spirit — mind or consciousness
— is the theory which is most commonly called
materialism, of which Spencer is the modern
champion.

Idealism began with Berkeley, but he formulated it
as a system of theology, or an explanation of the
origin of the world in the thought of God. Berkeley
gave us, in clear and beautiful English, a theory of
vision which was the germ of a new psychology
developed by Helmholtz into a more scientific form,
with greater exactness, as a scientific theory of vision
and also of audition. So Helmholtz may be con-
sidered as the founder of scientific psychology. But
the idealism of Berkeley was taken up by many
others, especially by the German school, represented
by Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Kant, who was the
founder of this new German school, left the subject
in an attitude wholly unsatisfactory to the human
mind as a theory of monism. In his great work,
"The Critique of Pure Reason," he pronounces
sentence on human reason by consigning its con-
clusions to the limbo of antinomies; in his subse-
quent work he relegates man back to practical
reason, that is, the formation of judgments which
must be made in order that we may act, instead of
what we may know. I have already mentioned the
primal fallacies into which Kant fell ; but he did not
produce a system of idealism, nor did Fichte nor
Schelling. It was left for Hegel to create a system.
This he did by creating a logic of contradictories.

Perhaps I have sufficiently set forth the nature of
conception, through the forming of judgments of

404 TRUTH AND ERROR

sensation, perception, apprehension, reflection, and
ideation, as stages in the process of forming con-
cepts, and that until all of these stages have been
passed there is a probability of entertaining fallacies,
especially when we do not recognize that cognition
is never completed until judgments are verified.
The nature of conception or reasoning, as thus set
forth, seems to have been understood by Hegel in
some vague way. Hence, he properly explained
antinomies as the final harmonizing of judgments by
the last process in conception as ideation. So far, I
believe his work to be sound; surely it possesses
this germ of truth. But he did not clearly under-
stand the nature of ideation, for he was an idealist,
and reified the property — the psychic property — of
bodies ; he was a monist of an abstraction, and he
believed the external world to be a fallacy — a phan-
tasm, an illusion, a delusion if you will — something
which does not exist in itself.

Hegel does not afHrm but he always assumes that
there is no external world, that is, there is no reality
in the four mechanical properties of body, the four
essentials — unity, extension, speed and persistence.
They exist only as attributes of consciousness. Con-
sciousness, or idea, to use his term, is the substrate
from which flows the accidents or mechanical
properties, as from its pores, in an inexhaustible sup-
ply of fallacies. There is kind, form, force, and
causation of conception, but there is no kind, form,
force, and causation, except that which is ideal;
that is, he everywhere assumes, and practically
affirms, that the mechanical properties are the crea-
tions of the mind. It is in this sense that he denies
the reality of the external world. Kant gives four

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 405

fundamental antinomies ; but with Hegel all reason-
ing about the external world, or the four properties
of bodies, is fallacious, and the only way to cognize
reality is first to cognize consciousness in all its
developments, and then to cognize the external
world as a system of fallacious judgments. Real
cognition must be of the "idea" itself. This is the
fallacy of Hegel.

Kant resolves the world of thought into antinomies
of contradictions, and refers us back to the practical
judgments of good and evil, which control our acts ;
but Hegel develops a system in which he refers all
of our judgments of an external world to fallacies.
The only realities or cognitions are those about
"idea," as he calls it, or those about consciousness,
and its development into the faculties of the intel-
lect, as herein set forth. According to Hegel, the
only noumenon is the idea. Mechanical properties
of bodies are but phenomena. There are no stars,
and we only fallaciously think there are stars.
There is no atmosphere, no sea, no forma-
tions, no rocks, no nucleus ; we only fallaciously
think that they exist. There are no plants;
we only fallaciously think there are plants. There
are no animals; we only fallaciously think there
are animals. But there are minds, which, by
some occult process, exist not in time or space,
and in this occult sense are internal, whatever
that may be. The furniture of the world, which
we suppose to be external, does not exist, except
as fallacy, or, as Hegel calls it, phenomenon. Anti-
nomies arise, when we consider them as realities.
But antinomies disappear, if we consider them as
ideas.

406 TRUTH AND ERROR

Having made this discovery, he announces it in
the "Phenomenology, " and shows us how he reaches
this conclusion in a marvelous collection of sen-
tences, paragraphs, and chapters, which, to the
scientific mind, at first seem wholly incompre-
hensible, for the argument is hieratic. It cannot be
understood except by those who are initiated into the
mysteries of its symbolic language. Though
tempted to analyze it, I must not, for it would
require a treatise in itself equal to that needed for the
unraveling of the cuneiform inscriptions. However,
I think that I may pause long enough to show the
fundamental principles on which he proceeds: (i)
He assumes that mind is the substrate, and hence
the unifying principle. (2) He sees as clearly as
may be from a study of language, that one property
may be spoken of in the terms of another ; thus a
space may be spoken of in terms of number, as, the
distance from the Capitol to the White House may
be six thousand feet. We have already seen that
measure itself is primarily the reduction of space to
number; it is then the reduction of motion and
space to number ; it is then the reduction of time to
motion, and motion to space, and space to number ;
it is then the reduction of judgment to time, and of
time to motion, and of motion to space, and of space
to number. These reductions are woven into all the
language of daily life, making them tropes, or giv-
ing them vicarious uses; but especially do we use
terms of the mechanical properties when we speak
of the properties of consciousness. The very same
words that we use to speak of the properties of
consciousness, we more often use when speaking of
other properties. It is that which we have set

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 407

forth as the vicarious faculty of the mind, and it is
the foundation of trope.

Now, when we use a word which has a great
variety of uses, and can trace in this usage some one
meaning as an attribute of consciousness, Hegel con-
siders it to be the fundamental meaning, as shown
by his practice. He affirms this, sometimes, when
he says that every word must be taken in all its
meaning, if it is logically used. The word compre-
hend is used as a sign of a mental and also of a physical
act. I may say that I comprehend the pen, when
I mean that I understand the pen, or I may say that
the different parts of the pen are comprehended in
one, as the pen itself. Now, in Hegel, the word for
comprehend seems to have many meanings that are
really comprehended in one, and, being an idealist,
that one meaning is its psychic significance. There
is no such thing as a pen with mechanical properties,
but it exists only with the properties with which I
endow it when I think it, for I create it with my
thought. According to the Hegelian theory, it is
nonsense to say that I think about a pen, but it is
the "thing-in-itself," when I say I think the pen.
This thing-in-itself is the noumenon of idealism.
This knife is composed of the handle and its parts,
and the blades with their parts, but, according to
idealism, things are only what we think them to be,
and the word composed, used in this manner, if prop-
erly understood, is but a psychic term, for, accord-
ing to Kant, space is a form of thought, not of
things. When we come properly to understand the
world, that all things are thoughts, then we see that
the real meaning of words is their psychic meaning,
and that words can have but one meaning. As com-

408 TRUTH AND ERROR

monly understood, apprehended, composed, and
embraced in the same senses, have synonymous
meanings, but, according to Hegel, and to idealism
generally since his time, synonymous words
always have the same meaning, and that mean-
ing must be found when it expresses a psychic
fact. This is the secret of Hegel, and the key
to his hieroglyphics, and, if consistently used
to interpret the sayings of his logic, it becomes an
open book. Now, when he uses a word for any
property whatever, we must understand, if we follow
Hegel in his argument, that the word is used in its
psychic meaning. If we consistently carry out this
rule, sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph,
chapter by chapter, through the "Phenomenology,"
where it generally works, on through his "Logic,"
where, perhaps, it is the universal rule, we
can translate his hieratic codex into demotic
speech.

Permit a word of advice to the student who desires
to accomplish this feat. First, read the works of
Hegel's most devout disciples. Then take up Hegel
himself. Then, after mastering Hegel, Kant's
"Critique" will be an open book. The student must
first learn the hieratic language, and then it is easy
to read all of the works of the idealists.

Hegel accepted not only void space and void time
as realities, but he accepted void essence and other
nothings which he included under the term being,
and sometimes under the term absolute. The world
of sense is seen by every one to be a world of
change, and he called it becoming; the fallacies,
then, he called the being, or the absolute, and the
realities the becoming. In his "Logic," he says:

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 409

"But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore
the absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate
aspect, is just Nothing.

"Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute ; the
Absolute is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in
saying that the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly
without form and so without content. . . .

' 'The proposition that Being and Nothing is the same seems so
paradoxical to the imagination or understanding, that it is
perhaps taken for a joke. And indeed it is one of the hardest
things thought expects itself to do: for Being and Nothing
exhibit the fundamental contrast in all its immediacy, — that is,
without the one term being invested with any attribute which
would involve its connexion with the other. This attribute,
however, as the above paragraph points out, is implicit in
them— the attribute which is just the same in both. So far
the [deduction of their unity is completely analytical : indeed
the whole progress of philosophising in every case, if it be a
methodical, that is to say, a necessary, progress, merely
renders explicit what is implicit in a notion. It is as correct
however to say that Being and Nothing are altogether differ-
ent, as to assert their unity. The one is not what the other is.
But since the distinction has not at this point assumed definite
shape (Being and Nothing are still the immediate), it is, in the
way that they have it, something unutterable, which we merely
mean."

What Hegel means is that the world of reality is
the creation of the human mind out of nothing.
Now, this creation of something out of nothing, as it
produces the material universe, is kept in constant
flux or change, for everything is in evolution and
dissolution, and thus it is the becoming. While
Spencer reifies the universe as force, and deems it
the unknowable, Hegel reifies the universe as
thought, and deems it the unutterable; so all
metaphysical philosophers trace the universe into
something occult.

4IO TRUTH AND ERROR

Hegel attempts to forestall ridicule in the follow-
ing language :

"No great expenditure of wit is needed to make fun of the
maxim that Being and Nothing are the same, or rather to
adduce absurdities which, it is erroneously asserted, are the
consequences and illustrations of that maxim."

Then he goes on, by a method of logic which he
calls dialectic, to show the validity of his proposi-
tion, in which he asserts :

"There is absolutely nothing whatever in which we cannot
and must not point to contradictions or opposite attributes."

This logic is well worth perusal by the curious
reader, as an example of mysterious arguments
about mysteries, of propositions about the unutter-
able, of notions about the unknowable, and of
attributes assigned to ghosts. In such manner,
scholastic learning transmutes folk-lore into the
semblance of wisdom, and the pathos of poetry.
Lowell, with sympathetic love, has given fine ex-
pression to the thaumaturgy of transcendentalism,
when he likens the gold-fish in the globe to souls
imprisoned in the sphere of sense:

"Is it illusion? Dream-stuff? Show
Made of the wish to have it so?
'Twere something, even though this were all:
So the poor prisoner, on his wall
Long gazing, from the chance designs
Of crack, mould, weather-stain, refines
New and new pictures without cease,
Landscape, or saint, or altar-piece :
But these are Fancy's common brood,
Hatched in the nest of solitude ;

FALLACIES OF IDEATION 41 1

This is Dame Wish's hourly trade,
By our rude sires a goddess made.

"The worm, by trustful instinct led,
Draws from its womb a slender thread,
And drops, confiding that the breeze
Will waft it to unpastured trees ;
So the brain spins itself, and so
Swings boldly off in hope to blow
Across some tree of knowledge, fair
With fruitage new, none else shall share:
Sated with wavering in the Void,
It backward climbs, so best employed,
And, where no proof is nor can be,
Seeks refuge with Analogy ;
Truth's soft half-sister, she may tell
Where lurks, seld-sought, the other's well.

"The things we see as shadows I
Know to be substance ; tell me why
My visions, like those haunting you,
May not be as substantial too.
Alas, who ever answer heard
From fish, and dream-fish too? Absurd !
Your consciousness I half divine,
But you are wholly deaf to mine.
Go, I dismiss you ; ye have done
All that ye could ; our silk is spun ;
Dive back into the deep of dreams,
Where what is real is what seems !
Yet I shall fancy till my grave
Your lives to mine a lesson gave ;
If lesson none, an image, then,
Impeaching self-conceit in men
Who put their confidence alone
In what they call the Seen and Known."

Emerson sings of the mystery of transcenden-
talism :

412 TRUTH AND ERROR

"The Sphinx is drowsy,

Her wings are furled ;
Her ear is heavy,

She broods on the world.
Who'll tell me my secret,

The ages have kept?
I awaited the seer,

While they slumbered and slept ;-

"The fate of the man-child;

The meaning of man ;
Known fruit of the unknown ;

Daedalian plan ;
Out of sleeping a waking,

Out of waking a sleep ;
Life death overtaking;

Deep underneath deep?

"Up rose the merry Sphinx,

And crouched no more in stone ;
She melted into purple cloud,

She silvered in the moon ;
She spired into a yellow flame ;

She flowered in blossoms red;
She flowed into a foaming wave ;

She stood Monadnoc's head."

Great are the poets of mysticism, but there is one
greater:

' 'What a piece of work is man ! How noble in reason ! How
infinite in faculties ! in form, and moving, how express and
admirable! in action, how like an angel! in apprehension,
how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of
animals!"

CHAPTER XXV

SUMMARY

I have tried to demonstrate that an ultimate
particle, and hence every body, has five essentials or
concomitants, these terms being practically synony-
mous. It has been shown that there is something '
absolute and something relative in every one. The
essentials of the particle are unity, extension, speed,
persistence, and consciousness, which are absolute.
The relations which arise from them, in order, are
multeity, position, path, change, and choice, which
give rise to number, extension, motion, time, and
judgment, as properties that can be measured. It
has been pointed out that particles are incorporated
in bodies through affinity as choice, and by this in-
corporation the quantitative properties become clas-
sific properties which, in order, are class, form, force,
causation, and conception. In the development of
number into class, unity becomes kind and plurality
becomes series. In the development of space into
form, extension becomes figure and position becomes
structure. In the development of motion into force,
speed becomes velocity and path becomes inertia.
In the development of time into causation, persis-
tence becomes state and change becomes event. In
the development of judgment into conception, con-
sciousness becomes recollection and choice becomes
inference.

As all particles, except those of the ether, are
413

414 TRUTH AND ERROR

organized into bodies, all of these bodies may be
viewed or considered from two standpoints — internal
and external. If we consider the body internally we
consider its particles externally to one another;
therefore, we are compelled to recognize the recip-
rocality of the two views — the quantitative view is
equal to or the reciprocal of the classific view.
Now, we have three terms, concomitancy, relativity,
and reciprocality, which, in all science and especially
in psychology, must clearly be distinguished. The
failure to distinguish them creates the fog of
metaphysic.

In the ether we do not know of the existence of
bodies, but it seems probable that only particles exist.
We do know of astronomical bodies, geonomic
bodies, phytonomic bodies, zoonomic bodies, and
demotic bodies. In the last class the particles do not
lose their three degrees of freedom of motion, but
this freedom is transmuted into cooperative recip-
rocality. The freedom of the particles by develop-
ment of motility as a mode of motion becomes the
self-activity of the individuals, which is exhibited in
promoting the welfare of the individual and of the
demotic body.

Properties are not creations of the mind ; they are
founded in nature and are recognized in nature in
the plainest manner, hence they are not artificial,
but natural. In molecules numbers are organized
into kinds and series, that is, into classes, the kinds
appearing as substances and the series as totalities
of substances. In stars spaces are integrated and
differentiated as figures and structures, and hence
forms are primarily organized in stars. In geonomic
bodies motions are organized as forces, being

SUMMARY

integrated and differentiated as cooperative spheres.
In plants times are organized as causations, antece-
dent and consequent, as parents and children, and
heredity thus appears. In animals judgments are
organized, in which times become states as memories
and changes as inferences. In this realm mind first
appears as conception, for concepts require memory
and inference, thus only animals have minds ; plants
do not have minds, but their particles have judg-
ment, for particles have affinity and make judgments
of association, and only such judgments. They do
not have memory, nor do they have conception,
therefore they do not have inference.

All particles of plants, rocks, and stars have judg-
ments as consciousness and choice, but having no
organization for the psychical functions they have
not recollection and inference ; they therefore do not
have intellections or emotions. Only animal bodies
have these psychical faculties. Molecules, stars,
stones, and plants do not think ; that which we have
attributed to them as consciousness and choice is
only the judgment of particles; but it is the ground,
the foundation, the substrate of that which appears
in animals when they are organized for conception.

That which perchance may be called hylozoism
in this work must radically be distinguished from
that hylozoism which appears in metaphysical
speculation, when it attributes mind to inanimate
bodies, or from that belief of early mythology
which also attributes mind to inanimate things. It
is this error of primeval savagery, called animism,
from which civilized men have long ago logically
revolted, that must be distinguished from the
hylozoism herein propounded. Perhaps it is this

416 TRUTH AND ERROR

repugnance to primeval error which has chiefly been
instrumental in causing the rejection of the funda-
mental principles of concomitance in the science of
mind, for it has occurred to great thinkers many
times since the revival of science effected by Colum-
bus and Copernicus.

It is marvelous how often it has occurred to the
great thinkers of science as well as of metaphysics ;
but so far as I know it was never clearly formulated
in such a manner as to become a scientific doctrine.
It has been held that mind itself belongs to the
inanimate realm, when it should have been held that
consciousness and choice only are inherent in this
realm, which is developed into psychic faculties only
by the organization of animate bodies.

In these chapters it has been affirmed that every
particle or body may be considered severally in its
essentials or concomitants, and that if we consider
one property and not the others we consider it
abstractly. Abstraction, therefore, is the con-
sideration of one property of a body, neglecting the
others which we are compelled to posit.

We cannot conceive one property as existing inde-
pendently of the others, but the discovery of one
property leads the mind by a habit, which is inexor-
able, to postulate the others. This postulation of all
properties from one, if neglected, leads to what
has here been called reification. The mind that
deals with things when it reasons, cannot make this
mistake, but the mind that deals with words and
thus reasons by the methods of scholastic logic, is
liable to this error, for a particle or a body may be
designated by the name of one of its properties.
The failure to make this distinction may be called

SUMMARY 417

the ground of the failure of Aristotelian logic as
distinguished from scientific logic.

Having set forth the reciprocal properties of
bodies, a brief chapter is given to explain how prop-
erties become qualities, in which it is demonstrated
that qualities arise through the consideration of
properties in relation to the purposes of animal
bodies, especially of human bodies.

The failure to distinguish between properties and
qualities is the fundamental error of modern meta-
physic. For twenty-five centuries many great
thinkers have considered the properties of a body,
which are founded upon its essentials, and which
essentials are the thing-in-itself, as if they were
qualities. Discovering that qualities are forever
changing with the point of view, as the purpose of
the individual is changed, the reality of properties
was questioned.

The unreality of properties when they are con-
founded with qualities finds expression in many
ways. Thus it is affirmed that man is the measure
of things, or that man is the measure of qualities,
meaning that things or their qualities are generated
by the mind. This is true of qualities, as I use the
term, but it is not true of properties. Still, the
ancients retained sanity, and believed in the thing-
in-itself, and called it a noumenon. An attribute of
a thing which seems to vary with the point of view
is called a phenomenon. Then, many properties
are imperfectly cognized, and their explanation
depends upon investigation which has come to be
recognized as scientific research; hence properties
that are still improperly explained are also called
phenomena, but when better explained are called

418 TRUTH AND ERROR

noumena. Thus noumenon as used by the ancients
is a term which means the thing which changes with
the point of view, whether it is a change of purpose
or a change of explanation. Thus errors of cogni-
tion in properties are confounded with what I call
qualities, and both are called phenomena.

An attempt is then made to demonstrate that the
cognition of these properties gives rise to five psychic
faculties, which we have called sensation, perception,
apprehension, reflection, and ideation.

In developing the five faculties of intellection an
endeavor has been made to set forth the nature of
the judgment and to show that its validity depends
upon verification. Repeated judgments from like
sense impressions become habitual or intuitive. I
here speak of habitual judgments of intellection as
intuitive, as in a later work I shall speak of habitual
judgments of emotion as instinctive, and consider
presentative judgments as being inductive, and
representative judgments as being deductive. The
division of the faculties into sense perception, under-
standing, and reason, to which metaphysic has been
committed in a more or less clearly defined manner,
is here rejected as a schematization that leads to
psychological confusion.

That speculation which deals with the properties
of bodies as if they were qualities, I call metaphysic.
That theorizing which distinguishes properties from
qualities and deals with properties as realities, I call
science. That speculation which fails to find con-
sciousness as an essential or concomitant 'of bodies,
but derives the mind from force or motion, I call
materialism.

Metaphysic has a history which must be unraveled

SUMMARY 419

to properly understand contemporaneous opinion at
any one stage, but especially to understand the suc-
cessive stages through which it has passed. Before
the birth of chemistry man believed the elements to
be earth, air, fire, and water, which elements were
mixed in all of the bodies of the world, and it
becomes necessary for us to understand how the
attributes of bodies were assigned to the several
elements. Not only was metaphysic founded upon
these doctrines, but it was out of a philosophy of
these elements that science itself was developed.
Gradually in the history of civilization there grew up
a doctrine of substance or substrate as something
which is not one of the essentials of matter, as
particle or body, but to which essentials adhere or
inhere or subsist. This substrate or substance was
supposed to be the vehicle of properties which
emanate from it. Two relics of this doctrine are
especially of interest to scientific men. It was long
believed that heat and light are corpuscular, and
that heat is given off from the substrate or substance
of one body and taken up by another. Even Newton
thought light to be corpuscular. The doctrine that
motion as speed emanates from one body as a sub-
stance or substrate and passes to another, comes
from this source. This relic of ancient philosophy
clings to much of modern physics, and is the founda-
tion of a body of speculation in which scientific men
indulge when they theorize about the dissipation of
motion, the exhaustion of the heat of the sun, and
the general running down of the solar system into
a state in which life will be impossible.

In a very brief and inadequate way I have tried to
set forth the origin and history of fundamental

420 TRUTH AND ERROR

fallacies relating to properties. This history com-
mences with the early Greeks, but we cannot under-
stand its origin without going back to an earlier
stage of society than that in which history presents
the philosophy of the Hellenic tribes.

In tribal society all honor is due to the progenitor
of a tribe for his goodness and wisdom, and his com-
mands have perpetual authority. The ancient time
was the golden age ; the present is a time of degen-
eracy. In tribal society to say that a man is elder is to
say that he is wiser and better and must be obeyed.
An ancient who lived in the ancient of days was
supremely wise and good. He who can trace his
ancestry farthest into antiquity has the most honor-
able beginning. The most ancient, the first, the
progenitor, the prototype, is the one to whom all
glory must be given. In savagery, authority, wis-
dom, honor, and parentage are so intimately
associated in the minds of tribal men, that their
demotic organization is dependent upon this com-
pound concept, taken as a single principle. With
these people demotic organization is founded upon
the authority of the parent over the offspring. To
be a parent is to have wisdom, and to be a parent
is to have authority. The parent seems to have
reason upon his side when he seeks to control the
offspring, for the parent is the author of the off-
spring; therefore, the progenitor is the wise and the
powerful, and this principle, which is at the founda-
tion of tribal society, is so thoroughly interwoven
into the habits of thought of the people, that it seems
to them a self-evident proposition that the pro-
genitor is wise and should rule.

When a group of kindred is considered with

SUMMARY 421

parents and children, and collateral lines of con-
sanguineal members, and further lines of kinship by
affinity, the whole group organized into a tribe with
authority in the relative elder, and all the items of
authority parceled out in a hierarchy of real or con-
ventional relative ages, we have the tribal plan of
government.

Honor for ancestors is the most profound senti-
ment of savage men and is daily and systematically
inculcated, so that the younger always yields
obedience to the elder, and the elder is always held
in reverence.

This principle leads to a gradation of the people
of a savage tribe into recognized ranks by relative
age, and if a man is promoted within a tribe, such
promotion is a formal advancement in age, and
kinship terms are readjusted so that the age received
by promotion may be recognized in terms of address.
In barbarism there comes another element to
increase this respect, for the elder is not only
obeyed, but is worshiped as a deity. In this manner
often the chief of the gens, which is a group within
the tribe, and also the chief of the tribe, is wor-
shiped. Dead ancestors are also worshiped as
ghosts. Clans of the savage tribe become gentes of
the barbaric tribe, and the gentes are grouped in
phratries as religious brotherhoods, and the dead
chief of the phratry is usually worshiped, while other
departed members of the phratry are also worshiped.
Chiefs, who may be called the priests of the phratry
when they become remarkable for their ability or
for success in shamanism as diviners, medicine-men,
and soothsayers, are held for a long time in great
reverence, and their accomplishments are repeated

422 TRUTH AND ERROR

in many a story. So in barbaric society the
patriarch — the ancient — is held to be the progenitor
or prototype of the gens, the phratry, or the tribe,
as the case may be. In gentes, phratries, and tribes
there is a constant veneration of ancestral ancients.
This appears to have been the case among the
Hellenic tribes, which belonged to that stage of
culture which we call barbarism.

In savagery seven worlds are developed, as the
east, west, north, south, zenith, nadir, and center;
and they schematize or systematize all the attributes
of things into seven groups. As geographic knowl-
edge increases, those attributes which are assigned
to the four quarters of the earth, are by natural
methods transferred from the cardinal worlds to
certain leading attributes of those worlds represented
by earth, air, fire, and water. In this manner the
worlds are transmuted into elements, but there still
remain the zenith, nadir, and center — the zenith
becoming a world of exalted attributes which they
suppose to be good, the nadir becoming a world of
evil.

Greek philosophy was developed at a time when
tribal society was developing. Upon the ruins of
tribal society imperialism was erected. The Greek
philosophers inherited the cosmology of barbarism
and with it the habits of thought characteristic of
barbarism, especially the mental tendency to claim
superiority for the ancient or first. Hence they
claimed superiority for one or another Of the four
elements. Particularly was air, fire, or water held
to be the first or progenitor of the others. In all
their concepts about the absolutes of bodies, whether
considering properties or qualities, there always

SUMMARY 423

seems to be a factor of this tribal concept. Thus
we see that one of the barbaric elements was always
taken as the substrate of the others. Thus was
born the doctrine of substrate.

When imperialism had led to monotheism, and the
school of theology was the school of philosophy
also, a new substrate was discovered — the deity as
something eminent in the world of attributes. At
last, in comparatively modern times, another sub-
strate was developed in speculation as a something
to which the attributes could inhere. This reifica-
tion still holds a place in the speculation even of
scientific men and vitiates our popular physics. It
is the chimera of substrate, this thing in itself as
noumenon that leads to the belief in the world only
as phenomenon. Since Berkeley and Hume a
special school of metaphysicians has been developed
who have the custody of this ghost and are its leal
defenders. The fifth property, or consciousness as
mind, is their ghost. These are the idealists. The
war of philosophy is between Idealists and
Materialists.

The philosophy here presented is neither Idealism
nor Materialism ; I would fain call it the Philosophy
of Science.

NDEX

Activities, human, considered,
180.

Adaptation, laws of, 201.

Affinity, phenomena of, 41.

Animals, principles or prop-
erties of, 74.

Animals, environment of, 75.

Animals, motility in, 76.

Animals, heredity in, 76.

Animals, reproduction of, 77.

Animals, judgment in, 77.

Animals, systems of organs in,
78.

Animals, metabolic processes
in, 79.

Animals, functions in, 83.

Animals, nervous system in,
87.

Animals, sense organs of, 89.

Apprehension, 237.

Apprehension, term restricted
to judgment of force, 237.

Apprehension, both induc-
tive and deductive, 243.

Apprehension, definition of,
250.

Apprehension, fallacies of,
352.

Assimilation, constructive, 66.

Assimilation, differentiating,
66.

Atmospheric agencies of dis-
integration, 48.

Berkeley, idealism of, 403.
Botany, facts relating to, 137.

Causation, primal fallacy of,

381.

Causation, study of, 186.
Cause and effect, 37.
Causes, genetic, 39.
Causes, teleologic, 39.
Chuar's illusion, i.
Classification, definition of,

109.

Classification, method of, 113.
Classification, test of, 117.
Classification, goal of the

science of, 118.
Classification, erroneous meth-

ods of, 119.
Classification, fundamental

among Greeks, 122.
Classification, a tool of logic,

126.
Classification, logical and

mathematical methods of,

131-

Cognition defined, 283.
Conception, a process of con-

solidating judgments, 214.
Consciousness considered,

211.

Cooperation discussed, 168.
Cooperation in celestial realm,

173-
Cooperation in terrestrial

spheres, 174.
Cooperation in vegetal realm,

~1?4'

Cooperation in zoonomic

realm, 174.

425

426

TRUTH AND ERROR

Cooperation of systems with

systems, 177.
Cooperation, societies formed

by, 179.
Cosmology, origin of systems

of, 377-
Culture, law of, 201.

Darwin, acceleration of evolu-
tion discovered by, 197.

Doctrines taught by modern
science, 9.

Dynamics discussed, 152.

Earth, composition of, 42.

Earth, form of, 43.

Earth, geologic facts, 43.

Earth, aqueous envelope, 45.

Earth, oscillations of upheaval
and subsidence, 45.

Earth, structure of crust of, 47.

Earth, changes effected in
crust by water, 60.

Effort, law of, 200.

Environment, effect of, 204.

Environment of animals, 75.

Evolution discussed, 183.

Evolution, primal law of, 188.

Evolution, organization of de-
motic life a factor in, 200.

Force, compound of motions,

36.

Forces, outline of. 171.
Functions, control of, 178.

Generations or properties of

plants, 64.
Geochemism, the fundamental

energy, 59-
Geonomic bodies, properties of,

42.
Geonomic realm, constitution

of, 192.
Geonomy, divisions of, 136.

Hallucinations defined, 313.

Hallucinations, so-called cen-
sus of, 315.

Hallucinations, classification
of, 320.

Hallucinations, among North
American Indians, 330.

Hegel, fallacies of, 405.

Heredity, effect of, 177.

Heredity, element of, in plants,
65-

Heredity, law of, 199.

Heterogeneity, law of, 199.

Homologies, extended from
atom to organism, 145.

Homologies, hierarchy of,
throughout universe, 146.

Homologies, illustrated in
organization of human soci-
ety, 146.

Homologies, in natural organ-
ization, 147.

Homology discussed, 133.

Human body, a hierarchy of
conscious bodies, 86.

Hylozoism, theory of, 95.

Hypotheses relating to changes
in earth's crust, 51.

Ideation discussed, 264
Ideation, fallacies of, 391.
Inertia, definition of, 360.
Intellections discussed, 278.
Intellections, psychology a

system of, 278.
Intellections, faculties of, 279.

Judgment, psychic elements

of, 280.
Judgment relating to cause

and effect, 282.

Lamarck, motile state of mat-
ter discovered by, 199.

La Place, on genesis of heav-
enly bodies, 190.

Law governing phenomena of
earth's crust, search for, 50.

Locke, John, on accidents, 401.

Mathematics of motion, science
of, 27.

Matter, definition of, 12.

Memory, physiological concep-
tion of, 333.

Metabolism in plants, 72.

INDEX

427

Metabolism in animals, 74.

Metagenesis, a process of
causality, 63.

Metamorphoses of mineral sub-
stances, 56.

Metaphysical reasoning, errors

*~of, 276.

Metaphysisis, a succession of
changes of force, 59.

Mill, John Stuart, on causa-
tion, 38.

Misperceptions, illustrations of,

338-339-

Molar bodies, definition of, 21,
129.

Molecular bodies, internal rela-
tions of, 21.

Morphology, illustrated by
animals and their organs,
142.

Morphology, illustrated by in-
sects, 145.

Morphology and classification,
relation between, 148.

Morphology of plant phytons,
70.

Motion of atoms, 152.

Motion, Descartes' theory, 153.

Motion, laws of, 163.

Motion, vibratory and struc-
tural, 169.

Motion, persistence of, 358.

Motion, concepts of, 361.

Myths, discussion of, 381.

Nature, five fundamental

realms of, 96.
Newton, theory of inertia, 161.

Ontology, philosophy of, 399.

Parish, on hallucinations and

illusions, 311.
Particles, inanimate, essentials

of, 1 6.
Particles of matter, affinity of,

31-

Particles of matter, combina-
tion into molecules, 31.

Particles of matter, classifica-
tion, 31.

Particles of matter, vibration
of, 35-

Particles of matter, persistence
of, interrupted, 36.

Perception discussed, 226.

Perception, fallacies of, 335.

Perception, as a mental phe-
nomenon, 341.

Perception, the interpretation
of a symbol, 342.

Phenomena, erroneously classi-
fied by Mill, 120.

Philosophy, transcendental,
errors or, 149.

Philosophy of the unknowable,
refutation of Spencer's, 370.

Plants, chemical laboratories,
69.

Plants, cells, tissues and forms
of, 69.

Plants, conditions of life, 72.

Processes or the properties of
geonomic bodies, 42.

Properties, essentials of, 9.

Protoplasm, constitution of, 64.

Psychophysics, science of, 120.

eualities, definition of, 98.
ualities, distinct from prop-
erties, IOO.

Qualities, errors of Locke in
relation to, 102.

Qualities, termed attributes by
Spencer, 105.

Qualities, Berkeley's ^opinions
in relation to, 107.

Qualities, Hume, Kant, Schill-
ing and Fichte on, 107.

Quantities or properties that
are measured, 20.

Reflection discussed, 251.

Reflection, concepts of, 253.

Reflection, definition of, 263.

Reflection, process of combin-
ing judgments by, 289.

Reflection, fallacies of, 374.

Reification, origin of, 3.

Relations that must exist
between particles, 23.

428

TRUTH AND ERROR

Science and speculation, issue
between, 150.

Science and metaphysics, dif-
ference of methods, 184.

Sciences, distinction between
classific and quantitative,
246.

Scientific research, definition
of, 7.

Sensation discussed, 207.

Sensation and feeling, differ-
ence between, 207.

Sensation, fallacies of, 307.

Sense impressions, 223.

vSenses, vicarious feelings,
209.

Signatures, the doctrine of,
385.

Solar system, motions within,

34-

Space, definition of, 133.
Specters, classification of, 348.
Structural geology, 56.
Substrates, recapitulation of,

222.

Survival, law of, 199.
Symbolism, explanation of the
laws of, 300.

Time, development by incor-
poration, 36.

Transmutation of substances
in rocks, 54.

Verification, methods of, 220.
Volcanic eruptions, 47.

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