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TtRKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR:

A NARRATIVE OF HISTORICAL EVENTS.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR ADOLPHUS SLADE, K.C.B.

(MU SHAVER PASHA),

"Methixks, the TBum should lite prom aof. to aor,

As *TWEBS RETAIL'D TO ALL POSTERITY,

Even to the oekeeal ali^-endino day." Shakrpkare.

LONDON:
SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL.

1867.

JIJ2, 3. I • -f-/.

[ 77*f riifht of Trunxfatiou is rcunved ]

ADMIRAL W. A. BAILLIE HAMILTON.

MANY YEARS SECRETARY OP THE ADMIRALTY
WITH HONOUR TO HIMSEI^ AND ADVANTAGE TO THE SERVICE ;

Cl|e CoIIotDtng 9aqt% are BeDieatel!

WITH PLEASANT BfEMORIES OF EARLY DAYS,
BY HIS OLD MESSMATE,

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

The reforms wrought by Sultan Mahmoud II. — in effect
a Moslem social revolution, — disturbed the foundations
of the edifice reared by his ancestors, and altered the
relations of Turkey with Christendom. Previously
isolated, with her hand* against everybody and every-
body's hand against her, Turkey then entered the comity
of nations, but on invidious terms, — the terms of a step-
child in a numerous family. Drawn irresistibly within
the sphere of alien influences exercised by diplomatists
variously inspired, she gravitated now towards one now
towards another centre of attraction, with unstable
equiUbrium, No longer self-reliant, she viewed apprehen-
sively the ambition of a neighbour and uneasily the
aspirations (encouraged by classic sympathies) of quondam
subjects : ill reassured in regard of the former by inter-
national jealousy, and with respect to the latter by
political incapacity.

Irresolute between antagonistic pretensions, the Porte
allowed a dispute at Jerusalem between members of the
Latin and Oriental churches to ripen into a ** question ; "

VUl PREFACE.

which opened a way for the French ruler to raise the
tone of his army and thereby replace France in her
natural, position, abdicated by his predecessor, in the front
rank of nations. Leading England, while seeming led by
her, to concur in his policy, and Turkey to believe in his
sincerity, he secured their active alliance, and so ably
played his cards in the ensuing game of war as to derive
from it a maximum of " glory " with a minimum of
obloquy. Eussia's ardent foe in the Crimea, France sat
at the council table at Paris her genial advocate.

A sketch of Sultan Mahmoud's reforms, and — direct
consequence — the attitude of diplomacy at Constantinople,
preceded, for the sake of comparison, by an outline of the
conditions of Turkish power when that power was
formidable to Europe, has seemed to the author a fitting
commencement of a narrative which embraces, witli other
topics, remarks on the Crimean war remotely flowing
therefrom.

Having briefly touched on those subjects, the author
indicates in the following pages the influences brought to
bear on the Porte preceding and during the Crimean war,
and gives deferentially a qualified Turkish view, essential
for the completion of the picture, of some of the events
of that war : moviad by a legitimate desire to show cause
for the untoward action of the Anglo-French alliance on
the prestige of the Ottoman power ; and also, by a
sense of the moral obligation of every one in a position
of observation during that period to contribute, in the

PREFACE. IX

degree of his lights and opportunities, materials for the
elucidation of a probable subject of controversy in later
times, the miscarriage in the main of a remarkable league
formed for the purpose of depressing one and ostensibly
sustaining another empire.

Within eight years of the Peace of Paris Kusaia
dared to irritate her recent vanquishers. Heedless of the
urbane remonstrances of one, of the traditional sympa-
thies of the other, she stamped out Polish nationality
with her heel, and, careless about public opinion,
plucked, remorseless, Caucasian independence up by the
roots. The Ehans of Turkistan have since admitted her
supremacy, and the Ameer of Bokhara has sued for her
graces. Within eleven years of that peace the Eastern
question, which enthusiasts fancied had been laid under
the Malakof for a century, reappears looming on the
horizon, hazy, indistinct, like the genius freed by the
fisherman in the Arabian Nights. Like that curious
Arab watching amazed the condensation of the portentous
v9.pour into form and substance, politicians and philo-
sophers are watching with speculation in their eyes for
an outline of the features of the Apparition. In view of
a possible menacing aspect, monarchies are arming,
cabinets are scheming, nationalities are stirring, and
propagandism is active. England alone, the most
interested after Turkey, the outwork of her Asiatic Empire,
in that question, sits in the chair of self-complacency,
fanned by the breeze of commercial prosperity.

X PREFACE.

The thesis that no race, whether Christian or Moslem,
in the Turkish empire can succeed the Ottomans as the
rulers of it, may be disputed by phil-Hellenists and philo-
Sclavs, and the theorem that Egypt cannot exist as
a sovereign Moslem state is apparently ignored by the
actual viceroy : they are, nevertheless, the reaUty of the
Eastern question ; and although in the opinion of some
it matters but little to England whether an Othman, a
Romanof, or a Hapsburg rule on the banks of the
Bosphorus, it does in the opinion of all concern her
much whether a Turk or a Frank rule in the valley of
the Nile.

London, March 1, 18C7.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

Origin of the Ottoman Nation — Othman Founder of the Turkisli
Monarchy — Sultan Amurath I. defeats the Sclavonic League —
Bajazet subjugates Asia Minor — He is defeated and taken Captive
by Tamerkme — Mahomet I. and liis Descendants consolidate the
Empire — Syria and Egypt subdued by Selim I. — Amurath IV.
captures Bagdad — Eastern Empire of the Turks — Policy of the
House of Othman — Reign of Sultan Mahomet IV. — Power of the
Sultans — Policy of Sultan Mahmoud — The Janissaries and their
Organization — Their Destruction and its Consequences — The
Reforms of Sultan Mahomet II. — Fires in Constantinople — Pertef
Pasha — Death and Burial of Sultan Mahmoud

CHAPTER II.

Sultan Abdul Medjid — The Tanzimat and its Results — ^Abrupt Transi-
tions in the Administration — The Army and Conscription — Brig-
andage — Lenity of the late Sultan — Official Corruption — Red-
shid Pasha — His Policy — The Medjlises, or Boards — Authority
and Power of the old Vizirs — Mode of dealing with rebellious
Vizirs — Government without an Army — ^Decentralization of
Finance — The Navy — Effects of Centralization — Conciliation of
the Rayahs advisable — Retrospect of an ancient Turk 24

CHAPTER III.

Ambassadors at Constantinople, under the Old and the New Regime
— Position of Diplomatists at Constantinople — Effect of Obselete
Commercial Legislation — Turkish Manufactures supplanted by
cheap foreign Fabrics — Novel Attitude of Diplomacy towards
the Divan — Presents to Foreign Diplomatists — Oriental Ideas of
Presents — Usury, the Cancer of Turkey and Cause of the Low
State of Agriculture — Education — Parish Schools — Colleges —

XU CONTENTS.

PAOB

Military and Medical Schools — Quarantine — The European Crisis
of 1848 — Dilemma of the Porte as to Hungarian Fugitives — The
Montenegrin Insurrection — Demands of Austria acceded to —
Similarity of Turkish and Austrian Policy — Ball given by tlie
French Ambassador in Honour of the Second Empire 46

CHAPTER IV.

Louis Napoleon's Choice of a War Policy — The Rival Christian
Powers in the East — The Firman restoiing to the Roman Catlio-
lics the Holy Places — The Porte summoned to carry it into Effect
— Menacing Attitude of France — Weakness of the Turkish Policy
— The Matter in Dispute — ^Attitude of England — Question of
tlie Holy Places — Russian Intervention — Mission of Prince
Mentchikof— Passive Attitude of the Porte — English View of the
Situation ~ «fl

CHAPTER V.

Prince Mentchikof s injudicious Conduct — Russian Demands — Posi-
tion of the Greek Church in Turkey — Russian Objects — Prince
Mentchikofs " Note " — European Misconception of its Object —
Feelings of the Turks towards Russia — Death of the Sultan's
Mother — The Funeral Ceremonies — Her Character and Influence
over the Sultan — Change of Ministiy — Redshid Pasha's Policy —
Antagonistic Feelings of tlie Ministers — The Russian " Note "
rejected by the Council of State — Rupture of Diplomatic Relations
with Russia — Depai-ture of Prince Mentchikof and the Russian
Legation 79

CHAPTER VI.

The Porte takes defensive Measures— The Castles on the Bosphorus
— The Turkish Fleet — Dangers from the Vicmity of European
Merchant Vessels — Harbour-masters of Foreign Consulates —
Turkish Captains under Restrictions — Fear of the Porte to give
Umbrage to Russia — Readiness and Activity of Sailors and
Soldiers— Military Preparations of tlie Porte — Self-dovotion of
the People — Troops marched to the Frontiers — Influence of the
English and French Press — Addresses of the Greek and Armenian
Patriarchs — Mussulman Distinctions applied to tlie Western
Potentates — Ariival of the English and French Fleets — The
Turks supposed them to have been hiied by the Sultan —
Moslem Behef in a special Providence watchiug over them —
Foreign Orders and Decorations profusely conferred on Turkisli
Ofllcials 92

CONTENTS. XUl

CHAPTER Vn.

PAGE

Passage of the Prutli by the Russians — The Sultan dismisses his
Ministers, but recalls them — ^Decision of a Council of State —
Position of Russia weakened — Dilemma of the Porte — Delusion
of the People — The Vienna Note — Advice respecting it — Sir
Stratford Canning and Redshid Pasha — The Porte's Refusal of
the Vienna Note — ^Warlike Preparations of Turkey — The Porte
in the Meshes of Diplomacy — The Ruling Class of Turkey past
and present— Frankish Turks 105

CHAPTER VUI.

Arrival of the Egyptian Contingent — Their close Stowage and scanty
Fare — Story of the Egyptian Contingent — Self-mutilation in
Mehemet Ali's Time to escape Military Service — Desertion and
its Penalty — Their Inspection by the Sultan — His Reception
and Largesse — Embarkation of the Egj'ptian Troops — Their
soldierly Spirit — Galata Newsmongers' Canards — Sanguinary
Rumours credited by the French and English Ambassadors —
Groundless Alarm — Four War Steamers summoned by the
Ambassadors — Calmness of the Sultan — Protection aflforded by
the Porte to Foreigners — Governmental Autliority in Constan
tinople-^ Loyalty of the Soldiery — Their Isolation from the
Civilians „ 116

CHAPTER IX.

Russia refuses the Porte's Modifications of the Vienna Note — The
Porte declares War — Prince Gortchakof invited to evacuate tlie
Principalities — Honours conferred by the Sultan on the Greek
Patriarch — A Turkish Squadron sent to the Black Sea returns
to the Bosphorus — Condition of the Turkish Navy — The
Author's Suggestion to the Capitan Pasha — It is overruled —
Sinope, the only safe Roadstead, exposed to Attack — The Navy
in a Transition State — Two Parties in the Ser\dce — Its low Tone

Forebodings of Disaster — A Russian Squadron reported —

The Frigate Nuzretieh ordered to Soa — Representation of
Mushaver Pasha — Strange Order of the Capitan Pasha — The
Nuzretieh in the Black Sea— Orders given to tlie Turkish
Squadron — Omar Pasha's Victory at Oltenitza — Successes and
Reverses of the Turks in Asia — Valour of the Troops and Mis-
conduct of their Officers — Exultation of the Turks 126

XIV CONTENTS.

CHAPTER X.

PAGE

The Turkish Squadron at Sinope — A Russian Squadron in the Offing
— Choice of Measures for the Turkish Commander — An Oppor-
tunity of Retreat — Reappearance of the Russian Squadron —
Position of the Turkish Ships — Shore Batteries of Sinope — The
Russian Ships enter the Bay — Flight of the Grovemor of Sinope
and the Moslem Inhabitants — ^Vacillation of the Turks — The
Fire of the Russian Squadron — Total Destruction of the Turkish
Sliips — Terrible Loss of Life — Gallantry of some Turkish
Officers — Indulgence of the Porte — Escape of the Taif — The
Captain Pasha reproaches the French and English Governments
— Opinions of their Ambassadors — Sinope after the Battle —
Pusillanimity of tlie Governor — Sufferings of the Survivors —
Pitiable State of the Wounded — Their Joy at the Prospect of Re-
moval to Constantinople 139

CHAFrER XI.

Tlie Turkish Fleet preparing for Sea — The Author summoned to the
Porte — Reception by the Divan of the Defeat at Sinope — Report
of a Repulse of the Russians — Unwelcome Counsel — The
Author's Representations prevail — His Suggestions for the
erection of Redoubts at Sinope overruled — Impracticable Sugges-
tions made to the Porte— Turkish Policy in yielding to them —
Gradual Progress safest for Nations — Result of Inquiry into the
Disaster of Sinope— Blame unjustly thrown on the Porte — The
Grand Coimcil ready to treat for Peace — Warlike Demonstra-
tion of Softas calmed down — Manifesto of the Porte — Redshid
Pasha's Note to the Four Powers — Lord Clarendon's Reply —
Action of the Western Powers — The combined Squadrons
enter the Black Sea — Notification of the Allies' Admirals to the
Russian Admiral 152

CHAPTER Xn.

CONTENTS. XV

PAOE

Allies — A Native Preacher's Prophecy for English Unbelievers
— Turkish Ideas of English Protestants — Invalid Troops at
Batoom — Georgian Bashi-bazouks and their Leader — Troops
under Canvas — Error in adopting European Clothing for
Turkish Troops — Advantages of the old Turkisli Costume —
Re-adoption of Oriental Uniforms by the present Sultan —
Foreigners wonder at the Hardihood of Turkish Soldiers — The
Secret explained — Habits of the Turkish Peasant fit him for
enduring Hardships — Promises of Mohammed to Soldiers — In-
fluence of patriotic or religious Sentiment — Comforts for Soldiers
and Sailors of recent Date — Initiation in England by Royalty —
Extent of Improvements in the British Navy — Former Condition
of the Sailors — Unhealthiness of Batoom — Turkish Reverses in
tliat District — A Westerly Gale in the Black Sea — Disasters to
the Steamer Fain-bari — No Assistance rendered by other
Steamers 104

CHAPTER XIII.

Drifting into War — Insurrection of the Greeks, headed by Karaskaiki
— Not supported by Russia — Policy of the Emperor Nicholas and
the Empress Catherine — Repressive Measures of the Porte — The
Egjrptian Contingent — The Greeks cahned by Fuad Efendi —
Hellenists banished by the Porte — ImpoUcy of tliat Measure —
Intervention of the French Ambassador — General Baraguay
d'Hilliers threatens to leave Constantinople — The Allies intervene
in Greece — Indignation of King Otho and his Queen — The Hel-
lenist Warfare beyond the Frontier of Greece — Successes of the
Ottomans at Czetate and Karakal — Turkish Enthusiasm — Call
for the Bashi-bazouks — Their Anival at Scutari — Reviewed by
the Seraskir at Constantinople — Their picturesque Costumes —
Bashi-bazouks headed by a female Chieftain — Sensation caused
by Kara Fatima — She is received by the Seraskir — Popular
Delusion as to the Value of the Bashi-bazouk — Their Ideas IKI

CHAPTER XIV.

Attitude of Austria — She is invited to arm against Russia — Her
ignoble Policy — The Western Powers show no Sign of Earnest-
ness — Sir John Burgoyne arrives at Constantinople — His Mea-
sures — Their Effect on the Turks — Russian Policy in War — Best
Course for the Western Powers — Military Force of Turkey — How
tliis Force might have been best used — Tlie Turkish Army — Its
former Organization — Its recent Alterations — The Soup-Kettles
of the Turkish Army in old Times — The ancient Turkisli Naval
System — Reply of a Mufti on the Question of Foreign Aid —
Secret of former Independence of Turkey — Machiavelli on Foreign

XVI CONTENTS.

PAOK

Auxiliaries— The Allied Fleets leave Beikos—A " Benevolence "
resorted to at Constantinople — Spontaneous Contributions of the
Provinces — Sickness in the Army on the Danube — Deficiency of
Medical Stores at Schumla, Rudshuk, and other Garrisons —
Fraud and Venality— Inferior Quality of the Supplies — Frau-
dulent Contractory — Tenderness for such Characters immoral —
Gravity of their Offences 1H9

CHAPTER XV.

The Turkish Fleet eager to enter the Euxine — Employment for it sug-
gested — Entliusiasm in the Caucasus for the Sultan — How to
profit by it — Schamyl Ruler of Daghestan — His Naib, Mehemed
Emin Efendi, in Circassia — Their opposite Modes of Rule — Their
Policy in regard to the War — The Caucasus the vulnerable Part
of Russia — Mushaver Pasha's Proposal for employing the Turkish
Fleet — How received by the Allied Admirals— An Anglo-French
Expedition to the Caucasian Coast projected — Its Futility — The
Turks best fitted to deal with the Circassians — ^A Turkish
Steamer asked for to accompany the projected Expedition —
Reasons for its Refusal— Views of the Porte 201

CHAPTER XVI.

Arrival of the Vanguard of the British Army in the Bosphorus —
Turkish and English Sentries at the Barracks in Scutari — Prince
Napoleon and the Duke of Cambridge — Gloomy Presages in Con-
stantinople—Reception of the Troops by the People and Authori-
ties — Arrival of the Fury in tlie Bosphorus — Attack on Odessa
b}' the Allied Fleets — Grounds for this Proceeding — Resem-
blance of Odessa to Brighton — What constitutes a Flag of Truce
— Ultimatum of the Allied Admirals — ^Admiral Dundas's View of
the Bombardment of Odessa — His Desire to Bombard Odessa
more effectually — Odessa of no strategic Importance — War never
aided by needless Severity — Moral and Physical Effects of
wanton Aggression — Instances in Point — Popular Feeling in
Russia and England excited by the War — Vicarious Retaliation
— Blockade of the Danube by tlie Allied Admirals 211

CHAPTER XVII.

CONTENTS. XVll

PAOE

and Advice — Achmet Pasha's Objections — Mushaver Pasha
requested to mediate with the Allied Admirals — His Memorandum
for their Consideration — He joins the Anglo-French Fleet in the
Faisi-bari — His Reception by Admiral Dundas and Admiral
Hamelin — Objections of the French Admiral — Letter of Admiral
Dundas to Ahmed Pasha — Dismay of the Circassian Pashas 2*22

CHAPTER XVIII.

The Allies' Fleets at Baltchik — How they watched Sevastopol — Tlie
Turkish Fleet kept at Out-post Duty — What might have been
done in the Summer of 1854 — Powerful Force of the Fleets —
• Discourtesy to Mushaver Pasha — Conciliatory Compliments
imacknowledged — Tidings of the Anglo-French Squadron on the
Circassian Coast — Turkish Envoys and Munitions of War tran-
shipped to Circassia — Precipitancy of the Measure — Indignation
of the Turks — Disappointment of the Circassians — ^Admiral Sir
Edmund Lyon's Report of the Circassians — Motives of the Allies'
Admirals— Articles in the Daily News — Mortality in the Turkish
Fleet — Its Cause — The Allies' Admirals object to its Cruising,
and order it to lie at Varna — Remonstrance of the Turkish
and Egyptian Admirals — Recall of the Fleet by the Porte —
Views of the Allies' Admirals as to the Turkish Fleet carried
out — Results of their Proceedings — Effect on the Circassians —
The Allies' Admirals secure for Russia Iq War what she had not
ventured to ask in Peace 237

CHAPTER XIX.

The Russian Army crosses the Danube — Prince Paskievitch lays
siege to Silistria — Its Governor, Musa Pasha, is kiUed —
Gallantry of the British Officers Butler and Nasmyth — The
Allies aroused to Activity — Conference with Omar Pasha at
Schumla — Duke of Cambridge embarks with his Division for
Varna — Quiescence of Omar Pasha — The Russians raise the Siege
of Silistria — What the Allies might have done — Todleben joins
the Russian Camp — Prince Gortchakofs Advice — The allied
Armies ordered to the Crimea — Proposals of Austria — Her
" Material Guarantee " — Plans of France and England — Reason-
able Hopes of Success — Sevastopol no longer "a standing
Menace " — Position of Constantinople — What is wanting to make
it Predominant — Results of such Consummation — Feelings of the
Turkish Navy — Exploit of a Russian War Steamer — The Turkish
Fleet at Varna — The Town occupied by the Allies — Uncere-
monious Proceedings of the French — Disgust of the Inhabitants
— Danger from Fire — Neglect of Precautions against it —
Outbreak of Fire — Losses of the British Commissariat — No one
to direct Operations — Conduct of European and Tuikish Soldiers

XVlll CONTENTS.

PAGE

contrasted — Groundless Sospicions of Greek Treachery — Too late
Precautions — Stormy Meeting of Turkish Notahles — Angry
Complaints against the European Conmianders — Accessibility
of Turkish Officials — Indignant Speech of an Efendi — Danger to
the Shipping in the Bay — No Guard-vessels — Outbreak of the
Cholera at Varna — Observations of the Disease — Inferences and
Proofs — Assistance safely rendered by the Healthy and Well-
fed — Danger of Mental Depression — Treatment of Cholera by
the Turks — Danger from checked Perspiration — Why the
Turkish Crews suffered less from Cholera — Superstitious Panic
of Turkish Sailors — Heavy Losses of French Troops from
Disease — Mortality at Kustenge — Sickness in the British Army
— Its Causes 250

CHAPTER XX.

Embarkation of the allied Armies — Rations of Turkish Troops —
Quality of the Men — The Conscription in Turkey — Suleyman
Pasha — The Turks averse from the Service — The Esnan — Their
Losses at Varna — Nostalgia a real Disease — Tone of the Allies
— Marshal St. Amaud and General Caurobert — Lord Raglan —
Criticism of the Naval Commanders — The three allied Fleets at
Baltchik — The French and Turkish Fleets weigh Anchor —
Arrival of the English Transports at Baltchik — The Covering
Fleet — An Opportunity lost by tlie Russians — Influence of British
Naval Reno^^Ti — The Russian Fleet at Sevastopol — ^Appearance
of the English Fleet — Advantages of Katcha Bay as a Landing-
Place — Two Modes of attacking Sevastopol — Error in choosing
the Point of Attack — Probability of Success from the opposite
Coast — Sevastopol exposed to a Surprise — The Flank March
— The combined Fleets anchor at Eupatoria — Estimate of the
Forces — Bat Horses of British Cavalry left behind — News-
paper Correspondents — The Question considered in relation to
War — The French Press tongue-tied 272

CHAPTER XXI.

The Fleets anchor off" " Old Fort " — Aspect of the Shore — Prompt
Disembarkation of French Troops — Their Alertness — Prince
Napoleon — French Soldiers under Canvas — Disembarkation of
the British Forces — The Soldiers landed without Tents or Knap-
sacks — Their Bivouac under heavy Rain — Defective Organization
— Results of needless Exposure — Altered Conditions of Invasions
created by Steam — Landing of Cavalry — Tartars come into Camp
— Their Joy at Sight of Moslem troops — Their Account of the
Force of Sevastopol — A Spy — Complaint against the Zouaves
by a Tartar — How disposed of — Combined Forces of the

CONTKNTS. XIX

PAUK

Allied Armies — Characteristics of each Army — Tlie Turkish
Commander returns to Constantinople and is banished — Tlic
English Tents re-embarked, and the Army bivouacked for three
weeks — 111 EflFects of tliis Exposure — Prince Mentchikofs
Forces — His Aim to create Delay — His Position liable to be
turned on both Flanks— March of the French— The British
storm the Hill-side of the Alma — Steady Calmness of their
Advance — " Forward ! " the only Order — The Crisis — Victory -JHO

CHAPTER XXII.

The Battle of the Alma firuitless — A Victory without Trophies — The
Victors sleep on their Laurels — Their pleasant Despatches — Aged
Ofl&cers — Few Troops in Sevastopol — Ineffective Fire of the
Forts — The Object of the Crimean Expedition frustrated by Delay
— Military Council in Sevastopol decides to obstruct tlie Entrance
of the Harbour by sinking a Squadron of Sliips — Review of the
Position of Affairs — English Troops suffer from Diarrhoea — Tlie
allied Armies march to the Balbec — The Russians sink tlieir
Ships — An English Officer of Engineers — Capture of Russian
Baggage — The Allied Army reaches Balaclava — Its Dependence
on the Sea disadvantageous — Artillery Engagement between ■
Steamers and Batteries — Bad l^ctice of Russian Gunners —
Death of Marshal St. Amaud :ii)H

CHAPTER XXIII.

Harbour of Balaclava — Neglect, Confusion, and Waste — Mistaken
Confidence in the speedy Fall of Sevastopol — Bird's-eye View
of Sevastopol — The Malakof— Fortime's Favours disregarded —
Talk with some English Soldiers — Corporal Wheeler's Bravery at
the Alma — Soldiers should judge of their Comrades' Deserts —
Partial Allotment of Good- Conduct Badges — Honorary Awards
should be made on the Instant — Practice in the French Armj' —
Colonel Todleben's Promptitude and Energy — Leisurely Pro-
ceedings of the Allies — Confidence of the Engineers — Comment
of a Moslem — The Cossacks regain Sway over the Tartar
Inhabitants — Russian Cavalry reconnoitre — The Allies' Siege-
works completed — Guns in Position — First day's Attack by Land
and Sea — The Enemy's Fire — Advance of the allied Fleets —
Firing ineffective because of the Smoke — The Aim at long
Ranges uncertain — Nelson's Maxim — The Agamemnon and Sans
Pareil — Effective Fire of the W^asp Battery — Low earthen
Redoubts with heavy Guns very formidable — Tactics of the
French and English Admirals 310

XX CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXIV.

PAGE

Partial Failure of the Expedition — Feelings of the allied Generals —
Hints of Winter unwelcome — Illusory Hopes of speedy Success —
Castrametation neglected — The British Lines — Turks driven out
of Redoubts — The Russians repulsed by Highlanders and routed
by Heavy Cavalry — The Balaclava Charge — Russian Sortie
from Sevastopol repulsed — Wreck of an Egyptian Ship and
Frigate — Sufferings of the Turkish Troops — Neglect of them
by the Allies — Turkish Hospital at Balaclava — Deaths from
Djrsentery and Overtoil — Oriental Indifference to unseen Suffer-
ings — Fatalism and Selfishness — Lord Raglan interposes — A Ship
Hospital fitted out for Turkish Sick — Lord Raglan's Appreciation
thereof— The Hospital Ship sent back to Constantinople — Rations
of Pork and Rum not available by Mohammedans — Other Supplies
not regularly issued-T-The Turks destitute of Money 325

CHAPTER XXV.

Russian Reinforcements — Prince Mentchikof tries to raise the Siege —
His Choice between two Courses — Russian Plan of Attack —
Conflict at Inkerman — Merits of the respective Troops — Perilous
Position of the British — Timely Aid of the French — Russian
Retreat — Loss of the Assailants — A Prisoner shot by his Captor —
Temptation to a British Sentry — Medals for Balaclava and Inker-
man — Theory of Distribution of War Medals — " Urgent Private
Affairs " — A noble Example — ^Violent Hurricane — Loss of Trans-
ports — Force of the Tempest — Cossacks come to tlie Rescue —
Damage to Ships of War — Captain Christie, R.N. — Court-
Martial ordered upon him — The Case of the Prince Transport
Ship— State of Anchorage at Balaclava — Rear- Admiral Boxer
and Captain Christie yielded to Clamour — ^Posthumous Honours
awarded them 380

CHAPTER XXNl.

Dispersion of the Fleets — Preparations for Winter — Helplessness of
English Soldiers — Obvious Precautions neglected — Available
Resources of Constantinople — Mr. Filder, the Commissary-
General — English Sympathy and Aid — Evils of Routine — The
Army pampered — State of Things at Constantinople — Turks
Amazed and Disgusted, but Powerless — Capitulations — Paralysis
of Justice — Consular Pri\'ilege8 abused — Gibbon's Picture of St.
Jean d'Acre realized at Pera — British Subjects abandoned —
Turkish Jails — Public Buildings of Constantinople occupied by
the Allies — The French dominate the City — Aspect and Bearing

CONTENTS. XXI

PAOE

of the Ottomans— Separation of Turks and Europeans — Excep-
tional Cases — Russian Military Schools — Fate of Turkish
Invalids— Turkish Naval Hospital — The Dockyard occupied by
the Allies — Solicitude of a noble Eltchee for Russian Prisoners
— An Ambassador at Constantinople — Military Hospital at
Scutari — Sympathies of Miss Nightingale and Lady Stratford de
Redcliffe — Soyer's Cookery — Sick Officers lodged in the Imperial
Kiosk — ^Exertions of Colonel Moore's Widow — British Cemetery
— French Hospitals at Constantinople — Mortality of French
Surgeons — Boy Soldiers — Scurvy and Dysentery rife — Visitors
— ^Invaluable Services of Sisters of Charity 350

CHAPTER XXVn.

Result of the Battle of Inkerman — Council of War — The Army of the
Danube transferred to the Crimea — The Russians attack Omer
Pasha at Eupatoria and are defeated — Dcatli of the Egyptian
Selim Pasha— Omar Pasha's Tactics— What the Army of Eupa-
toria might have done — Omar Pasha with his Brigade at Sevas-
topol — Comment of the Turks on the Death of tiie Czar — The
Porte ill able to bear the Absence of their Army in the Crimea —
The Anglo-Turkish Contingent — Its European Officers — l^oposal
of the Porte rejected — Head-quarters of the Contingent at Buyuk-
dereh — Life of Officers and Men — The Contingent transferred to
Kertch —Skirmish with Cossacks — The Bashi-bazouks — Their
Cost 874

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Brussa destroyed by Earthquake — Strength of the Allied Forces
before Sevastopol — Second Bombardment and its Effects — The
Malakof the Key of the Position — French Forces predomi-
nant — Sevastopol as fortified by General Todleben — General
Caurobert's Opinion — The Garrison short of Provisions and
Ammunition — The Governor empowered to act on liis Judg-
ment — Generals Caurobert and Pelissier — Plans for cutting off
Russian Supplies — Mr. Satler's Organization of Russian Trans-
port Corps — Naval and Military Expedition to open the Sea of
Azof— The Russian Garrisons of Kertch and Yenikaleh retire
— Tokens of Amity from the Tartars to the Allies — Strange
Conduct of the Allied Troops — Destruction of the Museum at
Kertch — Spoil shipped to Pera — Destitution of Jewish Families
— Destruction of property by the iVllicd Squadron hi the Sea of
Azof — The Russians evacuate Soudjouk and Anapa — Return of
the Expedition to Sevastopol — Capture of the Mamelon by the
French — High Expectations of Success — Combined Attack on
the Malakof and Redan — Cause of its Failure — Braverj' of the

XX CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Partial Failure of the Expedition — Feelings of the allied Generals —
Hints of Winter unwelcome — Illusory Hopes of speedy Success —
Castrametation neglected — The British Lines — Turks driven out
of Redoubts — The Russians repulsed by Highlanders and routed
by Heavy Cavalry — The Balaclava Charge — Russian Sortie
from Sevastopol repulsed — Wreck of an Egyptian Ship and
Frigate — Sufferings of the Turkish Troops — Neglect of them
by the Allies — Turkish Hospital at Balaclava — Deaths from
Dysentery and Overtoil — Oriental Indifference to unseen Suffer-
ings — Fatalism and Selfislinesa — ^Lord Raglan interposes — A Ship
Hospital fitted out for Turkish Sick — Lord Raglan's Appreciation
thereof— The Hospital Ship sent back to Constantinople — Rations
of Pork and Rum not available by Mohammedans — Other Supplies
not regularly issued-7-The Turks destitute of Money 325

CHAPTER XXV.

Russian Reinforcements — Prince Mentchikof tries to raise the Siege —
His Choice between two Courses — Russian Plan of Attack —
Conflict at Inkerman — Merits of the respective Troops — Perilous
Position of the British — Timely Aid of the French — Russian
Retreat — Loss of the Assailants — A Prisoner shot by his Captor —
Temptation to a British Sentry — Medals for Balaclava and Inker-
man — Theory of Distribution of War Medals — " Urgent Private
Affairs " — A noble Example — ^Violent Hurricane — Loss of Trans-
ports — Force of the Tempest — Cossacks come to the Rescue —
Damage to Ships of War ^—Captain Christie, R.N. — Court-
Martial ordered upon him — The Case of the Prince Transport
Ship— State of Anchorage at Balaclava — Rear- Admiral Boxer
and Captain Christie yielded to Clamour — ^Posthumous Honours
awarded them ~ 336

CHAPTER XXVL

Dispersion of the Fleets — Preparations for Winter — Helplessness of
English Soldiers — Obvious Precautions neglected — Available
Resources of Constantinople — Mr. Filder, the Commissary-
General — English Sympathy and Aid — Evils of Routine — The
Army pampered — State of Things at Constantinople — Turks
Amazed and Disgusted, but Powerless — Capitulations — Paralysis
of Justice — Consular Privileges abused — Gibbon's Picture of St.
Jean d'Acre realized at Pent — British Subjects abandoned —
Turkish Jails — Public Buildings of Constantinople occupied by
the Allies — The French dominate the City — Aspect and Bearing

CONTENTS. XXI

PAOS

of the Ottomans— Separation of Turks and Europeans — Excep-
tional Gases — Russian Military Schools — Fate of Turkish
Invalids— Turkish Naval Hospital — The Dockyard occupied by
the Allies — Solicitude of a noble Eltchee for Russian Prisoners
— An Ambassador at Constantinople — Military Hospital at
Scutari — Sympathies of Miss Nightingale and Lady Stratford de
Redcliffe — Soyer's Cookery — Sick Ofl&cers lodged in the Imperial
Kiosk — ^Exertions of Colonel Moore's Widow — ^British Cemetery
— French Hospitals at Constantinople — Mortality of French
Surgeons — Boy Soldiers — Scurvy and Dysentery rife — Visitors
— ^Invaluable Services of Sisters of Charity 350

CHAPTER XXVII.

Result of the Battle of Inkerman — Council of War — The Army of the
Danube transferred to the Crimea — The Russians attack Omer
Pasha at Eupatoria and are defeated — Death of the Egyptian
Selim Pasha — Omar Pasha's Tactics— What the Army of Eupa-
toria might have done — Omar Pasha with his Brigade at Sevas-
topol — Comment of the Turks on the Death of the Czar — Tlie
Porte ill able to bear the Absence of their Army in the Crimea —
The Anglo-Turkish Contingent — Its European Officers — Proposal
of the Porte rejected — Head-quarters of tlie Contingent at Buyuk-
dereh — Life of Officers and Men — The Contingent transferred to
Kertch— Skirmish with Cossacks — The Bashi-bazouks — Their
Cost 374

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Brussa destroyed by Earthquake — Strength of tlie Allied Forces
before Sevastopol — Second Bombardment and its Eflfects — The
Malakof the Key of the Position — French Forces predomi-
nant — Sevastopol as fortified by General Todleben — General
Caurobert's Opinion — The Garrison short of Provisions and
Ammunition — The Governor empowered to act on his Judg-
ment — Generals Caurobert and Pelissier — Plans for cutting off
Russian Sui)plies — Mr. Sutler's Organization of Russian Trans-
port Corps — Naval and Military Expedition to open the Sea of
Azof— The Russiiin Garrisons of Kertch and Yenikaleh retire
— Tokens of Amity from the Tartars to tlie Allies — Strange
Conduct of the Allied Troops — Destruction of the Museum at
Kertch — Spoil shipped to Pera — Destitution of Jewish Families
— Destruction of property by the Allied Squadron in the Sea of
Azof — The Russisuis evacuate Soudjouk and Anapa — Return of
the Expedition to Sevastopol — Capture of the Mamelon by the
French — High Expectations of Success — Combined Attack on
the Malakof and Redan — Cause of its Failure — Braver}' of the

ERUATA.

Page 123, line 30,/or " imcensured " read ** uncensorcd."

Page 133, line 6^/or " the Egyptian Hassan Pasha" read ** the Egyptian Admiral

Hassan Pasha."
Page 138, line 23, /or " Certainly not" read "Certainly."

TUEKEY

AND

THE CEIMEAN WAK.

CHAPTER I.

Origin of the Ottoman Nation — Otliman Founder of the Turkish Monarchy
— Sultan Amurath I. defeats the Sclayonic League — Bajazet suhju-
gates Asia Minor — He is defeated and taken Gaptiye hy Tamerlane
— ^Mahomet I. and his Descendants consolidate the Empire —
Syria and Egypt suhdued by Selim I. — Amurath IV. captures
Bagdad — Eastern Empire of the Turks — Policy of the House of
Othman — Reign of Sultan Mahomet IV. — Power of the Sultans —
Policy of Sultan Mahmoud — The Janissaries and their Organiza-
tion — Their Destruction and its Consequences — The Reforms of
Bultan Mahomet 11. — Fires in Constantinople— Pertef Pasha —
Death and Burial of Sultan Mahmoud.

The Ottoman nation^ like other nations which have
achieved greatness, rose from a small beginning. A
few hmidred Turcoman families, living in tents, like
the Turcomans and Kurds of the present day, formed
its nucleus. Under their chief, Ertogrul, they led a
pastoral life, in the dominions of the Sultan of Boum ;
whose capital, originally Nice until its capture by
the Crusaders (a.d. 1097), was Iconium. The kingdom

2 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

of Koum was a fragment of the empire, extending from
Samarcand to Egypt, consolidated by Alp Arslan, a
lineal descendant of Seljuk, which, breaking up on the
death of Malek Shah, resolved itself into four states, each
ruled by a prince of the Seljukian line.

Othman, the son of Ertogrul, entered early the
military service of the Sultan of Roum; he acquired
favour and influence there, and on the abdication of his
suzerain succeeded to the throne, a.d. 1299. The fallen
dynasty retained wealth and spiritual honours, and its
representative, the MoUah-Hunkiar, has since enjoyed
the right to gird with the sabre of power every sultan of
Turkey on his accession. Othman, the son of Ertogrul,
was the founder of the Turkish monarchy, and the Turks
by birth or adoption have since been styled Ottomans or
Osmanleys.

The Ottomans looked upon the dissolving Eastern
empire as their inheritance. Vigorously led, brave, and
united by a fervent religious belief, they despised alike
the arms and sophistry of the Greeks, who betrayed
their sense of weakness by sending in nominal marriage
a daughter of the imperial house to Sultan Orchan.
In the course of three generations they transferred their
capital, first to Brussa, next to Adrianople. Their neigh-
bourhood disturbed the repose of the Byzantines, and
roused the Bulgarians, Servians, and Albanians to arms ;
but the tardy valour of the latter was of no more
avail than the processions of the former. Amurath I.,
the founder of the Janissaries, overthrew their army,
and broke the Sclavonic league formed against him, at
the battle of Kossova, a.d. 1390. As the victor sur-
veyed the field of battle on the following day, a Servian

BAJAZET CAPTURED BY TAMERLANE. 3

started up from among a heap of slain and revenged his
comrades hy a blow of his yataghan, of which the Sultan
died, in the seventy-second year of his age and the
thirty-first of his reign. The tide of success continued
to flow on under his son Bajazet, sumamed Ilderim
(lightning). He curbed the aspirations of the emirs of
Anatolia, who ill bore the ascendancy of the house of
Othman; he subjugated the country from the Hellespont
to Mount Hsemus ; and he vanquished a confederate army
under Sigismund, king of Hungary, at the battle of Nico-
polis. The hour then arrived for the salutary trial of
adversity ; that ordeal which developes the virtues of a race
and discloses its tendencies. Every nation which has
acquired eminence has been early tempered by that trial.
The want of it proved fatal to the empire whose capital
had known neither infancy nor adolescence. Born of a
master will, "new Kome '' sprang at once, untrained,
untutored, into adult existence, with the wealth of
nations at command to gratify the passions of a corrupt
age. Success had made Bajazet arrogant, and his
arrogance had aroused the jealousy of Tamerlane, popu-
larly known as Timour the Tartar. Mutual reproaches
and defiance led naturally to war. The Tartar and
Turkish armies, both of common origin, met on the
plain of Angora, " each led by its sovereign in person
and animated by his rancour. In the battle which
ensued, July, 1402, victory remained faithful to her
favourite. The Turkish army was routed ; Bajazet
was taken prisoner, and Asia Minor lay at the feet
of the conqueror. The fruit of a century of toil
and courage, the work of Othman, Orchan, and
Amurath, seemed lost in a day. But the Ottomans

1—2

4 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

had not accomplished their allotted task ; the promise
of Mohammed of Constantinople for the ** faithful "
had to be fulfilled. Tamerlane, therefore, satisfied
with success and revenge, retired to his dominions
beyond the Caspian, leaving the Turkish empire to
be contended for by the four sons of Bajazet, the
eldest of whom, Mahomet, after ten years of civil
strife, remained the victor and ascended the throne of
his father at Adrianople. Mahomet I. reconsolidated
the Ottoman empire ; his son, Amurath II., strength-
ened its foundations by wise legislation ; and his
grandson, Mahomet 11., by the aid of a monster
cannon, wrought by a Venetian, throwing 600-pound
balls, crowned the edifice by the conquest of Constan-
tinople, 29th May, 1453. Mournful day! when the
last Constantine fell nobly in the breach, slain by a
vulgar hand; and the first cathedral, reared before the
birth of Islaniy rung with the praises of Mohammed.

This catastrophe revealed to central Europe the exis-
tence of a great and menacing Moslem power, and
showed the Italian republics the folly of having
allowed their policy to be shaped solely by mer-
cantile considerations. Hungary with Transylvania
became the battle-field of the German and Turkish
empires; while the Venetians and Genoese sank from
their haughty position under the Greek emperors to
the humble condition of suitors for commercial favours
at the feet of a slave of the Sultan. SeUm I., the third
in succession from the conqueror, subduing Syria and
Egypt, dethroned together with the Mamlouk dynasty
the titular caJiph of the Fatimite Une, seated in mock
state at Cairo, and transferred, a.d. 1516, the relics of

EASTERN EMPIRE OB^ THE TURKS. 6

the Prophet and other insignia of the caliphate from his
palace to the imperial seraglio. The eleventh in descent,
Amorath lY., the last Sultan who took the field in person,
wrested Bagdad from the Persians. In possession of
the ^'holy cities/' and the famous seats of the caliphate,
the house of Othman, invested thereby with the reli-
gious and historic associations dear to Islam, became
lustrous in the eyes of the Moslem world, and but
for its Scythian origin the lofty title of ** Commander
of the Faithful " * might have been awarded by common
consent to its chief.

The tenacious hold of the Eastern Empire by the Turks,
encamped amidst disaflfected peoples with whom fusion
was next to impossible, and menaced by powerful neigh-
bours animated by religious hostility, forms a remarkable
passage in history. They had taken that empire literally
in pieces. They reconstructed it. They reannexed to it
the Mesopotamian provinces ceded, with part of Armenia,
to the Persians by the Emperor Jovian, as the price of his
retreat from the Tigris with the remnant of Julian the
Apostate's army. They added to it the African presi-
dencies, part of the Western Empire, also Dacia, never
ruled firmly even by Rome ; and, with garrisons in
Hungary, they included in their dominion the extreme
point of Arabia, far beyond the Roman sway, Aden —
the refuge of Cain, according to the Arabs. With their
power recognized East and West, they sent, during

• ** Commander of the Faithful " was one of the titles of the Caliph,
and in virtue of it his name was mentioned in the Khoutbey (Fiiday noon
prayer) in every mosque. That distinction ceased with the fall of the
Abbassides. Since then each state has mentioned only its own sove-
reign in the Khoutbey. Moslems in countries ruled by sovereigns of
another faith mention as Commander of the Faithful the Sultan of Boum
(Turkey) in their Khoutbey.

6 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

the reign of Solyman the Magnificent, in a fleet built
expressly at Suez, an army to India against the
Portuguese ; and their diversion in Hungary and Naples
in favour of France, leading Charles V. to raise
the sieges of Marseilles and Aries, and retire with
his forces behind the Var, readjusted the European
balance of power. Haireddin Pasha (Barbarossa), with
the ambassador of the eldest son of the Church for his
guest, the negotiator of the treaty of alliance defensive
and offensive between Francis I. and the Ottoman Porte,
carried away captive in his galleys on that occasion
many thousand Italians from Brindisi and Otranto.

The House of Othman avoided dynastic complica-
tions and evaded that rule of inheritance which gives
precedence to the eldest of the race — fecund source of
Asiatic civil discord — by usages calculated to prevent col-
lateral extension and facilitate direct succession. The
princes of the blood, state prisoners virtually from the
hour of their father's death, were given concubines for
toys, and the princesses of the blood were married, for
little more than form's sake, to pashas who were generally
relegated to distant governments, with the charge of
maintaining their royal wives' establishments. The
issue of these unions, if female, might be reared ; but the
duty of perpetuating the imperial race devolved upon the
Sultan. No son, traditional testimony leading to that
conclusion, bom to or of any other member of the
family, survived to gladden its mother's heart with its
prattle; nor did the exception, proving the rule thus
far, occur until the reign of the thirtieth Sultan,
Mahmoud II. His eldest daughter's son attained the
age of five years and then died. His heir. Sultan Abdul

THE OTTOMAN DYNASTY. 7

Medjid, was equally tolerant of his brother, who, on his
accession, produced a son four years old, whose existence
had been a family secret ; but the boy was then recognized,
and registered at the Porte as a prince of the imperial
race. Infanticide, however, was rare, recourse being had
to an expedient to which allusion is sufficient ; and which,
becoming with such high sanction interwoven with the
domestic economy of private harems, may be considered
one of the causes (precocious marriage aiding) of the dis
proportionate female mortality among the Moslem popu-
lation of the capital.

Thus the Ottoman dynasty became, like the Nile
among rivers, a solecism : a stately stem without
branches, as the other is a noble stream without afflu-
ents. The direct succession of the first fourteen
Sultans is proof that each of them survived his uncles ;
whether fairly or unfairly cannot, in regard of all, be
affirmed. History only records three Sultans guilty
of the death of their brothers, the number of whom
in one instance exceeded fifty ; and in the absence of
evidence we may be allowed to assume that the princes
in general died naturally: some of them, perhaps, of
tedium vitce. They were sensually pampered, intel-
lectually starved ; they had no healthy pursuits, no
manly diversions ; they had much to fear, nothing to
hope for; their society was composed of treacherous
eunuchs, fawning pages, dissolute buffoons, and fanatic
moUahs. When 'sickness oppressed them why try to
combat it with nauseous drugs and insipid diet ? Better
lie down and die. Moslem resignation is often the
indifference to Ufe generated by mental and physical
languor, and sometimes the impatience of it, bom of

8 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

*' the law's delay," and '' the insolence of oflfice/' The
nation approved of an arrangement the. advantages of
which it shared without the responsibility ; all it required
was, security for the succession, in case of the Sultan
having no son, or one of tender age.

The fortunes of the Ottomans culminated in the
reign of Sultan Mahomet IV. That reign witnessed the
conquest of Crete ; the phenomenon of a series of able,
upright grand viziers of one family — the Kiuprogloas,
whose still respected tomb faces the column erected by
the first Consttmtine in the centre of his forum, — and the
siege of Vienna, A.D. 1683. The Turkish army before
Vienna clamoured for an assault for the sake of plunder ;
its commander, Kara Mustapha, temporized for a capitu-
lation for the sake of ransom : the plunder would belong to
the troops, the ransom to their general and his friends in
the capital. This hesitation gave time for Sobieski and
his Poles to arrive to the rescue. The tide then turned,
and, sweeping the Ottomans out of Hungary, where their
horsetails had floated in the breeze for above a century, it
continued to ebb slowly and fitfully, occasionally checked
by a transient breeze of prosperity, until it reached low-
water mark in the reign of Sultan Mahmoud II. ; of which
I shall speak more at length, since out of its events
grew the Eastern question. In that reign, for the first
time, revolt was successful, and peace was accompanied
by humiliation. The Greeks, cheered in their struggle
and finally aided by Western Europe, gained indepen-
dence, and the Russians exacted a pecuniary indemnity
at the peace of Adrianople ; and then, organized by an
aspiring rebel, the despised fellahs of Egypt, crossing
the Taurus, overthrew the imperial army at Konia,

POWER OP THE SULTAN. 9

the cradle of the monarchy. Their further advance,
beyond Kutaieh, was deterred by the disembarkation, in
February, 1833, of a Russian army on the Asiatic ^hore
of the Bosphorus : direct evidence of the distress of the
monarchy, thus reduced to crave aid from its hereditary foe
— the foe destined, in its own opinion, to deal by the Tur-
kish as the Turks had dealt by the Lower Empire.

Sultan Mahmoud's reign was a prolonged struggle
with his people for power. Theoretically absolute, the
power of the Sultan of Turkey had for generations been
practically limited by custom ; which in the East has the
force of law : often more. Adet dir (it is the custom) is the
excuse and the apology for abuses and anomaUes whose
name is legion. The Sultan might, unquestioned, decapi-
tate individuals and confiscate their goods ; but he dared
not oppress the community nor levy taxes unauthorized
by law. He might fill his harem with strange women, but
he dared not peer through the harem lattice of the
meanest of his subjects. The seduction of a Turkish
lady by Sultan Ibrahim filled the measure of his unpopu-
larity and determined the storm which deposed him.
The Tartar race, which sprang into notice under Othman,
regarded him as their chief, tacitly elected. They swore
fealty for themselves and posterity to the family of the
founder of the dynasty ; but reserved the right to choose
the worthiest of it to reign. When the line of conquer-
ing Sultans, followed joyously by the nation, ended,
their eflFeminate successors found themselves circum-
scribed by institutions silently grown out of the tradi-
tions of their nomade ancestors, of which the Kour-
shaltui was prominent. The Turkish nation, unable to
free itself from the obligation of passive obedience

10 TURKEY AND THE CRIAfEAN WAR.

ordained by the Koran, placed that volume beside the
throne, and empowered the Scheick ul Islam, the chief of
the Ulema, to interpret its meaning to the Sultan, and
remind him of his obligation also to govern according to
law. This restraint, aided by the domestic arrangement
before spoken of, has caused the comparative stability of
the Ottoman family among Moslem dynasties, the cohesion
of the heterogeneous elements composing the vast empire
under its sway. The Caliphate had been nearer the
fountain of Islam, invested moreover with a sacred
character ; yet each of its branches having run through
the cycle of conquest, torpor and decay sank under the
withering influence of a despotism which none dared
gainsay. The Ottoman monarchy — solecism in the East
— possessed a constitution : defective, and in a state of
chronic disorder, but still a roughly balanced system.

The tragedy enacted at Constantinople by the Janis-
saries and Mustafa Bairactar * which terminated with the

* In 1807 the Janissaries deposed Selim 111. in favour of Mustafa,
the eldest of his two nephews, the sons of Saltan Hamid. On hearing
of the fall of his patron, Mustafa Bairactar, the pasha of Eudschuk,
raised an army of Albanians and marched on Constantinople to rein-
state him. Overawing the city, he traversed it with his force to the
outer wall of the seraglio. Chamberlains met him there, and demanded,
in the name of Sultan Mustafa, his object. ** I know no other Sultan
than Selim ; let him appear and I will give an answer," said the
Bairactar. Sultan Mustafa sent word to him in rejoinder to wait a
little and Sultan Selim would appear. In half-an-hour the Bairactar
was admitted into the outer court, and there saw the dead body of the
unfortunate Selim, victim to his zeal. He at once stormed the inner
courts, deposed Sultan Mustafa, and transferred his brother Mahmoud
from the recess in which, it is said, the architect of the palace had
concealed him, to the throne. Sultan Mahmoud II. made Mustafa
Bairactar the grand vizier ; but he did not long fill that post. The
Janissaries in revenge soon afterwards set fire to his residence, in the
flames of which he perished.

POLICY OF MAHMOUD. 11

accession, a.d. 1808, of Sultan Mahmoud II. over the
bodies of his uncle Selim III. and his brother Mustapha III.,
was of a nature to make him ponder over cause and eflFect.
Mahmoud came to the conclusion that the disorganiza-
tion of the empire was due to institutional checks on the
sovereign's will — in the shape of Dere-beySj or feudal
nobles, some of whom were of older standing in the land
than the reigning house ; of the Timarlees, a tithe-endowed
gentry ; of the Ulema, a religio-legal estabhshment ; and
more than all, of a popular element, the Janissaries. He
resolved to remove those checks. He pursued that
resolve imperturbably ; he bent every consideration to it ;
and by remaining the last of his race during many years
was free from seditious interruption. He cut oflF, with
few exceptions, the Dere-beys ; some by force, some by
treachery, and impoverished their families by confisca-
tion of their estates. He dispersed the Timarlees, and he
suppressed the popular voice by his celebrated act, the
destruction of the Janissaries. He shattered the idols of
his nation as his prophet had shattered the idols of the
Caaba ; but less eflFectively. Religious idols broken drop
at once into the limbo of oblivion, while social idols over-
thrown leave memories behind them. To weaken these,
he proscribed, so far as he dared, the national garb and
traditional usages. The Ulema alone of the noticeable
classes were allowed to follow their fathers' fashions :
they continued to wear turbans and yellow slippers, to
sit cross-legged on sofas and speak oracularly of the
signs of the times. But deprived of their right arm,
the Janissaries, their influence became of the kind
termed moral; which self-willed monarchs in general make
light of.

12 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The Janissaries have been likened to the Pretorian
guards at Borne, but the resemblance is only specious.
The Pretorians were mercenary troops of various races,
quartered apart from the people ; they sold the empire
to the highest bidder, or to him from whom they
expected most indulgence ; they made whom they pleased
emperor — an illiterate Hljxian, a sedate Spaniard, or
a polished Italian; and when their choice turned out
good, the merit was scarcely theirs. The Janissaries,
on the contrary, were, during the greater part of their
existence, composed exclusively of Turkish citizens,
and they never looked outside the house of Othman for
a sovereign. If the prince elevated by them to the
throne proved no better than his predecessor, the fault
was not theirs, for they had no other choice. They were
in their origin an army of converted Christians, given,
when children, as tribute to the conquerors ; but this
tribute, being at variance with the letter and spirit of
the Koran, soon ceased, and kJmradj was paid instead.
Native-bom Turks took their place. In time the body
expanded into a national guard of armed citizens, pur-
suing, with martial habits, their respective avocations in
peace, and ready to follow the Sultan in war. They aided
the tent sultans to build up the empire ; they prevented
the harem sultans from pulling it to pieces. Their
credit led the people, high and low, to inscribe their
names in one or other of their oHaSj with preference for
those distinguished in the wars of the empire. They
were divided into numerous ortas of unequal strength.
Each orta had an oda (guard-house) at Constantinople,
with a permanent staff and a sufficient number of citizens
for police and garrison duty. An ulufe (gratification)

THE JANISSARIES. 13

of ninety paras a bead was given once in three months,
and on the accession of a Sultan, to the active force :
which received also rations. Their chief, the Janissaiy
Aga, held the second rank in the hierarchy of the empire,
and with his two lieutenants had the right to attend at the
Sultan's stirrup on Friday. Each Janisstu^ was indelibly
marked on the arm with the number and emblem of his
orta, which faciUtated recognition of the slain in battle :
a fish, for example, was the emblem of the 25th, the
favourite orta, which generally numbered 20,000 names
on its roll. The 31st and 64th ortas were also popular.
In the provinces, registration in an orta, though less
observed than in the capital, was general ; so much so,
that Janissaries and the adult male Turkish population
were nearly convertible terms. The practice of civic
virtue, as it entails inconvenience, is never zealous. The
home-loving ConstantinopoUtans made no exception to
the rule, and therefore in the course of time the guard-
house and garrison service fell into the hands of a low,
idle set, apt materials for demagogues to work with, who
often made themselves as odious to the peaceable citizens
as to the seraglio. Strangers, prone everywhere to see
the abuse and overlook the use of an institution, saw
in them the Janissaries, and took no note of the vast
organization of which they were the exaggerated
expression. When their discontent was popular, they
were the citizens of Constantinople ; when unpopular,
they stood alone. Such was their position as their fatal
hour drew near.

The Ulema and the people, enlightened by the dis-
credit of the Grecian war of independence, concurred
with the Sultan in the state necessity of a reorganization

14 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

of the Janissaries^ and the Sheick ul Islam gave his
fetwah, sanctioning compulsion* With this moral support,
Sultan Mahmoud — himself enrolled, Uke his predecessors,
in the first orta of the Janissaries — invited them to submit
to rules and discipline conducive to military eflficiency.
Distrust marred the negotiation which ensued between the
seraglio and the ortas. The Janissaries suspected ulterior
designs, and misled by their aga, who had been gained
over to the imperial side, under-estimated the force ready
to be arrayed against them. On their final refusal to come
to terms, with arms in their hands and their soup-kettles
reversed, the Sultan, displaying the holy standard, sum-
moned the citizens to rally round it or remain in their
houses ; then, 26th June, 1826, he attacked the mutineers
(who, dismayed by their isolation, made a sorry resistance)
with the topchis, galiondgis and a body of zeymenSj and
destroyed them with grapeshot, sword, and fire. Many
hundreds perished in the flames of their odas on the
Etmeidan. Daily, during a month afterwards, citizens
accused of reactionary tendencies were brought before a
commission, sitting ad hoc in ei tent pitched in the Hippo-
drome. Their interrogatory was short, their condenma-
tion inevitable. After the form of an inquiry, they were
strangled then and there, and their bodies, collected at
sunset, were conveyed in a cart to Akher Kapou, and
thrown into the Propontis. Similar scenes on a smaller
scale were enacted in the chief provincial cities. Many
fell victims to revenge ; several were strangled for their
wealth.

Sultan Mahmoud was then master of the situation ;
as every one in the East is who strikes a heavy unex-
pected blow. He might then have reorganized the insti-

THE JANISSARIES DESTROYED. 15

•

tution, had he chosen to make the attempt ; following the
example of the most sagacious of his ancestors, Soliman
I., after the suppression of the revolt of the Janissaries
excited by their jealousy of his creation of the corps of
Bostandgis. He might then have regenerated Turkey in
a Turkish sense : the sense most becoming an Ottoman's
consideration. No one could affirm that the Janissaries,
as an institution, had proved detrimental to Turkey ; their
grasp of the Eastern Empire of the Caesars, with extended
frontiers, was evidence of their loyalty and devotion
during centuries : all that could be said was, that a faction,
making its will prevail over reason, had long defied all
attempts to adopt their organization to altered circum-
stances. With Janissaryism the Ottoman dynasty had
traversed five centuries, defiant and self-reliant : without
it, in the course of thirteen years (between 1826 and 1840)
it was twice on the brink of destruction, and was saved
each time from faUing into the abyss by the friendly arm
of foreign intervention. With the institution unreformed,
rational government might demonstrably be despaired of :
without it, in one* form or another, Turkey, it might be
apprehended, would become a Byzantine empire ; an estate
to feed a luxurious capital.

History inclines us to think that a nation's progress
or regeneration is mainly conditional on adherence to the
rule or principle of its growth, tempered in practice to
modified social relations ; because that, harmonizing with
popular instincts and traditions, is intelligible to the mass.
Peter the Great, despotic by the suppression of the
Strehtzes, respected Muscovitism embodied in the
boyards and the priesthood. The Anglo-Americans, with
independence, remained English at heart, with the

16 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

•

representative and municipal institutions of the old
country. Both' Bussia and the United States, faithful
to tradition, have since progressed with great strides in
power and consideration. Spain, on the contrary, dis-
carded her cortes and fueros, and ridden by the Inqui-
sition retrograded from a high to an inferior place in the
scale of nations. The greatest of reformers, Mohammed,
while touching everything Arabian with a refining rod,
respected social usage. He found the Arabs idolatrous,
he made them devout ; he elevated their thoughts from
the worship of images to the adoration of an invisible,
eternal Being ; but he left them the excitement of their
fantastic whirl round the Caaba, and their beUef in the
mystic virtues of zem-zem water, drawn from the well
at which they beUeve Hagar filled her bottle for the
lad Ishmael ; and though he disturbed custom by elimin-
ating from their calendar its intercalary days, deference
for the Mosaic arrangement reconciled them to the
innovation. He found them discordant tribes addicted
to internecine strife, he left them a nation of warriors
united by the stimulus of the glory of propagating their
faith by the sword. He found them polygamists, he left
them such, but he gave woman rights. He found them
slave-owners, he left them such, but he enjoined kind
treatment of the slave, with manumission after seven
years' faithful service ; and, animated by his example,
Omar, the second Caliph, who collated the pages of the
Koran, ordained the freedom of the bondswoman preg-
nant by her master, with the legitimacy of her oflfspring.
He proclaimed the equality of Moslems before God ; but
he recognized the pre-eminence of the tribe of Koreish,
and the merit of ancient lineage in man as well as

REFORMS OF MOMAMMED, 17

horse. An exception appears. He found the Arabs
dirty, he made them cleanly by religious obligation. One
hundred and forty milUons of Moslems worshipping one
God with Uke forms, all prostrate, thrice or oftener a
day, with clean hands and feet, their faces turned towards
Mecca, attest the vitality of his legislation in the thir-
teenth century after his death ; and the absence of worldly
distinctions in the mosque reveals its fraternal spirit.
Black and white, rich and poor, — the Ethiopian and the
Tartar, the jewelled sirdar and the uncombed fakir, —
kneel down side by side on the same carpet, and listen
together to prayer recited in the old Arabian dialect.
The seragUo, with closed portals jealously guarded, is
the shrine of autocracy ; but the mosque, with its doors
wide open from dawn till after sunset, inviting all to
enter for repose, meditation, or prayer, is the temple of
democracy. The Sadr'azam enters with viziral attend-
ance ; no one regards, no one makes room for him : the
mendicant is at home, is his equal there.

Writers on Turkey, in dilating on the excesses of the
Janissaries, have seldom paused to examine if some justi-
fication may not have been pleaded. One of their earliest
recorded risings, that in the reign of Amurath III.,
merits notice for the moral, more recently applicable, to
be drawn from it. Their motive on that occasion was
the debasement of the coin of the realm, the favourite
resource of improvident governments until the discovery
of an ingenious substitute — inconvertible paper money.
They demanded the head of the vizir who had sanc-
tioned the measure, of the master of the mint who had
struck the base coin, and of the defterdar who had
paid the troops with it. The sacrifice of those heads

18 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

appeased the sedition, and this example long retarded
the depreciation of the money. Writers also have
been in the habit of connecting the current ills of
Turkey with the Janissaries, and in particular have
invariably attributed to their malice the fires of Con-
stantinople. No theory has ever been more contro-
verted by the logic of facts. Fires have raged, as
frequently since as in their time, in the capital and
the provinces. Every year has been marked by fires
more or less calamitous. Pera, with its churches and
embassy hotels, was burnt to the ground six years
after their fall ; and the greatest fire seen at Constanti-
nople for half a century — called, for distinction, hank
kibir (the great fire) — occurred in August, 1865, con-
suming in its progress, during twenty-three hours, across
the city from Hodja Pasha on the Golden Horn to Yeni
Kapou on the Propontis, a score of mosques, some
churches, many public establishments, and more than
2,000 dwellings.* In the ensuing months of March,
April, and May, 1866, three other fires in Constanti-
nople, respectively at Psamatia, Balata, and Bakchc
Kapousou, consumed together more than 2,000 houses
or shops, with several mosques and other public edifices.
The wonder is not that there are so many fires, but that

* D*apre8 lea docnments presentes par le comite, le grand incendie
de Hodja pacha a consume yingt-sept qaartiers qui contenaient 1879
iiiaisons, 751 boutiques, 18 khans, 7 bains, 22 mosquees, 8 teket^
18 ecoles, 7 medresxes, 3 ^glises, 2 imarets, 6 corps de garde, 87 fon-
taines, et 4 sehiU. Si Ton ajoute a ces chiffres celui des pertes immo-
bilieres caus^es par trois autres incendies, savoir : 18 maisons et 87
boutiques brulees a Ortakeuy ; 78 maisons et 48 boutiques, a Balat ;
57 maisons et 41 boutiques, a Y^dik-pacha, le nombre total des con-
structions de toutes sortes r^duites en cendres dans ces quatre incendies
s'el^ve a ^fi20,— Official Paper.

FIRES IN CONSTANTINOPLE. 19

they are not more numerous at Constantinople, con-
sidering the materials of the houses, the carelessness of
their inmates, the deficiency of water, and the absence
of organization. In olden days the fountains ran freely,
and the Grand Vizir attended on the spot with means to
stimulate, zeal and deter plunderers; his purse-bearer
distributed gold to some, his cavasses dealt blows to others.
The fire service of Constantinople is become in some
respects worse than formerly. It is composed of the
eliUj not of the unwashed, for there are none in a land
where the bath is an institution, but of the rabble of
the city ; dare-devil lads, who rush, on the cry yanghen
rar, to the various pump-stations, in light racing
costume, i.e., with bare arms, legs, and necks. Their
progress through the streets, at the top of their speed,
to the fire from all quarters, the pump-bearers being
relieved every five minutes, is a veritable stampedo.
The halt and the blind slink into comers on their
approach, and old women cry aman ! as they pass.
Their services are voluntary ; their remuneration is pre-
carious, being derived, it is said, from those on whose
houses they favourably pump, when water is procurable.
They, the street dogs, and the eunuchs form the visible
link between the past and the present. The Janissaries
may have set fire occasionally — the fire spreading — to an
obnoxious functionary's konak ; but they had recognized
modes of showing discontent, other than kindling a
conflagration Ukely to devour their own houses. They
formed the guard of honour hning the streets on the
Sultan's Friday progress to and from mosque ; and while
fans borne aloft by pages screened the imperial counte-
nance, theirs was open to the inquisitive scrutiny of the

2—2

20 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

imperial suite. If indications of ill-humour appeared, dis-
creet inquiries would be made into the cause. They
had also the airjak divan^ rarely resorted to — an open-air
** meeting,'* clamorous for redress on some capital point,
before the seragho gates.

The situation created by the destruction of the Janis-
saries soon made itself felt. The observation, Who now
will restrain the Sultan ? cost the poet Izzet MoUah his
head.

Sultan Mahmoud had by his side in Pertef Pasha,
commonly styled the last of the Turks, — of the Turks
who were loyal without flattery, hospitable without
ostentation, self-respectful without arrogance, and who
with the vices possessed the virtues of a dominant race, — .
the man to aid him in the task of reforming Janissaryism
and germane institutions. Pertef Pasha aimed at the
development of an Eastern civilization, based on respect
for national usages and predilections. An Eastern civili-
zation consisted in adapting existing institutions to
modern requirements, in purifying tradition of error
by education, and seeking knowledge everywhere, eVen
(in the words of the Koran) in China. The refinement
and prosperity attained by the Moorish kingdom of
Cordova under the Omeyah dynasty was on record
to show the coinpatibihty of eminence in arts, science,
and agriculture with the tenets of the Koran. The
Cordovan schools were famous throughout Europe,
particularly the school of medicine founded by Abdur-
rahman III. Instinct may have told him that a civi-
lization, the result of an amalgamation of usages derived
from antagonistic principles, would prove inherently weak
and superficial. An Oriental poUsh seemed to him

PERTEF PASHA— SULTAN MAIIMOUD. 21

preferable to a Western varnish. Pertef Pasha, however,
did not long retain favour. He saw idolatry in the
honours ordered to be paid to the Sultan's portrait,
and impolicy in the course pursued towards Mehemet
Ali pasha of Egypt. His enemies took advantage
of his outspoken frankness on these tender points.
They represented him to the Sultan as one kneaded
with the old leaven. They attained a decree for his
exile to Adrianople, and soon afterwards, fearing his
return, an order to the governor of that city to send
his soul ** back to its eternal abode.*'

Sultan Mahmoud had a dominant passion — revenge,
and a prominent defect — incapacity to regard an object
from two points of view. Their combined operation
had made him, in earlier life, attack out of season Ali
Tepelen, pasha of Yanina, and it drove him into his
disastrous second Egyptian war, in the course of which
his troubled reign terminated. His velleity for Ali
Tepelen's head blinded .him to the danger, greater
than that of any satrap's contumacy, of a Grecian revolt,
and his animosity against Mehemet Ali, making him
resent pacifioi counsel as treason, led to consequences
subversive of Oriental faith in Ottoman infallibility.
He was spared the sorrow of draining the cup of bitter-
ness to its dregs by dying a few hours before the news
of the battle of Nezib, fatal to the Turkish arms,
reached Constantinople. He had sent an order to Hafiz
Pasha, the Grand Vizir, to give battle on a certain day,
named auspicious by the court astrologer, but, before the
bey entrusted with it reached the scene of action, the
battle had been fought, and Hafiz was a fugitive. Next
followed the defection of the Turkish flaet under Achmet

22 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Pasha ; whose rise m a few years from the position of
stroke-oarsman in the imperial caik* to the post of
Capitan pasha, had excited jealousy. On his sovereign's
death, Khosrew Pasha, Achmet's enemy, sent the nazir of
the naval arsenal to the Dardanelles with an order for the
immediate return of the fleet to the Bosphorus ;' sending
also hy the same hand instructions to the capitana bey
to strangle his chief, if contumacious, and take the
command. Achmet Pasha, however, intercepted the nazir
on his way to the capitana bey's ship. His departure in
a steamer to save his Ufe would have been viewed indul-
gently ; but his taking the fleet with him to Alexandria
was unpardonable.* . . .

Sultan Mahmoud expired in a kiosk, at Scutari,
June 30, 1839. Having throughout his reign wielded
the executioner's blade vigorously, and the warrior's
sabre feebly, he was not regretted. His remains, after
ablution, were conveyed over the water to the old
seragUo, and laid out on a mat, symboUc of the Moslem
sense of equality in death. His son, Abdul Medjid,
having looked at them, ordered their interment — the
first and indispensable act of sovereignty; then pro-
ceeded to the KouValii for the ceremony of heeat (sub-
mission) . This ceremony, which takes place in one of
the vast courts of the seraglio, surrounded by struc-
tures of all forms and ages, is Asiatic. The Sultan
stands alone, unguarded, while the dignitaries of state
successively, on bended knees, kiss his feet ; and in that

* Ahmed Pasha, surnamed firari (deserter), remained in Egypt after
the treaty of 1841 ; and died there soon afterwards from the effects of
poison : administered to him, it is said, hy Mehemet Ali Pasha, in a cup
of coffee. His two sons are well placed in the service of the Porte at
Constantinople.

FUNERAL OF .THE SULTAN. 23

abject posture — regarded with as much indifiference
by the ipectatoi!^ as by the dogs at their feet .or the
storks above their heads — do not receive a glance from
the object of their adcyration. A few paces off, in a kiosk
beyond the ** gate of felicity/* the dead Sultan's body has
been in the meanwhile encoffined, as simply as a mendi-
cant's; and when his successor turns his back on his lieges,
pages carry it through the throng of anxious courtiers
who the day before were at its feet to the imperial gate,
when the people take it and bear it on their shoulders
to the mausoleum prepared for its reception, mounted
eunuchs in advance scattering money right and left.

24 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER II.

Sultan Abdul Medjid — The Tanzimat and its Results — Abrupt Transi-
tions in the Administration — The Army and Conscription — Bri-
gandage— pLeuity of the late Sultan — Official Corruption — Red-
shid Pasha — His Policy — The Medjlises, or Boards — Authority and
Power of the old Vizirs — Mode of dealing with rebellious Vizirs —
Government without an Army — Decentralization of Finance — The
Navy — ^Effects of Centralization — Conciliation of the Rajahs advis-
able — Retrospect of an ancient Turk.

By the subversion of tbe ancient Turkish constitution,
Sultan Mahmoud, uniting all the powers of the State in
his own person, became, as an Arabian caliph, Mohammed's
vicegerent, responsible for his acts to none on earth. He
transmitted this terrible power to his son, Abdul Medjid
Khan, then eighteen years of age, to use or abuse as he
might see fit. Brought up by his Georgian mother with
other sentiments, Sultan Abdul Medjid was, neverthe-
less, of the race of Othman — a race prone to, and
with difficulty restrained from, the abuse of power;
being taught by flattery to believe in its divine right.
The people, wearied by foreign and domestic strife,
watched with intense anxiety for indications of his
poUcy. Another five years of his father's rule would
have exhausted the empire, morally and physically. He
did not long keep them in suspense. He tranquillized
their fears, and justified their hopes, by his tanzimat
(reforms) proclaimed four months after his accession.

REFORMS OF SULTAN ABDUL MEDJID, 25

This famous proclamation, conceived in a spirit of
clemency and tolerance, inaugurated a new era for
Turkey. The direct power of death by decapitation was
taken from scores of vizirs ; the indirect power of death
by vexation, from hundreds of inferior station. Oriental
ductility was severely tested. An ensanguined nation
was ordered to be gentle, and the order was obeyed-
Pashas used to rule with the sabre were required to rule
by exhortation. Mudirs and agas, wont to admonish
rayas with the stick, were enjoined to be civil to them.
The exhaustion of the nation, after twenty years of
unparalleled sufifering, favoured the experiment: any-
thing for quiet was the universal aspiration. The
Ottomans, with the instincts of a dominant race, adapted
themselves to altered circumstances; they leant upon
their prestige, and it did not fail them. Fatalists, they
were not sorry to see their Sultan cease, of his own
accord, to be the direct instrument of fate in regard of
them.

The tanzimat, skilfully drawn up by Redshid Efendi,
afterwards Bedshid Pasha, so as not to alarm the
susceptibilities of the Moslems, nor unduly excite the
expectations of the rayas, shadowed forth rather than
indicated organic changes. It embodied a declaration
of sorrow for the past, with an assurance of improved
government for the future. It deplored the excesses of
delegated authority, and the abuse of monopohes, and it
promised protection to life, honour, and property thence-
forwards : a promise which has been fairly kept. It left
every one free to draw his own deduction from its tenour,
and gave no one the right to say that the Sultan and his
advisers had bound themselves to any definite course.

26 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

This has been the sum and substance of the famous
Hatti Sherif proclaimed at Gul-baneh, in the face of the
world, Nov. 3, 1839. Under its healing influence, trade
and agriculture revived, while the charm of luxuriating
in yalis on the banks of the Bosphorus, without seeing
the sword of Damocles suspended overhead, has recon-
ciled the upper class to diminished personahty.

But the transition from one extreme to the other
proved too abrupt. The infliction of death, recklessly
resorted to for centuries, and exciting no keen terror
among a people hardily nurtured, some under the dogma,
some under the idea of predestination, was suddenly
abolished in a country without the knowledge of
secondary punishment other than the bastinado: also
forbidden by the tanzimat, though still occasionally
irregularly administered. The administration, hitherto
systematically decentralized, was centralized now, in an
empire without roads, a post-office, or newspapers;*
save two salaried gazettes, in Turkish and French
respectively, of limited circulation among officials.
Legislation went far in advance of the age. Redshid
Pasha's political philosophy, gleaned in courtly Euro-
pean circles, had not taught him that every state of
society, as well as every age, has its appropriate scale
of punishment ; and that the treatment unduly harsh in
one, may be wholesomely severe in another. It had not
taught him that centralization, while it may be expan-
sive in the West, must be absorbent in the East. The

* Since that period Tnrkej, still deficient in roads, has organized a
letter post connecting the principal cities, and a telegraph system.
Since then newspapers in various languages, in English, Italian,
German, French, Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian, Turkish, and Arabic,
are published at Constantinople.

CONSCRIPTS FOR THE ARMY, 27

transition, moreover, coincided with a period of social
disquietude; with disaffection in every class, including
the military.

The Nizam (regular force), in place of the Janissaries,
was long odious to the Turkish people, and with reason.
Violence, guided by ignorance, long formed and organ-
ized it. Young men, the single anJ married alike, were,
on the call for a levy, seized in the provinces, wherever
they were found, were handcuflfed, and driven to the
nearest town. They were retained there some days,
amidst filth and vermin, to allow time for acting a
counterpart of the recruiting scene (minus its humour)
in Justice Shallow's house. They were then sent to
the coast for embarkation ; and on their arrival in the
capital, sea-sick and home-sick, were told oflf to regi-
ments or ships, for Hfe. Felons sent to the bagnio had
fairer prospects. Their food was bad and insufficient,
their apparel scanty, and their treatment brutal. A
captain of a frigate might be named who had his
cook beaten to death, in return for a bad dinner.
Their doctors in those days were charlatans ; their
hospitals charnel-houses, where patients perished of
heat and neglect in summer, of cold and neglect in
winter.* Numbers of men, also, were frozen every
winter in the barracks and ships, until the introduction,
in 1860, of stoves in both, with port sashes in the
latter. But this picture happily belongs to the past :
like impressment, with its attendant misery, in another

♦ The military and naval hospitals at Constantinople were duly
organized in the reign of Sultan Abdul Medjid. In regard of space
and ventilation they are now superior to most, and in regard of comfort
inferior to few, European hospitals.

28 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

land. EighFy per cent, of the levies made during that
gloomy period of transition never saw their homes again,
but died at their post miserably, like galley-slaves at the
oar. Deserters avoided their villages through fear of
discovery ; they went to the hills and joined others who
had fled from the conscription. In the brigand's garb
they had self-respect and were respected. Those retaken,
sentenced to receive a given number of blows, one-
third on the soles of the feet, one-third on the posteriors,
and one-third on the belly, were beaten to death in the
presence of their comrades. Strong men became insen-
sible under the first and generally expired under the
second series of blows. One man, a negro sailor, is
noted for having survived the third series.

Brigandage, ever recognized in Turkey, has never
been considered disreputable there. The exploits of
noted brigands have formed the theme of popular chaunts ;
and, in the Grecian provinces, Klephte and tine fellow
have long been synonymous terms. Never political,
confined to certain hilly districts in Europe and Asia,
it was vexatious, without giving umbrage to authority.
Occasionally serving the views of rival or recalcitrant
beys, it rarely aimed at more, on its own account, than
the interception of traders in ill-guarded passes, or the
lifting a troublesome proprietor's sheep. The fate —
impalement, or the hook — reserved sooner or later for a
brigand-hero, unless timely transformed into a derbeiit
aguy deterred all but the desperate or the innately
depraved from the career. The Turk reviled by a
pasha's minion, till he turned and struck, and the Greek
crossed in love by a primate's sensuality, might shake
hands at a cavern's mouth, and, banded with the repro-

BRIGANDAGE. 29

bates of the neighbourhood stained with vulgar crime,
swear revenge upon society ; but the simply idle and way-
ward might find congenial occupation in feudal service, or
loiter away their existence parasitically in towns. Social
revolution swelled the ranks of brigandage with men of
another stamp, outlaws from necessity. Emboldened by
the tanzimat, it descended into the valley, no longer
dominated as of yore by an armed gentry and yeomanry.
One band under Yanni Catergi frightened Smyrna out
of its propriety during two years, and another, led by
Moomgi Oglou, long infested the plain of Adrianople.
These worthies in time found their way to the bagnio,
where they remained several years, the admiration of the
incarcerated public, chained, exceptionally, each by the
leg to a comer of their cell.

With restored order, and limited military service
with fair treatment, brigandage resumed its normal
proportions, and its quietude for a while gave hopes
of its disappearance. Those hopes have been dis-
appointed. Lulled by the din of the Crimean war, it
has revived since the Peace of Paris, re-inforced by an
active contingent from the Circassian immigration, giving
constant anxiety to provincial governors, and harassing
occupation for their police. Its audacity went the
length, in 1865, of twice plundering the Imperial post
carrying treasure respectively near Silybria and Ismid.
We have not to go deep for the cause. Taxation has
increased of late years in a greater ratio than national
wealth, while the exercise of charity and hospitality — the
cardinal virtues of the land during centuries, and still
remarkable — has been sensibly on the decHije ; both in
combination tending to produce the embarrassment felt

30 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

in parts of Christendom on the suppression of monas-
teries, when men sought to obtain by force or importunity
the relief they had been used to receive, with kind words,
for the asking.

This, however, was the lesser of two evils developed
into unusual proportions by the lenity of the system
inaugurated by Sultan Abdul Medjid ; who, in the first
twelve years of his reign, is said to have sanctioned only
two executions, one of a relapsed Armenian renegade,
the other of a citizen of Eastambol, convicted, partly on
his wife's evidence, of blaspheming the Prophet : the only
crime which Mussulmans have agreed to consider heinous
and unpardonable. Brigandage on the hill and in the
plain continued to be held in check, more or less, by incar-
ceration in noxious prisons ; whence some with money or
friends might escape, but where many sickened and
died, without the negative merit of having served as an
example.* But in other regions, with euphonious names,
its urban foster-brother revelled free and fearless.
Those with places, promotion, monopolies, or contracts to
give, and in their default, those in a position to influence
them, yielded to seduction in every form which ambition
or avarice could suggest to render it acceptable ; and so
general became the weakness, giving point to the

* In 1858 capital punishment was partially resorted to, with a
wholesome effect, in Thessaly. Orientals are moved to reflection through
the medinm of their senses. The sight of one brigand hnng on the
theatre of his exploits has more effect than the report of a hundred
brigands wasting away in chains in the bagnio. Whatever may be
advanced against public executions, it will be admitted that punishment
without example has the taint of vengeance — a reproach sure to be
levelled in time against the cloistral imprisonment of the 19th century ;
the horrors of which cannot be imagined, nor conveyed even faintly to
the imagination by the pen of a Sterne or a Dickens. Public execution

OFFICIAL CORRUFriON. 31

proverb, Mai miri deniz dir itchmein domouz dur* as to
lead, in a few years, to the formation of the Tanzimat
Council: the rules emanating from which, with a
remedial view, showed its gravity. Chamberlains and
kislar agas traded with their influence ; the kiayas and
secretaries of chiefs of departments sang the praises of
wide-awake aspirants for favours; cabinet ministers' ladies
listened graciously to fair suppliants for marital or fiUal
advancement. The Janissaries in their day had battled
with the hydra — official corruption, and, by occasionally
lopping off some of its heads, circumscribed its action
within comparatively narrow limits. The bare mention
of their name, after an interval of forty years, makes the
monster hiss with all its tongues. Under the old regime
only imperial favourites and a few aspiring spirits willing
to stake life against the Aladdin's lamp wealth dared
openly indulge in malversation ; and retribution, the
poetical justice adored in the East, generally lighted
on them sooner or later. Some purchased forbearance
by expending part of their gains on pubUc works, or on
pious endowments.

Allowance may in fairness be made for the necessities
of the position. The men who had floated to the surface
on the wreck of the orthodox Turkish party were in
general needy, unillustrated by descent. They had to
acquire wealth to gain influence and make partisans, in
default of which they would be mere bubbles on a
troubled sea. Each in enriching himself had to wink

is the only gnarantee for the mass that crimiDals of a certain quality do
suffer death, and in times of social excitement, that criminals of an-
other stamp are hecomingly dealt by.

* The public treasury is a sea, who does not drink of it is a pig.

32 TURKEr AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

at his colleague's infirmity, and partisans could only
be retained on like conditions. The old nobility, pro-
fuse and open-handed, lived on their estates : their ovens
were never cool ; their pilaf cauldrons never empty.
The State was the estate of the new nobiUty. Bedshid
Pasha inspired their policy ; and on his return in 1846
from his second mission to Paris — an ostracism to allow
time for certain jealousies to subside — became their
leader, retaining that post with slight intermission until
his death in 1858. He, the son of a muderris of
Beyazid's mosque, realized in that interval an Oriental's
brightest dream of prosperity, unaccompanied by the
usual drawback. With the highest honours, with wide-
spread lands and sumptuous palaces, with domestics,
slaves, horses and jewels on a profuse scale, he enjoyed
imperial and civic favour. Every man in his shadow,
said an enthusiastic admirer, became rich. Bedshid
Pasha had acquired, while representing the Porte
abroad, an insight into other forms of government.
He admired the system, bating popular control over
the national purse, which practically Umits the sove-
reign's prerogative to the faculty of choosing his
ministry from a given set, with possibly dissonant
views but with common interests. He adopted the
phrase, ^^ Le Roi regne et ne gouvernt pas^" roughly
applicable under the old reghne, when a Sultan could
rarely retain a vizir long in office against the popular
voice. Bedshid Paslia doubtless saw the distinction
between the right to accept a ministry indicated by public
opinion, and the power to choose one independent of it ;
but he may not have clearly noted that the machinery of
parties unbased on representation, when understood by

CENTRALIZATION — THE MEDJLIS. 33

the Sultan, would give him mild absolute authority, free
from care and trouble. With a pensioned ministry out,
eager to supplant the ministry in power, the Sultan
would find accord on one point — the will to propitiate his
royal favour.

Out of this policy grew the imperial extravagance,
of world-wide resonance. Out of it grew the multi-
plication of offices beyond the requirements of centrali-
zation, with the transformation of the Turks from a
place-avoiding to a place-seeking people. And out of
it gi'ew the medjUs — ingenious contrivance for veiling
despotism with the semblance of deUberation and screen-
ing responsibility with the show of collective decision.
A medjlis (Anglic^, *' board/*) became attached to every
department in the capital, and to every provincial admi-
nistration. In the capital the members are salaried;
in the provinces, though honorary, the position is self-
beneficial. Spread Uke a net over the empire, the
medjlises have given occupation and profit to the ruling
classes, and maintained mildly their supremacy. In
other respects their action has been mediocre, productive
of no actual mischief and leading to no positive result.
The medjlis has effaced personal responsibility, without
affording security against misbehaviour. The chief, if
resolute, impresses' the members with respect for his
position ; if timid, he admits their respectful per-
suasion ; if corrupt, he finds abettors ; if scrupulous, his
credit is undermined by intrigue. Generally speaking,
a compromise is effected. The rayas, disappointing legiti-
mate expectations, have shown themselves animated by
Byzantine traditions. Some experience in the ways of
medjUses h^ taught the author, with sorrow, that the

34 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

rayas members are the least, and, with surprise, that the
muphti of a medjlis is the most, to be depended upon by
the chief, to aid him in spoiling a job or baffling an
oppressor. With the progress of centralization, the value
of seats in metropolitan medjlises became estimated less
by obvious than indirect advantages. Dignity, patronage,
and influence, enjoyed with the breezes and views of the
Bosphorus in the Sultan's shadow, have made them
objects of ambition. Expectant ministers bide their
time in a medjlis. Youthful damads learn the art of
combining much talk and little work in a medjlis.
Dismissed chamberlains find refuge in a medjlis ; blessing
Allah for non-transportation to a distant pashaUc. ^ Men
of rank, as a rule, place their sons in one or other of the
kalems (public offices) ; which have again become, as in
the days of the Lower Empire, the avenues to wealth and
power.

The Tartar conquerors of the Lower Empire saw
nothing worth copying in Byzantine centralization.
They judged the tree by its fruits, and avoided it.
Their ruling idea was to combine metropolitan pre-
dominance with modified provincial autonomy. Their
ruling policy was to retain the superior administrative
functions and mihtary authority in their hands, leaving
every community, every sect, every town, every village, to
manage its own affiairs. They organized their empire in
such a guise that it resembled a federation ; or rather a
congeries of states bound to co-act with the sovereign, for
imperial objects. They gave eski adet (old custom) the
force to resist despotism. Vizirs, imperial delegates, ruled
the provinces; potentates within them, but responsible
to the lord paramount for ruling according, to law and

POWER OF THE OLD VIZIRS. 35

usage. Invested themselves with the power of Ufe and
death, they were liable to be bowstrung on the strength
of a simple mandate. Brought up in the imperial shadow,
their sense of personal dignity and decorous manners
impressed the provincials with respect. Wild Alba-
nians, crafty Arabs, and supple Armenians admitted the
moral superiority, the instinct of command, of the
Ottoman. Each vizir was a Sultan in miniature. The
notables of his province kissed the hem of his garment,
and stood before him with crossed hands till bidden to
sit. They sent him, on his arrival, horses and arms in
token of good-will. Their attitude was defensive. The
vizir had to obtain all he could, the province to resist
giving more than custom sanctioned. The vizir had a right
to all fines : a right suggesting incrimination, and nearly
sure to be abused, if not by himself, by subordinates in his
name. He also shared with the cadi Ham parasij i.e.,
five per cent, of adjudicated claims, paid by the winner.
The provinces supplied, by custom, the viziral abode
with pro^dsions and forage for bountiful hospitality, and
entertained couriers and others travelling on Government
account : a source of irritation in the villages, since those
gentry expected dich parasi (teeth money) besides. The
province also found labour gratis for public works. This
obUgation, termed angaria, gave rise to oppression ; but,
being in accordance with immemorial Eastern custom,
never led to disturbance. Although discountenanced by
the tanzimat, angaria still exists in a less obtrusive but
equally exacting form. The inhabitants of a district, for
example, are invited to build* baiTacks for troops, a
village for Caucasian immigrants, or a lazzaretto for
cholera suspects. Having completed the work, they

8—2

36 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

press for payment, and are put oflf from month to month
with fair words. After a while, making a merit of neces-
sity, they renounce their claim, and are rewarded by
seeing their ** patriotism " and *' devotion " duly lauded
in the official Gazette. A loan extracted from the pro-
vincials in 1860 was repaid with like coin.

The vizir's residence contained within its precincts the
symbols of authority — the armoury, the treasury, the
guard-house, and the prison. He had a chamberlain in his
kiaya, a minister of the interior in his divan-efendisi, a
minister of finance in his defterdar, a minister of pohce in
his tchiaushbashi, a master of the horse in his ser-akhor,
and a keeper of the robes in his tchamasha agasi — all
domestics, but each with domestics of his own, each with
his httle circle of parasites, and each intent on filling a
purse during his lord's term of office. He had also his
body-guard of Albanians, a council (when he chose to con-
vene it) of ayans and ulema, and, more important than
«11, he had his representative in the capital in his kapou
kiaya, through whom he communicated officially with
the Porte. The kapou kiaya, necessarily chosen from
among the literate efendis of Constantinople, was expected
by his employer to inform him of sinister designs, and by
the Porte to betray him when necessary.

The vizir came to his province like a Koman pro-
consul, intent on raising money. He bought his place
during the reign of the series of feeble Sultans, when black
eunuchs were more esteemed at court than white sages,
and was therefore farmer of the revenue, as well as gover-
nor. The amount was based on a rough estimate of the
revenue derivable from the saUan (property- tax), the
tithe on sheep, and the unappropriated tithe on wheat

CHECKS TO THE VIZIR'S POWER. 37

and barley. This tithe in many districts belonged to the
timarlees and spahis, who, forming in the vigorous days
of the monarchy a permanent yeomanry above 100,000
strong, had the reputation of being traditionally content
with less than their dues : a distinction never accorded to
any other class of tithe recipients, lay or clerical.
Celebrated for their skill with the sabre, they were for-
midable in the Hungarian and Persian wars, and, with
the resident gentry, kept up the breed of horses. If the
vizir raised the revenue within the limits of custom, he
was considered a man with the fear of Allah before his
eyes. The amount sufficed to repay his debt to his sarraf,
with a balance over for his temporary rahat (repose) at
Constantinople and the propitiation of his patron in the
seraglio : less than is needful now for such objects being
required in days of simplicity, when pashas drank water
out of brass goblets and their ladies rode to the ^^ sweet
waters " in arabas. Arabian horses and Circassians, the
chief luxuries, were cheap, so long as India imported but
few of the former, and the slave-dealers were freely sup-
pUed with the latter. Unusual exaction exposed the
vizir to be petitioned against, in terms representing him
oppressive in regard of the poor; and, unless he were
exceptionally backed, the petition would be attended to,
the more readily since the confiscation likely to follow
would benefit the privy purse. His loyalty was, as a rule,
guaranteed by provincial antagonism and metropohtan
ties. But sometimes it happened that a vizir, seduced
by acquired popularity, declined a successor ; or a dere-
bey of influence arrogated to himself the right to ignore
the Sultan's delegate, and govern the province himself.
In addition to the insult, the audacious mortal might

38 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

withhold the revenue. The Porte then had to consider
whether it was politic to vindicate its authority hy sending
for his head, or save appearances hy confirming his usurpa-
tion ; the former means heing in general first resorted to.
The kapougi hashi, hearer of the firman of death, would
experience no difficulty, if able to reach the provincial
capital; respect for the Sultan's herald would protect
and aid him : even the rebel's guard would lower their
arms at sight of the imperial firman. The rebel, there-
fore, advised by his friends at Constantinople of the view
taken of his proceeding, endeavoured to have the kapougi
bashi waylaid on the road, as if by brigands. If a second
herald were thus served, the Porte would then probably
send a third to him, with the firman of investiture, and
bide its time. It would lure him by flattery or ensnare
him by deceit; and, if these arts failed, wait till his errors
enabled it to attack him openly. At the worst his power
would not survive him. Bebellion was simply local and
personal, with all the forms and protestations of loyalty :
a demonstration to avert danger, or to extort recognition
of office. The dynasty was not menaced, nor conter-
minous provinces affected by it. One bad man had made
it, and his removal quelled it. Neither vengeance nor
proscription followed ; for the Porto never admitted that
the people had rebelled : they had been misled, ifothing
more. The Ottoman dynasty respected national institu-
tions and usages, and was pro tanto respected. Hence
the rare spectacle of a vast heterogeneous empire kept
together during centuries, by a government often vicious
and contemptible, and without a regular army. The
Barbary regencies, apparently exceptions, are not so
really. Appendages, rather than provinces, of the

DECENTRALIZATION OP FINANCE. 89

empire, they had slipped away insensibly from metro-
politan control. Their distance made the Porte indif-
ferent to more than the forms of vassalage and the
payment of tribute, while their uninterrupted state of
hostility — dar vl harb — to the *' infidel " gave them the
air of champions of Islam.

Decentralization also characterized the public expen-
diture. Every service had its distinct, inalienable revenue,
derived from territorial sources. The state domain main-
tained the imperial dignity. The vacoofs (endowments) sup-
ported the mosques, the medressehs (colleges), the imarets
(almshouses), the mektebs (parish schools), the cemeteries^
the fountains, and the pavement of cities ; in fine, all the
pious and beneficent establishments. The vacoofsy pre-
viously administered locally under state supervision, were
consolidated in Sultan Mahmoud's reign, and placed under
the administration of a minister of state (evcaf naziri).
The aggregate revenue has not been diverted into secular
chsmnels ; but it is remarked that the salathin (royal
mosques) obtain more than their share of it, for repa-
ration and decoration, at the expense of humbler objects,
as parish mosques, fountains, &c., in disregard of founders'
intentions. The unassigned tithes, the salian, and the
kharatch defrayed the expenses of the central govern
ment, the artillery, the fortresses, and the enrolled
Janissaries. A district near the capital defrayed the ex-
pense of the gunpowder manufactory. The Navy — ^justly
esteemed the right arm of an empire with coasts bathed
by the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, by the Ked
and the Black Seas, by the Persian and Venetian Gulfs,
with numerous islands, some of them kingdoms in
ancient days — ^was* endowed with vast means, and its

40 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

chief, the Capitan Pasha, held the third rank in the
empire. It was endowed with the revenues of Maina and
of the sandjaks of Lepanto and the Negroponte, of the
Thracian Chersonesus, of Biga, Codja-eiU and Sighala,
rich maritime provinces of Asia Minor, and of the Cyclades
and Sporades in the Archipelago. A capitan pasha then,
ordered to build ships or construct docks, or reproached
for keeping the seamen in arrears of pay, would have
idly pleaded in excuse want of money — the excuse often
justly pleaded since by successive capitan pashas. Had
the Turkish navy possessed in 1821 the slightest organi-
zation, the Grecian revolt would have been crushed the
first year ; and had it possessed in latter times its ancient
resources, the neutralization of the Black Sea would not
-have been thought of. Favoured spots in Scio and other
islands supplied the ladies of the imperial harem with
aromatics and cosmetics. Works of general utiUty, such
as dykes, mountain passes, bendts and bridges, were kept
in order, and mines were worked, by local personal
service given in Ueu of taxation with exemption from
military requisition. The value of the privilege ensured
cheerful fulfilment of the conditions; as long appeared
in the comparatively fiourishing condition of various
communities.

This self-acting machinery, combining despotic power
with municipal freedom, and providing ways and means
independent of the calculations of a finance minister,
was eminently fitted for an empire made up of various
races, each tenacious of its own customs, with a tra-
ditional right of exemption from fiscal novelties. Purified
of its manifold abuses, this system would, in conjunc-
tion with the humanizing spirit of the tanzimat and a

EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZATION. 41

regnlar organized police force, have given lustre to the
throne, contentment to the people, and maintained the
services of the empire on a becoming scale : that is, with
the exaction, indispensable in an Oriental state, of personal
responsibiUty. Centralization has proved an inadequate
substitute. Ministers virtually irresponsible may favour
one department at the expense of the other, the capital
at the expense of the provinces ; may yield to the soUcita-
tions, pressed with varying urgency, of the favourite of the
day; may defer to another the necessary expenditure of the
current year ; while, dependent on the sovereign's favour,
they rival each other in obsequious deference to his wishes.
There have been, however, obstacles more than sufficient
to prevail against the firmest will, coupled with energetic
perseverance. Financial ability, statistical data, facile
communications, and agents to carry out any scheme
of a comprehensive character, have been wanting. Fraud,
incompetence, and indolence have not had the check or
the spur of publicity ; they have, on the contrary, been
encouraged by the cuckoo note of the official journals :
all is for the best in the best of all possible empires.
Moreover, centraUzation is absorbent in the East; of
which the ornamentation of the banks of the Bosphorus,
during the last twenty years, with palaces, mosques,
kiosks, and yalis, representing untold millions, is ocular
evidence to the crowds who daily pass up and down that
celebrated strait in the Shirket Hairie steamers. Under
the head of public works, little beyond imperial abodes,
barracks, and state manufactories have been cared for.
The Golden Horn remains as it was before the develop-
ment of its trade by steam, with indifferent accom-
modation in the way of quays, landing-places, &c. :

42 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

thongh it is fair to say in extenuation, that Euro*
pean merchant vessels, the general carriers, do not,
in virtue of antiquated treaties, pay port or anchorage
dues.* Reservoirs, bridges, mines, &c., have deteriorated,
through inability or indisposition to hire labour in lieu
of the personal service spoken of. Even the bendts in
the shadow of royalty, formerly tended by the inhabit-
ants of the adjoining village of Bakche-keuy, have been
neglected, so as to cause frequent distress of late years
to populous quarters dependent upon them for water.
The coal-fields lying within 200 miles of the Bos-
phorus, on the edge of the Black Sea, ought to furnish
motive power for every steamer in the Mediterranean and
Euxine; yet they are so ill worked, through want of
labour, that their produce is undersold at Constantinople
by coal brought from Newcastle. The iron and copper
mines respectively of Samakof and Tocat are also com-
paratively unremunerative. Passing over intermediate
districts, each presenting more or less evidence of the
inabihty of the central government to supply the want
of self-administration and custom, the dyke of Djezair,
formerly under local supervision, has given way, and the

• European yessels pay no port or anchorage dues in any provin-
cial harbour of the Turkish empire. At Constantinople they pay, with-
out reference to tonnage or length of sojourn, dues varying from one to
two shillings per vessel, according to her flag. For example : the
Great Eastern might lie in the Golden Horn for a year and her
anchorage due would be twelve piastres. Twelve piastres, once repre-
senting as many dollars, now represent two shillings. In 1864, the
Porte, at the instance of its admiralty, proposed to improve the harbour
accommodation on consideration of a graduated moderate scale of
anchorage dues, and in expectation of assent, suitable buoys with
mooring chains were brought from England. The European legations
declined the proposition.

ANCIENT AND MODERN SYSTEMS OP RULE. 43

stagnant water, with malaria resulting therefrom, has
completed the desolation of Bassorah, the happily-placed
city near the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates,
whose inhabitatants, in the days of the caliphate, prayed
in a hundred mosques and bathed in a thousand baths.

Centralization, with divided civil and military autho-
rity — the system initiated by Constantine, and perfected
by Theodosius — has undoubtedly strengthened the hands
of the Porte in regard of its subjects in general ; has
given it means to deal temperately with disturbances, and
quell in a forbearing spirit insurrection ; but it may be
doubted if it possesses equal ability to repel invasion,
counting upon disaffection within. Under the ancient
system the nation and the army were identical. The
forces on the frontier might be defeated ; but the nation,
with rights and liberties to defend, was behind. The
population, armed from childhood, and skilled in the use
of their arms, was sufficiently organized under hereditary
nobles to hold strong positions, and to harass troops in
a roadless sparsely-peopled country interspersed with
morasses. An invader, with spahis on his flanks, with
the villages on his path abandoned, and their flocks and
herds driven away, found his difficulties increase at every
stage. Under the modem system, the army is the
measure of national defence ; and this expression, applic-
able elsewhere as well, has peculiar force in an empire
with no ties of kindred and few bonds of sympathy with
the outer world.

Viewing dispassionately the altered conditions of
its rule, the Porte would conciliate those sections of
the rayas who, unimbued with ''grand ideas," have
httle more than social aspirations. The Armenians,

44 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

with Asiatic habits, reading in an antiquarian spirit
the history of Armenia, and the placid and industrious
Bulgarians, with no traditions worth dwelling upon,
would as citizens become loyal subjects, and be a
counterpoise to the irascible Greeks; with whom their
sympathy, created in other days by common oppression,
is on the wane : Greek vanity is more intolerable to
them than Turkish pride. Formation of Armenian and
Bulgarian regiments — ^military service being the only
reUable bond in an empire composed of various races —
should be the first step in the process. Comradeship
under one banner, in the absence of marked physical or
intellectual differences, assuages sectarian antipathies.
The prevalence of Turkish speech would render amalga-
mation easier than might be supposed. The Armenians
speak that language Uke their own ; the Jews speak it as
well as Spanish ; the easy class of the Sclavic tribes speak
it for practical purposes, more or less ; and the Greeks in
many inland districts of Asia Minor speak no other. The
Arabs, exalting the language of the Koran above all
dialects, are, with the Kurds, as a rule, least acquainted
with Turkish of any part of the population. When,
however, so disposed, they easily master a language into
the literary composition of which Arabic enters largely ;
though no amount of practice ever gives them the
euphonious Ottoman accent. Arabian recruits soon pick
up vulgar Turkish.

An ancient Turk, looking back to the days of his
youth, might draw conclusions from the survey not
altogether unfavourable to the mixed government of
Sultan, Beys, Ulema, and Janissaries. Under it Turkey
governed herself (badly he would admit), in her own way.

RETROSPECT OP AN ANCIENT TURK. 45

and fought unaided her own battles ; than which national
pride has no higher aspiration. Under it Turkey was a
lightly-taxed and a cheap country. With a reserved
fund for war expenses, she never had recourse to usurers
to defray current expenditure, and never gave people the
trouble to call twice for payment of just claims. With a
reasonable income, the old seraglio, one summer palace
of modest dimensions, and a few plain kiosks, sufficed
for the accommodation and recreation of the imperial
fitmily. In those days Turkey clothed her population,
and equipped her troops, ships, and fortresses, chiefly
with native products. Her gentry then loved the chase,
and the exciting game of jerreed, which requires a strong
arm, a sure eye, self-possession, and expert horseman-
ship ; and her citizens, led by imperial example, relaxed
themselves often with archery on the Okmeidan. The
ancient Turk would bid his son note that under that form
of government Algiers was a dependency of the empire,
Greece an integral portion of it, Egypt a nomination
pashalic, and the vassalage of Moldo-Wallachia and
Servia something more than nominal. If slightly
acquainted with history, he would further remark, with
bitterness, that since its subversion the Franks had
sat down in Fera and Galata somewhat after the fashion
of the Genoese and Venetians in the later days of
the Lower Empire, while their ambassadors, far from
bringing gifts to the Sultan from their respective courts,
as of yore, received instead presents from him for them-
selves and relatives. Ai de mi Alhambra I

46 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

CHAPTEE III.

Ambassadors at Constantinople, under the Old and the New Regime —
Position of Diplomatists at Constantinople — Effect of Obsolete i
Commercial Legislation — Turkish Manufactures supplanted by
Cheap Foreign Fabrics — Novel Attitude of Diplomacy towards the
Divan — Presents to Foreign Diplomatists — Oriental Ideas of
Presents — Usury, the Cancer of Turkey and Cause of the Low
State of Agriculture — Education — Parish Schools — Colleges — Mili-
tary and Medical Schools — Quarantine — The European Crisis of
1848 — Dilemma of the Porte as to Hungarian Fugitives — The
Montenegrin Insurrection — Demands of Austria acceded to—
Similarity of Turkish and Austrian Policy — Ball given by the
French Ambassador in honour of the Second Empire.

With Sultan Abdul Medjid's reign commenced the inter-
mittent sway of European ambassadors at Constantinople.
Their position alone showed the significance of the
change, effected within a few years, in the relations of
Turkey with Christendom. Under the old regime, an
ambassador had been tolerated rather than recognized
in the capital of the successor of the caliphs. His pre-
sentation at court to deliver his credentials was a
comedy. Presumed to be hungry, he and his suite were
preliminarily regaled at the Sultan's expense, when their
awkwardness in eating with their fingers lokmasy kadaify
and other oriental deUcacies, with their unbecoming
mode of squatting round the sinni (tray), drew from the
attendants remarks of pity for their defective education.
Possibly the infidels might become excited in the pre-

RECEPTIONS OF AMBASSADORS. 47

sence of the prophet's vicegerent, and, therefore, in pre-
caution, their swords were taken from them ; and to
render their appearance tolerable to oriental eyes, their
uniforms were covered by pelisses. The cortege was
augmented on its way to the seraglio by the ambas-
sador's compatriots in the capital ; who, arrayed variously,
went to see a show and made one themselves. Thus
garnished, the '* representative of the most powerful of
the kings of the adorers of Jesus," was led into a dimly
lit chamber, at one end of which the Sultan sat on a sofa,
and having delivered his little oration, more or less faith-
fully translated by his dragoman, was honoured in return
by a stare. He was regarded during his sojourn in
Turkey as an accredited spy ; and as such, on a declara-
tion of war with his sovereign, was sent to the Seven
Towers. In his rare interviews with the Grand Vizir,
he sat lower than that functionary, and his dragoman,
wearing a calpak^ knelt at his highnesses feet.

An ambassador, under the new regime, has had nothing
to complain of on the score of etiquette ; he has no longer
been stuflfed with moalebbi and j)ilaff nor sprinkled with
rosewater. He has stood, with sword by his side and
cocked hat in his hand, face to face with the Sultan ;
he has lounged on the same sofa with the Grand
Vizir; and his dragoman has smoked amicably with
the Reis Efendi, thenceforwards ycleped minister for
foreign affairs. The mission of ambassadors under
the new regime was ostensibly to encourage or observe
Turkey in the new path traced for her by fate.
Some of them came out with theories ready cut and
dried for her regeneration, and moulded facts to suit ;
others came with objects in reference to her, and wove

48 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

theories to justify them. Either process was easy ; for
Levantines have the art to divine the bias of a man's
mind, and the tact to adapt their conversation to it. An
influential man in the East, be he Christian or Moslem,
may give what shape he likes to the passing cloud — a
camel, a weasel, or a whale ; he will always find a
Polonius ready to echo him. Thence, in part, arises the
difficulty of a diplomatist at Constantinople losing a
wrong scent. Socially isolated, in a country devoid of
periodical literature, he has not opportunities, as in
other lands, to correct or confirm his views by friendly
intercourse with natives of various callings and opinions.
Remarks incidentally dropped in familiar conversation
over a chibouque, throw light on doubtful points, suggest
further inquiry, and sometimes vexatiously upset a pet
theory based on misapprehension or hasty generalization.
He has no intercourse with the ruling race, excepting
ministers of state, conversing with those ignorant of a
western language through an interpreter, when words
are weighed and sentences measured ; nor with the rayas,
beyond a select few who thrive upon their footing at
embassies. The dinners of the minister of foreign
affairs, at which diplomatists and state dignitaries mingle,
give him no insight into national manners ; for the table
is Parisian, the conversation vapid, and the Faithful drink
as though the prophet had enjoined, not forbidden, in-
dulgence in wine. At his dinners, given in return, the
guests, leaving prejudices with their slippers at the door,
discourse politely with unveiled ladies, and, blandly
declining ham in conjunction with turkey, see merit in
punch d la Romaine.

Schools, hospitals, prisons, factories, tribunals, &c..

DIPLOMATISTS AT CONST AXTINOPLE. 49

evidences of the degree of a people's civilization, lie
not in his way. The Bamazan, key of many riddles,
aimnally cementing the bonds of Islam under a lunar
sign, and making the followers of Mahommed during
thirty days one family — the newest fashions being
replaced for the time by the most ancient usage —
seems only an irksome penance ; and the Bairam cere-
mony, in which the Sultan figures in his regal and
sacerdotal character, is viewed simply as a brilUant
spectacle. The diplomatist resides in winter at Fera, a
nondescript suburb peopled by a loosely knit assemblage
of various races, whose choicest pastime is gaming, and
whose favourite topic of conversation is the demerits of
the Turks, the source of their prosperity ; and in summer
at Therapia or Buyukdereh, pleasant villages on the
Bosphorus, where the muezzin's chant is not heard.
Outside these chosen spots he sees little with his own
eyes. He visits as a matter of course the show mosques
and the tekieh of the *' dancing dervishes;" strolls in
the bazaars ; rows in spring up the meandering Lycus to
Kiat-haneh, and in summer down the Bosphorus to
Ghiok-sou ; rides, with reminiscences of Constantine and
Belisarius, from Yedi Koule to Eyoub, the ancient Greek
wall or a Turkish cemetery on either hand; and goes
perhaps, in duty bound, to Ehalki to see the tomb of an
ambassador interred in that fragrant island. A talented
Oriental on a mission to the court of St. James's or the
Tuileries, located in Leicester Square or in a correspond-
ing quarter of Paris, in habitual communication with
disaflTected natives and prejudiced foreigners, would
occupy somewhat an analogous position ; and if we might
fairly expect to read in his despatches, mingled with shrewd

50 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

remarks on social anomalies, direful forebodings drawn
from conversation with sanguine Fenians or morbid
socialists, we should cease to smile at strange tales in
blue or yellow books: we should cease to wonder at
the ever recurring announcement during a century,
by wise men from the West, of the imminent collapse
of the Turkish empire, and should ascribe it to a careful
notation of the fissures in the edifice, with inobservance
of its ivy-covered props.

Ambassadors under the new regime, how much soever
disagreeing on some points, have cordially agreed with
each other in enforcing the commercial legislation founded
on treaties applicable to bygone days, which has made
Turkey virtually a colony after the old colonial fashion,
bound to admit the products of every European state,
tvithout reciprocity, at a uniform low rate of duty,* reduced
lower by partial tariffs and by a system of smuggUng from
which she is not allowed to protect herself; f and they
with other foreign counsellors have, in their wisdom, led
her in a few years through the cloudy maze of financial

* The treaties of commerce between Turkey and European states,
based on the original treaty between Solyman U. and Francis I., were
merged in the treaty of Balta Liman, 1841. Until then, foreign pro-
ducts had been charged in Turkey 8 per cent. duty. This import duty
was increased 2 per cent., Turkey consenting at the same time to
abolish interior transit dues, which had been arbitrary and vexatious,
and restrict herself to one export duty of 12 per cent. In 1862 another
commercial treaty was made between Europe aud Turkey, enabling
Turkey to levy 8 per cent, duty on imports and 8 per cent, on exports,
the latter to be reduced annually 1 per cent., till it fall to 1 per cent.
This is a great improvement ; but, in the name of free trade, one might
ask, why has not Europe granted reciprocity to Turkish products in her
markets ?

f European merchant vessels in Turkish ports are, by a strained
interpretation of treaties, free from the visit of custom-house employes.

TURKISH MANUFACTURES SUPBLANTED. 51

expediency to the Austro-Hispano-Italian platform of an
annual deficit and increasing debt. Free trade, in that
sense, has ruined Turkey's manufactories, and politico
financial economy has brought her to a chronic state
of pecuniary embarrassment.

Various causes had contributed to render the Turks
commercially indifferent about their capitulations with
Europe until early in the present century, when Greek
traders pointed out a field for enterprise in Turkey, and
imparted to the manufacturers of the West the tastes of
her inhabitants. Turkish manufactures flourishing in the
memory of man then began inevitably to decay, throwing
out of employment permanently those classes, always
existing in old communities, unable to devote them-
selves to the production of raw materials. The muslins
of Aleppo, the silks of Brussa and Damascus, the
cottons of Tocat and Kastambol, the cloths of Timova
and Selivria, the shawls of Angora, the shalis, muslins,
and embroidery of Constantinople, have become in great
part replaced by wares got up for the Eastern market.
The people, at first, captivated by the difference of price,
exulted, but found out too late that cheapness in a
country unswayed by fashion ill compensates for dura-
bility. Garments made from their own rich manu-
factures wore becomingly to the last, while those made
with cheap foreign materials wear shabby from the first.
The army has specially suffered by the change, which
favours collusion between officials and contractors. The
manufactures of arms in Sparta (ancient Pisidia),
Damascus and Constantinople have sunk under the
competition of Liege and Birmingham. The manu-
facture of Turkey carpets still flourishes, but is

4—2

52 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

beginning to be affected by the cheap bright-coloured
carpets of the West.

The divan was at first perplexed by the novel
attitude of diplomacy. It seemed menacing. An
ambassador might speak his mind to the Sultan about
his ministers, and represent Turkey in any light he
pleased to his court. He might write ugly despatches on
the report of a disappointed dragoman, or of a provincial
consul out of humour with his pasha. But the divan
after a while discovered, to its great relief, that diplo-
matists, like ordinary mortals, could inhale voluptuously
the fumes of the moral opium of the East — adulation,
and accept smilingly tokens of imperial munificence,
and were, therefore, it thought, unlikely to be hyper-
critical : as events showed. Every minister of state
under the new regime who has benefited himself and
friends more than usual by office has had an ambassador
for his friend and embassy dragomans for panegyrists.

The readiness of diplomatists to accept presents
from the Sultan for themselves or friends, and ask
favours from the Porte for their satellites, must be
ascribed to misapprehension of Oriental habits of
thought. The objections to similar condescension in
the West exist with infinitely greater force in the East,
where the line between a present and a bribe is not
sharply defined, and where everything is estimated at its
money's worth. An Oriental conveys to his hearers an
idea of a woman's beauty, or a child's comeliness, by
stating the price which one or the other would fetch, if a
slave, in the market. An Oriental knows nothing of ideal
values. His sovereign's portrait is valued for its setting;
and as for a lock of a lady's hair, even Hafiz the

ORIENTAL IDEAS OP PRESENTS. 53

Persian Anacreon would have preferred a bunch of
roses to it. A gift of a rai-e manuscript or a bas-relief
from an ancient sarcophagus would, through Oriental
indifference to ideal value, excite no remark ; not so
diamonds or Arabian horses, which directly represent
money. The highest type of a present in the East is
money; in which form the Sultan gratifies docile
chamberlains or assiduous ministers of State. An
Oriental, whatever his station, is equally flattered by a
present of a purse of gold or a snuff-box of like value.
He would probably, being eminently practical, prefer the
former : a view shared not many years ago by an ambas-
sador, who, on being informed that Sultan Abdul Medjid
had in token of his esteem ordered a snuff-box worth
IjOOOZ. to be given him, sent word to say he would
rather have the money. Versed in the ways of the
court jeweller, his Excellency guessed that, although
the Sultan's account would be debited the full amount,
the box would be of less value. The presents given
to, or out of regard for, diplomatists, supplemented by
offerings to distinguished persons on special missions,
or on their travels, during the last twenty years, repre-
sent a large sum. The amount of this tribute to
necessity, as it may be termed, cannot be accurately
stated, but is beheved to be approximately known, and,
in face of the habitual indebtedness of every depart-
ment, has excited comment from natives and foreigners.
Incurred in a constitutional country, such expenditure
would suggest questions.

There is another point from which the question has
to be viewed. An Oriental, seeing a man accept presents
from one, argues his readiness to accept them from any

54 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

other quarter, and one might as soon persuade him to
the contrary as make him believe in more than a shade
of distinction between waltzing ladies and dancing
girls ; therefore when he sees an ambassador press
a claim of the Pacifico kind, he suspects a personal
motive : his Excellency accepts diamonds from the
Sultan, what should restrain him from taking diamonds,
or their equivalent, from any other person ? Two pashas
were conversing one day during Sultan Abdul Medjid's
reign about a bribe behoved by them to have been given
to an embassy to induce it to urge a compensation
claim on the Porte, which even the claimant's compatriots
thought exaggerated : they even specified the amount
given respectively to the ambassador, the secretary, and
the first dragoman. At this stage, a European present
in the room interposed with — ** Gently, Efendis, this is
impossible : that embassy is not to be bribed, directly or
indirectly." ** My friend," rejoined one of the pashas,
** your ambassador is a clever man, so is his secretary,
and his dragoman is sharp-witted ; is it hkely they would
back a claim of that kind for nothing ? be quiet, we are
not asses." An Oriental has no great respect for human
law, but he has a sense of equity. He will give a man
credit for doing justice, but never injustice, gratis.
Another trait is worthy of note. Bribes taken by an
inferior functionary are beUeved in the East to be shared
by his superior, on the principle of prize money.

The commencement of Sultan Abdul Medjid's reign
was a favourable opportunity to lead Turkey forward in the
thorny path of civilization, of which she had only tasted
the bitter fruits, conscription and taxation, before eski
add (old custom) should partially renew its sway. The

KEEDFUL REFORMS, 55

nation was pliant through exhaustion, and humbled by
misfortune ; but not broken in to view innovation with
apathy. The young Sultan was auspiciously disposed.
His father's ministers and courtiers had cast their lot
in with reform, and dared not retrograde : reaction
would have been their ruin. Unfortunately her patrons
looked down upon her from the height of their own
civiUzation, and urged upon her conditions of progress
beyond her powers. They should have looked back to
the history of Europe at that period when convictions
were realities, free-thinking was heresy, and intolerance
was a virtue, when astrology was esteemed a science,
when spirits were exorcised and witches burnt, when
the evil eye was shunned and comets were portents, and
have asked themselves how their ideas would then have
been received. The minister of the day, in advance
of his age, while admitting the abstract merit of his inter-
locutor's theories on tolerance, imprisonment, slavery
and civil rights, would have said: — **Go to yonder
priest, yonder soldier, yonder mechanic, yonder farmer,
and hear what they have to say : each of them has to be
convinced."

Religious disabilities, requiring tact and patience to
deal with in all countries, slavery — the slavery aiTayed
in shawls, interwoven with the affections of society
from the sovereign bom of a slave downwards — and
civic inequality, were delicate subjects. Inveighing
against them at that period was simply talking to the
wind. But there were other topics to dwell upon, invol-
ving no religious or sentimental feeUngs. Turkey has still
one paramount evil — usury; and two pressing wants —
popular education and medical aid. Usury, sordid un-

56 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

scrupulous usury, is the cancer preying on the vitals
of Turkey, Bad enough in the cities, where wit meets
wit, it revels oppressively 'in the rural districts. Indi-
viduals, under the denomination of selerrif taking advan-
tage of the peasants' ignorance of the state of markets,
lend them money on the security of their forthcoming
crops ; they add together the sum advanced and the
stipulated interest — often three per cent, per month —
and, setting an arbitrary value on the crops, force
repayment, in money or in kind as suits their con-
venience. The lender is in some instances in league
with the aga of the district, or with a trading consul ;
he may be the aga or the consul himself, lending in
his private and recovering in his official capacity.
Herein lies the secret of the low state of agriculture :
the cultivators require advances which are only to be
obtained on onerous conditions; the usurer, the tithe-
farmer, and the tax-gatherer combine against them, and
often, to satisfy the demands of the last, they are forced
to Usten to the offers of the first.

Education, though neglected, has ever been prized in
Turkey. Mahalleh (parish) schools were established
in the towns and boroughs in the reign of Soliman II.,
800 years ago. They still exist, but with no higher
objects. The children of each parish, rich and poor,
mingle in them, and the first day of a child going to
school is a family fete. The Uttle novice, his fez orna-
mented with gold coins or his mother's diamonds, is
escorted in triumph by his future companions from his
home to the school, and the juvenile procession, the
prettiest sight of Constantinople, is regarded by the
spectators with affectionate interest. A pasha's son is

SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES. 57

generally attended in the school by a black slave boy
of his own age. Nothing is learned there beyond the
radiments of Turkish, and docile manners. The Rmh"
dieh schools, of recent creation in the cities, teach only
oriental hteratnre; yet with a trifling annual expendi-
ture for educational appliances and competent salaried
teachers, they as well as the mahalleh schools might be
elevated to a level with the requirements of the age.
The imperial pages' school, distinguished by its com-
paratively refined tone, would admit of development into
an oriental Eton. The medressehs (colleges) might
possess other than theological chairs. With means
elsewhere for preparatory education, the imperial miU-
tary, naval, and medical schools — where every expense,
including pocket-money, is defrayed by the Government
— would produce more than a showy result. Much time
is passed in them in gaining elementary knowledge,
acquired in Europe by private tuition. The scholars have
in general to learn their own native language, involving
a smattering of Arabic, and gather some knowledge of
history and geography, before commencing the study
of special sciences. The military schools have had a
further disadvantage in the sons of influential individuals
obtaining high rank while students.* These favoured
youths have no other than abstract motives for study,
and their example acts banefuUy on their companions,
who thus too early learn the shortest road to advance-
ment. In the medical schools the scholars have first to

* Li 1858 there were in the military school at Constantinople
among the scholars under twenty years of age, one lieutenant-general,
two major-generals, one colonel, sons of ministers of state. One of
the said mcyor-generals, Mahzar Pacha, left the school in 1854 to com-
mand a hrigade of cavalry in Bulgaria.

58 TURKEY- AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

learn some French, through the want of appropriate
Turkish terms. Although alive to the value of military
and medical knowledge, the Porte has not seen fit to en-
courage popular instruction. The attentive group in
the mosque gathered round a muderris expounding
the Koran and the Hadis might Usten eagerly to a
professor of natural philosophy ; and the earnest crowds
hanging on the lips of the impassioned Ramazan
preachers might have ears for a political discourse.
In its apprehension of the possible effects of diffusion
of knowledge among the dominant race, the Porte
has overlooked the impatience likely to be generated
by superior scholastic attainments in the subject races.

The friends of Turkey might have thundered against
usury, taking for their text this verse of the Koran :
** They who Uve by usury will rise on the day of
resurrection like one whom Satan has soiled by his
touch, — they who, warned of the iniquity, abandon usury,
will obtain pardon for the past, — they who relapse into
usury will be cast into the fire and remain there eter-
nally." They might have urged the improvement of
schools, the amelioration of prisons and the creation of
hospitals, with the Koran in their hands ; and then the
people, benefited morally and physically by civilization,
would have learned to appreciate the motives of its
propagators. Quarantine, the undoubted boon of civili-
zation, has been sceptically viewed from the outset.
Death in the shape of plague has seemed kept out by it,
but in the form of cholera it has leaped the barrier and
seized its prey notwithstanding.

More than all, Turkey required a long period of repose,
to habituate her people to the new system, to lessen the

HER TRUE POLICY, 59

pressure of military service on the Turkish race — one cause
of its comparative numerical decline — and to restore her
finances by the gradual development of the resources of
the country : a natural result — unless checked by war's
alarms — of the security for Ufe and property guaranteed
by the tanzimat. The duty of every friend of Turkey
was to counsel her to avoid giving needlessly any cause
of offence either to Austria or Russia, With respect to
Eussia, the motives for preserving good neighbourhood
with her were self-evident. With respect to Austria,
they were less obvious, but more valid in a moral sense.
Austria had long been a loyal friend to Turkey ; she had
spared her in the day of triumph ; had never since
TekeU's time fomented insurrection among her rayas;
and had no presumed designs on any part of her terri-
tory. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire had been a
canon of faith with Prince Mettemich, and respect
for it in 1814 had perpetuated the complication of
Austrian and Turkish interests at either extremitv of the
Ragusan territory. This duty became apparent when,
with reviving strength, with habitual indifference to past
sufferings, and with a fairly-drilled army, the Otto-
mans — a warrior race, imbued with the traditions
of their conquering period, and descended from ances-
tors who gave their children arms for playthings —
after some years of inaction, began again to indulge in
flattering dreams. The chief feature of the Ottomans,
as of every dominant race, has ever been pride : their
bane has been self-commendation. Believing themselves
the elect of Islam, devoid of the means of comparison with
other nations by travel and study, they have ignored
their defects, and have discredited rumour thereon. The

60 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Bword of Ali, Mahomet's first and truest follower,
remains in their possession, and they have long fancied
themselves as able as ever to wield it. Unaccustomed
to reason on cause and effect, they refer everything to
predestination or special providence. Allah had sorely
chastised them, but he had pardoned them. Nearly all
the provinces of their vast empire were tranquil under
the gentle rule of Sultan Abdul Medjid. Mecca rejoiced
in an increased annual pilgrimage, unmolested by heretic
Wahabites. Plague had departed from the land. The
Turks felt new bom. In this mood the European crisis of
1848 found them. They heard of crowns falling, of states
rocking on the wave of revolution, of ministers who had
ruled the feverish masses of civihzation fleeing in dismay
from their homes. Tranquil themselves, outside the
storm circle, they gloried in their prophet's institutions.
As the flame spread in Hungary, they watched its pro-
gress with intense interest. Why might they not rebuild
the fallen mosque at Ofen ? They sympathized with the
Hungarians, their Christian cousins. They opened com-
munication with the patriots through their agents at
Widdin, encouraged in their equivocal course by a
" friendly " embassy. The hearts of Turks and Greeks
for once beat in unison, for success to Hungary. In vain.
Betrayed by their jealousies, and oppressed by Russia,
the Hungarian leaders and their immediate followers
closed a noble struggle by a sorry flight. After having
harangued like kings and striven Uke knights, they
crossed the Danube, fugitives, and claimed Turkish
hospitaUty; as their ancestors had often done before
them. It was accorded without hesitation, but with
misgivings. Rightly advised, the Porte would have had

THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEES. 61

steamers stationed in time at Varna to convey them far
away, after the purgation of their quarantine at Widdin.
That would have dulled the edge of Austria's demand for
their surrender, if then made, and have saved Turkey
the expense and waste of life incurred by calling out the
first division of the redif to be ready to support her
refusal. Austria, backed by Bussia, demanded their sur-
render, in virtue of a treaty for giving up deserters and
refugees from either side, excepting apostates. The
Porte saw, in the exceptional clause, a mode of escape
frt)m the dilemma created by the opposing claims of
international obUgation and civic duty. She held out to
the refugees congregated at Schumla inducements to
conversion. The shining example of the French taken
at the battle of NicopoUs — who remembered the divine
warning, " Whoever shall deny me before men, him also
will I deny before my Father which is in heaven,*' and
who all suffered decapitation, save a few nobles reserved
for ransom — was unheeded. The majority of the Hun-
garian refugees embraced Islamism; the minority, a
distinguished few, were conveyed, according to agree-
ment, to Kutaieh, where they remained sequestered a
year, honourably and liberally maintained at the Porte's
expense.

Thus far Turkey had acted well ; had reconciled policy
with humanity. Thus far, England's representative had
merited applause in recommending his Government to
send a demonstrative squadron to the Hellespont, and in
throwing the weight of his personal influence on the side
of the unfortunate. Both, in their zeal, went further.
Not content with the merit of having shielded the
Hungarian refugees from political vengeance, one

62 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

advised conferring and the other showered honours upon
them. Several were created pashas, and many received
field-officer's rank in the Turkish service. One might
draw a parallel by supposing high rank in the British
navy conferred upon the commanders of the Alabama and
Shenandoah, on their taking refuge in England. Austria
saw with vexation, easily imagined, the coveted title of
pasha, withheld from the noblest rayas, accorded to
men termed rebels by her. She saw with indignation
officers recently in arms against her, enrolled in the
army of her ally. Russia felt equally this violation of
international decorum, but was silent thereon. The
Porte measures weakness by quiescence under scorn or
ill-usage. She knew the gravity of the insult oflFered to
Austria, and attributed her placidity, if not to fear, to
inabiUty to back her words with deeds. Thenceforwards,
during three years, Austria was treated like a second-
rate power in discredit. Austria's claims were neglected :
Austrian influence became a by-word in the circles of
Pera and Galata.

Austria at length roused herself, on the occasion
of a feud between the Montenegrins and the Hirze-
govinians for the disputed territory of Zetta and
Crajova ; which, long tacitly considered neutral ground
for common pasturage, had been claimed by the Pasha
of Scodra in 1848 as Turkish soil, and as such entitled
to protection. The Montenegrins, bent on annexation,
had overbearingly abused the common right. The Porte
thought the hour arrived for reading a lesson to Monte-
negro — perennial source of irritation, nucleus of dis-
affection in the northern provinces — and encouraged by
an influential embassy, set about the task in earnest, and

MONTENEGRIN INSURRECTION. 63

in a way which indicated an intention of reduction rather
than repression, such as the case demanded. She sent
in the autumn of 1852 an army from Monastir to the
disaffected region under Omar Pasha ; who, zealous for
his adopted faith, promised (it is said) the Sultan to
extract from the Montenegrins the arrears of kharadj
due since their last revolt. That revolt had occurred in
1767, and is briefly mentioned by Wassaf Efendi, his-
toriographer of the empire, thus : ** The Montenegrins,
A.H. 1181, excited by detestable priests, and led on by a
bad individual, refused to pay their kharadj. The affair
having been examined into, the Scheick ul Islam issued
his fetwah that if they did not submit the men should be
made an example of, and the women and children be
carried into slavery. This fetwah was communicated to
the mountaineers ; and on their refusal to submit, the
Porte ordered Mehemet Pasha of Bosnia, and Mehemet
Pasha of BoumeUa, to carry out the sentence. They
assembled troops and munitions of war, and attacked
the mountains in two columns." The Turks, after their
success, again abandoned the mountain, carrying away
some women and children. The inhabitants, most of
whom had fled, then returned, and from that time
Montenegro had remained practically independent. The
Porte sent also a light squadron to the Adriatic, to
blockade the coast, and aid in provisioning the army.
Concurrently, about sixty Montenegrins* at Constan-
tinople were arrested as a precautionary measure, and

* There are generally above a thousand Montenegrins at Constan-
tinople under their own chiefs; they work chiefly as gardeners, and
after a few years return with their earnings to their families in the
Black Mountain.

64 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

thrown into prison ; whence they were in time released
through the good oflBces of the Kussian legation. Turkey,
misinformed about the temper of Christendom on certain
points, underrating the effect of pseudo-religious sympathy,
had made a false move ; and, instructed by it, her cam-
paign against the Montenegrins ten years later, conducted
more warily and with avowed reasonable views, proved
successful in a military sense. Austria was ill-disposed
to see the mountain overhanging the waters of Cattaro
ruled by a pasha. Western Europe was ill-prepared to
see a community self-administered the greater part of
a century, reduced to the condition of kharatch-paying
rayas. The vladika was Russia's pensioner.* Austria
being the nearest interested, espoused the cause of
the Montenegrins, and made that the opportunity to
settle a long account with the Porte. She sent Field-

• Prince Daniel (Vladika), bom in 1823, succeeded to the prince-
dom in 1851. He went to Petersbarg the ensuing year, and was
acknowledged by the Emperor Nicholas, who pensioned him, secular
prince of Montenegro.

October, 1854, a Russian envoy came to Cettigno, and tried without
success to induce Prince Daniel to organize a Christian insurrection in
Bosnia and the Hirzgovin.

The Turkish plenipotentiary to the peace conference at Paris, 1856,
maintained the Porte's rights oyer Montenegro. In that year Prince
Daniel, in a memoir addressed to the cabinets of Europe, demanded
for Montenegro recognition of independence, and possession of the port of
Antiyari with the intermediate coast. The following year Prince Daniel
went to Paris to solicit French protection, which was promised.

Idth August, 1860. Prince Daniel was assassinated in reyenge at
Cattaro, and was succeeded by his cousin. Prince Nicolas. Prince
Nicolas, encouraged by France^ from whom he expected material aid,
made war against the Porte in 1861-62, and was signally defeated.
He declared himself, by the treaty of Cettigno, Sept. 1862, the sultan's
vassal, and consented to the construction of a military road through his
territory, with a Turkish fort at either extremity. Through French
influence the construction of the road and forts is given up.

DEMANDS OP AUSTRIA. 65

Marshal Count Leiningen, in January, 1853, to Con-
Btantinople with a friendly autograph letter from the
Emperor to the Sultan, and a list of demands for the
consideration of the divan. This list comprised : — 1.
Abandonment of the intention to build a fort on Sutorina,
the strip of Turkish soil dovetailed into Dalmatia, con-
necting Le Bocche di Cattaro with Bosnia. 2. Becall of
the Montenegrin expedition. 3. Non-employment of
Hungarian refugees with the army of the Danube. 4.
Consideration for Austria's treaty right to protect the
Boman Catholics of Bosnia and Albania. 5. Indemnity
for damages caused to Austrian subjects by the forays of
Turkish borderers,* and for exaction of excessive dues
by local authorities from the Austrian company licensed
to fell timber in Bosnia : — a licence, it may be observed,
much abused by that company, with irreparable damage
to the forests, giving rather Turkey the right to claim
compensation from it. 6. Kespect for the exception to
the treaty of Balta Liman in Austria's favour. Count
Leiningen held out the prospect of war as the alternative,
while the Austrian embassy packed up ready for departure.
The Porte hesitated at compliance, and talked boldly of
caUing out 100,000 rediff. Turkey would have made a
good figure in a war with Austria alone, taking into
account the elements of disaffection in various parts of the
Austrian dominion ever watching for their opportunity.

• By an ancient treaty between Austria and Turkey, the Porte
engaged to make good losses sustained by Austrian subjects through the
acts of Barbary corsairs. In case of failure therein, Austria to have
the right to compensate them by forays on the Turkish territory. The
Turks, unwilling to be thus vicariously chastised, naturally retaliated
when that right was exercised. Hence arose the hereditary border
fend between the two empires.

66 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

But Russia's concnrrence with Austria was undisguised ;
her ci>-oiH^ratioii loomed in the distance ; the Western
IVwors wero silent. So Count Leiningen obtained the
8uMAiu*t^ of his demands except in regard of the fifth,
which wrts balanced by counter Turkish claims for border
lUitrajjt^s ; and the Constantinopolitans, whose creduhty is
lUHrvoUous, readily persuaded themselves that the object
\»f liin vUit had been to obtain the Sultan's permission for
tho Yoiuig emperor's coronation. The Turkish official
ut>\vspapor announced his arrival and departure in one
luimjjraph, and merely stated for the information of the
public that he had come to Constantinople on a particular
uUHHion. His prompt success was facilitated by the
iuiponding mission of Prince MentchikoflF; though, if
KuHsia had reckoned as part of her game the continuance
of Austria's rancour, she deceived herself. Satisfied with
hn gain, Austria, on the return of her envoy, directed
lior agents in the Levant to refrain from displaying exulta-
tion, and to endeavour to re-estabhsh amicable feelings
l)otween the two empires. Austrian and Turkish states-
men understand each other ; each has the same evasive,
dissembUng, procrastinating policy, derived from ruUng
respectively an ill-assorted empire, peopled by various
races some in antagonism to others, and therefore
each is inclined to make allowances for the other's
position.

The Montenegrin expedition cost Turkey a grievous
expenditure of men and horses, through their exposure
with scanty food and clothing to inclement weather ; and
its recall, at foreign dictation, when in occupation of the
passes leading to Cettigno, with an advanced guard of
irregulars within five hours' distance of that city, weak-

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S BALL. 67

ened the wholesome effect which its advance had pro-
duced on the minds of the Bosnians and Hirze-
govinians.

The sojourn of Count Leiningen at Constantinople was
marked by an event which, though of a social character,
was, nevertheless, a sign of the times. The French
ambassador threw open his saloons, freshly decorated with
impannelled N*s and eagles each surmounted by an im-
perial crown, and gave a grand ball in honour of the inau-
guration of the second empire. The preceding ball given in
them had been in honour of the inauguration of the second
repubUc ; and sixty years earUer, the French ambassador
of that day had assembled his countrymen at the same
spot to celebrate the Revolution; when, according to
local tradition, the guests, excited by champagne and
patriotism, sung the Marseillaise in chorus, and, led by
their host,' danced half frenzied the Carmagnole round
a tree of liberty planted in the garden near the chapel of
St. Louis. Pera has many associations with departed
glories. PoUsh Street recalls to mind the time when the
King of Poland had his representative at the SubUme
Porte, and the Austrian internuncio inhabits the palace
inhabited of yore by the Venetian Bails. The Italians
at Pera look upon that palace as theirs by right, and
in the excitement of '48 caballed over their cups in
coffee-houses, theatrically vowing to go and take it ; the
rumour of which, alarming the internuncio, made him
send to the Porte for an armed force to protect his
residence. The assemblage of the Turkish ministers
and other functionaries of high rank in gala costume
at the ball shewed the change which had come over
their thoughts, in regard of France, since the period

5-2

68 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

of Louis Philippe's vacillating reign: and there was
reason for their deference to the representative of
French power, for the cloud long floating over Jeru-
salem, formed of vapour exhaled by the heat of the
second Napoleonic era, now cast an ominous shadow on
Constantinople.

( 69 )

CHAPTER IV.

Louis Napoleon's Choice of a War Policy — The Rival Christian
Powers in the East — The Firman restoring to the Roman Catho-
lics the Holy Places — The Porte summoned to carry it into Effect
— Menacing Attitude of France — ^Weakness of the Turkish Policy
— The Matter in Dispute — ^Attitude of England — Question of the
Holy Places — Russian Intervention — Mission of Prince Mentchi-
koff — Passive Attitude of the Porte — English View of the Situation.

Louis Napoleon, in adopting the rule of his illustrious
uncle's internal policy, foresaw the external conse-
quences. Preparing for war from the outset of his pre-
sidency, the question was, where to make it when the
hour should arrive for encircling the foreshadowed
imperial crown with a military halo ? Three courses
presented themselves. First, war with Germany for
the Khine boundary. But that, with his power un-
consoUdated, would arouse Europe : isolation and
dethronement might follow, without the preamble of a
splendid drama like that closed with the drop-scene of
les adieux de Fontainehkau. ' Secondly, war with Eng-
land. But that, although an hereditary passion with his
people, would be equally hazardous. England might
again rally nations to her banner, again marshal a royal
crusade against dangerous doctrines. Thirdly, war
with Kussia. Distance, inadequate maritime resources,
and sad but not dishonouring recollections, were deterrent
considerations. Nevertheless it appeared the only choice.

70 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

A motive and an ally were required. The problem was,
to irritate Kussia and invert England's normal attitude
with respect to France. There was but one field,
Turkey ; and in that field but one spot where the solu-
tion could be found, Jerusalem. The means were, to
excite the jealousy of Russia in regard of her influence
in Turkey, and make that react on the susceptibility of
the English in regard of the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire ; to place Russia in the dilemma of surrendering
her ascendancy in Turkey, or of sustaining it in a
manner admitting of construction into designs on the
Sultan's rights. War once Ughted in the East, none
could discern ulterior consequences ; and be they what
they might, France in aUiance with England might
reasonably expect to leave off" a gainer. Louis Napoleon
chose that course, and made the Roman Catholic religion
his instrument to prepare the way.

During a long period the Roman Catholic religion,
under French protection, had acted a part in Turkey
analogous to the part since acted by the Greek rehgion,
under Russian protection. But as the Catholics in the
East were comparatively few in number, it had caused
no uneasiness to the Porte, then too powerful to heed
Christendom, and had simply proved vexatious to rival
powers. The Protestant powers of that day combated
Catholicism in the East with the Greek religion, which the
Jesuits were attempting to undermine, and showed their
influence occasionally by carrying the nomination of a
meritorious churchman to the patriarchal chair : pre-emi-
nently of the learned Cyril Lucari, brightest ornament of
the Oriental church since the Moslem conquest of Con-
stantinople. Turkey and Europe would both have gained

CLAIMS OF CHRLSTENDOM. 71

if England and Holland had resumed that lucid policy on
renewing their intercourse with Turkey after the civil and
international troubles of the seventeenth century. Free
from the sectarianism of the East — for only in latter days
have they attempted to plant Protestantism in an ungenial
soil — they might then have proved instrumental in puri-
fying the Greek church of many abuses, and might have
competed with Kussia in the field of protection. They
might have prevailed upon the Porte, in its own interests,
to consent to the nomination of the Greek patriarch and
primates for life, and thus have prevented the develop-
ment of a system of unexampled simony.

In other days, long previously, French ascendancy in
the Holy Land, fruit of the Crusades, had deprived the
Greeks of the position which theit numbers and the edicts
of Omar and succeeding caliphs rendered incontestable.
But only for a while. With the resumption of Moslem
rule in Syria the Greeks recovered it. In their turn
they made the Catholics taste the bitterness of religious
intolerance, and were naturally indifferent about the
preservation of monuments commemorative of their
rival's ascendancy. The Ottoman conquerors confirmed
the edicts of the caliphs in their favour. The feud
between the Greeks and the Latins in Palestine has
continued ever since, a scandal to Christianity and a
jest to Islam.

Thus things were, when, in 1740, the French am-
bassador at the Porte obtained a firman from Sultan
Mahmoud I., to restore to the Roman Catholics sundrv
holy sanctuaries at Jerusalem (not particularized)
alleged to have been usurped by the Greeks; against
whom a charge of desecration of the tombs of Godfrey

72 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

de Bouillon, of Guy de Lusignan, and of others, were
urged as a further and particular grief. Generally
speaking, an unscrupulous ambassador and a complaisant
vizir have suflBced to obtain a firman for any purpose
not militating against the letter of the Koran ; and the
one in question may have sprung from such a combina-
tion. Be that as it may, the said firman remained
u dead letter, like many others: -war and revolution
gave France other matters to think about; and, as if
it were non-existent, many firmans concerning the Holy
Places were subsequently given, down to the reign of
Sultan Mahmoud II., confirmatory of the rights of the
Greeks.

Louis Napoleon brought that firman to light, and
menacingly summoned the Porte to act up to its tenor.
Circumstances, however, had widely changed in the interval.
The subjects of the Porte of the Oriental church had in-
creased in numbers, wealth, and intelligence ; many of
them, the Moldavians, Wallachians, and Servians, had
acquired self-administration ; and Kussia had gained an
importance in the European scale with a preponderance
in regard of Turkey which naturally constituted her tho
officious advocate of her co-religionists. Circumstances
had strangely altered since Sully, speaking of his doubt
of Kussia consenting to join St. Pierre's projected peace
association,* said : ** Si le grand due de Muscovie ou Czar

• The Abb^ St. Pierre, in the reign of Henri IV., committod to
paper a vision of universal peace among Christian nations by arbitra-
tion, which was seriously entertained by that monarch and his miuisttr.
A dispute between two nations was to be submitted to the arbitration of
all. In case of the party declared in the wrong proving refractory, he
was to be proceeded against in accordance with the award of the
international Areopagus and compelled to submission.

THE HOLY PLACES. 73

do Russie, que Ton croit etre Tancien kn^s do Scjthie,
refuse d'entrer dans rassociation, on doit le traiter comme
le Sultan de Turquie, le depouiller de ce qu'il possede en
Europe et le releguer §a Asie, ou il pourra, sans que nous
nous en melions, continuer tant qu'il YOudra la guerre
avec les Persans et les Turcs."

The zeal of the czars in behalf of their co-rehgionists in
Turkey may have been a cloak to cover ambitious projects
with; but it reflected the sympathies of the Russian
nation, and thereby became an apparent duty from which
they might, when convenient, plead inability to exonerate
themselves. Nevertheless, they cannot fairly claim credit
for disinterestedness at any period in regard of the
Turkish Greeks. Twice during the eighteenth century
the Czarina excited them to revolt with promises of aid,
and each time abandoned them to the vengeance of their
incensed masters ; and during the civil war from 1820 to
1827, in the Morea and Attica, when they were exposed
there and 'elsewhere in the Turkish dominions to the
excesses of a dominant race, stung in its pride and stimu-
lated by fanaticism, the Czar remained a tranquil spectator
of their exertions and their sufierings : not through any
misapprehension of the nature of the struggle, for his
ambassador at Constantinople had, as early as July, 1821,
expressed in a note to the Porte his sovereign's fear lest
the *' measures of the Ottoman government should give
the revolution the character of a legitimate defence against
the total destruction of the Greek nation and its reUgion; "
but out of deference to the tenets of the ** Holy Alliance,"
which made no distinction between a patriot fighting for
his cause in the face of heaven and a carbonaro armed
with the assassin's blade.

74 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

For the sake of the doubtful claims of a Koman
Catholic minority, France called upon the Porte to
irritate the feelings of ten millions of her subjects of the
Oriental church, and to subject Kussia to the mortification
of seeing her influence lessened in their eyes and in the
eyes of Europe. This was the able scheme devised to
place Russia in the alternative of surrendering her prestige
or of provoking war. Intimidation, and instilling into the
mind of the divan an exaggerated idea of France's power
under a Buonaparte, were resorted to as subordinate
action. A French fleet threatened to bombard Tripoli
on an ignoble pretext ; * other Turkish towns were
menaced with similar visits, and the French ambassador
at the Porte talked of solving the Holy Places question
summarily by occupying Jerusalem with a French army.
The Porte was thus led to believe in the peril of offending
France. Alarmed, she lost her presence of mind.
Instead of making a candid appeal to the enlightenment

* Two French soldiers having deserted from Algiers in 1852,
came to Tripoli ; these hecame Moslems, and were enrolled, with the
knowledge of the French consul, in the Turkish army. They found the
fast of Ramazan unpalatable ; they infringed it, and were punished
accordingly. Escaping then from the barracks, tdey went to the French
consulate, proclaimed themselves Christians, and claimed protection.
The pasha of Tripoli demanded them from the consul, but in vain.
He could not seize them under the French flag ; but the delinquents
having one day left its protection to go to a grog-shop in the neigh-
bourhood, were laid hold of by the police and reconveyed to the bar-
racks. The French consul demanded their surrender, and being refused,
reported the affair to Paris. Three weeks afterwards a French fleet
arrived at Tripoli with orders to bombard the city if the men in ques-
tion were not on board in twenty-four hours. Its commander invited
the European inhabitants to place themselves in safety on board ship.
Thus summoned, the pasha had no choice. The men were given up,
and the pasha was recalled from his post as a further satisfaction to the
French government.

DILEMMA OF THE PORTE. 75

of Europe, to extricate her from the strait in which
opposing forces compressed her, she tried to wriggle out
of it. She advised the Sultan to promise the Czar the
maintenance of the status quo at Jerusalem, and after-
wards evaded performance. She ostensibly reviewed
favourably the claims of the Greeks, and gave to the
Latins the key which opened the gates of Janus. It seems
very Uke fiction, but it is true, that a key, a porter, and a
star were the elements out of which grew the late eventful
war with Bussia : the question being if the Latins should
possess a key to the principal door of the church at
Bethlehem, if the Moslem porter, the modem Shallumj
should be empowered to restrain Christians of a certain
denomination from entering the church at given hours,
and if the merit of replacing a star over the tomb of the
Virgin Mary, in lieu of one abstracted a few years
previously, should belong to the Greeks or to the Latins.
This question was left to the decision of the Porte, who
referred it to a council of ulema and efendis. Fairly
might they exclaim, **God is great and Mohammed is his
prophet ! " since Christians were willing to defer to their
judgment a question concerning places hallowed by the
acts and suflFerings of their Saviour. England was in
a position to decide it. Her Protestant and neutral
character would have enabled her to decide authoritatively
whether a firman, obtained no one could say through what
influence, never acted on, never even cited during a
hundred years, were or were not valid in equity to deprive
the Greeks of possessions and privileges enjoyed by
them for centuries. Her common sense would not
have required two volumes of despatches to show her
the diflferent effect on the dignity of France and Russia,

76 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

respectively, between replacing the Latins in the status
quo of the days of the Frank monarchy in Palestine,
and depriving the Greeks of the position occupied
by them long before Russia had acquired European
importance. England, far from desiring to mediate,
early resolved to look on and enjoy the fight. It
began in 1850. In June of that year, Sir Stratford
Canning is desired to watch and report the progress of
the contest which he considers likely to arise between the
Latin and Greek churches in Turkey, but to abstain at
present from taking any part in it. His Excellency
rephed in a letter to the Secretary of State as follows :
** Mindful of your lordship's instructions, I confine
myself to the duty of watching from a distance any move-
ment that may occur in the antagonists' camps. A
Christian having no immediate concern in the dispute
might reasonably wish to see the removal of a contention
between the two churches which arrogate an exclusive
guardianship of places sanctified by our common reh-
gion. But no Englishman, alive to the impoi*tance of a
true European policy in the East, could witness with-
out regret and anxiety the triumph of a political
influence which would always be ready to overflow its
bounds."

During the ensuing two years, the Holy Places ques-
tion went up and down like the mercury of a barometer ;
now announced in despatches from Constantinople to be
insolvable, now announced as on the point of solution.
It did not admit of earnest settlement, since England had
manifested a bias for the Latins. Louis Napoleon knew
that, and let the process work itself out. Ostensibly, at
length, a compromise was made. France forewent part of

MISSION OP PRINCE MENTCIIIKOF. 77

her claims for the Latins ; * Kussia yielded a portion
of the Greeks' yantage-ground. Russia had betrayed
indecision, and thereby lost caste in the eyes both of
Christians and Moslems. She soon felt this. In the
hope of recovering it, she prepared a pompous embassy
to send to Constantinople, to demand some concession
for the Oriental churches, in order to show the world
that her influence still preponderated in Turkey. Rumour
thereon, magnifying her object, produced unwonted agita-
tion at Constantinople. The Turks saw, in imagination,
the realization of prophecies connecting the year of the
Hegira, 1270, with national disaster ; and the Greeks ^
anticipated nothing less than the re-elevation of the
Cross in St. Sophia at the ensuing Easter.

With the capital in this mood, Prince Mentchikof
arrived in the Bosphorus, 28th February, 1853, with a
numerous suite, including naval and military officers of
rank to survey the position. His arrival excited the rayas,
and flurried the diplomatic body. Greeks thronged the
main street of Pera before the gates of the Russian em-
bassy, at which Russian sentries were posted, from mom
till night, to catch a gUmpse of the **hberator," and others
passing them made the sign of the cross. The repre-
sentatives of minor courts exchanged significant glances
with the pregnant remark, ^^Ueau chauffe." The English
and French charges-d'affairfes held midnight councils, and
declared Turkey in danger. One wrote for the British

* France had in reserve a distinct claim, said to be based also on
the firman of 1740, viz., the right to hoist the French flag at Jeru-
salem. This claim was brought forward during the war, was conceded,
and in September, 1855, the French flag was hoisted on the French
consulate at Jerusalem, in the presence of the pasha and of the Moslem
and Christian notables.

78 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

fleet at Malta, and the other suggestively for the French
fleet at Toulon, to repair to Vourlah. By theur request,
an English officer with Turkish rank waited on the
Grand Vizir, to urge the adoption of defensive measures.
He found his Highness indisposed to view affairs as des-
perate. Bakalum had yet to play its accustomed part.
He consented only to sanction silent preparations : to pre-
pare the squadron, laid up dismantled as usual in winter,
as far as could be done without attracting notice ; and he
enjoined discretion in conversing on the subject with
Franks. The Porte had made up its mind to listen to
Prince Mentchikof with an air of entire trust in the purity
of his sovereign's intentions.

In England Prince Mentchikof s mission was con-
sidered ominous. Ministers felt more than they avowed :
Pubhcists implied more than they wrote. All concurred
in thinking Lord Stratford de EedcUflFe, then in England
on leave, the man for the emergency ; and accordingly
he was directed to return to his post.

( 79 )

CHAPTER V.

Prince Mentchikof s injudicioas Conduct — Russian Demands — Position
of the Greek Church in Turkey — Russian Objects — ^Prince Mentchi-
kofs ** Note " — European Misconception of its Object — Feelings
of the Turks towards Russia — Death of the Sultan's Mother — The
Funeral Ceremonies — Her Character and Influence over the
Sultan — Change of Ministry — Redshid Pasha's Policy — Antago-
nistic Feelings of the Ministers — The Russian "Note" rejected
by the Council of State — Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with
Russia — Departure of Prince Mentchikof and the Russian Legation.

Prince Mentchikof reposed three days at Pera, in
seclusion. Reports of the state of pubKc feeling flowed
in that interval to his residence like flies to a spider's
web. On the fourth day his serene Highness made his
official debut, inauspiciously. He went, knowing an all but
regal reception awaited him, to the Porte — region of formal
etiquette — in plain undecorated costume; and having
smoked the calumet with the Grand Vizir, declined to
visit the minister for foreign affairs, who, in uniform,
with pipes, cofifee, and sherbet ready, sat expecting him
in his apartment, a few paces o£f, under the same roof.
This demeanour might have suited the atmosphere of
a saray in Turkestan, but was indiscreet in a capital
under the eyes of Europe. He gained his end ; but at
the expense of dignity. The slighted minister, since
decorated with the cordon of a Russian order, tendered
two days afterwards his resignation ; which was weakly

80 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

accepted. The Porte might thus early have made a
stand with the concurrence of every crowned head
except one. Supposing Fuad Efendi to have dissembled
with Bussia (as stated) on the Holy Places question, in
excess of the Kcence of statecraft, Prince Mentchikof
might on his arrival have intimated in a becoming
manner his reluctance to transact business with him :
as Viscount Ponsonby, when representing England at
Constantinople, had conveyed in a ** note " his desire
to cease intercourse with Akif Efendi, the minister for
foreign aflfairs of that day, for having deliberately sanc-
tioned the arbitrary imprisonment of an Enghshman;
but the prince lost sight of decorum when he read the
Sultan a lesson, as it were, by oflfering a pubKc slight
on unappreciable grounds to one of his ministers, so
timed that it could not be avoided. This injudicious pro-
ceeding aroused personal feehngs on which his diplomatic
opponents worked. His serene Highness afterwards made
another mistake, showing ignorance of the Oriental mind,
by warning the Porte to beware of disclosing the nature
of his negotiation to the French or EngUsh embassy.
He thereby betrayed a sense of apprehension, and so
defeated his object; whereas affected indifference about
their opinions would have ensured discretion on the part
of Rifaat Pasha, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Prince Mentchikof first intimated his sovereign's wish
to revive the treaty of Hunkiar Iskellesi ; engaging, if it
was acceded to, for Kussia to assist Turkey with an army
whenever required. With two shepherds at hand, the
representatives of France and England, this was playing
the wolf too openly. He next suggested a convention
to give increased honour and dignity to the Greek

THE GREEK CHURCH. 81

Church in the person of its patriarch. The patriarch,
named according to custom, by the Sultan, to be im-
movable, unless for treason ; in the appreciation of which
the Czar might, it was hinted, expect to have a voice :
the patriarch to continue to nominate in synod,
subject to the Sultan's approval, the sub-patriarchs and
the bishops, also for life. This proposition taxed the
Porte inferehtially — its weak point — with the odium
of interference in spiritual matters, and aimed — its real
object — at the power of the synod. The action of the
Porte, whatever it may be in substance, in regard of the
nomination of the patriarch or other dignitary of the
Church, is in form confirmatory of the national will
expressed apparently by the synod and the council of
notables. Its conge d'elire is general. The Porte may
unostensibly influence the election of a patriarch ; has
occasionally refused to confirm one; but as a rule its
prerogative has been used to prevent the election of a given
individual rather than favour that of any one in particular.
The proposition, though deemed unacceptable, was good.
No scheme short of life nomination will give dignity and
moral tone to the Greek Church in Turkey, — seeing the
tendency of the synod to suscitate and entertain charges
of dereliction of duty or venality against the patriarchs
and primates, to augment the chances of preferment,
and the disinclination of influential individuals in another
sphere to forego the advantages derivable therefrom.
Patriarchates and bishoprics have, like pashaUks, been
objects of competition, and, as the douceurs have till
recently been considerable, frequent mutations have
pleased all parties except the flocks ultimately sheared.
Two Fanariots, the capou-kiayas of Moldavia and

82 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Wallacbia, much caressed in political and diplomatic
circles, monopolized during many years preceding the
war the credit of adjusting the interests of this
simoniacal traffic. Kussia conferred a notable service
on religion by obtaining life occupancy of their sees
for the bishops in the Danubian principalities. She
accorded that also to the spiritual head of the Armenians,
the patriarch of Etchmiazin, a Russian subject since the
peace of Adrianople ; an example which, aided by
the good sense of his nation, has practically given
permanence to the resident Armenian Patriarch at Con-
stantinople.

The anomalous position of the Greek Church in
Turkey — a religio-civil estabUshment with municipal
and judicial attributions — has rendered the Porte, per-
suaded of Russia swaying the rayas through their clergy,
averse to increase its prestige by the surrender of the
right of spiritual degradation. Western Europe seems
by its silence to have allowed itself to be influenced in
the same sense. But though the apprehension of the
Turks, seeing a natural-bom foe in every Greek, might
obscure their vision, Europe should have taken a larger
view of the question. The Greek Church, occupying
an honourable iudependent position, might care less
for foreign protection, than now, when exposed to
intrigues within itself and to the vagaries of a domi-
nant race. The Patriarch of Constantinople would
not be a genuine priest if he should antepose another
to his own Church. He remembers that one of his
predecessors, Jeremiah, consecrated the first Russian
patriarch. Even in his sorry state under the Porte,
he lias never admitted the supremacy of the synod of

RUSSIAN OBJECTS. 83

Moscow.* He has ever regarded himself as the head
of the Oriental Church, and Russia, by increasmg his
prestige, might be arming him agamst herself. A
celibate churchman, on attaining the object of his ambi-
tion, is an arrogant mortal, ready to ** make his cap
co-equal with the Crown." As if anticipating this
tendency, Russia has endeavoured to introduce a Slavic
element into the synod of Constantinople. Her success
would be justice to the Bulgarians and a check on
Fanariote aspirations; but it might give tone to
Panslavism, viewed by some as one of Russia's objects.
On this point the Greeks are at variance with her.
Pre-eminent, in a religious sense, over the races of
the Oriental Church in Turkey — as the Ottomans are
pre-eminent over the Moslem races within its limits —
the Greeks have jealously opposed the elevation of
the Bulgarian clergy on whom only three or four
mitres have fallen, through Russian influence.

Prince Mentchikof, abandoning successively his idea
of a treaty and of a convention, reduced his demands to
the famous ** note," and sent it to the Porte as his ulti-
matum. May 7, 1853. He accorded three days for a
categoric answer, which delay was extended to the 18th
of May. The interval was passed in deep anxiety by the

• While the Lower Empire lasted, the Patriarch of Moscow depended
spiritually on the Patriarch of Constantinople. But after the fall of
that empire the inconsistency was seen of the Russian Church owing
obedience to a patriarch named by a Moslem sovereign. I wan the
Terrible, having married a daughter of the house of Palaeologos, fancied
he inherited thereby the spiritual rights of the Byzantine emperor ;
he therefore formally separated his church from Constantinople and
became the head of it. The orthodox Greek of every other land regards
the Czar as the protector only of his church : the spiritual head of it
in his eyes is the Patriarch of Constantinople.

6-2

84 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

public. Diplomatic and state machinery was set in
motion to influence the result. The Roman people never
watched more excitedly for the curl of white smoke from
the Hall of Conclave than the Constantinopolitans for
an indication of the deliberation on the ** note." It was
a momentous pause. The *'note/' impartially tested,
was not alarming. It embodied a demand for an engage-
ment by the Sultan, in confirmation of his promise to
that efiect, to maintain the rights and immunities of the
Greek Church on the existing basis; to give to that
Church all the rights and advantages which might be
conceded to any other Church in Turkey ; to maintain
and cause to be respected the ancient rights of the
Greek Church at Jerusalem without prejudice to other
Christian communities, native or foreign ; and to maintain
the status quo of the sanctuaries at Jerusalem, held by the
Greeks either exclusively or in common with other
sects. The ** note " contained less in wording and sub-
stance than three treaties — the treaties of Carlo witz,
Belgrade, and Sistowa — had accorded to Austria on
behalf of the Roman Catholics of Turkey, and it implied
no more than France had claimed to exercise in favour
of them since the days of Francis I., and had efiectively
exercised of late years : notably in the reign of Charles X.
and with more energy during the presidency of Louis
Napoleon. Charles the Tenth's ambassador obtained by
importunity the Porte's concession to the nomination of
a Roman Catholic Armenian patriarch ; which, involving
partial secular jurisdiction over his flock, gave ofience to
the Gregorian Armenians, in number forty to one. Louis
Napoleon's ambassador, on the occasion of a dispute
bdtween the Roman Catholic Armenians and their

PRINCE MENTCHIKOF'S NOTE. 85

patriarch — the former appealing to the Porte, the latter
to Rome — supported the Papal authority, and desired the
Porte, in virtue of " France's right to protect the Roman
Catholic faith in Turkey," to abstain from interference
in the matter.

But Europe, misled by those who should have
known better, imagined the *' note*' would transfer the
Sultan's authority over the ray as to the Czar. Russia
had owed her influence with the rayas to community of
religion and of enmity to the Turks. The *'note"
would not have added anything to those titles ; it
would simply, as intended, have set her right with the
Oriental Christians in regard of the check she had
experienced on the Holy Places question. The Turks
had abundant reasons for feeling angry with Russia, but
shrank from the consequences of a rupture with her.
Revenge, however, prevailed, and made them listen to
the counsellors who whispered, ** Fear not, the Western
Powers are with you ; together you will reduce Russia to
the condition of a second-rate power." Prudence ever
and anon gained the g,scendant. They knew that the
** note " contained nothing fatal to their dominancy over
the rayas, — the one thing prominent in their minds. It
did not ask for non Mohammedan evidence to be admitted
in the mekkiemelis (tribunals). It did not ask for rayas
to share in posts of dignity and hold commissions in the
army. It did not ask for bells to be rung in churches
for prayers. The *' note," less explicit than the Hatti
Humayoun of 1856, would have left matters materially as
they were. No astuteness on Russia's part could have
extracted anything practical from it, beyond showing the
Greeks that France had not supplanted her in the Porte's

86 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

estimation. Reflecting Turks saw danger to their law and
their independence in a war with allies. They feared that
if Turkey became the cause of a European conflict she
might by an easy transition become the object of it;
and, stopping short of that consummation, they saw
looming in the distance emancipation of their rayas, as
the remuneration to be demanded for the alliance at once
desired and dreaded. They instinctively apprehended that
a war waged by Christian powers on behalf of a Moslem
race, dominant over many millions of Christians invoking
rights, would prove a snare and a delusion, so far as they
were concerned, and develope designs, already latent,
more fatal to their race than the ** amity" of Eussia.
They had divined, before the publication of the ** Con-
fidential Despatches,'' the aversion of Russia, how well
soever disposed towards the Greeks, from the revival of
the Lower Empire. Left unbiassed to their own inspira-
tions, the Turks would have considered the ** note " in an
acquiescent spirit. Reluctantly, they would have acqui-
esced in it ; for much had passed of that which blinds men
and leads them on in dangerous courses. Prince Ment-
chikof s demeanour had been arrogant, his language
haughty. Calm reflection was required to mitigate their
eflFect.

In the midst of these troubles the Sultan sustained
the affliction deepest felt by a Mussulman, in the death
of the Valideh Sultana, his mother. Whatever may be
thought of the wife's position in the East, that of the
mother is unexceptional : she is in all respects the
mistress of her son's house and the confidant of his
sorrows, in every class of life. Female screams at dawn
in the palace of Beshik-tash, one morning early in May,

FUNERAL OF THE SULTAN'S MOTHER. 87

announced his bereavement to the guard-boats and
passing caiks, and bade farewell to the body which at
that early hour was conveyed in the imperial caik,
followed by other caiks with the deceased lady's suite, to
the old seraglio. It was there washed and perfumed
according to usage, and laid on a bier covered with
clothes of gold and silver. Preceded by incense-bearers
and choristers, it was then brought forth from the
interior of the palace and deposed under the shade of trees
in the centre court for a few minutes, while the court
imam recited a prayer for the soul of the departed.
During its recital, the spectators, taking ofif their slippers,
stood on the soles up-turned: a sign of deep respect.
The procession was then formed. Military pashas on
horseback, in single file, flanked by their grooms and
tchiaushes on foot, led the way, followed by a compact
body of Arabian dervishes chanting lustily. Then rode
three legal dignitaries, also in single file, the cazi-askers of
Europe and Asia with the evcaf nazir. A body of
Khademes (royal domestics) marched next in order.
Then the ministers of state rode in single file ; the three
last being the Capitan Pasha, the Scheick ul Islam, and
the Grand Vizir. After them rode a body of the
Sultan's eunuchs, the chief of whom, the kislar agasi,
an aged melancholy-looking Nubian, immediately pre-
ceded the corpse. The eunuchs of the deceased lady,
scattering new-coined silver money among the crowd,
closed the procession. As the procession passed along
the streets, lined at intervals with troops, numerous
female spectators in open spaces sobbed audibly; and
although Eastern women have ever tears as well as
smiles at command those shed on this occasion were

88 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

sincere, for the sex had lost that day an advocate, the
poor a frieird. The procession halted in front of the
garden of the Mahmoudieh mausoleum, where, on an
elevated slope, the boys of adjoining schools, chanting
hymns, were drawn up, and being reformed on foot
moved on through gilded gates and rose-beds, slowly to
the tomb. As its portals swung open, screams from the
valideh's women gathered in the interior of the edifice
to pay the last tribute of respect to their kind mistress
issued forth, sad and plaintive ; to mingle, strangely
harmonious, with the chants of dervishes and the neighing
of led horses. The body was buried beside that of
Sultan Mahmoud II.

The deceased lady, a native of Georgia, brought
to the seragHo when a child, died aged forty-six,
having survived her lord fifteen years. During her
widowhood she had devoted her large income to pious
and charitable works, and strenuously espoused the cause
of her sex, high and low. She built two mosques, and
a civil hospital — the only one deserving the name in the
empire — for Moslem poor, but which since her death has
declined in usefulness. She had exercised her influence
with her son for his good and the good of the State.
Freed from her gentle restraint. Sultan Abdul Medjid
gave way to those excesses which brought him to a prema-
ture grave : if that expression is admissible in regard of a
fatalist. During the valideh's last iUness, the physician
in attendance, seeing the Sultan's grief, begged to be
relieved from responsibility on account of his treatment.
*' Do what seems proper to you," replied the Sultan;
'* if my mother lives it will be with the consent of God ;
but if her hour is arrived your skill will avail nought."

REDSHID pasha's POLICY. 89

A few days after his mother's interment the Sultan
gave Prince Mentchikof a private audience ; then shuflSed
his ministry. He removed Mehemet Ali Pasha from the
Grand Viziriat to the seraskiriat (war department) ;
installed Eiridli Mustafa Pasha in his room ; turned out
the Hassa Mushiri (general of the guard) to make place
for the ejected seraskir ; and brought in Redshid Pasha
as minister for foreign aflFairs, his predecessor becoming
the president of the council. Save a few aware of the
influences at work against the **note," people in general
including the Russian party expected conciliatory counsel
from Redshid Pasha, the soul of the Porte whatever office
he might hold. More clearly than most men he saw the
hazards of a war such as the one foreshadowed. But he
was not a free agent. Ambitious, he had to choose
between leading the war party or leaving that to his
rival, the husband of the Sultan's surviving sister,
and the assumed representative of orthodox principles.
The hand of the Sultan's eldest daughter, chief prize
of the state, was shortly to be given away ; the
aspirants for it being one of Redshid Pasha's sons and
Mehemet Ali Pasha's son by a former wife (divorced,
as a matter of course, on his marriage with a sultana),
and though promised to the former the promise might
be revok€d. Redshid Pasha felt this and trimmed
his sails accordingly. He expected Russia, though she
might suspend diplomatic relations with Turkey, would
compromise difficulties at last rather than break with
the Western Powers. He hoped to talk war and main-
tain peace. He miscalculated the popular temper in
both climes. He underrated the strength of individual
will.

90 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The principal members of the said heterogeneous
ministry bore no love to each other. Redshid Pasha,
when Grand Vizir, had turned Mustafa Pasha, the actual
holder of the seal of state, out of the government of
Candia — which post, held by him for twenty-five years,
had made him one of the richest men in the empire ;
and Mehemet Ali Pasha, having previously supplanted
Redshid Pasha in the Grand Viziriat, had striven to involve
him in the imputed delinquency of Djezairli Migriditch,
the head of the customs : a weapon which Redshid Pasha
afterwards turned against him with more success, if not
with more justice. Two ex-Grand Vizirs rivals for
power under a new man, a stranger to the capital,
made an unmeaning coalition on which nobody counted.
The ministry was considered embodied in Redshid Pasha,
regarded as England's nominee. He soon became the
head of it.

May 17th. — A council of dignitaries and ulema, forty-
six in number, met under the presidency of Redshid
Pasha to deliberate on a foregone conclusion — the
answer to the ** note." Forty- three members voted
for its rejection ; three for its acceptance. After the
council Redshid Pasha repaired to the British embassy
and remained there until midnight.

May 19th. — The cessation of diplomatic, relations
between Russia and Turkey was announced to the pubUc.
Prince Mentchikof had already embarked in a steamer
and was lying at Buyukdereh, detained by a thunder-
storm. That evening the representatives of Austria,
England, France, and Prussia met to reconsider the
question, in the hope of finding a less menacing solution ;
and next day two of them rowed up the Bosphorus to

DEPARTURE OF THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 91

make a final appeal to the prince's feelings. To no
purpose. On May 21st his serene Highness steamed
into the Euxine, and next afternoon the eagles were
removed from the gates and fa9ade of the Russian
embassy in the presence of a crowd of Greeks excited
into silence. They looked as though they expected the
carved birds to fly away of their own accord to ** Holy
Russia." They blessed their descent. That night was
lelei berat* (record-night). Every pious Greek gazing
on the beautiful city, as it lay tranquil in the moonlight
with feasting in its palaces, its thousand minarets
wreathed with lamps tracing the contour of the hills
and valleys in their vast extent, from the Propontis to
the Golden Horn, from the seraglio to the Golden
Gate, thought of the ** handwriting on the wall."

The ordinary Russian legation left Constantinople
May 26th, leaving Russian subjects to the good offices
of the Prussian legation. A fortnight afterwards a
Russian secretary arrived at Constantinople with a letter
from Count Nesselrode to the Porte, approving of Prince
Mentchikof s proceedings, and inviting it to reconsider its
refusal of his ultimatum ; and on June 17th he steamed
back to Odessa with a confirmation of that refusal. War
remained undecided. People continued to hope against
hope.

• Lelei herat is the night on which the kiramen kiatibin (recording
angels) make np their accounts for the year. Every Moslem is supposed
to have two angels constantly in attendance, one on his right shoulder
noting down his good, the other on his left shoulder noting down his had
actions. It is to he feared that in these degenerate days the angel on
the right shoulder has little to occupy his pen dipped in azure.

92 TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER VI.

The Porte takes defensive Measures — The Castles on the Bosphorns —
The Turkish Fleet — Dangers from the Vicinity of European
Merchant Vessels — Harbour- masters of Foreign Consulates —
Turkish Captains under Restrictions — Fear of the Porte to give
Umbrage to Russia — Readiness and Activity of Sailors and Soldiers
— Military Preparations of the Porte — Self-devotion of the People
— Troops marched to the Frontiers — Influence of the English and
French Press — Addresses of the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs
— Mussulman Distinctions applied to the Western Potentates —
Arrival of the English and French Fleets — The Turks supposed
them to have been hired by the Sultan — Moslem Belief in a special
Providence watching over them — Foreign Orders and Decorations
profusely conferred on Turkish Officials.

Having done the deed, the Porte felt like a merchant who
has embarked his all in a hazardous venture. With
misgivings it began to think about defensive measures.
There appeared to be no time to lose. Bussia might
any day issue a declaration of war and send it with her
fleet to the Bosphorus. A social panic would ensue ;
the bewildering efiect of which, only surmised then, was
seen twelve years later on the appearance of cholera.
The spirit which animated the Turks in 1807 to prepare
to resist the English fleet under Sir John Duckworth's
command, then in sight from Galata Tower, had died
out under depressing influences. The castles of the
Bosphorus, on either side of a straight broad reach, were

CASTLES ON THE BOSPHORUS. 93

inadequate for its defence. They could hardly, if duly
anned and manned, have checked a fleet impelled by
the summer north-east wind ; d fortiony with guns of
mingled calibres deficient in accessories, and with gunners
unpractised in firing. Whenever attention had been invited
to their inefficiency the authorities had spoken contemp-
tuously of the idea of a fleet attempting the passage : it
would be sunk, they said ; but, confident as they then had
been, they were now depressed. In face of the danger
self-delusion vanished. Baron de Tott, the designer of
most of those castles, had overlooked, if unrestricted
in his choice, the defensible points of the Bos-
phorus — three salient points lower down, where the
stream flows narrow and sinuous, indicated by Me-
hemet II.'s castles, built four centuries ago, and still
remaining, quaint picturesque monuments of his military
judgment. Many Venetian vessels were sunk or stopped
by them during the last siege of Constantinople. Heavy-
armed batteries on those points would render the passage
of the Bosphorus problematic even with screw-propelled
ships.

As things were little argument was required to
show the dependence of Constantinople on its fleet,
but much persuasion was required to overcome the
reluctance of the Porte to betray to its own people
an apprehension of war by stationing it in an indicative
locahty. The fleet had left the Grolden Horn towards
the latter end of April, to be ready to co-operate with the
military in repressing Greek demonstrations, apprehended
as Ukely to occur during Easter week, on the shores
of the Bosphorus, in honour of Prince Mentchikof.
Four steamers and thirty guard-boats had been employed

94 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

on this precautionary service day and night. After the
saturnalia, which had passed oflF with little more than the
usual amount of noise and merriment, the fleet remained
at its summer anchorage off" Beshik-tash ; giving leave
as in ordinary times to officers and men, in a position, as
it might have turned out, of delusive security. A swarm
of Cossack galleys had burned Buyukdereh in the reign
of Amurath IV. ; why might not a Eussian fleet venture
as far in Abdul Medjid's reign ? This contingency being
admitted the fleet was towed up the Bosphorus during
the first week in June, and moored between Saryieri and
T^erapia ; its broadsides, when sprung, bearing on the
entrance of the Black Sea. The Umouryeri bank,
with two line-of-battle ships moored inside, rendered the
position remarkably strong. The Turkish fleet then
answered for the defence of the Bosphorus against any
naval force in the power of Russia to send. Block-
houses were erected on the hills commanding Bu-
yukdereh Bay ; signal stations were established between
the outer castles and the city ; and a service of steamers
and guard-boats was organized to keep watch near the
mouth of the Bosphorus and between the inner castles,
to prevent a surprise, and frustrate incendiary attempts
traditionally dreaded by the Turkish navy.

Danger, however, in that shape, seemed more likely
to be hatched at Constantinople under the wing of the
lax police exercised over European merchant vessels.
Such vessels are free from native supervision, whereby
gunpowder is frequently landed contrabandwise. Much
damage was done in Salonica a few years ago to life,
limb, and property, by the explosion of gunpowder stored
in large quantities, unknown to the authorities, in a

DANGER TO THE FLEET FROM FIRE. 95

French merchant's warehouse ; and every maritime town
in the empire has been constantly, of late years, exposed
to similar danger. A Greek vessel was detected, in 1860,
in the inner port of Constantinople — a piece of water
surrounded by wooden structures, and crowded with
shipping — with 120 half barrels of gunpowder con-
cealed under her declared cargo; and guided by this
indication several depots of gunpowder were then found
in European stores near the harbour. Each consulate
has its own harbour-master to attend to the affairs of its
shipping, and whatever his business may be it is hardly
his interest to denounce smuggling. In accordance with
the rule of contrary, omnipotent in most affairs in the East,
the choice of men, whose reports on collisions, salvage,
dereUcts, foul berths, &c., form the basis of judicial pro-
ceedings, is rarely determined by nautical considerations.
The English, for instance, have made their harbour-
master out of a servant in search of a place, out of a ship-
chandler in difficulties, out of a hydropathic doctor in want
of patients, but never out of a sailor ; and the example
has not been lost upon the consuls of other nations.

During the interval between the suspension of
relations between Turkey and Kussia and the declaration
of war, any Hellenic or other vessel might have fitted
herself clandestinely as a fire-ship with the materials at
hand at Galata, might have ascended the Bosphorus with
a southerly wind, unnoted among a crowd of vessels, and
have anchored with them at Buyukdereh among the
Turkish fleet, each ship of which, beside its powder and
shells, had on board carcasses or fire-balls, ten per gun.
Vessels anchored there how and where they pleased :
some hooked men-of-war's cables and swung alongside.

96 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The Turkish captains were restrained from exercising
the right of keeping clear water round them — exercised
by men-of-war in every part of the world, exercised freely
afterwards by the allied fleet in Beikos Bay, — by fear of
misrepresentation. All any of them ventured on in case
of suspicious proximity was to place a guard on board the
oflfending vessel. The naval reader will exclaim indig-
nantly, " Why did not Hassan Bey or Ali Bey weigh
Captain Tomkins' or Captain Lefevre's anchor and let
him drift to the devil if he pleased ? " I will tell him why.
Captain Tomkins or Captain, Lefevre would have made a
report to his consul, who would have forwarded it with
elucidatory remarks to his ambassador ; who in his turn
would have sent a dragoman to the Porte with a demand for
pecuniary compensation to Captain Tomkins or to Captain
Lefevre for the anxiety and ill-usage he had sufiered by
his own statement, and a request for the dismissal of
Hassan Bey or Ali Bey from his ship for over zeal.

Few can imagine the anxiety of serving an irresolute
government. Notwithstanding repeated representations
the co-operation of the European legations could not
be obtained to make their respective merchant vessels
anchor clear of the lines of the Turkish fleet ; a slight
return for the order and discipline maintained among
10,000 men during their wearisome sojourn in the waters
of Buyukdereh. Not a child was scared nor a bunch of
grapes plucked in any of the neighbouring villages or
vineyards : no leave was granted except to Constantinople
for the sake of the Franks ; and the small-arm men were
drilled on barren hills in the morning before they had risen.
The navy would have profited much by having a squadron
of all rates, as earnestly recommended, out in the Euxine

^ READINESS OF SAILORS AND SOLDIERS. 97

during the fine season of 1853, half the crews being new-
raised men and the other half little better ; but the fear
of the Porte to accelerate events by giving, as it fancied,
cause of umbrage to Russia, overcame nautical considera-
tions. Only two light vessels, afterwards increased to
four, were allowed to cruise. They cruised seventy
miles in either direction from the Bosphorus, that
Bussian vessels might not set emissaries ashore unnoticed
among the Greeks.

The Capitan Pasha objected to reefing and shifting
sails at anchor, out of regard for the Sultan's feehngs
in case men should fall from aloft. He averted his
eyes from the prospect of winter cruising in the Black
Sea. Allah was expected to make sailors. To pro-
pitiate his favour, the men were enjoined to miss none
of the prescribed daily prayers; and the Sourei Fethi
Sheref (war hymn) was chanted every evening on the
lighted decks by the imams of the fleet. In one respect
the men were pre-eminent. Sleeping, more or less
dressed, on their mattresses spread on the decks, they
were able to clear for action at night, load, and stand
ready to fire under five minutes. The garrisons of the
castles of the Bosphorus with similar habits displayed
equal alacrity. We have rowed to one or the other of
the castles at uncertain hours of the night, and in six
minutes seen the guns manned, the gunners looking
eagerly through the embrasures for the expected enemy.
The soldiers, at the sound of the trumpet, rushed half
asleep out of their barracks, and ran full speed along the
ramparts to their quarters.

Military preparations were also attended to. A body
of engineers was sent to Silistria, Widdin, and Routschuk,

7 ^

98 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

to set their works in order ; siege-guns and field-batteries
were sent to Trebizonde for transmission to Erzeroom and
Kars ; activity was imparted to the cannon-foundry and
the powder-mills ; and orders were sent to the provinces
to call out the first division of rediff. Withal, the word
was passed, *^ Avoid display, do the needful quietly."
The spirit of the people required no rousing. All were
ready to march, and waited for the order patiently.
Resolution is always calm. The earnestness and self-
devotion of the Turkish people in 1853 were remark-
able : they showed themselves descendants of a conquering
race, worthy of being better led than it was their lot to
be. Europe had fancied reUgious enthusiasm weak, union
impossible. The bureaucracy of Constantinople, misled
by its own indifferentism, were even more astonished
than Europeans at the ardour of Islam. During the
summer of 1853, 60,000 troops from various parts of the
empire were conveyed quietly, scarcely noticed by the
public, through the Bosphorus, in the steamers of the
Ottoman navy, and were landed at Varna in high condi-
tion. Thence they marched to the hues of the Danube
and the Balkan, reinforced by troops from Albania,
Bosnia, and Macedonia. Thirty thousand troops, besides
irregulars, were collected on the Asiatic frontier.

Steam had given Turkey a marked advantage over
Russia at the outset of war, by enabling her to assemble
an army on the Danube without wear and tear. In
previous wars the two empires had been on equal terms
in that respect, each having had long distances to march
to the frontier. Turkey was not allowed to profit by
this novelty. Russia's good fortune also restrained the
allies afterwards from duly avaiUng themselves of the

INFLUENCE OP THE WESTERN PRESS. 99

exclusive possession of screw-propelled line-of-battle
ships and minie rifles.

While preparing for war the Porte did not abandon
hopes of peace, and thereby, instead of leadmg the
movement, exposed itself to be led by it. The Porte
was equally indisposed to view war as inevitable, as to
make up its mind to profit by the contrast of a bUthe,
elated Turkish army in Bulgaria with a footsore dusty
Kussian army in Bessarabia. Its prime councillor con-
tributed to this indecision by sending the minister for
foreign affairs articles extracted from the Western press,
eulogizing Turkey, depreciating Russia. Unused to
free discussion, their own newspapers being strictly
censored, the Turkish ministers were unable to discrimi-
nate justly between the government and the press.
Innately suspicious, they may readily have fancied collu-
sion. The warlike articles of sundry English and French
journals weakened the effect of foreign offices' pacific
despatches. They were decidedly more palatable. The
latter alluded to social aberrations and rayas' rights ;
whereas the former made no allusion in that day to such
delicate topics. On the contrary, their editors seemed
ready to smoke their pipes with any efendis and join
chorus with them in abuse of the Greeks.

Soon after the rupture of relations, the Greek and
Armenian patriarchs were persuaded to send addresses
to the Sultan, breathing sentiments of devotion and
gratitude, in return for a firman recently issued, which
confirmed anterior firmans in favour of the rayas and
enjoined on the Moslems fraternal treatment of them,
though not having been read in the mosques it was
unknown to the public. The Porte could not consistently

7—2

100 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

proclaim its love for the rayas while exciting the
Moslems to a holy war. Fulsome addresses, inexpressive
of the feelings of their flocks, hoth of whom nourished
disaffection in their hearts, one heing on the verge of
rebellion, they were bosh lakerdsh (empty words),
intended solely for the ear of Europe. Now for the first
time the epithet liazretleri (highness), instead of djena-
bleri (excellency), was subjoined in the Turkish Gazettes
to the names of the French and English sovereigns : a
distinction previously reserved for native dignitaries.

The Turks have been accustomed in public and
private documents to distinguish non-Mussulmans from
Mussulmans, except of late years those with Turkish
rank when no distinction is made during life. On death
it reappears. Let two functionaries, one Mussulman
the other Christian, die the same day, the death of the
former would be recorded in the Gazette thus : *^ The
hour marked by destiny having arrived; he returned to
his eternal abode." Of the latter, thus : *^ He ceased to
live." In common parlance, the vulgar say a Mussul-
man dies ; a non-Mussulman perishes. The innovation
caused a marked sensation. Every one reading the
exclusive epithet, when it first appeared in the Gazette
in connection with Louis Napoleon's name, stopped sur-
prised, and rubbed his. eyes or wiped his spectacles.
Also the prefix hashmetly (splendid) was accorded, the
higher qualification, shevketly (majestic) , being reserved
for the Sultan. When Austria showed a disposition to
co-operate with the Western Powers, the epithet was
given to her Emperor. The King of Sardinia next
obtained it ; and soon all potentates, including the
Pope, were thus honoured : except the Czar, who was

ARRIVAL OP THE ALLIED FLEETS. 101

simply styled Nicolas or Alexander, until the peace ;
and King Otho, for whom djenableri was deemed
sufficient distinction. On the resumption of peaceful
relations the arbiter of state tiifles displayed capricious-
ness in the appUcation of the said epithet, but after some
oscillation it was appUed to all crowned heads and their
heirs apparent, and exceptionally for a while to the
Grand Duke Constantine and the Imperial Prince
Napoleon. As if in apprehension, however, of the
people ceasing thereby to regard the Sultan as the king
of kings, the dispenser of crowns, a marked distinction
of style has lately been revived in the Turkish Gazettes.
The arrival of the EngUsh and French fleets at
Beshika Bay and the unfaltering tone of the Western
press encouraged the Turks in their bold career, and
confirmed them in the belief, variously generated, of
Europe being under a destined necessity to abet their
interests. Not gratuitously, however. The people
imagined the Sultan had hired those fleets. Some
officers seriously asked the author how many purses his
majesty had agreed to pay per month for their services,
and were courteously jocose on his avowal of ignorance
of the transaction, averring, in corroboration of their
notion, that he had paid for the use of the English fleet
in 1840 against Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt. Allah,
said the ConstantinopoUtans, showed his regard for the
chosen race by inclining the hearts of infidels towards
them. This sentiment explained to them the anomaly of
Christians being about to wage war on a Christian power
on behalf of Moslems. Thus reasoned the middle and
lower classes, with whom religion is something more
than a banner. The upper class accounted for it by

102 TUBkET XSD THH (TRrVIEA^y WAR.

the antagonism between the ocddental and oriental
cJiarclies. Mucii has occmred in yarious ages to root
in Moslems* minds the beii^* m a special Providence
watching over thenu The Crasades* destined apparently
to conluie Ldmn within the hmits of Arabia^ weakened
instead the Greek empire, and paved the way for its
overthrow by Moslem arms. The capture of Bagdad
and the subversion of the caliphate by Holokou Ehan
gave Islam a shock such as might well have seemed
impossible to recover &om: bat the development soon
afterwards of the Turkish power — then unforeshadowed
— reinvigorated ik^ and planted its minarets beyond the
Danube. And in receut? dttv^ whenever a rebeUious
satrap or an ambitious^ u^>i^tt>ottr has menaced the first
Moslem empire — the 5>trvut^hovvt v^f Islam — Christian
powers have armed or iutvi^vst^ iia its defence. Argu-
ments in the mouch;:^^ s,>f utis^v>^^es« drawn from
Revelation^ are weak Innavlv ^twU practical evidence of
A superintending lV»^(U^^^Vx Mv^hammed promised
his followers the aid v*^'' U^tv>n^t v>f augels when over-
matched in battle with Ui\> mtivk^liik They reverently
believed him : but thcv w\»uW h^t\> li^^ued uicredulously
to the prediction v.J: a tiuw >*lwtt Uk* iutidels themselves
would tight their l^aUW : a^ul havl he a>retold the day
when Christian )K>teutato;s xrvniUl vie with eai'h other in
giving their onlers of dux-alrv to Mv^^slems, the mantle of
prophecy would have soiuiunl sJipping off his shoulders.

The profusion of onlors oinifcrred of late vears on
Turkish civilians by foreign jH^tentiites, in singular
contrast with the opinions of their representatives at
Constantinople respecting some of them, has excited
comment and somewhat impaired their prestige. To

FOREIGN ORDERS CONFERRED. 103

the question, For what services have they been given ?
echo in most cases answers, ** For what!" Are they
duly appreciated ? *' Scarcely," would be the answer
prompted by the indisposition to wear them at native
ceremonies or in the Sultan's presence. What, then,
it might be asked, has influenced the donors and the
recipients ? They are given at times to gain partisans
for a policy, and at times to reward cheaply services or
complaisances. The French Government, in exemplifi-
cation of the latter category, gave in 1853 five orders of
the Legion of Honour to dockyard officials at Constanti-
nople, for repairs done to one of its ships ; and a few
years later, in return for an entertainment given by a
high functionary to the Duke de Brabant, Belgian
decorations were sent to his principal domestic officers*
Cabinet ministers and ambassadors receive grand cordons
presumedly ex ojfficio ; and inferior badges are acceptable
to a certain class of officials as giving them a colourable
claim on the good offices, in case of need, of an embassy,
with invitations to its fetes. The motives which have
led minor sovereigns uninterested in the Eastern ques-
tion, as the King of Saxony, the Grand Duke of Baden,
and the Grand Duke of Weimar, to follow the example of
interested great Powers in that respect, is inexpUcable.
What are Baden and Weimar to Turkey, and what is
Turkey to them ? Baden and Weimar doubtless relish
the figs and raisins of Turkey ; and Turkey, unconscious
perhaps of the glory of Weimar, Goethe, has heard of the
gaming-houses of Baden. Denmark, still further ofi", can
nevertheless adduce a motive. She persuaded Turkey,
whose flag had rarely floated outside the Mediterranean,
and never north of the Timmes, to pay her 4,000/. in

104 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

exemption from Sound dues, and marked her sense of the
conciliatory temper of the officials engaged in the nego-
tiation with her minister at Constantinople by send-
ing each of them a Danish order. The New
World has also contributed its quota of decorations.
Some crosses of Nuestra Senora of Guadaloupe have
found their way to the Bosphorus, and several of the
newly-fledged Mexican eagles have flown across the
Atlantic to alight at the SubUme Porte. The hidalgo
spirit has kept Old Spain's orders from being thus indis-
criminately disposed of. The order which, from its name
and origin, might have seemed specially reserved from
Turks, the Grecian Order of the Saviour, has been the
most liberally bestowed upon them. A shower — one of
many — of sixteen crosses fell at Constantinople in
November, 1865 ; and none of the recipients, we venture
to say, have dared avow services past or prospective in
return for the honour.*

* Yoici la liste des decorations qne S. M. le roi des Hellenes a bien
vpulu conferer aux ministres et fonctionnaires de la Sublime Poiie dont
les noms suivent : —

Les Insigiies de la Grande Croix de VOrdre du Sauvcur, — A S. Exc.
Halil Pacha, ministre de la marine ; a S. Exc. Edhem Pacha, ministre
da commerce ; a S. Exc. Said Effendi, mmte'char da ministere des affaires
etrangeres ; a S. Exc. Kiamil Bey, introductear des ambassadears.

Les Insitjnes de Grand Commandeur du meme Ordre, — A S. Exc. Naizi
Effendi, Beylikdji, et k S. Exc. Aarifi Bey, drogman da divan imperial.

Les Insignes de Commandeur, — A Mehmed Effendi, Matib du minis-
tere des affaires etrangeres ; a Chevketi Effendi, viektouhdji du meme
ministere; a Fuad Bey, fonctionnaire du bureau de VAmcdi\ a Munif
Effendi, premier traducteur de la Sublime Porte, et a Serkis Effendi,
chef du bureau de la correspondance ^trang^re.

Les Insignes de Chevalier. — -A Nouri Bey, viuarin du Techrifatdji:
Mehemet Bey, Sead Oullah Bey, Shogoumon Effendi, et Hatchik
Effendi, fonctionnaires du ministere des affaires etrangeres. — Journal de
Constantinople f 25th November, 1865.

( 105 )

CHAPTER VII.

Passage of the Pruth by the Russians — The Sultan dismisses his
Ministers, but recalls them — Decision of a Council of State —
Position of Russia weakened — Dilemma of the Porte — ^Delusion of
the People — The Vienna Note — Advice respecting it — Sir Stratford
Canning and Redshid Pasha — The Porte's Refusal of the Vienna
Note — Warlike Preparations of Turkey — The Porte in the Meshes
of Diplomacy — The Ruling Class of Turkey Past and Present —
Prankish Turks.

News of the passage of the Pruth by the Russians,
July 5th, 1853, reached Constantinople July 8th, and
on the evening of the latter day a Russian frigate and
a steamer hove in sight, ten miles from the outer castles
of the Bosphorus : the first seen by us since the rupture
of relations. The coincidence of their appearance with
the advance of the Russian army seemed calculated :
they might be the look-outs of a fleet. Two frigates
were accordingly sent out next day to reconnoitre, with
orders on no account to fire unless fired upon. They
fell in at midnight with two strange frigates, and the
excitement of mustering at quarters revived their qualmish
crews. In the morning they saluted the Russian flag
with twenty-one guns, a courtesy which remained unre-
sponded to, and soon afterwards returned to port, driven
in by a summer gale. Closed to them since twenty
years, the Black Sea was not a lake for Turkish ships.
The day of the arrival of the news of the passage

106 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

of the Pruth the Sultan dismissed the Grand Vizir, and
the minister for foreign affairs, Kedshid Pasha, from
oflBce : an abrupt act, the cause of which did not tran-
spire, though shrewdly surmised. But the representations
of the representatives of friendly Powers on the impolicy
of unsettling the Government at a critical conjuncture,
aided by the difficulty of choosing successors, led to
their reinstatement next day. The public had expected
Aali Pasha to be summoned to the foreign department ;
but having been recently recalled from the govern-
ment of Smyrna, at the instance of the internuncio — for
having taken a Uberal view of a quarrel there between
Hungarian refugees and Austrian naval officers, which
led to a departure from the law of nations derogatory
to the Austrian flag by an American corvette in the
harbour — his appointment to a ministerial post would
have ruffled Austria's temper. In her character of
mediator in the Russo-Turkish dispute, her susceptibiU-
ties demanded consideration.

July 11th a council sat at the Porte to consider on
the matter of the passage of the Pruth. The council
agreed to consider it a violation of treaties, short,
however, of a casus belli ; to protest against it in the
face of Europe and remain on the defensive. Wishing
to gain time, the Porte accepted, by the advice of her
friends, the novel doctrine of a distinction between war
and invasion. On the other hand, Eussia had made
a false move and weakened her position in a moral,
political, and military sense. She had committed a
wrong ; she had insulted public opinion ; she had given
up the vantage-ground of an incompleted menace. By
remaining on her own side of the Pruth, giving Europe

POSITION OP RUSSIA. 107

no cause for action, she would have disconcerted Austria's
manoeuvring and have wearied the Porte, with its hands
tied, into an accommodating temper. Determined on occu-
pying the Danubian principalities, her wisest and manliest
course was to have preceded it by a declaration of war.
We leave out of consideration her right. She had, at
all events, more right to declare war than to trespass
with an army on her neighbour's territory.

The toleration of the seizure of the ** material
guarantee " (Moldavia and Wallachia) having been
included in the programme of the drama, the event
scarcely excited comment among the Constantinopoli-
tans (accustomed, moreover, to hear of the presence of
the Russians in those provinces), and did not influence
the march of affairs either domestic or foreign. The
double action of canvassing for peace and preparing
for war continued. The Porte, however, about this
time began to apprehend a novel complication. Having
roused the spirit of the nation, it now feared inability to
control it in case of the avoidance of war becoming
desirable. The language of the metropolitan softas in
their annual provincial migration and of the seyah
(roaming dervishes) had stirred the Moslem soul to
its depths. The people beUeved that Russia designed
to substitute Christians for them in the rule of the land :
they saw in idea their mosques converted into churches,
their rayas revelling in their konaks and tchiftliks. Better
die first ! Pains were therefore taken to keep the people
ignorant of the character of pending negotiations and
make them believe that the maintenance of peace, if
maintained, would proceed solely from the Czar's awe
of the Sultan. The people readily credited the flattering

108 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

taJe and much more. The Czar, they said, had sent
the Czarina incognita to Constantinople to intercede
for him ; he had oflFered to reimburse Turkey the expense
of her war preparations ; but that would not suflBce ; he
must give up the Crimea also. Such was the idle talk
in the cafes of the capital. Thus the Porte at once
sustained and controlled the excitement.

In the meanwhile Prince Mentchikof's **note/' cause
of the tribulation of Europe, having been stirred in the
political crucible, came out as the ** Vienna Note." In that
form, approved of by Europe and accepted (reluctantly)
by Russia, it was sent to Constantinople, scarcely any one
anticipating opposition in that quarter. Had Vienna and
Constantinople possessed then electric intercommunica-
tion none would probably have been oflFered eflfectively.
But it arrived too late. The ** Vienna note " reached
Constantinople after the incubation of another variety
of the original ** note " by the representatives of the
mediating powers, and being preferred to their bantling
by their respective Governments seemed defective in
their eyes. The Porte, beginning to weary of acting
a subordinate part in a play where its interests were
principally at stake, was disposed to accept the
** Vienna note," and only required friendly pressure
to allay its pride, chafed by the wording rather than
by the substance of it. Three months had raised the
hopes of the Turkish nation, but had not increased the
confidence of the Porte in the result of an appeal to
arms.

Few persons who have considered the subject now
doubt that Turkey, in her own interests, viewing her
dependence on eventuaUties beyond her guidance, ought

THE ** VIENNA NOTE." 109

to have accepted the ** Vienna note ; " stating frankly her
objections to it, and waiving them out of deference to the
wishes of her allies. She would then have secured the
continuance of peace on honourable terms, and would
have had her integrity ensured by the respect of Europe
and by her own unimpaired strength and dignity, far better
than by the formal guarantee afterwards given on implied
conditions, and which has been rendered derisive since by
the demeanour, incompatible with the ordinary notions
of sovereign rights, of one or more of the guarantors in
various parts of the empire. She might not then have
heard the chords, tuned by her allies, of Koumanian
independence and of Sclavic nationality vibrated in the
ears of the world. She would not have been humiliated
by the occupation of part of Syria by a French army,
because her troops were said to have looked on while two
semi-barbarous tribes, variously instigated, amused them-
selves in traditional fashion. She would not have been
drawn into the vortex of foreign indebtedness. She would
not have lost 120,000 men, the flower of the Turkish
race. Her army, unimpaired by disease and contumely,
would have returned to their homes or their barracks,
proud in the conviction of having by their gallant attitude
forced Kussia to recede, and her people would have
escaped the gaze in no friendly spirit of myriads of
strangers on their faults and their deficiences.

The EngUsh ambassador, in accordance with his
instructions, advised officially acceptance of the ** Vienna
note," and in accordance with his idiosyncracy advised
officiously its rejection ; or, to speak more accurately,
allowed his personal view of it to transpire. The
Prussian minister was said to have also dissociated his

110 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

individual and official character. In regard of the latter
this may have been snrmise, based on the impression
abroad of Russia's objection to the "note," but with respect
to his noble coUeague the evidence is less inconclusive.
Meeting the seraskir, the representative of the war party,
at a ball at the French embassy, he entered into conver-
sation with him through a chance interpreter — an unusual
condescension, — and alluding to the ** Vienna note," just
then arrived, said that in his opinion, speaking in his
individual capacity, it was unacceptable. That turned
the scales, balanced by acceptance and rejection, in favour
of the latter. In those days the Porte cared less for
reading by its own lights the despatches of the British
Government than for ascertaining its distinguished
representative's reading of them. His- Excellency's
disUke of the Czar Nicolas was no secret: he seemed
bent on seeing that autocrat humbled ; and long experi-
ence had made the Turks beUeve in the adoption sooner
or later of his views on Eastern poUcy by his Government.
The Porte at that time was for international
negotiation impersonated in Redshid Pasha, the Turkish
statesman par excellence: the first who had conciliated
diplomatic favour, given him seven years previously at the
critical point of his career, when, with all eyes fixed on him,
an imperial smile or frown might make or mar him. He
might legitimately aspire to guide the policy indicated by
himself ; he might through rivals' intrigues be consigned
to obscurity in the form of a provincial governor. He com-
prehended the position ; he saw the necessity of external
support, and found it in an alliance with Sir Stratford
Canning. Those eminent individuals — who in their mutual
relations might in some respects bear faint comparison

SIR STRATFORD CANNING AND REDSHID PASHA. Ill

with Rufinus the prefect of the East and Eutropius the
great chamberlain at the court of the Emperor Arcadius —
aided each other many years to retain the objects of their
ambition, respectively political ascendancy and diplomatic
preponderance. They left the stage on which they had
acted important parts within a few weeks of each other ;
one for the other world,* the other for dignified repose in
his own country. What, it might be asked, should have
induced his Excellencyto disclose himself thus unreservedly
on a vital point to the seraskir, a man decried and always
politically thwarted by him, the rival of his friend?
Presumedly to give the war party weight in the council
and keep Redshid Pasha in hand. Redshid Pasha, Uke
M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Clarendon, was anxious
to avert, with honour to all parties, a war whose preUmi-
naries foreshadowed indecision and cross purposes, — a war
which, ostensibly undertaken for the sake of Turkey, would
aggravate in no ordinary degree her financial diflSculty,
the rock in her course, — a war which, if stopping short of
its logical conclusion, letting Russia ofif with passing under
the caudine forks, would leave her the gainer by the
lessons of its teaching, and her antagonist the loser by the

• Redshid Pasha died suddenly, January 7, 1858, in the post of
Grand Vizir for the sixth time ; and the concourse of citizens at his
obsequies next day showed the general esteem which his affability, kind-
ness, and liberality had acquired for him. He left five sons, thus placed.
The eldest was ambassador at Paris with the rank of bala [Bala is the
second rank (for civilians) in the official hierarchy] ; the second
was a mmhir and member of the Supreme Council; the third was a
damad, and a minister of state ; the fourth was a member of the Supreme
Council with the rank of hala ; the fifth was a /erik (lieut.-general).
Redshid Pasha and his sons drew in salaries and allowances about
4,000/. a month; and his second wife, a Circassian, had a treasury
pension of 25,000 piastres (220/.) a month settled on her.

112 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

incidents of its perturbation. But Redshid Pasha was
an Oriental. Seeing others ready to play the game if he
threw up the cards he wrote a despatch in answer to the
*' Vienna note," worthy rather of a special pleader than
of a statesman.

Intellect playing off rivalries one against the other
formed a prominent group in the political cartoon of 1853.

August 20th, a Tartar left Constantinople for Bel-
grade, bearer of the Porte's refusal to accept the Vienna
note unless with modifications, which Russia had already
declared inadmissible be they what they might. That
matter might therefore be considered settled. Then
was the time for Turkey to declare war. Towards the
end of August Turkey's preparations were tolerably
complete. The Danube was Uned with good troops,
provided with excellent artillery. Schumla, Silistria,
and Varna were stronger than they had ever been in
previous wars. A numerous but indifferently com-
manded army was collected on her Asiatic frontier. The
Egyptian contingent had arrived. The Tunisian con-
tingent was expected. The pulse of the nation beat
high with religious zeal and hope. From all parts
of the empire, from every Moslem sect and race,
addresses and offerings flowed in. The season was
favourable for troops dependent by their equipment on
serene weather for extended operations. As much as
cold would numb the Turks would it nerve the Russians.
The Turkish navy could only hope to keep the sea in
fine weather, without disaster. With due appreciation of
the case as it stood between Turkey and Russia, and of
the case impending between Europe and Russia, states-
men would not have held back Turkey till the eve of

THE PORTE AND HER PROTECTORS. 113

winter. Turkey was making a supreme effort for
independence : Europe was weaving a coalition to curb
Muscovite ambition. On first moves much would depend.
At the commencement of September the Turkish army
was in a condition for active service; light clothing
and simple rations increasing its efficiency. On the
other hand, long marches, heat, and drought had
seriously demoralized the Bussian army. Statesmen
had worked well for Turkey up to the period of
the Vienna note; and in her interest they should
then have left her the free exercise of her own
discretion. Having displayed far more energy and
resources than her most sanguine partisans had given
her credit for she had the option between two courses :
either of sending an envoy to St. Petersburg with
the prospect of a gracious reception or of taking
the field with the certainty, humanly speaking, of
occupying the principalities in a few weeks. But in
order to adopt either course, it would have been neces-
sary first to send the friendly ambassadors (figuratively)
to the Seven Towers. Their Excellencies seemed re-
solved not to let Turkey escape from their protec-
torate ; neither negotiate without them nor commence war
on terms which might free her from their dictation.
Misled by their impUed assurances, their avowed pre-
dilections, by the sustained war-cry in Europe, and the
demonstrative attitude of the Anglo-French fleet in
Beshika Bay, the Porte clung to the hope of England
and France drawing the sword together with her, and so
remained in the entanglement of diplomacy, frittering
away precious time. The quotation : — ** There is a
tide in the affairs of men,*' &c., became then applicable.

114 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The ruling class of Turkey in that day were un-
equal to the position and did not clearly understand it.
Wanting popular antecedents, they inspired little con-
fidence : wanting earnest convictions, they failed to
comprehend the enthusiasm of the nation. As much
as the nation trusted in itself did they apparently
distrust it. In olden days those only who had led
armies in the field, or had ruled turbulent provinces,
dared aspire to the dangerous honour of wielding the
powers of the State in troublous times. They knew what
the nation could do and with all their misreckonings
they were never wanting in stubborn self-reliance. Their
Epicurean successors, the bland smooth-tongued efendis
of Constantinople, knew little of the nation from inter-
course and the nation knew little of them save by
report. They were, moreover, impressed more or less
with the ideas of, the men inlaid in every department, who
had as youths been sent to Europe for education, to
become the mirror for young Turkey. These youths had
not been selected from the scions of the old race, with
names to uphold and nursery traditions of their country's
glory to dwell upon ; they had been selected from among
the slaves of pashas or the sons of obscure denizens of
Constantinople. The young Circassians had no patriotic
feelings and their companions aspired to no higher
felicity than to Uve and die, as they had been born and
bred, in tlie Sultan's shadow. After some years passed
by most in desultory studies and idle pleasures, admiring
the superstructure but giving no heed to the foundations
of civilization, they returned home neither Franks nor
Turks : without the knowledge of the former or the
instincts of the latter. Their traditional contempt for

THE PRANKISH TURKS. 115

the infidel had been succeeded by envy, mingled with
discouragement. They had in general schooled them-
selves into neglect of their Prophet's self-denying ordi-
nances and had weaned themselves from the practice
of their national virtues. They had learned to view
everything European with Turkish and everything
Turkish with European eyes. Some may be deemed
worthy of their rapid elevation, but their countrymen
would assuredly Uken many to those Florentines whose
souls Dante, in his visit to the lower regions, found —

Mischiate a quel cattivo coro
Degli aogeli che non faron ribelli,
Ne for fideli a Dio ma per se forq.

S— 2

IIG TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER VIII.

Arrival of the Egyptian Contingent — Their close Stowage and scanty
Fare — Story of the Egyptian Contingent — Self- mutilation in
Mehemet Ali's time to escape Military Service^Desertion and its
Penalty — Their Inspection by the Sultan — His Reception and
Largesse — Embarkation of the Egyptian Troops — Their soldierly
Spirit — Galata Newsmongers' Canards — Sanguinary Rumours
credited by the French and English Ambassadors — Groundless
Alarm — Four War Steamers summoned by the Ambassadors —
Calmness of the Sultan — Protection afibrded by the Porte to
Foreigners — Governmental Authority in Constantinople — Loyalty
of the Soldiery — Their Isolation from the Civilians.

DuRiNO the month of August, 1853, the first Egyptian
contingent, 14,000 troops, arrived from Alexandria in
an Egyptian squadron, composed of three hne-of-battle
ships, four frigates, three corvettes, two steamers, and
several transports, — a magnificent offering from a tributary
prince. This force had been twenty-eight days on their
passage, during which the soldiers, stowed Uterally like
sheep, had received for sustenance IJ lb. of biscuit each
a day, and one drink of water served out in the evening.
To economize the water, measured in a tub for each
mess, the men imbibed it by turns through a reed as
more fortunate mortals imbibe ** sherry-cobbler." Not-
withstanding this abstinence and want of space, not
more than twenty men had died on board, and about
300 only were hospital cases on their arrival in the
Bosphorus. When they landed at the Sultan's Valley,

THE EGYPTIAN CONTINGENT. 117

where a camp had heen pitched for them with provisions
and cooks, their first cry was for water, their first act
was to rush into a stream with the zest of amphibious
animals after a promenade in the rushes. Their camp
occupied the spot where the Kussian army, invited by
Sultan Mahmoud to aid him in his first Egyptian war,
had been encamped twenty years previously ; and, by a
happy coincidence, their pasha's tents were pitched beside
the stone erected on Selve Bouroun to commemorate
the presence of the Kussians in that valley.

The tale of the enrolment of the Egyptian contingent
is sadly characteristic. The soldiers composing it were
veterans of Ibrahim Pasha's army, several of them having
served under him in Greece during the war of indepen-
dence, and all had shared in the toils and triumphs of his.
Syrian and Anatolian campaigns. Disbanded about the
year 1843, they had returned to their villages to recom-
mence the life of fellahs; had married, and become
fathers of families. When the Sultan demanded aid of
his vassal ten years later. Abbas Pasha, declining to
part with his embodied troops, cast his eyes on the
veterans, none of whom assuredly had ever expected to
shoulder a musket again. The required number were
seized wherever they happened to be, in their fields or in
their cabins, and were driven chained in pairs to Cairo.
There, cavalry, infantry, and artillerymen, non-commis-
sioned officers and privates, were commingled in one
mass, and then subdivided into six regiments, 2,400
strong each. After being clothed they were sent to Alex-
andria for embarkation. While at Alexandria many
deserted, of whom six were retaken and shot before the
fleet sailed. None of the men seemed under thirty,

118 TURKEY AKD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

while the beards of several indicated nearly doable
that age.

Some of them had sacrificed the forefinger of the
right hand, others the right eye. The severity of disci-
pline in Mehemet Ali's time had led to the practice of
self-mutilation, in the hope of thereby escaping from the
service. At first, the forefingerless were sent to labour
in the dockyard at Alexandria, but that possessed no
deterring eflfect ; for as the convicts used to be liberated
for joy on the launch of a ship of war, then of annual
occurrence, many soldiers preferred the loss of a finger
and limited convictism to military service. Perceiving
this, Mehemet Ali ordered such to be retained in the
ranks. Those afflicted with nostalgia then deprived
themselves of the right eye, by scooping out or arsenic.
They were also retained by their ruthless master. The
desperate then put out both eyes, but with no better
result ; they were set to pick oakum. We saw several
ancient soldiers minus thus a finger or an eye in the
Egyptian camp in the Sultan's Valley in 1853, and heard
their tale from their own lips. It soon became necessary
to station a body of Turkish police at the camp to prevent
desertion. Some deserters were retaken, and as an example
could not be made of them near Constantinople the general
expressed his intention of showing his sense of discipline
by having them shot on the line of march in Bulgaria.
We trust he kept his qualified promise to us to spare
them. * * Kilhng no murder *' spoilt OUver Cromwell's rest ;
and another pamphlet might be written in an inverse
sense to show that killing men thus arbitrarily impressed
for attempting to escape from their bondage is murder.
Part of the crews of the Egyptian ships were also

TROOPS INSPECTED BY IHE SULTAN. 119

veterans of Mehemet All's time and had been employed
in the excavation of the Mahmoudieh Canal, — a work
which cost the lives of 20,000 labourers.

Abbas Pasha agreed to pay his men during the war ;
the Porte to feed them and renew their clothing. He had
sent them to Constantinople destitute of many neces-
saries ; so much so, that the seraskiriat had to supply
them with great-coats, cloth trousers, and tents : also
water horses, one per company. As soon as ablutions and
good food had removed the dirt and squalor of their
wearisome cruise the Sultan honoured them with a visit.
Their joy at beholding the successor of the cahphs repaid
them for their troubles; and as his majesty passed through
their ranks, extending from Hunkiar Iskellesy to the im-
perial tents, many were heard praying in subdued tones
for his welfare. The Sultan gave each of the generals a
diamond-set snuff-box, and to every officer, non-com-
missioned officer, and private, a gratification of a month's
pay. His imperial father had on the same spot, twenty
years earlier, distributed medals to the Kussian troops
spoken of. Ill-advised, Sultan Abdul Medjid never
inspected any of his own devoted troops, either on going
to or returning from the war.

A few days after this pleasing ceremony the Egyptian
troops were again stowed on board ship as closely as the
most ingenious method of folding men into each other
would admit of. Six Turkish paddle-steam frigates, with
as many transports in tow, and two Egyptian steamers,
carried them with their baggage. Four of the steamers
embarked 2,000 men each. The only possible posture was
sitting, each man with his knapsack on his back and his
musket between his knees, each having besides a loaf or

120 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

two of bread and some onions, bought with his own money,
to supplement his slender rations. They landed at Varna,
and marched thence, some to Babadagh and Issatcha, and
some to Schumla. These veterans, thus cruelly seized,
thus abruptly torn from their homes, with their children's
cries ringing in their ears, transported from the banks of
the sunny Nile to the swamps of the dismal Danube,
sustained to the last the true soldierly spirit. Whether
in Bulgaria or elsewhere, they were distinguished for
courage in battle and resignation under hardships. Alas !
half their number had taken their last look at Egypt.

Soon after their departure the newsmongers of
Galata, stirred by the presentation of a petition to the
Sultan on his way to mosque one Friday by some
ardent softas, circulated an ugly rumour of a projected
massacre of Christians at the ensuing bairam ; adding, in
confirmation, that the Egyptians, who might have been
relied on to oppose ** Turkish fanaticism," had been sent
away on purpose. These gentlemen had found a mole-
hill and manipulated it into a mountain, according to
their wont. The preceding summer one of the fraternity,
who had always visions of truculent Janissaries and feline
eunuchs before his eyes, hearing of a body floating
between SeragUo Point and Tophana, which turned out
to be that of a missing German, wrote in hot haste
to an embassy at Therapia, to say the revolution had
commenced and the harbour was already covered with
headless corpses. That canard had died as soon as
hatched, but the one in question lived a while. The
ray as, who might, supposing the rumour founded, have
been in jeopardy, gave little heed to it ; but the Franks
and the Levantines fancied themselves doomed to act the

SANGUINARY RUMOURS. 121

part of sheep at the sacrifice, each to have his or her
tliroat cut by a zealous Moslem. The French and
English ambassadors accredited the rumour, and
increased the panic by sending to Beshika Bay for war
steamers. The former allowed himself to be ludicrously
mystified, and recorded his bonhomie in a despatch,
writing thus to his Government: ** La position du
gouvemement Turc s'aggrave de plus en plus, et les
choses sont au point de faire craindre une catastrophe
dont les habitants rayas ou Europeans seraient les
premieres victimes, et qui menacerait meme le trone
du Sultan."

M. Delacour was new to Turkey, and his credulity
was, therefore, in some measure excusable ; for he had
yet to learn that every statement made there should be
submitted to the test of probability before adoption.
Those in the way of being correctly informed, with no
party or stock exchange purposes to serve, assured
their Excellencies of the groundlessness of the alarm,
and commented upon the bitter efiect of bringing up
steamers for the protection of their countrjinen ; who
would in case of need, as truly observed, find refuge,
men, women, and children, in the Turkish barracks and
ships. The softas' petition, expressing discontent at the
state of afiairs, had simply arraigned the Government
for not declaring w^ar against Kussia. The instinct of
the people is in general true. Those uneducated men
saw the approach of war, stealthily but surely, and felt
the danger of procrastination. The Porte replied to the
petition, saying that it was equally desirous for war, that
it had sent proposals to Russia becoming the honour of
Turkey, and, in case of her rejecting them, there would

122 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

be war. Interrogated by the Sheick ul Islam, the
petitioners disclaimed all ideas of disaffection : they had
only, they said, spoken in the spirit of their holy law,
which enjoined war with the infidel, when provoked by
him and ready to meet him.

Excited, the French and English ambassadors sum-
moned four w^ar steamers from Beshika Bay, in order,
quoting from the despatch of the latter on the subject,
** to have sufficient resources at hand to protect their
compatriots, and even, in case of need, to give aid to
the Sultan, if the movement provoked by the war party
should go to the extent of menacing his authority."
Their Excellencies should have been consistent, and have
summoned the combined fleets : not a vessel too many
for the apprehended emergency. They were sanguine
in regarding four steamers ** sufficient resources" for
protecting their compatriots located in Pera hemmed
in by Turkish quarters, or scattered in villages along
the Bosphorus, and for giving ** aid to the Sultan."
There were then at Constantinople eighteen battahons,
two re giments of cavalry, artillery, and a fleet with crews
trained in infantry movements. This force would have
acted either for or against the Sultan's authority. If for
it, four steamers were a mockery ; if against it, a folly.
They were just sufficient to give a superfluous sense of
security to a few individuals fenced round by the law of
nations. Two of them anchored off Therapia and kept
their boats ready to bring off the inmates of the French
and Enghsh embassies at any hour of the day or night.
The other two remained off Tophana, to protect the
French and English in general and give aid to the
Sultan !

GROUNDLESS ALARMS OF THE FRANKS. 123

During that vision of alarm, Sultan Abdul Medjid
was seen going about more than usual, by land or water,
with his ordinary slender suite, unconscious of anything
menacing either his authority or pubUc order.

The Franks and Levantines had had the excitement
to themselves, and they incurred the ridicule when the
bubble burst. They had altogether, in their fright,
forgotten history. Foreigners, styled in Turkey misajir
(guests), have always been protected as such. A foreigner,
provided with the Sultan's firman or a Vizir's houyourouU
tou and accompanied by a Tartar, travelled safe in the
worst times in all parts of the country. More tourists
have been waylaid or intimidated from pursuing their
objects in the little kingdom of Greece since its esta-
bUshment than in the vast Turkish empire during its
existence. In periods of trouble, suggestive of anti-
Christian feelings — the civil war in the Morea, the
destruction of the Janissaries, the battle of Navarino, the
war of 1828-29 — the Franks and Levantines had not only
been unmolested, but their safety had been specially
cared for. Ought they, then, on any hypothesis, to
have apprehended molestation when their Governments
had come forward as the friends of Turkey, and were
expected to co-operate with her ?

The Turks were scandalized at this manifestation of
distrust, and surprised at the local ignorance betrayed
by it. In no capital is authority so paramount as in
Constantinople. Means of concert and action are wanting
there. The attitude of the Government is suspicion :
its rule is espionage. There are no papers uncensured ;
no criers unlicensed; no places of meeting tolerated.
The mosques, the cafes, and the gates of the city

124 TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

are closed two hours after sunset. The habits of the
people are early and domestic. The poUce can seize
suspected or obnoxious indi^dduals without notice or
inquiry, and sequester them ; and in a few hours embark
them, if necessary, in a steamer for a distant island.
No one in the East inquires after a lAan struck by fate.
By the agency of the imams and mooktars of the parishes
the Government knows, hour by hour, if it please, all
what is passing in the city, and thus exercises complete
control over the population. No popular emeute could
readily occur at Constantinople ; occurring, it would be
easily quelled. The Janissaries, in their day the only
troops in the capital, except the artillery and the
galiondgis, had been the sword of the Ulema to enforce
compliance with the holy law, and to punish ministerial
delinquency ; and with them ended fear of popular com-
motion at Constantinople. Their successors, the nizam^
all drawn from the provinces, are not learned in the
holy law, are indiflferent about corruption, and their rally-
ing cry is, ** Long Kve the Sultan ! '' — a heartfelt senti-
ment, not mere lip homage. In his shadow they receive
their pay and rations, and they feel grateful to him.
Their faculties belong to the state during their period
of service. They know this, and resign themselves to
a monotonous existence. The men never sleep out of
their barracks or guard-houses. Their only recreation
is the bath and an occasional promenade. The Sultan's
uniform, instead of being a passport for the ofl&cers, is
a social disqualification. Their steps are noted by
informers. They dare not visit men of rank in oppo-
sition. They may not frequent others than assigned
cafes. They may not accept invitations to dinner in

LOYALTY OF THE SOLDIERY. 125

a foreign house without permission. They are forbidden
to mingle with the gay and promiscuous crowds at
Eiathane and Ghioksou, the Hyde Park or Bois de
Boulogne of Constantinople. Between the miUtary and
civilians, in a word, non-intercourse is enforced.

126 TURKEY AKD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER IX.

Rassia refuses the Porte's Modifications of the Vienna Note — The Porte
declares War — Prince Gortchakoff invited to evacuate the Princi-
palities — Honours conferred hy the Sultan on the Greek Patriarch •
— A Turkish Squadron sent to the Black Sea returns to the
Bosphorus — Condition of the Turkish Navy — The Author's
Suggestion to the Capitan Pasha — It is overruled — Sinope, the
only safe Roadstead, exposed to Attack — The Navy in a transition
State — Two Parties in the Ser\'ice — Its low Tone — Forebodings
of Disaster — A Russian Squadron reported — The frigate Niizretieh
ordered to Sea — Representation of Mushaver Pasha — Strange Order
of the Capitan Pasha — The Nuzretieh in the Black Sea — Orders
given to the Turkish Squadron — Omar Pasha's Victory at Oltenitza
— Successes and Reverses of the Turks in Asia — Valour of the
Troops and Misconduct of their Officers — Exultation of the Turks.

Intelligence of Kussia's refusal to accept the Porte's
modifications of the ** Vienna note " having reached
Constantinople on September 21st, the grand counciJi
convoked on extraordinary occasions, composed of the
principal functionaries, religious, civil, and military, in
the capital, about 200 members in all, met to deUberate
on the question of peace or war. They sat two days,
and decided nearly unanimously for war. In conse-
quence, on the first day of Moharrem, 1270, corre-
sponding to October 4th, 1853, the Porte issued
a temperate manifesto to the nation, w^hich explained
the state of affairs and declared the existence of war
between Turkey and Kussia. Although expected, the

REFUSAL OP THE PORTE'S PROPOSALS. 127

declaration of war created, nevertheless, deep sensation.
Turkey had committed herself, single-handed, to war
with Kussia on a rehgious question. . The antagonistic
principles of Christianity and Islamism were again about
to come into conflict. The backwardness of the Western
Powers to declare themselves now excited painful com-
ment. Some termed it treachery ; others ascribed it
to the effect of their religion.

The Porte sent orders to the commander of the army
of the Danube to invite Prince Gortchakoff by letter to
evacuate the PrincipaUties in fifteen days, and to warn
him, in case of refusal, that he would be attacked at
the expiration of that delay. Keinforcements were sent
to the army of Asia Minor.

Concurrently, to propitiate the Greeks, their newly-
elected patriarch, Anthimos, was invested, with cere-
monies in abeyance since the execution of the Patriarch
Parthenius for imputed treason. His holiness went
from the Fanar with a priestly cortege to the imperial
palace ; received investiture at the Sultan's hands ; then
proceeded to the Porte, where due honours awaited him ;
and was reconducted to the patriarchal residence with
viziral pomp. Too late !

A squadron of frigates and smaller vessels was sent

into the Black Sea under the command of Pasha,

who received a month's extra pay to animate him, but
who returned without orders two days before war com-
menced, and never left the Bosphorus afterwards until
able to steam under convoy of the allied fleets. This
was a bad omen and a worse example. Kaw crews,
stormy weather, cold, and want of ports of refuge, made
the Turkish navy regard an order to cruise in the Euxine

128 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

as tantamount to a sentence of exposure to wreck or
destruction by the foe. Their taunt-rigged ships and
Bcantily-clothed sailors were adapted only for summer
work, and they had not enjoyed much of that. They
had never navigated in winter even the Mediterranean,
where ports abound, and they had to learn their task
in the ** icy Pontick,'* where fog and currents confuse
the reckoning, and where running for the land on an
uncertain course was eminently hazardous in those days,
through deficient lightage. The vaunt of having a
squadron at sea as well as the Kussians prevailed with
the Porte over the prudence of retaining the saihng
vessels in the Bosphorus, keeping up communications
with the outports with steamers.

Seeing the risk for a few cruisers, we proposed to
the Capitan Pasha, on his coming up to Buyukdereh to
announce war to the navy, to let the entire fleet go to
sea for the remaining few days of comparatively fine
weather, and then act according to circumstances indi-
cated by the movements of the Anglo-French fleet, —
either proceed to Sinope or return to the Bosphorus ;
but keep together. We were the more anxious for a
short cruise, to shake things into their places, knowing
the liability of the fleet to be ordered out any day.
In general slow in deliberation, dilatory to a fault, the
Porte can decide on impulse, and order ships to sail
or troops to march in disregard of wind or weather.
Our proposition was overruled by an apprehension
that the appearance of the Turkish fleet at sea would
entice the Russians out. The position of Sevastopol
might have been reckoned on for restraining the enemy
from going far away, with the chance of bringing on a

TR.VNSITION STATE OF THE XAVF. 129

general action oflf a lee-shore ; while a few frigates out
would be a bait to draw him to our coasts. The Capitan
Pasha a few days afterwards ordered the naval pashas
to indicate a place in the Black Sea for a Ught squadron
to winter in. The council, after deliberation with pilots
and others, reported Sinope to be the only roadstead
in which vessels could lie safely in regard of weather ;
but, viewing its proximity to Sevastopol, they added the
expression of their opinion that they would lie exposed
there to an attack from the enemy. The council w^as
snubbed for their addendum : they were told they had
exceeded their powers, their opinion having been asked
on the nautical question only.

The Turkish navy at that time, like everything else
in Turkey, was in a state of transition. The forms of
two systems were in presence without the substance of
either. The fitful energy of one had not been succeeded
by the regulated forces of the other. Open vests,
shalwars and sashes had given way to buttoned-up
coats and strapped-down trousers ; but under a Russian
garb there lurked the galiondgi, reckless and indolent.
Modem ideas of uniformity were at issue with prayers
and ablutions at the option of the devout. You looked
round in a squall for the men stationed at the top-
gallant sheets and halyards, and you saw them on their
knees absorbed in prayer. Ramazan, turning night into
day, mocked the routine of the other eleven months.
The oflBcers were divided into two sets, the educated and
the uneducated, each led by an admiral ; and the latter
were then in the best places. The educated talked
slightingly of practice, and fancied crude notions on tho
theory of storms suflScient to enable one to grapple with

130 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

the reality. The uneducated declared science spoiled the
sailor, and some of them made it a point of conscience
to set their chronometers in harbour to Arabic time.
Eules to guide patronage and laws to measure offences,
irrespective of position, were yet desiderata ; and as
the bastinado, and on an emergency the bowstring, had
not been replaced by the independent court-martial,
slander, the undermining element of Oriental society, and
passive resistance, the potent weapon of the East, were
unchecked. A vicious system of promotion during many
years joined with slender appointments had lowered the
tone of the service, while compulsory retirement from
time to time, to make room for favourites, haS deprived
the navy of several good oflBcers. The Capitan Pasha of
that day, a nominal soldier, was as ready to take inspi-
ration from his tchiaoushes as from his captains, and
shared the reluctance of his countrymen in every sphere
of life to seek advice until a crisis arrived : then
generally too late. His council sat to echo his words
and register his decrees. Withal there was a con-
fusion of powers coupled with an absence of respon-
sibility, and a pressure from without through unseen
influences. The Porte, hugging itself to the last moment
with the hope of receiving vahd aid from its allies, had
rushed into war scarcely knowing the meaning of the
word. It sought no professional counsel. It listened
alike to a chamberlain of the palace, to a scribe of the
council, to a dragoman of an embassy. Thus a position
was created which may be described by the word bewil-
derment. The armies (there being no telegraph) were
out of its reach, but the navy was not. Every oflBcer
and man consequently felt in his heart a sense of im-

THE CAPITAN AND MUSHAVER PASHA. 131

pending disaster. They looked forward to certain defeat
or wreck, and many expressed envy of their ** fortunate
comrades in the Archipelago."

Towards the end of October, a few days after the
commencement of hostihties, a steamer from the Black
Sea reported a Kussian squadron of three line-of-battle
ships, two frigates, and a steamer, cruising 120 miles
from the Bosphorus. Whereupon the Capitan Pasha sent
orders to the fleet at Buyukdereh to select one of two
heavy frigates to send out next morning, to reinforce
a light squadron of frigates and corvettes which had
sailed three days earlier ; and he added his desire, if the
Kuzretieh should be selected, for Mushaver Pasha to go
in her. The Nuzretieh,- a long frigate with first-rate's
spars, had scarcely been thought of for winter cruising,
and was therefore deficient in many respects. One
hundred of her best men had been lent to vessels at
sea: they were at once replaced from the squadron at
Buyukdereh, naturally with indifferent hands. While her
captain occupied himself with completing his crew,
getting on board also those on leave who could be
found, and using his eloquence with his brother captains
to obtain a few indispensable stores from their ships,
the dockyard being drained, Mushaver Pasha repaired
to Constantinople, and represented to the Capitan Pasha
the rashness of exposing frigates to unequal contest,
reminding him that ship for ship of nominal force the
Russians were superior, and he recommended him to send
out two line-of-battle ships as well. The Capitan Pasha
replied that the Porte having ordered out one frigate
only it would ill become him to discuss that ques-
tion ; but in regard of his further recommendation (in

9— JJ

132 TURKEY AXD TITE CRIMEAN WAR.

the propriety of which he entirely concurred) , to have
the next squadron, the squadron intended to winter at
Sinope, composed of Une-of-battle ships and frigates,
instead of frigates and corvettes as ordered, he pro-
mised to submit it to the Porte's consideration. The
Capitan Pasha concluded the interview by giving Mus-
haver Pasha a written order to abstain from firing first in
case of meeting the enemy. **Are we not at war?"
asked the latter. ** We are," he replied ; " but such is the
Porte's order." Mushaver Pasha excused himself from
undertaking to comply with it, since the first broadside
from a ship in position might decide an action. ** That
is your affair," replied the chief. ** I have given you the
order and that suflBces me."

The first heaving of the Black Sea under the Nuzretieh
showed unmistakeably many of her crew to be on their
trial cruise ; and a judicious helmsman was not forth-
coming, although several had apposite ratings. Her
captain proposed at once to fit gratings to the hatchways,
** They are to prevent the men running below in action,"
he said. ** Is that likely ? " ** Likely ! it is sure if the
hatches are left open." That was simply a class prejudice.
Throughout the war, whether ashore or afloat, the men,
with nothing to gain, displayed more zeal than the oflBcers,
with honours and promotion in view. Next day the
Nuzretieh spoke the Pervaz steamer, which had been sent
out to look for the cruising squadron, but had not found
it. She had heard at Varna of firing in the direction
of Issatcha, and having nothing further to communicate
steamed on to the Bosphorus. Her luck was bad.
Sent soon afterwards to Ereghli, she fell in with a
Eussian squadron, by which she was captured, with

THE TURKISH SQUADRON AT SEA. 133

her captain and half her crew slain, after a gallant
running fight.

On the second evening after leaving the Bosphorus
the Nuzretieh joined the squadron, and was hailed with
the signal ** Welcome*' flying at the masthead of the
Egyptian Hassan Pasha. Mushaver Pasha found that
ofl5cer and every captain of the squadron in possession
of an order to refrain from opening fire on meeting the
enemy, and on inquiry ascertained that his own captain
had received the same injudicious order. Two days
afterwards, Hassan Pasha, apprehending a gale — he
feared no other foe — telegraphed, " Is it right for us to
remain at sea, or to bear up for the Bosphorus ? " The
Eeala, Pir Bey, telegraphed in support, ** It looks truly
like a storm.'* The Nuzretieh answered, *' It is right to
remain at sea." And well it was she did, for otherwise
the squadron would have been embayed on a lee shore.
Before night the squadron was under low sail, with top-
gallant masts on deck. A succession of gales followed,
with rain, sleet or snow; the snow lying one night
(November 11th) several inches on deck. Those gales
proved very distressing : they made several vessels leak
seriously, and the Nuzretieh's masts and rudder-head
complain sadly. Pressed one night by north-west
squalls and a heavy sea, apprehensive of losing a
mast or the use of her rudder, the Nuzretieh was on the
point of bearing up : one of her consorts, the Kaid,
did bear up, finally reached Sinope, and was destroyed
there.

One dark night, the squadron being under close-
reefed topsails and reefed foresail, one of the corvettes
mistaking the signal *'Wear in succession'' for ** Wear

134 TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

together," placed herself in jeopardy of being run
over, and barely escaped that consummation by hoisting
with marvellous promptitude numerous lanterns and
burning blue-lights stem and stem. The recent adoption
by the Capitau Pasha of coloured lights led more than
once to confusion in misty or snowy weather. The
sufferings of the crews of the squadron, nearly all more
or less sea-sick, with diarrhoea prevalent among them,
excited mingled pity and admiration. Theirs was no
ordinary trial of fortitude. None had flannels ; few had
stockings ; many were still in white trowsers, the winter
clothing in store being deficient; each had only one cottony
blanket to cover him at night on a mattress not much
thicker than a hearth-rug ; and their coats were made of
cloth through which the stars might be seen. Biscuit,
rice, olives and water composed their sustenance, in
insuflBcient quantity to allay hunger, much less afford due
nourishment. None ever swerved, none shirked his
duty ; but many were carried below, exhausted by cold
and wet. We may not criticize the Porte for the destitu-
tion of its navy. Within three months it had trebled its
military and naval armaments, and could not face the
needful expenditure. But we may regret its having
inconsiderately ordered its ships to keep the sea for the
point of honour, regardless of other considerations.

On his return to the Bosphorus, Mushaver Pasha
mournfully reproached his chief for having composed the
Sinope squadron, which had sailed ten or twelve days
earlier, of only frigates and corvettes. The Capitan Pasha
excused liimself : he had done all that depended on him to
carry out Mushaver Pasha*s views, by representing them
to the Porte soon after his departure. Entirely approving

BANQUET TO THE ALLIES* ADMIRALS. 135

of them, the Porte had ordered him to prepare line-of-
battle ships for sea, and they were nearly ready to sail when
a counter-order came to the Admiralty : given, he said,
by the desire of the British ambassador. ** Inshallah ! ' •
he added, with a sigh, ** our frigates will be safe.'' He had
done his best on their behalf, by culling the best men of
the fleet for them. Moreover the Anglo-French fleet
had arrived at Beikos. The Turks fancied it came to
light their battles, and doubted the pluck of the Kussians
to leave port with that host in the neighbourhood.
Instead, therefore, of dwelling on anticipation of disaster,
the Capitan Pasha busied himself with doing the honours
of the Bosphorus to his guests. He gave a banquet on
board the Mahmoudieh, remarkable for the variety and
quantity of viands and wines consumed, to the admirals
and captains of the expected allied fleets, in company
with the pashas and beys -of his own fleet. With the*
champagne, he read a speech in Turkish — translated,
after deUvery, into French, for the benefit of the
strangers, by the chief dragoman of the Porte — on the
balance of power and the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire. The healths of the Sultan, of the Queen,
and of the Emperor, were then drunk with reiterated
applause. The health of the English and French
admirals, prefaced by thanks for their promptitude in
coming to Turkey's aid, was next drunk with due
honours. The jovial party then ascended to the quarter-
deck, transformed for the occasion into a brilliant
saloon, to listen to a concert by the artistes, male and
female, of the Pera Italian Opera. The Capitan Pasha
and the two admirals sat during the performance, in
silent dignity, side by side, on a sofa, smoking long

136 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

pipes, and their subordinates, picturesquely grouped about
the deck, followed their example. Tea and cakes were
handed round at intervals to the company by a score of
laquais de place^ in black coats and white neckcloths.
All was ** alia Franca.'* After the departure of the guests,
amidst a blaze of blue-lights from the Turkish squadron,
the scene changed. The deck was swept ; the pianoforte
removed ; and on came, smiling and salaaming, hitcheJc
(dancing boys) witli tchalglwjiler (native musicians).

The Capitan Pasha's statement, listened to with
incredulity, of the ambassador having prevented his
sending hne-of-battle ships to Sinope, was corroborated
by the blue book.* On its appearance his Excellency
said, in explanation, he had vetoed their departure by
the advice of Admirals Hamelin and Dundas ; and to
the question, asked with amazement, why he had reUed
Tor such a matter on the opinion of men unacquainted
with circumstances and localities, he observed that the
rank and command given them by their respective Govern-
ments left him no choice. The Secretary of State
approved of his veto, with the following trustful words,
in his despatch of November 21, 1853,—" The Turkish

• From Mr. Pisani to Lord Stratford de RdcUjfi'. JVm, Xov, 8,

1858.
[Kj'trftct.]
** The Turkish squadron, with the exception of the three-deckers,
is to proceed into the Black Sea, and will prohahly be ready on
Sunday."

From Ijord Stratford de Iledvlif,' to the Secretanj of State for Forehju
Ajf'airs, 2'herapia, Xor. 5, 1858.
[Krtract,]
** I have succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detach-
ment of line-of-battle ships and frigates into the Black Sea at this
moment.*'

TURKISH MILITARY OrERATIONS. 137

Government, if it understands its own interests, will
readily defer to the sound judgment of your Excellency
and the practical experience of Admiral Dundas.'* In
nine days from that date the flames of Sinope illuminated
the horizon. The gallant admirals may have conscien-
tiously expressed doubts about the fitness of Turkish
ships for winter cruising : their own well-found, ably-
manned ships did not relish it. That, however, was not
the point. The point was, the Porte considering its
dignity concerned in keeping a squadron in the Euxine,
to have that squadron suflBciently strong to take care of
itself at the anchorage designed for it.

War had already commenced in earnest on both con-
tinents. Omar Pasha had laid a clever decoy at Oltenitza,
into which the enemy, underrating his opponents, had
fallen. Satisfied with having furnished the public with
an agreeable topic of conversation, he sat down at
Schumla for the winter. Some have thought that, by
following up his success, he would have wintered in
Bucharest ; perhaps without another blow. In Asia the
Turks captured the Kussian frontier post, Shekvetil, on
the coast of Mingrelia, October 28, and Abdi Pasha
won the battle of Beyendir, November 3. These
advantages were balanced by the battle of Akiska,
fought November 14, in which the Turks, under Ali
Pasha, were defeated with the loss of twelve guns ; and
by the battle of Kedicleer, lost also by the Turks, under
Ahmed Pasha, with several guns, November 18.

These battles, all but unheeded in Europe, where atten-
tion was fixed on the operations on the Danube, were not
on the whole discouraging. The valour of the troops in
the two latter engagements had been as conspicuous as the

I:>? miZT jjn rzz CLnsAy wax.

::-MiiT»i::r- >=: ::±fi:lTi.:tr? vl; T-^re sncrs-uds recaUed
t-1 ^xllrl :: CTTn? lii ;ee- i^riLr- The delusion
i-^i: :lt: ^::liij: MZLiTr* tvJi jiji T±r\ corresponding
jkA'l'j is :-c :zl- ^iLtzx -Lii: ^-iz. w osered for the
P:r.- Lat-ji^ Liilr ?•: 7rrr:.;lei i s«=29c<^'>n of men for
cz.'.T.'.ii^ 1^. in i :iir:rr ■='lTrf ^-Ir L*! 1:0 one else to rely
rr- I. : inl Tl^r-r. :^~J :■: -i=:ii:i:c, :: was difficult to
i.— >t: a: :Lr in:l- .: -_i: :^::-:zzz±L AsLi was Bossia's
Tv:ii: t::l: : '^:^i.zi.l L^r -Li-err zz.rrej±red. with dis-
tr-n.::::! .l ^^'^-^rr illr. H-i :1^ Tzrks c-een ailr led at
ri*^ V-V:: ii. :!.::.: ^-jjn^r. ilc c::rr=i:; cf success wonld
l,iT-: rrr: 11. it-iil: J 111 "L-ir iivi^r. and have carried
t.-riLi :o Tiiii?. A-1 :L-: s-irn-ei lo te neqnired was a
ja^Li -n-illing lo i^j^j'T :.: :Lr Le^ui cf Lis eolanins.

XL- .Tn:o^:?:f^^ in E".;>r ini in Asia gave tlie Sultan
tLe :i:l^ o: irLizi Ti._:..ri.ns . anJ lei his Majesty to
aLLcinoe an intcLiiin :o rx Lis headquarters at Adrian*
0? Ir in t:.e essuiiii: s^^rin^^. TLey Trcnderfdly excited the
frj :rl: of Lslam. The Turkish Gazette, ailading to the
sl^in. sji 1 : •' Dnnkin^^ the sherbet uf martyrdom, they
gaiiifed eternal liie." A pasha inquired of the author if
Lfr tiiOTi^'hi the Turks would be allowed to march to
St. Petersburg the ibii j^inir year ? Certainly nol, was the
reply. He mused awhile, then said : •• I see how it is ;
f^urope will not alluw the Russians to come to Constan-
tinople nor the Turks to \:o to St. Petersburg."

( 139 )

CHAPTER X.

The Turkish Squacbon at Siuope— A Russian Squadron in the Offing
— Choice of Measures for the Turkish Commander — An Opportu-
nity of lietrcat — Reappearance of the Russian Squadron — Position
of the Turkish Ships — Shore Batteries of Sinope — The Russian
Ships enter the Bay — Flight of the Governor of Sinope and tho
Moslem Inhabitants — Vacillation of the Turks — The Fire of the
Russian Squadron — Total Destruction of the Turkish Ships —
Terrible Loss of Life — Gallantry of some Turkish Officers —
Indulgence of the Poiie — Escape of the Taif — The Capitan
Pasha reproaches the French and English Governments — Opinions
of their Ambassadors— Siuope after the Battle — Pusillanimity of
the Governor — Sufferings of the Survivors — Pitiable State of the
Wounded — Their Joy at the Prospect of Removal to Constantinople.

But the memorable, the decisive event of the campaign
of 1858 was naval. All conspired to class the battle of
Sinope in the category of predestined events.

Scattered by a gale of wind on the way, Osman
Pasha's squadron, the flag-ship with her mainyard sprung,
ran for and re-assembled at Sinope. All the ships had
suffered much wear and tear, and their crews, ill- provided
with winter clothing, were so beaten by cold and wet as
to be unable, for several hours after coming to anchor, to
go aloft to furl their sails. The appearance in tlie offing
of a Russian squadron the day after the arrival of the
last Turkish ship, coupled with the facility, then clearly
recognized, of its receiving reinforcements from Sevas-
topol, 180 miles distant, indicated the prudence of

140 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

running for the Bosphorus when the coast should be
clear. There were two chances to one in favour of a
successful run. The enemy might not reappear ; or if
reappearing might be outsailed. At the worst, a squadron,
composed of six frigates, a ship sloop, two corvettes, and
two small steamers, might hope to sustain creditably a
running fight with three line-of-battle ships, a frigate, and
a steamer — the force which originally hove in sight to
count heads in the trap. But Osman Pasha, distrusting
the ability of his captains to keep their stations,
allowed the possible contingencies of the third course
to outweigh the other two. In his opinion, as he after-
wards said, an action under way would have entailed
the loss of all hands : moreover, the weather had
affected his nerves ; leading him to avow his preference
to await the enemy at anchor, rather than face another
gale of wind.

A surer chance of retreat yet presented itself. Four
Turkish steam frigates, on their way home from landing
ammunition for the Circassians at Vardan on the coast
of Abasia, called at Sinope a day or two after the
reconnoitring Kussian squadron had stood away out of
sight in a north-easterly direction. Their commander,
by virtue of his higher rank, might have relieved
Osman Pasha from the sense of responsibihty which
oppressed his judgment, and have towed the squadron
clear of the bay — the chief effort — and further. The
united force, six steamers and nine sail ships — four of the
former well armed and some of the latter good sailers —
would, if declining action, have distanced the Russians.
Judged by the event, he was reproached afterwards for
remissness ; but if he had taken that step with no other

RUSSIAN SQUADRON OFF SINOPE. 141

authority than his perception of its necessity, his enemies
— and who has not got them in the East ? — insinuating the
improbabihty of the attack, would have blamed him for
over-zeal. Moreover, a fillip was wanting to rouse
Europe, loth to plunge into war. So Mustapha Pasha,
ruled by fate, leaving one of his steamers at Sinope,
contmued with the remainder his voyage to Constan-
tinople, where he arrived November 24, and made known
the unpromising aspect of affairs at Sinope. He had
seen no Kussians on the way.

The Russian squadron reappeared off Sinope the day
after the steamers' departure, and remained in sight
from the neighbouring promontory during the ensuing
gale. It was then, November 27, reinforced by ships
from Sevastopol, making a total of three three-deckers,
three two-deckers, two frigates, and three steamers.
They stood on and off for three days, waiting for moderate
weather. During that anxious interval, the doomed
Turkish squadron took up its final position in fifteen
fathoms, on a curve before the town, its left supported by a
sorry five-gun battery served by local gunners; which,
nevertheless, did excellent service in the action, and with
impunity, owing to its unobtrusive form and admirable
position on the edge of a low cliff. The ground around
it was literally ploughed with the enemy's shot, itself
being unharmed. The guns of this battery were
14-pounders and 19 -pounders — three of them old
Genoese guns. Of three similar batteries, the fire of one
was masked by its own ships, and that of another soon
ceased through want of cartridges. These were the
** respectable batteries" of Sinope, thus styled by Tophana
(the ordnance department) ; and they were not exceptions

136 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

pipes, and their subordinates, picturesquely grouped about
the deck, followed their example. Tea and cakes were
handed round at intervals to the company by a score of
luquais de place ^ in black coats and white neckcloths.
All was *' alia Franca.'' After the departure of the guests,
amidst a blaze of blue-lights from the Turkish squadron,
the scene changed. The deck was swept ; the pianoforte
removed ; and on came, smiling and salaaming, hutchck
(dancing boys) with tchalghigiler (native musicians).

The Capitan Pasha's statement, listened to with
increduhty, of the ambassador having prevented his
sending line-of-battle ships to Sinope, was corroborated
by the blue book.* On its appearance his Excellency
said, in explanation, he had vetoed their departure by
the advice of Admirals Hamelin and Dundas ; and to
the question, asked with amazement, why he had relied
Tor such a matter on the opinion of men unacquainted
with circumstances and localities, he observed that the
rank and command given them by their respective Govern-
ments left him no choice. The Secretary of State
approved of his veto, with the following trustful words,
in his despatch of November 21, 1853,—** The Turkish

• From Mr. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Bvdcliffe, Pera^ Nor. 8,

1858.
[Ejtrm't,]
** The Turkish squadron, with the exception of the three-deckers,
is to proceed into the Black Sea, and will probably be ready on
Sunday.'*

From Lord Stratford de Itedcliffi' to the Secretan/ of State for Fore'njn
Affairs. Therapia^ Nov, 5, 1858.
[Extract.]
** I have succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sendinpf a detach-
ment of line of- battle ships and frigates into the Black Sea at this
moment.''

TURKISH MLITARY OrERATIONS. 137

Government, if it understands its own interests, will
readily defer to the sound judgment of your Excellency
and the practical experience of Admiral Dundas." In
nine days from that date the flames of Sinope illuminated
the horizon. The gallant admirals may have conscien-
tiously expi-essed doubts about the fitness of Turkish
sliips for winter cruising : their own well-found, ably-
manned ships did not relish it. That, however, was not
the point. The point was, the Porte considering its
dignity concerned in keeping a squadron in the Euxine,
to have that squadron sufficiently strong to take care of
itself at the anchorage designed for it.

War had already commenced in earnest on both con-
tinents. Omar Pasha had laid a clever decoy at Oltenitza,
into which the enemy, underrating his opponents, had
fallen. Satisfied with having furnished the public with
an agreeable topic of conversation, he sat down at
Schumla for the winter. Some have thought that, by
following up his success, he would have wintered in
Bucharest ; perhaps without another blow. In Asia the
Turks captured the Russian frontier post, Shekvetil, on
the coast of Mingrelia, October 28, and Abdi Pasha
won the battle of Beyendir, November 3. These
advantages were balanced by the battle of Akiska,
fought November 14, in which the Turks, under Ali
Pasha, were defeated with the loss of twelve guns ; and
by the battle of Kedicleer, lost also by the Turks, under
Ahmed Pasha, with several guns, November 18.

138 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

incompetence of their leaders (who were afterwards recalled
and exiled to Cyprus) had been glaring. The delusion
that the Sultan confers with high rank corresponding
abihty is the only excuse that can be offered for the
Porte having made so wretched a selection of men for
commands, in a quarter where she had no one else to rely
upon ; and where, owing to distance, it was difficult to
arrive at the truth of what occurred. Asia was Russia's
weak point ; war found her there unprepared, with dis-
aflfection on every side. Had the Turks been ably led at
the outset in that quarter, the current of success would
have set in steadily in their favour, and have carried
them to Tiflis. All that seemed to be required was a
pasha willing to advance at the head of his columns.

The successes in Europe and in Asia gave tlie Sultan
the title of ghazi (victorious), and led his Majesty to
announce an intention to fix his headquarters at Adrian-
ople in the ensuing spring. They wonderfully excited the
spirit of Islam. The Turkish Gazette, alluding to the
slain, said : ** Drinking the sherbet of martyrdom, they
gained eternal life." A pasha inquired of the author if
he thought the Turks would be allowed to march to
St. Petersburg the following year ? Certainly not, was the
reply. He mused awhile, then said : ** I see how it is ;
Europe will not allow the Russians to come to Constan-
tinople nor the Turks to go to St. Petersburg."

( 139 )

CHAPTER X.

The Turkish Squadron at Siuopo— A Russian Squadron in the Offing
— Choice of Measures fur the Turkish Commander — An Opportu-
nity of Retreat — Reappearance of the Russian Squadron — Position
of the Turkish Ships — Shore Batteries of Sinope — The Russian
Ships enter the Bay — Flight of the Governor of Sinope and tha
Moslem luhahitants — Vacillation of the Turks — The Fire of the
Russian Squadion — Total Destruction of the Turkish Ships —
Terrible Loss of Life — Gallantry of some Turkish Officers —
Indulgence of the Poiie — Escape of the Taif — The Capitan
Pasha reproaches the French and English Governments — Opinions
of their Ambassadors— Sinope after the Battle — Pusillanimity of
the Governor — Sufi'erings of the Survivors — Pitiable State of the
Wounded — Their Joy at the Prospect of Removal to Constantinople.

But the memorable, the decisive event of the campaign
of 1853 was naval. All conspired to class the battle of
Sinope in the category of predestined events.

Scattered by a gale of wind on the way, Osman
Pasha's squadron, the Jflag-ship with her mainyard sprung,
ran for and re-assembled at Sinope. All the ships had
suffered much wear and tear, and their crews, ill- provided
with winter clothing, were so beaten by cold and wet as
to be unable, for several hours after coming to anchor, to
go aloft to furl their sails. The appearance in tlie offing
of a Russian squadron the day after the arrival of the
last Turkish ship, coupled with the facility, then clearly
recognized, of its receiving reinforcements from Sevas-
topol, 180 miles distant, indicated the prudence of

140 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

running for the Bosphorus when the coast should be
clear. There were two chances to one m favour of a
successful run. The enemy might not reappear ; or if
reappearing might be outsailed. At the worst, a squadron,
composed of six frigates, a ship sloop, two corvettes, and
two small steamers, might hope to sustain creditably a
running fight with three line-of-battle ships, a frigate, and
a steamer — the force which originally hove in sight to
count heads in the trap. But Osman Pasha, distrusting
the ability of his captains to keep their stations,
allowed the possible contingencies of the third course
to outweigh the other two. In his opinion, as he after-
wards said, an action under way would have entailed
the loss of all hands : moreover, the weather had
affected his nerves ; leading him to avow his preference
to await the enemy at anchor, rather than face another
gale of wind.

A surer chance of retreat yet presented itself. Four
Turkish steam frigates, on their way home from landing
ammunition for the Circassians at Vardan on the coast
of Abasia, called at Sinope a day or two after the
reconnoitring Russian squadron had stood away out of
sight in a north-easterly direction. Their commander,
by virtue of his higher rank, might have relieved
Osman Pasha from the sense of responsibiUty which
oppressed his judgment, and have towed the squadron
clear of the bay — the chief effort — and further. The
united force, six steamers and nine sail ships — four of the
former well armed and some of the latter good sailers —
would, if declining action, have distanced the Russians.
Judged by the event, he was reproached afterwards for
remissness ; but if he had taken that step with no other

RUSSIAN SQUADRON OFF SINOPE. 141

authority than his perception of its necessity, his enemies
— and who has not got them in the East ?— insinuating the
improbabihty of the attack, would have blamed him for
over-zeal. Moreover, a filhp was wanting to rouse
Europe, loth to plunge into war. So Mustapha Pasha,
ruled by fate, leaving one of his steamers at Sinope,
continued with the remainder his voyage to Constan-
tinople, where he arrived November 24, and made known
the unpromising aspect of affairs at Sinope. He had
seen no Russians on the way.

The Russian squadron reappeared off Sinope the day
after the steamers' departure, and remained in sight
from the neighbouring promontory during the ensuing
gale. It was then, November 27, reinforced by sliips
from Sevastopol, making a total of three three-deckers,
three two-deckers, two frigates, and three steamers.
They stood on and off for three days, waiting for moderate
weather. During that anxious interval, the doomed
Turkish squadron took up its final position in fifteen
fathoms, on a curve before the town, its left supported by a
sorry five-gun battery served by local gunners ; which,
nevertheless, did excellent service in the action, and with
impunity, owing to its unobtrusive form and admirable
position on the edge of a low cliff. The ground around
it was Hterally ploughed with the enemy's shot, itself
being unharmed. The guns of this battery were
14-pounders and 19-pounders — three of them old
Genoese guns. Of three similar batteries, the fire of one
was masked by its own ships, and that of another soon
ceased through want of cartridges. These were the
** respectable batteries" of Sinope, thus styled by Tophana
(the ordnance department) ; and they were not exceptions

142 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

to a general rule. From the Bosphorus to Batoom on
the one hand, and from the Bosphorus to the Danube on
the other, there was not on the coast of the Black Sea,
when war commenced, a battery deserving of the name,
nor a trained artilleryman, except at Varna. The Turkish
squadron, mounting collectively 430 guns, many of them
32-pounders, did not make the most of circumstances.
It ought to have moored in five or six fathoms water,
from one and a half to two cables' length oflf shore, have
established flanking batteries on the adjoining chflf with
some of its inboard guns, and have landed its light spars,
sails, and boats — inflammable and splintering matter.
Presumedly, the Russians would not then have attacked
it ; or attacking, they would probably have been repulsed.
About noon of November 30, 1853, the Russian
squadron, leaving its steamers outside to cut ofl* the
escape of any of the intended prey, stood into thfe
Bay of Sinope under all plain sail, wind light at E.S.E.,
each ship towing her boats astern. It was thought at
the time that the Russians, expecting the Turks to
surrender at discretion, had manned their boats to take
possession of them ; but it seems more likely they had
been lowered to keep them intact, ready to lay out or
replace springs. Seeing the approach of the enemy,
the governor of Sinope, Husseyin Pasha, who had kept
his horses saddled since the commencement of the
blockade, mounted, rode away from the town, and
never halted till he reached a place fourteen hours
distant. The Moslem inhabitants fled also. The Greeks,
seeing friends in the Russians, remained. Conversing a
few days later with some of the fonner, we commented
on their flight. ** When the pasha runs, can the people

THE BATTLE OF SINOPE. 143

remaiu ? " was the aphoristic answer. Thus ever in the
East ; the example of the chief is contagious.

The Turks, with customary vacillation, deferred
firing until the enemy had approached within half range ;
or it may be their commander let himself be fettered by
the suicidal order spoken of. The signal of the Navik for
leave to fire was disregarded. The Nizamieh with the
flag of the second in command, thinking the enemy about
to double on them, first opened fire ; her example being
followed directly by the whole line. Whereupon the
Kussians rounded to, clewed up, and anchored with springs
on their cables ; three-deckers opposite the two pashas'
frigates. During this manoeuvre some of their ships
suffered much by the Turkish fire ; and had that fire been
opened earlier, while the enemy was slowly bearing down,
he would have had no easy victory to boast of. The
enemy's fire at first was ineffective. Having given his
guns too much elevation, his missiles during half an hour
passed chiefly over the bulwarks of the Turkish ships,
cutting away masts and yards ; while it is deducible from
the unimportant injury inflicted by them during that
interval, that the Turkish gunners had, through inattention
to their quoins, lost the aim obtained before smoke
obscured their vision. A breeze then scattering the smoke
enabled the enemy to correct his sights. Awful execution
followed ; inevitable with line-of-battle ships armed with
68-pounders pouring broadsides into frigates and corvettes.
Some of the Turkish ships were unable to fire three
rounds afterwards. In one frigate, in a few minutes, six
iron guns were split, and several brass guns bent. In
all, the supply of ammunition was checked by the slaughter
among the powder-boys. Many hundreds of men were

144 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

drowned endeavouring to escape in boats or on broken
spars. *^ The devil was on one side, and the deep sea
on the other." Turks do not, but Egyptians do swim
hke fish ; hence the crew of the Dimiat frigate, remnant
of the Egyptian squadron at Navarino, who took to
their boats or jumped overboard after discharging a few
broadsides, saved above 300 of their number.

Unable to resist the irqp storm, the Turkish ships slipped
their cables, when not cut away, and drifted on shore. The
Nizamieh (GO) , in flames, fell on board the Kaid (50) , and
both were consumed together. In an hour and a half
the action was decided, and if Admiral Nakhimof then,
unheeding stragghng shot from desperate hands, had
ceased fire, there would have been no alloy to the credit
of having ably performed the critical operation of attack-
ing with sail-ships a squadron on a lee shore. But he
continued to keep up a merciless fire of shot, shell and
carcasses, which killed numbers of unresisting men,
and burnt the Turkish quarter of the town. He did
not cease firing till every Turkish ship save one was a
stranded bilged wreck. The Russians took possession of
the A^esivi frigate, in hopes of saving her for a trophy ;
but making water rapidly, she was run ashore next day
and burnt with carcasses. The Farsly Ilah, one of the
destroyed frigates, had, under the name of San EapJiaelj
been captured from the Russians in 1829.

The battle of Sinope, in which 2,700 Turks lost
their Uves out of 4,200, displayed vivid contrasts of
character. Ali Bey, a fine fellow, became early excited :
saying he never would be a prisoner, he bade his men try
to save themselves, then went below to the magazine
and blew up his ship the Navik. Otherwise inspired, the

CONTRASTS OP CHARACTER. 145

captain of the left her in a boat ere a shot was fired ;

deaf to the remonstrances of his pasha, who remained in
her, wounded, till next day. The second captain of the

also rowed ashore early in the action and narrowly

escaped being hit by a shot fired after him by his indig-
nant captain, who fell on his quarter-deck. These traits
came out at the examination of survivors before the Naval
Council. The inquiry also brought to hght the devotion
of the imams of the squadron, five of whom were slain
out of eleven ; the gallantry of Husseyin Pasha, who
commenced his career at Navarino and closed it at
Sinope ; the gallantry of the Syrian Kadri Bey, drowned
in swimming from his stranded burning ship towards
the shore ; and the valour of Izzet Bey, captain of
the Faisi-Marbouty who passed through the ordeal
unscathed.

Neither praise nor reproach was attached to the inci-
dents of the battle of Sinope, regarded apparently as the
decree of fate. The wary captains recovered favour
after a few months' reclusion in their homes on full
pay ; and the prudent governor of Sinope was appointed*
the following year to a more lucrative government. The

second captain of the , who fought the ship while

his captain noted the working of the engines, forgetting
the proverb, " Speech is silver but silence is gold," was
passed over. This indulgence, more or less shown
throughout the war — a deviation from the pole-star
of a warrior race — proceeded from the predominance of
the civil element in the rule of the land. In previous
wars the Sultan's lieutenants — the Grand Vizir, and the
Capitan Pasha, — had led in person the forces of the
empire, armed with sovereign authority. Punishment was

146 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

then terrible and reward ample, both on the spot, in
the face of approving thousands. No poltroon then re-
turned to the capital, and with lies and largess passed
himself oflf for a hero ; no brave man then had his
character whispered away in ante-rooms. In the late
war the nation fought in the shade of a bureaucracy.

Just before the action commenced, the Taif slipped
her cable, steamed round her consorts in the direction
of Gherzeh, had a running fight with Russian steamers
outside, saw the flames of Sinope in the evening,
made a detour in the Black Sea, and arrived in the
Bosphorus with the stunning news in the afternoon
of a stormy day, December 2, 1853, the day of the
departure of the destroying Russian squadron for
Sevastopol.

The Capitan Pasha's countenance the following
morning showed traces of a restless night. His distress
for the loss of his squadron was aggravated by a pro-
hibition to appear in the Sultan's presence. He vented
reproaches against the French and English Govern-
ments for their delusive attitude : '' They bade us arm,"
he said, ** resist Russia, and now in the hour of our need
their fleets look calmly on ! '* A naval pasha present
offered, by way of consolation, to go out with two steam
frigates to reconnoitre the enemy, and communicate, if
possible, with Sinope ; but as an officer of superior rank
had just declined that service with four steamers, the
Capitan Pasha could not, out of consideration for the
other's feelings, accept the offer. Intelligence, how-
ever, of some kind or other, was indispensable, and
therefore the Capitan Pasha desired him to wait on the
EngUsh and French Ambassadors, and ask them to send

CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS AND ADMIRALS. 147

a French and an English steamer to Sinope, accom-
panied by a Turkish steamer.

His envoy found their Excellencies at the French
embassy in conference with Admirals Dundas and
Hamelin about the catastrophe; the circumstances of
which, as far as then ascertained, he related to them. '
General Baraguay d'Hilliers frankly observed it was
an incident of war, and seemed to attach no great
importance to it. Lord Stratford de Redcliflfe professed
his ignorance, till within a few days, of a Turkish
squadron out in the Black Sea, and the gallant admirals
expressed themselves much to the same effect. Their
innocence of knowledge on a subject of general painful
anxiety, the chief topic of conversation in every konak and
cafe, was only so far remarkable that the squadron had
sailed from Buyukdereh in sight of Therapia and Beikos.
The ambassadors objected to Turkish steamers going
alone to Sinope, from apprehension of further disaster,
and they objected to a Turkish steamer accompanying
the English and French steamers they agreed to send
there, because they said the sight of the Turkish flag
might compromise their Governments. Carrying out that
idea to its extreme limit. Lord Stratford de Redchffe
objected also to a Turkish officer going in the EngHsh
steamer ; his colleague, however, overruled his scruples,
on the ground of the service he might render, and his
lordship yielded the point, with the proviso that he
should doflf his fez if the Russians were still there, and
keep his followers out of sight. The envoy's further
request for extra surgeons and appliances to be sent
with the combined steamers, prefaced by an exposition
of deficiencies on the spot, was acceded to : he had made

10—2

143 . TURKEY AND. THE CRIMEAN WAR.

it hesitatingly ; half expecting to hear that the sight of
French and English surgeons dressing the wounds of
Turkish sailors would be compromising.

December 4, 1853. — The Retribution and the Mogador
steamed into the Black Sea, still heaving from the effects:
of the late gale, and in fifty hours anchored in the Bay
of Sinope. The Russians had left there indubitable
marks of their visit. The shore of the bay was lined
with wrecks and strewed with corpses. Havoc had done
her worst. Not a mast was standing, not a timber was
left whole. The Czar, believing the Turkish squadron
at Sinope intent on supplying the Circassians with
ammunition, had ordered its destruction, and he had
been Uterally obeyed. One vessel only, the Taif^
escaped, and she alone had been thus employed. On
landing we found Sinope like a town after an assault :
disorder and confusion everywhere ; the bakeries closed
and provisions rare. Our arrival restored some order
and confidence. We collected the valid Turkish officers
and seamen in the town, and made them useful. There
were thirteen officers and 120 men. Five officers, in-
cluding the commander of the late squadron, and about
160 men had been carried away prisoners by the Russians.
Many officers and about 1,000 men had gone off into
the interior the evening of the battle.

The Governor, who had returned to his post, tried
to excuse himself in our eyes for his pusillanimity ;
but no rational excuse could be framed for it. His
defection had caused the flight of the Moslem inha-
bitants, and thence the destruction of their quarter of the
town, thus left without hands to extinguish the nascent
flames; it had also contributed to the neglect of the

SIXOPE AFTER THE BATTLE. 149

wounded, to a scarcity of provisions, and to general
demoralization. The captains who had fled inland as far
as Baibout, twenty hours distant, merited also reproach :
they ought to have remained in or near the town, where
their presence was much required, to collect stragglers
and attend to the wounded ; in a word, to supply the
absence of the missing authorities. They had been
punished, as we afterwards heard from their lips, by
their sufferings from cold and fatigue on the way. Had
boats put off to the \NTecks in the night, after the action,
many lives would have been saved. Many men sunk
and died in them from exhaustion. Others survived
through sheer hardihood. The Bash-liodja, for example,
of one of the stranded frigates, and three others remained
on the wreck three days and nights, and hved to tell the
tale. The smouldering timbers, they said, warmed the
water inside, and enabled them to bear semi-immersion
nearly all that while. Soon after the ships had stranded,
officers and men dropped themselves overboard and struck
out for the shore, with the aid of barrels or pieces of
timber. Many perished in that short transit, drowned or
struck by the enemy's missiles. Husseyin Pasha reached
the shore, only to die there of exhaustion. His body
' was recognized next day, and was interred at the tekieh
above the city, near the tomb of Seiti Belal,* a Moslem
saint in great repute with mariners. Most of those who

* Tradition says that Seiti Belal came to Asia Minor with the
Persians in the 11th century. He was slain in a battle with the ruler
of Sinopc. His body was removed from the spot where first interred
to the tekieh by the Turks. He is popularly considered to have been
descended from Ali ; but this is improbable. All seyahs (travelling
dervishes) visit his tomb, where lamps burn at night. It is customary
for the captains of Turkish vessels touching at Sinope to send presents
of oil for the lamps.

150 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

succeeded in setting their feet on shore, apprehending
pursuit, started immediately inland, and never stopped
till out of sound of the guns. Wounded men, who under
ordinary circumstances would have fancied themselves
incapable of movement, managed to reach villages several
hours oflf. We saw some of them brought thence to
Sinopc on horses or in carts, and marvelled how they
had ever reached them. We particularly remarked three
badly hurt men brought in in a cart from Gherzeh,
six hours distant, whither they had crawled after the
action. They explained their feat thus : freshly wounded,
their limbs were not rigid, and mental excitement over-
came physical suflFering.

Our first care had been to look for the wounded. We
found above a hundred in various cafes, in every stage of
sufiering : some in agony, many of them frightfully dis-
figured by explosions. They were stretched on the floors
or on the estrades, without beds or coveruigs ; the
wounds of some had not been dressed. Two medical
men of the destroyed squadron, a Pole and an Armenian
(the others were missing;, were in attendance, and showed
zeal and devotion ; but having lost everything in the catas-
trophe they were unable to afford much alleviation to the
sufferers. Six days having elapsed since the action, and
it being necessary to keep the windows closed to exclude
the cold air, the stench was sickening: with the best
hearts, our nerves could scarcely resist it. Gallant tars
present were moved to tears at the sight of such unmiti-
gated, unmerited suffering. When the poor fellows saw
me they looked joyful ; and those able to speak said,
** Welcome, father ! We have now hope ! " On hearing
that Captains Drummond and La Valle had consented

PITIABLE STATE OF THE WOUNDED. 151

to convey them in their steamers to Constantinople they
almost forgot their pains. That announcement was their
best medicine.

The surgeons of the Mogador and the Retribution^
and their coadjutors, took the sufferers in hand, and
well performed their task of mercy. With much per-
suasion some of the wounded submitted to amputa-
tion; but they might as well have been spared the pain,
for tetanus generally supervened. None who saw them
can easily forget the distressing scenes in those dingy
cafes, — their first glimpse of war's disillusory feature.
Several wounded men were brought in from neighbouring
villages, on the news of our arrival spreading. More being
spoken of, we left two native doctors with two Turkish
naval officers and ten sailors to attend upon them, with
necessary surgical appliances; and next afternoon we
embarked the survivors of the battle then at Smope,
excepting a few at death's door. God was merciful
to the wounded : He gave them fine weather and
smooth water on their voyage to the Bosphorus. A
request came off from the authorities, on the Retribution
and Mogador coming to anchor off Tophana, to defer
landing the wounded until evening, that the people
might not see them.

152 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XI,

The Turkish Fleet preparing for Sea — The Author summoned to the
Porte — Reception by the Divan of the Defeat at Sinope — Report
of a Repulse of the Russians — Unwelcome Counsel — The Author's
Representations prevail — His Suggestions for the Erection of
Redoubts at Sinope overruled — Impracticable Suggestions made to
the Porte — Turkish Policy in yielding to them— Gradual Progress
safest for Nations — Result of Inquiry into the Disaster of Sinope
— Blame unjustly thrown on the Porte — ^The Grand Council
ready to treat for Peace — Warlike Demonstration of Softas calmed
down — Manifesto of the Porte — Redshid Pasha's Note to the Four
Powers— Lord Clarendon's Reply — Action of the Western Powers
— The combined Squadrons enter the Black Sea — Notification of
the Allies* Admirals to the Russian Admiral.

We found the Turkish fleet hurriedly preparing for sea,
it having been ordered out on the impulse of the sensa-
tion excited by the battle of Sinope. The dejection of
the navy was profound ; but none dared give utterance

to it. Pasha said to the author, **If you will

prevent the fleet from going out, I and all the captains
will kiss your feet."

Summoned there for the purpose, the author went
to the Porte to relate the details of the battle to the
ministers. Their cheerful cushioned apartment and
sleek fur-robed persons deepened in imagination, by
the force of contrast, the gloom of the dingy cafes of

TUB DIVAN AFTER SINOPE. 153

Sinope with their writhing occupants. They listened,
apparently unconcerned, to the woful tale ; they regarded
composedly a panoramic view of the Bay of Sinope,
taken a few days after the action by Lieutenant O'Reilly
of the lietribution. A stranger, ignorant of the nil
admiran of Ottomans, would have fancied them listening
to an account and looking at a picture of a disaster
in Chinese waters. The mention, however, of the
flight of the Pasha of Sinope elicited a spark of the old
Turkish spirit. Redshid Pasha, in whose household
he had formerly served, attempted to excuse his con-
duct : ^* He could not," he naively remarked, " be
expected to remain in the way of cannon balls." On
which KiridU Mustafa Pasha gave him a scowl preg-
nant with meaning. No notice was taken of it, but it
was not forgotten. Kiridli Mustafa Pasha had been
given the seal of Grand Vizir as a lay figure, the real
power lying with Redshid Pasha, the minister for
foreign afiFairs. Within a few weeks of that scornful
glance the former resigned and the latter took his place.
I had scarcely finished the sad recital when a minister
of State rushed into the room joyous and announced the
arrival of a Tatar from Kastambol, bringing news of
the repulse of the Russians by the Turkish squadron
at Sinope, with the loss of two ships. A few gloomy
words from his colleagues calmed his exuberance. I
then, with due regard for national susceptibihty, dis-
closed to them the state of their fleet and its prospects
at sea. Four or five thousand of its best men had just
perished or been dispersed at Sinope ; and the remainder,
chiefly new levies, inadequately fed and clothed, were
deeply discouraged. If the Fleet encountered the

154 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

enemy, it would be defeated; if a storm, it would

be wrecked. Either would be equally a triumph for the
Russians. Such language sounded as harsh as it was
novel to men ordinarily under the influence of self-
delusion. But facts were stubborn. They had just
lost one squadron — through presumption ; they were
at war without allies ; so, after some vaporing for
form's sake, they admitted the prudence of nursing
their fleet in port until the return of spring with
renewed confidence.

Bent, however, on showing a bold face, like one half
stunned by a blow who still shakes his fist and cries
** Who's afraid ? " the Porte two days afterwards ordered
the Capitan Pasha to run round the Black Sea with four
steam frigates. This was, if possible, more objectionable.
A corpulent landsman propped up by cushions, giving
distracting orders, was the pleasantest feature of the
prospect. Those steamers had been employed as troop
or pilgrim ships for more than a year, with barely time
allowed them to wash their decks. There was no harbour
of refuge to run for in case of an accident ; no depots of
coals on the coast. The Capitan Pasha signified his
desire for the author's company on the cruise, at the
same time expressing freely his sense of its folly, and
unable officially to raise objections, desired him to repre-
sent them officiously in the right quarter : which he did.
** If," it was observed to Redshid Pasha's secretary,
" there is any object in view, let them circumnavigate the
Euxine by all means, and no one will shirk the service,
but do not send them out merely to show their flag. You
have already lost two corvettes by this kind of bravado.
Your frigates are too valuable to risk the loss of : you

SUGGESTIOXS FOR FORTIFYING SINOPE. 155

will require them all, and more, in spring, to carry troops
and munitions of war."

The steamers were countermanded.

The defenceless state of the coasts of the Euxine being
then tardily recognized, the author was ordered to confer
with the council of Tophana on the subject. Premising
the policy, in due season, of making Sinope a fortified
arsenal, he recommended for the present the erection on
given spots of the bay of four redoubts, trenched,
mounting each ten guns ; also similar batteries at
EreghH, Sampsoun, Trebizond, Ignada, and at the
anchorages in the Gulf of Bourgas and in the Bay of
Kavarna, one at each place. Armed anchorages are
the condition for the weaker belligerent keeping cruisers
at sea and carrying on its coasting trade. This plan,
simple and inexpensive, was accepted, and a minute
made for its speedy execution. Materials and labour
were on the spots, and appropriate ordnance was in store
at Constantinople. In another month the Turks would
have been able to send cruisers out and let merchant
vessels leave port, unanxious about their safety. But a
diplomatist, whose hghtest w^ord in that day was law,
interposed his veto : he desired the Porte to wait for a
report from a competent authority, whom he proposed to
send to the indicated places. Accordingly, two months
later, an Enghsh and a Turkish engineer officer went to
Sinope and Trebizonde on that errand, under his auspices.
Their report, with corresponding designs, was worthy of
their Woolwich education ; but being too elaborate for the
rough needs of actual war it remained a dead letter.

The misadjustment of means to ends has caused
many suggestions to fail in Turkey. This had been more

156 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

strikingly exemplified shortly before the war, by advice
from the same eminent quarter to make a carriage-
road from Trebizond to Erzeroom ; an undertaking more
arduous than the construction of the roads over Mount
Cenis and the Simplon combined. Whenever the Porte
agrees to an impracticability to please a friend it shuts
its eyes to a job or acquiesces in a mystification. Four
miles of that road on the side of Trebizond were made,
absorbing in the process 25,000/., when the enterprise
was abandoned for want of funds ; whereas had the Porte
been advised to repair the existing bridle-road from end
to end, the money might have been advantageously
expended, and the road would then have proved invalu-
able during the war for military and subsequently for
commercial purposes. Many other similar cases of the
preference for the costly and problematic to the facile
and requisite might be cited.

What Turkey can do is rarely suggested: what she
cannot do is frequently urged. She is told to draw on
European boots and run at the risk of breaking her
neck : she is not allowed to walk briskly in her slippers,
as inclined to do. Where a boat camber, for example,
daily wanted, would at a trifling expense save annually
hundreds of boats and much merchandise from loss, a
breakwater for shipping is advocated. Where a few miles
of paved road over a miry district or through a defile,
of easy construction with local means, would connect
fertile provinces with the sea or with each other, railways
with high guaranteed interest are projected.* Where

* The guaranteed interest on Turkish railways, calculated on a
capital in excess of the estimated outlay, is about 10 per cent. In
the course of 1867 three railways — single lines — measuring col-

IMPRACTICABLE SUGGESTIONS. 157

fountains lack water, spirit- shops abound ; the vendors
being foreigners, licensed by their respective chanceries.
Where grammar-schools are deficient, a palace is built
for a polytechnic university. Where whitewash, a prison
dress, and improved drainage would suffice to relieve the
administriation from reproach, a prison a h Pentonville is
designed; and for decUning to lodge forgers, burglars,
and murderers better than artisans, the Turks are termed
impracticable.

Turkey might, with the money idly laid out during
the last thirty years on dubious undertakings, have
given her harbours quays and boat havens, bridged
her rivers, and opened hundreds of miles of fluvial navi-
gation in Asia Minor and Eoumeha, by clearing the
Saccaria, the Kysil Irmak, the Marizza, the Meander,
the Cydnus, &c., of obstructions in their courses or at
their mouths. Turkey, in yielding against her convic-
tions, may yet deem herself wise in her generation. She
sees special correspondents abroad, and hears of tourists
** taking notes " at Pera or Therapia. For them and
other celebrities she lights gas, patronizes learned insti-
tutions, copies Gallic codes, concocts budgets, subsidizes
newspapers, and grants lucrative concessions. For them
she pins on the ruffles of civilization. Nations do not
progress by jumps or runs, but by steps. Macedonia,
in ancient days, subdued Asia from the Hellespont
to the Indus in a reign, and lost it in a day ; but Kome

lectively 290 miles, will bo open ; respectively from Varna to Rud-
Bchuk, from Smyrna to Aidiu, and from Smyrna to Cassaba. The
guaranteed interest on those railways amounts to 294,000/. a year.
Less than the annual expenditure of that sum on bridges, rowls, and
defiles would suffice to maintain a general healthy circulation throughout
the empire.

158 TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

welded her mighty dominion stroke by stroke. Modem
Greece passed at a bomid from subjection to an Oriental
despotism to the exercise of constitutional liberty, and
the deplorable result is too obvious to need illustration
here. Napoleon overran Europe with his legions, and
left France narrower than he had found her. Warned
by the example, his imperial nephew contented himself
with a ramble in Northern Italy, and extended her
frontier to the crest of the Cottian Alps. Then, giddy
with success, he took a leap into Mexico and sprained
his ankle.

Next, to appease public indignation by hitting a blot
somewhere — anywhere but in the right place — a council
sat at the Porte to inquire into circumstances in connec-
tion with naval administration before the Battle of Sinope.
A trial, in the East, often records a foregone conclusion.
Much ** dirt '' was eaten on that occasion. Jealousies
and animosities long pent up found vent. The Capitan
Pasha accused his feriks, one of cowardice and disobe-
dience, the other of remissness and error in judgment.
The feriks making up their quarrel for the nonce, joined
against the common foe, who had shown want of tact in
not restricting his animadversions to one. They accused
him in turn of incapacity and giving contradictory orders.
The naval captains, seeing him the doomed scapegoat,
sided with the admirals. Accordingly, the forms of
inquiry having been complied with, Mahmoud Pasha was
dismissed the capitan-pashalik and sent out of sight
to Borloz, in Asia Minor.

The British ambassador, in a despatch to the Secre-
tary of State for Foreign AflFairs, dated 17th December,
1853, threw the blame directly on the Porte, and indi-

IXTERVENTIOX OF THE AMBASSADORS, 159

rectly on other parties. He could not, be said, conceal
from himself that *^the destruction of so many Turkish
vessels at Sinope would probably never have occurred if
the ships of France and England had been sent there at
an earlier period ; not that he would throw the blame of
that disaster anywhere but on the Porte and its officers.
They alone, or their professional advisers, were cognizant
of the miserable state of the land defences of Sinope.
They alone were answerable for the obvious imprudence
of leaving so long in helpless danger a squadron exposed
to attacks from hostile ships of far superior force.'' His
Excellency did not think of his own glass-house while
throwing those stones. The French and English fleets were
more or less under the direction of their ambassadors at
Constantinople ; and it has not appeared that previous to
the battle of Sinope a wish had been expressed by them
for any French or English ships to enter the Black Sea.
The state of the defences, not only at Sinope but in
every part of the empire, ought to have been famihar to
men who claimed the right to dictate to the Porte its
war operations, deeming it superfluous to counsel pre-
liminarily with any of its military or naval officers ; and
who, with consuls at outports and contingent service
money, had ready means for obtaining special informa-
tion. The Capitan Pasha, the Porte's professional
adviser, had recommended sending line-of-battle ships
into the Black Sea, to obviate the exposure of a squadron
of frigates and corvettes *^ to attacks from hostile ships
of far superior force ;" and his recommendation, ap-
proved by the Porte, had been overruled.

A more important council, the Grand Council, next
sat to deUberate on peace, two months after it had met

160 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

to deliberate on war. It sat on the 16th and 18th
December, 1853, and deliberated on an identic note,
drawn up by the representatives of Austria, England,
France and Prussia, at Constantinople. Bedschid
Pasha was, as before, the spokesman ; but in an inverse
sense. The lay members voted with him, but the Ulema
were less tractable. The council voted readmess to
treat for peace on the basis of the evacuation of the
Principalities, the maintenance of Turkey's sovereign
rights, and a guarantee from the Four Powers for her
independence, as understood in a ** note " already
presented by their representatives. The divul^ng of
pacific views excited a few muderris and many softas to
make an anti-demonstration (exaggerated in the corre-
spondence of the day) at Sultan Suleyman's mosque.
The seraskir met them there. Admonished by him,
they gave up their arms. Interrogated afterwards at the
Porte, some of them pertinently said, ** If you want
peace now, why did you declare war two months ago ? "
The most turbulent were told that, as they were warlike,
they might go to the frontier. They replied to this
sarcasm that their avocation was to pray, not to fight ;
the war was holy, and angels would assist them. Above
a hundred of them were shipped next day and sent to
Candia; there to meditate on the Koran and learn that
all knowledge is contained in its pages for those who
know how to read them. Each exile was allowed for
maintenance four piastres (eightpence) and tw^o pounds
of bread a day.

The Porte then issued a manifesto, published in
the State Gazette^ December 23, 1853, and read in
the mosques, to the eflFect that the Grand Council

REDSHID pasha's NOTE. 161

had unanimously decided to consider peace desirable,
but with the maintenance of sovereign rights and terri-
torial integrity; that it had come to this decision in
consequence of the frequently manifested desire of
Russia for peace, and by the advice of the four alUed
Powers. War would not be relaxed during negotiations.
It warned the nation that if any one should dare to utter
a word against the decision of the council, he would
instantly receive condign chastisement. On the 31st
December, Bedshid Pasha addressed a note to the
representatives of the Four Powers, acquainting them
with the acceptance by the Porte, under the Sultan's sanc-
tion, of the terms of the identic note, since they contained
nothing prejudicial to the sacred rights of the Ottoman
Empire, and with the readiness of his Majesty to conclude
a peace in the manner indicated by his allies. Lord
Clarendon, in his despatch dated 17th January, 1854, to
Lord Stratford de RedchfiFe, said her Majesty's Govern-
ment considered the said ** note " quite satisfactory, and
added the expression of a hope that Russia, alive to her
own interests and those of Europe, would agree to the
reasonable terms now offered to her. Too late ! The
cannon of Sinope had re-echoed in Europe and given a
definite direction to public opinion ; and that finally
overcame the irresolution of the Western Powers : which
had, in truth, seemed unchivalrous from the hour of
Turkey drawing the sword. The French and English
Governments had already written to their ambassadors
at Constantinople, to inform them that the French and
English fleets were to protect the Turkish flag and terri-
tory in the Black Sea, and to require all Russian vessels
of war to return to Sevastopol or the nearest port ; and

1G2 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

to remove any doubts from the admirals' minds, Lord
Stratford de RedcliflFe, subsequently, in a despatch to
Admiral D. Dundas, desired him to bring into the Bos-
phorus every Bussian ship declining to comply with the
requisition.

Peace could not reasonably be expected after this
warning. The wonder is that it should still have been
harped upon.

We will now recur to the steps taken with respect to
the allied fleets on the news arriving of the battle of
Sinope. Two days afterwards Bedshid Pasha, in a
letter addressed to the British ambassador, after
observing ** that the salutary object of the French and
English fleets in the Bosphorus is to protect the Turkish
coasts,'' intimates the desire of the Porte for active
efforts on the part of the allies in the Black Sea ; and
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in liis despatch
to his Excellency, dated 17th December, 1853, expresses
the conviction of the British Government that the allied
fleets had been directed by the English and French
ambassadors, on the return of the steamers sent to
Sinope, to enter the Black Sea. General Baraguay
d'Hilliers and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had endea-
voured to persuade Admirals Hamelin and Dundas to
sail, and differences of opinion thereon had produced
coolness among those distinguished individuals. The
reluctance of the gallant admirals to quit their pic-
turesque anchorage at Beikos during the month of
December, 1863, remains a mystery, since no credit can
be attached to the rumour in circulation that they had
expressed themselves apprehensive of the Kussians seizing
the Dardanelles during their absence. There was no

THE ALLIED SQUADRONS IN THE BLACK SEA. 163

longer a squadron to save, but there was the duty of
depriving the Black Sea of the character of a Russian
lake. During the month which elapsed between the
return of the combined steamers from Sinope and the
entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, the
Russians might have disturbed the repose of every town
(except Varna) on the shores of that sea.

Hesitation was at length finally overcome by the arrival,
December 25th, 1853, of a despatch from the French
Government, written on an understanding with the English
Government, ordering the French fleet into the Black
Sea. Ten days were still required to prepare the fleets
for sea ; those noble fleets,- one of which, the Turks
had been told, Iny ready to sail even for China at
twenty-four hours' notice. At length they sailed, and the
ambassador announced their departure to the Secretary
of State by the following pithy sentence, in his despatch
of 5th January, 185 i : — '' The combined squadrons
succeeded at length in making good their entrance into
the Black Sea at an early hour yesterday morning/'
Wliile they ran in two lines, with a fair wind, along the
coast of Anatolia, with a few Turkish steamers under
their convoy, her Majesty's ship Betrihution steamed to
Sevastopol witli a letter from the allied admirals to the
Russian admiral, to inform him that the object of their
presence in the Black Sea was to protect the Turkish
flag and territory from any aggression or act of hostility ;
of which they apprised him, they added, with the view of
preventing any collision prejudicial to the friendly rela-
tions between their Governments and the Russian Govern-
ment. No answer was returned to their letter.

11—2

164 TURKEY AKD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XII.

Unexpected Return of the combined Fleets to Beikos Bay — They are
mistaken for the Russian Fleet by the Capitan Pasha — The
Russians again Masters of the Black Sea — Consequences of im-
perfect Accord between the Allies* Ambassadors and Admirals
— Turkish Steamers with Troops under Convoy enter the Black Sea
— Patience of the Soldiers under their Privations — ^Distress from
Overcrowding — Former Instances — The Turkish Convoy anchor at
Sinope and at Trebizond — Readiness of the Troops — Shifblessness
of Regular Troops when not cared for — Mortality in the Turkish
Army — Confidence at Trebizond in the Allies — A native Preacher's
Prophecy for English Unbelievers — Turkish Ideas of English
Protestants — Invalid Troops at Batoom — Georgian Basbi Bazouks
and their Leader— Troops under Canvas — En-or in adopting
European Clothing for Turkish Troops — Advantages of the old
Turkish Costume — Re-adoption of Oriental Uniforms by the
present Sultan — Foreigners wonder at the hardihood of Turkish
Soldiers — The Secret explained — Habits of the Turkish Peasant
fit him for enduring Hardships — Promises of Mohammed to
Soldiers — Influence of patnotic or religious Sentiment — Comforts
for Soldiers and Sailors of recent Date — Initiation in England
by Royalty — Extent of Improvements in the British Navy —
Former Condition of the Sailors — Unhealthiuess of Batoom —
Turkish reverses in that District — A Westerly Gale in the Black
Sea — Disasters to the Steamer Fam-hari — No Assistance rendered
by other Steamers.

The combined fleets did not remain long out in the
Euxine. Within three weeks of their departure, while the
public were speculating on the chance of their meeting with
tlie Russians, they were again moored in Beikos Bay.
Tliey had sailed to Sinope in three days, lain there eight,

RETURN OP THE FLEETS TO BEIKOS. 165

and sailed back in six days. Thus ended this memorable
cruise, which had assuredly caused more talking and
writing than the voyage of the Argonauts had given rise
to. The admirals returned, on their own suggestion,
uninvited, nearly unheralded. Admiral Hamelin did
intimate to General Baraguay d'HiUiers the probabiUty
of his early return ; but Admiral Dundas omitted to
write a word on the subject to his ambassador, and his
Excellency's disbelief of the rumour thereon, based on a
private letter, led him to tell the Capitan Pasha the day
before the fleet's reappearance in the Bosphorus that
they were still at Sinope, with no intention of coming
away. I was in the gallery of the Mahmoudieh, with the
Capitan Pasha, when the fleets hove in sight, and, on the
faith of the ambassador's statement, his Excellency
thought they were the talked-of Kussian fleet, chasing in
a French and an English steamer in advance. A signal
from the outer castles at that moment saved him from
the jest of signahzing his fleet to haul on their springs
and prepare for action. The Russians were again
masters of the Black Sea, and profited by their luck
(little to be expected after the notice given) to remove
some exposed garrisons from the coast of Abasia, which
the slave-dealers took advantage of. They may have
seen in the retreat of the combined fleets an indication
of vacillation on the part of the French and English
Governments, since their ideas on discipline would hardly
allow them to suppose it unauthorized. One conse-
quence of this event was imperfect accord between the
ambassadors and the admirals, soon made apparent by
cross action in regard of giviug aid to a Turkish expedi-
tion of troops and stores to the eastward.

1C6 TURKEY AND THE CRniEAN WAR.

The French and English ambassadors, disregarding
professional etiquette, promised, without consultation with
the admirals, more aid than the latter had counted upon.
General Baraguay d'Hilliers, for his part, oflFered to
carry part of the troops in French ships, then wrote to
his admiral on the subject. Admiral Hamehn refused to
embark a soldier, and kept his word. Lord Stratford de
RedcliflFe, for his part, engaged for English steamers to
tow some of the transports. He told the Porte to take
that for granted, and instruct its officers to confer
with Admiral Dundas on the matter. Admiral Dundas
refused to tow a vessel, and also kept his word. The
severity of the season and the scantiness of native means
aggravated the disappointment. However, there was no
help for it ; the gallant admirals were not to be diploma-
tized out of the position their sense of dignity indi-
cated as becoming.

The Turkish steamers, therefore, eight in number
— frigates and corvettes — embarked on the 6th of Feb-
ruary, 1854, all the troops, 5,000 for Trebizond, and
3,000 for Batoom ; and early next morning, with the
transport-craft, eighteen in number, some under sail,
some in tow, proceeded into the Black Sea, in company
with an Anglo-French steam squadron under the com-
mand of Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons. The
patience of the soldiers, half of whom necessarily re-
mained on deck, exposed to snow or rain, was exemplary,
their endurance remarkable. Their apparel was flimsy,
as usual in those days ; their food innutritions, in accord-
ance with custom when embarked. The military autho-
rities had supplied them biscuit at the rate of 1^ lb.,
with a handful of olives per day, per man, the bulk of

OVERCROWDING IN TURKISH SHIPS. 167

their ration going to swell the Debboi fund ; * and
though in summer such spare diet may have some of
the advantages claimed for it, seeing the way Turkish
soldiers are crowded on board ship, in winter it impairs
their health. We managed with difficulty to give tliem
in addition, from the ships' stores, rice soup in the
morning. All hands should have had a turn below at
night, but that was easier for their officers to order than
to effect. Wedged in one mass between decks, many
were deaf to exhortations to move, and being sea-sick,
the stimulus of blows, if resorted to, would have proved
ineffectual. Twelve hundred accoutred soldiers agglome-
rated in a steam frigate, with a crew of 300 men, for
several days and nights, wet, dirty, and sea-sick, made a
picture of wretchedness, in the face of which one's own
comforts, slight as they were, seemed a reproach. We
cast wistful glances, thinking of the room on their
spacious main decks, on our allies' line-of-battle ships
steaming with a fair wind on parallel lines.

Severe, even in favourable weather, the distress of the
troops on board ship, through overcrowding, till recently,
has been painfully aggravated in heavy weather ; and on
tlie occurrence of an accident at times fatally. Four
years earlier an 1100 ton paddle war steamer, bound for
Trebizond with a mushir and 1,200 soldiei-s, lost her
rudder off Eregli, when, as the first inconvenience, seas

" The equivalent in money of a reduction from the meat ration has
formed the Debhoi fuud, the object of which has been the purchase
of wholesome varieties of diet for the men. This fund has often been
abusively used for other purposes, as gala clothing for musicians, &c.
It has in some cases proved too strong a temptation for its trustee to
resist. Since the accession of the reigning Sultan, Abdul Aziz Khan,
the men receive their full rations in kind.

168 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

breaking over her fore and aft, drenched everybody on
deck. She steamed at a venture, wind ahead, when the
sea abated, and in 104 hours made the Crimea, fortu-
nately at CaflFa, having in the interval thrown overboard
100 bodies of soldiers frozen to death. With a supply
of fuel and a temporary rudder, she continued thence her
voyage, and on the tenth day from the date of her
departure from the Bosphorus landed her human freight
in a miserable state, many with frost-bitten hands and
feet. But for her making land before the exhaustion of
her coals, no one on board probably would have survived
to tell the tale.

On the 8th, at 11 p.m. we anchored at Sinope, and
next morning, after landing men and means for recovering
the guns of the sunken ships, we proceeded on our course
to the eastward, in sight of picturesque mountain ranges
covered with snow. We passed near Tirazon and Tirepol,
towns carrying on trade in fruit and wood with Constan-
tinople, and at 7 p.m. of the 10th anchored at Trebizond.
Having sent forward a fast steamer to announce our
approach, lighters came off directly to land our troops.
We disembarked a few hundreds, when a fi-esh breeze
setting in from seawards prevented us from landing
more. The soldiers had revived with the prospect of
treading ground, and every man stood ready with his
musket and knapsack. They bore the disappointment
manfully. Morning broke calm and bright. We landed
them speedily, and had the satisfaction before noon of
seeing them in weather-tight quarters, partaking of a
comforting meal. Only two had died on the passage ;
though, doubtless, the seeds of disease were implanted in
many by that trying exposure. Speculation, however, on

MORTALITY IN THE TURKISH ARMY. 169

that head is vain. Ere three months had elapsed, a third
of them had perished, some swamped in snow, others
wasted in unhealthy encampments. Sending troops in
winter to Erzeroom and Batoom, in want of ordinary means
to wrestle with their direst foes, cold and wet, was gra-
tuitously throwing them away. Regular, unlike irregular
troops, cannot take care of themselves, and when their
government fails in that respect, a standing army is a
fearful drain on the population liable to serve. The
mortality in the Turkish army and navy, chiefly from
preventible causes, has balanced the general saving of life
since 1838 by the absence of plague and the practice of
vaccination in towns.

Our arrival relieved the inhabitants of Trebizond
from their fears of a visit from the Russian fleet, which
the departure of the combined fleets from Sinope had
revived. That occurrence, however, had not weakened
their confidence in the allies. The English, in par-
ticular, had a warm advocate amongst them in Hadgi
Pir Efendi, a native .of Trebizond, the most popular of
the Ramazan preachers at Constantinople, drawing always
crowds to the Conqueror's mosque to listen to liis elo-
quence. The English, he averred, in reward for their
goodwill for Turkey, would be kept apart from other unbe-
lievers in the lower regions until an opportunity should
ofler for smuggling them into a comer of paradise : the
Prophet, he said, had certainly granted a dispensation
for Palmerston. The learned mollah's orthodox reputa-
tion ran comparatively little risk from the utterance of
this heresy, because the Turks in general — seeing no
priest, cross, bell, book, candle, or procession, seeing
them neither pray nor fast — believe the English innocent

170 TURKEY AKD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

of religion, and therefore open to receive the light ; unlike
thQ Greeks and Armenians committed by forms and
ceremonies to obduracy. The word Protestant has that
meaning with them. They call free-thinkers of any
sect indifferently protestan, fra-masson^ and kyzil-bach.
Another moUah, with Mecca rank, Koran expounder to
the imperial children, inquired of the author one day if
the English did not worship the moon. People, whether
Pagan or not, must worship some object, and what more
natural, he thought, than for a nation of mariners to select
a luminary whose beneficent light guided their ships in
safety off their stormy coasts. A functionary, with less
excuse for his ignorance, struck by the expression
** please God " in an English memorandum, asked a
learned Armenian if the Enghsh really knew God. ** Cer-
tainly ; they are Protestants." ** Are Protestants Chris-
tians?*' ** Of course; they acknowledge Christ.'* ** But
are they Christians like your people?" **Not exactly;
they are a sort of Christians." ** Ah — I understand : the
Persians are a sort of Mussulmans."

In the evening we left Trebizond, and next morning
landed the remainder of our troops at Batoom. We
found the houses occupied before the war by the French
and English consuls receptacles for invalids from the
camp at Tchuruk-sou. They were full of intermittent
fever and dysentery cases. The surgeon, a Hanoverian,
himself bearing the impress of the climate, complained
of the normal want of bark — the essential drug. After
many representations, he added, the medical board had
recently sent him an ounce of the sulphate of quinine.
Batoom was then garrisoned by 800 regular troops, and
as many Georgian Bashi-bazouks ; an athletic set of lads

INVALID TROOPS AT BATOOM. 171

appropriately attired iu native costume, armed with rifles,
pistols, and camas, and habituated by the habits of border
life to the varieties of military toil and devices. Two of
them, remarkably handsome youths, were in chains for
manslaughter, and were evidently not thought worse of
for it by their comrades. Their leader Achmet Bey, the
representative of an ancient family of Asia Minor, the
Khasnedar-oglous, differed from them in appearance only
by a cashmere vest and by handsomer mounted pistols.
He was a fine specimen of that race of nobles, the Dere-
beys, whose extinction or depression into unimportance
formed part of the late Sultan Mahmoud's policy. His
wife, also of gentle descent, with a family of six children,
was residing with him.

At Tchuruk-sou, a few miles to the northward, we
found the bulk of the troops under canvas, in sad plight
from unusually wet weather. Many of the men had no
great -coats, few had blankets, but each had a sedjadeh
(prayer-rug). Fire-wood was scarce, and meat only pro-
curable about once a w^eek on the average. The state of
the roads and the penury of the military chest deterred
the peasantry from bringing supplies to camp. A diet of
biscuit and pilaff, seasoned occasionally by a taste of meat,
with scanty clothing under canvas in winter, soon deterior-
ates the best constitution. A long hut had been erected
for the sick, but wanting stoves it w^as only a degree
warmer than a tent. Warmth is at once the cheapest
and most efficient restorative as well as the surest pre-
ventive of sickness, and is more necessary in Turkey than
in any other part of the temperate zone. The upper and
middle classes fastidiously wrap themselves in furs, and
the lower classes, hardy as they are, dread chills with

172 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

reason, seeing their fatal effects on man and beast in a
variable inflammatory climate. Nevertheless, in the face
of general conviction, the Turkish troops and sailors have
been exposed to wet and cold since the formation of the
nizatrif as though their natures had become changed by
enrolment.

In clothing its troops after a sorry European fashion,
the Porte erred philosophically and financially. Much
of the sickness of the army and navy since 1830 may
be ascribed to the abandonment of the sash, turban
and bag trowsers, worn by the natives from their infancy.
Many recruits never became used to the privation ; they
remained sickly, and generally died — the practice of
invaliding being of recent date — before the expiration
of their term of service. The sash protects the loins and
abdomen, chief inducts of disease, and supports the frame.
The turban may be unrolled in the bivouack, to envelope
the face or encircle the throat as well as the head ; and
on the march it may be arranged as the wearer hkes, to
screen his eyes from dust and wind. The bag trowsers
and loose-sleeved vest facilitate the blood's circulation in
sleep. In the old infantry dress, seen in the museum of
ancient costumes at Constantinople, a man could march
lightly, breathe freely, and sleep comfortably ; the desi-
derata which ought to predominate in the mind of every
designer of a military garb. The reigning Sultan, Abdul
Aziz Khan, soon after his accession sagaciously flattered
the national taste and increased with self-respect the
efficiency of his troops, by the re-adoption of an oriental-
cut uniform. In other respects also his Majesty's super-
vision has improved their condition, especially in regard
of the quaUty of their food and raiment.

TRAINING OF TURKISH SOLDIERS. 173

The foreigner, ignoraut of the ways of the land,
wonders how Turkish soldiers manage to serve and fight
through a campaign under privations more than enough
to lay up European troops in a week. His pointer,
Bollo, would, if gifted with speech, moralize in a similar
strain about his fellow quadrupeds, the flea-ridden,
garbage-fed scavengers of Turkish towns. One explana-
tion will serve for both. Weak infants and weak puppies,
as a rule, in Turkey die; such as survive the ordeal
of infancy or puppihood are sound in wind and Umb,
patient of summer sun or wintiy blasts. We will leave
the canine bpecimen in the enjoyment of his hberty,
from which a soft rug with daily caresses and chicken-
bones would not tempt him, — the redeeming point of
his character, — and consider the training of the human
specimen afterwards, of that valuable class from which
soldiers are drawn. The Turkish peasant lad, who has
known a mother's love but never maternal care, and
whose father places more faith in the imam's nooskha
(charm) than the hekim's skill, tends sheep or cuts
wood on the hills all day in all weathers. In the evening
he returns to the paternal hut, says his prayers after
ablution, devours his meal off a wooden platter, washing
it down with cold water, repeats his prayers, and then lies
down, dressed, in a comer to sleep. In summer and
autumn a few years later he sleeps out with his sheep ;
leading them from pasturage to pasturage, or to market,
which may be three weeks' march distant. He is early
taught deference for rank and age. Obedience is an
instinct under Oriental rule. Resignation to what-
ever may happen is indelibly impressed on his mind.
He is familiar with the company of fleas. Ramazan

174 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

has accustomed him to bear hunger and thirst with
cheerfulness. The ofk-repeated tale of the pilgrimage
to Mecca, the caravan hurrying on day and night, leaving
its dying and dead on the road, gives him a vivid idea of
the forced march of an army. He is therefore physically
and morally prepared for militaiy life, its hardships and
self-denial. The soldier's first lessons, elsewhere irksome,
come easy to •him. Genuflexion, prostration, and reve-
rent gesticulation several times a day under a roof or
the sky, alone or in company, have given him supple-
ness, and command of his Umbs. The warlike Prophet
in making naniaz (prayers) a gymnastic exercise may
have had mihtary organization in view. Any after-
noon during Kamazan in any popular mosque at Con-
stantinople may be seen many hundreds of individuals
of all degrees performing in several ranks their complex
namaz together, the imam giving the time, with a
precision and uniformity scarcely attained by the highest
trained troops. Put muskets in their hands, you think,
and there would be a battalion of soldiers.

Neglected, in comparison with the army of the
Danube, the troops on the eastern shore of the Black
Sea and in Armenia were essentially good. All they
asked for was bread and gunpowder. They were nerved
by their Prophet's promises. Mohammed said, — '* The
sword is the key of heaven : a drop of blood shed in
action, or a night passed under arms, is more meritorious
than two months of fasting and prayer. Who dies in
battle his sins are pardoned." Europeans in Turkey,
during the late war, fancied the moraU of the troops
affected by arrears of pay. There never was a greater
mistake. When men are inspired by a sentiment

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ENGLISH AKMY. 175

such considerations are of little account ; for proof of
which we need only look back to the attitude of British
sailors in the Napoleonic war, when with deferred pay,
they were ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-treated.

Attention anywhere to the comfort and solace of
national defenders is of modern date. The Royal Family
has the merit of the initiative in England : the Duke
of York with one, the Duke of Clarence with the other
service;* and in more recent times the solicitude of
the Prince Consort for the well-being of the army
has been exemplary. Few imagine the extent of naval
improvement in one generation. One must have served
for that since the general peace during that period, after
the necessity had ceased, when a ship's company, with-
out excitement or prize-money, received no pay abroad.
Ships were then floating prisons, with scanty fare and
tiresome work. Gazing wistfully on green hills and gay
towns, the men had no leave given them ; tantalized
by the sight of boat-loads of fruit, they had not where-
with to buy a banana or an orange. The prayer-book,
the articles of war and an old song- book were their
library ; a jig on the forecastle, a yarn on the booms
and a bathe occasionally alongside, were their recrea-
tions. Their diet consisted chiefly of biscuit and salt
meat at sea, varied with suet pudding on banyan days ;
biscuit and fresh beef, boiled with cabbage, in harbour,
the liquid being dignified with the name of soup. Sick

* The administration of the navy by the Lord High Admiral, the
Dake of Clarence, was signalized by three important measures : — 1.
The abolition of banyan days : 2. The exemption of petty oificers
from the lash : 8. The appointment of commanders (second captains)
to line-of-battle ships.

176 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

or well they had no more enticing food ; and but for the

nourishment sent from the captain's and the officers'

tables many men would have died of inanition after

fever. And finally, on their return home, they were

compelled, as it were, through the way things were

arranged in the seaports in those days, to spend their

wearily earned three years' pay in as many weeks.

Malaria in summer and autumn, and humidity in

winter and spring, have always rendered Batoom and

adjoining districts an objectionable station ; and as soon

as the alUes commanded the Black Sea, troops ceased

to be necessary there. But having taken Shekvetel, a

small place on the Russian bank of the Tchoolook-sou,

and subsequently Redout Kaleh, the Porte, to preserve

those trophies, stationed peimanently on a marshy coast

several thousand regulars, with as many Bashi-bazouks,

and on its own men failing, sent there the Tunisian

contingent.* Too many for the defence of places

unlikely to be attacked by the enemy in awe of steamers'

guns, they were too few for serious operations inland.

Selim Pasha marched from Tchuruk-sou in June, 1854,

to dislodge tlie Russians from Uzughetti. At first fortune

favoured him. Two battalions of Georgian militia and

many Poles came over to his side. But he afterwards

fell into an ambuscade, and got routed, with the loss of

fourteen guns; whereupon, suspecting treachery, he

ordered several Georgians and Poles to be treated as

spies.

* The Tunisian contingent consisted of 7,000 infantry, 2,000
cavalry, and 1,000 artillerymen. 4,200 died at Batoom, 2,000 were
invalided there; 8,800 remained in March, 1866, and returned to
Tunis in the Tunisian squadron, which had brought them to the theatre
of war.

THE FAISI-BARI IN THE BLACK SEA. 177

On our return voyage from Batoom to Sinope a
westerly gale dispersed the squadrons. With that wind,
the Black Sea becomes suddenly disturbed, as by the
up-heaving of an earthquake. In tlieir caprice the
waves washed away in the first hour the rudder of
the Faisi'bari ; the loss being revealed to us by the
steamer's deep rolling, coupled with the helmsman's excla-
mation, ** She won't steer!" in answer to a reproof.
A more distressing accident could not have befallen us
— distressing under any circumstances, but particularly
in a ship ill provided for such a contingency. The
water rushing through the stern windows flooded the
cabin and main deck ; and shot, 32 and 84 pounders,
escaping from their racks, rolled about, imperilUng the
legs of every one on deck, till penned up in comers by
hammocks and coils of rope. Our crew became, as
usual, affected by sea-sickness. With difficulty, in the
face of that leveller of distinctions, we roused hands
enough to fasten in the dead-hghts and additionally
secure the revolving guns. Our blue-lights and rockets
of distress burned to no purpose, for when morning
broke, after an anxious night, we found ourselves alone.
A rudderless paddle-steamer is unmanageable, caring no
more for her sails than for so many pocket-handkerchiefs.
With moderate weather she steams head to wind ; with
bad weather she keeps the wind abeam, labouring in the
trough of the sea.

In the morning, the sea falling enabled us to steam
head to wind to the westward as far as the meridian of
Sinope. The gale then freshening up again, the vessel
fell oflf as before into the trough of the sea, but this time
with her head towards the Crimea. Notwithstanding that

178 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

direction, we felt compelled to let the cranks slowly revolve
from time to time to relieve the " scend " of the vessel,
which her doubtful condition made apprehensive, and to
mitigate her roUing, which threatened, in the opinion of
her engineers, to distort the frame of her engine. A
one-gim Russian vessel dancing on the tops of the
waves would have had her way of us ; we could not have
cast loose a gun. Our efforts to turn the vessel's head
to the southwards proved unavailing : we worked the
port paddle with the head sails set, then the starboard
paddle with the after sails set; we could not make it
deviate two points either way. She would neither face
nor recede from the wind, but remained a log in the
hollow of the sea. Two of our consorts, a steam frigate
and a steam corvette, passed us successively on the
second evening, steering. for Sinope. The former dis-
regarded our signals, the latter obeyed them, and
remained by us till 10 p.m. ; then, apprehending we
should require assistance beyond her means to afford,
(so her captain averred in excuse,) she also made off out
of the gale for Sinope, the rendezvous of the allied
squadron. Much vexed at her defection, which filled the
measure of our crew's discouragement, we consoled our-
selves with the expectation of seeing a friendly steamer,
perhaps under another flag, alongside of us in the
course of next day.

Hassan Pasha, the port admiral of Sinope, — who
in the Grecian war of independence made a running
fight, in which he was wounded, and taken prisoner,
with the HellaSy commanded by Lord Cochrane, — when
informed of the Faisi-han's situation, got under way in
a steam frigate to proceed to her relief ; but on finding

"AIDE TOI, ET LE CIEL T'AIDERA." 179

the sea run higher in the offing than he expected, gave up
the attempt and returned to the anchorage ; whereupon
Hambdi Pasha, the governor of Sinope, applied to the
commander of the allied squadron for aid. The gallant
admiral courteously expressed concern for the Faisi-bari's
distress, but excused himself from sending one of his
steamers to her succour, out of consideration for the
Turkish steamers in port ; to whom, he said, the honour
of succouring their countrymen of right belonged. So,
between inaptitude on the one and delicacy on the other
hand, we might, in our character of a ** known friend in
distress," have fared badly, had we not at last succeeded
in rigging a paddle over the taffrail fit to steer a
1600 ton steamer with. Our previous attempt in that
line had failed through miscalculation of resistances.
We had fancied ourselves able to manoeuvre the paddle
with the vessel in motion on an arc of a circle, and
retain it at the required angle by hauling on the quarter
and counter tackles fitted to it ; in the course of which
the apparatus gave way. Taught by experience, we
secured the second paddle at a given angle with the keel
first; then, letting on steam, gradually brought the
vessel round against the sea. When nearly head to
wind, several deep plunges checked her way and made
it doubtful her passing the critical point. After some
minutes of anxious suspense she passed it. The jib was
then run up, and as she paid off, gathering fresh way
with the wind and sea drawing aft, her crew with one voice
gave thanks to Allah ; while their captain — who, giving
the affair up as a bad job, had predicted the rupture of the
second as well as of the first paddle, — capered for joy on
the quarter-deck as nimbly as his obesity would allow

12—2

180 TURKEY AND THE CBIMEAN WAR.

We were now at ease, with our prow in the right
direction. We worked our strained paddle tenderly;
we aided its action by varying the speed of the engines,
and heeling the ship to port or starboard as needful by
shifting weights ; and, making thus a course, we rejoined
our friends at Sinope in the middle of the third night.

The pintals of the rudder-post having been drawn,
the Sinope yard could do no more, through want of a
dock, than replace the Faisi-bans extemporized paddle
with another, stouter, built on the same model. The
boatswain of H.M.'s Sans Fareil assisted us to rig it with
his runners and tackles ; then, in tow of another steamer,
we returned to the Bosphorus without further mishap on
the 22nd February, 1854.

( 181 )

CHAPTER XIII.

Drifting into War — Insurrection of the Greeks, headed hy Karaskaiki
— Not supported by Russia — Policy of the Emperor Nicholas and
the Empress Catherine — Repressive Measures of the Porte — The
Egj-ptian Contingent — The Greeks calmed by Fuad Efendi —
Hellenists banished by the Porte — Impolicy of that Measure —
Intervention of the French Ambassador — General Baraguay
d*Hilliers threatens to leave Constantinople — The Allies intervene
in Greece — Indignation of King Otho and his Queen — The Hel-
lenist warfare beyond the Frontier of Greece — Successes of the
Ottomans at Czetat<> and Karakal — Turkish Enthusiasm — Call for
the Bashi-bazouks — Their Arrival at Scutari — Reviewed by the
Seraskir at Constantinople — Their picturesque Costumes — Bashi-
bazouks headed by a female Chieftain — Sensation caused by Kara
Fatima — She is received by the Seraskir — Popular Delusion as to
the value of the Bashi-bazouk — Their Ideas.

Events were then rapidly marching in the teeth of
diplomacy. The pen was giving way to the sword.
With words of peace still on their lips, and irresolution
in their hearts, the statesmen of the West were nerving
themselves for the responsibilities of war. They had
lacked the moral courage to adopt frankly the means to
preserve peace, and had allowed themselves, quoting
their own words, to drift into war. Greece overcame
their last lingering hesitation. She thought the days
of the Ottoman monarchy numbered ; she claimed as
her inheritance the imperial crown of Byzantium. The
Thessalians and Epirotes, excited by a recent pressure
for arrears of taxation, rose in arms ; the Hseteria

^^ TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

d^uu^l iixo flame, and Hellas aspired to profit by the
w^v^vt^Mout, Headed by Karaskaiki, son of the pahkar
svf that name, distinguished in the war of independence,
^ luuly of Hellenists crossed the frontier, unavowed, but
ohtH>rod on by the Hellenic court and nation. This was
i\\{\ disturbing element on which Kussia, not misled by
1 1 or agents, had counted ; and which, wanting boldness
for the occasion, she failed to support. Had she sent
20,000 men and a few batteries by sea to the Gulf of
IJourgas — an easy feat, with the alUed fleets in the
Bosphorus — the insurrection might have attained for-
midable dimensions. Successor to the poUcy of the
Empress Catherine, the Emperor Nicholas had not
inherited her sagacious daring.

Instinctively alive to the danger of a raya movement,
the Porte comprehended the necessity .of eiiergetic
measures of repression, tempered to European pro-
clivities. Two battaUons, with a field battery, were forth-
with despatched to Prevesa, to relieve Arta, then besieged
by the insurgents. Four battalions, in part for that
destination, followed them out of the Golden Horn a
few days later ; and Abbas Pasha, having furnished on
demand a second contingent of 9,000 troops — who disem-
barked at Constantinople, blue with cold after a deck
passage of a few days from Alexandria — 4,000 of them
were sent on immediately to Volo ; where they landed,
three weeks after the date of the appUcation to Egypt
for further aid, in time to disconcert a projected attack
on that place. Part of that force, on its march thence
some time afterwards to Yeni Scheyr, was surprised by a
body of Hellenists in the pass of Kalabocca, and nearly
cut to pieces. Its guns and tents were afterwards re-

THE GREEKS REPRESSED BY THE PORTE. 183

captured by Abdi Pasha. Fuad Efendi went, in the
course of spring, as imperial commissioner to the dis-
turbed districts, with instnictions to calm the eflFervescence
as much as possible by conciliation, and use force only
when that failed ; in which service he displayed his usual
ability and much personal courage. Enlisting the zeal
of the Moslems of Epirus on the side of order, he
cajoled the rayas into quietude by promises (disavowed
by the Porte) of remission of arrears of taxes ; and thus
the conflagration was before long confined mainly to
Thessaly, where it smouldered, flaring up occasionally
with brands thrown across the Grecian frontier.

Justly irritated by the disloyal attitude of the
Hellenic Government, the Porte decreed the banishment
from the Ottoman territory, within a limited period, of
all Hellenic subjects. This decree was at once harsh
and impolitic. The social distinction between Hellenists
in Turkey, many of whom are natives with Greek pass-
ports, and Greek rayas, is shadowy, especially in the
provinces. They are united by language, religion,
habits, and sympathies. They intermarry. Their pur-
suits are similar. Hence exile would amount to severance
from their friends and interests. Where could they go ?
They would go to Greece. They would embitter by
their tale and by the aspect of their privations the anti-
Turkish feeUng there, and the ardent would swell the
ranks of Karaskaiki. The French ambassador timely
interposed his influence, though not on the broad ground
of humanity. Taking a sectarian view of the case,
General Baraguay d'Hilliers claimed, in virtue of
France's right to protect the Roman Catholic religion in
the East, exemption in favour of CathoUc Hellenists;

184 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

dismissing from his mind her formal surrender of that
assamed right in regard of Hellenists, on the estabUsh-
ment of the kingdom of Greece. The Porte, in a
dignified reply, disclaimed all ideas of wishing to mix up
religion with a police measure. The gallant general
took offence. He threatened to leave Constantinople in
three days if his demands were not complied with ; and
as he showed himself in earnest — his earnestness repre-
senting Kedshid Pasha's fall or his own departure — it was
deemed prudent to depute the seraskir to wait on and
endeavour to pacify him. Better annul the decree, than
allow the French ambassador to depart in dudgeon at so
critical a conjuncture. Meanwhile Lord Stratford de
RedcUffe, anticipating his colleague's success, claimed,
as a diplomatic counterpoise, exemption for Hellenists
connected with mercantile houses in England. In the
end a compromise was made, whereby virtually the
befriended and rich, who might work mischief, remained ;
the friendless, chiefly provincials, were exiled.*

While the Porte successfully dealt with domestic
insurrection, England and France undertook to keep
their spoiled child, Hellas, in order, with trotps in
Attica. King Otho, who, having accepted frankly la
grande idee^ deserved better treatment than he afterwards
received from his subjects, was indignant at this infringe-
ment of his sovereign rights ; Queen Amahe wept at being
rudely woke out of a dazzUng dream : — and thus ended
the comedy of the Lower Empire, acted with unbounded

* The decree of exile was revoked in 1855. Within a year after
the Peace of Paris more than a hundred of the exiled Roumeliote families
retamed to Turkey; their example having been followed since by
about seventy Thessalian families, chiefly natives of Phthiotis.

THE BASHI-BAZOUKS. 185

applause at the theatre royal, Athens, in the spring of
1854. Nevertheless the chivalrous Hellenists, nothing
daunted by the grecophobia of the Western Powers,
continued the war beyond the frontier against unpro-
. tected villages, and indulged themselves in their usual
way at the expense aUke of Moslems and Christians.
Some of them, intent on indoctrinating the monks with
propagandist ideas, crossed the water to Mount Athos ;
but cut oflf from reinforcements by the vigilance of the
Turkish JEgesLXi squadron, they got only prayers and
absolution for their pains, with free quarters in the
monastery of Zographo.

On the Danube, fortune also smiled on the Ottomans.
Brilliant successes at Czetate and Karakal showed that
their right hand had not forgotten its cunning. All
combined to excite enthusiasm throughout the empire
for " God and the Sultan." Benevolences of money and
horses flowed in from various quarters. Ladies made up
military under-clothing in their harems ; and the mis-
taken call for Bashi-bazouk was rapturously responded
to. The Bashi-bazouk — whom the Porte, not always
keeping faith with them, agreed to furnish with rations
for man and horse — left their districts in bands of twenty
or thirty at a time, and traversed Asia Minor ; living at
free quarters wherever able. ColUsions occurred between
them and the inhabitants of several villages, reluctant to
comply with their requisitions in the name of the Prophet.
As the gathering began in winter, many companies were
three months on the road, detained occasionally by snow.
On reaching Scutari they used to be quartered for some
days in the SeUmieh barracks, for repose there and purifi-
cation in the baths of the town. Whenever a few hundreds

186 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

were assembled and ready for inspection, they were con-
veyed across the Bosphorus, and paraded tiirough the
streets of Tophana, Galata, and Constantinople, to the
seraskiriat. The seraskir reviewed them and praised
their zeal. The mnfti of the Darishura recited a prayer
for their welfare. Then, elated with the compliments
paid them, they proceeded along Adrianople Street to
the barracks of Eamis Tchifthk, or Daond Pasha, outside
the walls of the city, to enjoy a few more days' kiefmih
full rations at the Sultan's expense, before proceeding to
the frontier. This leisurely progress was calculated to
prevent the passage close upon each other of inconve-
niently numerous bodies of undisciplined armed men, — a
precaution more necessary in Roumelia than in Anatolia.
We saw individuals of all conditious among them,
between the ages of sixteen and sixty, some older. Aged
men, warmed by the enthusiasm of the hour, had disposed
of their lands, and departed for the holy war. They
were attired in the historic garb : sashed and turbaned,
and picturesquely armed with pistols, yataghan and sabre.
Some carried pennoned lances. Each squadron had its
colours and its kettle-drums of the fashion of those, if
not the same, carried by their ancestors who had
marched to the siege of Vienna.

The frequent transit of Bashi-bazouk during the spring
of 1854, made at length the ConstantinopoUtans indifferent
to the motley exhibition, as well as doubtful of the wisdom
of having evoked such gentry from their distant homes.
The Bashi-bazouk, however, from Marash, who arrived
among the latest, revived waning interest. They numbered
about a hundred, all kinsmen, under their chieftainess,
Kara Fatima, a single midJle-aged lady, with a com-

KARA FATIMA AND HER BASIII-BAZ0UK8, 187

plexion tanned by exposure, and a countenance which
indicated self-possession and the habit of command.
From the hour of her arrival at Scutari nobody else was
spoken of in the circles and cafehs of the capital ; and
in hopes of seeing her, the avenues along which she was
expected to pass were crowded several days in anticipa-
tion. The novelty stirred the etiquette of the seraglio
into manifestations of curiosity. When joined by the
Bashi-bazouks from Adana and Eonia, forming altogether
a company of about three hundred, they were crossed
over the water with unusual aquatic honours. Deemed
worthy of an imperial regard, they were landed near the
palace. Thence the streets of Fondouklu, Tophana,
Galata, and Stamboul, with the **new bridge," and
numerous boats lying off on either side, swarmed with
spectators eager to see the amazon. Except on the
passage of the '* sacred camels," laden with the annual
presents for Mecca, from Topcapou Saray to Bakche
Eapousou, one has rarely seen a denser throng in the
streets of Constantinople. Kara Fatima, with an ancient
on either side, rode first, habited in the Damascene
riding attire, and armed with sabre and pistols. Her
Arabian, of pure blood, scarce showed any ill-effects from
his long journey. Her followers rode in pairs after their
lady, bearing themselves with dignity, and evidently
esteeming themselves, as they doubtless were, truer
believers than the spectators ; who seemed highly amused
by the scene, although somewhat scandalized by the
appearance of a Moslem woman unveiled. Arrived at
the seraskiriat, Kara Fatima and her near kinsmen
aUghted, and went upstairs to visit the seraskir. Kiza
Pasha received them courteously. He invited them to

188 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

be seated on a row of chairs, in front of his sofa. He
regaled them with coflFee ; but did not vouchsafe the pipe
to provincials. After an interchange of compliments,
they took leave with profound salaams, the lady alone
kissing the hem of the functionary's garment. She re-
mounted at the foot of the stairs ; her followers gathered
round her in the square ; the mufti chanted the war
hymn ; they caracoUed in review before the windows of
the divan; and then proceeded joyously on their way
to Daoud Pasha barracks.

The stimulus given to the Bashi-bazouk fever of 1854
was a weak deference to the popular delusion about the
value of such a force. Much mischief, direct and indirect,
ensued; by the withdrawal of hands from agricultural
pursuits, by the unsettlement of men's minds, by idle
consumption of rations, and by the exasperation often
caused by their presence in Christian districts. Fervid
Moslems, taking words in their literal acceptation, the
Bashi-bazouks were not always capable of restricting the
sense of the expression, "holy war." With them, non-
Mohammedans were all in one category of anathema.
They looked to the war as a means of reviving their
waning dominancy over the rayas : — the latent aspiration
of the nation.

( 189 )

CHAPTER XIV.

Attitade of Austria — She is invited to arm against Eassia — Her
ignoble Policy — The Western Powers shew no Sign of Earnestness
— Sir John Burgoyne arrives at Constantinople — His Measures —
Their Effect on the Turks — Russian Policy in War — Best Course
for the Western Powers — ^Military Force of Turkey — How this
Force might have been best used — The Turkish Army — Its former
Organization — Its recent Alterations — The Soup-Kettles of the
Turkish Army in old Times — The ancient Turkish Naval System
— Reply of a Mufti on the Question of Foreign Aid — Secret of
former Independence of Turkey — Machiavelli on Foreign Auxiliaries
— The Allied Fleets leave Beikos — A ** Benevolence *' resorted
to at Constantinople — Spontaneous Contributions of the Provinces
— Sickness in the Army on the Danube — Deficiency of Medical
Stores at Schumla, Rudshuk, and other Garrisons — ^Fraud and
Venality — Inferior Quality of the Supplies — Fraudulent Con-
tractory — Tenderness for such Characters immoral — Gravity of
their Offences.

While Turkey was contending alone with Kussia,
Austria, menaced by the press and courted by the
governments of Western Europe, maintained an ex-
pectant attitude. The only resolve she betrayed was,
by concentrating an army in the Bannat, in February,
1854, to be prepared to have, at all events, a voice in
the fortunes of the Danubian PrincipaKties. France and
England had estimated Austria's morality by a low
standard. They invited her to arm against Kussia— the
Kussia who had saved her in 1849. They expected her

190 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

to forget that debt ; to forget also the manifestation of
their sympathies with the Italians and Hungarians during
that season of trouble. We may not ascribe Austria's
soothing deceptive poUcy in 1854 to a sense of gratitude
alone — as much of that, as weighed in the balance, was
nearly allied to apprehension; but we regret, for the
honour of human nature, her not having pleaded Russia's
assistance in her hour of need in bar of the Western
Powers' pretensions. The plea would have been unpala-
table, as the assertion of a moral principle in poUtics
often is ; but it would have raised her in historic esti-
mation. She would still have occupied the same position,
but with self-respect and Russia's esteem. As it was,
she endured the misery, without "the pride, pomp, and
circumstance of glorious war." Forty thousand of her
army of observation in Galicia are said to have perished
of disease. Nevertheless, Austria's desire for the main-
tenance of peace — seeing the tendencies of Italy — was so
ardent, that, with the best intentions towards Russia,
she would, as the surest means of preserving it, have
joined the league, in expectation of Russia yielding to the
imminence of the danger, could she have discerned in
the demeanour of the Western Powers an earnest of the
will to strike hard while the foe was unprepared. She
evinced this disposition later at Varna. But neither
France nor England gave signs of earnest purpose. The
idea — unshared by Austria — was abroad, that Russia's
power was factitious ; that her extended dominion had
been obtained by fraud ; that, in the scornful language
of the day, she was a sheet of paper to be crumpled up
with one hand.

The first visible and palpable' sign of impending war

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE AT CONSTANTINOPLE. 191

on the part of the Western Powers, was the appearance
of General Sir John Burgoyne at Constantinople, as
eclaireur for the British Government, He enjoyed a
high reputation ; hut it had heen acquired forty years
earlier in the Peninsula. Having fixed on Gallipoli, as
a proper place for the allied troops destined for the East
to disembark at, with the view of ** obtaining a sure base
of operations against any Russian force which might
hereafter move upon Constantinople, or against any
direct attack on that city ; " and having recommended
fortifying the Isthmus of the Chersonesus, he went to
Bulgaria, to gather notions about the army of the Danube.
Accustomed to associate valour and discipline with
stocks and shoe-brushes, he discerned no merit in the
barenecked slipshod Turkish soldiers. Versed in the
mysteries of Vauban, he looked upon the modest redoubts
of Schumla and Silistria as little better than toys. It
seemed to unprofessional people overcautious in the
Allies commencing war by entrenching themselves at
Gallipoli while the Russians were on the left bank of the
Danube. It was calculated neither to deter the Czar by
the prospect of energetic hostility, nor to encourage the
Porte by the hope of zealous co-operation. Then reflect-
ing Turks began to doubt the wisdom of Turkey having
rejected the last chance of peace. But they were few :
the nation had embarked in war, and was for seeing it
out. The selection of so distant a base of operations
betrayed inattention to the incidents of the war of 1828-29.
Even then, with Turkey just emerged from an exhausting
civil strife, and shaken to her centre by the throes of a
social Moslem revolution, Russia had required two arduous
campaigns to cross the Balkans.

192 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The idea had been entertained of a Eussian division
crossing the Danube above Kalafat, to excite the Slavjic
races in Northern Turkey; but although those locally
misinformed, making hght of the seldom beUed tenacity
of Turkish troops, may have let their fancy outrun their
judgment, the Powers interested, even if believing it
feasible, felt guaranteed by Kussia's doubt of Austria's
neutrality from such bold strategy : little, moreover,
in accordance with her genius. Kussia had never in
the course of her history seized victory by the fore-
lock, and had rarely commenced war under favourable
auspices. Unskilfully or unseasonably attacked, she had
either evolved victory out of defeats, or, by an opportune
peace, had retired a pace for a surer leap next time.
Taught by that lesson. Western Europe should have
commenced by striking heavy discouraging blows ; which
react from matter on mind, are difficult to rally under,
and which in our days of publicity and rapid transmission
of news produce on public opinion tenfold the eflFect
producible when official despatches were the meagre
record of passing events. That might have been accom-
plished by giving Turkey a principal, not a subordinate,
part in the general war.

Turkey, when her allies were thinking of entrenching
themselves in the Chersonesus of Thrace, possessed
150,000 troops under arms, with good artillery, the third
division of redif in reserve, and 50,000 irregulars. Since
170 years she had not made so imposing a display. Her
army had been collected silently and unostentatiously. It
stood to its arms without fear of punishment, or hope of
reward ; but wanting a regular commissariat and organized
hospitals and depots — living from hand to mouth, so to

THE TURKISH ARMY. 193

speak— with no confidence in the administration, it was
an army for the occasion. Enthusiasm creates but
cannot maintain an army unaided by activity and success.
" Forward ! " should have been its motto. If rightly
informed of the position in the spring of 1854, the Allies
would have turned to account the energies of that devoted,
afterwards contemned, army. Profiting by its enthu-
siasm and facile locomotion, they would have sent their
own troops — detained first at GalUpoli, next at Constan-
tinople — at once to Bulgaria, to give it moral support ;
and, if necessarj^ act by it the part of the Grecian
auxiliaries of old with the Persian armies. Unincumbered
by baggage, careless of comforts, patient under privations,
it was just the force to co-operate with that novel and
tremendous instrument of war, a steam fleet. While
embarking 20,000 European troops, you might embark,
convey 200 miles, and disembark 40,000 Turkish troops,
in fewer vessels.

I speak of the Turkish army of 1854 relatively. I do
not compare it, in its relation to contemporary armies,
with its predecessors, whose battle-fields were in Hungary.
The conditions were dissimilar. Halting between two
systems — one dear to the nation, the other foreign to its
instincts — the Turkish army no longer possessed the
organization long peculiar to itself, which had rendered it
often victorious over the imperialists in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and redoubtable to the Russians in
the eighteenth century ; and it had not acquired the
nerve of modem European armies — a body of high-bred
disciplined officers influenced by honour, for whom death
is preferable to shame. In former days, when Turkey
was a vast camp, when every gentleman and yeoman

194 TUKKEY AND THE CRniEAN WAR.

slept with arms by his side and horses saddled in their
stables, its military organization included special corps
not admitting of improvisation, which give coherence to
an army, and round which newly raised troops rally with
confidence. Besides the enrolled Janissaries, the artillery,
the bostandgis, and the yamaks, there were the djibedgis,
guards of the reserve ammunition and the baggage, each
man acquainted with a handicraft; the mounted tchiaushes,
for police and courier service ; the laghumdgis (miners) ;
and the arabadgis, artillery and waggon drivers, composed
of Bulgarians. When sick and wounded were left to
fate, hospitals were supererogatory.

In puerile dread of every usage reminiscent of
Janissaryism, i. e. of Ottomanism, in servile admiration
of every European fashion, Turkey abandoned much of
what was suitable in its own system and borrowed much
of the unsuitable from Europe ; and— singular coinci-
dence — while travestying itself, Europe took up many of
its cast-oflf habits. Its military garb, with slight variation,
has been adopted by France for her zouaves, and will
probably become the pattern for all armies ; cannon of
large calibre (of Turkish origin) are now cast in the
foundries of every state ; transport, army works, and
police corps, in other days exclusively Turkish, are now
considered essential by eveiy war office ; and the short
stirrups and high saddle of the East, obviative of sore
backs, are beginning to be faintly recognized us augment-
ing the rider's power over his weapon and steed. By
engrafting modern instruction and tactics on her ancient
system, reformed, Turkey would have united the
strength of two eras without the weakness of either.
One feature of the ancient system — a solecism in

THE TURKISH NAVY. 195

military practice — merits special notice. The soup-
kettles of the Turkish armies, second only in value
to the soldiers' weapons, did the duty of colours in
other armies. Invested by military philosophy with
the ideal value attached elsewhere to intrinsically
useless emblems, they were rallied round with devotion,
and the loss of any of them stigmatized the company to
which they had belonged.

Similar remarks apply to the navy. The galiondji
system,* at once solid and elastic, admitting of improve-
ment in every sense to meet modem exigencies, har-
monized with national habits and was singularly adapted
for a navy restrictively employed on its own coasts.

Many orthodox Turks, desirous of naval, averted their
eyes from the prospect of military, co-operation. The
Sheick ul Islam expressing disinclination to it, and his
assent being necessary, he was deposed and replaced by
the mufti of the military council. The new head of the law
answered allegorically the pregnant question, ** Shall we

♦ The galioiidjis, in their latter days about 5,000 in number, were
a permanently enrolled body at Constantinople of seamen-gunners and
seamen. The married men went to their homes at night, the bachelors
lived in barracks. They received each a ration, clothes, and about
thirteen shillings a month. When a line-of-battle ship, for example,
fitted out, two master gunners, each with a crew vaiying from sixty to
eigiity men, a bashrais (boatswain) with a crew of about eighty men, a
sail-maker and crew, were sent on board from the galiondji depot, with
artificers from the dockyard. The remainder of the crew was drawn from
the merchant service without regard to a man's religion, and as a cniise
rarely lasted above three months, volunteers were always foi-thcoming.
When the fleet fitted out it was manned by proclamation from the
sea-bordering towns. The defect of the system lay in the somewhat
exclusive control of the master -gunner and boatswain over their re-
spective crews, which affected the captain's authority and impaired
discipline.

IB -2

196 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

avail ourselves of foreign troops ? " *' Hunters/' he was
reported to have said, " take dogs with them to pursue
their game.'* The learned man had doubtless studied
the Koran, but he certainly had not read the fable of
Actaeon. The prudence of the step, in a Turkish point
of view, was doubtful. It was breaking a charm. The
secret of Turkey's independence and greatness had been
her isolation and her self-sustaining pride. Turkey had
fought alone with Kussia for above a century. She had
fought unsuccessfully, had been defeated, had surrendered
territory, but had never lost confidence in herself.
Casting the blame of defeat on ignorant pashas, on want
of concert, on a vicious administration, she had neither
felt nor admitted organic weakness. MachiaveUi, in his
treatise on war, says : ** Let a prince or a republic deter-
mine on anything rather than on calling in auxiliary
troops, and above all let him or it beware of placing him-
self or itself at their discretion. Any treaty with his or
its enemy, any concession however onerous, will be less
fatal to him or it than this measure."

A French and an English war-steamer gave proof of
their governments being at last in earnest by embarking,
towards the end of March, two battalions of Turkish rifle*
men for conveyance to Varna ; an imperial commissioner
proceeded the same day to the Hellespont to be ready to
welcome the allied troops on their arrival in Turkey ; and
two days afterwards the allied fleets again left Beikos ;
this time for Baltchik, to wait there the expected
declaration of war by England and France. The allied
admirals declined the company of any Turkish vessel,
and virtually ignored the Turkish fleet by refusing to
exchange recognition signals w^itli it ; assigning, in excuse

A " BENEVOLENCE." 197

for their unsociability, the necessity of its continuance in
the Bosphorus for the defence of Constantinople.

About that time a council of Ulema and dignitaries
was convened for the purpose of raising a ** benevolence"
from the civil, military, and naval authorities of the
state above the rank of colonel, and from the wealthy
denizens of the capital. Hithei:to Constantinople had
escaped this test of patriotism, while warmly applauding
provincial liberality. Although termed voluntary, the
gifts were often involuntary. Lists of names were
circulated by authority, and no one ventured to signalize
himself by writing down less than the expected sum ;
which, in the case of officers and employes, amounted
to about ten days' pay. Flag and general officers and
civilians of equivalent rank had already, during nine
months, surrendered one-fifth of their pay to the trea-
sury. In the provinces *' benevolence " seemed more
spontaneous than in the capital. Some lists, including
sums from 100 to 10,000 piastres, indicated general
contributory concurrence.* None, however, could escape
the ordeal. Certain districts, remiss in responding to
the appeal, were long afterwards invited to pay up
arrears. Gradually, as enthusiasm weaned, benevolence
degenerated into requisition. Even the favoured capital
was called upon for a second ** benevolence " in the
winter of 1854-55, for hirkas (wadded vests) for the
troops at Eupatoria. The benevolent were rewarded by
the pubUcation of the subscription lists in the Turkish

* During the years 1854-55, the inhahitants of part of Turkey
gave in money, under the head of ianl nmoumie (benevolence),
about 1,500,000/. ; and in kind, as horses, cattle, com, oil, &c., they
furnished supplies gratis to an equal amount.

198 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

newspapers. Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, Albanian, and
Bosnian names grated harshly on the ears of the
euphonious -tongued Constantinopolitans ; who thus
learned the heterogeneity of the Moslem population of
the empire. By such means, in aid of the ordinary
revenue, by a capitation tax of twenty piastres on males,
by paying for supplies with promissory notes, by borrow-
ing the orphans' fund, and by holding back more or less
the pay of the public services, the Porte tided over the
lirst year without a foreign loan.

But all was not rose-coloured. While fairly supplied
for the shock of arms, the army of the Danube was in
other respects ill off; sickness and other privations had,
during the winter, decimated the garrisons along the
Danube. The medical commission sent from Constanti-
nople to the frontier in the spring of 1854 reported
unsatisfactorily. At Schumla, the quarters of 25,000
men, they found only 200 drachms of sulphate of
quinine, and a scarcity of lint, tourniquets, and bandages;
similar deficiencies existed everywhere ; and Rudschuk,
garrisoned by 7,000 men, possessed no instrument for
extracting a ball. The discrepance between the amount
of medical stores charged to the Government and the
amount in camp argued venality somewhere. The army
surgeons declared that their stores never reached them
in the amount stated. Their detractors affirmed that
they trafficked with them for their own benefit. I do not
pretend to adjust the balance, nor would the attempt be
worth the trouble ; but I may say that, whatever doubts
may have existed about the quantity, none has existed
about the inferior quality of the medicines suppUed to
the armies. A similar reproach appUes to their food and

BAD MEDiaNES, FOOD AND CLOTHIXG. 199

clothing ; most of the pasterma (dried meat) sent to the
troops at Eupatoria in 1855 had to he thrown to the
dogs. Unholy gains were made from such sources, with
which honours were purchased as well as houses. No
supplies issued from the stores in the capital reached
their destination in their integity. Bullion made no
exception to the rule; twenty millions of piastres
(180,000/.) of the sums sent in 1853-54 to the army of
the Danube were never satisfactorily accounted for.

The country where George of Cappadocia — trans-
formed afterwards, according to Gibbon, into "the
renowned St. George of England'' — acquired wealth by
supplying ill-cured bacon to the Roman armies, will
never want apologists for the frauds of contractors nor
panegyrists of their assumed virtues ; and though none,
like the ''infamous George," may hope to attain eccle-
siastical all may aspire to lay honours. At this we
have no right to aflfv3ct surprise. The Eastern Empire,
whether under a Constantine or an Amurath, is in some
respects immutable. But we have a right to feel surprise
at the tenderness of western society for shortcomings
which, setting human considerations on one side, may
lead to national disgrace. Deteriorated medicines baflSe
the physician's skill ; adulterated food and flimsy shoes
disconcert the generaFs strategy. Society brands the
individual who takes arms against his country with the
name of traitor, and shoots him when caught, although
he may never have had the opportunity to point a rusty
firelock at it ; yet refrains from applying the epithet to
traders who undermine the health of their country's
troops fighting her battles, by supplying inferior food and
raiment, and who do not scruple even — relying on the

200 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

indulgence accorded to the misdeeds of capital — to sell
arms and ammunition to her foes. Of those traders —
''all honourable men'* — who sell preserved oflfal and
spurious lime-juice to vessels bound on long voj^ages, we
will only say wdth Dante, '' Guarda e passa!*' Their
sin is grievous. When offences substantially alike shall
be called by one name, the task of legislation will bo
lightened, and society be freed from the danger under-
lying it in the impression — daily gaining strength with
education in men's minds — that crime is measured by
a relative standard.

( 201 )

CHAPTER XV.

The Turkish Fleet eager to enter the Euxine — Employment for it
suggested — Enthusiasm in the Caucasus for the Sultan — How to
profit hy it — Schaniyl niler of Daghestan — His Naib, Mehemed
Emin Efentli, in Circassia — Their opposite Modes of Rule — Their
Policy in regard to the War — The Caucasus the vulnerable Part
of Russia — Mushaver Pasha's Proposal for employing the Turkish
Fleet — How received by the Allied Admirals — An Anglo-French
Expedition to the Caucasian Coast projected — Its Futility — The
Turks best fitted to deal with the Circassians — A Turkish Steamer
asked for to accompany the projected Expedition — Reasons for its
Refusal — Views of the Porte.

During some days following the departure of the allies'
fleets for Baltchik, the Turkish fleet, again alone in the
Bosphorus, felt that kind of relief which is experienced in
a quiet house on the departure of an exacting guest. With
the closing of their friends* slaughter-houses and grog-
shopSjthe air felt purer. But the sensation was transient.
The Black Sea lay hefore them, and all hands sighed to
follow the allies into it. They did not imagine that the
Russians, even if surmising the tenacity of its anchors
wherever they might happen to be dropped, would think
of shpping by the Anglo-French fleet into the Bosphorus
to scare the fair inmates of the harems and ruflSe the
equanimity of the embassies on its banks. Still less did
they give them credit for the bold conception of running
with a choice squadron the gauntlet of the castles of the

202 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Bosphorns during Ramazan — the season of drowsy days
and festive nights ; passing then, under strange colours,
those of the Hellespont, into the Mediterranean, to
intercept French and English transports steering east-
wards, visit their co-religionists in the Ionian islands,
salute Valette at a respectful distance, and finally seek
a neutral port within or without the Straits of Gibraltar.
Tranquil on that head, one of its officers, privileged in
that respect, submitted to the Capitan Pasha a sugges-
tion for the active employment of the Turkish fleet
during the ensuing summer. There was appropriate
work for it on the eastern shore of the Black Sea ; which
the Turks might but which the alUes with the best
intentions could not perform.

The Caucasians were then, like the Moslems of
Turkey, at the boiling-point of enthusiasm for God and
the Sultan. The spirit of Islam, normally lukewarm in
Circassia, in parts tainted with idolatry, was roused, and
for tlie hour rivalled the earnest fanaticism of Daghestan.
To profit by the excitement, to unite the Circassians and
Daghestanians in common action, was eminently worthy
of consideration in a war undertaken to depress Russia.
Left to their own mspirations, the Caucasians would
effect nothing. Left in possession of the Caucasus,
Russia would not be materially weakened by any terms
of peace. Tw^o men were then, in a different degree,
prominent in the mountainous region between the
Euxine and the Caspian. Sheick Schamyl, an austere
Moslem — who might, if Mohammed had not declared
the cycle of prophecy closed, have made himself to be
regarded as a prophet — had long ruled theocratically
in Daghestan. He possessed troops, forts, a police, and

SHEICK SCHAMYL A^'D HIS NAIB. 203

from time to time exchanged courtesies with Russia, as
well as shot. With success, his views had extended.
Aspiring to bring Circassia under his suzerainty, he
had about ten years previously named Mehemed Emin
Efendi his naib (vicar) there. Mehemed Emin Efendi,
aided by Sheick SchamyFs prestige, had striven on his
own account, and had gradually brought the turbulent
tribes of Circassia more or less under control. But he
failed to obtain the same result as his patron had
obtained — cheerful obedience. Sheick Schamyl ruled
with religion, his naib by intimidation, acquiesced in by
the majority through the need of union for self-defence.
That need ceased to be imperative with the commence-'
ment of war, and with it jealousy of the naib's ascendancy
transpired. Feeling his authority menaced by tribal
rivalries, the naib repaired to Constantinople to seek for
imperial countenance. He obtained it, promised fealty,
and returned to Circassia with the dignity of Pasha.
Nevertheless, he had no more idea of rendering Circassia
dependent on Turkey than on Russia, still less of
subjecting it to the influence of the Franks; whose
views, distorted by the partisans of Russia and of
Turkey, were not to be counted upon.

There w^as little doubt, if the Circassians were given
time for reflection, that their clannish notions would
prevail over feelings of revenge on Russia or of love for
Turkey. They had scarcely any more innate desire to
be ruled by Turkish pashas than by Russian generals.
Scheick Schamyl and his naib were aware of this in-
stinct, and though at first carried away by the stream,
they were unable to oppose the revived loyalty for the
padishah, they hoped, on the subsidence of its ebullition,

204 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

to bring the mountaineers to agree with them in the
suicidal policy of remaining neuter during the impending
struggle of empires. They reckoned on circumstances
rendering the Caucasus again a barrier between Russia
and the Turco -Persian empires : an Oriental Switzerland.
They expected to see Russia disastrously beaten by the
Allies. They would then be masters of the position,
independent of Russia, Turkey, and Frenghistan. Our
aim, profiting by the enthusiasm of the hour and the
Sultan's name, was to frustrate this erroneous calcula-
tion by enlisting the Caucasians actively in the war ;
whereby, if nothing more had ensued, the Russian trans-
Caucasian army would have been compelled to remain
on the defensive. The position would then probably have
been reversed. There was Russia's vulnerable quarter :
the only quarter where a vital blow on her ambition
could be struck ; the only quarter where a result bene-
ficial to England and to Turkey could be educed from the
war. The Caucasians, the Turkish fleet, and the Turkish
Asiatic army were the instruments to work with.

In his letter* to the naval chief, Mushaver Pasha,
proposed that the Turkish fleet, stored with mihtary
aid for the Circassians, should run along the coast of
Anatolia to animate the inhabitants ; tarrying some days
on the way at Sinope, to practise the crews in disem-
barking and embarking and in the use of their arms.
Thence proceed to Batoom to concert measures with the
military authorities there ; then take Soukhoum Kaleh,
and make that port a base of co-operation. Afterwards,
reduce the other Russian forts on the coast of Abasia
■ and show its flag to the Crimeans — unseen by them in
• Vide Appendix I.

MUSHAVER pasha's PROPOSAL REJECTED. 205

war for nearly a century. This project found favour.
The fleet was ordered to prepare for sea ; and the writer
was directed by the Capitan Pasha to proceed to Baltchik
to communicate with the alHed admirals on the matter.
This deference had been rendered necessary by the
injunction laid on the Porte by the French and English
ambassadors to abstain from undertaking any naval
operation without previous consultation with the allied
admirals.

The allied admirals evinced disinclination to discourse
with Mushaver Pasha, on his arrival at Baltchik, about
the Turkish fleet. They at length, however, yielding to
his respectful persistency, agreed to confer among them-
selves on the mode of .employing it during the summer ;
and having met for that purpose on board the Britannia^
they invited him into the cabin to hear the result of their
deliberations. He found assembled there Vice-Admirals
Dundas an.d Hamelin, Rear- Admirals Sir Edmund Lvons
and Jacqueminot, with a French and an English naval
captain. He naturally expected the admirals would, at
all events, go through the form of consulting with him
on the subject of his mission, before framing a decision
thereon. That was farthest from their thoughts. Without
preface, they read to him a letter — written while he had
been waiting upon their leisure outside— addressed to the
French and English ambassadors, requesting them to
advise the Porte to retain its fleet in the Bosphorus for
its defence ; excepting two line-of-battle ships required, in
their opinion, at Varna, to aid in its defence against a
possible attack by the Russian army. It rarely falls to
any one's lot to hear men in a responsible position
unwittingly cast a sarcasm on themselves. '^ If thus,''

206 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

their astonished listener might have asked, '* why
are your fleets in the Euxine ? Is the order given
you to retain all Russian ships in their ports a dead
letter?"

Mushaver Pasha, treating as visionary the apprehen-
sion of the Russians menacing the Bosphorus, dwelt on
the impolicy of letting the Turkish fleet, rawly manned,
with a sense of depression to recover from, remain
another year in port. The greater its inexperience the
more necessity for its cruising. He instanced the
disaster of the preceding autumn as having mainly
arisen from the difficulty of keeping the sea. Circum-
stances, he observed, beyond the control of the allied
admirals, might arise to send the fleet to sea the ensuing
autumn, and it ought to profit by the mild season to
abate sea- sickness and make sea legs. All present being
nautical men, necessarily felt the justness of his obser-
vations. Rear- Admiral Jacqueminot first admitted it ;
his chief seconded him, and the result was further
consideration of the subject ; which ended in a resolution
to write another letter to the ambassadors, recommending
the Turkish fleet to be ordered to navigate ofi* the coast
of Roumelia, between the Bosphorus and the Gulf of
Bourgas. This would be cruising certainly, but cruising
to no purpose in regard of the object of the war; it
would be only a degree better than remaining seques-
tered in port. Its proposed employment on the coas^t
of Circassia found no advocate among either French or
English ; and though not rejected, the question was
eluded by the expression of a unanimous opinion of the
desirability of the Turkish fleet waiting the return of a
projected Anglo-French expedition to the coast before

THE ANGLO-FRENCH EXPEDITION. 207

going there itself. Time and opportunity were not
considered. The admirals laid stress on the importance
of the intelligence which they fancied their ships would
obtain, and naively assigned the value of it to the Porte
as a vahd reason for the detention of its fleet during an
indefinite period off a dangerous coast indrawiug the
Black Sea current with variable force.

Ideas gathered in a flying visit by strange ships were
unlikely to add to the knowledge of the Porte on an
intricate subject — the instincts and tendencies of the
Caucasian races, derived from consanguinity and long
uninterrupted intercourse. The ruUng class of Turkey
is Caucasian. The Tartar blood of the Ottoman family
has been crossed out by Circassian connection. Slaves
of the imperial house have at all times, since the
conquest, filled high offices of state ; and every notable
harem has for ages been composed more or less of
Circassians. The Turks might, therefore, without pre-
sumption, flatter themselves with possessing more know-
ledge of the Caucasus than the Allies' admirals were
ever likely to obtain. Those gallant officers had, par-
donably, no clear conception of the geographical features
of that celebrated range whose lofty summit, Mount
Elborooz, still shows, according to the Armenian legend,
the notch scored by the keel of the ark grazing over if,
before the waters abating allowed it to rest on Mount
Ararat ; nor, more pardonably, of its social and political
features : for which, even now, it is doubtful if many
marks would be obtained in a civil serv^ice examination
by any one not specially crammed with Kussian
despatches, Tophana slave-dealers' reports, and Sheick
Schamyl's reminiscences in captivity. They seemed to

208 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

thinly their nautical envoys, intended to be set on shore
at Vardan with an interpreter unacquainted with any
Caucasian dialect, would ride in a few hours after
breakfast to that sheick's head-quarters. A Tartar
courier might, if not captured on the road, have reached
it in a week. Talking against a fixed idea is idle, as
idle as trying to cut glass with a knife : you see through
it, but make no impression. Circassia seemed mentally
reserved for the Anglo-French steam squadron, and laurels
grew too rare on the shores of the Euxine to admit of
sharing any which might be gathered with the Turks.
The cypresses of Sinope were considered enough for
them.

At the same time, if the unities of war had been
studied, no one would have dissented from the proposi-
tion to leave fickle Circassia for the Turks to coquet
with, while the allies wooed the stern beauty Sevastopol.
The great actors on the world's stage have owed much
to a correct casting of parts ; to combining ably all their
resources. The Eastern fable of the lion about to go
to war is apposite. His vizir, the bear, advised him to
leave the fox and the hare behind, as unUkely to render
any service. His maned majesty replied: ** They will
both be serviceable : the fox will be my envoy ; the hare
will be my courier.'' Connected with the Circassians by
the ties of religion, marriage, and adoption, skilled in
the art of flattering the passions and ministering to the
vanity of semi-barbarians, the Turks were appropriate
agents to employ on the eastern shore of the Euxine.
The admirals, nevertheless, signified their desire, in a
letter to the Capitan Pasha, for a Turkish steamer to
accompany their projected expedition to the coast of

THE sultan's prestige tn circassia. 209

Circassia. It found no favour in his eyes. Self-respect
and policy alike opposed it. A single Turkish steamer
in the wake of a foreign squadron would have lessened
the Sultan's prestige in the eyes of the Circassians, as
much as the sight of twenty vessels of war under the
Turkish flag, in lieu of the Russian squadron they had
been gazing on for a quarter of a century, would have
increased it. The news would have rapidly spread to
the remotest valleys of the Caucasus, and have electrified
the dwellers therein. While a Turkish vessel might
becomingly have displayed her flag with the allied fleets
in operations against the common enemy, that con-
junction on the coast of Circassia would have given,
weight to the reports industriously circulated of sinister
designs on its independence.

Mushaver Pasha next proceeded to Varna, to see in
what way ships might contribute, as proposed, to its
defence. He saw they would have to fire over a chff 60
feet high, with upsloping ground behind of equal elevation,
to the spot where an enemy would sit down to besiege
the town ; and consequently, instead of being in a position
to worry him, they would be disposed rather to move out
of range of the guns of the redoubt he would not fail to
plant on the edge of the cliff for their edification. But
an attack on Varna by the Russians, lying in the circle
of improbabilities, was not worth speculating about. He
went again to Baltchik on the 10th of April, 1854 ; the
day of the arrival there of intelligence of the declaration
of war by England against Russia, in honour of which
the Enghsh fleet manned yards and cheered. The allied
admirals began to ponder over their first move ; and the
pasha returned to Constantinople to report his pro-

210 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

ceedings. His report in no way affected the views of
the Porte, which were said to be approved of by the
alUed ambassadors. The Porte trusted in the alhed
admirals opening their eyes, on the completion of its
preparations, to the importance of the proposed expedition
of the Turkish fleet to the coast of Circassia.

( 211 )

CHAPTER XVI.

Arrival of the Vanguard of the British Army in the Bosphorus —
Turkish and English Sentries at the Barracks in Scutari — Prince
Napoleon and the Duke of Cambridge — Gloomy Presage in
Constantinople — Reception of the Troops by the People and
Authorities — Arrival of the Fnry in the Bosphorus — Attack on
Odessa by the Allied Fleets — Grounds for this Proceeding — Resem-
blance of Odessa to Brighton — What constitutes a Flag of Truce
— Ultimatum of the Allied Admirals — Admiral Dundas's View of
the Bombardment of Odessa — His desire to bombard Odessa
more effectually — Odessa of no strategic Irapoi-tauce — War never
aided by needless Severity — Moral and Physical Effects of wanton
Aggression — ^Instances in Point — Popular Feeling in Russia and
England excited by the War — Vicarious Retaliation — Blockade of
the Danube by the Allied Admirals.

When the Turkish historian approaches in the course of
his narrative the occurrences — beacon for old men here-
after to guess their ages by — of the month of April, 1854,
he will pause for inspiration to guide his pen over that
delicate page where truth clashes with national suscepti-
bilities. On the 14th day of that month the vanguard of
the British army of the East, the 33rd and 41st regiments,
arrived in the Bosphorus, in the Himalaya^ during a
snow-storm. Next day they landed and found hospitable
shelter in the SeUmieh barracks. Female feet, those of
soldiers' wives, then for the first time trod the area of a
Turkish barrack ; the hke of which for space, symmetry

14— i

212 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

and salubrity their fair owners had never seen elsewhere.
Docile Arabians neighed welcome in their stables to
restive Saxon chargers. Turkish and EngUsh sentries
exchanged mute courtesies on the same post ; and as the
former, standing at ease, slouched and careless, watched the
latter, ill at ease with stock and shako, pacing his measured
walk, he may have doubted whether he were undergoing
a penance or performing a duty. Other regiments
followed in their wake in the course of a few days, and the
unwonted bustle stirred the apathy — in harmony with
the necropolis on its border — of the Asiatic suburb of
Constantinople. The Crusaders led by **bUnd old
Dandolo " had encamped on the same spot, and had
gazed avidly from their tents on the same matchless
panorama which greeted the eyes of Albion's fair-haired
soldiers. Their Gallic comrades found congenial quarters
on the other side of the water, in the region of theatres,
cafes, and bilUard-rooms.

Two imperial yalis on the Bosphorus, stored with
luxuries, including the perfumes of the East and the
wines of the West, with attendants, horses, and caiques,
were placed at the disposal of Prince Napoleon and the
Duke of Cambridge. The Prince went to his epicurean
abode and enjoyed his kief there. The Duke, declining
the dolce far nientCy left his in a few days and went to
Scutari, to Hve with his soldiers.

This gathering of the chivalry of the West spread a
gloom over Constantinople. It seemed a warning, a
portent. The ominous word taksim (partition) found
utterance. The Constantinopolitans were awakened out
of a dream of centuries. Their imagination had barely
figured to itself foreign troops at Gallipoli : they started

THE ALLIED TROOPS AT CONSTANTINOPLE. 213

amazed at the reality in the capital. They asked each
other, with bated breath, ** why the AlUes tarried at
Constantinople ? Why did they not proceed on to
Varna ? Had they not heard of the recent passage of
the Danube by the enemy, and were they not come to
defend Turkey ? " Simple mortals ! They had not
read the decree of fate, that Eussia should have time
allowed her to balance her difficulties in the south through
distance and want of steam-ships. They had not, in
their faith in Him, supposed that Allah, having armed
the Franks in their cause, would lead them to think of
intimidating Bussia with a splendid parade of fleets and
armies.

Although the people looked coldly on the gallant
strangers, the authorities seemed earnest in their
endeavours to make them feel at home. Private houses
w^ere evacuated for the accommodation of officers ; spirit-
shops were licensed in the neighbourhood of the barracks ;
desecration of cemeteries was winked at ; and, crowning
mark of hospitable intent, the seraskir talked about
alluring fallen liouris from Galata and Tatavla, and
lodging them in roomy houses with allowances for the
solace of the soldiery. Deference to public decorum
overcame his friendly zeal.

On the day of the landing at Scutari, H.M. steamer
Fury arrived in the Bosphorus, having had the first shot
of the general war fired at her from a Eussian frigate off
Sevastopol.

In that month also occurred the attack on Odessa by
the alUed fleets ; which, as the first act of the drama,
merits reminiscence. Odessa is, as most persons may
know, a city as beautiful as Brighton ; and as every

214 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

person may not know, scarcely better fortified. The
position of Bri{:fliton and Odessa is not dissimilar. Each
stands on a cliflf with open sea in front, and steppes or
downs behind. Each is a bathing-place of fashionable
resort; one from London, the other from Poland and
Lithuania. Each contains young ladies' schools. Each
exhibits a statue of its benefactor — respectively of
George IV. and the Due de Richeheu — erected by
municipal gratitude. Odessa being a corn-mart has in
addition an exchange, and rejoices also in an Italian
opera and an imperial-founded Lyceum. "When Russia
obtained possession of the northern coast of the Euxine,
a Tartar village, Hodja Bey, occupied a corner of the
site of Odessa ; and, pursuing the comparison, Brighton
originated in a fishing village. Commerce in the one
and roval favour in the other case transformed in a few
years two hamlets into cities. The Prince de Joinville,
in his noted pamphlet, dwelt con gusto on the facility of
bombarding Brighton and other towns on the south coast
of England ; and the domesticated English felt shocked
at the bare idea, foreshadowing recurrence to the practices
of mediaeval warfare. Had his Royal Highness contem-
plated indulging the French navy in similar practice
against Portsmouth or Sheemess, he would have risen in
the estimation of his readers.

The menace passed from Brighton and settled on
Odessa.

April 20th, 1854, an Anglo-French fleet of twenty
sail of the line, five of them with screw propellers, and
many paddle steam frigates, cast anchor before Odessa,
four miles off shore. The admirals in command
demanded satisfaction of the governor for having recently

ODESSA AND THE ** FLAG OF TRUCE." 215

fired on a flag of truce. Count Osten-Saeken denied the
dastardly act ; and his denial having been teimed false,
we will pause to investigate the case. An English war-
steamer, on arriving off Odessa a short time previously,
to bring away the English consul, sent a boat to the
mole early in the morning, remaining herself under way.
Said boat delivered her message or letter to a quarantine
officer and shoved off. While rowing back to her ship
one or more shot passed in her direction ; fired,
according to the Russian version, to warn the steamer,
with her head inshore, to refrain from nearer approach
to the town. Granting the baseness of .firing on a boat
under the circumstances (if that were done) it is open to
doubt if she w^ere invested with the character described.
The simple display of a white flag does not constitute a
" flag of truce.'' Other formalities are required.
According to the laws of war, a boat with a parlementary
flag lies on her oars at a convenient distance from the
shore, until met by a corresponding boat. There ought
to be nothing in her to indicate a latent intention of
surveying; as a chart, a sounding lead, or a quadrant.
She either delivers her message to the shore boat, or
proceeds to the landing-place with it. In the latter case,
she remains there as long as is necessary under
surveillance, and is then re-escorted beyond gun shot.
Were not this rule imperative, any cruiser might send in
a boat anywhere with a white flag, on any pretext, make
plans and take soundings of a roadstead, free from
observation.

Having received their answer, the admirals sat down
to frame an ultimatum. Their first draft contained a
demand, in way of ransom from bombardment, for the

216 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

release of neutral vessels in the port of Odessa, and
for surrender of all Eussian vessels, together with the
artillery of the place ; but on consideration of the im-
probability of a general parting with his guns, they
restricted their demands to the release of neutrals and
the surrender of the Eussian shipping in the mole.
They sent it to the governor, with a warning of the
serious consequences of non-compliance. His Excel-
lency returned no answer, but indicated liis reception of
the missive by letting the neutrals depart in peace.
Chastisement was therefore decreed. In pursuance
thereof at half-past six in the morning of April 22nd,
four heavy armed steamers, with rocket-boats in atten-
dance, opened fire on the mole-head battery at 2,000
yards' distance, and were reinforced two hours later
by four similar steamers. Keeping under way, the
squadron was manoeuvred with admirable skill. Soon
after noon the Eussian fire was silenced, several vessels
were in flames, as well as houses and stores adjoining
the mole, and presently a powder-magazine in the
vicinity exploded. The fighting squadron then desisted,
to dine. After dinner the admiral made signal to the
commodore, '* Can you destroy any more ? '' which being
answered in the affirmative, the firing recommenced at
three o'clock, from the steamers and rocket-boats on the
shipping remaining inside the mole ; and in another
hour they, with several buildings, were in flames. Only
two guns replied to the repetition of the tire; they
were at length silenced, and then the attacking squadron
withdrew out of range.

In this action the Allies had one man killed and
three wounded ; and the Eussians, sustaining a heavy

ATTACK ON ODKSSA.. 217

loss, gave a foretaste of the courage under superior fire,
afterwards shown by them on a grander scale. The
allied steamers had discharged about 4,000 projectiles.
Many, necessarily, from the extent of range, went over
their mark into the city, one of them grazing the Due
de Eichelieu's statue; and their impacts have been
denoted since, by paint or inlaid stones, as honourable
mementos.

Vice-Admiral Deans Dundas, in his despatch on the
afiair, gracefully took credit to himself for having spared
the city of Odessa from bombardment, in deference to
the Queen's expressed desire to have private property
respected as much as possible ; but as the press viewed
the subject in another light, he repented of his forbear-
ance, and on his return home the following year sought
to clear his character from the imputation of mawkish
humanity, by persuading a ** friend" in the House of
Commons to move for papers to show that his desire
to revisit Odessa in the coming autumn, to bombard
it effectually, had been frustrated by the reluctance
of the allied generals to part with a division of the
fleet. That reluctance saved us regret. CiviHzed,
unlike barbarous warfare, glories in attaining its end
with the least amount of suffering and injury to
inoffensive persons and venerated things. It spares
w^omen and children, the sick and the aged : it re-
spects churches, tombs, and works of art. Such objects
in a city like Odessa are helplessly exposed to the
capricious effects of a bombardment. The gunners
fire in safety ; their shells explode in the wards of the
hospital, in the aisles of the church, in the galleries
of the museum. Misled, the press saw in Odessa a

218 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

place of strategic importance ; whereas, situated at the
extremity of the roadless steppe, open any day to a
naval attack, it possessed none. The Allies were
interested rather in its preservation, for the course of
hostilities might have so turned as to render the
possession of a city on the enemy's coast, to quarter
an army in, of vital consequence. Shelter for modem
troops is invaluable. Much of the misery and loss
sustained by the French on their retreat from Moscow
would have been avoided, had they respected towns and
villages on their advance to that city.

War is never aided by needless severity or destruc-
tion of domestic property. Reflection and history
combine to show a contrary result. The slaughter of
defenceless crowds in Mesopotamia and Armenia by the
hordes of Genghis Khan recoiled on the barbarians
in consequent famine and disease. The destruction of
the flourishing cities of the Palatinate by the armies of
Louis XIV. brought down universal execration on the
head of the crowned egotist, and sanctified tlie league
forming against him. Wanton aggressions in war, like
political oppressions in peace, are dragon's teeth, whence
armed men surely spring, inflamed with bitter hatred,
sooner or later. In a free country the press excites the
ardour of the people, in a despotic country the enemy's
acts shape public opinion. As long as the enemy directs
his efforts against the obvious resources of Government,
the people reason on the war, its causes and effects ; but
when he destroys private property with no apparent
military object, passions are roused. The burning, for
example, during the late war, of Kola, the capital of
Russian Lapland, with its pinnacled wooden cathedral.

EVILS OF WANTON DESTRUCTION IN WAR. 219

the veneration of every Laplander, graved a deeper im-
pression on the Russian mind than a thousand Times
power could have stamped. Read by any light, hostile
treatment of insignificant towns in the arctic zone could
admit but of one qualification, arouse but one sentiment.
We need not ask how we should feel on hearing of
Lei-wick in the Shetland Isles being thus treated late in
autumn by an enemy's cruiser: we have only to turn
back the page of history and read of the sensation
caused by the destruction of Teignmouth by the French
fleet in June, 1690. Faction was hushed by it ; Jacob-
ites and Orangemen for the hour w^ere reconciled. Few
persons can seriously think that molestation of open
country towns, on the coasts of a vast empire engaged
in a struggle for empire, can have a material weight
in the balance. But it has a moral weight. It unites
sovereign and. people by the feeling of indignation.
War, unadorned by chivalry, is so repulsive a spectacle,
its details are now so immediately brought home to every
hearth by the fulness and rapidity of new^s — the groans
of the hospital blending wuth the shouts of victory —
that were people unexcited by individual insult and
suffering, or by the recital of acts of cruelty, they would
be in a position to take a calm view of the subject,
and enforce consideration of it upon their rulers, if
necessary.

What occurred in the late war is confirmatory of
this proposition. Neither English nor French property
suffered by sea or by land ; nevertheless, both in England
and in France there was a peace party. Russian pro-
perty, on the contrary, suffered largely ; nevertheless, in
Russia there was no peace party. Popular at first, the

220 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

war became unpopular in France and in England ;
because, unstirred by individual misfortunes, the people
were able to ponder over its inconsistencies and its cost.
Unpopular at the commencement, the war became popu-
larized in Kussia by the razzias of the Allies in the
White Sea, in the Gulf of Bothnia, and in the Sea
of Azof. In England and in France, national impulse
dwindled into state or class policy. In Eussia, state
policy expanded into a national sentiment ; which, un-
happily, has survived with peace. That war witnessed
the revival of the practice, long disused in war between
civilized nations, of vicarious retaliation. Because a
military commandant had (presumedly) .ordered a flag of
truce to be fired at, commercial Odessa was menaced
with condign punislmaent. Because a Greek partisan,
ensconced in a dismantled redoubt on the left bank of
an issue of the Danube, perfidiously shot Captain
Parker, R.N., while rowing past in his gig, innocent
SuUna, on the opposite bank of the river, was destroyed.
Now there can be no doubt that such acts, if necessarj^
should have, formed pai-t of a scheme, and not have
seemed dependent on the chance of an insulted flag or of
a gallant young oflScer's death, — the assigned motives
respectively. The destruction of Sulina was the stupid
act of the war, since it injured friends alone. The
Russians had already abandoned the islands of St.
George and Leti, and had retired with their stores
and materiel to Ismael. Not a Russian remained in
Sulina. Its inhabitants were chiefly British, Ionian,
and Turkish subjects, occupied in supplying the wants of
merchant vessels and transporting their cargoes across
the bar. Sulina then, when burnt to the ground by

MISTAKEN ACTS OF THE ALLIES. 221

the allied admirals ' orders, belonged exclusively to
commerce.*

The allied admirals afterwards made another mistake
detrimental to friends, in connection with the Danube.
They declared that river blockaded ; in order, using their
words, to prevent supplies being conveyed to the Russian
armies in the Dobrudsha, and they warned all vessels
not to enter it.f They published that announcement to
the world : then ordered their cruisers to seize all
vessels leaving the Danube ; such vessels being laden
chiefly with cereals for friendly countries. About fhirty
vessels, outward bound, were accordingly captured by
some of the Allies' steamers.

'•' Sulina was indifferently rebuilt daring the Austrian occupation of
the mouths of the Danube, which terminated in 1857.

•j" " In consequence^of the Russian armies having crossed the Danube —
having occupied the Dobrudsha, and taken possession of the mouths and
noi-th banks of the river Danube, W^, the undersigned, being (he vice-
admirals commanding-in- chief the combined naval forces of France and
England in the Black Sea, in order to prevent supplies being conveyed
to the Russian forces, do hereby declare, in the names of our respective
Governments, and do hereby make known to all whom it may concern,
that we have established an effective blockade of the river Danube,
inducing all the mouths of the said river having communication with
the Black Sea : and we do hereby warn all vessels not to enter the
said river Danube until further notice.

(Signed) •* Hamelin. J. D. Dundas.*'

222 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XVII.

The Allied Fleets sail for Sevastopol, and an Anglo-French Steam
Squadron for the Coast of Circassia — The Capitan Pasha proposes
the Junction of the Turkish Squadron — Its Instructions — Presen-
tation of the Turkish, Admirals to the Sultan — Sefer Pasha an«l
Behchet Pasha — ^Equipment of the Turco- Egyptian Squadron —
Vice- Admiral Dundas counsels Delay — The Author's Opinion
and Advice — Achraet Pasha's Objections — Mushaver Pasha
requested to mediate with the Allied Admirals — His Memorandum
for their Consideration — He joins the Anglo-French Fleet in the
Faisi'hari — His Reception by Admiral Dundas and Admiral
Hamelin — Objections of the French Admiral — Letter of Admiral
Dundas to Ahmed Pasha — Dismay of the Circassian Pashas.

Four days after their attack on Odessa, the allied fleets
sailed thence to cruise oflf Sevastopol, fixing their
rendezvous forty miles west of that port. From that
rendezvous, the Anglo-French squadron already spoken
of steamed for the coast of Circassia, May 5th, 1854.
The Capitan Pasha had already informed the allied
admirals, by letter, and verbally through the captain
of an English vessel of war, of the proximate sailing
of the Turkish fleet for the same destination, and had
proposed the junction of the two expeditions. The
Turkish fleet had been fitted for service on the coast of
Circassia in a manner which reflected credit on all con-
cerned. Communications opened with the Caucasians
augured concert and co-operation on their part. ** The

THE TURKISH FLEET FOR CIRCASSIA. 223

appearance of the Turkish fleet off the coast," they said,
** will be the signal for our rising from the Euxine to
the Gasman." The fleet was instructed to join, in the
first place, the Allies' admirals off Sevastopol, and after
concerting with them a plan of operations on the coast of
Circassia, proceed direct to Batoom ; there embark 4,003
troops ; and then, reducing Soukhoum Kaleh, make that
place a depot for stores, and the base of co-operation with
the Circassians. In case of meeting with the Russian
instead of the Anglo-French fleet off Sevastopol, it was
to accept or decline battle, according to circumstances.

The Turkish admirals were presented to the Sultan,
on the eve of their departure. His Majesty addressed
them three sentences. He expressed his hope for
cordiaUty between them and the Allies' admirals. The
war, he said, was not of his making ; but he supposed it
necessary : moreover, wars had existed from the earliest
period. He would pray for their welfare.

Sefer Pasha and Behchet Pasha, of Circassian origin,
accompainied by Sheick Schamyl's envoy, embarked
with suites of their countrymen in the Turkish fleet,
with missions and gifts from the Sultan for Circassian
chiefs. Sefer Pasha, better known as Sefer Bey, of a
noble Anapan family, had been a renowned warrior in
his youth, and had enjoyed much consideration among
the Circassians. His renown led Russia, at the peace of
Adrianople, to induce the Porte to retain him in Turkey.
He had since resided at Adrianople, with an allowance
from the Sultan. He had, nevertheless, maintained
intercourse with his countrymen, and his recommenda-
tion had ensured honourable reception to any travellers
professing an interest in their independence. Mr.

224 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Urquhart, Captain Lyon, Mr. Lonjrworth, Mr. Bell,
and others, had availed themselves of it. In the spring
of 1854 the Porte summoned him to Constaptinople,
gave him the rank of ferik^ and invited him to return to
Circassia in the Sultan's name. His satisfaction at this
recognition of his merits was dashed with bitterness at
the thought of his sequestration during a quarter of a
century. His beard had grown white in the interval,
his companions in arms were no more, another genera-
tion had since fought with the Muscovites, and he would
in all probability be regarded with jealousy by the naib.
Such was his language to us before we sailed. Never-
theless, he expressed hopes of gathering round him the
sons of his ancient followers. Behchet Pasha had the
merit of being one of iRedshid Pasha's freedmen ; and,
though that would have but little weight in his native
land, he was a courteous well-bred man, adapted for
conferring the Sultan's distinctions with grace. About
300 other Circassians, traders or exiles, many of them
with their families, embraced the opportunity of revisiting
their country with eclat under the Turkish flag. Twelve
European officers to instruct the Circassian militia, a
field battery complete, with artillery officers, small arms,
ammunition and other stores, were also embarked. Thus,
full manned, and provisioned for four months, the Turco-
Egyptian squadron, composed of eight line-of-battle
ships, three frigates, four light vessels — corvettes or
brigs — five steam frigates, and three steam corvettes,
in all twenty-three vessels, mounting 1,100 guns,
sailed from the Bosphorus in high spirits, May 6,
1854.

Pursuant to its orders, it stood to the northward in

LETTER OF ADMIRAL DUNDAS. 225

search of the allied fleets, losing thereby, with regret, a
fair wind to the eastward. The scanty stock of pro-
visions laid in by its passengers, coupled with the want
of comfort and abluent conveniences for the women
and children, rendered a short passage desirable. When
off Varna, May 8, it sent in a steamer to communicate
with the town, and found there a letter from Vice-
Admiral Dundas to its commander, Achmet Pasha, as
follows : —

** Britamua, off Sebastopol, May 5th, 1854.

** Sir, — I have had the honour to receive a letter
from his Highness the Capitan Pasha, informing me
that a squadron under your command had been ordered
to join and co-operate with the combined squadrons of
France and England, and I hasten to acquaint you that
it is the opinion of Vice-Admiral Hamelin and myself
that it would be desirable you should cruise along the
coasts of Bulgaria and Roumelia, between the Danube
and the Bosphorus, until the return of Rear-Admiral
Lyons from the coast of Circassia and the arrival of the
combined squadrons at Varna, on or about the 20th
instant, when further operations can be concerted.

(Signed) '' J. W. D. Dundas,
** Vice- Admiral Commanding-in-Chief.''

The assumption by the admirals to give directions to
the Turkish fleet, before consultation with its chief or
knowing the nature of his orders, was informal, if not
offensive ; while the enjoined delay, dependent on a
contingency, might be indefinitely prolonged ; and there-
fore their missive, if addressed to a man alive to the
dignity of his position, would, instead of unsettling his
mind, have received an appropriate answer. He would

226 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

have regarded it as a release from the obligation to
confer with them. Could Musliaver Pasha's opinion, in
accordance with the wish of the majority, have prevailed
in the council of naval and Circassian officers convened
in the flagship to consider the subject, the fleet would
then and there have squared its yards and steered for
Batoom. With a prescience of the failure of the expe-
dition if it remained within reach of the allied admirals,
he advised its proceeding in the spirit of its orders to
the coast of Circassm, and ventured to assure the com-
mander-in-chief of the support of pubUc opinion, ever on
the side of enterprise, which would draw after it the
approbation of the Porte. kThe fleet's destination was
Circassia; and though it had been directed to join the
allied admirals en route, that was a secondary considera-
tion, or rather a formality, which they themselves might
be said to have dispensed with. Achmet Pasha objected
to this course, for fear of offending the allied admirals.
The Porte, he said, would disown him in the right, on
their complaint ; would abet him in the wrong, on their
approval. He and others had early made up their minds
to subordinate every interest to the propitiation of any
of the Allies' authorities ; and it is fair to say their selfish
calculation seldom proved erroneous. He also objected
to the proposition next made, for the fleet (seeing the
mischief of delay) to proceed on the letter of its orders
to join the Allies at once. The foggy season, he said,
was at hand ; the Allies might increase their distance from
Sevastopol ; he might fall in with the Eussians instead.

As a mezzo tennine he, in concurrence with the
council, requested Mushaver Pasha to proceed in a
steamer to the offing of Sevastopol, show the allied

MUSHAVER PASHA'S INTERVENTION. 227

admirals the orders of the Turkish fleet, disclose to
them its stored and crowded state, and obtain their
sanction for the continuance forthwith of its course to
Circassia. None of them anticipated opposition from
those distinguished individuals when made acquainted
with the facts of the case. Mushaver Pasha accepted
the mission, faintly encouraged by the altered circum-
stances under which he should again meet the Allies'
admirals. When he had previously had that honour, at
Baltchik, the Circassian expedition was in embryo ; now
it was developed into form and substance, and respect
for their rank forbade him to assume without evidence
an intention to mar the result of much cost and prepara-
tion for the sake of their consistency.

Leaving accordingly his ship hove to with the fleet
off Cape Kellagriah, Mushaver Pasha steamed for the
oflBng of Sevastopol; and on the way, that nothing
pertinent to the matter might be omitted in his interview
with the Allies' admirals, he noted down the following
memorandum for their consideration : —

** Fam-hari, at Sea, May 10th, 1854.

** The position of the Turkish army in Asia has excited
anxiety, seeing the consequences that might ensue from its
possible defeat. Persia, now waiting on events, might in
that case, declaring war, march on Bagdad ; the conquest
of which would be considered more than an equivalent for
the provinces wrested from her by Russia during the last
half-century. Hereditary aud religious associations are
connected with Bagdad ; and the power which shall hold
that prize out to the Persians will be readily listened to.

*' The Porte hopes to find auxiliary means of checking

15—2

228 TURKEY AND THE CREVIEAN WAR.

the assumed advance of the Russian army of Georgia in
the hostility of Circassia and Daghestan. Hitherto
during the actual war they have rendered no service to
the common cause, and have offered no more hindrance
to Russia than they have done at any time during the
last twenty years. Their attitude has heen defensive ;
whereas the object is to render it offensive, and thereby
influence Russia by the apprehension of a diversion on
the flank or rear of her army in Asia. For this purpose
it is necessary to unite the tribes under Sheick Schamyl's
rule with the tribes ruled vicariously by him, and to
supply them with military aid.

** With orders to proceed to the coast of Circassia,
after consultation with the allied admirals, the Turkish
fleet has left the Bosphorus. Sefer Pasha and Behchet
Pasha with 300 of their countrymen, and several Euro-
pean officers to act as ialimgis (instructors), are
embarked in it. Those pashas 'bear the Sultan's
firman, empowering them to act in his name, and are
carrying nishans of merit and herats of rank to influential
chieftains. In their opinion, unless the Caucasians operate
timely in concert and with strategy, the Russian advance
in Asia will be certain. There are embarked in the fleet
a battery complete with artillery officers and 300 rounds
for each gun, 600 barrels of gunpowder, 500 cases of
musket cartridges, 400 cases of muskets, 2,000 pistols,
20 cases of cutlasses, 10,000 moulds of lead, 1,000 axes,
7 cases of flints, 300 soup-kettles, and 20,000 okas of
salt, besides tents and bales of cotton cloth. Circassian
merchants have also embarked with wares to reopen the
trade, suspended for many years. Concurrently, orders
have been sent to Selim Pasha at Batoom, for the

MEMORANDUM OF MUSHAVER PASHA. 229

embarkation of 4,000 troops in the fleet for conveyance
to Circassia. It is anticipated that with the aid of 4,000
regular troops, the marines of the fleet, European miUtary
instructors, field-pieces, and other named munitions of
war, the Circassians will be able to act offensively on the
enemy's territory. At the same time Soukhoum Kaleh,
after being reduced, will be garrisoned and its works
strengthened, so as to render its port of due value.

** The Circassian pashas in and the superior officers
of the Turkish fleet trust that the allied admirals will
see with pleasure and advise its departure from the coast
of Roumelia to the coast of Circassia without delay.
Time is precious. The season for operations is rapidly
advancing, and if the Circassians shall not be enabled to
act soon, it is doubtful if they will be in a position to
render valid service in the war. Defensive hostility will
be of no avail. They must take the offensive, and for
that they require excitement in gifts and promises, and
the aid which the Ottoman fleet is bringing them.

*' The Porte has been in communication with the
Circassians on the subject, and the latter are daily
expecting the Ottoman fleet as the signal for their
gathering. If it do not soon make its appearance ofif
their coast, doubts will arise in their minds of the
Porte's earnestness."

May 11th, in the forenoon, making the land of the
Crimea, the Faisi-hari tried speed with a large war-
steamer, which thought her intent on breaking the
blockade. Intent on that, she would have made Cape Aia
early in the morning, and have run along shore, probably
unnoticed, to Sevastopol. A Hamburgher crossing her

230 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

bows was momentarily taken for a Russian, and was
nearly having a shot fired at him by an impatient gunner.
She ascertained from the stranger that the ships seen occa-
sionally through the haze, half topsails down to windward,
were the Allies. She then sighted Cape Chersonesus,
spoke H.M.S. I'm-ihle, and in the afternoon joined the
Anglo-French fleet, hove to in a fog, — the fog fatal to
H.M.S. Tiger, — twenty-five miles west of Sevastopol.

The rank of the allied admirals being coequal, the
first visit to either was, on the score of etiquette, a
matter of indifference, admitting the indulgence of a
natural bias.

Admiral Dundas, seeing the Faisi-bari alone, fancied
her come in pursuance of his wish to join the detached
allied squadron, and under this impression he cordially
welcomed Mushaver Pasha on board the Britannia.
**How many days' coal have you got?" he asked, and
scarcely waiting for an answer told him to follow the
squadron with all speed to the coast. But when he heard
the object of the pasha's mission, the friend gave place to
the admiral. His recommendation to the Porte about the
Turkish fleet had been disregarded. His directions to
its commander to cruise off the coast of Roumelia had
been dissented from. That fleet had been placed under
liis orders, he said, and he would be obeyed. He listened
impatiently to the perusal of the Turkish fleet's orders
and the afore-cited memorandum. Giving no heed to
the tenor of the former nor the argument of the latter, he
reproached their bearer with being the cause of that
fleet's Circassian destination, and expressed astonishment
at his having dared to give advice at variance with his
opinion. The pasha, asserting the policy of its destina-

MUSHAVER PASHA AND ADAURAL DUNDAS. 231

tion, reminded the gallant admiral of the priority of his
suggestion in that respect to the expression of the admiral's
opinion thereon ; and ventured to observe that although its
commander was instructed to act in concert with the AUies'
admirals, he might fairly expect to he consulted with, if
only for form's sake. The deference for rank and age
acquired by the habits of naval life enabled him to bear
with equanimity a sally of ofi&cial discontent, such as a
worried first-lieutenant might have addressed to a truant
midshipman! He was in a mood, seeing the importance
of 'the issue between them, to exclaim with the Grecian,
** Strike, but hear ! " That would not have availed him.
He might have been tapped good-humouredly on the
shoulder; he would not have been hstened to. The
gallant admiral refused to discuss with him the affairs of
the Turkish fleet before consulting with Admiral Hamelin ;
between whom and himself, he said, perfect accord
existed on all subjects. Without his concurrence he
decided on nothing. He would confer with him next
day, and then give their joint answer.

Accompanied by an officer of the Britannia, Mushaver
Pasha next rowed to the Ville d^ Paris. Admiral Hamelin
received him with formal courtesy at the entering port,
and having heard his colleague's message, delivered
aside, conducted him into the cabin, to which he sum-
moned the chief of his staff. Mushaver Pasha explained
to those two officers the state of the Turkish fleet and
the purport of his visit. He dwelt on the importance
attached by the Porte to its Circassian expedition. He
gave them a French translation of the orders of the
fleet to read, and translated to them, viva voce^ at
their request, his own memorandum, which appeared

232 TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN' WAR.

to interest them. Admiral Hamelin admitted the policy
of aiding the Circassians, but aUowed his jadgment
to be warj^ed by other considerations. He expressed
ap[»rehension of the Russian fleet pursuing the Turkish
fl«'et to the eastward and causing another dif^aster.
Thanking liim for his solicitude about their safety
(wliich seemed uncalled for), Mushaver Pasha expressed
}iis doulit of the Russian admiral, even though a Paul
Jo;jos, being so demented as to leave his only port
to run after the Turkish fleet, now become of secondary
importance. That would indeed be playing the Allies'
game. That consideration should be an additional
reason for the Turkish fleet steering eastward, to become
a d(jcoy duck. He invited the admiral's attention to the
dissimilarity between the cases, so marked as to destroy
comparison. The Sinope squadron had been feeble,
demoralized by cold and anxiety, and the allied fleets
were then moored at Beikos, their governments at peace
with Russia. Now, the Turkish fleet was comparatively
cflicient, the weather was mild, and the allied fleets com-
manded the Euxine.

Unable to controvert this matter-of-fact statement.
Admiral Hamelin entrenched hinjself behind his original
argument. If the Turkish fleet went to the coast of
Circassia the allied fleets ought in his opinion to remain
off* Svivastopol, whi(rh was out of the question, as they
W(?re about to retmii to Baltchik for water. Serious respon-
Kil)ility, he repeatiHl emphatically, would be incurred by
him if during their absence the Russian fleet should
track the Turkish fleet and bring it to action. He had,
he said, received blame on account of the battle of
Sinope, and he was disinclined to risk a repetition. The

MUSIIAVER PASHA AND ADMIRAL HAMELIX. 233

ascription of daring folly to the Russians was as gra-
tuitous, as the motive assigned for intermitting the
blockade, supposing one necessary, was specious. The
Russians possessed then in Sevastopol eleven or twelve
serviceable line-of-battle ships, and the Vladimir was the
best of their steamers. With five line-of-battle ships
watering at a time, the Allies would have had thirteeji
line-of-battle ships disposable, with several steam frigates,
to maintain the blockade with. One thought of the tedious
blockades of other days, with ships which would now
be pronounced uuseaworthy, on a strict allowance of
nauseous cask-water : one thought of Nelson detaching
four of his ships from ofi" Cadiz to water at Tetuan. In
those memorable days the practice was to cruise off an
enemy's port with an inferior force in the hope of enticing
him out : in the late war the practice was to appear off
the enemy's port with a superior force and gibe him for
remaining in. In conclusion. Admiral Htimelin said he
would talk to Admiral Dundas on the matter : perfect
cordiality on all subjects existed between them ; they
would consult together about the Turkish fleet, and then
give an answer.

Having thus disposed of the public business, Admiral
Hamelin abruptly took his visitor to task about a
private affair more interesting in his eyes than the
Caucasus — about a letter written by him five months
earlier, by request, to an eminent person at Constan-
tinople, on the advantage to be derived from the pre-
sence of the Anglo-French fleet in the Euxine, and
the facility of its remaining in that sea with Sinope to
water at : a copy of which had recently found its way to
his hands. He brought this matter on the tapis with the

231 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

remark, **We have seen your letter which sent ns all
into the Black Sea last winter '* — a distinction assuredly
not claimed for it by the writer. The gallant admiral
commented with professional zeal on the indecorum of
any person writing about his fleet, and his indignation
thereat measured the position attained in its estima-
tion by the French navy : a position above criticism.
Mushaver Pasha, with great respect for that navy, a
witness to its remarkable progress in a few years, could
not take that view of the case. A more careful perusal
of his letter, he observed in reply, would show that his
remarks had applied to the French in connection with
the English fleet, under the collective term '* allied
fleets ; '' meaning thereby that it was in good company.
This seemed to the admiral a distinction without a
difierence. Any reference to the proceedings of a French
fleet, though in a private letter, was an ofieuce in his
eyes grave enough to justify him in withholding thence-
forwards his countenance from the author of it ; and not
content with that, he called upon Admiral Dundas after-
wards to follow his example.

The gallant admirals, fearing perhaps to com-
promise the dignity of either by rowing in the fog to
the other's ship, failed to meet according to promise, but
came all the same to a perfect understanding with each
other. On the third day, feeling the inutility of waiting
longer, Mushaver Pasha, having dined in the interval
with Admiral Dundas, took leave of him and of
Admiral Hamelin in their respective flag-ships ; receiving
from the former, as their joint answer, the following
letter for the commander of the Turkish fleet, with
a verbal message to him to consider the anchorage

DECTSION OF THE ALLIED ADMIRALS. 235

of Baltchik reserved exclusively for the Anglo-French
fleet : —

** Britannia^ off Sevastopol, 18th May, 1864.

** Sir, — I had the honour to address you a letter on
the 5th inst., informing you of the wish of Vice-Admiral
Hamelin and myself as to the movements of the squadron
under your command then about to enter the Black Sea,
and I now enclose you a copy of it.

** Admiral Hamelin and myself still request you will
be guided by the opinion therein expressed, and I have
further to beg you will bo pleased to make your future
communications in writing, as verhal messages may lead
to serious inconveniences and mistakes.

(Signed) '' J. W. D. Dundas,

'' Vice-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.
** To Vice-Admiral Ahmed Pasha.'*

This laconic epistle found the Turkish fleet just
emerged from the fog, co-exteusive with the Euxine, in
which it had been straying some days, and created a
corresponding mental haze out of the elements of anger
and disappointment. The aUied admirals had addressed
its commander-in-chief Tsith scant consideration for his
rank, and had characterized a mission entrusted by him to
a flag-officer as a verhal message. Whose dog was he, to
be treated in that way ? The Circassian pashas were
dismayed at the adjournment of the expedition ; and the
sickness among their countrymen and women, through
confinement and privations, became aggravated by despon-
dency. No allusion having been made in their letter to
Mushaver Pasha, the allied admirals might officially
ignore his mission. It therefore devolved on the Turkish

286 TURKEY AND tHE CRIMEAN WAR.

commander-in-chief, in the interest of the Porte and his .
own responsibility, to confirm it in detail. He hesitated
to take a step likely in his opinion to incense his super-
cilious colleagues, and counselled anxiously several days
with his familiars before making up his mind to sign the
letter * to that effect which he sent them.

Achmet Pasha's heart was not in the Circassiim
expedition. He agreed with Admiral Hamelin on the
imprudence of the Turkish fleet going eastwai-d, with
Sevastopol unblockaded by the Allies, and he easily con-
soled himself for the tone of Admiral Dundas's letter.
Though addressed to him, its sting was evidently meant
for another. Lynx-eyed as a Persian in detecting a
slight, he saw that, through irreverence or some other
cause, Mushaver Pasha had forfeited the allied admirals'
favour, and that he himself, if successful in acquiring it
instead, would stand all the higher in the eyes of his own
people — seeing him preferred by them to a Nazarene,
one of their own race^-and be able perhaps to make
capital out of it at the Porte. On this prompting he
acted. While he spat, figuratively, on their beards, and
spoke disrespectfully of their mothers, for the '* dirt ''
they made him (^by his own account) eat in his interviews
with them from time to time, he laid himself out in an
Oriental spirit to win their smiles by any and every
means ; excusing his versatiUty by what he termed the
exigencies of his position.

* Vide Appendix II.

( 237 )

CHAPTEK XVIII.

The Allies' Fleets at Baltchik — How they watched Sevastopol— The
Turkish Fleet kept at oat-post Duty — What might have been
done in the Summer of 1854 — Powerlul Force of the Fleets —
Discourtesy to Mushaver Pasha — Conciliatory Compliments unac-
knowledged — Tidings of the Anglo-French Squadron on the
Circassian Coast — Turkish Envoys and Munitions of War tran-
shipped to Circassia — Precipitancy of the Measure — Indignation of
the Turks — Disappointment of the Circassians — Admiral Sir
Edmund Lyons' lieport of the Circassians — Motives of the
Allies' Admirals — Articles in the Daily Xcwh — Mortality in the
Turkish Fleet — Its Cause — The Allies' Admirals object to its
Cruising, and order it to lie at Varna — liemonstrance of the
Turkish and Egyptian Admirals — Recall of the Fleet by the
Porte — Views of the Allies' Admirals as to the Turkish Fleet
carried out — Results of their Proceedings — Effect on the Circas-
sians — The Allies' Admirals secure for Russia in War what she had
not ventured to ask in Peace.

Within eight days of the date of the letter cited in the
last chapter, the Allies' fleets returned to Baltchik. As
they passed Kavama, the Turkish fleet lying there
showed them deep respect. It loosed its sails, drew up
guards of honour on its poops, with bands playing alter-
nately French and Enghsh airs, and sent its steamers to
aid in towiug them to their anchorage. Those fleets
remained at Baltchik, with one short interval, until
the ensuing September : a couple of their steamers
looked into Sevastopol occasionally, and that inspection

238 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

was humorously termed equivalent to a blockade.
During that period the Russians may have conveyed
munitions of war unnoted from Nicolaef to Sevastopol ;
and might, if they had had the wit, have sent their
small frigates hghtened and corvettes, useless at
Sevastopol, into the Sea of Azof for its protection.
The Allies' admirals refused to allow the Turkish fleet —
solicitous of the honour for the sake of example —
to lie in company with their ships, and practically
commented on their professed anxiety for its safety
by retaining it at the outer anchorage of Kavama,
seven miles to windward, in the way to intercept fire-
ships, expected to be made use of by the Russians as in
all their previous wars with Turkey. The Turks, thus
left to themselves, did out-post duty for their allies
with cruisers beyond Cape Kelhigriah. There was no
necessity for that precaution. The three fleets lay
protected by the renown of the British navy. That
ancient renown covered the Black Sea as with a mantle,
and kept the Russians quiet.

Much might easily have been effected during those
three precious summer months of 1854, In the first
place, the Turkish fleet, carrying out the Porte's policy,
might have laid the foundation of Caucasian indepen-
dence. In the next place, a squadron of the allies'
line-of-battle ships with attendant steam frigates, the
bulk of their fleet off Sevastopol, might have silenced
Kilburn and Okchakof forts ; and then the steamers,
ascending the Boug, might have fired the arsenal of
Nicolaef, at that time unfortified and feebly garrisoned.
War having found Russia unprepared, ill able to make
front all round the compass, early maritime operations in

THE allies' fleets AT BALTCHIK. 239

the Black Sea would, in their reaction, have been
sensibly felt in her vulnerable quarter, her southern
provinces. The apologists for the inaction of the Allies'
admirals at Baltchik during that summer have instanced*
their deficient means, by comparison with the means at
the disposal of their successors the following year.
Relatively with the preparedness of the enemy in
1865, they were equal ; and they were far superior to
any ever possessed by their predecessors in command
of fleets in any quarter of the globe. While steam
locomotion was yet a philosopher's dream, the British
navy had ascended rivers in North America, sailing and
warping, and had landed armies in Egypt in the face of
gallant expectant foes.

The Allies' admirals, on their arrival at Baltchik,
desired the commander of the Turkish fleet, Ahmed
Pasha (who gave earnest of compliance) , to come un-
accompanied by Mushaver Pasha, when wishing to
confer with them. There was nothing in the caution
to take exception at; all that made it noticeable
was its contrast with Admiral Dundas's refusal some
months earlier at Constantinople to have an interview
with the former, at the request of the authorities,
unless in presence of the latter, ** that his words," he
said, '* might not again be misrepresented." More signi-
ficantly Admiral Dundas abstained, out of deference it
was said for his French colleague's whim, from inviting
Mushaver Pasha to an official dinner in the Britannia^
given May 24th, in honour of the Queen's birthday ; to
which the captains of his own fleet, the flag-officers and
captains of the French fleet, and the native pashas of
the Turkish fleet with one Turkish bey were invited.

240 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The invitations were sent to the Turkish fleet in a
manner which gave immediate publicity to an exclusion
little to be anticipated. A breach of the laws of hospi-
tality or decorum is .a momentous affair in the East,
because it presages mischief for the object of it ; and
therefore speculation on what might follow after an
Oriental fashion was excited among the Turkish oflScers,
who, with exaggerated notions of their power, thought
the admirals spiteful. Mushaver Pasha reassured some
and disconcerted others by proceeding in a steam
tender from Kavarna, in the forenoon of the said
24th May, to Baltchik, to pay his personal respects to
Admiral Dundas as the Queen's representative in the
Black Sea ; and he recommended his colleagues to send
their flag-captains to comphment him in their names.
They sent them with sweet-off'erings, they dressed their
ships in colours, they fired royal salutes, and did not
receive a simple " thank you '* in return.

While we were thus loyally occupied in the Britannia,
the imperial French steamer Mogador arrived from
Circassia with the first intelligence of the detached
Anglo-French squadron. It had looked at Anapa and
Soudjouk Kaleh on- the coast of Abasia, had landed
tw^o officers at Vardan to g&ther notions, had found
Soukhoum Kaleh abandoned by the enemy and in
possession of wild Circassians, busy extracting bolts
from gun-carriages ; and then, embarking a Turkish
battahon at Tchuruk-sou, had occupied with it Redout
Kaleh, as the Russians, who had already sent away
their military stores to Kutais, were in the act of evacu-
ating it.

The admirals, considering the occupation of Redout

"VIGOROUS" MEASURES OP THE ADMIRALS. 241

Kaleh a signal advantage, resolved to follow it up
** vigorously." With this view, they sent for the Turkish
and Egyptian pashas, who were whiling away the time
before dinner with the Mudir of Baltchik, and without
preamble ordered them to transfer the passengers and
munitions of war, embarked for Circassia in the Ottoman
fleet, to an English screw line-of-battle ship and two
Turkish steam frigates, for despatch that very evening to
to Soukhoum Kaleh and Redout Kaleh ; little thinking
that stores landed at the latter place, in Mingreliuy had
obviously shght chance of ever reaching Circassia.
Remarks incidentally dropped by the admirals in dis-
paragement of sail ships, — about the time they would take
to traverse the Black Sea, — had indicated the prospect
of some such mode of reconciling their duty by the
Circassians (as they understood it) with the detention of
the Turkish fleet at Kavama ; and therefore to meet that
objection the pashas were advised to propose, in amend-
ment, for the four Turkish steam frigates present to tow
as many line-of-battle ships across the Euxine. No delay
would have ensued therefrom. Thus handicapped, those
steamers would have fairly kept pace with their consort
the Sans Pareil. To no purpose. The gallant admirals
could not, or would not, be brought to see the difference
between an expedition and a consignment — the diflference,
in the eyes of a semi-barbarous people, between landing
envoys, auxiliaries, arms and ammunition from a squadron
with attendant pomp and circumstance, and dropping
them like ordinary passengers and goods from crowded
transports. Better far, but for appearance sake, have
sent them all back to Constantinople.

The precipitancy of the measure was remonstrated

242 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

against : a respite only till next forenoon was prayed for,
to eflFect the transhipment with due regard for the rank
and sex of some of the parties, and for the safety of the
ammunition. That reasonable prayer was refused. The
two pashas were desired, within an hour of the dinner
they had been invited to, to return to Kavama and see at
once to the business. Having to row back in their barges
seven miles, they reached their ships hungry and weary,
with gall in their hearts. One of them, usually reticent,
exclaimed, in the midst of his scribes and domestics sur-
prised at his return dinnerless, *' Can I ever forgive this
treatment ! " Chafing under contumely, they carried out
the irrational order : an order which they might, on the
ground of policy and humanity, have declined to act upon.
Pashas, military instructors, traders, women, children,
field-pieces, small arms, gunpowder, provisions, and
merchandise, were transferred, between 7 and 12 p.m.
of the 24th of May, 1854, from a dozen vessels in
the exposed roadstead of Kavama to the said three
steamers, with unavoidable confusion, damage and
personal risk. No order of precedence or arrangement
could be observed in the hurry of transhipment ; no
lists could be made of the goods hoisted in indiscri-
minately over the gangways, or handed pelc mele out of
the boats through the ports of the steamers.

Earely has a more ''fantastic trick" been played by
"men dressed m a little brief authority.'' It made
many sigh, if it did not make angels weep. Sefer
Pasha and his colleague expressed becomingly their
sorrow for such indecorous treatment. The European
" instructors *' swore loudly and declared the admirals
worse than Turks. Women and childi-en, roused out

A CONSIGNMENT FOR THE CAUCASIANS. 243

of sleep, screamed with alarm in the boats. Several
artillerymen ashore lost their passage. Half the ammu-
nition was necessarily left for another opportunity ; much
of the remainder having to be stowed, through want
of room in the magazines, on the lower decks of the
Turkish steamers thronged with a promiscuous crowd.
The explosion of either on the passage should have
caused no surprise.

Circassians of rank and others landed like adven-
turers, arms and stores cast on the shore to be scrambled
for, could not be expected, even by the AUies' admirals,
to produce the same result as if the former had disem-
barked with honours from a fleet, and the latter had
been distributed with discernment. Sefer Pasha, re-
turning to his country like a refugee, was long in
recovering some of his prestige. The military instructors
remained undirected, smoking their pipes at Soukhoum
Ealeh, till they dispersed sick at heart. Behchet Pasha
and others, landed at Ardler, turned their attention
to pursuits of individual advantage. The presents and
cloaks of honour intended for Circassian chieftains were
appropriated by those entrusted with them. The stores
melted away. The Caucasians, the parties chiefly inter-
ested, declared themselves betrayed as usual by the
Porte. '' The Porte promised us," they said, ** the
Turkish fleet with troops, and never sent it."

Four days after the Mogadovy Rear-Admiral Sir
Edmund Lyons arrived at Baltchik from the coast of
Circassia, and as the proceedings of the Turkish fleet
had been ostensibly made dependent on the information
he might bring, we entertained hopes of being allowed
to follow our friends, about whom some uneasiness was

16—2

244 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

felt. The expedition had suflFered heavy discouragement ;
but there was yet time for efficient operations. The
Rear-Admiral reported the Circassians to be divided
among themselves and clamorous for troops to act with
them against the Russians, — the old oft-repeated tale.
We had had in view to assuage their dissensions and
give them the means of organization with military aid.
He was as much opposed as ever to the Turkish fleet's
Circassian destination ; and thus supported, the Allies'
admirals, throwing oflF the mask, definitively declared it
inopportune. Then, with strange inconsistency, they
desired the commander of the Turkish fleet to write to
the seraskir at Constantinople a request for troops to be
sent to Circassia. The seraskir's reply was reproachful.
** With Roumelia in revolt and the Russians on the right
bank of the Danube, we cannot spare troops for Circassia :
we gave our fleet for that service, with orders to embark
4,000 troops at Batoom, and the AlUes' admirals have
detained it at Kavama."

This was the only audible accordant note between the
commanders-in-chief and the seconds in command of the
Anglo-French fleet in the Euxine during the year 1854.
Their motive was transparent. They ill brooked the idea
of the comparison sure to be drawn by the pubhc between
the Turkish fleet active on the coast of Circassia and the
combined fleets idle at Baltchik. One of the chiefs had, as
we have seen, been already morosely afiected by observa-
tions in a private letter, and the other had been painfully
excited by articles in the Daily News ; the indirect
authorship of which he — misled by a pleasant guest who
added one and .two together and made the sum even —
attributed to the writer of these pages, who had fortu-

THE AUTHOR CALUMNIATED. 245

nately the opportunity given him to repudiate the charge
in presence of the worthy admiral, before his informant
and other witnesses.* Nevertheless, the acrimonious
feelings naturally excited thereby never entirely subsided ;
so true is Solomon's remark: ** The words of a tale-
bearer are as wounds, and they go down into the inner-
most parts of the belly."

Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.

The admirals, moUified apparently by its docility,
graciously allowed the Turkish fleet about mid June to
quit Kavama and he with their fleets at Baltchik.
Encouraged by this condescension, the Turkish fleet,
after a few days of neighbourly intercourse, proposed to
part company and cruise ofi* the coast of Anatolia. The
inhabitants of that coast required encouragement ; the
coasting trade, exposed to a dash from Sevastopol,
required protection ; the fleet required fresh provisions,
unattainable by it in competition with the fleets of

* The calumny alluded to in the text had its origin as follows : —
A medical gentleman in London wrote to the author a request, on behalf
of a patient connected with the Daily News, to recommend a corre-
spondent at Constantinople for that paper. Knowing of no one in that
line, the author applied to some friends at Thcrapia, who requested him

to make the oflfer to Dr. . He accordingly sent the letter he had

received to the literary doctor, with an intimation that if the post suited
him he might put himself in communication with the editor of the Daili/
News. He heard no more of the matter ; but has reason to believe the
oflfer was not accepted. Quidnuncs, on the assumption of its acceptance,
jumped to the conclusion that the recommender influenced the writer.
The request in question had been written after the publication of the
offending articles in the Daily News. On their appearance at Constan-
tinople, the author of these pages, thinking them harsh and unmerited,
wrote in that vein to his brother in London, and begged him to
mitigate their effect as far as he could among his friends in his clubs and
at the bar.

246 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAX WAR.

wealthy European Governments. At Eavama its crews
had received only five ounces of meat per man twice a
week, while vegetables, in default of which the Turk's
health soon droops, were not procurable : keshkesh
(pounded boiled wheat) served out for a while in lieu,
proved deleterious ; and the consequence of all was, in
addition to a mortality on board at the rate of ten per cent,
per annum since leaving the Bosphorus, eleven per cent,
of the force, several hundreds of whom had to be inva-
lided, were afflicted more or less with scurvy. This
reasonable request for a cruise was unfavourably received.
Nothing short of its quitting the Black Sea could assure
the Allies' admirals of the Turkish fleet not going to the
coast of Circassia when out of their reach. Equally
averse from its presence in their sight, they ordered it to
go and lie at Varna, an objectionable anchorage. At
Varna the supply difficulty would have been enhanced,
for the Allies' military purveyors were there with open
bags of gold.

This order exhausted, for the moment. Oriental
patience. The Turkish and Egyptian admirals there-
upon wrote a joint letter to the Allies' admirals, in
which they courteously requested to be informed of their
motives for wishing thus to sequester twenty sail of men-
of-war ; reminded them of their own responsibility to the
Porte, and proposed an interview with them ; in answer
to which the admirals, in an official letter, informed them
of their having already requested the EngUsh and French
ambassadors at Constantinople to make a communication
to the Porte respecting its fleet, and pending the arrival
of the answer, they begged to decline an interview. The
terms of their letter, written before the junction of the

RESULTS OP THE ALLIES' ADMIRALS' SCHEMES. 247

fleets Bt Baltchik, did not transpire ; but the result was
the recall of the Turkish fleet, excepting two line-of-
battle ships, already there for the purpose, which
were ordered to lie at Varna to assist in the disem-
barkation of the Allies' armies' stores. The Porte
thought that its fleet, doomed to inactivity, might
as well lie in the Bosphorus with consideration and
full rations, as in the Bay of Kavama with humiliation
and scurvy.

Thus circuitously, the Allies' admirals succeeded in
carrying out their original views respecting the Turkish
fleet, as intimated to Mushaver Pasha three months
earlier at Baltchik. They carried them out to the very
letter. They doubtless, in accordance with human
infirmity, felt proud of their triumph. They had marred
an ably designed expedition, promising success, which
had sailed from the Bosphorus with four attainable
objects in view. First, to make Soukhoum Kaleh the
base of Caucasian operations; attempted seventeen
months later, then too late. Secondly, to reduce other
Russian positions on the coast of Abasia; abandoned
a year later unmolested. Thirdly, to unite the Circas-
sians by Moslem co-operation, and by the stimulus
of imperial favours ; also attempted fifteen months
later with trivial means by the Allies' agents, then
too late. Fourthly, to show the Turkish flag to the
Crim Tartars, and open communications with them in
anticipation of the invasion of the Crimea by the allied
armies. Instead of cheering it on and aiding it, the
Allies' admirals, in the exercise of their discretion,
detained the Turkish fleet in the Bay of Kavama, dete-
riorating there from day to day from inaction and

248 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

disappointment. They had, moreover, overlooked an
important principle.

Since the peace of Adrianople, the Turkish fleet had
been excluded from the Black Sea, not in virtue of any
treaty, but out of the Porte's deference for Kussia's
susceptibihty in regard to Circassia and the Crimea.
The Circassians and the Crimeans, unread, untravelled,
connect the past and the present by ocular evidence.
They distrust what they may hear; they may credit
what they see. They knew traditionally that Turkey
had been, in former days, a naval power. Russia willed
their ignorance of her remaining one, to strengthen the
sense of her ascendancy in their minds. The interest
created by the presence of two Turkish brigs of war at
Sevastopol, sent there in the autumn of 1850 to break
the charm, showed the wisdom of her prevision. During
three weeks 9,000 Russians and 10,000 Tartars visited
them. Many of the latter came expressly from the ends
of the Crimea ; and some among them, aged men who
remembered another order of things, were lachrymosely
moved on finding themselves xmder the Turkish flag.
This evidence of the vitality of religious associations
indicated the enthusiasm which the appearance of a
Moslem fleet at Eafla, a Turkish settlement in the days
of Crimean independence, would have evoked in 1854.
What Russia had not ventured to ask for in peace,
the Allies' admirals insisted upon in war : viz., the
exclusion of the Turkish fleet from the only sea where
its flag could give her umbrage, and where alone it could
have a moral effect.

The Turkish fleet re-anchored in the Bosphorus,
July 3, 1854. A letter followed it from Admiral Deans

TURKISH SAILOKS ON THE DANUBE. 249

Dundas to the president of the nayal council, expressive
of his desire for its crews to be sent to Batoom for
military duty. No notice was taken of this singular
proposition ; but 300 men were appropriately sent to the
Danube for boat and other nautical duties, making with
those already there 700 sailors of the imperial fleet
detached for service on that river.

250 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XIX.

The Russian Army crosses the Danube — Prince Paskievitch lays
Siege to Silistria — Its Governor, Musa Pasha, is killed — Gallantry
of the British Officers Butler and Nasmyth — The Allies aroused
to Activity — Conference with Omar Pasha at Schumla — Duke of
Cambridge embarks with his Division for Varna — Quiescence
of Omar Pasha — The Russians raise the Siege of Silistria — •
What the Allies might have done — Todleben joins the Russian
Camp — Prince Gortchakofs Advice — The allied Armies ordered
to the^ Crimea — Proposals of Austria — Her *' Material Guaran-
tee " — Plans of France and England — Reasonable Hopes of
Success — Sevastopol no longer ** a standing Menace " — Position
of Constantinople — What is wanting to make it Predominant
— Results of such Consummation — Feelings of the Turkish Navy
— Exploit of a Russian War Steamer — The Turkish Fleet at
Varna — The Town occupied by the Allies — Unceremonious Pro-
ceedings of the French — Disgust of the Inhabitants — Danger fi*om
Fire — Neglect of Precautions against it — Outbreak of Fire —
Losses of the British Commissariat — No one to direct Operations
— Conduct of European and Turkish Soldiers contrasted —
Groundless Suspicions of Greek Treachery — Too late Precautions
— Stormy Meeting of Turkish Notables — Angry Complaints
against the European Commanders — Accessibility of Turkish
Officials — Indignant Speech of an Efendi — Danger to the Shipping
in the Bay — No Guard-vessels — Outbreak of the Cholera at
Varna — Observations of the Disease — Inferences and Proofs —
Assistance safely rendered by the Healthy and Well-fed — ^Danger
of Mental Depression — Treatment of Cholera by the Turks —
Danger from checked Perspiration — Why the Turkish Crews
suffered less from Cholera — Superstitious Panic of Turkish Sailors
— Heavy Losses of French Troops from Disease — Mortality at
Kusteng^ — Sickness in the British Army — Its Causes.

In the meanwhile the Russian army, under Prince
Gortchakof, had crossed the Danube at Toolscha; the

SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. 251

spot where Darius crossed that river on his Scythian
expedition. The most accessible point of the river for
the disembftrkation of an army, opposite Ismael, had
been left invitingly bare of the means of resistance.
Thence the Eussians marched by Issatcha, Matchin, and
Hirsova, the garrisons of which retired on their approach,
to Sihstria ; before which they sat down, under the vete-
ran Marshal Prince Paskievitch. The memorable siege
of Sihstria, characterized by moving incidents, had run
its course. The envied martyr's death of Musa Pasha, •
its governor, mortally wounded by a piece of shell while
in the act of stepping on to his sedjadeh to say his evening
prayer, had sent a fervid thrill through Islam. ** For
him," said the Turkish Gazette, ** the gates of Paradise
opened wide.*' The gallantry of Captain Butler and
Lieutenant Nasmyth, in sharing the vigils and perils of
the Turco-Egyptian band entrusted with the defence of
Arah Kedoubt, had given every EngUshman a personal
interest in the siege.

The progress of the siege had aroused the Allies from
their dream of Oriental repose ; had dispelled the idea in
their minds of the improbabihty of a shot being fired in
anger by them. Marshal St. Amaud and General Lord
Raglan, accompanied by the Turkish ministers of war
and of marine, had gone to Schumla to confer with
Omar Pasha, had ascertained the danger of Sihstria, had
returned hurriedly to Constantinople, and had begun
towards the end of May to send troops to Varna. The
Duke of Cambridge embarked with his division, June 13.
The presence of a fine Turkish army at Schumla, and the
gathering of the Allies in the neighbourhood of Varna,
influenced without doubt the result of the siege ; but it

252 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

ought not to be forgotten that neither moved a step to re-
lieve the brave garrison, who had remained by their gnns
twenty-five days and nights. Straitened for provisions,
Silistria was on the point of surrendering. Its governor had
abeady informed the generahssimo of his inability to hold
out another week. '* God is great," was virtually the reply.
Omer Pasha's quiescent attitude at Schumla, making
no serious- attempt to disturb the besiegers, in a highly
critical position between him and the Danube, is an
• enigma for a future Jomini to solve. All he apparently
did was to allow Behram Pasha (General Cannon) to
manoeuvre himself with a brigade of infantry into the
place a few days before the termination of the siege.
But the Russians not suspecting scarcity in Silistria, the
place being open for supplies, apprehending also the
advance of converging armies from Varna and Schumla,
when they would not have saved either their guns or
baggage, raised the siege, June 18, and retreated with
their entire materiel : more fortunate in that respect
than their predecessors in 1828, who after four months'
open trenches before Silistria, defended then chiefly by
irregulars, left half their guns behind them, and aban-
doned nearly all the others in their retreat, harassed by
the victorious garrison and by detachments from the
Grand Vizir's army at Schumla. Had the Turks and
the Allies followed up with like vigour Prince Paskievitch
in 1854, they would have routed his army beyond the
power of rallying. The Allies might afterwards have
marched leisurely to Odessa, have there re-embarked in
their fleets, or have continued their march by Nicolaef,
Klierson, and Perekop to the Crimea. Although circuitous,
that was the best road to Sevastopol.

AUSTRIA DECIDES ON ARMED NEUTRALITY. 263

A few days before. the close of the siege of Silistria,
an officer of engineers — so it has been said — joined the
Bussian camp, simultaneously with the arrival of an
earnest request from Prince Mentchikof in the Crimea
for an able engineer. Prince Gortchakof s choice fell on
the stranger, Captain Todleben. Prince Gortchakof,
the ablest of Eussian strategists, advised, after the
failure before Silistria, sending two divisions of the army
of the Danube to the Crimea ; but the Czar, in doubt
about the Allies' intentions, would not consent to reduce
that army.

Ten days after the raising of the siege of Silistria,
the English and French Governments ordered the earliest
possible embarkation of their armies for the Crimea.
Whereupon Austria sent a mihtary envoy to Varna to
urge upon the allied generals' consideration the superior
advantages hkely in her opinion to be derived from an
autumnal campaign in Bessarabia, professing her readi-
ness, should they coincide with her view, to co-operate
actively with them. She excused herself from co-opera-
tion if the Alhes persisted in going to the Crimea, where
it was observed their detention might exceed anticipa-
tion. She would be exposed in that case to be attacked
by the Eussian army of the west, without their being
able to make a diversion in her favour. Paris was
sufficiently remote from that army to be careless about
its movements ; but Vienna lay within a few marches of
it, with discontented Hungary and fermenting Italy to
think about besides. Austria, having thus proffered as
much 9,s she thought could be reasonably expected of her
in her complex position, decided on armed neutrality.
She had already been busy negotiating a treaty with the

254 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Porte, signed July 14, 1854, for the joint military
occupation of Moldo-Wallachia, with the faculty of
marching troops into Bosnia in the event of the Servians
and Montenegrins proving troublesome. The '* material
guarantee " thus entrusted by Turkey, with the consent
of France and England, to Austria's keeping, became a
guarantee for her that, end how it might, she would not
be a loser by the war, and placed her in a position to
verify the axiom that in every Eastern question she must
sooner or later have a voice.

But France and England, confident in their resources,
gave no heed to her schemes. They intended the
Crimean campaign to be at once the commencement
and the termination of the war, — to begin and end in
the autumn of 1854. Counting on certain success, they
were resolved to have the glory to themselves, to share
it with no one else, and to show the world their abiUty
with their forces then in Turkey to humble Bussia. The
Turkish army was not invited to join them, save a few
indififerent battalions to amuse the Crim-Tartars with;
the Turkish fleet had been turned out of the Euxine ;
Austria was made light of. The expectation of early
and rapid success was not unreasonable. The English
and French Governments had obtained tolerably accu-
rate information about the Bussian forces in the Crimea ;
they in no material respect, as events showed, misled
their generals ; and it seemed as if human means would
be impotent to avert the anticipated catastrophe. They
may be supposed to have said to them in as many words :
— '* Take 50,000 of the finest troops of Europe, supported
by matchless fleets. Go to the Crimea, where a dis-
aflFected population is ready to welcome you. There you

WHAT STEAM HAS EFFECTED IN THE EAST. 255

will find an army inferior in numbers and equipment, and
an ill-foftified arsenal. Kout the former, reduce the
latter, and return with laurels to eat your Christmas
dinners."

On that hypothesis the expedition was judicious, and
on no other; for when undertaken, Sevastopol had,
through the agency of steam, ceased to be a ** standing
menace." The first screw line-of-battle ship which
furrowed the Euxine dissolved the charm, and converted
the menace into a bugbear. As long as the north-east
wind, prevalent in summer, could chain a fleet two
months together in the Bosphorus, Sevastopol com-
manded the Euxine, and cast the shadow of invasion over
Turkey ; but as soon as steam rendered egress as facile
from one place as from the other, the balance was righted,
if not inclined the other way. The Euxine possesses only
two safe defensible harbours, Sevastopol and the Bos-
phorus, and for a steam fleet the latter is the best, since
it has its port under its lee. The position of Constanti-
nople, always unrivalled in a military and commercial
sense, has gained by steam so much, that whenever the
balance of power shall be permanently deranged, the
seat of predominance will be that city — the natural
capital of all the provinces of the Eastern empire linked
with it by the traditions of fifteen centuries. All that
seems wanting for that consummation is a government
willing to rule on unsectarian principles, and adapt its
policy to the requirements of the age. Mark the logical
sequences. The Hellespont and the Bosphorus will be
rendered impassable, and the fleets behind them become
in their turn standing menaces for the Mediterranean
and the Euxine. The fertile districts bithed by the

256 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Propontis — the sun-lit lake of Constantinople — and its
inexhaustible fisheries, will nourish treble the actual
population of the capital. Fleets built and equipped
at arsenals in the Ked Sea and the Persian Gulf will
command the Indian and Chinese seas. Emigration from
Germany, Italy, and Western India, filling up voids in
Koumelia, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia, will re-cultivate
neglected plains, rebuild fallen cities, and develop mineral
treasures.

Seeing the daily passage through the Bosphorus of
troops and military stores, its own arsenal building
shalans to land them in the Crimea, the Turkish fleet
felt humiliated by its seclusion at Buyukdereh. But its
government was trammelled by deference to the behests
of the Allies, and no press existed to espouse its cause.
Unexpectedly its foe assisted it out of a false position.
One day, July 19, a Russian war steamer, the Bessarabia^
left Sevastopol and steamed across the Black Sea, then
alive with thirty hostile steamers, to the coast of Anatolia;
there captured two Turkish merchant vessels, one oflF
Cape Kempereh, the other oflF Amassereh, laden re-
spectively with Indian corn and coal ; and, having
replenished her bunkers from the latter, burnt them.
She retained the captain and scribe of each vessel as
evidence of her feat, embarked the crews in a coasting
craft to go their own way, showed her colours off Ereghli
and Kosloe, and then returned to Sevastopol. The
caimacam of Ereghli, where the ejected crews landed,
forwarded a report of the affair to Constantinople.
Together with the news, at first regarded as a hoax,
arrived accounts of the feeling of insecurity among the
inhabitants of the coast ; who fancied the Russian fleet

THE ALLIED TROOPS AT VARNA. 257

at sea. The Kussians had destroyed Turkish ships at
Sinope, as though in defiance of the alUed fleets at
Beikos ; they now burned Turkish vessels in the vicinity,
as though in contempt ^r the aUied fleets at Baltchik.
The Turkish steamers being either absent or under
repair, the author proposed to run down the coast of
Anatolia with a frigate, to encourage the natives; but
the Capitan Pasha expressed his apprehension of his
falling in with a Bussian squadron, Sevastopol, he said,
being evidently unblockaded. DecUning the respon-
sibility, he desired him to wait on the Grand Vizir and
confer with him thereupon. His Highness showed himself
equally disinclined to risk a frigate ; he would, however,
he said, consider about sending the fleet to sea again :
meaning rather, that he would concert an excuse to make
to the Sultan for having consented to its recall ; of which
he appeared ashamed, with reason.

July 29. — The Turkish fleet again left the Bospho-
rus, each ship carrying two shalans lashed on either
broadside, and four days afterwards anchored in the Bay
of Varna) crowded then with shipping of all denomi-
nations. One of its line-of-battle ships, having exhibited
dangerous leakage on the passage, was sent back to
Constantinople.

Varna seemed then in hostile rather than friendly
occupation. The best houses and private magazines had
been taken possession of by the Allies without any
remuneration to their owners. General Lord Raglan for
his part, when spoken to on the subject, said he had
served before in an ally's and an enemy's country and
had always enjoyed free quarters. Foreign residents
alone escaped the honour of furnishing quarters gratis.

258 ' TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

An Ionian tried the question by refusing to surrender his
house ; on which the EngUsh consul was called upon to
eject him, nolens voUnSy but excused himself on the plea
of want of authority. The French were particularly
unceremonious : they used to mark with chalk any house
the aspect or position of which suited them, then desire
the governor to give them immediate possession of it.
Many sighs issued from latticed harems at their ungallant
importunity. One day a staff officer, pensive as though
meditating on a thorny enterprise, meeting the author in
one of the streets, complained of the reluctance of the
fair occupants of a house selected by him that morning
to turn out, and requested his assistance. The French-
man had never seen his face before, and on being referred
to the governor, with the observation — " You should give
the ladies two days' grace," looked as if he wished never
to see it again. They chafed the temper of the miUtary
commandant, by making, without concert with him, a wide
breach in the curtain of the sea wall to facilitate the dis-
embarkation of their troops and stores. The inhabitants,
instable and sore, murmured reproaches against the
habits of the foreign troops — their proneness to drink
and quarrel, to deal with shops on credit — and soon
began to admire wonderfully, by comparison, the order
and docility of their own troops, who had landed at and
marched through Varna the preceding summer, and had
not taken the value of an apple nor disturbed the gambols
of a child. One night at ten o'clock some French soldiers
went to a Mussulman cafe, occupied as usual by sleeping
guests stretched on the estrades, and demanded wine.
The orthodox cavedji was shocked ; he told them wine
was not sold there, and requested them to retire. A

FIRE AT VARNA. 259

quarrel ensued, in which one of the Turks was killed and
several on either side were wounded. Other French
soldiers coming in from the camp outside the gates on
hearing of the scuffle, a serious fray on a more extensive
scale nearly occurred.

Varna being the chief depot of the stores and
provisions of the Allies' armies, containing also much of
their ammunition, demanded extraordinary precautions
against fire, accidental or wilful ; but by the rule of
contrary which prevails in Turkey, as well with foreigners
as with natives, simple precautions were considered as
needless as though the city had been constructed of
asbestos. Strangers came and went as they pleased, free
from police observation and passport investigation.
Bashi-bazouks encamped or bivouacked in open spaces,
cooking their food in currents of air. Kollicking camp-
followers threw the lighted ends of their cigars right and
left in the streets. Improvised cafes of boughs and laths
were filled with drinkers, smokers, and brawlers, till late
in the night. So, as was to be expected in a wooden town
— its non-occurrence earlier being surprising — fire broke
out one night, August 10. It blazed six hours, consumed
the bazaars, many private dwellings and store-houses,
and a large amount of mihtary supplies. The British
commissariat, — its difficulties thus early commencing, —
lost that night near six weeks' rations of biscuit for the
army, and much of its stored com. An hour of intense
anxiety was passed by all, watching and combating the
flames shooting out their forked tongues at the powder
magazines, and throwing sparks on their roofs. Their
ignition and the destruction of Varna were convertible
terms. Levelling adjoining houses and covering the

17—2

260 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

menaced buildings with wet canvas ensured their safety.
During the conflagration confusion reigned in the town.
Many gave orders, no one commanded : a head was
wanted. Marshal St. *Amaud was indisposed in his
house, and General Lord Raglan was absent at Baltchik.
Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons had come into the
illuminated bay from Constantinople early in the evening,
but after communicating with one of H.M.'s ships had '
steamed on to Baltchik with the rueful tidings. The
field officer on duty, brave veteran, stood feeble on his
legs on a heap of rubbish near the powder magazine, his
voice unheeded amidst a Babel of tongues. The pasha
sat smoking on a block of wood, in contemplation
of a party of sailors busy in razing a knot of dwellings
which threatened to lead the flames to the upper quarter
of the town. The captains of the ships of war in port
strove fearlessly and zealously, each on his own account.
Aides-de-camp galloping about added much to the
picturesque, but nothing to the useful. Prudence would
have suggested placing the material means of the Allies
at the disposal of the Turks, versed in the tactics for a
burning town, and leaving them to deal with the fire
while they maintained order with their own troops. As
fast as store-houses became reUeved of their contents,
heads of wine and sugar-casks were stove in for the
regalement of the thirsty and of the sweet- toothed.
*• Voici,'' said one of a hilarious group of zouaves towards
morning, handing us wine instead of the water asked for ;
** voici quelque chose meilleure que Teau : buvez, mes
braves, ne craignez rien ; le prophete ne regarde pas de
si pres.'' Frank soldiers and sailors spared dealers in
the bazaars the trouble of removing their goods, and the

GROUNDLESS SUSPICION'S OF GREEK TREACHERY. 261

rabble followed their example. As on other occasions
when honour or loot was to be obtained, the Turkish
soldiers and sailors were not invited to join : they neither
robbed nor rioted;

About midnight the inverse process of tracing cause
from effect was resorted to to account for the fire, which
was afterwards ascertained to have originated in a French
government store of spirits and stationery. The fire
would benefit Russia indirectly, therefore her partisans
had lighted it. Thus reasoned some persons of rank,
who might have reflected on the improbability o;
incendiaries choosing a calm night under a full moon fo\
their operations. They raised the mischievous cry ol
Greek treachery. Incontinently orders were given to
arrest every Greek whom any one in authority might
deem suspicious. Several individuals were beaten on
the spot, others were reserved for a beating next day.
Two or three, it was said, were tossed into the flames ;
though from personal knowledge I am only able to say
that two narrowly escaped that fate through timely inter-
ference. There was no fair ground for imputing such a
mode of carrying on war to Russia, still less for sup-
posing the Greeks willing to spoil their profitable
dealings with the Allies for her sake.

The morrow disclosed the usual scenes of desola-
tion, increased by the too late roused vigilance of the
Allies. They pulled down houses untouched by the fire
to make wider spaces round the powder depots : they
threw the planks of those and previously razed houses —
materials for reconstruction— into the sea ; and they
planted sentries in the streets to prevent the sufferers
from searching among the ruins of their shops and

262 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

dwellings for valuables. Precautions suggested by alarm
are always exaggerated.

Next afternoon the medjlis of the city held a stormy
meeting, presided over by the governor. The speakers
inveighed angrily against their allies. They compared
the Russians favourably with them. ** The Muscovites,"
they said, ** came to Varna after the irritation of a double
siege ; they remained there two years, gave nobody
reason to lament their conduct, and left the town better
than they had found it. The Franks have scarcely been
at Varna three months ; they have taken our dwellings
and store-houses compulsorily, have covered us with
opprobrium, and now the place is ruined by their
carelessness." An angry notable, whose store full of
wares had been consumed, reproached the pasha for
having neglected to make representations to the Allies'
generals about the ineflSciency of their police. The
pasha said he and the military commandant had warned
them as far as they could of the risk of fire. ** They
are like sultans ; it is difficult to obtain an audience of
them. When we visit either of them we are referred
to a dragoman ; when we write to them our letters
remain unanswered." The contrast between the acces-
sibility of a Turkish and the inaccessibility of a European
functionary astonishes Orientals. A ragged fakir j with
scarcely a crust to munch, may walk up to a pasha's
sofa : his tale will be listened to. This accessibility
and the right of petition operate as a check on subor-
dinate agents. Under the influence of pipes and coflfee
the effervescence of the company was subsiding, when
an incidental allusion to the siege of Varna in 1823
nearly roused it again. A white-bearded efendi warmed

DANGER TO THE SHIPPING FROM FIRE. 263

at the recollection. ** Talk of the late siege of
Silistria," he said ; " what is it compared with the
siege of Varna ! Varna possessed then only a few old
brass guns and scarcely any of its existent works :
yet we repulsed the enemy once and nearly repulsed
him twice. Wallah ! " he emphatically exclaimed,

**that enemy behaved better to us than these our

friends."

Any one who, on the side of the aided, has noted
the bearing of an auxiUary army would pray to heaven
for any calamity to befall him rather than see his own
country reduced to solicit such succour.

As on the land, so on the water. The Bay of Varna was
crowded with shipping of many nations, under little or no
surveillance. A vessel filled with combustibles might
have anchored any day among them unquestioned, and
her crew might have left in their boat at night
after having fired her and slipped her cable. Many
men-of-war and numerous transports, with two powder
ships, were irregularly anchored in the bay ; but there
was not a cruiser in the offing nor a guard-boat service
at night. A few fire-ships sent in with the prevailing
north-east wind would have caused inextricable confusion
and incalculable damage. Troop and store-ships were
continually passing between the Bosphorus and Varna ;
nevertheless not a vessel was stationed off the coast to
protect them from a dash such as the Bessarabia had
lately made on the coast of Anatolia. The AlUes'
admirals at Baltchik were not insensible to that risk, as
appeared by the following note from one of them to
the Turkish admiral: —

264 TURKEY AND THE CRWIEAN WAR.

** Baltchik, Angnst 6, 1864.
** Do not omit to keep a small vessel between the
Bosphorus and Vama, as the Kussians may think of
looking out for a merchant ship or a transport ; as well
as a steamer occasionally to Circassia. I have the Wasp
there just now. I am keeping my force ready to embark
troops."

This call upon the Turkish fleet to protect allied
vessels was tantamount to an apology for its dismissal
six weeks earlier. Marshal St. Amaud spoke to us in
the same apprehensive sense one day at dinner at his
head-quarters.

At that date the Russian fleet was cruising off Sevas-
topol, and two days earlier four Russian steamers had
been seen forty miles out at sea. The Russian admiral
little guessed the game there was for Enterprise to play
while the gathering was taking place at Vama.

During the month of August cholera tainted the
allied fleets and armies. Frequent visits to the sick-bay
of his ship, to relieve her crew of the apprehension of
contagion which depressed them, famiUarized the author
with its features, and made him think, notwithstanding
the fatal termination of some cases in thirty- six hours,
the panic usually created by it unfounded. Further
observation of the disease on a wider area at Constan-
tinople, eleven years later, confirmed that impression
in his mind. Three propositions seem demonstrable.
1. Cholera is not contagious in the literal sense of the
term, by contact. Proof : the immunity as a rule of those
who chafe with their hands the skin of patients in a state
of collapse. 2. Cholera is not infectious through the

OUTBREAK OF CHOLERA AT VARNA. 265

medium of effluvia from the bodies of patients, where
attention is given to ventilation and disinfecting pro-
cesses. Proof: the immunity, with rare exceptions, of
the doctors in attendance on cholera patients in properly
organized hospitals, and of patients with other diseases
under the same roof. The naval hospital of Constanti-
nople was crowded during the summer of 1865 with
cholera and cholerine patients, all of them sedulously
attended ; yet none of the medical officers — two of whom,
Hassan Bey and Gosma Bey, displayed remarkable
self-abnegation — took the disease. Similar remarks
apply to the military hospitals, as well as to the civil
hospitals improvised during that period. 3. Cholera
attacks only those classes whose blood has been slowly
poisoned by breathing for years foul exhalations in
confined, ill-ventilated quarters, or whose occupations
entail on them undue exposure to solar and atmospheric
influences. Proof: the immunity of the easy classes,
who can adapt their diet and apparel and their pro-
ceedings to the exigencies of an abnormal season ;
deducting those individuals among them who prefer
brandy-and-water to barley-water, who swallow every
nostrum advertised as ** infallible," or who brood isolated
over exaggerated reports, with their eyes mentally fixed
on their stomachs. From these premises we may infer
— with all deference for the opinion of learned members
of the Cholera Conference, advocates of selfish isolation
— that the easy classes, on the appearance of the disease
in any place, may safely give themselves the satisfaction
of mitigating by their example and advice the distress of
their poor neighbours. When those in no danger flee
away panic-stricken from salubrious dwellings, those in

266 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

real danger, with open sewers under their windows and
choked drains under their feet, may well imagine their
case hopeless, and thus open the door to cholera's chief
ally, moral depression.

The treatment of cholera in the Turkish fleet in
August, 1854, consisted in friction, — the best remedy —
chalk opiate mixture, and occasionally venesection.
Doubtful about the lancet (which was not put in requisi-
tion by the Turks in 1865), I presumed, on the authority
of the chief medical ofl&cers of the Allies' flagships,
consulted ad hocy to remonstrate against its use ; but
the doctors adhered to their view of its efficacy in some
cases, and cited afterwards in favour of it the compara-
tive large number of their cures, notwithstanding that
official cupidity denied them means to nourish their
convalescents suitably. Once the doctor of the Nuzretieh
abstained from venesection out of an Oriental deference
for rank, and although declining the responsibility I
begged him to act on the dictates of his judgment, he
would not swerve from his sense of the consideration
due for it. He could not, he said, knowing the pasha's
distrust in the practice, presume to bleed any of his suite.
The patient was not bled, and died. On reporting his
death, the doctor said, ** If he had been bled, he might
have survived." ** Y(m should not, as a good Moslem,
speak thus," I observed ; ** the poor fellow's hour was
come: bled or not bled, he must have died." This
silenced, without convincing, the hekim. Medical study
saps the dogma of fate.

Checked perspiration during a choleraic season is
fraught with peril ; and on this head it may not be amiss
to observe that its recurrence is invited in most navies

CHOLERA ON BOARD SHIPS. 267

by the custom — partly a cause of the premature old age
of man-of-war's men — of berthing a ship's company
together, in summer as well as winter, on the orlop deck,
in harbour,— a custom as injurious to the respiratory
organs as it is disagreeable to the olfactory nerves.
Perspiring from head to foot, vitally depressed by
breathing foul air, a man, at the call of nature, runs
half- dressed up to the head, and remains there, caressed
by the cool breeze, longer than necessary. That grateful
air bath may be his death. The larger the ship the
greater the danger. Hence the vessels of the Anglo-
French fleet most severely attacked in 1854 were three-
deckers : the Britannia and the Montebello. The crews
of the Turkish ships, debilitated more or less by scurvy
and inferior diet, might have been expected to have had
proportionally more cases than their Allies ; neverthe-
less they had fewer, which may be attributed to the
practice in summer of the men sleeping, with ample
space between them, on their beds spread on the gun
decks ; and also to covered ship's heads. A shght chill
might prove fatal, of which the author had melancholy
verification. Thrice at night, one of his boat's crew
sickened, and two out of three died. Alarmed, the
remainder of the crew came one morning with depre-
cating salaams into the cabin, and delivered themselves
to this effect : The cholera and a new coxswain had
made their appearance together in the boat ; there was
evidently a connection between them, and they humbly
requested his discharge. *' Have you any other cause
of complaint against Saly?" — ** None : he is a good
man, we all like him ; but he has brought the cholera
with him to the boat. Inshallah ! you will send him

268 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

away; if not, we shall all die." This hallucination was
serious. Their request could neither be regarded as an
infraction of disciphne nor joked with as a morbid fancy.
I adopted a middle course, and reasoned with them. I
commented on their irreverence in ascribing to their
fellow mortal more power than their Prophet had wielded.
** If he is possessed with a djin (evil spirit — the lower
classes in Turkey implicitly believe in djins,) **the
person in the stem sheets is the most exposed to liis
malign influence, and as he has no fear, why should
you ? ' ' This appeased them. But as their moral depres-
sion was predisposing, something more than argument
was necessary. They were therefore ordered thence-
forward to take their capotes with them at night, to put
on when lying on their oars. The heat rendered this
irksome, and they were then perhaps sorry for having
spoken. On their return on board hot coffee was sup-
plied them from the cabin. Thanks to these precautions,
no other of the barge's crew suffered ; and Saly, who had
not admired the attribution of life and death given him
by his comrades, retained his post.

One day the imams of the fleet embarked in one
boat and rowed round every ship in succession, chanting
supplications to heaven to deliver the faithful from the
cholera. As the disease was then on the decline, they
obtained much credit for the presumed efficacy of their
intercession.

The French suffered disproportionately during the
summer of 1854 by cholera and other diseases classed
under that head : for cholera had then to bear the sins
of absinthe. A Zouave regiment, 2,200 strong when it
left Algiers, was reduced to 1,400 men by the end of

SICKNESS AMONG THE ALLIES' TROOPS, 269

August ; and the first division of their army, in its aim-
less incursion to the Dobrudscha, lost in a few days,
from drought and heat combined, 3,500 men, including
sixty oflScers. During their hurried march of nine hours,
fleeing from an invisible foe, back to Kustenge, men
dropped exhausted every hundred yards. None heeded
them. Even a chef de bataillon, unhorsed by a sun-
stroke, was said to have been abandoned. At Kustenge
the dead and dying lay, we heard, mingled in heaps.
Steamer-loads of sick, brought away from Ovid's dreary
place of exile to be encamped on the northern slopes of
the Bay of Varna, long whitened with their tents, were
more eloquent than despatches.

The sickness in the British army in Bulgaria during
that lugubrious period may be fairly attributed as much
to injudicious diet as to a disturbed atmosphere. The
ordinary ration of one pound of meat per man per diem,
having been increased to one pound and a half, gastric
irritation naturally ensued more or less. A deduction
of a quarter of a pound and an issue of rice in lieu,
should have seemed preferable. Much animal food,
even of a digestible kind, cannot be eaten with impunity
in Turkey, where the climate is inflammatory, with
exceptional action on the stomach. The assertion,
repeated ad nauseam, of the troops requiring extra meat
and porter to keep up their strength — men between
twenty and thirty years of age, in weary idleness —
induced the error. Nature had given them the principle
of strength, and all she asked for was a suitable diet, cool
and unexciting. Hygienic science slumbered in the
British camp when it was proposed to counteract the
action on the human &ame of an increment of twenty

270 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

degrees of atmospheric heat by an addition to the already
liberal allowance of meat. Adherence to the routine, at
variance with the universal practice of all classes in the
south, of serving the men's principal meal at noon,
proved another, if not the chief cause, of debility. Salt
pork, or fresh killed ill-cooked beef, with biscuit and
grog, is not tempting diet anywhere in any latitude ;
but swallowed under canvas, with the thermometer at
90 degrees, it is well calculated to produce intestinal
derangement ; and it is little flattering to cholera to call
the dysentery resulting therefrom by its imposing name.
In the cool of the evening, an hour before sunset, such
diet would be comparatively wholesome ; exercise would
be agreeable afterwards, and refreshing sleep might
follow — ^with the mosquitos' leave. As long as soldiers
and sailors are compelled to eat indigestible food at
unreasonable hours, the cry for doctors will not abate
nor the consumption of drugs be diminished in either of
the services. In the Turkish service, under normal
conditions, the men have rice soup in the morning, a
light repast of bread and olives at noon, and their sub-
stantial meal, composed of meat and vegetables, savourily
cooked, or pilaf, is served towards sunset ; and to this
regimen, coupled with restrictions in regard of fruit,
must be ascribed the exemption from cholera of the first
regiment of the redif of the guard which lay encamped at
Devna during the summer of 1854.

The foot fever and sore backs of some of the English
cavalry, acquired during a few days' reconnaissance in
the Dobrudscha, much animadverted upon at the time,
originated in similar inattention to alimentary influences.
Fed according to EngUsh rule, without corresponding

STATE OF THE ENGLISH CAVALRY HORSES. 271

care and shelter, the animals were unprepared for the
call made upon them. Their riders, we fain hope, then
learned that high condition is a relative term, varying
with climate and circumstances. Equestrian tribes, the
Arabs and Turcomans, deduct a quarter of their horses'
barley, and stint their water, for two or three weeks
before setting out on an expedition. Their horses are
then in wind, without superfluous flesh to generate
humours.

272 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XX.

Embarkation of the Allied Armies — Rations of Turkish Troops —
Quality of the Men — The Conscription in Turkey — Suleyman
Pasha — The Turks averse from the Service— The Esnan — Their
Losses at Varna — Nostalgia a real Disease — Tone of the Allies —
Marshal St. Arnaud and General Caurobert — ^Lord Raglan
Criticism of the Naval Commanders — The three allied Fleets at
Baltchik — The French and Turkish Fleets weigh Anchor — Arrival
of the English Transports at Baltchik — The covering Fleet — An
Opportunity lost by the Russians — Influence of British Naval
Renown — The Russian Fleet at Sevastopol — Appearance of the
English Fleet — Advantages of Katcha Bay as a Landing-place —
Two Modes of attacking Sevastopol — Error in choosing the Point
of Attack — Probability of Success from the opposite Coast —
Sevastopol exposed to a Surprise — The Flank March — The
combined Fleets anchor at Eupatoria — Estimate of the Forces —
Bat Horses of British Cavalry left behind — Newspaper Corre-
spondents — The Question considered in relation to War — The
French Press tongue-tied.

The embarkation of the allied armies, originally fixed for
August 14, 1854, was delayed from day to day by the
prevailing sickness. Nevertheless, preparations for the
event were not remitted. Wharves were run out into
the sea, for men and horses to walk on board transit
steamers ; store-ships were loaded, and practice in
landing artillery was made in a cove on the south side of
the bay. Gradually, as the time drew near, the forces
approached Varna from distant encampments by easy
marches ; and embarked, the greater part of them during
the last week of August, without a mishap worthy of

EMBARKATION OF THE ALLIED ARMIES. 273

note. The English troops embarked in transports, the
comfort and roominess of which soon produced a sen-
sible amelioration of their health. The islanders felt at
home on board ship. The French troops embarked in
their own men-of-war, and in numerous small merchant
vessels of various nations, ycleped and numbered for the
nonce ** transports ; *' and the more crowded they were
the merrier they appeared. The Turkish troops were
embarked in their own ships of war, with three weeks'
supply of biscuit, flour, rice, and butter, for immediate
use in the Crimea — the AlUes undertaking to feed them
afterwards : also a fortnight's supply of biscuit and rice
for the voyage, at the rate of 150 dirrhems (seventeen
ounces) of biscuit, and ten dirrhems of rice, with butter
for cooking it, per day per man. The Turkish squadron
carried in addition a siege-train with its ammunition ;
three French batteries, with eighty-six horses for each ;
twenty shalans (flat quadriform boats), and a large
amount of stores and provisions for the French army.

The Turkish troops, ten battalions of 800 men each,
more or less, were of inferior quaUty; being chiefly
esnan.* Never before enrolled, the esnan battalions had

* Mussulmans in Turkey between the ages of nineteen and twenty-
four, try their luck in the conscription lottery every year, in the districts
where it can be enforced. Those who escape altogether are termed
esnan (aged). They are aggregated to the redif (reserve) and are
liable during thirteen years to serve in war. The redif is composed of
soldiers who have served their time, five years, and are liable as such
to be called out in war or on apprehension of war during eight years.
The redif of each district is supposed to be called out once a year for
exercise, under a permanent staflf of officers.

This system works harshly in a countr}* where the removal of a man
fifty miles from his home amounts to exile, with ignorance about those
dear to them, and it keeps a man's mind unsettled. The enrolment of
the redif for service is always attended by considerable mortality.

274 TTBKEY AXD THE CCOfEAX WAR.

kft t^Liiid them families and fields on whom their
iYjmuhis dwelled. They had received three months'
drilling at Scutari, and had been sent to Yama early in
An^niist ; where two battalions of Bonmelian redif, armed
with yercussion muskets, joined them. This contingent
T^hH under the conmiand of Soleyman Pasha, who had
ydHfifui the preceding twelve years of his life, with the
rank of colonel of the guard, as superintendent of the
imperial tannery at Beikos ; the only variations of his
duty in that period having been the surveillance of the
Iliifjgarian refugees at Kutaiah, and a mission to the Bey
of Tunis : who impressed on his mind a high idea of
liiH merit by giving him a backshish of 1,000 purses
(4fij()()l,) A complimentary mission to a feudal vassal,
who is bound by custom to mark his sense of the honour
by liberality to the envoy, is a convenient way of rewarding
tt favourite. During the present reign, one of the Sultan's
aides-de-camp received collectively in the course of a
year from the Sheick of Mecca and the Pasha of Egypt,
to whom he had been sent on missions, about 5,000
purses. Suleyman Pasha joined the expedition sorely
ugainst his will, ill-reconciled to it by promotion to the
rank of liva. The Turks shunned this service, for they
anticipated neglect when in the Crimea, both from the
Porlc and from the Allies. The health of the troops

'I' ho merit of the conscription, which is carried out as fairly as the
habitH of the country admit of, is due to Riza Pacha, who organized
it about 1H44. Previously the men had been pressed, and the term of
Hurviro had been unlimited.

'J' ho Cliristian communities of the empire have been considered
julniissiblo to military service since the Peace of Paris, but they have
boon allowed to compound for it by the annual pa}ment of nearly
niiu'iy millions of piastres (800,000/.), a sum equal about to the amount
of the abolished kharatch.

THE ESNAN AT VARNA — NOSTALGIA. 275

under his command had deteriorated at Varna, through
want of fresh meat and vegetables, which the ready
money of the AlUes monopoHzed. The destitution and
penury of the government stores and chest at Varna were
then complete ; so much so that* we were obUged, just
before saihng, to make, through the governor, a requisi-
tion on the inhabitants for the small supply of rice and
butter necessary to make pilaflf for the troops on the
voyage.

One battaUon of the esnan being embarked in the
author's ship, he learned its history ; which did not diflFer
materially from that of the others. When it left Scutari,
August 10th, it was 820 strong, having arrived there
900 strong. Out of that number sixteen had died, thir-
teen had deserted, and thirty-two had been invalided at
Varna; thirty-two had been left in hospital at Varna,
and twelve died on the passage to the Crimea ; making
on the whole a diminution of fourteen per cent, in one
month. The redif, and particularly the esnan ^ were
always during the war more or less painfully aflFected
with nostalgia ; a veritable, often fatal, disease in con-
nection with fatalism. The Turkish soldier on service
has rarely means of communicating with his family. He
broods over the forlorn condition in imagination of his
wife and children in case of his death, news of whicli
would not for months transpire in his village, unless by
mere chance, such as the return of an invalided comrade.
His arrears of pay, claimable by his heirs only within a
year, might, through red-tapist obstacles, lapse to the
treasury, or possibly become perquisites of office.

The tone and demeanour of the Allies on the eve of
their departure for the Crimea betokened little ardour.

18—2

276 TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The chiefs seemed oppressed by the responsibility of
leading an army into a country only a degree better
known to them than Japan. Few supposed the Czar had
left the pendent pearl of his empire in danger of being
torn away at a grasp. Many expected to find there twice
the number of troops actually encountered ; in which
case, observed a French staflf officer, ** pas un n'echappera,
pas m<';me le marechal/' The troops had the air of
wanting confidence in their leaders' abihty to meet a
criniH. Marshal St. Arnaud, advantageously known as a
duHhing colonel of cavalry, had won his baton by his
services as minister of war during the coup d'etat of
2nd December. He was moreover an invaUd ; with,
however, a spirit to control disease in the hour of action.
HiH H(U!ond in command, General Caurobert, had con-
('iliiitod inipcirial favour by storming with his brigade the
barricachm in the Faubourg St. Martin, rather than by
bin (liHtinguishod services in Africa. General Lord
JUij^latrH name possessed only reflected mihtary glory ;
h<3 being rcjsorvod with his divisional generals, and from
his sedentary habits personally unknown to his troops.
The naval commanders-in-chief threw cold water on the
expedition by criticizing its policy and dwelling on the
lateness of the season : thereby laying themselves open
to comment; for whatever their private opinion, the
expedition once decided upon, they were bound to encou-
rage and forward it by word and example. Even its
warm abettors, their seconds in command, had mis-
givings while decorously advocating it : thus securing
for themselves credit in case of success, and freedom
from responsibility in case of reverses.

The French and Turkish troops were all embarked at

THE ALLIED FLEETS AT BALTCUIK. 277

Vama, August 31st, 1854, and next day the three allied
fleets rendezvoused at Baltchik, with Marshal St. Arnaud's
head-quarters in the Vilk de Paris. That day being
Courban bairam, the Turkish fleet, dressed in colours,
fired the customary salutes at noon. Its allies, hoisting
the Turkish flag at the main, fired also a royal salute in
honour of the occasion, from a French and an EngUsh
ship. We lay at Baltchik, the French expressing
impatience, till September 5th, waiting for the arrival
of the rear division of the English transports from
Varna, with head-quarters in the Caradoc. At dayUght
on the 5th, the French and Turkish fleets weighed
anchor, and proceeded oflf Cape Kellagriah. They
lay to there for several hours, in sight from Baltchik;
then stood to the northward and eastward under easy
sail. All the 6th and 7th of September we stood on
and oflf, or lay to, out of sight of land, about the 44th,
or between that and the 45th parallel, in a weatherly
position for making a course to the Crimea. Lost in
conjecture about the. non-appearance of our friends, we
began to apprehend the arrival of counter orders since
our departure. A message brought by an EngUsh frigate
dispelled that sick fancy. We afterwards learned that
the absent transports arrived at Baltchik on the morning
of the 6th ; but we never satisfactorily learned the motive
for the further delay of the EngUsh fleet at that anchor-
age. The single fact of the French and Turkish fleets,
crowded with troops and encumbered with stores, being
at sea without disposable steamers, should have seemed
an all-sufficient motive for instant departure; at all
events of the Une-of-battle ships. They were not required
at Baltchik, and might have come on under sail, Uke the

278 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

French and Turkish ships, leaving the steamers, which
subsequently towed them, to accelerate the progress of
the transports.

The covering fleet, including the Napoleon and the
Charlemagm, the two best Fren,ch ships, ought, in accord-
ance with its chosen role, to have weighed anchor first,
not last, from Baltchik, and have interposed itself between
Sevastopol and the track projected on the chart for the
army : no chance should have been left open for the
enemy to profit by. He might have been assumed alive
to the uncertain calamity of invasion, with his fleet on
the look-out, and ready, as every fleet ought to be under
similar provocation, to risk much to prevent it. Every-
body conversant wit!i the circumstances of the ira^et across
the Black Sea knows that any check would have caused
the relinquishment of the expedition : all but relinquished
as it was, if report spake true, when half-way over. On
the appearance of the Russian fleet, accompanied pre-
sumedly by propelling steamers — supposing a diversion
to have been attempted on the 6th or 7th of September,
— the French and Turkish fleets must, as their least loss,
have cut adrift the shalans for landing artillery from their
sides, and have thrown overboard several hundreds of
artillery horses, as well as the baggage and stores on
their decks for which room could not have been found
below. The wind during those two days being light and
variable, they would not probably have been able, on the
dictates of prudence for the sake of the troops, to avoid
an action. The Russian fleet lost an opportunity of
striking a heavy blow and acquiring much distinction.
But its want of vigilance is accountable. How was it to
calculate on the inversion of rule ? on a transport fleet

INFLUENCE OP BRITISH NAVAL RENO^\'N. 279

at sea, the covering fleet in port ? As the name of the
kmg was a tower of strength in the Middle Ages, so in
the late war British naval renown was a fleet in itself.
But it may be as well to remember that the shadow of a
great name rarely serves twice.

The Russian navy may console itself for its non-
observation of the first movements of the Allies from
Baltchik, by the reminiscenc.e of the noble part it acted
in the defence of Sevastopol ; but it cannot excuse itself
from remissness ; for had the Allies adopted any of the
other plans which presented themselves for the reduc-
tion of Sevastopol, its fleet would have been sunk or
captured, dishonoured in its country's eyes.

At 10 A.M., September 8th, our doubts were removed
by descrying the van division of the EngUsh fleet. It
rapidly advanced. Beyond, as far as the visible horizon
from our mast-heads, the sea was covered with vessels,
half obscured by the smoke of a hundred steamers. A
Bed Indian's imagination would have fancied a forest
on the point of bursting into flame. At 3 p.m. the
Britannia, towed by the rieirihidion, leading the fleet,
passed under our stern. Crowds of steamers, some with
men-of-war, others with transports, one or more, in tow,
passed in close succession. They made a stirring
spectacle — a novel exhibition of power. Alas ! none of
us anticipated how few of that gallant army would ever
tread their native land again. Instead of joining us,
and proceeding at once to the Crimea — which would
have been a gain of three days — they steamed out of
sight to the northward, and anchored forty miles west
of Cape Tarkhan, the westernmost point of the Crimea.
While the ** covering fleet " lay thus at anchor in

280 TUKKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

mid-sea, the CaradoCy escorted by steam men-of-war,
made a recomiaissance of the coast between Sevastopol
and Enpatoria.

The notabilities on board fancied, as we afterwards
heard, the appearance of defensive works at Katcha
Bay, which decided in the negative the question of
disembarking the army there. This decision proved
unfortunate. At the Katcha, wood, water, and forage
were plentiful, while at ** Old Fort " all three were
wanting. It entailed also a more pregnant consequence.
Landing in that bay would have ensured, in probabihty,
adherence to the original intention of reducing the
north side of Sevastopol, in sight from it, and wanting
then the accessories to the " Sevemaya Fort,'* which
constituted, long afterwards^ the strength of the position.
Admitting the plea which has been urged of the hazard
of an assault, a siege appeared an ordinary operation of
given limited duration. The Russians have acknow-
ledged, since the peace, its feebleness at that time, and
have expressed surprise at our having turned away
from it. In changing their minds, the Allies' generals
betrayed a want of previous deliberation. There were
two direct modes of attacking Sevastopol to choose
between. The choice should have been irrevocably
made before leaving Bulgaria ; and, in accordance with
it, the army should have landed north or south of the
harbour, conveniently near the menaced point. The
north side having been preferred, the pleasant valley
watered by the Katcha, six miles from Sevastopol, near
the high road to Bakchesai-ay, seemed an appropriate
spot for the disembarkation. The siege-train, if wanted,
might have been landed four miles nearer. The com-

SEVASTOPOL ATTACKED FROM THE WRONG SIDE. 281

manding position of the ** Sevemaya Fort " with respect
to the harbour, had suggested that attack. That re-
duced, the fire from the north side would dominate
the arsenal.

These may not, in themselves, be deemed theoreti-
cally sufficient inducements, in the absence of correct
topographical information, to entirely justify landing an
army, with numerous wants, dependent on shipping,
on a part of the coast devoid of harbours ; but the usual
fair weather in September and October, the prevalence of
north-easterly winds at that season making a weather
shore, the engineers' low estimate of the Star Fort, and
the time required to change the base of operations, more
than sufficed to show the wisdom — the army being on
shore — of adhering to the original plan. An error in
the selection of the side of the harbour for disembar-
kation had been committed. Oral and written testimony
of the perilous exposure of South Sevastopol to be
carried by a coup de main^ it being fortified (before steam
had rendered invasion practicable) only against a naval
attack, had not received due consideration. A hardily-
executed attack from the south would have attained the
object of the expedition before the date of the landing at
** Old Fort : " thus surpassing the most sanguine expec-
tations. Leaving Baltchik, 'say on the 8th September,
and steering direct for Cape Chersonesus, 250 miles
distant, the Allies would have reached the offing of
Sevastopol on the 10th, designedly at daylight. Magni-
fied by apprehension, the army would have been landed
before night on the Heracleotic steppe. Immediate
surrender might have been expected to have followed,
to avoid an assault of no doubtful result ; since^ with

282 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

the allied fleet ready to enter the harbour, the enemy
could not have berthed his ships to fire on advancing
columns. Setting aside, however, the eflFect of panic,
supposing the army of the Crimea to have been concen-
trated in Sevastopol (an extreme supposition) and to
have marched out, colours flying, a battle Kke that given
on the .Heights of Abraham would have been fought on,
and have rendered otherwise memorable, the site of the
Allies' subsequent dreary encampment. Victors and
vanquished would have entered the city together. While
thus pecuUarly exposed to be carried by surprise, Sevas-
topol possessed, in the character of the ground before
it, and its immense materiel, means for extemporizing,
with short warning, a scheme of defence. Hence, with
the probability of warning being given by it, the flank
march, much extolled at the time, will finally be cen-
sured. An uncompUcated siege — a known quantity — on
the north side, was abandoned for complex operations —
an unknown quantity — on the south side ; and a fertile
position, whence an army could intercept communica-
tions between Sevastopol and Bakchesaray, was exchanged
for a sterile corner of the Crimea pent in by a barrier
of hills.

At 3 P.M., 11th September, we again descried a
crowd of steamers N.N.E. ; and at sunset the French
and Turkish fleets anchored for the first time in thirty-
five fathoms. Next morning, the other ships making
their appearance, the three fleets joined company, and
proceeded along the coast in picturesque confusion.
Nonconformity of night signals — preconcert having
been wanting in that as well as in other respects — and
the passion of one of the admirals for using themi

THE ALLIED FORCES IN THE CRIMEA. 283

caused ludicrous mistakes the following night. On the
13th, in the afternoon, the combined fleet of men-of-
war and transports came to anchor oflf the pretty, steppe-
fringing, windmill-flanked town of Eupatoria. The sight
of its minarets refreshed our Turks. How did the in-
habitants feel ? We tried to fancy ourselves in their
place, but failed to conjure up an adequate sensation. In
the evening the town was summoned to surrender, and
a few ships were told oflf for firing on its white stuccoed
walls and green Venetian blinds. As the garrison con-
sisted of only a few hundred invalid soldiers without
artillery, the governor deemed compliance excusable.
This hint of the military unpreparedness of the Crimea
was confirmed by subsequent interrogatories.

We now contemplated in its aggregate at one anchor-
age our mighty host, and we might be acquitted of
presumption in thinking the Crimea would be in our
possession before snow should whiten its hills. Its
means of locomotion, independent of wind, increased
its might. None could say where the first blow would
fall. There were present eight three-deckers, one of
them screw-propelled, twenty two-deckers, including six
•with screw propulsion, seven frigates, two of them with
screws, about thirty paddle war-steamers, and several
hundred transports, many of them with steam ; carrying
56,000 troops, including 1,400 cavalry, with twenty-two
batteries and two siege-trains. The crews of the men-
of-war, 35,000 strong, were trained to the use of great
guns and small arms. On one side there were 90,000
land and sea troops, able by their command of the sea
to draw supplies and reinforcements in three weeks from
Western Europe, in three days from Turkey. On the

284 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

other side there were ahout 60,000 land and sea troops,
separated from Russia hy the roadless steppe, with a
disaffected population to control. Nothing, apparently,
was wanting to the efficiency of the British army, save
its bat horses, left behind through alleged deficiency of
transport : a weak excuse, since the EngUsh fleet, unen-
cumbered by troops and stores, might have embarked
them, and many hundred horses besides, with a month's
forage; and in the unanticipated event of the enemy
showing fight have thrown them overboard. Officers,
devoid of means of carrying with them some of the
comforts which are necessaries to men accustomed to
them from their childhood, became thereby often unable
to perform their duties properly off the battle-field, and
fatigued men delayed the march of the army.

Recognized " correspondents," imiting in their cor-
respondence the graphic details of the early chro-
niclers with the graceful narrative of the panegyrists
of Louis XrV.'s progresses, formed part — not the least
important part — of the expedition. They wielded their
power, save in one or two instances, generously, and on
the whole impartially. They performed their duty by the
public conscientiously. Their courage and self-abnega-
tion, uncheered by honours in prospective, praising
others themselves unpraised, were exemplary. Never-
theless, the compatibihty of their avocations with the
obligations of an army on service remains questionable
with many. I doubt it. I am disposed to think that if
a nation wishes to have an army like those armies which
have in all ages won empires and defended empires, it
will dispense with correspondents. The province of
journalism is to indicate abuses and deficiencies during

NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS. 285

peace, and advocate amendment : in which respect the
British press has not been remiss ; but defects in war
should be left to cure themselves, as they will do, by a
slower, perhaps, but more salutary process. The special
correspondent, in his single-minded earnest endeavour
to perform his task loyally, does not reflect that, in
exposing ills which have a diflFerent hue in civilian and
professional eyes, and in giving expression to dissatis-
faction at hardships perhaps unavoidable, he may be
engendering a cankering evil, felt rather than seen —
lax discipline. He is also liable, unwittingly, to excite
jealousies, and even — a matter of deeper import —
enhance a reputation, on the faith of which a man
may be appointed to commands above his real capacity.
There are men in every army as in every fleet ready to
apply to ** correspondents '* Hamlet's words in regard
of players : — ** Good my lord, will you see the players
well bestowed ? Do you hear, let them be well used ; for
they are the abstract and brief chronicle of the time :
after your death you were better have a bad epitaph
than their ill-report while you Uve."

The French during the war went to the other
extreme. Not content with excluding ** correspondents "
from their camp, they tongue-tied the press wherever
able. Even some mild strictures on their operations in
the Crimea in the Journal de Constantinople were offensive
to them ; and the Porte in consequence, on the demand
of the French charge -d'affaires, placed that journal under
the censorship of the French commandant at Pera for
its military articles.

286 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAX WAR.

CHAPTER XXI.

The Fleets anchor off Old Fort — Aspect of the Shore — Prompt Disem-
barkation of French Troops — Their Alertness — Prince Napoleon
— French Soldiers under Canvas — ^Disembarkation of the British
Forces — The Soldiers landed without Tents or Knapsacks — Their
Bivouac under heavy Rain — Defective Organization — Results of
needless Exposure — Altered Conditions of Invasions created by
Steam — Landing of Cavalry — Tartars come into Camp — Their Joy
at Sight of Moslem Troops — Their Account of the Force of Sevas-
topol — A Spy — Complaint against the Zouaves by a Tartar —
How disposed of — Combined Forces of the allied Armies —
Characteristics of each Army — The Turkish Commander returns
to Constantinople and is banished — The English Tents re-em-
barked, and the Army bivouacked for three weeks — 111 Effects
of this Exposure — Prince Mentchikofs Forces — His Aim to create
Delay — His Position liable to be turned on both Flanks — March
of the French — The British stonn the Hill-side of the Alma —
Steady Calmness of their Advance — ** Forward " the only Order —
The Crisis — Victoiy.

September 14th, 1854, anniversary of the entrance of
the French into Moscow, forty-two years earlier, the
combined fleets commenced at 3 a.m. getting nnder way
for " Old Fort ; " a locality seventeen miles from Eupa-
toria, and twenty-eight miles from Sevastopol. The
continuity of the reddish cliff characteristic of the west
coast of the Crimea is interrupted at Old Fort by two
strips of beach, one mile apart, having inside of each a
marsh, residue of the overflow of the sea in a south-west
gale. By 6 a.m. all the ships had left Eupatoria, and
were steering for the landing-place ; except the ** covering

LANDING OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 287

fleet," which made an offing. The English transport fleet
and war-steamers anchored ofif the northern beach, joined
later in the day by the commander-in-chief with the
remainder of the fleet, and simultaneously the French and
Turkish fleets anchored off" the southern beach. The
French intimated their desire for the disembarkation of the
Turkish troops to be delayed till next day, that the boats
of the Turkish fleet might assist in landing their troops.

The aspect of the country from our thronged decks
was cheerless. Save a child at the door of a cottage of
a solitary hamlet a mile and a half inshore, and a few
Cossacks en vedette on the brow of the nearest cliflf, there
were no signs of life. About 8.30 a.m. the disembarkation
commenced under favourable circumstances. The weather
was serene and cloudy, the water smooth as glass, and
the shore accessible. The fore feet of the boats touched
the beach, and the soldiers landed dryfoot. The
artillery and horses were landed easily from shalans.
The Cossacks remained tranquilly at their posts,
their leader taking notes, until the first division of the
French army was half-way towards the shore ; when they
galloped ofl' with the portentous news. Eumoured
invasion had become a reality. By noon, 10,000 French
infantry, twenty guns, the staflF horses embarked all
at Varna in one steamer, and a few spahis, were on
Kussian ground. The spahis captured in the course of
the afternoon fourteen country carts conveying flour to
Sevastopol ; the drivers of which confirmed the intelli-
gence obtained at Eupatoria, of there being no Russian
troops anywhere near. They had been thus employed
for two months.

The French soldiers landed each with six days'

238 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

biscuit, four days' meat, and one day's water ; and with
that addition to their packs they stepped out briskly,
with the air of men bound on a pleasure excursion.
One of their chiefs, standing on the shore in an historic
pose, attracted notice by his likeness to a celebrated
portrait. I approached, with recollections of the tale
of Austerlitz, Wagram and Jena, and entered into
conversation with General Prince Napoleon. His Imperial
Highness was meditating over an interesting problem —
the cooking of his dinner — and proposed to find the
solution in the above-mentioned hamlet ; but on a
bystander remarking that the Cossacks, a voracious
ubiquitous race, might descend in a cloud of dust and
carry it oflf, he wisely decided to remain inside the lines.
Towards sunset the chief of the French staflf sent to the
Turkish fleet to land its troops, for no other apparent
object than that of making a display. We reminded
that officer of the intimation given in the morning ; we
could not get the tents ready for pitching at that hour ;
and we were disinclined to expose needlessly sickly troops
to the impending rain ; we would land them in the
morning with their tents and provisions. This was
agreed to. That night the French army slept under
canvas, every officer and man in his appropriate tent ;
and next morning a stranger might have fancied them
encamped there during a month. No one seemed out of
place, or out of humour. The soldiers were drying their
clothes or cooking their food before their gipsy-Kke tents ;
the officers in groups were breakfasting or smoking in
front of tlieir tents ; the blithe Advandieres had a smile
or a word for every one, and the Field Marshal was
sitting on a camp-ptool before his marquee, enjoying the

DISEMBARKATION OP THE BRITISH ARMY. 289

sun and reading a newspaper. I exchanged a few
words with his Excellency, and rejoiced to remark an
improvement in his health ; which, however, was illusory.
Apart from the camp, the butcher, in a white apron,
surrounded by a flock of sheep brought in by Spahis, was
busily employed in his caUing. " Are those sheep paid
for ? " I asked. *• No, we never pay for anything in an
enemy's country." ** But the Tartars are our friends."
'' C'est 6gal."

The disembarkation of the British army was, on the
whole, less felicitous. The passage of the Iroops from
their transports to the shore, — a facile operation with
numerous boats and two light steamers, — was rapid and
continuous ; but then appeared the want of comprehensive
arrangement and attention to details shown by the French.
The landing of staflF horses being inconveniently delayed,
an important part of the generals' functions, surveying
the ground, remained in abeyance for some hours. A
general, typified by the centaur, is only half himself
without his steed. The troops were landed without
tents ; some regiments without their knapsacks — a grave
omission, pregnant with mischief, the occurrence of
whicli still, after the lapse of many years, excites regret.
Rendered sensitive, by their sojourn in Bulgaria, to
atmospheric vicissitudes, the troops could better have
spared half their rations than their tents. Heavy rain
descended the first night, and beneath it the British
army bivouacked, minus head-quarters and part of the
cavalry. Tents should have occupied a high place in the
consideration of those entrusted with the responsibility
of landing the troops : which implied landing them with
all needful appliances, not setting them on shore like

290 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Caflfres, with only the clothes they stood in and their
arms. Some regiments remained a month without
tents ; and as for knapsacks, when finally landed at
Balaclava, many men could not find their own. The
excuse about the tents was that, having been stowed in
bulk in transports* holds, they could not be disinterred
upon occasion. ** Why were they thus stowed away?'*
ought to have been sternly asked. They might, together
with the knapsacks, have been distributed according to
brigades in ships of war and told-oflf transports ; the
crews of which should have had the charge — the gratify-
ing charge — of pitching and striking them. By such an
arrangement the army need not have passed a night,
except on the flank march, without cover. The slightest
canopy may prove invaluable to a sleeping man: a muslin
tissue, interposed between him and the expanse on a
starry night, may be the diflference of health or sickness.
Imperious necessity alone should have exposed the
tenderly-nurtured British army, unaccustomed to shift
for itself, to bivouac in autumn ; especially the first night
after leaving the shelter of comfortable transports. That
dreary night sent more than a thousand men to hospital,
and implanted the seeds of disease in thousands more.
Many ofl&cers of advanced age never recovered from the
eflfects of that exposure. Fortunately, the rain ceased in
a few hours ; but had it lasted (as sometimes happens in
those latitudes early in autumn,) from twenty-four to
thirty hours, it would have rendered the army invaUd.

An elaborate plan had been drawn up for landing the
army in the face of the enemy ; but none had been
thought of for the distinct, the probable, case of landing
it on an undefended coast. What must be done promptly

NO PLAN FOR LANDING THE TROOPS. 291

in the one case, may be done leisurely in the other.
The order of landing cavalry and infantry may, if
convenient, be reversed. Attention had not been given
to the altered conditions of invasion created by steam.
Viewing the facility now-a-days for an invader to steam
right or left a few hours' march from his expected place
of disembarkation, the general entrusted with the defence
would prefer a central position, free to act according to
circumstances. There being no signs of an enemy, the
cavalry, profiting by tlie calm weather of the first day,
should have landed at once : they were the most required
to reconnoitre and gain intelligence ; but roughish
weather coming on next day, great part remained on
board till the 16th.. Cavalry cannot, like infantry, be
landed in a fresh breeze or at night. Early disem-
barked in force, the cavalry might have cleared the
neighbouring villages of Cossacks ; and, thus encouraged,
the Tartars would have rendered valuable aid : they
might have furnished means to enable the army to march
with tents and baggage unanxiously in any direction.

Several Tartars came into camp the day after the
landing with stock for sale. Double-humped Bactrian
camels drew some of their carts, and it was amusing to
watch the devices of the soldiers to conciliate these
stately animals, beside which the plumed Highlanders
were in pictorial keeping. This beautiful breed perished,
it is said, in the Crimea, during the war, from overwork.
The Tartars manifested great joy at sight of Moslem
troops, and, speaking a Turkish patois, soon estabhshed
friendly intercourse. The inherent superiority of the
Ottomans was admitted. The natives salaamed the
pashas reverently; the latter promised protection, and

19—2

292 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

both parties seemed to anticipate the addition of tlie
Crimea in a few weeks to Sultan Abdul Medjid's
dominions, and the wooing of Tartar maidens for the
harems of Constantinople. The Tartars described the
mms at Sevastopol as innumerable, but the troops as few
and indiflFerent. The native population was unarmed ;
no man being even allowed, they said, to carry a long
knife. One of them, a pedling trader from Eupatoria,
in fraternization with a knot of Turkish soldiers, seemed
a fit subject for interrogation to the French chef d'etat
majorj who asked me to interpret for him. The inquiry
ended by handing him over to a guard for detention
only. Shooting a spy is as a rule folly ; it rarely deters
others; whereas hope and wine may extract valuable
information.

Some of the Spahis, in a distant reconnaissance on
the 15th, intercepted a carriage with some ladies : a
drosky with an officer, and several invalided soldiers.
Unconscious of the invasion, the ladies were taking an
airing ; and if of a romantic turn of mind, they were
doubtless pleasurably surprised by the apparition of a
party of Arabs politely brandishing their spears by
their carriage sides. That night we observed several
fires in the direction of Sevastopol, on the presumed liue
of the Allies' march. Next day the codja bashi of a
neighbouring village came to the French camp to
complain of a party of Zouaves (some of whom, we
heard, had remained in the Cossacks' hands) , for having
twisted the necks of sundry fowls and expressed their
admiration of the fair sex in an unorthodox style.
**The Tartars," he said, **are heart and soul for the
Allies ; but if such irregularities are committed they will

FORCE OP THE ALLIED ARMIES. 293

make common cause with the Russians." The marshal
pacified the old Tiirtar, and threatened to send similar
oflfenders in future on board ship in irons. But he
too well knew, from his African experience, the value
of that daring corps, to allow their propensities
(habitually winked at) to stand in the way of their
services. Foremost of the forward in battle, gayest of
the gay under privations, the Zouaves set a cheering
example in the Crimea. If any one of the survivors of those
landed at **01d Fort" considers himself overlooked, he
may console himself with the reflection of having merited
the Legion of Honour, — merited it, it may be, more
than his favoured comrade, the imperial guardsman.

The allied armies landed at '*01d Fort" consisted
of 26,000 EngUsh including 1,200 cavaby with 60
guns, 25,000 French including 200 Spahis with 66
guns, and about 7,000 Turks. They were reinforced by
the end of the second week in October by 14,000 French
and EngUsh troops ; barely sufl&cient to fill up the
vacancies in the ranks up to that date from deaths and
sickness. While the army lay at *'01d Fort" some
definite knowledge was obtained about the enemy ; to
whom the intention was ascribed of making a stand on
one of the three rivers on the road to Sevastopol. The
troops manifested no impatience at the delay. The
French were careless, the English meditative, and the
Turks listless. Neither the French nor the EngUsh
commander-in-chief — one in pain, the other pensive —
evinced active interest in the army. The Turkish chiefs
thoughts floated between the vision of a Crimean pashalik,
and the hope of revisiting Constantinople with a whole
skin : the latter weighed in the balance. Soon after the

294 TURKEY AXD TflE CRIMEAN WAR.

commencement of actual hostilities, auguring no speedy
termination to them, he gave himself sick leave and with
a colonel (a Pole) in the same temper returned to
Constantinople; where, after a while, they were tried
at the instigation of the Allies, degraded, exhibited
ironed to the troops at the seraskiriat, and exiled to
Cyprus for seven years. Their sentence, couched in
defamatory language, was aggravated by its publication
in the Turkish Gazette. Turkish officers on service,
with their hearts elsewhere, have no recognized mode
of getting out of their difficulty. They have no *' papers "
to send in ; medical certificates are hieroglyphics, and
leave of absence is unknown in war. They are expected
to remain at their posts, to be shot at and face cold and
disease with their men — no great demand upon them,
seeing the personal advantages and prospective rewards
of an officer.

On the 18th September, in expectation of marching
on the morrow, the English tents were ordered to be
struck, and, excepting one for the lieutenant-general,
two for the commissariat, and six for the hospital of
each division, were sent to the beach for re-embarkation.
Circumstantially privileged, the artillery officers carried
their tents with their guns. The rest of the EngUsh
army bivouacked the ensuing three weeks ; and to this
exposure, at the season of hot days and chilly nights, may
be traced the cause of the sudden failure of the health
of the troops at the commencement of winter.

Next moi-ning, at 7 a.m., the aUied armies commenced
their march towards Sevastopol ; on the road to which,
at that hour, we descried a village in flames. The
fleets, weighing anchor simultaneously, proceeded a few

PRIXCE MENTCHIKOF'S POSITION. 295

miles to the southwards, and re -anchored off Cape
Lougoul, where the Alma flows into the sea. After a
short day's march, and a dallying skirmish between
Russian and English cavalry, the armies lay down for
the night, in anticipation of a battle on the morrow.

Prince Mentchikof in the meanwhile had not been
idle. He had collected troops from all parts of the
Crimea, leaving in Sevastopol only a few veteran batta -
lions, with the artillerymen of the forts. With 32,000
infantry — 6,000 of whom had just joined him after a
forced march from Kertch, — 2,500 cavalry and 70 guns,
he made his stand on an elevated plateau south of the
valley of the Alma, w^ith guns in position on its northern
ridge. To create delay, to afford time for strengthening
the north, the menaced side of Sevastopol, was his
object. Although presumptuous — like all Russian
generals in the late war, till taught by many bitter
lessons the difference between man and man — he had
not the presumption to expect to drive the invaders back
to their ships ; for among them he knew were the British
Guards, '* feared by their breed and famous by their
birth," and choice regiments from Algeria. All he could
hope for was to impede their advance on the city ; and it
would appear from what has been said uncontradicted
that he counted on holding them in check many days.
He had overrated the strength of his position : one
condition of its strength being that it should be attacked
in his own way ; in which, as it happened, he was partly
indulged. His position had the inherent defect of being
open to be turned on either flank. A turned position is
obviously weak ; because, the original plan being deranged,
other combinations, requiring presence of mind and

296 TURKEY AND TlIK CRIMEAN WAR.

tactical resources, become necessary, and are diflScult to
make in the face of modern artillery and rifle practice.
Unable to approach near the sea — any doubt of which
was removed on the 20th September, by the dispersal of
a body of Cossacks by shells thrown from French ships
— the Russian left was exposed to be turned, as w^ell as
its right. The French showed this. Marching along
shore, their right covered by the sea, they arrived first at
the foot of the acclivity, and ascending it by a carriage-
able road, with smart opposition from some guns
dominating it (which the Zouaves charged and drove
oflF in gallant style) , they turned the Russians' left, and
came on equal ground with them. Had the English,
diverging from their line of march, similarly turned the
enemy's right, his position guns laid for ascertained
ranges would have been placed in jeopardy : and for him
there could only be an artillery fight. He had little else
than cannon to rely upon ; for in presence of the Allies'
rifle-armed infantry, his infantry, in dense formation,
unable to come to close quarters, were virtually unarmed
with old-fashioned muskets in their hands ; and there-
fore it is doubtful if Prince Mentchikof, with both
flanks turned, could have withdrawn his army in coherent
order from the field of battle. Russian officers have
said, since the war, that if the English had turned their
right, their retreat on Bakchesaray would have been cut
oflF. But this manoeuvre required preconcerted accordant
movements, non-existent through divided command.

Seeing the impetuosity of his ally with inadequate
forces. General Lord Raglan, impersonation of calm
courage, thought only of getting into action by the
shortest road, guided by the hottest fire. Then was

BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 297

witnessed the acting of one of the finest pieces of man-
hood acted on the military stage — the storming of the
hill side of the valley of the Alma. The English
infantry, never before under fire, their strength impaired
by the bivouac and the march, showed themselves
animated by the spirit of their fathers on other fields.
Calmly and resolutely, resolved to do or die, each man's
elbow touching his neighbour's elbow, sending an electric
touch of confidence through the line, every gap in the
ranks instantly filled up, they marched steadily along the
shot-torn road, to the order — the only order given —
** forward," repeated by every general, re-echoed by
every officer, silently responded to by every soldier. A
smouldering village in their path deranged their ranks,
but only till it was passed on either side. The passage
of the river detained them longer ; but having slaked
their thirst and climbed its further bank, again they
formed as on parade, under a withering fire, and again
to the word ** forward " advanced ; then with cheers they
rushed up the steep acclivity, down which, one-third of
the way, Russian infantry, leaving the cover of their guns,
descended to meet them. There was a wavering in the
column of attack, a pause of indecision in its commander.
But it was of short duration. All instinctively felt that
the crisis of the day was arrived. Officers and sergeants
stepped to the front ; two batteries came into play ; the
deadly rifle cleared the arena.

298 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN AVAR.

CHAPTER XXII.

The Battle of the Alma fruitless — A Victory without Trophies—The
Victors sleep on their Laurels — Their pleasant Despatches — Aged
Officers — Few Troops in Sevastopol — Ineffective Fire of the
Forts — The Ohject of the Crimean Expedition frustrated by Delay
— Military Council in Sevastopol decides to obstruct the Entrance
of the Harbour by sinking a Squadron of Ships — Review of the
Position of Affairs — English Troops suffer from Diarrhoea — The
allied Armies march to the Balbec — The Russians sink their
Ships — An English Officer of Engineers — Capture of Russian
Baggage — The allied Army reaches Balaclava — Its Dependence
on the Sea disadvantageous — ^Artillery Engagement between
Steamers and Batteries — Bad Practice of Russian Gunners — ^Death
of Marshal St. Amaud.

Like a tree in blossom which, suddenly bUghted, bears no
fruit, so was the battle of the Alma. An exaggerated
view of the success caused so much daring to remain
unproductive. Beaten in three hours from his chosen
position, disconcerted by the rival valour of the Allies,
and astounded at the eflfect of the mini6 rifle. Prince
Mentchikof retired in order, with his colours, cannon,
and baggage. Nevertheless, unprepared for a reverse,
confident at the outset of repelhng the attack, he had
remained on the ground too long. By retreating half-
an-hour earlier he would have sustained comparatively
sHght loss, while inflicting nearly as much on the Allies,
who suffered chiefly on their advance. Good part of his
own loss was incurred by the fire of the English artillery
and of the French infantry on his retiring columns. The

THE ALLIES SLEEP ON THEIR LAURELS. 299

Allies had gained a victory, but without trophies. They
occupied the disputed field, and no more. Their dead lay
mingled with the Kussian dead in the proportion of one
to four ; but no captured batteries, no shattered tumbrels,
no groups of valid prisoners, indicated a defeat involving
dislocation of the component parts of an army. Had
they, viewing the battle of the Alma simply as a brilUant
prelude, pursued the enemy the same evening with their
forces which had not been engaged — the English fourth
division and cavalry, and two French divisions, the main
body following after a few hours' repose — they would have
gained a complete victory; decisive not alone of the
fall of Sevastopol, but of the Crimea. With a river to
cross eight miles distant, without a reserve, in the midst
of a disaflFected population, the Russian army, far from
showing fight again next day, must have abandoned its
cannon at the Katcha : its cavalry might have got away,
but its infantry would have had to surrender or disperse.
At all events it would have ceased to be an army.
Whereas by virtue of its discipline and its moral impas-
sibiUty, with three days' grace to recover in, it remained
the army which had fought at Alma, less six or seven
thousand men killed or wounded — and its presumption :
the latter a gain.

The allied generals, as if under the impression of
hearing no more of Prince Mentchikof and his ** serf
soldiers'' — as if expecting Sevastopol to send her keys
to their camp — slept the night after the battle of Alma
on laurelled pillows, and next day sat down hopeful to
write their despatches. Paragraph by paragraph, from
the lofty announcement in one that the Emperor's cannon
had spoken at last, to the graceful reminiscence in the

300 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

other of the naval officer who had carried a telescope by
the generaFs side, all was pleasant reading in them ; and
we may not wonder at the elated public in France and
England, confirmed in their opinion of the hollowness of
Russia's power, having blushed for their betrayal of
anxiety about the capture of Sevastopol. They now
derided the ** easiness of the affiiir.*'

Care of the wounded and respect for the slain, alleged
as the reasons, were inadequate to account for the inaction
of the army on the field of Alma, seeing the assistance at
hand in the transport shipping. The exigencies of age
had pardonably something to do with it. Sexagenarian
generals and quinquagenarian colonels could hardly be
expected to be eager to run over the country after a hard
day's work : like aged mettled hunters, they wanted rest.
A distinguished officer observed to me the day after this
battle, *' In the morning I am forty, in the evening I am
eighty."

In the opinion of some, the time had arrived for the
fleets then at anchor oflf the Alma — one bearing the
British flag, another a flag bathed in the halo of military
and longing for naval renown, and the third a flag deeper
tinged with the blood of Sinope — to finish with a blow
what their comrades on shore had well begun ; and in
anticipation of it, apparently, Prince Mentchikof advised,
after his defeat, obstructing the entrance of the harbour
with sunken ships. The difficulties of the enterprise had
been diminished by the operations of the allied armies
far more than can be arithmeticaUy expressed. Instead
of a numerous garrison, arrogant and confident in their
resources, there remained in Sevastopol on the 21st of
September — by the testimony of deserters and prisoners

STATE OF SEVASTOPOL. 301

—only the dockyard brigade, a few veteran battalions
and the siege artillerymen; who, dejected by the message
reversing hope from the field of Alma, were not, the
Prince may have thought, in a position to oflfer more than
a feebly desperate resistance to thirty sail of the line,
besides frigates, aided by steamers, mounting collectively
3,000 pieces of heavy caUbre. The gunners in the frown-
ing forts of Sevastopol had not assuredly enjoyed more
sea-target practice than the gunners of the batteries of
Portsmouth and Malta. Their guns were worked clumsily
with handspikes and fired with matches. Uncertain at a
distance, their fire would have been languid against ships'
rapid and accurate fire at close quarters. When atten-
tion shall be paid to guns and gunnery on shore as well
as afloat, the question of ships versus forts will cease to
be vexed ; but as long as things are so managed that
men fire guns in batteries for the first time on the
approach of an enemy, that enemy may fairly assume
that appearances are sometimes delusive.

The delay of the army at the Alma showed incon-
sideration on the part of the allied commanders of the
object of the Crimean expedition. Undertaken late in
the season, without preparation for a winter campaign,
its real object, less military than political, had been to
elicit, by the moral eflfect of a great (by many deemed im-
possible) success on the suspensive mind of Europe, the
expression of a unanimous opinion adverse to Russia, in
the fairly grounded hope of cutting short thereby the
war unwillingly commenced. And doubtless the early
fall of Sevastopol — averted by remissness resembling the
effect of predestination — would have been accepted by
Europe as unequivocal evidence of her weakness, and

802 TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

have created an undefinable sense of apprehension in
Kussia, thus suddenly struck in her vaunted stronghold :
whereas its remarkable defence, the energy displayed in
supplying its wants, and her military organization, have
increased the impression of Kussia's innate vitality ;
especially in Turkey and in Central Asia. The natives
of those countries beheld with amazement the power
threatened with the loss of Bessarabia, the Crimea, and
the Caucasus, in one campaign, resisting with dignity
four nations backed by the genii steam and gold ;
holding in check 160,000 of their troops on the spot
where they had landed, unable to obtain food for man
or beast jfrom her territory ; and while opposing a
titanic attack in the Crimea, able to restrain the
Caucasians, intimidate Persia, and strike heavy blows
in Turkish Armenia.

While the allied armies lay complacently on the field
of Alma, anticipating no other, a scene of another
character was enacted at Sevastopol. The important
council sat, whence emanated the decision to sink a
squadron of ships at the mouth of the harbour ; derived
from the persuasion of the impossibility, with the north
side ihdiflFerently fortified, and the south side open, of
resisting a combined land and sea attack. Apprehending
an attack by the allied fleets, the Russians could neither
have unmanned any of their forts nor deranged the order
of battle of their fleet. Freed from that apprehension,
they would be at liberty to station elsewhere the gunners
of all but the outer sea batteries, employ ships' crews on
shore, and moor ships in suitable berths for firing on
advancing troops. The deliberation on the subject must
have been painfully diversified by conflicting views.

COUNCIL OF WAR IN SEVASTOPOL. 303

Possibly some of the naval members derided the idea
of an attack by the allied fleets. But although the
masters in the art of war have at all times mainly owed
success to divination of their opponents' designs, the
question at issue involved too mighty a stake — an
empire's prestige — to admit of leaving it in the circle
of probabilities. Admiral Nakhimof may have considered
improbable the magnificent spectacle of the allied fleets
entering Sevastopol harbour in order of battle, but Prince
Mentchikof must have viewed it as possible, A sense of
immediate security was required. That would be insured
by the obstruction of the harbour's mouth, and that
overcame the prescience in the nautical mind of ulti-
mate defeat thereby. Assured delay outbalanced pro-
blematic success.

A corresponding end alone justifies a great sacrifice :
and it may still be doubted by some if the defenders of
Sevastopol acted wisely, all circumstances considered, in
destroying a part and imprisoning the remainder of their
fleet. The object in view was to obtain a pause of tran-
quillity, leisure for throwing up redoubts. The question
was, would the allied fleets, going in before the aUied
armies were ready to attack, frustrate it ? This admitted
of answer only by the process of deduction from con-
jectural premises ; which, seeing the incalculable import-
ance of postponing for a season the fall of Sevastopol,
seemed hazardous to trust to. The Kussians' game did
not admit of a single doubtful move. Nevertheless we
should not allow ourselves, while admiring the grandeur
of the act, to overlook the violation of a principle.
Among the conditions of the defence of a maritime town
attacked by sea and land, the command of ships free to

304 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

emerge from its harbour, to take advantage of the chances
which weather and other circumstances may offer, ranks
high. With their fleet disposable, the Kussians would
have rendered Kamiesch untenable, unless the allied
fleets had remained always in force off the harbour.
Taught by the consideration evoked by the experiences
of the war, one might now construct steam locomotives
which would rfinder the effective blockade of a port
impracticable. In no other way could the issue of the
siege have been different. Steam transports brought
troops fresh from England and France respectively in
one-fifteenth and one-twentieth of the time required to
march troops despondent and fatigued from Moscow to
the Crimea ; and the Allies were, enabled to increase
aild vary their obsidional means at will, while similar
means on the side of the defence were on the decrease.
For although open to receive food and ammunition from
the north, Sevastopol was closed against supplies of
projectiles; and hence the siege finally resolved itself
into a trial between its resources and the resources of
Woolwich and Toulon. Whoever should plant the
heaviest and most numerous guns and mortars hi
position would win.

During their bivouac on the Alma the English troops
suffered much from diarrhoea, brought on by exposure to
hot days and cool damp nights. Many died there, and
numbers were embarked for Constantinople. The exertions
of the medical officers, admired by all, could not make
up for the want of administrative arrangements to meet
the unfaiUng accompanimient of war. Before the English
invaUds were all embarked, the aUied armies marched
from the Alma. They lay, September 23rd, on the

THE RUSSIANS SINK THEIR SHIPS. 305

Katcha, and next morning marched to the Balbec, within
four miles of th^ north side of Sevastopol. On the
morning of the 23rd the Kussians executed their afore-
mentioned project. They sunk one three-decker, four
two-deckers and two frigates, attached to each other
head and stem by chains, across the mouth of the
harbour, between the southern shoal and the north
shore ; leaving a narrow passage for steamers near the
latter. A deserter having given information the day
before to the admirals of several ships lying plugged
ready for immersion the event created no surprise. No
great importance was attached to the sacrifice. Quahfied
by most as an act of desperation, few only regarded it as
an earnest of determination, — of a step by step defence.
As though at the last moment fearing impediment, the
Kussians fired shot from Fort Constantino to accelerate
the immersion of the squadron.

The allied generals, deeming Fort Sevemaya too
strong to be carried by assault, continued their march on
the 25th September, from the Balbec towards the head
of the harbour. An aide-de-camp of Marshal St. Amaud
galloped back to the mouth of the Katcha to inform
Admiral Hamehn of the flank movement, with directions
to send the materiel of the army to the southwards.
Finding him a boat to go off to the Ville de Paris, I
walked up to a signal-station on the south side of the
river, whence the news of the defeat at the Alma had
been transmitted to Sevastopol. While enjoying the
prospect, and musing on the eventful drama just com-
menced, I was joined by three EngHsh officers just
landed from a transport newly arrived from England.
One of them, in a convalescent state, carrying a small

^Hi TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

oarpot-bag, inquired the direction of the army. The
army was already miles away : its trail had disappeared ;
the sunbeam no longer flickered in the dust of its
columns. The weather was sultry, and fearing the walk
would prove too much for his strength, I urged patience,
and recommended his companions, about to return on
board their transport, to try and assuage his ardour.
We spoke in vain. He set out alone on foot, and
reached his corps, the engineers, safe : as I afterwards
learned incidentally. He was a right-hearted fellow,
whose name, only heard once, I have not remembered.
He thought neither of the chance of sinking under
fatigue nor of meeting with stray Cossacks ; and though
the latter risk was imaginary, it was then apprehended.
He only thought of duty. No staflf officer, no " corre-
spondent " was by ; only, apparently, a weather-beaten
Turkish officer. Another officer, in rude health, for riding
back jfrom head-quarters over the same ground with an
escort, was mentioned in despatches as having performed a
remarkable feat, and received promotion accordingly.
This is one of many instances in the late war of the
diflference between record and reality.

After a straggling march through woods, infantry,
cavalry and artillery intermingled, the allied army
emerged into the open country in the nick of time for its
advanced squadrons to capture part of the baggage
(including a welcome supply of wine and cigars) of the
Russians marching from Sevastopol, by Khutor M'Kenzie,
to Bakchesaray. This palpable invitation to follow up
Prince Mentchikof and complete the battle of the Alma
was not accepted. Away from the fleet, the army felt
like a child separated from its mother. Turning to the

THE ALLIES DEPEND ON THEIR FLEETS. 307

right, it descended the heights, closing behind its rear-
guard, and never halted till it reached Balaclava; the
garrison of which, 140 in number, Greeks under a
Kussian colonel, surrendered, after the honours of a few
shot. The sense of dependence on the sea injuriously
predominated. Every confident invader, trusting in his
star — to wit, William the Conqueror, Henry V., Cortez,
and Napoleon (in Egypt) — has viewed the main duty of
his fleet over on landing him. An apparently grave
misfortune in our case would have turned out a signal
advantage. If bad weather had forced the allied fleets
to quit the coast temporarily after the battle of the Alma,
the army must then, in self-defence, have marched on
Bakchesaray and Simpheropol. The exultant Tartars
would have &uppHed all its wants, and Sevastopol,
isolated, have fallen of itself.

While the aUied armies were circumventing the city,
the aUied fleets, at anchor off the Katcha, detached six
steamers, half French half English, to engage the Wasp
and Telegraph batteries. Taking up their stations in
line of battle, they opened a heavy fire, which was duly
responded to ; but as the greater part of the shot
mutually fell short, none striking the objects on either
side, exercising the guns' crews was the only advantage
gained. After an hour of such pastime, the firing ceased
on both sides. Presently the commodore, his men being
reposed, made the signal '* Prepare to renew action,"
and experiments of the long range were repeated. Tired
of splashing the water, the enemy left off first, and then
the admirals recalled the squadron. This is a specimen
of the * '.incessant bombardment of the Kussian forts

20—3

306 TURKET AM) THE CSDOIAX WAR.

along the shore firom the Balbec to SeTsstopoI/' in which
the athnfnils are said, by an *• eve-witness/' to have
emplojcd their steam frigates. A few dajns afterwards,
the gunners of Fort Constancine edified the allied fleets
bj their rracdoe at an Ansrrian merchant vcssel. laden
with fcrage for the English army, drifting in a calm
across the hartocr's month. Of nnmercns shot fired
within easy range, one or two only stnrck her. Ac^andoned
ly her crew, who took to their hc-at and w^re picked
up by an allird steamer, she drifted in:o a c: re on the
south sde o: the harfconr. and lay there screened frc-ia
shot. An Fiygifsh ste^uner brongh: her aw^y at night ;
she then received b^ck her crew and fri.'oeedtdi to
BaladaTa.

The rejcncdoji of the allied armies ani frets was
Siiiddened by ihe sf^king sca:e of >Li^^haI S:. Anaods
health. With the hand ci dca:h in his vi:il>, he had
rerseTcred. cheertil to the lasc : se:tiig az. ^xamrve of
chivilry and deTodvn- Hiring, as has ceen lean^ifnlir
said. •' iidslcn Death wait :cr Vic:*:ry." he yi-flleu. raiLer
than gaTc nr. the tL-vmmand c: ihe French army of the
Easc to General Canrucem. en tie iSil Serienih^r.
Conveyed on beard the f^rr-V..^:. he theire. neaLrly
syeechlrss^ to<k leave of his noc«c ccLf-igie^ dknd
died on the rass&a^ge :o Theraria* wher^ he Lid left
his wire. Jz fmereal rcnip ovdi miiirLic thx: Lady's
grief Ir her huscanis descent f?;ni a rcnzj^^lr to the
<ccim'-n. lev^c^. it w:is no-u crfmec ^er. iiis remains lav
in 55ate f:r thrv'e lays in a :i ^kH^ .^'-z-.n': it th-r French
eciai&y at Thfracii : they w«r>f ^fisiicc ry nitniiers of
tie F:c*c and jf t-ie ciTv^cLin?* c^rcy : a:il tji-* Frvncli

DEATH OF MARSHAL ST. ARNAUD. 309

steamer which carried them away to France was accom-
panied by two Turkish steamers with music as far as
Seraglio Point.

This melancholy event changed the order of the
allied armies. The English became the right, the
French the left wing; the former with Balaclava, the
latter with Kamiesh, for their base.

310 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Harbour of Balaclava—Neglect, Confusion, and Waste — Mistaken
Confidence in the speedy Fall of Sevastopol — Bird's-eye View
of Sevastopol — The Malakof — Fortune's Favours disregarded —
-Talk with some English Soldiers— Corporal Wheeler's Bravery
at the Alma — Soldiers should judge of their Comrades*
Deserts — ^Partial Allotment of Good-Conduct Badges — ^Honorary
Awards should be made on the Instant — Practice in the French
Army — Colonel Todleben's Promptitude and Energ}' — Leisurely
Proceedings of the Allies — Confidence of the Engineers — Comment
of a Moslem — The Cossacks regain Sway over the Tartar Inhabi-
tants — Russian Cavahy reconnoitre — The Allies' Siege-works
completed — Guns in Position — ^First day's Attack by Land and
Sea— The Enemy's Fire — Advance of the allied Fleets — Firing
ineffective because of the Smoke — The Aim at long Ranges uncer-
tain — Nelson's Maxim — The Atjamennwn and Sons Pareil —
Effective Fire of the Wasp Battery — Low earthen Redoubts
with heavy Guns very formidable — Tactics of the French and
English Admirals.

The tiny harbour of Balaclava, nestled in a bosom of
rocky hills, aflFording shelter to the frailest bark from the
roll of the southern gale, is the realization of a smuggler's
dream. Unheeded by commerce in the interval between
the periods of oar and steam locomotion, it resumed, with
the arrival of the AUies, and soon surpassed, the anima-
tion which had characterized it in the days of Genoese
supremacy in the Euxine. A fleet of men-of-war and
transports lay in it, side by side, Uke the galleys of olden
times. The pretty town on its southern shore, lying in

STATE OF THIXGS AT BALACLAVA. 311

the shadow of lofty heights crowned with remains of
mediffival fortifications, among which part of the marines
of the fleet subsequently encamped, yielded accommoda-
tion for the heads of departments. General Lord Baglau
fixed his head-quarters in a pleasant house near the
watisr, and in front of his windows lay her Majesty's ship
Agamemnon, with the flag of Kear- Admiral Sir Edmund
Lyons. The disembarkation of the military stores, pro-
visions, and the siege artillery, immediately commenced ;
and in a few days the 5th Dragoon Guards, who had
arrived out too late to join the flank march, were landed
in high condition.

With some forethought. Balaclava and its environs
would not have degenerated, — one into a sink of filth,
the other into a swamp of mud. Confusion and waste
would not have become its characteristics. The buildings
in it would have been disposed for hospitals and maga-
zines, and the forage stacked in the neighbouring vale
have been husbanded. But no one anticipating a long
sojourn in the Crimea, laissez aller was the word. Streets
became sewers ; the harbour a receptacle for oflfal ; hay
was trampled into dung. Speculators on the wants of
the army were allowed to settle down in the town. Any-
body who pleased abstracted doors, window-frames, and
rafters for fuel. Vessels under any flag entered and left
the harbour un visited. Confidence and carelessness
rivalled each other. From the Commander-in-Chief
down to the junior ensign, everybody spoke and acted as
though under the impression that Sevastopol was only
waiting to be asked — only required gentle compulsion, to
surrender with honour. The reports of deserters of the
resolution of the garrison to sink their ships, destroy

312 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

their edifices, and leave only wreck and ruin for the Allies
to hoist their colours on, were considered weak inven-
tions. Even the daily departure of vehicles from the
city with women and children was not viewed as an
indication of the temper inside. The road of these com-
miserated fugitives passed some distance along the
cliflF, oft' which men-of-war lay at anchor, before turning
inland to Bakchesaray. Beside one of the carriages,
between it and the fancied danger — the ships' fire — we
saw a lady one day riding on horseback. Confiding in
man's honour, she knew that her fair person protected
that carriage — which conveyed, presumedly, her children
— more surely than the proudest Russian rampart.

Shortly after the occupation of Balaclava, leaving my
ship off* the Katcha, I went to that place, and thence to
the front of the EngUsh lines. Seated on a stone near
enough to note the agitation inside, I gazed long and
attentively on Sevastopol as it appeared in the last days
of September, white, bright, and symmetrical, — on its
duplicate sea-batteries reflected in the water, on its
colonnaded Athenaeum, on its domed and spired churches,
on its spacious barracks, broad streets, and venetian-
blinded houses, on its blue harbour : on which, at that
hour, boats were rowing and steamers paddling, and in
whict vessels of all denominations, from the first-rate to
the yacht, were anchored. I looked across a straggling
suburb, along open streets, down to the water. No
battery, no redoubt intervened. Looking down, my hand
above my eyes to exclude the opposite shore, the vista
was bounded by a three-decker, moored off* Dockyard
Creek, heeled on one side for firing on the approaches to
the town. Steamers also were in position to fire in the

THE MALAKOF AND THE MAMELON. 313

same direction. Looking towards the right, I saw on a
hillock a solitary white tower, with a few guns mounted
en barbette, and numerous labourers at its base laying
the foundation of the Malakof redoubt.

The failure of the engineers to discern, until the
ensuing April, the key of the position in the Malakof, is
the reason assigned for the neglect of the allied armies to
seize it on their arrival south of the city. The immediate
occupation of that hillock, obviating the construction of
forty miles of entrenchment, would have decided the
question then as well as a year later ; and few can doubt
the abihty of the AlHes, neglecting less material points,
to have entrenched themselves on it and on the Mamelon,
how warmly soever opposed by the garrison ; which was
not reinforced till the end of September, and then only by
a few battalions of the army beaten at the Alma. I do
not know on whom the ray of light dawned ; I only know
that when it emerged from the night which had long
obscured the operations of the siege, the post of honour
on the right — involving the reduction of the Malakof,
grown by that time into a fortress — had been ceded to
the French. Fortune had ardently wooed the Allies
since their disembarkation in the Crimea ; if she turned
at last, who should term her fickle ? At the Alma she
said, ** Follow the repulsed Russian army and disperse
it.'' On the flank march she repeated, ** Follow it to
Bakchesaray, isolate Sevastopol, and rule in the Crimea."
She whispered the alhed fleets, '* Enter Sevastopol
before it is closed to you, perhaps for ever." And
she pointed significantly to the White Tower on the
Malakof hill. Fortune does not like to have her
advances rejected. The loss of 200,000 lives, and the

314 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

expenditure of 200,000,000/. sterling showed her sense
of the slight.

While I was wishing some guns of the siege-train, in
part parked a mile in the rear, might be brought forward
to disturb the ant-like labour of the Russians at the foot
of the Malakof hill, a red-jacket came down from behind
a bit of old wall in advance of the advanced post, and
first by signs, and then (finding ** bono Johnny " able to
spe'ak intelligibly) by words, invited us to retire out- of
view : the white umbrella in Anastasius* hand screening
our heads from the sun, might, he thought, attract the
notice of some aspiring artilleryman, and draw fire in
that direction. We returned with him to his observatory,
and there enjoyed half-an-hour's talk with an unaflFectedly
brave set of English soldiers. My telescope afforded
them a keen and novel pleasure. They looked through
it eagerly by turns at the city, doomed in their as in
their superiors' eyes to fall Uke the walls of Jericho.
After listening with delight to their animated yet
modest recital of the deeds of their regiment at the
battle of the Alma, I inquired who amongst them
had the most distinguished himself. With one voice
they shouted, ** Corporal Wheeler, to be sure." ** Sergeant
Wheeler, of course, now ? " I interrogatively observed.
** No, indeed : who was there to speak for him ? "
was the equally unanimous but less cheerful reply. He
had been judged by his peers and found worthy. I men-
tioned the gallant corporal's case afterwards to officers of
rank, who seemed to view it much as his comrades had
done : overlooked, and no help for it. Having mislaid a
memorandum of the incident, I cannot recall to mind the
number of the regiment. ** Who was there to speak for

UNREWARDED BRAVERY OP PRIVATE SOLDIERS. 315

him ? " is a compound of all ever said or written about
the delusion of recommendations. His colonel, it might
be said ; but suppose his colonel to have clannish sym-
pathies with the men in the regiment from his part of the
United Kingdom ? The captain of his company, it might
be said ; but suppose the captain's eye to have Ughted
more favourably on his own faithful servant ?

I incUne to the opinion ascribed to the Duke of
Newcastle, of the fitness of soldiers to judge of con-
spicuous merit among themselves, and am disposed to
agree with his Grace in thinking that the verdict might
be safely entrusted to them ; giving their colonel the
right of veto. The popularity-hunter and the time-server
would have no chance of winning their suffrages gathered
on the morrow of the action. With their blood still
warmed by the excitement, with their eyes still glistening
with recollections of gallant feats, they would not wrongly
award the palm. Less favourably situated than the
officer, who, if passed over, may successfully urge his
claim, the private must resign himself to neglect ; for-
tunate if he abstain from seeking consolation in drink.
Distinction could hardly now-a-days be conferred upon an
officer less deserving than a co-equal in the same field;
but as much cannot be vouched for in the case of
soldiers. Out of six distinguished conduct badges sent to
the — Foot before Sevastopol, three were (as was currently
reported) bestowed upon field officers' servants excused
from trench duty ; and of similar distinctions sent to the
— Hussars, one was said to have been given to the
hospital sergeant, another to the orderly-room clerk.

On the pubhcation of the first distribution of the
Victoria Cross, a letter appeared in The Times from a

316 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

private, claiming for himself performance of the service
for which a sergeant had received that cross. Such a
delusion, if there were one, could not have survived if
the award had been made at the time. The faculty
accorded to the commander of a French army to confer,
subject to formal approval, the Legion of Honour
on the spot, attains nearly the desired end : as nearly
perhaps as human nature admits of. Leaving, for the
sake of discipline, the right of discernment with the chief,
it precludes the idea of favouritism. Favouritism could
not well be shown in the face of the army soiled with
the blood and dirt of the strife ; or if shown, would be
eloquently reproved by its silence. Of all the modes of
conferring distinction, despatch mention is the most open
to criticism. Associated with the personal character
and sympathies of the chief, it is equivocal ; written in
the privacy of the cabinet, to come to light only on pub-
lication, it is final. It originally derived value from the
presumption of the Commander-in-Chief being, in prac-
tice as well as in theory, the ablest and bravest man of
his force, with a mind above low influences. Even if
deserved in the particular case, it has not the merit of
encouragement ; since all feel that those only in the eyes
or the thoughts of the chief, or of his prompters, are in
the way of honourable record.

On the appearance of the allied armies before Sevas-
topol, its governor had apparently only the alternative of
burying himself beneath its ruins, or of capitulating
on disastrous terms. Colonel Todleben himself, while
asserting the feasibility of making a prolonged defence,
must have added mentally '* with time for preparation.'*
His prayer was for three weeks' delay. That interval was

TODLEBEN AND THE ALLIES' ENGINEERS. 317

accorded to his genius. While the Kussians, heart and
soul in the cause, toiled day and night in throwing up
redoubts on salient points, the Allies worked leisurely
and routinely at their lines. The trace of their first
parallel, more than 1,000 yards distant, made every
Kussian in Sevastopol cross himself in thanksgiving.
The facility of the battle of the Alma, unphilosophically
considered, had impressed the Allies with contempt for
the enemy. "Let him do whatever he likes," said their
confident engineers, *' in three days we will level their
works : that will strike terror ; and the place will then
fall without bloodshed." This assurance reconciled all
to the delay in opening fire. The army had won its
spurs ; it longed for home ; and though ready to march
through fire and gore into Sevastopol, it deemed its
conquest sweeter without farther loss of life and limb.
This feeling was natural. Serving an abstract cause,
appealing neither to the heart nor the imagination of
the many, and only vaguely to the reason of the few, the
army had gained as much as nascent ambition could
fairly desire. It had achieved European fame ; promo-
tion and honours were ready to be showered upon it. The
fall of Sevastopol, anticipated as the corollary of Alma,
would confer no more ; and therefore it is not surprising
if most concurred in the engineers' opinion about the
friable nature of Russian redoubts, and underrated the
temper of men nerved by religion and patriotism.

With this disposition prevailing, the engineers were
allowed to have their own way. General Lord Raglan
pursued his usual avocations at Balaclava as composedly
as when seated at the Horse Guards. In the cool of the
evening, he and the Rear-Admiral used to ride to the

818 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

front to note the progress of the works, then return to a
late dinner. Which feeUng predominated, satisfaction for
the past or confidence in the future, it would be difficult
to decide. Croakers, if there had been any, would have
been answered in the words of Henry the Fifth before
the battle of Agincourt. Thus, psychologically, the
escape of Sevastopol from early capture is explicable.
A pious Moslem some months later, explained it reve-
rently: *' You are always saying, * We will take Sevastopol,'
but you always neglect to add inshallah (please God).
When you say inshallah, you will take it." We did after-
wards in effect utter that potent word, by using the
intellect given us by God ; and had we done so at the
outset the Turk would have had no reason for doubting
our reliance on Him.

In the meantime, indications pf the value of time
were not wanting. During those precious three weeks,
the Cossacks began to recover their sway over the
Tartars ; some of whom had manifested a reprehensible
feeling. We met a party of them one day near a
Russian village, laden with priestly robes and holy
ornaments, which they had taken from the church,
and were carrying for sale to the Turkish boats watering
at the mouth of the Katcha. Purchasing the articles
for a trifle to save them from desecration, we warned the
sacrilegious plunderers to keep their hands oflf such spoil
for the future. The Cossacks also invested Eupatoria,
where many thousands of Tartars had taken refuge, and
where in the sequel they suflFered cruelly from disease and
want. After the peace, the survivors and others were
conveyed to the Dobrudscha, given land there, and
located in villages; the principal of which is named

THE allies' SIEGE-M'ORKS COMPLETED. 319

Medjidieh, built at the Sultan's expense. Kussian
cavalry reconnoitred Balaclava one day, but retreated
before a party of Scotch Greys and Horse Artillery.
On the other hand, the Allies sent some steamers to
Yalta, to try and procure a supply of wine ; but without
success. They took, however, some coals on credit from
Prince Woronzof s house, giving his steward a receipt
for them ; a noticeable circumstance, as being the only
example, we believe, during the war, of respect for
private property. The right of coal, however, wherever
found, to be thus classed is doubtful, since in a steam
era it is evidently a munition of war.

By the 16th October the Allies had completed their
works. The English had about eighty guns in position,
including several eight and ten-inch ship guns, served by
a naval brigade, and two ** Lancaster " guns, throwing
spheroidal shot, with a range of 4,600 yards ; the per-
formance of which disappointed expectation. Excepting
the latter, planted further off, the average distance of the
guns from the enemy's lines was about 1,200 yards ; the
extent of range being erroneously considered compen-
sated for by thqir calibre, as compared with that of guns
used in previous sieges. The guns mounted in the
French batteries against the western face of the town —
then and long afterwards the real attack — were more
numerous arid nearer. Disinterestedly — anticipating
victory whether joined by them or not — the Allied
generals had on the 14th invited the fleets to share
in the honour of the attack. Taken by surprise, the
allied admirals met at Kasatch to deliberate on the
proposal. Adverse to it on principle, doubting the
prudence of risking damage to the fleets with the armies

320 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

dependent on them, they nevertheless, in deference to
the generals' invitation, agreed to make a diversion ;
which, by obliging the enemy to man his sea batteries,
would be so much abstracted from the land defence.
They left it to the generals to decide if the fleets should
go in on the first or the second day of the bombard-
ment or on the third, the presumed day of the assault.
According to the original programme, the enemy's lines
were to be fired at two days and the morning of the
third day, and then to be stormed ; but confidence
increasing as the hour approached, expecting to finish
the aflfair in a few hours, the generals decided on a com-
bined land and sea attack the first day.

The allied armies opened fire on Sevastopol at half-
past seven on the morning of October 17th, 1854, and
sustained it vigorously during several hours. The enemy
replied from corresponding batteries, erected in the same
space of time ; and as his guns were served by seamen, —
part of those noble crews who bore the brunt of the siege
with the loss of four-fifths of their number, including
their admirals, — his fire was rapid and well directed ; and
though inferior to the English, was superior to the
French fire. Various explosions in their batteries, from
which most had been expected, caused the French to
cease firing at 11 a.m. ; and therefore — the project of
assault having been subordinated *to their success — the
destructive fire of the English batteries, sustained till
half-past 2 p.m. against the Malakof and Redan works,
led to no result. The enemy repaired his damages during
the night, and by morning was ready to renew action.

The allied fleets at the Katcha commenced getting
under way at 10 o'clock on the forenoon of that day,

NAVAL ATTACK ON SEVASTOPOL. 321

October 17th, each ship with a propelling steamer
lashed alongside ; and proceeded in succession towards
the mouth of the harbour ; the French in advance, led
by the screw liner, the Charlemagne, which, approaching
within range of Fort Alexander, began the engage-
ment by skirmishing with it before anchoring in the line.
Warned by the fate of his predecessor, who had been
superseded from the command of the fleet for having
arrived at Beshika Bay after the English fleet, Admiral
Hamelin, better inspired, went into action first j with the
signal ** France observes you," flying at his mast-head.
This felicitous distinction justified the paragraph of his
despatch, expressive of his sense of the honour acquired
by his fleet in the action. None of the other circum-
stances of the day could have been fairly viewed by him
as congratulatory.

Anchored in the French line, I was enabled to form
an idea of the situation, and to feel how nearly the
sublime and the ridiculous are aUied. I admired the
beautiful and sustained regularity of the fire of my
seconds ahead and astern, as well as of my own ship,
and I regretted the want of a defined object to test the
excellence of their gunnery. We were, most part of the
time, as though firing /tftia; dejoie in a fog. Wrapped in
smoke after a few rounds, the bulk of the ships did not
see the forts, save occasionally looming in the haze, nor
did the forts see more of them than their masts. The
ships were not targets; ihey were butts for missiles
flying through space to hit or miss as fate directed.
As one of them flew by the noses of some of us leaning
on the poop-rail of the Teshrifieh, making all our eyes
blink as one, and the men on deck fancy our heads were

322 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

oflF, I thought we could not have lost them on a more
unsatisfactory occasion. The Kussians had given their
guns in general too much elevation. The firing from
the fleets was also uncertain ; and although the guns*
crews, working joyously, flattered themselves they were
dismounting guns and bringing down masses of granite
at every broadside, inspection next day of the mischief
done dispelled the illusion. It had apparently been
expected that the aim once obtained from anchored ships
would keep of itself: a miscalculation at long ranges.
At long ranges the effects of oscillation on the longi-
tudinal axis, unnoted by the pendulum — caused by the
running in and out of the guns — of deflection of shot
by windage or other causes, and of unnoticed quoinage
slip, become sensible. There is more practical philo-
. sophy in Nelson's axiom, *'not to fire till you see the
whites of your enemy's eyes," than modern sea-gunners
seem to be ayare of. Several of the EngUsh ships were
more exposedly, if not more usefully, placed. The
Agamemnon and the Sans Pareil screwed as near Fort
Constantino as respect for the envirouing shoal admitted
of; and two other line-of-battle ships and a frigate
engaged some redoubts on the cliff" north of the harbour.
After fighting gallantly several hours, the former drew
off with much personal loss and some material injury,
withal less than the amount sustained by some of Lord
Exmouth's ships at Algiers, — direct evidence of the
inexpertness of the Russian artillery at the commence-
ment of the war, the result of parsimonious issues of
powder and shot in peace. The Wasp^ battery and
co-aiding redoubts, with skill derived from occasional
practice during the summer at inquisitive steamers, told

RESULTS OF THE SHIPS' CANXONADE. 323

a more significant tale. Unhurt themselves, save by the
explosion of a shell in the former thrown by a distant
steamer, they drove their opponents out of action in an
hour ; one of them leaving her anchors behind her, and
the other two so much disabled as to have to leave the
Euxine for a dockyard. Profiting by this hint, the
Russians afterwards raised similar works on cliflfs within
the harbour. Low earthem redoubts armed with heavy
guns are formidable coast defences. At 800 yards ships
are distinct objects from them, themselves being indis-
tinct in the smoke at less than that range.

At sunset the deafening cannonade, in which 700
tons of shot had been discharged — in augmentation for
the most part of the marine stores already deposited at
the bottom of the harbour — ceased, and the allied fleets
returned to their anchorage oflf the Katcha. They did
not carry with them even the satisfaction of having
exploded a powder magazine or ignited a store-house.
As they turned their stems to the forts, the Russian
fire acquired intensity, and did not cease until the last
ship was out of range. The terror of the fleets was
removed by that day's exhibition. Thenceforward,
during the siege, the enemy had nothing more to ap-
prehend from them than the periodic apparition of a
steamer firing random broadsides within gunshot at the
harbour's mouth. The Russian artillerymen termed
this nocturnal visitor ** the Phantom.*'

The tactics of the French and English admirals were
in contrast on that day. The former conformed his
practice to his theory. Having objected on principle to
a serious attack, and proposed only a pompous diversion,
he kept his sliips together, exposing none designedly

21—2

324 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

more than others. The latter, with similar views,
higher coloured (according to a pamphlet written by a
friendly hand*) exposed part of his fleet to the risk of
being cut up in detail. He allowed his two most valuable
his sole screw ships to engage a double tier fort near
enough for its fire, if ably directed, to be destructive, and
too far off for their own fire to be effective ; and he
pitted three others against mischievous redoubts of no
interest to the besiegers.

* The naval attack could be no more than a mere diversion

To have exposed the allied fleets to the danger of being crippled or
destroyed, would be to risk an imminent and fatal disaster for little or
no adequate advantage. — Bbereton.

( 325 )

CHAPTER XXrV.

Partial Failure of the Expedition — Feelings of the allied Generals —
Hints of Winter unwelcome — ^Illusory Hopes of speedy Success —
Castrametation neglected — The British Lines — Turks driven out
of Redoubts — The Russians repulsed by Highlanders and routed
by Heavy Cavalry — The Balaclava Charge — Russian Sortie from
Sevastopol repulsed — ^Wreck of an Egyptian Ship and Frigate
— Suflferings of the Turkish Troops — Neglect of them by the
Allies — Turkish Hospital at Balaclava — Deaths from Dysentery
and Overtoil — Oriental Indiflference to unseen Suflferings — ^Fata-
lism and Selfishness — Lord Raglan interposes — A Ship Hospital
fitted out for Turkish Sick — Lord Raglan^s Appreciation thereof — ■
The Hospital Ship sent back to Constantinople — Rations of Pork
and Rum not available by Mohammedans — Other Supplies not
regularly Issued — The Turks destitute of Money.

On the evening of October 17, 1854, the Crimean
expedition had failed : that is, the force embarked six
weeks earlier in Bulgaria, and since reinforced, to take
Sevastopol, had shown itself unequal to the task. It had
set foot on the promised land ; it had fought its battle
of Hastings, or of the Pyramids : but there ended the
parallel. No London, no Cairo, awaited submissively
the victor. Its numbers had to be trebled, its materiel
varied and quadrupled, a railway constructed, and nearly
a year had to elapse before the object was attained ; and
when Sevastopol at last fell, few of the officers, few of
the soldiers, originally landed in the Crimea, remained
to share the triumph. The armies were then commanded
and the engineering operations directed by other men :

326 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

not more talented, not more experienced in the art of war
than their predecessors, but who had the fortune to be
** les hommes du lendemain." The sun set that evening
on the keenest disappointment recorded in history : on
the reversal of the most remarkable foregone conclusion
ever arrived at by hope. Salutes were fired, bells rung,
and bumpers quaffed in Western Europe for the fall of
Sevastopol, on the authority of a random telegram ; and
when the error transpired, the rejoicings were considered
simply anticipatory of the event by a few days.

Crowned as victors by pubUc opinion, sensible of the
effect of suddenly chilling the warm expectations raised
by the battle of the Alma, the allied generals shrank
from avowing the truth, even to themselves ; much less
to those who had staked their reputation as statesmen
on the event. They had not the fortitude to look the
position in the face. Impressed with its reaUty, they
would have profited by the few remaining weeks of tine
weather to entrench the camp, make roads, and prepare
huts, to enable them to wait unanxiously for spring and
reinforcements. Depressed, the Russians had resisted
a combined land and sea attack: elated, would they
apprehend another attack by the same forces ? Hints
given by those who knew the cUmate, the sudden tran-
sition of balmy autumn to icy winter, were unwelcome.
'* If you talk in that strain we will have you thrown
overboard," said jocularly an influential officer to one
who said it would be well to think betimes on the pros-
pect of the army wintering on those bleak heights.
Hope of reducing Sevastopol before Christmas, not-
withstanding the increased confidence of the garrison,
overruled doubt, and incredulity prevailed at head-

THE BRITISH LINES AT BALACLAVA.' 327

quarters in regard of hostile reinforcements arriving in
time. Russia's ability to march troops and forward
supplies over the steppes, measured by the western
standard, caused erroneous calculation then and thence-
forwards. The batteries of the Allies and of Sevastopol
continued to fire at each other with equal results from
dawn to dusk, and it soon became evident that for
every Russian gun disabled there was another in store.

Castrametation, the art sedulously practised by the
Romans, one of the causes of their uniform success, had
formed no part of the studies of the British Staff; or if
it had, the theory was not put in practice. The lines of
the British army, uncovered from Inkerman heights to
Balaclava, temptingly invited the enemy, now beginning
to gather on the plain of Baidar. His first attempt, or
rather feeler, occurred near Balaclava ; where, on a low
ridge, in advance of the lines, three redoubts had been
thrown up, and were entrusted to the keeping of esnan,
— Turkish militia. This exposed aqd dangerous post,
above 2,000 yards away from any support, requiring the
staunchest troops of the army to hold, if worth holding,
was entrusted to men under depressing influences ; men
not long enrolled, and never in action. Ignorant and
suspicious, in a strange army, they may have fancied
themselves placed there by the '* infidel " to be sacrificed.
In this mood they were surprised at daylight of the
25th October, 1854, by the advance of a body of infantry,
cavalry, and aiiillery . Those in the first redoubt attacked
resisted with gallantry ; those in the others, obeying
their khismet, abandoned them and fled towards Balac-
lava, pursued over the intervening plain by cavalry.
The 93rd Highlanders turned out, with cavalry and

328 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

artillery, to cover the fugitives, and the former drawn up
in one line fired a harmless volley. The detonation
sufficed ; its effect was as good as though fifty saddles
had been emptied. Halting a few hundred yards off,
the Eussians wheeled to the right, and, unnoticing the
Heavy Brigade, were charged in flank and routed with
loss of hfe and credit. In the harbour all was commo-
tion. Transports got up steam ready to go out, and
men-of-war laid their guns to fire up the valley. Thus
far all went well ; and had the logical sequence of the
capture of the redoubts been admitted all would have
remained well. But Lord Raglan seeing, from an
eminence whence he had watched the fray, the Russians
carrying off the guns left in the redoubts, sent an order
(which admitted under ordinary conditions of two
readings) to the commander of the cavalry, to recover
them by a vigorous charge. When it reached the
lieutenant-general's hands the guns were irrecoverable
save by a battle ; and with that conviction he should
have galloped up to the commander-in-chief, to explain
the gravity of the position, presumedly unnoticed by him.
He had not been ordered to charge: he had been
directed to order a brigade to charge ; and therefore no
personal consideration stood in the way of his discharging
an important part of a second's duty, — that of pre-
venting, by timely caution or action, the consequences
likely to flow from an erroneous order. Various examples
mi^ht be cited of the exercise of such discretion. Had
Nelson obeyed his chief's signal at Copenhagen to cease
action, the Danish batteries would have crippled his
retiring fleet. Had General M'Mahon carried out his
instructions at Magenta, victory would have graced the

THE BALACLAVA CHARGE. 329

Austrian standards. The bearer of Lord Baglan's order,
Captain Nolan, had written a work on the superiority of
cavalry to every other arm ; he was eager to prove his
theory ; and when asked what there was for the Light
Brigade to charge, pointed to an army. Suiting his
actions to his words, he placed himself in front with the
advancing squadrons ; where, before he had gone far, a
fragment of shell terminated his brief promising career.
The single view of the enthusiast ought not to have
affected the circumspection of the general. Appropriately
made, the memorable charge, resistless as a torrent,
would, hke Kellerman's charge at Marengo, have decided
a battle had one been raging; but, under the circum-
stances, it was only a rare spectacle of courage and
discipline, — fruitless : deplored by two, admired by three
armies. Li olden days the Turks used to open a battle
by hurling a self-devoted body of cavalry (serden
ghefchdi) at the enemy, and their reckless valour often
made confusion in his ranks, their own army standing
ready to profit by it : the survivors each received a
pension for life. Unexcited by opium, uninspired by
fanaticism, the Light Brigade charged home ; but no
army stood ready to second their headlong daring : no
exceptional distinction awaited them. The charge of
Balaclava was, individually and collectively, the valorous
deed of the war. The Light Brigade saw destruction
before it ; yet not one drew his rein, not one swerved
from his path. They charged through a storm of grape
and shells up to the enemy's batteries, sabred his gunners,
and cut their way out again through masses of cavalry
supported by infantry. Every one who rode out of that
fiery circle merited a special cognizance.

330 TURKEY AND THE CRMEAN WAR.

The disputed guns remained in the enemy's hands,
and the redoubts in charge of his Cossack vedettes.
Afterwards the English lines were bounded by the next
interior ridge, breastworked and ditched, with batteries
at intervals to cover the approaches to Balaclava ; the
exposure of which to a coup de main General Liprandi's
attempt had disclosed. Encouraged, the Russians made
a vigorous sortie next day from Sevastopol, and were
repulsed by the British fourth division. During the
ensuing ten days nothing occurred to vary the monoton-
ous booming of the siege-guns ; shot returned for shot,
with equal injury to the works on either side. The first
breath of winter, however, a cold warning gale, swept
in the interval over sea and land, proving fatal to the
Moslems. An Egyptian Une-of-battle ship and a frigate,
on their passage from Eupatoria to Constantinople, were
totally wrecked, October 31st, on the coast of Roumelia
— the former near Midia, the latter near Kiha ; with the
loss of above 1,000 men drowned, including the estimable
Hassan Pasha commander of the Egyptian division.
The change of temperature with the gale developed
dysentery among the scantily clad, low fed, morally
depressed Turkish troops ; who merited more considera-
tion than they received from the Allies, by whom they
had been brought to a barren land. They early discovered
quanta $a di sale il pane altrui. With sorrow we write it :
the neglect of them was ungenerous, the disdain for them
insulting. Yet there was a nobility about them deserving
respect. When subsequently offered remuneration for
forced labour they resented it, saying they had come
there to fight and work in common, not to work
exclusively. They passed the winter on unequal terms

DESTITUTION OF THE TURKISH TROOPS. 331

with the Allies. They were as the potter's vase con-
tending with the iron vessel. They had neither extra
clothing nor food ; nor money to buy even tobacco with.
They received neither praise nor sympathy from their
countrymen. There were no commodious transports,
with surgeons, beds, and restoratives, to convey them
when sick to Constantinople. They had no press to
stimulate their rulers ; no philanthropists among then*
countrymen eager to run thousands of miles to administer
to their wants. The hovel denominated their hospital at
Balaclava presented early in November a deplorable
spectacle. About 400 men, some groaning with
abdominal pains, some breathing thick at the point of
death, were strewed on the damp mud floors of unglazed
rooms, the doors and windows closed to exclude the cold
air.

Qual sovra il ventre e qaal sovra le spalle
L*un dell' altro giacea, e qual carpone
Si trasmutava per lo tristo calle. — nin/enw.

They lay dressed as brought in from camp, without
beds, covering, or attendance. The doctor, an Armenian,
had no means of alleviating their sufferings : he had not
even utensils to heat sufficient water for drink, far less
for purification. Many were thus early dying every day,
and the deaths rapidly augmented in the course of the
winter, through overtoil in the British lines as night
working parties.*

Seeing there was nothing to be done for them at
Balaclava, where the Turks were regarded as pariahs,

"^ General Sir Colin Campbell, on being asked by the engineers, on
the 18th Januai7, 1855, for more Turks to work on the lines, answered
that 2,000 had died, 2,000 were sick, and the remainder unfit for work.

332 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

the author impetrated from his chief a steamer to convey
the woret cases to Constantinople. Out of 158 invalids
embarked in her 75 died on the passage. It was giving
them a chance : that was all. He then, seeing the
difficulties in the way of attending the sick on shore,
wrote to the naval council at Constantinople a recom-
mendation to station hospital ships, one at Balaclava
another at Kamiesh ; but scepticism in regard of a pro-
tracted siege, aided by official routine, prevailed. No
sufficient reason appeared to induce the naval authorities
to go out of their way for the sake of the army. Oriental
indifference to unseen woes also prevented consideration
of the subject. Moslems, high and low, like other
mortals left to their own promptings, are careless about
sufferings not appealing to the senses ; and this
indifference prevails in the East more than in the
West, through the want of publicity and the habitual
reluctance of those in power to probe the ills of society.
A man of rank in the East rarely visits prisons or
hospitals, and when by chance he makes himself remark-
able that way a veil is thrown over some things.
Fatalism also plays its part. That terrible dogma,
repudiated for self while accepted for others, often
reconciles a Moslem chief to the consequences of neglect
of the sick. ** Their hour was come ; no human agency
could have availed," is the answer to reproaches on that
head. This argument does not come seemly from men
who seek medical aid for the slightest ache in their own
persons, and who in their last hours summon doctors to
their couch in the hope of deterring Azrael, who stands
mocking in the doorway behind them.

Two months later (anticipating the narrative) the

THE author's efforts TO SAVE THE SICK. 333

adjutant-general of the army wrote to the author, in Lord
Baglan's name, to inform him of the sad state of the
Turkish troops under his orders, and to request his
assistance in relieving it. On that showing, the Capitan
Pasha ordered a 60-gun frigate to be disarmed and
arranged for a hospital, with a steam tender in connection
to convey necessaries to her, and bring away sick in
excess of room. She was fitted with 300 beds complete.
Two physicians, two surgeons, and two apothecaries, with
an ample supply of medicines and comforts, were embarked
in her. Due appreciation of this aid appeared in the
following letter from the adjutant-general to the author.

'* Camp before Seyastopol, Feb. 7ih, 1855.

" Sib, — I am directed by Lord Raglan to thank you
for your efibrts to promote an arrangement which his
lordship considers of so very much consequence. The
numbers of sick at Balaclava have always exceeded very
much the number you say that frigate will accommodate ;
and, in order to meet this difficulty, it will be the more
necessary that the steamer to be employed in conveying
the sick from Balaclava to the Bosphorus should be
constantly making trips for that purpose. Much suffering
and the saving perhaps of lives may result from the
efficient working of the plan now set in motion."

Fate, mysterious agent, which often dims clear eyes,
frustrated this healing arrangement. Towed to the
Crimea by her Majesty's ship Terrible^ proceeding there
with a batch of Croat labourers for the army, the
hospital frigate remained ten days in the offing of
Kamiesh, waiting the pleasure of the British authori-

334 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

ties, and was then sent back to Constantinople by order
of the naval commander-in-chief, on the plea of want
of room for her either at Kamiesh or Balaclava. Large
vessels were then lying in those harbours for the accom-
modation of a few officers, and a berth might have
been found for one more, exclusively for the service of
humanity. Everything conspired against the Turkish
soldiers in the Crimea in the winter of 1854-55. Many
a gallant decorated English or French soldier would
have sunk under their privations. Many a sneer would
have been spared had a charitable thought been given to
the effect of destitution and isolation on body and mind.
One day the pasha in command at Kadykeuy spoke to
the author about the slender rations issued to his troops :
each man, he said, received a daily allowance only of
biscuit and rice, without butter to cook the latter into
pilaf, and fresh meat about once a week. Had he repre-
sented the case in the right quarter, I asked. He had
not : he declined doing so ; and the tenor of his remarks
showed an indisposition, in common with other pashas
serving with the Allies, to say or do aught likely, in his
opiiiion, to make him seem troublesome. The loss of a
thousand men was not to be named in the same breath
with the loss of the English general's smile. An offer to
speak officiously on the subject was thankfully accepted,
provided no allusion were made to our conversation.
The pasha's version, corroborated elsewhere, of partial
treatment, was unwelcome at head-quarters, and was
met by an assurance, conscientiously made, that equal
rations were served out to all under Lord Raglan's
orders, English and Turks alike. Theoretically equal,
practically they were unequal. Pork and rum, decUned

COMMISSARIAT RATIONS FOR TURKS. 335

on religious grounds, were not issued to the Turks.
The commissariat was the gainer by so much ; and the
issue of an additional half pound of biscuit was advo-
cated in lieu of them. With more wit, the Turks would
have accepted the ** unclean thing" and the '* fire-
water," to give or sell to their Frank comrades; who
would then have regarded them more benignly. The
courteous secretary did not exactly approve of official
interference with '* regulations," to suit *' Turkish pre-
judices," and suggested an appeal rather to the feelings
of the commissary-general. That tender-hearted func-
tionary was unlikely I thought to heed officious pleading
— an indifferent voucher — but certain to comply cheer-
fully with an order. Finally, a promise for the desired
issue, conditional on the amount of biscuit in store, was
given, and on inquiry, fulfilled. Tea, coffee, sugar, &c.
— appropriate articles — always abounding in store, were
never regularly issued to the Turks; who were more
dependent, with their pay in arrears, than others with
silver in their pockets, on the commissariat for comforts.
The hucksters in the Crimea, unUke the bakkak of Con-
stantinople, gave no credit. Whence arose this indiffer-
ence about the Turks is difficult to say; unless one
might trace it to the habitual bearing of Anglo-Saxons
towards an '* inferior race." It did npt certainly proceed
from economic motives. These could never be attributed
to an administration which brought cavaliy regiments
from India, liberally entertained on their way by the
Pasha of Egypt, to gaze on the siege of a fortress in
the Crimea, and enriched its supply agents in Roumelia
and Asia Minor by the overflow of a lavish expenditure.

336 TURKKT AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTEE XXV.

RuBsian Reinforcements — Prince Mentchikof tries to raise the Siege —
His Choice hetween two Courses — Rassian Plan of Attack —
Conflict at Inkerman — Merits of the respective Troops — ^Perilous
Position of the British — Timely Aid of the French — Rassian
Retreat — Loss of the Assailants — A Prisoner shot hy his Captor —
Temptation to a British Sentry — Medals for Balaclava and Inker-
man — Theory of Distribution of War Medals — ** Urgent
private Affairs " — ^A noble Example — ^Violent Hurricane — Loss of
Transports — Force of the Tempest — Cossacks come to the Rescue
— ^Damage to Ships of War — Captain Christie, R.N. — Court-
martial ordered upon him — The Case of the Prince Transport Ship —
State of Anchorage at Balaclava- — Rear Admiral Boxer and Captain
Christie yielded to Clamour — Posthumous Honours awarded them.

Within three weeks of the opening bombardment of
Sevastopol, that is, on the 2nd of November, 1854,
General Danneborg's division arrived from Odessa, at
Bakchesaray, by forced marches made with enthusiasm
by the troops. They are said to have marched that
distance in twelve days : a remarkable feat even with the
aid of transports, to bring on wearied men and the
knapsacks. Another division reached Sevastopol the
following day. Thus reinforced. Prince Mentchikof,
giving his troops barely time to recover from their
fatigue, resolved to make an effort to raise the siege.
He would have acted more judiciously by waiting, his
strength concealed, for his best ally, cold. Summoning
a council to deliberate on the choice between attacking

RUSSIAN PLAN AT INKERMAN. 337

the British position at Balaclava, its base and depot,
weak by nature, but covered since General Liprandi's
attempt by ' batteries on commanding eminences ; .or
the heights of Inkerman, strong by nature, where its
right wing lay in careless security ; he decided on the
latter, as offering the fairest chance of immediate and
ultimate success. In possession of these heights, he
w^ould flank the southern approaches to the city, and be in
easy communication with the garrison. The project was
hazardous, requiring tried and trusty troops to carry out :
one of those in which a commander hardly dares to look
at the reverse of the picture. Repulsed, he would have
to retire down a steep decUvity, across a valley, under
.fire. On the threshold of war, with the traditions of
former campaigns — when field-pieces were unprovided
with tangent scales, and percussion locks were unknown
— generals had to learn the risk of exposing retreating
troops to the fire of modern artillery and rifles during
the extent of their range.

The Russian plan of attack was good, the execution
faulty. While the garrison of Sevastopol, making a sortie,
should occupy the French on the left, and a strong
division menace Kadkeuy, the reheving army in two
columns was to ascend the heights by two ravines and
meet on the plateau above. Through the inherent
diflBculty of night operations, the columns meeting at the
foot of the hills ascanded by one ravine, whereby their
dense masses had not room for deployment. Fewer men
at first would have proved more efficient. Screened by
mist, the advanced guard, infantry and artillery, gained
unnoticed the shoulder of the hill early in the morning
of November 5, and nearly surprised the sleeping: camp.

338 TUBKEY AKD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Warned just in time, by the vigilance of Colonel Codring.
ton, of the enemy's approach, the outposts fell back,
formed, fired ; again fell back, reformed ; and thus gave
time for a few thousand men, soon reinforced by every
disposable man, to assemble. What followed none with
a due regard for accuracy would venture to describe. It
was a melee, a struggle, a fight hand to hand, foot to foot ;
but not a battle involving command and manoeuvi-es.
Generals and soldiers were commingled — were shot down
side by side. Captains fought like privates, privates
fought Hke captains, each man striving like a knight for
his own honour. No orders were given ; but words of
encouragement resounded on all sides — now to attack this
batteiy, now to recapture that gun ; now to charge on
the right, now to stand firm on the left. Wanting pre-
conception and arrangement it was in regard of pluck
and manhood the repetition on a small scale of the stand
made at Waterloo.

All troops have their pecuHar merits. The French,
with eagles displayed, drums beating, and generals waving
their embroidered hats on the points of their swords,
charge briUiantly, checked by no surmountable obstacle.
The Russians, with stoical fortitude, stand for weeks to be
struck down in entrenchments, five hundred a day, by a
fire which can neither be avoided nor replied to. The
Turks, cold and hungry, remain unrepining by their guns
till their last biscuit and their last cartridge are expended.
The English excel on the open, when grape answers
grape, and bayonets cross. We doubt, divesting ourselves
of national predilections, if any other troops would have
held the position at Inkerman till such time as the
French, having repulsed the vigorous sortie on the left,

BATTLE OP INKERMAN. 339

were free to send a division to their aid. Nor did it
arrive too soon. Onwards dashed the Zouaves and the
Chasseurs d'Afrique into the midst of the fray ; their
shouts and the British cheers making wild and welcome
harmony. Again, as at the Alma, shattered, mowed
down by ranks, the Russians showed the force of their
discipline, and retreated in order, carrying off every gun.
The resolve of the Russians to leave no trophies in the
enemy's hands impaired the action of their artilleiy in
every battle. They halted under a bright sun, on the
slope of the hill, on the opposite side of the valley which
they had crossed in the morning mist ; and before sunset
some battalions marched into Sevastopol. We heard the
cheers in the city for their arrival, simultaneously w^ith
the cheers in the French camp for the return of tl^e
Zouaves from the field of battle, strewn with the bodies
of their comrades.

The Russians lost at the battle of Inkerman nine or
ten thousand men, killed or wounded. Some of the
latter remained on the field of battle, hid among bushes,
a week before the searchers discovered them ; having
supported life in the interval with the biscuit and water
which every soldier carries with him into action. The
''Odessa" regiment had, it is said, 1,400 men killed or
wounded, out of 2,200, being probably the heaviest loss
sustained by a regiment in one battle.

Livy's remark on the Roman army surprised by the
Volscians is applicable to the army surprised at Inker-
man : *' Militum etiam sine rectore stabilis virtus tutata
est."

That heady fight darkened one man's nature. Near
the field of battle we aldressed congratulations to a party

22-2

340 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

of soldiers returning to camp. Their spokesman vaunted
of having killed one hundred men for his share of the
day's work. ** How do you know ? " '* No doubt of it ;
I have fired away all my ammunition, and I rarely miss
my aim." *' Did you take any prisoners?*' ** I took
one." *• What have you done with him ? " ** I shot him."
*' Why ? " ** Because he was troublesome." And
shifting his rifle from one shoulder to the other, he
marched on ; little thinking, by his complacent mien,
that in the scales of eternal justice one prisoner's life
will weigh down a hundred lives taken in fair fight.

Riding back in the evening to re-embark in a frigate
in the ofl&ng of Balaclava we saw in a sequestered glen
an illustration of discipline resisting temptation, in the
juxtaposition of a British soldier and a cask of spirits.
'* This," he said, *'is a cask of rum abandoned in the
night by its carrier. I was planted sentiy over it this
morning. I have been forgotten in the turmoil of the
battle. I am hungry, tired, and thirsty. I expect to be
left here all night." We gave notice of his position to
the nearest post ; and then riding on overtook after dark
an illustration of reversed expectations, in a body of
Russian prisoners toihng through the mud escorted by
Turkish infantry.

The battles of Balaclava and Inkerman led to medallic
confusion, and inclement weather developed nostalgia
under the designation of '* urgent private affairs." In-
fantry miles away from the charge claimed the Balaclava
medal : cavahy out of sight of the struggle claimed the
Inkerman medal. The difficulty of drawing a line is
usually urged in excuse for indiscrimination, but in the
above-cited cases the line of demarcation seemed self-

DISTRIBUTION OP WAR MEDALS. 341

drawn. When evanescent none should be traced, for
it is better to honour many too much than one too
little. The mode of distribution during the late war
has made medals a geographical, clasps an equivocal
distinction. A medal guarantees the wearer to have
been in a given locality within a given period, but a
clasp does not indicate as surely his having shared in
the battle commemorated by it. We do not mean
that as a rule it should be conferred only on those
actually or likely to be engaged : that would be incon-
sistent. Some of your best troops may be ordered to
hold a distant pass, or a bridge, to the last man, which if
attacked and carried, would expose the flank of the army
to be turned ; and your engaged forces are encouraged
to persevere by confidence in the arrival of reinforcements
on the march, guided by the cannon's roar. Yet a
sophist might ask, if that be not the limit where are you
to stop ? On the issue of the Turkish war-medals to
the army and navy, the enrolled artisans of the ordnance
department and the dockyard murmured at their exclusion
from the distinction. ** Without us," said the former,
** your troops could not have taken the field." ** Without
us," said the latter, " your ships could not have gone to
sea." Our own view, hazarded with diffidence, of a
sensitive matter, is this : When a medal records an
elaborately designed operation of war — an epoch in
history — all concerned in it should be considered worthy
of the distinction ; and equity, we think, was lost sight
of by witholding the Crimean medal from the crews of
the transports employed in conveying the British armj
to the Crimea. When given for a battle in which the
component parts of an army have concurred, or have

342 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

been liable to concur, one way or the other — in action,
in reserve, in charge of baggage, or in a preconcerted
march — everybody, far or near, has an equal claim.
But when it is commemorative of a chance rencounter,
child of error or of surprise, combatants alone seem
legitimate recipients of it.

Contemporaries confer distinction, posterity awards
fame. There can be slight doubt that the Count de
Thoulouse and Provence, the Duke of Normandy, the
Count de Chartres, the Viscount de Melun, with other
nobles and gentles, who, variously inspired, abandoned
the famous siege of Antioch, were rapturously welcomed
to their ancestral halls by their friends and partisans,
who might reasonably have despaired of seeing them again ;
that banquets were spread and tournaments held, and
that troubadours sung jocund lays in honour of the gallant
Crusaders. There can be little doubt that private affairs
were distressingly urgent in the twelfth century, when an
absentee's property was exposed to despotic violence,
clerical avidity, and rabble lawlessness; and that sus-
pense about ail whom a man held dear must have been
painful, when news from home depended on the chance
arrival of a retainer of the house, or of a friendly pilgrim.
There can be little doubt that trifling ailments grew often,
under indifferent leechcraft, into grave indisposition, and
that the Genoese and Pisan traders failed at times to
supply the crusading army with necessaries, let alone
luxuries, twenty miles away from a stormy coast. But
neither these nor other considerations seemed to our
great historian adequate to excuse him from commenting
in caustic language on the motives which made them
leave their comrades when cold and wet, woe and want,

PLEA OP *' URGENT PRIVATE AFFAIRS." 343

beset the camp. Will the historian, describing the third
phase of the revolution of the Orient since the Hegira,
speak more daintily of nobles and gentles who — with
luxuries on the spot, with no misgivings about their
rights and properties, and with postal communication
twice a week with home — seceded from the siege of
Sevastopol when winter set in ; leaving in sorrow and
suffering the soldiers who had helped them to win their
honours, and who would have felt comforted by theii*
continued presence among them ? Likening no one m
the aUied armies to Bohemond or Tancred, he will speak
approvingly — glancing perhaps askance at the portrait of
Godfrey de Bouillon — of one noble, who, though he had
attained his highest distinction, a field-marshal's baton,
and had every comfort and solace adapted to his advanced
age awaiting him at home, remained at his post until
relieved by death. Time, rolling on, will efface the aber-
rations of his mihtary career ; and he will be remembered
as one of the true race, keeping steadily in view the
beacon which has guided England with augmenting renown
through ages of varied fortune— the beacon Duty.

A few days after the battle of Inkerman, a tempest
from south-west (bar. 29-38) — such as blows in the
Euxine twice or thrice in a century — burst, November 14,
on the allied armies, sweeping down their tents, and on
the allied fleets lying off Balaclava, off the Eatcha, and off
Eupatoria ; telling with direst effect on the first-named
anchorage, where deep water and a rocky coast rendered
escape from its violence impossible for vessels without
steam to ease the strain on their cables, and with diffi-
culty even then. Eight fine English transports, some
laden with winter clothing, some with pressed hay —

344 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

•

precious cargoes — perished oJBF Balaclava, with 460 men
(all but six) of their crews. luside the harbour two
steamers were wrecked, one steamer was dismasted, and
many other vessels were more or less damaged by the
wash of the sea from side to side. At Eupatoria, a
French and a Turkish line-of-battlc ship, a French
steam frigate, and eight transports were lost; and a
Turkish steam frigate only avoided the same fate by
slippmg her cables and standing out to sea. At the
Katclia, where we lay, fourteen transports (English and
others) went on shore, and one vessel foundered at her
anchors. From 8 a.m. till 6 p.m., the gale blew violently ;
the sea increasing from hour to hour, with hurricane
squalls at intervals of rain, sleet, or snow. No one could
stand on deck: whoever trusted to his feet alone was
carried along it by the force of the wind. We gazed
anxiously on eacli vessel successively as she parted from
her anchors ; we watched her borne helplessly from wave
to wave, and when she struck and the first sea broke
over her, there was a moment of breathless suspense.
In general sound ships, grounding on a sandy bottom
under wind-lulling chffs, iliey held together till moderate
weather allowed boats to approach and bring away their
crews. Three of them were set fire to by their own
people. One of them, the Lord Eaglan, was afterwards
got off, and her salvage was hailed as a good omen.

A detachment of Cossacks soon came to the beach.
Their officers parleyed with the crews of the nearest
stranded vessels under the cliff, and invited them to
land, with assurances of good treatment. Some of the
Cossacks, spurring their horses shoulder deep into the
waves, made eflbrts to succour the crews of two small

TEMrESTUOUS GALE AT BALACLAVA. 345

merchant vessels stranded off the valley of the Katcha,
where the surf ran highest. Those hapless vessels went
to pieces. Had the gale blown through the night with
equal force the entire fleet would have been wrecked ;
but soon after sunset it abated sensibly (bar. 29-85), and
though freshening up again at midnight, it was only a
farewell squall ; sending nevertheless two merchant craft
on shore which had ridden out the day with their masts
cut away. Next morning (bar. 30) found every man-
of-war off the Katcha at her anchors, several more or less
damaged. A Turkish Hne-of-battle ship had cut away
her fore and mizen masts ; an English steam frigate had
been dismasted by collision with a drifting transport;
and the rudders of five French line-of-battle ships had,
as stated, been washed loose.

Self-imprisoned or sunk, there was no Kussian fleet
to come out and attempt to profit by the consequences
of that fatal gale. Seeing the state of affairs on the
J 5th November, and the nervous excitement of the
admirals indisposed to let their sail ships remain longer
off the coast, we became confirmed in the opinion that
nothing short of a sense of absolute necessity justified
the defenders of Sevastopol in making a sacrifice which
shut the chapter of accidents to them.

The wrath of the gale, as before said, fell on Bala-
clava. In the ofl&ng of that harbour the Prince and
seven other transports had been dashed to pieces on the
rocks. Captain Christie, K.N. — whom I had met a few
weeks earlier at the mouth of the Alma, superintending
with wonted solicitude the embarkation of invalids — had
nearly shared their fate, through a high sense of duty ;
and he mwy have regretted an escape which reserved him

346 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

to die in sorrow, under arrest, a few months later. In
imminent danger, his ship, the Melbourne, rode heavily
in a deep rolling sea, her masts gone by the board, her
stem within a few hundred yards of rocks, to touch
which and to perish were one and the same tiling. Her
master wished to slip her cables and steam for an offing,
while the state of the sea rendered that possible ; but
Captain Christie withheld his consent, saying he would not
leave the other transports in danger. His devotion was
ill-rewarded. The press blamed him for the perilous posi-
tion of the transports, and the Admiralty accredited the
imputation by ordering a court-martial (averted by his
death) to sit on him for the loss of the Prince. Con-
trary to the rule and custom of the service, the Admiralty
ordered him to be tried for the loss of a ship which he
neither commanded nor was on board of. Unaware of
circumstances, the press imagined Captain Christie in pos-
session of an independent command over the transports.
Such was not the case. A commissioned officer on full
pay he was amenable to the orders of any senior officer
present ; and though charged with the details of the
transport service he had not authority to originate or
alter the destination of a transport, nor to select the
time for lading or unlading her. His suggestions on
those points might or might not be attended to.

The Prince arrived at Balaclava four days before the
gale, and coming to in deeper water than anticipated,
with the ends of her cables unclinched, lost her bower
anchors. Captain Christie, seeing her peculiarly exposed,
with inadequate ground tackling, recommended the
authorities either to receive her into the harbour or^
allow her to remain under way until it might be con-

CAPTAIN CHRISTIE AND THE ** PRINCE" TRANSPORT. 347

venient to land her cargo. Both sides of the alternative
were rejected. Want of room inside was alleged on
the one hand, and the general's anxiety to have the
winter clothing landed as early as possible was assigned
as a reason on the other hand for retaining her at
anchor outside. So she remained there with other
transports waiting for means to land their cargoes. The
means, two light steamers, were too often diverted from
their legitimate object to carry unimportant messages to
and from the fleets lying oflf the mouth of the Katcha.
There should have been no illusion about the peril of
the anchorage when the weather began to break and
southerly winds might be expected. On the arrival of a
transport at that season, the authorities at Balaclava
should have cleared her at once, and sent her away
to a safer anchorage, — especially if a sail ship. Before a
southerly breeze might freshen into a gale, a sail ship
would be exposed, when casting, to be thrown on the
rocks by the swell before gathering way.

A Turkish frigate had gone to Balaclava a few days
previously, with a supply of shot and shell for the army,
and a detention in the oflSng of five days for what might
have been accomplished in as many hours gave every
one on board a keen perception of its insecurity : the
faintest breeze from the southward raising a swell
dangerous for boats. She need not, distrusting the
anchorage, have remained there on an uncertainty, but
did not like to disappoint expectation. Danger is a
problem which in most cases has to be worked out : the
party immediately interested is rarely allowed to assume
^ its value : the apprehended gale may not blow home, the
bristling fort may not fire true. If Captain Christie had

848 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

gone away of his own accord with the transports, and the
gale had held oflf or had hlown from another direction,
he would have laid himself open to censure for over-
caution. No one remained longer at that season in
the oflSng of Balaclava than his sense of duty prescribed.
On the 12th, two days before the storm, of which there
were already premonitory signs, the second in command
of the British fleet left it with his division for Kamiesh
roads ; and with that prudent example before their eyes,
those invested with discretionary authority at Balaclava
might have taken upon themselves to let the transports
go to sea or to another anchorage. The Betrihution
alone of the men-of-war, with the Duke of Cambridge
sick on board, remained oflf Balaclava to brave the storm.
Captain Christie was not the only suflferer by the
clamour excited by the general and locnl administration
of the year 1854; not the only oflScer dropped by
superiors bound to hold out a helping hand. Rear
Admiral Boxer — v»hom I last saw at Balaclava, in the
spring of 1855, toiling from morning till night in the
task of creating, order and enforcing police regulations —
was another. One has no right to blame the press,
guided by appearances, dependent often on partial infor-
mation, for erring sometimes in regard of public
servants; but one has a right to expect those in posses-
sion of justificatory data to denote unequivocally their
dissent from an unfair verdict. Those oflScers had
shared, one way or another, in the worry and anxiety
of the Crimean expedition ; and all knew they had
striven, indiflferently aided, with a zeal beyond their
years. No one need feel disparaged by the expression of
a doubt if any other oflScer would have been equal to the

REAR-ADMIRAL BOXER. 349

work— demanding exceptional energy and nautical expe-
rience — ^performed by Admiral Boxer at Constantinople
in the winter of 1854-55. His exertions may be esti-
mated by comparing the scanty means doled out to him
in days of parsimony with the ample means ably used at
the disposal of his successor in days of prodigality. His
temper, it was said, ruffled philanthropists and specu-
lators. Little wonder ! A bishop in his place would have
spoken irreverently. Admiral Boxer and Captain Christie
were advanced in years. If deemed politic to yield them
as peace-oflferings to clamour, they should have been
recalled — but recalled with honour — to pass the evening
of their days at home, or in employments congenial with
their age. Instead thereof, mortification was their lot.
One was placed under arrest, an indignity which reacted
on a weakened frame, and the other was superseded in
the Bosphorus just as he had made the position tolerable
and had been joined by his family, and was sent to pioneer
anew alone in the slough of Balaclava. Both died in the
fatal Crimea with the sense of injustice weighing on
their minds ; and then, in recognition of their merits, the
Cross of the Bath was laid upon their tombs.*

• Id the Gazette of — July, 1855, the names of Roar- Admiral Boxer
and Captain Christie appeared posthamously honoured >vith the order
of the Bath, respectively K.C.B. and C.B.

350 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Dispersion of the Fleets — ^Preparations for Winter — Helplessness of
English Soldiers — Obvious Precautions neglected — Ayailable
Resources of Constantinople — Mr. Filder, the Commissary-
General — English Sympathy and Aid— Evils of Routine — The
Army pampered — State of Things at Constantinople — Turks
Amazed and Disgusted, but Powerless— Capitulations — Paralysis
of Justice — Consular Privileges abused — Gibbon's Picture of St.
Jean d'Acre realized at Pera — British Subjects abandoned —
Turkish Jails — Public Buildings of Constantinople occupied by
the Allies — The French dominate the City — Aspect and Bearing
of the Ottomans — Separation of Turks and Europeans —
Exceptional Cases — Russian Military Schools — Fate of Turkish
Invalids — Turkish Naval Hospital — The Dockyard occupied by
the Allies — Solicitude of a noble Eltchee for Russian Prisoners
— An Ambassador at Constantinople — Military Hospital at
Scutari — Sympathies of Miss Nightingale and Lady Stratford de
Redcliflfe — Soyer's Cookerj' — Sick Officers lodged in the Imperial
Kiosk — Exertions of Colonel Moore's Widow — British Cemetery
— French Hospitals at Constantinople — Mortality of French
Surgeons — Boy Soldiers — ScuiTy and Dysentery rife — ^Visitors
— Invaluable Services of Sisters of Charity.

The storm of November 14th, 1854, blew away the last
hope of reducing Sevastopol before Christmas. The
fleets dispersed. The Allies' admirals, hoisting their
flags on board steamers in Kamiesh harbour, sent some
ships to Constantinople for repairs, others to France for
troops. The French Euxine fleet was far different in
composition from the fleet off Cadiz thirty years earlier,
under the command of another Admiral Hamehn ; re-
garding which the Due d'Angouleme, in a letter to M. de

THE allies' prepare FOR WINTER. 851

Villele, dated Manzanares, 80th August, 1823, wrote, —
**Nous n'avons guere a nous louer de notre marine
sur aucun point; elle nous coute cependant soixante
millions." The French navy in the late war may be
said to have saved that amount in transport hire.*

The allied armies then began to think seriously about
the mode of getting through- the winter. Mature and
intelligent organization enabled the French to meet the
crisis with comparative faciHty ; but the English, sur-
prised, discovered their deficiencies. Accustomed to be
cared for, cooked for, washed for, the English soldiers
were unable to help themselves. They could only fight
and eat : could do both right well ; and the less distance
they had to go for their foe or their food the better
pleased they were : they preferred having either brought
to them. Untaught, inexperienced, the Staff was un-
equal to its task. The machinery of organization existed,
but motive power was wanting : as in an engine with
leaky valves and priming boilers steam could not be
kept up. Obvious measures of easy execution were
neglected : such as cementing with stone and bridging
with plank those parts of the thoroughfare likely to

• The imperial French navy, without ceasing to meet all the other
wants of the service, co operated as follows in the work of transport :
82 sail-of-the-line, 88 frigates, 21 corvettes, 24 transports, 17 small
steamers, total 182 vessels, made 905 voyages, and transported either
out or home, 278,780 men, 4,2G6 horses, and 116,081 tonsof mat<^riel.

The French war department chartered, in 1854-65, 66 steamers
and 1,198 sail vessels.

The steam -packets (messageries) carried troops and stores twice a
week.

The English Government placed at the disposal of the French Govern-
ment 8 naval transports and 42 merchantmen, which carried to the
East 88,353 men, 1,972 horses, and 6,624 tons of stores.— 3/oni/«/r.

352 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

become quagmires from convergent traffic, and forming
limited depots of provisions in the camp, to meet
inability (from weather or other cause) to convey up the
day's consumption from Balaclava. The artisans of
the fleet might readily, with ships* spare sails and light
spars, have stabled the cavalry ; and ready-made tchids
(iiorse clothing) were to be had in any reasonable
number at Constantinople. A requisition was sent to
the commissariat at Pera towards the end of November
for 2,000 suits of horse clothing ; but unfortunately
accompanied by directions to make them of a given
pattern, so that with all the trade set on the work
they were not completed under a month, when most
ot the horses were dead.

An army with unlimited command of money, in a
locality by the sea-side, only thirty hours' steaming from
the capital of the East — a city of commercial impor-
tance, with a million of inhabitants, dwelUng in wooden
houses, with nomade tastes — ought not to have been
subjected to any privations. As encamped soldiers,
heedless of the past, careless for the future, so in
general live the Constantinopolitans. They eat hurriedly,
in or out of doors, on a mat under a spreading tree, or
on cushions in a gilded saloon ; and sleep dressed, as
ready by night as by day to go wherever summoned.
Their houses are as airy as tents. They are ever on the
alert for the enemy — fire. Their markets and auctions
are held in the open air. They bury their dead as soon
as the breath is out of the body, and forget them on
the morrow. Wild dogs howl through the night in
concert with the sentries' challenges. Lean cows browze
in the outskirts. Dirt accumulates in the streets, till

RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN CONSTANTINOPLE. 353

washed away by rain. Inanimate dogs and cats taint
the lanes, till decomposed by the elements. Traffic is
carried on in military fashion : strings of horses or
mules convey food, fuel, and forage from one quarter
of the city to the other ; strings of camels, led each by
a patriarchal donkey, bring in supplies from outside.
Apart from the gorgeous mosques, the stately barracks,
the marble mausoleums, the ornate fountains, the
cypresS-shaded cemeteries, all at Constantinople savours
of a camp. There are always stored there, for the
casualties of fire, plank enough to hut 60,000 men.
Building materials are carried facilely up its steep hills
and through its narrow lanes by a docile asinine race.
With a timely appreciation of the congruous resources
of Constantinople, the British army could have been as
well sheltered in December 1854 as in December 1855,
and at one-fourth the cost, with exemption from scandal.
Artisans, labourers, donkeys, planks, and stoves might
have been shipped in a few days, and the troops hutted
within a month. Yorghans (wadded coverlids) and
•Salonica socks were procurable in the bazaars in any
number.

Mr. Filder, the commissary-general, was made the
scapegoat for all sins of omission ; but Mr. Filder,
wanting Atlas' shoulders, was unable to bear the load
put on him. Not his fault that the troops six miles off
were cold and hungry, through want of means to convey
his supplies to camp, or of organization to march thut
distance to fetch them. In despair at last the army
lay down and called upon Hercules. Hercules, grumb-
ling and growling, bestirred himself; he made the air
ring with his voice ; he shook the ground with his club.

354 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

He stimulated torpor, directed energy, and shamed
indiflference. He called forth the might, he roused the
sympathy of the nation. Reinforcements and supplies
streamed out to the scene of war. France also made
noble efforts. Turkey sent a reinforcement of 7,500
troops. So that the allied armies before Sevastopol,
after all losses, exceeded in January, 1855, double the
number originally landed in the Crimea. As much as
England felt for her army, had that army reason to be
proud of her. Such concord, such desire to assist brave
men in distress, had never before been witnessed.
Hams, jams, fur-coats, woollen comforters, worsted
stockings, pipes, tobacco, preserved meats, potted game,
plum puddings, offerings from all classes, sent partly
in private yachts led by the Fairy cutter belonging to
Major Lyon, were the visible tokens of homely aflfection ;
and they told a tale, on the moral of which statesmen
may dwell.

A nation forgives a breach of national trust once, not
twice. Since the general peace the English nation had
given its rulers five hundred millions sterling for an-
army, and at the first heavy strain the machine gave
way. Whole regiments nearly dissolved away through
the operation of routine. By mid-January, 1855, the
46th Regiment, which had landed in the Crimea after
the battle of Inkerman, 1,000 strong, was reduced to 150
valid men ; and of the 63rd Regiment not twenty men
remained fit for duty. The authorities, excited by the
general outcry, sinned afterwards in the opposite sense.
Overstepping the line of efficiency, they pampered the
army, and rendered it, by reason of its wants, incapable
of operating ten miles from the sea coast. The transport

THE ALLIES IN COXSTANTIXOPLE. 855

corps in the end numbered 18,000 animus, with a
motley crew of drivers. They were to feed the army.
Who would feed them ?

Shaken by the storm, the Turkish fleet — wanting
repairs and necessaries, — returned to the Bosphorus the
latter end of 1854. We found matters changed indeed
since our departure five months earlier. In that interval
Constantinople had been fully occupied by the Allies.
The Turks, in stupor, were drinking the bitter waters of
humiliation, were expiating the sins of their ancestors.
Frank soldiers lounged in the mosques during prayers,
ogled licentiously veiled ladies, poisoned the street dogs,
part and parcel of the desultory bizarre existence of the
East, shot the gulls in the harbour and the pigeons in the
streets, — which till then, like the water-fowl in St. James's
Park, had regarded every human face with confidence,
mocked the muezzins chanting ezzan from the minarets,
and jocosely broke up carved tombstones for pavement.
Custom was disturbed in its cradle, prejudice was shaken
to its roots. The Turks had heard of civilization : they
now saw it, as they thought, with amazement. Robbery,
drunkenness, gambling, and prostitution revelled under
the glare of an eastern sun, or did mild penance in the
shadow of a dozen legations : to each of whom the with-
drawal of a rascal from the station-house was a duty, the
shielding of a miscreant from punishment was a triumph.
The Sultan still sat in his palace, but his power was in
abeyance. His ministers met at the Porte as usual ; but
their councils were a formality : their monitors spoke
from the French and English embassies. The Allies'
troops had possession of the capital, — the English on
the Asiatic the French on the European side of the

28— a

856 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Bosphorus ; and their guards patrolled Pera and Galata
— sanctuary for a hybrid swarm from all parts of the
Meditenanean, whose avocations the police were cautious
in interfering with, for fear of drawing on themselves the
wrath .of some legation, by confounding an Ionian with a
Hellenist, a Genoese with a Sicilian, or a Javanese with
a Hindoo.

The necessity of framing capitulations in the sixteenth
century — when human heads were struck oflf with as
little ceremony as fowl's necks are wrung by the mistress
of an Italian inn on the appearance of hungry travellers
— for the protection of a few European traders, was a
disgrace to Turkey ; the strict enforcement of them in
the nineteenth century, under altered circumstances,
when it is difficult to get a murderer hanged, is a
reproach to Europe. They were framed on behalf of
limited associations, self-restrained by by-laws, and
self-responsible for the conduct of their servants and
employes : they are now enforced in favour of 50,000
Europeans of various nationalities and callings at Con-
stantinople, and twice as many thousands or more domi-
ciled in provincial cities, in pursuit, one and all, per fas
et nefasj of one object— gain; and, though divided by
clashing interests, united by the common bond of
rancour against the dominant race. Probed to their
source, the occasional outbreaks in Turkey called fanati-
cal would b^ seen to be the natural reaction against the
overbearings and insolence of foreigners and protected
natives. Would you abolish 'the ^' capitulations ? '* asks
the Levantine. Not altogether, so long as the separa-
tion of administrative and judicial functions in Turkey
remains indistinct: but we would modify them in the

CAPITULATIONS TO FOREIGN CONSULS. 357

interests of society by drawing a line between protection
and impunity, between privilege and licence.

The interests of society do not require any Frank store
or dwelling in Turkey to be an asylum for every kind of
offender, long enough occasionally to baffle police action.
A thief or a homicide may, as things are, run to a shop
or a dwelling under the aegis of the *' capitulations,'* and
the policeman, witness of the deed, cannot follow him
beyond the threshold without consular co-operation ;
which, never attainable under many hours, may, in
summer, when people reside miles away from the city, be
delayed for days. Two examples, of no distant occur-
rence, will suffice to show the working of the system.
1. A merchant's counting-house at Galata was broken
into one fete day, its iron safe forced, and 5,000/.
abstracted therefrom. With prompt action the police
would have caught the suspected burglars red-handed ;
but the co-operation of their respective authorities was
necessary, and was not obtained until the third day, —
too late for the search then made in the rookery to be
of any avail. 2. An Algerine was stabbed through the
back one evening, at the entrance to Pera from the
cemetery. His assassin, apparently a Sclavonian, fled
along the gas-lit music-enlivened Frank promenade,
les peiits champs, closely followed by two cavasses, who
were on the point of laying hands on him; when the
guests at a cafe, before which the chase passed in full
cry, interposed between the pursued and the pursuers,
hustled the latter, and carried off the former in triumpli.
The deep murmur of the Moslems gathered round
the victim, on hearing of the mode of the murderer's
escape, was stilled by the arrival of a guard summoned

858 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

ad hoc, and the prompt removal of the corpse to the
mosque' of another quarter dispersed the excited crowd.
The interests of trade do not require each member of the
consular legion in Turkey to have the privilege — in
some instances much abused — of importing duty-free
everything he pleases to declare for the use of his house-
hold ; or the right of protecting in the obnoxious sense
of the term every individual, of fair or ill repute, said to
be in his service.

The picture, drawn by a masterly hand, of St. Jean
D'Acre when it was the capital of the Latin Christians in
Palestine, is somewhat apposite. *'The population was
increased by the incessant stream of pilgrims and fugi-
tives. The markets could offer the products of every
chme and the interpretation of every tongue. But in
this conflux of nations every vice was propagated and
practised : of all the disciples of Jesus and Mohammed,
the inhabitants of Acre were esteemed the most corrupt.
Nor could the abuse of religion be corrected by the dis-
ciphne of law. The city had many sovereigns and no
government. The Kings of Jerusalem and Cyprus, the
Prince of Antioch, the Counts of Tripoli and Sidon, the
Grand Masters of the Hospital, the Temple and the
Teutonic Orders, the republics of Venice, Genoa, and
Pisa, the Pope's legate, the Kings of France and Eng-
land, assumed an independent command. Seventeen
tribunals exercised the power of life and death ; every
criminal was protected in the adjacent quarter."
Substituting the European governments represented in
Turkey : to wit, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Great Britain, the Hanse Towns, Hellas, Holland,
Naples, Prussia, Portugal, Russia, Sardinia, Spain, and

INTERVENTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. 359

Sweden, for the above-named powers, and making due
allowance for assuaged manners and milder laws, we
have seen, in several respects, the counterpart of Gibbon's
picture in Pera and Galata. Cognizant of this state of
things — unusually developed in 1855-56-57 — the Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a memorandum dated
July 2, 1844, addressed to the consuls in the Levant,
said: **If her Majesty's Government are obliged to
abandon any attempt to place British jurisdiction in
Turkey on a sound footing, the Porte may reasonably
require that a jurisdiction should be renounced which is
not enforced, but the nominal existence of which is
incompatible with the security of the society at large."

An order in council, passed in that year with a
remedial view, empowered consuls in Turkey, under
certain circumstances, to abandon British and "pro-
tected " subjects ; in other words, acquiesce in their
consignment to life-long imprisonment in a Turkish jail.*

* The order in coancil empowered a consul to expel any one under
his jurisdiction from Turkey after two convictions before a competent
tribunal, the expelled person not to be entitled to British protection
should he return to Turkey. Want had originally brought such indivi-
duals to Turkey, and want, supplemented by local ties, generally
brought them back to it. Taken up for any offence after his return,
an individual was at once, without inquiry, disowned by his consulate.
He then became a nondescript. He was not a Turk, nor a raya, nor a
European. His offence, if tried by the native authority, would probably
have been atoned for by a few mouths* imprisonment in the Zaptie,
which would have done him no harm ; but in his quality of European
he could not in virtue of treaty be tried witliout the concurrence of his
consul. His consul's disavowal did not change his nature. The Turks
solved the problem by dropping him into prison, leaving it to his consul
to extract him therefrom. Had they drowned him in the Bosphorus his
consulate would have been none the wiser. His death, when occurring,
would not be reported to the consulate. Abandoned loniaus, in a hope-

360 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The framers of that order little imagined the mode of its
operation, combining cruelty with inefficiency ; and were
not enhghtened on the subject by its executors. The
practice was brought to light in 1857 by an English
officer with Turkish rank meeting in the bagnio an
Ionian in chains, there since twelve years, linked to a
fellow-prisoner, other lonians being in the same predica-
ment, all of whom, but for that fortuitous rencontre,
would to a moral certainty have died there. The jailors
even considered that Ionian's case pecuHarly hard: a
hale man, thirty-five years old, he was Hkely to live long,
without hope of liberation. The extreme sentence in
Turkey, when blood is not demanded, being fifteen
years in the bagnio, that man, with no recorded offence,
might have lived to see three generations of murderers
pass out before his eyes. A native of the United Kingdom,
abandoned since four years, was subsequently lighted on
in like manner in that dismal abode : he was found
coupled with another prisoner, unable to converse with
him tlirough want of a common language. He gave
direct evidence of his nationahty, at first doubted, by
saying, ** Is it not a d — d shame, sir, that I, an English-
man, am chained here like a felon, without having been
tried ? " His case drew public attention to the subject
of ''abandonment,'' and led, with the liberation of the
'' abandoned," to the disuse of the melancholy practice in
1862. Many scores of lonians, and some others, aban-

less state, were allowed by the prison authorities to he removed to the
Greek hospital near the Seven Towers, where they were tended gratis.

England, Spain, and Naples were the only countries which aban-
doned their subjects. Spain is alone now in that respect. A juris-
consult might say that a person unable to surrender his allegiance
could not foifeit his protection.

PUBLIC BUILDINGS USED FOR BARRACKS. 361

doned under the provisions of the said order in council,
too rigidly interpreted, are understood to have wasted
away unto death in Turkish jails. Those jails, in regard
of natives, are simply jails, far better than several visited
by the author in Naples and Cuba ; but for ** abandoned "
Europeans, who, with dissimilar habits, have no local
sympathies, they have been oubliettes.

The Allies had demanded and obtained nearly all the
public edifices at Constantinople, including the naval,
military,* and medical schools, for barracks and hospitals ;
leaving, in their liberality, tw^o barracks for the native
garrison and hospital room for about 800 men. The
French thus obtained accommodation for 12,000, the
English for 5,000 patients. By means of their estab-
lishments, selected with military judgment — hospitals or
fortified barracks, as the case might require — the French
dominated the city in every sense, outside and inside.
They were quartered in the barracks of Daoud Pasha,f
Maltepeh and Ramistchiftlik, on the eminences where
Mahomet II. had encamped with his conquering army
400 years before. They occupied the palace of the
Russian embassy in the heart of Pera, dominating the
entrance of the harbour. They sat down in the Tash
and Gumuchsouyou barracks flanking the approaches to
Pera and overlooking the imperial palace. They planted
themselves on Seraglio Point, and occupied the adjoining
barracks of Gulhane. They encamped at Maslak and
stationed guards over the bendts (reservoirs). They
estabHshed themselves in the sensitive quarter of St.
Sophia (where they had on one occasion a sanguinary

♦ The Military School was burnt down when in French occupation.
I Daoad Pasha bairacks were bamt down when in French occupation.

362 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

fray with Tunisian soldiers) in a vast building near the
venerable fane, dear alike to the Turk and to the Greek
— trophy of conquest to one, memorial of empire to the
other. And they built a hut camp along the course of
the subterranean aqueducts, ready for a contemplated
reserve army of 60,000 men.

The bearing of the Ottomans under this infliction,
with gloomy prospects, darkened further by sinister pre-
dictions, was instructive to behold and impossible to
depict. Once a great, always a proud race thus humbled
by foreigners in the eyes of their rayas quivering with
joy at their rulers' abasement, their faith gave them
resignation to support it with dignity; their dread of
ulterior consequences gave them strength to dissemble.
Daily enduring mortifications more than enough to drive
into wild excesses the population of a western capital,
recalhng the scenes enacted by the Crusaders on their
passage through Constantinople, they conducted them-
selves with forbearance and urbanity. Their attitude
betrayed not the dejection in their hearts. Moved by
one impulse, under the apprehension of a great impending
calamity, all ranks, high and low, instinctively concurred
in the policy of abstaining from doing or saying anything
to irritate their *' guests." The war with Kussia had
become of secondary importance : the evacuation of their
capital was uppermost in their minds. In this spirit
they held aloof from the stranger ; they avoided his
haunts ; and the slight social intercourse heretofore
existing between Turks and Europeans soon ceased, or
became formal. They attended not his military spec-
tacles, nor encouraged him to witness their religio-civic
ceremonies. The review of the English cavalry at Scutari

ISOLATION OF THE TURKS IX CONSTANTINOPLE. 363

had no Turkish spectators beyond the imperial suite ;
and the gathering at the mosque of Codja Mustapha
Pasha in commemoration of the martyrdom of the imams
Hassan and Hussein — the most characteristic of Moslem
religious pageants, assembling both sexes of all classes,
including royalty — was unchequered by a foreign uniform.
Some few forgot their ideas of self-respect. One might
occasionally see a grave official, w^ho the year before had
scarcely deigned to rise for the representative of a second-
rate power, now advance several steps to meet the booted
aide-de-camp of a general or the bustling dragoman of
an embassy with an importunate message or an irksome
demand, draw him with ^oft words to a seat beside him
on the sofa, and give him the diamond-ringed pipe and
Mocha cofiFee in a china cup within a gilded zarj. The
Turkish proverb, '* Honey flows from his lips while the
blood is boiling in his heart " was exemplified in those
days. The fair sex shared with their lords the feeling of
repulsion. Not a hownt fortane left a souvenir of the
presence of the alhed armies on the banks of the
Bosphorus.

While the French converted the Turkish military
schools into hospitals, the Kussians opened two additional
military schools for the eventualities of the war.

We have debated in our mind if the Allies, in their laud-
able anxiety about their own sick, ever asked themselves
what became of the Turkish sick, who were more numerous
and more intensely diseased. They had deprived them
of their hospitals and barracks, and knew that no others
would be extemporized. We were not in the w^ay to see
the w^hole of that harrowing picture. We saw parts of
it, and perused reports on the subject from the captains of

304 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

English transports in Turkish pay. Devoid of resources,
with no public to stimulate their rulers, the Turkish sick,
all more or less influenced by the dogma of fate, in
general died where they had sickened. From time to
time some hundreds of invaUds by the sea-side, obstin-
ately tenacious of life, were shipped in transports unpro-
vided with necessaries, for conveyance to Varna or
Constantinople, the only ports where relief awaited them.
On one occasion 900 were embarked from Eupatoria, in
the Antelope steamer, in so wretched a condition that
twenty-six were found dead in the morning before she
weighed anchor, and nearly a hundred died on her pas-
sage to Varna. More would probably have died, but for
the solicitude of Mrs. Reid, the captain's wife. That
worthy lady directed tea and coffee from her own stores
to be given to them from time to time, and saw it done.
Biscuit used to be supplied for the sustenance of men
whose teeth were loose from scurvy.
. The Turkish Naval Hospital avoided surrender, by
the location of the French and English fleets' hospitals
on the Bosphorus, respectively in an airy yali at Eand-
lidja and in the embowered imperial kiosk at Therapia,
But in other respects the navy shared the common lot.
We found on our return to Constantinople the dockyard,
sole resource of four fleets for necessary repairs, in part
a receptacle for Allies' commissariat stores, with conse-
quent relaxation of rules conducive to safety ; and the
marine barracks occupied, through English influence, by
Russian prisoners, who should rather have been berthed
in a hulk, like their comrades in the hands of the French.
The fire one night proceeding from a French depot in
the dockyard went no further ; but the ejected marines

RUSSIAN TRTSONERS IN CONSTANTINOPLE. 365

spread mischief. Doubled up with the artisan brigade
in their quarters, the agglomeration bred typhus fever,
notwithstanding that additional windows and skylights
had been opened in the walls and roof of the building.
Several hundreds of the commingled corps died, and as
many more were invalided to their villages. On the
departure of the intruders for England, the marines
regained possession, of their barracks ; but were, some
months later, required to vacate th6m again, to make
room for miUtary stores sent from England for the
" contingent." This was worse. The stores might have
been housed more commodiously for the public service
in vacant buildings by the water side, in embassy
grounds, at Buyukdereh or Therapia. The naval
authorities, reluctant to oflfend an eltchee of mark by
refusal, were nevertheless indignant at this exaction.
The marine barracks was also a depot for naval super-
numeraries. Apprehending further sufiFering, they offici-
ously brought to l\is Excellency's notice the mortality
consequent on the previous ejectment ; and, although
the letter addressed to him remained unanswered, it was
tacitly acknowledged by a relaxation of the pressure,
whereby the marines retained one floor of their barracks
with its mosque.

The noble eltchee's solicitude for those prisoners
grew, he said, out of a letter written him by the Czar
Nicholas on their account : a plausible though inadequate
reason for turning men in the Sultan's uniform out of
house and home for their sake. His repetition of an
irksome demand in favour of less interesting objects
flowed from unconsciousness of the existence of people
with feelings of self-respect outside a hmited circle, and

366 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

the difficulty of realizing privations by those who have
never suffered any. Like an Oriental grandee, feared
and flattered, an ambassador at Constantinople dwells in
a pleasant house, secluded from plague, dogs and
beggars, and like him may naturally say ** Allah kerim "
for the rest of the world. Armed cavasses guard his
gates, ready at his behest to cut any intruder down ;
armed cavasses precede him in the streets to clear the
way. Like the Oriental, he may be thoughtlessly
unjust ; no one remonstrates : he may indirectly inflict
pain ; no one repines, save in secret. His scorn is
pardoned, his smiles are courted. The instincts of
nature give way to the force of habit; and therefore
one knowing the influences of the clime readily acquits
the noble eltchee of all but inadvertence ' in the cited
case. Others however, strangers to the Levant, came
on the 'scene with the war ; men with tongues in their
heads and pens in their hands ; and they, inferring
duties from position, imputed to him at the outset
indifference to the alleged wants of the Scutari military
hospital. The inference was as illogical as the imputation
was unjust. That hospital was in no way dependent
on his countenance. Moreover, supposing it otherwise,
as one can only judge of any thing by reference to a
known standard, so, by comparison with the only
hospital he had been in the way of seeing, the
British seamen's hospital at Pera,* the Scutari hospital

• The old British seamen's hospital at Pera,-^a self-supporting
estahlishment, comhining a maximum of expense with a minimum of
relief — unahle to hear the light reflected on it from the military hospi-
tal, ended its gloomy existence in 1856. Its successor, the British
seamen's hospital at Galata, — a suitahle stone edifice built by the
Government, — is supported by a duty of Ij penny per ton on British

MILITARY HOSPITAL AT SCUTARI. 867

in its decried state seemed replete with comfort and
conveniences.

When we first saw it, the military hospital at Scutari
had passed the stage of angry criticism. Its linen was
clean washed, its dead were decently interred, its sinks
were deodorized. Three simple accessories to comfort —
the real medicine for disease induced by exposure —
were still deficient : viz., bedside mats, unstinted bed-
clothing, and sun-blinds. Wind circulating freer than
agreeable to sound sleepers through broad stonepaved
corridors made the patients laid in them sensibly aware
of the atmospheric inconstancy of the Bosphorus, and
daylight streaming in through lofty windows broke the
precious morning slumber. The treatment early pursued,
in ignorance of climatic action, was unsatisfactory.
Native and foreign practitioners domiciled at Constanti-
nople trust chiefly for the relief of complaints such as
usually arrived from the Crimea to low diet and regu-
lated warmth. Recovery then, in five cases out of six,
ensues* naturally. The hospital, reversing the process,
gave its patients stimulating sustenance and let them lie
chilly in bed; and therefore it is not surprising that
during the winter of 1854-55 the average number of
daily deaths was fifty, the maximum having been eighty.
Rum in camp and port wine in hospital dug many
graves. Routine at length listened to reason.

Under the eyes of the Court represented by Miss
Nightingale, under the eyes of the House of Commons
represented by Mr. Stafford, under the eyes of the press
represented by Mr. McDonald, the hospitals of Scutari

shipping at Constantinoplo, and has a resident surgeon with requisite
attendants : and like every such establishment under the Crown it
is creditable to the nation.

868 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

aud Kouleli, — owing much to Lady Stratford de Redcliffe's
active sympathy, — progressed step by step, until they
united the comforts of a sanatorium and a club, with
reading and dining-rooms for convalescents ; the former
suppUed with agreeable literature, and the latter with
palatable food result of Mr. Soyer's gratuitous instruc-
tion. That renowned artist's soul was in his art. He
had tarried on his way eastwards a day at Athens, and
his feat of cooking a muttoa-chop in the Parthenon
remained his favourite recollection of the city of Minerva.
He used to say there were three humbugs in the East,
good-humouredly including himself in the triumvirate.
Intelligent Soyer ! He was no humbug ; he was a prac-
tical enthusiast. He would have made cookery part of
the scheme of national education ; and many witnesses of
the inexpertness of our soldiers in that respect in
the Crimea, with consequent waste, will agree with
him in thinking such teaching might benefit the poor
more than some things pretended to be taught them.
Sick officers were accommodated in the imperial kiosk *
of Haidar Pasha, under the matronship of Mrs. Moore,
widow of Colonel Moore. This estimable lady, following
her gallant husband's example, die J at her post. The
remains of the brave who died near the Bosphorus repose
in a cemetery, consecrated by the Bishop of Gibraltar,
on the brow of a chff overlooking the Golden Horn
and the Propontis, between Scutari and Kadykeuy. This
interesting spot, which merits a cypress plantation, is
inclosed by wall and rail ; it is under the charge of
an English non-commissioned officer, and is indicated
to the passing vessel by a granite column designed

• This kiosk was burnt down when in English occupation.

FUNERAL OF GENERAL GUTON. 869

by Baron Marochetti. The remains of Khourshid Pasha
(General Guyon) , contested for by Christian and Mos-
lem,* closed the long list. They were interred there,
October 15th, 1856, by the chaplain of the British embassy,
with Turkish (in default of British) military honours.

While the French hospitals in the Crimea might
have advantageously taken example from the English
hospitals there, their hospitals at Constantinople never
required suggestion or stimulus from any quarter.
Organized on the practice of former wars, with the
improvements of modem science, and arranged in due

* General Gayon, a son of Captain Gay on, K.N., and a naturalized
Hungarian by his marriage with a Hungarian lady, was one of that
distinguished band of refugees who claimed Turkish hospitality in 1849.
He received from the Porte then the rank of liva (major-general) —
his rank in the Hungarian army — and a few years later promotion to the
rank of ferik (lieutenant-general).

Having resided in Turkish fashion during the last year of his life in
the orthodox quarter of Bozdan Kemereh at Constantinople, he was
considered by the neighbours a '* true believer,'* and therefore on his
death the imams of the quarter came to his house to prepare the body
for interment : but Countess Gayon put them oflf with fair words and
sent for an English dragoman, who learned from the seraskir that
although the deceased appreciated the merits of the Koran, he had
died a Chiistian. The seraskir, seeing the incredulity in that respect
among the inhabitants of the quarter, advised the removal of the
body after sunset to Galata. This circumstance, coupled with the
selection of the military cemetery at Scutari as the place of inter-
ment, suggested the propriety of applying to the commander of the
British squadron in the Bosphorus for a man-of-war's boat to carry the
body across the water and for a guard of honour. Compliance with
this application was refused. General Guyon's body was therefore
conveyed to Scutari in a Turkish man-of-war's barge, followed by two
other man-of-war's boats with mourners, and was met at Harem
Sh'Uesi (the landing-place) by a company of the Imperial Guard with
music, who escorted it to the gates of the cemetery, where they drew
up in two lines with arms presented between which the funeral cortege
passed. General Guyon's two sons were, after his death, placed in the
College Henri 1 V, by Napoleon III.

870 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

time for the eventualities of a campaign, they met com-
posedly the trials of the winter of 1854-55, and the
heavier trials of the spring of 1856, when typhus fever
prevailed. Eighty French surgeons died in them. The
diseases were in general severer than in the English
hospitals ; owing in part to inferior food and raiment in
the field, and in part to the comparative youth of the
troops. Numbers wei:e mere lads, appearing from their
slight make younger than they really were. One day,
among a group of convalescents airing themselves before
the hospital at Gulhaneh, we remarked two lads under
18 years of age, as they said, who between ihem had
given much flesh and bone to the moloch of war. What
a prospect, we thought, for these poor boys ! Virtual
imprisonment for hfe in the H6tel des Invalides. Osten-
tation lodges a disabled soldier in a palace : sympathy
would nestle him in his mother's cottage with a pension.
The distressing complication of scurvy and dysentery
was common in the French hospitals, and proved very
fatal ; while a Uberal issue of anti-scorbutics rendered it
all but unknown in the British army. Men used to
arrive from the Crimea, barely able, from debility, to
state their names: such were sent on immediately to
France as the fairest chance of recovery. The French
steam-packets from Constantinople to Marseilles carried
twice a week from 160 to 200 sick or wounded soldiers,
of whom many are reported to have died on the passage.
The sick generally arrived from the Crimea in a state
which necesscirily rendered a bath the first process. The
French hospitals being uncommented upon were less
seen by the public than the English hospitals ; which
was to their advantage. Visitors might amuse con-

FRENCH HOSPITALS AT CONSTANTINOPLE. 371

valescents, but they often seriously disturbed the sick.
The sight of fashionably-dressed Jiadies and fine gentle-
men in the wards constrained decent-minded men to
regard conventionalities more than their condition
advised. Free permission was given to visitors to per-
ambulate the French hospitals, when a better motive
than idle curiosity was assigned. Their organization
was evidently the result of high professional knowledge
joined with extensive practice. The familiarity of every-
body with his duties rendered their performance easy.
The intelligence of the attendants, a trained body, saved
the surgeons much time and trouble : they made the pre-
liminary arrangements for operations, and were adepts in
the art of assuaging pain with pad and pillow.

The invalids derived inappreciable solace from the
presence of Sisters of Charity amongst them. These
self-denying women tended them as mothers and sisters
are expected to attend sons and brothers. They fed those
unable to feed themselves; they nursed the wounded
with gentle hands ; they cheered the desponding by their
gaiety ; they smoothed the pillows of the sleepless. We
saw many a poor fellow's eyes Ught up as one of those
good spirits, noiseless and smiUng, approached his bed-
side, if only to say a kind word and pass on to another.
In our unworthiness we have been unable to elevate our
thoughts to that frame of mind which leads women,
many of them fair and young, to devote themselves,
uncheered by fame, their names and garb conventual, to
the service of humanity in its most repulsive form. They
seemed to be ubiquitous. Wherever sufiFering lay there
they were sure to be found. One stormy rainy day a
French line-of-battle ship arrived in the Bosphorus with

24— »

372 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

wounded Kussians. Although we early went off to her,
two Sisters of Charity had preceded us with a supply of
lemonade, sugared wine, which they diluted with water
on board, soft biscuits, and chocolate. We found them
at their task, gay and smiling, administering restoratives
to the wounded ; who, excepting some who had suffered
amputation, were lying or sitting on a sail spread on the
main deck, in the dirty blood-stained clothes worn in the
battle where they had fallen four days previously — ^the
battle of the Tchemaya.

Only warm sympathy can overcome in the uninitiated
the sickness of heart occasioned by these scenes. It was
afflicting to behold those sufiFering men, some in a dying
state, seeking relief by shifting their irksome position on
the deck, or by leaning in various attitudes against gun-
carriages. Fourteen had died on the passage. The
lower jaw of one poor mortal had been shot away. He
was sitting up, supported by an iron stanchion, his eyes
staring with an expression of apprehensive agony, the
forefinger of his right hand pointing to the ghastly
wound. ** Is there no hope of his death ? " we inquired
of a surgeon, feeling that to be the greatest blessing for
him on earth. ** There is," he replied, **when the
reactionary fever sets in.'' He alone was passed by the
good sisters : he could not swallow. When their jugs
were emptied they repaired aft to replenish them ; and
on recommencing the distribution, misled by the resem-
blance of Russians to each other, they proffered the grate-
ful beverage a second time to some individuals ; but each
resisted the temptation, and indicated his comrade in turn
for it. As they had not calculated on so large a number,
the captain of the ship furnished them- with additional

SISTERS OP CHARITY AT CONSTANTINOPLE. 373

wine and sugar, so that each of the wounded received a
refreshing drink of negus or lemonade, according to his
state. Sister Bertha and her young companion, a novice,
then stepped into their caik, and rowed to another
similarly freighted French line-of-battle ship.

The wounded were landed next day, and conveyed,
some to the hospital of Tash Eishlasi, some to the
hospital of Gulhaneh. We saw them at the former, two
days afterwards, laid in the same wards with French
wounded, and receiving equal care and kindness. " They
merit it," said our cicerone, a French sergeant, himself
limping with a stick; ** fes braves! They have been
fightmg in defence of their country." Each prisoner in
hospital received four sous a day, tobacco money. In
one of the wards that day we witnessed an interesting
scene. A French soldier, a handsozie brown-bearded
fellow, was lying on his back in bed ; his left arm had
been amputated, and his right arm, bound in spUnts, lay
useless on the coverlid. By his side stood a Sister of
Charity, feeding him. She had broken bread in suitable
morsels, and lain them on his broad chest, and she held
a basin of soup, in the composition of which eggs seemed
to have a large share. All the while chatting, that he
might not eat too fast, she alternately put a spoonful
of soup and a morsel of bread into his mouth. When
they were disposed of, she raised his head higher with
her left hand, and with her right hand held a cup of
liquid to his lips. Good sister, we thought, the recording
angel is noting thee down !

Thirty-six Sisters of Charity died at Constantinople
and three at Varna during the war, from the effects of
their attendance in the French hospitals.

374 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Result of the Battle of Inkerman — Council of War— The Army of the
Danube transferred to the Crimea — The Russians attack Omar
Pasha at Eupatoria and are defeated — Death of the Egyptian
Selim Pasha — Omar Pasha's Tactics — What the Army of Eupa-
toria might have done — Omar Pasha with his Brigade at Sevastopol
— Comment of the Turks on the death of the Czar — The Porte
ill able to bear the absence of their Army in the Crimea — The
Anglo-Turkish Contingent — Its European Officers — Proposal of
the Porte rejected — Head-quarters of the Contingent at Buyuk-
dereh — Life of Officers and Men — The Contingent transferred to
Kertch — Skirmish with Cossacks — The Bashi-Bazouks — ^Their
Cost.

The battle of Inkerman was remotely advantageous to
Russia. That event, while it opened the eyes of the
Allies' generals to their own position, closed them to
every other consideration, and dwarfed the war, which
demanded comprehensive strategy, to the siege of a town.
Sceptical as those generals had been about the amval of
Russian reinforcements, they had now become no less
apprehensive of further arrivals ; and in sufficient force,
perhaps, to render their own position critical. In this
mood a council, composed of the military and naval
commanders-in-chief and their seconds in command,
met in the camp soon after that battle, to deliberate
on the means of isolating Sevastopol. The vaunt
attributed to General Caurobert, that no Russian soldier
should leave the plain of Baidar except as a prisoner.

TURKISH ARMY SENT TO THE CRIMEA, 375

had fallen into discredit. Eupatoria, already feebly
garrisoned by English, French, and Turks, appeared a
favourable point from which to make a telling diversion.
An army operating from thence would, they thought,
command the road from Perekop to Bakchesaray.
Unable to spare troops for that object, the AUies'
generals recommended the transfer of the bulk of the
army of the Danube to the Crimea. The EngUsh and
French ambassadors at Constantinople concurred in their
view and backed their recommendation. The Porte
consented : but consented unwillingly. No argument
seemed valid in its eyes to justify the grave error of
sending the best Turkish army, under a chief whose
proverbial caution forbade the hope of enterprising co-
operation, to a land where its deterioration would rapidly
follow the difficulty (non-existent in its own provinces,
where ordou caimh passed in exchange for bread, rice,
and mutton,) of supplying its wants: and although no
longer required in the valley of the Danube, there was
fitting scope for its activity in Armenia, whence cries of
distress were already heard.

No delay intervened. Under rain or snow, the
lightly clad Turkish troops marched from their canton-
ments to the coast ; and in four months, between mid-
December 1854 and mid-April 1855, 60,000 men, 12,000
horses, and eighteen batteries were conveyed, with stores
and provisions, from Varna and Sisepolis to Eupatoria.
Cold rendered warm clothing indispensable, and to meet
this want the Constantinopolitans were called upon for a
** benevolence " of hirkas (wadded vests) for the army of
Eupatoria.

Omar Pasha had scarcely established his head-quarters

3T6 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

At Eapatoiia when that place was attacked, 17th Februarr,
1855, by a Russian army of 30,000 infantry, 3,000
v«v«ilry, and fifty guns, which hoped to snatch the
honours of war on its march to Bakchesaray. Its ability
to move in winter across the steppe was less surprising
than its presumption in attacking 20,000 men on the sea
iH^Hst, covered by entrenchments and supported by English
ijun-boats : one of which did good service in the action
bv dislodging a body of riflemen from a strong position,
. — the cemetery near the windmills. The Russians
i^Vivnced tentatively three times to the attack, and then
retreated, leaving 420 men and 300 artillery horses on
the field. The Turkish soldiers, traditionally excited,
cut off the heads of some of the slain and planted them
on pikes on the hues of Eupatoria ; but on this abuse of
victory being pointed out to the general by European
officers attached to his staff, he ordered their removal.
The Turks had 103 killed and 298 wounded, including
among the former the Egyptian Selim Pasha, who united
experience and valour. An eleve of Soliman Pasha
(Colonel Selve) he had served under Ibrahim Pasha
during his campaigns in the Morea, in Syria, and in
Asia Minor. His death is supposed to have contributed
to the inaction of the army at Eupatoria. Omar Pasha,
wary in defensive, with no turn for offensive operations,
was not the man for the situation. His favourite tactics,
which had served him often in irregular warfare,
consisted in raising redoubts or barricades and waiting
to be attacked. Satisfied with the repulse of the
Russians, he enlarged the circle of his entrenchments,
and with Cossacks often in sight remained tranquil
behind them. The agglomeration of numerous troops.

TURKISH ARMY AT EUPATORIA. 377

refugee Tartars, and horses, within narrow Umits under
unwholesome conditions, bred fever and scurvy, and thus
reaUzed the Porte's worst anticipations.

The army of Eupatoria was negatively of service, by
obUging the Russians to station permanently in observa-
tion of it a division of iiifantry aijd two divisions of cavalry ;
but in other respects it might as well have been in
Arabia. Had that army gone in the spring of 1855 to
the Asiatic frontier, Russia would (presumedly) have
been reduced to sign away the Caucasus at the Peace of
Paris, instead of acquiring then, for the first time, virtual
recognition of her sovereignty over it. The Khans of
Turkistan might now have been smoking their pipes, and
the Ameer of Bokhara telling his beads, with confidence.
Civilization would have then been spared the sad spectacle
of the expulsion of half-a-million of Caucasians from
their homes for the crime of having fought in defence of
them for thirty years, and humanity the pain of seeing
their misery traded on by cupidity and lust : the cupidity
which conveyed the exiles from shore to shore in ill-con-
ditioned vessels, as closely stowed as Africans in slavers,*
and the lust which culled girls of all ages from destitute
crowds in border towns of the Black Sea.

Omar Pasha, afterwards invited by the Allies*
generals to share in the reduction of Sevastopol, joined

* A batch of 2,700 Circassians, male and female, embarked in
three Greek vessels, measuring collectively 840 tons, were a fortnight
on their voyage from Constantinople to Cyprus in September, 1864.
More than 1,400 of them died on board ; and of those landed in a
state of exhaustion at Lamaca, only 800 were alive in January, 1865.
The inhabitants of Lamaca did themselves no honour by their conduct
towards those hapless refugees. This was the worst case ; but there
were others very bad.

878 turkj:y and the Crimean war.

them by sea with 20,000 men, on condition of exemption
from trench duties. He did not long remain with them.
He found himself in an ambiguous position. He thonght
himself slighted by generals of whose talents he pro-
fessed a low opinion, and saw his troops despised by
troops whom he did not consider superior. Deference
he fancied was not paid to his experience; his advice
seemed asked for form's sake only. So after the failure
of the bombardment of April, he returned with his own
brigade to Eupatoria, and there amused himself after his
wonted fashion.

The mortification occasioned by the repulse of his
troops at Eupatoria embittered the last hours of the Czar
Nicholas. This startling demise made Turks reflect in
the following strain : — '* See," they said, *' our Sultan
has enjoyed himself as usual during the war, with his
harem and his palaces, undisturbed by cares. His allies
fight for him ; he is well and prosperous. See, on the
contrary, his enemy has toiled and fretted, Europe has
banded against him, and now he dies broken-hearted.
For whom has God declared ? "

The Porte was ill able to sequester an army in the
Crimea. The expense of maintaining it there, ineffi-
ciently, was the least objectionable feature of that mis-
direction of force. The cost alone of its transport from
Bulgaria to Eupatoria absorbed 250,000/., part of the
proceeds of the first foreign loan made by Turkey, the
commencement of a ** facile descent : " a sum sufficient
to have re-equipped the Asiatic army. Men had been
miscalculated. The decrement of the Turkish armies
since the declaration of war was already serious, teUing
on the demands for home service in Europe, Asia, and

THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONTINGENT. 379

Africa. The northern provinces, Koumelia, Mesopotamia,
and Tripoli, all required troops. ThessaJy and Epirus
required military restraint. Montenegro, Servia, and the
Grecian frontier invited military observance. Constanti-
nople required a garrison to meet a possible outbreak of
popular exasperation, as well as to furnish disposable troops
fol" an emergency. The Asiatic army, weakened by several
battles and disease, demanded reinforcements. Syria,
Arabia, Anatolia, and the Archipelago, had been all but
denuded of troops. Few of the above-named places were
considered adequately garrisoned. Bagdad, temptingly
alluring Persia, had only about 7,000 regulars. In
Tripoli there were indications of the discontent of the
Arabs breaking forth in insurrection ; and it became ne-
cessary, on the evasion of their exiled sheick, Ghuma,
from Trebizond, to send a reinforcement of five batt^ions
to that province.

In this strait the Porte was further called upon to
furnish 25,000 regular troops for an Anglo-Turkish
Contingent. Unaware of the intention to collect them
at the capital for new formation — believing them intended
for immediate active service — the Porte acceded, though
reluctantly, to the demand. Having acceded, it repented,
but had not the firmness to state its reasons ; feeling,
perhaps, they would be unavailing. By the course
pursued in regard of this corps, it seems to have been in
contemplation to raise an Anglo-Turkish army after the
Indian model ; but if this vision had floated before the
eyes of any person with influence to excuse the hope of
its realization, slight reflection would have shown him
that the Turks, with all their confidence in Great Britain,
would never have consented to such an amalgamation of

880 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

interests : nor, supposing obvions means adopted to
render it comparatively popular, would other powers
have remained silent thereon. No other power, however,
had real motives for the jealousy which it excited, and
which stimulated the premature desire for peace in
certain quarters. The indisposition to furnish the Contin-
gent, on national and reUgious grounds, felt by the
Sultan, the Ulema, and the people, appeared from the
outset. That of the army was natural. Officers who
had served for years with their regiments in various
grades were superseded by foreigners unknown to fame,
with antipathetic notions derived from service in a land
where natives are regarded as inferior beings.

Indian officers, accustomed to rule haughtily a subject
race, were not the men (with few exceptions) to act judi-
ciously with a dominant race, imbued with traditions of
military renown. The soldiers they had graduated with
were debarred the honours of the profession ; the soldiers
they were called upon to command carried each, in French
phrase, a marshal's baton in his haversack. The seraskir
(war minister) of that day had risen from the ranks.
Those selected came out, not in the spirit of their
comrades. Captain Ballard, Captain Ogilvie, Lieutenant
Caddell, and Lieutenant Hinde, to identify themselves
with the Turks; but with exclusive ideas, fostered by
brevet rank, high expectations, and double pay. They
were, nevertheless, a gallant set of men, eager for an
opportunity to repeat on the Turkish the part they had
nobly acted on the Indian stage. Things were so
managed at the outset as to worry all parties. The
Contingent officers, hurriedly sent from England, arrived
at Constantinople with bed and baggage, expecting to

INDIAN OFFICERS OF TURKISH TROOPS. 381

find an army drawn up to receive them, and found less
than a guard of honour. Their disappointment was
keen, their position false. Thronging in no pleasant
mood the thoroughfares, they talked of Turkey and the
Turks as at Calcutta of India and the Indians. White
scarves twisted round their foraging caps distinguished
them at first in the crowd, and hy that sign the sentries
received orders to salute them. But the fashion, at once
agreeable and becoming, was soon adopted by the Perotes,
when the distinction ceased, and with it naturally the
salutes. More than one puzzled sentry at the bridge
head was called eshek (ass) by the officer of the guard,
amidst the laughter of the bystanders, for having carried
arms to a pekin — an itinerant dragoman or a broker's
clerk — in mistake for a contingent officer. This was the
beginning.

Aware of its error, and dreading the effect on the
mind of the ConstantinopoUtans of the spectacle of a
native force under foreigners who declined lending them-
selves to a slight illusion by wearing the fez^ the Porte,
when urged on the subject, too sensitive to avow the
truth, cited, in excuse for delay, the expense and incon-
venience of withdrawing troops from the provinces, and
proposed, instead of bringing the men to the officers,
sending the officers to the men, either in Europe or
Asia, as might be preferred. Out of sight out of mind.
The troops idly disseminated in MingreUa and Lazistan
might, with 10,000 men from RoumeUa, have been
collected at Trebizond ; and thus formed, in the right
place, the Contingent would have given effective support
to the forces in Armenia. In presence of the enemy,
officers and men would soon have come to understand

382 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

each other's merits. No suggestion of the kind had any
chance of being heeded. Her Majesty's Commissioner
in Armenia, on the one hand, argued in disfavour of the
services of the Contingent in that quarter ; and the com-
mander of the Contingent on the other hand considered
it right, out of regard for his and his officers' credit, to
reserve his force until organized in his own way on the
shores of the Bosphorus. The former objected to be
joined by a body of men bringing with them all he had
been lamenting the want of in scores of despatches, and
the latter did not reflect that with the money and means
at his disposal, with unquaUfied support wherever he
might be from every quarter, preparatory delay was
unnecessary. In war, a game of chance and opportunities,
one should make the best use of materials at hand ; not
wait for the attainment of an ideal standard of efficiency.
General Bonaparte, pointing towards Italy, said to the
ragged army of the Alps, " We will find clothes and
shoes there." The Russian palace at Buyukdereh became
the head-quarters of the Contingent, and pleasant
heights in the vicinity the site of the camp of troops
urgently wanted elsewhere. The Contingent officers,
unaccustomed to heed social prejudices, lived in Buyuk-
dereh and in camp as at a relaxed Indian station. The
original mistake lay in giving officers to already organized
regiments having a certain esprit de corps. Turkish
troops only required, in the late war, to render them
incomparable for ser\dce in their own country — a country
beset with difficulties for European troops — a few able
staflf officers, a commissariat to ensure them their modicum
of food, and skilful surgeons to tend them when seriously
ill or wounded. Thus organized, chafing neither national

TRANSFERENCE OP THE TURKISH CONTINGENT. 383

pride nor regimental amour proprCj the Contingent would
have become an efficient corps at comparatively trifling
expense ; with a maximum of quaUties for campaigning
in Armenia and Trans-Caucasus.

Warily, at intervals, the Porto gave over troops to
the Contingent, till the number reached about 12,000.
Their comeliness improved with liberal rations, regular
pay, and gentle exercise ; but on the other hand their
lithesomeness diminished. Some, moreover, learned to
drink wine ; and sundry disputes, involving on one occa-
sion loss of life, between soldiers and the cultivators of
adjoining vineyards — the question being who had the
best right to the grapes — showed impaired discipline.
After some months passed in the tranquil existence dear
to Orientals, under canvas on breezy thyme-scented
uplands, it was thought necessary to transfer the Con-
tingent to some other quarter; for the most sanguine
began to despair of its completion near Constantinople,
and the most indulgent to desire fitter occupation for it.
The dilemma was, where to send it ? It would not suit
everybody; it would not fit everywhere. The British
commander-in-chief declined its company, on account of
jealousies excited by the brevet rank of its officers.
The Turkish commander-in-chief shunned the con-
trast between its comforts and the wants of his troops.
After receiving various destinations from home, nine in
all, the order of one day, sent by the electric telegraph
— perplexing instrument in indecisive hands — being con-
tradicted the next, Kertch was fixed upon as being a
neutral out-of-the-way place. There it accordingly went,
after the fall of Sevastopol, and was joined by the troops
previously stationed in that quarter ; making a total of

384 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

about 18,000 infantry with some artillery and a few
cavalry. Its own artillery remained at Scutari. The
bulk of its cavalry followed, remained ten days in the
roadstead, and were then, through unfounded fears about
forage, sent to winter at Buyuk-Tchekmedjeh and
Sehvria on the Propontis.

Surprised at this destination, the seraskir asked, if
not required at Kertch, why the cavalry did not go to Asia
Minor, where they were required ; rather than incom-
mode the inhabitants of country towns, who were com-
pelled to give up without remuneration their best houses
for the accommodation of its officers. Deprived of this
arm, invaluable in its position, the Contingent remained
behind their fortified lines of Kertch and Yeni-Kaleh
until the peace ; watched by the Cossacks of the division
on the isthmus of Arabat, who burnt large quantities of
forage in the neighbourhood : the cavalry in Kertch were
too few to deter them. One day a troop of Contingent
horse, incautiously extending a reconnaissance, led on by
a few Cossacks cantering a-head, were attacked unex-
pectedly by a superior body of cavalry previously con-
cealed from view behind a hillock. Three of the former,
including their gallant commander. Captain Sherwold,
were slain in the skirmish, two mortally wounded, and
forty-two captured. Next day a Contingent officer went
with a flag of truce to the Russian camp, fifteen miles
distant, to inquire after the prisoners. He found them
well cared for, and saw the body of Captain Sherwold,
bandaged with white linen and covered with a sheet,
treated with due respect. In doubt of the captain's
religion, the Russian general had invited a Greek and a
CathoUc priest to pray over it. The envoy also saw in

BASHI-BAZOUKS. 385

the Russian camp some horses of the 10th Hussars,
objects of pecuUar soUcitude.

The Contmgent was the most expensive item of the
war.

The Bashi-bazouks, addenda of the Contingent, fell
under the same law of contrariety ; being also retained
from the theatre of war, to prepare them (so ran the
phrasjB) for service. Raised as a suitable force, with
nomade watchful habits, for confronting Cossacks, they
were stationed, during the eventful summer and autumn
of 1855, near the plain of Troy ; where their pranks —
exaggerated in recital to the prejudice of General
Beatson who had campaigned Jon the Danube in 1854
with the few originally raised as an experiment — obtained
for them unenviable notoriety. From that classic scene
they marched, about 3,000 strong, across Roumeha and
the Balkan, to winter quarters at Schumla; and the
order acquired by them on the march showed the error
of having kept such lads inactive. The Turks had no
feeling about them: they only wondered at England
thinking it worth her while to incur expense on their
account. Independent of the first outlay, they are said
to have cost about 40,000/. a month.

386 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Brassa destroyed by Earthquake — Strength of the Allied Forces before
Sevastopol — Second Bombardment and its Eflfects — The Malakof
the Key of the Position — ^French Forces predominant — Sevas-
topol as fortified by General Todleben — General Canrobert^s
Opinion — The Garrison short of Provisions and Ammunition —
The Governor empowered to act on his Judgment — Generals
Caurobert and Pelissier — Plans for cutting off Russian Supplies —
Mr. Satler*s Organization of Russian Transport Corps — ^Naval and
Mililtary Expedition to open the Sea of Azof — The Russian
Garrisons of Kertch and Yenikaleh retire — Tokens of Amity from
the Tartars to the Allies — Strange conduct of the Allied Troops
— Destruction of the Museum at Kertch — Spoil shipped to Pera —
Destitution of Jewish Families — Destruction of Property by the
Allied Squadron in the Sea of Azof — The Russians evacuate
Soudjouk and Anapa — Return of the Expedition to Sevastopol —
Capture of the Mamelon by the French — High Expectations of
Success — Combined Attack on the Malakof and Redan — Cause of
its Failure — Bravery of the French and English Columns —
Captain Peel and the Naval Brigade — Death and Funeral of Lord
Raglan — Prince Gortschakof constructs a Raft-bridge for the
Retreat of the Garrison — Russian Corps d'Armee defeated at
Tchernaya — Loss of Men in the Siege Operations — Earthworks
yield to a Vertical Fire of Shell — Rejoicings in Sevastopol on the
Opening of the Raft- bridge — Final Bombardment of Sevastopol —
False Attacks to deceive the Garrison — Their successful Result in
the Surprise of the Malakof by the French — Resistance of the
Russians — Repulse of the French at two Points, and of the
English at the Redan — Evacuation of Sevastopol — Cause of
Failure at the Redan — Masterly Retreat of the Garrison of Sevas-
topol — What the Allies had gained — Losses on both Sides —
Total Loss of Russian Soldiers — The Siege of Acre in the 12th
Centuiy a Type of that of Sevastopol — Dissimilar Features.

Before the experiments mentioned in the preceding
chapter and others were begun, and while war was

THE ALUES BEFORE SEVASTOPOL. 887

waiting for spring, nature, as if to mock man's most
gigantic efforts in destruction, overthrew in a few
minutes (February 28th, 1856) by a gentle heave of
the plain great part of the beautiful and venerable city
of Brussa, resting-place of the remains of the first five
Sultans of the Ottoman race. Mosque and church, bath
and tomb, bazaar and khan, konak and cabin, fell
together. The famous sulphur springs ebbed and
flowed. The edge of the undulation reached, and
slightly rocked, Constantinople. This dire disaster,
mourned from the Danube to the Indian Ocean, aroused
apathy and made resignation impatient. The wreck
seemed ominous.

Careless about earthquakes, and uninfluenced by the
conference of Vienna, the Allies had made strenuous
eflbrts, since the commencement of the year, to reinforce
their army and advance their Unes, in the hope of
reducing Sevastopol ere the violets should fade. By
April, 1855, the English and French armies numbered
145,000 men ; 600 guns were in position, with 800
rounds of ammunition for each ; and a railway, novel
instrument of war, had been laid down from Balaclava
to the camp. All promised success. Letters, semi-
official and private, written from the theatre of war,'
coincided in that sense. But the recently-appointed
commandants of engineers had yet, like their prede-
cessors, to learn the nature of a redoubt; had yet to
witness the endurance of Bussian soldiers. Slaves those
soldiers may be, but not recreant. Put six ounces of
meat a day into their mouths, serviceable arms into their
hands, wearable shoes on their feet, give them more kind
words, fewer blows, and less vodtka, and we should see a

25— a

388 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

soldiery able to encounter both the troops of the West
and the hardships of the East.

The second bombardment of Sevastopol opened on
the 9th of April and continued until the evening of the
17th, with a daily expenditure of nearly 1,000 tons of
shot and shell : it then ceased, through exhaustion.
Although a higher application of the principle of force
than the opening bombardment of the previous October,
having lasted as many days as that had lasted hours,
the result was scarcely more fructuous. The works of
the Malakof and the Eedan, twisted and torn by the iron
storm, seemed shapeless mounds of earth ; fascines and
sandbags stood at all angles. But on looking narrowly
through interstices, one saw remounted guns in position
to fire on advancing troops ; and while on the left the
French batteries, at 300 yards' distance, had opened a
breach twenty-five yards wide, in the curtain between
the Quarantine battery and the Central bastion, inner
batteries frowned wamingly beyond. Many bold spirits,
impatient and repining then, may in their hearts have
applauded later the prudence which forbade the assault :
in expectation of which the enemy had reserved fifty
rounds per gun.

There was nothing left for the Allies but to sap
nearer the enemy's lines, bring up heavier guns, and
plant more mortars in position. The Malakof was now
clearly recognized as the key of the position, with the
necessity of taking preliminarily the Mamelon ; which,
long neglected by all parties, had been occupied and
entrenched by the Kussians only six weeks earlier.
Thenceforward the Gallic element predominated in the
siege. Of the six positions, — the Quarantine battery,

SEVASTOPOL AS FORTIFIED BY TODLEBEN. 389

the Central battery, the Flag-staff bastion, the Redan,
the Malakof, and the Mamelon, — the French undertook
to grapple with four.

This trial proved the strength of the works thrown
up, under tire, by the genius of General Todleben,
seconded by scientific officers of all arms and by devoted
soldiers and sailors. They defied a threefold mightier
host than the force Sevastopol had trembled before
five months earlier, and showed that, under ordinary
siege conditions, Sevastopol had been rendered impreg-
nable. But if the defence was unique so was the
attack. The facility of drawing supplies by sea from
inexhaustible resources, indicated, with perseverance,
a termination to the defence and no limit to the attack.
Nevertheless, the failure of an eight days' bombard
ment of unparalleled severity had shaken the confi-
dence of one of the allied chiefs ; not in the result, but
in the mode of attack. " Sevastopol," observed General
Caurobert to the author a few days afterwards, "is an
entrenched camp, defended by an army relieved at
pleasure from outside ; it is an exceptional place, for the
attack of which the rules of war offer no example/'
General Caurobert saw no good reason for retaining all
the allied forces in one spot, while in possession of a
steam fleet able to carry 40,000 men at once in a few
hours' run. He, it has been said, was for embarking
part of the army and landing it further north, to make
a diversion in the Crimea in co-operation with the army
of Eupatoria. Isolated, Sevastopol would have fallen of
itself. Indeed, it would soon have fallen ; for there was
not a month's supply of provisions in the city for 35,000
men : the number at which the garrison was permanently

390 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

maintained. Their ammunition was nearly exhausted ;
little more than sufficient remaining, besides the fifty
rounds per gun spoken of, for the infantry to fight a
battle with. The army in the field was weaJk, and the
towns in the peninsula were hospitals.

Fresh supplies of ammunition reached Sevastopol
three weeks after the bombardment, and with them the
governor received powers to act on his own judgment ;
either to abandon the place or continue the defence : as
no more troops could be spared to reinforce him. He
decided on the latter course ; and the reception, three
weeks later, of intelligence of the despatch of two more
divisions to the Crimea, approved his judgment. General
Caurobert's opinion, if given as stated, was overruled.
Loved by his soldiers, and tender of their lives, General
Caurobert seemed eminently fitted to lead an army
through a dashing campaign. On the other hand,
General Pelissier, stem, uncompromising, as ready to
roast Arabs as chestnuts for the attainment of a military
object, was the man to press a siege. Accordingly, the
Arbiter of war having decided on Russia sustaining the
least possible amount of injury by the war, in virtue of
her opponents' determination not to swerve from their
original plan of attack, the two generals changed places
by imperial order. General Pelissier justified the decision.
Week by week he circumscribed the enemy more closely,
and 5,000 French hors de combat gave the measure of his
exertions during the first month of his command.

Previous to the transference of command, — submitted
to with a cheerful countenance by General Caurobert
though with a wrung heart,-^subsidiary means of
straitening the enemy had been contemplated, and were

MR. SATLER, RUSSIAN COMMISSARY. S91

afterwards carried out. The Russians were supposed to
draw large supplies from the Sea of Azof, and the occupa-
tion of that sea had accordingly been decided upon. The
Allies, with all Turkey to draw from, yet supplied their
own armies with much cost and trouble ; they naturally
inferred from then: own experience great difficulty in
that respect for the enemy, and expected to enhance it
decisively by cutting off that channel of supply. Their
calculation was erroneous. Russia, in anticipation of that
diversion, deferred unaccountably long, had organized
the supply of her forces in the Crimea chiefly by
land carriage ; and although drawing supplies by sea
as long as she was -able, they were not depended upon
for a permanent resource : nor, as it appeared, were they
of sufficient importance to influence the result. Russia
possessed in Mr. Satler, her commissary-general in the
Crimea, as remarkable a man as General Todleben,
each in his own line, and she gave him unrestricted
powers. Mr. Satler, in addition to the ordinary army
transport corps of 6,000 horses, organized six draught
brigades of 1,000 pair of oxen each, two pair to. a
waggon, to bring provisions and stores from Perekop and
Tchongar as they arrived there from the interior to
Sevastopol and other stations in the Crimea, and to
convey away sick and wounded to the hospitals. The
dangerously wounded and seriously diseased were depo-
sited chiefly at Simpheropol ; the less afflicted were con-
veyed to Nicolaief and other places beyond the peninsula.
This vast movement shows demonstratively the
connection between the defence of Sevastopol and the
faculty of traversing the Crimea in every direction ; and
skilful diversional operations on the part of the Allies,

392 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

with the aid of their steam fleet, would have deranged it.
The diversion by turning the hills from the south,
planned by the French Emperor in Paris, proved on trial
impracticable. Mr. Satler — through whose hands
24,000,000/. sterling are said to have passed — kept the
army in the Crimea well supplied ; obtaining cordial
co-operation from every quarter by prompt payments
and by closing his eyes to the discrepancy between the
amount of forage drawn for by colonels of cavalry
regiments and of transport brigades and the number of
animals in existence. The Russians, nevertheless, ought
to have rendered the Sea of Azof safe, for the sake of the
defenceless towns on its shores. They had forgotten the
traditions of their wars in other days with the Turks,
when they strove with flat-bottomed frigates for the
mastery of that sea. The Cimmerian Bosphorus was
ill fortified, weakly garrisoned, and a few insignificant
steamers composed its naval defence.

After a false start, the combined naval and military
expedition to open the Sea of Azof reached its destina-
tion towards the end of May, 1855, and landed 15,000
troops (English, French, and Turkish), at St. Paul, a
few miles from Kertch, on which place they marched.
Simultaneously the Kussian garrisons of Kertch and
Yenikaleh retired on Arabat. Those places immediately
surrendered, or rather invited occupation. The notables
of Kertch met the allied chiefs and tendered them bread
and salt — an immemorial Tartar custom — in token of
amity. In return, the Allies conducted themselves after
the fashion of Arabs with a caravan. Making little
distinction between public and private property, they
destroyed government steamers and merchant vessels ;

DESTRUCTION AND PILLAGE AT KERTCH. 393

burnt planks enough to hut an army ; threw com and
flour into the sea sufficient to feed for a month the
refugee Tartars at Eupatoria, to whom the Sultan was
then sending food from Constantinople where distres-
sing prices ruled; and crowned their exploits by the
dispersion of the unique museum — pride of the Crimea
— of the Mithridatic era, wantonly breaking many of the
rehcs in pieces. The nationality of the perpetrators of
this act of vandalism is in dispute : all that is certain is,
no Turk had a hand in it ; nor in the subsequent rifling
of tombs which Greeks, Komans, Scythians, Genoese, and
Bussians had respected. Chairs, mirrors, pianos, cande-
labra, &c., — vulgar Bpoil — were shipped in AUies' trans-
ports on Frank or Levantine account, and sent to Pera ;
where they were afterwards seen, as reported, in various
fashionable saloons.

Athens mourned her statues and Egypt her obelisks
carried away by the Bomans, and Spain sent male-
dictions after her pictures carried oflf by the French ;
but no one had cause to blush : the nature of the spoil
condoned the act.

The Allies' proceedings ill-accorded with recognized
rules of war. Kertch having come peaceably into their
possession, its inhabitants with their property were
entitled to respect ; the more so on account of their sym-
pathies ; and its occupation having been decided upon,
the care of stores and provisions became a miUtary duty.
Had their town been besieged, it would scarcely have
suflered more injury at the hands of an enemy than their
friends inflicted.* Many of the inhabitants were reduced

* At the termination of the Allies* occnpation of Kertch, out of 2,500
dwellings, only 400 remained entire.

394 TURKEY ANB THE CRIMEAN WAR.

to beggary. Eighty-five Jewish famihes, for example,
bereft of shelter and subsistence, were sent soon after-
wards by the Allies to Constantinople, and there east on
the bounty of their co-religionists.

The navy followed suit. Fourteen steamers (French
and English) entered the Sea of Azof, 25th May, with
the laconism ** Bum, sink, and destroy,'' for their
orders. They acted up to them with zeal and discern-
ment. Complaisant towns — Berdiansk, &c. — were let
oflf with the destruction of their public stores ; recusant
towns — Taganrog, &c. — were shelled and rocketed.
In a few days, in their rapid course from place to place,
they destroyed ashore large quantities of com, oil, and
timber, chiefly private property ; afloat, above 200
vessels. Disinterestedly they bumt com-laden vessels
at sea, instead of sending them to market to convert
into prize-money. No corresponding result in distress
at Sevastopol followed this stirring cruise, nor was its
reduction facilitated thereby. An inconvenience certainly
ensued. Expecting the Allies to pass the Strait of
Yenitchi, and with their boats thread the mazes of the
Siwash, the Eussians thenceforwards abstained from
forwarding supphes to the Crimea by Tchongar bridge,,
which had shortened the road from some of the supply
districts by 100 versts. The Turkish galleys which in
the reign of Sultan Ibrahim ascended the Don as far as
Azof, bumt by the Cossacks on their approach, had made
a milder visitation. The Allies were able in the end to
boast of having swept the Sea of Azof of its last boat.

The presence of the allied fleets ofi* St. Paul, where
they tarried about three weeks, waiting the return of
the flotilla, warned the Bussians in garrison on the

PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE OF SEVASTOPOL. 395

opposite coast to decamp. Accordingly, razing the
works and disabling the guns of Soudjouk and Anapa
respectively on May 28 and June 6, they retreated in
order with their baggage towards the Kuban. When
the Allies' admirals, apprised by a Circassian of the
enemy's movements, reached Anapa, they found it had
been already evacuated a week and was in possession of
the Circassians.

Leaving a garrison in Eertch, and a few steamers in
the Sea of Azof to keep the inhabitants of the coast on
the alert and carry on war against the sturgeon fisheries
in that sea, the expedition returned to Sevastopol, to be
present at the projected attack on June 18th.

Since April the siege had made notable progress.
Although still distant, the AUies' hues had been advanced
considerably nearer, and the vertical fire from nunuerous
mortars had acquired fatal intensity. The e£fect of a
sharp bombardment on June 6th, followed up next day
by the capture of the Mamelon by the French, and of
the Quarries by the English — both with distinguished
gallantry — indicated diminished resources on the part of
the enemy, and allowed discouragement to be inferred.
These successes, the extent of the preparations, the con-
fidence of the engineers, and the ardour of the troops,
excited unmingled hopes, and raised expectation higher
than on any previous occasion. The expectation was
equally shared in London and in Paris, then in electric
communication with the Crimea. The initiated in these
capitals into the designs of the aUied armies, warned by
the lesson of the previous October, were doubtless
cautious of betraying their sense of confidence ; but in
the camp no reticence existed : champagne was laid

396 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

ready for libations at head-quarters and at every mess ;
and the Banshee was ordered to be ready to start for
Marseilles with the despatches. The armies were to be
under arms before dayhght of the 18th, the French and
English assaulting columns in position, the Turkish and
Sardinian troops in the field — to meet a possible flank
movement by the Kussian corps d'armee, supposed to be
on M'Kenzie's heights — and the fleets, under way, out of
gunshot, ready to go in on the fall of the southern defences
to impede the retreat of the garrison. The French were
to attack the Malakof, the Enghsh the Kedan.

At daylight on the 17th, the French and English
lines opened a heavy fire on the Malakof and Bedan,
and sustained it till evening; when the silence of the
enemy's guns confirmed the generals in their intention
to storm the defences next day. Suspecting, however,
that the enemy might, according to custom, remount his
guns at night, or have feigned exhaustion. Lord Eaglan
wisely proposed to open a preluding fire ip the morning
for a couple of hours, to try his strength ; but General
Pelissier, seeing no reason for that precaution, intimated
his resolve to attack at three in the morning. Soon after
midnight the troops were massed in the trenches, and
as they lay in anxious expectation shells thrown from
cohom mortars dropped occasionally amongst them.

On a signal, to be given by General Pelissier from
the Lancaster battery, the French divisions — right,
centre, and left — told oflf for the assault, were to advance
rapidly on the Malakof. With simultaneous action they
might have carried it ; but General Mayran, in command
of the right division, misled by a chance rocket, marched
prematurely. When the real signal flashed through the

FIRST ASSAULT ON THE MALAKOF. 397

air, his division had already been exposed nearly half-an-
hour to a warm fire from the enemy ; who, warned by a
French deserter, were prepared at every point: the
General himself, in the meanwhile, being carried oflf the
field mortally wounded. The other divisions then ad-
vanced, enveloped the Malakof, and fell by hundreds on
the edge of the ditch. On no other occasion in the war
did the French, losing that morning 1,600 men, display
more resolute bravery. They persevered until further
perseverance would have been temerity. Made in day-
light and with concert, the attack would in all probability
have predominated ; made in darkness, with confusion, it
was weak, and animating for the Bussians.

The EngUsh attacking column, ignorant at the
moment of their ally's discomfiture, left their trenches at
daylight, 800 strong, as many thousands being in reserve,
accompanied by a party of the naval brigade with scaling
ladders led by the paladin Captain William Peel. With
buoyant steps and stout hearts they traversed 240 yards
of open ground, in face of grape and canister ; and one
of that resolute band (the author's nephew a youth
fresh from Cambridge) though wounded continued to
advance till checked by another missile at the abattis of
the Redan. There fell his colonel, shot dead, with many
other gallant men ; while others, passing that frail
barrier, found cover in rifle-pits. Their courage and
valour were not altogether wasted on the sulphurized
air. They drew on themselves, with heavy loss, the
fire of the Redan away from the French, who were then
retreating from the Malakof. Another column, operating
on the left, made its footing good for a while in the
cemetery at the head of the Dockyard creek ravine ;

898 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

whence^ ultimately, the first explorers of Sevastopol pro-
ceeded.

This grievous failure, result of divided command,
disturbed Lord Baglan's equanimity; which was akin
to Oriental resignation. Weakened bodily, and mentally
depressed, the veteran sank ten days afterwards. He of
the noble house of Somerset breathed his last on a
camp bed, in a lone farm-house on the Heracleotic
steppe, June 28, 1855. Mourned by his staff, who lost
in him an indulgent chief, and attended by two armies,
who had admired his serene intrepidity on the field of
battle, his body was borne with mihtary pomp to the
Caradoc for conveyance to England. She tarried on her
way at Constantinople to coal and there lay alongside
a hulk, unnoticed and unnoted save by her coat of black
paint. No minute-guns from the Allies' men-of-war in
the Bosphorus, no colours half-mast, announced the
melancholy cause of her arrival in the Golden Horn.
The Porte wished to pay honours to the remains of
Lord Raglan similar to those paid by it eight months
earlier to the remains of Marshal St. Amaud ; but the
proposal of AaU Pasha, the minister for foreign affairs,
to that eflfect was decUned.

Prince Gortschakof did not let himself be deluded
by his success on June 18th: he knew he had only
obtained a respite. Foreseeing the inevitable result, he
had, on losing the Mamelon, the outwork of the Malakof,
given orders to collect materials for the construction of
a raft bridge across the harbour of Sevastopol, on the
plan of General Bauchmaer, to ensure the retreat of the
garrison; with purpose to maintain himself at all hazards
till its completion, longer if feasible, in order to deter

BATTLE OF TCHERNAYA. 399

the Allies by the lateness of the season from an autumnal
campaign in the Crimea. He made a vacillating attempt,
on the faith of General Keed's report, to disturb the
siege with a corps d'arm^e, sent, August 16th, against
the French supported by Sardinians and Turks, who
repulsed it with a loss of seven or eight thousand killed
or wounded. Men had never been more idly sacrificed.
General Pehssier was proud of the battle of Tchemaya. In
his order of the day he congratulated his troops on having
beaten the ** vaunted Russian infantry; " but inspection
of their arms * should have moderated his exultation.

The besiegers continued to push their approaches to the
Malakof with animation ; the enemy disputing the ground
manfully step by step. During the last two months of sap-
ping, their severest trial, the French had on the average 150
men killed or wounded each night. Science was no longer
in doubt. The tentative process pursued during eight
months had taught the lesson. It was simply recurrence
to Vauban's practice : subdue the enemy's fire, and have
your trenches sufficiently near to profit by opportunity.
Vast formations of earth, disposed with art, the Russian

* Extract from a letter from the Crimea dated 20th August, 1855,
about the battle of the Tchemaya : —

'< An attempt seems to have been made by the Russian army to supply
the want of rifles it laboured under. A number of their new rifles
were picked up, and judging from their appearances they were equally
as indifferent and quite as clumsy as their old muskets ; they seemed
for the most part to have been old muskets rifled and fitted with a
sight after the Li^ge pattern. Probably there is no army in Europe
BO badly armed as the Russian. The Turkish army is immeasurably
superior. The swords of the Russians seem as if made of the hoops
of a barrel ; one can bend them easily with the fingers ; and their
muskets are long, awkward, unwieldy things. They have no half-cock,
and their locks are so stiff as almost to require both hands to lift the
hammer.*'

400 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

works on the south defied horizontal fire, how well
soever directed and sustained ; but were powerless under
a rain of shells with accurately cut fuses. The Russian
admission of a daily loss of from 500 to 700 men killed
or wounded during the last twenty days of the siege,
showed the efficacy of the Allies' vertical fire. To
protect themselves in some degree from it, they made
bomb-proof burrows in their works : a choice of evils,
since their batteries were thereby exposed to be un-
manned at a critical moment.

The saving raft-bridge over the harbour being com-
pleted September 1, was opened that night with religious
solemnities and civic rejoicings. The transport of
archives, precious objects, and stores, immediately
commenced from the south to the north side. A month
would scarcely have sufficed to remove the immense
materiel in the place. That interval was not granted.

Four days afterwards, September 5th, the final
bombardment of Sevastopol opened from all points, and
continued for more than three days. The 7th French
parallel was twenty yards from the Malakof, with a spacious
place d'armes: the nearest English parallel was 200
yards from the Redan, with a narrow place d'armes.
Eight hundred guns and mortars were in position. In
deception, to throw the enemy oflf his guard, the Allies
from time to time slackened their fire, or directed it
beyond the works, on the reserves. The Russians, each
time deeming the assault imminent, left their retreats
to man their ramparts; when shells again rained in
amongst them with deadly effect. Shortly before noon,
on the 8th, this manoeuvre was repeated ; but the
Russians giving no heed to it, remained in their

CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOF- 401

blindages eating their dinners. The device had suc-
ceeded. Ready, with all conceivable appliances, the
columns of attack, the leader of each with his eyes
fixed on his watch, waited silently for noon.: then
unseen, unexpected, they leaped all together out of their
trenches, rushed forwards, and in a few seconds reached
the ditch. The first regiment of Zouaves had the
honour of leading the way. Some, jumping into the
ditch, climbed up to the embrasures, and the eagle-
bearer first appeared above the smoke and dust ; others
crossed it on planks thrown across by attendant sappers.
In five minutes the French were mthin the precinct of
the Malakof, w^ith trifling loss. As they entered they
met the enemy emerging like Troglodytes from the
earth, and shot them down easily.

The Russians made desperate resistance from the
basement of the White Tower, and at other points of
the vast area of the Malakof. Disregarding lesser
matters. General M^Mahon directed his forces to the
narrow gorge — Todleben's only fault — and thus pre-
vented the enemy, who made five attempts, from effec-
tively bringing up his reserves. In the meanwhile the
French engineers, running a sap up to the edge of the
ditch, threw a bridge over it ; along which the reserves
passed continuously, till opposition ceased and the
tricoloured flag floated triumphant. On all other points
the Russians were successful. They repulsed the French
with intimidating loss at the Central and Flag-staflF
bastions ; and although the English, after running the
gauntlet of a sweeping cross-fire, had gallantly carried
the Redan — being left there unsupported, while expect-
ing an attack from the enemy's reserve foiled at the

2(>

402 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAK,

Malakof — they abandoned it, and made no attempt to
reoccupy it. General Pelissier sent a message at 4 p.m.
to his colleague to advise another attempt, prognostica-
ting its success ; on which General Simpson sent for two
of his divisional generals to consult with ; but on their
joining him, it being then 8 p.m., further operations
were deferred till morning : when, let alone the Redan,
Sevastopol itself was evacuated. Disappointment ascribed
backwardness to the English storming party on that
day ; but without reason. They were sent forward
immethodically over a furlong of ground swept by the
enemy's balls. The disposition for the attack inspired
no confidence: no reserves appeared massed ready
to support them. Nevertheless they foUbwed their
leader into the Redan, and did not follow him out of it
until twenty minutes after his departure to seek reinforce-
ments, — a step which none but a man of courage could
have ventured to take. More could not fairly be
ijxpeeted from young troops. Had the French attack,
with all the advantages of proximity and surprise, been
thus languidly conducted, it would have failed even
more signally.

The capture of the Malakof compensated for all
failures. Aware that Sevastopol w^as no longer tenable,
that further delay would compromise the safety of the
garrison, Prince Gortschakof at once organized his
retreat, and conducted it with a masterly hand. War
has rarely witnessed a diflScult operation more success-
fully performed. Preserving order amidst exploding
mines and falling edifices, the dismaying scene lighted
up by the flames of his ships, he gathered his troops in
from the outposts, marshalled them on the shore, and

LOSSES OF MEN AT SEVASTOPOL, 403

abandoning some hundreds of wounded (in too sad a
plight for removal), ten days' provisions, and many
hundred pieces of siege ordnance, led them, in the grey
dawn of the morning, over the tremulous bridge provided
by his foresight. The sun rose on the 9th September
on a deserted ruined city * and on the vestiges of a
sunken fleet. The Allies had won the place, but were
scarcely masters of it. They had driven the enemy from
the field of battle, but could not sit down in it themselves.
They had gained the power of destruction of everything
remaining in it, but not of occupation, and the harbour
remained impervious to their ships.

The loss on the 8th of September was about equal
on either side. The Russians had 11,000, the French
9,000, and the English 2,500 killed, wounded, or
missing.

During the war 180,000 Russian infantry and
20,000 cavalry passed Perekop ; and 106,000 of that
force were buried in the Crimea. Allowing for unnoted
casualties by explosions and drownings, and for deaths
beyond the Crimea from wounds received in it, we may
estimate the Russian direct loss by the siege of Sevas-
topol at 125,000 men. The indirect heavier loss, by
fatigue and sickness on the march from the interior to
the Crimea, will never probably be known outside the
Russian war-office. In addition, the Russian Asiatic
army lost 40,000 men.

The nearest parallel in history to the siege of
Sevastopol is the siege of Acre in 1189-91, alike

* At the termination of the war there remained, of 15,000 dwellings
which had composed Sevastopol, 16 habitable hoases, and 60 repairable.
The rest was ruin.

26—2

404 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

tasking the might of three empires, alike holding Europe
and Asia in suspense. Substituting Moslems for Rus-
sians, we read the siege of Sevastopol typified in Gibbon's
account of the siege of Acre. The similar features are
these : Acre was besieged by the united forces of France
and England, with contingents from minor States, their
wants being supplied from friendly Mediterranean ports ;
nearly invested by land — inversion of the Allies' disposi-
tion—the naval blockade could not be strictly main-
tained, and therefore, whenever bad weather drove the
royal fleets away temporarily from the coast, supplies
were thrown into the city. A few miles from Acre the
Ccaliph lay encamped, intent on raising the siege, during
the progi-ess of which several battles favourable to the
Crusaders were fought near Mount Carmel. One hun-
dred thousand of the Crusaders perished in the siege.
The intimate union between England and France began
to cool at its termination.

The dissimilar features are as follow: at Acre the
sovereigns of France and England and the Caliph were
present with their armies ; the chief honour fell to the
English ; the success of the AlUes was complete ; the
defenders of Acre capitulated, paid 200,000 pieces of
gold in ransom for their lives, freed all Christian cap-
tives, and restored the wood of the true cross. But the
striking dissimilarity appears in the mode of following
up the victory. Richard CoBur de Lion marched imme-
diately, in the heat of a Syrian summer, along the coast,
reducing Jaffa and Csesaria on the way, to Ascalon. He
fought the Moslem army every day, and routed it so
completely, that at length Saladin remained alone in the
field with his personal guards. The action at Koughil,

INACTION AFTER THE FALL OF SEVASTOPOL, 405

near Eupatoria, September 29, between French and
Turkish and Russian cavalry — in which the latter were
defeated with losses in men, horses, and guns ; and the
reduction of Kilburn, 19th October, by the Allies' fleets,
when the French iron-cased floating batteries made a
successful debut, were a poor set-oflF for the inaction of
150,000 matchless troops before Sevastopol in the balmy
coolness of a Crimean autumn.

406 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Critical Position of Kars— The Turkish Asiatic Army — Zarif Miistapha
Pasha app<jinted to the Command — liattle of Kurekderah — Report
of the English Commissioner of the Efficiency of the Turkish
Troops and their Artillery — Report of the English Medical
Officer on the Hospitals at Kars — The British Commissioner's
Despatches— His Estimate of the Turks — Inadequate Grounds
for his unfavourahle Opinion — Zarif Mustapha Pasha and others
recalled at the Instance of the Commissioner — Charge of want
of Respect curiously disproved — The Porte unjustly reproached
for not sending Supplies to Kars — Isolation of that City — The
Decision to ahandon it as untenable overruled by the English
Commissioner — His Aim — The Question considered — The Asiatic
Army concentrated at Kars — General Maravief encamps on the Ai-jia
Tchai — Advance of the Russians — Brilliant Sortie from Kalafat
an Example for Kars — General Muraviefs Feint — He invests
Kars — Successful Defences of Garrisons mainly due to Soi-ties —
Instances cited — Russian Ravages — Protection of Kurdish Brigand
Chiefs by the English Commissioner — Their Condemnation.

The lamentations of Kars, faintly heard in the intervals
of the bombardment of Sevastopol, had been scarcely
heeded by the AUies ; although they may have appre-
hended the surrender of it, with the army, chief defence
of Asia Minor. Whatever doubts may have existed about
the prudence of occupying Kars, there could be none
about the policy of preventing its fall, viewing the
seasoned troops and valuable ordnance inside, and the
effect of its re-echo. The eyes of Central Asia were
concentrated on Kars. Whatever doubts may have been

CRITICAL POSITION OF KARS. 407

entertained of Russia's intention to act energetically in
Asia, had been removed by the appointment of Genera^
Muravief, distinguished under Paskievitch in the cam-
paign of 1828-29, to the command of the Trans-
caucasian army.

The Turkish Asiatic army, with ill-luck from the
commencement, had suffered more from its friends than
its foes. Superior in the quality of its men, artillery,
and small-arms, but ill commanded, it had gallantly
fought in the first campaign three battles — the battles of
Beyendir, Akiska, and Subahtan ; and had lost the two
latter through their generals' 'deficient knowledge of the
art of war, coupled with divided authority. Those battles,
costing the Turks 12,000 men in killed, wounded, and
prisoners, and many guns, were nevertheless all but
drawn. Tlie Russians were unable to follow up their
successes, and the Turks remained on the field. Various
pashas, who had been proved incompetent, were then
successively recalled, and Zarif Mustapha Pasha was
appointed in March, 18f54, to the chief command, with
other divisional generals. The army, demoralized by the
joint operation of his predecessors' incapacity and alien
rivalries, was then at its lowest ebb of destitution. Fifty
men a day were then dying at Kars. He reorganized
the staflF, reorganized the hospitals, and raising thus the
tone of his army morally and physically, made it, in
four months, again eager to be led under fire. The
battle of Kurekdereh, fought early in August, within
twenty miles of Kars, was lost by him, more, it is said,
through the hesitation arising out of the rival plans of
liis foreign military advisers, than by the tactics of his
opponent Prince Bebutof. The Russians, sustaining a

408 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

heavy loss in killed and wounded, did not advance
beyond the field of battle. The Turks ralUed with sus-
tained ardour, and within a few weeks were again in
heart and spirits ; according to a despatch written by her
Majesty's commissioner in Armenia to the Secretary of
State for Foreign Aflfairs. That officer inspected 12,000
of the infantry soon after his arrival at the theatre of
war, and thus described them : —

** Camp, near Kars, September 26, 1854.
** In closely inspecting the troops as I rode through
their ranks, I was struck with their healthy and soldier-
like mien. I doubt if any army could produce better
materials for working with in this country. Even from
my horse I observed the brightness and good condition
of their arms, and having expressed to the mushir my
wish to inspect a certain number of privates taken pro-
miscuously from each corps, his Excellency caused them
to fall out as they passed him. I minutely inspected
each man in succession. I found the greater proportion
of the muskets and bayonets in good order. The greater
proportion of them were flint firelocks, but three bat-
talions of chasseurs were armed with the minie rifle, and
seven battalions of infantry had detonating muskets.'*
In the same despatch the commissioner thus speaks of
the artillery :* — ** The guns and the carriages were in an
efficient state ; and the horses, considering the season

• The artillery consisted of six batteries of horse artillery, 5-pounders,
excepting ono battery of 15 lb. howitzers ; seven batteries of foot artillery,
viz., five of 9-pounders, one of 12-pounders, and one of 24 lb. howitzers ;
cue mountain batter}' — total 84 guns. The horse artiDery had six horses
and all the others eight horses per gun. Each heavy gun had 80 rounds,
each light gun 120 rounds, of ammunition. In the magazines there were
400 rounds per gun. — Oett. WiUiam:t' AV/>o/r.

TURKISH FORCES AND HOSPITALS AT KARS. 409

of the year and the diflSciilty of procuring forage, were
in tolerably working condition ; although those animals
had been cheated out of at least a third of their com by
the malpractices of the commander-in-cliief and his
generals of division. The harness will require consider-
able repair during the winter ; but considering the con-
stant exposure to sun and rain, it has been well cared for
by its commanding oflScer, Tahir Pasha. . • . Everj--
body present in the late battle admits the efficiency of
this arm, by which the enemy suffered most severely, and
those guns which were taken by the Russians did not
fall into their hands until they had inflicted severe
chastisement on the attacking columns. . . . The
small stores appear to be in very good order and ready
for use. The ammunition is made up with great care
and packed in boxes adapted for transport on mules or
horses.''

The English medical gentleman in his suite, in a report,
dated 24th September, 1854, thus speaks of the hospitals
at Kars : — ** The number of sick at present in the army
at Kars amounts to between 500 and 600, which in an
army of 28,000, suflfering from the effects of recent
engagements and defeats, is not extraordinary. To
these, however, must be added about 2,000 of the worst
cases sent to the central hospitals of Erzeroom, a largo
percentage of which died on the road. The hospitals
are large buildings, such as khans, mosques, &c., fitted
up and furnished for the reception of the sick. These
places are, on the whole, and considering the resources
of the country, not ill-adapted for their present service.
The beds of the patients consist of a good straw mattress,
and a quilt stuffed with cotton ; this quilt being enve-

410 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

loped in a covering of calico, which could he taken oflF
and washed when necessary. The patients are supplied
with clean shirts, cahco drawers, nightcaps, and bed-
gowns ; in short, the bedding and body linen of the
patients, as far as I observed, and considering the cir-
cumstances, are unexceptionable.''

The commissioner, in a despatch to the Foreign
Office of the same date, speaks from his own observation
of the hospital at Kars : — " The beds are comfortable,
the rooms as clean as the nature of the buildings would
admit of, the kitchen and offices in better order than I
had been led to expect ; the patients were well cared for
on all those points on which a military officer can be
supposed to oflFer an opinion.'' He had previously in a
despatch, dated Erzeroom, September 16, 1854, spoken
of the military hospital in that town in the following
terms : — ** I found the sick and wounded much better
lodged and taken care of than I had any reason to anti-
cipate, and all the arrangements which meet the eye of
the visitor show a regard to cleanliness and comfort
which is very commendable. These arrangements are
principally to be attributed to the care and attention
bestowed on them by Emin Bey, the chief medical
officer."

A general able to show his troops, artillery, and
hospitals in the condition described at the end of two
unfortunate campaigns, within seven weeks of a reverse,
deserved credit for administration, and — taking men as
they were in that day — support. The cited condition of
the hospitals of Kars and Erzeroom was far superior to
that of the hospitals of the anny of the Danube. The
afore-quoted reports seem irreconcileable with the charges

THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT KARS. 411

of remissness and corruption, to the prejudice of the
well-being of their men, brought against Zarif Mustapha
Pasha and his seconds by her Majesty's commissioner.
That distinguished officer was already known in the
East, but less in a military than in a civil capacity. His
estimate of the Turks, formed while employed on the
dehmitation of the Turko-Persian frontier, was unfavour-
able : — the inevitable consequence of his dependence
on interpreters, drawn from classes prone from infancy
to exaggerate in disfavour of the ruling class, and
who, when conflicting opinions respecting them are
deducible, invariably deduce the least flattering. He
had seen the Turks with their rayas' eyes, he had
heard about them from their rayas' lips, and had
passed judgment accordingly. As well might an
Algerine's sketch of the French, or a Hindoo's
colouring of the English, be accepted as a genuine
representation.

Thus impressed, the commissioner, face to face with
proud susceptible men, unconsciously passed the faint
line of demarkation between counsel and dictation.
Strong in his integrity, he measured the authorities
in Armenia by a higher than the national standard of
morality : — an unphilosophical error, which made his
remonstrances on certain points appear fanciful and
irrelevant to the business in hand, — as fanciful as similar
utterances in Marlborough's camp in the Low Countries
would have sounded ; and he fancied, in the professional
jealousy excited by his visitorial character, disrespect for
his position : — singular hallucination, in days when the
humblest individual in French or Enghsh uniform was
caressed ! He, or those in his confidence, saw concerted

412 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

fraud in every transaction ; and trifles light as air — as
the superscription of a letter carelessly or disloyally
translated — became matters of grave import. Indica-
tions of latent power are ever watched for in the East,
and when detected stimulate envy and defamation. As
soon as it became known that the stranger in camp,
himself above law, could convey praise or censure of any
one directly to the British indirectly to the Turkish
Government, his quarters became the focus of attraction
for jealousies and ambitions. Undercurrents of intrigue
set in, of a nature to aflfect the disciphne of a firmer
body than a Turkish army. Concord between individuals,
the one exacting the other impatient and both distrust-
ful, became difficult. Both viewing one thing in diflferent
lights, neither understood the other. One accustomed
to the rule and routine of British troops, saw irregularity
and disorder in the organization familiar to the other.
The discrepance between the number of men and of
rations — indicative of peculation to one brought up in a
service where they are convertible terms — resulted from
rations increasing in geometrical ratio with rank, and the
customary distribution of bread rations to camp-followers
and oth'ters having claims on the service ; and if some-
what in excess of recognized practice, it need not, under
the circumstances, have been closely scrutinized. Turkish
generals during the late war had difficulties to contend
with, such as officers drawing their pay regularly from
the British Treasury and backed by the British authori-
ties in Turkey, were ill able to form a correct notion of.
They had their enemies at Constantinople ; their letters
were not always answered ; their demands often seemed
importunate. They had no ** correspondents" by their

RECALL OF TURKISH PASHAS. 413

side to set them right with the pubhc when misrepre-
sented. The fact of a body of oflficers without private
means remaining long in arrears of pay was of itself a
grave difficulty.

On the demand of H.M.'s ambassador, based on the
commissioner's representations, the Porte recalled suc-
cessively the Mushir Zarif Mustapha Pasha, and the
feriks, Shukri Pasha and Husseyin Pasha ; replacing
the first ultimately by Wassif Pasha, who promised
docility. The Porte thereby impaired its dignity in the
eyes of the people, who were indignant at seeing men of
rank condemned unheard on the ipse dixit of a foreigner.
The evidence adduced in support of the charge against
Shukri Pasha, while temporarily in command of the
army, of want of respect for the commissioner, was dis-
proved by a curious process ;* and the charges against
others might, if submitted to test, have been equally dis-
covered to rest more or less upon imperfect or malignant
information. Arslan Pasha (General Bystrzonowsky)

* The commissioner sent the superscription of a letter written to
him by Shukri Pasha to the Foreign Office, in proof of his charge of
that officer's intentional disrespect towards him. The Foreign Office
sent the superscription to the embassy at Constantinople ** as an instance
of the disrespect shown to Brigadier-General Williams by the Turkish
military authorities," with instructions to demand Shukri Pasha's
recall. The superscription being translated at the embassy and found
becoming, was sent back to London with that information. The Foreign
Office then placed the superscription in the hands of Mr. Hedhouse, its
official interpreter. Mr. Redhouse summed up a critical report thus ; —
*'From my own knowledge and experience, derived from many years*
service in Turkey, I am bound to pronounce the original superscription
to be, as far as it goes, a very polite and flattering specimen of the
turgid mode in which letters are there constantly addressed, since many
of the terms used in it are of a class more laudatory than strict
etiquette demanded. . . . The terms actually employed are, under the
system in use, as polite and deferential as language can make them."

414 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

and Shahin Pasha (General Breansky) were also recalled.
Kerim Pasha, afterwards much distinguished in action,
was complained of, but escaped recall by timely depre-
cation. The Porte was unable to comply with some of
the commissioner's other demands.

Turkish history afforded no precedent of an Asiatic
army looking to the capital for everything, — for neces-
saries, expected to be drawn, as in previous wars, from
local sources. Asia Minor was not a desert; it was a fertile
country with many cities. The Porte, when reproached
for not sending supplies via Trebizond to Erzeroom — along
180 miles of furrowed mule track, over two mountain
ranges,* — then 100 miles further on to Kars, through
defiles and over plains watched more or less by the
enemy's cavalry, might have answered by citing the trouble
of supplying the Aihes' armies before Sevastopol, Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe subsequently, in a self exculpatory
despatch, expressed the diflference between giving and
following advice, by contrasting the facility of taking a
horse to water and the diflficulty of making him drink :
meaning that he had urged the Porte to forward supplies
to Kars, but in vain. His Excellency had better have
made a plain statement of the case and trusted in it to
justify both himself and the Porte. Between November,
1854, and May, 1855, the route from Trebizond to Erze-
room was passable, as a rule, only by couriers and
carriers with hght goods, and not always by them.
Between May, 1855, and the ensuing December a
Russian army lay interposed between Erzeroom and
Kars.

* The route between Trebizonde and Erzeroom traverses Hodja-
Bounar-diujhf at an altitude of 7)800 feet above the level of the sea.

POSITION AND STRENGTH OF KARS. 415

Kars was ill selected for the station of the Asiatic
army. Isolated on the extreme frontier of Turkey,
900 miles from the capital, 300 miles from the nearest
port, Trebizond, and 100 miles from the nearest support,
Erzeroom, it was a place at once difi&cult to relieve and
to retire from. The Kussian fortress of Ghumri, rela-
tively impregnable, lay thirty miles from it in facile com-
munication with Tiflis, the capital of the Transcaucasian
provinces. Kars was a fitting base for offensive opera-
tions. With that view the Porte had given orders,
carried out under the directions of Kliourshid Pasha
(General Guy on) , for ajtrengthening Kars with redoubts,
and had sent there seventy siege-guns, with ample
supplies of ammunition. But reverses in the field and
other considerations indicated, the following year, to
those on the spot the prudence of razing the works and
removing the cannon — conveyed there with months of
toil, and invaluable in a region 6,000 feet above the
sea-level — to a securer place. If taken fortified, Kars
would be an advanced post to Ghumri ; if taken dis-
mantled, it would prove a barren acquisition. The
council of the army, after mature deliberation recorded
in a note, decided on abandoning Kars as untenable, but
their decision was overruled by the commissioner, who,
having shown himself in possession of influence to pro-
cure the removal of pashas in disagreement with him, was
deferred to. The council, aware of imperial embarrass-
ments and topographical obstacles, placed no rehance on
the arrival of reinforcements ; aware, also, of the tenden-
cies of the Armenians and Kurds, it may have appreliended
encouragement to them by the sequestration of the army.
Europeans in the late war never sufficiently dwelt on

416 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

the grave fact of the Porte having, whether in Europe or
in Asia, an internal as well as an external enemy to
occupy its thoughts ; and in regard of the former, its
pecuUar position counselled discretion in speaking of it.
The council saw in the abandonment of Kars safety for
the army. The commissioner aimed at saving both the
army and Kars, one by the other. An eminent writer on
the art of war, discoursing on the tactics for an inferior
army anxious to avoid a battle, says : ** Si vous vous
enfermez dans une ville, votre perte est inevitable ; car
en vous enfermant avec votre armee dans une ville vous
ne pourrez manquer d'etre assiege, et dans peu force par
la famine de vous rendre.'' We will not try the value of
these divergent opinions by the result, but by the
doctrine of probabilities. Were the probabilities in
favour of the arrival in time of succour on the scale
required ? An inspection of the map and consideration
of the general military position would answer that in the
negative. The overland route from Scutari followed by
the warrior sultans in their Persian wars had ceased to
be used even by tartars : the vast posting establishment
along it had disappeared ; the menzil khans had fallen to
ruin. Shorter routes from the sea coast scarcely
admitted of the passage of artillery. The inhabitants
of the surrounding districts, even if paid for their
services, were not likely to incur risk by attempts to
supply an army resigned to inaction. Every authority
in Armenia had reason to know, when the occupation
of Kars was decided on in expectation of reinforce-
ments arriving before the exhaustion of its provi-
sions, that the available Turkish troops were detained
in the Crimea indefinitely; save those demanded for

THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF KARS. 417

the Contingent whose co-operation the commissioner
objected to.*

The real question at issue was not whether succour
might or might not arrive in time, but whether Kars
was of sufi&cient importance to justify incurring the
slightest risk of sacrificing an army for its sake. The
advocates for its occupation might colourably argue tha<"
their expectation of holding out would have been
justified if the serdari ekrem had operated, in their
opinion, energetically ; but this, at the best, was relying
on a remote contingency ; while, on the other hand, it
might be as reasonably argued that if the Russians had
undertaken a siege rather than an investment Ears
would probably have fallen before that general left
Constantinople. The vital question, however, for con-
sideration was this : Was there anything in Asia Minor
better worth preserving than the best army in it ? Ears,
without redoubts and guns, was an obscure country
town, of no strategic value. The strategic value formerly
belonging to it had been impaired by the territorial
changes eflFected by the Peace of Adrianople. The
capture of Beyazid by the Russians, July, 1854, had

* From General Williams to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

[Extract.]

" Erzeroom, May 8, 1855.
" With reference to the nature and composition of the troops to be
sent to co-operate with the Kars army, I feel myself justified in warning
her Majesty's Government of the danger which would threaten us were
that force to consist solely of the Turkish Contingent about to be fonned
under British officers. No sudden influence can be obtained over men by
officers ignorant of their language, manners, and habits ; and however
gallant and good those officers are, they would not, in my opinion, be so
far seconded by the Turkish soldiers as to successfully cope with Russian
discipline and combination in the open field."

418 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

circumscribed it still further. Ears derived importance
in the late war, not from its position, but from its
becoming an entrenched camp with the bulk of the
Asiatic army inside. Wherever that army might have
been stationed, the Russians would not have left it far
in their rear. They wanted it, not Kars. There is a
mountainous ridge, Sowanly Dagh, between Kars and
Erzeroom, twelve hours from the former place. By
occupying its passes, strengthened by redoubts, with
a few troops, the Asiatic army, in communication then
with the sea and the interior, would have equally held
the Eussians in check. The desire to send it supplies
/.nd reinforcements in detail as the means presented
themselves would not have been controlled by appre-
hension of their falhng into the enemy's hands. At the
worst, the alternative of retreat from position to position
was open to them. Long marches would not have been
needed. No Kussian general, with the possible move-
ments of the Allies and the Caucasians on his mind,
would have gone far from his base of operations ; still
less have disseminated his forces by the occupation of
open towns, with a Turkish army in the field.

By the end of May, 1855, the Asiatic army, less
10,000 men at Erzeroom, Kiupri-Keuy and Hassan
Kaleh, was concentrated in Kars. About 15,000 infantry,
well armed, 2,530 cavalry, and fourteen batteries fairly
horsed, composed it. The inhabitants of Kars, used to
arms, like all Turks in frontier districts, furnished, in
addition, 3,000 fighting men. The passes of Sowanly
Dagh were unoccupied, the depots of provisions on the
way were unguarded, the communications with Erzeroom
were unassured. Therefore, from that hour, the army,

GENERAL MURAVIEF BEFORE KARS. 419

dependent bn its own resources, was bound to watch for
and profit by opportunities given by the enemy's careless-
ness or presumption.

General Muravief left Ghumri about June 1, and
encamped on the Arpa Tchai (barley river) to complete
his organization. Whereupon the military council in
Kars proposed, in accordance with the rule of war based
on expediency and humanity, sending away non-com-
batants to neighbouring villages, or to Erzeroom. Not
deluding themselves with hopes of succour, they wished to
economize their provisions. Their proposition was
overruled. When it was subsequently entertained in
October, the inhabitants declined to expose their wives
• and children to the nearly certain risk then of perishing
of cold on the way or falling into Cossacks' hands.
General Muravief thought he saw his foe in a trap.
Promising his army possession of Kars without loss, he
marched from the Arpa Tchai with about 20,000 infantry,
4,000 cavalry, and ten batteries, and appeared in sight
of Kars on the feast of Bairam, 1271, corresponding to
June 16, 1855. His cavalry drove in the Turkish out-
posts and advancing within range of the artillery of the
place sustained a trifling loss. Two days later he
encamped four miles south of Kars. From that position
he sent, June 29, one-third of his force towards the
Sowanly Dagh ; thus rendering his plans doubtful. The
detachment found at Yeni-Keuy, a place fifty miles from
Kars, six weeks' supply of biscuit, wheat, and barley for
the army. It destroyed part, brought away part, and
having sounded the neighbouring country, rejoined the
main body : which had been left unmolested during its
absence.

27—2

420 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The example of the garrison of Kalafat under some-
what similar circumstances should have inspired the
garrison of Kars with confidence to make a sortie ; which
might have reversed the position of the opposing armies
in Armenia. General Muravief, despising the enemy,
had exposed his army to be attacked in detail. The
sortie from Kalafat, the most brilliant affair of the war,
has been little spoken of, through the absence of Euro-
peans. Brief mention of it, therefore, may not seem
out of place here. The Russians in the winter of 1853-54
concentrated considerable forces including three regiments
of cavalry at Zetate, for an attack on the entrenched camp
of Kalafat. The feriks, Ahmed Pasha and Ismael Pasha,
entrusted with the defence, resolved to anticipate their '
movement. Accordingly, at 10 p.m., January 18, 1854 (the
Oriental Epiphany), they marched from Kalafat with
15,000 infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and three bat-
teries, expecting to surprise the enemy; but their intention
having transpired, they found him ready to give battle.
They attacked the enemy at dawn, routed him after a
struggle of five hours, and returned to Kalafat with their
wounded by 7 p.m. The defeated Russians retired to
Crajova, and Kalafat was never again menaced. The
combination of a twelve hours' march out and home, and
five hours' combat, with twenty hours' continuous expo-
sure in the valley of the Danube in the month of
January, renders this sortie a remarkable event.

Towards the end of July, General Muravief again, as
it were, laid a bait to allure the garrison out. Leaving
fifteen battalions of infantry, one regiment of dragoons,
and two regiments of Cossacks, at Komansoor, near
Kars, he marched out of sight with the remainder of his

KARS INVESTED bY MURAVIEF. 421

force in the direction of Erzeroom. Driving in the
slender garrisons of Kiupri-Keuy and Hassan Kaleh,
which rallied at the entrenched pass of Deveboyounou,
his vanguard halted at Hassan Ealeh, eighteen miles
from Erzeroom ; alarming that city enough to make the
consuls in it pack up, ready for a start to Trebizond.
General Muravief, intending no more than a reconnais-
sance in force, to ascertain the strength of the enemy in
that quarter, went no further. He carried away 100
araba-loads of grain from the pubUc store at Kiupri-Keuy,
left detachments in the passes of Sowanly Dagh, and
rejoined his division before Kars in the middle of August.
Tranquil then about his rear, with his communications
assured, he sat down in two camps; investing Kars by
detachments of cavalry and Cossacks. Tartars with
despatches easily escaped their vigilance. The Russian
army now consisted of twenty-eight battahons of infantry,
5,000 cavalry, and twelve batteries. General Muravief
had probably received incorrect information about the
amount of provisions in Kars, or had measured an
Oriental by the scale of a Russian appetite. Otherwise
it is presumable he would have opened trenches before
that place.

The undisturbed investment of an entrenched army
during months, by an army in the field numerically
about one-half superior, and inferior when disjoined
as spoken of, is probably unexampled. Inferiority in
cavalry, in part compensated for by three battalions of
expert minie-aimed ridemen, seems an inadequate
explanation. Of the two modes of reducing a town — ^by
force of arms or by dint of hunger — General Muravief
chose the latter, and having a choice he was liable to

422 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

err ; but there being only one recognized mode of
opposition, the garrison had no motive for hesitation.

All writers on the art of defence recommend sorties.
Sorties harass the enemy ; they oblige him to keep large
bodies of men under arms ; they cause him the loss of
good ofi&cers, always on such occasions exceptionally
exposed ; they sustain the spirits of the garrison, and
animate their partisans outside. All favourable defences
have been mainly due to sorties. Londonderry, Limerick,
Gibraltar, and Jellalabad, are familiar examples to the
English. The two first had, like Kars, been extempo-
raneously fortified, and were garrisoned by troops com-
paratively inferior in numbers and organization : both
made sorties and saved themselves. The garrison of the
last, after an investment of five months, like that of
Kars, sallied out and routed the Afghan army under
Mehemet Akbar Khan. The sortie from Gibraltar against
the Due de Crillon's lines is ever memorable. The gar-
rison of Candia, — ^Venetians and French — often renewed,
resisted the Ottomans many years : withstanding
sixty -nine assaults, they made eighty-three sorties, and
finally capitulated on honourable terms. Sevastopol
prolonged her defence till it became famous by sorties ;
and the date of the day of the decision, in February,
1855, to rest the defence mainly upon systematic sorties,
is annually celebrated by the surviving engineers.

The object, as stated, of holding Kars to cover Asia
Minor by retaining the enemy in one position, was frus-
trated at the outset by the passive attitude of the garri-
son. For, as we have seen, half the Russian army held
Kars in check, while the other half traversed the country
between it and Erzeroom, and was free to march in any

PROTECTIOX OF THE BRIGAND CHIEFS. 4*23

other direction. The shame of abandoning the in-
habitants and crops of the plains between Kars and
Erzeroom to the enemy had been prominently put
forward as a motive for occupying the former town.
Nothing was ever more completely abandoned. The
letters of the EngUsh consul at Erzeroom to the Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, in August, 1855, show
that the Kussians had ravaged the country to that extent
that ** it would be difficult to estimate the immense
loss of property which had been already incurred." He
described all the villages as abandoned, and the cattle
left at the mercy of the Kurds, who drove them oflF and then
burnt the houses. The protection accorded to two Kurdish
chieftains, Isdinshir Bey and Manzour Bey, formed not
the least curious incident of the episode of Kars.
Those noted brigands, long the terror of the country,
were tracked by troops sent from Bagdad in the autumn
of 1854, and their escape was cut oflF. In this strait a
messenger reached the former from the commissioner, who
had been led to beheve him an oppressed man, with
an invitation to surrender on the faith of his word for
his personal safety. The Porte confirmed the guarantee,
on condition of liis being brought to Constantinople for
trial. Tried before the Grand Council, Isdinshir Bey
was proved guilty of the death of sixty individuals slain
by himself. The council in its mashata (decree), signed
unanimously, declared that in accordance with the laws
of God and man he ought also to suffer death. The
Grand Vizir professed himself unable to accept this
decision, out of consideration for the British Government
to whom the criminal's life had been promised, and
advised reconsideration of it. The criminal was then,

424 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

together with his lieutenant, Manzour Bey, sentenced to
imprisonment in a fortress for Ufe.*

* Early in 1858, Isdinshir Bey and Manzonr Bey escaped from
Widdin. and Ronght for refage in Austrian territory. Failing iu that,
they joined the Bashi-bazoaks in the Herzgovine ; deserted from them ;
went next to Bosnasaraj, were there recognized, and reimprisoned.

( 425 )

CHAPTER XXX.

Council of War in the Crimea — Omar's Pasha's Proposals overruled —
He returns to Constantinople — His Censures of the Porte and the
Allies — He undertakes the Relief of Kars — Naval and Military
Resources placed at his Disposal — Honours and an Estate be-
stowed on him — Darkened Prospects of Kars — Proposal to retire
on Erzeroom negatived — ^Letter from Omar Pasha — Kars to be
saved by attacking Tiflis — Omar Pasha embarks for Trebizond —
General Muravief resolves to storm Kars — Vigilance of General
Kmety — Gallant resistance of the Garrison — Defeat of the
Russians — The English Commissioner thanks General Kmety —
Who, however, is passed over without Mention — Exultation at
Constantinople — General Muravief re-establishes the Investment
of Kars — His Position — Omar Pasha at Soukhoum Kaleh — His
Plan for relieving Kars — His unaccountable Delay — Selim Pasha
sent to reinforce Erzeroom — Its Garrison — Selim Pasha's Des-
patches — Weak State of the Garrison of Kars — It surrenders to
General Muravief — His Consideration for the vanquished — Effect
of the Fall of Kars — Omar Pasha roused to Action — He defeats
the Enemy at Rouki — His Caution — Abundant Supplies sent to
him — Efficiency of his Troops — His leisurely March — ^Appropria-
tion of Spoils — Deluge of Rain — Omar Pasha retreats to Redout
Kaleh — Disappointment at Constantinople — Russia accepts the
Ultimatum of the Allies.

CoiNciDENTLY with the investment of Kars, a council
was held in the Crimea, composed of the Allies' military
and naval commanders. In that council Omar Pasha
requested the allied generals to sanction the departure
of a portion of the Turkish troops, then in the Crimea,
to reinforce the army of Asia Minor. His arguments

426 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

were overruled by the supposed necessity of retaining
every man in the Crimea until the fall of Sevastopol.
Omar Pasha, tired of acting a subordinate part, then
quitted the Crimea and arrived, unheralded, at Con-
stantinople, 17th July, 1855. Going, in disregard of
etiquette, from his ship to the imperial palace, he
accused the Porte to the Sultan of negligence and inca-
pacity in regard of military matters. He also censured
the allied generals ; saying they were intent on ruining
Turkey, by keeping her best troops in the Crimea to no
purpose ; and he averred their inability to reduce Sevas-
topol. This irregular proceeding hushed intrigue, and
increased his temporary popularity.

The people looked to him to save Kars ; and
he undertook the mission. All the resources of tha
capital were placed at his disposal. He named his
officers and selected his troops. Fourteen steam and
fifty sail transports were taken up in the course of the
autumn to ensure his supplies. His plan of campaign
was approved of by the military advisers of the Allies'
ambassadors. Time was the most precious material ;
nevertheless he tarried more than six weeks at Constan-
tinople, enjoying a long ovation. He was invested with
the Order of the Bath by the British ambassador, in the
presence of the Sultan's ministers, with extraordinary
ceremonial ; a guard of honour of 100 English and 500
Turkish soldiers received him in the garden of the
embassy, and the English guard-ship in the Bosphorus
fired a royal salute. The Sultan gave him an estate,
part of the succession of Khosref Pasha, — that remark-
able individual, who, originally a slave of Selim III.r,
had traversed with increasing wealth and honours the

DISTRESS OP THE GARRISON OP KARS. 427

most troubled period of Turkish history, and died in 1854
at the age of 97. The Turkish minister for foreign affairs
and the English and French ambassadors spread ban-
quets in his honour. Finally, the ministers of war and
of marine were replaced by two of his friends. Secure
then of support, ministerial and diplomatic, he, towards
the end of August, wrote to Wassif Pasha at Kars to
hold out twenty days longer, with the certainty of relief.
The tenacious pasha held out four times as long.

About the date of that letter the prospects of the
garrison of Kars became darkened by diminution of
forage. Without horses, Kars would become, nolens
volensj a prison. Whereupon it has been stated the
military council proposed, while yet a fortnight's supply
remained, the garrison being still efficient, in good health
and spirits,* to dismantle the works, leave invalids
with surgeons to the clemency of the enemy, and retire,
fighting their way if necessary, on Erzeroom by a cir-
cuitous route, partly through a hilly district difficult for
cavalry to act in. But the commander-in-chief, it is said,
declined the responsibihty of abandoning Kars ; and the
arrival of Omar Pasha's letter enabled him to reprove
the council complacently for having manifested distrust
ifi the ability of the imperial government to succour
them. Soon after the arrival of that letter, forage being
nearly exhausted, most of the horses were turned out
of the place ; and thenceforward the garrison saw no
prospect of escape save in winter or in Omar Pasha's
•

* ** The health and spirits of onr troops are most satisfactory.
On the part of the enemy, on the contrary, I heliere much sickness to
exist." — Gen. Williains to the Secretary of State for Foreig^n Affairsy
Sept. 14, 1855.

428 . TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

movements compelling the enemy's retreat before the
failure of their provisions.

On the question being discussed of the mode of
succouring Kars, some proposed for the reUeving army
to proceed direct to Erzeroom via Trebizond. The
enemy would then be placed between two fires. But
the seraskir and Omar Pasha said, ** From Trebizond to
Erzeroom the movement would be of long duration, and
difficult, from the distance and the mountainous nature
of the country ; which is only traversed by mule roads,
rendering the passage of artillery a work of great labour
and of slow process." They decided in preference on
the invasion of Georgia, in expectation of inducing
thereby General Muravief to retreat, to cover that im-
portant province. This plan found favour with the Porte
and the diplomatic circle. It especially pleased the Turks.
Turks love the figurative. Omar Pasha, they said, will
strike the serpent's head at its tail : Tiflis is the tail,
and when he touches it the head before Kars will recoiL

With this avowed object, Omar Pasha embarked at
Constantinople in a Turkish war steamer, September 1,
1855. Desirous of conferring with the allied generals,
he proceeded, after a detour, to Eamiesh, and arrived
there in time to co-operate, if he had pleased, in the
fall of Sevastopol. He declined the honour. For-
bidding the Turkish troops before Sevastopol to take part
in the assault designed for the following day (the failure
of which he predicted in a letter to Constantinople), he
re-embarked on the 7th September, and • steamed for
Trebizond. Thence, after making hospital arrange-
ments, he steamed on the 21st to Batoom and Redout
Kaleh, to meet the division of his army coming from

MURAVIEF RESOLVES TO STORM KARS. 429

Roumelia. The other division, completed with picked
men from the regiments at Eupatoria, having been
detained three weeks in the Crimea after the fall of the
Malakof, reached their destination later.

General Muravief, on hearing of Omar Pasha's
arrival on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, and soon
afterwards of the fall of Sevastopol, which would leave
the Allies free to send part of their troops to Asia
Minor, knowing how much there was for an enterprising
general to accomplish, felt his confidence shaken in his
position before Kars and alarmed about the exposure of
Georgia to invasion. Foregoing, therefore, his intention
to win Kars by patience, yet loth to relinquish a prize on
which depended Russia's prestige in Central Asia, he
resolved as a desperate resource to try and carry the
place by storm, then fall back on the menaced line.
Accordingly, late in the evening of September 28, he
summoned his divisional generals to his tent, and
informed them of his resolve. Soon after midnight
his troops left their camp and marched on Kars in three
columns, the main object of their attack being the
Tachmasp heights, the outwork and bulwark of Kars.
Those heights were trenched and counter-trenched : reso-
lute troops occupied them ; the artillerymen were skilful ;
and Ismael Pasha (General Kmety) in command of
them had seen much and varied service.

General Kmety's practised ear detected the distant
measured tread of advancing troops. He sent word
thereof to the town, and made due preparations to
receive the enemy. His vigilance had saved the heights
from a surprise. Disclosed by the moonlight, and
exposed to a fire of shot and grape during the extent of

430 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

the range of the Turkish guns, the Russians came on
with cheers, rushed up the ascent, penetrated the outer
line of defence, and were then checked by well -posted
riflemen in interior redoubts. Exposed to a cross-fire of
grape and musketry, they fell like game in a battue.
Foiled in their principal assault, their subsidiary attack
on the Ingliz iahias, chiefly manned by Karslees and
Lazistan irregulars, was momentarily successful. They
carried them ; but were driven out again at the point of
the bayonet by reinforcements, gallantly led by Captam
Thompson, sent by the commander-in-chief from the
camp. The battle remained long undecided ; the daring
of the assailants taxing severely the resolution of the
defenders. Officers and men on both sides, animated by
their respective leader's example, vied with each other in
courage and devotion ; and among the brave on the side
of the defence, Kerim Pasha, Hussein Bey, and Lieu-
tenant Teasdale, were observed. After a desperate
struggle of seven hours, the Eussians, bewildered, their
leaders killed, fled in disorder, leaving 6,000 slain and
some hundreds of wounded on the field of battle. The
Turkish loss was insignificant by comparison ; 362 killed
and 631 wounded. The remnant of the assaultinsr
columns ralhed under cover of their cavalry, mournful
spectators of the fray.

General Muravief s feelings at that moment may be
easier imagined than depicted. All the possible conse-
quences of his rash impulsive act must have rushed like
arrows through his brain. There he stood with a
shattered army, the fortress he was bent on taking
intact before him, its defenders refreshed by victory, and
the eUte of the Turkish armies gathering in his rear.

THE RUSSIANS DEFEATED — GENERAL KMETY. 431

After a pause, the Russians retired to their original
position at TchiviUi ; except a body of 3,000 men which
halted at AinaU, one hour and a half distance from Ears,
and four hours' distance from the main encampment.
The garrison, by making a sortie the ensuing night
against the detached force at Ainali would, in the opinion
of a competent witness, have achieved further important
success. ** The least result of its dispersal,-" quoting
the words of General Kmety, ** would have been the
impossibility of the enemy continuing the investment —
shutting the garrison within a circumference of ten
hours' march."

The omission of mention of Ismael Pasha (General
Kmety) in the despatches addressed respectively to the
British and Turkish Governments, announcing the battle
of the 29th September, 1855, is noticeable. This omis-
sion was not the result of ignorance of that oflBcer's
services. After the retreat of the Russians her Majesty's
commissioner repaired to the field of battle, and thus, it
is said, addressed him : — '* General Kmety, I thank you
in the name of the Queen of England for your gallantry
and exertions on this day." Corresponding mention of
him in his despatch,* written the same evening, would
have seemed becoming.

* General Williams, on the 29th of September, wrote a despatch to the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the battle of Kars, in which
no mention of or allusion to General Kmety is made. On the 80th of
September be wrote a second despatch, with equal reserve in regard of
General Kmety. Those two despatches, which left Kars on September 80,
formed European public opinion on the subject. No one could deduce
from them the existence even of General Kmety, the chief actor in tho
battle. On October 8rd General Williams wrote a third despatch,
containing a detailed account of the battle, in which General Kmety'a
name appeals with the names of others, but not prominently.

432 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

The news of the battle reached Constantinople a
fortnight later, and excited rapturous exultation among
all classes. Viewing the number of the enemy interred by
the garrison, the Kussian army was considered as good as
annihilated, and Kars relieved by its own eflForts. Honours
and rewards liberally showered on the principal persons
excepting General Kmety,* who, not having been
mentioned in despatches, was not officially meritorious,
showed the Porte's sense of the importance of the event,
seemingly calculated to make a salutary impression on
the Kurds and Armenians. The people, usually chary,
were profuse of praise. They viewed the battle as their
own, and they were justly proud of it. Depressed as
they had been by the previous successes of the Rassians
in Asia, cradle of their power, they were now equally
elated by the converse. Expecting the garrisons of Kars
and Erzeroom to assume the oflfensive, and Omar Pasha
to advance triumphantly, the Porte and people reckoned
on a Turkish army wintering at Tiflis ; and any one who
ventured to hint a doubt thereon had no chance of beinsr
listened to for ten days.

The evening of the battle. General Muravief called
in his circumlying cavalry outposts. Kars remained, in
consequence, open during thirty-six hours, joyfully anti-
cipating the retreat of the enemy altogether ; of .which
he gave signs by sending away materiel and heavy
baggage to Ghumri next day. But on receiving intel-

* General Kmety received promotion to the rank of ferik on his return
to Constantinople, four months later. General Kmety, with his health
enfeebled by his exertions in the war, passed the last two years of his
life in England, and died in London in the month of April, 1865. His
remains were interred in the Kensal Green Cemetery and a monument
erected over them at the expense of the Turkish Government.

MURAVIEF RE-INVESTS KARS. 433

ligence of vacillation in Omar Pasha's movements, of
indications of Soukhoum Kaleli becoming his base of
operations, General Muravief re-established the invest-
ment ; and maintained it, with diminished forces, regard-
less of Erzeroom in his rear and of the enemy on the
Mingrehan shore.

Seldom, if ever, has a general been placed in a more
arduous position, and one involving graver responsibility.
It called for the highest faculty of generalship, — the
faculty of estimating the military eflfects of time and dis-
tance, and of reading an opponent's plan of a campaign.
Menacing at Redout Kaleh, Omar Pasha's presence at
Soukhoum Kaleh would be comparatively innocuous.
From Redout Kaleh his march to Kutais must have been
viewed by Muravief as an affair of a few days ; and even
if, satisfied with an admirable base for a campaign in the
ensuing spring, he had halted there, the apprehension
of his advancing on the high-road to Tiflis would have
sufficed to relieve Kars. Tranquillized on that account,
Muravief prepared to hut his army.

The news of the battle of Kars found Omar Pasha,
not according to his programme, at Kutais, but far away
at Soukhoum Kaleh, disporting himself more hke a young
sultan after victory than a veteran at the commencement
of a campaign. His motive for going there, what-
ever it was, involved self-contradiction. His avowed
object before leaving Constantinople had been to relieve
Kars strategically by the invasion of Georgia. He had
stated the impossibility of reheving it in any other way,
because *^ seeing that the roads are extremely bad,
his army, with its artillery and munitions complete,
would hardly reach Erzeroom (from Trebizond) in

434 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR,

three or four months." On the other hand, ** the road
which leads straight from Eedout Ealeh to Kutais is
perfectly level and easy. The goodness of the road is
favourable to the transport of artillery and munitions,
and the march of a large army by this road will be rapid
and free from diflBculty/' Such were the arguments
brought forward to induce general concurrence with his
plan for relieving Kars by threatening Tiflis, ** This ^the
Turkish) army will be in the rear of the Russian army, and
will march straight on Tiflis, which is the very soul of the
Russians in the Caucasus ; as soon as it has advanced a
little, the Russians will evidently be obliged to abandon
Kars and fly to the defence of Tiflis and Suram.*'

The first stage to Tiflis was Kutais (Colchis), twenty
leagues distant from Redout Kaleh, with water communi-
cation nearly parallel the greater part of the way. The
stream up which the Argo had rowed 3,000 year before,
flowed sufficiently deep for the light steamers and boats
of the flotilla on the coast. Redout Kaleh was the
precise spot for commencing the campaign at. Troops
had been stationed there and in the neighbourhood during
eighteen months, in anticipation of Transcaucasian
operations. The bare fact of Omar Pasha's presence
there urged General Muravief to an act of desperation,
which cost him half his infantry and rescued the garrison
of Kars from the ignoble fate of being starved out without
a redeeming feat of arms to excite public sympathy on
their behalf.

Omar Pasha's delay at Soukhoum Kaleh was
variously commented upon at Constantinople. His par-
tisans fancied some deep design in it. His rivals hinted
at treason. The public, still exulting for the battle of

QUIESCENCE OF OMAR PASHA. 435

Kars, gave little heed to it : ignorant moreover of locali-
ties, they were unable to estimate the gravity of the error.
No pasha, probably, since the Vizir seduced by Catherine's
jewels and promises on the Pruth, had unwittingly done
Russia a greater service than Omar Pasha rendered her
by deviating more that a hundred miles from the pro-
jected scene of operations, in a country where distance
is measured by natural impediments, at a conjuncture
when every hour was precious.

The Porte — finding Omar Pasha tranquil by the sea-
side, as though under the influence of a charm, and
General Muravief abiding before Kars as though he
had won, not lost, a battle — sent Selim Pasha with a
battalion of the guards to reinforce the garrison of
Erzeroom, for its defence ; not, as has been pretended, to
try and throw supplies into Kars. Had Selim Pasha
attempted its reUef', as certain enthusiastic parties
expected of him, he would have lost both his troops and
Erzeroom. This statement is due to a traduced ofl5cer.
The problem was to send provisions for 30,000 mouths
eight or ten day's march over devastated plains. Two
thousand horses or mules would barely have carried a
week's consumption. Where were those animals with
drivers to be found ? If found, how were they to feed
and be sheltered at night on the road ? Who was
to escort them ? The enemy must first have been
driven from his intermediate positions and then de-
feated before Kars. The Turkish minister for foreign
aflFairs, in a despatch to the British ambassador, had
stated that, in the opinion of the Porte and of Omar
Pasha, ** to save Kars a force is required at least equal
to the besieging army."

23—2

436 TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

The garrison of Erzeroom, in November, 1855, con-
sisted of about 1,000 cavalry, little better than Bashi-
bazouks, four or five batteries indififerently horsed, and
about 8,000 infantry. With this slender force, Selim
Pasha has been censured officially and officiously by
military men and civilians then at Erzeroom, for having
declined to march to the relief of Kars in its agony, in the
face of an enemy whom the garrison with undiminished
health and strength had declined to encounter in the
field. Had Selim Pasha, yielding to their importunities,
undertaken such a quixotic expedition, Russia would
have come to the conference of Paris with Erzeroom, as
well as Ears, in her hands ; with every gun and every
regiment of the Asiatic army in her possession, and with
the passes to the coast between Trebizond and Sampsoon
in her occupation.

Selim Pasha has also been bitterly censured in a
work called The Siege of Kars, for having by his ** men-
dacious despatches " encouraged the garrison of Kars
*' to hold out to the utmost limits of human endurance ; '*
but for which '* they would, acting on a favourite idea of
General WilUams, have cut their way through the enemy
. while their strength allowed them to march.*' What-
ever may have been the tenor of Selim Pasha's despatches,
they ought not to have been deceptive. The pashas in
Kars had means of knowing — did presumedly know
(one of them being in direct communication with the
English consul and staff officers at Erzeroom,) to a man
and horse the force in that city ; they knew the nature of
the country, and were as well able as SeKm Pasha to
read Omar Pasha's strategy. It might have been
judicious, while a few days' provisions remained, to have

CAriTULATION OF KARS. 437

disabled the artillery in Kars, and have retired under
cover of darkness in a direction away from the hostile
camp ; but it is presuming too much on credulity to
expect any one to credit an emaciated army of infantry
and dismounted cavalry — even if confident of being as
well led as the Ten Thousand on their retreat over the
same ground — with the idea of cutting their way through
an enemy who had tranquilly invested them in their best
days, undeterred from continuing the investment by one
of the bloodiest repulses on record.

When succour was no longer calculated on, and when
no military object was obtainable, the policy became
questionable of prolonging a passive resistance, at the
cost of women and children dying hourly of hunger,
and daily executions of poor wretches, miscalled deser-
ters, for endeavours to escape from starvation ; until the
garrison being on the verge of inanition, no choice
remained but surrender nearly at discretion, with the
works and materiel intact, — with seventy position guns,
eighty-four field-pieces, and 24,000 stand of arms,
including several thousand minie rifles which were
turned afterwards in Russian hands against the Circas-
sians ; thus giving General Muravief a solid triumph, a
triumph enhanced by his previous failure, and adorned
by his consideration for the vanquished. His first act
was sending provisions to the starving population of
Kars: not an hour too soon. In nearly every house
his commissaries found corpses; in one as many as
eight. The position guns dragged to Ghumri, the field
batteries driven to Tiflis, there parked in the square,
and several thousand prisoners marched by detachments
at intervals to Odessa, announced victory in more

438 TURKEY AXD THE CRIMEAN WAR.

stirring terms than a gazette to the Caucasus and New
Bussia.

On the news of the fall of Kars transpiring in Persia,
the Shah sent troops and munitions of war to the frontier
of Bagdad.

Omar Pasha at length roused himself. Re-embarking
with part of his infantry at Soukhoum Kaleh, he relanded
at Tchamshirah, forty miles to the southwards ; the
remainder of the army proceeding there hy land. He had
lost a month. From Tchamshirah he marched coastwise
to the Entischai, crossed that river, and then advanced
inland with thirty- two battalions of infantry, four battahons
of riJBes, 1,200 cavalry, and forty guns; leaving 10,000
men to guard his depots of provisions at various places.
On the 4th November, 1855, he reached the Ingour at
the ford of Bouki, five leagues from its mouth. He there
first saw the enemy— nine battalions of infantry — ^posted
on the left bank of the river, with field-guns in position.
At noon of the 5th, fire opened on them from counter
batteries established in the night, and with their attention
thus occupied, troops, detached upwards and downwards,
crossed the river at two other fords. Attacked on both
flanks, the enemy gave way after a stout resistance, and
retreated into the forest, lea^dng three guns and near
400 men on the field of battle. The Turkish loss was
numerically trifling, but it included a promising young
officer. Captain Dymoke, serving as aide-de-camp to
Colonel Simmons, B.E. ; who, with Colonel Ballard, an
Indian officer in command of a rifle regiment, bore a
prominent part in the action.

Now came into high rehef Omar Pasha's characteristic
quality — caution. He had still time, the serene aatunmal

ADVANCE OF OMAR PASHA. 439

weather of those regions heing unusually prolonged in
1855, to make up in part for delay. The prisoners
reported the Russians nowhere in force, the Mingrelians,
though unfriendly, passive, and the country unorganized
for defence by the process of devastation. He had only
to advance. He could not have indirectly relieved Kars :
the time for that had gone by; but he might have
reached Kutais, the occupation of which would have
enabled the Porte to style itself in possession of Imeritia,
Mingrelia, and Gouriel (a fair set-ofif for the pashalik of
Kars), and have given his troops comfortable winter
quarters in the barracks and khans of that town, ready
for further operations in spring. The zeal of his friends,
the Seraskir and the Capitan Pasha, had sent him four
months' provisions, winter clothing, 100,000/. in gold,
and two light steamers for the navigation of the Phasis.
The English Government had provided him a hospital
staff in its pay. Too often in the East administration
sacrifices a general: this time the general failed the
administration. Twenty leagues separated Rouki on the
Ingour from the corresponding ford of the Tchanniskal,
and Kutais lay seven leagues farther ; in all, a week's
easy march for his troops.

Omar Pasha had under his command troops willing
to march for a week on a few biscuits a day, seasoned
with olives, and aided by gatherings on the road— troops
able to dig entrenchments, cook their food, wash their
linen, make shoes, and saddle-girths from hides, take
care of their horses, and construct huts with branches
and boughs of trees. Overlooking their essential quahties,
he encumbered them with baggage, and made his advance

440 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

conditional on the formation of depots of provisions.
Leaving the Ingour on the 7th November, he marched a
few miles to Sugdidi, the capital of Mingrelia, already
abandoned by its inhabitants and the Russians. He
reposed there several days. He admired the Princess
Dadian*s palace ; and, partially relaxing his order to
respect property, transferred from it to his own and
friends' konaks, costly furniture, rare exotics, and
carriages. The captains of the Turkish steamers which
carried these trophies to Constantinople said, ** Aib dir "
(It is a shame). His next stage was Tachlis, on the Sieva.
In that pleasant spot he halted several days to allow time
to accumulate provisions ; and continuing his march
thence at an episcopal pace, his advanced guard reached,
on the 21st of November, the Tchanniskal, a tributary of
the Phasis, the boundary between Miugreha and Imeritia,
at a point six leagues from Kutais. As far as the
confluence of those rivers, perhaps some way up the
former, provisions and stores might have been conveyed
to meet him.

Simultaneously with his arrival on the Tchanniskal,
the apprehended rain began to fall, to fall diluvially, as
customary in those regions at that season. The stream
lazily flowing knee-deep in the morning, became a heady
torrent by night ; and in a few days the plain over which
his guns might have trotted lightly was converted into a
swamp. In this strait, with an uufordable river in front and
a spreading morass in the rear, he received .the intelligence
of the fall of Ears. Deeming then all motive for per-
severance over, and fearing to compromise the subsistence
of his army by longer delay, he retreated, and led it in

RUSSIA ACCEPTS TERMS OF PEACE. 441

four days to Hopi, on a small navigable stream, fifteen
miles north-east of Redout Kaleh. He encamped the
bulk of his forces there, fixing his own head-quarters at
Redout Kaleh. Sickness breaking out among his troops,
by their exposure to wet and cold, sent many of them
to hospital at Soukhoum Kaleh and Trebizond.

The news of the fall of Kars and the failure of the
Mingrelian expedition reached Constantinople together,
and created a painful sensation ; for the pubhc had just
been reading hopefully in the Gazette the roseate despatch
for the passage of the Ingour. All, impressed with grief
and disappointment, seemed instinctively to feel the
connection between the discredit of the campaign and the
absence of zeal, and, but for the diplomatic cloak thrown
round him, the Porte w^ould, probably, in deference to the
public sentiment, have invited the serdari ekrem to Con-
stantinople to explain his reasons for having converted
a four days' direct march from Redout Kaleh to the
Tchanniskal into a six weeks' circuit by Soukhoum Kaleh
and Sugdidi ; which had rendered unavaiUng the devotion
of the garrison and inhabitants of Kars, and had saved
Russia from a damaging blow in her vulnerable quarter.
The Porte — well entitled to say, *' save me from my
friends,'' — behaved with dignity. Bowing to the
decree of Fate, it uttered no lamentations, expressed
no vindictiveness ; but alarmed about Erzeroom,it directed
troops to proceed to that city from Eupatoria, and the
gradual transfer of the army in Mingrelia to Trebizond,
in preparation for a campaign in Asia Minor the ensuing
spring.

Such was the position of affairs, gloomy for Turkey,

442 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

when the telegraph electrified the public of Constantiuople,
January 7th, 1856, by the announcement of Russia's
acceptance of the Allies' ultimatum as interpreted by
Austria. The announcement fell on the sarafs and
speculators of Galata like a live shell among a company
of gamesters.

THE END.

( 443 )

APPENDIX I.

Constantinople y
Excellence, Mars 22 — Avril 1, 1854.

Je me permets la liberty de soomettre a voire jagement ^clair^
qaelqaes idces snr Temploi de la flotte Ottomane lors de sa prochaine
sortie dans la Mer Noire, laqaelle, soit dit en parentbese, a canse de la
t^noit^ des v^tements des matelots et de Tinexperience de la plnpart des
^qnipages, soit officiers soit matelots, doit Stre diff^r^e jasqa*a ce qne le
temps 8*adoacit, ce que Ton ponrra attendre dans une qninzaine de
jours.

Ya la position de la flotte Anglo •Fran9aise dans les eanx de
Eavama, d'ou elle veille les c6tes de la Boam^lie, et est k m^me
d'observer les mouvements de la flotte Basse k Sevastopol, il serait,
il me semble, inutile que la flotte Ottomane aille de ce c6t^ \k. Elle
saurait ^tre mieux occupee ailleurs pour la cause commune.

II y'a en outre une consid^tion toute particuli^re qui m^rite atten-
tion : c*est que la flotte ajant peu nayigue depuis douze ans, elle pourrait
faire mauvaise figure en allant se joindre k la flotte Alli^e, sans avoir
fait pr^alablement un court voyage. Par consequent, 8*il n'existe pas des
raisons majeures centre, je suis d'avis que la flotte, en sortant du
Bosphore avec un vent du midi, doive aller directment k Sinope. Elle
devrait j rester quelques jours pour completer son eau et pour rem^dier
les defauts de gr^ment et d'autres que le voyage aura immanquable-
ment fait ressortir. Elle y aurait des facilit^s pour voir k Tarmement
et au conditionnement de see embarcations ^ fin de pouvoir sans confusion
debarquer, en cas de besoin, une partie de ses ^uipages pour coop^er
avec les troupes de terre quelque part : s'approfitant de I'occasion, elle
pourrait faire un exercise du tir de canon au blanc, et faire descendre
ses Equipages a terre pour les habituer au maniement de leurs fusils.
II pourrait se faire que dix au quinze jours seraient avantageusement
^coules dans cette mani^re \k ; de plus, la sant^ des Equipages, engourdis
par un long ennuyant sejour a bord dans le Bosphore, s'ameliorerait.

Partant de Sinope, la flotte devrait alonger la cote de TAnatolie
jusqu'a Trebizonde, touchant en route, si Ton vcut, a Sampsoon. Partout
elle inspirerait de Torgueil et de la confiance parmi les habitants des
c6tes. De Trebizonde elle se dirigerait a Batoom et a Tchuruksu, et

444 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

se mettant en communication Ik avec les antorit^s militaires, ferait ce
qni bon semblerait poor le service de la Sublime Porte. L*occnpation
de Sokhoum Kaleh nous serait d'one grande avantage. Ensnite la flotie
navignerait le long de la c6te de TAbazie jusqn*^ Anapa, avec
le but de s'emparer des forts (ou les detroire) que les Rnsses anront
pa y garder, et d'encourager et d'aider les braves Circassiens, leor
donnant des munitions de guerre et meme des pieces de campagne
avec des artilleurs. Ensuite elle cdtoyerait la rive m^ridionale de la
Crim^e, k fin de faire des observations necessaires et d'inspirer par la
vue de son pavilion des sentiments convenables dans la population
Tartare de la presqu*tle.

Termini ce petit course, la flotte irait sans ordre contraire rallier la
flotte AUiee dans les parages oix elle se trouverait.

Si dans cette intervalle une forte division de la flotte Russe sortat
inapper9ue de la flotte Alli^e, la flotte Ottomane saurait bien, il fant
esp^rer, y tenir tete.

Celle-ci n*est qu'une esquisse : si Ton en adopts le principe, la
sagesse de votre Excellence y saurait faire les developpements opportnns.

J'ai rhonneur d'etre, &c.

(Signed) - Mushaver.
A son Excellence Mehemet Pasha,

Grand Amiral de la FlotU Ottomane,

[Translation.]

Excellency, March 22 — April 1, 1864.

I take the liberty of submitting to your enlightened judgment a
few considerations as to the employment of the Ottoman fleet, on the
occasion of its next cruise in the Black Sea, which (I would observe
parenthetically) had better be deferred until the weather becomes more
favourable, on account of the thin clothing of the crews and the inex-
perience of both officers and seamen. It is presumable that such a
change in the weather may be expected in about a fortnight.

Considering the position taken up by the Anglo-French fleets in the
waters of Kavama, from which they can protect the coasts of Roamelia,
and at the same time watch the movements of the Russian fleet at Sevas-
topol, I believe that it would be useless to send the Ottoman fleet in
that direction, and that our ships might be better employed for the
common good elsewhere.

There is, too, another point especially deserving attention. Our
fleet having been but little at sea for the last twelve years, might

APPENDIX I. 445

possibly cut a bad figure were it at once to join the allied fleets, without
having made a short preliminary cniise ; I am therefore of opinion, il
no reason to the contrary exists, that, sailing out of the Bosphoms with
a southerly wind, we should steer direct for Sinope, and should remain
there a few days to fill up our water and to repair any defects that may
be discovered during the voyage thither. Wo should thus have an oppor-
tunity of seeing to the armament and to the fitting of our boats, so as
to be able to land a portion of our crews without confusion, should it be
necessary for them to co-operate with our forces on shore ; we could also
take the opportunity of practising with ball-cartridge, and could land
and drill our crews.

A fortnight might be advantageously spent in this manner, and the
health of the men, deteriorated by a long and tedious confinement ou
board ship in the Bosphorus, would certainly gain by the delay.

On leaving Sinope our fleet might coast along Anatolia as far as
Trebizond, anchoring, if neccssaiy, at Sampsoon. Its appearance would
inspire confidence and pride amongst the population of the coast. From
Trebizond it might proceed to Batoom and Tchuruksou, and placing
itself in communication with the military authorities in those places, act
as might seem best for the service of the Sublime Porte. The occupa-
tion of Soukhoum Kaleh would be very advantageous to us. The fleet
might then hug the coast of Abasia, as far as Anapa, in order to
obtain possession of or destroy any forts still in the hands of the
Russians, and encourage and assist the brave Circassians by sup-
plying them with munitions of war, and even with field-pieces and
artillerj-men to work them. It might then sail along the southeni coast
of the Crimea, collecting such information as might be u^ful, and
inspiring, by the sight of its flag, loyal sentiments amongst the Tai-tar
population of the peninsula.

At the close of this short cruise our fleet might join the allied fleets
wherever they might happen to be, unless orders to the contrary were
received by it. And if, during this interval, a strong division of the
Russian fleet should escape to sea, unobserved by the allied fleets, it is
to be hoped that the Ottoman fleet would be able to give a good account
of it.

This is merely a sketch ; should your Excellency adopt the prin-
ciple of it, you will doubtless be able in your wisdom to fill up the
outline which I have taken the liberty to submit to you.

I have the honour to remain, &c.

(Signed) Mushaver.

446 TURKEr AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

APPENDIX II.

Excellence, Kavarna, — Mai, 1854.

J'ai rhoDDear de vous annoncer que d'apr^s les ordres de mon
GonYernement la flotte Ottomane ct la division Egyptienne a faite voile
le 6 Mai pour la Mer Noire, avec ordre d'aller rejoindre les flottes Alliees,
meme devant Sevastopol, conf^rer avec leurs Excellences les Amiranx
qui les commandent, etapres s'dtre mis d'accord avec leurs Excellences,
se rendre sur la cote de la Circassie, pour y debarquer S. E. Sefer
Pacha, Behchet Pacha, qnelques autres chefs des tribus Circassiennes,
envoyes en mission en Circassie par la S. Porte, et y debarquer en
meme temps les munitions de guerre que mon Gouvemement a fait
embarqner sur la flotte. Sefer Pacha et Behchet Pacha, chefs de
tribus Circassiennes, et des personnes d'influence dans leur pays,
parmi lesquelles se trouve Tenvoye de Scheik Shamyl pres la Sublime
Porte, accompagn^s d 'environ trois cents personnes, sont attendns par
leurs compatriotes, avec lesquels ils ont et^ en correspondance. Le
debarquement sur la c6te de la Circassie de ces personnages, avec six
canons tout months, 7,000 fusils, 2,000 sabres, 500 barils de la poadre
a canon, 500 caisses contenant des cartouches, 10,000 balles de
plomb, une quantity des pierres k feu, 10,000 okes de plomb, 15,000
okes de sel, etc. etc., sera d*une grande utility, soit pour Tarm^e de
TAnatolie soit pour la Circassie elle-m^me. C'est dans ce but anssi que
mon Gouvemement, apr^s en avoir fait part aux representants des
puissanfces d'Occident, s'est d6cidi^ de faire cette expedition. Pendant
que j'^tait en route, au large de Kalaghria, pour rejoindre votre Excel-
lence, le consul Anglais a Varna m'a fait parvenir le 9 Mai la lettre que
votre Excellence m'a fait Thonneur de m'adresser sous la date du
5 courant : lettre qui m*a mis dans Tembarras, parcequ'elle a mis nion
ardent desir d'agir en tout de concert avec leurs Excellences les
Amiraux en opposition avec les ordres que j'avais re^us d'aller trouver
les flottes Allies meme devant Sevastopol, pour m*enteudre avec leur
Excellences sur la maniere a faire le debarquement surindique. C^est
dans cette circonstance que I'idee m'est venu d*envoyer aupr^s de lears
Excellences les Amiraux un oflicier superieur qui possede ma con fiance
et qui m'a paru pouvoir faire plasir a votre Excellence. Apr^s avoir
confere avec Hassan Pacha, le commandant de I'escadre Egyptienne,
nous avons juge convenable de vous deputer Mushaver Pacha, pour
exposer a leurs ExccUencaf les Amiraux la position dans luquelle se

APPENDIX II. 447

tronvait la flotte Ottomane, a cause des personnages et dcs manitions
destines ponr la c&te de la Circassie. Mushaver Pacha, a son retour,
m*a remis nne lettre portant la date du 13 Mai, par laqaelle voire
Excellence me fait savoir qn'elle aurait mieux aime que je m'adressasse k
votre Excellence par ecrit ; en outre, Mushaver Pacha m'a dit que votre
Excellence avait Tintention, si les batiments absens arrivaient a temps,
de faire voile le 15 Mai pour venir a Baltchik, et que votre Excellence
desirait qub la flotte Ottomane mouillat at Kavama, pour laisser libre le
mouillage dc Baltchik. Pret a etre agr^able a votre Excellence dans tout
ce que depend de moi, j'ai abandonn^ mon intention d'aller a Baltchik,
et je viens mouiller a Kavama pour attendre votre arrivee a Baltchik.

Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien communiquer la presente
lettre ^ S. E. I'Amiral Hamelin, et de la considerer comme si elle ^tait
aussi adi'essee a son Excellence.

Je saisis cette occasion pour renouveller a votre Excellence les
sentimens de la haute consideration avec laquelle j'ai Thonneur d'etre,

Monsieur I'Amiral,
Votre tres-humble et tr^s-obeissant serviteur,

(Signed) Achmet.

A son Excellence ^fon.veur Je Vice-Amiml DundaSf
Comni. en Chef de CEnciulre Antjlaise en Orient,

[Translation.]
Excellency,

I have the honour to inform you that, acting under instructions
from my Government, the Ottoman fleet and the Egyptian division
sailed on the 6th of May for the Black Sea, with orders to join the
allied fleets, even if they should be before Sevastopol, confer with the
admirals in command of them, and after having come to an under-
standing with their Excellencies, proceed to the coast of Circassia, to
laud there their Excellencies Sefer Pacha, Behchet Pacha, and other
Circassian chiefs, disembarking at the same time a quantity of muni-
tions of war which had been shipped by my Government on board the
fleet.

Sefer Pacha, Behchet Pacha, chiefs of Circassian tribes, and other
influential persons belonging to that country — amongst others the
enroj/e of Sheik Schamyl to the Sublime Porte — accompanied by about
three hundred followers, are expected by their countrymen, with whom
they have been in correspondence.

The disembarkation of these personages on the Circassian coast,
with six guns complete, 7,000 muskets, 2,000 sabres, 500 barrels of

418 TURKEY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

powder, 500 cases of cartridges, 10,000 bullets, 10,000 okes of lead,
15,000 okes of salt, a quantity of flints, &c. &c., will be of immense
service both to the army of Anatolia and to Circassia itself ; a con-
sideration which induced my Government, after having communicated
with the representatives of the Western Powers, to undertake this expe-
dition. Whilst I was at sea oflf Kalaghria on my way to join your
Excellency, the English consul at Varna forwarded to me, on the
^ 9th of May, the letter which your Excellency did me the honour of
writing to me on the 5th instant : a letter which embarrassed me con-
siderably, inasmuch as it placed my earnest desire to act in all things
in concert with the admirals of the allied fleets in antagonism with the
orders I had received to seek out their Excellencies even before Sevas-
topol, and to consult with them as to the best means of effecting the dis-
embarkation of the men and munitions of war to which I have adverted.
It occurred to me in this difficulty to send to their Excellencies
an officer of high rank, who possesses my confidence, and who
seemed to me likely to be agreeable to them. After having consulted
with Hassan Pasha, .the officer in command of the Egyptian squadron,
we thought it right to depute to you Mushaver Pasha, to explain to your
Excellencies the position in which the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets
are placed, by reason of the persons and the munitions of war destined
for the coast of Circassia on board of them. Mushaver Pasha, on his
return, handed me a letter dated May 18, in which your Excellency
informs me that you would have preferred that I should have addressed
myself to your Excellency in writing ; Mushaver Pasha tells me,
moreover, that your Excellency purposed, if the detached ships rejoined
you in time, to sail on the 15th of May for Baltchik, and that your
Excellency desired that the Ottoman fleet should anchor at Kavama in
order to leave the anchorage at Baltchik free.

Wishing to act as far as I can in all points in the way most agree-
able to your Excellency, I have abandoned my design of going to
Baltchik, and have anchored at Kavama, where I shall await your
arrival at Baltchik.

I beg your Excellency to communicate this letter to Admiral
Hameliu, and to consider it as addressed also to his Excellency.

I take this opportunity of renewing to your Excellency the expres-
sion of the sentiments of high consideration with which I have the honour
to be your Excellency's most humble and obedient servant,

(Signed) Achmet.

To his Kxcellency Vice- Admiral Duudmy
Commnnder-iU'Chief of the Britiah Squadron in the East. ,

GLOSSARY.

AoA An inferior title.

AiB DiR It is a shame.

AiYAK-DivAN A mass meeting.

Allah Kerim God is bountiful.

Aman Pardon.

Angaria Forced labour (corvee).

Araba Waggon ; any wheeled veliicle.

Araoadgi A waggon or carriage-driver.

Backshish A present.

Bagnio Convicts' prison at Constantinople.

Bairam Feast of three days after the ramazaii.

Bakalum Let us see.

Bash-hodja A chief teacher ; a purser in a ship.

Bashi-bozouk Irregular soldiers.

Bashueis Boatswain.

Beeat Act of submission to tlie Sultan.

Bkndt Reservoir.

Bosh lakerueh Empty words ; tall talk.

BosTANDGis Ancient seraglio guard (literally gardeners).

BouYOURouLTOu A vizir's order for safe conduct.

Caaba Ancient temple at Mecca.

Cadi A police magistrate; inferior judge.

Caik A skiff.

Calpac An ancient head dress.

Capitana bey Rear-admiral (not used now).

Capitan Pasha Lord High Admiral.

Cavedgi Coffee-house keeper.

Cazi-Asker Lord Chief Justice.

Coi)jA-BA8Hi Chief of a rural municipality.

CoDRBAN-BAiRAM Fcast of the Sacrifice.

Damad Son-in-law (as used in the text of the Sultan).

Dejterdar Accountant ; paymaster.

Derbknt aoa A chief of rural police.

Dere-beys iVncient Turkish feudal nol)los.

DivAN-EFENDisi Chief of a correspondence department.

DicH PARA8I Teeth money.

DiURHEM Unit of weight.

D.JIN X spirit.

Djenableri Excellency.

IXiEBEDGis Ammunition guardians.

Dragoman An interpreter.

500 GLOSSARY.

Efendi ...An educated man ; a gentleman ; tlic title of the

princes of the hlood.

Eltchee An ambassador.

EvcAF NAZiRi Minister of pious and charitable ondowments.

EsHEK. An ass.

EsKi ADET Old custom.

EsNAN A class of militia.

Etmeidan Meat-market.

EzzAN Summons to prayers.

Fakir A religious mendicant.

Fanab Greek quarter at Constantinople.

Ferik A lieutenant-general, or vice-admiral.

Fktwah A decree of tlie Sheick Islam.

Firman An imperial document.

Galiongi Ancient man-of-war's man.

Ghazi.'. Victorious.

Ghioksou ** Sweet waters " of Asia.

Heoira Commencement of the Moslem era.

Hadis Oral sayings of Mohammed.

Harem Skeu^si A landing-place at Scutari.

HiETERU Greek propagandist society.

Hashmetly Magnificent.

Hatti-sherif. An unpenal emanation of grace.

Hazretleri Highness.

Hekim A physician.

HiRKA Wadded vest.

HuNKiAu IsKKLLEssY The " Koyal Stairs " opposite Tlierapia.

Iani-umoumib General contribution.

Imam A parish priest ; an army or navy chaplain.

Imaret A refectory for tiieological students; soup kitchen.

Inshallau Please God.

Jerreed A blunt lance (for sport).

Kadaif :A favourite sweet disli.

Kalem Public office.

Kapouoi bash I An honoraiy title given indiscriminately to civilians

of ordinary dem*ee.
Kapou KiAYA Political agent at 3ie Porte of a feudal vassal, or

of a provincial governor.

Kesh-Kesh Pounded wheat boiled.

Khademes Royal domestics.

Kharatch ^ Graduated poll-tax on non-Mahommcdan nmle

Kharadj I subjects of tlie Porte (abolished in 1H50).

Khismet Fate.

Kief Dreamy repose.

KiATHANE *• Sweet waters" of Europe.

KiATiB Scribe ; government clerk.

KiAYA Steward.

Kiosk Summer-house.

K1SI.AR AOA Cliief of tlie black eunuchs.

KoNAK A mansion.

Koub'ai.ti Ceremonial spot in tlic old seraglio.

GLOSSARY. 501

KouRsiiAf.TAi Ancient Tartar national assembly.

KuTcuKK Dancing boys.

Kyzil-»a8h Persian free-Uiinker : a disreputable term.

Laghumdoih Miners.

LivA Major-general or rear-admiral.

LoKMA A sweet morsel.

Mahalleh A parish.

Masbata A decree.

Meixilis A council.

Mkdresseh A college.

Mekteb A school.

Mekkiemeh Mussulman tribimul.

MEKTODBDjf A letter writer.

Menzil khan A post-house.

MisAFiR A guest.

MoALEBBi A sweet dish, like blanc-mauge.

MoHABREM First montli of the Moslem year.

MoLLAH A legal dignitary ; judge of a city.

MooKTAR A parish overseer.

MuAviN An official assistant, less than a colleague.

Muezzin A caller to prayers.

MusHiR The highest Turkish rank (military and civilian) .

MuDiR. Governor of a town or hundred.

MuDERRiB Koran reader in the mosque.

MupHTi Expounder of the Holy Law; a chamber counsel.

MusTESHAR Under Secretary of State.

Naib A vicar or deputy.

Namaz I^yer.

Nazir ;Vn overseer or superintendent.

Nizam llegular troops.

NoosKiLv A ** charm."

Oda A room.

Okmeidan Archery ground.

Orta A company (of Janissaries).

Ordou CAIME8 Gamp paper money (during lato war).

Padishah The sovereign of Turkey.

Pasterma Dried meat.

Para Smallest denomination of Turkish money.

PiLAF Rice cooked with butter.

Ramazan The Moslem fast ; the nintli month.

Raya A non-Mohammedan subject.

Redif Military reserve.

RusHDiEH Progressing, advancing.

Sadr'azam The Grand Vizier.

Salathix lloyal founded mosques.

Salian Property-tax.

Sandjak A flag; a military government ; province.

Sar.vV A palace.

Sarraf A banker.

Salaam A salutation.

502 GLOSSARY.

Sedjadeh A prayer rug.

Selkm Rural usurer.

Selve Bouboux Cypress point, opposite Therapia.

Ser-akhor Master of the horse, head groom.

Seraskir Minister of War ; commander-in-chief.

Seyah A roaming dervish.

Shalan A flat quadriform barge.

SHAU.UM The chief i>orter of the Tabernacle.

SiiEVKETLY Majestic.

Shirket Hairie A promising company.

Shalwar. Loose trowsers.

SiNNi A metal dinner-tray.

Serden ghetcudi A forlorn hope.

SoFTA A theological student.

Sourei Fethi Sheref The war hymn in the Koran.

Spahis Hereditary yeomanry (non existent now)

Tabia A redoubt.

Tain Rations.

Taksim A division; a partition.

Tanzimat Reforms.

TcHALGHiGiLER Turlosh musicians.

TcuAMAsuA A0A8I Mastcr of tlie robes ; first valet.

TcHAousH A sergeant.

TcHiFiLiK A farm ; a country estate.

TcuiAUsuBASHi Head of a pohce corps ; ancient title of the

minister of police.

Techrifatdji Master of the ceremonies.

Tekieh A dervish hall.

TiMABLEE Ancient Turkish feudatory ; timariot.

TopcHi A gunner.

TopuANA Gun wharf; ordnance department.

UiJSMA Wise men ; a clerico-legal body.

Ulufb A gratification.

Vacoof A pious or charitable endowment.

Valideh Sultana The sultan's mother.

Vizir A first class functionary.

ViADiKA The chief of Montenegro.

Yali ......A residence on the shore of the Bosphorus.

Yamak Ancient garrison soldier.

Yanghen var There is a fire.

YoRGHAN A wadded covcrUd.

Zarf A coffee cupholder.

Zem-Zem Holy-water at Mecca.

Zeymen .....Ancient irregular troops.

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