The Turks and Europe

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STON GAILLARD

THE TURKS AND EUROPE

BY THE SAME AUTHOR
Culture et Kultur. i vol. gr. in-8, 242 p.

Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1916.

Judaisme et Kultur. 38 p. Giard et Bri&re,

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Revue des Nations latines, Florence, dicembre 1917.

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Les Turcs et 1'Europe. i vol. in-i2. 384 p.
Chapelot, 1920.

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P..V. Stock, Paris, 1907.
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THE TURKS AND
EUROPE

BY

GASTON GAILLARD

LONDON: THOMAS MURBY & CO.

1 FLEET LANE, E.G.

1921

b

CONTENTS

PAGES

I. THE TURKS - 1-8

II. THE TURKISH EMPIRE :

Its History — The Capitulations — The East, a
Fashion in Europe — The Turkish Empire
and the War .... 9-28

III. TURKEY AND THE WAR - 29-42

IV. TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE :

The Agreements before the Armistice — Occu-
pation of Smyrna by Greece — The First
Ottoman Delegation — Dismissal of the First
Delegation — Situation of the Ottoman
Government and the Nationalist Movement
— Foreign Interests in Turkey — Resources
of Turkey — The Damad Ferid Cabinet re-
signs— The AH Riza Ministry — The Marash
Incidents — The Urfa and Amtab Incidents
—The Silence of the United States— The
Turkish Question Resumed — The Anglo-
American Protestant Campaign — Repercus-
sions in India — Repercussions in Northern
Africa — The Indian Caliphate Delegation —
Value of Islam — Union of the Churches
— Islam versus Orthodoxy — The Persian
National Movement - - 43-150

V. THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE :

The Treaty before the London and Paris Par-
liaments— Resignation of the Salih Pasha
Cabinet— The New Damad Ferid Cabinet 151-168

VI CONTENTS

PAOKS

VL THE TREATY WITH TURKEY:

Mustafa Kemal's Protest — Protests of Ahmed
Riza and Galib Kemaly — Protest of the
Indian Caliphate Delegation — Survey of the
Treaty— The Turkish Press and the Treaty
— Jafer Tayar at Adrianople— Operations of
the Government Forces against the Nation-
alists— French Armistice in Cilicia —
Mustafa Kemal's Operations — Greek Opera-
tions in Asia Minor — The Ottoman Delega-
tion's Observations at the Peace Conference
— The Allies' Answer — Greek Operations in
Thrace — The Ottoman Government decides
to sign the Treaty — Italo-Greek Incident,
and Protests of Armenia, Yugo-Slavia, and
King Hussein — Signature of the Treaty - 169-271

VII. THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE :

1. The Turco-Armenian Question - - 274-304

2. The Pan-Turanian and Pan-Arabian Move-

ments :

Origin of Pan-Turanism — The Turks and
the Arabs — The Hejaz — The Emir Feisal —
The Question of Syria — French Operations
in Syria—Restoration of Greater Lebanon
— The Arabian World and the Caliphate —
The Part played by Islam - 304-356

VIII. THE MOSLEMS OF THE FORMER RUSSIAN EMPIRE
AND TURKEY :

The Republic of Northern Caucasus — Georgia
and Azerbaijan — The Bolshevists in the
Republics of Caucasus and of the Transcas-
pian Isthmus — Armenians and Moslems - 357-369

IX. TURKEY AND THE SLAVS :

Slavs versus Turks — Constantinople and
Russia - 370-408

THE TURKS AND EUROPE

THE TURKS

THE peoples who speak the various Turkish dialects
and who bear the generic name of Turcomans, or
Turco-Tatars, are distributed over huge territories
occupying nearly half of Asia and an important
part of Eastern Europe. But as we are only con-
sidering the Turkish question from the European
point of view, no lengthy reference is needed to
such Eastern groups as those of Turkish or Mongol
descent who are connected with the Yenisseians of
Northern Asia and the Altaians. The Russians call
these peoples Tatars, and they, no doubt, constituted
the " Tubbat " nation, referred to by the Chinese
historians under the name of " Tou-Kiou " up to
the seventh century after Christ. These very brief
facts show the importance of the race and are also
sufficient to emphasise the point that these people
are akin to those Turks of Western Asia who are
more closely connected with the Europeans.

The Western Turkish group includes the Turco-
mans of Persia and Russian or Afghan Turkistan; the
Azarbaijanians, who are probably Turkisised Iranians,
living between the Caucasus Mountains and Persia;
and, lastly, the Osmanli Turks, who are subjects of
the Sultan, speak the, Turkish language, and profess
Islam.

1

2 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Close to this group, but farther to the East, the
central group also concerns us, for some of its repre-
sentatives who now inhabit the boundaries of Europe
made repeated incursions into Europe in various
directions. In the plains lying between the River
Irtish and the Caspian Sea live the Kirghiz-Kazaks,
and in the Tien-Shien Mountains the Kara-Kirghiz,
who have preserved many ancient Old Turkish
customs, and seem to have been only slightly Moham-
medanised. The Usbegs and the Sartis of Russian
Turkistan, on the other hand, have been more or less
Iranised. Finally, on the banks of the Volga are to
be found the Tatars of European Russia. Among
them the Tatars of Kazan, who are descended from
the Kiptchaks, came to the banks of the Volga
in the thirteenth century and mingled with the
Bulgars. These Tatars differ from the Tatars of
Astrakhan, who are descendants of the Turco-Mongols
of the Golden Horde, and are connected with the
Khazars, and from the Nogais of the Crimea, who
are Tatars of the steppes who more or less inter-
married with other races — the Tatars of the Tauris
coast being the hybrid descendants of the Adriatic
race and the Indo-Afghan race. They are to be
found near Astrakhan and in the Caucasus Mountains,
and even, perhaps, as far as Lithuania, " where,
though still being Mohammedans, they have adopted
the language and costume of the Poles."1
* * *

The invasion of Europe by the Turks appears as
the last great ethnic movement that followed the

1 J. Deniker, Les Races et les peuples de la terre (Paris, 1900),
p. 438. Zaborowski, Tartares de la Lithuanie (1913).

THE TURKS 3

so-called period of migration of peoples (second to
sixth centuries A.D.) and the successive movements
it entailed.

Let us consider only the migrations of those who
concern us most closely, and with whom the 'Turks
were to come into contact later on. First the Slavs
spread westward towards the Baltic and beyond the
Elbe, and southward to the valley of the Danube
and the Balkan Peninsula. This movement brought
about the advance of the Germans towards the west,
and consequently the advance of the Celts towards
Iberia and as far as Spain. Owing to the invasion
of the Huns in the fifth century and in the sixth of
the Avars, who, after coming as far as Champagne,
settled down in the plains of Hungary and the terri-
tories lying farther to the south which had already
been occupied by the Dacians for several centuries,
the Slavs were cut into two groups. About the same
time, the Bulgars came from the banks of the Volga
and settled on the banks of the Danube.

In the ninth century, owing to a new migration of
masses of Slavonic descent, the Hungarians, driven
by tribes of Petchenegs and Polovts into Southern
Russia, crossed the Carpathian Mountains and took
up their abode in the valley of the Tirzah. While
the Magyar Turks settled in Hungary, the Kajar
Turks occupied the hinterland of Thessalonica in
Macedonia. In the twelfth century, the Germans,
driving the Western Slavs as far as the banks of the
Vistula, brought about a reaction towards the north-
east of the Eastern Slavs, whose expansion took place
at the expense of the. Finnish tribes that lived there.

Only in the thirteenth century did the Turco-

4 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Mongols begin to migrate in their turn ; they occupied
the whole of Russia, as far as Novgorod to the north,
and reached Liegnitz in Silesia. But, although they
soon drew back from Western Europe, they remained
till the fifteenth century in Eastern Russia, and in
the eighteenth century they were still in the steppes
of Southern Russia, and in the Crimea.

Finally, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
the Osmanli Turks invaded the Balkan Peninsula,
where they met such of their kindred as the Kajars,
the Tchitaks, and the Pomaks, who were heathens
or Christians, and later on embraced Islam. They
invaded Hungary and made incursions into Lower
Austria.

Then began the migration of the Little Russians
into the upper valley of the Dnieper, and in the
sixteenth century they set off towards the steppes
of Southern Russia, while the Great Russians began
to advance beyond the Volga towards -the Ural, a
movement which reached Siberia, and still continues.

It follows, necessarily, that in the course of these
huge migrations, the so-called Turkish race was
greatly modified; the Turks of the Eastern group
mixed with the Mongols, the Tunguses, and the
Ugrians; and those of the Western group in Asia
and Europe with various Indo-Afghan, Assyrian,
Arab, and European elements, especially with those
living near the Adriatic: the Greeks, the Genoese,
the Goths, etc. Thus the Osmanli Turks became
a mixture of many races.

Though ethnologists do not agree about the various
ethnic elements of the Turco-Tatar group, it is certain,
all the same, that those who came to Asia Minor early

THE TURKS 5

associated for a long time with the people of Central
Asia, and Vambery considers that a Turkish element
penetrated into Europe at a very early date.1

Though the Arabs in the seventh century
subdued the Turks of Khiva, they did not prevent
them from penetrating into Asia Minor, and the
Kajars, who were not Mohammedans, founded an
empire there in the eighth century. At that
period the Turks, among whom Islam was gaining
ground, enlisted in the Khalifa's armies, but were
not wholly swallowed up by the Arab and Moslem
civilisation of the Seljukian dynasty, the first repre-
sentatives of which had possibly embraced Nestorian
Christianity or Islam. Henceforth Asia Minor,
whence the previous Turkish elements had almost
disappeared, began to turn into a Turkish country.

All the Turks nowadays are Mohammedans, except
the Chuvashes (Ugrians) who are Christians, and
some Shamanist Yakuts.

As will be shown later on, these ethnographic con-
siderations should not be neglected in settling the
future conditions of the Turks and Slavs in Europe,
in the interest of European civilisation.
* * *

About half a century ago Elisee Reclus wrote as
follows :

" For many years has the cry ' Out of Europe ' been uttered
not only against the Osmanli leaders, but also against the
Turks as a whole, and it is well known that this cruel wish
has partly been fulfilled; hundreds of thousands of Muslim
emigrants from Greek Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, and

1 Deguignes, Histoire generate des Huns (1750 and 1756);
L. Cahun, Turcset Mongols, des origines d 1405 (Paris, 1896);
Vambery, Das Turlcenvolk (1885).

6 THE TURKS AND EUEOEE

Bulgaria have sought refuge in Asia Minor, and these fugitives
are only the remnants of the wretched people who had to
leave their ancestral abodes; the exodus is still going on, and,
most likely, will not leave off till the whole of Lower Rumelia
has become European in language and customs. But now
the Turks are being threatened even in Asia. A new cry
arises, ' Into the Steppes,' and to our dismay we wonder
whether this wish will not be carried out too. Is no concilia-
tion possible between the hostile races, and must the unity of
civilisation be obtained by the sacrifice of whole peoples,
especially those that are the most conspicuous for the noblest
qualities — uprightness, self-respect, courage, and tolerance?"1

For a long time this state of affairs did not seem
to change much, but after the recent upheaval of
Europe it has suddenly become worse.

Very different races, who have more or less
intermingled, live on either side of the Bosphorus,
for Elisee Keclus says :

" The Peninsula, the western end of the fore part of the
continent, was a place where the warlike, wandering, or
trading tribes, coming from the south-east and north-east,
converged naturally. Semitic peoples inhabited the southern
parts of Anatolia, and in the centre of that country their race,
dialects, and names seem to have prevailed among numerous
populations; in the south-west they seem to have inter-
mingled with coloured men, perhaps the Kushits. In the
eastern provinces the chief ethnic elements seem to have been
connected with the Persians, and spoke languages akin to
Zend; others represented the northern immigrants that bore
the generic name of Turanians. In the West migrations took
place in a contrary direction to those that came down from
the Armenian uplands; Thracians were connected by their
trade and civilisation with the coastlands of Europe and
Asia sloping towards the Propontis, and between both parts
of the world Greeks continually plied across the ^Egean Sea."2

Thus the common name of " Turks " is wrongly
given to some Moslem elements of widely different
origin, who are to be found in Rumelia and Turkey-

1 Elisee Reclus, Nouvelle geographic universelle (1884),
ix., p. 547.
3 Ibid., p. 536.

THE TURKS 7

in-Asia, such as the Albanians, who are akin to
Greeks through their common ancestors, the
Pelasgians, the Bosnians, and the Moslem Bulgars,
the offspring of the Georgian and Circassian women
who filled the harems, and the descendants of Arabs
or even of African negroes.

After the internal conflicts between some of these
elements, the quarrels with other foreign elements,
and the keen rivalry which existed generally, each
section seems to have held the Turk responsible
for whatever wrong was done, and the Turk was
charged with being the cause of all misfortunes —
almost in the same way as the Jews: the Turks have
become, as it were, the scapegoats.

Yet, in 1665, in his account of his travels in the
East, M. de Thevenot, who died at Mianeh in 1667,
praised Turkish morality and tolerance.

Elisee Reclus wrote:

" Turkish domination is merely outward, and does not
reach, so to say, the inner soul; so, in many respects, various
ethnic groups in Turkey enjoy a fuller autonomy than in
the most advanced countries of Western Europe."

Ubicini speaks in the same manner, and Sir H.
Bulwer states that :

" As to freedom of faith and conscience, the prevailing
religion in Turkey grants the other religions a tolerance that
is seldom met with in Christian countries."

Unfortunately the Turk's mentality, in spite of
what his enemies say, does not help him. Owing to
his nature, he is quite unable to defend himself and
to silence his slanderers.

For, as E. Reclus remarked:

" They are not able to cope with the Greeks, who, under
pretence of pacific dealings, take vengeance for the war of

8 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

extermination, the traces of which are still to be seen in
Cydonia and Ohio. They do not stand an equal chance of
winning; most of them only know their own language, while a
Greek speaks several languages; they are ignorant and artless
by the side of clever, shrewd adversaries. Though he is not
lazy, the Turk does not like to hurry; ' Haste is devilish,
patience is godly,' he will often say. He cannot do without
his ' kief,' an idle dream in which he lives like a mere plant,
without any exertion of his mind and will, whereas his rival,
always in earnest, can derive profit even from his hours of
rest. The very qualities of the Turk do him harm: honest,
trustworthy, he will work to the end of his life to pay off a
debt, and the business man takes advantage of this to offer
him long credits that shall make a slave of him foe ever.
There is an axiom among business men in Asia Minor: ' If you
wish to thrive, do not grant a Christian more credit than
one-tenth of his fortune; risk ten times as much with a
Mohammedan.' Encumbered with such a credit, the Turk
no longer possesses anything of his own; all the produce of
his work will go to the usurer. His carpets, his wares, his
flocks, even his land, will pass gradually into the hands of
the foreigner."1

But since the time when this was written the
Turkish mind has changed. The Turks have set to
work to learn languages, especially French. A large
part of the younger generation concern themselves
with what takes place in the West, and this trans-
formation, which the Greeks and other Europeans
looked upon as endangering their situation in Turkey,
may be one of the factors of the present conflict.

Besides, E. Reclus added: "The Greeks already
hold, to the great prejudice of the Turks, numerous
industries and all the so-called liberal professions,
and as dragomans and journalists they are the only
informers of the Europeans, and control public
opinion in the West."5

1 Elisee Reclus, Nouvette geographic universette. (1884),
ix., p. 546.

2 Ibid., p. 550.

II

THE TURKISH EMPIRE

THE Turks who lived in Turkistan and territories
lying to the north of China arrived in the tenth
century and settled down in Persia and Asia Minor,
together with some allied or subject races, such as
the Tatars. There they founded several dynasties.
Out of the numerous branches of the Turkish race we
will only deal with the Ottomans, who were to
establish their rule in Asia Minor and Europe.

People too often forget the wonderful rise of the
Turkish Empire, which for nearly three centuries
increased its power and enlarged its territories; and
they lay too much stress on its decline, which began
two centuries and a half ago.

The Oghouz tribe of Kai, following the Seljuks
more or less closely in their migrations, reached
the uplands of Asia Minor about the end of the
tenth century. While part of the latter retraced their
steps towards the territories from which they had
started, the others settled down and founded the
Empire of Rum. The Seljukian chief, Ala Eddin
Ka'i Kobad I, gave to Erthoghrul, a son of Suleiman
Khan, the ancestor of the Seljukian dynasty of
Konia, the summer pasturage of Mount Toumanitch,
south of Brusa, on the boundaries of the Roman
Empire of Byzantium. Erthoghrul and his successors

9

10 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

strengthened and enlarged their dominions and laid
the foundation of Ottoman power.

Othman, or Osman, settled at Karahissar about the
end of the thirteenth century, at the time when the
Seljukian Empire of Rum was destroyed by Mongol
inroads, and he conquered several of its principalities.

Orkhan conquered the rest of Asia Minor and set
foot in Europe in 1355. Amurath I took Adrianople,
subjugated Macedonia and Albania, and defeated the
Serbs at the battle of Kossowo in .1389. By the
victory of Nicopolis in 1396 Bajazet I conquered
Bulgaria and threatened Constantinople, but
Tarnerlain's invasion and Bajazet's defeat in 1402
at Ancyra postponed the downfall of the Byzantine
Empire. The Turkish Empire recovered under
Mohammed I and Amurath II, who made new con-
quests and entirely subdued the Serbians in 1459.
Mohammed II took Constantinople in 1453, quickly
subdued the Greek peninsula, and annihilated the
Byzantine Empire. He also took Carmania, the
Empire of Trebizond in 1461, Bosnia, Wallachia in
1462, and Lesser Tartary, and even made an incursion
into Italy. The Turkish Empire continued to expand
for nearly another century. In 1517 Selim I turned
Syria, Palestine, and Egypt into Ottoman provinces ;
he took Mecca and acquired Algiers in 1520. Soli-
man II made new conquests. In Asia he added to
the Empire Aldjeziresh and parts of Armenia,
Kurdistan, and Arabia; in Europe, after capturing
part of Hungary, Transylvania, Esclavonia, and
Moldavia, and taking Rhodes from the Knights, he
came to the gates of Vienna in 1529, and in 1534
added Tunis to his empire, and Tripoli in 1551. At

THE TURKISH EMPIRE 11

the beginning of his reign Selim II conquered the
Yemen, and in 1571 took Cyprus from the Venetians ;
but next year the Turkish fleet was utterly destroyed
at the battle of Lepanto.

Turkish domination then reached its climax, and
from this time began its downfall. Internal difficulties
soon showed that the Ottoman Empire was beginning
to decline. From 1595 to 1608 Turkey lost terri-
tory in Hungary, though, on the other hand, by the
battle of Choczim, she conquered new districts in
Poland. After a few perturbed years, in 1669
Mohammed IV took Candia, which Ibrahim had
vainly attempted to conquer.

But henceforth the decline of the Empire was
rapid, and its territories were dislocated and dismem-
bered. The regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli
became practically independent. By the fall of
Carlo vitz, which put an end to the 1682-1699 war,
the Turks lost nearly the whole of Hungary. By the
treaty of Passarovitz> they lost Temesvar and a part
of Serbia, which was restored to them by the peace
of Belgrade in 1740. The Russians, with whom they
had been fighting since 1672, and who began to get
the upper hand during the 1770-74 war, took from
them Bukovina and Lesser Tartary, the independence
of which was recognised by the treaty of Kuchuk-
Kainarji. After a new war from 1809 to 1812, the
treaty of Bukharest gave to Russia the provinces
lying between the Dnieper and the Danube. In 1809
Turkey lost the Ionian Islands, which became inde-
pendent under an English protectorate. The victory
of Navarino made Greece free in 1827. The Turks
were obliged to cede Turkish Armenia to Russia in

12 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

1829, and, after a new war with Russia, Wallachia,
Moldavia, and Serbia were put under Russian .pro-
tection by the treaty of Adrianople. France con-
quered Algeria in 1831. In 1833 the pasha of Egypt,
Mehemet Ali, rebelled, captured Syria, defeated the
Turks at Konia, and threatened Constantinople.
Turkey, lying at the mercy of Russia, opened the
Bosphorus to her ships and closed the Dardanelles
to the other Powers by the treaty of Hunkiar-
Iskelessi in 1833.

Yet a reaction took place, and it seemed that
Mehemet Ali, who helped the Sultan to subdue the
insurgent Greeks, was likely to stop the downfall of
Turkey. But his fleet was annihilated at Navarino,
October 20, 1827, by the combined fleets of England,
France, and Russia. He received Candia from the
Sultan as a reward for his co-operation, but, not
having been able to obtain Syria, he broke off with
the Sublime Porte. An intervention of the European
Powers put an end to his triumph. Turkey recovered
the territories she had lost, and, in return for this
restitution and for giving back the Turkish fleet, he
obtained the hereditary government of Egypt under
the suzerainty of the Porte.

Turkey then attempted to revive and to strengthen
her condition by organisation on European lines.

As early as 1830 a liberal movement had made
itself felt in Turkey as in many other States.
The Ottoman Government realised, too, that it was
necessary to get rid of the Russian influence imposed
upon her by the treaty of Hunkiar-Iskelessi, and so
was compelled to institute reforms.

As early as 1861 Midhat Pasha, first as vali of the

THE TURKISH EMPIRE 13

Danubian province, then as vali of Baghdad in 1869,
and later on in Arabia, showed much enterprise and
evinced great qualities of organisation and adminis-
tration. When recalled to Constantinople, he became
the leader of the Young Turk party.

Mahmoud II and Abdul Mejid renewed the
attempts already made by Selim III at the end of the
eighteenth century, with a view to putting an end
to the utter confusion of the Empire, and instituted
various reforms borrowed from Europe. In 1853
France and England helped Turkey to repel a new
Russian aggression, and the treaty of March 30, 1856,
after the Crimean war, guaranteed her independence.

But the reign of Abdul Aziz, which had begun in
such a brilliant way, proved unfortunate later on.
A rising in Crete was suppressed with great diffi-
culty in 1867; in 1875 Herzegovina and Bosnia,
urged on by Russia, rebelled, and Serbia, who
backed the rebels, was defeated in 1876. Abdul
Aziz, on account of his wasteful financial administra-
tion as well as his leaning towards Russia, which he
considered the only State to be favoured because
it was an autocratic government, unconsciously
aided the Tsar's policy against his own country,
and uselessly exhausted the resources of Turkey.
Yet under his reign the judicial system, the army,
and the administration were reorganised, the legis-
lation was secularised, and Mussulmans and non-
Mussulmans were set on a footing of equality. These
reforms, prepared by his two predecessors, were
carried out by him. He was forced to abdicate by
an insurrection in 1876, and committed suicide.

His successor, Mourad V, became mad and reigned

14 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

only a few months. He was dethroned and replaced
by his brother Abdul Hamid, who, on December 23,
1876, suspended the liberal constitution that the
Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha had promulgated. On
February 5, 1877, he disgraced Midhat Pasha, who
left the country and lived abroad. Midhat Pasha
was allowed to come back to Turkey later, and
ordered to reside in the Isle of Crete. He was
then appointed governor of the vilayet of Smyrna,
but was charged with the murder of Abdul Aziz, im-
prisoned in the fortress of Taiif in Arabia, and assas-
sinated on February 26, 1883.1 A rising of Bulgaria,
which the Turks put down ruthlessly, caused
European intervention and a new war with Russia
backed by Rumania and Montenegro. The Turks,
beaten in 1877, had to sign the preliminaries of San
Stefano, modified by the treaty of Berlin in 1878.
Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro became indepen-
dent States; Eastern Rumelia an autonomous
country ; and Bulgaria a tributary principality.
Austria occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, England
Cyprus, and in Asia the Russians received Kars,
Ardahan, and Batum. The Berlin Conference in 1880
allowed Greece to occupy Larissa, Metzovo, and
Janina.2

In 1898 Turkey slightly recovered, and in seventeen
days her armies routed Greece, and the country
would have ceased to exist but for the Tsar's
intervention with the Sultan.

However, as the condition of Turkey at the end of

1 Midhat Pacha, Sa vie et son wuvre, by his son Ali-Hayar-
Midhat Bey (Paris, 1908).

2 Janina was occupied by Greece in 1912-13.

THE TURKISH EMPIRE 15

Abdul Hamid's reign was growing more and more
critical, the old ambitions entertained by several
Great Powers revived. At the meeting of Ed-
ward VII and Nicholas II at Reval, the question of
the extension of the European control which already
existed in Macedonia was discussed.

The revolution of July 23, 1908, which put an end
to Abdul Hamid's autocratic rule, instituted consti-
tutional government in Turkey. The Great Powers
were at first taken aback, but without troubling
themselves about Turkey's chance of regeneration,
they carried on their rivalries, all trying to derive some
profit from Turkey in case she should become pros-
perous and powerful, and at the same time doing their
best to prevent her from reviving in order to be able
to domineer over her and exhaust her the more easily.

For a long time previously many Turks of the
younger generation, who regretted the condition of
the Empire, and were acquainted with European ideas,
had realised that, if Turkey was not to die, she must
reform herself. They had tried to further this aim by
literary methods and had carried on propaganda work
abroad, being unable to do so in Turkey. The reign
of Abdul Hamid, during which the old regime had
become more and more intolerable, was to bring
about its overthrow, and in this respect the revolu-
tionary movement was the outcome of Turkey's
corruption. Among the numerous instigators of this
movement, Enver Bey and Niazi Bey, who were
then only captains garrisoned in Macedonia, soon
became the most prominent. The revolutionary
elements were chiefly recruited from the university
students, especially those of the School of Medicine

16 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

and of the Mulkieh School. Officers of the highest
rank, such as Marshal Redjeb Pasha, who, when
governor of Tripoli, had plotted against Abdul
Hamid, were on the committee; but the masses,
among whom the Young Turk propaganda had not
penetrated, at first stood aloof, as they did not
know the views of the members of the committee,
who, before the revolution, had been obliged to carry
on their propaganda very cautiously and among few
people, for fear of the Sultan's reprisals.

The movement started from Albania. Macedonia,
the province which was most likely to be wrested
from the Empire, and Syria immediately followed
the lead, and the revolutionary movement soon met
with unanimous approval.

On April 13, 1909, a reactionary movement set
in which failed only because of Abdul Hamid's
irresolute, tottering mind. It was supported by the
garrison of Constantinople, which comprised Albanian
troops, the very men who had lent their aid to the
revolution at first, but had been brought back to
the Sultan's party by the lower clergy and politicians
whose interest it was to restore Abdul Hamid's
autocratic rule, or whose personal ambitions had
been baulked. Troops, comprising Albanians, Bos-
nians, and Turkish elements, and reinforced by
Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian volunteers, old
komitadjis, were summoned to Salonika.

The reaction of April 13 seems to have been partly
due to foreign intrigue, especially on the part of
England, who, anxious at seeing Turkey attempt to
gain a new life, tried to raise internal difficulties by
working up the fanaticism of the hod j as, most of whom

THE TURKISH EMPIRE 17

were paid and lodged in seminaries, and so were
interested in maintaining Abdul Hamid's autocratic
government. These manceuvres may even have been
the original cause of the reactionary movement.

Mr. Fitzmaurice, dragoman of the English embassy,
was one of the instigators of the movement, and the
chief distributor of the money raised for that purpose.
He seems to have succeeded in fomenting the first
internal difficulties of the new Turkish Government.
After the failure of the reactionary movement, the
Committee of Union and Progress demanded the dis-
missal of Mr. Fitzmaurice, who later on settled at
Sofia, where he continued his intrigues.

Then the government passed into the hands of the
Committee of Union and Progress which had brought
on the revolution, and which practically governed the
country from 1908 till the signing of the armistice
between the Allies and Turkey.

The Committee of Union and Progress, which at
the outset had shown a liberal and enlightened spirit,
soon became very powerful; but, being the only
ruling power in the country, they soon left the
straight path and began to indulge in corrupt prac-
tices. The leaders' heads were turned by their sudden
success, and they were not sufficiently strong-minded
to resist the temptations of office in a time of crisis.
All the power was soon concentrated in the hands of
a few: Talaat, Enver, and Jemal, all three men of
very humble origin, who, when still young, had risen
rapidly to the highest eminence in the State.

Enver, born on December 8, 1883, .was the son of a
road-surveyor. At twenty he left the cadet school
of Pancaldi, and became a prominent figure at the

2

18 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

time of the revolution. After Abdul Hamid's down-
fall, he was sent to Berlin, whence he returned
an enthusiastic admirer of Germany. After distin-
guishing himself in Tripoli, he was made War Minister
at the end of the Balkan war. He was naturally
very bold; his brilliant political career made him
vain, and soon a story arose round him. He became
rich by marrying a princess of the Imperial Family,
the Sultan's niece, but it was wrongly said that he
married a daughter of the Sultan — a mistake which
is easily accounted for as in Turkey anybody who
marries a princess of the Imperial Family bears
the title of imperial son-in-law, Damad-i-Hazret-i-
Shehriyari. At any rate, Enver's head was turned
by his good fortune.

Talaat is supposed to be the son of a pomak —
that is to say, his ancestors were of Bulgarian descent
and had embraced Islam. He was born at Adria-
nople in 1870, received an elementary education
at the School of the Jewish Alliance, then became
a clerk in a post-office and later on in a telegraph-
office. Owing to the liberal ideas he propounded
and the people he associated with, he was sentenced
to imprisonment. Two years after, in 1896, when he
came out of prison, he was exiled to Salonika, a centre
of propaganda of the Young Turks who were then
attempting to overthrow Abdul Hamid. He had
learned very little at school, but had a quick wit and
great abilities; so he soon obtained a prominent place
among the leaders of the revolutionary movement,
and in a short time became a moving spirit in
the party, together with Enver, Marniassi Zade
Refik Bey, and Javid Bey. Very strongly built,

THE TURKISH EMPIRE 19

with huge, square fists on which he always leant in
a resolute attitude of defiance, Talaat was a man of
great will power. When the constitution was granted
to the Turkish people, he went to Adrianople, where he
was returned Member of Parliament. Soon after he
became Vice-President of the Chamber, then Minister
of the Interior. But he always remained an un-
assuming man and led a quiet life in a plain house.
He was among those who desired to turn his country
into a modern State, in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the
word, with the help of Germany and by using German
methods, which was perhaps his greatest mistake.
When war broke out, Talaat was Minister of the
Interior in the Cabinet in which the Egyptian prince
Said Halim was Grand Vizier. On February 4,
1917, when this Ministry resigned, he became Grand
Vizier, and on February 17, in the course of the
sitting of the Constantinople Parliament, he declared
that he intended to maintain the alliance with
Germany to the end.

Jemal Pasha is of Turkish descent. He left the
War Academy as Captain of the Staff, and married
the daughter of Bekir Pasha, who commanded a
division of the second army garrisoned at Adrianople.
This Bekir Pasha had risen from the ranks, and
when he was still a non-commissioned officer had
throttled Midhat Pasha with his own hands. It
has been wrongly stated that his father was the
public executioner at Constantinople during the
reign of Mahmoud II. Whereas Talaat's and Enver's
manners were distant, Jemal professed to be affable
and strove to please, though he was very cruel
at heart. He was looked upon as a friend of France

20 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

when he came to Paris in 1914 to raise the Ottoman
loan. He was appointed military governor of
Constantinople after Nazim Pasha's murder,
January 10, 1913, in which he and Talaat and Enver
had a share ; then he became Minister of Marine.

Talaat fully represented the Committee of Union
and Progress, and was supported by it, but Enver and
Jemal, though also members, did not make use of
their connection with the party. Indeed Enver, who
disagreed with Talaat, had nothing to do with the
party after he had been appointed War Minister, and
when he was called upon to resign during the war, he
retained his office with the support of Germany.
Only the difficulties which the Empire experienced
could have brought together three men who were
actuated by such widely different motives; at any
rate the omnipotence of the Union and Progress
Committee, which even caused some liberals to regret
the passing of the old regime, was contrary to the
constitutional system which the party had purposed
to institute in Turkey.

Though the leaders of the Unionist movement drove
Turkey to the verge of ruin, yet the movement itself
to a certain extent aroused in the Turkish people a
consciousness of their rights, which they had nearly
given up under the control of foreign countries; the
movements of opinion brought about, and even the
reaction that set in finally, roused that national
feeling, which found expression soon after the events
of the last war.

* * *

It must be acknowledged that the Capitulations,
the extension of which led to the improper inter-

THE TURKISH EMPIEE 21

ference of foreign nations in the home affairs of the
Ottoman State and gave them a paramount power
over it, formed one of the chief causes of the modern
ruin of Turkey, by weakening and disintegrating it.
The extension of the economic Capitulations was
made possible by the carelessness of the Mussul-
mans in commercial matters, and by their natural
indolence, while the extension of the judicial
Capitulations, which originated in a Moslem custom
dating from the Middle Ages, seems to have been
due to the condescension of the Sultans.

It is a well-known fact that Mehmet II, by the
treaty he signed in 1434, granted to the Republic
of Venice extra-territorial privileges consisting of
commercial immunities, the benefit of which was
claimed afterwards by the Powers the Porte had
then to deal with. Those immunities, renewed with
slight alterations, constituted what was later on
called the Capitulations.

In 1528 Soliman II officially ratified the privileges
which French and Catalonian merchants living in
Constantinople had been enjoying for a long time,
according to an old custom. The treaty signed by
this monarch in 1535 confirmed the old state of affairs.
By this treaty the French king, Francis I, both
secured the help of Turkey against his enemies, and
promised the Ottoman Empire the protection of
France; at the same time he obtained for French
merchants the privilege of trading in the Eastern
seas, preferential customs duties on their goods, the
obligation for all foreigners trading in the East to
sail under the French flag, and the privilege of
appointing -consuls in the Levant who had juris-

22 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

diction over their fellow-countrymen. Lastly, the
treaty not only secured to France the protectorate
of the Holy Places, but also entrusted her with the
defence of all the Latin religious orders, of whatever
nationality, which were beginning at that time to
found establishments in the East.

These stipulations, renewed in 1569, 1581, 1604, and
1673, secured to France both commercial supremacy
and much prestige throughout the Ottoman Empire,
and gave a permanent character to the concessions
made by Turkey. The agreement that sealed them
and seemed unchangeable soon induced other foreign
nations to claim further privileges.

By the end of the sixteenth century Turkey had
to grant similar privileges to Great Britain, and the
contest between the British representative, Sir
Thomas Glover, and Jean de Gontaut-Biron, the
French ambassador, has become historical. Never-
theless France for nearly two centuries maintained
her position and influence.

So it was with Russia in 1711 and the United
States in 1830. The Ottoman Empire had even to
concede almost equal advantages to Greece and
Rumania, countries which had enlarged their
boundaries at her expense.

Such privileges, which were justifiable at the outset,
soon brought on unrestricted and unjustifiable inter-
ference by foreign Powers in Turkish affairs. The
Powers attempted to justify the establishment and
maintenance of this regime by alleging they had to
protect their subjects against the delays or evil
practices of the Turkish courts of justice, though
the Powers that had managed to gain great influ-

THE TURKISH EMPIRE 23

ence in Turkey were already able, through their
embassies, to defend fully the rights and interests of
their own subjects.

In virtue of the judicial privileges, all differences
or misdemeanours concerning foreigners of the same
nationality were amenable to the consuls of the
country concerned, whose right of jurisdiction in-
cluded that of arrest and imprisonment ; cases between
foreigners of different nationalities were heard in the
court of the defendant, this applying to both lawsuits
and criminal cases ; while, in lawsuits between Turkish
subjects and foreigners, the jurisdiction belonged to
the Ottoman tribunals ; but, as the consul was repre-
sented in court by an assessor or a dragoman, the
sentence depended chiefly on the latter. As a
matter of fact, these privileges only favoured the
worst class of foreigners, and merely served to make
fraud easier.

Lastly, from an economic point of view, the
Capitulations injured the Turkish treasury by binding
the Ottoman State and preventing it from establish-
ing differential duties, at a time when a war of tariffs
was being carried on between all States.

During the reign of Abdul Hamid, owing to the
facilities given by this state of things, the inter-
ference of the Powers in Turkish affairs reached such
a climax that they succeeded not only in bringing
Turkey into a condition of subjection, but in dispos-
ing of her territories, after dividing them into regions
where their respective . influence was paramount.
The greediness of the Powers was only restrained by
the conflicts their rivalry threatened to raise. If
one of them obtained a concession, such as the build-

24 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

ing of a railway line in the region assigned to it, the
others at once demanded compensation, such as the
opening of harbours on the sea-fronts assigned to
them. Things went so far that Russia, though she
could not compete with the Powers whose rivalry
gave itself free scope at the expense of the Ottoman
Empire, intervened to hinder Turkey from construct-
ing a system of railways in Eastern Asia Minor,
alleging that the building of these lines would en-
danger her zone of influence. The railway con-
cessions had to be given to her, though she never
attempted to construct any of the lines.

In addition, by laying stress on the Capitulations,
in which nothing could be found that supported their
demands, the Great Powers established foreign post-
offices in the ports of the Empire. These post-offices,
which enjoyed the privilege of extra- territoriality, were
only used by foreign merchants and persons of note
to smuggle in small parcels, and by native agitators
to correspond safely with agitators living abroad.

Of course Turkey, being thus brought into sub-
jection, did not develop so rapidly as the nations
which, not being under any foreign tutelage, enjoyed
independence; and it is unfair to reproach her with
keeping behind them.

After the revolution, and owing to many requests of
the Turkish Government, some economic alterations
were made in the Capitulations, such as the paying
of the tradesman's licence tax by foreigners, and the
right of the State to establish monopolies. Austria-
Hungary, when the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina
was settled, consented to give up her privilege con-
cerning the customs duties, on condition that other

THE TURKISH EMPIRE 25

Powers did the same. A short time after Germany
promised to do so, but, among the other Powers,
some refused, and others laid down conditions that
would have brought more servitude to Turkey and
would have cost her new sacrifices.

The Unionist Government, as will be shown later,
cancelled the Capitulations during the last war.

After recalling the wonderful political fortune of
the Turkish Empire, we should remember that,
after bringing Eastern influences to Western coun-
tries, it had also an influence of its own which was
plainly felt in Europe. Western art drew its inspira-
tion from Eastern subjects, and at the end of the
eighteenth' century everything that was Turkish
became the fashion for a time.

This influence was the natural outcome of the close
intercourse with the Levant from the Renaissance
till the eighteenth century, and of the receptions
given in honour of Eastern men of mark during their
visits to European courts. It is not intended
to discuss the . question of the relation between
Turkish art and Arabian art, and its repercussion
on Western art, or of Eastern influence in literature;
but it will be well to show how much attraction
all Turkish and Eastern things had for the people
of the time, and how happily the imitation of
the East influenced decorative art and style, as if
the widely different tastes of societies so far apart
had reached the same stage of refinement and culture.

Records are still extant of the famous embassy
sent by the Grand Turk during the reign of Louis XIV,

26 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

and the embassy sent by the Sultan of Morocco to ask
for the hand of the Princess de Conti, for in Coypel's
painting in the Versailles Museum can be seen the
ambassadors of the Sultan of Morocco witnessing a
performance of Italian comedy in Paris in 1682.
Later on the Turkish embassy of Mehemet Effendi
in 1721 was painted by Ch. Parrocel.

Lievins' " Soliman " in the Royal Palace of Berlin,
a few faces drawn by Rembrandt, his famous portrait
known as " The Turk with the Stick " in MacK.
Tomby's collection, which is more likely to be the
portrait of an aristocratic Slav, the carpet in " Beth-
sabe's Toilet after a Bath," bear witness to the
Eastern influence. So do the Turkish buildings of
Peter Koeck d'Aelst, who was the director of a
Flemish manufactory of tapestry at Constantinople
during Solunan's reign; the scenes of Turkish life
and paintings of Melchior Lorch, who also lived at
Constantinople about the same time and drew the
Sultan's and the Sultana's portraits ; and the pictures
of J.-B. van Mour, born at Valenciennes, who died
in Constantinople, where he had been induced to
come by M. de Ferriol, the French King's Ambassador ;
of A. de Favray; and of Melling, the Sultana
Hadidge's architect, who was called the painter of
the Bosphorus.1

There may also be mentioned Charles Amed6e van
Loo's pictures: "A Sultana's Toilet," "The Sultana
ordering the Odalisks some Fancy Work," " The
Favourite Sultana with her Women attended by White

1 Cf. A. Boppe, Lea Peintres du Bosphore au dix-huili&me
sikde (Paris, 1919).

THE TURKISH EMPIRE 27

and Black Eunuchs," " Odalisks dancing before the
Sultan and Sultana," most of which were drawn for
the king from 1775 to 1777, and were intended as
models for tapestries; and also the portrait of
Madame de Pompadour as an odalisk, " The Odalisk
before her Embroidery Frame," and " A Negress
bringing the Sultana's Coffee," by the same painter.
To these may be added Lancret's Turkish sketches,
the drawings and pastels of Liotard, who left Geneva
for Paris about 1762, then lived in the ports of the
Levant and Constantinople, and came back to
Vienna, London, and Holland, and whose chief
pictures are: " A Frankish Lady of Pera receiving a
Visit," " A Frankish Lady of Galata attended by her
Slave "; and also Fragonard's " New Odalisks intro-
duced to the Pasha," his sepia drawings, Marie
Antoinette's so-called Turkish furniture, etc.

In music any sharp, brisk rhythm was styled
alia turca — that is, in the Turkish style. We
also know a Turkish roundelay by Mozart, and a
Turkish march in Beethoven's " Ruins of Athens."

At the end of the eighteenth century, not only
did people imitate the gorgeousness and vivid colours
of Turkish costumes, but every Turkish whim was
the fashion of the day. Ingres, too, took from
Turkey the subjects of some of his best and most
famous paintings: " The Odalisk lying on her Bed,"
" The Turkish Bath," etc.

Lastly, the Great War should teach us, in other
respects too, not to, underrate those who became our
adversaries owing to the mistake they made in

28 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

joining the Central Powers. For the " Sick Man "
raised an army of nearly 1,600,000 men, about
a million of whom belonged to fighting units, and the
alliance of Turkey with Germany was a heavy blow
to the Allied Powers : Russia was blockaded, the Tsar
Ferdinand was enabled to attack Serbia, the blockade
of Rumania brought on the peace of Bukharest,
Turkish troops threatened Persia, owing to which
German emissaries found their way into Afghanistan,
General Kress von Kressenstein and his Ottoman
troops attacked the Suez Canal, etc. All this gave
the Allies a right to enforce on Turkey heavy terms
of peace, but did not justify either the harsh treat-
ment inflicted upon her before the treaty was signed,
or some of the provisions of that treaty. It would
be a great mistake to look upon Turkey as of no
account in the future, and to believe that the nation
can no longer play an important part in Europe.

Ill

TURKEY AND THE WAR

IT is a well-known fact that Germany, while care-
fully organising the conflict that was to lay waste the
whole world and give her the hegemony of the globe,
had not neglected Turkey. Her manoeuvres ended,
before the war, in concluding a Turco-German treaty
of alliance, signed in Constantinople at four o'clock in
the afternoon of August 2, 1914, by Baron von Wangen-
heim and the Grand Vizier Said Halim, an Egyptian
prince, cousin to the former Khedive of Egypt and
Mehemet All's grandson. It seems that the Turkish
negotiators had plainly told the German representa-
tives that they only meant to fight against Russia,
and they did not even require any guarantee against
the action of France and England.

The spirit in which these negotiations were carried
on has been lately corroborated by a statement of
M. Bompard, former French Ambassador at Con-
stantinople, who, in answer to a newspaper article
concerning the circumstances under which Turkey
entered into the war, and the episode of the Goeben
and the Breslau,1 wrote in the same newspaper:2

"Owing to the treaty of August 2, Turkey was ipso facto
a belligerent; yet though the military authorities acted in

"Comment le Goeben et le Breslau echap-
perent aux flottes allies," by Henry Miles, June 16, 1921.

2 M. Bompard's letter to the editor of the ficlair, June 23,
1921.

29

30 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

conformity with the treaty, the civil authorities — i.e., the
Government, properly speaking — had a somewhat different
attitude. In the first place, the Government denied it was
at war with France and England. The Grand Vizier had even
made a formal declaration of neutrality in Paris and London;
it only had to do with Russia; besides, the thing was not
urgent, as the Russian decree of mobilisation had just been
issued."

In the first article of the treaty it was stated that
both Powers should maintain a strict neutrality in the
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. This
clause, however, was only intended to give the treaty
a pacific appearance, for it was said in Clause 2 that
if Russia intervened and thus compelled Germany
to support her ally, Austria-Hungary, Turkey should
be under the same obligation.

Now, on the previous day, Germany had declared
war on Russia, and thus the second article came into
effect immediately. So by this treaty Germany
really wanted to throw Turkey into the war by the
side of the Central Powers.

The other clauses laid down the conditions of a
military co-operation. The most important one was
that Turkey pledged herself to let the German
military mission have the control in the conduct
of operations, " according to what was agreed
between His Excellency the War Minister and the
President of the Military Mission." Theoretically
the treaty was to come to an end on December 31,
1918, but, if not denounced six months before that
date, it was to be renewed for five years more.

Clause 8 and last expressly said that the agreement
was to be kept secret.

On October 29, 1914, two Turkish torpedo-boats
entered the port of Odessa, sank a Russian gun-boat,

TURKEY AND THE WAR 31

and fired at the French liner Portugal, and a Turco-
German squadron made a surprise attack upon
Theodosia and Novorossisk. Then the Allied Powers
declared war on Turkey on November 5.

Yet, after keeping neutral during the first three
months of the war, Turkey seems to have had
some hesitation in entering the conflict, notwith-
standing German pressure. Most of her statesmen,
who had weighed the financial and political con-
sequences of her intervention, did not seem to con-
sider they were to the advantage of their country;
but the ambitious aims of Enver Pasha, who was
devoted to Germany, for his success depended on her
triumph, prevailed upon Turkey to yield. On the
other hand, the Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha,
pointed out on October 2, 1914, to the Austrian
ambassador, who urged Turkey to utilise her fleet,
that if the latter was ever defeated by the Russian
fleet, Constantinople would be endangered. But a
few days after, on October 15, he declared that the
only obstacle to Turkish intervention was the penury
of the treasury. Indeed, it is probable that Javid
Bey, Minister of Finance, who had just signed an
agreement with France concerning Turkish railways
and finance, was not very eager to declare war on
a country whose financial help was indispensable.
He had even made overtures on several occasions
to the ambassadors of the Entente, on behalf of the
moderate members of the Ministry. In August, 1914,
he offered to come to an agreement with the Entente
providing that the Capitulations were suppressed,
and in September h£ asked them to recognise the
suppression of the Capitulations in order to be able to

32 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

demobilise the Ottoman army. He resigned after
the declaration of war, but consented to be member
of a new Cabinet the next year.

It seems probable, too, that Talaat for rather a
long time favoured an attitude of neutrality in
order to obtain for Turkey, among other political
and economic advantages, the suppression of the
Capitulations, and that only later on he finally, like
Jemal, Minister of Marine, sided with Enver Pasha
and the Germans. On September 6 Talaat Bey told
Sir L. du Pan Mallet that there was no question of
Turkey entering the war,1 and on September 9 he
declared to the same ambassador, with regard to the
Capitulations, that the time had come to free Turkey
from foreign trammels.2

Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Turkish Minister at Athens,
in a telegram addressed to Said Halim Pasha on
June 15, 1914, had informed him he had just learnt
that " Greece, by raising a conflict, expected a
general conflagration would ensue which might bring
on the opening of the question of Turkey- in- Asia."
On August 7, 1914, he stated in another dispatch
sent from Athens to the Sublime Porte :

" In the present war England, according to all probabilities,
will have the last word. So if we are not absolutely certain
to triumph finally, it would be a highly venturesome thing
for us to rush into an adventure, the consequences of which
might be — which God forbid — fatal to our country."

In a long report dated September 9, 1914, he
added :

" The present circumstances are so critical and so fraught
with danger that I take the liberty humbly to advise the

1 Blue Book, No. 64. a Ibid., No. 70.

TURKEY AND THE WAR 33

Imperial Government to keep a strict neutrality in the
present conflicts, and to endeavour to soothe Russia. . . .

" The compact lately signed in London by the Allies shows
that the war is expected to last long. ... A State like
the Ottoman Empire, which has enormous unprotected sea-
coasts and remote provinces open to foreign intrigues, should
certainly beware of the enmity of a malignant and vindictive
country like England. . . ."

So it appears that the decision of Turkey was
not taken unanimously and only after much
hesitation.

Henceforth the operations engaged in by both sides
followed their due course.

In Europe the Franco-British squadrons under the
command of Admiral Garden began on November 3
to bombard the forts which guarded the entrance of
the Dardanelles. On February 25, 1915, a combined
attack of the Allied fleets took place, and on March 18
a general attack was made by the Franco-British
squadrons, in which three of their ironclads were
sunk, four were severely damaged, and other ships
were disabled.

On April 25 to 27 the English and French troops
landed in Gallipoli, and after driving back the Turks
advanced on May 6 to 8. But when the expeditionary
corps had failed to reach Krithia and the Kareves-
Dere, then, after a violent offensive of the Turks,
which was repulsed on June 21, and the failure of
a diversion against the Sari-Bair Mountains, it was
withdrawn on January 8, 1916.

In Asia, after the Turkish naval action in the Black
Sea, and the march of the Turkish troops against
Kars and TifLis, the Russians invaded Armenia, in
Asia Minor, on November 4, 1914, and took Ardost.
On November 8 they captured Bayazid and Kupri-

3

34 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

keui; Ardahan and Sary-Kamysh, where, as will be
seen later on, the Armenians were partly responsible for
the Turkish retreat, December 21 and 22; on May 19,
1915, Van fell; then, in the following year, Erzerum
(February 16, 1916), Mush (February 18), Bitlis
(March 2), Trebizond (April 18), Baiburt (July 16), and
Erzinjan (July 25). Thus the Russian troops had con-
quered the four provinces of Erzerum, Van, Trebizond,
and Bitlis, extending over an area of 75,000 square
miles.

In Mesopotamia the British brigade of Indian
troops came into action on November 8, 1914, and
captured the little fort at Fao, which commands the
entrance of the Shatt-el-Arab. On November 17 it
was victorious at Sihan, took Basra on the 22nd,
and Korna on December 9 of the same year. Next
year, on July 3, 1915, the British troops captured
Amara, Suk-esh-Shuyukh on July 21, Naseriya
on the 25th of the same month, and on September 29
they occupied Kut-el-Amara, which the Turks re-
captured on April 18, 1916, taking General Townshend
prisoner. On February 28, 1917, Kut-el-Amara fell
again to British arms, then Baghdad on March 11,
On April 2, 1917, the English and Russian forces
joined together at Kizilrobat on the main road to
Persia, and all the Indian frontier was wholly freed
from the Turco-German pressure.

But after the Russian revolution, the Turks
successively recaptured all the towns the Russian
troops had conquered in Transcaucasia and Asia
Minor, and soon threatened Caucasus.

Meanwhile in Arabia the Turks had suddenly
invaded the Aden area, where they were beaten on

TURKEY AND THE WAR 35

the 21st by the British at Sheikh-Othman and on the
25th at Bir-Ahmed.

On June 10, 1916, the Arab rising broke out. On
June 14 they were masters of Mecca. On July 1
they took Jeddah, then Rabagh, then Yambo on the
Red Sea. On November 6, 1916, the Sherif of
Mecca, the Emir Hussein, was proclaimed King of
the Hejaz, under the name of Hussein-Ibn-Ali.

As early as November 3, 1914, Turkey, which
occupied all the Sinai Peninsula, threatened Egypt.
A first Turkish offensive against the Suez Canal was
checked from February 2 to 4 simultaneously before
El-Kantara, Al-Ferdan, Toussoun, and Serapeum.
A second Turkish offensive, started on July 29, 1916,
was also crushed before Romani near the Suez
Canal, on the 5th at Katia and on the llth at Bir-
el-Abd.

The British army then launched a great offensive
in December, 1916, which resulted, on December 21,
in the capture of El-Arish, on the boundary of the
Sinaitic desert, and in the occupation of Aleppo on
October 26, 1918. On January 9, 1917, they took
Rafa, then Beersheba on October 31, 1917, Gaza
on November 7, and Jaffa on November 17; and
on December 11, 1917, General Allenby entered
Jerusalem.

In September, 1918, a new offensive took place,
backed by the French troops that took Nablus,
and the French navy that made the British advance
possible by bombarding the coast. General Allenby
entered Haifa and Acre on September 23 and Tiberias
on the 24th, and on the 28th he effected his junction
with the troops of the King of the Hejaz. He

36 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

entered Damascus on October 1 with the Emir
Feisal, who commanded the Arabian army. On
October 6 the French squadron sailed into the port
of Beyrut, which was occupied on the 7th. Tripoli
was captured on the 13th, Horns on the 15th, Aleppo
on the 26th of October, 1918. By this time Syria,
Lebanon, Mesopotamia, and Arabia had fallen into
the hands of the Allies.

Meanwhile the disintegration of the Turkish troops
was completed by General Franchet d'Esperey's
offensive and the capitulation of Bulgaria. Turkey
applied to General Townshend — who had been taken
prisoner at Kut-el-Amara — to treat with her victors.
The negotiations of the armistice were conducted by
E-auf Bey, Minister of the Navy; Reshad Hikmet
Bey, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
and Sadullah Bey, head of the general staff of the
Third Army.

As early as 1916 Turkey of her own authority had
suppressed the Capitulations — i.e., the conventions
through which the Powers, as has been seen, had
a right, amongst other privileges, to have their
own tribunals and post-offices ; and by so doing she
had freed herself from the invidious tutelage of
Europe.

The Ottoman Government, in a note sent on
November 1, 1916, by the Turkish ambassadors in
Berlin and Vienna to the German and Austrian
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, notified to their respec-
tive Governments and the neutrals that henceforth
they looked upon the two international treaties of
Paris and Berlin as null and void.

Now the treaties of Paris in 1856 and of Berlin in

TUKKEY AND THE WAR 37

1878 were the most important deeds that had hitherto
regulated the relations between the Ottoman Empire
and the other European Powers. The treaty of
Paris confirmed the treaty of 1841, according to
which the question of the closing of the Straits to
foreign warships was considered as an international
question which did not depend only on the Turkish
Government.

The Berlin treaty of 1878, too, asserted a right of
control and tutelage of the Powers over Turkey, and
in it Turkey solemnly promised to maintain the
principle of religious liberty, to allow Christians to
bear evidence in law-courts, and to institute reforms
in Armenia.

As the King of Prussia and the Emperor had signed
the treaty of Paris, and the Austrian Emperor and
the German Emperor had signed the treaty of Berlin,
Turkey could not denounce these treaties without
the assent of these two allied countries, which thus
gave up the patrimonial rights and privileges wrested
from the Sultan by Western Europe in the course of
the last three centuries. This consideration accounts
for the support Turkey consented to give the Central
Powers and the sacrifices she engaged to make.

In order to understand the succession of events
and the new policy of Turkey, the reader must be
referred to the note of the Ottoman Government
abrogating the treaties of Paris and Berlin which
was handed on November 1, 1916, by the Turkish
ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna to the German
and Austrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This note,
recalling the various events which had taken place,
pointed out that they justified Turkey in casting

38 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

off the tutelage of both the Allied Powers and the
Central Powers:

" Owing to the events that took place in the second half
of the last century, the Imperial Ottoman Empire was com-
pelled, at several times, to sign two important treaties, the
Paris treaty on March 30, 1856, and the Berlin treaty on
August 3, 1878. The latter had, in most respects, broken
the balance established by the former, and they were both
trodden underfoot by the signatories that openly or secretly
broke their engagements. These Powers, after enforcing the
clauses that were to the disadvantage of the Ottoman Empire,
not only did not care for those that were to its advantage,
but even continually opposed their carrying out.

" The Paris treaty laid down the principle of the territorial
integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; it also
stipulated that this clause shoxild be fully guaranteed by all
the Powers, and forbade any meddling, either with the
relations between the Imperial Government and its sub-
jects, or with the interior administration of the Ottoman
Empire.

" Nevertheless, the French Government kept on interfering
by force of arms in Ottoman territory, and demanded the
institution of a new administrative organisation in Lebanon.
Then the Powers signatory to the treaty were compelled to
participate in this action by diplomatic ways, in order not to
let France have a free hand in carrying out her plans, which
were contrary to the Paris treaty and paved the way to
territorial encroachments.

" On the other hand, the Russian Government, pursuing a
similar policy, held in check by an ultimatum the action of
the Porte against the principalities of Serbia and Montenegro,
where it had raised an insurrection, and which it had fully
provided with arms, supplies, officers, and soldiers; and after
demanding the institution of a new foreign administration in
some Ottoman provinces and of a foreign control over their
home affairs, it finally declared war against Turkey.

" In the same manner the clauses of the Paris treaty did not
hinder either the French Government from occupying Tunis
and turning this province of the Ottoman Empire into a
French protectorate — or the English from occupying Egypt
to become the ruling power there, and from encroaching upon
Ottoman sovereignty in the south of the Yemen, in Nejed,
Koweit, Elfytyr, and the Persian Gulf. In spite of the same
clauses the four Powers now at war against Turkey have
also recently modified the condition of Crete and instituted

TURKEY AND THE WAR 39

a new state of things inconsistent with the territorial integrity
that they had guaranteed.

" Finally Italy, without any serious reason, merely in order
to have territorial compensations after the new political
situation created in Northern Africa, did not hesitate to
declare war against the Ottoman Empire, and did not even
comply with the engagement she had taken, in case of a con-
tention with the Imperial Government, to refer the case to
the mediation of the Powers signatory of the treaty before
resorting to war.

" It is not necessary to mention all the other cases of inter-
ference in the home affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

"The Berlin treaty, concluded after the events of 1877-78,
completely remodelled the Paris treaty by creating in Euro-
pean Turkey a new state of things, which was even modified
by posterior treaties. But soon after the Berlin treaty the
Russian Government showed how little it cared for its
engagements. Even before capturing Batum it managed to
annex that fortified place by declaring openly and officially
its intention to turn it into a free trade port. The British
Government consented to renew some of its engagements.
Yet the Cabinet of Petrograd, after fulfilling its aspirations,
simply declared that the clause relating to this case was no
longer valid, and turned the town into a naval station. As
for the British Government, it did not carry out any of the
protective measures it had hinted at, which shows how little
it cared for the regime instituted by the Berlin treaty.

" Though the Imperial7 Ottoman Government scrupulously
submitted to the harsh, heavy clauses of the treaty, a few
provisions that were favourable to it were never carried out,
in spite of its own insistence and that of its protectors,
because one of the Powers thought it its own interest to raise
difficulties to the Ottoman Empire.

" It ensues from all this that the fundamental and general
clauses of the treaties of Paris and Berlin, concerning the
Ottoman Empire, were annulled ipso facto by some of the
signatories. Now, since the clauses of an international deed
that are to the advantage of one of the contracting parties
have never been carried out, it is impossible that the obliga-
tions contracted by this party should be considered as valid
still. Such a state of things makes it necessary, as far as the
aforesaid party is concerned, to annul such a treaty. It
should also be borne in mind that, since the conclusion of
these two treaties, the situation has completely changed.

" Since the Imperial Government is at war with four of the
signatory Powers, to whose advantage and at whose eager

40 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

request the aforesaid treaties were concluded, it follows that
these treaties have become null and void, as far as the rela-
tions between Turkey and these Powers are concerned.

" Besides, the Imperial Government has concluded an
alliance on a footing of complete equality with the other two
signatory Powers. Henceforth the Ottoman Empire, being
definitely freed from its condition of inferiority and from the
international tutelage some of the Great Powers had an
interest in maintaining, now sits in the European concert
with all the rights and privileges of a completely independent
State; and this new situation cancels even the causes of the
aforesaid international agreements.

" All these considerations deprive the aforesaid contracts
of any binding value.

" Nevertheless, that there may lurk no uncertainty on this
head in the mind of the contracting Powers that have turned
their friendly relations into an alliance with Turkey, the
Imperial Government begs to inform the German and Austro-
Hungarian Governments that it has annulled the treaties of
1856 and 1878.

" It also feels bound to declare that, in accordance with the
principles of international law, it will certainly avail itself
of such rights as are to its advantage, and have not yet been
recognised.

" On the other hand, the Imperial Government, under the
pressure of France, had been compelled to grant the sanjaks
of Lebanon a strictly administrative and restricted autonomy,
that might be a pretext to a certain extent to the intervention
of the Great Powers. Though this situation was never
sanctioned by a regular treaty, but by interior laws in 1861
and 1864, the Imperial Ottoman Government, in order to
avoid any misunderstanding, feels bound to declare that it
puts an end to that state of things, and, for the reasons men-
tioned above, it institutes in this sandjak the same adminis-
trative organisation as in the other parts of the Empire."

After the military defeat of autumn, 1918, the
leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress who
had governed the Ottoman Empire since 1905 dis-
appeared, and the statesmen of the former regime
came into office again. In the very first days of
October, 1918, the Talaat Pasha Cabinet had offered
its resignation, which had not been accepted at first
by the Sultan.

TURKEY AND THE WAR 41

The new Ottoman Cabinet made a declaration of
policy to Parliament on Wednesday, October 23,
1918. In the opening address, read by the Grand
Vizier Izzet Pasha, an amnesty was promised to all
political offenders. Turkey stated she 'was quite
ready to accept a peace, based on Mr. Wilson's
fourteen points, and to grant at once to all the
elements of the population, without any distinction
of nationality or religion, full political rights and
the right to a share in the administration of the
country. She also promised to solve the question
of the Arabian vilayets, to take into consideration
their national aspirations, and to grant them an
autonomous administration, provided the bonds
existing between them, the Caliphate, and the Sultan,
should be maintained. The whole Chamber, with the
exception of ten deputies who refused to vote, passed
a vote of confidence in the new Cabinet.

After the French victory in the East and the
capitulation of Bulgaria, the political changes, which
had already begun in Turkey, soon became quite
pronounced. Talaat Pasha, whose ideas differed
utterly from those of Enver Pasha, and who had
more and more confined his activity to the war depart-
ment, had gradually lost his influence over the policy
of the Empire since the death of Mehmed V. After
having taken his share, together with Enver and
Jemal, in bringing Turkey into the war by the side of
the Central Powers in 1914, he now realised that
the game was up. Besides, the Ottoman Press now
openly attacked the Cabinets of the. two Empires,
and reproached them with neglecting the interests of
the Porte when the additional treaty of Brest-Litovsk

42 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

was drafted, during the negotiations of Bukharest,
and later on in the course of the negotiations with
the Cabinet of Sofia.

Talaat, Javid, and Enver sought shelter in Berlin.
Their flight greatly affected the new Constantinople
Government on account of some financial mal-
versations which had occurred while the leaders of
the Committee of Union and Progress were in office.
So the Sublime Porte in December, 1918, demanded
their extradition, which Germany refused to grant.
In April, 1919, Talaat, who lived in Berlin under the
name of Sali Ali Bey, and who later on opened a
public-house in that city, was sentenced to death
by default in Constantinople, and a year later, in
March, 1920, England, according to a clause of the
Versailles treaty, put him down on the list of the
war-criminals1 whose extradition might be demanded.

1 Since the publication of the French edition of this book
Talaat was murdered on March 15, 1921, at Charlottenburg, by
an Armenian student named Solomon Teilirian, aged twenty-
four, a native of Salmas in Persia.

IV

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE

As early as 1916 the Allies seem to have come to an
agreement over the principle of the partition of the
Ottoman Empire. In their answer to President
Wilson they mentioned among their war aims " to
enfranchise the populations enslaved to the san-
guinary Turks," and " to drive out of Europe the
Ottoman Empire, which is decidedly alien to Western
civilisation."

According to the conventions about the impending
partition of Turkey concluded between the Allies in
April and May, 1916, and August, 1917, Russia was
to take possession of ^ the whole of Armenia and
Eastern Anatolia, Constantinople, and the Straits.
In virtue of the treaty signed in London on May 16,
1916, fixing the boundaries of two zones of British
influence and two zones of French influence, France
and England were to share Mesopotamia and Syria,
France getting the northern part with Alexandretta
and Mosul, and England the southern part with
Haifa and Baghdad. According to the treaty of
August 21, 1917, Italy was to have Western Asia
Minor with Smyrna and Adalia. Palestine was to
be internationalised and Arabia raised to the rank of
an independent kingdom.

But, following the breakdown of Russia and the
43

44 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

entrance of America into the war, the conventions
of 1916 and 1917 were no longer held valid. President
Wilson declared in the fourteenth of his world-
famous points that: " The Turkish parts of the
present Ottoman Empire should be assured of secure
sovereignty, but the other nations now under Turkish
rule should be assured security of lif e and autonomous
development."

It follows that the partition of Turkish terri-
tories such as Mesopotamia or Syria between Powers
that had no right to them, as was foreshadowed in
the conventions of 1916, was no longer admitted;
and the Conference in February, 1919, decided, at
Mr. Wilson's suggestion, that all territories that be-
longed to the Ottoman Empire before should be put
under the control of the League of Nations, which
was to assign mandates to certain Great Powers.

According to the decisions taken at that time, and
at the special request of M. Venizelos, the Greeks
obtained all the western coast of Asia Minor between
Aivali and the Gulf of Kos, with Pergamus, Smyrna,
Phocosa, Magnesia, Ephesus, and Halicarnassus, and
a hinterland including all the vilayet of Aidin,
except the sanjak of Denizli and part of that of
Mentesha (Mughla).

The Italian delegation thought fit to make reserva-
tions about the assignment of Smyrna to Greece.

It seems that in the course of the conversations at
St-Jean-de-Maurienne — Greece being still neutral at
the time — M. Ribot asked Baron Sonnino whether
Italy, to facilitate the conclusion of a separate peace
with Austria-Hungary, would eventually consent to
give up Trieste in exchange for Smyrna. The Italian

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 45

delegation had merely noted down the offer, without
giving an answer. The Italian diplomats now
recalled that offer as an argument, not so much to
lay a claim to Smyrna — as their subsequent attitude
showed — as to prevent a change to Italy's dis-
advantage in the balance of power in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and an infringement of the London
treaty that guaranteed her definite possession of
the Dodecanese.

Moreover, according to Article 9 of the London
treaty, in case of a partition of Asia Minor, or merely
in case zones of influence should be marked out in it,
Italy was to have the same share as the other Powers
and receive, together with the province of Adalia,
where she had acquired a paramount influence and
obtained a recognition of her rights from Turkey in
1912, the neighbouring regions. In accordance with
this article, the Conference seemed inclined to give
Italy an international mandate for all the part of
Asia Minor that was to be left to the Turks — namely,
all the Anatolian plateau, including the vilayets of
Kastamuni, Brusa, Angora, Konia, and Sivas. It is
obvious that the difficulties raised by the assignment
of Smyrna to Greece could not but be aggravated by
the new political situation in case this mandate should
be given to the Italians.

Consequently, when the Italians saw Smyrna
assigned to Greece, they were all the more anxious
to give to their new zone of influence in Asia Minor
an outlet to the sea that should not depend on the
great port of Western Asia Minor. After considering
Adalia, Makri, and Marmaris, which are good har-
bours but do not communicate with the interior and

46 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

are not connected with the chief commercial routes
of the continent, their attention was drawn to Kush-
Adassi, called by the Greeks New Ephesus and by
themselves Scala Nuova, a port that numbered about
6,000 souls before the war, lying opposite to Samos,
in the Gulf of Ephesus, about ten miles from the ruins
of the old town of the same name and the Smyrna-
Aidin railway.

This port, which is situated on the mouth of the
Meander, might easily be connected by a few miles
of railroad with the main railway line to the south
of Ayasaluk which brings towards the ^Egean Sea
all the produce of Asia Minor; then it would divert
from Smyrna much of the trade of Aidin, Denizli,
and the lake region. To the merchants of Asia
Minor — who deal with Syria, Egypt, Greece, Italy,
and all Western Europe, excepting those who trade
with the Black Sea — the Kush-Adassi line would be
both faster and cheaper, if this port was as well
equipped as Smyrna.

But, as Kush-Adassi happened to be in the zone
which at first had been assigned to Greece and whose
frontier goes down to the south as far as Hieronda
Bay, Italy endeavoured in every way to carry farther
to the north the boundaries of the Italian zone, in
order to include this port in it. For this purpose,
Italy took advantage of the troubled condition of the
area round Aidin, Sokia, and Cape Mycale to send a
police force up the Meander and the railway line
along it, in order to carry her control up to the Gulf
of Ephesus. Of course the territory lying between
Hieronda and Kush-Adassi still remained part of the
Greek zone of occupation, but, all the same, Italy set

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 47

foot in it. Her diplomats soon turned this fact into
a right of possession.

M. Tittoni soon after agreed to play the part of
arbiter in the question of the southern frontier of
Bulgaria; and in July, 1919, it was announced that
after some conversations between M. Venizelos and
M. Tittoni an understanding had been reached about
Thrace and Northern Epirus. whereby Greece agreed
to enlarge the northern part of the Italian zone
of occupation in Asia Minor, and gave up to Italy
the valley of the Meander. So, though on the whole
M. Tittoni's arbitration was in favour of Greece, Italy
obtained the territorial triangle included between
Hieronda, Nazili, and Kush-Adassi, the control over
the Meander, and to a certain extent over the railway.
In return for this, Italy promised to cede to Greece
the Dodecanese except one, captured by Italy in
1912 during her war with Turkey, together with
the Isle of Rhodes, though she had a right to keep
the latter for at least, five years. In case England
should grant the inhabitants of Cyprus the right to
pass under Greek sovereignty, Italy was to hold a
plebiscite in Rhodes and let the native population
become Greeks if they wished. By supporting
the Greek claims in Thrace, Italy won the sym-
pathies of Greece at a time when the latter both
consolidated the rights of Italy on the continent
and strengthened her own situation in the Dode-
canese.

The control over the eastern part of Asia Minor
which was to fall to the lot of the Armenians and in-
cluded the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Kharput,
Diarbekir, and probably Trebizond — the population

48 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of the latter vilayet consisting chiefly of Moslems with
a Greek minority — was to be assumed, so the Great
Powers thought, by the United States.

It should be remembered that the question of the
eastern vilayets was raised for the first time by the
Tsars of Russia, and gave them a pretext for inter-
vening in the domestic affairs of Turkey and thus
carrying out their plans of expansion in Asia Minor.
As a matter of fact, those vilayets were not really
Armenian. The Armenians were in a minority there,
except in two or three districts where, as throughout
the Ottoman Empire, they were mixed up with
Turks. They had lived peaceably together till the
Powers thought fit to support the claims of the
Armenians and incite them to rebel, in order to
further their own aims in Turkey, by a misuse of the
privileges granted them by the Capitulations.

Constantinople and the Straits seemed likely to be
internationalised.

Lastly, the Arabian part of the Turkish Empire
was to be cut off from it, though nobody could tell
expressly in what manner, but in a way which it was
easy to foresee.

We shall deal later on with the negotiations that
took place during the war between the British
Government and Hussein, Grand Sherif of Mecca, the
Emir Feisal's father, and we have already mentioned
the help given to the British army by the Emir
Feisal's troops, after the aforesaid negotiations.
These facts throw a light on the policy pursued by
England later on; and besides, immediately after
the hostilities, in a speech made in London on
Friday, November 1, 1918, Mr. Barnes, a Labour

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 49

member of the British Cabinet, while speaking on the
armistice with Turkey, acknowledged :

" We could have signed it before, for we held the Turks
at our discretion. For the last fortnight the Turks had
been suing for peace, but we were on the way to Aleppo, which
is to be the capital of the future independent Arab State,
established in an Arab country and governed by Arabs. So
we did not want to have done with the Turks till we had
taken Aleppo."

Such was the condition of the Turkish problem
when the Peace Conference took it in hand for the
first time.

Rivalries naturally soon arose.

The Emir Feisal, supported by England, laid
claim not only to the whole of Arabia, but also to
Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia to make up a
huge Arab Empire, under his father's rule. France,
who opposed that plan, convened a Syrian Congress
in Marseilles, to raise a protest against the partition
of Syria as had been laid down by the Franco-
English agreement of 1916.

Soon after the landing of Greek troops in Smyrna
on the morning of May 15, 1919, brought about a
serious conflict.

It is noteworthy that after General Allenby's
victories in Palestine and the resignation and flight
of Talaat, Enver, and Jemal, General Izzet Pasha,
who had been appointed Grand Vizier, had signed,
on October 31, 1918, a convention of armistice, which
put Turkish ports and railways under the Allies'
provisional control and allowed them " in case things
should become alarming for them " to occupy " all
strategic points." This armistice had been con-
cluded on the basis 'of Mr. Wilson's principle that

4

50 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

" to the Turkish regions of the Ottoman Empire an
unqualified sovereignty should be ensured." In no
respect had the Turks broken the agreement when
the Allies infringed it by allowing the Greeks to
occupy Smyrna. This occupation, carried on in
spite of France, who was not energetic enough, and
one might almost say in spite of Italy, created a very
serious situation.

Indeed, no good reason could be given in sup-
port of this decision. By the help of misleading
or false information cleverly worded and widely
distributed by a propaganda which overwhelmed the
Press — and was only equalled by the propaganda
carried on by Poland — political mancmivres induced
the Allies to allow Greece, who wished to become
" Greater Greece " and wanted Epirus, Thrace,
Constantinople, Smyrna, Trebizond, and Adana, to
occupy a region belonging to Anatolia, where the
Turkish element predominates more than in all the
rest of the Ottoman Empire, for there are only
300,000 Greeks against about 1,300,000 Turks. This
permission granted to Greece was the more surprising
as it seems to have been obtained because the Greek
Government had informed the Supreme Council that
the disorder prevailing in the vilayet of Smyrna was
a danger to the non-Turkish populations.

Now the report of the Inter-allied Commission
about the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the
neighbouring territories which was sent later on and
was dated from Constantinople, October 12, 1919,
began as follows:

" The inquiry has proved that since the armistice the
general condition of the Christians of the vilayet of Aidin

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 51

has been satisfactory, and their security has not been threat-
ened.

" If the occupation of Smyrna was ordered by the Peace
Conference owing to inaccurate information, the primary
responsibility lies with the individuals or governments that
gave or transmitted inconsiderately such information as is
mentioned in No. 1 of the established facts.

" It is obvious, therefore, that this occupation was not at
all justifiable, and violated the terms of the armistice con-
cluded between the Powers and Turkey."

Moreover, to quote the very words of that report,
the Greek occupation, " far from appearing as carry-
ing out a civilising mission, has immediately put on
the aspect of a conquest and a crusade."

This inquiry, en the one hand, acknowledged that
the responsibility for the events that took place
at Smyrna on May 15 and 16 and in the immedi-
ate neighbourhood during the first days following
the landing, lay with the Greek headquarters and
some officers who did not perform their duty. On
the other hand it stated that part of the responsi-
bility rested with the Turkish authorities at Smyrna,
who took no step to prevent the escape and arming
of common law prisoners before the coming of the
Greeks. Then it went on as follows:

" In the person of the high civil authority that represents
it at Smyrna, the Greek Government is responsible for the
serious disturbances that ended in bloodshed in the interior
of the country during the advance of the Greek troops. . . .
The Greeks alone are responsible for the bloodshed at Mene-
men. . . . The Greek officers who were at Menemen quite
neglected their duty."

And the Commission wound up its report with
this:

"In the occupied region, putting aside the towns of
Smyrna — where the number of Christians is high, but th e

52 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

number of Greek Christians much inferior to that of the
Turks — and Aivali, the predominance of the Turkish element
over the Greek element is undeniable."

So we easily understand the violent and justifiable
indignation felt by the Turks when the Greek troops
landed, for they could not forget that now there were
no Turks in Thessaly, where they numbered 150,000
in 1878, or in the Morea, where there had once been
300,000, and that in Greece only about 20,000 were
left of the 100,000 that had once lived there.

M. Venizelos, in a letter addressed on May 29 to
the President of the Conference, thought it his duty
to give particulars about the way the occupation
had been effected. After setting right what he
styled " the wrong and misleading information given
by newspapers," he stated that the Greeks had
" arrived at Aidin, on the southern side, east of
Nymphaton and north of the Kiver Ermos." The
Great Powers having asked the Greek Government,
as he said expressly in his letter, " to occupy Smyrna
and its environs " without stating exactly how far
the environs of Smyrna reached, he thought he had
a right to look upon this operation — which had been
attended with a few incidents and had not been
received everywhere with unmixed joy — as the out-
come of a settled policy. After this occupation public
meetings of protest took place in Constantinople.

An important Crown Council was held in the after-
noon of May 26 at Yildiz-Kiosk, in order to enable
the various political groups to express their opinion
concerning the recent events.

The Sultan, attended by the princes of the Imperial
Family, opened the meeting, and stated it had been

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 53

thought necessary to call together the most eminent
men of Turkey that they might express their opinion
about the critical condition of the country.

The Grand Vizier, after recalling the events that
had taken place in Turkey since the beginning of
the war, asked the audience to let him have their
opinions.

The Unionist group said they were dissatisfied with
the composition of the Ministry, and demanded a
Coalition Government, in which all parties should be
represented.

Another political group asked the Crown Council
to form itself into a National Assembly.

Somebody else showed the inanity of such sug-
gestions and proposed to entrust the mandate of the
administration of Turkey to a Great Power — without
mentioning which Power. He added: "Otherwise
Turkey will be dismembered, which would be her
rain."

As the assembly had merely consultative powers,
no decision was reached.

At the beginning of June, 1919, the Ottoman
League sent from Geneva to Mr. Montagu, British
Secretary for India, the following note:

" The Ottoman League has examined the statements
which your Excellency was so kind as to make at the Peace
Conference, regarding the subsequent fate of the Ottoman
Empire.

" We have always been convinced that His Britannic
Majesty's Government in its relations with our country
would resume its traditional policy, which was started and
advocated by the most famous English statesmen, and
that, after obtaining the guarantees required for the safety
of its huge dominions, it would refuse to countenance
any measure aiming at the oppression and persecution of
Moslems.

54 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

" The British Government can realise better than any other
Power the disastrous consequences that would necessarily
follow throughout Islam on the downfall of the Ottoman
Empire and any blow struck at its vital parts, especially at
its capital, the universally revered eeat of the Khilafat, where
the best works of Moslem civilisation have been gathered
for centuries.

" We feel certain that your Excellency will also realise
better than anybody else of what importance would be to
Great Britain the loj^alty, not only of the Ottoman Moslems
without any distinction of race, but of all the Moham-
medans whose destiny is presided over by His Britannic
Majesty."

At last, about the end of the month, the treaty
with Turkey was drafted by the Conference, arid on
June 11 the Turkish representatives were brought to
France on board the French ironclad Democratic.

The delegation included Tewfik Pasha, Riza
Tewfik Bey, with Reshid Bey, former Minister of the
Interior, as adviser. At its head was Damad Ferid
Pasha, the Sultan's brother-in-law, who, after the
resignation of the Tewfik Pasha Cabinet at the
beginning of March, 1919, had formed a new Ministry.

As was stated in the Allies' answer to the Porte
in the letter addressed to the Turkish Premier,
Damad Ferid Pasha, Turkey had not attempted in
the memorandum handed to the Conference to
excuse the Germano-Turkish intrigues which had
paved the way for her to take part in the war on the
side of the Germans; neither had she attempted to
clear herself of all the crimes she was charged with.
Damad Ferid Pasha had simply pleaded that only
the " Young Turks " of the Committee of Union and
Progress were responsible for the Ottoman policy
during the last five years, and that, if they had
governed the Empire, as it were, in the name of the

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 55

Germans, the whole Turkish nation could not be held
responsible for this.

The Allies pointed out in their reply that they could
not accept the distinction which cast all the blame
on the Government and alleged the misdeeds were
not imputable to the Turkish people merely because
these misdeeds were abhorrent to Turkish ideas,
as shown in the course of centuries. So the Allies
informed the delegation they could not grant their
request to restore Ottoman sovereignty over territories
that had been taken away from them before.

Yet the Council, though they declared they could
not accept such views or enter upon such a con-
troversy, launched into considerations on Turkish
ideas and Turkish influence in the world which, to
say the least, were most questionable, as will be seen'
later on.

They stated, for instance, that no section of the
Turkish people had ever been able to build up a
lasting political organisation, the huge Empires of
the Hioung-nous, the Ouigours, and the Kiptchaks
having been of short duration. The Supreme Council
also asserted that the lack of stability of the Ottoman
Empire — which was represented as unable to develop
— was due to the various origins of its elements.
But other influences were laid aside, which have been
at work, especially during the modern period, since
the beginning of the decline. It should be borne in
mind that three centuries ago the civilisation and
prosperity of the Ottoman Empire were not inferior
to those of the Western nations, and its inferiority
appeared only nowadays, when Germany and Italy
founded their unity, while the European States did

56 THE TUEKS AND EUROPE

not do anything in Turkey to improve — or even did
much to aggravate — a condition of things that left
to Turkey no possibility of recovery. If Moslem
civilisation is quite different from Western civilisa-
tion, it does not follow necessarily that it is in-
ferior to it. For several centuries its religious and
social ideals safeguarded and ruled, to their satis-
faction, the lives of numerous populations in
the Levant, whereas more modern ideals in the
West have not yet succeeded in bringing about
conditions of life that can meet the requirements of
man's mind and physical nature. As to the so-called
combativeness of the Turks and their supposed
fanaticism — which may be only due, considering they
were nomads at first, to their quick and headstrong
nature — they both were certainly lessened by their
intercourse and especially intermarriages with the
Mongols, a quiet and peaceful people largely in-
fluenced by Buddhism and Lamaism, which they all
profess, except a few Bouriate tribes that are still
Shamanist. Moreover, even if such suppositions
were true, their mixing with Western people could
only have a good influence in soothing their original
nature, whereas their eviction to Asia, by depriving
them of any direct and close contact with Europe,
would have the effect of reviving their former pro-
pensities.

Finally, the aforesaid document, though it was
really superficial and rather vague on this point,
purposed to give a crushing answer to the arguments
of the Ottoman memorandum about the religious
rivalries ; yet these arguments were well grounded
and most important, as appeared when the Pro-

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 57

testant campaign broke out and Anglo-American
opinion demanded the ejection of the Turks.

On June 27, 1919, the President of the Peace
Conference in Paris addressed a second letter to
Damad Ferid Pasha to inform him that the solution
of the Turkish problem was postponed.

After stating that the declarations made before the
Peace Conference by the Ottoman delegation " have
been, and will continue to be, examined most atten-
tively, as they deserve to be," the letter went on
to say that " they involve other interests than those
of Turkey, and raise international questions, the
immediate solution of which is unfortunately im-
possible; and it ended thus:

" Therefore, though the members of the Supreme Council
are eager to restore peace definitely and fully realise it is a
dangerous thing to protract the present period of uncertainty,
yet a sound study of the situation has convinced them that
some delay is unavoidable.

" They are of opinion, therefore, that a longer stay in Paris
of the Ottoman delegation, which the Ottoman Government
had asked to be allowed to send to France, would not be
conducive to any good.

" Yet a time will come when an exchange of views will be
profitable again; then the Allied and Associated Powers will
not fail to communicate with the Ottoman Government as to
the best means to settle the question easily and rapidly."

One of the reasons given for this adjournment was
the protest handed to Mr. Montagu, Secretary of
State for India, by the Maharaja of Bikanir in the
name of the Moslems of India, a protest which is
supposed to have shaken the decisions already taken
by the British Government.

At any rate, instead of maintaining the negotia
tions on a sound basis, and dealing squarely with the
difficulties of the Turkish question, which would have

58 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

made it possible to reach a better and more permanent
solution, the Allies seemed to wish to break off the
debates, or at least to postpone the discussion, in
order to manoeuvre and gain time. Perhaps they
did it on purpose, or the negotiations came to an
untimely end because, among the men who had
assumed the charge of European affairs, some meant
to intervene in them all the more eagerly because
they did not know anything about them. They were
not aware or had forgotten that in dealing with
Eastern affairs or in pursuing negotiations with
people of ancient civilisation, a great deal of deli-
cacy, discretion, and shrewdness is required at the
same time, and that generally diplomatists must
expect plenty of haggling and procrastination, must
avoid clashing with the adversary, and be able re-
peatedly to drop and resume a discussion smoothly,
sometimes after long delays.

Somebody then quoted the words of the well-
known French traveller Chardin in regard to Chevalier
Quirini who, about 1671, carried on negotiations in
Constantinople with the Vizier Ahmed Kiipriili on
behalf of the Republic of Venice :

" I heard M. Quirini say, when I had the honour of calling
upon him, that the policy of the Turks far excelled that of
the Europeans; that it was not restrained by maxims and
regulations, but was wholly founded on, and regulated by,
discernment. This policy, depending on no art or principles,
was almost beyond anybody's reach. So he candidly con-
fessed that the vizier's conduct was an utter mystery to him,
and he was unable to fathom its discrimination, depth,
secrecy, shrewdness, and artfulness."

It is noteworthy that the same vizier was also
able to cope successively with three ambassadors of
Louis XIV.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 59

The direction taken from the outset by the
deliberations of the Conference, and the standpoint
it took to settle the Turkish question, showed it was
about to give up the traditional policy of the French
kings in the East, which had been started by
Francis I, and the last representatives of which had
been the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis XV s ambas-
sador, and the Comte de Bonneval.

As early as the end of the eighteenth century
Voltaire, though he extolled Turkish tolerance
throughout his " Essai sur la tolerance," and wrote
that " two hundred thousand Greeks lived in security
in Constantinople," advocated quite a different policy
in his " Correspondance," and took sides with the
Russians against the Turks. After confessing that
" he had no turn for politics," and stating in " Can-
dide " that he only cared for the happiness of peoples,
he wrote to Frederick II :

" I devoutly hope the barbarous Turks will be driven out
of the land of Xenophon, ^Socrates, Plato, Sophocles, and
Euripides. If Europe really cared, that would soon be done.
But seven crusades of superstition were once undertaken,
and no crusade of honour will ever be undertaken; all the
burden will be left to Catherine."

He did not conceal how highly pleased he was
with the events of 1769-71, and he wrote to the
" Northern Semiramis," as he styled her:

" It is not sufficient to carry on a fortunate war against
such barbarians; it is not enough to humble their pride; they
ought to be driven away to Asia for ever. Your Imperial
Majesty restores me to life by killing the Turks. It has
always been my opinion that if their empire is ever destroyed,
it will be by yours."

Indeed, some people .maliciously hinted at the time
that Voltaire's opinion of the Turks was due to his

60 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

disappointment at the failure of his play "Mahomet,
ou le fanatisme," and that it was for the same reason
he wrote in his " Essai sur les mceurs et 1' esprit des
nations " while he was Madame du Chatelet's guest:

" Force and rapine built up the Ottoman Empire, and the
quarrels between Christians have kept it up. Hardly any
town has ever been built by the Turks. They have allowed
the finest works of antiquity to fall to decay; they rule over
ruins."

It seems that the members of the Supreme Council,
in their answer to the Turkish delegation, only
harped upon this old theme, and amplified it, and that
in their settlement of the question they were inspired
by similar considerations, evincing the same mis-
understanding of Turkey and the same political
error. The Supreme Council might have remem-
bered J. J. Rousseau's prophecy in his " Contrat
Social," which might very well be fulfilled now:
" The Russian Empire will endeavour to subjugate
Europe, but will be subjugated. The Tatars, its
subjects and neighbours, will become its masters and

ours too."1

* * *

The negotiations which had just been broken off
could only have been usefully carried on if the Allies
had quite altered their policy and had realised the
true condition of the Ottoman Empire and the
interests of the Western nations, especially those of
France.

The condition of the Ottoman Empire, as will be
seen later on, when we shall dwell upon the slow and
deep disintegration which had taken place among the

1 Chapter " Le Peuple."

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 61

Turkish and Arabian populations, was on the whole
as follows: The Young Turk revolution, on which
great hopes were built, had ended lamentably: the
Austrians had wrested Bosnia-Herzegovina from
Turkey; the Turco-Italian war had taken from her
another slice of her territory; then the coalition of
the Balkan States had arisen, which seems to have
been prepared and supported by England and by
the other nations which followed her policy. Finally,
the treaty of Bukharest confirmed the failure of the
principle — once solemnly proclaimed by France and
England — of the territorial integrity of Turkey. So
the Turks no longer had any confidence in Europe,
and, being sacrificed once more in the Balkan
war, and as they could no longer trust England,
they were necessarily thrown into the arms of
Germany.

After Abdul Hamid, Mehmed V, with his weak,
religious mind, allowed himself to be led by Enver,
and his reign, disturbed by three wars, cost
Turkey huge territorial losses. Mehmed VI, being
more energetic and straightforward, tried to restore
order in the State, and to put an end to the doings of
the Committee of Union and Progress.

Then, too, the Crown Prince, Abdul Mejid, a man
about fifty, who speaks French very well, evinces the
same turn of mind. After seeing what Germany could
do with the Turkish Empire, such men, who had not
kept aloof from modern ideas, and to whom European
methods were not unfamiliar, had made up their
mind that the Turks should not be driven out of
Europe. But Mejid Effendi was soon deprived of in-
fluence through intrigues, and henceforth engaged in

62 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

his favourite hobby, painting, in his palace on
Skutari Hill, and kept away from politics.

Mustafa Kemal, who had been sent to Amasia as
Inspector-General of the Eastern army, had secretly
raised an army on his own account, with the help
of Reouf Bey, once Minister of Marine in the Izzet
Cabinet. When recalled to Constantinople by the
Turkish Government in July, 1919, he had refused
to obey, and had proclaimed himself his own master.
Though he had once gone to Berlin with the Sultan,
who was only Crown Prince at the time, the latter
degraded him and deprived him of the right of
wearing his decorations — which could only have been
a political measure intended to show that the throne
and the Government could not openly countenance
the movement that was taking place in Anatolia.

Mustafa Kemal, brought up at Salonika, had only
become well known in Constantinople during the
Revolution of 1908. During the war in the Balkan
Peninsula he had distinguished himself at Chatalja,
and after being promoted colonel he was sent as
military attache to Sofia, and then charged with a
mission in Paris. He came back to Constantinople
in 1914, a short time before war broke out.

Of course, when he had started his career a long
time previously, Mustafa Kemal had been connected
indirectly with the Union and Progress party, as he
was at the head of the revolutionary group in which
this association originated, but he was never a
member of the Merkez-i-Oumimi, the central seat of
the Committee of Union and Progress. He was a good
officer, very fond of his profession, and, as he loathed
politics, he had soon kept away from them, and con-

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 63

sequently never played any part in them, and was
hardly ever influenced by them. Yet the supporters
of the Committee of Union and Progress, who have
made great mistakes, but have always been patriots,
have necessarily been compelled lately to co-operate
with him, though they did not like to do so at the
outset.

Mustafa Kemal was undoubtedly the real leader
of the movement which had already spread over the
whole of Anatolian Turkey. As his influence was
enormous and he had an undeniable ascendancy over
the Turkish troops he had recruited, his power was
soon acknowledged from Cartal, close to Constanti-
nople, to the Persian frontier. He had compelled
Liman von Sanders to give him command of a sector
at a moment when the Turks seemed to be in a
critical situation during the attack of the Anglo-
French fleet in the Dardanelles, and by not comply-
ing with his orders he had saved the Turkish army
by the victory of Anafarta, and perhaps prevented
the capture of Constantinople, for two hours after
the Allies, whose casualties had been heavy, retired.

But he had soon come into conflict with Enver
Pasha. Their disagreement had begun during the
war of Tripoli; it had increased during the Balkan
war, and had now reached an acute state. The chief
reason seems to be that they held quite different
opinions about the organisation of the army and the
conduct of the war operations. Mustafa Kemal
having always refused to take part in politics after
the Young Turk revolution of 1908, it seems difficult
to believe this hostility could be accounted for by
political reasons, though the situation had now

64 THE TURKS AND EUROPE t

completely changed. As to Mustafa Kemal's bicker-
ings and petty quarrels with several German generals
during the war, they seem to have had no other cause
than a divergence of views on technical points.

In consequence of this disagreement Mustafa
Kemal was sent to Mesopotamia in disgrace. He
came back to Constantinople a few weeks before
the armistice. After the occupation of Smyrna he
was appointed Inspector- General of Anatolia, where
he organised the national movement.

By Mustafa Kemal's side there stood Reouf Bey,
once Minister of Marine, who, during the Balkan war,
as commander of the cruiser Hamidie, had made
several raids in Greek waters, had then been one of
the signatories of the Moudros armistice, and now was
able to bring over to the Anatolian movement many
naval officers and sailors, and General Ali Fuad
Pasha, the defender of Fort Pisani at Janina during
the Balkan war, who had a great prestige among the
troops.

Bekir Sami Bey, once Governor-General, and
Ahmed Rustem Bey, formerly ambassador at Wash-
ington, were the first political men of note who joined
the nationalist movement. On Mustafa Kemal's
arrival at Erzerum, Kiazim Karabekir, together with
the other commanders, acknowledged him as their
chief, and pledged themselves to support him against
Constantinople.

Mustafa Kemal openly charged the Government
with betraying Turkey to the Allies, and asked all
those who wanted to defend their country and their
religion to join him. At that time he only had at
his disposal two divisions of regular troops; he sent

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 65

an appeal to the populations of Sivas and Ushak,
and many volunteers joined his colours. Colonel
Bekir Sami, who commanded the Panderma-Smyrna
line and all the district, also rebelled against the
Constantinople Government, and soon his 10,000
soldiers joined the troops of Mustafa Kemal, who
assumed the general command of all the insurgent
troops. On the other hand, Kiazim Bey threatened
to resume hostilities, in case too heavy conditions
should be forced on Turkey. Mustafa Kemal, as he
refused to make any concessions to the victors of
Turkey, and opposed any separatist idea or the
cession of any Ottoman territories, of course had
with him a large section of public opinion, which
was roused by the Allies' threat to take from Turkey
half her possessions, Thrace, Smyrna, and Kurdistan,
and to drive the Sultan into Asia.

On July 23, a Congress of the committees which
had been established in various parts of the Empire
for the defence of the national rights was held at
Erzerum.

The proceedings were secret, but at the end of the
congress an official report was sent to the High Com-
missioners of the Allies in Constantinople.

An " Anatolian and Rumelian League for the
Defence of the National Rights " was formed, which
later on was called the "National Organisation."
According to what has become known about the
sittings of the Congress, the principles that were to
control the action of the National Organisation and
to constitute its programme were the following :
(1) Grouping of the various Moslem nationalities of
the Empire into a whole politically and geographi-

5

66 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

cally indivisible and administered so as to ensure
the respect of their ethnic and social differences.
(2) Equality of rights for non-Moslem communities
so far as consistent with the principle of the political
unity of the State. (3) Integrity of the Empire
within the boundaries of Turkish sovereignty as they
were in September, 1918, when the armistice was
concluded — which are almost the same as the ethnic
boundaries of Turkey. (4) No infringement what-
ever on the sovereignty of the Turkish Empire. A
special article expressed the sincere wish on the part
of the Turkish nation, with a view to the general
restoration of Turkey, to accept the support of any
Western country, providing the latter did not aim
at an economic or political subjection of any kind.

This programme was sanctioned in the course of a
second Congress which was held at Sivas at the
beginning of September, 1919, to allow the local
committees which had not been able to send delegates
to Erzerum to give their approbation to it and to
adhere to the national movement.

The executive functions of the Congress were
entrusted to a representative committee presided
over by Mustafa Kemal, and consisting of members
chosen by the Congress, who were : Reouf Bey, Bekir
Sami Bey, Hoja Raif Effendi, Mazhar Bey, once
vali of Bitlis, and later on Ahmed Rustem Bey, once
Turkish ambassador at Washington, Haidar Bey,
once vali of Kharput, and Hakki Behij Bey.

The local militias which had been raised took the
name of national forces; and when they had been
linked with the regular army, they were put by
Mustafa Kemal under the command of Kara Bekir

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 67

Kiazim Pasha, who became commander-in-chief in
Eastern Anatolia, and Ali Fuad Pasha, who had the
command of the forces of Western Anatolia.

Two delegates of the " Liberal Entente," some
leaders of which group seemed open to foreign
influence, were sent to Constantinople to ask the
Central Committee what attitude was to be taken,
and were prudently ordered to enjoin the supporters
of the Liberal Entente to be most careful.

But though part of the Constantinople Press
seemed to deny any importance to the Anatolian
movement, the Stambul Government deemed it
proper to send missions to Trebizond, Angora, and
Eskishehr, headed by influential men, in order to
restore order in those regions. It also directed two
of its members to go to the rebellious provinces to
see how things stood, and come to terms with
Mustafa Kemal. Some of these missions never
reached the end of their journey; most of them had
to retrace their steps, some did not even set out. In
September, 1919, Marshal Abdullah Pasha, who had
instructions to reach Mustafa Kemal at Trebizond,
and enjoin him to give up his self -assumed command,
did not stir from Constantinople. The Government
also sent General Kemal Pasha, commander of the
gendarmerie, to scatter the nationalist irregular
troops, but nothing was heard of him after a while,
and he was supposed to have been taken prisoner
by, or gone over to, the rebels. The Anatolian
valis and commanders who had been summoned to
Constantinople did not come, protesting they could
not do so or were ill. '

On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal sent back to

68 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Constantinople Jemal Bey, vali of Konia, and a few
functionaries, who had remained loyal to the Stambul
Government. Ismail Bey, vali of Brusa, one of the
most important leaders of the Liberal Entente, was
driven out of office by both Governments.

In addition, the cleavages already existing in the
Ottoman Empire, which since 1913 only included the
prominently Moslem provinces, had widened, and
endangered the unity of the Empire. In the pro-
vinces where the Arabic-speaking Moslems were in
a majority the authority of the Turkish Government
dwindled every day; they meant to shake off the
Ottoman yoke, and at the same time to keep off any
Western influence; they also wished more and more
eagerly to part from the provinces where the Turks
and Ottoman Kurds — who aim at uniting together —
are in a majority.

For the last four centuries France had enjoyed an
exceptional situation in Turkey. Her intellectual
influence was paramount ; French was not only known
among the upper classes, but it was also in current
use in politics and business, and even a good many
clerks in post-offices and booking-offices at Con-
stantinople understood it.

French schools, owing to their very tolerant spirit,
were very popular among nearly all classes of the
Turkish population, and the sympathies we had thus
acquired and the intellectual prestige we enjoyed
were still more important than our material interests.
Nearly 25,000 children attended the French ele-
mentary schools, most of them religious schools, which

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 69

bears witness both to the confidence the Mahom-
medans had in us, and the tolerance they showed.
The Grammar School of Galata-Serai, established in
1868 by Sultan Abdul Aziz with the co-operation of
Duruy, French Minister of Public Education, and
several other secondary schools which are now closed,
diffused French culture and maintained sympathy
between the two peoples. The Jesuits' school of
medicine at Beyrut also spread our influence.

The material interests of France in Turkey were
also of great importance; and it was, therefore, a
great mistake for France to follow a policy that was
bound to ruin the paramount influence she had
acquired. The other Western States had as impor-
tant interests as France; and it was necessary to
take all these facts into account if an equitable
settlement of the Turkish question was to be reached.

France, England, and Germany were, before the
war, the three Powers that owned the most impor-
tant financial concerns in Turkey, France easily
holding the premier position, owing to the amount of
French capital invested in Turkish securities, Govern-
ment stocks, and private companies.

From 1854 to 1875 thirteen loans — almost one
every year — were issued by the Ottoman Govern-
ment, ten being entrusted to the care of French banks
or financial establishments controlled by French
capital.

These thirteen loans have only an historical interest
now, except the three loans issued in 1854, 1855, and
1871, secured on the Egyptian tribute, which still
exist with some modifications, but may be looked
upon as Egyptian or rather English securities, and

70 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

were not included in the settlement effected in 1881
which converted them into new bonds, and the
1870-71 loan, styled "Lots Turcs," the whole of
which at the time was subscribed by Baron Hirsch
in return for the concession of railways in Europe.
To them let us add another financial operation
effected about 1865, consisting in the unification of
the various bonds of the interior debt and their
conversion into bonds representing a foreign debt.

Most of these operations were controlled by the
Imperial Ottoman Bank, founded by the most in-
fluential English and French financial groups, to
which the Ottoman Government by its firmans of
1863 and 1875 granted the privilege of being the
State bank. It thus has the exclusive right of
issuing banknotes, and has the privilege of being the
general paymaster of the Empire and the financial
agent of the Government, both at home and abroad.

The financial activity of the French companies was
only interrupted by the 1870 war. The only com-
petition met with was that of a few English banks,
which no doubt intended to second the views of the
British Government in Egypt, and of an Austrian
syndicate for the building of the Balkan railways
which, later on, furthered the penetration of Austria-
Hungary in Eastern Europe.

In 1875 the nominal capital of the Ottoman debt
rose to 5,297,676,500 francs. The Ottoman Govern-
ment, finding it impossible to pay the interest on the
Government stocks, announced its decision on
October 6, 1875, to give only one-half in cash in the
future. The Imperial Ottoman Bank, which was
practically under French control owing to the im-

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 71

portance of the French capital invested in it, raised
a protest on behalf of the bondholders.

The Porte then agreed to make arrangements with
the French, the Italians, the Austrians, the Germans,
and the Belgians. The claims of the bondholders were
laid before the plenipotentiaries who had met at
Berlin to revise the preliminaries of San Stefano,
and were sanctioned by the Berlin treaty signed on
July 13, 1878. They had three chief objects: First,
to secure the right of first mortgage which the creditors
of the Empire held from the loans secured on the
Russian war indemnity; secondly, to appoint the
contributive share of the Ottoman debt incumbent
on the provinces detached from the Empire; thirdly,
to decide what was to be done to restore Turkish
finance.

After the conversations with the plenipotentiaries
assembled at Berlin, and chiefly owing to the inter-
vention of the French representative, M. Waddington,
the Congress embodied the following clauses in the
treaty in order to protect the interests of the bond-
holders: Bulgaria was to pay the Sultan a tribute;
part of the revenue of Eastern Rumelia was to be
assigned to the payment of the Ottoman Public Debt ;
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro were to assume
a part of the Ottoman debt proportionately to the
Turkish territories annexed by each of them ; all the
rights and duties of the Porte relating to the railways
of Eastern Rumelia were to be wholly maintained;
finally, the Powers advised the Sublime Porte to
establish an international financial commission in
Constantinople.

In this way the Berlin treaty laid down the prin-

72 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

ciples on which every financial reorganisation was
to be based whenever a province should be detached
from the Ottoman Empire.

Then the mandatories of the bondholders began
to negotiate directly with the Ottoman Empire, but
as the various schemes that were preferred failed, the
Imperial Ottoman Bank, supported by the Galata
bankers, proposed an arrangement that was sanc-
tioned by the Convention of November 10 to 22,
1879. In this way the administration of the Six
Contributions was created, to which were farmed out
for a period of ten years the revenues derived from
stamp duties, spirits in some provinces, the fisheries
of Constantinople and the suburbs, and the silk tax
within the same area and in the suburbs of Adrianople,
Brusa, and Samsun; it was also entrusted with
the collection and administration of the revenues
proceeding from the monopolies in salt and
tobacco.

At the request of the Imperial Ottoman Bank the
revenues of this administration, first allocated to the
Priority Bonds, of which she owned the greater part,
were divided later on between all the bondholders.

In this way the important agreement known as
the decree of Muharrem, in which the French
played a paramount part, was made possible (Decem-
ber 8 to 20, 1881), according to which the original
capital of the foreign Turkish loans was brought
down to the average price of issue, plus 10 per cent,
of this new capital as a compensation for the interest
that had not been paid since 1876. The old bonds
were stamped, converted, and exchanged for new
bonds called Bonds of the Unified Converted Debt,

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 73

except the " Lots Turcs," which, being premium
bonds, were treated separately.

The interest of the Converted Debt was fixed at
from 1 to 4 per cent, of the new capital.

As to the amortisation, the decree divided the
various foreign loans into several series according to
the value of the mortgage; this classification stated
in what order they would be subject to amortisation.

The outcome of these negotiations, the decree of
Muharrem, also established a set of concessions
which could not be revoked before the extinction of
the debt, and organised the administration of the
Ottoman Public Debt, which was to collect and
administer, on behalf of the Ottoman bondholders,
the revenues conceded as guarantee of the debt.

The Ottoman Government pledged itself to allocate
to the payment of the interest and to the amortisa-
tion of the reduced debt till its extinction the fol-
lowing revenues : the monopolies in salt and tobacco;
the Six Contributions (tobacco, salt, spirits, stamps,
fisheries, silk) ; any increase in the customs duties
resulting from the modification of the commercial
treaties; any increase of the revenues resulting from
new regulations affecting patents and licences (temettu) ;
the tribute of the principality of Bulgaria; any sur-
plus of the Cyprus revenues; the tribute of Eastern
Rumelia; the produce of the tax on pipe tobacco
(tumbeki}\ any sums which might be fixed as con-
tributions due from Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and
Montenegro for the service of the debt.

The administration of the Ottoman Public Debt
was entrusted to " the Council for the. Administration
of the Ottoman Public Debt," commonly known as

74 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

" the Public Debt," consisting of delegates of Otto-
man bondholders of all nations. The French owned
by far the greater part of the debt. The English
represented the Belgians in the Council, the shares
of these two countries in the debt being about
equal.

This international council, who attended to the
strict execution of the provisions of the decree,
deducted all the sums required for the interest and
the sinking fund, and made over the. balance to the
Imperial treasury.

The decree of Muharrem also entrusted to the
Public Debt the control of the cultivation and the
monopoly of the sale of tobacco throughout the
Turkish Empire. Later on, in 1883, the Public Debt
farmed out its rights to an Ottoman limited com-
pany, the " Regie Co-interessee des Tabacs de
['Empire," formed by a financial consortium in-
cluding three groups: the Imperial Ottoman Bank,
which was a Franco-English concern; the German
group of the B. Bleichroder Bank ; and the Austrian
group of the Kredit Anstalt with a capital of
100 million francs. Only one-half of this capital
was paid up — i.e., 50 million francs — which was
cut down to 40 million francs on November 28,
1899, to make up for the losses of the first three
years. It is thought in French financial circles that
half this capital — viz., 20 million francs — is French,
and the rest chiefly Austrian.

The " Regie," whose activities extend throughout
the Empire, may be looked upon as one of the most
important financial concerns of the Ottoman Empire.
It has branches in all the chief centres, controls the

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 75

cultivation of tobacco, records the production, buys
native and foreign tobaccos, issues licences for the
sale of tobacco, and advances money to the growers ;
its chief factories are at Samsun, Aleppo, Adana,
Smyrna, etc. In return for the monopoly it enjoys, it
owes the Public Debt a fixed yearly payment, and has
to divide a fixed proportion of its net profits between
the Public Debt and the Ottoman Government.

The share of France in the Council of the Public
Debt, in which French was the official language, gave
her a paramount influence and prestige in the Otto-
man Empire. Owing to the importance and extent
of the part played by the Council of the Debt, in
which the influence of France was paramount, the
latter country indirectly acquired an influence in the
administration of the Malie — i.e., in the administra-
tion of the Turkish treasury — and in this way Turkey
was obliged on several occasions to call for the advice
of French specialists for her financial reorganisation.

But the Ottoman Government, in order to con-
solidate its floating debt, which had not been included
in the previous liquidation, was soon compelled to
borrow money abroad. Besides, it wanted to con-
struct a system of railways at that time.

The loan guaranteed by the customs duties in 1886,
the Osmanie loan in 1890, the 4 per cent. Tombac
preferential loan in 1893, the Eastern Railway loan
in 1894, the 5 per cent. 1896 loan, and the 4 per cent.
1901 loan, were all floated in France, and the English
had no share in the financial operations between
1881 and 1904.

During the same period Germany, through the
Deutsche Bank, took up the Fishery loan in 1888

76 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

and the 4 per cent. Baghdad Railway loan in 1903.
Later on the German financial companies, together
with the Deutsche Bank, gave Turkey as much support
as the French banks, in order to promote Pan-
Germanism in the East and oust French influence.
The chief financial operations carried on by these
companies were the Baghdad Railway loan, the
Tejhizat loan for the payment of military supplies,
and the 1911 loan, which were both a guarantee and
an encouragement for the German policy of penetra-
tion in Turkey, and paved the way to a Germano-
Ottoman understanding.

France continued to subscribe all the same, from
1903 to 1914, to six of the twelve Turkish loans raised
by the Ottoman Government; four others were taken
up by Germany, another by England, and the sixth —
the 4 per cent. 1908 loan — was issued one-half in
France, one-fourth in Germany, and one-fourth in
England. In 1914, as a reward for issuing a loan of
800 million francs in Paris — the first slice being
500 million — France obtained the settlement of
several litigious cases and new concessions of railways
and ports.

At the outbreak of the war, the external debt of
Turkey, including the Unified Debt and other loans,
amounted to 3£ milliards of francs, whereas the
Turkish revenue hardly exceeded 500 million francs.
One-third of this sum went to the sinking fund
of the external debt, of which, roughly speaking,
France alone owned nearly 60 per cent., Germany
nearly 26 per cent., and England a little more than
14 per cent.

In addition to this, in the sums lent to Turkey by

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE

77

private companies, the share of France was about
50 per cent. — i.e., over 830 million francs; that of
Germany rose to 35 per cent. ; and that of England a
little more than 14 per cent.

Foreign participation in the great works and the
various economic or financial concerns in Turkey may
be summed up as follows :

France.

.
England.

Germany.

Banks
Railways
Ports and wharves
Water
Mines
Various concerns

37-7
46-9
67-9
88-6
100-0
62-8

33-3
10-4

12-2

24-1

28-0
46-6
19-7
11-3

13-0

Total per cent. . .
Capital (million francs)

50-5
830

14-3
235

35-0
575

Not only had France an important share in the
organisation of Turkish finances, but had opened
three banks while the English established but one,
the National Bank of Turkey, which holds no privilege
from the State, and is merely a local bank for business
men. Two German banks — the Deutsche Orient Bank
and the Deutsche Palastina Bank, founded almost as
soon as Germany began to show her policy regarding
Turkish Asia — had turned their activity towards
Turkey, as we have just seen.

France incurred an outlay of 550 million francs —
not including the sums invested in companies which
were not predominantly French, such as the Baghdad
Railway — for the building of 1,500 miles of railway
lines, while the Germans built almost as many, and

78 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

the English only 450 miles; and France spent
58 million francs for the ports, whereas the English
only spent 10 million francs.

The railway concessions worked by French capital
included the Damascus-Hama line, which after-
wards reached Jaffa and Jerusalem; the tramways
of Lebanon; the Mudania-Brusa line; the Smyrna-
Kassaba railway; the Black Sea railways which,
according to the 1914 agreement, were to extend
from Kastamuni to Erzerum, and from Trebizond to
Kharput, and be connected with the Rayak-Ramleh
line — viz., 1,600 miles of railway altogether in Syria;
the Salonika-Constantinople line.

Before the London treaty, the Eastern railways
in European Turkey, representing 600 miles, were
worked by Austro-German capital, and the Salonika-
Monastir line, 136 miles in length, had a German
capital of 70 million francs.

The concessions with German capital in Asia Minor
formed a complete system of railways, including the
Anatolian railways, with a length of 360 miles and a
capital of 344,500,000 francs; the Mersina-Tarsus-
Adana line, 42 miles, capital 9,200,000 francs; the
Baghdad Railway, whose concession was first given
to the Anatolian railways but was ceded in 1903 to
the Baghdad Railway Company, and which before
the war was about 190 miles in length.

As the building of this system of railways closely
concerned the French companies of the Smyrna-
Kassaba and Beyrut-Damascus railways and the
English company of the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the
French companies and the Ottoman Imperial Bank
concluded arrangements with the holders of the

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE

79

80 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

concessions to safeguard French interests as much as
possible. Thus a French financial group took up a
good many of the Baghdad bonds (22,500 and 21,155
bonds) and numerous shares of the " Societe de
construction du chemin de fer " established in 1909.
On the whole, the share of the French consortium
before the war amounted to 4,000,000 francs on the
one hand, and 1,950,000 francs on the other; the
share of the German consortium was 11,000,000 and
8,050,000 francs.

The concessions controlled by English capital were
the Smyrna-Aidin line, 380 miles long, with a capital
of 114,693,675 francs, and the Smyrna-Kassaba line,
which was ceded later on to the company controlled
by French capital which has already been mentioned.
They were the first two railway concessions given in
Turkey (1856 and 1863).

In Constantinople the port, the lighthouses, the
gasworks, the waterworks, and the tramways were
planned and built by French capital and labour.

The port of Smyrna, whose concession was given
in 1867 to an English company and two years after
passed into the hands of some Marseilles contractors,
was completed by the " Societe des quais de Smyrne,"
a French limited company. The diversion of the
Ghedis into the Gulf of Phocea in order to prevent
the port being blocked up with sand was the work of
a French engineer, Rivet.

The Bay of Beyrut has also been equipped by a
French company founded in 1888 under the patronage
of the Ottoman Bank by a group of the chief French
shareholders of the Beyrut-Damascus road and other
French financial companies.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 81

Moreover, accoroling to the 1914 agreements, the
ports of Ineboli and Heraclea on the Black Sea, and
the ports of Tripoli, Jaffa, and Haifa in Syria, were
to be built exclusively by French capital. So it was
with the intended concessions of the ports of Samsun
and Trebizond.

At Beyrut a French group in 1909 bought up the
English concession for the building of the water-
works and pipelines, and formed a new company.
French capital, together with Belgian capital, also
control the Gas Company, Tramway Company, and
Electric Company of Beyrut. Only at Smyrna, where
the gasworks are in the hands of an English company
and the waterworks are owned by a Belgian com-
pany, has France not taken part in the organisation
of the municipal services.

Only the port of Haidar-Pasha, the terminus of the
Anatolian Railway, has been ceded by this company
to a financial company whose shares are in German
hands.

To these public establishments should be added
such purely private industrial or commercial concerns
as the Orosdi-Back establishments; the Oriental
Tobacco Company; the Tombac Company; the
" Societe nationale pour le commerce, rindustrie et
Pagriculture dans 1'Empire ottoman " ; the concession
of Shukur-ova, the only French concession of landed
property situated in the Gulf of Atexandretta on the
intended track of the Baghdad Railway, including
about 150,000 acres of Imperial land, which represent
an entirely French capital of 64 million francs ; the
Oriental Carpet Company, which is a Franco-British
concern; the Joint Stock Imperial Company of the

6

82 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Docks, Dockyards, and Shipbuilding Yards, which is
entirely under British control, etc.

During the war, the share of France and that of
England were increased, as far as the Public Debt is
concerned, by the amount of the coupons which were
not cashed by the stockholders of the Allied countries,
while the holders of Ottoman securities belonging to
the Central Powers cashed theirs.

Beyond this, Turkey borrowed of Germany
about 3 £ milliards of francs. An internal loan of
400 million francs had also been raised. To these
sums should be added 2 milliards of francs for buying
war supplies and war material, and the treasury
bonds issued by Turkey for her requisitions, which
cannot be cashed but may amount to about
700 million francs. As the requisitions already made
during the Balkan wars, which amounted to 300 or
400 million francs, have not yet been liquidated, the
whole Turkish debt may be valued at over 10
billion francs.

Finally, in the settlement of the Turkish question,
the war damages borne by the French in Turkey
should also be taken into account, which means an
additional sum of about 2 milliards of francs.

The French owned in Turkey great industrial or
agricultural establishments, which were wholly or
partly destroyed. At Constantinople and on the shores
of the Marmora alone they had about fifty religious or
undenominational schools, which were half destroyed,
together with everything they contained, perhaps in
compliance with the wishes of Germany, who wanted
to ruin French influence for ever in that country.

In order to keep up French influence in the East,

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 83

the High Commissioner of the Republic had, in the
early days of the armistice, warned his Government
it was necessary to provide a fund at once to defray
the expenses of the schools and other institutions
established by the French in Turkey in pre-war time
— which sums of money were to be advanced on the
outstanding indemnity. For want of any existing
law, this request could not be complied with; but,
as will be seen later on, the Peace Treaty, though it
says nothing about this urgent question, states that
the indemnities due to the subjects of the Allied
Powers for damages suffered by them in their persons
or in their property shall be allotted by an inter-
Allied financial commission, which alone shall have
a right to dispose of Turkish revenue and to sanction
the payment of war damages. But all this post-
pones the solution of the question indefinitely.

In the settlement of the Turkish question, the chief
point is how Turkey will be able to carry out her
engagements, and so, in her present condition, the
policy which England and America, followed by Italy
and France, seem to advocate, is a most question-
able one.

Javid Bey has even published an account of the
condition of Turkey, in which he finds arguments
to justify the adhesion of his country to the policy
of Germany.

Nevertheless it seems that Turkey, where the
average taxation is now from 23 to 25 francs per
head, can raise fresh taxes. The revenue of the State
will also necessarily increase owing to the increase of
production, as a tithe- of 10 to 12 per cent, is levied
on all agricultural produce. Finally, the building of

84 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

new railway lines and the establishment of new
manufactures — to which, it must be said, some com-
peting States have always objected for their own
benefit but to the prejudice of Turkey — would enable
her to make herself the manufactured goods she
bought at a very high price before, instead of sending
abroad her raw materials: silk, wool, cotton, hemp,
opium, etc.

The soil of Turkey, on the other hand, contains
a good deal of mineral and other wealth, most of
which has not been exploited yet. There is a good
deal of iron in Asia Minor, though there exists but
one iron-mine, at Ayasmat, opposite to Mitylene, the
yearly output of which is only 30,000 tons. The
most important beds now known are those of the
Berut Hills, north of the town of Zeitun, about
fifty miles from the Gulf of Alexandretta, which may
produce 300,000 tons a year. Chrome, manganese,
and antimony are also found there.

There is copper everywhere in the north, in thin
but rich layers, containing 20 per cent, of metal. The
chief mine, which is at Argana, in the centre of
Anatolia, is a State property. A French company,
the Syndicate of Argana, founded for the prospecting
and exploitation of the copper concessions at Argana
and Malatia, and the concessions of argentiferous
lead at Bulgar-Maden, had begun prospecting before
the war.

Lead, zinc, and silver are found, too, in the Kara-
hissar area, where is the argentiferous lead mine of
Bukar-Dagh, once a State property. Before the war
a French company of the same type as the one
above mentioned, the Syndicate of Ak-Dagh, had

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 85

obtained the right to explore the layers of zinc and
argentiferous lead in the vilayet of Angora. The
mines of Balia-Karaidin (argentiferous lead and
lignite) lying north-east of the Gulf of Adramyti in
the sanjak of Karassi, are controlled by French
capital. The English syndicate Borax Consolidated
has the concession of the boracite mines in the same
sandjak.

The range of Gumich-Dagh, or " Silver Mountain,"
contains much emery. At Eskishehr there are mines
of meerschaum, and in the Brusa vilayet quarries of
white, pink, and old-blue marble, lapis-lazuli, etc.

A few years ago gold layers were being exploited
at Mender- Aidin, near Smyrna, and others have been
found at Chanak-Kale, near the Dardanelles. Some
gold-mines had been worked in Arabia in remote

There are oil-fields throughout the peninsula, lying
in four parallel lines from the north-west to the south-
east. The best-known fields are in the provinces of
Mosul and Baghdad, where nearly two hundred have
been identified; others have also been found near the
Lake of Van, and at Pulk, west of Erzerum, which
are not inferior to those of Mesopotamia ; and others
fifty miles to the south of Sinope.

There are almost inexhaustible layers of excellent
asphalt at Latakieh, on the slopes of the Libanus,
and others, quite as good, at Kerkuk, Hit, and in
several parts of Mesopotamia.

Finally, some coal-mines are being worked at
Heraclea which are controlled by French capital, and
coal outcrops have been found lately in the Mosul
area near the Persian frontier, between Bashkala and

86 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Rowanduz and Zahku, close to the Baghdad Rail-
way. But the treaty, as will be shown later on, is to
deprive Turkey of most of these sources of wealth.

Among the other products of Turkey may be men-
tioned carpets, furs (fox, weasel, marten, and otter),
and, particularly, silks. The silks of Brusa are more
valuable than those of Syria — the latter being difficult
to wind; their output has decreased because many
mulberry-trees were cut down during the war, but
the industry will soon resume its importance.

Turkey also produces a great quantity of leather
and hides, and various materials used for tanning:
valonia, nut-gall, acacia. It is well known that for
centuries the leather trade has been most important
in the East, numerous little tanyards are scat-
tered about the country, and there are large leather
factories in many important towns. The Young
Turks, realising the bright prospects of that trade,
had attempted to prohibit the exportation of leathers
and hides, and to develop the leather manufacture.
During the summer of 1917 the National Ottoman
Bank of Credit opened a leather factory at Smyrna,
and appointed an Austrian tanner as its director.
Owing to recent events, it has been impossible to
establish other leather factories, but this scheme is
likely to be resumed with the protection of the
Government, for the leather industry may become
one of the chief national industries.

* # *

The Peace Conference, by postponing the solution
of the Turkish problem indefinitely, endangered not
only French interests in Turkey, but the condition of
Eastern Europe.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 87

The consequences of such a policy soon became
obvious, and at the beginning of August it was
reported that a strong Unionist agitation had started.
The Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha, after the answer
given by the Entente to the delegation he presided
over, was discredited, as it could not even give the
main features of the forthcoming peace, or state an
approximate date for its conclusion. He could have
remained in offi.ce only if the Allies had supported
him by quickly solving the Turkish problem. Besides,
he soon lost all control over the events that hurried on.

In the first days of summer, the former groups of
Young Turks were reorganised in Asia Minor; some
congresses of supporters of the Union and Progress
Committee, who made no secret of their determina-
tion not to submit to the decisions that the Versailles
Congress was likely to take later on, were held at
Erzerum, Sivas, and Amasia, and openly supported
motions of rebellion against the Government. At
the same time the Turkish Army was being quickly
reorganised, outside the Government's control, under
the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and Reouf Bey.
An openly nationalist, or rather national, movement
asserted itself, which publicly protested both against
the restoration of the old regime and the dismember-
ment of Turkey.

Even in Constantinople the Unionist Committee
carried on an unrestrained propaganda and plotted
to overthrow Damad Ferid Pasha and put in his place
Izzet Pasha, a shrewd man, who had signed the
armistice with the Allies, and favoured a policy of
compromise.

This movement had started after the resignation of

88 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

the Izzet Pasha Cabinet, when the prominent men
of the Unionist party had to leave Constantinople.
First, it had been chiefly a Unionist party, but had
soon become decidedly national in character. Every-
where, but chiefly in Constantinople, it had found
many supporters, and the majority of the cultured
classes sympathised with the leaders of the
Anatolian Government.

Moreover, the Allies, by allowing the Greeks to
land in Smyrna without any valid reason, had
started a current of opinion which strengthened the
nationalist movement, and raised the whole of Turkey
against them.

At the beginning of October, 1919, the Sultan
replaced Damad Ferid Pasha by Ali Riza Pasha as
Prime Minister. Reshid Pasha, formerly Minister
of Public Works and ambassador at Vienna, who
had been ambassador at Rome till the revolution of
1908, and had been first Turkish delegate in the
Balkan Conference in London in 1912-13, became
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Grand Vizier General Ali Riza had been Minister
of War, and Reshid Pasha Foreign Minister in the
Tewfik Cabinet, which had come into office in Decem-
ber, 1918, at a time when the Porte was anxious to
conciliate the Allies. Ali Riza had led the operations
on the Balkan front in 1912 and 1913, but had refused
to assume any command during the Great War, as he
had always opposed the participation of Turkey in
this war. As he was rather a soldier than a diplomat,
his policy seemed likely to be led by his Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Reshid Pasha, who was said to be a
friend of France.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 89

General Jemal Pasha Kush.uk, who became War
Minister, was quite a Nationalist. He was called
Jemal Junior, to distinguish him from the other
Jemal who had been Commander-in-Chief of the
Fourth Turkish Army during the war. He, too, had
commanded in Palestine. He was popular in the
army and among the Unionists. Rightly or wrongly,
he was supposed to be in correspondence with Kemal,
the leader of the Nationalist movement in Asia Minor,
and his appointment intimated that Ali Eiza did not
want to break off with Kemal, whose rebellion had
brought about Damad Ferid's resignation.

Said Mollah, Under-Secretary of Justice, a friend
of England, edited the newspaper Turkje Stan/ibid, in
which he carried on a strong pro-English propaganda.
It was said he was paid by Abdul Hamid to spy
upon a former Sheik-ul-Islam, Jemal ed Din Effendi,
his uncle and benefactor. It seems that by appoint-
ing him the Sultan wished to create a link within
the new Government between the supporters of
England and those of France, in order to show that
in his opinion Turkey's interest was, not to put
these two nations in opposition to each other, but, on
the contrary, to collaborate closely with them both for
the solution of Eastern affairs.

Sultan Mehemet VI, by doing so, endeavoured to
restore calm and order in Turkey, and also to enhance
his prestige and authority over the Nationalist rebels
in Anatolia who, at the Congress of Sivas, had plainly
stated they refused to make any compromise either
with the Porte or the Allies. The choice of the
new Ministers marked a concession to the Nationalist
and revolutionary spirit.

90 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

About the end of 1919 there were serious indications
that the Nationalist movement was gaining ground
in Cilicia, and in January, 1920, disturbances broke
out in the Marash area.

In September, 1919, some armed bands, wearing
the khaki uniform of the regular Turkish Army, had
been recruited at Mustafa Kemal's instigation. A
French officer had been sent to Marash for the first
time to watch over the Jebel Bereket district, which
commands all the tunnels of the Baghdad Railway
between Mamurah and Islahie. In December one of
those armed bands, numbering about 200 men,
occupied the road leading from Islahie to Marash,
and intercepted the mail.

As the conditions that were likely to be enforced
upon Turkey were becoming known, discontent in-
creased. General Dutieux, commanding the French
troops of Cilicia, determined to send a battalion as
reinforcement. The battalion set off at the beginning
of January and arrived at Marash on the 10th, after
some pretty sharp fighting on the way at El Oglo.
As the attacks were getting more numerous and the
Nationalist forces increased in number, a new French
detachment, more important than the first, and
provided with artillery, was dispatched to Islahie,
which it reached on the 14th. This column met
with no serious incident on the way from Islahie to
Marash; it reached Marash on the 17th, at which
date it was stated that all the district of Urfa,
Aintab, Antioch, Marash, and Islahie was pacified.

That was a mistake, for it soon became known that
the chiefs of Bazarjik, a place lying halfway between
Marash and Aintab, had gone over to the Kemalists,

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 91

and had just sent an ultimatum to the French com-
mander demanding the evacuation of the country.

On February 3 the French troops at Marash were
attacked by Turkish and Arabian troops coming from
the East, who intended to drive them away, and join
the main body of the Arabian army.

A French column under the command of Colonel
Normand reached Marash, and after a good deal of
hard fighting with the Nationalists, who were well
armed, relieved the French. But Armenian legion-
aries had most imprudently been sent; and after
some squabbles, which might have been foreseen,
between Moslems and Armenians, the French com-
mander had bombarded the town, and then had been
compelled to evacuate it. These events, later on,
led to the recall of Colonel Bremond, whose policy,
after the organisation of the Armenian legions, had
displeased the Moslem population.

Two months after the Marash affair on February 10
the tribes in the neighbourhood of Urfa, which the
French, according to the Anglo-French agreement of
1916, had occupied at the end of 1919 after about a
year of British occupation, attacked the stations of
the Baghdad Railway lying to the south, and cut off
the town from the neighbouring posts. The French
detachment was first blocked up in the Armenian
quarter, was then attacked, and after two months'
fighting, being on the verge of starvation, had to enter
into a parley with the Turkish authorities and
evacuate the town on April 10. But while the French
column retreated southwards, it was assailed by
forces far superior in number, and had to surrender;
some men were slaughtered, others marched back to

92 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Urfa or reached the French posts lying farther south
of Arab Punar or Tel-Abiad.

On April 1 — that is to say, nearly at the same
time — the Turks attacked the American mission at
Aintab. French troops were sent to their help as soon
as the American consul-general at Beyrut asked for
help. They arrived on April 17, and, after resisting
for eighteen days, the few members of the American
mission were able to withdraw to Aleppo, where
they met with American refugees from Urfa, with
the French column sent to relieve them.

In a speech made in the Ottoman Chamber of
Deputies about the validation of the mandates of
the members for Adana, Mersina, and other districts
of Asia Minor, Reouf Bey, a deputy and former
Minister of Marine, maintained that the occupation
of Cilicia had not been allowed in the armistice, and
so the occupation of this province by the French
was a violation of the treaty.

In the middle of February the Grand Vizier and
the Minister of Foreign Affairs handed the Allied
representatives a memorandum drawn up by the
Government to expound the situation brought about
by the postponement of the conclusion of the Peace
Treaty, and chiefly requested:

(1) That the Turkish inhabitants, in the districts
where they were in a majority, should be left under
Turkish sovereignty, and that their rights should be
guaranteed.

(2) That the position of the regions occupied by
the Allies should be altered.

(3) That the Turkish delegation should be heard
before irrevocable decisions were taken.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 93

The Allies, too, felt it was necessary to come to
a settlement; and as they had waited too long since
they had dismissed the Turkish delegation in July
of the previous year, the situation was getting
critical now. As the United States, which took less
and less interest in European affairs, did not seem
anxious to intervene in the solution of the Eastern
problem, Mr. Lloyd George, on Thursday, Decem-
ber 18, 1919, in an important speech in which he
gave some information about the diplomatic con-
versations that were taking place in London, came
to the Turkish question and stated that the terms
of the treaty would soon be submitted to Turkey.

"My noble friend said: ' Why could you not make peace
with Turkey, cutting out all the non-Turkish territories, and
then leaving Constantinople and Anatolia to be dealt with ?'
I think on consideration he will see that is not possible.
What is to be done with Constantinople ? What is to be
done with the Straits ? . . . If those doors had been open,
and if our fleet and our merchant ships had been free to go
through . . . the war would have been shortened by two or
three years. They were shut treacherously in our faces.
We cannot trust the same porter. As to what will remain
much depended on whether America came in. ... Would
America take a share, and, if so, what share? France has
great burdens, Britain has great burdens, Italy has great
burdens. Much depended on whether America, which has
no great extraneous burdens, and which has gigantic resources,
was prepared to take her share. . . . But until America
declared what she would do, any attempt to precipitate the
position might have led to misunderstandings with America
and would have caused a good deal of suspicion, and we
regard a good understanding with America as something
vital. That is the reason why we could not make peace
with Turkey. . . .

"We are entitled to say now: 'We have waited up to the
very limits we promised, and we have waited beyond that.'
The decision of America does not look promising. . . .
Therefore we consider now, without any disrespect to our
colleagues at the Peace Conference, and without in the least

94 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

wishing to deprive the United States of America of sharing
the honour of guardianship over these Christian communities,
that we are entitled to proceed to make peace with Turkey,
and we propose to do so at the earliest possible moment.
We have had some preliminary discussions on the subject.
As far as they went they were very promising. They will
be renewed, partly in this country, partly probably in France,
in the course of the next few days, and I hope that it will be
possible to submit to Turkey the terms of peace at an early
date."

But as the Allies, instead of dictating terms of
peace to Turkey at the end of 1918, had postponed
the settlement of the Turkish question for fourteen
months, as they had dismissed the Ottoman delega-
tion after summoning it themselves, and as the
question was now about to be resumed under widely
different circumstances and in quite another frame of
mind, the Paris Conference found itself in an awkward

situation.

* * *

About the end of the first half of February, 1920,
the Peace Conference at last resumed the discussion
of the Turkish question.

The task of working out a first draft of the treaty
of peace with Turkey had been entrusted by the
Supreme Council to three commissions. The first
was to draw up a report on the frontiers of the new
Republic of Armenia; the second was to hold an
inquiry into the Ottoman debt and the financial
situation of Turkey; and the third was to examine
the claims of Greece to Smyrna.

It had been definitely settled that the Dardanelles
should be placed under international control, and the
Conference was to decide what kind of control it
would be, what forces would be necessary to enforce

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 95

it, and what nationalities would provide these forces.
There remained for settlement what the boundaries
of the Constantinople area would be, and what
rights the Turks would have over Adrianople.

The discussion of the Turkish question was resumed
in an untoward way, which at first brought about a
misunderstanding. The English wanted the debate
to be held in London, and the French insisted upon
Paris. Finally it was decided that the principles
should be discussed in London, and the treaty itself
should be drawn up in Paris.

At the first meetings of the Allies concerning
Constantinople, the English strongly urged that the
Turks should be turned out of Europe, and the
French held the contrary opinion. Later on a change
seems to have taken place in the respective opinions
of the two Allies. The English, who were far from
being unanimous in demanding the eviction of the
Turks, gradually drew nearer to the opinion of the
French, who now, however, did not plead for the
Turks quite so earnestly as before.

This change in the English point of view requires
an explanation.

The English, who are prone to believe only what
affects them, did not seem to dread the Bolshevist
peril for Europe, perhaps because they fancied
England was quite secure from it; on the contrary,
they thought this peril was more to be dreaded for
the populations of Asia, no doubt because it could
have an easier access to the English possessions. The
success of Bolshevism with the Emir of Bokhara, close
to the frontiers of India, seemed to justify their fears.
Bolshevism, however, is something quite special to

96 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

the Russian mind; other nations may be led astray
or perverted by it for a time, but on the whole they
cannot fully adhere to it permanently. Besides, it
appears that Bolshevism has been wrongly looked
upon as something Asiatic. Of course, it has been
welcomed by the Slavs on the confines of Europe,
and seems to agree with their mentality; but in fact
it does not come from Asia, but from Europe. Lenin
and Trotsky, who were sent by Germany from Berlin
to St. Petersburg in a sealed railway-carriage and
had lived before in Western Europe, imported no
Asiatic ideas into Russia. They brought with them
a mixture of Marxist socialism and Tolstoist
Catholicism, dressed up in Russian style to make it
palatable to the moujik, and presented to the intel-
lectual class, to flatter Slav conceit, as about to
renovate the face of Europe.

The English did not realise that their own policy,
as well as that of their Allies, had run counter to
their own aims, that they had actually succeeded in
strengthening the position of the Soviets, and that
if they kept on encroaching upon the independence
and territorial integrity of the heterogeneous Eastern
populations of Russia and the peoples of Asia Minor,
they would definitely bring them over to Bolshevism.
Of course, these peoples were playing a dangerous
game, and ran the risk of losing their liberty in
another way, but they clung to any force that might
uphold them. Mustafa Kemal was thus induced not
to reject the offers the Moscow Government soon
made him, but it did not seem likely he would be so
foolish as to keep in the wake of the Soviets, for the
latter are doomed to disappear sooner or later, unless

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 97

they consent to evolution, supposing they have time
to change. The Allies, on the other hand, especially
the English, forgot that their policy risked giving
Constantinople indirectly to Russia, where Tsarist
imperialism had been replaced by Bolshevist im-
perialism, both of which are actuated by the same
covetous spirit.

The fear of Bolshevism, however, had a fortunate
consequence later on, as it brought about in 1920
a complete change in British ideas concerning Turkey
and Constantinople. The London Cabinet realised
that the.Turks were the first nation that the Bolshevist
propaganda could reach, and to which the Moscow
Government could most easily and effectually give
its support against British policy in Asia Minor,
which would make the situation in the East still
more complicated. So, in order not to drive the
Ottoman Government into open resistance, England
first showed an inclination to share the view, held
by France from the outset, that the Turks should
be allowed to remain in Constantinople.

So the British Government instructed Admiral
de Robeck, British High Commissioner in Con-
stantinople, to bring to the knowledge of the Turks
that the Allies had decided not to take Constantinople
from them, but also po warn them that, should the
Armenian persecutions continue, the treaty of peace
with Turkey might be remodelled.

The Turkish Press did not conceal its satisfaction
at seeing that Constantinople was likely to remain the
capital of the Empire, and was thankful to France
for proposing and supporting this solution. Meanwhile
a new party, " the Party of Defence and Deliverance

7

98 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of the Country," to which a certain number of
deputies adhered, and which was supposed to be
accepted and supported by the whole nation, had
solemnly declared that no sacrifice could be made
concerning the independence of the Ottoman Empire,
and the integrity of Constantinople and the coast of
the Marmora, merely recognising the freedom of
passage of the Straits for all nations. This party now
held great demonstrations.

At the end of February the Minister of the Interior
at Constantinople addressed to all the public autho-
rities in the provinces the following circular :

"I have great pleasure in informing you that Constan-
tinople, the capital of the Khilafat and Sultanate, will remain
ours, by decision of the Peace Conference.

" God be praised for this ! This decision implies that, as
we earnestly hope, our rights will be safeguarded and
maintained.

"You should do the utmost in your power and take all
proper measures to prevent at all times and especially at the
present delicate juncture untoward incidents against the
non-Moslem population. Such incidents might lead to
complaints, and affect the good dispositions of the Allies
towards us."

In the comments of the Ottoman Press on the
deliberations of the Peace Conference regarding the
peace with Turkey, the more moderate newspapers
held the Nationalists responsible for the stern decisions
contemplated by the Powers, and asked the Govern-
ment to resist them earnestly.

Great was the surprise, therefore, and deep the
emotion among the Turks, when, after the aforesaid
declarations, on February 29, the English fleet
arrived and a large number of sailors and soldiers
marched along the main streets of Pera, with fixed
bayonets, bands playing, and colours flying.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 99

A similar demonstration took place at Stambul on
the same day, and another on the following Wednes-
day at Skutari.

A sudden wave of discussion spread over Great
Britain at the news that the Turks were going to
keep Constantinople, and made an impression on
the Conference, in which there were still some advo-
cates of the eviction of the Turks.

A memorandum signed by Lord Eobert Cecil and
Mr. J. H. Thomas, requiring that the Turks should
be driven out of Europe, raised some discussion in the
House of Commons. In answer to this memorandum
some members sent a circular to their colleagues, to
ask them to avoid, during the sittings of the Peace
Conference, all manifestations that might influence
its decisions concerning foreign affairs. Another
group, in an appeal to Mr. Lloyd George, reminded
him that in his declaration of January 5, 1918, he
had stated that the English did not fight to wrest
her capital from Turkey, and that any departure from
this policy would be deeply resented in India.

Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Bryce proved the
most determined adversaries of the retention of the
Turks in Europe.

According to the Daily Mail, even within the
British Cabinet widely different views were held
about Constantinople. One section of the Cabinet,
led by Lord Curzon. asked that the Turks should
be evicted from Europe; and another, led by
Mr. Montagu, Indian Secretary, favoured the retention
of the Turks in Constantinople, provided they should

100 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

give up their internal struggles and submit to the
decisions of the Allies.

The Times severely blamed the Government for
leaving the Turks in Constantinople; it maintained
it was not too late to reconsider their decision; and
it asked that Constantinople should in some way be
placed under international control.

The Daily Chronicle also stated that it would have
been better if the Turks had been evicted from
Constantinople, and expressed the hope that at any
rate public opinion would not forget the Armenian
question. At the same time — i.e., at the end of
February, 1920 — American leaders also asked that
the Turks should be compelled to leave Constanti-
nople, and a strong Protestant campaign started a
powerful current of opinion.

On Sunday evening, February 29, a meeting of
so-called " non-sectarians " was held in New York,
with the support of the dignitaries of St. John's
Cathedral.

The Bishop of Western Pennsylvania, after holding
France responsible for the present situation because
it owned millions of dollars of Turkish securities,
declared: " Though I love England and France, we
must let these two countries know that we will not
shake hands with them so long as they hold out their
hands to the sanguinary Turk."

Messages from Senator Lodge, the presidents of
Harvard and Princeton Universities, M. Myron,
T. Herrick, and other Americans of mark were read;
asking President Wilson and the Supreme Council
that the Ottoman rule in Constantinople should come
to an end. Motions were also carried requesting that

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 101

the Turks should be expelled from Europe, that the
Christians should no longer be kept under Moslem
sway, and that the Allies should carry out their
engagements with regard to Armenia.

Another movement, similar in character to the
American one, was started in England at the same
time.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, with the other
Anglican bishops and some influential men, addressed
a similar appeal to the British Government.

Twelve bishops belonging to the Holy Synod of
Constantinople sent a telegram to the Archbishop
of Canterbury, entreating his support that no Turk
might be left in Constantinople. In his answer,
the Archbishop assured the Holy Synod that the
Anglican Church would continue to do everything
conducive to that end.

The Bishop of New York also telegraphed to the
Archbishop of Canterbury on behalf of about a
hundred American bishops, to thank him for taking
the lead in the crusade against the retention of the
Turks in Constantinople. The Archbishop replied that
he hoped America would assume a share in the
protection of the oppressed nationalities in the East.

The personality of the promoters plainly showed
that religious interests were the leading factors in
this opposition, and played a paramount part in it,
for the instigators of the movement availed them-
selves of the wrongs Turkey had committed in order
to fight against Islam and further their own interests
under pretence of upholding the cause of Christendom.

So, in February, -after the formidable campaign
started in Great Britain and the United States, at the

102 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

very time when the treaty of peace with Turkey
was going to be discussed again, and definitely
settled, the retention of the Turkish Government in
Constantinople was still an open question.

On February 12 the Anglo-Ottoman Society
addressed to Mr. Lloyd George an appeal signed by
Lord Mowbray, Lord Lamington, General Sir Bryan
Mahon, Professor Browne, Mr. Marmaduke Pickthall,
and several other well-known men, referring to the
pledge he had made on January 5/1918, to leave
Constantinople to the Turks. The appeal ran as
follows :

"We, the undersigned, being in touch with Oriental
opinion, view with shame the occupation of the vilayet of
Aidin, a province ' of which the population is predominantly
Turkish,' by Hellenic troops; and have noticed with alarm
the further rumours in the Press to the effect that parts of
Thrace — and even Constantinople itself — may be severed
from the Turkish Empire at the peace settlement, in spite of
the solemn pledge or declaration aforesaid, on the one hand,
and, on the other, the undeniable growth of anti-British
feeling throughout the length and breadth of Asia, and in
Egypt, owing to such facts and rumours.

"We beg you, in the interests not only of England or
of India but of the peace of the world, to make good that
solemn declaration not to deprive Turkey of Thrace and Asia
Minor, with Constantinople as her capital."

The next week a memorandum was handed to
Mr. Lloyd George and printed in the issue of The
Times of February 23. It was signed by, among
others, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the
Bishop of London, Lord Kobert Cecil, Mr. A. G.
Gardiner (late editor of the Daily News), the socialist
leader Hyndman, Lord Bryce (formerly ambassador
to the United States), the well-known writer Seton-
Watson, Dr. Burrows, Principal of King's College,
Professor Oman, and many professors of universities.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 103

In it the same desires lurked behind the same
religious arguments, under cover of the same social
and humanitarian considerations— viz., that the
Turks should no longer be allowed to slaughter the
Armenians, and that they should be expelled from
Constantinople.

"As to Constantinople itself, it will be a misfortune and
indeed a scandal if this city is left in Turkish hands. It has
been for centuries a focus of intrigue and corruption; and it
will so continue as long as the Turkish Government has power
there. If Constantinople were transferred to the control of
the League of Nations, there would be no offence to genuine
Moslem sentiment. For the Khilafat is not, and never has
been, attached to Constantinople. The Sultan, if he retains
the Khilafat, will be just as much a Khalifa, in the eyes of
Moslems all over the world, at Brusa or Konia, as at Stambul."

Now the absurdity of such arguments is patent to
all those who know that " the focus of intrigue and
corruption " denounced in this document is the out-
come of the political intrigues carried on by foreigners
in Constantinople, and kept up by international
rivalries. As to the exile of the Sultan to Brusa or
Konia, it could only-have raised a feeling of discon-
tent and resentment among Moslems and roused their
religious zeal.

Such a movement was resented by the Turks all
the more deeply as, it must be remembered, they have
great reverence for any religious feeling. For instance,
they still look upon the Crusades with respect,
because they had a noble aim, a legitimate one for
Catholics — viz., the conquest of the Holy Places;
though later on behind the Crusaders, as behind all
armies, there came all sorts of people eager to derive
personal profit from those migrations of men. But
they cannot entertain the least consideration or
regard for a spurious religious movement, essentially

104 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Protestant, behind which Anglo-Saxon covetousness
is lurking, and the real aim of which is to start huge
commercial undertakings.

Moreover, the Greek claims which asserted them-
selves during the settlement of the Turkish question
partly originated in the connection between the
Orthodox Church, not with Hellenism in the old and
classical sense of the word, as has been wrongly
asserted, but with Greek aspirations. For the
(Ecumenical Patriarch, whose see is Constantinople,
is the head of the Eastern Church, and he still enjoys
temporal privileges owing to which he is, in the
Sultan's territory, the real leader of the Greek sub-
jects of the Sultan. Though the countries of Ortho-
dox faith in Turkey have long enjoyed religious
autonomy, their leaders keep their eyes bent on
Constantinople, for in their mind the religious cause
is linked with that of the Empire, and the eventual
restoration of the Greek Empire in Constantinople
would both consolidate their religious faith and
'sanction their claims.

In spite of what has often been said, it seems that
the Christian Church did not so much protect Hel-
lenism against the Turks as the Orthodox Church
enhanced the prosperity of the Greeks within the
Turkish Empire. The Greek Church, thanks to the
independence it enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire, was
a sort of State within the State, and had a right to
open and maintain schools which kept up moral
unity among the Greek elements. So it paved the
way to the revolutionary movement of 1821, which
was to bring about the restoration of the Greek
kingdom with Athens as its capital ; and now it serves

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 105

the plans of the advocates of Greater Greece. Let us
add that nowadays the Greek Church, like the
Churches of all the States that have arisen on the
ruins of Turkey, has its own head, and has freed
itself from the tutelage of the Patriarch for the
administration of its property.

Lord Kobert Cecil, who had taken the lead in that
politico-religious movement, wrote on February 23
in the Evening Standard a strong article in which
he said something to this purpose: "Constantinople
is a trophy of victories, not the capital of a nation.
From Constantinople the Turks issue cruel orders
against the Christian population. From the point of
view both of morality and of prudence, the Stambul
Government must not be strengthened by such an
exorbitant concession on the part of the Allies."

In the debate which took place on Wednesday,
February 25, 1920, in the House of Commons regard-
ing the retention of the ^Turks in Constantinople, after
a question of Lord Edmund Talbot, Sir Donald
Maclean, who spoke first, urged that if the Turks
were not expelled from Constantinople all the worst
difficulties of the past would occur again, and would
endanger the peace of the world.

"The decision of the Peace Conference was a great surprise
to most people. We owed nothing to the Turks. They came
into the war gladly and without any provocation on our part.
They became the willing and most useful ally of Germany.
If the Turks were left in the gateway of the world, they would
be at their old game again."1

Sir Edward Carson said just the reverse:

"It was suggested that we should drive the Turks out of
Constantinople. ... If the Allies wanted to drive the Turks

1 The Time*, February 27, 1920, -p. 8, col. 4.

106 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

out of Constantinople, . . . they would have to commence
another war, and it would not be a small war. You must
not talk of cutting down the Army and the Navy, and at the
same moment censure the Government because they had not
settled the question of driving the Turks out."1

Mr. Lloyd George, speaking after them both, began
thus:

" This is not a decision, whichever way you go, which is free
from difficulty and objection. I do not know whether my
right hon. friend is under the impression that if we decided
to expel the Turk from Constantinople the course would be
absolutely clear. As a matter of fact, it is a balancing of the
advantages and the disadvantages, and it is upon that balance
and after weighing very carefully and for some time all the
arguments in favour and all the arguments against, all the
difficulties along the one path and all the difficulties you may
encounter on the other, and all the obstacles and all the perils
on both sides, that the Allied Conference came to the con-
clusion that on the whole the better course was to retain the
Turk in Constantinople for achieving a common end."

Then he explained that the agreement concerning
the substitution of the Kussians for the Turks in
Constantinople had become null and void after the
Russian revolution and the Brest-Litovsk peace, and
that at the present date the Bolshevists were not
ready to assume such a responsibility, should it be
offered to them.

"I will deal with two other pledges which are important.
My right hon. friend referred to a pledge I gave to the House
in December last, that there would not be the same gate-
keeper, but there would be a different porter at the gates. . . .
It would have been the height of folly to trust the guardian-
ship of these gates to the people who betrayed their trust.
That will never be done. They will never be closed by the
Turk in the face of a British ship again. . . .

" The second pledge, given in January, 1918, was given after
full consultation with all parties, and the right hon. member
for Paisley and Lord Grey acquiesced. There was a real

1 The Times, February 27, 1920, p. 8; col. 4.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 107

desire to make a national statement of war aims, a statement
that would carry all parties along with it, and they all agreed.
It was a carefully prepared declaration, which I read out, as
follows: 'Nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary,
or to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned
lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly
Turkish in race. Outside Europe we believe that the same
principle should be applied. . . . While we do not challenge
the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homeland
of the Turkish race, with its capital in Constantinople, the
passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being
internationalised and neutralised ' (as they will be), ' Arabia,
Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are in our
judgment entitled to recognition of their separate national
conditions.' That declaration was specific, unqualified, and
deliberate. It was made with the consent of all parties in
the community. . . .

"The effect of the statement in India was that recruiting
went up appreciably from that very moment. . . .

" Now we are told: ' That was an offer you made to Turkey,
and they rejected it, and therefore you were absolutely free.'
It was more than that. It was a statement of our war aims
for the workers of this country, a statement of our war aims
for India. It is too often forgotten that we are the greatest
Mohammedan Power in the world. One-fourth of the popula-
tion of the British Empire is Mohammedan. . . . We gave a
solemn pledge and they accepted it, and they are disturbed
at the prospect of our not abiding by it. . . . There is nothing
which would damage British power in Asia more than the
feeling that you could not trust the British word. That
is the danger. Of course it would be a fatal reputation
for us. ...

" When the peace terms are published there is no friend of
the Turk, should there be any left, who will not realise that
he has been terribly punished for his follies, his blunders, his
crimes, and his iniquities. Stripped of more than half his
Empire, his country under the Allied guns, deprived of his
army, his navy, his prestige — the punishment will be terrible
enough to satisfy the bitterest foe of the Turkish Empire,
drastic enough for the sternest judge. My right hon. friend
suggested that there was a religious issue involved. That
would be the most dangerous of all, and the most fatal. I
am afraid that underneath the agitation there is not only
the movement for the expulsion of the Turk, but there is
something of the old feeling of Christendom against the
Crescent. If it is believed in the Mohammedan world that our

108 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

terms are dictated by the purpose of lowering the flag of the
Prophet before that of Christendom, it will be fatal to our
government in India. It is an unworthy purpose to achieve
by force. It is unworthy of Britain, and it is unworthy of
our faith.

" Let us examine our legitimate peace aims in Turkey. The
first is the freedom of the Straits. I put that first for two
reasons, which I shall refer to later on. It was put first by
my right hon. friend, and I accept it. The second is the
freeing of the non-Turkish communities from the Ottoman
sway; the preservation for the Turk of self-government in
communities which are mainly Turkish, subject to two most
important reservations. The first is that there must be
adequate safeguards within our power for protecting the
minorities that have been oppressed by the Turk in the past.
The second is that the Turk must be deprived of his power
of vetoing the development of the rich lands under his rule
which were once the granary of the Mediterranean. . . .

" You can get the great power of Constantinople from its
geographical situation. That is the main point. It is the
main point for two reasons. The first is, when you consider
the future possibilities of the Black Sea. You have there six
or seven independent communities or nations to whom we
want access. It is essential that we should have a free road,
a right-of-way to these countries, whatever the opinion of the
Turk may be. His keeping of the gates prolonged the war,
and we cannot have that again. Therefore, for that reason,
it is coming to an end. The second reason why the guardian-
ship of the gates is important is because of its effect upon the
protection of minorities. How do we propose that that should
be achieved ? Turkey is to be deprived entirely of the
guardianship of the gates. Her forts are to be dismantled.
She is to have no troops anywhere within reach of these
waters. More than that, the Allies mean to garrison those
gates themselves. ... I was going to say that we have
been advised that, with the assistance of the Navy, we shall
be able to garrison the Dardanelles and, if necessary, the
Bosphorus, with a much smaller force because of the assis-
tance to be given by the Navy for that purpose. Turkey
will not be allowed a navy. What does she want with a
navy ? It was never of the slightest use to her when she
had it. She never could handle it. That is the position in
regard to the Straits.

' ' What is the alternative to that proposal ? The alternative
to that proposal is international government of Constantinople
and the whole of the lands surrounding the Straits. It would

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 109

mean a population of 1,500,000 governed by the Allies — a
committee representing France, Italy, Great Britain, and.
I suppose, some day Russia might come in, and, it might be,
other countries. America, if she cared to come in. Can
anyone imagine anything more calculated to lead to that kind
of mischievous intriguing, rivalry, and trouble in Constan-
tinople that my right hon. friend deprecated and, rightly,
feared ? How would you govern it ? Self-government
could not be conferred under those conditions. It would
have to be a military government. ... It would require,
according to every advice we have had, a very considerable
force, and it would add very considerably to the burdensome
expenditure of these countries, and it would be the most un-
satisfactory government that anyone could possibly imagine.
" We had hoped that two of the great countries of the world
would have been able to help us in sharing the responsibility
for the government of this troubled country ; but for one reason
or another they have fallen out. There was first of all Russia.
She is out of the competition for a very unpleasant task.
Then there was America. We had hopes, and we had good
reason for hoping, that America would have shared these
responsibilities. She might probably have taken the guardian-
ship of the Armenians, or she might have taken the guardian-
ship of Constantinople. But America is no claimant now,
and I am not going to express an opinion as to whether she
ever will be, because it would be dangerous to do so; but for
the moment we must reckon America as being entirely out
of any arrangement which we contemplate for the govern-
ment of Turkey and for the protection of the Christian
minorities in that land. . . . I ask my noble friend, if he were
an Armenian would he feel more secure if he knew that
the Sultan and his Ministers were overlooked by a British
garrison on the Bosphorus, and that British ships were there
within reach, than if the Sultan were at Konia, with hundreds
of miles across the Taurus Mountains to the nearest Allied
garrison, and the sea with its great British ships and their
guns out of sight and out of mind ? I know which I would
prefer if I were an Armenian with a home to protect."1

The Prime Minister concluded his speech by
saying that the Allies chiefly desired to take from
the Turks the government of communities of alien
race and religion, which would feel adequately pro-

1 The Times, February 27, 1920, p. 9.

110 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

tected when they knew that their former persecutors
must sign the decree for their liberation under the
threat of English, French, and Italian guns. Yet he
could not dissemble his own misgivings.

In the discussion that followed Lord Robert Cecil
said that, in any settlement with regard to Armenia,
he trusted there would not only be a considerable
increase in the present area of the Armenian Republic,
but that Armenia would be given some access to the
Black Sea in the north. Without that he was satis-
fied that the Armenian Republic would have the
greatest difficulty in living. He earnestly hoped that
every influence of the British Government would be
used to secure that Cilicia should be definitely
removed from Turkish sovereignty. He repeated
once more that he was sorry the Turks were going
to be retained in Constantinople, but that —

"No one wished to turn the Sultan out; the central thing
was to get rid of the Sublime Porte as the governor of Con-
stantinople. That did not mean turning anybody out; it
merely meant that we were not to hand back Constantinople
to the Turkish Government."

He had the greatest regard for the feelings of the
Indians in that matter, but was surprised they in-
sisted upon the retention of the Sultan in Constan-
tinople. He thought that there was not the slightest
ground for maintaining the Sultan as Caliph of
Mohammedanism, and, even if there were, there was
nothing at all vital about his remaining in Con-
stantinople. So far as the Turks were concerned,
what was Constantinople ? It was not a national
capital; it had been occupied by the Turks as their
great trophy of victory. He entirely approved of the

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 111

statement of 1918, and, in the same circumstances,
he would make it again. It seemed to him perfectly
fantastic to say that ever since 1918 we had held out
to our Indian fellow-subjects an absolute under-
taking that Constantinople should remain in the
hands of the Turks.

Then Mr. Bonar Law rose, and declared that it
would be easier to have control over the Turkish
Government if it was left in Constantinople, instead
of transferring it to Konia.

"Our fleet at Constantinople would be a visible emblem of
power. The Allies believed that the pressure they would be
able to exercise would have an effect throughout the Turkish
Empire, but it would not be so if we sent the Turks to Konia.
An hon. member had said that some Armenians had told
him that they desired the Turks to be sent out of Constan-
tinople. Let the Armenians consider the facts as they now
were.

"If there was one thing which more than another was
likely to make the League of Nations a failure it was to hand
over this question to them. In 1917 it was arranged that if
we were victorious in the war, Russia would become the
possessor of Constantinople. But all that fell to the ground,
and in 1918 a new situation arose, and a solemn document
was put before the British people in which it was stated that
one of our war aims was not to turn the Turks out of Con-
stantinople. Overwhelming reasons were required to justify
departure from that declaration, and those overwhelming
reasons had not been forthcoming. When it was hoped and
expected that America would accept a mandate in regard to
Turkey there was no question of turning the Turks out of
Constantinople. ' ' 1

The debate, which came to an end after this state-
ment by Mr. Bonar Law, was not followed by a
vote.

Mr. Montagu, Secretary for India, stated in an inter-
view printed in the Evening Standard, February 25:

1 The Times, February 27, 1920.

112 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

"If one of the results of the war must needs be to take
away Constantinople from the Turks, I should take the
liberty of respectfully telling Lord Robert Cecil, as president
of the Indian delegation in the Peace Conference, that we
ought not to have asked Indians to take part in the war
against Turkey. Throughout India, all those who had to
express their opinion on this subject, whatever race or
religion they may belong to, are of opinion that Constan-
tinople must remain the seat of the Khilafat if the internal
and external peace of India is to be preserved.

" The Turks, who are the chief part of the population in
Constantinople, have certainly as much right as any other
community to the possession of that city. So we have to
choose between the Turks and an international regime.
Now in the history of Constantinople examples have occurred
of the latter r6gime, and the results were not so good that
it cannot be said a Turkish government would not have done
better."

This opinion was upheld by a good many British
newspapers, notwithstanding Lord Robert Cecil's
campaign.

Yet under the pressure of a section of public
opinion and the agitation let loose against Turkey,
England seemed more and more resolved to occupy
Constantinople, and The Times, though it had never
been averse to the eviction of the Turks from Con-
stantinople, now showed some anxiety:

"We cannot imagine how the greatest lovers of political
difficulties in Europe should have ever dreamt that Constan-
tinople should be occupied exclusively by British troops,
or that such a decision may have been taken without pre-
viously taking the Allies' advice.

"As things now stand, we are not at all surprised that such
stories may have given birth to a feeling of distrust towards
us. These are the fruits of a policy tainted with contradic-
tion and weakness. The Allied countries refuse to sacrifice
any more gold or human lives, unless their honour is con-
cerned. They will not consent to go to war in order to safe-
guard the interests of a few international financiers, who want
to dismember Turkey-in-Asia."

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 113

This movement was broughtjibout by the explosion
of very old feelings which had been smouldering for
nearly forty years, had been kept alive by the Balkan
war, and had been roused by the last conflict. Even
at the time of Catherine II the merchants of the City
of London merely looked upon Russia as a first-rate
customer to whom they sold European and Indian
goods, and of whom in return they bought raw
materials which their ships brought to England. So
they felt inclined to support the policy of Russia,
and, to quote the words of a French writer in the
eighteenth century, the English ambassador at
Constantinople was " le charge d'affaires de la
Russie." So a party which took into account only
the material advantages to be drawn from a closer
commercial connection with Russia arose and soon
became influential. William Pitt inveighed against
this party when, in one of his speeches, he refused to
argue with those who wanted to put an end to the
Ottoman Empire. But the opinion that England
can only derive economic advantages from the dis-
memberment of Turkey in favour of Russia soon
found a new advocate in Richard Cobden, the leader
of the Manchester school, who expounded it in a
little book, Russia, by a Manchester Manufacturer,
printed at Edinburgh in 1835. This dangerous policy
was maintained, in spite of David Urquhart's cam-
paign against the Tsarist policy in the East in a
periodical, The Portfolio, which he had founded in
1833, and, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts
made by Blacque, a Frenchman, editor of The
Ottoman Monitor, to show that Europe was being
cheated by Russia, and was going the wrong way in

8

114 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

her attitude towards Turkey. And the same foolish
policy consistently pursued by Fox, Gladstone, and
Grey towards Tsardom is still carried on by Britain
towards Bolshevism. The same narrowly utilitarian
views, the typical economic principles of the Man-
chester School, linked with Protestant ideas, and
thus strengthened and aggravated by religious feeling,
seem still to inspire the Russian policy of Britain as
they once inspired the old " bag and baggage "
policy of Mr. Gladstone, the " Grand -Old Man," that
the Turks should be expelled from Constantinople
with bag and baggage. Indeed, this policy may be
looked upon as an article of faith of the English
Liberal party. Mr. Gladstone's religious mind, which
was alien to the Islamic spirit, together with the
endeavours of the economists who wanted to mono-
polise the Russian market, brought about an alliance
with Holy Orthodox Russia, and within the Anglican
Church a movement for union with the Holy Synod
had even been started.

That campaign was all the more out of place as
the Turks have repeatedly proclaimed their sympathy
for England and turned towards her. Just as after
the first Balkan war the Kiamil Cabinet had made
overtures to Sir Edward Grey, after the armistice
of November 11 Tewfik Pasha, now Grand Vizier,
had also made open proposals. England had already
laid hands on Arabia and Mesopotamia, but could
not openly lay claim to Constantinople without
upsetting some nations with whom she meant to
keep on good terms, though some of her agents and
part of public opinion worked to that end. Generally
she showed more diplomacy in conforming her conduct

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 115

with her interests, which she did not defend so
harshly and openly.

But religious antagonism and religious intoler-
ance were at the bottom of that policy, and had
always instigated and supported it. The Angli-
cans, and more markedly the Nonconformists, had
taken up the cry, " The Turk out of Europe," and
it seems certain that the religious influence was
paramount and brought on the political action.
Mr. Lloyd George, who is a strong and earnest Non-
conformist, must have felt it slightly awkward to
find himself in direct opposition to his co-religionists
on political grounds. Besides, the British Govern-
ment, which in varied circumstances had supported
contradictory policies, was in a difficult situation
when brought face to face with such contradictions.

It also seems strange at first that the majority of
American public opinion should have suffered itself
to be led by the campaign of Protestant propaganda,
however important the^ religious question may be in
the United States. Though since 1831 American
Protestant missionaries have defrayed the expenses
of several centres of propaganda among the
Nestorians (who have preserved the Nazarene creed),
paid the native priests and supported the schools,
America has no interests in those countries, unless she
thus means to support her Russian policy. But her
economic imperialism, which also aims at a spiritual
preponderance, would easily go hand in hand with a
cold religious imperialism which would spread its
utilitarian formalism over the life and manners of
all nations.

At any rate, the plain result of the two countries'

116 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

policy was necessarily to reinforce the Pan-Turkish
and Pan-Arabian movements.

Of course, Mr. Wilson's puritanism and his
ignorance of the complex elements and real condi-
tions of European civilisation could not but favour
such a movement, and on March 5 the New York
World, a semi-official organ, plainly said that Mr.
Wilson would threaten again, as he had already done
about Italy, to withdraw from European affairs, if
the treaty of peace with Turkey left Constantinople
to the Turks, and gave up all protection of the
Christian populations in Turkey.

The traditional hostility of America towards
Turkey — one of the essential reasons of which has
just been given — demanded that Turkey should be
expelled from Europe, and the Empire should be
dismembered. President Wilson, in Article 12 of
his programme, had mentioned the recognition of
the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire; yet the
American leaders, though they pointed out that a
state of war had never existed between the United
States and Turkey, were the first to demand the
eviction of the Turks; and the Chicago Tribune
of March 8 hinted that an American cruiser might
be sent to the Bosphorus. On March 6 Senator
Kling criticised in the Senate the Allies' proposals
aiming at tolerating Turkish sway in Asia Minor.
The United States even backed the Greek claims,
and on the same day Mr. Lodge moved that the
Peace Conference should give to Greece Northern
Epirus, the Dodecanese, and the western coast of
Asia Minor.

Mr. Morgenthau, too, criticised the terms of the

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 117

settlement which allowed Constantinople to remain
a Turkish city; he maintained that such a solution
could only be another inducement for America to
keep away from European affairs, and declared that
Europe would fail to do her duty if she did not punish
Turkey. Yet at the same time America, and
shortly after England, were endeavouring to mitigate
the responsibility of Germany, objecting, not to her
punishment, which had never been demanded by
France, but to the complete execution of the most
legitimate measures of reparation, and made con-
cessions on all points that did not affect their own
interests. In fact, they merely wanted to resume
business with Germany at any cost and as soon as
possible.

English newspapers printed an appeal to French
and British public opinion drawn up by some eminent
American citizens, asking for the eviction of the
Turks from Constantinople and the autonomy of
Armenia.

The British Press, however, remarked that it was
not sufficient to express wishes, and it would have
been better if the Americans had assumed a share of
responsibility in the reorganisation of Asia Minor.

Now, why did a section of British and American
public opinion want to punish Turkey, whereas it
refused to support the French and Belgian claims to
reparation ? In order to form an impartial judg-
ment on Turkey, one should look for the motives
and weigh the reasons that induced her to take part in
the war, and then ascertain why some members of
her political parties most preposterously stood by the
side of Germany. If the latter pursued such a policy,

118 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

perhaps it was because Germany, who aimed at ex-
tending her influence over the whole of Eastern Asia,
displayed more ability and skill than the Allies did
in Turkey, and because the policy of the Powers and
their attitude towards the Christians raised much
enmity against them.

On such a delicate point, one cannot do better
than quote the words of Suleyman Nazif Bey in a
lecture delivered in honour of Pierre Loti at the
University of Stambul on January 23, 1920:

"When we linked our fate with that of Germany and
Austria, the Kaiser's army had already lost the first battle
of the Marne. It is under such untoward and dangerous
circumstances that we joined the fray. No judicious motive
can be brought forward to excuse and absolve the few men
who drove us lightheartedly into the conflagration of the
world war.

"If Kaiser Wilhelm found it possible to fool some men
among us, and if these men were able to draw the nation
behind them, the reason is to be found in the events of the
time and in the teachings of history. Russia, who, for the
last two and a half centuries has not given us a moment of
respite, did not enter into the world war in order to take
Alsace-Lorraine from Prussia and give it back to France.
The Muscovites thought the time had come at last to carry
out the dream that had perpetually haunted the Tsars ever
since Peter the Great — that is to say, the conquest of Anatolia
and the Straits.

" It is not to Europe but to our own country that we must
be held responsible for having entered into the war so foolishly,
and still more for having conducted it so badly, with so much
ignorance and deceit. The Ottoman nation alone has a
right to call us to account — the Great Powers had paid us so
little regard, nay, they had brought on us such calamities,
that the shrewd Kaiser finally managed to stir up our discon-
tent and make us lay aside all discretion and thoughtfulness
by rousing the ancient legitimate hatred of the Turks.

"Read the book that the former Bulgarian Premier,
Guechoff , wrote just after the Balkan war. You will see in it
that the Tsar Nicholas compelled, as it were by force, the Serbs
and Bulgars, who had been enemies for centuries, to conclude
an alliance in order to evict us from Europe. Of course,

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 119

Montenegro followed suit. France approved, then even urged
them to do so; and then one of the leading figures of the times
intervened to make Greece join that coalition intended to
drive the Turks out of Europe. The rest is but too well
known. The Bulgarian statesman who owns all this is noted
for his hatred of Turkey.

"Let us not forget this: so long as our victory was con-
sidered as possible, the Powers declared that the principle
of the status quo ante bettum should be religiously observed.
As soon as we suffered a defeat, a Power declared this principle
no longer held good; it was the ally of the nation that has
been our enemy for two and a half centuries, and yet it was
also most adverse to the crafty policy that meant to cheat
us. ...

"Every time Europe has conferred some benefit upon us
we have been thankful for it. I know the history of my
country- full well ; in her annals, many mistakes and evil
doings have occurred, but not one line relates one act of
ingratitude. After allowing the Moslems of Smyrna to be
slaughtered by Hellenic soldiers and after having hushed up
this crime, Europe now wants — so it seems at least — to drive
us out of Constantinople and transfer the Moslem Khilafat
to an Anatolian town, as if it were a common parcel, or shelve
it inside the palace of Top-Kapu (the old Seraglio) like the
antique curios of the Museum. When the Turks shall have
been expelled from Constantinople, the country will be so
convulsed that the whole world will be shaken. Let nobody
entertain any doubt aboutthis : if we go out of Constantinople
a general conflagration will break out, that will last for years
or centuries, nobody knows, and will set on fire the whole
of the globe.

" At the time when Sultan Mohammed entered the town of
Constantinople, which had been praised and promised by
Mohammed to his people, the Moslem Empire of Andalusia
was falling to decay — that is to say, in the south-east of
Europe a Moslem State arose on the ruins of a Christian
State, while in the south-west of Europe a Christian State was
putting an end to the life of a Moslem State. The victor of
Constantinople granted the Christian population he found
there larger religious privileges than those granted to it by
the Greek Empire. The ulcer of Phanar is still the outcome
of Sultan Mohammed's generosity. What did Spain do when
she suppressed the Moslem State in the south-west of
Europe ? She expelled the other religions, burning in ovens
or sending to the stake the Moslems and even the Jews who
refused to embrace Christianity. I mention this historical

120 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

fact here, not to criticise or blame the Spaniards, but to give
an instance of the way in which the Spaniards availed them-
selves of the conqueror's right Heaven had awarded them.
And I contrast the Christians' cruelty with the Turks' gentle-
ness and magnanimity when they entered Constantinople !"

To adopt the policy advocated by Anglo-American
Protestants was tantamount to throwing Islam again
towards Germany, who had already managed to
derive profit from its defence. Yet Islamism has no
natural propensity towards Germanism; on the con-
trary, Islam in the sixteenth century, at the time of
its modern development, intervened in our culture
as the vehicle of Eastern influences. That policy
also hurt the religious feelings of the Mussulmans
and roused their fanaticism not only in Turkey, but
even in a country of highly developed intellectual
life like Egypt, and in this respect it promoted the
cause of the most spirited and most legitimate
Nationalism.

Besides, in the note which the Ottoman Minister
of Foreign Affairs handed in January, 1920, to the
High Commissioners of the Allies, together with a
scheme of judicial reforms, it was said notably:

"The Ottoman Government fully realises the cruel situa-
tion of Turkey after the war, but an unfortunate war cannot
deprive a nation of her right to political existence, this
right being based on the principles of justice and humanity
confirmed by President Wilson's solemn declaration and
recognised by all the belligerents as the basis of the peace
of the world. It is in accordance with these principles that
an armistice was concluded between the Allied Powers and
Turkey. It ensues from this that the treaty to intervene
shall restore order and peace to the East.

"Any solution infringing upon Ottoman unity, far from
ensuring quietude and prosperity, would turn the East into
a hotbed of endless perturbation. Therefore the only way
to institute stability in the new state of things is to maintain
Ottoman sovereignty

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 121

"Let us add that, if the reforms Turkey tried to institute
at various times were not attended with the results she
expected, this is due to an unfavourable state of things both
abroad and at home.

"Feeling it is absolutely necessary to put an end to an
unbearable situation and wishing sincerely and eagerly to
modernise its administration so as to open up an era of
prosperity and progress in the East, the Sublime Porte has
firmly resolved, in a broadminded spirit, to institute a new
organisation, including reforms in the judicial system, the
finance, and the police, and the protection of the minorities.

" As a token that these reforms will be fully and completely
carried out, the Ottoman Government pledges itself to accept
the co-operation of one of the Great Powers on condition its
independence shall not be infringed upon and its national pride
shall not be wounded."

As soon as it was known in what spirit the treaty
of peace with Turkey was going to be discussed
between the Powers, and what clauses were likely to
be inserted in it, a clamour of protest arose through-
out the Moslem world.

That treaty could not but affect the most im-
portant group of Mohammedans, the Indian group,
which numbers over 70 million men and forms
nearly one-fourth of the population of India. As
soon as the conditions that were to be forced on
Turkey were known in India, they roused deep
resentment, which reached its climax after the
Amritsar massacre. Some of the clauses which the
Allies meant to insert in the treaty plainly ran counter
to the principles of Mohammedanism ; and as they
hurt the religious feelings of the Moslems and dis-
regarded the religious guarantees given to the Hindus
and all the Moslem world by the present British
Cabinet and its predecessors, they could not but bring
on new conflicts in the future. Besides, the blunders

122 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of the last five years had united Hindus and Moham
medans in India, as they united Copts and Moham-
medans in Egypt later on, and it was also feared
that the Arabs, whose hopes had been frustrated,
would side with the Turkish Nationalists.

At the end of 1918, Dr. Ansari, M.D., M.S.,
chairman of the Committee of the All-India Muslim
League, in the course of the session held at Delhi
at that time, set forth the Muslim grievances. But
the address he read could not receive any publicity
owing to the special repressive measures taken by the
Government of India.

In September, 1919, a Congress of Mohammedans,
who had come from all parts of India and thus repre-
sented Muslim opinion as a whole, was held at
Lucknow, one of the chief Muslim centres. In
November another congress for the defence of the
Caliphate met at Delhi; it included some Hindu
leaders, and thus assumed a national character. Next
month a third congress, held at Amritsar, in the
Punjab, was presided over by Shaukat Ali, founder
and secretary of the Society of the Servants of the
Ka'ba, who had been imprisoned like his brother
Mohammed Ali and released three days before the
congress; it was attended by over 20,000 Hindus
and Mussulmans.

This meeting confirmed the resolution taken by the
previous congress to send to Europe and America a
delegation from India for the defence of the Caliphate.
On January 19, 1920, a deputation of Indian Mussul-
mans waited upon the Viceroy of India at Delhi, to
request that a delegation might repair to Europe
and America, according to the decision of the con-

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 123

gress, in order to expound before the allied and
associated nations and their governments the Moslems'
religious obligations and Muslim and Indian senti-
ment on the subject of the Caliphate and cognate
questions, and to be their representatives at the
Peace Conference.

The non-Mussulman Indians supported the claims
which the 70 millions of Indian Mussulmans, their
fellow-countrymen, considered as a religious obliga-
tion. In an address drawn up by the great Hindu
leader, the Mahatma Gandhi, and handed on Janu-
ary 19, 1920, by the deputation of the General Con-
gress of India for the Defence of the Caliphate to His
Excellency Baron Chelmsford, Viceroy and Governor
of India, in order to lay their amis before him,
they declared they raised a formal protest lest the
Caliphate should be deprived of the privilege of the
custody and wardenship of the Holy Places, and lest
a non-Muslim control, in any shape or form whatever,
should be established , over the Island of Arabia,
whose boundaries, as denned by Muslim religious
authorities, are : the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea,
the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Euphrates,
and the Tigris, thus including Syria, Palestine, and
Mesopotamia, beside the Peninsula of Arabia.

This General Congress of India, according to the
manifesto it adopted during its sittings at Bombay
on February 15, 16, and 17, 1920, gave to the delega-
tion sent to Europe the following mandate, with
respect to the Muslim claims regarding the Caliphate
and the " Jazirat-ul-Arab ":

" With respect to the Khilafat it is claimed that the Turkish
Empire should be left as it was when the war broke out ;

124 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

however, though the alleged maladministration of Turkey
has not been proved, the non-Turkish nationalities might,
if they wished, have within the Ottoman Empire all guarantees
of autonomy compatible with the dignity of a sovereign

State."

And the manifesto continued thus:

" The slightest reduction of the Muslim claims would not
only hurt the deepest religious feelings of the Moslems, but
would plainly violate the solemn declarations and pledges
made or taken by responsible statesmen representing the Allied
and Associated Powers at a time when they were most anxious
to secure the support of the Moslem peoples and soldiers."

The anti-Turkish agitation which had been let
loose at the end of December, 1919, and had reached
its climax about March, 1920, had an immediate
repercussion not only in India, where the Caliphate
Conference, held at Calcutta, decided to begin a
strike on March 19 and boycott British goods, if the
agitation for the expulsion of the Turks from Con-
stantinople did not come to an end in England.

At Tunis, on March 11, after a summons had been
posted in one of the mosques calling upon the Muslim
population to protest against the occupation of
Constantinople, a demonstration took place before
the Residency. M. Etienne Flandin received a
delegation of native students asking him that France
should oppose the measures England was about to
take. The minister, after stating what reasons
might justify the intervention, evaded the question
that was put him by declaring that such measures
were mere guarantees, and stated that even if France
were to take" a share in them, the Mussulmans should
feel all the more certain that their religious creed
would be respected.

The measures that were being contemplated could

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 125

not but raise much anxiety and indignation among
the Moslem populations and might have had dis-
astrous consequences for France in Northern Africa.
This was clearly pointed out by M. Bourgeois, Pre-
sident of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, in his
report read to the Senate when the conditions of the
peace that was going to be enforced on Turkey came
under discussion.

" We cannot ignore the deep repercussions which the in-
tended measures in regard to Turkey may have among the 25
million Moslems who live under our rule in Northern Africa.
Their reverence and devotion have displayed themselves most
strikingly in the course of the war. Nothing must be done
to alter these feelings."

Indeed, as M. Mouktar-el-Farzuk wrote in an article
entitled " France, Turkey, and Islam," printed in
the Ikdam, a newspaper of Algiers, on May 7,
1920—

" If the French Moslems fought heroically for France
and turned a deaf ear to the seditious proposals of Germany,
they still preserve the deepest sympathy for Turkey, and
they would be greatly distressed if the outcome of the victory
in which they have had a share was the annihilation of the
Ottoman Empire.

" That sympathy is generally looked upon in Europe
as a manifestation of the so-called Moslem fanaticism or
Pan-Islamism. Yet it is nothing of the kind. The so-called
Moslem fanaticism is a mere legend whose insanity has been
proved by history. Pan-Islamism, too, only exists in the mind
of those who imagined its existence. The independent
Moslem populations, such as the Persians and the Afghans,
are most jealous of their independence, and do not think
in the least of becoming the Sultan's subjects. As to those
who live under the dominion of a European Power, they have
no wish to rebel against it, and only aim at improving their
material and moral condition, and of preserving their per-
sonality as a race.

" The true reasons of the Moslems' sympathy for the
Ottoman Empire are historical, religious, and sentimental
reasons."

126 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

The delegation of the Moslems of India for the
defence of the Caliphate sent to the Peace Conference
was headed by Mohammed Ali, who, in 1914, on
behalf of the Government of India, had written to
Talaat, Minister of the Interior, to ask him not to
side with the Central Empires, and to show him how
difficult the situation of the Indian Mussulmans would
be if Turkey entered into the war against England.
On landing in Venice, he told the correspondent of
the Giornale d" Italia that the object of his journey
was to convince the Allies that the dismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire would be a danger to the
peace of the world.

"The country we represent numbers 70 million Moham-
medans and 230 million men belonging to other religions
but agreeing with us on this point. So we hope that if the
Allies really want to establish the peace of the world, they
will take our reasons into account. Italy has hitherto
supported us, and we hope the other nations will follow her
example."

This delegation was first received by Mr. Fisher,
representing Mr. Montagu, Indian Secretary, to whom
they explained the serious consequences which the
carrying out of the conditions of peace contemplated
for Turkey might have in their country.

Mr. Lloyd George, in his turn, received the delega-
tion on March 19, before it was heard by the Supreme
Council. Mohammed Ali, after pointing to the bonds
that link together the Mohammedans of India and the
Caliphate, because Islam is not only a set of doctrines
and dogmas but forms both a moral code and a social
polity, recalled that, according to the Muslim doctrine,
the Commander of the Faithful must always own a
territory, an army, and resources to prevent the

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 127

aggression of adversaries who have not ceased to arm
themselves; he maintained, therefore, that the seat
of the Sultan's temporal power must be maintained
in Constantinople; that Turkey must not be dis-
membered; and that Arabia must be left under
Turkish sovereignty.

" Islam has always had two centres, the first a personal one
and the other a local one. The personal centre is the Caliph,
or the Khalifa, as we call him — the successor of the Prophet.
Because the Prophet was the personal centre of Islam, his
successors, or Khalifas, continue his tradition to this day.
The local centre is the region known as the Jazirat-ul-Arab,
or the ' Island of Arabia,' the ' Land of the Prophets.' To
Islam, Arabia has been not a peninsula but an island, the
fourth boundary being the waters of the Euphrates and the
Tigris. . . .

"Islam required temporal power for the defence of the
Faith, and for that purpose, if the ideal combination of piety
and power could not be achieved, the Muslims said, 'Let us get
hold of the most powerful person, even if he is not the most
pious, so long as he places his power at the disposal of our
piety.' That is why we agreed to accept Muslim kings,
the Omayyids and the Abbasids, as Khalifas, now the Sultans
of Turkey. They have a peculiar succession of their own.
We have accepted it for the-time being because we must have
the strongest Mussulman Power at our disposal to assist us
in the defence of the Faith. That is why we have accepted it.
If the Turks agreed with other Muslims, and all agreed that
the Khalifa may be chosen out of any Muslim community,
no matter who he was, the humblest of us might be chosen,
as they used to be chosen in the days of the first four Khalifas,
the Khulafa-i-Rashideen, or truly guided Khalifas.

" But of course we have to make allowances for human
nature. The Turkish Sultan in 1517 did not like to part
with his power any more than the Mamluke rulers of
Egypt liked to part with their power when they gave
asylum to a scion of the Abbasids after the sack of Baghdad
in 1258."

It follows that " the standard of temporal power
necessary for the preservation of the Caliphate must
obviously, therefore, be a relative one," and —

128 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

" Not going into the matter more fully, we would say that
after the various wars in which Turkey has been engaged
recently, and after the Balkan war particularly, the Empire
of the Khalifa was reduced to such narrow limits that Muslims
considered the -irreducible minimum of temporal power
adequate for the defence of the Faith to be the restoration
of the territorial status quo ante bellum. . . .

" When asking for the restoration of the territorial status
quo ante bellum, Muslims do not rule out changes which would
guarantee to the Christians, Jews, and Mussulmans, within
the scheme of the Ottoman sovereignty, security of life and
property and opportunities of autonomous development, so
long as it is consistent with the dignity and independence of
the sovereign State. It will not be a difficult matter. We
have here an Empire in which the various communities live to-
gether. Some already are sufficiently independent and others
hope — and here I refer to India — to get a larger degree of
autonomy than they possess at the present moment; and
consistently with our desire to have autonomous development
ourselves, we could not think of denying it to Arabs or Jews
or Christians within the Turkish Empire."

He went on as follows :

" The third claim that the Mussulmans have charged us
with putting before you is based on a series of injunctions
which require the Khalifa to be the warden of the three sacred
Harams of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem ; and overwhelming
Muslim sentiment requires that he should be the warden of
the holy shrines of Nejef , Kerbela, Kazimain, Samarra, and
Baghdad, all of which are situated within the confines of the
' Island of Arabia.'

"Although Muslims rely on their religious obligations for the
satisfaction of the claims which I have specified above, they
naturally find additional support in your own pledge, Sir,
with regard to Constantinople, Thrace, and Asia Minor, the
populations of which are overwhelmingly Muslim. They
trust that a pledge so solemnly given and recently renewed
will be redeemed in its entirety. Although the same degree
of sanctity cannot be claimed for Constantinople as for the
three sacred Harams — Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem — Con-
stantinople is nevertheless held very sacred by all the Muslims
of the world, and the uninterrupted historic tradition of nearly
five centuries has created such an overwhelming sentiment
with regard to Islambol, or the 'City of Islam' — a title
which no city has up to this time enjoyed— that an effort
to drive the Turks out ' bag and baggage ' from the seat

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 129

of the Khilafat is bound to be regarded by the Muslims of the
world as a challenge of the modern Crusaders to Islam and
of European rule to the entire East, which cannot be
taken up by the Muslim world or the East without great
peril to our own Empire, and, in fact, to the Allied dominions
in Asia and Africa. In this connection, Sir, I might mention
one point, that the Muslims cannot tolerate any affront to
Islam in keeping the Khalifa as a sort of hostage in Con-
stantinople. He is not the Pope at the Vatican, much less
can he be the Pope at Avignon, and I am bound to say that
the recent action of the Allied Powers is likely to give rise in
the Muslim world to feelings which it will be very difficult
to restrain, and which would be very dangerous to the peace
of the world."

With regard to the question of the Caliphate and
temporal power, on which the Indian delegation had
been instructed to insist particularly, M. Moham-
med Ah', in order to make the Moslem point of view
quite clear, wrote as follows:1

" The moment this claim is put forward we are told that the
West has outgrown this stage of human development, and
that people who relieved the Head of a Christian Church of
all temporal power are not prepared to maintain the temporal
power of the Head of the Muslim Church. This idea is urged
by the supporters of the Laic Law of France with all the
fanaticism of the days of the Spanish Inquisition, and in
England, too. Some of the most unprejudiced people wonder
at the folly and temerity of those who come to press such an
anachronistic claim. Others suggest that the Khalifa should
be ' vaticanised ' even if he is to retain Constantinople, while
the Government of India, who should certainly have known
better, say that they cannot acquiesce in Muslim statements
which imply temporal allegiance to the Khilafat on the part
of Indian Muslims, or suggest that temporal power is of the
essence of the Khilafat. Where such criticisms and suggestions
go astray is in misunderstanding the very nature and ideal
of Islam and the Khilafat, and in relying on analogies from
faiths which, whatever their original ideals, have, for all
practical purposes, ceased to interpret life as Isl^m seeks
to do."

1 India and the Empire, reprinted from Foreign Affairs,
July 1, 1920 (Orchard House, Great Smith Street, West-
minster, London, S.W. 1), pp. 3 f.

9

130 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

As he had said in the course of his official interview
with the British Premier, as Islam is not "a set of
doctrines and dogmas, but a way of life, a moral code,
and a social polity," —

"Muslims regard themselves as created to serve the one
Divine purpose that runs through the ages, owing allegiance
to God in the first place and acknowledging His authority
alone in the last resort. Their religion is not for Sabbaths
and Sundays only, or a matter for churches and temples.
It is a workaday faith, and meant even more for the market-
place than the mosque. Theirs is a federation of faith, a
cosmopolitan brotherhood, of which the personal centre is
the Khalifa. He is not a Pope and is not even a priest, and
he certainly has no pretensions to infallibility. He is the
head of Islam's Republic, and it is a mere accident, and an un-
fortunate accident at that, that he happens to be a king. He is
the Commander of the Faithful, the President of their Theo-
cratic Commonwealth, and the Leader of all Mussulmans in
all matters for which the Koran and the Traditions of the
Prophet, whose successor he is, provide guidance."

Therefore, according to the Moslem doctrine —

"There is no such theory of ' divided allegiance' here, as
the Government of India consider to be ' subversive of the
constitutional basis on which all Governments are established.'
' There is no government but God's,' says the Koran, ' and
Him alone is a Mussulman to serve,' and since He is the Sole
Sovereign of all mankind, there can be no divided allegiance.
All Governments can command the obedience of the Muslims
in the same way as they can command the obedience of other
people, but they can do so only so far as they command it,
as Mr. H. G. Wells would say, in the name of God and for
God, and certainly no Christian Sovereign could expect to
exercise unquestioned authority over a Muslim against the
clear commandments of his Faith when no Muslim Sovereign
could dream of doing it. Mussulmans are required to obey
God and His Prophet and ' the men in authority from
amongst themselves,' which include the Khalifa; but they
are also required, in case of every dispute, to refer back to the
Holy Koran and to the Traditions of the Prophet, which are
to act as arbitrator. Thus the Khalifa himself will be dis-
obeyed if he orders that which the Faith forbids, and if he
persists in such unauthorised conduct, he may not only be
disobeyed, but also be deposed.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 131

"But whatever he could or could not do, the Khalifa was
certainly not a pious old gentleman whose only function in
life was to mumble his prayers and repeat his beads.

" The best way to understand what he is and what he is not
is to go back to the Prophet whose Khalifa or Successor he is.
The Koran regards man as the vicegerent of God on earth,
and Adam was the first Khalifa of God, and free-willed
instrument of divine will. This succession continued from
prophet to prophet, and they were the guides of the people
in all the affairs of life. The fuller and final revelation came
with Mohammed, and since then the Commanders of the
Faithful have been his Khalifas or Successors. But as religion
is not a part of life but the whole of it, and since it is not an
affair of the next world but of this, which it teaches us to
make better, cleaner, and happier, so every Muslim religious
authority has laid it down unequivocally and emphatically
that the allegiance which Muslims owe to the Khalifa is both
temporal and spiritual. The only limits recognised to his
authority are the Commandments of God, which he is not
allowed to disobey or defy. . . .

" The Mussulmans, therefore, do not believe that Christ,
for instance, could have said that His was the kingdom not
of this earth but of Heaven alone ; or that men were to render
to Caesar what was due to Caesar, and to God what was due to
God. Caesar could not share the world with God or demand
from mankind any allegiance, even if only temporal, if he
did not demand it for God and on behalf of God. But the
ordinary Christian conception has been that the kingdom of
Christ was not of this world, and no Pope or priest could,
consistently with this conception, demand temporal power.
It is doubtful if the Papacy is based on any saying of Christ
Himself. At any rate, the Pope has always claimed to be the
successor of St. Peter and the inheritor of his prerogatives.
As such he has been looked upon as the doorkeeper of the
kingdom of heaven, his office being strictly and avowedly
limited to the spiritual domain. A study of history makes
it only too apparent that the doctrine of the Papacy grew in
Christianity by the application to the Popes of the epithets
which are applied to St. Peter in the Gospels. Just as
St. Peter never had any temporal authority, so the Papacy
also remained, in the first stages of its growth, devoid of
temporal power for long centuries. It was only by a very
slow development that the Popes aspired to temporal power.
Thus, without meaning any offence, it may be said that the
acquisition of temporal power by the Popes was a mere
accident, and they have certainly been divested of it without

132 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

doing the least violence to the religious feelings of one half
of the Christian world.

" On the contrary, the temporal power of the Khilafat in
Islam is of the very essence of it, and is traceable not only
to the earliest Khalifas, but to the Prophet himself. This
is obviously not the religious belief of Christian Europe or
America; but equally obviously this is the religious Muslim
belief, and after all it is with the Muslim belief that we are
concerned. ..."

So, considering the ever-increasing armaments of
European and American nations, " even after the
creation of a nebulous League of Nations," he asked
himself :

" How then can Islam dispense with temporal power ?
Others maintain armies and navies and air forces for the
defence of their territories or their commerce, because they
love these more than they hate armaments. To Islam, its
culture and ethics are dearer than territory, and it regards
faith as greater than finance. It needs no army or navy
to advance its boundaries or extend its influence; but it
certainly needs them to prevent the aggression of others."

Then M. Mohammed Ali dealt separately with the
chief clauses of the Turkish treaty in the course of
his interview with Mr. Lloyd George, and made the
following remarks :

" As regards Thrace, it is not necessary to support the Turk-
ish claim for the retention of Thrace by any further argu-
ment than that of the principle of self-determination. Its
fair and honest application will ensure the satisfaction of
that claim.

" As regards Smyrna, the occupation of Smyrna by the
Greeks, who were not even at war with Turkey, under the
auspices of the Allies, has shaken to a great extent the con-
fidence which Muslims reposed in the pledges given to them,
and the atrocities perpetrated in that region have driven them
almost to desperation. Muslims can discover no justification
for this action except the desire of Greek capitalists to exploit
the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor, which are admit-
tedly the homelands of the Turks. If this state of affairs
is allowed to continue, not only will the Turk be driven out,
' bag and baggage,' from Europe, but he will have no ' bag

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 133

and baggage ' left to him, even in Asia. He would be para-
lysed, commercially and industrially, in a land-locked small
Emirate in Asia Minor, the speedy bankruptcy of which is
certain. The application of the principle of self-determination
would entirely rule out the Greek claim in this fertile region,
which obviously tempts the greed of the capitalist and the
exploiter.

" As regards Cilicia, reasons similar to those that have pro-
moted the action of Greeks in Smyrna seem clearly to prompt
the outcry of the Christian population in Cilicia, and obviously
it is the Gulf of Alexandretta which is attracting some people
as the Gulf of Smyrna is attracting others."

Afterwards, coming to the question of the mas-
sacres, M. Mohammed All declared :

" The Indian Khilafat delegation must put on record their
utter detestation of such conduct and their full sympathy
for the sufferers, whether they be Christian or Muslim.
But, if the Turk is to be punished as a criminal, and popula-
tions of other races and creeds are to be released from their
allegiance to the Ottoman Sovereign on the assumption that
the Turks have been tyrants in the past and their rule is
intolerable, then the delegation claim that the whole question
of these massacres must be impartially investigated by an
International Commission on which the All-India Khilafat
Conference should be adequately represented."

Moreover, the delegation had already said some-
thing similar in a telegram sent to Mr. Lloyd George :

" Where casualties have in fact taken place, not only should
their true extent be ascertained, but the Commission should
go fully into the so-called massacres and the intrigues of
Tsarist Russia in Asia Minor after the success of similar
intrigues in the Balkans; it should go into the question of the
organisation of revolutionary societies by the Christian
subjects of the Sultan, the rebellious character of which was
subversive of his rule; it should go into the provocation
offered to the Muslim majority in this region, and the nature
of the struggle between the contending parties and the
character of the forces engaged on either side. ..."

He went on:

" I have no brief for^fchem; I have no brief for the Turks; I
have only a brief for Islam and the India Muslims. What we

134 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

say is this, as I said to Mr. Fisher: Let there be a thorough
inquiry, and if this thorough inquiry is carried out, and if
it establishes to the satisfaction of the world that the Turks
really have been guilty of unprovoked murders, and have
been guilty of these atrocities and horrible crimes, then we
will wash our hands of the Turks.

"To us it is much more important that not a single stain
should remain on the fair name of Islam. We want to convert
the whole world to our way of thinking, but with what face
could we go before the whole world and say we are the
brethren of murderers and massacrers ?

" But we know the whole history of these massacres to some
extent. It is only in Armenia that the Turk is said to be so
intolerant; there are other parts of the world where he deals
with Christian people, and where he deals with the Jewish
community. No complaints of massacres come from those
communities. Then the Armenians themselves lived under
Turkish rule for centuries and never complained. The
farthest back that we can go to discover any trace of this
is the beginning of the last century. But in reality the
' massacres ' begin only in the last quarter of the last
century.

"It is pretty clear that they begin after the success of efforts
like those made in the Balkans by Russia, which has never
disguised its desire to take Constantinople since the time of
Peter the Great. It has always wanted to go to Tsargrad,
as it called it — that is, the city of the Tsars. They wanted
to go there. They tried these things in the Balkans, and they
succeeded beyond their expectation, only probably Bulgaria
became too independent when it became Greater Bulgaria.
But in the case of the Armenians, they had people who were
not very warlike, who had no sovereign ambitions themselves,
and who were also to a great extent afraid of conversion to
another branch of the Orthodox Church, the Russian branch,
so that they were not very willing tools. Still, they were
egged on, and plots and intrigues went on all the time. These
people were incited, and they understood that if they made
a compromise with Tsarist Russia they would get something
better. It was then that these massacres came on the scene.
No doubt there have been several outcries about them;
some evidence has been produced; but there has been no
thorough international inquiry which would satisfy the entire
world, Muslim as well as Christian. It is in that connection
that we earnestly appeal to you, to the whole of Christendom,
to the whole of Europe and America, that if the Turk is to be
punished on the assumption that he is a tyrant, that his rule

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 135

is a blasting tyranny, and that he ought to be punished, in
that case the evidence should be of such a character that it
should be absolutely above suspicion."

Mr. Lloyd George in his reply upbraided Turkey
with fighting by the side of the Central Powers
though Great Britain had never fought against her,
and protracting the hostilities by closing the Black Sea
to the British fleet ; but he did not seem to realise that
the Russian policy of the Allies partly accounted for
Turkey's decision. Only at the end of the interview,
in answer to a remark of the leader of the Indian
delegation, he pleaded in defence of England " that
she had made no arrangement of any sort with
Russia at the expense of Turkey at the beginning of
the war." Then, before coming to the various points
M. Mohammed Ali had dealt with, Mr. Lloyd George,
who had kept aloof for a long tune from the policy
of understanding with France, said:

" I do not understand M. Mohammed Ali to claim indul-
gence for Turkey. He claims justice, and justice she will get.
Austria has had justice. Germany has had justice — pretty
terrible justice. Why should Turkey escape ? Turkey
thought she had a feud with us. What feud had Turkey
with us ? Why did she come in to try and stab us and destroy
liberty throughout the world when we were engaged in this
life-and-death struggle ? Is there any reason why we should
apply a different measure to Turkey from that which we have
meted out to the Christian communities of Germany and
Austria ? I want the Mohammedans in India to get it well
into their minds that we are not treating Turkey severely
because she is Mohammedan: we are applying exactly the same
principle to her as we have applied to Austria, which is a
great Christian community."

As to Arabia — which will be dealt with later on
together with the Pan-Arabian movement — though
M. Mohammed Ali had declared that " the delegation
felt no anxiety about the possibility of an under-

136 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

standing between the Arabs and the Khalifa," and
that the Moslems " did not want British bayonets to
subject the Arabs to Turkey," Mr. Lloyd George
answered :

" The Arabs have claimed independence. They have pro-
claimed Feisal King of Syria. They have claimed that they
should be severed from Turkish dominion. Is it suggested
that the Arabs should remain under Turkish dominion merely
because they are Mohammedans ? Is not the same measure of
independence and freedom to be given to Mohammedans as
is given to Christians ? Croatia has demanded freedom, and
we have given it to her. It is a Christian community. Syria
has demanded it, and it is given to her. We are applying
exactly the same principles in Christian places, and to impose
the dominion of the Sultan upon Arabia, which has no desire
for it, is to impose upon Arabs something which we certainly
would not dream of imposing upon these Christian com-
munities."

With regard to Thrace, after owning it was difficult
to give reliable figures and saying that according to
the Greek census and the Turkish census, which differ
but little, the Moslem population was in "a con-
siderable minority," Mr. Lloyd George stated that
" it would certainly be taken away from Turkish
sovereignty." As to Smyrna, he asserted that
according to his information " a great majority of
the population undoubtedly prefers the Greek rule
to the Turkish rule."

Concerning the temporal power of the Khalifa, he
seemed to have forgotten the difference which had
just been pointed out to him between the Christian
religion and Islam on this point, for he declared :

"I am not going to interfere in a religious discussion where
men of the same faith take a different view. I know of
Mohammedans — sincere, earnest, zealous Mussulmans — who
take a very different view of the temporal power from the one
which is taken by M. Mohammed AH to-day, just as I know of

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 137

Catholics who take one view and other Catholics who take a
very different view of the temporal power of the Pope. That
is a controversy into which I do not propose to enter."

And as if M. Mohammed All's remarks had quite
escaped him, he added :

" All I know is this. The Turk will exercise temporal power
in Turkish lands. We do not propose to deprive him of Turkish
lands. Neither do we propose that he should retain power
over lands which are not Turkish. Why ? Because that is
the principle we are applying to the Christian communities
of Europe. The same principles must be applied to the Turk."

Finally, without thoroughly investigating the
question of the massacres, he concluded that the
responsibility lay with the Ottoman Government,
which " cannot, as it is now constituted, protect its
own subjects"; that Turkey is a "misgoverned
country " — a reproach that might be applied to
many other countries, though nobody would think
of declaring they must be suppressed on that account;
and that as the Turks " have been intolerant and
have proved bad and unworthy rulers," the solutions
proposed by the Allies are the only remedy and
therefore are justified.

And so the old argument that Turkey must be
chastised was recapitulated once more, and, through
the mouth of her Prime Minister, England resorted to
threats again, whereas she did not mean to compel
Germany to carry out her engagements fully. This
attitude seems to be accounted for by the fact that
Turkey was weak, and was not such a good customer
as Germany. England, while pretending to do
justice and to settle accounts, merely meant to take
hold of the Straits.

Islam has instituted a social polity and culture

138 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

which, though widely different from British and
American civilisations, and leading to different
methods of life, is not necessarily inferior to them;
and all religious sects, whether Protestant or
Catholic, are wrong when they look upon their
own moral conception as superior, and endeavour
to substitute it for that of Islam.

If we refer to the letter which was written to
Damad Ferid Pasha, president of the Ottoman
delegation, in answer to the memorandum handed
on June 17, 1919, to the Peace Conference, and which
lacks M. Clemenceau's wit and style though his
signature is appended to it, we plainly feel a Puritan
inspiration in it, together with the above-mentioned
state of mind.

One cannot help being sorry to find in so important
a document such a complete ignorance or total lack
of comprehension of the Muslim mind, and of the
difference existing between our modern civilisation
and what constitutes a culture. For instance, we
read in it the following:

" History records many Turkish victories and also many
Turkish defeats, many nations conquered and many set
free. The memorandum itself hints at a loss of terri-
tories which not long ago were still under Ottoman
sovereignty.

"Yet, in all these changes not one instance occurs in Europe,
Asia, or Africa when the establishment of Turkish sovereignty
was not attended with a decrease of material prosperity or a
lower standard of culture; neither does an instance occur
when the withdrawal of Turkish domination was not attended
with an increase of material prosperity and a higher standard
of culture. Whether among European Christians or among
Syrian, Arabian, or African Mussulmans, the Turk has always
brought destruction with him wherever he has conquered;
he has never proved able to develop in peace what he had won
by war. He is not gifted in this respect."

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 139

This stagnation, which to a certain extent has been
noticed in modern times, may proceed from the fact
that the old Turkish spirit was smothered and Islam
was checked by the growth of foreign influence in
Turkey. This is probably due, not chiefly to foreign
intrusion in the affairs of the Ottoman State — for
the latter needed the help of foreign nations — but
rather to the selfish rivalries between these nations
and to the mongrel solutions inherent in international
regimes by which Turkish interests were sacrificed.

It is well known that the decadence of the Arabic-
speaking countries had begun long before they were
subjected by the Turks. It has even been noticed
that Turkish domination in Arabia in 1513 checked
the decline of Arabian civilisation, and roused the
Syrians, who were in a similar predicament.

Besides, the prevailing and paramount concern for
material prosperity which asserts itself in the above-
mentioned document, together with the way in
which business men, especially Anglo-Saxons, under-
stand material prosperity, would account for the
variance between the two civilisations, for it
enhances the difference between their standpoints, and
proves that the superiority conferred by spiritual
eminence does not belong to the nations who con-
sider themselves superior to the Turks.

The Turkish mind, enriched both by Islamic ethics
and by Arabian, Persian, and Byzantine influences,
has risen to a far more definite and lofty outlook on
life than the shallow Anglo-Saxon morality. There is
as much difference between the two as between the
architecture of the Yeshil-Jami, the green mosque
of Brusa, the dome' of the Suleymanie, or the kiosk

140 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of Baghdad, and the art to which we owe the "sky-
scrapers," the "flat-iron" buildings, the "Rhine
bridges," and the "Leipzig buildings," or between the
taste of the man who can appreciate "loukoums" or
rose- jam, and the taste of the man who prefers
"chewing-gum" or the acidulated drops flavoured
with amyl acetate, or even the sweets flavoured with
methyl salicylate provided by the American Govern-
ment for its army. In the same manner, a similar
confusion is often made between comfort — or what
vulgar people call comfort — and true ease and real
welfare; or again between a set of practical com-
modities inherent in the utilitarian conception of
modern life, and what makes up culture. The quality
of culture evidently does not depend on the percent-
age of water-closets or bath-rooms, or the quantity
of calico used per thousand of inhabitants, in a
country where the walls of the houses were once
decorated with beautiful enamels, where the interior
courts were adorned with marble fountains, and
where women wore costly garments and silk veils.

Before throwing contempt on Islam, despising the
Arabian and Turkish civilisations, and hoping that the
Moslem outlook on life will make way for the modern
Anglo-Saxon ideal, Mr. Lloyd George and all those
who repeat after him that the Turks have no peculiar
gift for governing peoples, ought to have pondered
over Lady Esther Stanhope's words, which apply so
fittingly to recent events. Being tired of Europe,
she had travelled in the East, and, enticed by the
beauty and grandeur of the Orient, she led a retired
life in a convent near Said, dressed as a Moslem
man. One day she was asked by the " Vicomte de

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 141

Marcellus " whether she would ever go back to
Europe, and she answered in some such words as
these — we quote from memory:

" Why should I go to Europe ? To see nations that
deserve to be in bondage, and kings that do not deserve to
reign ? Before long the very foundation of your old continent
will be shaken. You have just seen Athens, and will soon
see Tyre. That's all that remains of those noble common-
wealths so famed for art, of those empires that had the
mastery of the world's trade and the seas. So will it be with
Europe. Everything in it is worn out. The races of kings
are getting extinct; they are swept away by death or their
own faults, and are getting more and more degenerate.
Aristocracy will soon be wiped out, making room for a
petty, effete, ephemeral middle class. Only the lower people,
those who plough and delve, still have some self-respect and
some virtues. You will have to dread everything if they
ever become conscious of their strength. I am sick of your
Europe. I won't listen to its distant rumours that die away
on this lonely beach. Let us not speak of Europe any more.
I have done with it."

Besides, all religions accord with the character of
the people that practise them and the climate in
which they live. Most likely Islam perfectly fitted
the physical and moral nature of the Turkish race,
since the latter immediately embraced Mohammed's
religion, whereas it had kept aloof from the great
Christian movement which, 500 years before, had
perturbed a large part of the pagan world, and
it has remained faithful to it ever since.

If the Allies tried to minimise the part played by
that religion, which perfectly suits the character and
conditions of life of the people who practise it, and
attempted to injure it, they would really benefit the
domineering aims of Rome and the imperialistic
spirit of Protestantism. In fact, the Vatican tries
to avail itself of the recent Protestant effort, as

142 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

has already been pointed out, and as various mani-
festations will show, to bring about a Christian
hegemony which would not be beneficial either to
the peoples of the East or to the civilisation of the
world.

By doing so, the Allies would drive those peoples
towards Germanism, though they have no natural
propensity for it, for they are averse both to the
Lutheran spirit and to the Catholic spirit; yet Ger-
manism has succeeded in rinding its way and even
gaining sympathy among them, because it pretended
to come in a friendly spirit.

It cannot be denied that before the war the Turks
endeavoured to find support among other nations to
counterbalance German influence. But as, above all
things, they dreaded the Russian sway — not without
reason, as the latter had already grasped several
Turkish provinces in Asia Minor and represented its
advance as the revenge of Orthodoxy over Islamism
— they had turned towards Germany, who, though
it secretly favoured Tsardom, yet pursued an anti-
Russian policy.

Of course, they could not have any illusion about
what a German Protectorate might be to Turkey,
for at a sitting of the Reichstag a German deputy
had openly declared: " In spite of our sympathy for
Turkey, we must not forget that the time of her
partition has come." As early as 1898 the Pan-
German League issued a manifesto under the title
Deutschlands Anspruche an das Turkische Erbe (The
Rights of Germany to the Heritage of Turkey). " As
soon as the present events shall bring about the
dissolution of Turkey, no other Power will seriously

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 143

attempt to raise a protest if the German Empire lays
a claim to a share of it, for it has a right to a share
as a great Power, and it wants it infinitely more than
any other great Power, in order to maintain the
national and economic life of hundreds of thousands
of its emigrants." In the same manner, at the time
of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, von
Aerenberg did not scruple to say: "The opening
to economic life of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia will
always be looked upon as a high deed of German
enterprise." And, alluding to the new field of activity
which was thus opened to Austria-Hungary, he
added: " The possession of Bosnia has made us a
Balkan Power; it is our task and duty to discern
when the time shall come, and to turn it to account."

But if the Turks chose to side with Germany, it
was because the Emperor " Guilloun " represented
himself as the protector of Islam, and promised to
leave the Ottoman Empire its religious sovereignty
and the full enjoyment of Muslim civilisation. Now,
as the Turks acknowledge only Allah's will, it is
foolish to ask a Christian sovereign or a Christian
community to exercise authority over them in order
to ensure peace; and yet the Western Powers, urged
on by religious interests, have continued to interfere
in Ottoman affairs from the Christian point of view
and in order to further Christian interests.

Now we see why Germany, in order not to lose the
benefit of her previous endeavours, readily welcomed
the Central Committee for the Defence of Islam, whose
seat was in Berlin, whence it carried on a vigorous
propaganda throughout the Muslim world.

At the beginning of December, 1919, that com-

144 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

mittee held a meeting in Berlin; among the people
present were: Talaat Pasha, representing the
Turanian movement; Hussein Bey Reshidof, repre-
senting the " Eastern Central Committee " instituted
by the Moscovite Foreign Commissariat for the
Liberation of Islam — which is at the head of all the
organisations at work in Persia, the Transcaspian
areas, Anatolia, Afghanistan, and India; Kutchuk
Talaat, a representative of the Union and Progress
Committee; Nuri Bedri Bey, representing the
Anatolian Kurds; and delegates from Persia and
Afghanistan. There they discussed what measures
should be taken and what means of action should
be resorted to in Muslim countries, especially in
Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco.

It must be owned, on the other hand, that the
Catholics in Turkey had refused — as they have always
tried to do in all countries — to acknowledge the
sovereignty of the Turkish Government, and had
looked upon themselves as above the laws of the
land, though they laid a claim at the same time to
a share in the government of the country; in short,
they wanted to be both Roman legates and Turkish
governors.

All this does not suffice to justify the measures of
oppression the Turks resorted to, but explains how
they were driven to take such measures, and accounts
for the state of mind now prevailing in Turkey, which
has brought about the present troubles. For the
foreign Powers, urged by the Eastern Christians,
kept on meddling with Turkish home affairs, which
caused much resentment and anger among the Turks,
and roused religious fanaticism on both sides.

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 145

If the liberal Western Powers carried on that
policy — that is to say, if they continued to support
the Christians against the Moslems — they would make
a dangerous mistake.

At the present time the Holy See, which has
never given up its ever-cherished dream of universal
dominion, plainly shows by its growing activity that
it means to develop its religious influence and avail
itself of the war to strengthen and enlarge it.

For some time the Austro-Hungarian monarchy,
though always a staunch supporter of the Papacy,
restrained that tendency and became a moderating
influence in Rome; but now the Holy See aims at
playing a more important part than ever in all the
affairs of Southern Germany and the countries that
have broken loose from the former dual monarchy.

In order to strengthen the Church and to realise
Catholic unity, the Vatican at the present juncture
is exerting all its power in Central Europe and the
Slavonic countries ; and is doing its best at the same
time to get in touch with the Protestant world in
order to reinforce its own action by coupling it with
the Protestant propaganda.

Benedict XV has revived the scheme of the longed-
for Union of the Churches in order to win over to
Catholicism part or the whole of the former Orthodox
Empire.

In New Germany the Holy See is endeavouring
to bring about an understanding between Catholics
and Protestants, with a view to a common Christian
— rather than strictly Catholic — action. In Austria,
after upholding all the elements of the old regime
so long as a monarchist movement seemed likely to

10

146 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

triumph, it now gives its support to Christian
Democracy. In Hungary, where the Jesuits and the
Cistercians first worked hand in hand together with
an Allied mission in Budapest to maintain Friedrich,
or at least a clerical government, in power, the
Primate, Mgr. Csernoch, and the Lutheran bishop,
Mgr. Sandar Raffai, have now agreed to work for
the same purpose. The Polish Schlachta, of course,
supports these schemes and intrigues, which are
being carried on at Fribourg, in Switzerland, where
certain princes connected with the Imperial House
and Prince Louis of Windisch-Graetz used to meet
Waitz, Bishop of Innsbruck.

Uniatism, or the rite of the United Greek Church,
which, though retaining the Slavonic liturgy, acknow-
ledges the Pope as the supreme head of the Church,
and is paramount in the Carpathian Mountains,
Eastern Galicia, and the Ukraine, favours the exten-
sion of the Pope's sovereignty over these territories,
and naturally the Holy See takes advantage of this
movement to support and reinforce the Church and
bring Orthodox countries under the dominion of
Rome.

Till these great schemes have been carried out,
and in order to further them, the Holy See means to
establish between the Orthodox and the Catholic
world an intermediary zone which would be a favour-
able ground for its penetration and conquest. To
this intent Father Genocchi has been sent as
apostolic visitor to the Ukraine by Cardinal Marini,
prefect of the congregation newly established for the
propaganda in the East, with full powers over both
Latin and Greek Catholics, or Uniates. Father

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 147

Genocchi is to act in close union with Mgr. Katti,
and both stand out as powerful agents of the great
scheme of the Roman Church.

While pursuing this direct conquest. Rome en-
deavours in all countries to gain the support of all
believers in Christ, even the Protestants, in order to
be able to exert an influence on the policy of the
Governments, and thus serve Christian interests.

At a recent conference of the Czecho-Slovak
Catholics, Mgr. Kordatch, Archbishop of Prague,
declared the Catholics would go so far as to resort
to public political action and hold out the hand to
the Protestants, who believe, like them, in the
Divinity of Christ and the Decalogue.

So any undertaking against Islam or any other
Eastern religion cannot but reinforce the power of
Rome, for it aims at destroying the power of the
other creeds which, as well as Catholicism, gratify the
aspirations of the various peoples, and thus legiti-
mately counterbalance its dream of hegemony.

Finally, though any communist conception is
abhorrent to the Moslem spirit, which is essentially
individualist and so has an aristocratic trend, and
though Bolshevism, as we have already pointed out,
is a specific doctrine which suits only the Russian
mind, the attitude of the Western nations threatened
to drive Islam towards Bolshevism, or at least to
create a suitable ground for its expansion. In spite
of the enlightened leaders of Islam, the attitude of
the Powers risked inducing the Moslem masses to
lend a willing ear to Bolshevist promises and to adopt

148 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Bolshevism in order to defend the Moslem creed and
customs. Besides, Bolshevism, which was under-
going an evolution, and was growing more wily, less
brutal, but all the more dangerous, no longer required
other nations to adopt its social ideal. In order
to serve a political purpose, it now turned its efforts
towards the Caspian Sea to communicate with Asia
Minor and create disturbances in Central Asia,
while, on the other side, it advanced as far as
Mongolia.

After the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian agree-
ment forced by Great Britain upon Persia, which, in
spite of what was officially said to the contrary,
deprived Persia of her independence, Bolshevism
saw what an easy prey was offered to it by the
English policy, and concentrated its efforts on Asia
Minor, where it could most easily worry England.
It carried on a very active propaganda in all Asiatic
languages in Turkistan and even in Afghanistan —
the result being that the latter country sent a mission
of inquiry to Moscow.

According to the statement of a Persian repro-
duced in the Journal des Debate of April 4, 1920, the
representatives of the Soviet Government made
advances to the Persian patriotic organisations and
told them:

" England despises your rights. Your Government is in
her hand. To organise your resistance, you need a help. We
offer it to you, and ask for nothing in return, not even for
your adhesion to our social doctrine. The reason that urges
us to offer you our support is a political one. Russia, whether
she is Bolshevist or not, cannot live by the side of an England
ruling qver nearly the whole of the East. The real indepen-
dence of your country is necessary to us."

TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE 149

Such suggestions could not but attract the attention
of the Persians at a time when, without even waiting
for the opening of the Chamber that had been elected
under the influence of British troops in order to
sanction the Anglo-Persian agreement, some English
administrators had already settled in Teheran.

The same Persian, in agreement with the main
body of Persian opinion, went on:

" Shall we have to submit to that shameful regime ? No-
body thinks so in our country. Even those who were not
bold enough to protest openly against the deed of spoliation
which the Anglo-Persian agreement is, are secretly opposed
to that agreement. But in order to avail ourselves of that
discontent, to concentrate our forces, and chiefly to act fast
and well, we need help from abroad, at least at the outset.
The Bolshevists offer it to us. I do not know why we should
discard the proposition at once. What makes us hesitate is
their communist doctrine; yet they declare they do not
want at all to ' bolshevikise ' Persia. As soon as their
promise seems to be quite genuine, it will be our national
duty to accept their help.

" Whether the Red Dictator's action in Russia was good or
bad is a question that concerns the Russians alone. The only
question for us is how to- find an ally. Now we have not to
choose between many.

" We should have been only too pleased to come to an
understanding with Great Britain, even at the cost of some
concessions, provided our independence were respected. But
the British leaders have preferred trampling upon our rights.
Who is to be blamed for this ? "

In the same manner as the Kemalist movement, a
Nationalist movement was gaining ground in Persia,
like the one which had already brought on the
Teheran events from 1906 to 1909.

Now, while the Bolshevists, in order to expand and
strengthen their position, did their utmost to con-
vince the Eastern nations that Bolshevism alone
could free them, the Germans, on the other hand,

150 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

seized the new opportunity that was given them to
offer the Mohammedans their help, and sent them
German officers from Russia. In this way, and
through our fault, Bolshevism and Germanism united
to foment disturbances in the East, and join with it
against us. That is why Mr. Winston Churchill said,
at the beginning of January: " New forces are now
rising in Asia Minor, and if Bolshevism and Turkish
Nationalism should unite, the outlook would be a
serious one for Great Britain."

THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE

THE Allied intervention in Turkey continued to be
the subject of frequent diplomatic conversations be-
tween the Powers.

Though Italy and France seemed to favour a
strictly limited action, England held quite a different
opinion, and energetic measures seemed likely to be
resorted to. Lord Derby at the meeting of the
Ambassadors' Council on March 10 read a telegram
from his Government stating it intended to demand
of Germany the extradition of Enver Pasha and
Talaat Pasiia, who were on the list of war criminals
drawn up a few weeks before by the British Govern-
ment, and who at that time were in Berlin.

As the Allies had not requested that these men
should be handed over to them at the time of the
armistice, and as the war criminals whose extradition
had been previously demanded of the Central Powers
did not seem likely to be delivered up to them, this
seemed rather an idle request at a time when it was
openly said the Allies wanted to expel the Turks
from Constantinople, when a deep agitation convulsed
the Moslem world and discontent was rife in it.
What was the use of this new threat to Germany if,
like the previous one, it was not to be carried into
effect ? What would Great Britain do if the two
" undesirables " thought of going to Holland, and

151

152 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

why did she prepare to punish Turkey when some
of her statesmen seemed inclined to make all sorts
of concessions, instead of compelling Germany, the
promoter of the conflict, who had not yet delivered
up any German subject, to execute the treaty without
any restriction whatever ?

At the beginning of the armistice England had
deported the members and chief supporters of the
Committee of Union and Progress, and later on the
high functionaries who had been arrested by Damad
Ferid Pasha, and were about to be court-martialled.
One night fifty-four of the latter out of about 130 were
suddenly deported to Malta for fear they should be
set free by the population of Constantinople. Among
them were: Hairi Effendi, ex-Sheik-ul-Islam; the
Egyptian prince, Said Halim Pasha, ex -Grand
Vizier; Ahmed Nessiny, ex-Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Halil Bey, ex-Minister of Justice; Prince
Abbas Halim Pasha, ex-Minister of Public Works;
Fethy Bey, ex-Minister at Sofia; Rahmi Bey,
Governor-General of vilayet of Smyrna; Jambalat
Bey, ex-Minister of Interior; Ibrahim Bey, a
former Minister; and four members of the Com-
mittee: Midhat Shukri; Zia Geuk Alp; Kemal
(Kutchuk Effendi); and Bedreddin Bey, temporary
vali of Diarbekir, who was deported as responsible
for the massacres that had taken place in that town,
though at that time he was out of office and had
been discharged by a court-martial. The British
even evinced a desperate, undignified animosity and
an utter lack of generosity in regard to the Turkish
generals who had defeated them. They had, as it
were, carried away the spirit of Turkey.

THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE 153

Italy, who had followed a most clever, shrewd,
and far-sighted policy, and who had kept some inde-
pendence within the Supreme Council, had been
very reserved in regard to the Turkish question.

In regard to Article 9 of the pact of London, which
ascribed to Italy, in case Turkey should be dis-
membered, a " fair part " of the province of Adana
in Asia Minor, the newspaper II Secolo, in the middle
of January, 1920, expressed the opinion that Italy
should give up that acquisition.

" Notwithstanding all that has been written for the last
seven or eight years about the Adalia area, we do not think
that its possession would improve our present economic con-
dition. It would only estrange from us a nation from which
we might perhaps derive great advantages through an open
policy of friendship and liberty.

" The most profitable scheme would have been to maintain
the national integrity of Turkey and to give Italy, not a
mandate over a reduced State, but a mere administrative
control, and to assign her a few zones of exploitation with
mere economic privileges, for instance, near Heraclea and
Adalia.

" But at the present stage of the Asiatic problem, such a
scheme could hardly be carried out. We must then lay
aside all selfish purposes, and openly and tenaciously defend
the integrity and independence of the Turkish State.

" Let the Turks be driven away from the districts which
are predominantly Arabian, Greek, or Armenian. But let
the Sultan remain in Constantinople, till the League of Nations
has become stronger and able to assume control of the Straits.
Let us not forget that the Turks chiefly put their confidence
in us now, and that Germany, whose policy had never threat-
ened Turkish territorial integrity, had succeeded in gaining
Turkish friendship and blind devotion.

" Italy has not many friends to-day, and so she should not
despise a hand which is willingly held out to her."

Italy therefore did not warmly approve an expedi-
tion against Turkey. Her semi-official newspapers
stated it was owing to Italy that the Allies' policy

154 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

still showed some moderation, and they hinted that
the presence of Italian troops in the contingent
landed at Constantinople was to be looked upon as
the best means to prevent extreme measures.

On Tuesday, March 16, the Allied troops, consisting
mostly of British soldiers, under the command of
General Milne, occupied the Ottoman Government
offices.

It might seem strange that the Allied troops in
Constantinople were commanded by a -British general,"
when the town was the residence of General Franchet
d'Esperey, commander-in-chief of the inter-Allied
troops on the Macedonian front, who, in the decisive
battle in which he broke through the Bulgarian front,
had had General Milne under him. But, after all, it
was better for France that an English general should
stand responsible for carrying out the occupation.

To the student of Eastern events this was but
the logical outcome of a patient manoeuvre of
England. The documents that have now been made
public plainly show how far-sighted her policy had
been.

General Franchet d'Esperey's dispositions were
suddenly reversed, for he had not advocated an
important military action against Russia or Turkey
when he had taken command of the Eastern army —
i.e., before his expedition from Salonika towards the
Danube — and at the beginning of October, 1918, he
had arranged the French and English divisions so as
to march against Budapest and Vienna, foreseeing
the ultimate advance of the Italian left wing against
Munich.

On October 8, 1918, he was formally enjoined from

THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE 155

Paris to send the British divisions which made up
his right wing against Constantinople under the
command of an English general.

Thus, after the defeat of Bulgaria in October, 1918,
the British Government required that the troops sent
to the Constantinople area should be led by a British
general. In this way General Milne assumed com-
mand of the British troops stationed round and in
Constantinople when Admiral Calthorpe had con-
cluded the armistice with Turkey, and as a conse-
quence General Franchet d'Esperey, though still
commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in European
Turkey, was now under the orders of General Mime,
commander of the Constantinople garrison and the
forces in Asia Minor.

Some time after receiving the aforesaid order,
General Franchet d'Esperey, on October 27, 1918,
received a letter from the War Minister, M. Clemen-
ceau, No. 13644, B.S. 3,1 forwarding him " copy of
a letter giving the outline of a scheme of action that
was recommended not only to carry on the war
against the Central Powers in Eussia, but also to
effect the economic blockade of Bolshevism, and thus
bring about its downfall." This scheme, after being
assented to by the Allied Powers concerned in it, was
to be " the natural outcome of the operations en-
trusted to the Allied armies in the East."

Finally, in a telegram, No. 14041, B.S. 3, dated
November 6, containing some very curious recom-
mendations, it was said:

1 Cf. the Matin, June 17, 1920, an interview of M. Paul
Benazet, ex-chairman of the Committee of War Estimates;
and the (Euvre, July 8, 1920.

156 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

" The operations in Southern Russia should be
carried on by means of Greek elements, for instance,
which it might be inexpedient to employ in an offensive
against Germany, or by means of the French army
in Palestine."1

Thus all the plans of the French headquarters
were altered by England, and to her advantage; at
the same time part of our endeavours was broken
up and annihilated under the pressure of the Pan-
Russian circles that urged France .to intervene in
Russia, and the French policy in the East was wholly
at the mercy of England. By saying this, we do not
mean at all to belittle M. Clemenceau's work during
the war, but we only mention one of the mistakes
to which he was driven, in spite of his energy and
determination, by the English and American policy,
which had dazzled some of his collaborators.

On March 16, at 9 a.m., some British estafettes
handed to the Sultan, in his palace at Yildiz-Kiosk,
and to the Sublime Porte a note of General Milne,
commanding the Allied troops in Asia Minor and the
town of Constantinople. It stated that at 10 a.m.,
with the agreement of the Italian, French, and
British High Commissioners, and according to the
orders of the British Imperial Headquarters, the
Allied contingents would occupy the offices of the
Minister of War and the Minister of Marine, the
prefecture, the post and telegraph offices, the town
gates, and the new bridge of Galata. In fact, the
town had been occupied at daybreak by the Allied
troops.

1 Of. the Matin, June 24, 1920, and M. Fribourg's speech
in the second sitting of June 25, 1920.

THE OCCUPATION OP CONSTANTINOPLE 157

The note added that for a short time the political
administration would be left to the Turks, but under
the control of Allied officers. Martial law was
proclaimed, and, in case of resistance, force would
be resorted to.

The Ottoman Government gave no answer, and
an hour later all the measures mentioned by General
Milne were carried out. As these operations took a
whole day, all the means of transport and com-
munication were temporarily stopped.

At the War Office the soldiers on duty attempted
to resist the British forces. A skirmish ensued, in
which two British soldiers were killed, and an officer
and three soldiers wounded; nine Turks, including
an officer, were killed, and a few more wounded.

At the same hour a Greek destroyer steamed into
the Golden Horn, and cast anchor opposite the
Patriarch's palace.

Before this, General Milne had had a few deputies
and senators arrested, together with a few men
considered as having a share in the Nationalist
movement, such as Kutchuk Jemal Pasha, ex- War
Minister in the Ali Riza Cabinet; Jevad Pasha,
formerly head of the staff; Tchourouk Soulou
Mahmoud Pasha, a senator ; Dr. Essad Pasha ;
Galatali Shefket Pasha, commanding the Straits
forces; Keouf Bey, Kara Vassif Bey, Shevket Bey,
Hassan Tahsin Bey, Nouman Ousta EfEendi, Sheref
Bey, deputies.

Reouf Bey and Kara Vassif Bey were considered
as representing in the Turkish Parliament Mustafa
Kemal Pasha and the people who ensured the trans-
mission of his orders.

158 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

All these men were arrested illegally and brutally,
with the consent of the French Governor, though
they had always evinced much sympathy for France,
under the pretext that they corresponded with the
national army ; and yet their intervention might have
had favourable consequences.

Among the men arrested that night, Jemal,
Jevad, and Mahmoud Pasha, all three former
Ministers, were insulted and sent to prison in
their nightclothes, with their arms bound. Their
doors and windows were broken open, and their
Moslem wives were threatened in the harem. Some
children of thirteen or fourteen were also arrested
and thrashed. Eight Turkish soldiers on duty at
Shahzade-Bashi were killed in the morning while they
lay asleep on their camp-beds, and the censorship
probably suppressed other deeds of the same kind.

The Ottoman Government could not understand
how members of Parliament could be imprisoned,
especially by the English, the founders of the parlia-
mentary system. The deputy Jelal Noury Bey,
who is neither a Nationalist nor a Unionist, was
apprehended, merely because he opposed Ferid
Pasha's policy.

England, to enhance her influence over public
opinion, got control over the chief newspapers which
were not friendly to her. Jelal Noury Bey, the
director of the Ileri, a radical newspaper, and
Ahmed Emm Bey, the director of the Vakit, were
deported. The Alemdar, the Peyam Sabah, the
Stambul, edited by Refi Jevad, Ali Kemal, and Said
Mollah, which, since the first days of the armistice,
had praised the English policy, fell into English hands;

THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE 159

which accounts for the varying attitudes successively
assumed by those journals in their comments on
current events. Their editors were mostly members of
the " Club of the Friends of England," and sought
in every possible way to increase the number of the
adherents of that committee, which was subsidised
by the British High Commissioner, and whose chief
aim was that the Turkish mandate should be given
to England.

On March 21, 1920, the British at Skutari requisi-
tioned the police courts, the law courts, the police
station, the town hall, and the prison, thus almost com-
pletely, disorganising the administration of the town.

In the note signed by the High Commissioners, this
occupation was described as a measure of guarantee,
with a view to the execution of the treaty that was
going to be forced on Turkey. Yet it seemed rather
strange that such measures should be taken before
the treaty was concluded — or was it because the
English, being aware the treaty was unacceptable,
thought it necessary to gag the Turks beforehand,
or even sought to exasperate them ? — for if the Turks
offered resistance, then the English would have a
right to intervene very sternly, and thus could
justify the most unjustifiable measures of repression.
What would England and the United States have
answered if France had proposed such coercive
measures against Germany in addition to those of
the armistice ? It was stated in this note that the
occupation would not last long, and was no infringe-
ment upon the Sultan's sovereignty, that it aimed at
rallying the Turks in a common endeavour to restore
prosperity to Turkey in accordance with the Sultan's

160 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

orders; but it also threatened that, should disorder
last longer in Asia Minor, the occupation might be
extended and the provisions of the treaty might be
made harder, in which case Constantinople would be
severed from Turkey.

The Daily Telegraph said about that time :

" The political situation, which has evolved so rapidly,
plainly shows it is not enough for the Americans to keep aloof
from the present events. Their national honour is at stake.

" Public opinion in Great Britain would unanimously side
with France in her operations in Asia Minor, provided France
declares herself willing to accept our co-operation.

" We easily understand that the occupation of Constanti-
nople came rather as a surprise to France and Italy, especially
if we take into account that this action closely followed
another measure of a similar kind taken by England within
the last fortnight.

" It seems that this time our Allies have assumed a slightly
different attitude: official France is still hesitating; public
opinion has changed completely, and the pro-Turkish feeling
is on the wane. If France wants to maintain her prestige in
the East unimpaired, she must associate with any political,
naval, or military measure taken by England.

" The Italian standpoint and interests do not differ much
from ours, or from those of France, but Italian circles plainly
advocate a policy of non-intervention, or an intervention
restricted to a diplomatic action."

If such proceedings emanating from some American
or English circles were hardly a matter of surprise,
the attitude of some Frenchmen of note was not so
easily accounted for.

M. Hanotaux1 was led by a strange political
aberration and a curious oblivion of all the tradi-
tional policy of France — unless he deliberately meant
to break off with it, or was blinded by prejudice —
when he assigned Constantinople to Greece, because,
according to him, to give Constantinople to Greece

1 Figaro, March 18, 1920.

THE OCCUPATION OP CONSTANTINOPLE 161

was " to give it to Europe, and to her worthiest,
noblest offspring."

Now Hellenism owes nothing to Byzantium, and
Byzantinism, imbued with Christianity, is but re-
motely and indirectly connected with the magnificent
pagan bloom of Hellenism. Byzantium, as has been
shown, was not only the continuation of Rome in its
decay: it had also a character of its own. Neither was
Byzantinism a mere continuation of Hellenism. It
was rather the propagator of Orthodoxy, so that
when the Greeks claimed Byzantium, they could not
do so on behalf of Hellenism, but merely on behalf
of Christianity. There is a confusion here that
many people have sought to perpetuate because it
serves numerous interests, those of the Greeks, and
also those of the Slavs, who owe their culture to
Byzantium. But whereas Byzantium chiefly taught
barbarous Russia a religion together with the rudi-
ments of knowledge, and opened for her a door to
the Old World, she imparted to Arabian civilisation
knowledge of the works and traditions of antiquity.
Russia, who only borrowed the rites of the Byzantine
Church and exaggerated them, did not derive much
profit from that initiation; the Turks and Arabs, on
the contrary, thanks to their own culture, were able
to imbibe the old knowledge bequeathed and handed
down to them by Byzantium — leaving aside the
religious bequest. Thus they were enabled to exer-
cise a wholesome influence, driving out of Con-
stantinople both Orthodoxy and the Slavs who
aimed at the possession of that town.

As to the so-called Hellenism of Asia Minor, it is
true that the civilisation of ancient Greece spread

11

162 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

over several districts on the coast; but it should be
borne in mind that, long before the Greeks, the
Egyptians and various Semitic peoples had settled
on the coast of Lydia — which up to the seventh
century B.C. bore the name of Meonia — and fought
there for a long time; and that the Lydians, a
hybrid race akin to the Thracians and Pelasgi com-
mingled with ethnic elements coming from Syria and
Cappadocia, kept up an intercourse between the
Greeks of the coast and Asia1 till the Cimmerian
invasion convulsed Asia Minor in the eighth century.
Lastly, the Medes, against whom the Greeks waged
three wars, are considered by Oppert,2 owing to the
etymology of the name, to be of Turanian descent.

In fact, the relations between the Turks and the
Greeks and the Byzantians are really most involved.
We know to-day that some Turkish elements, who
were converted to the Greek Church long before the
Ottoman Turks embraced Islam, and whose origin
is anterior by far to the establishment of the Sel-
jukian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, faithfully
served the Byzantine Empire from the fifth century
onwards, and were utilised by Justinian for the defence
of the Asiatic boundaries of the Empire — which were
also the boundaries of Christianity — against the
attacks of Eastern nations.

It is difficult to account for the sudden fervid
enthusiasm of the Allies for Greece. For two years
she adhered to Constantino's policy, perpetrating
many an act of treachery against both the Hellenic

1 Radet, La Lydie et le monde grec au temps des Merm-
nades (Paris, 1893).

* Oppert, Le Peuple des Mbdes.

THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE 163

people and the Allies, repeatedly violating the Con-
stitution guaranteed by the Powers that had pro-
tected her, and slaughtering many French sailors;
and then, after her unfriendly conduct towards the
Allies under cover of a pro-German neutrality, she
had very tardily sided with them. It was sur-
prising, therefore, that Greece, who had displayed
her pro-German feelings during a great part of
the war, would probably receive some of the most
thoroughly Turkish territories of the Ottoman
Empire, though she never fought against that Empire
even after she had deposed King Alexander's
father; in spite of the deplorable complaisance of
some of the Allies.

Finally, the very day after the occupation of
Constantinople, General Milne, who commanded the
British troops of occupation, enjoined the Salih
Pasha Cabinet to resign under pretence that it no
longer enjoyed the Sovereign's confidence. The
Grand Vizier refused to comply with the English
general's request, as the Government had the con-
fidence of the Chamber and the Sovereign need not
apply to the commander of the forces of occupation for
permission to communicate with his Ministers. After
incarcerating a good many deputies, senators, and
political men, as has just been seen, the general gave
the Grand Vizier to understand that orders had
been given for the arrest of the Ministers in
case they should attempt to go to their departments.
In order to spare his country another humiliation,
Salih Pasha handed in his resignation to the Sultan,
who, following the advice of England, charged Damad
Ferid to form another Cabinet.

164 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

It requires all the reasons that have been previ-
ously given to enable us to understand why England
threatened and humbled Turkey to such an extent —
the only Power left in the East that could be a factor
for moderation and peace.

Mustafa Kemal never recognised the Damad
Ferid Cabinet, and only after the latter had resigned
and Ali Riza Pasha had been appointed Grand Viaier
did he consent, in order to avoid another conflict
with the Sultan, to enter into negotiations with
the Constantinople Government. Salih Pasha was
charged by the Minister to carry on the negotia-
tions with the Nationalists, and repaired to Amasia.
There it was agreed — first, that the National Organi-
sation should be officially recognised as a lawful power
which was necessary to the defence of the rights of
the country, and should have full liberty of action
side by side with the Government; secondly, that
the Cabinet should avoid taking any decision sealing
the fate of the country before Parliament met;
thirdly, that some appointments should be made in
agreement with the National Organisation, after
which the latter should not interfere in the adminis-
tration of the country.

Besides, as Mustafa Kemal said later on in a
speech made before the Angora Assembly, though
the Sultan had been represented by some as lacking
energy, not maintaining the dignity of the Imperial
throne, and not being a patriot, yet the reason why
he had fallen under English tutelage was that he
had seen no other means to save both the existence
of Turkey and his throne.
The question whether Parliament should meet at

THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE 165

Constantinople or in a province brought on a first
disagreement between the Government and Mustafa
Kemal, who finally yielded. But, owing to the
occupation of Constantinople, Parliament soon found
itself in a precarious condition, and the National
Organisation decided to hold its sittings at Angora.

After all these events a deputy, Riza Nour, at the
sitting of March 18, 1920, raised a protest against
the occupation of Constantinople and the incarcera-
tion of some members of Parliament by the Allies,
which measures were an insult to the dignity of the
Turkish Parliament, and a contravention of the
constitutional laws and the law of nations. This
motion, carried unanimously by the Ottoman
Chamber and signed by the Vice-President, M.
Hussein Kiazim — the President, for fear of being
prosecuted by the British authorities, having left his
official residence — was forwarded to the Allied and
neutral Parliaments, and the Ottoman Chamber
adjourned sine die till-it was possible for the deputies
to carry out their mandate safely.

Ahmed Kiza, former President of the Chamber and
Senate of the Ottoman Empire — who, after the
failure of Damad Ferid's mission to Paris, had ad-
dressed an open letter to M. Clemenceau on July 17,
1919, almost the anniversary day of the Constitution
— joined in that protest and commented upon the
treatment some members of Parliament had under-
gone, as follows:

" It is contrary to all parliamentary rights and principles
throughout the world and to the legal dispositions that
guarantee the inviolability and immunity of all members of
the Turkish Parliament to arrest representatives of the
nation while they are carrying out their mandate. So the

166 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

armed interference of the foreigner with our Chamber cannot
be in any way excused or accounted for.

" Such an arbitrary intrusion, especially on the part of
England, that is looked upon as the founder of the parlia-
mentary system, will bring everlasting shame to British
civilisation.

" After the illegal arrest of several of its members, the
Turkish Parliament adjourned sine die, as a token of pro-
test, till the deputies are able to carry out their mandate
freely and safely.

" A note communicated to the Press makes out that some
deputies had been returned under the pressure of the National-
ists and that, as the Christian elements had had no share in
the elections, the session was illegal.

" Now, it should be noticed that these elements abstained
from voting at the last elections of their own free will, and
that since the armistice no representative of the Christian
communities has taken an official part in the public functions
in the Imperial Palace. The Nationalist forces cannot be
held responsible for this.

" Neither is it the Nationalists' fault if the French authori-
ties in Cilicia arbitrarily prevented the inhabitants of that
district from holding the parliamentary election, thus de-
priving the people of their most sacred rights, and violating
the terms of the armistice.

'! The acknowledgment of the validity of the mandates of
the new members by the unanimity of their colleagues, the
official opening of Parliament by the speech from the throne,
the good wishes and greetings of the Sultan to the deputies,
bear witness that the assembly legally represented the wishes
of the nation and had the Sovereign's approbation.

" Besides, these are strictly internal questions in which the
Allies' interests are not at all concerned, and with which
foreigners have no right to interfere.

" At such a solemn hour it would be an utter denial of
justice if the Ottoman deputies were not able to discuss the
fundamental stipulations of the intended Peace Treaty which
is to seal the future fate of their country.

" Who is to examine the Peace Treaty to-day, and who is
to give its assent to it now the nation has been deprived of
its representatives ?

" Of what value will be a treaty thus worked out secretly,
behind closed doors, and concluded in such conditions ? How
can the signature of the members of the Government be con-
sidered as binding the nation ? For the new Ministry does not
yet represent the Ottoman nation, since no motion of con-

THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE 167

fidence has hitherto been carried by a chamber which does
not sit; and so it cannot be looked upon as being legally
constituted.

" Whatever may happen, the nation alone can decide its
own fate. If, at such a serious juncture, when its very exis-
tence is at stake, it were not able to defend its own cause and
its own rights freely through the peaceful vote of its own
mandatories, it would be looked upon by the whole of man-
kind as the victim of most unfair treatment, the responsi-
bility of which will one day be determined by history."

During Abdul Hamid's reign Ahmed Riza had of
his own will gone into exile, and from Paris he had
wielded great influence over the movement that led
to the revolution of 1908. But when the Young Turk
Government had practically become dictatorial and
had yielded to the pressure that drove it towards
Germany, he realised that policy was a failure and
was leading the Empire to ruin; then, though he had
been one of the promoters of the movement, he
protested repeatedly in the Senate, of which he was
a member, against the illegal doings of the Govern-
ment and its foolhardy policy. As President of the
" National Block "— which, though not a political
party properly speaking, aimed at grouping all the
conservative constitutional elements friendly to the
Entente — he seemed likely to play an important part
in public life again when, about the middle of August,
1919, it was rumoured that the Damad Ferid Govern-
ment was about to take action against him and his
political friends; and soon after it was made known
that he intended to go to Italy or France till the re-
opening of the Ottoman Parliament. After staying in
Rome, where he had conversations with some political
men of note in order to establish an intellectual
entente between Italians and Turks, he settled in Paris.

168 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

The English censorship, which gagged the Turkish
newspapers, went so far as to prevent them from
reprinting extracts from French newspapers that
were favourable to the Ottoman cause. It brought
ridicule upon itself by censuring the Bible; in an
article in the Univers Israelite, reprinted by the
Aurore, which quoted and commented on three verses
of chapter xix. of Isaiah, the censor cut off the first
of these verses, which may be interpreted as fore-
shadowing a League of Nations, but in which he was
afraid the reader might find a hint at a connection
between Egypt and Asia and at the claims of the
Turkish and Egyptian Nationalists. This is the
verse, which any reader could easily restore: "In
that day shall there be a highway out of Egypt to
Assyria, and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt and
the Egyptian into Assyria, and the Egyptians shall
serve with the Assyrians."

VI

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY

IN the course of the debate on the foreign policy of
England which opened on Thursday, March 25, on
the third reading of the Finance Bill, Mr. Asquith,
speaking of the Turkish problem as leader of the
Opposition, urged that the Ottoman Government
should no longer hold in Europe the political power
that belonged to it before the war. He urged,
however, that the Sultan should not be relegated to
Asia Minor, where he would quite escape European
control. He proposed, therefore, that the Sultan
should be, as it were, " vaticanised " — that is to say,
he should remain in Constantinople, but should only
retain his spiritual power as Caliph, as the Pope
does in Home.

The Great Powers or the League of Nations would
then be entrusted with the political power in Con-
stantinople, and if the Bosporus or the Dardanelles
were neutralised or internationalised, the presence of
the Sultan in Constantinople would not be attended
with any serious danger.

As to Mesopotamia, Mr. Asquith objected to the
statiis quo ante helium. As the frontiers of that
region were not quite definite, sooner or later, he
thought, if England remained there, she would be
driven to advance to' the shores of the Black Sea, or
169

170 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

even the Caspian Sea, and she had not adequate
means for the present to do so. So it was better
for her to confine her action within the Basra zone.

The Prime Minister, rising in response, first re-
marked that the cause of the delays in the negotia-
tions with Turkey and the settlement of peace was
that the Allies had thought it proper to wait for the
decision of America, as to the share she intended to
take in the negotiations. He recalled that the Allies
had hoped the United States would not only assume
the protection of Armenia properly speaking, but of
Cilicia too, and also accept a mandate for the Straits
of Constantinople, and went on as follows:

" If we had not given time for America to make up her
mind it might have suspected the Allies wanted to take
advantage of some political difficulty to partition Turkey;
and it is only when the United States definitely stated she
did not intend to take part in the Conference that the Allies
proceeded to take definite decisions with regard to the
Turkish peace. I think that it is due to the Allies to make
that explanation."

Mr. Lloyd George went on to state that the Allies
had contemplated maintaining only the spiritual
power of the Sultan, but unfortunately this scheme
did not seem likely to solve the difficulties of the
situation. For Constantinople had to be administered
at the same time, and it is easier to control the Sultan
and his Ministers in Constantinople than if they were
relegated to Asia Minor.

Then, resorting to the policy of compromise which
bore such bad fruits in the course of the Peace Con-
ference, Mr. Lloyd George, in order not to shut out
the possibility of reverting to the opposite opinion,
added that if it was proved that the Allies' control

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 171

weakened the power of the Sultan in Asia Minor, it
would always be possible to consider the question
afresh — but he hoped that would not be necessary.

As to the question of Asia Minor and the distribu-
tion of the mandates, he declared:

" If America had accepted the responsibility for con-
trolling Armenia, the French, who, under what is called the
Sykes scheme, had Cilicia assigned to their control, were
quite willing to hand it over to American control. The
British, French, and Italians are quite agreed on the subject,
but we have not yet seen a sign. We have only received
telegrams from America, asking us to protect the Armenians;
we have had no offers up to the present to undertake the
responsibility. . . . We are hoping that France will undertake
that responsibility, but it is a good deal to ask of her. We
have also got our responsibility, but we cannot take too
much upon our own shoulders. . . .

" With regard to the Republic of Erivan, which is Armenia,
it depends entirely on the Armenians themselves whether
they protect their independence. ... I am told that they
could easily organise an army of above 40,000 men. If they
ask for equipment, we shall be very happy to assist in equip-
ping their army. If they want the assistance of officers to
train that army, I am perfectly certain there is no Allied
country in Europe that would not be willing to assist in that
respect."1

Finally, with respect to Mesopotamia, Mr. Lloyd
George urged " it would be a mistake to give up
Baghdad and Mosul."

" I say that, after incurring the enormous expenditure
which we have incurred in freeing this country from the
withering despotism of the Turk, to hand it back to anarchy
and confusion, and to take no responsibility for its develop-
ment, would be an act of folly quite indefensible. . . . They
have been consulted about their wishes in this respect, and
I think, almost without exception, they are anxious that we
should stay here, though they are divided about the kind
of independent Government they would like. . . .

1 The Times, March 26, 1920.

172 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

" We have no right, however, to talk as if we were the
mandatory of Mesopotamia when the treaty with Turkey has
not yet been signed. It is only oh the signing of that treaty
that the question of mandatories will be decided, but when
that time comes we shall certainly claim the right to be the
mandatory power of Mesopotamia, including Mosul."

In its leading article, The Times, criticising the
attitude Mr. Lloyd George had taken in the debate
on the Mesopotamian question, wrote on March 27 :

" The Prime Minister made statements, about the future
of Mesopotamia which require further elucidation. He said
that when the Treaty of Peace with Turkey has been finally
decided, the British Government would ' claim the right '
to be the ' mandatory Power ' for Mesopotamia, including the
vilayet of Mosul. . . .

"Judging from some passages in his speech, even Mr.
Lloyd George himself has never grasped the full and dangerous
significance of the adventure he now advocates. . . .

" The Prime Minister's reply conveyed the impression
that he has only the very haziest idea about what he proposes
to do in this region, which has been the grave of empires
ever since written history began."

After pointing out the dangers of a British mandate
over Mesopotamia, including the vilayet of Mosul,
The Times thought, as had been suggested by Mr.
Asquith, that England should confine her direct
obligations to the zone of Basra, and pointed out that
it was only incidentally and almost in spite of himself
that Mr. Asquith had been driven in 1915 to occupy
the larger part of Mesopotamia.

" Mr. Asquith says — and he is entirely right — that if we
hold a line in the mountains of Northern Kurdistan we shall
sooner or later be driven to advance to the shores of the
Black Sea, or even to the Caspian. His view is in complete
accord with every lesson to be derived from our history as an
Empire. We have never drawn one of these vague, unsatis-
factory frontiers without being eventually compelled to move

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 173

beyond it. We cannot incur such a risk in the Middle East,
and the cost in money and the strain upon our troops are alike
prohibitive factors."1

The next day, in a similar debate in the French
Chamber, M. Millerand, being asked to give informa-
tion about the leading principles of the French
Government in the negotiations that were being
carried on in regard to the Turkish treaty, made the
following statement, which did not throw much
light on the question:

" First of all the Supreme Council deems it necessary to
organise a Turkey that can live, and for this purpose — this is
the only resolution that was made public and the only one
that the British Government disclosed in the House of
Commons — for this purpose it has seemed fit to maintain a
Sultan in Constantinople.

" The same principle implies that Turkey will include,
together with the countries inhabited mainly by Moslems,
the economic outlets without which she could not thrive.

" In such a Turkey France, whose traditional prestige has
been enhanced by victory, will be able to exercise the in-
fluence she is entitled to by the important moral and economic
interests she owns in Turkey.

" This idea is quite consistent with an indispensable clause
— the war has proved it — viz., the freedom of the Straits,
which must necessarily be safeguarded by an international
organisation. It is also consistent with the respect of
nationalities, in conformity with which some compact ethnic
groups who could not possibly develop under Turkish
sovereignty will become independent, and other guarantees
will be given for the protection of minorities.

" We have in Turkey commercial and financial interests
of the first order. We do not intend that any of them
should be belittled; we want them to develop safely and
fully in the future. We shall see to it especially that the
war expenditures of Turkey shall not curtail the previous
rights of French creditors.

" In the districts where France owns special interests,
these interests must be acknowledged and guaranteed. It

1 The Times, March, 27, 1920: "Mesopotamia and the
Mandate."

174 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

goes without saying that the Government intends to base
its claims on the agreements already concluded with the
Allies."

At the sitting of March 27, after a speech in which
M. Bellet asked that the Eastern question should be
definitely settled by putting an end to Turkish
sovereignty in Europe and Asia Minor, M. P. Lenail
revealed that the Emir Feisal received two million
francs a month from the English Government and as
much from the French Government; he wondered
why he was considered such an important man,
and demanded the execution of the 1916 agreements,
which gave us a free hand in Cilicia, Syria, and the
Lebanon. Then M. Briand, who had concluded these

agreements, rose to say:

i

" It is time we should have a policy in Syria and CSlicia.
If we are not there, who will be there ? The 1916 agreements
were inspired, not only by the wish of safeguarding the great
interests of France and maintaining her influence in the
Mediterranean, but also because the best qualified represen-
tatives of the peoples of those countries, who groaned under
the Turkish yoke, entreated us not to forsake them. And it
is under these circumstances that in the middle of the war,
urging that a long-sighted policy always proves the best, we
insisted on the settlement of these questions.

" Thus were Syria and Cilicia, with Mosul and Damascus,
of course, included in the French zone.

" Shall we always pursue a merely sentimental policy in
those countries ?

" If we wanted Mosul, it is on account of its oil-bearing
lands; and who shall deny that we need our share of the
petroleum of the world ?

" As for Cilicia, a wonderfully rich land, if we are not there
to-morrow, who will take our place ? Cilicia has cotton, and
many other kinds of wealth; when we shall see other States
in our place, then shall we realise what we have lost, but it
will be too late !

" It has been said that it will be difficult for us to settle
there. As a matter of fact, the difficulties which are fore-
seen look greater than they are really; and some of these

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 175

difficulties may have been put forward to dissuade us from
going there.

" It remains that the 1916 agreements are signed; they are
based on our time-honoured rights, our efforts, our friend-
ships, and the summons of the peoples that hold out their
arms to us. The question is whether they shall be counter-
signed by facts.

" The name of the Emir Feisal has been put forward. It
is in our zone he has set up his dominion; why were we not
among the populations of that country at the time ? If we
had been there, the Emir Feisal would have received his
investiture from us by our authority; instead of that, he was
chosen by others. Who is to be blamed for it ?

" Britain knows the power of parliaments of free peoples;
if our Parliament makes it clear that it really wants written
treaties to be respected, they will be respected."

Mr. Wilson had been asked by a note addressed
to him on March 12, 1920, to state his opinion about
the draft of the Turkish settlement worked out in
London, and at the same time to appoint a pleni-
potentiary to play a part in the final settlement.
His answer was handed to M. Jusserand, French
ambassador, on March 24 ; he came to the conclusion
finally that Turkey should come to an end as a
European Power.

In this note President Wilson declared that
though he fully valued the arguments set forward
for retaining the Turks in Constantinople, yet he
thought that the arguments against the Turks,
based on unimpeachable considerations, were far
superior to the others. Moreover, he recalled that
the Allies had many a time declared that Turkish
sovereignty in Europe was an anomalous thing that
should come to an end.

Concerning the southern frontiers to be assigned
to Turkey, he thought they should follow the ethno-
graphic boundaries o'f the Arabian populations, unless

176 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

it were necessary to alter them slightly; in which case
the American Government would be pleased — though
that did not imply any criticism — to be told for what
reasons new frontiers had been proposed.

Mr. Wilson was pleased to see that Russia would
one day be allowed to be represented in the Inter-
national Council that was going to be instituted for
the government of Constantinople and the Straits,
as he felt sure that any arrangement would be still-
born that did not recognise what he thought was a
rital interest to Russia. For the same reason he
was pleased that the condition of the Straits in war-
time had not yet been settled, and was still under
discussion; he thought no decision should be taken
without Russia giving her consent.

Turning to the territorial question, he said:

" In regard to Thrace, it seems fair that the part of Eastern
Thrace that is beyond the Constantinople area should belong
to Greece, with the exception of the northern part of this pro-
vince; for the latter region has undoubtedly a Bulgarian
population, and so, for the sake of justice and equity, the
towns of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, together with their
surrounding areas, must be given to Bulgaria. Not only are
the arguments set forth by Bulgaria quite sound from an
ethnic and historical point of view, but her claims on this
territory seem to deserve all the more consideration as sho
had to cede some wholly Bulgarian territories inhabited by
thousands of Bulgarians on her western frontier merely that
Serbia might have a good strategic frontier."

He was chiefly anxious about the future of Armenia.
He demanded for her an outlet to the sea, and the
possession of Trebizond. He went on thus :

" With regard to the question whether Turkey should give
up her rights over Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and
the Islands, the American Government recommends the
method resorted to in the case of Austria — namely, that

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 177

Turkey should place these provinces in the hands of the
Great Powers, who would decide on their fate.

" As to Smyrna, this Government does not feel qualified
to express an opinion, for the question is too important to
be solved with the limited information possessed by the
Government."

Finally, the President declared he did not think
it necessary for his ambassador to be present at
the sittings of the Supreme Council; yet he insisted
on being informed of the resolutions that would be
taken.

The Philadelphia Ledger, when this note was sent,
commented on Mr. Wilson's opinion as to the Turkish
problem, and especially the fate of Constantinople,
and did not disguise the fact that he favoured the
handing over of Constantinople to Russia, in accord-
ance with the inter- Allied agreements of 1915, 1916,
and 1917.

" Mr. Wilson wants Turkey to be expelled from Europe,
and the right for democratic Russia to have an outlet to the
Mediterranean to be recognised. Thus, to a certain extent,
Mr. Wilson will decide in favour of the fulfilment of the secret
promises made by the Allies to Russia in the course of the
war.

"Mr. Wilson's opinion is that Bolshevism is about to fall,
and next autumn the new Russia that he has constantly
longed for and encouraged will come into being. It is
calculated that if America gives her support to Russia at this
fateful juncture, Russia will throw herself into the arms of
America, and this understanding between the two countries
will be of immense importance."

After the Allies had occupied Constantinople and
addressed to the Porte a new collective note request-
ing the Ministry officially to disown the Nationalist
movement, affairs were very difficult for some time.
As the Allies thought the Ottoman Cabinet's answer
to their note was unsatisfactory, the first dragomans

12

178 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of the English, French, and Italian commissioners
on the afternoon of April 1 again called upon the
Ottoman Premier.

Owing to the unconciliatory attitude of the English,
who made it impossible for it to govern the country,
the Ministry resigned. The English required that
the new Cabinet should be constituted by Damad
Ferid Pasha, on whom they knew they could rely.

Indeed, a secret agreement had already been con-
cluded, on September 12, 1919, between Mr. Fraster,
Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Churchill, on behalf of Great
Britain, and Damad Ferid Pasha on behalf of the
Imperial Ottoman Government. The existence of
this agreement was questioned at the time, and
was even officially denied in the Stambul Journal,
April 8, 1920, but most likely there was an exchange
of signatures between them. According to this
agreement,1 the Sultan practically acquiesced in the
control of Great Britain over Turkey within the limits
fixed by Great Britain herself. Constantinople
remained the seat of the Caliphate, but the Straits
were to be under British control. The Sultan was
to use his spiritual and moral power as Caliph on
behalf of Great Britain, to support British rule in
Syria, Mesopotamia, and the other zones of British
influence, not to object to the creation of an indepen-
dent Kurdistan, and to renounce his rights over
Egypt and Cyprus.

Damad Ferid agreed to do so, with the co-opera-
tion of the party of the Liberal Entente. If the

1 The very words of this agreement were given by M. Pierre
Loti in his book, La Mart de noire chtre France en Orient,
p. 153.

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 179

information given by the Press is reliable, it seems
that the composition of the new Cabinet was en-
dangered at the last moment through the opposition
of one of the Allied Powers; yet it was constituted
at last.

The members of the new Cabinet, headed by
Damad Ferid Pasha, who was both Grand Vizier
and Foreign Minister, were : Abdullah Effendi, Sheik-
ul-Islam; Reshid Bey, an energetic man, an op-
ponent of the Union and Progress Committee, who
was Minister of the Interior; and Mehmed Said
Pasha, who became Minister of Marine and provision-
ally Minister of War. The last-named Ministry had
been offered to Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha, son of
the famous Ghazi Mukhtar, who broke off with the
Committee of Union and Progress in 1912, was dis-
missed from the army in 1914 by Enver, and was
ambassador at Berlin during the first three years of
the war ; but he refused this post, and also handed in
his resignation as a member of the Paris delegation;
so the Grand Vizier became War Minister too. The
Minister for Public Education was Fakhr ed Din Bey,
one of the plenipotentiaries sent to Ouchy to nego-
tiate the peace with Italy. Dr. Jemil Pasha, who
had once been prefect of Constantinople, became
Minister of Public Works, and Remze Pasha Minister
of Commerce.

The investiture of the new Cabinet took place on
Monday, April 5, in the afternoon, with the usual
ceremonies. The Imperial rescript ran as follows:

" After the resignation of your predecessor, Salih Pasha,
considering your great abilities and worth, we hereby entrust
to you the Grand Vizierate, and appoint Duri Zade Abdullah
Bey Shcik-ul-Islam.

180 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

" The disturbances that have been lately fomented, under
the name of nationalism, are endangering our political
situation, which ever since the armistice had been gradually
improving.

" The peaceful measures hitherto taken against this move-
ment have proved useless. Considering the recent events
and the persistence of this state of rebellion, which may give
rise to the worst evils, it is now our deliberate wish that all
those who have organised and still support these disturbances
shall be dealt with according to the rigour of the law; but, on
the other hand, we want a free pardon to be granted to all
those who, having been led astray, have joined and shared in
the rebellion. Let quick and energetic measures be taken
in order to restore order and security throughout our
Empire, and strengthen the feelings of loyalty undoubtedly
prevailing among all our faithful subjects to the Khilafat and
the throne.

" It is also our earnest desire that you should endeavour
to establish trustful and sincere relations with the Great
Allied Powers, and to defend the interests of the State and
the nation, founding them on the principles of righteousness
and justice. Do your utmost to obtain more lenient con-
ditions of peace, to bring about a speedy conclusion of peace,
and to alleviate the public distress by resorting to all adequate
financial and economic measures."

The Sheik-ul-Islam in a proclamation to the Turkish
people denounced the promoters and instigators of
the Nationalist movement, and called upon all
Moslems to gather round the Sultan against the
" rebels."

The Grand Vizier issued an Imperial decree con-
demning the Nationalist movement, pointing out to
Mustafa Kemal the great dangers the country ran
on account of his conduct, wishing for the restoration
of friendly relations between Turkey and the Allies,
and warning the leaders of the movement that harsh
measures would be taken against them. The Otto-
man Government, in a proclamation to the popula-
tion— which had no effect, for most of the Turks
thought it was dictated by foreign Powers — de-

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 181

nounced all the leaders and supporters of the
Nationalist movement as guilty of high treason
against the nation. The proclamation stated:

" The Government, though eager to avoid bloodshed, is still
more eager to save the nation, which is running into great
danger. So it will not hesitate to resort to strict measures
against those who might refuse to go back to their duty
according to the high prescriptions of the Sherif , as is ordered
by the Imperial rescript.

" With this view, the Government proclaims:

" First, anyone who, without realising the gravity of his
act, has allowed himself to be driven by the threats or mis-
leading instigations of the ringleaders, and has joined the
insurrectionist movement, gives tokens of repentance within
a week and declares his loyalty to the Sovereign, shall enjoy
the benefit of the Imperial pardon.

" Secondly, all the leaders and instigators of the move-
ments, together with whosoever shall continue to support
them, shall be punished according to the law and the Sherif s
orders.

" Lastly, the Government cannot in any way allow any
act of cruelty or misdemeanour to be committed in any part
of the Empire either by the Moslem population against other
elements, or by non-Moslem subjects against the Moslem
population. So it proclaims that whosoever shall commit
such acts, or countenance them, or be party to them, shall
be severely punished individually."

A Parliamentary commission set off to Anatolia
in order to call upon Mustafa Kemal to give up his
hostility to the Entente and lay down arms with the
least delay.

Moreover, the Government decided to send some
delegates in order to make inquiries and point out
to the leaders of the Nationalist movement the
dangerous consequences of their stubbornness and
open rebellion.

The first delegation was to include an aide-de-camp
of the War Minister, and an Allied superior officer.

182 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Another delegation was to consist of members of
Parliament, among whom were Youssouf Kemal Bey,
member for Sivas; Vehbi Bey, member for Karassi;
Abdulla Azmi Bey, member for Kutahia; and Riza
Nun, member for Sinope, the very man who had
brought in a motion against the occupation of
Constantinople and the arrest -of some members of
the Ottoman Parliament, and who was credited with
having said: "Anatolia has a false conception of the
occupation of Constantinople. We are going to give
clear explanations of the seriousness of the situation
in order to avoid disastrous consequences. We are
going to tell Anatolia the ideas of the Government
about the interests of the nation."

An Imperial decree prescribed the dissolution of
the Chamber, and the members before whom it was
read left the Chamber quietly.

But it was obvious that the Damad Ferid Pasha
Cabinet no longer represented the country, and that
in the mind of most Turks it could no longer express
or uphold the free will of the Turkish people, whose
hidden or open sympathies, in view of the foreigner's
threat, were given to the Nationalist movement

It must be owned that the Turkish Nationalist
movement had at the outset co-operated with some
questionable elements and had been mixed up with
the intrigues of the former members of the Com-
mittee of Union and Progress. But it now became
impossible, in order to belittle it, to look down
upon it as a mere plot or insurrectionary movement.
In consequence of the successive events that had

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 183

taken place since the armistice and of the attitude
of the Allies, especially England, after the occupa-
tion of Constantinople, carried out under British
pressure with the approbation of the French Govern-
ment notwithstanding the protest of the French Press,
and in view of the provisions that were likely to
be included in the Peace Treaty, Turkish patriotism,
which could not allow Turkey to be destroyed and
meant to maintain her traditional rights, had tacitly
joined that movement. Besides, Mustafa Kemal,
who, at the very outset, had been a member of the
Committee of Union and Progress, had soon disagreed
with Enver, and it should be borne in mind that he .
was his enemy during the greater part of the war,
as he was an opponent of the German Marshal
Falkenhayn. Some people have tried to make out
there was only personal enmity between them, and
have denied the possibility of political opposition;
but the very fact that their enmity would have ruined
any common political designs they might have had
proves there were no such designs.

So Mustafa Kemal did not seem greatly moved
by the measures mentioned in the manifesto issued
by the Government under pressure of the foreign
occupation and amidst the perturbation caused by
recent events.

At the end of March Mustafa Kemal warned the
Sultan that, in consequence of the occupation of
Constantinople, he broke off all connection with the
central Government, which henceforth was quite
under foreign control. In a proclamation issued to
the Mussulmans, he declared it was necessary to form
a new independent Ottoman State in Anatolia and

184 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

to appoint an assistant Sheik-ul-Islam. The reason
he gave was that the Sultan could no longer be looked
upon as Caliph, for it is a fundamental principle of
Islam that the Caliph must be an independent
Sovereign, and, since the Allied occupation of Con-
stantinople, he no longer enjoyed his freedom of
action. In that appeal, which was not intended
for the Mussulmans of Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, and
Tripoli, for it seemed to be aimed at Great Britain
alone, he regarded the occupation of Constantinople
as a new crusade against Islam.

According to news from Nationalist sources,
Mustafa Kemal formed a Cabinet, in which he was
War Minister of the new Anatolian Government.

It was said at the time he had proclaimed Viceroy
of Anatolia and nahib — i.e., the Sultan's repre-
sentative in Anatolia — Prince Jemal ed Din, a
member of the Imperial Family, son of the late Prince
Shevket Effendi, and general inspector of the re-
cruiting service ; but the official circles of Con-
stantinople never believed that the prince had
allowed him to use his name.

At the same time he had a Constituent Assembly
elected, which he intended to convene at Angora.
This assembly consisted of the members of Parlia-
ment who had been able to escape from Constantinople
and of deputies chosen by delegated electors and met
on April 23 at Angora, where all sorts of people had
come from quite different regions: Constantinople,
Marash, Beyrut, Baghdad, etc. The National
Assembly of Angora meant to be looked upon as
a Constituent Assembly, and strove to introduce
wide reforms into the administrative and financial

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 185

organisation of the Empire. It elected a rather
large committee, which styled itself the Government
Council, and it included General Mustafa Kemal,
Jemal ed Din Chelebi, from Konia, as first Vice-
President, and Jelal ed Din Arif Bey as second
Vice-President, etc.

The members of the Government which was
instituted at Angora when the Great National
Assembly met in this town were: General Mustafa
Kemal Pasha, President; Bekir Samy Bey, Foreign
Affairs; Jamy Bey, Interior; General Feizi Pasha,
National Defence; General Imail Fazil Pasha, Public
Works; Youssouf Kemal Bey, National Economy;
Hakki Behij Bey, Finance; Dr. Adnan Bey, Public
Education; Colonel Ismet Bey, Chief of Staff.

The Sheik of the Senussi, who had joined the
National movement, and owing to his prestige had
influenced public opinion in favour of this movement,
was not appointed, as has been wrongly said, Sheik-
ul-Islam; religious affairs were entrusted to a member
of a Muslim brotherhood belonging to the National
Assembly.

According to the information it was possible to
obtain, the political line of conduct adopted by
the Nationalists was not only to organise armed
resistance, but also to carry on a strong political
and religious propaganda, both in Turkey and in
foreign countries.

No official letter from Constantinople was to be
opened by the functionaries, who, if they obeyed the
Constantinople Government, were liable to capital
punishment. v The religious authorities in the
provinces and the heads of the great Muslim brother-

186 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

hoods were called upon to protest against the fetva
by which the Sheik-ul-Islam of Constantinople had
anathematised the Nationalists.

But the chief difficulty for the Nationalists was
how to raise money.

On behalf of that National Assembly, Mustafa
Kemal addressed to M. Millerand the following
letter, in which he vehemently protested against the
occupation of Constantinople and laid down the
claims of the Ottoman people :

" I beg to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that,
owing to the unjustifiable occupation of Constantinople by
the Allied troops, the Ottoman people looks upon its Khalifa,
together with his Government, as prisoners. So general
elections have been held, and on April 23, 1920, the Grand
National Assembly held its first sitting, and solemnly
declared it would preside over the present and future destiny
of Turkey, so long as her Khalifa Sultan and her Eternal
City should remain under the dominion and occupation of
foreigners.

" The Grand National Assembly has done me the honour
to charge me to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency the
earnest protest of its members against that arbitrary deed,
which violates the terms of the armistice, and has once more
confirmed the Ottoman people in its pessimism as to the
results of the Peace Conference. Not long ago our Parlia-
ment— though a Parliament has always been looked upon as
a holy sanctuary by all civilised nations — was violated in the
course of a sitting; the representatives of the nation were
wrested from the bosom of the assembly by the English
police like evildoers, notwithstanding the energetic pro test of
the Parliament; many a senator, deputy, general, or man of
letters, was arrested at his home, taken away handcuffed,
and deported; lastly, our public and private buildings were
occupied by force of arms, for might had become right.

" Now the Ottoman people, considering all its rights have
been violated and its sovereignty encroached upon, has, by
order of its representatives, assembled at Angora, and
appointed an Executive Council chosen among the members
of the National Assembly, which Council has taken in hand
the government of the country.

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 187

" I have also the honour to let Your Excellency know the
desiderata of the nation, as expressed and adopted at the
sitting of April 29, 1920.

"First, Constantinople, the seat of the Khilafat and
Sultanry, together with the Constantinople Government, are
henceforth looked upon by the Ottoman people as prisoners
of the Allies; thus all orders and fetvas issued from Con-
stantinople, so long as it is occupied, cannot have any legal
or religious value, and all engagements entered upon by the
would-be Constantinople Government are looked upon by
the nation as null and void.

" Secondly, the Ottoman people, though maintaining its
calm and composure, is bent upon defending its sacred,
centuries-old rights as a free, independent State. It expresses
its wish to conclude a fair, honourable peace, but declares
only its own mandatories have the right to take engagements
in its name and on its account.

" Thirdly, the Christian Ottoman element, together with
the foreign elements settled in Turkey, remain under the
safeguard of the nation; yet they are forbidden to undertake
anything against the general security of the country.

" Hoping the righteous claims of the Ottoman nation will
meet with a favourable reception, I beg Your Excellency to
accept the assurance of the deep respect with which I have
the honour to be Your Excellency's most humble, most
obedient servant."

On the eve of the San Remo Conference, which met
on April 18, 1920, Ahmed Eiza Bey, ex-President of
the Chamber and Senator of the Ottoman Empire,
who kept a keen lookout on the events that were
about to seal the fate of his country, though he had
been exiled by the Damad Ferid Ministry, addressed
another letter to the President of the Conference,
in which he said:

" The Turks cannot in any way, in this age of liberty and
democracy, acknowledge a peace that would lower them to
the level of an inferior race and would treat them worse than
the Hungarians or Bulgarians, who have lost comparatively
small territories, whereas Turkey is to be utterly crippled.
We want to be treated as a vanquished people, not as an
inferior people or a people in tutelage. The victors may have
a right to take from us the territories they conquered by force

188 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of arms; they have no right to intrude into our home affairs.
The Turkish people will willingly grant concessions of mines
and public works to the foreigners who offer it the most
profitable conditions; but it will never allow the arbitrary
partition of the wealth of the nation. To get riches at the
expense of an unfortunate nation is immoral ; it is all the more
unfair as the responsibility of Turkey in the world war
is comparatively slight as compared with that of Austria-
Germany and Bulgaria. In respect of the crimes and
atrocities against Armenia and Greece which the Turks are
charged with, we deny them earnestly and indignantly.
Let a mixed international commission be formed, and sent to
hold an impartial inquiry on the spot, and we pledge our-
selves to submit to its decisions. Till such an inquiry has
proved anything to the contrary, we have a right to look upon
all charges brought against us as slanders or mere lies.

" The Sublime Porte had already, on February 12, 1919,
addressed to the High Commissioners an official note requesting
that neutral States should appoint delegates charged to
inquire into facts and establish responsibilities; but the
request of the Ottoman Cabinet has hitherto been in vain, as
well as that of the League for National Ottoman Unity made
on March 17 of the same year.

*' Yet the report of the international Commission of Inquiry
assembled at Smyrna, which proved the charges of cruelty
brought against the Turks were unfounded, should induce
the Allies, in the name of justice, to hold an inquiry into the
massacres supposed to have taken place in Cilicia and else-
where.

" I hope Your Excellency will excuse me if this letter is
not couched in the usual diplomatic style, and will consider
that when the life and rights of his nation are so grievously
endangered it is most difficult for a patriot to keep his
thoughts and feelings under control."

As early as April 19, the San Remo Conference,
which seemed to have come to an agreement about
the main lines of the treaty to be submitted to
Turkey, but had not yet settled the terms of this
treaty, decided to summon the Ottoman pleni-
potentiaries to Paris on May 10.

In a note sent on April 20, 1920, to M. Nitti, as
president of the San Remo Conference, Ghalib Kemaly

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY . 189

Bey, formerly Ottoman minister plenipotentiary to
Russia, now living in Rome, wrote :

" In order to justify the dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire it has been asserted that the Turks are not able to
administer a large country inhabited by various races, and
they have been especially charged with hating and oppressing
the Christian element. But a history extending over ten
centuries at least plainly shows, by innumerable facts and
truths, the absurdity of such assertions.

" If the Ottoman Empire, in spite of its wonderful efforts
for the last 130 years, has not been able to reform and reno-
vate itself as the other States have done, that is because, in
addition to a thousand other difficulties, it has never had, for
the last two centuries, either the power or the peacefulness
that would have been necessary to bring such a protracted
task to a successful end; for every ten, fifteen, or twenty
years, it has been attacked by its neighbours, and the events
of the last twelve years testify still more forcibly than any
others to the fact that any step taken by the Turks on the
way to progress — in the European sense of the word — was
not only resented, but even violently opposed by their
merciless enemies.

" As to the would-be oppression which the Christians are
supposed to have endured in the Empire, let us merely
consider that, whereas in Europe the Christians mutually
slaughtered each other ^mercilessly and unceasingly in the
name of their sacred Faith, and the unfortunate Jews were
cruelly driven away and tortured in the name of the same
Faith, the Turks, on the contrary, after ruling for a thousand
years over Turkish Asia with many vicissitudes, not only
tolerated the presence of millions of Christians in their large,
powerful Empire, but even granted them without any restric-
tion, under the benefit of Turkish laws and customs, all
possibilities to subsist, develop, and become rich, often at the
expense of the ruling race; and they offered a wide paternal
hospitality to many wretched people banished from Christian
Europe.

" To-day Greece, trampling upon justice and right, lays
an iniquitous claim to the noble, sacred land of Turkish Thrace
and Asia. Yet can she show the same example of tolerance,
and give a strict account of her home policy towards the non-
Greek elements, especially concerning the condition and fate
of the 300,000 Turks who, before 1883, peopled the wide,
fertile plains of Thessaly, of the hundreds of thousands of
Moslem Albanians, subjects of the Empire, of the 150,000

190 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Moslems in Crete, and of the 800,000 Moslems in Macedonia,
whose unfortunate fate it was to pass under her dominion ?

" I need not dwell at length on this painful subject, which
will be an eternal shame to modern civilisation, for the vic-
torious Powers know a great deal more — after the inter- Allied
inquiry held four months ago in Smyrna — about the ' gentle
and fatherly ' manner in which thousands of Mussulmans
were slaughtered and exterminated by the descendants of
the civilisation of ancient Greece, who invaded that essen-
tially Turkish province during the armistice under pretence
of restoring order."

And after recalling the figures of the various
elements of the population of the Turkish Empire
after the 1914 statistics, he concluded:

" Such figures speak but too eloquently, and the painful
events that drenched with blood the unfortunate Ottoman
land since the armistice raise only too much horror. So the
Turkish people most proudly and serenely awaits the
righteous, humane, and equitable sanction of the victorious
Powers that have assumed before history the heavy respon-
sibility of placing the whole world on a lasting basis of
justice, concord, and peace.

" God grant they may choose the best way, the only way,
that will lead them to respect, as they solemnly pledged them-
selves to do, the ethnic, historical, and religious rights of
the Ottoman nation and its Sultan, who is, at the same time,
the supreme head of the 350 million Mussulmans throughout
the world."

On the same date (April 20, 1920) the Indian
Caliphate delegation addressed a note to the president
of the Allied Supreme Council at San Remo, to the
English, French, Italian Prime Ministers, and to the
Japanese ambassador. In this note they summed
up their mandate with the Allied and Associated
Powers, and insisted again on the claims they had
previously laid before Mr. Lloyd George in the course
of the interview mentioned previously.

" Firstly, the Mussulmans of India, in common with the
vast majority of their co-religionists throughout the world,

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 191

ask that, inasmuch as independent temporal sovereignty,
with its concomitants of adequate military and economic
resources, is of the essence of the institution of the Khilafat,
the Empire of the Khalifa shall not be dismembered under
any pretext. As the Sultan of Turkey is recognised by the
vast majority of Mussulmans as Khalifa, what is desired is
that the fabric of the Ottoman Empire shall be maintained
intact territorially on the basis of the status quo ante bellum,
but without prejudice to such political changes as give all
necessary guarantees consistent with the dignity and inde-
pendence of the sovereign State for the security of life and
property, and opportunities of full autonomous development
for all the non-Turkish communities, whether Muslim or non-
Muslim, comprised within the Turkish Empire. But on no
account is a Muslim majority to be placed under the rule of
a non-Muslim minority contrary to the principle of self-
determination. In behalf of this claim, the delegation draw
the attention of the Supreme Council to the declaration of the
British Prime Minister, equally binding on all the Allied and
Associated Powers, when on January 5, 1918, he said: ' Nor
are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich
and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are
predominantly Turkish in race,' and to President Wilson's
twelfth point in his message to Congress, dated January 8,
1918, on the basis of which the armistice with Turkey was
concluded, and which required 'that the Turkish portions
of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured of secure
sovereignty; that the other nationalities now under Turkish
rule should be assured security of life andautonomous develop-
ment.' The delegation submit that any departure from the
pledges and principles set forth above would be regarded by
the people of India, and the Muslim world generally, as a
breach of faith. It was on the strength of these and similar
assurances that tens of thousands of India Mussulmans were
induced to lay down their lives in the late war in defence of
the Allied cause.

"Secondly, we have to submit that the most solemn religious
obligations of the Muslim Faith require that the area known
as the Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ' Island of Arabia,' which
includes, besides the Peninsula of Arabia, Syria, Palestine,
and Mesopotamia, shall continue to be, as heretofore for the
last 1,300 years, under exclusively Muslim control, and that
the Khalifa shall similarly continue to be the Warden and
Custodian of the Holy Places and Holy Shrines of Islam —
namely, Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Nejef , Kerbela, Samarra,
Kazimain, and Baghdad, all situated within the Jazirat-ul-

192 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Arab. Any encroachment upon these sanctuaries of Islam by
the inauguration of non-Muslim control in whatever guise or
form, whether a protectorate or mandate, would be a direct
violation of the most binding religious injunctions of Islam
and the deepest sentiment of Muslims all the world over, and
would, therefore, be utterly unacceptable to the Mussulmans
of India and the rest of the Indian community. In this con-
nection, apart from the religious obligations to which we
refer, the delegation would draw the attention of the Supreme
Council to the proclamation issued by the Government of
India, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government, as
also the Governments of France and Russia, on November 2,
1914, in which it was specifically declared that ' no question
of a religious character was involved ' in this war, and it was
further categorically promised that ' the Holy Places of
Arabia, including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the
port of Jedda, will be immune from attack or molestation.' "

After pointing out that these were the lowest
possible claims the Mussulmans could set forth, the
note went on as follows :

" But the Mussulmans of India have already submitted
to the British Government that a Turkish settlement made in
disregard of their religious obligations, on respect for which
their loyalty has always been strictly conditional, would be
regarded by Indian Mussulmans as incompatible with their
allegiance to the British Crown. This is a contingency which
the Mussulmans of India, in common with all their compat-
riots, constituting a population of over three hundred millions,
naturally view with the keenest apprehension and anxiety,
and are most earnestly desirous of preventing by every means
in their power. We believe that the British Government,
at any rate, is fully apprised of the range and intensity of
public feeling that has been aroused in India on this question,
and we content ourselves, therefore, by simply stating here
that the Khilafat movement represents an unprecedented
demonstration of national feeling and concern. Only on
March 19 last, the day when the delegation was received by
the British Prime Minister, all business was suspended
throughout the continent of India by Mussulmans and
Hindus alike, as a reminder and reaffirmation of the Muslim
case in respect of the future of the Khilafat. This unpre-
cedented yet peaceful demonstration involved a loss of
millions to the public at large, and was undertaken solely with
the object of impressing the authorities and others concerned
with the universality of Indian and Muslim sentiment on the

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 193

question. If, notwithstanding all constitutional and loyal
representations which the Mussulmans of India have put
forward on behalf of the obligation imposed upon them by
their Faith, a settlement is imposed upon Turkey which would
be destructive of the very essentials of the Khilafat, a situa-
tion would arise in which it would be futile to expect peace
and harmony to prevail in India and the Muslim world.

" The delegation, therefore, feel it their duty most solemnly
to urge upon the Supreme Council the desirability of en-
deavouring to achieve a peace settlement with the Ottoman
Empire which would be in consonance with the most binding
religious obligations and overwhelming sentiments of so
large and important a section of the world community."

As a consequence of what has just been said:

" The- delegation would beg, even at this late hour, that
the Supreme Council will defer taking any final decisions on
this question in order to afford to them an opportunity, such
as they have repeatedly applied for, of laying their case
before the Council. In answer to our request to be
allowed to appear before the Supreme Council, the British
Secretary to the Council intimated to us that only the
accredited Governments of the territories with whose future
the Peace Conference is dealing are allowed to appear before
it, and that at the request of the British Government the
official delegation of India had already been heard. But
we have already represented that the Turkish settlement, in-
volving as it does the question on the Khilafat, in the pre-
servation of which the Mussulmans of the world are so
vitally interested, does not obviously seem to be a question
on which the Peace Conference should hear only the Govern-
ments of territories with whose future they are dealing. In
fact, the concern of the Muslim world for the future of the
Khilafat. which is the most essential institution of Islam,
transcends in importance the interests of the various Govern-
ments that are being set up in different parts of the Khilafat
territories; and the delegation trusts that no technical
objection will be allbwed to stand in the way of doing
justice and securing peace."

And, finally, the note concluded :

" With reference to the official delegation of India, which
the Supreme Council has, already heard, the Indian Khilafat
delegation would invite the attention of the Council to the
fact that, so far at least, the State and the nation are not one

13

194 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

in India, and the delegation submit that a nation numbering
more than 315 millions of people is entitled to a hearing before
a final decision is taken on a question that has incontestably
acquired a national status. The delegation hope that they
may, without any disrespect to the members comprising the
official delegation of India, also refer to the fact that no
Indian Mussulman was represented on the delegation in spite
of Muslim protest."

In a second telegram, dated April 24, 1920, the
Indian Caliphate delegation, after the reply made to
them by the British secretary of the Supreme Council
at San Kemo on April 20, expressed their deep regret
that—

" the Council, while giving a hearing to a number of dele-
gations representing at best microscopic populations inhabit-
ing meagre areas and permitting the Premier of Greece, which
was not at war with Turkey, to take part in the discussions
relating to the Turkish settlement, should have ignored the
claims of a nation numbering more than 315 millions of people
inhabiting the vast sub-continent of India even to a hearing,
and should have denied the right of several hundred millions
more in the rest of the world professing the Muslim Faith to
express their views on the question involving the disintegra-
tion of the Khilafat. In the name of our compatriots and
co-religionists, we deem it to be our duty once more to point
out to the Government of Great Britain and to her Allies,
that it would be perfectly futile to expect peace and tran-
quillity if, to the humiliating disregard of the overwhelming
national sentiment of India, which would in any case lessen
the value of citizenship of the British Empire to the Indian
people, is added, as a result of the secret diplomacy of a few
persons, however exalted and eminent, who are now settling
the fate of Islam behind closed doors, a contemptuous dis-
regard of the most binding and solemn religious obligations
imposed on the Muslims by their Faith."

The delegation did not conceal their disappoint-
ment at the way they had been received by the
Allied representatives and the little attention paid
to the objections they had set forth. Yet they had
viewed the Ottoman question from a lofty stand-

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 195

point, and had brought forward powerful arguments
in favour of Turkey. While the Indian delegation
were setting forth the Turkish claims before the
Peace Conference, the Press, public opinion, and politi-
cal circles which had been influenced in some degree by
the coming of the delegates evinced more sympathy
for Turkey, and the deliberations of the Conference
seemed likely to assume a more favourable attitude
towards Turkey. Yet the Conference, in this case
as in many others, and in spite of the warnings it
had received, kept to its first resolutions, though
everything seemed to invite it to modify them.

On May 6 the Ottoman delegation arrived in
Paris. It comprised the former Grand Vizier Tewfik
Pasha; Reshid Bey, Minister of the Interior; Fakhr
ed Din Bey, Mioister of Public Education; and
Dr. Jemil Pasha, Minister of Public Works, accom-
panied by seventeen advisers and five secretaries.

On the previous Thursday, before they left Con-
stantinople, the Sultan had received the delegates,
and had a long conversation with each of them.

The draft of the treaty was handed to the delegates
on the expected date, May 11.

We refer the reader to this document, which
contains thirteen chapters; some of the most im-
portant provisions are so laboriously worded that
they may give rise to various interpretations, and
it is impossible to sum them up accurately.

Several clauses of that draft called forth many
objections, and we shall only deal with the most
important ones.

The treaty assigned to Greece all the Turkish
vilayet of Adrianople or Eastern Thrace — that is to

196 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

say, the territory which includes Adrianople, the
second town and former capital of the Ottoman Em-
pire, and the burial-place of Selim the Conqueror.
It only left to European Turkey a mere strip of
land near Constantinople up to the Chatalja lines.
Besides, this region is entirely included in the " Zone
of the Straits " to be controlled by a Commission
of the Powers which includes Greece, Rumania, and
Bulgaria, but excludes Turkey herself.

Now, according to the official census of March, 1914,
the Adrianople vilayet which includes Kirk Kilisse,
Rodosto, and Gallipoli, had a population of 360,400
Turks — i.e., 57 per cent, of the inhabitants — as
against 224,680 Greeks, or 35-5 per cent., and 19,888
Armenians. In addition, though in Eastern Thrace
the Moslem populations are mingled with numerous
Greek elements, the majority of the people are
Mussulmans. Out of the 673,000 inhabitants of
Thrace, 455,000 are Mussulmans.

It is noteworthy that after 1914 a good number
of the Greeks in that vilayet emigrated into Mace-
donia, where they were replaced by the Mussulmans
expelled by the Greek administration, and that out of
the 162,000 Orthodox Greeks amenable to the Greek
Patriarch, 88,000 are Gagavous — that is to say, are
of Turkish descent and speak Turkish.

Out of about 4,700,000 acres of land which make
up the total area of the Adrianople vilayet, 4,000,000
acres, or 84 per cent., are in Moslem hands, and the
Orthodox Greeks hardly possess 600,000 acres.

The Moslem population of Western Thrace, which
is no longer under Turkish sovereignty, rises to
362,000 souls, or 69 per cent., against 86,000 Greeks,

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 197

or 16-5 per cent., and if the figures representing the
Moslem population in both parts of Thrace are
counted, we get a total number of 700,000 Mussul-
mans— i.e., 62-6 per cent. — against 310,000 Greeks,
or 26 per cent.

Mr. Lloyd George had already guaranteed to
Turkey the possession of that region on January 5,
1918, when he had solemnly declared : "Nor are we
fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the
rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace,
which are predominantly Turkish in race," and he
had repeated this pledge in his speech of February 25,
1920. .

Yet a month after he declared to the Indian
Caliphate delegation, as has been seen above, that
the Turkish population in Thrace was in a consider-
able minority, and so Thrace should be taken away
from Turkish rule. If such was the case, it would
have been logical to take from Turkey the whole of
Thrace.

As the Indian delegation inquired at once on
what figures the Prime Minister based his statements
he answered:

" It is, of course, impossible to obtain absolutelj7 accurate
figures at the present moment, partly because all censuses
taken since about the beginning of the century are open to
suspicion from racial prejudice, and partly because of the
policy of expulsion and deportation pursued by the Turkish
Government both during and before the war. For instance,
apart from the Greeks who were evicted during the Balkan
wars, over 100,000 Greeks were deported into Anatolia from
Turkish Thrace in the course of these wars, while about
100.000 were driven across the frontiers of Turkish Thrace.
These refugees are now returning in large numbers. But
after the study of all the evidence judged impartially, the best
estimate which the Foreign Office could make is that the

198 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

population of Turkish Thrace, in 1919, was 313.000 Greeks and
225,000 Turks. . . . This is confirmed by the study of the
Turkish official statistics in 1894, the last census taken before
the Greco-Turkish war, after which ... all censuses as to
races in these parts became open to suspicion. According to
these statistics, the population of Turkish Thrace and of the
part of Bulgarian Thrace ceded to the Allies by the treaty of
Neuilly was: Greeks, 304,500; Mussulmans, 265,300; Bul-
garians, 72,500."

On receipt of this communication, the delegation
naturally asked to what region the Greeks " who
were evicted during the Balkan wars " had migrated,
and to what extent, according to the Foreign Office
estimates, " counter-migration of Turks had taken
place into what is the present Turkish Thrace," when
Macedonia was made, on the authority of English-
men themselves, " an empty egg-shell " and when the
Greeks and Bulgarians had decided to leave no Turks
in the occupied territories, to make a " Turkish
question " within the newly extended boundaries of
Greece and Bulgaria. It was natural that part of
the Turkish population driven away from Macedonia
should settle down in the Turkish territory con-
terminous to Eastern Thrace, as it actually did.

With regard to the " 100,000 " Greeks " deported
into Anatolia from Turkish Thrace during the course
of these wars," and the " 100,000 driven across the
frontiers of Turkish Thrace," the delegation asked
to what part of Anatolia the deportees had been
taken, and to what extent this deportation had
affected the proportion of Turkish and Greek popula-
tions in that part of Anatolia. It would certainly
be unfair to make Turkish Thrace preponderatingly
Greek by including in its .Greek population figures of
Greek deportees who had already served to swell the

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 199

figures of the Greek population in Anatolia. Under
such circumstances, as the figures which the Prime
Minister considered as reliable on January 5, 1918,
had been discarded since and as the figures of a
quarter of a century ago were evidently open to
discussion, the delegation proposed that the Supreme
Council should be given a complete set of figures
for every vilayet, and if possible for every sanjak
or kaza, of the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914.
But the Prime Minister's secretary merely answered
that it was impossible to enter into a discussion
" on the vexed question of the population statistics
in these areas."

As to Smyrna, the statistics plainly show that,
though there is an important Greek colony at Smyrna,
all the region nevertheless is essentially Turkish.
The figures provided by the Turkish Government,
those of the French Yellow Book, and those given
by Vital Cuinet agree on this point.

According to the French Yellow Book, the total
population of the vilayet included 78-05 per cent.
Turks against 14-9 per cent. Greeks.

M. Vital Cuinet gives a total population of 1,254,417
inhabitants (971,850 Turks and 197,257 Greeks), and
for the town of Smyrna 96,250 Turks against 57,000
Greeks.

According to the last Ottoman statistics in 1914
the town of Smyrna, where the Greek population
had increased, had 111,486 Turks against 87,497
Greeks; but in the whole vilayet there were 299,097
Greeks — i.e., 18 per cent. — against 1,249,067 Turks,
or 77 per cent., and 20,766 Armenians.

From the 299,097 Greeks mentioned in the statistics

200 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

we should deduct the 60,000 or 80,000 Greeks who
were expelled from the vilayet, by way of reprisal
after the events of Macedonia in January to June,
1914. The latter, according to the agreement
between Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Turkish minister at
Athens, and M. Venizelos (July, 1914), come under
the same head as the Greeks of Thrace and Smyrna
who were to be exchanged for the Mussulmans of
Macedonia.

Mr. Lloyd George's secretary, whom the Indian
delegation also asked, in reference to Smyrna, on what
figures he based his statements, answered on behalf
of the Prime Minister:

" The pre-war figures for the sanjak of Smyrna, according
to the American estimates, which are the most up-to-date and
impartial, give the following result: Greeks, 375,000; Mussul-
mans, 325,000; Jews, 40,000; and Armenians, 18,000. These
figures only relate to the sanjak of Smyrna, and there are
other kazas in the neighbourhood which also show a majority
of Greeks."

Now, according to the official Turkish figures, the
sanjak of Smyrna had, before the war, 377,000
Mussulmans as against 218,000 Greeks, while during
the war the Muslim figure rose to 407,000 and the
Greek figure was considerably reduced. Only in the
kazas of Urla, Shesmeh, Phocoaa, and Kara-Burun
in the sanjak of Smyrna, are there Greek majorities;
but in no other kaza, whether of Magnesia, Aidin,
or Denizli, is the Greek element in a majority. More-
over, the Greek minority is important only in the
kaza of Seuki in the sanjak of Aidin; everywhere
else it is, as a rule, less than 10 per cent., and only in
two kazas is it 15 or 16 per cent.

The treaty recognises Armenia as a free and

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 201

independent State, and the President of the United
States is to arbitrate on the question of the frontier
to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the
vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis.
Now, though everybody — including the Turks —
acknowledges that as a principle it is legitimate to
form an Armenian State, yet when we consider the
nature of the population of these vilayets, we cannot
help feeling anxious at the condition of things brought
about by this decision.

As a matter of fact, 'in Erzerum there are 673,000
Mussulmans, constituting 82-5 per cent, of the
population, as against 136,000 Armenians, or 16-5 per
cent. In Trebizond the Mussulmans number 921,000,
or 82 per cent, of the population, as against 40,000
Armenians, or 23-5 per cent. In the vilayet of Van
the Muslim population is 179,000, or 69 per cent.,
and the Armenian population 67,000, or 26 per cent.
In Bitlis the Mussulmans number 310,000, or 70-5
per cent., as against 119,000 Armenians, constituting
27 per cent. Thus, in these four vilayets the Mussul-
mans number 2,083,000, and the Armenians 362,000,
the average being 80 per cent, against 13 per cent.

On the other hand, it is difficult to prove that
Turkey has persistently colonised these territories.
The only fact that might countenance such an
assertion is that at various times, especially after
the Crimean war, many Tatars sought shelter in
that part of the Empire, and that in 1864, and again
in 1878, Circassians, escaping from the Russian yoke,
took refuge there after defending their country
The number of the families that immigrated is
estimated about 70,000. Turkey encouraged them

202 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

to settle down there all the more willingly as they
were a safeguard to her against the constant threat
of Russia. But as early as 1514, at the time of the
Turkish conquest, the Armenians were inferior in
number, owing to the Arabian and Persian pressure
that repeatedly brought about an exodus of the native
population northwards and westwards, and because
some Persian, Arabian, Seljukian, Turkish, and
Byzantine elements slowly crept into the country.
In 1643 Abas Schah, after his victorious campaign
against Turkey, drove away nearly 100,000
Armenians, and later on a huge number of Armenians
emigrated into Russia of their own free will after
the treaty of Turkmen-Tchai in 1828.

It is noteworthy that an Armenian Power first came
into existence in the second century before Christ.
It consisted of two independent States, Armenia
Major and Armenia Minor. After the downfall of
Tigrane, King of Armenia Major, defeated by the
Romans, Rome and Persia fought for the possession
of those regions, and, finally, divided them. Later
on there were various Armenian States, which were
more or less independent, but none of them lasted
long except the State of Armenia Minor, which lasted
from the twelfth century to the fourteenth, till
Selim II conquered that territory, where the Arabs,
the Persians, the Seljukian Turks, and the Byzantines
had already brought the Armenian dominion to
an end.

Therefore the numerical majority of Mussulmans
in Armenia has not been obtained or maintained, as
has been alleged, by the " Turkish massacres " ; it is
the outcome of more complex causes — which, of

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 203

course, is no excuse for the tragic events that took
place there. As the Conference did not seem to pay
any attention either to the figures of M. Vital Cuinet
(Turquie tfAsie, Paris, 1892), or to the figures
published by the French Government in the Yellow
Book of 1897, based upon the data furnished by the
Christian Patriarchates, or to the figures given by
General Zeleny to the Caucasian Geographical Society
(Zapiski, vol. xviii., Tiflis, 1896), the Indian delega-
tion asked that a report should be drawn up by
a mixed Moslem and non - Moslem Commission,
consisting of men whose integrity and ability were
recognised by their co-religionists; but this sugges-
tion met with no better success than the international
inquiry already suggested by the delegation in regard
to the population of every vilayet in Thrace.

The chapter dealing with the protection of minori-
ties plainly shows how much influence the aforesaid
Protestant Anglo-American movement had on the
wording of the treaty. In none of the four previous
treaties are included such stipulations as those con-
tained in the Turkish treaty, and there is a great
difference in this respect between the Bulgarian
treaty and the Turkish treaty. The latter, under
the term " minority," only considers the condition
of the Christians, and ensures to them privileges and
power in every respect over the Mussulmans.

As the Permanent Committee of the Turkish
Congress at Lausanne remarked in its critical ex-
amination of the treaty:

" Whereas in the Bulgarian treaty freedom of conscience
and religion is guaranteed so far as is consistent with morality
and order, this clause does not occur in the Turkish treaty.

204 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

The Turkish treaty states that all interference with any
religious creed shall be punished in the same way; in the
Bulgarian treaty this clause is omitted, for here it would
imply the protection of a non-Christian religion."

In regard to Article 139, that " Turkey renounces
formally all right of suzerainty or jurisdiction of any
kind over Moslems who are subject to the sovereignty
or protectorate of any other State," the Indian
Caliphate delegation raised an objection in a letter
addressed to Mr. Lloyd George, dated July 10, 1920:

" It is obvious that Turkey has, and could have, no ' rights
of suzerainty or jurisdiction ' over Mussulmans who are not
her subjects; but it is equally obvious that the Sultan of
Turkey, as Khalifa, has, and must continue to have so long as
he holds that office, his very considerable ' jurisdiction ' over
Muslims who are ' subject to the sovereignty or protectorate
of any other State.' The law of Islam clearly prescribes the
character and extent of the ' jurisdiction ' pertaining to the
office of Khalifa, and we cannot but protest most emphatically
against this indirect, but none the less palpable, attempt on
the part of Great Britain and her allies to force on the
Khalifa a surrender of such ' jurisdiction,' which must involve
the abdication of the Khalifa."

The delegation also considered that Article 131,
which lays down that " Turkey definitely renounces
all rights and privileges, which, under the treaty of
Lausanne of October 12, 1912, were left to the Sultan
in Libya," infringes " rights pertaining to the Sultan
as Caliph, which had been specially safeguarded
and reserved under the said treaty of Lausanne."
It also expressed its surprise that " this categorical
and inalienable requirement of the Muslim Faith,
supported as it is by the unbroken practice of over
thirteen hundred years, was totally disregarded by
Articles 94 to 97 of the Peace Treaty, read in con-
junction with Articles 22 and 132," which cannot

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 205

admit of any non-Muslim sovereignty over the
Jazirat-ul-Arab, including Syria, Palestine, and
Mesopotamia.

Referring again to the objection the British Prime
Minister pretended to base on the proclamation of
the Emir Feisal, King of Syria, and on the Arabs'
request to be freed from Turkish dominion, the Indian
Caliphate delegation in the same letter answered
Mr. Lloyd George, who had asked them in the course
of his reception " whether they were to remain
under Turkish domination merely because they were
Mohammedans " :

" We would take the liberty to remind you that if the
Arabs, who are an overwhelmingly large majority in these
regions, have claimed independence, they have clearly claimed
it free from the incubus of so-called mandates, and their
claim tojbe freed from Turkish dominion is not in any way
a claim to be subjected to the ' advice and assistance ' of a
mandatory of the principal Allied Powers. If the principle
of self-determination is to be applied at all, it must be applied
regardless of the wishes and interests of foreign Powers covet-
ously seeking to exploit regions and peoples exposed to the
danger of foreign domination on account of their unpro-
tected character. The Arab Congresses have unequivocally
declared that they want neither protectorates nor mandates
nor any other form of political or economic control ; and the
delegation, while reiterating their view that an amicable
adjustment of Arab and Turkish claims by the Muslims them-
selves in accordance with Islamic law is perfectly feasible,
must support the Arab demand for complete freedom from
the control of mandatories appointed by the Allies.

" With regard to the Hejaz, Article 98, which requires
Turkey not only to recognise it as a free and independent
State, but to renounce all rights and titles there, and
Article 99, which makes no mention of the rights and preroga-
tives of the Khalifa as Servant of the Holy Places, are, and
must ever be, equally unacceptable to the Muslim world."

On the other hand, as the Jewish question and the
Eastern question are closely connected and have
assumed still more importance owing to the Zionist

206 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

movement, the treaty forced on Turkey concerns
the Jews in the highest degree.

It must be borne in mind that if Sephardic Judaism
has been gradually smothered by Turkish sovereignty,
the Ottoman Empire has proved most hospitable to
the Jews driven away by Christian fanaticism, and
that for five centuries the Jews have enjoyed both
tolerance and security, and have even prospered
in it. So the Jews naturally feel anxious, like
the Moslems in the provinces wrested from the old
Ottoman Empire, when, following the precedent of
Salonika, they see Greece annex the region of
Adrianople and Smyrna; and they have a right to
ask whether Greece, carried away by a wild im-
perialism, will not yield to her nationalist feeling and
revive the fanaticism of religious struggles. So the
Allies, foreseeing this eventuality, have asked Greece
to take no action to make the Jews regret the past;
but as the Greek anti-Semitic f eeling is rather economic
than religious in character, it is to be feared that
the competition of the two races in the commercial
struggle will keep up that feeling. The annexation
of Thrace would probably concern 20,000 Jews —
13,000 at Adrianople, 2,000 at Rodosto, 2,800 at
Gallipoli, 1,000 at Kirk Kilisse, 1,000 at Demotica,
etc. Great Britain having received a mandate for
Palestine — that is to say, virtually a protectorate —
on the condition of establishing " a national home
for the Jews " — whatever the various opinions of the
Jews with regard to Zionism may be — a question is
now opened and an experiment is to be tried which
concerns them deeply, as it is closely connected with
Judaism.

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 207

In the course of the reception by Mr. Lloyd George
of the Indian Caliphate delegation, M. Mohammed
Ali told the British Prime Minister in regard to
the Jewish claims in Palestine:

" The delegation have no desire to cause an injustice to
the Jewish community, and I think Islam can look back with
justifiable pride on its treatment of this community in the
past. No aspiration of the Jewish community which is
reasonable can be incompatible with Muslim control of the
Holy Land, and it is hoped that the Ottoman Government
will easily accommodate the Jewish community in such
aspirations of theirs as are reasonable.

" Some responsible propagandists of the Zionist movement,
with whom I have had conversations, frankly admit: ' We do
not want political sovereignty there; we want a home; the
details can be arranged and discussed.' I askerf them: ' Do
you mean that Great Britain herself should be the sovereign
Power there, or should be the mandatory ?' and they said:
' No, what we want is an ordinary, humanly speaking reason-
able guarantee that opportunities of autonomous develop-
ment would be allowed to us.' We, ourselves, who have been
living in India, are great believers in a sort of Federation of
Faiths. I think the Indian nationality, which is being built up
to-day, will probably be one of the first examples in the world
of a Federation of Faiths, and we cannot rule out the possi-
bility of development in Palestine on the lines of ' cultural
autonomy.' The Jews are, after all, a very small minority
there, and I do not believe for one moment that Jews could
be attracted there in such large numbers as the Zionist en-
thusiasts sometimes think. I would say the same thing of an
Armenian State, without desiring to say one word which
would be considered offensive to any class of people. Because
we, ourselves, have suffered so many humiliations, we do not
like ourselves to say anything about other people that they
would resent. If the Allied Powers brought all the Armenians
together and placed them all in a contiguous position, ex-
cluding the present Kurdish community from them, no
matter what large slice of land you gave them, I think they
would very much like to go back to the old status. . . .

" In the same way I would say of the Jewish community,
that they are people who prosper very much in other lands,
and although they have a great hankering after their home,
and no community is sp much bound up with a particular
territory as the Jewish community is, still, I must say that

208 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

we do not fear there will be any great migration of such a
character that it will form a majority over the Muslim popu-
lation. The Jewish community has said: ' We have no
objection to Turkish sovereignty remaining in that part of
the world so long as we are allowed to remain and prosper
there and develop on our own lines, and have cultural
autonomy.' "

M. Mohammed Ali, in his letter to Mr. Lloyd
George, dated July 10, 1920, also observed that —

"With regard to Palestine in particular, the delegation
desire to state that Article 99, embodying the declaration of
the British Government of November 2, 1917, is extremely
vague, and it is not clear in what relation the so-called
national home for the Jewish people, which is proposed to
be established in Palestine, would stand to the State pro-
posed to be established there. The Mussulmans of the world
are not ashamed of their dealings with their Jewish neighbours,
and can challenge a comparison with others in this respect;
and the delegation, in the course of the interview with you,
endeavoured to make it clear that there was every likelihood
of all reasonable claims of Jews in search of a home being
accepted by the Muslim Government of Palestine. But if the
very small Jewish minority in Palestine is intended to exercise
over the Muslim, who constitute four-fifths of the population,
a dominance now, or in the future, when its numbers have
swelled after immigration, then the delegation must cate-
gorically and emphatically oppose any such designs."

The telegram in which Tewfik Pasha informed
Damad Fend of the conditions of the treaty, and
which the latter communicated to the Press, was
printed by the Peyam Sabah, surrounded with
black mourning lines. Ali Kemal, though he was a
supporter of the Government and could not be
accused of anglophobia, concluded his article as
follows :

" Better die than live blind, deaf, and lame. We have not
given up all hope that the statesmen, who hold the fate of

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 209

the world in their hands and who have officially proclaimed
their determination to act equitably, will not allow this
country, which has undergone the direst misfortunes for years
and has lost its most sacred rights, to suffer a still more
heinous injustice."

All the Constantinople newspapers, dealing at full
length with the conditions, unanimously declared that
the treaty was unacceptable. The Alemdar, another
pro-English newspaper, eaid:

" If the treaty is not altered it will be difficult to find a
man willing to sign it.**

Another newspaper, the Ileri, wrote:

" The anguish which depressed our hearts while we were
anxiously waiting seems a very light one compared to the
pang we felt when we read the treaty."

The aforesaid Peyam Sabah, after a survey of the
conditions, came to this conclusion :

" Three lines of conduct are open to the Turkish people:

" To beg for mercy and make the Powers realise that the loss
of Smyrna will be a great blow to Turkey and will bring no
advantage to Greece, and that the Chatalja frontier will be
a cause of endless hostility between the various races.

" To sign the treaty and expect that the future will improve
the condition of Turkey; but who in Turkey could sign such
a treaty ?

" To oppose passive resistance to the execution of the
conditions of peace, since all hope of armed resistance must
be given up."

Public opinion unanimously protested against the
provisions of the treaty, but fluctuated and hesitated
as to what concessions could be made.

Dajnad Ferid, receiving a number of deputies who
had stayed at Constantinople and wanted to go back
to the provinces, told them that he saw no objection
to their going away, and that orders to that effect

14

210 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

had been given to the police. Then he is said to
have declared that they might tell their manda-
tories that he would never sign a treaty assigning
Smyrna and Thrace to Greece and restricting
Turkish sovereignty to Constantinople, and that on
this point there was no difference of opinion between
him and the Nationalists. He also informed them
that in due time he would hold fresh elections, and
the treaty would be submitted for approval to the
new Chamber.

The Grand Vizier, who had asked Tewfik Pasha
to let him see the note which was being prepared by
the Turkish delegation at Versailles, was, on his side,
elaborating the draft of another answer which was
to be compared with that of the delegation, before
the wording of the Turkish answer to the Peace
Conference was definitely settled.

But the occupation of Lampsaki, opposite to Galli-
poli, by the Turkish Nationalists, together with the
Bolshevist advance in Northern Persia and Asia
Minor, made things worse, and soon became a
matter of anxiety to England.

After the text of the Peace Treaty had been
presented to the Turks, and when the latter had
the certainty that their frars were but too well
grounded, it appeared clear that the decisions taken
by the Allies would be certain to bring about a
coalition of the various parties, and that all Turks,
without any distinction of opinion, would combine to
organise a resistance against any operation aiming
at taking from them Eastern Thrace — where the
Bulgarian population was also averse to the expulsion
of the Turkish authorities — at assigning Smyrna and

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 211

the Islands to Greece, and at dismembering the
Turkish Empire.

Colonel Jafer Tayar, who commanded the Adria-
nople army corps and had openly declared against
the Sultan's Government since the latter was at war
with the Nationalists, had come to Constantinople at
the beginning of May. and it was easy to guess for
what purpose. Of course, it had been rumoured,
after he left Constantinople, that the Government
was going to appoint a successor to him, but nothing of
the kind had been done, and he still kept his com-
mand. When he came back to Adrianople, not only
had no conflict broken out between him and the
troops under his command, but he had been given
an enthusiastic greeting. As soon as it was known
that the San Remo Conference had decided to give
Thrace to Greece, up to the Chatalja lines, resist-
ance against Greek occupation was quickly organised.
Jafer Tayar, an Albanian by birth — he was born at
Prishtina — became the leader of the movement. He
hurriedly gathered some contingents made up of
regular soldiers and volunteers, and put in a state
of defence, as best he could, the ports of the western
coast of the Marmora. Jafer Tayar wondered why
Thrace was not granted the right of self-determination
like Upper Silesia or Schleswig, or autonomy under
the protection of France, whose administration in
Western Thrace had proved equitable and had given
satisfaction to that province. In face of this denial of
justice, he had resolved to fight for the independence
of Thrace.

It was soon known that the Moslem population
of Adrianople had held a meeting at the beginning

212 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of May, in which, after a speech by Jafer Tayar, all
the people present had pledged themselves to fight
for the liberty of Thrace. A similar demonstration
took place at Guinuljina. A congress including
above two hundred representatives of the whole of
Western Thrace had been held about the same time
at Adrianople.

In Bulgaria a movement of protest was also
started, and on Sunday, May 9, numerous patriotic
demonstrations were held in all the provincial towns.

On May 16 the inhabitants of Philippopolis and
refugees from Thrace, Macedonia, and the Dobruja
living at that time in the town, held a meeting of
several thousand people, and without any distinction
of religion, nationality, or political party carried the
following motion against the decision taken by the
San Remo Conference to cede Thrace to Greece:

" They enter an energetic protest against the resolution
to cede Thrace to Greece, for that would be a flagrant injustice
and an act of cruelty both to a people of the same blood as
we, and to the Bulgarian State itself; they declare that the
Bulgarian people cannot, of their own free will, accept such a
decision of the San Remo Conference, which would be a cause
of everlasting discord in the Balkans — whereas the victorious
Powers of the Entente have always professed to fight in
order to restore peace to those regions; and they entreat the
Governments, which have come to this decision, to cancel it
and to raise Thrace to the rank of an autonomous, inde-
pendent State under the protection of all the Powers of the
Entente, or of one of them."

On May 25 — that is to say, two days before the
Greek occupation — a few " Young Turk " and Bul-
garian elements proclaimed the autonomy of Western
Thrace, and formed a provisional Government to
oppose the occupation. At the head of this Govern-
ment were Tewfik Bey, a Young Turk, Vachel

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 213

Georgieff, and Dochkoff, Bulgarian komitadjis. But
the latter were expelled by General Charpy before
the Greek troops and authorities arrived, and the
Greek Press did its best to misrepresent that protest
against Greek domination. They set off to Adria-
nople, taking with them the treasury and seals of
the Moslem community, and were greeted by Jafer
Tayar.

On the other hand, the resistance of the Turkish
Nationalists was becoming organised, and as soon as
the conditions of peace were known new recruits
joined Mustafa Kemal's forces.

The- Nationalist elements, owing to the attitude of
the Allies towards Turkey, were now almost thrown
into the arms of the Russian Bolshevists, who carried
on an energetic propaganda in Asia Minor and offered
to help them to save their independence, though
they did so to serve their own interests.

Damad Ferid, Mustafa Kemal's personal enemy,
who stood halfway between the Allied Powers and
the Nationalists, believed that if he did not displease
the Allies, he could pull his country out of its
difficulties.

Before the draft of the treaty was handed to the
Turks, the Ottoman Government had already begun
to raise troops to fight the Nationalists. They
were to be placed under command of Marshal Zeki,
who had formerly served under Abdul Hamid. It
was soon known that this military organisation had
been entrusted by the Turkish War Minister to the
care of British officers at whose instigation the first
contingents had been sent to Ismid, which was to be
the Turkish base. -

214 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

It was soon announced that Damad Ferid Pasha's
troops, who had remained loyal and were commanded
by Ahmed Anzavour Pasha and Suleyman Shefik
Pasha, had had some hard fighting with the rebels in
the Doghandkeui and Geredi area, east of Adabazar,
which they had occupied, and that the Nationalists,
whose casualties had been heavy, had evacuated
Bolu. The information was soon contradicted, and
at the beginning of the last week of April it became
known that Anzavour and his troops had just
been utterly defeated near Panderma, and that this
port on the Marmora had fallen into the Nation-
alists' hands. Ahmed Anzavour had had to leave
Panderma for Constantinople on board a Turkish
gunboat, and Mustafa Kemal now ruled over all
the region round Brusa, Panderma, and Balikesri.
Moreover, in the Constantinople area, a great many
officers and soldiers were going over to the Nationalists
in Anatolia.

It should be kept in mind that Ahmed Anzavour,
though he was of Circassian descent, was unknown
in his own country. He had been made pasha to
command the Government forces against the
Nationalists with the help of the Circassians, who
are numerous in the Adabazar region, and to co-
operate with the British against his fellow-countrymen,
who merely wished to be independent.

Suleyman Shefik Pasha resigned, and some de-
fections took place among the troops under his
command.

About the same time, the emergency military court
had sentenced to death by default Mustafa Kemal,
Colonel Kara Vassif Bey, Ali Fuad Pasha, who

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 215

commanded the 20th army corps, Ahmed Rustem
Bey, ex-ambassador at Washington, Bekir Sami
Bey, Dr. Adnan Bey, ex-head of the sanitary service,
and his wife, Halide Edib Hanoum, all impeached for
high treason as leaders of the Nationalist movement.

Yet, despite all the measures taken by Damad
Ferid and the moral and even material support given
to him by the Allies, what could be the outcome of
a military action against the Nationalists ? How
could the Ottoman Government compel the Turks
to go and fight against their Anatolian brethren in
order to force on them a treaty of peace that it
seemed unwilling to accept itself, and that sanctioned
the ruin of Turkey ?

In some Turkish circles it was wondered whether a
slightly Nationalist Cabinet co-operating with the
Chamber would not have stood a better chance to
come to an understanding with Anatolia and induce
her to admit the acceptable parts of the treaty;
for should Damad Ferid, who was not in a good
position to negotiate with the Nationalists, fail, what
would be the situation of the Government which
remained in office merely because the Allies occupied
Constantinople ?

Of course, the Foreign Office proclaimed that
foreign troops would be maintained in every zone,
and that the treaty would be carried out at any cost.
Yet the real Ottoman Government was no longer at
Constantinople, where Damad Ferid, whose authority
did not extend beyond the Ismid-Black Sea line, was
cut off from the rest of the Empire; it was at Sivas.
As no Government force or Allied army was strong
enough to bring the Nationalist party to terms, it

216 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

was only in Anatolia that the latter Government
could be crushed by those who, with Great Britain,
had conspired to suppress 12 million Turks and
were ready to sacrifice enough soldiers to reach
this end.

On the other hand, it soon became known that at
Angora the question of the Caliph-Sultan had been
set aside, and even the Sultan's name was now being
mentioned again in the namaz, or public prayer
offered every Friday — that is to say, all the parties
had practically arrived at an understanding.

Besides, as most likely Greece would have to face
difficulties, if not at once, at least in a comparatively
short time, inspired information, probably of Greek
origin, already intimated that the Supreme Council
would decide whether France, England, and Italy
would have to support Greece — though one did not
see why France and Italy should defray the expenses
of that new adventure by which England first, and
Greece afterwards, would benefit exclusively.

On Saturday, May 22, the very day on which a
Crown Council met under the Sultan's presidency to
examine the terms of the treaty, over 3,000 people
held a meeting of protest at Stambul, in Sultan
Ahmed Square. Some journalists, who were well
known for their pro-English feelings — such as Ali
Kemal, an ex-Minister, editor of the Sabah; Refi
Jevad, editor of the Alemdar; Mustafa Sabri, a
former Sheik-ul-Islam — and some politicians de-
livered speeches. The platform was draped with
black hangings; the Turkish flags and school banners
were adorned with crepe. After the various speakers
had explained the clauses of the treaty and showed

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 217

they were not acceptable, the following motions were
passed :

" First, in contradiction to the principle of nationali-
ties, the treaty cuts off from the Empire Thrace, Adrianople,
Smyrna, and its area. In case the Allied Powers should
maintain their decisions — which seems most unlikely — we
want these regions to be given local autonomy.

" Secondly, now the Arabian territories have been cut off
from the Ottoman Empire, the Turks, in accordance with the
principle of nationalities, should be freed from all .fetters
and bonds hindering their economic development on the path
to progress and peace. To maintain the Capitulations and
extend them to other nations is tantamount to declaring the
Turks are doomed to misery and slavery for ever.

" Thirdly, the Turks, relying on the fair and equitable
feelings. of the Allied Powers, require to be treated on the
same footing as the other vanquished nations.

" Fourthly, the Turkish people, feeling sure that the peace
conditions are tantamount to suppressing Turkey as a nation,
ask that the treaty should be modified so as to be made
more consistent with right and justice.

" Fifthly, the aforesaid resolutions shall be submitted to
the Allied High Commissioners and forwarded to the Peace
Conference."

These resolutions were handed after the meeting
to M. Defrance, the senior Allied High Commis-
sioner, who was to forward them to the Peace
Conference.

As the difficulties increased, and more important and
quicker communications with the Ottoman delegation
in Paris were becoming necessary, the Cabinet thought
of sending the Grand Vizier to Paris. Upon the latter's
advice, and probably at the instigation of the English,
several members of the dissolved Chamber set off
to Anatolia in order to try and bring about an under-
standing between Damad Ferid and the Nationalists,
for the conditions of the treaty, as was to be expected,
had now nearly healed the rupture between the

218 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Central Government and the Turkish Nationalists,
especially as the Anglo-Turkish Army was unable
to carry out the treaty and Damad Ferid and his
supporters were neither willing nor able to enforce it.
Even the English had sent delegates to Mustafa
Kemal, who had refused to receive them.

The Grand Vizier, after reviewing the troops at
Ismid, found they were not strong enough, and
requested the headquarters merely to stand on the
defensive. Indeed, after a slight success in the Gulf
of Ismid, the Government forces found themselves
in a critical condition, for the Anatolian troops had
occupied Kum Kale, close to the Dardanelles, and
Mustafa Kemal had concentrated forces in that
region.

The Chamber, which had been dissolved at Con-
stantinople, resumed its sittings at Angora. It
criticised the Allies' policy with regard to Turkey,
especially the policy of England, at whose instigation
Constantinople had been occupied and military
measures had been taken on the coasts of the Black
Sea.

In the speech he delivered at the first sitting of the
Chamber, Mustafa Kemal showed that the English
occupation of Constantinople had been a severe
blow at the prestige of the Caliph and Sultan.
" We must do our best," he said, " to free the Sultan
and his capital. If we do not obey his orders just
now, it is because we look upon them as null and
void, as he is not really free."

The same state of mind showed itself in a telegram
of congratulation addressed to the Sultan on his
birthday by the provisional vali of Angora, who,

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 219

though he did not acknowledge the power of the
Central Government, stated that the population of
Angora were deeply concerned at the condition to
which the seat of the Caliphate and Sultanry was
reduced owing to the occupation of Constantinople.
This telegram ran thus:

" The people have made up their minds not to shrink from
any sacrifice to make the Empire free and independent. They
feel certain that their beloved Sovereign is with them at heart
and that their chief strength lies in a close union round the
Khilafat."

Similar dispatches were sent from the most active
Nationalist centres, such as Erzerum and Amasia,
and by Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, commanding the
15th army corps at Erzerum.

It was plain that, through these demonstrations,
Mustafa Kemal and the Anatolian Nationalists aimed
at nullifying the religious pretexts Damad Ferid
availed himself of to carry on the struggle against
them. Mustafa Kemal had even ordered all the
ulemas in Anatolia to preach a series of sermons with
a view to strengthening the religious feeling among
the masses. He had also the same political purpose
in view when he sent a circular to the departments
concerned to enjoin them to remind all Mussulmans
of the duty of keeping the Ramadhan strictly and
of the penalties they incurred if they publicly trans-
gressed the Moslem fast.

Besides, the Nationalists strove to turn to account
the movement that had taken place among all classes
after the terms of the treaty had been made known,
and their activity continued to increase. Sali Pasha,
who was Grand Vizier before Damad Ferid, had

220 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

escaped to Anatolia in order to put himself at the
disposal of the Nationalists. So their opposition
to the Central Government was asserting itself
more and more strenuously, and the struggle that
ensued assumed many forms.

An armistice, which came into force on May 30,
and was to last twenty days, was concluded at
Angora by M. Kobert de Caix, secretary of the High
Commissionership in Syria, between the French
authorities and the Turkish Nationalists. Though
the terms of this agreement were not made public,
it was known that they dealt chiefly with Cilicia and
allowed France to use the railway as far as Aleppo.
Meanwhile, conversations were being held on the
Cilician front, and finally at Angora, to extend the
armistice.

Indeed, it was difficult to understand why, after
the Italians had evacuated Konia, the French troops
had not been withdrawn before the treaty had been
handed to Turkey, for it gave France no right to
remain in Cilicia ; and now the situation of the French
there was rather difficult, and their retreat had, of
course, become dangerous. It seemed quite plain
that the evacuation of Cilicia had become necessary,
and that henceforth only the coastlands of Syria
properly so called would be occupied.

So the French policy at this juncture had lacked
coherency, for it seemed difficult to go on with the
war and carry on peace negotiations at the same time.

This armistice was denounced on June 17 by
Mustafa Kemal, who demanded the evacuation of
Adana, the withdrawal of the French detachments
from Heraclea and Zounguldak, and the surrender

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 221

of the mines to the Nationalists who lacked coal and
wanted Constantinople not to have any. Besides,
some incidents had occurred in the course of the
armistice: some French soldiers who were being
drilled near Adana had been fired at, the railway
track had been cut east of Toprak Kale, and telegra-
phic communications interrupted repeatedly between
Adana and Mersina.

An encounter occurred on June 11 between the
Nationalists and a company which had been detached
at the beginning of the month from a battalion of a
rifle corps that guarded the port and mining works
of Zounguldak. On June 18, after an inquiry, the
French commander withdrew from the spot which
had been occupied near Heraclea and the company
of riflemen was brought back to Zounguldak.

It was obvious that the staff of Cilicia did not seem
to have approved of the armistice which had been con-
cluded by the French authorities in order not to have
anything to fear in this region, and to send all their
forces against the Arabs; and so the head of the
Turkish staff, Ismet Bey, naturally did not wish to
renew it.

As we had entered into a parley with Mustafa
Kemal openly and officially and signed an armistice
with him, it seemed likely we meant to pursue a
policy that might bring about a local and provisional
agreement with the Nationalists, and perhaps a
definite agreement later on. If such an armistice
was not concluded, a rupture was to be feared on
either side later on, in which case the condition of
things would remain as intricate as before, or military
operations would be resumed in worse conditions

222 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

than before for both parties. In short, after treating
with Mustafa Kemal it was difficult to ignore him
in the general settlement that was to ensue.

But no broad view had ever dominated the Allies'
policy since they had signed the armistice with
Turkey in October, 1918. Eastern affairs had never
been carefully sifted or clearly understood; so the
Allies' action had been badly started. Conflicting
ambitions had led them in a confused way. The
policy of England especially, which had proved harsh
and grasping, and also highly dangerous, was at the
bottom of the difficulties the Allies had experienced
in the East. So France, where public opinion and
popular feeling were opposed to any Eastern adven-
ture or any action against Turkey, could not be called
upon to maintain troops in the East or to fight there
alone for the benefit of others. The operations that
were being contemplated in the East would have
necessarily required an important army, and ii
adequate credits had been asked for them, a loud
protest would have been raised — though later on the
French Chamber granted large sums of money for
Syria, after a superficial debate, not fully realising
what would be the consequence of the vote.

M. d'Estournelles de Constant, a member of the
Senate, wrote to the French Prime Minister on
May 25 that, " after asking the Government most
guardedly — for months in the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee and the day before in the Senate — to give
information about the mysterious military opera-
tions that had been carried on for a year and a half
in Asia Minor and towards Mesopotamia," he found
it necessary to start a debate in the Senate upon the

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 223

following question : " What are our armies doing in
Cilicia?"1

Meanwhile the Supreme Council urged the Turkish
delegation to sign the treaty that had been submitted
for its approval, and the Allies were going to negotiate
with the representatives of a Government which, on
the whole, was no longer acknowledged by the
country. Of what value might be the signature
wrested by the Allies from these representatives, and
how could the stipulations of that treaty be carried
out by the Turks ? Most of its clauses raised internal
difficulties in Turkey, and such a confusion ensued
that the members of the delegation did not seem to
agree any longer with the members of the Ottoman
Cabinet, and at a certain time even the latter seemed
unable to accept the treaty, in spite of the pressure
brought to bear on the Ottoman Government by the
English troops of occupation.

Mustafa Kemal's Nationalist forces conquered not
only the whole of Asia Minor, but also all the
Asiatic coast and the islands of the Marmora, except
Ismid, which was still held by British posts. The
Turkish Nationalists soon after captured Marmora
Island, which commanded the sea route between
Gallipoli and Constantinople.

On June 16 the British forces engaged the Kemalist
troops in the Ismid area. About thirty Indian
soldiers were wounded and an officer of the Intel-
ligence Department was taken prisoner by the Turks.
The civilians evacuated Ismid, and it was hinted that
the garrison would do the same. Mustafa Kemal's

Journal des 'Debats, May 26, 1920.

224 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

aeroplanes dropped bombs on the town, and the
railway line between Ismid and Hereke was cut
by the Nationalists. The British forces on the
southern coast of the Dardanelles withdrew towards
Shanak, whose fortifications were being hurriedly
repaired.

Mustafa Kemal's plan seemed to be to dispose his
forces so as not to be outflanked, and be able to
threaten Smyrna later on. To this end, the Nation-
alist forces advanced along the English sector towards
the heights of Shamlija, on the Asiatic coast of the
Bosporus, from which point they could bombard
Constantinople.

After a long interview with the Sultan, which
lasted two hours, on June 11, the Grand Vizier
Damad Ferid Pasha, owing to the difficulty of com-
municating between Paris and Constantinople, and the
necessity of co-ordinating the draft of the answer
worked out by the Ottoman Government and the
reports drawn up by the various commissions with
the answer recommended by the delegation, set off
to Paris the next day. So it seemed likely that
Turkey would ask for further time before giving
her answer.

It could already be foreseen that in her answer
Turkey would protest against the clauses of the
treaty concerning Thrace and Smyrna, against the
blow struck at the sovereignty of the Sultan by the
internationalisation of the Bosporus and the Dar-
danelles, as thus the Sultan could no longer leave his
capital and go freely to Asia Minor, and, lastly, against
the clauses restoring the privileges of the Capitula-
tions to the States that enjoyed them before the war.

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 225

Turkey also intended to ask that the Sultan should
keep his religious rights as Caliph over the Mussul-
mans detached from the Empire, and that a clause
should be embodied in the treaty maintaining the
guarantee in regard to the interior loan raised during
the war, for otherwise a great many subscribers
would be ruined and the organisation of the property
of the orphans would be jeopardised.

At the beginning of the second week of June it
was rumoured that the treaty might be substantially
amended in favour of Turkey.1 Perhaps Great
Britain, seeing how things stood in the East, and
that her policy in Asia Minor raised serious diffi-
culties, felt it necessary to alter her attitude with
regard to Turkish Nationalism which, supported by
the Bolshevists, was getting more and more
dangerous in Persia. For Mr. Lloyd George, who
has always allowed himself to be led by the trend of
events, and whose policy had lately been strongly
influenced by the Bolshevists, had now altered his
mind, as he often does, and seemed now inclined,
owing to the failure of his advances to the Soviet
Government, to modify his attitude towards Con-
stantinople— after having exasperated Turkish
Nationalism. The debate that was to take place
on June 15 in the House of Lords as to what charges
and responsibilities England had assumed in Mesopo-
tamia, was postponed — which meant much; and the
difficulties just met with by the British in the Upper
Valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates in their
struggle with the Arabs convinced them of the

1 Daily Telegraph, June 12, 1920.

15

226 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

advisability of a revision of the British policy towards
both the Arabs and the Turks.

On the other hand, it did not seem unlikely that
M. Venizelos, who was being expected in London,
might have seen the mistake the Supreme Council
had made when it had granted the Greek claims so
fully, and that the apprehension he was entitled to
feel about the reality of the huge advantages obtained
by Greece might have a salutary influence on him.
Yet nothing of the kind happened, and in a long
letter to the Daily Telegraph (June 18) he asserted
not only the rights of Greece to Smyrna, but his
determination to have them respected and to prevent
the revision of the treaty.

M. Venizelos, " the great victor of the war in the
East," as he was called in London, even supported
his claims by drawing public attention to the intrigues
carried on by Constantino's supporters to restore
him to the throne. He maintained that the revision
of the treaty would second the efforts which were
then being made in Athens by the old party of the
Crown, which, he said, was bound to triumph if
Greece was deprived of the fruits of her victory and
if the Allies did not redeem their pledges towards her.
But then it became obvious that the Greeks did not
despise Constantino so much after all, and their
present attitude could not in any way be looked upon
as disinterested.

It might have been expected, on the other hand,
that Count Sforza, who had been High Commissioner
in Constantinople, where he had won warm sym-
pathies, would maintain the friendly policy pursued
by Italy since the armistice towards Turkey — that is

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 227

to say, he would urge that the time had come to
revise the treaty of peace with Turkey which, since
it had been drawn up at San Remo, had constantly
been opposed by the Italian Press. All the parties
shared this view, even the clerical party, and one
of its members in the Chamber, M. Vassalo, who had
just come back from Turkey, energetically maintained
it was impossible to suppress the Ottoman Empire
without setting on fire the whole of Asia. The
Congress of the Popular Party in Naples held the
same opinion. Recent events also induced Italy to
preserve the cautious attitude she had assumed in
Eastern affairs since the armistice, and she naturally
aimed at counterbalancing the supremacy that
England, if she once ruled over Constantinople and
controlled Greater Greece, would enjoy over not only
the western part, but the whole, of the Mediter-
ranean Sea.

Henceforth it was obvious that the chief stipula-
tions of the treaty that was to be enforced on
Turkey were doomed to failure, and it was asked
with no little anxiety whether the Powers would be
wise enough to take facts into account and reconsider
their decisions accordingly, or maintain them and
thus pave the way to numerous conflicts and fresh
difficulties. Indeed, the outcome of the arrangements
they had laboriously elaborated was that things in
the East had become more intricate and critical than
before. No State wished to assume the task of
organising the Armenian State: the American Senate
flatly refused; Mr. Bonar Law formally declared in
the House of Commons that England had already
too many responsibilities ; France did not see why she

228 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

should take charge of it; Italy accepted no mandate
in Asia Minor. Syria, on the other hand, protested
against its dismemberment. Mesopotamia was rising
against the English at the very time when the
Ottoman Nationalists entered an indignant protest
against the cession of Smyrna and Thrace to Greece.

It was to be wished, therefore, from every point of
view that not only some articles of the treaty presented
to the Turks, but the whole document, should be
remodelled, and more regard should be paid to the
lawful rights of the Ottoman Empire, a change which
could only serve French interests.

But though reason and her interest urged France
to maintain the Ottoman Empire — which she at-
tempted to do to some extent — she allowed herself
to be driven in a contrary direction by England, who
thought she could take advantage of the perturbation
caused by the war within the Turkish Empire to
dismember it — not realising that this undertaking
went against her own Asiatic interests, which were
already seriously endangered. Such a submission to
the English policy was all the more to be regretted
as Mr. Lloyd George had but grudgingly supported
the French policy with regard to Germany, and after
the San Remo conversations it seemed that France
would have to consent to heavy sacrifices in the East
in return for the semi-approbation he had finally
granted her. This policy of England well might
surprise the French — who have always reverenced
the British parliamentary system; for the so-styled
imperialist policy of Queen Victoria or King Edward,
though it has been violently criticised, had really
kept up the old traditions of British Liberalism, and

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 229

had nothing in common with the greed and cool
selfishness of such demagogues and would-be ad-
vanced minds as Mr. Lloyd George, who stands forth
before the masses as the enemy of every imperialism
and the champion of the freedom of peoples. But
the former leaders of English foreign policy were not
constantly influenced by their own political interests ;
they knew something of men and countries; and
they had long been thoroughly acquainted with the
ways of diplomacy. Botb in England and France,
everyone should now acknowledge their fair-minded-
ness, and pay homage alike to their wisdom and
perspicacity.

Many people in France now wondered with some
reason what the 80,000 French soldiers round Beyrut
were doing — whether it was to carry out the expedi-
tion that had long been contemplated against
Damascus, or to launch into an adventure in Cilicia.

M. d'Estournelles de Constant, who had first
wished to start a debate in the French Chamber on
the military operations in Syria and Cilicia, addressed
the following letter, after the information given by
M. Millerand before the Commission of Foreign
Affairs, to M. de Selves, chairman of this Commission:

" I feel bound to let the Commission know for what reasons
I have determined not to give up, but merely postpone the
debate I wanted to start in the Chamber concerning our mili-
tary operations in Syria and Cilicia.

" The Premier has given as much consideration as he
could to the anxieties we had expressed before him. He
has inherited a situation he is not responsible for, and
seems to do his best to prevent France from falling into the
dreadful chasm we had pointed out to him. We must help
him in his most intricate endeavours, for France is not the
only nation that has to grapple with the perilous Eastern
problem. She must work hand in hand with her allies to avert

230 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

this peril. The whole world is threatened by it. Our Allies
should understand that the interest of France is closely con-
nected with their interests. France guards the Rhine; she
is practically responsible for the execution of the treaty with
Germany.

" How can she perform such a task, together with the
administration of Alsace and Lorraine and the restoration
of her provinces laid waste by the Germans, if she is to scatter
her effort and her reduced resources both in Europe and all
her large colonial empire and in Asia Minor among peoples
who have long welcomed her friendship, but abhor any
domination ?

" France would do the world an immense service by openly
reverting to the war aims proclaimed by herself and her allies.
Far from endangering, she would thus strengthen her tra-
ditional influence in the East; she would thus do more than
by risky military operations to smother the ambitions and
rebellions that might set on fire again the Balkan States,
Anatolia, and even Mesopotamia.

" After five years of sacrifices that have brought us victory,
to start on a would-be crusade against the Arabs and Turks
in a remote country, in the middle of summer, would
imply for France as well as for England, Italy, Greece, and
Serbia, the beginning of a new war that might last for ever,
to the benefit of anarchy.

" At any rate I ask that the intended treaty of peace with
Turkey, which has not been signed yet, should not be pre-
sented to the French Parliament as an irremediable fact."

After a long debate on Eastern affairs and on the
questions raised by M. Millerand's communications,
the Commission for Foreign Affairs, seeing things were
taking a bad turn, and the situation of France in
Syria, Cilicia, and Constantinople was getting alarm-
ing, decided on June 15 to send a delegation to the
East to make an inquiry on the spot.

At the first sitting of the French Chamber on
June 25, 1920, M. Briand, who three months before
had made a speech in favour of the 1916 agreements
which were being threatened by English ambition,
though he considered the Turkish bands " went too

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 231

far," and our policy " played too much into their
hands," felt it incumbent on him to say :

" When we leave a nation like Turkey, after a long war,
for over a year, under what might be called a Scotch douche,
telling her now ' Thou shalt live,' now ' Thou shalt not live,'
we strain its nerves to the extreme, we create within it a
patriotic excitement, a patriotic exasperation, which now
becomes manifest in the shape of armed bands. We call
them bands of robbers; in our own country we should call
them ' bands of patriots.' "

In the course of the general discussion of the Budget,
during a debate which took place on July 28 in the
Senate, an amendment was brought in by M. Victor
Berard and some of his colleagues calling for a
reduction of 30 million francs on the sums asked for
by the Government, which already amounted, as a
beginning, to 185 million francs.

M. d'Estournelles de Constant then expressed his
fear that this Eastern expedition might cause France
to make sacrifices out of proportion to her resources
in men and money, and asked how the Government
expected to recuperate the expenditure incurred in
Syria.

M. Victor Berard, in his turn, sharply criticised
our Eastern policy.

M. Bompard, too, expressed his fears concerning
our Syrian policy, and M. Doumergue asked the
Government to consent to a reduction of the credits
" to show it intended to act cautiously in Syria."

But after M. Millerand's energetic answer, and
after M. Doumer, chairman of the Commission, had
called upon the Senate to accept the figures proposed
by the Government and the Commission, these
figures were adopted by 205 votes against 84.

232 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

M. Komanos, interviewed by the Matin,1 and soon
after M. Venizelos, at the Lympne Conference, main-
tained that the treaty could be fully carried out, and
the Greeks felt quite able to enforce it themselves.

As the Allied troops were not sufficient to take
decisive action, and as a large part of the Ottoman
Empire had been assigned to Greece, England herself
soon asked why the latter should not be called upon
to pay for the operation if she insisted upon carrying
it out.

About June 20 the situation of the British troops
became rather serious, as General Milne did not
seem to have foreseen the events and was certainly
unable to control them.

The Nationalist troops, which met with but little
resistance, continued to gain ground, and after march-
ing past Ismid occupied Guebze. The Government
forces were retreating towards Alemdagh.

By this time the Nationalists occupied the whole of
Anatolia, and the English held but a few square
miles near the Dardanelles. The Nationalists, who
had easy access to both coasts of the Gulf of Ismid,
attempted to blow up the bridges on the Haidar-
Pasha-Ismid railway line. Though the English were
on the lookout, four Turkish aeroplanes started from
the park of Maltepe, bound for Anatolia. One of
them was piloted by the famous Fazil Bey, who had
attacked English aeroplanes during their last flight
over Constantinople a few days before the armistice
in October, 1918.

Indeed, the Government forces only consisted of

Matin, June 12, 1920.

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 233

15,000 specialised soldiers, artillerymen or engineers,
with 6 light batteries of 77 guns and 2 Skoda bat-
teries; in addition to which 20,000 rifles had been
given to local recruits. The Nationalists, on the con-
trary, opposed them with 35,000 well-equipped men
commanded by trained officers. Besides, there was
but little unity of command among the Government
forces. Anzavour Pasha, who had been sent with
some cavalry, had refused to submit to headquarters,
and at the last moment, when ordered to outflank
the enemy and thus protect the retreat of the Govern-
ment forces, he had flatly refused to do so, declaring
he was not going to be ordered about by anybody.

So, considering how critical the situation of the
British troops was in the zone of the Straits, England
immediately made preparations to remedy it and
dispatched reinforcements. The 2nd battalion of the
Essex Regiment was held in readiness at Malta, and
the light cruiser Carlisle kept ready to set off at a
few minutes' notice. All available destroyers had
already left Malta for the Eastern Mediterranean,
where the first and fourth squadrons had already
repaired. Besides, the cruiser Ceres, which had left
Marseilles for Malta, received orders on the way to
steam straight on to the ^Egean Sea. All the Mediter-
ranean fleet was concentrated in the East, while in
the Gulf of Isrnid the English warships, which were
already there, carefully watched the movements of
the Turkish Nationalist forces.

Such a state of things naturally brought about
some 'anxiety in London, which somewhat influenced
Mr. Lloyd George's decisions.

During the Hythe Conference, after some conver-

234 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

sations on the previous days with Mr. Lloyd George,
Lord Curzon, and Mr. Philip Kerr, in which he had
offered to put the Greek Army at the disposal of
the Allies, M. Venizelos, accompanied by Sir John
Stavridi, a rich Greek merchant of London, who had
been his intimate adviser for several years, went on
Saturday evening, June 18, to the Imperial Hotel at
Hythe, where were met all the representatives and
experts whom Sir Philip Sassoon had not been able
to accommodate at his mansion at Belcair, to plead
the cause of Greek intervention with them.

M. Venizelos, on the other hand, in order to win
over the British Government to his views, had
secured the most valuable help of Sir Basil Zaharoff,
who owns most of the shares in the shipbuilding
yards of Vickers and Co. and who, thanks to the
huge fortune he made in business, subsidises several
organs of the British Press. He, too, has been a
confidential adviser of M. Venizelos, and has a great
influence over Mr. Lloyd George, owing to services
rendered to him in election time. So it has been
said with reason that M. Venizelos' eloquence and
Sir Basil Zaharoff's wealth have done Turkey the
greatest harm, for they have influenced Mr. Lloyd
George and English public opinion against her.

According to M. Venizelos' scheme, which he meant
to expound before the Conference, the Turkish
Nationalist army, concentrated in the Smyrna area,
could be routed by a quick advance of the Greek
forces, numbering 90,000 fully equipped and well-
trained men, who would capture the railway station
of Afium-Karahissar. This station, being at the junc-
tion of the railway line from Smyrna and the Adana-

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 235

Ismid line, via Konia, the only line of lateral commu-
nication Mustafa Kemal disposed of, would thus be
cut off, and the Nationalist leader would have to
withdraw towards the interior. His resistance would
thus break down, and the British forces on the
southern coast of the Sea of Marmora that M. Veni-
zelos offered to reinforce by sending a Greek division
would be at once freed from the pressure brought
to bear on them, which, at the present moment,
they could hardly resist.

The next day the Allies decided to accept M. Veni-
zelos' offer, as the Greek troops were on the spot and
no other force could arrive soon enough to relieve the
British forces, which were seriously threatened.

Mr. Lloyd George declared that the British Govern-
ment was sending to the spot all the ships it had at
its disposal, but that this naval intervention could
not affect the situation much without the help of the
Greek Army.

"Without the Greek help," he said, "we may be driven
to an ignominious evacuation of that region of Asia Minor
before Kemal's forces, which would certainly have a terrible
repercussion throughout the East and would pave the way to
endless possibilities."

This was also the view held by Sir Henry Wilson,
Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Marshal Foch, too, was asked his advice about the
Greek co-operation. He had already declared at San
Remo. in agreement with Marshal Wilson, that an
army of 300,000 or 400,000 well-equipped men would
be needed to conquer Asia Minor. Now, after making
full reserves in regard to the political side of the ques-
tion, he merely remarked that from a strictly military

236 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

point of view, Greek co-operation might be a decisive
element of success; moreover, in a report he had
drawn up a few months before, he had pointed out
the advantage that an active co-operation of the Greek
Army was sure to bring, from a military point of view.

M. Millerand, while admitting these advantages, is
said to have raised some serious objections to the
scheme.

Finally, as the question could not be solved defi-
nitely without Italy's consent, it was adjourned till
the Boulogne Conference met.

Mr. Lloyd George accepted this solution the more
readily as he only seemed to look upon M. Venizelos'
scheme as an experiment; and he wanted to gain
time, in order to know whether he was to pursue it,
till facts had proved that M. Venizelos was right and
the Turkish Nationalists' resistance could be over-
come in a short time. If after some time things did
not turn out as he expected, he would merely resort
to another policy, as is usual with him. But England,
meanwhile, was in an awkward situation, since, while
accepting the help of an ally, she hinted at the same
time that she would not stand by the latter if things
turned out wrong. On the other hand, it was sur-
prising that the Supreme Council should take such
decisions before receiving Turkey's answer and know-
ing whether she would sign the treaty.

When the decisions taken at Hythe in regard to the
part to be entrusted to Greece were made known on
June 21 at the Boulogne Conference, they brought
forth some remarks on the part of Count Sforza, who
refused to engage Italy's responsibility in the policy
that was being recommended. He thought it his duty

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 237

to make reservations in regard to the timeliness of
these decisions and the consequences that might
ensue, referring to the technical advice given at San
Remo by Marshal Foch and Marshal Wilson as to
the huge forces they thought would be needed to
enforce the treaty against the Nationalists' wish.

Soon after — on July 13 — M. Scialoja, in the long
speech he delivered before the Senate to defend the
attitude of Italy in the Peace Congress, declared that
Italy could not be held responsible for the serious
condition of things now prevailing in Asia Minor and
the East, for she had attempted, but in vain, to secure
a more lenient treatment for Turkey. Finally, in
spite of all the objections raised against the treaty,
and the difficulties that would probably ensue, it was
decided at the few sittings of the Boulogne Conference
that the Ottoman delegation should be refused any
further delay in giving their answer, which averted
any possibility of revision of the treaty. The Powers
represented in the Conference gave a free hand to
Greece in Asia Minor, because they had not enough
soldiers there themselves — let us add that none of
them, not even England probably, cared to rush
into a new Eastern adventure. The Greeks had
none but themselves to blame; their landing at
Smyrna had started the Nationalist movement, and
now they bore the brunt of the fight.

This new decision implied the giving up of the
policy of conciliation which might have been expected
after the three weeks' armistice concluded on May 30
between the French Staff and the Nationalists, which
seemed to imply that the French military authorities
intended to evacuate the whole of Cilicia, left by the

238 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

treaty to Turkey. Owing to the serious conse-
quences and infinite repercussions it might have
through the Moslem world, the new decision heralded
a period of endless difficulties.

Even the Catholic Press did not much appreciate
the treaty, and had been badly impressed by recent
events. The Vatican, which has always sought to
prevent Constantinople from falling into the hands
of an Orthodox Power, might well dread the treaty
would give the Phanar a paramount influence in the
East, if Greece became the ruling Power both at
Stambul and Jerusalem. In the first days of the
war, when at the time of the Gallipoli expedition
Constantinople seemed doomed to fall, the Holy See
saw with some anxiety that the Allies intended to
assign Constantinople to Russia, and it then asked
that at least Saint Sophia, turned into a mosque by
the Turks, should be given back to the Catholic creed.
This fear may even have been one of the reasons
which then induced the Holy See to favour the Central
States. M. Rene Johannet, who was carrying on a
campaign in the newspaper La Cr&ix1 for the
revision of the treaty, wrote as follows:

" But then, if Asia Minor is deprived of Smyrna and thus
loses at least half her resources, we ask with anxiety where
France, the chief creditor of Turkey, will find adequate
financial guarantees ? To give Smyrna to Greece is to rob
France. If the Turks are stripped of everything, they will
give us nothing.

" Lastly, the fate of our innumerable religious missions, of
which Smyrna is the nucleus, is to us a cause of great anxiety.
After the precedents of Salonika and Uskub, we have every-
thing to fear. The Orthodox Governments hate Catholicism.
Our religious schools — that is to say, the best, the soundest

1 La Croix, July 14, 1920.

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 239

part of our national influence — will soon come to nothing if
they are constantly worried by the new lords of the land.
How can we allow this ?"

According to the account given by the Anatolian
newspapers of the sittings of the Parliament sum-
moned by Mustafa Kemal to discuss the conditions
of peace, very bitter speeches had been delivered.
The Assembly had passed motions denouncing the
whole of the treaty, and declaring the Nationalists
were determined to oppose its being carried out,
supposing it were signed by Damad Ferid Pasha, or
any venal slave of the foreigner, and to fight to the
bitter end.

Mustafa Kemal was said to have declared, in a
conversation, that he had not enough soldiers to
make war, but he would manage to prevent any
European Power establishing dominion in Asia
Minor. And he is reported to have added: " I don't
care much if the Supreme Council ejects the Turks
from Europe, but in this case the Asiatic territories
must remain Turkish."

The Greek Army, which, according to the decisions
of the Conference, had started an offensive on the
Smyrna front, after driving back the Nationalists
concentrated at Akhissar, occupied the offices of the
captainship of the port of Smyrna and the Ottoman
post-office.

On June 20, at Chekmeje, west of Constantinople
on the European coast of the Marmora, a steamer
had landed a detachment of Kemalist troops, which
the British warships had immediately bombarded at
a range of eight miles.

On June 21 and 22 two battalions, one English and

240 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

the other Indian, landed on the Asiatic coast and
blew up the eighty guns scattered all along the
Straits, on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.

On June 23 the 13th Greek division attacked
Salikili and occupied it. A column of cavalry ad-
vanced towards Kula.

On June 24 the Greek troops carried on their
advance in four directions and the Nationalists with-
drew, fighting stoutly all the time.

On June 25 the Greeks overcame their resistance
and captured Alashehr, formerly called Philadelphia,
an important town on the Smyrna-Konia line, about
100 miles from Smyrna, took some prisoners and
captured material.

On July 1 the Greeks occupied Balikesri, an im-
portant station on the Smyrna-Panderma line, nearly
fifty miles to the north of Soma, in spite of the
Nationalists' energetic resistance.

On July 3 a landing of Greek troops hastened the
fall -of Panderma. Some detachments which had
landed under the protection of the fleet marched
southwards, and met the enemy outposts at Omerkeui,
fifteen miles to the north-west of Balikesri.

Then on July 7 M. Venizelos stated at the Spa
Conference that the Greek offensive against Mustafa
Kemal's forces which had begun on June 22 and
whose chief objective was the capture of the Mag-
nesia - Akhissar - Soma - Balikesri - Panderma line, had
ended victoriously on July 2, when the forces coming
from the south and those landed at Panderma had
effected a junction, and that the scheme of military
operations drawn up at Boulogne, which was to be
carried out in two weeks, according to General

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 241

m

Paraskevopoulos' forecast, had been brought to a
successful end in eleven days.

On July 8 Brusa was occupied by the Greek army,
and Mudania and Geumlek by British naval forces.
Before the Greek advance began every wealthy Turk
had fled to the interior with what remained of the
56th Turkish division, which had evacuated Brusa
on July 2. Brusa had been occupied by the Greeks
without any bloodshed. A good number of railway
carriages and a few steam-engines belonging to a
French company had been left undamaged by the
Turks on the Mudania line. The British naval authori-
ties, under the pretext that some shots had been fired
from the railway station, had had it shelled, together
with the French manager's house, and all that was
in these two buildings had been looted by British
sailors and the Greek population of Mudania.

Some misleading articles in the Greek and English
Press, which were clearly unreliable, extolled the correct
attitude of the Greek troops towards the inhabitants
during their advance in Asia Minor. According to the
Greek communique of July 17, " the Nationalists, now
deprived of any prestige, were being disarmed by the
Moslem population which earnestly asked to be pro-
tected by the Greek posts," and " the Turks, tired of
the vexatious measures and the crushing taxes en-
forced by the Kemalists, everywhere expressed their
confidence and gratitude towards the Greek soldiers,
whom they welcomed as friends and protectors."

At the same time political circles in Athens openly
declared that the Greek operations in Asia Minor had
now come to an end, and that Adrianople and
Eastern Thrace would soon be occupied — this occu-

16

242 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

pation being quite urgent as the Turks already
evinced signs of resistance, and the Bulgarians were
assuming a threatening attitude. Moreover, as might
have been foreseen, the Greeks already began to speak
of territorial compensations after their operations in
Asia Minor and of setting up a new State.

General Milne, whose forces had been reinforced
by Greek elements, also undertook to clear all the
area lying between Constantinople and Ismid from
the irregular Turkish troops that had made their
way into it.

On July 7 it was officially notified by the British
Headquarters that " military movements were going
to take place in the direction of Ismid, and so the
Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus was considered as a
war zone." Accordingly troops quartered in that
district, and soldiers employed in the various services,
were to be recalled to the European shore at once,
and the next day any Turkish soldier found within
that zone would be treated as an enemy.

The great Selimie barracks, at Skutari, were there-
fore evacuated by the Turks, who thus had no troops
left on the Asiatic shore of the Straits.

At Pasha Bagtche Chiboukli, on the Asiatic shore
of the Bosphorus, Greek soldiers helped to disarm the
population, and searched everybody who landed at
that village.

At Stambul, on the great bridge of Karakeui,
British agents halted all officers and soldiers wearing
the Turkish uniform, and directed them to the build-
ings of the English gendarmerie to be examined.

The Alemdagh district was occupied, and General
Milne had all the Government troops disarmed, on

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 243

the pretext of their questionable attitude and the
weakness of the Turkish Government. Yet the latter
had, of its own accord, broken up the Constantinople
army corps, and replaced it by one division that was
to be dissolved, in its turn, after the signature of the
Peace Treaty, as according to the terms of peace
only 700 Turkish soldiers had a right to reside in
Constantinople as the Sultan's guard.

In an article of Le Matin, July 7, 1920, under the
title, " A New Phase of the Eclipse of French In-
fluence in the East," M. Andre Fribourg pointed out
the encroachment of the British Commander in
Constantinople.

The decision taken by the Allies at Boulogne not to
grant any further delay had placed the Turks in a
difficult situation. The Grand Vizier, who had come
to Paris in the hope of negotiating, handed his
answer on the 25th, in order to keep within the
appointed time.

The Supreme Council examined this answer on
Wednesday, July 7, at Spa. After hearing the
English experts, who advised that any modification
should be rejected, the Council refused to make any
concessions on all the chief points mentioned in the
Turkish answer, and only admitted a few subsidiary
requests as open to discussion. It deputed a Com-
mission of political experts to draw up an answer in
collaboration with the military experts.

Meanwhile the Minister of the Interior, Reshid
Bey, chairman of the Ottoman delegation, who had
left Constantinople on the 25th, and had arrived in

244 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Paris with Jemil Pasha only at the beginning of
July, sent a note to the Secretary of the Peace Con-
ference to be forwarded to M. Millerand at Spa. This
note, which came to hand on July 11, completed
the first answer. It included the decisions taken
in Constantinople during Damad Ferid's stay at
Versailles.

The remarks offered by the Ottoman delegation
about the peace conditions presented by the Allies
made up a little book of forty pages with some appen-
dices, which was handed to the Conference on the
25th. The answer, which had been revised in Con-
stantinople, and consisted of forty-seven pages, was
delivered a few days after; it differed but little from
the first.

This document began with the following protest
against the conditions enforced on Turkey:

" It was only fair — and it was also a right recognised by all
nations nowadays — that Turkey should be set on an equal
footing with her former allies. The flagrant inequality
proffered by the draft of the treaty will be bitterly resented
not only by 12 million Turks, but throughout the Moslem
world.

" Nothing, indeed, can equal the rigour of the draft of the
Turkish treaty. As a matter of fact, it is a dismemberment.

" Not only do the Allies, in the name of the principle of
nationalities, detach important provinces from the Ottoman
Empire which they erect to the rank of free, independent
States (Armenia and the Hejaz), or independent States under
the protection of a mandatory Power (Mesopotamia, Palestine,
and Syria); not only do they wrench from it Egypt, Suez, and
Cyprus, which are to be ceded to Great Britain; not only do
they require Turkey to give up all her rights and titles to
Libya and the States of the ^Egean Sea : they even mean to
strip her, notwithstanding the said principle of nationalities,
of Eastern Thrace and the zone of Smyrna, which countries,
in a most iniquitous way, would be handed over to Greece,
who wants to be set on an equal footing with the victors,
though she has not even been at war with Turkey.

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 245

" Further, they are preparing to take Kurdistan and in
an indirect way to slice the rest of the country into zones of
influence.

" In this way more than two-thirds of the extent of the
Ottoman Empire would already be taken from it. With
regard to the number of inhabitants, it would be at least two-
thirds. If we consider the economic wealth and natural re-
sources of the country, the proportion would be greater still.

"But that is not all. To this spoliation, the draft of the
treaty adds a notorious infringement on the sovereignty of the
Ottoman State. Even at Constantinople Turkey would not
be her own mistress. Side by side with His Imperial Majesty
the Sultan and the Turkish Government — or even above them
in some cases — a ' Commission of the Straits ' would rule over
the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles.
Turkey would not even be represented in this Commission,
whereas Bulgaria would send a representative to it.

" In addition to these two powers, there would be a third
one — the military power exercised by the troops of occupation
of three States, whose headquarters would have the upper hand
even of the Ottoman gendarmerie.

" Any possibility of mere defence against an attack would
thus be taken away from Turkey, whose capital would hence-
forth be within the range of her enemies' guns.

" The sovereignty of the State would also be deeply infringed
upon in all matters relating to legislation, international
treaties, finance, administration, jurisdiction, trade, etc., so
that finally the crippled-Ottoman Empire would be stripped
of every attribute of sovereignty both at home and abroad,
but would be held responsible all the same for the execution
of the Peace Treaty and the international obligations pertain-
ing to every State.

" Such a situation, which would be an utter denial of justice,
would constitute both a logical impossibility and a judicial
anomaly. For, on the one hand, it is impossible~to maintain a
State and at the same time divest it of all that is an essential
judicial condition of its existence; and, on the other hand,
there cannot be any responsibility where there is no liberty.

" Either the Allied Powers are of opinion that Turkey
should continue to exist, in which case they should make it
possible for her to live and fulfil her engagements by paying
due regard to her rights as a free, responsible State.

" Or the Allied Powers want Turkey to die. They should
then execute their own sentence themselves, without asking
the culprit — to whom they did not even give a hearing —
to append his signature to it and bring them his co-operation."

246 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

After these general considerations and some remarks
as to the responsibility of Turkey, the fundamental
rights of the State, and the right of free disposal of
peoples, the Ottoman Government made counter-
proposals which were quite legitimate, and at the
same time bore witness to its goodwill.

This document, to which we refer the reader for
further particulars, may be summed up as follows:
The Turkish Government recognises the new States
of Poland, Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia,, and Czecho-
slovakia. It confirms the recognition made by
Turkey in 1918 of Armenia as a free, independent
State. It also recognises the Hejaz as a free, inde-
pendent State. It recognises the French protectorate
over Tunis. It accepts all economic, commercial, and
other consequences of the French protectorate over
Morocco, which was not a Turkish province. It re-
nounces all rights and privileges over Libya and the
isles and islets of the ^Egean Sea. It recognises Syria,
Mesopotamia, Palestine, as independent States. It
recognises the British protectorate over Egypt, the
free passage of the Suez Canal, the Anglo-Egyptian
administration of the Soudan, the annexation of
Cyprus by Great Britain.

In regard to Constantinople and the regime of the
zone of the Straits, the Ottoman delegation remarked
that according to the terms of the treaty there would
be together in that town —

" First, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish
Government, whose rights and titles shall be maintained.

" Secondly, the Commission of the Straits.

" Thirdly, the military powers of occupation.

" Fourthly, the diplomatic representatives of France,
Britain, and Italy, deliberating in a kind of council with the

.
THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 247

military and naval commanders o£ the Franco -Anglo -Italian
forces."

With them would be —

" Fifthly, the Inter- Allied Commissioners of Control and
Military Organisation.

" Sixthly, the Commission of Finance.

" Seventhly, the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.

" Eighthly, the consuls' jurisdictions."

After going over all the objections raised by the
coexistence of these various bodies, whose powers
would encroach upon each other or would be exactly
similar, and the impossibility that foreign agents
accredited to the Sultan should hold such functions,
the memorandum opposed the following reasons to
the decisions of the Conference :

" First, the draft of the treaty does not in any way institute
an international judicial and political organisation of the
Straits.

" Secondly, it institutes a political and military power on
behalf of some States, attended with all the international risks
pertaining to it.

" Thirdly, with regard to Turkey it would constitute a
direct and deep infringement on her rights of sovereignty, pre-
servation, and security, which infringements are not necessary
to safeguard the freedom of passage of the Straits.

"Fourthly, from an international point of view the
intended regime wouW create a kind of international moral
person by the side of the States, which would not represent the
League of Nations.

" Fiftnly, the new international condition of Turkey
would in some respects be inferior to that of the new States
consisting of territories detached from Turkey, for these
new States would be placed under the mandate of a Power
appointed by the League of Nations mainly in accordance with
the wishes of the populations concerned, and bound to give
a periodical account to the League of Nations of the exercise
of its mandate.

" Sixthly, far from ensuring the internationalisation of the
Straits, which was aimed at by the Powers, the regime in-

248 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

stituted by the draft of the treaty would/avow their nationali-
sation by another State.

" The internationalisation of the Straits could only be
realised by means of an international organisation — viz.,
a judicial organisation representing all the Powers."

Therefore, the Government allows the free passage
of the Straits, but asks that they should Be controlled
only by the League of Nations, and that the Straits
zones mentioned in the scheme of internationalisation
" should be reduced territorially to what is necessary
to' guarantee the free passage of the Straits."
Turkey declares herself ready to accept " this scheme,
if restricted to the Straits zone, whose frontiers were
fixed as follows";

" (a) In Europe the Sharkeui-Karachali line, thus in-
cluding all the Gallipoli Peninsula.

" (b) In Asia a line passing through Kara-Bigha (on the
Sea of Marmora), Bigha, Ezine, and Behramkeui."

She thus agrees to " all restrictions to her sovereignty
over the Straits that are necessary to control the
navigation and ensure their opening to all flags on a
footing of complete equality between the States."

Further,

" As regards all matters concerning the region of the
Straits and the Sea of Marmora, the Ottoman Government is
willing to discuss a convention instituting for these waters a
regime of the same kind as the one established for the Suez
Canal by the Constantinople treaty of October 29, 1888, the
very regime advocated by Great Britain (Art. 109)."

The Ottoman Government — this article, together
with the one concerning the Hejaz that will be men-
tioned later on, was the most important addition in
the revised answer drawn up at Constantinople —
wishes the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, lying
before the entrance to the Dardanelles, to be included

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 249

in the zone of the Straits — that is to say, to remain
Ottoman territories under inter-Allied occupation.
The Allies intended to give these islands to Greece,
and it was feared in Constantinople the' latter might
hand them over to another Power — England, for
instance — that would cede her Cyprus in exchange.

Among a great many measures intended for en-
suring the security of Constantinople, the Ottoman
Government chiefly asks for the limitation of the
number of foreign warships allowed to stay in Turkish
waters.

It wants to maintain, under Ottoman sovereignty,
Eastern Thrace within its pre-war boundaries, and
Smyrna with the surrounding area, which shall be
evacuated by Hellenic troops, and may be occupied
for three years at the utmost by troops of the chief
Allied Powers.

The Ottoman Government asks for an international
inquiry to fix the frontiers of Kurdistan according to
the principle of nationalities, in case the Kurds —
who, it firmly believes, are " indissolubly attached
to His Majesty the Sultan," and who " have never
wished, and will never have the least desire, to be com-
pletely independent or even to relax the bonds that
link them with the Turkish people " — should express
the wish to enjoy local autonomy. The intended
frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia should also
be altered, for otherwise it would cut off from the
Ottoman Empire a predominantly Turkish popula-
tion; " an international commission should make a
thorough inquiry with a view to ascertain facts from
an ethnic point of view."

It also wants the King of the Hejaz to pledge him-

250 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

self to, respect the titles and prerogatives of the
Sultan as Caliph over the holy cities and places of
Mecca and Medina.

Lastly, it declares itself ready to accept, without
asking for reciprocity, the clauses concerning the
protection of minorities.

Meanwhile the Greeks seemed eager to carry on
their campaign in Asia Minor, without even waiting
for the definite settlement of the treaty. Accord-
ing to information sent from Greece,1 the Hellenic
army, having reached all its objectives, was waiting
for the decisions of the Spa Conference, and if the
latter wished her to carry on her operations in Asia
Minor, her fourth objective would probably be
Eskishehr, the nucleus of the Anatolian railways,
which commands all the traffic and revictualling of
Asia Minor, and whose fall would perhaps bring the
war to an end.

The Allied answer to the Turkish request for further
delays and to the Turkish remarks was handed to
the Ottoman delegation on July 17.

In this answer, the main lines or perhaps even
the very words of which had been settled at Spa, the
Allies only repeated their previous arguments — some
of which were ineffective and others unfounded; and
both the letter and the spirit of the answer were
most unconciliatory.

The assertion that " Turkey entered into the war
without the shadow of an excuse or provocation,"
recurred again in it and was fully enlarged upon.
The events that had taken place lately and the

1 Le Temps, July 17, 1920.

THE TREATY WriH TURKEY 251

character they had assumed since the end of
hostilities did not seem to have taught the writers or
instigators of the answer anything at all. We do not
wish here to mitigate in any way the responsibilities
of Turkey or her wrongs to the Allies ; yet we should
not overlook the most legitimate reasons that drove
her to act thus, and we must own she had a right to
mistrust the promises made to her. For the policy
that the Allies pursued at that time and that they
have not wholly repudiated obviously proved that
they would give a free hand to Russia to carry out
her ambitious schemes on Constantinople and Turkey-
in-Asia, as a reward for her energetic share in
the war.

Besides, a fact helps us to understand how Turkey
was driven to enter* into the war and accounts for
her apprehension of England and the Anglo-Hellenic
policy pursued by England in relation with her later
on, both in the working out of the Sevres treaty and
after the signature of this treaty; it is the proposi-
tion made by England to Greece to attack Turkey.
According to the letter that M. Venizelos addressed
to King Constantino on September 7, 1914, sending
in his resignation, which was not accepted by the
King, Admiral Kerr, the very man whom later on,
in 1920, the British Government was to entrust with a
mission to the Hellenic King while he was at Lucerne,
formally waited upon the latter to urge him to attack
Turkey. The King is said to have laid down as a
necessary condition to his consent that Britain should
guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria and should con-
trive to bring Turkey to afford him a pretext for open-
ing hostilities. Admiral Kerr, speaking on behalf of

252 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

the British Government, is reported to have given him
full guarantee on the first point ; but with reference to
the second point he hinted that he thought it unneces-
salry to seek for a pretext or wait for a provocation as
the Hellenic policy constantly evinced a feeling of
hostility towards Turkey.1

In this answer the Allies again reproached the
Turks with their atrocities — without mentioning the
atrocities committed by the Armenians against the
Turks ; and yet at that time Mr. Lloyd George seemed
to have wholly forgotten the German atrocities, for
he did not say a word about the punishment of the
war criminals, and seemed ready to make concessions
as to the reparations stipulated in the treaty with
Germany. Why should the Turks be chastised —
as was said at the time — if the other criminals were
not punished ? Was it merely because they were
weaker and less guilty than the Germans ?

Though it was a palpable falsehood, it was asserted
again in this document that in Thrace the Moslems
were not in a majority.

The Powers also gravely affirmed they contemplated
for Smyrna " about the same regime as for Dantzig,"
which could not greatly please either the Greeks or
the Turks, judging from the condition of the Poles in
the Baltic port; but they did not add that perhaps
in this case too England would finally control the
port.

" With regard to the control of the Straits," said
the document, " the Powers must unhesitatingly take

1 Of. Ex-King Constantine and the War, by Major J. M. Melas,
p. 239.

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 253

adequate measures to prevent the Turkish Govern-
ment from treacherously trampling upon the cause of
civilisation." It seemed to be forgotten that Turkey
insisted upon keeping them in order to prevent
Russia from seizing them; and at the very time
when the note was drawn up some newspapers
declared — which might have sufficed to justify the
Turkish claim — that the passage of the Straits must
be free in order to allow the Allies to send munitions
to Wrangel's army.

The Allies, however, decided to grant to " Turkey,
as a riparian Power and in the same manner and on
the same conditions as to Bulgaria, the right to
appoint a delegate to the Commission and the sup-
pression of the clause through which Turkey was to
surrender to the Allied Governments all steamers of
1,600 tons upwards." These were the only two
concessions made to Turkey.

The Allies' answer laid great stress upon the advan-
tages offered by the organisation of a financial control
of Turkey, which, to quote the document itself, " was
introduced for no other purpose than to protect
Turkey against the corruption and speculation which
had ruined her in the past." As a matter of fact, that
corruption and speculation had been let loose in
Turkey by the Great Powers themselves, under cover
of the privileges given by the Capitulations.

Judging from the very words of the clause which
left Constantinople in the hands of the Turks, the
Allies seemed to allow this merely out of condescen-
sion, and even alleged that the territory left to
Turkey as a sovereign State was " a large and pro-
ductive territory."

254 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Finally, the note concluded with the following
threat:

" If the Turkish Government refuses to sign the peace, still
more if it finds itself unable to re-establish its sovereignty in
Anatolia or to give effect to the treaty, the Allies, in accord-
ance with the terms of the treaty, may be driven to reconsider
the arrangement by ejecting the Turks from Europe once
and for all."

These lines plainly show that some Powers had
not given up the idea of ejecting the Turks from
Europe, and were only awaiting an opportunity that
might warrant another European intervention to
carry out their plans and satisfy their ambition; and
yet this policy, as will be seen later on, went against
their own interests and those of Old Europe.

The idea that the British Premier entertained of the
important stategic and commercial consequences
that would ensue if the Near East were taken away
from Turkish sovereignty was obviously contradictory
to the historical part played by Turkey ; and by dis-
regarding the influence of Turkey in European affairs
in the past and the present, he made a grievous
political mistake. If one day Germany, having
become a strong nation again, should offer her support
to Turkey, cut to pieces by England, all the Turks
in Asia might remember Mr. Lloyd George's policy,
especially as M. Venizelos might then have been
replaced by Constantino or the like.

Turkey was granted a period of ten days, expiring
on July 27 at 12 midnight, to let the Allies definitely
know whether she accepted the clauses of the treaty
and intended to sign it.

This comminatory answer did not come as a
surprise. Mr. Lloyd George openly said he was

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 255

convinced the Greeks would be as successful in Thrace
as they had been in Asia Minor, which was easy to
foresee but did not mean much for the future; and he
thought he was justified in declaring with some self-
satisfaction before the Commons on July 21, 1920 —

" The Great Powers had kept the Turk together not because
of any particular confidence they had in him, but because
they were afraid of what might happen if he disappeared.

" The late war has completely put an end to that state of
things. Turkey is broken beyond repair, and from our point
of view we have no reason to regret it."

The Greek troops, supported by an Anglo-Hellenic
naval group, including two British dreadnoughts,
effected a landing in the ports of Erekli, Sultan Keui
(where they met with no resistance), and Kodosto,
which was occupied in the afternoon.

The Hellenic forces landed on the coasts of the
Marmora reached the Chorlu-Muradli line on the
railway, and their immediate objective was the
occupation of the Adrianople-Constantinople railway
in order to cut off all communications between
Jafer Tayar's troops and the Nationalist elements of
the capital, and capture Lule Burgas. From this
position they would be able to threaten Jafer
Tayar and Huhi ed Din on their flanks and rear in
order to compel them to withdraw their troops from
the Maritza, or run the risk of being encircled if they
did not cross the Bulgarian frontier.

The Greek operations against Adrianople began
on July 20. The Turkish Nationalists had dug a
network of trenches on the right bank of the Tunja,
which flows by Adrianople; they offered some
resistance, and bombarded the bridgeheads of
Kuleli Burgas and of the suburbs of Karagatch, three

256 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

miles from Adrianople, where the Greeks had taken
their stand for over a month. But on Saturday,
July 24, the confident spirit of the Turkish civilians
and officers suddenly broke down when it was known
that the Greeks had landed on the shores of the
Marmora, had reached Lule Burgas, and threatened
to encircle the troops that defended Adrianople. In
the absence of Jafer Tayar, who had repaired to the
front, the officers suddenly left the town without letting
it be known whether they were going to Northern
Thrace or withdrawing to Bulgaria, and the soldiers,
leaving the trenches in their turn, scattered all over
Adrianople. The white flag was hoisted during
the night, and the next day at daybreak a delegation,
including Shevket Bey, mayor of the town, the mufti,
the heads of the Orthodox and Jewish religious
communities, repaired to the Hellenic outposts, at
Karagatch, to ask the Greeks to occupy the town
at once. At 10 o'clock the troops marched into
'the town, and by 12 they occupied the Konak,
the prefect's mansion, where the Turks had
left everything — archives, furniture, carpets, and
so on.

Meanwhile, it was reported that 12,000 Turks who
had refused to surrender and accept Greek domina-
tion crossed the Bulgarian frontier.

As soon as the Grand Vizier came back to Con-
stantinople a conflict arose between the latter, who
maintained Turkey was compelled to sign the treaty,
and some members of the Cabinet. As the Grand
Vizier, who was in favour of the ratification, hesitated
to summon the Crown Council, the Minister of Public
Works, Fakhr ed Din, Minister of Public Education,

THE TREATY WITH TCPKEY 257

Reshid, Minister of Finance and provisional Minister
of the Interior, and the Sheik-ul-Islam, who all wanted
the Council to be summoned, are said to have offered
their resignation, which was not accepted by the
Sultan — or at any rate was no more heard of.

On July 20 the Sultan summoned a Council of
the Imperial Family, including the Sultanas, and
on July 22 the Crown Council, consisting of fifty-five
of the most prominent men in Turkey, among whom
were five generals, a few senators, the members of
the Cabinet, and some members of the former Govern-
ment. The Grand Vizier spoke first, and declared
Turkey could not do otherwise than sign the treaty.
All the members of the Council supported the Govern-
ment's decision, with the exception of Marshal
Fuad, who had already used his influence with the
Sultan in favour of the Nationalists and who said
the Turks should die rather than sign such a peace,
and of Riza Pasha, who had commanded the artillery
before the war, who said Turkey did not deserve such
a grievous punishment and refused to vote. Turkey
had been at war for ten years, which partly accounts
for the decision taken. Therefore the order to sign
the treaty of peace was officially given, and, as had
already been announced, General Hadi Pasha, of
Arabian descent, Dr. Riza Tewfik Bey, and Reshad
Halis Bey, ambassador at Berne, were appointed
Turkish plenipotentiaries.

The Grand Vizier in an appeal to Jafer Tayar,
the Nationalist leader in Thrace, begged of him " to
surrender at once and leave Thrace to the Greek
army." He concluded with these words: " We fully
recognise your patriotism, but protracting the war

17

258 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

would be detrimental to the interests of the nation.
You must submit."

Then the question arose how the treaty — which
now admitted of no discussion — after being enforced
and carried out by arms, before the delay for accept-
ance granted to the Ottoman Government had come
to an end, against all rules of international law and
diplomatic precedents, could solve the Eastern
question.

Of course it was alleged that the Greek offensive
in Anatolia had nothing to do with the treaty of
peace presented to Turkey, that it only constituted a
preventive measure in support of the treaty and it was
not directed against the Stambul Government, but
against Mustafa KemaPs troops, which had broken
the armistice by attacking the British troops on the
Ismid line. Yet this was but a poor reason, and how
was it possible to justify the Greek attack in Thrace,
which took place immediately after ? The fact was
that England and Greece, being afraid of losing their
prey, were in a hurry to take hold of it, and neither
Mr. Lloyd George nor M. Venizelos shrank from
shedding more blood to enforce a treaty which could
not bring about peace.

Now that the Allies had driven a Government which
no longer represented Turkey to accept the treaty,
and the latter had been signed, under English com-
pulsion, by some aged politicians, while the Greeks
and the British partitioned the Ottoman Empire
between themselves, was it possible to say that all the
difficulties were settled ? The signature of the treaty
could but weaken the tottering power of the Sultan.
Moreover, England, eager to derive the utmost benefit

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 259

from the weakness of Turkey, raised the question of
the Caliphate; it was learned from an English source
that the title of Caliph had been offered to the Emir
of Afghanistan, but the latter had declined the offer.
On the other hand, how could Mustafa Kemal be
expected to adhere to the decisions taken in Con-
stantinople ? It was to be feared, therefore, the
agitation would be protracted, for an Anatolian cam-
paign would offer far greater difficulties than those
the Greek army had had to overcome on the low
plains along the sea; and at Balikesri, standing at
an altitude of 400 feet, begin the first slopes of the
Anatolian uplands. As a matter of fact, Turkey was
not dead, as Mr. Lloyd George believed, but the policy
of the British Premier was doomed to failure — the
same policy which the Soviets were trifling with,
which was paving the way to the secession of Ireland,
and may one day cost Great Britain the loss of India
and Egypt.

It has even been said the Bolshevists themselves
advised Turkey to sign the treaty in order to gain
time, and thus organise a campaign in which the
Bolshevist forces and the Nationalist forces in Turkey
and Asia Minor would fight side by side.

The Ottoman delegation, consisting of General Hadi
Pasha, Kiza Tewfik Bey, a senator, and the Turkish
ambassador at Berne, Reshad Halis Bey, arrived in
Paris on Friday, July 30. The signature of the
treaty, which was first to take place on July 27 and
had been put off till the next Thursday or Saturday
because the delegates could not arrive in time, was
at the last moment postponed indefinitely.

Some difficulties had arisen between Italy and

200 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Greece concerning the " Twelve Islands," or Dode-
canese, and this Italo-Greek incident prevented the
signature of the treaty. For it was stipulated in
Article 122 of the treaty:

" Turkey cedes to Italy all her rights and titles to the
islands of the Mge&n Sea — viz., Stampalia, Rhodes, Calki,
Scarpanto, Casos, Piscopis, Nisyros, Calimnos, Leros, Patmos,
Lipsos, Symi, and Cos, now occupied by Italy, and the isletfi
pertaining thereunto, together with the Island of Castel-
lorizzo."

The thirteen islands mentioned here constitute
what is called the Dodecanese, and Italy had taken
possession of them in 1912, during the war with
the Ottoman Empire. But in July, 1919, an agree-
ment, which has already been mentioned, had been
concluded between the Italian Government, repre-
sented by M. Tittoni, and the Greek Government,
represented by M. Venizelos, according to which
Italy ceded to Greece the Dodecanese, except
Rhodes, which was to share the fate of Cyprus, and
pledged herself not to object to Greece setting foot
in Southern Albania. Of course, Italy in return was
to have advantages in Asia Minor and the Adriatic Sea.

At the meeting of the Supreme Council held in
London before the San Remo Conference to draw up
the Turkish treaty, M. Venizelos had stated that
Greece could not accept Article 122, if the Italo-
Greek agreement did not compel Italy to cede the
Dodecanese to Greece. M. Scialoja, the Italian
delegate, had answered that on the day of the signa-
ture of the Turkish treaty an agreement would be
signed between Italy and Greece, through which
Italy transferred to Greece the sovereignty of the
aforesaid islands.

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 261

Now Italy, in 1920, considered that the agreement
which was binding on both parties had become
null and void, as she had not obtained any of the
compensations stipulated in it, and so she thought
she had a right now not to cede the islands — Castel-
lorizzo, though inhabited by 12,000 Greeks, not being
included in the agreement. As to Rhodes, that was
to share the fate of Cyprus: England did not seem
willing now to cede it to Greece; so that was out of
the question for the moment. Moreover, the Italian
Government insisted upon keeping the Island of
Halki, or Karki, lying near Rhodes. Lastly, as Italy,
after the solemn proclamation of the autonomy and
independence of Albania, had been obliged to evacuate
nearly the whole of Albania, the cession to Greece of
part of Southern Albania could not be tolerated by
Italian public opinion and had now become an utter
impossibility.

Under such circumstances the Greek Government
had stated it was no longer willing to sign the Turkish
treaty, which, if the previous agreement alone is
taken into account, assigns the Dodecanese to Italy.
This incident at the last moment prevented the
signature of the treaty which had been so laboriously
drawn up, and put the Powers in an awkward situa-
tion since the regions occupied by the Greek armies in
Asia Minor were five times as large as the Smyrna
area assigned to Greece, and obviously could not be
evacuated by the Greeks before a state of peace was
restored between them and Turkey.

The signature of the treaty, which had been put off
at first, as has just been mentioned, till the end of
July, was, after various delays, arranged for Thursday,

262 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

August 5, then postponed till the next Saturday, and
finally took place only three days later.

Meanwhile, the Armenian delegation raised an-
other objection, and informed the Allies that as their
president, Nubar Pasha, had been admitted by the
Allied Governments to the signature of the Peace
Treaty, as representing the Armenians of Turkey and
the Armenian colonies, they thought it unfair not to
let him sign the Turkish treaty too, merely because
he represented the Turkish Armenians. The Allies
advised the Armenians for their own sake not to
insist, in order to avoid an official protest of Turkey
against the treaty after its signature, under the
pretext that it had not been signed regularly.

In the House of Lords the treaty was sharply
criticised by Lord Wemyss, especially in regard to
the condition of Smyrna and the cession of Eastern
Thrace to Greece.

In the speech he delivered on Friday, August 6,
at Montecitorio, Count Sforza, coming to the question
of the Dodecanese, summed up the Tittoni-Venizelos
agreement of July 29, 1919, as follows:

" Italy pledged herself to support at the Conference the
Greek claims on Eastern and Western Thrace; she even
pledged herself to support the Greek demand of annexing
Southern Albania. Greece, in return for this, pledged herself
to give Italy a free zone in the port of Santi Quaranta, and to
give Italian industry a right of preference for the eventual
building of a railway line beginning at this port.

" Greece pledged herself to support at the Conference the
Italian mandate over Albania, to recognise Italian sovereignty
over Valona, and confirm the neutralisation of the Corfu
Canal already prescribed by the London Conference in 1913-14,
when Greece had promised not to build any military works
on the coast between Cape Stilo and Aspriruga,

" Greece pledged herself, in case she should have satisfac-
tion in Thrace and Southern Albania, to give up, in favour

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 263

of Italy, all her territorial claims in Asia Minor which hindered
Italian interests.

" The Italian and Greek Governments promised to support
each other at the Conference concerning their claims in Asia
Minor.

" Italy had already pledged herself to cede to Greece the
sovereignty of the isles of the JSgean Sea, except Rhodes, to
which the Italian Government promised to grant a liberal
administrative autonomy.

" Italy also pledged herself to respect the religious liberty
of the Greeks who were going to be more under her rule in Asia
Minor, and Greece took a similar engagement with respect to
the Italians.

" Article 7 dealt with what would happen if the two coun-
tries wished to resume their full liberty of action.

" Italy pledged herself to insert a clause in the treaty, in
which she promised to let the people of Rhodes freely decide
their own fate, on condition that the plebiscite should not
be taken before five years after the signature of the Peace
Treaty."

Count Sforza proceeded to say that on July 22,
after coming back from Spa, he had addressed M. Veni-
zelos a note to let him know that the Allies' decisions
concerning Asia Minor and the aspirations of the
Albanian people compelled the Italian Government
to alter their policy in order to safeguard the Italian
interests in those regions:

" Under the circumstances, the situation based on the
agreement of July 29, 1919, as to the line of conduct to be
followed at the Conference was substantially modified.

" Therefore Italy, in conformity with Article 7 of the agree-
ment, now resumes her full liberty of action. Yet the Italian
Government, urged by a conciliatory spirit, intends to
consider the situation afresh, as it earnestly wishes to arrive
at a satisfactory and complete understanding.

" The desire to maintain friendly relations with Greece is
most deeply felt in Italy. Greece is a vital force to the East.
When I tried to get better conditions of peace for Turkey, I
felt convinced I was safeguarding the independence and the
territorial integrity which the Turkish people is entitled to,
and at the same time I was serving the true interests of
Hellenism."

264 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

In an interview published by the Stampa, M.
Tittoni on his side declared, concerning the Dode-
canese and the arrangement he had negotiated with
M. Venizelos, that, as circumstances had changed,
the clauses of the agreement had become null and
void.

Alluding to the note handed by him on coming
to Paris to M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George and
recently read to the Senate by M. Scialoja, he com-
plained that the Allies supported the Greek claims in
Asia Minor, and overlooked the Italian interests in
the same region. As Greece had got all she wanted
and Italy's hopes in Asia Minor had been frustrated,
the agreement with M. Venizelos was no longer valid,
according to him, and he concluded thus : " The agree-
ment became null and void on the day when at San
Remo the draft of the Turkish treaty was definitely
drawn up." Finally, on August 9 Greece and Italy
came to an agreement, and a protocol was signed.
The Dodecanese, according to the Tittoni-Venizelos
agreement, were given up to Greece, with the ex-
ception of Rhodes, which, for the present, remained
in the hands of Italy. In case England should
cede Cyprus to Greece, a plebiscite was to be
taken at Rhodes within fifteen years, instead of five
years as had been settled before. There was no
reason why Italy should give up Rhodes if England,
whjph had ruled over Cyprus since 1878, did not hand
it over to Greece. The League of Nations was to
decide in what manner this plebiscite was to be taken ;
meanwhile Italy would grant Rhodes a wide auto-
nomy. According to the account given of the Italo-
Greek agreement, it includes some stipulations

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 265

concerning Smyrna, and at the request of the Italian
Government the Italian schools, museums, and sub-
jects enjoy a special treatment. Italy keeps her
privilege for the archaeological excavations at Kos.

Not a word was said of Albania, though there had
been some clauses about it in the 1919 agreement.
Italy and Greece were to make separate arrangements
with the Albanians.

Yugo-Slavia in its turn protested in regard to the
share of the Turkish debt that was assigned to her and
complained that the charges inherent in the Turkish
territories she had received in 1913 were too heavy.

King Hussein too was dissatisfied with the Syrian
events and the attitude of France. So he refused
to adhere to the treaty, though it indirectly acknow-
ledged the independence of his States and his own
sovereignty. He thus showed he really aimed at
setting up a huge Arabian Kingdom where his sons
would have only been his lieutenants in Syria and
Mesopotamia. Besides, King Hussein earnestly
begged that the Kingdom of Mesopotamia, which had
hitherto been promised to his son Abdullah, should
be given to the Emir Feisal as a compensation for
Syria, and a hint was given that England would not
object to this.

Then the Turkish delegates, seeing the Allies
at variance, raised objections to the treaty, and on
the morning of August 10 Hadi Pasha informed the
Conference he could not sign the treaty if the Allies
could not agree together. However, at the earnest
request of a high official of the Foreign Office and after
he had been repeatedly urged to do so, he consented
to sign the treaty in the afternoon at Sevres.

266 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Together with the Turkish treaty seven treaties or
agreements were also signed — namely:

" A treaty in regard to Thrace? sanctioning the cession to
Greece of some territories given up by Bulgaria in accordance
with the Versailles treaty, and giving Bulgaria a free outlet
to the sea at the port of Dedeagatch.

" A tripartite convention between England, France, and
Italy, settling the zones of economic influence of France and
Italy in the Ottoman territory of Asia Minor.

" A Greco-Italian convention assigning the ' Twelve
Islands ' to Greece — a plebiscite was to be taken in regard
to the sovereignty over Rhodes.

" A treaty between Armenia and the Great Powers, settling
the question of the minorities in the future Armenian State.

" A treaty in regard to the Greek minorities, ensuring them
protection in the territories that had newly been occupied
by Greece.

" A treaty concerning the New States, settling administra-
tive questions between Italy and the States which occupied
territories formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary.

"A treaty fixing various frontiers in Central Europe at
some places where they had not yet been definitely laid down."

According to the terms of the agreement concerning
the protection of minorities, Greece pledged herself
to grant to Greek subjects belonging to minorities in
language, race, or religion the same civil and political
rights, the same consideration and protection as to
the other Greek subjects, on the strength of which
France and Great Britain gave up their rights of
control over Greece, established by the London treaty
of 1832, their right of control over the Ionian Islands
established by the London treaty of 1864, and their
right of protection of religious freedom conferred by
the London Conference of 1830.

Greece pledged herself also to present for the
approval of the League of Nations within a year a
scheme of organisation of Adrianople, including a
municipal council in which the various races should

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 267

be represented. All the clauses of the treaty for the
protection of minorities were under the guarantee of
the League of Nations. Greece also pledged herself
to give the Allies the benefit of the " most favoured
nation" clause till a general commercial agreement
had been concluded, within five years, under the
patronage of the League of Nations.

All these delays and incidents bore witness to
the difficulty of arriving at a solution of the Eastern
question in the way the Allies had set to work, and to
the frailty of the stipulations inserted in the treaty.

They also testified to the lack of skill and political
acutehess of Mr. Lloyd George. Of course, the British
Premier, owing to the large concessions he had made
to Greece, had managed to ensure the preponderance
of British influence in Constantinople and the zone of
the Straits, and by seeking to set up a large Arabian
Empire he had secured to his country the chief trunk
of the Baghdad Railway.

But the laborious negotiations which had painfully
arrived at the settlement proposed by the Conference
did not seem likely to solve the Eastern question
definitely. It still remained a burning question, and
the treaty signed by the Ottoman delegates was still
most precarious. Accordingly Count Sforza, in the
Chamber of Deputies in Rome, made the following
statement with regard to Anatolia :

" Everybody asserts the war has created a new world; but
practically everybody thinks and feels as if nothing had
occurred. The Moslem East wants to live and develop. It,
too, wants to have an influence of its own in to-morrow's
world. To the Anatolian Turks it hag been our wish to
offer a hearty and earnest collaboration on economic and
moral grounds by respecting the independence and sovereignty
of Turkey."

268 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

The signatures of plenipotentiaries sent by a
Government which remained in office merely because
its, head, Damad Ferid, was a tool in the hands of
England, were no guarantee for the future, and the
failure of the revolutionary movement indefinitely
postponed the settlement of the Eastern question
which for half a century has been disturbing European
policy.

Islam remains, notwithstanding, a spiritual force
that will survive all measures taken against the
Sublime Porte, and the dismemberment of the Otto-
man Empire does not solve any of the numerous
questions raised by the intercourse of the various
races that were formerly under the Sultan's rule.
Russia has not given up her ambitious designs on the
Straits, and one day or another she will try to carry
them out; and it is to be feared that German influence
may benefit by the resentment of the Turkish people.
These are some of the numerous sources of future
conflicts.

On the day that followed the signature of the treaty
all the Turkish newspapers in Constantinople were
in mourning and announced it as a day of mourning
for the Turkish nation.

At Stambul all public entertainments were pro-
hibited, all shops and public buildings were closed.
Many Turks went to the mosques to pray for the wel-
fare of the country, the people who seek nothing but
peace and quietude looked weary and downcast.

A few organs of the Turkish Press violently attacked
the delegates who had signed "the death-warrant of
Turkey and laid the foundations of a necessary policy
of revenge."

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY

269

270

THE TURKS AND EUROPE

5

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY 271

Others hoped the Great Powers would take into
account the goodwill of Turkey, and would gradually
give up some of their intolerable demands.

Others, finally, bewailing the direful downfall of
the Turkish Empire and insisting upon the lesson
taught by this historical event for the future, hoped
that the future would forcibly bring on a revision of
that " iniquitous and impracticable " treaty of peace.

In France, M. Pierre Loti devoted one of his last
articles to the treaty, which he called " the silliest
of all the silly blunders of our Eastern policy."1

The map on p. 269 shows the area left to the Turks
in Europe and in Asia Minor by the Treaty of Sevres.
There will be seen the territories of Mesopotamia
under English mandate, those of Syria under French
mandate, and those which have been added to
Palestine and are practically under English control.
There will also be seen the regions on which France
and Italy, hi virtue of the tripartite agreement
signed on August 10, 1920, enjoy preferential claims
to supply the staff required for the assistance of the
Porte in organising the local administration and the
police. The contracting Powers in that agreement
have undertaken not to apply, nor to make or
support applications, on behalf of their nationals, for
industrial concessions in areas allotted to another
Power.

The map on p. 270 is a scheme of the territories lost
by Turkey from 1699 down to the Sevres Treaty; it
shows that, by completing the dismemberment of
Turkey, the treaty aimed at her annihilation.

The (Euvrt, August 20, 1920.

VII

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE

THE condition of affairs in the East now seemed all
the more alarming and critical as the Allies, after
dismembering Turkey, did not seem to have given up
their plan of evicting the Turks. This policy, which
had taken Armenia from Turkey, but had not suc-
ceeded in ensuring her a definite status, could only
hurry on the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Arabian move-
ments, drive them to assert their opposition more
plainly, and thus bring them closer together by
reinforcing Pan-Islamism.

Of course it had been said at the beginning of
January, 1920, that the Turks were downhearted,
that Mustafa Kemal was short of money, that he had
to encounter the opposition of the other parties,
and that his movement seemed doomed to failure.
It was also asserted that his army was only made up
of bands which began to plunder the country, and that
anarchy now prevailed throughout Turkey-in-Asia.
Yet the Nationalist generals soon managed to inter-
cept the food-supply of Constantinople, and when the
conditions of the Peace Treaty were made known
the situation, as has just been seen, underwent a
complete change. They held in check the English
till the latter had called the Greeks to their help,
and though at a certain stage it would have been

272

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 273

possible to negotiate and come to terms with Mustafa
Kemal, now, on the contrary, it was impossible to do
so, owing to the amplitude and strength gained by the
Nationalist movement.

It was soon known that many a parley had been
entered into between Turkish and Arabian elements,
that some Turkish officers had gone over to the
Arabian Nationalists of Syria and had taken command
of their troops, and though a political agreement or
a closer connection between the two elements did not
ensue, yet the Turks and the Arabs, dreading foreign
occupation, organised themselves and were ready to
help each other to defend their independence.

We should bear in mind what Enver Pasha, who
was playing a questionable part in the East, and
Fethy Bey had once done in Tripoli. Turkish officers
might very well, if an opportunity occurred, impart to
these bands the discipline and cohesion they lacked
and instil into them a warlike spirit; or these
bands might side with the Bolshevists who had
invaded the Transcaspian isthmus; they would have
been able to hinder the operations that the Allies had
once seemed inclined to launch into, but had wisely
given up, and they could always raise new difficulties
for the Allies.

Lastly, the idea, once contemplated and perhaps not
definitely given up, to send back to Asia the Sultans
and viziers who, after their centuries-old intercourse
with the West, had become " Europeanised " and
to whom the ways and manners of our diplomacy
had grown familiar, could only modify their foreign
policy to our disadvantage, and give it an Asiatic
turn; whereas now, having long associated Ottoman

18

274 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

affairs with European affairs, they have thus been
brought to consider their own interests from a
European point of view. The influence of this inter-
course with Europe on the Constantinople Government
naturally induced it to exercise a soothing influence
over the Mussulmans, which was to the advantage
of both Europe and Turkey. It is obvious that,
on the contrary, the eviction of the Sultan, at a time
when the Arabian world and the Turkish world were
being roused, would have left the Allied Powers face
to face with anarchist elements which, being spurred
on by similar religious and nationalist passions,
would have grouped together; and one day the
Powers would have found themselves confronted
with the organised resistance of established govern-
ments. Even as things are now, who can foresee
what will be all the consequences in the East of the
clauses enforced on Turkey by the Sevres Treaty ?

1. THE TURCO-ARMENIAN QUESTION.

The Armenian question, which has convulsed
Turkey so deeply and made the Eastern question so
intricate, originated in the grasping spirit of Russia
in Asia Minor and the meddling of Russia in
Turkish affairs under pretence of protecting the
Armenians. This question, as proved by the difficul-
ties to which it has given rise since the beginning,
is one of the aspects of the antagonism between
Slavs and Turks, and a phase of the everlasting
struggle of the Turks to hinder the Slavs from reach-
ing the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, to which the
Russians have always striven to get access either

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 275

through Asia Minor or through Thrace, or through
both countries at once.

Yet Mohammed II, after taking Constantinople,
had in 1461 instituted a patriarchate in favour of
the Armenians. Later on various rights were granted
to them at different times by Imperial firmans.

Some Armenian monks of Calcutta, availing
themselves of the liberty they enjoyed in India,
founded at the beginning of the eighteenth century
the Aztarar (the Newsmonger), the first newspaper
published in the Armenian language ; and at the end
of the same century the Mekhitharists published in
Venice Yeghanak Puzantian (the Byzantine Season).
About the middle of the nineteenth century, the same
monks edited a review of literature and information,
Pazmareb, which still exists. The Protestant Armen-
ians too edited a review of propaganda, Chtemaran
bidani Kidehatz, at Constantinople. Finally, in 1840,
the first daily paper printed in the Armenian language,
Archalouis Araradiari (the Dawn of Ararat), was
published at Smyrna.

In 1857, in the monastery of Varag, near Van,
Miguirditch Krimian, who later on became Patriarch
and Catholicos, established printing-works. Under
the title of Ardziv Vaspourakani (the Eagle of Vas-
pourakan) he edited a monthly review to defend the
cause of Armenian independence, and at the same
time a similar review, Ardziv Tarono (the Eaglet of
Taron), was published at Mush. About the same
time the Armenians in Russia too began to publish
various periodicals, such as Hussissapail (the Aurora
Borealis), a review printed at Moscow in 1850, and
several newspapers at Tiflis and Baku. In 1860

276 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

the Armenians were allowed to hold an Armenian
National Assembly to discuss and settle their
religious and national affairs.

From the fourteenth century till about I860, the
Armenian element lived on good terms with the
Moslem element, and some Armenians persecuted in
Russia even sought refuge in Turkey. The Turks, on
their coming, had found Armenians, but no Armenia,
for the latter country, in the course of a most confused
history, had enjoyed but short periods of independence
with ever-changing frontiers; and the Armenians
who had successively been under Roman, Seljuk,
Persian, and Arabian dominion lived quietly with
the Turks for six centuries.

But in 1870 a group of young men revived and
modified a movement which had been started and
kept up by Armenian monks, and wrote books in
Constantinople in favour of the Armenians.

In 1875, Portokalian established the first revolu-
tionary Armenian Committee, and edited a newspaper,
Asia. Soon afterwards the Araratian committee was
formed, aiming at establishing a close connection
between Turkish and Russian Armenians, followed by
other committees such as Tebrotesassiranz, Arevdian,
and Kilikia.

Other committees with charitable or economic
purposes, such as " The Association of Kind-
ness " and " The Association of Benevolence," which
were started in 1860 with a large capital to develop
the natural resources of Cilicia, also played a part in
the Armenian movement.

The Armenian question began really to arise and
soon grew more and more acute in 1878, after the

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIEE 277

Turco-Russian war, at a time when Turkey had to face
serious domestic and foreign difficulties. This question
was dealt with in Article 16 of the San Stefano treaty
of July 10, 1878, and Article 61 of the Berlin treaty.
Article 16 of the San Stefano treaty, drawn up
at the Armenians' request, and supported by the
Russian plenipotentiaries, stated that " the Sublime
Porte pledges itself to realise without any more delay
the administrative autonomy rendered necessary by
local needs in the provinces inhabited by Armen-
ians." The Turks raised an objection to the words
" administrative autonomy " and wanted them to be
replaced by " reforms and improvements," but the
Russians then demanded the occupation of Armenia
by the Tsar's troops as a guarantee. The Berlin
Congress did away with this clause of guarantee, and
instead of the words proposed by Russia adopted
those asked for by Turkey.

In order to acquire a moral influence over the
Armenians living in Turkey and play a prominent
part among them, the Orthodox Christians who were
devoted to the Tsar endeavoured to get themselves
recognised as a superior power by the patriarchate of
Constantinople, and with the help of Russian political
agents they succeeded in their endeavours. It was
soon observed that the new connection between the
Catholicos and the Constantinople Patriarchate
aimed at, and succeeded in, starting an anti-Turkish
movement within the Armenian populations of Russia
and Asia Minor.

When the Russians arrived close to Constantinople,
at the end of the Turco-Russian war, Nerses Varza-
bedian, who had succeeded Krimian, was received

278 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

by the Grand Duke Nicholas, and handed Him a
memorandum, in which, after stating all the Armenian
grievances against the Ottoman Government, he
asked " that the Eastern provinces of Asia Minor
inhabited by Armenians should be proclaimed inde-
pendent or at least should pass under the control of
Russia." Four prelates were sent separately to
Rome, Venice, Paris, and London to make sure of the
Powers' support, and met together at the Berlin Con-
gress. Though they strongly advocated the main-
tenance of Article 16 of the San Stefano treaty, they
only succeeded in getting Article 61 of the Berlin
treaty.

It was not until about 1885 that what was after-
wards called the Armenian movement began to be
spoken of, and then some Armenian revolutionaries
who had sought shelter in England, France, Austria,
and America began to edit periodicals, form com-
mittees, inveigh against the would-be Turkish exac-
tions, and denounce the violation of the Berlin treaty.

These ideas of independence soon made more and
more headway and the prelates who, after Nerses'
death, were known for their pro-Turkish feelings, as
Haroutian Vehabedian, Bishop of Erzerum, made
Patriarch in 1885, were forsaken by the Armenian
clergy and soon found themselves in opposition to
the committees.

In 1888 Khorene Achikian, who succeeded Vehabe-
dian, was also accused of being on friendly terms with
the Turks, and the committees strove to have him
replaced by Narbey, who had been a member of the
delegation sent to Europe for the Berlin Congress.

This Armenian movement naturally caused some

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 279

incidents between the various elements of the popula-
tion, which were magnified, brought by the bishops
and consuls to the knowledge of the European Powers,
and cited as the outcome of Turkish cruelty.

After the Turco-Russian war, the revolutionary
agitation which stirred up Russia and the Caucasus
had its repercussion among the Armenians, and the
harsh measures of the Tsar's Government only streng-
thened the agitation by increasing Armenian dis-
content.

Miguirditch Portokalian, a teacher living at Van,
came to Marseilles, where in 1885 he edited a news-
paper, Armenia. At the same time Minas Tscheraz
started another newspaper in Paris under the same
title. These publicists, both in their journals and in
meetings, demanded that Article 61 of the Berlin
treaty should be carried out.

In 1880 some revolutionary committees were
formed in Turkey. In 1882 " The Association of the
Armed Men" was founded at Erzerum; some of its
members were arrested, and the association itself
was dissolved in 1883.

A rising took place at Van in 1885 on the occasion
of the election of a bishop, and some insurrectionist
movements occurred at Constantinople, Mush, and
Alashehr under various pretexts.

Next year, in 1886, one Nazarbey, a Caucasian by
birth, and his wife Maro, formed in Switzerland the
Huitfchag (the Bell), a social-democrat committee
that aimed at getting an autonomous administration
for the Armenians, and published in London a monthly
periodical bearing the same name. This committee
meant to achieve its object not through the interven-

280 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

tion or mediation of the European Powers — to which
it thought it useless to make another appeal, as their
individual interests were so much at variance — but
solely by the action of its organisations through-
out the country, which were to raise funds, equip-
ment, foment troubles, weaken the Government, and
take advantage of any opportunity that might occur.

The Huntchag committee found representatives in
every great town — Smyrna, Aleppo, Constantinople,
etc. — and its organisation was completed in 1889.

In 1890, at the instigation of the Huntchagists,
a rebellion broke out at Erzerum, and incidents
occurred in various places. At Constantinople a
demonstration of armed men, headed by the Patriarch
Achikian, repaired to the Sublime Porte to set forth
their grievances, but were scattered ; and the Patriarch,
who was reproached with being too moderate, and
whose life was even attempted, had to resign.

In fact the Huntchag committee, which enlisted
the effective and moral support of the representa-
tives of the Powers, especially those of Russia and
England, carried on its intrigues without intermission,
and increased its activity.

On Sunday, March 25, 1894, at Samsun, in the
ground adjoining the church, one Agap, living at
Diarbekir, who had been chosen by the Huntchag
committee to kill the Patriarch Achikian because he
was accused of being on friendly terms with the
Ottoman Government, fired at the prelate with a
revolver, but missed his mark. After this criminal
attempt, Achikian resigned his office, and Mathew
Ismirlian, supported by the committees, was elected
Patriarch, owing to the pressure brought to bear on

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 281

the National Assembly. The new Patriarch imme-
diately became chairman of the Huntchag committee,
which he developed, and soon after appointed
President of the Ecclesiastical Council of the Patriar-
chate and later on Catholicos of Cilicia a certain
priest, Kirkor Ala j an, who had been dismissed and
sent to Constantinople for insulting the Governor of
Mush.

A few Armenians, dissatisfied with the programme
of the Huntchagists, founded a new association in
1890 under the name of Troshak, which later on
was called Tashnaktsutioun, and edited the Troshak
newspaper. The members of this committee often
resorted to threats and terror to get the funds they
needed, and did not shrink from assassinating whoever
refused to comply with the injunctions of the com-
mittee.

In 1896 the committees attempted to seize the
Ottoman Bank. Some armed komitadjis, who had
come from Europe with Kussian passports, rushed
into the Ottoman Bank, but were driven back by
Government troops. But the promoters of the raid
were not arrested, owing to their being protected by
the Russian and French authorities. Attended by
Maximof , an Armenian by birth, first dragoman of the
Kussian embassy, and Rouet, first dragoman of the
French embassy, they were brought by the dispatch-
boat of the latter embassy on board the Gironde,
a packet-ship of the Messageries Maritimes. The
adherents of the Troshak, entrenched in the churches
of Galata, Samatra, and the Patriarchate, begged
for mercy, while Armene Aktoni, one of the leaders
of the committee, committed suicide after waiting

THE TURKS AND EUROPE

for the coming of the English fleet on the heights of
Soulou-Monastir, at Samatra.

The bishops continued to solicit, and to some extent
obtained, the support of the Russian, English, and
French consuls; yet Mgr. Ismirlian, who had sent an
ultimatum to the Imperial Palace and never ceased
to intrigue, was finally dismissed in 1896 and sent
to Jerusalem.

At that time many Armenians set off to Europe and
America, and the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin sent some
delegates to the Hague Conference to lay before it
the Armenian plight in Turkey. These committees,
which displayed so much activity in Turkey, did not
attempt anything on behalf of their fellow-country-
men in Russia.

The committees which had been founded during
or before Nerses' patriarchate under the names of
Ararat, The Orient, The Friends of Education, Cilitia,
were all grouped, in 1890, into one called Miatzal
Anikeroutioun Hayotz, which association continued
to organise committees even in the smallest villages,
taking advantage of the tolerance of the Ottoman
Government and its benevolence to the Armenians
to carry on an active anti-Turkish propaganda.

This propaganda was supported by the Armenian
bishops in the eastern provinces, where they endea-
voured to bring about European intervention. On the
other hand the Russians, as eager as ever, to domineer
over both the Orthodox Church and Armenia, incited
the Armenians against the Turks by all possible
means and urged them to fulfil their national aspira-
tions, as they knew full well they would thus bring
them more easily under Russian sovereignty.

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 283

The influence of these committees, as will be seen
later on, had a very important bearing on the events
that took place in Asia Minor at that time.

Risings, which may be traced back to 1545 and
lasted till the proclamation of the 1908 constitution,
were continually taking place in the mountainous area
of Zeitun. They were partly brought about by the
feudal system of administration still prevailing in
that region. Each of the four districts of Zeitun was
governed by a chief who had assumed the title of
" ishehan " or prince, a kind of nobleman to whom
Turkish villages had to pay some taxes collected by
special agents. The action of the committees, of
course, benefited by that state of things, to which
the Ottoman Government put an end only in 1895.

The Armenians had already refused to pay the
taxes and had rebelled repeatedly between 1782
and 1851, at which time the Turks, incensed at the
looting and exactions of the Armenian mountaineers,
left their farms and emigrated. Till "that time the
rebellions of Zeitun could be partly accounted for
by the administration of the " ishehan." But the
leaders of the Armenian movement soon took advan-
tage of these continual disturbances and quickly gave
them another character. The movement was spurred
on and eagerly supported by Armenians living
abroad, and in 1865, after the so-called Turkish
exactions, the Nationalist committees openly rebelled
against the Government and demanded the inde-
pendence of Zeitun. Henceforth rebellion followed
rebellion, and one of them, fomented by the Hun-
tchagists, lasted three months.

In 1890 the Huntchag and Tashnaktsutioun com-

284 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

mittees stirred up riots at Erzerum, and in 1894 at
Samsun, where the Patriarch Ashikian was fired at,
as has just been seen. In 1905 the Tashnakists
started a new insurrection. The rebellion extended
to Amasia, Sivas, Tokat, Mush, and Van, and the
committees endeavoured to spread and intensify it.
In 1905-06 the manoeuvres of the Armenian com-
mittees succeeded in rousing hostile feelings between
Kurds and Armenians, which no reform whatever
seemed able to soothe. And in 1909-10, when new
troubles broke out, the revolutionary leaders openly
attacked the Government troops.

Two years after the confiscation and handing over
to the Ottoman Government of the Armenian churches
on June 21, 1903, massacres took place at Batum on
February 6, 1905, and later on at Erivan, Nakhi-
tchevan, Shusha, and Koshak. In 1908 the Tsar's sway
in the whole of Caucasus became most oppressive, and
a ukase prescribed the election of a new catholicos to
succeed Mgr. Krimian, who had died in October, 1907.
Mgr. Ismirlian was appointed in his stead in 1908.
By that time the Russian sway had become so oppres-
sive that the Tashnakists took refuge in Constan-
tinople, where the Young Turks openly declared in
favour of the Russian Armenians.

It might have been expected that after the pro-
clamation of the Constitution the committees, who
had striven to hurry on the downfall of the Empire
through an agitation that might have brought about
foreign intervention, would put an end to their
revolutionary schemes and turn their activity towards

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 285

social and economic questions. Sabah-Gulian, a
Caucasian by birth, president of the Huntchag, at a
meeting of this committee held in 1908 in Sourp-
Yerourtoutioun church at Pera, speaking of the
Huntchagists' programme and the constitutional
regime, declared: " We, Huntchagists, putting an
end to our revolutionary activity, must devote all
our energy to the welfare of the country." On the
other hand Agnoni, a Russian by birth, one of the
presidents of the Tashnaktsutioun, stated that
" the first duty of the Tashnakists would be to
co-operate with the Union and Progress Committee
in order to maintain the Ottoman Constitution and
ensure harmony and concord between the various
elements."

The union of the committees did not last long, as
they held widely different views about the new
condition of the Turkish Empire; but soon after
the Tashnaktsutioun, the Huntchag, and the Vera-
gaznial-Huntchag committees were reorganised and
new committees formed throughout Turkey. The
Ramgavar (the Rights of the People) committee
was instituted in Egypt by M. Boghos Nubar after
the proclamation of the Constitution, and displayed
the greatest activity. This committee, in March,
1914, agreed to work on the same lines with the
Huntchag, the Tashnaktsutioun, and the Veragaznial-
Huntchag. Another committee, the Sahmanatragan,
was also constituted. They made sure of the support
of the Patriarchate and the bishops to reassert
their influence and spread a network of ramifications
all over the country in order to triumph^' at the
elections. They carried on an active propaganda

286 THE TUBES AND EUROPE

to conciliate public opinion, by means of all kinds
of publications, school books, almanacs, postcards,
songs, and so on, all edited at Geneva or in Russia.

As early as 1905 the Armenian committees had
decided at a congress held in Paris to resort to all
means in order to make Cilicia an independent
country. Russia, on the other hand, strove hard to
spread orthodoxy in the districts round Adana,
Marash, and Alexandretta, in order to enlarge her
zone of influence on this side and thus get an outlet
to the Mediterranean. At the same time, the Bishop
of Adana, Mosheg, did his best to foment the rebellion
which was to break out soon after.

In this way the Armenian Christians contributed to
the extension of the Russian Empire. In 1904-05,
the Nestorians asked for Russian priests and ex-
pressed their intention to embrace the Orthodox
Faith. The Armenians of Bitlis, Diarbekir, and
Kharput in 1907 handed the Russian consul a
petition bearing over 200,000 signatures, in which
they asked to become Russian subjects.

The Huntchagist leader, Sabah-Gulian, even owned
in the Augah Hayassdan (Independent Armenia)
newspaper that the members of the committee had
taken advantage of the Turks' carelessness to open
shops, where rifles were being sold at half-price or
even given away.

The Armenian committees took advantage of the
new parliamentary elections to stir up a new agitation.
They increased their activity, and, contrary to their
engagements, corresponded with the members of the
opposition who had flediabroad.

During the Balkan war in 1913 the Tashnakist

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 287

committees issued manifestoes against the Ottoman
Government and the Union party. The Eussian
consuls at Erzerum and Bitlis did not conceal their
sympathy, and at Van the Russian consul threatened
to the vali to ask Russian troops to come through
Azerbaijan under the pretext of averting the fictitious
dangers the Armenians were supposed to run, and of
restoring order.

Now, whereas Russia at home unmercifully stifled
all the attempts of the Armenian committees, she
encouraged and energetically supported the agitators
in Turkey. Moreover, in the report addressed by the
Russian consul at Bitlis to the Russian ambassador
in Constantinople, dated December 24, 1912, and
bearing number 63, the Russian Government was
informed that the aim of the Tashnakists was, as
they expressly said, " to bring the Russians here,"
and that, in order " to reach this end, the Tashnakists
are resorting to various means, and doing their best
to bring about collisions between Armenians and
Moslems, especially with Ottoman troops." In sup-
port of this statement he mentioned a few facts that
leave no doubt about its veracity.

This report contained the following lines, which
throw considerable light on the Allies' policy :

" Your Excellency will understand that the future collisions
between Armenians and Moslems will partly depend on the
line of conduct and activity of the Tashnaktsutioun com-
mittee, on the turn taken by the peace negotiations between
Turkey and the Slavonic States of the Balkans, and on the
eventuality of an occupation of Constantinople by the Allies.
If the deliberations of the London Conference did not bring
about peace, the coming downfall of the Ottoman capital
would certainly influence the relations between Moslems and
Armenians at Bitlis.

288 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

" Both in towns and in the country the Armenians, to-
gether with their religious leaders, have always displayed
much inclination and affection for Russia, and have repeat-
edly declared the Turkish Government is unable to main-
tain order, justice, and prosperity in their country. Many
Armenians have already promised to offer the Russian soldiers
their churches to be converted into orthodox places of
worship.

" The present condition of the Balkans, the victory of
the Slav and Hellenic Governments over Turkey, have
delighted the Armenians and filled their hearts with the
cheerful hope of being freed from Turkey."

Of course, the coming to Bitlis of a mixed Com-
mission of Armenians and Turks under the presidency
of an Englishman, in order to carry out reforms in
the Turkish provinces near the Caucasus, did not
please the Armenians and Russians who had sacrificed
many soldiers to get possession of these regions.

Taking advantage of the difficulties experienced
by the Ottoman Government after the Balkan war,
the committees agreed together to raise anew the
question of " reforms in the Eastern provinces."
A special commission, presided over by M. Boghos
Nubar, was sent by the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin to
the European Governments to uphold the Armenian
claims. At the same time a campaign was started
by the Armenian newspapers of Europe, Constan-
tinople, and America, especially by the Agadamard,
the organ of the Tashnaktsutioun committee, which
had no scruple in slandering the Turks and announc-
ing sham outrages.

In 1913 Russia proposed a scheme of reforms
to be instituted in Armenia. It was communicated
by M. de Giers to the Six Ambassadors' Conference,
which appointed a commission to report on it. As
the German and Austrian representatives raised

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 289

objections to the Russian scheme before that Com-
mission of Armenian Reforms, which met from
June 20 to July 3, 1913, at the Austrian embassy at
Yeni Keui, Russia, after this defeat, strove to bring
over Germany to her views.

In September, 1913, M. de Giers and M. de Wangen-
heim came to terms on a programme to which the
Porte opposed a counter-proposal. Yet the Russian
representatives succeeded in concluding a Russo-
Turkish agreement, January 26 to February 8,
1914.

When the scheme of reforms was outlined, and the
powers and jurisdiction of the inspectors and their
staff were settled, the Catholicos sent a telegram of
congratulation to M. Borghos Nubar and the latter
sent another to M. Sazonov, for the Armenian com-
mittees considered the arrangement as a first step
towards autonomy. Encouraged by this first success,
the committees exerted^ themselves more and more.
The Tashnaktsutioun transferred its seat to Erzerum,
where it held a congress. The Huntchag committee
sent to Russia and Caucasus several of its most
influential members to raise funds in order to foment
a rising to attack the Union and Progress party
especially, and to overthrow the Government. Such
was the state of things when war broke out.

The Patriarch, who passed himself off as repre-
senting the Armenian people, gathered together
under his presidency the leaders of the Tashnaktsu-
tioun, the Huntchag, the Ramgavar, and the Veragaz-
nial-Huntchag, and the members of the National
Assembly who were affiliated to these committees to
decide what attitude they were to take in case the

19

290 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Ottoman Government should enter into the war.
No decision was taken, the Huntchagists declining to
commit themselves and the Tashnakists stating they
preferred waiting to see how things would turn out.
Yet these committees carried on their activities
separately, and sent instructions to the provinces
that, if the Russians advanced, all means should be
resorted to in order to impede the retreat of the
Ottoman troops and hold up their supplies, and
if, on the contrary, the Ottoman army advanced, the
Armenian soldiers should leave their regiments, form
themselves into groups, and go over to the Russians.

The committees availed themselves of the difficulties
of the Ottoman Government, which had recently
come out of a disastrous war and had just entered
into a new conflict, to bring about risings at Zeitun,
in the sandjaks of Marash and Cesarea, and chiefly
in the vilayet of Van, at Bitlis, Talori, and Mush in
the vilayet of Bitlis, and in the vilayet of Erzerum.

In the sandjaks of Erzerum and Bayazid, as
soon as the decree of mobilisation was issued, most
of the Armenian soldiers went over to the Russians,
were equipped and armed anew by them, and then
sent against the Turks. The same thing occurred at
Erzindjan, where three-fourths of the Armenians
crossed the Russian frontier.

The Armenians of the vilayet of Mamouret' ul Azig
(Kharput), where the Mussulmans were also attacked
and where depots of arms had been concealed, pro-
vided with numerous recruits the regiments dispatched
by Russia to Van and the Persian frontier. Many
emissaries had been sent from Russia and Constan-
tinople to Dersim and its area to raise the Kurds

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 291

against the Ottoman Government. So it was in the
vilayet of Diarbekir, though the Armenians were in
a minority. Depots of arms of all descriptions were
discovered there, together with many refractory
soldiers.

In the Karahissar area, where several revolutionary
movements had broken out during and after the
Balkan war, the Armenians refused to obey the decree
of mobilisation and were only waiting for the coming
of the Russians to rebel.

Similar incidents — such as mutinous soldiers,
attacks against the Turks, threats to families of
mobilised Ottomans — occurred in the vilayet of
Angora.

In the vilayet of Van, when the Russians, reinforced
by Armenian volunteers, started an offensive, some
Armenian peasants gathered together and prepared
to attack the Ottoman officials and the gendarmerie.
At the beginning of 1915 rebellions took place at
Kevash, Shatak, Havassour, and Timar, and spread
in the kazas of Arjitch and Adeljivaz. At Van
over five thousand rebels, seven hundred of whom
attacked the fortress, blew up the military and
Government buildings, the Ottoman Bank, the offices
of the Public Debt, the excise office, the post and
telegraph offices, and set fire to the Moslem quarter.
When this insurrection subsided about the end of
April, numerous Armenian bands, led by Russian
officers, attempted to cross the Russian and Persian
frontiers.

After the capture of Van, the Armenians gave a great
dinner in honour of General Nicolaiev, commander-
in-chief of the Russian army in Caucasus, who

292 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

made a speech in which he said: " Since 1826, the
Russians have always striven to free Armenia, but
political circumstances have always prevented their
success. Now, as the grouping of nations has been
quite altered, we may hope Armenians will soon be
free." Aram Manoukian, known as Aram Pasha,
soon after appointed provisional Governor of Van
by General Nicolaiev, replied: "When we rose a
month ago, we expected the Russians would come.
At a certain moment, our situation was dreadful.
We had to choose between surrender and death.
We chose death, but when we no longer expected
your help, it has suddenly arrived."1

The Armenian bands^even compelled the Ottoman
Government to call back troops from the front to
suppress their revolutionary manoeuvres in the
vilayet of Brusa and the neighbourhood. At Adana,
as in the other provinces, all sorts of insurrectionary
movements were smouldering.

Under such circumstances, the Turkish Government
tried to crush these revolutionary efforts by military
expeditions, and the repression was merciless. A
decree of the Government about changes of residence
of the Armenian populations included measures for
the deportation of Armenians. As the Turks are
generally so listless, and as similar methods had been
resorted to by the Germans on the Western front,
these measures may have been suggested to the Turks
by the Germans.

Tahsin Pasha, Governor of Van, was replaced
by Jevdet Bey, Enver's brother-in-law, and Khalil

1 Hayassdan, July 6, 1915; No. 25.

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 293

Pasha, another relation of Enver, had command
of the Turkish troops in the Urmia area. Talaat
sent Mustafa Khalil, his brother-in-law, to Bitlis.

The revolutionary manoeuvres of the Armenians
and the repressive measures of the Turks, with their
mutual repercussions, could not but quicken the old
feuds; so the outcome was a wretched one for both
parties.

One cannot wonder that under such conditions
continuous conflicts arose between the two elements
of the population, that reprisals followed reprisals
on either side, first after the Turco-Russian war,
again after the events of 1895—96, then in the
course of the Adana conflict, during the Balkan
war, and finally during the late war. But it is
impossible to trust the information according to
which the number of the Armenians slaughtered by
the Turks rose to over 800,000 and in which no mention
is made of any Turks massacred by the Armenians.
These figures are obviously exaggerated,1 since the
Armenian population, which only numbered about
2,300,000 souls before the war throughout the Turkish
Empire, did not exceed 1,300,000 in the eastern pro-
vinces, and the Armenians now declare they are still
numerous enough to make up a State. According to
Armenian estimates there were about 4,160,000
Armenians in all in 1914— viz., 2,380,000 in the
Ottoman Empire, 1,500,000 in Russia, 64,000 in the

1 We are the more anxious to correct these figures as
in 1916, at a time when it was difficult to control them, we
gave about the same figures in a note to the Societe d'Anthro-
pologie as to the demographic consequences of the war. We
then relied upon the documents that had just been published
and on the statements of the Rev. Harold Buxton.

294 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

provinces of the Persian Shah and in foreign colonies,
and about 8,000 in Cyprus, the isles of the Archipelago,
Greece, Italy, and Western Europe.

The best answer to the eager and ever-recurring
complaints made by the Armenians or at their
instigation is to refer the reader to a report entitled
" Statistics of the Bitlis and Van Provinces " drawn
up by General Mayewsky, who was Kussian consul
first at Erzerum for six years and later on at Van,
and in this capacity represented a Power that had
always showed much hostility to Turkey. It was
said in it :

" All the statements of the publicists, which represent
the Kurds as doing their best to exterminate the Armenians,
must be altogether rejected. If they were reliable, no
individual belonging to an alien race could have ever lived
in the midst of the Kurds, and the various peoples living
among them would have been obliged to emigrate bodily for
want of bread, or to become their slaves. Now nothing of the
kind has occurred. On the contrary, all those who know
the eastern provinces state that in those countries the
Christian villages are at any rate more prosperous than those
of the Kurds. If the Kurds were only murderers and thieves,
as is often said in Europe, the prosperous state of the Arme-
nians till 1895 would have been utterly impossible. So the
distress of the Armenians in Turkey till 1895 is a mere legend.
The condition of the Turkish Armenians was no worse than
that of the Armenians living in other countries.

" The complaints according to which the condition of the
Armenians in Turkey is represented as unbearable do not
refer to the inhabitants of the towns, for the latter have
always been free and enjoyed privileges in every respect.
As to the peasants, owing to their perfect knowledge of
farm work and irrigation, their condition was far superior
to that of the peasants in Central Russia.

" As to the Armenian clergy, they make no attempt to
teach religion ; but they have striven hard to spread national
ideas. Within the precincts of mysterious convents, the
teaching of hatred of the Turk has replaced devotional
observances. The schools and seminaries eagerly second the
religious leaders."

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 295

After the collapse of Russia, the Armenians,
Georgians, and Tatars formed a Transcaucasian
Republic which was to be short-lived, and we have
dealt in another book with the attempt jnade by
these three States together to safeguard their inde-
pendence.1

The Soviet Government issued a decree on January
13, 1918, stipulating in Article 1 " the evacuation of
Armenia by the Russian troops, and the immediate
organisation of an Armenian militia in order to safe-
guard the personal and material security of the inhabi-
tants of Turkish Armenia," and in Article 4, " the
establishment of a provisional Armenian Government
in Turkish Armenia consisting of delegates of the
Armenian people elected according to democratic
principles," which obviously could not satisfy the
Armenians.

Two months after the promulgation of this decree,
the Brest-Litovsk treaty in March, 1918, stipulated
in Article 4 that " Russia shall do her utmost to
ensure the quick evacuation of the eastern provinces
of Anatolia. Ardahan, Kars, and Batum shall be
evacuated at once by the Russian troops."

The Armenians were the more dissatisfied and
anxious after these events as they had not concealed
their hostile feelings against the Turks and their satis-
faction no longer to be under their dominion; they
now dreaded the return of the Turks, who would
at least make an effort to recover the provinces they
had lost in 1878.

In April of the same year fighting was resumed,

Le Mouvement pan-russe et les attogdnes (Paris, 1919)

296 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

and Trebizond, Erzinjan, Erzerum, Mush, and Van
were recaptured by the Turks. After the negotia-
tions between the Georgians and the Turks, and the
arrangements that supervened, the Armenians con-
stituted a Republic in the neighbourhood of Erivan
and Lake Sevanga (Gokcha).

After the discussion of the Armenian question at
the Peace Conference and a long exchange of views,
Mr. Wilson, in August, 1919, sending a note direct
to the Ottoman Government, called upon it to prevent
any further massacre of Armenians and warned it
that, should the Constantinople Government be unable
to do so, he would cancel the twelfth of his Fourteen
Points demanding " that the present Ottoman Empire
should be assured of entire sovereignty " — which,
by the by, is in contradiction with other points of the
same message to Congress, especially the famous right
of self-determination of nations, which he wished
carried out unreservedly.

The Armenians did not give up the tactics that
had roused Turkish animosity and had even exas-
perated it, for at the end of August they prepared to
address a new note to the Allied High Commissioners
in Constantinople to draw their attention to the
condition of the Christian element in Anatolia and
the dangers the Armenians of the Republic of Erivan
were beginning to run. Mgr. Zaven, Armenian
Patriarch, summed up this note in a statement
published by Le Temps, August 31, 1919.

Mr. Gerard, former ambassador of the United States

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 297

at Berlin, in a telegram1 addressed to Mr. Balfour
on February 15, 1920, asserted that treaties for the
partition of Armenia had been concluded during
Mr. Balfour's tenure of the post of Secretary for
Foreign Affairs and at a time when the Allied leaders
and statesmen had adopted the principle of self-
determination of peoples as their principal war-cry.
He expressed distress over news that the Allies
might cut up Armenia, and said that 20,000 ministers,
85 bishops, 250 college and university presidents,
and 40 governors, who had " expressed themselves in
favour of unified Armenia, will be asked to join in
condemnation of decimation of Armenia." He added
that Americans had given £6,000,000 for Armenian
relief, and that another £6,000,000 had been asked
for. Americans were desirous of aiding Armenia
during her formative period. " Ten members of our
committee, including Mr. Hughes and Mr. Root, and
with the approval of Senator Lodge, had telegraphed
to the President that America should aid Armenia.
We are earnestly anxious that Britain should seriously
consider American opinion on the Armenian case.
Can you not postpone consideration of the Turkish
question until after ratification of the treaty by the
Senate, which is likely to take place before March ?"
Mr. Balfour, in his reply dispatched on February 24,
said:

" In reply to your telegram of February 16, I should
observe that the first paragraph seems written under a mis-
apprehension. I concluded no treaties about Armenia at all.

" I do not understand why Great Britain will be held
responsible by 20,000 ministers of religion, 85 bishops,

1 The Times, March 15. 1920.

298 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

250 university professors, and 40 governors if a Greater
Armenia is not forthwith created, including Russian Armenia
on the north and stretching to the Mediterranean on the
south.

" Permit me to remind you of the facts.

"1. Great Britain has no interests in Armenia except those
based on humanitarian grounds. In this respect her position
is precisely that of the United States.

" 2. I have always urged whenever I had an opportunity
that the United States should take its share in the burden of
improving conditions in the pre-war territories of the Turkish
Empire and in particular that it should become the manda-
tory in Armenia. Events over which Great Britain had no
control have prevented this consummation and have delayed,
with most unhappy results, the settlement of the Turkish
peace.

" 3. There appears to be great misconception as to the
condition of affairs in Armenia. You make appeal in your
first sentence to the principle of self-determination. If this
is taken in its ordinary meaning as referring to the wishes
of the majority actually inhabiting a district, it must be
remembered that in vast regions of Greater Armenia the
inhabitants are overwhelmingly Mussulman, and if allowed
to vote would certainly vote against the Armenians.

" I do not think this conclusive; but it must not be for-
gotten. Whoever undertakes, in your own words, to aid
Armenia during her formative period must. I fear, be prepared
to use military force. Great Britain finds the utmost diffi-
culty in carrying out the responsibilities she has already
undertaken. She cannot add Armenia to their number.
America with her vast population and undiminished resources,
and no fresh responsibilities thrown upon her by the war, is
much more fortunately situated. She has shown herself
most generous towards these much oppressed people; but
I greatly fear that even the most lavish charity, unsupported
by political and military assistance, will prove quite insuffi-
cient to deal with the unhappy consequences of Turkish
cruelty and misrule.

" If I am right in inferring from your telegram that my
attitude on the question has been somewhat misunderstood
in America, I should be grateful if you would give publicity
to this reply."

On February 28 Mr. Gerard telegraphed to Mr.
Balfour that in referring to treaties made during Mr.
Balfour's period of office he had in mind the Sykes-

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 299

Picot compact. After saying that " Great Britain
and France could not be justified in requiring Ameri-
can aid to Armenia as a condition precedent to their
doing justice to Armenia," he declared that " Ar-
menia's plight since 1878 is not unrelated to a series
of arrangements, well meant, no doubt, in which
Great Britain played a directive role," and he con-
cluded in the following terms :

" Our faith in chivalry of Great Britain and France and our
deliberate conviction in ultimate inexpediency of allowing
Turkish threat to override concerted will of Western civilisa-
tion through further sacrifice of Armenia inspire us to plead
with you to construe every disadvantage in favour of Armenia
and ask you to plan to aid her toward fulfilment of her legi-
timate aspirations, meanwhile depending on us to assume our
share in due time, bearing in mind imperative necessity of
continued concord that must exist between our democracies
for our respective benefit and for that of the world."

Soon after, Lord Curzon said in the House of Lords :
" It must be owned the Armenians during the last
weeks did not behave ^like innocent little lambs, as
some people imagine. The fact is they have in-
dulged in a series of wild attacks, and proved blood-
thirsty people." The Times gave an account of these
atrocities on March 19.

At the beginning of February, 1920, the British
Armenia Committee of London had handed to Mr.
Lloyd George a memorandum in which the essential
claims of Armenia were set forth before the Turkish
problem was definitely settled by the Allies.

In this document the Committee said they were
sorry that Lord Curzon on December 17, 1919, ex-
pressed a doubt about the possibility of the total
realisation of the Armenian scheme, according to
which Armenia was to stretch from one sea to the

300 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

other, especially as the attitude of America did not
facilitate the solution of the Armenian question.
After recalling Lord Curzon's and Mr. Lloyd George's
declarations in both the House of Lords and the
House of Commons, the British Armenia Committee
owned it was difficult, if the United States refused
a mandate and if no other mandatory could be found,
to group into one nation all the Ottoman provinces
which they believed Armenia was to include ; yet they
drafted a programme which, though it was a minimum
one, aimed at completely and definitely freeing the$e
provinces from Turkish sovereignty. It ran as
follows :

" An Ottoman suzerainty, even a nominal one, would be an
outrage, as the Ottoman Government deliberately sought to
exterminate the Armenian people.

" It would be a disgrace for all nations if the bad precedents
of Eastern Rumelia, Macedonia, and Crete were followed,
and if similar expedients were resorted to, in reference to
Armenia. The relations between Armenia and the Ottoman
Empire must wholly cease, and the area thus detached must
include all the former Ottoman provinces. The Ottoman
Government of Constantinople has for many years kept up
a state of enmity and civil war among the various local races,
and many facts demonstrate that when once that strange,
malevolent sovereignty is thrust aside, these provinces will
succeed in living together on friendly, equable terms."

The British Armenia Committee asked that the
Armenian territories which were to be detached from
Turkey should be immediately united into an inde-
pendent Armenian State, which would not be merely
restricted to " the quite inadequate area of the
Republic of Erivan," but would include the former
Russian districts of Erivan and Kars, the zone of the
former Ottoman territories with the towns of Van,
Mush, Erzerum, Erzinjan, etc., and a port on the

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 301

Black Sea. This document proclaimed that the
Armenians now living were numerous enough " to
fortify, consolidate, and ensure the prosperity of
an Armenian State within these boundaries, without
giving up the hope of extending farther." It went
on thus :

" The economic distress now prevailing in the Erivan area
is due to the enormous number of refugees coming from the
neighbouring Ottoman provinces who are encamped there
temporarily. If these territories were included in the
Armenian State, the situation would be much better, for
all these refugees would be able to return to their homes and
till their lands. With a reasonable foreign support, the
surviving manhood of the nation would suffice to establish a
National State in this territory, which includes but one-fourth
of the total Armenian State to be detached from Turkey. In
the new State, the Armenians will still be more numerous
than the other non-Armenian elements, the latter not being
connected together and having been decimated during the
war like the Armenians."

Finally, in support of its claim, the Committee
urged that the Nationalist movement of Mustafa
Kemal was a danger to England, and showed that
only Armenia could check this danger.

" For if Mustafa Kemal's Government is not overthrown,
our new Kurdish frontier will never be at peace; the diffi-
culties of its defence will keep on increasing; and the effect
of the disturbances will be felt as far as India. If, on the
contrary, that focus of disturbance is replaced by a stable
Armenian State, our burden will surely be alleviated."

Then the British Armenia Committee, summing up
its chief claims, asked for the complete separation
of the Ottoman Empire from the Armenian area, and,
in default of an American mandate, the union of
the Armenian provinces of the Turkish Empire
contiguous to the Republic of Erivan with the latter
Republic, together with a port on the Black Sea.

302 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

In the report which had been drawn up by the
American Commission of Inquiry sent to Armenia,
with General Harboor as chairman, and which
President Wilson had transmitted to the Senate at
the beginning of April, 1920, after the latter assembly
had asked twice for it, no definite conclusion was
reached as to the point whether America was to
accept or refuse a mandate for that country. The
report simply declared that in no case should the
United States accept a mandate without the agree-
ment of France and Great Britain and the formal
approbation of Germany and Russia. It merely set
forth the reasons for and against the mandate.

It first stated that whatever Power accepts the
mandate must have under its control the whole of
Anatolia, Constantinople, and Turkey-in-Europe, and
have complete control over the foreign relations and
the revenue of the Ottoman Empire.

Before coming to the reasons that tend in favour
of the acceptance of the mandate by the United
States, General Harboor made an appeal to the
humanitarian feelings of the Americans and urged
that it was their interest to ensure the peace of the
world. Then he declared their acceptance would
answer the wishes of the Near East, whose preference
undeniably was for America, or, should the United
States refuse, for Great Britain. He added that each
Great Power, in case it could not obtain a mandate,
would want it to be given to America.

The report valued the expenditure entailed by
acceptance of the mandate at 275 million dollars
for the first year, and $756,140,000 for the first
five years. After some time, the profits made by

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 303

the mandatory Power would balance the expenses,
and Americans might find there a profitable invest-
ment. But the Board of Administration of the
Ottoman Debt should be dissolved and all the com-
mercial treaties concluded by Turkey should be
cancelled. The Turkish Imperial Debt should be
unified and a sinking fund provided. The economic
conditions granted to the mandatory Power should
be liable to revision and might be cancelled.

Further, it was observed that if America refused
the mandate the international rivalries which had
had full scope under Turkish dominion would assert
themselves again.

The reasons given by the American Commission
against acceptance of the mandate were that the
United States had serious domestic problems to deal
with, and such an intervention in the affairs of the
Old World would weaken the standpoint they had
taken on the Monroe - doctrine. The report also
pointed out that the United States were in no way
responsible for the awkward situation in the East, and
they could not undertake engagements for the future
— for the new Congress could not be bound by the
policy pursued by the present one. The report also
remarked that Great Britain and Russia and the
other Great Powers too had taken very little interest
in those countries, though England had enough
experience and resources to control them. Finally,
the report emphasised this point — that the United
States had still more imperious obligations towards
nearer foreign countries, and still more urgent ques-
tions to settle. Besides, an army of 100,000 to
200,000 men would be needed to maintain order in

304 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Armenia. Lastly, a considerable outlay of money
would be necessary, and the receipts would be at
first very small.

On the other hand, the British League of
Nations Union asked the English Government to give
instructions to its representatives to support the
motion of the Supreme Council according to which
the protection of the independent Armenian State
should be entrusted to the League of Nations.

According to the terms of the Treaty of Peace with
Turkey, President Wilson had been asked to act as
an arbiter to lay down the Armenian frontiers on
the side of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum,
and Trebizond.

Under these circumstances the complete solution
of the Armenian problem was postponed indefinitely,
and it is difficult to foresee how the problem will
ever be solved.

2. THE PAN-TURANIAN AND PAN-ARABIAN

MOVEMENTS.

The attempts at Russification made immediately
after the 1877 war by means of the scholastic method
of Elminski resulted in the first manifestations of
the Pan-Turanian movement. They arose, not in
Russia, but in Russian Tatary. The Tatars of the
huge territories of Central Asia, by reason of their
annexation to the Russian Empire and the indirect
contact with the West that it entailed, and also
owing to their reaction against the West, awoke to
a consciousness of their individuality and strength.

A series of ethnographic studies which were begun

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 305

at that time by M. de Ujfalvi upon the Hungarians
— all the peoples speaking a Finno-Ugrian idiom
descending from the same stock as those who speak
the Turkish, Mongol, and Manchu languages — and
were continued by scholars of various nationalities,
gave the Pan-Turanian doctrine a scientific basis;
the principles of this doctrine were laid down by
H. Vambery,1 and it was summed up by Leon Cahun
in his Introduction a Vhistoire de VAsie.2 This
Turco-Tartar movement expanded, and its most
authoritative leaders were Youssouf Ahtchoura Oglou ;
Ahmed Agayeff, who was arrested at the begin-
ning of the armistice by the English as a Unionist
and sent to Malta ; and later Zia Geuk Alp, a Turkish
poet and publicist, the author of Kizil-Elma (The
Red Apple), who turned the Union and Progress
Committee towards the Pan-Turanian movement
though he had many opponents on that committee,
and who was arrested too and sent to Malta.

Islam for thirteen centuries, by creating a
religious solidarity between peoples of alien races,
had brought about a kind of religious nationality
under its hegemony. But the ambitious scheme of
Pan-Islamism was jeopardised in modern times by
new influences and widely different political aspira-
tions. It was hoped for some time that by grouping
the national elements of Turkey and pursuing a con-
ciliatory policy it would be possible to give a sound

1 H. Vambery. Cagataische Sprachstudien (Leipzig, 1867);
Etymolooisches Worterbuch der Turko-Tatarischen Sprachen
(Leipzig, 1875); Das Turkenvolk (1885).

* Leon Cahun, Introduction a Vhistoire de VAsie, Turcs ef
Mongols, des origines a 1405 (Paris, 1896).

20

306 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

basis to that religious nationality. But that nation-
ality soon proved unable to curb the separatist
aspirations of the various peoples subjected to the
Turkish yoke, and then, again, it wounded the pride
of some Turkish elements by compelling them to obey
the commandments of Islam, to which all the Turanian
populations had not fully adhered. The Pan-Islamic
movement later on grew more and more nationalist
in character, and assumed a Pan-Turkish tendency,
though it remained Pan-Turanian — that is to say, it
still included the populations speaking the Turkish,
Mongol, and Manchu languages.

Without in any way giving up the Pan-Islamic idea,
Turkish Nationalism could not but support the Pan-
Turanian movement, which it hoped would add the
18 million Turks living in the former Russian Empire,
Persia, and Afghanistan, to the 8 million Turks of
the territories of the Ottoman Empire.

Owing to its origin and the character it has assumed,
together with the geographical situation and im-
portance of the populations concerned, this move-
ment appears as a powerful obstacle to the policy
which England seems intent upon pursuing, and to
which she seeks to bring over Italy and France.
It also exemplifies the latent antagonism which had
ever existed between the Arabian world and the
Turkish world, and which, under the pressure of
events, soon asserted itself.

Indeed, the mutual relations of the Arabs and the
Turks had been slowly but deeply modified in the
course of centuries.

After the great Islamic movement started by
Mohammed in the seventh century, the Arabs who

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 307

had hitherto been mostly confined within the boun-
daries of the Arabian peninsula spread to the west
over the whole of Northern Africa as far as Spain,
and to the east over Mesopotamia and a part of
Persia. In the twelfth century Arabian culture
reached its climax, for the Arabian Caliphs of
Baghdad ruled over huge territories. At that time
Arabic translations revealed to Europe the works of
Aristotle and of the Chaldean astronomers, and the
Arabs, through Spain, had an important influence on
the first period of modern civilisation.

In 1453, when the Turks, who had extended their
dominion over all the shores of the Mediterranean,
settled at Constantinople, which became the capital
of the Islamic Empire, the influence of Arabia de-
creased; yet the Arabs still enjoyed in various parts
political independence and a kind of religious pre-
dominance.

For instance, the Arabs settled in the north of
Western Africa, after losing Spain, became quite
independent, and formed the Empire of Morocco,
which was not under the suzerainty of Constantinople.

The Arabian tribes and Berber communities of
Algeria and Tunis, which had more or less remained
under the suzerainty of the Sultan, were no longer
amenable to him after the French conquest. The
Pasha of Egypt, by setting up as an independent
Sovereign, and founding the hereditary dynasty of
the Khedives, deprived the Ottoman dominion of
Egypt, where the Arabs were not very numerous, but
had played an important part in the development
of Islam. The Italian conquest took away from
Turkey the last province she still owned in Africa.

308 THE TUKKS AND EUROPE

Finally, when the late war broke out, England
deposed the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who was travel-
ling in Europe and refused to go back to Egypt.
She proclaimed her protectorate over the Nile valley,
and, breaking off the religious bond that linked
Egypt with the Ottoman Empire, she made Sultan of
Egypt, independent of the Sultan of Constantinople,
Hussein Kamel, uncle of the deposed Khedive, who
made his entry into Cairo on December 20, 1914.

The Turks, however, kept possession of the Holy
Places, Mecca and Medina, which they garrisoned
and governed. This sovereignty was consolidated by
the railway of the pilgrimage. The investiture of the
Sherif of Mecca was still vested in them, and they
chose the member of his family who was to succeed
him, and who was detained as a hostage at Con-
stantinople. But after the failure of the expedition
against the Suez Canal during the late war, and at
the instigation of England, the Sherif, as we shall
see, proclaimed himself independent, and assumed
the title of Melek, or King of Arabia.

On the other hand, the province of the Yemen,
lying farther south of the Hejaz, has always refused
to acknowledge the authority of Constantinople, and
is practically independent. Lastly, at the southern
end of the Arabian peninsula, the English have held
possession of Aden since 1839, and have extended
their authority, since the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869, over all the Hadramaut. All the sheiks of
this part of Arabia along the southern coast, over
whom the authority of Turkey was but remotely
exercised and was practically non-existent, naturally
accepted the protectorate of England without any

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 309

difficulty, in return for the commercial facilities she
brought them and the allowances she granted them,
and in 1873 Turkey formally recognised the English
possession of this coast.

On the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula the
territory of the Sultan of Oman, or Maskat, lying
along the Persian Gulf , has been since the beginning
of the nineteenth century under the authority of the
Viceroy of India. This authority extends nowadays
over all the territories lying between Aden and
Mesopotamia, which are in consequence entirely
under English sway.

Moreover, the English have proclaimed their pro-
tectorate over the Sheik of Koweit.

Koweit had been occupied by the British Navy
after the Kaiser's visit to Tangier, and thus Ger-
many had been deprived of an outlet for her railway
line from Anatolia to Baghdad. The Eev. S. M.
Zwemer, in a book written some time ago. Arabia, the
Birthplace of Islam, after showing the exceptional
situation occupied by England in these regions, owned
that British policy had ambitious designs on the
Arabian peninsula and the lands round the Persian
Gulf.

Since the outbreak of the war, Ottoman sovereignty
has also lost the small Turkish province of Hasa,
between Koweit and Maskat, inhabited entirely by
Arabian tribes.

The rebellion of the Sherif of Mecca against the
temporal power of the Sultans of Mecca shows how
important was the change that had taken place
within the Arabian world, but also intimates that
the repercussions of the war, after accelerating the

310 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

changes that were already taking place in the relations
between the Arabs and the Turks, must needs later
on bring about an understanding or alliance between
these two elements against any foreign dominion.
In the same way, the encroachments of England upon
Arabian territories have brought about a change in
the relations between the Arabs and the English;
in days of yore the Arabs, through ignorance or
because they were paid to do so, more than once
used English rifles against the Turks; but the recent
Arabian risings against the British in Mesopotamia
seem to prove that the Arabs have now seen their
mistake, and have concluded that the English were
deceiving them when they said the Caliphate was in
danger.

Finally, in order to pave the way to a British
advance from Mesopotamia to the Black Sea, England
for a moment contemplated the formation of a
Kurdistan, though a long existence in common and
the identity of feelings and creed have brought about
a deep union between the Kurds and the Turks, and
a separation is contrary to the express wishes of both
peoples.

It is a well-known fact that the descendants of
Ali, the Prophet's cousin, who founded the dynasty
of the Sherifs, or Nobles, took the title of Emirs —
i.e., Princes — of Mecca, and that the Emir of the
Holy Places of Arabia had always to be recognised
by the Sherif to have a right to bear the title of
Caliph. This recognition of the Caliphs by the
Sherifs was made public by the mention of the

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 311

name of the Caliph in the Khoutba, or Friday
prayer.

In consequence of political vicissitudes, the Emirs
of Mecca successively recognised the Caliphs of
Baghdad, the Sultans of Egypt until the conquest
of Egypt by Selim I in 1517, and the Sultans of
Turkey, whose sovereignty over the Holy Places has
always been more or less nominal, and has hardly
ever been effective over the Hejaz.

When the Wahhabi schism took place, the Wahha-
bis, who aimed at restoring the purer doctrines of
primitive Islam, and condemned the worship of the
holy relics and the Prophet's tomb, captured Mecca
and Medina.

Mehmet AH, Pasha of Egypt, was deputed by the
Porte to reconquer the Holy Places, which he governed
from 1813 to 1840. Since that time the Ottoman
Government has always appointed a Governor of the
Hejaz and maintained^ a garrison there, and the
Porte took care a member of the Sherif's family
should reside in Constantinople in order to be able
to replace the one who bore the title of Sherif , should
the latter ever refuse to recognise the Caliph.

Long negotiations were carried on during the war
between the British Government and Hussein,
Sherif of Mecca, the Emir Feisal's father, concerning
the territorial conditions on which peace might be
restored in the East. These views were set forth
in eight letters exchanged between July, 1915, and
January, 1916.

In July, 1915, the Sherif offered his military co-
operation to the British Government, in return for
which he asked it to recognise the independence of

312 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

the Arabs within a territory including Mersina and
Adana on the northern side and then bounded by the
thirty-seventh degree of latitude; on the east its
boundary was to be the Persian frontier down to the
Gulf of Basra; on the south the Indian Ocean, with
the exception of Aden; on the west the Red Sea
and the Mediterranean as far as Mersina.

On August 30, 1915, Sir Henry MacMahon,
British resident in Cairo, observed in his answer
that discussion about the future frontiers was rather
premature.

In a letter dated September 9, forwarded to the
Foreign Office on October 18 by Sir Henry Mac-
Mahon, the Sherif insisted upon an immediate dis-
cussion. As he forwarded this letter, Sir Henry
MacMahon mentioned the following statement made
to him by the Sherif s representative in Egypt:

" The occupation by France of the thoroughly Arabian
districts of Aleppo, Hama, Horns, and Damascus would
be opposed by force of arms by the Arabs: but with the
exception of these districts, the Arabs are willing to accept
a few modifications of the north-western frontiers proposed
by the Sherif of Mecca."

On October 24, 1915, by his Government's order,
Sir Henry MacMahon addressed the Sherif the
following letter :

" The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the parts
of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns,
Hama, and Aleppo cannot be looked upon as merely Arabian,
and should be excluded from the limits and frontiers that
are being discussed. With these modifications, and without
in any way impairing our present treaties with the Arabian
chiefs, we accept your limits and frontiers. As to the terri-
tories within these limits, in which Great Britain has a free
hand as far as she does not injure the interests of her ally.

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 313

France, I am desired by the British Government to make the
following promise in answer to your letter.

" ' With the reservation of the above-mentioned modifica-
tions, Great Britain is willing to recognise and support
Arabian independence within the territories included in the
limits and frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.' "

On November 5, 1915, the Sherif, in his answer,
agreed to the exclusion of Mersina and Adana, but
maintained his claims on the other territories, especi-
ally Beyrut.

On December 13 Sir Henry MacMahon took note of
the Sherif s renunciation of Mersina and Adana.

On January 1, 1916, the Sherif wrote that, not to
disturb the Franco-British alliance, he would lay
aside his claims to Lebanon during the war ; but
he would urge them again on the conclusion of
hostilities.

On January 30, 1916, Sir Henry MacMahon took
note of the Sherif s wish to avoid all that might be
prejudicial to the alliance between France and
England, and stated lhat the friendship between
France and England would be maintained after
the war.

On June 10, 1916, a rebellion broke out at Mecca.
At daybreak the barracks were encircled by Arabs.
Hussein ibn Ali, who was at the head of the move-
ment, informed the Turkish commander that the
Hejaz had proclaimed its independence. On June 11
the Arabs captured the Turkish fort of Bash-Karacal.
and on the 12th Fort Hamadie. Soon after Jeddah
surrendered, and on September 21 El Taif.

In a proclamation dated June 27, 1916, the Sherif
Hussein ibn Ali stated the political and religious
reasons that had induced him to rebel against the

314 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Ottoman Government. He declared the latter was in
the hands of the Young Turk party, that the Com-
mittee of Union and Progress had driven the country
to war, was destroying the power of the Sultan, and
had violated the rights of the Caliphate.

On October 5 the Sherif Hussein formed an
Arabian Cabinet, convened an Assembly, and on
November 6 caused himself to be proclaimed King
of the Arabs.

In November, 1916, he issued a second proclama-
tion, not so lofty in tone, but more wily in its wording,
which seemed to lack personality in its inspiration.
It began thus: "It is a well-known fact that the
better informed people in the Moslem world, Otto-
mans and others, saw with much misgiving Turkey
rush into the war." He then stated that —

" The Ottoman Empire is a Moslem empire, whose wide
territories have a considerable sea-frontage. So the policy of
the great Ottoman Sultans, inspired by this twofold considera-
tion, has always aimed at keeping on friendly terms with the
Powers that rule over the majority of Moslems and at the
same time hold the mastery of the seas."

He went on as follows:

" The one cause of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire
and the extermination of its populations was the short-
sighted tyranny of the leaders of the Unionist faction — Enver,
Jemal, Talaat, and their accomplices; it is the giving up of the
political traditions established by the great Ottoman states-
men and based on the friendship of the two Powers that
deserve most to be glorified — England and France."

He shared the opinion of those who reproached the
Turks with the " atrocities committed by Greeks
and Armenians "; he called upon them " the reproba-

315

tion of the world " ; and he wound up his proclamation
with these words:

" Our hatred and enmity go to the leaders who are re-
sponsible for such doings — Enver, Jemal, Talaat, and their
accomplices. We will not have anything to do with such
tyrants, and in communion with all believers and all unpreju-
diced minds in the Ottoman Empire and Islam throughout
the world we declare our hatred and enmity towards them,
and before God we separate our cause from their cause."

Great Britain later on insisted upon this point —
that the question of the territorial conditions with
a view to restoring peace had not been dealt with
since the beginning of 1916, except in the above-
mentioned exchange of notes. In September, 1919,
in a semi-official communication to the Press, she
emphatically declared that it followed from these
documents :

(1) That in the letter dated October 24, 1915,
which formulates the only engagement between Great
Britain and the Sherif , the British Government had
not pledged itself to do anything contrary to the
Anglo-French treaty of 1916.

(2) That no fresh engagement had been entered
into by Great Britain with the Sherif since the
beginning of the negotiations that M. Georges Picot
had been directed to carry on in London to pave the
way to the treaty of 1916. For the negotiators had
met for the first time on November 23, 1915, and
the last two letters exchanged in January, 1916,
added nothing to the engagements made with King
Hussein in the letter of October 24 of the previous
year.

Finally, on March '5, 1917, Hussein, now King of
the Hejaz, sent an appeal to all the Moslems of

316 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Turkey against the Ottoman Government, which he
charged with profaning the tomb of the Prophet in
the course of the operations of June, 1916.

On October 1, 1918, Feisal entered Damascus at
the head of his own victorious troops, but not with
the Allied armies, after fighting all the way from
Maan to Aleppo, a distance of above 400 miles.
By his military and political activity, he had
succeeded in quelling the private quarrels between
tribes, and grouping round him the Arabian chiefs,
between whom there had been much rivalry not long
before, at the same time protecting the right flank of
the British army, which was in a hazardous position.

Without giving up his favourite scheme, he was
thus brought face to face with the Syrian question.

Though the Arabian movement cannot be looked
upon merely as the outcome of the arrangements
concluded in regard to Syria between the Allies during
the war, the latter seem at least to have brought
about a state of things which reinforced the Syrian
aspirations and encouraged them to assert themselves.

The Syrians had once more taken advantage of the
events which had convulsed Europe, and had had
their after-effects in Asia Minor, to assert their deter-
mination to be freed frpm Ottoman sovereignty;
and now they hoped to bring the Peace Conference
to recognise a mode of government consistent with
their political and economic aspirations.

The suppression of the autonomy of Lebanon, the
requisitions, the administrative measures and prose-
cutions ordered in 1916 by Jemal Pasha against the
Syrians, who wanted Syria to be erected into an
independent State, had not succeeded in modifying

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 317

the tendency which for a long time had aimed at
detaching Syria from the Ottoman Empire, and at
taking advantage of the influence France exercised
in the country to further this aim.

In 1912 M. R. Poincare, then Minister of Foreign
Affairs, clearly stated before the French Chamber
that the French and British Governments shared
exactly the same views concerning the Syrian ques-
tion. Yet later facts soon proved that the English
policy would necessarily conflict with French in-
fluence and try to destroy it after turning it to her
own advantage. Simultaneously the Turks saw that
the time had come to modify the existing regime.

M. Def ranee, who is now French High Commis-
sioner in Turkey, but was then French Consul- General
at Cairo, informed the French Government that the
Ottoman Committee of decentralisation was of
opinion that Syria should become an autonomous
country, governed by a Moslem prince chosen by
the people, and placed under the protection of
France.

On March 11, 1914, M. Georges Leygues again raised
the Syrian question before the French Parliament.
He maintained that the axis of French policy lay in
the Mediterranean — with Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco
on one side and on the other side Syria and Lebanon,
the latter being the best spheres open to French
action on account of the economic interests and
moral influence France already exercised there. And
the French Parliament granted the sums of money
which were needed for developing French estab-
lishments in the East.

About the same time the Central Syrian Committee

318 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

expressed the wish that the various regions of Syria
should be grouped into one State, under French
control. Fifteen Lebano-Syrian committees estab-
lished in various foreign countries expressed the
same wish; the Manchester committee merely asked
that Syria should not be partitioned. A Syrian
congress, held at Marseilles at the end of 1918 under
the presidency of M. Franklin Bouillon, declared that
for various economic and judicial reasons France
could be of great use to Syria, in case the direction of
the country should be entrusted to her.

But the establishment of a Syrian State, whether
enjoying the same autonomy as Lebanon has had
since 1864 under the guarantee of France, England,
Russia, Austria, Prussia, and later on Italy, or being
governed in another way, was in contradiction to
the arrangements made by France and England in
1916. Though the agreement between these two
Powers has never been made public, yet it is well
known that it had been decided — contrary to the
teaching of both history and geography — that Syria
should be divided into several regions. Now, the
centre of Syria, which stretches from the Euphrates
to the sea, happens to be Damascus, and this very
town, according to the British scheme, was to be
included in an Arabian Confederation headed by the
Hejaz.

At the beginning of 1916, the Emir Feisal came to
Paris, and, after the conversations held in France, a
satisfactory agreement seemed to have been reached.

The Emir Feisal was solemnly received in January,
1919, at the Hotel de Ville in Paris, and in the course
of a reception at the Hotel Continental, the Croix de

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 319

Guerre of the first class was presented to the Arab
chief on February 4, with the following " citation " :

" As early as 1916, he resolutely seconded the efforts of
his father, the King of the Hejaz, to shake off the Turkish
yoke and support the Allied cause.

" He proved a remarkable, energetic commander, a friend
to his soldiers.

" He planned and carried out personally several important
operations against the Damascus-Medina railway, and cap-
tured El-Ouedjy and Akaba.

" From August. 1917, till September, 1918, he led numerous
attacks north and south of Maan, capturing several railway
stations and taking a great number of prisoners.

" He helped to destroy the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Turkish
armies by cutting off their communications to the north,
south, and west of Deraa, and after a very bold raid he
entered Damascus on October 1, and Aleppo on the 26th
with the Allied troops."

On February 6, 1919, he asked the Committee of
the Ten on behalf of his father, Hussein ibn Ali,
to recognise the independence of the Arabian penin-
sula, and declared he aimed at grouping the various
regions of Arabian Asia under one sovereignty. He
did not hesitate to remind the members of the Con-
ference that he was speaking in the name of a people
who had already reached a high degree of civilisation
at a time when the Powers they represented did not
even exist ; and at the end of the sitting in the course
of which the scheme of a League of Nations was
adopted, he asked that all the secret treaties about
the partition of the Asiatic dominion of the Ottoman
Empire between the Great Powers should be definitely
cancelled.

In March, 1919, the Emir went back to Syria,
under the pretext of using his influence in favour
of a French collaboration. He was given an enthusi-
astic greeting; but the supporters of the Arabian

320 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

movement, which was partly his own work, declared
their hostility to any policy that would bring about
a mandate for Syria.

On March 7 it was announced that a National
Syrian Congress, sitting at Damascus, had just
proclaimed Syria an independent country, and the
Emir Feisal, son of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, King
of Syria.

It was reported that a declaration, issued by a
second congress that was held in the same town
and styled itself Congress of Mesopotamia, had
been read at the same sitting, through which the
latter congress solemnly proclaimed the independence
of Irak — Mesopotamia — with the Emir Abdullah, the
Emir Feisal's brother, as King under the regency of
another brother of his, the Emir Zeid.

All this, of course, caused a good deal of surprise
in London, though something of the kind ought to
have been expected.

In the above-mentioned document, after recalling
the part played by the Arabs in the war and the
declarations made by the Allies about the right of self-
determination of peoples, the Congress declared the
time had come to proclaim the complete independence
and unity of Syria, and concluded as follows :

" We, therefore, the true representatives of the Arabian
nation in every part of Syria, speaking in her name and
declaring her will, have to-day unanimously proclaimed the
independence of our country, Syria, within her natural
boundaries, including Palestine, which independence shall
be complete, without any restriction whatsoever, on the basis
of a civil representative government.

" We will take into account every patriotic wish of all
the inhabitants of Lebanon concerning the administration of
their country and maintain her pre-war limits, on condition
Lebanon shall stand aloof from any foreign influence.

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 321

" We reject tho Zionists' claim to turn Palestine into a
national home for the Jews or a place of immigration for
them.

" We have chosen His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal,
who has always fought for the liberation of the country, and
whom the nation looks upon as the greatest man in Syria,
as constitutional King of Syria under the name of H.M.
Feisal I.

" We hereby proclaim the military governments of occu-
pation hitherto established in the three districts have now
come to an end; they shall be replaced by a civil representa-
tive government, responsible to this Council for anything
relating to the principle of the complete independence of the
country, till it is possible for the government to convene a
Parliament that shall administer the provinces according to
the principles of decentralisation."

The Congress then asked the Allies to withdraw
their troops from Syria, and stated that the national
police and administration would be fully able to
maintain order.

To some extent the Emir Feisal resisted the sugges-
tions, or at least refused to comply with the extreme
demands, of the Nationalists of Damascus and
Palestine — whose club, the Nadi El Arabi, played
in these regions the same part as the Committee of
Union and Progress — for after forming a Government
of concentration, he had merely summoned one class
of soldiers, whereas the Nationalists in his absence
had decreed the mobilisation of several classes, and
in agreement with General Gouraud he had appointed
administrator of the disputed region of Bukaa his
cousin, the Emir Jemil, who was a moderate man.
Yet, whether he wished to do so or not, whether he
was an accomplice of the leaders or not, the fact is
that, after being the agent of England, he became the
agent of the Nationalists, who had succeeded in
having the independence of the Arabian countries

21

322 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of Asia Minor proclaimed under the leadership of
the Hejaz.

Thus it turned out that the foundation of an
Arabian State assumed a capital importance at the
very time when the future condition of the Ottoman
Empire was under discussion.

In the course of the interview between M.
Mohammed Ali and Mr. Lloyd George, as the Prime
Minister asked him whether he was averse to the
action of the Syrian Moslems, who. had acknowledged
the Emir Feisal as King of Arabia and proclaimed
an independent Moslem State unconnected with the
Caliphate, the leader of the Indian delegation, after
hinting that " this matter can well be left for settlement
amongst Muslims," made the following statement:

" Just as we have certain religious obligations with regard
to the Khilafat that have brought us here, we have other
religious obligations, equally solemn and binding, that require
us to approach the Turks and Arabs. 'All Muslims are
brothers, wherefore make peace between your brethren,'
is a Quranic injunction. We have come here in the interests
of peace and reconciliation, and propose going to the Arabs
and Turks for the same purpose.

" Quite apart from the main claim for preservation of the
Khilafat with adequate temporal power, the Muslims claim
that the local centre of their Faith — namely, the ' Island of
Arabia ' — should remain inviolate and entirely under Muslim
control. This is based on the dying injunction of the Prophet
himself. The Jazirat-ul-Arab, as its name indicates, is the
' Island of Arabia,' the fourth boundary being the waters
of the Tigris and Euphrates. It therefore includes Syria,
Palestine, and Mesopotamia, as well as the region commonly
known to European geographers as the Arabian peninsula.
Muslims can acquiesce in no form of non-Muslim control,
whether in the shape of mandates or otherwise, over any
portion of this region. Religious obligations, which are
absolutely binding on us, require that there at least there
shall be exclusively Muslim control. It does not specify
that it should be the Khalifa's own control. In order to
make it perfectly clear, I may say the religious requirements,

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 323

sir, will be satisfied even if the Emir Feisal exercises indepen-
dent control there.

" But, since we have to provide sufficient territories and
resources and naval and military forces for the Khalifa,
the necessity for the utmost economy which has to rule
and govern all our claims in these matters suggests that both
these requirements may easily be satisfied if the Jazirat-ul-
Arab remains, as before the war, under the direct sovereignty
of the Khalifa. We have great hopes that if we have oppor-
tunities of meeting our co-religionists we shall bring about
a reconciliation between them and the Turks. After all, it
cannot be said that Turkish rule in Arabia has been of such
a character that other Powers are bound to interfere."

Moreover, he added:

" With- regard to the Arabs, about whom you asked me a
little while ago, the delegation are not apprehensive with
regard to the feasibility of an adjustment between the Kha-
lifa and the Arabs. As I have already pointed out, there is
the Quranic injunction: ' All Muslims are brothers, wherefore
make peace between your brethren.' That is a duty laid
upon us, and recently, at the Bombay Session, the All-India
Khilafat Conference passed a resolution authorising a dele-
gation to proceed to the Hejaz and other parts of Arabia
to reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. Our interest is in the
Khilafat as Mussulmans. No population and no territory
could be so dear to the Muslim as the Arabs and Arabia.
The Turks could not win such affection from us as the Arabs
do. This is the land that we want to keep purely under
Muslim control. Even if the Arabs themselves want a
mandate in that country we will not consent. We are bound
by our religious obligations to that extent. Therefore, it
cannot be through antipathy against the Arabs or because of
any particular sympathy for the Turks that we desire the
Khalifa's sovereignty over the Island of Arabia. The Turks
are much farther removed from us. Very few of us know
anything of the Turkish language; very few of us have
travelled in the Turkish Empire. But we do go in large
numbers to Mecca and Medina. So many of us want to
die there. So many Mussulmans settle down and marry in
Arabia; one of my own aunts is an Arab lady. Wherever
we have met Arabs on our journey — we have had no oppor-
tunity, of course, of discussing the subject with well-educated
people, but — we have asked the class of people we have met
what they thought of the action of the King of the Hejaz —

324 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

' King ' in a land where God alone is recognised as a king:
nobody can ever claim kingship there. They said his was an
act that they condemned, it was an act they did not in the
least like. They considered it to be wrong; the Arabs spoke
disparagingly of it. I do not know to what extent it may be
true, but there are a number of people who now come forward
as apologists for the Arabs. They say that what Emir
Feisal and the Sherif did was to save something for Islam;
it was not that they were against the Turks, but they were
for Islam. Whether this was or was not the fact, it is very
significant that such apologies should be made now.
Honestly, we have no apprehensions that we could not recon-
cile the Arabs and the Turks. This is a question which I
think the Allied Council, the Peace Conference, could very
well leave the Mussulmans to settle amongst themselves.
We do not want British bayonets to force the Arabs into a
position of subservience to the Turks."

Resuming the idea he had already expressed, he
concluded his speech thus :

" That can be very easily arranged, and if such a Federa-
tion as we dream of becomes a reality — and I do not see why
it should not — the Arabs would have all the independence
they require. They may claim national independence, but
they cannot forget that Islam is something other than
national, that it is supernational, and the Khilafat must be
as dear to them as it is to us, Even now the King of the
Hejaz does not claim to be the Khalifa. When people began
to address him as such, he rebuked them, and he published
in his official organ, Al-Qibla, that he wanted to be called
King of the Hejaz, and not Amir-ul-Mumineen, a title reserved
only for the Khalifa."

M. Syud Hossain declared in his turn:

" We are not opposed to the independence of Arabia. We
are opposed to Emir Feisal's declaration of independence
only for this reason — that Arabia, throughout the history of
Islam, has up till now remained under the direct control
of the Khalifa. This is the first time in the history of Islam
that anyone who is not the Khalifa has set up any claim over
Arabia. That is why there is, from the Muslim point of view,
a conflict of religious obligations with actual facts. We are
not opposed to Arabian independence. On the contrary,
we wish very much for complete autonomy in that region,

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 325

but we want it to be in harmony and not in conflict with the
Khilafat and its claims. The idea is not unrealisable, as both
Arabs and Turks are Muslims. "

Naturally the concentration of the French troops,
during the Cilician troubles, had made the action of
the Syrian Nationalists popular among the Moslem
masses. On the other hand, an anti-Zionist agitation
had gained ground in Palestine and quickly developed
into a propaganda in favour of the union of Palestine
and Syria under one sovereign. All these facts,
which point to the existence in Syria of a movement
in favour of an independent State, explain how it
turned out that the Emir Feisal, who favoured the
scheme of a confederate Arabian Empire, was pro-
claimed King.

General Noury Pasha, sent by the Emir Feisal
to London at the beginning of April, handed to the
Foreign Office and to the representative of the French
Foreign Office who happened to be in that city, three
letters written in the Emir's own hand in which he
is said to have asked both Governments to recognise
and support the independence of his country, and
informed them that the measures taken by the
Damascus Congress concerning Mesopotamia merely
aimed at putting an end to Turkish anarchy and the
riots of Mosul.

The proclamation of the Emir Feisal as King
of Syria brought about much discontent in
Lebanon.

A meeting was held on March 22 at Baabda,
where the General Government of Lebanon re-
sided, to protest against the decision of the
Damascus Congress. About a thousand people were

326 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

present, and the following motions were passed
unanimously :

" 1. The meeting enters a protest against the right the
Syrian Congress has assumed of disposing of Lebanon, of
laying down its frontiers, of restricting its independence, and
of forbidding it to collaborate with France.

" 2. The Congress asserts the independence of Lebanon.
In the demarcation of its frontiers, allowance should be made
for its vital necessities and the claims repeatedly expressed
by the populations.

" 3. The Congress considers as null and void the decisions
taken by the Damascus Congress concerning Syria, as the
latter Congress was never regularly constituted.

" 4. The Congress confirms the mandate given to the
delegates sent by Lebanon who are now in Paris.

"5. The Congress confirms the independence of Greater
Lebanon with the collaboration of France.

" 6. The Congress expresses the wish that a Commission
consisting of inhabitants of Lebanon will lay the foundation
of the future constitution of Lebanon, which is to replace the
protocol of 1860.

" 7. The Congress asserts the Union of Lebanon and France ;
the national emblem shall be the tricolour with a cedar on the
white part."

This opposition was supported by the Maronite
archbishops of the sanjak of Tripolis, Latakia,
Hama, and Horns, who sent a telegram of protest
from Tripolis to Syria on March 13. Thus the
Arabian movement also met with Christian opposition.

Khyatin Saffita Tabez Abbas, chief of the Alawite
tribe, sent the following protest from Tartus to the
Peace Conference:

" Without the consent of the Alawite tribes, the Emir
Feisal has had himself proclaimed King of Syria. We
protest energetically against such illegal proceedings. We
want an Alawite Confederation established under the direct
and exclusive protectorate of France."

Of course, it was urged that the Assembly of the
Syrian Congress at Damascus included only ex-

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 327

tremists who worked hand in hand with the Turkish
Nationalists; it seems, nevertheless, that it repre-
sented the opinions of most Syrians, who wanted to
restore the unity of Syria; and their wish was no
doubt connected with the wish that was gaining
ground to restore the unity of Arabia.

On the other hand, the Anglo-French treaty,
which aimed at a partition of Ottoman Arabia so
as to balance French and English interests, but
disregarded the wishes of the peoples, could not but
rouse a feeling of discontent. Moreover, some Anglo-
Egyptian agents and some British officers had foolishly
supported this movement in order to cripple French
influence, feeling quite confident they could check
this movement later on and put Syria under their
own suzerainty. But they were soon thrust aside
by the movement, which had been fostered by them
in India and now logically was turning against
them.

The Arabs of the interior of Arabia also addressed
a proclamation to General Gouraud stating they
welcomed the French as friends, but did not want
them as masters and conquerors.

The Arabian opposition to France which made itself
felt far beyond the boundaries of independent Syria,
the difficulties raised by the Emir Feisal in the coast
area, and the agitation stirred up by the Damascus
Government in Syria since the French troops had
relieved the English in those parts in October, 1919,
induced General Gouraud to occupy the railway
stations of Maalhakah and Eayak, the latter being
at the junction of the railway line from Aleppo with
the Beyrat-Damascus line leading to the Hejaz. At

328 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

the same time, by way of reprisal for the capture of
Mejel-Anjar in the plain of Bukaa lying between
Libanus and Anti-Libanus by the Sherifian troops,
he gathered his forces in the rear of that town at
Zahleh and decided to occupy all this area, which
was within the zone put under French control by the
1916 treaty.

On July 20 the Emir Feisal held a war council at
Damascus and issued a decree of general mobilisation.

According to the Memoirs of Linian von Sanders,
who commanded the Turkish troops in Syria-Palestine,
doubts may be raised as to the Emir Feisal' s straight-
forwardness in his dealings first with the Turks
during the war, and later with both the English and
the French after the cessation of hostilities.

" The commander of the fourth army, Jemal Pasha, in-
formed me in the second half of August that the Sherif Feisal
was willing to hold the front occupied by the fourth army
along the Jordan on his own account and with his own troops,
if guarantees were given him by the Turkish Government as
to the creation of an Arabian State. According to the Sherif
Feisal an important British attack was being prepared in
the coast zone, and in this way it would be possible to rein-
force the front between the sea and the Jordan with the
troops of the fourth army. Through my Turkish brigadier-
general I instructed General Jemal Pasha to enter into
negotiations with the Sherif Feisal on this point, and I urged
Enver to give the guarantees that were demanded.

" I never had any answer from either Enver or Jemal on
this point. So I cannot say to what extent Feisal's offer
could be relied upon. According to what I heard from my
brigadier-general, I fancy the Turks mistrusted his offer,
which they considered as a mere decoy to put our positions
along the Jordan in the hands of the Arabs, while the main
English attack was to take place in the coast zone or between
the sea and the Jordan."1

1 Liman von Sanders, FunfJahre Turkic, pp. 330-331.

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 329

As was pointed out by the Journal des Debate,
which quoted the preceding lines on July 21, 1920,
the opinion of Liman von Sanders was quite plausible;
yet the recent events on the French front may also
have had an influence on the Emir Feisal. Most
likely, if we bear in mind the intrigues he carried on
afterwards, his first proposal was a consequence of
the German advance on the Western front in spring,
1918, but the Allies' victorious offensive on the
Somme on August 8, 1918, caused him to alter his
plans. It is noteworthy that in his proposals he
disclosed where the first English attack was to take
place. At any rate, both suppositions, which cor-
roborate each other, increase the suspicions that might
already be entertained about his sincerity; and, since
then he has obviously taken advantage of every
opportunity to play a double game, or at least to
turn all the differences between the Powers to the
advantage of Arabian independence.

We criticise him the^ more severely, as we fully
understand the Arabs' aspirations. We disapprove
of his policy and blame his attitude, because we
believe Arabian aspirations cannot be lawfully
fulfilled at the Turks' expense, and the Arabs
cannot expect they will safeguard their liberty by
supporting the English policy in the East in every
particular, especially with regard to the Turks, at a
time when India and Egypt are seeking to shake off
that policy.

Let us add that the Pan- Arabian movement owes
the development it has now taken to Colonel Law-
rence's manoeuvres, who diverted it from its original
ami to make use of it, and became the Emir Feisal' s

330 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

counsellor in order to influence him in favour of
England. Miss Bell, too, played an influential part
in that movement.

Though the Emir was the leader of a movement
which, on the whole, was hostile to Turkey, and
though he asked for English support, he had no objec-
tion to co-operating with the Nationalists, who, being
threatened by the Allies, offered their support in
order to conciliate him. Thus things had come to a
more and more confused state. According to the
information given by Le Temps on July 20, 1920, it
appeared that as early as January, 1919 —

" The Sherifian agents, Noury Shalaan, Mohammed Bey,
and the Emir Mahmoud Faour, are working hand in hand with
the Turkish Nationalists. The Turkish Colonel Selfi Bey
has several times travelled from Anatolia to Damascus and
vice versa to carry instructions.

" At the beginning of February, Mustafa Kemal sent an
appeal to the population of Anatolia in which he said: ' The
Arabian Government relies or will rely on us.'

" The Sherifian authorities are constantly raising diffi-
culties to prevent the French from sending reinforcements or
supplies to Cilicia by rail."

In view of the exactions of all sorts the Emir
Feisal indulged in, such as the capture of revenue
lawfully belonging to the administration of the
Ottoman debt and the proscription of French
currency, to say nothing of such acts of aggression
as attacks on French outposts and the closing of the
railways, General Gouraud on Wednesday, July 14,
addressed to the Arabian chief the following ulti-
matum, which expired on the 18th:

" Recognition of the French mandate for Syria.
" Liberty to make use of the Rayak- Aleppo railway.
" The occupation of Aleppo and the stations lying between
Aleppo and Rayak.

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 331

" The immediate abolition of forced recruiting.

" Reduction of the Sherifian army to its effectives of
December, 1919.

" Free circulation for the French-Syrian currency.

" Punishment of the authors of crimes against French
soldiers.

" Acceptance of the above-mentioned conditions within
four days. If these conditions are not complied with, they
shall be enforced by arms."

Syria, too, was in quite a perturbed state, owing
to the discontent prevailing among the population
and the differences between the various factions which
were striving to get the upper hand in the country.
Two towns, Hasbeiya and Rashaya, situated on the
slopes of Mount Hermon, had rebelled against the
Sherifian Government and wanted to become parts
of Lebanon.

An important debate began on July 19 in the
House of Commons about the condition of affairs in
Asia Minor and the possible consequences the French
ultimatum addressed to the Emir Feisal might have
for British interests in that region.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore (Stafford, C.U.) asked the Prune
Minister whether he could give any information
regarding the new military action of France in Syria ;
whether the twenty-four hours' ultimatum issued
by the French to the Arab Government in Damascus
was submitted to and approved by the Supreme
Council; whether the terms of the mandate for
Syria had yet been submitted to the Allied and
Associated Powers; and whether His Majesty's
Government would use their influence with the
French and Arab Governments to secure the sus-
pension of further hostilities pending the decision
of the Council of the League of Nations on the terms

332 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of the Syrian mandate. To this Mr. Bonar Law
answered:

" The ultimatum had not been submitted to the Supreme
Council. The terms of the mandate for Syria have not yet
been submitted to the Allied Powers. As regards the last
part of the question, His Majesty's Government, who had
for some time, but unsuccessfully, been urging the Emir
Feisal to come to Europe to discuss the outstanding questions
with the Supreme Council, do not consider that they can
usefully act upon the information at present at their dis-
posal, but they are in communication with the French
Government on the matter."

Then Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked again:

" Is it a fact that severe casualties have already resulted
from this, and that the French have advanced over the line
agreed upon between the British and French Governments
last year, and that they have advanced from Jerablus to
Jisir-Shugr and from the junction at Rayak; and has he
any information with regard to the progress of hostilities in
another part of the Arab area on the Euphrates ?"

Mr. Bonar Law having replied that he had not
received the information, Lord Robert Cecil intervened
in the discussion, and asked in his turn :

" Have the Government considered the very serious effect
of these proceedings on the whole situation in Asia Minor,
particularly with reference to Moslem feeling, and whether,
in view of the fact that these proceedings were apparently
in absolute contravention of Article 22 of the Treaty of
Versailles, he would cause representations to be made to our
French Allies on the subject ?"

Of course, Mr. Bonar Law could only reply :

" We are in communication with the French Government,
but I do not accept the statement of my noble friend that
what has happened is against the Treaty of Versailles. It is
very difficult for us here to judge action which is taken on the
responsibility of the French Government."

Finally, to Lord Hugh Cecil's inquiry whether the

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 333

British Government was bound by promises made
to the Emir Feisal, Mr. Bonar Law answered :

" The Government are certainly bound by their pledge.
In my opinion the fact that the mandate was given to France
to cover that area was not inconsistent with that pledge."

Later on, Mr. Ormsby-Gore obtained leave to move
the adjournment of the House in order to call atten-
tion to the immediate danger to British interests
in the Middle East arising from the threatened new
hostilities in Syria. He said that first —

" He wished to criticise vigorously the sins of omission
and commission committed by the British Government, and
more particularly by the British Foreign Office. Only by a
frank and full statement by the British Government would
bloodshed be prevented. The responsibility of this country
was deeply involved in view of the pledges which had been
given to the Arabs before they came into the war, while they
were our allies, and above all since the armistice. ... It
was essential that both the French Government and the Arab
Government in Damascus should know exactly what the
demands of the British Government were, and how far we
were committed and how far we intended to stand by those
commitments. The British taxpayer, too, wanted to know
how far we were committed. Our pledges to the French were
less specific than those to the Arabs. We pledged ourselves
to recognise the independence of the Arabs. The British
Government were bound by their undertaking to Hussein to
recognise the establishment of an independent Arab State
comprising within its borders Damascus, Hama, Horns, and
Aleppo. Did the British Government communicate these
pledges frankly to the French Government ? We were
responsible for encouraging the Arabs to believe that we were
going to stand by them. Were we going to stand by that
pledge or not ? If not, we ought to tell the Arabs so frankly.
It was quite impossible for us to secure the pacification of
Arabia, including Mesopotamia, unless Damascus was at
peace. French, Arab, and British areas had been agreed upon
to last until the permanent settlement was come to. and if
there had been a breach pi that agreement those who were
responsible for the breach ought to be held responsible.
Until the mandate for Syria had been approved by the Council

334 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of the League of Nations and the new Arab Government in
Syria was established there should be no disturbance of the
status quo without the willing agreement of all parties. For
years the Arabs had been our greatest friends in the East
and France our dearest ally in Europe. The outbreak of
hostilities between them revealed the bankruptcy of British
diplomacy."

Earl Winterton, like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, took up the
defence of the Emir and suggested that Great Britain
should act as mediator between France and the
Arabs:

" As one who had fought with the Arabs during the war,
he resented the idea contained in the suggestion that while
it was all very well to use the Arabs during the war, it was not
worth while now that the war was over having a row with
France for their sake. . . . Prince Feisal had put his case
before the Peace Conference, but the Government, following
its usual practice of secrecy, had never allowed the House
to hear a word of it or of the considered answer of the Supreme
Council. He submitted that the claims that France had to
the mandate in Syria were based, and could only be based,
on the law of the League of Nations. He was amazed to see
in a Northcliffe newspaper that day a reference to ' the great
historical traditions of France in Syria.' If that suggested
that France had any rights in Syria over and above those
given by the League of Nations they were coming to a very
dangerous argument. It was absurd to treat a people like
the Arabs as an upstart people, to be treated in a condescend-
ing way by the Allies. The duty of the Government was to
make representations at once to both the French and Arab
Governments, asking that this matter should be submitted
to arbitration, and that the whole case should be made public."

Finally, General Seely, a former Minister, rose,
and owned that under the terms of the treaty with
Turkey, France had got a force in Syria, but the whole
difficulty lay in the French issuing an ultimatum
without consulting Great Britain. According to the
three speakers, England was interested in the ques-
tion, owing to her engagements with the Emir Feisal,

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 335

and the after-effects which French action might have
in Syria and the neighbouring regions.

Mr. Bonar Law, feeling obliged to take into account
both the section of public opinion on behalf of which
the three speakers had spoken, and the feelings
of an Allied country, reminded his opponents, who
hardly concealed their unwillingness to approve the
arrangements which had just been concluded, that
France had the same mandate for Syria as Great
Britain had for Mesopotamia, and endeavoured to
prove that the situation of England in Mesopotamia
was very much the same as the situation of France in
Syria. He expressly said:

" The real question before the House was whether the
British Government had a right to interfere in a country
over which France had duly received a mandate. It was
true that, in October, 1915, the British Government had
declared they were prepared to recognise and support the
independence of the Arabs within those portions of the terri-
tories claimed by the Emir Feisal in which Great Britain
was free to act, but it was added, ' without detriment to the
interests of her ally France.' . . .

" It was said that the independence of the Arab people was
incompatible with the mandate. If so, this part of theTreaty
of the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to have
been in, and France ought not to have been allowed to obtain
a mandate in Syria. It was also said that what the French
were doing was uncalled for; that all that was necessary was
to have the status quo. But British troops were in occupation
of all the territories, and the British Government came to the
conclusion that it was not fair that we should be called upon
to bear the burdens of occupation of territories in which later
we should have no interest. We gave notice that we intended
to withdraw the British troops. The country had therefore
to be occupied, and at the San Remo Conference the mandate
for Syria was given definitely to the French Government.
That was not done behind the back of the Emir Feisal. It
was done with his knowledge, and when he was in Paris he
himself agreed that there should be a French mandate for
that territory.

336 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

" We had accepted a mandate in Mesopotamia. Supposing
the French Government said to us, ' You are using force in
Mesopotamia, and you are doing it without consulting the
French Government. You are breaking the conditions of
the proper homogeneity of the Allies, and you should not take
steps to repulse the troops attacking you in Mesopotamia
until you have come to an arrangement with the French
Government.' The analogy was complete. We were in
Mesopotamia for the purpose of setting up not a colony, but
an independent Arab State, and, in spite of that, we were
attacked by Arabs all through Mesopotamia. Our answer to
the French would be that the mandate for Mesopotamia had
been entrusted to us, and we claimed to deal with the country
in the way we thought right. It was said that this action
of the French Government was contrary to the whole spirit
of the mandate and an independent Arab State. That was
not so. In the ultimatum to which reference had been made
a passage occurred which he would quote. Acceptance of
the French mandate was one of the conditions. ' The man-
date,' it is stated, ' will respect the independence of Syria
and will remain wholly compatible with the principle of
government by Syrian authorities properly invested with
powers by the popular will. It will only entail on the part
of the mandatory Power co-operation in the form of col-
laboration and assistance, but it will in no case assume the
colonial form of annexation or direct administration.' The
French Government told us they were acting on that prin-
ciple, and was the House of Commons really going to ask the
British Government to say, ' We do not accept your assurance,
but we ask you to allow us to interfere with you in the exercise
of your authority '?

" The mandate having been given, it was clearly no business
of ours to interfere unless some action had been taken so
outrageous that we had a right to say that it was not in
accordance with the Peace Treaty and would not be accepted
by the League of Nations or any other independent body. . . .

*' Had we that justification ? He thought we had a right
at least to assume that the French Government had some-
thing of a case for the action they were taking. He had the
actual words in which the French described the necessity of
their taking this action. They pointed out that a large
number of French soldiers had been massacred by Arabs.
They did not say that the Emir Feisal was responsible for
that — he did not think the Emir was — but that whether it
was due to his responsibility or want of power to prevent it
the situation was one which the French Government could

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 337

not allow to continue. With regard to the railway, on which
they said they depended absolutely under present conditions
for the support of their forces in dealing with the rebellion
of Mustafa Kemal in Cilicia, they complained that they had
tried over and over again to get from the Emir the use of that
railway for the purpose of the supply of their troops, but had
failed. They said that that was a condition of things which
they could not allow to continue if they were to be responsible
for the mandate. He thought that was a very good case."

On Lord Winterton exclaiming: " Then the French
have a mandate for Damascus ! But neither the
Arabs nor the Supreme Council have ever admitted
such a mandate," Mr. Bonar Law, on behalf of the
Government, answered:

" They had been in communication with the French
Government on that point, and their reply was to this effect:
' There is no intention of permanent military occupation.
As soon as the mandate has been accepted and order has been
restored the troops will be withdrawn.'

" A great deal had been said about the claims of Emir
Feisal. No one would recognise them more readily than His
Majesty's Government. They knew that he and his tribes-
men did gallant service in the war, but he asked the House
to remember that but for the sacrifices both of the French
and ourselves, there would have been no possibility of King
Hussein having any authority in his country. . . .

" They met him over and over again in London and Paris,
and when the question came of giving the mandate, on two
occasions the British and French Governments sent a joint
invitation to the Emir Feisal to come to Europe and discuss
the question with them. The Emir Feisal was not able to
come for one reason or another on either occasion ; but he did
say that no case of any ally or anyone in connection with the
Peace Treaty was considered more thoroughly than his, or
with more inclination to meet his wishes. The House must
be under no misapprehension. There was great trouble
in the Middle East. Arab fighting would add to that trouble,
and what happened in Syria must have reflex action in Meso-
potamia. If it was assumed, as some hon. members were
ready to assume, that we in Mesopotamia were pursuing solely
selfish aims with no other object, and if they assumed that
the French were pursuing' imperialistic aims in Syria with
no other object, then, of course, the case was hopeless. There

22

338 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

was no Frenchman who had shown a broader mind and a
greater readiness to grasp the position of other people than
General Gouraud. In any degree to reflect upon the French
Government in this matter was a very serious thing."

The time seemed very badly chosen indeed for
such a debate in the English Parliament, as Mr.
Winston Churchill, War Secretary, had just informed
the Commons that important reinforcements coming
from India had recently been dispatched to Meso-
potamia, and the Commander-in-Chief had been given
full powers to take any measures the situation might
require.

It was the policy of England in the East which
stood responsible for such a state of things. Though
the bulk of public opinion in France was averse to
any military action in the East, either in Syria or in
Turkey, yet France was driven to fight, as it were,
by England — though both Governments were sup-
posed to act jointly in the East — in order to prevent
her ally from undermining her influence. Such was
the outcome of England's ill-omened policy, who
first had supported the Arabian movement and now
seemed to forsake it, and thus had roused all the
East against Europe through the resentment caused
by her attitude towards Turkey and Persia. Perhaps
England was not very sorry, after all, that France
should divert against herself part of the Arabian
forces from the Mesopotamian front, where the
British effectives were insufficient in number.

M. Millerand corroborated Mr. Bonar Law's state-
ments before the French Chamber, disclosed some
of the agreements made with England, and apologised
for being unable to say more; he also declared
England had officially recognised she had no right

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 339

to meddle with Syrian affairs; and finally declared
that whoever should feel tempted — he meant the
Emir who had just submitted to General Gouraud's
ultimatum — to oppose France to Great Britain in
Asia Minor would now know it would have France
alone in front of him. And yet if one day Great
Britain rules over Mesopotamia, she is not likely to
give France a free hand in Syria.

Just at the same time — on July 20 — the Cairo
correspondent of The Times wrote that he under-
stood the King of the Hejaz had telegraphed to
Mr. Lloyd George how surprised and disappointed
he was at the French policy in Syria, and asked him
to interfere. King Hussein also declared he could
not exert his influence on the Emir Feisal's brothers
or prevent them from coming to his help.

The English Government circles, on the other
hand, seemed at last inclined to favour a scheme
that would put Syria and Mesopotamia, respectively
under the sovereignty of the Emir Feisal and the
Emir Abdullah, under a French mandate in Syria
and a British one in Mesopotamia. But the Daily
Express of July 17 seemed apprehensive lest the
French expedition aimed at overthrowing the Emir
Feisal and replacing him by the ]?mir Said, who had
been expelled from Syria during the British occupa-
tion. Let it be said, incidentally, that the Arabs of
the Emir Feisal possessed 100,000 rifles, the very
arms taken from the Turks by the English and left
by the latter in the hands of the Arabian leader.

General Gouraud's ultimatum had naturally been
accepted by the Emir Feisal, but a few days after
its expiration, and- so military action had been

340 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

started. General Gouraud, according to his com-
munique, had, on July 22, at the Emir's request,
stopped the column that was on its way from Zaleh
to Damascus. Feisal had alleged that his answer
had been sent in due time, but untoward circum-
stances had prevented it from coming to hand on
the appointed day.

The French General had consented to give him
the benefit of the doubt and halt his troops on
certain conditions, one of which was that his soldiers
should not be attacked. Now the French column
that guarded the country between Horns and Tripolis,
some distance to the east of the post of Tel-Kelah,
was attacked by Sherifian regulars. Under these
circumstances, and to prevent another attack which
seemed to be preparing between Damascus and
Beyrut, the southern French column that guarded
the railway in case of an attack coming from
Damascus, dislodged the Sherifian troops whose head-
quarters were at Khan-Meiseloun, in the mountain
range which divides the plain of the Bukaa from the
plain of Damascus, and thus the way was open to
the latter town.

France, who otherwise would not have been
obliged to fight in order to maintain her influ-
ence in Syria, was compelled to do so by the
policy in which she was involved. But this policy,
which drove her to inaugurate a Syrian campaign at
the very time when by the side of England she en-
forced on Turkey a treaty that no Turk could accept,
might have brought about, as Pierre Loti said in an
article of the (Euvre, July 22, " the death of France
in the East."

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 341

Even the Christians1 — the Armenians excepted —
wished the French to leave Antioch in order to be
able to come to an understanding with the Moslems
who maintained order in the four great towns of
Aleppo, Hama, Horns, and Damascus, occupied by
the Sherifian troops. A delegation of eight mem-
bers representing the Christian element wanted to go
to France, but the Patriarch of Lebanon handed
General Gouraud a protest to be forwarded to the
French Government; he inveighed against what he
called " the shameful conduct of some members of
the administrative Council of Lebanon," and charged
them, just as they were about to leave for Europe,
with receiving important sums of money from the
Emir Feisal to carry on an anti-French propaganda.
After this protest, they were imprisoned by the
French authorities: all of which shows the state of
deep unrest then prevailing in Lebanon and our utter
lack of reliable information from the East.

On July 23 a French column entered Aleppo, after
a skirmish north of Muslemieh, and a reconnoitring
body of cavalry which had pushed on as far as Horns
bridge was greeted by some Sherifian officers, who
informed them that the Sherifian troops had left the
town. On the 25th, in the afternoon, the French
troops entered Damascus without encountering any
resistance. A new Government was formed after
the downfall of the Sherifian Government, and
General Gobet formally notified them on behalf
of General Gouraud that the Emir Feisal was no
longer King of the country. He demanded a war
contribution of 10 niillion francs on account of the

1 Le Temps, July 21, 1920.

342 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

damage done by the war bands in the western zone;
general disarmament should be proceeded with at
once; the army should be reduced and converted into
a body of police; all war material should be handed
over to the French authorities, and the chief war
criminals tried by military courts. All these condi-
tions were, of course, assented to by the new Govern-
ment, who expressed their sincere wish to collaborate
with the French.

The Emir Feisal, who had come back to Damascus,
was requested to leave the country with his family.
He set off to England soon after and sought to
meet Mr. Lloyd George at Lucerne.

Without considering the future relations between
Lebanon and Syria or turning its attention to the
future mode of government of Syria and its four
great towns Damascus, Hama, Horns, and Aleppo,
the French Government decided to restore Greater
Lebanon. M. Millerand informed Mgr. Abdallah
Kouri, Maronite Archbishop of Area, president of
the delegation of Lebanon, of this by a letter dated
August 24, 1920. The new State was to extend from
the Nahr-el-Litani, which flows along the frontier
of Palestine, to another State, called " Territoire des
Alaonites," or, in Arabic, Alawiya, coming between
the Lebanon and Antioch, and to the crests of Anti-
Libanus, including the Bukaa area, with the towns of
Rayak and Baalbek. The ports of Beyrut and Tripolis
in Syria were to enjoy local autonomy, but to keep in
close connection with the new State. Beyrut was
to be the seat of the new Government; Tripolis and
its suburbs were to be grouped into a municipality.
In this way Greater Lebanon would have recovered

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 343

all its former territories, as it was before 1860, in
conformity with the promises made by M. Clemen-
ceau and confirmed by M. Millerand, and with the
claims set forth in 1919 at the Peace Conference by
the delegates of Lebanon.

Was it not a mistake in Syria, a country over which
France had a mandate and where the proportion of
Moslems is three to one, to start with a policy that
favoured Lebanon and consequently the Christians ?
The question was all the more important as the dis-
content brought about by the Powers' decisions was
far from subsiding in these and the neighbouring
regions.-

Indeed, the Ansarieh tribes, living in the moun-
tainous regions to the east of Antioch and Alex-
andretta, and in the Jebel Ansarieh between Latakia
and Tartus, which had persistently kept aloof from
us in the past, made their submission after the down-
fall of the Emir Feisal, and several Ansarieh chiefs —
Ismail Pasha, Inad, and Ismail Bey Yaouah — accepted
the conditions imposed on them. Yet dissatisfaction
was still rampant in the Hauran area, and the train
in which ed Rubi Pasha, the Syrian Premier, and
other Ministers were going to Deraa was attacked
on Friday, August 20, at Kerbet-Ghazeleh by Arabian
bands. Ed Rubi Pasha and Abderhaman Youssef
Pasha were murdered. The railway line was recap-
tured later on, but the contingents sent to Deraa
had to fight with Arabian bands at Mosmieh.

Farther north, in the part of Cilicia entirely
occupied by Kemalist troops, Colonel Bremond,
commanding a group of 3,000 to 4,000 men con-
sisting of French troops and native recruits, after

34:4 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

being blockaded at Adana for six weeks, had to sign
a truce in August because he was short of water,
and the provisioning of Adana could only be ensured
by establishing a base in the former Roman port
of Karatash. Mersina, where the French had en-
listed all the Armenian and Greek manhood, was also
besieged and blockaded, except along the coast
where a French warship overawed the rebels. Lastly,
Tarsus, the third place occupied by French troops,
was in the same predicament, and was cut off from
the other two towns. Under these circumstances
whoever could flee sailed to Cyprus, and the few
boats which called at Mersina took away crowds of
fugitives.

In Mesopotamia the situation was quite as bad,
and everywhere the Arabs evinced much discontent.
In the zone of the lower Euphrates and Lake Hamar,
as well as in the Muntefik area, many disturbances
occurred.

The Sunday Times of August 21, 1920, in an article
in which the attitude of the British Government was
severely criticised, wondered whether it was not too
late to atone for the mistakes of England, even by
expending large sums of money, and concluded thus ;

" Would it not be wiser to confess our failure and give up
meddling with the affairs of three million Arabs who want
but one thing, to be allowed to decide their own fate ? After
all, Rome was not ruined when Hadrian gave up the con-
quests made by Trajan."

The Observer too asked whether a heavy expendi-
ture of men and money could restore the situation,
and added:

" The situation is serious; yet it is somewhat ludicrous too,
when we realise that so much blood and money has been

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 345

wasted for a lot of deserts and marshes which we wanted ' to
pacify,' and when we remember that our ultimate aim is to
impose our sovereignty on people who plainly show they do
not want it."

The diversity of creeds among the various Moslem
sects had also, from the beginning, imperilled the
unity of the Arabian world within the Ottoman
Empire by endangering its religious unity. By the
side of the Sunnis, or Orthodox Moslems, the
Shia — viz., the rebels or heretics, belonging to a
schism which is almost as old as Islam itself
— recognise nobody but Ali as the lawful successor
of Mohammed. According to them, the title of
Caliph should not go outside the Prophet's family,
and his spiritual powers can only be conferred upon
his descendants; so, from a religious point of view,
they do not recognise the power of the other dynasties
of Caliphs — for instance, that of the Ottoman Sultans.
As Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, was killed at Kufa
in Mesopotamia, and as Ali's sons, Hassan and
Hossein, were also massacred at Kerbela, near the
ruins of Babylon, together with some of their descen-
dants who had a lawful right to the title of Imam,
Mesopotamia is looked upon by the Shia as their
Holy Places.

Many wealthy Persians, to whom the worship of
the members of Ali's family has become a symbol
and who consider their death as a religious sacrifice,
have their own coffins carried to Mesopotamia that
their bodies may lie in the holy necropolis of Kerbela
or of Nejef, to the north-east of Mecca and Medina;
and as a great many Arabs of Mesopotamia are still

346 THE TURKS A2*D EUROPE

Shia, this schism practically divides the Persian
world from the Turkish world.

But though the Persians, who have never recog-
nised any Caliph, and for the last thirteen hundred
years have been waiting till the Khilafat should
revert to the lineal descent of Ali, the Prophet's son-
in-law, to acknowledge a Caliph's authority, do not
recognise the Ottoman Caliphate, yet their monarchs
do not seek to deprive the Sultan of his title of
Caliph to assume it themselves.

So their case is entirely different from that of the
people of Morocco, who do not recognise the Ottoman
Caliphate because their own sovereigns, as descen-
dants of the Prophet, profess they have an hereditary
right to hold the office of Caliph within the frontiers
of their State.

The Shia faith has even spread as far as India and
the Sunda Isles ; and so the opposition between Shia and
Sunnis may play an important part in freeing Mesopo-
tamia from the Turkish influence of Constantinople.

Yet the English occupation has been so bitterly
resented in Mesopotamia that the Shia Mujtahids,
or imams of Nejef and Kerbela, have lately asked
for the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over these
towns, where are the two famous holy shrines of
Islam. Moreover, the controversy on the question
whether the Sultans of Turkey have a right to the
Caliphate, because they do not belong to the tribe
of Koreish, in which the Prophet was born, seems to
have come to an end among the Moslems, or at least
to have been laid aside in view of the present events.

Moreover, the Prophet, when he advised the Faithful
to choose his successor in the tribe of Koreish, does

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 347

not seem at all, according to the best Moslem authori-
ties, to have wished to confer the supreme spiritual
power for ever upon a particular section of the
community related to him by ties of blood, and to
have reserved the Caliphate to this tribe. It seems
more likely that, as Islam at that time had not yet
given birth to powerful States, he chose this tribe
because it was the best organised and the strongest,
and thus considered it as the fittest to maintain the
independence of the Caliphate and defend the interests
of Islam. Besides, within half a century after the
Prophet's death the Caliphate passed from Moham-
med's four immediate successors to the Omayyids
for the reason indicated above, and in contradic-
tion to the theory of lineal descent. It is obvious
that, had Mohammed been guided by family con-
siderations, he would not have merely given the
Faithful some directions about the election of his
successor, but he would have chosen one of his
relations himself to inherit his office, and would have
made it hereditary in the latter's family.

The Wahhabis, who are connected with the Shia,
are likewise a political and religious sect which was
founded in the eighteenth century in Nejed, a region
of Central Arabia conterminous with the north of
Syria. The Wahhabi doctrine aims at turning Islam
into a kind of deism, a rational creed, looking upon
all the traditions of Islam as superstitions, and
discarding all religious observances. Since the assas-
sination of Ibn el Rashid in May, 1920, the present
leaders of the Wahabis are Abdullah ibn Mitah and
Ibn Saud, over whom the Ottomans have a merely
nominal power.

34:8 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

When King Hussein planned to join the Hejaz
and Nejd to Syria, Ibn Saud refused to let Nejd
fall under the suzerainty of the King of the Hejaz,
who was powerful merely because he was supported
by Europe and because Syria is a rich country. Most
likely the religious question had something to do
with this conflict. In August, 1919, the Wahhabis,
who had asked the Emir Ibn Saud for his support,
suddenly attacked the troops of the sons of the King
of the Hejaz which were in the Taif area, and defeated
them at Tarabad. The Wahhabi Emu: gained a
few more victories, and was about to threaten the
Holy Cities when the rising of the Orthodox Moslem
tribes compelled him to retreat.

So the hostility of the Wahhabis, whose indepen-
dence was threatened by the Sunnis of the Hejaz,
whom they look upon as heretics, still embittered the
dissensions in the Arab world.

It has been asserted that this Wahhabi movement
was at first started by the Turks, which would not
have been unlikely at a time when it was Turkey's
interest to divide Arabia in order to raise difficulties
to the Allies after the Sherif's treason; but now it
was no longer her interest — and it was beyond her
power — to stir up an agitation.

The Ishmaelites, who laid waste Persia and Syria
in the eighth century, and played an important part
in the East till the twelfth century, have also broken
off with the Shia.

Lastly, the Druses, who inhabit the slopes of
Lebanon and the greater part of Anti-Lebanon between
Jebeil and Saida along the Mediterranean, profess
the creed of the Caliph Al-Hakem, who lived at the

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 349

beginning of the eleventh century. They had with-
drawn to Lebanon and long repelled the attacks of
the Turks, whose suzerainty they acknowledged only
in 1588. In 1842 the Porte gave them a chief, but
practically they have remained almost independent.
They have often fought with the Maronite Christians
living to the north, especially in 1860, and there is
still much hostility between them.

Moreover, all Moslem communities, without ex-
ception— whether the communities governed by in-
dependent national sovereigns such as Afghanistan;
or by sovereigns owing allegiance to non-Moslem
Powers such as Egypt, India, Tunis, Khiva, Bokhara ;
or the communities living under a non-Moslem rule,
as is the case with those of Algeria, Russia, and also
India and China — give their allegiance to the Sultan
as Caliph, though they are always at liberty to
refuse it. Even the Moslem communities of Algeria
and Tunis, which are connected with those of Morocco
by their common origin and language, and live close
by them, do not deem it a sufficient reason to recog-
nise the Emir of Morocco as Caliph that he is a
descendant of the Prophet.

An even more striking argument is that the com-
munity of the Hejaz, which rebelled against Turkish
sovereignty during the war and has made itself
politically independent, still maintains its religious
allegiance to the Sultan; and the present King,
Hussein, who is the most authentic descendant of
the Prophet, and who rules over the two holiest
towns of Islam, Mecca and Medina, soon after the
armistice addressed the Sultan a telegram of religious
allegiance drawn up in the most deferential terms.

350 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

The possession of Mecca and Medina being one of the
attributes of the Caliph, and these towns having a
great religious and political importance owing to the
great annual pilgrimage, King Hussein might have
taken advantage of this to dispute with the Sultan the
title of Caliph. England had strongly urged him to
do so, but King Hussein obstinately refused. Then
the British Government, giving up all hope of bring-
ing about the transference of the Caliphate from the
Ottoman dynasty to another sovereign, concluded
a secret alliance with Vahid ed Din.

Considering the intricate situation in the East
due to the variety of races and religions, and the
movements of all sorts by which the populations of
those countries are swayed, it seems most unwise to
increase the general restlessness by a vain inter-
vention of the Powers, and to dismember what
remains of Turkey in Europe and Asia Minor, a dis-
memberment which would necessarily have violent
repercussions throughout the deeply perturbed Moslem
world. Though the recent movements of emancipa-
tion in the East to a certain extent meet the
legitimate wishes of the peoples and have somewhat
cleared the situation in Asia Minor, yet it is obviously
most perilous to infringe upon the Sultan's sove-
reignty, to endeavour to drive away the Turks into
Asia, and to set up a kind of fictitious official Islam
by compelling the Moslem peoples of the East to
give up their cherished independence and submit to
an Arab imperialism which would soon become
British imperialism. At the present moment all the
Moslem elements are determined to unite together
against any enemy of their liberty; and all Moslems,

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 351

without any distinction of creed or race, might very
well one day flock to the standard of a bold leader
who should take up arms in the name of Islam, in
order to safeguard their independence.

These movements, and many other similar ones,
were encouraged and strengthened by the develop-
ment of the principle of nationalities and the support
given to it by Mr. Wilson, who was bent upon carry-
ing it out to its strictly logical consequences, without
paying heed to the limitations imposed by the present
material and political conditions. But we do not
think it is true to say, as has been urged, that 'the
assertion of the right of self-determination of peoples
was the initial cause of these movements. The move-
ment in favour of the rights of nationalities originated
long before Mr. Wilson's declarations, which merely
hurried on this powerful movement, and also caused
it to swerve somewhat from its original direction.

This movement, on the whole, seems chiefly to
proceed — though other factors have intervened in it
— from a kind of reaction against the standardising
tendency, from a material and moral point of view,
of modern Western civilisation, especially the Anglo-
Saxon civilisation, and also from a reaction against
the extreme unification aimed at by russifying the
numerous peoples living within the Russian Empire.
Modern civilisation, having reached its present
climax, has aimed — and its political and social reper-
cussions have had the same influence — at doing away
with all differences , between human minds and
making the world homogeneous; thus all men would

352 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

have been brought to live in the same way, to have
the same manners, and their requirements would
have been met in the same way — to the very great
advantage of its enormous industrial development.
Of course, all this proved an idle dream; human
nature soon asserted itself, amidst the commotions
and perturbations experienced by the States, and a
reaction set in among those who hitherto only aimed
at enslaving various human groups, or linked them
together politically in a most artificial way. Then
the same feeling spread among all those peoples.

All this enables us to see to what extent this move-
ment is legitimate, and to know exactly what pro-
portions of good and evil it contains.

It rightly asserts that various peoples have different
natures, and by protecting their freedom, it aims at
ensuring the development of their peculiar abilities.
For let us not forget that the characters of peoples
depend on physical conditions, that even the features
we may not like in some peoples are due to the race,
and that if, by blending and mixing populations
nowadays these features are modified, they are
generally altered only from bad to worse.

But this principle is true only so far as it frees
and enables to shape their own destinies peoples who
have distinctive qualities of their own and are able
to provide for themselves. It cannot be extended —
as has been attempted in some cases — to States
within which men descending from various races
or having belonged in the course of centuries to
different nationalities have long been united, and
through a long common history and a centuries-old
co-operation have formed one nation. This is one

DISMEMBERMENT OP THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 353

of the erroneous aspects of Mr. Wilson's conception,
and one of the bad consequences it has entailed.

The eviction of the Turks from Constantinople,
which the English wished for but which they dared
not carry into effect, does not thwart the scheme of
the Turkish Nationalists; it can only bring about a
reaction of the Moslem populations against foreign
intervention, and thus strengthen the Pan-Turanian
movement. Though this movement cannot carry
out all its aims, the eviction of the Turks obviously
must urge those populations to constitute a State
based both on the community of religion and the
community of race of its various elements, and from
which all alien ethnic elements would be expelled —
viz., Slavs, Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, who were
all an inherent source of weakness to the Turkish
Empire. This new State would include Anatolia,
Russian Azerbaijan, and Persian Azerbaijan, the
Russian territories in Central Asia — viz., Russian
Turkistan, Khiva, Bokhara — the whole of the region
of the Steppes; and towards it the Tatar populations
of the Volga, Afghanistan, and Chinese Turkistan
would necessarily be attracted.

As to the Arabs, the Turks have never been able
to gain their friendship, though they have done their
best to do so, and have drawn but little profit
from the money squandered plentifully in their vast
deserts. And the Russians have always stood in
the way of an understanding between Turkey and
the Arabian territories, because it would have
benefited the cause of Islam and therefore would
have hindered both their own designs on the territories
of Asia Minor and the ambitions of the Orthodox

23

354 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Church. Yet to the Turks as well as the Arabs — and
even to the Europeans — it would be a great advan-
tage not to injure the understanding and goodwill
that Islam engenders among these peoples, since its
creed has both a religious and a political aspect.

The maintenance of this Islamic union has been
wrongly called — in the disparaging sense of the word
— Pan-Islamism. Yet its ideal has nothing in
common with such doctrines as those of Pan-Ger-
manism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Americanism, Pan-Polism,
Pan-Hellenism, etc., which are all imperialistic
doctrines aiming at territorial conquests by military
or economic means, and also by the diffusion of their
own religious creeds and the extension of the influence
of their Churches. While Pan-Germanism aims at
the hegemony of the world; while Pan- Americanism
wants to control the whole of America; while Pan-
Slavism wishes to gather together all the Slavonic
elements — which is defensible — but also means to
supplant the old civilisation of Western Europe,
which it considers as " rotten," and to renovate
the world; while Pan-Polism, which has not such
ambitious aims, merely seeks, like Pan-Hellenism, to
conquer wider territories in order to restore Greater
Poland or Greater Greece — Islam, which does not
try to make any proselytes, has no other ambition
than to group all Moslem elements according to the
commandments of the Koran. Yet, Islam having
both a political and a religious purpose, a Pan-Islamic
concept might be defensible, and would be legitimate
from the Moslem point of view, whereas it cannot
be so from the Christian point of view. Pan-
Catholicism, on the contrary, is an impossible thing,

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 355

because Christianity does not imply a political
doctrine, and is distinct from temporal power —
though such a doctrine has sometimes been advocated.
For in the doctrine of monarchy, especially in France,
religion has always been held merely as a help, a
support, and the monarch, though he has often
been a defender of the Faith, has never looked upon
his power as dependent on the Papacy or bound up
with it. Islam, however, does not want to assert itself
in, and give birth to, a huge political movement — a
Pan-Islamic movement in the imperialistic sense of
the word — aiming at constituting a huge theocratic
State, including all the 300 million Moslems who are
now living. But there is between all Moslems a
deep moral solidarity, a mighty religious bond which
accounts for their sympathetic feeling towards
Turkey, and owing to which even the Moslem in-
habitants of countries which have lost their inde-
pendence still earnestly defend and jealously maintain
the privileges and dignity of the Caliph.

So it is a mistake to speak of the ambitious designs
of Islam, and the mistake has been made wilfully
Those who profess such an opinion are Pan-Slavic
Russians who want to deceive public opinion in the
world as to their true intent, and thus prepare for
territorial annexations, because Pan-Slavism is the
enemy of Islamism. As this Pan-Slavism has always
been, and is still more than ever, a danger to Europe,
it is the interest of the latter, in order to defend its
civilisation, not to fight against Islamism, but even
to support it. This necessity has been understood
by many Catholics who have always been favourable
to Turkey and by the Mussulmans, which accounts

356 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

for the long friendly intercourse between Moslems
and Catholics, and the Moslems' tolerance towards
the devotees of a religion which, on the whole, is
in complete contradiction to their own faith. On
the other hand, Islam appears as counterbalancing
Protestantism in the East, and it seems the future
of thought and morality and of any culture would
be endangered if the 60 million Indian Moslems
and the 220 million Indian Brahminists, Buddhists,
and the members of other sects ever listened to Mr.
Lloyd George and were connected with Protestantism.
Moreover, King Hussein, in the course of the
audience that he granted in July, 1920, to Prince
Ruffo, the leader of the Italian mission to Arabia,
before his departure, after saying that the Moslem
world resented the hostile attitude of the Powers
towards the Sultan of Constantinople, declared that
the Moslems are not actuated by any feeling of
conquest or proselytism, but simply claim the right
to preserve their independence.

VIII

THE MOSLEMS OF THE FORMER RUSSIAN
EMPIRE AND TURKEY

THE Supreme Council, in the course of one of its
last sittings, decided in January, 1920, practically
to recognise the independence of Georgia,1 Azer-
baijan, and Armenia.

It is deeply to be regretted that this decision came
so late, for, considering the circumstances under
which it was taken, it seemed to have been resorted
to in extremis and under the Bolshevist threat.

It was even announced, then denied, that the
Allies were going to send contingents to the Caucasus
in order to check the Bolshevist advance towards
Armenia, Turkey, Persia, and possibly towards
Mesopotamia and India. But under the present
circumstances, the Allies were not likely now to get
all the benefit they might have derived from this
measure if it had been taken long ago; and, on the
other hand, this measure was not likely to produce
any effect if the new States were not recognised
definitely and could not rely on the Allies' moral and
material support.

Since Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia seemed
to have been recognised as independent States, in

1 Since the French edition of this book was published,
Georgia was recognised, de jure, by the Supreme Council in
January, 1921.

357

358 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

order to incite them to check the Reds' advance,
how was it that the Republic of Northern Caucasus
had not been treated similarly ? The reason given
by the Supreme Council was that, as the greater
part of this State was occupied by Denikin's forces,
it did not think it proper to take a decision about it.
The true reason was that the Supreme Council
wanted to favour the Pan-Russian general, and it
was even rumoured that Koltchak and Denikin had
demanded this rich country to be set aside for the
Tsar, whom they wanted to restore to the throne.

Out of the 25 or 30 million Moslems living in
the whole of Russia, 6 or 8 millions were scattered
in the region of the Volga (Orenburg, Kazan) and
in the Crimea; they were about 6 millions in Tur-
kistan and 7 millions in the Caucasus region; about
2 millions in Northern Caucasus, 300,000 to 500,000
in Kuban, 600,000 in Georgia, 3,500,000 in Azar-
baiijan. Half the population is Moslem in the new
Armenian State, for only in two districts are the
Armenians in a majority, the Tatars being in a
majority in the others. It should be borne in mind
that all these Moslems, after the downfall of Tsardom,
had turned their hopes towards the Allies, especially
England, to safeguard their political independence.
Unfortunately neither Great Britain nor France paid
any heed to the repeated entreaties of M. Haidar
Bammate, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Northern Caucasus, or later on to the
appeals of the Georgian statesmen.

This omission appears all the more unaccountable
if we remember that the Allies, by settling the fate
of Armenia on this occasion, encroached upon the

MOSLEMS OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY 359

Turkish question and confused it with the Russian
question, which was already intricate enough; and
as it is clear that another obvious reason for the
Allies'5 decision was to befriend the Moslem popula-
tions of those regions, that they might not join the
Bolshevist cause, why then had Christian Armenia
been included in the aforesaid settlement, while
Northern Caucasus had been excluded from it ? Of
course, it is not to be regretted that Armenia bene-
fited by the Allies' decision, but it is impossible logi-
cally to explain how it came to be included in their
measure on account of its close relations with Georgia
and Azerbaijan, when, as a matter of fact, the
latter republics want to form a close union with
Caucasus. It was quite as urgent, therefore, to
recognise the Republic of Northern Caucasus as the
other three countries.

Moreover, as the Allies wanted to keep Bolshevism
out of Transcaucasia, it seemed obvious that their
first measure, from a military point of view, should
have been to hold a strong position in the Caucasus
Range, whose "slopes were being lapped by the Red
tide, and to organise its defence.

Indeed, the key to the defence of Transcaucasia
lies to the north of the Caucasus Range. Four
passes, crossing the mountains from the north to
the south, give access to it: the defile of Sukhum;
the road leading from Alatyr to Kutaris ; the Georgian
military road from Vladikavkaz to Tiflis; lastly,
the gates of Derbent, along the Caspian Sea. Only
the first of these defiles was held by the Georgians;
the other three were in the hands of the moun-
taineers, " the Gortsy " — viz., the Chechens, the

360 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Ossetes, the Ingushes, the Kabardians, and the
Daghestanians, who make up the Republic of
Northern Caucasus. It was easy for the moun-
taineers to set up a first line of defence on the Rivers
Terek and Malka, which constitute a good strategic
position, a second line before the denies, and, should
some detachments venture across the latter, they

V

would be quickly stopped by the mountaineers. If,
on the contrary, nothing was done, the Bolshevists
could easily cross the defiles and destroy the Batum-
Baku railway. These tribes, who had displayed so
much energy sixty years ago for the conquest of their
liberty, had fought against the Bolshevists from
November, 1917, till February, 1919; so they had
a right to expect the Allies would support their
claims.

Unfortunately, French policy resorted again to the
same manoeuvre to which it was indebted for its failure
on the Baltic coast, and which repeatedly deferred
a solution of the Russian question. For the Allies
refused to settle the condition of the Baltic States
definitely, and even tried to restore Russia to its
former state; they even urged the Baltic States, till
Yudenitch, Denikin, and Koltchak had been de-
feated, to carry on the onerous struggle they had
undertaken and to make all sacrifices of men and
money to capture Petrograd, which they were not
eager to do, as they would have merely paved the
way to the coming of the Pan-Russian generals.

The Allies made a similar mistake when they
indirectly asked the mountaineers of Caucasus,
who wanted to be independent, to attack the
Bolshevists, but gave them no guarantee they would

MOSLEMS OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY 361

recognise their independence. Of course, the moun-
taineers refused to play such a part, for they risked
finding themselves confronted one day or another
with a Russia that would despise their national
aspirations and would oppress them.

The situation could have been saved and the
balance between the States on the confines of the
Russian Empire could have been restored only by
a close understanding of all the Caucasian peoples,
after their independence should have been recog-
nised; the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan
agreed .on this point with the representatives of
Northern Caucasus, and these peoples were ready to
help each other mutually.

In the course of the last sitting of the Supreme
Council to which the delegates of Georgia and Azer-
baijan had been invited, the latter declared " that
the mountaineers were brave, that they had consti-
tuted some of the best units of the former Russian
army, and were bent upon stopping the Bolshevists,
but they lacked arms and ammunition."

Under such circumstances it seemed the Allies
could not possibly ignore these peoples' determina-
tion and turn a deaf ear to their earnest request, yet
they took no decision.

With regard to the Moslem question this attitude
of the Conference, which seemed bent upon ignoring
Northern Caucasus, was equally strange, for it was
bound to bring about discontent among these Moslem
populations. It was the more unaccountable as
the Bolshevists, who set up as protectors of these
populations, had sent .many emissaries among them,
who could not but derive profit from the Allies'

362 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

attitude. The Bolshevists had, of course, immedi-
ately recognised Daghestan a Moslem State.

Nor had the Republic of Northern Caucasus any
reason to be satisfied with the attitude assumed
by the British mission sent to Baku, for this mission
had constantly supported General Denikin, and
seemed to endeavour to destroy the economic and
political Caucasian union it had formed with Georgia
and Azerbaijan. The only theory which accounts
for the British attitude is that the English meant to
remain masters of Baku, and to leave the Russians
the oil-fields of Groznyi in Northern Caucasus, the
output of which was already important before the
war, and would certainly increase. But they were
mistaken in thinking that the petroleum of Groznyi,
which was partly used as fuel by the Vladikavkaz
railway and partly sent to the Black Sea ports to
be sold to Western Europe, was utilised in Central
Russia; it is chiefly the petroleum of the Baku area,
lying farther south, which is easily conveyed to
Russia across the Caspian Sea and up the Volga.

Again, the Allies ought to have taken into account
that the troublous state into which the Moslem
world had been thrown by the settlement of the
Turkish question as it was contemplated by the
Peace Conference might have most important re-
actions in all directions on the populations of the
former Russian Empire which now wanted to be
independent.

Yet the claims which the delegations of the
Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan — together with
Northern Caucasus — had set forth in January in
the course of their reception by the Supreme Council

MOSLEMS OF RUSSIAN EMPIKE AND TURKEY 363

concerning the support they might expect from the
Great Powers in case they should be attacked by
the Soviets, brought forth no answer; and the Allies
adjourned both the question of the defence of the
Transcaucasian Republics and the question of their
independence.

In consequence of all this, Northern Caucasus soon
fell a prey to Bolshevism, and some insurrections
broke out in Georgia. The Soviet Government sent
a great many agitators to these regions. Then the
Red army advanced in two columns, one of which
defeated Denikin and crossed the Kuban to invade
Caucasus, and the other spread over Kurdistan,
whence, after winning over to its cause the Tatar
and pro-Russian elements of the neighbouring
regions, it extended its field of action as far as Persia
and Mesopotamia.

As early as February the Russian Bolshevists
concentrated important forces near the northern
frontier of Azerbaijan under pretence of driving
away the remnants of Denikin's army, and after
hurriedly getting up a " Soviet Government " at
Daghestan, drew near the frontier of Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile their agents carried on an energetic
propaganda at Baku, where the inexperienced
Moslem leaders of Azerbaijan had foolishly left
almost all the administration of the country in the
hands of functionaries of the old regime or Russian
officers who thought that Bolshevism, especially with
the national character it had newly assumed, might
restore Russia to its former state.

Within the country an economic crisis on the
one hand, and on the other hand the Armenians'

364 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

aggressions, in the course of which they had mas-
sacred many Mussulmans, especially at Karabagh,
had raised a widespread discontent against the
Cabinet.

Emboldened by the success of the Bolshevists, who
benefited by these disturbances, their local accom-
plices, some Russian workmen supported by about
a hundred Moslem workmen, helped to organise a
series of raids. During the night of April 2t>-27 the
northern frontier of Azerbaijan was crossed at the
railway station of Jalama by a Bolshevist armoured
train, for the main body of the army of Azerbaijan
had been dispatched to Karabagh and Kasakg to
repel an Armenian attack, so that only one armoured
train and a few hundred soldiers had been left on
the northern frontier. This small detachment could
not prevent the advance of the Red forces which
followed the train, though it did its duty bravely
and destroyed the railway track. On April 27 the
Bolshevist forces reached the station of Khatchmaz,
where they were greeted by a group of local com-
munists.

At Baku, where the population lived in a state of
indifference and passivity, the local communists,
encouraged by the advance of the Russian Bol-
shevists, addressed an ultimatum to the Government,
which had declared itself in favour of armed resis-
tance, demanding the resignation of the Cabinet and
the handing over of the Government to the revolu-
tionary committee which had just been formed.
This ultimatum was enforced by the threat of the
bombardment of the town by the fleet of the
Caspian Sea.

MOSLEMS OF EUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY 365

The Government, which had vainly asked Georgia
for assistance, and had proposed to Armenia, before
the common danger, to put an end to the hostilities
at Karabagh in order to withdraw its troops and
dispatch them to the northern frontier, was com-
pelled on April 28 to hand over the power to the
people's commissioners. The members of the
Cabinet, against whom the Bolshevists had issued
a writ of arrest, hurried away and the communists
immediately resorted to their usual methods of
terrorism and plunder.

Instead of the " Moslem Brethren " the Bolshevist
emissaries had spoken of, the inhabitants of Baku
saw some Russian Bolshevists, accompanied by
Armenians who had been expelled by the former
Government, take possession of the town. As soon
as they arrived, the latter arrested all the foreign
missions, except the Persian mission. As the national
army was detained on the southern frontier by constant
Armenian attacks, the invaders dispatched Russian
detachments in all directions, to take possession of
the entire country. They addressed an ultimatum to
Armenia, demanding the evacuation of Karabagh. At
the same time Russian forces were sent via Zakatali
towards the Georgian frontier. At Baku the Moslem
militia was replaced by Russian workmen, and at
the same time orders were given immediately to
disarm the population of Ganjha (Elisavetpol), where
the governor and some notables were arrested and
incarcerated.

It is reported that at Ganjha 15,000 Moslems
were slaughtered by the Reds.

A correspondent of 11 Secolo, on coming back from

366 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Caucasus, wrote an article entitled " The East on
Fire" on May 25, 1920:

" The information that we have just received from Coiy-
stantinople, Anatolia, Caucasus, and Persia could not possibly
be worse. Bolshevism has won over Caucasus to its policy,
and from Baku it is carrying on a more and more energetic
propaganda in Persia and Turkistan. The British are
already fighting in the latter country with Bolshevism. All
this might have been foreseen.

"As it is cut off from Europe and encircled by hostile
bayonets, Bolshevism, which originated in Asia, is now
spreading over Asia. This does not mean that Caucasus
and Asia are ripe for a revolution of the poor against the rich.
It would be a foolish thing to say this. In Asia everybody
is poor, but nobody starves. In Asia there is no industry,
there are no organisations; therefore, there is no socialist
movement on the whole. But anybody who has been to
Caucasus lately must necessarily have noticed, to his great
surprise, evidences of a Moslem Bolshevism headed by Enver
Pasha and his brother Noury. The Republic of the moun-
taineers of Daghestan, the first that joined the Bolshevist
movement and made easier the advance of the Reds towards
the south, is headed by Enver Pasha. In Azerbaijan many
fanatic admirers of Russia are to be met with.

" And what are the reasons for this ? They are many.
First, the desperate condition of the new States which came
into being immediately after the Brest-Litovsk peace. In
Paris the Conference laid down frontiers, but never thought
the first thing to do was to put an end to the economic crisis
prevailing in those countries. And so an absurd thing
happened — wealthy countries living in frightful misery, and
issuing paper currency which was of no value on the world's
markets. Typical is the case of Azerbaijan, which had
millions of tons of petroleum at Baku, but did not know
where or how to export them."

In July it was announced that the situation of the
Moslems in Armenia had become critical, as for the
last two months the Erivan Government and the
"Tashnak" party had been carrying on a policy
of violence and massacres against them. What
remained of the Moslem populations had been com-
pelled to leave their homes and property and flee

MOSLEMS OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY 367

to Persia. The Armenian Government had even
appointed a Commission especially to draw up a list
of the crops left by the Moslems and the Greeks in
the district. At the end of June, in the district of
Zanguibazar, about twenty Moslem villages had been
destroyed by bombardments and their inhabitants
put to death. By that time the Moslem population
of Transcaucasia was being attacked both by the
Armenians and the Bolshevists.

M. Khan-Khoiski, ex-Prime Minister, and Dr. H.
Aghaef, former Vice-President of the Parliament of
Azerbaijan, were assassinated at Tiflis, where they
had sought refuge, the former on June 19 and the
latter on July 19, by Armenians belonging to the
" Tashnak " party, of which the leader of the
Armenian Government and most Ministers are
members.

This murder of the leaders of Azerbaijan, who
carried on the war against the invaders of their
country, served the Bolshevist cause, but aroused
much resentment among the Moslems of Azerbaijan
and Georgia, who were exasperated by the Bolshe-
vists' frightful tyranny and now hated Bolshevism
as much as they had formerly hated Tsardom.

The delegation of Azerbaijan handed to the Spa
Conference a note in which they drew its attention
to the condition of their country. On the other
hand, the members of the former Cabinet made
energetic efforts to rid their country of the Bolshevist
invasion. For this purpose they sent delegates to
Daghestan and Northern Caucasus to plan a common
resistance, as Daghestan, the tribes of the mountains
of Northern Caucasus, and Azerbaijan were on

368 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

friendly terms and shared the same views. By this
time a small part of the Red armies still occupied
the Baku area, whence the Bolshevists sent reinforce-
ments to the detachments fighting in Persia.

About the same time it was announced that Enver
Pasha had been appointed commander-in-chief of
the Bolshevist forces advancing towards India, and
the Bolshevist troops in Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan,
and Turkistan had been put under his command.
In this way the Soviets probably sought to compel
England to make peace with Russia at once.

At Tabriz a separatist movement was beginning
to make itself felt with a view to bringing about the
union of Persian Azerbaijan, of which this town is
the centre, with the Republic of Azerbaijan, the
capital of which is Baku.

All this Bolshevist activity naturally caused much
anxiety among those who closely watched the
development of Eastern events, for Soviet Russia
in another way and with different aims merely
carried on the work of Russian imperialism both in
order to hold Great Britain in check in the East and
to give the whole world the benefit of the Soviet
paradise. As the Allied policy with regard to
Turkey had roused the whole of Islam, the union of
the Bolshevist elements and the Turkish Nationalists
seemed inevitable when the question of the future
fate of Caucasus should be settled. It was only too
much to be feared, after what had just taken place
in Azerbaijan, that Soviet Russia, feeling it neces-
sary to get the start of the Turkish Nationalists,
would try to take possession of Georgia DOW she held
Azerbaijan, as a guarantee both against the hostility

MOSLEMS OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY 369

of England and against the opposition that might
sooner or later arise on the Turkish side. It then
appeared that the Turkish Nationalists had come
to a merely provisional agreement with the Russian
Bolshevists to disengage themselves on the Russian
side, and secure their help against Europe, which
threatened Turkey; and that, on the contrary, the
Angora Government, some members of which are
Chechens and Ossetes, when brought face to face
with the old historical necessities, would be one day
compelled to resort to the old policy of defending
the Moslem world against the Slavonic world. For
notwithstanding the inherent incompatibility between
the minds of these two peoples, the Allied policy,
through its blunders, had achieved the paradoxical
result of making a Russo-Turkish alliance temporarily
possible, and to bring together the Moslems — so
unresponsive as a rule to the idle verbiage and sub-
versive tendencies of revolutionists — and the Bol-
shevist Slavs, who were still their political enemies.
And so it turned out that the attitude assumed by
the various European Powers in regard to the Turkish
problem and the solution that was to eventuate were
prominent factors in the future relations between
each of those Powers and Asia. Now the Turks, who
alone are able to bring about an understanding
between the Moslems of Caucasus and those of Asia,
are also the only people who can bring about a
lasting peace in that part of the confines of Europe
and Asia, and settle the relations between those
Moslem populations and the West.

24

IX

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS

THROUGH a singular aberration, the dismemberment
of Turkey and the Turks' eviction from Europe
were being advocated at a time when the idea of the
restoration of Russia had not yet been given up, for
the various States now detached from the former
Russian Empire had not yet been definitely recog-
nised; and among the promoters or supporters of
this policy were many defenders of old Russia under
a more or less transparent disguise.

Though, from the point of view of European
policy, the situation of the two countries widely
differed, by dismembering Turkey before the Russian
question was settled, at least in its solvable part —
viz., with regard to the heterogeneous peoples — the
Allies made a mistake of the same kind, or at least
of the same magnitude, as the one they had made
when they dismembered the Dual Monarchy and yet
did not destroy German unity, or rather Prussian
hegemony.

Russia had already taken possession of several
Turkish territories, and not so long ago she plainly
declared she had not given up her ambitious designs
on Constantinople.

This open hostility of the Russians towards the
Turks is of very long standing.

370

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 371

The first Russian attacks against Turkey, as ex-
plained in the early part of this book, date back
to 1672. After the victory of Poltava, in 1709,
which the next year gave him Livonia, Esthonia,
and Carelia, Peter the Great turned against the
Turks, the allies of Charles XII, King of Sweden.
But Charles XII, who had sought shelter at Bender,
in Turkey, after the battle of Poltava, brought over
the Grand Vizier Baltaji Mohammed to his views,
and induced him to declare war on Turkey. Peter
the Great, encircled by the Turks at Hush, between
the Pruth and the marshes, was going to capitulate
when Catherine I, in order to save him, made peace
by bribing the Grand Vizier, who soon after was
exiled to Mytilene. The Turks only demanded the
restitution of Azov in 1711. In 1732 Peter the Great
took from Persia the provinces of Daghestan, Der-
bend, Shirwan, Mazandaran, and Astra bad. At that
time, while Villeneuve was ambassador at Con-
stantinople (1728-41) and Austria and Russia began
to turn greedy eyes on Turkey, France declared
" the existence of Turkey was necessary to the peace
of Christendom," and later on Choiseul-Gouffier,
who was the French king's last ambassador from
1784 to 1792, strove to save the Turks from the
ambitious designs of Catherine II.

Catherine, taking advantage of the intrigues
carried on in the Morea with two Greeks, Papas-
Oghlou and Benaki, dispatched a fleet to the
Mediterranean to bring about a Greek rising against
Turkey; the Ottoman fleet which sought shelter at
Tchesme, on the coast of Asia Minor, was burnt
by Russian fireships on July 7, 1770.

372 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

After the 1770-74 war, the Porte, which was
Poland's ally, lost Bukovina and Lesser Tatary,
whose independence was recognised by the treaty of
Kuchuk-Kainarji on July 21, 1774, but which
became a Russian province in 1783. The treaty of
Kuchuk-Kainarji ceded Kinburn and Yenikale to
Russia, left to the Christians the principalities lying
to the north of the Danube, and guaranteed the
Orthodox Greeks' liberty under the patronage
of the Russian ambassador at Constantinople.
Catherine II also compelled the Turks by the same
treaty not to defend the independence of Poland,
threatened by Russia with the complicity of the
Great Powers, and to give her a right of intervention
in their home affairs. The Tatars of the Crimea
and Kuban, detached from Turkey, soon after fell
under the Russian sway, in 1783. The Sultan even
had to sign a treaty granting a right of free naviga-
tion in the Black Sea and in the rivers of his empire.
About the same time the European Powers began
to interfere in Turkey : that was the beginning of the
" Eastern question." In opposition to the Austro-
Russian alliance of Catherine and Joseph II, England,
dissatisfied with Russia's attitude in the American
War of Independence, and wishing to find allies
in Germany to counterbalance Russian influence in
Europe, concluded an alliance with Prussia, Sweden,
Poland, and Turkey. The death of Frederic II
soon put an end to this coalition, and Russia's un-
friendly attitude, her encroachments in Caucasus,
and her territorial claims in Bessarabia, compelled
Turkey on August 16, 1787, to declare war on
Catherine, and Joseph II entered into the war in

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 373

1788. The Austrians took Khotin; the Turkish fleet
was destroyed at Otchakov; Belgrade fell on
October 8, 1789. Then Leopold, Joseph II's brother,
left the Turks and made peace with Turkey at
Sistova on August 4, 1791. The Russians, who had
defeated the Turks at Machin, were about to invade
the Empire when, as a result of the intervention of
England and Prussia, a treaty of peace was signed
at Jassy, by which the Dniester became the new
frontier between the two States. Thus Russia, who
owing to the perturbed state of Europe was preparing
to dismember Poland, was compelled to give up her
dream of restoring the Byzantine Empire.

After the 1809-12 war, Turkey lost the provinces
lying between the Dnieper and the Danube which
were ceded to Russia by the treaty of Bukharest.

Russia, who, by the convention of Akkennan in
October, 1826, had compelled Turkey to recognise
the autonomy of Serbia and Moldo-Wallachia and
cede her the ports of the coast of Circassia and
Abkasia, declared war on her again on April 26, 1828,
after the manifesto she had issued to her Moslem
subjects on December 28, 1827. The Russians took
Braila, advanced as far as Shumla, captured Varna,
and laid siege to Silistria, but the plague and food
shortage compelled them to make a disastrous retreat.
In Asia they took Kars, Akhalzikel, and Bayazid.
The next year they entered Erzerum; Diebitch
captured Silistria, outflanked the Grand Vizier's
army shut up in Shumla, crossed the Balkan moun-
tains, and laid siege to Adrianople. On Septem-
ber 14, 1820, Turkey signed a treaty in the latter
town, which put Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia

374 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

under Russian protectorate, and by which she ceded
to Russia all the coast of Transcaucasia, granted her
the free passage of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles,
and promised to pay a war contribution of 137 million
francs.

In 1833 Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, who, not
having been able to obtain the Morea through the
Powers' support, wanted to capture Syria, defeated
the Turks at Konia and threatened Constantinople.
The Tsar, Nicholas I, who hoped he could turn
Turkey into a kind of Russian protectorate, then
sent Mouraviev to Mahmoud to offer to put at his
disposal a fleet and an army to fight with Mehemet
Ali. A Russian fleet came and cast anchor before
Constantinople, and a Russian detachment landed
in the town. But then France, Austria, and Prussia,
perhaps foreseeing the danger of a Russian occupa-
tion which might pave the way to a definite posses-
sion, asked the Sultan to make the necessary con-
cessions to his vassal, and the latter to accept them.
The treaty of Kutahia, signed on May 4, 1833, gave
the Pasha of Egypt the whole of Syria and the
province of Adana. Russia withdrew her troops,
but did not lay down arms, and thus Count Orlov
compelled the Porte to sign the treaty of Unkiar-
i-Skelessi, which stipulated an offensive and defensive
alliance between Russia and Turkey, and the closing
of the Dardanelles to the other Powers. Turkey was
now under Russian tutelage.

After the defection of Ahmed Pasha, who led the
Turkish fleet at Alexandria, Great Britain, lest
Russia should establish her protectorate over Turkey,
offered to France, through Lord Palmerston, to

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 375

participate in a naval demonstration, but France
declined the offer. Metternich then suggested a
conference between the representatives of the five
Great Powers, in order to substitute their guarantee
for a Turkish protectorate. On July 27, 1839, the
ambassadors handed the Sublime Porte a note
communicating their agreement, and advising that
no definite decision should be taken without their
co-operation. Then England, having no further fear
of Russian intervention, turned against Mehemet
Ali, and Baron de Brunov even proposed an Anglo-
Russian agreement.

Owing to the intervention of Austria, which was
averse to a war with France, the question of Egypt
was only settled on July 13, 1841, by a hatti-sherif,
which gave Mehemet Ali the hereditary possession
of Egypt, and by the treaty of London, which
guaranteed the neutrality of the Straits, as Russia
wanted to control the Straits and conquer Con-
stantinople to free the Christians in the Balkan
Peninsula from the so-called Ottoman tyranny, and
" relight the tapers which had been put out by the
Turks" in St. Sophia, restored to Orthodoxy.
France, following the old traditions of her foreign
policy and in agreement with England, confined the
Russians within the Black Sea by the convention
of the Straits in 1841, and thus secured, not the
integrity, but the existence of the Turkish Empire.

But the Tsar, Nicholas I, who was bent on defend-
ing the Greek faith within the Ottoman Empire,
was anxious to see Turkey pursue the work of the
Tanzimat — i.e., the new regime — confirmed by the
promulgation by Abdul Mejid of the hatti-sherif

376 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

of Gulhane on November 3, 1839. In 1844 he made
overtures concerning the partition of Turkey, to
England, to which the latter country turned a deaf
ear. Thanks to the support of Great Britain and
France, the Turkish troops, which had been sent to
Moldavia and Wallachia after the riots which had
broken out after the revolution, compelled the Tsar
in 1849-51 to withdraw his army beyond the
Pruth.

In 1850 France protested against the encroach-
ments of Russia in the East, who, in order to protect
the Greek monks living in Palestine and secure her
own religious domination, wanted to deprive the
Roman monks of their time-honoured rights over the
Christian sanctuaries.

In 1853 the Tsar sent Prince Menshikov to Con-
stantinople in order to demand a formal treaty
granting the Greek Church religious independence
and temporal privileges. The Sublime Porte, backed
by France and England, rejected the ultimatum.
The latter Powers then sent a fleet to the
Dardanelles, and the next month — on July 4, 1853 —
Russia occupied Moldavia and Wallachia. At the
instigation of Austria, the Powers assembled at
Vienna on the 24th of the same month drew up a
conciliatory note, which was rejected by Russia.
Then the English fleet sailed up the Dardanelles,
and on October 4 Turkey declared war on Russia.
Austria tried again, at the Vienna Conference which
she reopened in December, 1853, to bring about an
understanding between Russia and Turkey. But
Nicholas I declared that he meant to treat only
with England and Prussia to restore peace in

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 377

the East, which Turkey looked upon as an affront.
He also rejected Napoleon Ill's mediation on
January 29, 1854, and the Franco-English sum-
mons on February 27, upon which France declared
war on him. Notwithstanding the political views
which unfortunately are still held by most of the
present diplomatists, and in pursuance of which the
Powers had already checked Mehemet Ali's success
and prevented Turkey resuming her former state,
France and England realised the dangerous conse-
quences of the Russian threat and backed Turkey.
In consequence of the manoauvres of Austria and the
unwillingness of Prussia, who had declared " she
would never fight against Russia," the Allies, who
were at Varna, instead of attacking the principalities,
decided to launch into the Crimean expedition.
Finally, after the ultimatum drawn up by Austria,
to which the Emperor Alexander submitted at the
instigation of Prussia, a treaty of peace signed in
Paris on March 30, 1856, recognised the integrity of
Turkey, abolished the Russian protectorate over the
principalities, and guaranteed the independence of
Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, under the suzerainty
of the Ottoman Empire. Our diplomats seem then to
have partly realised the extent of the danger con-
stituted by the Slavs, and to have understood that
the Turks, by driving back the Slavs and keeping
them away from Western and Mediterranean Europe
since the fourteenth century, had enabled Western
civilisation to develop.

As the influence of France in Turkey was im-
perilled after her defeat in 1870, Russia took advan-
tage of this to declare she would no longer submit to

378 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

the most important clauses of the London treaty
of March 13, 1871. Russia, whose ambassador in
Turkey at that time was General Ignatiev, took in
hand the cause of the independence of the Bulgarian
Church, for which, in 1870, she had obtained the
creation of a national exarchate with its own hier-
archy, which had exasperated the Phanar at Con-
stantinople and brought about deadly encounters
between Turks and Bulgarians.

In 1875 Russia, alarmed at the reforms instituted
by Turkey, and fearing the European organisation
she was attempting to introduce into the Empire
might strengthen it and thus prove an obstacle to
the realisation of her designs, fomented a Christian
rising in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was a
pretext for her to declare war on Turkey. Russia,
backed by the Bulgarians, obliged Turkey to agree
to an armistice and to an International Conference at
Constantinople. In consequence of the rejection by
Turkey of the protocol of London and the Russian
comminatory note which followed it, Russia carried
on the hostilities which, after the defeat of Plevna
in Europe and the capture of Kars in Asia, led to
the negotiations of San Stefano, on March 3, 1878.

Lastly, in the same year, on the occasion of the
treaty of Berlin, which gave Kars to Russia and
modified the San Stefano preliminaries by cancelling
several of the advantages Russia hoped to obtain,
France, pursuing her time-honoured policy, showed
clearly her sympathy for Turkey, by bringing to
bear on her behalf the influence she had regained
since 1871.

By so doing, France incurred Germany's anger,

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 379

for we have already shown the latter country's
sympathy for Slavism. As recent events have
proved once more, an alliance with Russia could only
be brought about by a corresponding understanding
with Germany, since Russia, where German influence
has been replaced by Slavonic influence, is now
being invincibly drawn towards Germany, where
Slavonic influence is now prevalent. This twofold
understanding could only be brought about by
sacrificing the whole of Western Europe and all her
old civilisation. The Europe " which ends on the
Elbe," as has been said, would become more and more
insignificant in such a political concept, and there
would only remain in the world, standing face to
face for a decisive struggle, the Germano-Russians
and the Anglo-Saxons.

Spurred on by the annexation of Eastern Rumelia
to Bulgaria, consequent on the rising of September 18,
1885, at Philippopolis, the Macedonian Slavs carried
on an agitation the next year, in 1886, in favour of
their union with Bulgaria, and resorted to an insur-
rection in 1895-96.

Lastly, the two Balkan wars of 1912-13, not-
withstanding the complexity and intricacy of the
interests at stake, may be looked upon to a certain
extent as a fresh outcome of the Slavonic pressure
and the ambitions of Orthodoxy.

The Russians, who had driven back the Turanian
peoples to Turkistan, began the conquest of this
country in 1815. -From 1825 to 1840 they subdued
the Khirgiz. They took Khiva in 1854, and in 1864

380 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

conquered the lower valley of the Syr Daria. In
1865 they occupied Tashkent, and in 1867 grouped
the territories they had conquered under the
authority of the Governor-General of Turkistan.
In 1873 they occupied all the country lying between
the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, and in 1876 took
Kokand.

Even before the war, as has already been seen,
Russia had turned her attention in the East towards
Armenia, who, owing to her situation, could best
serve her policy of expansion in Asia Minor. Accord-
ing to the plans of the Imperial Russian Government
set forth on June 8, 1813, Armenia was to be converted
into an autonomous province under the power of
a governor-general, including the vilayets of Erzerum,
Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharput, and Sivas, with the
exception of a few territories whose boundaries had
not yet been fixed. But in a memorandum presented
at the same time, the Imperial Russian Government
insisted upon " the close connection between the
Armenian question and the problems the Russian
administration had to solve in Transcaucasia." These
plans lay in abeyance, for they were opposed by the
German policy, which was hostile to any Russian
encroachment on Turkish territories; and Russia, on
the other hand, prevented Germany obtaining the
concession of a railway line which was to connect
the Turkish ports on the Black Sea, Samsun and
Trebizond, with the Baghdad Railway and the
Mediterranean Sea at Alexandretta, and settling down
on the coast of the Black Sea.

As the Entente had given Russia a free hand, the
latter country, as has been seen, resumed the realisa-

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 381

tion of her plans as soon as war broke out. Russia, who
had begun the conquest of Caucasus in 1797 and of
the Transcaspian isthmus from 1828 to 1878, occupied
Upper Armenia in 1914-15. The Young Turks, who
believed in the triumph of Germany, expected that,
thanks to the latter, they could hold in check the
Russian designs, and for this reason stood by her side.

Meanwhile the Russian policy with regard to
Turkey asserted itself more and more energetically,
especially in reference to Constantinople, so that
the antagonism of the two nations, created by
Muscovite ambition, had grown into a deep and
lasting hostility.

It was recommended in the testament which is
supposed to have been written by Peter the Great —

" Article 9. To draw as close as possible to Constantinople
and India, for he who rules over that city will rule over the
world. It is advisable, therefore, to bring about continual
wars, now in Turkey, now in Persia, to establish shipbuilding
yards on the Black Sea, gradually to get the mastery of that
sea and of the Baltic Sea — the possession of these two seas
being absolutely necessary for the triumph of our plans — to
hurry on the decay of Persia, to advance as far as the Persian
Gulf, to restore the once thriving Eastern trade, if possible
through Syria, and to advance as far as India, the emporium
of the world.

" When once we are there, we shall no longer be dependent
on English gold.

" Article 11. To show the House of Austria it has an
interest in ejecting the Turks from Europe, and to neutralise
her jealousy when we shall conquer Constantinople, either by
bringing about a war between her and the old European States,
or by giving her a share of the conquest — and take it back
from her later on."

Russia never gave up this policy; indeed, she did
not carry out her plans by force of arms, for the
other Powers would have opposed them; but she

382 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

resorted to all possible means to ensure its triumph.
She constantly aimed at the disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire by supporting and grouping the
Christian elements included in this empire, especially
those of Slavonic race and Orthodox faith; and thus
she really partitioned the Empire and bound to
herself the old Ottoman provinces now raised to
the rank of autonomous States. She acted most
cautiously, and in order to carry out her plans peace-
fully she sought to dismember Turkey gradually and
weaken her in order to finally rule over her. It has
been rightly said that as early as 1770 the Russians
opened the Eastern question exactly as it stands
to-day, and already advocated the solution they
have always insisted upon.1

A century ago Alexander I declared it was time
to drive the Turks out of Europe. Talleyrand, in the
account he gave of the conversations between that
Emperor and the French ambassador, relates that
he said one day :

" Now is the time to give the plans laid down by us at
Tilsit the liberal aspect that befits the deeds of enlightened
sovereigns. Our age, still more than our policy, requires
that the Turks be driven into Asia; it will be a noble deed to
free these beautiful lands. Humanity wants the eviction
of those barbarians; civilisation demands it."

But Napoleon had fully understood the Russian
policy, for at the end of his life he said at St.
Helena: " I could have shared Turkey with Russia;
many a time did I speak about it with the Emperor,
Alexander I, but every time Constantinople proved
the stumbling-block. The Tsar demanded it, and

1 Albert Sorel, La Question d'Orient au XVI 1 1* siede,
pp. 81, 86, 277.

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 383

I could not cede it; for it is too precious a key; it is
worth an empire."

At the memorable sitting of the House of Commons
of March 29, 1791, some speakers expressed the
anxiety felt in Great Britain, just after Catherine II
had annexed the Crimea, lest the Eussians should
capture the whole of the East. But Fox, the leader
of the Liberal party, declared he sa^ no ground for fear
in the constant increase of Muscovite power; he did
his best to please the Tsarina, who, on her side, con-
tinued to flatter him to obtain what she wanted from
England; he recalled that the British themselves
had opened the Mediterranean to Russian ships
twenty years before, and he had told the French
Minister Vergennes, who desired him to protest
against the annexation of the Crimea, that Great
Britain did not wish to raise any difficulty with
Catherine II.

Unfortunately, the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis
XV's ambassador, and the Comte de Bonneval,
who had been converted to Islam, had been the last
Frenchmen who had supported the Sublime Porte
against the Russian Tsar's hostility and endeavoured
to use Islam as the protector of the liberty of peoples
imperilled by the Tsars; and yet this old policy of
France had the advantage both of benefiting French
trade and counterbalancing the power of the enemies
of France.1 On the other hand, at the Congress of
Sistovo in 1791, Sir Robert Murray Keith, who
acted as mediator in the conclusion of the Austro-
Turkish treaty of peace, recommended his fellow-

1 Albert Vandal, Une ambassade franfaise en Orient sou*
Lmiis XV, pp. 4, 8, 331, 447.

384 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

countrymen " to let the Turks dwindle down in their
own dull way." So now French policy and English
policy were going the same way.

During the reign of Charles X, the Polignac
Cabinet was willing to sacrifice Constantinople to
the Russians in return for the left bank of the Rhine,
and in 1828 Chateaubriand, French ambassador at
Rome, favoured an alliance with the Tsar in order
to obtain the revision of the 1815 treaties, at the
cost of Constantinople. Moreover, Admiral Sir
Edward Codrington, by destroying the Turco-
Egyptian fleet at Navarino on October 20, 1827,
with the combined fleets of Great Britain, France,
and Russia, furthered the Russian Tsar's plans.

As the direct capture of the Straits was bound
to raise diplomatic difficulties, Nicholas I, on Sep-
tember 4, 1892, summoned a secret council to discuss
what policy Russia was to pursue on this point. The
opinion which prevailed was expressed in a memo-
randum drawn up by a former diplomatist, Dimitri
Dashkov, then Minister of Justice, and in a draft
partition of the Turkish Empire penned by a
Greek, Capodistria. This secret committee, dread-
ing the opposition of the Western States, decided to
postpone the partition lest, as Great Britain and
France refused their consent, it should not finally
benefit the designs of Russia and Greece on Con-
stantinople. These secret debates have been summed
up in a book published in 1877 -,1 and M. Goriainov,
in the book he wrote on this question in 1910,2

1 Martens, Etude historique sur la politique russe dans la
question d'Orient, 1877.

* Goriainov, Le Bosphore et lev Dardanelles, 1910, pp. 25-27.

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 385

thought it proper to praise the consistent mag-
nanimity of the Tsars towards the Turks — whereas
the policy which maintained that no reforms would
ever be instituted by Turkey of her own free-will if
they were not urged on by diplomatic intrigues or
international interference, and that " the sick man "
could only be restored to health by the intervention
of Christendom and under the Orthodox tutelage,
was the real cause of the decay of Turkey
and the origin of all the intricacies of the Eastern
problem.

In 1830 Lord Holland, Fox's nephew — it will be
remembered that on March 29, 1791, Fox had said
in the House of Commons he was proud of support-
ing Russia's advance to the East, in opposition to
William Pitt, who wanted to admit Turkey into the
European concert — declared he was sorry, as " a
citizen of the world/' that the Russians had not
yet settled down in the Golden Horn.

Besides, whereas the Tories felt some anxiety at
the territorial development of Russia — without
thinking of making use of Turkey to consolidate the
position in the East — the Whigs, on the contrary,
to use the words of Sir Robert Adair in 1842,
thought they could bring the Muscovite Empire into
the wake of the United Kingdom.

In June, 1844, the Tsar himself came to London
in order to induce Great Britain to approve his
Eastern policy, and Russian diplomacy felt so con-
fident she could rely on the support of the English
Liberal Cabinet that in 1853 Nicholas I, in the
overtures made to Sir Hamilton Seymour, expressed
his conviction that he could settle the Turkish

25

386

problem in ten minutes' conversation with Lord
Aberdeen.

On June 4, 1878, Lord Beaconsfield, who looked
upon the part of England in the East as that of a
moral protectorate over Islam and a mediator between
Europe and Asia, by ensuring the institution of a
system of reforms, signed a treaty of alliance with
Turkey, by which England pledged herself to protect
the Porte against Russian greediness in Asia. Unfor-
tunately, Mr. Gladstone, under the influence of the
ideas we have already expounded,1 soon reversed the
Eastern policy of England and unconsciously made
his country the Tsar's ally against Turkey.

Russia, to whom it was now impossible, since the
Bulgarians and Rumanians were no longer under
Ottoman dominion, to reach the shores of the
Bosporus through Thrace and to conquer Con-
stantinople and the Straits, which had been the aim
of her policy for centuries, then turned her designs
towards Turkish Armenia and Anatolia, as we have
just seen, in order to reach Constantinople through
Asia.

Tlutshev, in one of his poems entitled Russian
Qeography, said:

" Moscow, Peter's town, and Constantino's town, are the
three sacred capitals of the Russian Empire. But how far
do its frontiers extend to the north and the east, to the
south and the west ? Fate will reveal it in the future.
Seven inland seas and seven great rivers, from the Nile to
the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga to the
Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube — this is the
Russian Empire, and it will last through untold centuries !
So did the Spirit predict. So did Daniel prophesy !"

1 See supra, p. 114.

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 387

And in another place :

" Soon will the prophecy be fulfilled and the fateful time
come ! And in regenerated Byzantium the ancient vaults
of St. Sophia will shelter Christ's altar again. Kneel down
before that altar, thou Russian Tsar, and rise, thou Tsar of
all the Slavs."

The manoeuvres in which Great Britain and Russia
indulged during the first Balkan crisis in regard to
the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are another
striking proof of the rivalry between these two
nations concerning the Straits, for they plainly show
that their possession was still the chief ambition of
Russia, and that Great Britain, on the other hand,
was still determined to control the Straits directly
or indirectly, as she could not possibly seize them
openly.

At the time of that annexation, the Western
Powers and Russia had proposed that a conference
should be summoned to decide the fate of that
country. But this proposal did not please Germany,
who, though she had a right to be angry with Austria,
who had neither consulted nor warned her, yet
wanted to reconcile the patronising attitude she had
assumed towards Turkey with her obligations as an
ally of the Dual Monarchy. So Russia was obliged
to submit to the annexation, and the idea of a
conference was given up after Prince von Biilow had
stated that Germany would back Austria, but that
in regard to the indemnity claimed by Turkey as a
compensation for the loss of her suzerainty over
Bosnia - Herzegovina she would support Turkey.
Meanwhile, M. de Tschirschkly, German ambassador
at Vienna, did his best both to isolate Austria and to

388 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

bring her to rely more and more on German friend-
ship by striving to disturb the traditional friendly
intercourse between London and Vienna ; and he took
advantage of the disappointment caused in Austria
by the breaking off of the negotiations with Turkey
to make England responsible for their failure and
embitter the enmity already prevailing between
Austria and Russia.

Now at this juncture Russia is reported to have
declared her willingness to support Turkey, in return
for which she wanted her to open up the Straits to
her ships. This secret understanding was revealed
to the British Government by Kiamil Pasha, a friend
of England, who, at the suggestion of the British
embassy, asked Russia whether, in case war should
break out, she would take up arms in favour of
Turkey. At the same time England hinted to the
St. Petersburg Cabinet that she was aware it had
opened negotiations, and that, should these negotia-
tions bring about an understanding between Turkey
and Russia, the relations between their two countries
would be severely strained, and the situation would
become critical. And so it turned out that Turkey
too submitted to the annexation, and did not insist
upon the meeting of the Conference.

Meanwhile Russia had no thought of giving up her
designs on Constantinople, as is proved by the revela-
tions made in the Memoirs of Count Witte, the well-
known Russian diplomatist and ex-Prime Minister,
which were published in the Daily Telegraph in
January, 1921. In one of his articles, concerning
Nicholas II's character, we read that a Russo-
Turkish war had been planned at the suggestion of

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 389

M. de Nelidov, at that time Russian ambassador to
Turkey.

" In the latter period of the year 1896, writes Count
Witte, there was a massacre of Armenians in Constantinople,
preceded by a similar massacre in Asia Minor. In October,
His Majesty returned from abroad, and Nelidov, our ambas-
sador to Turkey, came to St. Petersburg. His arrival
gave rise to rumours about various measures which were
going to be taken against Turkey. These rumours forced me
to submit to His Majesty a memorandum, in which I stated
my views on Turkey, and advised against the use of force.
On November 21 (December 3) I received a secret memoir
drafted by Nelidov. The ambassador spoke in vague terms
about the alarming situation in Turkey, and suggested that
we should foment incidents which would create the legal
right and the physical possibility of seizing the Upper Bos-
porus. Nelidov's suggestion was discussed by a special
conference presided over by His Majesty. The ambassador
insisted that a far-reaching upheaval was bound to occur in
the near future in the Ottoman Empire, and that to safeguard
our interests we must occupy the Upper Bosporus. He was
naturally supported by the War Minister and the Chief of
Staff, General Oberouchev, for whom the occupation of the
Bosporus and, if possible, of Constantinople, was a veritable
idte fixe. The other Ministers refrained from expressing
their opinion on the subject, so that it fell to my lot to oppose
this disastrous project, "which I did with vigour and deter-
mination. I pointed out that the plan under consideration
would eventually precipitate a general European war, and
shatter the brilliant political and financial position in which
Emperor Alexander III left Russia.

" The Emperor at first confined himself to questioning the
members of the Conference. When the discussion was closed
he declared that he shared the ambassador's view. Thus
the matter was settled, at least in principle — namely, it was
decided to bring about such events in Constantinople as
would furnish us with a serious pretext for landing troops and
occupying the Upper Bosporus. The military authorities
at Odessa and Sebastopol were instructed immediately to
start the necessary preparations for the landing of troops in
Turkey. It was also agreed that at the moment which Nelidov
considered opportune for the landing he would give the
signal by sending a telegram to our financial agent in London,
requesting him to purchase a stated amount of grain. The
dispatch was to be immediately transmitted to the Director
of the Imperial Bank and also to the Minister of the Navy."

390 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

M. de Nelidov went back to Constantinople to carry
out this plan, and war seemed so imminent that one
of the secretaries of the director of the Imperial
Bank " kept vigil all night long, ready to receive the
fateful telegram," and was instructed to transmit
it to the director.

" Fearing the consequences of the act, I could not refrain
from sharing my apprehensions with several persons very
intimate with the Emperor, notably Grand Duke Vladimir
Alexandrovich and Pobiedonostzev. ... I do not know
whether it was the influence of these men or the influence of
that Power which rules the whole world and which we call
God, but His Majesty changed his mind and instructed Neli-
dov, soon after the latter's departure for Constantinople, to
give up his designs."

After the attack by the Turkish ships on October 29
and 30, the Emperor Nicholas, on November, 1914,
issued a manifesto to his people, which, though
sibylline in tone, plainly asserted Russia's designs on
Constantinople and showed that she meant to avail
herself of circumstances to carry them out.

" The Turkish fleet, led by Germans, has dared treacher-
ously to attack our Black Sea coast. We, with all the
peoples of Russia, feel quite confident that Turkey's rash
intervention will only hurry on her doom, and open to Russia
the way to the solution of the historical problem bequeathed
to us by our forefathers on the shores of the Black Sea."1

In the course of an audience which Nicholas II
granted to M. Maurice Paleologue, French ambassador,
at Tsarkoie-Selo on November 21, 1914, and in the
course of which he laid down the main lines of the
peace which he thought should be dictated to the
Central Powers, he considered how the settlement

1 Daily Telegraph, January 5, 1921.

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 391

of the war would affect the other nations, and
declared :

" In Asia Minor I shall have naturally to take care of
the Armenians; I could not possibly replace them under the
Turkish yoke. Shall I have to annex Armenia ? I will
annex it only if the Armenians expressly ask me to do so.
Otherwise, I will grant them an autonomous regime. Lastly,
I shall have to ensure for my Empire the free passage of
the Straits. . . .

" I have not quite made up my mind on many points;
these are such fateful times ! Yet I have arrived at two
definite conclusions: first, that the Turks must be driven out
of Europe; secondly, that Constantinople should henceforth
be a neutral town, under an international regime. Of course,
the Mussulmans would have every guarantee for the protec-
tion of their sanctuaries and shrines. Northern Thrace, up
to the Enos-Midia line, would fall to Bulgaria. The rest
of the country, between this line and the coast, with the
exception of the Constantinople area, would be assigned to
Russia."1

About the end of 1914, according to M. Maurice
Paleologue, public opinion in Russia was unanimous
on this point, that —

" The possession of. the Straits is of vital interest to
the Empire and far exceeds in importance all the territorial
advantages Russia might obtain at the expense of Germany
and Austria. . . . The neutralisation of the Bosporus and
the Dardanelles would be an unsatisfactory, mongrel com-
promise, pregnant with dangers for the future. . . . Con-
stantinople must be a Russian town. . . . The Black Sea
must become a Russian lake."2

In the formal statement of the Government policy
read on February 9, 1915, at the opening of the
Duma, after mention had been made of the victories
gained by the Russian armies over Turkey, the
following sentence occurred: " Brighter and brighter

1 Revue des Deux Mondes, March 15, 1921. pp. 261, 262:
Maurice Paleologue. -"La Russie des Tsars pendant la guerre."

2 Ibid., pp. 274, 275.

392 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

does the radiant future of Russia shine before us
in yonder place, on the shores of the sea which
washes the battlements of Constantinople."

Sazonov only hinted at the question of the Straits
in the speech which followed, but he declared:
" The day is drawing near when the economic and
political problems arising from the necessity for
Russia to have free access to the open sea will be
solved."

Evgraf Kovalevsky, deputy of Moscow, stated in
his turn: " The Straits are the key of our house, so
they must be handed over to us, together with the
Straits area."

Then, M. Miliukov, after thanking M. Sazonov for
his declaration, concluded his speech in these terms :

" We are happy to hear that our national task will soon be
completed. We now feel confident that the possession of
Constantinople and the Straits will be ensured in due time,
through diplomatic and military channels."

The question of Constantinople captivated public
opinion at that time, and in February, 1915, it en-
grossed the minds of all prominent men in Russia.
Public feeling agreed with the declarations we have
just read, that a victorious peace must give Con-
stantinople to Russia.

At the beginning of March, M. Sazonov could not
refrain from raising this question with the ambassa-
dors of France and Great Britain, and asked them to
give him an assurance that the Governments of
London and Paris would consent after the war to
the annexation of Constantinople by Russia.1

1 Revue des Deux Mondes, April 1, 1921, p. 673.

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 393

On March 3, at the dinner given in honour of
General Pau, Nicholas II talked on the same subject
to M. Paleologue. The Emperor, after recalling the
conversation he had had with him in November of
the previous year, in the course of which he had said
France could rely upon Russia, and telling him he
had not altered his mind, said:

" There is a point, however, about which recent events
compel me to say a few words; I mean Constantinople. The
question of the Straits engrosses the Russian mind more and
more every day. I consider I have no right to impose on
my people the dreadful sacrifices of the present war without
granting as a reward the fulfilment of their age-long
aspirations. So I have made up my mind. sir. I do not
want half-measures to solve the problem of Constantinople
and the Straits. The solution I pointed out to you in No-
vember last is the only possible one, the only practical one.
The city of Constantinople and Southern Thrace must be
incorporated into my Empire ; yet I have no objection, as far
as the administration of the city is concerned, to a special
regime making allowance for foreign interests. You know
that England has already sent me her approval. If any
minor difficulties should arise, I rely on your Government
to help me to smooth them."1

On March 8, M. Paleologue told M. Sazonov that
he had just received a telegram from M. Delcasse,
and was in a position to give him the assurance that
he could rely on the French Government's friendly
offices in settling the questions of Constanti-
nople and the Straits according to the wishes
of Russia. M. Sazonov thanked him very warmly,
and added these significant words: "Your Govern-
ment has done the Alliance a priceless service ... a
service the extent of which perhaps you do not
realise."2 On the 15th the French Government,

1 Revue des Deux Mondes, April 1, 1921, pp. 574, 575.
1 Ibid.

394 THE TURKS AUD EUROPE

having examined the conditions of peace which the
Allies meant to impose on Turkey, informed the
Russian Government of the compensations France
required in Syria.

On March 16, after being received by the Emperor
at the General Headquarters at Baranovitchi, the
Grand Duke Nicholas, speaking as commander-in-
chief of the Russian armies, had a formal conversation
with M. Paleologue, speaking as French ambassador,
and requested him to inform his Government that
he considered the immediate military co-operation of
Rumania and Italy as an imperative necessity.
The French ambassador suggested that the Russian
claims on Constantinople and the Straits would,
perhaps, prevent Rumania and Italy joining the
Allies. Upon which the Grand Duke answered:
" That's the business of diplomacy. I won't have
anything to do with it."1

Finally, the following letter of M. Koudashev to
M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in
the collection of secret documents of the Russian
Foreign Office published in December, 1917,2 shows
how deeply the leaders of Russia and the Russian
people had this question at heart, that it commanded
all their foreign policy, and that they were determined
to use any means, to resort to any artifice, in order
to solve it in conformity with their wishes. No
wonder, then, as we pointed out at the beginning
of this book, that Turkey, being fully aware of the
Russian enmity, should have consented to stand
by the side of Germany in a war in which her very
existence was at stake.

1 Ibid., pp. 578, 579. 2 The editor was M. Markine.

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 395

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS,

February 5, 1916 (O.S.).

" Most honoured Serguey Dmitrievich, — At the request of
General Alexiev, I waited on him to discuss how the capture
of Erzerum could be best exploited.

" Such an event obviously points to a certain state of
mind in Turkey which we should turn to account. If a
separate peace with Turkey was to be contemplated, it should
be borne in mind that such favourable circumstances are
not likely to occur again within a long time. It would un-
doubtedly be our advantage to start the negotiations after
a victory which the enemy rightly or wrongly fears will be
attended with a new catastrophe.

" Considering that our forces on the secondary front of
Caucasus are insignificant and it is impossible to take
away one soldier from the chief centre of operations, it would
be most' difficult, in General Alexiev's opinion, to derive full
profit from the glorious success of our Caucasian army in a
strictly military sense.

" Though he does not wish to advocate an immediate peace
with Turkey, the general desires me to bring to your know-
ledge some of his views concerning this eventuality that the
situation created by our recent success may be carefully
considered and fully utilised.

" According to him, it would be most important to specify
the war aims of Russia. Though the brigadier-general is
fully aware this is a question to be settled by the Government,
yet he thinks his opinion might be of some weight.

" In the course of our conversation, we have come to the
following conclusions:

" Whatever may have been our prospects at the time
when Turkey entered into the war, of securing compensa-
tions at the cost of the latter country when peace is con-
cluded, we must own that our expectations will not be ful-
filled during the present war. The longer the war lasts, the
more difficult it will be for us to secure the possession of
the Straits. General Alexiev and General Danilov agree on
this point. I refer you to my letters of December, 1914, and
January, 1915, as to Danilov's opinion.

" The defeat of the chief enemy and the restoration of
the parts of the Empire we have lost should be our chief
war aim. Our most important enemy is Germany, for there
cannot be any question that at the present time it is more
important for us to recover the Baltic Provinces than take
possession of the Straits. We must by all means defeat
Germany. It is a difficult task, which will require great

396 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

efforts and sacrifices. The temporary abandonment of some
of our hopes should be one of these sacrifices.

" Considering the advantages a separate peace with Turkey
would bring us, we might offer it to her without injuring our
real ' interests ' — the occupation of the Straits being merely
postponed — on the basis of the status quo ante bdlum,
including the restoration of the Capitulations and the other
rights acquired by the treaties. We should also demand
the dismissal of the Germans, with a promise on our side
to defend Turkey in case of German reprisals. If a separate
peace could be concluded with Turkey on such a basis, all
our Caucasian army would be available. We could send it
to Bessarabia and thus — who knows ? — bring Rumania to
our side, or, if Turkey asks for it, send it to defend Constan-
tinople. England would heave a sigh of relief when the
dangers of the Egyptian campaign and of the Muslim move-
ment thus vanished. She would then be able to send her
Egyptian army — nine divisions — to Salonika and Kavala,
bar the way definitely to the Bulgarians and liberate Serbia
with the help of the French, the Italians, and the reconsti-
tuted Serbian Army. If Turkey were no longer our enemy,
the situation in the Balkans would be quite altered, and we
should be able to keep in touch with our Allies by clearing
the southern route of Europe. In short, the advantages of
a separate peace with Turkey are innumerable. The chief
result would be the defeat of Germany, the only common
war aim of all the Allies. No doubt, we all — they as well as
we — will have to waive some of our cherished schemes.
But we are not bound to give them up for ever. If we carry
on the war with Turkey, we delude ourselves with the hope
our ideal can be fulfilled. If we interrupt the war with that
country, we postpone for a time the fulfilment of our
wishes. But in return for this, we shall defeat Germany, the
only thing which can secure a lasting peace for all the Allies
and a political, military, and moral superiority for Russia.
If a victory over Germany gives us back the paramount
situation we enjoyed after the Napoleonic wars, why could
not the glorious period of the treaties of Adrianople and
Hunkiar-i-Skelessi occur again ? In concluding that treaty
we should have only to take care not to offend the Western
Powers, and yet meet the requirements of Russia.

" Perhaps I have stated General Alexiev's opinions too
unreservedly, as I wished to give this report a definite form.
Though the brigadier-general does not wish to be the advo-
cate or promoter of the idea of a separate peace with Turkey,
I am sure he looks upon this as a highly profitable scheme.

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 397

" Of course, many difficulties will have to be overcome in
the conclusion of such a peace; but is not every matter of
importance attended with difficulties ? Public opinion should
be warned that we cannot possibly secure the fulfilment
of all our wishes at once, that it is impossible for us to shake
off German hegemony, reconquer the shores of the Baltic,
and the other provinces now in the hands of the enemy, and
at the same time take Constantinople, The conquest of
Tsarigrad in the present circumstances must necessarily
raise many a political and moral question. The Turks, too,
will have to be convinced. But they may be influenced both
by logical and pecuniary arguments. If once the question
of the loss of their capital is waived, it will be pretty easy
for us to convince them that the Germans merely want
their help for selfish purposes without any risk to themselves.
If some of them turned a deaf ear to logical arguments, we
might resort to more substantial arguments, as has always
been the way with Turkey.

" But the discussion of such details is still premature.
For the present, the important points are:

" 1. Plainly to define our real war aim.

"2. To decide, in connection with this aim, whether a
separate peace with Turkey should not be contemplated at
once.

"3. To prepare public opinion — the Duma is to meet to-
morrow— and our Allies for such a turn of events.

" I want to conclude this long letter by stating that
General Alexiev and I share the feelings of all Russians in
regard to Constantinople, that we do not disregard the
' historical call of Russia,' in the solution of the Eastern
question, but that we are actuated by the sincere wish to
clarify the situation by distinguishing what is possible at the
present time from those aspirations whose fulfilment is
momentarily—only momentarily — impossible."

It is obvious that if, at the beginning of the war,
General Kuropatkine maintained that it was a
military necessity to occupy part of Turkey, it was
because the only aim of Russia in entering into the
conflict was the conquest of Constantinople.

In an article entitled " La Neutralisation des Dar-
danelles et du Bosphore," which was written at the
beginning of the war, M. Miliukov confirmed the

398 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Russian designs on the Black Sea and consequently
on all the part of Europe and Asia Minor con-
tiguous to it. He recalled that, by the former treaties
concluded with Russia before the European nations
had interfered in the Eastern question — those of
1798, 1805, and 183&— the Porte had granted Russian
warships the free passage of the Straits, though the
Black Sea was still closed to the warships of any other
Power, and that when the treaties of 1841, 1856,
and 1871 had laid down the principle of the closure
of the Straits, Russia had always preferred this state
of things to the opening of the Black Sea to the
warships of all nations. This article throws a light on
the policy pursued by Russia and the propaganda
she is still carrying on in the hope of bringing about
the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. So the
writer recognised that it was the duty of Russia to
oppose the dispossession of Turkey and that, if the
Straits passed under Russian sovereignty, they ought
not to be neutralised.

Taking up this question again in an interview
with a correspondent of Le Temps in April, 1917,
M. Miliukov stated that the map of Eastern Europe,
as it ought to be drawn up by the Allies, involved
" the liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe,
the liberation of the peoples living in Asia Minor,
the independence of Arabia, Armenia, and Syria,
and finally, the necessity of recognising Turkey's
right to the possession of the Straits." Nobody
knows what was to become of the Turks in such a
solution, or rather it is only too plain that " the
liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe "
meant that Russia would take possession of the

399

Straits and rule over the Turkish territories in Asia
Minor.

Though both the Conservatives and the Bolshe-
vists in Russia were plainly drawing nearer to
Germany, M. Miliukov, who seemed to forget the
pro-German leaning of Tsardom and the tendency
he himself openly displayed, came to this conclusion:

" The Straits to Russia — that, in my opinion, is the only
way out of the difficulty. The neutralisation of the Straits
would always involve many serious dangers to peace, and
Russia would be compelled to keep up a powerful war fleet
in the Black Sea to defend our coasts. It would give the
warships of all countries a free access to our inland sea, the
Black Se'a, which might entail untold disasters. Germany
wants the Straits in order to realise her dreams of hegemony,
for her motto is ' Berlin -Baghdad,' and we, Russians, want
the Straits that our importation and exportation may be
secure from any trammels or threats whatever. Nobody
can entertain any doubt, therefore, as to which Power is to
own the Straits; it must be either Germany or Russia."

Prince Lvov, M. Sazonov, M. Chaikovsky, and
M. Maklakov, in a memorandum addressed to the
President of the Peace Conference on July 5, 1919,
on behalf of the Provisional Government of Russia,
stated the Russian claims with regard to Turkey, and
the solution they proposed to the question of the
Straits and Constantinople was inspired by the agree-
ments of 1915 and showed they had not given up
anything of their ambition. For, though they had no
real mandate to speak of the rights of New Russia
they declared:

" New Russia has, undoubtedly, a right to be associated
in the task of regeneration which the Allied and Associated
Powers intend to assume in the former Turkish territories.

" Thus, the question of the Straits would be most equitably
settled by Russia receiving a mandate for the administration
of the Straits in the name of the League of Nations. Such

400 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

a solution would benefit both the interests of Russia and those
of the whole world, for the most suitable regime for an inter-
national road of transit is to hand over its control to tho Power
which is most vitally interested in the freedom of this
transit.

" This solution is also the only one which would not raise
any of the apprehensions which the Russian people would
certainly feel if the aforesaid mandate were given to any other
Power or if a foreign military Power controlled the Straits.

" For the moment, Russia, in her present condition, would
be satisfied if the control of the Straits were assigned to a
provisional international administration which might hand
over its powers to her in due time, and in which Russia in
the meantime should hold a place proportionate to the part
she is called upon to play in the Black Sea.

"As to Constantinople, Russia cannot think for one
moment of. ceding this city to the exclusive administration
of any other Power. And if an international administration
were established, Russia should hold in it the place that befits
her, and have a share in all that may be undertaken for
the equipment, exploitation, and control of the port of Con-
stantinople."

Some documents, which were found by the Bol-
shevists in the Imperial Record Office, concerning the
conferences of the Russian Staff in November, 1913,
and which have just been made public, testify to the
continuity of the aforesaid policy and the new schemes
Russia was contemplating. It clearly appears from
these documents that M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, had represented to the Tsar the necessity
of preparing not only plans of campaign, but a
whole organisation for the conveyance by rail and
sea of the huge forces which were necessary to capture
Constantinople, and that the Crown Council was of
opinion this plan should be carried out in order to
bring the Russians to Constantinople and secure the
mastery of the Straits.

At the present time, forty or fifty thousand1

1 Now there are about 200,000.

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 401

Russian emigrants, fleeing before the Bolshevists,
have reached Pera and have settled down in it;
others are arriving there every day, who belong to
the revolutionary socialist party — an exiled party
temporarily — or who are more or less disguised
Bolshevist agents. It is obvious that all these
Russians will not soon leave Constantinople, which
they have always coveted, especially as the Bolshe-
vists have by no means renounced the designs of the
Tsars on this city or their ambitions in the East.

Not long ago, according to the Lokal Anzeiger,1
a prominent member of the Soviet Government
declared that, to safeguard the Russian interests in
the East and on the Black Sea, Constantinople must
fall to Russia.

Being thus invaded by Russian elements of all
kinds, Constantinople seems doomed to be swallowed
up by Russia as soon as her troubles are over,
whether she remains Bolshevist or falls under a
Tsar's rule again; then she will turn her ambition
towards the East, which we have not been able to
defend against the Slavs, and England will find her
again in her way in Asia and even on the shores of
the Mediterranean Sea.

On the other hand, as Germany is endeavouring
to come to an understanding with Russia and as
the military Pan-Germanist party has not given
up hope of restoring the Kaiser to the throne,
if the Allies dismembered Turkey — whose policy is
not historically linked with that of Germany, and
who has no more reason for being her ally now,

1 August 10, 1920.

26

402 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

provided the Allies alter their own policy — they would
pave the way to a union of the whole of Eastern
Europe under a Germane-Russian hegemony.

Again, the Turks, who originally came from
Asia, are now a Mediterranean people owing to
their great conquests and their wide extension in the
fifteenth century, and though in some respects
these conquests may be regretted, they have on the
whole proved beneficial to European civilisation,
by maintaining the influence of the culture of anti-
quity. Though they have driven back the Greeks
to European territories, they have not, on the whole,
attempted to destroy the traditions bequeathed to
us by antiquity, and the Turk has let the quick,
clever Greek settle down everywhere. His indolence
and fatalism have made him leave things as they were.
What would have happened if the Slavs had come
down to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea ? The
Bulgars and Southern Slavs, though they were sub-
ected to Greco-Latin influences, displayed much
more activity and were proof against most of these
influences. But the Turks checked the Slavs' advance
to the south; and, were it only in this respect, they
have played and still play a salutary part of which
they should not be deprived.

The new policy pursued by France towards
Turkey becomes the more surprising — coming after her
time-honoured Turkish policy and after the recent
mistakes of her Russian policy — as we see history
repeat itself, or at least, similar circumstances
recur. Even in the time of the Romans the events
of Syria and Mesopotamia were connected with those
of Central Europe; as Virgil said: " Here war is let

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 403

loose by Euphrates, there by Germany." Long after,
Francis I, in order to check the ambitious designs
of Charles V, Emperor of Germany, who, about 1525,
dreamt of subduing the whole of Europe, sought the
alliance of Soliman. The French king, who under-
stood the Latin spirit so well and the great part it
was about to play in the Renaissance, had foreseen
the danger with which this spirit was threatened by
Germany.

Moreover, a recent fact throws into light the con-
nection between the German and Russian interests
in the. Eastern question, and their similar tenden-
cies. For Marshal von der Goltz was one of the first
to urge that the Turkish capital should be transferred
to a town in the centre of Asia Minor.1 Of course,
he professed to be actuated only by strategic or
administrative motives, for he chiefly laid stress on
the peculiar geographical situation of the capital
of the Empire, which, lying close to the frontier,
is directly exposed to^ a foreign attack. But did he
not put forward this argument merely to conceal
other arguments which concerned Germany more
closely ? Though the Germans professed to be the
protectors of Islam, did not the vast Austro-German
schemes include the ejection of the Turks from Europe
to the benefit of the Slavs, notwithstanding the de-
clarations made during the war by some German
publicists — M. Axel Schmidt, M. Hermann, M. Paul
Rohrbach — which now seem to have been chiefly
dictated by temporary necessities ?

1 Von der Goltz, ",Starke und Schwache des turkischen
Reiches," in the Deutsche Rundschau, 1897.

404 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Thus the Turkish policy of the Allies is the out-
come of their Russian policy — which accounts for
the whole series of mistakes they are still making,
after their disillusionment with regard to Russia.

For centuries, Moscow and Islam have counter-
poised each other: the Golden Horde having checked
the expansion of Russia, the latter did her best to
bring about the downfall of the Ottoman Empire.
It had formerly been admitted by the Great
Powers that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman
Empire should not be infringed upon, for it was the
best barrier to Russia's claims on the Straits and
her advance towards India. But after the events
of the last war, England, reversing her traditional
policy, and the Allies, urged on by Pan-Russian
circles, have been gradually driven to recognise the
Russian claims to Constantinople in return for her
co-operation at the beginning of the war.

The outcome of this policy of the Allies has been
to drive both the new States, whose independence
they persistently refused to recognise, and the old
ones, whose national aspirations they did not counte-
nance, towards Bolshevism, the enemy of the Allies;
it has induced them, in spite of themselves, to come to
understandings with the Soviet Government, in order
to defend their independence. England in this way
runs the risk of finding herself again face to face with
Russia — a new Russia; and thus the old Anglo-
Russian antagonism would reappear in another
shape, and a more critical one. Sir H. Rawlinson1
denounced this danger nearly half a century ago,

1 H. Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East (1875).

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 405

and now once more, though in a different way,
" India is imperilled by the progress of Russia."

However, there is no similarity between Pan-
Turanianism and Bolshevism, though an attempt
has been made in press polemics or political con-
troversies to confound the one with the other.
They have no common origin, and the utter incom-
patibility between Bolshevism and the spirit of
Western Europe exists likewise to another extent
and for different reasons between Bolshevism and
the spirit of the Turks, who, indeed, are not Euro-
peans but Moslems, yet have played a part in the
history of Europe and thus have felt its influence.
The Turks — like the Hungarians, who are monar-
chists and have even sought to come to an under-
standing with Poland — have refused to make an
alliance with the Czecho-Slovaks, who have Pan-
Slavic tendencies; and so they cannot become Bol-
shevists or friendly to the Bolshevists. But, if the
Allies neither modify their attitude nor give up
the policy they have pursued of late years, the Turks,
as well as all the heterogeneous peoples that have
broken loose from old Russia, will be driven for
their own protection to adopt the same policy as
new Russia — the latter being considered as outside
Europe; and thus the power of the Soviet Govern-
ment will be reinforced.

We have been among the first to show both the
danger and the inanity of Bolshevism; and now we
feel bound to deplore that policy which merely tends
to strengthen the Bolshevists we want to crush.
Our only hope is that the influence of the States
sprung from old Russia or situated round it on Soviet

406 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

Russia — with which they have been obliged to come
to terms for the sake of self-defence — will complete
the downfall of Bolshevism, which can only live
within Russia and the Russian mind, but has already
undergone an evolution, owing to the mistakes of
the Allies, in order to spread and maintain itself.

As to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire,
it seems that far from solving the Eastern question,
it is likely to bring about many fresh difficulties, for it
is a political mistake as well as an injustice.

This dismemberment, impudently effected by
England, is not likely to turn to her advantage.
Of course, owing to the treaty, British hegemony
for the present extends over Mesopotamia, Palestine,
and Kurdistan, and is likely to prevail over the
international regime foreshadowed by the same
treaty; but the organisation which Great Britain
wants thus to enforce on the East, if ever it is effec-
tive, seems most precarious. For, even without
mentioning Turkey, which does not seem likely to
submit to this scheme, and where the Nationalist
movement is in open rebellion, or Armenia, whose
frontiers have not been fixed yet, the condition of
Kurdistan, which England coveted and had even at
one moment openly laid claim to, is still uncertain;
the Emir Feisal, who is indebted to her for his power,
is attempting to get out of her hand; finally, by
putting Persia under her tutelage, she has roused
the national feeling there too, and broken of her own
accord the chain she intended to forge all round India,
after driving Germany out of Asia Minor and cap-
turing all the routes to her Asiatic possessions.

Now it is questionable whether Great Britain —

TURKEY AND THE SLAVS 407

in spite of the skill with which her administration
has bent itself to the ways of the very various peoples
and the liberal spirit she has certainly evinced in
the organisation of the Dominions belonging to the
British Empire, the largest empire that has ever
existed — will be powerful enough to maintain her
sovereignty over so many peoples, each of which
is proud of its own race and history, and to organise
all these countries according to her wish.

As to France, she is gradually losing the moral
prestige she once enjoyed in the East, for the advan-
tages she has just gained can only injure her, and also
injure 'the prestige she still enjoys in other Moslem
countries; whereas, by pursuing another policy, she
might have expected that the German defeat would
restore and heighten her prestige.

It follows from all this that the Turkish problem,
as we have endeavoured to describe it — considering
that for centuries an intercourse has been main-
tained between the Moslem world and Mediterranean
Europe, and that a Moslem influence once made
itself felt on Western civilisation through Arabic
culture — cannot be looked upon as a merely Asiatic
problem. It is a matter of surprise that Islam, five
centuries after Christ, should have developed in
the birthplace of Christianity, and converted very
numerous populations, whose ways and spirit it
seems to suit. One cannot forget either that Islam
acted as a counterpoise to Christianity, or that it
played an important part in our civilisation by secur-
ing the continuance and penetration of Eastern and
pagan influences. So it is obvious that nowadays
the Turkish problem is still of paramount importance

408 THE TURKS AND EUROPE

for the security of Western civilisation, since it con-
cerns all the nations round the Mediterranean Sea,
and, moreover, all the Asiatic and African territories
inhabited by Moslems, who have always been in-
terested in European matters and are even doubly
concerned in them now.1

1 The French edition of this book bears the date August,
1920.

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