IDER THE OLD FLAG
JAMES HARRISON WILSON
to
of i\\t
of Toronto
Library of the late
R. H. Greer
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
VOLUME II
(/ ^L^-^^^
UNDER
THE OLD FLAG
RECOLLECTIONS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
THE WAR FOR THE UNION, THE SPANISH WAR
THE BOXER REBELLION, ETC.
BY
JAMES HARRISON WILSON
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. A.; LATE MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. V.
ENGINEER AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL ON GRANT'S STAFF
COMMANDER THIRD CAVALRY DIVISION, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
COMMANDER CAVALRY CORPS M. D. M., ETC.
VOLUME II
NEW YORK AND LONDON
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
MCMXII
Wl
COPYRIGHT, 1912, BY
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
Published October, igi2
LIBRARY
730032
UNIVERSITYOFJORONTO
Printed in the United States of America
CONTENTS
REORGANIZING AND COMMANDING SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
PAGB
Correspondence leading to detail Large but widely scat-
tered command Join Sherman at Gaylesville Hearty
welcome and carte blanche But little confidence in
cavalry Conversations with Sherman Fit out Kil-
patrick for March to the Sea Cavalry expedition to
Blue Mountain Join Thomas at Nashville 1
II
CAMPAIGN OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE AGAINST HOOD
Details of reorganization Hood at Gadsden Grant un-
easy Rawlins sends reinforcements from Missouri
Gathering and remounting cavalry Hood's advance
Wilson takes the field Columbia on the Duck River
Forrest turns position Schofield retreats Affair at
Spring Hill Victory at Franklin Cavalry defeats
Forrest Interview with Schofield and Stanley Retire
to Nashville Correspondence with Grant's headquar-
ters Impressing horses Thomas approves and co-
operates 25
III
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
Hood hanging on for the winter Uneasiness in Washing-
ton Injustice toward Thomas Orders directing him
CONTENTS
PAO
to fight Full correspondence Situation at Nashville
Thomas imperturbable Embargo of storm Van
Duzer to Eckert Thaw begins Army moves out
Defeats Hood Thomas vindicated Cavalry turned
enemy's flank and took him in rear Hood's retreat
Wilson's pursuit 64
IV
DRIVING HOOD FEOM MIDDLE TENNESSEE
Hollowtree Gap Affair at the West Horpeth Forrest
takes the rear Charge of the Fourth Cavalry Delay
at Rutherford Creek and Duck River Cheers of the
infantry Winter floods and ice Croxton routs Bu-
ford Enemy makes only counter attack End of cam-
paign McCook drives Lyon from Kentucky Sum-
mary of campaign and results 128
COLLECTION, ORGANIZATION, AND INSTRUCTION OF THE
CAVALRY CORPS
March to Gravelly Springs and Waterloo Pinhook Town
Construction of cantonments Long and Upton ar-
rive Division and brigade commanders Organization
of command Daily instruction Review for Thomas
Knipe detached to Canby The Confederacy is doomed
Flag of truce to Forrest Ready to move Amplest
latitude of an independent commander 160
VI
CAMPAIGN AND CAPTURE OF SELMA
Line of march through northern Alabama Passage of the
rivers Face to face with Forrest Forrest's mistakes
Defeat and pursuit of Forrest Capture of Tusca-
loosa Close in on Selma Assault and capture of
Selma Results and summary of campaign 190
vi
CONTENTS
VII
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
PAGE
Message to Canby Meeting with Forrest Campaign
against Montgomery, West Point, and Columbus
Colored regiments Capture of rebel supply boats by
Major Weston 237
^
VIII
END OF THE WAR
Capture of West Point by La Grange Minty at Double
Bridges Occupation of Macon Surrender of General
Cobb Peace declared Croxton's raid Resume of
campaign 270
IX
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
Administration of affairs in Macon Measures for the cap-
ture of Davis Jefferson Davis captured 297
X
RECONSTRUCTION
Winslow rebuilds railroad from Atlanta to Dalton Presi-
dent's message Governor Brown of Georgia Recon-
struction policy Conference with Brown Attitude of
the churches General Cobb's letter The South Mus-
tering out of Cavalry Corps Career of officers of Cav-
alry Corps Letter to Sherman Andersonville Prison
Meeting with Grant 344
XI
AFTER THE WAR
Disbanded officers National Express and Transportation
Company Leave of absence Defenses of the Dela-
ware Surveys and internal improvements Panama
Canal Transferred to the infantry Des Moines and
Rock Island Rapids St. Louis and Southeastern Rail-
way Resign from the army Cairo and Vincennes
Railroad Employments of civil life 380
vii
CONTENTS
XII
THE SPANISH WAR
PAGB
Cuba and the Cuban Rebellion Cane and beet sugar
Spanish oppression The Maine blown up in the har-
bor of Havana Declaration of war Reenter army as
senior major general from civil life Interview with the
President Composition of army 402
XIII
CAMP THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA
Volunteered to command First Division, First Army Corps
Santiago Campaign Ordered to Porto Rico by the
way of Charleston Waiting for transports Hospital-
ity of Charleston 424
XIV
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
Sail for Island Land at Ponce Miles in chief command
Advance to Juana Diaz Capture of Coamo and its
garrison Rumors of peace Armistice End of the
War Civil administration Address planters at El
Paraiso Relieved from duty Return to the States.. 439
XV
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
Commanding First Army Corps at Lexington and Macon
Renew acquaintance with people at Macon Review for
President McKinley Remarks on Continental Union
Negro regiments left behind Transfer Corps to Ma-
tanzas Recommended for chief command Brooke as
Governor General Province and city of Matanzas fall
to my lot Conditions prevailing in the Island Recep-
tion of Maximo Gomez Brooke's administration 460
viii
CONTENTS
XVI
DEPARTMENT OF MATANZAS AND SANTA CLAKA
PAGE
Absence of national policy State of law in Cuba Inspec-
tion of Provinces under my command Population and
distressing conditions Recommend measures for their
relief Meeting of generals in Havana Report on
economic, industrial, and social conditions Grafters
and speculators at work Wood, Governor General . . . 481
XVII
CALLED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONFERENCE
Interview with Secretary of War Conference with the *
President Statement to the Senate Committee on Re-
lations with Cuba Return to Matanzas Death of my
wife Annual reports and general statements 498
XVIII
THE BOXER WAR IN CHINA
Condition of affairs in China Offer my services to the Sec-
retary of War Ordered to Peking The only general
of any service familiar with theater of operations In
command of South Gate of Forbidden City Reestab-
lishment of order Commanded joint American and
British forces in capture of Eight Temples Count von
Waldersee Return to America Brigadier General,
Regular Army Retired by Special Act of Congress
Summary of services 517
APPENDIX
Condition of the South at the Close of the War of the Re-
bellion . 545
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
VOLUME II
REORGANIZING AND COMMANDING SHERMAN'S
CAVALRY
Correspondence leading to detail Large but widely scat-
tered command Join Sherman at Gaylesville
Hearty welcome and carte blanche But little confi-
dence in cavalry Conversations with Sherman Fit
out Kilpatrick for March to the Sea Cavalry expedi-
tion to Blue Mountain Join Thomas at Nashville.
The correspondence which led to my detail for the
important work of reorganizing and commanding
Sherman 's cavalry is interesting. It gives a glimpse
of the grim humor in which Sherman 1 often, and
Grant sometimes, 2 indulged. It also shows the flat-
tering estimate in which those great soldiers held
me, as well as the unflattering estimate in which up
to that time they held the western cavalry and its
leaders. I had just passed twenty-seven and had
seen but six months ' service with cavalry in the field,
but I had been in the war from the beginning and
was not lacking confidence or ambition.
1 O. E. Serial No. 79, p. 203.
"16., p. 750.
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
The telegrams are found in the Official Eecords
but widely apart, and as they have never been col-
lected in one publication, it may be worth while to
quote them here. The first, from Grant at City
Point to Sherman at Atlanta, was dated September
22, 1864, 10 P. M. It runs as follows :
Do you not require a good cavalry leader? It has
seemed to me that you have during your campaign suf-
fered for the want of an officer in command of cavalry,
whose judgment and dash could both be relied on. I
could send you General Ayres, who, I believe, would make
a capital commander and know him to be one of our best
officers in other capacities. 1
To this Sherman replied on the 23rd:
I do want very much a good cavalry officer to com-
mand, and have been maneuvering three months to get
Mower here, but Canby has him up White River. My
present cavalry need infantry guards and pickets, and it
is hard to get them within ten miles of the front. If you
think Ayres will do I would like him. Romeyn' B. Ayres
is, or was, as bad a growler as Granger. I would prefer
Gregg or Wilson, anybody with proper rank will be better
than Garrard. Kilpatrick is well enough for small scouts,
but I do want a man of sense and courage to manage my
cavalry, and will take any one that you have tried. 2
The subject was evidently now uppermost in
Grant's mind, and on the 25th he wired Meade :
Has Gregg returned yet ? I will have to send a cavalry
commander to Sherman and think of sending Gregg. At
present, and to this time, there has not been an officer
with the cavalry in the west whom it was safe to trust,
without infantry to guard them from danger. The rebels
1 O. E. Serial No. 78, p. 438.
3 O. B. Serial No. 98, p. 442.
2
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
are equally badly off. With either Gregg, Torbert, or Wil-
son in command of Sherman's cavalry, they could travel
over that western country with impunity. 1
To this Meade replied the same day:
General Gregg has returned. In reference to your
proposition to send him west, I have to call your attention
to the fact that there is no other general officer of cavalry
with this army but General Davies, one of the youngest
and most recently promoted, whereas with General Sheri-
dan's army are Torbert, Merritt, Ouster, Devin, Chapman,
and Mclntosh. 2
Why General Meade left my name out of the list,
whether for reasons complimentary or otherwise,
I have no means of knowing, nor did it make any dif-
ference in the result. Although there is no dispatch
in the files from Grant to Sheridan covering the sub-
ject, it is yet certain that there was such a telegram,
authorizing and instructing the latter to send either
Torbert or myself, and as stated at the close of the
last chapter, on consultation between Sheridan, Tor-
bert, and myself, the honor with the burden and
the risk fell to me. In his reply to Grant Oct. 1,
1864, at 10 A. M., Sheridan was good enough to do
so in the following terms.
I have ordered General Wilson to report to Sherman.
He is the best man for the position. 3
He had already issued Special Order No. 44, of
September 30:
In compliance with instructions from the lieutenant
general commanding, Brig. Gen. J. H. Wilson is hereby re-
1 O. E. Serial No. 98, p. 1008.
2 Ib., 1008.
8 O. B. Serial No. 91, p. 249.
3
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
lieved from duty with the Third Cavalry Division, and
will report without delay to Major General Sherman, com-
manding Military Division of the Mississippi, as chief of
cavalry. 1
The Lieutenant General lost no time in confirm-
ing the detail, and on October 4, at 11.30 A. M., wired
Stanton :
General Wilson has been selected to go west to com-
mand Sherman's cavalry. As he is junior to the officers
now serving with it, I would respectfully request that he
be brevetted a major general and assigned to duty with
that rank. 2
Both requests, anticipating my wishes as ex-
pressed in a telegram to Eawlins of the same date, 3
were promptly complied with on October 5 by tbe
War Department in Special Orders No. 333 :
By direction of the President, Bvt. Maj. Gen. James
H. Wilson, U. S. Volunteers, is assigned to duty according
to his brevet rank, in the armies now serving under Major
General Sherman, U. S. Army. 4
And then, as if to weight me with a great sense
of responsibility and to stimulate my efforts to tbe
utmost, Grant sent a telegram to Sherman, October
4, 1864, and at its close paid me tbe greatest com-
pliment of my life :
General Wilson has been ordered to report to you and,
that he may have rank to command your cavalry, I have
asked that he be brevetted a major general and assigned
with that rank. I believe Wilson will add fifty per cent,
to the effectiveness of your cavalry. 5
1 O. E. Serial No. 91, p. 218.
2 0. B. Serial No. 79, p. 63.
8 O. E. Serial No. 79, p. 104.
*0. E. Serial No. 79, pp. 714-753.
B Z&., pp. 358, 429.
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
Perhaps if I had known what was expected of
me when I left camp at Harrisonburg for my new
field of duty and responsibility on that bright morn-
ing of October 2, 1864, I should not have gone
with a heart so buoyant. When I recall now that
there were "present and absent " on the rolls of the
seventy-two regiments, which were to constitute my
new command, nominally the large force of about
fifty thousand men, and that there were actually less
than ten thousand with the colors, the difficulty of
the task of reorganizing this widely scattered mass
into an efficient fighting force, strong enough and
compact enough to take the field against Forrest,
Wheeler, Buford, Jackson, Chalmers, Armstrong,
Eoddy, Lyon, and Rucker with any certainty of suc-
cess would have been distressingly apparent. To
reach with any reasonable certainty the high mark
set for me by General Grant or to add fifty per cent,
to the effectiveness of even ten thousand men would
have been a task worthy of any young soldier's
highest ambition. It was, doubtless, well to leave me
free and of good heart for the responsibilities and
burden of each day as they presented themselves.
My ride down the valley was romantic and in-
teresting and, fortunately, was without accident or
delay. Most of the route was infested by Mosby's
scouts and bushwackers, who had lately killed or
captured several of our officers, but my escort was
strong enough to make an attack hazardous. I slept
at Winchester the first night, where I met Eoden-
bough of the regular cavalry, Ludington, my quar-
termaster, and Taggart, my commissary. I reached
Martinburg at noon the next day 1 and took the
1 O. E. Serial No. 91, p. 271, Neill to Halleck.
5
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
train for Washington, arriving there that night. I
spent the 4th at the War Department with Assistant
Secretary Dana and Colonel Martin, who that after-
noon turned over to me a dapple gray gelding of
fine form, fire, and action, which they had selected
from the Government stables for my special use.
Because of his blazing black eyes and his extraor-
dinary spirit, I named him "Sheridan," and sent
him with the "Waif" by rail to Nashville. The
journey lasted several days during which it was
impossible for the horses to lie down, and on arriv-
ing at Louisville, as soon as they struck the ground
"Sheridan" ran away in mere exuberance of feel-
ing, in spite of all his groom could do to prevent it.
He, however, kept pretty well in sight and wound
up with his rider at the railway station where he
was duly entrained with the rest for Nashville. I
rode him thenceforth in turn throughout the Hood
campaign. While in camp at Gravelly Springs most
of the hard work fell upon him, and on more than
one occasion he covered the mud road between head-
quarters and Waterloo Landing, a distance of
twelve miles, in fifty minutes without turning a hair.
During that winter I discovered his great powers
of endurance and his extraordinary capacity as a
high jumper. Although he had been badly handled
and was both impatient and headstrong, he was ab-
solutely without vice, and soon became noted for his
docility as well as for his beautiful behavior on
parade. He naturally loved action, military music,
and pageantry, and had no idea of fear, and it was
for these qualities no less than for his showy ap-
pearance that I rode him in the decisive charge at
Selma, where he received a mortal wound from
6
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
which he died at Macon nearly three weeks later.
I was still the junior brigadier of both the East-
ern and Western Armies and, although the Presi-
dent had hastened to assign me to duty under my
brevet rank, it was apparent that my new and much
greater command would bring me in contact with
many officers who would more or less openly resent
my selection for so great a command. It was on
this account that the President issued his order of
October 5, 1864.
I had already reached certain conclusions, not
only from the study of military history, but from
observation in the field, as to the proper functions
of cavalry and the necessity of handling it in masses
against the enemy's front, flanks, and communica-
tions, and this made it quite sure that the responsi-
bility as well as a large part of the credit would
be mine, as will more fully appear in the following
narrative. Obviously, I owed the opportunity which
the new detail brought me largely to General Grant's
impressions while serving with him in the close and
intimate relations of the two great campaigns of
Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Those good impres-
sions had doubtless been strengthened by my admin-
istration of the Cavalry Bureau as well as by my
experience with the Third Cavalry Division in the
Virginia campaigns. It was perhaps known to him
that a prejudice existed against me on the part of
those who had been overslaughed by my assignment
to that command, but this strengthened rather than
weakened me with him for the simple reason that
he was not only responsible for it, but subject to a
similar criticism from those he had superseded in
still higher command.
7
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
The fact is, that no fixed rule had yet been es-
tablished for the selection of generals or for their
assignment to command. The irule of seniority
which works well enough in times of peace, as might
have been expected, was found to be entirely inap-
plicable in a great war following a long peace, and
was specially so in the War for the Union. Selec-
tion was the inevitable alternative, but that was by
no means simple in its application. Whether the
initiative should be exercised by the President or
Secretary of War, who were the real appointing
power under the law, but who were always more or
less accessible to the politicians and place hunters,
or by the generals in the field, remained to the end
unsettled and largely a matter of chance. Unusual
liberty was allowed Grant after he became lieuten-
ant general and yet there was necessarily, even in
his selections, a large personal element based upon
his ,own observation and; judgment, which could
not be brought within any fixed rule.
It was also true that the organization and man-
agement of our armies in the field, and especially of
the various branches of the service in their rela-
tions to each other, had not yet been systematized.
Certain general principles were observed and cer-
tain units were established, but the actual practice
in the field and the daily use and inter-relation of
the different arms were neither well settled nor
uniformly applied. The generals were neither edu-
cated alike nor had they the same experience. Each
had his own ideas and each applied them to suit
himself, according to the exigencies of the case
as he saw them.
It is well known that with all his experience the
8
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
aged and patriotic Scott, who was general-in-chief
when the war broke out, steadily set his face against
calling volunteer cavalry into the field, because, as
he alleged, the war would be over before cavalry
could be organized and properly trained for service.
Months of valuable time were wasted before this
idea was overthrown and effective measures taken
to raise mounted troops. Even then but few regu-
lar officers were permitted to take a hand in that
work. " Chiefs of cavalry," so-called, were ap-
pointed in due course at each department or army
headquarters, but no fixed rule was prescribed
defining their duties or authority. While they were
generally selected for their experience and good
standing in the Old Army, they were in most cases
left to decide their own functions and duties,
and, especially, to determine for themselves how
far and in what cases they would exercise actual
command. This naturally tended to make them or-
namental staff officers rather than cavalry leaders,
and this tendency was still further developed by
the fact that but few of them had any definite ideas
as to how the cavalry regiments should be brigaded
and formed into divisions and army corps, or how
they should be handled in cooperation with the other
arms. Whether the cavalry should be used mainly
as orderlies, escorts, and scouts, as was too long the
practice, or what part of it should be so used and
what part of it should be kept in readiness as a
fighting force continued to be till the end of the war
largely a matter of chance. Whether the brigades
and divisions should be sent out separately on eccen-
tric movements, or collected into masses and used in
cooperation with infantry on the enemy's flanks,
9
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
rear, and communications, or alone in well-timed in-
dependent operations against his interior depots, ar-
senals, factories, railroads, and bridges, always re-
mained more or less an open question.
Fortunately, I had acquired definite and fixed
ideas on all these subjects and still more fortunately,
in spite of sharp criticism on the part of Halleck, the
chief-of-staff, and of Stanton, the secretary of war,
I was permitted, during the Nashville campaign, as
far as our resources would allow, to carry them into
effect. Through Grant's special intercession, in at
least one important instance, I was to have a free
hand with the largest latitude of an independent
commander, while through Sherman's authority, I
was permitted to call in all outlying details and de-
tachments and to organize a separate army corps
which should include all the mounted troops of the
four departments, constituting his military division.
I started for my new field of duty on the day
I received my new assignment by the way of Balti-
more, Wilmington, and Philadelphia, where I had
business or social engagements which required a
few hours in each place. I arrived at Louisville
early on October 9, and at once took train for
Nashville. At Louisville an amusing incident took
place. In those days each train was furnished with
a car for the special accommodation of ladies, and,
as it was somewhat more comfortable than the rest,
officers always wanted to get seats in the special car,
but this was difficult unless they had ladies with
them. One of my staff, acquainted with a clever
actress playing at Louisville, introduced me to her.
This made it easy for me and the aid-de-camp carry-
ing her boxes to enter the car with her, but the other
10
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
aids were promptly shut out, whereupon the quick-
witted actress passed her band-box out through the
window to another and this brought him promptly
within the privileged group. He in turn passed the
box out to the others until all had safely run the
gantlet. The incident gave rise to a good deal of
fun and made the journey to Nashville quite a gay
and pleasant one.
From Nashville we pushed on through Chatta-
nooga to Dalton, beyond which the railroad had
been badly broken by Hood's advance. Here we
took horse for Resaca and Kingston and, after a
short railroad transit, pushed on through Eome to
Sherman's headquarters at Gaylesville, west of the
Coosa Eiver in northeastern Alabama close to the
state line. It will be recalled that after the occupa-
tion of Atlanta, Hood took the offensive, marching
rapidly along the Nashville and Chattanooga Rail-
road to the northwest for the purpose of breaking
up Sherman's communications and invading middle
Tennessee. Through Corse's gallantry his attack at
Altoona failed, but, withal, he continued north
through Resaca and Dalton to Tunnel Hill, whence
he withdrew to Gadsden in northeastern Alabama.
This aggressive return was vigorous and excit-
ing and, although Sherman had a large preponder-
ance of force, he inflicted no material damage upon
Hood. The fact is that he could neither overtake
nor bring that wily and fleet-footed commander to
an engagement. He, therefore, gave up the chase
in disgust and when I joined him was full of the
March to the Sea. This would leave Hood free to
follow him or to invade middle Tennessee, subject
only to such resistance as Thomas might make with
11
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the Fourth Corps and such other organizations and
detachments as might be available for that purpose.
It was an interesting situation and I dropped in upon
Sherman in the midst of his correspondence con-
cerning it. I found him much perturbed by Hood's
movements and the uncertainty of the future cam-
paign, but firm in the conviction that his true policy
was to "cut loose, break roads, and do irreparable
damage, while Thomas should be left to take care
of Hood and destroy him. ' '
Sherman gave me a hearty welcome, and after
a few questions asked me to draft the order organ-
izing the "Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the
Mississippi, ' ' putting me in command and empower-
ing me to make such dispositions and arrangements
as I might think best for getting the largest possible
force into the field and inflicting the greatest possi-
ble amount of damage upon the enemy. He frankly
declared his dissatisfaction with his previous chiefs
of cavalry and cavalry commanders, as well as with
the work which they had done. He evidently had
but little confidence in that arm. He thought the
Confederate generals, especially Forrest, had been
far superior to his, and bluntly expressed his doubt
as to what I could accomplish. He gave me full
authority, however, with all the encouragement he
could think of, and generously declared that he
would not claim any part of the honors but would
leave me the full credit of whatever success I might
achieve. 1 Of course, this was most encouraging.
I had known Sherman intimately during the great
campaigns of Vicksburg and Chattanooga and, al-
though he was nearly twenty years my senior, he
1 O. E. Serial No. 79, p. 443, Wilson to Rawlins, Oct. 26, 1864.
12
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
assumed no superiority on that account, but acted
toward me with perfect cordiality and frankness.
He was a man of wide experience, extensive reading,
and high attainments, and was singularly brilliant
and entertaining in conversation. He received me
with the welcome of an old friend and at once gave
me his entire confidence, during which he explained
that he had intended to organize his available cav-
alry into three small divisions, but upon my repre-
sentation that so far as I could make out he had
enough regiments in the military division, if they
could be got hold of, to make six, certainly, and per-
haps seven, large divisions, he gave me carte blanche
and bade me do the best I could, merely asking me to
give Kilpatrick 's division a full mount and a com-
plete supply of ammunition, clothing, and other sup-
plies, for the March to the Sea, while I should gather
up the rest of the mounted and dismounted cavalry,
wherever found, and help Thomas as best I could to
defeat and destroy Hood.
It will be recalled that I succeeded Kilpatrick
in command of the Third Cavalry Division, and was
now to relieve him as chief of cavalry for the Army
of the Tennessee. In asking me to outfit his divi-
sion Sherman said with perfect frankness, but ap-
parently without intending to disparage him: -"I
know Kilpatrick is a hell of a damned fool, but I
want just that sort of a man to command my cavalry
on this expedition. " He explained many years af-
terwards that if he had used such language, which
he could not recall, he had done it because he knew
that that was what a good many of his officers were
in the habit of calling Kilpatrick. 1
1 O. E. Serial No. 79, p. 64, Grant to Sherman, Oct. 4.
13
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
In regard to my assignment, Sherman says :
General Grant, in designating General "Wilson to com-
mand my cavalry, predicted that he would by his per-
sonal activity increase the effect of that arm "fifty per
cent./' and he advised that he should be sent south to do
all that I had proposed to do with the main army, but I
had not so much confidence in cavalry as he had and pre-
ferred to adhere to my original intention of going my-
self with a competent command. 1
October 22 and the next seven days were full
of interest and made a lasting impression on my
mind. After supper Sherman dismissed his staff
to their tents with the remark that he wanted "to
talk with Wilson. " The night was clear, fresh, and
crisp, and this made the blazing camp fire in front
of his tent most comfortable. Sherman was full of
plans for the future. He had about given up hope
of bringing Hood to battle and was content to leave
him to the care of General Thomas, although he did
not seem to have any clear idea of the troops
Thomas would be able to gather, how long it would
take, or when they would be able to confront the
enemy. He had selected the flower of his three
armies, amounting to about sixty thousand infantry
and five thousand cavalry, with plenty of artillery,
all under his favorite leaders, for his own column,
but strangely enough, when we began our conversa-
tion, his mind had not fully settled on the route he
should take. He was clear that he should "march
to the sea," but whether it should be to Pensacola,
l " Personal Memoirs of General William T. Sherman", third
edition, Vol. II, pp. 159 et seq. Also O. R. Serial No. 79, p. 202,
Grant to Sherman, Oct. 11.
14
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
Apalachicola, Old Fort Meyers, or the mouth of the
Chattahoochee, on the Gulf of Mexico, rather than
to Brunswick or Savannah on the Atlantic, 1 seemed
far from settled. I pointed out that a march to
any point on the Gulf of Mexico, however far to
the east, would take him away from the Confederate
armies in the field and out of his true theater of
operations almost as completely as would a march
to Lake Erie or Lake Michigan. This seemed to
stagger him but he looked at the proposition from
every possible point before he finally decided in
favor of the South Atlantic coast. While the latter
lay in the proper direction and promised much bet-
ter results, I suggested that he would probably find
the country of central and eastern Georgia provided
with ample supplies and, unless defended by a much
more formidable force than was then in that region,
he need not go to the coast at all, but would find it
much better to pass through Augusta on the interior
short line toward Grant's army in Virginia. I
called special attention to the fact that Hood was
then near the Tennessee border and could hardly
overtake him, no matter what direction he might
take. While he admitted all that and finally settled
down on going to the South Atlantic seaboard, he
did not at that time, nor so long as I remained with
him, say definitely what his objective point would be.
And it is now well known that he met with no
effective resistance, but had a picnic excursion, liv-
ing on the fat of the land, going to Brunswick first,
and finally to Savannah. In this he lost much val-
uable time, which the enemy improved by collecting
X 0. B. Serial No. 79, Sherman to Grant, Oct. 11; also 16., p.
365, Sherman to Thomas, Oct. 19.
15
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the remnants of Hood's defeated army from Ten-
nessee, and, uniting it with all the other Confederate
troops they could find outside of Lee's army, con-
fronted the invaders in the Carolinas with a per-
fection of strategy and a boldness of determination
which, like Hood's movement against Nashville,
lacked nothing but weight to give it a complete vic-
tory.
During our discussion, which extended far be-
yond midnight, I developed my views in regard to
collecting, massing, and remounting the cavalry, and
giving them magazine rifles and carbines, all of
which he fully approved. He not only gave me
every encouragement, but directed me to return to
Nashville, where I could more readily carry out
my plans and more fully cooperate with Thomas in
the work of destroying Hood. With that job done
and he seemed to have no doubt of our success he
forcibly suggested that I should bring the Cavalry
Corps at its greatest possible strength through the
middle of the Confederacy, and join him in Virginia
for the final conflict with Lee and his army. This
was a splendid program, but, as will be seen, was
carried out only in part, for the simple reason that
the debacle came sooner than was expected.
During the memorable night at Gaylesville Sher-
man asked many questions about Grant, the condi-
tion of his army, and the progress he was making
toward finishing the great work before him in Vir-
ginia. He commented freely on Grant's delays and
disappointments, and while he acknowledged the
importance of Sheridan's victories in the Valley, he
felt that the deadlock in south Virginia would last
till his own army could reenforce Grant's in front
16
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
of Petersburg. He also commented freely on the
strong as well as the weak points of Grant's char-
acter and in the midst of the conversation looked
up suddenly, with the glow of the camp fire on his
deeply marked features and exclaimed: "Wilson,
I am a damned sight smarter man than Grant; I
know a great deal more about war, military history,
strategy, and grand tactics than he does; I know
more about organization, supply, and administration
and about everything else than he does; but I'll tell
you where he beats me and where he beats the world.
He don't care a damn for what the enemy does out
of his sight, but it scares me like hell ! ' ' He added :
"I am more nervous than he is. I am more likely
to change my orders or to countermarch my com-
mand than he is. He uses such information as he
has according to his best judgment; he issues his
orders and does his level best to carry them out
without much reference to what is going on about
him and, so far, experience seems to have fully justi-
fied him."
This was an acute and just analysis of the tem-
perament and character of the two men, and I have
quoted it more or less completely many times. While
Sherman was in many ways much more brilliant
than Grant, those who knew both will have long
since settled down to the conclusion that Grant was
a far saner and safer general than Sherman.
Sherman's mind was, however, at that time
wholly absorbed in. the proposed "March to the
Sea" and supporting it he insisted that it would not
only make ' ' Georgia howl, " * as it surely did, but
that it would also draw Hood after him, which it
1 O. B. Serial No. 69, p. 162, Sherman to Grant, Oct. 9, 1864.
17
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
certainly did not. Grant was slow in yielding to
Sherman's arguments in favor of marching away,
leaving Hood's veteran army behind him, free to
work its will, except as Thomas might confront it
with a superior force hastily improvised from widely
scattered fragments. Grant regarded the march
through Georgia at that time merely as a cavalry
proposition, claiming that "Hood would prohahly
strike for Nashville, " which he did as soon as he
could gather supplies and ammunition for the cam-
paign. Grant finally gave his consent to Sherman's
march not only with hesitation, but on the impera-
tive condition that Thomas should be left strong
enough to hold firmly the line of the Tennessee. It
is worthy of note that his position in this instance
was not weakened by the fact that it had Kawlins'
strong support throughout. It is also worthy of
note that Grant ended his dispatch by a final sug-
gestion in my behalf: "With Wilson turned loose
with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put
much more on the defensive than heretofore. ' ' 1
Although Sherman had conducted a successful
campaign against Atlanta, he had signally failed to
defeat or neutralize Hood's army. In fact, with all
his battles he had never gained a complete victory,
while Grant had to his credit the capture of Forts
Henry and Donelson, the campaign and capture of
Vicksburg, the victory of Missionary Eidge and was
destined, above all, without any direct help from
Sherman, to reap a final and overwhelming victory
at Appomattox. Notwithstanding Sherman's blunt
and searching criticism, it is greatly to the credit
of both Grant and Sherman who were in some sense
1 0. E. Serial No. 69, p. 202, Grant to Sherman, Oct. 11, 1864.
18
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
rivals, that they remained to the last firm and de-
voted friends. And yet there is something better
than self -depreciation in Sherman's remark, made
upon more than one occasion, that if it had not been
for the death of Charles F. Smith, their old West
Point commandant, "neither Grant nor he would
have ever been heard of !"
It well illustrates Grant's real modesty that he
never hesitated to say he regarded C. F. Smith as
the finest soldier he had ever known and that, even
after the fortunes of war had brought Smith under
his command, he always felt like "assuming the po-
sition of a soldier" and standing at "attention"
whenever he found himself in the presence of that
knightly old hero. It is hard to decide which of
those great men paid the finest compliment to C. F.
Smith, but his gallant and successful assault at Fort
Donelson showed that he deserved the unqualified
admiration of both.
I employed myself at Gaylesville till October
26, inspecting the cavalry and making the ac-
quaintance of its officers, perfecting the new organi-
zation, outfitting Kilpat rick's division, and sending
the dismounted troops back to the depots at Nash-
ville and Louisville for remounts and reequipment.
It was during this interesting period that I met
Kenner Garrard, whom I had succeeded a few
months before as chief of the Cavalry Bureau. He
was now commanding the Second Cavalry Division,
Army of the Cumberland, and, although only a brig-
adier general, his rank in the regular army as well
as his experience were so much greater than mine
that I thought it might embarrass him to serve under
me. Consequently I relieved him from further duty
19
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
in the cavalry and directed him to report to his army
commander for an assignment to the infantry.
I also found George Stoneman, who had been
the first corps commander of the Eastern Cavalry,
and first chief of the Cavalry Bureau, holding the
place of chief of cavalry to the Army of the Ohio.
W. L. Elliott, an old cavalryman of high character,
held the same title in the Army of the Cumberland,
while General Grierson of the volunteers held a sim-
ilar place in the Army of the Tennessee. They were
all my seniors and, although my brevet and my as-
signment thereunder gave me an indisputable right
to command them, I thought it best for all concerned
that they should be disposed of as Garrard had been,
and, as Sherman fully concurred, they were also
relieved in turn from further service with the cav-
alry.
This important step gave me direct control over
all the cavalry and its commanders, with no unnec-
essary links between me and them, and none of any
kind between Sherman and myself, except such as
grew out of the subsequent campaign. The March
to the Sea necessarily separated us and brought me
at once under the orders of Thomas, who was left
in chief command at Nashville. Henceforth, all the
mounted troops of the Military Division were abso-
lutely under my control, all details and detachments
were called in, and none were made thereafter ex-
cept by my authority.
The effect was instantaneous. Every army com-
mander and nearly every corps commander had a
cavalry escort of greater or less size, while regi-
ments, brigades, and divisions were scattered from
east Tennessee to the Missouri Eiver, with dis-
20
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
mounted men and convalescents at every hospital,
depot, and camp from Chicago and St. Paul on the
north to Vicksburg and Atlanta on the south. All
these were promptly relieved and sent to their re-
spective regiments; the regiments, when necessary,
were assigned to brigades, and the brigades to divi-
sions, while the divisions themselves were numbered
consecutively in the corps and, as long as they were
attached to it or were within reach, received their
orders solely from or through the corps com-
mander.
Inasmuch as there were seventy-two cavalry and
mounted infantry regiments in the Military Division,
sixty-one of which, not counting the Fourth Regu-
lars, were incorporated in the cavalry corps, it was
the largest cavalry organization ever made on this
continent. The nominal regimental strength was
from a thousand to twelve hundred, while the
number actually present with the colors was from
four to six hundred men. It will be seen that
even at the lowest average the force was an enormous
one, which needed only to be got together, properly
mounted, armed, equipped, and commanded to be-
come an army of itself. Fortunately, all but eight
Tennessee regiments were veterans of ripe experi-
ence. Excepting the Fourth Regulars, the Seventh,
Ninth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Pennsylvania, the
First Alabama, the Tenth and Twelfth Missouri, and
six splendid Kentucky regiments, they were from
the northwestern states and, it is safe to say, they
were nearly all native Americans, and as a class
no better men ever wore the nation's uniform or
carried its colors to victory.
While at Gaylesville, and after returning to
21
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Nashville, I wrote freely to Bawlins, Badeau, and
Dana, giving them the state of affairs as I found
it in Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee with my
views as to the measures necessary to put the west-
ern cavalry in a proper state of efficiency. Of course,
my letters to Eawlins and Badeau were intended for
the information of General Grant, when they thought
it advisable to submit them to him, while those to
Dana were under similar conditions for the informa-
tion of the War Department. A number of the let-
ters are in my possession, but, as they refer to inci-
dents or details which have long since lost their
interest, I shall quote them only when necessary to
give a contemporaneous touch to my narrative or
to emphasize points of special interest.
Before going to my new command, I received the
congratulations and good wishes of my army friends,
but, with the exception of an occasional mention in
an English newspaper, the press gave me a wide
berth. I saw but few reporters in the East and none
in the West. The cavalry service, although some-
what brilliant and romantic, was now settling down
to methodical work and hard knocks, neither of
which were greatly in favor with the reporters.
Both officers and men, however, gave their cheerful
help and, therefore, the new corps took shape much
more rapidly than anyone out of the army ever
dreamed of.
The Presidential election was now at hand and
all branches of the service were deeply interested
in the result. McClellan had been nominated by the
Democrats and, although he had not fully accepted
their platform, he had many friends among our
generals. Lincoln had been renominated against the
22
SHERMAN'S CAVALRY
wishes of many in high places, and had the opposi-
tion of all who thought him slow and irresolute. It
was a time of extraordinary anxiety. The Northern
states were unhappy over the campaign in Virginia.
They wanted and badly needed military success and
were apparently ready to support anyone who could
give them success. Grant had been held at bay in
front of Petersburg for five months, while Sherman
had at least driven the enemy's next most formidable
army back, and captured the great interior strong-
hold of Atlanta. This was fast making him a popu-
lar hero, and with his many accomplishments he
could probably have had the nomination for the
Presidency if he wanted it, but, like Grant, he was
for Lincoln as the best possible candidate, and was
utterly opposed to any candidate who could be
classed as "a copperhead" or "a rebel sympa-
thizer." 1 But neither the Presidential election nor
my correspondence interfered with my work.
1 spent the next three days with the cavalry in an
expedition toward Blue Mountain, Alabama, dur-
which I got acquainted with many of the officers,
studied the bearing, behavior, equipment, and
mounts of the men and gathered information about
that part of the country, but, not meeting any con-
siderable body of the enemy, I left the column and
returned to Borne, at which place I arrived after
nightfall on October 29. General Sherman with
some hesitation finally concluded that I should not
go on the March to the Sea, but should return to
help Thomas dispose of Hood. 2 Accordingly, I
1 O. R. Serial No. 79, p. 203, Sherman to Halleck, Oct. 11.
2 O. E. Serial No. 79, pp. 365, 515, 577, 582, 595, 599, 600, 618,
666, 714, 718, 747.
23
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
started on the next day for Nashville by rail and,
after some vicissitudes and delays, reached there a
few days later. Before leaving Georgia, I fully out-
fitted Kilpatrick's 1 division by taking horses from
the regiments left behind, and thus added largely
to the dismounted force, which now constituted by
far the largest part of my command. The task
of collecting and remounting it and of supplying its
deficiencies of arms and equipments, while watch-
ing and resisting the progress of an active invading
army under a most aggressive leader, engaged my
constant attention both night and day till the danger
had culminated and passed.
For about three weeks my headquarters remained
at Nashville, but as soon as news came that Hood
had crossed the Tennessee and had begun his ad-
vance in real earnest, I hastened to the front and
took personal command of all the mounted troops
I could find for service against the enemy.
1 O. E. Serial No. 79, pp. 479, 494 (Special Orders No. 3) ; 511,
Wilson to Garrard, Oct. 30; 531, Wilson to Thomas, Oct. 31.
24
II
CAMPAIGN OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE AGAINST
HOOD
Details of reorganization Hood at Gadsden Grant un-
easy Rawlins sends reinforcements from Missouri
Gathering and remounting cavalry Hood's advance
Wilson takes the field Columbia on the Duck River
Forrest turns position Schofield retreats Affair at
Spring Hill Victory at Franklin Cavalry defeats
Forrest Interview with Schofield and Stanley Re-
tire to Nashville Correspondence with Grant's head-
quarters Impressing horses Thomas approves and
cooperates.
With headquarters at Nashville, I was in close
touch with Thomas and his subordinate command-
ers. Up to that time the cavalry had been directly
under the department commanders and their chiefs
of cavalry and were scattered from southwestern
Missouri to east Tennessee and northern Georgia.
Many men were absent from the colors on detached
service of various kinds which contributed but little
to the progress of the war. Those at the depots,
remount camps, and various headquarters were for-
gotten or looked upon as out of reach, but as soon
as I got to Nashville, all this was changed. With
full powers from Sherman and with the active and
25
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
sympathetic cooperation of Thomas, who was him-
self an old and distinguished cavalryman, the work
of regeneration went forward from the start not
only without obstruction, but with the cheerful sup-
port of every officer in the field. Infantrymen and
cavalrymen alike gave their hearty approval. While
the mounted troops had done perhaps as well as
could be fairly expected under the old policy, their
operations had been so lacking in coherence and
method that they were generally inefficient and in-
conclusive and were, therefore, regarded with indif-
ference, if not with contempt. Sherman 's spicy but
severe criticisms in his letter to Grant reflected the
views generally held as to the cavalry arm through-
out the West. It had in no instance played an im-
portant, much less a decisive, part either in cam-
paign or battle and was, therefore, properly con-
sidered as a negligible factor in the western theater
of war.
From the best information I could get there were
seventy-two regiments of cavalry and mounted in-
fantry in the Military Division, nominally about fifty
thousand men, 1 of which one thousand and twenty-
six officers and twenty-two thousand nine hundred
and thirty-nine men were reported as present for
duty. These were divided into three army corps, one
of three divisions and two of two divisions each,
and yet there were no late returns on file either at
Sherman's or Thomas's headquarters. No one pre-
tended to know how many men were actually with
the colors nor how many horses were available or
could be got together for service. Even the chiefs
of cavalry were ignorant as to the number of
1 0. E. Serial No. 79, p. 573, Abstract of Returns, Oct. 31, 1864.
26
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
mounted and dismounted men, the number and kind
of arms, equipments, and remounts required, or
where they were to be had. These matters under
our military system were not within their control
but were left solely to the supply departments,
which were primarily controlled by the Secretary
of War and the chiefs of bureaus. The officers in
the field had no authority over army supplies of
any kind until furnished for issue. The Ordnance
Bureau supplied arms, ammunition, and horse
equipments; the Quartermaster's Bureau furnished
forage, remounts, wagons, clothing, harness, and
camp equipage; while the Subsistence Bureau was
by far the most efficient and, it is safe to say, no
army was ever better supplied with food than ours.
When regular supplies failed on account of dis-
tance or lack of transportation facilities, long be-
fore the war was half over, it came to be the custom
for the troops to supply their wants by impress-
ment from the enemy's country.
With the mounted troops scattered as they were
over the entire theater of war in the Mississippi
valley, they had, of course, lost many men, killed,
wounded, and captured, but, as their engagements
were nearly always at the outposts or on raids and
expeditions far away from the center of operations,
their performances were but little known and still
less appreciated. They were hardly ever in camp
long enough to make returns and rarely ever long
enough to make requisitions. It is no slander now
to say that the mounted service was looked upon
as both futile and discreditable. The results ac-
complished were in many cases negligible, if not
positively injurious. Indeed, it is but the simple
27
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
truth that the cavalry had come to be a scoff and
a byword to the other branches of service. The
derisive offer of a liberal reward for a dead cavalry-
man was just as fair in the West as the East and
was heard too often to be regarded as either witty
or agreeable. And yet wherever mounted men went
this reward was vociferously shouted with the de-
risive cry: "Dismount and grab a root!" Even of-
ficers and couriers were not exempt from it. Where
the cry originated or what its real significance
was, unless to hug the ground behind a tree,
has never been satisfactorily explained, but I first
heard it in the Army of the Tennessee two years
before. It subsequently spread to the other
armies and always indicated disrespect and con-
tempt. It is pleasant to add, however, that
neither the reward for a dead cavalryman nor the
cry of "grab a root" was ever heard in the East
after the battle of Winchester nor in the West
after the battle of Nashville. In both cases they
disappeared as the cavalry came together in masses
and began close cooperation with the other arms
of service.
Fortunately for us, Hood lost a whole month at
Gadsden, waiting for ammunition, supplies, and re-
cruits, while Forrest was making a senseless raid
toward the Cumberland Eiver. It was this delay
and this raid that justified Sherman in saying:
"That devil, Forrest, is down about Johnsonville,"
and gave Thomas time to assemble all his forces for
a sturdy defence. 1
While still at Gaylesville I wrote Eawlins, the
chief-of-staff, fully as to the situation which Sher-
1 0. E. Serial No. 79, p. 913, Hood to Davis, Nov. 12, 1864.
28
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
man would leave behind him. 1 I gave him a full ac-
count of the nominal cavalry force, of its inchoate
organization, and of its diminished strength in the
field. I pointed out that we had nearly fifty thou-
sand men on paper, divided into seven divisions, with
from seven to ten regiments each, and ought to have
an aggregate of thirty thousand men, not less than
twenty thousand of which should be actually in the
saddle, but, as a matter of fact, we could not raise
six thousand for actual service, on account of detach-
ments and a lack of horses, arms, and equipments.
I did all in my power to give him and General Grant
an exact idea of our situation. I discussed the case
in all its aspects, urging a policy of concentration
as the only means of overcoming the enemy's cav-
alry and establishing the invincibility of our own. I
showed that cavalry without horses was useless, that
it was worthless for defense, and that its only power
was in a vigorous offensive. I advocated its concen-
tration south of the Tennessee and hurling it into
the bowels of the Confederacy in such masses that
the enemy could not drive them back, as he did Sooy
Smith and Sturgis, the year before.
I indicated the organization I proposed to make,
gave the names of the division commanders, and
asked for the officers of experience that had been
promised me from the Army of the Potomac. I
made in addition a vigorous plea against subdivid-
ing Sherman's forces until Hood had been disposed
of and in favor of concentrating both infantry and
cavalry as the surest means of success. There can
be no doubt that this letter thoroughly aroused Eaw-
1 O. R. Serial No. 79, pp. 442 et seq., Wilson to Rawlins, Oct. 26,
1864.
29
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
lins 's apprehensions as to the possibilities of a great
disaster should Hood decide not to follow Sherman
but to lead an aggressive campaign against Thomas
in middle Tennessee. Perceiving that Sherman's
absence at the coast would certainly leave Hood free
to move against Thomas and that this movement of
a veteran and undefeated army against our widely
scattered detachments might be successful, Eawlins
got Grant's permission to go to St. Louis in person,
for the purpose of sending A. J. Smith with the
Sixteenth Corps and such other infantry and cavalry
as he could find in Missouri, to reenforce Thomas in
middle Tennessee. But with all that forcible officer
could do, the concentration made slow progress. A.
J. Smith, although a veteran of approved enterprise,
lost nearly a month in making his way to Nashville.
Meanwhile, Thomas with two corps of infantry and
not over five thousand mounted troops was in great
peril. Had Hood advanced at once with his three
corps of infantry and his cavalry in better condition
than ever before, he must have overthrown Thomas
and overrun both Tennessee and Kentucky. 1
But Sherman, having given me full control, the
cavalry reorganization under existing conditions
proceeded slowly but surely, while the various widely
scattered detachments, with their own horses and
transportation, marched from Memphis and west
Tennessee and took up their position in Hood's front
along Shoal Creek, and thus became the nucleus of
the best cavalry corps that had ever been organized
in the West. Hatch with his efficient division was
soon joined by Croxton, Capron, and Harrison with
fairly good brigades, and the line thus formed gave
1 0. E. Serial No. 77, pp. 590 et seq.
30
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
prompt notice of Hood's advance on November 19.
Forrest having rejoined Hood, moved out with all
his aggressive activity, through Florence and Law-
renceburg toward Pulaski. Born and brought up
in the Duck Eiver country, and having many Tennes-
seeans from the same district with him, Forrest was
perfectly familiar with every river and creek, as
well as with every turnpike and crossroad in that
region. The direct route to Nashville was a broad,
well-built turnpike, running due north through Col-
umbia, Spring Hill, and Franklin, and although the
weather was good, the streams still low, and the
side roads dry and passable, it required no great
knowledge of the country and but little military
acumen to foresee that Hood would make his ad-
vance by that route. Our own movements, as well as
his, were, therefore, clearly indicated from the start.
Hood must naturally follow the turnpike because he
could make better speed in that way. We were com-
pelled to do the same, because if we left it we should
necessarily lose both distance and time.
Long's division, formerly Garrard's, was the
largest and best one in my command, but its re-
maining horses had been taken to complete Kil-
patrick's remount and fit that division to go with
Sherman, while the dismounted troopers were sent
by rail to Louisville for fresh horses, and did not
rejoin me in the field or take any part against
Hood till the battle and campaign of Nashville were
over.
It was, undoubtedly, a great misfortune that we
were compelled to send this splendid division so
far to the rear for remount, but when the orders
were given, the railroad was so overtaxed with sup-
31
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
plies for Sherman that it could not carry horses to
the south at all, while it was easy to carry the dis-
mounted men by the returning empty trains to
Nashville and the refitting depot at Louisville. It
was the lack of sufficient rail transportation and
the danger of interruption by water which account
for much of the delay we experienced in concentrat-
ing both infantry and cavalry in front of Hood.
While both armies were delayed and embarrassed
by the lack of railroad facilities, it should be re-
membered that our railroads were better than the
enemy's and that, having superior resources of 'every
sort, we were finally enabled to concentrate our
troops and give battle in time to gain one of the
most overwhelming victories of the entire war.
As the campaign developed, the places in which
there seemed to be the greatest doubt as to the actual
condition of affairs, accompanied by the least hope
of a favorable outcome, were the War Department
and Grant's headquarters. While Sherman's col-
umns were lost to view, in the Georgia lowlands and
Grant's own army was at a deadlock with Lee's,
both Grant and Stanton became filled with undue
anxiety and impatience as to Thomas and his move-
ments. They thought him slow, and did not hesitate
first to criticise and then to issue positive and ill-
considered orders to fight, when the conditions were
still highly unfavorable.
While Hood was advancing from the Tennessee
and I had nominally six divisions of cavalry, my
actual force with the colors in front of Hood did not
exceed five thousand fighting men. Until the move-
ment began I remained at Nashville, engaged night
and day in perfecting the paper work, in gathering
32
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
horses, arms, and equipments, and in making ready
for the campaign which was soon to burst upon
us. Generally, the supply departments responded
promptly to my call, but horses, our greatest want,
were scarce, and with the higher requirements and
closer inspections I had myself prescribed a few
months before, and the advance in price which had
naturally followed the advance in quality, the west-
ern horse contractors found it impossible to supply
our demands. The War Department itself seemed
to despair, and while Stanton appeared willing to do
what he could, he finally lost patience and his good
sense besides, and telegraphed Thomas that if he
waited for Wilson to remount his cavalry he would
wait "till the crack of doom." But as this was
after I had asked and he had granted permission
to impress horses from the people wherever they
could be found south of the Ohio Eiver, his pessimis-
tic assertion was shortly shown to be both unjust
and unfounded.
This arbitrary measure was entirely without pre-
cedent within our lines, but it was carried ruthlessly
into effect while the contending armies were facing
each other in front of Nashville. Within seven
days after the Secretary's authority came to hand
seven thousand horses were obtained in middle and
western Kentucky and our mounted force was there-
by increased to twelve thousand, nine thousand of
which were actually assembled at Edgefield or with-
in supporting distance. The quartermasters to
whom this duty was assigned gave vouchers in
proper form for every horse taken and it is believed
that no permanent loss or injury was inflicted upon
the loyal people. Every horse and mare that could
33
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
be used was taken. All street-car and livery
stable horses, and private carriage- and saddle-
horses, were seized. Even Andrew Johnson, the
vice-president-elect, was forced to give up his pair.
A circus then at Nashville lost everything except its
ponies; even the old white trick horse was taken
but it is alleged that the young and handsome eques-
trienne, who claimed him, succeeded in convincing
my adjutant general that the horse was unfit for
cavalry service. Be this as it may, a clean sweep
was made of every animal that could carry a cavalry-
man and the result is shown by the fact that although
two brigades of three thousand men were sent to
Kentucky in pursuit of Lyon's Confederate cavalry,
about ten thousand well mounted men crossed the
Cumberland on the night of December 12 and
marched out against the enemy on the morning of
the 15th, as soon as the thaw made it possible to
move at all. The great victory which resulted from
turning the enemy's flank shows how important the
measure was in making the cavalry the tremendous
factor it became, not only in that battle but in the
campaign which wound up the war.
Meanwhile on November 21, at 9 :30 p. M., I left
Nashville by train and at 2 A. M. the next day reached
Lynnville, sixty-three miles south of Nashville.
There I took horse for the front and met Schofield
four miles north of Pulaski, whence he was retiring
with the bulk of our forces. He was not the senior
general at that time in the field but had the Fourth
Corps under the veteran Stanley, who ranked him
and the Twenty-third under Cox in all about twen-
ty-five thousand men. Schofield, commanding an
army and department, had precedence over Stanley,
34
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
who was but a corps commander by assignment. 1
After a short conference, we returned together to
Lynnville where I soon got in touch with the vari-
ous parts of my command covering the enemy 's
front. In the afternoon I rode to Campbellsville, a
small village and road-center to the west, and after
learning that the enemy had not made his appear-
ance in that quarter I rejoined Schofield at Lynn-
ville, and early the next morning with the rear guard
retired to Columbia, a considerable town on the Duck
Eiver. 2
On my way back I took station on a railroad em-
bankment to inspect Croxton's brigade, mostly Ken-
tuckians, as it passed to the rear. It so turned out
that the Eighth Michigan Veteran Cavalry, of ex-
cellent reputation, well mounted and equipped, had
the head of the column, but much to my surprise the
regiment itself was headed by a well mounted and
well clad woman riding with the field and staff as
though she belonged there. As this was an unusual
sight in an actual campaign, I turned to Croxton
nearby and asked who the lady was. The General
with a meaning smile said: "Oh, that is Mrs. Col-
onel Smith commanding the Eighth Michigan Cav-
alry/' In further explanation he added that she
had been with the regiment some time and seemed
to be quite at home, whereupon I said with all nec-
essary firmness: "General, please send my com-
pliments to 'Mrs. Colonel Smith ' with an order re-
lieving her from further service in the field, and
directing her to take the first train back to Nash-
1 O. B. Serial No. 79, pp. 638, Special Field Orders No. 302;
666, Thomas to Halleck; 685, Halleck to Thomas; see also p. 703.
2 0. B. Serial No. 93, p. 995, Schofield to Thomas, Nov. 23, 1864.
35
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ville." Thereupon a broader smile lighted the Gen-
eral 's face as well as the faces of his staff, as he said
to an aid-de-camp: "You have heard the General's
orders. Please deliver them to Mrs. Colonel Smith
and see that they are promptly obeyed. ' '
This episode, small as it was, made a favorable
impression on all present, as well as upon the offi-
cers and men of the regiment, for the next day the
field and staff called formally to pay their respects
to the new commander. Of course, no allusion was
made to the order sending the Colonel's wife to the
rear, but that it was heartily approved was shown by
the cordiality of all who took part in the visit. The
day after, however, I received a note from the lady
protesting against my action, and asking, inasmuch
as both Sherman and Thomas had permitted her to
accompany the regiment, that I should at least with-
draw my order till the campaign then on was ended.
Of course, I remained obdurate, but did my best to
soften the blow by the assurance that I had not
intended to cast the slightest reflection upon her
courage.
The whole of our infantry and artillery was
gathered and strongly entrenched at Columbia by
November 24, but Hood did not make his appear-
ance in force till two days later. Meanwhile, I
posted the cavalry on the north bank of the Duck
Eiver, watching the fords and roads above and
below the town for twenty-five miles. The entire
cavalry present for duty was four thousand five hun-
dred men, while in front of us Forrest had three
divisions estimated at from eight thousand to ten
thousand men in the saddle.
A slight breathing spell followed till the 27th,
36
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
when most of the infantry was withdrawn to the
north side of the river for the better defense of the
crossings against the enemy. It soon became evi-
dent, from the caution with which he moved, that
Hood would not throw his main force against Col-
umbia, but, using the fords above, would strike
across the country toward Spring Hill and Franklin
on the railroad in the rear. Communication with
Thomas at Nashville was slow and uncertain and
Schofield alleges that this was partly due to the fact
that his cipher telegraph operator had deserted and
gone back to Franklin. Be this as it may, I took the
precaution to send a courier to Thomas with a copy
of every dispatch, sent directly to Schofield. In this
way the Generalissimo was fully informed of all im-
portant movements at the front. We were daily ex-
pecting the Sixteenth Corps from Nashville with
such other reinforcements as might be gathered, but
it so turned out that Smith was delayed and did not
form a junction with the army till it was safely with-
in the defenses of Nashville a few days later. The
greatest peril on the Duck Eiver was due to the fact
that our forces might be caught napping while the
enemy made a rapid march around our flank to the
rear and threw himself upon our communications at
one or the other of the points left uncovered, and
this is exactly what he undertook to do. Having
posted my command on the road from Columbia to
the Lewisburg turnpike, north of the river, I was
in position to obtain prompt information from the
outposts and pickets watching the fords.
On Monday, November 28, it was certain that
we could no longer hold Columbia, which had become
an important depot not only for the quartermasters
37
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
and commissaries, but for the sutlers. The latter
had gathered a considerable quantity of officers'
supplies and when it became certain that they would
have to get back, they gave away such as they could
not otherwise dispose of, and a demijohn of whiskey
fell to my staff who received it without making the
fact known. My standing orders absolutely forbade
all officers from having liquor in their possession.
Even the doctors were discouraged from keeping it
in stock except for necessary medical purposes. The
next day, as headquarters with the Fourth Regular
Cavalry were marching to the Lewisburg turnpike,
one of the staff much to my surprise showed by an
incoherent speech that he had been drinking. This
was the first notice I had, and turning in my saddle I
saw a sergeant carrying a demijohn resting upon
his thigh almost tall enough to reach his shoulder.
Asking what he had, he answered: "Whiskey,
sir!" Thereupon I told him to dash it down, and
this he did with a cheerful "Aye, aye, sir," just as
the column was passing down the slope of a hill
where the stone was laid bare. The crash and jingle
of the glass, audible to the entire staff, was followed
by frowns and by silence which were ominous, but
it was soon evident that there was no more liquor
left in the column. We had plenty of hard work
all that night and the next day and for several days
afterward and while the officers scarcely spoke to
me, no more incoherent orders were heard. This in-
cident impressed me with the belief that no matter
how great the exposure or how hard the work,
strong drink affords no protection or benefit in either
case. We frequently laughed about the broken demi-
john afterward, and all admitted that my action was
38
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
justifiable and that the rule on which it was based
was a good one. The simple fact is, that all kinds
of ardent spirits are absolutely harmful to officers
and men on active duty and are of questionable value
even in the hospital.
Schofield, the actual commander at the front,
many years afterward wrote an elaborate justifica-
tion of his own course and a sharp criticism of
Thomas's. He blamed the latter for not making
his headquarters with the troops in the field, for
not concentrating his available forces more rapidly,
for not bridging the Harpeth Eiver in the rear, and
for leaving him without positive instructions as to
the course he should pursue. The truth is that
Thomas did exactly right in remaining at Nashville
till his entire army was concentrated and ready to
assume the offensive. Nashville was the center of
rail, river, and telegraphic communication for that
entire theater of war. It was also the principal
national depot south of the Ohio and it was clearly
Thomas's duty to make that place secure against
every possible attack, and to this end he could the
more properly devote himself, because he had in
Schofield and Stanley at the front, two major gener-
als of ability and reputation. Manifestly the most
important work for him was to gather all the avail-
able forces into a single and compact army and to
avoid a general engagement till that was accom-
plished. Whatver may have been Thomas's orders
or suggestions, it was clearly Schofield 's first duty,
while impeding the progress of Hood as much as
practicable, to incur no great risk and to accept no
general engagements, except from behind fortifica-
tions, till Thomas could either take the field with all
39
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
his reinforcements or till Schofield himself should
be forced back to Nashville. In violating these fun-
damental principles in face of full information,
Schofield lost at least twelve hours in getting out of
Columbia after he knew that Hood had crossed
Duck Eiver above and was marching on Spring
Hill. In endeavoring to justify this loss of time,
both he and Cox made elaborate explanations which
did not explain. 1
It was a period of great activity and of great
anxiety from the time we left Columbia till we
reached Nashville. Since we had passed three days
and nights in ceaseless marching and fighting, as-
sailed by Hood, one of the most aggressive of the
Confederate generals, with an army of veterans,
aided by such leaders as Forrest, Cheatham, Stephen
D. Lee, Stewart, Cleburne, and Walthall, it was of
vital importance that no mistake should be made
and that no time should be lost in reaching the im-
portant points on the line of retreat. Neither
Thomas, A. J. Smith, nor Steedman was at hand
and, therefore, it should have been plain sailing for
Schofield, without exposing any part of his com-
mand to defeat or disaster. The turnpikes were all
in his possession and the Harpeth Eiver f ordable at
many places but, withal, he tarried at Columbia
south of Duck Eiver till Hood's advance guard had
attacked a part of his forces twelve miles in the
rear.
At noon on November 28, the cavalry pickets
1 Schofield 's ' * Forty-six Years in the Army, ' ' pp. 170-225 ; ' l The
March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville," by Jacob D. Cox,
pp. 66-80; "The Battle of Franklin," by Jacob D. Cox, pp. 21
et seq.
40
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
gave notice of the appearance of the rebel cavalry
at various fords and particularly at Huey's Mill,
four or five miles above Columbia, in such force as to
leave no doubt of their intentions to cross. Shortly
afterward our pickets and supporting detachments
were driven in, while Forrest began laying a bridge
and crossing by the ford at the mill. At 2 :10 p. M. I
sent a dispatch to Schofield informing him of the
enemy 's movements and of my intention to con-
centrate the cavalry at the junction of the east and
west road with the Lewisburg turnpike. In the
same dispatch I requested him to send one of my out-
lying brigades by way of Spring Hill to reenforce
me on the fighting flank of the army. At 7 P. M.,
after much skirmishing and rapid marching, I had
my entire force, with the exception of this brigade,
in hand at the crossroads with a strong detachment
holding on till after nightfall at the crossing of the
turnpike and the Duck Eiver five miles south of
us. Thus I was in safe control of one turnpike while
the other was occupied by Schofield 's infantry with
nothing to oppose or delay its orderly retirement
in the direction of Franklin. This was obviously
the best possible condition for the army at the front
for it left the well covered broad turnpikes for our
use, while it forced the enemy to move on the mud
roads between the two turnpikes. It is a curious
fact, however, that Schofield, as though he doubted
the accuracy of my information, instead of begin-
ning his march to the rear, sent a brigade, as he al-
leges, to verify my report, while he himself held on
in the neighborhood of Columbia, if not actually in
the town, which was exactly what his opponent
wanted him to do.
41
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
During the night my men captured a number of
prisoners and brought them to headquarters, where
I promptly examined them with the result that the
previous information was fully verified. It was also
ascertained beyond doubt that Forrest 's cavalry,
consisting of Chalmers's, Jackson's, Buford's, and a
part of Boddy's divisions, with Biffle's regiment act-
ing as Forrest's escort, had already crossed the
river at Huey's Mill and that a large part of Hood's
infantry was following by the same route. Feeling
sure that this information was correct, I suggested
in my dispatch dated 1 A. M. November 29, which
I took the precaution of sending by several dif-
ferent couriers on different routes, that Schofield
should reach Spring Hill by 10 A. M. because, accord-
ing to my calculations, Hood with his advance could
easily reach there by noon. 1 I warned Schofield, who
got the first copy of my dispatch at 2 A. M. and the
second later, that there was not an hour to lose, but
instead of moving promptly with the whole of his
forces he ordered Stanley with one division to
Spring Hill to take position at that place covering
the railway and country roads passing through it.
Stanley, who was no sluggard, moved promptly,
reached his destination in time and with admirable
judgment occupied a position from which he was
enabled to foil every movement of Hood, whose ad-
vance guard made its appearance at noon of that
day as I had predicted. But Schofield still held
on, and, according to his own narrative, did not be-
gin his march to the rear till late in the afternoon'
of the 29th. Fortunately, the turnpike was not
1 O. R. Serial No. 930, p. 1143, Wilson to Schofield, Nov. 29,
1 A. M.J also, p. 1144, Schofield to Wilson, Nov. 29, 8 A. M.
42
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
only smooth and broad, but the enemy did not
reach or cross it from the fords and the southeast,
although his main body bivouacked in sight of it and
remained there throughout the night, while Scho-
field 's delayed columns, under cover of darkness,
marched within gun-shot and hearing distance of the
sleeping rebels. That Hood understood the real sit-
uation is shown by his own interesting narrative
published fifteen years later. His plan was bril-
liant, and so obviously proper that Schofield should
have divined it from the start. 1 It was, briefly, to
throw his cavalry, followed by two corps of infantry,
across Duck Eiver between the two turnpikes and
to march by the dirt roads rapidly to Spring Hill,
while Lee with his remaining corps, should hold
Schofield with the bulk of his army in front of
Columbia. By half past seven Hood, closely fol-
lowed by Cheatham and Stewart, had crossed at
Huey's Mill, while a part of Forrest's corps was con-
fronting me at Rally Hill, and the rest moving across
country toward Spring Hill. Losing no time, Hood
pushed forward by the mud roads, his advance guard
reaching the neighborhood of Spring Hill by noon
and his main body threatening Stanley at the village
and overlooking the turnpike to the left. Manifestly,
it was Hood's policy to strike the turnpike first
and thus divide Stanley from Schofield 's marching
columns. For that purpose he claims to have or-
dered Cheatham in person before nightfall to throw
his corps across the turnpike facing Schofield, but
for some reason, never made entirely clear, Cheat-
ham failed him. Doubtless, Stanley's entrenched
position was a serious obstacle to the movement.
1 " Advance and Retreat," by J. B. Hood, pp. 283 et seq.
43
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Cheatham afterward asserted that lie had positively
ordered Stewart to prolong his line to the left but
darkness settling down before anything could be
done in that direction, all operations came to an end.
Hood himself, with the instincts of an aggressive
leader, seems to have realized that a great oppor-
tunity was slipping away, but with all his efforts
he did not succeed in getting any part of his army
to the turnpike, much less across it. Learning later
that Schofield's column with its trains had not yet
passed, but was hurrying along the turnpike from
dark till midnight, he renewed his orders in writing,
directing Cheatham this time to throw himself across
the turnpike north of Spring Hill. Subsequent dis-
cussion makes it probable that this order reached
Cheatham 's adjutant general, who declares that he
withheld it on his own responsibility and that Cheat-
ham did not hear of it till after the Federal columns
had safely passed beyond the danger of interception.
It is an interesting circumstance, however, that
when I returned to that neighborhood a few weeks
later, I received what seemed to be reliable informa-
tion that Cheatham, for a part of the night at least,
was absent from his headquarters in the company
of ladies at a nearby country house and did not
hear of Hood's written order till after the great op-
portunity upon which it was based had passed. 1 It
is worthy of note that certain Confederate writers
discussing this question years afterward, set up the
contention that Hood's plans upon this interesting
occasion failed largely because his subordinates
1 O. E. Serial No. 93, p. 652, General Hood 'a Official Keport to
General S. Cooper; also, p. 657, General Hood to Seddon, Confeder-
ate Secretary of War.
44
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
lacked confidence in his capacity as an army com-
mander. It will be recalled that Hood succeeded
Joseph E. Johnston in command of that army by
the orders of Jefferson Davis, as a result of John-
ston's failure to stay Sherman's progress toward
Atlanta, and that Hood up to that time held an in-
ferior command. Although a soldier of great per-
sonal courage and prowess, there is no doubt that he
was looked upon by his contemporaries as possess-
ing but limited ability and lacking the necessary ex-
perience for the great responsibilities thus imposed
upon him. It was customary in both the Confed-
erate and Federal armies after his advancement to
decry both his performances and his abilities, and
this may account in some degree for the failure of
his bold undertakings, but it has always seemed to
me that they were ably planned and needed nothing
but heavier battalions, greater resources, and better
subordinates to make them successful.
Simultaneously with Hood's advance on Spring
Hill, Forrest threw his cavalry against me at Bally
Hill. Having given Schofield timely notice that I
should keep my force together and hold on as long
and as firmly as its strength would permit, I clung
to the Lawrenceburg turnpike, as I always sup-
posed, with his approval, as well as with Thomas's,
hoping to get no further back that night than to
the Eidge Meeting House abreast of Spring Hill. I
understood that Schofield would unite his army at
Spring Hill and hold that place till nightfall and
that I would be in my proper position, as indicated,
on the next turnpike facing the enemy's cavalry.
Had he conformed to that idea, there need have been
no serious fighting till both columns, then less
45
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
than four miles apart, were concentrated by the con-
verging turnpikes at Franklin the next day. As it
turned out, Forrest ceased his pressure against me
late in the afternoon and, dividing his command,
withdrew the greater part in the direction of Hood's
main body near Spring Hill. Keeping the cavalry in
a compact mass, it incurred no great loss or risk
from that time till the end of the campaign. Hatch
and Croxton, commanding the principal parts of the
active forces, were officers of rare experience and
self-reliance. Taking the rear by turns, during the
first day they compelled Forrest to advance slowly
and with caution. It was a heavily wooded country
in which it was easy enough to hold chosen positions
as long as necessary and then fall back to new ones
on the turnpike, while the enemy was compelled to
move through the woods in greater or less disorder.
Hatch had the rear at first with Croxton so posted
behind that when the time came Hatch could pass
through and reform farther back. In order to en-
courage Croxton, I told him when his turn came, to
hold the rear and fall back beyond Hatch, who would
be close at hand ready to support him, whereupon
Croxton asked quickly if I intended to fight, to
which I answered: "Only when necessary to delay
the enemy. ' ' At this, the self-reliant Kentuckian re-
plied: "I think I understand you, and all I have
to say is, if you don't intend to fight for all you
are worth, please get your 'horse cavalry' out of
the way and give me a clear road!" His perfect
confidence in himself and his men was so clear
from this remark that I felt no doubt our move-
ments that day would be both deliberate and suc-
cessful.
46
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
It is commonly supposed that it is one of the
most difficult operations of war to cover a retreat
successfully while retreatng yourself, but according
to my observation there is nothing easier in a
wooded country than "to get back" without haste
or loss. It was a busy and exciting day during most
of which my column was retiring or fighting. At
Mount Carmel Church, five miles north of Hart's
Crossroads, the enemy made two headlong charges
on our fence-rail layout but were repulsed with se-
vere loss. From that place back to Douglas Church,
four miles from Franklin, our retreat was made with
perfect order and deliberation. The enemy made
no effort to disturb us but without our knowledge
turned his attention entirely to Schofield's march.
Even that he did not molest in the least, and it is
now certain that, seeing the Federal columns could
not be brought to bay till they were safely behind
the entrenchments at Spring Hill, he dropped both
entirely about that time and confined himself to a
closer cooperation with the movement toward
Franklin, and with Hood's final gallant but futile
assaults upon the entrenchments of that place. I
here call attention to the fact that during that bloody
battle Forrest, acting strictly under Hood's instruc-
tions, divided his cavalry, sending Chalmer's strong
division to the extreme left, while he kept the other
two under his own personal command on the ex-
treme right of Hood's line confronting me. Al-
though we were separated by a fordable river, this
division of Forrest's corps was a fatal mistake for,
instead of driving me back and getting on Schofield's
rear as he might have done with his whole corps, it
made it easy for me not only to beat his two divi-
47
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
sions in actual battle but to drive them north of the
river in confusion.
As Schofield's infantry was safely within the
strong defenses of Franklin by an early hour on
the 30th, I took position with my main body on his
left along the river roads above him. The Har-
peth, although of considerable width, was fordable
at many places and this made it certain that any
turning movement on Forrest's part would be above
rather than below the town. This, however, did not
prevent me from sending one small brigade down
and one farther up the river toward Triune. To
any one who will take the trouble to consult the map
it will appear that this was the best possible ar-
rangement of the cavalry, especially as I kept Crox-
ton's brigade in its advanced position on the Lewis-
burg pike to the left and front of Franklin till the
enemy had closed in upon that place and Forrest
had taken position along the south bank of the river
confronting my position and pickets.
It is not my purpose to describe the battle of
Franklin. This has been done many times, with
sufficient accuracy as far as the part performed
by the infantry is concerned, but, inasmuch as the
all-important services of the cavalry in connection
with that battle have been habitually minimized, it
is my duty to set forth the part played by them while
Hood was hurling his masses with frenzied impetu-
osity against the entrenchments in his front.
Croxton's brigade became engaged at ten o'clock
near Douglas Church on the Lewisburg turnpike,
but successfully held its position till 2 p. M., when
he was again pressed by Forrest, supported by in-
fantry moving toward his left as if to turn his
48
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
flank and cross the river at Hughes' Ford. Regard-
ing his position as merely one of observation, I with-
drew him to the north side of the river at McGav-
ock's Ford, but he had scarcely reached his new
position when Hatch's pickets further up the river
reported the enemy crossing at various places in
his front.
The main body of my command under cover of
night had unsaddled, groomed, and fed their horses
and had taken a short rest, but were early under
arms and ready to drive the rebels back if possible.
I received no orders whatever from Schofield and,
although within two miles and a half of his head-
quarters, I was left for the entire day to my own
resources. Eealizing, however, that it was impor-
tant to drive Forrest back and to hold the line of
the river intact until Schofield 's infantry and ar-
tillery were safely out of Franklin, I lost no time
in pushing all the troopers I could dismount sharply
against the enemy. Naturally, we thought Forrest's
entire force confronted us and, although we be-
lieved he outnumbered us two to one, we felt it still
more imperative to hold him at bay, if possible.
A fierce fight followed, lasting till nightfall, when
every Confederate cavalryman had been driven
across the river, and so closely were they pressed
that they took the water wherever they came to it.
Hatch, Coon, and Croxton handled their men with
skill and determination. They were not only steady
and courageous, but experienced soldiers who had
been in such situations a hundred times before, but
they fully understood from their own observations,
as well as from my orders, which were frequently
repeated, that success on our part was an impera-
49
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
\
live necessity, and this feeling seemed to pervade
every officer and man engaged in the affair.
This successful first battle between my cavalry
and Forrest's was the best possible answer to Scho-
field 's gratuitous assumption in his dispatch to
Thomas on November 30, 1864, at 9:50 A. M.: "Wil-
son is entirely unable to cope with him. ' ' In a later
message at 3 p. M., while my fight was in progress
and before his own had begun at Franklin, in reply
to a question from Thomas : "I should like to know
what Wilson thinks he can do to aid in holding-
Hood, " Schofield replied in a vein, still more pessi-
mistic and unkind: "I will refer your question to
General Wilson this evening. I think he can do
very little. I have no doubt Forrest will be in my
rear to-morrow or doing some greater mischief."
Fortunately, Schofield was more of a general
than a prophet. By 5:30 p. M., after I had driven
the enemy across the Harpeth at every point, he
was tendering me "his compliments and thanks. M1
In his report to Thomas, December 7, 1864,
after crediting me with having successfully, although
with a greatly inferior force, held Forrest in check
until his trains and troops could reach Franklin,
he adds:
A short time before the infantry attack commenced the
enemy's cavalry forced a crossing about three miles above
Franklin, and drove back our cavalry, for a time seriously
threatening our trains, which were accumulating on the
north bank and moving toward Nashville. I sent Gen-
eral "Wilson orders, which he had, however, anticipated, to
drive the enemy back at all hazards and moved a brigade
of General Woods 's division to support him if necessary.
1 0. E. Serial No. 93, pp. 1169, 1170, 1179, 1184.
50
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
At the moment of the first decisive repulse of the enemy 's
infantry I received the most gratifying intelligence that
General Wilson had driven the rebel cavalry back across
the river. This rendered my immediate left and rear se-
cure for the time being. * * * * The enemy, hav-
ing nearly double my force of infantry and quite double
my cavalry, could easily turn any position I might take
and seriuosly endangered my rear. 1
*
If Schofield ever sent any such orders as those
mentioned above they never reached me; as to the
alleged support from a brigade of Woods 's infantry,
I never heard of it until my attention was called,
long after, to the passage in the Official Eeport above
set out. The simple fact is, that from the time I
assumed active command in the field south of Colum-
bia on November 22, 1864, until our imperiled army,
with its trains intact, was safely within our forti-
fied lines at Nashville, I was left almost entirely to
my own resources. To whatever cause Schofield's
contemptuous estimate of my command was due,
whether to my comparative youth, or to a doubt of
my capacity, or to the obvious inferiority of my
force, it is certain that, thereafter, and especially
at Nashville, he took a far kinder view of the fight-
ing ability of the cavalry. Fortunately, I found lieu-
tenants of rare ability and experience in Hatch and
Croxton, who were ideal leaders of cavalry, the
peers, if not the superiors of the vaunted Bufords,
Chalmers, Jacksons, to whom they were opposed.
Besides, their troops were hardy veterans worthy
of such leadership and every man a host in himself.
The assumption, so thoroughly exploded and in the
end so fatal to the fond hopes of the Confederate
1 O. R. Serial No. 93, p. 343, Schofield's Official Eeport to.
Thomas. -
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
oligarchy, that they were superior both in physical
courage and leadership to the Northerners, was not
only puerile to the last degree but never had the
slightest foundation in fact.
In the glamour of the victory won at Franklin by
the infantry, the country failed to notice the all-im-
portant, if less conspicuous, services of the cavalry
in covering the retreat, in divining and giving timely
notice of Hood's movements, and, finally, in defeat-
ing and driving back Forrest. Perhaps this was
natural enough in view of the fact that these serv-
ices received but scant recognition in the official re-
ports. It is hardly too much to claim that the cav-
alry, of which so little was expected, saved Scho-
field's army from a great disaster both at Spring
Hill and at Franklin, and such is my hope, will be
the verdict of history. In spite of inexcusable er-
rors, John Fiske accords that arm a fair share in
the glories of Franklin:
Meanwhile an important cavalry battle was fought on
the farther side of the river. A large force of the enemy 's
cavalry, under Chalmers [Forrest], crossed from the Lew-
isburg pike with the design of operating upon the Federal
connections northward; but Wilson met them with a su-
perior force, and the afternoon was consumed in an obsti-
nate battle, which ended in driving the whole rebel cavalry
to the south side of the Harpeth. 1
My grateful acknowledgments are also due for
the following statement :
The force which Sherman left behind for Thomas con-
sisted of about five thousand cavalry now to be commanded
by General James Harrison Wilson, whom Grant sent from
11 'The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War," John Fiske, pp.
337, 343, 354-358.
52
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
Virginia with the message, ' ' I believe he will add fifty per
cent, to the effectiveness of your cavalry."
As before stated I received neither orders nor
information from Schofield during the contest be-
tween him and Hood although I was not over two
miles away. I heard heavy cannonading for much
of that fateful afternoon, and was full of anxiety
but not a man in the cavalry had any idea that a
bloody battle was in progress. As soon as our own
fight ended, however, my first duty, after sending
Colonel Wharton to Schofield to report the result,
was to collect and reform my troops, and strengthen
the outposts and pickets at the river. With this
done, I took a watchful attitude, fully prepared for
a counter attack whenever it might come.
Fortunately, it was not the habit of the Con-
federates to do much night work, so that as soon as
it was dark I put my main body in reserve, with
orders to go into bivouac, unsaddle, feed, and rest,
while I rode rapidly to Schofield 's headquarters,
which I found in a comfortable house inside a re-
doubt north of the river, some two miles or two
miles and a half from the scene both of my engage-
ment with Forrest and of Hood's assaults upon the
defenses of Franklin. Schofield and Stanley were
together and, after reporting the result of my fight
with Forrest, I was greatly surprised to hear that
a fierce battle had occurred between our infantry and
Hood's army, that charge and countercharge had
followed in rapid succession, that our works had
been carried and recaptured, that deeds of extraor-
dinary courage had characterized the fighting on
both sides, that the enemy had been finally repulsed
with the loss of many officers and men, and finally
53
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
that Stanley himself, while in the midst of the
melee, had been shot through the back of the neck,
but had retained his position on the field till all
was safe. Stanley in his bloody coat, with his neck
wrapped in bandages, was before me and the wonder
was that he had escaped alive. Neither he nor Scho-
field seemed excited or disturbed to the slightest
degree, but the latter was busy arranging to with-
draw his army from the scene of its victory. This
was in pursuance of orders received from Thomas
before he knew of the fight when he thought it best
to withdraw Schofield from the field and unite him
with Smith and the garrison of Nashville, within the
fortifications of the place. After explanation on
both sides, Schofield thanked me and my command
most cordially for the gallant and successful services
we had rendered in driving back the enemy's cavalry
and maintaining the line of the river intact. He
added: "If you had not succeeded in doing that,
our victory here would have been in vain, for with
Forrest upon our flanks and rear it would have
been impossible for us to have withdrawn our train,
artillery, and troops from this position. " To em-
phasize his statement he frankly continued: "My
victory in front of Franklin would have been value-
less had Forrest succeeded in driving your cavalry
away and getting upon the Nashville turnpike. "
To the student of military history, with the maps
before him, the truth of the last statement will be
apparent, and yet I regret to add that, however gen-
uine Schofield 's sense of gratitude may have been
when my services were fresh in his mind, 1 he en-
1 O. E. Serial No. 93, p. 1179, Wherry, Schofield 's aid-de-camp,
to Wilson.
54
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
tirely forgot to express it in his official reports, and
had but little to say of it in his " Forty-six Years
in the Army." Such omissions were not infre-
quent with the army commanders of the day, for
they had not yet learned how to use cavalry in co-
operation with other troops. For the first time all
the available cavalry in the West was united upon
one battlefield, and, although it numbered actually
present less than five thousand men, its proportion
to the infantry was relatively great, while its actual
service was of unusual importance. Considered
from a military point of view the incidents so far
related gave unmistakable indication of the great
part the new cavalry corps was to play in the de-
cisive battle and campaign which were soon to fol-
low.
Schofield, having withdrawn from Franklin in
the dead hours of night under cover of my forces,
fell back by the turnpike to Nashville, the entrench-
ments of which he entered before nightfall of De-
cember 1. Protected by the screening operations
of the cavalry, not a wagon nor a pound of supplies
was lost. 1 Indeed, the enemy made no effort what-
ever to interfere with our retirement. He had been
so severely handled and had lost so heavily that he
had but little spirit left for an onward movement
and must have been greatly surprised when he
learned that we had left the works from which he
had received such a bloody and fatal repulse.
With detachments on all the turnpikes to Nash-
ville, I bivouacked that night in the Brentwood Hills
near Melrose, the country seat of ex-Postmaster
General Brown. Early the next day, under Thomas's
, supra, p. 343.
56
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
orders, now in immediate command, I withdrew by
flank of brigades inside the defenses of Nashville,
crossed the Cumberland by the bridges then in place,
and made camp in the town of Edgefield on the north
side of the river. I established headquarters for
the next ten days at the house of Mrs. Shelby and
went to work at once with all my aids and officers
to repair the damages of the campaign, to rest and
build up both men and horses, to reequip and re-
mount the dismounted troopers, and finally to bring
forward every cavalry organization as soon as it
could be got ready to take the field. This work re-
quired constant attention but, fortunately, with the
assistance of my stjaff, the leading members of
which were regular officers, and the hearty support
of Thomas, the work went forward without hitch
or delay to a successful issue.
During the retreat from Pulaski to Nashville I
had no time for correspondence with anyone except
my adjutant general and chief quartermaster, both
of whom were at Nashville. The burden of equip-
ping and supplying the troops fell on them, and
that they did it with extraordinary energy and abil-
ity is shown by the results. My own time was
wholly occupied in the field, with keeping track of
the enemy, and counteracting or resisting his move-
ments. Feeling confident that Forrest would oper-
ate mainly on our left to the east of us, I united
Hammond's and Stewart's brigades with my cen-
tral force so I could make the stoutest possible re-
sistance or move with the greatest celerity and
weight should Forrest endeavor to avoid action or
try to pass around or beyond me. At 3 A. M. on No-
vember 29, after reporting exactly my position
56
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
to Thomas and the substance of what I had sent to
Schofield, I expressed the opinion that the enemy
was aiming for Nashville by the Franklin pike, and
therefore advised Thomas to get everything off of
the Chattanooga Eailroad that day, and to concen-
trate all his forces at Nashville as soon as pos-
sible. As has already been recorded, this was what
was done. 1
As soon as I got settled at Edgefield and had a
little leisure, I felt it important that General Grant's
headquarters should have an inside view of the cam-
paign, and, accordingly, I wrote both Eawlins and
Badeau, commending the conduct of Thomas, Scho :
field, Stanley, and Cox. Under unusual circum-
stances and discouragements they had worked to-
gether effectively and successfully, escaping serious
disaster in the successive steps of a campaign in
which the different parts of their own commands
were more or less scattered, while those of the en-
emy were concentrated under a leader of singular
courage and persistency. To Badeau, Grant's mil-
itary secretary, I wrote :
The campaign from Pulaski to this place, in view of
the relative strength of the opposing forces, was conducted
with great skill. The battle at Franklin was moslt disas-
trous to the enemy, owing to the fact that our troops were
strongly entrenched in a position they were fully able to
occupy and to the further fact that Hood was foolish
enough to attack head on. Had fortune not favored us
as it did, we might have sustained a frightful disaster.
The rebel cavalry crossed at various points in my front
for five miles above the town, but were driven beyond the
1 O. R. Serial No. 93, p. 1145, Wilson to Schofield, Nov. 29, 10
p. M.; also, p. 1156, Wilson to Thomas, Nov. 29, 3 A. M. and 2
P. M.
57
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
river with much more rapidity and less order than they
advanced. Hatch's division (the Fifth) and Croxton's
brigade (of the First) behaved splendidly. The affair
was the handsomest I have seen during the war. Schofield
told me that my report was the most gratifying piece of
intelligence he had received during the campaign, for,
notwithstanding the repulse of Hood at the same time,
his position would have been in the highest degree pre-
carious with Forrest and the Harpeth River in the rear.
While he forgot the matter somewhat in his report, that
was to have been expected. In fact, it may have been
strictly just for I do not want my command to imagine
itself worthy of the highest commendation till it has ef-
fectively disposed of the rebel cavalry and begun its work
against the rebel infantry.
We got back into Nashville without further trouble,
and the next day crossed to the north side of the Cumber-
land. We are now quietly in camp preparing for an ag-
gressive campaign. Most of my horses are barefooted,
and many of my men dismounted. When I took command
near Pulaski, we had but four thousand five hundred cav-
alry properly mounted. We have over seven thousand
now, having gathered in about three thousand and taken
at least one thousand five hundred horses on our way
back, which enabled us to send a corresponding number
of br*oken-down horses into the cavalry depot at this place
for recuperation.
Since arriving here, the Secretary of War has author-
ized me to impress " every species of property" necessary
to put my command in an efficient condition. To this end,
I have sent four regiments into the lower counties of Ken-
tucky for all the horses they can gather, and expect to get
at least five thousand within a week. We are making
every possible effort throughout the country, within reach,
to secure remounts, but arms and equipments are farther
behind than horses. Grierson's division leaves St. Louis
on the 6th and Memphis on the 7th, and ought to reach
58
CAMPAIGN. AGAINST HOOD
here within a week. When it arrives, with Long's division
now refitting at Louisville, my force will be equal to any
undertaking. . . .
At that time it seemed to me that our entire
campaign had been admirably managed, that our
retreat in the face of Hood's overwhelming force
was in every way creditable, and that the battle of
Franklin, although greatly in our favor, could not
have been used by us as an opportunity for assum-
ing the offensive, because it might have enabled
Hood, before the arrival of A. J. Smith, to
crush us as soon as we had marched outside of our
works.
In the same letter I said:
. . . Thomas, I think, should have concentrated
everything at Pulaski or at Franklin, except the garrison
at Chattanooga. I urged him strongly two weeks ago to
evacuate Decatur and strip the Chattanooga Railroad of
troops, bringing in both the Murfreesboro and Decatur
garrison and pushing his united force boldly to the front
for the purpose of meeting Hood half-way at least.
I think the Murfreesboro garrison will be apt to "go
up." It can certainly do no good where it is, and here it
might enable us to overwhelm Hood.
I am confident, however, that if Hood will hold on
where he is for two weeks or will assault Nashville, he
cannot escape destruction. My health is splendid and
my hope as high as ever. The news from Sherman is
cheering, but I trust he will not be content with Savannah.
If he is, the campaign he is conducting will be of no ad-
vantage commensurate with the power put forth. . . .
The next day, December 5, having received let-
ters and newspapers giving a full account of Gen-
eral Grant 's trip to New York, I wrote as follows :
59
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
. . . That our people should admire and love the
man who, wielding such unlimited power, still retains an
unequaled simplicity and purity of character does not
surprise me. No man is so completely degraded as to de-
spise goodness in others. Man seems to differ most from
all other beings in this, that, however abject, sordid, and
selfish he may be himself, he always aspires to be better
than he actually is and in his heart really prefers good
over evil. People may bustle and struggle with policy
and rascality, but they always love and admire the man
who raises himself above such things and is really honest
in all his dealings. In fact, all good men recognize that
"the chief honor of man's nature is clear and round deal-
ing/'
Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and Sheridan! What could
be more splendid than the career and character of these
soldiers ? A country whose cause is in the keeping of such
men cannot fail, if it only remains true to itself and to
them. The fact that they occupy their position by virtue
of their merit is the strongest evidence that it and its
governing sentiment are essentially virtuous. I am glad to
believe that this is the case and am proud of my day and
its glories.
You seem to be disappointed at some of the figures I
have given you. . . . Are you sorry I told you the
truth, or was the truth unpleasant from the facts it con-
tained? If the former, I had better not write about mili-
tary matters ; if the latter, pray tell me what you expect ?
You should know by this time that I am not an alarmist,
and that I am not likely to arrive at incorrect judgments
upon military subjects. In regard to matters here, I am
sure my opinions as well as my figures are essentially cor-
rect. My sources of information are good, and I do not
hesitate to use them where and when I think good will
come of it. ... I have no hesitancy in laying the
truth before General Grant upon any question which may
have received my attention, and what I write is not
60
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
for your exclusive information. You will, of course, ex-
ercise your best judgment in what you do with it, remem-
bering always that you may thereby change or modify
policies and plans, and that the fear of such a change in
many cases might deter me from saying all I could wish.
I hope, however, you will not think that this fear would
prevent me in any real emergency from saying whatever
my sense of duty clearly demanded.
I am making good progress in getting my command
ready for the field. Ten days will make a wonderful
change.
The rebels are quiet to-day. They are making no ef-
fort to cross the Cumberland and showing no disposition
to attack our works. Tell General Grant that Hood is
doing good service for the Union and ought not to be dis-
turbed for the present. . . . If he will only wait a few
days I would not give much for his hide. . . .
I have not yet received the President's approval of
Sherman's order giving my command a corps organiza-
tion. He should either do this at once or make an order
establishing a cavalry department, for the simple reason
that nothing less than full authority can enable me to
thoroughly regenerate it, and to give the staff the proper
rank. I have recommended Beaumont for lieutenant
colonel and assistant adjutant general, Noyes for assistant
inspector general, and Carling for chief quartermaster
with the same rank. I have also recommended Andrews
for aide-de-camp, with the rank of major. These officers
have richly earned their promotions, and I trust they will
receive it without further delay. . . .
I may add here that, although my officers
performed their duty ably and faithfully to the end,
their promotions never came. This may be due
to the fact that the corps organization failed to re-
ceive the President's sanction, without which it
rested solely on the authority of Sherman and
61
UNDER THE'OI/D FLAG
Thomas, under Grant's instructions. It is but just
to explain still further that that authority proved
equal to all the demands made upon it, and that my
staff, after the war was over, was commended by
Colonel Chesney, of the British Army, as the best
and most efficient of its kind in modern warfare.
It will be remembered that, while Hood was con-
fronting Thomas at Nashville, Sherman was ap-
proaching the coast of Georgia with his splendid
army from five to seven hundred miles away. He
had neither been followed nor effectively opposed
by the enemy. Hood, instead of pursuing him, had
crossed the Tennessee and forced us back to the
Cumberland, where he was besieging our chief depot
and strategic center with what he believed to be a
fair chance, if successful, of driving us back two
hundred miles farther to the Ohio Eiver. The news-
papers throughout the country, understanding but
little of the real situation, were filled with prog-
nostications of disaster. Commerce and financial
affairs were disturbed. Gold was falling, the War
Department was demoralized, and even General
Grant himself showed greater uneasiness than he
had ever exhibited before. Thomas alone was calm
and full of confidence. He had organized and armed
eight thousand civilian employees of the supply
departments and had called in all his outlying de-
tachments except the garrison of Chattanooga. A.
J. Smith, with his invincible veterans, after a
month's delay, had finally joined him at Nashville,
thus raising his effective force to something over
sixty thousand of all arms. Nashville was now safe
beyond all peradventure. Its garrison was ample
for the defense of its long line of entrenchments.
62
CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOOD
The cavalry alone was still in a bad way. Its horses
had been worn out and many permanently disabled
by hard work. It therefore required a few days'
rest and many remounts before it could take the
field again and properly perform the part that would
surely fall to its lot. The imperturbable Thomas
was the one man who fully appreciated this fact and
was willing to wait until the cavalry could gather
in its remounts and get fairly ready to participate
in the great task before us. New as I was in the
West, I had already won the great General's per-
fect confidence, and it was my constant effort to
show myself worthy of it.
63
Ill
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
Hood hanging on for the winter Uneasiness in Washing-
ton Injustice toward Thomas Orders directing
him to fight Full correspondence Situation at
Nashville Thomas imperturbable Embargo of
storm Van Duzer to Eckert Thaw begins Army
moves out Defeats Hood Thomas vindicated
Cavalry turned enemy's flank and took him in rear
Hood's retreat Wilson's pursuit.
The record now clearly shows, contrary to
Grant 's belief, that Hood was intent on hanging on
for the winter where he was, capturing Murfrees-
boro, if possible, and that he had no present de-
sign of marching to the Ohio. 1
This assurance was made doubly sure by the
further important fact that there was a fleet of
iron-clads and gun-boats on the Cumberland under
command of Eear Admiral S. P. Lee, patrolling the
river from its mouth to Carthage, above Nashville,
in cooperation with my outlying cavalry forces. 2
All were especially on the alert to prevent Hood's
crossing to the north side of the Cumberland. Upon
other and stronger grounds, however, such a move-
1 O. E. Serial No. 94, pp. 121, 143, 153, 666, 670.
'/&., pp. 3, 4, 85, 97.
64
CONFKONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
ment was highly improbable, if not impossible. He
was already far from his base at Florence. It was
winter and the roads, whenever heavily used, were
soon almost impassable. The territory between the
Cumberland and the Ohio had been foraged more
than once by both sides. Besides, Hood was without
resources with which to repair and operate the rail-
roads, and it was beyond the waning power of the
Confederacy to supply them. To use them at all
he must first wrest them from our possession, and
this could not be done without the defeat of
Thomas 's entrenched army and the capture of Nash-
ville. That army, concentrated in comparative se-
curity behind the fortifications of Nashville, well
fed, well clothed, daily growing stronger and more
confident under a leader that it loved and trusted
and whom it knew familiarly under the fond and
expressive name of "Old Pap," was resolutely and
vigorously making ready for its spring upon the
foe. Under these conditions it must be conceded
that the possibility of Hood's marching around
Nashville or getting away from Thomas in the ef-
fort to cross the Cumberland for a winter march
into Kentucky and to the Ohio was not only reduced
to a minimum, but was about the wildest and the
most desperate and hopeless military undertaking
possible to imagine. 1 Here, if at any time during
the war, Grant lost his head and failed to act with
his usual sound sense. It is, of course, impossible
to say with certainty how far the alarm of the Presi-
dent and his immediate military advisers, Stanton
and Halleck, may have contributed to this, or how
far Grant's judgment may have been disturbed by
1 O. R. Serial No. 94, pp. 96, 97.
65
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
his fear that Thomas would fail to hold Hood, and
that this would condemn both himself and Sherman
for stripping Thomas and leaving him with widely
dispersed forces to contend against Hood's com-
pact veteran army. And yet, Lincoln, Stanton, Hal-
leek, and Grant, although a thousand miles from the
scene of conflict, concurred in assuming to under-
stand the situation better than the level-headed
Thomas in fearing that Hood would drop him and
get away on this wild march. Each in turn sought
to impose on Thomas his own views as to the man-
agement of the campaign and united in harassing
him beyond all patience and reason into fighting a
battle against his own tried and well-seasoned judg-
ment before the preparations which he deemed es-
sential to success were complete. He was twitted
with being slow. He was threatened with removal.
Orders, indeed, were drafted to that end, and, as
if to spare him no humiliation, it was proposed that
he should turn over his command to Schofield, his
inferior in rank, and report to him for duty. Not
satisfied with this, Grant ordered Logan from City
Point to Nashville. And then, as the crowning evi-
dence of lost equipoise, of confusion in counsel, and
of want of confidence either in Thomas, Schofield,
or Logan, or in all of them, Grant himself left his
army in Lee's front at Petersburg and got as far
as Washington on his way to Nashville. 1 Grant's
telegrams of this fortnight show that he had a good
memory for injuries, real or fancied, with an utter
lack of sympathy or active friendship for Thomas,
dating possibly as far back as Grant's unhappy
days after Shiloh, or Thomas's coldness and inhos-
1 0. B. Serial No. 94, p. 195.
66
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
pitality at Chattanooga. They also disclose a will-
ingness, if not a settled purpose, on Grant's part
to cause Thomas's removal and downfall, provided
the authorities at Washington could be induced to
take the responsibility for such radical action.
When told plainly by Halleck that if he wished
Thomas removed he would have to do it himself
and take the sole responsibility, he hesitated and,
while not abandoning his purpose, he drafted orders
to that end, but, fortunately for Thomas and the
country, they were not sent.
As the situation was without a parallel in the
history of the war, and as my own name was freely
used in the correspondence and as my fortunes were
thus involved and placed peculiarly on the hazard,
it will be of interest, before telling what was finally
done and how, to recall from the official files some-
thing of what was said.
On December 1, the day after Franklin, after
telling Grant "everything goes well," Thomas tele-
graphed Halleck fully as to his plans, as follows :
After General Schofield's fight of yesterday, feeling
convinced that the enemy very far outnumbered him, both
in infantry and cavalry, I determined to retire to the
fortifications around Nashville, until General Wilson can
get his cavalry equipped. He has now about one-fourth
the number of the enemy, and consequently is no match
for him. I have two ironclads here, with several gun-
boats, and Commander Fitch assures me that Hood can
neither cross the Cumberland nor blockade it. I, there-
fore, think it best to wait here until Wilson can equip his
cavalry. If Hood attacks me here, he will be more seri-
ously damaged than he was yesterday ; if he remains until
Wilson gets equipped I can whip him, and will move
67
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
against him at once. I have Murfreeshoro strongly
held, and, therefore, feel easy in regard to its safety.
Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, and Elk River
Bridge have also strong garrisons. 1
This dispatch, resting on the solid results
achieved in the concentration of widely dispersed
forces in the presence of a veteran invading army,
on which a most disastrous repulse had just been
inflicted, and giving sound military reasons for its
justification, ought to have been implicitly accepted
by his official superiors. For Thomas was no un-
tried general. He had long since demonstrated on
more than one occasion in the most incontestable
way his capacity to stand alone. He had done so at
the outset of his career as an independent com-
mander at Mill Springs against Zollicoffer, again
at Stone Eiver, again at Chicamauga, when his su-
perior in command retired defeated and disheart-
ened from the field. It was his army that, in the
presence of Grant, rushed the heights of Missionary
Eidge, which Sherman had assaulted in vain on
another part of the field. And throughout the At-
lanta campaign, as Sherman's loyal lieutenant,
where he might justly have been chief, he stood
every test and proved himself over and over again
a thoroughly level-headed, trustworthy, and most
capable general.
There was, therefore, neither justification nor
excuse for the action taken at Washington on receipt
of the above dispatch. Instead of approving it
directly and promptly, or of assuring Thomas that
he had the government's confidence, which he had
so well earned, and leaving the details of immediate
1 O. B. Serial No. 94, p. 3.
68
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
operations to his good judgment and sound discre-
tion, Stanton hastened the next day, Decem-
ber 2, 1864, at 10:30 A. M., to telegraph Grant as
follows :
The President feels solicitous about the disposition of
General Thomas to lay in fortifications for an indefinite
period "until Wilson gets equipments. " This looks like
the McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing and
let the rebels raid the country. The President wishes you
to consider the matter.
To this Grant replied at 1 P. M. the same day :
Immediately on receipt of Thomas's dispatch I sent
him a dispatch, which no doubt you read as it passed
through the office.
This dispatch, dated 11 A. M., December 2,
reads as follows:
If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nash-
ville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga and
possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should
he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should
attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the
trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc. 1
Later, at 1:30 P. M., Grant, as though not satis-
fied with what he had already said, wired again :
With your citizen employees armed, you can move out
of Nashville and force the enemy to retire or fight upon
ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood
at Franklin, it looks to me that, instead of falling back
to Nashville, we should have taken the offensive against
the enemy where he was. At this distance, however, I
may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy.
You will now suffer incalculable injury upon your rail-
*O. E. Serial No. 94, p. 16.
69
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
roads, if Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put forth,
therefore, every possible exertion to attain this end.
Should you get him retreating give him no peace. 1
Whereupon, at 10 p. M. the same day, Thomas
answered Grant as follows :
Tour telegrams of 11 A. M. and 1:30 p. M. to-day are
received. At the time that Hood was whipped at Frank-
lin, I had at this place but about five thousand men of
General Smith 's command, which, added to the force un-
der General Schofield, would not have given me more than
twenty-five thousand men; besides General Schofield felt
convinced that he could not hold the enemy at Franklin
until the five thousand could reach him. As General Wil-
son's cavalry force also numbered only about one-fourth
that of Forrest's, I thought it best to draw the troops
back to Nashville, and wait the arrival of General Smith's
force, and also a force of about five thousand commanded
by Major General Steedman, which I had ordered up from
Chattanooga. The division of General Smith arrived yes-
terday morning, and General Steedman 's troops arrived
last night. I now have infantry enough to assume the of-
fensive, if I had more cavalry, and will take the field any-
how as soon as the remainder of General McCook's division
of cavalry reaches here, which I hope it will do in two or
three days. We can neither get reinforcements or equip-
ments at this great distance from the north very easily;
and it must be remembered that my command was made
up of the two weakest corps of General Sherman's army
and all the dismounted cavalry except one brigade, and
the task of reorganizing and equipping has met with many
delays, which have enabled Hood to take advantage of
my crippled condition. I earnestly hope, however, that
in a few more days I shall be able to give him a fight 2
1 O. R. Serial No. 94, p. 17.
2 7b., 6. 17.
70
CONFEONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
A few minutes later he explained to Halleck:
I have succeeded in concentrating a force of infantry
about equal to that of the enemy's, and as soon as I can
get the remaining brigade of McCook's division of cav-
alry here I will move against the enemy, although my
cavalry force will not be more than half that of the
enemy. I have labored under many disadvantages since
assuming the direction of affairs here, not the least of
which was the reorganizing, remounting and equipping of
a cavalry force sufficient to contend with Forrest. The
signal officers and reconnoitering parties report this after-
noon that the enemy are moving to our right and going
into position southwest of the city or below. That would
*be by far the most advantageous position he could take
for us, as his line of communication would be more ex-
posed with him in that position than in any other. The
iron-clads and gunboats are so disposed as to prevent
Hood from crossing the river, and Captain Fitch assures
me that he can safely convoy steamers up and down the
river. I have also taken measures to have the river pa-
trolled as high up as Carthage. 1
Meanwhile, at Grant's suggestion, Stanton had
authorized Thomas to seize and " impress horses,
and every other species of property " at Nashville
and Louisville. "Horses and equipments enough
for Wilson might thus be procured immediately. " 2
This was a stroke of genius for which Thomas and
Grant and not Stanton should have the praise.
At 9:30 A. M. December 3 Thomas wired Hal-
leck:
The enemy made no demonstration to-day, except to
advance his pickets about five hundred yards on the Nol-
ensville, Franklin, and Hillsborough pikes. I have a good
entrenched line on the hills around Nashville, and hope
1 O. B. Serial No. 94, p. 18.
*., p. 18.
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
to be able to report ten thousand cavalry mounted and
equipped in less than a week, when I shall feel able to
march against Hood. I gave an order for the impress-
ment of horses last night, and we received the authority
of the Secretary of War this morning. 1
On the same day Thomas repeated to Admiral
S. P. Lee precisely the same reasons already given
Halleck and Grant for falling back from Franklin
to Nashville : ' ' To concentrate my infantry and to
give time to General Wilson to arm and equip suf-
ficient cavalry to meet Forrest. I have now nearly
as much infantry as Hood, and in a few days hope
to have cavalry enough to assume the offensive. In
the meantime, Captain Fitch has cheerfully com-
plied with my request to patrol the river above and
below the city. I am, therefore, in hopes we shall
in a few days be able to take the offensive on pretty
even terms with the enemy. ' J 2
The War Department was not alone dependent
on Thomas for its information. It also received
much news through the telegraphic correspond-
ence between Major T. T. Eckert, the head of the
telegraph bureau in Washington, and Captain Van
Duzer of the Quartermaster's Department, a very;
intelligent, wide-awake, and capable officer at Nash-
ville. This officer, on the 3rd, after stating Thomas 's
readiness to receive and repel attack, and giving the
position of his forces, wired: "It is a very strong
line strongly held," and adding: "Nothing heard
from Forrest, but General Wilson is looking after
him and no apprehension is felt. ' ' 3
J O. E. Serial No. 94. p. 29.
'/&., p. 30.
/&., p. 32. See also pp. 45, 47.
72
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
My own orders, directing the seizure of every
species of property necessary to put the cavalry
forces into efficient condition, were being executed
with the utmost energy by the officers of my com-
mand. To my inspectors I said: "You will per-
ceive that the authority is ample; use it without
stint for seizure both of equipments and horses.
... I leave many of the details to you in pur-
suance of General Thomas's general instructions,
confident that you will do all in your power to push
matters to the utmost. Spare nothing which is nec-
essary, but have everything done in an orderly man-
ner." 1
It will thus be seen that Thomas was not only
keeping everybody who had any right to know fully
advised as to his wise plans for the concentration
of his army and the strengthening of his cavalry
arm, but was proceeding to execute them with per-
fect good sense and unrelenting energy. No ap-
prehension was felt at Nashville. There was not
the slightest excuse for any at Washington. Be-
sides, the fundamental rule for the conduct of mili-
tary affairs remote from the seat of government de-
manded that the officer in immediate command
should be trusted with the details. Nobody under-
stood this rule better than Grant. He acted on it
throughout in his relations with Sherman and Sheri-
dan, and it is both interesting and instructive to
observe that at the very time he was most insistent
in his effort to interfere with Thomas, treating him
"like a school boy," he was invoking the rule in
behalf of Schofield against Stanton, and flatly re-
fusing to impose either Stanton 's judgment or his
1 0. E. Serial No. 94, pp. 34, 35, 36, 39-48, 63, 64, 76, 149.
73
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
own on that accomplished officer, who was then not
only in command of troops, but also of the Depart-
ment of the Ohio. It appears that, while in the
field, Schofield had assigned Stoneman to duty as
second in command of the Department. This Stan-
ton did not approve, declaring: "I think him
(Stoneman) one of the most worthless officers in the
service, who has failed in everything entrusted to
him." He had, therefore, caused to be prepared
and transmitted an order relieving him from such
command and directing him to proceed to Cincin-
nati to await orders. When Grant's attention was
called to the matter, he very promptly sent Stanton
the following telegram, dated December 5, 1864, at
1 p. M. :
I am not in favor of using officers who have signally
failed when entrusted with, command in important places.
Again, as a general rule, when an officer is entrusted with
the command of a department he ought to be allowed to
use the material given him in his own way. I would sim-
ply suggest the transmission of this dispatch to General
Schofield and leave it discretionary then with him to em-
ploy General Stoneman, or relieve him from duty, as he
deems best. 1
When Schofield 's attention was drawn to the
subject by the War Department he replied: "I fully
approve the correctness of the rule stated by Lieu-
tenant General Grant," and in face of Stanton 's
order removing Stoneman retained him in com-
mand.
Why Thomas did not receive the benefit of this
well-known and most salutary rule will, as far as the
X O. E. Serial No. 94, pp. 52, 54, 58, 59.
74
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
official records disclose, always remain a mystery.
The inference that Grant never quite forgave
Thomas for his cold reception at Chattanooga, else-
where described, and for Halleck 's preference of
Thomas to Grant following Shiloh and during the
advance on Corinth, seems to be the most probable
explanation. In any view, and for whatever cause,
it is certain that Grant refused Thomas as an in-
dependent commander that considerate and kindly
trust and confidence freely accorded to others, to
which the facts of record fully entitled him.
Meanwhile Grant, acting on his erroneous as-
sumption, forgetful of Thomas 's high and approved
character, in face of reassuring statements from
him, and of his purpose to assume the offensive and
to attack without unnecessary delay, and of like as-
surance from Van Duzer that no apprehension was
felt in Nashville, continued, with increasing force,
to impose his own views on Thomas as to the method
of conducting the campaign for Hood's overthrow.
In this he was, doubtless, largely influenced both'
by Halleck and Stanton. Halleck, in his telegram
to Grant, 3 :30 p. M., December 5, claiming that twen-
ty-two thousand cavalry horses had been issued at
Louisville, Lexington, and Nashville since Septem-
ber 20, added the erroneous and misleading state-
ment:
If this number, without any campaign, is already re-
duced to ten thousand mounted men, as reported by Gen-
eral Wilson, it may be safely assumed that the cavalry
of that army will never be mounted, for the destruction
of horses in the last two months has there alone been
equal to the remounts obtained from the entire West. 1
1 O. B. Serial No. 94, p. 56.
75
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
The absurdity and essential untruth of this tele-
gram, as far as it was intended to apply to the ef-
forts of General Thomas and myself to obtain re-
mounts and that was evidently its sole object
becomes at once apparent when it is recalled that,
under Sherman's express orders, I had dismounted
a large number of the cavalry then in the field to
complete the remount of Kilpatrick's division,
which had been overworked and run down before
the March to the Sea began in the fruitless effort
to overtake and bring Hood to bay. Then followed
at once one of the most strenuous, wasting, and per-
ilous campaigns of the war, during which, with
Hatch's division and Croxton's brigade alone of
nearly fifty thousand men nominally in my com-
mand, I was called upon to aid Schofield in resisting
Forrest and the advance of Hood's army. 1 And in
spite of all our efforts neither Grierson, Burbridge,
nor Garrard had been brought to Nashville. Kilpat-
rick, with by far the strongest and best-mounted
division, was hundreds of miles away, while Long
and many others were waiting remounts at Mem-
phis or Louisville, or were uselessly employed and
dispersed in far away and comparatively unimpor-
tant fields. Even admitting all that Halleck claimed,
it should be remembered, and he above all ought to
have recalled, that neither Thomas nor myself had
had the slightest responsibility for either the condi-
tion of the cavalry or its wide and useless dispersal.
Both of us were new to our respective commands,
and the responsibility for existing conditions was
upon those who preceded us. Besides it was no time
for fault-finding or cheese-paring. We were entitled
O. E. Serial No. 79, p. 358, Sherman to Wilson.
76
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
to the loyal and energetic support of our superiors.
Help, at least in good will, and not carping criticism,
based on mistakes or failures of others, was what
we needed. I say "we" deliberately, because it
was my great honor and privilege to have been
joined with Thomas, and, under him, I was chiefly
responsible for, and the chief object of, thoughtless
bureaucratic criticism. Happily for me, as well as
for the country, I had the "Bock of Chicamauga"
at my back.
On receipt of Halleck's telegram, Grant wired
Thomas on December 5 at 8 p. M. :
Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cum-
berland to where he can cross it? It seems to me while
you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possi-
ble to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where
he is. Time strengthens him in all probability as much as
it does you. 1
There were several good reasons why this tele-
gram was ill-advised. While possibly harmless and
well meant, it was quite unnecessary, as well as con-
trary to Grant's rule, and it served no good end.
Every possible precaution had been taken to prevent
any such movement on Forrest's part. No such
movement was, in fact, contemplated, and Hood, far
from being strengthened in any way by delay, was
daily finding it more difficult to subsist his army,
dependent for its supplies upon wagon trains from
distant stations, while every possible man the South
could get into the field was hurried to eastern Geor-
gia to help Beauregard, Hardee, Wheeler, and
Bragg in the vain effort to head off Sherman.
O. R. Serial No. 94, p. 55.
77
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Thomas, on the other hand, in full possession of
his rail and river lines, was in the midst of abun-
dance and was gaining rapidly in strength. On the
very day of Grant's dispatch, Thomas, 10 p. M.,
December 5, was crossing it by a telegram to
Halleck informing him fully as to Hood's passive
but increasingly difficult position, and fixing the 7th
as the date for moving out against him. 1 To Grant
himself Thomas, in direct reply to his telegram of
the 5th, received about 8 p. M. of the 6th, again re-
peated his promise to march against Hood just as
soon as he could get up a respectable force of cav-
alry:
General Wilson has parties out now pressing horses,
and I hope to have some six thousand or eight thousand
cavalry remounted in three days from this time. General
Wilson has just left me, having received instructions to
hurry the cavalry remount as rapidly as possible. I do
not think it prudent to attack Hood with less than six
thousand cavalry to cover my flanks, because he has, under
Forrest, at least twelve thousand. I have no doubt For-
rest will attempt to cross the river, but I am in hopes the
gun-boats will be able to prevent him. The enemy has
made no new developments to-day. 2
It is no doubt true, in the light of the later pub-
lished records, that Thomas overestimated For-
rest's strength, which had also been scattered, de-
pleted, and worn, as it was, by Jackson's detach-
ment to Murfreesboro and by Wheeler's in pursuit
of Sherman, to say nothing of the strenuous resist-
ance offered by my troops at every advantageous
point on his march from the Tennessee. But neither
1 O. E. Serial No. 94, pp. 55, 70.
2 Ib., p. 70.
78
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
Thomas nor I knew it, and even if we had known
his exact strength, which we had no means of learn-
ing, it was the part of the highest wisdom a^ad the
soundest military sense to reverse the conditions
and set into the field against him an overwhelming
force if possible, two to one which, with a little
delay, involving no great risk, it was quite possible
to do, and was, in fact, done a little later. Scho-
field, as we have seen, shared with Thomas the be-
lief as to the great numerical superiority of the rebel
cavalry under the prestige of Forrest's able and
intrepid leadership, supported by such veteran divi-
sion commanders as Buford, Bed Jackson, and Chal-
mers.
But Grant, without waiting for Thomas's reply,
as above, and yielding, as it would appear, for the
moment to an impatient impulse to assert his au-
thority, if not to show his superior generalship,
sent this peremptory order to Thomas on December
6, at 4 p. M. :
Attack Hood at once, and wait no longer for a remount
of your cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting
in a campaign back to the Ohio River.
To which Thomas at once replied, same day, at
9 P. M. :
Your telegram of 4 p. M. this day is just received. I
will make the necessary dispositions and attack Hood at
once agreeably to your order, though I believe it will be
hazardous with the small force of cavalry now at my
service.
And this, as shown by orders, Thomas cautiously
but resolutely set himself to do, and but for the in-
tervention of Providence would in all probability
79
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
have made his attack on the morning of the 10th.
Meanwhile Halleck, at 1 P. M. of the 6th, repeated to
Thomas the substance of his inconsequential tele-
gram to Grant about the twenty-two thousand cav-
alry horses issued since September 20; to which
Thomas promptly made reply that, notwithstanding
the large figures, which he did not dispute, there
had, nevertheless, been great losses from battle and
disease, "and a large number of the men are still
dismounted. ' ' This was the cardinal and unhappy
fact that confronted both Thomas and myself, and
which we were doing our utmost to remedy. Thomas
added : "I have seen General Wilson to-night, who
encourages me to hope that he will be able to re-
mount six thousand or seven thousand men in three
days from this time. The enemy made no new
developments to-day. I will attack as soon as
General Wilson can get together a sufficient cav-
alry force to protect my flanks." 1 To this sane,
specific, and reassuring telegram it would seem no
valid military objection could be found or offered,
but Stanton's abundant vocabulary was more than
equal to the occasion, and his characteristic intem-
perance of judgment and expression was embodied
and fully reflected in the following dispatch of De-
cember 7, at 10 :20 A. M., to Grant :
. . . Thomas seems unwilling to attack because it
is hazardous, as if all war was anything but hazardous.
If he waits for Wilson to get ready Gabriel will be blow-
ing his last horn.
Evidently Stanton had not forgotten my last in-
terview with him, when my division was passing
1 O. R. Serial No. 94, p. 71.
80
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
through Washington the summer previous. It is
equally clear that I had not especially commended
myself to him in our somewhat abrupt conference.
It is also evident that Grant was in a receptive
mood for suggestions adverse to Thomas, as shown
in his reply, of December 7, at 1:30 P. M., which
was not delayed :
You probably saw my order to Thomas to attack. If
he does not do it promptly I would recommend supersed-
ing him by Scho field, leaving Thomas subordinate. . . .
All of which was a curious revival against
Thomas, in quarters that ought to have known bet-
ter, of the foolish "On to Richmond " cry earlier
; n the war, and without half the excuse or nearly
as much sense behind it. It is, however, greatly to
the credit of Halleck and Grant that their good mili-
tary sense in other directions did not desert them,
and that, notwithstanding their unfriendly and dis-
couraging attitude toward Thomas and their unjus-
tifiable efforts to impose their views from afar upon
him, they continued their earnest efforts to ree'n-
force and strengthen him from every possible quar-
ter. 1 But Grant, having made up his mind that it
was necessary to remove Thomas, while hesitating
to act himself, yet kept the subject, with his cus-
tomary tenacity of purpose, before the War De-
partment. On December 8, at 4 p. M., he telegraphed
Halleck:
. . . If Thomas has not struck yet he ought to be
ordered to hand over his command to Schofield. There is
no better man to repel an attack than Thomas, but I fear
he is too cautious to ever take the initiative.
J O. B. Serial No. 94, p. 96.
81
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
In this same telegram renewed expression was
given to the fear that "either Hood or Brecken-
ridge will get to the Ohio" fears which the events
showed were idle and without sufficient foundation.
Moreover, it soon became apparent that Thomas's
representations and appeals were taking hold on the
sober second thought of the war authorities at
Washington, and that they balked at his removal
and declined any responsibility for it. Grant was
tersely told so by Halleck on December 8 at
9 P. M. :
If you wish General Thomas relieved from command
give the order. No one here will, I think, interfere. The
responsibility, however, will be yours, as no one here, so
far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas's removal. 1
At this Grant also balked, as indicated in his
reply the same day at 10 p. M. to Halleck :
Your dispatch of 9 p. M. just received. I want General
Thomas reminded of the importance of immediate action.
I sent him a dispatch this evening which will probably
urge him on. I would not say relieve him until I further
hear from him. 2
Then followed a dispatch to Thomas, wholly un-
objectionable either in tone or matter, and express-
ing the views of the Lieutenant General on the situ-
ation, as he had a perfect right to do, and while it
was erroneous in its inferences as to Hood's plans
and gave renewed expression to the baseless fear of
"a foot race" back to the Ohio, yet was temperate
in language, not unkind, and quite correct in point-
ing out to Thomas his great opportunity to destroy
1 O. K. Serial No. 94, p. 96.
2 16., p. 96.
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
one of the three armies of the enemy. It is greatly
to be regretted that all of his communications to his
sturdy and deserving lieutenant were not in the
same vein. The whole dispatch of December 8,
at 6 :30 P. M., was as follows :
Your dispatch of yesterday (referring to Brecken-
ridge's retreat and pursuit by Stoneman) received. It
looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the Cum-
berland River and are scattered. Why not attack at once ?
By all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see
which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio. If you think
necessary, call on the Governors of States to send a force
into Louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the
river. You clearly never should cross, except in rear of
the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities ever
presented of destroying one of the three armies of the
enemy. If destroyed, he never can replace it. Use the
means at your command, and you can do this and cause a
rejoicing what will resound from one end of the land to
the other. 1
This was crossed by a telegram, same day, at
9 :30 P. M., from Thomas to Halleck :
No material change has been discovered in the enemy's
position to-day. He attempted to advance his picket line
on the Franklin road, but was driven back. With every
exertion on the part of General Wilson he will not be able
to get his force of cavalry in condition to move before
Sunday (the llth). I have a report from the river as
high up as Carthage; no body of the enemy can be seen
or heard of. I also have information that there is no
enemy between Carthage and Albany, Ky. There are two
iron-clads above Harpeth Shoals on the Cumberland River,
and Admiral Lee is at Clarksville with the "Cincinnati."
I have requested him to patrol the river from Clarksville
1 O. E. Serial No. 94, p. 97.
83
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
to Harpeth, so as to discover and effectually prevent any
attempt of the enemy to cross below. 1
On the same page will be found a reassuring dis-
patch, confirmatory of the above, from Van Duzer
to Eckert, which shows the continued arrival of re-
enforcements to Thomas, while my own reports of
progress to him and my efforts appear at nearly
every page of the record, and especial attention is
called to that of December 8, to which Thomas re-
fers and from all of which it will be perfectly ap-
parent to the military student that all was going
well, that the moment of attack was drawing nigh,
and that every energy was on the stretch to be ready
for it. But, in the meantime, in spite of all that
we could do or say, and in the face of daily improv-
ing conditions in our preparations for the offensive,
measures of the gravest character were being ma-
tured at the War Department under the express di-
rection of General Grant, due, most unhappily, to
his misunderstanding of the facts and his persistent
disregard of his own wise rule of non-interference
in the plans and details of execution on the part of
independent commanders and his inexplicable re-
fusal to accord to Thomas, incomparably the best
of the lot, that freedom of judgment and action
which he so generously extended to Meade, Sher-
man, Sheridan, and Schofield. As the crisis was
grave, and as Grant's part in it was perhaps the
least creditable incident in his whole military career,
it is essential that the facts, as they officially appear,
should all be carefully recalled before resuming the
thread of my own personal reminiscences.
*O. B. Serial No. 94, p. 97.
84
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
Van Duzer's dispatch to Eckert on December
8, at 8 P. M., above referred to, becomes important,
and was as follows :
No change in position since last report. Enemy still
in force in front, as was found by reconnoissance, and a
large artillery force upon south bank of the Cumberland
below, between here and the Shoals. One of our gun-
boats came to grief in exchange of iron at Bell's Ferry.
Rebel General Lyon holds same bank below Harpeth to
Fort Donelson, but does not fight gun-boats. Reinforce-
ments now at Clarksville will reach here by a railroad to-
morrow night. Colonel Tompson's black brigade reached
here yesterday, having come from Johnsonville via
Clarkville. Deserters report Hood's headquarters seven
miles out on Hillsboro pike; Forrest three miles on
Granny White Road with main army on same road nearer
town. 1
With no other warrant than the above, without
material change in the positions of the respective
armies or any increasing menace from Hood, and
upon premises now indisputably known and clearly
seen to have been false, having at the time no ade-
quate support in the reports which had reached him
at the hour of his own telegram, and without wait-
ing for Thomas's reply to his message of 8:30 p. M.
of the 8th, quoted above, Grant did himself the great
wrong and Thomasi the intolerable injustice dis-
closed in the following message to Halleck of De-
cember 9, at 11 A. M. :
Dispatch of 8 p. M. last evening from Nashville shows
the enemy scattered for more than seventy miles down the
river, and no attack yet made by Thomas. Please tele-
graph orders, relieving him at once and placing Schofield
O. E. Serial No. 94, p. 97.
85
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
in command. Thomas should be directed to turn over
all orders and dispatches received since the battle of
Franklin to Schofield.
It is now well known that except a small raid-
ing force under Lyon, which was being sharply
looked after by detachments of my cavalry under
the vigorous leadership of McCook and LaGrange,
the enemy had no force on the lower Cumberland
and none on the river nearer Nashville except a
small battery of four guns and a brigade of
Chalmers's division. The main rebel army, as
clearly stated by Van Duzer, "so far from
being scattered for more than seventy miles
down the river," was intact and making no
movement whatever in force to cross the Cumber-
land. Lyon, as it turned out, was a negligible
quantity, and McCook had far better have been
held in hand for the decisive battle at Nash-
ville.
Pursuant, however, to Grant's telegram, tenta-
tive action had been taken in the Adjutant General's
office in Washington to carry it into effect by gen-
eral order, as follows :
In accordance with the following dispatch from Lieu-
tenant General Grant, viz :
Please telegraph order relieving him (General
Thomas) at once, and placing Schofield in command.
Thomas should be directed to turn over all dispatches re-
ceived since the battle of Franklin to Schofield.
The President orders:
1. That Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield assume command
of all troops in the Departments of the Cumberland, the
Ohio and the Tennessee.
2. That Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas report to Scho-
86
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
field for duty, and turn over to him all orders and dis-
patches received by him, as specified above.
By order of the Secretary of War.
It was well for the country that such, an order
should have given pause to all concerned in the War
Department and that no one seemed to be desirous
or in haste to give it vitality by lending his signa-
ture. Meanwhile Halleck, returning to his old-time
friendship for Thomas, dating back to the days of
Corinth, knowing Grant 's hostile attitude, before
the receipt of his order at 1:45 p. M. directing
Thomas's peremptory removal, sent him this dis-
patch, dated December 9, at 10:30 A. M. :
General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your
delay in attacking the enemy. If you wait till General
Wilson mounts all his cavalry you will wait till dooms-
day, for the waste equals the supply. Moreover, you will
soon be in the same condition that Rosecrans was last year
with so many animals that you cannot feed them. Re-
ports already come in of a scarcity of forage. 1
I can readily forgive Halleck for stealing Stan-
ton's thunder at my expense and repeating it to
Thomas, to my prejudice, for the reason that it was
full time for somebody to put Thomas on his guard,
and Halleck had sense enough and the courage to do
it- Moreover, the telegram, although it must have
wrung Thomas's great soul, yet brought into light
and play the loyal and intensely patriotic attributes
of the man. Thomas replied to Halleck on Decem-
ber 9, at 2 p. M. :
Your dispatch of 10:30 A. M. this date is received. I
regret that General Grant should feel dissatisfaction at
1 O. B. Serial No. 94, p. 114.
87
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
my delay in attacking the enemy. I feel conscious that I
have done everything in my power to prepare, and that
the troops could not have been gotten ready before this,
and if he should order me to be relieved I will submit
without a murmur. A terrible storm of freezing rain has
come on since daylight, which will render an attack im-
possible until it breaks. 1
Thomas had already at an earlier hour sent the
following reply to Grant, but it will be noted that
it was also responsive to Halleck's message just
quoted :
Your dispatch of 8 :30 p. M. of the 8th is just received.
I had nearly completed my preparations to attack the
enemy to-morrow morning, but a terrible storm of freezing
rain has come on to-day, which will make it impossible
for our men to fight to any advantage. I am, therefore,
compelled to wait for the storm to break and make the
attack immediately after. Admiral Lee is patrolling the
river above and below the city, and I believe will be able
to prevent the enemy from crossing. There is no doubt
that Hood's forces are considerably scattered along the
river with the view of attempting a crossing, but it has
been impossible for me to organize and equip the troops
for an attack at an earlier time. Major General Halleck
informs me that you are very much dissatisfied with my
delay in attacking. I can only say I have done all in my
power to prepare, and if you should deem it necessary to
relieve me I shall submit without a murmur. 2
General Thomas, without parading it, was a
man of deep religious convictions and doubtless
thoroughly shared the belief that l ' there is a Divin-
ity which shapes our ends, rough hew them as we
may. ' ' But whether so or not it is doubtful if in the
1 O. E. Serial No. 94, p. 114.
*Ib., p. 115.
88
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
life of any good and great man there was ever more
timely or clearer providential interference in his
fortunes and in his favor than that pitiless "ter-
rible storm of freezing rain ' ' to which, he makes ref-
erence in his telegrams to both Halleck and Grant.
It continued in its effects for four days days abso-
lutely essential to the completion of his and my or-
derly and final preparations for attack. It con-
firmed the War Department in its hesitation and re-
luctance to give immediate effect to the extreme
measure ordered by Grant. It gave a practi-
cal and unanswerable reason for further delay, and
stayed for a time even the hand of the grim Lieu-
tenant General. It left him unconvinced, growl-
ing, and waiting to strike and on the watch for op-
portunity, of which he was not slow to avail himself,
but in which, on credible testimony, he ultimately
failed, solely by reason of another! special provi-
dence, this time in the shape of wise, courageous
Major T. T. Eckert, head of the telegraph bureau
in the War Department, and afterwards, for many
years, the president of the Western Union Tele-
graph Company.
On receipt of Thomas's dispatch, Halleck tele-
graphed Grant, on December 9, at 4:10 p. M. :
Orders relieving Thomas had been made out when his
telegram of this p. M. was received. If you still wish these
orders telegraphed they will be forwarded. 1
To which Grant replied at 5 :30 p. M. :
General Thomas has been urged in every way possible
to attack the enemy, even to giving him the positive or-
ders. He did say he thought he would be able to attack
*O. E. Serial No. 94, p. 116.
89
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the 7th, but didn't do so, nor has he given a reason for
not doing it. I am very unwilling to do injustice to an
officer who has done as much good service as General
Thomas has, however, and will, therefore, suspend the
order relieving him until it is seen whether he will do any-
thing. 1
In a far saner tone, Grant, at 7:30 p. M., sent
this:
Your dispatch of 1 p. M. received. I have as much con-
fidence in your conducting a battle rightly as I have in
any other officer; but it has seemed to me that you have
been slow, and I have had no explanation of affairs to
convince me otherwise. Receiving your dispatch of 2
p. M. from General Halleck, before I did the one to me, I
telegraphed to suspend the order relieving you until we
should hear further. I hope most sincerely that there will
be no necessity of repeating the orders, and that the facts
will show that you have been right all the time. 2
The embargo of the storm did not seem to have
impressed Grant, and, as his telegram completely
ignored or turned down this and other very full ex-
planations of the delay, Thomas, at 11 :30 p. M., on
the same day, tersely repeated his controlling and
most important reason for the delay, with the ap-
parent purpose of leaving Grant free to do as he
pleased.
Your dispatch of 7:30 p. M. is just received. I can
only say in further explanation why I have not attacked
Hood that I could not concentrate my troops and get their
transportation in order in shorter time than it has been
done, and am satisfied I have made every effort that was
possible to complete the task. 3
1 O. E. Serial No. 94, p. 116.
2 /&., p. 115.
'/&., p. 115.
90
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
Earlier in the evening, at 9:30 p. M., Thomas
closed the day by a further report to Halleck :
There is no perceptible change in the appearance of the
enemy's lines to-day. Have heard from the Cumberland
River, between Harpeth and Clarksville, and there are no
indications of any preparations on the part of the enemy
to cross. The storm still continues. 1
The record shows that Thomas, as was his duty,
kept Halleck fully and accurately advised from day
to day, almost from hour to hour, especially as to
the imperative delay incident to the storm and its
effects, and reiterated his purpose to attack Hood
' i as soon as we have a thaw. ' ' But he did not again
volunteer any direct communication to Grant. On
the llth, at 4 p. M., however, Grant wired Thomas
in terms showing that it was still "On to Rich-
mond" with him, regardless of weather:
If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will
be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River,
and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as
you find. Let there be no further delay. Hood cannot
stand even a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ord-
nance stores. If he retreats and you follow, he must lose
his material and much of his army. I am in hopes of re-
ceiving word from you to-day announcing that you have
moved. Delay no longer for weather or reinforcements. 2
To this Thomas, on December 11, at 10 :30 P. M.,
replied :
Your dispatch of 4 p. M. this day is just received. I
will obey the order as promptly as possible, however much
I may regret it, as the attack will have to be made under
1 O. R. Serial No. 94, p. 114.
2 /&., p. 143.
91
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
every disadvantage. The whole country is covered with a
perfect sheet of ice and sleet, and it is with difficulty the
troops are able to move about on level ground. It was my
intention to attack Hood as soon as the ice melted, and
would have done so yesterday had it not been for the
storm. 1
This ended all correspondence between them un-
til after the battle had been fought and won. To
show indisputably that Thomas was perfectly sin-
cere and quite correct as to the imperative need for
delay, and that Grant was wholly wrong in his in-
sistence upon attack, it is only necessary to quote
from the record the judgment of other competent
observers on the ground. On the 9th Van Duzer re-
ported to Eckert : " . . . Storm of sleet and snow
to-day prevents any movement of our force or of
the enemy. " On the llth: ". . . . Frost still
holds everybody, except wood cutters, idle. No
movement to report either on our part or that of the
enemy for the past three days/' On the 13th:
" . . . , Thaw has begun and to-morrow we can
move without skates. " 2 General T. J. Wood, the
capable commander of the Fourth Army Corps, re-
ported to Thomas on the 10th: ". . . . The
ground between the enemy's lines and my own is
covered with a heavy sleet, which would make the
handling of troops very difficult, if not impracti-
cable. ' ' 3 That this also was the judgment of every
corps commander in the army will further appear in
the course of my personal narrative. Schofield, who
was to be the beneficiary of Thomas's removal on
1 O. K. Serial No. 94, p. 143.
2 76., pp. 117, 143, 171.
8 /b., p. 132.
92
CONFEONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
the 12th, reporting to Thomas, said: ". . . . It
seems hardly possible that Hood can attempt any
move at this time. ' ' l
Nowhere, and never, perhaps, in Grant's life
can be found an episode which better illustrates that
trait in his character which Mrs. Grant had in mind
when she said: "My husband is a very obstinate
man, ' ' a quality which, rightly directed, as it always
was in battle, helped to make him great, but which,
in this instance, was wholly misdirected and came
perilously near to involving him in an act of cruel
injustice and a great and harmful mistake. He
had, however, met his match even in that quality,
and, having been fought to a standstill by the equal
or greater obstinacy of Thomas, ceased to urge him
further to an act which was against his judgment,
and, without confessing . his defeat, relentlessly
turned to other expedients. Logan, having been on
sick leave and left behind at his home in Illinois
when Sherman cut loose from Atlanta, did not par-
ticipate in the March to the Sea, and in an effort to
get to the front and rejoin his corps command under
Sherman visited Grant's headquarters at City
Point. The result of his conference with Grant was
special order No. 149, dated December 13, 1864 :
1. Maj. Gen. John A. Logan, U. S. Volunteers, will
proceed immediately to Nashville, Tenn., reporting by tele-
graph to the Lieutenant General commanding his arrival
at Louisville, Ky., and also his arrival at Nashville, Tenn.
By command of Lieutenant General Grant. 2
Just what use Grant proposed to make of Logan
on his arrival at Nashville does not officially appear,
1 O. R. Serial No. 94, p. 157.
2 Ib., p. 171.
93
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
but the latter is himself authority for the statement
that he expected to assume command of the army
at Nashville in case Thomas had not engaged the
enemy when he arrived there, and this view is sup-
ported by David Homer Bates, in an interesting
book, in which he says that on the date of the above
order sending Logan to Nashville " Grant wrote his
second order relieving Thomas and sent it by the
hand of Logan, to be delivered in person, provided
when Logan arrived at Nashville Thomas had not
yet advanced." 1 But not satisfied with this Bates
further states that Grant, before Logan was a day's
journey away, started in person for Nashville via
Washington, where he arrived on the afternoon of
the 15th and found the wires interrupted, for rea-
sons which all the world now understands. A con-
ference between Lincoln, Stanton, Grant, and Hal-
leek followed, at which Grant declared his purpose
to go to Nashville, meantime relieving Thomas and
placing Schofield in immediate command until his
arrival.
Grant then wrote this third order, removing Thomas,
and although Lincoln and Stanton were strongly opposed
to such action, they were forced to consent because of
Grant's urgent importunity. The final order for the re-
moval of Thomas was then handed to Eckert for transmis-
sion, Grant going to Willard's Hotel to prepare for his
departure. 2
Most interesting details follow, telling how Eck-
ert, on his own responsibility, held the telegram
until he could hear from Van Duzer, which he did
in the course of an hour, at 11 P. M., in cipher, in-
1 Bates, "Lincoln in the Telegraph Office," p. 313.
/&., p. 315.
94
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
eluding one from Thomas, dated December 14, at
8 P. M., both of which. Bates translated ; the one from
Thomas to Halleck was as follows :
Your telegram of 12 :30 p. M. to-day received. The ice
having melted away to-day the enemy will be attacked to-
morrow morning. Much as I regret the delay in attacking
the enemy, it could not have been done before with any
reasonable hope of success. 1
The second telegram was from Van Duzer, Nash-
ville, December 15, at 10:30 p. M., telling of the
battle fought on that day and the great victory won.
This message is historic, and is found at page 196,
O. E., Serial No. 94. Great use was made of it and
great rejoicing on the part of Eckert, Stanton, and
Lincoln followed, of which Bates gives a graphic
and picturesque account. On its being sent to Grant
at Willard's he handed it to Beckwith with the re-
mark : "I guess we will not go to Nashville. ' ' He,
however, at once, 11 :30 p. M., telegraphed Thomas :
1 1 1 was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dis-
patch from Van Duzer, detailing your splendid success of
to-day, I shall go no further. ' "
And fifteen minutes later he sent his congratula-
tions to Thomas.
It was upon this historic setting on this forbid-
ding background, so full of menace to the fortunes
of General Thomas, that the decisive battle of Nash-
ville was fought and won. Despite all the untoward
and uncalled for " nagging " disclosed by the record,
I make bold to say that the battle was fought with-
out " unnecessary delay," just as Thomas all along
1 O. R. Serial No. 94, p. 180.
8 75., p. 195.
95
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
promised, with the result he had so carefully planned
for and so confidently anticipated. While prophecies
after the fact are always easy, it is in the highest
degree probable, tried by the facts actually devel-
oped in the course of the battle and by the experi-
ence of both armies, that if Thomas had made the
attack, as ordered so peremptorily, upon Hood's
strongly entrenched troops at any time prior to De-
cember 15, without waiting for reinforcements,
and especially without the aid of "a respectable cav-
alry force," he would have met with a disastrous re-
pulse. This, in fact, at first occurred everywhere
along the line, both on the first and second days,
except on the swinging flank, where Me Arthur's di-
vision and my cavalry were engaged. Grant had
no right to assume that Thomas would have had
any better luck in assaulting entrenchments, even
though held by inferior numbers, than he had him-
self had in Virginia, or Hood at Franklin, or Lee at
Gettysburg, or Sherman at Chickasaw Bluffs, or at
Missionary Ridge, or throughout the Atlanta cam-
paign, or than Grant himself on May 22, 1863, at
Vicksburg. These lessons of frightful disaster had
not been lost upon Thomas, a soldier of sound judg-
ment, and always a close student of the military art.
It is a notable fact, also, that the two most de-
cisive assaults of the war were made by troops un-
der Thomas's command at Missionary Eidge and
again at Nashville. Some may say that my state-
ment above, that even at Nashville the initial as-
saults on both days failed all along the line, except
as the operation of my cavalry on the flank and rear
made it easy, partakes of vainglory. I admit that
it is a somewhat startling statement, and may be
96
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
new to many, but it is not at all vainglorious. It
is the simple truth. I repeat it with great pride, but
in justice to the heroic valor of the noble men
"whose swords are rust and whose bones are dust,"
who so gloriously opened the road and showed the
way to victory where others not less brave but less
fortunate failed. As one among few survivors,
nearly half a century later, it is the last service I can
pay to the memory of my brave troops and the last
expression of my gratitude for their unfaltering
courage and support that I should make plain to
all who read these lines, for all time, a truth resting
not only upon my own observation and knowledge
but upon the incontrovertible evidence of others, a
truth that vindicates the judgment and the memory
of the illustrious Thomas, that answers my own
unfriendly critics, and that crowns the names of
Hatch, Croxton, Knipe, and Johnson, and the heroic
officers and men of their commands with imperish-
able glory.
It has been seen how large and free a use was
made of my name and how prominent the necessary
remount of my troops came to be in the issue be-
tween Thomas and his superiors in rank and au-
thority. In view of the great part played by the
cavalry in the battle, it will clearly appear that the
flippant criticisms of Stanton and Halleck were even
more uncalled for in my case than those made of
Thomas by Grant. The latter, it is to be observed,
nowhere echoed Stanton as Halleck did Thomas in
the use of my name and to my prejudice, but al-
ways recognized the need and utility of an adequate
cavalry force and did what he could to help Thomas
and myself in resurrecting it from the wasted, scat-
97
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
tered, and run-down material with which, under the
stress of severely adverse circumstances, we had to
deal. Aside from the impatience of Grant, and the
pressure from him, the mere fact of Hood's pres-
ence in front of our entrenchments was of itself
sufficient, without urging from any quarter, to speed
every one to his utmost. All the wisdom, experi-
ence, and skill of the veteran Thomas and every
atom of the energy and ability of my being were
brought to bear, day and night, in an unceasing ef-
fort to overcome our deficiencies and to be ready
at the earliest opportune moment to strike a deadly
blow.
Although the campaign just ended had been
crowded with marching and fighting, exposure and
privation, which had tried the nerves and endurance
of all, the cavalry in the field, notwithstanding its
inferiority in numbers, had successfully gained con-
fidence and efficiency from the start. It felt in-
stinctively that the day for numerous and unnec-
essary detachments, of desultory and inconclusive
operations had gone by. The era of concentration
and movements in mass had arrived. Both men and
officers had fully caught the new spirit and showed
by their bearing that they needed but to be correctly
handled and intelligently looked after to give a bet-
ter account of themselves than they had ever done
before.
With the Seventh Ohio Cavalry scouting the
north bank of the Cumberland as far down as
Clarkesville, and Hammond's brigade as far up as
Carthage, it was reasonably certain that Hood, even
if he had so intended, could make no movement
toward the invasion of Kentucky which we should
98
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
not promptly discover. Our central camp at Edge-
field was thus left entirely quiet, and this afforded
opportunity not only to rest and refit but to drill
and reestablish proper discipline and administra-
tion.
The first week of December was the busiest and
most important period in the reorganization of the
cavalry forces. Clothes were drawn for the men,
the horses were rested, reshod and well fed, extra
shoes were fitted, new arms were issued, old ones
were repaired, and equipments of every kind were
put in order. As fast as horses were received, they
were issued where they would do the most good,
and while they came in large numbers dismounted
men from the rear came more rapidly in numbers
sufficient to constitute two extra brigades of fifteen
hundred men each. These were organized and used
on foot as infantry till horses could be got for
them.
On December 9, as a result of daily confer-
ences, Thomas ordered me to break camp at Edge-
field, to recross the Cumberland with my entire
force, and to take position within the defenses of
Nashville between the Hillsboro and Harding
turnpikes so as to be ready to join in the attack
against Hood the next day. But a heavy rain set-
ting in about the time the movement should have
begun my orders were countermanded till further
notice. Eain, snow, and sleet in abundance fol-
lowed by intense cold covered the ground that night
with such a glare of snow and ice as to render it
impossible to move cavalry not especially rough-
shod for the occasion. In fact, neither infantry nor
cavalry could have made any progress whatever
99
UNDEK THE OLD FLAG
over a battlefield so undulating and broken and so
covered with ice and frozen snow as was that which
separated our lines from those of the enemy. There
cannot be the slightest doubt that the prevailing
conditions made it necessary to suspend operations
and were a full justification for every hour of delay
that followed this remarkable storm. It was at its
greatest intensity when Grant telegraphed positive
orders directing Thomas to attack the enemy with-
out further delay, and it was after it had spent its
full force that Thomas, on the evening of Decem-
ber 10, invited his corps commanders to his head-
quarters for the purpose of reciting his orders, mak-
ing known his reply, and asking their views as to
the action he had taken entirely on his own respon-
sibility in the emergency then at hand.
As I was the junior corps commander present,
in years as well as in rank, it was my duty to speak
first. Thomas laid before us Grant's orders and
his reply thereto, and then stated that he had
reached his decision and sent his answer absolutely
upon his own judgment and merely wanted us to
know what the situation was and what his sense of
duty had demanded of him. He intimated that he
would be glad to know that his action was in con-
formity with our views, but assured us in a tone of
lofty dignity and resolution that he was prepared
to take all the consequences of it upon his own
shoulders, whatever they might be. "With this manly
declaration from the lips of our commander, I has-
tened to express my full approval of the course he
had adopted and then added that, as I understood
the plans, in which I fully concurred, the initial
movements and maneuvers would naturally fall to
100
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
'the cavalry and that it was my deliberate judgment
that no hostile movement of any kind could be prop-
erly made either by infantry or cavalry till a thaw
had set in and the ground and its covering had be-
come sufficiently soft to enable both men and horses
to make their way over it. I then declared that if
my command held any part of Hood's position I
would agree to defend it successfully against any
force that could be sent against it with my own men
armed with nothing more dangerous than baskets of
brickbats, for I felt sure that the first volley dis-
charged would set the men to dodging and slipping
in such manner as to throw them into inextricable
confusion.
It will be remembered that Hood occupied at that
time a line of entrenchments on the tops of the Over-
ton Hills, the sides of which were steep enough to
make them difficult to surmount even if undefended.
My remarks seemed so appropriate to the real situ-
ation that they were received with a smile of ap-
proval by my brother officers. Thomas J. Wood,
commanding the Fourth Corps, was the next to
speak. At the outbreak of the war he was the
youngest cavalry colonel in the army, but he was
a soldier of great experience and unfaltering cour-
age. Much to my satisfaction he expressed his
hearty concurrence in what I had said. A. J. Smith
and Steedman were equally outspoken, and, as no
one present denied or criticised my proposition or
the conclusion drawn from it, and, as it was admit-
ted by all that the success of our operations would
depend largely upon the cavalry's turning move-
ment, the meeting was shortly dissolved, and the
officers dismissed to their quarters. Schofield, who
101
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
was present at the meeting, claims that, "without
waiting for the junior members of the council,"
he immediately replied: "General Thomas, I will
sustain you in your determination not to fight until
you are fully ready. ' ' 1 But on the testimony of all
who were present it is certain that Schofield 's ad-
vice, whatever it was, must have been given in pri-
vate. The fact is that upon this notable occasion
he sat silent and by that means alone, if at all, he
concurred in the judgment of those present that
Thomas's course first and last was fully justified by
the circumstances and conditions which confronted
him. It was doubtless this silence that gave rise to
the suspicion on the part of Steedman, and pos-
sibly of Thomas himself, that Schofield was already
in touch with Grant or the War Department.
As the others were withdrawing Thomas asked
me to remain for further conference, and this I did
with great pleasure. As soon as we were alone he
said, with much feeling :
"Wilson, the Washington authorities treat me
as if I were a boy. They seem to think me incapable
of planning a campaign or of fighting a battle, but
if they will just let me alone till thawing weather
begins and the ground is in condition for us to move
at all I will show them what we can do. I am sure
my plan of operations is correct, and that we shall
lick the enemy, if he only stays to receive our
attack. "
Saying what I could to soothe Thomas's
wounded feelings and to make it clear that Grant
and Stanton could hardly understand the effects of
^'Forty-six Years in the Army/' by Lieutenant General John
M. Schofield, Century Co., p. 238.
102
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
the hard winter storm which had come upon us,
without seeing them in person, I again expressed my
approval of his plans and my entire confidence in
our success if we did not throw our chances away by
attacking prematurely. This done, I gradually
led him into the discussion of other subjects and our
conversation lasted till after supper. It was my
custom to consider every question of organization
and administration with him. He was an old West
Point instructor who had devoted his entire life to
the study of professional questions, and it was a
rare opportunity for an officer of my age and lack
of experience to invite his counsel and confidence.
It was during an interview which took place a day
or two after we had come within the defenses of
Nashville that I told him of the disorganized and in-
efficient condition of the Tennessee cavalry regi-
ments and of my intention to court-martial the offi-
cers absent from duty without authority, and to
detail in their place field officers who could be spared
from the depleted Northern regiments. It was upon
that occasion that he suggested that I should call
upon Andrew Johnson, then military governor of
Tennessee, and ask for his cooperation. I have
given an account elsewhere of what took place be-
tween us but I had had no suitable opportunity
to explain the unfortunate result of the meeting
to General Thomas. This I now did and in do-
ing so raised a smile at the language I had used
and the nerve which I had displayed. He ex-
pressed no surprise at Johnson's conduct nor at
the course I had adopted without waiting for that
official's concurrence, but fully agreed with me in
my estimate of Johnson, as well as in the meas-
103
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Tires which I had taken to vitalize the Tennessee
mounted regiments. He admitted that it was a
great mistake on the part of the War Department
to permit their organization at all, and encouraged
me by his full approval of the course I had
adopted.
I went to camp that night with a higher opinion
of Thomas and his character than I had ever had
before. He was by no means a rapid thinker or a
brilliant conversationalist, but his mind was well
stored with all sorts of military information and
this was not all. He was an officer of unshakable
resolution and of the highest character. His self-
control was perfect, his bearing lofty and serene,
and in all that he said and did he reminded me of
the traditional Washington more than any man I
had ever met. 1 He was a patriot without flaw and
a soldier without reproach. He was as modest and
as composed in his demeanor as any woman could
have been, and yet he was not without the pride of
conscious merit and did not hesitate to use strong
and vigorous language when he thought he was im-
properly treated. He was as calm during the whole
of this interview and as confident of victory as it
was possible for a soldier to be. Withal he made
it clear that he would not permit himself to be hur-
ried into battle, but would lay down his commission
rather than fight against his judgment or before he
had done all in his power to complete his prepara-
tion and to insure victory.
And yet he could not forget the fact that Sher-
1 Others, Admiral S. P. Lee for one, commanding our Mississippi
Squadron, were similarly impressed. See also, ' ' Eecollections of the
Civil War/' C. A. Dana, pp. 124-125.
104
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
man, who had taken the pick and choice of the West-
ern troops, including his own splendid Fourteenth
Corps, was marching unopposed through the South,
while the enemy he should have destroyed before
starting on his holiday excursion had assumed the
offensive and was now confronting us at Nashville
within a line of circumvallating entrenchments which
all experience admonished us were inexpugnable
if properly defended. He commented on this more
than once during the so-called siege with bitterness
and resentment. But badly as he felt about it he
felt still worse in regard to Grant's impatient and
inconsiderate orders to fight without further delay.
Generals, however great, are but men after all, and,
while Thomas was always composed and dignified,
he would have been more than human had he not re-
ferred to the fact that Grant, with an army of nearly
a hundred thousand men, mostly seasoned veterans,
had been confronting Lee at Petersburg for seven
months, while Hood had been confronting us at
Nashville for only ten days. The deadlock in Vir-
ginia was far more complete than in Tennessee.
Lee, as if in contempt of Grant's generalship, had
made detachments to Lynchburg and the valley of
Virginia, thus greatly weakening his main army, and
while those diversions had in the end come to grief
Grant had not been able to avail himself of them for
a successful counter attack against the enemy in his
own front, but had finally settled down into a list-
less deadlock which continued substantially till the
first of April, the next year. Under the circum-
stances, which were well known to the entire army,
it was hard for Thomas, who was conceded to be a
better technical soldier and organizer than either
105
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Grant or Sherman, to understand why he should be
censured and lectured by either of them. Both were
far away, as well as more or less ignorant of the
actual condition of affairs in our front, and both
more or less responsible for the perils by which we
were surrounded. Thomas felt all this most keenly,
but, with a reticence which was one of his greatest
characteristics, he contented himself with recounting
it to me, possibly with the hope that I might use it
in some way for his justification, though he did not
intimate that I should use it then or at any future
time. He knew my intimacy with Grant and his
staff, and evidently had confidence in my judgment,
and, therefore, contented himself with the final dec-
laration that the authorities might relieve him from
command and put some one else in his place, in
which case he would do all in his power to help him
out, but that in no case would he fight against his
own judgment, or till local conditions should become
more favorable. For the adoption of this course,
the events which followed were a full justification,
but it is a curious circumstance that, although Grant
afterward went so far as to admit that he was wrong
and Thomas was right in not fighting till the
weather had moderated and the thaw had come,
neither he nor Sherman ever fully or fairly with-
drew the charge that Thomas was slow at Nash-
ville. 1
On the evening of December 11 the weather
moderated and the ice which- covered the hills and
fields began to melt. It required but a few hours
J On this interesting topic the critical reader should consult
Genwal Boynton's little book: "Was General Thomas Slow at
Nashville?" &c. Frances P. Harper, New York, 1896.
106
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
in that climate to clear and soften the ground
so that troops could move without danger. By the
next morning I began crossing to the south side of
the river, and before night had taken up the position
assigned to me, ready to attack as soon as the word
should be received. By the night of the 14th all
my near-by detachments had been called in and
every arrangement within my own control had been
completed, and, what is still better, both officers and
men showed every confidence of victory.
The plan of battle, as fully explained to all, re-
quired the cavalry to advance on the right of the
infantry, conform to its movements, drive the enemy
from the bank of the Cumberland at Bell's Land-
ing as well as from the Charlotte and Harding turn-
pikes, turn and envelop the enemy's left flank, and,
if possible, strike him in the rear. In arranging
to carry out these instructions, I conferred with A.
J. Smith, whose corps had been holding that por-
tion of our line between the Hillsboro turnpike
and the river, pointing out clearly that he should
reach his point of passage through our entrench-
ments in such a way as not to encumber the ground
over which the cavalry would have to operate. As
the result of this conference, Smith assured me that
the division on my right should march to the left
by the rear of my command inside the entrench-
ments.
In order that there should be no mistake as to
what was expected of them, I personally showed my
division and brigade commanders the ground over
which they were to advance, assembled them at my
headquarters, and verbally reiterated my instruc-
tions. To make sure that there should be no mis-
107
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
understanding, I then furnished each with a writ-
ten copy of the orders for his government.
I had three divisions and one extra brigade in
hand ready for the attack. The Fifth Division under
Hatch held the left and was directed to sally from
the fortifications on the Harding turnpike, its left
flank connecting with Smith's infantry and its right
flank moving by the turnpike. As soon as Smith had
carried the enemy's position in his front, Hatch was
to swing to the left, enveloping the enemy's flank
and taking him in reverse.
Croxton's brigade of the First Division, the
other two being still absent in pursuit of Lyon, was
ordered to conform to the movement on his left.
B. W. Johnson's Sixth Division, one brigade
mounted, the other having no horses, was directed
to clear the Charlotte turnpike of the enemy, to keep
in touch with Croxton, and to push on as far as
Davidson's House, eight miles from the city, so as
to cover the movement of the cavalry behind it from
a counter attack by the enemy.
Knipe's Seventh Division, one brigade mounted
and the other without horses, was directed to de-
bouch from our entrenchments on the Harding turn-
pike and advance in readiness to reenfortfe any
portion of the general advance which might require
it. Although the plan of operations was plain and
simple, a staff officer was told off to each division
to see that everyone was in his place and did his
part in conformity with the general plan of opera-
tions. As the entire battlefield was composed of
plowed land and heavily timbered hills, all were
directed to leave their transportation behind and to
take nothing with them except the artillery, the
108
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
teams of which, should be doubled. The entire force
consisted of something over nine thousand mounted
men and three thousand dismounted. McCook had
not returned.
With all arrangements complete and the cavalry
in bivouac on the commons inside of the entrench-
ments fronting the ground on which they were to ad-
vance the next day, I withdrew to my own tent and
wrote, at 11 :40 p. M., December 14, 1864, to a friend
at Grant's headquarters as follows:
. . . Everybody else has made his last will and tes-
tament or written to his wife or sweetheart, but, having
nothing to dispose of, and neither wife nor sweetheart to
write to, I give you about four minutes before preparing
myself for four or five hours of sleep.
All arrangements are made for battle in the morning,
and much seems in our favor. If we are ordinarily suc-
cessful, and Hood ordinarily complacent, we shall have but
little time for letter writing during the next two weeks.
The weather has moderated, the rebels are quiescent, and
our troops in good condition. . . ,
Everything was astir, breakfast was over, and
the cavalry corps ready to move out by daylight
the next morning, but, owing to a dense fog which
followed the change in the weather, the cavalry as
well as the infantry was compelled to delay the ad-
vance till half past eight, by which time it had
cleared sufficiently to enable each organization to
move against the enemy as directed. In spite,
however, of every precaution, McArthur's division
of Smith's corps, instead of marching to its position
on the left by my rear, as Smith had promised, de-
liberately crossed my front, thereby delaying not
only my advance but the advance of the rest of the
109
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
army till nearly ten o'clock. Had the enemy been
specially alert, this unnecessary delay might have
greatly deranged our plan of attack. As it was it
cost the entire army an hour and a half, which, in
the short days of December, could ill be spared, and
might have been of inestimable value in our opera-
tions of that afternoon.
Simultaneously with the advance of the infantry,
the cavalry moved out as directed, though Hatch's
division was further delayed after beginning its
march by the fact that Me Arthur's infantry still
blocked its way. Finally having got a clear road,
it advanced rapidly under the cover of a strong line
of skirmishers. Brushing away the enemy's pickets,
it soon encountered Ector's brigade of infantry on
the farther side of Eichland Creek, strongly en-
trenched on commanding ground. Without a mo-
ment's hesitation, Stewart's brigade threw itself
headlong against the enemy, broke through his line,
and drove him rapidly beyond Harding 's House.
In this attack, the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry,
which I had placed under the command of Colonel
George Spalding, of Michigan, charged the enemy
in the most gallant manner, capturing Chalmers's
headquarters, baggage, papers, and records, forty-
three prisoners, and fourteen wagons, all of which
was exceedingly gratifying because it fully vindi-
cated my action in putting a Northern field officer in
charge of a Tennessee regiment.
Having by this brilliant operation cleared his
front and put the enemy's cavalry to flight, Hatch
pushed his first brigade by flank rapidly to the left
to join his second brigade. This done, the division
found itself on the flank of a four-gun battery,
110
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
posted in a redoubt which formed the left of the
enemy's position. Sending his own battery "I,"
First Illinois Light Artillery, still farther to the
right to a position from which it could enfilade the
enemy's entrenchments, Hatch threw forward
Coon's brigade, dismounted, broke through the en-
emy's infantry, and captured the redoubt with four
guns. Turning the captured guns upon the enemy
occupying a higher hill farther on, Hatch promptly
threw forward his second brigade, supported by his
first, and swept over a second redoubt, capturing
four guns and two hundred and fifty prisoners.
This operation was conducted in sight of the in-
fantry, which had never seen dismounted cavalry
assault a fortified position before. To men less
brave and determined than these dismounted horse-
men it would have seemed like madness to attack
such entrenchments, but armed with magazine car-
bines the strong line of skirmishers made light of
the work before them. In spite of the steep acclivity
and of the withering fire both of artillery and mus-
ketry, the dismounted cavalrymen swept over the
next redoubt and, putting the enemy to flight, cap-
tured still another four-gun battery which the enemy
abandoned in the valley beyond. It was now almost
dark, and the cavalrymen, having been fighting on
foot swinging on a long radius from hill to hill, over
rough and muddy ground, had become exceedingly
fatigued. Besides, night was at hand, and Hatch
was, therefore, directed to bring forward his horses
and bivouac on the Hillsboro turnpike, connect-
ing with Schofield's right and covering it from the
enemy.
Knipe's mounted brigade had conformed to
111
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Hatch's movement, striking the Hillsboro pike
at the six-mile post. Three-quarters of a mile far-
ther out, he turned up a branch of Eichland Creek
and, just at dark, struck the Granny White turnpike
still farther around, where he found himself in rear
of the enemy's line.
The cavalry operations still farther to our right
had been equally successful. Croxton's brigade and
Johnson's division, although delayed by McArthur's
infantry, had found the enemy posted behind Rich-
land Creek, but, pressing him vigorously in front
and flank, they brushed him quickly out of the way.
Croxton, after following him several miles, also
turned to the left, skirmishing heavily with the en-
emy, and finally went into bivouac near the sixth
mile post on the Hillsboro turnpike. Both he
and Johnson had swept everything before them,
thus making it easy to concentrate the entire
mounted force within supporting distance of each
other on the left and rear of the enemy's position.
From this condensed account, it will be seen
from the map that the cavalry corps had driven
back the enemy's entire left wing an average of
over four miles, and had placed itself in a position
from which it was enabled to renew the attack
against the enemy's left and rear the next day with
deadly effect.
It was an unusual day's work for cavalry. For
the first time on any American battlefield all the
available mounted force, a full army corps in
strength, were massed on the flank of an advancing
army, making a turning movement of the first im-
portance against an enemy occupying a strongly for-
tified position. For the first time in our country
112
CONFEONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
the horsemen on foot had charged side by side with
the infantry, carrying the enemy's entrenchments,
taking his field guns, and capturing the detachments
told off for their support. For the first time they
had planted themselves in force behind the enemy's
flank on one of his main lines of retreat in exactly
the position for which they had started. The night
was, however, so cloudy and dark, the country so
broken, and the troops so fatigued, that a further
advance that night was impossible. There was noth-
ing for the cavalry to do but to make their bivouac
sure. Having done this, they slept without unsad-
dling and were ready at the earliest dawn to resume
operations. Having seen that they were invincible
in cooperating masses, they believed themselves
sure of victory the next day, and, with this exultant
feeling, they rested, though most uncomfortably,
till the next morning.
Having made my dispositions for the night, I
rode to Thomas's headquarters, which I found on
the turnpike, a mile or so outside the fortifications
surrounding Nashville. He received me with compli-
ments which might well have made an older and bet-
ter soldier blush. His only regret was for the fog
and the delay which had occurred from the blun-
der of McArthur's division. He felt that, if our
movement could have begun at seven o 'clock instead
of at ten, we should have had three hours more
daylight and might have finished up our work and
routed the enemy before dark. He was well satis-
fied, however, with the day's work and still more
confident than ever that we should achieve a com-
plete victory the next day. Thanking me again for
the services of the cavalry and expressing his confi-
113
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
dence with still greater emphasis in the final re-
sult, he directed me to resume operations without
change of plan, and to press the enemy's flank and
rear as soon as I could see to move, with all the
force I could bring to bear. 1
Shortly after dawn of the 16th, the enemy drove
in Hammond's pickets and took possession of the
Granny White pike. This was the initial movement
of the day, but Hammond, a gallant soldier, realiz-
ing the importance of that turnpike, without wait-
ing for orders threw out the dismounted men of his
entire brigade, drove the enemy back in turn, and
regained firm possession of the turnpike. The fight-
ing was sharp and determined, but its results were
encouraging from the first. Hammond now had the
most exposed position, but at the first sound of his
carbines Hatch, to the left, pushed forward his whole
dismounted force and joined in the attack on the
enemy's left and rear. We were in the midst of
the Brentwood Hills, densely covered with under-
brush and broken by fences which made the wooded
country entirely impracticable for mounted men.
The front covered by my fighting line was about a
mile and a half in length. Its advance was diag-
onally across the Granny White pike, inclining to-
ward Nashville. Croxton's brigade was near at
hand, ready to support either Hatch or Hammond,
while Johnson's division was making its way on a
greater arc across country to the Hillsboro turn-
pike. But the enemy held on stubbornly, and it
looked for a while as though the cavalry might do
more to annoy the enemy if it were on the other
^chofield also called on Thomas that night and received simi-
lar orders. "Forty-six Years in the Army," p. 244.
114
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
flank. At 10:10 A. M. I wrote Schofield and spoke
with Thomas to that effect. 1
But by noon our skirmishers, not less than four
thousand in number, had pushed their way slowly
through the underbrush and woods up the hills in a
curved line from Schofield 's right, across the
Granny White pike, to a position parallel with the
enemy's line and facing Nashville. There was no
longer any uncertainty as to which flank we ought
to be on, for all was now going well. Led and di-
rected by their gallant officers, the men of the two
divisions, skirmishing heavily, pressed the enemy
steadily back from the start at every point.
In the midst of the heaviest fighting, one of our
detachments captured a courier from Hood, carry-
ing a dispatch to Chalmers, directing him ' ' for
God's sake to drive the Yankee cavalry from our
left and rear or all is lost. ' ' 2 Eegarding this dis-
patch as of the first importance, I sent it at once
to Thomas without even making a copy of it. Hav-
ing already informed both Thomas and Schofield
by courier of my success and of the steady progress
my troopers were making, I sent three staff officers,
one after the other, urging Schofield to attack the
enemy in front and finish up the day's work with
victory. But nothing whatever was done as yet
from the right of the infantry line to support my
movement. Finally, fearing that nothing would be
done, and that night would come on again before the
1 Schofield 'a "Forty-six Years in the Army," p. 264.
*O. E. Serial No. 94, p. 693, Forrest's Inspector-General to Jack-
son, "The enemy ... at 2 o'clock were attempting to turn our
left flank." /&., 697, Stewart to Walthall, "It is important to
check the force operating against our left flank."
115
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
enemy could be shaken out of his position, by the
efforts of the dismounted cavalry alone, I rode
around the enemy's left flank to Thomas's head-
quarters, which I found on the turnpike about two
miles from my own. This was between three and
four o'clock, and, as it was a cloudy, rainy day, it
was already growing dark. Thomas and Schofield
were standing together on the reverse side of a
small hill, over the top of which the enemy's line
on a still higher elevation could be plainly seen less
than a mile away. What was of still more impor-
tance was that my dismounted men, with their gui-
dons fluttering in the air, flanked and covered by
two batteries of horse artillery, were in plain sight
moving against the left and rear of the enemy's line.
Shots from their batteries aimed too high but pass-
ing over the enemy's heads were falling in front of
Schofield 's corps. And yet he gave no orders to
advance. Pointing out the favorable condition of
affairs, I urged Thomas, with ill-concealed impa-
tience, to order the infantry forward without fur-
ther delay. Still the stately chieftain was unmoved.
Apparently doubting that the situation could be as
I represented it, he lifted his field glasses and coolly
scanned what I clearly showed him. It was a stir-
ring sight, and, gazing at it, as I thought, with un-
necessary deliberation, he finally satisfied himself.
Pausing only to ask me if I was sure that the men
entering the left of the enemy's works above us
were mine, and receiving the assurance that I was
dead certain of it, he turned to Schofield and as
calmly as if on parade directed him to move to the
attack with his entire corps.
Fully realizing that the crisis was now on, I
116
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
galloped as rapidly as my good gray, Sheridan,
could carry me back to my own command, but when
I reached its front the enemy had already broken
and was in full but disorderly retreat by the only
turnpike left in his possession. This was shortly
after 4 p. M.
The dismounted troopers had closed in upon the
enemy's entrenchments and entered them from the
rear before the infantry reached them in front.
They had captured fifteen more field guns, thus
bringing their score up to twenty-seven for the two
days, and had picked up several hundred prisoners.
Without permitting them to delay for the trophies
of battle, I directed them to turn over both guns
and prisoners to the infantry, while they went for
their horses and mounted for the pursuit. Hatch,
Knipe, and Hammond, full of enthusiasm, did their
best to carry these instructions into effect, while
Croxton, still some distance to the right, mounted in
hot haste and pushed forward to and through Brent-
wood. It was now raining heavily, mist was gather-
ing, and dark was closing down like a pall over
both victor and vanquished.
As on the day previous, the ground was not only
soft but heavily overgrown with timber and under-
brush. The distance which separated the dis-
mounted troopers from their led horses was consid-
erable, and although every man hurried as though
his life was at stake it was pitch dark before they
were remounted and in pursuit. Not a minute was
unnecessarily lost, but rapid movements across
rough country and plowed fields in the dark were
impossible. The only chance was to follow the turn-
pikes, and we had not yet reached, nor were there
117
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
any crossroads to the Franklin pike, which was the
main artery of Hood's connections with the rear.
The Granny White pike was in our hands, but its
junction with the Franklin pike was at Hollowtree
Gap, a strong position five miles farther toward
Franklin, which made it necessary that the broken
and retreating columns of the enemy should clear
that point before we reached it. But the enthusiasm
of victory was now all on our side. " There was
mounting in hot haste " and, although it was so
dark that our troopers could hardly see their horses '
ears, Hammond and Hatch, in the order named, led
their gallant horsemen in headlong pursuit. It was
now raining hard and the rain was gradually turn-
ing into sleet. The night was cold and dismal, but
both officers and men felt that the opportunity was
all they could expect and that no effort should be
spared to gather the fruits of victory. They noted
the low roll of thunder, which they may have mis-
taken for the roar of distant cannon, and they
were grateful for the momentary flashes of lightning,
which showed them the highway and fitfully lit up
the landscape on either hand, giving them a sight
here and there of straggling detachments of the en-
emy hurrying to the rear.
Again the slowness of the infantry from the right
of our line had cost us the hour of daylight which
would have enabled us to make our victory com-
plete. Hood, foreseeing the disaster about to over-
take him, and making it known to Chalmers and to
us alike, by his despairing cry, with the experience
of an old soldier, had evidently held on till the last
minute in the expectation that darkness would en-
able him, by a hurrying retreat, to reach Franklin,
118
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
less than eight miles away, and put the Harpeth be-
tween him and ns before daylight.
But the Confederate chieftain had, quite un-
known to us, committed a second and still more
grievous error, which had so far escaped our ob-
servation. Although many stragglers were picked
up and hastily examined by the proper officers, it
was soon discovered that they all belonged to Chal-
mers's cavalry or to the infantry of Hood's army,
and none to Jackson's or Buford's cavalry. Be-
sides, nothing was seen or heard of the redoubtable
Forrest himself. He was not on the field or we
should have certainly known it before. The rattle
of his repeater, the clang of his saber, and the
shout of his clarion voice were absent from the
racket and fighting which made that night so mem-
orable. 1
We had not heard of Forrest's absence before,
for, being north of the river or encircled by the en-
trenchments of Nashville, we had no means of learn-
ing what was going on behind the hills or in the en-
emy 's camps. But after the fighting of the second
day was all over and silence, had followed t ' the noise
of the captains and the shouting, ' ' it became certain
that Forrest was absent from the battle. A day or
two later we learned to our surprise that he had
been sent by Hood, December 6, with two divi-
sions of cavalry and Walthall 's division of infantry,
to capture Murfreesboro on the Nashville and Chat-
tanooga Eailroad, some two days' march to the
southeast. This detachment, amounting to about
a quarter of the entire investing army, was an in-
1 O. R. Serial No. 94, pp. 202 et seq., Wilson's orders. /&.,
Thomas to McCook. /&., p. 699, Hood to Seddon.
119
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
excusable violation of all the rules of war. While
it cannot be said with certainty that, had Forrest
been present with this force united with that of
Chalmers, on the left of Hood's line he would have
been able to hold it, it may well be claimed that he
could have made a better and more stubborn defense
than was made by Chalmers and Ector alone.
Our mounted force was at least equal if not supe-
rior to Hood's and, cooperating with the infantry
against a long line of entrenchments but poorly
manned, we should doubtless have broken through,
but with Forrest also resisting us we should have
had much more difficult work and could hardly have
pushed our turning movement far enough to reach,
drive back, and take in reverse Hood's main line
of defense for a mile and a half as we did. When
it is remembered that every infantry attack against
Hood's center and right on both days of the battle
had been at first repulsed and that neither Schofield
nor Smith fired a shot on the second day till after
our dismounted men were seen entering the enemy's
entrenchments from the left and rear, it may well be
believed that had the cavalry's assault and turning
movement also failed our general plan would have
been defeated. According to all the rules of war,
the cavalry was fully justified in claiming, as it al-
ways did, that, but for the part they took in the two
days' battle, the Confederate army would have main-
tained its position and the investment would have
been indefinitely prolonged. 1
Meanwhile, the Confederate commander had com-
mitted his final and fatal mistake and had lost out
1 O. R. Serial No. 94, see especially Hood to Seddon, p. 699;
also Beauregard to Cooper, p. 768.
120
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
forever. His flank was turned and taken in reverse
and his line was irretrievably broken. The most
he could hope to do now was to save his army by
flight from total destruction and capture. And in
this his most potent allies were darkness, rain, snow,
sleet, mud, and rising rivers, all of which he was to
have in succession for the next two weeks. With
the beginning of darkness he was in full retreat
along the two turnpikes and we were thundering at
his heels. While Hatch, Hammond, and Croxton,
with more men than they could properly use in the
dark on a single road, were charging every sem-
blance of a rear guard with no guide but an occa-
sional flash of lightning showing the white surface
of the turnpike, and no knowledge of the enemy's
position but that given by the blazing of his pistols
and carbines, Johnson pushed down the Hillsboro
pike for the purpose of crossing the Harpeth
and swinging into Franklin from the west, if pos-
sible, before Hood could pass beyond that point. >
Our contact was at first with the disorganized
Confederate infantry. In spite of our capture of
Hood's dispatch to Chalmers in the afternoon, Chal-
mers had doubtless received a copy of it or had got
instructions direct from Hood, for, according to
fthe Confederate accounts, he had hastened with
Eucker and Kelly, just before the break took place,
to the rear on the Granny White pike for the pur-
pose of standing us off. He had selected a favor-
able position for felling trees and had constructed
a barricade of brush, logs, and fence-rails behind
which to hold on while the infantry passed to the
rear. This accounts for the fact that, after sweep-
ing the broken Confederate infantry from the road,
121
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the head of our column ran into a strong defensive
line a couple of miles further on. Without pausing
to ascertain who or what it was, the gallant troopers
formed front into line and dashed headlong in the
thick darkness against the layout which barred their
way. The blaze of the enemy's carbines plainly in-
dicated its extent and one of the fiercest conflicts
occurred that ever took place in the Civil War. The
brunt of the Confederate defense fell upon Colonel
Eucker with a small brigade composed mostly of
Tennesseeans. As if by design, though it was pure-
ly an accident, the leader of Hatch's column was
the same Colonel Spalding who broke the Confed-
erate line on the Harding pike the day before. At
the first dash, he found himself and his command
inextricably mixed up in a hand to hand fight in
which no man could distinguish friend from foe.
But all did their best with pistol shot and saber
stroke to clear the ground they had gained. In the
midst of the clash a clear voice rang out : i i Who are
you, anyhow ?" The answer came back in defiance:
"I am Colonel George Spalding, commanding the
Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry," thereupon Bucker
rushed at Spalding, grabbing at his rein, and calling
out fiercely : ' ' Well, you are my prisoner, for I am
Colonel Ed Eucker, commanding the Twelfth Ten-
nessee Eebel Cavalry ! " " Not by a damned sight, ' '
shouted the Union colonel, and giving his horse the
spur, with a front cut in the dark, he broke the grip
of his antagonist and instantly freed himself.
By some strange chance, at this instant Captain
Joseph C. Boyer of Spalding 's regiment also be-
came engaged with Eucker. He had heard both chal-
lenge and answer and pushed boldly in to assist his
122
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
colonel in the blackness of the night, fighting to the
front like the hero he was. Without knowing ex-
actly how it came ahout, Boyer closed in upon
Eucker, wresting his saher from his hand, while
Eucker, in turn, grabbed Boyer 's saber from him.
Then occurred one of the most remarkable incidents
of the war, for, while the sturdy combatants were
whacking each other with exchanged sabers, a pis-
tol shot from an unknown hand broke Eucker 's
sword arm and thus disabled him, compelling him
to surrender at discretion. Just which of his as-
sailants actually captured him is unknown, but the
sword which he had used so well fell to Spalding's
lot and was sent to Monroe, Michigan, where it re-
mained for twenty-five years a cherished trophy of
the War for the Union.
When the gallant deeds of that night had become
a pleasant memory of their declining years, Spald-
ing and Eucker met in the course of business or
pleasure, and this led to friendly relations and cor-
respondence, the result of which was that Spalding,
then a banker and a member of Congress, returned
the captured sword to Eucker, who had become a
most distinguished citizen, a capitalist, and a manu-
facturer at Birmingham, in the iron district of Ala-
bama.
Later, during the confused and frenzied night
fighting on the Granny White pike, Colonel Benja-
min Gresham of the Tenth Indiana Cavalry, brother
of General Walter Q. Gresham, afterwards United
States Judge and Secretary of State in Cleveland's
cabinet, while charging a fence-rail layout farther
to the right, also became engaged in a hand to hand
conflict, in which he was struck from his horse and
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
had five ribs broken by a crushing blow from a
clubbed rifle in the hands of a sturdy Confederate.
All along the line and down the crowded road sim-
ilar incidents took place and similar fighting made
the night one of the most exciting of the war. It
was a scene of pandemonium, in which flashing car-
bines, whistling bullets, bursting shells, and the im-
precations of struggling men filled the air.
My own staff, carried away by the excitement,
threw themselves into the melee nominally to see
and report, but really to lend a hand. Followed
by their orderlies, with drawn saber and flashing
repeater, one and all rushed into the fight and were
soon bringing back prisoners and recounting their
adventures. There were neither laggards nor horse-
holders that night. Every officer and man, mounted
and eager for the fray, did his full duty in the
headlong rush which broke line after line, carried
layout after layout, captured gun after gun, and
finally drove Chalmers and his gallant horsemen
from the field, in hopeless rout and confusion. They
had stood their ground bravely, but were overborne
at every turn and at every stand by the weight and
fury of the Union onset.
The victory was all we could wish, but by the
time the fighting was over and the enemy had at
last disappeared into the darkness, which prevented
wholesale capture, it was nearly midnight and my
own columns were badly scattered. Although flushed
with success and still anxious to continue the fray,
they had been marching and fighting, dismounted
and mounted, skirmishing and charging the enemy's
works, capturing his guns, and pursuing in hope-
less confusion for nearly eighteen hours. They had
124
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
no time to eat or feed after dawn, but with the cer-
tainty of victory, they cheerfully answered every
call made upon them. Hungry and tired and badly
needing rest, nothing could stop them as long as the
enemy was in sight. Sustained by the splendid work
they were doing and the splendid results they had
gained, I was probably the only officer in the com-
mand fresh enough to keep the saddle and to con-
tinue the pursuit. I needed neither rest nor refresh-
ment, but realizing that we were in a strange stretch
of country, the features and accidents of which were
unknown to us, I concluded, just before midnight, to
sound the recall, to send out word for each com-
mand to bivouac where orders overtook it, and to
take up the advance at the first sign of dawn the
next morning.
No other pursuit of the war had been so promptly
begun nor pushed so far without pause or halt, and
while we might have done more had we had moon-
light or even starlight, instead of rain, sleet, cold,
and the thick darkness of a winter's night, there
seemed to me nothing else for us to do under the cir-
cumstances but to halt and rest as best we might
for a few uncomfortable hours.
It had been an exciting day and night for me as
well as for the command. My policy of concentrat-
ing and operating in masses instead of detachments
had received a signal vindication. Thomas's delay,
in order that this policy might be carried out, had
been fully justified, but I had received no orders
after parting with him and he had ordered Schofield
to move out. Indeed, I needed none. The merest
tyro would have known what to do, but shortly after
I got well under way that night down the Granny
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
White pike in pursuit of the enemy, I heard the
heavy gallop of horses on the macadam behind me
and as it came nearer and clearer the intuition
flashed through my mind that it might be Thomas
galloping to overtake me. It was too dark to see or
to recognize anyone, but reining up my horse and
pulling him toward the side of the road, a heavy
figure loomed up abreast of me, calling out: "Is
that you, Wilson 1 ' ' Eecognizing the voice I halted
instantly and answered: "Yes, General Thomas I"
By the time these words were out, the dignified com-
mander, for it was he indeed and no one else, shouted
so that he might have been heard a quarter of a
mile : "Dang it to hell, Wilson, didn't I tell you we
could lick 'em, didn't I tell you we could lick 'em?"
With scarcely a pause for my reply, the General
wheeled about and galloped for Nashville, with a
word of praise for the cavalry. He disappeared
in the darkness shouting : ' ' Continue the pursuit as
far as you can to-night and resume it as early as
you can to-morrow morning."
While Thomas was famed as one of the most re-
served as well as one of the most dignified of men,
this incident makes it certain that he had been
deeply wounded 'by the impatience of those above
him and after all he was but human. He had told me,
it will be recalled, at the personal interview on the
night of the council with his corps commanders, that
he was sure we should "lick Hood" if we were al-
lowed to choose our time and fight him under favor-
able circumstances, and it was but natural that he
should ride out after the battle was won to remind
me that he had told me so. While he never used
profane language, it must be noted that upon this
126
CONFRONTING HOOD AT NASHVILLE
occasion he said "dang it" with all the vehemence
of an old dragoon. This was the nearest approach
I ever heard him make to actual profanity.
My quartermaster having selected a house by the
roadside for a hospital, I occupied it also with my
staff as soon as I had given the necessary orders
for the night. Eucker was among the wounded who
had found shelter there, and had been assigned to
a bed in my room. His arm had been so badly shat-
tered that my staff surgeon had amputated it before
I got there. Of course, every attention possible un-
der the circumstances was extended to the gallant
sufferer, who was made as comfortable as our field
resources would permit. He was, however, more or
less excited and wakeful, while I was compelled to
receive dispatches, send out orders, and make ar-
rangements for the next morning. Under such con-
ditions neither of us slept much, but as Eucker 's
excitement wore away and my business was dis-
patched, we both fell into silence and may have
caught an hour's restful sleep, but I was up and
out by dawn, while Hammond, Hatch, and Croxton,
without urging, were spurring to the front.
127
IV
DRIVING HOOD FROM MIDDLE TENNESSEE
Hollowtree Gap Affair at the West Harpeth Forrest
takes the rear Charge of the Fourth Cavalry Delay
at Rutherford Creek and Duck River Cheers of the
infantry Winter floods and ice Croxton routs Bu-
ford Enemy makes only counter attack End of
campaign McCook drives Lyon from Kentucky
Summary of campaign and results.
During the night of December 16 the enemy in-
provised a new rear guard which had taken up a
strong position at Hollowtree Gap, near the junction
of the two turnpikes. But with daylight, although
it was both foggy and rainy, to say nothing of cold,
it was easy to find his flanks. The country was now
open and, although the fields were knee-deep in mud,
we soon doubled him up and sent him whirling down
the road, across the Harpeth Eiver, through Frank-
lin and out on the turnpike toward Spring Hill and
Columbia. Chalmers made a gallant stand and
compelled us to develop a full front, thus gaining
precious time, but the weight of numbers and the
impulse of confidence were now with us and noth-
ing could withstand our onset. We had at last struck
country which we knew and over which we could
move with confidence, so long as we kept on the
128
DRIVING HOOD OUT
turnpike. But the slightest departure from it into
the open fields at once involved us in difficulty and
delay, and thus it was for the next two weeks.
Johnson's division, marching by a half circle and
crossing the Harpeth lower down, had been delayed
and, unfortunately, did not reach Franklin till after
the enemy had swept beyond it. The morning's
work gave us four hundred and thirteen prisoners,
including two colonels, two lieutenant colonels, three
colors, and many stragglers, together with two thou-
sand of the enemy's and two hundred of our own
sick and wounded, whom we found in the hospitals
at Franklin. Without making a detachment to care
for them we left them behind, as the cavalry fre-
quently did, to swell the trophies of the infantry,
while my five mounted brigades, for the first time
united into a compact mass nearly ten thousand
strong, pushed cheerfully to the front.
* After the victory at Hollowtree Gap Knipe
forded the Harpeth at Franklin, while Hatch and
Croxton did the same at the crossings above the
town, through which they had driven Forrest a fort-
night before. With the whole corps now well in
hand, Croxton on the Lewisburg pike to the left,
Hatch and Knipe in parallel column followed the
Columbia pike, while Johnson turned down the Car-
ter's Creek pike to the right. These were diver-
gent roads, but I hoped that the outer columns at
least could march rapidly enough to pass around the
flank of the enemy, while Hatch and Knipe, pressing
him on the central highway, would compel him to
halt and form line frequently throughout the day.
By these means I expected to bring him to a
stand and capture or scatter his last organized force
129
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
and make prisoners of the broken and flying mass
it was covering. The prize was a great one, and my
subordinates, realizing this as fully as I did, re-
sponded to every order with alacrity and precision.
But the enemy, finding his flanks constantly en-
dangered, retired so rapidly under the cover of his
infantry skirmish line that all our efforts to bring
him to bay failed till the day was almost spent. It
was killing work for both sides. The rain was still
pouring and the fields on both sides of the roads
were soaking wet, so that both retreating Confeder-
ates and following Union men had all they could do
to get forward without the delay of fighting.
Late in the evening, after a dense fog and the
shades of coming night had darkened the scene, the
rebel rear guard, apparently exhausted by its toil-
some march, threw itself into a strong position in
the open fields about two miles north of the west
Harpeth and with a battery so placed as to sweep
the turnpike, gave unmistakable evidence of a de-
termination to stay our further progress. It made
a sullen but brave array, the first of the kind we
had seen during the pursuit, and this showed that
a master mind had taken charge.
At it turned out, Forrest, having been recalled
from Murfreesboro at the first sign of disaster, had
rejoined the retreating army that afternoon and,
assisted by Walthall, a sturdy, stately soldier, after-
ward for many years a distinguished senator from
Mississippi, had assumed the task of covering the
retreat. He had put himself, with a noble disregard
of danger, at the disposition of his disheartened
chief and, although it is believed that from that day
he despaired of the Confederacy, he willingly put
130
DRIVING HOOD OUT
forth all his powers to restore confidence and save
the wreck of the retreating army. But he was now
playing a new role, and one he was destined to play
to the end of the drama. Hitherto, his part had
been with the advance ; henceforth it was to be with
the retreat.
In the gloom which was now rapidly settling
upon both sides, Hatch's advancing detachments had
become so intermingled with the sullen and disor-
ganized enemy that, doubting the force in front
was really the rebel rear guard, Hatch hesitated
to order the charge. The delay which followed,
though scarcely perceptible, gave Forrest time to
swing his battery in position and strengthen the
weak points of his line, but, fortunately, I was close
enough to see plainly that the soldiers at the front,
although clad in bluish overcoats, were really the
enemy. Our own men, well closed up, were ready
for the fray. Without an instant 's hesitation, I or-
dered my bugler to sound the charge, sang out for
Hatch and Knipe to advance on both flanks, and
ordered Lieutenant Hedges, commanding my es-
cort, the Fourth Eegular Cavalry two hundred
strong, in column of platoons, to charge the enemy's
center, head on with drawn sabers. Hedges was a
true hero, and with only enough hesitation to satisfy
himself as to what was really required, dashed to
the front, with the regulars thundering at his heels
down the turnpike. He had hardly got fairly under
way when the enemy opened on him with canister
at point blank range, but failed to check his onset.
Hatch's Chicago Board of Trade battery, always in
the advance, replied from the roadside and, under its
diagonal fire sweeping the ground to the front, the
131
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
regulars broke through the enemy's line, sabering
the cannoneers and forcing the guns to withdraw
at the gallop, while Hatch's division and Ham-
mond's brigade with their deadly Spencers swept
the rest of the field before them, overthrowing both
flanks and driving the whole line from its chosen
position to the other side of the west Harpeth in
the utmost disorder. Hedges, outstripping his men,
was captured three times, but waving his hat and
yelling as though frightened out of his wits: "The
Yankees are upon us, run for your lives," succeeded
in escaping in the confusion and rejoining his
command before his men missed him from the
front.
The rout was instantaneous and complete and,
although friend and foe were at once intermingled,
every man striking and shouting at whomsoever or
whatsoever he saw, the whole command pressed
rapidly to the front as best it could without hesita-
tion or delay. It was a scene of wild excitement, but
Hammond had, fortunately, struck a path leading to
a ford by which he crossed the west Harpeth, al-
though it was dark as Erebus. Realizing from the
musketry that he was on the flank of a new line, he
led his gallant followers headlong into the darkness
and, overthrowing everything before them, picked
up many infantry prisoners, together with the bat-
tery Hedges had sent galloping to the rear.
It was another running night fight, in which all
semblance of order was lost, where regiment got
separated from regiment, troop from troop, and
officers from men. There was no guide but the turn-
pike, and no rule but "when you hear a voice, shoot"
or "see a head hit it." The game was with us now
132
DRIVING HOOD OUT
to our heart's content, and while everybody was
filled with enthusiasm, there was nothing to do in
the darkness and confusion which closed the scene
but to direct division and brigade commanders when
they could be found to sound the recall. There was
no danger that any one would pull up too soon.
As a matter of fact, the pursuit was kept up till
both men and horses were so blown that they could
go no farther into the darkness.
It is worthy of note that Hood's rear guard, or
what there was left of it, bivouacked that night near
Stanley's old camp at Spring Hill, from four to
five miles from the scene of conflict, while the vari-
ous divisions and brigades of the Cavalry Corps
halted, wet and hungry, at such places on the turn-
pike as seemed to be the least disagreeable. They
were completely out of rations and forage, and on
Sancho Panza's proverb, which is so often the cav-
alryman's only consolation, that "he who sleeps
eats," both sides threw themselves on the ground,
the weary to rest and the wounded to suffer with-
out relief.
As the entire country from Nashville to the Ten-
nessee had been fought and foraged over by the con-
tending armies, it had been swept about clean of
food for man and beast, and this was the second
day of the pursuit. Literally, there was nothing
for men and horses of either side but to go hungry.
The enemy, having nothing to cook, lit out by
daylight. There was, indeed, no choice for them but
to imitate the French in the retreat from Moscow
to take a drink, tighten their belts, and hit the road
to the rear at the best gait they could make. It
was but little better with the victors, and so both
133
UNDEB THE OLD FLAG
sides were under way as soon as it was light enough
to see their hands before them. Both put forth their
best efforts, but with the Confederates on the direct
turnpike hurrying to Columbia, with no thought of
making a stand again till they were safely beyond
Duck Eiver, there was but little fighting that day.
Marching as we were through densely wooded
country or fallow fields, by muddy roads, almost
impassable from constant rains and rising streams,
it was impossible for our flanking brigades to get
around the enemy while he was sticking to the turn-
pike and taking his best gait to the rear.
It was easy enough for the advance guard of
our main column to keep in touch with the enemy's
rear guard, but before we could form front into line
he would withdraw without waiting for an attack.
Thus it was till well into the third night, when
word came that the supply trains had caught up and
that rations could be had. These were issued as
soon as possible, although the operation was a slow
one in the dark, and at the first blush of dawn, in a
heavy rain and snow storm of the fourth day, I
ordered Hatch again to the front. But as fate would
have it, both Eutherford Creek and Duck Eiver
were already out of their banks, the bottoms were
flooded and there was nothing the best officer could
do but to call a halt. This had already been author-
ized by Thomas because of the wintry weather and
the high water, but it now became an absolute neces-
sity. Hatch was, however, an energetic and enter-
prising leader, anxious to get forward and again at
work on the enemy's rear guard. Under my per-
sonal supervision, he pushed a few dismounted men
over the ruins of the railroad bridge, but it re-
134
DRIVING HOOD OUT
quired several hours to gather sufficient materials by
tearing down the neighboring barns and outhouses
to floor over the track and make it passable for men
and horses. It took the better part of two days
for the staff engineer to make a raft bridge of sim-
ilar materials with sufficient buoyancy to pass our
columns to the south side of the river by the turn-
pike.
Meanwhile, the only pontoon train belonging to
that army had been sent on the wrong turnpike by
someone whose name was never known. But as it
did not get back to the direct road nor overtake
my leading division for forty-eight hours the re-
sult was that two whole days and nights were lost.
With one raging creek and one river out of banks
to bridge and cross, it was now certain that Hood
would gain sufficient time to save the wreck of his
army and get well on toward Alabama before we
could possibly get strung out again in orderly pur-
suit.
Much has been said, first and last, in condemna-
tion of Thomas for letting this pontoon train go
astray, and it was certainly a grievous mistake,
whoever made it, but it may well be doubted, even
if we could have laid the bridges one after the other
and got across the two streams, whether we would
have been in time to bring Hood to bay or to in-
terfere materially with his safe retreat from Co-
lumbia to the Tennessee Eiver. It is easy to criti-
cise, but I am sure that neither critic nor troops, no
matter who they might be, could have better with-
stood the exposure and hardship of the campaign,
captured more guns and prisoners, or inflicted
greater injury upon the retreating enemy than did
135
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the cavalry corps between Nashville and Columbia
in the midwinter of 1864. It was the only pursuit
of the kind on either side of the entire war.
While the greater part of the cavalry were wait-
ing, as they were forced to do, for the detachments
to bridge creeks and rivers, the Fourth Corps caught
up with us at Rutherford Creek, and I shall never
forget the enthusiastic greeting that its gallant of-
ficers and men shouted at us as we were passing
again to the front. Both General Wood, himself an
old cavalryman, and his officers declared they had
never seen so many cavalry in one body before;
they had never known cavalry to be handled as we
had handled it; they had never seen cavalry turn-
ing the enemy's flanks, rushing his breastworks,
capturing his cannon, taking his flags, and gather-
ing in prisoners as we had done at Nashville; and
finally, that they had never known cavalry to mount
so quickly nor so promptly nor to continue the pur-
suit so long. Not one of these veteran infantrymen
had yet realized the true cavalryman's dream of
mounted troops nor seen them as Wood declared
"used like a whip around the enemy's flanks and
rear" as we had used them for the last four days.
Finally, as we were marching to the Duck Eiver
bridge, an infantry corps, for the first time in the
history of that army, lined both sides of the turn-
pike, splitting their throats with cheer after cheer
for the gallant fellows who had not only shown
them how cavalry should fight, but had won the
substantial trophies of victory from the infantry,
who witnessed and gave such willing praise to their
performances.
It was an inspiring scene long to be remembered,
136
DRIVING HOOD OUT
and the only one of the kind I ever witnessed. In-
deed, it was the only one of the kind I ever heard
of even. It was not only the first but the last like it
that ever took place in the West, for after the cav-
alry got fairly under way south of Columbia, no
part of the infantry ever caught up with it again
in that theater of operations. As is well known, it
acted thenceforth as an independent body, and with
a few weeks' rest and reorganization grew, as I
shall show, into an invincible mounted army, which
played a separate and conclusive part not only in
defeating the Confederate cavalry, but did much in
destroying the resources of the Confederacy and in
bringing the Civil War itself to a glorious conclu-
sion.
On the night of December 18, eight miles north
of Columbia, I wrote as follows to Grant's head-
quarters :
. . . Our campaign is so far complete, and I know
you will rejoice. How is gold? If the right steps are
taken, and Dana operates properly from Memphis, Hood
ought to be destroyed.
I don't know how many trophies, nor how many pris-
oners we have, though I can safely say no corps of this
army has more of the real evidences of victory than the
one I have the honor of commanding. . . .
Having been brought to a standstill, as shown,
by conditions beyond human control, I sent Johnson
and Knipe back to Nashville on December 20 with
orders to gather up and remount their foot brigades
as soon as possible, but I relaxed no effort to get
Hatch, Croxton and Hammond across the Duck
River and strung out again in pursuit of the enemy.
It was a strenuous and distressing time for both
137
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
men and horses, but with all I could do we lost
much time and suffered much hardship in that deso-
late and difficult region.
The conditions which confronted Hood in his ad-
vance, and especially in his efforts to cross the Duck
Eiver, were far more favorable than those which
beset us in our efforts to cross that stream in pur-
suit of his defeated army. Winter and its floods
were now upon us, and not till the fourth morning
were we again fairly in motion. Hood, having
crossed the river and destroyed his bridges on the
19th, hurried his shattered divisions and impedi-
menta as rapidly as possible toward the Tennessee
at Bainbridge, about seventy-five miles away. While
resting south of the river at Columbia, he organized
a stronger rear guard, composed of eight picked in-
fantry brigades, each about five hundred strong,
under Walthall, "one of the ablest division com-
manders of the Confederacy, ' ' and, leaving him and
Forrest to bring up the rear, he pushed on with
more confidence and much better order to the river,
which he reached and crossed on Christmas day. 1
While Hood's rear guard under these able lieu-
tenants had a macadamized road from Columbia to
Pulaski, and the worst sort of dirt roads through
a thinly settled and barren country from Pulaski
to the Tennessee Eiver, it had secured a sufficient
lead to select and occupy the most favorable posi-
tions, one after the other, for delivering battle and
compelling us to develop front whenever they
thought their interests required it. Forrest's prin-
cipal object, after gathering up stragglers, was ob-
viously to gain sufficient time for Hood's main body
1 Hood's " Advance and Retreat/' pp. 243 et seq.
138
DRIVING HOOD OUT
to cross the river before we could fall upon and cap-
ture such part of it as we might still find on our
side. This I fully understood and, with five bri-
gades well in hand, lost not an hour night or day
that could possibly be avoided. But with rain and
frost to chill and distress both horses and men, and
the country getting wilder and more desolate as we
pushed into it, we could not get forward fast enough
on the flanks of the enemy ? s rear guard to seriously
engage it, till we came to a more favorable stretch
of country in the neighborhood of Lynnville. Here
we succeeded in spreading out somewhat and in
closing upon and driving the stubborn and still
unshaken Southerners beyond Eichland Creek.
In that spirited affair which took place toward
night, Hatch on the main road and Croxton at last
on the flank routed Buford's cavalry and drove it
from the field in confusion, capturing Buford's bat-
tle flag, wounding him through the leg, and taking
many of his escort and fighting force, prisoners of
war. The leaders in the melee, Croxton on our side
and Buford on the Confederate side, were Kentuck-
ians from the Blue Grass region. They were both
descended from men of the strong hand and were
soldiers of gallantry and experience who had tackled
each other many times before. With bugles blowing
and guidons fluttering in the wind, they rushed
bravely at each other and with their followers be-
came engaged in a hand to hand fight which lasted
till darkness closed the scene in Croxton 's favor.
Owing to the dash and skill of Tom Harrison's
brigade (Sixth Division), the Richland Creek
bridges were saved, and this enabled the entire
command to continue the pursuit without delay, but
139
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the advance was necessarily compelled to move in
weak order. Just at night it came up with the en-
emy, occupying a strong fence-rail layout at the
head of a heavily wooded ravine through which the
road passed. While Harrison was deploying to at-
tack, he paused for Hammond, Croxton, and Hatch
to pass around the enemy's position. But at this
juncture, as if to show that they still had fight left
in them, the enemy sallied from their layout, broke
through and drove hack Harrison's attenuated line,
and before the brigade behind could gather itself for
an effective defense or counter attack, captured, cut
out, and got away with one gun of Smith's battery,
I, Fourth United States Artillery. This was a gal-
lant but expiring effort. In those days it was cus-
tomary for the horse batteries to keep close up
with the advanced guard, so as to open promptly
with canister and shrapnel as soon as it got within
range of the enemy. Smith and his lieutenants, es-
pecially Eodney of the old Delaware family of that
name, were particularly active and aggressive and
no reflection rested upon them for the loss of the
only gun ever taken from the cavalry corps. The
incident was a surprise, due entirely to the rough-
ness of the ground, the narrow ravine in which the
battery was caught, and the dense forest in front,
but the spirited sally was promptly repulsed by the
cooperating troopers whose dismounted line over-
lapped, turned, and enveloped the rail layout, and
forced the rebel rear guard again to withdraw.
At this stage of the game nothing could resist
our onset. The enemy apparently realized that, and
again took up his line of retreat under the cover of
darkness through the wild and heavily wooded coun-
140
DRIVING HOOD OUT
try stretching onward to the Tennessee Eiver. Dash
after dash was made for the lost gun, but Forrest
gave his personal attention to hurrying it to the
rear, and it was not finally recaptured till a few
months later in the campaign against Selma.
Darkness again put an end to the pursuit, but it
was continued the next day to Sugar Creek, a clear,
beautiful stream of limpid water running through
an unbroken forest to the river. All efforts to bring
the enemy again to anything more than a skirmish
were futile. The road was lined with abandoned
wagons and broken down mules, giving conclusive
evidence that the fighting of that campaign was at
an end. Beyond the creek Forrest formed line and
made a brief show of resistance, but a flank move-
ment by Hammond's brigade easily turned him out
of his position and sent him again to the rear under
the cover of darkness.
The country in which we now found ourselves
was the worst we had yet seen. It was entirely
stripped of forage and supplies. Our own trains
were far to the rear, our haversacks and forage bags
were empty. There was absolutely nothing at hand
except the beautiful, clear spring water of Sugar
Creek, but neither men nor horses could live on
water alone. As I well knew, the enemy had had
ample time to reach his floating bridge at the foot of
Mussel Shoals, but that night it became certain from
the report of the country people that their main
body had not only reached it, but got safely to the
other side on Christmas day. My only hope, there-
fore, was to catch Forrest's cavalry and his eight
brigades of infantry before they could cross the
river. I therefore halted the corps and at once
141
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
selected five hundred of the best mounted men from
those regiments which had done the least work and,
placing the whole under the command of Colonel
Spalding, who had shown such untiring activity and
enterprise, ordered him to push forward by the
shortest possible route without pausing for any ob-
stacle he could overcome or pass around till he
reached the Tennessee Eiver. All day of the 27th
and most of that night he crowded his troopers to
the utmost of their strength and endurance but
without any other result than picking up a few tired
stragglers and seeing on either hand increasing evi-
dences of the ruin of the army which had confronted
us on the morning of the 15th, but only to find that
the last of the enemy's organizations had crossed
the river and destroyed the bridge during the night.
Foreseeing that this must be the inevitable re-
sult, I had taken the precaution several days before
of suggesting to Thomas that the light iron-clad gun-
boats of Admiral Lee 's fleet should push their way
up the river through Mussel Shoals for the purpose
of destroying the bridge, as well as such boats as
might be found, before the enemy could cross. It is
now known that this operation was entirely feasible,
but Admiral Lee let it slip by unimproved. Al-
though he got within one mile of the bridge in ample
time, he did not reach it because, as he afterward
told me, he had no pilot he could trust. This was
indubitably our last and best chance, but the inde-
pendence of the navy and the natural timidity of
a deep-water sailor in a shoal-water river defeated
it.
The Nashville campaign was at an end. It had
lasted nearly six weeks through untold hardship
142
DRIVING HOOD OUT
of advance, battle, and retreat. Men and horses
had suffered all the rigors of winter, snow, rain,
frost, mud, and exposure. During the nights, the
temperature would fall so as to make ice from half
an inch to an inch thick, and this was far too thin
to carry horses without breaking through. As a
consequence, the roads were worked up into a con-
tinuous quagmire. The horses 7 legs were covered
with mud, and this, in turn, was frozen, so that great
numbers of the poor animals were entirely disabled,
their hoofs softened and the hair of their legs so
rubbed off that it was impossible for them to travel.
Hundreds lost their hoofs entirely, and in all my
experience I have never seen so much suffering.
My own horse, the "Waif," with all his pluck, was
disabled and I had to send him from the Tennessee
to the depot hospital at Nashville for treatment. It
was six weeks before he was returned fit for service.
Of course, it was impossible to suspend operations as
long as there was the least chance of bringing the
enemy to bay. It was absolutely necessary to con-
tinue the pursuit while we had horses enough left
to carry the organization forward. During the fort-
night from Nashville to the Tennessee, over five
thousand horses were so disabled and so worn down
by fatigue, exposure, and starvation that such of
them as it was not merciful to kill had to be gath-
ered up and sent back for treatment. Fortunately,
a respite was now at hand, during which the work
of repair and restoration was to go on till the cav-
alry corps reached the condition of efficiency which
had not hitherto been possible.
It will be remembered that throughout this cam-
paign McCook with two brigades, about three thou-
143
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
sand sabers, was absent. He had been detached on
the eve of battle by direction of Thomas to south-
western Kentucky in chase of Lyon, a West Point
acquaintance of mine who had broken into that re-
gion with a small brigade of seven or eight hundred
men and was threatening our communications in
the direction of Bowling Green.
I should have delayed that detachment till after
Hood's defeat, but my duty was to obey orders.
Lyon was known as an "illusive cuss" whose force,
composed mostly of guerrillas, usually did more run-
ning than fighting. Of course, McCook, with his
much heavier column, failed to overtake him. But
during the pursuit, in which his men suffered great
hardships, he passed at first through a region in
which he picked up many horses and had some fun.
Finding himself one night at Trenton, a small town
near the state line between Tennessee and Kentucky,
he went into camp at the plantation of Colonel Se-
bree, a loyalist and gentleman of boundless hospital-
ity, with whom I was for many years afterward as-
sociated in a coal-mining enterprise at Earlington,
Kentucky.
Of course, McCook and his leading officers were
invited to make their headquarters in the Colonel's
mansion, and as they had been paid off a few days
before they had an abundance of greenbacks. After
dinner the Colonel according to the custom of the
country invited them to a game of cards as the
only entertainment he could offer them. Of course,
the stakes were heavy and, as the host lived in a
region where poker is not regarded as a game of
chance, the luck was with him. He, at least, had
nothing to complain of, but in the midst of the
144
DRIVING HOOD OUT
game his colored overseer softly entered the room
and whispered: "Colonel, them Yankee soldiers
outside are burning your fence-rails. " The Col-
onel dismissed him with a deprecatory wave of the
hand and gave increased attention to the game.
Shortly afterward, the overseer burst into the room
and called out this time so all could hear him:
"Colonel, if you don't come out here and stop it,
them Yankee soldiers will burn the very last one of
yo' fence-rails ! ' ' Even this did not move the im-
perturbable Kentuckian, for the game was still go-
ing his way, but raising his voice without taking his
eyes from the table, he called out: "Go away from
here, you black rascal; don't you see I'm making
fence rails a heap faster than those soldiers can
burn them?"
McCook's eccentric march carried him far away,
both from the battle and from Hood's line of re-
treat. He was gone seventeen days, marched more
than four hundred miles over the worst roads in
the country, hundreds of his men got frosted hands
and feet in the storm that delayed the attack on
Hood, and all suffered untold hardships, without
the consolation of having done the Confederate
cause the slightest injury.
It is well known that Hood's army was prac-
tically destroyed by this campaign. It was reduced
to less than fifteen thousand infantry, 1 without guns,
trains, or munitions. If I had had the use and help
of McCook's division it is doubtful whether any of
the enemy would have been left to tell the tale. It
is also well known that all prisoners taken prima-
rily passed through the hands of the cavalry or were
X O. K. Serial No. 94, p. 780, Beauregard to Davis.
145
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
picked up by the infantry because their escape had
been cut off by the cavalry. My provost marshal's
report shows that the cavalry actually captured
thirty-two field guns, eleven caissons, three thou-
sand two hundred and thirty-two prisoners, one gen-
eral officer, twelve colors or battle flags, besides
nearly all Hood's wagons and mules. It should be
noted that these figures do not include the sick and
wounded taken at Franklin, but the report also
shows that, after the operations of the main cavalry
column had come to an end, detachments from the
Sixth and Seventh Divisions went with General
Steedman's column south of the Tennessee, where
they burned the rebel pontoon train of eighty boats
and one hundred and twenty-five wagons, and cap-
tured a large number of horses and mules.
Our losses in these operations were one field
gun, recaptured the next spring, one hundred and
twenty-two officers and men killed, five hundred and
twenty-one wounded and two hundred and fifty-nine
missing.
During the campaign it was my pleasant duty to
congratulate my command in field orders "for their
success, good conduct, and the dashing gallantry dis-
played in the engagement near Nashville." A few
days later I had the privilege of adding to my own
congratulations the thanks of General Thomas "for
the vigor, skill, bravery, and endurance displayed, "
by the officers and men of the cavalry corps l i in their
long and toilsome pursuit of the retreating rebel
army." While Thomas never wasted compliments
nor extended thanks where they were not fairly and
fully earned, this served to make his praise all the
more acceptable. But in order that individual merit
146
DRIVING HOOD OUT
should not be swallowed up in the wholesale com-
mendation of the corps, I published a general order
from my headquarters, at Gravelly Springs, Ala-
bama, on February 24, 1865, commending the gal-
lant and meritorious conduct of many officers and
men, giving their names and specifying their indi-
vidual services. Among them will be found those
of Spalding, Harrison, Gresham, Boyer, Davis, Nor-
man Smith, Mitchell, Mead, Hedges, and many other
commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers,
and privates. 1 The list was long, but might well
have been doubled, for no army corps ever had bet-
ter officers or more gallant soldiers. As far as I
know there was not one in all the number who strag-
gled, skulked, or voluntarily remained in the rear.
All put forth their best efforts to get to the front,
and the only cry from those behind was : " Hurry up,
boys, or it will all be over before you get there!"
And that martial spirit lasted till the last gun was
fired, the last prisoner taken, and the last man mus-
tered out of service!
In this entire campaign I have not hesitated to
give the principal credit to the cavalry, not only
for the overwhelming victory at Nashville, but for
all the injury inflicted on the enemy during the re-
treat into Alabama. I have not hesitated to claim
that every attack made by the infantry, except pos-
sibly those of McArthur, from the morning of the
first day till toward the close of the second day,
when I personally pointed out to Thomas and Scho-
*For the Official Eeports of these operations from the date of
the Corps' Organization, Oct. 24, 1864, to Feb. 1, 1865, and for the
list of those who had especially distinguished themselves, see Official
Records, Serial No. 93, pp. 550 et seq.
147
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
field my men entering the left and rear of the en-
emy's works and my guns enfilading and overshoot-
ing his entrenchments, was either too long delayed
or primarily a failure.
I have not hesitated to say that but for the suc-
cess of the cavalry's turning movement on both
days, Hood would have been able to maintain his
position in front of Nashville indefinitely so far as
the infantry was concerned. Withal, of course, I
cheerfully concede that without the presence of the
infantry on the field to take advantage of the initial
demoralizing breaks, on both days, in the enemy's
lines, which they promptly and nobly did, the suc-
cesses of the cavalry would doubtless have been
quickly arrested and brought to naught. It is also
quite true that by far the heaviest fighting and the
greatest losses fell, as usual, to the lot of the in-
fantry.
That Schofield's corps met no serious resistance
and did no real fighting at Nashville or afterwards
is shown beyond doubt or dispute by the fact that
its killed in both days ' battle was 1 1 only nine men. ' '
But if there were any doubt on this point, it
would be set at rest by Schofield's own generous ad-
missions. In his official report, referring to the op-
erations on the second day, he says :
The hill was, however, carried by General Wilson's
cavalry (dismounted), whose gallantry and energy on that
and other occasions, which came under my observation,
cannot be too highly praised. . . . My order was not
executed with the promptness or energy which I expected.
. . . The cavalry had cut off his line of retreat by the
Granny White pike. 1
1 0. E. Serial No. 93, p. 346.
148
DRIVING HOOD OUT
That my statements and inferences are fully
justified is further shown by the facts as recounted
by Thomas and VanHorne, as well as by the state-
ments contained in the various official reports.
Moreover, Thomas, in recommending me on De-
cember 25 for promotion to the full rank of major
general for what he was pleased to term "the ex-
cellent management of his [my] corps during the
present campaign, " did not hesitate to say of the
cavalry : "It has peculiarly distinguished itself, at-
tempting such things as are not expected of cavalry,
such as assaulting the enemy in intrenched positions,
and always with success, capturing his works with
many guns and prisoners. His corps has always
been conspicuous for its energy in the pursuit of
the retreating rebel army, which has cost the rebel
commander many men, several pieces of artillery,
and tended much to the demoralization of his army/'
He also specially recommended the dashing com-
mander of my Fifth Division, Brigadier General Ed-
ward Hatch, to be full major general, quoting with
approval my prior recommendation and giving my
command full credit for enveloping and driving back
the enemy's lines on the flank and rear into the forti-
fications on the Brentwood Hills and then by a bold
charge carrying the works. 1
The infantry on my immediate left and next to
my troops, when they first enveloped and broke
through the rebel lines, belonged to Smith's corps.
Next to his left was the Fourth Corps, under the
able command of General T. J. Wood. Wood's
final assault on the enemy in his front was a
X O. E. Serial No. 94, pp. 343, 344.
Serial No. 93, pp. 38-39.
149
See also, p. 210; also,
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
desperate and bloody, but successful, affair, for
which Wood and his brave soldiers are entitled to
the highest credit. It is right, however, to say that
it followed in point of time the assault of my troops
on the enemy's extreme left. Nor can too much
praise be given to the gallant soldiers of Smith's
corps, who vied with my men and whose skirmishers
entered the forts with them. Here again, it is per-
fectly right to claim that the cavalry were in the lead
and showed the way. This is not at all disputed
either by General Smith or his subordinates. The
General himself officially says : ' i The cavalry claimed
the guns as their capture, and more for their gallant
charge than because they were entitled to the pieces,
they were conceded to them. ' ' Me Arthur, one of his
division commanders, reports: "Simultaneously
with their advance, the cavalry of General Hatch's
division charged, and from their advantageous
position entered the works with my skirmishers
and claimed the guns as their capture, which I con-
ceded to them, their gallantry on that occasion be-
ing conspicuous, although the fort had been rendered
untenable by the fire from my batteries." In this
last remark, however, he is not correct, and is not
supported by the report of Colonel William L. Mc-
Millen, commanding his First Brigade, who admits
my guns were in position, engaging the fort when
he arrived on the field : "A battery far to our right,
belonging, I think, to some cavalry command, was
engaging these guns when we came up." He, some-
what grudgingly, concedes : * ' The cavalry regiments
on my right deserve credit for the dashing part
they took in assaulting and carrying these works." *
1 0. K. Serial No. 93, pp. 434, 438, 441.
150
DRIVING HOOD OUT
Hood in his report says :
. . . Nothing of any importance occurred until the
morning of the 15th of December when the enemy .
attacked simultaneously both our flanks. On our right he
was handsomely repulsed, with heavy loss, but on our left,
toward evening, he carried some partially completed re-
doubts of those before mentioned.
During the night of the 15th our whole line was short-
ened and strengthened, our left was also thrown back, and
dispositions were made to meet any renewed attack. The
corps of Major General Cheatham was transferred from
our right to our left. . . .
Early on 16th . . . the enemy made a general
attack on our lines accompanied by a heavy fire of artil-
lery. All his assaults were repulsed with heavy loss till
3:30 p. M., when a portion of our line to the left of the
center . . . gave way . . . the position gained by
the enemy [clearly Hatch and Hammond] being such as to
enfilade and cause in a few moments our entire line to give
way and retreat rapidly down the pike ... in
great confusion. . . . Our loss in artillery was heavy
fifty-four guns. 1
He adds:
During this day's march (17th) the enemy's cavalry
pressed with great boldness and activity, charging our in-
fantry repeatedly with the saber, and at times penetrating
our lines.
Lieutenant General S. D. Lee says in his official
report.
. . . About 9 A. M. on the 16th the enemy . . .
opened a terrible artillery fire on my line, principally on
the Franklin pike, . . . lasting about two hours, when
his infantry moved to the assault ... in several lines
of battle, but the assault was easily repulsed. It was re-
1 0. R. Serial No. 93, pp. 654-5; also Serial No. 94, pp. 699-768.
151
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
newed, however, several times with spirit, but only to meet
each time with a like result. . . . Their last assault
was made about 3 :30 p. M V when they were driven back in
great disorder, . . . but suddenly all eyes were turned
to the center of our line near the Granny White pike,
where it was evident the enemy had made an entrance and
our men were flying to the rear in the wildest confu-
sion. . . .
Although from this out the report is somewhat
confused, he adds :
The enemy soon gained our rear, and was moving on my
left flank, when my line gradually gave way. . . . The
only pursuit made at that time was by a small force com-
ing from the Granny White pike. . . . When Brent-
wood was passed the enemy was only a half mile from the
Franklin pike, where Chalmers was fighting them. . . .
Early on the morning of the 17th our cavalry was
driven in confusion by the enemy, who at once commenced
a vigorous pursuit, his cavalry charging at every oppor-
tunity and in the most daring manner. It was apparent
that they were determined to make the retreat a rout if
possible. . . . 1
Major General Stevenson says :
. . . Toward evening General Lee sent me informa-
tion that things were going badly on the left, and that it
might be necessary to retire under cover of approaching
night. . . . 2
Lieutenant General A. P. Stewart describes the
battles as having begun "on the left, and resulted
in the capture of redoubts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5," when
he notified the commanding general, who sent re-
enforcements, and finally ordered Cheatham's whole
corps from the extreme right to the extreme left.
1 O. E. Serial No. 98, pp. 686 et seq.
3 II)., p. 695.
152
DRIVING HOOD OUT
He adds that "as the object of the enemy seemed
to be to turn our left flank, ' ' the first reinforcements
were put in on the left, "parallel to the Hillsboro
pike," . . . and were in turn reenf orced by
later arrivals. . . . "By this time the other
brigades of Johnston 's division had come up, but
they were unable to check the progress of the en-
emy, who had passed the Hillsboro pike fully a
half mile, completely turning our flank and gaining
the rear of both Walthall and Loring, whose situa-
tion was becoming perilous in the extreme. " . . .
The next day, the 16th, a reserve brigade . . .
was finally sent "to the hills in our rear, . . .
east of the Granny White pike" to drive back the
enemy who had "passed our left, crossed to the
east side of the pike and held this portion of the
ridge." He adds: "The situation then was briefly
this : The left flank completely turned, the enemy
crossing to the east side of the Granny White pike
in our rear, and holding the ridge on that side.
. . . It seemed as though in case of disaster, es-
cape was impossible. ... About two or three
o'clock in the afternoon, while in conversation with
Hood, an officer of his staff announced that the line
had given way. ' ' 1
No regular report from General Cheatham can
be found, but General Bate, commanding one of his
divisions, after describing the various operations
which ended in turning and driving back the left
of the Confederate line on the 15th, takes up the
operations of the 16th, describes how he moved
from the Granny White pike, how he called for re-
enforcements without getting them, how the extreme
1 0. B. Serial No. 93, pp. 712 et seq.
153
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
left of the Confederate line of battle "was driven
back down the hill into the field in his rear, and
the balls of the enemy were fired into the backs"
of his men, and how ' ' the brigade on the left of our
line of ba'ttle gave way and the enemy took his place
on the hills in my rear." About 4 p. M. the same
general, seeing "the enemy assault and carry the
line near the angle," was ordered to form line on
the opposite side of Granny White pike, but found
on getting there that that part of the Confederate
line "had also given way and the enemy was al-
ready commanding it with his small arms. The
men then one by one climbed over the rugged hills
in our rear and passed down a short valley which
debouched into the Franklin turnpike. ' ' 1
General Chalmers, commanding the Confederate
cavalry, actually present at the battle of Nashville,
is a witness of the highest credibility. He says:
. . . "On the morning of the 15th the enemy
made a general attack . . . and after forcing
Ector's brigade to swing around and join the in-
fantry on its right, thus leaving the Harding pike
open, the enemy moved down it and the first intelli-
gence I had of their presence, they were already
two miles in my rear on the turnpike." He adds:
"I had several times during the day attempted to
communicate with General Hood, but my couriers
were either killed or captured or failed to reach
him." 2
It is more than likely that the same was true of
Hood's efforts to communicate with Chalmers.
"Before daylight of the 16th," says Chalmers,
1 O. K. Serial No. 93, pp. 750 et seq.
2 II)., pp. 765 et seq.
154
DRIVING HOOD OUT
"I had taken position on the [Hillsboro] pike"
. . . and was soon engaged in skirmishing with
the enemy 's cavalry, whose object was to move in
a direction ' l which would have placed them entirely
in rear of our army and put them in possession of
the road by which it afterwards retreated. . . .
About 4:30 p. M. I received an order from General
Hood
to hold the Granny White pike at
all hazards, and sent Bucker's brigade "to take po-
sition in rear of that from which Kelly had been
driven. It was attacked at once in front and flank by
Hatch and Johnson and after a sharp struggle was
forced back in some disorder. " . . . 1
It must be observed that, while the Confederate
reports are more or less confused and difficult to
follow, they all concur in saying that the attack
which turned their infantry and cavalry came from
their left across the Hillsboro and Granny White
pikes, and as my cavalry were the only troops that
ever made claim to having followed that line on
the second day, the conclusion is inevitable that to
them and them alone is due the credit of having
turned that flank, taken it in reverse, and sent
Hood's entire army in confusion down the road to
Franklin, Columbia, and the Tennessee Eiver. This
conclusion is made certain by the fact that all Con-
federate accounts concur in declaring that every in-
fantry attack failed till the last one, and as that
was made only after Thomas saw my cavalry enter-
ing the left and rear of the Confederate works, there
can be no doubt as to the actual cause of the Con-
federate overthrow.
As none of the leading Confederate generals
1 0. E. Serial No. 93, p. 765 et seq.
155
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
were personally present at the spot where the break
actually took place, it is not strange that none of
them undertakes to say just at what place or at what
minute it occurred.
No vindication of the foresight and firmness of
General Thomas in his resolute stand for an ade-
quate cavalry force could possibly be more complete
than that furnished by the results of the battle and
pursuit. If anything is, however, needed to make
it more convincing, it will be found in the most
interesting testimony of General Forrest himself.
Under the date January 2, 1865, writing to his new
commander, General Eichard Taylor, successor to
the unfortunate Hood, Forrest said :
My command is greatly reduced in numbers and ef-
ficiency by losses in battle and in the worn down and un-
serviceable condition of the animals. The Army of the
Tennessee was badly defeated and is greatly demoralized,
and to save it during the retreat from Nashville I was com-
pelled almost to sacrifice my command. Aside from the
killed, wounded, and captured of my command, many were
sent to the rear with barefooted, lame and unserviceable
horses, who have taken advantage of all the confusion and
disorder attending the hasty retreat of a beaten army, and
are now scattered through the country or gone to their
homes. The enemy have about ten thousand cavalry,
finely equipped and recently mounted on the best of horses,
and I ask that you will send McCullough's brigade to me
at once, with any other cavalry you can possibly spare. 1
To this, General Chalmers, one of Forrest's
most capable division commanders, in an unofficial
letter to him, dated at Eienzi, Mississippi, January
3, 1865, adds:
1 O. E. Serial No. 94, p. 756.
156
DRIVING HOOD OUT
To learn wisdom from your enemy is one of the wisest
maxims of history. At Nashville our enemy had a large
force of cavalry, but, instead of wasting its strength in the
front, he kept it quietly, in the rear of his infantry, resting
and recruiting, until the time for action came and then
moved it out fresh and vigorous with telling effect. . . .
If we had time to organize, recruit, and fit up the command
in a place where forage could be procured, we can whip the
enemy's cavalry, and every man in your command is anx-
ious that you should have a fair trial of strength with
Major General Wilson. You will pardon me for the plain-
ness of this letter, but there are times when every man
should think, and should not hesitate to express his
thoughts. 1
Alas for Hood! He passed out broken-hearted
at last by the weight of his misfortunes. His cour-
age and his undoubted ability as a leader and a
general deserved better luck. But it was his sad
fate to dash his veteran army to pieces against far
better leadership backed by the still greater infal-
libility of numbers. The larger remnant of his
shattered army, two corps at least in name, was
hurried off to confront their debonair old antago-
nist, Sherman, in Georgia. A third corps, with
what was left of Forrest and his cavalry, were
turned over to General Taylor, the gallant son of
"Old Bough and Beady," to become the backbone
of whatever further resistance might be found pos-
sible to the impending onward march of Thomas's
victorious army. It was this rested, reorganized he-
roic remnant, under Taylor and Forrest, which, with
undaunted pluck, confronted a little later the rested
and fully organized Cavalry Corps of the Military
Division of the Mississippi.
1 0. E. Serial No. 94, p. 759.
157
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
After some days of hesitation and delay on
Grant's part, he finally consented to Thomas's well
deserved promotion to be major general in the regu-
lar army. He was, however/ apparently still dis-
posed to be exacting as to the troops and refused his
consent to winter quarters and greatly needed rest,
both of which were imperative for Thomas's army,
but instead marked out for them an almost impos-
sible further winter campaign in pursuit of Hood.
Thomas did not hesitate to declare it impracticable
and had his way, but was punished by seeing his in-
vincible army broken up and scattered, thereby re-
ducing him to a comparatively unimportant role for
the remainder of the war. I do not know on what
authority David Homer Bates makes the statement
that President Johnson offered, in 1868, after
Grant's election to the presidency, to make Thomas
lieutenant general over Sherman and Sheridan. No
doubt the offer was really made and it was like
this patient, high-minded man to refuse. His tele-
gram refusing on grounds most creditable to him is
quoted. Who could have blamed him if he had ac-
cepted? It is safe to say that neither of his great
rivals would, under like circumstances, have de-
clined. 1
As for my own promotion to be major general,
thanks, probably, to Stanton's good memory for
what he may have considered my impudence, it was
hung up in the balances for me to earn a second
time in a later, larger, and final campaign, in which
it was the good fortune of the troops under my
command to meet Dick Taylor and my old antago-
nists, Forrest and Chalmers, on their chosen fields
*" Lincoln in the Telegraph Office, " p. 321.
158
DRIVING HOOD OUT
and behind the strong fortifications into which they
were driven for refuge. It was still reserved for my
incomparable troopers to repeat again at Monte-
vallo, Ebenezer Church, Selma, West Point, and Co-
lumbus their successes at Nashville to ride down
the redoubtable Forrest, to scale again still more
formidable fortifications, to destroy the last strong-
holds and resources of the Confederacy, to deal the
final crushing blow and to end forever its last hopes
of further resistance in dreaded and threatened
guerrilla warfare by the capture of its fleeing Presi-
dent.
I cannot close this chapter without emphasizing
the important lesson it teaches, that the extraor-
dinary success which fell to the lot of the cavalry
in the Nashville campaign, as well as in that of the
following spring through Alabama and Georgia,
while largely due to the excellent character and dis-
cipline of both officers and men, was still more large-
ly due to their concentration into a single corps, to
their close cooperation in mass with the infantry
at Nashville, and to their mutual and unselfish sup-
port of each other in every stage of the campaign
from the Tennessee Eiver till the end of the war.
Finally, the following chapters will show that the
only correct principle for the use of cavalry was
stated in my letter of October 26, 1864, from Gayles-
ville to Eawlins, Grant '& chief-of-staff :
... Cavalry is useless for defence; its only power
is in a vigorous offensive. Therefore I urge its concentra-
tion south of the Tennessee and hurling it into the bowels
of the south in masses that the enemy cannot drive back as
he did Sooy Smith and Sturgis. . . .*
1 0. E. Serial No. 79, pp. 442, 445.
159
COLLECTION, ORGANIZATION, AND INSTRUCTION
OF THE CAVALRY CORPS
March to Gravelly Springs and "Waterloo Pinhook Town
Construction of cantonments Long and Upton arrive
Division and brigade commanders Organization of
command Daily instruction Review for Thomas
Knipe detached to Canby The Confederacy is doomed
Flag of truce to Forrest Ready to move Amplest
latitude of an independent commander.
Having camped on December 28, about two
miles west of Sugar Creek in the valley of the Ten-
nessee at a hamlet of two or three log houses, known
as Pinhook Town, we remained there till orders
came to collect my command at Huntsville, about
fifty miles to the eastward. General Wood joined
me for conference and his corps closed up within
supporting distance, but as the enemy had made
good his escape across the Tennessee and the coun-
try was impassable for wagons, as well as destitute
of everything except fuel and water, it was impossi-
ble for either cavalry or infantry to remain in that
region. Wood reported that with double teams it
took twelve hours to move an army wagon six miles,
and this made it necessary for us to separate.
Pinhook was one of the most desolate places in
160
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
the South, but the creek valleys and out-of-the-way
nooks which the Confederates had not found con-
tained enough corn to keep our horses alive till we
left the region. While waiting, the Nashville news-
papers overtook us with an account of Sherman's
capture of Savannah and its presentation to the
President as a Christmas gift. This suggested to
one of the staff that we should present "the city of
Pinhook with all its dependencies and resources " to
Mr. Lincoln as a New Year's gift, and much merri-
ment was had over the tentative messages submitted
for my approval. It was a grim and cheerless sort
of fun, but there were no holiday dinners, no steam-
ing hot punch, and no revelry for those dreary
days. It was a mercy that we found "hog and
hominy" enough to keep body and soul together in
that land of poor whites with neither turkeys nor
chickens, and not enough girls within twenty miles
for a country dance. It was mid-winter, cold, cheer-
less and distressing, and this made camp life almost
unbearable. Fortunately, we had but a few days'
wait till orders took us to Huntsville, an old plant-
ing town on the Memphis and Charleston Eailroad
about fifty miles east of Pinhook.
The country in that region was well settled and
had been flourishing, but, lying in the path of war,
it had been stripped of its surplus supplies and
completely impoverished. Connected with the outer
world by a single line of railroad, which had been
frequently broken and was now in specially bad con-
dition, it offered no attractions as a point of con-
centration, except that it lay on the direct route
from Nashville to central Alabama. I reached there
late on New Year's day. Fortunately, almost at
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
once I was directed to concentrate the cavalry corps
at Eastport, the foot of Mussel Shoals on the Ten-
nessee about one hundred miles further west.
The next day, January 2, 1865, 1 wrote to Grant's
headquarters, as follows:
. . . Several times before coming here I wrote to
General Thomas, urging Eastport as the proper place at
which to concentrate the cavalry. In face of the very pal-
pable necessities of the case we were ordered to Hunts-
ville. I arrived here last night, and twenty minutes later
orders came to go to Eastport.
. . . As soon as horseshoes arrive from Nashville,
say to-morrow, I shall begin the march to Eastport about
one hundred miles distant. My cavalry, including Long's
and McCook's divisions, can all be united there by the
15th, but how a campaign of more than three days can be
conducted from that point is more than I now know. The
roads in this country are not well adapted to hauling sup-
plies by wagons at this season of the year. . . .
To reach my new destination involved a toilsome
march through a poor planting country broken only
by the old towns of Athens and Florence. At Ath-
ens, on the Nashville and Decatur Eailroad, we
halted twenty-four hours to rest and set horseshoes,
and while there I wrote again to Grant's headquar-
ters:
. . . You may not have forgotten the remarks in one
of my letters in regard to General Thomas. ... I am
sure I have not overdrawn or overcolored the facts and in
continuance of the subject, let me add, there is some dis-
satisfaction existing in this army with the powers that dis-
pense military rewards, for what is regarded as partiality
to the Eastern army. You know there is a sort of jealousy
existing between the East and West, and while it is of no
vital importance, wise men should not entirely ignore it.
162
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
The promotion, therefore, of Thomas in the regular army
and of Wood, Cox, and probably some others of the volun-
teers either in fact or by brevet would be received very
gratefully.
I have heard men high in rank speak most unkindly
of General Grant in this connection. Feeling as I do, I
cannot forbear suggesting to you the propriety of not al-
lowing to pass an opportunity for doing the service and the
General a kindness. I have never looked into the relative
number of promotions made East and West, nor considered
the merits of those already made, but it is your place to in-
vestigate the justice of the complaint I have mentioned.
. . . I am almost afraid to write fully because
. . . my motives may be misconstrued. A man of my
make-up likes to know that his views are approved or dis-
approved upon their separate merits, not upon personal
grounds. I frequently differ with the policy of my su-
periors, say so squarely and unhesitatingly, and then set
about performing my part with all the zeal of which I am
capable.
. . . You will be sorry to know that the "Waif" is
sorely afflicted with boils and skinned legs. I send him to
Nashville to-morrow for medical treatment and rest. My
stud is more of an infirmary for broken-down cavalry
horses than when I used to be on the General's staff. I
am nearly a-foot once more.
What is the truth in regard to the Wilmington ex-
pedition? From the childish tone of Admiral Porter's
published report, I am afraid the expedition is so far a
failure. Was Butler actually in command of the land
forces ?
Remember me kindly to Rawlins and "all," and tell
him I saw his man Johnson a day or two ago. He has re-
enlisted in the Second Iowa Cavalry, and wishes to be re-
membered to him. Is Rawlins' health really established?
A friend of his who had seen him lately says not. I had
received the impression that he had entirely recovered.
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Passing through Florence several days later, I
tarried there a few hours while the column passed
on to Gravelly Springs, twenty miles further west.
I selected that place as the center of my canton-
ments, because it was near the head of steamboat
navigation at all stages of the river, and I felt sure
we could get supplies of every sort from the depots
on and beyond the Ohio. The region is high and
salubrious, the creek and river valleys abounded in
plantations, suitable for drill grounds, while the
wooded ridges of sandy and gravelly soil afforded
excellent camp sites with plenty of timber and many
beautiful springs and running streams. Indeed, it
was an ideal region for the work we had in hand.
I established headquarters at the house of Miss
Houston, a sister of Governor Houston of Alabama.
The family was an old and distinguished one, nat-
urally inclined to loyalty but its possessions lying
in a Southern state had compelled it, like many an-
other, to cast its lot in with the Confederacy. Curi-
ously enough, Mr. Boggs, a first cousin of General
Grant, with his wife and a charming young daugh-
ter, had taken refuge with their kinswoman in the
large and commodious mansion near the springs
which gave their name to the place. The family
of four were most amiable and were, of course, de-
lighted to give us shelter in exchange for protection.
In a few days the word went out that although
Northerners we were civilized and humane, in conse-
quence of which the mansion soon became the social
as well as the military center for the neighbor-
ing planters and their families.
For the first time, the cavalry corps now went
into regular cantonments of rapidly constructed
164
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
log cabins and lean-to stables, which gave fair pro-
tection to the men and horses. Every effort was
made to collect the entire corps, to remount the dis-
mounted, to drill, instruct, and discipline both offi-
cers and men, as well as to build up, train and break
in the horses for the spring campaign. No such
systematic work had ever been done with the west-
ern cavalry.
Hatch, Croxton, and Hammond had accompanied
me to that place and were soon followed by Long,
Upton, McCook, Alexander, and Winslow, and in
a few weeks I had the entire corps of six divisions
assembled there or within reach.
It will be recalled that Kilpatrick with the Third
Division had gone with Sherman, while a few de-
tached regiments were serving in east Tennessee
and along the river between our encampments and
the great depot at Chattanooga. But withal, this
was the largest body of cavalry ever collected on
the American continent. By the middle of February
there were twenty-seven thousand men in camp, fully
twenty thousand of which were mounted and ready
for any duty that might be required of them.
Horses had been gathered up and furnished with
liberality, but still many were needed to complete
the remount. We could easily have used seven thou-
sand more than we ever had, and they could have
been furnished had Halleck and Stanton believed
in the policy of doing it.
As before stated, the campaign against Hood
both in the advance and retreat, had cost us many
horses. It was a winter of marching and fighting
in rain, snow, and slush, with constant work and
exposure which not only disabled many men, but
165
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
thousands of horses, so that the mobility of the corps
as well as its strength had been materially impaired.
Long's division, it will be recalled, had gone to
Louisville for remounts, while Upton, with one bri-
gade in Missouri and one in west Tennessee, was on
the rail rather than in the fields. McCook, with La-
Grange 's and Watkins ? s brigades, had been detached
to drive Lyon and Crossland from Kentucky, so
that none joined us in time to take part in the pur-
suit of the rebel army. One by one, however, they
all arrived and took part in the work of instruction,
equipment, and reorganization at the cantonments
between Gravelly Springs and the steamboat land-
ings at Eastport and Waterloo.
Upton, of the West Point class of May, 1861,
was an incomparable soldier, and, although a mere
youth, he was a veteran in both artillery and infan-
try. He had been detailed for service with me as
soon as he was sufficiently recovered from the wound
received at Winchester. With three years of un-
broken success he had become widely known as one
of the most accomplished and aggressive soldiers
of his time. Naturally anxious to round out his
career with the cavalry, he threw himself into the
work of instruction and discipline with all the ardor
of a military enthusiast. Ambition impelled him
never to waste an hour in aimless idleness. His
constant thought was about organization, tactics,
strategy, and logistics. He knew all that the books
could teach about administration and military his-
tory, and, withal, was as gallant a soldier as ever
drew a sword or mounted a horse. 1 His two bri-
lf 'Life and Letters of Emory Upton, " by Prof. Michie, with
an introduction by James H. Wilson, Appletons, 1885.
166
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
gade commanders were Alexander and Winslow.
The first, a citizen appointed from Kentucky in the
old army, who had served on Stoneman's staff in the
Army of the Potomac and afterwards as chief-of-
staff to General Blair of the Seventeenth Army
Corps. He had been appointed colonel of the Tenth
Missouri Cavalry, but, owing to the regiment's re-
duction in strength, he could not be mustered into
service. In other words, he was a young, handsome,
and vigorous supernumerary officer, who had been
left behind and therefore joined me at Nashville as
chief-of-staff. After I became well acquainted with
him he was, at my request, brevetted a brigadier
general and assigned to Upton's division. His
career is fully described in a memoir which I pre-
pared after his death many years later. 1
Edward F. Winslow, of the old and distinguished
New England family of that name, absolutely with-
out military training till he entered the service as a
captain of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, and still a mere
youth, was a veteran of varied experience, fine judg-
ment, and approved courage. He fought on every
battlefield from Missouri and Kansas to Mississippi
and Tennessee and had shown the highest quality.
I met him first in the Vicksburg campaign when
only a major of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry. His
youthful appearance, delicate complexion, and mod-
est behavior had impressed me favorably, but he had
dropped out of my memory or become confused with
another officer of higher rank. Although he had
commanded a brigade and a division with signal
success, he had reached no higher grade than that
14 'Life of Andrew Jonathan Alexander, " by James H. Wilson,
privately printed.
167
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of colonel. When Upton first recommended him
as a brigadier I was reluctant because of uncertainty
as to his identity. But a few days later Upton pre-
sented him at headquarters and at a glance I rec-
ognized him as the worthy major of his regiment
who had already won my commendation, and, of
course, I consented at once to his assignment. At
my request he was also brevetted a brigadier gen-
eral so as to give him proper rank. From that
time till the end of the war he was one of our most
useful and resourceful brigade commanders. As
he had had considerable experience in railroad build-
ing, he was assigned not only to the permanent com-
mand of a brigade, but to work of destruction and
reconstruction, whenever occasion offered. His last
service was in rebuilding the railroad from Atlanta
to Chattanooga, which he did in a few weeks in a
masterly manner. After the war he became a dis-
tinguished railroad builder and accumulated an am-
ple fortune.
McCook, of the First Division, was a member of
the distinguished Ohio family which contributed
so many soldiers to the Union cause. He had en-
tered the service with the Fourth Indiana Cavalry
and, possessing all the talents of his race, had risen
by degrees to the command of a division. He was
unusually handsome, strong, and vigorous and,
while not specially a student nor learned in the
military art, he had had excellent experience and
was always prompt and cheerful in such duties as
fell to his lot. He was exceedingly fortunate in hav-
ing two of the best brigade commanders in the Vol-
unteer Army. John T. Croxton of Kentucky, al-
ready frequently mentioned in this narrative, com-
168
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
manded his first brigade of mounted infantry. He
was tall, handsome, dark-eyed, of straight English
descent, from the Blue Grass region. He graduated
at Yale a few years before the outbreak of the Civil
War, and, having grown up with slavery and its
abuses, like Lincoln, Palmer, Oglesby, Cullom, Fry,
Clay, Harlan, Bristow, the Goodloes, and many other
notable Kentuckians, had imbibed a bitter hatred of
that institution as well as an ardent love for the
Union. As a boy he had sent money to buy Sharp 's
rifles for the free-state men in Kansas and when the
Civil War broke out he was one of the first to en-
list in Cary B. Fry's regiment of Kentucky Infan-
try, of which he finally became colonel. He partici-
pated in all the battles of the Army of the Cum-
berland and distinguished himself for coolness and
courage in action. At the battle of Chickamauga
he won special mention for intrepidity. A staff of-
ficer had reported to Thomas that a certain piece
of woods to the front was full of disorganized reb-
els waiting to be brought in, whereupon the grave
and dignified general, turning to Croxton, directed
him to go out and bring them in. Croxton started
at once, but had hardly entered the woods in front
when he woke up one of the fiercest fights of the
day. Without stopping to count the rebels waiting
to be brought in, he found a full division moving to
the attack. Of course, he put up the best fight he
could but was quickly overborne and driven back to
rally behind the works from which he had advanced.
As soon as he reformed Croxton rode to Thomas
and saluting him, gravely remarked: "General I
would have brought them in if I had known which
ones you wanted I"
169
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
This grim humor touched Thomas deeply and
made him always the firm friend of Croxton. Shortly
afterward this brigade was mounted and added to
the cavalry corps, with which it served efficiently till
the end of the war. Croxton was an officer of rare
discretion, coolness, and courage, always ready for
any duty that might be assigned him.
0. H. LaGrange commanded McCook's second
brigade. He entered the army as a captain and had
reached the colonelcy of the First Wisconsin Cav-
alry before he was thirty. Tall, powerful, and ac-
tive, he had risen through hard knocks and experi-
ence to command a brigade. He looked like a ber-
serker and was full of enterprise and daring. His
fixed rule was to let no man get deeper into the
battle than himself. Withal, he was a cool, watch-
ful, and cautious officer, who exacted implicit obe-
dience but never exacted a service in which he was
not willing to lead. Without being a martinet, he
was one of the best all-round soldiers I ever met and
had the war lasted he must have risen to much
higher rank and more important command.
Eli Long was a Kentuckian, appointed from
civil life. He commanded the Second Division, com-
posed of one cavalry and one mounted infantry bri-
gade. He was serious, deliberate, methodical, " still
as the breeze, but dreadful as the storm." He en-
tered the regular army two years before the war
broke out, but never showed the slightest doubt as
to his loyalty or as to his duty. Like many other
Kentuckians, he was a born soldier. As modest and
noiseless as a woman but as intrepid as one of Crom-
well's "Ironsides," he was never absent from duty
except when suffering from wounds of which he-man-
170
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
aged to pick up his full share. Impassible and se-
rene under all conditions, he was without a trace
of the fanfaronade and fondness for dress and dis-
play which are supposed to be the characteristics
of the cavalryman. Looking out constantly for the
comfort of his men and horses, he needed no super-
vision and but few orders. He was always in his
right place and always ready for such service as
might come his way. Having long served in the
division, he naturally succeeded Kenner Garrard in
commanding it, took it to Louisville, remounted and
refitted it, and then brought it by easy marches to
the camp, where it speedily became known as the
strongest and best mounted division of the corps.
Strong and trustworthy as Long was himself, he
was extremely fortunate in his brigadiers, the first of
whom was E. H. G. Minty, the son of a British of-
ficer but of Irish blood. He was an educated sol-
dier of great intelligence and enterprise. He en-
tered the service as a captain, rose to the colonelcy
of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry, and then, by sen-
iority, to the command of a brigade. He had served
creditably through all the campaigns in Kentucky,
Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama and had gained
the esteem of all who had served with him. Long
before the close of the war his regiment had justly
come to be regarded as one of the very best in the
army. Young, natty, fair-haired, and debonair,
Minty was a dandy cavalryman, of many hard
knocks and not a few vicissitudes. As a man of
military instincts and professional aptitudes, he nat-
urally had his own ideas, and it was not strange
that they did not always receive the approval of
his less enterprising and less experienced superiors.
171
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
At all events, they gave him the reputation of be-
ing headstrong and bumptious but from the time he
fell under my command till the end of the war, he
was in every respect a modest and obedient officer,
an excellent disciplinarian, and as good a leader as
Murat himself. He needed but the continuous
chances of war to become famous as the best Irish
soldier of his day.
A. 0. Miller, commanding Long's mounted in-
fantry brigade, originally Wilder 's, was a doctor by
profession but a soldier by instinct and preference.
He entered the army from Indiana and rose by ardu-
ous service to the colonelcy of his regiment and to
the command of the mounted infantry brigade of
which it formed a notable part. Steady as a clock
and as intrepid as the best grenadier of them all,
Miller was equal to any undertaking that might fall
to his lot. Quiet, unassuming, and unobtrusive, he
might well have been taken, in plain clothes, for a
country doctor on his rounds, but he was a big, solid,
sound, and successful soldier, without a superior in
either the cavalry or infantry. With no bluster and
no thoughtless promises, he did his daily work with
persistence and patience which made him invincible.
He was at that time in middle life, but far above
middle merit as an officer. His brigade, armed with
Spencer magazine rifles, was a model of efficiency.
Whether mounted or on foot as skirmishers, it was
invincible. To my certain knowledge, it never made
a charge in which it was not completely successful,
and it fully sustains the dictum that the best cavalry
is the best infantry, mounted.
Edward Hatch of Iowa commanded our Fifth
Division. He was a lumberman who perhaps had
172
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
never seen a company of uniformed soldiers till he
entered the army as a volunteer. Eising rapidly
through all the grades, he won his brigadier's stars
before he fell under my control. He was a young
man, still in his lower thirties, of splendid constitu-
tion and striking figure. It was his good fortune
and mine that he came to our assistance against
Hood in middle Tennessee with a well mounted and
well seasoned division, and to him more than to any-
one else was due the early and exact knowledge
which we obtained of Hood's movements from the
time he left the Tennessee till he sat down in front
of Nashville. Hatch more than anyone else should
have credit for the active and aggressive advance of
the cavalry against Hood 's left in front of Nashville.
It was under his dashing leadership that Ector's
brigade was broken and driven back and that Chal-
mers's headquarters and ammunition trains were
captured. It was largely to him that the principal
success of both the first and second days in front
of Nashville was due. He was brave, energetic, and
aggressive, and needed only to be told what he was
to do and then attended to the rest himself. He had
only one fault. He was so ardent and active on the
fighting line and in pursuit, that he always said
' i yes ' ' to every suggestion and always declared him-
self ready without reference to food, forage, or am-
munition. He always took the chances of getting
them from the enemy or from the general trains
and seemed to fear nothing but that he and his com-
mand might not do their full share of the work, or
get their full share of the glory. It was a supreme
pleasure to command such a man and to look out for
the comfort and needs of such troops.
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UNDEB THE OLD FLAG
Although Hatch was talkative and somewhat
given to harmless gasconade, he never committed
himself to any enterprise or adventure, however dif-
ficult or desperate, which he was not willing to
undertake or which he did not throw himself and
his command into with absolute fearlessness. Short-
ly after reaching our cantonments on the Tennessee,
he fell sick, doubtless from exposure and over-exer-
tion, whereupon I ordered him on twenty days' leave
of absence, suggesting that if well enough he might
visit Sheridan in the Valley of Virginia and see how
the cavalry of that incomparable leader was or-
ganized and handled. He seized the opportunity
with avidity and made the visit before he was fully
well. Shortly after his return, he was giving an
account of his observations, concluding with the re-
mark that he would be willing to die if he could
"have the command of Sheridan's cavalry for just
one day." One of his staff, bolder and perhaps
more impudent than the rest, broke in with the in-
quiry : "But, General, wouldn't you like to live just
another day to brag about it! " The shot was a good
one and brought a laugh to the party in which
Hatch joined cheerfully with the rest. He was a
generous and magnanimous soul who had the
love of every officer and man in his command. I
desired, therefore, that his division should be re-
mounted, re-armed and re-equipped in the best pos-
sible manner. Consequently, I asked him to turn
over his horses to the other troops and make a spe-
cial requisition for their replacement. Unfortu-
nately, however, the Government would not or could
not furnish them in time to permit his division to
take the field with the rest of the corps a few weeks
174
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
later. He, therefore, remained in camp keeping
watch and ward over northeastern Mississippi and
west Tennessee, but as the war in that region ended
with Hood's defeat, Hatch's splendid division took
no effective part in the last campaign.
I have always felt that I made a serious mistake
in leaving this division behind. I am now certain
that it would have been far better to march it on foot
behind the corps as a reserve, with the expectation
of mounting it with horses captured or impressed
from the enemy as the campaign progressed. Had
I to do it over again I should certainly follow that
course.
Hatch's senior brigadier, Datus E. Coon of Iowa,
doubtless Kuhn originally, was a solid and serious
man, much like Miller in general characteristics. He
had had first-class experience, was full of resources,
and knew neither fear nor discouragement. His
career throughout the war was in the highest degree
praiseworthy and honorable.
Hatch's second brigade commander was Colonel
Stewart of Indiana, a brilliant, dashing, and experi-
enced soldier, equal to anything that might have
been demanded of him.
K. W. Johnson, commanding the Sixth Division,
was a West Pointer of high character and long ex-
perience. He had been chief of cavalry and knew
the needs of that arm as well as any man in the
service. His brigade commanders, Harrison of In-
diana and Palmer of Pennsylvania, were men of un-
usual ability, but, as General Thomas directed me
to leave the division in middle Tennessee under his
special orders, its services, except at Nashville and
in the pursuit of Hood, constitute but a small part
175
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of the corps ' history. Palmer, early the next spring,
while the rest of us were " breaking things down
in Georgia, " sallied out through east Tennessee into
the region through which the rebel chieftains were
endeavoring to make their way to the trans-Missis-
sippi and did valuable service in the general windup.
Joseph F. Knipe of Pennsylvania commanded
the Seventh Division with energy and ability, tak-
ing an active part in all the engagements from
Nashville to the Duck Eiver. He was nervous, gal-
lant, and enterprising, slight in person, cheerful
in manner, and entirely subordinate in behavior.
Hammond, commanding his first brigade, was a New
Yorker by birth, but a Kentuckian by adoption, with
liberal education and plenty of enterprise and spirit.
He was for several years Sherman's adjutant gen-
eral and chief -of-staff, but, falling sick, he reported
at Nashville after Sherman began marching through
Georgia and asked for service with me. Having
known him well in the Vicksburg and Chattanooga
campaigns, I had him brevetted brigadier general,
and gave him command of Capron's old brigade.
While he had never commanded troops, he was an
officer of great intelligence, energy, and courage,
and as such rendered valuable services in the defeat
and expulsion of Hood from Tennessee. Throwing
himself earnestly and enthusiastically into the work
of drilling and refitting his brigade, he again fell
sick, and, learning from the chief surgeon that his
ailment was of such nature that he could not with-
stand the fatigue of another campaign, I relieved
and sent him to the rear for treatment.
Before my winter 's work was completed, those in
authority ordered me to send one division, fully
176
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
mounted, armed, and equipped, by transport to
Canby, on the lower Mississippi, and I selected
Knipe's for the detail, with such remounts as he
would need from Hatch's division. He embarked
five thousand strong, with everything complete for
an active campaign, but rendered no useful service
in the windup. He and his gallant comrades were
merged with Canby 's other mounted troops, and,
while they made a cooperating expedition from the
neighborhood of Mobile to the lower Chattahoochee,
they met with no resistance and were too far out
of the way to be of any service in the last campaign.
With Kilpatrick's division sent to Sherman,
Knipe's to Canby, Johnson's to middle Tennessee,
and Hatch's to remain in northwestern Alabama,
the Cavalry Corps which I had assembled and got
ready for service was reduced from seven divisions,
approximately thirty-five thousand men, to three
divisions of about twelve thousand five hundred
mounted and one thousand five hundred dismounted
men. Thus that magnificent body of cavalry and
mounted infantry, with a full complement of horse
artillery, constituting a mounted army equal to any
military task that might fall to its lot, was divided
and again widely scattered. Had the Confederacy
not collapsed or had its leaders concentrated its
armies in a final effort, this dispersion of our cav-
alry might have been a fatal error. And yet it is
conceivable that the course of the war in the spring
of 1865 might easily have been such as to bring
together those widely scattered divisions somewhere
between central Georgia and south Virginia. At all
events, that was what I worked for to the end. Six
or eight weeks more might have seen my seven divi-
177
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
sions of about five thousand men each, or a total
of thirty-five thousand men in the saddle, reunited
in Virginia. With that done and the force divided
into two army corps, one for Upton, it would have
given Sherman such flanks as no modern army ever
had. With Sheridan's twelve thousand sabers, the
entire mounted force under Grant, not counting out-
lying detachments and regiments, would have
amounted to nearly fifty thousand men for duty,
and every professional soldier at least would have
watched with intense interest the decisive part which
such a mounted force must have played in closing
one of the greatest wars of modern times.
While the true function of history is to chronicle
events as they actually occur, rather than to specu-
late upon what might have taken place under dif-
ferent conditions, it is, nevertheless, worth while to
point out obvious mistakes and to show not only
how they might have been avoided, but how the same
or better results might have been gained with less
expense or with greater certainty. All useful mili-
tary criticism is based upon this principle, and
hence it has always been a matter of regret that
the splendid Cavalry Corps which I had the honor
of forming out of its widely scattered elements serv-
ing in the Military Division of the Mississippi was
again scattered before it had the opportunity of
showing its irresistible power against the enemy.
It is this feeling that made me sympathize so deeply
with the deliberate and serious-minded Long, who
said while suffering from a bullet wound in the
scalp : l ' General, I am sorry that this war did not
last just six weeks longer, for that would have
brought us to Virginia, alongside of Sheridan's
178
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
'gayoso cavalry/ and I am sure we should have
fanned the wind out of their sails, and shown them
how cavalry should both march and fight. ' '
That was the spirit which inspired both officers
and men of the western cavalry, and it is fair to
add that it was due, not only to their real quality
and character, but to the policy of collecting them
into a single corps and hurling them in close co-
operation with infantry on the flanks, rear, and com-
munications of the enemy, or of sending them on
independent operations against the interior of the
enemy's country in such overwhelming masses as
to make them irresistible.
It has been my pleasant privilege to commend
my division and brigade commanders in this nar-
rative with some particularity. If not natural
leaders of the highest quality, as several of them
undoubtedly were, they were from aptitude and ex-
perience most unusual men, true Americans in hardi-
hood, self-reliance, and soldierly requirements, and,
therefore, capable of overcoming every obstacle they
might encounter and of accomplishing every task
that might fall to their lot. And this was true not
only of division and brigade commanders, but of
regimental and company officers as well. Drawn
from every calling and condition of the plain people,
they had become good and self-reliant soldiers, free
from airs and pretensions, and inured by actual
experiences to all the tasks and vicissitudes of the
mounted service. The weaklings had been weeded
out, leaving the best to fight the war through and
reestablish the Union forever.
As our work at Gravelly Springs was drawing
to a close Thomas paid me a visit for the purpose
179
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
of looking over my command and conferring with
me about future operations. General Grant had di-
rected him, after sending my Seventh division to
Canby, to detach me with a force of "say five thou-
sand men to make a demonstration on Tuscaloosa
and Selma." Evidently both Grant and the War
Department, although doing but little in Virginia,
intended that Thomas and his army should make
no pause, but continue their operations indefinitely
through the winter. They apparently did not un-
derstand that, although the weather was generally
milder in the country south of the Tennessee than
farther north, the streams would be swollen and the
roads impassable till the winter rains were over and
the roads had measurably dried out. Just what they
counted upon or expected from Thomas, whom they
had promoted to a major general of the regular
army and who had fallen heir to the fragmentary
command Sherman had left behind him, they never
made clear. They sent Schofield with one army
corps to the east, Smith with another to the north-
western corner of Alabama, and Wood to Huntsville.
In other words, they scattered their infantry as
well as the splendid body of cavalry I had got to-
gether with so much trouble. Fortunately, however,
in passing seventeen thousand troopers in review
before Thomas, I convinced him that a "demonstra-
tion" in any direction would be a useless waste of
strength and, if permitted to go with my whole
available force into central Alabama, I would not
only defeat Forrest and such other troops as I
might encounter, but would capture Tuscaloosa,
Selma, Montgomery, and Columbus, and destroy the
Confederacy's last depots of manufacture and sup
180
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
ply and break up its last interior line of railway
communications.
Thomas, with sound judgment, heartily agreed to
my representations, telegraphed Grant, fully ap-
proving them, and earnestly requested that I should
be permitted to carry them into effect. Grant not
only gave his consent at once, but directed that I
should be allowed all "the latitude of an independ-
ent commander. " Much to my gratification, this
relieved me from direct responsibility to either
Sherman or Thomas. It will be recalled that the
former, in sending me back to help Thomas, sug-
gested that as soon as we disposed of Hood I should
gather all the cavalry I could get my hands on and
then sweep down through Alabama and Georgia to
join him wherever he might be found, either in the
Carolinas or on the march to Virginia, for the pur-
pose of taking part in the final struggle between
Grant and Lee. This wise policy I had kept con-
stantly in mind, and, now that Hood had been beaten
and driven out and I had collected and organized
the greatest body of cavalry the country ever had,
remounted and rearmed most of its men, and sup-
plied the whole with everything necessary to take
the field, I was naturally anxious to carry that pol-
icy and those instructions into effect. It was the
great opportunity of my life and, with the hearty
support of my officers of all grades, I felt perfectly
certain of success.
While engaged in remounting, refitting and in-
structing my command, a lady of the neighborhood
got permission to visit Nashville on a shopping ex-
pedition. I gave her a safeguard in addition, but
she had gone only two days when Lieutenant Eodney
181
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of the horse artillery reported at headquarters with
the lady's pocketbook, her pass, and two hundred
and fifty dollars in gold which one of his men had
picked up and passed on to him through the reg-
ular channels. Eecognizing the pass at once, I put
the pocketbook and its contents in my field desk.
Two weeks later the lady called to report her re-
turn, whereupon I asked what kind of a trip she
had had. To this she replied that she had had a
most successful one, but that she had lost her pocket-
book and money and had been compelled to borrow
for her purchases. At this I reached into my desk
and handed her the pocketbook with its contents in-
tact. Of course, she received it with surprise and
then grew desperately pale, as though she were
about to faint. Seeing her agitation, I asked what
was the matter, to which she replied: "Oh, the
Confederacy is doomed, the Confederacy is doomed!
It cannot prevail against an army in which such
discipline exists! This surpasses anything I ever
dreamed of. Had my pocketbook been found by Con-
federate soldiers, I should certainly never have seen
it again !"
From the time I took post at Gravelly Springs
I, of course, lost no opportunity to gather informa-
tion of what was going on in eastern Mississippi
and central Alabama. I soon learned that Forrest
had command of all the Confederate cavalry in that
region; that Wheeler with his corps had followed
Sherman into the Carolinas; that Hood had been
relieved at his own request in northern Mississippi ;
that he had given his infantry and artillery furlough
for twenty days; and, finally, that all the Confed-
erates in those important states were on the defen-
182
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
sive. But, knowing that Forrest was a determined
and resourceful commander, I did my best through
spies, scouts, flags of truce and other available
means, not only to confirm this information, but to
ascertain at what place he had ordered his troops to
reassemble. While he had evidently begun to de-
spair of the Confederacy from the time he took com-
mand of Hood's rear guard, he betrayed no weak-
ness, but put forth ceaseless energy and activity in
the reorganization of his own corps and for the de-
fense of the great stretch of country committed to
his care. To this end he gathered all absentees from
the ranks he could find, mercilessly shot deserters,
and conscripted every able-bodied man fit for mili-
tary service. While doing his best to fill up his
ranks, he also sent his picked and trusty scouts,
most of whom were Tennesseeans, to locate our
camps, estimate our numbers, and gather such in-
formation as might throw light on our plans and
future movements.
But this, as already seen, was a game at which
two could play. My spies and scouts were as good
and resourceful as Forrest's and it was not long
before they located his command, estimated his
strength, and got a fair idea of his plans and ex-
pectations. My conclusion was that Forrest's main
body under Chalmers, Buford, and Jackson, with
Wirt Adams's and Eoddy's outlying brigades, would
have a force of not less than ten thousand men and
possibly twelve thousand, and that with the co-
operation of those veteran leaders it would be easy
for him to thwart any demonstration made by a few
thousand Union cavalry.
In order, however, that no precaution should be
183
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
neglected and no information left unsought, I sent
Captain Hosea of the regular army, one of my most
intelligent officers, with a flag of truce, to negotiate
an exchange of prisoners with Forrest, and, inci-
dentally, to interview that wily commander, to study
his frame of mind, and to gather such information
as he could get in regard to the country, its food
supplies and military resources. In short, he was
instructed to keep his eyes open and play the game
before him for all in sight. Forrest, whom he found
at West Point, Mississippi, received him politely and
entertained him with true Southern hospitality.
While Forrest declined to consider any arrangement
for the exchange of prisoners, he seemed to be in
no hurry to get rid of his visitor. He talked freely
on all subjects except numbers and plans. He seemed
curious to learn what he could about me and my
career. He had never heard of me till I confronted
him on Duck Eiver in November, and did not know
whether I was a regular or a volunteer, a young man
or an old one, but when Hosea told him that I was
a West Pointer, an officer of engineers, had recently
commanded a division of Sheridan's cavalry, and
had some knowledge of tactics, strategy, and mili-
tary organization, he seemed to be greatly interested.
In the conversation he dropped the remark that he
had rubbed his back "against no college " and knew
nothing of military tactics, except what he had
learned in actual campaigning. Then he added re-
flectively: "But I always make it a rule to get
there first with the most men." After announcing
this sound, fundamental principle, he continued
somewhat contemptuously : ' l But you can tell your
General that I would give more for fifteen minutes
184
ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
of the bulge on him than for three days of tactics."
He apparently cared but little for regular forma-
tions or for the lessons of the military books. He
spoke contemptuously of the saber and declared his
preference for the " repeater" or revolver as the
true weapon for the charge and the melee. He val-
ued courage and dash over the formal methods of
the old school soldiers. He showed great confidence
in himself and his followers and finally said in bid-
ding his guest good-bye: "Captain, you can tell
General Wilson that I have picked out a first rate
place for a cavalry battle down here and if he'll
come down with any force he pleases, I'll meet
him with the same number and agree to whip the
fight."
From Hosea's report a few days later, supple-
mented by information from other sources, I became
satisfied that Forrest would be my principal oppo-
nent and that his line of operations would be from
his main camp at West Point toward central Ala-
bama, across my advance, and that I would have to
march rapidly to beat him to the important points
in the field of operations.
I explained all this on the maps to General
Thomas and from that moment had his entire sup-
port and confidence. Fully realizing that I would have
strength enough, even without Hatch, to go where
I pleased, he returned to Nashville and gave himself
no farther care on my account. Meanwhile, Sher-
man was uneasy. About that time he sent a dispatch
to Thomas, saying: "I suppose . . . Forrest
is again scattered to get horses and men and to di-
vert attention. ... I would like to have him
hunted down and killed, but doubt if we can do that
185
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
yet." 1 Forrest had, indeed, scattered his forces,
but, withal, he was gathering horses and improving
discipline and efficiency. Having been made a lieu-
tenant general and put in charge of a cavalry de-
partment covering Alabama, Mississippi, and east
Louisiana, to give him equal rank and command
with Wheeler as well as with other rivals, he was
now the main dependence of the Confederacy to re-
sist hostile expeditions from Memphis, Vicksburg,
and Baton Rouge. He knew also that Canby was
threatening Mobile and that another Federal force
was gathering at Pensacola. While he overesti-
mated our various columns at seventy-five thousand
men, we are told by his biographers that it was my
command on the Tennessee Eiver which gave him
the greatest concern and that he clearly foresaw
that my principal object would be the destruction
of the Confederate arsenal at Selma. So firmly was
he convinced of this that he moved his own head-
quarters to West Point and began the concentra-
tion of his troops in that region. Early in March
he took the precaution to have the various roads
leading toward Tuscaloosa, Selma, and the west
newly sign-boarded, and marked with crosses and
blazes in such manner that the most stupid of his
subordinates could find their way. 2
By the first of March my command was ready
to move, but, unfortunately, heavy rains flooded the
country and raised the streams, which delayed my
movement, much to my sorrow, for fully three weeks.
So violent and continuous was the downpour that
the Tennessee was soon out of its banks and a large
1 O. E. Serial No. 94, pp. 621 et seq.
2 Wyeth >s ' ' Life of Forrest, ' ' pp. 584 et seq.
186
ORGANIZATION OE CAVALRY
quantity of the quartermaster's stores near the
steamboat landing were swept away, and this added
to our difficulties through the first hundred miles
south of the river. We should have had grain
enough to feed our horses for five days at least.
While trying to get ready for an early start I
wrote frequently to Eawlins, Porter, and Badeau
at Grant's headquarters, touching matters of com-
mon interest, such as the relief of Butler from fur-
ther command, the fate of Baldy Smith, and the pro-
motion of Thomas, Schofield, Wood, and other west-
ern generals. I referred to the futility of the effort
to capture Wilmington, the rise of gold, and the
abolition of slavery. Finally I commented on the
fact that, while I had the largest corps in the army,
the President had not yet formally approved its
corps organization or given my staff the rank to
which they were fairly entitled by their deserts and
good works.
On March 7 I wrote as follows :
. . . I am sorry your letters find me here instead of
on the road to Dixie as the General expects and as I hoped.
This is the only time in my life I was ever ordered to start
by a certain date and could not do it. My command was
all ready, everything in tip-top order, but the extraordi-
nary rains and flood in the Tennessee have stopped every-
thing. My cantonments were located on the north side of
the river for many reasons, all good. My command by its
present condition clearly proves my wisdom in the matter.
The Tennessee is higher than ever before known, though,
thank heaven, it has begun to fall rapidly, and unless it
rains again in three or four days I shall be able to get to
the river bank and begin crossing. Once on the south side
I can start whenever I choose ; and as soon as possible, of
187
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
course. Please explain this to the General, and tell him I
shall not lose a moment in getting away.
The first eighty miles will be severe for my command,
as the region is entirely desolate. Once through it, how-
ever, I think we shall experience no great difficulty in liv-
ing. Tell the General I wrote a note to Babcock in which
I gave my views of what my command is capable of doing.
It may be the fifteenth or sixteenth, even with favorable
weather, before I can march. I am most anxious lest my
delay may not be sufficiently explained, but I venture to
hope the General will not lose any of his confidence in my
promptitude and determination, and also that the delay
will be really advantageous to our cause. At all events,
it has been simply impossible to cross the river and im-
possible to move out after we were over. . . .
I am sure my command is a good one, well organized,
and in fine condition. I am sorry to know that General
Halleck is allowed to prevent the approval of the corps
organization. If seven divisions of cavalry with over
twenty-five thousand men mounted and doing duty are not
entitled to a corps organization, I am sure I do not know
what is. I am anxious about it only because I want my
staff to have for their duty all the rank they can get. I
know there is no corps in the army better entitled to it,
not one in which the staff has done half as much work and
not one in which it is required to do as much. My officers
have well earned their promotion and ought to have it.
However, if ... the venture upon which we are
about to start turns out right, the officers as well as the
corps will win recognition. I have no fear that when
Grant receives my report of operations he will do all for
us we are entitled to. He may begin to look for it about
the first of May, and, if matters work well, I shall present
it in person with something between fifteen thousand and
twenty thousand troopers to tell the story and cross sabers
with the rebels in Virginia.
On March 20 I wrote from Chickasaw, Alabama :
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ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY
... I expected to have been well on my way before this
time. My command is all here in magnificent condition.
Orders were given to march at half -past five this morning
when information reached me that forage to supply us
through the barrens of Alabama had not yet arrived. We
must carry the forage, for my scouts report absolutely
none in that region. The boats are expected with it every
minute, and just as soon as they get here we shall be off.
Isn't it unfortunate that the rain cannot be controlled
by General Grant? Had we not had the recent extraordi-
nary floods in this country our grain would not have been
destroyed. I am greatly provoked at the delay, but am
powerless to help it. On the llth inst. no advance had yet
begun at Mobile, though the rebels thought they could see
indications of an early movement on our part. Withal,
I hope we shall be off in time to do good service. My
command is certainly in magnificent condition, well armed,
splendidly mounted, perfectly clad and equipped, and will
turn out a heavier fighting force than ever before started
on a similar expedition in this country. I am personally
in the best of health and spirits.
Notwithstanding my anxiety and the arrival of
the forage, my actual advance did not begin till the
morning of March 22, but this was fully a week
earlier than they were able to start with the Army
of the Potomac. It is a striking coincidence that,
while we had to march fully a hundred and fifty
miles and fight our way over the last third of it to
Selma against the active opposition of Forrest and
his cavalry, Sheridan had only to march about a
tenth of that distance to meet Hampton and his cav-
alry at Dinwiddie Court House. It is a still more
interesting coincidence that Selma and Eichmond,
fully a thousand miles apart by the traveled roads,
fell on the same day, April 2, 1865.
189
VI
CAMPAIGN AND CAPTURE OF SELMA
Line of march through northern Alabama Passage of the
rivers Face to face with Forrest Forrest's mistakes
Defeat and pursuit of Forrest Capture of Tusca-
loosa Close in on Selma Assault and capture of
Selma Results and summary of campaign.
While the campaigns then opening east and west
were destined to be the last of the war, none of us
had any adequate idea of the important part ours
was to play in closing the great drama. The ex-
tracts from private correspondence show that I had
definite ideas of what should be done and definite
hopes of the results, but neither I nor anyone else
foresaw the overwhelming success the cavalry army
under my command finally achieved.
As before stated, I started from the Tennessee
Eiver with McCook's, Upton's, and Long's divisions,
all mounted and equipped, twelve thousand five hun-
dred men in the saddle, with a battery of four guns
to each division, and one brigade, or one thousand
five hundred dismounted men, to act as train guard
and reserve till we could capture horses enough to
remount them. We also had one light pontoon train
of thirty canvas boats, hauled by fifty six-mule
190
CAPTUEE OF SELMA
teams, escorted by Major Hubbard with a battalion
of the Twelfth Missouri Cavalry.
Each trooper carried five days ' light rations, one
pair of horseshoes, and one hundred rounds of am-
munition on his saddle. We also had a supply train
of two hundred and fifty wagons, carrying forty-
five days' rations of coffee, twenty of sugar, fifteen
of salt, and eighty rounds of ammunition, besides
five days' rations of hard bread and ten of sugar
and salt on pack animals. My calculation was that
these supplies, with what we could gather from the
country, although the first half of our march lay
through a desolate region, would be sufficient for a
campaign of sixty days, at the end of which we
should reach a new base in Georgia, the Carolinas,
or Virginia. As trains in a country of good roads
are a great impediment to cavalry, I directed the
division commanders to send the " extra wagons"
back to the Tennessee as fast as emptied.
This order gave rise to a laughable incident
which my adjutant general did not hear the last
of for some time. When Long received it he made
the mistake of reading "majors" for "wagons" and
replied that, as he had no "extra majors," he could
not comply with the instructions. Of course, a few
hours straightened out the misunderstanding and re-
lieved his division of its "extra wagons."
Hoping that the promised horses would soon
reach Hatch, I ordered him to follow with his fine
division of over six thousand men as soon as pos-
sible, but, much to our common disappointment, the
horses never came and he took but little part in the
closing operations of the war. Could I have been
sure of securing the large number of horses and
191
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
mules we captured at Selma and found in the
enemy's country, I should have taken Hatch along,
as I have elsewhere said, thereby increasing my
train guard and reserve to fully eight thousand and
raising my entire force to twenty-two thousand men.
With the experience gained in the campaign
through Selma, Columbus, and Macon, I am sure I
should have had an ideal command, every man of
which could have been well mounted before we
reached the Chattahoochee Eiver.
From that day I have held that in a farming
country, fairly well supplied with forage, an invad-
ing force, consisting of two-thirds cavalry and one-
third infantry, with one field-gun for each thousand
men, would be the most effective organization, for
the large mounted force would enable it to move
rapidly, much more rapidly, indeed, than would be
possible for infantry. And, moving rapidly, it could
strike the flanks, rear and communications of the
enemy much more effectively than would be possible
with infantry alone. As celerity of movement is
the most variable factor in modern military opera-
tions, that force which moves most rapidly can place
itself in the best position for effective service.
In beginning the invasion I started my columns
on divergent routes for the purpose of confusing
the enemy, whose headquarters, first at Verona and
later at West Point, Mississippi, were about one
hundred miles southwest of mine, as to my plans
and of giving the greatest possible celerity to my
movements. Upton's division took the route
through Eusselville, Mount Hope, and Jasper to
Saunder's Ford, on the west branch of the Black
Warrior Eiver. Long's took the middle road by
192
CAPTURE OF SELMA
Cherokee's Station and Frankford and thence south
by the Byler road toward Tuscaloosa to upper Bear
Creek, where it turned east to the same ford of the
Black Warrior. McCook's division followed Long's,
but passed beyond as far as Eldridge, where it
also turned to the east. In this way they scooped
up all the food and forage that could be found in
the bottom farms, and kept well out of each other's
way. While each commander was left to regulate
the details of his own march, every precaution was
taken to get through the country as rapidly as pos-
sible. It was throughout a hilly, gravelly, and bar-
ren region, covered with dense forests of pine and
oak, broken here and there by the small clearings of
poor white folks. The valleys are deep and narrow
and the roads which threaded them much of the way
were often almost impassable for lack of bridges
and from the presence of quicksand and quagmires.
While both men and horses could pick their way
and make fair progress, especially along the ridges,
it was frequently necessary to construct corduroy
roads in order to get the artillery and wagons for-
ward at all.
Fortunately, the enemy was badly scattered. He
had gathered his principal force close to the Ala-
bama and Mississippi line, near the crossing of the
Mobile and Ohio Eailroad and the railroad from
Vicksburg to Montgomery and Atlanta. Department
headquarters under Lieutenant General Taylor were
at Meridian, while Forrest with cavalry headquar-
ters was at West Point, some forty or fifty miles
farther north. In view of the fact that Selma, the
seat of the great Confederate arsenal, manufactories,
and storehouses, and Montgomery, the first capital
193
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of the seceding states, were the chief objectives of
our campaign, the disposition of the Confederate
forces was decidedly unfavorable to their operations,
but exceedingly favorable to ours. It had but one
thing to recommend it. It would have facilitated
concentration after the fall of Selma for the defense
of the region to the westward.
It will be remembered that Canby had a strong
army threatening Mobile; Grierson and Knipe with
Canby 's cavalry were arranging to move eastward
from the Mississippi; Thomas, with one corps of
infantry and two divisions of cavalry, occupied mid-
dle Tennessee, ready to move in any direction offer-
ing the greatest attraction. Not knowing who would
strike first, the enemy was slow in divining my move-
ment and still slower in concentrating to resist it.
He was far too much spread out watching a vast
extent of country and was nowhere strong. Indeed,
but for Roddy's small force operating from Monte-
vallo toward the Tennessee, we should not have
known we were moving through a hostile region till
we crossed both forks of the Black Warrior and
reached the Cahawba valley. And yet the first half
of our march was not without anxiety. Forrest was
an aggressive and swiftly marching enemy, and no
one could tell when we might find him in the front.
I, therefore, kept scouts and patrols well out with
a view to getting the first possible intimation of his
approach. It is now known that he did not per-
sonally leave West Point till March 28, six days
after I left Waterloo Landing, and even then he
regarded my force as mere raiders which might be
driven back without much trouble.
It now appears from the Official Eecords that
194
CAPTURE OF SELMA
both Taylor and Forrest were looking for the prin-
cipal invasion of central Alabama to come from
Canby's department, and hence all their dispositions
prior to the discovery of my advance were made to
cover Montgomery and Selma from the south rather
than from the north. While they held the principal
part of their cavalry and such infantry as they could
gather well in hand near the railroad crossing in
the western part of the state, they directed Buford's
division first to Montevallo to support Eoddy and
afterward to the south side of the Alabama Eiver
to cover Selma and Montgomery against a move-
ment from the Gulf coast. Eoddy, with such help
as Dan Adams, the district commander, could
give, was to watch the movements from the Ten-
nessee.
Forrest himself, however, had his own eyes on
the roads to both Montevallo and Tuscaloosa. By the
direct route the distance from West Point to Monte-
vallo was about one hundred and twenty-five miles,
while it was considerably more by the way of Tus-
caloosa, either to Montevallo or to Selma. But, as
the Sipsey, the Black Warrior, and the Tombigbee,
with all their affluents, were out of their banks and
still high from the same rains that delayed us, For-
rest 's concentration and march to the eastward, even
after he learned we were in motion, were compara-
tively slow. As his escort moved much faster than
either division, within four days he was in our front,
while Chalmers and Jackson were straggling along
toward the Cahawba and Selma.
As early as March 7 Beauregard, the supervising
generalissimo, with headquarters on the railroad, re-
ported to Lee at Petersburg that he would be unable
195
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
to resist anything more than a cavalry raid 1 in the
direction of Selma and Montgomery, whereupon Lee,
now a real dictator, authorized him to select any
other place for concentration and defense that prom-
ised greater safety. The next day he mentioned
Forrest for the first time as lieutenant general and
directed him to garrison Selma, from which it will
be seen that Lee, at least, had a correct understand-
ing of that stronghold as a strategic center. Had
Beauregard, Taylor, and Forrest comprehended that
essential fact as clearly as did their common chief
and concentrated their forces within its fortifications,
as they could easily have done, they might have
made a more fortunate campaign than the one which
burst upon them a few days later.
On March 11 Beauregard reported Forrest's
and Roddy's cavalry at " about twelve thousand
men, ' ' 2 and Forrest could doubtless have got that
number together had he dropped all other tasks and
given his whole time to concentrating either at Tus-
caloosa, Marion Junction, or Selma. But, fortu-
nately for us, a multiplicity of minds and orders pre-
vented the adoption of any coherent or well-defined
policy. It will be remembered that the cavalry
corps under Forrest consisted of four divisions,
commanded respectively by Jackson, Chalmers, Bu-
f ord, and Roddy, with a few infantry and other out-
lying detachments operating more or less independ-
ently. Their cavalry was approximately three thou-
sand five hundred men to the division, and, although
a considerable number of Tennesseeans, Kentucki-
ans, and Mississippians were still absent from the
1 0. E. Serial No. 103, p. 1035.
2 O. E. Serial No. 103, p. 1048.
196
CAPTURE OF SELMA
colors, and stragglers and deserters increased as
soon as active operations began, I have never doubt-
ed that Forrest could have confronted us with at
least ten thousand men in the saddle, had he under-
stood the situation or got timely notice of our ad-
vance. Wyeth gives Chalmers's division on March
24, 1865 at three thousand six hundred and forty-
eight men, while Forrest reported to Taylor on
March 6 that as soon as the waters receded he
could place Jackson in the field with almost two
thousand five hundred effective men, though we al-
ways estimated his force at from three thousand to
three thousand five hundred.
From the Official Eecords and the narratives of
Jordan and Wyeth it appears that Forrest himself
was uncertain from the start as to the strength of
my columns and the direction in which they might
move. On March 13 he frankly said: . . . "I
have sent two flags of truce up to them, besides have
thrown out sufficient scouts to learn their real move-
ments. " * The next day, although his mind was
made up, he asked Chalmers if he " could be ready
to march day after to-morrow morning to Monte-
vallo." 2
On March 18 Forrest was at "West Point, writ-
ing a vigorous letter to Breckenridge, Confederate
secretary of war, and another to Taylor, protesting
against the policy of sending officers into west Ten-
nessee, northern Alabama, and Mississippi for the
purpose of organizing and bringing out the large
number of deserters and stragglers who were in-
festing those regions and living by plunder and rob-
1 O. R. Serial No. 103, p. 1030, Forrest to Taylor.
'16., p. 1060, Forrest to Chalmers.
197
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
bery. 1 Boddy wrote in a similar strain, and both
at that date were acting on matters of policy ex-
actly as though they expected the war to continue
indefinitely. While Wyeth tells us that Forrest, al-
though claiming to be the savior of Hood's army,
had lost all hope for the final success of the Confed-
eracy, and that he "was fully impressed with the
hopelessness of the struggle, but as a soldier he was
in honor bound to fight to the bitter end." . . . 2
It is evident, however, that Hood's overwhelming de-
feat and expulsion from Tennessee had greatly dis-
couraged Davis, Lee, Beauregard, Johnston, and
Taylor, though it failed to give any one of them a
definite conception of the impending catastrophe or
a definite plan for averting it. This was, perhaps,
natural enough for those at a distance, but it is diffi-
cult to understand how it was that neither Taylor
nor Forrest had the slightest conception of the real
danger, nor the slightest idea of the direction from
which it was to come till March 27 brought the in-
formation that my corps had crossed the Tennessee
and was advancing toward Jasper.
On March 22 Taylor telegraphed Forrest : ...
. . . General Stephen D. Lee . . . yesterday
reports enemy concentrating at Knoxville. Your main
force will move either to middle Tennessee or across Tom-
bigbee to Greenville. 3
The next day he telegraphed :
Enemy moving up from Pensacola. Start all troops
. . . at once for Greenville via Selma, where there is
a pontoon. 4
1 O. E. Serial No. 104, pp. 1124-26.
2 Wyeth 'a "Life of Forrest," p. 578.
8 O. B. Serial No. 104, p. 1144.
*/&., p. 1146.
198
CAPTURE OF SELMA
On that day Forrest ordered Armstrong's bri-
gade to Selma, and here it should be noticed that
Armstrong's brigade is the only one that reached
that place in time to take position within its de-
fenses.
As late as March 24 Taylor still thought Canby
11 might give Mobile the go-by and march on Selma
or Montgomery, " in which case, he added, "it might
become necessary to suddenly throw six or seven
thousand infantry up the river from Mobile to as-
sist the cavalry. ' ' 1
On the same day Forrest ordered Chalmers to
start Starke's brigade after Armstrong, 2 and gave
notice that Wirt Adams should follow in the same
direction, while he and Taylor would review Jack-
son's division and Crossland's, late Lyon's, brigade
at West Point, and that immediately after the re-
view Crossland should set out to report to Dan
Adams at Montevallo for the purpose of relieving
Eoddy, who was ordered south. It was not till the
25th that Taylor directed Forrest to push Chalmers
with his other brigades as rapidly as possible by
the way of Tuscaloosa to Selma, and that Jackson
should follow without delay . . . "to meet raid
from below." 3 The distance to be covered was
from one hundred and fifty to one hundred and sixty
miles, and, although the roads were bad and the
streams were high, with due diligence the time was
sufficient. But with the delay for the review and
the uncertainty as to our advance, it will appear
in the course of this narrative that Forrest's loss
X O. R. Serial No. 104, p. 1148.
a l&., p. 1150.
I6., p. 1155.
199
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of time was both irreparable and fatal. It is certain
that he had as yet no news of my actual movements.
Buford was still south of the river, looking to the
junction with Armstrong, advancing through Selma
for the purpose of guarding the roads from the Gulf
coast.
On March 26, however, Taylor seems to have got
news of my having reached Eussellville, whereupon
he instructed Forrest that Jackson, following Cross-
land . . . "should meet, whip, and get rid of"
my column, while Wirt Adams and Scott should
stand off any force coming from the Mississippi.
As if to emphasize these instructions, he added:
"Our plan is to meet and whip these detached col-
umns before they can unite with each other. You
had better, soon as possible, move [by rail] via
Meridian to Selma, whence you can assume direc-
tion of Chalmers's, Jackson's, and Buford 's move-
ments." . . .*
The next day Taylor telegraphed Forrest, still
at West Point . . . "a large and well-equipped
cavalry corps is moving from north Alabama," 2
and to Dan Adams that "Forrest, with three bri-
gades, moving via Tuscaloosa, is intercepting the
raid from above. ' ' 3 On the 28th he telegraphed
Beauregard that . . . "a heavy force of Thom-
as' cavalry is moving down through north Ala-
bama"; and to Maury at Mobile: . . . "The
Lieutenant General commanding hopes in three or
four days to whip the large raids moving from
north Alabama, and will then be in condition to as-
1 O. E. Serial No. 104, p. 1160.
2 16., p. 1164.
8 7ft., p. 1165.
200
CAPTURE OF SELMA
sist you with all the force of the department. ' ' 1
. . . All this was reported to Lee, the dicta-
tor, and by Lee to the Confederate Secretary of
War.
The truth was beginning to dawn upon the Con-
federate authorities. Forrest learned it as soon as
anyone, but no sooner. Having made such disposi-
tions as his means allowed to meet the expeditions
he supposed to be "threatening from Memphis "
and from the Mississippi below, he took the road
eastward on the 28th, and the next day was at Sip-
sey Bridge, where, after shooting "two deserters, "
one of whom claimed to be too old and the other too
young for military service, he directed Jackson to
detach an officer and twenty men to guard the cross-
ings, to bury the dead, and to execute such other
deserters as they might catch. 2 His blood was up
against his own people as well as against "the
Yankees," and, spurring to the front, he was "nine
miles from Centerville, on the Montevallo road, at
2 P. M. March 30." Here he issued an untimely or-
der countermarching Jackson's column and sending
him new instructions.
This was his first mistake and the beginning of
a series. The race was now on for Selma and it
remained only to decide whether Forrest, Chalmers,
Jackson, Buford, Eoddy, Armstrong, Crossland, and
Adams could get there before McCook, Long, Upton,
Croxton, LaGrange, Minty, Miller, Alexander, and
Winslow. Hitherto the Confederate cavalrymen
had been rarely caught napping, but the National
1 O. E. Serial No. 104, p. 1167.
2 "Life of General Forrest," by John A. Wyeth, p. 589, and
O. B. Serial No. 104, p. 1172, Strange to Jackson.
201
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
leaders had learned their lessons at last and, hence-
forth, let no grass grow under their feet.
Had Forrest moved with his usual celerity
straight across country to Tuscaloosa or south of
it, he would have reached Selma with all his force
before we could have struck him or any of his de-
tachments. This was clearly his better course and,
had he followed it, his chances for stopping or stand-
ing us off, if not for defeating us in the end, would
have been far more promising. But the chance of
meeting Forrest and his forces before we got out
of the barrens into the rich country below was not
the worst of our dangers. The spring was an un-
usually rainy one and it was a source of constant
apprehension both to Forrest and myself that a
heavy downpour might put the creeks and rivers
again out of their banks, which in turn would have
made it impossible to cross the broadest of them
without considerable delay. Fortunately, although
we had no Weather Bureau, a good many of our
officers had become sufficiently weatherwise to know
what winds and conditions would bring rain. I had
acquired enough skill to prognosticate with a fair
degree of certainty.
The Mulberry fork of the Black Warrior is a
wide and rapid stream with a gorge-like bed be-
tween hills five or six hundred feet high on either
side, and is unusually difficult to cross anywhere ex-
cept by bridge or ferry. It was reported fordable
beyond Jasper at ordinary low water, and this made
it all the more necessary that we should reach it be-
fore the rains which were threatening should swell
it unduly.
We, therefore, pushed on rapidly to Saunder's
202
CAPTURE OF SELMA
Ford, which our advance reached early on the 27th.
The rain set in during the night and the river had
begun to rise, which made Upton fear at first that
he could not cross without the pontoon train. But
he was an officer who took nothing for granted, and
soon ascertained by personal examination that the
ford, although a hundred and fifty yards wide, was
still passable. He found it composed of gravel and
sand lodged against a rough ledge of rock connect-
ing the hills on the opposite sides. Pushing boldly
through the rushing stream in loose order, and tak-
ing every precaution to hurry his dripping horses
up the muddy bank, Upton cleared the way for the
following divisions before the river had risen enough
to compel the rear of the column to swim. Several
troopers were, however, swept away and one was
drowned before assistance could reach him. The
passage was most perilous, but the entire command
got safely over, leaving the wagons in the forks of
the river under a dismounted guard, while the col-
umn, thus lightened, pushed on to the Locust fork
of the Black Warrior, which was also rising. For-
tunately, it was still passable, and, as the crossing
was also made with great rapidity, it was soon left
behind. The roads beyond were in better condition
and, as the enemy offered but slight resistance, we
pushed rapidly through Elyton to the Cahawba
Eiver.
Elyton at that time was a poor, insignificant
Southern village, surrounded by old field farms,
most of which could have been bought at five dollars
per acre. It presented no evidence of ever becoming
a great city or the seat of the iron and steel in-
dustry of the Southern states. Having taken posi-
203
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
tion on the top of an overlooking ridge to inspect
the passing column, I was deeply impressed by the
poverty-stricken and uninviting appearance of the
landscape. It was, of course, known to the geolo-
gists that the ridges dividing the river valleys con-
tained large deposits of both coal and iron in prox-
imity to each other. A few blast-furnaces had been
erected in the adjacent region and pig-iron had been
produced in considerable quantities for the arsenal
and foundries at Selma, but there was no sign what-
ever of the tremendous movement which a few years
later made Birmingham the coal and iron center of
that remarkable field. At that time the farms and
villages were poor and primitive, the yield of corn
and cotton insignificant, and the people without hope.
It is now one of the most flourishing manufacturing
districts in the United States.
While at Jasper on the 27th my scouts reported
Armstrong's brigade of Chalmers's division some
forty or fifty miles south of us moving through
Bridgeville and Tuscaloosa toward Selma. This
was a distinct admonition that we should quicken
our own speed so as to cross the Cahawba and reach
the district about Montevallo before the enemy could
interpose to delay us. I knew that Forrest, as soon
as he discovered our real direction, would lose no
time in throwing his whole available force in front
of us. It was now raining hard, the streams were
again rising rapidly, and this made it necessary to
march all night in order to reach and cross the
Cahawba and to get into the open and more pros-
perous country beyond. Happily, Upton and his bri-
gade commanders, Winslow and Alexander, were
full of energy and enterprise which no difficulty
204
CAPTURE OF SELMA
could thwart or discourage. Eeaching the banks of
the Cahawba ahead of the pontoon train, they found
the ford obstructed by fallen trees and impassable.
But, turning downstream, they came shortly to the
railroad bridge near Hillsboro and rushed upon
it before the enemy's pickets could set it on fire.
Both the bridge and the trestles connecting it with
the highland were then floored over with cross-ties,
making it safe for horses and men. By these means
we crossed the river and soon left it behind. This
was a notable feat, well illustrating the enterprise
and energy of the western cavalry. Not an hour
was lost and, although the actual passage on account
of the rude roadway was relatively slow, it took
the entire corps safely into a region abounding in
forage, corn, bacon, chickens, turkeys, and other
comforts for hungry soldiers. But, what was still
more important, was the fact that it brought us
quickly to the state road leading directly south to
the stronghold which was the main object of our
campaign.
To make sure that Armstrong and those follow-
ing in the same direction should not interfere with
or delay our advance, I detached Croxton near Ely-
ton on the evening of March 30 to march rapidly
on Tuscaloosa, which was not only the seat of the
Alabama Military College, but the center of a com-
paratively rich and populous region. After cap-
turing the town and burning the public buildings,
foundries, factories, stores and bridges, he was di-
rected to rejoin the main column by the way of
Centerville, where the direct road from Tuscaloosa
to Selma crosses the Cahawba.
Croxton executed the first half of his orders after
205
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
some countermarching with an allowable precaution-
ary delay. Tuscaloosa did not, however, fall into
his hands till April 3, when the Military College,
other public buildings, and property were destroyed,
and ample supplies of every sort were captured.
As Jackson's columns had passed on toward the
Cahawba, Croxton occupied the town for the night,
and it so happened that he found there several Con-
federate officers, with their fiancees, who had met
for the purpose of getting married. Instead of for-
bidding the bans, the gallant Kentuckian gave his
hearty consent and encouraged the contracting par-
ties to proceed with the ceremony, which they gladly
did. Early the next day he took the road again,
but, fearing he might encounter more rebels than
he cared to tackle, marching through or upon that
important town, he turned northward for safety.
As the direction of his original march lay in the
main at right angles to that of the Confederates,
it necessarily brought him into such contact with
them as led to the confusion of both without any
considerable advantage to either, except that Jack-
son and Chalmers, who were following Armstrong,
were so delayed by the presence of an enemy in their
rear and afterward on their flank that neither suc-
ceeded in crossing the Cahawba, without which it
was impossible to confront my main column or in
any way to delay the assault and capture of Selma.
This was of great advantage to me and in itself
justified the detachment of Croxton.
Meanwhile, my plan was clear and distinct from
the first. I knew it was absolutely necessary that
I should get through the barrens and across the
creeks and rivers, and, leaving my impedimenta be-
206
CAPTURE OF SELMA
hind, unite my columns at Montevallo, where I was
sure we should have what all good cavalrymen want
an open country and a clear road to the front.
I reached Montevallo at one o'clock on March 31.
Upton, having the lead, occupied the place at dusk
the evening before and hy the time he had given
me the lay of the land, the location and direction
of the roads, and the enemy's probable position,
Long's division and LaGrange's brigade of Mc-
Cook's division, free from all wheels except those
of their batteries, had closed up and were ready to
strike at the word. Upton's detachments had al-
ready destroyed or were engaged in destroying the
Red Mountain, Bibb County, and Columbiana Iron
Works, the Cahawba Valley Boiling Mills, and all
the collieries within reach. All these establishments
were in full operation and their destruction was a
vital blow to the Confederacy, inasmuch as they
were the source of the last and only raw materials
and fuel for the arsenals, foundries, and navy yard
at Selma.
My command present on the field mustered full
nine thousand men and twelve field guns. Straggling
had disappeared, and every trooper was in his place,
eager for the fray and confident of victory. Not
a minute had been lost and it so fell out, just as we
were advancing, that we discovered the enemy on the
Selma Eoad beyond the first field, with dense woods
behind. Simultaneously our pickets reported him
moving to the attack. As it turned out, Forrest was
in our front. We were face to face at last. True
to his own rule, he was striving with Roddy's divi-
sion, Qrossland's brigade, and Dan Adams' infan-
try and militia to strike the first blow. But we had
207
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
anticipated him and, as soon as advised of his ad-
vance, I ordered Upton, who was fully ready, "to
sail in!" He was no laggard; his skirmishers from
both brigades were already in line and, to add to
their weight, the splendid regular battery was
thrown well to the front, followed by Winslow,
Noble, Benteen, Peters, Garrard, Eggleston, and
Young, with guidons unfurled and the trumpets
sounding the charge. In less time than it takes to
tell it the rattle of cannon and carbine began. The
enemy was checked, his formation broken, and his
whole line overthrown and in retreat. Our skir-
mishers hastened to remount and with their sup-
ports joined promptly in* hot pursuit. What For-
rest thought has never been told, but he was a bold
and resolute man, not easily overborne, and never
rattled. Biding rapidly to the rear, he selected a
new position covered by a creek some five miles
south of Montevallo, and, again rallying his follow-
ers, made another stand in hopes of holding his po-
sition till nightfall. His men, and especially his
Kentuckians, made a gallant fight. But Upton,
aided by Alexander and Wiflslow, attacking both
center and flanks, soon lifted him from his new
position and drove him in confusion down the Selma
road, till darkness put an end to the pursuit and
gave his routed Confederates a few hours' rest.
Upton, flushed with victory, bivouacked that
night fourteen miles south of Montevallo. The first
day's work was a good one. Both cavalry and ar-
tillery had covered themselves with glory. They
had crumpled up the enemy's line, capturing a num-
ber of prisoners with arms, accouterments, and loose
material. Both officers and men had shown con-
208
CAPTURE OF SELMA
spicuous gallantry and had gained for themselves
and for the corps a moral supremacy over the enemy
which they never lost. They had fairly "got the
bulge on Forrest" and his followers and held it till
the end.
At dawn on April 1 Upton again took the lead
and, followed by Long and LaGrange, moved rapidly
and irresistibly to Eandolph. But soon after get-
ting under way Upton had the good fortune to cap-
ture a rebel courier just from Centerville, on whose
person he found three dispatches, which he sent me
without delay. The first was from Forrest, dated
six miles from Montevallo, March 31, 6 P. M., in-
forming Jackson . . . "that the enemy are mov-
ing right on down the railroad with their wagon
train and artillery," directing him . . . "to fol-
low down after them, taking the road behind them
from Montevallo," but cautioning him not *i>'Vv*
"to bring on a general engagement, as their force"
is much stronger than yours," and finally saying
. . . "an engagement should be avoided unless
you find the balance of our forces in supporting dis-
tance of you. ' ' 1
The second dispatch was from Anderson, A. D.
C., to Forrest, dated Centerville, April 1, 2 A. M.,
saying :
I opened the enclosed dispatch from General Jackson
to ascertain his position, etc. Sent couriers last night at
11 :30 to Chalmers and Mason. From reports received and
from this dispatch, enemy's cavalry or a portion of it have
crossed the Cahawba and General Jackson will attack them
at daylight. I shall remain here for further orders and de-
velopments and at daylight will take one side of the river
1 0. E. Serial No. 104, p. 173.
209
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
or the other. Have sent to General Jackson to know the
position of his artillery. If the couriers can be relied on
the enemy [Croxton] is between him and the battery.
Have the dismounted men entrenched on this side east of
the river, and if the enemy are as represented, will move
the battery here, cross it over and move on the nearest
road to Selma as directed. The courier can explain Jack-
son's position and that of the battery. From this state-
ment the battery is in rear of General Jackson, on the
Tuscaloosa road, and the enemy between his force and his
artillery. Have heard nothing of General Armstrong, but
sent orders to General Chalmers to move to or between the
enemy and Selma. Will dispatch you all information as
soon as received. 1
The third dispatch was a " sub-enclosure, " dated
March 31, 8:45 P. M., from Jackson to James Hill,
senior. The site of the encampment is not given, but
it was doubtless on the road from Tuscaloosa to Cen-
terville at Hill's Plantation, three miles from Scotts-
ville. It runs as follows :
I find the enemy [Croxton] encamped on Huntsville
and Tuscaloosa road at Whites, three miles from point
where Huntsville road comes into Tuscaloosa Road, and six
miles from this place. Their strength not yet ascertained.
I am closing around them with a view of attacking, or if
they move to-night will drive into them. I am placing a
force between them and Tuscaloosa. Have also directed
Colonel Cox, who is in charge of artillery and train some
fifteen miles from here, that in case I do not gain their
front and they advance on Tuscaloosa, to fall back before
them, impeding their progress; to notify Colonel Hard-
castle, commanding post [Tuscaloosa], to have everything
in readiness to meet them and to tear up planks on the
bridge and to remove them, nothing preventing. All ap-
pears bright and I expect success. 2
1 O. B. Serial No. 104, p. 173. */&., p. 174.
210
CAPTURE OF SELMA
Shortly after intercepting these dispatches, I also
received one written by Croxton at Trion, north of
Tuscaloosa, the night before, informing me that he
had struck Jackson's rear, and instead of pushing
on toward Tuscaloosa as ordered, he would follow
up Jackson and endeavor to bring him to an engage-
ment, hoping thereby to prevent his junction with
Forrest.
These dispatches, taken with the operations of
the day before, made it clear that Forrest had met
us in person near Montevallo, and helped by Eoddy,
Crossland, and Adams, was doing what he could to
stay our progress; that Jackson with his division
somewhat scattered was devoting his attention to
Croxton instead of trying to get in my rear; that
Croxton had interposed between him and his trains
and, understanding his duty, was endeavoring to
bring Jackson to an engagement ; that Chalmers was
still west of the Cahawba at or near Marion; and
finally, that if I could seize and destroy the bridge at
Centerville uniting LaGrange with Croxton, McCook
might not only beat Jackson but render it certain
that neither he nor Chalmers could cross the Ca-
hawba to form a junction with Forrest except lower
down the river where there were no bridges and no
fords. In other words, I now knew exactly where
every division and brigade of Forrest's corps was,
that they were widely scattered and that if I could
force the marching and the fighting with sufficient
rapidity and vigor, I should have the game entirely
in my hands. My greatest danger clearly was that
Jackson might overwhelm Croxton in time to cross
the Cahawba at Centerville and fall upon my rear
while I was fighting Forrest in front. The best way
211
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of preventing this was clearly to seize the Center-
ville bridge before the enemy could concentrate there
to hold it.
As Eandolph is abreast of Centerville only
twelve or fifteen miles away, I directed McCook l to
follow up the battalion already ordered there with
a regiment and to follow that with the rest of La-
Grange's splendid brigade, all to march as rapidly
as possible on that point, capture the bridge, and
open communications with Croxton. This done, Mc-
Cook was directed to attack Jackson with his united
division, scatter his forces and confuse him as much
as possible, after which he was to fall back, burn
the bridge at Centerville, and take the direct road
for Selma. His entire outward march was about
thirty-eight miles, and, although he did not leave
Eandolph till nearly 11 A. M., he was successful in
driving the rebel force from Centerville, capturing
the bridge, and pushing rapidly forward to Scotts-
ville, eight miles beyond, but without finding either
Jackson or Croxton. They were evidently engaged
with each other. As the region in which they were
operating was lacking in towns and highways, Mc-
Cook, judging that he should not be led away on a
wild-goose chase, returned to the bridge. After
burning it he set out by the direct road toward
Plantersville and Selma for the purpose of watching
the crossings and preventing the enemy's outlying
columns from getting into Selma ahead of him. But
his movements were somewhat over-cautious, and,
therefore, did not bring him to a junction with the
corps till after Selma surrendered. This detachment
has been criticised as weakening my force before
1 O. B. Serial No. 104, p. 173.
CAPTURE OF SELMA
the battle, but had Jackson, instead of following
Croxton, kept on toward Centerville, McCook 's
movement would have been exactly the right one to
prevent Jackson's junction with Forrest. And this,
of course, was its primary purpose. McCook and
Croxton together had effectually neutralized one of
Forrest's strongest divisions. They had not only
greatly confused Jackson, but by the destruction
of the Centerville bridge had also confused Chalmers
as well and had prevented both from taking any part
in the fighting which occurred in the next thirty-six
hours. I have also been criticised for detaching
Croxton, and the reasons given for this criticism
are similar to those given in the case of McCook
and LaGrange. The answer is the same and the
success of the two aggressive movements in keeping
the bulk of Forrest's corps west of the Cahawba
and thus allowing me to beat him in person by
superiority of numbers, as well as by more rapid
marching, was my complete justification.
Meanwhile Forrest was far from idle. Not sat-
isfied with having directed Jackson to fall in behind
and follow me down from Montevallo, he sent a
courier to Chalmers directing him to push across the
Cahawba with all possible celerity to Ebenezer
Church, six miles north of Plantersville, for the pur-
pose of joining Forrest and helping him stay my
advance. This was a brilliant plan, but, like John-
ston's for the destruction of Grant's army between
Jackson and Vicksburg, it came too late and took
too long to carry it out. Like Grant, I had inside
lines, and, knowing it, determined to force the fight-
ing, confident that it would result in my favor. Hav-
ing taken care of both my right flank and rear, as
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
there was no danger to be apprehended from the
left, it remained only to hurl my two splendid divi-
sions with all possible speed against the enemy in
front, which I knew they outnumbered. Having an-
ticipated Forrest in his own game of getting on the
rear of his opponent, I determined to allow him no
rest but to overwhelm him if possible on the road,
and, failing in that, to drive him inside the works
of Selma as soon as possible.
Had Jackson and Chalmers been swifter than
Croxton and McCook, the worst that could have hap-
pened would have been a battle between the entire
strength of the two corps. Had Long and Upton
been slower than they were in crossing the rivers
and in reaching the main road through Montevallo
to Selma, the two corps would doubtless have met
head-on somewhere north of Selma. But even in
that case the odds were in our favor, and we were
fully justified in the expectation that we should be
victorious.
As it turned out, Forrest received no substantial
additions to his own column and, moving as we did,
from twenty to thirty miles a day, with nine thou-
sand sabers, it was easy to brush his three cavalry
brigades and his infantry detachment out of the
way and to bring my victorious and exultant force
face to face with the fortifications of Selma.
I was constantly in close touch with Long and
Upton, both of whom fully understood what the sit-
uation demanded of them.
In accordance with the order of march for the
day, Upton at Eandolph turned eastward to Old
Maplesville, where he struck the main road to Selma,
while Long pushed straight forward by the new road.
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CAPTURE OF SELMA
This gave us the advantage of two columns in close
cooperation, nowhere more than two miles apart.
Both promptly encountered small parties of the
enemy evidently watching their approach, and with
the impulse of yesterday 's success in their blood,
they drove the Confederates rapidly back on their
main line, which Forrest had deployed in a strong
position near Ebenezer Church. His right rested on
Mulberry Creek, his center was behind Bogler's
Creek, while his left occupied a high wooded ridge.
Four field guns swept the Randolph road and two
the road to Old Maplesville. The position, naturally
a strong one, had been made still stronger by a fence
rail barricade and a slashing of pine trees.
Forrest had at that place, as near as I can make
out, something like five thousand, but both he and
his biographer state it as less than two thousand
men. It was made up of Roddy's division, Cross-
land's Kentucky brigade and Dan Adams' infantry
and state troops from Selma. A detachment of
Armstrong's brigade was also present and Arm-
strong himself with the rest of his troops was on
the way, but did not reach there till dark, when all
the fighting was over. Chalmers with Starke's and
Dan Adams's brigades did not get there at all.
Wyeth tells us that Chalmers sent a dispatch instead,
saying that he had met obstacles which had so de-
layed him that he could not effect a junction in time
to be of service. 1 As can well be understood, For-
rest "was furious with rage" upon receipt of this
dispatch. He evidently did not know that McCook
had interposed between him and Chalmers, and,
therefore, unjustly, but perhaps naturally enough,
1 Wyeth 'a "Life of Forrest, " p. 597.
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
accused the latter of lacking "the alacrity and
swiftness which the emergency required and which
had characterized him on other occasions. " War
is full of vicissitudes and Forrest was now in the
midst of them. Confronted by a superior force, his
own command was badly scattered, with the larger
part of it hopelessly shut out of the impending battle.
There was nothing left him but to curse and fight,
and he did both with characteristic energy and des-
peration. He hoped to stay our progress till
Chalmers could at least reach Plantersville, five
miles to the rear. But McCook was in the way and
all Forrest's efforts to unite his corps in my front
were in vain. We still "had the bulge on him" and
knew how to keep it. Long with his big division
of mounted infantry and cavalry had not yet been
seriously engaged, and, envious of Upton's successes
the day before, he now rushed eagerly upon the
enemy's thin line of skirmishers, from which it was
evident he intended to make his principal fight be-
hind his defenses.
It was now about four o'clock in the afternoon,
and, discovering at a glance the real situation, Long
strengthened the leading battalion of the Seventy-
second Indiana Mounted Infantry with the rest of
that splendid regiment dismounted. Armed with
Spencer magazine rifles, they deployed in open or-
der on the left of the road, and when the word
reached them they rushed to the attack, pumping
out a sheet of lead with each discharge which noth-
ing could resist. They easily broke through and
drove back the enemy's line, shortly after which
Long finished the fighting on that part of the field
by throwing Lieutenant Colonel Frank White with
216
CAPTURE OF SELMA
the saber battalion of the Seventeenth Indiana
Mounted Infantry headlong into the midst of the
retreating Confederates. White himself was a ber-
serker of the Norseman breed, broad-shouldered,
deep-chested, long-limbed, over six feet tall, and
" bearded like a pard." He would have been a full
match for Forrest himself had they met, but that
fate was reserved for a younger and slighter man,
Captain Taylor, a mere stripling, but a braver one
never rode to his death.
This brilliant charge was followed by a running
fight in which both sides and every man displayed
the highest valor. White, in the flower of his
strength, was more than once completely surrounded
by the enemy. But his life seemed to be charmed
and he fought his way out with but little injury.
Taylor, younger and more impulsive, was not so
fortunate. Biding through the melee, he singled out
Forrest, whom they all knew, and assailed him so
fiercely with a shower of saber strokes aimed at
his head and shoulders that for a moment it looked
as though he would kill or capture the fleeing chief-
tain. So closely did the boy-captain follow him and
so nearly were their horses matched in strength
and speed, it was several moments before Forrest
could open space enough to allow him to turn and
shoot his pursuer from the saddle. Speaking of it
a few days later, under a flag of truce with his arm
still in a sling, he said reflectively: "If that boy
had known enough to give me the point of his saber
instead of its edge, I should not have been here to
tell you about it. ' '
Long himself was close to the fighting line, but
before he could deploy the whole of his division to
217
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
support White, Alexander, on the road to the left,
hearing the firing in front, pushed rapidly forward
on Long's left till he also struck Forrest's line
stretching through the woods with its fence rail lay-
out and a slashing of trees further strengthened by
two guns sweeping the road on which Upton was
advancing. It was a well-chosen position, promising
plenty of hard work for the assailants, but Upton
with his entire division was soon abreast of Long.
Both commanders knew their business perfectly,
and with their men all on the field together, with-
out delaying to reconnoiter the enemy's position,
to count his numbers, or to ask for instructions, they
threw forward a strong dismounted skirmish line,
which at once became hotly engaged. In the midst
of the rattle and racket Upton sent Alexander with
two mounted regiments to charge from the left of
his line and this was done just in the nick of time
to catch the enemy in flank and drive him in con-
fusion from the field. Long captured one gun; the
impulse of his onset was so great that, striking the
carriage in flank as it was withdrawing, he crushed
it to the ground. Upton captured two others in his
front. Forrest's whole line was overborne and
driven from the field. So rapid was the charge that
four hundred infantry and dismounted cavalry fell
into our hands as prisoners of war.
The impetuosity of the Union cavalry was beau-
tiful to behold. Its instinct for the flank had led
it to the vital spot at the vital time, and it was now
evident that nothing could stop its gallant onset.
It had fairly turned Forrest's rules of war against
himself, for, without disregarding tactics, it had not
only "got the bulge on him," but "had got there
218
CAPTURE OF SELMA
first with the most men." Forrest, again in full
retreat, was taxed to the utmost to save his com-
mand and keep it together till darkness put an end
to the pursuit.
It was a running fight for twenty-five miles, last-
ing till dark, and, although the victory was com-
plete, the day's work was an exhausting one and
both men and officers were glad to find rest and
abundant food for themselves and their good steeds
at the bivouac fires which blazed that night in great
numbers around the little village of Plantersville,
just twenty miles from Selma. The principal affair
of the day was afterward known as the battle of
Ebenezer Church, and this name was inscribed on
the banners of every regiment of the two divisions.
The little meeting-house for which it was called stood
on the ridge near the scene of action. Every officer
.and soldier who participated in it was satisfied with
himself and the part he had played. There were
neither hesitation nor laggards on that day. Even
the horses seemed carried away by "the noise of
the captains and the shouting. " The foraging par-
ties brought in plenty of provisions that night and
a more joyful bivouac was never made by hungry
and tired soldiers. All were full of hope for the
morrow. No command ever worked more harmoni-
ously. The elan was perfect and the cooperation all
that could be desired. Straggling was unknown
from the time we left Nashville, and all seemed to
understand that the true plan of action was a heavy
dismounted skirmish line corresponding to the in-
fantry line of battle, with a mounted force to charge
the enemy's flanks and cut in upon his rear as op-
portunity offered. The weather was fine and the
219
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
landscape beginning to show the first approach of
spring.
It was near this pretty planting village that Cap-
tain Hill, superintending his foragers, found him-
self on the lawn of a fine country house standing
back from the highway. While directing one detach-
ment to gather forage from the barns and another
to get bacon from the smoke-house, and still another
to catch chickens and collect eggs, he was astonished
at a woman's voice calling out: "You, Boss Hill!
How dare you rob my plantation ! If you don 't call
your men from my smoke-house and stable-yard,
I'll go up to Indiana and make your mother whip
you within an inch of your life!" The hungry
young cavalryman was face to face with a danger
he had not thought of and, turning to meet it like
a man, he recognized a handsome young woman who
had resided in his native town just long enough be-
fore the war to get a divorce. Exactly what fol-
lowed has not been told, but it is a safe inference
that the impressments from that plantation were
minimized as much as possible.
While food and forage were abundant and the
camp fires that night were brilliant with blazing
fence-rails, the situation was by no means devoid
of anxiety. Forrest was still in front, and, although
I hardly expected him to make another stand out-
side of his fortifications, I supposed that Chalmers,
Jackson, and Buford were straining every nerve to
unite their forces with his for a final stand at Selma.
Although every step of the campaign had gone our
way so far, I still lacked exact information as to
the extent and character of the fortifications sur-
rounding the city, the number and size of the guns
220
CAPTURE OF SELMA
surmounting them, and the number of fighting men
available for their defense.
The situation was a grave one, but good fortune
was still with us. That afternoon or night an Eng-
lish civil engineer named Millington, who had been
employed on the fortifications at Selma, gave him-
self up to Upton, and that enterprising officer at
once set about finding out what he knew. It did not
take long to learn that he was exactly the man we
needed. He made no concealment of his knowledge,
and at Upton 's request prepared an accurate pencil
sketch of the trace and profile of the works and of
the topography in front and rear of them to scale,
together with the number and position of the guns
in place. This sketch is still in my possession.
Upton brought it, as well as the engineer, at
once to my headquarters, and it took but a cursory
examination to make certain that we were confronted
by a problem of great difficulty and complexity and
that the next day would be one of hard work and
desperate fighting.
The sketch showed that the city of about eight
thousand people was surrounded by a well-con-
structed, bastioned line of earthworks and stockades,
extending in a semicircle of about three miles, from
the river bank above to the river bank below the
town, with an inner but incomplete line covering the
principal roads from the city to the surrounding
country. The site of Selma is a river terrace above
overflow, rising gently to the northward, surrounded
by cultivated land well commanded and swept by
thirty-two guns in position behind heavy parapets
completely covered by well-constructed stockades
five and a half feet high, the stakes, from six to eight
221
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
inches thick, firmly planted in the ground and their
tops sharpened. The sketch also showed the earth-
works to be continuous except on the sections next
to the river, where the line crossed short stretches
of swamp or creek bottom, evidently considered im-
passable. Although these sections were also com-
pletely covered by the stockade, we hoped to find
the right more or less undefended.
So far as I could see, nothing had been left un-
done to make the place impregnable. Its fortifica-
tions were adapted to either a small force or a large
one, and, as no such works had ever been carried
by cavalry, or for that matter by infantry either,
where proper defense had been made, it was evident
that we were confronted by a mighty serious
problem.
Upton and I spent an anxious hour considering
every possible aspect of the case. He had had un-
usual experience and success with infantry in just
such work and from Marye's Heights to the Dead
Angle at Spottsylvania had never failed to break
through the entrenchments he had attacked. He was,
therefore, my main dependence, but, as I wanted
to lighten his task and divide the risk as much as
possible, I concluded that he should approach the
city by the left-hand road and make his principal at-
tack farther to the left through the swamp, if pos-
sible, where the defense was likely to be the weak-
est, while Long's division, heavier by two regi-
ments, was to follow the right-hand road, parallel
with the other, to the main entrance of the city.
On Sunday, April 2, the reveille was sounded
before daybreak, horses, arms, and equipments had
been well looked after and all arrangements had
222
CAPTURE OF SELMA
been made for a rapid advance and a desperate
fight. Everybody was ready and Long was on the
road before sunrise, but had hardly got strung out
before Upton was at his heels. All wagons, camp-
followers, animals, and surplus impedimenta were
left in the rear so as not to delay or interfere with
the march of the fighting men. Mile after mile
through a thickly settled country, dotted with houses
and enclosures, and broken by corn and cotton fields,
was covered without firing a single shot. The enemy
was nowhere in sight, but this was not surprising,
for Forrest, having been beaten in every encounter
from Montevallo to Plantersville, had wisely made
up his mind not to fight again till he had shelter
and protection from the fortifications of Selma. It
was clearly his duty and determination to defend
that place at every cost, for it contained the prin-
cipal gun factory, armory, machine shops and manu-
facturing establishments turning out military muni-
tions for the Confederate Government. With those
establishments destroyed and the Southern coast
strictly blockaded it would necessarily be but a few
months, probably but a few weeks, till the Confed-
eracy must collapse and its armies fall to pieces for
want of supplies. On the other hand, it was abso-
lutely necessary that our movement against Selma
should be successful. Failure to carry its defenses
would be defeat for us and would bring the entire
rebel force of that region together on our back.
There was not an officer that did not understand
this. Upton was a veteran who needed no super-
vision and no incitement to the full performance
of the task before him. Long was a good soldier,
but had had no experience except with cavalry, and
223
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
up to the time he fell under my command had seen
but little good military team work. His brigade
commanders, Minty and Miller, with similar experi-
ence, were men of untiring energy, but had never
engaged in such an enterprise as that now before
them. Nothing was concealed from them, however.
I rode all day, talking first with Long and then with
Minty and Miller in turn. I showed them the Eng-
lishman's sketch, explaining every detail as to the
cross-section of the works and their ditches, the
stockades, the open ground, the small creeks or runs,
the woods and the swamps outside, and pointed out
every conceivable difficulty. Dwelling upon the re-
sults of failure and disaster, I emphasized the dec-
laration that the works must be carried at no matter
what cost. I directed my efforts especially to
strengthening Miller 's determination and confidence.
Although his brigade of veteran infantry was re-
garded as more capable of such work than the cav-
alry, I pointed out they were up against a heavier
contract than they had ever yet carried through.
Miller was a serious and thoughtful man, sparing
of words as well as of promises. When he thor-
oughly understood his task the most he would say
was that he and his men would do their level best.
No soldier ever more fully redeemed his modest
promises than did Miller and his veterans. But no-
body was forgotten on that long, bright day as our
column hurried southward. Minty, the handsome,
educated Irishman; Biggs, the stalwart farmer;
Kitchell, the modest lawyer ; Vail, the intrepid mer-
chant, and Frank White, the modern berserker, as
well as Alexander, Winslow, Noble, Garrard, Peters,
Benteen, Young, and Eggleston, the splendid colo-
224
CAPTURE OF SELMA
nels of Upton's division, all got a word of explana-
tion and encouragement. Each in his own way prom-
ised and each made good to the letter. And in ad-
dition there was the Fourth Regular Cavalry, my
own escort under the daring Lieutenants Davis,
O'Connel, and Eendelbrook, every one of whom
gave assurance of success. They had been burning
bridges, stations, and cotton warehouses and tear-
ing up railroads all day, but were as eager as fresh
troops for the fray. It was a day of intense interest
and anxiety to no subordinate more than to myself.
While we had only nine thousand sabers, with two
field batteries, every man was a veteran and knew
that he was before the first objective of a great cam-
paign involving the military considerations of the
highest order. While no one could foresee the cer-
tainty of success, every officer fully realized its ab-
solute necessity and promised his best effort to in-
sure it.
As our column approached the city Long turned
to the right and crossed over to the Summerfield
road, while Upton continued down the direct road.
Shortly after three o'clock we caught sight o*f the
city from the higher land and immediately developed
our line with the assaulting regiments and their sup-
ports dismounted and their led horses sent to cover
in the rear. While this was going on I made a rapid
reconnoissance with my staff to verify the English
engineer 's plan and, much to my gratification, found
it to be surprisingly accurate. This made it easy to
complete our dispositions for the attack, which I de-
termined to make in accordance with the ideas de-
veloped by the plan and appearance of the entrench-
ments and the ground in front of them.
225
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Satisfied that I was making no mistake, I di-
rected Long to post a strong regiment at the creek
to his right and rear to look out for Jackson and to
protect the led horses and the pack train, and under
this cover to form his dismounted line across the
Summerfield road, with its right extending toward
Mill Creek, the whole parallel to the entrenchments
in front. This formation, concealed from the enemy
by a low intervening ridge, consisted of only one
thousand five hundred and fifty men and officers in
the fighting line. They were in single rank, open
order, with about one man to the yard, but as they
were all veterans of the finest quality, armed with
Spencer carbines or rifles, I regarded them as in-
vincible. The rest of the division and the horse-
holders were in close supporting distance.
Upton halted about a mile from the works be-
hind a bit of woods, and, immediately dismounting,
deployed Winslow's brigade in line, while he held
Alexander's mounted, ready to move in any direc-
tion. Bobinson's Chicago Board of Trade battery
took position on the Summerfield road, while the
regular battery formed front into action on the
Plantersville road. Both held commanding posi-
tions within close range. It was evident, however,
from the start that we were heavily outweighed in
artillery and that the fight would have to be won as
planned by a direct and dashing assault of the en-
trenchments by the dismounted men.
I decided after careful consideration that the at-
tack should be made under cover of darkness by
Long, while Upton, with three hundred picked men,
should push through a thick growth of young trees
and underbrush to his left and penetrate Bench
226
CAPTURE OF SELMA
Creek Swamp for the purpose of assaulting the
enemy's works where they were weakest. Although
it was growing late, ample time was left for each
division to reach the ground assigned it and to make
its preparations with precision.
The signal for the advance was to be a single
shot from Bodney's guns, but this arrangement
was interfered with by a movement against our
rear, which turned out to be an attack by a part of
Chalmers's division against the regiment that Long
had sent back to cover the pack train and led horses
in rear. It was promptly reenf orced by another regi-
ment and, as the position was a good one for de-
fense, Long rightly concluded that he could hold it
till the battle in front should be won. McCook was
not yet at hand and the situation was a grave one.
Foreseeing that time was of the essence of the un-
dertaking, Long, without even reporting that he had
been attacked in rear, dashed to the front and or-
dered his dismounted line to advance. It was now
just five o'clock. Assisted by both brigade com-
manders, with four field officers leading their respec-
tive regiments, he pushed his dismounted troopers
straight at the rebel works six hundred yards to the
front. They met at once a storm of shot and shell
from fully twenty guns, sweeping the ground over
which they were advancing. Armstrong's brigade,
equal in numbers to themselves, poured a galling
fire of musketry from the parapets as soon as they
got within range. Not an officer or man halted or
hesitated and, pumping out charge after charge from
their deadly Spencers, the men soon reached the
glacis, with Minty, Vail, and Kitchell leading,
clambered over each other's shoulders like boys play-
227
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ing leapfrog, surmounted the stockade, rushed down
into the ditch, and scrambled up the escarpment,
through the embrasures, and over the parapet into
the works. The enemy met them bravely in a sharp
hand-to-hand fight and Forrest always claimed that
Armstrong had enough men to repel the attack, but
the courage and impulse of the Union soldiers were
irresistible and soon gave them a complete victory.
In less time that it takes to tell it, four officers and
thirty-eight men were killed, while two hundred and
seventy were wounded. Long himself was stricken
down within a few yards of the enemy's works by
a bullet which ploughed through his scalp. Colonel
Dobb of the Fourth Ohio was killed, while the in-
vincible Miller, with Colonel McCormick and Lieu-
tenant Colonel Biggs, were also knocked out, but
nothing daunted or delayed the rush of that gal-
lant line in blue.
Upton, hearing the noise of battle to his right,
punctuated as it was by the rattle and roar of the
opposing artillery, waited for neither signal nor or-
ders, but made his way through the brush, across
the swamp, carrying the works in his front with
a rush and but trifling loss. Thus the entire outer
line of the defenses was captured with no other or-
ders than those I had given by way of preparation.
Hearing the fusillade and roar of artillery and
realizing that the fight was indeed on for better or
for worse, I galloped at once to the left of Long's
charging line, and, pausing only long enough to
learn what had precipitated the action, I sent a staff
officer to Upton with directions to carry out the
orders previously given him, to push across the
swamp, break through the stockade, and turn the
228
CAPTURE OF SELMA
enemy 's right. But before the officer reached him
Upton, with true military instinct, was under full
headway, doing his part and gaining his share of
the victory. The whole plain for a mile and a half
was covered at once with a whirlwind of battle.
Without waiting for the result, I promptly dis-
mounted the horse I had been riding all day, sprang
onto my splendid gray gelding, " Sheridan, " and,
turning to the Fourth Regulars, bade them follow
at the charge. Eegarding it as one of those emer-
gencies which occur but once in a soldier's life and
realizing that I had not another man to put in, I
felt it my duty to show myself on my most con-
spicuous horse with staff, escort, and red battle-flag
in the thickest of the fight. Not a man faltered.
Straight down the turnpike, through the first line
of works we rode all together, every man with saber
drawn and nerves strained to the utmost, as though
his personal example was essential to victory, and
while Long, to the right, swept over stockade, ditch,
and parapet, driving Forrest and Armstrong from
their outer entrenchments back upon the inner line,
I found myself abreast of our dismounted men, close
enough to the enemy's second line of entrenchments
to hear an officer call out : ' ' Shoot that man on the
white horse." My horse fell instantly with a bullet
in the breast. As he sank to the ground I threw
myself from the saddle, but had hardly touched the
ground before he was on his feet with his head high
in the air and his eyes blazing as though they were
balls of fire. As there was only a trickle of blood
from his breast and no other horse within reach,
I remounted and loudly sounded the rally. Incred-
ible as it may seem, I rode the wounded horse till
229
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
eleven that night. He showed neither pain nor fa-
tigue, but his wound was a mortal one. Two weeks
later he was wounded again through the neck by a
stray bullet in the dark inside the Chattahoochee
bridge, at Columbus, and died a week later at Macon.
My escort was badly scattered in the charge,
but, responding to the stirring calls of my Indian
bugler, it reformed at once and followed me at a
rattling pace through the entrenchments at the high-
way. As the ground was clear of obstructions from
that point, I sent the regiment again headlong after
the enemy and had the satisfaction of seeing it dis-
appear in the mass of broken and fleeing Confeder-
ates, when I halted and sent word to Minty, who
had succeeded Long in command of the Second Divi-
sion, to press his advantage for all that was in
sight. Upton was doing his work well from the
Eange Line road around to the left, sweeping every-
thing before him. He also broke through the inner
line, putting the enemy after a headlong charge
again to flight. Orders were sent to press his ad-
vantage, but upon such an occasion and to such a
man orders were hardly necessary. Withal he fol-
lowed the retreating enemy on the Burnsville road
back into the country, far into the night, capturing
four guns and many prisoners.
Eodney and Eobinson, with their field rifles,
pounded away from their advantageous positions
till the first line was carried, when they limbered
up and galloped into new positions almost muzzle
to muzzle with the enemy's guns on the inner en-
trenchments. From their last position they poured
a storm of canister and shrapnel into the retreating
enemy, thus adding to the rout and excitement,
CAPTURE OF SELMA
which now threw the suburbs of the city into wild
confusion and terror.
Our victory was complete, but night settled down
before the fighting ended or the dismounted troopers
could reassemble and remount their horses from
the rear. The only mounted men that actually got
into the melee were the Fourth Eegulars, who were
always kept at hand for such purposes. Most of
the Confederates left their horses behind to the
victors for the simple reason that they were so
pressed from first to last they could neither reach
nor remount them.
Forrest, Buf ord, Armstrong, and Adams exerted
themselves as they never did before to stem the tide
of defeat, but all their efforts were futile. Dark-
ness having fallen upon them as well as upon us,
it was impossible to rally or reform their men or
to do anything effective to bring order out of chaos.
Knowing the streets and open places better than
it was possible for us, they knew what direction
to take to escape from the city. The first three
made their way by the Burnsville road to the east-
ward out of the fortifications and into the open coun-
try before Upton's men discovered their route or
could go in pursuit. Dan Adams, it is said, took
to the Alabama Eiver and succeeded in reaching
the other side, but whether by boat or by swimming
is not known. Many men followed and were drowned
in their efforts to escape.
Before the attack began, but after we had made
our appearance in front of the town, Lieutenant
General Dick Taylor, the department commander,
seeing that the defense could hardly be made good,
escaped to the west by the last railway train that
231
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
left the city before our men cut off communication
with the country beyond.
As soon as the city was in our possession, all
organized resistance ceased, but desultory street
fighting continued till the remnants of the Confed-
erate force were picked up or had made their es-
cape. But this did not end the confusion and racket.
On the contrary, it seemed to increase them. The
inexorable Forrest had forced every male strong
enough to pull a trigger, including judges, lawyers,
preachers, doctors, and government employees, old
and young alike, to the number of two thousand or
more, into the defenses. Not one was excused. It
was " fight or swim; into the works or into the riv-
er, " for everybody, and, according to all accounts,
Forrest did not care much which. But when the
break came it was every man for himself. Many
were captured, and those that were not sought con-
cealment in the houses of the town.
It was now pitch dark and, as though this had
been the chance they were waiting for, the negroes
broke loose and began to plunder the shops and
stores. Pandemonium followed, and before our pro-
vost guard could get control fires were raging at
several places, and, as the firemen had been called
out to fight, it looked as though the town would be
destroyed by the fires. None of my people knew
where the fire engines were or how to get them at
work, and, although my staff, with the assistance
of the leading officers, did all they could to restore
order and prevent the fires from spreading, it was
nearly midnight before they got the situation com-
pletely under control. Some of the marauders and
desperadoes who always find place in modern armies
232
CAPTURE OF SELMA
doubtless took part in plundering the stores and
occasionally in breaking into private houses, but all
such work was ruthlessly and promptly stopped as
soon as it became known.
Naturally, I gave personal attention to restoring
order and finding the Confederate arsenal, gun
shops, foundries, factories, and storehouses, and to
putting them under military guard. Most of them
on the river front, covering some twenty acres, were
easily found and protected. Of course, they were
from the first doomed to destruction. Indeed, that
was the principal object of our expedition, but they
were spared for several days. They were finally
fired on a dark night in the midst of a heavy rain-
storm, but not till all the machinery had been dis-
abled and all the stores, ammunition, shot, and shell
had been tumbled into the river. This work, with
the construction of the necessary troughs and run-
ways, was placed under Winslow's supervision, who,
in addition to commanding the city, was charged
with destroying whatever it contained belonging to
the Confederate Government. The final act of the
drama was most impressive. The buildings, mostly
of dry pine, when ignited from the inside burned
like tinder. The rain, which shortly came down in
torrents, and the impenetrable clouds which over-
spread the skies added to the grandeur of the scene
and at the same time made it possible to confine
the fire strictly to the property destined for destruc-
tion. Every point in the neighborhood was watched
with vigilance to see that not a dollar's worth of
private property was injured in the conflagration
which closed the scene.
At eleven o'clock on the night of capture, after
233
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
restoring order and assuring myself that every or-
ganization under its own officers was safely assem-
bled in bivouac, I established headquarters at the
Gee House, the leading hotel of the place, turned
my poor wounded gray over to the veterinary and
prepared myself for the rest we had all so fully
earned. Selma was ours and fairly won, but it was
not till well into the next day that we realized the
full extent and value of our victory.
Sunday, April 2, 1865, was the greatest day in
the history of the Cavalry Corps M. D. M., for on
that day it had not only captured the most complete
set of fortifications in the South, covering the most
important Confederate depots of manufacture and
supply, but it had by the same act planted itself
firmly across the central line of railway connecting
Eichmond with the southwestern states. It had
practically turned the Confederacy's left flank, cap-
tured its last and most valuable stronghold, put it-
self in position to occupy and roll up its last line of
interior defense and communication, and finally
made it certain that the cavalry army which had
done these things could in a month more join
Sherman and Grant in Virginia. But it was not till
three weeks later that we knew Eichmond, at the
other end of the line, had fallen on the same day
with Selma, and that these simultaneous events were
practically the end of the War for the Union.
With nine thousand cavalry actually at hand
and three thousand more in supporting distance,
but less than half the number actually engaged, a
single line of one thousand five hundred and fifty
dismounted officers and men, led by Long, Minty,
and Miller, and four regimental commanders, aided
234
CAPTURE OF SELMA
by Upton, Winslow, and Alexander, farther to the
left, had broken through and swept over a strongly
constructed, double-bastioned line, covered by a con-
tinuous stockade, with a deep ditch containing mud
and water at places, mounting thirty-two cannon of
various calibers, and holding, according to the best
account we could get, from five to six thousand men,
cavalry, artillery, infantry, and militia. It is cer-
tain that Armstrong's veteran brigade, estimated at
not less than one thousand five hundred men, held
the entrenchments in front of Long and ought to
have repelled the force of equal size which carried
them. Be this as it may, the victory, no matter how
gained or what the odds, was an unheard-of one
for cavalry, and the results and incidents which
followed during the month of April made it abso-
lutely impossible for the Confederate Government
to continue the war after Lee's surrender at Appo-
mattox eight days later. 1
The enemy's killed and wounded in the campaign
ending at Selma were never reported, but probably
were somewhat less than ours, while their loss of
property and munitions was not only great, but ir-
reparable. We captured two thousand seven hun-
dred prisoners, with one hundred and fifty officers,
two thousand cavalry and artillery horses, thirty-
two guns in position on the defenses, besides forty-
four siege and seacoast guns and twenty-six field
guns, with their carriages and caissons, in the ar-
senal and foundries, sixty-six thousand rounds of
1 For a detailed account of the Selma Campaign with particulars
as to Forrest 'a command, see Scott 'a admirable work, "The Story
of a Cavalr7 Regiment/' G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1893,
pp. 410-463; also Official Eecords, Serial Number 103, Wilson's Raid,
Alabama and Georgia, pp. 339-504.
235
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
artillery ammunition, large quantities of cartridges
ready for issue, and fourteen thousand pounds of
gunpowder. The Selma arsenal, consisting of twen-
ty-four buildings filled with machinery and muni-
tions of war, the great foundry for casting naval
and military guns, with its machinery and tools,
three full iron plants in operation, many large shops
and factories making machinery, tools, and equip-
ments, the central powder and niter works, two maga-
zines, with seven buildings connected therewith, be-
sides many storehouses filled with quartermaster's
and commissary's supplies, were burned a few days
later. The blow was an overwhelming one to the
Confederacy and of corresponding advantage to the
Union national cause.
The sudden end of the war necessarily rendered
it impossible for the Confederate leaders to make
or send in detailed reports of the final campaign
through Alabama and Georgia. For a decade or
more the Confederate sympathizers and historians
either ignored it entirely or did what they could to
minimize its effects, but Lieutenant General Eichard
Taylor, the supreme Confederate commander in
that theater of operations, after all was over wrote
as follows:
I have never met this General Wilson, whose soldierly
qualities are entitled to respect; for of all the Federal
expeditions of which I have any knowledge, his was the
best conducted. 1
This is high praise, but we may well be pardoned
for leaving it at that.
^'Destruction and Keconstruction, " p. 220.
236
VII
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
Message to Canby Meeting with Forrest Campaign-
against Montgomery, West Point, and Columbus
Colored regiments Capture of rebel supply boats by
Major West on.
I was up and at work at an early hour on April 3.
Although Selma was firmly in our possession, it
was necessary to make our position secure and the
first measure to that end was to draw in our detach-
ments and trains and send out scouts to ascertain
the enemy's position and movements. We were en-
tirely ignorant of what was taking place in Vir-
ginia, or in Mississippi and Alabama. While my
campaign had been primarily intended as a demon-
stration in favor of Canby 's operations against Mo-
bile, its success had made it certain that Canby with
his overwhelming force would also succeed. I, there-
fore, sent Upton out for McCook, whom he found at
Plantersville, to bring in the pontoon train, the
wagons, and the dismounted men, and this he did
without delay or loss. The whole command, except
Groxton's brigade, was reunited and refitted as far
as the resources we had captured would permit. All
our dismounted troopers and servants were mounted
on captured horses, and after all swapping and ex-
237
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
changing were finished there was a surplus of about
five hundred horses and many mules. Fearing that
these might fall into the enemy's hands when we
left, I ordered them shot and thrown into the Ala-
bama Eiver, which was done. The measure seemed
cruel, but in war it is frequently necessary to do
such things for self-protection as well as for the
injury of the enemy.
We had no means of knowing that the Eebellion
was so near its end. We were in the heart of the
enemy's country, cut off from all communication
with the North and with the Government. The tele-
graph lines were broken or in hostile hands, the
trains were stopped, the newspapers and mail were
suspended, and the people sullen and dismayed. Our
only source of information were the "grapevine
telegraph" and the negroes. While the latter were
unreliable, but willing, they knew but little. We had
no white friends to declare themselves, and were,
therefore, thrown entirely on our own resources and
judgment.
Feeling sure that Mobile would necessarily fol-
low Selma, I regarded it of the first importance to
acquaint Canby with our success and our future
course, but the intervening country, including the
Alabama valley, was entirely in the hands of the
enemy. The distance from Selma to Mobile is one
hundred and fifty miles as the crow flies, by the
river at least twice that distance, and, while it is
now certain a squadron of cavalry could have ridden
through that region safely and rapidly, I concluded
it best to send a negro by skiff with the current of
the great river to carry him forward both day and
night. After some search I found a middle-aged
238
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
black man named Charles Marven, sensible, trust-
worthy, and well acquainted with the river, who was
willing to carry my dispatch to Canby, which I wrote
on tissue paper, to be concealed in his clothing, but
I took the precaution of explaining its contents fully
to my dignified and silent messenger. As though
proud of his trust, he received it with becoming
gravity and solemnly assured me he would deliver
it in person to Canby within five days unless killed
on the way. It is pleasant to record that he started
on the 4th and without resting night or day reached
his destination and delivered his message safely
into Canby 's hands. In compliance with my request,
the General gave him two hundred dollars for his
valuable service, and, after celebrating our victory
at Selma with a salute of a hundred guns, which
the enemy were slow to understand, he proceeded
with confidence and deliberation to enforce the sur-
render of Mobile and the strong places he had been
confronting for several weeks as a necessary pre-
liminary to his pushing into the interior as I ad-
vised. He knew as well as I did that the war was
over in Alabama and that our true line thenceforth
was to the eastward. The enemy to the westward
was soon advised through Taylor that Selma had
fallen, and this was followed by the assault and
capture of the Spanish Fort and Blakely, and the
surrender of Mobile. Of course, I was ignorant
of these events till several weeks afterward, but,
feeling assured that they would occur sooner or
later, my campaign to Montgomery and eastward
was fully justified.
Forrest, in escaping from Selma, rode rapidly
around the city to the westward under the cover
239
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of darkness. On the way his escort fell upon an
outlying detachment of the Fourth Cavalry at a
farmhouse and killed the last one of them, including
Lieutenant Eoys in command. Such incidents as
this were far too frequent with Forrest. He ap-
pears to have had a ruthless temper which impelled
him upon every occasion where he had a clear ad-
vantage to push his success to a hloody end, and
yet he always seemed not only to resent but to have
a plausible excuse for the cruel excesses which were
charged against him.
After calling in my detachments and decreasing
my impedimenta, I directed my engineer, Lieuten-
ant Heywood of the Fourth Michigan, to gather
materials for the construction of wooden pontoons
or batteaux with which to piece out our bridge train,
and to lay a bridge across the Alabama, which at
that place is eight hundred and fifty feet wide and
very deep, with a strong current toward the Gulf
of Mexico. Heywood and Hubbard were vigorous
and resourceful men, and, while they found but
little lumber ready, they fitted up a disabled saw-
mill and cut the saw logs by hand into lumber of
proper sizes for use. With the assistance of the
Michigan men, many of whom were lumbermen, they
made rapid progress, and, although nails, spikes,
and cordage were extremely scarce, they had a float-
ing bridge spanning the river by the night of April 7,
or within four working days.
Meanwhile, I was anxious to know what had be-
come of Croxton, who had neither come in nor re-
ported his whereabouts. As we were encumbered
with several thousand prisoners, many of them citi-
zens who had been forced into the defenses of Selma,
240
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
it occurred to me that I might arrange an exchange
with Forrest, whom I knew to be still in the vicinity,
west of the Cahawba. While I had lost relatively
few men, a sufficient number was missing to justify
an effort at their recovery. As Forrest was in much
worse condition, we arranged by correspondence
and couriers to meet under a flag of truce for the
purpose of discussing an exchange of prisoners and
such other matters as might interest us. Accord-
ingly, I started to Cahawba, nine or ten miles from
Selma, on the morning of the 7th, but, finding the
streams much swollen and the bridges broken or
swept away, I reluctantly gave up the trip and re-
turned to the city for the night. Early next morn-
ing I started out again and by ten o'clock reached
the hospitable mansion of Colonel Matthews in the
town of Cahawba. I found a gentleman of great
intelligence and high character and, although a slave-
holder and a rich planter, he had never given up
his allegiance to the Union. He received me and
my two aids with true Southern hospitality and,
although he expressed surprise at my youth and
modest suite, he at once made me understand that
I was a most welcome guest.
Forrest arrived at 1 P. M V and as soon as our
greetings, which were made with some reserve on
his part, were over, we were summoned to a bounti-
ful Southern dinner. With good cheer the formali-
ties were relaxed and all embarrassment disap-
peared, so that by the time the meal was over we
were treating each other like old acquaintances, if
not old friends. Left to ourselves, Forrest and I
withdrew to the parlor, where we had a long but
guarded conversation covering recent events and
241
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
their possible consequences. It was easy to see,
however, that he was depressed. He carried his left
arm in a sling and moved with cautious deliberation.
He appeared to be in the full maturity of his pow-
ers. Born in 1821, he was forty-four years of age
and in excellent condition, though, like myself, lean
in flesh and hard of muscle. With cold, steel-blue
eyes, regular features, full brown hair and a com-
manding figure, I found him neither so tall nor so
masterful in appearance as I expected. His biog-
raphers tell us he was over six feet tall. Before see-
ing him I thought of him fully up to "that stature,
with the erect figure and martial bearing of the typ-
ical Southern cavalier, but I frankly confess I was
somewhat disappointed. I found him loosely put to-
gether, if not somewhat stooping and slouchy in ap-
pearance, and he appeared rather under than over
six feet. His frame was large and his body full, and
I guessed his weight at one hundred and seventy-five
pounds. His countenance was serious, his conduct
diffident, but self-possessed, and his bearing free
from military affectations. It took but a glance to dis-
cover that life and its duties were all-important to
him, and that whatever engaged his attention would
receive most careful consideration. He was well
clad, and as he rode up it was evident that he was
admirably mounted. His general appearance indi-
cated great firmness, excellent judgment, and inflex-
ible will. I came to know him well, if not intimately,
after the war, when we were both engaged in build-
ing railroads. I found him in civil life a modest,
unassuming, and trustworthy man of affairs. What
he thought of me I never knew, except that he al-
ways treated me with due respect and consideration.
242
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
I was about sixteen years his junior, somewhat
shorter, and of lighter build, and, judging from his
first remarks at the Cahawba meeting, he was quite
as curious about me as I was about him. We had
hardly shaken hands and taken our seats when, look-
ing me steadily in the face, he said :
"Well, General, you have beaten me badly, and
for the first time I am compelled to make such an
acknowledgment. I have met many of your men,
but never before one I did not get away with, first
or last."
I replied at once: "Our victory was not with-
out cost. You put up a stout fight, but we were too
many and too fast for you."
To this he rejoined: "Yes, I did my best, but,
if I now had your entire force in hand, it would not
compensate us for the deadly blow you have in-
flicted upon our cause by the capture and destruc-
tion of our great arsenal, foundries, workshops, and
storehouses at Selma."
The conversation then turned to details, during
which he did not hesitate to say that Armstrong,
holding that section of the works carried by Long
with about as many men behind the entrenchments
as came against them, ought to have repelled the
attack instead of yielding to it. In this connection
he confessed that our movements were too rapid
for him, and that, although he had pressed every
townsman from the oldest down to the schoolboys
into the works and ought to have made good, we
had got the start of him from the first and, in spite
of all he could do, had carried everything before
us. While making no effort to conceal his surprise
nor to hide his chagrin, he closed his lips rigidly
243
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
with reference to all other operations and said abso-
lutely nothing as to the future course of the war,
either in our own theater or elsewhere in the Con-
federacy.
When I suggested an exchange of prisoners he
pleaded lack of authority, but offered to communi-
cate with those above him and give me their views
later. Whether he discovered that I did not regard
the matter as of serious concern, I never knew, but
in the conversation which followed he made it clear,
perhaps inadvertently, that he had captured but few
of Croxton's men, that Croxton, after operating
about Trion and Tuscaloosa, had gone well down
toward Meridian, and, finally, that he was still at
large, going practically where he pleased. As this
was precisely what I wanted to know, and, indeed,
had gone out to learn, I brought the conference to
a close with the remark that it was getting late and
I must return to Selma.
On taking leave I said with sincere sympathy:
"General, I notice that you are carrying your arm
in a sling. I hope you are not badly hurt. ' ' Where-
upon he replied : i l Oh no, merely somewhat severely
bruised. A young captain of yours singled me out
at Ebenezer Church and rained such a shower of
saber strokes on my head and shoulders that I
thought he would kill me. While warding them off
with my arm I feared that he would give me the
point of his saber instead of its edge, and, had he
known enough to do that, I should not have been
here to tell you about it. ' '
This incident may now be dismissed with the
remark that I cautioned Forrest to be more careful
hereafter, as many of our men knew him by sight
244
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
and would naturally regard it as a great feat of
arms to kill him in battle. Without the slightest
appearance of emotion he answered: "I am much
obliged to you, General, but I have no fear ! I have
faced death on a hundred fields and I am sure the
bullet has not been cast which is to kill me."
Having satisfied myself that Croxton was safe
and still cooperating with me, I galloped back to
Selma, resolved and ready to cross the river and
continue my operations, first against Montgomery,
and afterward onward to Columbus, West Point, and
central Georgia. Our floating bridge, eight hundred
and fifty feet long, composed of thirty canvas and
six wooden pontoons, with three large barges for
the shore ends, was now in position and ready for
use. It was firmly anchored by heavy pieces of ma-
chinery, but the river was rising rapidly and was
full of drifting trees, which made it difficult to keep
the bridge in position. While under construction
it had been broken more than once, but early the
next day the crossing began and continued with oc-
casional intermissions till the entire command was
safely south of the river. The passage was char-
acterized by several exciting incidents. The work
of protecting the bridge was difficult in the extreme,
but by the use of skiffs the floating trees were guided
either to the shore above and fastened there or
through the openings of the bridge. In supervising
this work General Alexander was particularly active,
but while warding off a heavy log the current dashed
him against one of the anchor lines, overturned
his boat, and threw his crew into the river. For-
tunately, he caught the bow of a pontoon as he came
up and was drawing himself over the gunwale when
245
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the log caught him between it and the pontoon, broke
three ribs and came near crushing his life out of
him, but happily the pontoniers succeeded in res-
cuing and lifting him onto the bridge without fur-
ther injury.
The march of our column by twos across the
bridge continued night and day till completed. Ow-
ing to the great depth and rapidity of the current,
the anchor lines pulled the bows of the boats so deep
that they occasionally took water, and in one in-
stance a section of the bridge was torn from the
structure. The boats were so short that it was diffi-
cult to keep the moving column close enough to the
downstream side to keep the bridge stable. The pas-
sage was, therefore, slow, but continued without halt
throughout the night till finished. This made it
necessary to light up the scene by the blaze of burn-
ing frame buildings, several of which near the bank
were set on fire for that purpose. The scene was
a romantic and brilliant one, long to be remembered.
The rear guard, composed of the Fourth Iowa
Cavalry, by midnight of the 9th had safely crossed
the river and gone into bivouac half a mile south
of the bridge. Winslow, commanding the city, hav-
ing satisfied himself that the entire command and
all its impedimenta were safely over, remained in
the town with his aids, orderlies, and a few troopers
till the morning of the 10th. Having personally
superintended the establishment of a hospital, in
which about eighty of our wounded were left be-
hind in charge of our own surgeons, with instruc-
tions to treat both Confederates and Union men
alike, he withdrew, instructing the pontoniers to
dismantle the bridge. All the new batteaux and
246
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
half of the canvas boats were then destroyed so that
the bridge train, thus lightened, could easily keep
up with the rapidly moving column. It had laid
three bridges before reaching Selma, and, as the
rivers east of that place were either narrow or
spanned by permanent bridges, it was confidently
believed we should be able to cross them without
material delay or difficulty.
While the corps greatly profited by the week's
rest at Selma, it devoted all the time necessary while
there to looking after harness and equipment and
to shoeing horses and mules. Wagons, pontoon
train, and pack animals had been reduced to the
lowest limit, and, as will be seen, camp followers
were rigidly cut off. But a great number of fugi-
tives from the surrounding country flocked into the
town and our march to the eastward had hardly
begun when it became apparent that new crowds
were following us, which made vigorous measures
necessary for getting rid of them. The rear guard
could keep them behind, but could not prevent them
from taking the road to freedom. The first day out
I became deeply impressed with the necessity of
turning the multitude to some useful purpose. Ac-
cordingly, I concluded to organize the able-bodied
men of military age into regiments, one to each
division, and to ruthlessly shut off the old men,
women, and children.
As Forrest was not willing to exchange prisoners,
I adopted the plan of marching those captured at
Selma through the country, and as they gave out
to parole and allow them to straggle back to Selma
or to their homes as best they could. This also de-
layed our rear guard somewhat, but the plan worked
247
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
well, as it gave every white man who fell into our
hands a severe lesson as to what might happen to
men captured in arms against their country.
As the surgeons examined and selected the able-
bodied negroes I detailed the necessary line officers
for the preliminary organization of companies and
regiments. This done, we mounted the men on such
horses and mules as we could pick up in the country.
The most rigid discipline was established, and from
that time we incurred no delay or inconvenience
to the marching column. No matter what distance
the white troops covered, the negroes always got
into camp at a reasonable hour the same night. Upon
one occasion many of them marched forty miles ,on
foot without stopping. This shows that they were
in fine condition for military life.
I am glad to add that this organization consti-
tuted the only instance of the kind that came to my
knowledge during the war. The results were satis-
factory and, although hostilities were practically at
an end, the organization and equipment of the regi-
ments were approved and they were duly mustered
into the army later, under the authority of the War
Department. Commanded by such men as Benteen,
Boot, and Archer, they could not fail to reach an
excellent state of discipline and efficiency. During
our march to the eastward a number were also used
as teamsters, train guards, and road makers, in all
of which work they soon became experts, and found
their highest utility.
Our march from Selma lay nearly due east
through the planting villages of Benton, Churchill,
and Lowndesborough. Little opposition was encoun-
tered, although Clanton's brigade of Buford's divi-
248
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
sion preceded us, keeping careful watch of our move-
ments. Slight skirmishing took place at the bridges
and other positions favorable for defense, but our
column, covered by strong and rapidly moving ad-
vance guards, was nowhere materially delayed.
Swamps and creeks alternating with rolling uplands
varied the scene from hour to hour. We were at
last within the richest planting district of the South
and found it, not only untouched by war, but abound-
ing in forage and provisions of every sort. The
roads, bordered by hedges of Cherokee roses, were
redolent with spring perfumes. The march was,
therefore, not only rapid, but delightful and
cheering.
The facility with which the negroes were organ-
ized, armed, and equipped and the service they ren-
dered made it certain that Hatch's division could
easily have been furnished at Selma and on the
march with horses and everything else essential to
its efficiency. When this came to me in all its force
I could not help wishing that I had brought Hatch
with me. His presence would have provided against
every possible contingency and would have given me
such a preponderance of force as to make victory
certain even if Forrest had succeeded in confronting
me with all the Confederate cavalry in the South-
west. The lesson taught by this incident should not
be lost sight of by military men hereafter.
Although the Confederates made but little show
as we approached Montgomery on the morning of
April 12, there was nothing visible to indicate the
peaceful surrender of the place. As the first capital
of the Confederacy and the strategic and commercial
center of a wide region, we naturally supposed it
249
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
had been fully fortified and would be stoutly de-
fended. While I knew that neither Taylor nor For-
rest was there, I supposed that some other general
would necessarily gather a strong force within its
works and that we should have a sharp fight for their
possession. But as it turned out the local authori-
ties decided that, as no effective defense could be
made, their only alternative was to place the city
and themselves under my protection. For this pur-
pose the mayor and several of the principal citizens
rode out with a flag of truce and surrendered their
charge into my hands without terms or conditions.
This made it necessary to halt, close up the column,
and take measures for raising the national flag over
the first Confederate capitol. During this halt officers
were told off to guard the public stores, to maintain
order, and to prevent straggling and marauding.
Finally every known precaution was resorted to for
the purpose of impressing the people with the disci-
pline, strength, and invincibility of the forces under
my command.
Naturally both officers and men were at once noti-
fied that the city had surrendered and that there
would be no fight. It is but the truth to add that
they were disappointed. They had not thought it
possible that Montgomery, after having given such
proud defiance at the outbreak of the Eebellion to
the national unity and power, would surrender with-
out even a show of resistance. But when they be-
came convinced that such was the case, they consoled
themselves with making the best possible prepara-
tions for a triumphal march through the principal
streets to their designated camp beyond. Having
sent the Fourth Cavalry forward as provost guard,
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LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
the entry was made with all the decorum and cere-
mony possible to a fighting force in the heart of a
hostile country.
With perfect order in column of platoons, every
man in his place, division and brigade flags unfurled,
guidons flying, sabers and spurs jingling, bands play-
ing patriotic airs, and the bugles now and then
sounding the calls, the war-begrimed Union troopers,
batteries, ambulances, and wagons passed proudly
through the city. Not a man left the ranks, not a
loud word was uttered, and not an incident hap-
pened to hurt the feelings of the misguided people.
It was an example of discipline, order, and power
lasting nearly all day and constituting a far more
impressive spectacle than a bloody battle would have
been. Five brigades, not far from twelve thousand
troopers, were in that column passing in review, as
it were, before the ladies and gentlemen of the city.
Many witnessed it from the windows, doorsteps, and
sidewalks with silent respect, which showed clearly
that the great Rebellion was at an end. The Union
flag, which we promptly hoisted over the State
House, was recognized by all as the emblem of na-
tional authority, and as regiment after regiment
passed onward beneath the shadow of its starry
folds, they made the city ring with their exultant
salute, and this must have impressed all with the
conviction that the Union had been reestablished,
and that peace was near at hand. It was a great
day for the Cavalry Corps, every man of which
seemed to understand and to act upon the under-
standing that the city, having surrendered without
a fight, belonged to the commanding general, and
that every soldier was in honor bound not only to
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
respect Ms truce, but to show the highest discipline
of which he was capable. It was an impressive sight
long to be remembered by both citizens and soldiers.
Having on my arrival accepted the hospitality
of Colonel Powell, a leading citizen, I dismounted,
my headquarters at his handsome house. He
and his family were people of education and refine-
ment, who knew how to be polite even to unwelcome
guests. They had seen no Union soldiers except
prisoners of war, but, fearing that those in arms
with me would be violent and predatory, the colonel
had, as a precautionary measure, emptied his wine-
cellar and broken the bottles on the curbstone. Many
of his neighbors had followed his example, and when
I got there the gutters were red with running wine.
But when it was seen that not a trooper left his
place in the ranks, that there were neither marauders
nor drunken men, and that perfect order prevailed,
a feeling of silent awe seemed to spread to the fea-
tures of those worthy people. More than one lady
expressed her surprise and gratification at the per-
fect behavior of our men, while all concerned de-
clared their regret at the waste of wines and liquors
which had been poured into the gutters to make
certain that the Yankee troopers should have no
opportunity for drunkenness.
Here, as at Selma, while protecting private prop-
erty, we burned such foundries and factories as
might be used in aid of the expiring rebellion. The
Confederate authorities, while making no resistance,
had burned eighty-five thousand bales of cotton and
loaded their military supplies on a fleet of steam-
boats, which they sent to the Tuckabatachee bend
of the Coosa Eiver, some twelve or fifteen miles
252
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
above the city, near Wetumka. But as soon as this
was reported I sent a detachment of the Fourth
Kentucky Cavalry under the command of Major, af-
terward Major General, John F. Weston to capture
and bring in the fleet. This service was performed
in a manner that well illustrates the hardihood and
enterprise of the western cavalrymen. As the boats
were found under guard, tied up to the opposite
shore, it seemed at first glance hardly possible to
reach them, but, nothing daunted, the young and
gallant major, with a non-commissioned officer and
two privates, pulled off their clothes and swam the
river behind a floating log at the bend above for
a couple of skiffs, with which they came back, and
ferried the rest of their men to the other shore.
While engaged in this operation a detachment of
the Fourth Iowa Cavalry came to the crossing and
offered their support, but this was declined, and,
although the Iowa men remained near at hand, they
took no other part in the enterprise. The Kentuck-
ians alone captured the steamboats, got up steam,
took their horses aboard, and brought the fleet to
Montgomery that night. ' After taking such of the
supplies as were required for our troops the boats
and cargoes were burned to the water's edge, mak-
ing a brilliant bonfire for the multitude which lined
the shore.
Years afterward, at my request and on my rec-
ommendation, the Congressional medal of honor was
bestowed upon Weston for his gallantry and enter-
prise in this unusual affair.
At Montgomery the local newspapers published
what appeared to be a truthful statement that Lee
had abandoned the defenses of Petersburg and re-
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
treated to the interior, closely followed by Grant,
while Davis and his cabinet had fled from Eichmond
and reestablished their Government, first at Dan-
bury and afterward at Saulsbury, North Carolina.
While these reports seemed to be entirely credible,
I could get no detailed confirmation of them. No
one would admit that he knew positively what had
taken place in .Virginia, and not a word reached me
indicating that Lee had surrendered.
It is possible that no official report of what had
happened in front of Petersburg had been sent out
or permitted to reach central Alabama. At all
events, I got no trustworthy details till the night
I entered Macon a week later. The air was full
of rumors, but I could find no one to confirm or
vouch for them. The most that I could consider
certain was that Eichmond had been abandoned by
both the Government and the army, and that con-
clusive events might follow at an early day. This
convinced me that my command was operating in
exactly the right line to produce the greatest effect
in the final windup of the great drama.
The situation as I still saw it made it my duty
to continue " breaking things" along the main line
of Confederate communications through central
Alabama, Georgia, and the Carolinas. I, therefore,
spent but a single night in Montgomery, pushing my
advanced brigade under LaGrange without halt or
delay in pursuit of Buford, whom he overtook at
nightfall twelve miles to the east. Without halt
or delay LaGrange charged boldly into Buford 's
line, capturing his battle flag with forty or fifty
prisoners, and driving him in confusion from the
field.
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LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
Having taken the precaution of sending another
courier from Montgomery to inform Canby of our
continued success, I pushed on to the Cubahatchee,
some twenty miles to the eastward, on the 14th.
With detachments scouting the country, front, flank,
and rear, the column reached Tuskegee about noon
the next day. Situated in the heart of a planting
country, this town was, even at that day, a beautiful
one of three thousand five hundred or four thousand
inhabitants, and has since been made famous by
Booker Washington and the Tuskegee Institute for
the education of negroes. It was the seat of edu-
cation and refinement for an extensive region, and
contained several private schools and seminaries for
both girls and boys, which contributed much to its
importance. Here, as at Montgomery, the mayor
and leading citizens met our advance guard and
surrendered at discretion, begging only protection
for person and property. I promptly granted their
request and told off the trusty Fourth Cavalry again
to guard the town and maintain order. Detachments
were sent to the principal schools, videttes were
posted at the street corners, and all the usual pre-
cautions were taken, not only to prevent straggling
and marauding, but to impress the people with the
good behavior and discipline of the Northern cav-
alrymen. As was now the rule, corps, division, and bri-
gade flags, regimental colors, and company guidons
were unfurled, the bands played patriotic airs to
the accompaniment of clanking saber and jingling
spur as brigade after brigade and regiment after
regiment, followed by the artillery and trains, passed
on to the eastward. Not an officer or man left the
ranks, but all bore themselves as proudly as if they
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
were on parade. With colors, staff, and escort I
made my headquarters at the best hotel for five
hours, while the mayor, the leading citizens, and
the principals of the seminaries called to pay their
respects. They were at first naturally timid and
backward, but when they saw the perfect order and
decorum which prevailed they gained confidence and
expressed both their gratification and surprise and
then their admiration and awe.
One of the first callers was a dignified and
serious woman, who said that a detachment of men
under the direction of an officer were threatening
to destroy her printing press and type because, as
the officer alleged, they were used in the publication
of a rebel newspaper. She asked me politely if this
was in accordance with my orders.
I replied at once that it was, as our policy and
practice were to break up all the rebel newspapers
we could find or overtake.
At this she lost her temper, declaring that she
had expected nothing better. She had never be-
lieved that Yankees could be as liberal or enlightened
as they pretended to be. She had always doubted
their sincerity, and, now that they were destroying
the only means the country had of printing Bibles
and schoolbooks, she was sure they were the enemies
of religion and education, as well as of the indus-
tries and political rights of the South.
When she paused I replied: "But, Madam, you
said nothing at first about printing Bibles and
schoolbooks, and you frankly admit that you have
been publishing a rebel newspaper. Thereupon I
told you quite as frankly that we were destroying
such presses as we could find engaged in that work.
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LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
If, however, you will give me a bond for $5,000,
with the Mayor and two of your principal citizens
as surety, that you will print nothing inimical to
the Union or to the Constitution, but will confine
your press hereafter exclusively to the publication
of Bibles and schoolbooks, I shall order my provost
marshal to suspend the destruction and give you
a safeguard for your printing office. "
Although evidently surprised at this turn in the
affair, she promptly accepted my offer and hurried
off to find her sureties, while I dispatched an aid
to see that no harm was done for the present. I then
sent for Colonel Noble, already noted as a rising
lawyer, and many years afterward greatly distin-
guished as secretary of the interior in Harrison's
cabinet, and, after explaining the case, directed him
to draw up a bond to cover the agreement. This
was work to his taste, and with all the solemn and
dignified phrases he could command he pledged her,
her heirs, and assigns, "so long as water runs and
grass grows," to publish nothing against the Gov-
ernment or the Constitution of the United States,
but to confine her printing establishment to the pub-
lication of Bibles and schoolbooks, thenceforth and
forever, unless otherwise permitted by proper au-
thority. The document, with no objection to its
stately phrases, was formally signed, sealed, and
delivered, one copy to her and one for the War De-
partment, where it will be found on file even at this
late day.
With this weighty matter disposed of, I was
about to take leave, but meanwhile the ladies con-
nected with the seminaries, none of which had suf-
fered the slightest mistreatment or inconvenience,
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had called to pay their respects, after which they
decked my horse with garlands and prepared a let-
ter thanking and commending me and my command
for our forbearance and good behavior. The docu-
ment was duly delivered, but the situation was be-
coming embarrassing. It was a novel performance
and I was anxious to put an end to it. After all
the troops, except the rear guard, had passed, a vio-
lent rainstorm broke upon the scene. Naturally both
officers and men, as well as the assembled citizens,
expected me to delay my departure, but, instead of
doing so, I took to the road, followed by staff and
escort, and made a march in pelting rain to a rich
and favorably located plantation six miles beyond.
Meanwhile I had detached McCook with LaGrange 's
brigade to follow the railway northeasterly by Ope-
lika to West Point, with instructions to burn the
trestles and stations and capture the fort and gar-
rison covering the bridge across the Chattahoochee.
After a comfortable night in a country with
plenty of food for man and beast, we resumed the
march at early dawn on a beautiful, clear, spring-
like morning, by the road through Crawford, to the
twin towns of Girard and Columbus, on the opposite
sides of the river. Upton had the lead and, brush-
ing the militia out of his way, rapidly closed in
upon Girard, where he made all his dispositions for
the attack before the middle of the afternoon.
Minty's division in rear made its appearance in
ample time to support Upton and to take such part
in the capture of the place as might fall to its lot.
It had borne the brunt of the attack at Selma, and
it was naturally Upton's turn to have the post of
honor at Columbus.
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LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
I was between the two columns and shortly after
arriving on the bluff overlooking the valley and the
city of Columbus beyond Upton crossed my front
within two hundred yards, riding rapidly to the
north. Supposing that he had seen me, but was
placing his troops and perfecting his dispositions,
I neither hailed nor recalled him till he had en-
tirely disappeared. After waiting patiently ten or
fifteen minutes for his return, I sent a staff officer
after him, but it was fully a half hour before he
reached my position. Eiding up rapidly and saluting
with impatience, he said: "Everything is ready
for the assault, but I cannot find Winslow and must
delay the attack till he is in position." As I had
passed Winslow with his command properly con-
cealed in a wooded valley close by, I pointed out
his position, whereupon Upton replied: "But it is
now too late. It will be dark before I can get him
into position and lead the division to the attack."
As we had already become pretty well accustomed
to night fighting and its advantages, it occurred to
me that an attack after dark would be accompanied
by less loss and greater success than one in full
daylight. As the position was a formidable one,
with two highway and one railroad bridge connect-
ing the two towns, all covered by a line of formid-
able entrenchments with many guns in position, I
felt that no mistake should be made. So far as could
be seen the works were well manned with both in-
fantry and artillery, and every indication led to the
belief that we should have a sharp and vigorous
fight, which might possibly end in our discomfiture.
Consequently, after learning Upton's plan, and sat-
isfying myself by careful scrutiny that it was the
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
best that could be devised, I expressed my approval
and then said: "But it is not too late to carry the
plan into effect to-night ; you will make all your ar-
rangements to attack at 8:30." With flashing eyes
he exclaimed: "Do you mean it? It will be dark
as midnight by that hour and that will be a night
attack, indeed!" Assuring him that it was just
what I wanted and that it should be made, with
Minty's division supporting, I instructed him to get
everything ready to carry it into effect. With en-
thusiastic promptitude he exclaimed: "By jingo,
I'll do it; and I'll sweep everything before me!"
In approaching Girard Alexander 's brigade, with
the veteran Eggleston and the First Ohio in the
lead, had pressed the enemy rapidly and fiercely
back into their works without halting. Eetreating
rapidly down the road and across the lower bridge,
which they had stuffed with cotton and turpentine,
the frightened rebels gave the bridge to the flames,
and, of course, put an end to the pursuit, as well
as to the capture, of Columbus in that direction. It
was this fact that hurried Upton northward along
the bluffs to the Salem-Opelika road leading by the
central highway bridge into the city. With this
road as directrix he planned to make the final at-
tack, and had from two to three hours in which to
complete his arrangements. With our field guns
displayed at commanding points and firing an occa-
sional shot at the entrenchments covering the ap-
proaches to the city, it was impossible for the Con-
federates to discover our real plan or the exact
point of attack.
Upton, with consummate ability, made a rapid
but close reconnoissance along the rebel entrench-
260
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
ments. He had selected Winslow's brigade for the
principal attack, and under the cover of darkness,
which was intensified by the shadows covering the
hillside, placed it, dismounted, in position as close
to the enemy's works as it could get without re-
vealing its presence or purpose.
After all arrangements were completed the men
made coffee, got supper, and passed an hour in ab-
solute rest, while Upton waited for the appointed
minute with confidence and patience. We were to-
gether on the turnpike behind the dismounted line.
I allowed him the amplest latitude, but every detail
of his plan was submitted for my supervision and
approval, and when the time came a signal gun was
sent and the dismounted cavalrymen, without a mo-
ment's hesitation, rushed from their concealment,
elbow to elbow, to the attack. The white road
through the works was their sole guide and direc-
trix. The intervening ground, obscured by shadows,
was soon passed, but when the gallant troopers
emerged from cover and got so close to the enemy's
entrenchments that the noise of their onward sweep
could be heard they were received with a withering
fire of musketry and the discharge of twenty-five
guns in position swept the ground over which the
attack was made. The starlight was so faint, how-
ever, that nothing could be clearly seen except the
flash of firearms. The roar of artillery and mus-
ketry was continuous and appalling, but the enemy
fired so high that they did but little harm to our
dismounted men. Darkness was their best protec-
tion, and* being veterans of four years ' experience,
they continued their advance unshaken and almost
unharmed. Before ten minutes had passed they
261
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
closed in and swarmed over the outlying entrench-
ments and had them firmly in their possession. The
defenders fell back in confusion, and, although the
rattle and roar of the conflict made night hideous,
it was far more noisy than destructive.
The capture of the outlying works followed al-
most instantaneously. It certainly could not have
taken five minutes, and, seeing them firmly in our
possession, I personally ordered Benteen with the
Tenth Missouri, in column of fours, to enter the
captured works and follow the road through the
inner entrenchments to the bridge. Promptly re-
sponding to this order, that gallant officer moved
at the trot, but had gone only a short distance when
Upton, who encountered him on the way, directed
him to halt and detach two companies to carry out
the mission which had been entrusted to the whole
regiment. This was done with the greatest spirit
under the lead of Captain McGlasson. It will be
remembered that there was nothing but starlight
and the flash of the enemy's guns to indicate the
road or the direction of the advance. McGlasson
was a daring and experienced soldier, and, although,
much to his surprise, he found himself in front of
an inner line of fortifications, he rode coolly through
an opening in their parapet, lined on either side
with Confederate soldiers, who evidently mistook
his command for a part of their own forces. Once
inside the enceinte he galloped directly to the
bridge, captured its guard of fifty men, and sent a
detachment through it to capture the battery at the
other end. All this was successfully executed, but
the enemy, discovering what had happened, at once
began to close in upon McGlasson, pouring a heavy
262
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
fire on him from all sides. Having no cover from
which to fight dismounted, he recalled his lieutenant
from the bridge-head and with his united force gal-
loped back to the point from which he had started.
By that time Upton had reached the inner line of
entrenchments, and under the immediate leadership
of Winslow and Noble, with my personal supervision,
he threw his whole force against them with an ir-
resistible impulse. Winslow 's dismounted men,
breaking through the abattis, swept over the en-
trenchments and put the whole opposing force to
flight. It was in this movement that Upton dis-
played the extraordinary insensibility to danger
which always characterized him. With his mind
entirely absorbed in the various problems before
him and in the measures necessary for their solu-
tion, he appeared as utterly unconscious of danger
as if he were on parade. Having given instructions
for the assault, with the white and dusty highway
as the only directrix and the bridges his only aim,
he called out continually in a high and penetrating
voice, plainly heard above the rattle of carbines
and the still louder roar of artillery : ' ' Charge 'em !
Charge 'em!" With the bugles repeating the stir-
ring call as the men broke through the slashing and
the abattis, and clambered over the entrenchments,
I remember the scene almost as vividly as if it were
actually passing before my eyes forty-seven years
later.
The plan was faultless and easier of execution
than it could possibly have been by daylight. With-
out pausing to take prisoners or to return the scat-
tering fire of the enemy, the dismounted troopers
pushed through the main bridge into the town, cry-
263
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ing: "Selma, Selma! Go for the bridge! Waste
no time with prisoners!" Upton, Winslow, Noble,
Peters, Abrahams, Dee, Dana, Benteen, and Glass-
ford were heroes that night. Every commissioned
and non-commissioned officer and every private did
his part as though he were a knight of old. The
bridge was soon passed, and, although it was stuffed
with cotton, wet with turpentine, the gallant troopers
rushed across it so intermingled with the flying
enemy that those charged with setting fire to the
wooden structure and sweeping its roadway with
canister and shrapnel were so confused with fear
and excitement that they not only failed to apply
the torch, but to fire a shot. The brave cannoneers
stood to their guns, waiting for orders and making
the best personal defense they could. They had
adopted every precaution, but resistance was hope-
less. Many of them were shot at their post, and
such as were not killed or wounded were compelled
to surrender to the onrushing victors. The bridge
was saved and the city penetrated, but the end was
not yet, nor could the victory be regarded as com-
plete till the railroad bridge nearby was seized and
the rebels retreating over it were captured. The
guns at the burned bridge below were taken, and
the scattered detachments left at the defenses, as
well as those who had been overborne and driven
back, were gathered up and made prisoners. Not-
withstanding the confusion and the further fact that
the victors found themselves in a strange city, on
unknown streets and roads, proper detachments were
told off and made their way to the railway station
and to the important points with incredible rapidity.
Within an hour from the first shot the fighting was
264
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
ended, the city was firmly in our possession, and
the entire garrison were prisoners, with the excep-
tion of one train-load, which included Howell Cobb,
a number of officers, a few leading citizens, and a
handful of soldiers.
It was the last real battle of the war and had
been won in the dark by a single brigade of dis-
mounted cavalry. Columbus was the door to Georgia,
four hundred miles from the point where our cam-
paign began. Our troopers had displayed the high-
est discipline and courage. Every man had acquitted
himself like a hero, and, although the resistance had
been noisy and determined, by eleven o'clock that
night absolute quiet and order reigned throughout
the city.
This final performance of the cavalry, involving
as it did not only the successful assault of strong
entrenchments, but the capture of two bridges span-
ning the Chattahoochee, was one of the most re-
markable, not only of the war, but of modern times,
and shows with unerring certainty that American
cavalry and mounted infantry when properly trained
and led are equal to any enterprise that can fall
to their lot by day or by night.
It was not till the next morning that the full
value of our victory became known. The enemy's
precise loss in killed and wounded was never re-
ported, but, like ours, it was doubtless inconsider-
able. Darkness had protected the fighting men of
both forces. We captured one thousand five hun-
dred prisoners, twenty-seven guns on the defenses
and thirty-six in the arsenal. We burned the ship-
yard with a new gun-boat ram, the Jackson, mount-
ing six heavy guns, and about ready to put to sea.
265
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The most conspicuous man killed in the city was
Colonel Lamar of the slave pirate Wanderer. He
had given up the slave trade and taken his place
among the land forces in defense of his native state.
He fell by a stray shot near the end of the central
bridge after the fighting had ceased.
The most gratifying circumstance connected with
this remarkable victory is that our entire loss was
only twenty-four officers and men killed and
wounded.
As Columbus was the last great manufacturing
place and storehouse of the Confederacy and we
were still without official information as to what
had taken place in Virginia, I resolved to destroy
everything within reach that could be made useful
for the further continuance of the Eebellion. It
will be recalled that up to that time the Confederate
authorities had been burning all the baled cotton
within reach of our column, whether it belonged
to the Confederate Government or to the Southern
people. It was the only product of the South that
would sell for gold and it was at that time worth
over a dollar a pound, for the simple reason that it
was required by the entire civilized world. And yet
with insensate folly the Confederates were destroy-
ing it, as though it were food or military supplies
necessary to meet our daily wants. So long as they
took that absurd view of it I willingly helped them.
Accordingly, the next day, Winslow, in command of
the city, burned seven warehouses, containing one
hundred and twenty-five thousand bales, and it is
a notable circumstance that before the torch was
applied the warehouse-men came with their books,
showing the number of bales on storage, and asked
266
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
me to take for my own use what I thought proper
on the sole condition that I should spare the re-
mainder. This, of course, made the destruction all
the more certain, but, as at Selma, I was anxious
that the burning warehouses should not set fire to
private property and saw that every precaution was
taken to keep the fire under control. Only one ware-
house in the city was spared. That was the prop-
erty of a Union man, at whose house I made my
headquarters, and within the dome of which he as-
sured me the American flag had been kept flying
from the outbreak of the war to that unfortunate
day. He claimed with the fervor of a patriot that
his house and grounds had never been out of the
Union. Of course, I ordered his property safe-
guarded till we withdrew from the city and that
was done, but our last man had scarcely taken the
road to Macon when Buford's division, of Forrest's
corps, entered the town. It is a suggestive fact
that the first thing they did was to set fire to and
completely destroy the warehouse we had spared.
In addition to one hundred and twenty-five thou-
sand bales of cotton, much of it belonging to the
Confederate Government, Winslow destroyed twenty
thousand sacks of corn, fifteen locomotives, two hun-
dred and fifty freight cars, the two bridges over
the Chattahoochee, the machine shops, roundhouses,
and railway supplies, one naval armory and ship-
yard, two rolling mills with all their machinery, the
government arsenal and niter works, two powder
magazines, two ironworks, three foundries, ten mills
and factories engaged in making cotton cloth, paper,
guns, pistols, swords, shoes, wagons, and other mili-
tary supplies, and over one hundred thousand rounds
267
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of artillery ammunition, together with immense
quantities of small arms, military accoutrements,
and army clothing of which no account could be
taken. The destruction of the last factories, depots,
and warehouses of the Confederacy was as com-
plete as fire could make it, and of itself must have
been the deathblow to the Confederacy, even if it
had been able to keep its armed forces together for
a further struggle.
One of the most gratifying incidents of this event
was the capture of a notorious Southern newspaper,
known as The Memphis Appeal. When Memphis
was taken the proprietor fled and reestablished his
press at Grenada, whence he removed it to Jackson,
the capital of Mississippi. He later transferred it
to Atlanta, but when Sherman captured that place
the editor turned back to Montgomery, where he
continued the publication of disloyal and inflamma-
tory articles against the Union and its armies, add-
ing the name of each place in turn to the title of his
journal. As my command approached Montgomery
the fire-eating editor again gathered up his presses
and printing materials and took train to Columbus.
Here, however, we were so close upon his heels that
he had no time to set up his press or to resume the
publication of his peripatetic journal. He fell into
our hands with all his materials, but, recalling the
eloquent terms in which Colonel Noble had bound
the owner of the Tuskegee Press for all time to
publish nothing but Bibles and schoolbooks, I de-
tailed him again to draw the bond for our captive
editor and proprietor, requiring him henceforth and
forever to publish nothing inimical or hostile to
the Constitution or to the sovereignty of the Union.
268
LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
The document was duly executed, forwarded, and
filed in the War Department. By that time Noble
had become an expert in framing and phrasing such
papers and took the keenest delight in binding the
editor of the Memphis- Jacks on- Atlanta-Mont g orn-
ery-Columbus Appeal, his heirs and assigns forever,
in all the formal phraseology of the law, not only
to abjure and recant the false doctrines he had pro-
fessed, but thereafter so long as he might live to
conduct himself in deed and work as a loyal citizen
of the great Eepublic.
269
VIII
END OF THE WAR
Capture of West Point by LaGrange Minty at Double
Bridges Occupation of Macon Surrender of Gen-
eral Cobb Peace declared Croxton's raid Resume
of campaign.
After the capture of Columbus I sent another
messenger through the country to Canby, advising
him of my further success and of my future plans ;
and, while Winslow delayed to destroy the Con-
federate property and warehouses, I sent Minty
with Long's division forward into central Georgia,
directing him to push as fast as possible to Thomas-
ton and the Double Bridges of Flint Eiver, some
fifty miles to the eastward. With those bridges in
our possession nothing could save the state from
complete subjugation.
Meanwhile, LaGrange marched rapidly through
Opelika to West Point, where there were both a rail-
road bridge and highway bridge across the Chat-
tahoochee. Following the railway, destroying
trestles, bridges, stations, and woodpiles, he cap-
tured several trains, and finally at 10 A. M. on
April 16 his leading regiment was in front of Fort
Tyler, a strong and well-defended, square redoubt,
covering both the town and the bridges. While the
270
END OF THE WAR
next regiment with two field pieces kept the fort
and its garrison shut up, LaGrange with the rest of
his brigade carried the town entrenchments, rushed
across the Chattahoochee bridge, leaping a breach
in the roadway, and captured the squad who were
trying with turpentine and cotton to set the bridge
on fire. Having thus secured control of both bridges,
his passage into Georgia was now assured. Satis-
fied of this important fact, he returned to the west
side of the river and without pausing closed in on
the fort. By these rapid movements he had not
only relieved his command from the danger of a
counter attack, but put his entire force in position
to attack the keypoint of the defenses.
A rapid reconnoissance convinced him that he
was up against a work of commanding position and
great strength, held by enough soldiers to repel any
ordinary attack. The main fort was a square re-
doubt of thirty-five yards face, with a closed gorge,
the whole surrounded by a ditch twelve feet wide
and ten feet deep, and still further strengthened by
an abattis and slashing, under command of General
Tyler, assisted by Colonel Fannin and about three
hundred men, with one thirty-two-pounder sweeping
the approaches and the ground beyond with canister
and grape. It was a formidable stronghold, but
nothing delayed or daunted LaGrange. His skir-
mishers had already discovered that they would
have to bridge the ditches, which was done on three
sides by the use of materials obtained by tearing
down frame houses nearby. No time was lost in
making sap-rollers or ladders. It was evident from
the first that if the place could not be carried with
a rush it could not be carried at all. So, after plac-
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ing two guns, one of which was a rifled field-piece,
supported by a close line of skirmishers, to comb the
parapets, and to keep down the fire of the fort,
LaGrange threw his dismounted men in three sepa-
rate columns, the first led by Colonel Harnden of
the First Wisconsin, the second by Captain Hill of
the Fourth Indiana, and the third by Major Bloom
of the Seventh Kentucky Cavalry, straight against
the rebel citadel. Like heroes of romance, these gal-
lant officers led their men through a withering fire
to the ditches, where, without faltering, they laid
their bridges, but this work broke their onset and
gave the enemy the momentary hope of stopping it
entirely. During the short check the enemy threw
hand-grenades and poured a withering rifle fire
upon the assailants without inflicting serious injury.
The bridges were ready in a few minutes, whereupon
the bugles sounded the charge and the dismounted
troopers, rising to their feet, rushed at the fort, a
part crossing the bridges, while the others descended
into the ditch. It was a race to see who should get
there first, and whether from the level of the bridge
or from the bottom of the ditch all clambered up
the slopes, crossed the parapets to the terreplein
of the fort, shouting and fighting like demons. It
was a struggle with swords and clubbed muskets,
but the Yankees were too many for the Confeder-
ates and forced them to surrender at discretion.
Harnden, the older and more deliberate man, reached
the flag staff first and had the honor of hauling
down the Confederate flag, while Hill, still lame
from his wound at Ebenezer Church, was stricken
down outside the breastworks by a shot passing
through his thigh within an inch of his old wound
272
END OF THE WAR
and so shattering his leg that it had to be ampu-
tated close to his body. It should be recalled that
this gallant officer had ridden in my ambulance from
Selma till he overheard me detaching his brigade for
the movement on West Point. With such wounded
men of both sides as could not travel, he was left
in a temporary hospital at that place. He was at
that time a strong, stalwart, youthful fellow, nearly
six feet tall and full size, who, after losing about
one-quarter of his weight by the operation, yet re-
covered so rapidly and so completely that he re-
ported for duty, incredible as it may seem, at the
end of twenty days, requesting that he might be
permitted to resume command of his regiment. Of
course, this request was denied and he was sent on
furlough instead, but he always claimed that he was
sufficiently recovered before leaving to perform all
the duties of his rank. His conduct upon that and
numerous other occasions fully justified LaGrange 's
official statement that "no braver man nor better
soldier ever wore a saber. He deserves to command
a brigade."
Colonel Biggs of Illinois was an officer of greater
age, stature, and rank, who was wounded at Selma
by a bullet passing completely through his shoulder
and the upper lobe of his right lung. He also re-
ported at the end of twenty days and seemed so
perfectly healed that he was actually permitted to
resume command of his regiment. These cases are
cited to show not only the vigorous character and
perfect bodily condition, but the splendid spirit
which prevailed among our officers at the close of
the war.
In the capture of West Point General Tyler, with
273
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
three officers and fourteen privates, were killed,
while twenty-eight were wounded, mostly in the
head, their bodies having been protected by the
breastworks. The remainder fell into our hands
as prisoners, and were shortly afterward paroled.
LaGrange also captured nineteen locomotives and
many passenger and freight cars, besides large
quantities of military stores and supplies, all of
which, after taking what he required for his com-
mand, were destroyed. LaGrange 's brigade in this
remarkable performance lost only seven killed and
twenty-nine wounded, and yet the struggle was a
fierce and determined one on both sides.
A year before no officer in either service would
have thought of sending cavalry against such en-
trenchments as those at West Point and Columbus,
but after the capture of the redoubts and guns in
front of Nashville and of the regular bastioned
earthworks covering Selma our officers and men felt
that nothing was impossible to them. Eelying on
their Spencers, firing six shots without reloading,
their splendid horse artillery always close up with
the skirmish line, they had justly regarded them-
selves equal to any task that might fall to their lot.
It was after the night attack and capture of Co-
lumbus with such insignificant loss that Upton, with
over three years' experience as an artillery and in-
fantry commander, declared that till then he had no
idea of what cavalry could do. After seeing what
it actually had done, both at Selma and at Colum-
bus, especially by night fighting, he did not hesitate
to declare that his division alone could go anywhere
and break its way into any place in the Confeder-
acy. He declared that his men could surmount any
274
END OF THE WAR
obstruction and clamber over any obstacles they
might meet, and that nothing short of the ocean
could stop them. When I add that this feeling pre-
vailed throughout the cavalry corps, some definite
idea may be had of the discipline as well as of the
coherence and aggressive temper which character-
ized that remarkable body of horsemen.
Having by these divergent operations secured
independent crossings of the Chattahoochee at Co-
lumbus and at West Point within forty miles of
each other, convergent roads were now open to
Macon and central Georgia, and every man was con-
fident that nothing could delay or imperil our fur-
ther progress. Minty's advance reached Flint Eiver
and captured the Double Bridges, fifty miles from
Columbus, by a single forced march ending in a
charge against the detachment guarding the bridges.
Some fifty prisoners, together with three pieces of
artillery and a wagon train of military supplies, fell
into his hands. What was quite as important was
the fact that one hundred and fifty horses and mules
were also gathered up.
This was the last stand of the enemy till our ad-
vance guard under Colonel Frank White of the
Seventeenth Indiana reached Mimms Mills at the
crossing of the Tobesofkee Creek, fifteen miles west
of Macon, on the afternoon of April 20. Some three
hundred Confederates had taken position behind the
creek, the mills, and a heavy barricade of fence-rails
to the right and left. As White made his appearance
in front they tore up the planking and set fire to
the bridge, and while this checked White's progress,
it did not stop him longer than it took to dismount
and deploy. Without regard to numbers or to the
275
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
position in front, with splendid dash and audacity
his troopers rushed through the flames, crossed the
bridge on the stringpieces, and charged the entrench-
ments, sweeping everything before them. This was
the final stand of the Confederates and, as though
they realized its futility, they threw down their
arms and blanket rolls and fled, mounted and on
foot, as rapidly as possible from the scene. The
only point at which they had the slightest chance
to rally was at Eock Creek, where a determined and
deliberate foe might have delayed the pursuers, but
this was not done, and but little effort was made
even to destroy the bridge at that place.
Waiting only for his column to close up, White
again took the road at the trot and shortly after
getting under way he met a flag of truce borne by
General Eobertson, a West Point companion of
mine, with a letter from General Howell Cobb to
"The Commanding General, United States forces."
Pausing merely to ask what it was about and, hear-
ing that it was from General Beauregard to General
Cobb, directing him to inform the commanding offi-
cer of the troops in his front that "a truce looking
to a final settlement had been entered into the day
before between General Sherman and General John-
ston in North Carolina," with rare presence of mind
White promptly declared: "I know nothing about
' truces, armistices or final settlements.' All I can
do is to send this letter back to General Minty, my
division commander, and wait for further orders."
Minty, who was close behind, opened the envelope
and read the enclosure. Eealizing that he was also
a subordinate, he sent it in turn to me. Having
done this, he ordered White to give the flag of truce
276
END OF THE WAR
five minutes to get out of the way and then to re-
sume his march on Macon in accordance with pre-
vious instructions. White, already getting impa-
tient, pulled out his watch and, turning to Eobertson,
with whom he had been chatting pleasantly enough,
said: "My orders require me to push for Macon
as rapidly as possible, and I'll give you just five
minutes to get out of the way with your flag of
truce and escort." Eealizing that discussion could
not change the situation, Eobertson, wheeling about
and rejoining his own escort, started at a brisk trot
to report to his commanding officer.
Meanwhile White, at the end of the short period
of grace, resumed the advance, but, moving at a
quicker gait, overtook the flag of truce as it was
closing up on the defeated detachment driven from
the Tobesofkee an hour before. White realized, how-
ever, that both were retreating slowly and with de-
liberation for the purpose of gaining time and delay-
ing our march. It was an exciting and somewhat
puzzling situation. It was nearly sunset and quite
apparent that the enemy was doing what he could
without actually fighting to make delay. I was far
in rear, with the other parts of the corps moving
on converging roads for a common objective. At
the same time both Minty and White, realizing that
it would be inconvenient, to say the least, for either
themselves or the rest of the corps to halt outside
the defenses of Macon, hastened their march as much
as possible. Fearing that delay on their part would
enable the enemy to destroy the remaining bridges,
they rushed each as they came to it and, fortunately,
not only saved them all, but kept the road intact
for the corps to enter the important city that night.
277
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Fortunately, Cobb's communication did not reach
me till 6 p. M., when I was still nineteen miles from
Macon. I, therefore, made no written reply, but
sent an officer to halt the head of column if he
should overtake it. I then hastened my own march
with a half dozen staff officers and a small escort,
for the purpose of ascertaining the actual condition
of affairs before replying to General Cobb or ac-
knowledging the existence of an armistice applicable
to my command.
While I moved rapidly and it was completely
dark, my situation was a peculiar one. It will be
remembered that, with Sherman in North Carolina,
and Thomas in middle Tennessee, I was conducting
an independent campaign through the country which
separated them and had the amplest latitude of an
independent commander. I was over five hundred
miles behind Sherman and as many in advance of
Thomas and, although I should have cheerfully
obeyed the slightest order of either, I felt that it
was my first duty, while caring for my own com-
mand, to look out for the interests of the govern-
ment in the region under my immediate observation.
With this thought uppermost, I pushed on toward
Macon as rapidly as I could, but, on arriving at the
fortifications at half past eight, I found them, as
well as the city, safely in White's possession, with
the garrison shut up in the stockade pen which the
Confederates had built for Yankee prisoners. Cobb,
G. W. Smith, Makall, Mercer, and Eobertson, with
their respective staff officers, were impatiently
awaiting me at the City Hall. They had made no
defense, but yielded under protest to a force they
could not successfully resist. Cobb, the chief com-
278
END OF THE WAR
mander, claimed that White's action was in viola-
tion of an armistice which, according to his views,
was equally binding on the National as well as the
Confederate troops operating in that region. Proud
and imperious by nature, he could not be made to
understand that, while he had received direct orders
from his own chief and was bound to obey them, my
subordinates could neither acknowledge him as a
proper channel of communication, nor assume the
responsibility of suspending operations which they
had been told off to conduct. They were old and
experienced soldiers who knew their own duty and
naturally doubted the disinterestedness of the
enemy. They could neither be persuaded nor bul-
lied into heeding any orders except mine, and in
this they were clearly right. In spite of Cobb 's vehe-
ment contention, both Minty and White insisted on
their right not only to disarm the garrison, but to
confine it as prisoners of war. With this done and
the city under perfect control, they met me at the
outworks and conducted me directly to the City
Hall. Here I met Howell Cobb for the first time
and had a most interesting interview with him and
his officers. The general, who was noted for his
proud and haughty bearing, even among the South-
erners, received me with lofty politeness, but, with-
out wasting any time whatever in civilities, renewed
his protest against his capture, insisting not only
that I should acknowledge the armistice as promul-
gated in the communication he had sent me that
morning, but that I should withdraw my troops
from the city to the point at which my advance
guard met his flag of truce. This I, of course,
promptly declined with the statement that nobody
279
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
had a right to stop my command against my will;
that my officers had acted strictly within their or-
ders ; that I had used due diligence to overtake my
head of column, but, having failed, I regarded Gen-
eral Cobb and his command rightfully as prisoners
of war.
Thereupon, the General, declining to consider the
matter from my point of view, in emphatic terms
reiterated his demand for the unconditional release
of his command and himself and for the restoration
of what he proudly designated as "the status quo
ante."
Seeing that argument was useless without more
exact information than I had yet received, I said:
* ' General, if there is an armistice in existence there
must be full justification for it and I can imagine
none sufficient except the surrender of Lee and his
army. Has that event taken place 1"
Thereupon, with great dignity and decision, he
answered : ' ' Sir, I am not here to give you informa-
tion. I decline to answer your questions and I again
demand the unconditional release of myself and my
command. ' '
To this I replied with corresponding firmness:
"I shall not comply with your demand and you must
consider that point settled for good and all."
Turning then to General Gustavus W. Smith, an
old and distinguished West Pointer, whom I had met
while a cadet, and who was now at Macon as com-
mander of the Georgia Militia, I said: "General
Smith, I am going to ask you the question I have
just asked General Cobb and hope you feel at lib-
erty to answer it fully and frankly. Have General
Lee and his army surrendered?" Straightening
280
END OF THE WAR
himself up and drawing in his chin in a manner pe-
culiar to himself, the general, without a moment's
hesitation, replied: "Yes, sir, Lee and his army
have surrendered ! "
As this was the first trustworthy information I
had on that subject, I regarded it as absolutely true
as well as sufficient to account for and even justify
an armistice. I, therefore, turned to Cobb and said :
"General, while I no longer doubt that an armistice
is in existence, I cannot admit its application to my
command till I receive confirmation, with proper
instructions, from General Sherman for my govern-
ment in regard thereto, but I shall conduct my opera-
tions hereafter on the theory that any man killed
on either side is a man murdered. General, you and
your officers, with this understanding, may go to
your quarters on your parole of honor that you will
report here daily at nine o'clock till further orders."
Thus ended the interview in a manner apparently
satisfactory to all. Even Cobb, although still sullen
and deeply dejected, accepted my decision as the best
he could get. Thereupon, he and his officers took
their leave and thenceforth conducted themselves in
a most satisfactory as well as a most complimentary
manner to me and to my authority.
Macon at that time was the leading city of cen-
tral Georgia and came under my control late on
April 20, 1865. When my interview with Cobb and
his officers came to an end it was nearly midnight.
Considering the exciting incidents of the last four
weeks, I realized that the last campaign, as well as
the war, was ended, and I was heartily glad of it.
After wishing my unwilling guests a friendly good-
night, I went to the Lanier House, where my staff
281
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
had established headquarters. It was the leading
hotel in full operation, and, although I can scarcely
claim that we were welcome, the manager assigned
me and my staff the best rooms he had and did all
in his power to make us comfortable. It was after
midnight before I received reports from the various
officers and gave proper instructions for the main-
tenance of order and the protection of persons and
property.
Both General Minty and Colonel White had dis-
played such sound judgment and such unusual en-
terprise on the march and in forcing the city to sur-
render without waiting for me that I felt under spe-
cial obligation to them. White had covered the en-
tire distance from Columbus to Macon, one hundred
and four miles, from 6 p. M., April 18, to the same
hour of April 20, and this heightened the satisfac-
tion with which I received the information that, im-
mediately after occupying the city and confining his
prisoners, he took all proper precautions without
waiting for orders to post videttes, patrol the streets,
and place the citizens under perfect safety and con-
trol. When I reached there two hours and a half
later it was as quiet as a country village that had
never heard a harsher tone than a flute note.
In special recognition of his valuable services I
assigned him to the command of the city, in which
position he proved himself to be a judicious and
able administrator. In addition to maintaining or-
der, it was his duty to gather up and care for such
Confederate property, both civil and military, as
might be in the warehouses or the surrounding coun-
try. With our large force the question of food and
forage and the care of supplies at hand were mat-
282
END OF THE WAR
ters of great importance in connection with which
White also rendered most valuable services.
While the armistice and its applicability to my
command were still under consideration I proposed
to dissolve all doubt by sending a message of in-
quiry over the Confederate telegraph to Sherman
through Beauregard's headquarters at Greensbor-
ough, North Carolina. As Cobb agreed, I prepared
a message, dated 9 p. M., April 20, saying in sub-
stance that my advance had captured and occupied
Macon after meeting a flag of truce which claimed
the existence of an armistice applicable to both sides ;
that I had not been able to overtake my advance in
time to prevent the capture; that I should, therefore,
hold Generals Cobb, Smith, and Makall with the
garrison as prisoners of war; and, finally, that I
should remain there a reasonable time for orders.
Fearing that this frank declaration might be changed
in transmission, I transposed it into cipher, in which
form it duly reached Sherman, but not till after he
had sent me through the same channel a dispatch
dated 2 p. M., April 21, which I received at 6 P. M.
the same day. While it was not in reply to mine, it
made it certain that Sherman had agreed with John-
ston "for a universal suspension of hostilities look-
ing to a peace over the whole surface of our coun-
try," which he felt, "assured would be made per-
fect in a few days." He added: "You will, there-
fore, desist from further acts of war and devasta-
tion until you hear that hostilities are resumed."
From the rest of the message which referred to the
subsistence of my command in western and south-
western Georgia and directed me to communicate
the information it contained to Canby, it is evident
283
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
that Sherman did not know my exact whereabouts,
nor that I was so far east as Macon.
The newspapers shortly afterward reported
Sherman as having directed me to release my
prisoners and to withdraw my command to the place
at which my advance met the flag of truce, but I
received no such instructions and doubt if any such
were ever sent. The lines were certainly open to
both Sherman and myself, and if he had desired to
send such orders they would have been promptly
transmitted.
Eegarding Sherman's message as authentic, I
decided to suspend operations till ordered by proper
authority to resume them, or till circumstances
should require independent action. I have no doubt
this decision was correct, and should have been
greatly surprised had Sherman disapproved or over-
ruled it.
By the next day Cobb had become reconciled to
my course, and, foreseeing that the addition of so
large a force to the population of Macon would
bring about a scarcity of provisions, he gave me
every assistance, not only advising me as to the dis-
tricts in which forage and provisions could be found,
but directing his quartermasters and commissaries
to ship such forage and provisions as they might
have on hand to my chief quartermaster at Macon.
And, what is more to his credit, he did this even be-
fore he knew the actual terms of the arrangement
between Sherman and Johnston.
It is a matter of history that Cobb was not only
one of the largest slaveholders, but an original se-
cessionist, whose proudest boast was that his state
followed him, not he his state. Nor is there any
284
END OF THE WAR
doubt that from the first he threw his whole heart
and fortune into the Confederate cause, but he was
sagacious enough to know when Lee and Johnston
surrendered and Davis became a fugitive that the
end had come, and from that moment he did all in
his power to restore order and confidence and to
help earnestly in the work which pressed upon me
at Macon. He was a man of austere manners and
great dignity, who scorned to ask favors for him-
self, but did his utmost to ameliorate the condition
of his fellow-citizens. It is a matter of sincere grati-
fication to me that our acquaintance, begun under
such unusual conditions, soon ripened into a friend-
ship which lasted till his death, and was continued
by his family to the present time. /;-{r
Hostilities having ceased from the hour of our
occupation, my first duty was to collect my com-
mand and put it in a state of readiness for what-
ever might be required. Fortunately, this was an
easy task. Upton, following closely behind Minty,
left only McCook's division to come in. LaGrange's
brigade, after its splendid victory at West Point,
left that place on the 17th, passing through La-
Grange, where it also broke the railroad, marched
thence to the Macon and Atlanta Eailroad, which it
followed through Griffin and Forsyth to Macon, ar-
riving at that place early on the 21st, where it re-
mained in camp till the end of the month. The per-
formances of this brigade, operating generally by
itself or on detached service, were quite remark-
able. They are summed up by LaGrange as follows :
A march of five hundred miles through the enemy's
country, the capture of four hundred and fifty-six prison-
ers with arms in their hands, including thirty-five officers,
285
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
seven battle flags, twenty-one thousand three hundred
stands of small arms, two siege guns in position, six field
pieces, three steamboats laden with stores, twenty locomo-
tives, two hundred and fifty cars loaded with stores and
machinery, and enough horses and mules to replace those
broken down by the march; the destruction of eight rail-
road depots, storehouses, water tanks, wood piles, three
railroad and two covered bridges, and innumerable cul-
verts, three large cotton factories, a saddle factory, niter
works, tanneries, three foundries, two machine shops, two
rolling mills, and a large number of smaller manufacturing
establishments. Where it was possible the provisions cap-
tured from the enemy were given to the poor.
The casualties of the brigade were ten killed, sixty-four
wounded, and sixteen missing. The brigade did all that it
was ordered to do, but, considering the nature of the ex-
pedition, the temptations offered, and the injuries many of
our men had previously received from the rebels, I have
less pride in what was accomplished than in what was
omitted. The steadiness, valor, and self-denial of the men
are beyond my praise.
In addition, the brigade recaptured two United
States regimental colors. In sending his trophies
to headquarters LaGrange cited the fact that the
First Wisconsin, of which he was colonel, was first
in the fort at West Point and lost twice as many
men as both the other assaulting columns. He,
therefore, modestly requested as a personal favor
to himself and as a reward for the good conduct
of the regiment that the garrison flag of Fort Tyler
should be returned to Colonel Harnden with per-
mission to send it to the Governor of Wisconsin, to
be placed in the State capitol among the trophies
forwarded by other regiments. He added: "No
other trophy has ever been asked for by the regi-
286
END OF THE WAR
ment and no regiment from the State has captured
a greater number. ' 9 1
It will be remembered that Croxton was detached
from the main column at Elyton at 4 p. M. on March
30, with one thousand five hundred men in the sad-
dle, for the purpose of capturing Tuscaloosa and
destroying the Alabama Military Academy, the fac-
tories, and whatever else might be found at that
place beneficial to the rebel cause. That done, I
personally instructed him if practicable to break
the railroad between Selma and Demopolis. The
last word received from him was up to April 3. On
that night he carried the Black Warrior bridge by
assault, taking sixty prisoners and three pieces of
artillery, thus putting his command in position to
occupy Tuscaloosa at daylight the next morning.
From that time the story of his march reads like
a romance of chivalry. After scattering the garri-
son and corps of cadets and burning the Military
Academy, the foundry, factory, and niter works at
Tuscaloosa, supplying his command with all the pro-
visions they could carry, and sending out recon-
noitering parties while resting the main body of
his brigade, he devoted himself to working out a
plan for rejoining the corps. He knew that both
Jackson and Chalmers were between him and me,
and, believing that the country behind them was
open for an incursion, he struck out to the south-
west by King's Store and Lanier's Mills for the
Demopolis-Selma Railroad with the hope of reach-
ing and breaking it effectually. He reasoned cor-
rectly upon this and other occasions that if Forrest
detached a force inferior to his own to look after
1 O. E. Serial No. 103, pp. 427 et seq.
287
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
him, he would " smash it up" and go whither he
pleased, while if Forrest sent a superior force
against him it would be his object to draw it as far
as possible from the theater in which the larger
forces were operating and thus give our cavalry
corps a still greater advantage in numbers.
On April 6, while moving down the Tombigbee,
which was then much swollen, he learned that Wirt
Adams was marching to meet him with a heavier
force than his own ; that Selma had been taken ; that
Forrest and Chalmers were at Marion; and that
Jackson was still in the neighborhood of Tuscaloosa.
Fearing that these forces would unite and turn
against him, he prudently resolved to retrace his
steps, but while doing so his rear guard was over-
taken and had a sharp fight near Eomulus with
Adams's command, which he estimated at two thou-
sand eight hundred men. In that affair he lost two
officers and thirty-two men, but put up such a stub-
born fight that the enemy drew off and molested
him no further.
His only purpose henceforth was to rejoin the
corps. Marching first to the northeastward, he
struck the Byler road and followed it twelve or
fifteen miles on the 8th. Here he rested for three
days, trying to open communication with me, but,
failing in that, he made his way by a circuitous
route across Wolf Creek, Blackwater, Sipsey, Mul-
berry, and Locust forks of the Black Warrior and
thence across the Cahawba Eiver into the Elyton
valley.
As it was spring and all the streams high, most
of the bridges were gone and the roads were nearly
impassable. Fording or swimming was necessary,
288
END OF THE WAR
in many cases, and it was not till the 19th that
Croxton reached Mount Pinson, fourteen miles north
of Elyton, where he learned at last that after taking
Montgomery I had continued my march to the east-
ward.
From that time his course was plain, but his
difficulties were by no means ended. In marching
to join me he naturally chose a northerly route,
where the streams were smaller, but, as they were
all swollen and some of them wide, his difficulties
were great. After destroying the foundry and niter
works near Mount Pinson, he passed through Truss-
ville and Cedar Grove, where he turned toward
Montevallo to give the impression that he was going
that way. On April 21 he moved eastward toward
Talladega, which brought him the next day to the
Coosa, an unfordable stream over which he had to
ferry, and this was slow and dangerous work.
The enemy in his front apparently had not heard
of the events in Virginia, and, as Croxton was in
the same state of ignorance, the war continued in
that section with frequent skirmishes, ending in a
sharp affair at Munford Station with five hundred
men and one piece of artillery under the command
of General Hill. After capturing the artillery and
a number of prisoners and scattering the force in
front of him, Croxton destroyed the Oxford and Blue
Mountain Iron Works, the railroad bridges and
depots, rolling stock, a large quantity of ordnance
stores, and a cotton factory. On April 26 he crossed
the Chattahoochee and met a flag of truce from New-
nan, Georgia, informing him of the armistice be-
tween Sherman and Johnston and claiming protec-
tion under it. While admitting the probability that
289
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
a truce had been entered into, like the corps com-
mander, he declined to recognize it as official or to
discontinue his march, but gravely notified the rebel
authorities that he " would trouble nobody who kept
out of his way. ' ' This done, he crossed Flint Eiver
at Flat Shoals on April 28, and, marching by the
way of Barnesville to Forsyth on the railroad, he
sent two of his staff officers by train to inform me
of his whereabouts. This was the first direct report
I had received from him for just one month. The
next day he rejoined the corps at Macon, having
marched six hundred and fifty-three miles, most of
the way through a country so destitute of supplies
that he subsisted his command with the greatest
difficulty. He swam four large rivers, destroyed
five ironworks, three factories, numerous mills, and
immense quantities of supplies. In addition, he cap-
tured four pieces of artillery, three hundred prison-
ers, and a large quantity of small arms. His own
losses were four officers and one hundred and sixty-
eight men, half of the latter captured while forag-
ing or scouting. Throughout this long and arduous
campaign his veterans never faltered. Officers and
men vied with each other in the cheerful perform-
ance of every duty. He specially commended Colo-
nels Dorr, Kelly, and Johnston, Major Fidler, and
Captain Penn. He was accompanied throughout this
march by Lieutenant Prather, Fourth Indiana Cav-
alry, one of my aids-de-camp, who gave me a most
glowing account of the steadiness and efficiency of
both officers and men from the time they were de-
tached till they rejoined the corps.
Having described in some detail the organization
of the cavalry corps and given some account of its
290
END OF THE WAR
great performances, including those of its detach-
ments, I am sure I shall be pardoned for again call-
ing attention to the fact that its great successes
were mainly due to the policy of concentration which
I inaugurated and, as far as permitted, carried into
effect, operating en masse as far as possible, instead
of in detachments, as had hitherto been the rule.
From the day I took command in front of Hood
till we defeated and drove him from the state with
the loss of his artillery, trains, and many thousand
prisoners, I kept the policy of concentration con-
stantly in force. At the beginning of that campaign,
it will be remembered, I found only five thousand
five hundred men in the saddle. At the middle, by
the purchase and impressment of horses, we had
fourteen thousand, of which three thousand were
detached to drive Lyon and Crossland from western
Kentucky. At the end, although we had lost over
six thousand horses in two weeks from overwork
and exposure, muddy and frozen roads, rainy and
sleety weather, in a wild and desolate country, de-
void of food and forage, we reached the Tennessee
Eiver with only seven thousand five hundred men
in the saddle.
In a few weeks thereafter I had collected into
cantonments between Gravelly Spring and Waterloo
Landing six divisions, amounting to an aggregate
of twenty-seven thousand men, all of whom, except
one division, were mounted and ready for service.
After sending Knipe's division to Canby, detaching
Johnston's for service in middle Tennessee, and leav-
ing Hatch's behind on the Tennessee, because horses
could not be got, we took the field with three divi-
sions, all of which, except one brigade with the wagon
291
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
train, were mounted, equipped, and fully provided
for a sixty days' campaign. They were all armed
with Spencer magazines, carbines, and rifles, and it
is worthy of repetition that this was the first army
corps in the world armed with such firearms. It is
also worthy of repetition that much of their sur-
prising success was due to that fact.
During Hood's Advance and Retreat the corps
marched approximately three hundred miles, the last
two hundred in midwinter. It turned the enemy's
left flank at Nashville, took his line in reverse, as-
saulted and captured three redoubts, took thirty-two
field guns, twelve battle flags, three thousand two
hundred and thirty-two prisoners, one pontoon train
of eighty boats, many wagons, and thousands of
horses, mules, and small arms.
General Thomas twice thanked me in orders for
"its success, good conduct, and dashing gallantry"
and for "its vigor, skill, and bravery in the long
and toilsome pursuit of the retreating rebel army. ' '
Many of its officers and men, from division com-
mander to private soldier, were mentioned by name
for promotion and for medals of honor which were
issued for "unusual and conspicuous gallantry."
During the pursuit of Hood it lost one gun which
it recaptured in the Selma campaign. It had one
hundred and twenty-two officers and men killed, five
hundred and twenty-one wounded, and two hundred
and fifty-nine missing.
By reference to the reports, which will be found
fully set forth in the Official Records, 1 it will be
seen that the corps in its last campaign from the
Tennessee River to Macon, Georgia, where it was
1 0. E. Serial No. 103.
292
END OF THE WAR
stopped by the armistice and the subsequent sur-
render of Johnston's army, marched an average of
five hundred and twenty-five miles in twenty-eight
days, crossed six large rivers, captured five fortified
cities and towns, twenty-three stands of colors, two
hundred and eighty-eight pieces of artillery, six thou-
sand eight hundred and twenty prisoners in battle,
including five generals. It also captured and de-
stroyed two gun-boats nearly ready for sea with the
shipyards in which they were constructed, seven
ironworks, seven foundries, seven machine shops,
two rolling mills, seven collieries, thirteen factories,
two niter works, one military university, three ar-
senals and contents, one naval armory and contents,
one powder magazine and contents, five steamboats
and cargoes, thirty-five locomotives, five hundred
and sixty-five passenger and freight cars, a great
number of railroad bridges, trestle-works, and sta-
tions, besides immense quantities of quartermaster,
commissary, and ordnance stores which could not
be enumerated. In addition to the foregoing
trophies of war the corps, after the peace was de-
clared, paroled six thousand one hundred and
thirty-four commissioned officers and fifty-three
thousand seven hundred and forty-four enlisted men.
Summarizing the principal items for the two cam-
paigns, it marched eight hundred and twenty-five
miles and captured ten thousand and fifty-two pris-
oners, thirty-five colors and three hundred and!
twenty guns in the open field and behind fortifica-
tions.
During its last campaign it lost thirteen officers
and eighty-six enlisted men killed, thirty-nine officers
and five hundred and fifty-nine enlisted men
293
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
wounded, and seven officers and twenty-one men
missing. Or from the time it left Nashville till the
surrender at Macon, it lost a total of two hundred
and twenty-one officers and men killed, eleven hun-
dred and fifty-nine wounded and two hundred and
eighty-seven missing.
The march from Montgomery to Macon, two hun-
dred and fifteen miles, was made between the 14th
and 20th of April at an average rate, including the
delay at Columbus and West Point, of slightly over
thirty miles per day. Involving, as this march did,
the capture of two fortified bridge-heads command-
ing the crossings of the Chattahoochee Eiver, and
the destruction of the Confederate property at those
places, it may well be considered as one of the most
rapid and important campaigns made by either side
during the War for the Union. Indeed, the cam-
paign from the Tennessee Eiver through Selma,
Montgomery, and Columbus may be fairly claimed as
the most rapid, far-reaching, and successful cavalry
campaign of modern times.
The complete destruction of the iron works,
foundries, collieries, factories, and boat yards with
their supplies and provisions, as well as the princi-
pal lines of railroad communication, connecting the
armies under Taylor, Beauregard, and Johnston was
an irreparable blow to the Confederacy.
Lee and other Confederate generals have been
praised for accepting the inevitable results and for
surrendering their armies and declining to inaugu-
rate a guerrilla war, but it must be remembered that
those officers had no choice. The great mass of the
enemy's armed force was in our hands as prisoners
of war or had deserted their colors and taken to the
294
END OF THE WAR
woods. The means of transporting troops, food,
arms, and military munitions having been effectually
destroyed, there was nothing left for the Southern
leaders east of the Mississippi to do but lay down
their arms, disband their organizations, and return
to the walks of peace. "The rich man's war and the
poor man's fight" had been fought to a finish. It
was ended for good and all, for the sufficient reason
that the means of carrying it on and keeping rank
and file with the colors, had been completely de-
stroyed, and it is but justice to the Cavalry Corps,
Military Division of the Mississippi, to assert that
this great result was due more to its prowess and
performances than to any other single cause.
It had put an end by its example to the cavalry
raid with a weak and inadequate force, and had in-
troduced instead the great campaign with an army
of mounted men. In doing this it made the last
campaign and fought the last battle of the great war
and at the close had something over thirteen thousand
white mounted infantry and cavalry and thirty-six
hundred negro infantry with the colors. In addition
every cavalry man was mounted and it had besides
eight thousand horses and mules for its teams and
for distribution afterward. It was a close, com-
pact, and efficient organization of three divisions
and six brigades with from three to five regiments
to a brigade and a battery of horse artillery to each
division, the whole capable of marching easily and
indefinitely at the average rate of thirty-five miles
per day. It is worthy of special note that this rate
would have brought it to a junction with Sherman
and Kilpatrick in North Carolina or even with Grant
and Sheridan in Virginia inside of thirty days. With
295
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
such a reenforcement either army, separate or the
two united, would have been invincible against any
force the Confederacy could have mustered, no mat-
ter what stroke of good fortune might have fallen
to its lot. When we add that from the time the cav-
alry corps left Nashville till it reached Macon it
attacked no fortifications that it did not carry, and
came within range of no cannon that it did not cap-
ture. When it is recalled that in all this, it never
avoided nor went around, but in every case attacked
and passed through the Confederate cities and
towns on or near its route, it will be readily admit-
ted that it fully justified Sherman's high praise
when he said that it was by far the largest, best
equipped, and best handled cavalry force that ever
came under his command.
Finally, it seems to have fairly earned for me
these kindly words from John Hay: "General J.
H. Wilson, who had been put in command of all the
cavalry in the Military Division of the Mississippi,
and who came endorsed by Grant, with the predic-
tion that he would increase the efficiency of that arm
by fifty per cent. " . . .
"The ride of Wilson's troopers into Alabama
was one of the most important and fruitful expedi-
tions of the war. ... If the Confederacy had
not already been wounded to death, the loss of Selma
would have been almost irreparable. ... It
justified by its celerity, boldness, and good judgment
the high encomium with which Grant sent Wilson to
Thomas." 1
14 'Life of Lincoln," Nicolayand Hay, Vol. X., pp. 8, 234, 238,
241.
296
IX
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
Administration of affairs in Macon Measures for the cap-
ture of Davis Jefferson Davis captured.
After the capture of Columbus, West Point, and
Macon, it was evident that there was no Confederate
force left to carry on the war in any part of Georgia.
The granary of the Confederacy had escaped the
horrors and devastation of war. Even Sherman
after capturing Atlanta left southwestern Georgia
intact, and on his March to the Sea came no nearer
Macon than Milledgeville, the capital of the State.
Although Cobb with a few thousand Confederate
soldiers and militia made the best fight he could at
Columbus and did all in his power to delay us on
the road, the people themselves kept as close to
their homes as possible, suspending all business em-
ployments and waiting for such outrages as they had
been taught to believe the Yankees would inflict
upon then. Although we were forced to impress
food and forage from the region through which we
were marching, it was our custom to do this with as
much regularity and impartiality as possible, and
when it is remembered that the path of a marching
column, whether cavalry or infantry, is necessarily
narrow even for the foragers, it will be seen that
297
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
relatively few people suffer severe loss and that
those who are absolutely cleaned out have but little
distance to go to the right or left in order to supply
themselves with food from their neighbors. The
real difficulty and hardship comes when a corps with
a large number of men and animals is compelled to
halt, for in that case it soon clears a country of both
forage and provisions. We had already discovered
that an ordinary county would not feed our seven-
teen thousand men and twenty-two thousand animals
longer than a day or two without greatly impover-
ishing the people. Sherman knew this as well as
anybody, and hence his telegram, calling attention
to southwestern Georgia and directing me to pur-
chase supplies in that region as far as possible, was
both kindly and considerate, and so far as it was
necessary and practicable his instructions were car-
ried into effect. But the left-over Confederate sup-
plies were soon exhausted and those in the hands of
the people were drawn upon heavily. All foraging
was, of course, discontinued from the time the war
had ended. This, together with the fact that there
was no tendency amongst the cavalrymen to vio-
lence, had a reassuring and tranquilizing effect. The
people gradually resumed their usual avocations
and, perceiving that we were not the barbarians they
had been accustomed to call us, gradually softened
in their behavior, and some even went so far as to
speak of us as fellow countrymen. While division,
brigade, and regimental commanders busied them-
selves with the maintenance of discipline and good
order in the camps and about them, the leading men
of the community, both soldiers and civilians, re-
sponded by counselling moderation of behavior and
298
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
total abstention from political discussion on the part
of the people. Evidently the soldiers as well as the
citizens were heartily glad the war was over. Here
and there a woman failed to recognize that fact, and
if she spoke at all, flouted the Union and those who
upheld it.
A day or two after we established headquarters
at the City Hall, the national flag was hanging over
the street, when one of the principal ladies out shop-
ping, caught sight of its shadow on the sidewalk,
and as though she might commit herself to some-
thing she or her neighbors would not like, rather
than pass under it, she crossed over the street and
started down the other side. As she did this, Col-
onel White, of stalwart frame and flowing beard,
caught sight of her through the window. Buttoning
his coat and hitching up his saber, he walked down
the steps and across the street, meeting the lady
opposite headquarters. Lifting his hat with dignity
and politeness, he took her hand and placing it under
his arm said: "Permit me, madam," and with that
led her, trembling and confused, carefully across
the street, and then pointing to the flag, he added:
"Madam, you seem to fear that the shadow of the
stars and stripes will do you some injury, but I as-
sure you you are mistaken. That flag is the emblem
of national sovereignty and of equal rights to all. It
is the banner of our reunited country, and when you
think you can pass under it without shying, you will
be permitted to go about your business." After
escorting her once more beneath its folds, he gal-
lantly raised his hat again and bade her good morn-
ing. The incident, of course, soon became known
throughout the town, and it gives me pleasure to
299
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
add that it needed no repetition. From that day
forth the flag was treated with perfect respect by
every member of the community. Good order pre-
vailed from the day of our entry, and although the
negroes showed a disposition to leave the farms and
to flock to the towns, it would have been difficult for
the onlooker to perceive any unusual movement in
Macon. Notice was given that both blacks and
whites were expected to remain at home, and this
was emphasized by the fact that our Kentucky, Ten-
nessee, and Missouri cavalrymen soon made it
known that they had no use for "idle niggers."
Shortly after the occupation of the place the pro-
vost marshal reported that two dead negroes had
been found in the Ocmulgee River with bullet holes
in their bodies, indicating that they had been mur-
dered. Investigation cast suspicion upon the sol-
diers and the soldiers cast suspicion upon the citi-
zens, and while the real murderers were never dis-
covered, the investigation produced a good effect.
Becoming known in the neighborhood, it discouraged
vagabondage and idle curiosity. But with all we
could do there was more or less uneasiness and dis-
contentment among the negroes, especially the house
servants.
One morning a lady in the deepest mourning
asked for a personal interview with General Wilson.
She was shown in, but had hardly reached her seat
before she showed that she was in a state of great
agitation. Of course, I asked her name and business,
whereupon, throwing up her hands and bursting
into a storm of tears and sobs, she said: "I am
Mrs. Blank of Blank. And, oh, sir ! I have shot my
nigger! I have shot my nigger!" Then rocking to
300
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
and fro as though she feared instant execution, she
gradually regained her composure, as I said what I
could to soothe and reassure her. My sympathy
as well as my curiosity were thoroughly aroused
while she told her tragic story between her sighs
and sohs.
It appears that a slave woman, her cook and
laundress, left home when she heard the Yankees
had come, but after her excitement was over had
gone back to get the washtub which she had come to
regard as her own. Unfortunately, she found her
mistress seated at the cooking stove, probably for
the first time in her life, roasting coffee. In reply to
a question she said: "Miss Jane, I've come back
for de tub." Whereupon the mistress told her she
could not have it and bade her begone. When she
rose from her chair as though she would enforce
her command, the colored woman put her arms about
her shoulders and forced her back into the seat. This
was more than any Southern woman could endure,
and boiling over with rage, she drew from her
pocket a small revolver, which she pointed upward
and fired. Although her arms were pinioned, the
shot ploughed through the colored woman 's cheek
and knocked her senseless to the floor. The blood
flowed freely and consternation prevailed. The
neighbors rushed in and did what they could to re-
store order and give help, but before the wounded
woman's injury was fully known, or the local au-
thorities were found, they hurried the mistress off
to make a virtue of telling her story first to the
commanding general.
On her own statement it was a serious case made
still more so by the paralysis of such justice as the
301
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
local laws provided, but after satisfying myself that
the injured woman was not dead, and assuring the
mistress that she might go for the present with an
aid-de-camp who would make further investigation,
I permitted her to return home. The next day I was
gratified to learn that the wound was but a super-
ficial one which would soon heal and that the mis-
tress had not only suffered almost as much as the
victim of her wrath, but had done what she could
for the comfort and cure of her old servant. What
the public expected in this case I never knew, but
on the officer's report, I was glad to drop it and to
leave the future relations of the parties to the
ameliorating hand of time.
Shortly afterward a more difficult and compli-
cated case came to my attention. A negro, arrested
and imprisoned for a petty offense, had apparently
been forgotten. After ten days or two weeks he
was offered his release on the payment of $50 to
a disbanded Confederate colonel making his way
home to Mississippi. It was also reported that the
colonel had arranged to give half the money in this
and in similar cases to the assistant provost mar-
shal for his cooperation. The story as told was al-
most incredible, but satisfying myself that it was
substantially true, I directed that the lieutenant
should be court-martialed and that the Confederate
colonel should be arrested and imprisoned for ten
days in the cell of the released negro. My orders
were promptly carried into effect, and as the people
heard of and approved my action in these cases,
much to my surprise, I became somewhat popular
with them.
The first day after reaching Macon a leading
302
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
citizen and lawyer, afterward a distinguished
judge, came for permission to resume the publica-
tion of the Macon Messenger as a daily newspaper,
which I granted on the sole condition that it should
publish nothing against the United States or its
Constitution. Two days later the same gentleman
came again and asked if I had any printers in my
command, adding that his compositors had struck
and that he was exceedingly anxious to get out the
paper at the usual hour the next morning. Turning
to my aid, Captain Van Antwerp of the Fourth
Michigan Cavalry, whom I knew to be a practical
compositor and the editor of the Jackson Patriot, I
asked if he had any printers in his troop. He re-
plied at once: "Oh, yes. I have between seventy
and eighty. ' ' After learning that only three or four
were needed, I directed the captain to send down ten
or a dozen to get the paper out. I need only add
that when they appeared with rattling sabers and
jingling spurs, the strike instantly ended. The old
printers hastened to say everything was "all right"
and that the paper would be forthcoming at the
proper hour. But the Michigan men, instead of re-
turning to camp that night, went to the cases and
completed the type-setting in shorter time than it
had ever been done before. They thorough^ en-
joyed the change of work and returned to camp next
morning a jolly and elated lot, assuring their fore-
man, one of their own non-commissioned officers,
that they would be glad to undortake any other
printing job the breakdown of the Confederacy
might bring to their attention. As far as I know,
however, this was the only case and their services
were not again required.
303
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
But the first week of our stay in Macon derived
its chief importance from other and far more im-
portant matters. Sherman's dispatch of April 20,
telling me of the truce and the arrangement he had
entered into with Johnston for * ' a universal suspen-
sion of hostilities," although definite enough, was
followed by no detailed instructions. On the con-
trary, I was left entirely to my own discretion for
eight or nine days. I knew that the silence which
had fallen on General Cobb and the state authori-
ties alike indicated a hitch in the arrangements
somewhere, but I heard nothing definite till April
30 brought again over the Confederate wires the
news that Johnston had surrendered not only his
army but all other Confederate forces east of the
Chattahoochee on terms identical with those Grant
had extended to Lee and the Army of North Vir-
ginia at Appomattox.
On May 1, the very next day, I received through
the hands of Colonel Woodall, who had come by the
way of Chattanooga and Atlanta from Thomas at
Nashville, an order from Stanton, secretary of war,
notifying me as well as other commanders that
Sherman's first truce had been disapproved, and
directing me to disregard his orders and re-
sume operations forthwith against the enemy's
armed forces wherever they might be found. While
I did nothing under these orders for the simple rea-
son that they had been rendered nugatory by the
time lost in transmission, they confirmed me in the
determination to act in all cases according to the
requirements of the public interests. While the final
capitulation made it clear that all Confederate offi-
cers and men who laid down their arms should be
304
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
paroled and allowed to remain at home without fur-
ther molestation, Stanton's order, issued prior to
the actual surrender, seemed to indicate that it was
the policy of the Government that we should pursue
and capture the Confederate chiefs who might be
trying to escape from the country. At all events,
this was the view I took of that matter. I had al-
ready learned on April 23, from a foreign-born citi-
zen of Georgia that he had seen Jefferson Davis and
his family a few days before at Charlotte, North
Carolina, with several members of his cabinet and
the remains of the Confederate treasury, making
their way south under an escort.
Although the President of the Confederate
States was also commander-in-chief of their army
and navy under their Constitution, it was evident
that Davis did not consider himself as covered by
the terms of the capitulation, but was endeavoring
to reach the trans-Mississippi Department or to
escape from the country. It was a juncture of ex-
treme gravity and I gave every circumstance con-
nected with it the most careful consideration. Hav-
ing an independent command in central Georgia with
no free telegraph or other safe means of communica-
tion, I dared not try to reach Sherman on such an
important matter as the flight of Davis with even
a cipher message, and as I had no possible way
of reaching either Grant or Stanton or of getting
their instructions in time, I was forced to assume
the entire responsibility. And this I did without the
slightest delay or hesitation. The capture of Davis
in southern Georgia within ten days proved that my
information and conclusions were sufficiently cor-
rect to justify my action. The details have been
305
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
more or less confused by contemporaneous writers ;
in one case at least they were ridiculously exag-
gerated, but all the essential particulars of the flight
and capture have been forever set at rest by Jeffer-
son Davis himself. 1
As the part taken in these events by the officers
and men of my command not only ended the drama
but made one of the most interesting chapters of
modern history, I shall proceed to tell it exactly as
it occurred. The records and contemporaneous pub-
lications afford abundant testimony upon all dis-
puted points.
As soon as I got word of Johnston 9 & capitulation
on April 27, 1 directed Upton to proceed with an es-
cort from his division, followed by Alexander's bri-
gade, by rail to Augusta, which he reached on May
3. At the same time I ordered Winslow with the
rest of the division to march as rapidly as possible
to Atlanta, one hundred and fifty miles north, where
they should take post for the purpose of carrying
out the Sherman-Johnston Convention. Colonel Eg-
gleston with the First Ohio was first to occupy that
unfortunate city. As Eggleston was an experienced
officer of discretion and judgment he was naturally
assigned to command the post with instructions to
send a strong detachment by rail southwest to West
Point. Winslow reached Atlanta several days later,
and from that time with Alexander, Noble, and Eg-
gleston, kept watch and ward over every road in
northern Georgia. Every officer and man was anx-
ious to assist in the capture of Davis and his party,
and had there been the slightest disposition to let
114 A Short History of the Confederate States, " by Jefferson
Davis, New York, Belford & Company, 1890, pp. 491 et seq.
306
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
up in the work Upton would not only have discov-
ered it but would have taken radical measures to
stimulate the vigilance and enterprise of those in
fault. His position at Augusta on the northeastern
boundary of the State, gave him an unusual oppor-
tunity to learn everything of importance taking
place in the surrounding country. As he was both
alert and full of expedients, he rendered most im-
portant service. He it was who suggested offering a
reward of $500,000 for the capture of Davis before
information reached us that the Secretary of War
had denounced him with others for complicity in the
assassination of Lincoln, and had based thereon an
official offer of $100,000 for his apprehension. Up-
ton had as yet no suspicion that Davis had partici-
pated in that crime, but like the rest of us he was
anxious that the great chieftain, who had waged
such a determined war for four years against the
Union, should be captured and brought to trial. He,
therefore, submitted his recommendation, and urged
that it afforded a cheap way to end the war. He
suggested that Davis would not travel blindly
through the South, but would know his friends be-
fore reaching them, and that such a large reward
would enlist thousands in his pursuit. As we had
already received "grape-vine" reports that Davis
had a large quantity of gold and other bank assets
with him, it occurred to me that without assuming
the risk of using the irascible Stanton's name or
putting a price on Davis 's head, I might properly
offer a reward for his apprehension and delivery on
the expressed condition that the reward should be
paid out of the treasure captured with the fugitive.
In view of the Secretary's stormy and arbitrary
307
UNDEE THE ODD FLAG
temper even that action was rather bold for a sub-
ordinate, but I promptly wired Upton * * to go ahead, ' '
giving him the assurance that we would "take the
consequences together." Thus, it will be seen, our
reward was offered before official authority reached
us from Washington and not without the thought
that it might possibly get us into trouble. 1 It is but
just to the officers and men actually engaged in the
pursuit of Davis to say, however, that not one of
them ever heard of the actual offer till after the
capture was made. I may add that, inasmuch as
Davis had distributed his treasury gold to his fol-
lowers before leaving Washington, Georgia, no part
of it fell into the hands of his captors or was paid
for his apprehension. On the other hand Stanton 's
offer was duly redeemed by an act of Congress ap-
propriating the money which in turn was distributed
according to the law of prize substantially as I had
recommended.
Before his brigade left Macon, Alexander was
authorized at his own request to send Lieutenant
Joseph A. 0. Yeoman, First Ohio Cavalry, brigade
inspector, with twenty picked men disguised as
"rebel soldiers" northeastward for the purpose of
obtaining definite information of Davis 's movements
and of cutting him out and bringing him in as a
prisoner of war if opportunity offered. With cap-
tured Confederate uniforms, these men would have
been taken by the closest observer for a smart de-
tachment of Confederate cavalry.
The other commanders were authorized to send
out similar parties to both front and rear. By these
1 O. E. Serial No. 104, pp. 628-629, Stanton and Schofield; also,
pp. 633-634, Upton and Wilson; also, p. 640, Stanton to Wilson.
308
CAPTURE OF, JEFFERSON DAVIS
means it was thought certain that all considerable
bodies of rebel troops moving in military order
would be duly discovered and that information would
be got which would enable us to disperse them and
to secure the principal leaders if they should try
to pass through the country in any other way than
as individual travelers or fugitives. With all the
railroads in Georgia under my control and a division
of four thousand national cavalry operating from
Atlanta in all directions, it seemed highly improb-
able that any considerable body of fugitives could
pass westward through northern Georgia by the or-
dinary roads, and as this narrative progresses it
will become evident that Davis himself reached the
same conclusion soon after crossing the Savannah
Eiver.
With the First and Second Divisions occupying
Macon and sending out detachments in all directions
and especially east, southeast, and southwest, that
place had also become a center of vigilance and ac-
tivity. In an incredibly short time every important
road in the surrounding country as well as every
ferry and crossing of the Ocmulgee and Oconee,
flowing through the center and southeastern part of
the state to the Altamaha and the Atlantic, was
closely patroled and guarded. The same was true
of the railways as well as of the bridges and ferries
of the Flint and Chattahoochee to the west. Little
by little it appeared likely that Davis would try to
escape to the southward rather than to the westward,
and hour by hour our efforts were increased to dis-
cover the road on which he was actually traveling.
Eumors and false reports came in constantly. One
day Davis was crossing the Chattahoochee in north-
309
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
era Georgia, the next he was crossing the Appa-
lachee near Madison. On the third he was reported
as being near Covington on the Ocmulgee. But as
it turned out all these reports were false. Davis,
who left the railroad at Abbeville, South Carolina,
had ridden through the country with his party,
crossed the Savannah at Petersburg, where there
was a pontoon bridge, and arrived at Washington
in northeastern Georgia on the 3rd or 4th of May.
Trustworthy news to this effect reached me on the
6th.
Fortunately, Yeoman's party, having started
first and traveled rapidly in the direction whence it
seemed most likely Davis would come, was first to
send in accurate information. He had not only
passed through northern Georgia but had joined
Davis 's party in South Carolina, and marched with
him to Washington, seeking an opportunity to cut
out and get away with him as a prisoner, but in this
he was disappointed. It was easy enough for Yeo-
man and his small body of troopers to circulate up
and down the column, made up as it was, of detach-
ments from many different commands. Everybody
was bent on saving himself, or at best on "going
along down with the rest." Nobody suspected his
chance neighbor of being a Yankee, but Davis nat-
urally kept his own friends and acquaintances near
by and, although but little formality and less state
was observed, no one without special business could
make an excuse for approaching him. The most
Yeoman could do was to follow the column as part of
it to Washington, but once there it disintegrated
and he soon lost sight of Davis. Although he hung
about and made cautious inquiries for a while, he
310
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
failed to learn Da vis's actual lodging in the town,
when he left, what direction he took, or by what road
he traveled. He sent several couriers to the railroad
to notify headquarters by wire what he had learned,
but that was also slow and uncertain work, and the
only definite information we actually got from him
was that Davis had been at Washington and had
disappeared. Yeoman, realizing that his own po-
sition was a perilous one, returned to the railroad
and the next we heard of him he was on the way to
Atlanta. Meanwhile, from the multiplicity of con-
flicting rumors and reports, and from the absence
of anything certain except that Davis had been seen
at Charlotte and been followed into Washington,
and had gone south from that place with an escort,
I concluded that he would try to make his way
through the pine forests east of us to southwestern
Georgia or to Florida and that if I started fresh
detachments from Macon, one to march southeast-
wardly across country in the direction of Dublin
on the Oconee and the other down the right bank of
the Ocmulgee, one or the other would be likely to
cross his trail. Accordingly, on the evening of May
6, I directed Croxton to select his best colonel and
best regiment and send them to march as rapidly
as possible by way of Jeffersonville to Dublin, post-
ing small parties at the principal crossroads and
sending others out still farther to the east after he
reached Dublin. By these means I hoped to dis-
cover Davis 's later movements, in which event the
commanding officer was to follow the fugitives till
they should be overtaken and captured. Under
these instructions Croxton selected and started Col-
onel Harnden with the First Wisconsin at once.
311
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
That night and the next day my conviction that
Davis would try to escape into Florida became so
strengthened that I directed Minty, commanding
the Second Division, also to select his best colonel
and best regiment and send them with orders to
follow the right or south bank of the Ocmulgee,
watching all the crossings and ferries as far down
as the mouth of the Ohoopee Eiver. In case he
crossed the trail of any important party he was
directed to follow it to the Gulf of Mexico if nec-
essary. For this purpose Minty detailed Lieuten-
ant Colonel Pritchard with the Fourth Michigan
Cavalry, and as both commanding officers were sol-
diers of the first quality and their men hardy vet-
erans, neither lost any time in carrying out the in-
structions he had received.
My final dispositions may be summarized as fol-
lows: Upton with parts of two regiments was at
Augusta watching the country in that vicinity and
informing me by telegraph of every important cir-
cumstance which came under his observation. Wins-
low with the larger part of Upton 's division occu-
pied Atlanta scouting the country in all directions
from that place. Alexander with five hundred picked
men patroled the country north of the Chattahoochee
toward Dalton, while smaller detachments occupied
Griffin and Jonesborough, watching the crossings of
the upper Ocmulgee and scouting the country to the
eastward. Small detachments had also been sent to
West Point and Columbus to watch the Alabama line
in that quarter.
Croxton, commanding the main body of the First
Division, had also sent a detachment to northeastern
Alabama by way of Talladega and another through
312
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
northeastern Georgia toward North Carolina, while
the rest of the division was watching the Ocmulgee
from the right of Upton's line to Macon. Minty
with the larger part of the Second Division, after
detaching Pritchard, scouted the country on both
sides of the river to the lower crossings of the Oc-
mulgee and had small parties at all the important
points on the Southwestern Eailroad and in western
and southwestern Georgia, while McCook with a
strong detachment at Albany and seven hundred men
between that point and Tallahassee, Florida, was
keenly on the lookout with the rest of the division
for important fugitives. By now I also had tele-
graphic communication with Atlanta, Augusta, West
Point, Columbus, Albany, Eufala, and Milledgeville,
so that it seemed certain we should hear of and
capture all important persons endeavoring to get
out of the country.
In addition to these arrangements it must be re-
membered that Stoneman and Palmer, the latter be-
longing to Johnson 's Sixth division, with strong col-
umns had broken into North Carolina and were
moving through that state toward the Georgia fron-
tier, breaking the railroad and looking for the Con-
federate leaders.
By inspecting the map it will be seen that not less
than fifteen thousand horsemen, counting Palmer's
brigade, were occupying central and continuous
lines from Kingston, Upper Georgia, to Florida,
covering the whole country with detachments and
scouts in all directions to the front and rear. When
it is recalled that with the surrender of Johnston's
army the conviction forced itself on the Confederate
leaders still at large that the war was ended for-
313
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ever and that Davis had lost his control of the
Southern people, it will be recognized that Upton's
suggestion of a reward for his capture was based
on strong probabilities.
Let us now turn to Davis. While we knew he had
been at Charlotte, Abbeville, and Washington, we
did not know just when he got to those places. From
his own "History of the Confederate States " it now
appears that Lee late in March notified him that it
might be necessary to abandon Petersburg and Eich-
mond at an early day and to concentrate the Confed-
erate forces, if possible, at Danville south of the
Eoanoke Eiver. Neither at that time seems to have
despaired of the Confederacy. It was then, doubt-
less, the intention of both to continue the war with
their main armies and if those were broken up, to
inaugurate a system of guerrilla warfare. The Con-
federate Congress had offered Lee the formal dic-
tatorship but he had declined, and this circumstance
allowed Davis to retain actual control to the end.
It will be recalled that Grant's army broke
through the defenses of Petersburg on April 1-2,
immediately after which Lee notified Davis that the
evacuation would have to begin that night. It is
now alleged that a forerunner of that notification
reached him on the way to church, but the formal
message was not handed to him till he took his seat
in his pew. It also appears that he had been busy
several days, selecting and packing the Confederate
archives, and that when this work was finished,
which was not till about midnight, Davis, his cabinet,
and his family took train for Danville, which place
they reached the next evening. They remained there
till seven hours after Lee's surrender at Appomat-
314
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
tox on April 9, and then went on to Greensbor-
ough, where they became the guests of Colonel
Moorehead for the 10th and llth. At that place Davis
held a council with Generals Johnston, Beauregard,
and Breckenridge, and with Benjamin, Mallory,
Eeagan, and George Davis of his cabinet on April 12
for the purpose of deciding on the policy of the Con-
federacy for the immediate future. It was at this
council that he made an eloquent and impassioned
speech, by which he endeavored to convince his hear-
ers that all was not lost. Although he doubtless
knew that Selma had fallen and that Montgomery
and Columbus were in danger, he contended that
they could still make head against the Union army,
and if it came to the worst could unite a large force
composed of Johnston's, Taylor's, Beauregard 's,
Maury's, and Forrest's troops in western Alabama.
He claimed that if this army, thus organized, should
be overborne, a large part of it could make its way
to the trans-Mississippi Department and there con-
tinue the war indefinitely. Although he received
but little encouragement from the council it is evi-
dent that he had not yet given up all hope.
While at Charlotte, where he arrived on April
18, he reluctantly authorized Johnston to open ne-
gotiations with Sherman for an arrangement by
which peace should be concluded. Some writers al-
lege that he drafted with his own hands the terms
finally agreed upon; others declare that the draft
was made by Breckenridge, his secretary of war, but
without reference to the real author of the scheme,
it is sufficient to state that Sherman accepted it and
reported it to his superiors for ratification, that
Stanton, the national secretary of war, promptly re-
315
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
pudiated it, and that Sherman in accordance with
instructions thereupon gave forty-eight hours' no-
tice that the armistice would terminate at noon
April 27.
Davis seems to have remained at Charlotte till
that day, although he claims that he did not hear
that the termination of the armistice was followed
at once by the surrender of Johnston with all the
Confederate forces east of the Chattahoochee Eiver
on terms substantially the same as those granted to
Lee and his army. 1 Be this as it may, it is now cer-
tain that Davis left Charlotte on April 27 and by
short marches with two intervals of a half day each,
reached Abbeville, South Carolina, May 3. Mrs.
Davis and family had already arrived at Wash-
ington some fifty miles to the southwest under the
escort of Burton Harrison, but had notified Davis by
letter which reached him the same day, of her inten-
tion to make her way to Pensacola by traveling
through the country to the south between Macon
and Augusta.
Disturbed by this information, Davis pushed on
at once, crossing the Savannah at Petersburg on the
morning of May 4, and arriving at the town of
Washington the same night. It was from that place
that Yeoman sent in his first information, and it was
there also that Davis first heard of Upton's occupa-
tion of Augusta.
Admonished by his proximity to our forces and
hearing that the country was full of marauding de-
tachments, mostly Confederates going home, he dis-
tributed the treasury gold and silver to the troops
who had not yet disbanded, and started early on the
1 0. E. Serial No. 97, pp. 1390-91.
316
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
morning of the 6th through Laurens and Dodge
Counties to the south. His escort, consisting of five
small cavalry brigades, deserted him at Washington,
though General Basil Duke and Colonel Brecken-
ridge marched westward to Woodstock to cover his
movements. Benjamin and Mallory left him before
getting to Washington while Breckenridge and Rea-
gan continued with Davis to that place. From Wash-
ington, with a volunteer escort of only ten or twelve
men and no encumbrance but a light wagon, he soon
caught up with Mrs. Davis and her party. From
this reunion, which doubtless occurred on the 7th,
they traveled together till the entire party was cap-
tured near Irwinville, the county seat of Irwin
County, three days later.
It is worthy of note, however, that Davis to the
time of his death declared that while it was his pur-
pose to send his wife to Pensacola, it was his own
intention to pass around or through my main line,
and across the lower Chattahoochee, into southern
Alabama, and then to continue his journey to a junc-
tion with Taylor, Maury, and Forrest. His narra-
tive shows that he conformed to that plan from
the time he crossed the Oconee River n-ear Dublin
till he was captured considerably out of the
course by which Breckenridge and Benjamin reached
the coast of Florida and finally escaped from the
country. Davis rode about one hundred and thirty
miles as the crow flies from Washington to Irwin-
ville, but taking into account the crooked roads the
distance was from one hundred and forty-five to
one hundred and fifty-five miles, which he made in
four days or at the average rate of something less
than forty miles a day. Considering his indistinct
317
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
route and the encumbrance of the family train, this
must be considered as good speed.
But to return to Harnden and the pursuit. That
sturdy veteran realizing that he was out for a long
chase, selected only three officers and one hundred
and fifty men with the best horses. When they were
drawn out and inspected for the march he briefly
explained in his own rough way that they had been
chosen to go in pursuit of Davis, vhose escort would
probably outnumber them and would certainly fight
to the death, but as the First Wisconsin had never
been whipped yet, he did not expect them to be
whipped now no matter how many rebels they might
encounter. Eeceiving this speech with cheers, they
took the road late in the evening of May 6. March-
ing southeastwardly all night by forest roads, they
reached Jeffersonville about daylight the next morn-
ing. Leaving there an officer and thirty men with
orders to scout the country in all directions for re-
liable information of Davis and his party, the re-
mainder, now reduced to one hundred and twenty,
pushed on without halting to Dublin, a poor little
town on the west bank of the Oconee, which they
reached at seven o'clock that evening. They cov-
ered something over fifty miles in twenty-four hours.
Harnden sent out scouting parties all day to the
right in pursuit of small detachments which in every
case proved to be paroled men from Johnston's army
on their way home. On arriving at Dublin, he found
the white people somewhat excited by his presence,
but after assuring them that he was establishing a
courier line between Macon and Savannah, he went
into bivouac between the town and the river and set-
tled himself apparently for the night. The leading
318
CAPTUEE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
gentlemen of the place affected entire ignorance if
not indifference to the movements of Davis and
other important rebels, but were unusually profuse
in their offers of hospitality to the grim old colonel.
As this was a trait of Southern character he had
seen but little of as yet, it naturally aroused his sus-
picion, and this was strengthened by commotion
amongst the negroes.
The town was full of Confederate officers in uni-
form, and their sullen looks indicated no friendship
to the Yankee colonel or his detachment. Shortly
after going into bivouac he got an intimation that a
party with wagons had crossed the ferry from the
east side that day, and after some delay "had gone
south on the river road, ' ' but his questions in regard
to the party were evaded, or if answered, the an-
swers were in terms intended to avert suspicion or to
put him on the wrong scent. The most he could be
sure of after all his inquiry was that a considerable
party had arrived there about noon and had gone on
south.
Having been twenty-four hours in the saddle and
thirty-six without sleep, Harnden turned in for rest
as soon as his arrangements were complete, but had
hardly struck his blankets when his body servant,
an ex-slave left behind by Bragg when Eosecrans
drove him from Tennessee, called him up with a
whispered word that he had found an old colored
man who could give him the information he was
looking for. Carefully questioning both men, the
colonel soon satisfied himself that "President
Davis" and "Mrs. Davis " had been in town that
day; that they had arranged to take dinner with a
local judge and were about seating themselves when
319
UNDEK THE OLD FLAG
information came which caused them to start without
eating, and that they had gone south with their en-
tire party. The colored man also said that another
party with horses and wagons had come to the land-
ing but, instead of crossing, had gone on down the
river to a lower ferry. He thought the two parties
had joined each other in the town and had been
traveling together, but was not certain. This was
confusing, but with the hope of getting more exact
information he went to the ferry with two men and
called out the ferryman, whom he questioned closely,
but found him so obstinate, stupid, or ignorant that
he could get nothing confirmatory from him. Con-
vinced, however, that it was his duty to follow the
united party now fully twelve hours on its way, he
returned to the bivouac, called out his half-rested
men and took the road again in pursuit. - The de-
tachment left behind on the Macon road had not yet
come in, and it was necessary under his instruction
to occupy Dublin and scout the country up and down
the river as well as to the eastward. He, therefore,
told off Lieutenant Lane with forty-five men for that
purpose, and with the remaining seventy-five started
by the road which he supposed the party had taken.
Unfortunately, it was still dark as midnight and as
the roads through the pine woods of that region were
mere trails, difficult to follow in the daytime and im-
possible to follow at night, he had great difficulty in
getting straightened out in the right direction. In-
deed, his little column wandered about in uncertainty
for some time and finally found itself, as day began
to break, again in the edge of the town. With com-
ing dawn it readily got off on the right road, but at
the end of the first five miles, it halted a few minutes
320
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
at Turkey Creek where the bridge had been torn up.
While line men were replacing the planking, the
colonel learned at a house near by that a party with
wagons had passed that way the evening before and
that two of the men had stopped to get some milk.
One of them dropped a scrap of newspaper which
had a late Richmond date on it. A bright little girl
of the house had heard one of the gentlemen call the
other "Colonel Harrison," who in turn addressed
the first as ' ' Mr. President. ' ' From further inquiry,
it appeared, both were well dressed and neither had
shoulder straps, but one had stars on his collar and
gold braid on his sleeves, while the others had no
noticeable marks about them, though " their clothes
were not like the colonel's." The information, how-
ever, when put together, convinced Harnden that
he was now on the track of Jefferson Davis, and in
this conviction he sent a courier to me with a dis-
patch to that effect; but the courier was captured
on his way to Macon, robbed of his horse and equip-
ments, and compelled to make his way to that place
on foot, and he did not get through till after the
colonel and his companions had returned from Ir-
winville.
Having repaired the bridge at Turkey Creek with
but little lost time, Harnden pushed on again, fol-
lowing the wagon tracks, which could be plainly seen
for a while, but a heavy rain setting in soon obliter-
ated them. Still the column continued its march,
sending out encircling parties in the hope of finding
the trail again, but in this they were unsuccessful.
One, however, brought in a countryman riding a fine
horse and claiming to be hunting sheep. He strenu-
ously denied all knowledge of the party that Harn-
321
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
den was pursuing, but the colonel threatening to take
his horse and compel him to march on foot, extorted
a confession that he did know where the party had
spent the night before. Closely guarded by two men,
he guided the column in a southwesterly direction to
a poor plantation where the fugitives had rested
over night. Here the column got forage for their
hungry horses, and while the owner stoutly declared
that he did not know where or in what direction the
fugitives had gone, he finally admitted that they
might have continued their march southwestward
across Gum Swamp, but followed this with the dec-
laration that the heavy rain had so raised the water
that it would be impossible for the pursuing column
to find its way through it.
By no means discouraged, the colonel ordered the
countryman to get his horse and guide the column
through the swamp to the dry land beyond and ac-
companied this order with the stern admonition that
if he did not lead the column safely through, he and
his men would return and eat him out of house and
home. As this threat brought him face to face with
a very real danger, he hesitated no longer but guided
the column for several miles safely through water
much of the time up to the saddle skirts. This was
a long and weary day, but the Union horsemen, with-
out flagging, continued the pursuit by a fairly plain
path threading the dense pine forest almost devoid
of settlements and supplies, in a southwesterly di-
rection till darkness compelled them to halt for the
night. Finding but little food for man or beast, and
no shelter for either, they made themselves as com-
fortable as they could by huge camp fires of pine logs,
but their rest about midnight was rudely broken by
322
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
a terrible storm of wind, rain, thunder, and light-
ning which blew down several forest trees near by
and so saturated the ground that none but veteran
cavalrymen could have got the slightest relief from
fatigue because of the discomfort of the bivouac.
Up and on the path again before daylight of the
9th, they pushed forward as rapidly as possible till
they reached the Ocmulgee River, which they had
crossed first at Macon, nearly a hundred miles to the
northwest. They had made almost a circle, but find-
ing no means of crossing they continued down the
left bank till they came to Brown's Ferry. Here
they found an old flat boat which they overloaded in
their anxiety to cross quickly, and the restive horses
kicked loose one of the bottom planks on the upward
curve of the bow, so that the boat took water rapidly.
This made it necessary to carry half loads after-
ward, which in turn prolonged the passage two
hours, but the delay gave Harnden the opportunity
of learning that the party he was pursuing had
crossed the river that day only a few hours ahead
of him. As soon as his men were all over, he fol-
lowed the river for an hour to the little town of
Abbeville, where he halted to feed and rest. Here
inquiry elicited the information that a party with
wagons had passed through the town that day, go-
ing toward Irwinville, some twenty-five miles far-
ther south. He now had no doubt that he was within
reach of the party he had been pursuing for three
days, but decided not to close in on it till after dark.
Having fed his horses and refreshed his men, he
again took the road, but just as he was moving out,
he met four soldiers coming from the north. As it
turned out, they were the advance of the Fourth
323
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
Michigan Cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel Pr it-
chard, near at hand.
It will be remembered that Pritchard had left
Macon the day after Harnden had started to Dublin.
He had marched rapidly, leaving detachments at all
the important crossings, and was now approaching
the lower bends of the river to which his attention
had been particularly directed. It was about the
middle of the afternoon. Without halting his own
column, Harnden rode back to meet Pritchard, to
whom, as they were engaged in a common enterprise,
he gave all the information he had gathered in his
three days ' pursuit, and this was most important for
Pritchard, who had a larger and fresher command,
but who as yet had learned nothing from any other
source as to Davis 's movements. After declining
reinforcements, Harnden rejoined his own column
near the spot where Davis and his party had halted
for luncheon and left their camp fire still burning.
This, of course, encouraged and quickened Harn-
den 's march till night, when he found himself in a
swale of the forest containing both water and grass,
and accordingly halted to rest and graze his horses.
Neither he nor his men had had anything to eat ex-
cept a small supply of damaged corn meal, but withal
they made a cheerful and hopeful bivouac till nearly
daybreak in the confident belief that they were but
a short distance from the party they were following.
Meanwhile, Pritchard continued his march by the
river road to the left for several miles, when he met
a negro, from whom he obtained information con-
firmatory of the information that Harnden had given
him an hour before. It removed all doubt that the
party Harnden had been pursuing was really that
324
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
of the Confederate President, and that it was also
his duty to join in the pursuit. In this he was clearly
right, and had he acted otherwise he would have
been censurable for negligence and want of enter-
prise. It should not be forgotten that he and Harn-
den were lieutenant colonels of different regiments
from different states belonging to different brigades
and different divisions. They had probably never
met before, and were, therefore, comparative stran-
gers. Had they continued together it would have
been necessary to compare commissions in order
that the senior might properly assume command of
the joint forces. But as they were acting under sep-
arate and distinct orders, they parted with the un-
derstanding that Harnden would continue the pur-
suit on the direct route while Pritchard would fol-
low the river indefinitely or till he found something
further to justify his leaving it. This was the condi-
tion when the latter got the negro's later informa-
tion which caused him to change his plan, and the
only mistake he made after that was that having de-
cided to join in the pursuit he should have sent a
courier to notify Harnden and especially to caution
him to look out for the Michigan men on the first
road farther south running toward Irwinville. For
some reason never clearly explained he failed to
take this precaution, and although it will appear
later that the consequences were unfortunate and
directly due to this failure, I have never thought
that Pritchard 's conduct was censurable for the rea-
son that it was probably an oversight which might
have occurred to any vigorous and zealous officer in
the heat and anxiety of the hour. While proper co-
operation would certainly have prevented mistakes
325
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
and accidents, it could scarcely be foreseen that the
converging columns would come together in the dark
at Davis 's camp, or that a collision would take place
near it during the night.
In order to march as rapidly as possible, Prit-
chard took only seven officers and one hundred and
twenty-eight men, selecting his best troopers and
strongest horses, and at four o'clock in the afternoon
of May 9, started by a roundabout road through
Bowenville toward the county seat of Irwin County.
He had nearly thirty miles to go, or from ten to
twelve miles more than Harnden, in order to reach a
common junction point. Leaving the remainder of
his men under Captain Hathaway with orders to
picket the crossings and continue the march in com-
pliance with the original instructions, Pritchard took
the first right-hand road at as rapid a gait as he
could maintain, following it without drawing rein
till his advance under Captain Hudson found itself
in the vicinity of Irwinville. The situation was now
an exciting one, and yet neither colonel was con-
scious of the other's exact position or what he was
doing. Pritchard 's road brought him into the sleep-
ing village at one o 'clock in the morning of May 10,
and although he and his men naturally made as
little noise as possible, the women and children soon
discovered their presence and became greatly ex-
cited. Eestoring quiet by the assurance that his
column was the rear guard of the rebel President's
escort, he was gratified to learn that the party he
was looking for had encamped that night about a
mile and a half north of the village on the Abbeville
road. With this important information, guided by
a negro, the column with Hudson in front now moved
326
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
noiselessly northward till within a short distance of
the camp.
There the colonel detached Lieutenant Purinton
and twenty-five troopers to make their way through
the woods as silently as possible to the Abbeville
road north of the camp for the purpose of cutting off
all chance of escape, and with the hope that they
might also interpose between the party and its es-
cort. As a necessary precaution he directed Purin-
ton in case of alarm or discovery to close in on the
camp from wherever he might be at the time, while
the remainder of the command would charge the
camp along the main road.
These preliminaries having been successfully
carried into effect without disturbance, Pritchard
moved a few minutes later undiscovered to within
a few rods of the camp, where he patiently waited
against the protest of one of his officers for the first
appearance of dawn, confident that no one could get
away undiscovered and that the chances of complete
success would be more certain by daylight.
Meanwhile Harnden, who had started as soon as
it was light enough to see, after a march of "a mile'
or two," found himself in front of a detachment
which opened fire upon him. From the rattle of the
carbines he estimated this party at from twenty to
thirty and, assuming naturally enough that they be-
longed to Davis 's escort, he promptly dismounted a
part of his force to fight on foot while he started the
remainder on a turning movement through the
woods. A sharp skirmish followed in which two
men were killed, and one officer and three men se-
verely wounded before either party discovered that
it was fighting Union men instead of Confederates.
327
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
Whether the noise of the unfortunate engagement
preceded Pritchard's dash or whether his movement
against the camp which had been timed for dawn
merely happened to be simultaneous with Harnden 's
cannot be positively stated, but Pritchard after sur-
rounding the camp and leaving it in charge of his
adjutant, like the true soldier he was, rode at once
toward the firing, where he and Harnden shortly
encountered each other riding from opposite direc-
tions. Both were greatly surprised, but the increas-
ing light and the hasty explanations which followed
soon cleared up the immediate situation and left the
colonels free to ride back together to a scene of a
much greater importance.
Without regard to the antecedent facts resulting
in the unfortunate skirmish, as well as in a lifelong
estrangement between the commanders, it is certain
that the firing up the road aroused Davis and his
party just as the Michigan men were closing around
the camp. Captain Hudson with a sergeant claimed
to be the first man to ride up to the central tent in
the camp, and was about to dismount when he saw
a woman en deshabille through the opening of the
tent front who asked him not to intrude upon the
privacy of ladies, but to give them time to dress. As
she followed this with the declaration that there was
no one but ladies in the tent, and that it belonged to
1 1 Mr. Smith and his friends, ' ' he was about to grant
her request, but just at that moment he also heard
sharp firing up the road and, leaving a trooper to
guard the tent, he rejoined his detachment and has-
tened to the fighting line.
This brings us to the actual capture of Jefferson
Davis and his party a few minutes later by men
328
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
operating under the immediate direction of Lieu-
tenant Julian G. Dickinson, adjutant of the Fourth
Michigan. In compliance with Pritchard 7 s orders,
that officer, after taking the necessary precautions
for the security of the captured camp and sending
forward. several men who had straggled, was about
starting to join the colonel when his attention was
called "to three persons dressed in female attire"
who were apparently just leaving the tent and were
moving toward the thick woods near by. Turning
his horse toward them, he sang out : ' ' Halt ! ' ' but as
this failed to stop them, he repeated the command in
a more imperative tone, which drew Corporal Hun-
ger and three men from the cordon about the camp,
with carbines advanced. This brought the party
promptly to a standstill. In the fright and confusion
which followed it became evident that one of the
party .was Mr. Davis in disguise, and that the others
were Mrs. Davis and her sister, Miss Howell.
At this juncture, before any persons had ree'n-
tered the tent, Pritchard and Harnden, returning
from the front, rode up to the group which had now
become the center of interest. Davis, who had been
permitted to throw off his disguise, was still some-
what excited, but, recognizing the officers, turned
fiercely upon them and asked which of them was in
command. As will be remembered, they had never
compared dates of commissions, so they were mo-
mentarily at a loss, if not somewhat disconcerted, by
the imperious question of their prisoner. Exactly
what followed has been variously told by the officers
present, but it seems clear that Colonel Pritchard,
who was a man of self-possession, replied substan-
tially as follows : "I am Lieutenant Colonel Pritch-
329
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ard, commanding the Fourth Michigan, and this is
Lieutenant Colonel Harnden, commanding the First
Wisconsin Cavalry. We belong to different brigades
and different divisions, and do not know who holds
the older commission, but that is not important, for
between us we shall doubtless be able to take care of
you and your party. ' '
Corporal Hunger later claimed to have been the
first to recognize Davis under his disguise by his
fyoots and spurs, while Colonel Harnden, in his ac-
count of the capture, says that John H. Eeagan,
Confederate postmaster general, was the first man
he and Pritchard saw, and that Eeagan pointed out
Davis to them, whereupon they rode up, dismounted,
and after saluting asked the person indicated if he
was Mr. Davis. To this he replied: "Yes; I am
President Davis. " Harnden adds that up to that
minute no one actually engaged in the arrest knew
certainly that their principal prisoner was the per-
son they were looking for.
On counting the captured party, it was found that
it consisted of Mr. Davis, Mr. Keagan, postmaster
general, Colonel Burton N. Harrison, private secre- ^
tary, Colonels Johnson and Lubbock, aids-de-camp,
four younger officers and thirteen private soldiers,
besides Mrs. Davis, Miss Howell, her sister, two
maid servants, four children, and several colored
servants and teamsters. One of the party, a private
soldier, in the confusion succeeded in slipping into
the woods and getting away.
As both Harnden and Pritchard had been notified
before starting that Davis was escorted by a party
variously reported at from ten to fifty picked men,
who would probably make a desperate fight, they had
330
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
fully made up their minds to take him dead or alive,
and this doubtless accounts for the sharpness of the
fight between the Wisconsin and Michigan men.
The women and children were carried by two
army ambulances, while six army wagons carried the
baggage and personal effects of the party.
News of the capture reached me two days later
by Pritchard's written report to Minty, who in turn
brought* it to me at the Lanier House. On entering
my office, this natty and dashing officer, hastily
saluting, called out in an exultant tone: "General,
we have captured Jeff Davis and, by jingo, we got
him in his wife's clothes !"
Minty 's first words brought me instantly to my
feet, but those which followed and the manner of
their delivery suggested that Minty might be treat-
ing the subject with untimely levity, whereupon I
replied : ' ' General, that is most important news, but
I trust there is no mistake about it." It flashed
through my mind that Davis 's capture would be
hailed throughout the North as the end of the Be-
bellion, and that if he were really caught in his
wife's clothes it would overwhelm him and the Con-
federate cause alike with ridicule. The severity of
my manner was instantly followed by a serious ex-
pression on the part of Minty, who said: "It's all
right, General; here is Pritchard's dispatch by a
special courier." Harnden himself, sad with disap-
pointment that the actual capture had been made by
another, appeared shortly afterward and not only
confirmed Pritchard's report, but gave the details
substantially as set forth in this narrative.
The next day Pritchard arrived with Davis and
his party, and it was on the authority of the verbal
331
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
but official statements submitted by Pritchard and
Harnden that my preliminary reports were made to
those in authority at Washington. In the haste and
excitement of the great event but few formal reports,
and they of the most general character, were ever
written. Months and even years afterward several
narratives, giving more or less of the details, were
published in the newspapers and magazines, but
they lacked the character of official documents.
Of course, I sent off my first dispatch on the
strength of the information brought in by Minty,
saying amongst other things that Davis was cap-
tured "in his wife's clothes," which was literally
the fact.
Although both officers and men declared that
when arrested Davis was endeavoring to escape in
disguise, I gave no details and specified no particu-
lar articles of clothing. My report, however, was
instantly flashed to all parts of the country as well
as to all parts of Europe. It was published every-
where in the newspapers and illustrated journals
with details and amplifications from the imagination
of the writers and artists who commented upon the
event and supplied details according to their own
fancy. So far as I know no officer ever asserted that
the Confederate chief was caught in crinoline or
petticoats as worn in those days, and yet his friends
everywhere hastened to deny the allegation as pub-
lished in the newspapers, and many went so far as
to declare that Davis was not disguised at all and
that the whole story was a tissue of falsehoods.
It will not be forgotten that the country was at
that time hung in black and overwhelmed with sor-
row for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, and that
332
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
so long as the Confederate chiefs were at large,
threatening to carry on the war more fiercely than
ever, there could be no assurance of peace. But
when the news that Jefferson Davis had not died i ' in
the last ditch, " but had been caught trying to get
away in woman's clothing, it was evident to all that
the war was ended completely and forever. The
illustrated journals made this more certain than
ever by depicting the disconsolate chieftain, seated
at the edge of "the last ditch " with his dress drawn
up over a hoop skirt, revealing a pair of cavalry
boots and spurs. That picture without reference to
its literal truth was also republished throughout the
world, and did quite as much as all the regular re-
ports and narratives together to restore public con-
fidence and to bring back to the faces of the people
the smiles which had vanished from them when they
heard of the wicked and senseless assassination of
Lincoln three weeks before at Washington.
The precise articles of Davis 's disguise were a
lady's waterproof cloak, buttoning down in front,
and known in those days as an ' ' aquascutum, " which
he doubtless put on at the instance of his wife. In
addition, he wore a sjnall, black, long shawl, with a
colored, cross border, wrapped about his neck and
over his soft felt hat. To the ordinary soldier the
"waterproof" looked exactly like a woman's coarse
gown for rough weather, and while put on over an
ordinary suit of Confederate gray, it was certainly
intended as a disguise by Davis and his wife, and
was so taken by those who saw it on him. If it had
proved successful and Davis had escaped by its use,
his friends would doubtless have fully justified its
use. The dress and shawl were delivered to Colonel
333
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
Pritchard and by him turned over to the Adjutant
General at the War Department, where they can
doubtless be inspected by such as are curious to
know their exact form and construction. All the in-
cidents of the pursuit and capture, including a de-
scription of the disguise in which Davis had at-
tempted to escape, will be found fully described in
the official records, 1 in "Annals of the War," 2 in
the Century Magazine? in "Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War," 4 in "Colonial Harnden's Narra-
tive," 5 in the Pamphlet of Brevet Lieutenant Col-
onel Charles L. Greeno, Seventh Pennsylvania Cav-
alry, 6 in Jefferson Davis 's "Eise and Fall of the
Confederate Government, ' ' 7 and finally in Davis 's
"Short History of the Confederate States." 8 In one
form or another, each of these publications fully con-
firms the story of the disguise as given above.
It can hardly be necessary to call further atten-
tion to the fact that I was not personally present at
the capture of Davis and, therefore, did not see him
till he arrived at my headquarters at Macon in the
afternoon of May 13. I never saw the disguise and
all that I have related is consequently based upon
1 0. K. Serial No. 103, pp. 370, et seq.
3 ' ' Annals of the War, ' ' Philadelphia Times Pub. Co., 1879, pp.
554 et seq.
* Century Magazine, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 386 et seq.
* Century Magazine, Vol. LV, pp. 759 et seq.
* ( ' Capture of Jefferson Davis, ' ' &c., by Henry Harnden, Madi-
son, Wis., 1898.
8 "The Capture of Jefferson Davis, and What I Know of It,"
by Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Greeno.
7 Davis 's "Eise and Fall of the Confederate Government,"
pp. 71-2.
8 Davis's "Short History of the Confederate States," Belford
Company, New York, 1890, pp. 491 et seq.
334
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
verbal and official reports and the statements of the
various participants in the events of the time, and
yet I have no doubt that I have given the truth with
accuracy just as it occurred.
As Davis and his escort were on the way to
my headquarters they found the streets of Macon
crowded with men and women who had supported
or sympathized with the Confederacy, but not a
single one of whom gave them a kindly greeting or
a word of recognition. While Davis and his party
were closely guarded no one was prohibited from
showing them personal respect or from offering
them a friendly salutation. From the fact that all
stood silent I have never doubted that from that
time at least Davis had lost most of his popularity
in that community. Neither then nor afterward
while at Macon did a single Confederate leader or a
single personal friend make inquiry in regard to
him. Not one soul showed the slightest interest in
his behalf while he remained at that place.
Of course, I received and treated the Confederate
President with every courtesy and consideration,
assigning him and his party the best rooms in the
hotel and, as soon as they had refreshed themselves,
I directed my own steward and servants to give the
tired and hungry travelers the best dinner the re-
sources of the hotel and the town could supply. It
is pleasant to add that they ate as heartily and with
as much freedom from annoyance as if they had
been my personal friends and honored guests.
Shortly after dinner I received Mr. Davis in my
official apartment and conversed with him till his
train was ready to start, which was set for five
o'clock that afternoon.
335
UNDEK THE OLD FLAG
Mr. Davis called alone and without escort, and
we had an informal and friendly interview lasting
something over an hour. He looked bronzed and
somewhat careworn, but hardy and vigorous, and
during the conversation behaved with perfect self-
possession and dignity. However petulant he may
have been at the time of his capture and during his
march to Macon, he had entirely recovered his equa-
nimity. While I had seen him before at West Point
both as secretary of war and as senator from Mis-
sissippi, I had never been presented to him, but my
classmate, John M. Wilson, knew him well and had
met Mrs. Davis frequently. From that circumstance
both of them evidently expected to meet an old
friend, but Mr. Davis, seeing at a glance that I was
another man, turned the conversation without em-
barrassment to West Point and our common recol-
lections connected therewith.
He asked kindly about the old professors, espe-
cially Mahan, Bartlett, and Church, commenting
upon their peculiarities with good feeling and criti-
cal discrimination. This naturally led to the con-
sideration of graduates who had become leading gen-
erals on the opposing sides. He spoke both freely
and feelingly of Lee's character and deeds, declaring
him to be the ablest, most courageous, and most
aggressive, as well as the best beloved of all of his
generals. On the expression of some surprise at his
ascription of an aggressive temper to Lee, he not
only repeated his high praise but went on to say that
Lee was the only Confederate commander of the first
rank whose aggressiveness amounted to rashness,
and whose bold advice and policies he had felt com-
pelled more than once to restrain. He also com-
336
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
mended Bragg, Hardee, Taylor, and several others
for high qualities and leadership, but, as might have
been expected, he spoke slightingly of Johnston,
charging him with timidity and insubordination. He
condemned Beauregard's military pedantry and
deprecated Hood's heroic rashness.
On the other hand he expressed surprise at
Grant's skill and persistency, admiration for Sher-
man's brilliancy, and respect for Thomas's solid
qualities. He did not hesitate to say that he had ex-
pected more from McClellan, Buell, and Fitz-John
Porter than they had performed. His comments and
criticisms were clothed in excellent language and de-
livered with felicity and grace, while his manners
were stately and dignified without being frigid or
repellent.
During our conversation, without the slightest
suggestion on my part, he referred to Mr. Lincoln
and his untimely death. Speaking of him and his
public services in terms of respect and kindness, he
seemed to regard the martyred president as having
been a worthy if not a brilliant member of Congress
and a conscientious president. He did not hesitate
to express his sorrow that a man of so much sensi-
bility and kindliness had been succeeded in the presi-
dency by Andrew Johnson, for whom he made but
little if any effort to conceal his dislike, and whom
he seemed to fear would be governed by a vindictive
and unforgiving temper toward the Southern peo-
ple.
He voluntarily alluded to the reward offered for
his arrest and which he heard of for the first time
on the road from Irwinville to Macon, declaring with
modest language and bearing that while he was
337
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
both surprised and pained at the charge of complic-
ity in the assassination of the President he solemnly
asserted that it gave him no serious apprehension.
In connection with this subject he added: "I have
no doubt, General, the Government of the United
States will bring a much more serious charge against
me than that, and one which will give me much
greater trouble to disprove. " Of course I under-
stood this as an allusion to his well-known public
actions in connection with secession and the war
against the Union.
His conduct throughout the interview was in
every way natural and self-possessed and, as far as
I could discover, did not reveal the slightest uneasi-
ness or apprehension. It gave me the impression
that, although he was the fallen chief of the Confed-
eracy who had lost and become a prisoner of war, he
still felt that he would in some way remain an im-
portant factor in the political reconstruction of the
Union.
In the midst of our interview he sent for his in-
telligent and manly little son, Jefferson, and politely
introduced him to me. This boy grew to manhood,
but had hardly started in life when he died of yellow
fever in the epidemic which prevailed at Memphis
and on the lower Mississippi some years later.
I did not meet either Mrs. Davis or Miss Howell.
As reported to me by Colonel Pritchard, Mrs. Davis,
womanlike, in her deep distress and anxiety, had
taken some slight comfort in the thought that she
would find me an old acquaintance in the person of
my classmate, Jack Wilson. That it was not so was
doubtless a disappointment to her. She did not, how-
ever, ask to meet me and I so far respected her
338
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
wishes and those of Miss Howell as not to ask to be
presented to them. Of course, every proper atten-
tion was paid to their comfort, and I am sure no due
or becoming courtesy was omitted either by
Colonel Pritchard or by any of my officers or by
myself.
After touching on the various subjects alluded to
in this narrative, I informed Mr. Davis that he was
to be sent that afternoon, when ready, by the way of
Atlanta and Augusta to Savannah and thence by sea
to such point north as the Secretary of War might
designate. At this he expressed no surprise, but as
he was about to take leave, he said: "I suppose, of
course, Colonel Pritchard will be my custodian here-
after as heretofore, and I wish to express my satis-
faction at this arrangement, for it is both my duty
and my pleasure to say that Colonel Pritchard has
treated me with marked courtesy and consideration.
I have no fault to find with him and beg you to tell
him so. I should do it myself but for fear it might
be regarded as a prisoner's effort to make fair
weather with his captor. ' ' He seemed to be specially
impressed by the Colonel's dignity and self-posses-
sion and intimated a regret that he had not been
more fortunate in his own conduct at the time of his
capture and during his march to Macon. In the first
instance he doubtless alluded to his loss of temper,
and in the second to the fact that he spoke sharply
and imperiously to the officers and men whose duty
it was not only to make sure of his safety, but to see
that he should have no chance to escape.
For the purpose of cutting off all hope of rescue,
I sent Mr. Davis and his party by the train leaving
at five o'clock for Atlanta and Augusta in personal
339
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
charge of Colonel Pritchard with twenty picked men,
escorted by eight hundred men carried on two trains,
one preceding and one following the train carrying
the prisoners. As far as I knew there was not a
single man and still less a single military organiza-
tion in Georgia, although the State was full of dis-
banded Confederates, which would have dared to
undertake his release, but it was clearly my duty
to see that every precaution was taken to make that
impossible.
The party passed safely over the road and, al-
though it was before the era of sleeping cars,
reached Augusta the next day in fairly good condi-
tion. General Upton, who had been duly instructed,
was on the lookout, and transferred them on arrival
to a river steamer with every possible provision for
their comfort. Under orders from Washington he
had also arrested Alexander H. Stevens, vice-presi-
dent of the Confederacy. As was well known at the
time that distinguished statesman was not on good
terms with Davis, for which reason Mr. Stevens ex-
pressed the hope that they would not be brought in
contact. For this reason Upton gave instructions to
keep them apart while they were on the steamboat.
They were also accompanied by Mr. Mallory, the
Confederate secretary of the navy, Mr. Eeagan,
postmaster general, Mr. Hill, a Confederate senator
for Georgia, and Mr. Clement C. Clay, who had sur-
rendered himself a few days before. General Joe
Wheeler and staff also accompanied the party. They
had been arrested at Conyer Station, near Atlanta,
by a detachment of Palmer's brigade, while trying
to make their way to the trans-Mississippi. Wheeler
had a forged parole with which he tried to pass him-
340
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
self off as Lieutenant Sharp. His conduct appeared
highly suspicious, and while he did not deny the
forged parole, he protested that hQ was not trying to
escape. But, withal, his prevarication and irrespon-
sible talk were such as to convince Palmer that he
should be deprived of his liberty and sent up for
such action as the Washington authorities might
choose to take. Both Upton and I had known
Wheeler well as a cadet and, while we regarded him
in no way as a dangerous opponent, it had always
been a mystery to us that he should have reached
such high rank and command in the Confederate
service. Upton, probably as much to get rid of him
as for any other reason, sent him with Davis 's party.
He, of course, made his companions believe that he
was a martyr to the Lost Cause, and his belief,
I regret to add, was strengthened by his transfer
with the rest to the gun-boat which conveyed the
party from Savannah to Hampton Eoads. Without
further details, it will be remembered that Davis was
separated at that place from his family and his
friends and then imprisoned at Fortress Monroe.
May 22, 1865.
While it has been frequently contended that it
would have been better to " build a bridge of gold"
over which Davis might escape, it must not be for-
gotten that the assassination of President Lincoln
had changed the feeling of the country from one of
indifference to one of intense anxiety that the lead-
ers of the Confederacy, as well as all persons who
might have been engaged in that wicked and unfeel-
ing crime, should be arrested and brought to pun-
ishment. And it was doubtless as the exponent of
that feeling that the Secretary of War took such an
341
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
intense interest in the pursuit and capture and the
safe transportation and imprisonment of Davis.
Both Stanton and President Johnson were accused
of vindictive feelings toward him. In common with
most military men I supposed that Davis would at
least be tried by a military commission for levying
war against the United States, but from the fact that
he was never brought to trial before either a mili-
tary or a civil court, it cannot be successfully con-
tended that he was vindictively treated, although
confined in a casemate with irons on his wrists. The
most that can be said against that treatment is that
it was foolish and unnecessary. While it is true that
every effort was made for the next six months to
find proof connecting Davis with the plot to assas-
sinate the President and his cabinet, all efforts in
that direction finally failed, and the charge was
properly dismissed along wdth all other charges
against the great prisoner. After nearly half a
century in the full light of every fact disclosed, it
does not appear that there was ever the slightest
justification even for the suspicion that Mr. Davis
had either personal or official knowledge or respon-
sibility for the wild and dastardly plot to murder his
great contemporary. That he was not only per-
mitted in the end to go free, but to die of old age in
peace, redounds to the glory of our common country
as well as to the moderation if not to the magnanim-
ity of both Stanton and Johnson. Both were at times
foolish and arbitrary, but neither was a corrupt or a
wicked man.
As before stated, the capture of Davis and his
family, following, as it did, the capture and destruc-
tion of the last Confederate arsenal, storehouse, and
342
CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
stronghold and the disbandment and parole of the
last Confederate army, made peace not only certain
but effective and permanent. Our task was done and
done well, and it remained but to retain only enough
troops to keep order in Georgia.
343
X
RECONSTRUCTION
Winslow rebuilds railroad from Atlanta to Dalton Presi-
dent's message Governor Brown of Georgia Recon-
struction policy Conference with Brown Attitude of
the churches General Cobb's letter The South
Mustering out of cavalry corps Career of officers of
Cavalry Corps Letter to Sherman Andersonville
Prison Meeting with Grant.
Having captured and disposed of the principal
civil officers connected with the Confederate Govern-
ment, the cavalry corps was concentrated as before,
two divisions at Macon and one at Atlanta, but while
the concentration was going on many other matters
engaged my attention.
I had kept Stanton, Grant, Thomas, Schofield,
Gillmore, and Canby daily informed of what was go-
ing on in Georgia, but the mails and telegraphs were
badly disarranged and their service was generally
far behind the events referred to. All the reports
and dispatches will, however, be found fully set forth
in the Official Records. 1 They epitomize a short but
interesting period of history, but as I have summar-
ized the military events, I shall confine myself hence-
forth to such civil matters as seem particularly im-
portant.
1 0. B. Serial No. 104, pp. 628 et seq.
344
RECONSTRUCTION
I was without experience to guide me through the
complications which followed the collapse of the
Southern governments both confederate and state,
and yet, having recently reread all the correspon-
dence and considered all the events in which I exer-
cised a controlling influence, it is a matter of su-
preme satisfaction that I find neither word nor deed
of mine that I should care to change.
My first care after arriving at Macon was to sub-
sist my command without inflicting unnecessary
want or injury on the people by which we were sur-
rounded. Efforts were made to send supplies to
me by way of the rivers bounding or penetrating
the state, but all such efforts proved inadequate or
abortive. Sherman intimated that I should send the
entire corps, except a few veteran regiments to keep
order, to the Tennessee Eiver, but, as the interven-
ing country was poor and thinly settled, and had
already been stripped of its supplies, I regarded
that suggestion as impracticable. As far as I could
see there was nothing for us but to rebuild and re-
open the railroad from Atlanta to Dalton and Chat-
tanooga, which Sherman had destroyed before
starting on the March to the Sea, and this I pro-
posed to both Thomas and Grant, but the latter
thought it unnecessary and forbade its being done,
mostly, as I supposed, on account of the large ex-
pense it would entail. This made it obligatory to
finance the undertaking, as well as to find men and
materials to carry it out. Fortunately, Winslow
was in the region of the railroad, .and, although as
young as the rest of us, he had had some experience
before the war as a railroad contractor and was,
besides, full of resources. I, therefore, put him and
345
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
his entire brigade at the work, with instructions to
keep careful account of its cost, with the under-
standing that we should require the railroad com-
pany to repay it out of its first receipts. And this
was done. Fortunately, the timbers for one or two
of the most important bridges destroyed by Sher-
man had been framed by the railroad employees
and were on the ground ready for erection. The
adjacent forest was full of suitable timber, and, al-
though the sawmills had been generally destroyed,
sufficient trees were soon felled and shaped for use.
Many of our troopers were experienced axemen,
bridge-builders, and track-layers. With seven hun-
dred axes, which were slow in coming from Chat-
tanooga, and the hearty cooperation of the railroad
officials, Winslow soon had out the necessary piles,
bridge timbers, and cross-ties, but to straighten the
rails, many of which had been wrapped around the
trees or otherwise bent out of all shape, was a more
serious undertaking. With the aid of his handy
men Winslow was equal to that job also. Working
night and day with frequent relays, he closed
up the gaps between him and Steedman, who
was working south from Dalton, and got
the trains running from end to end within
three weeks, thus solving all of our difficul-
ties. Mail, passenger, and freight communica-
tion was reestablished with the North, and all
our wants, as well as those of the people, were
soon fully supplied.
I have always regarded Winslow 's work in re-
building the railroad as most creditable. Indeed,
there was no other instance which more fully or
more creditably illustrates the capacity and re-
346
RECONSTRUCTION
sourcefumess of the American volunteer cavalry-
man.
Early in May Joseph E. Brown, Confederate
governor of Georgia, without consulting me, but en-
tirely on his own responsibility, summoned the Leg-
islature of the State to meet at the Capitol on the
22nd of that month. I invited him to Macon for a
conference and, after telling him he had made a
serious mistake, I authorized him, at his urgent re-
quest, to telegraph the President for his views, and
for such orders as he might issue in the premises.
The President made no direct reply, but the next
day Secretary Stanton instructed me by telegraph
to give "Mr. Brown " the following answer by order
of the President :
First : That the collapse in the currency and the great
destitution of provisions among the poor ... of
Georgia, mentioned in his telegram, have been caused by
the treason, insurrection, and rebellion against the au-
thority, Constitution, and laws of the United States, in-
cited and carried on for the last four years by Mr. Brown
and his Confederate rebels and traitors who are responsi-
ble for all the want and destitution now existing in that
State.
Second: What Mr. Brown called the result which the
fortunes of war have imposed upon the people of Georgia
and all the misery, loss, and woe they have suffered are
chargeable upon Mr. Brown and his Confederate rebels
who usurped the authority of the State . . . and
waged treasonable war against the United States and
. . . protracted the war to the last extremity until com-
pelled by superior force to lay down their arms and accept
the result ... as a just penalty of the crimes of
treason and rebellion.
347
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Third: That the restoration of peace and order cannot
be entrusted to rebels and traitors who destroyed the peace
and trampled down the order that had existed more than a
half century and made Georgia a great and prosperous
State. The persons who incited this war . . . will not
be allowed to assemble at the call of their accomplice to act
again as a Legislature of the State and usurp its authority
and franchise. . . " ' . In calling them together without
permission of the President, Mr. Brown perpetrated a
fresh crime that will be dealt with accordingly.
Fourth: You will further inform Mr. Brown that the
President of the United States will, without delay, exert
all the lawful powers of his office to relieve the people of
Georgia . . . from the bondage of military tyranny,
which armed rebels and traitors have so long imposed alike
upon poor and rich. The President hopes that by restor-
ing peace and order, giving security to life, liberty and
property, by encouraging trade, arts, manufactures, and
every species of industry, so as to revise the financial credit
of the State and develop its great resources, the people will
again soon be able to rejoice under the Constitution and
Laws of the United States and of their own State in the
prosperity and happiness they once Itad, but were deprived
of by the treason and rebellion now overthrown. To all
private persons who return to their allegiance to the United
States and devote themselves to peaceful pursuits liberal
clemency will be exercised.
You will communicate the foregoing answer to Mr.
Brown and take prompt measures to prevent any assem-
blage of rebels as a Legislature or under any other pretext
within your command. If any persons shall presume to
answer or acknowledge the call of Mr. Brown mentioned
in his telegram to the President you will immediately ar-
rest them and report to this department for further in-
structions. 1
1 O. E. Serial No. 104, p. 646.
348
RECONSTRUCTION
This was followed by another an hour later by
the same authority, directing me to arrest Joseph
E. Brown, " pretending to act as governor of
Georgia " and to send him "in close custody under
sufficient and secure guard " to Major General
Augur at Washington, allowing him to hold no ver-
bal or written communication with any person but
the officer having him in charge after the receipt of
this order. 1 Of course, this was done, but what took
place there I never knew. Brown was an adroit
politician and special pleader and doubtless estab-
lished personal, if not political, relations with Mr.
Johnson. At all events, he returned shortly to the
State, and, while he did not pretend to exercise any
of the functions of governor, from that time forth
he certainly had more influence and was on more in-
timate terms with the President than any other man
in the State. He was subsequently governor more
than once and finally died many years afterward as
a member of the U. S. Senate.
Mr. Stanton's instructions were more important
as foreshadowing the Government policy in regard
to " reconstruction " than as humiliating or restrain-
ing Brown in the exercise of authority after the
collapse of the Confederacy. It made it clear that
treason and rebellion were to be made odious, that
no secession or confederate authority would be rec-
ognized at Washington, and that in their own time
and way the Washington authorities would indicate
the course to be followed by the states that had
made war against the Union. While it did not in-
timate upon what class or group the work of reor-
ganization would be laid, it made it certain that for
1 O. R. Serial No. 104, p. 647.
349
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the present, at least, it would not be entrusted to
"Mr. Brown and his Confederate rebels and
traitors. " As nearly all the Southern politicians
had been engaged "in treason, insurrection, and re-
bellion, " they were as a class included within the
terms of the President's anathema. There was no
thought of pardoning or consulting the old leaders,
and no hope could be drawn from it by even the old
Union men. It was a note of vengeance and nothing
more.
But the order for Brown's arrest in face of the
parole I gave him was clearly an indication that
such paroles might be disregarded and set aside.
While obliged to carry out the President's order as
received, I also felt it my duty to inform both Grant
and the Secretary of War that I had paroled Gov-
ernor Brown as commander-in-chief of the Georgia
militia, nearly all of which was under arms when I
entered the State.
The circumstances were interesting. Foreseeing
shortly after Johnston's surrender that Brown, who
had defied the Confederate authorities, might con-
sider himself an independent authority, I sent him
word that he had better not exercise any authority
whatever as governor, but in face of this he issued
his proclamation calling the legislature together at
an early date. Thereupon I sent an officer to invite
him to Macon for a conference. I took the precau-
tion of telling the officer to say to the Governor that
if he thought he would have any difficulty in finding
his way he would personally escort him to Macon.
The Governor thanked him and said he would go at
once. That night, shortly after supper, a natty ma-
jor in a brand new Confederate uniform called at
350
RECONSTRUCTION
headquarters and on admission said in the most re-
spectful manner: "His Excellency, Governor
Brown, has taken rooms at the Brown Hotel, Suite
28, where he will be pleased to receive General Wil-
son at 8:30 this evening. " As the message seemed
somewhat peculiar under the circumstances, I asked
the Major if he was sure he had delivered it as he
had received it from the Governor. To this he said :
"Yes, sir exactly as the Governor gave it to me."
I replied: "Major, please repeat it," which he
did in the terms he had just used.
Thereupon, I replied deliberately: "I see, Major,
you have correctly given me the message entrusted
to you. If there is any mistake it is the Governor 's
and not yours. You may, therefore, return to the
Governor with my compliments and say: ' General
Wilson's quarters are at the Lanier House in par-
lor A, where he expects to see His Excellency Gov-
ernor Brown promptly at nine o'clock to-morrow
.morning. General Wilson adds, if His Excellency
has the slightest doubt as to the significance of this
message, General Wilson will send a sergeant of
the guard with four men to escort His Excellency
to General Wilson's headquarters.' "
From the change in the Major's countenance it
was more evident than ever that he had made no
mistake, and that he fully understood my meaning.
At all events, he disappeared without further cere-
mony, and promptly at the hour designated "His
Excellency" presented himself at my headquarters.
Neither referred to the messages exchanged the
night before. The Governor seemed to understand
my position exactly and I received him with every
proper mark of respect and consideration, except
351
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
that I did not turn out the guard, nor fire a gov-
ernor 's salute for him.
The meeting was a pleasant and interesting one.
The Governor was at that time in middle life and
in the possession of all his faculties, which, I soon
discovered, were by no means of a low order. I had
heard an amusing account of himself and his family
as having been reared in "the wire grass country
of Cherokee, Georgia, ' ' where they had but few edu-
cational advantages and none for the cultivation
of the graces. I was, therefore, somewhat sur-
prised to find him smooth, suave, deferential, and
polite, as well as more than usually intelligent. He
carried himself with easy self-possession and ap-
peared well dressed and prosperous, as might have
been expected of one who had grown rich by block-
ade running, while the majority of his fellow-citi-
zens had lost almost everything they had from the
ravages of war.
After the usual salutation I told him on my own
responsibility not to hold the meeting of the Legis-
lature he had called against my warning, pointing
out that such a meeting would probably be regarded
by the Washington authorities as both premature
and inexpedient. He argued the case in favor of
early measures for the reestablishment of social
order and prosperity, but I remained firm. I urged
him as a leading citizen to discourage even mass-
meetings and public discussions as prejudicial to
the quietude and exemption from excitement which
all should desire throughout the state. I explained
that, while I should hold myself responsible for the
maintenance of order, I should expect the surrender
of all State militia under arms when I entered the
352
RECONSTRUCTION
state or called out since my arrival under no matter
what pretext. I made it clear that this surrender
should include the Governor as commander-in-chief
and all military State officers. At this he seemed
deeply concerned, apparently on the ground that
such a policy on my part would rob him of his power
and influence, whereupon I warned him earnestly
against exercising any authority or power under
the last election or under any other pretense what-
ever. He listened attentively to what I said, but
was evidently unwilling to regard my authority as
military commander with anything else than dis-
trust, and during the discussion he made it apparent
that he wished to appeal to the President to set
aside my decision. As far as I knew, our meeting
was the first one held between a loyal army com-
mander and an elected governor holding authority
from a seceding state, but, as I was also anxious
to know what political view as well as what prac-
tical measures would be taken by the constituted
authorities in reference to " reconstruction, " I ap-
proved and forwarded his message to the President
with the assurance that I should transmit to him
any reply which might reach me.
After that was settled he tarried awhile and
from his conversation showed clearly that he was
not on good terms with General Cobb, whom he
thought overbearing, bombastic, and inconsiderate.
He had seen Cobb and other leading men the night
before repeating more than once, as I thought, in
a tone of ridicule the words which Cobb used in
describing the recent battle: "My God! How the
Georgia line did fight in the defense of Columbus!"
I naturally encouraged him to tell me what he
353
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
thought of Alexander H. Stevens, Herschell V.
Johnson, Senator Hill, Mr. Tombs, Eandolph Mott,
James Johnson, and Colonel Washington, the last
three of whom were Union men. It was evident that,
while he talked freely of all and unkindly of none,
he thought himself not only the most considerable
man of the State, but its safest guide back into full
and harmonious relations with the other states of
the Union. He dwelt complacently on his strenuous
opposition to Davis, his devotion to state's rights,
and to the organization of the state militia under
his own chosen commander as an independent force
for its defense, and yet he did not seem to appre-
ciate or even to have thought of a parole which
would protect him as commander-in-chief from ar-
rest and imprisonment. Foreseeing that this might
be his fate, I had already directed Colonel Noble,
who, it will be remembered, was gifted in that di-
rection, to prepare a drastic document covering
Brown's case, and as he was about to take his leave
I handed it to him with the remark that perhaps
he had better read and sign it. Cautious to the
last, he asked what it was, and when I replied that
it was a special parole prepared to cover his case
he said : 1 1 Yes, yes, I thought of that some time ago,
but it had escaped my mind." He then read it
carefully with a changing and saddening counten-
ance, and at the end laid it gravely on the table
with the remark: "But, General, I can't sign that
document. ' '
At this surprising conclusion I asked why he
could not sign the paper, calling attention to the fact
that it might be a protection which under the John-
son-Sherman capitulation he was entitled to have.
354
RECONSTRUCTION
To this he replied: "Why, General, it requires
me to recant and abjure all the political acts and
opinions of my life."
"Yes," said I. "Governor, that is one of its
conditions, and if it does not cover the case com-
pletely it is a mistake and not an intentional omis-
sion, but under the circumstances I am still at a loss
to understand why you hesitate. Please under-
stand, however, that it is in no way compulsory ! ' '
To this, with a deep and audible sigh, he replied :
"If I sign that paper it will destroy all my political
prospects forever."
That view of the case was novel, and it struck
me as indicating that the Governor had not yet
fully realized the significance or extent of the Union
victory, and, therefore, rising from my seat and fac-
ing him squarely, I said: "My God! Governor, is
it possible that you imagine, in the face of the part
you have taken against the United States for the
last four years, you have any prospect in this coun-
try but to be hanged?"
Evidently this presented the situation under a
new and unexpected aspect, for, without a moment 's
hesitation, he said: "That view of the matter had
not occurred to me." Thereupon, sitting again,
and taking up the pen, he deliberately signed the
document in duplicate, one copy of which I handed
to him and the other forwarded immediately to the
War Department, where it will doubtless be found
duly briefed and filed. So far as I know, it was
never published, though it served the governor more
than one useful turn.
Taking his leave, with a countenance somewhat
"sicklied o'er with a pale cast of thought," he re-
355
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
turned to the hotel, where several leading men were
waiting for him. The next morning General Cobb
told me what took place on his return. They asked
at first for the results of his interview, to which he
replied: "Well, gentlemen, General Wilson is a
very clever young man, but he takes the military
view of the situation. ' '
This phrase gave Cobb particular satisfaction,
for he repeated it frequently with a grim smile
and an emphasis on the word that showed quite
plainly not only his contempt for the Governor as
a "poor white from Cherokee, Georgia," but as a
scheming politician whom he was glad to see foiled
in his effort to beguile me while striving to avoid re-
sponsibility for his own acts. It was interesting
to note that even adversity had not yet leveled the
distinctions between the rich and the poor, the slave-
holder and the non-slaveholder, the military man
and the politician, with their varying shades of in-
terest and belief. It was apparent that their rival-
ries, even in the work of rehabilitation and recon-
struction, were to continue to the end.
During the next four weeks I mingled much with
the leading men, seeking their views and giving my
own on every public question of interest. I coun-
seled moderation in speech, abstention from pub-
lic discussions, and a strict and studious devotion
to the private duties of life. Many of those who
had been prominent in affairs wanted to hold mass-
meetings for the purpose of assuring the Govern-
ment of their readiness to accept the Union and such
laws as Congress might make for its complete re-
establishment. To all such I said: "Don't do any-
thing of the sort, but go home and attend to your
356
RECONSTRUCTION
farms, stores, and business and you will be gratified
in a short time to find that public affairs have taken
care of themselves. " While I cannot claim to have
anticipated Senator Hoar's sententious but sound
advice to all Southerners, "to raise more cotton
and less hell," that was the substance of my coun-
sel, and I am glad to record that it was accepted by
the people of Georgia as a wise and safe rule of
conduct. No public meetings were held and the
planting population, at least, devoted itself indus-
triously to taking care of the crops, and this busi-
ness, owing to the high price of cotton, promised
great profit.
The poor whites, who had been renters before
the war, were nearly as well off after it. They took
this advice in good part, and, although the season
was late, made one of the best and most profitable
crops the State ever raised. So deeply was I con-
vinced of the wisdom of this course, and that peace
would soon leave me without occupation, I thought
for a time seriously of going into the planting busi-
ness myself, not as a proprietor, for I had no money,
but as a renter who could probably get all the negro
labor I wanted. I proposed that General Croxton,
a free-soil Kentuckian, and Major Beaumont should
join me in the enterprise, but, fortunately, we en-
countered difficulties in securing a sufficient quan-
tity of good land, which caused us to give up the
project.
The attitude of the churches as a social force
early attracted my attention. The clergy of all de-
nominations, and especially the Episcopalians, from
the bishop down, were slow in accepting the inevi-
table and at first were strongly disinclined to in-
357
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
elude "the President of the United States and all
others in authority" in their regular supplications.
The first to conform to this usage in the Southern
states was the pastor of the principal Presbyterian
parish of the town, who called upon me with a lady
dressed in deep mourning one night shortly after
my arrival. They came to intercede for her father,
a distinguished judge, the Commissioner of Seques-
tration, who had gone into concealment for fear of
arrest. Of course, their request was granted and
a safeguard furnished at once, and this led to a gen-
eral conversation, followed in due time by a pleas-
ant friendship. Before leaving the reverend gen-
tleman expressed some doubt as to his own course,
whereupon I suggested that he should preach next
Sunday on the text : i l Eighteousness exalteth a na-
tion, but sin is a reproach to any people. ' ' I pointed
out that this proverb, inscribed under Weir's beau-
tiful picture over the chancel of the old chapel at
West Point, would be regarded by every army offi-
cer, as well as by every man familiar with the Bible,
as appropriate to the conditions which prevailed
about them. My visitor promptly accepted my sug-
gestion, and, I am glad to add, he preached an elo-
quent and appropriate sermon the next Sunday and
followed by praying " for the President of the United
States and all others in authority." The example,
much to my gratification, was promptly followed
by all the other churches of the city and the neigh-
boring towns.
During that summer I established intimate re-
lations with General Cobb, who, it will be remem-
bered, had been before the war a member of the
National Congress, speaker of the House of Eepre-
358
KECONSTRUCTION
sentatives, and secretary of the treasury in
Buchanan's cabinet. He was still in middle life
with unimpaired faculties, and, while possessing all
the lofty pretensions of the old school Southerner,
he was philosopher and statesman enough to recog-
nize that he had lost all with the Lost Cause; that
slavery was forever at an end, and that all who
loved the South and its people must now accept the
inevitable results and give their best efforts to re-
pairing the ravages of war, reframing their laws,
remodeling their institutions, and reestablishing
their industries. He called upon me frequently, and,
while asking nothing for himself, it was easy to per-
ceive that he stood with his class, all of whom had
been rebels, and regarded it as the class whose ad-
vice and active assistance should be sought in the
great work now before the country, and which was
of such transcendent importance to both the North
and the South.
I drew him out, as opportunity offered, on every
aspect of the situation, and it was at my personal
request that he wrote his celebrated letter, dated
Macon, June 14, 1865, 1 which I transmitted the same
day to President Johnson, the original manuscript
of which is now on file in the Library of Congress.
It was printed and widely circulated by the news-
papers of the day, and, although full of wisdom, I
regret to add, it was not received in any part of
the country with the favor to which its moderate and
statesmanlike views entitled it. It opened with the
manly declaration that he was a secessionist and
^'Documentary History of Reconstruction/' by Prof. Walter
Fleming, Arthur H. Clark Company, Cleveland, 1906, Vol. I, p. 128,
Howell Cobb to General Wilson.
359
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
counseled the people of his State to secede, that he
had served in the army till the end of the war, and
that his actions since then had conformed to the
obligations of the surrender. He regarded the South
as subjugated, and on that basis laid down the prin-
ciples which he thought should guide the policy of
both parties. He pointed out that the South 's plain
and simple duty was "a return to the peaceful and
quiet employments of life; obedience to the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States ; and the faith-
ful discharge of all the duties and obligations im-
posed upon them by the new state of things. "
While recognizing that the policy of the North
could not be so easily determined and that the hour
of triumph was not necessarily the hour for wise
judgments, he maintained that not only the present
condition, but the conditions which should be de-
sired, should receive primary and paramount con-
sideration. He then declared that the actual sit-
uation was as bad as the South 's worst enemy could
wish, that the institution of slavery had been inter-
woven with the entire framework of Southern so-
ciety and into every page of its statute books, and
that its abolition which all accepted would neces-
sarily revolutionize the whole system of agriculture
and labor, as well as greatly retard the restoration
of prosperity. Acknowledging fully and without
qualifications that the successful termination of the
war had restored the Union, he pleaded, not only
for the South, but for the whole country, that the
bitter animosities should be softened, that prosper-
ity should be restored, and that a spirit of mag-
nanimity and generosity should shape the policy of
the conquerors. He added in impressive language
360
RECONSTRUCTION
that the world was sadly in need of such an example
and that the United States should show it. He
deprecated the prejudices and passions and appealed
to the mellowing influences of kindness and of gen-
erosity as the surest means of making the South-
erners forget the privations of the present and the
sufferings of the past. Finally he declared that the
security of the future required no further punish-
ment of the South.
Having laid down these general principles, he
proposed that they should be carried into practical
effect by the discontinuance of all prosecutions and
penalties and by the proclamation of a general
amnesty for all past acts to those who had in good
faith abandoned the contest and returned to their
allegiance.
In further support of these merciful measures
he said : ' ' If my voice could be heard in the coun-
cils of the Government, I should seek to restore con-
cord and good feeling by extending it to those from
whom I ask it in return, and by a course of generous
confidence to win the willing and cheerful support
of those whose loyalty and allegiance when thus won
could be relied upon. No one will doubt that the
man who is received back into the Union and feels
that he has been subjected to no severe penalty, and
been required to submit to no humiliating test, will
make a truer and better citizen than the one who
feels that his citizenship has been obtained by sub-
mitting to harsh and degrading terms which he was
compelled to yield to, to secure the rights he has ac-
quired. . . ."
After reiterating his opinion that the institu-
tion of slavery provided the best system of labor
361
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
that could be devised for the negro race and point-
ing out that the Southern people were not only pre-
pared to conform to the new state of things, but
disposed to pursue it toward the negroes "in a spirit
of humanity and kindness, " he took it for granted
that "the future relations between the negroes and
their former owners, like all other questions of do-
mestic policy, would be under the control and direc-
tion of the State Governments. " He suggested that
a more certain and well-defined system than could
be enforced under military regulation should be de-
signed and promulgated to meet "the many ques-
tions that might arise." He seemed also to fear
that a system of internal taxation might be adopted
which would impose burdens upon the people they
could not meet, and might end in the virtual con-
fiscation of their estates, and that time should be
given to taxpayers to raise the necessary money and
thus save the remnants of their properties.
Lastly, while fully conscious that what he had
written might be criticised as proceeding from an
interested party, he frankly said : ' ' This is true, I
am . . . deeply interested in the question, not
so much for myself, for I have no future, as for my
friends, and my countrymen. . . . But we are
not the only persons interested in the solution of
the great problem which stands in the history of the
world without precedent or parallel. . . ."
I need not call attention to the fact that in trans-
mitting this weighty and dignified contribution to
the question of reconstruction, I counted myself as
having performed a public duty, the wisdom of which
has been amply justified by the course of subsequent
history. It was followed by many other letters of
362
RECONSTRUCTION
similar tenor from original Union men and original
secessionists from various parts of the South. But
I regret to add that none produced the slightest
favorable effect on the course of events at Wash-
ington. The passions and animosities of Stanton
and the radical leaders, doubtless aided by the split
between them and Johnson, resulted in plans and
measures for the restoration of the South to the
Union which led to great confusion and aroused the
opposition of the old secessionists, heated the South-
ern blood, and led later to the organization of the
Ku Klux Klan as the only practicable means of
driving out the scandalous governments of the car-
pet-bag adventurers and ignorant freedmen, aided
by renegade allies among the poor whites.
While it was General Grant's purpose to give me
command of the Department of Georgia, 1 I have al-
ways been thankful that he failed, whether from the
opposition of Stanton, the preference of the Presi-
dent for James B. Steedman, or from the fact that
Johnson had not forgotten the plain talk I gave him
at Nashville in regard to the Tennessee cavalry.
Whatever may have been the motive, it left me in
comparative idleness, which impelled me to ask for
muster out a few months later. My request was
granted by the Adjutant General as a matter of
course, but when the order passed through General
Grant's headquarters he countermanded it with the
understanding that he should retain me as a major
general as long as he could find appropriate em-
ployment for me in that grade. While my subse-
quent service as a district commander was not equal
to my rank, it afforded perfunctory employment,
and doubtless saved me from extended and annoy-
1 0. B. Serial No. 104, p. 882.
363
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ing participation in the thankless and complicated
work of reconstruction.
While the Cavalry Corps was reassembling from
its wide distribution throughout Georgia and Flor-
ida, as heretofore described, Thomas notified me to
hold it in readiness for transfer to Texas, and this
gave both officers and men unalloyed satisfaction.
It indicated that we were to participate in the ex-
pulsion of Maximillian and his allies from Mexico,
as required by the Monroe Doctrine, if they con-
cluded to fight rather than leave the country peace-
ably. Wisely enough, they chose the latter course
and our short-lived dream of service on foreign soil
gave way to the muster out, which was fully de-
cided upon before the end of May. It was at first
proposed to discharge only the newer regiments
and to retain the veterans, estimated at ten or twelve
thousand men, who had from one to two years yet
to serve on their second enlistment. But on my rep-
resentation that no such force was needed in
Georgia, that cavalrymen charged with the care of
their horses for at least an hour daily were not fitted
for garrison service in connection with reconstruc-
tion, and, finally, that two or three infantry regi-
ments would be ample to maintain order in the
State, it was decided to send my three divisions to
the North by the way of Atlanta, Dalton, and Chat-
tanooga for muster out.
This routine work fell to the regular mustering
officers, supervised by Major Hosea of my staff and
General Upton of the Fourth Division. The troops
made their way without haste along the railroad
which Winslow was rebuilding. Depots of supplies
had been established at convenient points by the
364
RECONSTRUCTION
corps chief quartermaster and chief commissary,
which made the march an easy one. This was fol-
lowed by the muster out of each division as it
reached its designated camp and by the transpor-
tation of the various regiments to their respective
states. Nothing could have been conducted more
rapidly, nor with more perfect discipline. The en-
tire command disappeared from the service and
dropped into the bosom of the people with no other
commotion than that which naturally followed the
return of the war-worn soldiers to their homes and
friends.
A formal order dissolving the corps was issued
by General Thomas and I followed that by my fare-
well General Order Number 39, dated at Macon,
Georgia, July 2, 1865 :
To the officers and men of the Cavalry Corps, Military
Division of the Mississippi. Your corps has ceased to ex-
ist! The rebellion has terminated in the reestablishment
of your country upon the basis of nationality and perpetual
unity. Your deeds have contributed a noble part to the
glorious result ; they have passed into history and need no
recital from me. In the nine months during which I have
commanded you I have heard no reproach upon your con-
duct and have had no disaster to chronicle.
The glowing memories of Franklin, Nashville, West
Harpeth, Ebenezer Church, Selma, Montgomery, Colum-
bus, West Point, and Macon may well fill your hearts and
mine with pride.
You have learned to believe yourselves invincible and,
contemplating your honorable deeds, may justly cherish
that belief. You may be proud of your splendid discipline
no less than of your courage, zeal, and endurance. The
noble impulses which have inspired you in the past will
be a source of enduring honor.
365
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
"Peace hath her victories no less renowned than war."
Do not forget that clear heads, honest hearts, and stout arms
guided by pure patriotism are the surest defense of your
country in every peril. Upon them depend the substantial
progress of your race and order of civilization as well as
the liberty of all mankind.
Let your example in civil life be an inducement to in-
dustry, good order, and enlightenment while your deeds in
war shall live in the grateful remembrance of your coun-
trymen.
Having discharged every military duty honestly and
faithfully, return to your homes with the noble sentiment
of your martyred President deeply impressed upon every
heart: "With malice toward none and charity for all,
strive to. do the right as God gives you to see the right." *
While many of these officers and men fell by
the wayside in civil life, the great majority became
good citizens, all the better for their sacrifices and
services in behalf of the Union. Many afterward
rose to distinction both in civil and military life.
McCook of the First Division became governor
of Colorado Territory and minister to the Hawaiian
Eepublic. He died at advanced age in 1909.
Croxton was appointed by President Grant min-
ister to Bolivia, where he died of tuberculosis at
the end of a few years' service.
LaGrange studied law and became an eloquent
public speaker in San Francisco, where he served a
term as superintendent of the mint. Later he be-
came a promoter and mine owner and afterward
commander of the Soldiers ' Home in southern Cali-
fornia, where he now lives.
Eobert M. Kelly was for many years collector
1 O. B. Serial No. 104, p. 1059.
366
RECONSTRUCTION
of internal revenue and editor of the Louisville
Commercial.
Wickliffe Cooper became an officer of the regu-
lar army, in which he died before reaching middle
life. John M. Bacon was appointed to the regu-
lar army, where he served with marked usefulness
and distinction till he reached the age of retire-
ment.
John F. Weston was appointed on my recom-
mendation to the regular army, where he became in
turn captain of cavalry, commissary of subsistence,
graduate of various service schools, and commissary
general. He received the medal of honor for un-
usual gallantry and enterprise in the capture of a
fleet of steamers on the Alabama Eiver, served with
distinction in the Spanish War, commanded the Mili-
tary Division of the Philippines, and is generally
regarded as one of the most intelligent, dashing,
and independent officers of his day.
Eli Long never recovered entirely from the par-
tial paralysis produced by the wound received in
the assault of Selma. And although placed on the
retired list, he became a lawyer and a grape cul-
turist and lived to a comparatively old age, hon-
ored and respected by all who knew him.
General Minty became a railroad superintendent
in the middle and western states, but his life was
one of vicissitude, mingled with success and failure.
A. 0. Miller returned to the practice of medi-
cine. His military life was an episode which in-
spired him to do his best to the end and he made
no failures.
General Kilpatrick threw up his commission in
the regular artillery and, true to his ambition, be-
367
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
came an active politician. He was an orator of rare
power and eloquence and a popular Eepublican
leader whose patriotism was ardent and whose am-
bition was boundless. He was twice rewarded for
his services and failures by the appointment of min-
ister to Chili, where he died on December 2, 1881,
a disappointed man. 1
Eli Murray became United States marshal for
Kentucky and twice governor of Utah Territory,
where he acquitted himself with equal satisfaction
to the Mormons and the Gentiles. He was a lawyer
by profession and died past middle life at Salt Lake
City.
Smith D. Atkins returned to the practice of the
law when the volunteer army was disbanded. He
has been for many years an editor and an able
leader of public opinion at Freeport, Illinois.
General Upton, shortly after the war, made a
tour of Europe and Asia and wrote a work on the
"Military Policy of the United States," which was
printed many years afterward by Congress and is
now regarded as a standard authority in our army.
He was always a military enthusiast and tactician.
He suffered from an incurable malady of the head
and its passages, which ultimately became unbear-
able and led to suicide before he had passed middle
life. 2
Alexander returned to his regiment and in due
course became a field officer for most of his life on
the frontiers. He was finally retired because of in-
1 See Cullum's Kegister for details of Kilpatrick's service, Vol.
II, p. 786, by J. H. Wilson.
2 ' Life and Letters of Emory Upton, ' ' by Peter S. Michie, with
an introduction by James Harrison Wilson, D. Appleton & Co., 1885.
368
RECONSTRUCTION
firmities incident to the service, which caused his
death on May 4, 1887. 1
General Winslow became a successful contractor,
railroad builder and manager, and did much work
which was better than the pay he got for it. He
has lived many years in Paris, where he has a wide
circle of acquaintances and friends.
John W. Noble settled after the war at St. Louis,
where he developed into a lawyer of great learning
and distinction. He became secretary of the interior
in Harrison's cabinet and now lives in St. Louis.
No man's career better illustrates what a citizen
of the great Eepublic should do in the emergencies
of life.
General Hatch became a full colonel of regular
cavalry and no one better deserved that unusual
distinction. He served capably and well till he
reached the retiring age. He was finally killed in
a runaway accident instead of on the field of battle.
General Datus E. Coon became a citizen of Cali-
fornia, where he played an honorable and useful
part to the end, but died before reaching old age.
Colonel Eobert E. Stewart returned to his state
after peace was established and became a successful
man of affairs and a citizen without reproach.
General E. W. Johnson returned to his regiment
in the regular army, performed his routine duties
for many years, but voluntarily retired and settled
at St. Paul, where he played the exemplary part
of a good citizen in all that pertained to the welfare
of the community in which he lived. He devoted
his declining years to letters, leaving behind him
of Andrew Jonathan Alexander, " by James Harrison
Wilson, privately printed.
369
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
several interesting volumes of military biog-
raphy.
Colonel Thomas J. Harrison returned to Indiana
and became a useful and honored citizen.
Colonel James Biddle rejoined his regiment in
the regular army and passed much of his life on
the frontier. He retired as a brigadier general in
1894 and died in 1910.
General William J. Palmer became a successful
promoter and railroad builder who linanced and
constructed the Denver and Eio Grande Eailroad
and most of its connections. He was the leading
man of the region of his activities and accumulated
a great fortune, which he devoted liberally to the
arts and to the advancement of the growing city in
which he died after a long and useful life. He was
always a lover of horses, one of which fell with him,
dislocating his spine and completely paralyzing his
body from the neck downward. An equestrian
monument is quite properly to be erected to his
memory at Colorado Springs.
General Joseph F. Knipe, Colonel George W.
Jackson, and Colonel Gilbert M. Johnson returned
to their native states when mustered out and re-
sumed the occupations to which they were devoted
before the war. They became useful citizens, but
achieved no marked success to distinguish them from
the great mass of their fellow soldiers.
General John H. Hammond, after several years'
service in the Interior Department, acquired an in-
terest in Superior City, at the head of the Great
Lakes, which in due course made him and his fam-
ily rich and prosperous.
Many other officers of the corps rose to useful-
370
RECONSTRUCTION
ness and distinction both in civil and military life,
but it would extend this work beyond its proper
limits to detail the distinctions they achieved. Many
officers were specially commended in my reports for
unusual gallantry and conspicuous services, and I
think the Official Eecords will show that a larger
number received the medal of honor than any other
corps of the Union army.
While still at Macon trying to get into touch
with General Sherman, over four hundred miles to
the northward, I received a letter from him, which
I answered as follows on May 8, 1865 :
. . . Permit me to write you a few lines unofficially :
I believe that under the circumstances I have done
everything you could have required and have kept you
and others duly informed. For your personal information,
however, I send you a copy of my summary of operations,
from which you will see that in thirty days we marched
over five hundred miles, took six thousand three hundred
prisoners, twenty-three colors, and one hundred and fifty-
six guns, defeating Forrest, scattering the militia, destroy-
ing every railroad, iron establishment, and factory in north
Alabama and Georgia. We marched from Montgomery to
this place, two hundred and twenty miles, in six days, rest-
ing one day at Columbus and West Point. I mention these
things to show you that our cavalry is cavalry at last. You
may not have forgotten our conversations in regard to the
matter at Gaylesville and your own remarks in reference
to it. I'll remind you of them one of these days.
I have now thirteen thousand five hundred men for duty
in the three divisions with me, thoroughly armed, well
mounted and equipped. I believe when you see them you
will say with me, it is nothing more than the truth, that
they cannot be excelled. I regard this corps to-day as a
model for modern cavalry in organization, armament, and
371
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
discipline, and I hazard nothing in saying that it embodies
more of the virtue of the three arms, without any sacrifice
of those of cavalry, than any similar number of men in the
world. From an undisciplined mass it has taken the most
perfect discipline; from fragments of every variety it has
taken a most coherent organization. The spirit of the men
is magnificent, the officers are admirable, and all think their
corps invincible. This is strong language, and may look
like self-praise, but it is simply for you and should be your
pride as well as mine. Without your carte blanche and the
admirable support of General Thomas nothing could have
been accomplished.
To put the test to my assertions, I would like to have
the corps put in camp at any point you may designate,
and everybody, including General Grant, who feels an in-
terest in such matters invited to review and inspect it. If
you do not agree with me I shall acknowledge myself mis-
taken in my opinions. .' .
... I have recommended Brevet Major General Up-
ton and Brigadier General Long, for major generals, Briga-
dier Generals Croxton and McCook for brevet major gen-
erals, Brevet Brigadier Generals Alexander and Winslow
for full brigadiers; also Colonels Minty, Miller, and La-
Grange for the same. I think the officers I just mentioned
are the best cavalry officers I ever saw. They have richly
earned their promotion, and I hope you will urge General
Grant to give it to them. 1
1 That the history and performances of the Cavalry Corps
M. D. M. fully justify the high praise given above to General Sher-
man appears from Colonel George Denison's "History of Cavalry/'
London, Ma'cmillan & Co., 1378, pp. 469 et seq. After giving a con-
densed account of the organization and operations, the author con-
cludes, notwithstanding his English partiality for the Confederates:
{ ' This was one of the most remarkable cavalry operations of
the war, for, as we have said, it was not a mere raid or dash, but
an invading army determined to fight its way through. . . . It is
certainly one of the most extraordinary affairs in the history of
the cavalry service, and recalls the romantic episodes of the
372
RECONSTRUCTION
It is no part of my plan to dwell upon the
troubles of reconstruction. While I early favored
the abolition of slavery as a measure of humanity
and civilization no less than of punishment for the
crime of secession and rebellion, I had but little con-
fidence in the average Southern politician. While I
found some Union men, like James Johnson, first
provisional governor of Georgia; Kandolph Mott,
and Colonel Washington, a kinsman of George Wash-
ington, and the first loyal postmaster at Macon, I
was forced to the conclusion that there were not
enough sterling and unshaken Union men and states-
men in the South at the close of the war to manage
the complicated business of reconstruction. I sup-
posed that some workable plan would be found to
call the best men of both sections to assist in de-
vising a plan and bringing the states that had tried
to secede into proper political and economic rela-
tions with the rest of the Union. But I was at no
time asked for my views by anyone except Badeau,
who wrote, as I supposed for Grant as well as for
himself, and yet I found means of giving them not
only to the War Department but to the public at
large before terminating my connection with the
State.
On account of unsettled social conditions and
vagabondage, which necessarily followed the break-
down of the Confederacy and the abolition of slav-
ery, I found it necessary, without instruction from
above, to meet actual conditions, to issue on July 5,
Crusades, where the armies consisted almost solely of knights who
dismounted to attack fortified places. It is a striking illustration
of what can be done by the judicious use of a force of mounted
riflemen if bravely led and skillfully commanded. "
373
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
1865, the following orders for the guidance of the
freednien and their former masters till superseded
by the orders of the Freedman's Bureau:
1. The common law governing domestic relations, giv-
ing parents authority and control over their children and
guardians control over their wards, is in force.
2. The former masters are constituted the guardians
of minors and of the aged and infirm in the absence of
parents or other near relations capable of supporting them.
3. Young men and women under twenty-one years of
age will remain under the control of their parents or
guardians, until they become of age, thus aiding to sup-
port their parents and younger brothers and sisters.
4. The former masters of freedmen must not turn
away the young and infirm, nor refuse to give them food
and shelter. Nor shall the able-bodied men and women
go away from their homes or live in idleness and leave their
parents or children or younger brothers or sisters to be
supported by others.
5. Former masters of freedmen will not be permitted
to turn away or drive from their plantations faithful hands
who have helped to make the crops, when the crops are
saved, without paying for the labor already performed.
6. Freedmen, like all other men, are amenable to civil
and criminal law, and are liable to be punished for viola-
tions of law just the same as white citizens, but in no case
will brutality be allowed on the part of the former master.
Thinking men will at once see that, with the end of slav-
ery, all enactments and customs which were necessary
for its preservation must cease to have effect.
7. Persons of age who are free from any of the obli-
gations referred to above are at liberty to find new homes
whenever they can obtain proper employment, but they will
not be supported by the Government or by their former
masters in idleness and vagrancy.
374
RECONSTRUCTION
8. It will be left to the employer and servant to agree
upon the wages to be paid, and any just arrangement or
contract will not be interfered with ; but f reedmen are ad-
vised that for the present they ought to expect only mod-
erate wages,, and when their employers cannot pay them
money they ought to be content with a fair share in the
crops to be raised. This rule is subject to such modifica-
tion as the Freedman's Bureau may require.
9. All officers, soldiers, and citizens are requested to
give publicity to these rules and to instruct the freed peo-
ple as to their new rights and obligations.
All offenses hereunder may be tried by a military com-
mission or provost's Court. 1
As can be well understood, I was up against one
of the gravest problems of the times, and did what
I could to solve it with as little violence as possible,
and without unnecessary embarrassment either to
the Government or to the people. I had, of course,
had no experience in framing such orders, but, in
looking back on them with such additional wisdom
as a half century may have brought me, I cannot see
how they could have been much improved. They
were widely circulated by newspapers and hand-
bills, and it is a pleasure to add that no
complaint ever reached me about them from either
the white or colored people of Georgia or from
Washington.
Having early after my arrival at Macon exam-
ined into the conduct of Captain Wirtz at the An-
dersonville prison and caused his arrest and trans-
portation to Washington for trial, I was ordered
to appear as a witness before the military commis-
sion with books, records, and plans to testify as to
1 O. R. Serial No. 104, p. 1068.
375
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the condition in which I found the prison camp in
my first visit to that region. 1
I had hoped to meet General Grant and his staff
on my trip north, but they were taking a holiday
and visiting their friends in the various parts of
the country. Some delay occurred in taking my
testimony, which I spent at Wilmington and Phil-
adelphia, and finally, when discharged from at-
tendance on the court, I made a short visit to my
home in Illinois. From there I went to Louisville
and Cincinnati for the purpose of meeting General
Grant, but he had changed his plans and gone east,
and hence I failed to meet him till he came to
Georgia in November. I was naturally anxious to
hear the inside of the wonderful campaign in
Virginia, as well as to give him a personal
account of my own campaign through Alabama and
Georgia.
The summer was long and hot and all the more
oppressive because the excitement of war was at
an end. While I had been assigned to command the
district of Macon and had accompanied General
Steedman to Milledgeville to witness the proceed-
ings of the first convention which President John-
son had permitted to assemble in October, and had
afterward relieved General Steedman for a few
days at Augusta, I was far from pleasantly em-
ployed. I foresaw that I should soon be mustered
out, and before returning to duty as a captain of
engineers I had dreams of European travel, of a
trip to Mexico, and even of a fortune in cotton
planting, but none of them materialized. They all
*My testimony will be found in General A. P. Chipman's "Trag-
edy of Andersonville, ' ' pp. 47 et seq.
376
RECONSTRUCTION
failed, doubtless, for the simple reason that I had
not sufficient money to carry any one into effect.
Late in November Grant, with Badeau and Bab-
cock, made a tour through the South and asked me
to meet him at Atlanta, which I did. After dining
we spent the evening in a full and friendly discus-
sion of every important military and civil event
which had taken place since we parted the year
before in the valley of Virginia. I have always re-
membered that night as one of the most interesting
of my life. General Grant never appeared in bet-
ter condition, nor in better light. He showed me
the most perfect friendship and confidence, exactly
as though I had never been out of his military fam-
ily, and as though I were his equal in every respect.
With rare modesty and yet without the slightest
restraint, he told the story of his last campaign in
all its details. He praised both officers and men in
unstinted measure, passing in review all the lead-
ing generals of the day, speaking ill of none and
kindly of all. He praised Sheridan and Hum-
phreys as the greatest of his immediate lieutenants.
He minimized the hurtful effects of delay upon his
own reputation. While magnifying the importance
of the March to the Sea, he claimed that he first
suggested it, but feared it might be carried prema-
turely into effect. While admitting that he had al-
ways trusted Halleck's good offices and kind dis-
position farther than he should have done, he cred-
ited him with disinterested motives and respectable
talents. He spoke in high terms of McPherson and
Sedgwick, both killed in battle, and mentioned many
officers of inferior rank with affection and admira-
tion. While he had nothing but praise for the Army
377
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of the Potomac, he did not disguise the fact that
he regarded the Army of the Tennessee as the best,
all things considered, he had ever been personally
associated with.
He expressed profound sorrow for Lincoln's
death as an irreparable blow to the orderly and
conservative reconstruction of the Southern states.
While he did not hesitate to discredit the judgment
and statesmanship of Andrew Johnson, nor to con-
ceal his dislike of Stanton's arbitrary ways, he dis-
trusted the senatorial group with which Stanton
was associated, and declared that his own views
were not only thoroughly conservative, but thor-
oughly kind, as to the generals and politicians of
the South. He hoped that all classes would frankly
accept the situation and devote themselves unself-
ishly to the restoration of friendly relations between
the North and the South. He emphasized the state-
ment that we had had bloodshed and punishment
enough, and that we of the North should now strive,
without prejudice or passion, to protect those we
had paroled, to close the wounds of war, and to start
the South anew on the road to prosperity and
fortune.
At eleven o'clock he dismissed Badeau and Bab-
cock to their rooms with the remark that he wanted
to talk alone with me, and when the talk was
through would give me the spare bed in his own
room. With their withdrawal we renewed the con-
versation and kept it going till one o'clock in the
morning, during which he stated his views on other
important questions of the day. He indicated for
the first time his desire, now that Maximillian 's Em-
pire had come to an end, to march an army into
378
RECONSTRUCTION
Canada for the settlement of the Alabama claims
and the expulsion of the British flag, not only from
that country, but from every British colony on the
continent. He declared that in carrying out such
a policy we could mobilize five hundred thousand
of the best infantry and artillery and fifty thousand
of the best cavalry in the world, and suggested that
the ex-Confederate leaders would hasten to enroll
themselves under the national flag for the execu-
tion of that great purpose.
At one o'clock we went to bed, but, as can well
be understood, I had by that time become thoroughly
aroused to the great events of the past and to the
great questions of the future which he had brought
forward that evening, and, instead of going to sleep,
I lay pondering their solution. After perhaps thirty
minutes I turned over, heaving an unconscious sigh,
whereupon the General said: "If you can't go to
sleep, "Wilson, let us get up and finish our conver-
sation." Of course, I accepted the suggestion and
we at once carried it into effect, our talk continuing
unbroken till we were called to breakfast at eight
o 'clock.
To use the phrase of a common friend, we had
"posted and closed the books;" peace was fully re-
established; the War of the Eebellion was ended
forever; and we were both entering upon a new
period of our lives.
379
XI
AFTER THE WAR
Disbanded officers National Express and Transportation
Company Leave of absence Defenses of the Dela-
ware Surveys and internal improvements Panama
Canal Transferred to the infantry Des Moines and
Rock Island Rapids St. Louis and Southeastern Rail-
way Resign from the army Cairo and Vincennes
Railroad Employments of civil life.
Before leaving Georgia, which I did in Decem-
ber, 1865, I made a report to the Secretary of War
setting forth at some length the conditions which
prevailed in that State from the close of the war
till the end of 1865. It was my only contribution
to the problem of reconstruction, and, as it is not
only too long for condensation, but has long since
ceased to be of vital interest, I merely refer the
student of such matters to the Chicago Republican
for December, 1865.
One of the subordinate questions after peace was
established was to find employment for the dis-
banded officers of both sides, especially for the Con-
federates. A number of the latter, in the heat and
humiliation of defeat, were irreconcilable. A few
emigrated to Mexico, a few were later employed
as officers in the Egyptian army, but the great ma-
380
AFTER THE WAR
jority cast in their lot with the people from whom
they sprang and .resumed the callings they had left
in civil life. But there was a large number who had
been officers and soldiers by profession in the old
army, who had no other calling, and for whom the
leaders thought it the part of wisdom to find honor-
able occupation. Joseph E. Johnston and a number
of his friends conceived the idea of establishing the
National Express and Transportation Company,
which would require managers and agents in all the
important business centers, north as well as south.
They formed a corporation under that title, sub-
scribed the capital and elected Johnston president.
On application for an officer of the Northern army
to manage the business, especially in the Northern
states, General Grant designated me for the place
in flattering terms and just as I was starting north
I received notice both from Grant and Johnston
that the business was already in order for my co-
operation. As I was only a captain of engineers,
and did not intend to remain in the army for pro-
motion, I notified all parties that I should accept.
My salary was fixed at the high figure of $12,000
a year, with the understanding that I was to become
the chief executive officer of the company. I was
without experience in the transportation business,
but, as I had confidence in General Johnston, who
had been quartermaster general of the army and
was therefore well versed in matters of that sort,
I had but few misgivings as to my capacity to man-
age the new company or as to its probable success.
The Adams, and the American were at that time
the leading express companies. It was currently
stated that the Adams Company, which had been
381
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
divided and continued business in the Southern as
well as Northern states during the rebellion, had
called in only five per cent, of its subscriptions.
This became an unfortunate example, for each
Southern subscriber naturally reasoned that the new
company would not require a larger assessment and,
consequently, each man who had only a hundred
dollars subscribed for twenty shares, instead of for
one or two. The consequence was that many failed
to pay the second installment and, therefore, the
company was without sufficient capital from the
start. This circumstance was unknown to me at the
time I accepted, but it came forcibly to my attention
a few weeks later.
In my efforts to establish the business over the
Pennsylvania Eailroad and its connections, then the
central and most important artery of transporta-
tion, I soon found that I should have to contract
under the practice of the day for a certain space
in the baggage or express cars at the same or simi-
lar rates paid by the established companies. This
necessitated ready money to the extent of at least
$200,000 for the first year, and after satisfying my-
self that the business could not be established with-
out that sum I made requisition for the same. I
had, of course, been in constant communication with
General Johnston and his experts and had kept
them constantly and precisely informed in respect to
every aspect of the business. They knew as well
and as accurately as I the amount that would be
needed and caused the necessary assessments on the
subscribed capital to be issued, but, unfortunately,
the assessments were not paid. A few subscribers
responded, but by far the larger number were un-
382
AFTER THE WAR
able to meet their calls. Consequently the company
was bankrupt, and, foreseeing this result, I accom-
panied my requisitions with the request that my res-
ignation, which I also enclosed, should be accepted,
and this was done.
I came north late in December and was married
at Wilmington, Delaware, on January 3, 1866, to
Ella Andrews, the daughter of General John W.
Andrews, late Colonel of the First Delaware Vol-
unteers, and the sister of my classmate and aid-de-
camp, Captain John N. Andrews, afterward colonel
of the Twelfth U. S. Infantry and Brigadier Gen-
eral of Volunteers in the Spanish War.
After ten days in New York, made memorable
by dinners, balls, and theater parties, we went to
Eichmond, where I completed the arrangements with
General Johnston in reference to the new express
company. While life seemed full of hope and prom-
ise, there was already more than one cloud above
the horizon.
As I had saved but little, I was forced soon af-
ter leaving the express company to throw up the
year's leave of absence which had been granted me,
with the understanding that I should resign at its
expiration. Through the official kindness of the
Chief of Engineers, I was then assigned to tempo-
rary duty as assistant engineer on the defenses of
the Delaware, which lasted less than three months,
at the end of which, in the fall of 1866, I was or-
dered to Davenport, Iowa, to make surveys and
plans for the improvement of the Bock Island and
the Des Moines rapids and for a line of deep water
navigation from Green Bay by the way of Fox Riv-
er and Eock Elver, and also from Chicago by the
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Illinois Eiver to the Mississippi. This was the
opening measure for the systematic and comprehen-
sive improvement of our inland waterways.
I had had no experience whatever in such work,
nor in dealing with such important questions, but
General Grant, reasoning from what he had seen
me doing on the bayous of Mississippi and Louisi-
ana, had reached the conclusion that I was the right
man to study, grow up with, and solve the questions
involved in my new assignment.
Somewhat later he directed the Chief of En-
gineers to charge me with the official study of the
question of an isthmian or inter-oceanic ship canal
in Central America and to place all reports and cor-
respondence relating thereto at my disposal. His
own interest in that important question was first
aroused by his friend and fellow statesman, Captain
Ammen of the navy, who, to the day of his death
many years afterward, was one of the most intelli-
gent and constant friends of "an inter-oceanic ship
canal" at such place as exhaustive surveys should
show to be best adapted to that purpose. My own
interest in the question has remained unabated to
the present day, and with a tolerable knowledge
of all that has been said and done I held, and still
hold, that there is no adequate solution of the prob-
lem but a tide-level canal, without respect to cost
or length of time required for its completion.
While steamboats were still the principal means
of transportation on the western rivers, Eobert E.
Lee and his classmate, Mason, both distinguished
engineers, with the aid of other military and civil
engineers, had been charged with the improvement
of the rapids of the Mississippi. They confined
384
AFTER THE WAR
themselves, however, to subaqueous blasting and
chisel work, but their efforts, although persisted in
for years and costing large sums of money, proved
entirely futile. The places where they worked could
hardly be found. All such projects had been sus-
pended during the war, but with the return of peace
and the revival of business, river transportation
again became an important factor. It was just as
true then as it is now that the rivers did not gen-
erally run in the right direction, and that those in
the Northern States at least froze up during the
winter, but the people called vociferously for im-
provements, and the most important improvements
were undertaken in turn as soon as feasible plans
could be devised.
My first duty under my new employment, after
a personal examination of the sites and routes of the
various works and surveys, was the employment of
the most competent civil engineers that could be had
and the organization of parties to make complete
surveys of the various routes and to prepare ex-
haustive studies for such works as might be found
necessary. I reasoned that when I knew the exact
facts of each case and had familiarized myself with
the treatment and results of such streams and rapids
as were similar, or in any way like those which had
already been disposed of in our own or other coun-
tries, I should know as much as any more experi-
enced engineer in reference to the questions under
consideration. At all events, that was my working
conclusion and the basis of all measures I recom-
mended thereafter.
As soon as I reached Davenport I organized com-
petent surveying parties under Mr. D. C. Jenne of
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
New York, Mr. James Worall, and Mr. W. P. Shunk
of Pennsylvania, Major Hoffman, and Captain
Ulffers, late of the volunteer army. Captain Hains
of the Engineer Corps had already been detailed
as my assistant, and with the aid of these able men
I soon had four principal and several subsidiary
parties in the field, numbering in the aggregate be-
tween thirty and forty civil engineers of all grades.
I, of course, pushed field operations with all pos-
sible vigor, and by early the next year the various
projects began to take definite shape.
Here I should explain that in the reorganization
of the regular army in 1866 I was appointed lieu-
tenant colonel of the Thirty-fifth Infantry, but con-
tinued in charge of the works previously assigned
to me. General Grant had put my name at the head
of the list of colonels, intending to give me prece-
dence over all new appointments, whether of cavalry
or infantry, but when the list went to the President
for his sanction he insisted on putting two older
regulars who outranked me into it. The list then
went to the Adjutant General, who, as required by
army regulations, arranged it according to the date
of prior regular army commissions for appointments
made the same day. Besides, the act of Congress
required that one-third of the new field officers
should go to volunteers and that no regular officer
should be considered as a volunteer. These two cir-
cumstances threw both Upton and me into the list
of lieutenant colonels, and, as that list had also to
be arranged according to the dates of prior regular
commissions and we were junior captains, we finally
landed at the foot of the lieutenant colonels, I in
the infantry and Upton in the artillery.
386
AFTER THE WAR
As might have been supposed, my surveys and
examinations eliminated the Rock Eiver and Green
Bay route as not only impracticable but far too
costly for a deep water line between the Lakes and
the Mississippi.
The Chicago, Des Plaines, and Illinois Eiver
route was found to be practicable, and a project was
submitted to cut down the summit level, widen and
deepen the canal from Chicago to Ottawa, and then
by a system of locks and dams through the Illinois
to the Mississippi. It was substantially the first
part of this project with all of its principal dimen-
sions which the Chicago Drainage Commissions
adopted and carried into effect many years later.
The surveys showed the fall of the Eock Island
Eapids to be about twenty-one feet in thirteen miles,
divided into reefs or chains and navigable pools,
which could be effectually connected by removing the
rock ledges, but, as this involved the excavation of
many thousand cubic yards, instead of undertaking
such a task under running water, I resolved to do
it by constructing coffer dams around the proper
areas and, after pumping out the water, covering the
bed with workmen, blasting out and removing the
broken stone so as to make proper channels. This
plan was proposed by Charles G. Case and Company
of New York, the lowest bidders, and, although the
coffer dam at Sycamore Chain included and laid
bare one hundred and sixty acres of river bed, the
work was carried through without accident or delay
and has proved sufficient for the accommodation of
the river commerce at that place.
The case at the Des Moines Eapids from Mon-
trose and Nauvoo to Keokuk, twelve miles below,
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UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
was somewhat different. The river was consider-
ably wider, the channel shallower and not so well
defined, and the fall of about twenty feet was largely
confined to the lower eight miles. The solution of
the problem was, therefore, more difficult. While
there was no case exactly like it known, the rapids
of the St. Lawrence, although carrying a much
larger and more constant volume of water in the
dry season, resembled it more closely than any other.
Several rapids on that river had been overcome by
the construction of locks and dams and that prece-
dent was a large factor in favor of a similar remedy
at Keokuk. This plan with its details was carried
out by Mr. Jenne under my supervision, but at my
request the project was submitted to a Board of
Engineers, which included W. Milner Eoberts, C. E.,
of Pittsburgh, and after approval of the work was
let to local contractors, who carried it successfully to
completion. These projects and my supervision of
them covered a period of four years. The locks of
the Keokuk canal were at their completion the larg-
est in America or in the world, and the canal itself
has proven equal to all the demands made upon it.
It is noteworthy that I reported that it would
be but a few years till a much larger volume of traf-
fic would pass across than through or along any of
these improvements, and this prediction was abun-
dantly verified in due time.
It was during this period, shortly before I left
the army in 1870, that Captain James B. Eads of
St. Louis brought forward his project for the im-
provement of the mouth of the Mississippi by the
jetty system and sought my advice.
His project, as original as it was bold, led to a
388
AFTER THE WAR
heated discussion among both military and civil en-
gineers. The Chief Engineer of the army took
strong ground against the Eads plan, and suggested
an artificial cut-off or canal into Lake Pontchartrain.
But General Barnard, also a high scientist, differed
with him and pronounced in favor of Eads. The
controversy was a notable one, and, after consider-
ing all the attainable facts, I gave Eads a written
opinion endorsing his plans, but in a personal inter-
view I warned him that he would find the opposition
too strong for him, unless he could secure the help of
influential men at Washington, to whom I later gave
him letters of introduction.
Eads was a man of great natural ability and,
although laying no claims to the profession of en-
gineer, he proposed to ask the Government for
neither money nor assistance of any kind till he
had demonstrated both the feasibility and the effi-
ciency of his plan. Such a proposition as this, in-
volving as it did several million dollars, had never
been submitted to our Government or to any govern-
ment, in fact, by a private citizen, but it was so fair
and was pushed with such energy and tact that Con-
gress finally gave its approval, and the bold engineer
not only completed his contract and demonstrated its
success, but received the entire sum in consecutive
annual payments, extending over something more
than twenty years, when the works reverted to
the general Government, as provided for in the
contract.
While still engaged on the Mississippi Eiver in
frequent contact with leading promoters and con-
tractors, my attention was drawn to the great need
of railroads in southern Illinois. At that time
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
only the Illinois Central and the Ohio and Missis-
sippi Eailroads had been built and put in operation.
Many years before a line had been located from
Shawneetown to Alton, near St. Louis, and much
work had been done on it, but, like every other en-
terprise of the time, it fell into bankruptcy and was
abandoned in the great financial crisis of 1837, after
which the entire region had languished for means
of transportation. The country was rich in timber,
coal, and agricultural products, but was backward
in development for lack of capital and enterprise.
Under the inspiring leadership of Stephen A. Doug-
las, and in spite of alleged leanings toward the
South, it had contributed a larger percentage of
soldiers than any other portion of the State to the
Union army, and with the return of the disbanded
volunteers it naturally looked to the outer world for
help. My uncle, who was at that time the largest
landholder and the richest man in that part of the
State, and, therefore, greatly interested in improve-
ment, sought to interest me in building a railroad
from St. Louis to my native town. He represented
the various counties through which the road would
run as willing under the railroad laws of the State
passed in 1869 to advance their credit and issue
bonds in aid of the enterprise. But what was still
more surprising was the fact that, while they were
ready to subscribe the full face of the bonds to the
stock of the railroad company, they would give it
to me if I would successfully finance, build, and
equip the railroad. It was a favorable and flattering
offer, and, as it was my purpose to leave the army
if I could find a suitable opening, I immediately sent
contractors to look over the route and give me their
390
AFTER THE WAR
conclusion as to its merits and their figures as to
the probable cost of the railroad. On receipt of
favorable reports, I notified the parties in interest
that I would take up the enterprise and put it
through if I could get the cooperation of General
Winslow, who, it will be remembered, had rebuilt
and reopened the Atlanta and Chattanooga Eailroad
under my direction. As Winslow was at that time
engaged in building the Vandalia Eailroad, he was
obliged to delay till he leased it to the Pennsylvania
Company. This was done in 1869, shortly after
which we took up the new project, which we desig-
nated the St. Louis and Southeastern Eailway. The
whole enterprise was soon on its feet, and, like many
others of the day, it grew into notice under our di-
rection. We found it advisable to extend the main
line to Evansville, in the southwestern corner of
Indiana, a large and flourishing city on the Ohio
Eiver, with a branch through the Saline coal field
to Shawneetown. Evansville had already voted a
large cash subsidy, which, after a sharp contention
with the late Samuel J. Tilden and his agents, also
passed into our control, principally on the ground
that Evansville, having already been connected with
Chicago, now wished to establish rail connection
with St. Louis, to which our line was the direct
route.
The negotiations with the city authorities and
leading men were by no means easily carried
through. We were comparatively unknown in the
business world, and had to have the support of in-
fluential outsiders. Fortunately, my friend, Major
Samuel K. Casey, the first citizen of Mount Ver-
non, an interior town on the line to St. Louis, came
391
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
willingly to our assistance. He had known me
always, and after an adroit and strenuous appeal
in behalf of the proposition my associate and I had
submitted, concluded somewhat as follows: "And
now, gentlemen, I hope you will close with my
friends. I know they will do as they say and fulfill
all promises to the letter. We Democrats over in
Illinois " then pausing and looking gravely over
the assembled notables, nearly all of whom were of
the same political faith, he added "I hope I offend
no one by the use of that word but, gentlemen,
that's my persuasion we Democrats over in Illi-
nois, whenever we find men who will stand with-
out hitching, we are willing to trust them to the end.
And now if you will close the contract with these
young men, I'll tell you what I'll do; I'll come over
here from Mount Vernon and buy the very last one
of my catfish from you ! ' '
It is needless to add that this appeal was re-
ceived with applause and was followed shortly by
a formal contract which gave the subsidies of both
city and county, amounting to something over a half
million dollars, to the St. Louis and Southeastern
Eailway, which was promptly completed and put
into operation.
This business soon absorbed most of my time,
and, as the local subscriptions were not sufficient to
pay for more than the right of way and the grad-
ing, it became necessary to mortgage the property;
for enough to buy the rails, crossties, bridges, sta-
tions, and rolling stock. The next thing was to sell
the bonds and this fell to my lot.
About that time Congress reduced the army and
I availed myself of that opportunity to put in my
392
AFTER THE WAR
resignation (December 31, 1870), which I phrased
"to be in effect from the date hereof till the begin-
ning of the next war to which the United States
might be a party." Fortunately, the surveys and
government work with which I had been charged,
especially the improvement of the Des Moines and
Eock Island Eapids, were so far advanced that the
plans could not be changed. But to prevent this
and to secure their completion I was retained as
consulting engineer for a year or two longer.
Although my pursuits in civil life absorbed my
entire time and attention, they did not prevent my
consideration for public office. Shortly after re-
turning from Europe, in 1873, I was asked semi-offi-
cially if I would accept the commissionership of
Internal Revenue, but, regarding the private station
as the post of honor, in times such as then prevailed,
I gave the matter no consideration, and never from
that time to this have I sought civil office. My per-
sonal relations, however, with Grant and his official
household, as well as with the members of his cabi-
net, continued on an intimate footing till well
toward the end of his second term, and it is a grati-
fying circumstance that I retained his approval to
the end as a military man. This is confirmed by
the fact that Mr. Fish, who had been his secretary
of state, asked him a decade later what the country
would have done for army commanders in case of
the death of Sherman, Sheridan, and Schofield. To
this the General replied that there were others com-
ing forward who could quite well fill their places,
and then named " Upton, McKenzie, and Wilson,"
in the order given. 1
1 See Hamilton Fish on Grant The Independent, July 30, 1885.
393
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Eemoving to New York early in 1871, I was
elected a member of the principal clubs and through
George Opdyke, the late mayor, Governor Morgan,
Commodore Vanderbilt, and Colonel Cannon, I made
the acquaintance of Jacob H. Schiff, Morton, Bliss
and Company, Seligman Brothers and Company,
Naylor and Company, Morris K. Jessup and Com-
pany, Perkins, Livingston and Post, the Grant Loco-
motive Works, Rogers Locomotive Works, Baldwin
Locomotive Works, the principal car-building com-
panies, and many other firms prominent in the vari-
ous branches of railroad exploitation. My acquain-
tance with Mr. Opdyke, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Schiff, Mr.
E. Suydam Grant and many others in New York and
Europe, ripened into friendship which has lasted
unbroken save by death to the present day.
At that time all rails and fastenings as well as
a large portion of the capital necessarily came from
Europe. I made my first and second visits to Eng-
land and the Continent with Mr. Schiff for the pur-
pose of selling bonds, and in two years Winslow and
I built and equipped two hundred miles of railroad
in Illinois and Indiana and acquired one hundred and
fifty more by purchase and consolidation in Ken-
tucky and Tennessee, which gave us the shortest line
from St. Louis as well as from Chicago to Nashville
and beyond. Although the gauge changed at the
Ohio Eiver from four feet nine inches to five feet
south of that river, it was the first railroad in the
United States to run loaded cars both ways without
breaking bulk between the Northern and Southern
states. It penetrated a rich and undeveloped coal
field both in Kentucky and Illinois, passed through
heavily timbered districts, and connected widely
394
AFTER THE WAR
separated regions for the interchange of fuel, lum-
ber, farm products, and merchandise.
During the same period we took over and built
the Cairo and Vincennes Eailroad in connection with
General Burnside and his friends under contract
with the Pennsylvania system to the junction of the
Ohio and Mississippi Eivers at Cairo. Winslow was
as able and energetic a railroad builder as he was
a soldier, and everything seemed going our way.
The roads were properly located, rapidly and eco-
nomically built. Every dollar of the subscriptions
as well as the proceeds of all the bonds went hon-
estly into the roads and their equipment. Neither
of us received salaries, but both depended solely
upon the stocks we were to receive under our con-
tract for compensation, and with the unusual suc-
cess of our operations it looked as though the stocks
would enrich us. Of course, we divided with our
bankers with a fair margin of profit for all, and
everything went on swimmingly till the crash of
1873, which carried down every uncompleted rail-
road in the country. The most promising and those
most nearly completed went with such as had not
yet been fairly started. The Northern Pacific, the
Union Pacific, the Texas Pacific, and the Wabash
shared the fate of the Ontario and Western, the St.
Louis and Southeastern, the Cairo and Vincennes,
and scores of others, all of which were overwhelmed
in bankruptcy and ruin. It was a period of wide-
spread distress during which there was no immu-
nity either for new corporations or new contractors.
All suffered alike.
During its first years our consolidated road
earned a considerable surplus above operating and
395
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
interest charges, and even in the hard times its
traffic continued so large that we felt sure it would
carry us through. But it was still the age of unregu-
lated competition and arbitrary management in
which each railroad was a rule unto itself and self-
preservation was regarded by all as the first law of
nature. Our through cars south from Nashville
ran over the Louisville and Nashville and the Nash-
ville and Chattanooga Eailroads and their connec-
tions, and when the pinch of hard times came, which
commenced with the failure of Jay Cooke and Com-
pany, these railroads shut off our through traffic to
the last car and the last pound of freight, and as
there was no statute law against this, in spite of our
urgent appeals to equity in the U. S. circuit courts
at Louisville and Nashville, they completely de-
stroyed our business and our revenues and thereby
forced us into default and into the hands of a re-
ceiver. While in due time I became receiver and
general manager, the Southeastern Eailway finally
passed into the control of the Louisville and Nash-
ville by purchase after foreclosure, which wiped out
both stock and bonds. The road they covered now
constitutes the principal connection of that flourish-
ing system to Chicago, St. Louis, and the North-
west, and for many years has earned and paid both
interest and dividends on a much larger amount of
money than it cost, thus fully justifying its construc-
tion and the hopes which we entertained of its use-
fulness and profit.
My connection with it brought me but one con-
solation. The country it served has made great
strides in wealth, education, and refinement. The
interior counties were then the home of idleness, and
396
AFTER THE WAR
often of drunkenness and violence. The churches
were neglected and the schools comparatively empty.
Now and for many years all this is changed. The
lands have been drained, churches built, streets
paved, schools opened and prosperity established on
every hand. Population has doubled, villages have
become towns and towns enterprising cities. Pro-
hibition is the rule, violence and even litigation are
hardly known, and contentment, progress, and plenty
are found from the Mississippi to the Cumberland.
The greater part of the praise for all this is due to
the railroads. They let the light through, aroused
ambitions, and furnished markets, while the people
did the rest. The transformation which is complete
came as though by magic. The region prospered.
The bankers and contractors alone suffered loss.
My unfortunate experiences in that field con-
vinced me that something more than the common
law was necessary for the regulation of railroads,
and from the day of our break with our Southern
connections, I saw the necessity for a national law
compelling all railroads engaged in interstate com-
merce to make physical connection with the tracks
of all connecting and intersecting railways, to issue
and participate in through bills of lading, to give
prompt dispatch to business from whatever source,
to make fair and equitable rates to all and to dis-
criminate against none. I had studied the Constitu-
tion of the United States as well as all the great
commentaries upon it. I was familiar with the com-
mon and the statute law for the regulation of com-
mon carriers, and while I was reluctant to invoke
national legislation to compel just and fair treat-
ment, I saw no other means of dealing adequately
397
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
with the far-reaching abuses, of which my associ-
ates and I were the innocent victims. In the midst
of my employments I wrote many times to friends in
Congress and in the newspaper world supporting
and invoking the right of Congress to regulate com-
merce between the states. Later I went before the
committees of both Houses and stated my case as
strongly as the facts would allow and yet opposing
any law which did not apply equally to foreign
and inter-state railroads, doing business with or
forming links in railroads between one section of
the country and another, and especially along the
Canadian border. Senator Cullom and Senator
Eeagan openly expressed their approval of my
views, declaring that they were with me "all along
the line of my argument, ' ' and yet they were unable
to incorporate the restrictions I pointed out in the
act which ultimately became the law. It has been
amended if not improved in many particulars since,
and while I was one of the first, if not the very first
railroad manager, to urge such a measure upon the
attention of Congress, it came far too late to benefit
the railroads in which I was so largely interested.
The effects of the law and the restoration of con-
fidence and prosperity were too slow to save my in-
terest or any part of it from the general wreck. I
held that the mortgages should have absolute pri-
ority over the shares of the stockholders, no mat-
ter how much money or labor had been paid for the
stock. The day had not yet come for recognizing
such equities, and all the stockholders were ruth-
lessly wiped out. It was not till a good many years
later that stockholders were recognized and taken
into account in the new schemes of capitalization.
398
AFTER THE WAR
Meanwhile many millions of honest money and much
honest work were foreclosed out of existence and
it is this fact which has always made me believe that
our railroads are on the whole far from being over-
capitalized.
My only consolation is that I gained a great deal
of useful experience, and with the loyal help of my
associates made good my undertakings. I had had
some influence in ending the abuses of which I com-
plained, and I am sure they can never be again prac-
tised or directed against those who come after us.
A great country like ours still affords splendid op-
portunities and holds out great inducements for the
capital and enterprise which are necessary for the
development of its resources. With their encourag-
ing stimulus its citizens may put forth their noblest
efforts with the assurance that it is rarely ever
necessary to do more than lay down general rules
for the regulation and control of its enterprises to
insure an equal opportunity and fair treatment for
all.
During my railroad life from 1870 to 1883, a
period of thirteen years, I lived in New York, St.
Louis, and Chicago. In the earlier part of that
period I became associated with George M. Pullman
and Henry M. Alexander as an active promoter of
the New York Elevated Railway, and after several
visits to Europe and many changes of plan took
charge of its construction as general manager and
chief engineer. In the latter capacity I controlled
the plans and awarded the contracts for the sec-
tion between Eector Street and Central Park, and
with the help of my able chief assistant, Mr. William
F. Shunk, I regulated all and devised many of the
399
UNDEK THE OLD FLAG
details of structure, track, stations, locomotives,
and cars, none of which have ever failed, but all of
which have stood the test of daily use for many
years. It was a pioneer work and has been imitated
in its principal features by all similar undertakings
down to the present day.
At a pause in its plans and construction I found
it necessary to take the receivership and manage-
ment of the Southeastern Eailway in which I had a
much larger interest. Having wound up that busi-
ness and transferred the railroad to its purchaser,
I accepted the vice-presidency and presidency in
turn, of the New York and New England Railroad
and, after buying one hundred and three acres of
the South Boston flats for its eastern terminal and
extending it as a trunk line to Fishkill and New-
burg on the Hudson, thus making it a competitive
i'oad for the principal cities of New England, the
group I was associated with gave up control and,
although rich enough to hold it, allowed the system
with a greater mileage than any other in New Eng-
land, to pass into the hands of the New York and
New Haven Company which had been from the first
its most unrelenting and irreconcilable rival. See-
ing that this result was inevitable, I gave up my po-
sition and in 1883 removed from Boston to Wil-
mington, Delaware.
This ended the most strenuous period of my
business life and although a few years later I be-
came a co-receiver of the Louisville, Evansville and
St. Louis Railroad, which I had helped my brother
and others to promote and in which I had acquired
an interest under a previous foreclosure, I took no
part after that in active railroad management.
400
AFTER THE WAR
During my residence in Delaware, I devoted my-
self to my business interests, to letters, to public
affairs, and to travel, visiting Europe, Mexico,
Canada, Japan, Formosa, and China, 1 and, although
I had many interesting experiences and met many
notable men, I have sufficiently described most of
them in newspapers, magazines, or books. Before
completing this narrative I may refer to others
for special reasons, but looking back upon that part
of my life as personal rather than public, I pass
on to the Spanish War.
1 " China, Travels in the Middle Kingdom," Appleton & Co.
401
XII
THE SPANISH WAR
Cuba and the Cuban Rebellion Cane and beet sugar
Spanish oppression The Maine blown up in the
harbor of Havana Declaration of war Reenter
army as senior major general from civil life Inter-
view with the President Composition of army.
For over four hundred years Cuba played an
important part in the world's history. Diseovered
in 1492 by Columbus, it was thought for many years
to be a part of the Asiatic mainland. Containing
approximately forty-four thousand square miles,
lying just within the north torrid zone, it is one of
the most fertile and productive countries in either
hemisphere. Settled and populated by Spain, its
growth was never rapid, and this is to be accounted
for mainly by the fact that from the date of the ex-
pulsion of the Jews and Moors, Spain has always
been more or less short of labor.
The native population of Cuba at the time of its
discovery was estimated at from two hundred thou-
sand to a million souls, who were first enslaved and
then exterminated by forced labor in the search for
gold and by diseases introduced by the whites.
Their places were gradually filled by negroes, the
first of whom were imported in 1501, and with but
402
THE SPANISH WAR
little interruption the last in 1880. In this year
slavery was abolished by law, but it continued in
the remote districts till 1887.
Contrary to the common opinion the proportion
of the white population to the colored for the last
hundred years at least has stood in the ratio of two
to one, and is now gradually on the increase, the
last census giving it as 70 to 30. Curiously enough
no trace of Indian blood is found in the population.
I met one woman in the valley of Manicaragua and
the census takers another in the Cienaga de Zapata,
showing distinct traces of Indian blood, but neither
had children in whom Indian blood could be recog-
nized. There had been an intermixture of the white
and negro races and it may be safely said that no
Cuban dark enough to be asked his color ever says
anything but white. Nevertheless, the white popu-
lation is largely in excess in all recognizable shades,
and as there is but little of the race prejudice that
exists in our Southern states, there is a far greater
homogeneity than is found in any other Spanish-
American country or even in South Carolina, Ala-
bama, Mississippi, or in Louisiana. Illiteracy does
not exist so largely amongst the blacks of Cuba as
in any of the states just mentioned, but for three
hundred years there were practically no schools in
the island and the lack of educational facilities
greatly retarded the material prosperity of all
classes of native Cubans. Like the colonies of all
other countries, those of Spain were established,
exploited, and controlled mainly for the benefit of
the home government and people, and yet for many
years the Cuban trade with Spain languished for the
sufficient reason that Spain herself was impover-
403
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ished. Notwithstanding the wealth, which for years
poured in from the colonies in exchange for sup-
plies which were frequently got in other countries,
Spain became little more than a clearing house for
colonial products.
The principal staples of this beautiful and fruit-
ful island are sugar and tobacco, the first a neces-
sity for the world at large, and the second a luxury
which required but little skilled labor and no sci-
entific manipulation to prepare it for use. But
tropical fruits of all kinds flourish and, with rail
and steamship transportation and a remission of
duties, might be produced and delivered in the Euro-
pean as well as in the near-by countries in bound-
less profusion. Even with the oppression and ex-
actions of the mother country the value of the ex-
ports from the island per capita were larger than
those of any other colony or country in the world,
but under the pernicious system in force the profit
therefrom was squeezed out of the producers in the
shape of taxes and salaries which went to Spain and
not to the people of the island. Duties were levied
on exports as well as on imports, direct taxes were
laid on personal property, industries, trades, and
professions, while seal and stamp duties on all kinds
of legal papers and business transactions, a munici-
pal tax on the slaughter of cattle as well as a
heavy head tax on every immigrant, white or black,
were also collected. Having neither banks nor local
currency, the financial and commercial difficulties
were heavily increased, and when it is considered
that the entire system of government and adminis-
tration was monopolized by the Spanish officials to
the exclusion of natives, sufficient reason will be
404
THE SPANISH WAR
seen for the discontentment of the Cuban people.
From 1821 down to the beginning of the last rebel-
lion in 1895, it may be truthfully said that the hopes
of the Cuban people were directed to independence
of Spain and to the establishment of closer trade
relations with the rest of the world.
From Jefferson's administration to McKinley's
the island of Cuba, lying directly south of Florida,
less than a hundred miles away, has always been
viewed with interest by the American people. Its
position was regarded as the key to the Gulf of
Mexico and our southern seaboard, and this caused
the possibility of its transfer to any other power to
be considered a menace to our paramount interests,
which could not be tolerated. As its great produc-
tivity became better known, the desire for annexa-
tion spread throughout the country, and had it not
been for the difficulty between the North and the
South in regard to slavery, there can be but little
doubt that vigorous and effective measures would
have been taken to secure the annexation of the isl-
and before the Civil War broke out. Indeed, efforts
more or less persistent were made from time to time
to purchase the island from the Spanish Govern-
ment, but, unfortunately, these fell to the ground
and the Cuban people were left to struggle on un-
aided till their burdens became greater than they
could bear.
And yet the home Government was not altogether
to blame for the condition which prevailed in Cuba.
While the Spanish people had had no reformation
and no renaissance, they were not materially worse
nor much more intolerant than the people of other
European countries. Their Government and colonial
405
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
system were rotten, while their statesmen and phi-
losophers were backward, if not illiberal. Nor can
they be blamed for failing to see what all other na-
tions equally failed to see, namely, the concealed but
far-reaching consequences of certain important facts
and influences growing out of the wars of the Na-
poleonic period.
Up to the Battle of Trafalgar, the entire sugar
supply of the world came from the tropical islands,
but the successful blockade which followed that vic-
tory enabled Great Britain to close the ports and
coasts of Europe against tropical productions of
every kind. And it was this that vitalized the Ger-
man discovery that the sugar of the carrot and beet
was identical with that of sugar cane, but beets car-
ried only four per cent, of extractable sugar, while
cane carried ten, and the supply of beets was insig-
nificant. A new industry had to be created. By
selection and cultivation the sweetness of the beet
was increased to ten, fifteen, twenty and finally,
after a hundred years, to twenty-five per cent, in
parts of California, while the best sugar cane con-
tinued to carry only ten or twelve per cent, of ex-
tractable sugar. With the continental blockade the
price of sugar soared in Europe, while ruin stalked
abroad in the islands in which it was produced.
Whether the cane-sugar planters knew what had
befallen them, or foresaw what would be its effects
or their duration is more than doubtful, but it is
certain that the Germans, followed quickly by the
French, and later by the Eussians, did all they could
to put the beet sugar business on its feet. Within
ten years, from Trafalgar to Waterloo, over six
hundred factories were put into successful opera-
406
THE SPANISH WAR
tion in Germany and France alone. By 1840 fifty
thousand tons of beet-sugar were produced annu-
ally and although hundreds of sugar planters had
been ruined, the cane-sugar industry was not yet
dead. Beet-sugar, stimulated by duties and restric-
tions on cane-sugar, was annually increasing in out-
put and decreasing in cost throughout Europe.
Sugar was no longer a luxury, but had become an
article of staple necessity which its cheapness finally
put within the reach of all mankind. For the year
1900, the world's sugar output was eight million
four hundred and forty-eight thousand and forty-
four long tons, of which five million six hundred and
eight thousand or a little less than two-thirds were
of beet, while two million eight hundred and thirty-
nine thousand were of cane-sugar. This was the
high-water mark of beet-sugar. Since the indepen-
dence and pacification of Cuba, the output of cane-
sugar has been relatively increasing. For the year
1909-10 the total output of sugar was fourteen mil-
lion eight hundred and ninety thousand long tons,
of which seven million nine hundred and thirty-five
thousand were of cane and six million seven hun-
dred and fifteen thousand were of beet-sugar. For
the first time in this decade the output of cane
passed that of beet-sugar in 1908. The crop year
of 1910-11 gave a still greater relative output of
cane-sugar.
At the beginning of this revolution in one of the
world's great industries, the price of raw sugar was
something like $.20 a pound or $450 a ton. From
that date till the end of the Spanish War it
went down till it sold at $40 per ton at the planta-
tion. It has even touched $35 per ton more than
407
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
once during the previous twenty years. For most
of the last hundred years the war between beet- and
cane-sugar was a war without mercy or quarter,
during which the plotted curve of prices is a de-
scending one every subdivision of which is marked
with the ruin of sugar-cane planters throughout the
world.
Although the sugar industry started in Cuba as
early as 1523, it was not till the end of two cen-
turies that the output reached twenty-five thousand,
and not till 1750 that it reached seventy-five thou-
sand tons per year. At the end of another hundred
years it had reached three hundred and twenty thou-
sand tons. During the next sixteen years it gradu-
ally increased to seven hundred and fifty thousand
tons. But this was a period of high prices and great
improvements in grinding the cane, converting the
beg ass e or fiber into fuel and extracting the sugar,
but it was offset by a period during which the an-
nual exactions of Spain amounted to an average of
$5,000,000 in excess of the official budget. With
these exactions a third of the Cuban planters were
driven into bankruptcy, which in turn threw both
skilled and unskilled laborers by the thousand out
of employment. And it was this state of affairs, and
not any special or unusual oppression or any new
form of outrage and wrong which drove the Cuban
people into poverty and insurrection.
The first Cuban Eepublic was proclaimed at Yara
in 1868, and the struggle which followed lasted with
varying fortunes and inconclusive results till 1878.
Carlos Manuel Cespedes was the president and Max-
imo Gomez, who had experience in the Spanish army
as a non-commissioned officer, became the active
408
THE SPANISH WAR
leader. The fierce but desultory struggle was con-
fined mostly to the Eastern provinces, and was fi-
nally ended by a series of concessions and stipula-
tions on both sides, with the payment of a consider-
able sum of money to the insurgent leaders, as pro-
vided in the so-called Capitulation of Zanjon.
Without dwelling on the settlement which each
party charged the other with violating, it is certain
that the war cost both Cuba and the mother country
an enormous sum in property as well as in money,
and that on this account Spain added $300,000,000
to the public debt, thus bringing it fully up to $400,-
000,000 or to $283 per capita, all of which was
charged to Cuba. What was worse, Spain insisted
upon adding the interest on the same to the Cuban
budget, already far greater than the Cuban people
with the decreasing profits of their principal busi-
ness could bear.
To make a deplorable case desperate, a further
fall in the price of sugar took place in 1884, which
brought another crop of planters to ruin and con-
tinued the depression till the American Congress
put the Elaine system of reciprocity into effect. As
this admitted Cuban sugar into the States without
duty, the crop rapidly responded to the magic touch
of free trade till it reached its maximum of one mil-
lion fifty-four thousand two hundred and fourteen
tons in 1895. But, unfortunately, the competition
with beet-sugar at the same time grew fiercer and
fiercer till it finally culminated with the repeal of
the reciprocity arrangements during Cleveland's
second term, in an apparently complete victory for
beet-sugar. Our part in the battle was the straw
which broke the camel 's back and whelmed both the
409
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
surviving planters and the common people of Cuba
in ruin.
In a storm of fury against Spanish oppression,
and apparently in entire ignorance of the fatal blow
we had struck their most flourishing industries, the
second rebellion broke out in 1895, under Cisneros,
Maso, Marti, Gomez, and Maceo. Although the in-
surgents were poorly prepared to carry on war
against Spain, the infuriated combatants with torch
and machete, small arms and artillery soon had the
beautiful island ablaze and running with blood from
end to end. Industry ceased, idleness became the
rule, the rate of wages for the few workmen still
employed fell to a nominal figure, the cost of living
rose and the output of sugar dwindled in a single
season to a little more than two hundred thousand
tons. Spain had filled Cuba with soldiers while the
Cuban leaders had called every unemployed man to
the banner of his country. Every " central" that
could not pay tribute to both sides was burned, the
cane-fields were fired and all the cattle that could be
found were driven away, slain and eaten. No animal
escaped. Nothing that could be eaten was spared.
The infuriated forces vied with each other in the
work of destruction, each declaring its purpose to
make the island valueless to the other. Spain in her
desperation increased her army of occupation as fast
as the ships could bring them over to full two hun-
dred thousand men, a force amply sufficient to sweep
the country from side to side and from end to end as
rapidly as the troops could march had it been pos-
sible for them to march at all. The most that the
invaders could do was to occupy the principal cities
and towns, driving the people from the neighboring
410
THE SPANISH WAR
farmhouses and cabins and shutting them up within
fortified limits so restricted that it was impossible
for them to find food enough to keep body and soul
together.
This cruel and infamous practice became known
as "Reconcentration," the poor victims of which,
called "Reconcentrados," died by thousands from
starvation and disease. According to the best evi-
dence obtainable, the population of the island was
reduced by these means fully two hundred thousand,
before the practice was abandoned and succor came
to the suffering Cubans. A cry of horror went up
against the inhuman policy all over the world, but
Spain, as long as Weyler held command, was inex-
orable. It may be truthfully said that Spain was
also powerless to carry on the war in civilized fash-
ion, not that she was short of men or resources, but
that her rapacity and misrule for four hundred years
had been such as to sweep all the surplus wealth out
of the island into her own coffers instead of leaving
a reasonable part for building turnpikes and rail-
roads. Had she located and constructed a central
highway of either sort from the ends of the island
to Havana, with branches from the principal ports,
she could easily have overwhelmed the Cuban re-
bellion before the nearest outside power could have
gone to its assistance.
The American people from Maine to California
and from St. Paul to New Orleans without refer-
ence to party were outraged by the cruel policy of
the Spanish Captain General. The adventurous re-
porter never better displayed his enterprise than in
the accounts he gave of the sufferings inflicted on
(r.3 Cuban people. Food, clothing, and medicines
411
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
were sent by shiploads to the suffering Eeconcen-
trados, and curiously enough the Spanish authorities
amiably assisted the Bed Cross in distributing them
to the sick and starving Cubans. Scores of enthusi-
astic young Americans had flocked to the standard
of the insurgents, and the conviction was spreading
like wildfire throughout the States that the Cuban
Eepublic should be recognized, and if that should
not prove sufficient, that the Spanish forces should
be driven out of the island at the point of the bayo-
net. But notwithstanding the excitement, both the
President and Congress proceeded with delibera-
tion. Both recognized the gravity of the situation
and honestly strove to avoid war. In memory of
our own great rebellion they were loath to recognize
the new Eepublic or to intervene for the expulsion
of the Spaniards and the reestablishment of peace.
They offered the country's "good offices" but the
hour had not yet come for their acceptance. Al-
though the disturbance in the house of the next door
neighbor was intolerable and ought to be suppressed
as a matter of common right, they were reluctant to
play the part of policeman.
As time passed, however, the row seemed to sub-
side from within, but this was doubtless due more to
the exhaustion and powerlessness of the combatants
than to a disposition on either part to reach a just
and peaceable settlement. The enormous expense
coupled with the impossibility of concentrating their
forces and of conducting successful operations in the
interior appeared to be dawning at last upon both
the Captain General and the home Government.
But as yet neither Spain nor the outer world
seemed to understand that the underlying cause of
412
THE SPANISH WAR
the rebellion was primarily economic and not alto-
gether political. While it was true that Spam's do-
minion on this side of the Atlantic was regarded by
many as an anachronism, and that Cuba had a par-
donable desire for independence, no one seemed to
recognize the deep-seated and fatal cause of her
discontentment. No political economist had yet
discovered that the island and its people were hope-
lessly bankrupt. No statesman had perceived that
they paid willingly so long as they had profit enough
to defray the cost of production including taxes and
extraordinary exactions and leave a reasonable sur-
plus behind. No governor general and no Spanish
minister had suggested that Cuba could not possibly
continue to pay after its business had been destroyed
and its debt had become greater than it could carry.
No accountant had discovered that its surplus had
already given place to a deficit that it could not
make good or that financial ruin was stalking abroad
in the land. Strangely enough no American from
the President down seems to have got the faintest
glimpse of the real trouble, and thus Spaniards,
Cubans, and Americans alike were drifting help-
lessly and unconsciously toward a catastrophe which
shocked the world and led ultimately at a great cost
of life and money to only a partial amelioration of
conditions rather than to a radical cure of the deep-
seated disease.
This was the general situation when the tragic
event to which I allude took place, fixing if not
changing the course of history. For the protection
if not at the direct request of Consul General Fitz-
hugh Lee and the American residents of Cuba, the
Washington administration, acting entirely within
413
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
its discretion but, as the outside world thought,
without sufficient justification, sent the battleship
Maine to Havana where she was received with
proper if not effusive respect. An advantageous
anchorage was assigned to her, but shortly after-
ward this was changed. Then came an explosion
blowing out her bottom and causing her to sink be-
fore a large part of the crew, which were below
deck, could escape. This occurred on February 15,
1898, at about ten o'clock at night. The dull heavy
rumble of the explosion was heard ashore, and when
its cause was ascertained the news was flashed by
cable and telegraph to all parts of the world. While
there was no positive proof, the suspicion was al-
most irresistible that the disaster* was the result
of hostile design and not of accident. A board of
naval officers investigated the matter as best they
could, and although they got nothing but circumstan-
tial evidence, they expressed the opinion that the
ship had been blown up by a torpedo or sub-marine
mine directed or planted by the hands of the Span-
iards. The Spanish authorities were swift to deny
the charge. They were also swift to make an in-
vestigation which, without throwing any positive
light upon the tragic incident, expressed the counter
opinion that the battleship was sunk by an explosion
from within. It is, however, worthy of note that the
American solution of the mystery has finally been
confirmed by a new board of army and navy ex-
perts, who made a careful examination and survey
of the hulk after it had been laid bare within a cof-
fer dam constructed for the purpose of removing it
from the harbor.
A wave of excitement swept over the country
414
THE SPANISH WAR
when the news of the disaster came to hand. Many
newspapers and many congressmen clamored for an
immediate declaration of war. But the President
and the cooler heads, knowing that the country was
not prepared for extreme measures, did all they
could to make delay. Diplomacy was called upon
again to do its work. An armistice with a revoca-
tion of the order of reconcentration was suggested
to be followed by a fair and honorable peace be-
tween the belligerents. Counter propositions fol-
lowed ; a meeting of ambassadors in Washington of-
fered the good offices of the European Governments ;
Spain proclaimed an armistice, revoked its order of
reconcentration, appropriated money to assist in re-
lieving the suffering Cubans, and finally took meas-
ures to establish an autonomous government in the
island ; but it all came too late. The conviction that
Spaniards if not the Spanish government had blown
up the Maine, was too strong to permit an impartial
arbitration. McKinley had stood firmly for peace
up to that time, but his position now became uncer-
tain. Whether he sincerely wished for peace, or was
working for delay in the hope that he would be bet-
ter prepared for war, remains a matter of doubt to
the present day. He was naturally a timid man if
not an opportunist. Although his service in the War
for the Union began with the humble rank of com-
missary sergeant and ended with that of brevet
major on the staff, there is reason for believing that-
he regarded himself like many another distinguished
civilian, as in fact a great military organizer and
administrator. And yet in calling an ex-colonel of
volunteers who, although reinstated, had been sum-
marily dismissed from the army a third of a cen-
415
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
tury before, to the high position of secretary of
war merely because he had become rich and had
made large contributions to pay the personal debts
and campaign expenses of the presidential candi-
date, he had rudely shaken the confidence of the
try as well as of the army in his discretion and
judgment. But he was both president and comman-
der-in-chief and the war with all of its uncertainties
was not only on but under his supreme direction.
Although I knew as little as any one else at that
day as to the misrule and economic ruin in Cuba, I
had sympathized deeply with her from the day of
the first rebellion and wanted to see her freed from
Spanish tyranny and annexed to the United States.
I, therefore, made haste to offer my services to the
Government, and in doing so called special attention
to the fact that my resignation from the army in
1870 was by its terms to remain in effect for the in-
terval of peace which might elapse between the date
thereof and the beginning of the next war to which
the United States were a party. In due course I
notified the Adjutant General that I was ready to
accept any rank and command which might be as-
signed to me with due regard to my past services.
Shortly afterward I was invited to the executive
mansion, and on my arrival with Corbin, the Adju-
tant General, the President, whom I knew well, and
who received me most cordially, told me that he had
placed my name at the head of the list of major gen-
erals to be appointed from civil life. He then showed
me his list and asked me what I thought of it. As a
cursory examination revealed that he had left off
several of the best men of the old army, notably
Ames, Fitzhugh, and Hall, still in their prime, and
416
THE SPANISH WAR
also Basil Duke of the Confederate army, to all of
whose merits I called special attention, he said at
once that he would put them on the next list. They
were notified at once and so far as they were ready
to accept, he sent their names to the Senate for con-
firmation, in due time.
Thus, by my appointment and previous services,
I became the senior major general from civil life.
Fitzhugh Lee and Joseph Wheeler had also gradu-
ated at West Point and held commissions in the reg-
ular army before they went into the Eebellion, but
with my longer service and higher rank in the old
army, I had precedence over them. The first five
army corps were assigned to the senior regular offi-
cers of continuous service. The sixth fell to my lot
and the seventh to Lee's, but when it came to the
actual reorganization of the new army all the corps,
except mine, were filled up. A full staff of able and
acceptable regulars for the chief places, competent
to administer an army of two hundred thousand men,
was detailed and promptly reported to me at Camp
Thomas, Chickamauga Park. They were Lieutenant
Colonel Tasker H. Bliss, of the regular artillery,
Lieutenant Colonel Wilber E. Wilder, of the cav-
alry; Lieutenant Colonel Avery D. Andrews, lately
of the artillery; Lieutenant Colonel John Biddle and
Major Clement A. F. Flagler, of the engineers ; Lieu-
tenant Colonel Henry D. Borup, of the ordnance;
Lieutenant Colonel Eeber, of the signal corps; Ma-
jor Eli D. Hoyle and Captain Arthur Murray, of
the artillery, and Captain Helmick, of the infantry.
Later Colonels McClernand, Dorst, Greble, Craig,
and Cecil, all regular officers of the highest char-
acter and great experience, came to me in turn.
417
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
From civil life came Colonels Hull and Hill, Ma-
jors Carlton, Vernadoe, Parkhill, and McMichael;
Captains Allison, Breckenridge, Hewitt, and La-
trobe ; and Lieutenants Black, Fullington, and Titus,
each of whom showed himself steady, honest, patri-
otic, and faithful to the duties which fell to his lot.
But with all this array of experience, talent, and
ambition not a single regiment or battery was ever
assigned to the Sixth Corps. While I never made
inquiry or asked for an explanation, I have always
felt that the failure to fill up the Sixth Corps was
very unfair to me and was due to political pull or
influence or possibly to Alger's hostility which might
have worked as much disadvantage to the country
as to myself had the war been mainly on the land
or seriously protracted on either land or sea. As it
turned out, the Spaniards were as unready as we
were and no ill effects can rightly be ascribed to
our War Department's partiality and favoritism
whatever may have been their origin.
There was a good deal of comment, however, dur-
ing the entire war amongst the West Pointers and
other observant men on the fact that both the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of War as well as the Gen-
eral-in-Chief, the Adjutant General, and all the gen-
erals commanding expeditions were civilians or offi-
cers appointed to the regular army from civil life
or from the volunteers. The President, the Secre-
tary of War, Generals Miles, Corbin, Shafter,
Chaffee, Young, Lawton, Brooke, Coppinger, Wade,
and Bates, as well as Colonels Eoosevelt and Wood,
belonged to this class. With the exception of Lee
and myself, no West Pointer had corps rank and
none received the command of an independent ex-
418
THE SPANISH WAR
pedition. It all looks as if it was the deliberate
purpose to prefer the volunteers and to turn down
West Pointers. Inasmuch as I was the only sur-
viving general of the Civil War still below the re-
tiring age, who had commanded an army in inde-
pendent operations, and was besides the only one
of any grade who had accompanied a great mili-
tary expedition by sea to its objective base of oper-
ations, my friends thought it strange that I should
not have been assigned to chief command in the
Cuban or Porto Eican operations. General G. M.
Dodge of the Sixteenth Army Corps in the Civil
War had been offered and declined the rank of ma-
jor general in the Spanish War, but took the liberty
of telling the President that he had only one officer
of high rank fitted by experience and character for
the command of an independent expedition, or army,
and that officer was General Wilson. This was with-
out my knowledge or connivance and did not become
known to me till long after the confusion and mis-
management attending the embarkation and disem-
barkation of the expedition to Santiago had become
a military scandal. Later when charged with the
transfer of a part of the First Division by ship to
Porto Eico, I made requisition for the proper flat-
bottomed scows and motor boats to disembark my
command promptly and expeditiously, but my requi-
sitions were quietly ignored, and the expedition was
sent to an unknown coast with nothing but the ship 's
yawls or row boats to land the troops. It is need-
less to add that the landing would have been greatly
delayed if not rendered impossible had the enemy
been strong and determined enough to make a stand
at Ponce.
419
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
It is just such ignorance and neglect that bring
our War Department into discredit, subject our
commanders to criticism and contempt and endan-
ger the success of their operations. It is safe to
add that all the confusion and delay in landing and
most of the exposure and sickness of the Santiago
expedition, ending in the scandalous round robin
and the withdrawal of the Fifth Corps from Cuba
as unable to keep the field with less than thirty days '
campaign duty to its credit, were due to the igno-
rance and inexperience of its leading officers. It is
inconceivable that an invading army composed of
good volunteers properly commanded, should have
been reduced in so short a time to the helpless con-
dition set forth in the round robin. It is inconceiv-
able that it could not have continued indefinitely in
the field in spite of its sick and wounded, had proper
provision been made or proper measures taken by
officers of experience to provide for its health, sub-
sistence, and transportation. When we recall that
an Anglo-American expedition made up mostly of
colonial militia carried by sailing ships, captured
and held Havana for over six months in 1762, it will
be difficult to understand how an army of the pres-
ent time transported rapidly and comfortably to
destination by steamer could have been placed hors
du combat by a few weeks' service about Santiago
in 1898. Who the author of the round robin was is
not definitely known, though I am sure it could not
have been drawn up by an officer of experience nor
signed by those who did sign it had they been free
from panic and demoralization.
But it is not my purpose to give an outline, much
less a detailed history of the Spanish War, the for-
420
THE SPANISH WAR
tunate ending of which was due more to the unreadi-
ness and inefficiency of the Spanish army and navy,
than to the superior organization and management
of our own. While our navy was then as always,
from the date of its earliest existence, a well-
trained and efficient organization in which both rank
and file were regulars with no volunteers amongst
them, it was fully abreast, ship for ship, gun for gun,
and man for man, with the best navy of the times,
success at Manila was generally regarded by other
nations as a "scratch," but when Sampson's fleet
destroyed the Spanish fleet coming out of Santiago
Harbor, it is safe to say that a cold chill went down
the back of every naval power in the world. Al-
though our English cousins professed to rejoice with
us, there is good reason for saying that they were
particularly skeptical in reference to American gun-
ners and gunnery. Captain Paget, naval attache at
my headquarters, in discussing the naval victory off
Santiago at my mess table, was indiscreet enough to
attribute our success to the statement that we had
got all of our best gunners from the English navy.
This was so far from the truth as well as so lack-
ing in politeness that I replied, possibly with some
heat: "I suppose you will say that the capture of
the Serapis by the Bon Homme Richard, the Guer-
riere by the Constitution, Macdonough's victory of
Lake Champlain, and Perry's victory of Lake Erie
were also due to the same cause?"
Whatever may have been the merits of this retort
it silenced the captain and was evidently regarded
by other naval guests as disposing of the claim, that
our recent naval victories were due in any degree
to English gunners.
421
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
But to return to my personal narrative. Having
been for a second time appointed a major general of
volunteers on May 4, 1898, I took post two weeks
later at Camp Thomas, Chickamauga Park, with my
able staff of regulars and volunteers, for the pur-
pose of organizing and commanding the Sixth Army
Corps in pursuance of my assignment. I selected
an advantageous camp on the old battlefield of
Chickamauga and at once put the regular officers to
teaching the volunteers the practices and duties of
military life. They were an able and brilliant lot
who made enthusiastic and rapid progress in learn-
ing their new duties. Having named Lieutenant
Colonel Tasker H. Bliss, United States Volunteers,
of the regular artillery, an officer of rare ability and
learning, as chief-of-staff, the task and responsibil-
ity of getting its members into working order rested
mainly on him, though the technical instruction of
those from civil life fell mostly upon Lieutenant
Colonel Biddle and his able assistant, Major Flagler
of the Engineer Corps. They opened at once a staff
school for the purpose of giving systematic instruc-
tion, and by earnest devotion to the students soon re-
ported them as nearly ready for field service as they
could be without the practical experience of actual
war. With all branches of service and administra-
tion thoroughly provided for, it would have been a
great pleasure to organize my share of the raw vol-
unteers, which the President had called out, into an
efficient army corps, but, as previously explained,
no troops were ever assigned to the Sixth Corps.
Its only existence was on paper.
But neither I nor my officers were willing to re-
main idle and, therefore, we offered ourselves to
422
THE SPANISH WAR
General Brooke commanding the camp as well as
the First Army Corps, for the command and instruc-
tion of his First Division. This he cheerfully ac-
cepted, and from that day till the end of the war we
were fully employed. The Division was composed
of excellent officers and men mostly from the Na-
tional Guard, who threw themselves heartily into
the task of transforming it as nearly as possible into
a division of regulars. The camp was beautiful and
abundantly supplied with excellent water from
Crawfish Springs, the drills and exercises were fully
within the capacity of men and officers, and the
work at hand went on with as much regularity and
as much to my satisfaction as it could have done
had I devoted my whole life to the army instead of
leaving it nearly a third of a century before. Such
is the force of systematic military education and ex-
perience, and so different are the occupations and
habits of civil life, that it seemed to me as though
I had merely returned from a short leave of absence
and was resuming my daily routine just where I left
off many years before. One of my regular staff re-
marked that in this respect I had apparently for-
gotten nothing but had learned much while in civil
life.
423
XIII
CAMP THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA
Volunteered to command First Division, First Army Corps
Santiago Campaign Ordered to Porto Rico by the
way of Charleston Waiting for transports Hospi-
tality of Charleston.
While the bustle and excitement of the Spanish
War in its opening days centered around Tampa
and the force gathering there under Shafter, the
Administration's favorite commander, chosen doubt-
less because lie was of Michigan antecedents by a
Michigan secretary of war, the life at Camp Thom-
as was by no means a quiet one. It had been the
intention of the Government to make it the camp
of instruction for three army corps, the First,
Third, and Sixth, or in all about one hundred thou-
sand men under Brooke, Wade, and myself. As it
turned out, this intention was partly realized only
in respect to the First and Third Corps, and as my
lot was soon cast in with the First, I became ab-
sorbed in its work and history. After Brooke was
named governor general of Porto Rico I succeeded
Breckenridge in the command of the First Corps
and my story henceforth is rather of what might
have been than of the important events which ac-
tually took place.
424
CAMP THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA
Brooke, whom I had met casually in the Army of
the Potomac many years before, was a handsome
man of fine figure, great dignity and impressive
carriage. Having won his way by hard fighting and
exemplary conduct from the command of a regiment
of Pennsylvania volunteers to the command of a
fine division, he was appointed to the regular army
at the close of the war, and had risen to high rank
and command not only by seniority but by excellent
service and behavior. No finer specimen of a sea-
soned veteran could be found in ours or in any other
service. He was an officer of correct habits, unim-
paired powers, and deliberate judgment, but made
no claim to unusual ability and still less to military
genius. He was a general of real modesty but,
withal, an excellent disciplinarian who not only re-
quired obedience to his own orders but gave prompt
and unquestioning obedience to those in authority
over him. He was, besides, fully able with proper
instructions from those above to perform all the
duties of any command to which he might be as-
signed either in the field or in the cabinet. In short,
he was the superior in rank and in every other re-
spect, unless I except the knowledge of medicine and
surgery, to either the officer who received prece-
dence over him then, or to the one who superseded
him later in Cuba.
It was a pleasure to serve under and to assist
such an officer, and had the Government appreci-
ated his character and quality at their real value, or
taken him into its confidence in respect to its plans
and policies, there can be no doubt that he would
have carried out his orders to the letter without
giving the slightest cause for criticism or complaint.
425
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
It will be remembered that lie was the first governor
general of Porto Eico after it passed under our con-
trol, and was transferred soon after the Treaty of
Peace with Spain to the same position in the island
of Cuba. At the end of a year's loyal, if not bril-
liant service, he was relieved of his high office by
an officer who had won favor in "Washington of
the President and other high officials. This offi-
cer had within the short space of two years been
raised from the humble rank of captain in the
Medical Corps, through that of colonel and briga-
dier, to major general and governor general of
Cuba, not only over the head of Brooke and all
the other corps and division commanders, but over
the heads of some six hundred other regular offi-
cers, his seniors in service, rank, and military merit.
It was a most remarkable case of favoritism which
could not have occurred in any other country ex-
cept in case of revolution. Brooke bore the humilia-
tion without a word of official remonstrance, but
his closest friends know that he felt the injustice
like a blow in the face.
As long as I remained under the immediate com-
mand of General Brooke, it was my custom to pay
my respects with my staff in uniform, fully mounted
and accompanied by our orderlies, every afternoon
between four and five o 'clock for the purpose of con-
ferring with him and receiving his orders for the
next day. I am surely within bounds when I add
that he looked forward to my daily visit with as
much pleasure and satisfaction as I did. At all
events, our service at Camp Thomas was the begin-
ning of a friendship which has lasted to the present
time without a cloud, and I am sure will continue
426
CAMP THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA
unbroken to the end. Happy is the country that is
served by such officers as Brooke in its high places
of power and responsibility. A true and loyal sol-
dier without fear and without reproach, sound,
healthy, and capable, he discharged the duties of his
high position efficiently and well, and when it is con-
sidered that he had^ received no special instructions
from the Government, and had no intimation of its
policy if it had one, the student of history will find
it difficult to account for his relief from command
in Cuba by a junior who had had but little experi-
ence except as a subordinate department commander
in that military division.
Of course, the principal interest in our camp at
Chickamauga Park was the force gathering at
Tampa. While its destination was unknown outside
of the Washington authorities, the common supposi-
tion was that it was for the invasion of Cuba, and
all the principal officers were anxious to join it. This
kept us more or less in a state of change and excite-
ment. Leading generals, with us one day, would be
gone the next. First Wheeler, the ex-Confederate
anxious to rehabilitate himself as a loyal officer, and
then Lawton, the veteran frontiersman who needed
no rehabilitation, but merely a chance to show what
he could do as a leader of men. None wanted work
in a camp of instruction, but all were looking for a
chance in the field. Ernst, the courtly and dignified
superintendent from West Point, Sanger, the dis-
tinguished artillerist and brigadier general of vol-
unteers, still sound and ambitious, Grant, long out
of service, but now wearing his stars in recognition
of his great father, were all hard at work, each hop-
ing that he might be called to the front, and some
427
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
perhaps leaving no stone unturned to secure that
honor without delay.
In the midst of the anxiety, I devoted myself con-
stantly to getting the First Division " ready to the
last linchpin," and for my success in that received
Brooke's hearty and affectionate thanks and com-
mendation. After a creditable review on June 12,
he said : * * You are most helpful to me. I never give
the First Division a thought." But it soon became
certain that there was anxiety in Washington if not
In our camps. The inside history of the embarkation
at Tampa was coming to us ; we heard that there was
much confusion amongst both officers and men, but
in view of the fact that not one of them had ever
been connected with such an expedition, or had
had the slightest experience in that direction, I
thought it but natural. Not so with others. Colonel,
afterward Major General Weston, deputy commis-
sary general, who was on the ground, outfitting the
expedition with food supplies, seeing the confusion
and lack of system and remembering his service with
me during the closing year of the Civil War, blurted
out to Miles, the general-in-chief : ' i If you want to
get things straightened out here you had better send
for Wilson and put him in charge. He has had ex-
perience."
What impression this remark produced is a mat-
ter of conjecture, but a few days later orders came to
Brooke to send me with fifteen thousand men to
Tampa as soon as practicable. The first expedition
had sailed and all the transports were in use. It
was, therefore, certain that we could not embark till
they returned, but my division was ready and anx-
ious. Not so the authorities. Indeed, they seemed
428
CAMP THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA
uncertain as to the course to be pursued, and kept
us waiting in camp for ten days. Meanwhile Shaf-
ter's expedition had landed at Daiquiri in a still
greater state of confusion if possible than when it
embarked. Fortunately for the country, however,
it was composed mostly of well-trained regulars, ac-
cording to all accounts the finest body of men the
country had ever assembled, amounting, all told, to
about fifteen thousand. It had a few regiments of
volunteers and two battalions of so-called Bough
Eiders without horses. The landing was made on
an open deep-water beach, and but for the presence
of the navy and its small boats would have been
seriously delayed, especially if the enemy had made
an effective resistance. There were no roads, and
this, added to the fact that the commanding general
was unfit by excessive obesity for active service, not
only delayed the advance but gave it a haphazard
character far from reassuring.
It will be recalled that shortly after the landing
at Daiquiri and the affairs at Las Guasimas and El
Caney, Shafter's main body, under the immediate
command of Kent, Hawkins, and Sumner, crossed
the San Juan Creek and assaulted and captured the
enemy's entrenchments crowning San Juan Heights
and covering the city of Santiago. With victory ap-
parently in his grasp, Shafter, losing confidence, if
not courage, telegraphed the Secretary of War on
July 3, 1898, much to the surprise of all, that he was
. . . "seriously considering withdrawing .;.''*<
about five miles and taking up a new position on the
high ground between San Juan Eiver and Siboney." 1
In order that this startling proposition, com-
1 Report of War Department, 1898, Vol. I, part 2, p. 17.
429
UNDEE THE OLD FLAG
ing so closely upon a notable success, and followed
as it was the next day by a hurry call for fifteen
thousand more troops, 1 may be clearly understood,
it should be stated that Shaf ter himself had not seen
nor directed any part of the assault and knew noth-
ing whatever from personal observation as to the
character and value of the position his forces had
carried, for the simple reason that his disability was
so great that he could neither mount his horse nor
go afoot. He had managed to reach El Poso two
miles short of and across the valley from the en-
emy's line of defense, but in so doing had so
abraded his abdomen that he was suffering much
pain therefrom and not only compelled to confine
himself to his tent but to depend entirely upon
others for his information, if not for his inspiration.
To add to the confusion, it now appears that
both Wood, the colonel, and Eoosevelt, the lieuten-
ant colonel of the Bough Eiders, were more
active, at least with the reporters, and it was
this activity that afterward brought them the great-
est fame and the highest reward, although it is now
known that they took no leading part and rendered
no important service whatever in the actual capture
of the entrenchments crowning San Juan Heights.
It is also certain that they directed their efforts,
such as they were, solely against Kettle Hill, which
a personal inspection of the ground and an exam-
ination of all maps showed to be an outlying, un-
fortified, and practically undefended knob some sev-
enty or eighty feet high, and fully a half mile to
the left front of San Juan Hill and its principal en-
1 Report of the War Department, 1898, Vol. I, part 2, p. 18, Shaf-
ter to Adjutant General, July 4, 1897.
430
CAMP THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA
trenchments, from which it is separated by a swamp
that could not be crossed and was not flanked till
after the enemy beyond had ceased firing and with-
drawn from his main defenses.
It was upon the judgment of such officers as these
that the fortunes of the United States depended in
this campaign. The ranking general had never
commanded during his whole life in an important
action, and could not direct in this one, because of
physical disabilities of a kind which the War De-
partment should have fully understood. Neither
Wood nor Eoosevelt had ever before seen, much less
taken part in a real battle. To make matters worse
Young, afterward made lieutenant general without
additional service, was too sick to leave the landing
in rear, and Wheeler, although present with the
troops at the front, was physically disqualified for
active service, while Lawton and Chaff ee were neu-
tralized in a roundabout march from El Poso to El
Caney and back to the main army.
No message of any sort had reached the War De-
partment from Shafter for over twenty-four hours,
but the air was filled with " foreboding rumors. "
Previous dispatches had announced that Shafter
and Wheeler, the second in command, and Young,
were sick or disqualified for duty, and finally that
yellow fever had appeared among the troops. The
President and his secretaries were up nearly all
night waiting with intense anxiety for tidings, and
when Sunday morning opened with no bulletins from
the army, the anxiety had spread to the whole coun-
try and the situation was justly regarded as one of
extraordinary gravity. 1
1<<r The Spanish American War," by R. A. Alger, secretary of
war, &c., Harper & Brothers, pp. 172 et seq.
431
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Under these alarming circumstances with the
possibility of a national disaster staring them in the
face, it is not strange that the Secretary of War in
consequence of Shafter's proposed retirement and
in compliance with his call the next day for reen-
forcements, should have telegraphed Brooke, com-
manding the principal camp of instruction, as he did,
to send me with fifteen thousand men as soon as pos-
sible to reenforce the army in front of Santiago. As
I recall it, this order must have reached Brooke be-
fore midnight and me early on the morning of July
4. Of course, it was gladly received and, fortu-
nately, my division had been ready for ten days to
entrain as soon as cars could be got for it. Early
the same morning Brooke called at my camp, and
after we had discussed the situation and settled the
plans for a rapid movement to Charleston, where
the transports were to meet us, he expressed a sol-
dier's regret that he could hot go also. Eealizing
that if reinforcements were really required at San-
tiago, we should send all the troops we had ready
and thus make sure of the result, and in full sym-
pathy with Brooke's desire to go with them, I sug-
gested that he should notify the War Department
that he was ready to follow with the balance of
the First Army Corps as rapidly as transportation
could be furnished.
But to this the General replied: "The rest of
the corps is not ready and I cannot get it ready in
time."
"Oh yes, you can; there are over thirty thousand
men fully armed and equipped in this camp, and you
can follow with them all as soon as I get out of the
with my Division. ' '
432
CAMP THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA
"No, that's impossible without breaking into
Wade's corps and transferring his best troops to
my immediate command."
"Well, why should you not do that? You are in
command of this camp, and know better than any one
in Washington what its resources are. As the senior
officer you are fully entitled to go with them, if you
think it best for the country's interests."
"Why, General, you talk as though you would
take everything Wade has, including his overcoat,
as well as his troops and transportation. ' '
To this I replied : "I certainly would if I thought
the country would be benefited by it, ' ' and as Wade
was present listening with deep interest, I added:
"Wade would be just the man not only to approve
it, but to offer to go himself in command of a divi-
sion if permitted to do so."
Thereupon, Wade, who had sat silent, spoke up,
like the true soldier he was, expressing his hearty
approval of what I had said, and offering to do all
in his power to carry it into effect at the earliest
possible moment. With this they took their depar-
ture together, Brooke looking much happier than
when he arrived at my headquarters.
Just what further action Brooke took in the
premises I never knew, but I have always assumed
that he presented the whole case, exactly as it stood,
loyally and promptly to the War Department. At
all events, that is what I expected of him, and I am
glad to add that he was shortly ordered with an-
other part of his command to Porto Rico. But, for-
tunately for the country, Shafter, meanwhile, in-
stead of withdrawing from his advanced position,
permitted Colonel McClernand, his adjutant general,
433
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
in response to the earnest request of that officer,
to frame and send a letter to the Spanish comman-
der demanding his surrender, and although he did
this in language not as direct or as confident as
he might well have used, it was sufficient to change
the situation radically. It was followed by further
correspondence which led to the immediate with-
drawal of the foreigners from the city, to the main-
tenance of the army's advanced position and of
Shafter 's prestige, and finally, as one of our major
generals afterward wittily remarked, to the surren-
der of Santiago, "when ToraPs sand gave out."
While this sequence of events made it evident in
due time that my reinforcements would not be re-
quired, there can be but little doubt that the credit
of the demand for surrender was due mostly to Col-
onel McClernand rather than to General Shafter,
who discouraged it at first and yielded only on the
urgent representation that it could do no harm but
might do much good. As it frequently turns out in
military life, the demand was a fortunate one, for
it found the Spanish commander worse demoralized
by his own situation and by the destruction of the
Spanish fleet than Shafter was by the difficulties
which confronted him and his army.
Without dwelling further on the Santiago cam-
paign and its fortunate termination, I may say that
in pursuance of the first orders received, my Divi-
sion was transported rapidly by regiment and bri-
gade through Chattanooga and Atlanta to Charles-
ton, but as it found no transports on its arrival at
the seaport, it was obliged to go into camp, where it
remained for two weeks. While waiting, regular
instruction, drills, and reviews were resumed, and
434
CAMP THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA
everything practicable was done to interest, if not
to please, the people of the city. Eigid discipline
was maintained, due respect was shown to the local
authorities, open-air concerts were given by the
bands, the national colors were displayed on every
occasion and every respect, including standing at
attention with bared heads, was shown by the officers
present when the "Star Spangled Banner " was
played. But the people were slow to respond. They
had been rebels in the days of the Civil War, and
seemed to be disposed to look upon both officers and
men not only as Northerners but as hirelings of a
hated Government. All the white people, including
the ladies, held themselves aloof till the federal
judge, a gallant one-armed ex-Confederate, and a
leading newspaper, recognized and extended to us
the right hand of fellowship. Fortunately, a few of
our officers were acquainted with some of the lead-
ing "ladies, upon whom they called, and to whom
later they introduced their friends. By a few well-
directed civilities the ice was broken and in a short
time the principal houses were open and extending
their hospitality to our officers. Finding that'
there was not a single man in the command ex-
cept myself and General Ernst who had ever borne
arms against the South, the frigid atmosphere
warmed and friendly relations were soon estab-
lished. Balls were given by us as well as by the citi-
zens, which were followed by breakfasts, teas, and
dinners exactly as though no estrangement had ever
existed. It was an interesting coincidence that I had
been present with our army on James Island just
across the bay, and had participated in the battle of
Secessionville, fought within sight of Battery Point,
435
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the chief promenade of the town, during the first
year of the Civil War. As far as I know this was
not laid up against me, for I was treated by every
one as an honored guest, if not as a cherished per-
sonal friend. The two weeks of our occupation of
Charleston were really the only period in the his-
tory of the town when a United States force strong
enough to hold it, was concentrated within its bor-
ders. It was a pleasant episode and one which, no
doubt, did much to break down prejudice and rees-
tablish friendly relations between that city and the
rest of the United States. I have always regarded
my stay at that place as one of my happiest experi-
ences, and the friendships contracted there amongst
the pleasantest and most durable of my life.
There was only one episode connected with the
matter of transportation and its supply worthy of
record. Immediately after arriving at Charleston
and finding that no ships were in port to conve^ us
to our destination, Judge Brawley, of the United
States admiralty court, told me that the tramp
steamer Rita, trying to run the Cuban blockade, had
been captured, brought in, and condemned as a prize,
and with proper authority and security he would
turn her over to me. I at once had her inspected by
Colonel Biddle, chief engineer, and Major Wood-
bury, chief surgeon, and on their report that she
was sound and seaworthy and could be furnished,
coaled, and got ready to sail with a regiment of sol-
diers within forty-eight hours, I asked and obtained
orders from the War Department to use her as a
troop ship. Although she was almost immediately
taken out of my control for twenty-four hours by the
general-in-chief, who was also under orders for Cuba
436
CAMP THOMAS, CHICKAMAUGA
or Porto Eico, my officers actually outfitted and dis-
patched her with eight full companies of another
command for Santiago within two days. It is pleas-
ant to add that she reached her destination in safety
after rather a long voyage of six days. The readi-
ness with which this steamer was dispatched grew
out of my experience at Port Royal farther down
the South Carolina coast the first year of the Civil
War, and its success was not only gratifying to me
but was most creditable to the officers who prepared
and dispatched her for sea with such unusual ex-
pedition. In connection with our delay the incident
served besides to emphasize the fact that a nation
should not engage in a war beyond sea without an
ample fleet of suitable transports and a body of
trained officers to outfit, supply, load, and dispatch
them in an orderly and systematic manner. It is not
a simple branch of military service in which the in-
experienced volunteer is likely to excel.
Another incident of less importance but far more
amusing took place a few days later. After the good
people of Charleston had got used to our presence
and began to entertain us, my staff arranged for a
return ball. I was holding a conference on the front
piazza of the hotel with General Ernst, a most digni-
fied and serious officer, commanding my first brigade.
It was after dark and the hotel was filled with wives
and daughters who had come to bid us good-by and
to see us embark. Eumors had already begun to
circulate that our destination would be changed and
that we should be sent on some perilous expedition
against the public enemy. Everybody was eager to
know what was going on, and everybody kept us
under close and anxious surveillance. It was now
437
TINDER THE OLD FLAG
the middle of July, and in that latitude it was nat-
urally hot and sultry. It was before the days of
khaki, and both officers and soldiers were badly clad
for the weather and still worse for the season in the
tropics. Under these conditions Ernst and I were
seated apart in the coolest spot we could find. We
were supposed to be engaged in a " council of war,"
and were unconscious that we were under observa-
tion. The ladies thought surely that orders had
come at last, that there would soon be bleeding
hearts and parting in hot haste, and that all the dis-
tressing details would probably be arranged and
made known by morning. The anxiety and suspense
were at the highest when I broke the spell by bring-
ing my hand down with a sharp slap, saying aloud :
"Well, Ernst, that settles it! You can wear regula-
tion uniform if you like, but I am going to wear
white to the ball to-morrow night."
The glad news spread rapidly, and the anxious
crowd on the piazza -soon thinned out, but I did not
know, till a bright girl told me the next day, how
great the anxiety or how perfect the relief had been.
And it is frequently this way in war time. Neither
the gravest men nor those charged with the heaviest
responsibility are always pursing their brows or
turning over in their minds the weighty affairs of a
coming campaign.
While we were waiting for transports, and would
have continued to wait impatiently, however grave
the emergency, our destination was changed from
Santiago, the early surrender of which had now
become certain, to Porto Eico, the next most popu-
lous and most important Spanish island east of
Cuba.
438
XIV
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
Sail for Island Land at Ponce Miles in chief command
Advance to Juana Diaz Capture of Coamo and its
garrison Rumors of peace Armistice End of the
"War Civil Administration Address planters at El
Paraiso Relieved from duty Return to the States.
General Toral and the Spanish forces defending
Santiago surrendered July 14, 1898, but the Peace
of Paris, which ended the war and defined the rela-
tions of the parties thereto, was not concluded till
several months later. Meanwhile, hostilities con-
tinued in a somewhat languid way. Spain was sup-
posed to have other cruisers besides those destroyed
or captured at Manila and Santiago, and there was
still some ground for the fear that they would keep
the sea, especially against our commerce, and might
even make a descent on exposed points of our long
and undefended seacoast. In face of this possibility
we sailed from Charleston at 7 P. M. on July 20, 1898,
with Ernst's brigade, First Division, First Army
Corps, embarked on the transports Obdam, La
Grande Duchesse, and the Mobile, for Porto Eico,
but entirely without naval escort or protection of
any kind. Fortunately, the weather was fine and the
sea smooth, so that we arrived at our destination off
439
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the east end of the island abreast of Fajardo on the
morning of the 26th. One of our ships had met with
an accident to its condensers, and one was slower
than represented, but the whole fleet was well in
hand when we met the United States cruiser Colum-
bia, just east of the island with an order from Gen-
eral Miles to join him without delay at Guanica, a
small landlocked harbor near the southwestern end
of the island. A beautiful sail in sight of land all
day brought us to our anchorage shortly after dark.
Early the next morning we entered the harbor and
reported to General Miles, whom we found there
with one brigade, but the little bay was utterly out
of the way and the roads entirely inadequate for ef-
fective operations in any direction. Accordingly,
Miles changed his plans and decided to disembark
sixteen miles farther east at Ponce, the second city
of the island, connected with San Juan on the north
coast by a broad macadamized highway, said to be
at that time the best road in the West Indies.
The harbor of Guanica which we had entered
head on, although sufficiently deep, was almost land-
locked and so crowded with transports that our
steamer could not turn about in it. This made it
necessary for us to back out for over a mile through
a narrow crooked channel, but the maneuver, al-
though hitherto unheard of for a long, ocean-going
steamer, was successfully managed by the captain,
who was a bold and skillful navigator. Had the
weather been rough this fortunate result could not
have been attained, and our withdrawal as well as
our further movements would have been correspon-
dingly delayed. But fortune favored us. "We found
that Ponce had been abandoned early that morning
440
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
and was already occupied by a small detachment of
marines from our blockading ships. My whole com-
mand was at hand, but as the beach, or playa, two
miles in front of the city, was shallow and shelving
for a half mile out, and my requisitions for flats and
motor boats had not been filled, the landing of our
animals and supplies was a long and tedious opera-
tion. Had our movement into the interior depended
upon a prompt advance after our first appearance,
it would have been seriously endangered by the fail-
ure of the War Department to fill my requisitions,
and by its generally inadequate preparation to meet
perfectly well-known conditions. With our trans-
ports anchored more than a half mile from the
shore, with no wharf or landing facilities, it would
have been impossible to disembark the transporta-
tion and supplies of the command without the as-
sistance rendered by the navy, and especially by
Captain Higginson, of the battleship Massachusetts.
The troops got ashore that day, but with all we could
do our impedimenta were seriously delayed and our
preparations to advance were not complete for fully
a week longer than would otherwise have been neces-
sary.
As the enemy had withdrawn toward the interior
and made no sort of effort to resist or embarrass us,
I had ample time in which to restore order, establish
a military administration and reconnoiter the coun-
try along the great highway toward Coamo. Not-
withstanding the improvements in infantry firearms,
my command had been supplied with Springfield
rifles and cartridges of black powder on the theory
of the Ordnance Department that these would be
good enough for fighting the Spaniards, but under
441
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
my earnest protest the new standard rifle, of which
a supply was on hand in the States, was furnished
and issued to the command on the third day of Au-
gust on foreign soil only four days before we began
our forward movement. With any men less intelli-
gent than the American soldier this might have been
a costly if not a fatal change, but the volunteers
readily adapted themselves to the new rifle and used
it in their first and only action with great effect.
The authorities and people of Ponce received us
with an enthusiastic welcome. They were heartily
tired of Spanish domination and quite ready to give
us every help in their power. Under the guidance
of young and patriotic citizens my engineers soon
had a perfect understanding of the surrounding
country to the vicinity of the stronghold at Aibo-
nito, thirty miles from Ponce on the military road
near the summit of the main divide between the
north and south sides of the island. It is a bold and
rapidly rising region broken by brooks and rivers
which are insignificant in the dry season but become
raging torrents, many of them deep enough to float
a first-class battleship, in the rainy season.
The enemy had abandoned all the near-by coun-
try and posted his advanced detachment at Coamo,
a small and beautiful town in the coffee region some
twenty miles inland on the main road near the junc-
tion of the Coamo and Cuyon Eivers. It is a com-
manding site of great natural strength where one
determined soldier might well defy a hundred. But,
fortunately, the broken country about it was heavily
timbered and the position was found to be easily
approached and turned.
Miles, the general-in-chief, joined me ashore
442
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
shortly after I had landed and, escorted by the fire-
men of the city with a military band playing one of
Sousa's marches, we drove to the City Hall, where
we held a reception and received the heartiest as-
surance of welcome. At the conclusion of that cere-
mony, Miles appointed me military governor of the
city and district and then returned on board to look
after the scattered force of twelve or fourteen thou-
sand men which constituted his invading army. He
had landed two brigades at Guanica, sending one
around the island to the left toward Mayaguez, one
to join me at Ponce, and two further to the east
under the immediate command of General Brooke,
while my column of only one brigade of infantry
with two regular batteries and a troop of New York
cavalry had the main and only practicable road to
the capital of the island, which would naturally be-
come our main objective as well as the enemy's final
stronghold. It requires no knowledge of strategy
to show the reader that this disposition of the in-
vading force, while well calculated to confuse the
Spaniards, made it almost impossible to synchronize
and coordinate our own movements. My advance was
pushed out to Juana Diaz, ten miles from Ponce,
soon after landing, but my main column did not be-
gin its advance till August 8. Miles followed me to
the front and, after approving my plan to turn
Coamo with a strong regiment and if possible shut
up and capture its garrison, he left me to look after
his other columns, remarking as he took his leave
that he wished he could depend upon me "not to go
too fast." Eegarding this as a mild though some-
what complimentary criticism, I replied at once:
"You are commanding general in the island, and if
44,3
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
you are not willing to trust my discretion, you have
only to give your specific orders and they will be
literally obeyed. " To this he gave a reassuring re-
ply, and then rode back to Ponce.
Accordingly, with a thorough understanding of
the country and the problem before us, I moved for-
ward from Juana Diaz to within three miles of
Coamo. I sent Colonel Hulings with the Sixteenth
Pennsylvania Volunteers under the guidance of
Colonel Biddle by a night march through the cross
trails and valleys and over the divide into position
behind the enemy, while Ernst with the rest 'of his
brigade supported by the batteries with his right
covered by Clayton's troop of New York cavalry,
guided by Major Flagler, advanced by the right of
the highway directly against the town. These move-
ments were so timed as to bring the main force
against the left and front of the Spaniards shortly
after daylight, but also after the turning column
had reached its designated position in rear. Al-
though the indistinct trails and the shades of night
made the movement through the tropical forest
somewhat slower than it should have been, the com-
bination was entirely successful and by eight o'clock
in the morning the narrow valley both above and be-
low the town, and the surrounding heights, were
reverberating with the field artillery and the tearing
rattle of our Krag-Jorgensens. An outlying block-
house on the road to Los Banos held by the enemy's
pickets, was set afire by our shells and the whole*
beautiful landscape was soon covered by the smoke
and made horrid by the noise and confusion of bat-
tle. But our plans were well laid and although not
a man of the command except Lancaster, the chief
444
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
of artillery, Ernst, and myself had ever seen
a gun fired in anger or a man killed in
war, every officer and soldier did his duty ac-
cording to the part assigned him, as fully and satis-
factorily as if he had been a seasoned veteran of
many campaigns.
The Spaniards made a bold stand, and from their
serried and well-formed ranks, poured volley after
volley upon our converging columns, and especially
upon Hulings and his Pennsylvanians in the rear.
But they were evidently taken by surprise, though
not in their beds. Our soldiers were closing in upon
them from all sides as well as from the rear, and
there was nothing left for them but to fly or to lay
down their arms and surrender. They did both. The
teamsters, clerks, and invalids to the number of
seventy or eighty starting at the first alarm by the
highway to the interior got off in the con-
fusion, but the bulk of the fighting force five
officers and one hundred and sixty-two men were
made prisoners. The gallant Spanish colonel
and four men were killed, while between thirty and
forty were wounded. The Spanish firing was unusu-
ally wild, for not one of our men was killed and
only six wounded.
The cavalry which struck the highway east of the
town, pushed promptly along the great road to pre-
vent the enemy from blowing up the bridges and cul-
verts, while the infantry and artillery followed
closely in support. One single-span bridge across
the Coamo had been destroyed before we reached
the town, but the pursuit was so prompt and rapid
that all beyond it were saved, although the enemy
had exploded a mine, blowing a hole in the arch of
445
TJNDEB THE OLD FLAG
one bridge, and with his ample preparations would
have treated others in the same way, if his main
force had not been captured.
That portion of the enemy which escaped lost
no time in getting back to the stronghold of Aibo-
nito, some five miles beyond Coamo, but this was a
place near the top of the mountains, not only so
strong of itself but so covered by fortifications and
guns on the craglike and lofty ridges of El Penon
and Asomanti, that it was impossible to reach them
by a front approach. .The intervening country, al-
though as beautiful as the Vale of Cashmir, was so
broken and tumbled into ravines and impassable
ridges that regular operations through it were im-
practicable. The only road that could be traveled
through the region is the beautiful highway which,
twisting through crooked valleys, doubling around
sharp promontories, skirting the base of overhang-
ing cliffs, and hugging the sides of the precipitous
slopes, all the time rising rapidly to their summits,
was swept at its most favorable reaches by the en-
filading, plunging, and cross fire of the batteries
above.
A personal reconnoissance with the aid of my
enterprising engineer officers under the cover of the
mountains to heights from which the whole scene
could be taken in, convinced me that afternoon that
the enemy's position on the summits beyond was im-
pregnable by direct attack. Before nightfall it be-
came apparent that our progress would have to be
suspended till we could work out a route through the
trails and ravines and up the mountain sides, by
which we could repeat the operation at Coamo and
again turn the enemy out of his commanding posi-
446
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
tion. Experience was our only safe guide and, for-
tunately, we had plenty of that.
Accordingly, the command was ordered into
bivouac by the side of a mountain stream flowing
with crystal water, amidst mountain air which was
filled with balm and pleasant odors. We had been
taught that great rainstorms and tropical cloud-
bursts followed by raging floods might drive us to
the tops of the ridges, hence our camps were se-
lected most carefully above the reach of overflow,
and were soon ablaze with cheerful camp fires.
Meanwhile, our engineers who had learned Spanish
at West Point, guided by natives, were again work-
ing their way to the front, through defiles and rocky
valleys, for the purpose of seeing how the heights
above could be turned. Fortunately, by the second
day they had found practicable routes around both
of the enemy's flanks, which would surely enable me
to place our column again across his line of retreat.
Both routes were obscure and exceedingly precipi-
tous, but as the shorter led to the left, it became our
plan to make the new turning movement in that di-
rection. As that movement would at first carry us
far afield and up the craggy mountain sides, Ernst
in person with the bulk of his brigade was told off to
lead it through Baranquitas and Honduras, mere
points on the map, to the rear of Aibonito.
Rumors of peace had already begun to reach us
at the front, and to make sure that the enemy was
still there, as well as to learn what I could of his
temper and disposition, I sent Colonel Bliss, chief-
of-staff, next day under a flag of truce to demand
the surrender of the enemy in our front. While I
had but little, if any, expectation that the Spanish
447
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
commander would yield to my cheeky demand, I had
long years before learned that it was no mistake
in war to ask for what you would like to have, even
if you should be forced to accept only what you could
get away with. While my flag was politely received
and my demand sent to the commanding officer in
rear for an answer, which would probably be forth-
coming the next morning, Bliss returned to Coamo.
The next day at sunrise he went for the promised
answer, which was, of course, not only a negative,
but accompanied by a strong intimation that no
more flags would be received and that if we wished
to avoid an effusion of blood we had better not ad-
vance against the position in our front.
As nothing further was to be gained by delay,
I decided to begin the turning movement that night
and push it to a conclusion. The distance to be cov-
ered, with all its turnings and difficulties, could not
be less than ten miles, and, as much of it was to
be straight up the mountain side, it might fairly
be regarded as twice and possibly three times that
distance on the level. Every possible arrangement
was made to hold the road to the rear with artillery,
cavalry, and a small detachment of infantry, while
the main body was struggling up the mountain in
search of victory, which would force the enemy to
retreat and clear the road to San Juan. To make
sure that no effort in that direction and that no ac-
cident to Ernst should cause confusion or uncer-
tainty in the turning movement, I sent Colonel
Biddle and Major Hoyle, both able and vigorous offi-
cers, to guide and, in case of need, to assist the
commanding officer. With all these precautions the
head of column had begun its march along the trail
448
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
toward Baranquitas, when a courier arrived at my
headquarters with the news that an armistice had
been concluded between the United States and Spain
and that all military operations were to cease for
the present, the opposing forces to hold their re-
spective positions till further orders.
General Miles, still at Ponce, sent for me the
next day and after showing some displeasure at my
flag of truce he heartily thanked me and my com-
mand for the successes we had gained at such little
expense, declaring that we could not have taken
more trouble or done better work had we been con-
fronting a hostile force of twenty-five thousand men.
His praise was unstinted, and when it is remem-
bered that the affair at Coamo was the most com-
plete of any connected with the operation in Porto
Eico, his gratification can be well understood.
But the war was over, and the conditions of
peace were now to be determined by high commis-
sioners who were to meet in Paris. The Porto Eico
campaign had been made by experienced regular
officers, with but few newspaper men at hand to
spread exaggerated reports about it for the glori-
fication of popular favorites. As far as Miles and
his subordinates were concerned they had managed
every detail methodically and efficiently. The coun-
try was naturally quite as difficult as Cuba and just
as sickly, but it is proper to say that, with the ex-
ception of a typhoid infection brought from the
States and slight digestive disturbances, due more
to the native fruits than to climate, the troops were
free from epidemics and any unusual sickness. The
records showed but few deaths and at no time over
twenty-three per cent, from all causes unfit for duty,
449
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the larger part of which were light cases, mostly
developed after the campaign had ended, and the
friendly people, with pardonable anxiety to please
our soldiers and satisfy their curiosity, had sup-
plied them too freely with oranges, pineapples, and
bananas and with the rarer and less wholesome
varieties of tropical fruits. Withal, there was no
lack of hospitals, medicines, Eed Cross nurses, or
supplies, and no cause for alarm at any time. Al-
though our occupation continued for over two
months, there was no round robin and no necessity
for withdrawing the troops to Montauk Point. The
simple fact is that the campaign and occupation of
Porto Eico in July and August were managed so
well that the officers and men, as well as the people
of the island, regarded it as a continuous picnic or
gala fiesta, while the campaign and capture of San-
tiago at practically the same time of year were char-
acterized by sickness, disorder, and general misman-
agement, which came uncomfortably near to national
disaster and disgrace.
As military governor I took every precaution as
long as I remained in the island to maintain order,
to enforce discipline, and to reassure and protect
the people, who received us everywhere with open
arms as friends and liberators. While the great ma-
jority of the islanders were peacefully rejoicing
that the Spanish dominion was at an end, a few
pronounced revolutionists and patriots who had not
taken up arms with the Cubans now showed a dis-
position to wreak vengeance on the Spanish sym-
pathizers who were still in the* island. In one case
they burned a village, pillaged the shops, and com-
mitted other outrages, but, sending troops at once
450
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
to the spot, the ringleader was promptly arrested.
As the insular judges holding under Spanish author-
ity had abandoned their offices and fled, the enforce-
ment of the local laws was necessarily suspended,
and this made it necessary to hold all prisoners in-
definitely or try them at once by military commis-
sion. Naturally, I chose the latter course for the
great offense referred to above. I convened a com-
mission of high officers in accordance with regula-
tions and orders in force and designated Colonel
Burpee, my staff judge advocate, to conduct the trial.
This was done with promptitude, patience, delibera-
tion, and with a due regard for all the prisoner's
rights, as well as for such formalities as could in
any way concern the prisoner or impress the public.
The meetings were open and, of course, conducted
with the utmost decorum. Interpreters were pres-
ent and all questions and answers were duly trans-
lated into both Spanish and English where neces-
sary. Fortunately, the facts were all easily ascer-
tained and clearly proven, and after due delibera-
tion the prisoner was convicted and sentenced to im-
prisonment in the Minnesota state prison for fifteen
years.
The proceedings and findings were duly approved
and forwarded to the , War Department and the
President, who also approved them and ordered the
sentence to be carried into effect. This was done,
and, as proper notice was given through the in-
sular newspapers, the beneficial results were instan-
taneous.
A certain Senor Fajardo, one of the most promi-
nent republicans of the island, shortly after our
landing asked authority of General Miles to raise
451
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
a regiment of Porto Eican soldiers, but upon my
advice the general denied or recalled the authority
which the applicant claimed to have received from
him and made certain that there should be no divided
responsibility in the maintenance of order and no
interference with the peaceful pursuits of the people.
Several of our higher officers, notably General
Henry, seemed to regard themselves as in authority
over an alien, if not a conquered, people, and, there-
fore, charged with supervising and correcting their
manners and customs. The custom of yoking cattle
in Porto Eico is by binding a padded beam across
their foreheads to the base of their horns with raw
hide thongs or ropes. This method made such an
appeal to Henry's pity that he was about to issue
an order forbidding it and prescribing the American
method instead. Fortunately, however, he consulted
me about it and I forbade his making any order
whatever on the subject, calling his attention to the
fact that, while it was none of our business how the
Porto Eicans yoked their cattle, they were but fol-
lowing the method that had come down to them
from Bible days and had been used in nearly all
countries except our own from the dawn of civiliza-
tion to the present time. This view of the matter,
my gallant friend frankly confessed, had not oc-
curred to him, and without further reference to the
relative merits of the two plans he gave up his idea
and made no order on the subject.
But this was not the end of our work. The civil
officers of all grades were slow to resume their func-
tions. The mayors, or alcaldes, held over without
question, but they were naturally more or less in
doubt as to what would be expected of them by the
452
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
new regime. I therefore reassured them at the ear-
liest hour by calling attention to the fact that the
municipality is in all countries regarded as the po-
litical unit, and no matter what changes of govern-
ment may take place above, whether through con-
quest or revolution, the mayor and council not only
remain in office till removed by competent author-
ity, but are held responsible for the maintenance
of order, the protection of persons and property,
and the continuance of municipal business exactly
as though there had been no interruption or change
in the regular course of affairs. With this assur-
ance the police, the markets, and the railroads were
set in motion without delay, but the custom house
and postoffices were more complicated affairs. They
belonged to the nation and were taken over by my
appointees the first thing after our occupation, much
to the gratification of both natives and invaders.
The customs receipts the first day were over $7,500,
and increased rapidly thereafter. The idea that we
were among friends whom we must protect and not
harass was quickly adopted by our soldiers. The
best of feeling followed immediately. Our bands
gave public concerts in the parks, and from the first
every boy in Ponce was whistling "A Hot Time in
the Old Town To-night, " and regarding it as our
national air. Within a week the islanders, as well
as our own people, recognized that we stood for or-
der, good behavior, and a peaceful resumption of
business, while the powers above would settle the
future status of the country in their own good time.
When this understanding had become established
some of the leading citizens of the district invited
me to meet them at the coffee plantation of El
453
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Paraiso, some fifteen or twenty miles back of Ponce,
ostensibly for breakfast, but really for an informal
conference in regard to the future of the island.
This meeting took place on the last day of
August, 1898. The weather was fine and the journey
on horseback most delightful. The first five miles
were over a splendid macadamized highway pointed
toward Adjuntas on the north side of the island,
but not yet finished. The rest was a zigzag climb
up steep hills and through beautiful tropical forests
which filled the soul with delight. The breakfast,
or as we should call it, the luncheon, was at a Cor-
sican planter's, Mr. Pierluisi's, modest but commo-
dious country house. It consisted of native fruits
and a number of tasty dishes, including "bacalao
biscayino" and light Spanish wines, ending with
the best coffee I ever tasted, made from caracolillia
grown on the place. It was my first Spanish- Ameri-
can fiesta and left nothing to be desired. It will al-
ways be remembered as a most delightful experience,
not only for the sympathetic hospitality extended to
me, but for the opportunity it gave me of meeting
the leading lawyer, merchants, and planters of the
region, and of advising them as to their duties and
prospects as affected by the expulsion of the
Spaniards.
Addressing them as " gentlemen and fellow citi-
zens," with the explanation that Porto Eico had
become an American dependency, I pointed out that
the great Eepublic, unlike European governments,
has no subjects but extends its rights and privileges
freely and equally to all men who reside within its
far-reaching boundaries. I expressed the hope that
the termination of Spanish rule and the establish-
454
OCCUPATION OF POETO RICO
ment of military government under the American
flag would soon be followed by local self-govern-
ment based on the essential principles of American
liberty. I called attention to the fact that we did
not pretend to interfere with the local laws except
when necessary to protect our army and to maintain
peace and good order, and that we looked to the
local courts to do justice between man and man, and
to the moderation and good sense of the people them-
selves for the continuance of that tranquillity which
had so far characterized their conduct. I added in
substance: If every one, high and low, rich and
poor, Puerto-Eiqueno and Espanol, devoted himself
strictly and exclusively to his own private affairs
or to official business, eschewing politics and public
discussion, everybody would find in the end that the
island had not only been well governed and pros-
perous, but worthy of the good fortune which had
come to it. With proverb and precept I warned
both insulares and peninsulares that they must re-
gard the past as a sealed book which we would not
permit either side to open, and that they must live
together in peace and harmony. I then called at-
tention to the fact that as soon as the Spanish left
the island the President would probably appoint a
military governor, the length and character of whose
administration would depend largely upon their own
behavior; that in the natural course of events it
would be replaced by a territorial government, the
powers of which would be prescribed by Congress,
and would be followed in turn by an autonomous
state, which would doubtless be finally admitted into
the Union. How long they would be kept in pro-
bation was a matter of conjecture. With peace and
455
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
good order showing the people really worthy of self-
government, the period would be merely nominal,
but, if unfortunately they disregarded the rights
of each other or showed by turbulence, intolerance,
and ignorance that they were unfit for self-govern-
ment, they could rest assured that that great privi-
lege would be withheld indefinitely.
Finally, I pointed out that, as we have no state
church, the Catholic church would no longer be sup-
ported by the public treasury, but must adopt the
parochial system like the Protestant sects; that
there must be perfect freedom and toleration for
all; that no enlightened man in the United States
ever asks another what his religion is ; that all rec-
ognize perfect freedom of choice for everyone else ;
and that God, the Compassionate, is alone the judge.
I then told the story of the Wisconsin boy who car-
ried a saber for the Union till the end of the Ee-
bellion, worked his way through college, became a
missionary in the South, and founded "The Helping
Hand," with the following impressive words as its
motto :
"I shall pass through this world but once; there-
fore, whatever good thing I may do for any human
creature, let me do it now; let me not postpone nor
delay it, for I shall not come this way again."
Emphasizing this as the true philosophy of life
in politics as well as in religion, I concluded with
a word against the intolerance of one and the bigotry
of the other and then warned them as solemnly as
I could against the danger of insular turning against
peninsular, of Puerto-Riqueno turning against Es-
panol with torch and dagger to avenge the wrongs
and oppression of Spanish domination. It needed
456
OCCUPATION OP PORTO RICO
no argument to show that an outbreak against this
feeling could not fail to condemn their countrymen
as a turbulent and law-breaking people, unfit for
self-government, and therefore doomed to be ruled
by the strong hand of a military governor. Feeling
that they were, in fact, docile, orderly, kindly, and
fully prepared already for a better government than
they had ever enjoyed, I urged them to lose no op-
portunity to show the world that they were tolerant
and magnanimous as well. In conclusion I called
special attention to the fact that their wrongs, what-
ever they might have been, had already been amply
avenged by the expulsion of the Spanish flag, with-
out cost or effort on their part, and that the least
they could do in return was to repress the spirit
of revenge and resolve to live in peace, quietude,
and forbearance with their Spanish neighbors. Thus
and thus only could they show themselves to be
worthy of the great destiny which had overtaken
them, and which, it was to be hoped, would finally
clothe their beautiful island with sovereignty and
membership in the great continental republic, and
make them our "fellow citizen " forever.
Fortunately, several of the gentlemen present
understood English, and this, with an occasional
pause for translation, gave the entire party ample
time to gather my meaning. All seemed deeply im-
pressed and gave the most flattering assurance of
approval and support. The next day Matienzo Cin-
tron, the most eminent lawyer in that part of the
island, asked me to write out my remarks so that
they might be translated at length, printed, and cir-
culated in the insular newspapers. This I did at
once and, judging from the favorable response which
457
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
came in from all quarters, my remarks were recog-
nized by all as the right word at the right time.
They found their way to the States shortly after-
ward and, much to my gratification, were widely
republished and favorably commented upon.
In due time, with unanimous approval, I ap-
pointed Matienzo Cintron judge of the highest
district court. Later Governor General Brooke not
only confirmed him in office, but promoted him to
the supreme court, with which he has been honorably
connected for many years. Thus it is that timely
forethought, forbearance, patience, and good judg-
ment on the part of those in high authority are fre-
quently far better than the strong hand in dealing
with alien people and their affairs.
With the tranquillity which followed, my task as
military governor was not only a light one, but came
to a calm and peaceful end. Within two months
from our landing I was relieved from duty in the
island and ordered back to the States with the
greater part of my command.
My connection with the expulsion of the Spanish
flag from Porto Eico and with the establishment and
maintenance of a just and orderly peace among the
people has always given me unalloyed pleasure, not
only because the exemplary conduct of the command,
drawn as it was from widely separated states of
the Union, reflected great credit on the American
name, but because it won the warmest commendation
of the Porto Eican people. The hearty and affec-
tionate farewell they gave us made it certain that
they regarded us as " amlgos muy simpaticos," and
our country as "la mas grande del mundo!"
The only dissatisfaction I witnessed and did not
458
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO
fully understand at the time was on the part of
General Miles, who as commanding general of the
invading army naturally expected to be at the head
of the commission to arrange for the withdrawal
of the Spanish forces and the occupation of the en-
tire island by our own. He also signified his inten-
tion to put me in chief command, but the Govern-
ment, for reasons of its own, had other plans. It
appointed Brooke, Wade, and Gordon as commis-
sioners, and afterward made Brooke governor gen-
eral, while it ordered Miles home, and he in turn
ordered me to take my troops to New York on their
way to be mustered out. I had wished to march
them by the Royal Eoad through the island to San
Juan, but, seeing that this might delay us, and that
he was to have nothing further to do with estab-
lishing the national authority in the island, he or-
dered me to take the first transports that could be
had for New York, authorizing me to review the
troops and lead them in triumph through the streets
of the metropolis before sending them to their re-
spective states. But this was countermanded from
Washington on our arrival, and thus the only or-
ganization that came back from the war in better
condition than when it entered it was disbanded and
sent home without any -public recognition or cere-
mony whatever. While no explanation of this un-
usual course was ever made, I have always supposed
that it was due partly to politics and partly to the
controversy which was soon on in full blast between
Miles and the Administration in regard to the food
supply of the army. But why it should have affected
me, who had no part in either, I could never un-
derstand.
459
XV
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
Commanding First Army Corps at Lexington and Macon
Eenew acquaintance with people at Macon Review
for President McKinley Remarks on Continental
Union Negro regiments left behind Transfer Corps
to Matanzas Recommended for chief command
Brooke as Governor General Province and city of
Matanzas fall to my lot Conditions prevailing in the
Island Reception of Maximo Gomez Brooke's ad-
ministration.
The campaign of Porto Eico was a short one.
Within thirty days from the time we sighted the
island off Point Fajardo I was ordered back to the
States with troops which had beaten the Spaniards
in the field and were no longer needed for military
operations. Shortly after reaching home and enjoy-
ing a few days ' rest I was assigned to command the
First Army Corps, vice Brooke, who on leaving for
Porto Eico had been temporarily succeeded by
Breckenridge. That part of the corps left at Chicka-
mauga Park, naturally one of the wholesomest
places in the country, had become so seriously in-
fected with typhoid fever from the State encamp-
ments that it had been transferred to a new encamp-
ment near Lexington, Kentucky, where I rejoined it
460
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
on October 20. I found it comfortably and advan-
tageously situated. Every known precaution had
been taken to leave the infection behind. Its sani-
tary condition was greatly improved, but many gen-
erals, as well as staff and line officers, were absent
on leave and much work was necessary to put it
into proper condition for service in what was sup-
posed to be the sickly climate of Cuba. There were
still a few typhoid cases, and another change of en-
campment seemed to be necessary to get entirely
rid of that disease. The fall season was well under
way and cold weather coming on. Our next duty
was known to be as a part of the army of occupation,
which had been fixed at about fifty thousand men.
In accordance with my own judgment, as well as
that of the Washington authorities, I was ordered to
transfer the corps by rail to southwestern Georgia,
with my own headquarters at Macon. Of course, I
was familiar with the entire region, for I had ended
the War for the Union in it a third of a century be-
fore. The climate at that season was delightful, the
soil was porous and easily drained, and the officers
by that time highly skilled in moving and making
camps as well as in all sanitary measures necessary
to keep them clean and healthy. With such division
commanders as Bates, Sanger, and Ludlow, the corps
was soon comfortably settled, this time in the most
perfect surroundings. Every known precaution had
been taken; all sick or ailing soldiers were left be-
hind, disinfectants of every kind had been used in
abundance, and before a fortnight elapsed it was
certain that the entire command was not only free
from infection of every sort, but in better condition
than ever before. Methodical instruction and drills
461
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
were resumed, and it was but a few days till all
branches of administration were brought to a high
state of perfection.
In the desire to obtain troops that would be im-
mune, several negro regiments had been lately or-
ganized in the South, and, although commanded by
good officers, several of whom were regulars, one
of the regiments reached camp in a somewhat law-
less condition. The first night it got liquor and
was soon reported drunk and disorderly. A few
men left camp with their guns and on some trivial
pretext began shooting up the neighborhood. When
this was reported I ordered the division commander
with white troops to surround the camp, to parade
the regiment, call the rolls, report the absentees,
stack arms, take away the colors, arrest and confine
the disorderly, and then send the men to quarters
with notice that none could leave camp or have their
arms again till their commander could assure me
that they knew how to behave themselves as soldiers.
The lesson was silently but promptly adminis-
tered, though it was not till the climax that its full
import was understood. By daylight the absentees
had been gathered in and confined, and the entire
command taught a lesson of discipline and obedi-
ence that it never forgot. A system of squad drills
and camp instruction was rigidly enforced, and
within a week the arms were restored and the negro
brigade was one of the most quiet and well behaved
in the corps. And yet the episode taught me a les-
son also. Eealizing that the Cubans were a civilized
people who had rightly rebelled against foreign op-
pression and were entitled to be regarded as friendly
allies, instead of alien enemies, I at once recom-
462
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
mended the discharge of all negro volunteers from
the First Army Corps. I represented them as in
no way fit exemplars of the American army in the
work of restoring order, pacifying the island and
preparing it for self-government. Fortunately, my
views were accepted by the President, and all the
colored troops were discharged before the corps was
transferred to Cuba. The result was most satis-
factory in every respect, for it left none but white
Americans of the best type to carry on the work
which fell to their lot under the joint resolution of
Congress and the Treaty of Paris. Of course, there
were occasional acts of bad behavior and even of
violence on the part of a few drunken soldiers, but
on the whole no country ever sent out an army corps
which better represented its civilization or better
understood the mission upon which it was about to
embark. Here and there an officer, not always of
inferior rank, forgot or failed to comprehend the
simple work of pacification and took up that of
political reconstruction and administration exactly
as though they were conquerors who had come to
occupy the land indefinitely. How far that was due
to misconception or to unofficial intimations from
those in higher authority will probably remain al-
ways a matter of conjecture, but I shall have more
to say on that subject as it develops during my stay
in the island.
Meanwhile, the First Corps remained in its
Georgia encampment for about two months, during
which it did much good work outside of the strictly
military line. As I had made many acquaintances
throughout the State, and especially at Macon, dur-
ing the six months after the close of the Civil War,
463
UNDER, THE OLD FLAG
the leading people received my family, my higher
officers, myself, and my staff with every social at-
tention. Most of the older citizens had "gone over
to the majority, " but here and there was one who
had not only survived, but forgotten the days of
humiliation and defeat and welcomed me and my
command with pleasant memories and assurances
of high respect. Among these were Senator Bacon,
Major Hanson, the Nesbits, the Jphnstons, and the
family of Howell Cobb, but there were also many
others who had heard their parents and friends
speak kindly of my stay among them in former
days, so that all extended the hand of good fellow-
ship and did what they could to show that they
regarded us not only as fellow citizens, but as the
soldiers and representatives of a common and re-
united country. It was to Senator Bacon that I
was indebted for my prompt confirmation as a ma-
jor general the year before.
It seems that the Senate in executive session was
about to vote on my nomination, when the Senator
asked for delay, speaking substantially as follows:
' ' The fortunes of war made me a prisoner to Gen-
eral Wilson at the close of the late unpleasantness,
and I was under parole to report daily at his head-
quarters. Having done this several times, I grew
restive, and called one morning to see General Wil-
son, whom I found a younger man than myself.
After giving him my name as a staff officer of
General Cobb, I told him that the war was over,
and I wanted to give my general parole, and see if
I could not make a living for myself and family. I
had but little money; my negroes were free, but
I had plenty of land, and wanted to cultivate it.
464
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
"At this juncture, Senator Hawley, Chairman of
the Military Committee, fearing that I was going to
make trouble, came over and asked me what was the
matter with General Wilson. Waving him aside, I
said: 'Wait a minute,' and then proceeded as fol-
lows : . . . After hearing me through, rising from
his seat, Wilson placed his hand on my shoulder and
said: 'Of course, you can have your general parole.
The flag flying over us is your flag as much as it is
mine, and this is your country to assist in restoring
to prosperity; and by the way, Captain, perhaps
you could use a few horses and mules in your farm-
ing operations. If so, I shall have pleasure in di-
recting my quartermaster to give you a supply.'
"Of course I was surprised at this unexpected
generosity from a Federal commander, and as a
token of my appreciation, even at this late day, I
want to move General Wilson's unanimous con-
firmation without further ceremony." I need not
add that it has always been a most gratifying cir-
cumstance that the motion was carried immediately.
At Macon every one now appeared to be willing
to forget and to forgive the past and to recall only
the acts of good temper and good feeling which were
'ascribed to me in days long gone by. I had my
headquarters in the identical rooms of the Lanier
House that I had occupied in the summer of 1865.
There was but little change in the hotel, but the
city was two or three times larger. Business was
brisk, the country was flourishing, and the people
were happy and contented. We received and gave
breakfasts, teas, dinners, and balls. The bands
played, the flags were unfurled, and reviews were
held. The President, the Secretary of War, mem-
465
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
bers of Congress, and many distinguished men from
all parts of the country visited us. Banquets were
given, patriotic speeches were delivered, and a sin-
cere and successful effort was made "to bridge the
bloody chasm " between the North and the South.
In all that took place I was necessarily the central
figure till the President arrived on the scene, but I
minimized my speeches or reserved them for the
promotion of friendly relations between the troops
and the people by whom they were surrounded.
I had known and held friendly, if not intimate,
relations with Major McKinley ever since he had
entered Congress. We had always talked freely in
regard to public matters at the national conventions
and at other meetings. I had visited him while he
was Governor of Ohio, had assisted in electing him
as President, and had conferred with him at his
home at Canton after his election, as well as at the
White House after his inauguration, and, while I
never regarded him as the greatest and most virile
statesman our country produced, I did regard him
as an amiable and able man of irreproachable habif s
and character, as well as a very astute politician.
He knew very well the views I held in regard to
"continental union, " and especially in favor of an
equal and honorable union of the Dominion of Can-
ada with the United States whenever it could be
arranged. We had discussed those questions in all
their bearings at Canton only eighteen months be-
fore. He had assured me of his hearty concurrence
in my views and especially in the suggestion that
the Eepublicans should favor such trade and eco-
nomic relations with the Dominion as would result
sooner or later in bringing about a commercial, if
466
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
not a political, union between the two countries.
That this was no casual or evanescent thought is
shown by the fact that for eight years "continental
union ' ' was a cardinal principle which had gone into
the Eepublican platform through the consent, if not
the efforts, of himself and his Ohio supporters and
as a direct result of my report on that subject from
a sub-committee of which I was chairman.
But this is not all. In the last discussion, when
the Cuban Eebellion and the Spanish War were far
from occupying the center of the stage either at
home or abroad, we went over the entire subject
again, and in parting he assured me that he looked
upon political union with Canada as a measure to
be kept constantly in mind, and that if it should be
his good fortune to carry it through he should re-
gard it as "the crowning glory " of his adminis-
tration.
With these statesmanlike sentiments in mind, I
was unexpectedly called upon as the next speaker
after the President at Macon. The troops had gone
by when shouts from the people brought the Presi-
dent to the front with a few remarks in which he
glorified the power and prestige of the country as
manifested in the war with Spain. Although it can-
not be said that he used the words, "world power,"
the germ of the idea was evidently in his remarks
as well as in his mind. The response was enthu-
siastic. Under that inspiration, although I spoke
with reluctance, I not only approved and emphasized
all the President had said, but added in substance
that, as the United States was the largest area in
the world ever devoted to free government and free
trade, I hoped the day would come when our flag
467
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
would fly supreme from the Arctic Ocean to the
Isthmus of Panama, over an entire continent, not
only free from European dominion, but dedicated
eternally to the cause of peace. The response was
still more enthusiastic, and after the pause which
followed I declared that the realization of that hope,
which might be delayed, but could not be defeated,
would be "the crowning glory " of the administra-
tion whose good fortune it should be to bring it
about.
There was not a word said about war, conquest,
or forcible annexation, yet the outburst of cheers
was loud and prolonged, and the President's ap-
proval seemed to be hearty and enthusiastic. But
the whole proceedings were unpremeditated and
spontaneous. I had not thought of speaking, much
less of writing out, my remarks. The reporters were,
therefore, taken by surprise, not only by the turn
of our remarks, but by the fact that we spoke at
all. They naturally got a poor report of what was
actually said, but condensed my part therein into
a spread-eagle intimation to all the world, and es-
pecially to Great Britain, that she must not only
withdraw from the Western Hemisphere, but leave
it to the exclusive control of the American people.
While the President knew as fully what was in my
mind as in his own, he was naturally a timid man
who had already become alarmed by the manifest
disposition of the European nations to minimize
the advantages which we might claim from the Span-
ish War. It will be recalled that the British Gov-
ernment had sympathized with us rather than with
Spain. It is possible that her leading statesmen
and journalists, considering our success and oppor-
468
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
tunities, may have reached the conclusion that as
her flag was the only European flag still flying over
any part of North America, it would be the next to
go, and that it would be good policy on her part to
turn over a new leaf, and, instead of taking sides
against us as she had always done in the past, to
cultivate a better understanding and closer rela-
tions with the great Eepublic hereafter.
Be this as it may, "continental union " disap-
peared from the platform of the Republican party,
nobody has ever told exactly when or exactly how,
and from that day forth much more has been said
about the natural bonds of interest and affection
between the United States and Great Britain than
in the entire century prior thereto. Whatever the
motive, it is certain that McKinley was the first to
weaken on this time-honored policy, the realization
of which he had not long ago frankly said he should
regard as the crowning glory of his administration.
Whatever may be the secret history of this ap-
parent change of policy, there can be but little doubt
that the recent defeat of reciprocity in certain nat-
ural and manufactured products by popular vote
in Canada was a disappointment to President Taft
and his supporters. It was a deliberate rejection
by friends of the British connection and the enemies
of the great Eepublic of closer trade relations with
the American people, but it is to be hoped that
Congress will put all such articles produced in Can-
ada as are desirable and useful in the States on the
free list and keep them there without reference to
the course pursued by the Dominion. In the end
that policy cannot but be favorable to American con-
sumers, and to the solidarity of the English-speak-
469
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ing people in the Western Hemisphere. What Gold-
win Smith termed the " greater forces" appear to
be working to that end with Canada as with Cuba,
as silently, reasonably, and inevitably as they did
two centuries ago for the union of England and
Scotland.
The practical matters to dispose of when Mr.
McKinley visited Macon were the occupation of
Cuba, the disposition of the forces, the designation
of the officers for the chief and department com-
mands, and the settlement of the policy to be car-
ried out in the island. Miles had become embroiled
with the War Department in regard to details of
army administration, besides his proper place as
general-in-chief was Washington. Brooke had been
left in Porto Eico, but was supposed to be some-
what dissatisfied with the small number of troops
left under his command. Wood had succeeded Law-
ton at Santiago under circumstances reflecting on
Lawton, and this left Wade, Lee, and myself as the
seniors from whom a commander would naturally
be selected. Wade was from a distinguished and
influential Ohio family, and it soon became known
that for this reason, if for nothing better, he was
strongly favored by the President. His age, serv-
ices, and character were all most creditable and his
name was advocated by many influential men. Lee
had been governor of Virginia, and was, besides,
an officer of merit and deserved popularity. The
strongest argument against him was that he had
been in the Confederate army and was a Democrat.
But I was not without highly influential friends. Al-
though I had never been a civil office-holder, I knew
many governors, senators, representatives, leading
470
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
journalists, and ex-army officers, and for a third of
a century had been active in various parts of the
country as a railroad manager and man of affairs,
who had always done his full duty as a loyal citizen.
Senators Frye, Allison, Platt of Connecticut, For-
aker, Aldrich, Cullom, Fairbanks, Lodge, Bacon,
and Cushman K. Davis, all intimate friends of mine,
had early reached the conclusion, without the slight-
est solicitation on my part, that I was the best quali-
fied and most available major general either in the
regular or volunteer army for the principal com-
mand in the field and afterward for governor gen-
eral of Cuba. The regular army officers, especially
those of high rank, were largely in my favor, and
so far as they dared, were the earnest advocates of
my appointment. Generals Howard, Schofield, Mc-
Cook, and Dodge, all of whom I had known for many
years, recommended me on their own motion for the
chief command in the Spanish War. Besides this,
General Dodge went out of his way, after having
spent some time with me at Lexington as chairman
of a commission which was making certain investi-
gations, and strongly advised the President to give
me the appointment.
But this was not all. Secretary Alger, of whom
I was no admirer and with whom I had but a
slight acquaintance, sent out a confidential officer
of rank, a stranger to me, to make a careful and
exhaustive examination into my personal and offi-
cial fitness for high command, and on the receipt
of a favorable report proceeded at once to strong-
ly urge the President not only to put me in chief
command of the army of occupation, but to give
me the much higher and more important appoint-
471
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ment of governor general. The New York Sun,
the Evening Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Cin-
cinnati Commercial, the Louisville Courier-Jour-
nal, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, and many other
leading journals east and west, from the first, re-
peatedly and in no uncertain terms expressed them-
selves in favor of my appointment. This commen-
dation was all unsought and still more gratifying
on that account. The work would have been en-
tirely congenial and I felt confident of my ability
to carry it through in such a manner as could not
fail to promote the welfare of both Cuba and the
United States. But, withal, the President was evi-
dently unfavorable to me, while his outgivings, non-
committal as they were, strongly indicated the ap-
pointment of Wade till the very day on which
Brooke turned up in Washington about the middle
of December. There had been little or no mention
of him till his detail was actually given out on De-
cember 13, 1898, as commander of the newly estab-
lished Military Division of Cuba and as military
governor of the island. What the arguments cr
influences were in his behalf I never knew, but I
always supposed they were that he was a regular
officer of unbroken service and high character and,
as next in rank to Miles, entitled to precedence.
As he was my senior both as a regular and volun-
teer, I gave him my most loyal and unqualified
support. I did not doubt then, nor have I ever
doubted since, that with proper instructions he
would have faithfully and successfully carried out
the policy of the Administration.
The island, something over seven hundred miles
in length and an average of over sixty miles in
472
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
width, with an area of something like forty-four
thousand square miles, was at first sub-divided by
province into six military departments, and, while
it afterward came to my knowledge that Brooke
wished me to command at Havana, he was not al-
lowed to have control even in that matter. The
President made the assignment himself of Brooke,
Lee, and Ludlow,and under this assignment the prov-
ince of Havana fell to Lee, while Ludlow, one of my
division commanders, got the city of Havana. As he
was a regular of the Engineer Corps, it was doubt-
less thought that he was peculiarly fitted for the
work of sanitation and repair. The province and
city of Matanzas fell to my lot, under an assignment
of the War Department. Bates, another of my divi-
sion commanders, got the province of Santa Clara
and the city of Cienfuegos, but remained in com-
mand for a short time only, after which it was added
to my command in April of that year, and the num-
ber of military departments in the island was re-
duced to three.
It was originally intended that the First Army
Corps should reach the island in December, but lack
of transports made it impossible to carry that in-
tention into effect till early in January, 1899. While
the movement was in progress the corps organiza-
tion was dissolved and the troops assigned to ter-
ritorial departments as above indicated. I reached
Matanzas with Sanger's fine division, every man
of which was in perfect health, two days before the
last Spanish troops embarked for home. Without
recognizing the insurgents or having anything to
do with the insurgent leaders, the Spaniards had
maintained order and drawn in their detachments
473
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
as rapidly as transports could be furnished to take
them out of the country. They occupied that part
of the city and shore east of the bay, while the ad-
vanced troops of my command, a battalion of the
Third U. S. Volunteer Engineers, under the super-
vision of Colonel Biddle of my staff, took posses-
sion of Fort San Severino and that part of the city
and suburbs west of the bay. No prescribed ceremo-
nies or courtesies took place between the Spanish
and American forces. Our communications were of
the most formal character and there was no sign of
the departing sovereignty of Spain or the oncoming
possession of the United States, except that at noon,
when, with appropriate salutes, the Spanish colors
were lowered and the Stars and Stripes hoisted to
the head of the flag staff in San Severino. That
night the last transport disappeared, and for the
first time General Betancourt and his native troops
made their appearance, but not till after I sent a
courier to the country to find the General and his
escort and bring them into the city for a patriotic
fiesta. General Betancourt and I met on the bal-
cony of the City Hall, overlooking the public square,
which was crowded with patriotic soldiers and citi-
zens. We embraced in the sight of the multitude
amid the plaudits of the Cuban citizens and soldiers
and under the inspiring strains of martial music.
It was a gala night characterized by a noble out-
burst of enthusiasm and marred by no single act
of violence or misbehavior. The only condition put
upon the patriotic forces was that they should en-
ter the town absolutely without ammunition and
that no act of resentment or contumely should be
manifested toward the Spaniards who remained be-
474
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
hind as loyal subjects of the Spanish Government.
It was the beginning of a friendship between Gen-
eral Betancourt and myself, as well as between my
troops and the insurgent forces of the Cuban Re-
public, which, I am sure, will last as long as life
is spared to any of us.
Brooke, under the President's assignment, which
was absolutely silent as to his functions except in
so far as they were implied by the words "who in
addition to the command of the troops in the Divi-
sion, will exercise the authority of military gover-
nor of the island, 77 issued his first order from
Havana on December 27, 1898. Neither instructions
nor order contained the slightest allusion to the
course to be pursued toward Cuba, the Cuban peo-
ple, or the various governments left behind by the
Spanish authorities. It will be remembered that
the latter, before retiring, had authorized what was
known at the time as an autonomistic government
for the island and its various provinces. It had ap-
pointed and installed a governor for each province,
and had designated or acknowledged an alcalde and
council for each important town and city. As far
as I knew then or afterward, these officials were in-
sulars of good character, conservative views, and
fair education. In my province they gave ready
and cheerful support to the military government
without putting themselves forward, claiming pre-
cedence, or pressing their views upon my attention.
But there was in addition a more or less inde-
pendent republican government and national assem-
bly which represented the cause of "Cuba Libre y
Independiente." This government was strictly na-
tive. It stood for the successful revolution, and,
475
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
while it had no fixed habitation or national capital,
and could hardly claim that it had been chosen by
the people at a regular election, there can be no
doubt that it had a written constitution under which
it controlled the rebellion against the mother coun-
try, conducted all its negotiations, and managed all
its military, financial, and political business at home
and abroad. True, Maximo Gomez had in the pro-
tracted, and at times almost hopeless, course of
the war been clad with the powers of a dictator,
and, while he had shown a disposition to be some-
what arbitrary with his own people in the field,
he proved himself in the end to be the loyal and
obedient servant of the Cuban assembly. He did not
resign his commission and lay down his sword with
as much ceremony as our own Washington, for, in-
stead of being the greatest landowner and richest
man of Cuba, he was but a poor adventurer and
patriot of the same race from another island; but
when formally notified by the assembly a few months
later that the war was over, the island independent,
and its army disbanded, he promptly handed in his
resignation without a word of protest and with
as much modesty as if he had been Cincinnatus
himself.
Under these circumstances, all of which were
creditable to the Cuban people and their leaders,
it must be regarded as strange that in converting
the island into a military division and sending an
army of fifty thousand men to occupy it after the
treaty of peace, which they did without the slightest
authority from Congress, neither our civil nor mili-
tary authorities uttered a single word nor promul-
gated a single order defining our policy, declaring
476
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
our intentions, or telling the Cuban people what was
expected of them during the intervention. In view
of the specific declaration of the Joint Eesolution
which had been widely published throughout the
world, that the United States would exercise neither
sovereignty, jurisdiction, nor control in the island
of Cuba, except for the pacification thereof, and
that it was its determination and purpose when
that was accomplished to withdraw all armed forces
and leave the island and its government to its peo-
ple, it may be contended that no further notice of
any kind was necessary. But the formal occupa-
tion of the island after the peace was a most im-
portant event in the eyes of the world, and a full
statement of its purpose, as well as of the duties
of the army and what was expected of the Cuban
people, would have been received by all concerned
with the highest satisfaction. It would have been
a guide to the military governor, the department
commanders, and the civil officers of every grade,
as well as to the people themselves. That they
expected something of the kind is certain. The
Cuban army modestly asked permission to take part
in the ceremonies which terminated the Spanish sov-
ereignty, but this was denied, as afterward reported,
till "the excitement had cooled off" and the "pas-
sions of the people could be controlled. ' 9 The mo-
tive as described was, of course, a good one, but
the apprehension of danger to life and property,
with fifty thousand American troops to maintain
peace and order among the people, who had as yet
shown no sign of violence or outbreak, was without
sufficient justification.
Brooke's denial had, however, aroused a feeling
477
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of apprehension which was but partly quieted by
his formal order of January 1, 1899, announcing
himself as the representative of the President in
the humane purpose of putting an end to the dis-
tressing conditions in the island, and announcing
that this was to be done by a military government.
While he declared that the object of this govern-
ment was to give protection to the people, security
to persons and property, and to restore confidence,
encourage the resumption of the pursuits of peace,
build up waste plantations, restore commercial traf-
fic, and to afford full protection to all civil and
religious rights, he also declared that this was to
be done through the channels of civil administration
under the civil and criminal code previously en-
forced and invited the Cuban people to cooperate
in these objects. With the final statement that this
course would "insure kind and beneficent govern-
ment,-' it was absolutely silent as to what, if any,
political action the people themselves should take.
It ignored both the autonomistic government author-
ized by Spain and the Republican government es-
tablished by the revolution, while it quietly assumed
for the American commander all the arbitrary
powers of a Spanish captain general. There was
not a word recognizing the Cuban Eepublic, nor the
sovereignty of the Cuban people. With all that was
said and done, much of which was admirable, there
was not a word acknowledging the obligations placed
upon the President and his Government by the
Teller Amendment as set forth in the fourth article
of the Joint Resolution, not even a suggestion look-
ing to the limitation of the government of interven-
tion, nor to the establishment of a government by
478
OCCUPATION OF CUBA
the Cuban people. It could not have been more in-
definite and non-committal had it been the open
purpose of the United States to continue in posses-
sion of the island and ultimately to annex it in spite
of the plain obligation placed upon it by Congress
in the declaration of war. In view of all the cir-
cumstances, no one can successfully contend that
the phraseology of the orders was a mere matter
of chance, or that by its omissions, at least, it was
not well calculated to alarm such of the Cuban peo-
ple as favored the establishment of a free and inde-
pendent republic.
On the day I arrived at Matanzas the division
of the civil government into four departments was
announced and the next day the Cuban secretaries
were appointed. It is hardly necessary to call at-
tention to the fact that they were all civilians. Dur-
ing the year which followed they devoted themselves
to taking over and perfecting the administration
of the several departments as established under the
Spanish civil government, and, while this work was
honestly and capably done, it naturally failed to
allay the distrust of the people. They had neither
part nor interest in it, but gave it quiet and un-
questioning obedience for the simple reason that
they could not help themselves. The government
was in every respect a government of conquest and
in no way the choice of the Cuban people. The
most fortunate circumstance connected with it was
that as long as Brooke and his department com-
manders were in control it was honestly and
humanely administered. But it is worthy of note
that when I asked Brooke, as I did frequently dur-
ing that year, what our Government's policy and
479
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ultimate purpose were in all that it was doing, in
short, what was the state of the law under which
we were acting, he frankly confessed that he did
not know, " except by induction. " He said his pub-
lished orders contained all the information he had
on that subject. He had no private instructions and
had received no personal or official intimation from
those in the confidence of the President or of his
Administration. He regarded the pacification of the
island and the reestablishment of prosperity as com-
prising the whole duty with which he was charged.
And this would have been sufficient had the island
been in a state of turbulence and violence, instead
of being as quiet and peaceful as any state of the
Union from the day of our arrival within its limits.
Fortunately, the Cuban people and their leaders
were well advised. They behaved with what must
be regarded as unusual patience, moderation, and
wisdom. Having on the first intimation discharged
their commander-in-chief , disbanded their army, and
dissolved their Asamblea, they waited with compo-
sure, though the air was filled with alarming
rumors, till McKinley got time eighteen months
later to formulate and adopt a policy which finally
acknowledged their autonomy and gave them the
right of independent self-government.
480
XVI
DEPARTMENT OF MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA
Absence of national policy State of the law in Cuba
Inspection of Provinces under my command Popula-
tion and distressing conditions Recommend measures
for their relief Meeting of generals in Havana Re-
port on economic, industrial, and social conditions
Grafters and speculators at work Wood, Governor
General.
While there was no affirmative authority of law
after the peace with Spain for the occupation of
Cuba by an American army, and certainly no Con-
gressional mandate requiring the President to ap-
point a governor general or to establish a republi-
can or any other government in that island, the
next two years and a half were full of interesting
incidents. Goldwin Smith thought they marked the
beginning of a fatal policy of expansion by the
thoughtless absorption of a mongrel and mixed
population alien to the American people, which
would start us on the road of "Empire." The un-
explained facts and the comments of both the home
and foreign press filled the country with mingled
doubt and apprehension. While McKinley in his
message to Congress in December had declared that
our relations with Cuba should be "close and recip-
481
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
rocal," he failed to define the state of the law under
which he was acting, or to indicate how long our
army would stay, or what the Cuban people should
do to get rid of it. The situation from the first was
enigmatical and embarrassing.
While it is a well-established principle that mili-
tary men must obey the orders of those in authority
over them, it is equally well understood, by Ameri-
can officers at least, that this obligation is not a
sufficient warrant for obedience to illegal orders.
In other words, it rests with the officer at his own
peril to decide, in every important case whether
orders from those higher up are legal or illegal.
With this well-established principle in mind, I went
to Havana shortly after taking charge of my de-
partment for the purpose of conferring with Brooke
as to what was expected of me as a department
commander. While he was most friendly and con-
ciliatory, it soon became apparent that he had no
specific orders for his Government and did not know
the state of the law under which he was acting. He,
therefore, gave me no special instructions, but left
me to take my own way through the maze which
surrounded us both.
Manifestly, the first thing that required my at-
tention was to ascertain for myself as fully as pos-
sible the state of the law under which we were act-
ing in Cuba, and this was done from the statutes,
the acts of Congress, the treaties, and the general
orders and army regulations then in force. As far
as I know, Major Carbaugh, my judge advocate,
who had this matter in hand, was the first and only
officer, either in the island or out of it, to collect
and codify everything bearing on this important
482
MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA
question. Not even the President's messages or
proclamations were omitted, and when I declare that
the whole codification did not make four foolscap
pages, it will be seen that we had but little that
was definite or positive to go upon. We were left
absolutely to our own conception of the situation
and what it required of us. This made it still more
important that we should fully understand the con-
dition of the people and of the country by which
we were surrounded and with which we had to deal.
To this end the next thing in order was to send
out staff officers in every direction and, then, with
the civil governor and local officials, to go in person
to all the important towns and cities reached by
rail, and when there was no railroad to go by horse-
back to every outlying village and barrio in the de-
partment.
By these means I visited all parts of both prov-
inces and interviewed every alcalde, every member
of the ayuntamiento, every magistrate, and every
important lawyer, doctor, engineer, merchant,
planter, priest, schoolmaster, and military officer
within my jurisdiction. My secretary made an ac-
curate stenographic typewritten record of all we
saw and heard and nothing important escaped our
notice. My first trip was to Cardenas, Union de
Eeyes, Colon, Macariges, and Jovelanos, in the
Province of Matanzas. A few weeks later I took
in Sagua la Grande, Remedies, Caibarien, and
Placetas, on the north side of Santa Clara, and then
Villa Clara, in the interior, after which I went to
Cienfuegos, at the southern end of the railroad, and
thence along the coast by steamer to the old cities
of Trinidad and Sancti Spiritus. From the latter
483
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
place I went by quartermaster's steam tug to Tunas
de Zaza, crossing again to the north side of the is-
land and back by the Jucaro and Moron trocha and
railroad. I then returned to Castillo and Sancti
Spiritus and with a small escort rode northward
to the rich planting town of Placetas, where I in-
spected the detachment of cavalry which had re-
cently taken post there, and then struck out to the
southwest, traversing forest, plain, and the beau-
tiful tobacco valley of Manicaragua to Cienfuegos,
on the south coast, about one hundred and twenty
miles away as the crow flies. By these means I
familiarized myself personally with the condition
of both provinces, with the lay of the land, and with
the state of the people and their industries. But,
not satisfied with this, I sent my engineer officer
to explore the Cienaga de Zapata, an extensive
swamp region in the southern part of Matanzas,
extending from a few miles north of the bay of
Cochinos to the mouth of the Hatiguanico Eiver.
In addition to ascertaining that this extensive re-
gion could be easily drained and brought under cul-
tivation, especially for rubber, he also surveyed and
reported upon the condition of all the railroads in
the department, submitting estimates for their re-
pair and full reports as to the topographical and
agricultural features of the thinner settled regions
traversed by him. The chief surgeon made a care-
ful examination and report upon the sanitary con-
dition of all the chief cities and towns, as well as
of the outlying districts, which might become the
source of infection from epidemic disease. The in-
spector general, chief commissary, and chief quar-
termaster did similar work in their respective de-
484
MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA
partments. It is safe to say that no area of like
extent in the world was ever more thoroughly or
more rapidly reported upon with reference to its
economic and sanitary conditions. The result of
these examinations was set forth in elaborate re-
ports with the necessary sub-reports to the com-
manding general of the Military Division.
The story was everywhere the same. From the
largest cities, Matanzas and Cienfuegos, to the
smallest and remotest villages, the greatest poverty
and distress prevailed. No repairs of roads, streets,
or public buildings had been made for four years,
and but little revenue from any source had been col-
lected or disbursed. The people had been driven
from the farms and the poorer plantations into the
larger towns and cities. Production had been ab-
solutely suspended everywhere except upon the plan-
tations which were rich enough to buy protection,
and, although yams, or boniatos, could be produced
anywhere in quantities within six weeks from the
date of planting, it was evident that starvation had
been abroad in the land and that if the conditions
existing at the close of the war with Spain had
continued a few months longer half the population
would have been dead of starvation. In other words,
Weyler's policy of reconcentration with its mani-
fold horrors was everywhere doing its fatal work,
and, had our intervention not put an end to it, there
can be but little doubt that a year's further en-
forcement of it would have destroyed the bulk of
the Cuban population. As it was, when we took
charge the people had had several months in which
to start new crops in a small way. Fortunately,
in a country of Cuba's fertile soil and mild climate
485
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the recovery was rapid. But, in view of the fact
that every farmhouse, however humble, and every
sugar mill, however impoverished by competition
with beet-sugar, that the Spaniards could reach had
been burned, every banana and fruit tree destroyed,
all agricultural implements broken up, and all poul-
try and cattle killed, the state of impoverishment
was pitiful beyond description. In all my travels
over the two provinces, an area of something over
twelve thousand square miles, or about one-fourth
of the entire island, I did not see many acres of land
under cultivation, and yet there was not one acre
that was not admirably adapted to the production
of tropical fruits, coffee, tobacco, or sugar cane. All
the country needed was peace, proper economic con-
ditions, and capital. With these everything could
be supplied, without them a continuation of the dir-
est poverty and distress was inevitable.
As near as could be ascertained, the total popu-
lation of the department was at that time slightly
in excess of five hundred thousand souls, approxi-
mately two-thirds of which were white and one-
third colored. We estimated that during the war
and the few months immediately following over one-
third of the population of Matanzas and one-seventh
of the population of the Santa Clara province had
been killed or had died of sickness and starvation,
leaving behind forty-four thousand widows and
sixty-nine thousand orphans in the two provinces.
From the insular statistics it appears that those
two provinces at the outbreak of the war contained
one million two hundred and sixty-five thousand
head of horned cattle, which, according to the re-
port of my officers, had been reduced to forty-one
486
MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA
thousand eight hundred head at its close. In other
words, the Spaniards, aided by the insurgents and
the people, had in three years killed and eaten about
one million two hundred and twenty-five thousand
head. During the first six months of bur occupa-
tion thirty-two thousand seven hundred and seventy-
five head had been imported from Central America
and the Spanish Main. But, as these were mostly
for the use of the plantations, the poor people re-
ceived but little advantage therefrom. As all cul-
tivation in the island is carried on by the help of
oxen, it will be seen from this brief statement that
the great and pressing want was work, cattle, agri-
cultural implements, poultry, building materials,
and tools. With these means the work of reestab-
lishing their homes and restoring agriculture would
have been easy, but these means were precisely what
they could not get. Manifestly, they were impera-
tively needed, and after gathering the distressing
facts I lost no time in asking General Brooke to
supply them out of the insular revenues, which were
now rapidly accumulating at the various custom
houses. My first report was dated February 16,
the second June 20, the third August 1, and the
fourth September 7, 1899. With appendices and sub-
reports they covered two hundred and fifty pages,
and gave all the information properly indexed nec-
essary for a perfect understanding of the case.
I have every reason to believe that General
Brooke fully understood it and sympathized deeply
with the suffering Cubans. The revenues were am-
ple, and in view of the fact that it required only
about $350 to supply an impoverished farmer with
a yoke of oxen, a cart, two plows, two hoes, one
487
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
harrow, two pigs, ten chickens, an axe, and a pick,
and a bohio, or cabin, it is difficult to understand
why this policy was not adopted. It should be re-
membered that it was never so much as intimated
that the money should be given gratuitously to any
one, but that in every case it should be lent to the
honest needy with security, at not less than five per
cent, interest for one, two, and three years. It was
even suggested that as it was paid back it should
be added to the capital of an agricultural bank,
which all admitted was greatly needed in behalf of
that suffering interest. Inasmuch as it was the
money of the Cuban people which we were admin-
istering as a benevolent intercessor for their bene-
fit, every conceivable argument seemed to favor put-
ting it where it would do most immediate good.
When we consider, besides, that the insular rev-
enues were already largely in excess of the current
needs for both civil and military administration
and many millions were turned over by Brooke to
his successor, it is impossible to imagine any sound
reason for withholding the help the people needed
so badly. Indeed, no good explanation was ever
advanced for not offering it to them. But it leaked
out finally that someone at Brooke's headquarters
thought it would look like " paternalism," whatever
that might be, and so it was withheld to the end of
the intervention mainly for sanitation, schools, and
public roads.
In my argument favoring the proposition I went
so far as to ask that the money already set aside
for the payment of the unnecessary rural guard
which had been established in the province of Santa
Clara before I took charge of it, and which it was
488
MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA
proposed to set aside for the payment of a rural
guard in the province of Matanzas, should be turned
over to me monthly for the purpose of lending it as
far as might be necessary in the manner fully set
forth in my reports. I urged that the rural guard
was neither republican nor American and that, as
the municipality was the unit of civil administra-
tion, all the authorized police force should belong
to, be paid, and controlled by municipal authority,
subject, however, to the inspection of a military
superintendent belonging to my staff, and this was
the policy followed with perfect success and perfect
immunity from outbreak and violence in the prov-
ince of Matanzas till I surrendered the command
and left the island. It is but fair to add that Gen-
eral Brooke yielded to my importunities so far as
to send me a few thousand dollars, which were most
successfully lent out and expended near Matanzas
in accordance with my recommendation, with the
result that up to the time I left every dollar due
had been repaid and, so far as I know, so continued
to the end.
Both Betancourt, the governor of Matanzas, and
Gomez, the governor of Santa Clara, the latter now
President of the Cuban Republic, offered their guar-
anty of peace, and gave their personal and official
support to the measures which I proposed for the
reestablishment of industry and the relief of the
people's most pressing wants, but their interces-
sions were also in vain.
After I had completed my inspections and formu-
lated my measures for the immediate relief of the
people, General Brooke called a meeting of the
department commanders at his headquarters in
489
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Havana and asked them to discuss and elaborate
a plan for the reestablishment of agriculture, in-
dustry, and commerce. Generals Ludlow, Lee, Car-
penter, Wood, and I attended this meeting. I
brought forward my proposition, supporting it with
details which must have been as true and fully as
applicable in every other department as in my own.
The matter was discussed fully, pro and con. No
one denied the facts as stated by me, but not an-
other officer approved the remedy which I proposed.
The four agreed, however, in asking the Governor
General to divide the surplus revenue of the island
between them according to the population of the
several departments. They seemed to have no defi-
nite idea of what should be done with the money
farther than to clean up the towns, establish proper
sanitary conditions, and build a system of country
roads from town to town and to the seacoast. All
advocated reopening the schools and enlarging the
school system. One or two remained silent, but both
Ludlow and Wood talked exactly as though they
expected to occupy the island and remain in mili-
tary command indefinitely. Both seemed confident
that pacification, which under the law was our sole
function, could not be established for years. Lud-
low went so far as to say afterward in Washington,
probably to the President, that he did not think
the Cuban people would become sufficiently pacified
or fitted for self-government within a generation.
Whatever may have been Wood's real views at that
time he gave ready assent to the President's final
determination to set up an autonomous government
in the island, to withdraw our armed forces, and
to make a treaty with the new government which
490
MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA
should determine its relation with the Government
of the United States, and which I was the first and
only one to recommend.
At the Havana meeting I not only combatted
the opinions Ludlow brought forward, but asked him
bluntly where he got them. His reply was as frank
as my question: "I got them from William Mc-
Kinley, President of the United States. " This was
a startling statement, and, as far as I knew, could
have had no foundation except that of a personal
interview, but, as it seemed to me to be in absolute
violation of the actual conditions as well as of the
Joint Eesolution, I added at once: "No matter if
you did get your views from President McKinley, I
venture the prediction that we shall all be lifted
out of here by the will of the American people within
less than two years. They will never consent that
the President or any of his subordinates shall vio-
late the public faith as pledged in the Joint Eesolu-
tion in face of the treaty with Spain and of the con-
ditions as they have been shown to exist in this
island. " It is with pride that I call attention to
the fact that such was afterward the course of
history.
It is not within the scope of this narrative to
recount the circumstances by which my prediction
was made good, but in order that it may be more
fully understood I shall briefly state my connection
therewith.
In my special report, which was the only one
of the kind submitted, ' ' on the industrial, economic,
and social conditions " existing in the department,
dated September 7, eight months after the occupa-
tion of the island, I reiterated and elaborated my
491
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
views in reference to the pacification and reconstruc-
tion of the provinces under my control. I set forth
fully the condition of the disbanded Cuban army
and of the people to which it had returned ; the sup-
pression of the spirit of retaliation ; the reestablish-
ment of municipal government and of the judicial
system with such modifications as had become nec-
essary through the change of government; the re-
opening of the schools ; the restoration of the sugar,
tobacco, and cattle industries, and of such other in-
terests as had been deranged or destroyed by the
war or by the disturbed economic conditions which
had resulted therefrom. After declaring that a per-
fect state of tranquillity had prevailed from the date
of our arrival in the island, I pointed out that the
circumstances of the case confronting us had had
no parallel in modern history for the destruction of
life and the ruin of industry. While I called atten-
tion to the fact that distinguished statesmen had
confidently suggested British Indian methods for
our imitation, I showed that those methods were
not applicable to the free people of Cuba; that we
had intervened as a friendly ally, not for spoil or
conquest, and for the purpose of securing to our-
selves a quiet neighborhood and to the Cubans the
right of self-government, free from repressive
commercial conditions, as well as from the embar-
rassments of a state religion. The cases were by
no means similar. The problems of India and of
British domination were entirely different from the
problems of Cuba and of the western world, in which
oppressive colonial government and the persistent
violation of economic laws had always prevailed.
Those violations, extending over a period of four
492
MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA
hundred years, had enriched the Spanish official
classes, while they had impoverished the Cuban peo-
ple. Spain herself had spent nearly a thousand
years in war against the Moorish invaders. She
had succeeded through extraordinary heroism in ex-
pelling both the converted and the unconverted, and
had followed that by driving out the Jews. She had
established the Inquisition and burned heretics with-
out number for a hundred years. She had taken
no part in the crusades and had devoted no time to
a renaissance or to a reformation. She had dis-
covered and occupied the new world, exterminating
the native races and introducing African slavery in
her search for gold. She sent her civilization, such
as it was, along with her colonists, but seems to
have had no adequate conception of justice and
mercy. How far these facts may have changed the
underlying nature of the Spanish people or modified
their civilization, and how far they unfitted the
Spanish colonists for the establishment and main-
tenance of a just and peaceable system of local self-
government, I leave others to explain. While I am
willing to admit that neither the Cuban, the Mexi-
can, nor the South American Spaniard seemed to
have been as well fitted at any time for self-gov-
ernment as were the English, Dutch, and Swedish
colonists, I maintain that the Cuban people, with
all the faults they may have inherited, would more
rapidly fit themselves for self-government if they
were freed from the oppressive conditions which
they had inherited from, or which had been inflicted
upon them by their Spanish ancestors.
I contended then and I contend now that the
sooner the Cubans were permitted to establish their
493
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own government, take charge of their own internal
and external affairs, and get rid of the restraints
and exactions of hostile tariffs and foreign trade
restrictions, the sooner they would become a pros-
perous and enlightened people, capable of peace-
able, intelligent, and stable self-government, as well
as a source of profit to the United States.
While these conclusions were the merest truisms
of political economy, they received but scant and
tardy recognition from our own Government. The
senators and the representatives in Congress were
slow to learn the facts. Even the great independent
newspapers of the country were apparently indif-
ferent to the real situation and to the actual state
of affairs among the Cuban people. After the first
excitement over the establishment of peace and the
occupation of the island wore off the Associated
Press news agency at Havana fell under the control
of an alien ex-convict, who became the facile tool
of the grafters and speculators from the States and
deliberately perverted the news from all parts of
the island to the glorification of the Administra-
tion's favorites and to the prejudice of the Cuban
people. Every little row between drunken soldiers
and idle citizens was magnified into a lawless out-
break. The islanders were called " dagoes " and
" niggers " and stigmatized as ignorant and vicious.
"Bandoleerism" was said to prevail in all the rural
districts, and the severest measures of repression
were openly urged upon the military commanders.
But, fortunately, all the American newspapers did
not belong to the Associated Press. Several of them
had able and independent correspondents, who made
it their business to see things as they were and to
494
MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA
report them truthfully. Still more fortunately, the
New York Sun, which, under the control of the late
Charles A. Dana, had always been favorable to Cuba
and its heroic sons, got from the police records the
history of the Havana news agent, and by publish-
ing it on its editorial page eliminated from news-
paper activities the person who had already done
such irreparable mischief. From that day the Amer-
ican press began to publish more truthful accounts
of the conditions prevailing in the island of Cuba.
This was especially true of the Sun, whose able
writers made a careful study of the actual conditions
prevailing in the island and of the antecedent causes
which produced them. At my suggestion the sugar
question, as affected by the commercial war between
beet and cane sugar, and as it in turn would cer-
tainly affect the actual and future economic condi-
tion of Cuba, was fully discussed in the columns of
that journal. The discovery of beet sugar and the
influence of the Battle of Trafalgar and the Orders
in Council upon the establishment of the beet sugar
industry were fully and impartially set forth. The
system of bounties in favor of beet sugar and of
the duties and imposts against cane sugar, were
carefully described. The improved methods of sugar
manufacture, the consequent world-wide fall in
prices, the ruin of the cane sugar planters in all
the tropical countries, the increased use of sugar
from a luxury of the rich to a daily necessity of
the poor throughout the civilized world, together
with the far-reaching consequences of these facts,
and the important economical and political changes
they had produced, were pointed out so clearly that
a country storekeeper could understand them. In-
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
deed, it is safe to say that two articles published
in the Sun in the year 1899 contained more facts
and information than the Administration ever got
elsewhere and more wisdom and statesmanship in
regard to Cuba and its future than Congress in all
its legislation ever utilized or displayed.
During the eighteen months that I remained in
command at Matanzas two secretaries of war, one
postmaster-general, and many of the leading sena-
tors were guests at my headquarters, where all the
facts of the actual situation were laid before them.
The leading Cubans of all occupations were freely
introduced to them, and they were taken, besides,
to all the important towns and cities and to several
of the most important plantations, where they saw
for themselves the conditions as they actually were
at the time. There was no room for ignorance or
deception. The facts were everywhere perceptible,
and no one disputed them, but little perceptible
progress was made in the solution of the grave and
important questions they presented and illustrated.
The grafters and speculators were actively at work,
some striving to get concessions and contracts
through the government of intervention, others
striving to stir up doubt and dissatisfaction in the
United States, if not social and political disturb-
ance among the Cuban people. The evident inten-
tion was to prolong the military occupation and to
delay the establishment of local self-government and
independence. But, fortunately, Senator Foraker,
with whom I was in close correspondence, had great
influence in Congress, by which he succeeded in at-
taching to the appropriation bill an amendment
which positively forbade the granting of any conces-
496
MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA
sions whatever in Porto Eico, Cuba, and the Philip-
pines during the period of intervention. While this
brought all such schemes to a standstill and was a
great relief to the military governors, the actual
work of political reconstruction and rehabilitation
still languished.
General Brooke was relieved from the supreme
command in Cuba after a year's conservative man-
agement, during which he knew nothing of the Wash-
ington government's real policy "except by induc-
tion, ' ' and there can be but little doubt that this re-
moval was due to misrepresentation, or that it was
made mainly for the further reward of the Presi-
dent's personal friends.
Cushman K. Davis, the distinguished Eepublican
senator from Minnesota, naturally favored the re-
tention of his old friend, Brooke. Several others,
recognizing that Brooke was doomed, urged the
appointment of Ludlow; a few recommended Wade,
while one of the Virginia senators asked for
Lee. But by far the larger number, including the
leaders of that body, strongly urged my appoint-
ment on the ground that I had had many years' ex-
perience in civil life and had successfully managed
the department with which I had been entrusted, and
that my appointment would be approved by the peo-
ple of both countries. Influence and public consid-
erations, however, were of no avail against the
preferences of the President and his family and
personal coterie.
497
XVII
CALLED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONFERENCE
Interview with Secretary of War Conference with the
President Statement to the Senate Committee on
Relations with Cuba Return to Matanzas Death of
my wife Annual reports and general statements.
Early in January, 1900, shortly after the change
of governor generals was made in Cuba, I was sum-
moned to Washington. On my arrival I reported
to the Honorable Elihu Eoot, the newly appointed
secretary of war, whom I had known favorably and
well from the first year of his advent in New York.
After the usual friendly greetings he said in sub-
stance :
"General, I am sorry you wrote your reports
about the conditions in your department. "
While this was somewhat of a surprise, I re-
plied at once:
"What is the matter with my reports, Mr. Sec-
retary? If they are not correct in both statement
and conclusion, I wish you would point out wherein
they are wrong.''
To this he answered with some confusion:
"Oh, they are all right, but I wanted you to sup-
port the policy of the Administration."
This was still more surprising, but, pausing long
498
CALLED TO WASHINGTON
enough to call his attention to the fact that as secre-
tary of war he was my superior in rank and ought
to know that he had only to issue his orders to com-
mand my prompt obedience or my immediate resig-
nation, I asked with emphasis and possibly with
some show of feeling:
"But what is the policy of the Administration,
Mr. Secretary? That is exactly what I want to
know, and I have been trying for a year to find out.
I have carefully read all the statute laws, orders,
and messages in any way connected with Cuba, have
asked every officer of the Government and every
senator and important person who has visited or
written to me, and have, besides, read such of the
leading newspapers as could be in any way regarded
as inspired. I have utterly failed withal to find that
the Administration has any policy whatever in ref-
erence to this important matter, or, if it has one,
what it is, or how it is to be carried into effect. ' '
This prompt return seemed to slightly embarrass
the Secretary, and, instead of giving me a direct
reply, he began immediately to discuss the ques-
tion of establishing municipal government in the isl-
and of Cuba, whereupon I called attention to the
fact that the departing Spanish Governor General
had appointed mayors and members of the ayunta-
mientos, all of whom had taken their offices, and that
under Spanish law they had had fair and regular mu-
nicipal government in the island of Cuba by alcalde
and ayuntamiento, mayor and alderman, a hundred
years before there was a city of English-speaking
people in the Western Hemisphere. I also called his
attention to the Spanish code in respect to this mat-;
ter, and to the fact that the municipality is the unit
499
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
of all civilized government and that the same code
prescribed the qualification of Cuban citizenship in
terms which are far more precise, fair, and equitable
than those contained in our national laws or in many
of those enacted by the different states. This led
to a fair and full discussion of the subject, in which
I contended that little needed to be done by the in-
tervening government in prescribing the qualifica-
tion of Cuban electors, or in reestablishing munici-
pal government in the island. No race question and
no question of loyalty or disloyalty had yet been
raised in the island, and, so far as I could see, no
such question could be raised in time to delay or
otherwise embarrass the establishment of civil gov-
ernment. The discussion then took a wide range
over the affairs of the island as I had reported upon
them, and this discussion was renewed day after
day for nearly an entire week, during which the Sec-
retary pointed out no misstatement in my reports
and joined no issues with me in respect to either
the facts as they existed or to the conclusions which
I had drawn therefrom. In the most thorough and
friendly manner, every aspect of the problem before
the Government was fairly and fully considered. I
had arrived in Washington early on a Monday morn-
ing. Our conferences lasted from an hour to two
hours daily and upon one occasion well into the
night. At the end of them the Secretary signified
his desire that I should see the President, and, as
I was entirely under the order of the President
and his Secretary, I promptly said as much and that
I would go whenever the former was ready to re-
ceive me.
The Secretary accompanied me to the White
500
CALLED TO WASHINGTON
House and promptly presented me to the President,
who received me in a most friendly and cordial man-
ner. He had evidently been fully informed as to
the range of the discussion at the War Department,
and, although he indicated at the outstart that he
was pressed for time and could give me only twenty
minutes, he finally gave me full four hours, during
which I laid my views and conclusions fully before
him. He was, however, a highly interested inter-
locutor from the first, who asked many questions, and
seemed to be entirely satisfied with my prompt and
complete replies. I did not hesitate to declare the
island absolutely pacified from the date of our oc-
cupation and under the Joint Resolution of Con-
gress, which was the controlling law, " pacification "
seemed to be the only duty with which we were
charged, I unhesitatingly advised that a convention
should be called to frame a constitution of govern-
ment under which, as soon as promulgated, an elec-
tion should be held for President and members of
Congress, and, finally, that as soon as the result
was known the newly-elected government should be
installed and a treaty should be negotiated between
it and the United States, defining fully the relations
between the high contracting parties. Pointing out
that the census, which I had been the first to recom-
mend, had been ordered, and that it would reveal
the fact that the population would be found to be
two-thirds white and one-third colored, and that,
while no conflict between the races had yet appeared,
the dominion of the white race in Cuba rested upon
as solid a foundation as it rests upon in our South-
ern states, I contended that the new government
would probably be peaceable and stable. I then
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UNDER THE OLD FLAG
briefly referred to the economic and social condi-
tions prevailing in the island as set forth in my
reports, and argued that they not only called for,
but fully justified, such " close and reciprocal rela-
tions' 7 as would stimulate and develop Cuban in-
dustries and commerce and prove equally beneficial
to our own people. Under the conditions before and
after the war, as well as under the provisions of the
Teller Amendment or the Fourth Article of the Joint
Eesolution, declaring war with Spain, it seemed to
be self-evident that no other course was open to
him or to the government, and that the sooner this
course was adopted and carried into effect the better
it would be for all concerned.
Without contesting my statement of fact or my
argument, the President, in concluding the audience,
which had been extended far beyond the limit placed
upon it at its beginning, said without the slightest
intimation that his remarks should be regarded as
confidential :
" General, I am greatly obliged to you for the
information you have given in reference to the con-
dition of affairs in your department and in the isl-
and of Cuba. Up to this time we have had no policy
in regard to Cuba or our relations therewith, for
the simple reason that we have had no time to
formulate a policy. But the situation is now en-
tirely clear to me. Henceforth we shall proceed with
certainty toward a definite end."
While he did not so far depart from his usual
caution as to indicate in terms what his policy was
to be, I understood him to imply that it would be
substantially in the line I had indicated, and sub-
sequent events confirmed this conclusion. Several
502
CALLED TO WASHINGTON
months after my own connection with Cuba and with
the department which I had administered had ter-
minated Mr. Boot assured me in the most unequivo-
cal terms that I had never written a report nor made
a recommendation in reference to Cuba or to the
policy which our government should adopt toward
that country that did not receive his hearty ap-
proval, and yet it was fully another year till our
army was withdrawn and the new government had
taken charge of Cuban affairs. Many people, doubt-
less, thought that our occupation of the island, its
pacification, and the government which^was organ-
ized under our supervision constituted not only a
most rapid and satisfactory job, but one which was
greatly to the credit of the Administration.
Having concluded my interviews with the Presi-
dent and Secretary of War, I was called before the
Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba. Sena-
tors Platt, chairman, McMillan, Spooner, Teller,
Money, and Butler were present, and during the ses-
sion, which lasted several hours, every aspect of
affairs in Cuba was fully considered. Many ques-
tions were asked by the senators, all but two of
whom had recently visited Cuba. With my last re-
port in hand they were all answered as fully as
time and circumstance would allow. Nothing was
concealed or glossed over. The conditions of the
island and its people as affected by the war, the
policy of reconcentration, the great loss of popu-
lation from the war, the destruction of property,
the ruin of industry, agriculture, and commerce, the
need of financial help, the relation and proportion
of whites to colored, the policy of the Spaniards,
their expulsion, the judicial system, and municipal
503
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
institutions, the immediate establishment of a stable
republican government, and, finally, the negotiation
of a treaty which should safeguard our interests and
provide for close and reciprocal relations on a free
trade basis, or, failing in that, on a preferential
basis which should be as liberal as possible, were
all considered and every point of interest was elab-
orated and fully explained.
The meeting, which took place Friday, January
12, 1900, was a most friendly one in which no dis-
cordant note was heard and no sign of disagree-
ment or antagonism was developed. Eepublicans
and Democrats vied with each other in striving to
draw from me a full and fair statement of every
fact and condition bearing upon the military occu-
pation of Cuba, the pacification of its people and
the establishment of a republican government which
should be stable and peaceful. During my examina-
tion I was even asked if to my knowledge any of
the other commanders in Cuba held the same views
I did in regard to the questions under consideration,
and in reply I was obliged to say they did not, but,
on the contrary that they would, one and all, prob-
ably take the view that we had better go slow in
arriving at definite conclusions.
With all the arguments I could bring to bear, I
urged the calling of a sovereign convention at an
early day, to be held at Santa Clara, rather than
at Havana. This convention should receive the as-
sistance of a committee of United States senators
and judges in framing a constitution of government,
which when finished should not be submitted to the
people, but should be declared to be the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Cuba. It should be put im-
504
CALLED TO WASHINGTON
mediately into effect, and as soon as the government
provided for should be installed and ready for busi-
ness, a treaty of peace and commerce should be
negotiated by the United States with it in such man-
ner and in such terms as would fully define the poli-
tical and commercial relations of the two countries
and provide for carrying the terms of the treaty
into effect.
So important did the chairman of the committee
regard my statement and the plan I had outlined
that he notified all present to regard the hearing
and the views which it had brought out as strictly
confidential. He even went so far as to direct the
official stenographer not to transcribe his notes, and
as a matter of fact they were not transcribed or put
in print till nearly two years later, long after the
policy adopted had been carried into effect and our
army withdrawn from the island. Even then the
notes were somewhat carelessly transcribed and
abridged. But such as they were they were finally
clearly printed by the Committee without any re-
vision from me and may now be consulted by the
student of our relations with Cuba. 1
But in order that there may be no misconception
in regard to conditions in Cuba during our first in-
tervention, or to the views I held and expressed
thereupon, I summarize my testimony substantially
as follows:
I have made a thorough study and report upon
all conditions prevailing in the central provinces
of the island from January 10, 1899, to the same
lf< Conditions in Cuba," Testimony of General James H. Wilson,
Jan. 12, 1900, as printed by the Senate Committee on Eelations with
Cuba.
505
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
date in 1900, and after asking Governor General
Brooke first as to the state of the laws of the United
States in regard to the military occupation of the
island and second as to the policy of the adminis-
tration in carrying the laws into effect, without get-
ting any definite instructions as to either, I pro-
ceeded to visit every town, township, municipality,
city, and seaport under my jurisdiction by water
and rail, or on horseback, interviewing every intel-
ligent citizen and official from the provincial gov-
ernor and leader of the insurgent forces to the
mayors, judges, councilmen, priests, school-teachers,
and planters. Their statements were taken down
by my stenographer, and the reports I submitted
were based on information gathered in that way.
The two provinces were found to contain a super-
ficial area of about twelve thousand square miles
and a population of five hundred and sixty thousand,
two-thirds of which were white. They were produc-
ing at that time about eighty per cent, of all the
sugar and forty-five per cent, of all the tobacco of
the island. Their maximum output up to that time
was a little over a million tons of sugar, with a prob-
able expansion under favorable conditions to two
million and a possible expansion to four million tons
per year. It i the best cane sugar growing area
in the world.
At the time of the occupation the towns, cities,
and reconcentration camps were crowded with starv-
ing men, women, and children, dying at the rate
of eight hundred per week, and I estimated that
within a year under the same heartless policy the
entire agricultural population would have perished.
The richer planters had by bribery or by force
506
CALLED TO WASHINGTON
protected their plantations and farm buildings from
destruction, but nearly all the farm houses, agricul-
tural implements, and growing crops of the poorer
people had been destroyed, and nearly all the farm
stock of every kind had been killed and eaten. Most
of the insular officials under the Spanish regime had
thrown up their commissions and withdrawn from
the island. The governors recently appointed under
the plan of insular autonomy were good men, but,
feeling that the insurgent leaders were entitled to
the offices, the new governors after a short interval
insisted on resigning. The place in Matanzas was
given to General Pedro E. Betancourt, a distin-
guished physician and surgeon, educated in the
States, while that in Santa Clara was given to Gen-
eral Jose Miguel Gomez, a successful ranchman, of
high character and ability, who is now President
of the Eepublic. They had both been despoiled of
their property and had taken up arms on the broad
principle that they might as well be killed by the
Spaniards as starved to death in the woods.
The mayors appointed by the Spaniards before
leaving or by us afterward were, without exception,
a most excellent set of men. And they, as well as
the citizens of all classes, cooperated with us most
cordially in maintaining order, relieving and caring
for the sick and starving, and in preparing for local
self-government. I gave a full account of munici-
pal government, the machinery for the administra-
tion of justice, the need for schools, and the means
necessary for the restoration of agriculture, indus-
try, and commerce.
I pointed out that there was no friction between
the people of my department and the army of occu-
507
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
pation, and that the natives were obedient to the
law, free from violence and crime, patient, and
friendly with those in authority over them, and anx-
ious only that we should tell them what we wanted
done and how to do it. Natives and Spaniards were
treated alike and counseled to live together in mu-
tual peace and forbearance without reference to the
past. They were told in no uncertain terms that
bygones must be considered as bygones and that all
peaceable citizens must be regarded as equal before
the law, and this they seemed to accept as just and
fair to all. I also pointed out that Cuba was then,
as it is now, the only Spanish- American country in
which the whites had always been largely in the ma-
jority, that the planters, engineers, doctors, priests,
lawyers, and merchants were educated people, but
most of the poorer classes were illiterate and com-
paratively ignorant.
After answering every question fully and fairly
I told the committee that, while the planting class
and many of the merchants evidently wanted an-
nexation, I had no doubt that the mass of the people
wanted a free and independent republic, and to that
end expected the United States to carry out the pro-
visions of the Fourth Section of the Joint Resolu-
tion, which pledged the United States to exercise
neither sovereignty, jurisdiction, nor control in the
island of Cuba, except for the pacification thereof,
and declared it to be their purpose when that was
accomplished to withdraw their armed forces and
leave the island and its government to its people.
Obviously, the only question left for considera-
tion was when and how this policy should be carried
out. As the pacification was complete, the first thing
508
CALLED TO WASHINGTON
to be done was to lay the foundation for a republi-
can government which should be peaceable and
stable. In other words, to frame a constitution
through the agency of a sovereign convention, which
by its terms would go into effect without submis-
sion to the people. This convention should be elected
by a popular vote under the excellent election laws
which the Spaniards had left behind them. I sug-
gested that this convention should have the advice
of three or four United States Senators and two
justices of the supreme court, standing, as it were,
in loco parentis.
After adopting a constitution fixing the form and
organization of the government, the next step would
be to hold an election for president, senators, and
congressmen, and when the result was known to in-
stall the new government, and give it complete con-
trol over all the affairs of the Eepublic, subject only
to the conditions which might be imposed by the
Congress of the United States as a necessary safe-
guard to our common interests.
Meanwhile, I advised a conservative expenditure
of the insular revenues, mainly for the promotion
of agriculture and the reestablishment of industry
and commerce. I deprecated the expenditure of any
money by the government of intervention for roads,
harbors, or even for schools, except for school fur-
niture and for starting a normal college for the edu-
cation of schoolmasters. I would prohibit the grant-
ing of franchises for the extraneous development
of the island's resources, and would confine the gov-
ernor general to the maintenance of order and the
collection of the revenues.
Having thus formed and installed the new gov-
509
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
eminent, I should then proceed to the negotiation of
a treaty defining the " close and reciprocal rela-
tions ' ' which President McKinley had already wisely
said should prevail between the two Eepublics. I
then recommended that that treaty should guarantee
to the Cuban people a republican government which
should be stable and peaceable, provide for a postal
union, for reciprocal free trade relations in natural
and manufactured products under a common tariff,
and possibly a common supervision of the customs.
Failing in that, I advised reciprocal and fair reduc-
tions in tariff rates both ways, on the ground that,
while this would greatly stimulate agriculture, es-
pecially in sugar, tobacco, and fruits, in Cuba, it
would give us the control and profits of trade with
the island. I urged that some such general arrange-
ment under a new treaty would not only make the
greatest boom Cuba had ever had, but it would help
to Americanize the island more than anything else.
Finally, I suggested the cession of one or more
naval stations to the United States "for the better
protection of the American ports in the Gulf of Mex-
ico and of such inter-oceanic canal as might be con-
structed by the United States at Nicaragua or
Panama. "
My session with the Senate Committee was a
most interesting one, and covered every possible
question that the senators could suggest. In con-
clusion it was decided that my testimony should be
regarded as confidential until the Committee should
think proper to give it out, but it was printed for
the use of the Committee on Eelations with Cuba.
That it had a controlling influence in the legisla-
tion and policy which followed is shown by the fact
510
CALLED TO WASHINGTON
that a census was taken, that a sovereign conven-
tion was elected and Assembled, that it framed and
adopted a constitution modeled on our own, that
this was followed by the formation and installation
of a republican government, which in turn entered
into a treaty with the United States, in which the
latter was represented by Colonel, now General,
Tasker H. Bliss, who had been my chief-of-staff,
and was taken from it to be collector of customs for
the island during the first occupation. I was con-
sulted no further, and, although the plan I had out-
lined was adopted, no mention was ever made of my
part in it either by the Washington administration
or by the Senate.
It is worthy of note, however, that, instead of
forming a Customs Union, or Zolverein, under which
reciprocal free trade would have been established to
the great profit of both countries, a treaty was ne-
gotiated in which the United States granted a twenty
per cent, reduction of duties on Cuba's principal
products, and exacted from forty to eighty per cent,
reduction on such articles as she might buy from us.
While the arrangement has worked well and
Cuba has greatly profited under it, white wages have
risen, immigration of white people has increased,
agriculture has been reestablished, railroads have
been built, and commerce has flourished, it is greatly
to be regretted that the more liberal policy of abso-
lute free trade had not been adopted, for it is now
certain that that would have still more powerfully
stimulated the progress of Cuba in all directions
referred to above. It is equally certain that it would
still more largely have increased the profits of the
United States from the joint traffic, stimulated the
511
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
emigration of Americans to the mild climate and
fruitful land of Cuba, and, finally, added more than
all other causes to the peace and stability of the
Cuban government.
What will ultimately become of Cuba it is im-
possible to say, but, having come within the in-
fluence of our economic system, it may well be hoped
that it will sooner or later be received fully into
our political system on such fair and equitable terms
as shall be beneficial, as well as satisfactory, to
both countries.
Having concluded the business which called me
to Washington, I returned at once to my post at
Matanzas, where I took up again my decreasing civil
and military duties. As long as I remained there
my relations with the Military Governor at Havana
and with the people of the two provinces were most
friendly and satisfactory. I continued to do what
I could to preserve the peace, restore agriculture,
and promote commerce without calling for or wast-
ing the revenues of the island unnecessarily, and
also without controversy of any sort. The remain-
der of the cooler season was delightful. The troops
of my command had been reduced to two regiments
of infantry and one of cavalry, or about two thou-
sand one hundred of all arms. Their behavior was
all that could have been desired, and their health
quite as good as it would have been in the States.
With the help of my wife and daughters and of the
able and accomplished officers of my staff, the beau-
tiful Quinta Felix Torres, which had been rented and
refitted for my official residence, became the social
center of the region under my control. I received
and entertained all the important people, whether
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CALLED TO WASHINGTON
foreign or native, who did me the honor of calling,
and once a week I gave a ball for the civil and mili-
tary officers and their wives, as well as for the lead-
ing gentlemen and ladies of Matanzas. It was the
beginning of a new and happy era for the entire
region. The city was a model of order and cleanli-
ness. The people had returned to their homes, the
plantations and ingenios had resumed operations,
and prosperity was everywhere showing its smiling
face.
In the midst of growing contentment and happi-
ness on the morning of April 28, 1900, a terrible
calamity befell me and my family. I had just ar-
rived at my office in the town when I was startled
by an excited orderly with the information that my
wife had been frightfully burned while driving from
the Quinta to the bathing beach near San Severino.
Bushing up the street as rapidly as possible, I found
her seated on the sidewalk, surrounded by a crowd
of sympathetic but panic-stricken women. Her
skirts had been set on fire and completely burned
off by a wax friction match which someone had care-
lessly dropped on the floor of the army springwagon
she was using. I drove her home immediately and,
although the staff surgeon, aided by her daughters
and servants, did all in their power to alleviate her
suffering, she died at the end of a few hours in un-
told agony. Like a bolt out of a clear sky, it over-
whelmed us with consternation and grief. The whole
city went into mourning, while the President, the
cabinet, and our friends throughout the United
States sent us by cable and mail the warmest as-
surances of sympathy and condolence.
She was buried at Wilmington, Delaware, early
513
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
in May, 1900, in the cemetery of Holy Trinity, Old
Swedes Church, near the last resting place of her
parents.
At the close of the fiscal year ending July 1,
1900, I sent in the usual reports required by stand-
ing orders and army regulations, and had the satis-
faction of calling attention to the fact that the
statistics, conclusions, and recommendations of my
previous reports had all been fully justified by the
census and the lapse of time. The provinces had re-
mained tranquil, the people had resumed their in-
dustries as fast and as far as their scanty resources
would permit, and the municipal elections had been
conducted with perfect order and propriety. In
short, everything was in train, with the continued
patience and tractability of the people, for Cuba's
becoming "at an early date, a rich, independent,
and well-governed country. ' ' 1
This report, touching both civil and military af-
fairs, concluded my official connection with the first
intervention. Whatever delay there was in organiz-
ing the Cuban Eepublic, it is now known, was due
entirely to the Washington government. The first
president, Estrada Palma, who had been for many
years the financial representative of the insurrection
in the United States, was elected and inaugurated
without opposition. His administration was conser-
vative, honest, and non-partisan, though it was more
or less crippled from the first by a depleted treas-
ury and a lot of continuing contracts made by the
Government of Intervention, but withal its period
1 Annual Eeport of Brigadier General James H. Wilson, &c.,
commanding the Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara, July 22,
1900.
514
CALLED TO WASHINGTON
of four years was one of rapid recovery and increas-
ing prosperity. Palma was reflected as a conserva-
tive without an opposing candidate, and this gave
him, whatever else may be said, a clear and un-
clouded title to his office, though it did not shield
him from the criticism of the radical party, which
had come into existence during his first term.
Shortly after his second inauguration an armed in-
surrection took place, and this in turn forced him
to call upon the Government of the United States
for support. The Second Intervention followed un-
der Secretary Taft and Mr. Magoon, but, instead
of supporting President Palma and his Government
and requiring the former to retain his office as the
head of the constitutional republic and making him
and such part of his cabinet as could properly be
retained the basis of a reorganization, matters
were so managed that Palma felt compelled to
withdraw from his high position, along with the
cabinet and such part of their congressional sup-
porters as had been declared improperly elected.
In other words, an entirely new government was set
up under Magoon and the old round of activities
organized by the first Government of Intervention
was taken up by the second, as a result of which
the insular treasury, at the end of a year and a
half of poor administration, was left in a worse con-
dition than Palma found that of his predecessor.
This had a powerful influence in solidifying the peo-
ple and the radical party in opposition to the United
States and to their management of Cuban affairs.
With a broader and more liberal policy and a strict-
er observance of their duty under the treaty, it is
probable that the feelings of the Cuban people
515
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
might well have been made much more friendly than
they have ever been.
My friend, General Jose Miguel Gomez, whom I
came to respect most highly for his honesty and
sound judgment while serving under me as gover-
nor of Santa Clara, became the radical candidate
for the presidency and was elected by an overwhelm-
ing majority. He had always been known as an ar-
dent advocate of Cuban independence and of firm but
conservative government. It is fair to observe, how-
ever, that his administration was handicapped from
the start by the burdens the Second Intervention
had placed upon it through unnecessary activities
and extravagances. The contracts left behind were
not only beyond its strength, but carried with them
conditions which imposed upon the new President
a policy in some respects wasteful and unrepubli-
can. By increasing and spreading the rural guard
far and wide, the Cuban Congress has called into
existence a system which is not only useless in war,
but can easily be made an instrument in the hands
of the President for the maintenance of govern-
mental control against the will of the Cuban people
in the time of peace. A tendency in that direction
is generally regarded as natural to Spanish- Ameri-
can countries, and obviously should be discouraged
upon all occasions in which the United States have a
controlling influence. As the Monroe Doctrine re-
quires us to defend the countries of the Western
Hemisphere from European aggression and unjust
oppression, it should be our established policy, as
far as possible, for the present at least, to discour-
age standing armies and navies for our North and
South American neighbors.
516
XVIII
THE BOXER WAR IN CHINA
Condition of affairs in China Offer my services to the
Secretary of War Ordered to Peking The only gen-
eral of any service familiar with theater of operations
In command of South Gate of Forbidden City Re-
establishment of order Commanded joint American
and British forces in capture of the Eight Temples
Count von Waldersee Return to America Brigadier
General Regular Army Retired by Special Act of
Congress Summary of Services.
Without devoting further time to the affairs of
Cuba, in regard to which I was charged with no re-
sponsibility except in my own department, I return
to my personal narrative. As may be recalled, I had
traveled extensively in China (1885-86) and estab-
lished close relations with gentlemen of intelligence
and influence. Through them I had become deeply
interested in the unsettled condition of affairs and
the family embarrassments of the Empress Dowager
at Peking. That extraordinary woman, confronted
by the impending failure of the dynasty through the
impotency of the Emperor, had notified the world
of his probable death at an early date and of the
necessity of finding a new and more promising heir
to the throne than the one she had previously chosen.
517
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
This led to a wide discussion among the Chinese,
as well as among the foreigners resident in the Em-
pire. Nearly every Chinaman, at least, understood
that these outgivings indicated the early and, pos-
sibly, the violent death of the Emperor Kwang Hsu.
The diplomatic corps were deeply moved, and, hav-
ing but little else to do, took part in the discussion,
keeping their own Governments fully informed in
regard to its various phases. Mr. Pethick, my most
intelligent correspondent, a man long resident in
China, and profoundly learned in Chinese history,
art, jurisprudence, and affairs, kept me fully in-
formed of all that was taking place. He was one
of the first to recognize the serious importance of
the Boxer movement and the dangers it threatened.
It was through him that I learned how great were
the difficulties which confronted the Empress Dow-
ager and how alarming the dangers that were men-
acing the legations of the treaty powers. At bottom
it was a conflict between ignorance and superstition
on one side and enlightened progress on the other,
and this conflict threatened the life and business
interests of every foreigner, including the foreign
ministers, and the Christian missionaries in the Em-
pire. The crisis was a grave one sure to involve
China in serious complications with the outside
world, and this especially aroused my deepest inter-
est. Foreseeing that the troubles would involve our
legation and our diplomatic interests, along with
those of the other nations, and that we should be
compelled to cooperate with them against any out-
break that might occur, I telegraphed the Adjutant
General of the army on June 17, 1900, suggesting
that in case of actual war my experience and ob-
518
THE BOXER WAR
servations as a traveler in northern China might
enable me to render important service to the Gov-
ernment, and I wished to be considered as placing
myself entirely at its disposal.
Within a few weeks the telegraph brought the
announcement that Admiral Seymour had started
to Peking with a relief expedition. A few days later
it was announced that the expedition was a failure
and had corne to a halt, that communication with
the legations had been cut off, and that all for-
eigners were evidently in great peril. A few days
later still, the world was startled by the news that
Seymour had been defeated and driven back, and
that nothing but a powerful intervention of the
Treaty Powers with a strong army to be contributed
by those nations who were willing to participate in
the enterprise, could save the legations and prevent
a disaster which would horrify the world. The next
thing I heard the Secretary of War had ordered a
force from the Philippine Islands to Taku and
Tientsin and had announced General Adna K. Chaf-
fee, who had been specially promoted to the rank of
major general, as commander of the relief expedi-
tion. Three weeks later on July 22 I received a tele-
gram from the Adjutant General notifying me that,
as a larger force would probably be sent forward
than had at first been intended, the presence of an-
other general would be needed, and that, if agree-
able, I would be detailed as second in command to
Major General Chaffee. Of course, this was wel-
come intelligence, and, although it required me to
serve under an officer whom I had always outranked,
I saw in that no ground for hesitation. The serv-
ice was a most important one, the General was a sol-
519
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
dier of large experience and high character, and I
had, besides, placed myself unreservedly at the dis-
posal of the War Department. Within forty-eight
hours I turned over the command of my department
to General Fitzhugh Lee, forwarded my military
and civil reports, sent my horses by the way of
Galveston and the Southern Pacific Eailroad to San
Francisco and started in person on July 24 with my
aids-de-camp, via New York and San Francisco,
to the scene of my new services in northeastern
China.
As it turned out, I was the only general officer
of any army connected with the Boxer War who had
ever traveled extensively in the actual or probable
theater of operation. I had personally ridden over
all the country from the Great Wall to the Yangtse
Kiang, and from Kaifong fu, the capital of Honan,
near the western border of the Great Plains, to the
seacoast. In addition, I was well informed as to the
disorganized state of the Chinese military forces
and of the utter incompetency of the Chinese Gov-
ernment to make war in accordance with modern
practice. But I was also fully alive to the defense-
less condition of the legations in Peking, and, there-
fore, felt that they might succumb any day to the
outbreak of a local mob or to a frenzied attack of
the Boxers, or of the imperial troops, and, hence,
put forth my best efforts to reach China and the
scene of disturbance at the earliest possible day.
Specially relieved from the delay of quarantine,
I tarried in New York only a few hours. Traveling
by express trains with my aids-de-camp, Lieuten-
ants Beeves and Turner, I reached San Francisco
at midnight of the fifth day, and the next day,
520
THE BOXER WAR
August 3, at noon, I left for Yokohama and Naga-
saki, via Honolulu, on the fast Japanese steamer
America Maru. Touching for a few hours at Hono-
lulu and ten days later at Yokohama, where I
changed steamers, I pushed on through the Inland
Sea to Nagasaki, where the United States transport
Indiana was waiting for me. While far from fast,
she landed me on the third day at Taku, the mouth
of the Peiho, just thirty-seven days from Cuba. As
far as I know, this is the quickest trip ever made
from that island to northeastern China. With only
a day's delay at Tientsin, some thirty miles inland,
I took train for Yangtsun, from which place I
reached Peking on September 6, escorted by a small
detachment of the Sixth United States Cavalry un-
der Lieutenant C. D. Ehodes, afterward my adju-
tant. Although the distance covered was about
twelve thousand miles, equal to half the world 's cir-
cumference, and involved four steamship voyages,
three railway trips, and a march of fifty miles over-
land, the entire distance was made without accident
or delay and with no other anxiety than that which
was natural to an officer who was striving to reach
the scene of what might end in a world tragedy.
Fortunately, I found all semblance of actual war
had been over for three weeks and a state of per-
fect calm prevailing.
As I have given a condensed but comprehensive
account of the origin, progress, and principal events
of the Boxer Eebellion, the relief of the legations,
and the reestablishment of peace in a new edition
of my little book on China, 1 to which I refer for de-
1 "China, &c., Together with An Account of the Boxer War,"
by James Harrison Wilson, D. Appleton & Co., 1901.
521
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
tails, comments, and opinions, I shall content myself
here with a few personal reminiscences.
My trip from Taku and Tientsin to Peking was
over familiar ground, but the villages had been
burned and looted by the allied columns, the people
had fled from their homes, their cattle, poultry, and
provisions had been carried off, and their growing
crops had been broken down and trampled under foot.
Desolation prevailed along the entire route, and, al-
though the fighting had ended three weeks before,
the sedgy banks of the Peiho were reeking with the
stench from the floating bodies of dead Chinamen.
At Tungchow, the port of Peking on the Peiho, I
heard of one well in which several women had
drowned themselves to escape what they regarded
as a worse fate. It was evident on all sides that
the allied armies had spared no Chinaman with
arms, or even with the appearance of arms in his
hands, but had been conducting war on the old plan
of kill, ravish, burn, and destroy. The people of
all ages and conditions, men, women, and children,
had fled as from a besom of destruction, leaving
their possessions to the plunderer and the torch.
A few weeks later in conversation with the grave
and dignified Field Marshal von Waldersee, who
had been chosen generalissimo of the allied forces
on account of seniority, in regard to the relative
practice of Europeans, Asiatics, and Americans in
conducting warfare, I took occasion to condemn as
a recrudescence of barbarism the wholesale prac-
tice of violence, outrage, and robbery which had
evidently characterized the campaign on the part
of the Europeans and Asiatics. In doing so I ex-
pressed the thought that, while our forbears ap-
522
THE BOXEK WAR
peared to have left the customs of the Middle Ages
behind when they came to America, their racial kins-
men from European countries, greatly to my sur-
prise, seemed to return naturally to the cruelties
of primitive man. I frankly confessed that I could
not understand it. To this remark the humane and
courtly Field Marshal replied with a sigh: "Ah,
General, I regret to say that Europeans, no matter
whence they come, have never abandoned the cruel
and outrageous practices which you so justly con-
demn. ' '
On arriving at Peking I dismounted at the Amer-
ican legation, where the Minister and his Secretary,
my friend, Herbert G. Squiers, an ex-officer of our
regular army, were on the lookout for me. They
gave me unstinted hospitality and during the week
I remained the guest of the Secretary and his fam-
ily they told me the interesting story of the defense
of the legations, in which they modestly minimized
the prominent and creditable part they had taken.
Here again I met my friend Pethick, the experienced
and learned sinalogue, who, it will be remembered,
had served as a trooper in the Twenty-second New
York Cavalry under me in the War of the Rebellion.
True to the gallant instincts of his youth, he had
taken a modest but essential part with Captain
Meyers, commanding the Legation Guard of U. S.
Marines, in the capture of the enemy 's advanced
posts on the city wall and in holding that command-
ing position against all subsequent attacks. What
a fortunate thing it was for all the legations and for
the Christian converts who flocked into them that
the American minister, Mr. Conger, an ex-major of
Dlinois Infantry Volunteers, had had four years of
523
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
strenuous marching and fighting during the Civil
War, while Sir Claude MacDonald, the British min-
ister, the elected commander-in-chief, had had much
experience in the English army! With these two
veterans in daily council and mutual support, the
gallant detachment of United States Marines, aided
and encouraged by Squiers and Pethick, as well as
by their sick and wounded captain, successfully
guarded both legations against attack from the di-
rection of the city walls night and day till the com-
ing of the allied columns put an end to the siege.
General Chaffee received me with a hearty wel-
come and with marked courtesy and consideration
and at once assigned me to the command of all the
American troops in and about Peking. In addition,
he gave me special charge over the main entrance
to the Forbidden City, as well as over the imperial
palaces, residences, and temples, including the quar-
ters occupied by the concubines and eunuchs which
the imperial court in the hurry of their fight had
left behind. He also put me in charge of that part
of the Chinese city which had been allotted to the
American troops. This was a great responsibility,
but all the officers of the American contingent ma-
rines and troops of the line were regulars and a
number of them graduates of West Point, who knew
exactly how to obey orders, as well as how to take
care of their commands and to respect the rights of
the people with whose interests they were charged
and for whose good order they were held responsible.
Through Pethick, who was the best Chinese scholar
among the foreigners, my orders and instructions
were translated into Chinese and posted in all public
places so that the merchants and men of authority
524
THE BOXER WAR
could read them freely and without interruption. So
far as I know, not a single breach of discipline oc-
curred after that. The result was magical. Slowly
at first, but certainly and completely in the end, the
Chinese came to understand that not only life but
property of every sort was safe in the American
quarter. In a few days the streets had been policed,
the markets and shops were reopened, and the peo-
ple of all classes had apparently resumed their daily
occupations as though no foreign soldiers were at
hand or disposed to make them afraid. It is a pleas-
ure to add that our example was followed by the
Japanese with the same happy results.
I had early established my headquarters at the
fine old Temple of Agriculture, on the edge of an
extensive grove of cedars not less than a thousand
years old, and at once proceeded to familiarize my-
self with the station of the various detachments,
charging their officers specially with supervising the
work of cleaning the streets and open spaces, and
with the establishment and maintenance of proper
sanitary conditions in the precincts under their
jurisdiction. As Major Ives, my chief surgeon in
Cuba, again came within reach and knew from long
experience exactly what was to be done, no neces-
sary precaution was neglected. Every line officer,
as well as every surgeon, received full instruction
and gave the heartiest and most intelligent co-
operation.
Finally, to broaden and more fully define our
purposes and methods, I put in force the provisions
of the military code, prepared by the distinguished
Professor Lieber and promulgated by Secretary
Stanton April 24, 1863, in General Orders Number
525
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
100, for "the government of the armies of the
United States in the field. " It will be recalled that
those instructions define in precise terms both mar-
tial law and the customs of war, in actual cam-
paign as well as in the occupation of captured ter-
ritory. It is a just, liberal, and humane code, the
first of the kind, I believe, ever formally issued
by a civilized nation for the government of its
armies, and, although I had put its principles
into effect in the Department of Matanzas and Santa
Clara, this was the first and only time, so far as
I know, that they were ever formally enforced in
an Asiatic country.
It will not be denied that a few men and officers
of the marine detachment, during the earlier days
of the occupation had appropriated abandoned prop-
erty and works of art, but, as these could not be
used for military purposes, the quartermasters were
directed to take charge of them in accordance with
standing orders and army regulations, to sell them
at public auction, to take the money received from
the sale into their regular accounts and to apply it
to supplying the current wants of the command. It
is confidently believed that no part of the regular
army got off with either silks, carvings, lacquers,
or porcelains in the way of loot, and that whatever
they carried back to the States they purchased at
the regular daily sales in the British quarter or
at the special sales of our own quartermasters. It
is a matter of pride that so long, at least, as I re-
mained in command, my orders as above specified
were strictly and cheerfully observed.
Shortly after arriving at Peking it was reported
that the Boxer general headquarters had been estab-
526
THE BOXER WAR
lished at Pa-ta-Chow, the Eight Temples in the foot-
hills some twelve miles northwest of the city, and
that the place was held by a strong force of Boxers,
or Chinese insurgents. It was decided by the allied
commanders that an expedition should be sent out to
capture those headquarters, to destroy the arsenal
a few miles further on, and to scatter the forces
which might be found in that region. The duty of
carrying this policy into effect was assigned to the
American and British contingents, and, very much
to my surprise, I was designated to command the
expedition of the joint forces. To what influence I
owed that honor I never knew, but I always sup-
posed that it was partly due to the fact that I had
visited the Eight Temples during my trip to China
in 1885-86, arid that I was familiar with the topog-
raphy of the surrounding country. At all events, I
took charge of the expeditionary force and sallied
out from Peking with a column of about two thou-
sand men, made up of two battalions of the Ninth
and one of the Fourteenth Infantry, under Major
Quinton, one section of Biley's battery, a small de-
tachment of the Sixth Cavalry of our army, and
from .the British force, the Welsh fusileers, two
battalions and one extra company of native Hindu
troops, Baluchs, Sikhs and Pathans, followed by a
large number of Hindu packers. As Lieutenant
General Sir Alfred Gazelee of the British contin-
gent, and his Adjutant, Brigadier General Barrow,
outranked me and my Adjutant, Lieutenant C. D.
Ehodes, they did not accompany the expedition, but
generously put their officers and troops absolutely
under my command.
Commencing the march at 3 P. M. on September
527
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
16, 1900, to the southwest and toward the Hun-ho
for the purpose of misleading the enemy, the whole
force bivouacked at Lin Ko Chow after dark that
night. At two o'clock the next morning we took
the road to the north and by a rapid march toward
the hills found ourselves shortly after daylight in
the vicinity of the Temples. Here I divided the
force into two detachments, the first composed of
the Baluch battalion and the Fourteenth United
States Infantry, which I dispatched under the super-
vision of my aid-de-camp, Mr. Turner, guided by
Mr. Squiers, and Mr. Jameson, both Americans, long
resident in the country and familiar with the local-
ity, to make a turning movement through the hills
to the rear of the Temples about the White Pagoda.
The main body of the command pushed at the proper
time to the opening in the foothills on the slopes
of which the Temples were situated. This com-
pleted the investment of the position except to the
eastward, on which side a detachment of German
troops was expected to take position.
The combined movements and operations were
attended by complete success. The Baluchs, who
were famous as mountain climbers, were kept in ad-
vance, closely followed by the Fourteenth U. S. In-
fantry, but, instead of " skipping from rock to rock
like mountain goats," as we had been led to believe
they would do, the Baluchs soon became fatigued
and, as Jameson afterward described it, they halted
"without skipping a single rock," while the Amer-
icans pushed by them and were the first not only to
reach the summit, but to descend into the valley be-
hind the Boxer position. With but little delay both
battalions opened fire on the Boxers in and about
528
THE BOXER WAR
the White Pagoda, the Americans pressing forward
and cutting off the retreat of the main body, while
a few broke from their position and, scattering up
the bare hillsides and ravines to the northeastward,
succeeded in making their escape to the open coun-
try. The principal force of Anglo-Americans, mov-
ing forward under the hills at the proper moment,
with a few minutes of light skirmishing, promptly
closed in on the Temples without casualty or acci-
dent of any sort. When I reached the Boxer shrine,
at or near Boxer headquarters, I found the altar still
smoking with incense and the few native women that
were left behind, running hither and yon with heart-
rending shrieks and frenzied excitement.
Wliile the fugitives were pursued far enough to
discover that they had neither coherence nor organi-
zation and a number of prisoners were taken, the
affair was soon ended and the main body of the at-
tacking force went into bivouac for breakfast and
rest while the Baluchs went to looting. The victory
was an easy one. Nine Boxers in uniform were
killed, while many more were wounded and carried
off, but, sadly enough, the only wounded person I
actually saw was a Chinese woman who had been
hit in the elbow by a stray rifle shot. Of course, she
received surgical attention at once and was reas-
sured and pacified, without further injury, but ap-
parently much to her surprise.
The whole affair was over before eight o'clock,
and a half hour later the British Adjutant General
joined us. After profuse congratulations and
praises for the skillful manner in which the joint
operations had been conducted, he asked permission
in the name of Sir Claude MacDonald to destroy
529
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the beautiful white porcelain pagoda which had
stood on the brow of the hill overlooking the plains
beyond for a thousand years, and was still as fresh
in appearance as the day it was built. Amazed
at the request, which seemed to be made in a spirit
of barbarism, I declared at once that I could not
countenance the destruction of such a beautiful
building while I remained in command of the joint
forces. Desirous, however, of knowing what jus-
tification could be advanced in support of this
strange request, I asked General Barrow why the
British Minister wanted to destroy so notable a
landmark. His reply was still more amazing, for
he explained at once that if the Christians did
not destroy this famous Chinese temple, the Chinese,
who had destroyed many missionary churches, would
conclude that their gods to whom the Pagoda was
dedicated were more powerful than the God of the
Christians. A brief conversation followed, in which
I stood by my disapproval of the proposition, but
concluded with the remark that I should dissolve
the Anglo-American command and withdraw our
contingent to Peking at an early hour the next morn-
ing, after which the British Minister and the British
commander would, of course, be free to take such
action as they might think proper. And there the
matter rested that night and the next morning till
I took up my return march, but I regret to add that
we had hardly got strung out in the plain below
when the British contingent, which had already un-
dermined the foundation of the pagoda, exploded
a charge of gunpowder under its base and toppled
the world-famed structure over in irretrievable ruin.
The curious and inexcusable sequel to this inci-
530
THE BOXER WAR
dent was that the Chinese correspondent of the Lon-
don Times, a Mr. Middleton, I believe, cabled that
journal that the White Pagoda had been destroyed
by my command and authority. Of course, news
of this message reached me a few days later, where-
upon I demanded that the correspondent should cor-
rect his inexcusable misstatement by cable at the
earliest possible moment and this, I believe, was fi-
nally done. But the event left a most unfavorable
impression in my mind, both on account of the views
brought forward by the British Minister and of the
unfair account the correspondent made haste to give
of it without even taking the trouble to learn the
real facts of the case as they would have been given.
The whole performance, although but seldom men-
tioned, was generally regarded by the allies as an
act Of superstitious vandalism, alike discreditable to
the British officers concerned and to the British
civilization which they represented.
While I held command at Peking during the ab-
sence of General Chaffee, I sent out several other
small expeditions to scour the country east, south-
east, and south of the city, to break up predatory
Boxer bands, to gather in the property, and to pro-
tect the Chinese converts at the missionary stations,
but in no instance did they discover any consider-
able armed force, nor any disturbance among the
people. Everywhere outside of the line of the allied
operations they found peace, order, and industry
prevailing as though there had been neither vio-
lence nor war in the land. Whether this was due
to the ignorance or to the duplicity of the people,
I leave others to decide. It has always been some-
what of a puzzle to me.
531
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
Our daily life in Peking was full of interest, for,
although every officer of the imperial Government
had disappeared with the Empress Dowager and
the court and the war had come to an end, the allied
powers were continuing their measures to establish
a definite and lasting peace. Field Marshal Count
von Waldersee was the last of the commanders to
arrive, and owing both to his high character and
his unusual rank the other commanders and the
members of the Diplomatic Corps received him with
every honor. Linevitch, the sturdy old Eussian;
Gazelee, the polished Briton; Yamaguchi, the mod-
ern Japanese, followed by Chaffee and myself, with
our staff officers in full uniform, escorted by a troop
of the Sixth Cavalry, met the Field Marshal outside
the walls on the Tung Chow road and, after extend-
ing the usual military courtesies, escorted him in
state to his headquarters in the imperial city. The
next day we called upon him formally, but without
notice. Not finding him within, we renewed out call
the following afternoon, according to appointment,
and were received with a blare of trumpets and a
salute of the guard. The stately Field Marshal him-
self came to the front and after a formal welcome
escorted us to his private quarters. Here showing
us to seats and taking one himself, he scanned us
closely, but kindly. After gathering in the details,
which he evidently approved, he turned to me and
said in excellent English, which he had doubtless
cultivated by daily conversation with his American
wife:
"And that is the full uniform of an American
general. I never saw it before, but it is mighty
fine!"
532
THE BOXER WAR
This, of course, broke the ice and led to a friendly
conversation, early in which he showed us with pride
the photograph of the Countess von Waldersee and
signified his decided admiration for American
women. This won our sympathy at once, and, al-
though the American contingent never formally
placed itself under his command, both Chaffee and
I became quite intimate with him. Shortly after-
ward Chaffee went again to Tientsin for a fort-
night, during which I had occasion to see the Field
Marshal frequently. I took luncheon with him and
his personal staff several times, and had many con-
versations with them. His chief -of -staff, Major Gen-
eral von Schwartzoff, and his assistant, Count von
York, were officers of great merit, the first of whom
lost his life in a fire which burned the headquarters
building in which he was sleeping, while the second
was asphyxiated north of the Great Wall by the
fumes from a brazier of smouldering charcoal. It
was a sad loss to the Field Marshal and in the lat-
ter case an unfortunate ending to the career of one
who had been counted on to fill the place of Von
Moltke, the great German chief-of -staff.
The German expedition to Paoting-fu was made
before their death, and, although its object was far
from apparent, Mr. Turner, my aid-de-camp, who
represented me on Von Waldersee 's staff, gave both
him and his officers high praise for the thorough-
ness with which they did their work. Of course,
he was there to help and to observe, and he seems
to have won the good opinion of all the officers, es-
pecially those of the Japanese staff, who did not
hesitate to assure me on their return that they felt
far more at home with my staff and the American
533
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
officers than with those of any other country. This
was probably because most of the Europeans, spe-
cially the English, seemed to look down upon them
very much as Li Hung Chang did before the Japan-
Chinese War.
After the expedition to Paoting-fu had started
and General Chaffee had returned to Peking, I gave
him a review of the troops serving under my com-
mand. This took place on October 3 between the
Temple of Agriculture and the Temple of Heaven
on the Chien Men, a wide street, running north be-
tween broad open spaces to the principal southern
gate of the Tartar city. It was admirably adapted
to the purpose for which we used it, the weather
was fine, and many of the generals, ministers, at-
taches, and officers of the various contingents were
present in full uniform.
The Ninth and Fourteenth Infantry, the marine
battalion, six troops of the Sixth Cavalry, and
Biley's battery of six rifled guns, all in excellent
condition and equipment and constituting as com-
pact and complete a brigade of fighting men as ever
made its appearance in the Far East, marched by
in column of companies, sections, and troops, with
their flags and guidons fluttering gayly, to the music
of the consolidated bands playing "A Hot Time in
the Old Town To-night !" The rank and file were
all young, stalwart, and fit, their service uniforms
were becoming, their arms in perfect condition, and
their alignment and marching all that could be ex-
pected of the finest veterans in the world.
The scene was one never before witnessed in
China, and never imitated afterward. The invited
guests were surprised and enthusiastic, and the
534
THE BOXER WAR
whole occasion was one which deeply impressed all,
including the Chinese, who saw it from afar. After
the troops had marched to their encampments the
invited guests were escorted to my headquarters in
the Temple of Agriculture, where they were regaled
with an abundant supply of punch and light refresh-
ments, with the usual assortment of American airs
from our military bands. All seemed delighted with
our entertainment. This was particularly true of
the East Indian officers, whose handsome uniforms
and soldierly bearing added to the interest of the oc-
casion. We were particularly struck, however, by
the fact that the lowest white officers in rank took
social precedence of even the Indian field officers.
If this is the common rule in the native army, it
must ultimately give our British cousins at good
deal of trouble before they are through with it.
The remainder of my stay in Peking was passed
in the routine duties of administration. Chaffee and
I made expeditions to the nearby places of interest
frequently, and on one occasion rode entirely
around the city with several staff officers and order-
lies on the top of the wall, which was furnished with
ramps at various points, where we went up or down
without dismounting. The trip of fifteen or six-
teen miles gave us a splendid view of the city and
surrounding plains and was one to be long remem-
bered.
After the beginning of proceedings looking to
peace, Secretary Hay of the Department of State,
looking upon me as an expert " China hand," pro-
posed that I should be associated with Mr. Eockhill
and Minister Conger as commissioners to represent
our Government in the negotiations, but Mr. Con-
535
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
ger made objections on the ground that the com-
mission would be larger than any other and there-
fore too cumbersome, and on consideration this view
was accepted. As my military work was at an end,
I was relieved from further service and returned to
the States by the way of San Francisco, reaching
home by the middle of December, 1900.
President McKinley received me with every mark
of consideration, and, after thanking me for my
services in China, as well as in Cuba, told me that
he intended to ask Congress for authority to trans-
fer Fitzhugh Lee, Joseph Wheeler, and myself to
the regular army, and then retire us with the rank
of brigadier general. Of course, I was gratified at
this very unusual proposition, recognizing it as good
policy so far as concerned Lee and Wheeler, both
of whom had served with high rank and great dis-
tinction in the Confederate Army, but I then called
the President's attention to the fact that I was not
eligible for retirement either by age, continuous
service, or infirmities. He, however, with good na-
ture and kindness, waived all that, and subsequently,
at his request, Congress passed a special act to put
us on the retired list, accordingly, and that was done
in due time.
Before leaving Washington, Mr. Boot, the sec-
retary of war, asked what further duty or assign-
ment I wanted, whereupon I replied, none that he
could give me. I then added that I had reentered
the army to take part in any war the Government
might have on hand, but, as it had reestablished
peace with all powers and potentates, I was ready
to return again to civil life and take up my private
business. I had no active interest in military af-
536
THE BOXER WAR
fairs except in times of war, and no desire but to
resume the pursuits of peace. That, he was good
enough to reply, was exactly what he expected me
to say, and so we parted.
I returned to my family and home at Wilming-
ton, where I have remained ever since, except for
three months, during which, accompanied by my
aids-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel John Biddle of
the engineers, Lieutenant Colonel Henry D. Borup
of the ordnance, my secretary, F. E. Mayer, and two
daughters, I represented the army, under appoint-
ment from President Koosevelt, at the coronation of
King Edward VII in 1902. This was an interesting
event. We were all duly presented at court, and I
placed a wreath on Queen Victoria's tomb at Wind-
sor, and, although the coronation was delayed two
months by the King's illness, my party were spe-
cially, but informally, invited to return to the ad-
journed ceremony, which we did, much to our per-
sonal edification and enjoyment.
This was my last appearance in public life, and,
although still enjoying unimpaired health and vigor,
and taking an unabated interest in everything that
concerns the public welfare and the prosperity and
greatness of our common country, I have little else
to do but to publish these historical glimpses of the
wars and events in which I took part according to
my opportunities.
If called upon to summarize my most notable
services, I should start with the part I played in the
Port Eoyal expedition, particularly in leading the
way across the salt marshes and planting the battery
which isolated Fort Pulaski and made its surrender
a mere question of time.
537
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
I regard my services on McClellan's staff dur-
ing the Antietam campaign and my personal sug-
gestions in regard to the course McClellan should
pursue when relieved from the command of the
Army of the Potomac as worthy of commendation.
I have never doubted that, had he followed my ad-
vice to the end, he would have been elected Presi-
dent of the United States, or come far nearer to that
destiny than he did.
The part I took as engineer and assistant
inspector general on General Grant 's staff in the
Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaign, as set forth
in the foregoing narrative, I have never doubted,
won General Grant's confidence and friendship.
This is shown, not only by his words, but by the fact
that through his recommendation I gained the rank
of brigadier general of volunteers.
I have always regarded my brief but rapid work
in reorganizing and administering the Cavalry Bu-
reau, the opportunity for which I owed principally
to Charles A. Dana, assistant secretary of war, as
having been highly valuable, for it resulted in giv-
ing the cavalry service more and better horses, arms
and equipments than it ever had before. My revised
regulations for the inspection of horses were a large
factor, not only in giving Sheridan's cavalry better
and improving mounts to the end, but in enabling
me to regenerate and make invincible the Cavalry
Corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi.
While my assignment to command the Third Cav-
alry Division, Army of the Potomac, over my sen-
iors may have been an injustice to them, I have al-
ways held that the services I rendered in the Wil-
derness, at the Yellow Tavern, Chesterfield Court
538
THE BOXER WAR
House, Hanover Court House, Ashland Station,
Hawes Shop, the crossing of the Chickahominy, St.
Mary's Church, and the passage of the James were
as valuable as the operations of any division in the
Cavalry Corps, while my success in breaking and
disabling the railroads in southern Virginia was the
severest blow the cavalry ever struck the Confeder-
acy, till Five Forks, Appomattox, and Selma
ended it.
The good results produced by my division at
Kearneyville and afterward at Winchester, were
largely due in both cases to the Spencer carbines
with which I armed it. This was besides the first
instance of the close and effective cooperation of
cavalry with infantry up to that date in Virginia.
Military writers generally regard my reorgani-
zation of Sherman's cavalry, its services at Colum-
bia, its defeat of Forrest at Franklin, and its col-
lection into a single corps in front of Hood's invad-
ing army as notable achievements. The impress-
ment of horses and the increase of the corps' effec-
tive force in ten days to twelve thousand men, who
broke through Hood's line at Nashville, turned his
flank, captured his batteries, took his left wing in
reverse, and compelled his army to retreat in dis-
order, closely pursued through the rain, frost, mud,
and ice of midwinter, have been cited as the best
instance of proper cooperation between cavalry and
infantry in the War for the Union.
The collection of twenty-seven thousand men, or
five divisions of cavalry, with proper artillery in
midwinter into cantonments at and near Gravelly
Springs, seventeen thousand of whom were well
horsed and armed, was a creditable performance.
539
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
The system of instruction, drill, and discipline there
instituted, lasting for ten weeks, produced most ex-
traordinary results, and, although I detached one
full division to Canby, another to middle Tennessee,
and still another to remain in camp with orders to
follow when mounted, I took with me three divisions
with twelve thousand five hundred men mounted
and one brigade of one thousand five hundred dis-
mounted. These figures seem to fully justify the
policy of concentrating and using cavalry in masses,
instead of scattering it far and wide in detachments,
as had been the previous practice in the West.
Finally, if anything further is needed to com-
mend this policy it is found in the history of what
turned out to be the "Last Campaign of the War."
I refer, of course, to that which defeated Forrest,
scattered his forces, captured Selma, destroyed the
armory, factory, arsenal, storehouse, and shipyard
at that place, and which opened the way to Mont-
gomery, West Point, and Columbus, to the passage
of the Chattahoochee River into Georgia, to the oc-
cupation of Macon, Atlanta, Augusta, and Milledge-
ville, and, finally, to the capture of Jefferson Davis
with his aids-de-camp and several of his cabinet
trying to make their way to the trans- Mississippi
Department for the purpose of continuing the war.
While General Lee has been credited with declin-
ing to carry on guerrilla warfare and to the noble
and disinterested example which gave the country
peace, it must not be forgotten that the capture
of Selma and its supplies on April 2, of which he
doubtless heard before he surrendered on April 9,
must have convinced him, as it certainly did Joseph
E. Johnston and other leading generals and mem-
540
THE BOXER WAR
bers of the Confederate cabinet, that the end had
come and that further resistance was useless.
If the Confederate soldiers and statesmen had
any doubt on this question after our destructive
march through Alabama and Georgia along their
main artery of inter-communication, it was neces-
sarily ended by the capture of Davis and his suite
and his imprisonment at Fortress Monroe. The fact
is Davis 's official work ended at Danville. Aided
by Lee, Johnston, arid Forrest, he had got all out
of the Confederate army that was in it, and, as
shown by his final cabinet conference at Charlotte,
needed only the ruin I had committed further south,
followed by his own capture as a fugitive, to con-
vince even him that the Union was 'triumphant and
indestructible.
That I was able a third of a century after the
close of the Civil War to resume my sword and do
my fair share as a general officer in two later wars
was an interesting, if not unique, experience, and
will, I hope, afford all justification necessary for
the personal reminiscences touching my part therein
and the great men who have honored me by their
friendships or by the reverse.
My success as a government engineer speaks for
itself. The removal of the rapids of the Mississippi
at Eock Island and the neutralization of those at
Keokuk were works of a pioneer character. The
surveys and plans submitted by me in 1868-9 for
cutting down the summit level and making a line
of deep navigation from Lake Michigan to the Illi-
nois Eiver were, in the main, adopted and carried
into effect without serious modification many years
afterward.
541
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
The plans which I supervised, controlled, and car-
ried into effect for the location, construction, and
equipment of the Sixth Avenue Elevated Eailroad
between the Battery and Central Park, New York
City, was pioneer work which served as guides for
all similar undertakings till the introduction of elec-
trical power for the operation of city railroads.
But the undertaking in civil life that gave me
the greatest satisfaction was the construction of the
St. Louis and Southeastern Eailroad, connecting
Evansville and my native town on the Ohio with
St. Louis. It led to the purchase of the roads from
Evansville to Nashville and their consolidation into
a through line, which gave both St. Louis and Chi-
cago the shortest and most direct connection with
the central Southern states. It was entirely success-
ful till the breakdown of 1873, at which time the
principal connecting railroads south shut off its
business and forced it into bankruptcy, which in
turn wiped out the stock, and on the foreclosure of
the bonds made the road a part of the Louisville
and Nashville system, where it has since proved
profitable to the purchasers, as well as to the coun-
try through which it runs. But that is not the best
of it. It opened up in connection with our other
railroads the entire region, which was almost a
forest much of the way, from St. Louis to Nash-
ville, from St. Louis to Louisville, and from Cairo
to Vincennes, to progress in all its branches. From
backwoods and the rudest sort of country life,
it has become the abode of industry, plenty, good
schools, flourishing churches, and thriving towns and
villages, in which prohibition is the rule and law-
lessness the exception.
542
THE BOXER WAR
While I lost my time and the profit I had fairly
earned, I feel that my associates and I did good
work, and I sincerely rejoice, not only in having
been a pioneer in it, but that I have been permitted
to live and to see its full fruition. I know of no case
in the whole country that did more good to the peo-
ple served by those lines in southern Illinois, for
the construction of which I was largely responsible,
In concluding this work I trust I shall be par-
doned if I venture to say, in no boastful spirit, I
have played my part as it came to me in war and
peace, and under all circumstances to the best of
my abilities and opportunities, and always and
everywhere according to the soldier's motto: "Aut
veniam viam, aut feciam!"
543
APPENDIX
CONDITION OF THE SOUTH AT THE CLOSE OF
THE WAR OF THE REBELLION
A REPORT MADE TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT
MACON, GEORGIA, November 23, 1865.
It has' occurred to me that the results of my observa-
tion during and since the Rebellion might throw some light
upon the various questions growing out of the abolition of
slavery, and thereby assist the public in obtaining a clear
understanding of the condition of the South at this time.
It is important that intelligent men should deal with these
questions dispassionately and discuss them without acer-
bity or prejudice. They are no longer local, but concern
the entire nation. The day of strife is past, and the era
for free thought has at last dawned upon the South. It
is hardly necessary to assure the reader that in view of
these facts I shall endeavor to write plainly and say noth-
ing but what is susceptible of proof.
Many of our writers have said, and not a few of our
people have believed, that the suppression of the rebellion
had settled the negro question, but this is a grave mistake.
That question is now fairly open for discussion, and justly
claims our serious attention. Upon its practical solution
depend the prosperity of the entire South and the welfare
of a race. How can the f reedmen be best protected in their
personal, social, and civil rights, be made a self-sustaining
and useful element in society, and be secured in the bene-
fits of their own labor and intelligence, with the privilege
of developing both to the utmost of their capabilities ?
545
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
The discussion will involve a statement of the rights of
freedmen, the present moral, intellectual, and physical con-
dition of the negroes, the influences which have been at
work upon both white and black society, as well as the
means necessary to secure simple justice to all persons un-
der the laws of the United States. An exhaustive discus-
sion of these subjects would require months of minute re-
search and patient industry, and would fill an entire vol-
ume ; but I shall endeavor to compress into this chapter all
that is essential.
The rights of freemen under our Government are by
no means generally understood in the South ; the rights of
freedmen, or people of color emancipated by the President's
Proclamation, and the successful enforcement of the latter
by the army, have neither been clearly defined nor gen-
erally recognized. A part of the difficulty arises from the
use of terms regarded as synonymous by Northern people,
for purposes of the law, but which in the minds of South-
ern people have a widely different meaning. Free men are
white and were always free freedmen are blacks, and were
once slaves, but by the force of arms are so no longer.
This much, and no more, the Southern people as a class
admit. In other words, the freedman is "a negro a two-
legged, yertebrate animal, good enough as a machine in his
place, but entitled to no consideration out of it, valuable
as a slave, but worthless as a freeman, and possessed of no
rights which a white man is bound to respect." But few
^Southern men have surrendered their convictions based
upon "the Bible right to enslave the descendants of Ham,"
or have yielded assent to the constitutionality of the Eman-
cipation Proclamation. Many say, I have no doubt, sin-
cerely, they are glad slavery has ceased to exist, but they
see no more plainly to-day than ten years ago the moral
wrong of withholding liberty from a fellow man. The ma-
jority do not acknowledge the negro as a fellow man; they
are bound to him by no relation except those established
for self-interest, and acknowledge no obligation except that
546
APPENDIX
which may be mentioned ''in the bond." It is no uncom-
mon thing for them to denounce abolitionism as bitterly
as they did before the war. I have known of one case in
which a minister of the Gospel, thoroughly identified with
the Rebellion, was charged by members of his church with
the advocacy of miscegenation, because in a sermon upon
practical Christianity he announced the Bible doctrine of
the unity of the human family ! The sentiment which un-
derlies these facts is not universal, but it is the popular
and positive one, which opposes liberal views, and which,
conjoined with ignorance and prejudice, prevents substan-
tial progress, and keeps from the people a knowledge of
what constitutes the rights and duties of freemen. It is
no exaggeration to say that no Southern newspaper has yet
dared to divest itself of prejudice and discuss that subject
truthfully, fearlessly, and persistently, and but few have
adverted to it in any other than a tone of expedient sub-
mission to national dictation. There is no such thing yet
as a free press in the South, nor can there be till free
thought becomes habitual. The feeble and timid efforts of a
newspaper in the city of Macon to conduct itself in ad-
vocacy of "the restoration of the civil order, and the ex-
istence of the national unity under the Constitution and
the laws," subjected its editor to so much insult and con-
tumely that he was compelled to appeal to military au-
thority for protection.
No public man of importance in this region, unless I ex-
cept Mr. James Johnson of Columbus, has had the nerve to
tell his people the plain, unvarnished truth, or to show
them clearly their relations to the general Government and
what would be required of them. His speeches were re-
garded as too radical on the points touching freedmen,
and have not been published; or, if published at all, have
been changed to suit the popular temper. No organic law
has yet been framed in the South which secures to the
negroes the simplest rights of freemen, no bill of rights
which declares that they shall not be punished for crimes,
547
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
except upon legal conviction thereof, or that enables them
to sue and be sued, acquire and convey title to property,
and testify in courts. Without further enumeration, it
may be clearly seen that no Southern state has yet framed
a constitution strictly republican in form since none has
yet provided for the security of those rights justly re-
garded by freemen as inalienable, and without which, se-
curity for life, liberty, and happiness is impossible.
Under the orders of military authority and in the proc-
ess of reconstruction, civil courts have been allowed to re-
sume their functions with instructions to administer the
laws as they existed previous to January 1, 1861, except
that in no case shall there be discrimination in reference
to color. But in the face of this clear principle of justice
the commanding officer of this district was to-day compelled
to arrest two justices of the peace for refusing, while in
the execution of their office as an inferior court, to receive
the testimony of negro men in a case touching the rights
of property between a white and a black man, although
both sides desired to introduce such testimony and both
had more than one witness to prove the same fact. The
justices gave as a reason for action "that the laws of
Georgia in force previous to January 1, 1861, prohibit
the use of negro testimony; they did not know any other
law had been established, and did not intend to do wrong
or violate military orders. ' ' The difficulty is that they did
not intend to do right, for, admitting the truth of their ex-
cuses, they had failed to inform themselves of the law set-
tled by the war and to become acquainted with the points
which the President had declared "no longer debatable."
The fact is the moral appreciation of those points is dead,
and hence public sentiment fails to compel officers of the
law to properly inform themselves. I doubt if there are
ten in all Georgia and one State is a fair sample of the
whole South below the grade of superior judge, who un-
derstand the common law of evidence, or who can perceive,
through the aid of their own unassisted understanding, the
548
APPENDIX
wrong which may be inflicted upon the negroes by the ex-
clusion of their testimony from the courts of justice. It
needs no argument to prove that this right under the law
is essential to the preservation of life and liberty, as well
as for the protection of property, labor, and the sanctity of
the marriage relations. To deprive a citizen of it, in the
most enlightened community and under the best laws,
leaves him a sport to the vice, cunning, and superior
strength of every man who may chance to assail him.
But there are other rights not less essential to the ex-
istence of our form of government and not less vital to the
public welfare than the one just alluded to for the pres-
ervation of personal liberty. In a government based upon
the intelligence of the people, in which slavery cannot ex-
ist, it is the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as
shall enable every man to make the most he can of his in-
telligence as well as of his labor. It is just as much the
duty of the law to render it possible for him to buy educa-
tion for his children as to buy bread and clothing for them.
And precisely upon this point the greatest opposition will
be encountered by the freedmen. Between the almost uni-
versal prejudice in the South against free schools and the
incredulity of even enlightened men in regard to the capa-
bilities of the negro for mental improvement the country
need not expect the voluntary adoption of a liberal system
of education. When it is remembered that the jealousy ex-
cited in the minds of ignorant white people by anything
which looks to the elevation of the negro has already re-
sulted in breaking up more than one negro school, it will
be perceived that nothing less than military protection can
secure the continuance of the philanthropical labors or-
ganized by the Freedman's Bureau and Northern educa-
tional societies.
Many radical Northern men contend that the negro
should also have the privilege of voting, and urge that
nothing else can protect him from tyranny; but it should
not be forgotten that there is a great deal of difference be-
549
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
tween the rights of a freeman and the privileges of a citi-
zen. Property and intelligence are the natural qualifica-
tions for the ballot, but in our civil polity the property
qualification is almost entirely excluded, and States are
held competent to give the privilege to whom they please.
While I doubt the right of Congress to interfere in this
matter at all, I have no hesitation in saying that the be-
stowal of suffrage upon the negro at this time would result
in an unmitigated evil to Southern society and the country
at large. The assertion of General Schurz that it would
result in a war of races is no exaggeration and would be
a sufficient reason for withholding it even if the negroes
as a class could be depended upon to vote intelligently and
independently.
It is unnecessary here to enlarge upon this matter, or
the absence of all law specially applicable to the freedmen
as independent members of society. The- indisposition of
civil officers to enforce that which in equity and justice
is plainly applicable under the orders of military authority
would seem to indicate clearly enough the duty of the gen-
eral Government to continue its protection to these unfor-
tunate people, till the States have manifested an honest
intention to give them all the rights enjoyed by their most
favored non-voting population.
We shall obtain a clearer view of Southern society by re-
membering that the white race, not liable to blood con-
tamination, and the black, " subjected to an incessant con-
tamination of an extraneous kind," although physically
distinct, have been, for all practical purposes, a unit.
Without venturing an opinion as to how far this contami-
nation, the fruits of which may be seen in many house-
holds, may be instrumental in the ultimate extinction of
the negro race in America, its moral influence upon South-
ern society cannot be neglected.
At the beginning of the Rebellion there were in the
South four orders of men. First, there were the educated
and highly intellectual men politicians, lawyers, divines,
550
APPENDIX
and men of wealth. This class furnished the "leaders,"
filled all high offices, propagated Southern ideas, and con-
trolled public sentiment. Second, the intermediate order,
includes the less intelligent of the professions, planters,
business men, overseers, and country politicians. This class
was mainly instrumental in adopting the ideas, in follow-
ing the fashions, and aspiring to the dignity of the first
class. Third, were the poor white people, who, from de-
fective organization of society, mental inaptitude, and a
variety of other natural causes, were kept in subordination
and benighted ignorance. The only pure, unadulterated
American "mudsills" are found in the South, and belong
to this order. And fourth, there was the negro, who should
fairly be classed intellectually with the poor whites.
Socially these classes are entirely distinct. There is no
gradual blending of the one with the other as in the North-
ern states, nor is there the usual proportion of intelligence
to ignorance. The third and fourth orders are hopelessly
ignorant, and constitute three-fourths of the entire popula-
tion. At the beginning of the war the first class were com-
pletely dominant, and carried with them the entire white
population of the South. With the relentless intolerance
of feudal aristocrats they crushed out every spark of in-
dependent thought remaining true to the idea of national
unity, and drove the poor whites into the ranks of the rebel
army. So complete was their sway that they held the ne-
groes in subjugation with scarcely an effort, and used the
abundant products of their labor to support their armies
in the field. No society for political or military purposes
was ever more homogeneous. No despot's authority was
ever more complete or controlled by more determination
and energy. The writer has heard many prominent South-
ern men assert that the controlling idea of their order had
been throughout the war "the establishment of a govern-
ment in which slavery should be so protected by law and
interwoven with their domestic concerns that the one could
not be destroyed except at the cost of the other." Their
551
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
purposes were so far successful in Georgia, that, in the
words of Howell Cobb, there was scarcely a paragraph in
their entire statute book which did not either directly or
indirectly involve the protection of slavery as its primary
object. For a season their plans worked well everywhere,
and gave them cheering promises of success, but disaster at
last befell their arms, and with disaster the weak-hearted
lost faith. The North rose as one man, and with the most
determined spirit of loyalty and nationality furnished the
Government with a magnificent army, provided it with
arms, clothing, and provisions, and pushed it irresistibly
forward. Donelson, Shiloh, Antietam, the Proclamation of
Freedom, Vicksburg, Gettysburg, Chattanooga, Mission
Ridge, Atlanta, the battles of the Wilderness, the Valley,
Nashville, the March to the Sea, and finally the fall of
Richmond and the complete collapse of the Confederacy
followed each other with slow but unerring certainty. The
capture of Fort Donelson destroyed their boast of invinci-
bility ; that of Vicksburg, the first vital stroke, severed their
Confederacy into two parts. That part west of the Mis-
sissippi died like the tail of a snake at sundown. While
that part east of the great river struggled on with the poor
consolation that its losses were "blessings in disguise."
The victories of the Wilderness, Atlanta, and the Valley of
Virginia strengthened the national faith, saved the national
credit, and overwhelmed the Northern allies of rebellion
and treason. Sherman's desolating march through Georgia
and the Carolinas again divided the Confederacy, sepa-
rated the rebel armies, rendered their ablest generals hope-
less of success, filled the negro with anxious expectations,
and convinced the common soldiers that this was ' ' the rich
man's war and the poor man's fight." The final collapse
of their cause which followed the splendid victories about
Richmond found their unity of sentiment destroyed, their
substance wasted, their leaders proscribed, and their so-
ciety, by the destruction of slavery, its only bond, divided
into its heterogeneous elements. The highest intellect of the
552
APPENDIX
land was paralyzed by the magnitude of the disaster. The
second order, not yet enfranchised from the tyranny of old
ideas, was unable to realize the necessity of their situation
and unwilling to accept for their guidance the principles
which had been forever settled by the war. The poor white
people, hopeful of a better day relieved from a tyranny
which they had learned to despise, cared only to busy them-
selves in the reestablishment of their homes and in collect-
ing such of their personal possessions as had escaped the
devastation of warfare. The negroes, hitherto the obedient
children of toil, suddenly relieved of their yoke by ' ' Good
News from a Far-off Land," resolved to work no longer,
but taste fully that liberty whose highest attribute in their
dwarfed and benighted minds is a life of idleness and im-
munity from the lash.
This hasty recital, while it does not describe the abso-
lute condition of the blacks, will give some idea of the
white society with which the President was compelled to
try the experiment of reconstruction. A moment 's consid-
eration will show that no spontaneous political action was
possible, except the course to be followed had been clearly
and authoritatively defined. The people as a unit looked
to the national government for their inspiration, and were
willing to submit to whatever terms the President might
think proper to dictate. A few hoped to save slavery in
one form or another, or believed they would be remuner-
ated for it if abolished. All were feverish and anxious
about confiscation, but I do not remember meeting a single
person who did not believe himself compelled to accept
whatever terms might be extended to him or leave the
country.
The first step in the President 's policy was the appoint-
ment of provisional governors with instructions to call
conventions, whose duty it should be to annul the work of
secession and reestablish the sway of civil law, in accord-
ance with the hereditary policy of the country. No clearly
define^ instructions were given to the conventions to guide
553
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
them in the duty they were called upon to perform ; they
were left perfectly free to exercise their own intelligence
and judgment in selecting the course they might think best
adapted to their condition. In the interval between the
appointment of the provisional governors or the ending of
hostilities, and the meeting of the first convention, a re-
action set in in Georgia headed by the younger men who
had but little experience in public life, and supported by
a few of the returned officers more " irrepressible " than
the rest, aided by that class of men who had remained at
home during the war, and had not, therefore, been " sub-
jugated. " Through the agency of this reaction, gaining
head every day, the people soon began to imagine that they
might possibly obtain better terms than they first expected.
They adopted readily the idea that their States had not
been out of the Union, and, therefore, might claim the full
benefits of the fact, and that, after all, they were still
sovereignties capable of doing a variety of things indepen-
dent of national dictation. The new men were ambitious to
obtain place, and the old leaders were sagacious enough to
put them forward to undo the work of rebellion and re-
ceive whatever odium might be attached thereto. This was
the case particularly with such of the new men as had
claimed to be originally conservative or for the Union.
When the conventions finally assembled, the reaction had
progressed so far that the question was not, "How much
shall be done to put our section right and engraft upon
its organic laws the principles settled by the war?" but,
"How little can we do and get our States recognized ? "
Most of the conventions had in them an unusually large
number of gray-haired men, noted for their intelligence as
well as devotion to the Union and conservative tendencies
during the war. Among these men there were not wanting
experienced legislators, who saw plainly their duty to the
loyal States as well as to their own people, and who ex-
erted their influence to secure such action by the conven-
tions as would prove acceptable to Congress and obtain for
554
APPENDIX
the States recently in rebellion a speedy restoration of the
privileges of representation and government. But these
men, although supported by the advice of the President,
could neither overcome the noisy exponents of secession
and State rights nor control public sentiment. The action
of Georgia is sufficiently like that of the other states to be
taken as a fair example. Her convention " repealed" the
ordinance of secession, instead of declaring it "null and
void 7 '; "repudiated" the debt accumulated in conducting
war against the United States, instead of pronouncing it
"illegal and fraudulent." They "abolished" slavery and
failed to adopt the constitutional amendment to that effect,
instead of asserting that it had ceased to exist by virtue
of the President's Proclamation and the acts of Congress
giving the force of law thereto. They failed to define and
render sacred the rights of freedmen, but passed a resolu-
tion reciting their obligation to give "efficient protection"
to the freedmen, and "to promote among them the observ-
ance of law and order, habits of industry, and moral im-
provement," and appointed a commission of five persons
"to prepare and report a code or system of laws" for
their government and regulating how and in what cases
they might be permitted to testify in the courts.
The temper displayed by this convention was the re-
verse of grave, dispassionate, and dignified; its legislation
was marked by illiberality, bad taste, defective judgment,
and absence of the spirit of loyalty ; many of the speeches
were rebellious in tone, and couched in language peculiar
to the chivalry of other days, and one member went so far
as to denounce the President's telegram advising the re-
pudiation of the rebel war debt, as an attempt "to dictate
to a sovereign convention." Since the termination of the
convention, the members who were loyal enough to advo-
cate the adoption of the President's views have been con-
demned by public sentiment. Not a single representative
to Congress has been elected who can take the test oath.
It is clear the Southern people have failed to appreciate
555
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
the magnanimity of the Government, and have voluntarily
rejected its measures of reconciliation. They do not seem
to have realized the changes which have taken place in the
last four years, either in their own condition or that of the
loyal States. It is hard for them to perceive, at a glance,
the difference between a negro man free and a negro man
enslaved, or to understand that by the laws of the United
States a freedman is a free man, and that justice is color-
blind. The "manifold infirmities of the flesh" are not yet
subjugated, even in the North; the prejudices of race, the
passions of the ignorant, and the aggressive tendencies of
unbridled arrogance and cruelty, fostered by years of mas-
tership, cannot be uprooted in a day, much less can they
be expected in a day to yield to a spirit of forbearance and
justice. "We can see now that the Government in its blind-
ness had committed a grave error, very natural and there-
fore excusable. It should have exercised its military right
"to dictate the terms," not "advise" them, and to com-
pel their adoption as a "condition precedent" to the com-
plete restoration of civil functions to the rebel States. Had
the internal condition of the South been similar to that
which generally obtains in a territory during its natural
growth to the importance of a State, the President would
not have misplaced his confidence in "the sagacity, intelli-
gence, and loyalty of the people." An executive proclama-
tion, enforced, if necessary, by the military forces of the
Government, would have been received with more consid-
eration than has been accorded the spoken admonitions of
the chief magistrate.
It is now clearly the duty of Congress to see that the
conditions herein set forth shall be adopted by all the
states recently in rebellion, and that they shall embody
them in their organic laws without further evasion or in-
direction, before they are admitted to the full enjoyment
of the privileges of the loyal States. In the performance
of this duty Congress may also require each State to pre-
sent satisfactory evidence of an intention to provide for
556
APPENDIX
all classes of its citizens the means of educating their chil-
dren. No government which neglects this high and solemn
duty can justly claim to be republican in form, since upon
the intelligence of the people it must depend for its very
existence. Congress should also take care to see that every
member of either House is required to present satisfactory
evidence in the form of an oath that he has abjured all sym-
pathy with the doctrines of secession and rebellion ; is sorry
for his past acts in opposition to the national authority;
that he will henceforth and forever, in word, thought, and
act, bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of
America, and protect, preserve, and defend the Constitu-
tion and the laws enacted thereunder against all their ene-
mies and opposers, whether foreign or domestic. They
should go farther and declare that all cabinet ministers,
members of Congress, generals, and judges of the so-called
Confederate States, and all governors of either of them,
are forever disqualified from holding any office or trust
under the Government of the United States. Having done
all this, they may repeal the test oath as it now stands, and
leave to the separate States the question of negro suffrage,
that it shall be properly and intelligently exercised for
the advancement of local interests as well as the national
honor and glory.
This still leaves the negro question, in its practical as-
pect, unsolved. As far as we have proposed to provide by
forms of law for the primary rights of the freedmen, and
however liberal may be these laws, they must depend for
their effect upon white men, who have shown but little in-
terest in them, and who find it so hard to understand the
difference between the freedman and a slave. But under
our system of government this is the best we can do; and
under the most favorable circumstances the negro must be
more or less subject to the passions and prejudices of
white men. I have no idea that any system, either under
the general government or that of a State, can be devised
which will secure exact justice to the black race, or im-
557
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
munity from abuse and oppression ; so it may be safely as-
sumed that the problem of the moral, intellectual, and so-
cial regeneration of the negro is by no means simple or free
from serious complications. In order that philanthropy
and enlightened effort may accomplish the greatest possi-
ble amount of good toward a work of such great impor-
tance, it is necessary that the public should understand the
difficulties likely to be encountered and that they should
not lose sight of the indolence and inferior aptitude, either
natural or induced in the negro by years of bondage, while
endeavoring to counteract the vice and prejudices of white
men.
It has been said, and it is widely believed, that the
negro is physiologically different from the Caucasian, and
inferior to the latter in mental and physical activity, so
that, if left entirely free from extraneous influences, we
need not expect as high a state of social, moral, and intel-
lectual development as that attained by the white people
among whom his lot is cast. Whatever may have been his
moral condition in ages past, or whatever progress may be-
come possible for him in the future, is a matter of specula-
tion; but close observation leaves me no doubt that ''the
humanizing influences ' ' of slavery, even in the South, have
not tended to develop his intellectual and moral qualities
to the degree claimed by Southern men of intelligence and
fairness. Among women and another class of men, the fol-
lowing remark, in discussions touching the negro character,
is very common: "You Northern people do not understand
this question ; you are ignorant 'of the negro 's true char-
acter ; he is lazy, deceitful, dishonest, and improvident, ut-
terly worthless now that he is free, and only useful as a
slave." Without undertaking here to investigate the truth
of this analysis of character, or, if true, how it became pos-
sible, it is not unfair to suppose that Northern men of in-
telligence, free from the bias of interest and other natural
predisposition to prejudice, are quite as apt as Southerners
to judge the question in all its bearings, dispassionately
558
APPENDIX
and practically. The results of the war should suggest the
bare possibility to the Southern people that they do not
fully understand "the question/' and are not likely to, so
long as they view it only in the light of their own experi-
ence
It is true that the freedmen are not models of industry,
frankness, honesty, or discretion. As a class they may be
deceitful, idle, inclined to theft, and pitiably ignorant.
They have no conception of the nature of a contract, or its
obligations, and but limited ideas of duty to each other
and their employers. Nor is this the worst. Professor
Draper, in his ' ' Thoughts on American Civil Policy, ' ' says,
in the full blaze of this enlightened age, that the civilized
world will scarcely believe that a State recognizing and
practicing polygamy should be allowed to exist in the very
heart of the great Republic. But the "civilized world"
does not know half the truth, and will find it hard to be-
lieve that one-third of the entire population of the South-
ern States, one-seventh of that of the United States, were
born out of lawful wedlock; and yet this is so! Strange
as it may seem, there has never been a legally solemnized
marriage among the entire black population while in a
state of slavery. No slave State ever permitted such a
thing, or made the slightest provision for it. To be sure,
many piously inclined masters were accustomed to compel
their servants to be married by a clergyman, either white
or black, most commonly the latter; but these marriages
were a mere semblance and a mockery of that holy Sacra-
ment. They had no stability in law, and but little in cus-
tom, and could be dissolved at the will of the master, or
the whim of either party. The value of negro property was
too great to permit either the men or women to live un-
married, so that as fast as they reached the adult age they
were paired off. The negro man, where it was practicable,
always had a wife on his master's place, but in many cases
they selected from the neighboring plantation, so that they
could have the privilege, usually granted, of visiting their
559
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
wives Saturday night and getting back home to work late
on Monday. I have heard of several cases in which the
men had three wives, living on different plantations, and
am told that this was no uncommon occurrence. The com-
mon practice is not that of open polygamy, but the negroes
themselves compel the men to wait for the new wife till
the old one is abandoned, and, in some cases, if the master
discovers a man has a wife at home and one elsewhere, he
compels the relinquishment of one or the other. But there
is no such thing known as a marriage among negroes which
might not be severed either by caprice, removal, sale, or
the will of the master. The result of the system is that
such a thing as virtue among the blacks is unknown.
The greatest difficulty experienced in dealing with the
negroes and their late masters arises from this extraordi-
nary state of affairs. It is no uncommon thing for the
negro men to find themselves charged with more than one
family, and, in order to relieve themselves of their burdens,
compelled to go to another neighborhood. This fact, to-
gether with the general desire they have to prove their
freedom by getting out of the reach of their old masters,
accounts for the daily complaint among the planters that
they have nobody left upon their places but women and
children. ' ' The men have all gone, and if they would take
their families I wouldn't care." Yet very intelligent men
and women tell us, in view of these facts, and with the
perfect assurance of its truth: " Negroes have no idea of
the duty of parents to each other, or to their children;
they are naturally loose and lascivious in disposition, and
cannot be made to care for their children, or live in lawful
wedlock. ' '
This may not be entirely true, but it would seem to a
dispassionate person, with a system such as I have de-
scribed, to be entirely false. Let us look still further at
this subject, for herein lies the greatest crime of slavery,
since it debases not only the negro race, but poisons the
society of the whites throughout the whole South. Among
560
APPENDIX
the four millions of negroes released from slavery, there is
not a single family organized under the operations of the
Southern code in accordance with the principles of Chris-
tian civilization! The legislators and thinking men of the
South, unless they are blind, may see enough in this as-
tounding fact to incite in them the gravest fears for the
future of their country. The Southern people have gath-
ered golden harvests for many years, careless of the fact
that in doing so they have scattered seeds more fatal than
dragons ' teeth. The system of slavery in its mildest form
is the legitimate origin of every vicious habit and form of
immorality with which the freedmen are afflicted. Living
in cabins clustered about the overseer 's or master's house,
they had no care but to draw their rations and go to the
fields at the sound of the horn. They looked to the mas-
ter for everything they were accustomed to receive, and
are, therefore, improvident and lazy; they were paid noth-
ing but scanty "board and clothes " for their labor, and
are, therefore, "inclined to steal"; they had no induce-
ments to tell the truth and do right, and are therefore
"deceitful"; they were not allowed the privileges of edu-
cation it was a penal offense in most Southern States to
teach them to read and they were therefore "ignorant";
their rights as men and women, as husbands and wives, as
parents and children, were neither taught nor protected
by law; they are, therefore, given to the practice of
adultery and the neglect of their offspring. A white
man and his wife, with three or four legitimate children,
and a hundred negro servants, do not constitute a family
in accordance with the principles of our religion and race.
In such a patriarchal or oriental assemblage, every servant,
instead of looking to his own parents for enlightened in-
struction and guidance, looks to the master, but in vain,
for he is frequently the creature of vice, ignorance, and cu-
pidity, either of which transmits its own influence, like the
error of an algebraic equation, with an increasing ratio the
further it goes. Where no "home" exists we do not ex-
561
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
pect home virtues. And when not a man of a whole race
owns his own cabin or a foot of land, the difficulties of
regeneration may be partly imagined. The South may
claim that it is not to blame for the negro's condition, and
urge that it is the natural result of the means necessarily
adopted to protect slavery from the attack of abolitionists ;
but for purposes of reform it is a matter of little impor-
tance who may be culpable, or by what means the negroes
were brought to their present condition, the vital question
is, how shall their condition be ameliorated?
A variety of opinions have been given to the country.
General Cox recommends colonization; but that, however
good in itself, is impracticable, and I doubt its efficacy.
The Government can neither afford the expense, nor with
justice compel the negroes to accept such a questionable
solution of their troubles. Southern men say: "We will
push them to the wall; they must work as freedmen, and
we are unwilling to have them about, but we will get along
with them as well as we can till we can obtain a supply
of European immigrants. ' ' This is neither good policy nor
very likely to succeed. Immigrants will not settle in the
South to compete with negro labor, nor will they consent
to pay high prices for land when they can obtain it in the
West for almost nothing, and become at once as respectable
and prosperous as their neighbors. The South is essentially
a planting country, and not adapted to small farming ; and
should immigration set toward it, it will be gradual and
increase but slowly. Enterprising Yankees, who can take
the test oath, practice the professions, and induce negroes
to work for fair wages, will be the first to go South. In
fact, they have already invaded every part of that region,
and are making arrangements to cultivate cotton planta-
tions extensively. If they are ordinarily successful, they
will replace ill-natured and improvident planters rather
than the blacks. Vine and fruit growers and artisans may
also find immediate inducements to go South. But the ne-
groes are already there, settled upon the land, adapted for
562
APPENDIX
the climate, and willing to work for those who will treat
them justly; and they must work, or both classes will
starve. The Southern planters must not deceive them-
selves; they cannot dispense with the freedman. They
must depend upon him to cultivate their fields and gather
their harvests ; but slavery is dead, and they cannot entice
him to his labor with the lash. They must give him full
wages for full work, protect him in all his rights by equit-
able and humane laws, educate his children, and lift him
morally and intellectually to the dignity of the freeman.
They must do better and more than all that. They must
cure the vices of bondage, by organizing negro society into
families, according to the principles of Christian civiliza-
tion families consisting of one man, one wife, and the
legitimate offspring thereof, living in " homes, " fixed upon
the land, and guarded as jealously by the laws as the fam-
ilies of white men. The present communal system must be
broken up; no more polygamy, ignored by law, and sanc-
tioned by custom ; no more concubinage by purchase or in-
heritance, under the cover of domestic usage, but plain,
simple justice. With all that can be accomplished by the
most enlightened legislation, the work of regeneration will
progress but slowly, and leave an ample field for the most
intelligent missionary labor. This work is not exclusively
the business of the South, but demands attention at the
hands of the entire nation.
Four millions of practical heathens are crying for light ;
the instruction they have received, although involving the
arts of labor, has bonded them body and soul to moral
darkness. The religion taught them has been a mockery,
because they were compelled to witness the daily violation
of its most sacred precepts. We say the South is mainly
concerned in this work, but how much of the patience,
labor, and faith, necessary for its success, can be expected
from her people ? I fear but little. In the aggregate there
are many thousand enlightened, humane, and Christian
people in the South who would scorn to inflict a wanton
563
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
wrong upon any human being, who have been kind, indul-
gent, and sympathizing masters; but it is unfortunately
true that even they, as a general rule, doubt the capacity
of the negro for mental and moral improvement. The
masses look with extreme jealousy at any one who advo-
cates negro schools, and render it impossible for a timid
person to teach one, except under military protection. Yet,
education is the only means of opening the mind for the
reception of moral and social truth, and upon it must rest
our only hope of an intellectual regeneration of the entire
South, white as well as black.
With such a system of laws and education as justice
demands, and which the Southern people must be com-
pelled to enact and enforce, the freedman may ultimately
become a freeman in mind as well as person.
There is, however, a grave obstacle in the way to his
complete independence, to which I have not yet adverted.
I mean that of obtaining permanent and cheap homesteads,
without which the families cannot be organized. This or-
ganization, as the social unit, is just as essential as that of
the battalion in military matters. General Saxton's order
touching this matter is well enough if it could be enforced ;
but could the President have been induced to exact, as a
condition to pardon, a bond from every rebel holding prop-
erty to the value of $20,000 or over, that he would give to
every respectable and honest freedman, who had previously
belonged to him, a life lease to as much land as he and his
family' could cultivate, a substantial beginning would have
been made in the right direction. This class of men own
nearly all of the land in the South, and each one of them
could find upon his place several negroes who would be
good tenants in any country. To prevent oppression to the
owners, it would have been well enough to allow them a
fair rate of rent, but to compel them to sell to the negro at
least forty acres whenever the latter became able to pay for
it at its market value. This is, however, impracticable as
a government measure, but it contains a suggestion to the
564
APPENDIX
planters, the adoption of which may ultimately become a
matter of profit to them as well as to the freedmen.
No system of philanthropy, whether under the auspices
of the Government or benevolent societies, can neglect to
consider the influence of this home idea, and experience
more than partial success. The planters are in a fair way
to realize its significance involuntarily. The negroes at this
time throughout the South are refusing to hire themselves
for the ensuing year. They entertain the idea that the gov-
ernment intends to divide among them, during Christmas
week, the lands, produce, stock, and implements of their
old masters. The origin of this notion is not known, though
it probably grew from the following remarks so often made
to the too-credulous negroes: "We are going to whip these
rebels after a while, and then we intend to give you all
their property." The idea, once started, found ready be-
lievers, and may have been strengthened by the advice of
military commanders, urging the negroes to continue work,
on the promise that they should have a portion of the crop.
At all events they are making no contracts. Planters are
becoming generally discouraged, and are anxious to rent or
sell their lands. Should they fail to do one thing or the
other, and fail to make a crop themselves, they will find
their land at the end of the year in the forcible possession
of tenants that cannot be easily ejected. Thus the negro
dream of a division may be realized at no distant day.
Some landowners in southwestern Georgia have abandoned
their lands or rented them to the negroes on shares, but
this has created great excitement. A county meeting has
been held and resolutions adopted, the tenor of which is
that negroes shall not be permitted to become tenants, that
such "privileges and immunities " are dangerous to the
white population, and prejudicial to the interests of the
blacks ! The spirit of these resolutions is simply infamous.
Should it be developed generally, and the President permit
the organization of the militia in accordance with the pres-
ent indications, it would be well for Congress to provide
565
UNDER THE OLD FLAG
for the increase of the regular army to one hundred and
fifty thousand men, for nothing short of that force could
possibly maintain public tranquillity.
The excuses given by the South for this militia move-
ment are poorly grounded. There is no possible danger of
a negro outbreak if the negroes are simply let alone. There
is not a county in the South in which a sheriff and his
deputy cannot enforce any legal process. Whatever may
be the moral and intellectual qualities of the negro, he is
the most non-combative, patient, and docile of the human
race. But if he is not so, the Southern militia will soon
reduce him to that condition ; and I have no hesitation in
saying its organization will result in the systematic inflic-
tion of more deliberate, wanton, and unprovoked cruelty
upon those unfortunate people than they were ever com-
pelled to undergo in a state of slavery. One or two years
of the old-fashioned ''patrol system" will result in the
practical re-subjugation of the entire race; neither ballot
nor bullet can save them, unless the Government continues
the functions of the Freedman's Bureau, and gives it an
organization of ten times its present efficiency in men and
administration. It will not do yet to trust State laws or
State militia to do the work of that Bureau. It is the only
hope of the negro, feeble as it is; it needs more officers,
and, instead of abolishing it, Congress should perfect its
organization, make it self-supporting if possible, and give
it such a code of laws as would secure uniform administra-
tion throughout the South. I have no doubt that with the
loan of ten or fifteen millions of dollars the Bureau can be
so administered as to afford efficient protection to negroes,
organize their industry, and found a system of education
which shall gradually make the race self-supporting and
useful to society at large.
The ballot is a poor remedy for ignorance, vice, and
prejudice. Even in the hands of the negroes, it could
scarcely overwhelm three such dragons, defended by double
their numbers. Under the present aspect of affairs it would
566
APPENDIX
be anything but kindness to give it to them by national
interference. Aside from the increased jealousy and vio-
lence which would be engendered on the part of the whites,
and the necessity which would at once arise for the increase
of the national armed force to preserve order and repress
outbreaks, it is almost certain that a few shrewd men with
plenty of money could control every negro vote even in
the interest of Southern policy. No ignorant farm negro
working for ten dollars per month would fail to sell his
vote for two dollars and a whole day's frolic.
Let the Government rather exercise its supreme au-
thority in compelling the States to pass such laws and give
such assurances as will secure equal and exact justice for
every freedman; and let an enlightened public sentiment
constrain the adoption of such a national system of schools
as shall qualify every adult of sound mind to exercise the
privilege of suffrage. When education and intelligence
have become universal, suffrage may be so regulated as to
secure its virtuous and universal enjoyment. On the prin-
ciples embodied in this paper I confidently believe the ne-
gro question, in its economical, moral, intellectual, and so-
cial aspects, can be solved. They accord with the genius of
our institutions and the principles of justice, and are
worthy of a trial. When they shall have been adopted, the
South will find free labor profitable, and its own reward in
the pleasures of enlightened and humane policy.
The war has done much toward giving the Southern
people free speech, but they must do much more them-
selves before they can hope to enjoy free thought. Hu-
man slavery has ceased to exist, but mental slavery yet ex-
erts its influence against the best interests of the country.
Let them throw off the yoke, submit to the inevitable des-
tinies of the great Republic, abandon sympathy for a dream
of the past, and join heart and hand with the North in the
glorious work of progress and education.
Free press, free speech, free schools, and free pulpits
are essential to the propagation of free thought and the
perpetuation of free government !
567
INDEX
Adams, Dan, C. S. A., 199,
231.
Adams, Wirt, C. S. A., 183,
199, 200.
Aibonito, 447.
Alabama, Wilson's invasion in,
192 et seq., 237 et seq.
Aldrich, Senator, 471.
Alexander, Andrew J., 224,
306, 368, 372; commands
brigade, 167.
Alexander, Henry M., 399.
Alger, Secretary of War, 414,
418, 431, 465, 471.
Allison, Senator, 471.
Allison, W. B., Jr., 418.
Ames, Adelbert, 416.
Andrews, Avery D., 417.
Andrews, John W., 383.
Appendix (Condition of the
South at the Close of the
Rebellion), 545 et seq.
Armistice between Sherman
and Johnston, 276.
Armstrong, General, C. S. A.,
5, 204, 227, 231; ordered
to Selma, 199.
Army administration in field,
8.
Asamblea, Cuban, 480.
Asomanti, 446.
Associated Press, 494.
Atkins, Smith D., 368.
Augur, Major General, 349.
Ayres, General Romeyn B., 2.
B
Bacon, John M., 367.
Bacon, Senator, 464, 471.
Barrow, Brigadier General,
527, 529.
Bate, General, C. S. A., 153.
Bates, David Homer, statement
of, 94, 95, 158.
Bates, General John C., 461,
473.
Beauregard, General G. T., C.
S. A., 77; reports on Ala-
bama campaign, 195; dis-
couraged by Hood's de-
feat, 198.
Benjamin, Judah P., 317.
Benteen, Tenth Missouri Cav-
alry, 224, 262.
Betancourt, General Pedro E.,
474, 489, 507.
Biddle, Colonel James, 370.
Biddle, Lieutenant Colonel
John, 417, 422, 436, 444,
448, 474, 484, 537.
Biggs, Lieutenant Colonel, 273 ;
Illinois Volunteers, 224 ;
wounded, 228.
569
INDEX
Black, Lieutenant, 418.
Bliss, Colonel Tasker H., 417,
422, 447, 511.
Bloom, Major, Kentucky Cav-
alry, 272.
Boggs, Grant's cousin, 164.
Borup, Henry D., 417, 537.
Boxer headquarters, 525.
Boxer War, 517 et seq.
Boyer, Captain Joseph C.,
Twelfth Tennessee, 122,
147.
Bragg, General Braxton, C. S.
A., 77.
Brawley, Judge, 435, 436.
Breckenridge, Captain, 418.
Breckenridge, General Joseph
C., 424, 460.
Breckinridge, John C., C. S.
A., 317.
Bristow, Benjamin H., 169.
Brooke, General John R., 423,
424 et seq., 432, 443, 459,
460, 470, 472, 473, 475,
477, 479, 482, 487, 489;
relieved from command,
497.
Brown, Governor Joseph E.,
347 et seq., 350, 356.
Buford, General, C. S. A., 5,
183, 231.
Burnside, General A. E., 395.
Butler, Senator, 503.
C
Campaign and capture of Sel-
ma, 190 et seq.
Canby, Major General, U. S.
V., 237 et seq.
Cannon, Colonel LeGrand, 394.
Capron, Colonel, 30.
Carbaugh, Major, judge advo-
cate, 482.
Carlton, Major, 418.
Carpenter, General, 490.
Case, Charles G., 387.
Casey, Samuel K., 391.
Cavalry, Chiefs of, 9.
Cavalry Corps, M. D. M., 12,
364, 372 ; control of, 20 ; or-
ganization of, 21; in bad
way, 63; at Nashville, 107
et seq.; drives back Hood's
left wing, 110 et seq.; oper-
ates on foot, 111; turns
enemy's flank, 113; cap-
tures courier, 115; concen-
trated and instructed, 160
et seq.; strength and outfit
of, 190; captures Selma,
224; summary of captures
of, 292 et seq.; speed of,
and distance marched by,
294; captures Jefferson
Davis, 297 et seq.
Cecil, George R., 417.
Chaffee, General, 418, 431, 519,
524, 531, 533.
Chalmers, General, C. S. A.,
154, 156, 158, 183; letter
of, praising Wilson, 157.
Cheatham, General, C. S. A.,
152, 153; at Spring Hill,
44.
Chicago Board of Trade Bat-
tery, 131, 226.
570
INDEX
intron, Matienzo, 457.
Cisneros, 410.
Clanton, Confederate, 248.
Clayton, Captain, 444.
Coamo, 440 ; Battle of, 444.
Cobb, General Howell, C. S. A.,
265, 276, 278, 283 et seq.,
297, 304, 353, 356, 358,
464.
Colored troops, 461; mustered
out, 462.
Columbus, Georgia, captured
and factories destroyed,
266 et seq.
Concentration, policy of, 291
et seq.
Condition of the South at the
close of Rebellion (Appen-
dix), 545 et seq.
Confederacy doomed, 182.
Conger, American minister,
523, 534.
Coon, Colonel Datus E., 175,
369.
Cooper, Wickliffe, 367.
Coppinger, 418.
Corbin, Adjutant General, 416,
418.
Cotton and warehouses burned,
266 et seq.
Craig, Colonel, U. S. A., 417.
Croxton, Brigadier General
John T., 30 ; orders lady to
the rear, 35; wanted a
clear road, 46; at Douglas
Church, 48 ; at Franklin,
51; at Nashville, 108, 114,
121, 129, 140; at Gravelly
Springs, 165 ; character of,
168 et seq.; detached, 205;
neutralized Jackson, 213 ;
operations of, 287 et seq.,
311, 312, 366, 372.
Cuba, 402 et seq.; Republic of,
408; occupation of, 460 et
seq. } 479; population of,
484; condition of, 485.
Cullom, Senator, 471.
Custer, General George A., 4.
D
Dana, Charles A., 6, 495, 538.
Davis, Cushman K., Senator,
471, 497.
Davis, Jefferson, discouraged by
Hood's defeat, 198; cap-
tured by Wilson's cavalry,
306 et seq.; Hood's coun-
cil and, 314, 316; disguise
of, 332 et seq.; at Macon,
335; interview of, with
General Wilson, 336; ef-
fects of his capture, 342,
540.
Davis, Wirt, Fourth Cavalry,
147, 225.
Dickinson, Julian G., Fourth
Michigan Cavalry, 329.
Discipline, military, 480.
Dobb, Colonel, Third Ohio Cav-
alry, killed, 228.
Dodge, General G. M., 419, 471.
Dorr, Colonel, 290.
Dorst, Joseph H., 417.
Douglas, Stephen A., 390.
Duke, General Basil, C. S. A.,
317, 417.
571
INDEX
E
Eads, Captain James B., 388.
Eckert, Major T. T., 72, 89.
Eggleston, Colonel, First Ohio
Cavalry, 224, 306.
Eight Temples, 527 et seq.
El Poso, 431.
Elliott, General W. S., 20.
Emperor Kwang Hsu, 517.
Empress Dowager, 517.
Ernst, 0. H., 427, 435, 437,
438, 444, 447-448.
F
Fairbanks, Senator, 471.
Fajardo, Sefior, 451.
Fidler, Major, 290.
Fiske, John, praises Wilson's
cavalry, 52.
Fitzhugh, Charles L., 416.
Flagler, Major C. A. F., 417,
422, 444.
Foraker, Senator, 471, 496.
Forrest, N. B., C. S. A., 5; ad-
vances, 31; at Rally Hill,
45; detached against Mur-
f reesboro, 119 ; rejoins
Hood, 130 ; new rear guard
for, 138; writes to Taylor,
156, 158; distribution of
troops of, 182 ; strength of,
183; challenges Wilson to
battle, 185 ; forces of, badly
scattered, 193; looking for
invasion, 195; has four di-
visions, 196; writes Breck-
enridge, 197; learns situa-
tion and makes first mis-
take, 201; at Montevallo,
207; not idle, 213; defeated
at Ebenezer Church, 215 ; in
retreat, 2^.9, 231; escapes,
239; under flag of truce,
241; appearance of, 242;
reveals Croxton's move-
ments, 244, 539.
Fourth Regular Cavalry,
charges of, 131; breaks
railroads, 225; charges of,
at Selma, 229, 231.
Franklin, Battle of, 48 et seq.
Frye, Senator, 471.
Fullington, Lieutenant, 418.
G
Garrard, Colonel, 224.
Garrard, General Kenner, 19.
Gazelee, Sir Alfred, 527, 532.
Gomez, Jose Miguel, 507, 516.
Gomez, Maximo, 410, 476.
Goodloe, William C., 169.
Grant, Frederick D., 427.
Grant, R. Suydam, 394.
Grant, U. S., Lieutenant Gen-
eral, correspondence of,
with Sherman about caval-
ry, 1 et seq.; estimate of,
of C. F. Smith, 19 ; becomes
uneasy, 32; judgment of,
disturbed about Nash-
ville, 66; telegraphs
Thomas, 69 et seq.; disre-
gards storm, 89 et seq.; or-
ders Logan to Nashville,
93; starts to Nashville, 94;
572
INDEX
gives up trip, 95; plans
and intentions of, 180, 363,
373; visits Georgia, 377 et
seq.
Greble, E. St. J., 417.
Gregg, General D. McN., 3.
Gresham, Colonel Benjamin,
123, 147.
Gresham, General Walter Q.,
123.
Grierson, General, 20.
Guard, rural, 488, 489, 516.
Hall, Robert H., 416.
Halleck, General, Chief of
Staff, 75 et seq.
Hammond, General J. H., on
Granny White Pike, 114,
121, 132; turns enemy's
position, 141; at Gravelly
Springs, 165, 370.
Hardee, General, C. S. A., 77.
Harlan, John M., 169.
Harnden, Colonel Henry, 272;
in pursuit of Davis, 318 et
seq.
Harris, Captain, 386.
Harrison, Burton N., 321.
Harrison, Colonel Thomas J.,
30, 139, 147, 370.
Harrison, General Benjamin,
369.
Hatch, Brigadier General Ed-
ward, 30, 129, 132, 139,
249, 369; at Franklin, 51;
at Nashville, 111; turns
Hood's left, 121 ; character
of, 172, 177; left behind
and ordered to follow, 191.
Hawkins, General Hamilton S.,
429.
Hay, John, 535; compliments
Wilson's troopers, 296.
Hedges, Lieutenant, Fourth
Cavalry, leads charges,
131, 132, 147.
Helmick, Captain, 417.
Henry, Guy V., 452.
Hewitt, E., 418.
Heywood, Lieutenant, engineer,
240.
Higginson, Captain, 441.
Hill, Captain Ross, 220, 272.
Hill, Colonel, 418.
Hill, Senator, 354.
Hoar, Senator, 357.
Hoffman, Major, 386.
Hood, General J. B., C. S. A.,
11, 24, 30; crosses Duck
River, 36 et seq.; advances,
42; in affair at Spring
Hill, 43; an able man, 45;
is defeated at Franklin,
and closes in on Nashville,
64; dangers of position
of, 65; detaches Forrest
against Murf reesboro, 119 ;
fatal mistake of, 121 et
seq.; retreating from Ten-
nessee, 128 et seq.; rear
guard of, 133, 135; new
rear guard of, 138; report
of, 151.
Hosea, L. M., interviews For-
rest, 184, 185, 364.
Houston family, 164.
573
INDEX
Howard, General 0. 0., 471.
Hoyle, Eli D., 417, 448.
Joseph E., 381; discour-
aged, 198.
Hubbard, Major Twelfth Mis- Johnston, Colonel, Kentucky
souri Cavalry, 240.
Hudson, Captain, Michigan
Cavalry, 328.
Hulings, Colonel, 444.
Improvements, internal, 385.
Intervention, second, 515.
Ives, Major, 525.
Jackson, Colonel George W.,
370.
Jackson, General William H.,
C. S. A. ("Red"), 5, 183.
Jameson, American guide, 528.
Jenne, D. C., 385, 388.
Jessup, Morris K., 394.
Johnson, Andrew, President,
359 ; offers Thomas lieuten-
ant generalcy, 158.
Johnson, Colonel, A. D. C., to
Jefferson Davis, 330.
Johnson, Colonel Gilbert M.,
370.
Johnson, General R. W., 114,
129, 175, 369; at Nash-
ville, 108; in middle Ten-
nessee, 177.
Johnson, Hersehell V., 354.
Johnson, James, Governor, 354,
373.
Johnston, Lieutenant General
Cavalry, 290.
Joint Resolution, 477-491.
Kelly, Colonel R. M., Fourth
Kentucky, 290, 366.
Kelly, Confederate Cavalry,
121.
Kent, General J. F., 429.
Kettle Hill, 430.
Kilpatrick, General, 165, 177,
367; superseded, 13.
Kitchell, Lieutenant Colonel,
224, 227.
Knipe, Brigadier General Jo-
seph F., Ill, 129, 176, 370;
at Nashville, 108; sent to
Canby, 177.
LaGrange, 0. H., First Wis-
consin Cavalry, 170, 190,
254, 264, 266, 372; cap-
tures Fort Tyler, West
Point, Georgia, 271; re-
joins, 285 et seq.
Lancaster, Captain, 444.
Lane, Lieutenant, 320.
Last campaign of war, 237.
Latrobe, 418.
Lawton, General, 427, 431, 470.
Lee, Admiral U. S. N., fleet of,
on Tennessee River, 64,
142.
574
INDEX
Lee, General Fitzhugh, consul
general, 413, 417, 470,
473, 490, 497, 519, 536.
Lee, Lieutenant General S. D.,
C. S. A., 151; discouraged,
198.
Lee, Robert E., 384, 540 et seq.
Li Hung Chang, 534.
Lieber, Professor, 525.
Linevitch, General, 532.
Lodge, Senator, 471.
Logan, General John A., or-
dered to Nashville, 93.
Long, Eli, Brigadier General,
170, 190, 367, 372; at Eb-
enezer Church, 215, 216,
225, 226; assaults Selma,
227.
Looting, 524.
Loring, General, C. S. A., 153.
Ludington, Quartermaster, 5.
Ludlow, General, 461, 473, 490,
497.
Lyon, C. S. A., 144.
M
McArthur, General, at Nash-
ville, 147, 150.
McClernand, Colonel E. J., 417,
433, 434.
McCook, General A. McD., 471.
McCook, General E. M., de-
tached, 143 et seq.; at
Gravelly Springs, 168; de-
tached, 212 ; neutralized
Jackson, 213; in the way,
216, 282; sent to Florida,
366.
McCormick, Seventh Pennsyl-
vania Cavalry, 228.
McDonald, Sir Claude, 524,
529.
McGlasson, Captain, at Colum-
bus, 262.
Mclntosh, Confederate Major,
350.
McKinley, President, 415, 465,
466, 469, 470, 478, 480,
481, 491, 500, 501, 510,
536.
McMichael, Major, 418.
McMillan, Senator, 503.
McMillen, Colonel William L.,
praises cavalry, 150.
Maceo, 410.
Macon captured and occupied,
297 et seq.
Magoon, Governor, 515.
Maine, battleship, 414.
Majors, extra, 191.
Mallory, C. S., Secretary of
Navy, 317.
Marti, 410.
Martin, James P., 6.
Marven, colored, carries mes-
sage to Canby, 239.
Maso, 410.
Mason, engineer, 384.
Matanzas, 473, 481 et seq.
Mead, U. S. V., 147.
Meade, General George G., 2, 3.
Memphis Appeal, story of, 268.
Meyers, Captain, Marines, 523.
Middleton, correspondent, 531.
Miles, General, 418, 428, 440,
442, 449, 451, 459, 470,
472.
575
INDEX
Miller, Colonel A. 0., 172, 224,
367, 372.
Minty, R. H. G., Colonel
Fourth Michigan Cavalry,
171, 224; advances on Ma-
con, 275; captures Macon,
276 et seq., 279, 282; Da-
vis's capture and, 336, 367,
372.
Money, Senator, 503.
Montgomery occupied, 249 et
seq.
Morgan, Governor, 394.
Morton, Bliss & Co., 394.
Mott, Randolph, 334, 373.
Munger, Corporal, 330.
Murray, Captain Arthur, 417.
Murray, Eli, 368.
N
Nashville, Battle of, 110; cav-
alry drives and turns en-
emy's left wing in, 112 et
seq.
National Express and Trans-
portation Co., 381.
Naylor & Co., 394.
Nesbit, Commissioner, 358, 464.
New York Sun, 495.
Noble, Colonel John W., 224,
264, 354, 369.
O'Connell, Lieutenant, 225.
Opdyke, George, 394.
Pagoda, Porcelain, destroyed,
529.
Palma, Estrada, President, 514,
515.
Palmer, General William J.,
370.
Paraiso, 454.
Parkhill, Major, 418.
Penn, Captain, 290.
Perkins, Livingston and Post,
394.
Peters, Kentucky Cavalry, 224.
Pethick, William N., 518, 524.
Pierluisi, 454.
Pinhook Town, 160.
Platt, Senator, 471, 503.
Pool, Orval, 381.
Porto Rico, occupation of, 439
et seq.
Powell, Colonel, 252.
Prather, Lieutenant Thomas B.,
Fourth Indiana Cavalry,
A. D. C., 290.
Pritchard, Lieutenant Colonel,
Fourth Michigan Cavalry,
312; captured Davis, 324.
Promotion, rule of, 8.
Pullman, George M., 399.
Purinton, Lieutenant, 327.
Quinta, Felix Tores, 512.
Quinton, Major, U. S. A., 527.
Paget, Captain, 421.
Rawlins, General John A.,
576
INDEX
Chief of Staff, 4; goes to
St. Louis, 30.
Reagan, C. S., Postmaster Gen-
eral, 317, 329, 340.
Reber, Lieutenant Colonel, 417.
Reconcentrados, 411.
Reconstruction, 344 et seq.
Reeves, Lieutenant, A. D. C.,
520.
Rendelbrook, Lieutenant, 225.
Rhodes, Adjutant, 521, 527.
Rita, 435.
Roberts, W. Milnor, 388.
Robertson, General, C. S. A.,
and flag of truce, 276.
Rockhill, W. W., 535.
Roddy, C. S. A., 183, 194, 195,
198.
Rodenbough, T. F., 5.
Rodney, George B., lost guns
and, 227.
Roosevelt, Colonel, 418, 430.
Root, Elihu, 498 et seq., 536.
Roys, Lieutenant, Fourth U. S.
Cavalry, killed, 240.
Rucker, Colonel C. S., Tennes-
see Cavalry, 122.
S
St. Louis and Southeastern
Railway, 390, 542.
Sampson, Admiral, 421.
Sanger, J. P., 427, 461, 473.
Santiago, 438.
Schiff, Jacob H., 394, 395.
Schofield, General J. M., 471;
has precedence in field, 34;
justification of, 39; slow
at Columbia, 40; reached
Franklin, 48; lacks confi-
dence in cavalry, 50; de-
feats Hood, 53; withdraws
to Nashville, 55; did no
fighting at Nashville, 148;
sent east, 180.
Schwartzoff, Major General
von, 533.
Scott, Lieutenant General Win-
field, opposition of, to cav-
alry, 9.
Sebree, Colonel E. G., 145.
Seligman brothers, 394.
Selma, campaign and capture
of, 190 et seq.; plan of
fortifications at, 221; cap-
tured, 231.
Seymour, Admiral, 519.
Shafter, General William R.,
424, 429, 430, 431, 433,
434.
Sheridan, General Philip H., 3.
Sherman, General William T.,
304, 305, 371; correspond-
ence of, with Grant, about
cavalry, 1 et seq.; gives
Wilson hearty welcome, 12 ;
estimate of, of Forrest, 12 ;
talks with Wilson, 14 ; esti-
mate of, of Grant, 17 et
seq.; March to the Sea and,
62; orders Thomas to hunt
down Forrest, 185; armi-
stice and, 281 et seq.;
terms of Johnston's capitu-
lation, 283 et seq.
Shunk, William P., 386, 399.
Sixth Army Corps, 417.
Smith, General A. J., 29; at
577
INDEX
Nashville, 107, 148 et seq.;
in northwestern Alabama,
180.
Smith, Goldwin, 470.
Smith, Gustavus W., C. S. A.,
280, 283.
Smith, Norman, 147.
Smith's Battery, Fourth Artil-
lery, loses gun, 140.
Sousa, 443.
Spalding, Colonel George, of
Michigan, 110, 122, 147.
Spanish War, 402 et seq.,
420.
Spooner, Senator, 503.
Squiers, Herbert G., 523, 524,
528.
Stanley, Major General, 34; at
Spring Hill, 42; wounded
at Franklin, 54.
Stanton, E. M., Secretary of
War, becomes uneasy, 32;
authorizes impressments,
33; disturbed about Nash-
ville, 65 et seq., 158; sus-
pends Sherman's orders,
304; replies to Governor
Brown, 347 et seq.
Steedman, General James B.,
363.
Stevens, Alexander H., 354.
Stewart, Colonel Robert R.,
369.
Stewart, Lieutenant General,
C. S. A., 152.
Stoneman, General George,
20.
Sugar industry, 407.
Sumner, General S. S., 429.
Taft, William H., 515.
Taggart, Chief Commissary, 5.
Taylor, Captain, rides to his
death, 217.
Taylor, General Richard, C. S.
A., 156; looking for inva-
sion, 195; telegraphs For-
rest, 198, 199, 200; escapes
from Selma, 231.
Teller, Senator, 503.
Thomas, Camp, 424 et seq.
Thomas, General George H.,
left to take care of Hood,
11, 12; at Nashville, 25;
concentrates army, 62 ;
waits for cavalry, 63; in
security behind entrench-
ments, 65; distrusted by
Washington authorities,
66 ; correspondence o f ,
with Grant and others, 68
et seq.; explains to Admi-
ral Lee, 72; treated like a
school boy, 73 ; preliminary
steps for removal of, 79 et
seq.; delayed by winter
storm, 88; remains firm,
91; council of, with offi-
cers, 100 et seq.; confer-
ence of, with Wilson, 102;
description of, 104; orders
infantry forward, 115 ;
overtakes Wilson, 126 ;
criticised, 135 ; praises cav-
alry, 146 ; recommends Wil-
son and Hatch for promo-
tion, 149; vindicated, 156;
578
INDEX
visits Wilson, 179 ; heartily
seconds Wilson's plans,
181; occupies middle Ten-
nessee, 194; again thanks
C. C., M. D. M., 292.
Tilden, Samuel J., 391.
Titus, Lieutenant, 418.
Tombs, Mr., 354.
Toral, 434.
Torbert, General A. T. A., 3.
Trafalgar, Battle of, 406, 495.
Turner, A. D. C., 510, 528,
533.
Tuskegee, 255; incident of the
Bibles and school books at,
256.
Tyler, General, C. S. A., 273.
U
Upton, Emory, Brigadier Gen-
eral, 165, 166 et seq., 178,
274, 364, 368, 372, 386;
crosses Milberry Fork,
203; destroys iron works
and coal mines, 207; vic-
tory of, at Montevallo, 208;
captures dispatches, 209;
at Ebenezer Church, 214;
cooperates with Long in
defeating Forrest, 218;
captures English engineer
with plans of Selma, 221;
cooperates in making
plan, 222; closing in on
Selma, 225, 226; assaults
entrenchments, 228 ; ad-
vances on Gerard and Co-
lumbus, 258; captures Co-
lumbus, 260 et seq.; sent
to Augusta, 306.
Vail, Colonel, Indiana, 224, 227.
Van Antwerp, Captain, A. D.
C., 303.
Van Duzer, Captain, A. Q. M.,
72, 84-85, 92, 95.
Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 394.
Vernadoe, Colonel, 418.
W
Wade, General, 418, 433, 459,
470, 472, 497.
Waldersee, Field Marshal von,
522, 532.
Walthal, General, C. S. A., new
rear guard of, 138, 153.
War ended, 270 et seq.
Washington, Colonel, 354, 373.
West Point, discrimination
against, 418.
Weston, Major John F., Ken-
tucky, 275, 367, 428; cap-
tures fleet, 253.
Weyler, Governor General, 485.
Wheeler, General Joseph, C. S.
A., 77, 340 et seq. } 417, 427,
431, 536.
White, Lieutenant Colonel
Frank, 216, 217, 275 et
seq., 279, 299; commands
Macon, 283.
Wilder, W. E., 417.
Wilson, James H., ordered to
command Sherman's cav-
579
INDEX
airy, 4; appointed brevet
major general, 5 ; horses of,
"Sheridan" and "Waif",
7; junior brigadier, 7;
goes West, 10; discusses
campaign with Sherman,
14 et seq.; correspondence
of, with Dana, Rawlins,
and Badeau, 22 ; returns to
Nashville, 24; in close
touch with Thomas, 26;
work of, at Nashville, 26 et
seq.; letter of, to Rawlins,
29; impresses horses, 33;
orders of, to Croxton, 35;
joins Schofield, 34; watch-
ing Hood, 36; whiskey in-
cident and, 38; defeats
Confederate cavalry at
Franklin, 50 et seq.; dis-
patches of, to Thomas, 51;
John Fiske's commenda-
tions of, 52; covers rear to
Nashville, 55; camps at
Edgefield, 56; letters of, to
Rawlins and Badeau, 57 et
seq.; impressing horses,
78; letter of, to friend,
109; advance of cavalry
of, 110; rides to Thomas's
headquarters, 113 ; rides
again to Thomas, 116;
turns enemy's flank, 117;
bivouacs for night, 128;
driving Hood from Ten-
nessee, 128 et seq.; letter
of, 137 ; suffering horses of,
143; letter of, to Rawlins,
159; letters of, to Grant's
headquarters, 162 ; head-
quarters of, at Gravelly
Springs, 164 ; describes
and commends command-
ers, 166 et seq.; plan of
campaign in heart of Con-
federacy, 180 ; gathering
information, 182; ready to
move, 186; writes Rawlins
and others, 187 et seq.; de-
layed by rains, 189; de-
taches Croxton, 205; de-
taches McCook, 212; en-
counters Forrest at Monte-
vallo, 207; had inside lines,
213; closing in on Selma,
223; reconnoiters, 225; led
charge of Selma, 229;
horse of, mortally wound-
ed, 230; message of, to
Canby, 241 ; meets Forrest,
241; crosses the Alabama,
245 et seq.; occupies Mont-
g o m e r y , 249 ; continues
breaking things, 254, 266;
occupies Macon, 278 ; meets
Howell Cobb, 279; Gusta-
vus W. Smith and, 280, 300,
302; interview of, with Jef-
ferson Davis, 335 et seq.;
farewell orders of, 365;
writes to Sherman, 371;
orders of, for guidance of
freedmen, 374; a witness
at Washington, 376; inter-
view of, with Grant, 377;
report of, on conditions in
Georgia, 380 ; National Ex-
press and Transportation
580
INDEX
Co. and, 381; defenses of
the Delaware and, 383; in-
ternal improvements and,
384; Lieutenant Colonel of
Infantry, 386 ; leaves army,
392; railroad life of, 399;
receiver of St. Louis and
Southeastern R. R. Co.,
399; president New Eng-
land R. R. Co., 400; trav-
els in China, 401; Spanish
War, 402 et seq.; interview
of, with McKinley, and
appointment to major gen-
eral, 416; staff of, 417; at
Camp Thomas, 422; at
Charleston, 434 et seq.; at
Ponce, 440; at Juana Diaz
and Coamo, 442 et seq.;
appointed military govern-
or, 450; addresses citizens,
454 et seq.; returns to New
York, 459 et seq.; assigned
command of First Army
Corps, 460; at Macon,
Georgia, 461, 462; speech
at Macon, 467 et seq.; rec-
ommended for governor
general, 470 ; patriotic
fiesta and, 474; at Matan-
zas, 479; visits interior,
483 et seq.; meets generals,
489; special report of, 491
et seq.; guests at headquar-
ters, 496, 497; called to
Washington, and has inter-
view with Root, 498 et
seq.; interview of, with
President, 499 et seq.; rela-
tions with Cuba, 503 ; sum-
mary of testimony of, 504
et seq.; calamity in family
of, 513; reports of, 514;
offers services in China,
517; ordered to China,
519 ; in Peking, 524 et seq.;
commands joint British
and American forces, 527
et seq.; commands in Pe-
king, 531; calls on von
Waldersee, 532 ; reviews
troops in Peking, 534 ; rode
walls of Peking, 535; re-
turns to States, 536; re-
tirement of, 536; repre-
sents army at coronation
of Edward VII., 537; sum-
mary of notable services
of, 537 et seq.
Wilson, John M., 336, 338.
Winslow, General Edward F.,
Fourth Iowa Cavalry, 224,
368, 372, 391, 395; as-
signed to command bri-
gade, 167; commands in
Selma, 246; at Columbus,
259 et seq., 266; at Atlan-
ta, 306; rebuilds railroad,
346.
Wirtz, Captain, 375.
Wood, .General Leonard, 413,
430, 431, 470, 490.
Wood, General T. J., supports
Thomas in council, 92;
catches up with cavalry,
136, 149.
Woodall, Colonel, 304.
Woodbury, Major John McG.,
436.
581
INDEX
"Worrall, James, 386. Yeoman, Lieutenant Joseph A.
Wyeth, Dr., "Life of Forrest" 0., Iowa, 308, 310 et seq.
of, 198. York, Count von, 533.
Young, General, 418, 431.
Y Young, Morris, Fifth Iowa
Cavalry, 224.
Yamaguchi, General, 532.
582
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