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3 6105 048 942 101

31I-3X

THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

1821—1848

THE UNITED STATES

AND MEXICO

1821—1848

A HISTORY

OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO f OUNTRIES

FROM THE INDEPENDENCE OF MEXICO

TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR

WITH THE UNITED STATES

GEORGE LOCKHART RIVES

VOLUME I

•

•. . - ^. ^. • - ; •

NEW YORK

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1918

COPTRIOHT, 1913, BT

CHARLES SCRIBNBR'S SONS

Published September. 1913

> •

PREFACE

The events which led up to the war between the United
States and Mexico, with all its momentous consequences to
both nations, have been very generally misapprehended.
On the American side the war has been treated in histories
of the United States as a mere episode in an all-embracing
struggle over slavery, which it was not. Mexican historians
have treated it as the unescapable result of American aggres-
sion in Texas, which it was not. But each of these views
embodies a sort of half-truth, and it becomes therefore both
diflScult and important to disentangle the whole truth.

Until very recently a thorough study of the relations be-
tween the two countries from the time Mexican indepen-
dence was achieved down to the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, was not possible.

In the first place, the mere fact of the existence of negro)
slavery in the United States imparted an element of intense/
bitterness into every discussion of the subject in this country.!
The North hated and dreaded the extension of slavery,
and even before the Mexican War was over the fear that
the newly acquired territories — New Mexico and Calif omia
— might becomes slave states, gave rise to passionate de-
bates which continued until' the breaking out of the Civil
War. Thereafter the prejudices and passions which were
awakened or inflamed by four years of murderous warfare
prevented an impartial view until the generation which had
so eflfectually dealt with slavery had nearly passed away.

In the second place, no complete account could ever have
been written without a knowledge of the diplomacy of those
countries whose interests were chiefly affected; and it is
only within a comparatively short time that the archives

vi PREFACE

of the United States, Mexico, Great Britain, and Texas have
been thrown open freely for examination.

It has been my object to present a consecutive narrative
of the events which cuhninated in war in 1846 and peace in
1848. In doing so it has seemed necessary to digress in
various directions, as, for instance, in relating the French
seizure of Vera Cruz and the controversy with Great
Britain over Oregon. It also has seemed necessaiy to give
the story of the Mexican War itself in some detail, although
it has been far from my purpose to attempt the writing of
a military history. That can hardly be well done by any
but a professional soldier, and, moreover, the naval and
military operations described in these pages — ^whether in
the strife of Mexican revolutions, or in the contests between
Mexico and Texas, or in the French bombardment of San
Juan de Uliia, or in the war between the United States and
Mexico — ^were carried on with weapons and means of com-
munication and transportation so completely obsolete at
the present day, that it is doubtful whether a detailed study
of such minor events could be of much real importance.

On the other hand, it is not doubtful that some lessons
of extreme importance may be drawn from a study of our
dealings with the nearest of our Latin-American neighbors.
We have not always been fortunate in our conduct toward
the other nations of this hemisphere, and our failures have,
as I think, been chiefly due to our ignorance. We have not
fully grasped the fundamental truth that our southern
neighbors are of an utterly alien race, whose ideals and
virtues and modes of thought and expression are so radically
different from ours that we have lacked the sympathetic
insight which comes only with perfect comprehension.

Nbwfobt, R. I.,
June, 1913.

CONTENTS

QBAPniB PAOB

I. The Florida Treaty 1

- •n. Mexico Achieves Her Independence .... 27*

— ^III. The People of Mexico 51

-^ IV. The People of Mexico (Continued) .... 77

V. The Northern Frontier of Mexico .... 103

/^^^. The Permanent Settlement of Texas . . . 128

VII. Mexican Politics: 1824-1830 155

VIII. Mexico Resolves to Take Order with the Texans 182

IX. Santa Anna in Control 205

X. President Jackson's Offers to Purchase Texas 234"

XI. Texas in Arms 2^

XII. Texas Stands by the Constitution .... 286

XIII. The Mexican Invasion 311/

XIV. San Jacinto 33&

XV. American Sympathy with Texas 362

XVI. Texas Proposes Annexation 389

XVII. Claims Against Mexico 417

XVIII. Santa Anna Once More 445

XIX. The Repubuc of Texas 464

viii CONTENTS

OHAPTSB rAom

XX. The Whigs and Mexico 495

XXI. Efforts at Mediation 525

XXII. British Proposals for Abolishing Slavery in

Texas 555

XXIII. Tyler's Treaty of Annexation 585

XXIV. The Election of Polk 618

XXV. The Banishment of Santa Anna 651

XXVI. Congress Invites Texas to Enter the Union . 679

XXVII. Texas Enters the Union 703

MAPS

FACINO PAOB

The Sabine River 10

The San Jacinto Campaign 346

The Kingdom of New Spain End of the Volume

THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

CHAPTER I

THE FLORIDA TREATY

The country we now know as Mexico was formerly a part
of that great and famous kingdom of New Spain which was
conquered by stout Cortfe, and which for nearly three cen-
tunes was held under an um^lenting and iron rule by a long
succession of Spanish viceroys. The people of the kingdom in
the first quarter of the nineteenth century rose in revolt, and
after a tedious and doubtful and bloody struggle succeeded
in establishing their independence. From the earUest years
of their separate existence as a nation they were necessarily
brought into close contact with their ambitious neighbors
on the north, and it is the purpose of this book to trace the
coiu'se of the relations between the two coxmtries until these
relations were interrupted by war, and then re-established
after the loss by Mexico of more than half her territory.

The relations between the United States and Mexico
could hardly be regarded as a continuation or development
of those which had existed for a generation between the
United States and Spain. Foreign intercourse with the Span-
ish possessions was, in general, sedulously restricted under
the colonial poUcy of the mother country; and therefore,
out of all the many and varied controversies which vexed the
American and Spanish governments, but a single one related
directly to the kingdom of New Spain. That one, however,
was of great magnitude, for it involved nothing fess than
the ownership of Texas.

It was at first asserted on the one hand, and denied on the

other, that Texas was, of right, a part of Louisiana, and that

J
2 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO j^^

it had therefore been included within the boxindaries of t' oe
great purchase from France in 1803; but after long u. voA
acrimonious discussions the United States, in 1819, in the
treaty by which it acquired Florida, ceded to Spain and
renounced forever all ite "rights, claims, and preteiisions "
to Texas. This cession was criticised at the time; and the
beUef persisted for many years that the American govern-
ment had recklessly given away a vast and fertile territory.
It was inevitable that such a beUef should seriously influence
the subsequent course of events, and it is therefore neces-
sary to inquire, at the outset of this nairative, whether the
United States ever really possessed any such title to Texas
as was capable of being given away. Whatever that title
was, it necessarily depended upon the grant contained in the
Louisiana treaty of 1803; and the question in debate always
came back to this : Was Texas, or any 'part of it, included in
what was formerly called Louisiana f ^

The French title to Louisiana had come through discov-
eries made by her subjects. Starting from Canada, they had
explored the Mississippi and its head-waters and had ulti-
mately descended the stream to its mouth. Subsequently
Mobile and New Orleans were occupied, colonies were
planted, and permanent possession was maintained of posts
on both banks of the Mississippi. Both banks of the Red
River were also occupied for some distance back from the
point where it emptied into the Mississippi. These noto-
rious facts, it was generally conceded, gave France title to
the whole of the Mississippi valley, except perhaps where
actual occupation might have secured small portions for
British settlers, and the French title continued until it was
extinguished by the cessions to Great Britain and Spain in
1762 and 1763.

^ This question has recently been re-examined, and much light thrown upon
it from the French and Mexican archives and the records of the Texan missions.
Reference may in particular be made to La Louisiane sous la Compagnie des
Indes, by P. Heinrich; "The Beginnings of Texas," by R. C. Clark, in Tex.
Hist. Quar., V, 171-205; "Louis Juchereau de Saint-Denis," by the same author,
in Tex. Hist. Quar,, VI, 1-26; "Was Texas a Part of the Louisiana Purchase?"
by John R. Ficklen, in Publications of Southern Hist, Asm,, V, 351-387; "The
Louisiana-Texas Frontier," by I. J. Cox, in Tex, Hist, Quar,, X, 1-75.

THE FLORIDA TREATY 3

Spain's title to her possessions in the New World rested,
in the first place, upon the universally recognized basis of
discovery and occupation; and, in the second place, upon
the papal bull of May 4, 1493, in which Alexander VI — act-
ing, as he asserted, by divine authority — gave, granted, and
assigned to Ferdinand and Isabella and their heirs and as-
signs the whole of North America and the greater part of
South America, and all the islands "discovered and to be
discovered" in that quarter of the globe.* The official
Spanish view was therefore that the French and all other
settlers in North America were mere trespassers; and al-
though the Spanish government made no effectual attempts
to distm-b the English, French, or Dutch colonies farther
north, it did prevent by force of arms, up to almost the
end of the seventeenth century, any foreign settlements in
Florida or on the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico.

As early as 1519 the shores of Texas were explored by
Alonso Alvarez de Pineda.^ Sixteen years later Alvar Nufiez
Cabeza de Vaca and three companions, having escaped from
captivity among the Indians and wandered across the in-
terior, by some extraordinary good fortune made their way
to the Spanish settlements on the Pacific coast.' Between
1540 and 1543 Francisco Vdsquez de Coronado and Her-
nando de Soto may have visited parts of the present state
of Texas.* And during the next hundred and forty-four
years several expeditions from New Mexico visited the
country, unvexed as yet by rival explorers.*

But the earliest attempt at a permanent settlement was
made by the French. Robert CaveHer de la Salle, a native

^ "AudoriUUe OmnipoterUis Dei nobis in Beaio Petro conceasa, ac Vicariatua
Juu~Christi quo fungirmur in terria . . . tenore praeaeniium danamuaf concedi-
mua ei aaignamuSf vosque et hae^edeaf ac aubceaaorea, " are the words of the grant-
ing clause. — (Navarrete, Viagesj II, 32.)

• Navarrete, Viageaj III, 64.

s Bancroft, North Mexican Statea and Texaa, 1, 60-67. And see " The Route of
Cabeca de Vaca," by Judge Bethel Coopwood, in Tex, Hiat, Qvar,, III, 108,
177, 229; IV, 1.

« Bancroft, Nofrth Mexican Statea and Texaa, I, 85, 381.

* For a good summary of the various expeditions, see Herbert £. Bolton's
''Early Eiqilorations of Texas," in Souihweatem Hiat. Quar., XVI, 1-26.

4 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

of France and a resident of Canada, had been the first to de-
scend the Mississippi to its mouth, a feat he accomplished in
1682; and it was easy for him, when he returned to France,
to convince Louis XIV and his ministers of the advantages
that might be drawn from the discovery. A .colony on the
shores of the Gulf of Mexico, directly connected with the
north by navigable rivers which were only separated from
the Great Lakes by short and easy portages, would at once
convert the whole interior of the North American conti-
nent into French territory. The EngUsh colonies would be
henmied in and pressed back upon the sea. The Spanish
possessions would be directly menaced. The Spanish mo-
nopoly of trade, that treasure which the Spaniard guarded
as a vigilant dragon his golden fleece,^ would be broken up.
And accordingly, in 1684, an expedition was fitted out under
La Salle which was to proceed from France directly to the
Gulf of Mexico and seize a post near the mouth of the
Mississippi, where forts were to be erected and Indians en-
listed— all with the ultimate view of descending upon the
rich silver mines of New Spain.

The attempt ended in tragic failure. The ships — prob-
ably by some error in navigation, which was conceivable
enough in the days when longitude could only be guessed
at — ^held their way into the Gulf of Mexico, but far to the
westward of the mouth of the Mississippi. Instead of
Louisiana they reached Texas. On the shores of what is
now called Matagorda Bay, in February, . 1685, a landing
was effected, and upon one of the streams falling into the
bay a rude stockade was built.* Misfortunes followed fast.
One of the ships had been taken some months previously by
the Spaniards, one was sent back to France, and the two
remaining were stranded, and proved total wrecks. Bitter

^ ''The policy of Spain doth keep that Treasury of theirs under such lock
and key, as both confederates, yea and subjects, are excluded of trade into
those countries, . . . such a vigilant dragon is there that keepeth this golden
fleece/' — (Sir pS-ancis Bacon in the House of Commons, June 27, 1607, quoted
in Brown's First Republic in America^ 17.)

' The French called the bay St. Bernard; the stockade was Fort St. Louis.
For the precise location of the French fort, see Tex, Hist, Quar., XV, 58.

THE FLORIDA TREATY 5

quarrels broke out among the colonists. Some of the party
were killed by the Indians, some were lost by drowning or
other accidents; and many perished of disease. By the end
of the year 1686 fully three-fourths were dead. No help
had come from France, and there were no means of return-
ing thither. The last desperate resource was an attempt
to reach the Canadian settlements overland, and in January,
1687, a party, about twenty in number, headed by La Salle
himself, set out on the northward journey.

In the autunm of that year six broken men reached the
French post near the mouth of the Illinois. La Salle and
three of his companions had been murdered by others of
the party, one man had been drowned, and several had
fallen into the hands of the Indians.^

The settlement on the Gulf held out imtil nearly the end
of February, 1689, in spite of pestilence and famine; and
then the Lidians fell upon the feeble survivors, and the
French attempt at a settlement in Texas was at an end»
Of those who had landed four years before, almost all were
dead. Besides the six men who had foirnd their way to
the Illinois Biver, four boys and a girl had been saved by
Indian women fr^m the rLsacve, md a few deserters had
voluntarily taken up life among the Indian tribes.

In the meantime, while the poor wretches who had accom-
panied La Salle were slowly dying in the wilderness, the
colonial authorities of New Spain were trying to discover
them. The capture of one of the French ships had given
warning of an attempt to form a settlement somewhere on
the coast of the Gulf of Mexico; but though expeditions
were sent out by sea and land, no French settlement could
be foirnd. At length, in April, 1689, a Spanish force from
Coahuila came upon the wreck of the French fort, and picked
up here and there among* the Indian huts the miserable sur-
vivors of La Salle's fatal attempt. These men were all sent

prisoners to the city of Mexico.^

* Avkmao's La SaJHe and ike Discovery of the Great West gives a full acoount
«f tbe adventure.

s Ao interesting account, written by a member of this expedition, will be
foond in Historia de Nueoo Le&ttf 319-342 (Garcia, DocumeiUos InSdUos, XXV).

6 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The Spanish authorities, however, were not content with
merely ascertaining the fact of the destruction of the French
settlement. They determined to explore and settle Texas
themselves in order to forestall any future attempts by
foreigners, and two missions were established as early as
1690. It seemed as though Texas was to be permanently
occupied at last; but the Indians proved restless and thievish
and not amenable to missionary influences; there was neither
gold nor silver in the country; there was no monetary return
for the expense of maintaii^g friars and soldiersTInd the
viceroy of New Spain decided that colonization should be
postponed until the natives showed a better disposition.
Accordingly, in 1693, the Texan missions were abandoned.

OthT^itions did not postpone pushing their colonies
forward until the natives were ready to welcome them, and
during the next twenty years, while the English colonies
were slowly coming to maturity, France was busy laying the
foundations of an empire at Mobile and New Orleans, and
in improving the means of communication between Canada
and the Gulf of Mexico.

Late in 1714 Lamothe-Cadillac, then governor of Loui-
siana, conceived the idea of attempting to import cattle
from the Mexican settlers on the Rio Grande, and thus
establishing a trade by land which was prohibited by sea.
For this purpose he sent a certain Louis Juchereau de Saint-
Denis, a Canadian by birth, from the Red River across
Texas. With not more than about a dozen white men,
Saint-Denis safely accomplished his journey, and in Feb-
ruary, 1715, presented himself at the first Spanish post he
found on the Rio Grande. The apparition of a foreigner
on the soil of a remote Spanish colony was an imheard-
of and disturbing event, and the astonished commander of
the presidio at once put the whole party imder arrest, and
referred the case to his superior officers. Under their in-
structions the companions of Saint-Denis were sent back
to the Red River, while he himself was carried to the city
of Mexico. After he had been fully interrogated as to his
purposes, the viceroy solemnly determined that it was essen-

THE FLORIDA TREATY 7

tial to take active steps to check any further advance by
the French; and that missions should be established along
the frontier so as to win over the Indians, while keeping a
dose watch on the Louisiana settlements.

An adequate expedition was accordingly fitted out irnder
the conmiand of Captain Domingo Ramon, and Saint-Denis
willingly agreed, for a suitable compensation, to serve as its
chief guide. In April, 1716, the Rio Grande was crossed.
The weather was fine; the country was an open prairie; the
Indians seemed friendly; and, travelling by easy stages, the
whole company by the latter part of Jirne reached the valley
of the Neches, in the extreme eastern part of what is now
the state of Texas. In this neighborhood four missions
were planted in the sunmier of 1716. Later in the year two
more were established farther east — one of them, among
the Adaes Indians, lying far within the present state of
Louisiana, and not more than about twenty miles from the
French frontier post at Natchitoches. The French made no
protest; they only strengthened their Natchitoches "fort."

The original expedition of Saint-Denis had not been in
any sense an attempt to plant the French flag south or west
of the Red River. Its sole object, real as well as ostensible,
was to try to open a trade with the Mexicans; and both
Saint-Denis himself and his superiors acquiesced, as we have
seen, in the Spanish occupation of the entire territory from
the Rio Grande to a point between the Red and the Sabine
rivers. Nor was any serious effort ever made afterward
by the French to take permanent possession of any part of
Texas.

The short war of 1719 certainly offered France a new and
excellent opportunity of seizing Texas if she had wished to
do so ; but the opportunity was not availed of . A force
from Natchitoches did indeed take possession of the mission
of los Adaes, whereupon the Spaniards withdrew from all
their eastern posts, and fell back to B6xar. The French
followed perhaps as far as the Trinity River, and after
they or their Indian allies had burned the Spanish mis-
sions, they withdrew to Natchitoches.

8 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

They also sent an exploring expedition up the Red River
and established a post among the Nassonite Indians at a
point which, the Spanish authorities asserted, was within
the jurisdiction of New Mexico. But except this, and the
short raid above referred to, the French made no attempts
on Texas during the continuance of that war.^

At the end of the war an occasion arose for a diplomatic
settlement of the questions at issue; but again it was not
availed oi/ When the terms of a treaty of peace were under
discussion, the French envoys were instructed to ask for a
definition of the boundaries of Louisiana. On the west, the
Rio Grande was to be suggested; but if, as was likely, the
Spaniards would not consent to this, then the Bay of St.
Bernard might be accepted as a compromise. This bay, it
was pointed out, was that at which La Salle had landed,
*^ce qui prouve qu^il rums appartient de droit.'' The Spanish
King, however, flatly refused to discuss the subject. His
chief desire was that Pensacola, which the French had
taken during the war, should be restored, and in the end
the question of boimdaries was dropped, the French gov-
ernment being too desirous of securing the Spanish alliance
to haggle over details. The treaty of March 27, 1721,
therefore, contained only a clause providing for the resti-
tution to the King of Spain of all the territories, coasts,
and bays situated in America which had been occupied by
the French during the war. A similar provision was in-
serted in the first of the secret articles of the treaty of alli-
ance of June 13, 1721, between Spain, France, and Great
Britain.*

These treaties, by their failure to define the boundaries of
the Spanish possessions, still left open the question as to the
ownership of Matagorda Bay, the scene of La Salle's mis-
fortunes, to which the French diplomatists had asserted an
"irrevocable" right. As the colonial authorities of Loui-
siana were eager to extend their jurisdiction, upon a con-

' Heinrich, Lfa Lauinane sous la Compagnie dea Indes, 104r-108.
' Ibid.f 79. The despatches of the French ambassador in Madrid showing
the course of the negotiations are very fully quoted (ibid., 72-80).

THE FLORIDA TREATY 9

venient rumor that the English were desirous of taking pos-
session of the bay, a small expedition was sent there by sea,
under the conmiand of B^nard de la Harpe. On August
27, 1721, he landed with a few men somewhere on the Texan
coast — ^probably near Galveston. He foimd the country
extraordinarily fine and fertile, and he heard of no Spaniards
in the neighborhood. The Indians, however, were too hos-
tile to justify La Harpe in running the risk of settling among
them with his Uttle force; and after a sojourn of only ten
days, he set sail again for Louisiana.^

Although he had not felt strong enough to carry out his
attempt at re-establishing La Salle's colony, La Harpe him-
self remained more than ever convinced of its importance;
but notwithstanding his urgent representations of the "in-
finite consequence" of taking possession of the Bay of St.
Bernard, the authorities in France remained sceptical. It
was doubtless, they said, a fine country, and easy to cultivate,
but they were in no condition to support so distant a post,
and at the close of 1721 positive orders were sent directing
that the enterprise should be abandoned.^

Meanwhile the Spaniards, on their side, were not idle.
In the autumn of 1720 an expedition on a considerable scale,
under the command of the Marquis de Aguayo, was sent out
with instructions to take possession of Matagorda Bay and
to re-establish the missions which had been abandoned dur-
ing the war. The plan was to send married soldiers and
settlers, the latter to include a proportion of mechanics and
craftsmen. But although the settlers were to be paid wages
for two years in advance, and were to receive grants of land
in Texas, only seven families volunteered, and the rest of
the expedition, exclusive of the friars who were to serve the
missions, was chiefly recruited from the jails of the different
Mexican cities.

In the spring of 1721 the expedition was divided, a small
detachment being sent to take military possession of the

1 Ibid., 11&-118; Margry, Dicauvertes et EiabliasemerUs des Francis dans
FAmirique Sej^erUrianaie, VI, 320-347.
*Heiiirich,119.

10 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

shores of the bay; and a year later a presidio having, we are
told, four bastions and a tower was erected on the precise
site of La Salle's fort. The main body of the expedition,
marching east from B^xar (San Antonio) and refounding
missions as it went, crossed the Sabine late in August of the
same year. Not only was the mission of San Miguel de los
Adaes re-established, but on a neighboring hill the spacious
presidio of Nuestra Senora del Pilar, mounting six field-
pieces and manned by a garrison of a hundred men, was con-
structed. The mission and fort lay seven leagues from
Natchitoches and about one league from the Laguna de
los Adaes (Spanish Lake) ; and although the precise spot is
not now exactly ascertainable, it was certainly many miles
east of the Sabine River.

The French officer in conmiand at Natchitoches and Bien-
ville, the new governor of the colony of Louisiana, protested;
but they offered no real opposition to the Spanish establish-
ment, and both parties settled down to a sort of tacit under-
standing by which the Arroyo Hondo, a small stream cross-
ing the road from Natchitoches to the Sabine, was regarded
as marking the boundary between the French and Spanish
possessions.^

The precise line of demarcation was never looked upon as
a matter of practical importance. Neither party formally
surrendered claims which might perhaps serve as useful
grievances in the future, and orders were sent from time to
time to the conmianding officers of the frontier post direct-
ing them to resist encroachments. But no orders were ever
given, after the close of the war in 1721, to push forward on
either side, and an excellent imderstanding was thus kept up.
It was, of course, the duty of the Spanish officials to pre-
vent all conmierce; but "contraband trade with the French

'See "The Aguayo Expedition into Texas and Louisiana, 1719-1722," by
Eleanor Claire Buckley, in Tex. Hist. Quar., XV, 1-65. This author fixes the
site of the mission of the Adaes and the presidio of Pilar as being "near the
present town of Robeline, Louisiana." For further information as to the
location of the presidio and as to the general topography of the region between
the Red River and the Sabine, see note to Coues's edition of The Expeditiona cf
ZebuUm M, Pike (N. Y., 1895X II) 713, and the maps accompanying the same
work.

THE SABINE BIVER

THE FLORIDA TREATY 11

seems to have been the chief occupation of all classes on the
frontier, including the governor, and perhaps even the friars." ^

So matters rested until 1762, when the treaties between
England, Spain, and France which closed the Seven Years'
War effected a complete change in the ownership of a large
part of North Ammca. Canada and all the French posses-
sions east of the Mississippi, including the Floridas, but ex-
cepting New Orleans, were ceded to England; and the King
of France at the same time conveyed "to His CathoUc
Majesty and his successors in perpetuity, all the country
known under the name of Louisiana, as well as New Orleans
and the island on which that place stands." ^

Thirty-eight years later the work of the statesmen of 1762
was undone. By the treaty of San Udefonso of October 1,
1800, Spain ceded back to France "the colony or province
of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the
hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it,
and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently
entered into between Spain and other States." *

France did not long continue mistress of Louisiana, for in
1803 she ceded to the United States " the said territory, with
all its rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the same
manner as they have been acquired by the French Republic,
in virtue of the above-mentioned treaty." *

Louisiana, therefore, as it had been when France pos-
sessed it, and as ii should be according to the terms of any \ t|
treaties niade afleFr762,~was what^ had sold to the

1 Bancroft, North Mexican States and Texas, I, 643. See also Perrin du Lac,
Voyage done lee Deux Louisianes, 375.

' Tlie conveyance was dated November 3, 1762, and was ratified by the
Kings of Spain and France respectively on the 13th and 23d of the same month.
An interesting account of the negotiations, showing the eagerness of Louis XV
to put off on his cousin the heavy burden of Louisiana, will be found in a paper
by Professor William R. Shepherd, ''The Cession of Louisiana to Spain,'' Pol.
8ei, Quar., XIX, 439-458.

*"La eoUmie ou province de la Louieiane avec la mime Hendue qu*elU a actvr
eOemenl eoue le potufoir de VEepagne et qu^eUe avail sotie la domination frangaiee
d telle ^'elle doit itre en vertu dee IraitSs condue depuis enire Sa MajeaU Catho^
Uque el d^aidres ^to/«."— (Garden, VIII, 48.)

***Le dit terriioire, avec Ume ses droits et appartenanceSy ainsi et dela manihre
gu'iZt oni iU acquis par la ripublique fran^ise en vertu du traiU susdit condu
Sa MaieiU CaiAo^igue."— (Martens, RecueU de Traiiis, VII, 708.)

12 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

/United States; but Livingston and Monroe, before they
/ signed the treaty, had asked in vain for some intelligible
and precise definition of this great territory. They were
\ told in effect that they had made a noble bargain and that
V they would doubtless make the best of it; and with that
reply they had to be content. The fact was, of course, that
the American agents had asked a question to which no defi-
nite answer was possible. No doubt some statement could
easily have been made setting out the results of treaties affect-
ing the eastern boundaries of the old French possessions; but
there were no treaties that affected their southern or western
boundaries, and no man could undertake to declare what
was the extent of the colony or province of Louisiana when
France possessed it. Every spot to which a French trapper
had wandered or on which a French colonist had built a
hut was^ or might be claimed to be, French territory.
,. Nevertheless the French government, though it did not
Xchoose to take Livingston and Monroe into its conSdence,
had previously formulated for its own eventual and exclusive
use a tolerably precise declaration as to the starting-points
which it meant to claim for the boundary w^t of the Mis-
sissippi. In secret instructions issued to the French com-
mander in Louisiana the pretensions he was to assert were
clearly and concisely stated.

"The extent of Louisiana/' he was told, "is well determined on the
south by the Gulf of Mexico. But bounded on the west by the river
called Rio Bravo from its mouth to about the 30^ parallel, the line
of demarcation stops after reaching this point, and there seems never
to have been any agreement in regard to this part of the frontier. The
farther we go northward, the more undecided is the boundary. This
part of America contains little more than uninhabited forests or Indian
tribes, and the necessity of fixing, a boundary has never yet been felt
there." ^

In the Ught of our present knowledge of the facts, it is per-
fectly apparent that the French pretensions were ridiculous

' Instructuma Secrhtea pour le Capitaine-G^n4ral de la Louisiane, 5 frimaire,
an XI (November 26, 1802) ; quoted in Adams's History of the U. 5., II, 6.
A literal translation of the entire letter is printed in Robertson's Louisianaf 1,
35&-358.

THE FLORIDA TREATY 13

and unwarranted. Except as a prisoner, no Frenchman had
ever even seen the Rio Bravo, or been within two hundred
miles of it; and except for the brief and surreptitious occupa-
tion by La Salle's colony and the short-Uved raids in 1719 and
1721, no Frenchman had ever been in possession of any post
within four himdred miles of that river. Moreover, the
above instructions clearly impUed that there had been some
agreement as to a boundary along the Rio Grande from
its mouth to "about the 30® parallel." This was a deliber-
ate suggestio falsi. There was never any agreement of the
kind.

When Jefferson's administration learned that the boim-
daries of their new pxirchase were left so vague, their course
seemed plain. The straightforward mode of dealing was
evidently a proposal to Spain to fix the line by agreement;
and instructions were accordingly sent to Monroe to pro-
ceed from Paris to Madrid and to join with Charles Pinck-
ney, the American minister in Spain, in an effort to adjust
the matter.^ These instructions were dated July 29, 1803,
but when they reached Paris, the irritation of Spain over the
palpable bad faith of France in the business of Louisiana was
so great as to make any overtures at that time obviously
useless.

However, in April, 1804, renewed instructions were sent
to Monroe, directing him to take up the Spanish negotia-
tion, after first ascertaining the views of the French govern-
ment. The main objects were stated to be the acquisition
of the Floridas (which Great Britain had ceded to Spain
in 1783) and the settlement of spoliation claims; but the
boundary west of the Mississippi was also to be adjusted.
As to this, Monroe was informed that "in one of the papers
herewith transmitted, you wiU see the grounds on which our
claim may be extended even to Rio Bravo," but that Hne was
not to be insisted on. As a concession to Spain, a proposi-
tion for a neutral zone might be made, under which American
settlements would be prohibited for a term of years west of
the Sabine. In later instructions, of July 8, 1804, greater

1 Amer. St. Papers, For. Rel, II, 626.

14 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

stress was laid on the Texan boundary. The President, so
the envoys were infonned, was "not a little averse to the
occlusion, for a very long period, of a very wide space of
territory westward of the Mississippi, and equally so to a
perpetual relinquishment of any territory whatever east-
ward of the Rio Bravo." Nevertheless, the degree to which
the envoys were to insist on these points was to be regu-
lated by what they learned "of the temper and policy of
Spain." 1

Monroe and Pinckney were not long left in doubt as to
either the temper or the policy of the Spanish government.
Talleyrand made no secret of his opposition to any further
extension of the territory of the United States; and Godoy,
who was still for a few months to remain the real ruler of
Spain, was whoUy subservient to France and immovable in
the face of any threats which the American diplomatists
were in a position to put forward. Monroe reached Madrid
on January 2, 1805. He left it on May 26 of the same year,
having failed in every branch of the negotiation with which
he was charged.

The relations between the United States and Spain were
now at the breaking point. War seemed impossible to avoid,
and on both sides such preparations were made along the
frontier as were possible in a remote and unsettled country.
Early in February, 1806, a small body of American troops
from Natchitoches pushed back across the Sabine a Spanish
party who were encamped near the old Adaes mission: but
in My the Spaniards'we^ back in much greater force.
Meanwhile the American War Department had ordered the
reinforcement of the post at Natchitoches, and in Septem-
ber General Wilkinson, then commanding in the Mississippi
valley, arrived there in person. An exchange of letters with
the Spanish officers followed, the result of which was that
it was agreed that the American troops were to remain east
of the Arroyo Hondo, and the Spanish troops were to remain
west of the Sabine. For the next fifteen years this arrange-
ment remained in force, the neutral ground between the

1 Ibid., 628-^30.

THE FLORIDA TREATY 15

two streams becoming a place of refuge for bandits and des-
peradoes of every kind.^

Such were, in outline, the facts of the case. It is of in-
terest to turn now to the argimients advanced with great
fulness on each side when the subject was imder discussion
in Madrid in the year 1805.

The Spanish argument rested upon the theory that the de-
cision ought to be based upon the actual possession enjoyed
by France and Spain respectively in 1762, and that the
boundary must be so traced as to throw on one side of the
line all establishments made and maintained by the French,
and on the other side all establishments made and main-
tained by the Spaniards. The Spanish province of Texas,
said Cevallos, the Minister of Foreign Relations, extended
to the presidio of the Adaes; it had been occupied since
1689, and the Spanish possession had been acknowledged and
respected by the French while they owned Louisiana. He
concluded that the boundary ought to pass between Natchi-
toches and the presidio of the Adaes, and should there-
fore run northward to the Red River from a point on the
Gulf between the rivers Mermentau and Calcasieu. From
this point, the limits being little known, he proposed that
a joint commission should be appointed to investigate the
facts.* The line as thus suggested started more than forty
miles east of the easterly boundary of the present state of
Texas.

This view of the case was strikingly opposite to that which
the French government had been secretly preparing to assert
on its own behalf after the treaty of San Ildefonso. Napo-
leon's government, however, was never much troubled by

* See McCaleb's Aaron Burr Conspiracy^ 105-157. The correspondence be-
tween Wilkinson and the Spanish officers was transmitted to Congress with
the President's annual message, December 2, 1806, and referred to in that
document. Congress, therefore, was fully informed of the arrangement.

• Cevalloe to Pinckney and Monroe, April 13, 1805, Amer. St. Papers^ For.
Bd., II, 660-662; Robertson's Louisiana^ II, 19^211. A later statement of
the Spanish position is very clearly presented in a pamphlet prepared for and
published by the Spanish minister in the United States, Don Luis de Onis,
entitled Ohaervalions on the Existing Differences between the Government of
Spain and the United States, No. Ill, by Verua (Philadelphia, 1817).

16 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

any restraints of consistency, and Talleyrand had had no
difficulty in suggesting to the Spanish authorities, in antici-
pation of Monroe's visit to Madrid, the policy they should
adopt. If the cession of Louisiana had not been made to the
United States, he said:

"We should have sought to distinguish between settlements that
belong to the kingdom of Mexico, and settlements that had been
formed by the French or by those who succeeded them in this colony.
This distinction between settlements formed by the French or by the
Spaniards would have been made equally in ascending northwards.
All those which are of French formation would have belonged to
Louisiana; and since European settlements in the interior are rare
and scattered, we might have imagined direct lines drawn from one to
the other to connect them; and it is to the west of this imaginary line
that the boundary between Louisiana and the Spanish possessions
would have been traced at such distance and in such direction as
France and Spain should have agreed." ^

To this argument of Talleyrand's, as presented through
Cevallos, the American representatives rephed on April 20,
1805.^ The question respecting the western limits of Louisi-
ana was to be answered, they conceived, by a consideration
of the rights which France would have had if she had never
parted with the province.

" All the rights," they observed, " which she formerly possessed over
it were restored to her by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, and by her trans-
ferred to the United States by that of Paris, 1803; to ascertain these,
it is necessary to go back to that epoch when the river Mississippi,
with the waters which empty into it, and when the bay of St. Bemajrd
were just discovered."

In these words lay the heart of the controversy. Was
the boimdary to be settled by the possession of 1685 or by
the possession of 1762? The American argument, which
supported the first of these alternatives, proceeded upon the

'Talleyrand to Gravina, 12 fructidor, an XII (August 29, 1804); quoted
in H. Adams, II, 2d9. A literal translation of the entire letter is printed in
Robertson's Louiaiana, II, 195-198. See also Talleyrand to Turreau, 20
thermidor, an XII (August 8, 1804) to the same effect; ibid., 193.

« Amer. St. Papers, For. Rd., II, 063.

THE FLORIDA TREATY 17

assumption that La Salle, as the first settler of this region,
had conferred a lawful right of possession on the King of
France, and that all the subsequent settlements by the
Spaniards were imlawful intrusions.

Three principles were laid down by Pinckney and Monroe
as applicable to such cases. First, that when a European
nation takes possession of any extensive sea-coast, that pos-
session is understood as extending to the interior country as
far as the sources of the rivers emptying into the sea within
the portion of the coast so occupied. Second, that whenever
one European nation makes a discovery and takes possession
of any portion of a continent, and another afterwards does
the same at a distant point, the boundary between them is a
line midway between their possessions. Third, that when-
ever any European nation has thus acquired a right to any
portion of territory, such right cannot be diminished or
affected by any other power by virtue of grants from the
natives within the limits of the territory in question.

The utter futility of such reasoning should have been ap-
parent to any man with a sense of hmnor. No individual
would have voluntarily given up a single acre of land of
which he and his ancestors had been in continuous and un-
disturbed possession for a hundred and twenty years, upon a
mere assertion of theoretical right ; and it should have needed
no very strong sense of the ludicrous to appreciate the ab-
surdity of addressing to a country still apparently indepen-
dent a request to surrender four or five hundred miles of
sea-coast and an immense hinterland, upon no other ground
than the unsupported assertion that its possession from
1689 to 1762 had been in violation of principles "adopted
in practice by European nations."

Cevallos did not even think it necessary to reply to the
American argument. To a proposition made later on to
adopt the Colorado River of Texas as a compromise boun-
dary, he simply declined his assent to "propositions so
totally to the disadvantage of Spain," and here the diplo-
matic discussion rested for thirteen years. When it was re-
sumed, events had occurred which changed the face of

18 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Europe and America. The War of 1812 had demonstrated
the power and the weakness of the United States; Napoleon
had been sent to Saint Helena; the crown of Spain, after
many vicissitudes, had been set upon the head of the false
and unworthy Ferdinand VII, and all the American con-
tinental possessions of the Spanish crown had broken into
open revolt.

The negotiations between the United States and Spain
were now again conducted under the direct personal super-
vision of Monroe, who, after a diplomatic career of unusual
length and variety and a long service in the State Depart-
ment, had risen to the presidency. No man was more famil-
iar than he with the controversy as to the Louisiana boun-
daries,, for he had not only signed the Louisiana treaty in
1803, but had carried on all the negotiations concerning it
with the Spanish government.

Standing upon this high vantage-ground of knowledge
and experience, Monroe's mind was clearly made up that it
would be expedient to surrender whatever colorable claim
to Texas the United States possessed. Every member of his
cabinet concurred with him— Adams, according to his own
account, having been the last man in the administration to
agree to accept the Sabine for the western boundary' — and
finally, after wearisome discussions on a multiplicity of
other details, the treaty was signed on the twenty-second
of February, 1819.

That same evening Adams wrote in his diary that it was
the most important day of his life.^ It was certainly an
important day in the life of the nation, for it marked the

^ J. Q. Adams's MemoirSf V, 54. But there seems to be no other evidence
in support of his assertion. The first written proposal for a definition of the
boundary was made by the Spanish minister, October 24, 1818. Adams re-
plied October 31, 1818, offering the line of the Sabine, and never qualified that
offer. — (Amer, St, Papers, For, Rd., TV, 526, 530.) His diary does not mention
any cabinet discussion on the point. Indeed, the point was hardly open to
discussion, as Monroe, in Madison's administration, had already offered the
Sabine. — (Monroe to Erving, May 30, 1816; H. R. Doc. 42, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 5.)

'A quarter of a century later he repeated the assertion. ''The Florida
Treaty was the most important incident in my life, and the most successful
negotiation ever consummated by the government of this Union." — (Diary of
Sept. 27, 1844; Memoirs, XII, 78.)

THE FLORIDA TREATY 19

end of forty years of complicated and vexatious contro-
versies which had baffled every successive American cabinet,
and which time and again had threatened to result in war.
The treaty now settled all differences. The United States
agreed to adjust the claims of its citizens against Spain,
estimated at five million dollars; Spain ceded the Hondas,
East and West, and a boundary line between the respective
possessions of the two countries was agreed upon, from the
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. The treaty line fol-
lowed the present western boundary of the state of Louisiana
and the southern boundary of Oklahoma, cut off the south-
western comer of what is now the state of Kansas and the
greater part of what is now the state of Colorado, and then
followed the parallel of 42® north latitude across the continent
to the Pacific Ocean. The vast and then unknown and
almost impopulated region which has since been formed into
the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah,
and California, together with large parts of Kansas, Colo-
rado, and Wyoming, was thenceforward to be recognized as
included within the possessions of the Spanish crown, while
the King of Spain renounced in favor of the United States
whatever claims he had to the more northern and eastern
portions of the American continent.

The immediate advantages of this arrangement to the
United States were manifest. By assuming the claims of
American citizens against a bankrupt debtor, the whole un-
broken coast-line from the Bay of Fundy to Sabine Pass came
into the hands of the United States; the uninterrupted i ^ x
navigation of all the rivers that, emptied into the Gulf of P"/

Mexico east of Texas was secured; an excellent naval base
at Pensacola was obtained; and the long-standing and irri-
tating question of boundaries was removed from discussion.

On the Spanish side, the advantages of the treaty were no
less obvious. What she needed, next to money, was peace.
The Napoleonic wars had ruined her at home. The revolt
of her colonies had, on the one hand, cut oflf a constant source
of tribute, while, on the other hand, the futile effort to repress ^
the rebeUions had involved her in endless expenditure. In/

20 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Florida, the exploits of Jackson and the unpunity of the
pirates of Amelia Island had abundantly shown that in the
event of a war with the United States the whole territory
would be lost. Nor was a doubt then entertained that
Texas and northern Mexico were likewise indefensible.

In addition to these considerations there was the over-
whelming desire of Spain to prevent a recognition of the
independence of any of her revolting colonies. The outbreak
of a war with the United States would have been instantly
followed by such recognition, and, conversely, a removal of
the causes of difference, or even a pending negotiation, might
delay any decisive action. It was even hoped that a stipu-
lation might be obtained that the United States would agree
not to recognize the colonies, and suggestions to this effect
were made at least twice during the course of the negotia-
tions; but President Monroe and his Secretary of State per-
emptorily declined to discuss the proposal, on the ground
that it was^ " repugnant to the honor and even the indepen-
dence of the United States." ^ Delay, therefore, was all that
Spain secured; but of that she obtained more than she
could reasonably have hoped. Not only were the weary
negotiations dragged out to unconscionable lengths, but even
after the treaty was signed there were excessive delays in the
exchange of ratifications. The Senate of the United States
by a unanimous vote approved the treaty two day« after it
was signed. The Spanish ratification was withheld for pre-
cisely two years.
^ These two years gave time for reflection, and the reflec-
tions of some of the inhabitants of the western portions of
the United States were not at all favorable to the treaty.
Benton, not yet in Congress, attacked it in the press,* and
Clay, then hostile to Adams and all of Monroe's administra-
tion, criticised it vehemently in Congress. In a fervid
speech delivered in the House of Representatives, April 3,
1820, he denounced the treaty upon the ground that it
failed to secure Texas for the United States. His two prop-
ositions, which he put in the form of resolutions, were, Jir^l^

1 President's message, May 9, 1820. * Thirty Yean' View, I, 14r-18.

THE FLORffiA TREATY 21

that under the Constitution no treaty alienating any portion
of the territory of the United States was valid without the
consent of Congress; and, second, thaf the equivalent pro-
posed to be given by Spain "for that part of Louisiana lying
west of the Sabine" was inadequate.

These resolutions and Clay's speech in support of them
were based upon the assumption that Texas had, in fact,
once been a French province and a part of Louisiana, and
that the treat)'^, by drawing the boundary so as to exclude
Texas, alienated territory of the United States. If this as-
sumption was imfounded, then his entire argument fell to
the ground.

Qay offered no evidence of his own to support his asser-
tion, but rested his case on the claims advanced fifteen years
before by the American ministers in Spain. An imfortunate
phrase used in a note to the Spanish Foreign Office was quot-
ed by Clay with great eflfect. After setting forth at length
certain reasons for claiming that Louisiana rightly extended
to the Rio Grande, Monroe and his colleague had asserted
that these were enough to " convince " the government of the
United States that it had not "a better right to the island
of New Orleans" than it had to Texas. And Clay trium-
phantly asserted that Congress could hardly presume to
question a right which the executive had so constantly
maintained. Assuming, then, that the right of the United
States to Texas had been clear. Clay pointed out that the
treaty had given to Spain the whole of "unencumbered
Texas," and five million dollars, besides other great and valu-
able concessions — for what? For Florida, which was of
relatively trifling value, and which must come to the United
States as surely as ripened fruit must fall.^

Clay's followers, who knew even less than he of the facts
in the case, repeated his assertions with equal confidence.
A conversation recorded by Adams which he had with
William S. Archer, of Virginia, then a member of the House,*

» Colton's Clay, V, 205-217.

' Archer was a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and sup-
ported Clay in his opposition to the treaty.

22 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

and George ELay^ the President's son-in-laW; illuminates the
entire controversy. Archer had taken occasion to denounce
the treaty:

''It was the worst treaty the country had ever made. Hay asked
him why. Because we should get by it nothing but Florida, and gave
away for it a country worth fifty times as much. I asked him if he
had examined the validity of our title to the valuable country of
which he spoke. He said, no. I told him he would find it weak;
and rather a claim than a title. Hay said that there had been on our
side a strong argument and a weak title. Archer did not reply." ^

A reply was indeed not easy, even for those who had taken
the trouble to learn the facts before expressing their opinions,
and Clay's assertions failed to convince the House. After
a debate extending over some days, the matter was dropped.

Meanwhile the failure of the Spanish government to
ratify the treaty had left the whole question open, and
Monroe and Adams gave much thought to the question
whether it was wise, after all, to proceed with the business.
Adams himself professed an indifference on the subject which
he did not really feel. To members of Congress who called
upon him he said that he set no great value on the treaty,
and was very ready to abandon it if Congress was averse to
it ; that he had been the last man in the cabinet to accept
the Sabine as a boundary ; that we needed no more territory,
for "the greatest danger of this Union was in the overgrown
extent of its territory, combining with the slavery question " ;
and that neither Florida nor Texas ought to be accepted as a
gift unless slavery should be excluded.^ These were only
the impatient expressions of a man out of temper with his
opponents. For two years Adams labored incessantly to
secure ratification, and when the task was finally completed,
he returned thanks to that kind Providence which had en-
abled him to carry it through.*

Monroe, more cautious, refrained from expressing his
doubts publicly, but he consulted Jefferson and Jackson.
The former had written to say he was not sorry Ferdi-

» J. Q. Adams's Memoirs, V, 42. » Ibid., 5^-64, 67. » Ibid., 289.

THE FLORIDA TREATY 23

nand VII had failed to ratify the treaty. Our assent to it
had proved our desire to be on friendly terms with Spain ;
"the first cannon" would make Florida ours without offence
to anybody; Texas, in our hands, would be the richest state
in the Union ; and the result, sooner or later, would be that
we should get Florida and Texas too.^ This was no hasty
opinion. A year before he had written that he would rather
"keep" Texas "and trust to the inevitable falling of Florida
into our mouths." ^

Monroe replied by a long exposition of his inmost convic-
tions. If the question had concerned only the relations
between Spain or her colonies and the United States, he
would have concurred entirely with Jefferson, but there was
much more involved. The New England states ever since
1785 had been endeavoring to check the Western growth of
the Union in order to secure power for themselves; in this
they had been helped by Jay, who had wished to let the
Spanish government close the Mississippi; and the Hart-
ford convention was another proof of the same spirit, and
so was "the proposition for restricting Missouri."

"From this view/' he continued, "it is evident that the further
acquisition of territory to the west and south, involves difficulties
of an internal nature which menace the Union itself. We ought there-
fore to be cautious in making the attempt." *

This was a striking prophecy, which time was to verify in
a noteworthy manner.

It does not appear what answer, if any, Jeflferson made;
but Jackson fully concurred with the presidential views.
To him Monroe had expressed his opinions as follows:

" Having long known," he wrote, " the repugnance with which the
eastern portion of our Union, or rather some of those who have en-
joyed its confidence (for I do not think that the people themselves

* Jefferson to Monroe, May 14, 1820, in The Wriiinga of Thonuu Jefferson
(memorial ed.)) XV, 251.

* Jefferson to Dearborn (former Secretary of War), July 5, 1819; vbid.f XIX,
270-272.

* Monroe to Jefferson, May, 1820; Hamilton's Writinga of Monroe, VI, 119-
123.

24 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

have any interest or wish of that kind) have seen its aggrandizement
to the west and south, I have been decidedly of opinion that we ought
to be content with Florida for the present, and until public opinion
ii;i that quarter shall be reconciled to any further change." ^

Jackson replied: "I am clearly of your opinion that, for
the present, we ought to be content with the Floridas"; and
he went on to point out that Texas, in the hands of a foreign
power, could never be made the base of an invading force.
Sixteen years later he vehemently denied that he had ever
been consulted about the treaty.^

Monroe's final conclusion was that, although the acquisi-
tion of Texas by the United States was certainly desirable,
yet it was better not to risk the Florida treaty, with all its
advantages, by pressing a doubtful claim to a territory for
which the United States was not ready, more especially in
view of the Northern opposition to any extension of the area
of slavery.

"It is remarkable," says Wharton, in commenting on Monroe's
attitude, " that this view of the acquisition of Texas was not shared
by Mr. Adams, in whose mind the dangers of the extension of slavery
had not yet become such as to influence his political course. He not
only urged the assertion of our title to Texas, necessarily then a slave
State, but he assented to the Missouri Compromise which gave the
Southwest to slavery. The issue in fact was fraught with conse-
quences which Mr. Monroe was the only leading statesman of the day
to foresee." '

In his decision to stand by the Florida treaty and yield
the claim of the United States to Texas, Monroe was sus-
tained by the sober judgment of the country, for notwith-
standing serious expressions of doubt as to the wisdom of the
treaty during the two years while the exchange of ratifica-
tions was delayed, the overwhelming weight of contempora-
neous public opinion, in Congress and out of Congress, North
and South, was in its favor.

The acquisition of the Floridas was a step which had been,

1 Monroe to Jackson, May 23, 1820; ibid., VI, 127-128.

* Parton's Life of Jackson, II, 585.

• Note of Dr. Wharton to International Law Digeet (Ist ed.), I, 284.

THE FLORIDA TREATY 25

in some form or other, under discussion ever since the pur-
chase of New Orleans from France was first in contemplation ;
the terms of the treaty were freely and fully discussed and
met with all but unanimous approbation, and yet, by a sin-
gular perversion of the truth of history, a general belief grew
up, a few years later, that Monroe's administration had
somehow been duped into giving away an unquestionable
title to the whole of Texas.^

The people of the seaboard states cared at first little
about it, for, as John Quincy Adams wrote more than twenty
years later:

"The appetite for Texas was from the first a Western passion,
stimulated by no one more greedily than by Henry Clay. He had
denounced the Florida Treaty for fixing the boundary at the Sabine,
and held and preached the doctrine that we should have insisted upon
our shadow of a claim to the Rio del Norte." '

But those who assailed the treaty overlooked one inesti-
mable advantage which it had secured : the grant, namely, of
a clear title to the Far West, even to the Pacific Ocean. In
Jefferson's administration the government had been willmg
to exchange for Florida everything west of the valleys of the
Mississippi and the Missouri.^ Adams rightly congratulated
himself on having introduced a new feature into the settle-
ment.

"The acknowledgment," he wrote, "of a definite line of boundary
to the South Sea forms a great epocha in our history. The first pro-
posal of it in this negotiation was my own, and I trust it is now secured
beyond the reach of revocation. It was not even among our claims
by the Treaty of Independence with Great Britain. It was not among
our pretensions under the purchase of Louisiana.'' *

Wisely or unwisely then, the boundaries between the
United States and Mexico were firmlv fixed. The sover-

* This belief still persists in the writings of recent historians. — (H. Adams's
History qf the U. S,, II, 294; III, 40; Chadwick, The RekUions of the U, S. and
Spain: DipUmuwy^ 69.)

^Memoirs, XI, 348 (March, 1843).

» Madison to Monroe, April 15, 1804; Amer. St. Papers, F&r, Rd., II, 627-(J30.

« Memoirs, IV, 275.

26 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

eignty of the United States was unequivocally recognized
by Spain as extending from sea to sea; while Texas, de jure
as well as de facto ^ was henceforward to be r^arded as an
integral part of the kingdom of New Spain.

CHAPTER n

MEXICO ACfflEVES HER INDEPENDENCE

The ratifications of the Florida treaty were exchanged by
the American Secretary of State and the Spanish minister at
Washington on the twenty-second of February, 1821. Two
days later, at the little town of Iguala, half-way between
the city of Mexico and Acapulco, an event occurred which
put an end, within a few weeks, to three centuries of Spanish
rule. A body of about twenty-five hundred troops belong-
ing to the government, and commanded by Colonel Agustin
de IturJ^ide, issued a proclamation dated February 24, 1821,
and later known as the plan of Iguala, in which they de-
clared themselves in favor of Mexican independence under
a constitutional monarchy.

The movement thus inaugurated by Iturbide's command
ended, after some early reverses, by sweeping the whole
country — ^but it was only the culmination of a long struggle
which, imder several leaders and for diverse objects, had
been going on for more than twelve years. In its general
features it was similar to the other contests begun, almost
at the same moment, in the several Spanish colonies of
Central and South America. In each case the first cause
of the uprising was not a desire for independence or a
hostility to Spanish rule, but an eager purpose to prevent
Napol4 from seizing the coloniesl he h^d seized Spain.
The popular motive at first was purely patriotic and anti-
French. That the movement later on inevitably became
separatist and anti-Spanish was due to strong i^derlying
causes which had no part in the original outbreaks.

It was on June 6, 1808, that Napoleon placed his brother
Joseph on the throne of Spain. As soon as the news reached
Mexico a unanimous sentiment of resistance to the usurpa-

^•7

28 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tion became manifest; and when a French vessel arrived
at Vera Cruz, bringing despatches from Joseph, she was fired
upon by the castle of San Juan de Uliia, was allowed to enter
only under a flag of truce, and tHe despatches she brought
were publicly burned.

Nor was there then the slightest difference of opinion as
to the recognition of Ferdinand VII as King of Spain and
the continuance in office of the viceroy as his representative.
A meeting of the principal persons in the city of Mexico,
called by the viceroy of New Spain, adopted a formal decla-
ration to this effect ; ^ but the discussions of this gathering
developed serious differences of opinion as to the course to
be pursued for the future. It was not doubted that during
the King's captivity "the Sovereignty is represented by the
nation, to accomplish in his name what may be mpst con-
venient";^ but the dispute turned upon the question which
nation — Spain or Mexico — was to act in the King's name.
One group, consistmg principally of native-born Mexicans,
desired that a local junta should be sunwnoned by the viceroy
to represent the captive King and govern in his name until
he was restored. The other group, consisting principally
of natives of Europe and merchants with European connec-^
tions, desired to recognize the authority of the temporary
anti-French government then forming m Spain.

An end was soon put to this imsettled debate. Before
daylight on September 15, 1808, the viceroy, who was be-
lieved to be intending to sunwnon a Mexican congress, was
seized by the royalists, deposed, and deported to Cadiz. The
senior officer of the army succeeded to his place, and later a
new Spanish viceroy was appointed by the junta central,
which then sat at Seville and represented what was left of the
Spanish government.

The peninsular authorities were thus put in complete con-
trol of the affairs of Mexico, and for two years their power
was not openly contested. But the discussions to which

1 Aug. 9, 1808.

* Address of municipality of Mexico to viceroy, Aug. 5, 1808, in Romero's
Mexico and the United States, 294.

MEXICO ACHIEVES HER INDEPENDENCE 29

the crisis in Spain had necessarily given rise, and the violence
ofifered to the person of a viceroy suspected of leanings to-
ward Mexican independence, could not fail to give occasion
for popular discontent. Sooner or later, discussion was cer-
tain to result in armed revolt against Spanish domination.

The "patient sufferance'' of the Spanish colonies had been
tested by a despotism to which the history of their northern
neighbors offered no parallel. Mexico could not complain
that the assent of the sovereign had been refused to laws
passed by her legislature, for no legislature had ever existed.
But she had the most abundant reason for joining in the
other grievances which the Philadelphia Declaration of In-
dependence had set forth. Her King had endeavored to
prevent the population of the territorv; he had obstructed
the administration of justice; he had made judges dependent
on his will aJone; he had erected a multitude of offices and
sent swarms of officers to harass the people and eat out their
substance; he had kept among them in times of peace stand-
ing armies and ships of war; he had cut oflF their trade with
all parts of the world ; he had imposed taxes upon them with-
out their consent. All these things, and more, the Spanish
colonies had endured.

Clay, in a famous speech, put the comparison in the fewest
possible words:

"Our revolution," he said, "was mainly directed against the mere
theory of tyranny. We had suffered comparatively but little; we
had, in some respects, been kindly treated; but our intrepid and in-
tdligent fathers saw, in the usurpation of the power to levy an incon-
siderable tax, the long train of oppressive acts that were to follow.
They rose, they breasted the storm; they achieved our freedom.
Spanish America for centuries has been doomed to the practical effects
of an odious tyranny. If we were justified, she is more than justi-
fied."*

But, in addition to the feeling of hostility to a remote and
oppressive government, there was also an instinctive though
somewhat illogical hatred of the Spaniards themselves.

^ Speech in the House of Representatives, March 24, 1818; Colton's Clay,
Y, 142.

30 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Not the Indians only, but the whites bom in the colonies as
wjsll, grew up to detest the natives of Old Spain. The con-
descending superiority of the inhabitants of the mother
country and their determination to exploit the colonies for
their own exclusive benefit, was a phenomenon not peculiar
to Spain; but the sullen and suspicious nature of the Indians,
and the inherited pride of the whites gave a pecuUar bitter-
ness to Ifce resentment of the colonists which f oimd a parallel
only in the feeling of the Irish natives and settlers toward
their English neighbors.

Nevertheless, it was not until 1810 that Mexico actually
took up arms in the cause of independence. A long-meditated
conspiracy waa forced to premature action by some discovery
of its plans, and suddenly, on Sunday, September 16, Miguel
Hidalgo, the parish priest of the town of Dolores, near
Guanajuato, roused his people to revolt. Urged from the
pulpit, actuated by the hope of plunder, with the cry of
"Down with the evil government, death to the Spaniards,"
and under the banner of Our Lady of Guadalupe, thousands
from the countryside flocked to Hidalgo's support.

Their cry for liberty was the " Grito de Dolores," and it
echoed loudly through the central provinces of New Spain.
The towns of Celaya, Guanajuato, and Valladolid (Morelia)
fell into the hands of the insurgents. The city of Mexico
itself was threatened, but Hidalgo feared that his undisci-
plined and tumultuous mass of followers — which is said to
have niunbered no less than eighty thousand men — ^would
prove unequal to the task of capturing the capital. Retreat-
ing from the neighborhood of the city northward and west-
ward, his forces captured and sacked the important towns of
Guadalajara, San Bias, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosf.

The government had, however, been concentrating its
troops, and by the beginning of the year 1811 was able to
put a well-equipped force in the field imder the command of
Calleja, an experienced and intelligent oflSicer. On the
seventeenth of January, 1811, at the head of about six
thousand men, he met and routed the main body of the in-
surgents at the bridge of Calderon, although they outnum-

MEXICO ACHIEVES HER INDEPENDENCE 31

bered him at least ten to one. The captured towns were
quickly recovered. On March 21 Hidalgo and his principal
associates were captured, and, in accordance with the usual
custom, within a short time were all pimctually shot.

The destruction of the main organized force— if an ill-
armed and undisciplined crowd of Indians could be so called
— did not by any means end the revolution. There was
thenceforward Uttle that could be described as regular war-
fare, but there was nothing that could be r^arded as even
remotely resembling peace. There can be Uttle question
that a large proportion of the people of Mexico — ^including
the people of European descent — ardently desired to put an
end to the rule of the Spanish monarchy.^ The execution
of their leader did not terminate the iWrection. After
Hidalgo, Morelos, and after Morelos other leaders came for-
ward at the head of revolutionary bands more or less niuner-
ous. Some of these bodies had in some sense a miUtaiy
organization and captured and plundered towns and ha-
ciendas. Others were mere bands of brigands. In either
ease, it was all but impossible for any regular military force
to suppress them. When the flames of rebellion were extin-
guished in one part of the kingdom they would break out in
another. The larger towns could be garrisoned and securely
held, but, as the viceroy of New Spain officially reported,

''An infinity of smaller towns are left, unavoidably, at the mercy
of the banditti; the roads are ours only as long as a division is passing
over them; and the insurgents, who are infinitely superior to us in
number, are masters of the largest proportion of the cultivated lands;
the consequence is that trade is at an end; agriculture languishes; the
mines are abandoned; all our resources exhausted; the troops wearied
out; the loyal discouraged; the rich in dismay; in short, misery in-
creases daily, and the state is in danger."'

To a certain extent the revolution reflected the varying
fortunes of the Peninsular War. The original outbreak of

> Representation of the Audiencia to the Spanish Cortes, Nov. 18, 1813;
tnmslation in Ward's Mexico, I, 498.

< Calleja to the Minister of War, Aug. 18, 1814; ibid,, 519.

32 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Hidalgo was undoubtedly encouraged by the fact that ihe
Spanish troops and their aUies had everywhere been beaten
by the French. The news of Vimeira and Talavera, of the
return of Joseph to Madrid, of the disastrous retreat of the
British, of the death of Sir John Moore at Corunna, of the
surrender of Saragossa — all must have penetrated even as
far as Dolores before the day when the cry of independence
was raised in its church. And, on the other hand, when
Wellington had retaken Ciudad Rodrigo and stormed
Badajos; when, in October, 1813, the aUied English and
Spanish forces had entered France itself and the soil of the
Peninsula was at length delivered from invasion, the pros-
pects of a successful revolt in Mexico must have seemed im-
questionably dim.

As soon as the Spanish authorities began to be rdUeved
of the pressure of the French invasion they undertook to
strengthen their Mexican garrison. As early as January,
1812, two Spanish battalions were landed — tiie first troops
that had been sent from Spain since the troubles b^an^ —
and thenceforward the conflagration, although still flicker-
ing in various quarters, was gradually extinguished.

At the same time political conditions in Spain passed
through several novel phases. During the period from 180S
to 1814 the government was carried on by adf-constituted
and provisional bodies, formed originally to resist the foreign
invasion as best they could, and to support the cause of Fer-
dinand VTI. Provi^onal juntas were first formed, then a
junta cenlTol, then the constituent Cortes, which adopted and -.
proclaimed the Constitution of 1812. Tlie sfllf-govemmcr^t
thus necessarily impoaed unon Spain had brought forward
many men whom an alllpoh emment would never have

discovered, and the Const ithey framed reflected fully

the more modem politio If France and Enp^ Jf

declared that the Spani was free and yu- j, '^^

and not the patrimony oily or indWidpi ■■ ^|

the sovereignty resided ■^-" -*^-^ -* ^^^ ^^

the right of establishini

MEXICO ACHXE\'ES HER INDEPENDEXCE 33

enunent was to be a limited hereditai}' monarchy, governed
by the King and the Cortes. The King was to have merely a
su^)eDave veto over the acts of the Cort«s, and could do no
more than execute such laws as ^ould be duly passed. The
privil^es of the clerg>' and the nobility, the hereditary juris-
dictions, the seigniorial rights were swept away. No man
should thereafter be deprived of life or liberty but by the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. TTie liberty
of the press was to be secure. The white residents of the
colonies were to have all the rights of Spaniards. Any man
of African descent might be admitted to citizenship provided
he was the Intimate offspring of free parents, was married
to a free woman, and carried on within the ^lauish domin-
ions, by means of his own capital, some profeaaion, employ-
ment, or useful trade. Tlie basis of representation in the
Cartes was to be the same in the colonies as in Spiun itself.*
Under this Constitution Mexico would have been entitled
to some thirt}'-seven deputies, and if the liberal plans could
have been faiily carried into execution Mexico mi^t have
Temained loyaL But before any elections under the new
Constitution were held Ferdinand had been released from his
Fnndi prison, and had entered upon a rigidly reactionan'
poliey. Almost his first step was a refusal to accept the Con-
stitution, accompanied by a dedaistion that all the acts of
the Cortes were void. Slany ot its leading members were
arrested and sentenced by administrative order to long terms
of imprisonment. The Sin^a purpose was to restore the
detested monarchy of 18 '^ and to make himsdf as abso-
lute as Charles V or Phil IL The old council of Castile,
the iDrjui^tion, the privilt s ol the nobility and clei^, were
restored; i^U^Z^^tm ^ «e again filled with monks; the
Je«uit£, b«|^^ ^^ m, were brou^t back. In the

to the liboal cause:

ax yean before was re-estsblisbed,

m1 shown to exist, sU the reoognised

, — wid they were re-estabUshed, not

, but definitdy, sbso-

34 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

lutely, as a thing stable and perpetual, as an institution, as an element
in the constitution of the State." ^

But the restoration of the old order of things, however
distasteful to Mexican liberals; certainly seemed to insure a
strong government of the colonies. Calleja, who had been
promoted to be viceroy, had to a great extent destroyed the
revolutionary forces by the beginning of the year 1816; and
it was even said that the only reason why his success was not
altogether complete was because he had a pecuniary interest
in the continuance of the war.* His successor, Apodaca, who
arrived in August, 1816, swept cleaner, and by the end of
1819 the whole of Mexico was very nearly "pacified." Twa
or three leaders in remote moimtainous districts still held
out, but the viceroy could fairly congratulate himself that
everything like organized resistance was at an end, when
events occurred in the Peninsula itself which destroyed all
prospect of continued Spanish domination.

The King was not simply engaged in making war on his
rebellious subjects in Mexico. All South and Central Amer-
ica was in revolt, and in most parts the revolutionists were
successful. In Buenos Ayres an independent government
had existed de facto since May, 1810. In Chile the war had
been carried on with varying results, but on the whole the
Spaniards had been generally unsuccessful. In Venezuela
and New Granada Bolivar had established independence.
It was only in the West India islands and Peru, where (as
in Mexico) there were powerful commercial intei^ts, great
mining interests, and an extraordinarily rich church, that the
Spanish government had been able to sustain itself.
i This far-flimg battle-line called for great expenditures of
! men and money. The drafts on the army for colonial ser-
vice were heavy, and the mortality among the troops was
known to be excessive. It was indeed asserted that out of
forty thousand men who had been sent to America not one
had returned.'

^ Martignac, UEspagne et sea RSvolulions.

* Bancroft, History of Mexico, IV, 645.

* De Pradt, RSv. ActueUe de VEspagne, 78.

MEXICO ACHIEVES HER INDEPENDENCE 35

But the anny had other causes of discontent. The officers j
had, many of them^ imbibed liberal ideas during the six years -
of Ferdinand's captivity. The men were impaid, ill clothed,
and ill fed. The medical service was notoriously inefficient.
Mutiny after mutiny had broken out in the period between
1814 and 1820, and although put down without serious
difficulty the government had had abimdant warning of the
dangerous spirit which existed.

It was obviously the part of wisdom to keep the army
scattered throughout Spain in small detachments; and to
avoid designating; until the last moment; the forces destined
for colonial service. Instead; the government committed
the folly of collecting a large expeditionary force at Cadiz
months before transports were ready. There were extraor-
dinary delays in getting any ships at all; and those finally
secured were universally beheved to be unfit for sea. For
a year this army had^ no other occupation than to watch the
J rotten and fever-infected ships on which it was to em-
bark; and to listen to hideous tales of disease and death. In
such a combination of circumstances — ^the destitution of the
\i troopS; the general public discontent, the tedious waiting

'J*

for transportation; the tortiuing fear of inglorious death from
tropical disease — a mutiny was inevitable.

On the first day of January; 1820, it broke out imder th*e
leadership of RiegO; a battalion commander. At the head
of a few men he surprised the head-quarters of the army;
captiu^ the conmianding general and his staff, and was
soon joined by the rest of the troops. The movement at first
was not successful, but the contagion spread. In widely dis-
tant points of Spain one body of troops after another "pro-"
nounced" in favor of the Constitution of 1812. Ferdinand,
in the face of the defection of his army, was utterly powerless,
and on March 9, 1820, he abandoned the cause of reaction
and solemnly and publicly took an oath to support the Con-
stitution.

The success of Riego's revolt put an end to any expecta-
tions that Spain could, with her own resources, recover her
colonies. When a Spanish army refused to act against them

36 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

their independence was virtually secured. Peru and Mexico
and Cuba were indeed still in possession of the Spanish
authorities, and by wise and timely concessions it might
perhaps still have been possible to establish autonomous
local governments and to preserve them as in some sort a
part of the Spanish empire. But the policy of even the re-
formed government did not tend to conciUation. Impotent
as it was, it declined to recognize accomplished facts.
^ The determining cause of the final revolt in Mexico was,
however, not the oppressive, but the liberal spirit of the new
rulers of Spain. The Cortes elected in accordance with the
Constitution of 1812 met in July, 1820, and at once took up
the desperate financial situation. Unpopular and oppressive
taxes were reduced, and the deficit was made good by sup-
pressing religious orders and confiscating a part of the prop-
erty of the church. These measures instantly alarmed the
Mexican clergy, and under the leadership of the highest ec-
clesiastics the conspiracy was formed which resulted in •
Iturbide's proclamation of the plan of Iguala, the first arti-
cle of which was that the religion of New Spain should be
"the Roman Catholic Apostolic, without tolerating any
other." 1

Iturbide's prospects seemed at first imfavorable, but the
cause of independence was soon joined by officers of high
rank in various parts of the country. By the beginning of
July, 1821, the greater part of New Spain was in the hands
of the insurgents, although the cities of Mexico, Acapulco,
and Vera Cruz, with the important fortresses of Perote and
San Juan de Ulda, still remained loyal to Spain.

On July 30, however, a new viceroy. General O'Donojii,
landed at Vera Cruz, where he found himself besieged, and
unable, for want of an adequate force, to proceed to his
capital. His first attempt to stay the progress of events
was to issue a proclamation urging the people to await the
action of the Spanish Cortes, which, he asserted, would un-
questionably grant them autonomy; but as autonomy seemed
already pretty well assured as a fact, and as O'Donoju's

^ See the text in Alaman, V; App. 8-13.

MEXICO ACHIEVES HER INDEPENDENCE 37

jurisdiction could only be exercised over the space com-
manded by the guns of the ship on which he had come over,
he detennined to treat with the insurgents.

Three days after his arrival he opened negotiations,*
which resulted in his receiving a safe conduct from the revo-
lutionary leaders, allowing him to come into the interior as
far as the town of Cordova. There he met with Iturbide.
No time was lost in coming to an agreement, for O'Donojii
had become convinced that instant action was essential if
the lives and property of the natives of Spain then in Mexico
were to be spared. Within forty-eight hours after their
meeting he signed, with Iturbide, a paper which came to be
called the treaty of Cordova.* """*"" ^

-This piiper, Wlll<itf was dated August 24, 1821, provided,
in substance, that the independence of Mexico should be
recognized by Spain; that the form of government sEotfld be
a constitutional monarchy, under the style of the Mexican
Empire; that the crown should be oflfered to the male mem- j
bersof the Spanish royal family in succession; and that on ;
the failure of them all to accept, then to such person as the
Mexican Cortes might designate. A provisional junta was to
be formed at once, O'Donojii and Ittirbide"bemg members.

O'Donojii's action, which was probably quite imwarranted
by his instructions, had the eflfect of putting an end to all
conflict. The Spanish troops in the city of Mexico, while
declining to recognize the vaUdity of the treaty of Cordova,
were willing to obey O'Donojii's orders to march out, and
subsequently to embark for Spain.

Shortly after Acapulco and Perote surrendered to Itur-
bide, and the Spanish commander at Vera Cruz retired, with
his entire force, to the castle of San Juan de Uliia, which then
remained the sole reUc of Spanish rule in Mexico.'

On September 28, 1821, a provisional junta of thirty-six
members nominated by Iturbide met in the city of Mex-
ico and appointed him, together with O'Donojti and three

^ Santa Anna, Mi HUt^riB, % (Garcia, Doeumentos IrMUos 6 Muy Rara8,
U),
' See the text in full in DuWlan y L#zant, I, 548-550.
* It continued in the possession of Spain until Nov. 18, 1825.

■ I *m

38 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

other persons, regents of the empire, to govern until an
Emperor was selected. A plan was also formulated for the
creation of a Congress of two houses, and December 24 was
fixed as the date for the preliminary elections. In the
meantime the junta busied itself with internal legislation and
authorized the appointment of diplomatic agents in South
America, the United States, England, and Rome. No at-
tempt was made to enter into diplomatic relations with any
of the other continental powers of Europe — ^not even Spain.

On February 24, 1822, the first anniversary of the plan of
Iguala, the Congress met, and at once entered upon a series
of angry controversies with Iturbide. O'Donojti had died
some months before, and Iturbide had been made not only
president of the regents, but general-in-chief of the army
with the title of Most Serene Highness. The break finally
came when Congress passed measures fof^tk^reduction of
the army and for prohibiting any member of the regency
(«,m holdtog maiLy comL.! A convenient SnT
broke out in the barracks of the city of Mexico on May
19, 1822, and by a terrified Congress Iturbide was hurriedly
proclaimed Emperor imder the title of Agustin I.

While Mexico was thus turbulently engaged in settling
her own affairs, the liberal government ^ Spam was m-
grily protesting against being excluded from any share in
the business. As soon as O'Donojii's surrender was made
known the Cortes, by a decree of February 13, 1822, re-
pudiated his action, authorized the appointment of com-
missioners to all the revolted colonies to hear and receive
their proposals, and directed that all foreign governments
should be notified that recognition of any of the new gov-
ernments would be regarded as an act of hostility;^ but
these measures of conciliation never came to anything —
so far, at least, as Mexico was concerned.

^ CoUcci&n de Decretos . . . Expedido8 por las Cortes, VIII, 272. The exact
language as to the treaty of Ck)rdova is as follows: *^Se dedaran UegUimos y
ntdoB en aus efedos para d Odbiemo espafiol y sus svhditos d Uamado tratado
de Cordoba cdd)rado erUre d Oeneral O'Dorwjil y d Gefe de los disiderUes de
Ntteva Espafia D, Agustin de Itfirbide,»lo mismQ que otro cualquiera ado y Mfi-
puhcidn" etc.

MEXICO ACHIEVES HER INDEPENDENCE 39

•

The plan of Iguala and the treaty of Cordova had con-
templated offering the Mexican crown to the several male
members of the Spanish royal famUy in turn; but as Spain
had now refused to agree to the proposed arrangement,
the Mexican Congress might be regarded as acting strictly
within the terms of the programme when it elected Iturbide.
It is true that the election was made hurriedly, under the
threats of a mob, and by a doubtful vote; but the country
accepted the result with satisfaction, or at least without
open objection.

Iturbide's first business was to establish an imperial
court. He founded an order of Guadalupe. His father
and mother, as well as his numerous sons and daughters,
were created princes and princesses. And on the 21st day
of July, 1822, he was duly crowned, in a shabby state, which
was copied as closely as practicable from Isabey's designs
in the lAvre du Sacre prepared for Napoleon's coronation
sixteen years before.

The career of the new Emperor was short and stormy.
It was much easier to imitate Napoleon's coronation cere-
monies than to copy his methods in dealing with the repre-
sentatives of the people; as Iturbide soon discovered when
he came in conflict with the Mexican Congress.

Within six weeks after his inauguration he caused fifteen
of the deputies to be arrested on charges of conspiracy, and
two months later he dissolved the Congress by a military
force. In this he only followed Cromwell's example as
well as Napoleon's; but he lacked one essential element of
success which had enabled Cromwell and Napoleon to main-
tain themselves in the face of a hostile public opinion.
He had not first made sm^ of the army. As a matter of
fact, he seems not to have been especially popular in the
army or out of it, and his extraordinary rise — ^which was
not due to any marked military talents — ^undoubtedly ex-
cited many jealousies.

At any rate, early in 1823 a military revolution broke
out, which was soon supported by a large part of the army,
who pledged themselves to re-establish and support a na-

40 TliE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tional assembly. Iturbide's troops, almost in a body, de-
serted him and left the city of Mexico to join the insurgents
and on the 19th of March his abdication was announced.
He had reigned for just ten months.

The remainder of his career was almost as short and quite
as disastrous as his reign. He left Mexico, went to Italy,
and after spending a few weeks there, travelled overland
to England, and thence sailed for Mexico. With a single
companion he landed near Tampico; but his imitation of
the return from Elba proved a complete fiasco. He was at
once recognized, arrested, and shot. His execution took
place July 18, 1824.

The abdication of Iturbide, coupled with the refusal of
Spain to recognize the validity of O'Donojii's treaty
of Cordova, left the government of Mexico in a state of
utter confusion. The military insurgents who had suc-
ceeded in dethroning the Emperor had created a triiunvirate
and had reassembled the Congress which Iturbide had
illegally dissolved; but the triumvirs and the Congress
together were hopelessly unequal to the task of governing
the coimtry. It was obvious that they possessed no con-
stitutional authority, and they were equally without any
efficient organization for preserving order. After a short
and highly unsatisfactory existence, the authorities felt
compelled to convene a constituent Congress; and this body
met November 7, 1823.

That the Constitution to be adopted should be republi-
can in form was a foregone conclusion. The one fimda-
mental point upon which opinions diflfered, and upon which
there was a long discussion, was the point whether the re-
public should be federal or centralized. The former plan
was demanded by the various local bodies throughout the
country. It had also the advantage of being actually in
force in the United States, and this was an example which
the delegates generally were prepared to follow.

A more complete acquaintance with the nature of the
compromises under which the Constitution of the United
States had been framed might have led to the adoption of

MEXICO ACfflEVES HER INDEPENDENCE 41

a different system of government. The thirteen states,
when their delegates assembled in 1787; had had a long
history of practical autonomy. Except as they were loosely
grouped through their dependence on the British crown,
the North American colonies had been separate and self-
contained xmits. War with France and British oppression
had more than once brought them together; but they were
even then thoroughly resolved on preserving their separate
individuality and independence, and on resisting any en-
croachments by their neighbors. The articles of confed-
eration had looked merely to a league of thirteen equal na-
tions, and it was only the bitter experience of a protracted
war and the humiliations of five years of inglorious and im-
potent peace that finally persuaded these reluctant sover-
eigns to surrender some of their authority to a common
superior.

No such conditions, nor anything approaching them, had
ever prevailed in Mexico. The government had always
been highly centralized. New Spain was in fact oa well
as in name one kingdom. The several intendancies were
nothing more than administrative divisions which repre-
sented no separate traditions and had no independent life.
Before establishing a federal Constitution it was actually
necessary to create the states which were then to come to-
gether into one. -^

The process of federation in the two countries was thus
reversed. Mexico divided herself into separate states. In
the American Union, the heretofore sovereign states fused
themselves into a single nation. In the latter case, to use
Freeman's phrase, federation meant uniting that which
before had been disunited; in the former, it meant break-
ing up what before had been joined together.

These views were pressed on the constituent Congress
with great clearness and vigor by Father Mier, a delegate
who had lived for some years in England and had a good
knowledge of English and American constitutional prin-
ciples.* He also based his opposition on the incapacity of

^ See a sketch of hiB life in Bancroft's History of Mexico, IV, 451.

42 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the Mexican people to work so elaborate a machine; and
he contended that independent sovereignty of the several
states would certainly give rise to internal dissensions, and
that the government would be too weak to repel foreign ag-
gressions.

Others also spoke in the same sense. "It shocked my
poor notions/' said C. M. Bustamante, who was also a
delegate, "that a nation made up of people who were
united by nature, religion, language, and even prejudices,
should be obliged to divide themselves up into fractions in
order to be happy." ^

The feder/idea, however, prevaUed; and this point
being settled, the details of the Constitution were agreed
to after considerable delay but without any very serious
discussion except on the point whether the executive head
of the nation should consist of one person or three. The
final decision was in favor of a single President, chiefly, says
Bustamante, "because the Anglo-Americans had a Presi-
dent, and they were at that time the type we imitated be-
cause we did not know them as we do now." ^

The Constitution as finally adopted and signed October
4, 1824, was curiously compounded of the Constitution of
the United States — omitting the first ten amendments —
and the Spanish (Cadiz) Constitution of 1812.^ There was
to be a President elected every four years; a Senate com-
posed of two members from each state; and a House of
Deputies consisting of one member for every 80,000 inhab-
itants or major fraction thereof — each state to have at
least *one member, no matter how small its population.
The powers of Congress were closely analogous to those of
the Congress of the United States; and the President pos-
sessed the same power of suspensive veto.

* Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., VI, 199. Padre Mier's speech is given in full
in the same volume, 200-216.

« Ibid., 270.

' See '' Spanish Source of the Mexican Constitution,'' by James Q. Dealey,
in Tex. Hist. Quar., Ill, 161-169, and "A Comparative Study of the Constitu-
tions of the United States of Mexico and the United States of America," by
Wm. H. Burges, in Amer. Law Review, XXXIX, 711-726. The text of the
Mexican Constitution is in Dublan y Lozano, I, 719.

MEXICO ACHIEVES HER INDEPENDENCE 43

The principal differences were significant. At the very
begmning of the Mexican Constitution the doctrine of re-
ligious intolerance was proclaimed. '^La religion de la
nacion mexicana es y serd perpetuamente la catdlica, apos^
tdlica, romana. La nacion la proteje por leyes sdbias y justas,
y prohibe el ejercicio de cualquiera otra,^^ were the plain
and positive words of the text. And not only did the Con-
stitution promise to protect the national reUgion by "wise
and just laws'' and prohibit the exercise of any other, but
by the express language of the final article these provisions
were put beyond the reach of amendment.

The President, besides the ordinary executive duties, which
were defined with some particularity, was expressly authorized
to arrest any person when the safety of the nation required it,
provided such person were placed, within forty-eight hours,
"at the disposition" of a court of competent jurisdiction.

A council of government, composed of one senator from
each state, was to sit whenever Congress was not in session^
Its principal duties were to watch the President and see that
the laws were strictly enforced, and to confirm presidential
appointments.

The several states of which the nation was to be composed
were enumerated — Coahuila and Texas together constitut-
ing a single state. Each unit of the federation was required
to adopt a Constitution complying with certain specified re-
quirements and to do and refrain from doing certain things.

Finally came the immensely significant provision that the
General Congress alone had the power to "resolve doubts
which may occur about the meaning or understanding of the
articles of this Constitution." The interpretation of the
Constitution was not to be a matter for the courts to deter-
mine, but for the fluctuating majority of the Congress.

On the subject of slavery, the Constitution itself was silent,
but an act of the constituent Congress passed July 13,
1824, had prohibited the slave trade. ^ The wording of this

* Dublan y Lozano, I, 710. '^Queda para siempre prohibido en el terrUorio
de lo8 Ealadaa Unidos Mexicanos d comerdo y trdfico de eadavoa, procedentes de
cualquiera potenda . . . Las esclavos que se introdujeren contra el tenor del
arUculo anieriar, guedan librea con solo el hecho de pisar d tenHorio mexicano"

44 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

statute gave rise later on to doubts as to whether the intro-
duction of slaves by their owners, when the slaves were not
for sale, was unlawful; and it was generally considered that
only trading was prohibited.^

The country having thus secured its independence and
estabhshed a form of government, the recognition by other
powers was all that was needed to enable Mexico to take its
place among the nations of the earth. There were, however,
great difficulties in the way.

The principal contmental powers of Europe were steadily
opposed to recognizing the independence of any of the former
colonies of Spain. Their policy ever since the fall of Na-
poleon had been reactionary in the extreme. Under the lead
of Mettemich, they had tried to create a coalition for the
purpose of suppressing revolutionary disorders everywhere;
and they did in fact all co-operate to put down risings in
Piedmont and Naples. As late as 1823 France, acting as
the agent of the continental powers, invaded Spain, deposed
the liberal government, which had been in existence from the
time of Riego's rebellion, and reinstalled Ferdinand as an
absolute monarch.

But this was the last effort of which the coalition was
capable. The powers failed to agree over Greece, and they
were still less capable of agreeing over the Spanish colonies.
Russia, Austria, and Prussia, constituting the Holy Alliance,
would have been willing to give some material aid if Eng-
land had consented, but when England first held aloof and
then positively refused to help they contented themselves
with empty protests.

The theory of the Holy AUiance was that the rights of
each legitimate sovereign ought to be upheld by every other;
and, as a corollary, that no revolting colony should ever be
recognized as independent until the mother country had it-
self set the example. This theory was very acceptable to the
British Tories, and especially to those who could remember
the tune when England herself was engaged in a war with
revolting colonies; but it was antiquated nonsense to the

» Pd, Sci, Quar., XIII, 398.

MEXICO ACHffiVES HER INDEPENDENCE 45

English Liberals no less than to the people of the United
States. John Quincy Adams and Sir James Mackintosh
expounded on several occasions the doctrine which is now a
conmionplace of international law — ^namely, that every comi-
try may recognize the independence of a revolted colony
without violation of neutrality or just offence to the mother
country, provided only that an independent government,
able to sustain itself and maintain order, really exists.

The propriety of recognizing the former Spanish colonies
began to be discussed in the United States as early as 1817.
Henry Clay in particular made himself their champion, but
he was not able to hasten the deliberate procedure which
Monroe and his cabinet believed to be essential to the honor
of the country.

" It is by success," said a memorable state paper, " that the colo-
nists acquire new claims on other powers, which it may comport neither
with their interest nor duty to disregard. Several of the colonies
having declared their independence and enjoyed it for some years, and
the authority of Spain being shaken in others, it seems probable that,
if the parties be left to themselves, the most permanent political
changes will be effected. It therefore seems to be incumbent on the
United States to watch the movement in its subsequent steps with
particular attention, with a view to pursue such course as a just re-
gard for all those considerations which they are bound to respect may
dictate." 1

For five years the government of the United States fol-
lowed in the path thus outlined. It honestly tried to pre-
serve neutrality — "to leave the parties to themselves" —
and it diligently collected information as to the strength
and stabiUty of the new governments. In message after
message Monroe reiterated his determination to maintain
neutrality and to recognize the independence of the Span-
ish colonies when, but only when, the fact of independence
was convincingly established. It was not lentil March 8,
1822, that the President thought the time had come to rec-
ommend to Congress that steps should be taken to enable

^ Rush to Rodney and Graham, commissioners, etc., 18 July, 1817; Slate
Depl. MSS.

46 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

him to appoint diplomatic representatives to the former
Spanish colonies. As Congress was much in advance of
the President on this subject, the measure recommended
was passed without serious delay, and became a law May
4, 1822.1

Up to this point, the action of the United States had far
outstripped that of other nations, but, in respect to Mex-
ico at least, a series of delays now began which it is not easy -
to explain. For some reason Monroe shrank from the per-
formance of a positive act of recognition, and it was not
until nearly a year after Congress had authorized the ap-
pointment of a minister that he attempted to fill the place.
His first choice was Andrew Jackson, but Jackson, in a
rather cool note, declined the post.^ Almost another year
passed, and then the nomination of Ninian Edwards, who had
been governor of Illinois and a senator from that State,
was sent in to the Senate. Edwards was confirmed, but
before leaving for his post resigned the oflSce on grounds
entirely imconnected with Mexico.' Monroe's next choice
was Joel R. Poinsett, of South Carolina; but, owing to the
exigencies of the presidential campaign, his actual appoint-
ment was delayed.* It was not until Adams was inaugu-
rated that the credentials and instructions of the new min-
ister were prepared, and it was not until the first of Jime,
1825, that he was oflBicially received by the President of the ^
Mexican republic*

^ 3 Stat, at Large, 678.

' Jackson to Adams, March 15, 1823, in volume of instructions entitled,
"Joel R. Poinsett, Mexico"; StaU Dept, MSS.

« Edwards's History of Illinois, 134.

^ On July 8, 1824, Calhoun, then Secretary of War, wrote to Poinsett as fol-
lows: ''You have seen Gov. Edwards's resignation. The place is not filled.
Would you accept of it? If you would, the President will confer it on you."
Southard, the Secretary of the Navy, also wTote to him on July 17, to the same
effect. Poinsett, however, was unwilling at that time to resign his seat in
Congress, because it already seemed likely that the presidential election might
be thrown into the House of Representatives, in which case the vote of South
Carolina would be important; and if he resigned, the views of his successor on
the subject of the presidential succession could not be foretold.— -(Poirwett
MSS)

* Adams was inaugurated March 4, 1825. Poinsett's credentials are dated
March 14, and his very voluminous instructions March 26, 1825.

MEXICO ACHIEVES HER INDEPENDENCE 47

The British government Mowed in the footsteps of the
United States, but at a considerable distance. So long as
Castlereagh Uved no steps were taken looking to a recog-
nition of Mexican independence, although as early as 1817
Brougham had questioned the ministry as to the affairs
of Montevideo and incidentally as to the condition of the
other Spanish-American colonies.^ It was not until Can-
ning entered the Foreign Office in September, 1822 — six
months after the President of the United States had pub-
licly conmiitted himself to the policy of recognition — that any
steps looking to that end were taken by Great Britain,

Canning's determination to take up the cause of the re-
volted colonies was not adopted from any theoretical love
of struggling nationalities or from any liking for revolution-
^uy principles. He had joined a cabinet of which a major-
ity were " Ultra Tories . • . unqualified by Uberal opinions
upon any subject whatever," * and he himself was absolutely
opposed to internal reform. His decision was based solely
upon two very practical considerations — ^fear of France and
the urgency of British merchants. He himself boasted
that his action had been part of a successful effort to oppose
the ambitions of the French government — "I resolved
that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the
Indies" — ^but, although the successful French war in Spain
in 1823 unquestionably stimulated his action, the insist-
ent demands of British traders were the real determining
factors.

Ever since the outbreaks in the several Spanish colonies
the former rigid restrictions against foreign commerce had
disappeared of themselves and a very large trade with both
the United States and Great Britain had sprung up. It was
asserted by Canning, and apparently not denied by Spain,
that there was a "complete understanding" that this trade
was not to be molested.^ Nevertheless, after 1814 British
as well as American ships were seized on the one hand by
the Spanish authorities and on the other by the pirat-

^ Hansard, 1 ser., XXXV, 1196 et seq.

•Sti^leton's Political Ufe of Canning, I, 127. * Ibid., I, 168; U, 11.

«s^

48 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ical privateers that sailed under various South Americaa
flags.^ Petition after petition was presented to Failiament
by British merchants urging that something should be done
to put a stop to an intolerable state of affairs. Brougham
and Mackintosh in the House of Commons, and Lansdowne
in the House of Lords, following in Clay's footsteps, called
public attention to the tyranny of Spain and the indomita-
ble resolution of the colonists.

In the latter part of 1823 Canning fairly entered upon the
path of recognition. Following the precedents set six years
before by the United States, he sent commercial agents
and commissioners to the Spanish colonies to collect infor-
mation; and at last, in 1824, though opposed by some of
his colleagues and by the King, he committed the ministry
to the principle of recognition by the issuance of full powers
to a British agent to negotiate a treaty with Buenos A3rres.
Like instructions for a treaty with Mexico were signed on
January 3, 1825, and Henry George Ward was received
as charge by the Mexican government on May 31 of the
same year. England thus anticipated by one day the pres-
entation of the credentials of the American minister to
Mexico.

Spain, still laboring under self-delusions and still bent on
wasting the remnant of her strength in carrying on a hopeless
and barbarous war, was violent in her remonstrances against
the course of the United States and Great Britain. She could
see no ground upon which they could sanction causeless
rebellions or recognize " the momentary triuiliph of violence
over justice," and she asserted her determination never to
abandon her legitimate rights.

These impotent expressions of anger failed to stir either
the American or the British governments. Adams in 1822
and Canning in 1824, in almost identical terms, replied that
the act of recognition involved no question as to the rights
of the parties, and that therefore Spain had no Intimate

1 ''We have been made to feel sensibly the progress of this contest. Our
vessels have been seized and condemned, our citizens made captives, and our
lawful commerce, even at a distance from the theatre of the war, been in-
terrupted."—(Rush to Rodney and Graham, July 18, 1817; State Depi. M88.)

MEXICO ACHIEVES HER INDEPENDENCE 49

g.t^uiids of complaint. There the matter rested, for in nei-
ther case was Spain prepared to make the recognition of her
former colonies a casus beUi.^

The other governments of Europe, still mider reactionary
influences, preferred to follow the lead of Spain rather than
the lead of England, and recognition was in many cases long
delayed. Ultimately, however, it was conceded. Treaties
were entered into with several of the German states, Den-
mark, and the Netherlands in 1827, and with France after
Louis PhiUppe came to the throne in 1830.* Spain herself
yielded when Ferdinand VII was dead and the young Isa-
bella reigned in his place.'

Among the most reluctant sovereigns to face the fact of
successful rebellion was the Pope. By an encyclical dated
September 24, 1824, addressed to the bishops and archbish-
ops in America, Leo XII, lamenting the impunity of the
wicked, the increasing plague of books that brought authority
into contempt, the existence of secret societies, and the dis-
turbance of public peace, instructed the American prelates
that a happy issue out of all these afflictions could only be
found by preaching the supreme duty of obedience to legiti-
mate authority and the pre-eminent and distinguished qual-
ities of Ferdinand of Spain, "who prefers, before all else,
religion and the happiness of his subjects."*

* The correspondence here referred to will be found cited in Paxson's Inde-
pendence of the Souih American RepublicSy 174, 244, 252.

< Dublan y Lozano, II, 136, 184, 190, 491.

s Ibid., Ill, 389. Treaty of Dec. 28, 1836. This tardy action was doubtless
hastened by the friendly insistence of the United States, which had for years
been urging upon Spain the expediency of recognizing the independence of the
revolted colonies. See Amer. State PaperSf For, Rel., VI, 1006; H.R. Doc.
361, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 533-553, 668-698, etc.

* "Pereuasum profecto eel Nobis hoc gravieeimum negotium ad fdicem exitum,
Deo adixMvanie, voe perdtuAwroe fore citOf si apvd Gregem Vestrum darescere
fadalie praesenies, eximiasque virtuUes diarissimi in Christo Filii Nostri Fer-
dinandi Hispaniarum Regis Catholicif qui nihU Religionef et subdilorum suorum
fdiaiate potius habel, sique ante ocuLos omnium^ eo quo par est zelo, posueritis
iUtistria et nuUo unquam tempore interitura exemplo eorum Hispanorum in
Buropa existenlium, qui fortunas, vitamque suam nihil estimaruntj ut verae Re-
Ugund ac Legitimae Potestati semper fidelissimos ostenderentJ* ** The encyclical,"
said Tomel, "afforded the Mexican clergy a brilliant opportunity of showing
their patriotism, of which, however, they failed to avail themselves.'' — (Breue
BeseiUi, 60.)

50 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

But at last even the Holy See itself relented. After Sp^
had consented by treaty to recognize the independence of
Mexico, a Mexican envoy, who had been knocking ul the
Vatican gates for several years in vain, was officially and
graciously received in 1837 by Pope Gregory XVI, who
promised to send an internuncio in return.^

^ Rivera, HisUnia de Jatapa, III, 320.

CHAPTER III

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO

The nation which had thus acquired an acknowledged in-
dependence occupied a territory covering abnost one million
seven hundred thousand square miles/ and inhabited by some
seven millions of people.^ The area of this imperial domain
was nearly fourteen times larger than that of Great Britain,
It was more than eight times the area of France; nearly nine
times that of Spain; and was approximately equal to the
then area of the United States.'

With respect to the number of their population, the United
States and Mexico had probably been much on an equahty
near the beginning of the century. But while the Mexican
population had very slowly increased — ^the natural growth

^ The exact area was not then known, or indeed ascertainable, for the boun-
daries between Mexico and its southern neighbors, Guatemala and British
Honduras, had never been fixed. The northern limits were in like manner
quite unknown until they were settled by the Florida treaty in 1819. The
esEact area of modern Mexico plu8 her lost provinces, as given by the United
States government authorities, is 1,697,916 square miles. — (Romero's Mexico,
5y 8.) Humboldt, in giving the boundaries of New Spain, took into account
only those portions of the continent which the Spaniards occupied, and his
eBtimate amounted to only 900,000 square miles.

' The statistics of the Mexican population were extremely vague. Hum-
boldt, basing his calculations on an imperfect official census of 1793, concluded
that the total number of inhabitants in 1803 was not leas than 5,837,100. —
(JSTtsoi Politique, I, 53-65.) Another estimate, made in 1810, gave a total of
«,122,354.— (Bancroft, History of Mexico, III, 736.) Poinsett in 1822, using
Humboldt's figures and his calculations of the rate of natural increase, and al-
kyvring for the destruction caused by twelve years of civil war, estimated the
population at about 6,500,000.^ — (Notes on Mexico, 110.) From precisely the
aame data Ward in 1827 concluded that the population must amount to 8,000,-
OOD (Mexico, 1, 21); but as the official estimates only showed a population in
1839 of 7,016,300 (Dublan y Lozano, V, 154) it is probable that Ward's figures
were much too hi^.

s This must be understood as excluding the "Oregon Country," then jointly
occupied by the United States and Great Britain, and as assuming the north-
eastern botmdary to be that subsequently fixed. The area of the territory
80 bounded was 1,817,888 square miles.— (T^ National Domain, 12, 29.)

52 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

being checked by a constant and peculiarly savage warfare —
the inhabitants of the United States, living in peace and
plenty, and aided by a laige immigration, were increasing
at a rate of about thirty-five per cent every ten years. In
1825 they probably numbered over eleven millions.^

The two countries were, moreover, very different in respect
to the composition and distribution of their population. The
only portion of the dwellers within the boundaries of the
United States of which its census took account had sprung
exclusively from European and African inmiigrants. Set-
tling origmally on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean and the
Gulf of Mexico, they had gradually pushed their way inland
along the more accessible and fertile valleys. The densest
population was in the New England and Middle states,
with a diminishing ratio of inhabitants to the square mile
in the South and on the eastern slopes of the Mississippi
valley. The mountainous regions and most of the country
west of the Mississippi were practically uninhabited except
by "Indians not taxed." In Missouri and Arkansas there
was a population of perhaps a hundred thousand, of whom
about five thousand were in the flourishing town of St. Louis.

In Mexico, likewise, the Indios bravos, the wild Indians,
were not enumerated, but the rest of the population was
composed in the main of the descendants of those whom the
Spanish conquerors had found in possession three hundred
years before. Their grouping had not materially changed
in that time. The hot, unhealthy country on the coasts was
thinly settled. The densest population was still found in the
interior along the high central plateau from Oaxaca on the
south to Zacatecas on the north. The intendancy of Vera
Cruz, which stretched for nearly six hundred miles along the
Gulf of Mexico and included the only important seaport on
the Atlantic side, had not more than five inhabitants to the
square mile.^ Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,

1 The census of 1800 showed a total of 5,305,941 inhabitants; that of 1810,
7,239,903; and that of 1820, 9,638,191. According to Gihnan's formula
(Science N. S., XXXII, 276) the population in 1825 was 11,134,000.

' Humboldt, Easai Politique, I, 155. The proportion cannot have varied
much between 1803 and 1825.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 53

New Hampshire, and Maine, with a coast-line and area
about the same as those of Vera Cruz, had not less than
twenty^five inhabitants to the square mile.^

North of Zacatecas, in San Luis Fotosf, Durango, and
Sonora, in Texas, New Mexico, and the Califomias, there
was no considerable population. Humboldt had estimated
the density of population in the intendancy of San Luis
Fotosf at thirteen, and in Durango at less than two to the
square mile.^ But these were mining regions, and the long
wars had done infinite mischief to that industry and before
1825 had brought about a great decrease of population.
North of the frontier mining camps there was almost noth-
ing. The vast region from Texas to Calif omia was all but
tminhabited. There were a few missions, a few ranches,
and some little towns like Santa Fe; but the greater part of
the country was dominated by the unsubdued Ludians, few
in numbers but formidable in war. The Apaches and Co-
manches were always an insuperable obstacle to Mexican ex-
pansion.

In another respect the distribution of population was
maricedly different in Mexico and the United States, and that
was in relation to the size of the cities. In 1825 the city of
Mexico had over a hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants;
the city of New York probably a little more. Guadalajara
was larger than Baltimore, and Fuebla than Boston. Gua-
najuato, though nearly destroyed by the civil wars, still
remain^ as populous as New Orleans.^

Adam Smith, writing fifty years before, had noticed this
tendency to growth in the chief cities of all the Spanish
colonies, but he did not attempt to seek its cause.^ A
French economist attributes it to a variety of causes: an
inherited Moorish habit, a desire on the part of the small
number of white conquerors to keep united for defence, the

> 24.19 by the census of 1820. < Esaai PolUique, 1, 282-294.

* PtoiDsett gives the population of the city of Mexico in 1822 as 155,000;
GoadflJajara, 70,000; Puebla, 60,000; Guanajuato, 31,820.— (i^otos on Mexico,
41, 94, 110.) In 1820 the population of New York was 123,706; of Baltimore,
69,738; of Boston, 43,208; of New Orleans, 27,146.

« WeaUh cf Natums, book IV, chap. VU.

54 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

fact that the emigrants from Spain were not usually part of
the rural population. And he lays it down as a general rule
that when the population of a new country is observed to
flow to the towns, it may certainly be concluded that pro-
duction is small; that the majority of the colonists are
idlers, speculators, or government officials, and not workers;
and that beneath them there is a conquered people whose
labor is exploited for the benefit of the victorious class.^
Such certainly were the conditions in New Spain.

The proportion of persons of pure European descent was
almost exactly reversed in the United States and Mexico.
In the former, according to the census of 1820, about eighteen
persons out of every hundred were wholly or partly of African
blood, the rest of those eniunerated being of immixed Euro-
pean ancestry.^ In Mexico, at the beginning of the century,
it was estimated that only eighteen per cent of the popula-
tion was pure European, while sixty per cent was pure IndiaUi
and twenty-two per cent was part European and part Indian.
It may well be doubted whether these estimates were accu-
rate. The native population was notoriously averse to being
counted, and Humboldt for this reason added one-sixth to the
official figures in order to cover the deficiency; and besides,
many persons who passed as white were in reality part
Indian. Relatively few Spanish women came to Mexico, so
that the children of the inmiigrants generally were the off-
spring of a union with an Indian woman, or at least a woman
having some proportion of Indian blood. " Few of the mid-
dUng class," says Ward " (the lawyers, the curas or parochial
clergy, the artisans, the smaller landed proprietors, and the
soldiers), could prove themselves exempt from it"; but at
the same time purity of descent during the Spanish rule was
considered so great a mark of superiority that at that time
most people would be disposed to deny Indian descent.*
But whatever the proportion of people of pure European

^ Leroy-Beaulieu, Colonisation chez lea Peuples Modemes (4th ed.)) 7.

* The exact figures were: colored, 1,781,652; white, 7,856,539. This made
the colored population 18.49 per cent of the whole. The proportion diminished
slightly in the next ten years.

* Ward's Afocico, I, 20-25.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 55

descent; it probably varied little during the first quarter of
the nineteenth century; or, if anything, the percentage of
white people diminished.^

The foreigner coming to Mexico from the United States or
the West Indies was struck by the fact that there were almost
nc,negroes.-.-Poinsett, coming from South Carolina in 1822,
on his first visit to Mexico, noted that the pure negro race
was nearly extinct. He had seen not more than twenty
negroes in six weeks' travel. The census of 1793 gave six
thousand as the total number in the whole of Mexico, most
of whom were near the seaport towns of Vera Cruz and
Acapulco; but by 1825 the race, in the absence of im-
portation, had probably become practically merged in the
predominant Indian population. After two crosses with the
Indians, all traces of negro blood seemed to disappear.*

The contrast in this regard with the United States was cer-
tainly striking. The number of negroes there in 1825 was
About two millions, of whom less than, three hundred thou-
sand were free.' Negro slavery was one of the most con-
spicuous and disturbing elements in the United States. In
Mexico it was practically unknown. Not, indeed, that it
was prohibited by law, for in other Spanish colonies, such as
Cuba, it had been considered essential ; but economic condi-
tions in New Spain never made African labor profitable, and
the slave trade had been naturally diverted to Havana and
Caracas. Nor did the independent government of Mexico
think it necessary to abolish slavery. The Constitution of
1824 was silent on the subject, and the constituent Congress
contented itself with passing a law prohibiting the slave
trade.*

^ Romero's Mexico f 76; Alaman, Historia de Mijico, I, 21.

* Poinsett, Notes on Mexico^ 141; Humboldt, Esaai Politique, I, 130; Ward,
Mexico, II, 101. But see Thompson, Recollections of Mexico, 188, who thinks
that there were few mulattoes or zambos in the country, and considers these
types remarkably distinct.

' The oensus figures were as follows: In 1820 there were 1,531,436 slaves and
233,306 free persons of color. In 1830 there were 2,009,043 slaves and 319,-
fi99 free persons of color.

* Dublan y Lozano, 1, 710, Decree of July 13, 1824. Hidalgo, by a decree
dated Dec. 6, 1810, had required all masters to free their slaves within ten days,
under penalty of death; but no one paid any attention to this edict.

56 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

TTie fact was, of course, that the Spanish conquerors had
found Mexico well populated by a docile race, of whom they
readily made competent workmen. The Indians were good
agricultural laborers and soon learned to be quite exceptional
herdsmen. As mining was developed, they became miners of
a sort. And in general it may be said that without serious
exceptions, the Mexican Indians, either pure-blooded or
mixed with some small infusidn of African or European
blood, were the laboring men of the country. In the
cities and in some country districts there were white men
working for daily wages, but they were relatively few in
number.^

"These Indians/' wrote an American traveller in 1822, "are much
darker than those of our borders, their hair is straight and glossy, the
lips rather thick, the nose small and the eyes inclining upward like
those of the Chinese and Mongols. Their bodies are stout and their
limbs nervous. They are not generally tall, but are strong and active.
According to our notion3 of beauty, they are not a well-favored race."*

Their JnteUectual and moral qualities were the subjects of
longhand eager discussion. The Spanish conquerors, who
found a profit in utilizing their labor, considered them as a
grossly inferior race and accused them of the most disgusting
vices. The clergy, on the other hand, lauded their intelli-
gence and goodness, and appealed to the home government to
protect them. Of the seven deadly sins, wrote Archbishop
Palafox, there were five of which the Indians were rarely
guilty, namely, avarice, pride, anger, ambition, and envy.
As for idleness, their masters saw to it that they were cured
of that sin. And as for lust, it was only the result of drink,
and their self-indulgence extended to drink alone, for they
were not gluttons, being very sparing in food. And so, the
worthy archbishop concluded, it may be said that out of

^ The paternal Spanish government was always afraid that the Indiana would
be ill-treated and corrupted by the whites, and it tried to keep them distinct.
It was very early provided that they must inhabit separate villages from which
Spaniards and negroes were to be excluded. — (Recofilaci&n de Indias, leyes
2i-24, tit. 3, lib. 6.) These provisions were, of course, unavailing.

* Poinsett, Notes on Mexico, 80.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 57

these deadly sins the Indians fall into half a one only, while
the rest of us are so much afflicted by all seven,^

The native population was indeed singularly abstemious in
respect to eating. The banana, raw or fried, was the one
great resource wherever it grew. In all parts of the country
tortillas, a kind of corn-cakes or flapjacks, were a perpetual
reliance ; and frijoleSy or stewed beans, were nearly as com-
mon. Meat, when eaten at all, was generaUy stewed with
formidable quantities of chili — for pepper was as necessary
to the Mexicans as salt. A very admired dish was the
pucherQ, a compound of all sorts of meat and vegetables con-
sisting, as one disgusted American declared, ''of about as
many different things as were contained in the sheet which
St. Peter, with less reason than we had, thought unclean.'' ^
Jlie most notable defect of the Mexican Indians was their
love of "strong drink. They were also indolent and untrust-
worthy, and they did not always exhibit a lively sense of the
respect which is due to other people's property. They were
naturally of a gentle disposition and crimes of violence were
rare among them.

"To the honor of the Indian race," says a Mexican author, "and
for the good fortune of the country, it may be affirmed that no other
race in the world has been more provoked to wrong-doing by speech
and by example, and more removed from well-doing by ignorance,
oppression and poverty, and that nevertheless has committed fewer
crimes."*

But back of the apparent apathy of the Indians there was
a steadily burning flame of hatred to the Spaniard, and it
was this feeling which, in large measure, brought together
the ragged multitudes that followed Hidalgo to kill and
plunder the whites.

With these dispositions it was natural that the Indians

I **Parece que puede decirse que de sieie vicioSj cahezas de todos los demde, solo
inewrren en el medio vide, cuanto d los demds tanto nos afligen todos aieteJ' —
Don Juan de Paiafox y Mendoza, 255 (Garcia, Documentos IniditoSf VII).

' Thompeon, Recollections of Mexico^ 143.

' Portilla, Espaila en MSxicOf 91-98, where the subject of the character of
the Mexican Indians is discussed at length.

58 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

should live from hand to mouth in a condition of abject
poverty. They showed no desire to accmnulate property ,
or to better their condition by emigration. In the larger
towns, as well as in the country, their condition was indeed
deplorable. Thus Humboldt draws a gloomy picture of a
visit to the woollen factories of Quer^taro, where Indian and '
half-caste workmen were exclusively employed. He was
disagreeably impressed, not only by the extreme imperfection
of the technical methods used, but more particularly by the
misanitary conditions of the buildings and the ill-treatment
to which the workmen were exposed. Convicts were farmed
out and set to work side by side with freemen. All were half-
naked, thin, and haggard. The factories were like gloomy
prisons, the doors of which were constantly kept closed, for
the men were not allowed to leave the buildings. Those who
were married could only visit their families on Sunday. All
were liable to be pitilessly beaten if they were guilty of the
least breach of discipline.

" It is hard to understand," he adds, " how the owners of the fac-
tories can act thus toward free men; how the Indian workman can
suffer the same treatment as the convict. The fact is that the rights
asserted by the owners are acquired by fraud. The manufacturers of
Quer^taro employ the same device that is used in some of the cotton
factories of Quito and in those farms where, for want of slaves, labor
is very scarce. Those natives are selected who are the very poorest,
but who have some capacity for work. A small sum of money is
advanced to them. The Indian, who loves to get drunk, spends his
advance in the course of a few days. Having become indebted to his
master he is locked up in the factory under pretence of paying off his
debt by the work of his hands. He is allowed for wages only a real
and a half, or twenty cents, a day; but instead of paying him in
cash, care is taken to supply him with food, spirits and clothing, on
the price of which the manufacturer makes fifty or sixty per cent.
The hardest working laborer, by this means, remains constantly in ^
debt, and his masters exercise the same rights over him that are sup-
posed to be acquired over a purchased slave."*

This was the notorious system of peonage, a system which
lingered in many places long after Mexican independence

1 Humboldt, Essai PolUique, II, 667-6G8.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 59

had been achieved. Under it the Indians were in many
places nothing but serfs attached to the soil.^

Legally; the Lidians were placed by the Spanish govern-
ment in substantially the same category as minor children,
and in many ways the law endeavored to protect them from
the consequences of their own acts. After independence they
were men before the law, but mentally and morally they re-
mained children.

The life of great cities was disastrous to the Indians, and
those in the city of Mexico were much more degraded and
drunken than anywhere else in the country.^ They formed
indeed the whole of a distinct and most unprepossessing class
of beggars and vagabonds. Not even in Naples were there
such swarms of idlers. It was beUeved that in the city of
Mexico, out of about one hundred and fifty thousand inhabi-
tants, there were no less than twenty thousand who had no'
permanent place of abode and no ostensible i^^eans of gaining
a livelihood.* ^

These people were locally known as Uperos — ^lepers or
outcasts. Their existence was due to a variety of causes.
The Indians and half-breeds, of whom they were composed,
hated work and had the simplest ncjeds. They ate Uttle
meat and wore few clothes.* Begging was encouraged by
a strong religious feeling that the sight of poverty and the
giving of abns were good for the soul's health; and accord-
ingly the convents indiscriminately succored those who
crowded around their doors, the churches allowed privileged
b^gars to occupy year by year their regular seats at the
church doors, and the exhibition of all sorts of disgusting
deformities was permitted in the streets in order to stimu-
late the zeal of the charitable.^

^ American slave-holders thought the Mexican proprietors merciless to the
peoDS, attributing this to the fact that they had no property interest in the
men themselves or their families. — (Mayer, Mexico as It Was, 202; Thompson,
ReooOeetions of Mexico, 7.)

s Beltrami, Le Mexique, II, 263.

• Poinsett, Mexico, 49, 73; Ward, Mexico, II, 50-52; Mayer, Mexico as It
Was, 41, 55.

* Their nakedness was more covered when foreign trade made clothing
cheaper, after 1826. — (Ward, Mexico, I, 17.)

*The official recognition and encouragement of mendicity was distinctly
Spanidi. "La mendiciU (wait pria en Espagne le caractkred^une veritable institu-

60 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

In the country districts the Indians lived in the rudesfc
huts, and even the better class of houses in the great haci-
endas and in the villages were of a very simple construction.
The only really substantial buildings usually found were
churches and convents. But in the principal cities, amid
many flimsy buildings, stood great houses of the rich Mexi-
cans, built of stone in the Andalusian style, round a patio
or court-yard. They were generally of not more than two
stories, but as the ceilings were eighteen or twenty feet high
the fagades were not disproportionately low. There was
but a single door to the court-yard, and about it were
grouped, on the ground floor, the porter's lodge, the stable,
kitchen, and other household offices. It was not unconmion
to have the front on the street used for shops. Stairs from
the patio, open to the weather, led up to the family quarters,
which were connected by covered galleries that ran round
the inner walls, and were often filled with shrubs and flowers.
The flat, paved roof, or azotea, served the purposes of a ve-
randa, and its heavy stone parapets were just of a height to
be convenient for street-fightmg.

Nowhere in the world were there greater contrasts of
wealth and poverty than in Mexico. In the United'States,
in 1825, wealth was not accumulated in one place or in a few
hands, but was diffused over the whole community. In
Mexico, on the other hand, a few owners of mines and
ranches, and a few rich dignitaries of the church visibly en-
joyed nearly all the wealth of the nation.

Almost the only well-to-do people were to be found in the
cities, for life in the haciendas was, as a rule, too lonely and
sometimes too dangerous for any one who could afford to Kve
elsewhere. The city of Mexico, as the seat of the old vico-
regal court, was the social s well as the political centre, the
other towns being but pale provincial copies of the capital.

Social life in the capital was a \^efl-regulated and simple
affair. At five in the afternoon the whole fashionable world
turned out in the Alameda, the women in the great painted

tion nationcUe." — (Desdevizes du Dezert, UEspagne de VAncien Rigime, ItflMw)
As to the efforts to suppress it in Spain, see Rousseau, Rhgne de ChmrlmJiff
II, 279-283.

THE PEOPLE OP MEXICO 61

Spanish coaches which were just beginning to be exchanged
for smart London or Paris carriages, now become attain-
able, the men on horseback, dressed in gaudily embroidered
jackets and equipped with amazing spurs and bridles and
saddles of the most showy and expensive kind- In the even-
ing everybody went to the theatre. The single men had
their stalls, famiUes their;^ boxes. Pretty much the whole
house smoked through tl^^ performance — ^the men and the
women, the pit and the bo^^es.

The theatre was the general meeting-place of society, for ^
dinners and dances were rare,Vnd the evening parties (fer- *
tidias) can hardly have been gay. Unmarried young ladies
were not expected to speak to young men; but they could
dance, while their elders generaUy played cards. The pleas-
antest entertainments were alrfresco dances in the suburbs.
ThQre were also masked balls two or three times a year in the
theatres, but it was not thought very proper to be seen there.

Marriages, as a matter of course, were arranged by the
parents, and often a bride hardly knew her husband by sight
when they stood before the altar. Yet such marriages gen-
erally turned out well. Family relations were close and
affectionate, and the women for the most part found their
happiness in their households and their children. It was not
considered at all necessary that they should be well educated.

"Generally speaking/' said an acute observer, "the Mexican
Senoras and Seiioritas write, read and play a little, sew, and take care
of their houses and children. When I say they read, I mean they
know how to read; when I say they write, I do not mean that they
can always spell; and when I say they play, I do not assert that they
have generally a knowledge of music. If we compare their education
with that of girls in England or in the United States, it is not a com-
parison, but a contrast." * ^

There was great out raxd decorum in the relations of the
sexes, and, whatever might be suspected, it was always diffi-
cult to perceive any evidence of wrong-doing.^

^CalderoD, Life in Mexico, 179. The author, Madame Calderon de la
Barca. was a Miss Inglis, of New York.
« /bid., 181.

62 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The Mexican ladies dressed for great occasions with lavish
splendor, and made a great display of jewels. The posses-
sion of diamonds or pearls was, however, no proof of great
wealth, for precious stones were regarded as a safe and
convenient form of investment in which a man's fortune
might be locked up.

There were then, of course, no clubs, in the English sense
of the word. Men met and heard the news and talked politics
in caf 6s. The nearest approach to a social or political organ-
ization was to be found in the Masonic lodges, which had
been successfully established near the very beginning of in-
dependence. TTie fundamental principle of that order — ^the
fraternity of all men — and the apparent indifference of its
members to theological beliefs had always arrayed the
Roman Catholic Church against it, and indeed against all
secret societies. Damnantur dandestinae sodetaies, were the
words of an infallible Pope;^ and so long as ecclesiastical
authority wafi in M vigor in New Spain Freemasons were
not tolerated in the kingdom. But when Mexican delegates
sat in the Spanish Cortes under the Constitution of 1812,
some of them were initiated under the ancient Scottish rite,
so that in 1820 and afterward Masonic lodges were estab-
lished in Mexico, and came to be exceedingly influential
bodies.

As in all Spanish tropical possessions, cock-fighting was
the most popular of amusements. Bull-fighting, in the true
Spanish sense of the word, had not yet found a place in
Mexico, for though the bull might be lanced by picadors and
stabbed by banderilleros, his horns were blunted and often
he was not killed. In the country districts the rancheroa
amused themselves by exhibitions of their skill in roping
and throwing and riding wild cattle. Even in the bull-ring
these feats were performed, to the horror, one may imagine,
of the Spaniard educated in the classic school of taurom-
achy.^

^ Pius IX, in 1864, in the bull Quanta cum.

* A ludicrous account of a Mexican bull-fight as performed at Monclova
will be found in the L\fe of Berijamin Lundy^ 71-73.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 63

Outedde the cities, and wherever water could be found,
bathing was a frequent amusement. The traveller as he
rode along found groups of both sexes bathing in rivers,
lakes, tanks, or fountains, and generaUy, as British observers
thought, with very few scruples as to publicity.^ The In-
dians in many parts also made use of a rude steam bath
called the temezcaUi,'^ which was not unlike that used by the
Sioux.

Gambling was universal.' Beggars gambled in the streets,
coachmen and footmen at the doors of the theatres while
waiting for their masters. There were said to be hundreds
of small gambling-houses in the metropolis, always open.
In accordance with a long-standing tradition the feast of
Whitsimday was always celebrated at the village of San .
Agustin de las Cuevas, a suburb of the city of Mexico, by
the opening of public tables for a period of three days. The
most respectable people were to be seen there, and the crowd
>¥as mostly well dressed, although there were tables where
the stakes were in coppers, while at others the lowest bet
permitted was a gold ounce. — ^

All the institutions of New Spain had naturally and
necessarily been derived from the mother country, as those
of the United States had been derived from England; but
New Spain was a much older country than the British
colonies. Within fifty years after the first discoveries of .
Ck)lumbus the Spanish King had established in his colonies *
n complete administrative, economic, and religious system.
Great cities, well planned, with soUd buildings in the grave
and serious character of Spanish sixteenth-century archi-
tecture— forts, aqueducts, palaces, theatres, cathedrals,
convents, and hospitals — existed in the Spanish colonies
before the huts of Jamestown and Plymouth had been
raised by the ill-equipped and imdisciplined English set-
tlers. Empires had been created and laws had been estab-
lished by the paternal government of Spain before English

^ Lyon, MexieOy I, 318. * Calderon, Life in Mexico, 134.

*A8 it was in Spain in the eighteenth century. — (Desdevizes du Dezert,
1243.)

64 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

official indiflference had even granted permission to private
enterprise to undertake colonial adventures. Spain was a
hundred years before England in colonizing the New World,
and much more than a hundred years before her in devel-
oping a consistent and well-planned system of colonial ad-
ministration, and the most conspicuous, as well as the most
powerful of the institutions introduced into Mexico by
the Spanish government was the Catholic Church, with its
powerful adjimct, the Holy Inquisition. During the whole
period of Spanish supremacy rdigious influences were quite
as important as political, and left a far deeper mark on the '
manners, morals, and intellectual tendencies of the people.

Between them the Spanish governors and the Roman
clergy contrived to create and preserve rigid and uncom-
promising religious imiformity. The welfare of the church »
was borne in mind by the civil authorities quite as anxiously
as the welfare of the state. To keep religion pure, heresy was
as carefully excluded from the Spanish colonies as foreign
visitors or foreign manufactures, and it was in order that
this work should be thoroughly done that the Inquisition
was first imported into New Spain.

In the half century that followed the Spanish conquest
the bishops had exercised inquisitorial powers, and they so
continued until Philip II determined that the work was too
heavy for them. He had found that reformers were intro-
ducing heretical books and translations of the Scripture into
the New World, and were even attempting to send mission-
aries in the guise of Flemish and German traders, who, as
Spanish subjects, were permitted to visit the colonies. In
order to preserve the faith and to pursue the heretics — ^whom
the King pleasantly characterized as wolves and dogs — a
branch of the Inquisition was established in Mexico in No- •
vember, 1570, and it exercised a wide-spread and highly
efficient jurisdiction for two hundred and fifty years. In-
deed, so efficient was the machinery that in the eighteenth
and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries the tribunal
almost came to an end for want of business. There were
no heretics left, and complaints of bigamy, witchcraft, and

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 66

soliciting by priests in the confessional became almost the
only cases tried before it.

A more active branch of the business was the censorship
of books and pictures, and these functions became more im-
portant when the outbreak of the French revolution led to
the spread of a spirit of liberalism throughout the world.
That spirit became more and more earnest, unta it assumed
extravagant forms when Hidalgo raised the cry of inde-
pendence, and thenceforward the Inquisition was a willmg
coadjutor of the miUtary power in seeking to suppress the
revolutionists. Hidalgo and Morelos, being priests, were
both tried by the Holy Office.

The liberal Spanish Cortes in 1813 decreed the suppression
of the Inquisition, but it was re-established by Ferdinand
VII immediately upon his restoration in the foUowing year.
There was therefore a short period of about eighteen months
during which the functions of the Inquisition were dormant;
but in 1820, after Riego's rebeUion, the Inquisition was finally
suppressed in Mexico, and on June 16th of the same year it
was officially reported that the tribunal had ceased all its
functions and that it remained in a condition of absolute
extinction. It never was revived.^

Thus ended what an eminent Spanish author described as
"one of our most national and purest institutions," ^ but
its age-long influence over national character and modes of
thought continued until at least a generation had passed
away.

The suppression of the Inquisition was by no means the
only modification in ecclesiastical matters which the revo-
lutions in Spain and Mexico brought about, although in the
latter country at least the changes effected were extensive
rather than radical. The wealth and numbers of the clergy
were reduced, but the legal situation and the moral influence
of the Church of Rome were not, at first, seriously affected.

Under the government of the Catholic Kings the church

^ Lea, The Inquisition in the Spanish De-pendencies, 196-299.
* **Bl SofUo Ofieio, una de nuestras mds espafiolas y castizas instituciones" —
(Menendes y Pelayo, Ciencia Espafiokif 11/ 95.)

66 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

establishment in New Spain had so prospered that at the
beginning of the nineteenth century there were probably not
less than ten thousand of the clergy, divided nearly equally
between the regular and secular bodies, who enjoyed reve-
nues from tithes, fees for masses, and other sources, amount-
ing to several million dollars a year. They also admin-
istered an immense property in the niunerous cathedrals,
churches, and convents scattered throughout the settled
districts. Besides the ecclesiastical buildings, they held
large amoimts of productive real estate, and a variety of
trust funds, aggregating upward of forty million dollars,
mainly invested in mortgages.^ It was estimated that, either
through direct ownership or by way of mortgage, the church
controlled two-thirds of the land in the kingdom.* In ad-
dition to the clergy, there were lay brothers, servitors, and
nims whose niunbers brought the estimated total of those
"in religion" up to thirteen or fourteen thousand.

The niunbers and wealth of the religious persons in Mexico
were indeed trifling compared either with the multitudes who
lived by the church in Spain, or with the riches it had ac-
cumulated,' but the drain upon the economic resources of a
poor country was steady and severe.

To a needy government the funds of the church offered a
perpetual attraction, and few revolutionary administrations
in either Old or New Spain failed to help themselves out of
that abundant store. Not more than twenty millions of the
principal of the church funds in Mexico remained in 1825,
and it was with difficulty that either principal or interest
could be collected from mortgageors. The church lands and
buildings, however, were as yet imtouched by the civil
authorities, but measures were already imder discussion
looking to confiscation of the whole of the church property.
It was also in contemplation to take from the clergy the col-
lection of tithes.*

' Humboldt, Eaaai PolUique, II, 474-476.
* Romero, Mexico, 340.

' For a detailed account of the Spanish church near the end of the eighteenth
century see Desdevizes du Desert, I, 38-120.
« Poinsett to Adams, April 26, 1827; PoinaeU MSS.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 67

The federal authorities were moreover engaged in a con-
troversy over the patroTuUo or power of appointment to
church benefices. Trivial and sordid as such a dispute over
patronage might seem, it yet involved consequences of a
most serious character. The facts were simple. During the
period of Spanish rule in Mexico all church preferment was
in the hands of the crown by virtue of a concordat with the
Holy See.* The moment independence was attained the
question arose whether the ecclesiastical patronage there-
tofore vested in the CathoUc King passed with other govern-
mental powers to the new rulers of Mexico, or whether it
was a personal privilege which had been vested in the King
and his royal successors only, and which therefore could not
be exercised by revolutionary authorities until revived by
a new grant from the Sovereign Pontiff.

The clergy naturally maintained the latter view, the
government the former, and as there was no one to decide
the controversy but the Pope himself, one of the first acts
of the new government was, as we have seen, to send an
envoy to Rome; but, as the Roman Curia declined to re-
ceive him, no adjustment was then possible. It was not
until 1830 that even a provisional modus Vivendi could be hit
upon,* and even after the independence of Mexico was for-
nially recognized by the Holy See no definite settlement was
arrived at — ^the Mexican clergy opposing all proposed solu-
tions.

In this unsatisfactory state matters continued during the
whole of the period covered by the present history. The
church in Mexico, as a direct result of the revolution, para-
doxically became more and more reactionary and ultramon-
tane. The higher clergy were transformed from respectful
servants of the crown into consistent opponents of the rulers
of the state, and became active participants in almost every

^ The relations between the Spanish government and the church were lat-
terly regulated mainly by the concordat of 1753, which was continued in
force in Spain until the middle of the nineteenth century. See Rousseau,
Rhffne de Charles III, I, 111-116.

> Under the laws of May 22, 1829, and Feb. 17, 1830.— (Dublan y Losano,
n, 109, 226.)

68 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

political contest. With even more reason than Gambetta
might Mexican Uberals have proclaimed: "Le CUricalisme —
voiUt Vennemil^'^

The numbers of the clei^ had also seriously diminished
since Spanish times. Many priests, like Hidalgo and More-
los, had taken up arms in the revolution and had either been
killed or had permanently abandoned the religious life. On
the other hand, some of the higher clergy, the Archbishop
of Mexico for example, had fled to Spain.* The refusal of
the Papal government to recognize the Mexican republic
caused other serious difficulties as time went by, for since
the Mexican government had no diplomatic relations with
the Holy See, nominations for bishoprics or cathedral bene-
fices were not, for a long time, recognized, and the conse-
quence was that episcopal vacancies remained unfilled, or-
dinations became diflScult, or, in remote parts of the country,
impossible, and the attractions of clerical life were in many
indirect ways diminished.' From one cause or another it
was reckoned that the total niunber of ecclesiastics had
fallen off in 1825 to less than two-thirds of what it was at
the beginning of the century. The diminution was prin-
cipally apparent in the regular clergy, where it was con-
temporaneous with a great reduction in the revenues of the
several convents.

Nevertheless the influence of the church upon the great
mass of the people was not perceptibly diminished. One of-
the leading features of the constitutional documents of that
day, the treaty of Cordova, the plan of Iguala, and the
Constitution of 1824, was the provision that the national
reUgion should be that of Rome, and that the exercise of any
other should be prohibited. This erection of reUgious intol-

^ Alaman in his Histaria de Mijico, V, 906-909, gives the clerical view of the
controversy over the patronato. For the anti-clerical view, see the introduc-
tion to the fifth volume of Mexico d Iravis de loa Sigloa, pp. xxii-xxxii, by Joe6 M.
Vigil.

* See Zavala, Revclud&n de MixicOy I, 369-372.

' It was not until 1830 that the first nomination to a bishopric was con-
firmed by the Pope. But the places of the bishops who had fled to Spain were
never filled as long as the incumbents lived. — (Bancroft, History of Mexico,
VI, 681, noU.)

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 69

erance into a principle of government was in exact accord-
ance with public opinion. The Mexican revolution had
never had any of the characteristics of the French revolu-
tion. On the contrary^ it had originated in a determination
that a French sovereign and French ideas should not rule
New Spain, and it had been supported to a great extent and
even 1^ by members of the clergy. Independence had been
first proclaimed by the mouths of the ruraJ priesthood; the
justice of the cause had been advocated by them in the con-
fessional;^ the insurgents had marched under the banner of
the Virgin of Guadalupe; and the military mutiny at Iguala
had been planned and financed by dignitaries of the church.
It was therefore not surprising that throughout Mexico the
influence of the priest as the friend, adviser, and protector
of his flock continued substantially imshaken after the revo-
lution.

Religious observances exhibited the grosser features of the
Bpanish and Italian Catholicism of that age, combined with
some grotesque local practices. There were Mexican legends
of saints of whom Eiux)pean Catholics had never heard, and
whose memory was perpetuated by showy ceremonies and
by pictures which foreigners thought hideous. Miraculous
images were not uncommon.^ Rockets and Roman candles,
fiddling and dancing were usual accompaniments of reUgious
celebrations.^ "An eminent Mexican ecclesiastic'' is said
to have sunmied up the religious condition of his coimtry-
men in the words, ^^son muy humos Catdlicos, pero muy mahs
Cristianos^' (they are excellent Catholics but very poor
Christians), and the phrase was not unjust.*

The changes effected by the revolution caused other se-
rious difficulties besides those which arose out of the lack of
recognition by the Holy See. Thus when foreigners were
allowed freely to enter and reside in the coimtry, many of
them were Protestants ; and, even though they did not openly

^ Viceroy Calleja to the Minister of War, Aug. 18, 1814; quoted in Ward's
MexicOf I, 520; and see same volume, 502.

•Lyon's Mexico, I, 65, 80, 103-107; II, 27. Thompson's Recollediana of
Mexico, 105-115, 189.

• Mayer's Mexico, 142-155. * Ward's Mexico, 1, 250.

70 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

practise their religion, their presence gave rise to questions
not easily solved. Mixed marriages were considered im-
possible, and Protestant fimerals were the occasion for dis-
tressing scenes.^ Protestant missions could not be tolerated,
although the federal government was not disposed to inter-
fere with the sale of the Bible.*

All education was, as a matter of course, under the strict
control of the church. Here, as elsewhere in the Spanish '
dominions, from the first days of Spanish sovereignty to its
close, "all advances of the hiunan mind in the line of inde-
pendent thinking, which disregarded tradition and the influ-
ence of religious and empirical forms, were . . . anathema." *

Within the limits prescribed by the Roman Church, tow-
ever, the policy of Spain was not ungenerous. One of the
main objects of both the church and the Spanish crown had
been from the very first to christianize the Indians, and for
this purpose an early decree had imposed upon the holders
of royal grants of land the obligation of teaching their
laborers religion and good manners {la doctrina y huena
policia), and of maintaining a priest in each Indian village.*
The practices of the church were accordingly duly taught,
although without burdening the hiunble scholars with the
arts of reading and writing. At the period of independence
the vast majority of the inhabitants of Mexico were entirely
illiterate.'^

In the cities the proportion of those who could read or
write was doubtless greater. For those who could afiford to
pay there were schools of no very great degree of excellence.

» Ibid,, 263; Lyon's Mexico, I, 182; Mayer's Mexico, 141; Tex. Hist. Quar.,
XI, 168. In 1824 a special burying ground was allotted "for foreigners who
do not profess the exclusive religion of the state." See H. R. Doc. 351,
25 Cong., 2 sess., 460; Fagoaga to Butler, Nov. 22, 1832.

* Poinsett to secretary of Am. Bible Society, June 2, 1826; PotnaeU MSS,
' Philippine census of 1905, I, 336.

* Recopilaci&n de Indias, ley 37, tit. 9, lib. 6.

* One of the Spanish viceroys, the Marquis de Branciforte, was accused of
saying that it was enough for Americans to teach them their catechism {"que
en AnUrica no ae debia dar mds inairucdin que el catedsmo**). The remaiic,
whether he made it or not, illustrates the latter-day attitude of the Spanish
authorities, who were content to let the Indians grow up without other edu-
cation than some imperfect and scanty knowledge of the tenets of their
church.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 71

"Their method of teaching," wrote the American minister, "re-
sembles that practised by the Arabs, and the boys may be heard a
square off bawling out their lessons all together. It costs the parents
a trifle . . . and most of them send their boys to school where they
are taught to read, to write, to repeat prayers, and to cross themselves.
The giris are not generally so fortimate and fewer among them read
or write." *

The number of scholars was never very great. Accordmg
to the census made in 1793 the total number in the city of
Mexico was less than foiuteen hundred, of whom seventy-
eight were Indians.* There were similar schools in other
large cities, such as Guadalajara and Puebla, but it was con-
sidered doubtful whether there were over three thousand
children at school at any one time. The more Uberal spirit
which accompanied the revolution awakened the idea of
general popular education, and efforts, more or less local and
spasmodic, were made to accomplish that end. It is prob-
able that the percentage of illiteracy had been materially
reduced during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

The higher education was not much better cared for.
The University of Mexico was founded in 1551, and other
universities established later at Michoacan, Guadalajara,
Chiapas, and Merida never attained any vigorous existence.
As in the Spanish imiversities, the course of study remained
almost mediflBval, and examinations for degrees were puerile.
Theology, canon and civil law, rhetoric and the Aristotelian
philosophy, comprised the bulk of the instruction ; the study
of Greek and of modem languages was little known, and re-
search was discouraged. In Mexico the programme was
much the same, but even greater importance was attached
to theology.'

As early as 1578 a chair of medicine was established in the

^ Poinsett to secretary of Am. Bible Society, June 2, 1826; Poinsett MSS.

s Humboldt, Basai PdUique, II, 837.

* Ab to the Spaniflh universities at the end of the eighteenth and beginning
of the nineteenth centuries, see Desdevizes du Dezert, UEtpagne de VAnden
lUffime, m, 186-205; Rousseau, Rhgne de Charles III, II, 313-325; Doblado's
Letten fnm iSpoui, 100-1 17. In 1825 out of eighty professors in Mexican sem-
L MikB (wlio taught 1,444 students) there were twenty-four in theology, six

72 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

University of Mexico and other professorships were added
later, and in 1768 a royal college for surgeons was founded.
A large and well-equipped school of mines was founded in
1791, which occupied spacious and handsome buildings where
chemistry, geology, physics, mineralogy, and mathematics
were taught.^ An academy of fine axts and a botanical
garden were also prosperous and well frequented. Hmn-
boldt, visiting Mexico in 1803, expressed himself surprised
at the artistic zeal, the architectural ability, and the knowl-
edge of botany, chemistry, and mathematics which he dis-
covered.* The civil wars had, of course, caused the decay
of all these institutions. Governments which could barely
keep themselves in existence had no money to spare for
universities or the fine arts.'

In considering the condition of education in Mexico it is
not to .be forgotten that in 1825 education of every grade in
the United States was also at a low ebb. The earlier Amer-
ican settlers had generally entertained very liberal views as
to the importance of establishing schools for the people, but
their efforts had resulted, after two centuries, in nothing that
could be regarded as a well-ordered system. With the in-
creasing prosperity of the country in the period after the
second war with England, doubts began to arise in many
minds as to the adequacy of existing conditions ; but in 1825
httle had been done to remedy the situation. Horace Mann
was still practising law and De Witt Clinton was meditating
his reconmiendations to the legislature of New York. Uni-
versal, free, and compulsory primary education, under the
control of the state, which has become the ideal of most
American commonwealths, was as yet far from realization;
and the thirty-five small colleges scattered throughout the

in canon law, three in Holy Scriptures and church history, and one in " cere-
monies." Tliere were twenty-three in Latin and rhetoric, sixteen in phi-
losophy, four in "civil and natural" law, one in '' public constitutional
law," one in Spanish and grammar, and one in **the Mexican language."
There was no instruction in mathematics or science, or in Greek or Hebrew,
even for intending priests. — (Memoria que leyd d Secretario dejustida y nego-
eio8 eduidslioos , . . enero 1826.)

^ Humboldt, Essai PolUique, I, 121. < Essai PdUique, I, 118-124, 182.

* Poinsett, Notes on Mexico, 82-84.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 73

country offered but a narrow and antiquated course of the
elementary classical and mathematical studies.

Whatever may be thought of the relative educational fa-
cilities in Mexico, there can be no doubt as to its literature.
Literature can hardly be said to have existed in New Spain
at all. By far the greater part of the population were imable
to read, and the small minority of colonists who possessed
that art were principally Spaniards by birth or immediate
descent who preferred peninsular to colonial authors.

Even in Spain, literature had not exactly flourished under
. patemd ^veiment in the eighteenth Ltmy or during
the early years of the nineteenth. Even as late as 1802 theV
importation of foreign books was practically forbidden on \ ^
accoimt of "the irreparable injury caused to religion and the \ (
State by the reading of wicked books.'' The strictest cen- J
sorship was likewise exercised over native productions. An
author, before he could publish, must obtain a license from
some specified authority. If he wrote on banking or com-
merce, he must get the permission of the Junta of Com-
merce; if he wrote of the colonies, he must have the author-
ity of the Coimcil of the Indies; if of medicine, a license must
be secured from the protomedicatO: and if of geography, from
the Academy of History. Discussions of pubUc affairs and
translations of the Bible were absolutely prohibited. Transla-
tions of the oflSces of the church into Spanish were permitted,
but only imder special license from the King himself.^

The troubles of the author were by no means at an end
when he had got his license. The Liquisition was on the
watch for every book or pamphlet that came from the press, *
and was ready to confiscate copies and imprison the writer
if his views could be regarded as savoring of heresy. The
agents of the Holy Office in the colonies were even more
active and zealous than in Spain itself, and their vigilance
was sometimes triumphant in detecting dangerous errors in .
books that had been suffered to pass the scrutiny of the home
authorities.*

1 Desdevizes du Dezert, III, 224-228.

* Lea^ The InquinUon in the Spanish Dependencie$f 264, 274.

74 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

•

It very naturally followed that although a printing-press
was established in the city of Mexico in 1536 — one hundred
and four years before the pubUcation in Massachusetts of
the Bay Psalm Book — the long list of books printed in New
Spain contains hardly a single work of genuine literature.
There are, indeed, a vast number of odes of welcome to
viceroys, and verses on the births, coronations, marriages,
and deaths of members of the royal family. There are in-
numerable books of devotion, tracts for the Indians, gram-
mars of the native tongues for the use of missionaries.
Funeral sermons are a favorite vehicle of expression. Plead-
ings in important lawsuits, occasional works on jurispru-
dence and medicine and on geography and astronomy also
figure in the list. But philosophy, politics, most of the
natural sciences, romance, and unofficial verse are absent.

The learned Dr. Beristain, whose Biblioteca Hispano-
Americana Septentrional, published in 1816, is still the most
complete of Mexican bibliographies, admits fully the one-
sided character of the writings he catalogues.

"I know very well," he says in his introduction, "that all of the
contents of this book, except a dozen items, will be regarded by the
delicate palates of the learned, in this age of irreligion, libertinism and
materialism, as mere rubbbh fit for the flames, being only monu-
ments of the fanatisicm and superstition of devotees and aristotelian
monks. How many lives, they will say, of the Saints I How many
panegyrics! How many treatises de Naturd Dei and de TrinUaiel
How many legal documents! How many books of devotion! But
where, they will ask with Robertson — the Pliny of America — where
are the new inventions and discoveries? Where are the new truths
in science and art?"

And the worthy father goes on to explain that Spanish
America had never pretended to boast of its literature, and
that it claimed only the credit of producing a series of
worthy disciples of the learned Spaniards of the sixteenth
century. It was, in truth, the aim and object of those who
controlled the pubUcation of books in New Spain, up to the
very end of the Spanish dominion, to avoid dangerous novel-
ties. The science, the theology, the history, and the litera-

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 75

ture of the sixteenth century were all that Mexicans were to
be permitted to have. The force of conservatism could no
further go.

It is hardly necessary to dwell upon the very different
conditions that prevailed in the British colonies. The ear-
lier instructions to the provincial governors did, indeed, gen-
erally contain a clause to the eflfect that no printing-press
should be set up and no book printed without the governor's
license, but little or no effort seems to have been made to
assert this powfer, and after Queen Anne's time the clause was
omitted. Even the newspaper press was never seriously
molested by the British authorities. As early as 1721 a reso-
lution of the Massachusetts legislature that a licensing sys-
tem would be attended by "innumerable inconveniences and
dangers" served as a sufficient warning, and the result of
the 2ienger case in New York, fourteen years later, es-
tablished forever the liberty of the press.

The people of the thirteen colonies and their descendants
and successors even far into the nineteenth century could
hardly have been described as lovers of art and letters. Cer-
tainly they added little to the artistic or Uterary or scien-
tific treasures of mankind. But at least their governments
left them free to wander at will through the pleasant regions
of poetry and romance, and to pursue as they chose the
learning of all the ages.

The revolution in Mexico put an immediate end to the
systems of Ucensing and censorship that had been so marked ^
a feature of Spanish rule; nevertheless, the habits of genera-
tions were not easily got rid of and the blight of continual
civil war hindered the development of Uterature. Books
were at least double the price that they were in Europe.
And at a time when the New York Society Library numbered
twenty thousand volumes and there were small subscription
libraries ui every coimtry town in the United States, there
was not a circulating library in Mexico.^

The first newspaper in America was the official Gaceta de
M&tico, but so long as Spain was in control this, or a harmless

^ Calderon, Life in Mexico^ 172.

76 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Mercurio Volante or Diario Mercantil, was all that was per-
mitted to exist. The Constitution of 1824 proclaimed the
new order of things, and was emphatic in declaring that the
political freedom of the press should never be suspended,
"much less abolished"; and a number of newspapers were
early established in every part of the country.

In 1825 the Aguila Mexicana was, or tried to appear, the
official organ at the national capital. El Sol, the conserva-
tive paper, was regarded as reactionary and even monarch-
ical; and its motto. Post nubila Phoebus, was understood to
mean that the weather under the republic was extremely bad
but that the sun of Spain would soon return.^ The Correo
de la Federaci&n was the radical or Yorkino oi^an; the Fan^
tasma was essentially anti-clerical.^

In the provinces a number of more or less ephemeral pub-
lications caused constant irritation to the central govern-
ment. In one way or another it was possible to control the
newspapers of the metropolis, but it often happened that
local journals were protected by those who were not at all in
accordance with the policies of the President for the time
being, so that in general the press of the country was a
constant thorn in the side of the successive Mexican admin-
istrations. In its way it seems to have represented with
sufficient fulness the varying opinions and moods of the
relatively small groups whose ideas constituted public
opinion.

^ Beltrami, Le Mexigue, II, 258. * Suarez, Histaria de Mixioo, 59, 60.

CHAPTER IV
THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO (Continued)

A MOST important and striking difference between Mexico
and the United States was the entire absence of water com-
munications in the former coimtry. In the United States,
at a time when raflroads were only just being planned, the
main internal routes of conmierce and travel were along the
great rivers and other water-ways which were a marked feat-'
ure of the country. The finest steam-boats in the world plied
on the Mississippi and the Ohio, the Hudson and the Dela-
ware, Lake Champlain and Long Island Sound. The Erie
Canal was the longest in existence, and others were building
or projected all over the country. In Mexico, on the con-
trary, there were practically no navigable rivers, and any
extensive system of canals was made impossible by the very
slight rainfall of the interior. Even the coasting trade, so
active and important along the Atlantic coast of the United
States, was all but impossible in Mexico, owing in great
measure to the lack of safe harbors. ^

The internal conmaerce of the country was therefore \
carried on by road. But the Spanish colonists had never \ Jj
proved themselves successful road-builders in any part of J ' ^
their great empire. The mule-paths of New Spain— even J
those connecting the capital with Vera Cruz and Acapulco —
were for generations neither better nor worse than those
which led from the sea-coast to Bogotd or Quito. It was only
in the early years of the nineteenth century that the Vera
CJruz road was made into a paved cha7iss6e over which heavy
coaches and wagons could pass with reasonable safety.

The revolution, however, wrecked this fine road as it
wrecked mainy other solid moniunents of Spanish rule. In
part, the destruction had been deliberate, but in large part

78 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

it was the inevitable result of neglect. The city of Mexico
lying in a valley of the great central plateau, the roads from
the sea-coast necessarily rose some nine thousand feet, and
had long and steep ascents which were always liable to be
badly washed by tropical showers.

The British mission, sent in 1823 to Mexico to investigate
and report upon the condition of the country, brought with
them three carriages from London, but the members of the
mission found it impossible to travel in them, and they were
dragged empty from the city of Vera Cruz to the city of
Mexico.^ Heavy coaches did manage to cany passengers
in some discomfort over the road. Horse-litters, however,
were preferable, and in general no one travelled between
Mexico and Vera Cruz in any wheeled vehicle if he were able
to sit a horse.*

In the rest of the country conditions were worse. A
carriage, if it were strong enough, could be driven from
Mexico along the central plateau as far as Durango, but it
was an imusual feat of endurance. The commerce of the
country, with quite negligible exceptions, was carried on by
trains of pack animals — generally mules or asses — ^furnishing
a picturesque but extremely costly and inefficient means of
transportation.' The cities were supplied with milk, butter,
cheese, fruit, vegetables, poultry, and charcoal by half-naked
Indians carrying great panniers on their bacl^. When it
came to moving heavy or bulky articles, such as parts of
mining machinery, the difficulties Were all but insurmount-
able.

Commerce was fmther hampered by a local tax on sales
known as the alcabala, and which amounted on the average

1 Ward's Mexico, II, 9.

* Ibid,, 174. In the year 1823 only 76 wheeled vehicles left Vera Crux
for the interior, but 259 litters and 41,980 loaded mules and donkeys.
In 1824 the number of wheeled vehicles leaving fell to 56, litters to 223, and
mules and donkeys to 29,342. See Lerdo de Tejada, Camercio Esteriar,
App. 30 and 31.

* An illustration of the prohibitive cost of transportation in Mexico is found
in the fact that a barrel of flour from Kentucky could be profitably sold in
Vera Cruz for less than the mere freight on the same quantity of flour if sent
from points in the State of Puebla, only a hundred and fifty miles away. —
(Ward's Mexico, I, 36.)

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 79

to twelve per cent^ although on wines and brandies it was
thirty-five and forty per cent. There were also certain
small municipal duties levied in several towns for such pur-
poses as support of hospitals and public buildingS; and the
introduction of water.^

By the law of August 4, 1824, all imported goods, in ad-
dition to customs duties, paid an additional fifteen per cent
duty on being sent to the interior, and were relieved from
the alcabala.^ And by the law of December 22, 1824, the
several States were empowered to impose a tax of three per
cent on foreign articles consumed within their borders.'
*The simple wants of the arrieros, who accompanied the
pack trains, were easily supplied along the roadside, or in
rough sheds or bams, but more fastidious travellers found
the accommodations at the inns so bad as to render any
joumey a business of the utmost difficulty and discomfort.
Nor wL this suiprising, for travelling w^ a sort of recent
invention in Mexico. Before the revolution there were no
foreigners, and as there was not much but local trade, mer-
chants had small occasion to go or send an agent to any
distance. The wealthier Mexicans seldom moved from one
place to another. When they did, the hacienda of some
friend could almost always be found, and journeys were
planned from one such house to another.

At most of the larger villages there was a meson, or inn;
but an imfumished room with an earthen floor, often exces-
sively filthy, was all that the majority of these establish-
ments could afford. They were, said one indignant foreigner,
neither inns nor houses, and the rooms were nothing but
dimgeon cells to which light and air penetrated only through
the doorway. In some places such a house contained but
a single room, which served as an eating and sleeping place
both for the innkeeper's family and his guests. In any case,

1 Lerdo de Tejada, 41.

* Dublan y Lozano, 1, 710. This duty, known as derecho de inUmaddn, was
for the benefit of the federal government. It was computed on the appraised
nJne when landed, plus 25 per cent, and was therefore in reality an additional
eusUmis duty of 18' per cent.

* Ibid,f I, 748. This tax was known as derecho de oontwno.

80 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

travellers must sleep on the bare floor^ unless they were
prudent enough to bring their own blankets^ or, better still,
a hammock or a portable bed that was set high enough to be
above the leap of a flea from the floor. Food was not always
to be obtained at an inn, and travellers usually carried their
provisions with them. Sometimes the proprietor of the meson
would consent to have his guests' suppUes cooked, and a
little patience and diplomacy was usually rewarded by the
production of fresh tortillas. In the larger cities, like Mexico
and Guadalajara, there were some indifferent restaurants.
In remote districts and villages where inns did not exist
travellers must be content with an Indian hut, or, if they were
lucky, they found lodgings in one of the great haciendas,
where they could almost always count on the unquestion-
ing hospitality of a thinly settled country.

Not only were the roads bad and the roadside inns uncom-
fortable, but brigandage was not imcommon. Along the
Vera Cruz road, where the most valuable traffic passed,

(armed escorts were usually furnished to all important people.
Internal commerce could not, of coimse, flourish in the face
of these difficulties, and in consequence an economical inde-
pendence was created, which characterized many districts.
The inhabitants not only raised their own food and built
their houses out of whatever material was at hand, but their
clothes were made of home-grown cotton or wool, spun and
woven by the women.
Foreign commerce was also greatly affected by the same
causes, for imported goods in large quantities could hardly
be distributed in the interior. Moreover, the country had
become accustomed to exist upon its own productions.
Before the revolution the colonial policy of Spain had in-
volved with few exceptions the absolute prohibition of trade
with foreign countries or by means of foreign vessels. Trade
with the other Spanish colonies, except the Phihppines, was
likewise prohibited, and in that exceptional case only a sin-
gle ship once in each year was allowed to cross the lonely Pa-
cific between Acapulco and Manila. Even between Old and
New Spain there were numerous and embarrassmg restrio-

THE PEOPLE OP MEXICO 81

lions on commerce, which persisted to the last day of Spanish
rule, although from time to time they had been greatly re-
lax^ from the original sixteenth-century monopoly.

In Spanish times the only port of entry on the Atlantic
coast of Mexico was Vera Cruz, and the business of the small
number of merchants in that unhealthy town was extremely
lucrative. The total amount of their commerce was, how-
ever, comparatively small.^ The inland freight often
reached prohibitive figures, and there were many places
which might therefore have done a good business if they
could have been reached through ports like Tampico or
Campeche, but which were practically cut off from all the
benefits of foreign trade.^ In other localities, only articles
of relatively large value and small bulk, principally luxuries
like silks or laces, could be profitably imported.

One of the first results. of independence was that all
foreign commerce f eU off to an extraordmaiy degree, owing
chiefly to the total change in methods of doing business.
Intercourse with Spain was at an end, and merchants doing
business in Vera Cruz or the city of Mexico had no corre-
spondents in other countries through whom to purchase
goods. In the same way foreign manufactiu^rs knew of no
agencies through which they could sell their wares in Mexico.
Ttae «,ndiUo^ we«, of ™u,«, only temponuy, tor the
ports of the country were opened freely to the shipping of all
nations, and it was not long before channels of trade were
discovered and freely used; so that by 1825 it is probable
that the imports into Mexico were equal to the average of
the prosperous years before the revolution broke out in
1810.

Probabilities are all that can be affirmed of the volume of
Mexican commerce, and this for two reasons. In the first
place, oflicial statistics were always conspicuously inexact;

1 The imports in 1819 at Vera Cruz amounted to $10,099,196.— (Lerdo de
Tejada, App. 29.)

' As soon as the port of Tampico was opened to foreign commerce the town
grew amazingly. A new town came into existence, inhabited almost entirely
by foreign merchants, who supplied the wants of San Luis Potosf and all the
nortliem parts of Meadco. — (Berlandier y Chovel, Diario de Viage, 222.)

82 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

and in the second place^ there was always a great and unas-
certainable amount of smuggling. Himiboldt estimated the
contraband imports under the Spanish regime at four or five
million dollars a year in time of peace^ and at six millions
a year in time of war.^ The amoimt of goods irregularly
or illegally imported was largely increased after the revo-
lution, especially with the opening of the northern ports,
such as Galveston, Refugio (Copano Bay), Matamoros, and
Tampico. A considerable trade rapidly sprang up between
these places and New Orleans, so that about 1827 the number
of vessels that entered Mexican ports from the United
States was believed to be more than the number entering
from all the rest of the world.

Ward, who as British minister at Mexico had every oppor-
tunity and incentive to ascertain the facts as to the foreign
commerce of the country, estimated the total import and
export trade of Mexico for 1824 at about $21,500,000, and
concluded that for 1825 the amount would be still greater.*
These estimates, however, were probably too low. The total
of exports and imports as reported for 1824 by the custom-
houses of Alvarado and Vera Cruz alone amounted to nearly
seventeen million, and adding the business of other ports
and the amount of contraband trade, the total would exceed
Ward's figures by a considerable sum. For 1825 the total
of reported exports and imports for all Mexican ports was
over twenty-four million, and the figures for the three suc-
ceeding years were not very different.

The chief articles of export were still the precious metals,
which were always subject to an export duty and were there-
fore smuggled out of the coimtry in such large quantities
that exports were understated by the customs authorities
even more than imports. It has been estimated that the
real value of imports during the four years 1825 to 1828,
both inclusive, was not less than eighteen million dollars a
year; and that the real value of exports was about the same,
making a total of about $36,000,000.^

1 Humboldt, Eaaai PolUique, II, 730. * Ward, Mexico, I, 325-333.

* Lerdo de Tejada, 51.

^^ -^:iHE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 83

As compared with these figures, the imports and exports
of the United States for the fiscal year ended September 30,
1825, were each a Uttle mider a hundred miUions, the total
being $195,875,463,^ or rather more than five times that of
Mexico.

The character of the exports of the two countries was very
different, for while agricultural products, such as wheat,
flour, rice, com, cheese, bacon, cotton, and tobacco, formed
by far the larger part in value of the exports from the
United States, the agricultural exports from New Spain had
been always of trifling amount, for the country always con-
sumed almost all that it produced. Indeed, the methods
of cultivation had not much changed since the Spanish
conquest. Cortfe found the land well cultivated, "the ex-
treme dryness being reUeved by the canals with which the
land was partially irrigated"; and in three hundred years
there was no material variation in the crops or the people.
The banana, the useful maguey plant, Indian com, cotton,
and tobacco remained the chief products of the soil.^ The
collection and preparation of cochineal became an impor-
tant industry during Spanish times, but the modem uses of
India-mbber and sisal-hemp were hardly known.

The Spanish conquerors introduced wheat, barley, coffee,
and sugar. Mexico, however, never competed with the
United States in wheat or flour, or with the other European
colonies in sugar and coffee. The olive and the vine were also
planted, but their cultivation was restricted by law that they
might not compete with the Spanish-grown product.

A far more important result of the conquest was the in-
troduction of domestic animals. In the northern parts of
the country, particularly, sheep, cattle, horses, and mules
were raised in enormous niunbers. The herds on some of
the great estates were of astonishing magnitude. Thus in

* Pitkin, SUUisUcal View of the Commerce of the U. S. of America, 66. These
figures include very large amounts of foreign goods re-exported. The aver-
age annual value of goods imported for domestic consumption was estimated
at under 160,000,000, and the average annual amount of domestic exports
at $53,000,000.— (/Wd., 480.)

'Prescott, Conquest of Mexico, I, 131-137; Humboldt, Eaeai PolUique, U,
351-447; Ward, Mexico, I, 31-68.

84 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

1826 the hacienda de la Sarca in Durango had a stock of
200^000 sheep and 40,000 mules and horses; that of Ramos
had 80;000 sheep; that of Guatinap6; 40,000 oxen and cows.
On the breeding estates of the Marques de Guadalupe in
Zacatecas there were 18,000 horses and brood mares. The
hacienda of El Jaral in San Luis Potosf was said to possess
at least three million head of live stock, and to send thirty
thousand sheep a year to market.^

What with the difficulties of internal transportation, and
the fact that the Spanish peninsula was the only country
with which commerce was permitted, it was obviously im-
practicable during the colonial period to develop any export
trade in food supplies. The only customers of the farmers
were in the large Mexican cities, including the great mining
centres where the vast niunbers of animals employed neces-
sitated a very considerable consumption of food for horses
and mules. The forage crops were, however, much exposed
to injury by drought, and therefore a dry season always led
to the destruction of large niunbers of animals employed in
mining, and this in turn to a reduction in the annual output
, of the mines.
/ Manufacturing was even more hampered by Spanish policy
j than agriculture. The early colonial policy of all European
j governments had been unfavorable to the establishment of
'^7 manufactures in their dependencies, for the accepted com-

mercial principles limited the functions of a colony to the
supplying of raw materials to the mother country, and
the consumption of her manufactured articles. The whole
traffic was required to be carried on under the national flag.
Spain did not differ from England or France or Holland in
her theories — she was only more rigid and consistent in ap-
plying them.

But even Spain could not be consistent at all times and
in all places. If the law had compelled Mexico to be clothed
only in Spanish garments, Mexico would have gone naked.
Hmnboldt correctly summed up the situation by saying that
if populous cities are built at great distances from the coasts,

1 Ward, Mexico, II, 218-391.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 85

behind mountain ranges^ and if many millions of inhabitants
can obtain European goods only after they have been carried
on mule-back; sometimes five or six months' jomney, through
tropical forests and waterless deserts, local manufactures
must of necessity exist.^ The force of circumstances there-
fore compelled the Spanish government to tolerate what it .
could not prevent, and thus in New Spain a limited manuf act- 1
uring industry existed, which supplied most of the simple
needs of the people but furnished no goods for export.

Coarse woolen and cotton fabncs, hats, saddlery and har-
ness, soap, furniture, toys, pottery, and cigars made up al-
most the entire list. To these might be added the manu-
facture of silverware, which was in demand in the churches
and in the wealthier households, where fine porcelain and
glassware — difficult to carry safely over mountains on mule-
back — ^were not much used.

The first efifects of independence were, necessaiily, dis-
astrous to the manufacturing interests. Not only had factory
buildings been damaged or destroyed during the civil wars,
but the removal of colonial restrictions also had its effect.
When new ports were freely opened to conmierce and when
shorter routes to the interior were made available for the
carriage of imported goods, trade from foreign countries
grew and domestic production fell off. It is therefore not
siuprising to find that the annual value of manufactured
products was estimated at only one-half what it was before
the revolution.* As usual, there was no means of forming
any accurate judgment on the subject. Himiboldt, without
expressmg any opinion of his own, says that the value of the
manufactures of New Spain was estimated at seven or eight
million dollars a year,' and on this basis the manufacturing
output of the Mexican republic in 1825 might perhaps be put
in ttie neighborhood of four millions a year. In the United
States at that time it was probably as much as two hundred
and fifty millions a year.*

The one industry of Mexico that had fmnished any sub-

1 Humboldt, Esaai PolUique, II, 664. * Poinsett, Notes on Mexico, 102.
t Humboldt, Eaaai PdUique, II, 665. « Pitkin, 461-530, pasnm.

86 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICX)

stantial quantity of exports during Spanish times was the
mining of precious metals. It was this alone which enabled
New Spain to pay tribute for so many centurieS; and it was
this which, coupled with Spanish secrecy, attracted the
attention and inflamed the imagination of the world. For
years the beUef in the prodigious wealth of Mexico was as
imiversal as it was vague and mistaken.

The statistics of production were most meagre and unsat-
isfactory, but it seems safe to conclude that before Mexican
independence was .achieved the precious metals made up
at least three-fourths in value of the total exports. In ad-
dition to this, over eight million dollars a year used to be
shipped for account of the royal Treasury, and thus the pro-
portion of the precious metals was brought up to perhaps
seven-eighths of the whole export trade.^

The quantity of gold mined was probably about a million
dollars a year on the average. The production of silver was
probably not far from twenty-three million dollars a year
during the peaceful times preceding the outbreak of the
revolution in I8IO.2

The methods employed were both primitive and extrava-
gant. The permanent works were constructed upon a scale
which was described as wonderful and imposing, and which
was obviously impossible in a country where labor was not
abundant and extremely cheap. Thus the dimensions of
the principal shafts were often excessive. In some cases
they were octagons from twenty-two to twenty-seven feet
across, sunk to very great depths.' The ore was brought up
on men's shoulders, the half-breed Indian workmen carrying
incredibly heavy loads.^ Water was pmnped by a primi-
tive arrangement of leather buckets worked by mules. At
the Candelaria mine in Durango the water was brought up
in buckets on men's shoulders from a depth of nearly seven

1 Ward, I, 318, note,

* Humboldt estimated the total amiual product in 1803 at slightly over
$23,000,000. — (Easai Poliiiquef II, 580.) Ward, whose sources of informatioii
appear to have been good, estimated the average production of the precioiis
metals for the fifteen years from 1796 to 1810 at $24,000,000— of which a little
leas than five per cent was gold. — (Ward, I, 365.)

» Ward, II, 203-207. « Ibid., 211, 216.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 87

hundred feet. At the reduction works the processes of
crushmg, washing, and amalgamation were carried out
chiefly by men and mules.^

The rising of 1810 wrought swift disaster to the mining
industry. The fury of Hidalgo's followers, who were chiefly
recruited near the mining districts, was first directed against
the tangible property of Spanish capitalists at the great
mines, and their machinery and reduction works were ruth-
lessly wrecked. As the principal veins had been explored
in the course of centuries to very great depths, the destruc-
tion of pumping machinery made it impossible to keep the
lower levels free of water, and for many years some of the
most productive workings were necessarily abandoned on
that account alone. In addition the loss of confidence which
naturally discouraged bankers from making advances to
mineHjmiers, andthe extreme difficulty of procuring steady
labor, combined to hamper the carrying on of mining opera-
tions. At the end of a few years many workings were in a
condition of absolute ruin, shafts had fallen in, timbering
had rotted and given way, buildings and machineiy had
been destroyed or had been so neglected as to be beyond
repair. In one mining town after another, the traveller
heard the same tale of ruined buildings and machineiy, or
of rising water and falling population.^

For the fifteen years that immediately succeeded the out-
break of the revolution — ^that is to say from 1811 to 1825,
both inclusive — ^it is probable that tne average production
of the precious metals had fallen to about eleven million
dollars a year. In some years, as in 1811 and 1812, and
again in 1823 and 1824, it fell to almost nothing.^

The result of this blow to the principal industry of the
coxmtry was extremely far reaching, for not only were great
numbers of men thrown out of work, but there was also a
great diminution in the demand for agricultural products
due to the reduction in the nimibers of both men and animals

» Ibid., 196-199.

< Ward, II, 110-341; Poinsetti Notes an Mexico, chap. XII, 156-177; Lyon,
I, 301; n, 149, 153.
s Ward, I, 362-374.

88 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

to be fed. These reached surprising figures. Thus at the
Barranco mine at Bolanos, in the state of JaUsco, twenty-
two hundred mules and four hundred men were employed
in pumping alone.^ In the great Valenciana mines near
Guanajuato over three thousand men were employed and
fourteen thousand mules.^ At Tlalpujahua, in the state of
Michoacan, about two thousand horses and mules and more
than two thousand men were required.' At the Veta Grande
of Zacatecas there were more than twelve hundred horses
and mules.*

For these armies of men and beasts the supplies of food
were naturally drawn from the nearest farming districts,
and the moment that the activity of the mines was checked
the price of agricultural products fell off, and the prosperity
of the rural population with it. On the other hand, when
mining operations were resmned the demand for horses and
mules, for maize and barley, instantly increased.

The termination of Spanish rule in Mexico and the open-
ing of the country to foreigners were almost immediately
f oDowed by a great influx of foreign miners, or mining specu-
lators, mostly English and German, attracted by the vague
and often mythical accounts of the extraordinary riches of
the Mexican mines, which were now at last to be opened to
the enterprise of Europe. The further away, the greater
seemed the prospect of enormous and quick returns. In
London the shares of newly formed Mexican mining com-
panies rose to high figures, and for a short time were the
subject of excited speculation. Writing of the conditions in
Great Britain in the winter of 1824-1825, a recent author
says:

"The English people were at this moment suffering from one of
those attacks of speculative mania to which they are subject. Some
years of great national prosperity had preceded, and for the capital
then accumulated and now seeking investment a new outlet had been
found in the revolted colonies of Spain. Canning's foreign policy,
of which these colonies were the pivot, helped to give an air of respect-

^ Lyon, I, 315. Ward puts the number of mules employed for this purpose
at 6,000.-(Ward, I, 425.)
« Ward, II, 190, 200. > Ibid., I, 427. « Lyon, Mexico, I, 255.

THE PEOPLE OP MEXICO 89

ability, or even of patriotismi to the schemes of company promoters,
and presently all the phenomena of the South Sea Bubble were repro-
duced. The old stories of the mineral riches of the New World were
revived, companies were formed in great numbers to exploit them,
and the shares were eagerly bought by a credulous public." *

The promoters of course contended, and with some reason,
that the introduction of improved modem methods would
result in a great increase in the output of the mines, but
there were a nimiber of other elements they did not take
into account. Worn-out old workings were sold by shrewd
Mexican owners to eager customers at extravagant prices,
and even where the quantity and quality of the ore were
satisfactory, the difficulty of transporting machinery from
the sea-coast, the want of fuel (for there was no known coal
and little timber), the dislike of the native miners to changes
in their traditional methods, and the unexpectedly costly
outlay for preliminary work in re-establishing drainage and
restoring ventilation and facility of access to the mines,
absorbed all the product. Mining shares in London fell,
and the reaction from the exaggerated belief in the wealth
of Mexican mines led to a distrust of all Mexican invest-
ments both in Great Britain and elsewhere.

The long and destructive civil war, which had been fol-
lowed by a complete upsetting of all the relations of trade
with fo4o ml^.' Ud ne^sarily been accompimed by
disaster to the public revenues, as well as by the very great
changes in industrial and economic conditions above noted.
It is therefore not surprising to find that from the very be-
ginning of the war of independence there were serious
deficits in the annual budgets of both the colonial and the
independent governments.

Before the revolution the country had annually furnished

1 M on^ypenny's Disraelif I, 55. Disraeli's first appearance as an author was
in writing pamphlets to ''boom'' Mexican mining shares. He himself in-
Tested in them, and lost more than he could afford.

• By a decree of Oct. 8, 1823, Spanish vessels were excluded from all Mexican
ports, and the importation of all articles manufactured or grown in Spain was
pn>hfl>ited; and by a previous decree of Nov. 5, 1822, exports to Spain
were forbidden. — (Lerdo de Tejada, 30.)

.»

90 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

a large surplus. For the period from 1800 to 1810 the rev-
enues of New Spain amounted to about twenty million dol-
lars a year. Of this only ten and a half millions was expended
in the interior of the country. From the siuplus about six
millions a year, on an average, were remitted as tribute to
Madrid, and over two millions were sent to Cuba, Florida,
Porto Rico, the Philippines, Louisiana, and other Spanish
possessions, all of which were, in some measure, supported
by Mexico.

The outbreak of the revolution threw all the finances of
New Spain into confusion, and produced continual deficits
in the colonial administration, which were made good, partly
by new forms of taxation and partly by forced loan^W
tamos forzosos). The latter expedient, which necessarily in-
volved disastrous although remote consequences, was much
admired for its elegant simplicity. It was usually operated
as follows: The commanding officer of an army would be
authorized by the national authorities, or those acting as
such, to resort to "exceptional means" to raise money. He
would then assess individuals various smns according to
what he believed they could be made to pay, and would give
them notes in the name of the government for the amoxmts
collected, which nobody ever expected to see paid, and which
never were paid. It was, say^ a Mexican author, very much
as if a highway robber should stop a lady on the street and
pull oflf her rings, while handing her at the same time his
promissory note.^

After the fall of Iturbide, the reorganization of Mexico,
and the adoption of the Constitution of 1824, there began a
period in which national revenues were increased, expendi-
tures were cut down, and the methods of doing business
were reformed and simplified by the intelligent men at the
head of the treasury. It was, however, evidently impossible
to create a satisfactory budget so long as the conditions of
trade, and especially of the import trade, were daily chang-
ing, and while the effects of the new federal form of govern-
ment could only be conjectured. Consequently it is not

^ Bulnes, Grandes Mentiraa de Nuestra Hi^oria, 664.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 91

surprising to find that the official estimates often proved
very inexact, and that even with the help of large foreign
loans the government was at times in straits for ready money.
For the two years and a half, from the beginning of the
year 1824 down to Jmie 30, 1826, the receipts of the federal
government, as reported, were at the rate of about fifteen
miUion doDars a year, includmg some part of the proceeds of
loans; and the expenditures were at the rate of about six-
teen millions.^ These figures, however, seem to have varied
a good deal in different years. Thus in the year 1825 the
ordinary revenue was estimated at less than nine and a
half millions of dollars, the expenditures at close to eigh-
teen millions. But with the growth of imports the revenue
largely increased, and for 1826 may be put at thirteen million
dollars. At the same time the expenditures, including in-
terest on foreign loans, were brought below sixteen miUions,
so that the true annual deficit (excluding proceeds of loans)
liad fallen from eight to about three millions a year.*

The foreign loans with which the deficits were covered
were principally two in mmaber, one made through Gold-
schmidt & Co., of London, and the other through Barclay,
Herring, Richardson & Co., each for sixteen million dollars.
The Goldschmidt loan was made at the beginning of the
year 1824, before the independence of Mexico had been
acknowledged by England or any other nation, and while
the efforts of the Holy Alliance to re-establish the Spanish
power in America still seemed likely to be formidable, and
it was to be expected that usurious terms would have to be
submitted to, but the reality of the extortions siupassed ex-
pectations. The report of the agent of the Mexican gov-
ernment, Francisco de Borja Migoni, gives a very full ac-
count of the difficulties he encountered, and a scandalous
but most amusing history of the partially successful attempts
of men in semi-official positions to get a share of the plunder.'
He ultimately made a contract by which he sold to Gold-
schmidt & Co. the whole issue of sixteen million five-per-cent

* IUMnero'8 Mexico, 139. « Ward's Mexico, I, 275-287.

•Tornel, Breve Reeefia, 117-128.

92 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

bonds at fifty, less deductions for commissions, interest re-
tained, etc., which amoimted to over two million dollars, so
that all the Mexican government actually got was $5,900,-
323, or less than thirty-seven per cent of the face of the loan.

The Barclay & Co. loan was issued in February, 1826,
after Canning had called his New World into existence. This
firm acted merely as agents, and sold the bonds by subscrip-
tion to the public at eighty-six and three-quarters, but the
commissions, interest, and sinking-fund payments for the
first eighteen months retained, and "contingent expenses"
absorbed over five himdred thousand pounds, so that this
loan only produced a little over eleven million dollars, or
something more than seventy per cent of its face. But even
this sum was not actually received, for shortly after the
bonds had been sold Barclay & Co. failed, owing the Mexican
government nearly three hundred thousand pounds.^

The revenues of the government were derived from cus-
toms duties, the monopolies of tobacco, gunpowder, and salt,
the post-office, the lottery, the revenues of the estates for-
merly belonging to the Inquisition or suppressed convents,
and a direct tax apportioned among the several states. Of
these items, the customs duties were much the largest,
amounting to about sixty per cent of the whole. All other
sources of revenue were declared by statute to belong to the
several states.^

The receipts from customs were, however, much less than
they might have been under a more liberal policy. Protec-
tioim'nm mad had not been content to'im^se he.^
duties upon articles grown or manufactured in the country,
but from the very first years of independence had adopted
the poUcy of prohibiting the importation of such things as
were produced in Mexico, as well as of some things that were
not, but might be, produced.^ Among the results of this

^ According to Alaman, the loss through the failure of Barclay & Co. amounted
to considerably over two million dollars. — {Liquid. Gen. Deuda Exter.f 92.)

* Law of Aug. 4, 1824.— (Dublan y Lozano, I, 711.) By the law of Dec. 22,
1824, the states were also permitted to collect a duty of three per cent on
foreign goods which were consumed within their borders. — {Ibid., 748.)

< Lerdo de Tejada, 31.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 93

policy were the loss to the treasury of a large revenue that
might have been derived from duties on the goods thus pro-
hibited; and also the continuance and growth of the system
of contraband trade which the colonial policy of Spain had
notoriously fostered.

Of the national expenditures, the heaviest annual item
was for the maintenance of the army and navy, amounting
in 1825 to about eighty per cent of the whole cost of the
government.

In 1823 a few vessels had been purchased and the naval
force was gradually increased until in January, 1827, it con-
sisted of one ship of the line,^ two frigates, a corvette, four
brigs, and some smaller vessels. In 1826 Conmiodore
David Porter, formerly of the United States navy, was ap-
pointed "General of Marine," with a salary of twelve thou-
sand dollars a year and perquisites, besides the control of
the castle of San Juan de Uliia. He cruised off Cuba and
conmiitted great havoc on the Spanish conmierce, but lost
one of the frigates in action, and j&nally resigned in 1829,
after a series of vexatious controversies with the Mexican
government.^ The fact was that the natives of Mexico had
no maritime aptitude or experience, and their attempt at
creating a navy was a foregone failure.

The army, whose organization and equipment was in-
herited from colonial times and was chiefly commanded by
men brought up in the Spanish service, was much more for-
midable. On paper, it consisted of about thirty thousand
men actually with the colors, with reserves of about thirty
thousand more, but it was always doubtful how far the re-
turns were to be relied on.

The regular army {ej&rcito permanente) consisted of twelve
battalions of infantry, whose peace strength was just short
of ten thousand ; twelve regiments of cavalry, with a peace

> This was a Spanish ship, the Aaiay whose crew mutinied while en route to
Manila and carried her into Monterey in California. From there she was
brought at great expense to Vera Cruz, round Cape Horn. She proved per«
feeUy useless to the Mexicans, and was used for years as a prison hulk.

• An account of Porter's career in Mexico will be foimd in Memoir of Com-
fnodore David Porter of the U, S, Navy, by his son, Admiral David D. Porter,
947-391.

94 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

strength of sixty-seven hundred; and three brigades of
artillery, numbering about eighteen hundred in all. The
aggregate was therefore about eighteen thousand five hun-
dred, which, in time of war, would be increased to over
twenty-six thousand. The presidial companies and certain
companies of coast-guards added about four thousand five
hundred men to the nominal force of the regular army.

There were also always imder arms over nine thousand
militia {milicia adiva) who were, for all practical purposes,
a part of the standing army. The enrolled militia amounted
altogether to a little over thirty-six thousand men, but the
military value of three-quarters of them, for any purpose,
Fas probably very trifling.^

The army was scattered over the whole of Mexico in rela-
tively small detachments, so that it always proved a matter
of the utmost difliculty to concentrate a respectable force at
any threatened point, even when ample warning of the need
of men was given. This was due in part to the great difficul-
ties in the way of transporting men and suppUes, either by
land or sea — ^by land, because of the non-existence of decent
roads or navigable rivers; and by sea, because of the non-
. existence of a considerable body of shipping. A second
1 reason why troops could not readily be collected was that
\ they were universally relied on to do the work of preserving
\ order, and it was never considered safe to leave the larger
\ towns without substantial garrisons, and as the garrisons
\ were frequently mutinous, other troops within a reasonable
\ distance were always maintained to help preserve discipline.
\Quis custodiet custodes? was a question that often arose to
perplex the federal authorities.

The rank and file of the army were, of course, Indian
peasants. There was no r^ular system of conscription, but
some mode of compulsion seems to have been almost always
resorted to in order to get men into the army. One very

^ Ab to the army statistics, see Ward's Mexico^ I, 228-236, which probably
represents the average figures. The report of General Mier y Ter&n gives the
figures on Dec. 14, 1824, as follows: Troops of the line, 22,534; active militia,
40,018; making a total of 62,552, as against Ward's total of 61,000. — {Memona
del Secretario , , , dela Querra, preaerUada d las Cdmaraa en cmto de 1825.)

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 95

favorite expedient was to send into the ranks men who were
convicted of petty ofifences, and parties of handcuffed re-
cruits were constantly to be met marching to join their
regiments.

The number of officers was always disproportionately
large^ even from the time of Iturbide. At the beginning of
his reigU; out of a force of about thirteen thousand men there
were over eighteen hundred commissioned officers under the
rank of general/ and the niunber of generals was always
great. TOs di^^portion mcreaaed inlibeequent yean."^

The cost of maintainmg the army and navy in 1825 was
estimated at about fifteen million dollars. In addition the
salaries of President and Vice-President and the expenses of
the Ministry of Finance were estimated at two millions; the
Ministiy of Internal and Foreign Relations at a hundred
thousand, and the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical
Affairs at seventy-seven thousand dollars.*

The last item was much below the amount required when
the federal tribunals authorized under the Constitution of
1824 were fully established. The estimates for 1827 called
for over one hundred and sixty-three thousand dollars for
the maintenance of the supreme tribunal of justice, the
inferior federal courts, and the local coxirts of the Federal
District.

In general, the laws of Mexico were necessarily based upon
those of Spain as applied in her colonies, but after indepen-
dence there was a large mass of legislation which affected
both the procedure of the coiuts and the main body of the
law. The clergy and the army had, besides, their own special
tribimals, which administered separate codes of law and had
extremely wide jurisdiction. The administration of justice
in the regularly constituted coiuts, both state and federal,
was dilatoiy both in civil and criminal cases, and in the
latter the proceedings were largely conducted in secret.

To the foreign nations who had acknowledged the inde-
pendence of Mexico all these questions— the administration

1 Bancroft'^ Hutiory of Mexico, IV, 753. * Ward's Mexico, I, 275.

96 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

of justice, the strength and efficiency of the army and navy,
the commerce and wealth of the country, her agriculture,
mines, aad nmufactures-were of very great importance;
but the chief inquiry, which really included all the rest, was
as to the political capacity of the people and the probability
of their being able in a shorter or longer period to establish
an efficient, stable, and prosperous government capable of
maintaining internal tranquillity and of performing the in-
ternational duties which the nation owed to other coimtries.

It is easy now to see that a nation constituted of such
materials as were united in the people of Mexico, and gov- ^
emed for three centuries as Mexico had been governed, was
inevitably doomed to suffer, at least at the outset of its in-
dependent career, from political incapacity and inefficiency.
But the conditions of the country were not very generally
or very clearly imderstood at that time, and foreign ob-
servers were often perplexed and disappointed by the patent
inability of the Mexicans to establish a government which
was either stable or efficient.

In the United States particularly a complete misconcep-
tion of the essential facts was prevalent. The people of the
United States were apt to think of Mexico as a coimtry in-
habited by a European race— a nation consisting of the de-
scendants of inmiigrants who had overrun Mexico as the
English had overrun the North Atlantic seaboard, and who
had driven out the aborigines as the Algonquins and the
Six Nations and the Cherokees had been got rid of from
Maine to Georgia. Nothing could have been more errone-
ous. The Mexicans were not to be regarded as a European
but rather as an indigenous race, and although the original
occupants of the country had been conquered they had ^
neither been exterminated nor expelled. In fact, they re-
mained the predominant element in the population so far
as numbers went, very much as the Saxons remained in the
majority in England after the Norman conquest.

There were few analogies between the Spanish colony in
Mexico and the English colonies of North America. When
the English, French, and Dutch first settled in America they

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 97

found the land thinly occupied by a few groups of wandering
savages who were skilful and formidable warriors. These
Indians lived by hunting and fishing and had only the most
elementary notions of agriculture. They were sudden and
violent, treacherous and thieving. Not a man of them would
work for wages. The British settlers found them impossible
neighbors, and from the very first became involved in long
and doubtful struggles for mere existence. It was univer-
sally "believed that if the British settlements were to survive
at all their people must destroy or banish the native In-
dians; and therefore from East to West one tribe after an-
other was conquered and driven back into the wilderness.
The native savage, who was incapable of work as a servant,
^was swept away like the wild-cat and the wolf in order that
life might be a possible tiling for the white farmer and his
n^ro slave.

In Mexico all the conditions were reversed. The first

Europeans found the land occupied by a tolerably dense

population which had already made considerable advances

tx)ward civilization. These people— although passing under

"the generic name of Indians — ^were totally unlike the Indians

of the British colonies. They were essentially a peaceful

Tace, well advanced in agriculture and in some of the simpler

dosGiestic arts. They had learned to build houses of brick ) \^

and stone, to weave cloth, and to communicate by a sys-

tem of hieroglyphics. They had a form of reUgious ritual.

They had built great temples. And they had no skill in

war.

The North American Indian fought desperately for sev-
eral generations, upon not altogether unequal terms, with
the British settler; but a few hundred Spaniards were able
in ten years to overrun and permanently subdue a Mexican
native population of several millions.

New Spain resembled British India much more than it
i-esembled any British colony in America. Both in Mexico
and Hindustan a small niunber of adventurers had quickly
subdued, by craft or by violence, a huge, ill-organized, doc-
ile, and luuxi-working population composed of a number of

\ \

98 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

different and generally hostile tribes. In neither case were
the natives expelled. They were simply made to work for
the benefit of their new masters, and the bulk of the inhabi-
tants continued after the conquest, as before, to be made up
of the same indigenous races that the conquerors had f oimd
in the land. Both in Mexico and in India an unwarlike
people were readily kept in control by a small but relatively
efficient European gairison, and in neither did the people
love their rulers.

But no analogy is ever complete at all points, and the
analogy between New Spain and the East Indies breaks
down in several particulars.

In the first place. Englishmen did not go to India with the
intention of settling. They did not intermarry with the
natives, and white chfldren bom in India did not thrive.
The Spaniard, on the other hand, who went to Mexico veiy
generally looked forward to making that his permanent
Lidence, aiid his children and his chUdi^n's c Jdren Kved
and flourished and often married Indians or half-breeds and
became merged, more or less, in the native population. The
result was a far less rigid demarcation between the native
and the European races than existed in British India and
a larger percentage of European blood, although even in
New Spain the Indian blood greatly predominated.

Another very important difference was the existence of
the religious motive in the Spanish conquest. The Hon-
ourable East India Company was frankly commercial. Its
court of directors and their officers, with Roman impartial-
ity, allowed Mussulman and Hindu to exercise their relig-
ions freely so long as they did not disturb the British peace,
and would never for one moment have dreamed of forcing
the Church of England upon Asiatics. The Spanish gov-
emment had a veiy different opinion of the obligations of
reUgion. They were quite as much concerned with saving
the souls of the natives as in exploiting their labor, and
accordingly all native forms of worship were persistently
broken up and supplanted by an official and rigidly intoler-
ant creed from one end of New Spain to the other. All the

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 99

influences of reKgious unity were obviously favorable to a
fusion between the conquered and the victorious races.

The people of the United States also failed to recognize
the important fact that the people of Spain itself; although
classed as Europeans, had a very considerable infusion of
Asiatic and African blood, and were of very different de-
scent from the other races who inhabited western Europe.
" Of the many races which have gone to make up the vary-
ing tjrpes of men in the Spanish Peninsula," says an accom-
plished historian, "the early Afro-Semitic and the Saracen
have made the strongest impress upon the national char-
acter, and have given it mainly its qualities, good and bad;
its tribal tendencies, its fatalism, its gloomy pride and con-
servatism, and, not least, its cruelty. . . . We have in the
Spaniard a man in whom so much is not imderstandable
until we reckon with him, not as a European, but as the
Moro-Iberian which he is; a man apart, and differentiated
from the other races of Europe. Looked at so, much becomes
explicable which is otherwise strange, and has defied the
effort of the Anglo-Saxon to understand the philosophy of
the acts and ways of the conglomerate race of the Penin-
sula, which, in its incapacity for government, its regional-
ism, its chronic state of revolution, its religiosity, its fatal-
ism and procrastination, its sloth in material development,
have made the Spanish nation an enigma to the northern
mind." '

The population of New Spain at the time the Spanish
domination came to an end was thus made up of a mixture
of races in which there was in reality but a comparatively
small infusion of European blood, and in which the descend-
ants of the feeble folk whom Cort6s had so quickly and
completely subdued were in a very large majority. But
whether Saracen, Moor, or Aztec, the people of Mexico in-
herited from their ancestors no capacity for self-government,

1 Chadwick, The RekUwns of the 17. S. and Spain, DipUmacy, 4-6. " It has
been said that a Spaniard resembles the child of a European father by an
Abyssinian mother. Whether or not the statement is literally true, the simile
may be accepted as a convenient s3rmbol of the most fimdamental fact about
Spain and her people."~(Ellis, The Saul of Spain, 29.)

100 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

and to that inborn defect there was added a fatal lack of
experience.

Three centuries of Spanish autocratic government in New
Spain would have inevitably rendered the natives unfit for
self-government, even if they had ever possessed that diffi-
cult art; and it is probably true that when the republic was
established the vast majority of Mexicans cared nothing
whatever about republican principles or understood what
self-government really meant. They hated the Spaniards
and were glad to be rid of them. But they knew no more
of the business of governing than they did of the business of
fighting, and were quite content to leave such matters to
those who cared for them. "The people," said a Mexican
statesman and historian, in discussing the downfall of Itur-
bide, "were silent and obedient, as they have always
obeyed and been silent; for no stimulus ever rouses them
from the cool indifference with which they watch the com-
ing and going of revolutionB in which they have no part
and from which they secure no advantage." ^

But if the great majority of the population were sullen or
silent in the face of political emergencies, there were always
large numbers of men — ^mostly of Spanish descent — ^who
were fiercely clamorous to undertake the affairs of the nation
and to assmne the honors and emolmnents of office. Every
garrison town swarmed with them. As a class they possessed
only the limited education which the Mexican schools and
imiversities of that day afforded, but they had inherited the
Spanish pride and the peculiar Spanish inability to look
facts fairly in the face. They had large aspirations and
limited energy and knowledge. Their traditions forbade
their earning money in trade or manufactures, even if a
country so poor as Mexico had offered them many oppor-
tunities. Priest, lawyer, soldier, and government official
comprised almost the entire list of careers open to them.

"Whether as the result of their vicious education," says AlamaQy
''or on account of the influence of the climate which tempts men to

* Tornel, Breve Resefia, 12.

THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO 101

easy-going indulgence, the white natives were generally jfQle and care-
leas; ready to undertake but without foresight in mea^jures of execu-
tion; giving themselves up ardently to the present and heedless of the
future; prodigab in good fortune and patient and enduring: in bad." ^

A very great proportion, therefore, of the better-educated
people of Mexico — ^that is to say, of the men who could i^s^
the newspapers and discourse of public affairs in the caf4^' -
and barracks — ^were constantly and deeply interested in the
question of the possession of public oflGice, because that was,
in effect, the only means of livelihood of a great many of
bheir number.

These men, of necessity, attached themselves to one fac-
tion or another, but most of them could have had very
little real conception of the principles for which their parties
Qominally stood. They might call themselves Federalists,
or Centralists, or Constitutionalists, but as they had had no
experience in self-government and knew nothing of the
rights of minorities, they never really comprehended the
essential bases of free government. Above all, they never
succeeded in understanding that the limitations of a paper ,
constitution could be permitted to stand between them and
the inmiediate satisfaction of their political desires.

With all this, the ruUng class had a high sense of national
dignity coupled with a great ignorance of the strength and
power of foreign nations. That Mexico had conquered
Spain, and that Spain had conquered the French, who were
the first soldiers in Europe, was the national belief, and the
inferences drawn from this assmnption were very favorable
to an opinion of the invincibility of Mexican arms.

It was therefore an impoverished, ill-organized, and inex-
perienced government which came into existence under the
federalist Constitution of 1824, and which was destined to
have as its most important neighbor the growing power of the
United States. In the latter country the immense majority
was as yet made up of people of English descent, although
with considerable additions from the other vigorous nations
of northern Europe. These people for two centuries had

* Historia de M^ico, I, 11.

102 THEMWITED states and MEXICO

•• • •

been pracjtiain^ local self-government, and for fifty years
had had'.Oi^ bracing experiences of independent national
life. ;;•/.;•*

B.etween two neighboring nations so singularly ill-as-

Gprjje^y a land frontier stretched for nearly twenty-five hun-

j>jS^ miles through a vast region that was as yet almost

••ivholly unpopulated and was very nearly unknown. It cer-

...\y.tainly did not need any great degree of poUtical foresight

*'•^•* to perceive that, sooner or later, questions arising along this

far-extended line were bound to give occasion for serious

differences, and that in the conflict of interests the weaker

nation was extremely likely to go to the wall.

CHAPTER V

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO

The Spaniards first came to Mexico as conquerors, not as
colonists. They were neither seeking an outlet for an over-
crowded population, nor new avenues for trade. What
they really hoped to discover were opportunities of wealth
for a few lucky adventurers, and to this must always be
added a sincere religious determination to convert the hea-
then— ^by force, if necessary.

The British colonies were established under totally op-
posite conditions. The needs bom of the economic status of
the country first directed the English, in the reign of Queen
!EIlizabeth and her successor, to the fruitful field of emigra-
tion.^ A little later, during the twenty years that preceded
the meeting of the Long PaxUament, the persecuting zeal
of the Church of England also operated to force reluctant
thousands into seeking new homes beyond the Atlantic.
After the first venture into that imknown country suc-
cessive generations of British emigrants went soberly forth
in search of virgin lands. They went to seek farms, not gold
mines. They did not gather into cities, but were scattered
in Uttle agricultural settlements that multiplied and were
pushed slowly but constantly inland. They were not aided
in any material respect by the British government, neither
were they controlled by the Church of England. They
made no systematic efforts to christianize the natives. They
took care of themselves without the support of a miUtary
force or a state church, and they settled where they pleased
and established their own forms of local government and
their own laws. There were marked differences between the
several colonies from New Hampshire to Georgia, and be-

^ Leroy-Beaulieu, CoUmisatian chez ka PeupUd Modemea, 87.

103

104 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tween the same colonies at different periods of their history;
but as time pa^d differences tended to disappear, and the
middle of the eighteenth century saw fairly developed two
fundamental beliefs which were essentially characteristic of
the whole group — ^the first a broad religious tolerance, and
the second a firmly settled conviction of the right to local
self-government. The true underlying spirit of the British
colonists, as it ultimately developed, was never more strik-
ingly set forth than in the civil compact of the Providence
Plantation, signed in' 1637. ^

"We whose names are hereunder," ran the agreementy "desirous
to inhabitt in ye Towne of Providence, do promise to subject ourselves
in active and passive obedience to all such orders and agreements as
shall be made for public good of ye body, in an orderly way, by the
major consent of the present inhabitants, Maisters of families incor-
porated together in a Towne fellowship and others whom they shall
admitt unto them only in civill things,*' ^

The spirit of independence mherent in the British cola-
nists being matched by a like untamable spirit among the
Indians with whom they came in contact, and the home
government lending no assistance, there ensued necessarily
a long and desperate struggle with these formidable enemies.
Much may be said of the unchristian and vindictive manner
in which this warfare was carried on, but it is unquestion-
ably true that it helped to develop those sturdy and self-
reliant qualities which so strongly characterized the pioneer
settlers and frontiersmen in the United States.

The same differences of purpose that had inspired the
earliest eflforts at American colonization, and the same con-
trast in methods and objects that had characterized the
British and Spanish settlements, respectively, continued
manifest even through the first quarter of the nineteenth
century in the processes of growth of the United States and
New Spain.

The expansion of the western frontier of the United
States was an unconscious development — ^as cruel and un-

' Rhode Island Colonial Records, I, 14.

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 105

sparing as nature and as inevitable as the healthy growth of
a plant — and it was unaided, as it was unrestricted, by the
paternal hand of the government. An endless variety of
motives and emotions were constantly operating to ui^e
the inhabitants of the settled East to seek their fortunes
beyond the Alleghanies. The mere love of adventure, the
spirit of speculation, the reasonable hope of attaining at an
early age professional or political prizes, influenced some.
For those who were in distress or in debt, or were discon-
tented, the Mississippi valley was a hopeful refuge. But
that which affected the minds of most was imquestionably
the national hunger for land, the eager desire to become a
freeholder, an independent and self-supporting citizen, to be
the head of a household and the owner of a home. The same
imperious desire which had animated the German forest
tribes in their western and southern migrations centuries be-
fore had driven for two hundred years successive genera-
tions of American settlers into the wilderness, and had
supported them through incredible hardships, in famine, m
sickness, and in all the hideous risks of Indian warfare.

Nor did satiety follow possession. The fruitful and un-
occupied lands of the continent were there for those who
dared to take them. To the adventurous and the hopeful
there was the ever-present prospect of still more attractive
lands still further west, and on many minds a first removal
(whether successful or the reverse) operated only as an in-
ducement to tempt fortune once more.

The type of the restless and dissatisfied frontiersmen was
entirely novel to the oflGicials of more paternal governments.
De Laussat, who had been appointed by Napoleon in 1802
prefect of Louisiana, gave a humorous description of these
people.

"There is a class," he wrote, "of Anglo-Americans who majce it
their business to push constantly forward into the deserts of America,
fifty leagues in advance of the population. They are the first to im-
migrate, to clear the land, and to people it; and time and time again
they move on with no other, object or profession than that of op>ening
the way for future settlers. . . . They run up their shanties, cut down

106 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

and burn the timber, kill the Indians or are killed by them, and disi^
pear from the locality either through death, or through a quick sale
of the half-cleared land to some more permanent husbandman. As
soon as a score of settlers are collected at any point, two printers
make their appearance, one a federalist, the other an anti-federalist;
then come the doctors, then the lawyers, then the speculators; toasts
are drunk; a speaker is elected; they proclaim themselves a dty; th^
beget children at a wonderful rate. . . . A district under the Spaniards
or the French may have been begun, abandoned, begun again, and
ruined once more, and so on over and over again until its destiny for
life or death is finally determined. Under the Anglo-Americans, a
new-bom state may advance with a greater or a less degree of pros-
|!>erity; but it is certain never to go back. It always keeps on, groifing
and becoming stronger." ^

Nothing, TOuJd. be in greater contr^ than the methods
adopted -ta settle the northern possessions of New Spam.
/ There was none of the "fierce spirit of liberty," not a trace
of that "wise and salutary neglect," which Bm^ke thought
had contributed so much to the growth of the British colo-
nies. The hand of the central authorities at the city of
Mexico interfered in every detail of every settlement, se-
lected those who were to take part, planned their route, r^-
ulated their lives, and furnished their military escort.

The religious motive was almost always prominent. The
conversion of the natives to Christianity continued to be a
perfectly genuine object with the Spanidi government, as it
was an end to which hundreds of hard-working friars devoted
their inconspicuous and humble lives, not without success.

The oldest of the settlements on the northern frontier was
New Mexico, which dated back to the closing yeai-s of the
sixteenth century. Nine years before the English ships
landed their passengers at Jamestown Don Juan de Onate,
with the sanction and aid of the viceroy of New Spain, was
leading a successful expedition to the upper waters of the
Rio Grande.^ On April 30, 1598, probably not far from the

* De Laussat, Mhnoires sur Ma Vie^ quoted in Villiere du Terrage, Let Der^
nihes Annies de la Louisiane Fran^ise^ 408.

* Ofiate was a native of New Spain. His expedition was organized under a
contract with the viceroy, by the terms of which the King was to furnish annfl^

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 107

^resent city of El Paso, he crossed the river and took formal
Dossession, in the King's name, of New Mexico and all the
«ijoining provinces. His party consisted of about four
tiundred men, of whom a hmidred and thirty were accom-
panied by their wives and children,' a number of servants
smd Indians, ten friars, eighty-three wagons, and seven thou-
sand head of cattle.

The natives were not unfriendly, or at least not actively
hostile, so that there was no very serious difficulty in set-
tling the coimtry and establishing mission churches. Ex-
ploring expeditions were sent out in various directions and
a good general knowledge of the surrounding regions was
Dbtained at a comparatively early day.

The troubles of the settlement, such as they were, arose at
first from internal disputes, chiefly between the civil author-
ities and the missionaries as to their respective jurisdiction
3ver the local Indians. Many thousands of these people
were subdued and baptized, but the number of civilized in-
habitants (gente de razon) remained small. Even as late as
1680 there were probably only about twenty-four himdred
Mexicans in the whole province of New Mexico.

The native Indians, as a rule, were easily controlled. They
had always lived, and they continued to live, in large vil-
lages or jmehhs. Each pueblo had its church, and near it
crops of com and cotton were raised imder the eye of the
priests and subject to the eventual control of a small gar-
rison at Santa Fe. The Pueblo Indians were held to strict
obedience, and indeed were generally regarded as children,
to be treated according to the maxims of Solomon. If they
misbehaved the rod was not spared. For more serious
offences they might be imprisoned or hanged.

Late in the seventeenth century, however, a general In-

ammunition, and priests, while Ofiate was to furnish at his own expense a
specified number of soldiers. In return for his labor and expenditure he was
to be made governor, addaniado and captain-general of the territories he
colonized, and was to receive certain grants of land and other rights and
privileges.

'Then and long afterward Mexican soldiers were generally accompanied
by numbers of women and children, just as the Soudanese troops march in
Egypt.

108 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

dian revolt occurred. Many Mexicans were killed and the
whole province had to be evacuated, but after an interval of
some twelve years of anarchy it was reoccupied permanently.^

Notwithstanding the slow growth of the Spanish power
the area of the settlements did not increase. The Navajos,
Utes, Apaches, and Comanches who siurounded them could
not be persuaded to adopt a peaceful agricultural life.
Among such tribes the Spanish government never perma-
nently extended its possessions, and the wavering and ir-
regular frontier of New Spain always indicated pretty closely
the line of demarcation between peaceful and warlike tribes
of Indians.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the numbere
of the pure-blooded Indians native to the soil had dimin-
ished in New Mexico to something less than ten thousand,
while the numbers of the Mexicans had grown to nearly
twenty thousand, mostly through natural increase. There
had been little inmiigration. The province was not very
different from the rest of New Spain, except for the presence
of the Pueblo Indians, who lived apart under the tutdage
of the Franciscan friars.

Beyond the virtue of moderate and regular industry these
converts had few of the Christian graces. "The Indians,"
says Bancroft, "were in no sense Christians, but they liked
the padres in comparison with other Spaniards, and were
willing to comply with certain harmless church formalities,
which they neither understood nor cared to understand.
They had lost all hope of successful revolt, but were devotedly
attached to their homes and their ancestral ways of pueblo
lite; d^aded aposf^, b«>au^ it involved . p.^o»,
existence among hostile tribes of savages; and thus, as a
choice of evils, they Kved and died as nominal Christians
and Spanish subjects, or perhaps more properly slaves." *

The country was purely agricultural. There was no min-

1 See "The Revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico in 1680," by Charles
Wilson Hackett,in Tex, Hist. Quar., XV, 93-147; and "Retreat of the Span-
iards from New Mexico in 1680," by the same author, in S, W, Hist. Qiuar.^
XVI, 137-168, 259-276.

* Bancroft, Hist, of Arizona and New Mexico, 271.

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OP MEXICO 109

ing and no manufactures, and of necessity little commerce of
any kind. It was only after Mexican independence had been
assured that trade with the United States, or, indeed, any
kind of intercourse, became legally possible. Trappers and
traders had visited New Mexican territory during the period
of Spanish rule, but they had always been arrested, and im-
prisoned or expelled, as soon as their presence became known.
In 1807 Lieutenant Pike, in command of a small exploring
expedition sent out by the United States government,
visited New Mexico. He had trespassed, not quite inno-
cently, on what was imquestionably Spanish territory, and
he and all his men were in like manner arrested and sent to
Chihuahua, and then, after a short and ea^y imprisomnent,
were sent back to the United States. But as soon as an
independent government was established, probably as early
as 1821, a regular conmaerce was established between St.
Louis and Santa Fe, which rapidly assimied considerable
proportions.^

In 1825 the population of New Mexico was probably not
far from forty thousand — ^the nmnbers of the Pueblo Indians
remaining stationary and the numbers of the Mexicans in-
creasing from about twenty to about thirty thousand.
Since 1800 some attempts had been made at rude manu-
factures, and possibly some at mining. There were no col-
leges or public schools, no lawyers, and few physicians. There
were no municipal bodies and no courts. The government
was a paternal despotism, nominaQy tempered by a right of
appeal from the governor to the far distant avdiencia of
Guadalajara. And all through the long war of independence
this remote and pastoral commimity had remained neutral
and imdisturbed.

Upoer and Lower California remained, like New Mexico,

* See Gregg's Commerce of the PrairieSf two vols. The Mexican govem-
menty it should be noted, was for some time unfavorable to the opem'ng of the
Santa Fe trail, as they feared it might be made a means of territorial acqui-
flition by the United States. Clay, as Secretary of State, took pains to point
out that no such danger was to be apprehended. — (Clay to Poinsett, Sept. 24,
1825; Amer. 81. Papers, For. Rel, VI, 581.)

110 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

although the missions along the shores of the Pacific were
very unlike those along the Rio Grande. The first settle-
ment of the Califomias was made imder purely religious
auspices. There was no contract with any enterprising canr
quistador, and no grants of land or patents of nobility were
offered as an inducement to settlers. The leaders of the
earliest expeditions were animated by no hope of wealth or
worldly advantage, but simply and sincerely by an ardent
faith and a desire for the advancement of the church. For
this they and their followers gladly gave their Uves.

Lower California was the source from which all the mis-
sions proceeded. That peninsula was first occupied by the
Jesuits about the end of the seventeenth century in pursu-
ance of the remarkable colonial policy of the society, of
which the most conspicuously successful example was ex-
hibited in Paraguay. The theory, in a general way, upon
which the society proceeded was that the natives of America
were free men who could not justly be enslaved, and were the
lawful owners of land of which they could not justly be de-
prived; that the Pope had given to the Kings of Spain
authority over the New World solely in order that the In-
dians might be converted to the true religion;^ and that
consequently aU the Spanish authority necessarily rested
upon the condition of their spreading the gospel among the
heathen. The object, therefore, for which the society strove
was to adapt the savage tribes to civilized life, and it was
intended that their territory should never be occupied by
Europeans. To this end, the missionaries were to establish
Indian villages, each surrounded by so much land as would
suffice to support the inhabitants. The missions were not
to be permanent institutions, but rather schools to teach the
heathen to become Christian subjects of the Catholic King.
In theory, the Indian proselytes were to be regarded as
children at school, subject to all the restraints and liable to

^ The bull Inter cactera (May 4, 1493), after reciting that it is the purpose of
Ferdinand and Isabella to subdue the newly discovered lands and islands
and reduce them to the Catholic faith, continues: **No8 xgilur hujusmodi vea-
trum sanctum et latidabile propoaitum plurimum in Domino commendantea . . .
donamuSf concedimua" etc. — (Navarrete, ViageSf II, 30.)

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 111

all the punishments which that age regarded as suitable for
school-children. In particular the beneficial effect of steady
work was to be insisted on, and the Indians were not to be
allowed to resume their roving habits or wander from the
missions. But steady work was just what North American
Indians objected to. Sometimes they could be induced to
give work in exchange for food, but "the main diflGiculty/'
as an apologist for the missions naively writes, "was to
make the converts regard it as a duty to be performed on
moral grounds." ^ Especially was this difficulty felt in the
barren coimtry of Lower California, where water was scarce
and only the scantiest crops could be grown, but somehow
by tact, patience, and infinite courage the friars did achieve
a certain limited measure of success.

The expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish possessions
in 1767 was a heavy blow to the missions. The injury, how-
ever, was soon repaired more or less thoroughly by the ar-
rival of a body of Franciscans under the leadership of a man
of the utmost energy and force of charsteter — ^Jimfpero Serra.
But by this time the Spanish authorities had begun to meddle
with the progress of the missions, and the r^ults were not
generally conducive to morality or good order. A large part
of Serra's work consisted in adjusting the relations of his
dergy with the Spanish soldiers.

In 1769 the work of the Franciscan missionaries was
pushed into Upper California, and the occupation of the
coast from San Diego to San Francisco was effected within
seven or eight years.^ There was hardly a show of hostil-
ity from the naked and degraded Indians of that coast.
With the advantages of a good soil and an unequalled cli-
mate, the missionary establishments grew slowly at first, but
later with extraordinary rapidity; and in the course of twenty
or thirty years attained a remarkable prosperity. The ex-

* Clinch, Califomia and Its Missions, II, 155.

'The occupation of Upper Califomia was encouraged and aided by Jos6
Galves, afterward the powerful minister of the Indies, for political reasons.
It was feared that the English or Dutch, or " the Muscovites,'' might estab-
lish a colony when least expected in the port of Monterey, and it was thought
wise to anticipate them. — (Richman, California^ 65.)

112 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

periment which had been tried in Paraguay and in the Philip-
pines was being attempted again under singularly favorable
auspices.

The real difficulty in making a beginning with the Indians
was again not due to hostility, but to indifference. Where
game and fish were plenty they showed no inclination to
change their way of life, and until crops began to grow and
cattle to multiply they preferred a wandering to a settled
life. At first; they thought it easier to get provisions by
theft than by agriculture, but a few cattle stealers were shot
and several were flogged, whereupon the remainder became
much more amenable to moral training.

The fine mission buildings of the Franciscans usually com-
prised a church, dwellings for the priests, workshops, gran-
aries and bams, quarters for half a dozen soldiers, lodgings
for immarried Indian women, and a prison for turbulent
converts. The single men and the married people were
lodged in groups of filthy huts a short distance from the
mission walls. •

The Indian proselytes were required to cultivate the ad-
jacent land, and in return for their labor they received food
and clothing and instruction in such things as they were
capable of learning and which were considered fit for them
to know. The children were given some sort of schooling.
Only the most intelligent were taught to read and write, but
church doctrines and the principles of morality were im-
parted to all by the good fathers, and some effort was made
at manual training.

Near each group of missions in Upper California — at San
Diego, Santa Barbara, Monterey, and San Francisco — ^there
was a presidio or miUtary post. The presidial troops were
not usually a part of the regular army. They formed, prop-
erly speaking, a separate establishment and were generally
attached permanently to a particular post, so that they were
rather armed and subsidized settlers than soldiers. Their
main duty was to act as a police among the Indians, but
only imder the direction or at the request of the friars. The
consequences of such an organization were natural enough*

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 113

The garrisons of the presidios were idle and undisciplined.
The men were often guilty of immorality and of violence
to the Indians, and the commanding officers were fre-
quently on the very worst tenns with the heads of the
missions.

The death-rate among the mission Indians was at all
times excessively high, the deaths being greatly in excess of
the births. The difference, however, was more than made
up, until about 1810, by new conversions. In the ten years
from 1800 to 1810, with a total mission population averaging
perhaps eighteen thousand, the deaths 'averaged sixteen
himdred a year, an annual death-rate of nearly ninety in a
thousand.^ In the next ten years, in a population of prob-
ably twenty thousand, the death-rate was over seventy-
seven in a thousand.* At San Juan Bautista, between 1800
and 1810, where there were on an average no more than six
himdred Indians at any one time, the deaths in the ten years
averaged ninety-nine;' and at San Luis Rey, which had
the best record in this regard, the average annual death-rate
was always over forty in a thousand.'* There were some
dreadful epidemics, especially of measles and tuberculosis,
which termed the Mans, a^d on one occasion at least led
them temporarily to abjiu^ Christianity; but the fact of the
continued great mortality offers no mystery to those who are
at all familiar with the diseases common in ill-policed camps.
Syphilis, brought by the Mexican soldiery, was also a terrible
scouige.

Mexican settlers came slowly and even reluctantly. In
fact, they did not come at all except as soldiers, or in return
for special inducements. Early in 1776 a body of about
two himdred colonists came to California. They were all
clothed, armed, and transported at the expense of the gov-
ernment; they were promised rations for all members of
their families for the first five years; and the workingmen
were to be paid wages for the first two.^

Settlers at San Jos6 in 1777 were paid by the government

» Bancroft, Hist, of Califamia, II, 160. « Ibid., 395.

•/Wa., 154. * Ibid,, 108, 346. • Ibid,, I, 258.

114 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ten dollars a month besides an allowance of rations, and each
was supplied as a loan with cattle, seeds, and tools.^

By the reglamento of 1781 all Mexican settlers in Cali-
fornia were to be paid wages by the government, on a dimin-
ishing scale, for five years; they were each to have a grant of
land; to be supplied with animals, tools, and seed, which
they were to pay for in instalments; to have the use of public
lands for pasture and firewood; and to be free of taxes for
five years. In return, the settlers were required to sell all
their produce to the government, and were to be ready to
act as a miUtia*. The lands granted them could not be
mortgaged or sold, and their methods of agriculture were
minutely prescribed.^

Even such liberal terms failed to prove attractive. In
1779 the government sought to enlist a body of twenty-four
settlers with famiUes. After some months' effort, fourteen
were secured. Two of them deserted before reaching Cali-
fornia and one seems not to have started at all. With the
eleven remaining families the pueblo of Los Angeles was
founded, but early in 1782 three of the settlers were sent
away as useless to themselves and the community. Of
the eight men left, four were Mexican Indians, one was a
mestizo, or half-breed, two were mulattoes, and one was of
pure Spanish descent.'

Another town (Branciforte, after the viceroy) was pro-
jected and seventeen persons from Guadalajara were im-
ported to foimd it. They arrived at Monterey in May, 1797,
but within three years the settlement had ceased to exist,
in spite of elaborate governmental regulations for its wel-
fare.*

In 1797 "vagrants and minor criminals" were ordered to
be collected and shipped to found a new settlement.^

But although there were few immigrants, and though the
mission Indians were wretched workmen, the colonies of

» Ihid., 313. « Ibid., 336.

* Ibid,, 33&-346; Richman, op. cU,, 125.
♦Bancroft, HiaL of California, I, 565-571; Richman, 172.
» Bancroft, HiaL of California, I, 568. After 1797 and down to 1810, at least,
there were no immigrants except convicts and a few women. — (Ibid,, II, 168, 169.)

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 115

Jpper Califomia prospered exceedingly. By 1810, the year
)f the outbreak of revolution in Mexico, it was estimated
.hat there were something over two thousand Mexicans,
nen, women, and chUdren, Uving in the midst of a popula-
ion of not quite twenty thousand christianized Califomia
Indians. This agricultural population raised, one year with
mother, something under a himdred thousand bushels of
vheat and a little fiax.^ But its great wealth was in flocks
md herds. It is believed that there were in the community
10 less than a himdred and sixty thousand head of cattle,
lorses, and mules, and ahnost as many head of sheep. In-
leed, the horses had become so numerous that they were
-egarded as a nuisance, and were slaughtered in great num-
)ers.*

Upper Califomia was much too remote from the actual
jcene of the Mexican revolution to be directly afifected by
ihe varying phases of that long struggle, but it suffered
idirectly through the withdrawal of goyemmental and ec-
sugport. The soldiers were unpaid^ the presidios
eU tomin, and no new settlers— not even convicts— arrived
rom Mexico. The friars grew old and some died; few new
nissionaries arrived; and the ranks of the clergy began to
ihin. The missions did indeed continue their peaceful
existence by a sort of moral impetus acquired in earlier days,
md their cattle and crops supported the government. But
ihey had ceased to grow in numbers, and the eager striving
ifter spiritual conquest which had animated the original
nissionaries was gone. The controversies between the
3riests and the soldiery continued from force of habit, but
:hey were no longer very serious, and the land remained
gnorant, slothful, comfortable, and happy.

The failure to send supplies from Mexico resulted in the

^ Tlie indolence of the settlers was answerable for the relative smallness of
be crope. As early as 1796 the friars complained that the people were a set
>f idlers, who had "scant relish for work/' and were quite content to let the
lative Indians sow, plough, and reap. " Confident that the Gentiles are work-
ng, ^e settlers pass the day singing. The yoimg men wander on horseback
Jnough the rancherlaa soliciting the women to immorality.'' — (Richman, 171.)

1 Bancroft, Hist, of Ccdifomia, II, 182.

116 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

open recognition of foreign trade by the local Spanish
oflicials. From the very b^inning of the nineteenth century
foreign vessels — ^American, English, and Russian — had vis-
ited the coast from time to time and had conducted a
contraband business which seems to have reached consicfer-
able proportions.^ For some years the governors preserved
an attitude of hostility to such violations of law, and even
refused to countenance the sale of anything to foreign shqis
expept when they put into California ports in distress. But
after the outbreak of the revolution, the successive govern-
ore, at first more or less privately, and then quite openly
and under the plea of necessity,^ penmtted trade to be earned
on. Duties were collected on all exports and imports ac-
cording to a tariflf devised by the governor without any
l^al authority; but otherwise there was practically no
obstacle thrown in the way of trade after 1816,' and as many
as nine or ten trading craft came to the coast each year
laden with goods to be exchanged for hides and tallow.

When foreign trade began to be permitted, another cher-
ished Spanish colonial "r^iilattolT" was also digpogarded^
Foreigners were allowed to settle in the' country. It was
expected, as a matter of course, that they eboukl be baptized
into the Catholic Chxu-ch, but otherwise there seeiris to have
been no restriction upon thein. Most" of those who came
before 1825 were deserters from ships, beach-combers of a
type which Stevenson has since made familiar to literature.
But three or four American and as many British traders
who settled thus early fiunished a rather more respectable
and stable element.

In 1825 there were probably well over thirty-five hundred
Mexicans or other immigrants in the coimtry, and, in spite
of the continued high death-rate among the mission Indians,
a resident native population of about twenty thousand.

> Ibid., 23, 32; Richman, 189-207.

* Bancroft, Hist, of California^ II, 211, 278.

* Ibid., 410. After the Spanish colonial system was overthrown and the
legal prohibition against foreign commerce was removed, restrictions of a
vexatious kind were imposed in the interest of the Mexican customs. But
thia was not until after 1825.

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 117

Agriculture continued the chief business of the people, for
he permitted importation of foreign goods checked even the
irude manufactures which the missionaries had tried to
stablish. In the absence of an adequate foreign market,
lie production of ' wheat had not materially increased.
Mature imassisted had, however, multiplied the cattle and
ihe sheep prodigiously.

I^e ggKemment>J[ike that of New Mexico, was a patgmal
lespotism, the governor being only iiamperedj)y JJ]^5bility
if Ifie B&u^ W^evade his edicts and to make meir remon-
strances felt. And like New Mexico, tEe" conmraolty had
leither lawyers nor doctors, nor any but the most primitive
>f schools.

The customary communication between the Calif omias
md the rest of Mexico was by water, but repeated efforts
[lad been made from 1773 to 1777 to establish an overland
route,* and for this purpose the governor of the Provincias
Tntemas, by an order of March 20, 1780, decreed the estab-
lishment of two missions on the Colorado River. The In-
dians, however, were hostile and the officer commanding the
expedition was injudicious. The result was a sudden at-
tack in which all the friars and nearly all the rest of the
party were killed;^ and no further attempts were made to
create establishments on the Colorado.' ^

The fluctuating line of settlements west of New Mexico
proper, therefore, ran irregularly through northern Chihuar
hua and Sonora to the Gulf of Mexico, although a presidio
and two or three small missions lay beyond the present in-
ternational boundaiy line at Tucson and its vicinity, in
what is now Arizona. To the northward was a vast and un-

* Ridunan, 115, 98-102, 123. Sixty or seventy years later this trail, or so
much of it as led from California to New Mexico, was much used and became
well marked.

* Bancroft, Hist, of Arizona and New Mexico, 396; Hist, of California, 1,
353-371. Richman, 133-136.

' The project of an overland route was discussed again in 1796, but nothing
was done; and again a fruitless effort to open communication was made in
1822. — (Richman, 237, 458. See also, in this same connection, W. E. Dunn's
"Miflsionary Activities Among the Eastern Apaches,'' Tex. Hist. Quar., XV,
186-200.)

118 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

inhabited and unnamed r^on from which the states of
Utah and Nevada and Arizona have since been carved
It had been occasionally traversed before 1825; but it had
never been explored. In strictness, it seems to have been
neither under the jurisdiction of Califomia nor of New
Mexico, but in current speech the territory of Califomia and
New Mexico would always be understood to include all of
Mexico that lay between Texas and the Pacific Ocean.

The remaining frontier province of Mexico on the north
was Texas, first visited by the Spaniards, as we have seen,
in the sixteenth centiuy, and finally occupied by them in
1716.*

The Texan missions were under the Franciscans, and in all
essential respects resembled those in Califomia. The In-
dians were treated as children, were duly taught the Chris-
tian doctrine, were required to do some small amoimt of
field labor, and were mdely clothed and fed. But the efiFort
to turn the wild tribes of Texas into God-fearing peasants
was very far from successful. They were very different from
the indolent and timid Califomians. So long as knives or
blankets were to be got, or when the fiercer Apaches and
Comanches were on the war-path, members of the weaker
tribes would assemble round the missions and were quite
ready to promise anything that was asked of them. But
in the long run, to labor and to pray with monotonous r^-
ularity proved to be beyond their power. They seem even
to have exhibited a positive aversion to the simple rite of
baptism. They could only be kept from running away by
the employment of the secular arm, and the presidial sol-
diers who acted as a guard were not very eamest or very
efficient when it came to chasing runaway Indians.

A few settlers who were neither soldiers nor priests came
from time to time into Texas, but they were not much en-
couraged, and their nmnbers always remained small.

^ See pages 3-7 above. See also, as to the motives for the occupaUon of
Texas, Bolton's ''Spanish Occupation of Texas, 151^1690/' 8. W. Hi&L
Qvar,, XVI, 1-26.

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 119

In 1762 all interest in the colonization of Texa^ on the
part of the government of New Spain ceased. Louisiana was
:^ed to the Spanish crown, and for some years the existence
Df expensive missions and military posts was barely toler-
ited by the authorities of New Spain. A disastrous at-
tempt to establish a mission among the Lipan Apaches and
% disastrous attack on a Comanche village served to em-
Dhasize the dangers to which the Mexican priests and soldiers
?vere constantly exposed. It was thought that if the Texan
establishments were not to be destroyed by Indians, they
^ould have to be either abandoned or strongly reinforced,
ind the government decided on the policy of abandonment.
Nobody believed that Mexican colonists could keep their
own roofs over their heads. Accordingly the presidio of El
Pilar, east of the Sabine, and a presidio more recently built
at Orcoquisac, on the Trinity River, were evacuated. The
friars had to follow suit, and for some years there were few
white men in Texas east of B^xar (now San Antonio) and La
Bahfa (now Goliad). A few exceptionally enterprising
Mexicans returned in 1779 to the site of the old Nacogdoches
mission, where they succeeded in maintaining themselves
against the Indians.^

What the population of Texas was about this time it is
hard to say, but probably the number of Mexican or Span-
ish settlers was not far from twenty-five hundred, of whom
nearly a half were in and near B6xar. In 1792 the population
was said to be about three thousand. About B6xar there
were still several missions in existence, but in a moribund
condition. Most of the converts had fled. "The few still
left under the padres' care," says Bancroft, "were vicious,
lazy, tainted with syphilitic diseases, and were with great
diflBculty induced to gain a precarious living by cultivating
their maize patches and tending their reduced herds. No-
where in America had missionary work been so complete a
faaure."*

> See Herbert E. Bolton, "Spanish Abandonment and Re-occupation of East
Texas, 1773-1779," in Tex, HisL Quar., IX, 67-137.
* Bancroft, North Mez. States and Texas, I, 667.

120 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

So far as the government of New Spain was concerned,
Texas had ahnost ceased to exist. In spite of its agricultural
possibilities, it was diflGicult for settlers to continue in the
country after the government gave up the task of trying to
restrain the Indians, who seem to have long preserved bitter
recollections of the way in which they had been treated by
the presidial soldiers. "The barbarous use which the friare
made of the rehgio-miUtary force," says a Mexican author
who visited B6xar in 1828, "was the origin among the na-
tives, not only of hatred to the Spanish name but also of
reprisals of which the Texans have been and are victims."*
But the Indians were shrewd enough not to carry their hos-
tilities too far, and especially at seed-time and harvest the
Comanches protected the farm hands near B^xar.* * These
poor inhabitants lived a hand-to-mouth existence, but slowly
multiplied. There was even some trifling inmiigration,
partly from Mexico and partly from Louisiana, and four or
five famihes of English descent managed somehow to es-
tablish themselves near Nacogdoches. The inhabitants had
little trade, even contraband. They had no manufactures,
no ambitions, and few wants. No one kept statistics, and
no traveller visited their country.

The cession of Louisiana to the United States at once
changed the whole situation and brought with it, in a new
and much more serious form, the danger of foreign encroach-
ment. Forty or fifty years before, Louis XV would have had
little difficulty in restraining his Creole subjects from ex-
cursions into the Spanish dominions, but the arm of the
government at Washington was not long, and the backwoods-
men who had won Kentucky and Tennessee and were al-
ready across the Mississippi were not the men to respect an
imaginary boundaiy line.

Even before the cession of Louisiana the authorities of
New Spain had had a foretaste of what they might expect.
In October, 1800, a certain Philip Nolan with some twenty
men, mostly Anglo-Americans, left Natchez, crossed Louisi-
ana into Texas, and began collecting wild horses somewhere

* Berlandier y Chovel, Diario de Viage, 116. • Prid,, I21,

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 121

yn the Brazos River. He had a passport from the governor
[)f Louisiana; but this gave him no authority to enter Texas.
In the spring of 1801 his party was attacked by a strong
Spanish force that had been sent out to capture them.
Nolan himself was killed and the rest were made prisoners.
After a time one was hanged, some escaped, and some were
sent to fortresses in different parts of Mexico, where they
suffered a long captivity.^

There is some rather vague evidence to show that Nolan
had a notion of building a fort among the Indians, and ulti-
mately using that as a base for conquering Texas. This
is, however, very inconclusive. Ostensibly he went to get
horses, and to trade with the Texan Indians. No doubt he
had been told by the United States authorities, and notably
by the conmaanding officer. General Wilkinson, to collect all
the information he could, but his expedition was absurdly
inadequate to accomplish any wider purpose. The whole
affair was imimportant, except to the unfortunate men who
were concerned in it; but it attracted attention then and
afterward, as it was very erroneously believed that the
government of the United States had in some underhand
way promoted the expedition.

More serious causes of alarm were discoverable when the
disagreements between the United States and Spain brought
the two coimtries to the very verge of war. On both sides
of the frontier, as has been already related, all available
military forces were assembled and actual hostiUties were
narrowly averted. Neither party, however, was really
anxious to fight, and that storm passed over.^

In preparation for possible hostiUties the Spanish govern-
ment in 1804 had gone so far as to begin collecting in the
Peninsula a body of troops which was destined to occupy
Texas. The objects which were proposed were stated to be

^ Nolan was a confidential agent of General Wilkinson, and for a time acted
as his go-between with the Spanish authorities at New Orleans, where he was
pc^mlar. ' ''Gorgon charmantj et donijefais le plus grand cos** was Carondelet's
description of him in 1797. — (Clark's Proofs of the Corruptum of Wiikiman,
App, 102.)

* See above, p. 14.

122 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

three, namely : to defend the frontier against any aggression
from the United States, to protect the coimtry from Indian
raids, and to foimd a commimity which should be skilled in
the use of fire-arms and at the same time skilled in agricul-
ture or the various handicrafts. The Spanish statesmen
evidently had their eye on the American frontiersman, and
they expected, by paternal methods, to match him in a
colony of subsidized settlers. They therefore proposed
that the troops destined for Texas should be all married men
who had some trades of their own — ^farmers, carpenters,
masons, blacksmiths, and the like; and, in addition, some
poor but respectable families and a "multitude" of found-
lings were to be added, making in all about five thousand
souls.^ War with England and the day of Trafalgar put an
end to this benevolent project.

When the Mexican revolution Wf<^f^ nnf Tpyaj^ ^^^i w.^
like New Mexico and California, so remote from the seat of
war as to be left on one side. On the contrary, Texas soon
became the scene of a good deal of serious fighting, in which
adventurers from across the border bore an active part.
Filibusters from east of the Sabine and pirates from the
tropical seas were at all times ready to take advantage of
any opportunities that the varying phases of the contest
might afford.

The first conspicuous movement was in the summer of
1812, when a body of men, originally recruited among the
loose characters of the neutral ground,^ marched into Texas
under the command of Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara, who
had been a follower of Hidalgo's. Many of the men were
American citizens who were probably animated by various
motives, among which a love of adventure and the prospect
of a share in the plunder of Mexico must have been con-
spicuous. Among them was a former officer of the United
States army. Lieutenant Augustus Magee. This little force,
which at first only numbered one hundred and fifty-eight,
marched through Texas from end to end, being constantly
recruited from Louisiana as it proceeded, and in October

1 Filisola, Guerra de T^aa, I, 47. ' See aboYCi p. 14.

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 123

captured the important position of La Bahfa (Goliad). The
royalist forces, under Salcedo, the govenjlor of Texas, and
Herrera, the governor of Nuevo Leon, then laid siege to La
Bahfa, but after foiir months of ill success fell back toward
B^xar (San Antonio). The insurgents followed, and on
March 29, 1813, utterly defeated the royalists. As the prison-
ers were mostly local militia they were generally allowed the
option of joining the insurgents — as many of them didr—or
of returning home. The fourteen principal officers who had
been captured, including the two governors, were, however,
put in jail, where they were treated rather as malefactors
than as prisoners of war, and were presently brought before
a court-martial composed chiefly of personal enemies of the
two governors.^ All the fourteen were condemned to death.
The sentence, however, was not carried out because the men
from the United States, who were the backbone of Gutier-
rez's forces, protested forcibly against any such barbarous
proceedings. Gutierrez pretended to accede to the wishes
of the Americans and sent off the unlucky fourteen under
an escort of seventy men, upon pretext of taking them to
Matagorda Bay and so shipping them to Spain, but no sooner
were they fairly out of B^xar than their throats were all cut
by their escort.

Gutierrez tried first to evade responsibility for this piece
of savagery, and then to excuse it on the ground of the
cruelties which these very Spaniards had committed. The
more respectable of the Americans, however, had had enough
of Mexican warfare and left for home. What happened
after this is not quite clear, but at any rate Gutierrez was
deposed and Alvarez de Toledo, an ex-officer of the Spanish
navy, was put in his place.

In August, 1813, Toledo had under his conmiand over
three thousand men, of whom about eight hundred and fifty
were Americans, seventeen hundred were Mexicans, and ^ve
or six hundred were allies from various unsubdued Indian
tribes. With this motley force he engaged a body of Spanish

^ FiliaolSy Guerra de T^aSt I, 56. See an account of the two governors in
CoufiB'B edition of Pike*9 TraveU, U, 697-704.

124 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

troops near B6xar, west of the River Medina. The result
was a total defeat of the insurgents after a stubborn fight.
As usual, all the prisoners were shot the same day.

As soon as the inhabitants of B6xar learned of the royal-
ist victory they attempted to get away, preferring, as they
said, to beg their food in Louisiana, or even among the Indian
tribes, rather than face the victorious forces. Nevertheless,
few escaped, and the worst anticipations were fully justified
by the treatment of those who were caught. Both in B6car
and La Bahfa a number were put to death, and those who
were permitted to live— women as well as men— were sub-
jected to the most shocking cruelties.^ From B^xar a detach-
ment was marched to Nacogdoches, murdering, plundering,
and burning as it moved; and once more the authority of
the King of Spain was enforced, more or less imperfectly,
from the Rio Grande to the Sabine.^

The island of Galveston, however, was soon lost to the
crown. In 1816 it was occupied by a band calling themselves
revolutionists, originally organized by one Luis de Auiy and
afterward commanded by Jean Lafitte, whose legendary ex-
ploits as "the pirate of the Gulf" were long commemorated
in the juvenile romance of the nineteenth century. Auiy
and Lafitte were furnished with letters of marque from the
revolutionary governments of Mexico and the South Amer-
ican states. These "privateers," many of which were said
to be owned by citizens of the United States, were often en-
gaged in the slave trade and were generally manned by crews
too careless to discriminate between the flags of Spain and
other nations. It soon became impossible to tolerate their
depredations. The United States brig Enterprise, Captain
Kearney, visited Galveston early in 1821, and the mere

^ Filisola, who confirms the above, calls the Spanish commander, Arredondo,
"un azote de la humanidad y d verdadero tipo de la mds salvaje tirania de que puede
avergomarae la eapecie humana" (a scourge of humanity and a genuine type of
the most savage tyranny which mankind can blush for). — (fluerra de T^ae,
I, 75.)

' Elizondo commanded the fifteen hundred men who marched to and oc-
cupied Nacogdoches. He is said to have left small garrisons at Nacogdoches, at
the "old fort of the Adaes/' on the Colorado River, and on Matagorda (San
Bernardo) Bay.— (/&id., 76.) But it is not likely that he crossed the Sabine.

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 125

show of force served to break up that establishment for-
ever.^

During its piratical revolutionary period this port served
as a base for a most gallant and ill-fated expedition against
the royal authority in New Spain. On November 24, 1816,
when the Mexican revolution was almost at its lowest ebb,
Francisco Xavier Mina, a yoimg Spanish gentleman who
bad made a great reputation as a ^ccessfifguerilla chief
during the French occupation, and who had been proscribed
by the reactionaiy goveriiment of Ferdinand VH, arrived
Sit Galveston, accompanied by a cosmopolitan party of
adventurous follower^paJrds, Italians, EnglLh, and
Americans. After some four months spent in preparation
lie sailed away toward Mexico, landed in the present state of
Tamaulipas, and with a force which grew like a snowball,
lie made his way into the interior, and joined, near Guana-
juato, one of the rough bands that were still holding out
4igainst the government. For a time he carried on success-
fully an irregular warfare, but he was taken prisoner at last,
in November, 1817, was exultingly shot by his captors, and
later became one of the heroes of the Mexican Pantheon.^

The neighborhood of Galveston was the scene of another
picturesque adventure. A French colony, composed of old
soldiers of the Empire, headed by General Charles Lalle-
mand, came to Texas in the spring of 1818 and established
themselves on the Trinity River. The site they selected was
to be known as the Champ d'Asile, and, according to the
plans published in Paris, was to have been a very complete
town.'

The French settlers had not thought it necessary to ask
permission to enter the country, and as soon as the Spanish

1 Yoakum, I, 180-197, 202 ; Bancroft, North Mex. States and Texas, II,
34-43; Amer. St. Papers, Far. Rel., IV, 134, 138; StaU Papers and Pub. Docs,
of the U.S. (3d ed., Boston, 1819), XI, 359, 386.

' See Robinson's Mina*s Expedition for details. By the law of July 19, 1823,
Mina and others were declared to be "benemSrilos de la patria en grado her&ico,"
and their names were ordered inscribed in letters of gold in the legislative
diambers. — (Dublan y Lozano, I, 660.)

* The project excited much interest in France and was helped by the rem-
nant d the Bonapartists. B^ranger, in some verses entitled Le Champ

126 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

govemment heard of the intrusion they sent a force of sol-
diers to drive the Napoleonic invaders out. The colonists,
warlike as they had once been, knew when they were beaten.
They did not wait to be attacked, but retreated to the coast,
where some of them probably joined Lafitte, some went to
Mexico to join the revolutionists, and some foimd their way
to New Orleans. Lallemand himself remained for several
years in the United States, but returned to France after the
establishment of the monarchy of July, was reinstated in the
army, and died in 1838.^

In a less ostentatious way a small body of perman adven-
turers also came to Texas from New Orleans in the course of
the year 1821. They landed near Copano and managed to
get as far as Goliad, where they were all made prisoners.*

These were both peaceful though ignorant and ill^al
attempts at settlement, but one purely filibustering ex-
pedition remains to be noticed. In 1819 James Long, who
had been a surgeon in the United States army, fitted out>
more or less openly, an expedition at Natchez.' His inten-
tion was to establish Texas as an independent republic, and
he appealed with so much success to the love of adventure

ePAnle, pictured the French leader explaining to the natives the reasons for
his settling among them:

**Un chef de hannia courageux,

Implorant un lointain asile,

A dea sauoagea ombrageux

Disail: *U Europe nous exile,

Heureux enfanla de cee forits,

De noa maux apprenez Vhiatoire:

Sauoagea! noua aommea Frangaia

Prenez pUU de notre gloire* "

and so forth.
^ The anon3nnous work, Le Champ d^Aaile (Paris, 1819), and Hartmann and
Millard's Le Texaa (Paris, 1819), are the principal sources of information con-
cerning this foolish undertaking. See also ' 'The Napoleonic Exiles in America, "
by Jesse S. Reeves, in Johna Hopkina Univ. Studiea in Hiaiary, ser. XXIII,
Nob. 9 and 10, where an account of the antecedents of the principal men con-
cerned and the origin of their plans will be found.

* German^American Annala, N, 5., VI, 329.

* Long had married a niece of Gen. Wilkinson, and thus seems, like Nolan,
Burr, and Pike, to have come under the influence of that indefatigable plotter.
After his marriage Long left the army and was first a planter and then a mer-
chant, and apparently not very successful in either capacity. See Foote's
Texaa, I, 201-203.

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF MEXICO 127

of the people of the Southwest that by the time he reached
Nacogdoches his force had grown from seventy-five to three
hundred men. Their procedure was very characteristic.
The first thing they did was to organize a complete civil
government, the next was to publish a newspaper.^

Long's republic had lasted less than four months when a
detachment of the Spanish army attacked and utterly dis-
persed them.2 Long himself was not discouraged- He es-
caped by way of Galveston to New Orleans, and in 1821
again led an expedition— this time under the auspices of cer-
tain Mexican revolutionists — against Texas. He landed at
the mouth of the San Antonio River about the first of
October, 1821, but was easily captured. As Mexico had
now gained her independence, he was not shot at the time;
yet he did not escape with his life, for a few months later he
was killed in the city of Mexico.'

By the time that Mexican independence was fairlyX
achieved, Texas was almost depopulated. The Spanish \
troops and the horse Indians between them had very nearly j
succeeded in destroying every semblance of cultivation and I
civilized life. A few destitute people still lingered about j
B4xar and La Bahfa, and some few in and near what had ^
once been Nacogdoches. Otherwise the coimtry was de-
aerted. Its wide and fertile expanse lay in the sight of all
men, a huge and tempting prize for whosoever, Mexican I
or foreigner, was skilful enough or bold enough to take it. /

» The first number appeared Aug. 14, 1819. See Tex. Hist, Qvar., VI, 162;
Vn, 242.

' Poinsett, on his first visit to Mexico, was able to get Iturbide's govern-
ment to release some of Long's men who were still held as prisoners. — (Notes
on Mexico, 122.) One of these prisoners was Benjamin R. Milam, who after-
Ward played a conspicuous part in Texas. An interesting letter from him to
Poinsett, dated Dec. 5, 1822, in which he complains of some of the ruffians
Who were his comrades, is preserved among the Painaeit MSS.

*The accounts differ as to circumstances of his death. Bancroft thinks
the most probable version is that he tried to enter the barracks of Los Gallos,
and, being refused, struck the sentinel, who straightway shot him. — (Bancroft,
^arth Mex. SUUea and Texas, U, 51.)

CHAPTER VI
THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS

The general policy of all the European nations in the
eighteenth century and a part of the nineteenth excluded
from their respective colonies all commerce with
countries. Spain followed the same principles, but
them out more logically. Her l^islation, adopted at the
very beginning of her colonial empire, involved a system of
isolation under which no foreigner was to be allowed to set
foot within her dominions. Japan was hardly more 4gid.
The reasons for this extreme policy were complex. Hie se-
curing a complete monopoly of trade was one of the motives
conmion to her and to other European countries, but more
important perluqps were the religious objects which the ocm-
quest of the Indies involved. It must never be foigatten
that the conversion of the heathen was always actually and
\*i\*idly present in the minds of the medisevid explarers and
conquerors, as well as in the minds of the successive Catbolie
Kings, and that a genuine zeal for the welfare oi the natives
found its expression in all the Spanish colonial Ifgidaticin of
that period. Moreover, as the Spanish title to Ammca
rested upon the bull of Alexander \I, which granted the
neidy discovered lands upon tnist to chiistianiie the TiidiaiiB^
the Kings of ^)ain considered it incumbent upon them to
eschide from that fidd all whom they could not eoDtroL
Moie especially did they do their utmost to exdude all
heretics, wfaetho' French Huguenots, Dutchmen, or

. jr^; I

But phinly it was not Plough merely to dose the doois to
luiqgpms and heretics. Unworthy Spaniards must also be
kqit fipom eontact with the natives, and acconlii^^ RC^
of cfltiacadinazy minuteness were adopted. Xo

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 129

of coiirse, could even visit the Indies without a passport;
and it was the law that no passport should be issued to any
man unless he presented satisfactory evidence of good char-
acter and made it appear that he had never been accused
before the Inquisition, and was not the son or grandson of a
person who had been convicted by that tribunal.

Permission to settle pennanently in the colonies was more
difficult. It was at first granted with reluctance, even when
all the necessary evidence was forthcoming. Preferably,
passports were granted for a limited period only. When
granted for one colony they were not available for any
other, and the holders were required to go to their destina-
tion by the most direct route. To go from one colony to
smother a new passport must be obtained.

These, it must be noted, were the early ideals, but as time
passed the dream of developing the colonies through the
labor of regenerated races of christianized Indians, working
under the direction of a paternal government and super-
vised by an army of devoted friars, was either forgotten or
tacitly abandoned. The Bourbon princes who succeeded to
the throne early in the eighteenth century were more ame-
nable to modem ideas, and especially to French ideas, than
their Austrian predecessors, and the pressure of the constant
and world-wide warfare of the latter half of that century
frequently compelled temporary relaxation of the general
colonial laws, sometimes with, and more often without, the
previous sanction of the superior authorities in Spain. There
also came in course of time to be a variety of individual
cases, in which for one reason or another exceptions were
permitted. " Some foreigners have found and do daily find
means," said an experienced traveller, "to evade the law,
either by stratagem, or by the tolerance of the governors or
commandants of the ports at which they land." ^

Toleration of the presence of foreigners was practised in
Louisiana under Spanish rule to an extent quite unheard of in
any of the other colonies of Spain. The reasons were obvious.
To b^in with, the population was not Spanish but French.

* DeponSy Voyage d la Terre Ferme, I, 183.

130 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Agaiii; the fact that British vessels had a right under the
treaty of 1762 to navigate the Mississippi from its mouth to
its source; and the fact that under that same treaty the whole
east bank of the river, from a point just above New Orleans,
was British territory and contained actual British settle-
ments, introduced features entirely imknown elsewhere.

It is therefore not surprising to find that as early as the
outbreak of the American Revolution there were a number
of English-speaking residents in New Orleans.^ Later on,
the rapid growth of the population of Kentucky and other
parts of the Mississippi valley gave rise to new perplexities,
and finally compelled the Spanish authorities, after 1795, to
grant a certain authorized freedom of commerce. The suc-
cessive governors of Louisiana, during the last years of
Spanish rule, piu^ued an extremely vacillating course, but
there were times when American settlers were actually in-
vited into the colony and grants of land were actuaUy made
to immigrants from the United States.^

Such concessions, however, were peculiar to Louisiana
alone. They were entirely unheard of in any other part of
the Spanish possessions, and would have seemed to experi-
enced colonial officials as something almost contrary to the
established course of nature. It certainly was so in Texas,
and therefore Governor Martinez of that province was
greatly surprised and shocked when in November of the
year 1820 a Connecticut Yankee rode into B6car and coolly
requested that a tract of land be given to him as the site of
a whole colony of foreigners.

The enterprising stranger was Moses Austin, a native
of the town of Diurham, which lies next to Middletown, in
Connecticut. He was bom about 1764 and when a lad had
gone into business in Philadelphia. There he was married
in the year 17S5.* From Philadelphia he moved to Ricb-

> Martin, Hiai. cf Lovituuui. II. 26-2S. 36.

* In 1799 Uie Bishop of New Orleans forcibly protested against tlie mob oC
Mhreiitiii«n» who were permitted to reside in TiOiilsiana, and who knew not
God or religion eTidcntly emigrants from the United States. — (RobertsoD's
Imiwrnm. h 35ft.)

*liis. Anttin was a member of a New Jersev family long settled in the
lUtad 8Uim.^rcx. HiiL Qwar., X, 343.)

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 131

id and became interested in lead mining in the moun-
ts of Virginia — an enterprise that did not prove prof-
Je. Hearing of lead mines west of the Mississippi he
naged to obtain a passport from the Spanish minister in
shington, and after a diflficult and dangerous journey of
loration in the dead of winter, he finally settled with his
lily in the year 1798 in the colony of Louisiana, at a place
r the present town of Potosi in the state of Missouri.*
e years later the cession of Louisiana brought Austin
e more within the limits of the United States.
""or a number of years his affairs prospered, but in 1818
was ruined by the failure of a St. Louis bank of which he
I been the founder and chief stockholder. The irrepress-
j Yankee again asserted himself. The conclusion of the
rida treaty had now clearly defined the boimdaries of
Spanish possessions, and Austin resolved to repeat the
16 experiment which he had tried successfully twenty
js before. After careful preparation, he started in the
;er part of 1820 on a preliminary visit to Texas. Six
nths previous to his departure the passage of the Missouri
npromise had in effect decided that the southwestern
tion of the United States should become a series of slave
tes.

Lustin safely crossed the deserted wilderness of eastern
(as and arrived at Bfear without molestation, precisely
Saint-Denis had arrived at the presidio of the Rio
mde one hundred and five years before. In no material
pect was the Texas of 1820 different from the Texas of
5.
jovemor Martinez did not receive Austin cordially.

At the first interview," his son relates, " my father received a most
smptory order to leave Texas immediately; he endeavored to
iate and give a favorable turn to matters by entering into a genial
versation with the governor in French, which they both under-
ad, but his efforts were fruitless; the governor even refused to read
papers my father presented as evidence of his having formerly

An interesting account of Moees Austin's first journey across the Missis-
ipi will be found in Amer, Hist, Review, V, 519-542,

132 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

'hs — — " — ^

been a Spanish subject in Louisiana, and repeated his order, with
much asperity and some passion, to leave Texas inmiediately." ^

Fortunately for Austin he happened, just as he left the
governor, to meet an old Louisiana acquaintance, a cosmo-
politan adventurer who had once been in the Spanish service
and was now hving in great poverty at B^xar, the Baron de
Bastrop.^ With this man's aid, Austin managed to get a
hearing from the indignant governor. What arguments
were offered is not related, but the rather surprising re-
suit was that a week after all the asperity and passion of
the first interview the governor and ayuntamiento of B^xar
imited in a letter advising the superior authorities to grant
permission for settling three hundred American families in
Texas.

The work of Moses Austin was now finished. He could do
no good by remaining at B^xar, and he returned home to
await the result. The journey in winter was full of dangers
and diflficulties. By the time he reached Missouri he was
in a most serious condition of health, and he died June 10^
1821, in the fifty-seventh year of his age. He had learned
before his death from Governor Martinez that the proposed
grant of land had been duly authorized by a decree of the
viceroy of New Spain, and he was planning another visit
to Texas when the end came.^

* Comprehensive Hist, of Texae^ I, 442.

'The history of the Baron de Bastrop is very imperfectly known. In a
Spanish official document he is called Don Felipe Henrique Neri, Baron de
Bastrop; but the Spaniards often made sad work of foreign names. — {Com'
preheniive Hist, of Texas, 1, 479.) In 1820 he was very old, but hale and active.
He is said to have been a native of Holland, to have served under Frederic of
Prussia, by whom he was ennobled, and then to have served under the Spanioh
colors. He asserted a dubious claim to an extensive tract of land on the
Washita River, which he sold to Aaron Burr, and which Burr asserted was the
goal of his expedition. See Tex, Hist. Qtiar., VI, 248, for some aooount of
Bastrop. As to his grant of land on the Washita, see White, A New CoOeo-
tion of Laws, etc., II, 404-408. The grant was made by Carondelet, Governor
of Louisiana, June 21, 1796. See also Dunbar and Hunter's Obeervationa in
Amer. St. Papers, Indian Affairs, 1, 731-743.

*The letter from Martinez was dated Feb. 8, 1821, and was prok>abIy
received by Moses Austin in April or May. As to details, see Comprehenmi^e
Hist, of Texas, I, 440-444, 470 ; Tex. Hist. Quar., VII, 286; X, 346. Tbe
decree of the viceroy was dated Jan. 17, 1821.

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 133

Stephen Fuller Austin, the eldest son of Moses, who now
took up and carried forward to success his father's work,
was at this time twentynseven years old. He was bom in
Vii^ginia November 3, 1793. He went to school in Connecti-
cut, spent two years at college in Kentucky, and returned to
Missouri when about eighteen years of age to help his father
in the management of his multiplying business. When only
twenty years old Stephen Austin became a member of the
territorial legislature of Missouri, a position he retained for
six years. In the spring of 1819, when he and his father had
agreed on the plan for making a settlement in Texas, he left
home for Arkansas to arrange there for carrying on the en-
terprise, and during the eighteen months that he spent in
Arkansas, he located the town of Little Rock and served as
one of the circuit judges of the territory. In person he was
short and slight, with dark hair and a penetrating eye. All
who saw him seem to have fallen under the spell of his very
agreeable personality, and to have preserved pleasant mem-
ories of his .winning smile and of what one old friend de-
scribed as "his simple, unpretentious, gentle, and dignified
manners," and his "unconscious magnetic bearing and in-
fluence among men." ^

In the autumn of 1820, when his father finally set out for
Texas, Stephen Austin went to New Orleans, where he found
occupation as a newspaper editor. He remained in New
Orleans for six months, until he learned that a grant to his.
father had been authorized, and on June 18, 1821, eight
days after his father's death, of which he was still entirely
ignorant, he started for Natchitoches where he and his father
had agreed to meet and travel west to select the site for
their colony.^ There he met two commissioners from B6xar,
who had been sent by the governor to escort the expedition.
It was not until after Austin had made up an exploring party
of about a dozen men, that he received letters from home
announcing his father's death, just thirty days after the
event.

1 Robert Mills, in Comprehen9we HiaL of Texas^ I, 5CX); and see Tex. HUt*
Qtiar., m, 6-10.

134 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Stephen Austin's diary of his journey to B^xar gives a
vivid impression of the condition of Texas in 1821.^ From
the Sabine to Nacogdoches there were a very few American
settlers. Nacogdoches itself was in ruinS; and of a once
flourishing village there remained one church and seven
houses "still standing entire, one of them two story high."
Just beyond Nacogdoches two families had settled, "the
last habitation to B6xar."

For twenty-two days the party journeyed through this
two hundred and fifty miles of wilderness without annoyance
from the Indians, although once they saw a large trail, and
at nig^ their sentinel saw "several Indians and other alarm-
ing things" which turned out in the morning to be stumps
and roots of trees that had been blown over. Only once did
they meet any human being, "two parties from LaBahfa,"
whom we may conjecture to have been Mexicans moving
back to Nacogdoches, although there were two women
among them who spoke English. From these travellers were
received alarming stories of the Comanches killing men and
stealing horses in "the very Town of San Antonio," where
"the people were in a very distressed condition." Without
other incident the party rode into B^xar on Simday the 12th
of August, 1821, where they were met by "the glorious news
of the Independence of Mexico."

The efforts of the Austins to establish themselves in Texas
had in fact been closely contemporaneous with the efforts of
Mexico to get rid of Spanish supremacy, and their success
must have been due, in great measure, to the progress of
Hberal ideas. The year 1820, in which Moses Austin visited
Texas, was the year of Riego's rebellion and of the restora-
tion of the Cadiz Constitution of 1812. In June, 1820, the
viceroy of Mexico had publicly sworn to uphold this Con-
stitution, and had proclaimed liberty of the press and the
abolition of the Inquisition; and had it not been for such
changes in the form and spirit of the government it is hardly
probable that the governor of Texas would have ventured
to consent, in November of that same year, to Austin's

1 See the complete text in Tex, HUL Quar., VII, 286-307.

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 135

projects. Even in his distant post the advei^ of the new
ideas and aspirations of the rulers of Me^j^ct) /nust have
become known.

In addition to a general desire to conform) to |the spirit
of the age and to enter upon a career of liberalism marked
by progress and national development, it seems likely that
the colonial authorities were actuated by^ other notions pf a \
very erroneous kind. From the fact that Moses Austin Had
come to Texas from Louisiana, they seem to have had a\
vague notion that the colonists he was to bring with him
would be from Louisiana also, that Louisiana was a CathoUc
country inhabited by Frenchmen and Spaniards,\ and that
the new settlers would be people who had once been subjects
of the King of Spain and wanted to become so again.

But before the liberal intentions of the viceroy toward
Austin could be carried out Mexico had shaken off her
Spanish allegiance. It was on February 8, 1821, that
Governor Martinez designated the representatives who were
to meet Stephen Austin at Natchitoches. It was on Febru-
ary 24, 1821, that Iturbide proclaimed the plan of Iguala,
and it was on the fifth of July, 1821, that the Spanish viceroy
was deposed and independence was practically achieved.
The news of this ]ast event was that which greeted Stephen
Austin as he came into B6xar.

The viceroy's permission to establish a colony in Texas
was singularly free from restrictions. Austin might settle
anywhere and take any quantity of land he chose, and he
was not required to pay anything to the government. "It
will be very expedient," was the language of the official
decree of January 17, 1821, "to grant the permission solicited
by Moses Austin that the three hundred families which he
says are desirous to do so should remove and settle in the
Province of Texas." The conditions were short and ex-
tremely simple:

^If to the first and principal requisite of being Catholics, or agree-
ing to become so, before entering the Spanish territory they also add
that of accrediting their good character and habits, as b offered in
said petition, and taking the necessary oath to be obedient in aQ

136 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

things to the government^ to take up arms in its defence against
kinds of enemies, and to be faithful to the King, and to observe
political constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, the most
hopes may be fonned that the said Province will receive an impw^*'
tant augmentation in agriculture, industry, and arts." ^

To profess the Catholic religion and to take an oath oi
allegiance proved, in practice, to be easy burdens for the con-
sciences of eager emigrants, and the conditions imposed
lightly accepted by Stephen Austin. Two days after
arrival in B^xar he secured a letter from Governor Mar — ^
tinez authorizing him to proceed to the River Colorado an<
to select a place for the three hundred families. These coli
nists, Martinez stated, would be permitted to come to
either by land or sea, but in the latter event they could onl^^
disembark in the Bay of St. Bernard (Matagorda Bay, thi
site of La Salle's old settlement), which had recently beei
established as a port of entry — the only one in Texas. Nc^
duties were to be charged on provisions imported by the
emigrants for their own use, or on farming utensils or tools.^

Having spent ten profitable days in B6xar, Austin and his
party started out to explore the country to the south and
east, where they found everything " as good in every respect
as man could wish for, Land all first rate, plenty of timber,
fine water — ^beautifully rolling." '

Before November Austin was back in New Orleans, full of
eager occupation, enlisting settlers and chartering schooners
to carry emigrants and supplies to the new colony. In De-
cember he was once more on the banks of the Brazos Rive
with the first of the emigrants, and here the earliest Angle
American settlement in Texas was firmly planted.* Priv
tions and dangers, such as had attended all the enteiprif
of American pioneers from the days of Raleigh, had to
faced by Austin's colonists, although in those almost tr
ical latitudes they escaped one bitter enemy. They t
spared the prolonged rigors of a Northern winter.

» Comprehensive Hist, of Texas, I, 470. « Ibid., 47

•Austin's Journal, Sept. 20, 1821; Tex, Hist. Quar,, VII, 306.
*For an Account of Austin's arrangements with the early coloni
Tex. Hi»t. Quar,, VI, 319.

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 137

Of their early troubles^ Austin himself has given a vivid
account.

•"One vessel," he says, "the Schooner Lively , was lost, without any
avaO or benefit whatever to the settlement; for, owing to the inac-
curacy of the charts, or some other cause, those who commanded the
first vessels did not find the appointed place of rendezvous, the mouth
of the Colorado.^ One cargo which reached that place, was destroyed
by the Carankaways in the fall of 1822, soon after it was landed, and
four men were massacred. These disappointments compelled the
emigrants to pack seed-corn from the Sabine or Bexar, and it was very
scarce at the latter place. They were totally destitute of bread and
salt; coffee, sugar, etc., were remembered, and hoped for at some
future day. There was no other dependence for subsistence but the
wild game, such as buffalo, bear, deer, turkeys and wild horses. . . .
The Carankaway Indians were very hostile on the coast; the Wacos
and Tehuacanas were equally so in the interior, and committed con-
stant depredations. Parties of Tonkaways, Lipans, Beedies, and
others were intermingled with the settlers. They were beggarly and
insolent, and were only restrained the first two years by presents, for-
bearance and policy; there was not force enough to awe them." ^

But want and danger from thieving Indians were not the
only difficulties with which the pioneers were forced to con-
tend. These were the inevitable accompaniments of an
attempt by adventurous and poorly equipped settlers to
establish themselves in a new country. There was now
added the unpleasant fact of finding themselves in conflict
with the rulers of the country.

Austin had proceeded with his plans and enlisted his com-
panions on the strength of nothing more definite than a
letter from Governor Martinez. It seems not to have oc-
curred to him that a formal grant might be requisite, and it
was therefore "totally unexpected and very embarrassing"
to be told, when he reached B6xar again, in March, 1822,
that it would be necessary for him to procure a confirmation
from the Mexican Congress. There was nothing for it but
to go to Mexico himself, and on April 29 he arrived in the
Capital at a most unpropitious time.

1 Cknnpare with this statement the articles in Tex, Hist. Qtcar., Ill, "Ad-
ventures of the 'Lively' Immigrants," 1-32, 81-107, and "What Became of
t-lie 'Lively,'" 141-148.

s Ccmprehentwe Hist, of Texas, I, 450.

138 THE UNITED STATES AND Ii|EXlCO

The news of the refusal of the Spanish Cortes to recognize
the treaty of Cordova or to permit a member of the royal
family to assimie the independent crown of Mexico had just
been received, and all sorts of fierce intrigues were going on,
more or less publicly, with reference to the future govern-
ment of the nation. Foreigners too had descended upon the
country, seeking concessions for mines or land, and presum-
ably not very scrupulous as to the means for attaining their
ends.^ And amid all this turmoil and the conflict of rival
interests, it is not surprising that Austin's business was not
quickly disposed of.

While he waited, full of activity and hopefulness, in the
Mexican capital Iturbide was crowned Emperor, formed his
imperial court, and by a coup d^6tat dissolved Congress. It
was not until this was done that an3rthing was actually ac-
complished in regard to the settlement in Texas, although
during the existence of Congress the subject of a general
colonization law, under which foreigners might be admitted
to take up and settle the uninhabited regions of the republic,
had been debated at much length. The question of slavery
was that which had principally delayed the passage of a law.
Austin, who was by far the most efficient of those who were
seeking concessions, and whose character inspired confidence
in the Mexican leaders, was in principle opposed to slavery;
but he was then convinced that at least temporary toleration
was necessary if any colony in Texas was to succeed. The
semi-tropical climate and the fact that the best lands were in
malarial river bottoms seemed to him to make n^gro labor
absolutely essential to agriculture; and as emigrants would
naturally be farmers from the adjoining slave states, he be-

' Among the American seekers for concessions was the old Spanish pensioner
General James Wilkinson, who went to Mexico in the spring of 1822 to try to
pick up a living where he would not be subject (as he said) to '*the disposition
of the little Jesuit Maddison or his Bifaced successor Monroe." A characta^-
istic letter written by him to a friend April 17, 1823, giving an account <^
Iturbide's career and other Mexican affairs, is printed in the N, Y. Pub,
Library BuU., Ill, 361. An equally characteristic and impudent note, do-
manding an official certificate of character from the American minister, exists
among the Poinwit MSS. (July 9, 1825). Wilkinson got a concession for land
in Texas, but died near Mexico Dec. 28, 1825, leaving the conditions of the
grant unfulfilled.

THE PEBJ^ANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 139

lieved that the difficulties of atteacting settlers would be
immensely multipUed if slavery were prohibited.

To Austin's self-interested and commercial views were
opposed the more elevated theories of some of the best men
in Mexico, who desired that their country, Which had just
attained its independence, should keep slavery out of its as
yet unsettled lands. It was the same spirit as that which
had led the American Congress in 1786 to prohibit slavery in
the Northwest Territory. In the case of Mexico, however,
the question was far more difficult to decide, for the evidence
seemed to be strong, if not conclusive, that if slavery were
prohibited colonization would not take place.

The doubtful controversy was still unfinished when Itur-
bide dissolved Congress, but it was renewed in the sittings of
the Junta Instituyente soon after the beginning of November,
1822.* By January 4, 1823, a conclusion had been reached \
which was acceptable to Austin, and the important statute,
known in the Texas courts as the imperial colonization act
of 1823, was duly enacted. This measure, which forms the
starting-point of Mexican legislation on the subject, and
marks the complete and deliberate abandonment of the most
cherished maxims of Spanish colonial administration, de-
serves careful examination. /

After a declaration that the government would protect the \
Kbertv. propertv, and civil rights of all fQrejgneigjgrhojQro- \
fessed the Catholic religion, the-statuta^iroyided for the dis- \ 'X^

f.rihntifm ^f piihlie IrtiHs either Hi>ep,t1y_.^;Qji;j[^vj^ilif»l fam-

iliffl ftr indirprtly thrniich thi^ flg^nr^y nf emjrf^mr? An
empresario was defined as a contractor with the government
who should undertake to introduce not less than two hun-
dred families. PubUc lands were to be classified as grazing
lands and arable lands. Colonists whose occupation was
farming were to receive at least one labor, or about 177 acres;
and those whose occupation was grazing at least one sitio, i
or about 4,428 acres. An empresario who had actually /

* A most interesting account of the debates, and of Austin's efforts to secure
fmvanble legislation, will be found in Bugbee's "Slavery in Early Texas/'
FU. Sci. Quar,, XIII, 392-395.

140 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

established two hundred families was entitled to receive
as a bonus for himself fifteen sitios and two labors^ or
something more than 66^000 acres of grazing lands and some-
thing less than 360 acres of arable land; but his title was
to lapse unlesS; first, these lands were settled and cultivated
within twelve years, and, second, imless two-thirds of the
lands allotted to him were sold or given away within twenty
years. In the same way the titles of colonists were to lapse
if they failed to cultivate their lands within two years after
the grants to them. Villages and towns were to be formed
md priests suppUed by the government as soon as a suffi-
cient number of famihes were assembled. The colonists
were to be exempt for six years from the payment of all
taxes, ecclesiastical or civil, and for the next six years there-
after they were to pay only half the taxes exacted from
other citizens. Tools and implements of husbandry were
to be admitted free of duty, as also goods to the value of
two thousand dollars for each family. Foreigners estab-
lished in the empire were to be considered naturalized
at the end of three years if they exercised any useful pro-
fession or industry, had a capital sufficient to support them-
selves decently, and were married; and if they married
Mexicans they were to have a preference. The importa.
tion of slaves was not prohibited, but if imported they
were not to be sold, and their children were to be free.

It is apparent on the most casual examination that this
scheme required for its successful working a large force of
highly skilled and intelligent officials. The classification of
land and its surveying and allotment would have called for
professional services of a high order. The keeping of accurate
records was also an essential feature, as was an efficient in-
spection service to see whether the lands were occupied and
cultivated as prescribed by the law. And the laying out of
villages. and towns would have also required the expenditure
of substantial amounts of money, which the Mexican govern-
ment could ill afford to spare. ^

Moreover, the law was very loosely drawn. It waB-made
to apply only to those who professed the Catholic religion^

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 141

but what tribunal was to ascertain the fact, or what was to
be the fate of immigrants who proved not to be Catholics,
was not stated. A like uncertainty attended the provisions
relative to naturalization.

However, having succeeded in getting this legislation,
such as it was, Austin's business was not to criticise but to
make the best of it, and to secure a definitive grant under
its terms. On January 14, 1823, the council of state ap-
proved generally the issuance of such a grant to Austin;
and on February 18, an imperial decree directed that one
labor or one square league of land (sitio) should be given to
each of three hundred "Louisiana" families, with more for
those who had many children, or who might merit special
recognition. The governor of Texas was to designate and
lay out the land. Austin was authorized to found a town
at a point as central as possible for the colonists, "who
must prove that they are Roman Apostolic CathoUcs, and of
steady habits" ; he was to organize these colonists as a body
of national militia; and he was charged with the adminis-
tration of justice, and the preservation of good order and
tranquiUity.

The signature of the decree was among the last acts of
Iturbide's reign. The insui^ents were even then rapidly
closing in on the capital, and five days later two regiments
miSed, relea^ the pditicaJ prisoners from the old prison
of the Inquisition, and marched out of the city. Next day
two more regiments followed the same course. Iturbide's
career was too plainly in danger of coming to a sudden end
to make it wise for Austin to retmn to Texas with an un-
executed decree in his pocket, which might very possibly be
repudiated by a new government. A new period of wait-
ing— ^which must have been irksome indeed, to the active-
minded man — ^had to be undergone. Events, however,
moved fast. On March 7 Congress reassembled, on March
19 Iturbide abdicated, by the 1st of April a triumvirate
was formed to administer executive functions, and on April
11 Iturbide sailed for Italy. The same day Congress au-
thorized the "Supreme Executive Power" to confirm the

142 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Austin concession. A short time afterward it was duly con-
finned; and on the twenty-eighth of April, 1823 — ^a year
less one day from the time he had ridden into the capital
— Austin rode away, his task fuUy accomplished.*

The local authorities, when Austin reached the Rio Grande^
proved complaisant, and cheerfully recognized the grants
made by the central authorities. It was officially proclaimed
that Austin was authorized to administer justice, make war
on Indian tribes, import goods, and govern his colony
"according to the best of his abilities and as justice might
require," until the government was otherwise organized.*

The last touch had now been put to the model of inepti-
tude which the Mexican government in its dealings with
Austin had managed to construct. They had begun by
making a bargain which was extraordmarily vague, and they
had then abdicated and in efifect turned over to the con-
tractor the interpretation and supervision of the enterprise.
Austin was a well-meaning and honorable man; but the
highest sense of honor and the best intentions do not fit a
man to be judge in his own cause.

A single example of the way in which this method of
transacting business actually operated, will suffice. "The
first and principal requisite'' for intending emigrants had
always been that they should be Catholics, or have agreed
to become so, and the imperial decree of February 18, 1823,
had declared that the colonists must prove "that they are
Roman Apostolic Catholics, and of steady habits.'' The
plain' meaning of these words and the unquestionable intent
of the authorities was that only Roman Catholics should
come in as settlers; and there were very obvious reasons
why this policy should have been adopted. How did Aus-
tin interpret this provision? " I wish the settlers to remem-
ber," he said in a manifesto issued just after his return to

' The official communications from Gov. Martinez to Moses Austin; im-
perial colonization law of Jan. 4, 1823; rep)ort of council Jan. 14, 1823; im-
perial decree of Feb. 18, 1823; resolution of Congress of April 11, 1823; and
correspondence with the local Mexican authorities from July 26, 1823, to May
31, 1827, are printed in White's New Collection, I, 559-622.

« Comprehensive Hist, of Texas, I, 455-457, 473-477.

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 143

Texas, "that the Roman Catholic is the religion of this na-
tion. I have taken measures to have Father Miness, for-
merly of Natchitoches, appointed our curate; he is a good
man and acquainted with the Americans. We must all be
particular and respect the Catholic religion." ^ In the same
spirit a few years later a pamphlet issued in New York to
intending settlers, informed them that "the CathoUc con-
tinues to be the established reUgion of the state, as it is in
most of the nations on the continent of Europe, and as the
^Episcopal is in England.'' ^ There was not a. word in either
document to show that the law forbade any but Catholics
to become settlers.

As a matter of fact, it is quite possible that not one of
Austin's settlers was a Roman Catholic. The immigrants
-were naturally recruited along the banks of the Mississippi,
and they were much the same sort of population as that
which fiJst moved into Arkansas, or w Jtem Tennessee, or
Mississippi. Thus, for example, out of three hundred and
twenty-three old settlers, whose names are among those of
the first class (i, e., the earUest) of the Texas Veteran Asso-
ciation, forty-one were natives of New England and the
Middle states, eight were natives erf Louisiana, nineteen of
foreign countries, one hundred and seven of the Southern
Atlantic states, and one hundred and thirty-seven of the
states bordering on the Ohio and the Mississippi.' They
were no more Catholics than the men who settled Kentucky
or Tennessee; and a decent respect to the established religion
of Mexico was all that even the most scrupulous supposed
was required of them.* If this was the respect paid to " the
first and principal requisite" of the contract, it may readily
be inferred with what exactness the less important details
were complied with.

^ Address to Settlers, dotted Aug. 6, 1823; Comprehensive Hist, of Texas, I,
404. He wrote long afterward that the stipulation requiring colonists to
become Catholics was ''formal and unessential." — (Austin to Wharton, Nov.
18, 1836; Tex, Dip, Corr,, I, 134.)

' Address to the Reader of the Documents Relating to the Galveston Bay & Texas
Land Co,, 15.

* Baker/A Texas Scrap-Book, 585.

« Ibid., "The First Sunday School in Texas," 69.

144 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

During the period between the spring of 1822^ and the
summer of 1823, while Austin was in Mexico, and while
some action by the Mexican government was awaited which
should define the legal status of the colonists and their
slaves, the settlement of Austin's grant had hardly pro-
gressed at all ; but now that he was recognized by Congress,
and was helped by friendly officials who gave the most lib-
eral interpretation to the terms of the law, he was able to
recruit his ranks with great rapidity. In a very short time
his colonists were scattered over the extensive region bounded
by the San Jacinto and La Vaca rivers on the east and
west, by the Gulf on the south, and by the San Antonio-
Nacogdoches trail on the north. A town site, San Felipe
de Austin, was established on the Brazos River at a point
about a hundred and fifty miles east of B6xar.^

One of Austin's first cares was to establish a code of laws
for his little kingdom. This was completed and promul-
gated early in the month of January, 1824, and being
later approved by the jefe politico of Texas, was put into
effect at once. In most of its features it was adapted from
American models, although in some instances Spanish names
were bestowed upon the officers of justice. Austin himself
was to be the chief judge and the sole court of appeal. In-
ferior courts were to be presided over by the alcaldes. An
alguazil (sheriff) was to be appointed for the whole colony,
and there was to be one constable for each alcalde to carry
his decisions into effect.

There were some remarkable provisions in the code. Thus
on an execution upon a judgment for money the constable
was to seize the debtor's property ; and if no property were
found he was to seize the debtor himself; and if it appeared
to the satisfaction of the alcalde that the defendant had
"fraudulently conveyed away or concealed his property,
then in such case the alcalde may at his discretion hire out
the defendant to the highest bidder until his wages pay the
debt." Indiam^whose conduct justified a belief that they

' San Felipe de Austin must not be confounded with the present city of
Austin, a much later settlement on the Colorado River.

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 145

meant mischief, were to be arrested and might be punished
by the alealde for rudeness or ill-treatment of settlers with
not more than twenty-five lashes. Gambling was prohibited,
but "horse-racing, being calculated to improve the breed of
horses, is not included in the above prohibition." No person
was to harbor or protect any runaway slave under severe
penalties; and it was made the duty of every person who
should find any slave away from his master's premises with-
out a pass from his master or overseer, to tie him up and |
give him ten lashes.* ■

The history of Austin's settlement has thus been traced
in some detail, because it was the first of several similar
enterprises under which foreign colonists were brought into
Mexican territory under the auspices of the government,
and were given Uberal grants of pubHc lands. The later
cases differed from Austin's, in their legal aspect, only be-
cause they were established under general instead of special
statutes; and the provisions of these later statutes must
now be examined.

The resolution of the Mexican Congress, passed April 11,
1823, which authorized the confirmation of Iturbide's grant
to Austin, had also provided that the imperial colonization
law of 1823 should be suspended in all other cases. Noth-
ing, however, was done in reference to this subject .until
August 18, 1824, when an act known as the national col-
onization act of 1824, was passed, which superseded the
imperial act of 1823, and thenceforth regulated the subject
so far as the federal authority had power to deal with it.

By this statute it is declared that "the Mexican nation
offers to foreigners who come to establish themselves within
its territory, security for their persons and property, pro-
vided they subject themselves to the laws of the country."
The legislatures of the several states are to pass colonization
laws, but no colony ig to be_ established within twenty leagues
of the boundaryirf any foreign country or within ten leagues
of the coast, without the previous approvqjgpf the national I
executive; the right of eminent domain is to be reserved; i

* Comprehensive HUL of Texcis, I, 481-492.

146 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

no tax is to be imposed for four years on the entrance of
foreigners; and no person who acquires a title to land under
this law shall hold such land; if he is domiciled beyond the
limits of the republic. The question of slavery was not
dealt with.

Two clauses, drawn with the utter lack of precision char-
acteristic of Mexican statutes, seem to indicate that a dis-
trust of the American settlers was already felt. These
clauses are as follows:

"Art. 7. Before the year 1840, the general Congre£ cannot pro-
hibit the entrance of foreigners as colonists, unless imperious circum-
stances should compel it to do so with respect to the individuab of
some particular nation.

" Art. 8. The government, without prejudice to the object of this
law, shall take such precautionary measures as it may deem expedient
for the security of the confederation, in respect to the foreigners who
may setde within it." ^

Under the foregoing act, the federal government pre-
scribed regulations for carrying the law into effect, and au-
thorized the jefe politico of each district to issue grants of
land to all qualified applicants, subject, of course, to all
statutory restrictions.^

On March 24, 1825, the state of Coahuila and Texas, after
considerable debate, adopted a local law of colonization,
under the authority of the national colonization law of 1824.
The controversy was again over the question of slavery,
and the member from Texas, who was at this time Baron
de Bastrop, was very warm in urging that it be permitted.'

After a short preamble, the state statute declares that all
foreigners who wish to settle in any part of the state of
Coahuila and Texas are at liberty to do so, "and the state
itself invites and calls them." Foreigners desiring to settle
must take an oath to obey the federal and state Constitu-
tions, and observe the Catholic religion; must fiftnish a
statement of their place of birth, age, and family (if fypy) ;

1 Dublan y Lozano, I, 712.

*See Comprehensive Hist, of TexaSj I, 798, for the details of these rules.

* Bugbee, "Slavery in Early Texas," Pol Science Quar., XIII, 403.

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 147

and must ''prove their Christianity, morality, and good
habits by a certificate from the authorities of the place
from whence they came." Persons offering to bring in at
their own expense one hmidred families or more, are au-
thorized to present their projects to the state government;
and if these are found to be acceptable, the locality for such
settlement will be designated by the state, which will guar-
antee to the families brought by the empresario, the due
execution of the contract. As compensation to the empre-
sario, the state will give him five sitios (22,140 acres) of graz-
ing land, and five labors (886 acres) of arable land, for each
one hundred families brought in. ^

Administrative details, including provision for a nominal
pa3rment by settlers for allotments, are carefully regulated.
The state undertakes to provide a suitable nmnber of priests,
whose stipends (to be fixed by the state) are to be paid by
the settlers. "In regard to the introduction of slaves," says
article 46 of the law, "the new settlers shall subject them-
selves to the laws that are now, and shall be hereafter estab-
lished on the subject." ^

By the time of the passage of this act the success of Aus-
tin's colony had become so fuUy assured, that nmnerous imi-
tators aj>plied for contracts to import immigrants on the
liberal terms set forth in the act, and the state authorities
were imquestionably eager, not to say reckless, in granting
concessions to empresarios.

As early as April 15, 1825, two contracts were entered into,
for four hundred and eight himdred families respectively,
which formed the bases of what were later known as DeWitt's
Colony and Robertson's Colony. These adjoined, on oppo-
site sides, the district within which Austin's immigrants had
settled. DeWitt and Robertson counties in modem Texas
indicate roughly the regions in which the operations of these
two empresarios were carried on.^

^ Thr text €i this statute, in Spanish and English, will be found in Laws and
f^€eree$ of the State of Coahtnla and Texas^ 15.

*A very excellent and detailed account of the origin and growth of De
\^itt'B Colony, by Dr. Ethel Zivley Rather, will be found in Tex. Hiet, Quar,,
Vin, 05-102.

148 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

In the same month of April another contract was entered
into with Hayden Edwards^ which was destined to lead a
few years later to some serious difficulties. It limited Ed-
wards's settlement to a district near Nacogdoches in the
extreme eastern part of the state.

In all^ eight contracts entered into by the state authori-
ties under the colonization act of 1825, called for the intro-
duction in the aggregate of twenty-nine hundred families;
and these contracts were substantially carried out, so far
as concerned the nmnber of families. In addition, a number
of other families were brought in under empresas which were
but very partially carried out by the empresarios.^

Every contract made with an empresario defined an area
within which settlements might be made; and the area so
defined far exceeded the amount of land which all the immi-
grants together could receive. The professed object of the
designation of such wide borders in the concessions, was to
allow settlers the widest choice; but the result, in some cases,
at least, was to delude the unwary into believing that the
empresario had title to the whole tract, instead of an option
to select limited portions of it for actual, qualified settlers.
This delusion was availed of in forming the somewhat notori-
ous Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company of New York,
which, in 1830, acquired the contracts made with Lorenzo
de Zavala (a Mexican), Joseph Vehlein (a Swiss merchant
living in Mexico), and David G. Burnet (a settler from Ohio,
living in Texas). The company issued scrip, granting the
absolute right to locate land within the limits of the three
concessions; and this scrip, though legally worthless, actu-
ally found purchasers.^ Of Zavala and Burnet there will be
occasion to speak later on.

The supervision of the authorities over the mode of carry-
ing out the contracts was very lax.

* Wooten, "Spanish and American Titles to Land," in Comprehensive HiaL
of TexcUt I, 806. Concessions were granted to about twenty-five foreigners,
mostly Americans; but many of these proved unsuccessful and resulted in no
matenal accessions to the population. There were some contracts entered into
with Mexicans, which were also ineffectual.

> See Rase v. The Governor, 24 Tex. Rep., 496, for a history of this oompAny.

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 149

"In strict conformity to law," says Kennedy, a British historian
partial to the settlers, "an applicant for settlement was required to
present a certificate from the authorities of the place whence he came,
accrediting his ' Christianity,' that is, his profession of the ' Catholic
Apostolic Roman' religion, and his morality and steady habits; with-
out the production of such certificate, as also that of the empresarios
testifying its genuineness, the (Mexican) commissioner was bound to
withhold title. In practice, a law so narrow in itself, and generally at
variance with the interests of the empresarios, was unscrupulously
evaded. To procure an order of survey, it was sufficient for an appli-
cant to go to a neighboring Alcalde, and obtain, on the testimony of
two by-standers, and payment of a dollar and a half, the certificate
required." *

Under these circumstances, the popyktion naturally in-
creased with great rapidity. There were large numbers of
j>eople ready and anxious to settle in Texas, and there were
no barriers at the open door. Certainly up to 1829 or 1830
neither the federal nor the state government made any
serious effort to find out whether the laws of colonization
were observed. Nobody thought of guarding the eastern
frontier against unauthorized settlers. Any man who chose
could cross the Sabine in the confidence that he would not
be asked inconvenient questions. A man was free to make
his home upon any of a million unoccupied acres, and many
a squatter built his hut and raised com and chickens, and
hogs and children, without any point of law upon his side
except the nine points of possession. And, beside the farmers,
there were shopkeepers, tavern-keepers, horse-traders, and
others who could live by supplying the wants of a simple
agricultural community, and who came drifting in without
anybody's permission.

This fiomewhat motley conmiunity existed for a time with-
out any regular system of government. The first settlement
of Texas had taken place just at the period when national
independence was secured and before a constitution had
been established by the Mexican nation; and until the na-
tional affairs were put upoa a permanent basis no attention
was paid to the political affairs of Texas. The first step

1 Kennedy's Texas, I, 339.

150 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

in this direction was the decision of the federal Congress to
erect Coahuila and Texas into a state of the confederation,
and the next step was the creation of a constituent state
legislature, which met on August 13, 1824, before the na-
tional Constitution was promulgated, and which for the
next three years legislated for the state, and incidentally
adopted a prodigiously long state Constitution.*

Under this instrument, which is dated March 11, 1827,
the state legislature was to consist of a single house of
twelve members, chosen for two years, and to be appor-
tioned from time to time among the several districts of
the state. By the first apportionment two members were
allotted to Texas and nine to Coahuila.^ The l^islature
was required to meet annually. It was given various ex-
clusive powers; among them the power to adopt and
interpret the laws of the state, to vote money, to impose
taxes, and to regulate the militia. The governor was
chosen for four years, and was not eligible for successive
terms. He was given a limited veto power, the pardoning
power, and power to appoint to all state offices not elective,
and he was commander-in-chief of the state militia. A
council of state, consisting of three members elected by the
people, was to advise the governor when called upon to do
so, to notify the legislature of infractions of the state or
federal Constitution or laws, to examine the public ac^
coimts, and to encourage and promote the establishment
of all kinds of industry in the state {'^promover d estableci-
miento yfomento de todos los ramos de prosperidad dd estado^^).

There was to be a supreme court, with appellate jurisdic-
tion only. Inferior courts then existing were to be con-
tinued until the revenues of the state would permit -the ap-
pointment of judges learned in the law {^^jueces de letras*^).
No tribunal was to undertake to interpret the laws or sus-
pend their operation, and doubts as to the meaning of stat-
utes {'^dvdas deley^^) were to be reported by the courts to the

' The complete text, with an English translation, is printed in Laum and
Dtcreea of Coahuila and Texas, 313-343.
' Laws and Decrees of Coahuila and Texas, 47.

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 151

legislature. Soldiers and ecclesiastics residing in the state
were not subject to the civil courts. Controversies involv-
ing small amounts were to be settled without appeal by the
local executive authorities Cj>ot providencias gubemativas^').
Other cases were to be first heard by a tribunal of concilia-
tion. In criminal cases the procedure was only regulated so
fax as to provide that search-warrants should not be issued
except in cases prescribed by law. In other respects the
practice was left to statutory regulation, with the proviso
that one of the first objects of the legislature must be to
establish trial by jury in criminal cases, and to extend the
system gradually even to civil cases if it proved practicable.

There was nothing at all resembling the county govern-
ments of most of the American conmionwealths. For elec-
toral and administrative purposes the state was divided
provisionally by the Constitution into three districts —
B^xar, Monclova, and Saltillo, B6xar being defined as em-
bracing the whole of what had been theretofore known as
the province of Texas. The legislature, however, was au-
thorized to modify this division. In each of these three dis-
tricts there was a jefe politico appointed directly by the
governor, who had power to nominate his own deputies.
All the other duties of the office were left to be defined by
statute.

Prior to the adoption of the Constitution the law of Feb-
ruary 1, 1825, had regulated the government of localities,
and the state Constitution merely adopted the agency it
found in existence. By the statute just mentioned the jefe
politico of B^xar was required to watch over pubUc tran-
quillity; to act in a sununary way in imposing punishment
for certain minor offences; to arrest any person if the public
good required ("en los casos de exigir el bien jyCiblico'') and to
turn him over within forty-eight hours to a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction; to conmiand the local militia; to examine
and issue passports; and to take a census.

The control of the towns and villages of the state was
continued in the hands of the ayuntamientos, or local coun-
cils— a popular institution which had existed in Spain for

•■»

152 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

many centurieS; and which had persisted even under the
Bourbon Kings. Through the operation of a variety of local
causes these coimcils had developed in different parts of
the Peninsula into many varying forms, with some curious
mediaeval survivals of custom. In some places the coim-
cillors were chosen by lot from among a limited number of
names; in others the office was hereditary. The names and
fimctions of the other mimicipal officials also varied in dif*
f erent town^.

In the reign of Charles III attempts had been made to
unify this chaotic system, but nothing effectual was accom-
plished until after the French invasion, when the Cortes
passed a law abolishing hereditary tenures, providing for
popular elections of members of the ayuntamientos, and
fixing the nimiber and grade of all mimicipal officials ac-
cording to the population of the several towns; ^ and by
a decree of December 14, 1824, the legislature of Coahuila
and Texas bodily adopted the provisions of the Spanish
statute.*

The state Constitution of 1827 provided that there should
be ayimtamientos in all villages (pueblos) where they had
theretofore existed, and that others might from time to
time be established by the legislature. In places which were
too small to have an ayuntamiento, the people were to elect
a comisario de policia and a sindico procurador, who may be
said to correspond, roughly, to a constable and a justice of
the peace. All these officials were to be elected for short
terms — one and two years. ^

On April 14, 1827, the legislature, complying with the
requirements of the Constitution, passed an act for the
speedy election of ayuntamientos in the various towns/
The number of men composing the ayuntamiento varied
according to the size of the town. For a population be-
tween one thousand and twenty-five hundred there were to
be four members chosen ; namely, one alcalde, two regidores,

* Decree of May 23, 1812, in Dublan y Lozano, I, 380.
^ Laws and Decrees t 11.

' Articles 155 to 164, Constitution of Coahuila and Texas.

* Laws and Decrees, 56-58.

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS 153

and one procurador. These numbers gradually increased to
a Tnaximum of three alcaldes, six regidores and two procurch
dares for towns of more than ten thousand inhabitants.

The ayuntamientos, therefore, were, in Texas, very eflfec-
tive instruments for political action and organization, and
the people were not long in learning how to make use of the
opportimities thus afforded.

It is little better than guesswork to attempt to state the
pK)pulation of Texas at any particular stage of its early his-
tory; but it may be said that in 1825 it amounted to seven
thousand or seventy-five hundred in all — ^perhaps about
evenly divided between the Mexicans and the American
settlers. /In 1827 the number of inhabitants, excluding
Indians, may be estimated at about ten thousand. By this
time the Americans probably outnumbered the Mexicans in
the proportion of five to three. The fetter were a station-
ary, the former a rapidly growing element in the population,
and had already begun to excite misgivings in the minds of
the more far-seeing observers in the city of Mexico.

The British minister. Ward, who was always on friendly
terms with the leading men in public life, and particularly
with the Conservative party at the capital, took very early
occasion to advise his own government of the serious diffi-
culties to which the presence of American settlers was likely
to give rise. Less than five months after his arrival in
Mexico he addressed the British Foreign Office as follows:

"On the most moderate computation," he wrote, "six hundred
North American families are already established in Texas; their num-
bers are increasing daily, and though they nominally recognize the
authority of the Mexican Government, a very httle time will enable
them to set at defiance any attempt to enforce it. . . . General
Wavell has, I believe, a considerable share [of the land], but he is, I
understand, almost the only Englishman who has applied for land in
Texas. The rest of the settlers are all American — Backwoodsmen, a
bold and hardy race, but likely to prove bad subjects, and most in-
convenient neighbors. In the event of a rupture between this country
and the United States, their feelings and earlier connections will
naturally lead them to side with the latter; and in time of peace their
lawless habits, and dislike of all restraints, will, as naturally, induce

154

THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

them to take advantage of their position which is admurably adapted
for a great smuggling trade, and to resist all attempts to repress it.
In short, Mexico, though she may gain in point of numbers, will not,
certainly, acquire any real strength, by such an addition to her popu-
lation. . . . Were but one hundredth part of the attention paid to
practical encroachment, which will be bestowed upon anything like a
verbal cession, Mexico would have little to fear." *

It was hardly fair to speak of the "lawless habits and dis-
like of all restraints" of these people. They were, in fact,
always ready to conform to laws which they had made
themselves and which they understood, for that had been
their custom and the custom of their fathers for many gen-
erations. But there was one thing they would never submit
to. They would never submit to the domination of a race
they regarded as inferior. They despised Mexicans as they
despised negroes arid Indians, and they calmly ignored
Mexican laws.

They were industrious and brave, and their morality, on
the whole, stood high. The political conditions of their
existence were already difficult, and were certain to become
more and more so, as the disproportion increased between
the numbers and wealth of the colonists on the one hand,
and of the Mexicans on the other. On^thesidejjfjthe Mexi-
rnnn wafi Iftcal nnthor^Jj ^^rl^ed bvthe disij^and deeply
distracted government in thecit^^^nTW^co^on the side

courage, antTa'great preponderance of numbers wKMn the
territoiy itSelT K Struggle" was-inevitSBIer

1 Ward to Canning, Sept. 6, 1825, in Tex, HUi. Quar,, IX, 140.

CHAPTER VII

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830

In the preceding pages an account has been given of the
condition of the Mexican people — and especially of those
who inhabited her northernmost provinces— at the period
when they had finally succeeded in releasing themselves
from the grasp of Spain and had set up a federal republic.
We are now to see what use they made of their newly
acquired freedom.

When the first election for President and Vice-President
took place tjie condition of the country was, on the whole,
fairly satisfactory, and those who hoped for the success of
the republic could not have wished a better opportunity for
testing the working of the governmental machinery. Order
had been restored in all parts of the country. Relations
with the continental powers of Europe — ^thanks to the
friendly offices of the United States and England — ^were in
a hopeful state of adjustment. The credit of the country
was good. The proceeds of foreign loans had given the
Treasury adequate funds. Trade was increasing. Foreign
capital, chiefly English and German, was eagerly seeking to
develop the mining industry of the country, and was ready
to embark on any enterprise in Mexico which could show a
reasonable assurance of profit. All that was needed in order
to secure continued prosperity was internal peace and the
certainty of protection to life and property.

The Constitution adopted in 1824 had provided that the
President and Vice-President should be elected by the votes
•of the state legislatures. Two names were to be presented
by each legislature— the person receiving the most votes
to be President, and the person receiving the next highest
number to be Vice-President. If there was not a ma-

155

156 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICX)

jority of the votes of all the states, the federal Chamber of
Deputies was to select the President and Vice-President from
among the candidates who stood highest on the list. The
term of office was to be four years.

The first election was ordered by the constituent Con-
gress to be held in the early autumn of 1824, before the
complete adoption of the Constitution, the persons then
elected to take office immediately and to continue in office
until the first of April, 1829. Subsequent elections were to
be held by the legislatures of the several states on the first
day of September preceding the end of each presidential
term.

When the results of the election of 1824 became known,
it was found that the votes of the seventeen states talcing
part were divided between three generals of the revolu-
tionary war — ^Victoria, Bravo, and Guerrero. Victoria re-
ceived a clear majority of all the states, and was declared
elected President; Bravo and Guerrero each having received
less than a majority, the Chamber of Deputies duly selected
Bravo as Vice-President.^ On October 10, 1824, the newly
elected officers took the oath of office.

The choice of Victoria as President appeared full of prom-
ise. "He was one of Plutarch's Romans," said an admirer;
and, indeed, he possessed many admirable qualities. He was
of a good family in Durango, but had little education.* He
had joined the revolutionists at an early day, and was one
of the few active insurgents who accomplished the feat of
living through eleven years of unceasing warfare without
ever asking a pardon from the government.

The principal scene of Victoria's exploits was in the neigh-
borhood of Vera Cruz, where, at the head of a small and
highly irregular band, he had attacked convoys and inter-
cepted conmiunications with the capital. He could some-
times be persuaded to relate the most surprising tales of his

^ Dublan y Lozano, 1, 719.

* His real name was Felix Fem&ndez, but after some successes in the war of
independence he changed his name to commemorate the event and to do honor
to the Virgin of Guadalupe. — (Suarez, Historia de Mixico, 71; Tomel, Brev^
Resefla, 24.)

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830 157

sufferings and adventures, although generally he was modest
and far from a fluent talker.^ In Iturbide's time he was
not in favor at court, in spite of his having very effectively
used his influence in support of the plan of Iguala; and he
was arrested, with Bravo and others, upon charges of con-
spiring against the Emperor. He was released after a short
imprisonment, and when Congress was forcibly dissolved
he joined the popular party and rendered useful service in
overthrowing the empire. He was a man of integrity, and,
indeed, seems to have embodied all the private virtues.
But he had his faults. He was ignorant of public business,
and was indolent and vacillating in his conduct of affairs
at a time when a clearly defined poUcy and great firmness
were, above all, essential.

Madame Calderon gives an interesting picture of him:

"General Guadalupe Victoria," she says, "is perhaps the last man
in a crowd whom one would fix upon as being the owner of the above
high-fiounding cognomen. ... He is an honest, plain, down-looking
citisEen, lame and tall, somewhat at a loss for conversation, apparently,
amiable and good-natured, but certainly neither courtier nor orator;
a man of undeniable bravery, capable of supporting almost incredible
hardships, humane, and who has always proved himself a sincere
lover of what he considered liberty, without ever having been actuated
by ambitions or interested motives." '

Nicolas Bravo, the Vice-President, was of a very similar
type. He also was a white man, a member of an influen-
tial family in southern Mexico, who had adhered to the
revolutionary party as early as 1811, He was the right-
hand man of Morelos so long as that leader was at lai-ge.
Near the close of the year 1817 he was taken prisonel*; but
as the revolution was then being rapidly suppressed, and
perhaps from some regard for his personal character, the
viceroy refrained from having him shot; and he was ulti-
mately released upon the occasion of the marriage of Ferdi-

* Ward's Mexico, 1, 170-175. C. M. Bustamante could not induce him to
talk on the subject. — {Cuadro Hist., IV, 175.) Alaman says these famous
stories were "fables." — {Historia de Mijico, IV, 641.)

* Life in Mexico, 23.

158 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

nand VII to his third wife. He supported Iturbide in 1821,
but later was one of his opponents.

Bravo's reputation rested upon his clemency to prisoners
even under the greatest provocation.

''Many were the instances of humanity/' says a Mexican historian,
** which this worthy oflScer displayed during the course of the revolu-
tion. Always valiant on the field of battle, his hands were never
stained with the blood of a prisoner; and keeping his reputation dean
through all the vicissitudes of war, he always lived up to the nobility
of his character." *

This is high praise. The commanding officers on either
side who did not habitually shoot their prisoners were rare
indeed.

In spite of the selection of men like Victoria and Bravo
for the two highest offices in the gift of the people, and in
spite of the favorable circumstances under which the new
Constitution came into operation, the path of the republic
was still beset hy serious dangers and difficulties — some
inherent in the situation, and some arising out of circum-
stances more or less temporary.

The first and perhaps the most fundamental difficulty
was the total inexperience of the Mexican people in the
difficult art of self-government. They had abandoned autoc-
racy and had substituted a system that was designed, by
means of a written constitution, to be so regulated as to se-
cure the rights of minorities and the blessings of freedom —
in everything but religion. Such a sjrstem, even in the
simplest form, would have been hard enough to work by
men who had never lived under free institutions; but as a
matter of fact not the simplest but the most complicated
form of government known to man was adopted, and it is
not at all smprising that the division of powers between
federal and state governments was so little imderstood as
to give rise to constant attempts by one or the other to
usurp authority. The matter was made worse because
there was no impartial arbiter like the Supreme Court of

^ Alaman, HUtoria de M^jicOf III, 261, and see App. 5, same voL

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830 159

the United States to settle disputes, the sole authority in
such cases being the federal Congress.^

The existence of militarism in an aggravated form was
another source of danger. "In Mexico/' says a liberal
writer, contrasting the condition of his own coimtry in
1821 with that of the United States in 1783, ''the officers of
the army took possession of the rewlviion and its fruits. Very
few were content with the large pay they enjoyed. Posi-
tions as governors of states, commanders of nailitary dis-
tricts, the first places in the republic, hardly satisfied their
ambition." *

In addition to the fact that few men occupied high office
except through the favor of the army, there was the con-
stant use of federal troops in the daily life of the nation.
A military commander resided at the capital of each state,
and assumed the right, quite independently of the state
government or of the courts, to put down and punish con-
spiracies and other crimes, especially crimes of violence.
Lideed, by an act passed by the constituent Congress itself,
wide discretionary powers were given to the President,
which it was impossible that he could exercise except by
the use of the military arm. He was authorized to banish
whatever foreigners he thought fit, to remove any person
from one state into another, and to use force against the
authorities of any state who should conspire against the
federal system of the nation.^

The passage of this law not only showed a singular con-
ception of the powers of the executive branch of the govern-
ment, and of the proper manner of developing a scheme of
ordered liberty, but it betrayed a consciousness of serious

^Constitution of 1824, Art. 165. A curious instance of state usurpation
of powers was the banishment by the state of Vera Cruz of an unpopular but
imqprtant federal office-holder; an abuse of power, says Tomel, which was
imitated many times thereafter. — {Breve Reaena, 130.)

* Zavala, Enaayo HistMco, I, 351.

< Act of Dec. 23, 1824; Dublan y Lozano, I, 763. The banishment of citi-
lens of states, however, was to be effected " por medio de loa reapectivas gcber^
nadores,** This measure was vigorously opposed in Congress, but supported
upon the ground that extraordinary powers were necessary to enable the
President to control the Anti-Federalist party and to check the intrigues of
Spanish ag^ts. — (Tomel, Breve Reaefia, 29.)

160 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

opposition to the form of government which had just been
put into operation. That such opposition did exist was
very well known, although it would probably not then have
been prudent for those who held the hostile opinions to give
pubUc expression to their sentiments.

In a general way, it may be said that the wealth of the
country and the influence that goes with wealth and educa-
tion were in the hands of men who did not believe in the
republican experiment. Among them were the higher orders
of the clergy and most of the people who had what used to
be called a stake in the country. They believed that their
coimtrymen were unfit to govern themselves, and thought
that any idea of a republic was purely visionary. Some
hoped for a sovereign of the Bourbon family of Spain, some
looked for a constitutional king, caring little whence he
came, and some wanted a military despot after the pattern of
Buonaparte; but they were all agreed in expecting a speedy
end of republicanism. The conditions in many respects re-
sembled those which prevailed in France for some years
after 1871, when Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists,
differing about everything else, were imited in wishing for
the downfall of the republic.

Among the anti-republicans were the large majority of
the Spaniards who were still living in Mexico; and the noian-
ner in which these men, now become alien enemies, were to
be dealt with was one of the most serious problems which
the new government had to meet. The plan of Iguala and
the treaty of Cordova had both proclaimed, as one of their
essential principles, a perfect equality between Spaniards
and Mexicans — a pledge which the government of Iturbide
had utterly failed to keep. The result had been, of course,
to incense the natives of Old Spain against the Mexicans.
The former were naturally opposed to a government* of
Mexico by the Mexicans, for they regarded themselves as
belonging to a superior race, and, as a matter of fact, they
were generally superior in character, in enterprise and in-
dustry. There were still many Spaniards in the country, a
large proportion of whom were soldiers who had surrendered

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830 161

after the success of the plan of Iguala, and their mere pres-
ence, added to their superior ability and activity, evidently
constituted a perpetual source of irritation. Even before
the adoption of the Constitution a rather serious mihtary
outbreak in the city of Mexico had proclaimed hostility to
Spanish residents as a principle which justified revolt; and
then and later there were similar outbreaks in different
parts of the country.

Another circumstance which gave rise to much anxiety
was the growth of organizations that divided the country
into bitterly hostile factions. They were not, in reaUty,
poUtical parties, for they were not essentially based upon
differences of opinion concerning questions of governmental
pohcy. They were rather accidental agglomerations of in-
dividuals, whose hopes of sharing in public plunder consti-
tuted the chief bond of imion among them. The strength
of such societies was properly regarded as a symptom of a
deep-seated social disease. They could exist only in an
ignorant population, who had no views of their own as to
national affairs, and who could be easily led by promises
of immediate personal advantage. These two factions hap-
pened to be Freemasons of different lodges, but they might
just as well have been formed on any other basis.

Very imfortunately, Mr. Poinsett, the American minister,
was popularly believed to have been engaged in promoting
the success of one of these factions. Such a belief, even
if it had been entirely unfounded, must have produced the
worst effects, for if the American minister was thought to
be busying himself in local poUtics it seemed to follow that
his government was intent on interfering in the domestic
concerns of her weaker neighbor. But there was a regret-
table amount of truth in the charges against him.

Joel Roberts Poinsett, when he was first received as min-
ister, was not a stranger in Mexico. Three years before,
while a member of Congress from South Carolina, he had
spent two months in the country, and his Notes on Mexico,
first published in 1824, was one of the earliest accounts
given to the world of the condition of things since Mexican

162 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

independence.^ He was a native of South Carolina and had
been educated in Connecticut, and later in Great Britain.
He had studied the art of war at Woolwich and the art of
medicine at Edinburgh. After completing his studies^ he
had travelled widely in Europe and Asia, and had been
favorably looked upon in very high circles.*

Soon after the revolt of the Spanish colonies, Poinsett was
sent by Madison on an unofficial mission to inquire into the
condition of South American affairs, and while in Chile he
had joined the insurgent forces, and had taken some part in
actual fighting. But notwithstanding his intimate relations
with the South American patriots, his confidential reports
were not imduly favorable. He told the government, says
Adams, "much of the naked truth." ^ He chanced to be in
Valparaiso on the day of the memorable fight of the Essex
against the Phcebe and the Cherub ; * and as the British com-
mander refused to let him return to the United States direct
by sea, he made the dangerous crossing of the Andes in
April, and after a long journey reached home after peace
between the .United States and Great Britain had been de-
clared. He was soon afterward elected to the legislature
of South Carolina, and from 1821 to 1825 was a member
of Congress.

He was an eager botanist, and although he Uved to hold
high office, the beautiful leaves of the Poinsettia pvlcher-
rima have chiefly served to preserve his memory in the
minds of his feUow-countrymen.

When he was sent, in the summer of 1825, to represent the
United States in Mexico, he was forty-six years old. In the
Mexican capital he was well received on account of the favor-
able impression he had made on his first visit, as well as on
account of his excellent manners, and his easy conmiand of
the Spanish language; and as he entertained freely, he was
soon on familiar terms with all those who were most dis-
tinguished by reason of social position, wealth, or talents.*

^ He was in the city of Mexico from Oct. 27 to Nov. 11, 1822, during Stephen
F. Austin's sojourn, but there seems to be no evidence of their having met
« J. Q. Adams, Memaira, II, 56, 59. » Ibid., IV, 388.

« March 28, 1813. * Tornel, Breoe Reaefia, 38, 39.

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830 163

Unfortunatdy, he conaidered it a part of his duty to work
activdy for the overthrow of aristocracy and hereditary
privilege and priesthood— a state of mind not uncommon
among American democrats of his generation.

Early in Poinsett's career as minister an opportunity
was afforded him to put this theory in practice by aiding
in the establishment of new Masonic lodges, which were in-
tended to be, and, in fact, were, purely political centres.

The first Masonic lodge in Mexico was established in

1806 by Spaniards. There were at that time four lodges in

the Peninsula, which had been founded by Englishmen —

two at Gibraltar, one at Cadiz, and one at Madrid — and it

xnay be reasonably assumed that from these the Mexican

Aiasons first derived their existence. It is reported that

Xlidalgo, who first raised the cry of independence, became

a Mason about 1807. At any rate, the existence of this

first lodge was short-lived, for it was denounced to the

stuthorities in 1808, and many of the brethren were im-

I)risoned and prosecuted before the tribunals of the In-

c}uisition.

Later on the Spanish troops which landed in Mexico after
1811 brought in their ranks a niunber of Masons; and still
later the Mexican delegates to the Spanish Cortes were ini-
tiated in Europe, and on their return founded lodges, which,
deriving apparently from French sources, followed the Scot-
tish rite.^ These lodges were chiefly composed of men who
were fairly well-to-do or were of recognized professional or
conmiercial standing, and they thus naturally came to form
in a short time a nucleus for those who were not favorable
to the idea of a repubUc.

By 1825, the year of Poinsett's arrival in Mexico as min-
ister, the need of a similar centre for men who professed
more liberal and popular ideas appears to have been felt,
and naturally suggested the idea of founding rival societies.
Poinsett, who was himself a Mason, was either appealed to
for help or volunteered his advice. At any rate, he lent
himself to the project and helped to obtain charters for lodges

1 Chiflm, CofUribuci&n d la Historia Maadniea de MMeo, 6-14.

164 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

practising the York rite, which were to serve as rivals to the
existing Scottish lodges.

In a long and confidential letter to the President; written
nearly two years later as a sort of apologia pro vitA sud, he
explained his motives. He had become convinced, he said,
after a few months' observation, that, while the majority of
the people were not opposed to "our Republican principles,"
they were "dispersed and discouraged." Upon bringing to-
gether the friends of republican principles, they were easily
made sensible of their weakness if they remained disunited,
of the imminent danger that threatened the new form of
government, and of the urgent necessity of systematic oppo-
sition to the plans of those who wished to overthrow it;
and they therefore soon agreed to unite and organize
themselves by forming a grand lodge of York Masons. The
great success, he added, of this movement was popularly
attributed to his (Poinsett's) influence, although in reality
he had withdrawn himself from the party soon after its
organization, and for twelve months before he wrote had
not entered their lodges nor attended any of their meet-
ings.^

The newly established York lodges rapidly multiplied,
and proved immediately successful. They opened their
doors much more freely than the older lodges to men of all
classes, and soon became a very effective poKtical machine,
which controlled the conduct of elections and the distribu-
tion of patronage. As the York lodges developed in po-
litical effectiveness, their rivals imitated their methods, and
the country soon became divided, not into Republicans and
anti-Republicans, or into Liberals and Conservatives, but
into Yorkinos and Escoceses — ^Yorkmen and Scotchmen.
At the head of the Escoceses was Bravo, the Vice-President.
His opponent at the time of the election. General Vicente
Guerrero, was the chief of the Yorkinos. The President and

^ Poinsett to Adams, April 26, 1827; Poinsett MSS. Adams seems never
to have answered this letter or others from the same source; at any rate, there
are no replies preserved in the Poinsett MSS., and no reference in Adams's
diary to a reply. Adams notes the receipt of a letter from Poinsett, in vindi-
cation of his conduct, on Sept. 10, 1827. — {Memoirs^ VII, 328.)

MEXTCAN POLITICS: 1824-1830 , 165

the members of his cabinet were also mostly Yorkinos,
though Victoria hiraself professed an impartial attitude.^

Poinsett's comise was amazingly imprudent, and, in fact,
it wrecked his mission. The Escoceses were naturally in-
censed against him, while the leading Yorkinos were afraid
to come to any public understanding with him lest they
should be accused of betraying their coimtry. Nor had he
been without early warning of the diflScult course he had to
steer if he was to succeed in acquiring the good-will of those
who directed Mexican affairs. From his first arrival in the
coimtry he had been made aware of a deep feeling of hostil-
ity to the United States which he felt himself unable to
counteract :

"They regarded the United States," he wrote, "with distrust and
^e most unfounded jealousy — a feeling which, I am sorry to say, still
exists, and which, during the present administration, cannot be
changed. It is in vain that I represent the disinterested and generous
conduct of the United States towards these countries and assure them,
that so far from our regarding their prosperity with envy (as they,
^th unequalled vanity, suppose) we are most desirous that the Mex-
ican States should augment in wealth and in power, that they may be-
come more profitable customers and more efficient allies. The gov-
ernment has been taught to believe that because the United States
and Mexico border upon each other, they are destined to be enemies.
. . . The most bitter hatred of the United States existed long before
my arrival in this country; so much so that two of the Ministers of
State had declared in secret sessions of Congress, that Mexico ought
to regard the United States as her natural enemies." ^

The American government had not, of course, authorized
Poinsett's excursion into local politics. That was entirely
his own conception of the r61e he was to play. But his at-
tention had been officially directed to another subject on
which the Mexicans were acutely sensitive, namely, the ces-
sion of Texas to the United States.

^ See 88 to the influence of the Masonic lodges, Suarez, Hiatoria de Mixico,
77-79; Zavala, Ensayo Hist., I, 346; Ward's Mexico^ II, 408. Zavala, Ramon
Aiispe, Alpuche, and Esteva were the most active among the public men of
Mexico in founding the York lodges, and both Zavala and Alpuche were later
ooncemed in Texan affairs, the former very deeply. — (Tomel, Breve Reaefia,
4^-46.)

s Poinsett to Adams, Apr. 26, 1827; PoinaeU MSS,

166 THE UNITED STATES AND kEXICO

Poinsett's instructions from his goverriznent had been one
of the very first things undertaken by the newly formed
alliance between Adams and Clay; and bore the marks of a
careful preparation that was inspired b}^ a sense of the great
importance of starting fair in the matter of the relations
between the two countries. It also bore evidence of the
desire of the administration to meet the views of those
persons in the South and West who felt aggrieved at the
result of the Missouri compromise, and at the relinquish-
ment of the claims to Texas. The Richmond Enquirer, in
commenting on the compromise bill, early in 1820, before
.the Florida treaty was finally ratified, had advised the
Southern and Western members of Congress to keep their
eyes firmly fixed on Texas. "If we are cooped up on the
North, we must have elbow room to the West";^ but no one
seems to have asked at that time how the North would re-
gard the acquisition of Texas.

Clay prefaced the instructions to Poinsett by reciting at
some length the liberal principles which had governed the
policy of the United States in its dealings with the several
governments established in Spanish America, and then pro-
ceeded to mention the subjects which the new minister was
to take up. The first was a treaty of commerce, the sec-
ond a treaty of boundaries.

' As to boundaries. Clay began by the declaration that the
Florida treaty, "having been concluded when Mexico com-
posed a part of Spain, is obligatory upon both the United
States and Mexico," and he authorized Poinsett to agree to
the demarcation forthwith of the line of 1819, imless Mexico
should be willing to vary it. If the Mexican government
should have no "disinclination to the fixation of a new line,"
it was proposed that some point between the Brazos and the
Rio Grande should be substituted for the Sabine as a start-
ing-point, and that the "Red River and Arkansas and their
respective tributary streams" should be wholly included in
the United States; thus giving to the United States the
whole of the drainage basin of the Mississippi. If this very

1 Tyler's LeUera and Times of the Tylers, I, 326.

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824:-1830 167

Qite chMige were made, involving apparently a sur-
r of somewhere between thirty thousand and three
-ed thousand square miles, all causes of future collision
I be prevented, the capital of Mexico would be nearer
entre of that country, and the United States would
ate 'Ho restrain, as far as practicable, the Comanches
committing hostilities and depredations." No pecu-
compensation to Mexico was suggested. Any treaty
undaries, it was said, ought to provide for the sur-
r of fugitive slaves.^

nsett presented his credentials on the first of Jime,
and made an unusually long speech on that occasion.
British minister, writing to the Foreign Office the same
reported that Poinsett had concluded his remarks by
Dg an analysis of the object of his mission, which, he
^as to conclude a treaty of commerce and boundaries, an
ation which appeared by no means so palatable as the
ding part of his speech, if one might judge by the looks
5 spectators, who are well aware of the difficulties with
L the question of boundaries is likely to be attended." *
Fact of course was that the over-emphasis and over-
lence with which the government of the United States
epeatedly asserted its claims to Texas had very natu-
led Mexican officials to suppose that the American
ter was desirous of reopening the old controversy-
jould they reasonably have been expected, when that
ion was removed from their mindsf to a^ to sur-
r any part of their acknowledged national domain to
eign government. Even absolute monarchs, as the
ience of the United States with France and Spain had
iantly shown, were not always easy to deal with; and
^emment whose existence depended in any degree on

y to Poinsett, March 25, 1825; Amer. St. Papers, Far. Rd., VI, 678. A
proposal for the surrender of fugitive slaves from Canada was made
British government during Mr. J. Q. Adams's administration, but
peremptorily rejected as '' utterly impossible."

rd to Canning, June 1, 1825, quoted in Tex. Hist. Qtiar., IX, 139. Poin-
Clay, June 4, 1825, State Dept. MSS., contains the text of his speech
e President's reply. The room, he says, was ''crowded to suffocation
oiaton, members of Congress and respectable inhabitants of the city.''

168 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

popular opinion had never been known to part with terri-
tory, except as the result of an unsuccessful war.

The first suggestion of the Mexican authorities as to
boundaries was therefore purely dilatory. They proposed
that a joint exploring expedition, without any definite au-
thority, should examine the country from the Atlantic to
the Pacific within certain latitudes; but Clay very posi-
tively rejected that idea.' They next suggested insertmg a
clause in the projected treaty of conmierce, binding both
governments to take up the subject of boundaries as early
as possible, each of the governments in the meantime to
allow exploring expeditions to make scientific observations
within their respective territories.^ This was agreed to by
Pomsett, and added as an additional article to a treaty of
coEomerce which he signed July 10, 1826, after nearly a year
of discussion.'

The treaty, however, did not receive the assent of the
United States Senate except subject to certain modifica-
tions which were advised on February 25, 1827, and the
whole business was thereupon again thrown open to discus-
sion. Poinsett himself thought it wise not to press the
subject of boundaries. He had not failed to notice from
the very first the jealous suspicion with which the Mexican
government regarded all movements of the Americans to-
ward Texas and New Mexico, and he thought it might be
well to accede to the proposal for an exploring expedition
which Clay had rejected.

" It appears to me," Poinsett wrote, " that it will be important to
gain time if we wish to extend our Territory beyond the Boundary
agreed upon by the Treaty of 1819. Most of the good land from the
Colorado to the Sabine has been granted by the State of [Coahuila
and] Texas and is rapidly peopling with either granfees or squatters
from the United States, a population they will find it difficult to govern
and perhaps after a short period they may not be so averse to part
with that portion of that Territory as they are at present." *

» Clay to Poinsett, Sept. 24, 1825; Amer. St, Papers, Far, Rd,, VI, 582.

*See Protocol of June 19, 1826; ibid., 599.

•/bid., 613.

« Poinsett to Clay, July 25, 1825; SUUe Depl, MSS.

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830 169

Clay at first acceded to this notion, but after eighteen

months' reflection instructed Poinsett that he might offer

a million dollars for a change of the boundary line from the

Sabine to the Rio Grande.^ Poinsett, however, thought the

offer much too small, and, it seems, never submitted it.*

Notwithstanding the rather cautious and tentative way in
^which the United States government had made its proposals
for the acquisition of Texas, the most extraordinary rumors
"were current in the city of Mexico as to the American pur-
poses and proposals. One story, that the United States had
offered to advance a sum of money, said to be $12,000,000,
lo be secured by the pledge of Texas, was repeated in 1829
T^y Ward, the British minister in Mexico, and commented
on by him as follows:

" It is now seven years," he said, " since the design of appropriating
to themselves that fertile province, and thus extending tiieir frontier
to the Rio Bravo del Norte, was first attributed to the United States;
nor have the Escoceses hesitated, since Mr. Poinsett's arrival in Mexico,
to ascribe to an ardent wish on his part to secure this prize, the share
which he has taken, or is thought to have taken, in the intestine
divisions of the Republic. . . . We are not informed what security
the United States propose for the restoration of the territory, in the
event of the money being repaid; but when we reflect upon the per-
severance and assiduity with which, since the acquisition of the
Floridas, their establishments have been pushed in a Southwesterly
direction, roads having been traced and canals opened, in such a man-
ner as to admit of their being prolonged at once, should an extension
of territory render it advisable, — those least disposed to question the
good faith of nations, will find reason to suspect that possession, if
once obtained, will not easily be relinquished." •

The tale of a proposed mortgage on Texas was not more
preposterous than that of canals pushed west and south to
the Mexican frontier; but it is not surprising that if the
gossip of Mexico had run upon a loan of $12,000,000 on the

» Clay to Poinsett, Mar. 15, 1827; StaU Dept. MSS, He had at first pro-
posed to ofifer some ships of war besides; but Adams thought it best to offer
nothing but the money. — (MemoirSj VII, 240.)

'Poinsett to Clay, May 10, 1827; StaU Dept, MSS. And see Colton's
Cloy, III, 26.

« Ward's Mexico, II, 556.

170 TH iiJNITED STATES AND MEXICO

property; the b^garly million; which was all that Adams
offered for a purchase, should have been thought too little.
At any rate, Poinsett made no progress whatever in in-
ducing the Mexican government to consider modifying the
boundary line as fixed by the Florida treaty. The United
States government explicitly declared that it regarded that
treaty as binding both on itself and Mexico, as was indeed
perfectly apparent;' but still public opinion was so morbidly
sensitive on this point that when the treaty of commerce
was under discussion in the Mexican Congress, in 1827, the
Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution in the following
terms:

''This Chamber will not take into consideration the treaty which
the Government has concluded with that of the United States of
America, until an article shall be inserted in it recognizing the validity
of that which was entered into by the cabinet of Madrid, in the year
1819, with the Government of Washington, respecting the limits of
the territories of the two contracting parties." '

The Mexican plenipotentiaries, therefore, when Poinsett
took up again the discussion of the treaty of commerce, told
him that before advancing a step further the boundary line
of 1819 must be explicitly confirmed. There was obviously no
objection to this, but Poinsett suggested it would be better
to make a separate agreement on the subject; to which pro-
posal the Mexican plenipotentiaries consented.' Four days
later, on January 12, 1828, a treaty was signed which de-
clared that the boundaries between the two countries were
the same as agreed upon by the treaty with Spain of Feb-
ruary 22, 1819, and that the United States and Mexico
would at once proceed to carry into full effect the provisions
for surveying and marking the line.^

Ratifications of this treaty were to be exchanged in Wash-
ington within four months, and the papers were duly sub-

» Amer. St. PaperSy Far. Rd., VI, 580.

« H. R. Doc. 42, 25 Cong., 1 seas., 26.

> Poinsett thought that the proposal for a confirmation of the treaty of 1819
was intended to entrap him, and that the Mexican authorities were surpriaed
and disappointed when he made no objection. — {Ibid., 26-29.)

^ See text in English and Spanish in Amer. St. PaperBt For. Rd., VI, 946.

MEXICAN POUTICS: 1824-1 C 171

mitted to the United States Senate on April 21, 1828, or
three weeks before the end of the period. The treaty was
approved by that body on April 28. Mexico, however, was
dilatory. The treaty received the necessary approval of
the Mexican Congress, but the ratification was not de-
spatched from Mexico until May 10, just two days before
the time expired for its delivery in Washington.^ It was
not imtil August 2, 1828, that the Mexican minister notified
the State Department of his readiness to proceed to an
exchange of ratifications; but as the time limited by the
treaty had expired nearly three months before, the Presi-
dent of the United States had lost his authority to act until
further action by the Senate, and when Congress again met,
in December, the business of the treaty of conmierce with
Mexico was still unfinished and Adams had been defeated
for re-election. Under these circumstances he did not choose
to resubmit the boundary treaty to the Senate, and he
went out of oflBice in March, 1829, leaving the whole sub-
ject just where it was on the day of his inauguration.*

Pohtical conditions in Mexico were meantime growing
worse from day to day, and divisions were becoming more
complicated. In addition to the Escoceses and Yorkinos,
there came into existence a third faction which may be called
the Pedraza party. Don Manuel Gomez Pedraza, President
Victoria's Secretary of War, the creator and leader of the
new faction, was a native Mexican of Spanish descent, and
like Iturbide and many other Mexican politicians had been
an oflBicer in the Spanish army. He was as active and en-
ergetic as Victoria was the reverse. Originally a member of
a Scottish lodge, he joined the Yorkinos when they came
into existence; and he then set to work to build up a
personal machine of his own.

His oflScial poUcy was one of conciliation. Three or four
small risings took place in various parts of the country,
but no vigorous attempt was made by the government to

1 H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 202.

* The ratifications were finally exchanged April 5, 1832. See H. R. Doc. 42,
26 Cong.| 1 8888., 46-50, as to causes for delay.

172 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

suppress them; Pedraza asserting that to do so would awaken
a general civil war. These isolated attempts soon broke down
from their own weakness, but they were obviously the pre-
cursors of more serious revolts with which the government
might find it extremely difficult to deal, for the very simple
reason that it was always in the army itself that these dis-
turbances began.

"Some generals and many officers/' said Pedraza, "obeyed the
factions rather than the President. The right of petition was con-
fused with insurrection, and whoever had influence anywhere took
up arms to demand whatever the clubs in the capital decided on." ^

The basis of most of these pronundamientos was the de-
mand that all Spaniards should be expelled from Mexico, a .
demand that now found a certain added support in the fact ^
that Spain, feebly and ineffectually, but with some noisy '
ostentation, was preparing a military and naval expedition i
against Mexico. The state legislatures took up the popular *
cry and one after another passed laws expelling the Span —
iards — ^laws which the federal Congress was at first disposed J
to declare unconstitutional. But the public demands, es —
pecially when made by bodies of armed men, were much j
too insistent to be disregarded. On December 20, 1827, a -
federal law was adopted by which a partial measure of ex-
pulsion was put in force.^

Three days later a new and more serious disturbance broke
out at the village of Otmnba. The real leader of this revolt
was no less a personage than the leader of the Escoceses,
the Vice-President of the republic, General Don Nicolas
Bravo.^ The sole object sought to be attained was to put

^ **El derecho de petici&n fuS confundido con los levantamierUoSf y cualquiera
que tenia influencia en algun lerritorioj iomaba las armas para demandar lo que
disponian loa dvbs de la capital.*^ — (Pedraza's Manifesto, quoted by Suarei,
Hiatoria de Mixico^ 83.)

* Dublan y Lozano, II, 47.

* Bravo justified his course by saying that the government itself had opened
the way, since in the events which had preceded and accompanied the decree
of expulsion of the Spaniards it had unequivocally authorized the right of
''armed petition'' — **atUariz6 de un modo inequiooco el derecho de petiei6n
mada," — (Suarez, Historia de Mixico^ 89, note 2.)

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830 173

the Escoceses in power; but the nominal demands were con-
cisely stated as folio ws : 1. The passage of a law by Congress
prohibiting secret societies. 2. Dismissal of all the minis-
ters, "placing in each department men of acknowledged
probity, virtue, and merit/' 3. Expulsion of Mr. Poinsett.^
4. Strict observance of the Constitution.*

This time the Yorkinos found that they were able to
coimt upon an adequate military force, and Pedraza set
upon Bravo with such vigor that within a fortnight he and
most of his followers were safely in jail. There were also
isolated mutinies of garrisons in the states of Vera Cruz
and San Luis Potosf, but these were easily put down. In
a month the whole affair was at an end, the prisoners were
tried and, instead of being shot, were banished. This very
unusual conclusion of the revolt was due to Pedraza, who
thought it "good poUtics'' to exert clemency toward the
defeated Escoceses, a course of conduct which resulted in
bringing down on him the hatred of the more violent of the
Yorkinos.

The election of 1828 for President was now rapidly ap-
proaching, and Pedraza's efforts were all directed toward
getting himself chosen. The Escoceses were powerless since
their leaders had been banished, and were glad to join in a
coahtion which Pedraza managed to form between them
and the more moderate Yorkinos; and in aid of this com-
bination the whole government patronage was freely and
very openly used.

The regular Yorkino candidate and the leader of the fac-
tion was General Guerrero, a half-breed Indian, who had
been a defeated candidate in 1824. He was the son of poor
parents, and was wholly without education. When about

^ The demand for Poinsett's expulsion was no new thing. The legislatures
of several of the states had passed resolutions more than six months before
calling on the government to expel him. Victoria, as usual, was undecided
and ineffectual, although Poinsett in a personal interview insisted that he
ought to take a definite position. — (Poinsett to Adams, June 8, 1827; same to
same, July 18, 1827; Zavala to Poinsett, June 16, 1827-— all in PoinseU M8S.)

* Tlie full text is given in Suarez, 90. See English translation in Ward's
Mexico, II, 5d5; as also the President's proclamation on that occasion and
Bravo's Manifesto, ibid., 571, 574.

174 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

eighteen years old, at the time when the standard of inde-
pendence was first raised, he had joined the insui^gents, and,
like Victoria, he never was made a prisoner and never asked
a pardon. Even in the darkest days of the long revolution-
ary struggle he was the leader of a little unconquered body
of men who kept alive the cause of independence in South-
em Mexico, and his personal bravery and enthusiasm were
unquestioned. He believed firmly in the equality of all
men, especially of Indians and white men, and he hated kings
and priests, but he had none of the qualifications needed to
administer the simplest pubUc afifairs.^

Before Iturbide openly mutinied he had thought it wise
to secure Guerrero's support. Guerrero, however, was one
of the first to revolt against the Emperor, and was severely
wounded in the short struggle against the imperial forces.
He was, as already stated, grand master of the Yorkino
lodges, and as a hero with an organization at his back,
possessed every qualification necessary to make him the
figure-head of the party. The capacity to steer the ship
must needs be found elsewhere.

The contrast between the two presidential candidates was
striking. Guerrero was an ignorant half-breed, who had
risen to eminence solely because he had been a noted insur-
gent leader all through the obscure fighting of the war of
independence. Pedraza was in every respect his opposite.
He was an educated white man, an old servant of the crown
of Spain, a steady opponent of the revolution, and possessed
of every advantage of ability and training; and he entirely
dominated Victoria's cabinet.

No method of persuasion or intimidation which the gov-
ernment could employ to advance his candidacy seems to
have been omitted. But a certain inexperience in the art
of controlling elections seems to have allowed the working
of the machinery to be too plainly seen, and a large part of
the ruling classes became persuaded that if Guerrero were

^ Alaman, who was an enemy of Guerrero, says of him: *^Nunca 8e le haJbia
empleado nienla regencia ni en el consejo de estadOf pues aunque tenia bcutanlB
penetrad^n y buen aentido natural^ su falla de inetruccidn era tan absolvta, qu9
apSnas aabia firmar au nambre" — {Hiatoria de Mijico, V, 766.)

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824r-1830 175

•

beaten it could only be through unfair means. In the result
Pedraza was elected. Of the nineteen states then existing,
ten voted for him, eight for Guerrero, and in one (Durango)
the l^islature did not vote.

The moment the result was known a military mutiny
broke out. A small body of troops stationed at Jalapa
proclaimed themselves a "liberating army," and under
the lead of General Santa Anna, a young officer who had
already had a stormy career, marched on Perote and took
possession of that fortress. On September 16, 1828, they
issued a pronunciamiento, in which they declared that Pe-
draza was a secret enemy of his country, and that in voting
for him the state legislatures had disregarded the general
wish of the people. "The name of the hero of the South,"
said the proclamation, "is repeated with unspeakable en-
thusiasm. His valor and constancy combined, have en-
graved upon the hearts of the Mexicans the image of their
felicity. They wish to confide to him the delicate and sa-
cred deposit of the Executive Power."

Protesting their imalterable devotion to the Constitution
which they were openly violating, the mutineers set forth
the following plan: 1. "The People and the army" were
to annul the election of Pedraza. 2. A law for the expul-
sion of Spaniards was to be passed. 3. Guerrero was to be
declared President. 4. The legislatures who had voted
against Pedraza must inmiediately proceed to a new elec-
tion, "in conformity with the wish of their constituents." ^

At first it seemed that the government would have
little difficulty in suppressing this mutiny. Congress on
September 17, 1828, declared Santa Anna an outlaw,^ and
a competent body of troops was sent to capture him. He
extricated himself, however, from the indefensible position
of Perote, and, marching south, shut himself up in Guer-
rero's country of Oaxaca, and ceased to be a factor in the
situation.'

While Santa Anna was thus isolated, Guerrero's friends,

1 Suarez, 109. An English translation is given in Ward's Mexico^ II, 582.
t Dublan y Lozano, II, 79. < Suarez, 112-126, 131.

(

176 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

who seem to have used Santa Anna as a cat's-paW; took
advantage of the reduction of the garrison in tiie city of
Mexico to organize a revolt of their own. On the night of
November 30, 1828. they seized the Acordada prison, and
alter tnr^ or four days of vicious street fighting completely
defeated the government troops. The members of the cabi-
net fled, and the supporters of Guerrero amused themselves
by looting the shops in the Parian, on the pretence that the
proprietors were all Spaniards.^

President Victoria, incapable to the last, surrendered to
the insurgents, and was thenceforward a puppet in their
hands. Guerrero was made Minister of War, vice Pedraza
resigned, and the other places were filled by Yorkino nomi-
nees. Pedraza, impelled, as his friends asserted, by a pa-
triotic desire to prevent a civil war, and also doubtiess by
well-founded fears for his life, renoimced all claims to the
Presidency and went to England. Everywhere the military
conunanders pronounced in favor of the expulsion of the
Spaniards and the election of Guerrero. And finally CJon-
gress ratified the accomplished fact by a declaration that
Guerrero had been duly elected President and Anastasio
Bustamante Vice-President of the republic.

The inmiediate effect of this successful revolution, the
third in less than eight years, was to put the offices com-
pletely in the hands of the Yorkinos. A more remote effect
was to create a difficult diplomatic situation by reason of
the claims of niunerous foreigners for damages caused by
the destruction of their property, especially in the shops
of the Parian.* And the reports of mob rule in the streets
of the capital were enough to discourage foreigners from com-
ing into the coimtry upon any terms.

^ The Parian was a part of the great public square in which a number of
small ugly shops had been allowed to be constructed. It was entirely removed
by the public authorities in 1842 or 1843. See map in Bullock's Mexico,
Guerrero was accused of having publicly encouraged the looting. ** Hijoa I Para
Uatedea ea el Parian P* (Boys, the Parian is yours !) he is reported to have shouted
to the crowd from a window in the Acordada. — (Ward's Mexico^ II, 610.)

* The loss of property was estimated at as high a figure as S2,0Ci0,000, and
more than twenty years after the event the Mexican Congrees voted «a
indemnity. — (Rivera, Historia de Jalapa, II, 508.)

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830

177

But the most important and far-reaching result was the
establishment of the fatal precedent that a party, defeated
at an ordinary election, might always appeal to the army
in order to reverse the decision of the electors rendered in
due l^al form. Both of the two previous successful revo-
lutions had been based upon a proposed change in the form
of government. / Thenlan of Iguala looked to the estab-
lishment of an independent eMplre. 2!^ he revolution whicB*

li'm'.V, Wtgrettndilcted by men whQ profpA<sPf^ fihft T^^«^^^^-^
ous attachment to the existing institutions of the country,
and who opp^ejj Pedraza simply because they personally
dislikea nim agd asserted thatmostjgople agreed^ mth
tBemi OT course tESFfeal reason, it might almost be said
their professed reason, was because their particular faction
could not expect from Pedraza any of the patronage or other
opportunities which the party in power had to distribute.
The villainy thus taught their opponents, the latter were
certain sooner or later to execute, and even to better the
instruction.

Meanwhile, the winter passed by peaceably; Santa
Anna's outlawry was reversed and complete amnesty was
voted to all who had "pronounced''; ^ and on Wednesday,
the first day of April, 1829, General Guerrero was inaugu-
rated as President. Four weeks earUer General Andrew
Jackson had been inaugurated at Washington as President
of the United States.

Guerrero, who had taken the sword, soon perished with
the sword, but his fall was delayed by a piece of undeserved
good luck. The long threatened Spanish invasion was at
last attempted, but with forces so utterly inadequate as to
insure an easy victory to Mexico and temporary glory to
the administration of the day.

The whole conduct of the invading expedition was as
stupid and ill-considered a piece of business as anything
that the government of Ferdinand VII ever attempted.

^ Dublan y Lozano, II, 97.

178 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO .

Something like thirty-five hundred European troops safled
from Havana on the first of July^ 1829; at the worst season
of the year, to conquer a population of seven millions. The
commanders of the naval vessels that convoyed the tran^
ports did not feel strong enough to attempt an attack on
the fortifications of Vera CruZ; and after the Spanish troops
had been put ashore on the beach near Tampico, in the
middle of the rainy season, the ships returned to Havana.

Spain having thus deliberately abandoned control of the
sea, it was easy for the Mexicans to bring up men both by
sea and land; and after a certain amount of skmnishing in
which the invaders were generally successful, the wretched
remnant of the Spanish forces surrendered to General Santa
Anna on September 11, 1829. Fever had been far more
formidable than the Mexican arms. Nearly half of the
Spanish expedition perished.^

In despatching so inadequate a force to Mexico, the gov-
ernment of Ferdinand VII was acting imder the delusion
that a majority of the Mexican people were tired of the
republic, and were desirous of renewing their allegiance to
Spain. It was believed that a small military force, landing
on Mexican soil, would serve as a nucleus around which
would gather all those who were hostile to the existing state
of things, and that a march to the capital would prove an
easy triumph. There was, however, an abundance of re-
cent historical examples to demonstrate the folly of sending
an insufficient invading force into an enemy's country, de-
pending upon the hope of a local rising to help it out.' The
preposterous failure of the long-heralded Spanish expedition
not only served to emphasize this militajy maxim, but it
showed the world how groundless was the belief that the
Mexican people generally desired to return to their former
condition of colonial dependence.

The popular hero of the occasion was, of coiu^, Santa
Anna, who had exhibited great promptitude and eflBciency

^ General Mier y Terdn, who was left by Santa Anna in charge of the prift-
oners, reported that only 1,792 men had been sent back to Cuba. — (Suarei,
160.)

' See Mahan's Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revoluium, 1, 97, 119.

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830 179

in collecting and transporting his little army^ without help
from the federal government. The authorities in the city
of Mexico, on the other hand, had failed to rise to the height
of their opportunities, or perhaps it would be more accu-
TsAe to say, had made the poorest possible use of them, al-
though the Mexican Congress had seen fit to put the most
extraordinary powers into the President's hands. By an act
passed August *25, 1829, he had been authorized to adopt
whatever measures might be necessary to preserve inde-
pendence and public tranquillity.^ TTiese powers, which
were conferred without any express warrant in the Consti-
tution, were to cease upon the reassembling of Congress.

The clique surrounding Guerrero evidently concluded that
the possession of this Uttle brief authority was something
to be utilized without delay, and they accordingly proceeded
to promulgate in his name a series of edicts which may not
liave made the angels weep, but which certainly made the
Mexicans extremely angry. Their remarkable legislation
liad, for the most part, no relation whatever to the contest
with Spain. On the contrary, the greater part of it was
directed toward ameliorating the condition of mankind in
general. Gambling-houses were regulated, and so was the
coinage of copper and the method of filling vacant bishoprics.
A complete system of statistics was to be created. The
death penalty was suspended. Slavery was abolished. A
sinking fimd was established, as well as a national soldiers'
home (Casa Nacional de Invdlidos). The mining laws, the
diplomatic service, the mint, the pawn shops, and the gov-
ernment of the Federal District were all attended to. But
what chiefly exasperated public opinion, were two decrees
providing that any one who calumniously attacked the exec-
utive of the nation or of any state, might be proceeded
against under admmistrative process, or, in other words,
might be punished without a trial.^
In the middle of November, 1829, the garrisons in Yuca-

^ **Se atdoriza al ejecuivoo de la Federaddn para adoptar cuarUaa medidaa scan
neeesarias d la amaervaci&n de la independencia^ del sistema actval de gobiemo
y de la tranquUidad pUblica" — (Dublan y Lozano, II, 151.)

* Decrees of Sept. 4 and 11, 1829; Dublan y Lozano, II, 156, 160. ^

180 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tan began a revolution; and a few days later Bustamante,
the Vice-President, who had been put in command of are-
serve army numbering three thousand men, with head-
quarters at Jalapa, followed suit. His proclamation an-
noimced that he and the army under his conunand were
resolved to destroy the national government in order to
preserve the Constitution and the laws, and that those
officials who had failed to conform to public opinion would
be dismissed and their places fiUed by the conquering pa-
triots (patriotas vencedores). Nothing could be more frank.
Bustamante and his friends wanted the offices, and an-
nounced that they meant to take them.

Within three weeks, the administration was overthrown
and Guerrero himself was a fugitive. Bustamante natu-
rally succeeded to the de-facto position of President and early
in February, 1830, he procured the passage of an act of Con-
gress which formally deposed Guerrero upon the ground of
incapacity {'Hmposibilidad para gobemar la RepubUca^^)}

Anastasio Bustamante, who was thenceforward for several
years a conspicuous figure in the rapidly shifting scenes of
the Mexican drama, was in his fiftieth year. He was a
white man, well educated, and had served in the Spanish
army until Iturbide's mutiny. Originally he had studied
medicme and had begun to practise that profession; but at
the first symptoms of the approaching struggle for inde-
pendence, he had entered the royal army. By 1821 he had
risen to the rank of colonel. Iturbide promoted and deco-
rated him, and Victoria made him a major-general. In the
spring of 1826, he had been placed in command of the forces
on the northeastern frontier, which included Texas, and
had managed to keep the peace with the Indians, and with
the very few Texan colonists who were then in the country.
He was, on the whole, a weak man, but he managed to se-
cure the respect and support of abler and stronger men.

When he first became President * he siurounded himself

> Ibid., 223.

' He did not assume the title. He was always officially designated as El
ExcdcndrimQ Scfior Vice-Prendente,

MEXICAN POLITICS: 1824-1830 181

with an energetic cabinet, and his administration was not
unsuccessful. The financial and' industrial condition of the
€X)untry was improved, and order was preserved with a stem
and bloody hand. His object may best be described as the
establishment of a miUtary despotism. The opponents of
Iiis administration were imprisoned, banished, or shot. The
press was effectually muzzled. The army in general was
^well paid and its officers encouraged. The church also was
not neglected. And if there had only been offices enough to
satisfy everybody, there was no reason why Bustamante's
administration should not have continued indefinitely.

CHAPTER VIII

MEXICO RESOLVES TO TAKE ORDER WITH THE

TEXANS

During these weary years of discord in Mexico Texas
had been rapidly growing and prospering. By 1830 her
population was about twenty thousand, having doubled^ it
would seem, in the short space of three or four years.

In general character the people who were settling Texas
did not materially dififer from the early population of any
of the states of the Mississippi valley. They were, as we
have seen, mostly native Americans from all the states of
the Union, although Kentucky and Tennessee led the rest.
There were also a considerable number of colonists from
Ireland and Germany, but, as in the United States, they
soon fused with the native stock.^ There were only a few
Englishmen, and they were generally much less adaptable,
and frequently proved to be very ill suited to the rough
pioneer life.*

^ There were two concessions to Irish empresarios; one to James Powen,
the other to McMullen and McGloin, for settling four hundred families in
southwestern Texas. The name of San Patricio county recalls the locality
of these grants. The Mexican authorities complained that these colonists
did not come from Ireland, but from New Orleans and New York. The Ger-
man colonists were more scattered, but were almost all settled east of the
Colorado River. A full account of them will be found in a monograph by
Doctor Gilbert G. Benjamin, in German-American AnnaU, N. S., VI, 315-d40.
The causes of their immigration seem to have been the same that brought other
Germans to the United States — ^namely, the economic conditions at home re-
siilting from the Napoleonic wars and the political oppression which preceded
and followed the outbreaks of 1830. The ideas of resistance to tyrazmy and
of a struggle for religious freedom appealed to these people, and they wert
strong supporters of Texan autonomy. See also, for an account of some Ger-
man immigrants, Tex, Hist. Qitar., II, 228.

' A humorous reminiscence of some English settlers — London tradesmen—
will be found in Tex. Hist. Qmtr., IV, 121 et seq. In later years the British
charg6 d'afifaires wrote of the '^ helplessness of our own poor English people"
who came as immigrants to Texas. — (Elliot to Aberdeen, Mar. 26, 1843;
S. W. Hist. Qiuur., XVI, 203.)

182

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 183

For those who came by sea the pomt of departure was
fenerally New Orleans, although occasional vessels bringing
mmigrants arrived from Atlantic ports.^ The trade was
Meffy carried on by smaQ coasting schooners, often ill-
oiind and commanded by men who had no deep-sea experi-
jnce. The low coast was siirrounded by immarked dangers,
ind shipwrecks were frequent.*

The immigrants who came by land could either travel
rom Natchitoches, in Louisiana, crossing the Sabine gener-
illy at Gaines's Ferry, or could come through south-
i7€»tem Arkansas. In either case they passed through long
itretches of country where there were no houses and where
ihey must make camp every night. Until after 1822 no
x>ad existed which a wheeled vehicle could follow,' but as
»rly as 1824 a family travelled all the way from Illinois to
ALUstinJb colony "in a large wagon with six mules." * In
1831 Mrs. Perry, a sister of Stephen F. Austin, with her
husband, children, and negroes, travelled from Missouri to
San Felipe, "using two-horse wagons and a carriage, and
young Guy [her son] rode a mule the whole distance." ^

Year in and year out, and for many years, the toiling pro-
cession of pioneers followed the rough track through the
wfldemess. A later traveller has left a vivid picture of the
dull emigrant trams jolting slowly along, the jaded cattle,
the lean^dogs, the dispirited negroes, the tired children-
black and white — ^peering out of the backs of the wagons,
"the white mother and babies, and the tall, frequently ill-
humored master, on horseback or walking ahead with his
gim, lu^g up the black driver and his oxen. As a scout
ahead is a brother, or an intelligent slave, with the best
gun, on the lookout for a deer or a turkey." «

When this description was written the richer farmers —
men with many slaves, and horses, and cattle — were coming

^ A graphic account of the difficulties attending the landing of a party of
immigrants from New York will be found in Kennedy, II, 30-57.

'DeweeSy Letters from TexaSy 30; Baker, Texas Scrap-Book^ 69; Tex, Hist.
Ouor., I, 297; II, 227; III, 14-22; IV, 85; VI, 47, 236; XIII, 50.

» Dewees, 24; Tex, Hist. Quar., V, 12. * Tex, Hist. Quar,, IV, 93.

• Ihid., V, 121. • Ohnsted, Journey through Texas, 55-57.

184 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

into Texas. But in 1830, and for several years afterward,
the slave population was relatively small. Many colonists
had no slaves. One man was reputed to have nearly a hun-
dred, but most people who owned slaves at all had from
two or three to fifteen or twenty. There were in 1830 per-
haps a thousand slaves out of a total population of twenty
thousand, and the proportion continued small even as late
as 1843.1

The Mexican law of July 13, 1824, as already stated,
prohibited the slave trade. The Constitution of the state of
Coahuila and Texas, adopted March 11, 1827, provided that
no one in that state should thereafter be bom a slave, and
that the introduction of slaves, under any pretext, should
be prohibited after a period of six months.* This was fol-
lowed by a state statute, passed September 15, 1827, requir-
ing each municipality to make a list of all slaves within its
borders, and to keep a register of births and deaths.' But
the laws against importation of slaves was easily evaded by
bringing b negroes as indentured servants, who were in
form indebted to their masters for a sum equal to their
value, which they agreed to pay for out of their earnings.
In other words, they were nominally held under a system
of peonage, legalized by a state statute of May 5, 1828.*

In 1829 Guerrero, acting under the extraordinary powers
conferred upon him at the time of the Spanish invasion, had
issued a decree abolishing slavery throughout the whole of
the republic of Mexico. As the rest of the country had
no slaves, the news of this decree was received with great
equanimity; but it naturally produced a considerable degree
of excitement in Texas, especially as compensation was, by

» Bugbee, "Slavery in Early Texas," FoL Sci, Quar,, XIII, 664. The
largest slave-owner in Texas was Jared E. Groce, who came from Tennessee
in 1822. He was the first man to plant cotton for market and to erect a
cotton-gin in Texas. His only daughter married William H. Wharton, a
conspicuous figure later on in Texan affairs.

' Const., Art. 13, Laws and Decrees of Coahuila and Texas, 314.

• Ibid., 78; and see amendatoiy act of Nov. 24, 1827, ibid., 92.

« Ibid., 103. Pol Sci. Quar., XIII, 409-412. There were also occaakmal
illegal importations of slaves from Cuba. See Life and Adventures of Monroe
Edwards*

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 185

its terms^ only promised to the owners of slaves on tliat
uncertain day when the condition of the national Treasury
would permit payment.^

The situation was critical, and an eflfort to enforce the
decree might have led to serious disturbances, or at any
rate so Austin thought. Acting upon his advice, Don
Ilam6n Musquiz, the jefe politico of B6xar, declined to
publish the decree until the matter could be again laid be-
fore the chief executive, and he also addressed remonstrances
to the governor of the state and the officer in command of
the federal troops. The governor forwarded the Texan re-
monstrance to the President with a long letter of his own.
All of these documents, doubtless inspired by Austin, ar-
gued the question on economic grounds, the impossibility
of obtaining sufficient labor or of growing cotton except with
help of negroes, and also laid some stress on the vested rights
of property in slaves, which, it was asserted, the Mexican
government had guaranteed to the settlers whom it had in-
vited into the country. The governor added that enforce-
ment of the decree might possibly "draw upon the state
some conmiotions," although he did not wish it to be inferred

"that these settlers are of a turbulent and insubordinate character,
for up to this time I have received nothing but proof to the contrary
— but would refer to the condition of man, and the inclinations of
which he is capable when, from one day to another, he b about to be
ruined."

In compliance with the opinions thus expressed by the
local officials, the President on December 2, 1829, notified
the governor of Texas that he had been "pleased to accede
to the solicitation of your Excellency, and to declare the

» Decree of Sept. 15, 1829, Dublan y Lozano, II, 163. The text of the de-
cree was as follows: "1. Queda abolida la esdavitud en la ReyHblica, 2. Son
par eontiguiente Itbres los que hasta hoy se habian considerado como esclavos,
3. Cuando las ctrcunstandaa del erario lo 'permiAan, se indemnizard d los propie-'
iarios de escUwos^ en los Urminos que dispusieren las leyes.** In 1826 Tomel,
then a deputy, had proposed a measure abolishing slavery, but for two years
the Senate failed to act upon it. When Guerrero was vested with extraor-
dinary powers Tomel availed himself of the opportunity to draw up the fore-
going decree and present it to Guerrero for signature. — (Tomel, Breve Resefia,
85.)

186 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

department of Texas excepted from the general disposition
comprehended in said decree." ^

l^^lavery, therefore, existed in Texas from this time forward
elk jure as well as de facto, subject to the laws against the
importation of slaves and the constitutional provision af-
fecting persons bom in the state. But it must not be
forgotten that the early settlers were almost, without an
exception, very poor people, working with their own hands
to provide the elementary necessities of life; and if a man
owned two or three slaves he worked by their side in the
fields. The day of great plantations, of overseers, and of
non-resident owners had not arrived, if, indeed, it ever
dawned in Texas. Slavery there presented a very different
aspect from that which it presented in states like South
Carolina or Georgia, where hundreds of slaves under a single
master created quite exceptional social and economic con-
ditions. In the early days in Texas the number of slaves
was too small to produce any such results, and conditions
were never radically different from those of the frontier
communities in the free states of the American Union.
There was the same sort of mixed population, with the
native American largely predominating; there was a certain
number of men who had left their homes for reasons which
would not bear investigation ; and there were a great many
more who had emigrated from a sanguine hope of bettering
their condition.

Life in all these new communities was reduced almost to
its ultimate elements, for each family was compeDed to
build its own house, to make its own clothes, and to find its
own food. One old settler has described the log-house he
lived in as a boy. It contained at first, he says, one room,
"but that room was either very large or stood cramming
remarkably well," for it held nine persons besides the cook.
"I don't know," he adds, "where she slept, but certainly
not in the kitchen, for that family convenience was just
outside the door without other protection than a few brush
overhead." But, if the kitchen was primitive, the larder was

^ The correspondence is given at length in Pol. Sci, Quar.y XIII, 649-659.

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 187

'well supplied. " Ducks and geese and swan almost literally
covered the waters. The deer came in sight of the house
in droves, and fish at the bayshore in variety and abundance.
Cattle were plenty and cheap." ^

Flour was harder to get than meat. For almost a year
Austin's early settlers had none. There was neither a hoe
nor a plough in the colony, and com was planted with a
stick. And even as late as 1834 people at times had to do
without bread.*

Those who were of an age to work had little opportunity
for amusement, but there were occasional diversions of a
rather primitive kind. One early settler writes:

" We frequently make up parties of men, women, and children, and
start out on a hunting or fishing expedition, and are gone for several
days. These excursions are very pleasant." '

Another and more trustworthy author, discoursing of the
''hardihood and courage" of the gentle sex, developed under
the conditions of life in a wild country, says :

" It is not uncommon for ladies to mount their mustangs and hunt
with their husbands, and with them to camp out for days on their
excursions to the sea shore for fish and oysters. All visiting is done
on horseback, and they will go fifty miles to a ball with their silk
dresses, made perhaps in Philadelphia or New Orleans, in their saddle-
bags."*

The "balls" must have been very modest entertainments,
but dancing seems to have been a frequent source of pleas-
ure. Whenever the neighbors volunteered to help in a
heavy piece of work the gathering often ended in a dance.
A cheerful account of such an event has been preserved in
the reminiscences of a lady who came as a child to Texas
in 1833. It was necessary to take off the roof of her father's
house and repair it. All the neighboring men and boys
were to help.

» Tex, Hi9t. Ouar., Vl, 115. » Ibid., V, 14; IV, 96.

s Dewees, LeUera jfrom Texas, 137. * Mrs. Holley, TexaSy 145.

188 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

"The young men said if mother would let them dance they would
put the new roof on and clear the yard in one day. Mother consented,
and all the men came except Mr. M . He would not have any-
thing to do with his neighbors. . . . The boys went down to Mr.
Shipman's settlement and fetched four young ladies. They with Mrs.
Roark's four young daughters, were enough for dancing. Mr. Adam
Stafford had sent a negro woman the day before to do the cooking.
Before it was dark the dancing began. The girls and young ladies
all had new dresses and shoes. I suppose I was the happiest child in
the world that night." ^

Hospitality and neighborly kindness were naturally the
favorite virtues in such a society. The man who "would
not have anything to do with his neighbors" was at the
bottom of the social scale. One who, on the contrary, was
thought really worthy of admiration, was thus described:

''Mr. Brinson was a very social, hospitable man and an obliging
neighbor. . . . He was a hard-shell Baptist of the ultra kind — pre-
destination and all. His wife was a good little woman and one of
the sort that never Aires. She usually milked thirty to forty cows
night and morning, and supplied the family, from butter and cheeses
and chickens and eggs that she marketed in Galveston." *

When people fell ill, their neighbors helped as far as pos-
sible, although among the settlers there were some who
had practised medicine before they had turned farmers.*
Like Burke's English colonists, they had made the law a
general study, and were all "lawyers or smatterers in law."
They dealt in general principles, for the only codes they
knew were those drawn up by Austin,* and when crimes were
committed the settlers administered their own justice —
sometimes under the jurisdiction of one of the English-
speaking alcaldes, sometimes by the tribunal of Judge
Lynch.5

For the most part, there was no public exercise of religion.
The Baptists early held occasional religious meetings, and

» Tex, Hist. Quar.y IV, 114. And see an account of "an old-fashioned coun-
try quilting," iWd., VI, 127.
» Ibid., VI, 116. » Ibid. IV, 93. * /Wd., XIII, 59.

*Ibid., VII, 32, 34, 60; IV, 101, 117; XIV, 34-37.

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 189

Later on members of other sects did t)ie same^^ but it was
generally known tliat the law forbade such assemblages.
There were but few Catholic priests, and in so large a coun-
try their visits to any particular neighborhood were nec-
e^arily rare. A certain Father Muldoon was a public
favorite, and was in particular request for weddings. The
Mexican law recognized only reUgious marriages, and as they
could not be legally celebrated unless a priest happened to
be at hand, a weu4fined custom grew up of a sort of civilN
marriage, to be followed by the religious ceremony as soon \
as possible. It sometimes happened that the priest per- I
formed the marriage ceremony for the parents and baptized /
the children all at the same time.*

Schools, such as they were, the people organized among
themselves. There had been Mexican schools at a much
earlier day in B^xar, but these had led a precarious exist-
ence and were of no value to the American settlers.' As
early as 1829 a school numbering about forty children was
in existence at San Felipe.* Other neighborhood schools
were established here and there, as itinerant teachers could
be secured.^

The Mexican state authorities were, in theory, favorable
to the cause of education, and the Constitution of Coahuila
and Texas and several acts of the legislature attest their
interest ; « but lack of means always prevented the carrying
into effect of these well-intentioned projects. Stephen F.
Austin was anxious to establish a sort of high school at San
Felipe, where Spanish, English and French should all be .
taught — aad no other languages; but this plan also came
to nothing. 7

» Bancroft, North Mex. States and Texas, II, 647; Yoakum, II, 220.

* See Tex, Hist. Qitar.f IV, 114; and "Reminiscences of Henry Smith" in ibid.,
XIV, 34-37. These marriages were subsequently legalized by statute, even
when no religious ceremony had been performed. — (Imws of Rep, of Texas,
I, 233— June 5, 1837.)

» I. J. Cox, in Tex. Hist. Quar., VI, 27-50. « Baker, Texas Scrap-Book, 74.

* For reminiscences of these early schools, see Tex. Hist. Qtiar., I, 285; FV,
108, 112; V, 86.

* Constitution, Art. 277; acts of May 13, 1829, April 13 and 30, 1830; Laws
and Decrees of Coahuila and Texas, 127-130, 148, 157.

» Mattie Austin Hatcher, in Tex. Hist. Quar., XII, 231.

190 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

As true Americaijs, the settlers did not long delay the
establishment of a newspaper. Apart from one ephemeral
sheet published at Nacogdoches during Long's short-lived
attempt at independence, the earliest newspaper was The
Texas Gazette, published in Austin's colony, the first nimi-
ber of which appeared about September, 1829. Very near
the same date a journal called The Mexican Advocate, printed
in Spanish and English, made its appearance at Nacog-
doches.^

In spite of the lack of any eflScient government, or per-
haps (at that early stage of its history) because of such lack,
Texas in the main was peaceable and well-ordered, and
only one really serious incident occurred to confirm the
pessimistic views which observers in the city of Mexico
entertained, touching the turbulent character of the Amer^.
ican settlers.

Hayden Eklwards was one of the empresarios who had a
contract to^bring in a large number of families. The dis-
trict within which his recruits were to settle was in the
neighborhood of Nacogdoches, near the Louisiana line, a
region from which most of the inhabitants had fled in 1813.*
The natural result of the attempt to resettle the abandoned
lands was a serious confusion as to titles, which was made
worse by the fact tliat most of the old settlers were native
Mexicans and most of the new ones were not. Edwards
was not the man to adjust such matters amicably. He
seems, to judge from his correspondence, to have been
of quick t^nper and violent speech, and his antecedents
were doubtful.' At any rate, he succeeded, during the
course of the dispute as to titles, in offending and fri^t-

> Tex. Hisi, Qwur-y VII, 243. Sec also Bancroft, North Mex. States and Temu,
III 549, where it is stated that the paper published in 1829 in Austin's ookmy
was called The Cotton Plant, He does not refer to The Mexican AdoooaU^ and
says that the second newspaper was published at Braxoria in 1830, and called
The Teiae Gazette and Brazoria Advocate.

* See the testimony in Stdphen p. NorriSy 44 Tex. Rep., 204, where some
curious light 18 thrown on the primitive methods of colonixation and survey ing
in vogue in early days.

* Austin asserted that he had kept a roulette table in the city of Mexico
(Comp, Hist,, I, 510); while Yoakum calls him "a wealthy and inteUigent
gentleman" (Yoakum, I, 215).

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 191

ening the governor of the state,, who cut the controversy
short by cancellmg Edwards's contract and banishing him
from the country. To remonstrances and threats of appeal
to the federal authorities, the governor merely answered
that Edwards might do as he pleased about appealing, but
that he must first leave Mexico.^

Very much against Austin's advice, Edwards determined''^
on armed resistance, entered into an affiance with a band
of Cherokees who were then in eastern Texas, and under-
took to create a new and independent state, which he called
Fredonia. Meetings were held, and a complete constitu-
tion was solemnly adopted on December 21, 1826.* It
was Long's attempt over again, and it collapsed as quickly.
A force of two hundred Mexican soldiers from B^xar was
joined by a body of militia from Austin's colony and marched
into Nacogdoches on January 28, 1827; whereupon Ed-
wards and his followers fled to the United States.'

This short-lived rebellion had very much alarmed the
Mexican government/ but its prindpal significance was
in the determination of the majority of American settlers,
Hrith Austin at their head, to sustain the Mexican govem-
xnent and put down disorder. Austin's men and their near
x^eighbors were on the whole a property-owning, and there-
fore a conservative class, perfectly satisfied with their politi-
cal status so long as they were allowed to do as they pleased.
X)oubtless they had no affection for Mexico or the Mexi-
c^ans; but they were not seeking independence, and there
no evidence that they then expected or desired annexa-

> Ibid., 243.

* See text in Gammel's Laws of Texas, I, 109-110.

* Yoakum's HiH. of TexaSf 1, 234-250, gives a clear and generally accurate
account of the "Fredonian War/' and further details will be found in Camp,
Bist., I, 50&-534.

* See law of Feb. 23, 1827, passed when the trouble was all over, entitled
FacuUades concedidas al Gobiemo para contener las des&rdenea de Tijaa, Dublan
y Lozano, II, 5. The government is authorized to call out the militia and
$500,000 are voted for extraordinary expenses. Poinsett sai4 the President
proposed " to set on foot an expedition against the rebels of Texas which would
have been sufficient to repel an invasion," and intimated that these excessive
precautions were due to a universal suspicion of the conduct of the United
States government.— (Poinsett to Adams, April 26, 1827; PoinnU MSS.)

192 THE V iTED STATES AND MEXICO

tion to the United States^ or that they took any steps what-
ever looking to that end.

The Mexican authorities, however, had not regarded i
in the same light. To them Edwards was a type of th<
American colonist who was always bent on mischief; andJ
they strongly suspected the American government of
privy to the Fredonian rising, if not of having directly
tered it. As proof they pointed to the undisguised
of the United States to acquire Texas, a desire which hacH
been repeatedly expressed. There was, however, a verj^-
considerable difference between an ofifer to purchase tb
territory and an intrigue to stir yp trouble among its in-
habitants. The administration at Washington had veiy^
openly proclaimed a desire to buy Texas, or a part of it,
if it could be had at a reasonable price; and had argued
that it was a burden and likely to become a danger to
the Mexican republic. But there seems to be no good
reason to suppose that either John Quincy Adams or
Henry Clay had advised or encouraged or been privy to
the IVedonian revolt.

Whatever might have been the suspicions or fears of the
successive Mexican governments in regard to Texan affairs,
they had no time to spare for such matters dining the close
of Victoria's administration and the brief and troubled
period of Guerrero's tenure of oflSce. It was not imtQ
Bustamante had taken possession of the presidency that
the subject was seriously considered.

Lilcas Ignacio Alaman, the new Secretaiy of Foreign Rela-
tions, was the person through whom the attention of the
Mexican public was really and seriously called to Texan
^ affairs; and it was in consequence of his recommendations
that the era of easy indifference was succeeded by a period
of attempted regulation and repression, which ultimately
brought about disaster.

Alaman was a native Mexican who had taken no part
in the revolution. He was a student, who had pursued
knowledge in many directions. From 1814 to 1820 — ^the
period of Waterloo and the Holy Alliance — he had lived in

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH *%£ TEXANS 193

Europe; and it was not until his return to Mexico that he
had b^un to take part in public affairs.^ He is best known
at the present day for his authorship of an excellent and
authoritative history of Mexico.

Bustamante's cabinet was formed on January 7; 1830^ and
one of the first subjects to engage the attention of the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs was a proposal which, it was stated,
was to be submitted by Jackson's administration, for a
purchase of the whole or a part of Texas. This report —
that the oflFer made by President Adams was to be renewed
— ^had excited a good deal of attention in the American
press, and had caused some rather vehement comments in
the Mexican newspapers. On February 8, therefore, Ala-
man presented a report to the Congress, taking as his text
"the pretensions now clearly manifested" by the United
States, to possess themselves of Texas.^ He divided his
paper into two parts: the first dealing with the supposed
policy of the American government, the second dealing
with the means which Mexico must adopt to preserve the
territory coveted by her neighbor.

As to the first point, the policy of the United States, the
examples of Louisiana and the Floridas were cited. The
government of the United States, it was said, had pursued
successfully one imiform and consistent line of conduct in
all cases:

"They begin by introducing themselves into the territory they
covet, upon pretence of commercial negotiations or of the establish-
ment of colonies, with or without the assent of the government to
which it belongs. These colonies grow, multiply, become the pre-
dominant part of the population; and as soon as a support is found
in thb manner, they begin to set up rights which it is impossible to
sustain in a serious discussion, and to bring forward ridiculous pre-
tensions, founded upon historical facts which nobody admits, such
as LaSalle's voyages now known to be a falsehood. . . . Their machi-
nations in the country they wish to acquire are then brought to light
by the visits of explorers, some of whom settle on the soil, alleging
that their presence does not affect the question of the right of sov-

^ Tomel calls him a pupil of Mettemich and Nesselrode. — (Breve Resefuif 26.)
* See text in Filiaola, (hurra de T^ae, II, 590-612; translation in H. R. Doc.
351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 312-322.

194 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ereignty or possession of the land. These pioneers originate, littk by
little, movements which complicate the political state of the oountiy
in dispute, and then follow discontents and dissatisfaction, calculated
to fatigue the patience of the legitimate owner, and diminish the use-
fulness of the administration and the exercise of authority. When
things have come to this pass, which is precisely the present state of
things in Texas, diplomatic intrigue {d manejo diplomdtico) begios."

As to the pending diplomatic negotiations (which Poiih
sett was charged with having purposely delayed) Alaman
stated that new proposals were about to be made to pui^
chase Texas for the sum of five miUion dollars, and if this
was not accepted it was veiy probable that the next propo-
sal would be to submit the matter to arbitration, as had
been lately done by naming the King of the Netiierlands
arbitrator with regard to "some territories of Canada";
and when once that is done, said Alaman, the evil will be
accomplished and Texas will be lost forever.

Alaman's historical parallels were invented to fit his
theory and were quite as foolish as his ideas about arbitra-
tion. It was certainly not the fact that either in Louisiaiia
or the Floridas, the course of events had even remotely
resembled the process he traced. It was not true that it
had ever occurred to any one to arbitrate the question of
the title to Texas as between the United States and the
Republic of Mexico. Arbitration had been adopted in re-
spect to the disputed boundary of Maine, but the Texas
question had been conclusively settled by the treaty with
Spain as far back as 1819. And it was not true that the
United States government had ever interfered, either by
encouragement or otherwise, with the settlement of Texas.
That movement, such as it was, was pure individualism.
There was no "conspiracy" to encourage emigration from
the United States. The early settlers had been moved by
no other conceivable motive than that of bettering their
condition. They went to Texas because they could get
good land for nothing; and they had neither asked nor
received help from anybody, least of all from the federal
authorities of the United States.

MEXICX) TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 195

But when Alaman turned to the consideration of exist-
ig conditions in Texas he was on firmer ground. The
majority of the population, he reported, were natives of
he United States; they occupied the frontiers and the
oasts contrary to law; they had failed to comply with
tie colonization laws; they had obeyed or disobeyed, as
tiey chose, the orders of the state government. The state
uthorities had been deplorably lax. The federal law
f July 13, 1824, required the colonists to manumit their
laves,^ and they had paid no attention to it, but had openly
arried on the slave trade from the United States. Presi-
lent Guerrero, by his decree of September 15, 1829, had
;oiie so far as to abolish slavery; though it was true that
n order to avoid an insurrection he had been led to modify
he decree in question secretly, so that it should not em-
brace Texas. It was a leading feature of all the coloniza-
tion contracts that only CathoUcs should be admitted;
whereas, according to Alaman, not one of the colonists in
Texas was a CathoUc.

What, he asked, was to be the remedy? It was obvious \
that Mexico could not part with her own soil. If she did
90, she would degrade herself from the highest rank among
the American nations, and sink into contemptible me-
diocrity. It would be necessary, therefore, to adopt without
delay proper measures for effectually asserting Mexican
GUithority in Texas. These should be as follows :

1. To send enough troops to occupy suitable points so as
bo repel invasion or check insurrection, and to increase
the Mexican population by settling convicts in the points
x^cupied by the troops.

2. To colonize the country with people whose interests,
customs, and language were different from those of the
[Jnited States.

• 3. To encourage the coasting trade between Texas and
iie rest of Mexico.
4. To repeal the colonization law of 1824, and give au-

18 a doabtful interpretation of that very loose statute. See above,
43.

196 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

/ thority over the public lands to the federal and not to the

state governments.

5. To send a commissioner to Texas to get statistics as
to the colonists, and then to proceed ''to take the necessaiy
measures to preserve that part of the republic."

Without much delay the Mexican Congress took up, and
in substance adopted Alaman's reconmiendations. On
April 6, 1830, they enacted a measure which, if it had been
vigorously and eflSciently enforced, might have changed
the destinies of their coimtry; but which, as it turned out,
served only to irritate those whom it was intended to con-
trol.

This statute provided that the government might ap-
point one or more conmiissioners whose duty it should be
to visit the frontier states, to arrange with the state legisla-
ting for taking over vacant lands in order to establish
colonies of Mexicans and foreigners, to inquire into the
execution of all colonization contracts theretofore made,
to see that their terms were exactly complied with, and to
make such new arrangements with settlers already in the
coimtry as might be deemed desirable for the safety of the
republic. The federal government was to acquire land for
forts and arsenals, and to employ convicts in building these
public works; and after the sentences of such prisoners had
expired, they were to be given land and tools in case they
desired to become permanent settlers. Mexican families
who wished to settle near the frontiers were to be trans-
ported free, maintained for a year, and given land and
agricultural implements. The coasting trade to Mata-
moros, Tampico and Vera Cruz was thrown open to for-
eigners for four years, so that the produce of the colonies
might be shipped to these points. Lumber for building pur-
poses, and food supplies, were to be admitted free of duty
at Galveston and Matagorda for a period of two years.

Such were the provisions relative to encouraging Mexican
immigration into Texas. That they failed entirely was not
a matter for siuprise. Similar measures had been tried
before to promote settlement in California, but without

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 197

success;^ and Mexican statesmen might well have asked
l^hoBselves why their countrymen^ when they were paid to
do 80, would not go io a fertile coimtry, while thousands of
eager settlers were pouring in from the north; paying their
own way and asking no help from anybody. The answer
could have been foimd only in the fimdamental and mys-
terious differences of race.

The act of April 6, 1830, next proceeded to deal with the
colonists from the Upited States. By article nine, foreign-
ers were prohibited from crossing the frontier imder any
pretext without a passport vis^d by a Mexican consul. By
article ten, the status of existing colonists and their slaves
was not to be distiu'bed; but no slave was to be imported
in future.* And finally, by article eleven, colonization by
the citizens of any adjacent nation was forbidden, and all
contracts, not fully executed, which conflicted with this
act, were "suspended."

The execution of the new law was intrusted to General
Manuel de Mier y Ter&a, the commanding officer of the
military district which embraced the states of Tamaulipas
and Coahuila and Texas. He was a man of high character
and ability, cautious, law-abiding, and well-educated. He
had been Secretary of War during Victoria's administration.
In 1827, when the Mexican Congress made an appropria-
tion for surveying the northern boimdary, Tomel was put
in charge and got as far as Nacogdoches, although for some
reason the rest of the expedition never got beyond B6xar,'
and he had been second in command to Santa Anna in the
short campaign of 1829 against the Spanish invaders.
In addition to the duties specifically imposed on him by

^ See above, chapter V.

' "No u hard variaci&n respedo de las coUmicu ya establecidaSf ni respedo de
los eMclavas que holla en ellas; pero d gohiemo general, 6 d particular de coda
EdadOf euidardn bajo 8u mda edrecha responeabilidadf del cumplimiento de Uu
leyes de coUmiiaci6n, y de que no ee introduzcan de nuevo eedavoe" — (Dublan
y Losauo, II, 239.)

' An account of this journey is contained in Berlandier y Chovel's Diario
de Viage de la Comiei&n de Limiteef etc. Clay, as Secretary of State, sent
passports for Terdn and his party. — (Clay to Obregon, March 19, 1828; H. R.
Doc. 42, 25 Cong., 1 sess., 44-46.)

198 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the law of April 6; 1830; it was essential for the command-
ing general to watch over the organization and administrar
tion of the custom-houses in his district; for under the rather
primitive system then in vogue the moneys coUected at
these custom-houses could be turned over directly to him
for the support of his troops.^ This task, however, was
one that obviously required the greatest tact so far as
Texas was concerned.

Under the law of September 29, 1823, the importation
of supplies for the colonists had been permitted free of
duty for seven years, a period now about to expire, when
the general tariff of Mexico would become operative. The
extremes to which this tariff went, have already been re-
ferred to. The law of November 16, 1827, as amended and
added to by the law of May, 1829,^ prohibited absolutely
the importation (among other things) of flour, wheat, and
rice; of salted or smoked meat, including pork; of salt, cof-
fee, sugar, rum, whiskey, and tobacco; of almost all kinds
of cotton goods, clothing, boots and shoes, hats, carpets,
and blankets; of soap, of earthenware, of lead, including
shot, and of many articles of saddlery and harness. These
were the commonest necessities of a farming community.

The law of April 6, 1830, had, however, modified the
tariff by permitting the importation of lumber and all kinds
of provisions, free of duty for two years in the ports of Gal-
veston and Matagorda only,* but many indispensable arti-
cles were still the subject of prohibition, and others were
subject to the high duties imposed by the Mexican tariff.
; The imposition of even low duties would have caused
j irritation, for the people had become used to a condition of
I absolute freedom of trade. As the country had been grad-
ually settled, trade had increased, small merchants had
I established themselves, and merchants, masters and own-
\ ers of vessels, and colonists had all flourished upon a direct
^and tmrestricted commerce with the United States. In

> Filiiola, Ouerra de T^as, I, 158. * Dublan y Lozano, 11, 26, 109.

' Art. 13; ibid.^ 239. Matagorda had been made a port of entry directly
after independence was secured; Galveston only on Oct. 17, 1825.

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 199

\
\

axidition, there was a feeling; not very unnatural under the \
drcuEGistanceS; that it was unjust to be asked to pay taxes to \
WL government which had never expended a sin^e dollar for \
tJie benefit of the commimity. The Mexican government, \
It is true, had given them land; but, it was argued, the
land was worthless to the donor, as not a Mexican could be
liired to live on it, and it continued worthless until the labor
of the American colonists had given it value. These col-
onists, it was said, who were now ordered to pay taxes,
liad been compelled to defend their lives, liberty, and
property against savage enemies as best they might; and
ilie government had not only failed to give them pro-
tection, but it had never opened a road, or a school, or a
court-house.

If it had been humanly possible for the colonists to sup-
ply their wants in Mexican markets, the result of a high
tariff, rigidly enforced, might have been at worst an in-
crease in prices; but Mexican markets were either inacces-
sible or inadequate. The nearest places at which Texan
merchants could have been supplied were San Luis Potosl
and Tampico. From any of the American settlements in
Texas the distance to San Luis was not less than seven
hundred mfles, a large part of which was over waterless
deserts and was constantly subject to the raids of Apache
and Comanche Lidians. As a commercial highway, this
was plainly impossible; and indeed it was not suggested
by Alaman, who looked hopefully to a coastwise trade,
which, however, he admitted, did not then exist, to supply
the needs of the colonists. With some legislative encourage-
ment he believed that vessels from Yucatan might be in-
duced to imdertake coasting voyages to the northward of
Matamoros, and this, he thought, would be of the greatest
importance for "nationalizing" the department of Texas.^
It was with a view to inaugurating such a system of water-
borne commerce that the coasting trade was thrown open
to American vessels for a period of four years.
Texan consumers, being thus prohibited by law from im-

^ Filisola, U, 609, 610.

\Y\

200 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

porting from the United States many articles of daily use;
and being imable to procure them in Mexico, were in effec
reduced to the choice of two alternatives — ^to go without o:
to smuggle — ^and. they chose the latter. Their choice w
the easier from the fact that there were almost innumerabl
pointS; both on the searcoast and along the land frontier^
through which contraband importations were easily poa
sible, unless indeed a very vigilant and very incorruptibl
set of watchmen was constantly employed. Mier y
saw clearly that, if the law was to be enforced, it must
with a strong hand; but the limited means which the govern
ment had placed at his disposal compelled him to sen<
boys to do men's work.
His plans embraced two principal features: the

lishment of a number of military posts within supporting'
distance of each other, and the introduction of large num-
bers of Mexican colonists. The second part of this pro-
gramme, to his great surprise and annoyance, failed utterly,
although Congress, by the law of April 6, 1830, had appro-
priated half a million dollars for the purpose, and although
he had used every means of persuasion to interest the gov-
ernors of the several states in a plan for sending poor fam-
ilies to Texas at the public expense.^

The military part of his programme, however, was in a
measure carried out, though the number of troops at Terdn's
disposal was absurdly insufficient to ,overawe such a popu-
lation as he had to deal with — men who were hardened by
recurrent Indian warfare and who thought much better of
a Comanche than they did of a Mexican. A hundred Mexi-
can Indians, even though they were dressed in the imiform

' Filisola, I, 162-165; see also page 289 of the same volume, where the
ayuntamiento of B^xar complains of the sacrifice of public money involyed
in bringing men to Texas roped together {"para la conduccidn de cuerdas").
It would appear that some minor criminals were sent under guard to fonn
settlements, but with disastrous results. The ayuntamiento declared that "it
is necessary to blot the newly formed villages from the map of Mexico, and put
the points in which they were founded into the desert once more; since at
least of the Mexicans who lived there, not a single one has remained, and even
the troops who were stationed there have returned to this city beaten and
exhausted." This seems to refer to encounters with the Indians— not the
American colonists.

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 201

of the republic, remote from all possible reinforcement or
supplies, could hardly be counted on to restrain* for very
long the well-armed frontiersmen who outnumbered them
at every point; and there were few of Terdn's posts that
had even a himdred men.

The most important garrison was, of course, on Galves-
ton Bay. It was situated at Andhuac, and was under the
command of Colonel John Davis Bradbum, a Kentuckian
by birth, who had taken part in Mina's unfortunate expedi-
tion in 1817 and had remained in Mexico ever since. He
seems to have been considered a good officer by the Mexi-
cans, but he impressed the colonists as a harsh and unrear
sonable tyrant, and indeed appears to have been very ill
qualified for the discharge of his extremely delicate duties.
He was set to play, on a smaller stage, the part that Gen-
eral Gage had played in Boston sixty years before, and he
achieved a similar ill success. The very fact that he was
not a native Mexican must have told against him, for in
the eyes of the settlers he was a renegade as well as an op-
pressor.

A number of small but irritating controversies soon arose
between the colonists and the Mexican officers. Immi-
grants were stopped and turned back at the frontiers.
State officials engaged in surveying and issuing grants to
settlers were illegally arrested. Almost all the concessions
to empresarios were - declared by Bradbum to be "sus-
pended." The establishment of a mimicipal government at
the village of Liberty, and the election of an alcalde and
ayimtamiento were also arbitrarily and quite illegally an-
nuUed, although apparently regular under the state laws,
and a new village government was set up imder his own eye
at An^uac. And Bradbum refused to give up two run-
away negroes from the United States who had found their
way to his post.

Even more serious difficulties occurred in connection with
the collection of customs at the Brazos River. Although
not established as a port of entry, vessels from the United
States had long been in the habit of coming some miles up

202 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the river to Brazoria;^ and Terdn^ in order; aa he saidi
to meet the views of the colonists, directed that a receiver
of customs, Subordinate to the collector of Galveston Bay,
should be stationed at Velasco, at the mouth of the river.
This measure, owing to administrative technicalities, proved
unworkable, as vessels were required to report at Galves-
ton or Andhuac after discharging their cargoes, before they
could receive a clearance. The inhabitants along the river
sided, of course, with the masters of the schooners, espe-
cially when they were charged with smuggling guns and am-
munition. On December 15, 1831, matters were brought to
a crisis by three schooners — ^the Ticson,^ Nelson, and Sabine
— refusing to pay tonnage dues and sailing out of the river
without proper clearances. They were fired upon by the
little detachment of Mexican troops at the mouth of the
river, and returned the fire — neither party having artillery
— and a Mexican soldier was wounded. Ter&a was ex-
tremely angry. He directed that the owners of the cai^oes
brought by the three schooners should pay the tonnage
dues, and that if the schooners should ever return with the
same crews to Texas they should be detained imtil those
who had wounded the soldier should be given up for trial.
Nevertheless, the Sabine was back in Brazoria on the twenty-
ninth of January, 1832, this time with two cannon in her
cargo. Naturally, the colonists laughed. They went further,
and knocked down and maltreated one of the custom-house
employees, and so frightened Lieutenant Pacho, the re-
ceiver of customs, that he literally took to the woods and

yKbandoned his post.'

^ These disorders finally culminated in an open conflict in
May, 1832, when Bradbum, entirely without warrant of
law, arrested seven of the colonists living near Andhuac,

^ The practice of landing goods without entering at an established custom-
house was illegal and led to some diplomatic correspondence. — (Cafiedo to
Poinsett, April 8, 1828; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 234.)

* This vessel is also referred to as the Tyson. — (Montoya to Livingston, April
9, 1832; ibid. J 673.) Her real name was very likely the Texan,

* Filisola, 1, 186. Pacho, he says, "se intemd d pU par erUre las espemras y
malezaa de aqueUos basques, en donde pas6 la noche, para diriffirse el dia nguienie
d la parte mds seffura,**

MEXICO TAKES ORDER WITH THE TEXANS 203

who were charged with participation in some riotous pro-
ceedings.* The men arrested were well known and liked
by their neighbors, and the embattled farmers of the vi-
cinity determined to release them by force of arms. On
June 9, a body of perhaps a hundred and fifty or two
hundred men advanced on the fort at Andhuac; but after
some desultory firing, which lasted for two or three days
without serious result, an arrangement was made by which
Bradbum agreed to surrender the seven prisoners, and the
colonists agreed to retire from the fort and release some
cavalrymen they had captured. The colonists withdrew,
or appeared to withdraw, and released their prisoners; but
Bradbum failed to release his. He alleged later that he
kept them because the colonists had only pretended to with-
draw, and had left men in Andhuac who were to "rush" the
fort as soon as the gates were opened. Whatever the truth
might be in this regard, the Texans were furious at what
they considered Bradbum's treachery, and w^re more de-
termined than ever to take the fort. But to do this they
found that artillery was needed, and they sent to Brazoria
for the two guns which had been acquired by the settlers.
Bradbum, on his part, availed himself of the lull in hos-
tilities by sending for reinforcements from the neighboring
Mexican posts. However, the officers to whom he appealed
had their own diflficulties to contend with, and he was left
to withstand as best he could the coming storm.

The colonists foimd themselves imable to send the two
gims by land for reasons which a glance at the map will
show, and therefore had them shipped on the schooner
Brazoria^ to be sent round by way of Galveston. Here
they met with a new dUemma, for the officer commanding
at Velasco naturally declined to permit the schooner to sail.
That post had been strengthened in the previous April and
now possessed a garrison of over a hundred men who had
one piece of artillery and were strongly intrenched. It

* The accounts of this affair are conflicting, but the evidence is collected in
The Disturbances at Andhuac in 1832/' by Miss Edna Rowe, Tex, Hist,
Quar., VI, 280-282.

204 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

became necessary, therefore, to capture Velasco before pro-
ceeding to the siege of Andhuac.

Early in the morning of June 26, 1832, the attack was
begun. After a day's lively firing, in which the Brazoria,
protected by bulwarks of cotton bales, and the two famous
guns bore leading parts, the Mexican ammimition was ex-
*hausted, and the garrison surrendered. The casualties on
both sides were serious, considering the small numbers
engaged.*

Without any further fighting, the seven prisoners at
Andhuac were released a week later, and on July 13 that
post also was evacuated by the Mexicans. The fall of
Andhuac, however, was not by any means due solely to
dread of the Texan riflemen. An unusually well-planned
and well-executed revolt against Bustamante's adminis-
tration had broken out at home, and under the lead of
General Santa Anna was evidently gaining strength. The
prospect of the early success of this rising and the conse-
quent overthrow of the national administration exercised a
powerful influence over the minds of the oflScers of all the
Uttle Mexican garrisons, who naturally wished to be on the
winning side, and some account of Santa Anna's exploits
during the year 1832 is necessary before the later events
in Texas can be related.

' On the Mexican side there were five killed and sixteen wounded; on the
Texan, seven killed, fourteen wounded. — (Tex. Hist. Quar., Yl, 292.) The offi-
cial report of Lieutenant-Colonel Ugartechca, the Mexican commander, is
summarixed by Filisola, Guerra de T^as, I, 199-209. The schooner Bnuoria
was so much damaged in the attack that her ownors abandoned her to the
underwriters, who claimed over seven thousand dollars from the Mexican
government for a total loss. — (McLane to Butler, Dec. 31, 1833; H. R. Doc.
351, 25 Ckmg., 2 seas., 115.)

•HAPTER EX

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL

The irritating question of Texas had not been the only
source of anxiety to President Bustamante and his cabinet,
for from the very commencement of his administration
there had hardly been a day when some ambitious leader
was not heading an qpen revolt against the government.

Trouble had broken out first in the south, where vigorous
but intennittent fighting went on through most of the year
1830. In October of that year the ex-President, Guerrero,
emerged from his hiding-place and joined the southern in-
surgents, but was defeated early in January, 1831, by his
old rival. Bravo, who had been pardoned and allowed to
return from exile. A few days later Guerrero was taken,
apparently by a contemptible piece of treachery, under-
went a form of trial by court-martial, and was sentenced
and executed.

Outbreaks in various parts of the coimtry continued, but
were put down without serious difficulty. But on January
2, 1832, a much more serious mutiny than most of such
afifairs broke out in Vera Cruz. The garrison " pronoimced "
against the government, and issued a proclamation inviting
General Santa Anna to join them and put himself at the
head of a movement which they proposed to carry forward,
with a view to eflfecting an entire change in Bustamante's
cabinet. . The movement was only the usual attempt to turn
out one set of office-holders in order to put in another. No
change in the form of government was proposed as a jus-
tification for the revolution ; and indeed the movement was
annoimced as one intended to support and enforce the
federal Constitution.^

1 Suarez, Hiataria de Mtrico, 26^-265.

205

206 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Santa Anna, who had been living quietly at his hacJenff a
since he had defeated the Spaniards at Tampico in 182^3^
accepted the invitation to head the revolt, put all the mone^-^r
in the custom-house at Vera Cruz into his pocket, and wrote ^
very respectful letter advising the Ministers of Foreign Relfii^
tions and of War to resign. These men, "hard of hearty
says Santa Anna in his memoirs, ''and well satisfied with the
offices they occupied, were annoyed" ("se molestaron*') at
this request, and even exhibited some degree of warmth in
their refusal to comply with his modest advice.^ A civil
war followed, which was prosecuted more or less vigorously
through several states, and lasted imtil December, 1832,
when Bustamante abdicated.

The plans of the opponents of the government had become
enlarged during the progress of the struggle. They were no
longer content with merely dismissing Bustamante's cabi-
net, but insisted also on getting rid of Bustamante himself
and of installing Pedraza in his place, although the latter
had resigned his claims to the office of President four years
before, and had left the coimtry. He was now brought
back and was willing to serve for the short remainder of the
term for which, he had once been elected. This arrange-
ment being finally agreed to by the military conmiandeis
on both sides, Pedraza took the oath of office as President
on December 26, 1832, and served without molestation imtQ
the first of April following.

The existence of a state of civil war had prevented the
election of a new President in September, as required by
the Constitution; and it was therefore agreed, as part of
the plan of settlement, that on the first day of March,
1833, the several state legislatures should vote for Presi-
dent and Vice-President; that the votes should be opened
on March 26; and that the result of the election should be
announced on or before March 30. On that day the
Congress, which seems to have been an obedient tool in the
hands of the army, declared that Santa Anna and (j6mez
Farias had received the largest number of votes, and had

> Ibid., 266; Santa Anna, Mi Hiataria, 26.

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 207

been duly elected President and Vice-President, respec- \
tively.

Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna; who was destined for the
next fifteen years to play the most conspicuous part in the
affairs of his country^ was a native of Jalapa^ where he was
bom February 21, 1795. When fifteen years old he had
obtained the place of gentleman cadet in the infantiy regi-
ment of Vera Cruz, having furnished the proof of gentle
birth (hidalguia) then required. For the next five years
he served in the King's troops in Texas and Nuevo San-
tander. Thenceforward, during the war of independence, he
served in the neighborhood of Vera Cruz, and was princi-
pally engaged in trying to suppress such guerilla chiefs as
Victoria and Guerrero. He gradually rose through the
various grades, and near the end of the war was promo
by the viceroy Venadito to the rank of lieutenant-colonel,
receiving at the same time the cross of the order of Isabel
la Cat6hca.^

When the plan of Iguala was proclaimed Santa Anna
hastened to join Iturbide, and took an active part in the
final struggle against the Spanish troops; but nevertheless
he was not well regarded by Iturbide. As he considered
himself slighted, Santa Anna was among the first to proclaim
the repubUc. Under Victoria's administration he was
given conmiand in Yucatan, and later was made governor
of the state of Vera Cruz. He headed, as we have seen, the
first rising against Pedraza, but was very nearly defeated.
In 1829 Guerrero put him in command of the forces which
opposed the Spanish invasion, and his success on that oc-
casion naturally brought him into popular favor.

Santa Anna was shrewd enough to retire at that time
from active service, waiting till an opportunity offered of
getting something really worth while. All through his
career he showed himself curiously imwilling to take up the
ordinary duties and routine of public life. These he left
to others. For himself he preferred the spectacular. He
eared little for the growth and prosperity of his coimtry.

^ Santa Anna, Mi Historia^ 1-3.

208 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

For his own wealth and aggrandizement he was jdwayssai
deeply concerned.

In person he was of a good height, about five feet tea.
incheS; slight; with an intelligent and expressive counte-
nance. His hair was dark; his complexion was de-
scribed as "olive"; his manners were excellent and, at^
least in later years, he wore an habitual expression of placid
sadness. He had little education, and no taste for let-
ters; and he neither read nor spoke ^y language but
his own.

He loved luxury and public display. As far as he could
he lived a life of pleasure, and his pleasures were not re-
fined. He valued money for what it procured him, and he
was never particular as to how the money came. He was
ambitious, not for love of power, far less from a desire to
benefit Mexico, but for the simple reason that high office
was in his case the shortest and surest road to wealth.
Offices, contracts, and concessions yielded him a handsome
revenue, and so long as the stream flowed on he was con-
tent to let his associates attend to the public business.

He could be enormously energetic on occasion, and when
he thought it needful to strike he struck hard. He thor-
oughly imderstood his countrymen, and he therefore always
stood for the cause of the army, and generally for the cause
of the church. He realized perfectly that it was necessary,
on occasion, to fight in order to maintain his prestige; but
he did not fight because he loved fighting. He fou^t at
first in order to bring himself into notice, and afterward
in order to keep himself in power, for unbroken success
against all recurring military mutinies was an essential con-
dition of his retaining the presidency; and the presidency,
with its opportunities for money-making, was essential to
his enjoyment of life.

He was not a good general. As an organizer his talents
were unrivalled in Mexico, owing to his fiery energy and
the hold he had on the imagination of his coimtrymen. But
he knew little of strategy, and, owing perhaps to want of
sustained diligence and attention to details, such plans as

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 209

he made constantly miscarried. He was almost always
defeated in serious warfare.*

He had no political principles. Those which he pro-
cessed at any moment were invariably capable of instant
change. He was true, as Lowell said of Caleb Gushing, to
me party, and that was himself; but he so managed his
affairs as to conmiand, for long periods of time, the enthu-
dastic support of those who created pubhc opinion in
Mexico.

Cj6mez Farias, the new Vice-President, differed in every
respect from Santa Anna. Most of the principal Mexican
officials had held high military rank. Farias had never
3een in the army. He had been bred a physician, and had
levoted himself seriously to the practice of his profession.
Ee had taken no active part in the revolution against Spain;
ae seems never to have figured in politics until the reign of
[turbide; and he never held any important office imtil he
oecame Secretary of the Treasury on the fall of Bustamante,
it the end of the year 1832.

n Santa Anna had no poUtical principles, Farias had
3nly too many. He was a philosophical radical, whose
system, says his enemy Alaman, was formed on the study
3f Diderot and other writers of the eighteenth century.^
5e had a considerable following in both houses of Con-
jress, who represented a reaction from Bustamante's des-
potic government, and who set to work with great energy,
IS soon as Congress met, to pass laws regulating anew all
ihe affairs of the nation, and correcting every abuse that
Kjcurred to them. Santa Anna carefully avoided taking
my part in their activities. If the measures which the
■eformers passed proved popular, it would be time enough
x) come forward and claim credit for them. If they proved
mpopular, he could easily denounce the folly of Congress.

The Texan colonists naturally saw in Santa Anna merely
;he leader of a vigorous revolt against the arbitrary acts

* The "love of idleness, tempered by the aptitude for violent action," and
he disinclination for "sustained and detailed labor," according to a philo-
ophical traveller, are typical Spanish traits. See Ellis, The Soul of Spairif 37.

* Drfensa del ez-MinUtro D. Liicaa Alaman^ MexioOi 1834, Introd., xx.

210 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

of Bustamante's ministers^ and therefore a welcome aOy.
They probably knew very Uttle of his real character or
antecedents; but it was quite enough for them that he was
fighting against BustamantC; and that he loudly supported
the federal Constitution. It is therefore not at all surpris-
ing to find the Texan insurgents, in their camp before
AndhuaC; passing resolutions in which they expressed their
approval of 'Hhe firm and manly resistance which is made
by the highly talented and distinguished chieftain General
Santa Anna/' and pledged their ''lives and fortunes in the
support ... of the distinguished leader who is now so gal-
lantly fighting in defence of civil liberty." ^

At the time when these resolutions were adopted (June,
1832) Santa Anna's success appeared to be assured; and
this meant to the Texans the downfall of their enemy Gen-
eral Terdn, who had honestly and steadfastly supported the
administration of Bustamante against serious odds.' Oa
May 13, 1832, Terdn had been disastrously defeated by
Santa Amia's followers at Tampico, and on the same day"
the government forces, who had been besieging Santa Aims^
in Vera Cruz, were compelled to retreat. Four day£^
later Bustamante had accepted the resignation of his min —
isters.

The influence of this turn in affairs upon the garrisons in -
Texas was very marked. The settlers were declaring for^
Santa Anna, and any officer who opposed Santa Anna's^
friends rail a very great risk of finding himself on the wrong -
side politically. Some of the officers were in favor of siding
with the colonists and boldly declaring for Santa Anna
and the plan of Vera Cruz; others were for a more pru-

» "The Disturbances at AnAhuac," in Tex. Hist. Quar., VI, 287. This dec-
laration, according to an old settler, was not because the Texans liked Santa
Anna particularly, "for we had no more confidence in one Mexican than an-
other. . . . The fact is, we were determined to protect ourselves from insult
and injury." — ("Reminiscences of Henry Smith," Tex. Hist, Qtuxr.f XIV, 44.)

* He had advised Bustamante, when Santa Anna's revolt first began, that
the ministry ought to resign at once, as they would be compelled to do so sooner
or later. He was, however, opposed, on principle, to all military revolutions,
and had invariably declined to take part in them. — (Filisola, Querra de TijoB,
1, 573.)

SANTA ANNA IN CX)NTROL 211

dent line of policy^ and among the latter was Colonel Pie-
dras, the commander at Nacogdoches.

On May 31; 1832, more than a fortnight after his defeat
at Tampico, Terdn had ordered Piedras to go from Nacog-
doches to Andhnac and to ''take suitable measures to pacify
the disturbances.'' The order does not seem to have
reached Piedras until after the attack had been made on
the fort on the ninth of Jime and following dajrs. At any
rate, he did not leave Nacogdoches imtil near the end of the
month. On the way he was captured by the Texans, but
was immediately released upon giving his word that Brad-
bum's seven prisoners should be surrendered.

Piedras finally arrived at Andhuac on the first day of
July; and on the next day he took over the command from
Bradbum. Within a week he had given up the seven pris-
oners; settled affairs in the garrison; and was on his way
back to his post. He had effectually allayed the local ex-
citement by yielding all the causes of it.

BradburU; however, had refused to resume conmiand of
the post; and Piedras left with him a sort of certificate of
character which throws a clear light on the difficulties ex-
perienced by the Mexicans in dealing with the rough and
eneiigetic settlers whom they were tiying to bring under
control.

"There is no doubt," wrote Piedras, "Jthat the Texan colonists have
plans for separating from the Mexican government, which are encour-
aged and promoted by Austin's men; and that as this opinion is not
yet genendly held, they avail themselves of pretexts to put it forward
and prepare the minds of all. As the political situation of the govern-
ment is excessively critical, and as it is exhausted by internal con-
vulsions, the troops not occupied in the present revolution of Santa
Anna are left without money, and no hope is afforded us of receiving
early aid of any kind. And considering also the dangerous situation
in which the military detachments in this department are placed —
wanting in supplies and men, and scattered at such enormous dis-
tances that it is not feasible, even if they should make the greatest
efforts, to give each other support — it is proper, according to my way
of thinking, for us to conduct ourselves in the present circumstances
with the most cautious policy" ("Za mayor polUica").^

» Filiflola, I, 213.

212 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Piedras then went on to explain his idea of a cautioi
policy. He proposed to give the colonists fair words^
grant all their requests, to keep on building forts, and
urge the government to send such reinforcements and suj^-
plies as might enable the Mexican troops at last ''to chas-
tise the insolence of the colonists, who now prevail by force
of numbers, and are trying to withdraw themselves from
obedience to the laws." ^

He had, however, hardly started on his return to Nacog*
doches before the Andhuac garrison "pronounced" in favor
of Santa Anna and decided to leave Texas. They found no
difficulty in chartering two schooners, and the greater part
of the force sailed away on July 13, 1832, leaving behind
them Bradbum and some other officers, together with the
few cavalrymen who formed a part of the garrison. Those
who were left marched peaceably ofif toward Matamoros;
all but Bradbum, who, believing his life in danger, made
his way in disguise overland to the United States. On the
road he met a great many Americans, who told him they
were going to help their brethren "throw the Spaniards
out of Texas"; and he was assured that it would be easy
to enlist four thousand men in Louisiana alone for such an
enterprise.* He reached New Orleans without adventure,
and ultimately returned to Mexico.

As the garrison of Andhuac sailed out over Galveston
bar they met two armed Mexican schooners with four or
Sve tni»rts coming in and bringmg . body of some two
hundred and fifty troops under the command of Colonel
Jos6 Antonio Mejla, an adherent of the plan of Vera Cruz.
As all were now on the same side in the revolution, the new
invaders put to sea again, and the imited forces made sail
for Tampico to give their support to the victorious cause of
Santa Anna.

Mejfa had left Tampico about the middle of June, with
the object of reducing the towns on the coast of Tamaulipas,
and had occupied Matamoros on June 29. At Matamoros
he learned of the events in Texas and of an armistice just

' Pnd,, 214. > See his report, ibid., 21^224.

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 213

signed between the contending forces near Vera Cruz. The
small garrison of government troops which had abandoned
Matamoros on Mejfa's approach had not retreated far, and
on July 6 an agreement was arrived at between the respec-
tive commanders, under which Mejfa undertook to restore
the town to the government and to relieve the beleaguered
posts at Velasco and Andhuac, upon condition that the
government oflBicials should furnish him with all needed
supplies. In the meantime the statvs quo was to be main-
tained in Matamoros.

It so happened that Stephen F. Austin was then in Matar
moros on his way back from attending a session of the state
legislature. He had been trying with some success to in-
duce the Mexican authorities to send pacific orders to the
tropps in Texas. News had just come of Terdn's suicide,
induced partly by his military reverses and partly, it would
seem, by some family difficulties.^ Austin's best chance of
securing peace was obviously to go with Mejfa to Velasco,
i^hich he did; and the whole expedition reached the Brazos
lUver about July 16, 1832. The Mexican garrison from
Telasco was at that moment actually on the march to Matar
moros, and the relief expedition had come too late.

Mejfa and Austin were, however, received with enthu-
siasm by the colonists. An address was presented to the
former, assuring him that the late rising had been solely
directed against the "arbitrary and unconstitutional meas-
ures of the administration of Bustamante," as evidenced by
the acts of Terdn and Bradbum. A dinner was given at
which many patriotic toasts were (proposed in the fashion
of the day. And ' delegates from the neighboring ayxmtaf-
mientos adopted res0lutions declaring their adherence to
the principles of Santa Anda's party, their desir^ to co-oper-
ate heartily in the glorious work of political regeneration

^ FHisols believed that he had been murdered. — (Giterra de T^as, I, 184,
249.) " Teiin,^* says Rivera, ' ' was one of our notable men, whether considered
as a politician, a soldier, or a man of science. ... He loved glory, but did not
believe in it when it rested on domestic revolts — a business he abandoned to
vulgar ambitions. ... He always obeyed the recognized government, and
aaserted that public convulsions are very rarely the means 6f progress."—
de Jalapa, HI, 90.)

;

214 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

in which he was engaged, and their readiness to take up
arms in defence of the independence of their adopted coun-
try and the integrity of its territory.^ No wonder Mejfa
became convinced that he was not needed in Texas.* He
went from Velasco to Galveston, and thence sailed back,
as we have seen, to Tampico.

There now remained on Texan soil only the garrisons at
B6xar and Nacogdoches, the former a small body of pre-
sidial troops living quietly in the midst of a Mexican popu-
lation and giving no annoyance to the American colonists.

At Nacogdoches, the case was different. Kedras, the
commanding oflBicer, seems to have been, on the whole,
popular with his neighbors,^ but he was opposed to Santa
Anna; and the inhabitants of the district finally decided
that he must either declare himself on that side or go. It
/ is to the colonel's credit that his ideas of a cautious policy
did not go so far as to lead him to abandon his colors with-
out a struggle. The colonists, however, were quite ready
to show their strength. A sharp skirmish followed, in whidi
Piedras was worsted, and on August 2 he evacuated the
place. He was at once pursued by the Texans, who brought
luin to bay about twenty miles south of Nacogdoches.
After an exchange of shots Piedras resigned the command
to his major, who was prompt in declaring for Santa Anna,
whereupon the whole force was allowed to march off to the
uouthwest and so out of Texas.^

By September, 1832, and for nearly three years afterward,
there was not a Mexican soldier in Texas except the inof-
forwive little troop at B6xar. The collectors of customs

I Hw) the text of these documents m Edward's Hist, of Texas^ 184^190.

( Auntin wrote two years later that Mejia's expedition was a miracle, and the
imprfMiiion was not far wrong. See his letter of Aug. 25, 1834, in Edward's
im. of Texas, 214.

* FilbiolA accuses Piedras of being engaged in business in Nacogdoches, and
<if monopolixing all the most lucrative import trade from New Orleans, which,
hp Miyii produced local discontent. But Filisola disapproved of Piedras.
^{Guerra de Tijaa, I, 262.)

<T1m report of John W. Bullock, "Colonel commanding'' dated Naoog-
Jq^Ii^ Aug. 9, 1832, begins, "I have the pleasure to announce to you that
Ikto POit surrendered io the Santa Anna flag on the 5th inst."— (Brown» I,

IN.)

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 215

also departed, unable, as they said, to endure the untam* |
able spirit {los genios discolos) of the inhabitants.^ But H
although almost all the visible signs of Mexican domina- 1 '
tion had been thus got rid of, there were serious questions /
remaining, to which it behooved the colonists to find an/
answer.

What was to be the future of Texas? Was it to remain a
province of Mexico, subject to the hazards of an ill-defined,
not to say arbitrary, jurisdiction, by military oflBicers? Should
it seek to become an independent nation? Or should it go
further and try to secure incorporation into the United
States? One thing at least was certain, and that was that

the existing chaotic condition of things could not long en- ^^

dure.

It is not easy at this day to form a satisfactory judgment
as to what was then the general public opinion in Texas in
relation to these questions. Piedras, Bradbum, Terdn, Fili-
sola, and other Mexican officers, who had good opportunities
for observation, were unanimous in reporting that there
was a strong sentiment in favor of separation. Doubtless
that was true. There could have been no genuine loyalty
felt toward Mexico on the part of the settlers from the
United States, and there were hot-headed people on both
Bides of the American boundary line who were loud in pro-
claiming that Texas was strong enough to defend herself
against the whole power of Mexico, and that she might well
declare her independence. But such loose talk could hardly
have influenced those who had anything like a sober appre-
ciation of the apparent relative strength of Mexico and
Texas. Texas was weak in numbers, poor, without credit,
and possessed hardly a semblance of organized government.
Every consideration of expediency seemed, therefore, at
that time to be against an attempt to force a separation.
The public utterances of all the organs of public opinion
continued to be in favor of adhering to Mexico, and the
evidence seems, on the whole, to show that in the autmnn

> Filisola, 1, 301. One amiable collector continued for some time at Copano,
but declined to examine the effects of settlers. — (Kennedy, U, 34.)

216 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

of 1832 there was a decided sentiment in Texas against
independence.^

If the support of the United States government could
have been assured it would have been another matter; buW
there is a total want of evidence to show that there was thee-
smallest idea in any responsible quarter of giving aid to a*
revolution. It was known that both Adams and Jackson,
had expressed a desire to buy Texas; but it is as clearly^
proved as any negative can be that neither of them had
resorted to any imderhand means of attaining their object.
Adams did indeed, in later years, accuse Jackson of having
secretly encouraged a projected filibustering expedition from
Arkansas in 1830; but the accusation was rather absurd
on its face, and has since been effectually disproved.*

In this condition of their affairs, the best hope of secure
ing some satisfactory government seemed to the colonists
to Ue in having Texas constituted a separate state of the
Mexican repubUc. Many of them looked forward to the
establishment of a vigorous and eflScient local government,
in which the common law of England would be administered,
and in which the immunities guaranteed by the bill of rights
would form the basis of individual freedom.

The procedure for effecting the establishment of a new
state was perfectly familiar to the inhabitants of the Mis-
sissippi valley, where precedents were abundant. In par-
ticular, the case of Kentucky was almost precisely in point,
for she had sought her separation from Virginia upon grounds
that were in all important respects identical with those
upon which Texas now sought her separation from Coahuila.
TTie methods then successfully adopted were closely fol-
lowed.

The first step was the holding of a general convention,
which met at San Felipe on Monday, the first of October,
1832, upon the call of the alcaldes of San Felipe, and which
sat imtil the following Saturday. Fifty-six delegates as-

» See Tex. Hist. Quar., XIII, 261 ; ibid., VIII, 247. Reinte des Deux Mandes,
April 15, 1840, 4 ser., XXII, 227.

'The subject is disposed of in E. C. Barker's ''President Jackson and the
Texas Revolution," Amer. Hist. Rev., XII, 788 et aeq.

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 217

sembled; representing pretty much all the English-speaking
districts except Goliad, and the delegates from Goliad, who
arrived after the convention finally adjourned, concurred
unreservedly in all that was done.

A number of subjects were discussed. It was agreed to
petition for separate statehood, for the settlement of land .
titles, for the creation of a new ayuntamiento in the region
between the San Jacinto and the Sabine rivers, and for the
grant of lands to support schools. "In view of the ex-
posed condition^ of the country to Indian depredations,"
a. provisional regulation for the militia was agreed to. But
the most urgent matters appeared to the members of the
convention to be the reform of the customs tariff and the
xepeal of the law which prohibited citizens of the United
States from becoming settlers.

As to the tariff, it was agreed to petition the Mexican
Congress to permit the importation free of duty for three
years of such necessary articles as provisions, machinery,
tools, cotton bagging, clothing, shoes and hats, household
furniture, powder, lead and shot, medicines and books.

"The foregoing articles, "^ said a proposed memorial, "include the
principal imports made use of and wanted by the inhabitants of
Texas. Many of them are prohibited, and on those which are allowed
to be introduced the duties are so high that they amount to prohibi-
tion. The trade of Texas is small and the resources limited, but if
fostered by a liberal policy on the part of the general government,
it will, in a few years, yield a revenue of no small importance."

On the question of the repeal of the law against American
settlers, another memorial, long and rhetorical, was imani-
mously adopted. The law of 1830, it was declared, implied
an xmwarranted suspicion of the fidelity of the settlers to
the Mexican Constitution. The lands of Texas, which had
been given them, were in no true sense a gratuity; for these
were granted on condition that they should be redeemed
from a state of nature, a condition which could only be
fulfilled by toil and privation, patience and enterprise, and
loss of life from Indian hostilities. The only portion of^ the

218 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

conduct of the settlers which could be tortured into anything
like disloyalty was the Fredonian disturbance in 1826, which
was the work of only fifteen or twenty men and was "op-
posed by ninety-nine hundredths of the settlers and which
was quieted by their zeal and patriotism." They had in-
deed imited with "the heroic and patriotic General Santa
Anna," to vindicate liberty and the Constitution. It would
have been easy at that time to declare and battle for inde-
pendence. Why had they not done so?

" Because in the honest sincerity of our hearts, we assure you, and
we call Almighty God to witness the truth of the assertion, we did
not then, and we do not now, wish for independence. No I there is
not an Anglo-American in Texas whose heart does not beat high for
the prosperity of Mexico; who does not cordially and devoutly wish
that all parts of her territory may remain united to the end of time."

The law of 1830, said the memorial, was destruction to
the prospects of. Texas. Experience had shown that native
Mexicans would not settle in it, nor would "Europeans of
the right description," and all hope of the growth and pros-
perity of the country depended therefore on people from
the United States, against whom alone the door was closed,

The convention then, having adopted the measures above
referred to, agreed to send two delegates to Saltillo and the
city of Mexico to present the several memorials to the
federal and state governments; but for some reason the
persons selected prudently found themselves "unable to
go." And finally the convention appointed a central com-
mittee, whose duty it was to correspond with the subordi-
nate local committees, to inform them concerning objects
of general interest, and in case of emergency to call another
general meeting.^

For some reason, not now very clearly apparent, the cen-
tral committee thought it wise to summon a new conven-
tion. "The suddenness with which the [first] convention
had been convoked and the non-attendance of a number

^ See Journal of the Convention in Gammd's Laws of Teaas, I, 477-503;
and Brown, I, 197-213.

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 219

of the ddegates" is the reason generally assigned; ^ but the
complete and final success of Santa Anna and the disap-
pearance of Bustamante's government may also have been
facts that influenced the decision.^

On the first day of March, 1833, the elections for the
new convention were duly held, and the delegates met
again at San FeUpe, on the first of April, the day of the
inauguration of Santa Anna and G6mez Farias as President
and Vice-President of the repubUc. During the thirteen
days which the sessions of this convention lasted, the mem-
bers adopted a tentative Constitution for the proposed new
state, a resolution condemning the African slave trade, and
an address to the Mexican Congress.'

The proposed Constitution followed the general lines of
such instruments in the United States. Its opening sen-
tences proclaimed the inviolable right of citizens to trial by
jury and to the writ of habeas corpus; it promised security
against unreasonable searches and seizures; it prohibited
general warrants; and it declared that no man should be
deprived of life, Uberty, or property but by due process of
law. These were the fimdamental privileges which many
generations of Englishmen and their descendants had en-
joyed; but they rested on conceptions of law and govern-
mental powers, which were not readily comprehensible in
Mexico.

The address to the Mexican Congress, which was in fact
the most important work of the convention, was admirable
in tone. In clear, straightforward, and perfectly respect-
ful language it set forth the evil results of the existing poUti-
cal situation, and the reasons for the proposed remedy. It
began by referring to the federal law of May 7, 1824,*

1 Kennedy, II, 18.

' About Nov. 1, 1833, Santa Anna addressed an official letter to President
Jackson announcing that Heaven had crowned with success the efforts of the
defenders of federal institutions and that the revolution was "entirely extin-
guished."—(H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 689. See Jackson's reply dated
Feb. 8, 1834, in ibid., 116.)

* The text of this Constitution will be found in Edward's Hiai. of Texas, 19&-
205; and of the address in Yoakum's Rial, of Texas, I, 469-482.

^ Dublan y Lozano, I, 706.

220 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

adopted by the constituent Congress, which provided that
Coahuila and Texas should form one state and also that
" so soon as Texas shall be in a condition to figure as a state
by itself, it shall inform Congress thereof for its decision"
(' ' participard al Congreso general para su resohiddn ' ') . That
time, the memorialists asserted, had now come; the union
with Coahuila had been a mere temporary expedient; the
two parts of the state were not a geographical unit, and their
respective interests and the character of their populations
were different. Coahuila was an inland region, adapted to
mining and grazing. Texas was on the seaboard, with good
harbors and a fertile soil, and was therefore fitted for com-
merce and agriculture. To the fact of the distance of Texas
from the capital of the state, and the lack of interest felt
by the people of Coahuila in her affairs, were due the impo-
tence of the local government. The Indians massacred and
robbed the oldest settlements. There was virtually no
government, and it was only the "redeeming spirit" of the
people which prevented complete anarchy. The judicial
system was inadequate to the preservation of order, the
protection of property, or the redress of wrongs.

For these and other reasons, the address asserted, the
political connection with Coahuila was daily becoming more
odious to the people, who, although mainly of foreign ori-
gin, were pledged by every moral and religious principle
and by every sentiment of honor, to dedicate their energies
to the advancement of their adopted coimtry. A system
which should redress grievances and remove causes of com-
plaint would best secure the permanent attachment of such
a population; and such a system could only be established
by admitting Texas to the equal sisterhood of states.

A committee was appointed to lay this address and an
account of the proceedings before the Mexican authorities,
and thereupon the convention adjomned and the members
went peaceably to their homes.

A few months earher the purely Mexican population of
B6xar had drawn up a separate petition to the state legis-
lature, which set forth their view of the evils from which

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 221

^exas was suflfering, and the nature of the remedies to be
pplied.^ Owing, it was said, to the want of paternal pro-
action from the government during the past hundred and
>rty years, the wretched settlements made in Texas had
ther disappeared or were suffering aU sorts of evils. Num-
ers of the inhabitants had been killed by the Indians, and
ot a few by famine and pestilence, a result due to the
idifference and apathy of the authorities. In the past
[even years ninety-seven men had been thus killed in the
eighborhood of B^xar, Goliad and Gonzales alone, without
Dunting the soldiers who had perished in the field. These
:)ldiers also had been neglected. During the past year
hey had not received a twentieth part of what was due
hem, and half of them had necessarily been discharged, so
hat there were not left seventy men imder arms in all
Texas. Another evil was that there was not and never had
)een any judicial organization, nor were there any public
chools.

As to legislation, the law of colonization was said to be
confused and inadequate, while the law of April 6, 1830,
brbidding North American immigration, had simply re-
;ulted in keeping out the best elements. North American
jettlers had redeemed the deserts, and given such an im-
pulse to agriculture and other arts as the country had
lever seen; and these same people would afiford the most
jflScacious, prompt, and economical means of destroying the
lostile Indians. The outrageous conduct of Colonel Brad-
Dum in arresting state officials at Andhuac, and the inju-
ious effect of the tariff were also dwelt upon. But the
jource of all the sufferings of Texas was traced to the want
)f a government in touch with the necessities of the people;
md a change of the capital from Saltillo to a point farther
lorth was suggested. It was also said that Texas was
mtitled to a larger representation in the state legislature.
But the more thorough and logical remedy of making Texas
nto a separate state was not proposed; and indeed such a

1 Representacidn del Ayuntamiento de Bijar, Dec. 19, 1832; Filisola, I, 273-
SOS. Copies were sent to all the other ayuntamientos of Texas.

222 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

suggestion would have been contrary to the spirit of this
document. The ayuntamiento of B^xar was calling upon
a paternal government to come and help them. The Amer-
ican settlers in their conventions at San Felipe were begging
to be allowed to help themselves. There was a world of
significance in the different attitude of the two races.

The representation from B6xar, which concurred with
the San Felipe memorial as to matters of fact and only
differed in respect to the remedy proposed, being made in
form by an official body, although it was in fact the expres-
sion of the views of all the assembled inhabitants of B^xar,^
was not objected to; but the two conventions at San Felipe
were highly disapproved of by the Mexican officials. They
considered such a^emblages contrary to law, and "derog-
atory to the supreme government,'' and in fact they were
never able to understand very clearly what was meant by
a convention or a committee.* They felt convinced, how-
ever, that the proceedings of the American colonists bore
some character which did not appear on the surface. The
real object, it was argued, could not be to secure statehood,
for the people were too few, too poor, and too ignorant to
constitute a separate state, and their efforts could only
excite the derision and hatred of the rest of the country;
nor could they wish to have Texas made into a territory,
for that implied a military government; and still less could
it be supposed that they were aiming at independence, for
that required a supply of men, arms, and money, which the
colonists did not possess. The only reasonable conclusion
appeared to be that either the cabinet at Washington or
the Southern states of the Union, under the lead of South
Carolina, were secretly intriguing to annex the rich terri-
tory of Texas. This conclusion was thought to be sup-
ported by the fact that Butler, then the United States
charge d'affaires in Mexico, had visited Texas in June,

» Filisola, I, 272.

' The governor of Coahnila and Texas directed the jefe politico to give the
ayuntamiento of San Felipe to understand that the government viewed the
recent proceedings with high displeasure, and he desired to know the true
meaning of the word "convention." — (Brown, I, 220.)

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 223

1832, with no ostensible object but to see the country;
whereas his presence, it was contended, must have deter-
mined the revolutionary movements which broke out just
at that time.^

It would no doubt have surprised the leaders of the nul-
lification movement in South Carolina to be told that while
they were preparing to resist the execution of the laws of
the United States in November, 1832, they were engaged
at the same moment in intrigues in Texas. There is, of
course, no evidence whatever that there was any such stuff
in their thoughts. That Colonel Butler may have busied
himself in secretly encouraging revolutionary movements,
is more possible. There appears to be no evidence to show
that he did; but, on the other hand, there was nothing in
his character to prove that he did not.*

Three months after the adjournment of the second San
Felipe convention — that is to say, on July 18, 1833 — ^the
indefatigable Austin arrived in the city of Mexico bearing
with him the address of the convention to the federal au-
thorities. He had no reason to anticipate an imfriendly
reception, for the new administration had been supported
by tiie Texan insurgents and was known to be liberal and
open-minded. Santa Anna himself was not at that time

1 Mtisquiz, jefe politico of B^xar, to the governor of Coahuila and Texas,
March 11, 1833; Filisola, I, 310-315.

' On July 26, 1831, the State Department granted Butler leave of absence to
"make a visit to the north of Mexico," where he desired to go on account of his
health.— (Brent to Butler; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 81.) He did not
leave the city of Mexico that year, but on Jan. 2, 1832, he wrote a private
letter to President Jackson, in which he stated that he expected, in a few days,
"to make a journey north with General Mason." — (Jackson MSS., Library of
Congress.) He remained, however, in the capital until after the eighth of
March, and he was absent until about the twentieth of June. — (H. R. Doc. 351
25 Cong., 2 sess., 437. Butler to Jackson, June 20, 1832; Jackson MSS,)
"General Mason" with whom he travelled, was John Thomson Mason, agent
for the Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company, and later accused of rather
unsavory dealings with the legislature of Coahuila and Texas concerning cer-
tain fraudulent land grants of 1834. Mason was in Saltillo on May 11, and at
the hacienda del Cojo, Tamaulipas, May 30, 1832, and reached New York
in July. See article on " John Thomson Mason," by Kate Mason Rowland, in
Tex, Hist. Qtior., XI, 167-170. Whether Butler actually went with Mason
into Texas does not appear, but it is quite probable that he did, as there was
time enough to go at least to Bixax and be back in the city of Mexico by the
twentieth of June.

224 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

taking any active part in the administration, but either
lived retired at his hacienda or occupied himself in sup-
pressing the military mutinies that were breaking out as
usual from time to time; and when Austin reached the
capital Santa Anna had just left it, with the special author-
ity of Congress, to march against General Arista, who was
conducting a revolutionary campaign that was believed to
be more or less collusive. The duties of the presidential
oflBice were being discharged by the Vice-President, G6mez
Farias.^

Farias and his followers were in the full tide of their
reforming zeal when Austin presented his plea for Texan
statehood. He no doubt expected that an appeal for greater
individual freedom for citizens of the repubKc would receive
favorable consideration from philosophers and radicals; but
theory was one thing and autonomy for foreign settlers
another, and Austin's mission was a complete failure. In
the first place, there was a technical diflBculty in the way.
The federal Coiistitution, which was adopted October 4,
1824, and therefore five months after the law which united
Texas with Coahuila, provided that a new state could only
be created out of part of an existing one by a three-f ourtli^
vote in each of the houses of Congress, ratified by three-
fourths of the state legislatures.^

But, in addition, there was never any disposition on the
part of the federal authorities to modify the legislation of
the Bustamante government respecting Texas. The tariff
and the laws relative to slavery were maintained. No
assurances were given as to continued freedom from mili-
tary control. And there was no willingness even to con-
sider separate statehood. The proposals that looked so
fair in Texas bore a very different aspect in the capital.
Granting that separate statehood might benefit the Texan
colonists, it was by no means so clear that Mexico would
benefit by building up a strong and well-organized state,

^ See proclamation of July 5, 1833; Dublan y Lozano, II, 536. AristA was
defeated and surrendered at Guanajuato on Oct. 8, 1833.
s Constitution, Art. 50, subd. vii.

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 225

composed of hardy men of foreign race and alien tongue
who were hostile, by all their traditions, to the ideals and
aspirations of the Mexican people.

The federal authorities therefore expressed themselves as
thinking that the time had not yet come when Texas could
properly be erected into an independent state, but prom-
ised to recommend to the legislature of Coahuila and Texas
the enactment of various measures for the relief of the
colonists. In one respect only did Austin gain any positive
success. He persuaded Congress to repeal the obnoxious
provisions of the law of April 6, 1830, which forbade immi-
gration from the United States,^ and with this small favor
in his baggage he set out from Mexico on the tenth of
December, 1833.

He had only got as far as Saltillo on his journey home
when he was arrested under orders from the federal govern-
ment, and was taken back to Mexico and locked up in the
old prison of the Inquisition. Following the usual custom
in cases of serious crime, he was not permitted to communi-
cate with any one, nor was he informed of the charges against
him. What these were never clearly appeared, but the
chief offence seems to have been his sending what he him-
self admitted later to be "an imprudent and perhaps an
intemperate letter" to the people of B^xar. In this he had
been rash enough to advise them to form a state govern-
ment without waiting for Congress to act, for he said if
the people did not take matters into their own hands Texas
was ruined forever.*

^ Law of Nov. 25, 1833; Dublan y Lozano, II, 637. The repeal was not to
take effect for six months. The government was authorized to expend all sums
of money necessary to colonize the uninhabited districts Cpuntoa valdioa")
of the country, and to take whatever measures it considered conducive to the
security, progress, and stability of the colonies it might establish. As no col-
onies were established under this act there was never any occasion to exercise
the magnificently vague powers thus conferred on the executive.

* Austin's diary from Dec. 10, 1833, to April 29, 1834, is printed in Tex.
Hist. Quar,, II, 183-210. It is interesting not only as giving some account of
Mexican conditions at the time, both in prison and out, but it also reveals
Austin's attitude toward Texan independence. He was honestly trying to
continue the existing Mexican connection, great as the difficulties were. See
also Tex. Hist. Quar., XIV, 155-163.

226 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The chai*geS; whatever they may have been, were never
pressed; and Austin, after ei^t months' imprisonment, was
finally released from jail as the result of important political
changes in Mexico. His friends in the United States had
tried to help him by getting the State Department to inter-
fere; but Butler, the American charg^ d'^aires, wrote that
Austin was faring better than he deserved in prison, that he
was the bitterest foe to the United States, and that he had
prevented the Mexican government's agreeing to a sale
of Texas; and so Austin got no help from that quarter.^

For over a year the radicals, under G6mez Farias, had
had things pretty much their own way and had "hustled"
Mexico to an extent which was not at all approved by a
large proportion of the influential classes. Many matters
of importance had been taken in hand. A detailed census
was decreed,* a national library was established,* and the
usury laws were abolished.^ A complete system of public
education for the federal district and the territories, under
the control of a government board headed by the Vice-
President of the republic, was enacted and the old Univer-
sity of Mexico and the Colegio de Santa Maria de TodoB
Santos were abolished.*

Taking the control of education out of the hands of the
clergy was a bold step of itself, but the party in power went
further and undertook a far-reaching reform of the church.
Tithes were abolished;^ all statutes under which monastic
vows could be enforced were repealed,^ sales of church prop-
erty were subjected to government regulation,* and the
missions in CaUfomia were secularized.'

The army also was to be reformed. The niunber of regi-
ments and battalions was reduced. The nmnber of gen-
erals of division was cut down to eight, and the number of
brigadiers to twelve.^o The engineer corps was remodelled."

1 McLane to Butler, May 26, 1834; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 seas., 141.
Butler to McLane, July 13, 1834; StaU Dept, MSS.
s Dublan y Lozano, II, 582.

» /WcJ., 575. * Ihid., 657. • Ibid., 664, 571, 563.

•/Wd.,577. »/Wd., 580. •/WcJ., 635.

• /Wd., 641, 689. " Ibid., 600. " Ibid., 601.

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 227

The militaiy school at Chapultepec was established.^ And
penalties were imposed upon officers and regiments who
''pronounced." '

Wise and liberal as the policy of G6mez Farias and his

followers may have been^ their haste in putting it into

effect was boimd to wreck the whole scheme. Nothing

but discontent and revolution could come of an attempt to

ref orm in a single year the two strongest institutions in the

country — ^the army and the church; and it is not surprising

to find risings everywhere to the cry of '^Fueros y rdigi&n!'^

(privileges and religion) . In some places the cry was " Fueros,

religi6n y Santa Anna! " for it was pretty generally believed

that the President of the republic was not at all favorable

to curtailing the privileges of the soldiery or the clei^.

It was even hinted that Santa Anna himself had instigated

some of these insurrections^ and he certainly put them all

down with rather suspicious ease.

At lengthy on April 24; 1834; Santa Anna saw that his
time had come; and he suddenly reassmned the duties of
the presidential office. The Vice-President retired from
the post of authority with his hands — to use the energetic
expression of a Mexican historian — clean of blood andi
money,' and the way was made easier for Santa Anna to
attain; what was probably his real object all along; the pos-
session of a purely dictatorial power. There werC; how-
ever, some difficulties still in the way. The old party of
the EscoceseS; and the Moderates generally; believed that
changes had gone far enough for the pt'esent; although they
were in favor of carrying out those reforms which were in
process of execution. The church and the army, however;
did not approve of this programme, and on May 23, 1834,
a reactionary plan was formally proclaimed at Cuemavaca

» Ibid,, 603. « Ibid., 647, 699, etc.

* " Dt^d d poder dictatorial can las manos limpias de sangre y de dinero," —
(Rivera, Historia de Jalapa, III, 227.) The author discusses at some length the
question whether Farias should not have seized and imprisoned Santa Anna
as an obstacle to reform, whether he was not wanting in firmness in failing to
put out of action those who were opposed to the social changes in question,
and whether he was not too scrupulous about the Ck>nstitution — ^retreating in
the face of childish obstacles and leaving the field open to the reactionaries.

228 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

which was very quickly approved by the greater part of
the country.

Briefly; the plan of Cuemavaca declared against aU pro-
scriptive laws, all religious reforms, and all toleration of
"Masonic sects"; pronounced all laws void which were con-
trary to these views; called upon Santa Anna to uphold
the constitutional safeguards; and demanded that the dep-
uties who had passed the obnoxious laws should be dismissed
"until the nation represented anew shall be reorganized
according to the Constitution and in a manner conducive
to her happiness. " ^

This meant; in plain words, that the reactionaries wished
Santa Anna to dissolve CongresS; to amend the Constitu-
tion; and meanwhile to rule as a dictator; and this he did
as rapidly as circumstances would allow. He exercised dic-
tatorship without a CongresS; without a council of govern-
ment; without state legislatures; and even without min-
isters; and at first without any opposition or obstacle.
The governors of most of the states were dismissed; and
even many ayimtamientoS; the vacant places being filled by
supporters of the plan of Cuemavaca.^

Nevertheless, by the month of July; 1834; a wide-spread
but never very vigorous revolt against reaction had broken
out. In Puebk; and especially in the northern and eastern
states — San LuiS; ZacatecaS; JaliscO; Nuevo LeoU; and Coar
huila — there was very serious discontent and troops were
sent to reduce the nearer towns to obedience. The gar-
risons of Tampico and Matamoros having "pronounced,"
any idea of a movement against Texas was necessarily
abandoned for the time being; while Coahuila seized the
opportunity to indulge in a small civil war of its own over
the question whether Saltillo or Monclova should be the
capital of the state.

After a long siegC; the city of Puebla surrendered and the
force of the revolt against Santa Anna was thereby broken.
By a manifesto dated October 15; 1834; he announced that

^ Text in Mexico d trtwSa de los Siglos, IV, 341.
* Rivera, Historia de Jalapa, III, 198, 202.

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 229

lie was determined to sustain article 171 of the Constitution,
which declared that no amendment could ever be made in
reference to the state religion, the form of government, the
liberty of the press, and the division of powers between the
federal and state authorities. Never, said a circular of the
Department of Relations, never could the President forget
that the federal system was the work of his hands, never
would he permit the fundamental bases of the Constitution
to be overthrown; all he desired was that the Congress to be
chosen in the autunm of 1834 should have power to deal
with such constitutional changes as experience had shown
were desirable.^

Busy as Santa Anna was during the summer and autunm
of 1834, he did not overlook the troublesome question of
Texas. One of his first steps after he reassumed the office
of President was to relieve Austin from his rigorous impris-
onment in the cells of the Inquisition. Austin, however,
was too important and too valuable an intermediary in
Texan affairs to be allowed to go back at once, and he was
detained in Mexico, upon one pretext or another, until the
middle of the following year.*

Santa Anna was apparently very imcertain as to the
proper course to be pursued in reference to Texas. The
notion of subsidizing native Mexicans to colonize the fron-
tier had been revived by Farias in February,' but this at-
tempt had proved no more fortunate than its predecessors,
for no Mexicans could be hired to go as colonists either to
Texas or to the Califomias. Santa Anna, however, under
pretence of making preparations to establish the colonists
contemplated by this decree, sent his aid. Colonel Almonte,
who spoke English fluently, to report on the condition of
Texas.^ He also devoted a good deal of time to hearing

' Rivera, Histaria de Jalapa, III, 218. The conservatives, " the sensible and
pious," were much alarmed by this circular. — (Mixico d troves de los Sigloa, IV,
349.)

' He left Mexico by sea about July 1, 1835, remained a short time in New
Orleans, and sailed thence in August, reaching Texas Sept. 1, 1835.

* See text of decree in Filisola, Guerra de TSjaSf II, 39-43.

* The text of his report, or so much of it as was published, is in ibid., 535-570.

230 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Austin's opinions; and to settling the disputes between the
Monclova and Saltillo factions; which had given rise to a
condition ahnost of anarchy in Coahuila. In the course
of these conversations Santa Anna posed as the friend of
the colonists; and succeeded in making Austin regard hun
as thoroughly well disposed toward Texas, and as deter-
mined to remedy the evils which had been complained of .^
Even as late as December 2, 1834. Austin wrote that every-
thmg waa now changed, thai contiDued union with Coahima
was the object to be sought; and that Santa Anna intended
to sustain the federal system if any constitutional changes
were to be made.*

It was quite true that there had been some changes for
the better. The state legislature had shown very con-
siderable liberality. New mimicipalities had been estab-
lished.' Additional representation was allotted to Texas
in the state legislature; and the use of English in transact-
ing public business was allowed.^ The sale of public lands
at auction was provided for; either to Mexicans or foreign-
ers; and the act expressly declared that "no person shall
be molested on account of his political or religious opinions;
provided he does not disturb public order."* A further
act authorized the governor to distribute four hundred
sitios of land under such rules and regulations as he might
establish; and this became the origin of a great scandal.*

Another measure which might have had important results
if it had ever been carried into effect was an act which
created a superior judicial court in TexaS; and established
for it a sort of English common-law procedure, including
trial by jury in civil cases.'' Thomas J. Chambers, an
American lawyer who had lived some time in MexicO; was

1 Austin to Perry, Aug. 25, 1834; Edward, 211. * Yoakum, I, 326.

' Laioa and Decrees of Coahuila and Texas, 242, 274.

• Ibid,, 245. Law of March 18, 1834.

• Ibid., 247. Law of March 26, 1834. This act repeals all former laws
relating to public lands, and provides that there shall be no more oontracts
for colonization; those previously executed, however, to be " religiously com-
plied with."

• Ibid., 270. Law of April 19, 1834.
f Ibid,, 254. Law of April 17, 1834.

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 231

appointed judge under this statute; but unfortunately the
state of Coahuila and Texas never had money enough to
pay the expenses of opening a court in Texas, any more
than it had ever found the money to cany out any act of
government except the issuance of grants of land; and in
the complicated controversies which now involved both
Ck)ahuila and Texas it became all the more difficult to ac-
complish an3rthing which required the spending of money.

The rather inexpensive concessions which the legislature
made to the inhabitants of Texas were by no means enough
to remove either the causes of complaint or the prevalent
distrust of the intentions of the Mexican government. In
October, 1834, even the Mexican inhabitants of Texas be-
came excited and alarmed, and the jefe politico of B6xar,
adopting for this occasion American methods, sent out a
call for a convention, to meet on November 15; and at the
same time issued a fiery proclamation urging Texas to de-
clare herself independent.^ The central committee ap-
pointed by the convention of March was, however, still in
existence, and it succeeded in putting a stop to this prema-
ture effort. In a very temperate address, issued in Novem-
ber, 1834, the coDMnittee seriously warned the people against
violent and reckless measures. The federal Constitution
of 1824, it was said, was still in force; a separate state gov-
ernment could lawfully be established under it, and none
but constitutional means ought to be resorted to for that
end; the existing Mexican government and President Santa
Anna entertained the most friendly feelings toward Texas;
any attempt to eflfect forcibly a separation from Coahuila
would invite fresh difficulties and prolong Austin's impris-
onment, and perhaps endanger his life; Texas was prosper-
ing, thanks to excellent crops and a large immigration;
and, in short, if the people of Texas would but be patient
their grievances would be remedied in the end.^

These cautious counsels undoubtedly represented the
views of the best men in Texas. "My advice to Texas,"
said Austin, "is what it has always been — ^remain quiet —

1 Text in Edward's Hiat. of Texas, 222-224. * Ibid,, 225-231.

232 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

populate the country — improve your farms — ^arid discoun-
tenance all revolutionary men and principles." ^ But these
were not the sentiments of all of the people^ and perhaps
not of a majority. No doubt the well-to-do, the farmers,
the people with property and families, deprecated hasty
action; but there can be no question that a large propor-
tion of the inhabitants of Texas, including many of Mexican
descent, were by this time strongly inclined to instant and
radical action. The conservatives, however, were well or-
ganized and well advised, and they were able, through the
whole of the year 1834, to prevent any revolutionary meas-
ures whatever.

Meanwhile the population of Texas was steadily grow-
ing m numbers, notwithstanding the restrictions of the law
of April 6, 1830. As Mexico had wholly abandoned the
attempt to guard the frontiers, "innumerable" immigrants
from the United States had continued to pour in, even dur-
ing the three years and a half that the proffibition against
American immigrants was in force. But if the law had not
affected the quantity, it was believed to have operated
against the quality of the immigration. Men of means
and men who were peaceable and industrious naturally
hesitated to settle, with their families, in Texas when their
very first step involved a plain violation of the law. On
the other hand, the door was left wide open to "adven-
turers, malefactors, and the dregs of the people," who had
nothing to lose.^ The result, therefore, of passing this law
and not enforcing it effectually was, as is usually the case
where prohibitive laws are unsupported by an efficient and
honest police, that conditions were aggravated; for while
immigration from the United States was not checked, the
conservative element was replaced by the adventurous.

The wealth of Texas had likewise increased as the farm-
ers had extended the area under cultivation, improved their
buildings, and increased the number of their cattle and

•

> Letter of Jan. 16, 1834, in Tex. Hist. Quar., XIII, 266. And see letter of
^arch 3, 1835, ibid., 270.

' Address of the Ayuntamiento of B6xar, Dec. 19, 1832; Filisola, Giurra de
T^Vw, I, 278.

SANTA ANNA IN CONTROL 233

daves. In Austin's colony alone it was estimated that the
exports of cotton for the year 1833 amounted to nearly two
oillion pounds. There were thirty cotton-gins in opera-
ion, two saw-mills, and several water-mills.^ There were
iractically no manufactures in the country, because every-
hing came in from New Orleans free of duty; and in San
rdipe and Brazoria there were good country stores which
vere so well supplied with clothing and the necessaries of
if e, and which offered their goods at such low prices, that
,he Mexicans came from B6xar, and even from as far as
Monclova, to deal with them. There was a small steam-
x)at trading on the Brazos River, and others were expected
X) be built. All the settlements as far as Nacogdoches were
prospering in like manner.^

It was, in short, a thriving frontier commimity of a type
perfectly familiar in the annals of the Western states of tlie
American Union, still poor and inhabited by a population
scanty in numbers, but of an intensely hopeful, not to say
Banguine,'disposition.

1 Austin to Filisola, May 24, 1833; ibid., 351.
* Report of Almonte; ibid., U, 555-568.

CHAPTER X

PRESIDENT JACESON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE

TEXAS

When Henry Clay, in 1825, first undertook the manage^
ment of the foreign affairs of the United States, under the
administration of John Qnincy Adams, it was undoubtedly
the expectation of both these experienced public men that
through their agency close and friendly relations would
be established with all Latin America. These hopes, so
far at least as Mexico was concerned, were utterly disap'
pointed. The administration came to an end without hav-
ing been able to conclude either of the two treaties which
the American minister to Mexico had been particularly in-
structed to negotiate, and the government of the United
States had become the object of settled dislike and suspicion,
which it should have been the effort of the new administra-
tion to remove. The situation in respect to the two treaties
was as follows :

The treaty which was intended to confirm the boimdaiy
hne of 1819 had been ratified by both governments, but the
Mexican ratifications had arrived in Washington too late
to be exchanged within the time limited, and no effort had
been made by the Adams administration to fix a new period.
The treaty of commerce signed in 1826 had been approved
by the United States Senate, subject to certain modifica-
tions, early in March, 1827. A new treaty, bearing date
February 14, 1828, had been negotiated which contained
all the proposed alterations; but the Mexican Congress
failed to take any action upon the treaty, two principal
objections being raised in their debates. These objec-
tions related to the clauses which dealt with the surrender

234

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 235

of fugitive slaves and the control of the border tribes of
Indians.^

So far as the completion of a treaty of commerce went,
there appeared to be nothing for the new administration
to do except to await patiently the action of the Mexican
Congress, but if the boundary line was to be fixed by a new
treaty, it was evident that aflfirmative action by the Amer-
ican government was needed. Jackson, however, was in
no haste to take up that question. Instructions had been
sent to Poinsett to enter into negotiations for the purchase
of Texas within three weeks after Adams had entered th
"Wliite House, but it was not until Jackson had been ove
five months in office that anything was done. As a resident
of Tennessee, which was the principal centre of early emigra-
tion to Texas, Jackson was naturally better informed on the
subject than most people, so that it is perhaps surprising
to find that he should not have taken any active interest
in the question at an earlier date. Neither he nor his
Secretary of State seem to have given it any consideration
imtil it was specially brought to their attention by an old
friend of the President, Colonel Anthony Butler.

Butler was a native of South Carolina, who, as a yoimg
man, had removed to Kentucky and settled at Russellville,
where he was a friend and neighbor of John J. Crittenden.^
When the war of 1812 broke out, Butler was made lieu-
tenant-colonel, arid subsequently colonel, of the twenty-
eighth infantry, and in that capacity was in command at
Detroit in the spring of 1814 after its recovery by the Amer-
icans in the previous autumn. The next winter he was
with Jackson at New Orleans, where the foimdations were
laid for an intimate and confidential friendship. After
the close of the war with Great Britain Butler removed to
Monticello, Mississippi, where he became a member of the
legislature in 1826; and not long after that time he seems

^ The text of the treaty of Feb. 14, 1828, both in English and Spanish, is in
AfMT, St. Papers, For. Rel., VI, 952. The Mexican objections are stated in a
deqjatch from Poinsett to Clay, May 21, 1828; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2

08.. 210.

* Butler, it seems, married Crittenden's sister.

236 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

to have acquired some interest in lands in Texas, probably
near Nacogdoches. And when Jackson became President,
Butler turned up in the city of Washington, partly as an
applicant for office, and partly to get the govermnent of
the United States to do something for Texas.^

Butler in later years quarrelled with Jackson, who de-
clared he was a scamp and a liar.* He quarrelled with
Wilcocks, the American consul in the city of Mexico, who
charged him with all sorts of inamorality.' And he quar-
relled with Sam Houston, who asserted that he had squan-
dered his wife's property and then abandoned her; that he
had swindled many persons in the United States; that he
was a gambler; that he was not a citizen of Mississippi, but
a resident of Texas, in 1829; and altogether that he was a
much worse man than anybody else whom Houston knew.*

John Quincy Adams, who examined Butler's despatches
on file in the State Department, declared that his looseness
of moral principle and political proffigacy were disclosed in
several of his letters, and his vanity and self-sufficiency in
others. This statement is fully warranted. Some of But-
ler's correspondence is insolent and even scmrilous in tone;
and all of it betrays the author as vain, ignorant, ill-tem-
pered, and corrupt. A man more unfit to deal with the
pimctilious, well-mannered, and sensitive people who con-
trolled the Mexican government, or to attempt the delicate
task of restoring confidence in the objects and purposes of
the American government, could scarcely have been found.

During the sunmier of 1829 Butler, according to his own
account, talked very freely in relation to Texas with both
Jackson and Van Buren, then Secretary of State. Presum-
ably at their request, he prepared a statement as to the
geography and productions of Texas, and another paper in

* Adams in his Memoirsy XI, 359, gives some particulars about Butler, de-
rived apparently from Mr. Hunter, then chief clerk of the State D^Murtment.
Other information is to be found in Butler's letters to Crittenden in the CrUr
ienden MSS., Library of Congress.

« See Atlantic Monthly, vol. XCV, Feb. (1905), 220.

* McLane to Butler (enclosing charges made by Wilcocks); H. R. Doc. 361,
25 Cong., 2 sees., 109-111.

« Houston to Butler, Dec. 25, 1S45; Texan Archives MSS.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 237

which he set forth the arguments that might properly be
addressed to Mexico to urge the sale of that province to the
United States.^ It was the presentation of these documents ^
by Butler, then a speculator in Texas lands, which seems to
have first aroused Jackson's interest in the subject of the
acquisition of Texas.

It is to be noted here, for Butler's arguments subse-
quently became of some importance,* that in the second of
these papers he pointed out there were two rivers flowing
into Sabine Lake, one coming from the north, which was com-
monly called the Sabine, and one from the northwest, com-
monly called the Neches ; and he contended that there was
ground for argument that the latter of the two was the river
which the treaty of 1819 really intended as the boundaiy.
This seems to have been an invention of his own. There
never was any confusion of names; the rivers were clearly
laid down in Melish's map, referred to in the treaty of 1819;
and the only reason for Butler's claim was in the fact that
as the village of Nacogdoches lay between the two rivers,
it would have come within American jurisdiction if his view
had prevailed, doubtless enhancing the value of all the lands
in that neighborhood.'

With Butler's two papers before him, Jackson began by
preparing a careful memorandum for the Secretary of State,
bearing date August 13, 1829, in which he directed that
Poinsett should be instructed to renew the proposal for a ^
change in the boundary as fixed by the Florida treaty of
1819. The President wished the line between the United
States and Mexico to follow the watershed between the
Nueces River and the Rio Grande "to its termination on
the mountain," and that it should then follow the watershed

^ These two papers are undated, but will be found in the Van Buren MSS.,
Library of Congress, under the supposed date of Aug. 11, 1829.

• See Chapter XV below.

* When the line between the United States and Texas was finally run in
1840, the commissioners agreed without difficulty that the Neches did not
form the boundary. Among other reasons, they stated that all the editions
of Melish's map prior to 1819, as well as ''the concurrent testimony of respec-
table inhabitants," fully established the identity of the Sabine. — (Sen. Doc.
199, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 60, noto.)

238 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

"dividing the waters of the Rio del Nort from those that
run Eastward of them in the Gulf, to the 42° of North
latitude until it strikes our present boundary on that paral-
lel." For such an acquisition of territory Poinsett might
be authorized to pay as much as five million dollars; and
less m proportion if the Mexican government would not
cede so much territory.

He urged, as a good reason why Mexico should agree to
sell, the avoidance of "collisions," which would certainly
grow out of "the intercourse of her citizens with ours," and
which could best be controlled if the line ran through a
"desert." Texas, he said, would be settled "chiefly by the
citizens of the United States, who imder a different system
of government may become turbulent and difficult of con-
trol and taking advantage of their distance from Mexican
authority, might endeavor to establish one independent
of it."
, / This proposal, it will be seen, was not essentially different
^ " from the proposals made in Adams's administration; ex-
cept that Jackson offered five times as much money. $ r^j'^Vi^*--

In another note, dated the following day, August 14,
Jackson added the suggestion that, in the event of a cession,
the United States should not be bound to confirm any
grants within the territoiy ceded, the consideration of which
had not been complied with. And on the next day, August
15, he wrote again to Van Buren, rearguing the advantages
of a cession and urging that now was "the time to acquire
this country, or at least to make the attempt." ^

Jackson evidently saw clearly the advantage to the
United States of the purchase of a fine and fruitful coun-
try. He also saw the immense advantage to Mexico of
getting rid of a territory which m her hands was useless
and was certain shortly to become troublesome; but he
lacked that quality of insight into the character of the rul-
ing class in Mexico which might have enabled him to fore-
see how such a proposal would be received, for the suggestion
that the national territory should be dismembered because

^ All the above are in the Van Buren MSS., Library of CongresB.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 239

the government was incapable of administering it was cer-
tain to awaken every inherited Spanish instinct of pride
and every feeling of national independence.

In later years Jackson was accused of miderhand con-
trivance in stiiring up trouble in Texas, and his truthful
prophecies of the difficulties Mexico would find in control-
ling the American colonists were cited as evidence of his
machinations. But Ward and Poinsett long before had
both prophesied to the same effect; and indeed the event
was plain enough to any one who was acquainted with the
unspeakable inefficiency of the Mexican government of that
time, and with the fundamental differences between the two
races.

On August 25, 1829, in strict accordance with the Presi-
dent's orders. Van Buren, then the Secretary of State, wrote
to Poinsett, instructing him to reopen negotiations; but
even before Van Buren wrote, the newspapers of the coun-
tiy had begun to publish voluminous articles on the subject
of Texas. Up to this time it would have been hard to find
in the American press anything more than a passing allusion
to that distant country. Texas was not only physically
far away, but its future development seemed to be quite as
distant, and the prospects of a mere agricultural country
were not calculated to excite much interest at a time when
the valleys of the Mississippi and the Missouri, not to
speak of the distant Oregon country, still seemed full of all
manner of possibilities.

The newspaper campaign began on August 18, 1829,
when the Nashville Republican and Gazette undertook a long
essay on the advantages of the proposed purchase. It was
followed in September and October by similar articles in
other parts of the country, some of which were from the
unwearying pen of Senator Benton, of Missouri, who had
for years resented the boundary line of 1819.

Benton's arguments are worth stating, for he represented
fully and intelligently the opinion of the Southwest. His
objections to the line of 1819 were far other than those of
Clay, and rested on much firmer ground. Briefly, he con-

240 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tended that Lonisiaiia in French hands had certainly ent-
braced the whole of the Mississippi basin; ^ that it there^
fore had included the whole of the valleys of the Arkansas
and Red rivers; and that^ as the treaty line intersected both
these valleyS; a large part of the Mississippi basin had been
given away to Spain without her ever having had title to it
and practically without her having asked for it. The result^
he contended, was injurious to the Southwest in many wa3rS;
especially because it impeded trade between St. Louis and
New Mexico, rendered it imduly difficult to control the
Indian tribes, and brought Mexico, a country without
slaves, in direct contact with the slave-holding portion of
the Union.*

The President's friends, however, were not alone in the
field. Some of the newspapers opposed the acquisition of
more territory, and an attentive ear might have heard,
clearest of all, the small voice of the Genius of Universal
Emancipation. That struggling sheet had just been re-
vived by William Lloyd Garrison's joining forces with Ben-
jamin Lundy,' and on September 16, 1829, it sounded an
alarm against the attempt of the advocates of slavery to
acquire Texas "for the avowed purpose of adding five or
six more slave-holding States to this Union." Slavery, it
was asserted, had already been abolished in Texas by the
Mexican government, and the object of Senator Benton
and his friends who advocated the purchase was merely that
they might reintroduce slavery. "A greater curse," con-
tinued the editor, "could scarcely befall our country than
the annexation of that inunense territory to this republic,
if the system of slavery should likewise be re-established
there." ^ The assertion that slavery did not then exist in
Texas waa, as has been shown above, entirely imtrue.

> This was admitted by the French government. — (Champagny to Beau-
hamais, Aug. 31, 1807; Robertson's Louisiana, II, 211-214.)

s See McMaster's History of the People of the U. S., Y, 543-548; Benton's
Thirty Years* View, I, 14-18. That the treaty of 1819 yielded to Spain some
80,000 square miles of the Mississippi basin is unquestionable. — (Z. T. Ful-
more, in Tex, Hist, Qtiar,, V, 260.)

* Garrison's Life of WiUiam Lloyd Garrison, I, 141.

* These articles are reprinted in full in Lundy's War in Texas (2d ed.), 16-20.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 241

Far more influential criticism than Lmidy's would have
been required to swerve Jackson from a course on which
he had deUberately entered; but; as a matter of fact, the
opposition of Lundy and his friends would not then have
halted the most timid politician. ''When Jackson became
President, in 1829, anti-slavery seemed, after fifty years of
effort, to have spent its force. The voice of the churches
was no longer heard in protest ; the abolitionist societies were
dying out; there was hardly an abolitionist militant in the
field; the Colonization Society absorbed most of the public
interest in the subject, and it was doing nothing to help either
the free negro or the slave; in Congress there was only one
anti-slavery man, and his efforts were without avail." ^

And it is quite clear that such slight opposition as then
existed to the acquisition of new slave territory did not
affect in any way the action of President Jackson and his
administration. If their efforts for the purchase of Texas
subsequently slackened, it was due to the conviction, grad-
ually reached, that the attempt was hopeless because of the
state of public opinion in Mexico and the march of events
in Texas itself.

It has been already stated that President Jackson in three
separate memorandia, on the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth of August, 1829, directed his Secretary of State to
reopen the negotiations for the purchase of Texas. Van
Buren's instructions to Poinsett based on these memoranda
were dated August 25, 1829.^ They were intrusted to the
hands of Anthony Butler, who set out for the city of Mexico
by way of Texas, ostensibly as bearer of despatches, but in
reality charged with verbal messages and explanations from
the President.'

Butler had hardly left Washington when a despondent
letter from Poinsett arrived at the State Department to

^ Hart, Slavery and Aholiiianf 165.

* H. R. Doc. 42, 25 Cong., 1 sess., 1(>-16. Several drafts of this important
document are among the Van Buren papers in the Library of Congress.

•"This despatch will be delivered to you by Colonel Anthony Butler, of
the State of Mississippi. Colonel Butler has made himself we]l acquainted,
by actual examination, with the territory in question, its streams and locali-

242 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

disturb the complacency and self-confidence of the admin-
istration. This communication was shortly followed by the
arrival of Commodore Porter bearing a number of other
despatches from the American legation, and chai^ged with
verbal messages from Poinsett to the President.^ The bur-
den of all Poinsett's complaints was the jealousy of the
Mexicans at the growth and prosperity of the United States,
and the undue influence of Great Britain.

"I am still convinced," Poinsett wrote, "that we never can expect
to extend our boundary south of the river Sabine, without quarreling
with these people, and driving them to court a more strict alliance
with some European Power." '

And Porter, who just then entertained the worst possi-
ble opinion of the Mexican government, imdoubtedly con-
firmed these conclusions.

Whether Poinsett's imhopeful view of the situation was
or was not justified by the facts, it was, at any rate, per-
fectly apparent that his own usefulness had long since ceased,
and that he himself was well aware of it. The President^
however, waa by no means eager to displace him, for Poin--
sett, with the rest of the South Carolina delegation in th^
House of Representatives, had voted for Jackson in th^
exciting cont^t of 1825. Instructions were therefore sent>
to him merely authorizing his return to the United States^
unless a change of sentiment had occurred since he last>
wrote, in which case he might remain at his post. It was
the President's "anxious wish'' that Poinsett's return should
not be "attended by any circumstance which might wear

ties. In the belief that he deserves your confidence, and that he may be use-
ful to you in the negotiation, by supplying you with facts which might not
otherwise be within your reach, he has been instructed to observe your direc-
tions in regard to his stay at Mexico, and his agency in the matter whilst
there."— (Van Buren to Poinsett, Aug. 25, 1829; ibid,, 16.)

^ Porter had been employed to organize a Mexican navy. He went to
Mexico in 1826, and returned in disgust to the United States early in October,
1829.— (D. D. Porter, Memoir of Commodore David Porter, 347-391.) Ho
wished to be sent to Mexico as minister to succeed Poinsett, but the adminis-
tration refrained from committing that particular act of folly.

* Poinsett to Van Buren, July 22, 1829; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Ck>ng., 2
286.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 243

the appearance of censure/' If Poinsett should decide to
return to the United States, he was to leave in charge of the
legation Colonel Anthony Butler, who, according to Van
Buren, was possessed of "qualifications peculiarly adapted
to the station." At the same time long instructions were
sent to Butler to cover the case of his having to assume the
duties of charge d'affaires.^

When these letters were written^ Butler was sick at* At-
takapaS; in the state of Louisiana, having got only that far
on his road to Mexico.^

Before the messenger bearing the instructions to Poinsett
and Butler had left the city of Washington, the Mexican
representative presented to the State Department a com-
munication requesting, in the name of his government,
Poinsett's recall.' The request was at once complied with
by adding postscripts to the instructions of October 16.^

A private letter from the President reinforced the admo-
nitions of the Secretary of State.

"I have full confidence," Jackson wrote to Butler, "you will effect
the purchase of Texas, so important for the perpetuation of that
harmony and peace between us and the Republic of Mexico so de-
sirable to them and to us to be maintained forever and if not obtained,
is sure to bring us into conflict, owing to their jealousy and the dis-
satisfaction of those Americans now settling in Texas under the
authority of Mexico — who will declare themselves independent of
Mexico the moment they acquire sufficient numbers. This our Gov-

1 Van Buren to Poinsett, Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16, 1829; ibid,, 35-38,
40-^2. A memorandum from the President and Van Buren's draft of these
iDstnictions are among the Van Buren papers in the Library of Congress.

* Butler to Van Buren, Oct. 17, 1829; StaU Dept. MSS, In this letter But-
ler expressed the opinion that the newspaper publications about Texas were
doing harm.

* Montoya to Van Buren, Oct. 17, 1829; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess.,
638.

* In addition to the formal commission and credentials to Butler, sent with
these instructions, President Jackson adopted the very unusual course of send-
ing a private and confidential letter of introduction addressed to President
Guerrero dated Oct. 18, 1829. This letter was extremely complimentary to
Poinsett, as to whom Jackson stated he thought there had been a misappre-
hension. Colonel Butler, he said, ''was a gallant commander of one of our
regunents of infantry in the last war of the United States with Great Britain''
and a soldier and citizen of the highest honor and respectability. — {Jadswn
MSS,, Library of Congress.)

244 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

emment will be charged with fomenting, altho all our Constitutional
powers will be exercised to prevent. You will keep this steadily in
view, and their own safety if it is considered will induce them to yield
now in the present reduced state of their finances/' ^

The October instructions reached the city of Mexico about
December 16 and before Butler's arrival in that city; but
Poinsett, without waiting, immediately notified the Mex-
ican Foreign Office that he had been recalled and requested
the President to fix a date for a final audience. President
Guerrero, however, was much too busy at that time defend-
ing his own existence to trouble himself with civilities to
foreign ministers. Bustamante had pronoimced, and was
advancing against the capital; and on the night of Decem-
ber 22, 1829, he assaulted both the palace and the citadel,
which were immediately surrendered. But on December
24 Poinsett was notified by the new administration that he
might present his letter of recall on the following day.*

Butler had arrived in Mexico December 19, 1829,' and
had been in the capital only a few days when the Mexican
newspapers annoimced that he had come with instructions
to pmxjhase Texas for five million dollars. Where the infor-
mation came from did not appear, but it is likely that But-
ler had boasted on his way through Texas of what he was
going to accomplish. The organ of the Bustamante party,
El Solf expressed editorially the opinion that as Butler had
so far made no overtures on the subject, " we presume that
he does the new administration the justice to suppose it
incapable of a transaction as prejudicial and degrading to
the republic as it would be disgraceful to the minister who
would subscribe to it." ^

This probably inspired utterance was not calculated to
encourage the American representative, and indeed the most
recent official communications from the State Department
at Washington exhibited no expectation of his accomplish-

Uackflon to Butler, Oct. 19, 1829; Jackson MSS,

* Poinsett to Viesca, Dec. 15, 1829; Torres to Poinsett, Dec. 24, 1829; H. R.
Doc. 351, 25 Ck>ng., 2 sess., 307, 309.

* Butler to Van Buren, Dec. 31, 1829; StaU Dept. MSS,

* Translation in H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 310.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 245

ing anything. Writing to him on the same day that leave
was given Poinsett to retire, Van Buren's instructions to
Butler had been one long complaint of the unfriendly and
ungrateful attitude of the Mexican government toward a
coimtry which had been its earliest and best friend. Mexico
had treated the efforts of the United States to regulate com-
mercial intercourse "with a degree of indifference and sus-
picion as extraordinary as it was to be regretted " ; there had
been "unaccoimtable tardiness" in ratifying the boimdary
line of 1819; the course of President Guerrero toward Poin-
sett had been imjust; and the government of the United
States, to its deep regret, was unable to call to mind "a sin-
gle act of the Mexican Government which would serve to re-
lieve the imfriendly aspect of its whole conduct." ^

The next six months only served to heighten Van Buren's
gloomy views as to the attitude of the Mexican govern-
ment. Poinsett reached Washington in March, 1830, and
expressed most freely to the President and Secretary of
State the highly unfavorable opinion he had formed in rela-
tion to public affairs in Mexico. These conversations con-
vinced the administration that a change in Butler's instruc-
tions was imperative, and on April 1, 1830, Van Buren wrote
him that the President after hearing Poinsett did not de-
spair of a final arrangement, but was convinced that this
was not an auspicious time for beginning negotiations for
the purchase of Texas. "To watch the state of the public
mind, the opinions of the principal membera of the govern-
ment, and hear what is said on all sides, is all that is, for the
present, expected from your agency in the matter." *

The hopes which Jackson less than eight months before
had entertained of acquiring with general applause the fer-
tile land of Texas, of completing with success a negotiation
in which Adams and Clay had so conspicuously failed, were
thus laid aside. But even before Poinsett had arrived in
Washington, before the April instructions to Butler had
been written, and, of course, before he had had any oppor-

^ Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16, 1829; ibid,, 40-52.
* Same to same, April 1, 1830; ibid., 59-62.

246 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tunity of removing what Van Bnren had not unjustly de-
scribed as ''a groundless and unjust prejudice which had
been excited against the Government of the United States,"
the new Mexican government had more than justified Van
Buren's conclusions as to the imwisdom in going on Ynih
the proposed negotiations. The views of Bustamante's
cabinet on the subject of Texas were set forth in the con-
fidential report from Lilcas Alamaii; the recently appointed
Secretary of Foreign Relations, dated February 8, 1830,
which has been already fully referred to.^

Butler secured a copy of this report as early as February
19, 1830. " I have had placed in my possession," he wrote,
"the transcript of a document recently presented by the
secretary of state to the Mexican Congress in conclave and
which I design forwarding to you by a private conveyance
which leaves Mexico in about a week." * It was not imtil
March 9, however, that Butler was able to find a safe con-
veyance for this paper which he sent in the original. "I
have not sent you," he said, "a translation of Mr. Alaman's
report because I should have performed that duty imper-
fectly myself, and to trust such a document to another would
at once disclose the fact that I had access to the secret pro-
ceedings of the Mexican Government." * The tone of this
report was more than imfriendly to the United States. It
was grossly insulting. Nevertheless, Butler in transmitting
it had the effrontery to say that although the difficulties
to be overcome in a negotiation with Mexico had doubtless
multiplied in the two years preceding, there were, never-
theless, the best groimds for believing Texas could be had
by treaty.

For some weeks Butler kept on writing, both to the
President and the Secretary of State, most gratifying ac-
counts of his long and friendly conversations with Alaman,

» See Chapter VIII.

* Butler to Van Buren, Feb. 19, 1830; State Dept. MSS.

* Butler to Van Buren, March 9, 1830; SuUe Dept. MSS. Alaxnan himaelf
says that his report was to be kept strictly secret, but that one of the Yorkino
deputies gave a copy to Poinsett. — (Alaman, Histaria de M^icOf V, 874.) Poin-
aetty however, had left Mexico before the report was presented to CongreaB.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 247

and of the probability of a settlement of all the matters
under discussion, "including the cession of part or the whole
of Texas." * But after receiving Van Buren's instructions
of April 1, 1830, Butler wrote that he was glad that the
department had adopted the opinion "that the present time
is inauspicious for the commencement of negotiations for
Texas."* He recurred to the subject later on, and at inter-
vals during the next six years he tried to encourage Jackson's
hopes of rivalling Jefferson and Monroe by acquiring Texas,
as they had acquired Louisiana and Florida.

There does not seem to have ever been the slightest groimd
for Butler's repeated assurances that he was within a hand's
breadth of success. His motive in giving them is plain
enough. He wanted to be retained in office; and if he
could only make the President believe that his removal
would wreck a promising negotiation he would be safe. At
times it would seem that Jackson was partly convinced. But
it is quite apparent that the very capable men. Van Buren,
Livingston, McLane, and Forsyth, who successively filled the
office of Secretary of State, were never imposed upon.

Butler's only diplomatic success was in getting the two
treaties ratified which Poinsett had negotiated. The com-
mercial treaty, however, was modified in certain minor
particulars, and notably by omitting the clause as to sur-
render of fugitive slavi; and as so amended was ratified
by Mexico, but only after a threat by Butler to close his
legation if Congress did not act by a certain day.* The
ratifications of both treaties were exchanged in Washington
on April 5, 1832.^

* Butler to Van Buren, April 7, 1830; Van Buren PaperSj Library of Congress.
Butler to Jackson, April 15, 1830; StcUe Dept. MSS.

< Butler to Van Buren, May 21, 1830; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 326.

* Butler to Alaman, Dec. 14, 1831; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 411.
In connection with the treaty confirming the boundary line of 1819, Butler
<m Jan. 2, 1832, wrote a private letter to the President to the e£Fect that it
had much better not be ratified by the American Senate as it would facili-
tate the negotiations with Mexico if the whole subject were open to discussion.
— (See Jackson MSS., Library of Congress.) The President does not seem to
have paid any attention to this silly and dishonest suggestion.

*See correspondence as to exchange of ratifications; H. R. Doc. 42, 25
CoDg., 1 seas., 48^^.

248 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

It was not untU Butler bad been nearly two years in
Mexico that he ventured to open the subject of Texas to
Alaman. He had previously sent to Washington excuses
for delay and requests for further instructions. In May,
1831, he wrote to the President that there had never yet
been a fit time for discussing the subject.

"It would," he said, "have been something worse than foOy to
approach the affair of Texas. It was a prindpal object with me to
permit that subject to rest so completely that it would be lost si^t
of by the people here, and be taken up on some proper occasion, after
all the suspicions and jealousies it had awakened were dissipated.
But our newspapers have kept it so constantly before the public gase,
not only in the United States, but so as to attract the attenticKi of
Europe during the past year, as in a great degree to prevent the
previous excitement from subsiding. . . . Whenever the {Mexican]
newspapers desired to fan anew the flame of opposition against Gen-
era] Guerrero, there would appear publications charging him with the
de^gn of selling Texas to the United States, and then add that for
such a crime alone he deserved expulsion from the Government. All
this served to admonish me that success in a negotiation for Texas
hitherto was out of the question." ^

On June 23 he wrote again that he should sedc the earliest
occasion to bring the subject of Texas before the Minister
of Foreign Relations, but as the subject aboimded in difficul-
ties and required to be treated with great caution and deli-
cacy, it might take time. He wished, however, to be ad-
\'i8ed whether the sum of five millions was the maximum
that would be given under any circumstances, or whether
be might not go as far as seven millions if it should be dis-
ocn-ered in the course of the negotiation that a difference as
Vj price was the only obstacle.* "Your suggestion with
i*;5ard to the maximum," Jackson replied, "has been fully
cjiuadered in executive Council and their imanimous opin-
x'jL ifi, the Five millions cannot be exceeded." •

At last, in October, 1831, Butler " cautiously approached "
liti Minister of Foreign Relations, and was told "that the

May 25. 1831 ; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 mm., 381.
23, lSZ\;JackaoiiMSS.
17, lS31;ibirf.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 249

federal government,, if they were to attempt such a measure,
i¥Ould not only violate the Constitution, but produce resist-
ance on the part of the states"; and Butler thought it best
not to press the matter further at the time; ^ and he did
nothing more about it that year. Just before Christmas,
in a despatch transmitting the ratified treaty of commerce,
lie wrote: "Being now at leisure to turn my attentiqn to
another subject, I hope to be able very shortly to communi-
cate something on the subject of T ." *

Meanwhile, the situation in Texas was becoming acute
through the operation of Alaman's stringent measm^ to
regulate the conduct of the settlers. In February, 1832,
Edward Livingston, the Secretary of State, wrote to Butler
on the subject. Advices, he said, had been received from
private sources of great discontent in that quarter threaten-
ing a fonnidable insurrection.

"As the persons most active in these movements are said to be
emigrants from the United States, suspicions may arise in the minds
of those ignorant of the principles on which our Government is
conducted, that it has fomented or connived at these discontents,
should they break out into action. These it will be your duty, by
every means in your power, to remove; declaring, should any such
suggestions be made, that you are instructed to say that they are
totally unfounded, and that your Government will consider them as
the expression of an unfriendly doubt of their good faith/' '

When this reached Mexico Butler was absent on a trip
to the northern part of the country, which may have ex-
tended as far as Texas. He returned to the capital late in
Jime and unmediately sought an interview with Alaman.
During the next three or four weeks they had at least three
conversations, concerning which Butler wrote at great
length to the Secretary of State, referring also to the prob-
ability of Santa Anna's success and to the exhausted con-
dition of the Treasury, which he said had been replenished
by means of a small loan at the extraordinary rate of four

1 Butler to Jackson, Oct. 6, 1831; Texan Archives MSS,

> Butler to McLane, Dec. 23, 1831; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 411.

» /Wd., 83.

250 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

per cent a month interest. He expressed the opinion that
Bustamante's government would certainly not last a year;
but he apparently did not thinlr-it necessary to report to
the State Department the fact that Alaman had resigned
his position as Minister of Foreign Relations six weeks pre-
viously.^

In a private letter to Jackson, however, Butler, while ;
asserting that the probability of acquiring Texas was then .
better than his most sanguine hopes had allowed him to ^
anticipate, did indirectly refer to the fact of Alaman's J
resignation.

" Although that Gentleman," he wrote, " has apparently withdrawn^
from the Cabinet he still directs the Department of Foreign Affairs^
8vb rosa and is in fact as much the Minister as at any period heretofore
. . . The amount I am limited for the purchase by my instructions
will very probably be in part applied to facilitate the Negotiation, in.
which case we shall provide for that portion of the payment by 8
secret article." *

Alaman, according to Butler's accoimt, listened politely,
but said nothing. Even if he had been susceptible to the
kind of arguments which Butler evidently expected to em-
ploy, the late Minister of Foreign Relations could do nothing.
He was no longer in office, and the growing strength of Santa
Anna's party was such that even his life was plainly in
peril. On August 19, 1832, Francisco Fagoaga was ap-
pointed his successor by Bustamante.' On December 26,
1832, another minister was appointed by Pedraza, who held
only imtil April, 1833, when Carlos Garcia was appointed
Minister of Foreign Relations imder the administration of
G6mez Farias.

While the domestic affairs of Mexico were in such a posi-
tion of uncertainty, it is not surprising that Butler could

^ Butler to Livingston, July 16, 1832; StaU Dept, MSS, The minutes of
the conversations are printed in H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 442-445.

* Butler to Jackson, July 18, 1832; Jackson MSS. In a previous letter to
Jackson, dated June 21, 1832, Butler had expressed himself as confident of suc-
cess if he could deal with Alaman alone, ''for I think I hold the key to un-
lock his heart and the means of enlightening his understanding/'

• Bancroft, History of Mexico ^ V, 116.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 251

get no intimation as to the views of the successive admin-
istrations; and as direct negotiations for the purchase of
Texas seemed to be hopoj^ss his thoughts reverted to an-
other mode of deaKng with the subject, which was in fact
the making of such a mortgage as Ward had outUned in his
book some years before. This suggestion was made in a
letter to the President early in 1833, and upon the back of
the letter Jackson wrote an impatient memorandum which
he sent to Livingston, and which was subsequently the sub-
ject of adverse comment :

"Instruct Col. Butler," Jackson said, "to bring the negotiation to
a close. The Convention in Texas meets the 1st of next April to
form a constitution for themselves. When this is done, Mexico can
never annex it to her jurisdiction again, or control its Legislature or
exercise any power over its Territory — it will be useless after this act,
to enter into a treaty of boundary with Mexico." ^

The convention referred to was, of course, the second
San FeUpe convention \^hich had been called some weeks
before to consider not independence, but separate statehood
within the Mexican federation. The convention which met
on the first of April, 1833, did practically nothing except to
affirm the resolutions of the convention of October, 1832,
and to send Austin to Mexico to urge the plan for the new
state. Jackson's memorandum, therefore, indicated that
he was not very accurately informed as to the plans ot the
Texan leaders. Certainly it entirely failed to show that
he knew anything more about the subject than was open
to anybody who read the newspapers.

Part of Jackson's information, however, may have been
derived from Sam Houston, who had just returned to the
United States from a visit to Texas, and wrote, imder date
of February 13, 1833, from Natchitoches, in Louisiana, that
unless Mexico was soon restored to order the province of
Texas would remain separate ; that Texas had already beaten
and repelled all the troops of Mexico from her soil and would
not permit them to return; and that it was probable that

1 Indorsement on letter of Butler to Jackson, Feb. 10, 1833; Stale Depl. MSS.

252 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO v

he (Houston) might make Texas his abiding-place; but, if
so, he would "never forget the coimtry of his* birth." ^

In accordance, therefore, with the President's memoran-
dum on Butler's private note of February 10, 1833, the lat-
ter was officially instructed to reject any proposal for a loan
by the United States, and the instructions continued as
follows :

"The situation of affairs in the State of Texas y Coahuila makes
it important that yom* negotiation on that subject should be brought^
to a speedy conclusion. It is at least doubtful whether in a few weeks.
any sHpidcUum could be carried into effect. No new instrucHona on..
the subject of the proposed cession being deemed necessary the Presi-
dent has directed me to refer you to those already given on tha^
subject." *

But it was not at all in accordance with Butler's personal
notions that the negotiation for Texas should be brought
to an end. During the spring and summer he wrote very
fully about conditions in Mexican politics, asserting that
the Department of Foreign Relations was friendly, prophesy-
ing the destruction of the federal system and the success of
Santa Anna, who would be made dictator, and explaining
that he would talk with Santa Anna himself, as soon as he
came to the capital, upon the subject of Texas. On July
26 he complained that he could get no answer to his letters
about Texas; but ten days later he wrote that the prospect
of acquiring Texas was better than at any period since the
late Secretary Alaman left office. His reason for this con-
fidence, as he explained, was because of the discussions then
going on in the cabinet of G6mez Farias, in reference to the
action to be taken in regard to the petition presented by
Austin praying for separate statehood for Texas.

"The Cabinet," Butler wrote, "are engaged at present in the
cussion of a Memoir presented to it by the Citizens of Texas pray-

> Williams, Sam Houston, 79-81. As to the withdrawal of the Mexican
troops from Texas in 1832, see Chapter IX, above.

* Livingston to Butler, March 20, 1833; StaU Dept, MSS, Italics in the
original. And see extract from this instruction in H. R. Doc. 42, 25 Cong.,
1 seas., 16, and H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sees., 95.

JACfffiON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 263

ing to be pemJitted to form themselves into an independent State and
my informant tells me that the Cabinet have made three questions:

"1. Shall the prayer of the Memorialbts be granted and they
admitted to form an independent State?

"2. Shall we atteibpt to reduce them to order by military force?

"3. Or shall we give up the territory and cede it to the United
States?

''The first question it is said by my informant has been decided
in the Negative, the others continue under discussion." ^

Nothing having come of these discussions that was at all
favorable, Butler lightly turned to thoughts of bribery on
a large scale, accompanied by violence. In September, 1833,
he drafted a letter to the President in which he expressed
a doubt whether anything could be done " with the present
Men in power"; that his principal hope now rested on
Zavala, to whom he had offered two himdred thousand dol-
lars if he could bring about a cession of Texas; and that it
was probable he should employ from four to six hundred
thousand dollars " of the sum to which you have limited me,
in purchasing Men, and the remainder in purchasing the
coimtry." *

Whether the foregoing letter was sent is perhaps doubt-
ful, as no such letter is among Jackson's papers in the
library of Congress, nor alluded to in any later corre-
spondence; but on the second of October, 1833, he did
write a letter which Jackson received, and in which Butler
advised the immediate and forcible occupation of the terri-
tory lying between the Sabine and the Nueces rivers:

"When I recollect the advice you gave,", said Butler, "and the
opinion you expressed to Mr. Monroe in relation to East Florida, a
case presenting features nothing like so strong as the present, and
with not a tithe of the circumstances to justify the proceeding which

we have in the T affair, I can not doubt but you will concur

with me in the propriety of the movement. . . . The Territory once

occupied by any portion of our Troops, and the people of T

would themselves do the work, they require nothing but our coun-
tenance— ^nothing but an assurance that they would not be rejected

» Butler to McLane, Aug. 5, 1833; StcUe DepL M8S,

> Butler to Jackson, Sept. 14, 1833; draft in Texan Archives MSS.

254 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

by us. There are at present in Mexico two Gentle from T-

bearers of a petition to the Supreme Govemmt for permission to
assume an Independent State Government and be separated from
Coahuila. . . . The application for State Govt, is all humbug. . . .
Santa Anna is a vile hypocrite, and most unprincipled man, you can
have no hold on his moral principles because he is without any, count
therefore on nothing but what we may be prepared to enforce.^'

On October 28, 1833, Butler again wrote a private letter
to the President relating what he called a "very singular
conversation" with "one of the most shrewd and intelli-
gent men of the coimtiy" who held a high oflBcial station
and had much influence with Santa Anna, the substance of
which was that the question of the boundary could be ar-
ranged if two or three himdred thousand dollars were paid
to a very important man, and that it would be necessary
to distribute three or four himdred thousand more among
other persons. "You will be at no loss to imagine," But-
ler added, "who the important Individual was, which he
considered it all important to gain over^

Jackson answered more in sorrow than in anger. He was
astonished, he, wrote, that Butler should have intrusted
such a letter to the mail without its being in cipher, and
astonished that he should have repUed to a suggestion of
bribery by a statement that the money should be forthcom-
ing. Nothing, said Jackson, had been further from his inten-
tion than to convey the idea that money might be used for
purposes of bribery. The United States had nothing to
do with the distribution of the purchase-price among per-
sons who held uncompleted grants of land, if any payments
to such grantees were necessary in order to give the United
States an imencumbered title; "but I admonish you to give
these shrewd fellows no room to charge you with any tamper-
ing with their oflScers to obtain the ce^ion thro corruption." ^

^ Butler to Jackson, Oct. 2, 1833, Oct. 28, 1833; Jaekson to Butler, Nov.
27, 1833; all in Jackson MSS.y Library of Congress. A draft of a reply from
Butler to Jackson's letter of Nov. 27 is in the Texan Archives MSS. In this
draft Butler explains that he thought he was justified, under some former let-
ters from the President, ''in conciliating, or corrupting if you please, influential
individuals to aid me in the object to be completed and without which, I saw
that a successful negotiation for T was out of the question."

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 255

A few weeks' reflection seems to have satisfied the Presi-
nt that Butler's activities had better be brought to a
yse; though tenderness to an old friend induced him to
range matters so that Butler could leave Mexico with
me appearance of dignity. The Secretary of State, there-
re, instructed Butler that as the time had passed for the
»eting of commissioners to mark the boimdary line imder
B treaty of 1819, an additional article must be agreed to
fore the treaty could be carried into efifect; and that it
kS the President's wish that as soon as this additional
icle was ratified by the Mexican government, Butler
3uld take leave and return home bringing the document
th him.^

Butler did not receive these instructions, or at least he
id he did not, imtil the month of June. He had in the
jantime written a private letter to the President on March
1834, again urging that the United States take forcible
ssession of the territory between the Sabine and Neches
rers.

'* If you will withdraw me from this place," said Butler, " and make
s movement to possess that part of Texas which is ours, placing me
the head of the country that is to be occupied, I will pledge my head
it we shall have all we desire in less than six months without a blow
d for the price we are willing to pay for it."

Upon this letter Jackson indorsed the following character-
ic memorandum:

''A. Butler. What a scamp. Carefully read. The Secretary of
ite will reiterate his instructions to ask an extension on the Treaty
' running boundary line, and then recal him or if he has received
1 former instructions and the Mexican Government has refused, to
sd him at once. A. J."

The State Department on Jime 11, 1834, complied with
e President's directions by sending Butler a duplicate of

McLane to Butler, Jan. 13, 1834; H. R. Doc. 42, 25 Cong., 1 sess., 16.
e additional article was not signed until April 5, 1835, and ratifications were
; exchanged until April 20, 1836. As to the causes for this delay, see ibid,,
-43,62-94.

256 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the former instructions directing him to conclude an addi-
tional article in reference to running the boundary line and
then to take leave and return home. When Butler received
these orders, he evidently concluded that his best hope of
retaining possession of his office was a personal appeal to
the President. He therefore wrote to the Secretary of State
explaining that, as the Mexican Congress would not meet
imtil the following January, a ratification of the proposed
article might be long delayed, and suggesting that it might
be better to permit his return immediately to the United
States, for, he said :

''I am fully persuaded that the public service may derive benefit
from an interview either with yourself or the President, at which cer-
tain communications may be made and opinions freely exchanged
and compared, which it is impracticable to do by any other mode;
4nd after this interview, it may be better determined whether the
public interest will be more advanced by my return to Mexico, or by
the appointment of a successor." ^

Forsjrth forwarded to the President, who was then in
Tennessee, an extract from this despatch, together with a
private letter from Butler, and he added :

''Probably no evil consequence will result from his leaving Mexico
after he has negotiated the new Convention with Mexico respecting
Boundary, etc., and h^ore the ratification of it by the authority of
the Mexican Congress. Whenever you have decided upon his re-
quest, I will hasten to let him know the decision that he may act in
conformity to it." *

In his private letter to the President, Butler adopted a
different tone. He was in doubt, he said, whether it was the
President's intention that he should return home on leave,
or whether he was recalled on accoimt of some ne^ect of
duty "or the commission of some act imworthy the char-
acter and station of a public fimctionary." He had never
wanted to stay in Mexico ; his continuance in oflBce had in-
volved great pecuniary "sacrafices"; his only reward had

1 Butler to MoLane, July 1, 1834; H. R. Doc. 42, 25 Ckmg., 1 smb.* 87.
* Foiqrth to Jackson, Aug. 11, 1834; Jackwn M88.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 257

1)een ''a proud consciousness" that his labors had been suc-
cessful; he wished to know who were his accusers; and he
i¥as then and always ready to confront them.^

He had previously written to Jackson that he wanted to go
home and have an hour's confidential talk^ after which he
could return to Mexico "prepared to be much more usefvl.^^ '
Butler, however, was in no haste for his confidential con-
versations, and during the rest of the year 1834 he did noth-
ing. Early in the winter of 1835 he began writing more
confidentially and mysteriously than ever. On February
26, 1835, he wrote to the President that one stmnbling-block
only was in the way, "but I pledge myself to you — ^mark
me — ^I give you my pledge, that your administration shall
not close without seeing the object in your possession." •
Again on March 31, 1835, he wrote that the additional
article to the treaty of 1819 was agreed upon and would
shortly be signed and that he was convinced the United
States would gain jurisdiction over a very valuable tract
of country (between the Sabine and the Neches) ; and that
in addition " by the establishment of the true line, a door
will be opened to us, through which we may enter for the
satisfactory arrangement of a question of much deeper in-
terest to us than the mere marking of a boundary line.'* *

At length, on June 6, 1835, Butler arrived in New York,
and on June 9 he reached Washington, where he had sev-
eral interviews with the President and the Secretary of
State. Forsyth was much too wary to let Butler get away
without putting his statements in writing, and accordingly
on June 17 the latter prepared a paper in which he set out
the state of the boundary negotiations. At some length he
explained the causes of the delay in reaching any conclusion,
and then went on to state that the existing difficulty was
explained in a note dated March 21, 1835, from Ignacio
Hernandez, whom he described as a Catholic priest inti-

> Butler to Jackson, July 2, 1834; (bid.

* Butler to Jackson, June 6, 1834; ibid.

* Butler to the President; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 555.

« Butler to Forsyth, March 31, 1835; H. R. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 seas., 4',
H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 556.

258 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

mately ax^quainted with Santa Anna and confessor to his
sister, ''and known as the manager of all the secret nego-
tiations of the palace." In this note, evidently written on
the eve of Butier's departure from the city of Mexico, the
writer said:

''The negotiation you have so long desired to efFect is as I have
often told you perfectly within your power, nothing is required but to
employ your means properly. Five hundred thousand judiciously
applied will conclude the affair and when you think proper to author-
ize me to enter into the arrangement depend upon my closing it to
your satisfaction." ^

Forsyth hastened to show this precious letter to the
President, who returned it to the State Department with the
following indorsement :

"Nothing will be countenanced by the Executive to bring this
Government under the remotest imputation of being engaged in cor-
ruption or bribery — we have no concern in the application of the
consideration to be given; the public function 'Jies of Mexico may
apply it as they may deem proper to extinguish private daims and
give us the cession clear of all encumbrance except the grants which
have been complyed with. June 22 — ^35. A. J."

That Jackson ought to have dismissed Butler from the
service at once is, of course, apparent; but his invincible
determination to stand by his old friends interfered. For-
syth, we may guess, urged that Butler ought to be super-
seded, but a middle course was finally decided on. Under
date of July 2, 1835, Forsyth wrote to Butler as follows:

'' I have presented for the consideration of the President your let-
ter of the 17th relating to a negotiation with Mexico for Texas. By
his directions I have the honor to inform you that no sufficient reason
appears upon it for any changes in the instructions that have been
heretofore given to you on that subject. With an anxious desire to
secure the very desirable alteration in our boundary with Mexico,
the President is resolved that no means of even an equivocal character
shall be used to accomplish it. It is due to the occasion to say to you
also that on the examination of your communications on this subject

^ Butler to Forsyth, June 17, 1835; SiaU Depi. M8S.

JACKSON'S OFFERS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 259

^sonnected with your verbal explanations, no confidence is felt that
.Srour negotiation is likely to be successful, but as you entertain a
^x>nfident belief that you can succeed in a very short time, it is deemed
;9roper to give you this opportunity of benefiting your country by
^our exertions and of doing honor to yourself. The President how-
ever, directs me to say that the negotiations must be brought to a
<;lose at once so that the result may be known by the meeting of Con-
.gress as provision must be made in case it is successful, for carrying
it into execution. You will be expected in the United States as soon
as it is closed to report the result, whatever it may be, to the Presi-
dent." *

Butler left Washington on the third of July and passed
through Texas on his return to Mexico just before the out-
break of the revolution. The patience of the Mexican gov-
ernment at last gave way under this circumstance. Writ-
ing to the Mexican charg6 d'affaires in Washington on
October 21, 1835, the Minister of Foreign Relations said that
it was manifest that public opinion was very imfavorable
toward Mr. Anthony Butler, "to whom are imputed in-
trigues unbecomifl^ a diplomatic agent which imputation
is strengthened by the present occurrences in Texas, the
revolt there having commenced whilst that gentleman was
in those parts." And the government of the United States
was, therefore, to be requested to recall Mr. Butler in order
to avoid the necessity of "tendering him a passport." *

Butler, of course, accomplished nothing during the re-
mainder of his stay in Mexico, but he wrote repeated letters
to the Secretary of State inquiring whether his time would
not be extended beyond the first of December, and urging
that his efforts were paralyzed by the uncertainty of his
position. BQs imcertainty must have been greatly increased
by the receipt of instructions dated August 6, 1835, in which
he was told that, as the port of San Francisco on the western
coast of Mexico would be a most desirable place of resort
for whaling vessels and far preferable to those to which
they had access, the President had directed that an offer
be made to Mexico of an additional five hundred thousand

» Forsyth to Butler, July 2, 1835; StaU Dept. M8S,

* Monasterio to Castillo, Oct. 31, 1835; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sees., 719.

260 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

dollars if the boundary line could be so varied as to include
not only Texas but also the Bay of San Francisco.^ Why
these instructions should have been sent at that time, in view
of the recognized hopelessness of any result, is not apparent,
unless it was to satisfy Eastern owners of whaling vessels
that something was being done in their interest.

Finally, on December 16, 1835, Butler was informed that,
as the time for his return to the United States had expired,
the nomination of his successor would be sent to the Senate
on the following day; and he was further told that the
government of Mexico had asked for his recall.* On re-
ceipt of this Butler was furious. He wrote that the instruc-
tions of July 2 had not been received by him imtil the evening
before he left Washington, and were not read imtil he was
nearly in Mexico. Had he known what they contained on
the subject of Texas he would have resigned; they were
contrary to the President's own words, and contrary in fact
to what Forsyth had led him to believe in conversation;
"and just at the period," said Butler with extraordinary
insolence, "when a favorable moment presented itself to
renew the work, I am discharged from office." •

To appreciate the full humor of Butler's suggestion that
the time was favorable for renewing negotiations to purchase
Texas, it must be remembered that the Mexican govern-
ment had asked for his recall, that they believed him to have
been concerned in stirring up the revolution in Texas, and
that they were straining every nerve to send an army under
Santa Anna to reconquer the country.

Butler lingered on in the city of Mexico for six months
after his successor arrived, and finally left after the most
absurd series of quarrels with the Minister of Foreign Rela-
tions and with the Secretary of War, General Tomel, whom
he personally insulted, for all of which the United States
government duly expressed regrets. Henceforward Butler
disappears from this narrative. He took up his residence

» Forsyth to Butler, Aug. 6, 1835; H. R. Doc. 42, 25 Ck)ng., 1 sess., 18.
* Forsyth to Butler, Dec. 16, 1835; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 seas., 158.
» Butler to Forsyth, Jan. 15, 1836; ibid., 573.

JACKSON'S OFFEBS TO PURCHASE TEXAS 261

in Texas, where the remainder of his Ufe was passed in de-
served obscurity.

With his retirement; Jackson's efforts to pm*chase Texas
came to a dose. They had been conducted in such a manner
as to reflect discredit on his administration, both at home
and abroad, and with the result of increasing materially
Mexican distrust of the intentions of the American govern-
ment and of adding to the difficulty of preserving amicable
relations in the future.

-Ui

CHAPTER XI

TEXAS IN ARMS

The meeting of the Mexican Congress in January, 1835,
proved to the whole world how completely the reactionary
elements were in control. One of the first acts of Congress
was to depose G6mez Farias from the oflSce of Vice-Presi-
dent; ^ and as Santa Anna again desired to retire to his
hacienda; General Miguel Barragan, a willing tool of Santa
Anna's, was elected President ad interim.

After a short period of hesitation, Congress, on May 2,
1835, declared that it had been vested "by the Will of the
Nation" with the power to make any constitutional changes
it might think were for the good of the people, without
reference to the methods of amendment prescribed in the
Constitution itself; * or, in other words, it declared the Con-
stitution of 1824 to be at an end. Later, on September 9,
1835, it reiterated this declaration,* and began the detailed
task of constitution-making.

The first step was to abolish the state legislatures and to
make the governors of the several states entirely dependent
on the federal government.* And on October 23 an act
was passed in which the outlines of a new constitution were
adopted.^

^ Law of Jan. 28, 1835. The form of this singular and obviously unconsti-
tutional statute is as follows: ** The general congress declares that the nation
ha8 disowned (desconocido) the authority of Vice-President of the Republic
exercised by I>on Valentin G<5mez Farias, and he therefore no longer pos-
sesses the powers of that office." — (Dublan y Lozano, III, 15.)

« Ibid., 43. » Ibid., 71. < Ibid,, 75.

* Ibid.f 89. In cotnmunicating these decrees officially to the United States
govemmtot the Mexican legation wrote that the '^ system of government
of the nation has been changed, and is simply republican, representative and
popular, instead of federal, as it was before. This change has been effected
by the free and spontaneous will of the people, manifested in a legal and
pacific manner. . . . Neither the heat of party nor force have, in any way,

262

TEXAS IN ARMS 263

By this revised Constitution the powers of the several
states were destroyed and the nation became, in form, a
strictly centralized repubUc. The whole legislative power
ivas to be vested in a bicameral Congress, the whole execu-
tive power in an elected President, and the whole judicial
power in courts to be established by Congress. The national
territory was to be divided into departments. Laws and
regulations for the administration of justice were to be imi-
form throughout the republic.

The drafting of the details proceeded very slowly, and it
was not imtil December 29, 1836, that the complete con-
stitutional provisions were finally adopted.^ On the fol-
lowing day a law was adopted by which Coahuila and Texas
were made separate departmente.^

The success of the Centralist party and their avowed de-
termination to overthrow the federal form of government
awakened new resistance in the spring of 1835, especially
in Zacatecas and Coahuila; and this served for some months
to divert the attention of the government from the ever-
present problem of Texas.

The inmiediate cause of the revolt in Zacatecas was the
passage of an act by Congress on March 31, 1835, regulating
the militia, and providing that their number should be re-
duced so that there should only be one militiaman for every
five himdred inhabitants.* The objects of this law were, of
course, to strengthen the position of the regular army as
the controlling power in the country, and to weaken the
local authorities.

Zacatecas had been for some years extremely prosperous
and well governed, and it had a local militia which was
considered to be superior to any in Mexico. The people of
that state having refused to obey the new law, Santa Anna
left his hacienda, and by express leave of Congress, granted

contributed to this change."— (Castillo to Forsyth, May 13, 1836; H. R. Doc.
351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 736.) Certainly a very strange assertion, in view of the
notorious and undisputed facts.

> Dublan y Lozano, III, 230-258. A useful summary of the provisions
adopted will be found in Bancroft's History cf Mexico, V, 144.

s Dublan y Losano, UI, 258. ' Ibid,, 38.

264 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

April 9; 1835/ took command of the anny and marched with
three or four thousand men against the state troops. On
the night of May 10; 1835^ he routed the Zacatecans in a
contest in which his own losses were trivial and those of the
rebels enormous; and aa the result of this one-sided affair
Santa Anna's prestige throughout the country was im-
mensely increased.

The affairs of Coahuila were somewhat more compli-
cated. In the first place, there was the perennial quarrel
over the state capital. The governor of the state favored
MonclovA. General Cos, the federal commander of the
military district, favored Saltillo, the inhabitants of which
supported the plan of Cuemavaca, or, in other words,
supported Santa Anna and the reactionaries. In the
second place, the federal government had taken a hand
in the disposition of the vacant lands in Texas and else-
where in the state. The legislature of the state had passed
a law on March 26, 1834, by which vacant lands were to be
sold at auction, and on April 19 of the same year it passed
a second law authorizing the governor to dispose of four
hundred leagues of land, nominally for the purpose of re-
straining Indian depredations.^ Under these acts it seems
that large quantities of public lands were granted to a small
niunber of persons, although the details of these grants are
at the present day very imcertain. On March 14, 1835,
the legislature passed another law, under which the governor
was empowered to dispose of four hundred leagues of public
land, in order to meet the existing exigencies of the state
C'para atender d las urgencias pUblicas en que adtuilmente se
encuentra'^). He was to regulate the colonization of these
lands as he saw fit, without reference to the act of March
26, 1834.* Finally, on April 7, 1835, the legislature passed
a law authorizing the governor to take whatever measures
he might think proper " for securing public tranquillity and
sustaining the authorities in the free exercise of their func
tions"; and this vague authority the governor construed 8

1 Ihid,, 41. * Laws and Decreea of CoahuOa and Texas, 247, 270, 27

» Ibid,, 281.

TEXAS IN ARMS 265

quite sufficient to enable him to grant some hundreds of
leagues more to Dr. James Grant, of Parras, in Coahuila, a
naturalized Scotchman, who was destined to exercise a very
disastrous effect on Texan affairs a year later. ^

For once the people of Texas and the Mexican govern-
ment were in accord. The former believed that the author-
ities of Coahuila were alienating all the most valuable lands
of Texas at a sacrifice to a set of dishonest speculators, and
thereby ruining her future prospects; and they had little
doubt that the action of the authorities was the result of
bribery. The federal government regarded the action of
the legislature as an imwarranted infringement upon its
own prerogatives. By an act passed April 25, 1835, the
federal CJongress declared that the state law of March 14,
which was the one that had excited the most opposition both
in Texas and at the national capital, was void.^

The state also joined Zacatecas in protesting against the
law regulating the militia.* But what served, probably
more than anything else, to embitter the controversy, was
a representation to Congress, adopted by the state legisla-
ture on April 25, 1835. This representation or protest 1 tl
declared that the state of Coahuila and Texas did not recog- * »
nize, and would never recognize, the measures emanating
from the General Congress, imless they were in conformity
with articles 47 to 50 of the Constitution — the articles limit-
ing the powers of the federal Congress — ^nor would the state
ever acknowledge any amendments to the Constitution of
1824 which were not subject to the limitations and adopted
by the methods therein contained. In addition, the state
protested against the action of the federal officer command-
ing the eastern internal states (General Cos) for interfering
in the most turbulent manner in its internal affairs.'*

^ A detailed account of this mass of legislation and of the action taken under
it will be found in an article entitled ''Land Speculation as a Cause of the
Texas Revolution," by Eugene C. Barker, Tex. Hist. Quar., X, 76-95. All
the grants made under the legislation of 1834 and 1835 were subsequently
annulled by the victorious Texans.

* Dublan y Lozano, III, 42. How far Congress was authorized to annul
the act of the legislature is an interesting but unimportant question.

* Law and Decreea of Coahuila and Texas, 290. < Ibid., 288-200.

266 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICX)

Agustin Viesca had been elected governor^ and Ramdn
Miisquiz vice-governor, on March 20, 1835,^ and, the leg-
islature having adjourned at the end of April, the executive
oflScers were left to face, as best they might, the hostile fed-
eral officers. General Cos had issued a proclamation from
Saltillo threatening to put down the "revolutionists" by
force, and it was becoming evident that Monclova was no
longer a very safe place of residence for the state authorities.
Accordingly, Viesca decided to remove the seat of govern-
ment to B6xar, and attempted to make his way thither with
some members of the state legislature and some of the state
officers. They were, however, captured by Cos's troops,
but ultimately escaped and made their way to Texas, where
Viesca and those who were regarded as responsible for the
land laws of 1835 were very coolly received.*

The affairs of Coahuila having been thus settled, the
Mexican government was free at last to turn its imdivided
attention to the affairs of Texas. Through all the recent
vicissitudes of the nation those in authority had never
varied in their determination to take military .possession of
that province, although since the summer of 1832, a period
of three years, they had not exercised, in fact, any control
over it whatever.

The subject was, however, quite obviously one of urgent
importance. Not only had Mexican officials been attacked
and driven f,x,m tteir^a, not only had the .nilita^ free,
of the country been insulted, but the Treasury was being
daily despoiled aa one cargo after another was landed in
Texas without even a pretence of compliance with the cus-
toms laws. Whether a policy of concession might have
served to restore the authority of the national government
is not important to consider. A recent Mexican author
contends that if a very moderate tariff had been'adopted,
with provisions for expending the whole proceeds on internal
improvements; if the comparatively few slaves then in

1 Ibid., 282.

* Viesca's vindication of his actions, which he asserted were patriotic in the
extreme, will be found in Filisola, Gnerra de T^aa, 11, 115-125.

TEXAS IN ARMS 267

Texas had been purchased and manumitted by the govern-
ment and slavery absolutely abolished; if emigration from the
Northern and Eastern United States had been encouraged;
if land titles had been promptly and fairly settled; and if all
religious intolerance had been done away with, the discon-
tent of the settlers could have been readily appeased.^ Per-
haps so; but no such solution commended itself to the
federal government, although Austin spent months in Mex-
ico trying to secure the adoption of some such programme.

If Mexican authority was to be forcibly established in
Texas, an efficient and adequate army and navy were evi-
dently the first essential. Unfortunately for itself, the
national government was unable to furnish any military
force that was either adequate or efficient.

Early in 1833, during Pedraza's short tenure of office, an
effort was made to accomplish something with such forces
as it could then command; for the government was much
disturbed by the reports of the San Felipe convention of
October, 1832, and the new convention called for March,
1833. The Mexican Minister of Relations on March 2, 1833,
solemnly wrote to the American charge d'affaires that " our
North American colonists of the department of B^xar'' in-
tended to secede from the State of Coahuila and unite them-
selves to the United States; that they were favored and
encouraged by the inhabitants of the neighboring North
American states; that he hoped the United States govern-
ment would do what it could to stop this; and that the
President of Mexico had issued such orders as were deemed
necessary to prevent the dismembering of the national terri-
tory.* What those orders were has been related in very great
detail by the officer charged with their execution, General
Vicente Filisola, an ItaUan by birth, but for many years a
resident of Guatemala and of Mexico, who had been appointed
early in the year 1833 to command the eastern internal
states, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and Coahuila and Texas.

1 Bullies, Ixu Grandes Mentiras de Niiestra Historia, 255 et seq.
'Gonzales to Butler, March 2, 1833; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Ck)ng., 2 seas.,
470-471.

268 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Filisola's force consisted of two battalions of regular infan-
try, a regiment of regular cavalry, and a six-gun battery of
horse artillery, besides the local troops, presidial guards,
and detachments of various arms which since the abandon-
ment of Texas had been wandering about the neighboring
states. These men, for the most part, had been loyal to
Bustamante, and they entertained the idea that they had
been ordered to Texas as a punishment for taking the wrong
side in poUtics, an idea that seems to have been pretty well
founded.^ Not only were the troops disaffected, but they
were utterly incapable of taking the field. The general
wrote that the artillery horses were unfit for service, and that
the battery had neither carpenter, armorer, wheelwright,
smith, nor harness-maker. The two regular infantry battal-
ions numbered, between them, but two hundred and thirty-
six men. The cavalry regiment had but a hundred and fifty
men, and their horses were utterly useless. The presidial
companies were six months in arrears in their pay, and they
were badly mounted, worse armed, and in rags. The bar-
racks at Matamoros, the head-quarters of the department,
were almost in ruins. There were no hospitals, no medi-
cines, and no surgeons.^

In letter after letter Filisola urged the government to send
him men, money, arms, ammunition, clothing, supplies, en-
gineers, and surgeons. He had been ordered to reoccupy
Texas, and was impressed with the imperative necessity of
doing so at once if Texas was to remain a part of the repub-
Uc ; but he was totally unable to do more than establish one
weak detachment at the mouth of the Rio Grande and
another at GoUad.

To add to his difficulties, Filisola fell ill, the cholera broke
out, and the troops became uneasy and desirous to join in
the contest for fueros y rdigidn. The results of these multi-
plied difficulties were that the force under Filisola's com-
mand was not only mutinous but had no effective organ-
ization of any kind. By the end of the year 1834 it had

1 Filisola, Guerra de T^as, I, 298.

* Filisola to the Secretary of War, May 9, 1833; ibid., 327-340.

TEXAS IN ARMS 269

practically ceased to exist.^ The battery of artillery which
Filisola had brought with him had been marched oflF some-
where else. The men of the other commands had mostly
deserted. The presidial companies had been all but dis-
banded. Men could not be found to pursue highway rob-
bers on the roads near Matamoros. In Texas, where there
were no bandits on the roads, the colonists lived "in almost
total independence," refused to allow troops and federal
employees within their territory, administered justice ac-
cording to their own fancy and under foreign laws, and not
only paid no dues to the Treasury, but filled the interior with
smuggled goods.^

The failure of the custom-houses to produce money was a
very serious business for the Mexican army, inasmuch as
commanding oflBcers considered themselves quite at Uberty
to take over directly the customs receipts; and if there
were no receipts, very often there was no money for the
troops. Not only had the Texan custom-houses ceased to
exist, but Matamoros and Tampico, which ought to have
brought in a great deal of money, as trade was constantly
increasing, showed constantly diminishing receipts. This
fact Filisola oflBcially reported to be due entirely to the
gross and open corruption of the revenue service.*

On November 22, 1833, an order was issued relieving
Filisola and appointing in his place General Pedro Lemus,
who did nothing.* In September, 1834, Lemus was suc-
ceeded by General Martin Perfecto de Cos, a brother-in-law
of Santa Anna. For the time being Cos also was reduced
to impotence by the lack of means, but when, after the fall
of Zacatecas, he was enabled to adopt a forward policy, his
achievements were represented not by a zero but by a neg-
ative quantity. He failed in everything he attempted.

His first step was to re-establish a custom-house for Gal-
veston Bay, and he sent for this purpose a small detachment
under a certain Captain Antonio Tenorio, who landed about

^ " Las trapas . . . se hdUen reducidaa d la mds campleta ntdidad" — (Report
to Secretary of War, Dec. 30, 1833; ibid., I, 470.)
« Ibid., 475. » Ibid., 481-484.

* He took over the command at Saltillo Jan. 4, 1834.

270 THE UNITED STATES AND MEjXICO

the first of January, 1835, on Galveston Island. About
January 31 he removed with his men to Bradbum's old post
at Andhuac, where there were at first two oflScers and thirty-
four men, although in May they received a reinforcement
of a lieutenant and nine men.^ Cos also strengthened to
some extent the detachments at B^xar and Goliad, but
he entirely underestimated the magnitude of his task. He
repeated Terdn's blunder of sending a boy to do a man's
work.

In a general way Cos was disposed to follow the conduct
recommended by Colonel Piedras three years before, namely
to conciliate the colonists by fair words and to continue
gradually strengthening the military posts until he was in
a position to crush out all resistance. In accordance with
this policy he addressed in June, 1835, a friendly circular
to the people of Texas "full of the paternal views of the
government"; but the persons to whom it was addressed
were angry and perplexed and not very well disposed to
listen to his assurances. The arrest of the governor of the
state by the federal authorities, and the well-understood
intention of the party in power to adopt a new federal Con-
stitution which would destroy all state rights, had been
universally unpopular. So far, all Texas was agreed; but
multipUed doubts and diflficulties had arisen when the ques-
tion of a remedy came to be considered.

Meetings had been held at various places, which led to
heated discussions, but to no definite results, for in spite of
violent antagonisms, threatening even to end in tragedies,
the majorities were conservative.* The most important of
these local meetings was announced to be held at San
Felipe on June 22, 1835. The day before the meeting, some
hot-headed enthusiasts for the Texan cause stopped a gov-
ernment courier, who was bringing Cos's conciliatory cir-
cular; but there were also found in his possession private
letters, one from Cos and another from Colonel Ugartechea

^ Barker, " Difficulties of a Mexican Revenue Officer in Texas/' Tex. Hist.
Quar., IV, 190, 192. .
* Comp, Hi8L, I, 604; Brown, I, 297-299.

TEXAS IN ARMS 271

at B^xaT; addressed to the commanding oflGicer at Andhnac,
promising such reinforcements as would soon enable him
to regulate matters.

The disclosures of these letters caused great excitement
at the San Felipe meeting. Violent language was used and
violent proposals were made. One suggestion was that an
expedition should be organized and sent across the Rio
Grande to rescue Governor Viesca from the federal troops,
and to set up the old state government at B^xar; but this
plan evidently involved risks and delays. As an alterna-
tive it was proposed that Miisquiz, the vice-governor, who
was then at B^xar and quite ready to act with the American
colonists, should be installed as governor in open opposi-
tion to the national authorities. -BiitJthejnajQrity_was_no.t
yet ready to take any decided step, and so nothiRg wasJcme.^

Neverthelea3j^ a^^^ resolved -that 48Gnaething

should be done ; and at a secret meeting they passed resolu-
tions "recommending that^ in connection with the general
defence of the country against military sway, the troops of
Andhuac should be disarmed and ordered to leave Texas." '
The irrepressible William B. Travis was authorized to col-
lect men for the purpose. He had been one of Bradbum's
seven prisoners in 1832, and he had been invited, as he said,
by several of his friends, "who were suffering under the
despotic rule of the military," to come and help them.

On June 29, 1835, with about thirty men from San Felipe
and Harrisburg, he sailed across Galveston Bay in a sloop,
on board of which he had mounted a six-pounder gun.
Without waiting for an attack, Captain Tenorio evacuated
the fort and took to the woods; but next morning he and
his forty men came in and surrendered. They agreed to
leave Texas immediately and not to serve again against the
people of Texas, whereupon twelve muskets were allowed
them as a protection against the Indians. The rest of their
arms were surrendered, and then the Mexicans and Texans
sailed peaceably back across the bay in Travis's sloop,

> Brown, I, 294; Yoakum, I, 338.

* Travis to Henry Smith, July 6, 1835, in Tex, Hist. Quar., II, 24.

272 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

reaching the viUage of Harrisbuis in time to celebrate to-
gether the Fourth of July.

A young girl who was present on that occa^on wrote
years afterward a naive accoimt of it.

"The citizens of Harrisburg," she wrote, "had been preparing for
a grand ball and barbecue before the trouble at Anahuac. When they
heard the Mexicans would be brought there they sent word to the
people of the different settlements to attend. . . . The Fourth of
July brought out quite a crowd. The Texans and Mexicans arrived
in time for the barbecue. . . . The men spent the day talking war
and politics. Families from the country camped. Ladies were shop-
ping and visiting and young people were having a good time. . . .
Captain Tenorio walked among the people shaking hands with the
men and acting as if he was the hero of the occasion. The Mexican
soldiers sat and smoked and played cards. . . . The Mexican officers
were at the bail. They did not dance country dances. Mr. Koker-
not (sic) and his wife were Germans. They waltzed, and Captain
Tenorio danced with Mrs. Kokemot. She could speak French and
Captain Tenorio also was a French scholar, so they danced and talked
all the evening." ^

Captain Tenorio and his men, feasting and dancing, in
time got as far as San Felipe where he stayed for seven weeks
in the hope that the Mexican commander at B^xar would
send him horses and money with which to complete his
journey; and he ultimately reached B6xar about September
8, 1835, where, one may suppose, he was certainly not re-
garded as a hero.*

Precisely what was the motive for this silly attack upon
the Anihuac garrison is not quite clear. There had been
local difficulties, one man had been shot and woimded by a
Mexican soldier, and a Mr. Briscoe had been put in the
guard-house ; but probably Travis's action was chiefly due to
a sort of boyish impulse to show the Mexicans that they could
not order Americans about. Certainly to sensible Texans

^ Reminisoences of Mrs. Harris, Tex, Hist, Quar.f IV, 125.

* An excellent account of this whole affair \b a paper on the '' Difficultiee of
a Mexican Revenue Officer in Texas," by Eugene C. Barker, Tex. Hist. Quar.,
IV, 190-202, already referred to. See also "The Old Fort at Anahuac" by
Adele B. Looscan, Tex. Hist. Qitar., II, 21-28.

TEXAS IN ARMS 273

an insult to the Mexican flag just then was the very last
thing to be desired. What they must have prayed for was
continued peace. No other part of Mexico was so peace-
ful, so free from crimes of violence, or so prosperous as
Texas; and if only a few more such years of growth and
plenty could be assured, she would have attained a place
where she need fear nothing from Mexican arms.

General Cos, even before he heard of the Andhuac afifair,
had taken the talk of the war party in Texas very seriously.
He could not yet bite, but his bark was tolerably ferocious.
In a proclamation dated at Matamoros, July 5, 1835, he
warned the inhabitants of Texas that if they attempted to
disturb the peace from a mistaken zeal for '^ persons who
had acted as State authorities but had been deposed by the
determination of the Sovereign General Congress" (mean-
ing Viesca and MUsquiz), the inevitable consequences of
war would fall on them and their property, so that they
would no longer benefit by the advantages adBf orded by their
situation, ''which places them outside the oscillations that
have agitated the people in the centre of the Republic";
and that the Mexican government would know how to
repress with a strong hand those who, forgetting what they
owed the nation that had adopted them as sons, went so
far as to desire to live according to their own pleasure and
without submitting in any way to the laws.

With this threatening proclamation before them and with
Captain Tenorio in attendance, a meeting of representatives
from the local committees of the neighboring settlements
was held at San Felipe July 17, 1835. The members ap-
pointed a delegation to wait on General Cos to explain the
late disturbances and assure him of the adherence of Texas
to the general government; the arms and papers taken
from the Mexicans at Andhuac were ordered to be restored;
and resolutions were adopted recommending "moderation,
organization, and a strict adherence to the laws of the land,"
protesting against the acts of any set of individuals which
were calculated to involve the citizens of Texas in a con-
flict with the federal authorities, and promising to assist

274 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

in carrying the revenue laws into effect and in punishing
those who had insulted the national flag at Andhuac.^

These resolutions probably represented with accuracy the
opinions of a majority, or at any rate a large proportion of
the settlers in southwestern Texas, who were most exposed
to Mexican attacks; but there, as elsewhere, there was a
strong party in favor of driving the Mexican troops out of
B6xar. Nevertheless the impolicy of taking any such ac-
tion without a unanimous Texas behind them, was still
manifest even to the most eager of the war party.

"The truth is," wrote Travis on July 30, 1835, "the people are
much divided here. The peace-party, as they style themselves, I be-
lieve are the strongest, and make much the most noise. Unless we
could be imited, had we not better be quiet, and setde down for a
while? There b now no doubt but that a central government will
be established. What will Texas do in that case? ... I do not know
the minds of the people upon the subject; but if they had a bold and
determined leader, I am inclined to think they would kick against it.
. . . General Cos writes that he wants to be at peace with us; and he
appears to be disposed to cajole and soothe us. Ugartachea does the
same. . . . God knows what we are to do!" '

Texas did "settle down for a while," and all through the
rest of the summer of 1835 peace reigned. Nevertheless,
the uncertainties of the situation evidently needed to be
cleared up by some concerted action of the colonists, and a
third conference or convention was a tolerably obvious
means to that end. Such a conference was first proposed
at a meeting held at San Felipe on July 14, 1835; but
similar proposals were made almost simultaneously at other
places. The first definite action, however, was taken by

» Yoakum, I, 341 ; Edward, 239-245.

* Yoakum, I, 343. Edward Gritten, an English-bom settler, who was on
friendly terms with the Mexican authorities, wrote to Colonel Ugartechea
half a dozen long letters between July 5 and 17, giving an account of affairs.
He represents the great majority of the Texans as peaceable, law-abiding
Mexican citizens, but says that the introduction of a large body of soldiers into
Texas would unite all parties against the government. See Publications of
theSoiUhem Hist, Assn., VIII, 345-456; Tex. Hist. Qvar., XIII, 150. Grit-
ten had been a grocer in the city of Mexico, and was there involved in a law-
suit with Anthony Butler, the American charg6 d'affaires. — (H. R. Doc. 351,
25 Cong., 2 sess., 110.)

TEXAS IN ARMS 275

the people of Columbia. Hiroiigh a committee appointed
at a meeting held there on August 15, 1835, they issued an
address (dated August 20) to the people of Texas, inviting
each jurisdiction or municipality to elect five representa-
tives; who should meet at Washington, on the Brazos,^ on
the fifteenth day of the following October "for a con-
sultation of all Texas."

Although the word convention, which had so vexed the\
Mexican authorities, was not used, and all that was pro- ^
posed was a meeting for considtation, there was at first much
doubt as to the wisdom of the proposed conference. Never-
theless, delegates were peaceably chosen, and if the colo-
nists had been let alone, they would certainly have taken
no hostile step imtil the consultation had been held. But
the Mexican authorities, long before they had been ade- 1
quately reinforced, were imprudent enough to provoke an /
armed conflict. They began (under orders from the capi-
tal) by demanding the surrender of six men whom they ought 1
to have known that no self-respecting people would ever
give up to certain death. The first of these was Lorenzo
de Zavala.

Zavala was a native of Yucatan, and in his time had
played many parts in the drama of Mexican history. When
very yoimg he had been kept a prisoner for three years by
the Spaniards on account of his revolutionary tendencies;
and after his release became for a time a deputy to the
Spanish Cortes. He then travelled in England and the
United States, and on his return to his native country held
high office. As President of the constituent Congress in
1824, his name was the first subscribed to the federal Consti-
tution. He became later one of the foimders of the Yorkino
party and an intimate friend of Poinsett's. At the time of
the troubles in 1828 he was governor of the state of Mexico,
and he was made Secretary of the Treasury in Guerrero's
cabinet. He was necessarily in the backgroimd during
Bustamante's rule, but in 1833, under G6mez Farias, he

* WaahiAgtoD was a new settlement, and there was a good deal of opposi-
tion to its selection. See Tex, Hist. Quar,, X^ 06, 150<

276 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

presided over the Chamber of Deputies, and then served
for a short time as Mexican minister to France.

In the spring or simmier of 1835 he quarrelled with Santa
Anna, and sought refuge in Texas, where for several years
he had had pecuniary interests. It is known that in the
year 1829 he had secured an empresario contract from the
state of Coahuila and Texas, authorizing him to settle three
hundred families in northeastern Texas, which contract he
assigned to the Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company
of New York; ^ and he seems to have had other lands also
on the San Jacinto River.

Butler, the American charge d'afifaires in Mexico, said
in 1831 that it was then a matter of common knowledge in
Mexico that Zavala had declared he would revolutionize
Texas,* and two years later, in drafting a private letter to
President Jackson, Butler wrote that Zavala was poor and a
prodigal, and that he was purchasable; ' but Butler's word
was not to be taken against anybody. Among the Texans
Zavala was always regarded as a man of high character, as
well as of great ability and experience. Tomel, who was
bitterly opposed to Zavala after the latter quarrelled with
Santa Anna, described him as a man of great talents and great
versatility, with a character so singularly compoimded of
good and evil that it was difficult to imderstand how his
successive acts could have proceeded from one and the same
individual.^ It seems, on the whole, quite true that with all
his talents he was "everything by starts, and nothing long";
and this would doubtless account for the very various esti-
mation in which he was held by different people. What is
important for present purposes is that Zavala was a firm
friend to Austin, and that he had tried to help him in Octo-
ber, 1834, while in Mexico.^

^ The origin and history of this rather dubious corporation is set out very
fully in the report of Rose v. The GovemoTf etc., 24 Tex. Rep., 496.

< H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 382. Zavala came to the United States
in the autumn of 1830, with a letter of introduction from Butler dated May
24, 1830; StaU Dept. MSS.

> Butler to Jackson, Sept. 14, 1833; Texan Archives MSS.

* Tomel, Breoe Besefia, 43-46. * Yoakum, I, 32&

TEXAS IN ARMS 277

On August 1, 1835, Tomel, the Minister of War, sent
orders to General Cos to arrest Zavala; and also the five
men who were regarded as the most active agents in driving
out Tenorio and his men from the post at An^uac. Cos
was particularly required to exert all his "ingenuity and
activity in arranging energetic plans for success in the appre-
hension of Don Lorenzo Zavala/' who, when captured, was
to be placed "at the disposition of the supreme govern-
ment.'' ^

Cos could think of nothing more ingenious or energetic
than to write a letter from Matamoros addressed to Colonel
Ugartechea at B^xar, directing him to march "at the head
of all his cavalry" and arrest Zavala in case the local
authorities did not give him up. Ugartechea had com-
manded the fort at Velasco in 1832 and knew the Texans,
and when he got Cos's letter he contented himself with writ-
ing to Wylie Martin, the American jefe politico of the
Brazos district, asking him for the surrender of the six men
who were wanted.^ Martin of course first temporized and
then wrote that the men had left, and Ugartechea seems to
have contented himself with this assurance. At any rate,
he did not stir from B6xar.

But the news of the demand for the surrender of the six
men had spread. Addresses and speeches, especially from
those parts of Texas which were furthest from Mexican
vengeance, warned the people that the Mexican garrisons
were being reinforced; that the overthrow of the federal
Constitution had been decided on; that the authority of
Congress had been declared to be unlimited; that all who
had come into Texas since April 6, 1830, were to be expelled; j
that those who had resisted Mexican soldiers were to be
tried by court-martial; and that the slaves were to be
freed. In a manner of speaking this was in fact the official
Mexican programme, and the crude statement of such a
policy was very well calculated to arouse the most hesitat-

> Tomel to Ckw, quoted in Yoakum, I, 347.

s Eight men were later demanded, and two of them, Mexicans named Car-
vajal and Zambrano, were taken by the Mexicans and sent into the interior. —
(Yoakum, I, 360.)

278 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ing among the settlers and to put fresh zeal into the hearts
of the warlike.

By the end of August Travis, who was an active leader
of ike war party, was able to write exultingly that the
orders of arrest issued by Cos and Ugartechea had proved
too much for the people to bear, that the " Tories and submis-
sion men" were routed, and the people had become '^ almost
completely united." The Mexicans, he heard, were coming
to garrison San Felipe and other towns, but the people would
not submit to that— "we shall give them hell if they come
here." '

At the same time J. W. Fannin, a native of Georgia, who
was eager in the same cause, was writing from Velasco to
a friend in the United States army to urge him to resign
and come to conunand the Texans. "The time is near at
hand," he wrote, "nay has arrived, when we have to look
around us and prepare, with our limited resources, ior fight "^

A further source of trouble arose from the efforts of the
Mexican government to control the contraband trade by
means of a revenue-cutter stationed off Velasco. The
vessel employed was the Correo de M6xico, schooner, com-
manded by Captain Thomas M. Thompson, an English-
man by birth. Through the months of July and August she
cruised up and down the coast and succeeded in capturing
one American brig; but by the end of August the colonists
and the American traders were ready for her.

On the first day of September, 1835, the American schooner
San Felipe, inward bound from New Orleans, and having
among her passengers Stephen F. Austin, fell in with the
Correo off the mouth of the Brazos River. After a fight
some miles offshore, which lasted for three-quarters of an
hour, the Correo drew off. The San Felipe entered the river
and landed her passengers, but the next morning the Correo,
being becalmed about six miles off, the San Fdipe came
out in tow of a river steam-boat, whereupon the Correo, hav-
ing had fighting enough the day before, surrendered.

1 Travis to Andrew Briscoe, Aug. 31, 1835; Tex, Hist Qttar., II, 25.
< Fannin to Colonel Belton, Aug. 27, 1835; Tex. Hiet. Quar., VII, 318.

TEXAS IN ARMS 279

Thompson and his crew were carried oflf to New Orleans
and handed over to the federal authorities upon a charge of
piracy committed against an American vessel on the high
seas. As they could show no commission from the Mexican
government, they were indicted and Thompson was tried;
but the jury disagreeing, he was dischai^ed.^ The Mexican
government asserted, through diplomatic channels, that the
Correo was a regularly commissioned giuirda costa; and
although the regularity of the commission may have been
questionable, the fact itself and the responsibility of the
Mexican government for her acts seem to have been clear.*

This sea-fight, of which he had thus been a witness, pro-
duced a deep impression on Austin's mind. Of a naturally
timid and hesitating disposition, disliking disturbances and
extra-legal measures, with a sanguine belief in the power of
reason and good temper to settle differences, he was better
fitted to follow than to lead in a revolution. He was not of
the temper to ride the whirlwind or direct the storm.

All that night, as we are told by his nephew, he "walked
the beach, his mind oppressed with the gravity of the situ-
ation, forecasting the troubles ahead to Texas." ' He had
returned home, after more than two years' absence, full of
hope and bringing messages from Santa Anna and "the
most intelligent and influential men in Mexico," to the
effect that they were the friends of Texas, that they wished
for and would do everything to promote her prosperity, and
that special provision would be made for her people in the
new Constitution. He found the country "in anarchy,
threatened with hostilities, armed vessels capturing every-
thing they can catch on the coast." ^

A week later, in a speech at a large public meeting at

^ A report of the trial by John Winthrop was printed and published at New
Orleans in 1835.

* Thompson's activities had been the cause of complaints before 1835. In
1829 he seised an American schooner off Matagorda, and in 1832 he stopped
vessels off Tabasco and was accused of robbing them. See H. R. Doo. 351,
25 Cong., 2 sess., 304, 305, 448, 450. The correspondence relative to his
arrest and trial will be found at pp. 708-713, 720-724 of the same volume;
where an account of the fight by a Mexican officer is given (712-713).

« Guy M. Bryan, in Camp. HUL, I, 500. « Ibid., 503.

280 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Brazoria, Austin gave a detailed account of affairs in Mexico,
and of his conversations with Santa Anna and others. He
had warned them, he said, that the sending of any armed
force to Texas would be war, and his advice had been dis-
regarded. What, then, was to be done? Texas needed
peace and a local government. Its inhabitants were farm-
ers and needed a calm and quiet life. But their rights and
property were in jeopardy and some remedy must be found,
and that without delay. The remedy, to his mind, was
plain. All divisions, or excitements, or passion, or violence
must be banished, and the general consultation of the people
of Texas must decide what was to be done.^ The "general
consultation" had already been summoned, as we have
seen, to meet on the fifteenth of October.

Rumors that Cos was actually coming to Texas in per-
son and bringing reinforcements with him had, however,
reached San Felipe even before Austin's return home, and it
seemed probable that peace could not long be preserved.
On September 19 Austin wrote to a friend that Cos's "final
answer" had been received, that he had positively declared
that the persons whose surrender had been demanded must
be given up, and that the people of Texas must imcon-
ditionally submit to any alterations which Congress might
see fit to make in the federal Constitution.^ Two days
earlier, a committee of safety, which had been formed at
San Felipe, and of which Austin was chairman, had issued
an address warning the people that war was their "only
resource," and advising that volunteer companies be im-
mediately formed;^ and the same spirit rapidly became
manifest throughout Texas.^

Cos, as a matter of fact, had left Matamoros on Septem-

^ What purports to be the text of this speech will be found in Foote, II,
60-65; Yoakum, I, 357.

* Austin to Grayson, Sept. 19, 1835, in Brown, I, 345.

•Yoakum, I, 361.

^ At about this time the old central committee, appointed by the oonveiition
of October, 1832, and continued by the convention of April, 1833, was re-
vived and reorganized. It sat at San Felipe and controlled affairs for six
weeks, until the meeting of the consultation. — (E. W. Winkler, in Tex. Hist.
Qtior., X, 142.)

TEXAS m ARMS 281

ber 17, and he reached Goliad on October 2, 1835. On his
arrival he was met by news of very serious import.

The little settlement of Gonzales, on the east (left) bank
of the Guadalupe River, and sixty-four miles east of B6xar
in a straight line, was in possession of an unmoimted six-
pounder brass gun, which had been either given or lent to
the inhabitants four years previously by the Mexican com-
mander at B^xar, for use against Indian attacks. In Sep-
tember, 1835, it seems to have occurred to Colonel Ugarte-
chea at B6xar as a happy thought that it would be a wise
measure of precaution to take the gun back, and he there-
upon sent a corporal and four men with a cart to get it.
AJfter some delay the alcalde of Gonzales, Andrew Ponton,
wrote, declining-on various grounds— to comply with
Ugartechea's request. This letter, it would appear, the
Mexican corporal sent back by one of his men, remaining
himself near Gonzales with the other three. At the same
time, the settlers buried the gun, sent their women and chil-
dren away, and despatched messengers to various points
for help.

On receipt of the alcalde's letter, Ugartechea did too late
what he should have done at first. He sent eighty men
under a lieutenant, Don Francisco Castaneda, to get the
gun, bring off the corporal and his three men, and chastise
those who had been guilty of such a piece of insolence.^
Castaneda reached the Guadalupe River in front of Gon-
zales on Tuesday, September 29, 1835, and then learned
that the corporal and his men had been disarmed and taken
into town as prisoners; and he also found that all the boats
had been taken across to the east bank of the river. There
were at this time only eighteen armed men in Gonzales,
and Castaneda could probably have forded the stream in
spite of these few villagers and taken the place, if only he
had acted at once. Instead, he wasted time in parleying,
and then he learned that the Texans were being rapidly
reinforced. His orders from Ugartechea were that, if he
was certain the opposing forces were superior to his, he was

» Filisola, Guerra de Tijas, II, 146.

282 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

to retire, so as not to compromise the national honor, and^
he therefore determined to fall back.

His information in regard to reinforcements was correct. "
The news of the threatened attack on Gonzales had spread
fast all over the coimtiy, and long before Castaneda had
reached the Guadalupe, volimteers from the neighboring
settlements were on the march. From all along the banks
of the Colorado and the Brazos more or less organized
bodies of men took their way to Gonzales, precisely as sixty
years before the men of Acton and Chelmsford and Little-
ton and Carlisle had marched to Concord when they
learned that a force was coming to seize arms and ammu-
nition. By Thursday, the first of October, the Texan force
had grown to over a himdred and sixty men, of whom fifty
were moimted. Their first act, being native Americans,
was to organize by electing a colonel and lieutenant-colonel.
Their next was to cross the river at about seven in the even-
ing in pursuit of the Mexicans, who were now slowly falling
back. Early the next morning the Texans came up with
the Mexicans, "in a commanding position on a slight emi-
nence," and after a short encoimter the latter scattered and
fled. One Mexican was killed and one Texan was slightly
woimded. There were no other casualties.^

On the same day as this skirmish General Cos reached
Goliad, where he received news of the imexpected resist-
ance of the colonists; and on Monday, the fifth of October,
he left for B^xar, about ninety miles away, where he ar-
rived on Friday, the ninth.

Goliad, Gonzales, and B6xar formed approximately a
right-angled triangle, Goliad lying nearly due south of
Gonzales and sixty miles from it, and about southeast of

^ The best and most detailed account of this affair will be found in Tex.
HisL Quar.f VIII, 14^156, by Ethel Zivley Rather. Amusing reminiscences
by an anon}rmou8 eye-witness, written thirty years after the event, will be
found in Baicer's Texas Scrap-Book^ 83-86. The writer says that as soon as
the settlers felt strong enough they drew the cannon out in plain sight of the
Mexicans and put a sign up over it in large letters, Come and take rr! When
the Mexicans fell back, the decision to pursue them was based on the extraor-
dinary reason that, as the volunteers had spent their own money and time
in coming to Gonzales, ''it was too much to bear'' to go home without a fight.

TEXAS IN ARMS 283

B^xar. Some forty miles from Goliad was the port of
Copano, on Copano Bay, which was frequently used by light-
draught vessels entering through Aransas Pass, and which
could readily have served as a means of communication by
sea from Matamoros and other Mexican ports. In fact,
military supplies in considerable amoimts had already been
sent to Goliad and were stored in what was called a fort,
but was in reality an abandoned mission, with the usual
stone church and extensive mission buildings.

From every point of view Goliad was a point of strategic
importance for the Mexicans. It was within easy reach of
the sea. By land, it was considerably nearer than B^xar
to the important points of Matamoros and Mier, on the
Rio Grande. It was also nearer than B6xar to San Felipe
and all the other centres of American colonization. In any
extensive military operations that might be undertaken by
the Mexicans Goliad would have been the natural base of
operations; and it is a measure of General Cos's incapacity
that he left this important post under the guard of less than
thirty men.

Late at night on Friday, the ninth of October, a small
party of colonists, acting apparently on their own initiative,
"rudied" the mission-fort and captured the entire garrison.
One Mexican soldier killed and three woimded, and one
Texan slightly wounded, made up the list of casualties.
Twenty-five prisoners, including Colonel Sandoval, the com-
manding ofl&cer, large quantities of military supplies, sev-
eral pieces of artillery, and three himdred muskets were 1
the material prizes.^ More important still were the indirect
results of the capture, for B^xar was practically cut off from
communication with Mexico.

When the news of Castaiieda's repulse at Gonzales reached
San Felipe, even the most peaceable among the Texans were
ready to admit that a conflict had begun which could not i
be avoided and which must be vigorously carried forward, j

^ Yoakum, I, 369. Filisola says the attack was made at about 1 a. m. on /
Saturday, the tenth of October, and that the Mexicans made a vigorous re-
sistance for an hour, losing three killed and several wounded. — (Querra de
T^, II, 153. See also Baker, Texas Scrap-Book, 260.)

284 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

"One spirit, one common purpose," declared the Committee
of Safety, "animates every one in this Department, which is
to take Bejar and drive all the military out of Texas before
the campaign closes"; ^ to such a pitch had the most con-
servative of the colonists been raised by the events of the
previous weeks. Austin himself, ahnost immediately after
the receipt of the news, started for the scene of action; and
by the middle of the day on Thursday, the eighth of October,
he had reached Gonzales, and was immediately selected by
common consent to be the commander of the motley anny
which had already assembled.^

The enthusiasts who were proposing with so light a heart
to march on B^xar and drive all the Mexicans out of Texas
were very far indeed from constituting a real military force.
They knew nothing of discipline or obedience. They had
not enlisted imder any definite agreement or for any fixed
term of service. They had elected their ofl&cers from their
own ranks, and they could see no reason for treating them
after election on any different terms from those they had
used before. The men considered that they had a perfect
right to come and go as they pleased, and that orders which
they deemed imwise need not be obeyed. And yet they
were not wholly without experience of a kind of warfare,
for many among them had fought the extremely formidable
Indian bands of the interior. A protracted campaign was,
however, something of which they were wholly ignorant.

Nor was Austin the man to create an army. He had
never had experience as a soldier, and he seems to have had
no conception of the importance of discipline. He lacked
the firmness and vigorous self-reUance which were essential
for the task before him, and he was, very likely, only too
conscious of his own shortcomings. Nevertheless he was,
as always, honestly desirous of doing his best to serve the
cause of the country he had created.

Having evolved some sort of organization, Austin and his

» Foote, II, 84.

* The rivalries of local celebrities, each anxious to be elected commander-in-*
chief, had threatened to disrupt the Texan forces before Austin's arrival.—
(Tex. Hist. Quar., VUI, 157; Baker, 8^91.)

TEXAS IN ARMS 285

army set out from Gonzales on Monday, the twelfth of Octo-
ber, but they marched so slowly that it was not imtil Tues-
day, the nineteenth, that they reached the Salado Creek,
close to B6xar. Here they remained for over a week, pushing
forward small parties to reconnoitre the town. General Cos,
though his .force was probably at first numerically superior,
did not attack them, and after a few days the disparity WM
greatly diminished, if not overcome, through the steady
arrival of Texan reinforcements. By the end of the month
Austin was in command of perhaps seven himdred men.

While encamped on the Salado the troops were visited
by a number of the men who had been elected to the " con-
sultation" which had been sununoned to meet on October
16, but had been postponed. The soldiers, we are told,
"demanded speeches from those who were regarded as
orators, and were successively gratified by eloquent and
patriotic addresses from Messrs. Houston, Archer, the two
Whartons, William H. Jack, the old-time Baptist preacher
Daniel Parker, and perhaps others." Having indulged in
this characteristic pastime, the troops next held a mas&-
meeting and passed resolutions demanding that the orators
go back to San Felipe and attend to business.^ And then,
on Tuesday, October 27, the legislators having departed,
the Texan army moved to a new camp on the San Antonio
River.

^ Brown, I, 367; Yoakum, I, 370-372. Yoakum says that Austin at this
time offered to resign his command in favor of Houston; but there seems to
be little or no foundation for the story. — {Comp, Hist, I, 185.)

CHAPTER Xn

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION
t

The proposal for a general consultation of all Texas had
been made in August^ 1835; and the expectation was that the
delegates would meet on the fifteenth of October; but there
was some confusion as to the place of meeting. The call
issued by the inhabitants of CJolumbia had suggested Wash-
ti ington, on the Brazos. The people of San Felipe desired
it to be held in their own village. However, the gathering
of the Texan army at Gonzales interfered with any assem-
bling of the delegates at the appointed date, inasmuch as
many of them were in Austin's conmiand; but ultimately
the consultation convened at San Felipe, and by Thursday^
November 5, all parts of Texas were represented.^

The need of some, recognized central authority was evi-
dently great. Except for the ineffectual and generally nomi-
nal state government at Saltillo or Monclova, all legal
authority had long resided with the several ayuntamientos;
and if Texas was to attain any permanent results in the
contest in which she was now embarked a working organ-
ization of some kind was a necessity. The most important
business of the consultation was obviously to supply this need.

The consultation organized by electing Branch T. Archer,
of Brazoria, as their president. Archer, like many of the
better-educated men in Texas, was a physician. He was
bom in Virginia, had been speaker of the House of Dele-
gates of that commonwealth, and had come to Texas in 1831.

The first question for the consultation to decide was

whether they should proclaim the independence of Texas,

: or whether they should still hold themselves out as con-

\ 1 See Tex, Hist. Quar., X, 142-146, for an account of the doubts and difficul-
ties as to the place of meeting.

286

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 287

•

tending solely for the maintenance of the federal CJonstitu-
tion of 1824. A large proportion of the members of the
consultation believed that independence sooner or later was
inevitable; but a majority believed it inexpedient to take
the step at once. They considered that they were not
empowered to do so ; that separation from Mexico was not
in the contemplation of those who elected them; that a
premature declaration of independence might aUenate pub-
lic opinion in the United States; and that a declaration in
favor of the Constitution of 1824 "would neutralize the ,
prejudices or enlist the sympathies and assistance of the |
Federal party of the interior." ^ I

Whether this attitude truly represented the wishes of the
people of Texas is perhaps doubtful; although Austin, who
was at first unfavorable to a declaration of independence^
wrote, after the consultation adjourned:

''The majority of Texas, so far as an opinion can be fonned from
the acts of the people at their primary meetings, was decidedly in
favor of declaring in positive, clear, and wiequivocal terms for the
federal constitution of 1824, and for the organization of a local gov-
ernment, either as a state of the Mexican confederation or provi-
sionally witil the authorities of the state of Coahuila and Texas could
be restored. . . . Some individuals were also in favor of indepen-
dence, though no public meetings whose proceedings I have seen
expressed such an idea." *

It is perhaps not very important whether the people of
Texas acted upon mere grounds of temporary expediency
or whether they were really loyal to Mexico and believed
that a continuance of their Mexican connection was right
and desirable in the long run. They were all agreed, at
any rate, that local self-government must be secured, and
they all acted more or less consciously upon the belief that
if they stood for the Constitution of 1824 they would find
qrmpathy and support from the Mexicans themselves. As
a matter of fact, however, the existence of a "Federal party

* William H. Wharton to Archer, Nov. 29, 1835; Brown, I, 428.

* Austin to Barrett, Dec. 3, 1835; Comp. Hiat.f I, 566. And see Barker's
" Stephen F. Austin and the Independence of Texas," Tex, Hist. Quar,, XIII,
280,284.

288 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

of the interior" which had either the wish or the power to
help Texas, was a mischievous delusion. There was no
Federal party then in existence in any part of Mexico except
Texas, for Santa Anna had by this time very effectually
silenced it. And even if there had been, the universal feel-
ing in Mexico was opposed to permitting Texas to set up
as an autonomous state, even within the Mexican xmion.
If the opponents of Santa Anna could have made use of
Texas to overthrow his government, they would doubt-
less have been glad to do so; but no government could
have existed in Mexico at that time which failed to insist
on the supremacy of the church and the army in every part
of the republic. The ideals of the inhabitants of Mexico
and the inhabitants of Texas and their conceptions of civil
and reUgious freedom, of law and of justice, were as dif-
ferent as the widely divergent races from which they sprang,
and a complete or permanent union was impossible without
such concessions and such a surrender of ideals as neither
party was ready to make.

However, the views of those members of the Texas con-
sultation who opposed independence prevailed. On No-
vember 7, 1835, a unanimous declaration was adopted set-
ting forth that the people of Texas had taken up arms in
defence of their rights and Uberties, which were "threatened
by encroachments of military despots," and in defence of
"the republican principles of the federal Constitution of
1824." The right of "the present authorities of the nom-
inal Mexican Republic " to govern within the limits of Texas
was denied; the right of Texas, under the circumstances,
to withdraw from the Mexican imion, to establish an inde-
pendent government, or to adopt such other measures as
she might deem best calculated to secure her rights and
liberties, was asserted ; and it was declared that the people
of Texas would continue faithful to Mexico, so long as that
nation was governed by the Constitution of 1824.^

^ The full text of this declaration is in Tex, Hist. Qitar.f XIII, 156. And see
Eugene C. Barker's "The Texan Declaration of Causes for Taking Up Arms
against Mexico/' ibid,, XV, 173-185.

TEXAS STANDS BY TH^JSGNSTITUTION 289

The next and most vital step was the creation of a pro-\
visional government. By a resolution vinanimously adopted \
on November 11a governor, Ueutenant-govemor, and coun- J
cil were created. The council was to consist of one repre- I
eentative from each municipaUty. The members were to f
"advise and assist the governor in the discharge of his/
functions/' and to pass such laws ''as in their opinion the
emergency of the country requires, ever keeping in view the
army in the field." The governor was to be "clothed with
full and ample executive powers," and was to be conmiander-
in-chief of the army and navy. The lieutenant-governor
was to preside over the council, and perform the duties of
the governor in case of the death, absence, or other inabiUty
-of the latter. Provisional courts were to be created, which
were to administer the common law of England in all crim-
inal cases and to grant writs of habeas corpus. In general,
the civil code and code of practice of Louisiana were to be
followed, but all trials were to be by jury.*

The consultation also adopted what were called "pro-
visions for an army and military defence." There was to
be a regular army composed of eleven hundred and twenty
men enlisted for two years, and an indefinite number of
volunteers. A major-general, chosen by the consultation,
was to be "commander-in-chief of all the forces called into
public service during the war," who was, however, to be
"subject to the orders of the governor and council." ^

The consultation next proceeded to elect the ofl&cers of
the provisional govermnent. Hemy Smith, of Brazoria, re-
ceived thirty-one votes for the ofl&ce of governor, as against
twenty-two cast for Austin, and Smith was accordingly
declared duly elected. For lieutenant-governor James W.
Robinson, of Nacogdoches, was unanimously chosen; Sam
Houston, also of Nacogdoches, was unanimously elected
commander-in-chief. Branch T. Archer (the chairman of
the consultation), Stephen F. Austin, and William H. Whar-

» Text in Brown, I, 388-394.

*The full text is in Journals of the ConsuUation Held at San Felipe
de AusUn, October 16, 1835 (Houston, 1838). Brown, I, 394, gives only ex-
tracts.

290 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ton (then Austin's adjutant-general in front of B6xar) were
appointed agents to the United States. Resolutions were
adopted which were intended to propitiate the powerful
Cherokee Indians in northeastern Texas.^ By another reso-
lution adopted just before final adjournment the governor
and councfl were empowered to reassemble the consultation
at any time before the following March, or "to cause a new
election in toto for delegates to the convention of the first
of March next"; and then, on November 14, 1835, the con-
sultation adjourned.

Neither the governor nor the Ueutenant-govemor was in
any way conspicuous. Smith was a native of Kentucky,
Robinson was from Ohio. Both of them in later years emi-
grated to Califomia, and both died there. Of the two-
Smith was the stronger man. At the time of his election
as governor he was the jefe politico of the department of the
Brazos and was known as an earnest advocate of an im-
mediate declaration of independence. His majority over
Austin may perhaps be fairly regarded as giving a mea*.
ure of the true feeling of the delegates on this subject.

But if the governor and lieutenant-governor were incon-
spicuous, the commander-in-chief made up for their defects,
for conspicuousness was Houston's most striking char-
acteristic. He was always an interesting and vigorous per-
sonality, full of gross faults and with some great merits.
Wherever he went he attracted attention, for not only was
he a perfect giant, tall and with an immense frame, but he
had always, especially when the worse for liquor, a most
stately and solemn demeanor. His eye for dramatic effects
was unfailing and he had a life-long passion for picturesque
costume.

"He was considerably over the ordinary height," a lady wrote who
knew him some years later, "six feet four at least. He had a noble
figure and handsome face, but he had forgotten Polonius's advice,
'Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy, but not expressed in fancy.*
He rejoiced in a catamount skin waistcoat; it was very long-waisted,
and his coat was left ostentatiously open to show it. Another waist-

* JovmaU of the ConsuUcUiaiit etc., 51-52.

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 291

coat, which he alternated with the catamount, was of a glowing scar-
let doth. His manner was very swelling and formal. When he met
a lady he took a step forward, then bowed very low, and in a deep
voice said, ' Lady, I salute you.' It was an embarrassing kind of thing,
for it was performed with the several motions of a fencing lesson." ^

Both of Houston's parents were of that sturdy Scotch-
Irish race which played so important a part in the develop-
ment of the Middie West. They both came of families which
had been settled for several generations in Virginia; and
it was near Lexington, in Rockbridge County, that Sam
Houston was bom, on March 2, 1793. When he was about
thirteen years old his father died, leaving a remarkably
capable widow and nine children. Rockbridge County, it
appears, did not afford an adequate theatre for the display of
the widow Houston's energies, and soon after her husband's
death she moved, with her children, into eastern Tennessee,
and settled in Blount County, south of Knoxville, on what
was then the edge of the Indian country.

In Tennessee Sam Houston had a little schooling, helped
in a country store, and finally ran off and lived for some time
with the Cherokee Indians. When he was about eighteen
years old he returned to civilization, and for a time taught
in a school himself; but when the War of 1812 broke out
he enlisted as a private in a Teonessee regiment of volun-
teers. His regiment never met the British, but imder Jack-
son, in 1814, they took part in a bloody battle with the
Creek Indians, when Houston was desperately woimded.
After a long convalescence he received a conmaission in the
regular army. By this time the war was over, and after
serving as a lieutenant until May 17, 1818, Houston re-
signed to study law. Five years later he was elected to
Congress, and served from 1823 to 1827 as a silent but
steady follower of Andrew Jackson, and in 1827 he was
elected governor of Tennessee.

For two years he went through the uneventful routine of
the governor of a small Western state, and then suddenly, in
April, 1829, he resigned his office and without a word went

1 Mrs. Davis, in Memoir of Jefferson DaviSf I, 282.

292 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

back to barbarism, and resumed his life with his old friends
the Cherokees, now transplanted to Arkansas. That his
dramatic departure was due to some disagreement with his
wife is certain, but the assiduity of his biographers has
failed to throw light upon the details of their quarrel.

For nearly four years he lived a restless and useless life,
of which little was ever known. For a time he was an
Indian trader. In 1830, and again in 1832, he was in Wash-
ington, and in the latter year was arrested for an outra-
geous assault on a member of Congress. He was known to
the Indians as the Wanderer, or Big Drunk, or Drunken
Sam.

Toward the end of 1832 Houston went to Texas with a
commission from Jackson, nominally to confer with the
border Indians, but perhaps, in reality, to get for Jackson
some authentic information as to the state of affairs. He
travelled as far as B6xar, and on his return to Natchitoches,
in February, 1833, wrote that Texas was the finest country
upon the globe and that he would probably go there to live.
He did, in fact, go back there a few weeks later, and was
one of the representatives from Nacogdoches at the San
Felipe convention in April of the same year, where he served
as chairman of the committee to draft the proposed state
Constitution. The history of Houston for the next two
years is a blank. He does not appear to have been living
in Nacogdoches, but whether he had gone back among
the Indians it is now impossible to state. However, it
seems to be quite certain that he took no part in any
of the public movements of those busy months.^ In Octo-
ber, 1835, he was present at a meeting at San Augustine

^ ''The writer has examined hundreds of letters and public documents, both
Texan and Mexican, on the development of the revolution, has collected, with
few exceptions, the proceedings of all the public meetings and revolutionary
committees, and has found nowhere a single reference to General Houston." —
(E. C. Barker in Amer. Hist. ReuieWf XII, 803.) In December, 1834, he was
found by an English traveller at a small tavern in Washington, Hempstead
County, Arkansas. Writing nine or ten years later, this author thought he
had discovered signs of a conspiracy against Mexico at this remote spot. —
(Featherstonehaugh, Slave States^ II, 161.) Mrs. Jefferson Davis relates, on
rather doubtful authority, that Houston headed a parade of Indian warriors
at Fort Gibson, in the spring of 1834. — {Memoir oj Jefferson Davis, I, 167.)

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 293

when a company of volunteers was raised, and a little later
he was chosen to command the men of eastern Texas. When
he came to San Felipe to attend the consultation his "ap-
pearance was anything but decent or respectable, and very
much that of the broken-down sot and debauchee," ^ but
from this time forward he lived in the public eye, and lived,
on the whole, an exemplalry life. His permanent reforma-
tion seems to have been largely the work of a very estimable
and pious yoimg lady, whom he married in 1840, his first
wife having secured a divorce long before.^

Late in October, 1835, and during the whole month of
November, while the provisional government was coming
into existence, as above described, and was endeavoring to
create for Texas an efficient organization, the Texan volim-
teers were slowly and unskilfully trying to capture or drive
out the Mexican force which, under General Cos, was hold-
ing the town of B6xar. This place, so often mentioned in
the early history of Texas, had grown up near the presidio
of San Antonio de B6xar and the neighboring mission of
San Antonio de Valero, founded in 1718. In 1730 the town,
with all the apparatus of ayimtamiento, alcaldes, and regi-
doresy was established under the name of San Fernando de
B6xar. Its most flourishing days under Spanish rule ap-
pear to have been shortly after the middle of the eighteenth
century, when the adjacent missions and their Indian settle-
ments were most prosperous.

In 1770 its population was said to have been reduced to
eight hundred and sixty persons, owing chiefly to the inces-
sant hostilities of the Indians. A few years later Father
Morfi gave a melancholy picture of ite dilapidated con-
dition.' Pike, who spent some days there in June, 1807,
described it as containing perhaps two thousand inhabitants,
"most of whom reside in miserable mud-wall houses, cov-

^ Jones, Republic of TexaSf 12.

*The second wife was a Miss Lea, of Marion, Alabama, and is described
as being ''a lady of good family, force of character, amiability, and consid-
erable literary talent. She was aware of Houston's weaknesses in habits
when she married him, and was confident that she could influence him for the
better."— (Williams, Sam Houston, 248.)

s Bancroft, North Mex, States and Texas, I, 618, 632, 653.

294 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ered with thatched grass roofs." ^ Almonte, in 1834, esti-
mated the population of the town and neighboring district
at 2,400, all Mexicans and having no negroes.-

B6xar itself stood wholly on the western (right) bank of
the river San Antonio. Two or three streets running ap-
proximately north and south crossed the one principal
street, which ran nearly east and west. South of the main
street was the military square. Plaza de Armas, while to
the eastward of this, and separated from it by the parish
church and a few other buildings was a second square, known
as the Plaza de las Yslas, or, in later days, the Plaza de la
Constituci6n. The houses facing the squares were gen-
eraUy soUd stone structures, one or two stories high, with
the usual flat roofs and parapets. All the rest of the town
was made up of flimsy adobe huts.

Continuing easterly on the main street, the San Antonio
River was crossed by a bridge, and about two himdred yards
northeasterly from the bridge was the abandoned mission
of San Antonio, better known as the Alamo.' In Pike's
time this group of buildings served as barracks for the local
presidial company. It was probably little changed in 1835,
but General Cos had strengthened the walls of the old mis-
sion and mounted some small guns, thus making it the cita-
del of his miniature fortress.^

Ix)wer down the San Antonio River there were the re-
mains of four other missions. The nearest was the Puri-
sima Concepcidn de Acuna, distant about two miles and a
half from the town and lying about half a mile east of the
river. About two miles farther down was San Jos6 de
Aguayo, whose solid masonry and delicate sculptures still
excite, ^ven in their decay, the wonder and adLation of
the visitor, and which justly earned it the reputation of the
finest mission in New Spain. Still farther down was San
Juan Capistrano, of the same name as a more famous
religious house in California; and, finally, about eight miles

» Pik^s TraveU (ed. 1895), II, 783. « Filisola, Ouerra de T^'aa, H, 544.

' As to the origin of the name Alamo (literally a poplar or ootton-wood
tree) see Tex. HieL Quar., II, 245; III, 67.
« Filisola, U, 179-184.

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 295

below B6xar, was San Francisco de la Espada, which even
in 1835 was in almost total ruin. The Indian neophytes
of all four establishments had long since disappeared.

The river near the town was not over sixty feet wide at
any point, and was almost everywhere fordable. Irriga-
tion ditches ran down on both sides of it, nearly parallel
with its general course, and in the region of the missions
the ground was fairly well cultivated.

Austin moved from his camp on Salado Creek to the
Espada mission on Tuesday, October 27, and sent forward
a party of ninety-two men under the command of James
W. Fannin, with orders to select a suitable camp as near
B6xar as possible.^ With Fannin went James W. Bowie,
one of Austin's staff, who was doubtless selected for his
local knowledge, for Bowie knew B6xar weU, having married
a daughter of Juan Martin de Veramendi, one of the prin-
cipal residents of the town.

Close to the Concepci6n mission a bend of the winding
San Antonio leaves on the east bank of the stream a level
meadow in the shape of a rough semicircle, several feet
below the level of the neighboring prairie. On the land
side, the meadow is terminated by a rather steep bank or
blufif about eight feet high, which forms the chord of the arc
described by the river; and on this well-watered and grassfy
spot Fannin and his men bivouacked for the night.

Early on Wednesday morning there was a dense fog, but
when it dispersed the Texans found themselves confronted
by a superior force. They at once cut away the bushes
and vines on the face of the bank, and at the steepest places
they cut steps in the slope so that they might stand and fire
over the top. The opposing force consisted of all General
Cos's cavalry with a few infantry and one piece of artillery.
Cos had made a reconnoissance in person the previous day,
but had returned without meeting the Texans, although he
heard from two of the inhabitants that Bowie had crossed
the river near Concepci6n at three o'clock in the afternoon.
In consequence, he had directed his cavalry to be ready to

^ Comp. Hist., I, 550.

296 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

start again at daylight, and soon after sunrise they reached
the neighborhood and learned that there were a few rebeb
in the old mission. The commander of the detachment
halted and sent back for artillery, whereupon Cos sent him
one field-piece, escorted by the small detachment of infantry.

The delay in obtaining this field-piece was what had
enabled the Texans to prepare their defence; but finally,
at about eight o'clock in the morning, the whole of the
Mexican force, numbering some two hundred and ei^ty
men, was formed opposite the right of the Texan position,
and advanced slowly. Their one gun was at the same time
pushed forward.

This not very vigorous attempt to dislodge the invisible
enemy failed. The Texan fire was reported to have been
very deliberate {muy pausado), and it was at short range.
The Mexican field-piece was only fired five times, so deadly
was the execution of the Texan rifles. In ten minutes,
says the Mexican historian, nearly all the supporting in-
fantry were killed or wounded and the gun was abandoned.
The remaining Mexican force retreated in disorder, leavmg
one ofl&cer and twelve men killed and three officers and
thirty-two men wounded. The Texan loss was one man
killed and three slightly wounded.^

By noon on this same day the main body of the Texans
had arrived at the Concepci6n mission, and the question
of an immediate attack on B6xar was discussed, but Bowie
strongly advised against the attempt, and Austin's own
judgment, then and later, was that the position was too
strong to be taken without "heavy battering cannon and
ammunition."

It had been the expectation of the Texans that Cos
would not allow himself to be besieged, and Austin there-
fore sent forward a flag of truce with a demand of surrender,
Cos, however, refused to hold any communication with
rebels, and sent word to the bearers of the flag who had
been detained by his pickets that if they did not withdraw

^ Filiaols, II, 157-160. Bowie's report to Austin is given in Comp. Hisf.,
1,650.

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 297

at once he would have them shot.^ By this time Austin
was convinced that "the fortifications are much stronger
than has been supposed," and called a council of war, which
decided that it was inexpedient to attempt an assault, and
that such positions should be taken up, out of range of the
enemy's guns, as would allow offensive operations to be
carried on while waiting for "the large cannon." * About
the first of November, therefore, the Texans encamped on
the river half a mile above the plaza, and there for the
next five weeks they stayed and accomplished nothing.
Their moimted men were kept moving around the town,
with a view to intercepting supplies, and there was some
skirmishing; but there was nothing like a regular siege.
Cos, on his part, was improving the time by building bar-
ricades in the streets and throwing up a redoubt on some
waste land northwest of the plaza.' Gims were also
mounted on the roof of the parish church. Neither party
attempted any offensive movement.

The Texans were constantly receiving reinforcements; but,
on the other hand, their force was continually being depleted
by reason of men quietly leaving the inactive army and
rettuning to their farms. However, on the twenty-first of
November, Austin having been strengthened by the arrival
of a number of men and a twelve-pounder gun, announced
his intention of making an assault on the town at daybreak
the next morning; but as soon as his orders were issued he
was coolly informed that a majority of the ofl&cers and men
were opposed to the plan and would not attempt it.

Austin accepted these mutinous reports with extraordi-
nary cahnness, and issued a general order announcing that,
as "the inmiediate commanders of the two divisions of the
army" had informed him that "a majority of their respec-
tive divisions are opposed to the storming of B6jar," and as
he had ascertained from other sources that "this majority
is very large," the order for an attack was countermanded.

' Jhid.f 554. » See Baker, Texas Scrap-Book^ 646-652.

* The barricades were built at the points where the streets came into the
plAsa. No flanking fire was provided, so that the barricades did not protect
each other. — (Fihsola, II, 195.)

298 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

A military commander whose movements were decided by
a vote of his troops was clearly in an impossible position,
and it must have been with a feeling of relief that Austin
received the news that the provisional government of Texas
had appointed him one of three commissioners to secure
help from the people of the United States. On November
24 he left the army.

The timid and irresolute policy which had been displayed
by the Texans before B6xar was not wholly due to Austin's
physical and moral limitations.^ The whole of his force
probably felt convinced that they were not capable of
meeting regular soldiers on equal terms, much less when
the regulars were fighting in superior force behind forti-
fications; and in this view most men on the spot concurred.
Anson Jones, afterward an important personage in Texas,
records a noisy conversation between Doctor Archer and
General Houston, the burden of which was abuse and denim-
ciation of Austin for not breaking up the siege of B^xar
and retiring east of the Colorado River.^ Austin's friends
beUeved also that intrigues had been going on to discredit
him with his men and with the provisional government,
but the evidence to that effect seems to be slight.'

As soon as Austin announced his retirement the Texans,
according to a cherished custom, elected a new commander.*
He was Edward Burleson, a native of North Carolina, who had
come to Texas in 1831 and settled on the Colorado River.*

^ Austin's health was so poor at this time that he could hardly leave his
tent. — (Comp. HisL^ I, 556.)

' Jones, 13. And see letter of Houston to Wylie Martin, Nov. 24, 1835, in
Brown, I, 407.

» Comp. Hist., I, 559.

* "We claim, and can never surrender but with life, the right to elect, and
elect freely, our immediate commander.'' — (Resolutions of volunteers at
Goliad, Nov. 21, 1835 ; Brown, 1, 377.) The custom of electing officers was then
universal in the U. S. In the spring of 1832 the Illinois volunteers assembled
for the Black Hawk War elected Abraham Lincoln as their captain. "The
method was simple: each candidate stood at some point in the field and the
men went over to one or another, according to their several preferences. Three-
fourths of the company to which Lincoln belonged ranged themselves with
him, and long afterward he used to say that no other success in life had given
him such pleasure as did this one." — (Morse's Lincoln, I, 35.)

• Baker, 2d8.

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 299

The situation of the command was now daily becoming
intolerable. Food was scarce, there were no proper tents
and no supplies of clothing or shoes, and the winter, with
its occasional severe northers, was drawing on. The vol-
unteers were much dissatisfied. "Some prudence,'' Aus-
tin had written, "will be necessary to keep this army to-
gether/' and when a vote, as usual, was taken, only four
hundred and five men agreed to stay on. Among those
who voted to stay were sixty-four men from New Orleans,
constituting a company known as the Louisiana Grays.
They had volunteered in New Orleans immediately on re-
ceipt of news that fighting was in prospect, had sailed for
the river Brazos in October, bringing with them "an in-
valuable supply of munitions, provisions and miUtary
stores," and from Brazoria they had marched nearly two
hundred miles to join Austin. They arrived at the camp
of the besiegers on the evening of November 21, just as the
proposed assault was abandoned, to their keen regret; for
they were "willing and anxious for it to a man." ^

Burleson, in this difficult situation, summoned a council
of war, which met on the evening of December 3, and con-
cluded to raise the siege and go into winter-quarters either
at Gonzales or Goliad. The necessary orders were issued
on the next day, and by the evening all, or nearly all, the
preparations to retire on the fifth had Ijeen made.

This time the men were greatly disappointed, for the im-
pression had been gaining ground of late that the strength
of B6xar had been exaggerated. This impression was fur-

^Comp, Hist.f I, 557. Another company of Louisiana Grays, which left
New Orleans at the same time as the company above referred to, but travelled
by way of Natchitoches, joined the Texans somewhat later. There was also
a company from Mississippi under a Captain Peacock which took part in the
siege of B^xar. — (Yoakum, II, 23, 24.) Among the members of the Grays was
a certain Hermann Ehrenberg, who took an active part in the Texan War,
and survived to write three books in which he described his adventures.
These books, all published in his fatherland, are TexcL8 und die RevoltUian
(Leipzig, 1843), Der Freiheitskampf in Texas (1844), and Fahrten und Schick'
sale einea DeiUschen in Texas (1845). They are said to have had a great
influence on the subsequent large German inmiigration. See " Germans in
Texas/' by Gilbert G. Benjamin, in German-American Annals^ N, 8,, VI,
315-340.

300 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ther strengthened by the arrival of a Mexican deserter, who
reported that ''the garrison was in a tumult and much dis-
satisfied." ^ At once volunteers were called for, and two
hundred and sixteen responded. They were organized in
two divisions, one under the command of Frank W. Johnson,
a Virginian by birth, who had led the attack on Bradbum
at Andhuac in 1832, the other under the conmiand of Ben-
jamin R. Milam. Milam was a Eentuckian who had come
to Texas as early as 1816 with Long's fiUbustering expedi-
tion,* had subsequently served in the Mexican army, had
been a member of the Coahuila legislature, and had been
arrested with Governor Viesca in the spring of 1835. He
escaped and joined the Texans just in time to take part in
the capture of Goliad. "Who will go with old Ben Milam
into San Antonio? " he shouted when volunteers were called
for, and his enthusiasm was contagious.'

A little before daylight the assault was made with a
force aggregating two hundred and fifty or three hundred
men, some additional volunteers having come forward dur-
ing the night, and an earlier attack was also made on the
Alamo to draw off attention from the two divisions marching
on the town. Johnson's and Milam's parties got within a
himdred yards of the Plaza de la Constituci6n, which was
strongly defended by heavy earth barricades, before they
were discovered. They had brought two guns with them,
but in the face of the Mexican fire down the streets these
were nearly useless, and the Texans took shelter in the
houses and replied as best they could with their rifles. For
five days a confused contest was kept up, both sides occu-
pying the roof-tops and firing from behind parapets. The
Texans, on their part, presently conceived the idea of break-
ing through the walls of the houses, and thus pushing on
from one to another. "We went through the old adobe

» See Frank W. Johnson, in Comp. HUt., I, 198, 199.

' Miliun was one of the prisoners released through Poinsett's unofficial good
offices during his first visit to Mexico. A letter from Milam to Poinsett, com-
plaining of the ruffianly characters of some of his fellow-prisoners, dated Dec.
5, 1822, is among the Poinsett MSS,

> ''Old" Ben Milam was bom in 1791, and was consequently forty-four
years old at this time.

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 301

and picket houses of the Mexicans/' says one participant,
"using battering-rams made out of logs ten or twelve feet
long. The stout men would take hold of the logs and
swing them awhile and then let drive endwise, pimching
holes in the walls through which we passed. How the
women and children would yell when we knocked the
holes in the walls and went in!" ^

Slowly gaining groimd from house to house, the Texans
finally got possession of the better buildings that faced the
plaza. They had turned the barricades and the Mexican
position had become untenable, so that about two o'clock
in the morning of Thursday, the tenth of December,* Cos
gave orders to abandon the town and concentrate the whole
force within the walls of the Alamo. Six oflEicers with one
hundred and seventy-nine mounted followers immediately
fled for the Rio Grande. The rest, including the wounded,
with the military supplies and artillery, were safely across
the bridge and in the Alamo soon after sunrise.

The troubles of General Cos, however, were by no means
at an end. For «>me time his' pro™io,i had lien scanty.
On the morning before he abandoned the town he had re-
ceived a reinforcement of over six hundred men, most of
whom were utterly useless convicts, and their numbers only
added to the difficulties of supplying food. The Alamo
itself was already crowded with the women and children of
the soldiers, and wood and water, under the accurate rifle
fire of the Texans, were not procurable. There was noth-
ing left for Cos but to surrender.^

After some haggling over the details, articles of capitu-
lation were signed. The agreement allowed the Mexican

1 Sion R. Bostick, in Tex. Hist. Quar., V, 89.

' The official reports of Johnson and Burleson, in Brown, I, 417-424, both
state that the fighting ceased on the ninth; but they appear to be contradicted
by the articles of capitulation, which are dated the eleventh. The matter is
of no importance.

' Filisola gives a vivid account of the long and wearisome march of the rein-
forcements above mentioned, the last phases of the fighting in the town, the
scenes in the crowded Alamo with the shrieking women and children, the con-
fusion among the troops, and Cos's own temporary collapse under the burden
of defeat and the desertion of some of his best men. — (Ouerra de T^aSf II,
143-144, 161-169, 194-205.)

302 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

officers to retain their arms and private property, on their
promise to retire "into the interior of the republic" and
not to oppose in any way the re-estabUshment of the federal
Constitution of 1824. The six hundred convicts who had
arrived just before the fall of B6xar were to be taken back by
Cos beyond the Rio Grande, and a small escort of armed
Mexican soldiers, with one Ught field-piece, was to accom-
pany them. The rest of the Mexicans were free to go with
Cos or not, as they pleased; private property was to be
restored to its owners; private citizens were not to be
molested; and the Texans were to furnish Cos with such
provisions as could be obtained "at the ordinary price of
the country." ^

On December 14, 1835, the Mexican troops began their
march to the Bio Grande. Eleven hundred and five men
retired with General Cos, and these, with the men who had
deserted on the morning of the tenth, and the wounded left in
the Alamo, and others who were not accounted for, brought
the total of the Mexican force up to fifteen or sixteen
hundred men. That is to say, Cos had probably nine
hundred or a thousand men on the morning of the first as-
sault; and he had received reinforcements nimibering over
six hundred.* His losses are not known, but they were
probably large. The Texan loss is given as one officer
(Milam) killed and four officers and twenty-one men
wounded.

The troops that retreated with General Cos over the
himdred and fifty miles of almost waterless country that
lay between B6xar and Laredo were the last Mexican sol-
diers left in Texas. A small force that had been stationed
on the west bank of the Nueces River, at a settlement called
lipantitlan, above San Patricio, was captured about No-

^ See text in Brown, I, 424. Filisola says that Cos declined to accept any
supplies, on the ground that ''the Mexican army neither receives, nor needs
to receive, anything given by its enemies." — {Gverra de T^aSj II, 208.)

' This agrees with F. W. Johnson's estimate. He says Cos had a thousand
or twelve hundred men early in October. Allowing liberally for losses, he
would have had at least nine hundred when the assault was begun, on Decem-
ber 5. See Comp, Hist.^ I, 185.

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 303

vember 13^ 1835^ and released soon after on a promise not
to serve again against the Texans.^

By the time that B6xar capitulated, the provisional gov-
ernment of Texas had been about a month in existence, but
it had done little to facilitate either Austin or Burleson in
their efforts to drive the Mexicans out of the country; and
indeed it can hardly be said to have ever accomplished
anything. Its history, during its entire existence of one
hundred and seven days, is v^ry far from edifying. It is
little more than an account of petty jealousies, stupid mis-
management of serious affairs, and a long series of squab-
bles between the governor on the one hand and his council
on the other.

There was one deep-seated difference of opinion as to the
policy of the new government which accounted for a great
deal of this incessant quarrelling. Governor Smith was in
favor of independence, and entirely opposed to any dealings
with Mexicans. "I consider it bad poUcy," he wrote to
the council, "to fit out or trust Mexicans in any matter
connected with our government, as I am well satisfied that
we will in the end find them inimical and treacherous.'' The
council, on the other hand, continued to believe in the
"Federal party of the interior," and were anxious that the
war should be carried on as a purely civil contest in support
of the Constitution of 1824. They were supported by a
number of Mexicans, some of them men of considerable
consequence, who had sought an asylmn in Texas, and who
naturally encouraged the idea of making war for the pur-
pose of restoring the federated republic. They also en-
couraged all proposals for carrying the war into Mexico,
where they declared the Texan forces would be joined by
numbers of local insurgents.

In a broader sense, perhaps, the division between the
governor and the council may be regarded as a difference
based on the choice of a defensive or an offensive policy.
The governor wished to await attack; the council wished to

^ The best account of this trivial affair is in Filisola, U, 188.

304 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

push into MexicO; to keep the volunteers eii^>Iq3red, lest
they should melt away, and to unite with oth^ Mexican
citizens in an effort to overthrow Santa Anna and the
Centralist pwty.

Mrerio/^„» on th«e point, might ^ry well 1..V.
been entertained, and no great harm have ^isued, but for
imf ortunate defects in the organic act constituting the pro-
visional government. This instrument actually invited con-
troversies, and in particular it wholly failed to define cleariy
where the executive power was lodged. The governor
asserted that it resided with him, but the phrase '' the gov-
ernor and council" was constantly used in the organic act
to indicate the executive authority. The result was that
the council; possessed with the idea of sending troops into
Mexico, and filled with that love of patronage and love for
meddling in military matters which have distinguished most
legislative bodies in America, undertook to a^int officers
in the Texan army, and to direct their plans of campaign,
without the slightest reference to the views of the governor
or the commander-in^jhief .

The council believed in or at least supported the local
volunteers. The governor was convinced that the state
government should "bring everything under its own proper
control," or, in other words, that all the volunteers should
be placed (so long as they served) under the control of the
commander-in-chief.^ Finally the quarrel culminated in a
violent outbreak over a proposed expedition to Matamoros,
which the council favored and the governor vehemently
opposed.

The subject had been broached to Austin while he lay
before B6xar by Doctor James Grant, a Scotchman by birth,
but a resident of Mexico for many years. Grant, who lived
at Parras, had been a member of the Coahuila and Texas
legislature, and had been arrested with Viesca and Milam
by General Cos. He had escaped like the others, and had
joined the Texans who were besieging B6xar. He had ac-
quired from the state government enormous tracts of land,

^ GoTemor Smith to the Council, Dec. 18, 1835; Brown, I, 453.

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 305

uader such doubtful circumstances that either the success of
Santa Anna or the independence of Texas would probably
involve the revocation of his grants; so that his interest
clearly lay in the restoration of the federal form of govern-
ment.

Another advocate of an expedition to Matamoros was
Philip Dimmitt, the conmiander of the little Texan gar-
rison at Goliad, who had had an angry controversy with
Austin,* and who wrote on December 2, 1835, apparently
as soon as he heard that Austin was no longer in conmiand,
urging that if Matamoros were taken the war would be
brought home to the Mexicans and the revenues of the
port, amoimting to a hundred thousand dollars a month,
would be used in support of Texas, instead of against it.
"The presence of a victorious force in Matamoros, having
General Zavala for a nominal leader, and a counter-revo-
lutionizing flag," he believed, would lead to great results.
"The liberal of all classes would join us, the neutral would
gather confidence, both in themselves and us, and the
parasites of centralism, in that section, would be effectually
panic-struck and paralyzed." ^

Before this letter could have reached San Felipe, a cer-
tain Captain Miracle, a Mexican refugee, had talked with
a committee of the coimcil. It was the usual story. He
had brought no credentials, but he asserted that he had
been sent by the principal men in Nuevo Leon and Tamauli-
pas; that they had arranged to take up arms as soon as all
was ready; that many of the officers and men of the army
were ready to join the Texans when called upon; and that
if the object of the revolution really was to sustain the
federal system the liberals would all unite and rise en massed
Even Austin was impressed with this view of the situation,
and wrote to the council in favor of an expedition to Mexico
under Mexican leadership.*

If such an attempt was to be made at all, it was clear that
Mexican leadership would have offered the best chances of

» Brown, 1, 375. *^ « Foote, II, 184.

» W. Roy Smith, in Tex. Hist. Quar., V, 299. < Ibid., 302.

306 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

success, provided other conditions were favorable; but in
the manner the attempt was actually made, without an
adequate force, or competent leaders, or a definite plan,
it was certain to end in ignominious disaster.

Early in November, 1835, an expedition had sailed from
New Orleans under the command of Colonel Jos6 Antonio
Mej(a, of the Mexican army. Mejfa was a Cuban, who had
come to Mexico in 1823. From about 1829 to 1831 he had
been secretary of the Mexican legation in Washington, and
while in the United States he became one of the incorpora-
tors of the notorious Galveston Bay and Texas Land Com-
pany.* In 1832 he was again in Mexico, a supporter of
Santa Anna when Santa Anna was a Federalist. He was
the same Mejfa who commanded the expedition that sailed
from Tampico and Matamoros to rescue the beleaguered
garrisons of Velasco and Andhuac. He had quarrelled with
Santa Anna when the latter turned Centralist, and after fail-
ing in various revolutionary attempts in Quer^taro and
Jalisco had escaped to New Orleans, where he succeeded in
collecting men and money for a projected descent on the
Mexican coast.

Mejla, as the event proved, really had friends in the
states of Vera Cruz and Tamaulipas, and he believed, or
said he believed, that an expedition landing near Tampico
woidd at once be joined by large nmnbers of the Federalist
party. If successful, his expedition would unquestionably
have paralyzed the Mexican plans for invading Texas, and
it therefore received the support of the friends of Texas in
New Orleans, and was hopefully looked on by Austin.

The iU-fated expedition arrived oflf the Tampico bar on
November 14, 1835. The garrison in the fort at the mouth
of the Panuco had been already won over by the Federalist
conspirators in Tampico, and the united forces, on the next
afternoon, attacked the town of Tampico, about nine miles
up the river. The garrison of the town, however, proved
faithful to Santa Anna; and after a fight in the streets
Mejla and his men retreated to the mouth of the river,

1 Rose V, The Gooemar, 24 Tex. Rep., 496.

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 307

leaving behind them eight dead and a number of prisoners,
of whom thirteen were native Americans, nine English
or Irish, seven Germans, and two French. Three of this
number died of their woimds, and the rest were tried by
some sort of court-martial and shot.^ Mejla himself, after
waiting ten days on the beach, looking in vain for support
from the interior, sailed away to Texas, where most of his
men, early in December, joined the Texans; and aa he
was not trusted by the Texans, he took no conspicuous
part in their struggle with Mexico.^

The plan of a descent by the Texans on Matamoros
seemed feasible at first to Governor Smith, and under his
instructions Houston, immediately after receiving news of
Cos's capitulation at B6xar, ordered Colonel James Bowie
to proceed "forthwith" to that place and to take and hold
it imtil further orders. K he was unable to attain the de-
sired object, he was to occupy some strong position on the
frontier and harass the enemy.'

Bowie did not receive this order until the first of Janu-
ary, when he came to San FeUpe; but in the meantime
everything had been thrown into such confusion by the con-

' The French government subsequently demanded and obtained indemnity
for the shooting of its two subjects. They were shot, said the French minister,
**9ans que le goiwemement mexicain ait jamais pu dirCf depuia deux ana que la
France le lui demande, en vertu de quelle lai, ni suivant quellea formes jvdiciairea,
on lee avail condamnis et mis d mart.** — (Ultimatum presented by Baron Def-
faudis to the Mexican government, March 21, 1838; Blanchard et Dauzats,
San Juan de Uliia, 230.)

' The best account of this tragic affair is E. C. Barker's ** Tampioo Ex«
pedition," Tex. Hist. Quar., VI, 169-186; and see also " New Light on the
Tampioo Expedition,'' in vol. XI, 157. Diplomatic correspondence on the
subject between the governments of the United States and Mexico is in H. R.
Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 569-573, 576-580. General G6mez, who com-
manded at Tampico, and was responsible for shooting the prisoners, became
involved the following spring in a quarrel with the American consul at Tam-
pico in reference to a boat's crew from the United States revenue-cutter
Jejferson (Sen. Doc. 160, 24 CJong., 2 sess., 117-130), which ended by an
apology from the Mexican government, who disavowed G6mez'8 actions and
relieved him from his command. He was, however, promoted immediately
afterward to be commandant at Vera Cruz, where he again got into a con-
troversy with the captain of the United States sloop-of-war NatchsE. — (Ibid.,
5~^t 90-98.) The French government in 1838 insisted upon his being dis-
miflsed from the Mexican service on account of his conduct at Tampioo.—
(Blanchard et Dauzats, 241.)

s Houston to Bowie, Dec. 17, 1835; Yoakum, II, 464.

308 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

troversies between the t^YfrrmFTi^r and thft fnnnril that
nothing could be done. On Christmas Day the committee
on militaiy affairs of the council presented a report; in which
they stated that, in view of the advance of a strong Mexican
force against Texas (positive news of which was beginning
to come in), it was most important to take MatamoroS; ^Hhe
key; yes, the commercial depot of the whole country north
and northwest for several hundred miles," and they there-
fore recommended that the governor be advised by the
coimcil "to concentrate all his troops by his proper ofiScers
at Copano and San Patricio." * Houston, however, was
earnestly opposed to the policy of concentrating the whole
of the Texan forces at distant posts, and begged that he
might be kept in command at some central point until the
campaign should actuaUy open.*

On the same day that Houston was protesting against
concentrating on the searcoast, the troops left in B^xar were
actually carrying that policy into effect without orders.
Burleson, on December 15, had turned over the command to
F. W. Johnson, " with a suiEcient nmnber of men and officers
to sustain the same in case of attack. . . . The rest of the
army vriU retire to their homes" ' The men who stayed at
B^xar were, therefore, for the most part, volunteers from'
New Orleans or elsewhere, who were more interested in a vig-
orous prosecution of the war than in the preservation of the
farms and villages of the country. The garrison remaining
was believed to number about four hundred; and on the
thirtieth of December all of these, except about one hundred
men, among whom were the sick and wounded, started for
Matamoros by way of Goliad, taking with them all mov-
able supplies, including medical stores. The expedition
was not rapid in its movements. Three weeks were con-
sumed in getting to the old Refugio mission,^ and by that

» Brown, I, 466-458.

* Houston to Smith, Dec. 30, 1835; Tex. Hist. Quar., V, 315.
> Brown, I, 424. The italics are not in the original.

* The mission Nuestra Sefiora del Refugio, founded in 1791 and abandoned
probably during the Mexican revolution, about 1812. It was distant from
B6xar in a straight line a little over one hundred miles. .

TEXAS STANDS BY THE CONSTITUTION 309

time Matamoros had been so strongly reinforced that any
attack would have been impracticable.

Johnson, the commander at B^xar, at first assumed full re-
sponsibility for this movement, but he evidently soon became
doubtful about his own authority to do so. He therefore
came to San Felipe, and on January 3, 1836, wrote a letter
to the council stating that he had ordered the expedition
upon the strength of a letter addressed to his predecessor.
General Burleson, by the committee on military affairs;
and that he desired the council to give him full authority
to make the attempt on Matamoros. He did not pretend
to have any orders from the commander-in-chief, and, in fact,
denied the latter's authority to issue orders to volunteers.

The coimcil highly approved Johnson's plans and imme-
diately passed a resolution granting the authority requested.
Johnson, however, began to hesitate, probably because he
discovered that the governor was opposed to his projects;
and the council on January 7 adopted a resolution appoint-
ing James W. Fannin as " agent of the provisional govern-
ment," to collect as many volunteers as possible and to
make a descent on Matamoros. The result of this impet-
uous legislation was that there were now two separate and
entirely independent leaders, each authorized by the coun-
cil to attack Matamoros, each clothed with extensive
powers, and each considering himself entirely free from any
necessity of obeying the orders of Houston, the titular
commander-in-chief.

Ahnost simultaneously with this preposterous action by
the council came alarming letters from Lieutenant-Colonel
Neill who had been left in charge of B6xar. He had now
one himdred and four men, who had received no provisions
or clothing since Johnson and Grant had left.

The brave men," wrote Houston, in forwarding Neill's reports,
who have been wounded in the battles of Texas, and the sick from
exposure in her cause, without blankets or supplies, are left neglected
in her hospitab; while the needful stores and supplies are diverted
from them, without authority." ^

^ Houston to Smith, Jan. 6, 1836; Yoakum, II, 457.

310 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The governor was provoked to the highest degree of fury
by the action of the council and the news from B^xar. He
had a special session of that body called for Sunday^ the
tenth of January, and sent them a message in the most intem-
perate terms. Corruption, he asserted, had crept in among
them, and though he knew there were honest men in their
nmnber, there were also Judases, scoimdrels, wolves, and
parricides; and he declared that if the obnoxious resolu-
tions were not rescinded by the next morning the council
should not meet again. The coimcil replied by a resolution
deposing the governor, and until the first of March, when
the convention met and the provisional government came
to an end, the governor and the council refused to recognize
each other.

The effect of such a state of things upon the efforts
to make military preparations was of course disastrous.
Houston, representing the authority of the governor, went
about making speeches to the volunteers, in which he de-
clared that the proposed Matamoros expedition was unau-
thorized and imwise. Johnson, holding authority from the
council, asserted that Houston had no authority except over
the "regular" troops. Fannin said he would serve under
Houston, but only if the latter would head the expedition
to Matamoros and obey the orders of the council.

A coi3Mnander-in-chief whose orders were only to be
obeyed when they were the kind of orders that his subordi-
nates approved was evidently of no manner of use, and on
January 28, 1836, Houston was instructed by the governor
to go to the eastern part of the state to confer with the
Cherokee Indians, who were threatening trouble. There,
at least, he was listened to and he did good service, for he
made a treaty which helped to keep these Indians quiet so
long as the war with Mexico lasted.

CHAPTER XIII

THE MEXICAN INVASION

f One of the many controversies between Governor Smith
and the council had arisen out of the question of summon-
ing a constitutional convention. The consultation, just
before adjoimiing, in November, 1835, had authorized the
provisional government to provide for the election and
meeting of such a body; and the council accordingly, on
December 10, 1835, adopted an ordinance, at the urgent re--
quest of Governor Smith, directing that a general election be
held on February 1, 1836, for delegates to a convention, who
were to be clothed with plenary powers, and were to meet
at Washington, on the Brazos, on the first day of March,
1836. Governor Smith vetoed this ordinance on the groimd
that it allowed all " Mexicans opposed to a central govern-
ment" to vote, as well as "all free white men"; and he did
not know how to determine what Mexicans were or were
not opposed to centralism, although he did consider that
those near B6xar were not entitled to either respect or favor.
The council, however, repassed the ordinance over the gov-
ernor's veto on December 13, 1835.^

Notwithstanding the confusion that prevailed in Texan
affairs at the time set for the elections, these were duly held
and resulted in the selection of a body of men who appear
to have represented fairly the diverse elements of the popu-
lation. Forty-two members out of a total of fifty-eight, or
about three-quarters of the whole, were natives of the slave
states of the American Union. Six were natives of the
Middle and New England states, four were native subjects
of Great Britain. The birthplace of three of the Americans
was not ascertained. B^xar sent two Mexicans, Francisco

^ Text in OrdinancM and Decrees of the CantuUaHanf 77 (Gammel, I, 081).

311

312 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Ruiz and Jos6 Antonio Navarro^ besides whom Zavala sat
for Harrisburg; so that the Anglo-American race had little
more than a proportionate representation.^

The principal question before the voters was, of course,
whether Texas should declare her independence or whether
she should still continue to struggle, as an integral part of
the Mexican republic, for the maintenance of the Constitu-
tion of 1824. The capture of B6xar, the failure of Mejfa's
expedition, and the daily increasing mass of evidence that
there was no substantial "Federal party of the interior"
either willing or able to support Texas in a contest with the
national troops, all tended to change the opinions of the
most conservative.

Austin vacillated, but he ultimately declared himself in
favor of independence. Just before sailing for the United
States he wrote advising that Texas should do nothing to
alienate the Federal party,* but by the time he had reached
New Orleans he was clearly in favor of a declaration of
independence. Writing to Houston on January 7, 1836,
from New Orleans, he said:

" A question of vital importance is yet to be decided by Texas, which
is a declaration of independence. When I left Texas I thought it was
premature to stir this question and that we ought to be very cautious
of taking any step that would make the Texas war purely a national
war, which would unite all parties against us, instead of it being a
party war, which would secure us the aid of the Federal party. In
this I acted contrary to my own impulses. ... I now think the time
has come for Texas to assert her natural rights, and were I in the con-
vention I would urge an immediate declaration of independence. I
form this opinion from the information now before me. I have not
heard of any movement in the interior by the Federal party in favor of
Texas, or of the constitution. On the contrary, the information
from Mexico is, that all parties are against us, owing to what has
already been said and done in Texas in favor of independence and that
we have nothing to expect from that quarter but hostility. I am
acting on thb information. If it be true, and I have no reason to
doubt it, our present |X)sition in favor of the republican principles
of the constitution of 1824 can do us no good, and it is doing us harm
by deterring that kind of men from joining us that are most useful." «

» See list in Yoakum, II, 612. » Brown. I, 463-468. » Ibid., 471.

THE MEXICAN INVASION 313

To much the same effect was an oflficial letter from the
Texan representatives in the United States addressed to
Governor Smith on the tenth of January.^ At ahnost the
same moment Houston expressed himself to the same pur-
pose. "No further experiment need be made," he wrote
to a friend on January 7, 1836, " to convince us that there
is but one course for Texas to pursue, and that is an im-
equivocal declaration of independence." *

If the neighboring Mexican states had had as vigorous a
leader as Santa Anna, when he "pronoimced" in 1832 for ^
the federal system, and if they had been willing to join with
Texas in a contest against centralism, a declaration of inde-
pendence might have been postponed. But when it was
learned that all parties in Mexico were united in a conunon
desire for vengeance on the Texan rebels, and the projects
for a descent on Matamoros failed, the hope of support V
from that quarter disappeared and nothing more was heard A , .
of an opposition to a final break with Mexico.^ When the 1 -pi
convention met its members proved to be unanimously in J
favor of independence.

The month which elapsed between the election of dele-
gates and their meeting in convention brought about no
improvement in the distracted condition of Texan afifairs.
The breach between the governor and the coimcil was ir-
reparable. There was, in reality, no government, no central
authority, and no direction in afifairs, and a large Mexican
army was known to be advancing on B6xar.

The situation of the very inadequate garrison at that
place had already attracted the serious attention of Gov-
ernor Smith and General Houston, but they had been un-
able to do anything effectual. About the middle of January
Houston determined to abandon the town, and he accord-
ingly sent forward James Bowie and what few men he
could gather, with orders to withdraw the whole force to
the Alamo and to destroy the barricades in the streets; and
he asked the governor for authority to remove all the ar-

» Tex. Dip. Can., I, 56. « Yoakum, II, 55.

* See Revue dea Deux Mondes, April, 1840.

314 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tillery and stores to Gonzales and Copano and to blow up
the Alamo.^ Neill, the commander, reported, however, that
he could not remove the guns for want of horses (which
Grant had carried off), and the Alamo was left intact under
the care of about a hundred men.

A few days later William B. Travis was ordered to B^xar,
and started with some thirty men, arriving early in Feb-
ruary, when he took over the conmiand from Neill, who left
for home, "in consequence of the sickness of his family."
On February 12, 1836, Travis wrote that he had not more
than a himdred and fifty men, "and they in a very disor-
ganized state." As the frontier post, it would certainly be
the first to be attacked, and his information was that nearly
five thousand of the enemy were approaching. "Yet we
are determined," he wrote, "to sustain it as long as there
is a man left, because we consider death preferable to dis-
grace." * On February 24 the Mexican advance was ac-
tually in the town of B6xar, and Travis again appealed for
aid. "I call on you," he exclaimed, in an address to the
people of Texas, "in the name of liberty, of patriotism, and
of everything dear to the American character, to come to
our aid with all dispatch. . . . Though this call may be
neglected, I am determined to sustain myself as long as pos-
sible, and die like a soldier who never forgets what is due
to his own honor or that of his coimtry." ^

While Travis was sending out these desperate appeals for
help, Fannin was lying idle not a himdred miles away, with
a considerable force. He had become convinced that his
project of a descent by sea upon Matamoros was impracti-
cable, and about the end of January, 1836, he left Vdasco
and collected at Goliad some four hundred men, mostly
volunteers from the United States. On February 28 he
set out from Goliad with three hundred men to reinforce
Travis; but owing to insufficient transport, and perhaps a
shrewd sense that it was now too late, he returned to his
post on the same day.

» Houston to Smith, Jan. 17, 1836; Yoakum, II, 458.

« Brown, I, 534. » Ibid., 667.

THE MEXICAN INVASION 315

The Matamoros expedition undertaken by Johnson and
Grant which had so weakened B6xar, had by this time come
to a wretched end. Many of the men deserted, either to
return home or to join Houston, and by the beginning of
February Johnson and Grant had less than a himdred men
in all. With this handful they occupied San Patricio, and
then busied themselves in collecting horses from the scat-
tered Mexican ranches lying west of the Nueces. While
Grant, with some fifty men, was on an expedition of this
kind, Johnson was surprised at San Patricio, on February 27,
1836, by an overwhelming force of Mexicans. He himself,
with four other men, escaped. The rest, with the exception
of five or six, were all killed ; and from thenceforward John-
son, who Uved to be nearly eighty-five, disappears from
Texan history.

Grant was less fortunate. After a successful raid he was
retiuning to San Patricio, on the second of March, when
he was attacked by a force of several hundred Mexican
dragoons. He himself was killed, as were all but one of
his men. Reuben R. Brown, the sole survivor, was lassoed,
and was thus captured, only slightly woimded. He was
taken to Matamoros, and made his escape nearly a year
later.^

The convention which met on Tuesday, the first of March,
under these depressing circiunstances, wasted no time in
discussion. On the next day after assembling, the dele-
gates, by a imanimous vote, solemnly declared, in words
copied from the more famous declaration of 1776, that their
pohtical connection with the Mexican nation had forever
ended, and that the people of Texas now constituted a free,
sovereign, and independent republic.^

The next step was necessarily the organization of an army.
On March 4, by a unanimous vote, Houston was appointed

^ The narratives of Johnson and Brown will be found in Brown, I, 542-548.
Johnson's account is also printed in Baker, 80-82. It seems that eighty-five
men were killed, five escaped, and seven were taken prisoners, making ninety-
seven in all.

' The official text is in Journals of the ConvenUon of the Free, Sovereign and
Independent People of Texas (Houston, 1838).

316 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

commander-in-chief; with authority over all regulars, vol-
unteers; and militia in the field; and on the morning of the
seventh; as soon as his conimission and instructions were
received; he took leave of the convention; of which he was
a member; and started for GonzaleS; where a small force
was again assembling. Houston was subsequently criti-
cised for not having gone earlier to the front; but it is ap-
parent that he could not have pxercised any real authority
if he had. The provisional government, from which he had
theretofore derived authority; was at an end; and to have.
attempted to organize a military force under a doubtful
title while the constitutional convention was sitting, would
have been useless.

On March 12; 1836, an ordinance was adopted providing
for a species of military conscription. Boimties in the form
of Uberal grants of land were also authorized.

On March 16 a Constitution was adopted; which was
signed the next day. It was compounded; without much
alteration, from the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitutions of some of the Southwestern states. A
President and Vice-President, a Senate and a House of
Representatives; a Supreme Court and such inferior courts
as might be established by Congress from time to time,
were to exercise the executive; legislative; and judicial
powers respectively. The conmion law of England; subject
to such statutory changes as Congress might make, was to
govern; the usual bill-of-rights provisions were, of course,
included; and the acts of the legislature of Coahuila and
Texas, passed in 1834 and 1835, which disposed of many
himdred acres of the public landS; were declared to be null
and void.

The constitutional provisions relative to slavery seem to
have caused little or no discussion at the place and time of
their adoption. Briefly, the Constitution declared that per-
sons of color who had been slaves before coming to Texas,
were to remain in a state of servitude ; that Congress could
pass no law emancipating slaved; that no individual could
manumit his slaves without the consent of Congress; that

THE MEXICAN INVASION 317

no free person of color could reside permanently in the re-
public without the like consent; and that Congress might
prohibit the introduction of slaves as merchandise, or from
any coimtry but the United States.

It could hardly have been expected that a body of men
of whom the larger part had always lived in slave states,
and nearly all of whom represented slave-holding constitu-
ents, should have adopted any different Constitution. To
have done so, indeed, would have been suicidal. The one
object for which the convention had been called was to re-
lieve the people of Texas from Mexican control. It was
abimdantly evident that the accomplishment of this task
would require all the best efforts of a united nation; and if
the convention had begun by destroying the property of
large numbers of the people, and thus creating most bitter
antagonisms, their main object would most assuredly have
been defeated. There was at the time no anti-slavery senti-
ment in Texas ;^ but if there had been, any delegate who
desired independence as his first object would have been
ill advised indeed, if he had attempted to compUcate the
situation by a premature proposal to make Texas a free
state.

At the same time that the Constitution was approved
ordinances were adopted for the establishment of a pro-
visional government, consisting of a President, a Vice-Presi-
dent, Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and the Treasury,
and an Attorney-General. The Constitution was to be sub-
mitted to the people, and, if approved, elections were to be
held for the constitutional officers under the direction of the
provisional government. David G. Burnet, a lawyer, a
native of New Jersey, who had practised in Ohio before
coming to Texas, was elected President, and Lorenzo de
Zavala Vice-President. An address to the people of the

^ Even Austin had reached the conclusion more than six months before that
** Texas must be a slave country. It is no longer a matter of doubt." — (Austin
to Mrs. Holley, Aug. 21, 1835; Tex. Hist. Quar., XIII, 271.) This letter was
written from New Orleans, before the writer had reached Texas on his way
home from Mexico, and while he was still in hopes that an armed conflict
might be avoided or postponed.

318 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

United StateS; appealing for their sympathy and aid, was
adopted. And then on Thursday, the seventeenth of
March; the convention adjourned, while the new provisional
government sought safety at the town of Harrisburg from
the advancing forces of Santa Anna.

The Mexican expedition to Texas, which now appeared so
formidable to the Texan authorities, had been long prepar-
ing, and was on as lai^e a scale as the chronic emptiness of
the national Treasury and the necessity of guarding against
domestic disturbances would permit. As early as Jime,
1835, the rumor began to spread in the caf^s and anterooms
in the capital that the next achievement of the President
(who had just slaughtered the Zacatecans) was to be the re-
duction of the Texan colonists to a proper condition of
obedience.^

In preparation for definite mihtaiy action, the Minister
of Relations, on the last day of August, 1835, sent a circular
to the governors and other local officers throughout the
republic, which was doubtless meant to intimidate the col-
onists, but which only succeeded in enraging them.

"The colonists established in Texas," the circular declared, "have
recently given the most unequivocal evidence of the extremity to
which perfidy, ingratitude and the restless spirit that animates them
can go, since — forgetting what they owe to the supreme government of
the nation which so generously admitted them to its bosom, gave
them fertile lands to cultivate, and allowed them all the means to
live in comfort and abundance — they have risen against that same
government, taking up arms against it under the pretense of sustain-
ing a system which an immense majority of Mexicans have asked to
have changed, thus concealing their criminal purpose of dismember-
ing the territory of the Republic.

" Hb Excellency the President ad interim, justly irritated by a con-
duct so perfidious, has fixed his entire attention upon this subject;
and in order to suppress and punish that band of ungrateful foreigners,
has directed that the most active measures be taken, measures re-

^ Santa Anna at about this time told Austin that he (Santa Anna) would
"visit Texas next March — as a friend. His visit is uncertain/' Austin added,
"his friendship still more so. We must rely on ourselves and prepare for the
worst."— (Austin to Mrs. Holley, Aug. 21, 1835; Tex, Hist. Quar., XIII. 272.)

THE MEXICAN INVASION 319

quired by the very nature of what is in reality a crime against the
whole nation. The troops destined to sustain the honor of the coun-
try and the government will perform their duty and will cover them-
selves with glory." *

It was Santa Anna's intention to open the Texan cam-
paign in the springy and meanwhile to remain at his hacienda
of Manga de Clavo, leaving General Barragan, as President
ad interim, to administer the government and to gather an
adequate force of troops at B6xar by the end of the follow-
ing February,* but the news of the affair at Gonzales and
the seizure of the post at Goliad forced the hand of the gov-
ernment. On October 29, 1835, the Mexican Cabinet laid
before Congress reports from General Cos, to the effect that
all the colonies in Texas had risen, even including Austin's
colony, "which imtil then had supported the government," •
and on October 31, 1835, orders were sent to General
Ramirez y Sesma, the governor and commanding officer in
Zacatecas, directing him to march at once to B^xar with
four battalions and a battery of Ught artfllery. By Novem-
ber 11 Ramirez had started on his difficult march with
about fifteen himdred men and a hastily organized transport.
The distance from Zacatecas to the Rio Grande at Laredo is
about four himdred and fifty miles, and it was not until two
days after Christmas that Ramirez and his division reached
the southern bank of the river. Awaiting him there was
General Cos, with the defeated garrison of B6xar and a large
number of their women and children, who had reached
Laredo on Christmas Day.

Santa Anna himself had hurried back to the capital early
in November to take personal command of the Texan ex-
pedition, and after arranging the political affairs of the
coimtry to his satisfaction, started for the front toward the
end of the month. By December 7 he was at San Luis
PotosI, where he was energetically occupied for some days
in organizing his army. The task was made peculiarly
difficult from a lack of money. Although the total ex-

1 Dublan y Lozano, III, 64. * Filisola, II, 213.

• Manco d tr<wi8 de loa Siglos, IV, 360.

320 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICX)

penditure of the republic for the army amounted in 1835
to $7,686,926, according to the reports of the Secretary of
the Treasury, it was necessary to resort to the most desperate
expedients to raise the additional simis required for the
Texas campaign. The government had been authorized
by Congress on November 23, 1835, to raise $500,000 "by
the least onerous method" for the purposes of the war,*
but it was unable to do so by any of the ordinary means
of finance.* - -

Santa Anna himself, in his manifesto written after ^e
close of the war, thus explained the situation:

"Who is ignorant," he wrote, "of the condition of our public treas-
ury? Not only was it very wretched, but the only hope of raising
money for the war was the slow and risky expedient of assessments
{contribiiciones), which might also serve as a pretext for risings and
popular commotions, and which it was therefore impolitic to adopt
... In spite of the authority granted by Congress on November 23,
the government was unable to procure the means necessary for the
campaign, and until my arrival at San Luis, the supply was so trifling
that although a part of the army was already assembled in that city,
five days passed before it was possible to pay the men anything; and
then but $10,000 were distributed, which I was only able to secure on
giving my personal guarantee. I was empowered by the government
to effect a loan, and I had to do it under extremely disadvantageous
conditions for the nation, for I feared that later on the necessity
would be greater and in consequence the conditions more oner-
ous. . . . This contract, which was made on condition that it should
be approved by the government, as it was finally approved, and which
taken by itself will appear ruinous for the nation, but whose advan-
tages are obvious if compared with other transactions of the same
kind entered into by the government directly, was at that time
the sole means of equipping troops and opening the Texas cam-
paign." *

^ Dublan y Lozano, III, 106.

* The Treasury report for the year showed that the income of the government
was far from sufficient to meet its obligations, and the minister (Jos^ Mariano
Blasco) dwelt unhopefully on the necessity of devising some means to relieve
the exhausted Treasury from the abject condition into which it had fallen
Caacar d nuestra eapirarUe hacienda de la abyeccidn en que la ha pveslo circua-
atanciaa"), — (Memoria de la hacienda federal . . . preeentada al Congreso . . .
en 22 de Mayo de 1835.)

* Santa Anna, Manifiesto, 6.

THE MEXICAN INVASION 321

The loan referred to was for $400,000, of which only a
small part was actually paid in cash, the remainder being
in supplies to be delivered at Matamoros or in bills of ex-
change. A biQ for $47,000, previously drawn on the col-
lector of customs at Matamoros, and protested by him for
lack of funds, was to be accepted as cash.^ Nor was this
usurious loan the end of the money difficulties of Santa
Anna's army. They were expected to Uve upon the coun-
try; but in spite of forced loans and the seizure of all they
could lay their hands on, they were always in distress for
the lack of the most trivial sums of money.

Another difficulty under which the expedition labored
was the inability to secure transportation of men and sup-
plies by sea, or to blockade the coast of Texas. Consider-
ing that the colonists received from New Orleans all their
supplies (except what little food they raised themselves),
and that they were certain to receive considerable reinforce-
ments of men from the same source, an effectual blockade
and the seizure of all the principal ports would have been a
very effectual means of conquering the country. So also, if
vessels had been procurable, the army and its entire train
might have been rapidly carried and regularly supplied from
Vera Cruz or Tampico. But Mexico had no navy, no mer-
chant marine, and no money with which to charter ships.
So far as control of the sea went, Texas, with four patched-
up schooners, secured and held it.^

Santa Anna was thus compelled to march by land with
an ai-supplied and inadequate force. To reduce and hold
effectively so large a country as Texas, thinly settled as it
was, a very considerable army should have been provided;
but in spite of all Santa Anna's undoubted energy and skill
as an organizer, he could only manage to get together six

* See details in App. 2 and 3 of the ManifiestOj 43-45. Caro, Santa Anna's
private secretary, asserts that Santa Anna himself got a commission on this
loan. Also that General CastriUon was paid $6,000 by the lenders, which
0um he advanced to the army paymaster at 4 per cent a month interest. —
(Caro, Verdadera Idea, 2-4, 148-162.)

' A detailed history of the Texan navy at this period will be foimd in a
series of papers by Alex. Dienst in Tex, HUt. Quar., XII, 165-203, 249-295.

322 THE UNTIED STATES AND MEXICO

thousand men. The r^ular anny at that time amounted,
on pBper, to twenty-seven thousand, and with the more or
less pennanently organized militia, to forty-eight thousand
six hundred men.

Ferbsps with the view of making good this deficiency in
physical force, the Secretary of War, on December 30, 1835,
issued a blood-thirsty circular which was intended to dis-
courage the landing of men and supplies from the United
States. The government, it was stated, had positive in-
formation that meetings had been held in the United States
with the undisguised object of equipping armed expeditions
against the Mexican nation; and the government was also
assured that these acts were disapproved by the authorities
of the United States, and were contrary to its laws. Never-
theless, as some speculators and adventurers had managed
to evade the punishment that awaited them at home, the
President ad interim directed that all armed foreigners who
entered the republic should be treated and punished as
pirates, as also all persons who imported arms or munitions
of war intended to be put into the hands of those who were
hostile to the government.^ There can be no doubt what-
ever that Santa Anna, who was still the real head of the
nation, was responsible for this measure. Indeed his pri-
vate secretary asserts that it was drafted in Santa Anna's
residence.*

Santa Anna's next care was to relieve B^xar, and orders
were accordingly sent to General Ramirez y Sesma, directing
him to push on from Laredo and take measures to raise the
siege, which, it was assumed, was still in progress. "The
foreigners," ran the orders, "who are making war on the
Mexican nation in violation of every rule of law, are entitled
to no consideration whatever, and in consequence no quarter
is to he given them, of which order you will give notice to
your troops." '

Reinforcements under General Fernandez were ordered
to be collected at Matamoros; General Filisola, who had

> Dublan y Lozano, III, 114. * Caro. Verdadera Idea, 155.

* Filiwlai II| 245. Italics not in original.

THE MEXICAN INVASION 323

been appointed as second in command of the expedition,
was despatched to the front; and Santa Anna himself
promised to follow at the earUest possible moment.

From the Rio Grande Filisola, who had overtaken Ra-
mirez on the road, wrote a long and despondent letter to
Santa Anna. The march, he reported, had been most toil-
some; the horses and mules were all lame, the inhabitants
of the comitry were apathetic, there were no cattle in the
ranchos, and there was no money to pay the troops. Gen-
eral Cos had only eight hmidred and fifteen men left, most
of them naked and mitrained, although he had equipped
them as well as he could.

With respect to the plan of campaign, Filisola strongly
advised that the base on the Rio Grande should be at Mier —
eighty miles below Laredo — ^and that the advance should be
by the line of San Patricio and Goliad to San Felipe. In
this way B6xar would be turned, and would either be cut
off from the rest of Texas altogether and easily taken later,
or would be abandoned by the enemy. At Goliad, the army
would be only fourteen leagues from Copano on Matagorda
Bay, whither suppUes could readily be forwarded by sea.
As for Matamoros, the commandant was clamoring for re-
inforcements, and Filisola suggested that it might be well
to send General Cos and his wretched troops to that point,
where they could be organized, clothed, and drilled.^

Filisola's letter was crossed by one from Santa Anna,
dated at San Luis Potosf on December 28, 1835, in which he
stated that he had sent orders to Cos to continue his retreat
to Monclova (nearly two himdred miles from Laredo), where
his force could be rested, and to Ramfrez y Sesma to march
eighty miles up the Rio Grande to the old presidio of San
Juan Bautista. These orders Filisola was to see executed.
With respect to Matamoros, General Fernandez with a well-
equipped body of troops was at hand, and Filisola need not
pay any attention to it, but was to establish his head-
quarters at Monclova. General Urrea, who had been
ordered to proceed from Durango with a small body of

1 Filisola, II, 260-260.

324 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

cavalry, was to take command in Saltillo. A company of
presidial troops was to remain at Laredo, but no other
troops were to be detached by Filisola except imder express
orders from Santa Anna himself.^

This letter indicated clearly the decision which Santa
Anna had reached. He pmposed to make B^xar his first
objective, and to advance along a nearly straight line from
San Luis Potosf by way of Saltillo, Monclova, and the pre-
sidio of San Juan Bautista. His decision, which ignored
the importance of having a base of supplies on the sea, and
indeed ignored the requirement of any base whatever, ap-
pears contrary to every principle of the military art. Ac-
cording to Filisola, it was also contrary to the advice of
almost all the principal officers of the army, and he asserts
that Santa Anna persisted, largely from wrong-headed ob-
stinacy, and a desire to have his own way, aggravated by
illness.^

At any rate, there was nothing for Filisola to do but to
obey. On January 5, 1836, his movement began. By the
sixteenth Ramirez was at the presidio, and by the twenty-
first Cos was at Monclova. Li the meantime the main
body, under Santa Anna, was arriving at Saltillo, where they
were joined on the nineteenth by General Urrea with his
cavalry. On January 23, 1836, Santa Anna — ^who had
arrived at Saltillo with the first detachment — tissued de-
tailed orders for the march. The expeditionary army now
amounted, according to the official returns, to 6,019, rank
and file, organized in five brigades or detachments, as follows:

1. Vanguard, under General Ramirez y Sesma, number-
ing 1,541 men (of whom 369 were cavalry), with eight guns.

2. First infantry brigade, under General Gaona, 1,600 men
and six guns.

3. Second infantry brigade, under General Tolsa, 1,839
men and six guns — including General Cos's troops.

4. Cavalry brigade, under General Andrade, 437 men.

t Filinola, II, 260.

*Hftnta Anna states that he was in bed for two weeks at SaltiUo. — (Mi

Uitlaria, 33.)

THE MEXICAN INVASION 325

5. Detachment under General Urrea, 300 infantry and 301
cavaliy, with one four-pounder gun.

On January 26, 1836, the main body of the army, except
Urrea's command, began to march from Saltillo, picking up
Cos and his men at Monclova. Urrea was ordered to march
from Saltillo to Matamoros, where he was to be joined by
300 men from the Yucatan regiment — ^who, it seems, had
been sent from Campeche by sea — ^and was to cross the Rio
Grande at once, in order to repel any projected attack by
the Texans and to guard the right flank of the main body.
Urrea left Saltillo on the last day of January, and crossed
the river on February 17, 1836. It was his command which,
on February 27 and March 2, destroyed the insurgent parties
imder Johnson and Grant.

Santa Anna himself pushed forward rapidly, overtaking
and passing the various brigades, and reached the presidio
of San Juan Bautista on February 12. On the same day
Ramirez y Sesma, with a force now numbering over sixteen
himdred men,^ crossed the Rio Grande and began the toil-
some march to B^xar.

Before leaving the presidio Santa Anna himself wrote to
the civil authorities at the capital, asking to be furnished
with instructions as to the steps to be taken for the govern-
ment of Texas after he had reconquered it.* The Secretary
of War, on March 18, sent a reply ,^ in which he stated
that the President and cabinet had carefully examined the
grave, difficult, and important questions upon which the
commander-in-chief had touched in so masterly a mamier,
and then proceeded to lay down, under ten different heads, a
complete ^ries of provisions for punishing the Texans aid
rewarding the Mexican soldiers and employees out of the
spoils of victory. Briefly, all expenses of putting down the
insurrection and all losses incurred thereby, including duties
not collected, were to be made up by confiscation of the

> He had picked up a few recruits near Laredo and the presidio. — (^lisola,
II, 326.)

* See text in Santa Anna's Manifiesto, 53-59.
» Text in Filisola, II, 371-379.

326 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

property of the settlers;^ all the principal promoters of the
revolution were to be executed; all foreigners who had come
as part of an aimed force were to be treated as pirates; all
other prisoners were to be dealt with as Congress might
direct;* all foreigners who had settled in Texas without law-
ful passports were to be expelled; and all slaves were to be
set free.

These instractions were received by the commander-in-
chief about the middle of April, and circumstances occurred
soon afterward which rendered the decisions reached by the
Mexican government entirely unimportant — except as these
decisions threw some Ught upon the spirit in which they in-
tended to carry on the war. It was probably considerably
later when the Texans learned of the officially declared in-
tentions of the government in regard to them. Had they
been more promptly informed, they might very well have
replied as Henry V is represented to have replied to the
French herald before Agincourt:

"Bid them achieve me, and then sell my bones.
Good God! Why should they mock poor fellows thus?
The man that once did sell the lion's skin
While the beast liv'd, was killed with hunting him."

But Santa Anna, at any rate, was not troubled by any
misgivings as to his fate, and he set out from the presidio
on the sixteenth of February, hot upon the trail and with
every preparation made for disposing of the beast's skin.
On the foUowing day he joined the advance under Ramirez y
Sesma, and on the twenty-third took possession of the town
of B6xar — ^Travis and his men taking refuge in the Alamo,
which they had provisioned as well as possible. Santa Anna

^ Congress passed a special confiscation act to cover the case of Texas on
April 9, 1836.— (Dublan y Lozano, III, 141.)

* On April 14, 1836, Congress passed another law, directing that prisoners
taken with arms in their hands and persons who might surrender within a
period to be fixed by the commander-in-chief should not be executed, but should
be banished forever or (in certain cases) should have the option of being con-
fined for ten years within districts to be designated by the government and
distant at least seventy leagues from any frontier. The principal agents of
the insurrection were excepted from the benefits of the law. — (Ibid,, 142.)

THE MEXICAN INVASION 327

contented himself with surrounding the mission buildings
while awaiting the arrival of the brigade under Gaona.^

On the twenty-ninth of February, however, he ordered
Ramirez to send out a party to reconnoitre the road toward
Gonzales, whence it was supposed that reinforcements for
the Texans were advancing. "You know," wrote Santa
Anna to Ramfrez, "that in this war there are no prisoners J^ '

The reconnoissance, which was made in some force,' was
unsuccessful. The troops employed returned to camp on
the morning after they left it; but at three o'clock of that
same morning thirty-two men from Gonzales had joined
the Texans. The number of the defenders of the Alamo
was now raised to one hundred and eighty-eight.

The disaster which followed was inevitable. The build-
ings of the mission of San Antonio de Valero had been con-
structed about the middle of the eighteenth century. They
had later been converted into a military post, but they
could not stand against artillery, and even against infantry
they could only have been held by a far larger force than
that which now occupied them.

The place consisted of a large four-sided corral or yard,
about four himdred and fifty feet long from north to south
and a hundred and sixty feet wide from east to west. The
enclosure was formed partly by stone buildings, and partly
by a masonry wall about two feet and a half thick and from
nine to twelve feet high. A part of the wall near the north-
westerly comer appears to have been in ruins. There were
irrigation ditches not far from and nearly parallel to the
longer walls, and something like a regular ditch may have
existed roimd the whole enceinte. There were no bastions
or other means of enfilading the walls.

The middle part of the easterly side of the lai^e enclosure

1 Santa Anna to Secretary of War, Feb. 27, 1836; Filisola, II, 380. He says
in this letter that he had expected to surprise the rebels at dawn of the twenty-
second, but that a heavy shower of rain had prevented him.

' "En eaUi guerra aabe vd, que no hay prisUmeros," — (Filisola, U, 387.)
* A regiment of cavalry and a battalion of infantry. They only went as
far as the Espada mission, about eight miles down the river. — (Kesmedy, 11,
184.)

328 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

was formed by the back of the old convent buflding, two
stories high and one hundred and ninety-one feet long.
Along the south end of the enclosure was the c&rcd, or prison,
a strong one-story building, with the main gate-way entering
through it. On the west side of the enclosure was a range
of one-story buildings, also of stone. Back of the old con-
vent building was another yard, about a hundred feet square,
surroimded by stout stone walls; and adjoining this at its
southeast comer stood the remains of the convent church.
This little cruciform structure was about seventy-five feet
long and sixty feet wide across the transepts. Its roofless
walls were approximately twenty feet high and four feet
thick. At the east end of the church an earthen moimd or
platform had been constructed the previous autimm by
General Cos, on which three twelve-poimder guns were
moimted, firing through embrasures roi^ghly notched in the
masonry.^ Fourteen guns, or possibly more, were mounted
in various parts of the works, but as the Texans were im-
skilled in the use of artillery, these did not prove to be of
much use. The defences were substantially as they had
been left by General Cos when he surrendered the previous
December.

The garrison was much too small to man walls a quarter
of a mile or more long, and, what was worse, it was unor-
ganized and divided into factions. Travis, who had been
commissioned a colonel in the "regular" army of Texas,
had been sent by Houston to take command; but the vol-
tmteers in B^xar declined to serve tmder him, and elected
James Bowie as their commander. To solve the difficulty
thus created, the two commanders entered into an extraor-
dinary written agreement, by which Travis was to com-
mand so much of the garrison as consisted of regulars and
volunteer cavalry, and Bowie was to command the rest, and
all orders and correspondence were to be signed by both

> See account of the Alamo by Col. R. N. Potter, U. S. A., in Comp, Hist,,
1, 641, with diagram. A better and more accurate diagram will be found in
Comer's San Antonio de Bixar. Yoakum has a diagram which appears to be
substantially correct, but the dimensions given in his text are enoneoua and
are contradicted by the diagram.

THE MEXICAN INVASION 329

officers.* Bowie, however, fell seriously ill, and Travis was
quietly accepted as sole commander.

But notwithstanding the inherent and notorious weakness
of the Alamo and its garrison, the stout posture of defence
which they presented was enough to render Santa Anna ex-
tremely cautious. He had only Ught field artillery with
him, and he hesitated about attempting an assault until
Gaona's guns had arrived. A part of Gaona's brigade
joined Santa Anna on Friday, the third of March, consist-
ing of a battalion of sappers and the infantry battalions
of Aldama and Toluca — ^in all, eight hundred men or
less.*

Santa Anna must now have had under his command
somewhere between two thousand and twenty-four himdred
men — at a moderate computation a preponderance of twelve
to one over the besieged — and an assault was ordered.' A
little before the dawn of Sunday, the sixth of March, three
colunms attacked — one at the northwest angle of the large
enclosure, where a breach existed, another about the middle
of the western wall, and the third at the church. The large
enclosure was, of course, soon gained. Travis himself was
killed early in the fight, and his body was found near the
northwest comer.

The Texans, or such as were left of them, fell back on the
two-story convent and the church, in both of which a des-
perate and unavailing fight was kept up by the defenders
against enormous odds. One room after another of the con-
vent building was invaded, and the occupants killed. Bowie,
who was lymg in bed, sick of typhoid pneumonia,^ was shot.
The church was the last point carried, and every one of its
defenders was killed. Not a single man of the Texans was
left to tell the story of the siege and assault, and it was
from the lips of Mexican soldiers that an American resident

» Brown, I, 536.

> Kennedy, II, 184; Filisola, II. 334.

* The Texans believed that Santa Anna had his full force with him at this
time; but the evidence seems quite clear that the rest did not join him imtil
after the assault on the Alamo. — (Ibid., 431.)

* Comp. Hist,, I, 643.

380 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

at MatamoroS; a few weeks afterward; picked up a more or
less intelligible statement of the details.^

Santa Anna's victory was complete; but, in a way, it
was worse than a defeat. He had lost a great number of
men — ^how many it is impossible to state. Filisola says
"more than" seventy killed and three hundred wounded.*
But besides the men, Santa Anna had lost valuable time.
He had been delayed by Travis's obstinate and hopeless de-
fence for two weeks — sl period of incalculable value to his
adversaries. And worse than all, the very dramatic com-
pleteness of his victory had turned the world against him.
A cause for which nearly two hundred men had Uterally
fought until they died was one to enlist the sympathy of
all who heard of their heroic resolution. To defend a
post until the last drop of blood, was a figure of speech
often employed ; but these men, with unheard-of resolution,
had actually done the thing itself. "Thermopylae," said a
Texan orator, "Thermopylae had its messenger of defeat,
the Alamo had none"; and the point and vigor of the
phrase embodied, in ten words, the feeling of the pride of
race with which all EngUsh-speaking men learned of the
great feat of Travis and his command.'

Santa Anna's next step, having taken the Alamo, was to
prepare for a general advance as soon as the whole of his
force had joined him. The remaining part of Gaona's bri-
gade, with its guns, arrived on the eighth of March. Tolsa,
with the second brigade, and Andrade with the cavalry
brigade and the wagons, reached B6xar by the tenth or
eleventh of March.* On the latter day the forward move-
ment began. General Ramirez y Sesma, always active,.being
sent in the direction of Gonzales and San Felipe, with a
view to securing the fords of the Colorado : while a detach-

* R. M. Potter in Magazine of Amer. Hiat., Jan., 1878.

*Guerra de Tijas, II, 389. Santa Anna gives seventy dead and about
three hundred wounded. — {ManifiestOf 10.)

* The best evidence seems to be that the famous phrase was first uttered
by Edward Burleson in a speech at Gonzales, when the news of the fall of the
Alamo reached that place.— (Tex. Hist. Quar., VI, 309; VII, 328.)

* Filisola, II, 431.

THE MEXICAN INVASION 331

ment of about six hundred men, under the command of
Colonel Morales, was ordered to Goliad to reinforce the
right wing of the army under Urrea.^

Urrea, after his easy trimnphs over the little parties of
Johnson and Grant, had halted at San Patricio, where he
remained, probably waiting for orders from Santa Anna,
until the twelfth of March. He then pushed forward to
Refugio, reaching the site of the mission after two days'
march. There he found a party of insurgents under Major
Ward, of Georgia, holding the church. Ward repulsed Ur-
rea's attack that afternoon, but retreated in the night, in-
tending to join Fannin, who was still holding GoUad.

Next day Urrea also started for Goliad, picking up on the
way Captain Kong, one of Fannin's officers, with a detach-
ment of forty-seven men. Of these, sixteen were killed in
action, and the remaining thirty-one were made prisoners
and then shot. "The fatigue of the troops, in consequence
of their constant marching," says the Mexican historian of
the war, "the number of prisoners — ^which was now much
increased — the want of means for keeping and feeding them,
and finally, the orders of the supreme government and the
latest orders from the conunander-in-chief, compelled Gen-
eral Urrea to yield to difficult circumstances, although con-
trary to his own intentions, and to order some thirty ad-
venturers to be shot"; and Filisola goes on to argue, that
although Urrea's conduct had been blamed, he was really
quite right in extirpating "these hordes of assassins and
thieves." ^

Pushing rapidly forward, Urrea interposed a part, if not
all of his force, between Ward and Fannin, and was joined
by Morales with the reinforcements from B6xar on the seven-
teenth of March, raising his force to about twelve hundred
men. Two days afterward Fannin, too late, began his retreat.

> Goliad was originally the presidio de la Bahfa del Espiritu Santo. The
buildings were almost a duplicate of those at the Alamo. It was occupied at
this time by about four or five hundred volunteers under Col. J. W. Fannin.
—(Comp. Hist.y I, 613.)

* " Nada mda natural que d que se estirpasen estas hordas de oaeaiMM y la-
dronw."— (Filisola, II, 419.)

332 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

He had received orders from Houston on the fourteenth of
March to fall back to Victoria as soon as practicable, with
" such artillery as can be brought mth expedition,^^ to sink the
rest in the river, and to afiford every facility to women and
children desirous of leaving the place. " The inmiediate ad-
vance of the enemy may be confidently expected," Houston
added, ''as weU as a rise of water. Prompt movements are
therefore highly importarUJ^ ^ That Fannin delayed moving
for five days after receipt of this order was, perhaps, excus-
able, in view of the continued absence of Ward and King with
a hundred and fifty men. A more serious disobedience of
orders was his determination to remove all his artillery, so
that, when he finally started on the morning of March 19,
he was encumbered not only by a following of non-combat-
ants, but also by a train of ox-carts.

About the middle of that day Fannin was overtaken by
Urrea's cavalry in an open prairie, some five miles from the
Coleta River. Unable to advance, he was soon surrounded
by Urrea's whole command, which outnumbered the Texan
force about four to one. All that afternoon and until well
into the night a bitter fight went on, the Texans sheltering
behind their carts and the dead bodies of their cattle; the
Mexicans constantly attacking with horse and foot, and
both sides suffering rather severely.

By next morning, Sunday, March 20, Fannin realized
that his position was hopeless. He was five miles from water,
his animals had been killed, and he had a number of women
and children, besides his wounded, whom he was not will-
ing to desert, and he determined to surrender. He there-
fore displayed a white flag, and Urrea sent three oflBcers —
Colonel Morales, Colonel Salas, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Holzinger — ^to negotiate terms of surrender. Fannin asked
for assurances that his men should be treated as prisoners
of war, and a written agreement to that effect was drawn
up on his behalf. According to Colonel Holzinger, this
proposition was referred to General Urrea, although* the

1 Yoakum, II, 472. Italics are not in the original. The orders were dated
March 11.

THE MEXICAN INVASION 333

orders of the government were well known to his three repre-
sentatives. The answer was that no agreement to that
efifect could be made^ but that private assurances might be
given to Fannin that he (Urrea) would use his influence
with the government to spare their lives, and that until the
reply of the government was received, they should be treated
as prisoners of war. Fannin said to the Mexicans : '' Gentle-
men, do you believe the Mexican government will spare our
Uves?'' to which the commissioners answered that, although
they could give no positive promise, yet there was no ex-
ample of the Mexican government having ordered the shoot-
ing of a prisoner who had appealed to its clemency; and
thereupon Fannin surrendered, without any papers having
been signed by the Mexicans.^

Urrea's own account of the surrender only differs from
this in one material point. In his diary, published a year
later, he says that he gave Fannin the assurance that he
would interpose in his behalf vrith the amtmander-dn'^hief,
and accordingly did so, in a letter from Victoria.* From
Victoria he alio wrote to the officer in command of the guard
at Goliad, directing him to treat the prisoners with con-
sideration, and particularly Fannin.'

The rank and file of Fannin's force, who were not, per-
haps, accurately informed as to what had passed in the con-
ferences, were certainly convinced that the Mexicans (whom
they naturally mistrusted) had consented to definite terms

^ Letter from Holzinger to John A. Wharton, June 3, 1836, in Caro's Verda"
dera Idea, 73-78.

> Urrea, DiariOf 17. This letter is not published, but Santa Anna's reply
will be found at page 60, in which he argues the case at some length, and says
the indignation of the nation would fall on him if he protected such highway
robbers. "I yield to no one, my friend,'' he continues, "in tender-hearted-
ness, for I am not aware that I hate any man, and I have never had a thought
of avepging even personal injuries; but what authority have I to overrule
what the government of the nation has in terms commanded, by remitting
the penalty for such criminals as these foreigners? " If, instead of Santa
Anna's ordering the prisoners to be executed, the question had been referred
to the city of Mexico, an answer would not have been received till the end of
April; and by that time Santa Anna had ordered all surviving prisoners re-
leased, in spite of the directions of the supreme government.

' " Trate V. con connderaddn d lo8 priaUmeros, principalmerUe d 8u grfe Fan-
mny."— (Urrea, Diario, 62.)

334 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

of capitulation; under which they were to be treated as
prisoners of war and be sent back to the United States.
Their treatment at first confirmed this belief. They were
sent back to Goliad, including all the wounded, and here
they were shortly joined by Ward and his men, who were
captured on Monday, the twenty-first, and by eighty-two
men fresh from the United States, who had been taken as they
landed at Copano. There were in all about five hundred
prisoners, almost all of them volunteers from the United
States. They were guarded by about two hundred Mexican
infantry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Portilla,
Urrea himself having marched forward from the field of
Fanmn's surrender direct to Victoria.

About seven o'clock in the evening of the following
Saturday (March 26), Portilla received a despatch from
Santa Anna, expressing surprise that the prisoners should
have been sent to Goliad at all, recalling the order of the
government that all foreigners taken with arms in their
hands should be treated as pirates, and directing that the
prisoners should all be immediately shot.^

Portilla, after some hesitation (as he asserted later), de-
termmed to comply with Santa Anna's very positive com-
mand. The eighty-two men taken at Copano, however, he
thought were not included in the order, and four American
surgeons, with some other men, who were saved by the con-
nivance of Mexican officers or the kindly intercession of a
Mexican lady, were also spared. In all about a hundred
and twelve men were excepted.^

Early on the morning of Palm Sunday, those who were
not in the hospital, numbering over three hundred, were
mustered, with their knapsacks on their backs, divided into
three separate parties, and marched out in different direc-
tions on the prairie. The men were in high spirits, for^they
believed they were going home. About half a mile from the
presidio they were formed in line with the Mexican escort
facing them. Even then they did not understand what was

^ For the text of this order see Urrea, Diario, 60.
« See PortiUa's reports, ibid., 61-63.

THE MEXICAN INVASION 335

going on. As one survivor related, while they stood there,
somebody suddenly cried out: "Boys, they're going to
shoot," and then the slaughter began.

The details of this horrible business need not be gone
into, but it is enough to say that of the men thus marched
out every one was put to death except a few who ran the
moment they saw they were to be murdered. The troops
employed in the execution then went back into Goliad,
dr^ged the wounded out of the barracks, and put them to
death. Fannin himself, who was among the wounded, was
the last man shot. In all, about three hundred and fifty-
seven men were executed. Their bodies were biuned.^

If the evidence of Urrea and Holzinger is to be believed,
the guilt of this atrocious butchery of prisoners, a week after
they had surrendered, lay solely at Santa Anna's door.
"Every soldier in my division," wrote Urrea, "was con-
founded at the news; all was amazement and consternation.
. . . They [Fannin's men] certainly surrendered in the be-
lief that Mexican generosity would not make their sacrifice
sterile; for if they had thought otherwise they would have
resisted to the last, and sold their lives as dearly as possible." *
It is to be noted, however, that Urrea, when his diary was
published, was hostile to the government, that he did not
publish the text of his report to Santa Anna, and that the
latter may not have been fully and fairly informed of the
circumstances of the surrender. But whatever the degree
of Santa Anna's guilt, there can be no question that his | H
act was an amazing blunder. This cold-blooded slaughter '
aroused a spirit of vengeance which was not to be lightly
satisfied, and which wrought infinite mischief to Mexico in
the long run.

^ Accounts by two of the surgeons who were spared and by some of those
who were ordered out for execution, but escaped, will be found in Foote, II,
227; Comp, Hist., I, 608; Tex. Hist. Quar., I, 54; Baker, 144, 244. Andrew
A. Boyle, one of the Irish settlers at San Patricio, was wounded but was left
in the hospital through the personal intervention of General Garay, and saw
his companions shot in the hospital yard. His account is in Tex. Hist. Qtuxr.,
XIII, 285-291. The most careful calculation of the number put to death is
In Brown, I, 624.

"Urrea, Diario, 22.

336 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

It is no more than just to the Mexican commander to
recall that his course was in full accord with Spanish and
Mexican precedents. The royalists and the insurgents^
like Calleja at Guanajuato, and Hidalgo at VaUadoUd,
from the very beginning of the war of independence, had
made it thek' co^tant practice to shoot th^ prisoieis.'
At Guadalajara, the patriot priest Hidalgo caused a body
of Spanish prisoners to be marched out of the city to a
lonely spot, and there butchered; "and on other occasions
the same ceremony was repeated." * At Zipimeo, in Sep-
tember, 1812, the royalist general, Castillo, put more than
three hundred prisoners to death: and a few days after a
hmidred more were drawn up in line and shot, i but one
man, who was dismissed to bear the tidings to his country-
men.' In August, 1817, the royalist general Linan cap-
tured a fort, and all the sick and wounded in the hospital
were dragged out and shot. The unwounded prisoners
were made to work for three days restoring the fortifications,
and when they were no longer needed for that purpose, they
were shot also.*

These, though conspicuous, were not isolated instances.
It was the general rule, during the revolutionary war, that
if any prisoners had been taken on either side, they were
forthwith shot; * and these were the standing orders, at least
on the part of the royalists. On November 23, 1811, Ca-
lleja, then commander-in-chief, and afterward viceroy of
New Spain, issued a proclamation announcing that all who
were taken with arms in their hands were to be shot." And

» Bancroft, History of Mexico, it, 226, 230. « Ibid,, 249.

' Ihid.f 337. And see for other examples of wholesale butcheries, ibid., 268,
311, 317, 321, 349, 355, 372, 571, etc.

* Robinson, Mina'a Expedition (Am. ed.), 207.

■Of Pedro Celestino Negrete, a Spanish officer, it was reported that not
one insurgent prisoner captured by him had ever escaped death. — (Bancroft^
Hwtofy of Mexico, IV, 387.)

* Calleja believed that citizens of the United States were encouraging the
revolution. He caught one of them at the bridge of Calderon, a certain
Simon Fletcher, a captain of artillery, who was badly wounded. **Era tal
el deseo de CaUeja de fitsilar d cdguno de los de aquella nacion" says Alaman,
**que anddban fomerUando la revoludon, que para ejecutarlo se le eacd del hospiial
en donde eetaba.** — (Historia de M^ico, II, 154.) It was an exact precedent for
the murder of Fannin.

THE MEXICAN INVASION 337

a Uttle later General Jos6 de la Cruz, in his orders to a subor-
dinate, expressly directed that he must not spare the life
of any rebel, no matter of what class, condition, or age he
might be.^

It was also declared by the Spanish Cortes to be contrary
to its own majesty and dignity to confirm, any capitulatio^
with insurgents;* and accordingly, even where surrenders
were made on the express condition that the Uves of the
prisoners should be spared, the condition was repeatedly
violated. The insurgents were as faithless as the royalists.
When Tasco surrendered in December, 1811, Morelos, a
week later, ordered that the terms of surrender be disre-
garded, and the prisoners were shot.^ Tehuacan capitu-
lated under a guarantee that the lives of all the royalists
should be spared, "to which stipulation, according to cus-
tom, not the slightest attention was subsequently paid." *

The Spaniards practised similar barbarities in their wars
at home. As late as August, 1834, General Rodil — ^who had
indeed learned his trade in the revolution in Chile — tissued
a proclamation condemning all Carlists and their abettors
to death; and Zumdlacarregui, the Carlist leader, answered
by ordering that all prisoners, of whatever grade, be executed.

It may weU be supposed, therefore, that Santa Anna
never anticipated the strong expression of horror and re-
sentment which was manifested m foreign nations at the
manner m which he waged war. The school in which he
was bred had taught, and the nation from which he was de-
scended was practising, the doctrine that the wholesale
slaughter of disarmed insurgents was the proper way to
suppress rebellion.

^ Bancroft, Mexico, IV, 324; and see Beltrami, Le Mexique, I, 346.
< Decree of April 10, 1813.
» Bancroft, Mexico, IV, 350.

* Ihid., 398. Other examples of the same disregard of pledges will be found
in Robinson, Mina^s ExpedUion, 177-188.

CHAPTER XIV

SAN JACINTO

The fall of the Alamo and Urrea's destruction of Grant's
small force had convinced Santa Anna — according to his
second in conunand — ^that the war was at an end, and when
Fannin's command was captm^; he felt that his presence
at the front was no longer needed, and that he might return
to Mexico to enjoy his triumph. His plan was to go him-
self by sea, and to send back a large part of the artillery and
wagon-train by land. He had previously, as we have seen,
sent off Gaona in one direction, and Ramirez y Sesma in
another, so that by the twenty-fifth of March his army was
divided into four parts, of approximately equal size, separated
from each other by several days' march, and liable to be
attacked and beaten in detail if the Texans possessed any
military force whatever. Filisola was much alarmed, as he
states, at this condition of things, and with the help of Colonel
Almonte of the staff, who had Santa Anna's confidence, was
able to induce the latter to rescind the order for the return
of the artillery and wagons to Mexico, and to take some
steps looking to the concentration of his scattered troops.^
What the Texan forces might still amount to, was, however,
a matter as to which the Mexican officers were entirely in
the dark.

Houston, as already stated, had attended the convention
at Washington on the Brazos long enough to sign the decla-
ration of mdependence, and have his appomtment as com-
mander-in-chief confirmed. He left Washington early on the
morning of Monday, the seventh of March, the day after the
Alamo had fallen. By the next Friday afternoon he was at
Gonzales, where he found three or four hundred men gath-

» Filiflola, Defensa, 10-12.
338

SAN JACINTO 339

ered together without organisation of any kind. A few
minutes after his arrival a report was received from Mexican
rancheros that the Alamo had fallen.

Whether the report was true or false, the obvious thing to
do was to concentrate the remaining Texan forces as soon
as possible; and Houston's first act was to send orders to
Fannin to blow up the presidio at GoUad, to throw his heavy
guns into the river, to fall back on Victoria, and to send
from there one-third of his force to Gonzales. Of Fannin's
fatal neglect to obey these orders, literally and promptly,
no more need be said.

The Alamo had been taken on the sixth of March, but it
was not until Monday, the fourteenth, that Houston received
tragic and convincing evidence of the fact. Mrs. Dickinson,
whose husband had been an officer of the garrison, arrived at
Gonzales with her child, escorted by two negroes — one a ser-
vant of Colonel Bowie's, the other a servant of Santa Anna's
aid, Colonel Almonte. Mrs. Dickinson and her child, with
two Mexican women and Colonel Bowie's servant had been
in the Alamo at the time of the assault, and as non-com*
batants their lives had been spared by the Mexicans.

Houston's retreat from Gonzales was inmiediately begun,
and begun in a panic. Clothing was destroyed; the two
pieces of artillery in possession of the Texans were thrown
into the river, and the wagons belonging to the troops were
turned over to the fleeing inhabitants for the removal of
their household goods. There was, if Houston had only
known it, no necessity whatever for this headlong haste and
destruction of valuable supplies; but much more serious
than the loss of property was the moral effect produced on
the people of Texas. The story of Houston's precipitate
retreat spread, with every circumstance exaggerated. Well-
founded fear of the Mexican soldiery urged the inhabitants
to abandon their homes; and from one end of the settle-
ments to another, men, women, and children fled frantically
toward the boundary, where the strong arm of the United
States was trusted to protect them. Men who might have
been with the army were carrying off their women and

340 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

chadren, and saving what they could of their movable prop-
erty. And in the rear, as weU as in all the front of Houston's
command; was an iminhabited zone; where abandoned or
burning dwellings and untended fields were almost the only
signs that the country had ever been occupied. The fact
was tragic enough to the participants at the time, but when
the danger was over it was treated as a joke. "The run-
away scrape" became the recognized name of this episode.

Starting from Gonzales a Uttle before midnight on the
fourteenth of March, Houston by the afternoon of the
seventeenth was encamped with about six hundred men at
Bumham's Crossing, on the Colorado, not far from the
present town of La Grange. On the same day General
Gaona, with his brigade, reached that river at Bastrop,
higher up, where he was delayed by floods; and from tlds
time forward he ceased to be a factor in the campaign.
Ramirez y Sesma at the same time was on the march for
San FeUpe, and was somewhere between Gonzales and
Columbus. Urrea had just reached Goliad, and Santa Aima,
with the rest of the army, was at B^xar, nearly a hundred
miles distant from any one of his three detachments.

After halting at Bumham's for two days, Houston crossed
the Colorado to the east bank, and marched down on that
side to Beason's Ferry, nearly opposite the site of the pres-
ent town of Columbus, where he remained for about a week,
drilling, organizmg, sending out appeals for men and sup-
pUes, and doing his best to allay the panic among the set-
tlers.

Meanwhile the Mexican advance, numbering about seven
hundred men under Ramirez y Sesma, had reached and
halted upon the opposite (right) bank of the Colorado ; but
as Houston had secured all the boats and the river was in
flood, they were unable to cross. On March 24, therefore,
Ramirez reported to Santa Anna, who was still at B^xar,
that the Texans were in front of him, twelve hundred strong; ^

^ These figures were, at that time, fairly accuratei as Houston received con-
siderable accessions while encamped on the Colorado. — (E. C. Barker, "The
San Jacinto Campaign/' in Tex, Hist. Quar,, IV, 244.)

SAN JACINTO 341

that untfl he was reinforced a crossing in the face of the
enemy was impracticable; and that when reinforcements
arrived he proposed crossing fifteen leagues or more further
down.^

This report came in time to confirm the arguments of
Filisola and Ahnonte as to the danger of dividing the army.
Concentration was at once attempted. Gaona was ordered
to march from Bastrop for San Felipe, Urrea was ordered to
proceed from Victoria in the same cUrection, and Ramfrez
was directed not to attempt to cross the Colorado unless
the Texans should retire, and was notified that six hundred
men had started from B^xar to reinforce him. But before
these orders reached Ramfrez, Houston had received the
news of Fannin's surrender, and had retreated once more,
abandoning the line of the Colorado and falling back to the
Brazos. Why he did so was never adequately explained.
On March 28, he reached San FeUpe, and on the next day
marched up the west bank of the Brazos River, leaving a
force of over one hundred men in San Felipe, and sending
another hundred down the river to -Fort Bend, near Rich-
mond.' That evening, March 29, after a difficult march
over muddy roads and in the midst of heavy rain, he en-
camped on Mill Creek, a tributary of the Brazos, quite un-
decided as to the future movements of his force. But by
the thirty-first he had placed himself in what he considered
a "secure and eflfective position" on the west bank of the
river at Groce's Ferry, some fifteen miles above San Felipe,
where he found and detained a steam-boat; and there he
remained for a fortnight.

Santa Anna himself had amved at the Colorado River on
April 5, where he found that Ramirez y Sesma was across
with a part of his force. Leaving Filisola to hasten the
movements of the rest of the army, Santa Anna set out with
the leading brigade for San Felipe, which he reached on the
morning of April 7. He found the place abandoned and in

> Filisola, II, 441.

' It is perhaps more accurate to say that these men refused to follow Hous-
ton's march up the river, which appeared then and appears now, an entire
waste of effort. See Tez. Hist. Quar., IV, 246.

342 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ruins — Shaving been burned either by the flying citizens or
by Houston's men. On the opposite (east) bank the de-
tachment of a hundred Texans or more were still on guard;
but the Brazos also was in flood; the Tpxans had secured all
the boatS; and Santa Anna was unable to cross. He had
no pontoonS; and to make boats or rafts capable of ferrying
over his men and guns would (he asserted) be the work of
ten or twelve days. According to his critics, it could have
been accomplished in three.

Santa Anna's impatient disposition could not endure a
delay. Although f^ola was not yet up, and nothing had
been heard of Gaona, who was supposed to be on the march
from Bastrop to San Felipe, Santa Anna judged Houston
to be in a desperate situation, and he therefore determined
to make, as he said, a reconnoissance for ten or twelve
leagues dovm the river. Why he went dovm the river when
he knew that Houston had gone up, is one of the mysteries
of this singular campaign.

Taking with him only a hundred men, Santa Anna started
southwesterly on April- 9 from San Felipe, then followed the
valley of the San Bernardo River for some distance, then
turned east, and on Monday, the eleventh, again reached
the banks of the Brazos, at Thompson's Ferry, at the " Old
Fort," or Orozimbo, some twenty miles below the modem
town of Richmond. Here he seized two or three boats,
which gave him the means of crossing the river, and sent
back for the troops that were encamped at San Felipe.
Ramirez y Sesma, with his men, joined him two days later.

At Thompson's Ferry Santa Aima was informed that
Burnet and Zavala — ^the President and Vice-President of
Texas — ^with other leaders of the insurrection, were at
Harrisburg, only twelve leagues (really about thirty miles)
away, and that they could easily be captured by a prompt
movement. As they had no niilitary guard, it would have
been quite sufficient to send a troop of cavalry to effect the
arrest of these ten or a dozen civilians; but Santa Anna,
probably for the sake of effect, decided to go himself at the
head of a considerable force.

SAN JACINTO 343

The day after Ramirez joined him, Thursday, April 14,
orders were sent to Urrea directing him to hurry forward and
occupy Brazoria, and to send small parties up and down the
west bank of the river.^ Cos, with five hundred men, was
detached from the main body and ordered to Velasco, at
the mouth of the Brazos, with orders to march thence along
the sea-shore toward Galveston Bay. By the same after-
noon Santa Anna himself crossed the river with about seven
hundred and fifty men, leaving Ramirez in command at
Thompson's Ferry, and also leaving sealed orders for Filisola,
who was then on his way from San Felipe. The commander-
in^hief was now more convinced thaTever that the insur-
rection was practically at an end. He had, indeed, some
apparent justification for his confidence. He had marched
two-thirds of the distance from the Rio Grande to the Sa-
bine; he had thus far overcome every obstacle; and he had
seen the only organized force of Texans constantly retreat-
ing before him.

The next evening, Friday, April 15, Santa Anna was in
Harrisburg, but found it in flames and deserted, the Presi-
dent and his cabinet having fled to Galveston. Santa Anna
thereupon decided to push on to eastern Texas, following
the road through Lynchburg, or Lynch's Ferry, over the
San Jacinto River, distant about fifteen miles.

On Saturday morning he sent his aid. Colonel Almonte,
with a small escort, to reconnoitre the ferry and the shores
of Galveston Bay as far as New Washington. Almonte,
who had been secretary of the Mexican legation to the
United States, and spoke English perfectly, reported the
next day that he had talked to a number of colonists, and
had learned that Houston was retreating to the Trinity
River by way of Lynchburg.*

Santa Anna believed that the time had now come to strike a
final blow, and to destroy the fiying and demoralized enemy.

' See tejct in Filisola, II, 447. Urrea received his orders on April 15.

> Santa Anna had written to Urrea on the thirteenth: "the so-called Gen.
Houston appears to be marching for the said point [Harrisburg] and has
about 600 or 800 men altogether, and is the only hope of the traitors." —
(Filisola, II, 448.)

344 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

" To cut off Houston from the ferry," he wrote in his official repqrt,
''and to destroy at one blow the armed force and the hopes of the
rebels, was too important to let the opportunity escape. It was my
intention to seize the Lynchburg Ferry before he came up, and avidl
myself of the advantages of the ground. My first step was limited to
reinforcing the detachment accompanying me, which consisted of
one piece of artillery, seven hundred infantry and fifty cavalry, so
as to make it as superior in numbers as it was in discipline; and I
ordered General Filisola to stop General Cos's movement on Velasco,
which my previous orders had directed, and to send forward promptly
five hundred picked men from the infantry to join me at the earliest
possible moment. . . . But as Colonel Almonte was at the port of
New Washington, on the shores of Galveston Bay, engaged with the
enemy's vessels, and as it was necessary at the same time to make
sure of the supply of provisions which he had managed to collect, I
made one day's march to that point, arriving in the afternoon of the
eighteenth." »

At New Washington (a hamlet of four or fiive houses) Santa
Anna, with his seven hundred and fifty men, remained from
Monday afternoon, the eighteenth of March, to Wednesday
morning, the twentieth. He had put himself in a very dan-
gerous position. He was at least thirty miles from the main
body of his army, and Houston, with a superior force, was
now virtually interposed between the two divisions. More-
over, the detaching of Gaona in one direction and of Urrea in
another had greatly diminished the numbers which Santa
Anna could in any event rely on, and an active and vigi-
lant commander on the Texan side might have successively
fought these fractions and beaten them in detail.

Houston, however, though vigilant, was far from active.
He had been most averse to stirring from his camp at
Groce's Ferry in search of adventures of any kind. His re-
sponsibility he felt to be extremely heavy — no less, indeed,
than the total loss of Texas ; and it is highly probable that,
with the ingrained distrust of the regular army oflBcer, he
doubted the capacity of his un-uniformed, imorganized, im-
disciplined, and undrilled volunteers to stand against an
army which he believed to be superior to his own, both in
equipment and in discipline. He did not, indeed, exagger-

' Santa Anna's ManifiesiOf G3.

SAN JACINTO 345

ate the Mexican numbers^ for his reports as to all the enemy's
movements proved to be^ in general, surprisingly accurate;
but his hesitations and misgivings were apparently due
solely to his sense of the enormous disaster that would fol-
low a defeat. He could not bring himself to stake aU his
fortunes on the result of a single battle.

Houston's citizen-soldiers were of a very different mind,
and were not at all disposed to be chary of advice or to re-
frain from criticism; but he kept his own counsels and re-
fused to be hurried into courses he did not approve. On
his arrival at the Brazos he wrote to the Secretary of War of
the grumblings of his men. '^ Many wished me to go below,
others above. I consulted none — I held no councils of war.
If I err, the blame is mine. . . . There was on yesterday,
as I imderstood, much discontent in the lines because I
would not fall down the river." * But a fortnight later he
reported that under the most disadvantageous circumstances
he had kept an army together "where there has not been
even murmuring or insubordination.'' * The revolutionary
government of Texas also kept up a fire of criticism, but he
contented himself with temperate and straightforward state-
ments of the difficulties of his position.

The silence of his men does not seem, however, to have
been due to acquiescence in Houston's policy, or to confi-
dence in his methods. On the contrary, it was rather the
silence of conspirators, for the project of a mutiny, and of
deposing him from command were seriously discussed.'

In spite of complaints and criticisms Houston, however,
held on doggedly to his position at Groce's Ferry for nearly
a fortnight, but at length, on Monday, the eleventh of April —
the day on which Santa Anna reached Thompson's Ferry,
lower down the river — ^he made up his mind that it was time
for him to move. He was in no hurry. Orders were sent
to all his parties along the river to join him at a designated
place, and on the Tuesday morning he began crossing in the

^ Houston to Rusk, March 29, 1836; Yoakum, II, 485.
« Houston to Thomas, April 13, 1836; ibid., 497.
» Tex, HUL Quar., IV, 249, 282, 302, 311, 331.

346 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

steam-boat he had seized — an operation which consumed two
days. Having got his whole force over, with the wagons
and horseS; he halted on the east bank of the river until all
the outlying parties had come up and he had received two
four-pounder guns — a gift from the people of Cincinnati.
And then on Saturday, the sixteenth of April, everything
being ready to his mind, he left the Brazos and began his
march to the east. It was the day after Santa Anna had
occupied Harrisburg.

What Houston's plans were, if indeed he had any definite
plans, he divulged to nobody; and when the eastward march
was begun the army were in doubt as to whether they were
not to fall back as far as Nacogdoches. About twenty miles
east of the Brazos the road forked. The left-hand branch
led to Nacogdoches, the right-hand branch to Harrisburg.

" All expected a scene at the forks of the road," one of the men
related afterward, " for it was generally agreed that if the commander-
in-chief did not order or permit the army to take the right hand road,
he was then and there to be deposed from its command. I do not
believe that General Houston gave any order whatever as to which
road should be followed, but when the head of the column reached
the forks of the road it took the right hand without being either bid
or forbid." *

But whether Houston led the army or the army led him,
it was at any rate generally believed that the time for re-
treating had passed, and that the troops were at last to be
allowed to have a fight. On Monday afternoon they reached
the Buffalo Bayou at a point opposite Harrisburg. There
they learned that Santa Anna had left the town that same
morning, marching toward New Washington, so that in-
stead of retreating they were now pursuing the enemy, and
were only a few hours behind him. The men were naturally
in the highest spirits.

Next day ''Deaf" Smith, one of Houston's excellent
scouts, who has since become the hero of many traditional
stories in Texas, was lucky enough to capture a certain

^ Tex. Hut. Qiutr.f IV, 302; another eye-witness has recorded the "loud and
joyous shouta" which greeted the turn to the right. — (Ibid., 313.)

SAN JACINTO 347

Captain Bachiller; bearing despatches from Pilisola, which
gave full information as to Santa Anna's movements.
Houston's hesitations were at last at an end; and early on
Tuesday morning he crossed Buffalo Bayou below Harris-
burg; leaving the baggage and the sick imder a camp guard.
Marching all night; the little army halted in some timber
on the shore of Buffalo BayoU; within half a mile of Lynches
Ferry.

The San Jacinto River, shallow and barely navigable by
small steam-boatS; runs in a southerly direction, and empties
into the northwesterly comer of Gdveston Bay. Just be-
fore its marshy shores widen out into the general expanse of
the bay, Buffalo BayoU; a narrow and comparatively deep
stream — on which stands the modern city of Houston —
comes in from the west; and at the junction was Lynch's
Ferry. The locality in spring-time had much natural beauty.
A lady who visited the country eight years later has left
an attractive picture of Buffalo Bayou as seen from the
river steam-boat :

"For a considerable distance from the mouth, the shores are low,
flat and swampy, but as the stream narrowed there were high banks
and the trees were quite beautiful. . . . Such magnolias — eighty feet
in height, and with a girth like huge forest trees — ^what must they
be when in full blossom! There were also a great number and va-
riety of evergreens, laurel, bay, and firs, rhododendrons, cistus and
arbutus. It seemed one vast shrubbery; the trees and shrubs grew
to a prodigious height, and often met over the steamer, as she wound
through the short reaches of this most lovely stream." ^

Here, then, amid the rhododendrons, with laurel and bay
at hand for the victors, Houston and his men awaited the
advancing troops of Santa Anna. About the middle of the
day, on Wednesday, the twentieth of April, the whole Mexican
force had drawn within rifle-shot, and skirmishing began
and continued without result during the afternoon — Santa
Anna having fallen back some nine hundred yards to a
slight rise in the ground, where he encamped. This, he
wrote, afforded an advantageous position, "with water in

^ Mrs. Houston, Tex<i8 and the OvJtf of Mexico^ II, 181.

348 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the rear, a thick wood on the right down to the banks of the
San JacintO; a broad plain on the left; and open ground in
front." ^ It was not quite open, for there were some clumps
of trees; but in the main there was a level prairie in front
and on his left.

During the night he occupied himself in strengthening his
position. A sort of breastwork made by piling up the packs
and baggage secured the more or less exposed left of the
line, which was further strengthened by the one gun which
Santa Anna had brought with him and by the whole of his
cavalry.

Houston had stood pretty much on the defensive all day
Wednesday, and he did not ventiu^ a night attack — a course
for which he was afterward severely criticised; and indeed
it is hard to understand why, with a superiority, or at least
an equality in numbers, he should have delayed his attack
when he was aware that within a few hours the Mexicans
must certainly receive considerable reinforcements. At
nine o'clock on Thursday morning General Cos arrived, after
a rapid march from the Brazos. He had started with five
hundred men, according to orders; but he only brought
four hundred with him into camp, the rest having been left
near Harrisburg as an escort for the supply-train.

Houston still held his ground, very likely expecting that
he would be attacked; but at half past three in the after-
noon, no attack having been made, he ordered his men to
be paraded, having, as he reported, ordered a bridge about
eight miles off, on the only road leading to the river Brazos,
to be destroyed.^ Protected by the woods along Buffalo
Bayou, the Texans were mustered without attracting the
enemy's attention, and when all was ready moved quietly
forward xmtil they emerged from the wood, and then made
a rush for the Mexican line.

' Santa Anna's Manifiesto, 64. A swamp behind and a wood close by, af-
fording cover for the enemy's active scouts, would probably not have be«i
considered an advantageous position by most commanding officers.

' ''Deaf'' Smith burned this bridge which crossed Vince's Creek, a tribu-
tary of Buffalo Bayou. There was some controversy afterward as to whether
Houston ordered it destroyed or whether Smith did so on his own responsi-
bility.

SAN JACINTO 349

"Our cavalry," to quote from Houston's official report, "was first
despatched to the front of the enemy's left, for the purpose of at-
tracting their notice, while an extensive island of timber afforded us
an opportunity of concentrating our forces and deploying from that
point, agreeably to the previous design of the troops. Every evolu-
tion was performed with alacrity, the whole advancing rapidly ii
line, through an open prairie without any protection whatever for
our men." *

The Mexican camp was entirely unguarded. Apparently
every ordinary precaution had been neglected. The horses
were xinsaddled, the men were cooking or eating, and Santa
Anna himself was taking a siesta. Before the Mexican line
could be formed the Texans were upon them. "The
enemy," reported Santa Anna, " continued their rapid charge
with tremendous shouts {''descompasados gritos^'), and
in a few minutes gained such a victory as could not have
been imagined." ^ Santa Anna, however, did not choose to
relate what these shouts were. The Texans, as they came
over the breastwork, were yelling at the top of their voices :
^^ Remember Goliad !'' ^^ Remember Tampico!^^ '^Remember
the Alamo !^^

The action, if that may be so called which was nothing
but a fierce rush by the Texans and a headlong flight by
the Mexicans, was very quickly over.

"The conflict in the breastwork," to quote Houston's report again,
"lasted but a few moments; many of the troops encountered hand
to hand, and, not having the advantage of bayonets on our side, our
riflemen used their pieces as war-clubs, breaking many of them off at
the breech. The rout commenced at half past four and the pursuit
by the main army continued until twilight." •

" Such slaughter on one side, and such almost miraculous
preservation on the other," wrote another participant in the
battle on the day after the event, "have never been heard
of since the invention of gunpowder." *

» Houston to the President of Texas, April 25, 1836; Yoakum, 11, 600.
' Santa Anna to the Secretary of War, March 11, 1837; in his Manifiesto, 67.
•Yoakum, II, 501.
* Letter of Capt. Tarlton, April 22, 1836; Kennedy, II, 228.

350 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The aspect of the field of battle on the following morning
told the story. Along the front of the Mexican position
lay the bodies of General Castrillon and several other officers
and some fifty soldiers. In the wood on the Mexican right
and about the camp there were some additional bodies,
making perhaps a hundred dead in all. On the left of the
position over the prairie, "as far," says a Mexican eye-wit-
ness, "as the eye could reach, I observed to right and left
two lines of corpses — all our men." But the chief scene of
destruction was in the rear of the camp, where a gully led
down toward the lagoon and marsh which, in Santa Anna's
opinion, made his position so advantageous. "There were
an infinite number of dead," says the same witness, "piled
one upon the other, till they might have served as a bridge." ^
The unfortunate fugitives had tumbled headlong into the
water and mud, and had been shot like rabbits.

Houston officially reported the Mexican loss as six hun-
dred and thirty killed, two hundred and eight wounded, and
seven hundred and thirty prisoners,^ against a Texan loss
of two killed and twenty-three wounded. The destruction
of Vince's Bridge had served to cut oflf the retreat of many
; fugitives, and, in fact, not more than about forty of Santa
{ /^Anna's entire force ultimately escaped. It is amusing to
'/ note that in the lists of Mexican killed, wounded, and cap-
1 tured there were three generals and twenty-one colonels or
u Ueutenant-colonels, for a force of eleven hundred and fifty
\ men.'

The completeness and rapidity of this victory inevitably
recalled the exploits of Cortes against the ancestors of the
same poor docUe Indians who formed the rank and ffle of
Santa Anna's army. The reasons why these swift and
sweeping victories were possible were the same in both cases.

* Caro, Yerdadera Idta^ 44.

* Yoakum, 11, 501. The figures of the Mexican loss are certainly exag-
gerated, for Santa Anna had not more than eleven hundred and fifty men in
all. Houston's report as to the number of his prisoners is very likely exact,
the error consisting in an overestimate of those who were killed in a pursuit
which extended about eight miles, namely, to Vince's Bridge.

' General Cos, who had in effect violated his parole, was one of the pris-
oners. For details as to his capture, see Brown, II, 41.

SAN JACINTO 351

The Mexican Indian had never been a fighting man. He
could be cruel and blood-thirsty when roused. His endu-
ranee and patience made him admirable in marching under
adverse conditions; and his Spanish officers could lead him or
drive him into battle, or even hold him steady under severe
fire. But he never learned to shoot straight, and he never
learned to withstand a determined rush by men of the war-
like races either of Europe or America. He feared and ran
from the Apache, just as he fled from the Spaniard, or as he
fled from the descendants of Germans and Irish and Eng-
lish when they came roaring over the breastwork at San
Jacinto and knocked him on the head with their clubbed
rifles. He could not fight for himself any more than he
could colonize or govern. He never did either if he could
help it; and he was perfectly willing, as a rule, to leave these
uncongenial duties to the descendants of his Spanish masters^
It was only here and there that an exceptional man like\ ,^^f
Guerrero served to make more conspicuous the weakness/^
and inefficiency of his race. /

The morning after the battle, when the heat of the pur-
suit had died away and the full measiu'e of their triumph
had become so apparent to the Texans that their antipathy
to the Mexicans had turned into pity, a party of men were
scouting over the prairie to pick up escaping Mexicans.
About eight or ten miles from the battle-field they saw the
head and shoulders of a man above the tall sedge grass.
When he caught sight of his pursuers he lay down, evi-
dently hoping to escape observation, but they galloped up
to him and ordered him to get up. As he lay still, one of
them said, "Boys, I'll make him move," levelling his gun
at the same time. "Don't shoot," said the others; and
getting down from his horse, one of them gave the prostrate
form a kick, saying : " Get up, damn you ! " The man slowly
rose and addressed his captors in Spanish, which one of
them spoke imperfectly. They understood him to say that
he was not an officer, and that he belonged to the cavalry.
He was roughly dressed, but wore a fine shirt and good
shoes. As he rode into camp behind one of the Texans^ the

352 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Mexican prisoners saluted, exclaiming, "-BZ presidente!^^ It
was Santa Anna.^

His captors took him at once to Houston, who was
wounded in the ankle, and was sitting under a tree. It was
manifest that Santa Anna's life, now he was recognized, was
in imminent danger; but Houston had enough control over
his men to protect the prisoner for the moment.

With a single eye to his own safety, Santa Anna at once
proposed to enter into negotiations for his liberation, upon
the basis of the recognition by Mexico of Texan indepen-
dence; but Houston declined to go into that business at all,
and said that all such matters must be referred to the Texan
government. He did, however, demand as a preliminary
that Santa Anna should send an order to his second in com-
mand, directing him to evacuate Texas; and Santa Anna,
without hesitation, dictated the following despatch, ad-
dressed to General Filisola: *

"Your Excellency:

" The small division under my immediate command having had an
unfortunate encounter yesterday afternoon, I find myself a prisoner
of war in the hands of the enemy, who have extended to me all pos-
sible consideration. Under these circumstances I recommend your
Excellency to order General Gaona to march back to B^jar and await
orders, as your Excellency will also do with the troops which are
under your immediate command; at the same time warning General
Urrea to retire with his division to Victoria; since I have agreed with
General Houston upon an armistice pending certain negotiations
which may put an end to the war forever." •

The touch about an armistice, added near the end of this
hasty and agitated letter, was xmtrue. No agreement of the
kind had been made.

But long before Filisola received this letter he had made

^ The various conflicting accounts of Santa Anna's capture are collected in
Tex. Hist, Quar., V, 92-95.

* The private secretary's account of the circumstances attending the prep-
aration of this paper will be found in Caro, Verdadera Idea^ 44 et seq,

* The correct Spanish text is given in Santa Anna's ManifiestOf 87, and in
Filisola, II, 481, with one important misprint — camunicacumes for conn*
deraciones, A fac-simile of the original duplicate of the order is in Yoakum,
II, 148; but the English translation there given is inaccurate.

SAN JACINTO 353

up his mind to retire from the position he was holding at
Thompson's Ferry. The news of the disaster at San Jacinto
reached him on Saturday, two days after the battle, through
Colonel Garcia, who commanded the escort of a hundred
men which Cos had left with his supply-train near Harris-
burg. Garcla's report was that Santa Anna was either dead
or a prisoner, and that while reports of the Texan strength
varied, some of the prisoners put it as high as twenty-five
hundred men.

At this time the line of the Brazos River was held by three
detachments of Mexican troops. Urrea was at Brazoria
with the main part of his force, not quite a thousand in num-
ber. At Columbia, about eight miles farther up, he had
about two hundred men more, under Colonel Salas. Fili-
sola himself was at the Old Fort, about thirty miles above
Columbia, with some foiuteen hundred men, made up of
the remnants of the brigades of Ramirez and Tolsa, and of
the detachment under Gaona, who had finally joined the
main body after xmexplained delays. Not only was the
army thus divided, but the position at the Old Fort was, in
Filisola's opinion, a very weak one. His first move, there-
fore, was to concentrate all the troops within reach, for
which purpose he ordered Urrea and Salas to march at once
to Mrs. Powell's farm, which was situated in an open prairie,
about twelve miles (five leagues) west of the river, and equi-
distant from the Old Fort and Columbia.

On Sunday, the twenty-fifth, the concentration was com-
pleted, the entire force amoxmting, accordiflg to the ofl&cial
returns, to twenty-five hundred and seventy-three men. In
addition, there was a garrison of a thousand men at B6xar,
and small detachments at Copano, Goliad, Matagorda, and
other points; so that the total Mexican force in Texas at
this time was ofl&cially given at four thousand and seventy-
eight.^ This showed a loss of over thirty per cent since the
opening of the campaign. Moreover, the condition of the
troops and their equipment, according to the usually pessi-
mistic Filisola, was very bad. The men's clothes were in

» Filisola, II, 475.

354 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

rags; they had no shoes, and no shelter; there were no sur-
geons and no medical stores; and if they were wounded or
fell ill they could have no spiritual help, since there was not
a priest to say mass. There were inmiense numbers of
women following the army, besides teamsters and muleteers,
so that the number of persons to be fed was double the fight-
ing force. The niunber of mules was excessive, and both
horses and mules were in wretched condition. But what was
worst of all was the lack of provisions. Since they had left
Monclova the army had been on short allowance, for the
inhabitants had fled, and this cotton-growing country was a
desert, and there was little prospect of getting any supply
by water.^

Strategic conditions could only be guessed at. It was
then quite unknown to the Mexican officers what Houston's
force had been at the time of the battle, what losses he had
sustained, and what reinforcements he might receive. It
was fifty miles in a straight line from Mrs. Powell's to the
San Jacinto, with a large river, the Brazos, to be crossed on
the way. If the army ever got to the scene of the late bat-
tle, there was no certainty that they would find the Texans.

"The state of the enemy," writes Filisola, "was very different. He
was in his own country. He was in possession of three steamboats
and several small schooners, with which he could make raids with
impunity, from Galveston or Culebra Island,* up the rivers on our
right flank or rear and could also put in peril our detachments at
Copano, Goliad and Matagorda." *

Filisola, therefore, summoned a council of war the mo-
ment he reached Mrs. Powell's, and the conclusion was
reached to continue the retreat at least beyond the CJolo-
rado.* All this time nothing had been heard of Santa Anna.

» Filisola to Secretary of War, May 14, 1836; Defensa, 46-56.

* In Matagorda Bay. * Filisola, II, 478.

* This was Filisola's report to the War Department at the time. — (D^enmig
50.) Subsequently Urrea announced loudly that he had opposed the retreat
from the Brazos River and had favored an advance. Filisola asserted that
all Urrea had then said was that he was sorry the army had to retreat, but had
full confidence in the experience and skill of the second in command; and

SAN JACINTf 355

On Tuesday, the twenty-seventh of March, the whole force
started for Victoria, on the Guadalupe River. For a week
Filisola struggled on in the midst of torrents of rain — the
soil turning to liquid mud in which his mules sank up to
their packs, the road strewn with men, guns, ammunition,
and provisions — ^imtil at length, on the second of May, he
reached the Colorado.^ I

It was only on the twent)|-eighth of April, during this
miserable march, that Filisola was overtaken by Santa Anna's
orders. The answer Filisola sent was intended for Houston's
reading. He reported that he had concentrated his forces as
soon as he had heard of the battle of San Jacinto, and had
retired from the Brazos so as to be better able to take the
initiative against the enemy; but that in view of Santa
Anna's letter, and the circumstances therein disclosed, and
of his (Filisola's) desire to give a proof of his affection for
the commander-in-chief and the other prisoners, he had de-
termined to cross the Colorado and cease hostilities in spite
of his responsibility to the government; but that he must
be assured that all the prisoners were treated with entire
respect. And he added that the prisoners he held (being
chiefly those spared at Goliad) were well cared for.

Three days after crossing the Colorado Filisola received
further orders from Santa Anna directing him to withdraw
to Monterey, leaving in all Texas only four hundred men, at
B6xar, with a couple of guns, to protect the sick and woxmded.
Filisola then fell back as far as Goliad, where he halted for
several days before resuming his march for the Rio Grande ;
but in the middle of June he was superseded, under orders
from Mexico, by General Urrea.

Meantime, even B6xar was being evacuated. On the
twenty-fourth of May the Mexican troops marched out, after
setting fire to the Alamo. The church, being of solid masonry,
would not bum, but the old convent was almost completely
destroyed. "All the single walls were levelled, the fosse

Filisola called the other officers who were present, Gaona, Sesma, Tolsa, Woll,
and Ampudia, to witness. — (Defensa^ 25, 34.)

^ Filisola (Defensa, 50-54) gives a most graphic account of this march.

356 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

filled up, and the pickets torn up and burned. All the artil-
lery and ammunition that could not be carried off were
thrown in the river." ^ Ten or fifteen years afterward it
was diflScult to trace the outlines of the walls and ditch ; but
the church was restored, to remain a venerated relic for
many future generations.

While the remnants of the Mexican army were thus with-
drawing beyond the Rio Grande Santa Anna was busy
negotiating with the Texans. President Burnet had arrived
from Galveston at the San Jacinto battlefield on the steamer
Yellowstone on the fifth of May, 1836, two weeks after the
battle, and he took up the discussion, Houston leaving
shortly afterward to go to New Orleans for surgical treat-
ment.*

The first diflSculty the Texan officials had to contend with
was the very natural feeling in the army and throughout
the coxmtry that the massacres at the Alamo and at Goliad
ought not to go unpimished.

" What will my countrymen do/' wrote one Texan when he heard
of Santa Anna's capture, "in the way of reprisal for outrages com-
mitted by this monster? What ought they to do? . . . What does
not the killing of Grant and his men, taken by surprise and unable to
fight, and the wanton murder of King and his dozen, after they could
fight no longer, and that worst of outrageous atrocities, the massacre
at Goliad, in violation of pledged faith and solemn stipulation, de-
serve? I will not say retaliation, but a just vengeance on the author
of these enormities." »

This feeling was not confined to private individuals, but
was shared by some of President Burnet's immediate en-
tourage. Two of his cabinet — Lamar and Potter — ^were
strongly opposed to the idea of showing any leniency.
They beUeved that Santa Anna should be treated as a
murderer, and they urged that he be brought before a
court-martial and shot.*

^Reminiscences of Dr. Bernard (an eye-witness), in Comp. Hist., I, 634.

• He left Galveston on the eleventh, and reached New Orleans, on the Flora,
May 22, 1836.— (Tex. Hist, Qiiar., XII, 251.)

* Reminiscences of Dr. Bernard, May 6, 1836; Comp, Hist,, I, 631.
*See Lamar's views, at some length, in Brown, II, 56-61,

SAN JACINTO 357

General Cos also was the object of great hostility. He
had been released at B6xar in the previous December, on a
promise which was, in effect, that he would not bear arms
again against Texas, and he might be justly considered in
the light of one who had deUberately broken his parole.^

Nevertheless the Texan government, with commendable
self-restraint and a wise regard for the opinion of other
coxmtries, ultimately decided that both Santa Anna and Cos,
as well as the rest of the prisoners, must be treated with
every consideration. On the fifth of May it was thought
best to remove the chief prisoners to Galveston, probably
because there was a doubt as to their safety in the midst of
the army; but Galveston offered no accommodations, and
accordingly Santa Anna and the Texan Cabinet sailed ami-
cably together to Velasco. On the fourteenth of May, 1836,
shortly after arriving at Velasco, Santa Anna and Burnet
signed two "treaties" — one public and the other secret —
which the Texan authorities hoped would result in securing
their independence.^

By the public treaty Santa Anna agreed that he would
not take up arms himself, nor exercise his influence to cause
them to be taken up, against the people of Texas "during
the present war of independence"; that all hostilities should
cease; that the Mexican troops should evacuate Texas,
going beyond the Rio Grande; and that all private property,
"including horses, cattle, negro slaves or indentured per-
sons" {"gente contratada^^), captured by or who had taken
refuge with the Mexican army, should be restored. It was
further stipulated that there should be an exchange of pris-
oners, the surplus remaining in the hands of the Texans to
be kindly treated, and that Santa Anna should be sent back
to Vera Cruz.

In the secret treaty Santa Anna further promised to ar-

>The Mexican authorities were very anxious in regard to Santa Anna.
Reiterated orders were sent to Filisola by the War Office to do his utmost to
secure the President's liberation, and to do nothing to endanger his life. — (Fih-
sola, II, 499, 501, 506.)

* The English text of these treaties will be found in Yoakum, II, 526, and
elsewhere. The Spanish text is in Santa Anna's ManifiestOf 94-^6.

358 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

range matters with the Mexican Cabinet so that a Texan
mission would be received, Texan independence acknowl-
edged, and the boundaries between Mexico and Texas es-
tablished, "the territory of the latter not to go beyond the
Rio Bravo del Norte." It was also declared that, as Santa
Anna's return to Mexico was "indispensable for effecting
his solenm engagements," the government of Texas would
provide for his immediate embarkation for Vera Cruz.

Whether Santa Anna could have brought about peace on
the terms proposed, if he had tried to do so, must remain
the merest conjecture, for he never did try. In fact, ac-
cording to his own published statement, he never meant to
try, and all his written and verbal assurances were part of
an elaborate and successful effort on his part to save his
life and secure his liberty by throwing dust in the eyes of
the Texans.^

The Mexican authorities seem to have anticipated some
attempt at treachery on his part, for on May 20, 1836, the
moment Santa Anna's capture was known in the capital.
Congress passed a law directing the government to take
measures to "excite the patriotism" of the people, to recruit
the army, and to secure the liberty of the President; but in
doing so they were to pay no attention to " any stipulations
with the enemy which the President while imprisoned has
made or may make, which stipulations shall be regarded as
null, void and of no eflfect." *

The Mexican authorities also lost no time in bringing this
action officially to the attention of the government of the
United States. On July 9, 1836, the Mexican minister in'
Washington wrote officially to the Secretary of State, to give
notice that no agreements made by Santa Anna would be
regarded as binding upon his government."

In spite of the treaties, his life at this moment was still
in very serious danger. He had embarked on the Texan
schooner Invincible, to sail for Vera Cruz, and had written

^ Santa Anna's ManifiestOf 29-42.

* Dublan y Lozano, III, 162.

* Gorostiza to Forsyth, July 9, 1S36; Sen. Doc. 1, 24 Cong., 2 seas., 36.

SAN JACINTO 359

and published a farewell to the Texan army,^ when the
steamship Ocean, with two hundred and fifty American vol-
unteers on board, very inopportxmely arrived at Velasco.
These warriors were not at aU satisfied with the arrange-
ments which had been made by the government, and they
forbade the sailing of the Invincible. In this they were sup-
ported by many of those already in Texas who had pre-
viously demanded Santa Anna's execution. The govern-
ment was too weak to prevent Santa Anna's being seized
and carried ashore, but after a great deal of effort it man-
aged to prevent his being shot. The favorite plan was to
carry him off to Goliad and execute him there; but Austin,
who returned to Texas about the first of July, and Houston,
who returned late in the same month, were active and ear-
nest in protesting against this policy of retaliation.

At Austin's suggestion Santa Anna, on July 4, wrote a
letter to President Jackson, enclosing copies of the two
treaties, and begging him to use his influence to have them
carried out, and to aid in putting Texas in a strong and in-
dependent position.* Jackson replied on September 4, from
his home in Tennessee, to the effect that the government
of the United States would always gladly do all it could "to
restore peace between contending nations or remove the
causes of misunderstandilig " ; that it never could interfere
with the policy of other powers, and that in this case the
United States was forbidden from considering the treaties
to which Santa Anna referred by reason of the notification
made by the Mexican government.

"Under these circumstances," continued the writer, "it will be
manifest to you that good faith to Mexico, as well as the general
principle to which I have adverted as forming the basis of our inter-

^ This strange document was as follows:

"My friends! I know that you are valiant in war and generous after it;
rely always on my friendship and you will never regret the consideration you
have shown me. Upon my returning to the land of my birth, thanks to your
kindness, accept this sincere farewell from yoiu: grateful

Antonio Lopez db Santa Anna.

Vblasco, June 1, 1836."

* See Spanish text in Santa Anna's Manifiutoi 102; English translation in
Sen. Doc. 84, 24 Cong., 2 sees., 3.

360 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

course with all foreign powers, make it impossible for me to take
any steps like that you have anticipated. If, however, Mexico should
signify her willingness to avail herself of our good offices in bringing
about the desirable result you have described, nothing could give me
more pleasure than to devote my best services to it." *

This rather cool reply was not of itself particularly useful
to Santa Anna; but the fact that he was in correspondence
with General Jackson^ and was asking him to join in secur-
ing the independence of Texas, was a fact which was made
known at once, and which doubtless had a great influence
in calming the public mind. Nevertheless, the unfortunate
prisoner during all that summer was carried about from
place to place, put in irons on one occasion, and otherwise
ill-treated; but time was on his side, and the intercession
of the most influential men in Texas finally prevailed. On
the twenty-fifth of November he sailed from Texas, not for •
Vera Cruz, but for New Orleans, accompanied by his faith-
ful friend Colonel Almonte.

Travelling slowly up the Mississippi and Ohio, and in a
private carriage from Wheeling, they reached Washington
in January, 1837, when Santa Anna called upon Jackson,
then in very feeble health, and had \ confidential interview*
with him. What passed between them was not important.
Santa Anna says they had very little conversation, that the
subject of their exchange of letters was touched on, and that
Jackson said he had sent copies to Gorostiza, the Mexican
minister in Washington.^ In an undated memorandimi
Jackson, on his part, wrote that Santa Anna had proposed a
cession of Texas to the United States "for a fair considera-
tion." To this rather belated proposal Jackson appears to
have replied, first, that the United States could not act in
the matter without knowing the disposition of the Texans;
second, that until the independence of Texas was acknowl-
edged (a matter then imder consideration by Congress) the
United States could not "hold any correspondence with her

^ Sen. Doc. 84, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 5.

* Santa Anna's ManifieatOy 77. These copies were handed to G^rMtiia %r
Sept. 23, 1836.— (Sen. Doc. 1, 24 Cong., 2 eess., 84.)

SAN JACINTO 361

as a nation"; third; that until MexicO; through the regular
diplomatic channels; was ready to make some proposition
" we cannot speak to Texas" ; and, fourth, that if it suited
Mexico to cede Texas and Northern California to the United
StateS; this might be made the means of securing permanent
tranquillity; "which has been like to have been interrupted
by the civil war in Texas." ^

Santa Anna spent six days in Washington without accom-
plishing anything further. The government offered him a
passage to Vera Cruz, and he was landed at his native city
about the first of March, 1837. He returned at once to
Manga de Clavo, which he had left over fifteen months
before, and busied himself in writing a long report to the
Secretary of War, and a tortuous and impassioned manifesto
to the people of Mexico, in which he defended his course at
the battle of San Jacinto and after.

^ Jackson MSS,, in Library of Congress. See Amer. HUt, Review, XII, 808.
Jackson told the Texan agents in Washington, on Feb. 1, 1837, "that he had
conversed freely with Santa Anna in regard to extending the present open
Southwestern line so as to include Texas and that their views and wishes were
in entire accordance." — (Wharton to Austin, Feb. 2, 1837; Tex, Dip, Can.,
1,180.)

CHAPTER XV

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS

Until the latter part of the year 1835 the development
of Texas excited very little general interest among the
people of the United States. Texas and Mexico were far
away, and conamunications were irregular and extremely
slow. There were many other matters at home to claim
popular attention. During the greater part of Jackson's
administration Congress and the people were discussing
the removal of the Indians from Alabama and Georgia,
the President's disputes with the federal judiciary, the
tariff, nullification, and the removal of the deposite from
the Bank of the United States. If they turned to foreign
affairs, the controversies with Great Britain over the West
India trade, and with France over the spoliation claims,
were all that seemed important.

In the press, the allusions to Texas were few and widely
scattered, except, of course, for the passing interest excited
in the sunmier of 1829, when it was reported that the pur-
chase of Texas was imminent. In Congress, the word Texas
seems not to have been pronounced for sixteen years — ^that
is, from the period of the debates over the Florida treaty
(about 1820) until the spring of 1836.^

Before 1836 there certainly was no such thing as a definite
public opinion on the subject of Texas. The few men in
the United States who knew anything at all about it be-
lieved that Mexico would not be able to govern Texas much
longer; and most of them believed that the acquisition of

^ There is only one allusion to Texas in the diary of John Quincy Adams
between 1827, when he was negotiating for its purchase, and the spring of
1836. This was in January, 1832, when he had a friendly conversation with
Senator Johnston, of Louisiana, as to the merits of the Florida treaty, and
the possibility of bu3ring Texas. — {Memoirs, VIII, 464.)

362

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 363

Texas would be of benefit to the United States, and to the
Southern states more particularly. But after the autumn
of 1835 conditions were totally changed. The subject of
Texas then became one of great and general interest, and in
considering the attitude of the government and the people
of the United States it is necessary to draw a veiy sharp and
clear distinction between public opinion before that time
and public opinion after that time.

It can hardly be too strongly asserted that the people of
the United States in general, before the middle of the year
1835, knew little and cared nothing about Texas. And
there is no evidence whatever to show that there was then
any combination, or conspiracy, or organized movement of
any kind, or in any part of the country, which was intended
to affect the relations that existed between Mexico and the
inhabitants of her Texan possessions.

The very earliest organized attempt to create favorable
public sentiment in the United States seems to have been
the meeting held on July 14, 1835, at New Orleans — the
port through which nine-tenths of the foreign commerce of
Texas passed. News had just been received of events in
Texas down to June 20, 1835, when the destruction of the
state government and the imprisonment of Governor Viesca
were causing heated discussion in every Texan village. "A
numerous and respectable assemblage of citizens," as the
newspapers described it, was organized by the selection of
General Felix H. Huston, as chairman.

"The chair," said the reporter, "addressed the meeting in a spirited
and elegant harangue, describing in a manner exceedingly touching
the wrongs and sufferings of the people of Texas, and exhibiting the
necessity of immediate action on the part of friends of civil and re-
ligious freedom in their behalf; after which General H. S. Foote . . .
submitted the following resolutions, and accompanied them with
elegant and appropriate remarks."

And then follow long and high-flown resolutions of sjmapa-
thy.^

» Tex. Hist. Quar,, IV, 145.

364 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Another similar meeting was held at the same place on
October 13, 1835, when resolutions were adopted not only
expressing the warmest sympathy for the Texans, but prom-
ising them every assistance which the neutrality laws of the
United States would permit, and appointing a committee
to receive donations and expend them in such a manner as
might be deemed most expedient for the cause. Within a
week the committee had raised seven thousand dollars, and
forwarded to Texas the two companies of New Orleans
Grays to whom reference has been already made. Other
Southern states nearest the scene of action followed rapidly
with arms and men. A company from Mississippi waa de-
spatched. A Kentucky company was organized in Novem-
ber, 1835, and of its adventiu^s, up to the time of its sur-
render with Fannin a detailed account has been preserved.*
Two Georgia companies were raised at about the same time,
who also surrendered with Fannin, and their movements
have been related by a survivor.^

As the news from Texas became more and more warlike,
meeting after meeting was held throughout the Union — ^at
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Baltimore,
and Washington. Men and money and supplies were lib-
erally contributed. The American people from Maine to
Louisiana, with hardly a dissenting voice,4oudly expressed
their sympathy with their Texan neighbors, who were not
only of the same blood and the same speech with them-
selves, but who also appeared to be struggling for a laiger
autonomy and for religious liberty, and to be upholding the
essential principles of ordered freedom against cruel and
treacherous enemies.' In Webster's words, it was "no more
than natural that the sympathies of all classes of our citizens
should be excited in favor of a war, founded in the desire
and sanctified by the name, of liberty," * and this natural

1 William Comer, "John Crittenden Duval," in Tex. HisL Quar., I, 47-67.

« Baker, 244-250.

' ''Our cause is that of Liberty, Religious toleration and Freedom of Con*
science against Usurpation, Despotism and the Unnatural and Unholy Mo-
nopolies of the Church of Rome." — (Texan Commissioners to Owings; Tex.
Dip. Can., I, 60.)

* Debate on recognition of Texas, May 9, 1836.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 365

sympathy, as a matter of course, was greatly increased by
the blood-thirsty conduct of the Mexican government and
its officers in the field.

Austin and his associates reached New Orleans the first
week in January, 1836, and were surprised at the depth and
extent of the public interest. But their coming still further
stimulated the enthusiasm of the American people. At
New Orleans they were able to borrow substantial sums for
their government.^ From New Orleans they went to Nash-
ville, Louisville, and Cincinnati, where they addressed large
meetings and noted "the universal and enthusiastic i^r-
est which pervades all ranks and classes of society in every
part of this country in favor of the emancipation of Texas." *
In Washington, which they reached about the first of
April, they " received the most marked attention " — of course
unofficially. And from there Austin and Wharton went to
New York, and Archer to Richmond. Wherever they went,
these missionaries foimd large and friendly audiences, and
reaped abundant harvests of men and money.

Before the end of February, 1836, himdreds of men from
Louisiana, Georgia, Kentuclqr, Tennessee, Mississippi, and
Alabama had reached Texas. Provisions, arms, and money
were for months quite openly sent from New Orleans; and
as Mexico had no naval force to control the Gulf, the trade
in contraband of war went on without the least hinderance.

The Texan colonists," said the Mexican Foreign Minister,

have obtained and do daily obtain from New Orleans, sup-
plies of every kind, in pn>,«ons, in arms «nd mumtions S
war, in money, in men who are openly enlisted in that city,
and who leave there under arms to make war against a
friendly nation, and by their mere presence to render more
difficult the peaceable solution of a purely domestic ques-
tion." ' The movements of these volunteers were, of course,

^ Details as to these loans will be found in E. C. Barker's "Finances of the
Texas Revolution," Pol. Sci. Quar., XIX, 612-635. The instructions to the
commissioners authorizing them to contract loans, purchase naval vessels,
procure arms, etc., are printed in Tex. Dip. Corr.f I, 52.

« Tex. Dip. Can., I, 66, 93.

s Monasterio to Forsyth, Nov. 19, 1835; H. R. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 seas., 8.

366 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

facilitated by the total inability of Mexico to patrol its
coast or to guard its land frontier.

The great majority of those who volunteered for the war
in Texas came from the Southern states, but adventurous
spirits from the North were not wanting.^ Thus Doctor J.
H. Bernard, of Chicago, with two friends, started for Texas
in the early part of December, 1835. At Peoria they were
joined by several others, and the whole party went on to
St. Louis to take a steamboat for New Orleans. At St.
Louis they "found several passengers aboard for Texas."
Early in January they reached New Orleans, where the
taking of B^xar and the death of Milam had already been
dramatized, and waa being acted with great app W.«

Another case of a Northern man, who, however, was a
resident of the South, was that of John A. Quitman. He
was bom at Rhinebeck, on the Hudson River, the son of a
German immigrant who was pastor of the Lutheran Church.*
When he was twenty-one years old Quitman started for the
great West to make his fortune. The great West in 1819
meant the state of Ohio. There he was admitted to the
bar, but soon after went down the Mississippi and took up
his residence at the frontier town of Natchez, becoming ulti-
mately a very great personage in his state.

In October, 1835, the question of Texas first began to in-
terest him, as it interested thousands of others in the Missis-
sippi valley. "There is war in Texas," he wrote to his
brother. "Were I without family I would repair there
immediately. Freemen who are struggling for their vio-
lated rights should not be left to struggle unaided.'' * Five
months later, the news of the fall of the Alamo stirred the
hearts of the people of the United States. The dramatic
completeness of the event — Travis's appeals for help "to
the People of Texas and all Americans in the world," his

^ As to the Southern volunteers, see James E. Winston, ''Kentucky and the
Independence of Texas," and ** Virginia and the Independence of Texas,"
S. W. Hist. Quar., XVI, 27-62, 277-283.

* Reminiscences of Dr. Bernard, Comp. Hist., I, 608.

•Smith's Hist, of Rhinebeck, 104. The Rev. Frederick Henry Quitman's
pastorate lasted thirty-two years, from 1798 to 1830.

« Claiborne's Life of QuUman, I, 139.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 367

simple but perfectly sincere declaration : " I shall never sur-
render or retreat," and the death of every man of his com-
mand in a contest against overwhelming odds — ^were well
calculated to arouse the enthusiasm of his American kins-
folk. Quitman, a successful and well-to-do lawyer of thirty-
eight, could no longer resist the appeal; and he was but one
of hundreds throughout the country.

The interesting details of his adventures are preserved in
his letters, written from day to day. He raised a company
and set out from Natchez on the fifth of April, acclaimed by
the whole city. Steaming down the Mississippi and up the
Red River, he and his fellow "emigrants" were at Natchi-
toches two days after they started. They made a slight
detour to avoid the United States troops at Fort Jesup,
though Quitman believed the officers sympathized with
him. As soon as they were across the Sabine, a military
organization was formally adopted, and the company
marched rapidly for the front, and met the panic-stricken
colonists flying before the Mexican advance. Pushing for-
ward afi fast as possible, Quitman and his men at last joined
Houston on the field of San Jacinto — ^two days after the
battle.^

The Mexican legation in Washington of course protested
against all such proceedings, but their communications were
rather remarkable for vehemence and emphasis than for a
clear apprehension of the facts or for a knowledge of the re-
quirements of American law. The Mexican representatives
in Washington had not usually been men of first-rate abil-
ities. From June, 1831, when General Tomel (afterward
Santa Anna's Secretary of War) ceased to be minister to the
United States, a period of nearly five years elapsed during
which Mexico was represented by a successioh of charges
d'aflfaires, and it was not until the beginning of the year
1836 that Santa Anna's administration awoke to the im-
portance of being represented by one of their foremost
citizens. The condition of affairs at that time was evi-
dently critical. The summary execution of a number of

^ Claiborne's QuUman, I, 140-153.

368 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

American citizens at Tampico had occasioned a strong pro-
test from the American legation; the supply of men and
arms to the insurgents in Texas was beginning to raise im-
portant questions; and the physical marking of the boundary
line between the United States and Mexico was still to be
provided for. It was therefore decided to send what was
described as a "mission extraordinary" to the United States
"to treat on points of the highest interest" pending between
the two countries.

Manuel Eduardo de Gorostiza, appointed envoy extraor-
dinary and minister plenipotentiary, was of Spanisii descent,
and at the time of his appointment was forty-six years old.
He had been educated in Spain, had fought as a boy against
the French in the Peninsula, and had been banished in 1823
by Ferdinand VII. He lived three or four years as an exile
in London, and then became the Mexican representative at
Brussels, London, and Paris successively. Returning to
Mexico in 1833, he held several important public offices.
He was a successful playwright, a man of literary talents —
"witty and agreeable," says Madame Calderon. Butler,
the Ajnerican charg6 in Mexico, writing to the State De-
partment of his appointment, called him the "Magnus
Apollo of Mexican diplomacy and of literature." ^

But Gorostiza as well as his predecessors, in their com-
plaints to the State Department, utterly failed to distinguish
between assertion and proof, or to master the well-established
principles of the federal statute. A newspaper clipping was
generally the basis of their conmiunications. They never
seem to have furnished the names of witnesses, or to have
considered that American courts could not act without
evidence. Many of the acts they complained of were not
within the statute. It was not an offence against the law
to furnish money to insurgents, or to express sympathy for

^ H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 seas., 577, 725. An excellent life of Go-
rostiza was published in 1876 by J. M. Roa Bdrcena under the modest
title of Dato8 y ApurUamientoa para la Biografia de Don M. E. de GorcHita.
It was rumored (in Texas at least) that Gorostiza's special purpose was to
effect a sale of Texas; against which the Texan representatives were instructed
to protest. — (Tex, Dip, Corr.^ I, 76.) Of course the rumor was unfounded.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 369

them, or to sell or export arms and munitions of war or other \
contraband articles/ or even to form oi^anizations which \
were intended to aid and abet rebellion in other countries.* I
It was never an offence against the laws of the United States /
for men to leave the country with intent to enlist in foreign /
countries, provided they went as individuals and did not/
combine or organize a militaiy expedition while in the
country.*

The acts which the statute of 1818 did prohibit, were the
equipping of armed vessels and the setting on foot of hos-
tile expeditions; and as to these, the attitude of the adminis-
tration was at least formally correct. As early as Novem-
ber 4, 1835, and before any complaints were received from
the Mexican representatives, a warning circular was sent by
the Secretary of State to the United States' attorneys in the
districts of Louisiana, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsyl-
vania,, Maryland, and Alabama, declaring it to be the ''fixed
determination of the Executive" to see that citizens should
abstain, under every temptation, from intermeddling in the
domestic disputes of Mexico. The district attorneys were
further directed to be "attentive to all movements of a hos-
tile character which may be contemplated or attempted,"
and to prosecute all violations of the neutrality laws.*

These orders proved quite fruitless, partly because evi-
dence was really hard to get, partly because the district
attorneys were far from zealous, and partly because those
who were managing the busineU were sh^wd enough to
put on a cloak of legality.

In the case of one company of recruits who went down
the Mississippi "with drums beating and fifes playing," and
were received with enthusiasm at the river landings, the
United States attorney reported innocently that, as the men

^ Moore, IrUemai, Law Digest, VII, 976-982. The act of 1818, in force in
1836, was superseded by the act of March 10, 1838, passed in consequence of
the condition of things on the Canadian frontier. See President's message
of January 5, 1838.

' Opinions of Attorney-General, VIII, 216, in answer to British complaints
of Irish societies in the United States.

» Wiborg v. The United States, 163 U. S., 632.

« H. R. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 sess., 36.

370 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

assured him that their only motive in going to Texas was
emigration, and as there was no apparent movement on
their part "exhibiting them as an armed force," he did not
consider he had any such information as would justify legal
proceedings.^ Another district attorney reported, in ^t
to this same party, when they stopped at Natchez, that as
he had failed, after using great exertions, to procure a war-
rant in the case of Felix Huston (whose recruiting activities
were locally notorious) he really did not see what more
could be done.*

The attitude of James P. Grundy, the United States at-
torney at Nashville, was even more scandalous. He, as well
as his predecessor, had been specially ordered by the Secre-
tary of State to inquire into the truth of certain newspaper
allegations, that men were being raised and equipped at
Nashville for miUtary service in Texas, and if he found that
any persons had violated the law in this regard, he was to
institute such proceedings as might be necessary to pimish
them.* Nevertheless, if the report of a Texan agent may
be believed, Grundy was himself the person who was rais-
ing the company.

"He says/' so the story ran, "he will prosecute any man under his
command who will take up arms here and he will accompany them to
the boundary line of the U. S. to see that they shall not violate her
NetUralUy and when there, if the boys think proper to step over the
line as peaceable Emigrants his authority in this Grovt will cease and
he thinks it highly probable that he will take a peepe at Texas him-
self." *

The completeness of this piece of cynical impudence
seems to cast a certain doubt on the accuracy of an other*
wise delightful story; but if it was not true, it was well in-
vented, for it illustrated completely the methods adopted
to evade the statute.

1 Sanders to Dickins, Aug. 5, 1836; Sen. Doc. 1, 24 Cong., 2 sees., 53.
s Addison (acting for Gaines) to Forsyth, Aug. 20, 1836; ibid,, 66.
•Forsyth to Brown, Feb. 24, 1836; Forsyth to Grundy, April 9, 1836;
H. R. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 sess., 37-38.
* Canon to Burnet, June 1, 1836; Tex. Dip, Corr,, I, 92.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 371

The committees who raised and equipped the American
volunteers were thoroughly informed as to the state of the
laW; and took some pains to evade its provisions. Thus, as
a general thing, the American volimtc«rs were publicly de-
scribed as "emigrants," and their weapons as "hollow-
ware." Notices were published in the newspapers to the
effect that those who went to Texas must embark on their
own responsibility, at their own expense, and subject to no
other ndes than such as might be adopted for convenience
in travelling; and that all money subscribed for the Texan
cause would be applied solely to piu-chasing "provisions,
suppUes, etc."

Writing to an agent employed to purchase a steamship in
New York intended to cruise in the Gulf, the Texan com-
missioners instructed him as follows:

"You will also advertise for passengers for Texas, and charge them
such reasonable price for passage as in your judgment should be
proper, and if any should take passage in said Boat, with intention
of entering into the service of Texas, they shall have their passage
money refunded to them, on being received into the service." *

Subterfuges like these might not have deterred an im-
sympathetic or absolutely impartial grand jury from in-
dieting offenders; but an impartial grand jury could hardly
have been found anywhere in the country. Like their fel-
low-citizens, the members of grand juries in 1835 and 1836
were all for the cause of Texas, and the most zealous of
district attorneys must have failed in an endeavor to pro-
cure indictments.

The President himself was by no means impartial. His
feelings were very strong in favor of the Texan cause, but I h\
he also had a high sense of the digni^ of the government of ' ^
the United States and of its obligation to observe a careful
attitude of neutrality. At a time when Texan affairs looked
very dark, Austin wrote from New York to the President,

1 Tex. Dip. CoTT.f I, 61 ; and see i6id., 56, where the oommiasionera explain
that men cannot be enlisted in the United States and their passage paid to
Texas without violating the statute.

372 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the Vice-President; and other officials, begging the admin-
istration to help the Texans openly with men and money.
Jackson filed away the letter with his private papers, and
indorsed it in his own handwriting:

''The writer does not reflect that we have a treaty with Mexico,
and our national faith is pledged to support it. The Texians before
they took the step to declare themselves Independent, which has
aroused and united all Mexico against them ought to have pondered
well — ^it was a rash and premature act, our neutrality must be faith-
fully maintained/' *

Another and more serious source of controversy than the
enlistments on American soil grew out of the conduct of
the United States troops ^tationed on the Mexican frontier.
The facts in regard to the matter were very simple.

As soon as authentic news reached Washington that Santa
Anna was marching upon Texas with a large anny, orders
were issued to General Edmund Pendleton Gaines^ the
officer then commanding in the South; informing him that
the sixth regiment of infantry had been ordered to Fort
Jesup (near Natchitoches), and that all troops west of the
Mississippi and south of the Missouri were to be employed
in enforcing neutrality. Gaines was ordered to proceed in
person to "some proper position near the western frontier
of the State of Louisiana/' and to see to it first that neither
of the contending parties crossed the boundary into the
United States, and second that no Indians living within the
United States made any hostile incursions into Texas.*
These orders, the Mexican minister expressly admitted, were
beyond criticism.*

General Gaines was an elderly officer, who should have
been well qualified by experience for the delicate duty with
which he was charged. He had entered the army in 1799,
served on the northern frontier, and greatly distinguished
himself at Fort Erie, August 15, 1814, for which he had re-

» Jackson MSS., Library of Congress. See Tex. Hist. Quar,, XIII, 185.

* Secretary of War to Gaines, Jan. 23, 1836; H. R. Doc. 256, 24 Omg,

* Gor06ti2a to Forsyth, April 23, 1836; ibid., 16.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 373

ceived the thanks of Congress and a gold medal. Shortly
after the treaty of Ghent he was put in command of the
troops on the Florida frontier, and became engaged in the
Seminole war. In January, 1836, he was still in Florida.

Pursuant to the orders of the War Department, Gaines
proceeded to Natchitoches, but at so leisurely a rate that he
did not reach that post imtil the fourth of April. On his
way he heard a good deal about ^Hhe sanguinary manner in
which the Mexican forces seem disposed to cany on the war
against our Texian neighbors," and from Baton Rouge he
wrote to the Secretary of War that he should deem it his
duty to anticipate the lawless movements of the Mexicans
and 'Hheir red allies," if he found any disposition to men-
ace American settlements; and in that event he intended
to cross "our supposed or imaginary national boimdary,"
and meet "the savage marauders wherever to be found in
their approach to our frontiers." ^

It is not apparent where Gaines picked up the notion
that the Mexican forces were aided by "red allies"; but it
is perfectly clear where he had got the idea of penetrating
into foreign territory to pimish hostile Indians. In 1817 he
had been instructed that if the Seminoles refused to make
reparation for outrages and depredations on the citizens of
the United States, he was "at Uberty to march across the
Florida line and attack them within its limits." ' This was
a policy deliberately approved by Monroe and his cabinet
at a meeting specially called for the purpose,* and the sub-
sequent action of the United States troops in invading
Florida and capturing Spanish posts was diplomatically de-
fended by John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State, upon
the ground of t^ faUure of Spain to restrain her lAdLs
and the imperative duty of the United States to protect the
persons and property of its citizens near the border/

Entertaining these preconceived notions as to what he

^ Gaines to Cass, March 29, 1836; ibid., 42.

* Calhoun (Secretary of War) to Gaines, Dec. 16, 1817; Amer. St, Papen,
Ma. AS,, I, 689.
' J. Q. Adams, Memoira, IV, 31.
« Adams to Erving, Nov. 28, 1818; Amer. St, Paper$, Far. Bd., IV, 530»

374 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

would find to do when he reached his post; Gaines arrived
at Natchitoches a fortnight before San Jacinto, and was
greeted at once by a number of very excited people. He
was informed that Santa Anna was rapidly approaching;
that his intention was to put to death all who did not yield
to his dictation ; that the Cherokee and Caddo Indians were
to join him as soon as he reached the Trinity River, and
unite with him in a war of extermination; that a Mexican
agent had been stirring up the Indians on both sides of the
border, and that the people of Louisiana were not safe un-
less there was an ample force "to arrest the career of these
savages." ^

Gaines was absurdly credulous if he really believed all
these tales, but at least he did not exaggerate the violence
of the cxurent rumors. The Mississippi volunteers, who
reached Natchitoches three days after him, found condi-
tions even worse than he described them.

"Advancing into the country," the commander wrote home, **we
found the roads literally lined with flying families, and instead of the
men turning their faces to the enemy, we met at least 300 men, with
arms in their hands, going east. Perhaps they considered the con-
test hopeless and did not care to throw away their lives. The reports
of the enemy's overwhelming numbers and bloody intentions were
indeed alarming. We must have met, at least, a thousand women
and children, and everywhere along the road were wagons, furniture
and provisions abandoned."

At Nacogdoches the Mississippians were told that a de-
tachment of the Mexican army had reached the upper
waters of the Trinity and would attack the town in a few
days, and scouts who had been sent to reconnoitre west of the
town came galloping back with a report that they had been
actually fired on by a party of Mexicans. On the twelfth
and thirteenth of April there were incessant alarms. Three
thousand Mexicans and Indians were reported close at hand,

1 H. R. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 seas., 4&-48. And see agitated letters to
Gaines from John T. Mason and residents of Nacogdoches in fl. R. Doc 351»
26 Cong., 2 sees., 779-782.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 375

and it was not until a day or two later that it turned out
there was no foundation for these stories and no immediate
danger.^

Surroimded at Natchitoches by terror-stricken fugitives,
and by officers eager for a chance to distinguish themselves
in actual warfare, it is perhaps not astonishing that Gen-
eral Gaines should have completely lost his head. He
thought that he was called upon to decide whether he should
sit still and suffer the Indian movements "to be so far
matured as to place the white settlements on both sides of
the line wholly within the power of these savages," or
whether he should take steps at once to compel the Indians
to return to their reservations. Without hesitation he de-
cided on the latter course; but as he was persuaded that
Santa Anna, with his " Indian allies," had somewhere from
twelve to twenty thousand men, reinforcements appeared
to be urgently needed. Gaines therefore, certainly without
express authority, called on the governors of Louisiana,
Mississippi^ Tennessee, and Alabama for volunteers.^

His call was rather coolly received by the state authori-
ties. Governor White, of Louisiana, said that after looking
at the statutes he did not think he was authorized to furnish
the force called for; that he did not beUeve it was necessary;
that Gaines had been imposed upon by Texan speculators
(i. e., John Thomson Mason, who had been mixed up in the
New York and Galveston Bay Land Company and the
Coahuila land grants of 1834 and 1835) ; and that these peo-
ple hoped to get the United States involved in the war be-
tween Mexico and Texas. Governor Cannon, of Tennessee,
on the other hand, felt it his duty to raise a brigade of volim-
teers, although he was much perplexed to see how it could
be done. The governors of Alabama and Mississippi must
have shared the views of the governor of Louisiana. At
any rate, they did nothing.'

^ Claiborne's QuUman, I, 148-150.

* Gaines to the governors, April 8, 1836; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 seas.,
770. One at least of Gaines's staff believed the rumors of Indian depredations
unfounded and told him so. — (Hitchcock, Fifty Years in Camp and Field, 98.)

* See correspondence in H. R. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 sess., 49-56.

376 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Gaines himself in another two weeks began to doubt
whether things were quite as bad as he had been led to be-
lieve. He reported that the Indians had killed one white
man, a trader, but that there was "no conclusive evidence
of a spirit of general hostiUty toward the inhabitants."
He also confirmed the reported visit of a Mexican agent to
the Cherokees and Caddoes, but said that thus far the visit
had been without success.^ In another eight dajrs news
reached him of the battle of San Jacinto, and he wrote to
the governors to suspend the movements of the volimteers.*
The activity of General Gaines failed, therefore, to produce
any direct results on the frontier. Its principal effect was
to create trouble in Washington.

When the War Department received Gaines's first letter
from Baton Rouge a rather serious diflBculty had presented
itself. On the one hand, it hardly seemed possible for the-^
executive branch of the government alone to authorize the
invasion of a foreign coimtry, except imder the pressure of
extreme necessity; on the other hand, in dealing with sav-
ages it might easily prove disastrous to ignore warnings, and
to defer attacking them imtil after they had crossed an ill-
defined boimdary.

In this dilemma a suggestion first made by Anthony
Butler seven years before, and repeated by him several times
since, seemed to offer a way out. In his conversations with
Jackson and Van Buren, in the summer of 1829, Butler had
contended that the river truly intended as the Sabine in the
boimdary treaty of 1819 was the westerly one of the two that
flowed into the Sabine Lake — ^in other words, the river shown
on all the maps as the Neches.' In several private letters
to Jackson he had urged that the United States ought to
take immediate forcible possession of the triangular piece
of territory between the two rivers; and Jackson, in at least
one letter, had intimated an intention of doing so if the
Mexican government delayed joining in a survey and de-

^ Gaines to Secretary of War, April 20, 1836 (the day before San Jacinto);
H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sees., 771.
s Gaines to the Secretary of War, April 28, 1836; ibid., 783.
» See page 237, above.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 377

marcation of the boundary.^ There was in reality no con-
fusion or doubt whatever about this part of the boundary
line. The Sabine was a perfectly well-known river which
had been correctly mapped years before the treaty of 1819
was made; but just as it had suited Butler's purposes some
years before to invent a doubt, so it now suited Jackson's
to assume that the doubt was genuine.^

On April 25, 1836, long before news had been received in
Washington of the battle of San Jacinto, General Cass, the
Secretary of War, wrote to Gaines, in reply to his request for
authority to cross the frontier. In effect the letter granted
the authority asked for, with the proviso that Gaines was
in no event to go beyond Nacogdoches, "which is within the
limits of the United States as claiined by this Government";
that is to say, he was not to go beyond the Neches River.'

The intention to issue these instructions had previously
been conmiunicated to the Mexican minister. On Wednes-
day, the twentieth of April, when Gorostiza called at the
State Department to exchange the ratifications of the second
additional article to the treaty of 1819, he was verbally in-
formed by the Secretary that " orders would be given to Gen-
eral Gaines to take such a position with the troops of the
United States as would enable him to preserve the territory of
the United States and Mexico from Indian outrage " ; and that
if the troops should "be advanced beyond the point Mexico
might suppose was within the territory of the United States,
the occupation of the position was not to be taken as an in-
dication of any hostile feeling, or of a desire to establish a
possession or claim not justified by the treaty of limits."*

^ "We are deeply interested that this treaty of cession should be obtained
without any just imputation of corruption on our part. Bring this to a close
as speedily as possible, and if you cannot now make a boundary write us that
we may take measures to make the necessary communication thro you that
we will run the line & take possession of Nachedoges." — (Jackson to Butler,
Nov. 27, 1833; Jackson MSS., Library of Congress.)

* As early as October, 1832, a rumor had reached Texas — ^very likely through
Butler himself — that the United States government intended to make the
Neches the boundary. The Texans were indignant at " this hitherto unheard-
of claim." — (Proceedings of the General Convention, etc., 15; Gammel, I, 489.)

* H. R. Doc. 256, 24 Cong., 1 sess., 43.

« Memorandum of conference 6h April 20, 1836; ibid., 31.

378 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

GorostizE; who had never heard the suggestion that the
Neches might be claimed as the true boundary, listened in
stupefied silence, and only asked that this statement be put
in writing. Three days later he wrote a long and indignant
letter in reply, and for weeks an angry correspondence con-
tinued, in the course of which Forsyth reminded him that
Mexici was not then in possession of the disputed territory,
and that whether it could ever obtain it was a question
"now at issue by the most sanguinary arbitrament." ^

Forsyth went even further. He avowed the doctrine that
in pursuance of the treaty obligation to restrain by force all
hostilities and incursions on the part of the Indians living
within the United States "the troops of the United States
might justly be sent into the heart of Mexico." And he
coolly assured Gorostiza that their presence there would be
the strongest evidence of the friendship of the United States
toward Mexico. Friendship of this kind was quite beyond
the comprehension of the Mexican minister, but he was, of
course, wholly unable to do more than protest.

Meittoe, the Texans we« bu^ to4 to mduoe G^nes
to take some active part in their affairs. On July 4, 1836,
while Santa Anna was writing to President Jackson to urge
him to mediate, Austin was writing both to Gaines and
Jackson to ask the United States to guarantee the execution
of the treaties of Velasco, so as to satisfy the people of Texas
that Mexico would fulfil Santa Anna's promises. For this
purpose it was proposed that Gaines should occupy Nacog-
doches. Houston also wrote to Jackson on the same subject.

Gaines declined this extraordinary request on the ground
of insuflScient instructions, and Jackson does not seem to
have answered Austin's proposal at all.^ But on September
4, 1836, on the same day that he wrote to Santa Anna, he
wrote from the Hermitage to General Gaines. As to the
treaties of Velasco, he said that Mexico had served notice
that no act of Santa Anna's since his capture would be held

^ Forsyth to Goiostixa, May 10, 1836; ibid., 33-35.

'See Miss Rather's excellent article on ''Recognition of the Republic of
Texas by the U. 8.," Tex. Hist. Quar., XUI, 211, 228.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 379

binding. As to the Indian rumorS; he took a somewhat
different ground from that taken by his Secretary of State.
Mexico, he said, was bound by treaty to prevent the Indians
from committing hostilities against the citizens of the United
States- If she was unwilling or imable to perform that duty,
the United States was justified in performing it for her. And
therefore, if General Gaines became satisfied that any body
of Indians who disturbed the peace of the United Stat^
were receiving aid, or were taldng shelter within Mexican
territory, it would be proper for him to pursue them with-
out reference to boimdary lines. But the evidence must be
clear before undertaking an act involving so much respon-
sibility.^

Gorostiza, to whom extracts from these letters were shown,
"did not deny the right of the United States, if the facts
were true, to take upon itself the defence of its frontiers,
and to advance upon Mexico, who would, in that case, have
been false to her obligations imder the law of nations, and to
her treaty stipulations." ^ But he explained later on that
what he meant was that if the Mexican govermnent had in-
stigated Indian warfare against the United States, then in
such a case, and in such a case only, would the United
States (after repulsing the Indians) be justified in occupy-
ing temporarily a post within Mexican territory.'

Meanwhile Gaines, without any real justification, had
again allowed himself to be persuaded that the Indians in
Texas were planning mischief/ and late in .July, long after
the Mexican forces were back again south of the Rio Grande,
he sent a small detachment as far as Nacogdoches. This
force amoimted, according to official returns, to three him-
dred and twenty-four men imder command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Whistler.* Gaines also repeated his requisition for

^Jackson to Gaines, Sept. 4, 1836 (two letters); Sen. Doc. 1, 24 Cong.,
2 sesB., 85-86. This was substantially the doctrine avowed by Adams in
the Florida case where Jackson was himself the chief actor.

< Memorandum of Forsyth of Sept. 23, 1836; ibid., 84.

* Gorostiza to Forsyth, Sept. 27, 1836; ibid., 88.

* Austin and Houston seem to have been his principal informants. — (Yoakum,
U, 182, 191, 201.)

* Nine companies, according to table in Sen. Doc. 1, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 146.

380 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICd

militia; but, this proceeding being expressly disapproved by
the President, none went to the frontier. Gaines was then
quietly superseded by General Arbuckle, and the troops
were withdrawn from Nacogdoches during the autunm.

Gorostiza's patience was rapidly giving way under the
strain. On October 13, 1836, the State Department in-
formed him that the President, who had returned to Wash-
ington on the first of the month, after giving the fullest
consideration to his request for a recall of the instructions
given to Gaines, declined to comply with it. The refusal
was distinctly put upon the groimd of the paramount duty
of the government to protect the people of the United States.
If Mexico fafled to restrain the Indians upon her territory,
the United States would have a right to do so —

** founded on the great principle of self-preservation, which, as it
constitutes the first and highest duty of all states, forms the very
essence of the law of nations. The present inability of Mexico to
restrain the Indians within her territory from hostile incursions upon
the citizens of the United States, if they should once be engaged in
hostility near the frontier, and the barbarous character of their war-
fare, which respects neither the rights of nations nor of humanity,
render it imperative on the United States to adopt other means for
the protection of their citizens. What those means should be must
depend upon the nature of the danger. Should that require the
temporary occupation of passes beyond the frontier, the duty of self-
defence gives them the right to such occupation. It needs no justi-

1 fication but the necessity which led to it." *

\ As a theory this was no doubt all very well, but the

\ diflSculty was that the facts did not fit the theory. The

\ fears of an Indian invasion of the acknowledged territory

of the United States were chimerical, and when the truth
was ascertained an apology should have been offered to
Mexico for the unwarranted action of General Gaines.
Gorostiza did not, however, wait for any more detailed state-
ment of facts. On October 15 he sent a long reply, in
which he pointed out the very apparent weakness of the
evidence on which Gaines had acted, declared that the prin-

^ Dickins to Gorostiza, Oct. 13, 1836; ttnd., 93.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 381

ciples invoked by the United States constituted a continued
aSeat ag«^ the sove^gnty and independenoe of its neigh-
bors, denied the right of the government to shelter itself
behind an injudicious subordinate, and ended by declaring
his mission at an end and requesting his passports.^ He
was not content with this. Before leaving the United States
he published and privately circulated a pamphlet, to which
he appended a part of the correspondence with the State
Department and with his own government, and in which he
railed in good set terms against the government of the
United States.^

The publication of this pamphlet infuriated the Presi-
dent. It was declared to be "imexampled in the history
of diplomacy," and the Mexican government was invited
to disavow an act "so glaringly violating all the decorum
of diplomatic usage; so disrespectful to the government and
people of the United States; so imworthy the representa-
tive of a respectable government, and so well calculated to
interrupt the harmony and good will which ought to sub-
sist between the United States and Mexico." ' The Mexi-
can government, however, far from disavowing Gorostiza's
conduct, declared that after examining "frankly and im-
partially" all the correspondence, it could not but coincide
with all he had done, and approve his withdrawal from
Washington.* In later years, however, upon a demand from
the United States for an explicit and unequivocal disavowal
by Mexico of Gorostiza's action in circulating this pam-
phlet, assiu'ances were given which were accepted as satis-
factory.*

Before the Mexican government had annoimced its opin-
ion concerning Gorostiza's acts the President of the United
States, on December 6, 1836, sent his annual message to

1 Gorostiza to Dickins, Oct. 15, 1836; ibid., 95.

* Correspondencia que ha mediado entre la Legacidn Extruordinaria de MSxico
y d Departamento de Eatado de loa Eatados Unidos aobre d paso dd Sabina jhjt
loB TropM que mandaba el General Gairiea (Philadelphia, 1836).

» Forayth to Ellis, Dec. 10, 1836; H. R. Doc. 105, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 47.
« Monasterio to Ellis, Dec. 21, 1836; Sen. Doc. 160, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 83.

• Martinez to Forsyth, Nov. 18, 1837; Sen. Doc. 1, 25 Cong., 2 seas., 114.
Fanyth to Ellis, May 3, 1839; Sen. Doc. 320, 27 Cong., 2 seas., 179..

382 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Congress. He made no reference in it to the pamphlet^ but
called attention to Gorostiza's departure; based; as the
President put it, "on the sole grounds that the obUgations '
of this government to itself and to Mexico" had made it
necessary to intrust an officer of our army with the dis-
cretionary power to advance into Texas, "if necessary to
protect our own or the neighboring frontier from Indian
depredation."

Whatever may be thought of the reasoning of President
Jackson and his Secretary of State, it is at least clear that,
as events turned out, neither the orders of the administration
nor the acts of General Gaines were of the least benefit
to Texas. Indirectly, Gaines did no doubt encourage the
Texan insurgents, who beUeved that he sympathized with
them, and that under certain circumstances he might help
them.^ But the much more serious and definite results of
his acts were the feelings of irritation and annoyance created
in both Mexico and the United States. The Mexicans were
aggrieved by a course of dealing which they naturally looked
upon as a thinly disguised attempt to help the insurgents,
while in the United States the adversaries of the administra-
tion seized upon the affair as an indication of the real sym-
pathies and wishes of the President and his party.

To what lengths Jackson might have been wUling to go
if he had had a perfectly free hand is, of course, imcertain.
There can be no doubt that he personally sjrmpathized with
the Texan insurgents; but however eager he may have been
to help them, he was restrained by an honorable sense of
what the international obUgations of the United States de-
manded. He had also received abundant warning that the
pubUc opinion of the country at large could hardly be
coimted on in support of a policy of intervention.

In the first place, it was apparent that, however general
the feeling of sympathy with Texas, especially in the South
and West, it was not universal. There was an active mi-
nority, small, indeed, and poUtically without influence, who

^ Carson to Burnet, April 14, 1836; Tex. Dip. Corr,, I, 83. And see Tex.
Hist. Quar., IV, 261-255. f

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 383

looked with' suspicion and dislike upon the efforts of the
Texan settlers to free themselves from Mexican rule; and
the man who most forcibly voiced the opinion of this little
band, and who spoke with some first-hand knowledge of the
f actS; was Benjamin Lundy, the editor of the Genius of Uni-
versal Emancipation.

Between the beginning of 1832 and the spring of 1835,
Lundy paid three visits to Texas, Coahuila, and Tamau-
lipas — ^travelling on foot for long distances and existing
mainly by his trade as a saddler. He talked much with
chance acquaintances whom he met, and among others he
fell in and travelled with Ahnonte, who was then conduct-
ing the tour of observation in Texas which he had under-
taken at Santa Anna's request.^ From these means of in-
formation, accompanied by such newspaper reading as his
nomadic habits permitted, Lundy (who never learned to
speak Spanish) picked up an extensive but inexact knowl-
edge of conditions in Texas and northern Mexico, and of
the hopes and expectations of the American settlers.

The main object of his travels had been to obtain a con-
cession as empresario for the introduction of a number of
families; and Limdy and his friends intended to use any
lands so granted as a colony for manumitted slaves. The
period of his visits to Texas corresponded, however, almost
exactly with the period of three years during which Mexico
— after the disturbances at Andhuac — ^withdrew her troops
and revenue officers from Texas; and no such grant of land
as he desired was procurable either in Texas or Coahuila.
He was more fortunate in Tamaulipas, and when he reached
the United States in the summer of 1835 he busied himself
with plans to take his colonists thither.

"A large number of respectable persons, in different states/' he
wrote, " proposed to accompany me. Among them were our friends
David Lee Child and wife.^ But the insurrection in Texas, or rather

* See page 220, above.

' Lydia Maria Child. Both Mr. and Mrs. Child were well known and en-
ergetic workers in the cause of abolition. The proposed journey to "Mata-
moras, near Texas/' was strongly disapproved by Willis^ Lloyd Garrison,
who thought it a ''hazardous project." — (Garrison, Life qf Qomimm^ U, 105.)

384 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the invasion of brigands from the United States, caused me to defer
it a little. . . . Just about that time, the opportunity presented itsdf
of exposing, with the co-operation of John Quincy Adams, the vile
projects of the Texan invaders." ^

Lundy had already, in 1829, before he had ever visited
Texas, denounced in his newspaper the project of purchas-
ing that province. He declared that it had been conceived
by the advocates of slavery "for the avowed purpose of
adding five or six more slave-holding states to this Union"; *
and the lapse of six years, during which that project had
been suffered to drop by the administration, and the peo-
ple of Texas had come to blows with Mexico, only served
to convince Lundy that the disturbances which were taking
place constituted a "crusade against Mexico, set on foot
and supported by slave-holders, land-speculators, &c., in
order to re-establish, extend, and perpetuate the system of
slavery and the slave trade." In the pages of the Genius
of Universal Emancipation and the Philadelphia National
Gazette, and in two pamphlets, entitled, respectively, The
Origin and True Causes of the Texas Insurrection and
The War in Texas, he declaimed, therefore, against "the
clandestine operations of this unhallowed scheme," in
terms whose vagueness detracted nothing from their
vigor.'

How far Lundy's writings directly influenced the public
of the day it is hard to say. Probably they did not carry
far, for their professed abolitionist origin would then have
been a poor passport to popular favor; but that they did
deeply affect the course pursued by a man whose voice com-
manded a general hearing, namely, John Quincy Adams, is
imquestionable. Adams had first met Lundy in 1831, and
in the summer of 1836 had long conversations with him;*
and although Adams's diary does not reveal the precise ex-
tent to which he made use in his speeches of Limdy's writ-

^ Life of Lundy, 188. ' See page 240, aboye.

* The second of these pamphlets seems to be an enlargement of the first.
See The War in Texas (2d ed.), 30.
^Adams's Memoirs, VIU, 316; IX, 302, 303.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 385

ings, it is evident that these were the fountain from which
he drew inspiration for his attacks upon the Texan policy
of Jackson's administration.

But Jackson was not merely faced with the abolitionist
opposition first voiced by Limdy. It also became perfectly
plain that Congress would not be willing to support any
measures tending to involve the coimtry in a war with
Mexico. This first became evident when on May 4, 1836,
the Secretary of War, with the President's approval, asked
the Committee on Ways and Means for an appropriation of
money to defray the possible expenses of calling out volun-
teers in case it should become necessary to reinforce the
regular troops on the southwestern frontier. On the seventh
of May a violent debate upon this subject in the House of
Representatives sprang up, in which the propriety of the
instructions to General Gaines of April 25 was warmly criti-
cised by John Quincy Adams and others.^ But as ike bill
before the House merely provided that the money appro-
priated should be used for the defence of the frontier, it
was considered imobjectionable by many who were opposed
to the government, and was ultimately passed by a large
majority, Adams himself voting for it.

Nine days later came the news from San Jacinto. " Glori-
ous news from Texas," wrote Adams, "that Santa Anna
had been defeated and taken by Houston, and shot, with all
his officers." * The bearer of the news. Captain Hitchcock,
of General Gaines's staff, had had a dangerous and most
toilsome journey through southern Mississippi and Alabama,
and broi^t with him original accounts of the battle. The
first of these was a scrap of paper, addressed to nobody in
particular, and in form a sort of proclamation. It pur-
ported to be signed by Houston, although its authenticity
was doubted by Gaines and his officers. The other was a
letter from Rusk, the Texan Secretary of War, addressed to
General Gaines. The moment Captain Hitchcock reached
Washington he called at the White House.

1 Debates in Congress (Gales & Seaton), XII, 351&-3547.
* Adams's Memoirs, IX, 282.

386 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

"I am not sure," he wrote, "that I ever saw a man more delighted
than President Jackson appeared to be at the reception of these notes.
If there had been a vacancy in the dragoons at that time I think he
would have given it to me on the spot. He read both the notes over
and over but dwelt particularly upon that from Houston exclaiming
as if talking to himself: 'Yes! that's his writing I I know it well!
That's his writing! That's Sam Houston's writing! There can be
no doubt of the truth of what he states!' Then he ordered a map,
got down over it, and looked in vain for the unknown rivulet called
San Jacinto. He passed his finger excitedly over the map in search
of the name, saying: 'It must be there! No, it must be over there!'
moving his finger round but finally giving up the search." '

Every one, indeed, was delighted at the retribution which
had overwhelmed Santa Anna, and no one in Washington
failed to show it. Gorostiza was ''astonished and shocked"
at the "intemperate joy . . . expressed by all in Washing-
ton, both great and small, magnates and legislators, on re-
ceiving news of the battle of San Jacinto." ^ And almost
at once the question of recognizing Texan independence was
raised in both houses of Congress.

The subject had already been before Congress- On
April 26 Senator Morris, of Ohio, who was an anti-slaveiy
man, presented a report of the proceedings of "a lai^ re-
spectable meeting of citizens of Cincinnati on the subject
of the struggle for freedom now going on in Texas, and sug-
gesting the expediency of acknowledging the independence
of that country." Morris said that as a citizen he was in
full accord with the proceedings of the meeting, and be-
lieved that the people of Cincinnati spoke the voice of the
whole state. King, of Alabama, thought it premature to
consider the recognition of Texas, and by general consent
the subject was laid on the table.

On May 9 Preston, of South Carolina, presented memorials
from citizens of Philadelphia praying Congress to recognize
the independence of Texas; but although he avowed the
most ardent sjrmpathy with the revolutionists, and trusted
in God the Texans would succeed, he admitted that for the
present no action could be taken by the American govem-

*■ Hitchcock, 108. * Gorostiza, Correspondenciaf Introd., xzviL

AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH TEXAS 387

ment. Webster proclaimed his entire concurrence with
most of Preston's sentiments, and only criticised his per-
sonal denunciation of Santa Anna — the head of a foreign
nation with which we maintained diplomatic relations.

A week later, after the news of San Jacinto, memorials
praying for the recognition of Texan independence poured
in from different parts of the coimtry, including one from
the legislature of Connecticut. When the subject was next
brought up in the Senate on May 23, 1836, there was a gen-
eral expression of opinion that the independence of Texas
ought to be recognized if reasonable proof were furnished
that a government had been firmly established. It was
agreed, however, that without proof the United States could
not act, and that the Conmiittee on Foreign Relations ought
to ascertain the facts without delay.

That conmiittee on June 18 presented a report recom-
mending a resolution which favored the recognition of Texas,
whenever satisfactory information was received that it had
a civil government in "successful operation." ^ On July 1
the report was considered and conmiented on by nearly all
the leading men in the Senate — ^Preston, Clay, Webster,
Walker, Buchanan, Benton, and others — all approving the
course proposed. A clause was added to the conmilttee's
resolution, expressing the gratification of the Senate on
hearing that the President of the United States had taken
steps to ascertain the facts of the case, and the resolutions
were then unanimously adopted in the following form:

" 1. Resolved, That the independence of Texas ought to be acknowl-
edged by the United States whenever satisfactory information has
been received that it has in successful operation a civil Government^
capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an
independent Power.

"2. Resolved, That the Senate perceive with satisfaction that the
President of the United States has adopted measures to ascertain the
political, military and dvil condition of Texas."

^ Clay drew this report, which discusses with considerable fulness the prin-
ciples that should guide a government in recognizing the independence of a
newly created state, and which may be said to be one of the classics of inter-
nati«mal law in the United States. See Moore, InUrmU, Law Digest^ I, 96.

388 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

In the House of Representatives there was no such una^
nimity. Adams was again the leader of the opposition. On
May 25, in a speech in Committee of the Whole, when an
entirely different subject was under discussion, he denoimced
the war in Texas as intended to bring about the re-establish-
ment of slavery where it had previously been abolished by
law, and he bitterly attacked the administration for making
every effort to drive the United States into the war upon
the side of slavery. Mexico, according to Adams, was up-
holding the cause of freedom. And he warned the House
that if it came to invading, Mexico was far more likely,
with her large and constantly exercised army, to overrun
the border states of the American Union than the United
State* were to overrun Mexico. Adams himself was im-
pressed next day with the violence of his language, for he
thought it "the most hazardous" speech he had ever made;
but later he foimd it greeted by "a luiiversal shout of ap-
plause" in the North.^

Nothing more was done in Congress imtil the very last
moment. On June 27, 1836, the House, by a vote of 142
to 54, laid on the table a proposal to appropriate money for
a minister to Texas. On Jidy 4, the last day of the ses-
sion, the Committee on Foreign Affairs reported the Senate
resolutions; debate was cut off by the previous question;
the two resolutions were carried by decisive votes— 128 to
20, and 113 to 22 — ^and the House thereupon immediately
adjourned sine die.

* Memoirs, IX, 287-289.

CHAPTER XVI

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION

When the American Congress adjourned on the fourth
of July, 1836, the question whether the independence of
Texas diould be recognized had been fairly submitted to the
executive branch of the government, although with strong
intimations in debate that an affirmative answer would be
welcome. But before the passage of the resolution the Presi-
dent had arranged for a careful inquiry at first hand into the
facts, and for that purpose he sent to Texas a certain Henry
M. Morfit.

Morfit's instructions were probably verbal, and he bore
with him as his credentials nothing but a personal letter of
introduction from Forsyth, the American Secretary of State,
to Burnet, the provisional President of Texas.^

Morfit reached Texas early in August, and stayed until
the middle of September, sending back to the State Depart-
ment about two letters a week, in which he gave an intelli-
gent accoimt of the subjects most likely to interest the
American government. Although he only visited that part
of Texas which lay in the valleys of the Brazos and the
Colorado, he saw and talked with the principal men in the
Texan government, . and was thus enabled to make what
appears to have been an impartial and reasonably complete
report.^

The army, he stated, was composed of about two thou-
sand men actually with the colors. It was thought that
in addition some three thousand militia might be counted
upon. The mimitions of war appeared to be abundant,
and there was scarcely a cabin in the country that could

1 Dated June 25, 1836; Tex, Dip. Con,, I, 100.

' Morfit's letters are printed in Sen. Doc. 20, 24 Cong., 2 seas., as an appen-
dix to the message from President Jackson, dated Dec. 21, 1836.

389

390 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

not, at a moment's warning, arm several men. The weapons
of the several classes of troops were, howevet, not alwajrs of
the same pattern, and the soldiers, as their terms of enlist-
ment expired, frequently took their arms home with them,
"to be ready in any emergency." The navy consisted of
four schooners, one of which was undergoing repairs. A
descent upon Matamoros, and an expedition to Chihuahua,
aided by a force of Comanche Indians, were under discus-
sion. Diuing the summer several hundred emigrants had
arrived by sea, besides many who had come overland by
the Nacogdoches road. About six hundred and fifty Mex-
ican prisoners were still on Galveston Island, or near Ve-
lasco. Santa Anna was at Thompson's Ferry, on the Brazos,
his fate still very doubtful.

The programme of the Texan leaders was extremely am-
bitious. They had intended at first to extend their national
boundaries to the Pacific Ocean, but had ultimately decided
that if they extended from the Sabine to the Rio Grande,
and up to the head of that stream, there would be territory
"suflSicient for a young republic." As the area within the
boundaries thus proposed amounted to something like three
hundred and seventy-five thousand square miles — more than
that of Great Britain, France, and Ireland combined, and
approximately equal to that of the thirteen original states —
these modest views were probably correct. It was also the
intention that as soon as peace was made with Mexico a
railroad should be run to the Gulf of California, to give
"access to the East Indian, Peruvian, and Chilian trade." *

As to boundaries, it was conceded that Texas as a Mexi-
can province had never extended on the Gulf beyond the
river Nueces. And inasmuch as Santa Fe, the capital of
the province of New Mexico, lay east of the Rio Grande on
its upper waters, it was clear that the boundaries to be
claimed in that direction were also far beyond those of the
old province. The claim to the additional territory seemed
to be based upon the rights gained by conquest, the Mexican
army having, in fact, withdrawn beyond the Rio Grande.

^ Sen. Doc. 20, 24 Cong., 2 seas., 12, 13.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 391

From the best information obtainable there were in Texas
proper about thirty thousand American settlers, five thou-
sand negroes, and thirty-five himdred native Mexicans —
besides some twelve or fourteen thousand independent In-
dians. The part of New Mexico which the Texans meant
to claim woidd increase her population by at least fifteen
thousand, making, in all (including '^ Indians not taxed '0»
about sixty-five thousand.

As to financial matters, Morfit calculated that the in-
debtedness of the country by the time the term of oflfice of
the provisional government expired would probably amount
to a million and a quarter of dollars; and to meet this debt
and provide for the future support of the government there
were the public lands, the customs duties, and moneys still
due on lands formerly granted.

"The present resources of Texas," he added, "are principally de-
rived from the sympathies of their neighbors and friends in the United
States, and by loans upon the credit of the state. The donations
from the former quarter have been, and will no doubt continue to be,
very liberal, and indeed munificent. ... I have been surprised to
find that Texas has carried on a successful war thus far, with so little
embarrassment to her citizens or her treasury; and perhaps it is the
first instance in the history of nations where a state has sustained
itself by men and means drawn wholly from a distance." ^

As to the attitude of Mexico, no negotiations for peace
had been undertaken since those with Santa Anna had been
interrupted. It was believed that his power and popularity
at home were already extinct, and that if the Mexican gov-
ernment could raise the necessary money, which seemed
doubtful, a new invasion of Texas would be undertaken.
Already four thousand troops were said to have been col-
lected for the purpose at Matamoros.

That the people of Texas with entire imanimity desired,
at that time, to be admitted as one of the states of the
American Union, was made apparent by the election held on
the fifth of September, at which the voters were required

» Ibid., 16, 17.

392 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

to state whether they favored annexation/ and the terms
on which annexation was to be effected had been seriously
discussed in the Texan cabinet.

Finally, Morfit's conclusion was that as the population of
Mexico was eight millions, and that of Texas not over fifty
thousand, . the issue of the war between them would not,
under ordinary circumstances, long remain doubtful; and
that the ability of Texas to maintain her independence re-
solved itself, after all, into the single fact that "without
foreign aid her future security must depend more upon the
weakness and imbecility of her enemy than upon her own
strength."

The September election to which Morfit referred had

been held pursuant to the action taken by the constitutional

convention of the previous March, directing that an election

should be held for ratifying the Constitution, and choosing

officers at a date to be fixed by the provisional government.

/On July 23, 1836, President Burnet had issued his procla-

/ mation fixing the first Monday of September as the day for

/ choosing a President, a Vice-President, and representatives

' to the first Congress of Texas; also for deciding upon the

acceptance or rejection of the new Constitution; and also

for voting upon the question of annexation to the United

States. By the same proclamation the new government

was to come into existence at Columbia, on the Brazos, on

the first Monday of October.*

The voters, by a substantially unanimous vote, approved
the Constitution and declared in favor of annexation. At
the same time they elected Houston as President and Lamar
as Vice-President; but the newly elected oflficers were not
inaugurated and the regular constitutional government of the
republic did not go into operation until Saturday, October
22, 1836. Houston's two principal rivals for the Presidency
were made members of his cabinet — Stephen F. Austin be-
coming Secretary of State and Henry Smith Secretary of

* Only ninety-three votes were cast against annexation. — {Tex, Dip, Ccrr.,
I, 140.)

•See E. W. Winkler, "The Seat of Government of Texas," in Tex. Hiel.
Qwar,f X, 156 el eeq,, for the reasons for selecting Coliunbia.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 393

the Treasury. William F. Wharton, who had be6n one of
Austin's associates as commissioner to the United States,
was appointed to the highly important post of minister at
Washington.

Wharton's credentials and instructions reached him at
Velasco on November 22, 1836, and he arrived at New
Orleans six days later, after a stormy passage across the
Gulf, " without a place to sleep, except on the naked deck —
without anything but two little blankets to answer both
for a bed and covering." How to get to Washington was a
problem. The meeting of the American Congress was only
eight days off. To go by sea to New York, with a certainty
of northerly winds, would require thirty or forty days, and
the roads on the southern route through Alabama and
Georgia were reported to be almost impassable. Wharton
concluded, therefore, that the "shortest and far the most
certain " method of reaching Washington was by way of the
Mississippi and Ohio rivers to Wheeling, and thence over-
land.*

Travelling with the utmost rapidity, Wharton was only
nineteen days on the road, and having reached Washington
in safety was received by General Jackson unoflScially on
December 20. The next day he saw Forsyth, who told him
that the Texan popular vote for annexation had embarrassed
the American government in the matter of recognizing their
independence; for if Texas were recognized promptly it
would look as if it were part of an agreement for immediate
annexation. He wished Texas would get recognition from
England or elsewhere first. And he said that the President
would that week send a message to Congress dealing with
Texan affairs.*

Wharton was evidently not at all pleased with these in-
terviews, and was still more put out when he read the
President's message, which was presented to Congress on
the day following his conversation with Forsyth.

The message transmitted the greater part of Morfit's

» Wharton to Austin, Nov. 28, 1836; Tex. Dip. Carr., 1, 144.
« Wharton to Auatin, Dec. 22, 1836; ibid., 157.

394 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

letters. After an admirably clear and accurate statement
of the considerations which should govern the nation in
acknowledging the independence of any new state, and the
peculiar delicacy of doing so when the new state had forci-
bly separated itself from another of which it had formed a
part, and which still claimed dominion over it, the Presi-
dent went on to express the view that it was expedient to
leave to Congress the question of the recognition of Texas,
although he did not intend to relieve himself from the re-
sponsibility of expressing his own opinion concerning the
course which " the interests of our country prescribe and its
honor permits us to follow." A rigid adherence to the prin-
ciples laid down and followed in the contests between Spain
and her revolted colonies would be the safest guide. In
those cases "we stood aloof, and waited, not only until the
ability of the new states to protect themselves was fully
established, but until the danger of their being again sub-
jugated had entirely passed 'away. Then, and not until
then, were they recognized."

With regard to Texas, the fact was that, although the
civil authority of Mexico had been expelled, its invading
army defeated and driven beyond the frontier, and tbe
President of the republic captured, yet there was, in appear-
ance at least, an immense disparity of physical force on the
side of Mexico and a fresh Mexican invasion was in prepara-
tion.

"Upon the issue of this threatened invasion," the message con-
tinued, "the independence of Texas may be considered as suspended;
and were there nothing peculiar in the relative situation of the United
States and Texas, our acknowledgment of its independence at such
a crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent
reserve with which we have heretofore held ourselves boimd to treat
all similar questions. But there are circumstances in the relations
of the two countries, which require us to act on this occasion, with
even more than our wonted caution. Texas was once claimed as a
part of our property, and there are those among our citizens who,
always reluctant to abandon that claim, cannot but regard with so-
licitude the prospect of the reunion of the territory to this country.
A large portion of its civilized inhabitants are emigrants from the

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 395

United States; speak the same language with ourselves; cherish the
same principles, political and religious, and are bound to many of
our citizens by ties of friendship and kindred blood; and more than
all, it is known that the people of that country have instituted the
same form of government with our own; and have, since the dose of
your last session, openly resolved, on the acknowledgment by us of
their independence, to seek admission into the Union as one of the
federal states. ... It becomes us to beware of a too early move-
ment, as it might subject us, however unjustly, to the imputation of
seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory, with a
view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves. Prudence, therefore,
seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof, and maintain our
present attitude, if not until Mexico itself, or one of the great foreign
powers, shall recognize the independence of the new government, at
least imtil the lapse of time, or the course of events shall have proved,
beyond cavil or dispute, the ability of the people of that country to
maintain their separate sovereignty, and to uphold the government
constituted by them."

The signature to this message was that of Andrew Jack-
son, but the body of it was unquestionably the production,
both in form and substance, of John Forsyth.^ The cautious
policies here advocated — the acute sensitiveness to foreign
opinion, the desire not to seem to interfere with the rights
of others — ^have not always been manifest in the foreign
policy of the United States.

A policy so hesitant as that advocated in the President's
message was not very consonant with Jackson's impetuous
character, and it is quite possible that if he had not been for
several weeks in ill health more vigorous methods might
have been adopted by his administration.^ Certainly the
tone and spirit of the message, as John Quincy Adams
noted in his diary, were entirely une5q)ected, "a total re-
verse of the spirit which almost universally prevailed at
the close of the last session of Congress, and in which the
President notoriously shared."* It was rumored that Van

* There is some evidence, besides strong antecedent probability, to show
that Van Buren was consulted in the preparation of this message.

* "I have been only four times downstairs since the 15th of November last,
although I have been obliged to labor incessantly.'' — (Jackson to Trist, March
2, 1837; Parton, Jackson, III, 624.)

* Memoirs, Dec. 22, 1836, vol. IX, 330. And see DebaUs in Congress, 24
Cong., 2 sess., 1141-1143.

396 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Buren was the real author of the message. The Texan
representatives thought its "cold-blooded" and "ungener-
ous" tone argued ill for the policy of the American govern-
ment in the next administration/ and they believed that
the best prospect of success lay in an immediate appeal to
Jackson himself.

"All that remains for me," wrote Wharton, "is to operate with
the President, and to get him to quicken the action of Congress with
another message. This I shall day and night endeavor to effect by
using every argument that can operate upon his pride and his sense
of justice." *

And for the next two months Wharton had many highly
confidential interviews with the President, in which annexar-
tion as well as recognition were discussed.

But while Jackson listened benevolently, and told Whar-
ton to be easy, for all would go right, he steadily declined to
take any further public steps in the matter, although his
private and personal sympathies were not disguised. The
object of his message, as he explained to Wharton, had been
to obtain the concurrent action of Congress; he wished the
sense of Congress on the subject; he would immediately
concur if a majority recommended recognition; and it was
"all foolishness" to say that members of Congress woidd
forbear voting for recognition for fear of being thought to
be opposed to the administration. He did, however, send to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House a copy of a
private letter from Austin, giving a long and detailed account
of conditions in Texas, with some appended comments of
his own favorable to recognition.' Early in February he
told Wharton that Judge Ellis (then the United States min-
ister in Mexico), who had just arrived in Washington, if
called before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, could con-
vince them in five minutes that a new invasion by Mexico
was an utter impossibility. But although entirely imdia-

» Catlett to Austin, Jan. 11, 1837; Tex. Dip. Carr., 1, 173.
» Wharton to Houston, Feb. 2, 1837; Urid., 180.

* Miss Rather, "Recognition of the Republic of Texas," in Tex, HiH. Quar^
XIII, 251.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 397

guised and explicit in expressing his personal views, be still
refused to send another message to Congress.^

Jackson was no doubt influenced chiefly by a desire not
to embarrass Van Buren's administration by committing
the executive branch of the government to a course which
had not the support of Congress, and until the latter part
of January he was probably not without hope that Santa
Anna's visit to Washington might result in some sort of
treaty between Mexico, on the one side, and the United
Stat^ and Texas, on the other, which would solve all diflS-
culties. But the firm refusal of the Mexican charg6 d'affaires
to have anjrthing to do with Santa Anna put an end to that
possibility. Until almost the last moment of the remaining
weeks of his term of office the President, broken in health,
allowed his pubUc conduct in this matter to be governed by
the views of Van Buren and Forsyth, and to put the re-
sponsibiUty upon the shoulders of Congress.^

Congi^, on its part, was not much bterested in the sub-
ject. The expunging resolution, the Treasury circular re-
quiring specie payments for purchases of public lands, the
admission of the state of Michigan, and the question
whether anti-slavery petitions should be received, were far
more attractive topics. Wharton tried hard to find mem-
bers of the two houses who would urge early consideration
of the claims of Texas, for he was in the greatest anxiety
lest other matters should so occupy the time of Congress
during the short session as to put off the business of recog-
nition till the next December, and it was not until three
weeks after the President's message was received that the
subject was mentioned in either house.

» Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837; Wharton to Houston, Feb. 2, 1837;
Wharton and Hunt to Rusk, Feb. 20, 1837; Tex, Dip, Corr., 1, 171, 179, 195.
Austin died Dec. 27, 1836, which was the reason why Wharton addressed
Houston, the President. Zavala had also died, Nov. 15, 1836.

' There are some curious analogies between the position of President Jack-
son and his Secretary of State in reference to the recognition of Texas and
that of President Grant and Mr. Fish in reference to the proposed recognition
of the Cuban insurgents in 1870. General Grant was at first in favor of recog-
nition, but was persuaded by Mr. Fish not to take the steps he had had in
contemplation. — (Chadwick, The RekUiona of the United States and Spain,
Diplomacy f 306 et seq.)

398 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

There had been, in fact, a considerable change in pubUc
opinion since Congress adjourned the previous July, when
the Mexican atrocities and the sweeping victory of San
Jacinto were fresh in men's minds. The possible efifect of
the proposed step on the subject of slavery was beginning to
be recognized, and many men in public life were coming to
see that it was something to be handled with great caution.
However, on the eleventh of January, 1837, Senator Walker,
of Mississippi, offered a resolution that, as there was "no
longer any reasbnable prospect of the successful prosecution
of the war by Mexico," the independent political existence
of Texas ought to be recognized. In offering it he explained
that he had that morning received information from Vera
Cruz that General Bravo's army, destined for an invasion
of Texas, had been reduced to a very small number by de-
sertion and other causes; that this "miserable remnant"
was imsupplied with provisions; that Bravo himself had re-
signed the command; and that the proposed invasion had
proved entirely abortive.^ He did not, however, ask for
immediate consideration of his resolution.

A month later Walker called up his resolution, but both
Benton and Silas Wright objected — the former with rather
uncalled-for vehemence — and the subject was postponed.
The source of the objection suggests Van Buren as the per-
son most anxious to defer the discussion, but indeed nearly
all the administration senators from the Northern states
thought it should be postponed.*

It was not until the first day of March that Walker could
get a hearing, when he and Preston and Calhoun spoke
strongly in favor of recognition. Both Clay and Buchanan

^ Bravo was appointed Aug. 12, 1836, to succeed Urrea, whose deeds had
by no means equalled his brave words. Bravo soon found, however, that the
government could not, or at least did not, send him the men or the equipment
which he considered indispensable if Texas was to be recovered, and he re-
signed, turning over the command to Ramirea y Sesma. On November 21,
1836, a debate occurred in the Mexican Congress, in the course of which the
Deputy Don Mariano Michelena seems to have made the assertions which
Walker repeated, and which Tomel, the Minister of War, substantially ad-
mitted to be true. See MSxico d travis de lo8 Siglos, IV, 380.

s Jenkins, Life of Silas Wright, 113.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 399

were in favor of waiting. Norvell, of Michigan, a new mem-
ber, proposed a substitute, which was lost by a vote of 16
to 25, and thereupon Walker's resolution was carried by
23 to 19. The division was mainly between the West and
South in the aflinnative and New England, New York,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania in the negative; but there
were aflfinnative votes from Maine and Connecticut and
negative votes from Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana,
Webster and Clay did not vote. On the next day a mo-
tion was made to reconsider the Walker resolution, which
failed by a tie vote, 24 to 24.

In the House of Representatives Waddy Thompson, a
South Carolina Whig, was the principal advocate of inmie-
diate recognition; but although he had displayed a good
deal of temper when the President's message came in, he did
nothing until the thirteenth of February, 1837, when he in-
quired why the Committee on Foreign Affairs had not acted.
The committee did, however, report on Saturday, February
18, when it recommended the adoption of the following
resolutions:

1. That the independence of the government of Texas
ought to be recognized.

2. That the Committee on Ways and Means be directed
to provide in the bill for the civil and diplomatic ex-
penses of the government, a salary and outfit for such
public agent as the President might determine to send to
Texas.

On February 21, after some debate, these resolutions were
laid on the table by a vote of 98 to 86. Six days later, on
February 27, Thompson renewed his efforts by moving an
amendment to the civil and diplomatic appropriation bill,
while in Committee of the Whole, so as to provide for the
salary and outfit of "a diplomatic agent" to Texas. After
a very long discussion TTiompson was beaten again, this
time by a vote of 40 to 82.

On tiie following day, the last of February, after the bill
had been reported to the House, the indefatigable Thomp-
son again offered his resolution, in the following form :

400 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

"For the outfit and salary of a diplomatic agent to be sent to the
independent republic of Texas thousand dollars."

Again discussion ensued, but at length the word inde-
pendent was struck out and the following phrase was added/
viz.:

"Whenever the President of the United States may receive satis-
factory evidence that Texas is an independent power and shall deem
it expedient to appoint such minister."

In this form the amendment was adopted; by a vote
of 121 to 76. The bill was passed by the Senate two da,ys
afterward without a division, and was approved by the
President on March 3, 1837.^

The action of Congress, while finally favorable to Texa^,
had thus been exceedingly dilatory. It had also been made
apparent that there was a very large minority opposed to
any action, and probably a majority opposed to immediate
recognition. The only measure which secured the approval
of both houses was the bare permission given to the Presi-
dent to appoint a diplomatic agent whenever he might re-
ceive satisfactory evidence that Texas had become "an in-
dependent power." In effect, Congress had decided to
leave the whole responsibility with the President.

Andrew Jackson was by this time ready to take all the
responsibility. Many of those who had finally voted with
Waddy Thompson undoubtedly expected that the incoming
President woidd be the person to decide as to the status of
Texas; but the Texan representatives had left no means
untried to prevent that result. Jackson had been persuaded
that the action of Congress was all thatvwas necessary to
enable him to take the decisive step to which he had long
been inclined, and accordingly, the moment the diplomatic
appropriation bill became a law, he sent to the Senate the
following explanatory message :

''In my message to Congress of the 21st of December last," said
the President, "I laid before that body, without reserve, my views
concerning the recognition of the independence of Texas, with a re-

» 5 U. S. Stat, at Large, 170.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 401

port of the agent employed by the Executive to obtain information
in respect to the condition of that country. Since that time the sub-
ject has been repeatedly discussed in both branches of the Legislature.
. . . Regarding these proceedings as a virtual decision of the ques-
tion submitted by me to Congress, I think it my duty to acquiesce
therein, and therefore I nominate Alc^ La Branche, of Louisiana, to
be charg^ d'affaires to the Republic of Texas." ^

The nomination was received by the Senate during the
legislative day of March 3, 1837, and on motion of Mr.
Webster consideration thereof was postponed until the
following Monday, the sixth of March. By that time Jack-
son was out and Van Buren was in the White House. La
Branche's name was referred to the Conmiittee on Foreign
Relations, who reported favorably the next day, and the
nomination was confirmed without objection.

It was too late for Van Buren to draw back, much as he
and Forsyth might have wished to do so: but they managed
to deUy^vi^La Bn>ache hta comnukion »a J,Jy 21,
1837. The official reception of the new Texan minister.
General Himt, was also put o£f, on the ground of the in-
formal character of the credentials with which he had been
furnished; but finally, on July 6, 1837, he was duly intro-
duced at the White House, and received with the genial
coiui;esy for which the new President was so noted.*

Public announcement of the fact that the United States
government had recognized the independence of Texas was
inmiediately followed by vehement protests from the Mexi-
can authorities, who appealed to the principles laid down
in President Jackson's special message of December 21,
1836, and asked — ^not without a good deal of justice —
whether the situation of Texas had so changed since then
as to justify recognition.' The Secretary of State did not

^ Senate Executive Journal, IV, 631. Shortly before midnight on the third
of March Jackson sent for the Texan agents, told them what he had done,
and "requested the pleasure of a glass of wine." — {Tex, Dip. Corr.^ I, 201.)

« Hunt to Irion, July 11, 1837; Tex. Dip. Corr., I, 235. In Tex. Hist.
Qnar., XIII, 155-256, will be found further details concerning the subject of
the recognition of Texas.

'Castillo to Forsyth, March 8, 1837; Monasterio to Forsyth, March 31,
1837; Sen. Doc. 1, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 131, 143.

402 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

attempt to answer this question, but simply replied that in
recognizing the independence of Texas the govermnent of
the United States had acted upon the ordinary and settled
policy which had been observed in many cases, including
that of Mexico herself, and that this act did not proceed
from any imfriendly spirit toward Mexico, and must not be
regarded as indicative of a disposition to interfere in the
.contest between her and Texas.*

Recognition having been secured, the Texans lost no time
in bringing before the American government their proposals
for annexation. These proposals had not originated with
the people of the United States. They were the natural
and inevitable result of the circumstances in which Texas
was placed — a small, poor, and widely scattered population,
mostly composed of natives of the United States who were
living under the constant menace of invasion whenever Mex-
ico could manage to collect the men and money necessary
for that purpose. Protection by the United States was the
simple, cLct, and obvious meL of securing the people of
Texas in the peaceful possession of the settlements they had
formed, and with an instinctive and all but unanimous move-
ment they had turned for help to their powerful neighbor.*

The advantages to the United States of the acquisition of
Texas were, however, no less obvious than the advantages
which would accrue to Texas from being incorporated as a
part of the American Union. The immense agricultural ^
possibilities of the country, its evident adaptation as the
home of many millions of people, and the fact that its pos-
sesion would give to the United States a practical control
of the world's supplies of cotton, were aflSrmative reasons of
great weight. They had been clearly apparent to Adams
and Clay and Jackson and Forsyth. In addition, it was be- .
ginning to be perceived that the existence of a separate and
independent English-speaking country to the south of the

^ Forsyth to Castillo, March 17, 1837; Forsyth to Monasterio, May 22,
1837; ibid,, 135, 150.

*The provisional government, within five weeks after the battle of San
Jacinto, declared itself ready to begin negotiations for annexation. Burnet
to CoUingBWorth and Grayson, May 26, 1836; Tex. Dip. Con., I, 89.

«»-.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 403

United States could not fafl to be a source of trouble and
irritation. Nevertheless, the government of the United
States made no move in the direction of annexation, and
Calhoun seems to have been the only man in Congress who
— up to the end of Jackson's administration, at least — ^had
expressed himself as favorable to that policy. The over-
tures came from Texas, and dated back to the very begin-
ning of the establishment of the constitutional government
of the republic.

As early as the autumn of 1836, when Wharton was ac-
credited as minister to the United States upon the forma-
tion of Houston's administration, his instructions were to
the effect that next to seeming recognition the great object
of his mission was to effect the annexation of Texas to the
United States, "on the broad basis of equitable reciprocity."
In any treaty that might be made, the privilege of becoming
a state of the American Union ought to be secured, and it
should be provided that Texas might thereafter be sub-
divided into a limited number of new states at the pleasure
of the people concerned. The location of Indian tribes,
the settlement of public debts, and the adjustment of land-
claims should all be arranged for. There must be no special
restrictions or limitations as to slavery. As to boundaries,
the Texan government asserted that they held possession as
far as the Rio Grande, and they considered that this river
ought to be the boundary to its source; but if "serious em-
barrassments or delays" would be produced by insisting on
that line they would agree to a line following the water-shed
between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, and would le&ve
out the settlements in New Mexico.*

By further private instructions, Wharton was directed to
stand very firm and yield nothing that would be likely to
cause discontent in Texas. He was informed that there
was a strong undercurrent of sentiment in favor of remaining
a separate and independent republic, and if a treaty of

1 Austin to Wharton, Nov. 18, 1836; Tex, Dip. Can., I, 127-135. These
instructions followed a joint resolution of the Tejuui Congress passed Nov.
16, 1836.— (Lottw of the Rep. of Texas, I, 29.)

404 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

peace could be effected with Mexico, and a friendly disposi-
tion were manifested by France and England, public opin-
ion might decide in favor of independence, rather than an-
nexation. This change in public opinion, it was said, would
certainly take place if the govenunent of the United States
should prove adverse to annexation, or should fail to allow
the most Uberal terms. If such a disposition were mani-
fested, the Texan minister was directed to "have full and
free conversations with the British, French, and other for-
eign ministers" in Washington, with a view to enlisting the
interest of their governments and securing recognition of
Texan independence in return for a system of low duties
and Uberal encouragement to immigration.^ Three weeks
later, however, Austin wrote again to Wharton that public
anxiety in Texas, on the subject of annexation, remained
unabated, and that opinion in favor of the measure was
more decided than before.*

But before Wharton had been long within the United
States he discovered what he described as a bitter oppK)si-
tion to annexation.

''The leading prints of the North and East and the aboIitionistSj"
he reported from Kentucky, " every where oppose it on the old grounds
of an opposition to the extension of slavery and of a fear of southern
preponderance in the councils of the nation. Our friends, by which
term I now mean those of Louisiana, Mississippi, Kentucky, etc. (for
I have seen and conversed with no others as yet) oppose our annexa-
tion, on the grounds that a brighter destiny awaits Texas."

As a state in the Union these friends thought Texas
would be oppressed by "high tariffs and other Northern
measures," and would be driven to nullification and ulti-
mately to civil war. Nevertheless, Wharton continued to
believe in the policy of annexation, although he saw with
remarkable clearness the difficulties in the way.

"To be plain and candid," he continued in the same letter, "I
believe the recognition of our independence will certainly take place,

» Austin to Wharton, Nov. 18, 1836; Tex, Dip. Corr., I, 135-140.
'Same to aame, Dec. 10, 1836; ibid., 150.

\ TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 405

but I have not at present much hopes of our being annexed. That
question when proposed will agitate thb imion more than did the
attempt to restrict Missouri, nullification, and abolitionism, all
combined/' *

The events of the next eight or nine years bore signal
witness to the wisdom of this forecast.

When Wharton finally reached Washington, about the
middle of December, the prospects of annexation seemed
still more doubtful. Some of the Southern senators ap-
peared friendly, but the Secretary of State, although him-
self a Southerner, was not at all encouraging. In reply to
a direct inquiry from Wharton, Forsyth said that "various
conflicting sectional interests in Congress would have to be
reconciled before annexation would be agreed to"; that, if a
treaty of annexation should be made by the administration,
he thought it would be consented to by the Senate; and he
added that "he thought it would be best done under the
administration of a Northern President." This, as Wharton
pointed out, was simply postponing the subject for at least
a year, though he then beheved that Van Buren would
favor annexation.^ But for months the Texan representa-
tives were imcertain and worried, as to what Van Buren
would really do.

Although Van Buren, in the course of a long career in the
active school of New York politics, had acquired a remark-
ably effective knowledge of political methods, it would be a
mistake to regard him as nothing more than a party man-
ager. He had strong and clear convictions on certain sub-
jects, and was quite capable of expressing them upon suit-
able occasions with courage, and to his own hurt, although
he was generally inclined, in his own phrase, to " the utmost
prudence and circumspection" on delicate questions of pub-
lic policy. He was usually a follower, rather than a leader,
of public opinion, and anxious to find out what the people
wanted before declaring himself; and this helped to make
him a reputation as an extremely clever but shifty poli-

1 Wharton to Austin, Dec. 11» 1836; ibid., I, 151-154.
> Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837; ibid., 169.

406 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tician — an opinion which did not do justice to some really
solid and admirable qualities.

As Jackson's devoted adherent and political heir, it was
to be expected that Van Buren would continue his prede-
cessor's policies, and his first step after his inauguration
was a significant confirmation of that expectation, for he
retained all of Jackson's cabinet except Cass, the Secretary
of War, who had already been appointed minister to France,
Cass's place was taken by Poinsett, the former minister to
Mexico.

For months after his inauguration Van Buren kept strictly
to himself whatever views he may have had on the subject
of Texan annexation. His thoughts were indeed occupied
very largely by matters nearer home, for the purely domestic
diflSculties of the administration were extremely serious. In
the first few weeks after March 4, 1837, the disastrous finan-
cial panic of that year was at its worst. The banks through-
out the country suspended specie payments in the month
of May, and the situation became so acute that the Presi-
dent f oimd it necessary to simmion a special session of Con-
gress, to meet on the fourth of September, 1837.

The Texan representatives could not, of course, bring up
the question of annexation imtil they had been formally re-
ceived, which was not, as already stated, until July 6, 1837;
in the meantime they were busy with inquiries and con-
jectures as to how the proposal, when made, was likely to
be received by the administration. Before the inaugura-
tion Wharton reported that "the Van Buren party" were
very fearful on the subject of annexation, as they believed
it would become the controlling issue in the next elections,
and that they would therefore try to postpone its considera-
tion'.^ In July Hunt, who hdd succeeded Wharton as min-
ister from Texas, wrote that he was satisfied the President's
ambition would lead him " to distinguish his administration
by such an accession of territory";^ but on August 4 he
could only say that the President had not yet determined

» Wharton to Houston, Feb. 2, 1837; ibid,, 180.
* Hunt to Irion, July 11, 1837; ibid., 240.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 407

what to dO; '^ or at least he is doubtful as to what course of
policy would be most popular — ^for that course he will be
certain to pursue as soon as it is fairly ascertained." And
Hunt added that since the first part of his letter was written
he had received "intimations" which strongly confirmed
him in the behef that the President would favor annexation.^

Thus emboldened, the Texan minister submitted to the
State Department a long commimication proposing annexa-
tion, giving a r6sum6 of the history of both Mexico and
Texas, and pointing out the mutual advantages to be de-
rived from the course proposed, and the disadvantages that
were likely to arise if Texas should remain an independent
power.* This paper bore date the same day as Hunt's
despatch to his own government just quoted.

Nearly a week later he sent a copy to Texas, explaining as
his reason for the historical disquisition that it was indis-
pensable to destroy the false impressions created by Goros-
tiza's pamphlet and other publications. " The French and
English legations," he added, "are the only ones here that
are not decidedly against us." He also mentioned that he
had thought it best "to say nothing on the slave question,
which, as you know, is more important than any other con-
nected with the subject of annexation." As to the attitude
of the administration, he thought they wished consideration
of the question postponed, and that they were likely to
"pursue an equivocating course." The President, Hunt
believed, could not be re-elected unless he favored annexa-
tion. As to the cabinet, Poinsett (Secretary of War), For-
83rth (Secretary of State), and Kendall (Postmaster-General)
were favorable to annexation — especially Poinsett, who
zealously advocated the measure.

So far Hunt on Thiu^ay , the tenth of August ; but in an
agitated postscript, dated "Friday morning," he reported
that Forffjrth was "violently opposed" to annexation, and
therefore "a traitor to the most delicate and deepest inter-

> Same to same, Aug. 4, 1837; ibid., 247. Poinsett was probably Hunt's
infonnant.
* Hunt to Forsyth, Aug. 4, 1837; H. R. Doc. 40, 25 Ck>ng., 1 aess., 2-11.

408 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ests of those to whom he is mdebted for the very power and
influence which he is now attempting to exercise against
them." Poinsett, however, was still true, and would retire
from the cabinet if the question was not carried.^

Hunt was not kept long in suspense. An answer dated
August 25, 1837, not only refused, in the most explicit terms,
to enter upon any negotiation in regard to annexation, but
stated that the subject would not be considered in the
future.

"Neither the duties nor the settled policy of the United States,''
said Forsyth, " permit them to enter into an examination of the accu-
racy of the historical facts related by General Hunt, nor to allow them,
if even admitted to be correct, to control the decision of the question
presented by him. The United States were foremost in acknowledg-
ing the independence of Mexico, and have uniformly desired and en-
deavored to cultivate relations of friendship with that Power. Having
always, since the formation of their Government, been exempt from*
civil wars, they have learnt the value of internal quiet, and have con-
sequently been anxious yet passive spectators of the feuds with which
their neighbor has been afBicted. Although in the controversy be-
tween Texas and Mexico, circumstances have existed, and events have
occurred, peculiarly calculated to enlist the sympathies of our people,
the effort of the Government has been to look upon that dispute also,
with the same rigid impartiality with which it has regarded all other
Mexican commotions.

"In determining with respect to the independence of other coun-
tries, the United States have never taken the question of right be-
tween the contending parties into consideration. They have deemed
it a dictate of duty and policy to decide upbn the question as one of
fact merely. This was the course pursued with respect to Mexico
herself. It was adhered to when analogous events rendered it propa
to investigate the question of Texian independence. . . .

"The question of the annexation of a foreign independent State to
the United States has never before been presented to this Govern-
ment. Since the adoption of their constitution, two large additions
have been made to the domain originally claimed by the United States.
In acquiring them this Government was not actuated by a mere thirst
for sway over a broader space. Paramount interests of many mem-
bers of the confederacy, and the permanent well being of all, impera-
tively urged upon this Government the necessity of an extension of
its jurisdiction over Louisiana and Florida. As peace, however, was
our cherished policy, never to be departed from unless honor should

^ Hunt to Irion, Aug. 10 and 11, 1837; Tex. Dip. Con., I, 252-256.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 409

be perilled by adhering to it, we patiently endured for a time serious
inconveniences and privations, and sought a transfer of those regions
by negotiations and not by conquest.

"The issue of those negotiations was a conditional cession of these
countries to the United States. The circumstance, however, of their
being colonial possessions of France and Spain, and therefore depend-
ent on the metropolitan Governments, renders those transactions
materially diflferent from that which would be presented by the ques-
tion of the annexation of Texas. The latter is a State with an inde-
pendent Government, acknowledged as such by the United States,
and claiming a territory beyond, though bordering on the region ceded
by France, in the treaty of the 30th of April, 1803. Whether the
constitution of the United States contemplated the annexation of
such a State, and if so, in what manner that object is to be effected,
are questions, in the opinion of the President, it would be inexpedient,
under existing circumstances, to agitate.

" So long as Texas shall remain at war, while the United States are
at peace with her adversary, the proposition of the Texian minister
plenipotentiary necessarily involves the question of war with that
adversary. The United States are bound to Mexico by a treaty of
amity and commerce, which will be scrupulously observed on their
part, so long as it can be reasonably hoped that Mexico will perform
her duties and respect our rights under it. The United States might
justly be suspected of a disregard of the friendly purposes of the com-
pact, if the overture of General Hunt were to be even reserved for
future consideration, as this would imply a disposition on our part
to espouse the quarrel of Texas with Mexico; a disposition wholly at
variance with the spirit of the treaty, with the uniform policy and the
obvious welfare of the United States.

"The inducements mentioned by General Hunt, for the United
States to annex Texas to their territory, are duly appreciated, but
powerful and weighty as certainly they are, they are light when op-
posed in the scale of reason to treaty obligations and respect for that
integrity of character by which the United States have sought to dis-
tinguish themselves since the establishment of their right to claim a
place in the great family of nations. ... If the answer which the
undersigned has been directed to give to the proposition of General
Hunt should unfortunately work such a change in the sentiments of
that Government as to induce an attempt to extend commercial rela-
tions elsewhere, upon terms prejudicial to the United States, this
Government will be consoled by a consciousness of the rectitude of
its intentions, and a certainty that although the hazard of transient
losses may be incurred by a rigid adherence to just principles, no last-
ing prosperity can be secured when they are disregarded." *

^ H. R. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., 1 sess., 11-13.

410 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

To Forsyth's note Hunt returned a somewhat uncivil
reply. As the United States, he said, had declined the gen-
erous offer of Texas, the latter would feel free to look solely
to her own interests. If, for example, she should lay heavy
duties on cotton-bagging and provisions, "such as would
amount to an almost total prohibition of the introduction
of those articles," or if she should establish intimate com-
mercial relations with Great Britain and France, to the
practical exclusion of the United States, she miist not be
blamed for looking solely after her own interests.^ This
not very formidable threat called for no answer, and none
was sent.

The Texan representatives, however, hoped for some weeks
that the American government might be induced to recon-
aider its action. Forsyth was reprinted as being friendly
at heart, and as thmkmg that annexation would come about
in time if matters were properly conducted in Texas.*
Poinsett, the Secretary of War, gave assiu'ances that he was
still firm in support of annexation, and the cabinet as a
whole was said to be merely "acting with a sort of diplo-
matic caution out of deference to the prejudices of the
North." ' On the other side in politics Clay was quoted
as saying that he was friendly to the annexation of Texas,
" but that in his opinion the time had not arrived when the
question could be taken up in Congress with any proba-
bility of success." *

But notwithstanding these vague and polite assurances,
the agents of Texas very soon acquired the conviction that
no favorable result could be looked for until there was a
great change in pubhc opinion. The "determined and un-
compromising" character of the opposition from the North-
em and Eastern states was what was imderstood to weigh
with the administration. All contemporaneous opinion
considered that the action of the government was solely
due to Northern opposition to the extension of slavery, and

» Hunt to Forsyth, Sept. 12, 1837; ibid,, 14r-18.

« Hunt to Irion, Nov. 15, 1837; Tex. Dip. Con,, I, 268.

» Grayson to Houston, Oct. 21, 1837; ibid., 265.

« Hunt to Irion, Jan. 31, 1838; ibid., 287.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 411

it is indeed abundantly clear that the existence of slavery
in Texas delayed and prevented action by the United States
on the subject at that time. The friends of the measure
who were in the confidence of the President and his cabinet
assured the Texan minister that it was "impossible to jeop-
ardize the strength of the party in the North by precipi-
tate action upon the subject." ^

The one fact which seems to have chiefly impressed the
Texan representatives was the astonishing volume of peti-
tions that were being presented to Congress. "Petitions
upon petitions stiE continue pouring in against us from the
North and East/' wrote the Texan minister in Washington,
describing what he called " the furious opposition of all the
free States." ^ "I regret the presentation of so many peti-
tions against Texas from the Northeastern states," was the
comment of the Texan Secretary of State in a previous letter
to the same effect, " I had anticipated opposition from that
quarter, but did not suppose it would be so determined and
imcompromising in its character." ^

In the face of this attitude on the part of the government
of the United States and a large proportion of its people,
the proposal for annexation was withdrawn by the Texan
government,* and the people of Texas turned their thoughts
in other directions and began to consider whether, after all,
an independent existence might not be to their interest.

"The prompt and decided refusal of the Government of the U.
States to act in favor of the proposition," said the Texan Secretary
of State, ''has had a tendency to fix the opinions against admission
of those who were wavering on the subject. So great has been the
change in public sentiment that it is probable should the vote be
again taken at the next September election that a majority would
vote against it. Therefore, I do not believe that any future ad- .
ministration will attempt such a negotiation." ^

» Hunt to Irion, Oct. 21, 1837; ibid., 266.
« Hunt to Irion, Jan. 31, 1838; ibid., 287.
» Irion to Hunt, Dec. 31, 1837; ibid., 277.

« Same to same, May 19, 1838; ibid., 329. Also Jones to Vail, Oct 12,
1838; H. R. Doc. 2, 25 Cong., 3 sess., 33.
• Irion to Hunt, Dec. 31, 1837; Tex. Dip. Corr., I, 279.

412 THE rXHED STATES ASD

rA.%'^%

Vntiy^it Lusaif of TexK, wiio came ioso office m Des
e«»d^T^ l^C^^ IvSkf ren6ed ifak ptrrfirtinn, for lie not cadf
fttkd U> atttOQfC any ocgodatiaDs for anseiacian, bak ex-
pnstmid YaamfM as voaiAt xo dastarer any adraotages in it.^
With tt«}r opiimian and ambition, and a certain ^■■i^ii|4
for tbe trnfJeaaant realities of life, he was looking forward
to a |>oirerf ul Texan nation, which sfaoald extend &om the
Oiilf of Mexico to the Pacific, and ohimatefy afford a h%^
way for eonuneree to the Indies by way of Gahreston and
8an FianciiKX^. These dreams were destined to become
realities^ InA \iy other and far different agencies than those
which Lamar imagined, and if he could have had his way
he would have proved an obstacle, and not a he^^ to the
accomplishment of the objects he had in mind.

It was indeed not surprisiiig that Van Buien, ofyreaaed
by many cares, diould have been willing to put aside the
question of Texas when he saw how certain it was to arouse
new controversies over tbe expansion of the slave territory
I of the United States. That subject, it was hoped, had been
laid at rest \jy tbe adoption of the Missouri compromise;
/ and it was l^elieved that it would not again be brou^t to
lif(5 HO long as there was no addition to the possessions
of the United States. ' But the moment any addition was
made, the balance of power established by the compromise
would be disturbed.

The year 1837 was a singularly unpropitious time for the
discuMMion of so agitating a topic. In his inaugural address
Van Burcn had urged the importance of a spirit of forbear-
ance in regard to the institution of slavery and the neces-
sity of avoiding dangerous agitation if "the apprehensions
of th(5 timid and the hopes of the wicked" were to be dis-
appointed. Agitation, however, could not be stilled by any
presidential voice, no tnatter how persuasive, for the anti-
slavery spirit had grown up during Jackson's eight years
in the presidency to a most amazing extent.

The causes of this phenomenal growth and the sudden
development of moral and quasi-religious fervor, which was

I Yoakum, II, 252.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 413

the marked characteristic of the movement, are not alto-
gether easy to trace; nor would the attempt to trace them
fall within the proper limits of this work. But the strong
and growing anti-slavery sentiment in the United States
was henceforth so potent in its influence upon all subjects
connected with the growth of the Southern portions of the
country — ^it played so immense a part in all discussions
relative to Texas annexation, and thus incidentally in the
relations of the United States with Mexico — ^that the salient
features of the development of the anti-slavery movement
must be always clearly present in any study of these sub-
jects. And although no attempt to inquire into its complex
causes need here be made, the symptoms and results of the
widening conviction that slavery was morally wrong, and
should be put an end to, must be briefly stated.

The establishment of the Liberator by William Lloyd
Garrison on the first of January, 1831, marked, if it did not
occasion, the beginning of a period of thirty years of dis-
cussion which never failed to be earnest, and was very often
violent and bitterly abusive. The founding of the Ameri-
can Anti-Slavery Association, in 1833, tended to foster the
growth of the movement throughout the North, and the
fact that this association represented the genuine convic-
tions and hopes of a multitude of people was shown by the
fact that by 1835 there were already two hundred local
auxiliary societies, and in 1837 there were more than five
hundred.

The rise of the mihtant aboUtionist party was not, how-
ever, welcomed by the major part of the people of inteUi-
gence or wealth. Their opposition to the movement was
partly due to the crude methods of the more active preach-
ers of the cause, such as Garrison. His support of all sorts
of then impopular causes, including those of co-education
of the sexes and the participation of women in public
affairs; his supposed lack of adherence to established re-
ligious standards, and his rather ostentatious disregard of
the customary amenities of life were some of the reasons
why he and his followers failed to attract the more fastidi-

414 THE CXTIED STATES AND

i:4^«[»i

ous* Bat a modi more fmidiunffrt^al leMon irfqr tiie octr
and-oiit abolitkniisto always remained a idadveiT aoiall

grotqp was because of the immfirae danger to the Unkm
which their programme involved

To die best minds of that day the perprtnatioo of the
American Union and the avoidance of civil war spemfsd in-
finitely more important objects than the abolition €i daveij.
The thing which was nearest their hearts and deepest in
tiieir convictions was that die Union (tf die states should be
perpetuated If the Union could best be preserved by tol-
erating daveiy, they were ready to tolerate it. Hie men
who directed the affairs of the nation and the men who
directed the affairs of the several states were all of one
mind in this r^ard, and the great body of voters was all
but unanimously of the same opinion. Until at least 1835
there was not a man in Congress of either house who was
in favor of abolition. From 1835 to 1839 Slade, of Vermont,
was alone in Congress as a professed representative of anti-
slavery constituents; although Morris, of Ohio, joined an
abolitionist society in 1835 and defended the cause in the
Senate.

At the beginning of Van Buren's administration, there-
fore, almost all the men in public life, almost all the men of
affairs, and, with few exceptions, all the churches and col-
leges throughout the coimtry, especially those in New Eng-
land, were arrayed against the abolition propaganda.^ By
the ruder elements of society the freely expressed dislike
of educated people in the North for the active abolitionists
was translated into violent acts. Abolitionist meetings in
New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and other
smaller places were the signal for riots, which went to ex-
traordinary lengths. In Boston, in 1835, Garrison was about
to be lynched when the mayor managed to rescue him and
lodge him in jail to save his life.^ In some parts of New
England the opposition to any movement for the benefit of
negroes showed itself in the extravagant form of the sup-
pression, by violent means, of schools for colored children;

» Hart, Slavery and Abolition, 210-214. » Life of Garrison, II, 1-37.

TEXAS PROPOSES ANNEXATION 415

and this not only in cities like New Haven, but in rural
towns like Canaan, in the heart of New Hampshire, and
Canterbury, in the wilds of eastern Connecticut. In Dli-
nois in November, 1837, Lovejoy, an abolitionist editor,
was deliberately murdered by a mob.

It would, however, be a very great mistake to conclude
that because the majority of the people of the Northern
states were opposed to the methods and doctrines of those
who advocated inmiediate aboUtion, they were insensible to
the evils and dangers of slavery. On the contrary, there
was always a very large proportion of the most influential
men in the free states who were strongly opposed to slavery
in principle, who beUeved it to be highly injurious to the
best interests of the nation, and who would gladly have
seen it abolished if any means of doing so could have been
devised which did not seem to them likely to create even
greater evils, and to endanger the very life of the nation.
At the same time, they were strongly opposed to anything \
which would tend to increase what they regarded as a ]
national misfortune, if not a crime, and they were, therefore, I \l,
steadily hostile to any proposal to extend the area of slavery. / ^^
They desired, in Lincoln's famous phrase, to "arrest the I
further spread of it, and place it where the public mind /
shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinc-/
tion."

It was this feeling, not yet fully formulated, which had
embittered the long discussion over the admission of Mis-
souri. It was a very clear apprehension of the hostility
with which any proposal to acquire additional slave terri-
tory would be viewed in the North, that had inspired
Monroe in dealing with the problems raised by the Florida
treaty. And there could be no question that the anti-
slavery discussion from 1830 on, if it had thus far produced
no direct results, had at least greatly strengthened North-
em opposition to the spread of slavery.

The conduct of the Southern states was not calculated to
relieve the tension. Violent language and imfoimded asser-
tions in the North were met with even greater violence and

416 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

more extravagant statements in the South. It was impos-
sible for an abolitionist to hold a public meeting in the
Southern states or to print his views. Anti^veiy news-
papers and pamphlets could not even be circulated through
the mails, for the postmasters were authorized by the gov-
ernment to refuse to deliver such documents. In Congress
the course of the Southern leaders was not only character-
ized by vehemence, but — ^what was worse for them — ^by ex-
traordinarily bad judgment. Their^ most conspicuous and
fatal blimder was the attempt to stifle discussion, by the
adoption of the famous rule in the House of Representar
tives, in February, 1836, which provided that all petitions
or papers " relating in any way or to any extent whatever to
the subject of slavery shall, without being either -printed
or referred, be laid upon the table and that no further
action whatever shall be had thereon."

The chief opponent of this measure was John Quincy
Adams, whose views on slavery, imtil that -time, had been
those of the great majority of men in Massachusetts. He
disliked slavery, but he thought that discussion of the sub-
ject "would lead to ill-will, to heart-burnings, to mutual
hatred, where the first of wants was harmony, and without
accomplishing anything else." ^ But the moment he be-
lieved that free speech was in danger his energies and his
inmiense abilities were aroused. Characteristically, he con-
ceived the most intense dislike of all those who opposed
him. He regarded himself as the champion of a great moral
cause, and he went into the conflict with a whole-souled
bitterness that could not fail to attract universal attention
and stir up the most furious antagonisms. The picturesque
details of the controversy need not be gone into. In 1836
and 1837 it was at its height. One effect of it was to in-
crease greatly the number of abolition petitions presented;
while another effect was to add to the already dangerous
acrimony with which every topic relating to slavery, in-
cluding Texan annexation, was discussed in Congress.

» Memaira, VIII, 454.

CHAPTER XVn

CLApSS AGAINST MEXICO

Both Poinsett and Butler, when they were sent aa repre-
sentatives of the United States to Mexico, had been in-
structed to pay particular attention to two subjects: the
negotiation of a treaty of commerce and the purchase of
Texas. By the beginning of the year 1836 these subjects
had been removed from the region of diplomatic discussion.
The treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation ratified
April 5, 1832, had put the ordinary relations of the two
coimtries upon a basis that was regarded as reasonably satis-
factory. The boundary line of 1819 had been explicitly
affirmed by the treaty concluded January 12, 1828. The
proposals to buy Texas had been fruitlessly and persistently
urged for ten years, until further efforts were manifestly
useless, and until the rising of the colonists indicated at
least a possibility that Mexico, even if terms were agreed
on, would be imable to deliver possession.

There was, however, another task for diplomacy which
had not been in any way disposed of, although it had con-
stantly been before the American legation, and that was the
subject of the claims of American citizens. These claims
were all based on asserted injuries to persons or property
inflicted by the Mexican government or its agents, for which
redress had been sought in vain. As early as the year 1826
Poinsett had been instructed by President Adams's admin-
istration to demand redress for damage sustained by the
forcible seizure of the property of American citizens,^ and a

^See Clay to Poinsett, March 20, 1826, StaU Dept. MSS., where Clay
writes in regard to the seizure and detention of the schooner Fair American:
^Respect for the authorities of the United Mexican States alone forbids my
characterizing it by the epithet which belongs to the transaction/' Most of
the instructions of 1826 related to similar claims, and the number of demands
increased in later years.

417 --^-^

:i*\" •

418 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

steady stream of similar applications had flowed in ever
since, and always without result.

The Mexican government, almost from the very begin-
ning of its independent existence, had been so weak, so in-
efficient, so tossed about between the several factions which
gained from time to time a precarious control, that it had
never been able to- discharge effectually its international
duties, and had been powerless either to prevent the com-
mission of wrongs or to repair the injuries infficted. Com-
plaints to the Mexican Foreign Office were met by silence
or evasion. It was difficult to get a reply to any com-
munication.

''When a delayed and apparently reluctant answer is wrung from
the Secretary," the American charg^ d'affaires reported, "we are
merely told that the disorganized state of the political system pre-
cludes the General Government from exerting those powers with
which they have been invested by the Constitution, and we are ad-
monished to forbear complaints and remonstrances until the restora-
tion of order may enable the Executive to discharge its functions and
enforce the Laws; in the meanwhile however the interests of For-
eigners, their persons and their property are exposed to daily violation
and outrage by every petty officer either of the General or the State
Governments and often without even a plausible pretext to excuse
the delinquency." *

A little later the same official wrotC; in a private letter to
President Jackson :

''Since the present party [Santa Anna and G6mez Farias] came
into power I have been able to do nothing. During the last two
months I have not even received a reply to the many official notes ad-
dressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs on affairs previously
before it, as well as on many new Cases that are daily occurring; the
British Minister informed me that he was similarly situated." *

By the following summer the American government be-
gan to show signs of impatience.

"The President," wrote the Secretary of State, '' dissatisfied with
the continued delays which have taken place in adjusting the points

1 Butler to McLane, Aug. 5, 1833; StaU Depi. MSS,

> Butler to Jackson, Sept. 14, 1833; Texan Archives MSS.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 419

at issue between the two Governments, directs that you will take an
early occasion, after the receipt of this communication, to bring them
again before the Mexican Government, and to obtain a prompt and
definite answer.

"You will also state that the United States hold the Federal Gov-
ernment of Mexico alone accountable for such injuries to their citizens
as merit national interposition; and that the requirement of the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs in his note to you of the 24th of October last,
that the claimants should present their demands in person at the
Mexican Treasury, is too unreasonable to be submitted to. Indeed,
taken in connexion with the refusal to examine any of the claims
until all shall be presented, it is tantamount to a denial of justice."

And Butler was directed, in case a prompt and favorable
answer was not given, to return home.^

In the following winter the subject was brought before
Congress soon after its meeting. On January 5, 1835, the
President sent to the House of Representatives a report
from the Secretary of State, which was to the effect that the
representatives of the United States in Mexico had, from
time to time, addressed the Mexican government in rela-
tion to American claims, but in consequence of the disturbed
condition of the coimtry, entirely without success.* He also
repeated the substance of a despatch from Butler, dated
October 20, 1834, written at a time of political excitement
in Mexico, when Santa Anna had taken over the government
from G6mez Farias, and had directed the election of a new
Congress.

"There is strong ground for believing," said Butler, "that very
important changes will be made in the Cabinet by the time, or very
shortly after, the meeting of Congress; and should the offices be filled^
as there is strong reason for believing they will be, I shall be able to
close in the most satisfactory manner every negotiation on every
subject now pending." '

Butler's optimistic expressions, as usual, rested on nothing
but his wish to be kept in oflSce, and during the next eighteen
months, while he continued to represent the United States,

^ McLane to Butler, June 24, 1834; H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 seas., 144.

«H. R. Doc. 61, 23 Cong., 2 sees.

* H. R. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sees., 542.

42^ THE VSFmtP STATES ISSD

ijk 111

• I IM X «•!

m4 f9risfer iTM vid ;£iat fui fifio«9Bcr vrnid be Ji|i|i»MHril

M tiMr ^/fki^mft^;; lyti^Mihfx^ ^ithm^ ht

^ff^pftmatj V> floak^ fp^A fome Off kas

A# Im; irmi.|>r)7^^ wfaolljr iDdlettaal, the ^ >. »— , ,,, ,»

\}^fpi^u\0^ u wfttmaA0A » eharg^ d^aSiires to Mexko,

Kttm wm A little ov^ forty years old, a nadre of YirgM^
aif^l a ifraduat^ <^ William and Mary. He had been far
m¥0^iid y^M% tu% inc^jMpicoam member of the Hoase of
tUrffr^i¥^$iAiivm, And afterward of the Seoate. He was a
Ihwytrr \fy imA^mum, and at the time of his i^ipointment to
MirxUu} wtm district judge of the United States fcH* the
dintriM (ft Mi$mmipi)l

ffin Uiniruf^iotm, dated near the end of Januaiy, 1836,
w^r^ iri rriarkf'^1 (contrast to those which were giv^i to his
iwr; \)r(uUuttmf)m. The proposals for a treaty of conmierce,
and th<5 propimeiU for the purchase of Texas, which had been
ihi) principal ot)jc;cts of Poinsett's and Butler's missions,
worr) now pamoA ows, and attention was particularly called
Ut tho largo and numerous claims of American citizens
agahiHl tho Mexican government.

" ProviMioti for tlirir payment," he was told, "is pertinaciously with-
held, ntid ihd JtmilcMi of most of them has not been acknowledged.
. . . Though t ho Promdent is willing to look with indulgent considera-
tion U|N)n thn ahnoNt incessant commotions in Mexico, which, by
wonkonlng tho authority of the P'ederal Government, may have en-
oourngtMl thn poriKtration of the acts complained of, and, by exhaust-
ing Itn rtNiount^N, havo, (H^rhaps, made it impossible to grant immediate
rrltt^f to tho injurtnl, ho thinks tliat they afford no sufficient apology
for rofuniug or diH'linutg thus long to examine the claims." *

T\\m U\o n^fu^U to exanune the claims was made the
Uuuti of tl\o complaint against the Mexican government^
luul it waa thi8 ft'i^turo, rather than a failure to pay, that was
to Ih^ on^Juu^Jntnl.

« (^ vV^«Ml# K#«^^««l^ J«M<rPMl. IV, 48$« 502.

« l^Xyn^vlh U^ Kllk Jan. J9. 1$»»; H. H. Doc 351, 25 Ckm^ 2 stm^ ISI^-IA

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 421

Ellis evidently took himself and his instructions very seri-
ously. As soon as he had established himself in Mexico he
went vigorously about the business of pressing the Ameri-
can demands on the distracted government, which was then
straining eveiy nerve to sustain Santa Anna's advance into
Texas, and he very soon convinced himself of the merit of
all the claims presented. " Our coimtrymen here/' he wrote
on April 30, 1836, when he had been but a few days in Mexico,
''are exceedingly anxious in regard to their claims on the
Mexican government; and, if their own accounts be true,
their suflferings and wrongs deserve the prompt and effectual
protection of oiu* government."^ A month later he wrote
again that the "long forbearance" of the American govern-
ment had had " the most unhappy influence on the Mexican
people."

''They look upon^us as either too imbedle, or afraid to vindicate
our just rights; and hence the continual injuries inflicted upon the
persons and property of citizens of the United States. So long, then,
as these impressions prevail here, I am deprived of the power of ren-
dering but little service to my countrymen. ... I would respectfully
suggest the propriety of pursuing a different policy in our intercourse
with the Mexican States. They ought to be made to understand
that the seizure and condemnation of the property, and the imprison-
ment of American citizens, without in some instances even the color
of law to warrant it, will be arrested by a Government whose uniform
policy has been to resist violence and aggression from all foreign
powers."*

Ellis had not the ^t of clear expression, but his meaning,
at any rate, was plain enough. His advice to use forcible
means for impressing the Mexican people, and for putting
an end to "violence and aggression," was well calculated to
appeal to an administration which had just succeeded in
settling a most threatening dispute over the long-outstand-
ing claims of American citizens against the government of
France ; and the preliminary steps were taken with prompti-
tude and vigor.

Congress adjourned on July 4, 1836, and immediately

1 Ellis to Forsyth; iWd., 591.

* Ellis to Forsyth, May 28, 1836; ibid., 591-^2.

422 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

afterward the State Department sent new and detailed in-
structions on the subject of claims^ taking bb a text the
"outrageous conduct" of the Mexican authorities at Ta-
basco with regard to an American schooner stranded near
that port. After referring to a number of other instances
in which very serious wrongs were alleged, Ellis was directed
to address immediately "a strong but respectful representa-
tion to the Mexican government" on the subject of these
and "the numerous other complaints, which had been made
from time to time, and which stiU remain unredressed";
and he was to ask such reparation as these accumulated
wrongs might, on examination, be found to require.

" If, contrary to the President's hopes," the instructions ran, ** no
satisfactory answer shall be given to this just and reasonable demand
within three weeks, you will inform the Mexican government that,
unless redress is afforded without unnecessary delay, your further
residence in Mexico will be useless. If this state of things shall con-
tinue longer, you will give formal notice to the Mexican government
that unless a satisfactory answer shall be given within a fortnight,
you are instructed to ask for your passports; and, at the end of that
time, if you do not receive such answer,^ it is the President's direction
that you demand your passports and return to the United States
bringing with you the archives of the legation."^

Such instructions, given little more than three months
after the battle of San Jacinto, were not very generous to a
nation plunged in hopeless difficulties; but at least they were
well calculated to bring the Mexican Foreign Office to the
conviction that the United States meant business.

Ellis, from point to point, faithfully obeyed his orders.
On September 26, 1836, he addressed the required conununi-
cation to the Minister of Foreign Relations, reciting the
several cases specified by Forsyth, and referring generally
to the other claims, theretofore presented, and the "unex-
pected procrastinations" of the Mexican government in
affording redress for injuries marked by the strongest evi-
dence of cruelty and injustice. And, in conclusion, he per-
emptorily demanded prompt satisfaction.

1 Forsyth to Ellis, July 20, 1836; Sen. Doc. 160, 24 Cong., 2 sees., 133-136.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 423

''The undersigned, therefore/' he wrote, "in compliance with in-
structions from the President of the United States, demands that full
reparation be made to all persons who have sustained injury from the
several cases now set forth; that all private claims of citizens of the
United States on this Government be promptly and properly examined
and Sjuitable redress afiPorded; and that due satisfaction be given for
the numerous insults offered to the officers and flag of the United
States, as heretofore represented."*

The Mexican Foreign OflBce, a week later, sent in reply
the usual light-hearted and meaningless fonnula. The
documents in regard to the various matters mentioned,
some of which related to affairs of distant dates, would be
sent for and submitted to His Excellency the President ad
interimj and a statement of the result would be sent to Mr.
Ellis as soon as practicable {con toda oportunidad) .^

Ellis never had much expectation of accomplishing any-
thing,' and therefore, as soon as the three weeks mentioned
in his instructions were up, he wrote, calling attention to his
note of September 26, and stating (in Forsyth's precise
words) that imless redress was afforded without unneces-
sary delay, "the longer residence of the undersigned, as the
representative of the government of the United States of
America, near that of Mexico, will be useless."*

This time, an immediate answer was returned. The min-
ister had seen with regret Mr. Ellis's note. The Mexican
government could not imderstand that a delay in replying
to a note, however important, could of itself justify so grave
a step as breaking off diplomatic relations. In the present
case there was good reason for the delay, from the want of
documentary evidence (falta de antecedentes) in the depart-
ment, and it was necessary to get documents from the other
departments, and even from the state governments; and
besides this, it would take time to examine them with care,
and to prepare a proper answer. All that could be done at

^ Ellis to Monasterio, Sept. 26, 1836; Sen. Doc. 160, 24 Cong., 2 ix»o.,
13&-143.
s Monaflterio to Ellis, Oct. 3, 1836; ibid., 143.
* Ellis to Forsyth, Oct. 11, 1836; ibid., 152.
« Ellis to Monasteiio, Oct. 20, 1836; ibid., 153.

424 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

present was to give assurances that as soon as the necessary
papers were collected an answer should be made; that the
documents had already been sent for, and that their trans-
mission should be hastened.^

This naive admission that the Foreign Office had for yeara
made no effort whatever to collect the essential information
upon claims which had been repeatedly called to its atten-
tion, fully justified all that the American and other foreign
representatives had said of the wilful delays of the Mexican
authorities. Claims were made, polite repUes were sent to
the effect that the matter should be investigated, and noth-
ing was ever done. Now, an indefinite promise was tardily
given, that an investigation should be made as soon as pos-
sible, but no limit of time was even hinted at.

Ellis, without consulting his own government, concluded
that the occasion had arisen for proceeding to the next step
trailed for by his instructions, and he accordingly wrote to
the Foreign Office that imless " a satisfactory answer " should
be received within two weeks, he was directed to demand
his passports, and return to the United States.*

Within the two weeks a long and argumentative reply was
received from the Foreign Office. In general, the groimd
was taken that in all cases the Mexican courts were open to
the claimants, and that the grievances complained of were
not the subject of diplomatic action. Examining in order
the specific cases mentioned, it was said that in half of them
no siifficient information had yet been received ; as to others,
that the parties had failed to prosecute their cases in the
Mexican courts; as to one case, that orders had been given
to hasten Utigation already begun; and as to others, that
the statements of facts made by the claimants were untrue,
or "exaggerated." In regard to all cases not stated in
detail, the request was made that they should be specified
before taking them into consideration. The note concluded
by rhetorical professions of the willingness of the Mexican
government to satisfy all claims which should be properly

1 Monasterio to Ellis, Oct. 21, 1836; ibid., 153.
* Ellis to Monasterio, Nov. i, 1836; t&u2., 156.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 425

proved; by denials that the government had ever been
guilty of "illegal, arbitrary, and violent acts"; by allusions
to American citizens who had been guilty of smuggling-
especially in Texas, and by references to "the scandalous
proceedings of the authorities in New Orleans" in regard to
the Mexican schooner Correo}

Ellis replied at much length to this conamunication, which
he declared was not a satisfactory answer. He had, there-
fore, he said, but one course to pursue, especially in view of
an outrage conmiitted only a few days before on an American
merchant vessel, in the port of Vera Cruz,^ and the very
recent promotion of the notorious General Gregorio G6mez.'
Entertaining no hope of a satisfactory adjustment of the
questions in controversy, he felt it his duty to request his
passports, and an escort to Vera Cruz/

On December 27, 1836, Ellis left the city of Mexico,
joined the U. S. S. Boston at Vera Cruz, and reached Wash-
ington by way of New Orleans, about the beginning of Feb-
ruary, 1837. Shortly before his departure from the Mexican
capital Gorostiza arrived there; and his government, after
hearing what he had to say, wrote to Ellis their thorough
approval of Gorostiza's conduct.* This act, of itself, re-
quired Ellis (imder instructions previously sent but not re-
ceived when he left) to return at once to the United States.*

The return of Ellis to Washington, bringing full informa-
tion of his fruitless negotiations with the Mexican govern-
ment, was followed by a violent outbreak from the Presi-
dent, occasioned, very likely, quite as much by the expUcit
approval of Gorostiza's course, as by the failure to secure any
acknowledgment of American claims. The latter, however,
was the ostensible cause of Jackson's excited utterances,

^ Monasterio to Ellis, Nov. 15, 1836; ibid.f 42-51. As to the affair of the
Correo, accused of piracy, see ante, page 279.

' The facts in regard to this vessel, the brig Foturth of July, will be found in
Sen. Doc. 160, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 167-169.

' This man was the executioner of the Tampico prisoners in December, 1835.
See page 307, above.

• Ellis to Monasterio, Dec. 7, 1836; iWd., 62-70.

• Monasterio to Ellis, Dec. 21, 1836; ibid., 83.

• Forsyth to Ellis, Dec. 10, 1836; ibid., 157-161.

426 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

which were in rather striking contrast to the tone of his
former messages to Congress.
In his annual message of December, 1835, just before
, Ellis's appointment; the President had contented himself
with a just; but very general allusion to claims against sev-
j eral of the Latin-American nations. Mexico was not specif-
ically mentioned, but the reference to the governments
1 "self-tormented by domestic dissensions . . . upon which
\ oiu* citizens have valid and accumulating claims," were as
\ applicable to that imhappy country as to any of her southem
neighbors.

"Revolution," said the President, "succeeds revolution, injuries
are committed upon foreigners engaged in lawful pursuits, much time
elapses before a government sufficiently stable is erec^ to justify
expectation of redress — ministers are sent and received, and before
the discussions of past injuries are fairly begun, fresh troubles arise;
but too frequently new injuries are added to the old, to be discussed
together with the existing government after it has proved its ability
to sustain the assaults made upon it, or with its successor, if over-
thrown."

To this not too highly colored picture, Jackson added the
warning that; if this state of things should continue much
longer; other nations would be under the painful necessity
of seeking redress "by their own power."

A year later; the annual message of December 6, 1836,
contained a specific reference to the American claims on
Mexico. The President expressed himself as fearing that
"the irritating effect of her struggle with Texas" might lead
Mexico to delay acknowledging and pajdng these "ancient
complaints of injustice."

" I trust, however," he added, " by tempering firmness with cour-
tesy, and acting with great forbearance upon every incident that has
occurred, or that may happen, to do and to obtain justice, and thus
avoid the necessity of again bringing this subject to the view of
Congress."

The amicable tone of this passage made the language of
the special message sent in just two months later; all the
more remarkable.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 427

** At the beginning of this session/' said the President in the message
of February 6, 1837, "Congress was informed that our claims upon
Mexico had not been adjusted; but that, notwithstanding the irritat-
ing effect upon her councib of the movements in Texas, I hoped, by
great forbearance, to avoid the necessity of again bringing the subject
of them to your notice. That hope has been disappointed. • . .
The length of time since some of the injuries have been committed,
the repeated and imavailing applications for redress, the wanton
character of some of the outrages upon the property and persons of
our citizens, upon the officers and flag of the United States, independent
of recent insults to this government and people by the late extraor-
dinary Mexican minister, would justify, in the eyes of all nations,
immediate War. That remedy, however, should not be used by just
and generous nations, confiding in their strength, for injuries com-
mitted, if it can be honorably avoided."

A,.a^.«^tivetoadedaratio„ofwar,.the«fo..it
was suggested that an act be passed authorizing reprisals,
and the use of the naval force of the United States to enforce
them, in case Mexico should refuse an amicable adjustment
upon another demand being made from on board a naval ^^

vessel. Congress, however, was not quite so ready as the | (
bellicose President to take strong measures with Mexico.
The administration was within four weeks of its close, and
Congress could hardly have been expected, just at the end
of the session, to adopt any measure so serious as that
proposed. The committees of both houses did, however,
bring m reports.

In the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations —
probably under the inspiration of Van Buren — recommended
following the President's advice, and giving Mexico "one
more opportunity to atone for the past." This was to be
done by presenting "a statement of such injuries or damages,
verified by competent proofs," in strict accordance with
article XXXTV of the treaty of 1832. The committee
proposed to leave the mode and manner of making this
demand to the President of the United States.

Clay and Buchanan, on February 27, 1837, spoke in sup-
port of the resolution oflfered by the committ^, and upon
calling for the yeas and nays, forty-six senators (out of a

428 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

total membership of fifty) voted in the affinnative, and none
in the negative. Among those who voted were such op-
ponents of the administration aa Clay, Morris of Ohio, and
Webster.

In the House, the Conmiittee on Foreign Affairs brought
in a report on February 24, in which they recommended that
"another demand, made in the most solemn form," should
be tried; and they reconmiended that "a diplomatic fimc-
tionary of the highest grade should be appointed to bear
this last appeal." Time did not permit any discussion on
the report, and no action was taken by the House upon it,
but an item of eighteen thousand dollars was inserted in the
civil and diplomatic appropriation bill for the salary and
outfit of a minister to Mexico whenever, in the opinion of
the President, diplomatic intercourse with that power could
be honorably renewed.^

President Jackson took no action imder this clause of the
appropriation bill, though he had been quick to act on the
previous clause in the same bill, authorizing the appoint-
ment of a diplomatic agent in Texas. But Van Buren on
March 6 nominated Ellis as minister, and he was confirmed
by the Senate without opposition on March 9, 1837.*

When Van Biu-en came into office the whole subject of the
American claims against Mexico was, therefore, still open.
It seemed to him apparent that both branches of Congress
were agreed in thinking that if one more demand for redress
were made and refused, the United States might justly de-
clare war, but that neither house was willing to give the
President discretionary authority to make reprisals, or to
take any other final action before such a demand was made.
The duty of the President, upon this view of the situation,
seemed plain. Unless he was prepared to abandon the
claims altogether, he could do nothing else than present his
demand, receive the reply of the Mexican government, and
if (as was to be anticipated) it proved imfavorable, submit
the matter again to the consideration of Congress.

That programme was accordingly carried out. Instead,

1 5 Stat, at Large, 170. * SenaU Executive Journal, V, 13, 23.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 429

however, of sending a minister to Mexico to present once
more the claims of the United States, Mr. Robert Greenhow,
the interpreter of the State Department, was despatched in
June, 1837, from Pensacola to Vera Cruz, with a long letter
from Fors3rth, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Mexican republic, "inviting for the last time, the
serious attention of the government of that country to the
numerous, various, and long-standing complaints of in-
juries to the citizens, and insults to the officers, flag and
government of the United States, by Mexican authorities."^
With this went a detailed statement of claims under fifty-
five heads, accompanied by documentary proofs. An answer
waa immediately returned, which contained assurances that
the government of Mexico earnestly desired to give a prompt
and explicit answer to each of the claims to which the de-
mand related, and that nothing should be left undone to
effect a speedy and equitable adjustment of all the matters
which had occupied the attention of the government of the
United States.^ The changed tone of this communication
was probably due in some measure to the fact that France
was abo ing ve,y prert>g demands. The Mexican
Congress had, in fact, been already induced to authorize
the government to act in the matter, for by a law of May 20,
1837, the settlement of claims by or against the United
States, by agreement if possible, and, if not, by a joint sub-
mission to the arbitration of a foreign power, was provided
for. If the United States refused to settle the reclamations
of Mexico, the ports of the nation were to be closed to
American vessels, and importation of American goods was
to be prohibited.'

Agreeably to the promises of the Minister of Foreign Re-
lations, Mr. Martinez, the new Mexican minister, reached
Washington on October 14, 1837, and on November 18,
1837, he wrote to the State Department a series of letters
which did not in any sense constitute a complete reply to

* Forsyth to Minister of For. Aff., May 27, 1837; Sen. Doc. 1, 25 Cong.,
2 sess., 10&-108.

» Cuevas to Forsyth, July 29, 1837; ibid., 109-111.
s Dublan y Lozano, III, 392.

430 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the final demand f onnulated by the American government
six months earlier.^

President Van Bm^n, in his annual message of December
5, 1837, referred in detail to this correspondence, and pointed
out that although the lai*ger number of claims had been be-
fore the Mexican government for years, and although some
of the most serious admitted of '^immediate, simple, and
satisfactory replies," yet after a delay of months since the
latest demand had been made, satisfaction had not even
been offered for any one of the public complaints, only a
single one of the cases of personal wrong had been favorably
considered, and but four cases out of over fifty had been
answered at all.

"Considering the spirit manifested by the Mexican Government,"
continued the President, " it has become my painful duty to return
the subject, as it now stands, to Congress, to whom it belongs to de-
cide upon the time, the mode, and the measure of redress."

Congress, however, was not able to come to any deter-
mination. In the House, a week before final adjournment,
the majority of the Committee on Foreign Affairs presented
a report suggesting decisive action, but Cushing, of Massar
chusetts, brought in a minority report, expressing the view
that the errors of the Mexican government were in so great
a degree the result of revolutionary changes, induced by her
struggle for independence, as to require the United States
to receive her overtures with indulgence.* Adams pre-
sented a series of resolutions, ending with a request to the
President to resume amicable relations with Mexico.* No
action was taken on any of these propositions, all of which
were laid on the table.

The Senate did nothing. Four months after the session
opened, Senator Buchanan, in reply to a question, explained
that, as any measure the Senate might adopt would be such

1 Martinez to Forsyth, Nov. 18, 1837; Sen. Doc. 1, 25 Cong., 2 seas., 113-
128.
* Cohg. Globe, 501, July 7, 1838. See H. R. Reports 1056, 25 Cong., 2 seas.
» Ibid., 187, Feb. 19, 1838.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 431

as would be likdy to lead to war, the Committee on Foreign
Kelations were of opinion that they should wait for the
House of Representatives to taJke the lead. An examina-
tion of the precedents, he said, showed that ever since the
foundation of the government, coercive measures had al-
ways originated with the immediate representatives of the
people.*

Although he did not say so, Buchanan, as chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, had probably been
told in confidence that the administration was at that
moment about to enter upon negotiations with Mexico for
a settlement of all claims by arbitration. Such negotiations
were, in fact, carried through successfully, and on Septem-
ber 11, 1838, a convention for that purpose was signed.
For some reason Mexico did not ratify this convention
within the time agreed on, but a new one was entered into
the following April, and in 1840 the arbitrators began their
sessions. There was a board composed of two commis-
sioners on each side, and an umpire. Baron Roenne, ap-
pointed by the King of Prussia. The time limited by the
treaty expired before all the claims presented were &ially
disposed of, but the two commissioners, without reference
to the umpire, allowed nearly $450,000; and in cases where
the board could not agree, Baron Roenne awarded over a
miUion and a half more. The claims actually disposed of, all
of which were for unliquidated damages due to American
citizens, naturally exceeded greatly the amoimts allowed.
They aggregated $6,648,812.88, and the awards amoimted
in aU to $2,026,149.68, or over thirty per cent of the amoimts
originally demanded — rather an unusually high percentage
in cases of this kind.^

Before the treaty of arbitration had been concluded,
Adams, in the House of Representatives, took occasion to
make an attack of extreme bitterness upon the administra-
tions of both Jackson and Van Buren for their conduct in

1 Ibid., 299, April 11, 1838.

' A detailed account of the proceedings under the claims convention of 1839
wOl be found in Moore's Intemational Arbitrationa, II, 1218-1245.

432 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

respect to Texas and Mexico.^ Speaking on July 5, 1838,
he declared that "a system of deep duplicity worthy of
Tiberius Caesar, or Ferdinand of Aragon . . . had been
pursued by the administration ever since the 4th of March,
1829," and that the object of this system was "the breeding
of a war with Mexico, in order that, imder the cover of such
a war we might accomplish the annexation of the province
of Texas to this Union." Adams was unable to complete
his speech before the final adjournment of Congress, but he
published it as a pamphlet, with a preface and a supplement,
in which he stated that the presentation of the clainis
against Mexico had been deliberately managed so as to be
a step toward " fretting the people of this Union into a war
with Mexico, and that this object was pursued by indirect
means and with a double face."

So far as Van Buren was concerned he could afford to
laugh at these denimciations; for at the very time that
Adams was speaking, the administration was busy settling
the details of the treaty of arbitration. But the record of
Jackson's administration for good or ill had been finally
closed, and upon that record the judgment of histoiy must
be made up.

The conclusions to be reached as to Jackson's conduct in
this business will principally depend upon the opinion to be
formed as to his personal character; for the facts being now
generally accessible, are not, in any material respect, in
doubt. Adams looked upon Jackson as a man capable of
carrying out a long-meditated system of "deep duplicity"
which involved such subtle intrigue as the careful fabricar
tion of a letter years in advance of its production; but the
patient plotting requisite to the carrying out of such a sys-
tem is foreign to the judgment that has generally prevailed
in regard to Jackson's character. It seems far more in ac-
cordance with his impulsive and wilful nature to suppose
that the violent course he pursued in reference to the presen-

^ Speech . , , on the Freedom of Speech and of Debate, etc., ddwered in the
House of Representatwes in fragments of the morning hour, from the 16IA (^
June to the 7th of Jtdy, 1838, indusive.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 433

tation of the claims on Mexico was the result of genuine in-
dignation at her procrastination, and at Gorostiza's insult-
ing language, rather than to believe that it was the result
of a compUcated plot.

The bulljdng methods he adopted toward Mexico were
the subject of just criticism, but there were extenuating
circimistances. Jackson was pursuing substantially the
same methods which he had adopted with success in his
controversy with France only a short time before; and he
was recommending precisely the methods which France, in
her turn, was adoptilig with respect to her claims on Mexico,
at the very time when the United States was settling its
diflficulties by the peaceful methods of arbitration. An
accoimt of what was done by the French government to /
enforce the claims of their subjects against Mexico is, there- /
fore, of special interest as exhibiting, in the first place, what /
the public opinion and the practice of the leading European /
nations considered justifiable in such cases; and, in the/
second place, as throwing light upon the military and naval/
problems with which the United States at a later perioa
imdertook to deal, and upon the curiously compoimdec^
character of Greneral Santa Anna.

The claims presented by the French against the Mexican
government were entirely similar in their nature and origin
to those presented by the government of the United States;
but they were much smaller in amount. Some vague
promises of settlement had been made by Cuevas, the Min-
ister of Foreign Relations, in the spring of 1837, but nothing
definite was done during that year, so that finally, in de-
spair, the French minister, Baron Deffaudis, took his de-
parture. When he reached Vera Cruz, he was met by in-
structions from his government, in consequence of which he
addressed a renewed demand for reparation from on board
a French naval vessel.

In this paper the French representative, after setting out
in a general way the claims presented since 1825 by his gov-
ernment— ^none of which had been settled — ^went on to re-
mark upon the policy pursued at different times by the

434 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Mexican government in dealing with such complaints.
The first plan, he said^ consisted in excusing the injuries
committed on foreigners by reason of the backward and dis-
turbed condition of the countiy, the imperfection of ite or-
ganization, and the inexperience of its subordinate officera;
and in promising that reparation would be made as soon as
the financial condition of the republic would permit. Sub-
sequently the Mexican government had changed its tone.
Ii^tead of making promL, it had resorted to intenninable
delays and controversies; and to wholesale assertions that
the allegations of the complainants were false and offensive
to the Mexican government and people.

In conclusion, the French representative demanded the
immediate payment of six hundred thousand dollars in cash;
the dismissal from the service of various Mexican officials,
including the same General G6mez of whose promotion
Ellis had complained; an agreement never to impose forced
loans on French subjects; and a treaty permitting French
subjects to carry on retail trade on the same footing as
Mexican citizens. The last two concessions were said to
have been previously granted to British subjects. A reply
would be awaited for three weeks, or imtil April 15, 1838.
If this reply should not be perfectly favorable upon every
single point, or if it were delayed beyond the fifteenth of
April, the whole subject would be placed in the hands of
Captain Bazoche, commanding the French naval forces, who
would carry out the orders he had received.^

The French ultimatum was at once laid before the federal
Congress, with the statement that the Executive had replied
to Baron Deffaudis by telling him that the honor of the
Mexican nation would be outraged if it entered into negotia-
tions while France retained its threatening attitude, and so
long as its squadron was before the Mexican ports. Con-
gress was delighted with this reply, "and the whole country
applauded a response which was in accordance with the sen-
timents of aU classes of society." ^

^ Blanchard et Daiusats, San Juan de Ul^ia, ou RdatUm de VExpidiiion
FranpiUe au Mexique, 229-250.
' Zamacois, Hiataria de MijicOf XII, 132.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 435

Before this controversy with the French government
General Bustamante had again become President. He was
elected by Congress in the spring of 1837, xmder the Consti-
tution then in force, by a nearly uiiAnimoiis vote, for the
regular term of eight years.^ He actually served less than
four years and a half. This, his second term of office, al-
though longer, was even more disturbed than his first. In
addition to the war with France and minor revolts in various
parts of the coxmtry, the Federalist party revived and became
formidable, and for this revival there seem to have been
several causes.

In the first place, the more remote parts of the country
had felt keenly the change from federalism to centralism.
In the twelve years from 1824 to 1836 the state legislatures
had acquired a certain degree of prestige which attracted
local men, who were naturally dissatisfied with changes that
reduced 4eir importance. But a more far-reachini result
of centralism was the total neglect of local concerns by the
distant government in the city of Mexico — a circimistance
which was inevitable in so large a country, where means of
commimication were so slow and xmcertain; and it is there-
fore not surprising that in Sonora, in Sinaloa, in California,
in Tamaulipas, and in Yucatan formidable Federalist risings
took place.

The most serious of the early revolts was in Sonora and
Sinaloa, and was headed by General Urrea, who had been
one of Santa Anna's principal Ueutenants in Texas, and had
been made commander of the northwestern department of
the country by President Bustamante. Urrea's first act
was to seize the custom-house at Guaymas, to pocket the
money he found there, and to proclaim the restoration of the
federal system. He was defeated, however, at Mazatlan,
on May 6, 1838, and betook himself to Tampico, which re-
volted, in its turn, in October, 1838 ; so that the period of
the IVench controversy coincided exactly with Urrea's
rebellion.

> See Dublan y Lozano, III, 242, 363, for the legislation on this sabjeet.
The Pnrident was ineligible for re-election under the Ooxurtitution of 1836.

436 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The French naval force naturally was not withdrawn
upon the demand of the Mexican govenunent, and Bazoche
instituted what was rather absurdly called a pacific blockade
of the Gulf ports during the summer of 1838. This blockade
produced various consequences, the first of which was a
considerable increase in the price of imported goods. That,
however, was not regarded by everybody as a misfortune.
Those who favored a protective system declared that the
blockade was the greatest good that Heaven could have sent
to Mexico.* It was also thought that a war with France
would be of the greatest advantage to the coxmtry, because
privateers could be sent out to cruise against French com-
merce, whose prizes would fill the country with gold.'

There were no fears of the result of such a war. It was
not thought possible that any French expedition could pene-
trate the country, and the fortress of San Juan de Ultoa was
looked upon as impregnable — as a second Gibraltar. San
Juan de Ulua was a masonry work, begun early in the seven-
teenth century, and built on the southwesterly edge of the
Gallega bank or shoal, a large coral reef directly opposite
the city of Vera Cruz, and distant less than half a mile from
it. The shore at Vera Cruz runs very nearly northeast and
southwest. The Gallega bank runs north and south, and
is over a mile long, and more than three-quarters of a mile
wide in its widest part; and beyond it, separated by a nar-
row deep channel, is a similar but smaller reef, the GaUeguilla.
The depth of water over all of these banks in 1838 was very
trifling, and in most places they were awash at low spring-
tides. As the tides rise and fall only about two feet on this
part of the coast, and as the surface of the banks was smooth,
level coral sand, it would have been perfectly practicable for
assaulting columns to advance directly on the works. No
vessels could approach the fort within a mile and a half on
the north; nor could it be attacked on the south and west
without the assailants coming under a cross-fire from the
fort itself and the batteries of Vera Cruz. The only point,
therefore, from which a naval attack could be delivered

^ Hivera; Hi9t, de Jalapa, III, 354. ' Bulnee, Orandes Menlirtu^ 725.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 437

was on the southeasterly f ace, where there was enough water
for vessels of considerable draught within about a thousand
yards.

The main body of the fortress was a quadrangle of great
capacity, with strong bastions at the comers. The sea-front,
looking northeasterly over the Gallega reef, was covered by
a demilune and two redoubts, and beyond these by a water-
battery extending entirely along the front; but these out-
works gave little additional strength. Two hundred and
seven pieces of artillery of all sizes were mounted upon the
works, of which somewhat less than fifty could be brought
to bear on any vessel attacking from the eastward. Well-
constructed cremates gave exceUent protection from high-
angle fire. Included in the armament of the fortress were
twelve mortars and a number of carronades, but it would
appear that no shells had been supplied for them by the
ordnance department of the government, and there do not
seem to have been any furnaces for heating solid shot.^

During the summer no attack \yas made upon any of
the Mexican defences, but late in the month of October,
1838, an additional French naval squadron arrived at Vera
Cruz, xmder the command of Admiral Charles Baudin, who
was intrusted with diplomatic as well as naval functions.'
Baudin's first act after reaching Mexico was to address a
letter to the government, stating that he was authorized to
request an answer to the note addressed the previous March
by Baron Defifaudis. In reply Cuevas, who was still Min-
ister of Foreign Relations, agreed to meet him for conference
at Jalapa, where a discussion over the French claims took
place during the month of November, without result.'

1 Blanchard et Dauzats, 334-336.

' The British government had an understanding with France on the sub-
ject of Baudin's expedition, and instructions were sent to Admiral Sir Charles
Paget in October, directing him not to interfere with the French operations,
but to keep track of their squadron and to remain away from the coast of
Mexico if an attack was to be made. — (Palmerston to Lords of the Admiralty,
Oct. 9, 1839; E. D. Adams, British InteresU and AdimHea in Texas, 22.) The
British shipping trade was seriously inconvenienced by the French blockade.

* The first result of any agreement, according to C. M. Bustamante, would
-have been a revolution that would have destroyed the Mexican government.
—(Oabinde Mexioano, I, 118.)

438 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

•

FmaUy^ on November 21^ 1838^ Admiral Baudin notified
Cuevas that he would wait ofif Vera Cruz xmtil the twenty-
seventh of the month; at noon, and if by that time an agree-
ment had not been reached in terms completely satisfactory
to France hostilities would immediately begin.

The French fleet now consisted of four frigates, two cop-
vetteS; nine brigs, two small steamers used as tugs, two
mortar vessels, and three store-ships, whose crews amoxmted
in all to about fom* thousand men. Early on the morning
of the twenty-seventh three of the frigates proceeded to a
point about sixteen hundred yards off the southeasterly face
of the works, and anchored with a spring on their cables, and
two mortar vessels were also moored about a mile to the
northward.* Two smaller vessels were posted so as to be
able to observe the fall of the shot, and to signal the frigates
and mortar vessels when they got the range. The corvette *
Oriole, under the command of the Prince de Joinville, a son
of the French King, was to be kept under way, and take an
active part in the attack as circumstances might dictate.
The Mexicans all this time, under orders of their govern-
ment, had remained silent.

No reply which Admiral Baudin considered satisfactory
having been received, the ships opened fire at 2.35 p. m.
and the Mexicans instantly replied. Before four o'clock a
powder-magazine in one of the bastions exploded, and at
half past four a tower in the fort also blew up, killing and
wounding a number of the defenders. Firing continued
until about six, when, darkness coming on, the admiral
decided to withdraw his ships and wait until the next day.
Before morning, however, the fort had surrendered.

About nine o'clock in the evening of the bombardment
Admiral Baudin received a letter from General Gaona, who
conmianded the fort, proposing a suspension of hostilities.
The admiral replied by stating that he would suspend hos-
tilities until morning, but if at daylight the fort was not

^ The admiral had previously made careful recomioiasanoee of the fortreBS
of San Juan, some of his officers wading over the reef up to the very walls
of the outworks. — (Blanohard et Dauzats, 210. 222; Jurien de la
VAnwral Baudin, 134.)

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 439

surrendered he would blow it up, and negotiations for sur-
render immediately began.

While this exchange of letters was going on Santa Anna
arrived at Vera Cruz, and offered his services to Rincon, the
general in command of the town, ostensibly to aid in the
defence, although, no doubt, he had really come to Vera
Cruz to see whether something for his own benefit might
not turn up. The first duty assigned to him was to vi^t
San Juan de UlUa to report on the extent of the damage
done by the French fire. He foimd Gaona in conference
with two French officers, and suggested that a council of
war should be called to consider what was to be done. Likev
most councils of war, this one declined to fight, even though \
reinforcements should be sent; and finally, at half past \
two in the morning, an agreement was made, by which the \
fort was surrendered and the garrison was withdrawn, with 1
their arms and baggage, and with the honors of war, under 1
a promise not to serve against France for eight months. It iV-A
was further agreed that the city of Vera Cruz should be IT /
neutralized; that there should not be a Mexican force ex- I
ceeding one thousand men within ten leagues; and that the ]
blockade of the port should be suspended for eight months, \
pending a settlement of the differences between France and
Mexico.*

News of this surrender was very badly received by the
authorities in the city of Mexico, where it was universally
attributed either to treason or cowardice. The government
disapproved both the surrender of the fortress and the
agreement neutralizing the city of Vera Cruz, and ordered
Generals Rincon and Gaona to proceed to the capital of the
republic, to appear before a court-martial. It further di-
rected that the city of Vera Cruz should be defended and
appointed Santa Anna to the command.

Santa Anna's appointment was tremendously popular.

* For accounts of the bombardment of San Juan de Ultia and the text of the
capitulation, etc., see Blanchard et Dauzats, 306-340, and C. M. Bustamante,
Oabinde Mexioano, 1, 121-136, where General Gaona's official report is printed.
Some additional facts will be found in Jurien de la Gravito's VAmiral Batuiin,
106-153, together with excellent maps.

440 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

On Saturday, the first of December, before a crowded audi-
ence in the Chamber of Deputies, the ministry announced
the news of the surrender of San Juan de Uliia and the re-
moval of Generals Rincon and Gaona. The minister,
Pesado, who made the announcement, went on to say that
the President had named, to succeed Rincon, "General —
General" — the speaker hesitated, stumbled over his words,
and suddenly blurted out — ^^Don Antonio L&pez de Santa
Anna^ Instantly the galleries burst into loud applause,
and shouts of "He's the man we want!" "He's the savior
of the country!" "You heard the shouts of the galleries
for Santa Anna," said General Tomel to his friends; "he
is the only head of the nation that the people will approve";
and it is quite possible that President Bustamante was very
much pleased to put so dangerous a rival in command of an
indefensible city.*

So far as public opinion condemned the surrender of San
Juan de Uliia, it had some good grounds for an adverse
judgment. The preparations for defence had been exces-
sively feeble; but Rincon, who had been charged with these
preparations, could plead that the government had failed
to supply him with the necessary funds. He had estimated
that it would cost a hundred and fifty thousand dollars to
make adequate preparations, and he showed that the gov-
ernment had persistently failed to give him the money which
he had reported was essential. Indeed, so distressed was he
for want of funds that he was obliged to dismiss on furlough
the boats' crews of the government launches, and was hardly
able to procure provisions for the garrisons of the fort and
the city.

When it came to the actual attack. General Gaona, con-
manding the fort, seems to have made poor use of such
materials as were at hand. He had nearly twelve hundred
men, many more than were necessary to man the guns.
Instead of keeping his reserves in the casemates, they were
drawn up in a hollow way, as though an assault might be
expected at any moment upon this island fortress. In con-

^ C. M. Bustamantei GabineU Mexicano, I, 133-137.

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 441

sequence of these dispositions, there were not only many
casualties among the men serving the guns but also among
the reserves. These losses, coupled with the risk to the
large number of women in the fort, had thoroughly demor-
alized the garrison.

The fort itself, as a result of the French bombardment,
was a good deal knocked about, but the casemates were un-
injured; a large part of the guns which could be brought to
bear on the fleet could still have been served; and there were
no breaches in the walls which would permit an assault.
This, at least, was the opilnion of the French officers who
visited the fort after the bombardment. Lieutenant Mais-
sin, aide-de-camp to Admiral Baudin, reported that the de-
fensive works were intact, and consequently, according to
the ordinary laws of warfare, the fort, though badly dam-
aged, was still tenable.^ M. Mengis, an officer of engineers,
who accompanied the expedition, and who also visited the
fort after the surrender, said that the principal powder
magazine was intact, there were still at least seven hundred
men in the garrison — ^who were more than enough for de-
fence— ^and that there was no adequate reason for surrender.^
Other observers were of a different opinion. Thus Captain
(afterward Admiral) Farragut, who was present at the time
of the bombardment in conmiand of the United States
sloop-of-war Erie, and visited the fort soon after its surren-
der, said that a single glance satisfied him that it would not
have been practicable for the Mexicans to stand to their
guns, and that in a few hours more the place would have
been a mass of rubbish.'

The Mexican losses amounted to sixty-foiu* men killed
and one hundred and forty-seven wounded. The wounded,
as usual, had received no medical attention, and were found
in a shocking condition.^ The French losses amounted to
four killed and twenty-nine wounded. Their ships had re-
ceived practically no injury.

On December 4, 1838, General Santa Anna, under instruc-

1 Blanchard Qt Dauzats, 465. * Jurien de la Gravi^re, 151.

' Life and LeUers of David 0. FarragvJL, 134. « Blanchard et Dauzats, 337.

442 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tions from his government^ notified Admiral Baudin that
the convention neutralizing Vera Cruz was disapproved and
was therefore void. The admiral^ however, was unwilling to
open fire upon an inhabited city, but as the town was forti-
fied he decided to land a party at once, before the garrison
could be reinforced, in order to spike the guns — at least on
the seaward face of the works.^ At three o'clock, therefore,
on the morning of the following day two strong landing
parties from the ships were sent ashore with instructions to
take the northerly and southerly bastions respectively, spike
the guns, and destroy the gun-carriages. A third party was
ordered to land on the mole lying about half-way between
the two bastions and opposite the gate of the town.

The landing was made in a thick fog. The town was
taken completely by surprise. The bastions were seized by
the right and left columns without difficulty, while the centre
column blew open the gate and seized a piece of artillery
which had been placed to command the mole, and rushed to
the house which was occupied by General Santa Anna and
General Arista. Arista, who conmianded a force that was
advancing from the direction of Jalapa to reinforce the gar-
rison, was taken prisoner: but Santa Anna, who had been
awakened by the explosion when the gate was blown in,
managed to escape just in time. The Merced barracks, in
the southeastern part of the town, where the whole garrison
had assembled, were then attacked by the French force,
and some fighting took place at this point without any par-
ticular result.

After it appeared that the town had been taken. Admiral
Baudin himself came ashore to see that his orders were car-
ried out. He found that the whole extent of the walls had
been occupied by his men, and that the guns had been
spiked and their carriages disabled; and h£ object being
thus fully attained, he ordered the men to withdraw to the

^ The city walls were built about 1741 ; they were six feet high and sur-
mounted by a strong double stockade of the same height. At the north and
south ends of the town were bastions mounting over forty guns between them,
and protecting the arsenal and naval stores. — (Bancroft, History of Mexico,
III, 215.)

CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO 443

shore in order to regain their ships. The retreating French
forces were followed by the Mexicans — ^at a very respectful
distance according to French accounts — ^and when the last
of the French were embarking at the mole the Mexicans
opened a musketry fire from the walls. The French replied
with the piece of artillery that had been taken at the
gate; as well as with their own boat guns. The principal
losses of the French occurred at this point, where the men
were crowded together during the confusion of embarkation;
but the Mexicans at the same time suffered heavily. Among
others, Santa Anna was wounded, being shot in the foot.

The French losses in this afifair were eight killed and sixty
wounded, all of the wounded being carried ofif in the boats.
The Mexican losses were probably as large, although the
exact figures were not known.^

The wound of Santa Anna was so severe that it became
necessary to amputate his leg below the knee the day after
the fight; but his ingenious mind was quite equal to the
task of turning this misfortune to account. In a high-flown
report to the Mexican government he declared that he had
repulsed the French attack and had driven them at the
point of the bayonet until they took to their boats. He
lamented that in consequence of his wound this victory
would probably be the last he could ofifer to his country.

At the close of my existence," he continued, "I cannot but ex-
press the satisfaction which accompanies me at having seen the be-
ginnings of reconciliation among Mexicans. I have given my last
embrace to General Arista, with whom I was unfortunately at odds,
and I now abo embrace his Excellency, the President of the Republic,
to mark my gratitude for his having honored me in the moment of
danger. I embrace likewise all my compatriots, and I conjure them
for the sake of a country that stands in such peril, that they put away
their resentments and unite to form an impenetrable wall on which
the daring of the French shall be shattered.

*' I also request the Government of my country to permit my body
to be buried in these dunes; that all my companions in arms may

^ Blanchard et Dauzats, 360-^2. Modern Mexican historians do not seri-
ouisly dispute the accuracy of the French reports. See Mixico d travia de lo8
Sighs, IV, 423-426. A detailed account by one of Santa Anna's aids, Colonel
Gimdnez, will be found in Garcia's DocumerUaa IrUditos, etc., XXXIV, 62-72.

444 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

know that this is the line of battle whidi I have mariced out for them,
and that from thb day forth the unjust enemies of Mexicans may not
dare to tread with unclean feet upon our soil. . . . Let all Mexicans,
forgetting my political errors, not deny me the sole title which I
desire to leave my children: that of a good Mexican," ^

Santa Anna's life was really in no sort of danger, but this •
pathetic appeal to his countrymen exactly suited their taste,
and from this time forward his political position was even
stronger than it had been before his unlucky expedition to
Texas.

1 C. M. Bustamante, Oabinde Mexioano, 1, 143.

CHAPTER XVm

SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE

The capture of San Juan de Ultla and the disarming of the
fortifications of the city of Vera Cruz left the contending
parties at a dead-lock. The French were not in sufficient
force to attempt an expedition into the country, and the
Mexican government was powerless to attack the French
ships. Santa Anna's command; therefore, abandoned Vera
Cruz and encamped a few mfles outside the city, while
Baudin stationed some of his ^nailer vessels in the harbor
of Vera Cruz itself, thus holding the city entirely at his
mercy. The Mexican government, however, did not dare to
enter into negotiations for peace, as opinion both in Congress
and out was still very much inflamed; and if it had been
known that the administration was negotiating with the
French, the result would probably have been an inmiediate
revolution, that would have driven Bustamante from power.

The solution of the difficulty came through the mediation
of the British minister in Mexico, who returned from a
leave of absence rather unexpectedly, accompanied by the
entire British West India squadron. As this squadron had
with it 'two seventy-four-gun line-of-battle ships, it was
greatly superior to Baudin's division, and the French ad-
miral judiciously refused to accept the mediation of the
British minister in the presence of a superior naval force.
Mr. Pakenham, the British minister, saw the full force of
this objection, and sent the two line-of-battle ships back to
Jamaica, but kept the rest of the ships near Vera Cruz, as
he had business of his own with the Mexican government.

For two months Pakenham, with great tact, negotiated
with the Mexican government, and finally persuaded them
to send representatives to Vera Cruz to treat with the French

445

446 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

•

admiral. The administration itself was quite willing from
the first to make peace on the French terms, because the
blockade of the Gulf ports had cut off aknost all the princi-
pal sources of revenue, and without money the government
could not be carried on. Moreover, Baudin had not merely
cut off the supplies, but had entered into relations with the
Federalist insurgents at Tampico, and had left that part of
the coast open to foreign commerce. The trade of Tampico
flourished in consequence, and a large amount of money was
received at the custom-house — all of which went into the
treasury of the insurgents. The result of the blockade,
therefSe, was twofold It impoverished the govemmeni
while it enriched the insurgents. But the voice of Congress
and the newspapers was still for war, and it was only by
degrees that they could be persuaded that the national honor
did not require any longer keeping up a hostile attitude.

The representatives sent to Vera Cruz by the Mexican
government were Gorostiza, who was then Secretary of
Foreign Relations, and the ex-President Victoria; and Paken-
ham went with them. Their task was a very easy one, for
they had only to consent to the French demands. Baudin
made some iLnportant concessions, principally in matter
of form, and two papers, one a treaty o/ pea^ a^d the other
a convention for the payment of the indemnity of six hun-
dred thousand dollars, were signed on March 9, 1839.^

The next question was whether the treaties would be
ratified by Congress, which, according to the terms of the
agreement had to be done within twelve days. After con-
siderable and heated discussion the government was sus-
tained by a vote of twenty-seven to twelve in the Chamber
of Deputies, on March 19, 1839, and on the following day
by the Senate, three members voting in the negative. This
result seems to have been due in considerable measure to
the influence of Santa Anna, who had arrived in the city of
Mexico on February 17.^

^ See Spanish text in Dublan y Lozano, III, 617--619.
'The negotiations and debates above referred to will be found in Busta-
mante, Gabinete MexicanOf 1, 163-177; see also Blanchard et Dauzats, 4S2-501.

t SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE 447

Shortly after the settlement of the Mexican diflSculties
with the French, Pakenham was able to get from the Mexi-
can government the long-delayed sanction required for the
adjustment of the claims of the British holders of Mexican
bonds — a matter which then had been long pending, and
which might not have been carried through at all but for
the lesson of San Juan de Ulila, and the very significant
hint afforded by the visit of a powerful Britidi squadron.
The details of this negotiation may be briefly stated.

It will be recalled that two loans had originally been made
in London by the Mexican government, one through Gk)ld-
schmidt & Co., in October, 1823, and another through Bar-
clay, Herring, Richardson & Co., in February, 1825, amount-
ing in all to thirty-two million dollars. Interest upon these
issues was paid up to July 1, 1827, and then stopped.

By an act of Congress of October 2, 1830,^ it was deter-
mined to capitalize all of the xmpaid interest up to April 1,
1831, and one-half of the interest that would fall due from
1831 to 1836, by issuing five per cent bonds at sixty-two and
one-half for the unpaid interest on the five per cent loan;
and by issuing six per cent bonds at seventy-five for the
impaid interest on the six per cent loan. In accordance
with this authority, Gorostiza, at that time the Mexican
minister in London, made a refunding agreement with
Messrs. Baring Brothers & Co., which was subsequently
approved by the bond-holders. This arrangement required
the issuance of new bonds, amounting in all to seven million
five hundred thousand dollars. The Mexican government
duly issued the refunding bonds of 1830, and paid so much
of the interest as fell due under the agreement up to and
including July, 1832 ; but it paid nothing for the years 1833,
1834, 1835, and 1836.

Early in 1837 the Mexican government, xmder the au-
thority of an act of April 4, 1837, offered the bond-hofders
to convert one-half of their holdings into new consolidated
fund bonds, and to pay the other half by "inscriptions," or
certificates, giving the right to locate vacant land in the

1 Dublan y Lozano, II, 280.

448 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

departments of Texas, Chihuahua; New Mexico, Sonora,
and California.^

The Mexican proposal was disapproved by the bond-
holders, but a counter proposition was made on their be-
half, which was accepted by the Mexican representatives in
London, and an agreement to carry it into eflfect was signed
on September 14, 1837.' The substance of this arrangement
was that instead of " inscriptions'' for land, "deferred
bonds," bearing no interest for ten years, were to be issued
to the bond-holders for half their holdings; that at any time
during the ten years the holders of such deferred bonds
might at their option receive land in payment for the bonds,
upon certain terms; and that bonds not so exchanged for
land during the ten years would become interest-bearing,
and receive five per cent from and after October 1, 1847.

This arrangement, however, was disapproved by tiie
Mexican government, apparently on the ground that the
act of Congress of April 4 did not confer suflBcient authority;
and therefore, when Congress met in January, 1838, the
government submitted a bill to grant the necessary authority
which concluded with the following provision : " The Execu-
tive is authorized to take into consideration the proposal
heretofore made by the holders of the Mexican bonds or
any new propositions which may be submitted, and to agree
with the bond-holders in such manner as may best combine
and insure the interests of both parties." '

When this measure was introduced in Congress at the
beginning of the year 1838, the administration of Busta-
mante was engaged in controversies with both France and
the United States over the claims of their citizens. The
Mexican Congress was in a very uncompromising mood, so
far at least as paying creditors was concerned, and the pro-
posal to give the administration full discretionary authority
to settle with the English bond-holders met with such oppo-
sition that nothing whatever was done toward disposing of

^ See the text of this proposal in Murphy, Memoria 9obre la Deuda Esierior^
141; Dublan y Lozano, UI, 359-361.
« Murphy, 144-147. » Ibid., la

SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE 449

the matter during the year 1838. But by the early part of
1839, after the fall of San Juan de Uliia, Congress was in a
much more yielding temper. On June 1 of that year, under
Pakenham's persuasions, a law was passed approving the
agreement made in London on September 14, 1837, and
giving the government authority to carry out the details.*
This was the price of British mediation.

The principle of an adjustment with the British bond-
holders had thus at last been agreed upon; but the accumu-
lation of unpaid interest in the meantime caused fresh com-
plications. A new act of Congress was required, which was
not passed until August 3, 1841, and thereupon a modifica-
tion of the agreement was finally adopted in London, Feb-
ruary 10, 1842, and ratified at a bond-holders' meeting.*
The total funded debt under this agreement amounted to
very nearly fifty million dollars (£9,247,944.2.3, with interest
from October 1, 1837).

In the early spring of 1839, the American claims having
been got out of the way by the acceptance of the proposal
for arbitration, and the English and French questions be-
ing in a fair way of settlement, the Mexican government
felt that it was at last strong enough to devote attention to
certain serious and urgent domestic questions, the chief of
which was the Federalist rising in the northeastern part of
the country. Matters had become worse since Urrea came
east in 1838. In the winter of 1839 the garrison of Mon-
clova had pronounced for federalism; and in the spring,
Matamoros, Monterey (Nuevo Leon), and Saltillo fell into
the hands of the insurgents.

Santa Anna urged Bustamante to assmne conmiand in
person of the government troops, which the latter was quite
willing to undertake in the hope of acquiring on his own part
some military laurels, though he hesitated at leaving Santa
Anna behind him in the capital. But finally he was per-
suaded to do even that. The constitutional laws provided
that in the absence of the President from the city of Mexico

1 Murphy, 147; Dublan y Lozano, III, 624, 646.
« Murphy, 152-155; Dublan y Loxano, IV, 29.

450 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

his duties should be devolved upon the president of the
council; whO; at the time^ was Nicolas Bravo. Brave^ how-
ever^ consented to step aside in favor of Santa Anna^ and
gave the usual excuse that his health would not permit him
to undertake the duty. It was thereupon declared by a
decree of the so-called Supreme Conservative Power, that
in view of the inability of General Bravo to act, and in view
of the unanimous wish of Congress, and the confidence mani-
fested by all Mexicans in General Santa Anna by reason of
his late deeds and his patriotic detennination in the war
against France, he should take charge of the government
diuing the President's absence. On March 18, therefore,
Santa Anna took over the government, and on the evening
of that day the President set out for Tampico.^

Unfortunately for Bustamante's hopes and ambitions, his
attempt to acquire a military reputation was imsuccessf ul ;
and it was Santa Anna who again gained all the glory,
and who raised himself higher than ever in the estimation
of his coimtrymen. Bustamante's very leisurely advance
afforded the Tampico insurgents an excellent opportimity
of slipping in between his colunm and the city of Mexico.
The moment this plan was developed Santa Anna, with his
customary energy, managed to concentrate a considerable
force at Puebla, which met the insurgents and totally de-
feated them at Acajete, on May 3, 1839. Urrea, who com-
manded the federal force, managed to escape; but Mejfa —
the same man who had sailed to Texas and fraternized with
the colonists in 1832, and whp had led the fatal expedition
from New Orleans to Tampico in 1835 — ^was captured and
duly shot. It was said, very likely on insuflficient authority,
that Santa Anna after the battle sent Mejfa a message
that he was to be put to death in half an hour. "He is
very kind," was the alleged reply, "but if I had taken him,
I would have shot him inside of five minutes." Such were
the amenities between old friends in Mexican politics.

Early in June, 1839, Tampico surrendered, and Urrea
again escaped; but he was captured soon after and con-

^ Dublan y LozanOi III, 581 ; Bustamante, OabineU MexioanOf 1, 176.

•I

SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE 451

demned to banishment; escaped once more^ and was again
taken and imprisoned in the city of Mexico. Bustamante
himself saw no fightings and returned to the capital in July,
weaker politically than when he left. Santa Anna, however,
evidently thought that the time had not yet come to over-
throw tlie government, and he returned to his ranch at
Manga de Clavo, where he bided his time, posing mean-
while as a friend and supporter of the administration.

The Federalists were not yet put down in Coahuila, where
General Canales tried to get the Texan government to join
him in forming with the northern Mexican states a separate
republic; but the Texan authorities had a profound distrust
of Mexicans and declined to help. Nevertheless, there were
enough men eager for excitement to enable Canales to enlist
in Texas an auxiliary corps several hundred strong, who
carried on a desulto^ warfare for some time with gi^t
success, until they found themselves abandoned by their
Mexican allies.^

But much the most successful Federalist rising was in
Yucatan, which broke out in May, 1839, at about the time
when Santa Anna was defeating Urrea and his Tampico
insurgents. Yucatan was a great deal too far from the
capital to be easily reached by land, and for lacjc of vessels,
lack of money, and several other good reasons, reinforce-
ments for the government troops could not be transported
by sea. The result was that by Jirne, 1840, the Federalists,
being in control of the entire peninsula, and of the neighbor-
ing state of Tabasco, presently declared their independence
of Mexico.

Yucatan then proceeded to enter into friendly relations
with Texas, and subsidized the little Texan navy, which,
on two occasions, in June, 1840, and in November, 1841,
visited the ports of Yucatan and cruised with success along
the whole Gulf coast of Mexico.^ In 1843 the Texan navy

^ An account of the exploits of this Texan force will be found in Yoakum, II,
274-279, 28S-297; Rivera, HMnia de JaLapa, III, 427, 440, 465.

' A verv full account of these operations will be found in Tex, Hiet, Qtiar.,
Xra, 18-28, 33-43.

452 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

was again off Campeche and roughly handled such vessels
as the Mexican government had been able, after some effort,
to station on that coast — ^apparently some small ships bought
.in England.*

The chief result, therefore, of nearly five years' effort to
establish centralism had been the loss of Texas, Yucatan,
and Tabasco, and a general discontent throughout all the
- ^ more distant parts of the Mexican republic. Disturbances
now began to break out in the centre. These, however,
were not due to the establishment of a centralized govern-
ment, but rather to tendencies inherent in the very frame-
work of Mexican society.

In the first place, the chronic emptiness of the Mexican
Treasury was a symptom of the distressed condition of the
nation, and it was not then easy to see how this diflSculty
was ever to be overcome.* Mexico had no inunigration.
Its government was unsettled. There was no security for
investments. The stream of wealth which Europe had
poured into the country immediately after independence
had long since been completely checked. And as the situa-
tion of the Treasury grew worse, the church and the army
became more and more active in their interference with
pubUc affairs.

The great wealth of the church was, on the one hand, a
constant source of temptation to needy governments; but,
on the other hand, it was an imdoubted source of power.
In order to preserve its threatened possessions, the ministers
of the church, who still enjoyed a number of special legal
privileges, naturally exerted themselves for the continuance
of existing institutions. The clergy were well able to exer-
cise a great influence upon all classes of society, for, as a
rule, the Mexican people of that day were extremely devout,
and some of them were intensely superstitious. It is true
that in later years the laws of reform, which destroyed the

1 Tex, Hist. Qtior., XIU, 105-112.

'Successive Secretaries of the Treasury confessed their inability to solve
the problem of making both ends meet. See for example, Memoria de la
hacienda general . . . preaentada ... en 29 (ie Jtdio de 1837, and Memoria
de la hacienda nacional . . . preeeniada ... en Julio de 1838.

SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE 453

financial and political power of the church in Mexico,
secured the support of a great majority of the Mexican
voters; but during the ten or fifteen years after 1836, public
opinion had not reached a point where it was ready to sus-
tain any real or thorough-going effort to deal with ecclesi-
astical abuses.

Th^ army had no invested wealth to preserve, but it had
a great interest in keeping up its special privileges, and in
the payment of the large sums disbursed in salaries to its
officers. The officers were almost all white men, and the
preservation of the power and privileges of their class was
the one thing which united them; and indeed what chiefly
made the army a curse to Mexico was the fact that by an
unbroken tradition nearly all the most lucrative places in
the government, from the presidency down, were within
the reach of ambitious and popular officers. As the busi-
ness of every officer of high rank was, therefore, politics,
so the business of every party was to keep the army satis-
fied; and just in proportion to the skill and success of an
administration in distributing good places among the other
party generals was their success in keeping high office and
wealth for themselves. No number of offices could, however,
have satisfied the insatiable demands of the army, and hence
the perpetual series of mutinies, whose real objects, what-
ever popular cry might be used as a pretext, always were to
put one set of men in and to turn another set out.

The rank and file of the army had very Uttle to say about
such matters. They were badly fed, badly armed, badly
clothed, and rarely paid. They were compelled to endure
all sorts of privations, which they sustained without a mur-
mur, and if they were not very effective in battle, they were
astonishingly good upon the march. The patient and ig-
norant Indians in the ranks knew no more of pubUc affairs
than their relatives who tilled the fields, worked the mines,
and performed the manual labor of the coimtry, for the
number of people in Mexico who took any interest in public
affairs or exerted the smallest influence was always extremely
limited. Indeed, the law permitted few of the people even

454 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

to vote. Under the constitutional laws of 1836 no one was
entitled to the suffrage unless he had an income of at least
one hundred dollars a year, "proceeding from real or per-
sonal property, or from trade or honest personal labor use-
ful to society'': and domestic servants, vagabonds, and
persons having io trade or honest means of U^elihood wer«
specially excluded.^

In a large sense the office-holders, actual or potential,
ruled Mexico. In so poor a coimtry there were few other
ma^ns for men of education to get alivmg thaa by holding
office, either in the church or imder the government. The
legal and medical professions, and to a certain extent whole-
sale trade, offered a career, but the most coveted openings
for a yoimg man of education were still in Mexico what
they had been in the eighteenth century in Spain, where
the pretendientes had for years furnished Spanish literature
with a constant subject for ridicule.

Madrid under the Bourbon Eangs had been the general
meeting-place of all the office-seekers of the kingdom. The
clergy came to solicit benefices and bishoprics, the officers
of the araiy and navy came to beg for promotion, and civil-
lans came to find employment imder one branch or the
other of the government. As their purses were in general
very ill furnished, the caricatures of the day exhibited them
leading a wretched life and constantly at odds with their
landlords, by whom they were fleeced and whom they
principally supported. In reality, they were so trouble-
some to the police that from time to time the authorities
would make a clean sweep of them and a decree of the Coun-
cil of Castile would banish the whole herd of office-seekers
from Madrid; but when they were driven out of one gate
these insatiable beggars would enter by another.*

There was, however, this important difference in prac-
tice between Spain and Mexico. In eighteenth-century
Spain offices and promotions were distributed in accord-

1 Dublan y Loaano, III, 123, 232.

*Desdevizes du Desert, UEspagne de VAncien lUgime {La SocUU)^ 171,
Introd., XXV] Doblado, LUtera from SpaiUf 361-376.

SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE 455

ance with the uncertain whims of the court. In Mexico
during the first half of the nineteenth century they were
usually obtained through the success of a mutiny. If the
mutiny failed, then the holders of the offices remained in
possesion undisturbed.

The operation of all these influences upon the destinies
of Mexico was very fully and clearly exhibited in the dis-
turbances which broke out in the capital during the summer
of 1840. G6mez Farias, who had been elected Vice-Presi-
dent imder Santa Anna eight years before, and had lately
been living in New Orleans, had returned, and his irrepress-
ible activities in favor of radical reforms had led to his
arrest and imprisonment. With him General Urrea also waa
confined in the old prison of the Inquisition. At dawn on
the fifteenth of July, 1840, they were both released by two
mutinous battalions; and at the head of these troops, with
a cheering mob at their heels, they surprised President Busta-
mante in the palace of the government, and proclaimed the
re-establishment of the federal system and the Constitution
of 1824. For ten days the city of Mexico was the scene of
a sort of continuous warfare — ^the government troops hold-
ing the citadel, the insurgents holding the cathe(h*al, the
palace, and the central part of the city.^

The wife of the Spanish minister was an interested ob-
server, and left a full and illuminating account of the aspect
of the city in the time of this revolution.

"The tranquillity of the sovereign people," she wrote, "during all
this period, b astonishing. In what other city in the worid would
they not have taken part with one or other side? Shops shut, work-
men out of employment, thousands of idle people, subsisting, Heaven
only knows how, yet no riot, no confusion, apparently no impatience.
Groups of people collect on the streets, or stand talking before their
doors, and speculate upon probabilities, but await the decision of their
military chiefs, as if it were a judgment from Heaven, from which it
were both useless and impious to appeal."

^Conditions were reversed in 1912, the insurgents under F^lix Dias then
holding the citadel, and the Madenst government the palace and the cathe*
dral; but the essential features of the contest were much the same as in
1840, though the use of modem weapons increased the chances of injury.

456 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The "military chiefs'' did not, in her opinion, show them-
selves very efficient. Urrea and his men took possession of
the towers of the cathedral and some of the highest edifices
in the centre of the city, and fired indiscriminately in all
directions. The government troops, instead of attacking
the insurgents in the palace, were firing through peaceful
streets in quite another direction.

" Both parties," writes Madame Calderon, " seem to be fighting the
city instead of each other; and this manner of firing from behind para-
pets, and from the tops of houses and steeples, is decidedly safer for
the soldiers than for the inhabitants. It seems also a novel plan to
keep up a continual cannonading by night, and to rest during a great
part of the day. One would think that were the guns brought near
the palace, the affair would be sooner over." *

This desultory burning of gunpowder might indeed have
gone on for a long time without much damage to any ex-
cept non-combatants, but the leaders on both sides learned
that the government troops in the coimtry districts would
remain loyal, and that a strong force imder Santa Anna was
approachhig the capital. Bustamante, however, was evi-
dently in quite aa much danger from these advancing sup-
porters as he was from the followers of Farias and Urrea,
and therefore, in order that Santa Anna might not get the
credit of restoring order, an arrangement was arrived at on
July 26, 1840, by which peace was made and the insurgents
were pardoned and left in full possession of all their property
and their offices under the government.

For some months longer the government of Bustamante
struggled on against constantly increasing financial difficul-
ties and general discontent. At length, in August, 1841,
an unexpected and formidable revolt broke out at Guadar
lajara (a long way from Manga de Clavo), imder the lead of
General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, who issued a pro-
nunciamiento denouncing the incapacity of the government,
demanding the convocation of a constituent Congress to

* Calderon, 182-204. For other accounts by eye-witnesses, see Treat to
Lamar, July 23, 1840; Wright to Bee, July 27, 1840; Tex, Dip. Carr,, II,
670-674, 677-683.

SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE 457

reform the constitutional laws of 1836, and urging the trans-
fer of the executive powers, in the meantime, to " a citizen
worthy of confidence." That citizen, of course, was Santa
Anna.

Paredes, who thus assumed rather suddenly a conspicu-
ous position in the shifting scenes of Mexican politics, had
been, like Bustamante and Santa Anna, an officer in the
Spanish army. Like them, he had joined Iturbide, and had
gradually risen to be a general of division. It was he who
had defeated Urrea and the Federalists at Mazatlan in 1838,
and he had been looked upon as a loyal supporter of the
government. An American author, writing of him a few
years later, said that he was "a man of talents and acquire-
ments in his profession, and all speak of him as a gentleman
and a patriot." *

Within two months from the time Paredes pronounced,
the overthrow of Bustamante was complete. The troops
in one town after another, including Santa Anna and his
followers in the state of Vera Cruz, joined the movement
and marched on the city of Mexico. On the thirty-first of
August a large part of the troops in the capital mutinied
under the lead of General Valencia, and the usual sort of
street fighting followed.

Madame Calderon describes the aspect of the city on the
second of September, 1841, as follows:

"Mexico looks as if it had got a general holiday. Shops shut up,
and all business is at a stand. The people, with the utmost apathy,
are collected in groups, talking quietly; the officers are galloping
about; generals, in a somewhat party-coloured dress, with large gray
hats, striped pantaloons, old coats, and generals' belts, fine horses,
and crimson-coloured velvet saddles. The shopkeepers in the square
have been removing their goods and money. An occasional shot is
heard, and sometimes a volley, succeeded by a dead silence."

Three days later she noted that every turret and belfry was \
covered with soldiers and the streets blocked up by trenches, W
the soldiers firing at each other, but as a rule hitting nobody / »
but peaceful citizens. J

^ Thompson^ Recollections of Mexico^ 85.

458 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

^The war <rf July,** she writes, ''had at least a shadow of pfetext;
it was a war of party, and those who wished to re-establish federalisni
may have acted with good faith. Now there is neither principle, nor
pretext, nor plan, nor the shadow ol reas<Mi €X legality. Disloyalty,
hypocrisy, and the most sordid calculation, are all the motives that
can be discovered; and those who then affected an ardent desire for
the wdfare of their comitry have now thrown aside their masks, and
appear in their true colours; and the great mass of the pe(^>le, who,
thus passive and oppressed, allow their quiet homes to be invaded,
are kept in awe neither by the force of arms, nor by the dq[>th ot the
views of the conspirators, but by a handful of soldio^ who are them-
selves scarcely aware of their own wishes or intentions, but that they
desire power and distinction at any price." ^

By the end of September, Bustamante was still in
possession of the city, but Santa Anna, at the head of a
considerable anny, was in possession of Tacubaya; and from
that suburb, on September 28, 1841, the principal officers
of his army issued a paper which was called the Bases of
Tacubaya^ and which became, in effect, the Constitution
of the coimtry for the next three years.* After reciting that
the immense majority of Mexicans did not wish, and would
not consent to, a continuance in office of the men who had
controlled their destinies since the year 1836, and that it
was necessary to establish some temporary authority until
a special congress could meet and adopt freely and after
full discussion new fimdamental laws, the document declared
that the following provisions were unanimously adopted:
All executive officers were to be removed and the Congress
dissolved. A coimcil was to be selected by the commander-
in-chief (Santa Amia), consisting of two members from
each department, who were to designate the provisional
President. The President so designated was to take over
the government of the country immediately, and within
two months was to issue a call for a new Congress. This
new Congress was to meet within six months after the call
was issued, and was to transact no other business but the
formation of a constitution. And the provisional President
was to have all powers "necessary for the organization of

1 Calderon, Life in Mexico, 334, 335. ' Dublan y Lozano, IV, 32.

SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE 459

all branches of the public administration/' or, in other words,
was to act as dictator.

As the new President was to be chosen by a body selected
by Santa Anna himself, the plan was simply equivalent to
naming Santa Anna for the post, and to delivering over the
whole of Mexico into his hands.

Bustamante replied to the Bases of Tacubaya by pro-
claiming the re-establishment of the Constitution of 1824,
and for several days longer he held out while some skir-
mishing between his forces and those of Santa Anna went on
in the suburbs. No great harm was done on either side,
but Bustamante's men were deserting, and he presently
abandoned the city and retreated toward Guadalupe, where
he offered battle. Neither party, however, had much
stomach for serious fighting, and eventually, on October 6,
1841, an amicable arrangement was made between the two
conmianders, by which the government troops were turned
over to Santa Anna and it was provided that no person
should be pimished for his past poUtical acts or for any
expression of his opinions.^ Three days later the comedy
of a meeting of the coimcil named by the conmiander-in-
chief was gone through with, and Santa Aima was declared
duly elected as provisional President of the republic. He
continued to govern, without any real check on his powers,
for more than three years.

For the first few months the course of his government
ran with comparative smoothness. There were some out-
breaks of minor importance, and hostilities were continually
taking place on the frontiers of Texas, Yucatan, and Guate-
mala; but his dictatorship was not seriously questioned.
He had now reached a point where he thought it safe to
affect great state. One may read of gala performances at
the opera in his honor — the staircase "lighted by and lined
aU the way up with footmen in crimson and gold UveIy'^•
of the Preident and his suite driving in open carriages, with
outrideiB and an escort of cavalry-carriages, outriders, and
escort all at a full gallop; of his "brilliant cortege of offi-

> Convenioa de la Ealamuela; Dublan y LozanOi IV, 34.

460 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

cers" in full-dress uniforms and of diplomatic dinners at
the palace, with six colonels standing all through the meal
behind the President's chair. ^

One very extraordinary incident of this period of Santa
Anna's career was the ceremony of burying the foot which
he had lost at Vera Cruz. The members of the cabinet and
their principal clerks, the President's personal staff, the
general staff of the army, and other officers formed a pro-
cession, which was escorted by two regiments of infantry
and a squadron of cavalry, with their bands, and a battery
of artillery. In the midst of this procession, as the news-
papers of the day recorded, was borne a fimeral um, hand-
somely draped, in which was a box containing the foot.
Having arrived at the cemetery of Santa Paula, the box
containing the foot was placed in a stone um on top of a
column, the whole crowned with the arms and flag of the
republic. A salute of artillery annoimced the end of this
part of the solemn ceremony, after which a discourse was
pronounced by the Licentiate Ignacio Sierra y Rosso.*

The government of Santa Anna was not inefficient, but
he was extravagant, and there can be no doubt that all his
surroundings were corrupt. The condition of the country
was constantly growing worse, and in spite of the fact that
the nation was practically at peace the state of the finances
of the republic was growing more and more imsatisfactory.
Trade did not increase. The interest due to foreign bond-
holders was paid irregularly, and the bonds were selling in
London below forty. All roads and public works were
neglected, and every available dollar went to satisfy the
army. But dollars were hard to come by, and only by the
seizure of property belonging to the church was Santa

^ Calderon, 358; Mayer, Mexico as It /«, 71, 74. An amusing legend of
Santa Anna's ostentation and cruelty — which, however, appears to have no
basis of historical fact — is printed in No. 412 of the Nineteenth Century magazine
(June, 1911), under the title, ''Sefiora Santa Anna's Misadventure/' by Baron
Malortie.

' Mixico d trav^ de los Siglos, IV, 488. C. M. Bustamante says he composed
an inscription for this monument, but it does not appear whether it was used.
The text of this production, with a description of the monument, will be found
in his Gabinete MexicanOf I, 145.

SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE 461

Anna able to reUeve some of his most pressing necessi-
ties.^

The first distinct shock to his administration was suffered
when the constitutional Congress, summoned imder the
provisions of the Bases of Tacubaya, met on Jime 10, 1842.
Up to that time the invariable rule had been that the gov-
ernment in power always carried the election.* On this
occasion, in spite of the ordinary precautions, the majority
of the Congress proved to be strongly Federalist, and in-
clined to take rather radical views as to the need of reform-
ing the army and the church. For months this Congress
sa! aaid discussed various projects, none of which caiie to
anything, but the talk of the capital became increasingly
liberal.

The inclination of Congress for a democratic constitu-
tion was highly obnoxious to Santa Anna, whose ideas were
by no means favorable to religious toleration, or to control
of the army by Congress, or to the exercise of real self-
government by the departments. However, it was of coiu^
an easy matter at any time to have the garrison of the city
of Mexico pronounce against Congress; and Santa Anna,
having withdrawn to Manga de Clavo on the usual plea of
ill health, and all being in readiness, the troops declared
Congress to be imworthy of confidence and dissolved that
body. A proclamation was issued at the same time by
Bravo, the acting President, which declared that as the
towns and garrisons of various departments, including th6
garrison of Mexico, had refused to recognize the constituent
Congress, a crisis had arisen which made it impossible for
that body to continue; and that, as it was necessary to
"offer to the nation guarantees of its future happiness," the
government would appoint a coimcil composed of " citizens
distinguished by their learning and patriotism" to frame a
constitution. In other words, the government annoimced

* Bancroft, Mexico, V, 239, 246, gives details.

* ''Elections among us do not rest upon any solid basis, for they are always
in accordance with the will of the party in power and are entirely illusory." —
(Alaman, Defenaa, Introd., xviii.)

462 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

that Santa Anna would write a constitution to suit him-
self.*

The new council showed no great haste in performing
its duties, but Santa Anna came back to the capital eariy
in March, and on Jime 12, 1843, the new Constitution was
proclaimed. It was distinctly Centralist. The official
name of the country was no longer "The United States of
Mexico/' but "The Mexican Republic." The country was
to be divided into departments; having at the head of each
a governor, appointed by the central authorities upon the
nomination of the departmental assemblies. These as-
semblies had certain defined and very limited powers.
The President was to be elected for five years. There was
to be k House of Deputies, chosen by an elaborate syBtem
of indirect elections. There was to be a Senate, of which
one-third was to be appointed by the central government,
and two-thirds by the departmental assemblies. The Catho-
lic Church was to be protected by the nation, to the ex-
clusion of any other. The preservation of the fueros, or
special privileges of the church and the army, was carefully
provided for by an article imder which no one could be tried
or sentenced in civil or criminal cases but by judges who
had special jurisdiction (^'jueces de su propriofuero "); and in
accordance with laws enacted and tribunals established prior
to the transaction which might be in question. Slavery
was declared abolished.* The new Congress was to meet on
the first day of January, 1844, and on the following day was
to proceed to ascertain the votes cast by the departments
for the President of the republic. The President-elect was
to take oflSce on the first day of the following February.

One auspicious event occurred to smooth the path of the
new government, for before the time came for the inaugura-
tion of the newly elected Congress the war with Yucatan
was brought to an amicable end. After some negotiations, a

> See Decree of Dec. 19, 1842; Dublan y Lozano, IV, 352. The names of
the eighty men who were to compose this council can be found in the same
volume, 354.

» Ibid,, 428-449.

SANTA ANNA ONCE MORE 463

treafy was entered into at the city of Mexico on December
15, 1843, by which Yucatan agreed to recognize the govern-
ment about to be established under the Constitution of
Jime, 1843, and was to have representation in the Congress,
but at the same time it was to enjoy complete autonomy.*
The elections for President and the members of Congress
in the year 1843 were conducted with skill and care, and it
was believed that no such blimders had been committed as
at the previous election. The government nominees were
carefully selected and looked after and duly returned, and
an apparently subservient Congress met on New Year's
Day of 1844, and on the next day declared that Santa Anna
had been chosen President of the republic by an all but
unanimous vote.* So far all was well, but before many
months the new President and his Congress were destined
to be involved in bitter quarrels. The twenty-seven months
of Santa Anna's dictatorship had been marked by abuses
of power, and the resources of the nation had been squan-
dered. Taxes had been increased and the money used to
keep up an oppressive miUtaiy display. At the ime time
Santa Anna's private fortime had been increasing, and,
very much to the scandal of the public, he had been buying
valuable estates in the department of Vera Cruz. His
friends and supporters were not at all slow to follow his
example, and their suddenly acquired wealth in the midst
of the general distress of the nation gave rise to unpleasant
but natural suspicions. There was unquestionably a general
desire throughout the country to shake off this heavy bur-
den, but until the hour struck the leading men in Congress
and in the army were, to all appearances, Santa Anna's
very obedient servants.'

» Ibid., 675-678.

' Nineteen departments out of twenty-one voted in his favor.

* Rivera, Histaria de Jalapa, III, 606.

CHAPTER XIX

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS

For more than nine years after the battle of San Jacinto
the republic of Texas existed as an independent sover-
eignty. Into the details of its history it is needless to in-
quire; for they related principally to local affairs which in
no way affected the United States or Mexico; but both
nations were deeply concerned in the larger aspects of the
development of the coimtry.

The population of the Texan republic when it first came
into existence-includmg the American settlers, the negroes,
and the resident Mexicans — ^was estimated by Morfit, in
1836, at something over 30,000. From that time forward
there was a continuous and rapid growth. No census was
taken imtil 1847, but it may fairly be concluded that the
repubUc in 1840 had about 55,000 inhabitants, of whom
7,000 or 8,000 were negro slaves. In the same year the
state of New York had a population of nearly 2,500,000,
Rhode Island of more than 100,000, and Delaware of over
75,000. The nearest neighbors of Texas were Louisiana,
with over 350,000 inhabitants, and Arkansas, with almost
100,000.

The population was therefore small compared with that
of the neighboring American conmionwealths, but its area
was relatively inmiense. The repubUc, even within the
boimds traditionally assigned to it, while an integral part
of New Spain, was roughly estimated to include about
250,000 square miles, or four times the area of Vii^ginia,
then the largest state in the American Union. ^ The pop-
ulation continued to be made up chiefly of small fann-
ers, who Uved widely scattered over the region between

1 Ward's Merico, II, 431.
464

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 465

the Sabine and the Nueces, and within one hundred and
fifty miles of the Gulf of Mexico. The remainder of their
widely extended territory was uninhabited, except by tribes
of nomadic and warlike Indians. The people had no ex-
tensive commerce, no mines, no manufactures, few roads,
few steamboats, no railroads, and no banks; and with this
extremely scanty equipment, but with an immense faith in
their future, they set out to establish and maintain an in-
dependent eristence.

The problems of organizing a government and a judiciary,
of erecting necessary public buildings, of constructing roads
and bridges, of regulating the disposal of their public lands,
of establishing and enforcing a system of taxation and a
system of dealing with the aborigines, and a hundred other
pressing questions of internal administration, were neces-
sarily difficult; but such problems had been solved by all
the commonwealths that made up the American Union.
Texas, however, with a population and resources less than
those of Delaware, was forced also to deal with the great
variety of important subjects which under the Constitution
of the United States fell within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal government. Of these the most urgent, as
well as the most costly, was the creation and maintenance
of an army and navy adequate to cope with the threatened
Mexican invasion. The establishment also of a diplomatic
service both in Europe and the United States, if not impera-
tive, was at least extremely important. The solution of
most of these problems ultimately resolved itself into ques-
tions of finance, and the financial history of Texas was
that which had the greatest significance for its neighbors.

When Houston was inaugurated as President in the
autimm of 1836 the Treasury was empty, and the debt of
Texas amounted to about one million and a quarter of
dollars. Most of this was due in small amoimts to a multi-
tude of persons — to soldiers and sailors, to civil officers for
salaries, and to merchants — some in Texas itself and some
in the United States — for supplies of all kinds. The amoimts
due for money borrowed were relatively small, for the loans

466 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

negotiated in the United States had in the end amounted to
very little. But the war up to this time had so easily been
financed that the first constitutional Congress paid little
attention to the question of raising money. The provisional
government had established a tariff on imported goods and
regulated the manner of collecting land dues, and beyond
some amendments of the existing system it was not thought
necessary to do anything in the way of fiscal legislation.^

The expenditures of the Texan government were bound
to be large in any event, but with a war on its hands, and
therefore an army and navy to support, the outgo was cer-
tain to be greatly in excess of any possible income. It was
expected that the ordinary revenues would chiefly be de-
rived from duties on importations and from direct taxes on
property; but it was only too evident that the income from
these sources, in a country with a long frontier by land and
sea, and with a poor and widely scattered population, would
be small for many years to come. The government, there-
fore, could only in part be supported by taxation, and it
was necessary to consider by what means, direct or indirect,
additional sums of money could be borrowed to cover the
deficit.

The real source to which the authorities in Texas always
looked to meet their obligations was the vast extent of un-
occupied land belonging to the commonwealth. It was ex-
pected that this land would ultimately be sold, and that in
the meantime it would furnish an asset against which loans
for large amoimts might be placed abroad. In reality such
an asset was of very Uttle avail, but almost to the last the
government of Texas clung hopefully to the delusion that
wild lands could be made to pay the debts of the repub-
lic, besides supplying the deficiencies in the revenue. The
truth, of course, was that it was hard to find purchasers for
land that not only was entirely unimproved, but which was
also quite inaccessible by roads of any sort, and which,
moreover, in many localities, was exposed to Mexican or,

*See "Finances of the Texas Revolution," by E. C. Barker, in Pol, Sd,
Quar., XIX, 612-635.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 467

what was more serious, to Indian depredations. The gov-
ernment was tiying to sell or mortgage "what in time of
peace had little commercial value, even in Texas, and what
in time of war had hardly any." ^

Quite apart from the ordinary difficulties of selling such
land was the fact that the effort to effect sales in the United
States was made in the height of a most disastrous panic,
when fertfle lands in old-established and well-developed
communities could be had for little or nothing. Not only
was the demand for vacant agricultural land at the lowest
possible ebb, but there was the fmther difficulty that the
supply which Texas had to offer was far beyond the capacity
of even a steady market to absorb; for while the government
was offering its own land for sale it was at the same time
creating competition with itself by a liberal system of
bounties to soldiers and settlers.* " The Texan government
bestowed its lands with so much profusion on soldiers and
settlers as to supply all demands, not only for cultivation,
but for speculation, for many years to come." ' The cer-
tificates, or scrip, issued to soldiers and settlers authorizing
them to locate lands within the republic were constantly
offered for sale, and thus came in competition with the direct
offers of the national government — ^with the result that for
many years the land office, even after it had been fully or-
ganized, and after surveys had been begun, was imable to
dispose of any considerable quantity.

When Congress met again in the early summer of 1837
the condition of the Treasury was desperate. The govern-
ment had been unable to borrow any money, or to sell any
substantial quantity of land, and a message from the Presi-
dent, issued, he said, as soon as he was able to get accurate
information, called the attention of Congress to liabilities
which must be immediately met if the army was to continue
to exist. SuppUes, said the President, had only been ob-

> Ck>uge'8 Fiscal Hisi. of Texas, 64.

'The laws on the subject are numerous and conflicting. An adequate
discussion for historical purposes will be found in chap. XX of Compnf^mnvt
Hist, of Texas, I, 812-^826, by Dudley G. Wooten.

s Gouge, 141.

468 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tained upon his own individual notes, indoroed by certain
members of Congress.

" This was done," he continued, " at a time when a part of the army
was in an actual state of mutiny from want of every kind of provisions.
Galveston Island would have been deserted had not this course been
pursued. Since the commencement of the constitutional government
no public officer has received any salary. Their personal expenses
are great from the fact of their having to pay an exorbitant price for
board. Their individual means are quite exhausted. . . . The Execu-
tive since he has come into office has received into the treasury and
disbursed only five hundred dollars for provisions for the troops.
Under these circumstances your honorable body must be aware of
the absolute necessity of some provision being made to sustain the
country." *

In face of the widely advertised fact that the Mexican
government was collecting troops for an invasion of Texas,
it was evident indeed that immediate steps must be taken
to meet the immediate necessities. The British colonies,
when faced by similar difficulties sixty years before, had
issued paper money, and to that obvious resource Texas
now turned.^ By an act of June 9, 1837, the government
was authorized to issue its promissory notes to the amount
of five himdred thousand dollars, and these notes were made
receivable for all pubUc dues.' It is to the credit of Texas
that they were not made legal tenders for debts between
private individuals.

However, notwithstanding the despauing tone of Presi-
dent Houston's message, the government of Texas in some
way managed to exist for nearly another six months with-
out having recourse to the paper money. A new tariff act,
passed June 12, 1837, had required that duties should be
paid "in gold and silver, or such current bank-notes as

^ Message of June 6, 1837.

' Treasury notes to the amount of $150,000 had been already authorized
by an ordinance of the provisional government passed January 7, 1836, and
approved by the lieutenant-governor after Smith had been ''deposed," on
Jan. 20, 1836.— (Ordinances and Decrees of the ConauUalion, 12^130.) The
ordinance was therefore of doubtful validity, and it is probable that no notes
were issued under it.

* Lam of the Rep. of Texas, I, 249.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 469

the government might direct";* and the Secretary of the
Treasury seized upon the discrepancy between these two acts
as a groimd for refusing to issue the treasury notes. For this
he was called to accoimt in the autumn by Congress, which
passed a joint resolution on October 23, 1837, declaring that
"the necessary and pressing wants of the country require
that the issue of such notes shall immediately commence."
It was indeed high time that something should be done.

"The finances of our country," said the President in a special
message, " since the commencement of the revolution up to this time
have been in a more embarrassed situation doubtless than any other
nation ever experienced. Since the commencement of the present
administration, during the first year there was at the disposition of
the Executive or in the treasury, but five hundred dollars in cash.
The several amounts that had been appropriated for specific or gen-
eral purposes depended upon the sale of scrip, and that by acts of
Congress was placed in the hands of foreign agents who were irre-
sponsible to the Executive. ... This imaginary and unfortunate
expedient is now at an end." '

The treasury notes were now at last issued, and, being
limited in amount, passed current for some time at par;
but they soon began to fall of their own weight, and the
issuance of additional notes imder authority of Congress
hastened rapidly the inevitable depreciation. By June,
1839, the paper money was "almost worthless," although
it bore ten per cent interest. In the autunm of 1840 the
notes were said to be worth from fifteen to twenty cents on
the dollar/ and ultimately " they sunk so low that no price
at all could be obtained for them in many parts of Texas." *
The total amoimt issued is stated to have been $4,717,939.^

The irrmiediate cause of the final fall in the value of the
treasury notes was the passage of a law of Congress on
January 18, 1842, providing that nothing but gold and
silver or the "exchequer bills" of the govenunent should be
received in payment of public dues.* The goverrmient at

» Ibid,, 2S3et8eq. » President's message, Nov. 21, 1837.

» Gouge, 97, 101. < Ibid., 117.

* See App. B, ibid., where details are given.

* Laws Passed at the Sixth Session, etc., 55.

470 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the same time was authorized to issue "exchequer bills,"
payable on demand, to an amount not exceeding two him-
dred thousand dollars. These bills were issued for only
very moderate amoimts, and there were seldom as many as
fifty thousand dollars in circulation at one time. Never-
theless, the practical repudiation of the old treasuiy notes,
by the refusal to receive them in payments to the govern-
ment, caused the "exchequer bills" also to sink rapidly in
value, so that by the end of the year they, in turn, were
worth only twenty-five cents on the dollar. This very rapid
fall was due to the fact that Congress, only six months after
their issue, passed a law which was in fact a partial repudia-
tion/ of the "exchequer bills"; for by an act of July 23,
1842, public officers throughout the republic were required
to receive these bills only at thfe current rates at which they
were sold in the market — a striking instance of folly no less
than of bad faith. ^

In addition to the depreciated currency already referred
to^ the Texan government had from an early date attempted
to meet its obligations by providing that what were called
"audited drafts" on the Treasuiy should be received in
payment of money due on lands granted or sold.' For a
time these drafts also were receivable for direct taxes and
for customs; but notwithstanding this feature they fell with
extraordinary rapidity, and in May, 1837, they could only
be sold for about fifteen cents on the dollar. Audited drafts,
however, continued to be issued by the Treasmy, and to be
accepted by creditors who could get nothing else, with the
result that there were ultimately issued very nearly eight
million dollars of such paper in all. Of this amount less
than seven himdred thousand dollars was received in pay-
ment of pubUc dues; somewhat less than a miUion wL
exchanged for bonds, and about six millions was paid at
the Treasury by exchanging the audited drafts for treasury
notes, which were worth no more in the market, but were
more convenient as currency.

^ Laws Passed at a Special Session of the SixUi Congress, etc., 4. And see
Gouge, App. I, 279.
' Ordinance of Dec. 30, 1835; Ordinances and Decrees, 114.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 471

From its very first days the Texan government made
every effort to borrow money abroad. As early as Novem-
ber 24, 1835, the General Coimcil authorized an issue of
bonds for one himdred thousand dollars, the rate of interest
not to exceed ten per cent.^ This was followed by an ordi-
nance, on December 4, authorizing the representatives of
Texas in the United States to negotiate a sale of ten per
cent bonds to the amoimt of one million dollars, payable in
not less than five nor more than ten years in the city of
New York, and " to pledge or hypothecate the public lands
of Texas, and to pledge the public faith of Texas in such
manner and with such restrictions as shall best comport
with the honor and dignity of the state, and give effect to
the pledges." *

On November 18, 1836, although the bonds authorized
in the previous year were still unsold, the first constitutional
Congress authorized the President to sell additional bonds
to an amount not exceeding five million dollars, and at a
rate of interest not exceeding ten per cent per annum.'
These bonds, however, or any bonds were impossible of
sale in the United States. The financial crisis which
wrecked so many banks in the United States in the early
months of 1837, and which induced President Van Buren
to call the American Congress together for a special session,
soon made it out of the question for any banker to attempt
to dispose of securities, no matter how well they might be
secured. Moreover, the people of the United States had
never been in the habit of investing in the obligations of
foreign coimtries, so that even in the best of times it would
have been difficult for Texas to find an American market
for her bonds. There remained, of course, the markets of
Europe, but imtil the independence of Texas was recognized
by European powers it was difficult to conduct hopeful
financial negotiations.

Attempts to secure recognition abroad were first begun

> Ibid,, 18.

^Ihid.f 44; and see supplemental ordinances of Dec. 5, 1835, and Jan. 10,
1836; ibid,, 52, 130.
*Louw of the Rep. of Texaa^ 1, 32.

472 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

in the summer of 1837, when General J. Pinckney Hepder^n^
was appointed diplomatic agent to Great Britain and France,
in the spring of the following year he succeeded in obtain-
ing from Great Britain a partial and limited recognition of •
Texan independence; that is, he was informed that, j)end-
ing complete recognition, Texan ships and cargoes to Great
Britain would be received on the same footing with British
ships so long as British ships should practically enjoy the
same privileges in Texas. Henderson very naturally asked
what; precisely, this meant. Lord Palmerston replied that
a Texan ship would be "admissible into the Ports ot Great
Britain as a Mexican ship according to the stipulations of
the Mexican Treaty, notwithstanding that the Documents
issued for the use of such ship should bear upon their face
they were the avowed acts of a Govt, in Texas, assuming
the style of a Republic independent of Mexico." ^ In
November of the same year a somewhat similar arrange-
ment was entered into with France.* The full recognition
of Texan independence was, however, delayed by the French
government until September, 1839, and France was not fol-
lowed by the British government until November, 1840.'

But before any foreign government had taken definite
and final action to recognize Texas an attempt was made
to place the five millions of bonds in London or Paris; and
prior to leaving the United States General James Hamilton,

* Palmerston to Henderson, April 6 and April 11, 1838; Tex. Dip, Corr., II,
856,859.

» Mol6 to Henderson, Nov. 2, 1838; ibid., 1233.

• The following treaties were entered into, viz.: with France, treaty of com-
merce, etc., Sept. 25, 1839; ratifications exchanged Feb. 14, 1840. With
England, treaty of commerce, etc., Nov. 13, 1840; "Convention containing
certain Arrangements as to the publick debt," Nov. 14, 1840; treaty for ^c
suppression of the African slave-trade, Nov. 16, 1840. There was a long
delay on the part of the Texan Senate in ratifying the last of these treaties,
owing, as the British government believed, to the trickery of General Hamilton,
the Texan plenipotentiary. The British government refused to exchange the
ratifications of any of the treaties until Texas was ready to ratify them all,
and it was not until June 28, 1842, that this was done, and a British diplomatic
agent was sent out to Texas. A treaty was made with the Neth^lands
Sept. 18, 1840, and ratified June 15, 1841. Negotiations for treaties of com-
merce were also conducted with the Hanse towns and with Belgium, but none
were ever actually signed and ratified.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 473

who had been appointed financial agent for the Texan gov-
ernment, managed, in May, 1839, to obtain an advance of
four himdred thousand dollars from the then moribimd
Bank of the United States in Philadelphia, against which,
presumably, the whole amount of the bonds was deposited
as collateral security.^

Btumlton never met with any financial success in London,
His failure, it seems, was due partly to distrust of all North
American securities, partly to the activities of the British
and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, and partly to the oppo-
sition of the British holders of Mexican bonds. Nor did he
succeed in Holland, where it would appear that another
effort was made to place bonds. But early in February,
1841, he was enabled to make a contract by which the well-
known firm of J. Lafitte & Co., of Paris, agreed to take
the whole issue upon certain terms. As soon as the con-
tract with them was signed Hamilton commimicated the
fact to the newspapers, and the immediate result was, of
course, a great improvement in the credit of the Texan
government in the United States. Treasury notes rose in
New Orleans to thirty cents on the dollar, and the few
ten per cent bonds which had been placed in the United
States rose to forty.

Unfortunately for Hamilton, his contract with Lafitte
& Co. contained the following clause:

* James Hamilton had been governor of South Carolina, and was an eager
nullifier. Although an American citizen, he offered his services to the Texan
government — largely, it would seem, because he was interested in land in
that country. His first employment was as Texan agent to Great Britain
and France, to act with Henderson in securing recognition of Texan inde-
pendence. He was appointed special and confidential agent of Texas to
Great Britain, and commissioner to negotiate with Mexico, in Dec., 1839;
joint agent with A. T. Burnley to negotiate a loan with France, and agent to
Belgium, April, 1840; confidential agent to Holland, Sep., 1840; minister
plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to Great Britain in 1841. He was
recalled early in 1842, and not again employed. Hamilton was a promoter
of a familiar type — unscrupulous, untruthful, and because of his reckless op-
timism entirely untrustworthy. He constantly made the wildest and most
reckless assertions. At one time he had a plan for a maritime expedition into
Mexico which would strike terror into that government and astonish the
world by its boldness and success. At another he was assuring the British
government that a hundred thousand emigrants had gone from the United
States into Texas within three months!— (Tex. Dip. Corr,, II, 468, 883.)

474 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

"The present contract is concluded upon a formal assurance given
by the Texan Envoy that he has obtained the consent or admission
of the French Government to the above Loan, and a further assur-
ance that the said Government will facilitate with its moral aid the
negotiation of the said Loan of which assurances the Texan Envoy
has furnished us with the documentary proofs."

What "the documentary proofs" may have been which
Hamilton furnished to the bankers does not appear; but it
is clear that the French government at least did not con-
sider that it was in any way bound to afford aid, moral or
otherwise, to the flotation. On the contrary, it proved
very unfavorable. On May 6, 1841, the official newspapers
published articles which Lafitte & Co. described as "of a
nature to inspire the public with doubts as to the security
offered of the Loan." Hamilton, who had probably deceived
the bankers as to the assurances given by the government,
professed vast indignation at what amounted to a refusal
to allow the bonds to be sold on the Bourse. "The French
Government," he wrote, "cannot without a breach of faith
unexampled even in the treachery of modem diplomacy,
refuse us this privilege; if they do, I shall have to let Messrs.
Lafitte & Co. off their contract, and denounce the conduct
of the French Government in the face of all Europe. I
think they will find old Lafitte and myself rather trouble-
some customers." ^

Hamilton, however, was not such a troublesome customer
as he thought, and these negotiations fell through; but the
Texan government was not discouraged, and manfully re-
newed its efforts to sell its bonds. On June 14, 1842, an
agreement was made with a certain M. Bourgeois d'Or-
vanne for a loan of a million dollars, in connection with a
project for introducing European colonists. This loan also
ultimately fell through.

At last, on January 17, 1844, Congress passed an act re-
pealing "all the laws authorizing the President to negotiate
a loan or loans upon either the public faith or the hypothe-
cation of the pubUc lands." The total amount of loans

^ Hamilton to Lamar, May 17, 1841; ibid., 1336.

TpE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 475

previously cbntract^ by the Texan government seems to
have been from first to last only half a miUion, being about
seventy-four thousand dollars borrowed in the winter of
1836, before the battle of San Jacinto, and four hundred
thousand dollars borrowed from the Bank of the United
States in the spring of 1839.

With insuflScient revenue, with unsalable assets, and with
practically no credit abroad, it is not surprising that the
Texan government continued to be in great financial straits.
In the latter part of 1838, when Houston's first term as
President was coming to a close, the public indebtedness
amounted to a Uttle short of two million dollars; and from
that time forward, under the administration of Houston's
successor, the public debt rapidly increased.

Mirabeau Bonaparte Lamar, who was inaugurated Presi-
dent of Texas on December 9, 1838, was a native of Georgia,
and was at that time a little over forty years old. He had
come to Texas three years before, had entered the army as
a private, had commanded the cavalry detachment at the
battle of San Jacinto, and had been Vice-President under
Houston's administration. One of his successors as Presi-
dent of the Texan republic, who was not unfriendly to him,
described him as a weak man, governed by passion and
prejudice, though undoubtedly honest and always actu-
ated by good motives. He had local celebrity as an orator,
and the author already mentioned, who describes him as
"an elegant writer," also declared that Lamar's mind "is
altogether of a dreamy poetic order, a sort of political
Troubadour and Crusader, and wholly unfit by habit or edu-
cation for the active duties, and the every-day realities of
his present station. Texas is too small for a man of such
wild, visionary, vaulting ambition." ^

Lamar!s ambition at once led him to develop a very ex-
travagant policy, largely as the result of what John Jay
had called, nearly sixty years before, "drawing drafts on the
Bank of Hope." The expectation of being able to float five
millions of bonds in Europe had completely turned the

^ Jones, Republic of Texas^ 34.

476 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

heads of Lamar and his adviserS; and the attempt at a
strong navy, with every sort of reckless expenditure, was
the result. Unlike Houston, Lamar openly rejected the idea
of annexation, upon the ground that Texas was quite strong
enough to stand by herself. The same sort of policy was
practised in respect to Indian affairs. Houston, who knew
the Indians well, was in favor of soft words, of conciliation
and fair treatment. Lamar was for driving the Indians out
with a stem and ruthless hand. The result of his adminis-
tration is seen in the fact that when his term expired in
December, 1841, the total debt of Texas amounted to nearly
ggven millions and a half of dollars, which at that time
there was no possible means of paylfigT^

Under the Constitution of Texas the President was not
eligible to succeed himself until one presidential term had
intervened, and Houston was elected as Lamar's successor,
and took office on December 12, 1841. There was but one
course for his administration. A radical cutting down of
expenditure was absolutely essential if Texas was to con-
tinue to exist; and by some miracle of economy Houston
managed to reduce the outgo of the government in a single
year from nearly a million and a quarter to less than two
hundred thousand dollars. During the three years of Hous-
ton's second term of office the average expenditures for all
purposes amounted to only one hundred and seventy thou-
sand dollars, against an average annual expenditure during
Lamar's three years of office of over one million six hundred
thousand dollars.

"The Texans," says Gouge, "never became economical until con-
strained by necessity. So long as there was any hoi>e of negotiating
a loan in Europe, and so long as they could borrow from the citizens
of the United States, by new issues of treasury notes, their extravagant
expenditures were continued. When they were reduced to such straits
that they could borrow no longer, except from themselves, and then
only to a limited amount, in anticipating the revenue by issues of
exchequer bills, then they became saving." ^

* Gouge, 127. In App. F of Gouge's Fiscal Hist, of Texas will be found a
tabular statement of the debt of Texas at different periods.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 477

Bad as was the condition of the Texan finances; the evil
was not vital. With great untouched resources which were
bound in time to become of substantial value, with con-
stantly increasing exports, constantly increasing produc-
tion of cotton, and a swelling stream of immigration, the
future of the country was reasonably safe, provided only
that peace could be assured. But the strain of an actual
war with Mexico could not possibly have been long endured,
and if Texas continued to exist it was simply because the
Mexican republic never foimd it possible to furnish either
an army or a navy adequate to the task of recovering the
lost territory. As Morfit had pointed out in his report of
1836, the security of Texas depended more on the weakness
and imbecility of her enemy Ln upon her own strength;
and as time went on the truth of that remark became more
and more manifest.

During the first two years which elapsed after the battle
of San Jacinto the Mexican government repeatedly and
publicly, and in stentorian tones, proclaimed its intention
of reconquering Texas, and in 1837 and during a part of
1838 it maintained a force at Matamoros which, it was
said, was destined to take part in the advance. That force,
however, never attained any serious proportions. No
sooner were troops collected there than it became necessary
to despatch them to the interior to put down some mZ?
mutiny. Some efforts were made to enlist the aid of Indian
tribes. Thus, in 1838 and 1839, General Filisola, who was
once more in command at Matamoros, and his successor,
General Canalizo, sent emissaries to the Cherokees and other
Indian tribes in northeastern Texa^, with a view to sturing
them up to an attack on the settlements, and thus facilitat-
ing a Mexican advance into the southwestern part of the
country. Two of these men were killed, and the papers
found upon them abundantly proved the fact of official
Mexican complicity in this projected piece of wickedness.^
But nothing else was done.

Indeed, after the middle of the year 1838, the war with

> Sen. Doc. 14, 32 Cong., 2 seas., 31-55.

478 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

France and the successful rising in Y^icatan absorbed all
the spare energies and cash of the Mexican government,
and TexaS; if not forgotten, was at least left undisturbed.
Nevertheless, the Mexican government was never willing
to admit for a moment that the independence of Texas was
a question to be considered. The ruling classes in Mexico
had inherited from then- Spanish ancestors their character-
istic unwillingness to look facts in the face, or to admit dis-
agreeable truths, as well as their pecuUar sensitiveness and
desire to preserve appearances at any cost — traits which at
least suggest an Oriental origin. All factions in Mexico,
therefore, made the reconquest of Texas a party cry,
"urging the continuation of the war as being necessary for
the vindication of the national honor, cdthough they had
neither the mil nor the power to carry it on.^^ ^

The Mexican government had already shown their utter
inabUity, in the campaign under Santa Anna, to cany on a
distant and difficult offensive war, and every day the con-
quest of Texas was becoming a more serious task. A well-
equipped and well-drilled army of twenty thousand men
would not have been too large; and, to enable it to advance,
a navy capable of securing control of the Gulf, of blockad-
ing three or four hundred miles of coast, and of assisting in
the seizure of the principal ports would have been essential.*
None of these requisites did Mexico possess.

Less than twenty years before Spain had loudly pro-
tested against the recognition by the United States and
Great Britain of her former American colonies, and had
announced her imalterable determination to reduce them to
obedience. Mexico used precisely the same language in re-
spect of Texas, and it was quite as impossible for Mexico
to conquer Texas as it had been for Spain to conquer
America.

^ Rivera, Historia de Jalapaf III, 291.

'"The continued bad faith of the Mexican Gk>vemment has induced the
President to issue letters of marque and reprisal; the great object now being to keep
command of the Gulf. They cannot reach us by land, unless they can supply
their troops by sea/' — (Irion, Texan Secretary of State, to Hunt, Sept. 20,
1837; Tex, Dip, Con,, I, 262.)

THE REPUBUC OF TEXAS 479

The failure to undertake an aggressive campaign against
Texas was the more remarkable because the Texans had
on several occasions given active help to the enemies of
Mexico, and were constantly giving other causes of annoy-
ance. Reference has already been made to their participa-
tion in the Federalist rising in northern Mexico, and to the
help given by the Texan navy to the people of Yucatan.
In the early part of 1837 a small party of Texans made an
vmsuccessful effort to capture the Mexican town of Laredo,
on the eastern bank of the Rio Grande. Hostile parties,
both of Mexicans and Texans, constantly ranged over the
territory between San Antonio and Matamoros, "and gave
to their respective superiors such news as they could gather
— ^the most of which was totally unreliable, yet still cal-
culated to produce imeasiness and uncertainty on the fron-
tiers.'* ^ Still another trivial event which pleased the
Texans and annoyed the Mexicans was the friendly visit
paid to Texas by Admiral Baudin, with a part of his fleet,
after the Vera Cruz campaign, in the course of which he
exchanged civiUties with the authorities of the republic*

But in spite of these petty sources of irritation on both
sides Mexico might have continued to abstain from com-
mitting any actual acts of warfare if it had not been for the
veiy imprudent conduct of Lamar's administration. In his
annual message for 1839 President Lamar had urged that
some steps should be taken to extend the authority of the
Texan government as far as the upper waters of the Rio
Grande, in what was then and is now known as New Mexico.

The province of Texas during Spanish times, and later
under the Mexican republic, had never extended so far as
that; but the Texan Congress had passed a law three years

» Yoakum, II, 210.

' The admiral landed May 2, 1839, at the mouth of the Brazos River, but
0ent his ships on to Galveston. He visited the city of Houston, at that time
the capital, where he was very cordially received, and he sailed from Galveston
on the fourteenth, after giving a reception and dance on board his flag-ship. —
(Blanchard et Dauzats, 522-525.) General Bee, of Texas, met Baudin in June
at Havana, who expressed himself as ''perfectljipharmed with you all. He
says if not ordered to France, he will go to Texad^ take horses and ride oyer
the country."— (Bee to Webb, June, 1839; Tex. Dip. Can., II, 456.)

482 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

no game was to be found. It was determined, therefore,
to send ahead three men under the lead of one Howland, a
member of a well-known family of New Bedford, Massa-
chusetts, who had formerly been in New Mexico and spoke
Spanish. These men, steering by compass, reached the
Mexican settlements early in September, and were at once
arrested. They, however, made their escape, and endeav-
ored to find their way back to the main party, but were re-
captiu^, and all three were presently shot.

Meantime, the main body of the Texans was painfully
pushing its way northwestward, under ever-increasing diffi-
culties for want of food and water both for the men and the
animals. By the beginning of September the situation had
become so acute that the best mounted and most vigorous
men, ninety in number, were sent ahead under the com-
mand of Colonel Cooke, and after suflfering extreme hard-
ships they reached the little village of Anton Chico, on the
Pecos River. A few days later they surrendered to Gov-
ernor Armijo.

The remaining Texans had continued in camp until Sep-
tember 17, when they were found by some Mexican guides
who had been sent back by the advance party, and at once
resumed their march toward Santa Fe. When they reached
the borders of the Mexican settlements, at a place called
the Laguna Colorada, somewhere, it would seem, not far
from what is now Fort Bascom, they were met by a body of
Mexicans. The Texans were in no condition to fight.

"Out of more than two hundred men, it was now found that the
Texans could muster but about ninety who were really fit for active
service, and these would have been obliged to act on foot entirdy, as
their horses had been either run off in the stampede on the Palo Dure,
or kept so closely within the lines that they could not obtain grass
enough to sustain their strength. Many of the men who had lost
their horses, weak and dispirited from long marches and want of food,
had secretly thrown away their arms to lighten themselves upon the
road, and, in the mean time, that subordination, without which aU
efforts are useless, was in a measure lost. In this desperate condition,
unable to hear a word concerning the fate of either Colonel Cooke
or of two small parties they had sent out, and with the promise of

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 483

good treatment and that their personal effects would be returned to
them, a surrender was made." ^

The Mexice».n forces had thus captured every one of the
Texans who had reached Mexican territory without strik-
ing a blow or firing a shot. Governor Annijo, however, in
reporting the event to the national authorities, did not fail
to represent that he had gained two great victories over
the Texan invaders. The bells in the city of Mexico were
duly pealed, and salutes were fired to conunemorate Annijo's
triumphs at Anton Chico and the Laguna Colorada. " We
congratulate the whole nation," wrote the Diario de Gcbiemo,
"with the greatest satisfaction and the most lively joy upon
this fortunate event; and we also offer congratulations to
his Excellency the President, General Antonio L6pez de
Santa Anna, benemirito de la patria, whose administration
seems to be destined by Providence to win for this country
the completest glory and the most important triumphs, and
insure its nationality and independence." *

The question now was what disposition should be made
of the surviving prisoners, and Annijo decided to send them
to the capital and to place them, as it was called, at the
disposition of the supreme government. The prisoners,
therefore, started from the village of San Miguel, now a
station on the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, just
south of Las Vegas, on October 17, 1841, upon their long
march to the city of Mexico. A week before Santa Anna
had taken the oath of oflBce as provisional President under
the Bases of Tacubaya.

So long as the prisoners remained in the power of Gov-
ernor Annijo and his men they were treated with great
cruelty, and those who were unable to keep up with the
rest were mercilessly shot and their bodies abandoned by
the way-side. Early in November, however, they reached
El Paso, and passed out of the jurisdiction of New Mexico,
and thenceforth had more humane treatment as they toiled
along to the south. The poUcy of the Mexican, authorities

1 Kendall's Santa Fi ExpedUian, I, 369.
' Mfyrico d travis de lo9 Siglo9, IV, 476.

484 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

evidently was to exhibit the prisoners in all the principal
towns between El Paso and the capital, and they were taken
through the streets of Chihuahua, Zacatecas, San Luis,
Guanajuato, Quer6taro, and other minor points — ^living
proofs of the success of Santa Anna's armies — ^reaching the
suburbs of Mexico during the first week in February, 1842.
Apart from the hardships necessarily incidental to such a
march, small-pox broke out among the men and some died
and many suffered severely on this account.

Upon their arrival at the capital those who were citizens
or subjects of some other country than Texas at once ap-
pealed to their respective ministers, and through diplomatic
intervention most of them were released in time, but with
more or less reluctance and unwillingness, by the Mexican
government. The rest who could not claim such protection
lingered for some time in military prisons; but finally, on
June 16, 1842, almost all of the prisoners obtained their
release on the occasion of Santa Anna's saint's day.^ The
one who was longest detained was Navarro, one of the Texan
conmiissioners, who, having been bom at B^xar, and having
taken an active part in the formation of the Texan govern-
ment, was especially singled out. He was imprisoned in
the castle of San Juan de Uliia until December, 1844, when
he was allowed to reside in Vera Cruz, and from there he
managed to escape early in the year 1845.*

The first news of this unfortunate expedition reached the
United States about the end of the year 1841, and on
January 14, 1842, caused some discussion in the House of
Representatives. But the interest taken by the newspapers,
especially in view of the fact that the editor of a leading
journal was among the prisoners, was much greater than

^ An account of the ceremony of the day and the general spirit of kindness
manifested by the people to these unfortunate men will be foimd in Thompson's
RecoUectiana of MexicOf 92. Thompson also sent an accoimt in an official
despatch, dated June 20, 1842.— (5tote Dept. MSS.)

' The above account is taken from Kendall's Santa Fi Expedition^ whidk
not only appears to be a truthful history of events, but is also exceptional
among works of this period, in possessing genuine literary merit. The official
report of the Texan commissioners to their government, dated Nov. 9, 1841,
written from AUende in the state of Chihuahua, is printed in Tex. Dip, Con.,
U, 777-783.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 485

that evinced by Congress. The newspapers painted the
sufferings of the prisoners in lurid colors, and the American
government continued for some time to receive numbers
of petitions from state legislations and from individuals,
begging for intervention on behalf of the captives — ^although
it was evident that the United States government could do
nothing oflBcially on behalf of citizens of Texas. The Ameri-
can minister in Mexico did what he could, unoflBcially, to
help them, and seems to have acted prudently and tactfully.

As might have been foreseen, if Lamar's government had
been capable of foreseeing anything, the invasion of New
Mexico inevitably led to a Mexican demonstration against
Texas. Early in March, 1842, seven hundred men under
General Vdsquez, advanced upon San Antonio, and formally
demanded a surrender of the place. There were only about
one hundred Texan soldiers in the town, and they promptly
retreated — ^leaving the Mexican force in possession. These
troops remained two days, and departed on the morning of
March 7, taking with them "all the valuables they could
carry." At about the same time a small force took posses-
sion of Refugio and Goliad, and drove off a few cattle, but
did no other harm.

The news of this invasion spread rapidly through Texas,
and, of course, in a very exaggerated form. It was even
beUeved that the new capital, Austin, on the Colorado River,
was in danger of capture, and the militia was called out,
under command of General Somervell, who, by the middle
of March, 1842, had about thirty-five hundred men under
his command. By that time it was ascertained that the
Mexicans had already recrossed the Rio Grande.

President Houston, who had taken oflGice the previous
December upon his re-election to the presidency, was by
no means so ready as his predecessor to engage in an offen-
sive war. He was quite aware that an invading expedition
needed to be strong, well-equipped, and well-disciplined; and
he also was aware that the number of troops which Texas
itself could supply, and the sum of money which its Treasury
could furnish, were utterly inadequate to the object pro-

486 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

posed. He therefore instructed General Somervell to or- j
ganize his troops and to await further orders. At the same
time commissioners were sent to the United States to tiy
to secure men, money, and munitions of war.

The news of the Mexican invasion of Texas reached Wash-
ington on March 24, 1842, through a New Orleans news-
paper of the sixteenth of the month. Webster at once con-
sulted the President on the subject of restraining the Indians
along the frontier, and later assured the Texan representa-
tive in Washington that the United States would see to
having the Indians kept within their proper territory.

"I feel satisfied," the minister reported, "that it will be done,
and that Texas in her struggle can have the aid of all her gallant sons,
both in the east and along the Red river line, since the United States
will save their homes and property from the depredations of the sav-
ages. The Government here will likewise take means to defend the
lives, liberty, and property of her citizens on Galveston Island." *

This was a promise of pretty substantial help,. but it may
very well be doubted whether Webster went quite as far as
was represented; although he certainly was, at that time,
very bitter against Mexico.

So far as the public was concerned, the news of the in-
vasion added fresh fuel to the flame which had already been
kindled in the United States by accounts of the brutal treat-
ment of the Santa Fe prisoners. Enthusiastic meetings in
behalf of Texas were held in New Orleans, Mobile, Savannah,
Louisville, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, New York, and else-
where; committees were appointed to raise money; and a
small number of "emigrants" were enlisted and started
from New Orleans. The excitement, however, was short-
lived. As soon as the further news came that the Mexican
advance was not a real attempt to reconquer Texas, and was
nothing more than a mere raid, enthusiasm throughout the
United States cooled as quickly as it had flared up, and
nothing further was heard upon the subject.^

1 Reily to Jones, March 25, 1842; Tex. Dip. Corr., I, 546.
*See McMaster, VII, 307, for newspaper accounts of the feeling in the
United States at this period.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 487

The Mexican government, however, exhibited and un-
doubtedly felt great indignation at the conduct of the
United States government in permitting such open expres-
sions of sympathy with Texas, and such practical proofs of
the sincerity of that feeling; and the Mexican Minister of
Foreign Relations went so far as to threaten, in scarcely
concealed language, a declaration of war against the United
States — a threat which Webster, then the American Secre-
tary of State, declared would not in the slightest degree
change the conduct of his government.^

Meanwhile, the Texan troops encamped at San Antonio
were by no means pleased at President Houston's restrain-
ing them from an inmiediate advance into Mexico. When
General Somervell, who was regarded as Houston's repre-
sentative, arrived in the bamp on March 18, the men re-
fused to obey his orders; and he thereupon retired, leaving
Burleson, the Vice-President of the repubUc, in conmiand.
Burleson had had experience before of the entire impossi-
bility of enforcing any orders upon Texan volunteers of
which these gentry did not approve, and after some efforts
at organization he gave up the task, and disbanded his mili-
tia on the second of April. At the same time, he published
an insubordinate letter, saying that if his orders had per-
mitted him to cross the Rio Grande he would have inflicted
a chastisement on the Mexicans which would have resulted
in an honorable peace.

Houston, however, without money and without credit,
was in reality doing his best to collect some sort of military
force. The Texan navy was ofif the coast of Yucatan and
it was ordered to return. The few volunteers who had come
from the United States were collected at Corpus Christi,
where they were to be organized and drilled, but under
strict orders from the government to make no advance
toward the frontier. The disastrous folly which had
prompted the attempt to advance on Matamoros in 1835
had taught the Texan executive a lesson of prudence.
"When there are means for a successful attack," ran the

^ For this correspondence see the next chapter.

488 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

orders, "it shall be taken; and until then any attempt
would be destructive to Texas."

At this time Matamoros was held by a considerable force
of Mexican troops under the command of General Manuel
Arista, a man who was more of a politician than a soldier,
who had been alternately a supporter and an opponent of
Santa Anna, but who was now again in favor.^ If the Texans
were to make any hopeful move against him they required
a far more complete equipment than any of their forces had
ever possessed. But to equip an anny required money and
Houston had none. He was at the end of his resources,
and all he could do he did, by calling a special session of
Congress, to meet on June 27, 1842. In a message sent in
on that day the President advised that Congress should
•take suitable measures to counteract whatever steps Mexico
might take to disturb the peace, prosperity, and settlement
of the frontier. The volunteers from the United States, he
said, had been sustained almost entirely by private contri-
butions, which were now exhausted, and there was no
sufficient appropriation for the support of the navy. In
reply to a request from Congress for information the
President on July 18 further reported that the American
volunteers were mutinous and insubordinate, and that he
despaired of their reformation, and believed it would be
more politic for Texas to rely on her own militia and to
discharge the foreign volunteers.^

Congress thereupon passed a foolish bill, authorizing the
President to call for volunteers for the piupose of invading
Mexico, and if the number responding to such call should
be insufficient he was authorized to order out not exceed-
ing one-third of the militia. He was also authorized to re-
ceive contributions of land, money, provisions, and equip-
ments, and to h5rpothecate or sell not exceeding ten millions

^ Arista was bom at San Luis Potosf in 1802, and was a lieutenant in the
Spanish army. For a time, while suffering imder Santa Anna's displeasure,
he lived at Cincinnati, Ohio. During Bustamante's second administration
he was reinstated in the army and put in command of a force intended to
relieve Vera Cruz, where he was taken prisoner by the French, but released
after a short and easy captivity.

» Yoakum, II, 369.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 489

of acres of the public lands for the purpose of raising a war
fund. This was all very well on paper, but as there was no
sale for the land, and probably no disposition on anybody's
part, in Texas or out of Texas, to contribute a dollar for the
purpose of invading Mexico, Congress, for all the good it
did, might just as well have stayed at home. For these and
other reasons the President vetoed the bill, and Congress
shortly after adjourned without having taken any action.^

In the meantime Arista was not altogether idle. At day-
break on July 7 the volunteers encamped at Corpus Christi,
then niunbering less than two hundred men, were attacked
by a force of Mexicans, who were rather easily repulsed.
Two months later the Mexicans made another advance into
Texas. On September 11, 1842, a force of about twelve
hundred men, under the command of General Adrian WoU,
entered San Antonio; and so little precaution had the
Texans taken to watch the enemy's movements that the
presiding judge of the district court, then sitting at San
Antonio, together with the leading members of the bar,
were captured — ^practically without resistance. About fifty-
three men in all were thus made prisoners, and were marched
off to the city of Mexico, probably with the idea of giving
further ocular demonstration of the success of the Mexican
arms.

Again the Texan militia were called out, under command
of General Somervell, and responded in great numbers.
The first of the advancing Texans met with misfortune.
On September 13 they were attacked by General Woll's
troops at the Salado Creek, and after an indecisive action
the Mexicans fell back to San Antonio, taking with them
some fifteen prisoners who had formed part of a small force
of men under Captain Dawson, and who were captured
before they had had an opportunity to join the main body.*

By this time the Texan militia were rapidly assembling,
and would soon have outnumbered WoU's force. At day-

> Ihid., 360.

«/Wa., 361-366. E. W. Winkler, "The B^xar and Dawson Prisoners,"
Tex, Hi8L Quar., XIII, 292-324. The greater part of these prisoners were
held in captivity until the spring of 1844.

490 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

break on September 18, 1842, he therefore set out in retreat,
taJdng his prisoners with him. He was pursued by the Texan
militia for thirty or forty miles, when the pursuit ceased,
and he was permitted to recross the Rio Grande without
molestation.

The assembling of the Texan forces near San Antonio was
accompanied by the usual amount of intrigue and disorder.
"From the time of the first assembling of the troops," says
Yoakiun, "until their departure, there was much confusion,
arising out of a want of provisions and ammunition, but,
above all, from the insubordination and ambitious preten-
sions of various persons in the army, who, feeling themselves
competent to assume the direction of the entire force, and
march them to victory over the whole of Mexico, were sur-
prised and indignant that the command was not conferred
on them." * There was also the usual amount of desertion
by men who did not thoroughly approve of the course of
their commanding oflGicers, but ultimately, about the begin-
ning of November, General Somervell, with some seven hun-
dred and fifty men, started out to take the town of Laredo.
The historian of the expedition casts severe ridicule on
Somervell's cautious approach upon this undefended village,
the inhabitants of which were perfectly friendly and ready
to sell the Texans anything the latter were able to pay for.*

From Laredo Somervell marched his men down the Texan
side of the river. On December 15, 1842, he crossed over
and plundered the Mexican town of Guerrero and inmie-
diately recrossed to the Texan side. Finally, on Decem-
ber 19, 1842, he issued an order directing his troops to march
in the direction of Gonzales, in Texas, where they were to
be disbanded.

A considerable part of Somervell's men very indignantly
refused to obey this order. They had supposed that they
were to be marched into Mexico, and to Mexico they in-
tended to go, whether General Somervell took them or not;
and thereupon the Texan force was divided into two parties,
one of which set ofif for Gonzales to be disbanded and the

^ Yoakum, II, 368. ' Green, Expedition against Mier, 52-55.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 491

other, consisting of about three hundred men, set oflf to
cany on a private war of their own. Crossing the Rio
Grande, they undertook to attack the town of Mier, which,
like most small Mexican places, was built of flat-topped
stone or adobe houses ranged around a principal square.
Following the example set at San Antonio in 1835, the
Texan forces assaulted the town on Christmas night, and
working their way through the mud walls of the Mexican
huts effected a lodgement on the square. The Mexican
troops, however, were present in considerable force — ^prob-
ably more than fifteen hundred men— under the immediate
command of General Pedro Ampudia. Some severe fight-
ing took place on the afternoon of December 26, 1842, but
at last the Texans surrendered, under a written assurance
from the Mexican general that they should be treated "with
the consideration which is in accordance with the magnan-
imous Mexican nation."

The Texan prisoners taken at Mier who were able to
march numbered two hundred and twenty-six, and, as in
the case of the Santa Fe and San Antonio prisoners, they
were sent off under a strong guard toward the city of
Mexico. Their route lay through Matamoros, Monterey,
and Saltillo. Early on the morning of February 11, 1843,
at a point one hundred miles south of Saltillo, the prisoners
overpowered their guard, seized their horses, and started
back on the road to Texas. Their conduct on the return
march was as injudicious as their advance upon Mier.
They abandoned the main line of travel in the hope of
evading pursuit, and becoming lost among the mountains
were compelled to kill their horses for food. What arms
and ammunition they had many threw away. Five were
known to have died of starvation in the mountains, four
managed to reach Texas, three more were missing and sup-
posed to have perished somewhere on the road, and the
rest were retaken by the Mexican forces. When the re-
captured prisoners were brought back to the scene of their
escape they were met by an order from the government
that they were to be decimated, and accordingly lots were

492 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

drawn and every tenth man was shot. The survivors were
sent on toward the capital, where, like the other Texan
prisoners, they were held for some months, either near
Mexico or in the castle of Perote. Some of them managed
to escape from that fortress and others were released from
time to time; some died and all the rest were finally dis-
charged on September 16, 1844, the anniversary of Mexican
independence.^

That all the recaptm'ed prisoners were not shot appears
to have been due, in some measure at least, to the imofficial
intervention of Waddy Thompson, the American minister,
who called at the Mexican Foreign OflGice and expressed the
hope that all the privileges of prisoners of war would be ex-
tended to the Texans. Bocanegra, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, was much excited, and insisted that as they were
not American citizens Mexico would listen to no suggestion
upon the subject from any quarter.

"I rose from my seat," says Thompson, "and said: 'Then, sir,
shoot them as soon as you choose, but let me tell you, that if you do
you will at once involve in this war a much more powerful enemy than
Texas,' and took my leave. An express was immediately sent, coun-
termanding the order to shoot them all, and another order given that
they should be decimated, which was executed. I afterwards received
from some of the Texan prisoners, a heart-sickening account of the
execution of those upon whom the lot fell. It was a cold-blooded and
atrocious murder." ^

The tragic circumstances attending the execution of these
prisoners — ^who were not on parole, and were therefore
thought to be justified in escaping if they could — created
much sympathy for the men who had engaged in the foolish
and insubordinate expedition above related. Its ill success
served one good purpose at least, for it convinced the Texans
that they were as incapable of invading Mexico as Mexico
was incapable of subduing Texas.

^ See Green's Expedilion against Mier^ which is the leading authority upcm
this subject. Bancroft, North Mex. Stales and TexaSy II, 360-370, oondenaes
Green's narrative, and gives a number of additional details from other souroes.

' Thompson's RecoUectiona of Mexico, 74.

THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 493

One other foolish attempt at reprisals femains to be no-
ticed. In the spring of 1843 a force of about two hundred
Texans was assembled near Georgetown, on the Red River,
under the command of a certain Major Jacob Snively,
which was intended to proceed in the direction of Santa Fe
and capture the goods of Mexican merchants trading with
St. Louis. President Houston was so ill-advised as to fur-
nish Snively with a sort of commission, very much like
letters of marque and reprisal to a privateer, authorizing
him to capture the enemy's property. Half the proceeds
was to belong to the captors and half to the Texan govern-
ment, and the Texan government was not to be put to any
expense in the matter, i Snively lay in wait in what is now
southern Kansas, on the ^uth side of the Arkansas River,
for the caravan from St. Louis; but it was doubtful whether
or not his camp was west of the one-hundredth meridian.
n it was not, he was within the territory of the United States.

On June 30 the caravan reached tlje river, escorted by a
detachment of United Sta^tes dragoocfe and two field-pieces,
imder the command of Captain Philip St. George Cooke.
Cooke, who seems to have been a rather peremptory oflGicer,
sent for Snively, told him he was encamped on territory of
the United States, and that he and his force must give up
their arms. This they did and the expedition was igno-
miniously dispersed. Upon the complaint of the Texan
govermnent a court of inquiry was appointed in the case
of Captain Cooke, which found that the place where the
Texan force was disarmed was within the territory of the
United States, that there was nothing harsh or unbecom-
ing in Cooke's conduct, and that he did not exceed his
authority.^

It had become apparent before this to the Texans that
they could not obtain permanent peace with Mexico save H
with the help of some other nation. The United States
might, if Congress were willing, secure peace by force of
arms, and England, or France, or even the United States,

^ An adequate account of this adventure will be found in the diplomatic /
correspondence published in Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 96-112.

494 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

or all three together, might persuade Mexico to accept their

^1 1 mediation. To one of these solutions — ^intervention by the

United States or mediation by one or more foreign powers —

the diplomatic efforts of Texas were necessarily addressed.^

1 Further details as to some of the subjects treated of in this chapter will
be found in Mr. T. M. Marshall's article on ''Diplomatic Relations of Texas
and the United States, 1839-1843/' Tex. Hiat, Quar,, XV, 267-293/

CHAPTER XX

THE WfflGS AND MEXICO

In the preceding chapters the political history of Mexico
and Texas has been traced down to the end of the year
1844; and it next becomes necessary to relate the course
of events in the United States — so far, at least, as those
events had any bearing upon the destinies of the two
neighboring repubUcs.

It will be remembered that President Van Barents admin-
istration had very positively declined, in the simuner of
1837, to give any consideration to the proposal for the an-
nexation of Texas, and that Texas herself, in the course of
the following year, had formally withdrawn the proposal.
On December 9, 1838, Lamar had been inaugurated Presi-
dent of the infant republic, and had expressed himself, in
his very finest language, as definitely opposed to reopening
negotiations.* From the moment it became generally known
that neither the United States nor Texas desired annexation
the exciting subject lost its interest. Petitions ceased to be
presented to the American Congress, debates tiuned on
other matters, and the question of Texas played no part
at all in the extremely active presidential campaign of
1840.

Van Buren was renominated by the Democratic conven-
tion, which met at Baltimore, May 5, 1840. The platform
declared that Congress had no authority to interfere with
slavery in the states; that all efforts of the abolitionists to
induce Congress to act in this matter were alarming and

^ " A long train of consequences of the most appalling character and magni-
tude have never failed to present themselves whenever I have entertained
the subject, and forced upon my mind the unwelcome conviction that the
step once taken, must produce a lasting regret, and ultimately prove as dis-
aatrouB to our liberty and hopes as the triumphant sword of the enemy."

495

496 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

dangerous to the Union; and that public moneys should not
be deposited in banking institutions. In addition, the plat-
form disapproved "internal improvements/' federal assump-
tion of state debts, the fostering of one industry so as to
injure another, the raising of more money than was required
for the necessary expenses of the government, and the
creation of a national bank. The word "Texas" was not
mentioned.

The Whig convention had previously met at Harrisburg,
in December, 1839, but it had put forward no platform.
The reason for this failure to issue any declaration of prin-
ciples was well understood. The delegates could not pos-
sibly have agreed on any statement whatever. "A plat-
form," said the candidate for Vice-President, "would have
scattered us to the winds";* and indeed the Whig party,
which had only come into existence during Jackson's second
administration, was not a political party at all, in any
proper sense of the word. It was composed of a number
of factions, who only agreed in their opposition to Jackson
and Van Buren, and who were opposed to each other upon
every other subject. It comprised as its most numerous
and conspicuous group the "National Republicans," chiefly
Clay's worshippers, who had been outspoken in favor of
"internal improvements" and protective duties. It com-
prised extreme "state-rights" advocates, who were opposed
to both "internal improvements" and high tariffs, but who
had been angered by Jackson's proclamation of 1832 against
nullification. It comprised a majority of the anti-Masons,
who detested Clay. It comprised many men who had sup-
ported Jackson, but who had been driven away by what
they regarded as his high-handed and arbitrary action.
And it comprised a small group who, under the name of
Conservatives, finally abandoned the fortunes of Van Buren
because they could not support his independent treasury
scheme, believing that the moneys of the United States
should be deposited under proper safeguards with the state
banks.

» Tyler, LeUers and Times of the Tylers, I, 596.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 497

The accepted leaders of the most numerous branch of the
Whig party were Webster and Clay, althougH outside of
New England Webster had little support, and six months
before the Hanisburg convention met had taken himself
out of the contest. Clay, on the other hand, had friends
and supporters everywhere; but he had also active and in-
fluential enemies in the party, the result of whose activities
was the nomination of William Henry Harrison, of Ohio.

Harrison was a native of Virginia, the son of Benjamin
Harrison, one of the signers of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. He had entered the army when a mere lad; had
served in the West under Anthony Wayne ; had been secre-
tary of the Northwest Territory and governor of what was
called the Indiana Territory; and had been active and suc-
cessful in the War of 1812. At the battle of Tippecanoe he
had broken up the strongest Indian federation, and at the
battle of the Thames he had defeated the British and re-
covered possession of Detroit. He was no genius in military
»y nJ: than in civil affairs, but in a wafwhere the« h3
been very little glory for anybody the smallest success was
a mark of distinction for a fortunate commander.

Since the close of the war Harrison had represented Ohio
in both houses of Congress, where he had played an ex-
tremely modest part, and had been appointed by Adams,
near the close of his administration, as minister to Colombia.
One of Jackson's first acts had been to recall Harrison, and
since 1829 he had been living in a very small way on a farm
near Cincinnati. Both as a follower of Clay's wing of the
Whig coalition, and as a military "hero" Harrison was dis-
tinctly available. He had no inconvenient record; he was
connected with some of the leading families- in the South;
he was not obnoxious to slave-holding constituencies; and
he was popularly believed to be living the simple life of the
poorest farmer.

The Whig candidate for Vice-President, who was destined
to have a far larger influence over public affairs than usually
falls to the lot of Vice-Presidents, was John Tyler, of Vir-
ginia. He was the son of a former governor of Virginia

498 • THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

who had been the neighbor and friend of Benjamin Har-
rison. John Tyler had Altered public life almost at the
moment he was twenty-one. He was now a little short of
fifty, and had been in public life almost without a break
ever since his majority. He had served in the legislature
of his native state, had been governor of Virginia, and had
had, from time to time, a seat in one house or the other of
Congress. He was a kindly and well-educated man, of
agreeable manners, and of strong though narrow beliefs;
and the political opinion to which he chiefly clung, and which
had notoriously served to guide him throughout his career
in Congress, had been an unqualified and unwavering belief
in the doctrine of state rights.

In Congress he had been almost always in opposition.
He had voted against internal improvements. His vote was
the only one cast in the Senate against the "force bill" of
1833.* He believed the Missouri compromise to be uncon-
stitutional. He deplored the existence of slavery, but de-
clared that he would tolerate no oflScious interference from
without. He was a free-trader, and had voted against the
tariff of 1828 and the tariff of 1832, although he had sup-
ported if not inspired Clay's proposal which resulted in the
compromise tariff of 1833. One of Tyler's strongest con-
victions was the unconstitutionality of the United States
Bank. The fact that the law creating it had been upheld
by a decision of the Supreme Court did not at all shake his
convictions as to his own duty. When the question of re-
newing the bank's charter came up he voted against it,
though he also voted against the withdrawal of the deposits,
regarding it as a harsh and arbitrary measure. His career
had been straightforward and consistent, and was perfectly
well known to all who cared to inquire. He certainly had
nothing whatever in common with such leaders as Clay and
Webster, having in fact been opposed to almost every meas-
ure with which they were identified; and his nomination on
the same ticket with Harrison was such an open bid for

* The other Southern members opposed to this bill left the Senate when it
was brought up and declined to vote.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 499

Southern support as fairly personified the real spirit of the
Whig party and the Harrisburg convention.

Clay, who was greatly disappointed at the failure of the
convention to nominate him, is said to have protested that
he was the most imfortunate man in the history of parties
— " always run by my friends when sure to be defeated, and
now betrayed for a nomination when I, or any one, would
be sure of an election." There was indeed little doubt as
to the result of the election. The bad times which had pre-
vailed since 1837 had made the administration impopular;
there had been scandalous peculation on the part of some of
the Democratic office-holders, and the tyranny of the Demo-
cratic organization had driven out of the party many of its
most influential supporters. The campaign, however, was
very vigorously fought after a fashion of its own.

''There has probably never been a presidential campaign/' says
Schurz, "of more enthusiasm and less thought than the Whig cam-
paign of 1840. As soon as it was fairly started, it resolved itself into
a popular frolic. There was no end of monster mass meetings, with
log cabins, raccoons, and hard cider. One half of the American peo-
ple seemed to have stopped work to march in processions behind
brass bands or drum and fife, to attend huge picnics, and to sing cam-
paign doggerel about * Tippecanoe and Tyler too.' . . . The immense
multitudes who gathered at the meetings came to be amused, not to
be instructed. They met, not to think and deliberate, but to laugh
and shout and sing." ^

As a result of this novel method of campaigning the total
popular vote cast was immensely in excess of anything known
in former elections, and the Whig candidates received an
immense popular majority. In the electoral college the
vote was nearly four to one in their favor.

Harrison, when he was inaugurated, was not in good
health. He was nearly sixty-eight years old, and was sub-
jected, from the time he reached Washington, to an excessive
strain upon all his faculties. Just a month after his inaugu-
ration he died, but he had lived long enough to make up

1 Schurz, Clay, n, 186.

500 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

his cabinet, and to summon a special session of CongresS;
which was to meet on May 31, 1841.

Clay had at first been offered the position of Secretary of
State, but he declined it in order to remain the leader of
Congress. Thereupon Harrison appointed Webster Secre-
tary of State. Francis Granger, of New York, who was re-
garded as one of Webster's friends, and was an anti-Mason
and an anti-slavery man, was appointed Postmaster-General;
but the Secretaries of the Treasury, of War, and of the Navy,
as well as the Attorney-General, were intimate friends and
supporters of Clay. In this cabinet Tyler, upon his accession,
made no change, although there was not a man in it who
was his friend or who shared his peculiar constitutional views.

The fimmess with which the new President held these
views was soon put to the test. The object of the special
session of Congress had been loudly proclaimed by Clay
and the exulting and victorious Whigs to be the entire
overthrow of the financial legislation of Van Buren's ad-
ministration. They meant to repeal the law establishing
the independent treasury, to re-establish a central bank,
to amend the tariff, and to provide for the distribution of
the proceeds of land sales among the states. There was no
difficulty in passing an act abolishing the independent
treasury; but the next step, that of framing a charter for a
new United States bank which should meet the approval
of the President, was a much more serious undertaldng.
Tyler's objections to a central bank were based upon his
strong beUef that Congress had no power to confer on any
banking corporation chartered by it authority to act in
the various states; but he announced his willingness to
sign a bill which should provide for creating a bank in the
District of Columbia, with authority to establish branches
in the several states, but only with the assent of such states.
Such a form of charter would, however, have been of very
little practical value, and the bill as passed by Congress
provided that the assent of the states should be presumed,
imless dissent was expressed within a limited time. This
bill Tyler, as might have been foreseen, at once vetoed.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 501

Negotiations followed in an effort to frame a measure that
would accomplish what the friends of a central bank de-
sired; and at the same time would not be obnoxious to the
President's constitutional scruples. The majority of Tyler's
cabinet seem to have supposed that they had got his assent
to a measure which they submitted to him, but when a bill
in that form was hurriedly passed by both houses of Con-
gress it was again vetoed. A very violent controversy
broke out, which imfortunately tiuned, in part, upon ques-
tions of the President's veracity. All the members of the
cabinet, with the exception of Webster, resigned their
places, and Tyler was left without a party, and almost with-
out supporters.

Webster had been in doubt as to his own course, and there-
fore, when his colleagues threatened to resign, he invited the
Massachusetts delegation in Congress to meet him and laid
the case before them. The resignations of four members of
the cabinet — Clay 's four followers — were to be sent, he said,
to the President the next morning.

"Mr. Webster then, addressing me," says Adams, ** said that, being
thus placed in a peculiar position, and seeing no sufficient cause for
resigning his office, he had requested this meeting to consult with the
members of the delegation and to have the benefit of their opinions,
assuring them that as to the office itself it was a matter of the most
perfect indifference to him whether he retained or resigned it — a
declaration which it is possible he believed when he made it. But he
had prefaced it by stating that he saw no cause sufficient to justify
his resignation. It was like Falstaff's recruit 'Bullcalf.' *In very
truth, sir, I had as lief be hanged, sir, as go; and yet, for mine own
part, sir, I do not care; but rather because I am unwilling, and for
mine own part have a desire to stay with my friends; else, sir, I did
not care for mine own part so much.' . . . For himself, Mr. Webster
said, Mr. Tyler had never treated him with disrespect, and he had no
doubt it was his desire that he should remain in the Department of
State. . . . But the joint resignation of the four heads of Depart-
ments together was a Clay movement, to make up an issue before the
people against Mr. Tyler. We all agreed that Mr. Webster would
not be justified in resigning at this time; but we all felt that the hour
for the requiem of the Whig party was at hand." *

1 Adams, Memoirs, XI, 13.

502 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

It was indeed natural to conclude that the Whig party
was on its death-bed. The break between the President
and the main body of the party was complete and irremediar
ble. Clay at the beginning of the special session of Congress
had '' entered the Senate as a captain of a ship would step
on deck to give his orders," ^ and he had failed in all the
objects nearest his heart. The resignation of the members
of the cabinet had been devised by him in the hope of mak-
ing a complete breach between the mass of the Whig party
and the President; but Webster's refusal to resign served
to prevent the plan from being carried out to its full extent.
The President felt confident that, with the aid of Webster,
he could now go forward to create a new party which would
overthrow Clay and all his friends. "I will say to you,"
said the President to Webster, when the latter announced
that he would stay in the cabinet, "that Henry Clay is a
doomed man from this hour." ^

The resignations of Clay's friends, followed by that of
Granger, the Postmaster-General, were sent in to the Presi-
dent on Saturday, the eleventh of September, and Congress
was to adjourn at noon on the following Tuesday. The
President beUeved and said that the intention was to pre-
vent him from having any cabinet at all until Congress should
meet again in December, for the Constitution only author-
ized him to fill, without the consent of the Senate, vacancies
that might happen during its recess, and these vacancies
had been carefully timed so as to happen just before a
recess. Tyler, however, had evidently been considering
for some time the constitution of a new cabinet, and by
Monday morning he was ready with a complete list of names
which were submitted to the Senate and inmiediately con-
firmed. The men named, he wrote, were, like himself, "all
original Jackson men, and mean to act upon Republican
principles." ^

But Tyler's visions of a regenerated Whig party, led by
himself and Webster amid the applause of the country, was

1 Schurz, Clay, II, 204.

« Letiers and Times of the Tylers, 11, 122. » Ibid., 125.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 503

destined to a swift and rude awakening. He found himself
not only without a party, but without friends in the press,
and the object of loudly expressed popular detestation as a
traitor to the Whig party, which had honored him with
office. Nor were conditions any better when Congress met
in the regular session. The Clay Whigs were found to be
in a majority, which was unshaken by any defection, except
of an insignificant few, whom Clay contemptuously called
the corporal's guard. From the first Monday in December,
1841, until the last day of August, 1842, therefore, Congress
sat, doggedly determined to carry out none of the President's
recommendations. It failed for a long time even to pro-
vide the necessary means for carrying on the government.

The Whigs were desirous of passing a measure — ^to which
the President was strongly opposed— for distributing among
the states the proceeds of the sales of public lands; and they
endeavored to secure their end by tacking this measure to
a tariff bill. Tyler had no serious objection to the tariff
biU, but he objected to the distribution of money in the
Treasury among the states. He therefore vetoed two suc-
cessive tariff bills, and undertook to lecture Congress upon
their duty.

The second veto roused the Whigs to an extraordinary
pitch of indignation. The President's message, whatever
may have been its faults of taste and temper, was at least
an act entirely within his constitutional province. But the
House of Representatives, to which it was addressed, pub-
licly denounced his conduct as an "abusive" exercise of
power, and adopted the report of a special committee, of.
which John Quincy Adams was chairman, which expressed
the opinion that it was a case for impeachment. The com-
mittee further advised the adoption of a joint resolution —
which was immediately passed by the House and never
heard of again-recommending to the states an amendment
to the Constitution by which a majority of each house of
Congress, instead of two-thirds, should be sufficient to pass
a bill over the President's veto.

The Whigs might well rage, for they were impotent to

504 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

pass any measure over the President's veto, supported as he
was both by his "corporaFs guard" and by the whole
strength of the Democratic party in Congress; nor did they
dare to press impeachment, for they were beginning to be
aware that public opinion outside of Congress, which had
manifested itself in the previous autunm in noisy demon-
strations against the President, was in rapid process of
change. The Whig majority thus had their hands tied by
their own President; but in the end Congress passed a
tariff bill which omitted the obnoxious provision as to the
distribution of the sales of public lands. Congress also
made tardy provision for supplying the needs of the govern-
ment, and adjourned on August 31, 1842, leaving Tyler
triumphant and happy. He was still better pleased when
the congressional elections in the autumn of 1842 resulted
in a crushing defeat for the Whigs, the House of Repre-
sentatives becoming Democratic by a very large majority.
The expiring Congress met again in December, 1842, for
the short session, but in a chastened and far more peaceful
and conciliatory temper, and it did little beyond the routine
appropriation of money.

Webster all this time had continued steadily at his post
in the State Department. His refusal to resign with the
rest of his colleagues was in reality due to several reasons, '
of which a desire not to play the part of tail to Clay's kite
was undoubtedly one; but it is probable that his chief
reason Was a patriotic desire to settle the very serious ques-
tions then pending with Great Britain, and which bore the
^appearance of leading to a possible war between the two
countries.^ Adams's chief reason for advising him to stay,
in spite of his ungenerous sneers at Webster's attitude, was
imquestionably the belief that his "signally conciliatory
temper and disposition toward England was indispensably

^ ''I shall not act suddenly; it will look too much like a combination be-
tween a Whig Cabinet and a Whig Senate to bother the President. It will
not be expected from me to countenance such a proceeding. Then, again, I
• will not throw the great foreign concerns of the country into disorder or
danger, by any abrupt party proceeding." — (Webster to Ketchum, Sept. 10,
1841; Webster's PrivaU Con,, II, 110.)

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 505

necessary to save us from a most disastrous and calamitous
war." 1

Into the details of the British negotiations it is imneces-
sary to enter. In large part they turned upon the irritating
controversy concerning the northeastern boundary between
the United States and Canada, which had been under dis-
cussion for fifty years. If any compromise of the extreme
claims on both sides was to be effected — and that seemed
the most likely way out — it was apparent that the United
States must surrender territory claimed by the state of
Maine; and it was also apparent that no one but a New
England man possessing the influence and authority that
were possessed by Webster could possibly have succeeded
in getting such a compromise approved in New England.

The negotiations were conducted with great skill and entire
succesS; and Webster was ably supported by Edward Everett,
of Massachusetts (who had been appointed minister to Eng-
land by Tyler, in July, 1841), and by the good sense and
quiet tact of the President, which helped in smoothing over
difficulties. The British government, on its side, was repre-
sented by Lord Ashburton, a member of that influential
family which has given so many statesmen and adminis-
trators to the service of the kingdom, and has made the
name of Baring known throughout the world. He arrived
in the United States early in April, 1842, and on August 9,
1842, a treaty was signed which, with a single exception,
practically disposed of every question in controversy be-
tween the two countries. The exception was the north-
western boundary of the country, from the Rocky Moun-
tains to the PaciiSc.

But if most of the dangerous questions on the northern
frontier were settled or adjourned, the equally troublesome
questions on the southwestern frontier were still open. The
first of these problems was that of Texas. To a solution by
the simple remedy of annexation President Tyler did seri-
ously incline. As early as October, 1841, very shortly after
the reconstruction of his cabinet, he wrote to Webster: "I

^ Adams, Memoirs, XI, 36.

606 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

gave you a hint as to the probability of acquiring Texas by
treaty. I verily believe it could be done. Could the North
be reconciled to it, could anything throw so bright a lustre
around us?" ^ But though Webster did not fall in with
the suggestion, the subject evidently was a good deal talked
about, for in November Adams was much alarmed by state-
ments appearing in newspapers favorable to the adminis-
tration, to the effect that the project of annexing Texas to
the United States was to be revived. In December he read
a long article in the New York Courier and Enquirer recom-
mending annexation by arguments addressed first of all to
the abolitionists.^

The fact was that a large majority of the reconstructed
cabinet was in favor of annexation. " I feel satisfied fully,"
wrote the Texan minister in Washington the following spring,
"that the administration is decidedly in favor of the policy,
and that the Question is a popular one with Congress." *
The next July the Texan minister had "a full and free con-
versation" with the President upon the subject of annexar
tion, in the course of which the latter remarked " that he
was anxious for it, and wished most sincerely he was able
to conclude it at once." The only fear was that a treaty
would not be confirmed by the Senate, although there was
a majority in favor of annexation, and "the President would
act in a moment if the Senate would concur." *

In December, 1842, the Texan minister in Washington
reported that the President, as well as the majority of his
cabinet, were decidedly anxious for annexation, and had so
expressed themselves without reserve, the President saying
that as soon as he was satisfied that the co-operation of the
Senate could be had he would be willing immediately to
make the treaty. "Some of the most prominent leading
partisans of the President in Congress" were also in favor
of his making the treaty, "believing it would render him
omnipotent in the South and West," and it was thought

* Letters and Times of the Tylers^ II, 126. * Adams, Memoirs, XI, 41.
» Reily to Jones, April 14, 1842; Tex. Dip. Corr., I, 552.

* ReUy to Jones, July 11, 1842; ibid., 567.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 507

that the time would soon arrive when it would be in the
power of Texas to secure annexation; and, if Texas still
desired it, full powers should be sent so that the negotiation
could be begun at the proper time.^

But the real obstacle to any effort at annexation was
always Webster, who could not be expected, as a Massa-
chusetts Whig, to favor the project. He had expressed a
very decided adverse opinion early in Van Buren's admin-
istration, first, because there was no need of extending the
limits of the Union in that direction, and, second, because of
his "entire unwillingness to do anything that shall extend the
slavery of the African race on this continent, or add other
slave-holding states to the Union"; ^ and from that opinion
he never departed. While Webster remained in the State
Department, and Adams was chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, the cause
of annexation, therefore, necessarily remained in abeyance;
but there were other controversies with Mexico in plenty.

In the first place, the settlement of the American claims
against Mexico, some of which had been disposed of by
arbitration, was still extremely troublesome. It was one
thing for Mexico to submit a question to arbitration ; but it
was quite another thing to pay a judgment when rendered.
There were, moreover, a number of claims which, for one
reason or another, had not been passed upon in the arbitra-
tion, and it was necessary to enter into negotiations for the
adjustment of this unfinished business. "These negotia-
tions were complicated by two causes — the Texan question,
and the poverty of the Mexican Treasury. The former
served to render all intercourse between the two governments
difficult and precarious; the latter — the lack of money —
rendered the Mexican government unable to discharge its
pecuniary obligations either to the United States or to
other powers." ' In the end a new treaty was signed, on
January 30, 1843, by which the Mexican government agreed

1 Van Zandt to Terrell, Dec. 23, 1842; ibid., 633.

'Speech at New York, March 15, 1837; Webster's Works, I, 356.

• Moore, International ArbUrations, II, 1245.

508 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

to pay the amount of the awards, with interest, within five
years, in the city of Mexico, in gold or silver money; and
it was also stipulated that a new convention to setUe such
claims of the two governments and their citizens as were not
decided by the late commission should be entered into.
The new claims convention contemplated by the treaty of
January 30 was concluded on November 20, 1843, but,
owing to objections by the American Senate, was never
ratified.^ The claims not passed upon by the former arbi-
trators were, therefore, left in the air — without any prospect
of early settlement. In the meantime, and while these nego-
tiations with respect to the payment of awards and the set-
tlements of the other claims were still pending, the relations
between the United States and Mexico were further compli-
cated by acrimonious correspondence growing out of the
Santa Fe expedition and the capture of San Antonio by the
Mexican forces.^

The Santa Fe prisoners had reached the neighborhood of
the city of Mexico early in February, 1842, but the tales of
their sufferings and of the cruelties practised upon them by
Governor Armijo had reached Washington a month before.
The relatives and friends of the prisoners, of course, began
calling upon the State Department to interpose in their
behalf, and Webster wrote urgently to Ellis, who was still
the American minister in Mexico, directing him to demand
the release of at least such American citizens as were only
travellers or traders.' But the fears of ill-treatment on the
part of the Mexican government led inevitably to sugges-
tions from various quarters that Ellis should be replaced
by a more efficient man. Early in the month of January,
when the news first came, Senator Preston, of South Carolina,
called on Webster and urged that the best and most effectual
step in the case of the Santa Fe prisoners would be to send
out Waddy Thompson, then a member of the House from
South Carolina, in a frigate to Vera Cruz, armed with special
instructions concerning the prisoners. Webster approved,

^ H. R. Docs. 19 and 158, 28 Cong., 2 sess.

s See Chapter XIX, above. ' Sen. Doc. 325, 27 Cong., 2 seas., a-8.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 509

and promised to speak to the President on the subject/ but
it was not until the end of March that the appointment was
actually made.

Thompson had been long in Congress, where he was a
leader among the Southern Whigs. He had been particu-
larly conspicuous for his hostility to Adams, and for his
advocacy, first of the recognition, and then of the an-
nexation of Texas. The Texan minister, writing to his
government with that contempt for conventionalities of
orthography and punctuation which distinguished many
statesmen of the republic, said of Thompson: "He has the
character of being a bold fearless enerjetick man a warm
friend of Texas." ^ He was indeed so very warm a friend
that it might well have been doubted whether he would
be regarded as persona grata to the Mexican govern-
ment. Nevertheless, whatever unfavorable anticipations
were formed, they were disappointed, and he proved an
efficient and successful representative.

His instructions were dated April 5, 1842, and these were
followed up after his departure by special instructions,
dated April 15, 1842, in which the subject of the Santa Fe
prisoners was discussed by Webster, who directed Thomp-
son to make a rather peremptory demand upon the Mexi-
can government.' But before the instructions of April 15
reached Mexico all the American citizens who were entitled
to a release had been surrendered, and Thompson had no
occasion to make the demand in the form directed.

The episode of the Santa Fe prisoners and the tone of
definite hostility in American newspaper comments were
not at all pleasing to the Mexican authorities, but they
were still more incensed when news came of the strong feel-
ing created in the United States by the capture of San
Antonio in the month of March, 1842. The anger of Mex-
ico at the popular expressions of sympathy in the United
States was so intense as to induce the Minister of Foreign

^ Amory to Jones, Jan. 15, 1842; Tex. Dip. Corr., I, 527.
« Reily to Jones, March 25, 1842; ibid., 546.

* The inBtructions of April 5 are in Sen. Ex. Doc. 325, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 8-17;
those of April 15 are printed in full in Webster's WorkSj VI, 427-440.

510 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Relations to adopt the very unusual course of sending to
the diplomatic corps resident in Mexico a circular setting
forth the Mexican grievances. He complained that meet-
ings had been held in the presence of American authorities,
with the avowed purpose of assisting "the adventurers of
Texas," that volimteers had been recruited and armed in
the United States, and that " no other voice was heard but
that of war with Mexico and of aid to Texas," The Mexican
government, he said, had protested against such conduct,
believing that the government of the United States "would
cause its citizens to return to their duty"; but in spite of
these protests "the aggressions made upon the territory of
the republic were tolerated," contrary to the principles of the
law of nations and the treaties between the two countries.^

Thompson, the American minister, at once repUed by
a circular expressing his astonishment and regret at the
"extraordinary proceeding" of the Mexican government,
denying any violation of treaties or the law of nations, and
asserting that, on the contrary, the conduct of the United
States had been "uniformly kind and forbearing." With
respect to public meetings, Thompson had, of course, no
difficulty in showing that the government of the United
States could not interfere, and that the practice of both
Great Britain and the United States was entirely opposed
to restrictions upon freedom of speech. In the very week,
he said, in which a meeting in favor of Texas, complained
of by Bocanegra, was held in New Orleans another was held
there in favor of a repeal of the Irish Union; while in Great
Britain anti-slavery meetings were constantly held, "de-
noimcing a large portion of our people and our institu-
tions in language which, in comparison with that used in
the public meetings toward Mexico, is the language of
compliment."

The question as to enlistments in the United States was a
more troublesome one to answer. Thompson asserted that

^ See text, page 5 of Official Correspondence between the United States and
Mexico from May 12 to Sept. 10, 1842, in vol. 117 of Political PamphleU—
American, in Library of Congress. This pamphlet was printed and circu-
lated by the Mexican legation in Washington.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 511

the United States government had used ''all the means in
its power to prevent this," and had done what was required
by the obligations of the law of nations and what good
faith demanded. He showed that the laws of the United
States only prohibited armed and organized expeditions;
that emigration was not prohibited, and that if men left
the country armed, and even if they announced their inten-
tion of joining the armies of Texas, the American govern-
ment could not interfere so long as they did not constitute
an organized military body.^

Bocanegra, on July 6, 1842, sent another, and this time a
very long, circular to the diplomatic corps, as a rejoinder to
Thompson. The Mexican government, he said, did not
deny the legahty of public meetings to discuss domestic
affairs, or even to criticise the poUcy of foreign nations.
What it did object to were meetings for " the sole piupose
of exciting citizens to arm and leave their country in order
to usurp the territory and rights of a friendly nation.'' He
admitted also that citizens of the United States might freely
emigrate, but he asserted that this rule did not apply where
the emigrants were armed and suppUed with all the mu-
nitions of war — ^incorporated often into military companies
regularly organized — with the never-concealed piupose of
^^g agaLt a neighboring nation, and with a pubUc
promise of sharing the booty with the first U8Uipers.«

Before sending out his circulars Bocanegra had addressed
two commimications directly to Webster, which were dated,
respectively, the twelfth and the thirty-first of May, 1842.*
The first of these reached Washington on the twenty-ninth
of Jime, and a week later Webster, with the cordial approba-
tion of the President,^ sent a reply, in which he refused to

* Official Corre8pondence, 7. Thompson in private did not take Bocanegra
very seriouBly, and thought his utterances "gasconnade and intended for
Mexico/' And he very truly added that "whoever is at the head of this
Government holds his power so insecurely that the Foreign Relations even of
this country are conducted mainly with a view to domestick poleticks. . . .
Much is to be pardoned to the petulance of conadoua weakneaa" — (Thompson to
Webster, June 20, 1842; State Dept, MSS.)

« Official Correapondence, 19. » Ibid., 2, 4; Webster's Works, VI, 442, 467.

^LeUenand Timee of the Tylera, II, 258.

512 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

admit the slightest paxticle of justification for the Mexican
complaints.

"M. de Bocanegra/' said Webster, ''would seem to represent,
that, from 1835 to the present time, citizens of the United States, if
not their Government, have been aiding rebek in Texas in arms
against the lawful authority of Mexico. This is not a little extraor-
dinary. Mexico may have chosen to consider, and may still choose
to consider, Texas as having been at all times, since 1835, and as
still continuing, a rebellious province; but the world has been obliged
to take a very different view of the matter."

TexaS; he continued; had shown as many signs of inde-
pendence as Mexico, and quite as much stability of govern-
ment. The United States had fairly endeavored to fxilfil
all neutral obligations; both Texas and Mexico stood on
the same footing of friendly nations; and the transactions
complained of by Bocanegra were only the natural conse-
quences of the political relations existing between Texas and
the United States. The American government encouraged
trade, of course. To supply contraband of war was not con-
trary to international or mimicipal law, nor was emigration
from the United States. The United States always had and
always would pay attention to any violation of neutral
duties. But it would not interfere with commerce or with
free speech. And Webster closed with a stem note of
warning.

" M. de Bocanegra," he said, " is pleased to say, that, if war actually
existed between the two countries, proceedings more hostile, on the
part of the United States, could not have taken place, than have taken
place, nor could the insurgents of Texas have obtained more effectual
co-operation than they have obtained. This opinion, however hazard-
ous to the discernment and just estimate of things of those who avow
it, is yet abstract and theoretical, and, so far, harmless. The efficiency
of American hostility to Mexico has never been tried; the govern-
ment has no desire to try it. It would not disturb the peace for the
sake of showing how erroneously M. de Bocanegra has reasoned;
while, on the other hand, it trusts that a just hope may be entertained
that Mexico will not inconsiderately and needlessly hasten into an
experiment by which the truth or fallacy of his sentiments may be
brought to an actual ascertainment. . . . If the peace of the two coun-

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 513

tries is to be disturbed, the responsibility will devolve on Mexico.
She must be answerable for consequences. The United States, let
it be again repeated, desire peace. . . . Yet no fear of a different
state of things can be allowcMi to interrupt its course of equal and
exact justice to all nations, nor to jostle it out of the constitutional
orbit in which it revolves." *

Webster, a few days later, had an opportunity of still
further emphasizing the attitude of the American govern-
ment. The day after despatching the letter just referred
to, Bocanegra's second letter, together with copies of his
first circular to the diplomatic corps and a copy of Thomp-
son's rejoinder, were received. Webster's instructions to
Thompson upon this were lucid but warlike.

**You will write a note," he said, "to M. de Bocanegra, in which
you will say, that the Secretary of State of the United States, on the
9th of July, received his letter of the 31st of May; that the Presi-
dent of the United States considers the language and tone of that
letter derogatory to the character of the United States, and highly
offensive, as it imputes to their government a direct breach of faith;
and that he directs that no other answer be given to it, than the dec-
laration, that the conduct of the government of the United States,
in regard to the war between Mexico and Texas, having been always
hitherto governed by a strict and impartial regard to its neutral
obligations, will not be changed or altered in any respect or in any
degree. If for this the government of Mexico shall see fit to change
the relations at present existing between the two countries, the re-
sponsibiUty remains with herself." «

Bocanegra was completely cowed by this outburst. Ac-
knowledging receipt of Webster's views, he roared as gently
as any sucking dove. He relied, he said, on Mr. Webster's
assurance that the strictest neutrality was maintained in
the existing contest between Mexico and Texas, and that
he would leave without remark "the harshness of some of
the expressions foimd in the ii^tructions of his Excellency,
Mr. Webster"; • and here ended this correspondence.

Another letter of Webster's was occasioned by the last of

» Webster to Thompson, July 8, 1842; Webster's Works, VI, 44&-457.
« Wdwter to Thompson, July 13, 1842; ibid., 459.
* Official Correspondence, 38.

514 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the Mexican efforts to invade Texas, made in the month of
September, 1842, when General Woll captured San Antonio
by smprise, and carried away aa prisoners the district judge,
members of the bar, and other people of note in that part of
Texas. President Houston, about four weeks later, caused
identical notes to be sent to the American and British repre-
sentatives in Texas, calling attention to the character of the
warfare waged by Mexico. During the nearly seven years
which had elapsed since the estabUshment of the indepen-
dence of the republic, Mexico, he said, "although uniformly
asserting the ability and determination to resubjugate the
country, has never made a formidable effort to do so"; the
three incursions made during the year 1842 "were petty
marauding parties sent for the purpose of pillaging and har-
assing the weak and isolated settlements on our Western
border . . . murdering the inhabitants in cold blood, or
forcing them away into a loathsome, and too often fatal
captivity"; and the Mexican government was exciting "the
murderous tribes of hostile Indians who reside along our
Northern border." He therefore called upon the United
States and Great Britain to interpose their authority, and
to require Mexico either to make peace or, if she continued
to make war, to do so according to the rules established and
recognized by civilized nations.^

The subject was brought to the attention of Webster,
first by a despatch from Eve, the American representative
in Texas, and next by verbal and written conmiimications
from Van Zandt, the Texan minister, who had been accred-
ited in the smnmer of 1842, but had only arrived at his post
in the beginning of December.^ Webster told Van Zandt
that he had said to General Almonte, the Mexican minister,*
two or three times, in "unequivocal yet respectful terms,"
that Mexico must cease the predatory warfare which she

» Waples to Van Zandt, Oct. 20, 1842; Tex. Dip. Can., I, 609-611. Lester's
Sam Houston and His Republic, 163.

« Van Zandt to Terrell, Dec. 7, 1842; Tex. Dip. Cotr., I, 613.

'Almonte, who had been on Santa Anna's staff at San Jacinto, and had
shared his leader's subsequent captivity, had come to Washington as minister
from Mexico in the autumn of 1842.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 515

had lately pursued against Texas. And on January 31,
1843, he sent instructions to Thompson upon the subject,
forwarding at the same time a long letter from Van Zandt,

"This department," said Webster, "entirely concurs in the opinion
of Mr. Van Zandt, that practices such as these are not justifiable or
sanctioned by the modem law of nations. You will take occasion to
converse with the Mexican Secretary, in a friendly manner, and repre-
sent to him how greatly it would contribute to the advantage as well
as the honor of Mexico, to abstain altogether from predatory incur-
sions, and other similar modes of warfare. Mexico has an undoubted
right to resubjugate Texas, if she can, so far as other States are con-
cerned, by the common and lawful means of war. But other States
are interested — and especially the United States, a near neighbor to
both parties, are interested — not only in the restoration of peace be-
tween them, but also in the manner in which the war shall be con-
ducted, if it shall continue." ^

Thompson did not have much success in his attempt to
induce the Mexican government to modify its methods of
making war. He reported that, in obedience to Webster's
instructions, he had verbally presented the views of the
American government to Bocanegra.

" He replied, (very much excited), that Mexico did not regard Texas
as an independent power, but as a rebellious province; and that
prisoners taken were not entitled to any of the privileges of prisoners
of war, but that they were rebels, and would be so treated; and that
no suggestions on the subject from other governments would be re-
ceived or listened to." *

But Bocanegra's excitement and defiant attitude were due
not so much to the presentation of the subject of Thompson's
instructions as to the fact that he was just then dealing with
the prisoners of the Mier expedition, and also that he was
still vexed at a very absurd affair which had brought Ameri-
can and Mexican officers into collision on the distant shores
of Califomia.

Bocanegra had only himself to blame for the origin of the

1 Webster to Thompson, Jan. 31, 1843; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Gong., 1 sees., 69.
s Thompson to Webster, March 14^ 1843; ibid,, 71.

516 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

latter affair. His circulars to the diplomatic corps in the
spring and summer of 1842 had been published by him in
full in the Mexican newspapers, and in the course of time
had reached John Parrott, the American consul at Mazatlan.
On June 22, 1842, Parrott sent a copy of a Mexican news-
paper, containing some of Bocanegra's eloquent prose, to
Conmiodore Jones, of the United States navy, who was tJien
in command of a small squadron on the west coast of South
America, and at the same time expressed the opinion that
diplomatic relations might soon be broken off, as the Ameri-
can minister had been " forcing very hard our claims on this
coimtry." ^

Parrott's letter was received by Jones at Callao during
the first week in September, and the same vessel brought
him the first news he had had from the United States since
he left there the previous December.^ He knew nothing of
any trouble with Mexico, but he was well aware that the
relations between the United States and Great Britain were
threatening, and he had been keeping an eye upon the Brit-
ish squadron, which was also lying at Callao, and which
was dightly superior in force to his own.

It so happened that by the same mail which brought him
Parrott's letter Jones received a cutting from a Boston news-
paper, reporting that Mexico was about to cede Califomia
to Great Britain in payment of the British debt. This, of
course, was a mere blunder, based on the proposal made by
Mexico to give bondholders grants of land in payment for
their bonds; but the sudden departure of the British squad-
ron from Callao within twenty-four hours after Jones's re-

* Parrott to Jones, June 22, 1842; H. R. Doc. 166, 27 Cong., 3 sees., 86.
Parrott was not alone in thinking war likely. At about the same time Presi-
dent Tyler told the Texan minister in Washington that "he did not see how
a war between the United States and Mexico could be avoided." — (Reily to
Jones, July 11, 1842; Tex. Dip. Corr.j I, 567.) Webster thought Bocanegra's
circulars so extraordinary that they must have been prompted by some other
reason than that which appeared on their face — probably to find a way to
avoid paying the awards of the arbitrators. — (Webster to Thompson, July 9,
1842; Webster's Private Corr., II, 136.)

*A11 the news he received was unofficial. He had not had "a scrip of a
pen" from the Navy Department since his sailing orders of Dec. 10, 1841.—
(Jones to Upshur, Sept. 13, 1842; H. R. Doc. 166, 27 Ck>ng., 3 sess., 68.)

THE WfflGS AND MEXICO 517

ceipt of the Boston and Mexican newspapers and the letter
from Parrott, gave. him food for thought.

After consulting the American minister in Chili Jones con-
cluded that it was his duty to take steps to forestall any
attempt by Great Britain to take possession of Calif omia;
and to take possession of it himself in behalf of the United
States if; as he thought likely, Mexico and the United States
were by this time actually at war. On Wednesday after-
noon, the seventh of September, therefore, Jones set sail from
Callao with two of his vessels, the frigate United States and
the sloop of war Cyane, both relics of the War of 1812. At
daybreaj£ on Wednesday, the nineteenth of October, the
two ships were close to Monterey, and a Mexican bark was
boarded, the master of which professed ignorance of any
trouble between Mexico and the United States. That same
afternoon the vessels anchored in the bay, as close to the
"castle" of Monterey as the depth of water would allow.
There was no British squadron m the harbor, and no sign
of anything but profound peace.

At first nobody paid any attention to the American ships,
and Jones impatiently waited for some conmiunication from
the shore. At length two Mexican officers came off, who
also denied having heard of any diflBiculties between Mexico
and the United States. The ship Fame, of Boston, which
was at anchor near by, was visited, but her people knew
nothing definite. However, they had recently come from
the Sandwich Islands, and there they had heard rumors of
war, and also a report that England was to take possession
of Upper Califomia and guarantee Lower California to
Mexico.

What was Jones to do? Up to this point his acts had been
above criticism. He was fully justified, with the informa-
tion he possessed, in going to Califomia with Jiis ships, pre-
pared to act according to the facts he discovered on arrival;
but he was evidently boimd, before he acted, to be very sure
what the facts actually were. Unfortimately for him, the
abundant leisure of a six weeks' passage from Callao had
permitted him to prepare elaborate plans for a coup de

518 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

thMlre. In the first place, he had composed a proclamation
which he could not willingly let die. Also he had issued an
address to his crews, enjoining in moving terms the duty of
moderation in the hour of victory. He must have felt
that it would have been a tame ending indeed if, upon
arrival, there was to be no war with anybody.

In this frame of mind, the very absence of definite infer-
mation and the assertions of the people from the shore that
they knew of no diflBiculties seemed to Jones suspicious —
especially as he saw, or thought he saw, some stir on shore
near the fort. He imagined that there was "trepidation
manifest in the deportment" of the men who came off from
the village, which he interpreted as due to an endeavor to
coi^ceaJ the facts. Upon these trifles he came to the de-
cision, after he had been an hour at anchor, to send one of
his captains on shore with a solemn written demand for the
surrender of the place " in the name of the United States of
America, and with the earnest desire to avoid the sacrifice
of hmnan life and the horrors of war." Nobody on shore,
however, had the slightest idea of sacrificing their lives or
of doing anything but surrender as fast as possible. The
Uttle castle of Monterey was in the usual condition of Mex-
ican forts. Its eleven guns could not be fired; there was no
ammunition; there were only twenty-nine soldiers in the
place, and the Mexicans were only too eager to accede to
Jones's demand before harm came of it — a good deaLto
Jones's surprise, and perhaps to his annoyance.

On Thursday morning, as soon as his landing party was
in possession of the fort, Jones issued to "the inhabitants
of the two Calif omias" a high-flown proclamation, which
he had carefully prepared while at sea. "Although I come
in arms, . . ." the proclamation ran, "I come not to spread
desolation an^ong California's peaceful inhabitants. It is
against the armed enemies of my coimtry, banded and ar-
rayed under the flag of Mexico, that war and its dread con-
sequences will be enforced," and so on.^

This ridiculous paper threw a touch of absurdity over the

» H. R. Doc. 166, 27 Cong., 3 seas., 79.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 519

whole proceeding; which Jones himself probably never quite
appreciated; but it very soon began to dawn upon him that,
although it was very proper to visit the coast of Calif omia,
he had been extremely imprudent in taking actual possession
of Mexican territory without any more knowledge than that
which he possessed. On the evening he arrived, and on the
next day, he had a good deal of conversation with Thomas
O. Larldi, an American shopkeeper, who had been Uving
for ten years in Monterey. Larkin, who was a sensible man,
assured the conmiodore that the rumors of war between
Mexico and the United States and of the cession of California
to Great Britain were quite unfounded. He thought there
were late advices to that effect on shore, and after some com-
ing and going he succeeded in finding in the village a news-
paper from the city of Mexico, of a date as recent as August
4, and a private letter from Mazatlan as late as August 22,
which satisfied Jones upon these points. On the following
afternoon, Friday, October 21, Jones therefore re-embarked
the landing party, which had been in possession of the fort
since the previous morning, hauled down the American flag,
and hoisted and saluted the Mexican. Two days before,
in his proclamation to the inhabitants, he had declared that
"those stars and stripes, infaJHble emblems of civil Uberty,
. . . henceforth and forever will give protection and
security to you, to your children, and to unborn countless
thousands."

Jones's absm^ties, however, were more than matched by
the absurdities of General Micheltorena, of the Mexican
army, who had recently come to California with a command
of about three himdred men. This warrior, when he re-
ceived an account of the seizure of Monterey, was encamped
with his men about twenty miles north of Los Angeles, hav-
ing left that place two days before on his way to Monterey.
He at once wrote letters to the various Mexican command-
ants in different parts of California, to the effect that he
could not "fly to the assistance of Monterey," for he could
not think of leaving Los Angeles imdefended. He did not
fear an attack, but he thought that all the inhabitants ought

520 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

to participate in the pleasure of victory, and therefore he
directed that the patriotism of all who were able to bear
arms should be "excited" by threats of losing their property
and being declared imworthy of the name of Mexicans, and
enemies to the coimtry, if they failed in their duty. To the
commandant at Santa Barbara he wrote that he was about
to establish his head-quarters at Los Angeles, and wished all
the arms and ammmntion then at San Pedro sent to him.^

It is doubtful whether Micheltorena's men left their camp
at all; and if they did, they marched avxiy from their enemy
— that is, back to Los Angeles. But at any rate it is certain
that on the very next day he received a letter from Com-
modore Jones, who annoimced that he had withdrawn his
forces from Monterey. Micheltorena at once replied, stat-
ing that he would now suspend the hostile march he had
undertaken; that some further satisfaction than a mere
salute was necessary to satisfy "the multitude of persons
now surroimding me"; and that he wished a conference
with Jones at Los Angeles or San Pedro.*

Li Micheltorena's official report his own enei^ and the
valor of his troops were loudly proclaimed. He declared
that on the morning after receiving news of Joneses seizure
of Monterey he had started with his troops to attack the
invaders. "We thus marched for two hours during which
my soul was wrapt in ecstasies at the flattering prospect of
a speedy and certain victory," when another messenger had
brought news of the evacuation of Monterey by the American
forces, and he had immediately written an insulting letter
to Jones, a copy of which he enclosed. He also said that
he expected shortly to induce Jones to sign an agreement
containing an apology and a promise of indemnity.' It is
perhaps imnecessary to say that Jones refused to sign any
agreement, on the correct ground that this was a matter for
the two governments to adjust.

^ Micheltorena to Vallejo, H. R. Doc. 166, 27 Cong., 3 sess., 26; same to
Alvarado, ibid., 25; same to Arguello, ibid., 24. All the above are dated
Oct. 25, 1842.

' Micheltorena to Jones, Oct. 26, 1842; ibid., 35.

'Micheltorena to Mendivil, Nov., 1842; ibid., 18.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 521

The Mexican government caused Micheltorena's report to
be published in the Diario dd Gobiemo of December 14, and
on December 19 Bocanegra wrote 1;o the American minister
calling attention to the seizure of Monterey, "the greatest
outrage that can be conmiitted against an independent and
sovereign nation," and demanding reparation and satisfac-
tion, besides indemnity for losses.^ Thompson replied, ac-
knowledging receipt of Bocanegra's note.

ill

The surprise and regret of your Excellency cannot have exceeded
what has been experienced by the undersigned, who takes great
pleasure in assuring your Excellency that these acts of the American
commander were wholly unauthorized by any orders from his govern-
ment and that the fullest disclaimer to that effect will be promptly
made by the government of the undersigned, with whatever other
reparation is due to the honor of Mexico, and which is not incompati-
ble with that of the United States."

But Thompson also pointed out that the Mexican gov-
ernment was in a measure to blame, inasmuch as the harsh
and menacing tone of Bocanegra's papers, pubUshed in the
previous spring, at a time when the United States was be-
lieved to be on the verge of war with Great Britain, might
well have furnished additional groimd for the opinion on
which Commodore Jones acted. He stated also that the
letter which Micheltorena represented himself as having
written to Commodore Jones had never been received by
the latter, and undoubtedly had never been really sent,
and he expressed the opinion that Micheltorena's coarse and
abusive language deserved rebuke.^ Thompson's conmoiuni-
cation was enough for the Mexican government, in whose
ears Webster's vigorous language was still ringing; and on
January 7, 1843, the Diario del Gobiemo officially announced
that everything had been satisfactorily settled.'

* Ibid., 9 et seq.

* Ibid., 12. Thompson's note was based upon information verbally given
by one of Ck>n[m)oclore Jones's officers, who passed through Mexico at this
time with despatches for the Navy Department.

» Ibid., 16.

522 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Rumors of these events arrived in Washington in January,
1843; during the expiring session of the Whig Congress.
Webster at once wrote to Thompson, without waiting for
official information, instructing him to state to the Mexican
government that Conrnoiodore Jones had no warrant from
the American government for his proceeding, and that the
President exceedingly regretted the occurrence. This was
followed by a somewhat acrimonious discussion between
Webster and General Almonte, the Mexican minister.
Almonte thought that an apology and expression of regret
from the United States for this unprecedented outrage (" tn-
avdito oienlado'^) was not sufficient, and that the United
States should promise that Jones would be " exemplarily "
punished. The President and Webster, however, both
agreed that Almonte went too far when he asked for pun-
ishment, and Webster wrote that while Jones was no doubt
mistaken, he had not intended any affront to the govern-
ment of Mexico, and that " some allowance may be properly
extended toward acts of indiscretion in a quarter so very
remote." Almonte replied, not very temperately, that the
promise in regard to Jones's pimishment was too vague;
but Webster suggested to the President that no further
answer should be given to Almonte except by sending the
correspondence to Congress.^

In Congress a resolution had been adopted on the second
of February, on the initiative of ex-President Adams, calling
for information as to the authority or mstructions under
which Conrnoiodore Jones had invaded the territories of the
Mexican republic; and accordingly, on February 18, the
President sent a message stating that Jones's proceedings
were "entirely of his own authority, and not in consequence
of any orders or instructions, of any kind, given to him by
the government of the United States. For that proceeding
he has been recalled." The opponents of the administra-
tion used some violent language, and tried to prove that
Jones's act was part of a plan to stir up difficulties with
Mexico and to annex California; but the evidence was too

* Ihid., 3-8.

THE WHIGS AND MEXICO 523

strong for them. There can be no doubt that the Presi-
dent's statement was exactly true. It need only be added
that Jones was not punished further than by being reUeved
from his command. He returned home pursuant to orders,
in the latter part of 1844, and was then informed by the
Secretary of the Navy that his zeal in the service of his
country and his devotion to what he had deemed his duty
entitled him to anything but censure. In later years he
again commanded the Pacific squadron.^

With this incident Webster's dealings with Mexico came
to an end. On the eighth of May, 1843, he resigned the office
of Secretary of State, which he had held for a little more
than two years. The great task of settling the controversies'
with Great Britain, with the single exception of the dispute
over Oregon, had now been completely finished. The Senate,
by a nearly unanimous vote, had consented to the ratifica-
tion of the treaty of Washington, and the House of Com-
mons in England had voted down a vicious protest from
Lord Palmerston. But, on the other hand, Mexican affairs
were in a much worse condition than when Webster took
office. Under Van Buren's administration the relations of \
the United States with that country had been put upon a \
footing which was correct even if not exactly friendly. But \
since the Whigs came in, threats of war on both sides had I
been uttered, and in spite of efforts made by the ministers
of both countries feeling was steadily becoming embittered.
It is not to be supposed, however, that this increased ill-
feeling was due to anything done or omitted by the Whig
administration. On the contrary, the whole course of
events can be traced, with a certainty quite unusual in his-
tory, to the preposterous attempt of the Texans to invade
New Mexico.

Webster's departure from the cabinet was due, of course,
to the fact that he had never been in full sympathy with
the President or the other members of the administration.

' BaDcroft, Hist, of Calijomiay IV, 330-350, gives a number of details con-
cerning Jones and his seizure of Monterey — largely derived from personal
recollections of old inhabitants — which supplement the official reports.

524 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

In paxticular, he stood alone in opposing the policy of an-
nexing Texas. However, he and President Tyler parted
with mutual and evidently sincere expressions of confidence
and good-will.

CHAPTER XXI

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION

General Houston, as we have seen, had begun his
second term as President of Texas in December, 1841, and
had immediately reversed the policy of his predecessor in
regard to finance. He had also adopted a foreign policy
which was in many respects different, for Houston was a
man who believed in the gods of things as they are, and he
clearly perceived the utter inability of Texas to maintain -^
itself permanently in its detached condition. Indeed, he
went so far as habitually to exaggerate the possibility of
Mexican invasion. His first desire had been for annexar -
tion to the United States; but he was quite prepared, when
that seemed to be impracticable, to adopt any other measure
which might put Texas in a position to exist and prosper.
The only other measure which could give Texas the security
she so sorely needed was peace with Mexico. The policy
of President Lamar, as has been seen,. was strongly against
annexation, and it had also been generally aggressive; but
some ineffectual efforts had been made to bring about peace, '
both by means of direct negotiation with Mexico and
through the good oflfices of the United States and other
foreign nations. And in order to get a clear apprehension
of the problems with which Texas was faced at the end of
the year 1841 it is necessary to go back for a period of
nearly three years and examine into what had been at-
tempted in that regard.

The first serious effort to open negotiations, after the
repudiation of the agreements made with Santa Anna while
he remained a prisoner in Texas, was in the spring of 1839.
About that time President Lamar received a curiously dis-
torted report that Santa Anna had placed himself at the

525

526 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

head of the Federal party, and was likely to succeed in carry-
ing out their plans. TTie fact, of course, was exactly the
reverse; but the erroneous rumor led the Texan government
to think that this might be an opportune moment for trying
to get Santa Anna to carry out the promises he had made
in Texas some three years before. Accordingly, Colonel
Barnard E. Bee was sent to Vera Cruz, where he arrived on
the eighth of May, 1839. He was there notified that if he
had no other object in coming to Mexico than that of solicit-
ing the recognition of the independence of Texas he must de-
part at once, which he did, after publishing a sort of mani-
festo, in which he reviewed Santa Anna's promises and
treaties, and asserted that Santa Anna had not acted in
Texas imder duress. The official newspaper in Mexico
printed this statement of Bee's as a conclusive proof of the
patriotism of the hero of Tampico and Vera Cruz ! ^

The British government, at about the same time, was
quite independently expressing its willingness to mediate
between Mexico and Texas, although the independence of
the latter had not yet been fully recognized. In the same
month of May, 1839, Pakenham, the British minister in
Mexico (who had j\ist returned from a visit to England on
leave), had an interview with Gorostiza — at that time Min-
ister of Foreign Relations — which was fully reported to the
British Foreign Office. In pursuance of verbal instructions
from Lord Palmerston, Pakenham had urged upon Gorostiza
the importance of a prompt negotiation for Texan indepen-
dence, laying stress upon the advantages to Mexico of a buffer
state between it and the United States, and, according to
Pakenham, Gorostiza said frankly that although he agreed
perfectly i to the importance of such an arr^ement the
Mexican government dared not risk so unpopular an act,
but hinted that a suggestion from England for a suspension
of hostilities might prove advisable. He also said that
Mexico would never consent to the Rio Grande as the
boundary, and that if a boundary were ever fixed " it would

^ Mexico d iraois de loa SigloSf IV, 442. Bee's own account of his mismoD
will be found in Tex. Dip. Corr., II, 432^56.

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 527

be desirable to have it guaranteed by some powerful Euro-
pean government"; but Pakenham assured him that no
European power would be willing to undertake that respon-
sibility. And Pakenham sunamed up the result of his in-
terview with Gorostiza by the statement that "reconquest
is admitted to be impossible, and yet a feeling of mistaken
pride, foolishly called regard for the National honour, de-
ters the [Mexican] Government from putting an end to a
state of things highly prejudicial to the interests of Texas
and attended with no sort of an advantage to this Country." ^

Pakenham's efforts were approved by Palmerston, who
wrote to him at length, nearly a year later, arguing the
impossibility of a reconquest of Texas and expressing the
opinion that Mexico would do better to exert her energy
in rendering productive other portions of her vast and un-
developed territory. Palmerston also argued that Texas
ought to be recognized by Mexico at once, since otherwise
the Texan people "might throw themselves upon the United
States for assistance, and their final incorporation with the
Union might be a consequence of temporary co-operation."*

Long before these instructions reached Mexico Gorostiza
had been succeeded in the Mexican Foreign Office by Canedo,
who, as Pakenham reported, acknowledged the strength of
the British arguments, and expressed himself as ready to
take the risk of accepting the British offer of mediation if
his colleagues would support him; but he asked Pakenham
not to press the matter until the new ministry had become
more firmly established.^

While these conversations were going on in Mexico, Bee,

^ Pakenham to Palmerston, June 3, 1839; E. D. Adams, BrUiah InieresU and
Activities in TexaSj 28.

* Palmerston to Pakenham, April 25, 1840; ibid.f 30.

> Pakenham to Palmerston, Sept. 12, 1839; ibid., 32. Between April, 1837,
and March, 1839, there were twelve changes in the Mexican Ministry of For-
eign Relations. The entire cabinet was renewed on July 27, 1839. — (Bancroft,
History of Mexico, V, 217, note.) Cafiedo was always personally of the opinion
that it would be far better for Mexico to give up the idea of conquering Texas.
He wrote a long article to this effect, which was published in Mexico on Jan-
uary 15, 1844, in the Revista Econdmica, etc. A copy of this article was sent
to the State Department in Washington, shortly after its publication, by the
American minister in Mexico, and is filed with the despatches.

528 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the Texan agent sent to Vera Cruz, had returned to New
Orleans, and had got into communication with a certain
Juan Vitalba, who represented himself to be a secret agent
of the Mexican government. Bee seems to have been very
much such a person as James Hamilton, and he wrote to
Texas that, no matter who was at the head of the Mexican
government, it could only be approached in one way.

"The truth is," he said, "the oflBcers of Gov't are only waiting for
their fee to commence operations. I was aware of this at Vera Cruz
but I was solicitous of breaking ground without it — ^fully sensible
however that as I progressed the way would have to be paved with
gold. The Presidents best plan is to make up his mind to this at
once. , . . My impression is that he will have to spend from Five
Hundred thous'd to a million in this way." ^

A few days later he wrote that what was needed was to
assure the Mexican agents that "we will not be wanting in
making them ample compensation." "I wish," he added,
" to give the Individual here a doceur, and I am desirous of
sending an officer of their Go't a handsome carriage from
this place." *

In the meantime James Hamilton, who had just then
been appointed financial agent to place the Texan bonds,
was taking a hand in the business. On May 20, 1839, he
had an interview with Fox, the British minister in Wash-
ington, and later sent him a statement "in relation to the
advantages which might result to Great Britain from the
mediatorial offices of Her Britanic Majesty's Minister Mr.
Pakenham at Mexico." Fox promised to write, in due
course, to Pakenham and Lord Palmerston.' At the
same time Hamilton was in communication with Poinsett,
then Secretary of War, and induced him to talk with

1 Bee to Webb, July 9, 1839; Tex, Dtp, Corr., II, 460.

* Same to same, July 9, 1839; ibid,, 463. That Lamar was not at all ayeree
to bribery appears from a letter in which he authorized the expenditure of
not more than fifty thousand dollars ''as secret service Money in procuring
the recognition of Texas."— (Burnet to Hamilton, Aug. 19, 1839; ibid,, 873.)

* Hamilton to Fox, May 20, 1839; Fox to Hamilton, May 22, 1839; ibid^^
867-S71.

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 529

MartineZ; the Mexican minister in Washington.^ Late
in the year Hamilton went to Texas, and on his way, at
New Orleans, he wrote direct to Pakenham, who replied
that he had not heard from Fox, but had received instruc-
tions from Lord Palmerston to tender the good offices of
her Majesty's government toward effecting an arrangement
between Mexico and Texas. He regretted to say that all
his exertions to induce the Mexican government to enter-
tain the question of recognition had proved unavailing.

" Not," he wrote, " but that the more enlightened Members of the
present Administration appear to understand that to continue the
contest with Texas would be worse than useless, but there is no man
among them bold enough to confront the popular opinion, or, I should
rather say the popular prejudice upon this point, which is strongly
pronounced against any accommodation with Texas. Besides which
they fear, and not without reason, that, for the sake of Party objects,
an attempt would dishonestly be made to crush by the unpopularity
which would, very certainly, attend such a measure, any Government
which should be bold enough to advocate the policy of alienating what
is still talked of as a part of the National Territory. . . . You are, I
dare say, sufficiently acquainted with the Spanish character to under-
stand how untractable they, and their descendants likewise, are in
matters affecting their pride and what they are pleased to call their
National honor." '

Before this letter was written the indefatigable Hamilton
had informed the Texan administration that there was a
gentleman in New York named Treat, a cordial friend of
Texas, who had been many years in Mexico, and was inti-
mately acquainted with Santa Anna, and who corresponded
with a close friend of the Mexican President. Treat, said
Hamilton,, had received several letters in which this friend
represented that he was amply empowered by Santa Anna
to conclude the secret articles of a pacification ; and Hamilton
hoped that Treat might be induced to go to New Orleans to
see what could be done.^ Treat's correspondent seems to

» Poinsett to Hamilton, May 31, 1839; ibid., 452.

* Pakenham to Hamilton, Dec. 12, 1839; ibid,, 879.

* Hamilton to Lamar, June 22, 1839; ibid., 450.

530 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

have been the same Vitalba who was trying to get money
out of Bee in New Orleans.^

Treat went to New Orleans, and from there to Texas, and
on August 9, 1839, was appointed " a Private and Confiden-
tial Agent for the Government of Texas for the purpose of
ascertaining the disposition of the Government of Mexico in
regard to a negotiation of a peace between the two Nations,
and if practicable to prepare the initiatoiy arrangements
for such a negotiation." Recognition of Texas and the Rio
Grande as the boundaiy were to be indispensable conditions,
but Texas was willing to pay Mexico a sum not exceeding
five million dollars as a compensation for her relinquishment
for all claims, public and private, to the territory within
these limits.*

The Texan agent arrived in the city of Mexico December
11, 1839, and, after some unsuccessful efforts to reach the
Mexican authorities directly, he put himself in relations
with Pakenham, who wrote home that he was impressed by
Treat's intelligence, good sense, and knowledge of the lan-
guage and customs of Mexico; that he had induced Canedo
to receive Treat imofficially ; and that Canedo had expressed
himself as being personally much inclined to favor the con-
cession of Texan independence.* But it was evident to
Pakenham and everybody else that the political diflBculties
in Canedo's way were very serious, inasmuch as Busta-
mante's government was now existing simply at the suffer-
ance of Santa Anna, and was therefore much too weak to
undertake an unpopular foreign policy. Nevertheless, after
a good deal of discussion, the matter was laid before the
council of state with the hope of inducing them to advise
Congress to grant authority to the government to make

^ Same to same, June 28, 1839; ibid,, 453. Hamilton also wrote that he had
received "an intimation from a respectable Quarter that if he would see the
Mexican Minister in the United States or write to him privately he would
receive a pretty unequivocal assurance that Mexico was prepared to accept
the mediation of the United States.'' '^The respectable Quarter" was prob-
ably Poinsett, but it is incredible that he should have made such a stateiment
as Hamilton said he had made.

« Burnet to Treat, Aug. 9, 1839; ibid., 470.

* Pakenham to Palmerston, Feb. 9, 1840; £. D. Adams, 41.

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 531

some sort of axrangement with Texas.^ But Gorostiza was
an influential member of the council, and in spite of his
former assurances to Pakenham he strongly opposed the
proposal, and disapproved "of any accommodation with
Texas as an independent country," so that in the end the
coimcil referred the whole matter to Congress without a
recommendation.2

The result, which might easily have been foreseen, was
that members of Congress loudly proclaimed the greatest
indignation at any suggestion of a settlement, and the gov-
ernment quietly dropped the matter, although Canedo as-
sured Treat that a committee of Congress was occupied with
a report on the subject, and that the government would
"accelerate all it coidd." '

Subsequently Treat endeavored to effect an arrangement
under which a truce for one, two, or three years should be
agreed upon, terminable on six months' notice by either
party; but to this proposal the Mexican government re-
plied by a simple refusal to enter into any negotiation what-
ever that was not based upon a recognition of Mexican
sovereignty over Texas; although Pakenham urged them
to adopt tiie Texan proposal, and indeed expressed himself
as thinking that it ought to be considered by the Mexican
government "as quite a Godsend."* In reporting to the
British government the failure of these efforts Pakenham
dwelt upon "the obstinacy and infatuation" of the Mexicans
and "the pusillanimous fear of responsibility which has in-
fluenced the conduct of the Mexican Government through-
out the whole affair/' ^ Shortly afterward Treat left Mexico,
and died on board drip on hi Lum joumey.-

* Treat to Lamar, May 7, 1840; Tex. Dip. Corr., II, 634. Pakenham to
Palmerston, May 18, 1840; E. D. Adams, 43.

« Treat to Lamar, May 28 and June 6, 1840; Tex, Dip. Can., II, 636-641.
Pakenham to Pabnerston, July 5, 1840; £. D. Adams, 44.

» Treat to Lipscomb, Sept. 7, 1840; Tex. Dip. Corr., II, 697.

^Pakenham to Palmerston, Oct. 7, 1840; £. D. Adams, 46. Cafiedo to
Pakenham, Sept. 26, 1840; Pakenham to Treat, Sept. 29, 1840; Tex. Dip.
Can., II, 723-725.

* Pakenham to Pahnerston, Oct. 26, 1840; £. D. Adams, 48.

* Pakenham wrote to Treat on October 14, 1840, regretting "the failure of
our joint labours to bring about a friendly understanding between Texas and

532 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

In the spring of 1841 Lamar's administration very unad-
visedly renewed their efforts by sending to Mexico Judge
Webb; at one time Secretary of State of Texas, but again
without result. Webb was even refused permission to land
at Vera Cruz, although Pakenham did his best to get the
Mexican Foreign Office to consider the subject.^ The re-
fusal was, of course, due to the continued existence of the
same causes that had formerly influenced the foreign policy
of the Mexican government. Bustamante's administration
was still in power, but the time was evidently close at hand
when they would have serious difficulty in sustaining them-
selves, and they could not afford to take any added chances
of pubUc dissatisfaction.

When Webb's failure became public Hamilton and Bee
saw their opportimity to meddle again in the affair, although
by the time they resumed their activities Lamar was out of
office and Houston had become President of Texas. They
both wrote to Santa Anna on the subject, Hamilton pro-
posing that "if a treaty of peace and limitations could be
made Texas would pay five million dollars which I can place
in London for this object, within three weeks after receipt
of the agreement, together with two himdred thousand
dollars which will be secretly placed at the disposal of the
Agents of the Mexican Government." ^ Santa Anna replied
to Bee with an angry reference to the Santa Fe expedition,
and to Hamilton with a virtuous outburst, declaring that
his offer of a bribe was "an insult and an infamy unworthy
of a gentleman." '

Mexico/' and expressing the opinion that ''every thing that zeal and ability
could suggest as likely to lead to a favourable issue has been done by you,"
and that he had failed only because success, under the existing circumstances,
was impossible. Nothing, Pakenham believed, would be gained, under these
circumstances, by further overtiu-es to the Mexican government. — {Tex. Dip.
Can., II, 726, 727.) This estimate of Treat's conduct does not seem at all
excessive.

^Pakenham to Palmerston, June 10, 1841; E. D. Adams, 64. Mayfield
to Webb, March 22. 1841; Webb to Mayfield, June 29, 1841, etc.; Tex. Dip.
Can., n, 732, 751-766.

* Bee to Santa Anna, Dec. 27, 1841 ; Hamilton to Santa Anna, Jan. 13, 1842;
Niles's Reg., LXII, 49-50.

* Santa Anna to Bee, Feb. 6, 1842; Santa Anna to Hamilton, Feb. 18, 1842;
ibid., 50,

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 533

Santa Anna was so pleased with this correspondence that
he caused it to be published, and it was replied to in a fieiy
letter from Houston, in which he disavowed entirely the
actions of Bee and Hamilton, asserted that Texas would
make war against Mexico, and wound up with a high-flown
paragraph declaring that ''ere the banner of Mexico shall
triumphantly float on the banks of the Sabine the Texan
standard of the Single Star, borne by the Anglo-Saxon race,
shaU display its bright folds m Liberty's triumph on the
Isthmus of Darien." ^ With this exchange of compliments
the efforts at direct negotiation between Texas and Mexico
came to an end.

Mediation by the United States had also been tried, but,
as might have been foreseen, had not been accepted. In
May, 1839, Forsyth, at the request of the Texan government,
verbally offered mediation to the Mexican minister in Wash-
ington, an offer which the latter promised to transmit to
his government, but from which nothing ever came.*

When, therefore, Houston began his second term as Presi-
dent, the foreign affairs of the country were in serious con-
fusion. Mexico had repeatedly declined to receive any
Texan representatives; attempts at mediation, both by the
United States and Great Britain, had failed, and the formal
recognition of Texas by Great Britain was incomplete, be-
cause the ratification of the three treaties signed more than
a year before was still delayed by the non-action of the
Texan Senate. Forsyth, as Van Buren's Secretary of State,
had very definitely refused to consider the Texan pro-
posals for annexation, and there seemed to be no prospect
under Webster of any change in the attitude of the Ameri-
can government. Mexico, on her part, still continued to
threaten invasion, and if she ever could carry out her threats
and make a real effort to conquer Texas, the latter country
was without money or credit or supplies with which to meet
the invaders. It was therefore natural and indeed inevitable
that Texas should do its best to strengthen its position with

1 Houston to Santa Anna, March 21, 1842; Yoakum, II, 544-558.
* Dunlap to Lamar, May 16, 1839; Tex, Dip, Carr.^ I, 383.

534 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the European courts, and especially with Great Britain,
whose influence with Mexico seemed greater than that of
any other power.

/ Houston was subsequently credited with profound cal-
culation in his conduct of the foreign policy of Texas, and
he was very ready to admit his own astuteness in this regard;
but the reasons for the erratic course he pursued seem to he
on the surface. BQs rather rough and primitive nature was
-no better adapted to conspiracy and intrigue than that of
Lj Andrew Jackson, and the simplest explanation of his con-
^ duct is also the most probable. He seems to have believed
at the time that the best thing that could happen to Texas
would be annexation to the United States; but as that ap-
l peared to be out of the question, and as he was convinced
\ that peace with Mexico was essential to the prosperity, if
1 not the very existence, of Texas, he was ready to promise
\ almost anything in order to attain that end. But he could
mot always carry his constituents with him, for the people
<rf Texas never seriously wavered in their hope and desire
_ for annexation. The dream of a separate existence was never
popular with the voters.

Houston evidently did not consider that in appealing to
European powers for help to secure peace he was giving up
his hopes of ultimate annexation. He considered, rather,
that he was merely trying to find out what were the best
terms he could get; but he was quite prepared to accept
even onerous conditions if they were essential to the accom-
plishment of the great purpose he always had in view,
namely, a secure peace. Peace at almost any price was in
truth the key-note to Houston's policy; but he pursued his
object without any well-defined plan of action, and without
any clear imderstanding of the difficulties in the way. He
was constantly dominated by a nervous dread of invasion,
and he was forever being spurred by the rumors from the
border into a desire to raise some new barrier against the
Mexican peril. The result was a perpetual vacillation.
This vacillation served to perplex observers; but in reaUty
it was not at all mysterious, for it was precisely of a piece

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 535

with his uncertainties and changes of plan in the San Jacinto
campaign, where all his movements were the results of sud-
den impulses acting upon a strong but emotional and un-
disciplined mind; and which ended in his becoming the
follower, rather than the leader, of a loudly expressed public
opinion.

The foreign situation was never free from uncertainties,
but at the moment of his accession to oflSce the most prom-
ising line of effort seemed to Houston to be an appeal to
both Great Britain and France. In the United States,
President Tyler was in the veiy height of his quarrel with
his own party, and it was quite apparent that whatever
foreign policy he might propose was Uttle likely to be ac-
cepted by the Senate. There was, moreover, an apparent
probabiUty of war between Great Britain and the United
States, so that the latter coimtry would certainly be cautious
about adding to its foreign complications.

Political conditions in Great Britain had recently imder-
gone very material changes. When the three treaties with
Texas were signed in November, 1840, the Whig administra-
tion of Lord Melbourne was still dragging out a precarious
existence, and Lord Palmerston, as Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, was still managing, imchecked, the external policy
of the British Empire. Neither the young Queen, nor the
easy-going Prime Minister, nor his other colleagues in the
cabinet, were able to control the masterful disposition of the
Foreign Secretary. He believed in pressing British demands
with a high hand and a rude manner, and in never giving
way or making concessions. Li particular, he was opposed
to any appearance of weakness in dealing with France or
the United States, and he favored everything that seemed
calculated to diminish the strength or prestige of either.
Had he continued in power, he might very well have brought
about a renewal of the American and French war of 1778 — ^a

possibility he of course disclaimed, but which he seems to
have looked forward to without dismay.^

1 "He said we might hold any language we pleased to France and America,
and insist on what we thought necessary without any apprehension that either

536 .THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

However, Palmerston was obliged to leave his office not
long before Lamar laid down his, for Melbourne, after re-
peated defeats in the House of Commons, found himself
compelled to dissolve Parliament; the Conservative party
carried the elections, and at the end of the summer of 1841
Sir Robert Peel was placed at the head of the government,
with a majority of nearly a hundred in the House of Com-
mons and a safe and steady majority in the Lords. ^ With
this strong support in Parliament the new administration
could afford to dispense with bluster in its foreign affairs,
and could venture to make such concessions as it thought
reasonable to secure peace and promote British interests.
Having such a policy in view. Peel intrusted the Foreign
Office to the moderate and conciliatory Lord Aberdeen,
whose first and most difficult task was to undo much of
Palmerston's work, and to endeavor to create friendly rela-
tions with France and America. The history of his com-
plicated, vexatious, but successful negotiations with the
French government fall outside the scope of this history,
and it has been already seen that under his guidance the
most threatening questions between the United States and
Great Britain were settled by the compromises of the
Webster-Ashburton treaty. In a later qhapter it will be
seen how the northwestern boundary question was also dis-
posed of by mutual concession.

Lord Aberdeen at first gave himself little concern about
the affairs of Texas. The affairs of Texas were indeed a
very minor matter in the widely extended and complicated
foreign interests of the British Empire; but so far as British
policy concerned itself with them at all it rested on a few
clear and definite principles. Peel's government was un-
questionably averse to anything which would increase either
the territory or the power of the United States, but at the \

of them would go to war, as both knew how vulnerable they were, France with
her colonies and America with her slaves." — (Greville, Journal of the Reign of
Queen Victoria^ II, 6.)

* The majorities against the Whig government were 72 in the House of
Lords and 91 in the House of Commons on the amendment of the address,
which was the decisive blow to Melbourne's administration.

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 537

same time it was most anxious to avoid an American war.
The government was also desirous of opening new markets
for British manufactures, and it would have seen with great
satisfaction the growth and prosperity of an independent
Texas, especially if that coimtry could have been induced
to adopt permanently a policy of free trade, or at least of
low tariflfs. The fact that Texas was potentially a great
cotton-producing coimtry was an obvious element in the
possibilities of an extended commercial intercourse. Nor
was it ever forgotten that Mexican bonds to a large amoimt
were held in England, and that the greater part of Mexican
foreign trade was in British hands.

But what gave the subject a peculiar interest was the
fact of the existence of slavery in Texas. The British public
was extremely susceptible to any opportunity of preventing
the extension of slavery or of abolishing it where it already
existed. Unofficial agencies in England were numerous and
active in helping abolitionists within the United States, but
had met with little apparent success, and a more hopeful
field for their efforts seemed to present itself in Texas, for
the slave population was small and it was thought that it
might be possible to induce the Texan government, in re-
turn for other favors, to consent to abolition. The British
public, no doubt, did not fully appreciate the views of the
Texans in regard to this matter, nor did the Texan govern-
ment probably understand accurately the strong feeling
which prevailed throughout Great Britain in- regard to
slavery.^

Aberdeen, himself a Scotch Presbyterian Tory, was at
first quite as ill-informed as any of his countrymen, and,
though he later acquired information, he lacked the imagi-
nation, insight, and sympathy which would have been essen-
tial to enable him to enter into the feelings of the people of
either the United States or Texas, or of the ruling classes of
Mexico. He knew Europe well, but he never fully compre-
hended America, so that he was continually being surprised

* The British attitude toward slavery in Texas prior to 1843 is stated in
J. H. Smith's Amiexatum of Texas, 7^88.

538 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

by some turn of events which seemed to him to be whofly
imexpected. His conduct of American affairs, therefore^
during his five years' tenure of oflSice, was never steady or
consistent. He tried hard to shape the future of Texas and
to keep Mexico at peace, but, as will be seen, he abandoned
one position after another, and he had neither the abilities
nor the strength of character to carry through any policy
which seemed to be opposed by a majority of the people of
the United States.

As for France, the course which she might choose to pur-
sue in reference to Texan affairs was obviously a matter of
great importance in determining the action of Great Britain.
The British position was delicate. If any foreign country
were to interpose vigorously between the United States and
Texas, it was apparent that such an act would be very likely
to give offence to the people of the United States, and pos-
sibly to the people of Texas, so that it was of the first con-
sequence to British diplomacy to be sure of the backing
of other European powers. But no such support could be
looked for from any of the powers except France, for no
other country then seriously counted. Spain was helpless.
Italy and Germany were mere geographical expressions,
without navies and without national interest in world poli-
tics. Austria and Russia were too far off to care. And it
was thus of extreme importance to the future of Texas that
the sympathies of both France and Britain should be en-
listed, and that whatever action they might take should be
harmonious as well as vigorous.

Touching the attitude of France, the Texan authorities
had some ground for encouragement in the fact that since
the autumn of 1840 the government had been in the hands
of a ministry of which Guizot — a Protestant and professed
liberal — was the head. But Guizot in oflfice found himself
faced by insistent popular demands for electoral and other
reforms which neither he nor the King were at all inclined
to grant ; and thus the policy of the government at home and
abroad developed into one of timid conservatism. They
were utterly averse to adventures, of which they believed

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 539

the countiy had had enough.^ Peace and prosperity were
what they offered France.

So far, then, as mediation in favor of Texas was concerned
France was not disposed to go beyond expressions of friendly
interest. Moreover, she still remained on bad terms with
Mexico, who had not yet forgotten the bombardment of
San Juan de Ultia, and she therefore had little or no influ-
ence with the Mexican government. Nor had France any
serious interests in Texas. On the other hand, her relations
with England from early in 1840 to at least 1846 were in a
constant state of tension. The popular sentiment in France,
even after Palmerston retired from office, remained extremely
hostile, and a recurring series of minor but irritating con-
troversies taxed the best efforts of the leaders on both sides
of the Channel to avoid war. Guizot and the King, who
were all for peace, were consequently very ready to please
the British government by following its lead in Texan
affairs, which were matters nobody in France cared about;
and the French agents in Texas and Mexico, as it ultimately
turned out, newr did aoythkg exc^t to second theLr
British colleagues.

In Mexico the time seemed favorable for a permanent
settlement of all difficulties. Santa Anna, who had come
into office at about the same time as Sir Robert Peel in
England, appeared to be at the very height of his power.
He had triumphed over all opposition; he was supported
by the army and the church; he had repeatedly expressed
himself during his captivity in Texas as convinced that a
reunion of the two coimtries was impossible ; ^ and it might
be hoped that he was now strong enough at home to cany-
out a reasonable foreign policy. Such a policy would, of
course, have involved a recognition of the independence of
Texas, for there was no unpartial foreign observer who
doubted for a moment that the pretence of a war with
Texas was a constant source of expense and weakness to the

^Time proved them mistaken. France still longed for adventure — **la
Prance s'ennuie" in Lamartine's famous phrase.

' See, for e3cample, his letter to Houston of Nov. 5, 1836; Niles's Reg,, LXII,
115.

540 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Mexican government, and had been persisted in merely to
f mnish an excuse to successive Mexican administrations for
keeping up a strong army at home.

Under these circumstances, the first thing for the Texan
government to do was, obviously, to ratify the treaties enr
tered into in 1840 with Great Britain, and accordingly, the
Texan Senate having at last assented to them, Ashbel Smith
was sent abroad, accredited as minister to both England and
France, with instructions to exchange ratifications as soon
as practicable. The next point to be attended to by him
was to seciu^ "prompt and eflficient action" in respect to
mediation — ^for the attainment of peace was "an object of
paramount importance." ^

Smith arrived in England May 10, 1842, but it was not
until seven weeks later — on the twenty-eighth of June —
that the ratifications of the treaties were exchanged and
the independence of Texas was fully recognized by the
British government.

Long before the exchange of ratifications was effected a
British diplomatic agent to Texas had been appointed.
This gentleman, who was destined to play a conspicuous if
not a very effective part, was Captain Charles Elliot, of the
Royal navy, who had already made a considerable stir in
the world. He was a man of good family, had entered the
navy as a midshipman in 1815 — the Waterloo year — ^and
had become a captain at the age of twenty-seven. He rose
ultimately to the rank of admiral, but almost all his service
after he was thirty years old was administrative or diplo-

^ Jones to Smith, March 9, 1842; Tex, Dip. Corr., II, 948. Ashbel Smith,
like Archer and Anson Jones, was a physician. He was bom in Connecticut,
graduated at Yale in the class of 1824, and went to Texas to practise his
profession in 1836. He was appointed to his diplomatic post March 2, 1842.
The business of exchanging the ratifications of the three British treaties was a
matter that required some caution, as many people in England still opposed
recognition. He seems to have been well qualified for the position and to
have made an excellent impression both in England and in France. Lieu-
tenant Maissin, Admiral Baudin's aid, noted his indebtedness to Dr. Smith,
who had acted as interpreter and guide to the admiral's party during their
visit to Texas in the spring of 1839. **Sa parfaite connaissance de la langue
frangaise, son insiructian variie, aa grande obligeance onl donrU d sea services un
prix inestimabUJ* — (Blanchard et Dauzats, 524, note.)

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 641

matic. In 1834 he was sent in a quasi-diplomatic capacity
to China, where he was concerned in bringing on what was
called the Opium War, and where he annexed the island of
Hong-Kong, made a treaty with the Chinese that both
parties subsequently disavowed, quarrelled with the prin-
cipal military and naval officers on the spot, and returned
to England in the summer of 1841 to find himself the centre
of a violent controversy. In order, it would seem, to get
him quietly out of the way he was appointed to Texas in
August, 1841, just before the fall of Lord Melbourne's min-
istry; but his departure, what with the ministerial crisis
and the difficulty in ratifying the Texan treaties, was long
delayed.

He reached Texas August 23, 1842, and soon became on
most intimate terms with Houston, Anson Jones, and other
leading men in the republic. He was at this time forty-one
years old, full of energy (in spite of the fact that he suffered
a good deal in health), and of a cheerful and optimistic spirit.
Charles Greville, who met him for 'the first time in Novem-
ber, 1841, found him "animated, energetic, and vivacious,
clever, eager, high-spirited and gay," treating with great
contempt the British officers who disagreed with him and
disapproving the course which the government proposed in
respect to China.^

Having thus got diplomatic relations with Great Britain
in a fair way of being regularly established, the next step of
the Texan government in the path of peace was to instruct
Ashbel Smith to propose to Great Britain and France that
they should join with the United States in what was called
a "triple interposition."^ It was, he was told, "the first
wish of the President's heart to bring about an amicable
adjustment of the long-continued and profitless difficulties
between this Government and that of Mexico." '

Smith, on his first arrival in London, had found the sen-
timent generally hostile to Texas, and when he urged upon

1 Greville, I, 386.

* Jones to Smith, June 7, 1842; Tex, Dip. Corr., II, 964.

•TerreU to Smith, Aug. 20, 1842; ibid., 1007.

542 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Aberdeen's attention the provisions of the treaty with Texas,
by which Great Britain had undertaken to mediate with
Mexico, he was told that the subject had frequently been
pressed on the consideration of the Mexican government,
which had positively declined to entertain it. " The Earl of
Aberdeen could give me no hopes that the Mediation of England
would he successful y ^ Under these unhopeful conditions the
instructions as to the "triple interposition" reached Smith
in August in Paris. He at once called upon Guizot, who
stated that the government of France would readily act in
concert with the United States and Great Britain in mediat-
ing between Texas and Mexico, but suggested that the un-
friendly feeling subsisting between the United States and
Mexico might form a rea^n why the American govenmient
would not join in making a triple representation on this
subject.* At the request of Guizot, Smith addressed him
a note on the same day, making the proposal in writing;
and he also wrote briefly to Aberdeen, stating that he was
informed the subject would be presented to her Majesty's
government by the French ambassador in London.*

Guizot replied in writing that the French government
willingly agreed to the Texan request and would imite, with
pleasure, its good offices to those of the cabinets of London
and Washington to facilitate, as far as it could, a pacifica-
tion which was so desirable from every point of view. He
had already, he said, instructed the French representative
in London to arrange with the British cabinet, and he in-
tended to send instructions to the French minister in Mexico
directing him to act in accord with the British minister.*

The British government returned no written answer to
Smith's proposal, but when he went back to London later
in the year he had interviews with Lord Aberdeen and Mr.
Addington, the Under-Secretary of State,^ who showed him

^ Smith to Jones, July 3, 1842; ibid.t 972. Italics in the original.

* Smith to Jones, Aug. 15, 1842; ibid,, 1383.

* Smith to Guizot, Aug. 15, 1842; ibid., 1387. Smith to Aberdeen, Aug.,
1842; ibid., 1011.

< Guizot to Smith, Aug. 22, 1842; ibid., 1397.

* Henry Unwin Addington, a nephew of the Prime Minister of the early
years of the century.

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 543

the correspondence between the Foreign OflSce and Paken-
ham in Mexico and Lord Cowley in Paris. It appeared
from the latter correspondence, as Smith wrote, that —

"The French Government have proffered with alacrity to unite
their good offices with the other Powers in the proposed interposition.
The British Government however declines acting in conjunction with
the American Government for the alleged reason of the unfriendly re-
lations subsisting between the United States and Mexico. They would
however be pleased to be aided by the good offices of the French Govt,
in the affairs of Texas and Mexico. The fact undoubtedly is, as Mr.
Addington distinctly intimated to me in conversation, that the British
Government would prefer to act solely in this matter and not con-
jointly either with France or the United States." *

A month later Smith had another interview with Guizot
in Paris, which tmned chiefly on the refusal of England to
imite with France and the United States in the proposed
triple mediation. Guizot stated that the French minister
in Mexico had been instructed, since the refusal of England,
to offer separately the good oflBces of the French govern-
ment, but he was not prepared to answer definitely whether
France would act jointly with the United States, without
the acquiescence of England, in making a representation to
Texas and Mexico. Smith, however, gathered from his re-
marks that the French government would be reluctant to
take such a course under the existing circumstances,' The
fact was, although it was not fully explained to Smith, that
Lord Cowley had seen Guizot and explained to him the con-
clusions of the British cabinet; and that Guizot had replied
he was entirely of Lord Aberdeen's opinion, "that a joint
mediation of Great Britain, France and the United States
for the purpose of effecting an acconunodation between
Mexico and Texas would not, under present circumstances,
answer any good purpose, and that it would be better that
each government should act separately, but in strict concert,
with a view to the attainment of the proposed objects." *

The British government previous to this time, as appeared

» Smith to Jones, Oct. 17, 1842; Tex. Dip. Corr., II, 1027.

>Same to same, Nov. 13, 1842; ibid., 1395.

* Elliot to Houston, Dec. 27, 1842; ibid., l» G37.

544 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

from the correspondence shown to Smith, had really been
earnestly renewing the attempts it had made in Lord Palm-
erston's time to persuade Mexico to recognize the inde-
pendence of Texas. Immediately after exchanging ratifica-
tions of the treaties with Ashbel Smith at the end of June,
1842, Lord Aberdeen had sent instructions to Mexico direct-
ing Pakenham to bring the subject again to the attention of
the Mexican government. He was to renew the arguments
already made, to dwell once more on the friendliness and
disinterested conduct of Great Britain, and to point out
again the importance of interposing a buffer state between'
Mexico and the United States. Aberdeen saw much more
clearly than his predecessor the difficulties which Mexico
was certain to encounter if she should ever make a real
attempt to reconquer Texas.

"Considering," he said, "the powerful support with which Texas
is likely to meet from the People — I speak not of the Govt. — of the
United States, and the unlimited means of recruiting her forces both
by land and Sea, which are within the reach of Texas by reason of
her proximity to that Country, the sentiments of whose Citizens in
general are strongly in favour of the Texians, H. M. Govt, can not but
perceive all the difficulties which are likely to surround Mexico." ^

A fortnight later Aberdeen wrote again to Pakenham,
pointing out that even if Mexico should succeed in invading
Texas the result might very likely be to force annexation
to the United States. He also repeated his warning as to
the popular American support which Texas was certain to
receive, and directed that this view be impressed upon the
Mexican authorities.

" You will represent to them," he wrote, " the impossibility of pre-
venting the interference of the People of the United States in this
Contest: and you will endeavour to convince them that in the present
state of publick feeling in that Country, neither the Supreme Govern-
ment at Washington, nor the Local Governments of the States, how-
ever well dbposed they might be to do so, could put a stop to that
interference. . . . Nor should they allow themselves to suppose that
they can at any time count upon succour from Great Britain in their

^ Aberdeen to Pakenham, July 1, 1842; £. D. Adams, 101.

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 545

struggles with Texas, or with the United States. Great Britain is
determined to remain strictly neutral." *

Pakenham in due course laid the matter before the Mex-
ican government, but he received both from Bocanegra and
Santa Anna very emphatic refusals to reconsider then- de-
termination upon the subject of Texas. Indeed, Bocanegra
expressed vehemently his opinion that the conduct of Great
Britain was far from friendly. Consequently, when renewed
instructions were sent near the end of the year from the
British and French Foreign Offices directing offers of media-
tion, the British and French representatives in Mexico had
no difficulty in agreeing that any representations by them
to Santa Anna's government would prove useless, and in
consequence none were made at that time.*

Before this, however, American mediation had once more
been tendered, and again without success. The subject had
been brought forward by Reily, the Texan charg6 in Wash-
ington, who urged upon both Tyler and Webster the pro-
priety and justice of the United States, as the leading power
on the continent, mediating between Texas and Mexico.
On Wednesday, June 22, 1842, Reily had a conversation
with Webster, who said that the President and the cabinet
were "extremely desirous to bring about a peace between
the two countries," and on the next day Webster gave Reily
an opportunity to read instructions he had just written to
the American ministers in Mexico and Texas.'

The instructions to Thompson in Mexico were to the
effect that the government of the United States saw, with
pain, a prospect of a resumption of hostilities. While it
claimed no right to interfere, it could not remain indifferent
to a prospect of actual warfare. There should be peace, as
the commercial interests of the United States would suffer
from a state of war. It was also to be borne in mind that
if warfare were resumed "crowds of persons" from the
United States would certainly attempt to take part in it,

* Same to same, July 15, 1842; ibid,, 103.

* Pakenham to Aberdeen, Feb. 24, 1843; ibid., 123.
•Reily to Jones, June 24, 1842; Tex, Dip. Carr., I, 563-566.

546 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

which was something the United States government could
not prevent, and which would involve it in serious difficul-
ties. The President had " a clear and strong conviction that
a war was not only useless but hopeless, without any attain-
able object, injurious to both parties, and likely to be, in its
continuance, annoying and vexatious to other conmiercial
nations." In view of these considerations, if any intimation
should be received of a desire from Mexico for interposition or
mediation, the United States would cheerfully undertake to
do what it could to bring about peace, but would do nothing
unless both parties asked for it.^ A copy of these instruc-
tions was sent at the same time to Eve in Texas, directmg
him to make the subject known to the Secretary of State of
Texas, and to express the hope that Texas would suspend
any offensive operation until the result of the application to
Mexico should be ascertained.^

Texas would, of course, have been ready to make a formal
request for mediation if there had been any prospect that
Mexico would imite in it; but the universal beUef in Mexico
that the United States had had a constant share for years
past in stirring up trouble in Te^cas was quite sufficient to
prevent the possibility of her making any such request, and
none was ever made.

Reily at the same time had been busy in Washington try-
ing to get at the real attitude of the British government,
which both the Texans and Americans then regarded as sus-
picious. There were even rumors that Mexico was to be
directly helped to invade Texas, or at least to blockade the
coast,* and Lord Ashburton was applied to to learn the real
attitude of his government. Reily thought that Ashburton
would talk to Clay more freely than to anybody else, and he

^ Webster to Thompson, June 22, 1S42; State Dept, MSS.

* Webster to Eve, June 23, 1842; ibid. Eve to Waples, Aug. 12, 1S42;
Tex, Dip, Con., I, 581.

' These reports had a certain foundation in the fact that the Mexican gov-
ernment had bought two steamers in England which it sought to arm there,
and which were to be commanded by British naval officers, who secured leave
of absence for that purpose. The vessels were never of the slightest use to
Mexico, and were sold to Spain four years after they crossed the Atlantic
Accounts of the Texan protests and of the uncertain course of Lord Aberdeen

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 547

persuaded Clay to ask whether it was true that Great Britain
intended to help the Mexicans. The result of the inter-
view between Clay, on the one side, and Ashbiuton and Fox
(the resident British minister), on the other, was reported
by Reily as follows:

"Lord Ashburton peremptorily disclaimed any interference of the
British Government in l>ehalf of Mexico, and that the British Ministry
he said would as soon aid Old Spain in again subjugating the Low
Countries, as to aid Mexico in reconquering Texas. Mr. Fox re-
marked that Great Britain would much rather interpose to bring
about a peace between Texas and Mexico than to aid Mexico in her
attempts upon Texas, and that the Crown without the consent of
Parliament, could not make advances of either money, ammunition
or supplies to Mexico. Lord Ashburton farther added, that Great
Britain would sooner expect Texas to Conquer Mexico, than Mexico
Conquer Texas, and that if the Mexican Government had obtained
any money at all, it was as all others obtain it, by loans. Both dis-
claimed in positive terms again, and again, any interference on the
part of Great Britain, in favor of Mexico." *

On two later occasions Reily had personal interviews with
Ashburton, who repeated that Great Britain had not inter-
meddled, and had no disposition to do so, and that if it in-
terfered at all it would be to make peace between Mexico
and Texas.^

Everett, the American minister in London, also spoke to
Lord Aberdeen of the suspicions entertained by some per-
sons that Great Britain was aiding Mexico in her move-
ments against Texas.

" He replied with great readiness that there was no foundation for
such a belief, adding with a smile that Mr. Murphy (the Mexican

and the law-officers of the Crown in respect thereto, will be found in E. D.
Adams, 79-96, and in Tex, Dip. Corr., II, 961-1055. Hamilton's officious
interference in this affair greatly offended President Houston, and his indig-
nation was increased by a proposal which Hamilton made, that he be employed
to carry on a secret negotiation with Almonte, 'Hhrough the instrumentality
of my friends Mr. John C. Calhoun and Mr. Webster.'' The result was an
emphatic disavowal of Hamilton's acts and a refusal to employ him in any
manner whatever.— (/&i(f., 1045, 1056, 7S4.)

^ Reily to Jones, April 14, 1842; Tex, Dip, Con., I, 553. Henry Stephen
Fox was a nephew of Charles James Fox.

> Reily to Jones, April 28 and July 11, 1842; Urid., 558, 568.

548 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Charg^ d'AflPaires at this Court) could satisfy me on this head. I in-
ferred from this remark that the Mexican Government had endeav-
oured, in some way or other, to obtain the countenance at least of
England for the reconquest of Texas." *

In reality, the British government did not then intend to
do anything more than precisely what Aberdeen had told
his agents was his purpose, namely, to urge Mexico "to lose
no time in coming to an acconunodation with Texas on the
basis of a recognition of the independence of that country," *
but their efforts, at least up to the smnmer of 1843, were
marked by a good deal of vacillation, due no doubt largely
to indifference as well as to ignorance of the subject on the
part of the Foreign Office.

While foreign diplomatists in Mexico thus found them-
selves unable to accomplish anything in their missions of
peace, a very unexpected negotiator appeared on the scene.
One of the prisoners captured at San Antonio by General
Woll in September, 1842, was James W. Robinson, who had
been the lieutenant-governor under the provisional govern-
ment from November, 1835, to March, 1836. Writing to
Santa Anna from the castle of Perote on January 9, 1843,
Robinson stated that the Texans, after seven years and a
half of war, were anxious for peace, and would gladly ac-
cept it on terms having for their basis the reimion of the
republic with that of Mexico; that some others of his
fellow-prisoners were of the same opuiion with himself, and
that if they could be sent back to Texas they would exert a
powerful influence in reuniting Texas with Mexico. He also
expressed the opinion that peace could not be made without
an armistice, and that Mexican commissioners, together
with one or two of the prisoners who were of Robinson's
way of thinking, ought to be sent inmiediately to Texas to
enter upon negotiations.

Santa Anna, then at Manga de Clavo,^ transmitted the

1 Everett to Webster, May 6, 1842; State Dept. MSS.

* Elliot to Houston, Dec. 27, 1842; Tex. Dip. Corr., I, 637.

' Santa Anna left the city of Mexico October 26, 1842, having previously
appointed Bravo President ad interim. The excuse given was the iU-health
of Santa Anna and his wife. The real reason was the intended diasolutioa

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 549

letter to Tomel, Minister of War, suggesting that though
Robinson's object might simply be to obtain his liberty
nothing could be lost by hearing him, and some favorable
result might be obtained. He therefore requested Tomel
to lay the letter before the President ad interim, and if that
ftmctionary should think it proper, he (Santa Anna) would
hear what Robinson had to say, it being understood that he
would make no concessions to the latter that would com-
promise the nation.^ Bravo, the President ad interim, natu-
rally gave Santa Anija full power to do whatever he thought
proper, and Santa Anna sent for Robinson to come to
Manga de Clavo. The result of their conferences was that
a basis of settlement — ^under which Texas was to have a
certain measure of autonomy while remaining a department
of Mexico — was drawn up and signed by Santa Anna.

As stated by Robinson on his return to Texas, the pro-
posal was as follows:

" It is proposed that —

" 1. Texas should acknowledge the sovereignty of Mexico.

"2. A general act of amnesty to be passed for past acts in Texas.

"3. Texas to form an independent department of Mexico.

"4. Texas to be represented to the general congress.

" 5. Texas to institute or originate dl local laws, rules and regula-
tions.

" 6. No Mexican troops under any pretext whatever to be stationed
in Texas." «

Robinson, armed with this document, reached the capital
of Texas about the first of April, 1843, and laid Santd Anna's
proposition before Houston. There was, of com^e, no pos-
sible chance that the people or the Congress of Texas would
consent to return to Mexican allegiance under any condi-
tions; but Houston, while objecting strongly to the terms
of the proposals so far as they involved an acknowledgment
of Mexican sovereignty, thought that they " evinced a peace-

of the constituent Congress, which was accomplished by Bravo in December,
1842. Santa Anna returned to the capital on March 5, 1843. See chapter
XVIII, above.

1 Santa Anna to Tomel, Feb. 6, 1843; Yoakum, II, 387.

» NUefl's Reg,, LXIV, 97.

550 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

fulness of spirit on the part of the Mexican government,"
and got Elliot to write to Pakenham to secure an armistice
pending negotiations.^

A confidential letter to Santa Anna from Robinson, gave
an account of aflfairs as he found them in Texas. It was as-
serted by Houston's friends that he had dictated the letter,
but there is nothing in the text which appears to bear out
this assertion. The news of Santa Anna's proposals, said
Robinson, had not created much excitement, although they
had been presented by him in the Texan newspapers "in the
most favorable light."* Houston also had "evinced no
excitement" over the proposals, but had remarked that since
the revolution began, in 1835, the aflfairs of Texas and Mexico
had become much more complicated than they had once
been ; that Texas had been recognized by foreign powers, and
had formed treaties with them ; and that if Texas should act
independently of the consideration of those powers it would,
in his opinion, be treating them with disrespect. Robinson
had been unable to find out from Houston what course
would be adopted by the Texan government, and could not
ascertain what Houston's purposes were — ^if he had any.
Robinson further reported that the people of Texas were not,
as he had supposed, torn by factions, and in view of the con-
ditions actually existing he suggested to Santa Anna that
all of the Texan prisoners should be released, and that an
armistice should be declared for some months, so as to give
the people of Texas time to think over the Mexican propo-
sitions. "I will not," he concluded, "be so presumptuous
as to advise your Excellency about anything; but as things
have changed since I conununicated with your Excellency
in reference to the affairs in Texas I feel bound to inform
you of such facts as resulted from my observation." *

1 Elliot to Pakenham, April 14, 1843; S, W, Hist. Quar., XVI, 207-213.

*The Galveston Civilian spoke of Robinson's proposals ''in a decidedly
favorable manner,'' and asked for them serious and respectful consideration.
The Galveston Times, on the other hand, said the proposals would be consigned
by reflecting Texans to the contempt which was all they deserved. — (Niles's
Reg., LXIV, 97).

* Robinson to Santa Anna, April 10, 1843; Yoakum, II, 38&-391.

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 551

Writing to the American charge d'affaires, Houston ex-
pressed the opinion that Santa Anna's offer to treat with
Texas indicated "that some of the powers have touched
him in a tender part," but that the whole affair was an ab-
surdity, and the proposal for tenns of peace "will do veiy
well to file away as a curiosity for after-times; and that is
about as much as can well be made of it." ^ But to Elliot he
wrote privately of the advantages that would accrue to
England if peace between Mexico and Texas could be
brought about on the basis of Texan independence, espe-
cially in the event of war between the United States and
Great Britain.^

The Texan government oflBcially rejected the proposals.
Thus the Texan Secretary of State, writing to the charg6
d'affaires in Washington, declared that —

"The propositions of Gen. Santa Anna, have been published by
Mr. Robinson through the medium of the public papers, and have
every where been met by the people to whom they were addressed
with indignation and contempt, and rejected by one unanimous re-
sponse from the whole country." •

Nevertheless, Robinson's amateur efforts did bear fruit.
As soon as Santa Anna received Robinson's letter of April
10 he sent for Percy Doyle, the British charge (Pakenham
having gone home on leave), and told him that he was now
ready to agree to an armistice, and would at once give orders
for a total cessation of hostilities on his part; and he sug-
gested that Houston should be asked to despatch similar
orders to the oflBcers commanding the Texan forces. If
this were done ''he was ready to receive any Commissioners
which might be sent from Texas to treat on the terms pro-
posed by him." This request Doyle transmitted without
comment to Elliot.*

> Houaton to Eve, April 22, 1843; ibid., 392, noU.

« Houston to Elliot, May 13, 1843; S, W, Hist, Quar,, XVI, 321-326.

* Jones to Van Zandt, May 8, 1843; Tex. Dip. Con., II, 176.

« Doyle to Aberdeen, May 25, 1843; E. D. Adams, 134. Doyle to Elliot,
May 27, 1843; Tex. Dip. Carr., II, 1091. A copy of this last letter, together
with all the other correspondence in relation to the same matter, was furnished
by the Texan State Department to Murphy, the Ameiicaa oharg6 in Texas,

552 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The formal oflFer of an armistice was thereupon trans-
mitted to the Texan government by Elliot, with a letter ex-
pressing his belief that Santa Anna would not give way on
the sovereignty of Mexico, but that the negotiations, if
begun, would end in an honorable and desirable pacifica-
tion.^ M. de Cramayel, the French minister in Texas, ex-
pressed his concurrence in this view, and joined Elliot in
urging the proposed armistice. Houston therefore, on June
13, 1843, issued a proclamation declaring that hostilities
were suspended pending negotiations for peace, and that the
armistice was to continue until notice of an intention to
resiune hostilities should have been transmitted through the
British legation. A copy of the proclamation was sent to
Captain Elliot, with a request that he obtain the sanction
of Mexico to its terms; and copies of all the papers were
forwarded at the same time to the Texan representative
at Washington.^ Elliot duly transmitted the inquiries of
the Texan government to Mexico, and was informed, in
reply, through Percy Doyle that the duration of the armis-
tice could best be determined by the military authorities of
the two countries; that General Woll, then in conmiand at
Matamoros, was authorized to represent the Mexican govern-
ment ; and that it was hoped Texan conmaissioners would be
sent, " with full powers to treat upon the terms of which Mr.
Robinson, one of the late Texian prisoners was the Bearer." •

When Santa Anna's proposals to Robinson first reached
Lord Aberdeen, in the month of May, 1843, they did not

in the following September. He sent them to Washington, with a despatch in
which he said that he could not have obtained them if Houston had not been
absent from the seat of government. — (Murphy to Upshur, Sept. 28, 1843;
State Dept. MSS.) There seems to have been no foundation for the latter
statement except Murphy's rooted dislike for Houston. The correspondence
was voluntarily given by Jones to Murphy, without the least pretence of con-
cealment or any request that it should be regarded as confidential. The
American State Department was disposed at first to censure Murphy for undei^
hand dealing, but subsequently decided he was not at all to blame. — (Upshur
to Murphy, Nov. 21, 1843; Stale Dept. MSS.)
» Elliot to Jones, June 10, 1843; Tex. Dip. Corr., II, 1090.

* Jones to Elliot and Jones to Van Zandt, June 15, 1843; ibid., 1092, 1093.
The proclamation is printed in H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sees., 83.

* Elliot to Jones, July 24, 1843; Tex. Dip. Corr., II, 1112. Houston's pur-
poses in all this negotiation are discussed at length in J. H. Smith's Annexatum
qf Texas, 94-100.

EFFORTS AT MEDIATION 553

appear to him to be of "a veiy practical description," or
fitted to give rise to more than "a faint hope" of a satis-
factory settlement ; ^ but he soon came to see that they did
open a way for hopeful negotiations, and he wrote to both
Mexico and Texas to urge an agreement, and to advocate
concessions on either side. Mexico, he thought, had not
gone far enough, and its best policy would be to make a
complete and full acknowledgment of Texan independence
at once.* To Elliot he wrote, expressing his conviction that
Santa Anna's offer was made in the full hope " and even ex-
pectation" of its being accepted by Texas, that it meant
virtual independence, and that a mere "nominal concession"
ought not to prevent acceptance by Texas.^ Elliot there-
fore tried hard to persuade the Texan government to accept
these terms. The proposal, he said, amounted to an acknowl-
edgment of virtual independence, and what remained was
but the shadow of a name ; and as the Mexicans were will-
ing to surrender the substance in exchange for the shadow
he thought the Texans ought not to quarrel with their pro-
posal, the acceptance of which would be to the manifest
advantage of Texas.* A few weeks later he wrote privately
to Jones that he was again informed by Doyle that Santa
Anna showed no disposition to yield upon the point of the
sovereignty of Mexico being acknowledged by Texas, but
thought there would be no difficulty about other points, and
on the whole was of opinion that there was a general im-
provement in that government in the sense of moderation
and good-will toward Texas.^

As soon as the Texan government received notice that
General Woll was authorized to represent Mexico in the
matter •of an armistice it notified Elliot that the President,
"concurring in the views entertained by Her Majesty's
Gov. will accede to the proposition made by Gen. Santa
Anna, and dispatch Commissioners to treat with Gen. Woll

1 Aberdeen to Elliot, May 18, 1843; S, W. Hist, Quar,, XVI, 307.

* Aberdeen to Doyle, July 1, 1843; E. D. Adams, 130.

•Aberdeen to Elliot, June 3, 1843, No. 6; S. W, HisL Quar,, XVI, 314.
« Elliot to Jones, Aug. 17, 1843; Jones, 246.

• Same to same, Aug. 28, 1843; ibid., 248.

554 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

upon the terms and conditions of the Armistice and should
these be satisfactorily adjusted, he will forthwith send Com-
missioners to the City of Mexico." ^ Houston, however,
was in no hurry to designate his conunissioners, and it
was not until nearly the end of September that George
W. Hockley and Samuel Williams were appointed. Their
instructions stated that they were to endeavor to establish
a general armistice between Texas and Mexico, which
was to continue during the pendency of negotiations with
Mexico for a permanent peace, and for such further period
as they could agree upon, requiring due notice to be
given by either party disposed to resmne hostilities to the
other, through the British legation, six months previous
to any act of hostility. They were also authorized to
agree upon the appointment of conmiissioners to meet at
the city of Mexico to negotiate for the adjustment of all
existing difl&culties between the two countries and the es-
tablishment of a permanent peace. Any agreement made
by them was to be subject to ratification by the two coun-
tries.^ It will be noticed that Santa Anna had asked for
commissioners "to treat upon the terms of which Mr.
Robinson, one of the late Texian prisoners was the Bearer";
while Houston had sent commissioners who were empowered
only to fix the terms of an armistice pending negotiations.
The condition of afifairs, therefore, in Mexico and Texas
in the early summer of 1843 — shortly after the time when
Webster resigned the oflBce of Secretary of State of the
United States— bore a promising appearance of early peace.
Hostilities had been suspended, and it was known that the
French and English agents, especially Captain Elliot in
Texas, were busy trying to bring the contending parties to-
gether, a result which, if it should involve a return of Texas
to Mexican allegiance, would assuredly prove very distaste-
ful to President Tyler, although it might be entirely in Une
with Webster's private views.

» Jones to Elliot, July 30, 1843; Tex. Dip. Can., II, 1114.
* G. W. Hill (Secretary of War) to Hockley and Williama, Sept. 28, 1S43;
Yoakum, II, 415.

CHAPTER XXII

BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISHING SLAVERY IN

TEXAS

For several weeks before Webster actually resigned his
office as Secretary of State the prospect of a vacancy had
been a subject^ common go4 ^Washington, Jd the
President and his friends had been considering the choice of
a successor. John C. Calhoun was the most conspicuous
possibmty, and many of Tyler's friends thought he ought
to be appointed. But it may well be questioned whether
Tyler was ever anxious to have Calhoun in his cabinet,
and Calhoun himself was at that time unwilling to take the
place. His reasons were the same that induced him to re-
sign his seat in the Senate at the close of the session of 1843,
namely, that he wished to devote all his time and strength
to securing the presidential nomination in 1844. His ad-
vice was that Upshur, the Secretary of the Navy, should be
promoted. "I had a conversation with him," wrote Cal-
hoim, "a few days before I left Washington, in which the
subject of a possible vacancy of the State Department was
adverted to, and in which I stated to him in that event, if
the office was tendered to him, I was of impression that he
ought to accept." ^

Webster, as well as Calhoun, thought Upshur ought to be
appointed Secretary of State. The range of choice he re-
garded as limited and the President could not do better.
"Mr. Upshur is an accomplished lawyer, with some ex-
perience abroad, of gentlemanly manners and character, and
not at all disposed to create or foment foreign difficulties." ^

^ Calhoun to Green, March 19, 1843; Amer. Hist, Aasn, Rep. 1899, II, 526.
Calhoun left Washington about March 4, 1843.

"Webster to Everett, May 12, 1843; Webster' 8 Private Carr., II, 173.
Abel Parker Upshur was a Virginia lawyer, and a man of good abilities

555

556 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The subject was one to which the President gave long
consideration; for its decision involved very serious conse-
quences. Van Zandt, the Texan representative, three
weeks before Webster's resignation, had correctly grasped
the situation.

"Captain Tyler," he wrote, "is endeavoring to repair his vessel.
... I think from present appearances Democracy will be seen written
upon his flag in big letters when it is hoisted to the masthead. If the
Captain succeeds in getting a full crew on board who will be ready to
obey orders when the word is given to beat to quarters, I think he
will give a broadside that will tell for the lone star." ^

•

The President, being in no hurry, intrusted the State
Department temporarily to the amiable and accomplished
Attorney-General, Hugh Swinton Legar6, of South Carolina,
who was not only a leading lawyer of his state, but had
been for several years in charge of the American legation in
Brussels.^ Legar6 unfortunately only lived for six weeks
after taking charge of the State Department, and died
rather suddenly at Boston on June 18, 1843, where the
President and his cabinet had gone to hear Webster's
second Bunker Hill oration;' and the President then finally
tiUTied to Upshur.
— The new Secretary of State was well known to be in favor
of annexing Texas. Indeed, Webster asserted, five years
later, that when Upshur entered the cabinet he had " some-
thing like a passion" for accomplishing that object.* Van
Zandt, the Texan minister in Washington, wrote privately,

and good character. When he first entered the cabinet he was a judge of the
Virginia courts. His administration of the Navy Department had been
business-like and efficient, although critics of the administration thought he
was too anxious for a big navy.

' Van Zandt to Jones, April 19, 1843; Jones, 222.

**^Ily a parmi les nauveaiLX membres du cabinet un M, Legari qui parle bien
fran^ia, qui eat aimable et remplacera avantageusemerU Af . Webster J* — (Baoourt,
Souvenirs d*un Diplomaiey 327.)

* Adams's cheerful opinions on this occasion, in which he characterises
Daniel Webster as ^'a heartless traitor to the cause of human freedom," and
comments on the desecration of the solemnity by the ^'pilgrimage of John
Tyler and his Cabinet of slave-drivers," are to be found in Memoirs^ XI, 383.

« Webster's speech in the Senate, March 23, 1848; Wdbster's Works, V, 286.

PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISHING SLAVERY 557

when rumors of Webster's retirement first began to cir-
culate, that it was likely Upshur would take his place. "If
he does, it will be one of the best appointments for us. His
whole soul is with us. He is an able man and has the nerve
to act." ^ But weeks passed and Upshur took no steps
toward a negotiation with Texas, restrained, it would seem,
by the President, who thought the time had not yet come.
What finally induced the President to give Upshur per-
mission to act was the language used by Lord Aberdeen in
respect to certain proposals looking to the abolition of
slavery in Texas.

Strictly speaking, the British government never took any
official steps in that direction, although the subject was for
some time under a sort of unofficial discussion.* Captain
Elliot, who had arrived in Texas in the summer of 1842,
began sending a series of personal letters in the autumn of
that year to Addington, the Under-Secretary of Foreign
Affairs in England, m which he developed a plan of his own
for Texas. There was to be a revision of the Constitution,
doing away with "the folly of a yearly elected Legislature
and other liberality of the rhodomontade school"; abolish-
ing slavery and all poUtical disabilities of colored people;
establishing an educational test for voters; and making
"perfectly free trade a fundamental principle." The north-
em states of Mexico would, he thought, be glad to unite
with a nation built upon such a foundation, and the north-
eastern states of the American Union would not be sorry
"to see the power of the South and West effectually limited,
and a bound marked beyond which Slavery could not ad-
vance." ^ That a project so purely visionary could have

^ Van Zandt to Jones, March 15, 1843; Jones, 213.

* In 1837 a British agent who visited Texas reported that the existence of
slavery might be done away with if it were made a condition in a treaty with
some influential power. Another suggested, in 1840, that the abolition of
slavery might be made a condition of recognition. See " British Correspond-
ence Concerning Texas," edited by E. D. Adams, Tex. Hist. Quar., XV, 216,
225, 238. The suggestions, however, were not adopted by Lord Palmerston,
although British public opinion would undoubtedly have favored any effort
to abolish slavery in Texas.

« Elliot to Addington, Nov. 15, 1842; 8. W. HUL Quar,, XVI, 76.

558 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

had any support from men like Houston or his cabinet is
incredible. No convention of Texans at any period of its
history would have considered such a constitution for a
moment, although Elliot seems to have had abiding faith in
the possibility of carrying out his plan.^ Money lent by
Great Britain to put an end to slavery in Texas, he wrote,
would give quite as profitable returns as money spent in
fortresses on the Canadian border.*

But although Houston certainly took no part in these
efforts for the abolition of slavery, he kept continually iHging
upon Elliot the importance of action by Great Britain to
induce Mexico ta acknowledge Texan independence, lest a
worse thing should happen. On January 24, 1843, he wrote
that the subject of annexation to the United States was
being much discussed in Texas, and that the whole of the
United States was fast becoming a unit in favor of that
policy, which would ultimately result in their acquiring not
only Texas, but the Bay of San Francisco. "To defeat this
policy it is only necessary for Lord Aberdeen to say to Santa
Anna, 'Sir, Mexico must recognize the independence of
Texas.' Santa Anna would be glad of such a pretext."'
Elliot was strongly impressed with the force of this argu-
ment, which was quite in line with what Van Zandt was re-
porting of his interviews with the President and other public
men in Washington,^ and he therefore wrote to the Foreign
Office, insisting on the danger of annexation unless peace
were made "in some brief space of time." '

All this left Aberdeen cold. He evidently did not then
consider that there was any immediate danger of annexa-
tion— as indeed there was none — so long as Webster re-
mained at the head of the Department of State, and he

^ Same to same, Dec. 11, 1842; ibid., 85.
*Same to same, Dec. 16, 1842; ibid., 92.

' Houston to Elliot, Jan. 24, 1843; ibid., 198. To the American representa-
tive in Texas Houston wrote, about the same time, that the idea of annexation
was well received in Texas, and that if it became a political question in the
United States both parties "would seize hold of [it] or grasp at the handle.'' —
(Houston to Eve, Feb. 17, 1843; Tex. Dip. Corr., II, 128.)
' * Van Zandt to Terrell, Dec. 23, 1842; iJbid., I, 633.

• > Elliot to Aberdeen, Jan. 28, 1843; Elliot to Addington, March 26, 1843;
5. W. Hist, Quar., XVI, 189, 200.

PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISHING SLAVERY 569

probably was very little interested at that time in the sub-
ject. He therefore contented himself by the purely per-
f imctory statement to Elliot that —

"Her Majesty's Government do not think it necessary to give you
any Instructions at the present moment on that subject, further than
to desire that you will assure the President of the continued interest
which the British Government takes in the prosperity and indepen-
dence of the State of Texas: and of their full determination to perse-
vere in employing their endeavours, whenever they see a reasonable
hope of success, to bring about an adjustment of the differences still
existing between Mexico and Texas, of which they so much lament
the continuance." *

The activity of Elliot was by this time a matter of common
talk in Texas. William S. Murphy, who had been appointed
charg6 d'affaires of the United States in place of Eve,
whose course had not been satisfactory to his government,^
landed at Galveston on the third of June, and two days
later he wrote that, according to general report, Houston
was completely under British influence and opposed to an-
nexation, although the people were favorable.' The rumors
which reached Murphy probably went so far as to assert
that Houston and the British government were planning
abolition, although Elliot, in conversation with Houston,
positively asserted that the subject of slavery in Texas had
never been mentioned to him in any despatch from his
government or by word of mouth.* But if instructions had
not been sent to Elliot upon this subject they were sent, as
we shall see, to Doyle in Mexico.

What knowledge Houston had of Elliot's private and per-
sonal opinions in respect to slavery is not known, for if he
had any such knowledge he kept it to himself. Murphy,
who saw Houston for the first time in the latter part of
June, wrote that he could not find out what was going on,
though he was siu'e some important negotiations were on

1 Aberdeen to Elliot, May 18, 1843; ibid,, 308.

« Webster to Eve, April 3, 1843; StaU Dept. MSS, Eve died at Galveston
on June 9, 1843, as he was about to embark for home.
* Murphy to Upshur, June 5, 1843; ibid.
« Elliot to Aberdeen, June 8, 1843; S. W. Hiat. Quar., XVI, 319.

660 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

foot. "What steps are in progress; I know not, nor can I
know until they shall develop themselves to the world.
England may at this tune be setting on foot a negotiation
of vast consequence to the United States, and in all proba-
bility such is the case." Captain Elliot, as Murphy re-
ported, was known to be an ojien advocate of Santa Anna's
propositions, made through Robinson, which the people of
Texas had imanimously scorned; and though the President's
views were not known, the next Congress would show a vast
majority in both houses "in favor of active measures to
coerce Mexico into an acknowledgment of the Independence
of Texas." ^ Two days later Murphy wrote again to say that
the friendly policy of the United States toward the republic of
Texas seemed to have been greatly misunderstood through-
out the country, as well by the government as the people,
and that he had heard the assertion made that Texas could
not look to the United States for countenance and support
in any emergency, but that her whole hope rested upon the
friendly offices of England and France.*
/ A similar vague feeling of suspicion and distrust of Brit-
ish activities in Texas was manifest in all the reports which
reached the newspapers of the United States. The press
generaUy had no doubt that something was going on in
which the British agents had an active share; but what the
British government was trying to do seemed to be wholly
uncertab. The general i^oo in th« Amm<»„ prei
was that Texas, in despair of ever entering the Union,
was ready to deliver herself, bound hand and foot, to
Great Britain; that Great Britain would insist on abol-
ishing slavery; and that the real reason of British interest
in the subject was that she hoped to raise up a great cotton-
growing country which should prove a rival to the United
States.'

Ashbel Smith, after he had been in Europe six months,
thought that he understood the true motives of the British

^ Murphy to Legar^, July 6, 1843; SiaU Depi. MSS,

* Same to same, July 8, 1843; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 seas., 72,

» McMaster'a History, VII, 316-318.

PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISfflNG SLAVERY 561

government. Writing to Van Zandt, he said that one of
the things it desked wa^ the right of search over aU vessels
suspected of slave-trading, which the United States had
stubbornly refused to grant. The next motive was a fear
that Texas might be annexed to the American Union, which
would be undesirable for commercial reasons, as the English
wished Texas to remain a consumer of their manufactures,
not subject to the tariff restrictions of the United States.
Another was that Texas would interpose a barrier to the
encroachments of the United States upon Mexico. Still
another point was involved in the question of slavery.

''It is the purpose of some persons in England to procure the aboli-
tion of Slavery in Texas. They propose to accomplish this end by
friendly negotiation and by the concession of what will be deemed
equivsJents. I believe the equivalents contemplated are a guarantee
by Great Britain of the Independence of Texas — discriminating duties
in favor of Texian products and perhaps a negotiation of a loan, or
some means by which the finances of Texas can be readjusted. They
estimate the number of Slaves in Texas at 12,000 and would consider
the payment for them in full, as a small sum for the advantages they
anticipate from the establishment of a free State on the Southern
borders of the Slave holding States of the American Union. . . .

" Rely on it, as certain, that in England it is intended to make an
effort, and that some things are already in train to accomplish if
p>ossible the abolition of slavery in Texas. And might not Texas
exhausted as just described, listen in a moment of folly to such over-
tures of the British Govt?

" In the meantime, rely on it we have nothing to expect from the
continued offer of British mediation to Mexico on its present basis.
As little have we to expect from the good ofHces of France, although
sincerely and faithfully employed, so long as they are separately ex-
erted as at the present time. • ^

" The independence of Texas and the existence of Slavery in Texas
is a question of life or death to the slave holding states of the American
Union. Hemmed in between the free states on their northern border,
and a free Anglo Saxon State on their southern border and sustained
by England, their history would soon be written. The Establishment
of a free state on the territory of Texas is a darling wish of England for
which scarcely any price wovld be regarded as to [sic] great. The bar-
gain once struck what remedy remains to the southV ^

1 Smith to Van Zandt, Jan. 25, 1843; Tex, Dip. Carr,, II, 1105-1106. Italics
in original.

562 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

That Van Zandt showed this letter about in Washington,
or at least expressed himself in the terms which Smith had
used, is of course most probable. At any rate, stories of the
intentions of England in relation to the abolition of slaveiy
in Texas were everywhere rife in the sunmier of 1843, when
Upshur entered upon the duties of the State Department,*
and it was only a short time after he took office that he
began to receive what he regarded as strong confirmation of
the most injurious rumors respecting the abolitionist activi-
ties of the British government. Their dealings with a man
in whom he saw a secret agent of the Texan authorities
were what principally excited his alarm.

Stephen Pearl Andrews, the supposed agent, was a young
man, thirty-one years old, bom in Massachusetts, educated
at Amherst, and afterward a resident of New Orleans.*
In 1839 he migrated from New Orleans to Galveston, where
he proved highly successful in the practice of his profession.
He had become an active and militant abolitionist, and,
according to his own account, had converted a number of
slave-holders in Texas by showing them that if free labor
were encouraged the value of their lands would increase.
It was his plan to have the Constitution of Texas amended
so as to abolish slavery, and the British and Foreign Anti-
Slavery Society was to be asked to raise the money to buy
and free the slaves. Elliot, the British minister, it was re-
ported, believed that such action would secure not only the
warm support of his government, but the money with which
to accomplish emancipation.' It seems to be quite clear
that it was Andrews who enlisted Captain Elliot's interest
and persuaded him to write to Addington, in London, favor-
ing these schemes.

In the spring of 1843 Andrews set out for England to
attend the World's Convention of Abolitionists, imder the
auspices of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society,

^ His commission as Secretary of State was dated July 24, 1S43.

* In his old age he became a resident of New York, where he attained some
unpleasant notoriety. He was an expert stenographer, and became identi-
fied with various "advanced" causes.

» Niles's Reg, (July 8, 1843), LXIV, 293.

PHOPOSALS FOR ABOLISHING SLAVERY 563

which was held at London between the thirteenth and
twentieth of June; but before going he called on John
Quincy Adams, in company with Lewis Tappan.

"Mr. Lewis Tappan and Mr. Andrews visited me this morning,'*
Adams noted in his diary on May 31, 1843. "Mr. Tappan had with
him the New Orleans Bee of the 15th and 16th May, containing sev-
eral long articles soimding the trumpet of alarm at the symptoms
recently manifested in Texas of a strong party with a fixed design to
abolish slavery. The Bee has the name of Henry Clay on its first
page, nominated as its candidate for the Presidency, but its groans
at the prospect of abolition in Texas are agonizing. Mr. Andrews . . .
says he knows that the Texan President, Houston, is in favor of aboli-
tion. He is now about to embark in the steamer Caledonia, to-mor-
row, for England, with a view to obtain the aid of the British Govern-
ment to the cause. ... I bade him God speed, and told him that I
believed the freedom of this country and of all mankind depended
upon the direct, formal, open, and avowed interference of Great
Britain to accomplish the abolition of slavery in Texas; but that I
distrusted the sincerity of the present British Administration in the
anti-slavery cause." *

Andrews and Tappan in due time reached London and
attended the convention and other meetings. As a spectator
of the proceedings Ashbel Smith also attended, and he re-
ported to the Texan State Department that the convention —

"gave the subject of abolition in Texas a very full consideration,
deem it of great importance, will spare no efforts to accomplbh it, and
count confidently on the co-operation of the British Government. I
was present at this meeting of the Convention and heard Texas de-
scribed as the hiding place of dishonesty, as the refuge of unprincipled
villians, swindlers and criminals escaped from the hands of justice in
other countries; and that to this general character our population
presented only occasional or rare exceptions." *

A committee from the convention waited on Lord Aber-
deen, and reported that he had promised that the British
government would guarantee the interest of a loan to Texas
if it were raised and appUed for the sole purpose of purchas-

» MemriTB, XI, 379.

'Smith to Jones, July 2, 1843; Tex, Dip, Con,, II, 1100. Further details
as to Andrews and his visit to England will be found in J. H. Smith's Annexes
Hon qf Texas, 112-117.

564 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ing and emancipating slaves, on condition, of course, that
the introduction of slaves should thenceforward be pro-
hibited. Lord Aberdeen subsequently denied having naade
any such promise, and what he did say to the conmiittees
must remain to some extent uncertain. The probabilities
are that he listened to their suggestions, gave them some
vague assurances of interest in their projects, and promised
careful consideration. It is quite clear that he had no con-
ception of the importance which would be attached to his
words in Texas and the United States.

Andrews remained in London for some time after the
close of the convention, and had interviews with a number
of more or less important people, all of whom he represented
to Smith as being extremely eager to bring about abolition
in Texas. Among them were Lords Aberdeen, Brougham,
and Morpeth (afterward the Earl of Carlisle). Andrews
got Smith to introduce him as a citizen of Texas to Adding-
ton, of the Foreign Office, which, says Smith, "I consented
to do, the introduction being in no degree official as I stated
to Mr. Addington, and as this course puts me fairly in pos-
session of the abolition schemes which had already been
presented to the British Government." Smith was careful
to explain to Addington that Andrews's coming to London
was wholly unauthorized by the government or citizens of
Texas, and that there was no disposition to agitate the sub-
ject, either on the part of the government or of "any re-
spectable portion" of the citizens of Texas; and he also
expressed his own "utter dissent" from all the proceedings
in London which had abolition in view.^

Tappan, in person, and Andrews, by letter, reported to
Adams the results of their visit to England, and furnished
him with a full report of the proceedings of the convention.
Andrews wrote that he was encouraged in the hope of ac-
complishing, with the aid of British influence, the abolition
of slavery in Texas; but Adams could see nothing to remove
the deep distrust which he felt of British policy with regard
to slavery in Texas and the Southern states.

1 Smith to Jones, July 31, 1843; Ttx. Dip. C&rr,, II, 1116.

PHOPOSALS FOR ABOUSHING SLAVERY 665

'*Her interest," he wrote, "is to sustain and cherish slavery there,
and there is too much reason to surmise that in the conflict between
policy and principle slavery will bear off the palm." ^

The views which Adams entertained in regard to British
poUcy were strikmgly different from those which were en-
tertained by the leaders of opinion in the South.
_^ On July 20 Smith, who was a good deal troubled at the
stories that were in circulation, called on Lord Aberdeen
and told him he had heard that representations would be
sent to Texas to the effect that her Majesty's government
would provide means, in some way, for reimbursing slave-
holders in the event of abolition, and he inquired what
ground there was for these assertions.

"EBs Lordship replied in effect, that it is the well known policy
and wish of the British Government to abolish slavery everywhere;
that its abolition in Texas is deemed very desirable and he spoke to
this point at some little length, as connected with British policy and
British interests and in reference to the United States. He added,
that there was no dbposition on the part of the British Govt to inter-
fere improperly on this subject, and that they would not give the
Texian Govt cause to complain; 'he was not prepared to say whether
the British Govt would consent hereafter to make such compensation
to Texas as would enable the Slaveholders to abolish slavery, the
object is deemed so important perhaps they might, though he could
not say certainly.' . . .

" Lord Aberdeen also stated that despatches had been recently sent
to Mr. Doyle the British Charge d'Affaires at Mexico, instructing
him to renew the tender of British Mediation based on the abolition
of slavery in Texas, and declaring that abolition would be a great
moral triumph far Mexico. Your Department will not fail to remark
that this despatch to Mr. Doyle appears to introduce a new and
important condition into ' mediation.' . . .

"The British Government greatly desire the abolition of slavery in
Texas as a part of their general policy in reference to their colonial
and conmiercial interests and mainly in reference to its future influ-
ence on slavery in the United States." '

> Memoirs, XI, 407.

* Smith to Jonee, July 31, 1S43; Tex. Dip. Corr., n, 1116. Extracts from
this letter, embradng the above passages, were sent to Calhoim by the Texan
authorities, but when is uncertain. — (Am. Hiet. Aaen. Rep. 1809, II, 867.)

666 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The day after the date of the despatch just quoted
Ashbel Smith addressed a note to Aberdeen, whidi was
intended; first, to make a record of the conversation of
June 20 and, second, to "place on record the explicit disap-
proval by the Texan government of all proceedings having
for their object the abolition of slavery in Texas." ^ And on
the following day, August 2, Smith wrote a private letter
to Anson Jones, the Texan Secretary of State, in which he
said it was difficult to convey a correct idea of the course of
conduct of the British government in relation to slavery in
America. He did not wish to attribute to that government
any sinister or covert purposes in Texas, but he believed
that if money was necessary they would give it out o£ con-
sideration for the interests of their own country, aid in
entire disregard of its influence on the prosperity of Texas.
The abolition of slavery was the open and avowed policy of
Great Britain everywhere, which they pursued in favor of
their own commerce, manufactures, and colonial interests.
He did not think they had any hostile or unfriendly feelings,
but, on the contrary, "as much practical good-will for us as
may be consistent with the vigorous perseverance in their
abolition policy"; but he could not speak in terms of com-
mendation of Mr. S. P. Andrews's friends, who were chiefly
violent abolitionists, unfriendly to 'texas and imscrupulous
in the means they employed to accomplish their ends.*

On receiving these despatches the Texan Secretary of
State wrote back that in reference to "the efforts making
in Great Britain for the abolition of Slavery in Texas" it
was only necessary to say that the government desired to
be kept fully advised.

"The subject as you are abeady aware and as you have very prop-
erly stated to Lord Aberdeen, cannot nor will not be entertained in
any shape by this government." *

With this emphatic declaration of the policy of Texas the
movement begun by Stephen Pearl Andrews really came

1 Smith to Aberdeen, Aug. 1, 1843; Nilee's Reg,, LXVI, 97.

* Smith to Jones, Aug. 2, 1843; Jones, 236.

* Jones to Smith, Sept. 30, 1843; Tex. Dip. Con., II, 1141,

PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISHING SLAVERY 667

to an end, although an echo of it persisted in Aberdeen's
correspondency with Mexico, and the results upon the policy
of the United States were extremely important.

The instructions to the British charg6 in Mexico upon
this subject, to which Aberdeen had referred in his conver-
sation with Ashbel Smith, related primarily to the Robin-
son plan of settlement between Mexico and Texas. This
plan Aberdeen thought did not go far enough, and Mexico's
best poUcy would be to make a complete and full acknowl-
edgment of Texan independence at' once. He then, for the
first time, brought up oflScially the question of abolition,
which he proposed as the price that Texas was to pay for
recognized independence. "It may deserve consideration,"
he wrote, "whether the abolition of slavery in Texas would
not be a greater triumph, and more honourable to Mexico,
than the retention of any sovereignty merely nominal."
Of course the source/of Aberdeen's inspiration is obvious.
It was to be found tn the suggestions made by the anti-
slavery convention.^

This was made entirely clear by the instructions sent to
Doyle by the next packet. A proposition, he was told, had
been made by "the Tappan Committee" that Great Britain
should "advance a loan to Texas to be applied to the pur-
chase and emancipation of Texas slaves." A copy of the
letter from the Foreign Office to the committee, declining
to make the proposed loan, was enclosed with the instruc-
tions.

"You will perceive," Aberdeen continued, "that Mr. Tappan is
informed in that letter that if the State of Texas should confer entire
emancipation on all persons within its territory, and make that de-
cision permanent and irrevocable, H. M. Govt, would not fail to press
that circumstance upon the consideration of the Mexican Government
as a strong additional reason for the acknowledgment by Mexico of
the independence of Texas. ... It might be a point well worthy of
the favourable consideration of the Mexican Govt., whether it would
not be wiser and more consonant to their true interests, and even to
their dignity, to waive the vain and objectionable consideration of
nominal supremacy over Texas which they have included in the

^ Aberdeen to Doyle, July 1, 1S43; E. D. Adams, 130.

568 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

propositions submitted by them through Mr. Robinson to the Govt,
of Texas, and rather to substitute for it that of the absolute abolition
of the principle of slavery." *

Santa Anna; however^ cannot have cared anything about
negro slavery as an abstract proposition. He had indeed
expressed himself, according to Houston's not very trust-
worthy recollection, as thinking that it would be of great
advantage to Mexico to introduce slave labor, thus enabling
her to produce cotton, sugar, and coffee for export.* Cer-
tainly he and his associates would never have dreamed of
surrendering the Mexican claim upon Texas in exchange
for so barren an advantage as the abolition of slavery in
that country, and Aberdeen's well-meant suggestion led to
nothing.

At about the same time that Stephen Pearl Andrews
visited England an American traveller of a very different
description was also there. This was Duff Green, conmionly
known as "General" Green, presumably from a militia ap-
pointment in Missouri. He was a native of Kentucky, and
had served as a private in the War of 1812. After that he
had been a school-teacher, had kept a country-store, had
been a surveyor in Missouri, a member of the legislature of
that state, a member of the bar, and finally the editor of a
St. Louis newspaper. In 1826 he bought an unimportant
newspaper in Washington — the Telegraph — ^which for sev-
eral years he continued to edit as a Jackson organ, and which
seems to have proved ultimately unsuccessful. At the
same time he became a resident of Maryland.

In the spring of 1843 Green was in London, and at the
request of Delane, of the London Times, wrote a series of
letters for that newspaper. According to his own account,
he became acquainted while in London with Cobden, Peel,
Aberdeen, Palmerston, Lord John Russell, and other influ-
ential persons. He was also constantly writing to Calhoun,
to Everett (the American minister in London), to Webster,
to the President of the United States, and to various other

^ Same to same, July 31, 1S43; ibid,, 138. ' Yoakum, II, 556.

PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISHING SLAVERY 569

official people whom he undertook to advise as to how they
should manage pubHc affairs.

Some time in July, 1843, he wrote to Upshur that a Mr.
Andrews had been deputed by the abolitionists in Texas to
negotiate with the British government, that Andrews had
seen Lord Aberdeen and submitted a plan for organizing a
company in England which was to advance a sum sufficient
to pay for the slaves in Texas, and was to receive in payment
Texan lands, and " that Lord Aberdeen has agreed that the
British Government will guaranty the payment of the in-
terest upon this loan, upon condition that the Texan govern-
ment will abolish slavery." ^

To Calhoun Green wrote that, as he was informed, Lord
Aberdeen had told Ashbel Smith "that the British Govt,
deem it so important to prevent the annexation of Texas
to the United States that they were disposed to support
the loan if it should be required to prevent annexation." *
Green did not accurately report Smith's interview with
Aberdeen, but the statements he sent produced a great
effect upon the action of the government of the United
States.

The moment Green's letter came into Upshur's hands he
proceeded to take it as a text for instructions to Murphy in
Texas. Upshur wrote that he had every reason to confide
in the correctness of the statements made, and that there
seemed no doubt as to the object in view, and none that the
English government had offered its co-operation. If the
proposal to abolish slavery in Texas had in fact engaged the
attention of the British government, and the co-operation
of that government in the plan had been pledged, it possessed
an importance which demanded serious attention. It could

^ The original of this letter was never produced. An extract only is printed
in H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sees., 18. The statements here attributed to
Andrews correspond closely with those which Ashbel Smith reported him as
making. — (Tex; Dip, Corr.j II, 1100.) Aberdeen, however, told Everett that
when the proposals in respect to a loan were submitted to him, ''he had given
them no countenance whatever,'' and that he had at once rejected the sugges-
tion.—(Everett to Upshur, Nov. 3, 1843; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 39.)

« Green to Calhoun, Aug. 2, 1843; Am, Hist. Assn. Rep, 1899, II, 846.
The letter is wrongly dated as of 1842.

570 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

not be supposed that England meant to limit her designs
to the emancipation of the few slaves in Texas; she must
have ulterior objects far more important to her, and far
more interesting to the United States. These objects could
only be the abolition of "domestic slavery throughout the
entire continent and islands of America in order to find or
create new markets for the products of her home industry,
and at the same time destroy all competition with the in-
dustry of her colonies." Sugar and cotton could not be
produced to any considerable extent on the continent of
America by the labor of white men, and of course if slavery
could be abolished on the continent the great rivals of her
colonial industry would be removed. "No other adequate
motive," said Upshur, "can be found for her determined
and persevering course in regard to domestic slavery in
other countries."

So far as Texas was concerned Upshur discerned further
motives.

"Pressed by an unrelenting enemy on her borders, her treasury
exhausted, and her credit almost destroyed, Texas is in a condition
to need the support of other nations, and to obtain it upon terms of
great hardship and many sacrifices to herself. If she should receive
no countenance and support from the United States, it is not an ex-
travagant supposition that England may and will reduce her to all
the dependence of a colony, without taking upon herself the onerous
duties and responsibilities of the mother coimtry. The aid which it
is said she now offers toward the abolition of slavery, although prob-
ably not the first, is a very important step; it will be followed by
others, which will not fail to establish for her a controlling influence
for many years to come. The United States have a high interest to
counteract this attempt, should it be made."

There was still another point of view, and that was " the
establishment, in the very midst of our slave-holding States,
of an independent government, forbidding the existence of
slavery, and by people bom for the most part among us,
reared up in our habits, and speaking our language." If
Texas were in that condition, her territory would afford a
ready refuge for fugitive slaves from Louisiana and Arkansas,

PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISfflNG SLAVERY 571

which would lead to constant collisions along the border.
The difficulty would be much greater than that which
existed within the Union as between slave-holding and
non-slave-holding states. Nor was there any just analogy
between Texas and Canada. Canada could not be reached
by land without passing through the free states of the
Union, and was therefore only "the secondary recipient of
the fugitive slave."

For these reasons Upshur conttnended the subject to . .
Murphy's most vigilant care. " Few calamities could befall ~ J p/
this coimtry more to be deplored than the establishment of /
a predomiWt British influence aixd the aboUtion of domes- /
tic slavery in Texas." ^

It is not easy at this day to imderstand or to judge im-
partially the mental attitude of men like Tyler and Upshur
when dealing with questions relating to the existence of
slavery. Both of these men, and a large proportion of those
by whom they were surrounded in the cabinet and in Con-
gress, were slave-owners, as their fathers had been before
them for many generations. Many of them were men of
education, usually with strong religious beliefs, charitable
and well-meaning. They habitually Uved for a considerable
time in each year an isolated life, away from large affairs,
and the currents of trade and of National and international
opinion. It was only while in Washington that they ex-
perienced the bracing contact with other minds. At home
the men who were apt to represent the South in the cabinet
and in Congress were generally the most conspicuous
personages and the oracles of their neighborhood. They
lived much in the past, their ideas of politics and history
were those in vogue shortly after the adoption of the
federal Constitution, and they were, as a class, intensely
conservative.

Conscious of good intentions themselves, and knowing or
believing that their own slaves were treated with kind-
ness and cared for in sickness and old age, they were slow
to beUeve that other owners were less himiane or that there

^ Upshur to Murphy, Aug. 8, 1843; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sees., 18-22.

572 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

was any real hardship in the lot of the Southern negroes.
As time went by their opinions on the subject of slavery had
been slowly modified. Their fathers had looked upon the
institution as a national misfortune; but throughout the
South many of the public men of Tyler's time had gradually
come to persuade themselves that slavery was so far from
being an evil that it was in reality a great blessing to the
slaves themselves, as well as to the white people of the
South.

T9ie economic and social status of the whole South rested
upon the existence of slavery. The older of these states
had been developed for two centuries, and their industries
had been carried forward by the use of slave labor. It was
hard for men brought up in the midst of such conditions to
see how a community could change habits which were so
deeply rooted in custom; and it was indeed generally be-
lieved (as Upshur said) that the greater part of the agricul-
ture of the South was impossible except by the use of negroes,
who could thrive in a climate which was thought to be deadly
to white men. It was, moreover, the honest conviction of
most people at the South that free negroes were shiftless
and lazy, and that they never could be induced to work.

No one who had any responsibility for the administra-
tion of the American government ever failed to perceive
the enormous difficulties in the way of abolishing slavery.
Northern statesmen, even those most hostile to the institu-
tion, offered no solution of the problem; and as time went
on they came more and more strongly to believe in the
policy of limiting the extension of slavery, hoping that if
the evil were confined it might at some time cm^ itself.

The people of the South were of course forced into look-
ing at the difficulties of emancipation from a closer and more
personal stand-point than that which was occupied by peo-
ple in the North. The whole South was possessed by a
perfectly genuine, though very likely an exaggerated, dread
of negro risings, and almost every provision of local statutes
dealing with the status of slaves was based upon the notion
of forestalling what Southern legislators looked upon^ not

PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISHING SLAVERY 573

without some justification, as a possible and an inuneasu-
rable calamity.

As the summer of 1843 passed by the American adminis-
tration became more and more nervous on the subject of
British interference — a menace of which the Texan agents
made good use. On August 10 Van Zandt had an inter-
view with Upshur on the subject, and in a private letter to
the Texan Secretary of State wrote that he thought Upshur
was disposed "to act up to my most sanguine expectations
in relation to Texas"; that he was fully alive to the impor-
tant bearing which slavery m Texas had upon the United
States; and that he had expressed alarm lest England was
attempting to exercise some imdue influence upon Texan
affairs. Van Zandt said he had replied that England had
always professed and evinced a great desire to secure peace,
but I L did iniend or wa. Xally tiying to obtl an
undue mfluence over Texas the best way to coimteract her
efforts was for the United States " to act promptly and efl5-
ciently.** Upshur replied that nothing should be lacking
on his part to secure peace for Texas and to advance its
prosperity, that he conceived the interests of the two coun-
tries to be closely connected, and that he could best serve
the interests of the United States by promoting those of
Texas. Van Zandt, however, pointed out in writing to
Anson Jones that the other branches of the government,
and especially the Senate, were not disposed "to aid Mr.
Tyler m his views upon any important national question;
therefore, his efforts, no odds how laudable they may be,
will meet with more or less opposition." ^

A few weeks after this conversation between Upshur and
Van Zandt strong confirmation was received of the current
reports as to British efforts to bring about emancipation in
Texas. Lord Brougham had asked a question in Parlia-
ment about negotiations with Texas and Mexico. He looked
forward, he declared —

"most anxiously to the abolition of slavery in Texas, as he was con-
vinced that it would ultimately end in the abolition of slavery through-

^ Van Zandt to Jones, Aug. 12, 1843; Jones, 244.

574 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

out the whole of America. He knew that the Texians would do much,
as regarded the abolition of slavery, if Mexico could be induced to
recognize her independence. If, therefore, by our good offices, we
could get the Mexican government to acknowledge the independence
of Texas, he would suggest a hope that it might terminate in the aboli-
tion of slavery in Texas, and ultimately the whole of the southern
states of America."

Aberdeen had replied that no one was more anxious than
himself to see the abolition of slavery in Texas, and that
though he must decline to produce papers or give further
information it did not arise from indifference, but from
quite a contrary reason; "but he could assure his noble
Friend that, by means of urging the negotiations, as well as
by every other means in their power, Her Majesty's minis-
ters would press this matter." ^

On receiving the newspaper reports of Aberdeen's remarks,
Upshur on September 22, 1843, sent confidential instruc-
tions to Murphy, expressing the regret of the American
government that there should be any misunderstanding in
Texas as to the feelings of the United States toward that
coimtry, which it had every motive to encourage and aid
in all honorable courses. The government of the United
States had every desire to come to the aid of Texas, although
how far it would be supported by the people was regarded
as somewhat doubtful. "There is no reason to fear that
there will be any difference of opinion among the people of
the slave-holding States, and there is a large number in the
non-slave-holding States with views sufficiently liberal to
embrace a poUcy absolutely necessary for the saJvation of
the South, although in some respects objectionable to them-
selves." In fact, said Upshur, the North had a much deeper
interest in this matter than the South; for the policy which
the South would pursue would simply give them security
and no other advantage whatever. On the contrary, it
would give them an agricultural competitor. The North,
however, would be helped by acquiring a new market for
its manufactures and a cheapening of the price of cotton.

^ Hansard, Debates, 3d ser., LXXI, 918.

PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISfflNG SLAVERY 575

It was hoped that the North would be soon convinced of
this, and no effort would be spared to lay the truth before
them. Texas had every motive to hold on to her present
position, to yield nothing to British counsels or British in-
fluence. She might rest assured that the moment she com-
mitted herself to British protection she would be the lamb
in the embrace of the wolf. Great Britain was already
claiming an "ascendancy" in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Murphy was urged to exercise " the most imtiring vigilance
of the movements of the British Government." ^

Upshur also wrote at great length to Everett, in London,
to the effect that the movements of Great Britain in respect
to slavery demanded the serious attention of the American
government, and he repeated and enlarged upon the theme
developed in the instructions to Murphy, of the dangers
that would be involved in the abolition of slavery in Texas.*
Everett could not reply at once, for Aberdeen was in the
coimtry and Ashbel Smith in Paris; but as soon as prac-
ticable he sent long accoimts of the information he had
gathered from both sources as to the Stephen Pearl Andrews
incident of the previous sunmier, and as to the poUcy of the
British government. He particularly laid stress on Smith's
assertion that no proposition had been made to Texas in
which abolition was mentioned.'

But by the time Everett's reply was received President
Tyler had fully committed himself to the policy of annexing
Texas — a policy he had been considering for months. He
had even discussed it with the Texan charg6 d'affaires
as early as the month of December, 1842. At that time
the Whig Congress was certain to oppose anything Tyler
suggested ; but the elections of November, 1842, had resulted
in the choice of a Democratic House of Representatives,

^ Upshur to Murphy, Sept. 22, 1843; State Dept. MSS. and see extracts in
H. R. Dpc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 25.

•Upshur to Everett, Sept. 28, 1843; ibid., 27-37.

'Ever^t to Upshur, Nov. 3 and 16, 1843; ibid., 38, 40. The statements
made by Aberdeen were verbal. He assured Everett that he had at once
rejected the proposal of a loan made by the Tappan conmuttee. Smith's
statements were contained in a private letter from Paris. — (Smith to Everett,
Oct. 31, 1843; Tex. Dip, Corr., U, 1145.)

576 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

and he thought the next Congress might prove favorable to
annexation. Van Zandt, in due course, reported this con-
versation to his own government, and expressed the opinion
that the time would soon come when it would be possible
to conclude a treaty of annexation, and he again said that
if this was desired by the government of Texas he ought to
be furnished with full powers for that specific purpose.*

Van Zandt's letter must have reached Texas about the
beginning of February, 1843, and the prospect that annexa-
tion might now be carried through was well received by
Houston and some of his friends. Houston at that time
thought the prospect of an early annexation was hopeful.
" I find," he wrote, " as news reaches me both from the United
States and Texas, that the subject of annexation is one that
has claimed much attention, and is well received"; * but the
Texan government, with obvious good sense, declined to ask
for annexation upon any such shadowy assurances of sup-
port in Congress as Van Zandt had up to this time been
able to secure from President Tyler. Their policy was to
"suffer matters to gUde along quietly imtil the U States
Govt decides upon the policy of annexation";' and Van
Zandt was instructed that the rejection by the United States
of the former proposals for annexation had placed Texas in
an attitude which would render it improper for her to re-
new the proposition. He was, however, authorized to say
verbally that before Texas could take any action on the
subject it would be necessary for the United States govern-
ment "to take some step in the matter of so decided a
character as would open wide the door of negotiation to
Texas," in which event Van Zandt would be authorized "to
make a treaty of annexation." * But Tyler was not yet
ready to take a decided step toward annexation, and in
July the Texan government, being then engaged in the
preliminary negotiations for an armistice under the shadow
of the Robinson proposals, instructed Van Zandt, in sub-

1 Van Zandt to Terrell, Dec. 23, 1842; ibid., I, 633.
•Houston to Eve, Feb. 17, 1843; ibid., II, 128.
» Waples to Reily, May 12, 1842; ibid., I, 559.
« Jones to Van Zandt, Feb. 10, 1843; ibid., II, 123.

PROPOSALS FOR ABOUSHING SLAVERY 577

stance; that his authority to give verbal assurances of a
readiness to treat of annexation were withdrawn; that it
was thought best to postpone the subject pending the set-
tlement of diflBculties with Mexico; and that if the inde-
pendence of Texas should be acknowledged by that power
the question of annexation would be much simplified.^

While Texas thus remained to all appearances cool and in-
different, the American administration was becoming eager in
pursuit. All through August and September of the year 1843
Upshur was in a state of nervous excitement over the fear
that British intrigues would result in the aboUtion of slavery
in Texas. Cumulative evidence of this design kept amving
at the State Department, and he must have repeatedly im-
portimed the President to take the first step in a nego-
tiation which, if successful, would put an end forever to
the possibility of British success in whatever objects it was
striving for in Texas. At length the President gave way.
Speaking of Upshur in an address delivered in 1858, Tyler
said:

"I remember how highly gratified he was when, after receiving
voluminous dispatches from abroad, mostly bearing on the matter, I
announced to him my purpose to offer annexation to Texas in the form
of a treaty, and authorized him at once, and without delay, to com-
municate the fact to Mr. Van Zandt, the accomplished minister from
that republic." *

It was on the twenty-second of September that Upshur in-
structed Murphy to use imtiring vigilance in watching British
movements, and on the eighteenth that he informed Van
Zandt of the change in the attitude of the American govern-
ment. They now contemplated, he said, early action, and he
desired Van Zandt to communicate this fact to the Texan
authorities, so that, if they still desired to conclude a treaty
of annexation, their representative in Washington might be

^ Same to same, July 6, 1843; ibid,, 195. These instructions were dated on
the day Murphy was received as United States charge, when he was writing
of mysterious negotiations going on which he could not fathom, and which
might be of vast consequence to his government.

« Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 389.

578 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

furnished with the necessary powers to act. Upshur also
went on to say that such a treaty was "the great measure of
the administration here," and that he beUeved it might be
safely submitted to the next Senate. He also explained the
grounds of his belief, "which were drawn from the views of
various correspondents; and the manifestations of public
sentiment in different parts of the country." Van Zandt
said he told Upshur he doubted whether the power to nego-
tiate would be given him, unless the proposition for annexa-
tion was positively made by the United States; to which
Upshur replied that he could not then make a definite pro-
posal, and thought it would not be proper to make it unless
Van Zandt had the necessary powers — ^all of which the latter
reported to his government, ^th a strong expression of his
own opinion in favor of annexation.*

Four weeks later, and without waiting to receive a reply
to his verbal inquiry, Upshur addressed a note to Van Zandt
in which he stated that recent occurrences in Europe had
imparted a fresh interest to the subject of annexation, and
although he could not offer any positive assurance that the
measure would be "acceptable to all branches of this gov-
ernment," the administration would present it in the strong-
est manner to the consideration of Congress. He w.ould
therefore be prepared to enter upon negotiations for a
treaty of annexation whenever Van Zandt was furnished
with proper powers.* The "recent occurrences in Europe"
to which Upshur referred were, of course, the dealings of
Lord Aberdeen with the abolitionists in reference to slavery
in Texas, the first news of which had reached the State De-
partment in August. But what had at last impelled him
to put his proposals in writmg, weeks after he had been
informed of the attitude of the British government, could
only have been the threatening and warlike tone adopted
by Mexico on the subject of annexation.'

The willingness of Texas to enter upon negotiations for

1 Van Zandt to Jones, Sept. 18, 1843; Tex, Dip, Can,, II, 207-210.

» Upshur to Van Zandt, Oct. 16, 1843; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 seas., 37,

* See Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 8^94.

PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISHING SLAVERY 579

annexation seems to have been taken for granted by the
American administration. No doubt a majority of the peo-
ple of Texas would have welcomed the project with enthu-
siasm. But the Texan government was by no means com-
mitted to it; and approached the subject with a great deal
of caution. la the first place, the bugbear of British inter-
ference with slavery did not excite much alarm in Texas.
"The subject," says Jones, "was never once so much as
mentioned or alluded to by the British minister to the
government of Texas, except to disclaim in the most em-
phatic terms any intention on the part of England ever to
interfere with it here." ^ On the other hand, the Texan
government was very much afraid that if a treaty of annexa-
tion were concluded, Mexico might terminate the existing
armistice, break off negotiations for peace, and again
threaten, or even conmience, hostilities against Texas; and
that at the same time the British and the French govern-
ments, which had been instrumental in obtaining the cessa-
tion of hostilities, might cease their efforts at mediation, or
possibly throw their influence into the Mexican scale.

Van Zandt was accordingly instructed on December 13
to notify the American government that Texas would not
enter into the proposed negotiation. Two reasons were
given. In the first place, it was thought that —

"in the present state of our foreign relations, it would not be politic
to abandon the expectations which now exist of a speedy settlement
of our difficulties with Mexico, through the good offices of other powers
for the very uncertain prospect of annexation to the United States
however desirable that event, if it could be consummated, might be.
Were Texas to agree to a treaty of annexation, the good offices of these
powers would it is believed be immediately withdrawn, and were
the Treaty then to Fail of ratification by the Senate of the United
States, Texas would be placed in a much worse situation than she is
at present/*

In the second place, the Texan government, though duly
sensible of the friendly feeling evinced by the President of
the United States in the offer to conclude a treaty, was of

^ Jones, 82.

580 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

opinion that "its approval by other branches of that gov-
ernment" would at least be very uncertain.

"At this particular time, therefore, and until such an expression
of their opinion can be obtained as would render this measure certain
of success the President deems it most proper and most advantageous
to the interests of this country, to decline the proposition for conclud-
ing a treaty." ^

Other people held the same opinion as President Houston.
Thus General Henderson, who had been the first repre-
sentative of Texas abroad, and had been for a time Secre-
tary of State, protested strongly to Anson Jones, the then
Secretary, against a premature attempt to make a treaty.

" When in the United States lately," Henderson wrote, " I received
a letter from Van Zandt in which he expressed a strong hope of being
able to consummate a treaty of annexation. I took the liberty to
suggest the impropriety of making such a treaty unless he was cer-
tain of its ratification by the United States Senate. I am extremely
anxious to see such a thing take place; but it does seem to me that
Texas would be placed in an extremely awkward situation in regard
to her intercourse, should the treaty be signed, and afterwards re-
jected by the United States." *

Upon this letter the gratified Jones indorsed the remark:
"A shrewd and sensible letter this, and hits the nail on the
head every time."

The Texan Congress met on December 4, 1843, three
weeks after the date of the instructions to Van Zandt not to
enter into negotiations, and in his annual message President
Houston was silent on the subject of negotiations with the
United States, but referred gratefully to the kind oflBces of the
foreign governments which had contributed toward bringing
about negotiations with Mexico for an armistice. Houston
personally had been very much disturbed by the American
offer, and told Elliot that he would never consent to a treaty
of annexation, provided the independence of Texas were rec-
ognized by Mexico.' And in a public speech he had accused

1 Jones to Van Zandt, Dec. 13, 1843; Tex, Dip, Corr., II, 232-233.

'Henderson to Jones, Dec. 20, 1843; Jones, 278.

s Elliot to Aberdeen, Oct. 31, 1843; E. D. Adams, 151.

PROPOSALS FOR ABOUSHING SLAVERY 581

the United States of hostility to the interests of Texas, and
held up Great Britain as her true friend.^ It seems likely,
however, that Houston and his cabinet very soon learned
from conversations with members of Congress how strong
the public opinion in favor of annexation really was.

The Texan representatives in the United States were also
urging the policy of entering upon negotiations. "I hope,"
wrote Van Zandt, "that you will accept annexation. It
will be the best move we can make."* A Texan naval
officer who had been in the United States wrote that he
had seen President Tyler and Mr. Upshur, and was "sorry
to find the subject of annexation suspended by us. Mr.
Upshur is a great advocate of this Measure." *

Van Zandt was also busy in trying to remove one, at
least, of the obstacles which stood in the way of the Texan
government. As he saw it, their chief objection to negotia-
tions for annexation lay in their fear of an attack from
Mexico; and therefore, entirely without instructions, he
addressed a note to Upshur inquiring whether the President
of the United States, after the signing of a treaty and before
its ratification, woidd "in case Texas should desire it, or
with her consent, order such number of the miUtary and
naval forces of the United States to such necessary points
or places upon the territory or borders of Texas or the Gulf
of Mexico, as shall be sufficient to protect her against for-
eign aggression." *

To this inquiry no written answer was returned at that
time, but Van Zandt reported that he was verbally author-
ized by the Secretary of State, " who speaks by the authority
of the President of the United States," to say to the Texan
authorities —

1 Murphy to Upshur, Dec. 5, 1843; StaU Dept, MSS. Enclosed with this
despatch were editorials from Texan newspapers criticising Houston's pro-
British tendencies. On Dec. 26 Murphy wrote that the Congress was very
hostile to Houston.

* Van Zandt to Jones, Oct. 22, 1843; Jones, 260.

* Tod to Jones, Oct. 25, 1843; ibid., 261. Reference may also be made to
Van Zandt's official despatches of Nov. 4 and 30, 1843; Tex, Dip, Corr., II,
224,228.

« Van Zandt to Upshur, Jan. 17, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 89.

582 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

*' that the moment a treaty of amiexation shall be signed a large naval
force will be assembled in the Gulf of Mexico, upon the coast of Texas,
and that a sufficient number of the Military force will be ordered to
rendezvous upon the borders of Texas, ready to act as circumstances
may require; and that these assurances will be officially given pre-
liminary to the signing of the treaty, if desired by the Government of
Texas; and that this Government will say to Mexico that she must
in no wise disturb or molest Texas." *

In the same despatch in which Van Zandt reported these
comforting assurances he also stated that he had taken the
responsibility of withholding from the American govern-
ment the fact that Texas refused to negotiate, because he
had become convinced that there was now a "confident
prospect" of a treaty being consented to by the Senate.
This opinion was based chiefly on the impression that the
measure would be regarded as a matter of national impor-
tance, "alike interesting to the whole Union." The general
opinion in Washington was that Texas must either be an-
nexed to the United States or become a dependency of
Great Britain.

" This view of the case has had an important influence upon many
of the Senators of the non-slaveholding states. Were the question
deprived of this feature I should dispair of its success. ... I fed
confident that we may rely upon the entire vote of the south and west,
regardless of party, while at the north we may calculate on the whole
democratic vote, and many say Mr. Tallmadge of the Whig party,
though the latter may be considered doubtful."

At about the time that Van Zandt was thus reporting on
affairs in Washington, Upshur was writing another long and
confidential letter to the American charg6 in Texas, dealing
with the general subject of annexation. "You are probably
not aware," he said, "that a proposition has been made to
the Texan government for the annexation of that country
to the United States. This, I learn from the Texan charge,
has been for the present declined." But Upshur expressed
himself as not disappointed, for he thought it not surprising

» Van Zandt to Jones, Jan. 20, 1844; Tex. Dip. Corr., II, 239-243.

PROPOSALS FOR ABOUSHING SLAVERY 583

that that government should hesitate ''in the present state
of its interest" to make any further movement toward
annexation. So long as the success of the measure in the
American Congress was doubtful he considered it only
natural that Texas should be disinclined to hazard the
friendship of other powers by an unsuccessful appeal to the
United States. At the same time he had no doubt as to
the imanimous wishes of the people of Texas.

Upon the action of the American Congress Upshur did
not profess to speak with absolute certainty, although he
said he felt "a degree of confidence in regard to it which is
little short of absolute certainty."

''The more the subject is discussed among our statesmen, the more
clearly does it appear that the interest of both countries absolutely
requires that they should be united. When the measure was first
suggested, although the entire South was in favor of it, as they still
are, it found few friends among the statesmen of the other States.
Novo, the North, to a great extent, are not only favorable to, but anx-
ious for it; and every day increases the popularity of the measure
among those who originally opposed it. Measures have been taken
to ascertain the opinions and views of Senators upon the subject,
and it is found that a clear constittiiional majority of twoAhirds are in
favor of the measvre. This I learn from sources which do not leave
the matter doubtful; and I have reason to know that President
Houston himself has received the same information from sources
which will conunand his respect. There is not, in my opinion, the
slightest doubt of the ratification of a treaty of annexation, should
Texas agree to make one."

As to the importance of the measure, Upshur professed
"a deep and solemn conviction" that it involved the des-
tinies of both Texas and the United States "to a fearful
extent." In the first place, he believed that if Texas made
concessions to England it would lead to irritation between
the United States, on the one hand, and Texas and Great
Britain, on the other. Texas would be populated by emi-
grants from Europe, and the country would soon be subject
to the control of a population who were anxious to abolish
alaveiy. To this England would stimulate them, and would

584 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

furnish the means of accompUshing it. With such causes
at work war between the United States and Texas would be
inevitable.

'' England will be a party to it, from necessity, if not from choice;
and the other great powers of the world will not be idle spectators
of a contest involving such momentous results. I think it almost
certain that the peace of the civilized world, the stability of long
established institutions, and the destinies of millions, both in Europe
and America, hang on the decision which Texas shall now pronounce." ^

Such, then, was the attitude of the governments of the
United States and Texas in the middle of January, 1844.
Tyler and his Secretary of State were eager and hopeful for
the success of the project, and were professing — ^probably
quite sincerely — the belief that a failure to carry it forward
might result in the most serious calamities. On the other
side were Houston and his Secretary of State, urged on by
a nearly unanimous population, but held back for the time
being by the fear that the making of a treaty might be the
signal for an actual invasion at last by the Mexican forces.

^ Upshur to Murphy, Jan. 16, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 aesB., 43-48.
Italics in original.

CHAPTER XXni

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION

General Almonte, the Mexican minister in Washington,
arriving at his post late in the year 1842, lent an attentive
ear to all the gossip that floated about the capital in refer-
ence to Texan affairs. All that he learned led him to urge
again and again upon his govenunent the importance of
speedy military action to reconquer Texas. The news-
papers, he wrote, were full of reports that France, England,
and the United States had instructed their ministers to
offer mediation. He did not think that much attention
should be paid to these proposals, for this was the last re-
sort of the demoralized Texans. It was essential, in his
judgment, not to let this opportunity of recovering Texas
escape, for if it was not improved it never would recur again.^
A little later he wrote that public opinion in the United
States with respect to Texas had never been more favorable
for Mexico. He hoped to obtain from the President a
proclamation of neutrality, which would serve to discourage
emigration to Texas, and would give Mexico the right to
treat "with rigor'' those who might be found, in spite of
warnings, within the revolted territory.^ Six weeks after-
ward he was less hopeful. Public opinion, he reported, was
still favorable to Mexico, but he could not be certain how
long it would so continue if unfortunately the campaign
against Texas was not begun in March or April. Up to the
. time of writing no proposition for the admission of Texas to
the Union had been made, but he did not doubt that at the
next session of Congress, in December, 1843, this would be
one of the principal matters under discussion. By that

1 Almonte to Minister of Relations, Nov. 15, 1842; Secretaria de Rdaciones
Ezleriore8f Mexico^ MSS.
' Same to same, Dec. 12, 1842; ibid.

585

586 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

time he hoped that Texas would be garrisoned by Mexican
^ troops. The Oregon question with England was full of
difficulties, and might result in a war between England and
the United States.

" Let us hasten," he said, " to make ready for that event, since we
cannot remain indifferent, and we have been too much injured not
to take advantage of the occasion which presents itself to us, to obtain
vengeance." *

Writing again only a few days later, he reported that the
triumph of the national arms in the town of Mier had so
discouraged the adventurers of Texas that all was confusion
among them. They mistrusted each other, and even sus-
pected Houston of intrigues with Mexico. No better occa-
sion, therefore, could be presented for recovering the terri-
tory, and it was necessary to lose no time, for the Southern
membera of Congress had intentions with respect to Texas;
at the next session they would have a majority, and it would
not be surprising if their project should be carried forwaiti.
It was therefore, he continued, essential —

" to make good use of the time which will elapse between the dose of
the present session, which will be the fourth of next March, and the
first Monday of December next when the new Congress will meet
It is important that by that time, if the reconquest of Mexico is not
complete, at least operations shall be well advanced. If it is not so,
I repeat that I fear there may be a reaction in favor of those advent-
urers and then it will be extremely difficult for us, not to say impossi-
ble, to get public opinion again in our favor as it is at present." *

On the fourth of March Almonte saw his worst fears con-
firmed by the publication of a document signed by John
Quincy Adams, Giddings, and eleven other members of
Congress, a copy of which he enclosed, and again he urged
that before the next session of Congress some part of Texas
should be occupied, since this would serve to defeat the
plans of the friends of Texas by showing that the United
States could not occupy, except at the cost of a war with

^ Same to same, Jan. 25, 1843; ibid.

* Almonte to Minister of Relations, Feb. 7, 1843; Sec. de Ed. Exi. M8S,

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 587

Mexico, points which were already occupied de facto and de
jure by the Mexican government.^

The paper which Almonte enclosed was dated March 3,
1843; and was widely circulated in the American press. Its
signers, in the most positive language, asserted that a large
part of the Southern states had solemnly and unalterably
determined that the plan of annexing Texas should be
speedily carried into execution, so that "the undue ascend-
ency of the slave-holding power of the government shall be
secured and riveted beyond all redemption." The effort to
accomplish this purpose had already, it was said, led to set-
tlements in Texas by citizens of the United States, to the
creation of difficulties with the Mexican government, to
the bringing about of a revolt, and to the declaration of an
independent government; and all the attempts of Mexico
to reduce "her revolted province'' to obedience had proved
unsuccessful because of the unlawful aid of individuals in
the United States and the co-operation of the American
government. The open and repeated enlistment of troops
within the United States and the occupation of Nacogdoches
by Gaines's troops "at a moment critical for the fate of the
insurgents," the entire neglect of the United States govern-
ment to prevent "bodies of our own citizens enlisted, or-
ganized and officered within our own borders and marched
in arms and battle array upon the territory and against the
inhabitants of a friendly government, in aid of free-booters
and insurgents," and the "premature" recognition of the
independence of Texas, were all brought forward as proofs
that annexation and the formation of several new slave-
holding states had always been the policy and design of the
South and of the national executive.

Thus far the address was simply a reproduction of the
assertions which had been originally made by Benjamin
Lundy eight years before, and which had formed the con-
stant themes of Mexican official communications. But
what made the address remarkable was the suggestion that
annexation would be a violation of the national compact

^ Same to same, March 4, 1843; ibid.

588 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

and "identical with dissolution''; that it would be an at-
tempt to "eternize" slavery; and that this would be so
unjust and so injurious to the interests and feelings of the
people of the free states as to justify fully a dissolution of
the Union.^

The spectacle of an ex-President of the United States ad-
vocating a dissolution of the Union was not likely to com-
mend itself to sober-minded citizens, and the address was
not much heeded within the limits of the United States,
but in Mexico it met with a more congenial reception. It
was naturally not very easy for Mexican officials to know
what weight to attach to an address of this description,
and it seems to have been considered wise, after some
weeks of consideration, to announce the opposition of
Mexico to any project of annexation and the determination
of the Mexican government to take vigorous measures.
The first step was to issue a proclamation, on June 17, 1843,
directing that in future no quarter should be granted to any
foreigner who invaded the territory of the republic, "whether
he be accompanied in his enterprise by a few or by many
adventurers . . . and all such persons taken with arms in
their hands shall be inamediately put to death." * This was
followed by a note from the Minister of Foreign Relations
to the American minister in Mexico, declaring that the
Mexican government would consider the passage of an act
for the incorporation of Texas with the United States as
equivalent to a declaration of war against the Mexican
republic.

What with Adams and his friends on one side and Mexico
on the other, the United States was thus threatened with
both civil and foreign war. Calmly considered, neither of
these threats was very formidable; for neither was backed
by any respectable force.

So far as Mexico was concerned Thompson made short
work of her protest. He instantly replied that the direct
threat of war made by the Mexican Minister of Foreign
Relations precluded any explanation whatever upon the

^ Niles's Reg., LXIV, 173. > Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 34.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 589

subject. The American government; he said; had no de-
sire for a war with Mexico; but if anything could excite
such a feeling it would be a constant repetition of threats,
which he requested might not be repeated. If intended for
intimidation they would have no effect, and if as a warning
they were not necessary.

This reply was approved by the State Department, but
Thompson was instructed that if he should be again ad-
dressed in terms so offensive, he must demand that the letter
be withdrawn or that a suitable apology for it be made.
"You will at the same time inform the Mexican government
that you can hold no intercourse with it, except on such
terms of courtesy and respect as are due to the honor and
dignity of the United States." ^

Almonte, the Mexican minister in Washington, took up
the subject in the following November in an even more
warlike spirit. The Mexican government, he wrote to the
State Department, had well-grounded reasons to believe
that the Congress of the United States, at its next session,
would discuss the annexation of a part of the Mexican ter-
ritory to that of the United States. Any such measure, if
carried into effect, would be considered by Mexico as a direct
aggression. If the United States should, in defiance of good
faith and of the principles of justice, commit the unpre-
cedented outrage {inaudito atentado) of appropriating to
itself an integral part of the Mexican territory, the act of
the President in approving the annexation of Texas, would,
said Almonte, terminate his own mission, as the Mexican
government was resolved to declare war the moment it was
informed of such an event.

Upshur replied that as General Almonte had made no
inquiry from the State Department concerning the facts
upon which his letter was founded it was unnecessary either
to admit or deny the design imputed to the Congress of the
United States.

^ Bocanegra to Thompson, Aug. 23, 1843; Thompson to Bocanegra, Aug. 24,
1843; Bocanegra to Thompson, Sept. — , 1843; Upshur to Thompson, Oct.
20, 1843; Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 89-94.

590 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

''As to the threat of war made in advance, in the name and by the
express order of the Mexican Government, the undersigned reminds
General Almonte that it is neither the first nor the second time that
Mexico has given the same warning to the United States, under sim-
ilar circumstances. The undersigned had hoped that the manner in
which these threats have heretofore been received and treated had
clearly shown to the Mexican Government the light in which they are
regarded by that of the United States. The undersigned has now
only to add, that as his Government has not, in time past, done any
thing inconsistent with the just claims of Mexico, the President sees
no reason to suppose that Congress will suffer its policy to be affected
by the threats of that Government. The President has full reliance
on the wisdom and justice of Congress, and cannot anticipate that
any occasion will arise to forbid his hearty co-operation in whatever
policy that body may choose to pursue, either towards Mexico or
any other Power.

''In conclusion, the undersigned reminds General Almonte that
this Government is under no necessity to learn, from that of Mexico,
what is due to its own honor or to the rights of other nations. It is
therefore quite unnecessary that General Almonte, in his future com-
munications to this dep>artment, should admonish thb Government
either to respect its duties or to take care of its reputation, in any
contingency which the Mexican Government may choose to antici-
pate."

Almonte replied, softening some of the expressions con-
tained in his note, but intimating that Upshur's language
implied ignorance of any project being in hand for the an-
nexation of Texas or that the submission of such a question
to Congress was under consideration, and he would "highly
value" a formal declaration to that effect. To this Upshur
answered that it was evidently impossible for him to dis-
avow any purpose to annex Texas to the Union so far as the
action of Congress might be concerned, and that, consider-
ing the attitude which Mexico had chosen to assume, such
a disavowal on the part of the President could not be
reasonably expected, whatever his views and intentions
might be. He would, however, make what he called an
" explicit explanation " :

"Near eight years," he wrote, "have elapsed since Texas declared
her independence. During all that time Mexico has asserted her

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 591

right of jurisdiction and dominion over that country, and has en-
deavored to enforce it by arms. Texas has successfully resisted all
such attempts, and has thus afforded ample proof of her ability
to maintain her independence. This proof has been so satisfactory
to many of the most considerable nations of the world, that they have
formally acknowledged the independence of Texas, and established
diplomatic relations with her. Among these nations the United States
are included; and indeed they set the example which other nations
have followed. Under these circumstances, the United States re-
gard Texas as in all respects an independent nation, fully competent
to manage its own affairs, and possessing all the rights of other inde-
pendent nations. The Government of the United States, therefore,
will not consider it necessary to consult any other nation in its transac-
tions with the Government of Texas." *

Four days after Upshur's final letter to Almonte the
President sent the correspondence with his annual message
to Congress. He regarded it, he said, as not a little extraor-
dinary that t^e government of Mexico, in advance of a
public discussion on the subject of Texas, should so far have
anticipated the result of such discussion as to have an-
nounced its determination to meet the decision of Congress
by a formal declaration of war against the United States.
If designed to prevent Congress from considering the ques-
tion, the President had no reason to doubt that it would
entirely fail of its object. Certainly the executive depart-
ment of the government would not fail, for any such cause,
to discharge its whole duty to the country.

No allusion was made in the message to any prospect of
negotiations with Texas, but a large part of it was taken up
by complaints against the action of the Mexican government
in respect to various matters, such as a renewal of the pro-
hibition against foreigners carrying on retail trade in Mex-
ico. Particular stress was laid on the mode in which Mexico
had conducted its war with Texas. This war, the President '
said, consisted for the most part of predatory incursions,
which had been attended with much suffering to individuals,
but had failed to approach to any definite result. Mexico

> Almonte to Upshur, Nov. 3, 1843; Upshur to Almonte, Nov. 8, 1843;
Almonte to Upshur, Nov. 11, 1843; Upshur to Ahnonte, Dec. 1, 1843; Sen.
Doo. 341, 28 Cong., 1 sees., 94-103.

592 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

had fitted out no formidable armament by sea or land for the
subjugation of Texas. The interests of the United States
were involved in seeing an end put to this state of hostilities,
and the government could not be indifferent to the fact that
such a warfare was calculated to weaken both powers, and
finally to render them the subjects of interference on the part
of stronger nations, who mi^t attempt to bring about "a
compliance with terms, as the condition of then- interposi-
tion, ahke derogatoiy to the nation grantmg them, and detri-
mental to the interests of the United States." After this fling
at England, the President declared that he thought it be-
coming to the United States to hold a language to Mexico of
an unambiguous character. It was time that this war' ceased.
There must be a limit to all wars; and if the parent state,
after an eight years' struggle, had failed to reduce its re-
volted subjects to submission, she ought not to expect that
other nations would look on quietly, to their own obvious
injury.

The President's hints at British interference in the affaire
of Texas excited Aberdeen's very pronounced indignation,
and he instructed Pakenham to remonstrate with the
American Secretary of State, and to point out that the
President's language when speaking of the measures which
the United States might have occasion to adopt accorded
ill with his condemnation of the supposed designs of other
powers.^ At the same time instructions were sent to Lord
Cowley, in Paris, stating that the President evidently
contemplated the annexation of Texas, a measure which
neither France nor England could look upon with indiffer-
ence. The views of the French court were therefore to be
ascertained, and a proposal made that they should join in
a remonstrance to the American government.*

^Aberdeen to Pakenham, Jan. 9, 1944; E. D. Adams, 156. Copies of
these instructions, and those of Dec. 26, 1843, to Pakenham (referred to below)
were sent to the British legation in Mexico, and were read to Bocanegra by
Bankhead at a long interview on March 29, 1844. Bocanegra asked what
the object of the British government was in communicating all this, and
Bankhead could only say that it was intended to show the frankness and
friendliness with which the British government was acting. — (Memo, filed in
Sec. (2e ReL Ext. MSS.)

* Aberdeen to Cowley, Jan. 12, 1844; E. P. Adams, 158.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 593

Cowley at once executed his orders, and reported that he
found both the King and Guizot in perfect sympathy with
Aberdeen's ideas. The King m particular expressed him-
self as thinking that the independence of Texas should be
maintained, and a barrier thus opposed to the encroachment
of the United States, "whose object was not only to take
possession of Texas, but at some future period to make that
province a stepping-stone to Mexico." ^ But notwithstand-
ing the harmony of the British and French governments in
agreeing to instruct their agents in Washington to protest
against annexation, no such instructions were sent at that
time.*

Meanwhile, the Texan administration was reluctantly
being pressed toward annexation. Houston and Anson
Jones were imdoubtedly, at that moment, opposed to the
step; but they could not stand out indefinitely against the
pressure of local public opinion and the evidences they were
daily receiving of the eagerness of the American government.
They had also some evidence of the temper of the American
Senate, and they were constantly hearing the views of mem-
bers of the Texan Congress; but before Houston would com-
mit himself definitely to a negotiation he thought it prudent
to submit the whole question of annexation to the latter body.

On January 20, 1844, he therefore sent a secret message
to Congress, in which he asserted that he had carefully ab-
8tained during his present administration from expressmg
any opinion in reference to the subject, and he thought it
imbecoming in him now to express any. He went on, how-
ever, to point out that if any effort were to be made on the
part of Texas to effect the object of annexation, "which is
so desirable,'^ and such an effort should fail of acceptance
by the United States, it might have a seriously prejudicial

^ CJowley to Aberdeen, Jan. 15, 1844; iWrf., 159. The traditional policy of
France had always been opposed to the growth of the United States. See the
point discussed in McLaughlin's The Confederation and the Conatiiviionj 89.

' Smith reported, after a conversation with Guizot in February, that the
French and British governments had united in a protest to the United States
against the annexation of Texas. — (Smith to Jones, Feb. 29, 1844; Tex, Dip,
Corr.f II, 1481.) But no instructions to this e£Fect have been found in the
archives, and certainly no such protest was ever received.

594 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

influence upon the course which England and France might
otherwise be disposed to take, and might to a great extent
diminish the claims of Texas to the confidence of other
nations and create distrust on their part. For these reasons
" the utmost caution and secrecy on our part, as to the true
motives of our policy, should be carefully observed." If
annexation could not be obtained, at any rate, " a treaty of
alliance, defensive at least," might be entered into with the
United States. Immediate action was desirable, as the
American Congress would be likely soon to indicate their
disposition and course of policy toward Texas. Action,
however, must be taken first by the United States, "and
we must now watch and meet their disposition towards us.
If we evince too much anxiety, it will be regarded as impor-
timity, and the voice of supplication seldom commands great
respect." He therefore proposed the appointment of "an
additional agent to the Government of the United States to
co-operate with our agent there." ^

Without waiting for the action of the Texan Congress
upon this proposal, instructions were sent to Van Zandt,
in Washington, directing him to begin negotiations for a
treaty of annexation, provided he was "satisfied that the
door will be opened by the Congress of the United States
... in any manner which may seem to ensure certain
success." The main outlines of a treaty were suggested,
but Van Zandt was told that there were many points of
minor importance, as to which instructions would be fur-
nished "so soon as this government is advised of the fact
that the measure of annexation is made certain to Texas by
the action of the present Congress or Senate of the United
States." In that event, if the Texan Congress voted an
appropriation, a special minister to act in conjunction with
Van Zandt would be sent.*

^ Van Zandt in his despatch of Sept. 18, 1843, above referred to, had sug-
gested that, in view of the great importance of the business, some other per-
son might be empowered to represent Texas. — (Ihid.f 210.) See J. H. Smith's
Annexation of Texas^ 160-162, as to the pressure brought to bear by the Texan
Congress upon Houston.

"Jones to Van Zandt, Jan. 27, 1844; Tex, Dip, Corr., II, 248. Italics in
origiDal.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 695

The Texan Congress did not act upon Houston's message
imtil just before its adjournment on February 5, 1844, when
an appropriation of five thousand dollars was made to cover
the expense of an additional representative at Washington;
and on the tenth of February, Houston sent for General J.
Pinckney Henderson to offer him the position thus created. -/
Henderson, as appeared from his letter of the previous /
December, was strongly in favor of annexation, but very/
much opposed to signing a treaty unless its ratification wa$
certain; and in this he was fully in accord with the viewfe
then pubUcly professed by the Texan administration.

Their views had, however, been in some measure modi-
fied by the receipt of Van Zandt's despatch of the twentieth
of January, in which he reported the willingness of the
American government to protect Texas against Mexico after
a treaty was signed. It seems to have been thought by
Houston and his advisers that if these assurances were put
in a more definite shape, it would be safe to proceed, even
without any certainty as to what the American Senate
might do.

The first step was, therefore, to get a written imdertaking
from Murphy, who called upon President Houston, on the
same tenth of February, to present to him Upshur's views
as contained in the instructions of January 16, urging the
pressing importance of annexation. Murphy was sur-
prised and, of course, greatly pleased to learn that the
Texan government had at last determined to negotiate, and
he accepted without a protest the statement that before
actually entering upon the business, a promise would be ^
required from him that the United States would protect, or
aid in the protection of Texas, pending the proposed nego-
tiation. This promise Murphy readily gave.

" I trust," he said, " my Government will at once see the propriety
of this course of policy; for I found it impossible to induce this Gov-
ernment to enter heartily into the measure of annexation without an
assurance that my Government would not fail to guard Texas against
all the evils which were likely to assail Texas in consequence of her
meeting and complying with the wishes of the United State9« i i . I

596 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

took upon myself a great responsibility, but the cause required it,
and you will, I hope, justify me to the President." ^

With this ofl&cial despatch Murphy sent a hastOy scribbled
note, marked "Confidential."

" The President of Texas," it ran, " begs me to request you that no
time be lost in sending a sufficient fleet into the Gulf, subject to my
order, to act in Defence of the Texan Coast, in case of a naval descent
by Mexico and that an active force of mounted men, or cavalry be
held ready on the line of U. S. contigeous to Texas to act in her de-
fence by land — ^f or says the President ' I know the Treaty will be made
& we must suffer for it. If the U. States is not ready to defend us' —
do comply with his wishes immediately.

"Yours truly in great Haste, as the Express is ready mounted &
waiting at the Door

*'W. S. Murphy." «

Nothing could better paint Houston's frame of mind than
this hurried scrawl, with its almost pathetic entreaty for
ships and troops "contigeous" to the border, and the ex-
pression of a conviction that Texas "must suffer for it," if
the treaty were made. However, Houston had now done
what he could to guard against the evil he anticipated; and
Henderson, having accepted the task assigned to him, was
duly furnished with his commission and full powers. No de-
tailed written instructions were given him at the time, as
he was told that the President placed great reliance upon
his skill, judgment, and intimate knowledge of the subject.
Only one condition was imposed. Before entering upon the
negotiation, measures must be taken to obtain from the
American government as full a guarantee as that given by
Murphy.'

On February 25, 1844, further instructions were sent, io
the effect that the Texan representatives were to be guided
by views previously expressed; but they were further di-
rected to see that provision was made for ultimately erect-
ing four states out of the Texan territory, that the Texan

> Murphy to Upshur, Feb. 15, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 seas., 92.

* StaU Dept. M8S,

* Jones to Henderoon, Feb. 15, 1844; Tex. Dip, Corr,, U, 252.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION! 597

navy was to be paid for by the United Stat^, and that the
boundary was to extend to the Eio Grande.^

At the very time these preliminary discussions looking to
annexation were going on^ the commissioners who had been
sent to Mexico to conclude an armistice were still proceeding
with their negotiations without a hint from their own govern-
ment that any change was intended in its policy. As late
as the third of February Houston was writing them, express-
ing a hopeful feeling as to the result of their labors, and
aJluding quite casually to the rumor that there waa much
excitement in the United States in relation to annexa-
tion.* The Texan commissioners persevered, and on the
eighteenth of February signed an agreement with the
Mexican representatives which was sent to Houston for his
approval.

Houston^s conduct in the matter was, to say the least of
it, wanting in candor. He rejected the agreement without
notice to Mexico, and without any statement of his reasons.
Later on it was explained that the ground for his action was
the fact that the agreement referred to Texas as a " Depart-
ment" of Mexico; but the real reason was, of course, the
fact that he had embarked upon hopeful negotiations with
the United States, and that he wished to gain time by keep-
ing Mexico in ignorance of his purpose.'

By the end of March, 1844, the Texan administration had
thus secretly but definitely abandoned the poUcy of attempt-
ing to make peace with Mexico, and had thrown themselves
imreservedly into the arms of the United States. Their
decision wi officially made known in a despatch to the
Texa^ representatives in Washington, who were now in-
structed that if they were imable to conclude a treaty of
annexation "within the limits of the instructions'* already
given them, they were vested "with discretionary powers
to conclude said Treaty upon the best terms possible to be

1 Jones to Henderson and Van Zandt, Feb. 25, 1S44; ibid., 259.

» Houston to Hockley and Williams, Feb. 3, 1844; ibid., 786-789.

' Yoakum, II, 421. See also Houston to Van Zandt and Henderson, May
10, 1844, and Jones to same, March 26 and May 2, 1844; Tex, Dip. Corr,, II,
278, 265, 276.

698 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

attained/' ^ Houston and his cabinet were ready to take
anything they could get.

The steps preparatory to a treaty of annexation had not
been so secretly taken but that some account of the action
of Congress reached the newspapers, and the British chaig6
d'affaires wrote asking for explanations on the subject of
Henderson's mission. Such explanations, he thought, were
due to the governments of Great Britain and France,

''for it i^ not to be supposed that they could continue to press the
government of Mexico to settle upon one basis while there was any
reason to surmise that negotiations were either in actual existence or
in contemplation, proposing a combination of a totally different nat-
ure.'

»» t

Elliot also wrote privately to Jones, the Secretary of State,
expressing a hope that the answer of the Texan government
would be satisfactory and his conviction "that the Presi-
dent has not the least intention, so far as he or his Cabinet
is concerned, of sacrificing the independence of the country
and the well-founded hope of an honorable and early ad-
justment, to the exigenci^ of party spirit, and intrigue and
electioneering trick in any quarter whatever." '

In reply, Elliot was informed that, although Texas had the
greatest confidence in the good-will of the British govern-
ment, she felt that there was no prospect of any result from
mediation. The negotiations for an armistice had failed.
The Texan prisoners had not been released. The British
minister at Mexico had quarrelled with the Mexican govern-
ment, and had ceased to hold any intercourse with them.*
There was no assurance from either England or France that
Santa Anna would not immediately invade the Texan fron-
tiers. Under these circumstances^ as the proposition for
annexation had been made by the United States govern-
ment, and as pledges had been given by it for protection

1 Jones to Van Zandt, March 26, 1844; ibid., II, 266.
s EUiot to Jones, March 22, 1844; Niles's Reg., LXVUI, 35.
* Elliot to Jones, March 22, 1844; Jones, 330.

^ The quarrel arose over a display, at a ball given by Santa Anna, of a Brit-
ish flag, among trophies captured from the Tezans in New Mexioo.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 599

against her enemy^ the republic had accepted the American
proposals for the sake of peace and future security.^

With these explanations Elliot had perforce to be content.
He had written to the British Foreign Office as late as Feb-
ruary 17 that any inunediate danger of annexation was at
an end; and he seems at that time to have felt confident
that independence for Texas was assured; but he was now
reduced to consoling himself with the prospect that the
American Senate would reject any treaty of annexation.*

Meanwhile Van Zandt was busy discussing with Upshur
the terms of a treaty, and before Henderson had even left
Texas all the main points had been agreed upon. Written
drafts had been exchanged; and Van Zandt thought that if
final instructions had then arrived "the treaty could have
been concluded in half a day.'' '

During the period of these negotiations Almonte, on the
other hand; had been hopeful and even confident that noth-
ing would come of the agitation for annexation. In Decem-
ber, 1843, he had a long conversation with John Quincy
Adams, who, he reported, assured him that the views of
the South would not be realized, even though there was a
majority in the House of Representatives in favor of the
measure, because the Senate would be against it. Almonte
felt confident, from this and other information, that, though
there would be much talk, nothing would be done by Con-
gress. . Tyler, he said, had no popularity, and sensible peo-
ple in the United States were all in favor of Mexico.* Some
weeks later Almonte felt less confident. He still thought
that Congress would do nothing about the annexation of

^ Yoakum, II, 427. See also calendar of printed correspondence; Tex, Dip,
Con., II, 46.

' E. D. Adams, 155. Elliot was absent from Texas the greater part of the
year 1S44. He wrote from New Orleans on February 10, 1S44, that he had
had a good opportunity of judging the real state of feeling in the United States
respecting annexation, and was persuaded it was entirely out of the question.
— (Jones, 308.) His principal informant was Henry Clay. In his private
letter to Jones of March 22, quoted above, he said that he was sure there was
not the most remote chance of carrying the scheme of annexation through the
United States Senate.— (/&id., 320.)

» Van Zandt to Jones, March 5, 1844; Tex. Dip. Con., II, 261.

« Almonte to Minister of Relations, Dec. 11, 1843; Sec. de Rd. Exi. MS8.

600 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Texas, but in a conversation with Upshur on various matters
the latter had alluded to the desire of his government to
acquire the territory of Texas from Mexico by means of
purchase. Upon this point Almonte wrote home asking for
further instructions, and he expressed the opmion that if
the campaign against Texas could not soon be begun it
might perhaps be desirable to gain time by allowing the
American government to entertain some hope that Mexico
might be willing to negotiate on the subject.^

But before any instructions could be received Almonte
had another interview with Upshur, who unreservedly ex-
plained his fears that Great Britain might exercise an in-
fluence over Texas deeply prejudicial to the interests and
tranquillity of the United States. As the sole means of
avoiding this evil, he proposed that Mexico should cede
Texas to the United States in consideration of adequate
compensation. After enlarging further upon the dangers
of British interference in Texas, Upshur—

*' concluded by saying that for all these reasons the government of
the United States desired to enter upon negotiations with the govern-
ment of Mexico for the acquisition of Texas; but if it was unsuccess-
ful in such negotiations, he would infinitely prefer to see Texas again
in the possession of the Mexicans than under the influence of the
British government, as the Mexicans were entirely unlike the Ang^o-
Americans, their origin, their language, their religion, their customs,
etc., being totally different and they could not therefore inspire the
same fear as the English, who had so many points of resemblance
with the inhabitants of that country, who spoke the same language,
and who could so easily mingle with them.

" He then added that he was positive that at least three-fourths of
the inhabitants of Texas desired to be annexed to the United States;
but that it would not be easy to foresee what course of conduct the
Texan Congress might follow in this affair. For his part he wished to
remove all cause of annoyance or conflict with Mexico, and he hoped
our government would not consider the annexation of Texas to the
United States as equivalent to a declaration of war on their part
without first endeavoring to arrive at a full explanation.

"He next undertook to demonstrate the advantages which in his
opinion would result to Mexico from the sale of Texas. He said that

^ Same to same, Jan. 25, 1844; ibid.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 601

by this means the republic would be spar^ sacrifiees of men and
money; that instead of laying out its treasure to recover a country
which would always be a source of expense, it would be better to re-
ceive in exchange a large sum which might be used for paying off a
part of the foreign debt, or for making internal improvements in the
country; that in that event the honor of Mexican arms would not
run the risk of being exposed to the hazard of war; and that the honor
of the nation would not suffer by treating, not with Texas, but with
the government of the United States, who would undertake to make
the Texans agree to abide by whatever the two governments might
decide on."

Almonte thereupon asked whether the Secretary of State
did not think that England would object, even if Mexico
should be willing to enter upon the proposed negotiation.
Upshur replied that whatever English opinion might be,
the government of the United States was resolved, in case
Mexico should agree to its proposition, to go to war with
Great Britain if necessary.

This ended the conversation, Ahnonte promising to sub-
mit the matter to his government, but he remarked to Up-
shur that he hoped that before a negotiation was really in
train the Mexican troops would have reached at least
the centre of Texas, and thus put an end to the question.
To his own government he expressed the opinion that Up-
shur's proposition should not be lightly dismissed, for two
reasons. The first, that the opening of a negotiation would
show definitely that the United States did recognize Mexi-
can rights over Texas, notwithstanding their declaration to
the contrary; and the second, because the United States
would make no attempt to take the territory by force so
long as it hoped to gain it by negotiation. He thought
the reasons why the American government wished to nego-
tiate were that it expected Congress would agree to admit
Texas, and that it was feared a war with Mexico might
follow which would bring about a separation between the
Northern and Southern states. He thought that they also
considered it "cheaper to negotiate than to fight for the
acquisition of Texas.'' ^

1 Same to same, Feb. 17, 1844; ibid.

602 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Such was the condition of the negotiation for annexation
when Henderson left Texas. He reached Washington on
March 29, 1844. When he arrived at the seat of govern-
ment Upshur was no longer alive.

On February 28 a number of people had been invited by
the Secretary of the Navy to visit the new United States
man-of-war Princeton, a vessel of only about six hundred
tons, but which was remarkable as being the first naval
vessel in any country that used a screw-propeller. She was
designed and buUt by Ericsson, under the supervision of
Captain Robert F. Stockton, U. S. N., and was justly re-
garided with great curiosity as a promising experiment.
Reporting upon her when she was first ready for sea. Captain
Stockton described her advantages as follows:

"The advantages of the Princeton over both sailing-ships and
steamers propelled in the usual way are great and obvious. . . .
Making no noise, smoke, or agitation of the water, (and, if she chooses,
showing no sail,) she can surprise an enemy. She can at pleasure
take her own position and her own distance from the enemy. Her
engines and water wheel being below the surface of the water, safe
from an enemy's shot, she is in no danger of being dbabled, even if
her masts should be destroyed. . . . The Princeton is armed with
two long 225-pound wrought-iron guns and 12 42-pound carronades,
all of which may be used at once on either side of the ship. She can
consequently throw a greater weight of metal at one broadside than
most frigates. The big guns of the Princeton can be fired with an
effect terrific and almost incredible, and with a certainty heretofore
unknown."

The guns were indeed quite as much of a novelty as any
part of the ship. They were known by the significant names
of the Oregon and the Peacemaker, and they had been fired
a number of times with what were then considered the
enormous charges of from twenty-five to fifty poimds of
powder.^

After lunch on board, and while the ship was returning
to an anchorage near Washington, one of the pivot guns
which had already been fired several times exploded, kill-

* Life of Commodore Stockton, 82. See also Church's Life of John Eric89onf
I, 117-139.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 603

ing five persons and wounding more or less severely many
others. Among those killed was the Secretary of State.

President Tyler's thoughts were now almost inevitably
turned to John C. Calhoun as Upshur's successor, and as
the man of aU others to cany through the negotiation with
Texas. For some years Calhoun had been fully committed
to the policy of annexation. When the question of the
recognition of Texas first came up in the Senate in 1836, he
had declared that he was not only ready to recognize her
independence, but to vote for her admission to the Union.
" There were powerful reasons why Texas should be a part
of this Union. The Southern States owning a slave popula-
tion, were deeply interested in preventing that country from
having the power to annoy them, and the navigating and
manufacturing interests of the North and East were equally
interested in making it a part of this Union." ^ Annexation
he thought was a question of life and death, and he believed
that opposition to it at the North was due to the fact that
the people there had not sufficiently weighed the conse-
quences of British policy, or the obligation of aU sections to
defend the South from the effects of British greed.

"There is not a vacant spot left on the Globe," he wrote to a friend
concerning Texas, " not excepting Cuba, to be seized by her, so well
calculated to further the boundless schemes of her ambition and
cupidity. If we should permit her to seize on it we shall deserve the
execration of posterity." *

On the other hand, there were reasons why Calhoun
should not be appointed, which were bound to weigh seri-
ously with the President. The most obvious was the fact
that he had long been talked of as a presidential possibility,
and had quite openly announced his candidacy. It was to
be expected that he would inevitably use his opportunities
in the State Department as a means of advancing his political
fortimes, and that he rather than Tyler (who had ambitions
of succeeding himself in the presidency) would profit by

1 Debates in Congress, XII, 1531.

t Calhoun to Wharton, May 28, 1844; Amer. Mist. Assn. Rep. 1899, II, 594.

604 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

success in foreign negotiations. Another reason, not to be
avowed, but perhaps none the less potent on that account,
was the uneasy feeling which Tyler must have entertained
at the thought of having a stronger intellect and a more
powerful will closely associated with him in the cabinet.
But the immediate danger which the President apprehended
from Calhoun's presence in the cabinet was the effect to
be produced upon the Senate. He feared, and was justified
in fearing, that senators who otherwise might have voted
for annexation, would oppose it if it were known as Cal-
houn's measure.^

But Tyler's hand was in some sense forced. Wise of
Virginia, who was one of Tyler's closest friends, gave Sen-
ator McDuffie of South Carolina to understand that he had
the President's authority for saying that Calhoun would be
appointed if he would accept the place. Tyler feared that
if he disavowed Wise it would make matters worse, would
oflfend McDuffie, and would thus jeopardize the success of
the treaty in the Senate; and after some hours of hesitation
he decided to ratify Wise's unauthorized statement, and to
invite Calhoun to take up the work of the State Department.*

McDuffie wrote to Calhoun that he ought not to hesitate
in accepting, and that this was the decided opinion of all
his friends.

" I mention to you in confidence that the Texas question is in such
a state that in ten days after your arrival the Treaty of annexation
would be signed, and from poor Upshur's account 40 senators would
vote for it. The President says he has hopes of the acquiescence
of Mexico. It is a great occasion involving the peace of the country
and the salvation of the South, and your friends here have ventured
to say for you, that no party or personal considerations would pre-
vent you from meeting the crisis." '

* Tyler was in hopes that a treaty could be signed before Calhoun could get
to Washington. '' The President stated that he was very desirous to have the
treaty concluded at once and by Mr. Nelson the Attorney-General, who is
Secretary of State ad interim^ that he preferred he should do it instead of the
gentleman to whom he intended to offer the permanent appointment/' — (Van
Zandt to Jones, March 5, 1844; Tex. Dip. Can., II, 262.)

* LeUers and Times of the Tylers, II, 294.

* McDuffie to Calhoun, March 5, 1844; Amer, Hist. Assn. Rep. 1899, II, 934.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 605

The President himself wrote to Calhoun that after a con-
versation with McDuflGie and Holmes of South Carolina,
and "in full view of the important negociation now pending
between us and foreign Governments," he had sent his name
to the Senate. The annexation of Texas and the settlement
of the Oregon question were the great ends to be accom-
plished. The first was in the act of completion, and would
admit of no delay. The last had but barely been opened.*

Calhoun had Lt in his resignation from the SeLte at
the close of the short session of Congress in March, 1843,
and had been devoting himself since that time with zeal and
energy to securing a nomin^ion for the presidency in 1844.
Living upon his farm in South Carolina, he carried on an
extensive correspondence with his friends, but in spite of
that sort of encouragement which is never wanting to con-
spicuous candidates, he had become convinced very early
in 1844 that his chances for that year at least were hopeless,
and he had caused his withdrawal from the contest to be
announced. The whole machinery of the Democratic party
had in fact been carefully set in motion to effect the renomi-
nation of Van Buren, and it was the confident expectation
of both parties that Van Buren would succeed.

At the time of his appointment as Secretary of State Cal-
houn was fifty-seven years old, and not in very vigorous
health. He was a man in whom the powers of intellect had
always prevailed at the expense of good judgment. His
contemporaries described him as a thinking machine, and
the cold and logical precision of his arguments seem to have
produced an impression on the men of his day which it is
not easy now to realize. Starting from premises which he
accepted as accurate, he often reached conclusions which
seemed to other minds absurd, and which might have seemed
absurd to him also if he had lived a life that brought him
into more active contact with affairs. Another man would
have concluded that there was something wrong with either
his premises or his argument; but Calhoun remained serene
in the face of his absurdities. As one result of his mental

» Tyler to Calhoun, March 6, 1844; ibid., 938.

606 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

isolation; he had no party back of him^ and but little influ-
ence with the people outside his own state, although at the
same tune his striking abihties and his high character
caused him to be regarded with respect throughout the
country.

Calhoun imdertook the duty of negotiating for the ac-
quisition of Texas, and for the settlement of the outstanding
controversy with Great Britain with apparent reluctance.
He would do so. he said, only from a sense of duty, and he
asked whether it might not be possible for him to be ap-
pointed as a special plenipotentiary to take charge of the
two pending negotiations, and to let a Secretary of State
be appointed to manage the ojbher affairs of the department;
but upon this suggestion he did not insist.^

Arriving in Washington on March 31, 1844, he lost no
time in taking up the business of the treaty with the repre-
sentatives of Texas, Mexico, and Great Britain. After some
conversations with Van Zandt and Henderson, Almonte was
sent for to come to the State Department, and he was there
informed that a treaty of annexation was in contemplation,
but that the American government was anxious to avoid any
ill-feeling or controversy with Mexico. Calhoun said he
would be pleased if Almonte could indicate some measure
by which annexation could be accomplished without a
breach with Mexico; to which Almonte replied that war
would be inevitable if annexation were carried into effect
without the consent of Mexico, Calhoun suggested the in-
sertion of a clause in the proposed treaty, imder which a
certain sum of money should be provided as compensation.
He said he had been speaking upon this subject with
the Texan agents, and asked Almonte's opinion on that
point. Almonte professed himself not authorized to give
any opinion, and the only thing he could say was that he
would have to ask for his passports as soon as he knew that
any such treaty had been approved by the Senate. All that
the American government, in his opinion, could do , was to
propose to Mexico the purchase of Texas, Whether it

> Ibid., 575.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 607

would be agreed to or not, he did not know. Such a pro-
posal, he believed, would not offend Mexico, especially if
France and England would agree with the United States and
Mexico upon a guarantee that the American government
would not in any case go beyond limits which might be
fixed. Calhoun observed that Pakenham had already pro-
posed to the American government to unite with the British
government in urging upon Mexico the recognition of the
independence of Texas, and that they should guarantee its
independence; but that the American government had not
agreed to co-operate in this project.

In reporting this conversation, Almonte observed that he
did not believe Pakenham would approve of a sale of Texas;
and he therefore thought it very probable that the annexa-
tion treaty would go to the Senate in the form which the
Secretary of State had indicated. He hoped, however, that
it might be possible to get a proposition in writing for the
purchase of Texas, and he would use it to postpone action
by the Senate until after the next presidential election. In
the meantime, Mexico might recover Texas by force of arms.^

So far as the Texan representatives were concerned, the
negotiation was taken up exactly where it was at the time
of Upshur's death, with one extremely important exception.
Nelson, the Attorney-General, had been appointed to take
charge of the State Department ad irdenm, and in that
capacity had replied to Murphy's despatch of February 15,
1844. Under date of March 11, 1844, Nelson expressed the
President's satisfaction with Murphy's general attitude,
but sharply disapproved the pledges given for the use of
the army and navy of the United States.

"The employment of the army or navy against a foreign power,
with which the United States are at peace, is not within the competency
of the President; and whilst he is not indisposed, as a measure of
prudent precaution, and as preliminary to the proposed negotiation,
to concentrate in the Gulf of Mexico, and on the southern borders
of the United States, a naval and military force to be directed to the
defence of the inhabitants and territory of Texas at a proper time, he

1 Almonte to Minister of Relations, April 9, 1844; Sec. de Rd. Ext. MSS.

608 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

cannot permit the authorities of that Government or yourself to labor
under the misapprehension that he has power to employ them at the
period indicated by your stipulations." *

How far Nelson's statement of the President's constitu-
tional powers was made known to the Texan plenipotenti-
aries does not clearly appear. They had been required by
their instructions to obtain "as full a guarantee as possible"
of protection against Mexico, but they probably persuaded
themselves that it was not necessary to be too exacting in
this regard. Calhoim was evidently ready to go far in
order to satisfy them, and he accordingly wrote a formal
reply to the note of January 17, 1844, in which Van Zandt
had inquired whether the President of the United States
would use the miUtary and naval forces to protect Texas
"against foreign aggriion."

Calhoun's written reply stated that a strong naval force
had been ordered to concentrate in the Gulf of Mexico, " to
meet any emergency," and that similar orders had been
issued to the military forces to march to the southwestern
frontier for the same purpose.

"Should the exigency arise," he added, " to which you refer in your
note to Mr. Upshur, I am further directed by the President to say,
that, during the pendency of the treaty of annexation, he wovld deem
it his duty to use all the means pUiced within his power by the canstiiiUion
to protect Texas from all foreign invasion." *

By way of a supplement to this note, Calhoun stated
verbally that in case of any serious demonstration by water
Commodore Conner, commanding the naval force, would
inform the Mexican commander that any attack on Texas
would be considered a hostile act, which the Executive
would feel bound to use every means to repel; that General
Gaines had been ordered to Fort Jesup (near the Sabine),
with similar orders as to any demonstration by land; that
if there appeared to be any serious intention upon the part

» Nelson to Murphy, March 11, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 95.
' Calhoun to Van Zandt and Henderson, April 11, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271,
28 Cong., 1 sess., 96. The italics are not in the original.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 609

of Mexico to invade Texas the President would send a mes-
sage to Congress, requesting them to adopt such measiu'es
as might be necessary for the defence of Texas; and that

if the emergency should require it" the President would

say in his message that he would in the meantime consider
it his duty to defend Texas against aggression, and will
Srccordingly do so." ^

Henderson and Van Zandt could not have been misled
by these assurances. They undoubtedly knew quite as well
as either Calhoun or Tyler what were the limits of the
President's powers, but they were satisfied to take what
they could get. "Much more," they wrote in the despatch
just quoted, "passed between Mr. Calhoun and ourselves
on this subject, calculated to assure us that everything
would be done by the United States to protect Texas from
the aggressions of Mexico, but which we cannot now men-
tion"; and they signed the proposed treaty on the twelfth
of April.

This instrument recited that the people of Texas at the
time of adopting their Constitution had, by an almost unan-
imous vote, expressed their desire to be incorporated into
the Union of the United States; that they were "still de-
sirous of the same with equal unanimity"; and that the
United States, "actuated solely by the desire to add to
their own security and prosperity and to meet the wishes of
the government and people of Texas," had determined to
accomplish an object so important to the future and per-
manent welfare of both parties. The treaty then provided
for the cession of the whole of Texas to the United States.
Public lands were to be subject to the laws regulating the
public lands in other territories of the United States. The
United States assumed and agreed to pay the public debts
and liabilities of Texas, however created. The amount of
such debts and the legality and validity thereof were to be
determined by a commission appointed by the President of
the United States. The citizens of Texas were to be main-
tained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty

^ Van Zandt and Henderson to Jones, April 12, 1844; Tex. Dip. Can., II, 269.

610 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICX)

and property, and admitted; as soon as might be consistent
with the principles of the federal Constitution, to the en-
joyment of all the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States. Until fmther provision was made the
laws of Texas would remain in force, and all executive and
judicial oflBcers, except the President, Vice-President, and
heads of departments, were to retain their oflBces,^

The treaty was not sent to the Senate for ten dayB after
it was signed, and during that period Calhoun endeavored
to propitiate the Mexican government. Almonte had re-
ported, a month before, that a treaty was in preparation,
and that the Secretary of State hoped to induce Mexico to
defer hostilities by his suggestions of indemnity; and he ex-
pressed himself as confident that if annexation should ever
be carried through, the New England states, and perhaps
New York and Pennsylvania, would secede, or, if not, woiUd
refuse to join in the war, for he had been so assured by
members of Congress, senators, and other influential persons.
This, he added, was without counting upon the aboUtion-
ists, who were and would be decided supporters of the
Mexican cause.^ Nevertheless, he wrote next day that he
was convinced war was inevitable. There was not a
moment to lose. The army of the North ought to begin
operations in Texas without delay, for April, May, and
June were the best season.' He was disappointed to find
that Pakenham was not disposed to interfere with the
American plans with respect to Texas, and he now felt cer-
tain that the British government would not interpose de-
cisively to prevent annexation; nor would it expose itself
to a war which might injure its enormous trade with the
United States. This he thought surprising, but he regarded
it as a suflScient explanation of British inaction.* Almonte
was thus prepared for the official announcement that a
treaty had actually been concluded — ^an announcement
which was not delayed.

* The text is in H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 5-8.

* Almonte to Minister of Relations, March 15, 1844; Sec. de Bd. Ext, M3S,
'Same to same, March 16, 1844; ibid.

* Same to same, March 20, 1844; ibid.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 611

At a conference with Calhoun on April 17 the latter told
Almonte that a treaty with Texas had been signed five days
before; but he did not think it should be regarded aa a cause
of offence to Mexico; the American government had de-
clared that it did not recognize any right in Mexico over
Texan territory, but still, to avoid difficulties, he thought
some compensation should be given if Mexico would re-
noimce its pretensions, and he desired to know Almonte^s
opinion, and whether he thought the Mexican government
would receive favoratly a proposition of that kind. He did
not, he said, intend to send'the treaty to the Senate imtil
after despatching a messenger to Mexico with such a pro-
position. ^

Almonte, according to his own accoimt, replied that this
was not the way to avoid a war; that no consideration for
the dignity of Mexico had been observed; and that such a
communication could not be favorably received if it was
proposed to annex Texas without first obtaining the consent
of Mexico.

'' Calhoun/' Almonte continued, "tried to excuse his government
by reason of its fears of England and other reasons even less plausible;
and he again intimated that he was going to send a messenger to Mexico
with letters for our government, in which would be set out the causes
which had induced the United States to act as they had done, and a
proposition would be made for the acquisition of Texas. At the same
time he said he thought that since Texas, through the intervention
of England, had offered five million dollars for the recognition of its
independence, the United States might do as much if the boundaries
it proposed were accepted. I replied that he might do what he liked
in this matter, but that I did not wish to have anything to do with
this negotiation as I had no authority in regard to it, nor did I wish
to receive any proposition of any kind whatever, as my government
had been so ignominiously treated." ^

The interview with Almonte ended with this very in-
amicable remark, and Calhoun sent oflF a special messenger,
as he had said he would do, with instructions to Benjamin
E. Green, then American charg6 d'affaires in Mexico,

^ Same to same, April 18, 1S44; ibid.

612 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Green was merely directed to make known the fact
of the signature of the treaty to the Mexican govern-
ment, and to give the strongest assurance that the United
States, in adopting this measure, was actuated by no feel-
ings of disrespect or indiflference to the honor or dignity of
Mexico. The step, it was said, had been forced on the
government of the United States in self-defence in conse-
quence of the policy adopted by Great Britain in reference
to the aboHtion of slavery in Texas. Green was also to
assure the Mexican government of the President's desire
to settle aU questions between the two countries which
might grow out of this treaty, including the question of
boundary, on the most liberal and satisfactory terms, and
for this purpose the boundary of Texas had not been speci-
fied in the treaty, so that what the line should be still re-
mained an open question, "to be fairly and fully discussed
and settled according to the rights of each and the mutual
interests and security of the two countries." ^

Calhoun having thus tried to forestall criticism in the
Senate as to want of consideration for Mexico, also obtained
a letter from the Texan representatives, giving assurances
that annexation would " receive the hearty and full concur-
rence of the people of Texas," and presenting statistics as to
the extent of the public lands and the amount of the debts
and liabilities of the repubUc.^

Finally, he composed a document intended to set forth
fully the reasons which, in his judgment, compelled the
United States to annex Texas. This significant and char-
acteristic paper was in form a note to Pakenham, in reply
to one addressed by Pakenham to Upshur, on February 26,
two days before the latter's death, in which was enclosed a
copy of a despatch from Lord Aberdeen.

The British government, by the end of the year 1843, had
begun to perceive that the efforts, official and imofficial,
which had been made in England to procure the abolition
of slavery in Texas, and Lord Aberdeen's rather airy refer-

1 Calhoun to Green, April 19, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 seas., 54.
* Van Zandt and Henderson to Calhoun, April 15, 1844; ibid,, 13.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 613

ences to the subject, were proving unfortunate. Slavery in
Texas had not been abolished, and a spirit of opposition had
been roused in the United States which seemed likely not
only to perpetuate slavery in Texas, but to produce other
highly imdesirable results. It was, unquestionably, the wish
of the British government to make Texas a free, strong, and
above all an independent nation; but they discovered that
what they were really doing was to drive her into the arms
of the United States, the precise thing they were trying to
avoid. Also they were still imperfectly informed as to the
state of public opinion either in the United States or Texas,
The members of Peel's cabinet evidently believed that the
Texan people wished to be independent, and they did not
believe that the American feeling in favor of annexation was
by any means as strong and general as it was later shown to
be. They also underestimated, or failed to understand, the »
general American dread of anything that might tend to
disunion. It was in this frame of mind that Lord Aberdeen
had thought to mend matters by addressing instructions to
Pakenham, which he was to read to Upshm-, and furnish a
copy if desired.

This paper began with the statement that her Majesty^s
government thought it expedient to take measures for stop-
ping at once the misrepresentations which had been circu-
lated, the errors into which the government of the United
States seemed to have fallen on the subject of the policy of
Great Britain with respect to Texas, and the agitation which
appeared to have prevailed of late in the United States rela-
tive to British designs. Great Britain had recognized the
independence of Texas, and desired to see that independence
generally recognized, especially by Mexico. But this de-
sire did not arise from any special motive of self-interest.
The British government was convinced that the recognition
of Texas by Mexico must conduce to the benefit of both
countries, thus advancing the commercial dealings of Great
Britain with both. Great Britain, moreover, did not desire -
to establish in Texas any dominant influence, her objects
being purely commercial. It was well known to the whole

614 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

world that Britain desired; and was constantly exerting her-
self to procure, the general abolition of slavery throughout
the world.

" With regard to Texas, we avow that we wish to see slavery abol-
ished there as elsewhere; and we should rejoice if the recogmtion of
that country by the Mexican Government should be accompanied
by an engagement on the part of Texas to abolish slavery eventually,
and under proper conditions, throughout the republic. But although
we earnestly desire and feel it to be our duty to promote such a con-
summation, we shall not interfere unduly, or with an improper assump-
tion of authority, with either party, in order to ensure the adoption
of such a course. We shall counsel, but we shall not seek to compd.
• . . The British Government, as the United States well know, have
never sought in any way to stir up disaffection or excitement of any
kind in the slaveholding states of the American Union. Much as
we should wish to see those states placed on the firm and solid footing
which we conscientiously believe is to be attained by general freedom
alone, we have never, in our treatment of them, made any difference
between the slaveholding and the free States of the Union. All are,
in our eyes, entitled, as component members of the Union, to equal
political respect, favor, and forbearance on our part. To that wise
and just policy we shall continue to adhere." ^

Calhoun, in writing a reply to Pakenham, expressed his
pleasure at Lord Aberdeen's disavowal of any intention on
the part of the British government to resort to measures
which might tend to disturb the internal tranquillity of the
slave-holding states, and thereby affect the prosperity of
the American Union; but he expressed deep concern at
Lord Aberdeen's statement that Great Britain desired, and
was constantly exerting herself, to procure the general aboli-
tion of slavery throughout the world. The President, said
Calhoun, had examined with much care and solicitude
what would be the effect upon the prosperity and safety of
the United States should Great Britain succeed in the en-
deavor to abolish slavery in Texas, and he had come to the
conclusion that the result would endanger both the safety
and the prosperity of the American Union. Under this con-
viction, it was felt to be the imperious duty of the federal

1 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Dec. 26, 1S43; Urid,, 49.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 616

government to adopt, in self-defence, the most effectual
measures to prevent such a disaster, and for this reason a
treaty had been concluded between the United States and
Texas for the annexation of the latter. The people of
Texas had long desired annexation, which the United States
had declined to agree to; but the time had now arrived
when they could no longer refuse consistently with their
own seciuity and peace and with the sacred obligations
imposed by their constitutional compact for mutual defence
and protection.

The government of the United States, Calhoun continued,
was in no way responsible for the circumstances which had
imposed this obligation on them. They had had no agency
in bringing about the state of things which had terminated
in the separation of Texas from Mexico. The true cause of
this event was the diversity in character, habits, religion,
and political influence of the two countries. The American
government was equally without responsibility for that state
of things which had dbiven them, in self-defence, to adopt
the policy of annexation. The United States had remained
passive. Great Britain had adopted as a policy the imi-
versal abolition of slavery. That policy within her own
possessions might be humane and wise. Whether it was
so in the United States was not a question to be decided by
the federal government. The rights and duties of the
federal government were limited to protecting, imder the
guarantees of the Constitution, each member of the Union
in whatever policy it might adopt in reference to the portion
of the coimtry within its own limits. A large number of the
states had decided that it was neither wise nor humane to
change the relation which had existed between the two races
ever since the first settlement of the country, while others,
where the African race was less numerous, had adopted the
opposite policy. All were entitled to protection.

Calhoun concluded by a very long statement of his own
views as to the inhumanity and unwisdom of abolition,
quoting statistics of the number of negroes who were deaf
and dumb, blind, idiots, insane, paupers, and in prison in

616 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the free and slave states, respectively, in order to show
what he asserted to be the wretched condition of the
African race under freedom.^

Calhoun's views as to the obligations of the federal gov-
ernment to protect the several states against attempts at
abolition were only a restatement of views which he had
embodied in a series of resolutions presented by him to the
Senate on December 27, 1836, and which he had defended in
a series of speeches beginning December 28 and running to
January 12, 1837. The whole letter indeed, as Benton said,
was not written for Lord Aberdeen, although addressed to
him through Pakenham; and it was sent to those for whom
it was really intended, to wit, the American Senate, long
before Lord Aberdeen ever saw it.

It was generally regarded as a most extraordinary indis-
cretion.

"I have just been informed," wrote the Texan secretary of legation,
''that Mr. Calhoun has, in his letter to the Senate, placed the ques-
tion almost solely on the groimd of British interference with the in-
stitution of slavery, and presents this as the grand argument for the
measure. Such a position may answer with the South, but it will
only create and strengthen opposition North and West. Indeed I
heard this morning that the views of Mr. Calhoun had brought the
Ohio Senators into the opposition." '

Having thus formulated his statements to his own satis-
faction, Calhomi was at length ready to have the treaty,
with the accompanying documents — the instructions to
Green in Mexico, and the correspondence with the Texan
and British legations in Washington — transmitted to the
Senate. It was accordingly sent in by the President on
April 22, 1844, with a message in which he tried his best to
give the transaction a national rather than a sectional im-
portance, and thus mitigate the force of Calhoim^s blow.

The President, in defending the treaty, congratulated the
country on "reclaiming a territory which formerly consti-
tuted a portion, as it is confidently believed, of its dominion,

1 Calhoun to Pakenham, April 18, 1844; ibid., 50-53.
* Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844; Jones, 343.

TYLER'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION 617

by the treaty of cession of 1803, by France tp the United
States." The character of the inhabitants of the country
proposed to be annexed; its fertile soil and its genial and
healthy climatC; would all add to the wealth of the Union;
the coastwise trade of the country would "swell to a
magnitude which cannot be easily computed," and the ad-
vantages to the manufacturing and mining interests of the
country would be of the most important character. These
were some of the many advantages which would accrue
to the Eastern and Middle states, while at the same
time the Southern and Southwestern states would find in
the fact of annexation "protection and security to their
peace and tranquillity, as well against all domestic as
foreign efforts to disturb them ; thus consecrating anew the
Union of the Statesy and holding out the promise of its per-
petual duration."

CHAPTER XXIV

THE ELECTION OP POLK

If the members of Tyler's cabinet wished for ratification,
they showed very little wisdom in sending to the Senate a
treaty for the annexation of Texas just at the beginning of
a presidential campaign. If, however, popular discussion
was what they wanted, they could not have chosen better.
Ratification was certain to be made a party question, with
the Whigs solidly against the administration, and every man
who spoke in the Senate was certain to do so with his
thoughts on the nominating conventions and the November
elections. That Calhoim wished the treaty ratified for its
own sake cannot be doubted; but Tyler may have been
le^s dngl^minded. He did not yet deiair of I r<«lecti«r.

The treaty came before the Senate deeply discredited.
It was not only the work of two unpopular men — a Presi-
dent without a party and a Secretary of State who had
constituted himseK "the sleepless guardian of Slavery^'—
but the announcement that a treaty was about to be con-
cluded had been badly received by the public. Long be-
fore Henderson, the special agent of Texas, arrived in Wash-
ington the American newspapers had published more or
less accurate accounts of the supposed secret action of the
Texan Congress in appropriating money for a special envoy
to the United States, and of Henderson's appointment to
that post.

The Texan charge d'affaires wrote home of the results of
these indiscretions with a certain incoherence and exaspera-
tion which were easily explicable.

"This information," he reported, "has roused the whole oppoa-
tion and who now daily pour forth the vials of its wrath upon the
contemplated treaty. Why all these matters should be oommuni-

THE ELECTION OF POLK 619

•

cated to Genl Murphy and otherwise made public in Texas and to be
heralded throughout this country by the newspapers and yet I re-
ceive no information from your Department concerning it, is most
remarkable. ...

" The delay which has attended the action on this matter has had
an injurious tendency. Our friends here, in New York and ebe
where urge the importance of an early action if an action is contem-
plated at all, . » .

"Four of the New York papers are out in favor of annexation,
viz. The 'Herald' 'The Republic' The 'Courier and Enquirer' and
the Journal of Commerce." ^

On the day before Van Zandt wrote, the rumors of an-
nexation had produced in Wall Street the result which
unexpected reports of possible foreign complications always
have produced.

"Stocks fell; United States six-per-cents fell four per cent; men
looked alarmed, and shook their heads in fearful doubt. A war with
Mexico would be the immediate consequence of this measure, and
privateers would be fitted out in the Mexican ports of the Gulf of
Mexico, to prey upon the immense commerce of the United States,
having themselves little or nothing to risk in return." *

The terrified gentlemen who were selling stocks so freely
from a fear of Mexican privateers were probably not very
familiar with the way in which the Texan navy, with its few
ill-foimd schooners, had controlled the Gulf. There could
be no question of the adequacy of the American navy for
that ta^.

The excitement in Wall Street was short-lived, but the
newspapers continued the discussion by publishing at por-
tentous length the views of men whose opinions were likely
to cany weight in the coimtry. The first of these was
Andrew Jackson.

Early in the year 1843 Gilmer, of Virginia, then a member
of the House of Repr^entatives, had published a letter
over his own signature inVhich he had expressed himself
very strongly in favor of annexation. A few days later

» Van Zandt to Jones, March 20, 1844; Tex. Dip. Coir., II, 263.
' Tuckerman, Diary of Philip Hone, II, 209.

620 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Aaxon V. Brown, of Tennessee, also a member of the House,
sent a copy of Gilmer's letter to General Jackson, with a
request for an expression of his opinion on the subject.
Brown was himseK in favor of annexation, but feared that
Tyler was too weak politically to carry such a measure
through, and he thought that a strong expression from
Jackson might be useful in arousing or sustaining the ad-
ministration in making such a movement.

What was Brown's motive? Benton, in his Thirty Yecars*
VieWj^ declared that Brown was merely a tool in the hands
of Gilmer, whose purpose and hope it was to get Jackson to
express himseU as favorable to annexation, and at the same
time to induce Van Buren to express himseK against it, and
then to produce Jackson's letter at the proper moment, so
as to defeat Van Buren's nomination for the presidency in
1844. But this intrigue was a little too complete and elab-
orate to have been fully thought out more than a year in
advance, and Brown hiinseK in the House of Representatives
denied strongly that he had acted in a "vicarious" character
or that his action had the slightest reference to the presi-
dential election, then nearly two years off.

Jackson's letter in reply to Brown was dated February 13,
1843, and was evidently written without consultation with
any one. He began by making an extremely foolish state-
ment, inspired by his intense hatred for John Quincy Adams.

"Soon after my election, in 1829," he said, "it was made known to
me by Mr. Erwin, formerly our minister at the Court of Madrid, that
whibt at that Court he had laid the foimdation of a treaty with Spain
for the cession of the Floridas and the settlement of the boundary of
Louisiana, fixing the western limit of the latter at the Rio Grande,
agreeably to the imderstanding of France; that he had written home
to our government for powers to complete and sign this negotiation;
but that, instead of receiving such authority, the negotiation was
taken out of his hands and transferred to Washington, and a new
treaty was there concluded, by which the Sabine, and not the Rio
Grande, was recognized and established as the boundary of Louisiana."

Jackson went on to say that when he found these state-
ments were truC; he was filled with astonishment at the sur-

m, 681-691,

THE ELECTION OF POLK 621

render by Monroe's administration. He had thought; '^ with
the ancient RomanS; that it was right never to cede any
land or boundary of the republic, but always to add to it
by honorable treaty, thus extending the area of freedom."
It was in accordance with this feeling that he had entered
upon the unsuccessful negotiation for the retrocession of
Texas. In a military point of view he considered it most
important to the United States to be in possession of that
territory, and he drew a pictm^ of the probable course of a
war with Great Britain — two armies moving from Canada
and Texas, respectively; the negroes excited to insurrection;
servile war raging through the vhole South and West, and
ruin and havoc spreading from the Lakes to the Gulf of
Mexico. The- question, he declared, was full of interest also
as it affected the domestic relations of the United States^
and as it might bear upon those with Mexico; but he be-
lieved annexation to be essential as lessening the probabili-
ties of futm^ collision with foreign powers.^

This strange production bore clear marks of Jackson's
failing powers. It was impossible that Erving (the Erwin
of Jackson's letter) should have made the statements which
Jackson attributed to him, for there was nothing in Erving's
correspondence with the State Department which even re-
motely suggested the possibility of Spain's being willing to
concede the line of the Rio Grande. Moreover, Jackson's
memory must have played him false, for he had explicitly
written to Monroe in 1819 that he did not regard Texas as
important from a military stand-point.*

Brown, to whom the letter was addressed, did not make
any public use of it for more than a year after it was received.
In March, 1844, at about the time of Calhoun's appoint-
ment as Secretary of State, the letter was published in the

» Parton, Jackson, III, 658-660.

' The despatches from George W. Erving, as minister to Spain in 1817 and
subsequent years, were sent to Congress in response to a call from the House
of Representatives on June 14, 1844. The instructions to him were sent the
next session. On October 7, 1844, John Quincy Adams made a very violent
speech to a "Young Men's Whig Club,'' in which he discussed the whole sub-
ject, denounced Jackson and Erving, and predicted "a foreign, civil, servile
and Indian war," if annexation were carried through.

622 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Richmond Enquirer , with the date changed from 1843 to
1844, whether by accident or with the intention to deceive
was never fully ascertained. The matter, however, was not
important, because Jackson had written a second letter,
reaffirming his views, and at the same time expressing his
regard for and confidence in Van Buren, which he said no
difference of opinion on the subject of Texas could change.

Soon after the annexation treaty was sent to the Senate
letters upon the subject were published from the leading
presidential candidates of the two parties. As it happened,
they appeared in print on the same day, which was probably
a mere coincidence, although there was a somewhat general
belief that the authors, who were on friendly personal terms,
had agreed that the subject of Texas should be kept out of
the presidential campaign.* It is probable that both men
were imwilling to bring any new issues into the campaign.
Van Buren's point of view is not so clear, but Clay was
vigorously asserting that with the "old Whig policies" —
the tarifif, the bank, and internal improvements — success in
1844 was well assured. Writing to his friend and supporter,
Crittenden, on December 5, 1843, on the subject of the an-
nexation of Texas, he said that he had refused to announce
his opinion because he did not think it right unnecessarily
to present new questions to the public, as those which were
already before it were suflBiciently important and niunerous.

That politicians could at their pleasure determine what
questions were to form the issues of a campaign was a
curious delusion which Clay was by no means the only m^i
to entertain, and he very naively denounced Tyler for med-
dling in the matter.

"Nor do I think it right to allow Mr. Tyler, for his own selfish
purposes, to introduce an exciting topic, and add to the other sub-
jects of contention which exist in the country. . . . Considered as a
practical question, every man must be perfectly convinced that no
treaty, stipulating the annexation of Texas, can secure for its rati-
fication a constitutional majority in the Senate. Why, then, present

^ Schurz, Clay^ II, 243. The author seems to think that there was good
ground for the belief.

THE ELECTION OF POLK 623

the question? It is manifest that it is for no other than the wicked
purpose to produce discord and prostration in the nation."

In this view of the matter Clay thought it would be best
to "pass it over in absolute silence," if that could be done;
but he sketched for Crittenden, who was then in the Senate,
the outlines of an argument to be used against any measure
of annexation.^

In spite of Clay's desire to keep silent on the subject of
Texas, he was forced by the progress of events to declare
himself before many months had passed. During the early
months of 1844 he had made a long journey through the
South. Everywhere he went he foimd the people greatly
interested in the subject of Texas, and urgently demanding
to know his opinion. For a long time he kept silence, but
finally the signature of the treaty and the publication of
Jackson's letter forced him to speak. On April 17, 1844, at
Raleigh, North Carolina, he composed a letter for publica-
tion which he sent to Crittenden on the same day, after
consulting the governor of North Carolina and other friends.
Crittenden was told to consult with Alexander H. Stephens,
of Georgia, and others, to whom Clay left the time of publica-
tion, with power also to make "slight modifications of its
phraseology." Two days later Clay had come as far north
as Petersburg, in Virginia, and he again wrote to Critten-
den, expressing perfect confidence in the groimd he had
taken in the Raleigh letter, and explaining that he could not
consent to suppress or unnecessarily delay the publication
of it. He had left to his friends merely the question of de-
ciding when it should appear, but he himself thought it
should be within a week.*

In this Raleigh letter Clay began by expressing his aston-
ishment at the information that a treaty of annexation had
been actually concluded, and was to be submitted to the
Senate for its consideration. In the first place, he held it
"to be perfectly idle and ridiculous, if not dishonorable, to

^ Clay to Crittenden, Dec. 5, 1843; Mrs. Coleman, Life qf CriUenden, I,
207-208.
> Ibid., I, 219.

624 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

talk of resuming our title to TexaS; as if we had never
parted with it." "We could no more/' he said, "do that
than Spain could resume Florida, France resume Louisiana,
or Great Britain resume the thirteen colonies/' Clay then
went on to say that the signal success of the revolution in
Texas was greatly aided, if not wholly achieved, by citizens
of the United States who had migrated to Texas, and that
this aid had been furnished in a manner and to an extent
"which brought upon us sime national reproach in the eyes
of an impartial world." This, he thought, imposed the ob-
ligation of scrupulously avoiding the imputation of having
instigated and aided the revolution with the ultimate view
of "territorial aggrandizement." The recognition of the
independence of Texas did not afifect or impair the rights of
Mexico. Under these circumstances, if the government of
the United States were to acquire Texas it would acquire
along with it the war between Mexico and Texas. Of that
consequence there could not be a doubt; annexation and
war with Mexico were identical.

Thus far Clay was following in substance the aiguments
presented by Forsyth when he refused the Texan proposals
in 1837; but Clay presented a novel argument, which may
at least be said to be doubtful, that inasmuch as annexar
tion meant war with Mexico it was not competent to the
treaty-making power to do what was equivalent to a declara-
tion of war without consulting the other branch of Congress.

Clay then went on to assert that Texas ought not to be
received into the Union, even with the assent of Mexico,
because to do so would be "in decided opposition to the
wishes of a considerable and respectable portion of the con-
federacy," and would introduce a new element of discord
and distraction. The coimtry, before acquiring further ter-
ritory, might well pause to "people our vast wastes, develop
our resources, prepare the means of defending what we po&-
sess,*and augment our strong power, and greatness." As for
annexing Texas in order to increase the power of the South,
he believed nothing would be more unfortimate or fatal,
and the adoption of such a principle would certainly menace

THE ELECTION OF POLK 625

the existence of the Union. He thought, indeed; that the
addition of Texas would weaken the South. As for the
aims of Great Britain, Clay declared that he would regard
it as the imperative duty of the government of the United
States to oppose any design of colonizing or subjugating the
country, but he believed that Great Britain had no such
aims or purposes.^

This letter, on the whole, was satisfactory to the Northern
Whigs. It committed their leader fully against the chief
measure of the detested Tyler administration, and there
seemed to be nothing in it to ofifend the moderate opponents
of slavery. To the South, however, so outspoken a declara-
tion against annexation was by no means agreeable, although
Clay, near the beginning of his letter, had taken pains to
say that the question of annexation would appear in quite
a different light if it were presented "without the loss of
national character, without the hazard of foreign war, with
the general concurrence of the Union, without any danger
to the integrity of the nation and without giving an un-
reasonable price for Texas.*'

Van Buren's letter, which was dated April 20, 1844, from
his coimtry-place on the Hudson River, and was probably
written in complete ignorance of Clay's letter, was on very
similar lines although about three times as long. It was
written in reply to a letter from a Mr. Hammet, a representa-
tive in Congress from Mississippi, who had asked Van Bm^n
for an expression of his opinion with a view to determining
the writer's course as a delegate in the approaching Demo-
cratic convention.

Van Buren fully admitted that annexation was desirable
per 86, and encouraged some hope that he might consent to
it as a measure of self-defence rather than permit Texas
to become a British dependency or the colony of any Eiux)-
pean power. He admitted also that Mexico might persist
so long "in refusing to acknowledge the independence of
Texas, and in destructive but fruitless efforts to reconquer
that State," as to produce a general conviction of the neces-

^ Colton's Clay, III, 25 et seq.

626 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

sity of annexation for the permanent welfare, if not absolute
safety, of all concerned. But he declared that under exist-
ing circumstances he could not give his support to the
scheme, even though assured that his re-election to the
presidency depended upon it. The annexation of Texas,
he thought, would draw after it a war with Mexico, which
he did not think it would be expedient to attempt. " Could
we hope," he said, "to stand perfectly justified in the eyes
of mankind for entering into it; more especially if its com-
mencement is to be preceded by the appropriation to our
own uses of the territory, the sovereignty of which is in dis-
pute between two nations, one of which we are to join in

le struggle? '*

In 1837, continued Van Buren, his administration had
decided, after careful consideration, against annexation; the
situation had not since changed; inmiediate annexation
would place a weapon in the hands of those who looked
upon Americans and American institutions with distrust
and envious eyes, and would do us far more real and lasting
injury than the new territory, however valuable, could
repair; he was aware of the rid^ he ran with his Southern
fellow-citizens in expressing these opinions, but the only
qualification he would give was that if, after the subject
had been fully discussed. Congress should favor annexation,
he would yield to the popular will.

It may be assumed that both Clay and Van Buren were
sincere in their declarations, but it is not perhaps going
too far to suggest that their opinions would not have been
expressed at this time and in this manner so strongly if
it had not been for their mutual dislike of Tyler and the
near approach of the presidential election. But the real
question, which both Van Buren and Clay feared to inject
into the campaign, was the question of the extension of
slavery. If that was to be brought into the contest no m^i
could foresee where the discussion might lead or what the
consequences to the Union might be. Their concern for
Mexican rights was therefore in a high degree exaggerated
and unreal. Mexico, as was said by Tyler and his friends,

THE ELECTION OF POLK 627

had lost Texas irrevocably — she had no better chance of
regaining it than the Cherokees had of regaining their hunt-
ing-grounds in the heart of Georgia. Texas, it was argued,
was free morally and legally to dispose of her own future,
just as Mexico had been free to dispose of Texas while
nominally at war with Spain, for Spain, imtil 1838, had pro-
claimed her unalterable purpose of reconquering the whole
of Mexico; and yet, inasmuch as the whole world knew that
she could never succeed, the assertion of Spanish rights had
not led either Adams or Clay to hesitate a moment in bar-
gaining, in 1825, for a cession of Texas. x

The truth was that every one who considered the matter \
at aU could see that tenderness for Mexican interests was \
not the real motive of the writers, and that the well-groimded j ^
fear of reopening the terribly dangerous discussion of slavery / (>"
extension was at the bottom of the opposition of both Van •/
Buren and Clay; and so, once again, slavery served, not to A
hasten, but to delay and to defeat temporarily the project /
of annexation.

That Van Buren courageously took his political life in his
hand wTien'he wrote is no doubt true. But it is also prob-
ably true that he believed a declaration of the Dempcratic
convention in favor of annexation would so far imperil
Democratic success in the JN ortn as to rendeiLajnoDodnaiion
upon IJ^tjjlalJur^^ the Whig

nomination was not a matter of doubt. JIle^SwasKro^fer
^an^q^el Hejrajnjaa-^ridr oTlosing the nomination,
whateverKelSii^Krsay about Texas; and he seems to have
thought that the only thing which could prevent his elec-
tion would come through Tyler's administration acquiring
popular support by carrying through a measure so conspicu-
ous as the annexation of Texas.

Events turned out at first precisely as Clay had foreseen.
The Whig convention met at Baltimore on the first of May,
1844, and sat but a single day. No other candidate than
Henry Clay was mentioned, or even thought of, in connec-
tion with the nomination ; nor was any consideration given
to a declaration of principles. '' Were it not that we have to

628

THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

select a Vice-President/' said Thurlow Weed, "there would
be no need of a convention," * And therefore, after nomi-
nating Clay with noisy enthusiasm, and nominating Theodore
Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, for Vice-President, and adopt-
ing a Qhort platform, the convention adjourned. Clay, in
fact, was the whole platform. The formal paper which was
adopted eulogized the candidates, and annoimced that the
great principles of the Whig party would be maintained and
advanced. What these principles were was then, for the
first time, oflScially set forth,

''These principles/' the platform announced, ''may be summed up
as comprising: A well-regulated currency; a tariff for revenue to
defray the necessary expenses of the Government, and discriminating
with special reference to the protection of the domestic labor of the
country; the distribution of the proceeds from the sales of the public
lands; a single term for the Presidency; a reform of executive usurpa-
tions; and generally such an administration of the affairs of the coun-
try as shall impart to every branch of the public service the greatest
practical e£Sciency, controlled by a well-regulated and wise economy." >

This was all. The qui^tion of a Bank of the United
States, which had so agitS

hsiA hftfin dropped. Not a word was sairf in r^fyf^n^ to the
question of Texas, and not a word in regard to the question
of slavery. A single term for the pn!!Sld3hcy and an aniSnd-
ment to the Constitution to deprive the President of the
veto power were the only really definite features of the
programme, and these were in themselves not calculated to
fire the blood of the average American citizen.

TTir Prrpofrntir nnnvflntiftnj whirh nIgQmet at Baltjgiore
about four weeks lat^r. dpsdt much more faithtuiiy with the

faitl
real questions which now began to interest and divide the

of a g^tfwlidaLe. That Van BUl^n was fai in the lead was
unquestioned, but there was strong opposition to his re-
nomination, which was strengthened by his attitude upon
the annexation of '^^^^^^ Frfiflid^^^^-^^^^'' ^^"^^ ^"t his

^ Bamee, Life of Thurlow Weed, II, 119.
* Stanwood'B History of the Presidency, 220.

THE ELECTION OF POLK 629

treaty tf" thfi Senfltf ti ^ f ""^ ?^-, hii-I Vnn Purrn^ri Irttirr Hi^

Hfyjppf ^^"^°^^^ ^fi^'^'nflt ^^"^ treaty was pnh]|]>l^pfL-^c^nnf.ti
befet'e-the-conventioii met. During this month many things
happened^ among them the publication by the Senate of
the Texas treaty and all the accompanying documents,
including Calhoim's appeal for the annexation of Texas as
an essential means of protecting the institution of slavery.
It was evidently the opinion of the Whig majority of the
Senate that Calhoim had ruined himself and his party by
these ill-judged utterances. Northern Democrats were very
much of the same opinion.

•

'' Calhoun," wrote one of them, ''has committed a great blunder
by vindicating slavery in his letter to Pakenham, and Van Buren a
greater by publishing a letter against immediate annexation, when
nearly all his adherents are committed, with most of the Democratic
presses. Calhoun, with superior talents, is extremely sectional and
southern. I cannot guess how Van Buren made such a blunder. I
think they are both demolished — ^fdo de se." ^

Tha Southern Democrats were naturally much more an-
T\ns^ atr Vnn T^iiron^fl flfftfpmpnfA than at Calhoim's, and^
many of the delegates who had been instructed in Van
Buren's favor were at a great loss how to vote, in view of the
changed condition of affairs. Jackson, writing privately on
May 14, 1844, to Van Buren's closest political friend in
New York, referred to the great excitement the Texas letter
had creat^, which it was feared would be difficult to allay.

"Clay's letter," continued Jackson, "had prostrated him with the
Whiggs in the South and West, and nine tenths of our population had
declared in favour of Mr. V. Buren and annexation of Texas — ^when
this, illf ated, letter made its appearance, and fell upon the democracy
like a thunderbolt. . . . You might as well, it appears to me, attempt
to turn the current of the Mississippi, as to turn the democracy from
the annexation of Texas." *

At the same time Jackson wrote a public letter to the
Nashville UnioUy in which he reaffirmed the views expressed

' Meigs's Hfe of C. J. IngeraoU, 266.

' Jadcson to Bcnijamin F. Butler (of New York), May 14, 1844; Amer. Hi9t.
Beo., XI, 833.

630 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

in his published letter to A. V. Brown, but defended Van
Buren on the ground that he was not informed as to existing
circumstances. "He has evidently prepared his letter from
a knowledge only of the circumstances bearing on the sub-
ject as they existed at the close of his administration, with-
out a view of the disclosures since made." ^ Van Buren
might weD have prayed to be delivered from such defenders
as his old chief.

Calhoun shared Jackson^s views as to the effect of Van
Buren's letter. Writing to his daughter, he said:

"V. B's letter has completely prostrated him, and has brought for-
ward a host of candidates in his place; Buchanan, Cass, Stuart, John-
son, who, with Tyler and V. B. himself, make six. ... In the meane
time, I stand aloof. I regard annexation to be a vital question. If
lost now, it will be forever lost; and, if that, the South will be lost.
... It is the all absorbing question, stronger even than tjie presi-
dential. It is, indeed, under circumstances, the most important
question, both for the South and the Union, ever agitated since the
adoption of the Constitution." *

The most formidable opponent of the ex-President was
General Lewis Cass, of Michigan, who had resigned his
position as minister to France eighteen months before. He
had been ever since a candidate for the presidency, and had
declared himself early in May as decidedly in favor of an-
nexation.' There was, however, no sort of certainty as to
the result. It was anybody's race, and it was perfectly
possible that a dark horse might win.

The chairman of the Tennessee delegation reached Wash-
ington on the twenty-first of May, and wrote home the next
day.

"We have," he reported, "been busily engaged examining into the
condition of things here and though I had expected to find much con-
fusion and excitement among our friends, yet I confess myself much
surprised at the extent of the distractions and the bitterness of feeling

1 Parton, Jackson, III, 661.

* Calhoun to Mrs. Clemson, May 10, 1844; Amer, Hist, Assn. Rep. 1899, II9
585.
' McLaughlin's Life of C<^s, 209.

THE ELECTION OF POLK 631

which exists between the Van Buren and the disaiTected portion of
the party. This last party I am satisfied is daily gaining strength by
the arrival of delegations from regions of the country which have been
lost by V's letter. . . . The Democracy or rather the Delegates of
the south west and west are making an extraordinary effort for Cass." ^

Two days later the same correspondent wrote that the
trouble was increasing, that the anti-Van Buren party was
becoming stronger; but that Cass's friends thought he
would get the vote of Pennsylvania from Van Biu^n on the
second ballot. The breach between the Van Buren and the
anti-Van Buren parties, he thought, had become impassable,
and they would never imite except upon some other man
than Cass.^

In this agitating state of uncertainty the convention met.
More than a day was consumed in effecting an organization
and in discussing the question of the adoption of the two-
thirds rule, which had governed the two previous national
Democratic conventions. Many men who were unwilling
openly to desert Van Buren were willing to vote for a rule
which made his chances hopeless; and ultimately, at about
noon of the second day of the convention, the two-thirds
rule was adopted by a vote of 148 to 118. This sealed the
fate of the leading candidate. On the first ballot Van Buren
was 32 votes short of two-thirds. Upon the second ballot
he fell below a majority; and during the remainder of the
day he lost upon every ballot, while Cass came gradually to
the front.

When the convention adjourned that evening George
Bancroft, one of the delegates from Massachusetts, con-
sulted his colleagues and the New York delegation, and sug-
gested to them the nomination of James K. Polk, of Ten-
nei^jge. Both agreed, as Bancroft later described it, that
"Van Buren implacably detested the thought of Cass as a
candidate, and that it would have been impossible for Cass,
owing to Van Buren's hatred and jealousy, to carry the
State of New York.'' Bancroft then suggested his plan to

» Gideon J. Pillow to Polk, May 22, 1844; Amer, Hist. Rev., XI, 835.
* Same to same, May 24, 1844; ibid., 837.

632 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the delegation from Tennessee, " and they naturally accepted
the name of Polk joyfully/' ^ Polk's nanae had not, up to
that time, been suggested as a possible candidate for the
first place. He had been talked of in various parts of the
country as a suitable Vice-President, but two days before
the convention met his friend Pillow wrote: "You have
more friends here than any man in the field and if your name
had been brought before the country for the first place we
would have had far more unanimity. . . . Things may take
that turn yet. We of the South cannot bring that maUer up.
K it should be done by the North it will all work right." *

Writing again on the evening of the second day of the
convention, Pillow described the extraordinary excitement
which, he said, "had well-nigh got into a general pel-mell
•fight." The excitement was wholly ungovernable by the
chair and the chances were for the nomination of Cass.
Near the foot of the letter he added : " I have within the last
few minutes received a proposition from a leading Del^ate
of the Pennsylvania and of Massachusets to bring your
name before the Convention for President." The next
morning, on the first ballot. New Hampshire, quite unex-
pectedly to the majority of the delegates, gave its votes
to Polk; and upon the next ballot New York withdrew the
name of Van Buren in the interest of harmony, and cast
its entire vote in Polk's favor. A "stampede" followed,
which resulted in Polk's unanimous nomination, and there-
upon Silas Wright wanmixrudiaUil^ nonimated as JiQce-
President, to conciliate the Van Buren party. Wright,
however, declined, protesting with some warmth that cir-
cumstances rendered it impossible for him to accept the
nomination consistently with his sense of public duty and
private obligations.' The convention ended by nominating
GeorgaJ^Dallas, of ^£ennaylyania, after it had ascertained
that Governor Fairfield, of Maine, was not to be coimted
on in favor of Texan annexation.

1 Bancroft to Harris, Aug. 30, 1887; iWd., 841, note.
« PiUow to Polk, May 25, 1844; ibid., 839.
> Jenkins's Life of SUas Wnght, 148.

THE ELECTION OF POLK 633

Before the nomination of Dallas for Vice-President was
made the convention adopted a long and detailed platform,
in which, besides naming their candidates and expressing
their confidence, affection, respect, and regard for "their
illustrious feUow citizen Martin Van Buren," and declar-
ing their reliance upon the intelligence, patriotism, and dis-
criminating justice of the American people, the resolutions
adopted by the Democratic convention of 1840 were re-
peated word for word.

In addition, the platform declared against a distribution
of the proceeds of public lands and against taking from the
President the veto power which had " thrice saved the Amer-
ican people from the corrupt and tyrannical domination of
the BsLJok of the United States." The platform finally
declared —

"That our title to the whole of the territory of Oregon is clear and
unquestionable; that no portion of the same ought to be ceded to
England or to any other power; and that the re-occupation of Oregon
and the re-annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period are
great American measures, which this Convention recommends to the
cordial support of the Democracy of the Union." ^

James K. Polk, who had thus unexpectedly been placed
in nomination, was another of those Scotch-Irish Presby-
terians who have exerted so material an influence upon the
fortunes of the United States. His family was long settled
in North Carolina, and he himself was bom in Mecklenburg
County on November 2, 1795. His mother was Jane Knox,
whose name indicates that she too was of uncompromising
Scotch descent.

The Polk family in 1806, following the stream of Western
migration, settled in Tennessee, where the future President
attended school. He was subsequently graduated at the
University of North Carolina, at the then rather unusually
advanced age of twenty-three. He studied law in the office

* Stanwood's History of the Presidency^ 215. For the history of the Oregon
controversy, see Chapter XXVIII, Vol. II.

634

THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

of Felix Grundy, of Nashville, became a follower and ad-

bore, intoHpeliticSTlSec^

and in%&25. when thirty yeare old, was electei

where ^jie servM euutmuo fui foufteenfyeara. When the
Twenty-fourth Congress niet In December, 1835, Polk was
elected Speaker of the House of Repreaentativfta^ a position
he continued to hold through that an^' the Twenty-fifth
Congress. During his whole term in Congress he had been
a consistent and steady follower of Jackson and Van Buren.
He was also a stead v^poneni of John UiilBCV Adamsn)oth
while Adams was President and when he saTtirtfae House
of Representatives.

In 1839 Polk's service in the House of Representatives
came to an end, as he was elected governor of Ms state, a
position he held for two yeare. He was def eatedTorT^-elec-
tion in the great Whig campaign of 1840, and again two years
later; and when the spring of 1844 came he had been more
than three yeare out of office. Hisname, however, was then
beginning to be suggested as a possible candidate for Vice-
Pregidfiiit, and as such he was addressed by a committeg of
citizens of Cincinnati oppesrH to flnnpYfltign^ who ingiiirpd

vieHSjugon the Tgxas question. Similar lettera
been sent toHEeFproimhent men of both political parties.
Writing from Columbia, Tennessee, on April 22, almost at
the same moment that Clay and Van Buren were expressing
their opinions, Polk announced his in terms which had at
least the merit of absolute frankness.

I have no h^itation/' he said. **in rlw^larin^ ^j^ttf T am in favor
of the ?^rri<>ri;Qf£';:pjfrnTTnvtiil I '1^7^^ t,() \]^^ temtOTy illlll ^U¥cm-

fnited States. I entegteig lui ilaiiliLi as to the powpj or_
Jthe reannexati(

expedie

These are my opinions; and

without deeming it necessary to extend this letter, by assigning the
many reasons which influence me in the conclusions to which I come,
I regret to be compelled to differ so widely from the views expressed
by yourselves, and the meeting of citizens of Cincinnati whom you
represent." ^

/ 1 Jenkins's PoUc, 120-123,

THE ELECTION OF POLK 635

ThisJetter^ so different from those of Clay and Van Buren,
must have had an important bearing on the action of the

Locratic convention.

The first name signed to the letter to Polk was that of
Salmon P. Chase, a young lawyer known for his activity in
behalf of fugitive slaves, and for his zeal in organizing the
Liberty party throughout the United States. The begin-
nings of this party dated back to the election of 1840, when
a few men met at Albany and nominated for President
James G. Bimey, of Ohio, very much against the wishes of
Garrison aiid the more pronounced anti-slavery advocates.
The movement made no impression in that excited cam-
paign; but in August, 1843, a national convention of the
Liberty party was again held at Buffalo, and Bimey was
once more put in nomination for the presidency upon an
anti-slavery platform, chiefly written by Chase.^

Finally a fourth convention, if it could be so called — ^for
it was really a mass-meeting of people from various parts
of the country, representing nobody but themselves — ^was
held in Baltimore on the same day as the Democratic con-
vention, and it put in nomination John Tyler. The hall
waa decorated with banners bearing the inscription "Tyler
and Texas." Tyler, as he subsequently related, had been
advised by his friends to take his chances in the Democratic
convention, but he had thought it impossible to do so. " If
I suffered my name to be used in that Convention, then I
become bound to sustain the nomination, even if Mr. Van
Buren was the nominee. This could not be. I chose to
run no hazard, but to raise the banner of Texas, and con-
voke my friends to sustain it." ^ The truth was that Tyler
was infatuated with the notion that "the banner of Texas"
would of itself suffice to rouse the country and carry its
bearer triumphantly into the White House. His anxiety
and eagerness for re-election were veiy manifest to those
with whom he talked.'

» Schucker's Chase, 47, 69.

* Tyler's LeUera and Times of the Tylers, II, 317.

> Meigs's 'Ingersoll, 264-266.

636 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

His friends having, therefore, been thus "convoked," duly
nominated him and forthwith adjourned. They named no
Vice-President, and they adopted no platform. No plat-
form, indeed, was required, for Tyler could stand with per-
fect comfort on that of the democracy, which embodied all
his beliefs and heartily sustained his Bank vetoes and the
annexation of TexM.

The adoption of the Democratic platform, the selection of
Polk as the Democratic candidate, and the defeat of Van
Buren on the groimd of his anti-Texas attitude, were alone
sufficient to bring the question of Texas to the front. But
interest in the subject was inmiensely increased by the action
of the Senate in rejecting Tyler's treaty, almost inunediately
after the last of the nominating conventions had been held.
On June 8, 1844, twelve days after the adjournment of the
Democratic convention, the ^naLe, by'Tf'yoiaiLlSSlto ij6,
refused its approval. Every Northern state except New
Hampshire, ^nnsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois voted against
the treaty, as did all the Whig senators but one. Of the
Democrats, fifteen were in favor of it and seven against it;
but the seven included Benton, Wright, and other devoted
friends of Van Buren, who were still smarting under his
defeat.

Tyler's and Calhoim^s opponents probably hoped and be-
lieved "that this was the end of the annoying question of
annexation, for the time being at least; but, if so, they had
very much underestimated the resourcefulness and persist-
ence of the President. He had come to the conclusion,
weeks before, that Texas could be admitted as a state in the
Union by an act of Congress, "imder that provision of the
constitution of this Government, which authorizes Congress
to admit new states into the Union"; and when the treaty
was signed he had ^promised the Texan representatives that
if the treaty failed in the Sehateyhe wuuld ui;ge Corfgr^,
"in the strongest terms/' to j^nagtja tvyyy a/frnf^^

as a state. ^

^ Van Zandt and Henderson to Jones, April 12, 1844; Tex, Dip. Corr., II,
271. This mode of dealing with the business seems to have been first sug-

THE ELECTION OF POLK 637

The details of procedure were settled at a conference on
Sunday, the fifth of May, between Calhoun and Charles J.
Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, the chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, who was
eager in support of annexation. It was agreed, the latter
noted in his diary, "that if the Senate reject the treaty of
Texas, I am to move it embodied in a bill in the House."
The next day he saw Tyler, who approved the suggestion,
but promised to let Ingersoll hear from him again.

By the beginning of June the plan had been somewhat
modified, and as modified was ready in all its details. On
Monday, June 3, Ingersoll talked with Van Zandt, the Texan
minister, on the subject, and later with Calhoun. The mo-
ment the Senate either rejected the treaty or laid it on the
table Tyler was —

''to send a full open message to the House to serve as an appeal to
the people on that subject, when Congress adjourn. . . . The people
are to be appealed to everywhere to condemn Clay, Benton and Van
Buren's opposition to immediate annexation. The then remaining
and resulting and all important question is whether Tyler shall con-
voke Congress in special session early in September, supposing that
the minority in which Texas is in both houses may become then a
majority by means of popular will on that subject. The plan is all
clean and good but for Tyler's desire to be elected President, for which
he is fomented by crowds of vulgar fellows, deluding him to get places.
But for this the proposed plan is excellent to carry Texas and defeat
Clay by the same blow." ^

On June 11^ therefore, thi-ee days4tfter.the.j&nal vote in the
Senate5:Ty(Br^^tenj5QXl§ulting the Texan representatives,*
published his appeal to Congre^and-the^people. He evi-
dently had an imwavering confidence in the popular desire
for expansion. He believed that the people were with him
upon this question; that the advantages of Texas could be

gested by Henderson, acting Secretary of State of Texas, in instructions to
Hunt, Dec. 31, 1836; ibid.y I, 164. It had been repeatedly discussed since.
It is of interest to note that Hawaii was annexed by joint resolution of Congress,
July 7, 1898, after it was found that a treaty of annexation could not com-
mand a two-thirds majority of the Senate.

* Meigs's Ingersoll, 268.

* Van Zandt and Henderson to Jones, June 10, 1844; Tex. Dip. Corr., II, 284.

638 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

made manifest dming the com'se of the presidential cam-
paign; and that the existence of slavery would not prevent
the great mass of voters from declaring themselves in favor
of annexation. But slavery expansion was the one obstacle
which Tyler evidently underrated. Yet neither he nor any-
body else seriously doubted that the existence of slavery
in Texas was the real objection to annexation, and that all
the talk of Clay and Van Buren and their followers as to
constitutional questions, or as to the danger of a war with
Mexico, or as to international rights and duties, was mere
beating of the air. If it had not been f orslaveiy the coun-
try would jprobably not^Kave'Eesilated; but, as it was, the
strongly held andlvlde-spiead objection to any extension
of slave territory rendered the fate of the question extremely
doubtful.^

The President began his message of June 11, 1844, by the
statement that the power of Congress was fully competent
to accomplish everything that a formal ratification of the
treaty could have accomplished, and that therefore his duty
would be imperfectly performed if he failed to lay before
the House everything in his possession which would enable
it to act with full light on the subject.

"I regard/' he said, "the question involved in these proceedings
as one of vast magnitude, and as addressing itself to interests of an
elevated and enduring character. A republic, coterminous in terri-
tory with our own, of immense resources, which require only to be
brought under the influence of our confederate and free system, in
order to be fully developed — promising, at no distant day, through the
fertility of its soil, nearly, if not entirely, to duplicate the exports of
the country, thereby making an addition to the carrying-trade, to an
amount almost incalculable, and giving a new impulse of immense
importance to the commercial, manufacturing, agricultural, and ship-
ping interests of the whole Union, and at the same time affording pro-
tection to an exposed frontier, and placing the whole country in a
condition of security and repose — a territory settled mostly by emi-
grajits from the United States, who would bring back with them,

* These views are very clearly expounded by the late Professor Garrison in
an article on "The First Stage of the Movement for the Annexation of Texaa^"

THE ELECTION OP POLK 639

in the act of reciprocation, an unconquerable love of freedom, and
an ardent attachment to our free institutions; such a question could
not fail to interest most deeply in its success, those who, under the
constitution, have become responsible for the faithful admimstra-
tion of public affairs. . . .

'' So much have I considered it proper for me to say; and it becomes
me only to add, that while I have regarded the annexation to be ac-
complished by treaty as the most suitable form in which it could be
effected, should Congress deem it proper to resort to any other ex-
pedient compatible with the constitution, and likely to accomplish
the object, I stand prepared to yield my most prompt and active co-
operation.

"The great question is — not as to the manner in which it shall be
done, but whether it shall be accomplished or not.

''The responsibility of deciding this question is now devolved upon
you."

The President's proposal, of course, came too late in the
session for anything to be done in regard to it, and within
a week Congress adjourned; but Benton in the Senate, in
order to make his own position clear, had first introduced
a bill and explained his notion of the proper method to be
pursued in securing Texas, a result he, or at any rate his
constituents, very much desired. He thought that Congress
should authorize the President to open negotiations with
both Mexico and Texas, but coupled with the proviso that if
the assent of Mexico could not be attained "it might be
dispensed with, when the Congress of the United States
may deem such assent to be unnecessary." Benton's pro-
posal was not taken seriously by anybody, his suggestion
that the assent of Mexico should be formally asked, and then
dispensed with whenever Congress saw fit, being too ob-
viously futile.

With the adjournment of Congress the presidential cam-
paign was fairly opened, and it was waged with spirit and
earnestness all over the country. The Whigs were„imited
and, enthusiastic under their strongest leaderj. the Demo-
crats were divided and doubtful, and Van Buren, Wright,
Benton, and others were openly opposed to the onel^e
upon which their convention had been carried for such
relatively unknown candidates as Polk and DaQaa. But as

640 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

time passed the popular feeling became more manifest and
the hopes of the Democratic party revived.

In different parts of the country the contest seemed to
turn upon different questions. In the larger cities particu-
larly the "Know-Nothing" issue played an important part.
In Philadelphia, in July, there was a serious riot, as there
had been in New York at the spring election for mayor,
when a Native American candidate was elected. But the
Democrats on the whole profited by this agitation.^

The tariff also was important, especially in Pennsylvania.
Both parties had adopted vague or unmeaning statements
in their platforms. Clay was unquestionably the candidate
most inclined to a protective policy, and the Democratic
newspapers in Pennsylvania, therefore, found themselves
compelled to protest that Polk was anything but a free-
trader, and that he favored what was lucidly described as
"a judicious revenue tariff giving ample incidental protec-
tion to all American industries." But elsewhere, and es-
pecially in the crucial state of New York, the controversy
over Texas was the reiJ-Mid decisive issue.

On thatsuyectthe South was pretty generall;
although bylio meanslnmit-f or the Demdcratic candidate.
Maiylagd^JVirgmia^^^ Carolinaj^Geoj^a,. Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Louisiana wprpnl| kno^^^ ^^ ^ ftyc^^^"^gV
close; ^md &er-AEhifig^pedTlmtjwith judicious avoidangg
ofaSti-slavery argumentst)y tdo"z5ilous orators in the NorQi
they might all be carried for Qa^. ATaBSS^^MfegtesTppi,
and^Souihr-^aTohnaTaloue were -faaewnrto" be ^BSpetesdy
Democratic, for some of-their^more hot-headed citizens were

finiti^Iymore impoftaiitiiiair'ffie'c^ the Ameri-

can Union. ^

Tfie^olitical conditions, therefore, craved wary walking
on the part of the Whig leaders. If they advocated annexa-
tion, they wftFft-gning (*,ontrary_i:CL the d?rTflirfl.tit?rnFrfff thnr
candidat^ and were certain to offend a strong and growing

^Ab to the influence of the "Know-Nothing" movement in the campaign
of 1844, Bee McMaater's History of the People of the U. S,, VII, 369-385.

THE ELECTION OF POLK 641

s^timenjt- At the North. If, on the^ther hand, they took
vigorous ground against annexation, they were met by
ahnost a cw'toiiity of losing the whole vote of the goutL
They had hoped, like Clay, to limit discussion to "the old
Whig poUcies,'* and, like Clay, they were all indignant with
Tyler at his having forced a new question into the presi-
dential campaign. But just as poUticians can seldom fore- *
see, so they can never control the issues upon which popular
elections williactually turn. Whig speakers in the campaign
confined themselves, as far a^ possible and as long as possible,
to other questions; but as time went by it became more and
more evident that Texas was the real issue. The Demo-
cratic platform had made that measure an article of party
faith, in spite of Wright and Benton and Van Buren, and
these dissatisfied leaders were now all working harmoniously
with the rest of the party. Wright, who had declined to be
the candidate for Vice-President, had been reluctantly per-
suaded to run for governor of New York, which brought to
the party the support of Van Buren and his friends. Benton,
too, had been brought to support the ticket, contenting him-
self with favoring annexation in general, while reserving his
criticisms for the particular measiu^ advocated by Tyler.

These facts did not fail to be noted by foreign observers.
The British and French governments early in the year 1844
had agreed to make a joint formal protest against the annexa-
tion of Texas by the United States, a project which was
abandoned when they were informed that the Senate would
in all probability decline to approve a treaty for that pur-
pose. About the first of June, however, Ix)r(t..Aberdeen ^
had discussed with the representatives of Mexico and Texas,
in Loridon7a' P^^^ for a joint guarantee of Mexico against
American aggression by Britain and.:Fr2Uicar-«pon-ttl^oii-
dition that Mexico, 4vorfd-acaowiedge the independence

^ See Chapter XXII, above. On May 17, 1844, Lord Brougham, in the House
of Lords, and on May 20 Mr. J. Hume, in the House of Commons, had asked
questions about the annexation treaty. Aberdeen expressed the opinion that
iJie whole subject involved "quite new and unexampled" questions, and
promised "the most serious attention" on the part of the government. Peel,

642 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

The British and French ministers in Washington were
much alarmed when they learned thiat these latt^nproposak
WCTe under discnssiotty-f or they T^fatly-fudgedJibat nothing
could niorecertainlyunitailie Americaji peogle^^
Annexation than an atteno^t by European powers to prevent
it. They therefore wrote to T;ESCrr^ecirve go venun
urging that nothing should be done publicly, at least until
after the presidential election had taken place, as any action
by Great Britain and France under the suggested agreement
would have the very opposite effect to that intended.
"Texas would be inamediately annexed and occupied,
leaving it to the Guaranteeing Powers to carry out the ob-
jects of the agreement as best they might."

" It is scarcely necessary for us to remark," Pakenham wrote, " that,
by the rejection of the late Treaty the question of the annexation of
Texas must not be considered as disposed of. On the contrary it
must be looked upon as the question which at thb moment most
engages the attention of the American People, and which will form
one of the most prominent Subjects of agitation and excitement dur-
ing the approaching election to the Presidency. In fact it may be
said that both questions will be tried at one and the same time: that
is to say, if the feeling in favour of annexation should predominate,
Mr. Polk, who stands upon that interest, and who has moreover the
support of the democratic party, except where anti-annexation feel-
ings may operate against him, will be elected.

''If happily the party opposed to annexation should prevail, Mr.
Clay, who has taken a stand in opposition to that measure, will be
the man; in which case, although the project must not even then be
thought of as abandoned or defeated, there would at least be a pros-
pect of its being discussed with the calmness and dignity required by
its importance, and by the interest which other powers are justly
entitled to take in it.

" According to this view of the question it seems to us. My Lord,
that the Govts, of England and France have everything to gain by
the success of Mr. Clay: and accordingly that whatever might in
any way unfavourably affect his prospects ought by all means to be
avoided." *

more bluntly, said they would not follow the example set by other countries
in the publication of diplomatic documents in the newspapers. — (Hansard,
3 ser., LXXIV, 1227, 1330.)
1 Pakenham to Aberdeen, June 27, 1844; £. D. Adams, 178.

THE ELECTION OF POLK 643

Aberdeen .was convinced by this exposition of the popular
sentiment in the United States^ and at once proposed to '
France a postponement of the project, to which Guizot very
readily agreed.^

One obstacle to Democratic success was, quite obviously,
the cancKdacy^oTTyten — Slenderas hiTfollowing might be,
it divided the ranks of those who favored annexation, and
to. that extent -4eadeA-to favor ClayV'chances;''aiid as
the caaipaign progiessed the Democra,tic leaders more and •
more sU-ongly UlgedT^er to withdraw his name. General
Jackson wrote to a friend, evidently for Tyler's eye:

"Mr. Tyler's withdrawal at once would unite all the Democrats
into one family without distinction. This would render our victory
easy and certain, by bringing Mr. Tyler's friends in to the support of
Polk and Dallas, — received as brethren by them and their friends —
all former differences forgotten, and all cordially united once more
in sustaining the Democratic candidates." *

The Presidefitrjridded ^t last, and on August 21 published
a letter addressed "to my Friends throughout the Union,"
withdrawing from the contest. He had^been led^^h^^
to flp.r^ppt thp^ nnminfltinn because he had been threatened
with impeachment for having negotiated the Texan treaty,
and for leaving adopted precautionary measures to ward off
any blow whiclnnight^ave been aimed at the peace and
safety ofThg .country.' A large proportion of the Demo-
cratic party had exhibited hostility and "the most unre-
lenting spirit of opposition," and he had felt himself in
honor bound to maintain his position "unmoved by threats,
and unintimidated by denunciations." He had also had
some hope that "the great question of the anneKatieil of
Texas'' might be controlled by' the position he occupied.
But since he had accepted the nomination for President
the action of the House of Representatives, in passing reso-

» Aberdeen to Cowley, July 18, 1844; CJowley to Aberdeen, July 22, 1844;
ibid., 181, 182.

« Niles's Reg,, LXVI, 416.

* Chancellor Kent had expressed the opinion that Mr. Tyler's course in
reference to Texas and the sending of military forces to the border, laid him
open to impeachment.

644 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

lutions approving his vetoes, had gone a long way toward
justifying and upholding his policy; and since the adjourn-
ment of Congress the language of the press and the people
had still further expressed approbation of the acts of the
administration. To a great extent, therefore, his reasons for
becoming a candidate had been removed.

With respect to the Texas treaty, he declared that when
it was made he had anticipated receiving the support both
» of Clay and Van Buren ; because when Clay was Secretary of
State to Mr. Adams, and when Van Buren was Secretary
of State to General Jackson, each in his turn had attempted
to obtain the annexation of Texas.

'' If it had been charged that the administration was prompted by
the ambition of securing the greatest boon to the country, and the
whole country, in the acquisition of a territory so important in itself,
and so inseparably connectfidLyJth the inter^'t of every Sfete in Ae
Union, I would have plead guilty without a moment of hesitation.
... I believed, and still believe, that the annexation of Texas would
add to its strength, and serve to perpetuate it f^r npfon y^» tn fvin^p;
and my best efforts, while 1 remain in office, will be directed to secur-
ing^ iti "Acquisition, either now or at a future day." *

Against this now reimited Democracy most of the Whig
speakers failed to ofifer any effective opposition. They
were hampered by Clay's declaration that neither the
annexation of Texas nor the extension of slavery were in
themselves objectionable, so that their opposition could
not be directed to the thing itself, but only to the man-
ner in which it was proposed to be done — ohyiously not a
very effective issue for a national campaign.

Of all the leading jgoenm the Whig party Webster was the

only one who had fuUy reaK^rffie imporfcgm the Texas

question, or who perceived clearly that the party had put

itself into a false position. Upon this^pointixis record was

-tjiiile cTeax.

" Time," he wrote in 1843, " has already shown how really incon-
siderable were the grounds upon which the leading Whigs in Congress

1 Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 342-349.

THE ELECTION OF POLK 645

went into their crusade against the President. Time has already
shown how unimportant, practically and really, the measures were
which threw them into such a flame. Who cares anything now about
the bank bills which were vetoed in 1841? Or who thinks now that,
if there were no such thing as a veto in the world, a Bank of the United
States, upon the old models, could be established?" ^

As a member of Tyler's cabinet he had been made well
aware, from his conversations with the President, of the
latter's views in regard to Texas, and after his retirement
from the cabinet a long and friendly interview with Up-
shur had put him in possession of the hopes and intentions
of the administration. Webster indeed had long felt deeply
distressed at the prospect he foresaw of the danger to the
Union arising out of the Texan controversy, and early in
1844, although he believed that all New York and New
England were opposed to the annexation of Texas, he ex-
pressed the opinion that strong efforts ought to be made to
arouse the North upon the subject. A spring election being
about to take place in Connecticut, he declared that if it
was in his power he would make the Texas question a lead-
ing feature of the contest. "If I had the means," he said,
"I would send men to Connecticut who would run through
the State from side to side, with their arms stretched out,
crying Texas! Texas!" But he was quite unable to make
his friends in Massachusetts see that there was a real prob-
ability of annexation being accomplished.^

In the course of the presidential campaign, therefore,
Webster boldly proclaimed- haaaself against annexation upon
aiiti-slavery girnmds^almier-fie^jrdtested that he wished
Texas*^ well, but was opposed to taking over such a vast
extent of territory into the Union so long as slavery existed
there. "It has dways appeared to me," he said, "that the
slavery of the blacks, and the unavoidable increase both in
the niunbers of these slaves, and of the duration of their
slavery, formed an insuperable objection to its annexation." *

While Webster thus stood upon the solid ground of oppo-
sition to annexation because annexation involved the exten-

» Curtis's Webster, II, 208. « Ibid,, 230-235. • Ibid., 244.

646 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

sioaof ^Y.ery^Clay appeared unable to take any clear or
consistent position. ' During the progress of the campaign
he wrote no less than six letters on the subject, which his
Democratic opponents made the most of, and which brought
him few friends and lost him many votes. Thurlow Weed,
then the shrewd and eflBcient editor of an important Whig
newspaper, had cautioned Clay, even before the nominating
convention, to write no more letters. Weed felt sure that
the election was likely to turn upon the question of admitting
Texas as a slave state, and he believed that upon this issue
Clay had nothing to gain by courting the South and every-
thing to lose by alienating the North. Before the Whig
convention met. Weed therefore wrote that the outlook
for Mr. Clay was as propitious as his most sanguine friend
could wish, but the danger was that designing men would
endeavor to get something from Clay to misrepresent, and
there was no need of his writing his opinions on all sorts of
subjects. Clay, he said, had been forty years before the
public ; his views and principles were suflBciently well under-
stood, intelligent men knew perfectly what they were;
and on the Texas question, which was the only new one
before the people, he had expressed in his Raleigh letter
convictions which were satisfactory to the people. Clay
thereupon promised he would write no letters, and a we^
after the convention he wrote to Weed: "I am sure you
will be pleased to hear from me that I am firmly con-
vinced that my opinion on the Texas question will do me
no prejudice at the South." ^ But in spite of his prudent
resolutions Clay could not remain silent.

On the first day of July he wrote to a Mr. Miller, of Ala-
bama, to explain that when he had referred in his Raleigh
letter to "a considerable and respectable portion of the
confederacy" opposed to annexation, he had not meant the
abolitionists. What he had there said was based upon the
fact that the states of Ohio, Vermont, and Massachusetts
had declared against annexation, that the legislature of
Georgia had declined to recommend it, and that other

1 Bamee, Life of Thurlow Weed, II, 119.

THE ELECTION OF POLK 647

states were believed to be iraverse to the measure. The
. idea of his courting the abolitionists was perfectly absurd.
Persona^ he could have np( pbjection to the annexation of
Texas, 6uf he feisred it might. res\flt in a dissolution of the
Upioa. TheJTexas question "was a babble blown up by
Mr. Tyler in the most exc^>tionable m^Jiner^ for sinister
purposes, and its bursting has injured no body but Mr. Van
Buren."^— -

On July 27 Claj wrote again to Miller that, far from having
any personal objection to the annexation of Texas, he would
be glad to see it if it could be secured "without dishonor,
without wafTupon the common consent of the Union, and
upon just and faiT^tSians. I do not think the subject of
slavery ougEf to i^ect the question, one way or the other."
And in later letters he tried again and again to define his
position, but without being able to make it clear to the com-
prehension of ordinary voters.

Then and alway&the only real~and BubstM^tial objection

to the annexation of Texaajwag^thft nhjfintion to thp. ftyf^n-

sion of slavery, an argument which the national parties
dared not urge; and it was this which had for years held
back the American government from moving in the matter.
The.aigument'^tEarTiiereiVas no^^ c^ to

add new territory to the Union could hardly be sustained
since the purchases of Louisiana and Florida. Nobody was
much interested in the controversy whether the constitu-
tional power to annex a foreign country resided in the legis-
lative or in the treaty-making power. The argument that
Mexico possessed any rights in the matter must have seemed
very hoUow to those who remembered her utter impotence
during the eight years that had elapsed since San Jacinto,
and who reflected that during those years Texas had prob-
ably doubled in population, and that Mexico had steadily
gone backward in wealth and the elements of civilization.
A serious war with Mexico was out of the question, unless
indeed the United States should attempt a war of conquest.
On the other hand, the advantages of acquiring a country
like Texas, inhabited by a population which was substan-

» ^^Ron's C7ai>7lV7«gTr^

648 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tiallysimilar to that of the United States, having a similar
f orm^^oyemme^^^^ aiid~silliflar4deate7wi^e tM to

be difiE^arded. PfeSd6lrtiP3rter,Tniiis mesBageio the Sen-
ate accompanying the treaty, can hardly be regarded as
overstating the facts when he said that there was no civil-
ized government on earth having a revolutionary tender
made to it of a domain so rich and fertile, so replete with all
that could add to national greatness and wealth, and so
necessary to its peace and safety, that would reject the offer.

The course of the -WhigB-, aad.,e^gcially Clay's efforts to
please. -tha-SQuttiern^vote, now afforded an o^viousjoproing
fftrJJift J^i|iftrtypflTTy: TK^^ad been making little prog-
ress before Clay's Texas letters appeared, but they instantly
seized upon his expression that under certain circumstangg
he would be glad to see Texas annexed! Henry Clay, they
prcJdaimed, was ftt heart like^rdt^ther slave-holders, and
did not care whether slavery was voted up or voted down;
and there was inmiediately an accession of confidence and
strength to their party which was mainly drawn from the
faltering Whig ranks. From the middle of the summer the
hopes of the Democrats correspondingly rose, as the Whigs
became more and more discouraged. The letters of William
H. Seward convey a striking impression of the growing dis-
couragement in the progress of the campaign. At Rochester,
where he was to speak, he was appealed to by the local
Whig managers to make "a tariff and Texas speech" to
the naturalized voters, who were said to be all against the
Whigs. From Rochester he went to Geneva, where he met
" that letter and found everybody weeping and despairing."
Clay was jeopardizing and would perhaps lose the state.
"That last letter," he wrote, "will do its mischief unnoticed
and unthought of. The former ones irritated our friends
but they have become inured; and they complain not of
the last, because complaint is unavailing. But the effect
will be calamitous."

Seward also, like Webster, protested that Texas must not
come in " until she casts off the black robe that hangis around
her, and thus renders herself worthy of adoption by the

THE ELECTION OF POLK 649

•

American sisterhood"; but he saw, nevertheless, that "the
party is struggling like a strong man. We shall see whether
they are too deep in the morass to extricate themselves." ^

When the election came at last Seward's fears were seen
to be fully justified. His party could not extricate itself
from the morass, and the result turned entirely upon the
vote of the state of New York.

Of the^ifegfcJBngtagd' states^ Main^ and Nrw Hftmpnhirr
wpTjti fnr^k. Vermont; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut went-f(»-C3^^;^^o did New Jersey, 15elaware,
and .OET^emMylvatilJ^^MSEgan,!^
were for Polk. Of the Southern stat^ Olay carried Mary-
land, North Carolina,' Kentacky, and Tennessee, the re-
maindei going fot'ToIk. Leaving out T^e^grYofkpthe vote

Ih&Demo-
iTotfisJiad been

given to Clay he would have been elected. But by iaplu-
rality of only^5,106j out of a total vote of nearly 500,000,
Polk carried the state, givipg him 170 votes in the electoral
college, asji6a5a[m f or Clay.*

The Liberty partjThad acquired the balance of power,
and had used tScii' puwer tu-4efpa,t thp 3¥higs.~There can
be no question lEhaT it was Clav's attitude^^jn the Texas
question, and especially the declaration thatlhe"subject of

slavery mTghtTTnt.-tn-frfy^f4;.4JaA^^iAQfio]^ Qx\^ i^rny nr ynnf.ViPr^

which cost hiin^Jthe election. Birney's supporters were
drawn "aEoosTentirely frorn among the Whigs, and if Clay
had received but one-half of the Bimey vote in the state
of New York he would have been elected President.

"The country owes much of its misrule jind misery," wrote ThurloiA
Weed, " to the acGon of minorities, — well-meaning, patriotic, but mis- \
guided minorities. . .- . The election of Mr. Polk means that Texas 1
will be annexed to the United States. In all rational probability^
this gain to the slave power insures permanent slave supremacy in ^fe
administration of the government. Such, at all events, was the known
and avowed object of the annexation. That question, and that ques-

» Seward's Life of Seward, I, 723-729.

» The popular vote in New York was, for Polk, 237,688; for Cby, 232,482;
and for Bimey, 15,812.

650 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tion alone, produced the nomination of Mr. Polk. It was that upon
which the Presidency hung, first in the nominating convention, and
\ then at the ballot-boxes, where the people ratified the act of the con-
vention. This is the precise truth, to deny which is both dishonest
and unwise." '

But if Clay's defeat was thus due to the anti-slavery spirit

* of a minority, Polk's siipfiort can hardly be said to have been

due solely to slavery. It was rather due to the Western

^ spirit of expansion, wbipJi wasunwilling to pPl bumida U»-the

growth of the nation, and theret'ore welcomed annexafibn.

[e"^IaY<B states were by no meang""Tgrfriendly to Clay.

Maryland^ Virgmia, JNorth Carolina, Georgia, igirtiielqr,

ftft4-~TftRfituuifi' Lci^^^ttlftT^flyft 2Sfij27^ vai^s. for "himj afl

against 277,615 for Eolk; anJlia tfae--^lootorQL.i'infa^n jjhe
votes from these stdtes stood, 44 for Clay and 27 for Polk.
South Garelina,- which was dominated by "Calhoun, was in
ah exceptional position. Her nine electors were chosen by
her legislature; but if she had held a popular presidential
election there would probably have been nearly 50,000
majority for the Democratic candidates.^

On the-otfaexLJiand^ll the Wostom and South wpst^
states, jadth ih^ single pyppptipn nf Obinj wp^e jgr J^nllr Ohio
gave Clay 5,940 plurality, but Michigan, Indiana, Illinois,
Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana
together gave Polk a plurality of over 50,000.' The tetal
popular vote was. 1^7,243_ for Pi)lk^._ 1^299^^
and42,3QQJor^Bim^3^ Adding the estimated vote of South
Carolina, it mayT)e said that Polk received about 90,000
more votes than Clay and 30,000 more than Qay and Bimey
combined.

The results of the congressional elections wera.fiYenjjpre
dftp.iRiVftijx-ffl.vor of the Democrats than the result of the
presidential election. The new House of Representatives
stood about 12QJ)gmQcretaJ^J^ '

* Pickens to Calhoun, Nov. b, l»44* Amer. Hist. Assn. Rep,, 1899, II, 990.
« 283,423 for Polk 232,860 for Clay. See Stanwood's History of the Pren-

dency^ 223.

* Vote for Speaker when the 29th Congress organized.

CHAPTER XXV

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA

During the period when the terms of the Texan treaty
of annexation were under discussion and the presidential
election in the United States was in progress Mexico was
enjoying an interval of quite unusual tranquillity. The
chronic revolution in Yucatan was for the time being at
an end, and, notwithstanding the urgency of Almonte's ap-
peals for an invasion of Texas, not a Mexican soldier crossed
the frontier. But the political barometer was steadily
falling.

The ominous calm which prevailed was, for the first six
months of the year, in part the effect and m part the cause
of Santa Anna's prolonged absence from the capital. Fol-
lowing his usual custom, he had gone to Manga de Clavo in
the autumn of 1843, before Congress met, and he did not
return imtil the following month of June. He had been
duly elected President in the meantime, in spite of a sullen
and growing opposition, for no one else had yet shown him-
self strong enough to take and hold the place.

The government during these months was intrusted to
the incapable hands of General Canalizo, who managed to
preserve order, in spite of the menacing aspect of foreign
affairs on the north and a chronically empty Treasury at
home. Tomel continued as Minister of War and Bocanegra
as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and they brought at least a
considerable experience into the cabinet of the President
ad interim. But the dictatorship of Santa Anna during the
previous two years and a half had made him and all about
him excessively unpopular. The extraordinary ostentation
he had introduced gave rise to the most injurious suspicions
of corruption, which extended to all his intimate friends;

661

652 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

and the government, being looked upon in Congress with
the greatest distrust, was not able to get anything done.

There was some evidence, as the American minister re-
ported, of a disposition to resist, and to put an end to the
absolute dictatorship which Santa Anna had so long exer-
cised; but if this spirit were to be persisted in he would
come up from Jalapa with nearly the whole of the army
and dissolve Congress. " He is very far from bemg popular,
but is feared by all. His great security consists in the divis-
ions amongst those opposed to him, and their want of a
leader who could command general confidence. The army
is in his interest and so are the clergy generally." But the
diflBculty, as Thompson saw it, was that Santa Anna could
not keep the army unless he paid them; and he could not
pay the army unless he took church property, and he thus
stood to lose either the church or the army.^

In March, 1844, came the news that Houston had rejected
the terms of the proposed armistice, and that he was bar-
gaining with the United States for the annexation of Texas;
and shortly afterward it was announced that the treaty had
actually been signed and sent by President Tyler to the
American Senate. It will be remembered that this informa-
tion was oflficially conveyed through the American charg^
d'affaires in Mexico, and that he had been instructed to
give the Mexican government the strongest assurances that
the United States had not been actuated by any feelings of
disrespect or indifference to the honor or dignity of Mexico.*

The messenger who bore this important commimication,
Colonel Gilbert L. Thompson, reached Vera Cruz about the
fourteenth of May, and on his way to the capital called on
Santa Anna and told him the news, and perhaps suggested,
under orders from Calhoun, some pecuniary compensation
to be offset against the claims of American citizens. Santa
Anna must have felt that Calhoun's instructions merdy
added insult to injury; but with his habitual self-conmiand,
he only said that Mexico was resolved to maintain its rights

» Thompson to Upshur, Feb. 2, 1844; StaU Depl. MSS.

< Calhoun to Green, Apnl 19, 1844; H. R. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., 1 seas., 54.

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 653

over its revolted territory, and could not, therefore, enter
into any agreement on>the subject.^ He had, in fact, already
taken certain steps in view of this new turn of afifairs; for
he had seen in the signing of the treaty of annexation an
opportunity to regain his waning popularity. On May 12
the unpopular Tomel was dismissed from the War OflBce
and General Reyes was put in his place.^ The next day
Canalizo issued a proclamation summoning a special ses-
sion of Congress for the first of June, " to receive the oath of
the Constitutional President, who is about to enter on the
discharge of his duties," to authorize an increase of the
army, and to grant suppUes for the recovery of Texas.'

Having thus prepared for his reception, Santa Anna in
due time set out from his hacienda, and made a formal
entry into the capital under triumphal arches on the even-
ing of June 3. On the next day he appeared before Congress
and took the constitutional oath of office as President of
the republic.

In the meantime Green, the American charge, had con-
veyed the official information of the action of the United
States by means of a note to the Foreign Office, in which he
repeated, almost word for word, the language of Calhoun's
instructions. Bocanegra, in reply, expressed his astonish-
ment that the United States should have agned a treaty
despoiling Mexico of "a Department which, by ownership
and possession, belongs to her." Such an event, he de-
clared, must lead to the most serious consequences. Mexico
was entitled to satisfaction for the atrocious injury which
was done to Mexico by the mere signature of the treaty;
but she flattered herself with the hope that the Senate of a
free and enlightened nation, founded by the immortal Wash-
ington, would not constitutionally consunmiate an act which
reason, right, and justice condemned. If, imfortunately,
contrary to this hope, the treaty should be approved, Mexico

^ MSxico d travis de los Sighs f IV, 515; J. H. Smith's Annexation of Texas,
289-293.

* C. M. Bustamante says that Santa Anna thought Torael was getting too
rich. — (Ajmntes para la Historia de Santa Anna, 250.)

• Dublan y Lozano, IV, 758.

654 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

would consider herself placed in such a position that she
ought to act in accordance with the law of nations and her
reiterated protests. And the minister went on to discourse
at great length upon the wickedness of the United States
government.^ Green sent a rejoinder to Bocanegra, defend-
ing the course of his government; and Bocanegra replied to
Green, and for six weeks an angry correspondence continued
which was published in the government newspaper, but
which led, and could lead, nowhere.*

The real purpose of the Mexican Foreign Ofl&ce in all this
exchange of notes was obviously to fire the Mexican heart,
and thereby to induce an unwilling Congress to vote money
for the army, for money was every day harder and harder
to come by. Accordingly, on June 10, 1844, as soon as pos-
sible after the ceremonies attending Santa Anna's inaugura-
tion and the opening of the special session of Congress,
General Reyes, the new Minister of War, appeared before
the Chamber of Deputies. It was necessary, he declared, to
undertake a campaign in Texas without the loss of a moment.
If the United States Senate should approve the annexation
treaty, war could not be avoided, and the Mexican govern-
ment believed that even should the treaty not be ratified
war would only be postponed for a short time. What was
needed in order to enable the government to act in an effec-
tive manner was an abundance of military supplies and an
abundance of men and money.

"The ordinary expenses of the government," said the Minister of
War, "cannot be met at the present time by the ordinary receipts,
so that a large deficiency exists. I confidently believe that in order
to begin the campaign and to move the army to the territory which
is to be recovered, four million dollars will be barely sufiScient; and
for the present the government limits itself to this sum and gives
assurances that it can begin operations immediately. . . . The gov-
ernment also thinks it urgent that the contingent of men from the
departments be increased by thirty thousand. . . . The government
does not desire extraordinary powers. It restricts itself to those

^ Green to Bocanegra, May 23, 1844; Bocanegra to Green, May 90, 1S44;
Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 52-57.
* Ibid., 5&-89.

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 655

which are conceded to it by the constitutional bases. It goes further,
and asserts that if, through zeal such as has in other times animated
legislators, it is granted these ampler powers, it will undoubtedly re-
fuse them because it desires that its course of conduct shall be pure,
that it shall not be censured for desiring any personal advantages in
the affairs of the nation, and that it may be in all things subUme and
heroic. Save then the country. Save the law. Save principles.
Such is the fundamental idea which dominates the President."

Writing to Calhoun, Green explained that the course of
the Mexican government was based upon its confidence that
the annexation treaty would be rejected by the United States
Senate, and that for this reason the government had assumed
" a lofty and war-like tone, expecting to strengthen its popu-
larity by making the Mexican people believe that the failure
of the treaty was owing to its firmness and threats." ^

In addition to appealing to Congress for money and men,
the Mexican government made further preparation for the
proposed campaign by issuing an order to General Woll,
then in command at Matamoros, which instructed him aa
to the course he was to pursue in regard to the inhabitants
of Texas. Any person who might be found at a distance of
one league from the left bank of the Rio Grande was to be
regarded as a traitor to his country, and after a summary
military trial was to be shot; and persons who might "be
rash enough to fly at the sight of any force belonging to the
Supreme Government" were to be pursued until taken or
put to death.^

Green at once called to see Bocanegra upon the subject '
of this sanguinary order, and told him that he hoped it
would not be put in force against any citizen of the United
States, to which Bocanegra replied that the order applied
only to Mexican citizens.^ In Bocanegra's mind Texans
were of course Mexican citizens.

There was no need of a proclamation calling for the shoot-

^ Green to Calhoun, June 7, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 57.

* The orders to Woll were printed in the Diario de Gdbiemo of June 13, 1844.
Woll issued a proclamation in accordance with these orders, dated Mier,
June 20, 1844.

* Green to. Calhoun, June 15, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 60.

656 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ing of foreigners who might be captured; because that par-
ticular feature of the war was covered by the decree of
June 17, 1843, aheady mentioned, which directed that in
future no quarter should be granted to any foreigner who
invaded the territory of the republic, " whether he be accom-
panied in his enterprise by a few or by many adventurers,
. . . and all such persons, taken with arms in their hands,
shall be immediately put to death." ^

The fact that this latter decree was in full force was made
very apparent within a few days after the interview between
Green and Bocanegra by the shooting of a number of French
and Spanish subjects who had landed in the state of Tabasco
on the seventh of June, imder the conmiand of a Cuban ad-
venturer, one Don Francisco Sentmanat, and who were
captured next day by a government force under General
Pedro Ampudia. Sentmanat, who had himself been gov-
ernor of Tabasco, but had had disagreements with Ampudia
the year before, had been banished. When captured, he
told a very improbable story. He had sailed from New
Orleans, he said, in an American schooner for Honduras,
with a niunber of persons who meant to found a colony.
They had had no intention of landing in Mexico, but had
been driven out of their course by contrary winds and
stranded near Tabasco bar. He did not explain why his
men were armed or why they opened fire on the Mexican
troops who captured them.

Ampudia regarded this invention as only an aggravation
of the original offence, and without any form of trial at once
executed his prisoner.

" Being convinced therefore," he said in his official report, " that I
was now bound to proceed according to the letter and spirit of the
decree of June 17, 1843, 1 granted him the necessary time to make his
will and to receive the spiritual aids of religion, and then had him shot
according to the requirements of the law. . . . After the corpse had
been placed for a few moments in consecrated ground, I directed that
it be taken to San Juan Bautista in order that it might be exposed
as a public spectacle, showing the just punishment by which society

1 /6id., 34.

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 657

had purged itself of a scoundrel who had made open war against it,
and in order that the people might be satisfied that the object of its
terrors and the cause of its disquiet no longer existed." ^

Within the next four or five days Ampudia shot thirty-
eight prisoners out of fifty-three whom he had taken; but
the most shocking feature of these acts of pimishment,
against which the ministers of England, France, Spain, and
Prussia protested, was the fact that after the corpse of Sent-
manat had remained exposed to public gaze for twelve hours
his head was cut off and boiled in oil, and then shown in a
glass jar in a public place.

The Spanish and French ministers also protested against
the shooting of the other prisoners, which they asserted was
not within the provisions of the decree of June 17, 1843, as
the evidence showed no intention to invade Mexican ter-
ritory, and that a regular trial would have established the
fact. Out of the thirty-eight men shot by Ampudia in
Tabasco sixteen were Spaniards and eleven Frenchmen, and
the Mexican government was thus deprived of foreign 33^11-
pathy and support which might have been of value.

The support and sympathy of the Mexican Congress were
however, what the government most needed; but that body
proved to be in no huny to pass any law imposing new bur-
dens on the people. It was rumored that Congress would
have been willing to grant the President "extraordinary
powers," but this would have placed the odium of oppressive
war measures upon Santa Anna; and he insisted that he
would accept nothing but what was constitutionally voted
by Congress. A report from the committee to whom the
matter had been referred bitterly criticised the government
for asking additional supplies, and asserted that the ordinary
revenues would have suflBced for the proposed extraordinary
expenses if they had only been managed faithfully and
economically. The members of the committee did not say
so, but they probably believed the common talk in Mexico,
namely, that Santa Anna did not really want the money

^ Mexico d travis de I08 SigloSf TV, 519.

658 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

which he had asked for in order to make war upon Texas,
but solely in order to forward his own ambitious puiposes
at home, and that his eagerness in respect to Texas was
merely an excuse for carrying into effect his favorite measure
— ^the increase of the army.^

On June 23, the report of the committee was discussed in
the Chamber of Deputies, and the government used its
whole influence to have the report voted down, assert-
ing that the measure which the conunittee reconmiended
would render it impossible to cany on the Texan campaign
effectively, and would even prevent the maintenance of
the existing military force. Various alternatives were pro-
posed, but a project of law for imposing an extraordinary
tax was finally passed and sent to the Senate on the
thirteenth of July. In the Senate the proposed measure
was disapproved, and an amended bill passed on July 29.
By this time the newspapers had taken the matter up.
The government organs angrily charged Congress with a
want of patriotism in dealing so slowly with the urgent sub-
ject of supplies for the Texan campaign; whereupon the op-
position newspapers asked whether the government wanted
a Congress which did not talk, but which took orders from
the editor of the Diario del Gobiemo. The Diario repUed
that this was treason, and at once both houses protested
against the articles in the Diario, and declaimed against any
attacks on the freedom of the press. The ministry ener-
getically sustained the government organ. Although, it was
said. Congress had pretended to read with indignation and
regret the articles of which complaint was made, nothing
had been done except to prove the truth of their assertions;
and, indeed, the controversy over the LHario^s attacks had
effectually diverted attention from the real business in hand,
the raising of money. The opposition leaders industriously
replied to the ministry and kept up the exciting topic ; and
it may be said that the debate over the newspapers marked
the final break between Congress and Santa Anna's govern-
ment. Nevertheless, the raising of money could not be

^ Green to Calhoun, June 15, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 61.

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 669

absolutely refused, and a bill for a special tax {impuesto
extraordinario) was finally passed on August 21, after Con-
gress had been almost three months in session.^ The suc-
cess of Santa Anna was to cost him dear; for the imposition
of the severe special taxes excited the enmity of the people,
who were becoming tired of paying for the support of a
government that was getting to be detested.*

Santa Anna and his ministers^ in urging Congress to grant
supplies, entertained sanguine hopes of material aid from
England.* Thus when Waddy Thompson, on his way back
to the United States, called at Manga de Clavo to take leave,
Santa Anna said that Bankhead, the new British minister,
had assured him that in the event of Texan annexation
"England would have a hand in the matter." * This was
probably a misrepresentation, for Bankhead's official state-
ments were quite diff erelit, and when the news of the annexar
tion treaty reached Mexico, and he was asked by Bocanegra
whether England would give aid to prevent annexation, he
declined to give any explicit promise.*^ So also after Santa
Anna came to the city of Mexico, and before the opposition
of Congress had fully developed, he himself told Bankhead
that rapid preparations were making to reconquer Texas,
and asked what position Great Britain would take if the in-
vasion of Texas should lead to war with the United States,
but Bankhead again refused to commit his government.^

The British government, however, was at that moment
considering more active measures than Bankhead knew of.
On May 29, 1844, Lord Aberdeen had an interview with
Tomds Murphy, the Mexican charge d'afifaires in London,
in the course of which the annexation treaty was discussed.
Murphy said that Mexico would never tolerate this outrage
on her rights; to which Aberdeen answered that if Mexico
would acknowledge the independence of Texas, Great
Britain, and probably France, would oppose annexation to

» Dublan y Lozano, IV, 760./ » Rivera, HUtoria de Jalapa, III, 619.

• See Chapter XXXI, Vol. II.

* Thompeon to Upshur, March 25, 1844; Stale Dept. MSS.

* Bankhead to Aberdeen, May 30, 1844; E. D. Adams, 176,

• Bankhead to Aberdeen, June 29, 1844; ibid.^ 177.

660 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

the United States, and he would endeavor to arrange a joint
guarantee of Texan independence as well as of the boundaries
of Mexico. He even went so far as to say that, "provided
England and France were perfectly agreed/' England would
go to the last extremity to prevent annexation.^ Following
this interview, on May 31, Aberdeen invited the French
government to join in offering to guarantee that the inde-
pendence of Texas, if acknowledged by Mexico, "shall be
respected by other Nations, and that the Mexico-Texian
boundary shall be secured from further encroachment";
and he then informed Bankhead of what was proposed.*

When a copy of Murphy's memorandimi of May 29 in
reference to his conversation with Aberdeen, and Aberdeen's
instructions in reference to it, reached Mexico, Congress had
not yet passed the special tax law, and Santa Anna was
eager to impart the news. "I shall send this conununica-
tion to Congress," he was quoted as saying, "show them
that England will, stand by us, and they must now give the
money. . . . The English government say we must either
conquer Texas or grant its independence — what will Congress
say to that!" But though Bankhead finally prevailed on
the Mexican government not to submit the memorandmn to
Congress, he could not find out what coiu-se the government
would ultimately take. He did not believe that Santa Anna
was sincere in his declared intention to invade Texas, and
he also believed, like most other people, that if the money
were raised the greater part of it would go into Santa Anna's
pockets.'

However, by the end of October, as difficulties began to
thicken in Santa Anna's path, the ministers showed them-
selves inclined to consider seriously the British plan of a
joint guarantee. Bankhead wrote that he had secured their
practical acquiescence, and a month later he sent a memo-
randum, drawn up with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of
"points on the settlement of which the Mexican Govem-

* Memorandum of Conversation^ etc. ; tWd., 168.

' Aberdeen to Bankhead, June 3, 1844; tbid., 171.

* Bankhead to Aberdeen, Aug. 29, 1844; ibid., 184.

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 661

ment might agree to grant the independence of Texas." ^
It came too late. Long before this reached London, both
the British and French governments had agreed to drop the
plan of a joint guarantee, and Bankhead was instructed to
point out clearly to Bocanegra that if Mexico " were to take
the rash step of invading Texas with a view to its forcible
reconquest," she must not look to Great Britain to help her
out. Again Aberdeen wrote that the mere existence of a
plan to make war on Texas defeated in advance the purpose
of the Anglo-French combination ; and hence the combina-
tion was at an end.* The Mexican hope of possible help
from European countries was thus disappointed; but the gov-
ernment did not wholly give it up, and returned later to the
plan of recognizing Texas in order to prevent the alternative
of annexation.

During all this time the government of the United States
was by no means an iminterested spectator of the course of
events in Mexico. In June, inunediately after the adjourn-
ment of the American Congress, Calhoun, in a veiy miamia-
ble temper, took up the subject of Mexican relations. He
had indeed much cause for annoyance. The Texan treaty
was defeated. He himself had not got the nomination for
the Presidency. And he had made no success, so far, in
his conduct of foreign affairs.

Some weeks before this Thompson, who was a regular
Whig, and had determined to support Clay, had resigned his
place as minister to Mexico, and the appointment was offered
to Wilson Shannon, an Ohio lawyer of middle-age, who had
been twice elected governor of his state, but who was other-
wise without distinction. He had been confirmed by the
Senate shortly before its adjournment.

In giving him instructions upon his departure Calhoun
dwelt ''upon various causes of complaint against Mexico.
The failure to pay the instalment due under the Claims Con-
vention was, he declared, a violation of national faith, in-
jurious alike to the honor of Mexico and the interests of the

t Bankhead to Aberdeen, Oct. 30 and Nov. 29, 1844; ibid., 187, 188.
* Aberdeen to Bankhead, Sept. 30 and Oct. 23, 1844; ibid., 186.

662 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

United States. Certain recent decrees of Mexico, prohibit-
ing foreigners from residing in the border states, from engag-
ing in retail trade, and from having in their possession
imported merchandise for more than a year, were all (as
they affected American citizens) infringements of the treaty
of conmierce of 1831. With regard to the Texas treaty, the
United States government could not permit itself to be
drawn into a controversy.

'' We hold Texas to be independent, de jure as well as de facto; and
as competent, in every respect, to enter into a treaty of cession, or
any other, as Mexico herself, or any other independent Power; and
that, in entering into the treaty of annexation with her, we violated
no prior engagement or stipulation with Mexico. We would, indeed,
have been glad, in doing so, to have acted with the concurrence of
Mexico . . . because, in our desire to preserve the most friendly
relations with Mexico, we were disposed to treat her with respect,
however unfounded we believed her claim to Texas to be. . . . You
will also state that you are instructed to pass over unnoticed the
menaces and offensive language which the Government of Mexico
has thought proper to use. . . . The Government of the United States
is too mindful of what is due to its own self-respect and dignity, to be
driven, by any provocation, however unwarranted or great, from that
decorum of language which ought ever to be observed in the official
correspondence of independent States. In their estimation, a good
cause needs no such support, and a bad one cannot be strengthened
by it" 1

At the same time Texas was watching the warlike prepara-
tions of Mexico with anxiety and mieasiness. General WoU
had sent to President Houston a formal declaration of war,
dated Jmie 19, 1844, stating that the President of Mexico
had directed that hostilities be renewed, and declaring that
"the civilized world will become the judge of our rights,
while victory will crown the efforts of those who fearlessly
wage the battle for their country, opposed to usiupation " —
a curiously ambiguous phrase.* But it was not until the
month of August that information began to reach the Texan
government that troops were really assembling with a view

^ Calhoun to Shannon, June 20, 1S44; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Ckmg., 2 sen., 23.
» Ibid., 26.

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 663

to marching on San Antonio. The Texan Secretary of State
therefore wrote to Howard, the United States charg6
d'affaires, requesting that the necessary steps be taken to
cause the assurances of the Aimerican government to be
carried into effect by extending military aid to Texas.
Howard at once replied that the Aimerican government had
not agreed " to interpose by affording military aid to Texas
in the present emergency," such promises as were made
being limited to the constitutional power of the President
while the treaty was before the Senate.^

This very unwarlike reply did not at all suit Calhoun, who
wrote to Howard, the moment he learned of the correspond-
ence, that while the President could not make war on Mexico
without the authority of Congress, he could and would make
suitable representations to the Mexican government against
the renewal of the war in the savage manner in which it was
proposed to conduct it, and he added that when Congress
met the President would reconmiend the adoption of meas-
ures to protect Texas effectually pending the question of
annexation.* Calhoun, who always had his own peculiar
views as to the meaning of the Constitution, told the Texan
representative in Washington that he had at first drafted
instructions to Howard which went even further, but that
the gentlemen at the head of the War and Navy Depart-
ments wished to have some of his promises as to the use
of the army and navy omitted.*

Instructions were sent at the same time to Shannon,
directing him to present to the government of Mexico a
serious protest and warning. There could no longer be any
doubt, said Calhoun, that Mexico intended to renew the war
against Texas on a large scale, and to carry it on with more
than savage ferocity; and there was no doubt that the ob-
ject of renewing the war was to defeat the annexation of
Texas to the American Union. The United States could
not stand by and permit Texas to be desolated, or to be

* Jones to Howard; Howard to Jones, Aug. 6, 1844; ibid,, 25-28.

' Calhoun to Howard, Sept. 10, 1844; ibid,, 38. Howard had died in Texas
Aug. 16, 1844, although Calhoun did not hear of it until Sept. 15.

* Raymond to Jones, Sept. 13, 1844; Jones, 382.

664 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

forced into a "foreign and unnatural alliance." The Presi-
dent would therefore be compelled to regard the invasion
of Texas by Mexico, while the question of annexation was
pending, as highly offensive to the United States, whose
honor and weKare and safety could not permit such an
attack. Moreover, the voice of himianity cried aloud
against the manner of conducting the war.^

A week later another step was taken in aid of Texas.
Orders were sent to the commanding officers of the army in
the Southwest directing them to restrain all hostilities and
incursions on the part of the Indian nations living within
the United States; and they were informed that, if after
consultation with the Texan authorities it was deemed ad-
visable to occupy points within the limits of Texas in order
to prevent Indian hostilities, this might be done. At the
same time A. J. Donelson, a nephew, and formerly the
private secretary, of President Jackson, was appointed
charg6 d'affaires to Texas.^

But while the United States and Texas were thus Tnalnng
what preparations they could to meet the threatened danger,
the warlike clouds in Mexico had altogether dissipated.
The act passed by the Mexican Congress on August 21,
1844, was very far from providing any such sum of money
as would have been needed to enable Santa Anna to
undertake a vigorous campaign. He had been in fact dis-
appointed in not receiving the enthusiastic and vigorous
support from Congress on which he had counted, and he
felt that his surroundings in the city of Mexico were daily
becoming more and more hostile. The death of his wife on
the twenty-third of August gave him an opportune excuse
for withdrawing from the scene of his defeat. He therefore
obtained permission from Congress on September 7 to re-
tire to the country, and his faithful Canalizo was again ap-
pointed President ad interim. Canalizo, however, was ab-
sent at the time from the city, as he had been intrusted

^ Calhoun to Shannon, Sept. 10, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 seas., 29.

* Adjutant-General to Taylor; same to Arbuckle; Calhoun to Donelson,
Sept. 17, 1844; %bid,f 37, 38. See also private letter of Calhoun to Donelson,
Sept. 16, 1844; Amer, Hist, Asm. Rep. 1899, 614.

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 665

with the command of the army that was intended to be
sent to Texas, and Santa Anna therefore turned over the
presidency to General Herrera as president of the council.
Herrera, however, only held it for about three weeks, for
Canalizo came back to Mexico on September 19, and two
days later took up the work of the office.

The government soon afterward determined to ask Con-
gress to authorize a loan of ten million dollars to cany on
the war with Texas, and to meet other necessary public
expenses, this request being based on the assertion that the
extraordinary tax would fall very far short of producing the
four miUion dollars which had been considered necessary to
begin the campaign, so that some other means of raising
money was essential. In fact, very Uttle money had yet
been collected, nor had anything whatever been done to
prepare for an advance, and no hostile measures of any con-
sequence had been taken, in spite of Woll's threats and
proclamations. Congress, however, was proving itseK more
and more independent of Santa Anna, and the most serious
opposition to the loan at once developed.

Llaca, a member of the Chamber of Deputies from Quer6-
taro, gave the project its death-blow in the latter part of
October. The man, he said, who had caused the loss of
Texas on that unhappy day when he gave to the rebel
colonists the victory of San Jacinto by going to sleep in
front of the enemy had no right, under a pretence of
carrying on a Texan war, to exact impossible sacrifices
from the nation; and the galleries saluted the speech with
enthusiastic and noisy applause. Long newspaper contro-
versies followed as to whether Santa Anna or Filisola had
lost Texas, and the historical discussion diverted attention
from the proposed ten-million-dollar loan.

In order to arouse congressional enthusiasm to the point
of voting money, the government, in accordance with their
usual course, now published in the official organ their cor-
respondence with Shannon, the United States minister, who
had been received on the first of September, 1844. In ac-
cordance with his instructions he had duly presented to

666 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Rej6n, who had shortly before succeeded Bocanegra as
Minister of Foreign Relations, the warlike protests and
warnings required in Calhoun's instructions of September
10. These were well calculated to excite Mexican anger.

The President, said Shannon, had learned with deep re-
gret that the Mexican government had announced its de-
termination to renew the war against the republic of Texas,
and he protested both against the inva^on and also as to
the manner in which it was proposed to be conducted. The
decree of the provisional President of June 17, 1843, and the
orders of General Woll, issued June 20, 1844, had left no
doubt upon the latter point. In what spirit these orders
would be fulfilled was well illustrated by the fate of the
party under General Sentmanat at Tabasco, who "were
LJted and executed, without hearing or trial, against the
express provision of the Constitution and the sanctity of
treaties, which were in vain invoked for their protection."

"Such," continued the United States minister, "is the barbarous
mode in which the Government of Mexico has proclaimed to the world
it is her intention to conduct the war. And here the inquiry naturally
arises, what is her object in renewing, at this time, a war, to be thus
conducted, which has been virtually suspended for eight years, and
when her resources are known to be so exhausted as to leave her with-
out the means of fulfilling her engagements? But one object can be
assigned; and that is, to defeat the annexation of Texas to the United
States. She knows full well that the measure is still pending, and
that the rejection of the treaty has but postponed it. She knows,
that when Congress adjourned it was pending in both Houses, ready
to be taken up and acted upon at its next meeting, and that it b at
present actively canvassed by the people throughout the Union.
She is not ignorant that the decision will, in all probability, be in its
favor, unless it should be defeated by some movement exterior to the
United States. The projected invasion of Texas by Mexico, at this
time, is that movement, and is intended to effect it, either by con-
quering and subjugating Texas to her power, or by forcing her to
withdraw her proposition for annexation, and to form other connexions
less acceptable to her.

"The United States cannot, while the measure of annexation is
pending, stand quietly by and permit either of these results. It has
been a measure of policy long cherished, and deemed indispensable
to their safety and welfare, and has accordingly been an object steadily

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 667

pursued by all parties, and the acquisition of the territory made the
subject of negotiation by almost every administration, for the last
twenty years. This policy may be traced to the belief, generally
entertained, that Texas was embraced in the cession of Louisiana by
France to the United States in 1803, and was improperly surrendered
by the treaty of Florida in 1819, connected with the fact that a large
portion of the territory lies in the valley of the Mississippi, and is
indispensable to the defence of a distant and important frontier. . . .

"The President has fully and deliberately examined the subject,
and has come to the conclusion that honor and humanity, as well as
the safety and welfare of the United States, forbid it; and he would
accordingly be compelled to regard the invasion of Texas by Mexico,
while the question of annexation is pending, as highly offensive to the
United States. He entertains no doubt that ihey had the right to
invite her to renew the proposition for annexation; and that she, as
an independent State, had a right to accept the invitation, without
consulting Mexico, or asking her leave. He regards Texas, in every
respect, as independent as Mexico, and as competent to transfer the
whole or part of her territory as she is to transfer the whole or part
of hers. . • •

"Such are the views entertained by the President of the United
States in regard to the proposed invasion, while the question of annexa-
tion is pending, and of the barbarous and bloody manner in which it
is proclaimed it will be conducted; and, in conformity to his instruc-
tions, the undersigned hereby solemnly protests against both, as
highly injurious and offensive to the United States." ^

Ilej6n replied in the usual maimer, making much of the
imlucky phrase that the annexation of Texas had been a
cherished measure of American policy for twenty years; but
gross as Shannon's indiscretions were, and violent as was the
language of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in his reply, the
correspondence failed to produce the effect which the Mexi-
can government had hoped for at home. In the United
States the tone of the correspondence served only to hasten
the annexation measures.

The truth was that by this time the Mexican public had
lost confidence in Santa Anna's administration, and was
beginning to accuse him of having betrayed the country.
It was beginning also to be publicly said that he had threat-

> Shannon to Rej6n, Oct. 14, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 seas., 48-52-
Rejdn to Shannon, Oct. 31, 1844; H. R. Doc. 19, 28 Cong., 2 seBS., 8 et $eq-

668 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ened the United States with war in case of annexation sim-
ply for the criminal purpose of finding, in a foreign war, a
plausible pretext for prolonging his dictatorship and squeez-
ing the tax-payers, in order to benefit the private fortunes
of his followers and to help along impudent speculators.^
Obviously the time had come when a revolt was certain to
break out, and it was not long delayed.

On October 30, 1844, the departmental assembly of Jalisco
began the revolt by sending a petition to Congress in which,
after a detailed statement of grounds of complaint, it sub-
mitted a proposal for repealing the law of August 21 which
imposed the extraordinary tax, and for an amendment of
the Constitution "in the respects in which experience haa
shown that it is contrary to the prosperity of the Depart-
ments." Federalism was once more coming into fa^on.
The garrisons in Jalisco at the same time signed a declaration
approving these proposals of the departmental assembly,
and inviting General Paredes to put himself at the head of
the forces.

Paredes hesitated before taking any decided action, but
on the second of November he issued a manifesto to the
nation reviewing the history of the revolution which he
himself had set on foot in 1841, and which had resulted in
the Bases of Tacubaya.^ He accused Santa Anna of not
having known how to discharge the duties devolved
upon him, and asserted that in his hands the army had
come to a deplorable condition. The ranks were not filled,
the men were not paid, promotions were wrongly made, the.
widows and families of patriots were in poverty, and yet
the military budget had grown to such an exorbitant sum as
the nation could not satisfy. The government offices were
in the most frightful disorder and confusion. The Treasmy
was disorganized and bankrupt, and was surroimded by

^ M6xico d travia de los Sighs, TV, 523.

' Paredes had in fact been conspiring for some time before, and the govern-
ment knew it. Tq get him out of the way, he was appointed governor of
8onora in August, and flattering letters were sent to him from Santa Anna,
Rej6n, and others. See El General Paredes y ArriUaga, 139-207 (Garda,
DocumerUos InSdilaa, etc., XXXII).

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 669

inexorable creditors, by insatiable speculators/ by naked
soldiers, and by hungry employees. What had become of
the public funds? More than sixty million dollars had been
placed at the disposal of General Santa Anna since October
10, 1841, and what had he done with them? It might not
be easy to reply to these simple questions, but it was appar-
ent, and was indeed a matter of general attention, that some
speculators had acquired sudden fortunes under the shadow
of absolute power, and had converted themselves into vam-
pires of the blood of the people.

"The plunder of the property of the nation is carried on with the
greatest impudence. The administration of the custom houses and
contracts of all kinds have been an abundant mine for the new variety
of thieves, who are scattered in bands throughout the whole of the
Republic. Hence that accumulation of frauds which have now become
a habit and a system — hence that scandalous luxury with which the
public poverty is insulted. Although the crimes of the Texan colonists
have offended the generosity of Mexicans, the unhappy event at San
Jacinto has excited public indignation. Ever since that time, the
nation whose honor has been wounded has been willing to make
every sacrifice to vindicate the stain upon its honor, and this universal
enthusiasm has been a talisman to which recourse has been had to
extort from the people heavy taxes and to carry forward ambitious
designs. Under the pretext of recovering Texas, Santa Anna ex-
torted from Congress the decree to raise four million dollars as a war
subsidy, but that money was spent before it had been collected."

Paredes went on to say that Santa Anna could very well
have undertaken the Texan campaign at the end of the year
1842, when the government had ample means for the pur-
pose; but in place of doing so, and thus putting the nation
in possession of the rights of which it had been defrauded,
he had sent the army to Yucatan, where hundreds of lives
and thousands of dollars had been wasted. If the eight
thousand soldiers sent against Campeche and Merida had
been sent against Texas triumph would have been certain.

"History will say to future generations that in the acts of General
Santa Anna there has never been anything great, anything noble,
anything becoming; that he has pursued a petty and culpable policy.

670 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

and has used wicked and vile methods; that his tortuous progress has
been that of a tyrant made insolent by power or infatuated by pros-
perity; that his base duplicity and his unmeasured ambition do not
deserve to be compared with the bold generosity of great rulers; and
finally that in everything he has done there is nothing noticeable but
a heterogeneous mass of contradictory qualities, — ^nothing great but
his crimes, and even these are made petty by the smaUness of his
motives, which have merely been to satisfy a general avarice and the
inclinations of a pirate." ^

This declamation need not be accepted as an accurate
statement of f acts^ but it is of value as indicating what was
then said, and in some cases beUeved, by those who were
opposed to Santa Anna's government.

For several days the govenimentoi^ans persisted in ignor-
ing the movement in Jalisco, but by November 9 it was
officially announced that the supreme government had
directed the President to place himself at the head of the
troops stationed at Jalapa, and to march to Quer^taro, so as
to be ready to act according to circumstances; that the
President had replied he was glad to comply with the order
and to serve the country : and that troops to the number of
seven thousand Wanf^fifteen h^dml cavaJ-y, and twenty
pieces of field artillery were on the march. It was also, of
course, officially declared that the real purpose of the pro-
moters of the pronunciamlento was to put an obstacle in the
way of the Texan war; but it was in vain for Santa Anna
any longer to blow his Texan trumpet. His enemies
professed to be just as earnest as he for the recovery of the
lost territory, but they declared they would not have him
as their leader.

On November 12, in the Chamber of Deputies, General
Reyes, the Minister of War, was questioned as to the order
directing the President to take conmiand of the army, con-
trary to the provisions of the Constitution, which prohibited
his doing so without express authority from Congress. The

^ Mixico d travis de los SigloSf IV, 524-525. Santa Anna afiserted that
G6mcz Pedraza, then a senator, was the real author of this document, and he
had told Canalizo to arrest him and imprison him in San Juan de Ult&a. — (Santa
Anna to Canalizo, Dec. 5, 1844; Causa Criminal, App., 0.)

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 671

minister, in reply, admitted that he had given the order re-
ferred to, and that he had done so because of the high regard
which the army had for Santa Anna, and that he was ready
to defend his action before a court of impeachment if it was
thought contrary to the Constitution. The galleries hooted
and hissed the minister, who furiously denoimced the con-
duct of the crowd, asserting that they were instigated by
some* of the deputies; and order was only restored by going
into secret session. On the following day the Minister of
War was impeached.

Santa Anna himself reached Mexico a few days later, and
tried in vain to come to an agreement with Congress; but
Congress did not believe in Santa Anna's good faith and
nothing was done. And after two or three days spent in
these fruitless efforts, and after issuing a long reply to the
manifesto of Paredes, he set out to overtake his army on
the march to-Quer6taro.

On Simday, November 24, 1844, Santa Anna entered
Quer^taro, receiving what he regarded as a very cool re-
ception from the inhabitants. He administered an angry
rebuke to the ayuntamiento next day for their failure to
come out to meet him. But there was worse than disrespect
at Quer6taro, for the departmental assembly had passed a
resolution approving the action taken in Jalisco. On
Monday the governor was ordered into Santa Anna's pres-
ence and was violently upbraided for allowing the assembly
to pass such a resolution. Looking at his watch, the Presi-
dent said to the governor: "It is now 12 o'clock, and if by
to-morrow at this time the repeal of the act by the assembly
is not here, your Excellency will be deposed and put under
arrest, and the deputies will be sent to Perote." The gov-
ernor tried to defend the assembly, but Santa Anna abruptly
turned his back on him and went out of the room.

The people of the town, with quite unexpected spirit, sus-
tained the members of the assembly. There were great
popular demonstrations. Balconies were hung with black.
Citizens put on mourning. And the members of the assem-
bly, amid shouts and applause, declared that they would

672 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

go to Perote, or go to death if need be, rather than make an
ignominious retraction. Before this determined opposition
Santa Anna quailed, and the order to send the members to
Perote was revoked.

But the mischief was done, for the news soon reached
Mexico, and the ministers were at once called upon in the
Chamber of Deputies for an explanation. The discussion
took place in secret session, although a crowd was demand-
ing that the hearing should be public. The ministers at
first refused to give any explanation, but finally promised to
obtain official information from the President, and Congress
declared itseK to be in permanent session. Thereupon the
ministry took military possession of the palace and refused
to allow Congress to sit.^

The Senate then met at the house of its president and
drew up a protest, which the ministers refused to have
printed. The members of Congress who could be got to-
gether replied by passing a resolution denying the authority
of the executive to prevent the meeting of Congress, and
declaring that the government measures were destructive
of the Organic Bases on which the republic rested, and
tended to destroy the present form of government, and that
Congress would continue sitting in such place as it might
consider suitable. Upon this the ministers were so ill-
advised as to issue a decree, dated November 29, suspending
the sessions of Congress until public order should be re-
established and the executive put in a position to carry on
effectively the Texan campaign, for which objects, it was
announced, the government had assumed all necessary
authority. In a second decree, dated December 2, all au-
thorities and employees of the republic were required to
swear obedience to the decree of November 29.*

The ministry at once met with general opposition. The
Supreme Court of Justice on December 2 declared that
having sworn to obey and cause to be obeyed the Organic
Bases of the republic, which the nation had accepted, and

* Mixico d travis de los SigloSf IV, 527.

> Decrees of Nov. 20 and Dec. 2, 1S44; Dublan y Lozano, IV, 767, 768.

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 673

considering that the government had no power to suspend
these Bases, they found it legally impossible to comply with
the decree, and would continue to discharge their functions
in compliance with the Bases referred to. Similar protests
were made by other official bodies. The city was filled with
alarm and agitation. All classes made sport of the authori-
ties. The box containing Santa Anna's amputated foot was
taken from the cemetery and dragged triimiphantly through
the streets, and his statues in the market-place and at the
palace were thrown down.

The agitation against Santa Anna's government spread as
fast as the news of the decree of November 29, suspending
the sessions of Congress, could reach the rest of the country;
On the second of December the garrison of Puebla joined
in the revolt. The task of the government was now to,
maintain itself in the capital, and for this purpose cannon;
were planted in the streets and patrols were kept moving
through the whole city. For two or three days longer a
condition of imeasiness prevailed, but at last, on the sixth
of December, a battalion pronounced in support of the Con-
gress, and in a moment the whole fabric of the government
collapsed. The rest of the troops united in the mutiny, and
before night Canalizo was in prison and Herrera, as presi-
dent of the council, was again called upon by Congress to
assume the duties of President.

General Herrera, who thus succeeded to the chief executive
post, was about a year older than Santa Anna, and, like him,
was a native of Jalapa. Both he and Santa Anna had been
officers in the Spanish army, and both had supported the
revolt of Iturbide. Herrera had been always Santa Anna'a
obedient friend and follower, and it is not surprising, there-
fore, that Santa Anna looked upon Herrera's assimiption of
power as an act of personal treachery. The circumstances
imder which he rose to the presidency were, however, some-
thing quite outside of Santa Anna's experience, for there
had never before been a revolution such as this in the his-
tory of independent Mexico. It was not the work of a single
military chieftain, but was a general rising of all the govern-

674 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

ing classes of the community against the attempt of Santa
Anna and his friends to re-establish a dictatorahip. In a
proper sense it was not a revolution at all, for the leaders of
the movement were acting in strict accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. Herrera was not one of the
leaders. He happened to be in office and was selected by
those who really possessed the power as a mere figure-head,
and as such he remained; and for the first time in Mexican
history the government was really in the hands of a small
group of men in Congress who were in a position to insist
upon a responsible ministry.

■^On theTveniBg of the Sth of December a new nudsfy
was created in which Luis G. Cuevas was Mmister of For-
eign Relations, a post he had filled under Bustamante's
government at the time of the war with France. The min-
isters inmiediately set to work to obtain from Congress
authority to raise a force of volunteers and to incur the
necessary expenditure,^ while at the same time General
Bravo, the last survivor of the old revolutionary leaders in
the war of independence, was put in conunand of the city
of Mexico, and his name, of itself, gave great weight to
Herrera's government.

While these things were happening in the capital Santa
Anna was on his way to attack Paredes. He was at Quer^
taro when the news came of the decree of November 29,
closing the sessions of Congress, and from there he wrote to
Canalizo and his ministers expressing his delight at their
vigorous action. "The protest of the Deputies and Sen-
ators," he wrote to Canalizo, "is very ridiculous, and I am
sure it will not find an echo anywhere." Energetic disposi-
tions to save the situation and severity for the enemies of
the government were what he reconunended.*

Two days later he had heard of the mutiny of the troops

^ at Puebla, and he wrote that he could only spare six himdred

men from his own forces, but that while the defection of

General Inclan, in conmiand at Puebla, was not pleasant it

» Law of Dec. 9, 1844; ibid., 769.

' Santa Anna to Canalizo, Dec. 4, 1S44; Cauaa Criminal, App., 8.

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 675

really did not matter, provided the government acted with
skill and firmness. "In short, my friend," he wrote to
Canalizo, " resolution, exemplary chastisement for the heads
of every conspiracy: don't stop now on the road, since that
would be very dangerous at this moment. WeaJmess and
vacillation are dangerous." ^

But at the very moment Santa Anna was sending this
advice to the city of Mexico his government was crumbling
to pieces, and he received at Silao, four or five days later, the
news of the catastrophe. It was perfectly evident that the
destruction of Paredes had now become a secondary object,
and at once Santa Anna halted his army and returned toward
the capital. From Celaya he wrote as foUows to Herrera:

"My dear Friend and Companion. I regret extremely that you
have so far forgotten what is due to our old friendship, our pleasant
relations, and what I think I am entitled to as first magistrate of the
Republic, as not to have thought fit to write me to give information
of the events which have placed you for the time being at the head
of the administration. I do not know what to think of this silence
on your part, although indeed I seem to see in it a kind of hostility
towards me personally which I do not think I deserve in any view of
the case: but I hope I am mistaken in this idea, and that th^ origin
of your silence may be something else.

"But whatever it may be, I am to-day writing to you officially
that as I consider myself in complete possession of the rights and priv-
ileges which are granted to me by the constitution, I am about to
proceed to the capital with the object of taking up the duties of Presi-
dent of the Republic. My honor and my duty impose upon me the
obligation of asking you to turn over to me the exercise of the post of
chief magistrate, which the nation spontaneously conferred upon me
for a period of five years, and I trust that your good judgment will
decide in accordance with that which in my opinion reason demands,
namely, not to oppose the precepts of the law. ... I am starting
to-morrow for Quer^taro and will then proceed to the capital at the
head of the army of operations." '

At Quer6taro Santa Anna caused explanations of the
mutiny at the capital to be circulated. It was the work,

^ Santa Anna to Canalizo, Dec. 6, 1844; ibid,, 18.
* Santa Anna to Herrera, Dec. 18, 1844; ibid., 36.

676 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

his official organs asserted, of foreigners, and was paid for
by foreign gold. These foreigners (presumably Frenchmen
and Americans) were burning with anger at the mere memory
of December 5, 1838 (the day Santa Anna lost his leg at
Vera Cruz), and were interested in putting an end to the
career of the only man who was capable of conducting the
war with Texas. ^ At the same time he sunmioned a meet-
ing of the officers of his army, who duly signed a declaration
to the effect that they would support Santa Anna, and
would not recognize those who were in power at the city of
Mexico ; and that they would not lay down their arms imtil
order was re-established and the constitutional authority of
the President was acknowledged and obeyed by all.*

By this time, however, Santa Anna's enemies at the capital
were busy with his impeachment. On December 6 he had
been formally accused "of having attacked the constitu-
tional system established by the Bases of Organization of
the RepubUc by dissolving the departmental assembly of
Quer^taro, by arresting its members, and by suspending the
governor of that department." To this was subsequently
added the charge of co-operating in preparing the decree of
November 29, and of endeavoring thereby to destroy the
constitutional government of the repubUc. On December
10 the two houses of Congress met and formally declared
that, having considered the accusation and certain docu-
ments which were in evidence in the case of General Canalizo,
testimony should be taken in regard to the acts of which the
President was accused.

All this was in strict accordance with the Constitution.
By Article 90 of that instrument the President might be
proceeded against criminally for treason against the national
independence and the form of government established by
the Constitution. The two houses of Congress in joint ses-
sion were, in such a case, to constitute a grand jury, whose
business it was to examine the charges and to formulate

* Mixico d trav^ de los SigloSj IV, 531.

* Acta de la junta mUUar celehrada en QueritarOf Dec. 20, 1844; Cauaa
Criminal, App., 46-56. . .

THE BANISHMENT OF SANTA ANNA 677

an indictment which was to be heard before the Supreme
Court of the nation.^

Santa Anna, with his army, reached the suburbs of Mexico
on Christmas Day, but he could not bring himself to the
point of attacking the city. The fact probably was that he
thoroughly distrusted his own officers. "You know," he
had written to Canalizo on December 6, "the kind of Uttle
officers (pficialitos) we have, whom you have to keep imder
your eye all the time." * He therefore only paused for a
day or two, and by the first of January, 1845, he had ar-
rived, with his division, in front of Puebla, and exchanged
shots with the forts. For the next ten days some desultory
firing was kept up, but reinforcements for the garrison
began to come in from the city of Mexico and Santa Anna
saw that the game was up. He offered to resign the presi-
dency if he could have permission to retire to a foreign
country with full pay and restoration of his statues and por-
traits, but the new government refused to entertain any
terms short of unconStional surrender.

Santa Anna's men were by this time demoraUzed and
many were deserting, and he finally advised them to sub-
mit, and started for the coast with an escort of seven or
eight hundred cavahy. His Uttle remaining force was,
however, intercepted by the garrison at Jalapa and Santa
Anna left them. With only four men he attempted to
make his way through by-paths to the coast, but he was
arrested by some volunteers at the village of Jico, on
January 15, and was carried the next day to Jalapa,
where he was kept for four days in prison, incomunicado,
and then sent to the castle of Perote.

The Congressional party had now completely triumphed
in all parts of the republic and the impeachment proceedings
were pressed. Santa Anna's answer to the charges against
him was taken, and on February 24 the two houses of Con-
gress, sitting as a grand jury, formulated and adopted the
indictment against him by a vote of 90 to 7.* For the next

* Dublan y Lozano, IV, 435-440. * Cawa Criminal, App., 17.

• Ibid., 105.

678 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

three months the slow procedure of the Mexican courts
continued. Santa Anna was examined in his prison at
great length, but finally, on May 24, 1845, Congress passed
a law of amnesty, by which all persons charged with poUtical
crimes were granted a pardon, with the exception of Santa
Anna, Canalizo, and the ministers. As to Santa Anna, it
was provided that the proceedings against him should be
terminated provided he would leave the national territory
within a period to be fiixed by the government, in which case
his resignation as President of the republic would be ac-
cepted.^ Santa Anna made haste to accept the tenns
offered, and on June 3 he embarked with a yoimg wife,
V whom he had recently married, and took up his residence
' in Havana.

^ Dublan y Lozano, V, 18.

CHAPTER XXVI
CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION

We have seen that President Houston and his advisers
early in the year 1844 had been reluctantly induced, under
the strong pressm^ of public opinion, to enter into negotia-
tions for a treaty of annexation. How far they expected
or wished for success in these negotiations was uncertain,
and in particular Houston's personal attitude at this time
has always been an enigma. But it may fairly be said
that the President of Texas and his cabinet remained at
least lukewarm while the subject of the treaty was before
the government and people of the United States.

A week before the treaty was actually signed the British
charg6 d'affaires reported Houston as very much embarrassed,
but stm firm in his desire for independence, and aa demand-
ing such terms from the United States as it could not pos-
sibly grant.^ On the day foUowing the date of this letter
the American charg6 was writing to Washington very much
to the same effect. Houston, he said, had received letters
from Van Zandt, and had written to the Texan representa-
tives in Washington not to move in the negotiation unless
such pledges and assm-ances as Murphy had given were
again renewed by the American government.*

Nevertheless, when the treaty actually reached him,
Houston was not displeased. To Van Zandt and Hender-
son he wrote that Calhoun's assurances of protection did
not "embrace the guarantee as fully as was contemplated."
Still, he thought the treaty weU enough, but he was clearly
convinced that this was the last effort that Texas would
ever make, and if it failed he did not believe that any solici-

1 Elliot to Aberdeen, April 7, 1844; E. D. Adams, 161.
s Murphy to Tyler, April 8, 1844; SUUe Depi. MS8.

679

680 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

tation or guarantee would at any future day induce her to
consent to annexation.^ To Jones he wrote that he pre-
sumed the treaty would do very well. "All we had to do
was to dispose of ourselves decently, and in order. K this
is done it is weU done." * To the Ajnerican charg6 Houston
was more expansive.

"I then took occasion," Murphy wrote, "to make known to his
Excellency, So much of the substance of your despatch to me, relating
to the defence of Texas pending the Treaty of Annexation, as I deemed
useful, and proper to Communicate; at which he arose to his feet, and
gave utterance to his feelings of gratitude toward the President of
the United States and yourself for this distinguished manifestation
of the generous and noble policy which ruled in the Councils of my
beloved Country." •

A little later Houston's views underwent a change.
Murphy thought it necessary to keep near Houston in order
"to keep up his spirits and cheer his hopes of the final suc-
cess of the treaty, for he is often despondent of its fate." *
By this time Houston also began to think that the treaty
with the United States contained conditions not quite liberal
to Texas, and he expressed some apprehension that the
Texan Senate might not be disposed to ratify it. These
suggestions, he said, he had not made public, nor did he
intend they should be so made, but he beUeved the United
States would realize everything from the treaty, while Texas
would derive very httle.* Another week's reflection brought
him to the conclusion that it was useless for Henderson to
remain in Washington if the American government was not
disposed to consummate the plan of annexation.

" Whatever," he said, " the desires of this Govt, or the people are,
or might have been in relation to annexation, I am satisfied that they

^ Houston to Van Zandt and Henderson, April 29, 1844; Tex, Dip, Corr,, U,
274.
' Houston to Jones, April 29, 1844; Jones, 347.

* Murphy to Calhoun, April 29, 1844; Am. Hist. Asm. Rep. 1899, 948.

* Same to same, May 8, 1844; State Dept. MSS.

* Houston to Van Zandt and Henderson, May 10, 1844; Tex. Dip, Corr,^
11,278.

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 681

are not ambitious at this time, nor will ever be again, to be seen in
the attitude of a bone of contention, to be worried or annoyed by the
influence of conflicting politicians. . . . The desires of the people of
Texas, with my love of .repose — (this far I am selfish) had detennined
me in favor of annexation. My judgment though rendered subser-
vient to their inclinations and my own, has never fully ratified the
course adopted. Yet in all good faith I have lent and afforded every
aid to its consummation." ^

Houston, however, could do nothing but wait until the
American Senate took some definite action ; but toward the
end of June his fears were again excited by the official noti-
fication of the renewal of hostilities. The Mexican govern-
ment, he was informed by General WoU, " is highly indignant
at the perfidious conduct of those said inhabitants towards
the republic, which, ever generous to them, believed they
were acting in good faith, until' the contrary became mani-
fested by their disregard of the promise made in the treaty
of armistice." * Upon receipt of this notice, and later upon
information reporting a threatened Mexican advance upon
San Antonio, Houston again appealed to the United States
for aid; an appeal which, as has been seen, the American
charge did not feel himself authorized to consider favorably.

At about the same time that General Woll's threats of
renewed hostilities reached the Texan government they also
received news of active efforts on the part of the British
government to prevent annexation. Writing to Lord Cowley
at the end of May, 1844, Lord Aberdeen had proposed " a
joint operation on the part of Great Britain and France in
order to induce Mexico to acknowledge the independence
of Texas, on a guarantee being jointly given by us that that
independence shall be respected by other Nations, and that
the Mexico-Texian boundary shall be secured from further
encroachment." ' At almost the same time Ashbel Smith
wrote giving an account of interviews on the same subject
with the King and Guizot in Paris, and with Addington and
Aberdeen in London.

I Same to same, May 17, 1S44; ibid., 281-283.

* Woll to Houston, June 19, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sees., 26.

< Aberdeen to Cowley, May 31, 1844; £. D. Adams, 171.

682 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

"The negotiations/* he reported, "for our incorporation in to the
American Union and the treaty signed for this purpose at Washington
took both cabinets by surprise. Both Governments are opposed to
the annexation and will use all legitimate me^ns to prevent its taking
place. They have instructed their ministers at Washington, U. S.
to present a protest against it to the American Gov. as stated in former
dispatches of mine. These Governments have conferred together,
and as Lord Aberdeen informed me, will act in concert in relation to
this subject. I understood Monsieur Guizot to intimate the same
opinion, though he did not distinctly express it. . . .

"Lord Aberdeen inquired what had occasioned this desire on the
part of the citizens of Texas to be annexed to the United States. I
replied the chief reason in my opinion was to be found in the continu-
ance of hostilities on the part of Mexico, or rather of harassing threats
and occasional though inefficient preparations to attack Texas, which
nevertheless were sufficient to deter immigration and prevent those
enterprises for developing the resources of our country which can only
be executed in times of p>eace; that our citizens were wearied out with
the state of things, which for aught we could see might under present
circumstances continue for twenty years or even a longer period. . . .

"Your department will perceive that the proposed 'annexation' has
excited very great interest in these two countries, altho' the rejection
of the Treaty by the American Senate is here deemed quite certain.
My clear opinion is, that in the event of the rejection of the treaty
in question, Texas may profit by the present circumstances to induce
France and England to compel Mexico to make peace with us; pro-
vided Texas will give to those two Powers satisfactory assurances
that it will not become incorporated into the American Union."

Smith added that Aberdeen had also remarked, in the
course of his conversation, that he would say nothing more
about slavery.

Having thus presented the subject to the consideration of
the Texan government as a possible option in case annexa-
tion should be found impracticable at the present time,
Smith concluded by saying he would wait for information.^
There was in fact nothing else for him to do, and for the
next few days he continued in London, endeavoring —

'' to impress on the leading men here the opinion that the only means
of preventing annexation is by rendering it unnecessary or disadvan-

1 Smith to Jones, June 2, 1844; Tex. Dip. Con., II, 1485^1488.

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 683

tageous for Texas: — that tho' the 'Treaty* will be rejected for the
present by the U. States Senate, owing chiefly perhaps to temporary
party considerations, that the American people will not long resist
the allurement of so important and desirable an addition to their
territory." ^

On June 24 Smith had another interview with Lord Aber-
deen, chiefly in reference to the negotiations at Washington
for annexation. Smith thought that the unfavorable im-
pression relative to the course of Texas which Aberdeen
entertained at the former interview had been entirely re-
moved, and reported that he had made a more definite
proposition, contingent, however, upon the expected rejec-
tion of the annexation treaty by the American Senate. As
Smith reported. Lord Aberdeen stated that in the event of
rejection —

"the British and French Governments would be willing, if Texas
desired to remain independent, to settle the whole matter by a ' Diplo-
matic Act*: — this diplomatic act in which Texas would of course par-
ticipate would ensure peace and settle boundaries between Texas and
Mexico, guarantee the separate independence of Texas, etc., etc.; —
the American Government would be invited to participate in the ' Act'
as one of the parties guaranteeing etc., equally with the European
Governments; — that Mexico, as I think I clearly understood his Lord-
ship, would be invited to become a party to the Diplomatic Act, and
in case of her refusal, would be forced to submit to its decisions: —
and lastly, in case of the infringement of the terms of settlement by
either of the parties, to wit, Texas or Mexico, the other parties would
be authorized under the Diplomatic Act, to compel the infringing
party to a compliance with the terms. . . .

"The permanent perpetual character of a diplomatic act of the
nature spoken of by Lord Aberdeen, appears to me as it will doubt-
less to you, worthy of our gravest consideration before acceding to
it; and the inviting of European Governments to make compulsory
settlement of dissensions between the countries of America and the
conferring on them of the right to interfere in our affairs may lead to
the greatest inconvenience on our side of the Atlantic; as such in-
terference and settlements have been the pretexts for inflicting
atrocious wrongs and oppressions on the smaller states of Europe.
I have believed that the objections to a Diplomatic Act as mentioned

1 Same to same, June 18, 1844; ibid,, 1153.

684 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

above will be deemed by our Government greater perhaps than the
inconveniences of our unsettled relations with Mexico." *

Writing privately a week later to Jones, Smith said that
he had found on Aberdeen's part "the most friendly tone
and soUcitous dispositions towards Texas," and that, while
"extreme dissatisfaction" had at first been felt in reference
to the course of Texas on annexation, he beUeved it had been
whoUy removed from Lord Aberdeen's mind by a plain
statement of the motives which had led to the adoption of
this course.*

It is very doubtful whether the proposal for a "Diplo-
matic Act" could ever have been carried into effect even if
the Texan government had heartily approved it. Paken-
ham and Pageot, in Washington, had just written to their
respective governments warning them that any action look-
ing toward foreign interference would only serve to defeat
Clay and to make the annexation of Texas certain. And
France, in spite of the wishes of the King and Guizot, would
have hesitated long before actually agreeing to any under-
taking that might require her to use force in order to support
British interests upon the western shores of the Atlantic.
But these questions never came to thfe test, owing to the
failure of the Texan leaders to agree at that time upon a
clear and definite course of action.

Ashbel Smith's despatches containing Aberdeen's pro-
posal came into the hands of Houston late in the smnmer.
He was then angry and disappointed at the failure of the
treaty in the American Senate, and wrote a memorandum
for Jones directing him to instruct the Texan representatives
in Europe "to complete the proposed arrangement for the
settlement of our Mexican difficulties as soon as possible,
giving necessary pledges, as suggested in the late despatch
of Dr. Smith on this subject, but adhering to the Rio Grande

^Same to same, June 24, 1844; ibid.f 1154. Smith also mentioned in this
despatch that Aberdeen had ''more than once made observations to the efifect
that he regretted the agitation of the abolition of Slavery in Texas . . . and
that hereafter he would have nothing to say or do in relation to the subject."

' Same to same, July 1, 1S44; Jones, 369.

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 685

as a boundary, sine qua rum^^; but by this time Jones had
become the President-elect of Texas, and was by no means
disposed to act as promptly as the more impulsive Hous-
ton. Jones therefore calmly ignored Houston's orders, and
merely wrote to Smith granting him a leave of absence to
return home, as he had requested.

What were the reasons for this act of disobedience is not
certain. Jones himself subsequently asserted that the
«dopUon of Aberieen's suggestiom would ha™ inevitdJy
resulted in war between the United States on the one side,
and Great Britain and France on the other, and probably
would not have resulted in defeating annexation. Ashbel
Smith, reviewing the circumstances nearly thirty years after
the event, expressed the opinion that war would not have
resulted, and that no attempt would have been made by the
United States to enforce the Monroe Doctrine by an appeal
to arms; and he also gave his explanation of Jones's con-
duct.

"Why did Anson Jones, Secretary of State, disobey the orders of
President Sam Houston? Why did he not send instructions to Ashbel
Smith to pass the diplomatic act? It is scarcely possible to me to be
in error in asserting that Mr. Jones declined to send me the instruc-
tions, because he intended to make the diplomatic act, bringing hon-
orable peace and independence, a measure, and it would have proved,
as he dearly saw, the prominent measure of his administration. . . .
But events culminating in annexation were crowding on too rapidly,
too powerfully, to suffer stay; they out stripped every other policy." *

But whatever Jones's motives may have been, he at any
rate contrived that nothing should be attempted during the
brief remainder of Houston's term of office, either in the
way of meeting Aberdeen's suggestions or of taking up a
well-defined line of policy in respect to Mexico or the United
States. Jones succeeded Houston on December 12, 1844,
and by that time Polk had been elected President on an

^ Ashbel Smith, Reminiscencea of the Texas Repvblic, 64; Jones, 44, 55.
The confidential order from Houston to Jones was made public by the latter
in the autumn of 1848 at a time when he had quarrelled with Houston. It is
printed in Niles's Reg., LXXIV, 413.

686 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

annexation platform^ the United States Congress had met
for its short session^ and it had become apparent that the
question of annexation would be discussed, and very likely
disposed of so far as the United States was concerned, within
the next three months.

It might have been expected that President Jones, in his
inaugural address, would have explained the wishes and
purposes of his administration on the vital question of an-
nexation, but he chose to be silent. He made Ashbel Smith
his Secretary of State, and then doggedly sat down to wait
for something to turn up. He had not long to wait, for
within a few days he received a copy of the annual message
of the President of the United States, which announced,
with much emphasis, the course the American admrnistra-
tion desired to pursue.

President Tyler had had every reason to rejoice in the re-
sult of the election of 1844, for, if he himself had not suc-
ceeded, at least the policies he had so long and so stubbornly
advocated were triumphantly sustained. His message to
Congress in December, 1844, was therefore one long strain
of exultation. He dwelt upon the immense improvement in
the condition of the country during the previous three years.
Questions with foreign powers of vital importance to the
peace of the country had been settled and adjusted. The
Seminole war had been brought to a close. The credit of
the government had been thoroughly restored. The empty
Treasury had been replenished. Commerce and manufact-
ures had revived, and the whole country presented an aspect
of prosperity and happiness.

But the point upon which the President dwelt with the
most evident pleasure was the fact that his policy in respect
to Texas had been fully sustained by the vote of the people.

''The decision of the people and the states, on this great and inter-
esting subject/' said the President, "has been decisively manifested.
The question of annexation has been presented nakedly to their con-
sideration. By the treaty itself, all collateral and incidental issues,
which were calculated to divide and distract the public councils,
were carefully avoided. These were left to the wisdom of the future

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 687

to detennine. It presented, I repeat, the isolated question of annexa-
tion; and in that form it has been submitted to the ordeal of public
sentiment. A controlling majority of the people, and a large majority
of the states, have declared in favor of immediate annexation. In-
structions have thus come up to both branches of Congress, from their
respective constituents, in terms the most emphatic. It is the will
of both the people and the states that Texas shall be annexed to the
Union promptly and immediately. . . . The two governments having
already agreed, through their respective organs, on the terms of an-
nexation, I would recommend their adoption by Congress in the form
of a joint resolution, or act, to be perfected and made binding on the
two countries when adopted, in like manner, by the government of
Texas."

The President's suggestions as to the action to be taken
by Congress were followed within a few days by the intro-
duction of a joint resolution in the House of Representatives.
Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, and Stephen A. Douglas, a young
member from Illinois, were the principal supporters of the
measure.

Public sentiment, said Ingersoll, was now weU ascertained;
the subject had been jfetbundantly discussed everywhere ex-
cept in the House of Representatives. In particular it had
been discussed in the late presidential election. He himself,
at every meeting in his district during the campaign, had
said that if elected he should deem himself instructed to
vote for the immediate reannexation of Texas.

*'When we reflect," he continued, "on what public sentiment was
only one year ago, and is now, it is as pleasing as surprising, to per-
ceive how it has grown on this subject. Without government sup-
port, this progress is strong proof of popular will. When Congress
came together last year, Texas was little known in the greater part
of the United States and less liked. Most people were ignorant of
the localities, the advantages, the rights and the realities of that fine
region. A vote on it then would have been largely negative. . . .
If then we represent an American Union governed by the will of the
people, it is our representative duty to bring back Texas into it, if
we can. ... If Southern Secretaries of State — one of whom orig-
inated, and another is striving to consummate the affair — betray
Southern partialities which many of us deem not quite national,
that is no reason why a great national measure should not be effected
on great national considerations."

688 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Douglas denied that President Tyler had the credit of
originating the project of the annexation of Texas to the
Union. It was true, as asserted by the opponents of the
measure, that it had originated with a President not elected
by the people, but that President was John Quincy Adams,
who in 1825 had, with his Secretary of State, Mr. Clay,
offered millions of dollars in order to secure this valuable
acquisition. The annexation of Texas would afford im-
mense commercial advantages, and open a great and in-
creased market to Northern manufacturers, and it would
give better boundaries than the country now possessed and
thus avoid collision with foreign powers.

Belser, of Alabama, after discussing the constitutional
power of Congress to deal with the subject, asked the op-
ponents of the measure what they supposed was to become
of the rising generation in the West? Did they think it
was to stay there to vegetate like a plant and die on the
spot where it grew? They might as well attempt to stop
Niagara. The flood would go onward and onward. It
would fill the Oregon; it would fill Texas; it would pour
like a cataract over the Rocky Mountains, and, passing to
the Great Lakes of the West, it would open the forests of
that far-distant wilderness to the light of the rising sun, and
in fifty years whoever should visit this continent might hear
the voice of the American reaper on the far shores of the
Pacific.

On the other hand, Robert C. Winthrop, of Massachusetts,
opposed annexation upon the grounds, first, that it would
extend the area of slavery, and, second, that the government
had no power to annex a foreign state "by any process short
of an appeal to the people in the form which the Constitution
prescribed for its amendment.''

Giddings, of Ohio, opposed the measure on the ground
that the only substantial reasons urged in favor of it were
the extension and perpetuation of slavery. Upon this text
he attacked the whole system of slavery, and declared that
it was impossible for him to believe that any member of the
House from the north of Mason and Dixon's line could be

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 689

brought to vote for an extension of the crimes and whole-
sale murders involved in the existence of slavery. Should
the measure be carried, it would be in violation of the Con-
stitution; in violation of the honor, the interests, and the
rights of the people of the free states; and in violation of
the rights of man. The repeal of these resolutions, if they
should be adopted, would constitute the rallying-cry and
watchword of the North.

Adams, who closed the debate, admitted that he had been
the first to originate the idea of annexing Texas to the
United States, but he said there was this difiFerence be-
tween his action on the subject and that now contemplated:
he had proposed to purchase Texas with the consent of the
owner, whereas it was proposed now to take it without the
owner's consent. There was the same difiFerence between
his action and that now contemplated as there was between
purchase and burglary. Moreover, slavery did not exist
in Texas when he proposed its purchase. If Texas could be
obtained with the consent of the owners and if slavery were
abolished, he would go for the annexation of Texas to-
morrow. He ridiculed the idea that Texas had been in-
cluded in the Louisiana Purchase. As to the constitutional
power of Congress, he maintained the very singular theory
that while a treaty might be made to acquire territory, there
was no power in the government to act upon the people of
that territory after it was annexed: and he declared that
he would vote against every form of the propositions before
the House on the^ ground that they were imconstitutional.

Therer^fsis likewise much debate asTtrliie-lerm that the,
resolution ought to take, and a radical departure was made
from the terms of the abortive treaty of the previous April.
As ultimately adopted by the House, the joint resolution
expressed the consent of Congress that the territory "prop-
erly included in and rightfully belonging to the Republic of
Texas" might be admitted as one of the states of the Union,
imder a republican form of government to be adopted by
the people of that republic before July 1, 1846, upon condi-
tion, first, that all questions of boimdary should be subject

690 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

to adjustment by the government of the United States;
second; that the new state should retain all its public lands,
to be applied to the payment of the debts of the republic,
which were in no event to become a charge upon the govern-
ment of the United States; and, third, that new states, not
exceeding four in number, might, by the consent of Texas,
be formed out of its territory, provided that in such states
as should be formed out of territory north of the Missouri
Compromise line, slavery should be prohibited. And in that
form the resolution was passed by the House on January 25,
1845, by a vote of 118 to 101.

The debate in the Senate was much -more extensive. It
was begun by Benton, who submitted a bill of his own in
place of the joint resolution of the House of Representatives.
The results of the election had to a certain extent converted
Benton as it had converted others. He now dropped from
his bill the provision for obtaining the assent of Mexico,
which he said he omitted because of the difficulty of agreeing
upon this and other conditions, and because it was clear
that whatever bill was passed the execution of it must de-
volve upon the new President, in whom he had every con-
fidence. He therefore proposed the admission of Texas upon
such terms as might be settled by a joint conmiission.

A Jju;ga4)aif of the discussion in the Senate turned upon
the constitutional question of the power J^ adMt new stat^^
and especially as to whether this could be done otherwise
than by treaty. There was not much discussion as to the
merits of annexation. Many of those who wei:e opposed to
the joint resolution expressed their approval of the annexa-
tion of Texas "whenever it could be accomplished in a
manner consistent with the principles of the Constitution,
and without disturbing the various interests and the ex-
ternal peace of the Union." Thus Archer, of Virginia, ad-
mitted that the annexation of Texas was the will not alone
of the majority of the people, but of a very large majority
of the people of Virginia. To his constituency he yielded
the question of expediency, but nothing could prevent him
from interposing his voice against the violation of the Con-

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 691

Btitution. Rives, of Virgima, and Huntington, of Connecti-
cut, contended that annexation by joint resolution was un-
constitutional, and also that it was inexpedient because we
had more territory than we could occupy for ages to come.
The suggestion, which had been frequently heard before,
that if Texas was annexed the war with Mexico would be
annexed too, was also mentioned; but it had less weight
than when the treaty was imder discussion — ^for while the
Senate alone could not make war, it was evident that Con-
gress had the power to do so if it chose.

Thus the debate dragged its slow length along through
January and February, until it became extremely doubtful
whether a vote could be had in the Senate before final ad-
journment. There were the usual rumors that if the Senate
failed to pass the joint resolution the new President would
summon a special session of Congress. Nobody wanted a
special session, and indeed a majority of the Whigs were not
very much in earnest in their opposition. A liirge propor-
tion of the party would have been glad to see Texas admitted
provided it were not done under Democratic auspices. A
part of the Whig party was, of course, bitterly opposed to
the project on anti-slavery grounds, but there were not
many members of Congress in either house who shared
these views.

In the meantime the country began to be heard from. In
Vermont and Massachusetts and New York there was talk
of a dissolution of the Union if annexation were carried.
"Rather than be in Union with Texas^" wrote William Jay,
"let the confederation be shivered. My voice, my efforts
will be for dissolution, if Texas be annexed," ^ and there were
many who shared his views. The legislating of Vermont,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Ohio passed resolutions
against annexation; but, on the other hand, the legislatures

^Garrison, III, 94. The lAberaloT was clamoring for dissolution of the
Union. In i843 it had placed and kept at the head of its columns the famous
declaration that the Constitution was "a covenant with death and an agree-
ment with hell/' which ought to be immediately annulled. The Liberty
party, on the contrary, did not favor disunion, even though Texas should bo
annexed.

692 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

of Maine, New Hampshire, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri,
Alabama, and Louisiana passed resolutions in its favor.
What was perhaps more important, the newspapers through-
out the coimtry took up and daily discussed the question.
The pressure of public opinion, especially in the Mississippi
Valley, where Western expansion was most popular, made it-
self felt; and this, coupled with the fear of an extra session,
led to a final disposition d the controversy, which was set-
tled, as so many controversies have been settled in Congress,
by a somewhat unmeaning compromise. After some private
talk Walker, of Mississippi, proposed that the resolution
passed by the House should be amended by tacking on the
substance of Benton's bill. The resolution would then pro-
vide that the territory belonging to the republic of Texas
should be admitted as one of the states of the Union, upon
the conditions named in the House resolution; but if the
President of the United States should "in his judgment and
discretion deem it most advisable," he might negotiate with
the republic of Texas for admission upon such terms and
conditions as might be agreed upon by the two governments.
In effect this gave to the President the right either to invite
Texas to come into the Union upon the terms fixed by Con-
gress, or to invite Texas to come in upon terms to be there-
after agreed upon; and the question whether the invitation
should be delayed in order to formulate terms which might
be more satisfactory to Texas, was left entirely to the judg-
ment and discretiori of the Pi^dent.

Senator Tappan, of Ohio, three years later, in a letter to
the New York Evening Post, asserted that he and other
Democratic senators would have voted against the passage
of the resolution if it had not been for statements made in
debate by McDuJEe and others that President Tyler would
not dare to act under the resolution during the few remain-
ing days of his term, and assurances from some of Polk's
friends that he would accept* the second alternative, and ap-
point a mission to Texas composed of the first men in the
coimtry. Benton confirmed Tappan. Polk, however, ve-
hemently denied, when the story came to his ears, that he

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 693

ever authorized any such assurances; and the weight of
evidence seems to sustain him, and to throw doubt on the
whole of Benton's narrative.^

At any rate, the joint resolution as thus amended came to
a vote on Wednesday, February 26, and was passed by 27
senators in the aflSrmative to 25 in the negativeVxhe vote^
wafi,£ractically on party lines, all the Deiiipcrats favoring

{he r<Han1nHnnjmjj^,1] f.hp WKigq hilt twn hping flg^TnsTT TtT

It w^MrT]r7^ra7ipft]i^^ fiin'mnn Of the New England states,
New Hampshire voTed in lavor of* tSie. resolution and one
senator eacLfromMaiire and Connecticut. Both senatore
frc^TNew York, Pennsylvania,^;;CMo*.And JEd^^^
con^ in i^tefavdrjlboth senators f romT^ew Jersey, Delaware,
and Michigan agaansftET'^the Southern states, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Vil^nia, and I/iuiaana were opposed and Mis-
si^iri, Arkansasj South GgroMnay~ and Mississippi were in its
favor. The remaining stat^ weredivided. ""

On Friday, FeBruaiy 28,"11ie joint lesolution was returned
to the House of Representatives, the question being upon
concurrence in the amendment made in the Senate. There
was no debate, the previous question was ordered, and the
joint resolution in its amended form was passed by a vote
which was largely increased over that by which the resolu-

tion had been originally passed. ThejroL

affirmative to 76 in the n(^frsifiw--j[u^

On the next day, Saturday, ^3farch 1 , the resolution was

signed by President Tyler.

The question then arose whether action should be taken
by the outgcring administration or whether it should be left
for President Polk. Immediately after signing the resolu-
tion, as Tyler subsequently recorded, he had a conversation
with Calhoim, who expressed the hope that the President
would not hesitate to act. Tyler replied that he entertained
no doubt in the matter of the method of proceeding so far

* See Benton's Thirty Years' View, II, 636, where Tappan's letter Is printed.
Polk called on the members of his cabinet for their recollections of what
passed at the time in question. His correspondence with Buchanan on the
subject is in Moore's Buchanan^ VIII, 208, 240. And see Polk's Diary^ IV,
38-52, 186, 187.

694 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

as Texas was concerned; that he regarded the Senate amend-
ment as designed merely to appease the discontent of one
or two members of that body, and for no other purpose; and
that his only doubt of the propriety of inmiediate and prompt
action arose from a feeling of delicacy to his successor.
Calhoun urged strongly the necessity of inmiediate action,
and thought that no consideration of delicacy ought to
stand in the way; and it was finally agreed that a cabinet
meeting should be held on the day following, which was
Sunday, the second of March. The whole cabinet concurred
in the necessity of immediate action, although it was agreed
that Calhoim should wait upon Polk and inform him of the
President's views; and after the meeting of the cabinet
Calhoun did wait on Polk, and reported that the President-
elect declined to express any opinion or make any suggestion
in reference to the subject.^ Thereupon instructions were
at once despatched to Donelson, the American representa-
tive in Texas, directing him to present to the Texan govern-
ment, as the basis of admission, " the proposals contained in
the resolution as it came from the House of Representatives."
He was also directed to urge speedy action, for time was im-
portant, "and not a day ought to be lost." *

Almontftj thfi Mft?riftan minintSIL"^ Wa.shingt.QQ^of course
ex^tfOBseAJiiigBi^^'theTiiUHt vehement mSimeragaJiisl" the
joint4;^olution. The American government, he wrote, had
now con8mnm"at6d"^ari""ML uf atj^ijiression; the mus<y>- unjust
which could be foimd recorded in the annals of modem
history, namely, the despoiling a friendly nation of a con-
siderable portion of her territory. For these reasons he
solemnly protested against the law whereby the province of
Texas, "an integrant portion of the Mexican territory,"
was admitted into the American Union; and he ended by
demanding his passports.*

> Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 364. It is probable that Polk let it be
tacitly understood he would approve. In his message to Congress the follow-
ing December he said that his predecessor had elected to submit to Texas the
first part of the joint resolution as an ov^ure from the United States. '* This
decUon I approved"

' Calhoun to Donelson, March 3, 1845; Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 seas., 32.

* Almonte to Calhoun, March 6, 1845; ibid,, 38.

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 695

But in spite of Almonte's protests the new American ad-
ministration proceeded to cany forward, without hesitation
or delay, the policy which Congress and the people of
the coimtry had sanctioned. President Polk had had no
difficulty in making up his mind to adopt the action of his
predecessor. He regarded thenceforward the annexation
of Texas as a thing to all intents and piuposes finished;
and in his purpose to go forward at once with the plan of
annexation, the new cabinet fully concurred.

Polk's^ Secretaiy of State was James Buchanan, of Penn-
sylvania, the son of an IJ^^ a man at this
time fifty-four years old. He tiad been for several years in
the House of Representatives, had been United States min-
ister at St. Petersburg, had been three times elected to the
Senate, and had been supported by his state for the Demo-
cratic nomination to the presidency. He was a lawyer by
profession, a man of imdoubted abilities, which were ham-
pered through all of a long life by constitutional timidity
and a lack of resolution or strength of will. But these de-
fects in Buchanan's character were fully compensated by
the dogged pe^istence and detennination of the P^ddeot".
Polk, like many other Ulster Scots, had neither imagination
nor a sense of humor; but in spite of these shortcomings
he was an excellent administrator and the master of his
cabinet,' and under him Buchanan became merely an in-
strument for carrying out the policies which were prescribed
by the more determined and positive character of the
President.

Ca^Kg^^a^d had hopes of being continued in his office
as SQere^ryl:>{ State, but the offer was not made to him.
Whatr^^f^^olk^^ motives can only be conjectured, for he
left no record on that subject; but it is easy to see that a
man of Calhoim's intense personality and determination,
holding views so extreme, would have been a very trouble-
some member of the cabinet, unless the President were pre-
pared to let him have his own way entirely in the conduct
of his department. This Polk was certainly not ready to

^ Schouler, IV, 497.

696 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

do, and he contented himself with offering Calhoun the
position of minister to England, which Calhoun civilly
declined.*

The new cabinet contained other men of wide experi-
ence and a high average of intellectual ability^ , Robertj^
Walker, of Mississippi, who had been for years a member
of tEeSenate, was SecretaQ^f the^reasuiy. *\Villiam L.
Marcy, of New Yor^, whose rugged strength of character
iftdirtellect has never received due recognition, a former
governor of his state and a former member of the United
States Senate, was Sep:etary of S^r. George Bancroft, of
Massachusetts, who had just led a forlomTtope as candidate
for governor of his state, was Secretary of the Navy. John
Y. Mason^ of Virginia, who had been successively^~Secretary
of the Navy and Attorney-General in Tyler's cabinet, and
was a college friend^ tfie'neW'President, was continued in
his post ; and Cave Johnson, of Tennessee, an active Demo-
cratic politinnnj wnn K^^gtrrinfitpr-Gftnprnl

Buchanan did not enter upon the duties of Secretary
of State imtil the tenth of March, and his first act was to

deal ^th tha-4y^f>«f4o?m AgJBinpr nnt nf thp jninf. lY^snlnfinTT

"toF'flie annexation of Texas. To Donelson, the American
charg6 d'affaires m Texas, he wrote that the President enter-
tained "a clear and firm conviction that it would be inex-
pedient to reverse the decision of his predecessor," and he
therefore confirmed the instructions sent by Calhoim on
the third of March, and directed Donelson to exert all his
ability and energy to obtain the acceptance of Texas, " with-
out qualification of the terms and conditions proposed by
the first two resolutions." ^

To Almonte Buchanan wrote acknowledging receipt of
Ws protest.

"The admission of Texas/* he said, "as one of the States of this
Union, having received the sanction both of the legislative and execu-
tive departments of the government, is now irrevocably decided, so

> Calhoun to Mrs. Clemson (his daughter), March 11, 1845; Am, Hist, Asm.
Rep, 1899, II, 647.

' Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 35.

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 697

far as the United States are concerned. Nothing but the refusal of
Texas to ratify the terms and conditions on which her admission
depends, can defeat this object. It is, therefore, too late at present
to reopen a discussion which has already been exhausted, and again
to prove that Texas has long since achieved her independence of
Mexico, and now stands before the world, both de jure and de facto,
as a sovereign and independent State amid the family of nations.
Sustaining this character, and having manifested a strong desire to
become one of the members of our confederacy, neither Mexico nor
any other nation will have just cause of complaint against the United
States for admitting her into this Union."

AndJie-added the President's regrets that the government
of Mexico fihnnld have taken ofTence at these proneedingSj
and his promise to use his ^^most strenuous efforts" for an
amicable adjustment of every cause of complaint between
the twogovernihents.^

T^ejgjmim^^^ of Mexico, for whom these friendly as-
surances were intended," was, h6wever7T)y no means ready to
be so easily placated. The progress of the presidential elec-
tion in the United States had been followed with close and
painful interest, and the result had given rise to very serious
talk as to the policy which Mexico ought to pursue, so that
the new administration of Herrera found itself confronted
at the outset of its existence by a very difficult problem,
which it made a frank and honest effort to solve.

One of the first duties of Cuevas, the new Minister of
Foreign Relations, was to draw up the annual report of his
department for submission to Congress, and in this docu-
ment, which was not submitted until March, he discussed at
considerable length the question of Texas. He began by
admitting with unusual frankness that the separation of
Texas from Mexico was de facto complete. This separation,
for which "our national disorders" were responsible, was ac-
tively supported by the American government, and recog-
nized by the most powerful nations of Europe.^ But the

> Ibid., 39.

' T^as 86 ha sustraido de hecho de la union nadonal; y esta separacidnt de que
son reaponsablea nuestras revueUaa nadonalest estd apoyada decididamente por
el gdbinele de los Eatados^Unidoa, etc. — {Memoria de Relacionee, 1845, 14.)

698 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

American government had gone farther, and had announced
the policy of incorporating that territory in the American
Union, and had even threatened to consider an attack upon
Texas as an offence against itself. There were, therefore,
two questions for Mexico to decide. The first was the in-
dependence of Texas, the second its annexation to the United
States. It would be easy to continue the old policy of in-
voking public opinion and doing nothing effectual; but a
responsible ministry was bound to consider the case fairly,
and endeavor to ascertain the people's will before committing
the people to costly sacrifices. The rights of the nation were
imquestionable; but the na.tinn musf.^cEQQ5g"te?lweeu ttiong
and costly war on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an
arrangement which, without injuring its good name, would
afford it security for the future.

If internal order were fully established in Mexico, a war
against Texas might have a certain and glorious result.
But even in that case there would be serious difficulties.
The population of Texas was entirely foreign. It had no
sympathies with the Mexican nation. Its manners, its cus-
toms, and its political methods all exhibited the differences
which existed between the Mexican and the American races.
It was impossible to think of either annihilating the inhabi-
tants of Texas or of compelling them to abandon the coimtry.
The most determined and disciplined army and the most
prudent policy would not suffice to maintain Texas in a
condition of peace and sincere union with the Mexican re-
public, so long as the influence of the present inhabitants of
the department and the hostile tendencies of its neighbor
continued.

On the other hand, " the difficulties which the recognition
of Texan independence presents are not less serious, whether
we consider the integrity of our territory, or the national
honor, or the evils which may come to us from that part of
our country, — as it will be a source of contraband trade and
a constant threat to our frontiers and a support for the
enterprising and ambitious policy of the United States."
Mexico had pledged its word to recover Texas, but had made

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 699

no "formal demonstration" since the first campaign. The
1oflflf>f TftNftfl wt>uld (liftmftTphfir thft Mexican jbemtory by
alBlfind^dag^jme^^^^ parts.^ An independent Texas

WisnlJundoubtedly be the natural ally of the United States,
would comply with all its exigencies, and would tend to in-
jure Mexican commerce and impair Mexican order near
the boundary.

The question imder discussioii^ Cuevas continued, had ac-
tfuired extreme importance because of the declared annexa-
tion policy of the government of the United States. The
very existence of li^exico was involved in the question., Jlfefi
independence of Texas would be a Jairfortune, ^itits annex-
ation to the United States might be fatal.. The Mexican
govemmeiit thfergfore proposed to undertake d negotiation
to fix definitely the relations between Mexico and Texas.
What would be the basis of that negotiation, or the conduct
of the government, it was not easy to indicate in advance,
because it was hardly possible to foresee the events upon
which these things must depend; but Congress might be
sure that the government would do nothing that was not
honorable to the country or in conformity with the senti-
ments of the two houses.

Thus far the Minister of Foreign Relations had written
when, about the middle of February, 1845, the passage of
the annexation resolution by the American House of Repre-
sentativ^ became known in Mexico. The British minister
who was consulted advised moderation and caution, and

tooK 6(i(iii»iijfl afenUi CO mgy llb aukiiuwiMlgiiiyiii uf mim.

Juev^' replied "that the prdipdaHSBr 10" T&[!Ug!ll2(J. TeSas
would be instantly rejected by the Mexican Congress imless
supported by both England and France. " I reminded his
Excellency," reported Bankhead, "that any assistance from
England must be a moral one, for whatever disposition may
at one time have existed to go beyond that line, has now
been withdrawn." ^ Cuevas waited some three weeks longer

^ Bankhead to Aberdeen, March 1, 1845; J. H. Smith's Annexation of Texas,
420. Charles Bankhead, who was afterward minister to the United States,
had arrived in Mexico as minister a year before, in March, 1844.

700 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

before submitting his report to Congress, and he then added
to his first draft the following clause:

"Since the foregoing was written, the government has received
information that the project of annexation was approved in the House
of Representatives of the United States by a majority of twenty-two
votes. This project having been sent to the Senate, it now depends
upon that body whether or.aQ^this iniquitpua ^I'jurpati^h shall he car-
ried further, — of which the world will judge with all that severity
which unquestionable right, honorable p>olicy, and an event unfort-
unate for Mexico and humanity, require."

The report of the Minister of Foreign Relations as thus
amended was read in the Mexican Senate on March 11, and
in the Chamber of Deputies on March 12, 1845, and although
no action was taken by Congress at that time in regard
to the recommendations concerning Texas, the effect upon
public opinion must have seemed satisfactory to Cuevas,
\ _ for within a week he authorized the British minister to say
\ that Mexico was disposed to receive overtures from Texas
with a view to recognition. This information Bankhead,
on March 20, conmiunicated to Captain Elliot, the British
representative in Texas, adding that all the bravado of
threatening hostilities meant nothing.^
- The day after Bankhead sent off his message, news came
that the American Senate had passed the joint resolution.
The fact was annoimced by Almonte, who wrote from Wash-
ington on February 28, while a salute was being fired in
honor of the passage of the resolution, and he informed his
government that he intended to sail from New York in a
few days.* Cuevas at once sent for Bankhead, who en-
deavored to calm his excitement; and later both the English
and French mmisters discussed the situation with him and
strongly recommended moderation. On March 22, 1845,
with these admonitions in his ears, he formally reported the
fact to Congress. The proposition for the annexation of
Texas, he said, had been accepted by the United States, and
it wa. now n^^ry to inte^Tbarrier to the advance

1 Bankhead to ElUot, March 20, 1845; ibid,, 422,
« Sec. de Rel. Ext. MSS.

CONGRESS INVITES TEXAS TO ENTER THE UNION 701

of their invading neig^tjQijjiLtfeg. north; but he confined his
comments to expressions of regret over "the criminal care-
l^ness" with which former administrations had looked
upon this affair at a lime when resources were ample and
opjportunities were good for prosecuting a war — ^the direct
result of past neglect being the consummation of this out-
rage and the difficulties of the times. A week later he ad-
dressed a note to the American minister in Mexico in grave
and moderate terms.

"T[^e undersigned," he wrote, "in addressing your Excellency for
the last time, has the regret of informing him that as the law of Con-
gress of the United States in regard to the annexation of Texas to
its territory has been approved, and as the Mexican minister has
retired from his mission and presented a protest against the act of ,
Congress and the government of the United States, diplomatic rela- J y-
tions cannot continue between the two countries. What can thai /
undersigned add to that which has abeady been said by his govern- \/
ment in regard to the grave offence inflicted by the tJnited States /\^
upon Mexico by usurping a portion of its territory and violating the
treaties of friendship which the republic on its part has observed as
far as its honor will permit and the desire of avoiding a rupture with
the United States? Nothing more than to lament tfiat free and re-
publican nations, neighbors worthy of a fraternal union founded in
mutual interest and a common and noble loyalty, should sever their
relations by reason of an event which Mexico has endeavored to fore-
stall, but which the United States have carried through and which
is as offensive to the first as it is unworthy of the good name of the
American Union. The undersigned repeats to his Excellency, Mr.
Shannon, the protest which has been presented against annexation,
adding that the republic of Mexico will oppose it with all the earnest-
ness which becomes its honor and sovereignty, and that its govern-
ment trusts that that of the United States may more carefully weigh
considerations of loyalty and justice than those of an increase of
territory at the expense of a friendly republic, which, in the midst
of its misfortunes, desires to preserve an unstained name and to de-
serve thereby the rank to which its destinies call it." *

The British and French ministers had seen this note and
endeavored to moderate its tone before it was sent; and it

^ Cuevas to Shannon, March 28, 1845; Spanish text in Mixico d travU de
lo8 Siglo8, IV, 538.

702 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

waajthe^bject of remark ^iat> while war wno thrpfltfiDgi^tt^
Mexieaa govenuQgnt did not reassert a claim to Texas.^

Shannon contented himself by replying That* the United
States, having tendered the olive branch to Mexico by assur-
ances that annexation had been adopted in no unfriendly
spirit, and being desirous of adjusting all questions, including
that of boimdary, on the most just and liberal terms, had
done aU.that was possible. It now remained for Mexico to
determine whether friendly relations should be preserved or
not. For himself, he would await the arrival of of&cial infor-
mation from his government before taking any further steps.*

Official information, of a kind not very pleasant to Shan-
non, was in fact on its way. The American Secretary of
State, two days before Shannon's last note to Cuevas, had
written disapproving his course in regard to the Rej6n cor-
respondence of the previous October. The President, it
was stated, was desirous of adjusting all questions in dis-
pute between the two republics, for he did "not believe that
any point of honor can exist between the United States and
Mexico which ought to prevent him from pursuing a friendly
policy toward that republic ".; and under these circumstances
it was apparent that some other person than Shannon
would do better service. He was therefore recalled^' ___At^
the same time William S. Parrott was sent as a secret agent
to Mexico, with instructions to try to convince the Mexi-
can authorities that it was the true interest of their country
to restore friendly relations; that the United States was
prepared to meet Mexico in a liberal and friendly spirit in
regard to dU unsettled questions; and that a minister would
be sent to Mexico as soon as assurances were given that he
would be kindly received.* Parrott sailed from New York
on the third day of April in the same ship with Almonte and
his family,* and how he fared in his mission of peace will be
seen in a later chapter.

^ J. H. Smith's Annexation of Texas^ 422.

> Shannon to Cuevas, March 31, 1845; StaU Dept. MSS.

* Buchanan to Shannon, March 29, 1845; ibid.

« Buchanan to W. S. Parrott, March 28, 1845; Moore's Buchanan, VI, 132.

» Parrott to Buchanan, April 2, 1845; StaU Dept. MSS,

CHAPTER XXVII

TEXAS ENTERS THE UNION

Anson Jones, the new President of Texas, was a native
of the town of Great Barrington, in Massachusetts. He had
been educated at the academy in the pleasant village of
Lenox, and had left the Berkshire Hills to attempt mercantile
pursuits. He had subsequently studied medicine in Phila-
delphia, graduating from the Jefferson Medical College in
1827. Six years later he landed at Brazoria, where he prac-
tised medicine. He was a surgeon in Houston's little army,
and participated in the battle of San Jacinto, and from that
time on was pretty constantly in public life imder the re-
public of Texas. He was Texan minister to the United States
under Lamar, and was Secretary of State through the whole
of Houston's second administration. At the regular elec-
tion in September, 1844, he was chosen President by a good
majority, having the support of Houston and his friends.
A sagacious, cool-headed man, of very moderate abilities,
his temper was in rather striking contrast with that of so
emotional and ill-balanced a nature as that of Houston.
Chiefly, perhaps, for this reason, he conceived in later years
a great hostility to Houston, which he gratified by the
publication of letters and memoranda filled with bitterness
against his former colleague. But it seems clear that, in
1845 at least, Houston professed none but friendly and even
cordial feelings for the new President.

"Houston/' says Ashbel Smith, "stood a giant of power in the
land — he stood by President Jones and on his strong arm Mr. Jones
visibly leaned for support. President Jones's administration was in
all its leading policy a continuation of the preceding administration
of President Houston." *

^ Smith, Reminiacencea of the Texaa Republic, 60.

703

704 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Jones had not been four months in office when the great
responsibiUty of deciding the future of Texas — the choice
between annexation, on the one hand, and independence and
peace with Mexico, on the other — ^was laid upon him and the
people of Texas. If, as he wished it to be understood, he
had really so shaped his foreign pohcy as to secure simul-
taneous offers from rival suitors, he could not have managed
better; but it may well be doubted whether he was capable
of playing so deep a game, and whether he was not in reality
being carried helplessly along upon confused currents which
he had no power to control, and against which he could not
swim.

Calhoim's instructions to the American charge in Texas,
directing him to submit the offer of annexation, reached
Donelson late in March in New Orleans, where he had gone
on leave of absence. He at once returned to his post, but
he did not reach the Texan seat of government imtil the
thirtieth of March, 1845. On his way he met the English
and French representatives, who were returning to Gal-
veston. He thought that they had not manifested much
satisfaction at the result of their visit.^ As a matter of
fact, however, they had every cause for satisfaction, for they
had just succeeded in concluding a most important arrange-
ment with the President and the Secretary of State of
Texas.

EUiot and SaUgny had gone to the seat of government
together in consequence of instructions from their respective
governments, the origin of which was not without interest.
It seems that William R. King, of Alabama, then American
minister in Paris, had written home a rather effusive ac-
coimt of his reception by the French sovereign, and had
quoted him as saying that France would take no steps
which were in the slightest degree hostile, or which would
give the United States the slightest cause of complaint.
Calhoim chose to consider the remark as an assurance that
France would not be a party to any attempt to induce
Texas to withdraw her proposal for annexation, and upon

^ Donelson to Buchanan, April 1, 1845; Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 seas., 47.

TEXAS ENTERS THE UNION 705

that text he wrote a long denunciation of British poUcy
and an enthusiastic eulogy of the system of negro slavery.^

This-document, upon which Calhoun evidently took great
pains, was very injudiciously published as an annex to the
President's message of December, 1844, and, reaching Lon-
don about Christmas, produced most unchristian feelings
in Lord Aberdeen's usually placid mind. He at once wrote
to ask from the French government a clear explanation, and
he received assurances in reply that France was disposed to
second the views of England, and to act in accord with her
in everything relative to Texas. Not content, as Aberdeen
told the Mexican minister, with mere assurances and pro-
tests, he requested Guizot to make proof of his intentions
by taking part in some act that would confirm his words,
and he suggested a joint conununication to Texas in favor
of independence, thus destroying the impression which had
been created by Calhoun's note.^

Tbe4Qi:mal protocol of the conference^of March 30, 1845,
between the^ecretary of State of Texas and the representa-
tives of Englatrd and France, accordingly stated that the
charge d'aff^res of their Majesties the King of the French
and the Queen of Great Britain had communicated instruc-
tions of their respective governments, dated the seventeenth
and twenty-third of January, 1845, respectively, inviting
the government of Texas to accept the good oflSces of France^
and,.. Engird "for an early and honorable settlement of
their difficulties with M^coTupon thebasiHiif tte acknowl-
edgment of the independence of Texas-hy that .Republic " ;
that the Secretary of State had expressed the President's
willingness to accept the intervention of tlie two powers;
that " in view of the much more advanced condition of cir-
cumstances connected with the affairs of Texas" the Presi-
dent thought it urgently necessary that he should be enabled,
as speedily as possible, to present to the people, for their
consideration and action, decisive proofs that Mexico was
ready at once to acknowledge the independence of the re-

1 Calhoun to King, Aug. 12, 1844; Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 39 ef wq,
* TomdB Murphy to Min. Rel., Jan. 18, 1845; Sec. (ie Rd, Ext. MSS.

706 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

public, " without other condition than a stipulation to maiD-
tain the same " ; and that the government of Texas therefore
proposed certain preliminary conditions to be submitted to
Mexico, agreeing that if these were accepted a proclamation
should be issued announcing the conclusion of the prelimi-
naries of peace, and that Texas, for a period of ninety days
from the date of the memorandum, would not " accept any
proposal, nor enter into any negotiations to annex itself to
any other country." It was further stated that if the peo-
ple of Texas should decide upon pursuing the policy of annex-
ation, in preference to the proposed arrangement with
Mexico, then the government of Texas would so notify
France and England, and be at liberty to consmnmate the
national will.^

Annexed to the protocol was a memorandum setting forth
as follows the terms proposed by Tejjaa.asji basis for negOf
tiations :

"1. Mexjooxonsents to acknowl^ye tl^y inrfffifiPirl''nrP^^ T^^ff?
"2. TexiEii^pga,ge&' tbiU-Bho-wiit stipulate m tfae -Treaty not to

"3. Limitsjind other conditions to be matter of arrangem^t in
the final Treaty.

" 4. Texas will be. willing tQ.repiit_disputed points respecting terri-
tory and other matters to the arbitratiuirof-timpiFeB."- '*

On the heels of this agreement came the information that
Mexico had expressed a willingness to treat.

"More good news!" Elliot wrote from Galveston on the third of
April. "I have this day received despatches from Mr. Bankhead
of the 20th ult., and a private letter of the 22nd ult., by her Majesty's
ship 'Eurydice/ commanded by my cousin, Capt. Charles George
Elliot. These tidings annomice the cordial adhesion of the new Gov-
ernment to the favorable dispositions expressed by Gen. Santa Anna,
communicated to you in our late instructions; and M. Alleye de
Cyprie [Cyprey], the French Minister, has written in the same sense to
de Saligny." «

Two days later Elliot was on his way to Mexico. He
gave out at Galveston that he was going to Charleston,

1 Jones, 473-475. * Elliot to Jones; ibid., 441.

TEXAS ENTERS THE UNION 707

South Carolina, in H. M. S. Eledra, and in the Electra he
sailed; but out of sight of land he changed to the Eurydice,
and arrived at Vera Cruz on the evening of the eleventh of
April. The two Elliot cousins at once went in company to
the city of Mexico, where the Texan proposals were laid
before the ministers, by whom they were approved.^

On April 21, 1845, Cuevas laid the proposals before Con-
gress. He began with the customary assurance (which
could deceive nobody) that a considerable body of troops
had been collected on the Texan frontier, and that they
were ready to begin operations. But, he continued, cir-
cmnstances had recently occurred which made it not only
proper, but necessary, that negotiations should be under-
taken to forestall the annexation of Texas by the United
States, an event which would make war with the American
republic inevitable.

"Texas has just proposed an arrangement and his Excellency, the
President ad interim, who, though strongly impressed with its impor-
tance and the urgency of adopting a definite resolution upon the sub-
ject, is persuaded that the Executive can do nothing in the matter
without previous authorization of Congress. ... He believes that
in the present condition of the affairs of Texas he ought not to refuse
the negotiation to which he has been invited, and that he should not
vary from the obligation which he is under not to decide so delicate
a point before it has been previously examined in the Legislative Body.
. . . The preliminary propositions which Texas has submitted, pre-
sent an agreement honorable and favorable to the Republic; and the
government, without committing itself to anything, has not hesi-
tated to accept them as a mere proposal for the formal agreement
which is solicited. To refuse to treat upon the subject would be to
decide the annexation of Texas to the United States, and Congress
will at once notice that so ill-advised a step would constitute a ter-
rible accusation against the present administration. To refuse to
listen to proposals of peace that may lead to a satisfactory conclusion,
and thus to bring about a result which is even less desirable for the
republic, might be the more pleasing course for a justly irritated
patriotism; but it would not be that which the nation has a right to

^ Everett reported that Elliot's going in person to Mexico was not in pur-
suance of instructions from the Foreign Office, and that Lord Aberdeen said
that he was writing to Elliot disapproving his conduct in that respect.^
(Everett to Buchanan, July 4, 1845; SUUe Depi. MSS.)

708 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

expect from the Supreme Government — bound to foresee, to weigh and
to avoid, the evils of a long and costly war, and not to subject itself
to that calamity unless, in a crisis so grave as the present, honor can
m no other manner be saved. In view of the foregoing, the Presideot
ad interim, by unanimous agreement of the council of ministers,
directs me to submit the following resolution: 'The government is
authorized to consider the propositions which have been made to it
on the subject of Texas, and to proceed to make sucl^ agreement or
to sign such treaty as he shall consider pro|>er and honorable for the
republic, rendering an account to Congress for its examination and
approval.'" ^

Writing from Mexico on the same day, April 21, Elliot
informed President Jones that the first great difficulty was
that the Mexican government had felt itsdt-jcompelled to
ask for the authority of Congress, inasmuch as the alienation
of a part of the national territory was involved. That hard
step had been taken, and the Frencli and English ministers
were of opinion that the government would never have
risked an appeal to Congress unless they had felt sure of
success. The French and English ministers had had a very
difficult and delicate task, which had only been accomplished
"by their hearty co-operation, and the exercise of great
firmness, tempered by the utmost discretion and conciliatori-
ness of language.'' ^

The Mexican Congress, however, was by no means in a
hurry to act, and a refusal to approve the government pro-
posals would have been supported by a section of the Mex-
ican press. The four daily papers then published at the
capital supported generally the Herrera government, but
two semiweekly papers. El Amigo del Pueblo and La Voz
del Pueblo, were in violent opposition. The coimtry news-
papers m general did nothing but repeat or comment upon
the editorials and articles of the newspapers of the metropolis.

The chief ground of criticism had been the weak conduct
of the government in dealing with the question of Texas; so
that the news that the government was actually proposing
to treat for the recognition of Texan independence was
the signal for a general outbreak of the opposition papers.

^ Mixico d iravia de los Siglos, IV, 539. ' Jones, 452.

TEXAS ENTERS THE UNION 709

"Extermination and death will be the cry of the valiant
regulars and the citizen soldiery, marching enthusiastically
to conquer Texas" was the key-note of a series of articles
published in La Voz del Pueblo ] and "death and extenni-
nation," in varying phrases, was the burden of the chorus
throughout the country. "Such appeals as these were ad-
mirably calculated to excite the public they addressed, for
they touched the springs of patriotism, pride, suspicion,
jealousy, and conscious weakness." ^ In the face of this
opposition, and of opposition in Congress, the Mexican
ministry faltered, and it is probable that but for constant
pressure from the British and French representatives the
cabinet would have resigned, and the project of direct nego-
tiation with Texas would have been given up. On the other
hand, the government newspapers, and especially the Diario
and the Siglo XIX, supported the project, to which seems
to have been added the support of Almonte, who had by this
time arrived from Washington.^

After three days of heated discussion the Chamber of
Deputies, by a vote of 41 to 13, adopted the resolution pro-
posed by the government. The Senate committee, to which
the matter was referred, concurred, after a good deal of
delay, in recommending its passage, and it was finally car-
ried in the Senate by a vote of 30 to 6. Being signed by the
President, it became a law on May 17, 1845.' Two days
later Cuevas signed and delivered to the English and French
ministers a paper in which he recited the receipt of the four
preliminary propositions of Texas and the authority granted
by Congress to hear the Texan propositions and declared —

" that the Supreme Government receives the four articles above men-
tioned as the preliminaries of a formal and definitive treaty; and
further, that it is disposed to commence the negotiation as Texas
may desire, and to receive the Commissioners which she may name
for this purpose."

At the same time Cuevas added an additional declaration,
to the effect that besides the four preliminary articles pro-

> J. H. Smith's Annexation of Texas, 426 • /Wd., 430.

• Dublan y Lozano, V, 17.

710 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

posed by Texas there were other essential and important
points which ought also to be included in the negotiation;
and that if for any reason the negotiation failed, then the
answer given a<!cepting the four articles proposed by Texas
as the preliminaries of a treaty was to be considered null
and void. Armed with this document and a letter from the
French minister in Mexico addressed to the President of
TexaS; Elliot started back and reached Galveston on the
thirtieth of May, 1845.^

The moment Captain Elliot placed in the hands of Presi-
dent Jones the papers showing the action of the Mexican
government, Jones issued a proclamation to the people of
Texas, in which he recited the efforts he had made to secure
an unconditional, peaceful, honorable, and advantageous
settlement of their difficulties with Mexico.' He announced
that he had placed in the hands of the representatives of the
British and French governments a statement of conditions
preliminary to a treaty of peace, which he had agreed to
submit to the people of Texas for their decision and action;
that the Congress of Mexico had authorized their govern-
ment to open negotiations and conclude a treaty with Texas;
and he therefore made known these circumstances to the
citizens of the repubUc, and declared and proclaimed a
cessation of hostilities by land and sea.*

Thanks to the procrastination of the Mexican Senate
this proclamation came^oo late. Wiiatevcf mligliTTiflvo
been its effect if it had been before the people a fortnight
earlier, it could now produce none, for it was issued on the
fourth of June, and on that same* day the people of Texas
voted for delegates to a national convention.

It is very likely that President Jones and many of the
high officials in Texas would have preferred independence
to annexation. To be at the head of an independent republic
with an army and a navy and a diplomatic establishment of

* For a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the Mexican declara-
tion of a willingness to treat with Texas, reference may be made to J. H.
Smith's Annexation of Texas^ chap. XIX.

' Proclamation of June 4, 1845; Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Ck>ng., 1 seas., 81.

TEXAS ENTERS THE UNION 711

its own, must have seemed much more tempting to ambi-
tion than to manage the local affairs of a not very influential
Southwestern state of the American Union. Jones himself
was always cautious in his correspondence and conversation,
but Elliot at any rate assumed that he himself and the Presi-
dent were of one mind in their hostility to the proposals of
the United States. Writing from Galveston just as he was
about to start for another visit to the United States, he
offered his advice to the President.

^I feel/' he said, "that my continued presence in this country,
under present circumstances, is rather hurtful than helpful. But if
this crazy fit should pass away without overturning the nationality
of the country, and with it the ti ae and lasting interests of the peo-
ple, Texas may depend upon the fast friendship and assistance of
Her Majesty's (Jovemment. . . . Preserve the country, my dear sir,
if you can, and with firmness, moderation, and prudence, (which you
really possess in an eminent degree, most happily for these beguiled
and bewildered people, more to be pitied than bUmed), I have not
lost all confidence that you will yet save them froA^i what would be
little short of their ruin." *

The American representatives in Texas also considered
that Jones was very indifferent to annexation, or even hos-
tile. Indeed, it was reported that he had had to be coerced
into favorable action on the original project of a treaty of
annexation.* And Terrell, an intimate friend of Jones's,
who had succeeded Ashbel Smith as minister to England,
openly avowed his opposition.'

As for Houston, he was never long of one mind, and as he
was constantly agitated by nightmare fears of an invasion
of Texas he could not be satisfied by evidence that nothing
had occurred, or was likely to occur, to disturb the peace,
or to lead to hostilities with Mexico.* "He showed con-
siderable passion" in a conversation during the siunmer of
1844, which lasted several hours, and he expressed great

1 Elliot to Jones, June 13, 1845; Jones, 470.

< Murphy to Upishur, Feb. 22, 1844; StaU Dept. M83.

* DonelBon to Calhoun, Nov. 23, 1844; ibid.

* Murphy to Tyler, April 8, 1844; ibid.

712 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

dissatisfaction that stronger guarantees of protection had
not been exacted from the United States.*

The American government, however, realizing Houston's
undeniable influence with the people of Texas, had con-
stantly used all possible efforts to propitiate him. Howard,
who was sent as charg6 to Texas in the early sunmier of
1844, had been, as Houston himself said, ''his particular
friend" in early days in Tennessee; and Donelson, who suc-
ceeded Hojvard, was Jackson's nephew and private secretary.
Jackson's name indeed carried the greatest weight with
Houston, and Jackson was induced to write repeatedly,
urging upon Houston the importance of annexation. Don-
elson, in a long and interesting conversation, told Houston
that Jackson looked on the annexation of Texas as the great
question of the day, and that he was anxious his old friend
diould show that he appreciated the great results which
were to follow. Houston was represented as being unre-
served and cordial, and determined to adhere to the cause
of annexation so long as there was any hope of carrying it
through. "I remained with the President," said Donelson,
"nearly all night, there being nothing but a door to separate
our apartments which are open log cabins." ^

In the spring of 1845, after Houston had left the presi-
dency, it was rumored that he might oppose the joint reso-
lution. "His opposition," reported Donelson, "cannot de-
feat the measure if he does. Texas will be in a blaze
of excitement, but it will be one in which American will
triiunph over foreign influence." Nevertheless, Donelson
thought it expedient to go on a journey to visit Houston,
and to attempt to gain him over. Houston was averse to
the terms proposed in the joint resolution; he thought that
the President of the United States should have resorted to
negotiation; he objected to leaving the boundary question
open. "I left him," reported Donelson, "under a full con-
viction that if the adoption of our proposals depended upon
his vote it would be lost." But a few days later Houston's

> Howard to Calhoun, Aug. 7, 1844; ibid.

> Donelson to Calhoun, Nov. 24, 1844; Urid.

TEXAS ENTERS THE UNION 713

views had changed again. On reflection he thought Texas
had better come into the United States on the terms offered
her, rather than run the hazard of obtaining better by a
new negotiation.^

After all, the decision of the question of annexation rested
not with President Jones and his cabinet, nor with ex-
President Houston, but with the people of Texas, and there
was never much real doubt as to their earnest and all but
unanimous desire for annexation. Donelson on his first
arrival in Texas, at the end of 1844, had reported that the
people were all in favor of annexation, but that speedy action
was necessary. A month later he wrote that the delay in
carrying through annexation had not changed pubUc opinion,
and that the measure would be ratified in Texas with great
imanimity.2 In the spring of 1845 the feeling was still
stronger. Ashbel Smith, writing confidentially to President
Jones from Galveston, reported that he had generally avoided
conversation on this subject.

"I find however," he said, "everywhere very great, Tfery intense
feeling on this subject; I quieted it as much as possible by stating
that you would at no very distant period present this matter to the
consideration and action of the people. I am forced to believe that
an immense majority of the citizens are in favor of annexation — that
is of annexation as presented in the resolutions of the American Con-
gress— and that they will continue to be so, in preference to indepen-
dence, though recognized in the most liberal manner by Mexico. This
last opinion is, however, I know more doubtful. But I cannot be
mistaken in the belief that the tranquillity at present arises from a
confidence in your favorable dispositions toward annexation. . . .
On looking over what I have written I find that I have understated
rather than overstated the feeling on this subject." •

It was probably after receiving the foregoing letter that
Jones took occasion to say to the American representative
that while he was of the same opinion as General Houston,
in his belief that the United States should have offered Texas

^Donelson to Calhoun, April 1, 1845; Donelson to Buchanan, April 12,
1845; Donelson to Buchanan, May 6, 1845; ibid.
* Donelson to Calhoun, Nov. 23 and Dec. 17, 1844; ibid.
' Smith to Jones, April 9, 1845; Jones, 446.

714 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

more liberal terms, he would interpose no obstacle to their
submission to Congress and the people; and Donelson
thought that, though Jones had been represented as hostile
to annexation, and as favoring the English and French proj-
ects, in reality he was not desirous of injuring the United
States, but was simply faithful to his public duties as
President, and anxious to secure the independence of Texas
on the most favorable terms.^

A few days later Donelson wrote privately to Calhoun
that it was now a certainty that the measure of annexation
would be consummated. There was some impression that
Jones was " hostile to it, yet he never for a moment in any
interview with me intimated a wish to interpose an obsta-
cle to the judgment of the people." Houston, Donelson
continued, had done all he could against the American
proposals, but the people of Texas were holding pubUc
meetings and expressing their approbation "with a una-
nimity which no other debated question has ever received."*
Again on May 6 Donelson wrote that he considered the
question settled so far as Texas was concerned.* And to the
same effect Wickliflfe, of Kentucky, who was an unofficial
American agent in Texas, wrote to Buchanan that the people
of Texas regarded annexation as settled, and did not talk
about it any more. The all-engrossing subject was the new
state Constitution.^

The joint resolution for the annexation of Texas had rather
clumsily provided that the territory rightfully belongmg to
the repubUc of Texas might be erected into a new state
" with a Republican form of government, to be adopted by
the people of said Republic, by Deputies in Convention

^ Donelson to Buchanan, April 12, 1S45; Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sesB., 52.
' Donelson to Calhoun, April 24, 1845; Amer, Hist, Assn, Rep, 1899, II,
1029-1032.

* Donelson to Buchanan, May 6, 1845; Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sees., 56.

* Wickliffe to Buchanan, May 6, 1845; extract in Curtis's Buchcman, I, 588.
Wickliffe's instructions are printed in Moore's Buchanarif VI, 130. Aahbel
Smith accused Wickliffe of inducing members of the Texan Congress to vote
for annexation by lavish promises of river and harbor appropriations, as well
as promises of office. Working in connection with him were ex-Governor
Yell, of Arkansas, and Commodore Stockton, of the U. S. Navy. — (Smith,
Reminiscences of Uie Texas RepvbliCf 76.)

TEXAS ENTERS THE UNION 715

assembled, with the consent of the existing government in
order that the same may be admitted as one of the States
of this Union." The functions of the proposed convention
seemed, under this phraseology, to be limited to adopting a
state constitution ; and on the other hand it was a matter
of some doubt whether the Texan Congress could be said
to have any power to decree the end of the republic. Jones,
therefore, hesitated as to the proper course to be piu^ued,
but he ultimately decided to summon the Congress in special
session (which was done by a proclamation issued April 15),
and in addition, to summon a convention of the people
(which was done by another proclamation dated May 5).

Once these matters were arranged Donelson had little to
do. The State Department in Washington wrote to him
that it was important to press for immediate action, but
Donelson wrote back that he considered that question set-
tled. He thought there might be some increase of the op-
position when the project of independence was brought for-
ward by Mexico, "but the opposition will be powerless
compared with the mass of those who, proud of their kin-
dred connection with the United States, are willing to share
a conmion destiny under the banner of the stars and stripes."
From this opinion Donelson never wavered, and he con-
gratulated Buchanan "that this great question is advancing
to its consiunmation with so much calnmess and certainty,
and with so much patriotic joy in the hearts of the brave
and gallant Texans." ^

In his message at the opening of the special session of
Congress on June 16, President Jones very fau-ly laid before
that body, for such action as it might deein suitable, the
propositions which had been made on the part of the United
States and of Mexico respectively, together with the corre-
spondence between the several governments relating to
these proposals. " The state of public opinion and the great
anxiety of the people to act definitely upon the subject of
annexation" had, he said, induced him to issue his proclar

^ Buchanan to Donelson, April 28, 1845; Donelson to Buchanan, May 6,
1845; Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Ck)ng., 1 sess., 40, 56.

716 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

mation recommending the election of deputies to a con-
vention which, it was expected, would assemble on the
fourth of July, the time fixed in the proclamation.

" To this Convention the question of annexation and the adoption
of a State constitution will properly belong, they will determine the
great question of the nationality of Texas as to them shall seem most
conducive to the interest, happiness and prosperity of the people
whom they will represent. It is important * that the consent of the
existing government' should be given to their exercising the powers
which have been delegated to them, in order to comply with a require-
ment to that effect and the resolutions on the subject of annexation,
passed by the American Congress. For this purpose, the present
session of the Congress of the republic of Texas has been convoked."

The President then went on to say that he had the
pleasure, in addition to presenting to Congress the Ameri-
can proposal concerning annexation, to inform them that
certain conditions preliminary to a treaty of peace upon a
basis of the recognition of the independence of Texas had
been signed by the Mexican government on May 19, and
had been transmitted through the French and British lega-
tions. These conditions would be laid before the Senate
for their advice and consent. The President had made
known to the people of Texas the fact of the Mexican will-
ingness to treat, and at the same time he had proclaimed a
cessation of hostiUties. Texas, therefore, was now at peace
with all the world; the alternatives of annexation or of in-
dependence were placed before the people; and their free,
sovereign, and unbiased voice was to determine the all-
important issue.
/ All-important this issue undoubtedly was, but it took
/ Congress a very Uttle while to make up its mind. On June
2 Va jwit resolution was adopted, formally_consentiofiJo^
terms of the joint resolution of the American Congress, and
approving the proclamation of the President for the Action
of deputies to a convention for the adoption of a constitu-
tion for the state of Texas. Thojgif^ wqc^ "nanimo"" In
the Texan Senate the votejipon the preliminary treaty with
Mexico was also imanimous inl^^)eating it.

TEXAS ENTERS THE UNION 717

The proceedings in the convention which assembled at
Washington on the Brazos on the fourth of July were even
more brief. A single day was consumed in the organization
of the convention and the adoption of a resolution accept-
ing annexation. There was no debate upon the subject, and,
the vote being taken, it was fifty-five in favor and one
against the ordinance. The single negative vote was cast
by Richard Bache, of Galveston, a great-grandson of Ben-
jamin Franklin; but Bache united with his colleagues in
signing the ordinance, which was thus the unanimous act
of the convention.

Mexico during all this whilejgiade no hostile move, and
the Texan convention continued to sit peaceably7
the terms of a state cotistitution; which was- ultimatcljr^
adopted by unanimous vote on August 28, 1845. This in-
strument followed the^eneral form of constitutions through-
out the United State3. There was to be a governor and a
bi-cameral legislature, to be chosen by a vote of free male
citizens — excluding Indians not taxed, Africans, and de-
scendants of Africans. There was to be a supreme court,
district courts, and such inferior courts as the legislature
might from time to time appoint. The judges of the su-
preme and district courts were to be appointed by the
governor, by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds
of the senate, and were to hold office for six years. The
legislature was to have no power to pass laws for the eman-
cipation of slaves without the consent of their owners, nor
without payment of a full equivalent in money for slaves so
emancipated; nor should the legislature have power to
prohibit immigrants from bringing in their slaves, although
it might pass laws against the importation of slaves ''as
merchandise only." The Constitution was to be submitted
to the vote of the people on the second Monday of Octotfer,
1845, and at the same time a vote of the people was to be
taken for and against annexation. If a majority of all the
votes given was in favor of the Constitution, the President
of Texas was to make proclamation of that fact, and notify
the President of the United States. He was also to issue a

718 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

proclamation requiring elections to be held on the third
Monday in December for the choice of a governor, a lieu-
tenant-governor, and members of the state legislature. The
legislature was to meet as soon as the Constitution of the
state of Texas was accepted by the Congress of the United
States, whereupon two senators were to be chosen by the
legislature, and provision was to be made for the election
of representatives in Congress.

A number of intricate but relatively unimportant ques-
tions arose as to the legal status of Texas during the period
between the acceptance of annexation on the fourth of
July, 1845, and the completion of all the preliminaries; but
these questions were eventually disposed of, and on Feb-
ruary 16, 1846, J. Pinckney Henderson was inaugurated gov-
ernor, and a month later Sam Houston and Thomas J.
Rusk took their seats in the Senate of the United States.^

The annexation of Texas to the United States, which had
been the cause of so much discussion, and had excited so
many jealousies within the United States and Mexico, not
to speak of England, was thus irrevocably completed. The
success of the negotiation had not indeed been in serious
doubt for a moment since P9lk's inauguration, and his
cabinet, from the very day it first met, was free to consider
the consequences of annexation and the next step to be
taken. What Mgxico might choose to do about it was of
no consequence whatever. fehe._haxLJaaiQd tcrreeouquer
Texas during the nine years thafT^wtM stood alone, and she ^

was too plainly devoid of military power^^ither bxJ^O^
land, to regain her lost province-now that it was incoiporated
with the United States. She would doubtless threaten war,
but Without allies it was impossilrie for her toiaaJge etteciive^
war.

'or the American govgmment, therefore, the question of
Texas wasliettled and done with fromlthe^mng of i?<45.
I'hero wnxi no iear of aerioua Mexican aggre^ionr"Bnd if the

^ For details as to the hesitation and final action of the Texan govemm^t,
and the delays in the consummation of annexation, see J. H. Smith, Atmexar
turn of Texas, 432-468.

TEXAS ENTERS THE UNION 719

question of Texas had stood alone, affairs with Mexico might
vefy~well have been Icft-to seUle Ihemselv^
Texaua question by no means stood alone. Thfi^iinggid
claims of Amf^rif^an rit.izffnp ap;mnnti 1Mf>?giffu fonfit.it.utifd - a
very substantial and very real grievance which remained to

be disposed of, along with the adjustmenl of the new buun"-
dafy'. Here^ifwasTidped, was a lever which might^senre to
move the Mexican government to make territorial concesr-
sions, precisely as Spain had been moved twenty-six years
before to yield the Ploridas. A settlement of the spoliation
claims and an adjustment of a disputed boundaiy, by yield-
ing all the peninsula of Florida, were what Monroe had ob-
tained from the Spanish monarchy. It was a precedent
complete in all particulars, and Polk looked to make a
similar bargain, only this time there was to be a surrender of
land on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. His ambitions did
not concern themselves any longer with Texas. That had | ^
been acqmred by nis predecessor. What he looked to waS^S
Q

early forty years after Polk was in his grave George
Bancroft relgifidJiQw, when they were alone togethePuTElTe
early days of the administration, ^Polk Ijad laid down the
four gi:eat measures iie^proposgd. They were:

1. A reduction of the tariff.

2. The independent Treasury. -

3. The settlement of the Oregon boundary question.

4. The acquisition of California.^ ^^ ^^

How far the memory of a man of nearly ninety could be
trusted to relate correctly "^a conversation which, in the light
of subsequent events, looked astoundingly like prophecy, is
no doubt a question ; but that Polk from an early period in
his presidency was casting about If or means tV acquire C^i-

^ Schouler, IV, 498. Six months before the inauguration the acquisition
of California formed no part of Polk's programme. In September, 1844, he
told Francis W. Pickens, of South Carolina, that, if elected, he was determined
to reduce the tariff of 1842, to introduce strict economy, and to acquire Texas
"at all hazzards.'' This was not at all the programme as related by Bancroft.
See Pickens to Calhoun, Sept. 9, 1844; Am^, Hist. Asm, Rep. 1899, II, 969.

720 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

f orni^^ nhiinHantly nppeam from rnntfniporaneoiis evidence.
iCnd it is also Apparent, that, in this he was far inadvance of
the "puhlic opinion of his time. CaUfomia had notl^et been
mentioned in general political cQscussion^ it had attracted
litileatt^nticnrm Congress or in the Newspapers, and it had
furnished no plank for party platforms.

But almost silently the"4fflpre83ive--phenQmenon of emi-
gration on a^lajgejcalejiad begun. Hundred of toiling
'wagons' and thousands of men, women, and children had
already marked out the rough highway yrhich led from
the head-waters of the Platte to the meadows of Oregon, or
thence southward, across the Mexican frontier, to the valley

of the Sacramento. Thft_ Dpnrinr>r5i.tip. (>pi^YArifmnj mfh ft

keen appreciation of a spirit that was bepinning to stir the
nation^_liadjiQnfidently--put~forwaKl a demand for "the
whole of the territory of Oregon '^; and Western expansion
was a policy that no administration could have ignored.

To -this policy Polk and his cabinet chiefly addressed
thegisfibges, andjheJiOpics with-:»btGS""Smeocan diplomacy
Ti^nn now ninnt ronrrmnd rrlntrd/ dimntly or inHirrrtl^-jto
Oregon and California, the former invotvihg. the relations
of Great Britain, and the latter those of MexicQ^wil^
Uibtea otates*

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Full text of "The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848; a history of the relations between the two countries from the independence of Mexico to the close of the war with the United States"

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