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The United States and Spain in
1790

313

F71

WINNOWINGS IN AMERICAN HISTORY.

DIPLOMATIC SERIES.

No. I.

THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN

IN 1790.

AN EPISODE IN DIPLOMACY DESCRIBED FROM
HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED SOURCES.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD.

BROOKLYN, N. Y.:

HISTORICAL PRINTING CLUB.
1890.

25O Copies Printed.
No.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Introduction 7

Questions of the President 43

Reply of the Vice-President, John Adams 45

Opinion of the Chief Justice, John Jay 50

Opinion of the Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson 56

Heads of consideration on the Navigation of the Mississippi, for

Mr. Carmichael, by Thomas Jefferson 59

Heads of consideration on the conduct we are to observe in the

war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly should

the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas.

By Thomas Jefferson 65

Hamilton to Washington, 15 September, 1790 68

Opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton . 69

Opinion of the Secretary of War, Henry Knox 103

Index 107

(v)

INTRODUCTION.

THE interest of the papers included in these pages lies in
the light they throw upon the first question of diplomacy,
which confronted the newly constituted government of the
United States. During the Revolution diplomatic relations
with European powers had been confined to offers of alli-
ances, of commercial reciprocity and requests for financial
aid ; but the net result had been a treaty of alliance with
France, which led to important results for the revolting col-
onies ; a treaty of commerce with the same nation, that was
entirely inoperative, thanks to the network of protective
duties and prohibitions that closed the French ports to out-
side traders ; and a few parchments involving contracts with
other nations and supposed to contain concessions that might
in certain contingencies become of value, but rather from
their moral and political influence, as involving a recognition
of the independence of America, than from any actual bonds
of interest, political or commercial. Nor had the foreign
relations of the States improved during the years from the
treaty of peace in 1783, to the promulgation of the new
constitution and the establishment of a central government.
Great Britain recognized the independence of the new
nation, but refused to treat with it politically or commer-
cially under formal exchange of ministers or a commercial
treaty. The laws of trade and the rigid laws of the mer-
cantile system gave the trade of America into British hands ;

(7)

and, enjoying a natural monopoly, the British ministry saw
no good reason for jeopardizing actual profit by suggesting
changes that might prove injurious. To purchase by con-
cession what they were already in the full enjoyment of, was
not recognized as good policy ; nor was it more agreeable
to them to open diplomatic relations that could not but lead
to embarrassing controversies. There were charges of bad
faith in the execution or rather evasion of the terms of the
treaty of 1 783, which could be judged of only by a tedious,
difficult and extremely delicate weighing of claims on both
sides. The Revolution in France had disarranged the rela-
tions of that people with the outside world, and already in
America a feeling was engendered that a too close connec-
tion with that country might not be safe or expedient for
the American interests. With Spain, there were still the
embarrassing claims and denials attending the free naviga-
tion of the Mississippi ; while the problem of public credit
was intimately connected with the relations between the
United States and their creditors — France and Holland.

This unsatisfactory condition of diplomatic relations was
emphasized by the geographical bounds of the new nation.
On the north was the English province of Canada, posses-
sion of which was long the object of the Continental Con-
gress, and scattered within American territory were a num-
ber of fortified posts held and garrisoned by the British, in
direct contradiction to the terms of the treaty of peace.
To the south were the possessions of Spain, for whom the
Americans had little affection because of the hesitating and
half-hearted assistance given during the war, and because of
the complications raised in the subsequent negotiations for
the navigation rights of the Mississippi. When Spain in

1 783 obtained both Florida and Louisiana, the Spanish gov-
ernment " aimed at excluding the United States, not France,
from the gulf,"* and she had little compunction in showing
how little regard she intended to have for the wishes of the
new republic, whose very institutions implied a menace to
her colonial possessions in America. The Count de Florida
Blanca, now supreme in the conduct of the foreign relations
of Spain, was opposed to ceding any privileges asked, much
less to recognizing any rights claimed by the Americans,
touching the Mississippi. Smarting under the slight in-
flicted by the treaty of 1 783, which by a secret article looked
to an English ownership of West Florida, she notified Con-
gress that until the question of boundaries — always vexatious
and easily prolonged — had been determined, the exclusive
control of the Mississippi would be claimed by Spain. f
As an earnest of her desire to accommodate any difference,
Don Diego de Gardoqui was named " Encargado de Nego-
cios," to reside near Congress and negotiate a settlement.
The matter might have rested there for some time had it
not been for the excitement raised in the western country.
The arrival of Gardoqui gave reason to look for a removal
of differences and the inhabitants of the west were quite
willing to await the result. But months passed and nothing
was published. Jay was bound by his instructions to insist
upon the right of navigation of the Mississippi from ocean
to source, while Gardoqui sought to establish the views of
his master by securing the exclusion of all nations — Ameri-
cans included — from that part of the river that ran through
his, then undefined, territory. Annoying matters were con-

* Henry Adams, History of the United States, I, 353.
f 25 June, 1784.

tinually arising : the unlawful occupation by Green ; and his
followers of Spanish territory, an act promptly disavowed by
Georgia ; the stoppage of traders at Natchez ; the question
of indebtedness to Spain ; the complaints made by Indian
tribes ; and what must have been most galling to Jay, the
secret article of the treaty with Great Britain. At length, in
August, 1786, Jay notified Congress that no treaty could be
framed if the navigation right was insisted upon, and pro-
posed to yield the claim for a period of twenty-five or
thirty years, before the end of which the privilege, he
thought, could hardly become of importance. *

To Madison, always firm in insisting on maintaining to
the utmost the claims against Spain, such a concession was
almost criminal.

" Passing by the other Southern States, figure to yourself
the effect of such a stipulation on the Assembly of Virginia,
already jealous of northern politics, and which will be com-
posed of about thirty members from the western waters ; of
a majority of others attached to the western country from
interests of their own, of their friends, or their constituents ;
and of many others who, though indifferent to Mississippi,
will zealously play off the disgust of their friends against
Federal measures. Figure to yourself its effect on the
people at large on the western waters, who are impatiently
waiting for a favorable result to the negotiation of Gardoqui,
and who will consider themselves as sold by their Atlantic
brethren. Will it be an unnatural consequence if they con-

* " With respect to the Spaniards, I do not think the navigation of
the Mississippi is an object of great importance to us at present ; and
when the banks of the Ohio and the fertile plains of the western country
get thickly inhabited, the people will embrace the advantages which
nature affords them in spite of all opposition." Washington to Itoch-
ambeau, 7 September, 1785.

sider themselves absolved from every Federal tie, and court
some protection for their betrayed rights? This protection
will appear more attainable from the maritime power of
Britain than from any other quarter; and Britain will be
more ready than any other nation to seize an opportunity of
embroiling our affairs. ... I should rather suppose that
he [the Spanish minister] means to work a total separation
of interest and affection between western and eastern set-
tlements, and to foment the jealousy between eastern and
southern States. By the former, the population of the
western country, it may be expected, will be checked, and
the Mississippi so far secured ; and, by both, the general
security of Spanish America be promoted."*

This expression of an extreme view was actually a very
accurate forecast of what did occur, so far as it applied to
the inhabitants of the western country. A rough popula-
tion, having no sentimental ties that could bind them to
home or state, by necessity often trespassers or aggressors,
using force to obtain what they thought belonged to them,
adventurous and restless, easily influenced by a desire for
gain that need not respect the shadowy claims of a govern-
ment incapable of enforcing them, and captivated by the
energy and promises of demagogues, it was not to be ex-
pected that they would fret long under the restraints imposed
upon them by Spain, acting through her governors on the
Mississippi. Retaliation was the readiest weapon at hand.
Green, who had already figured as the Governor of a State
parcelled out of Spanish territory, came again to the front,
and another adventurer, Clark, in return for a seizure by the
Spanish at Natchez, rifled a Spanish trader's store at Vincen-
nes. If the Americans were not permitted to trade down

* Madison to Jefferson, 12 August, 1786.

the river, it was urged the Spaniards should not trade up.
And a vigorously expressed protest now appeared which did
much to excite a public feeling against the Spaniards, as well
as against the Congress :

COPY OF A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN AT THE FALLS OF OHIO
TO HIS FRIEND IN NEW ENGLAND, DATED DECEMBER 4, 1786.

Dear Sir : Politics, which a few months ago were scarcely
thought of, are now sounded aloud in this part of the world,
and discussed by almost every person. The late commer-
cial treaty with Spain, in shutting up, as it is said, the navi-
gation of the Mississippi for the term of twenty-five years, •
has given this western country a universal shock, and struck
its inhabitants with amazement. Our foundation is affected ;
it is therefore necessary that every individual exert himself
to apply a remedy. To sell and make us vassals to the
merciless Spaniards is a grievance not to be borne. The
Parliamentary acts which occasioned our revolt from Great
Britain were not so barefaced and intolerable. To give us
the liberty of transporting our effects down the river to New
Orleans, and then be subject to the Spanish laws and impo-
sitions, is an insult upon our understanding. We know, by
woful experience, that it is in their power, when once there,
to take our produce at any price they please. Large quan-
tities of flour, tobacco, meal, &c., have been taken there the
last summer, and mostly confiscated : those who had per-
mits from their Governor were obliged to sell at a price he
was pleased to state, or subject themselves to lose the whole.
Men of large property are already mined by their policy.
What benefit can you on the Atlantic shores receive from
this act? The Spaniards, from the amazing resources of
this river, can supply all their own markets at a much lower
price than you possibly can. Though this country has been
settling but about six years, and that in the midst of an in-
veterate enemy, and most of the first adventurers fallen 'a
prey to the savages, and although the emigration to this

country is so rapid that the internal market is very great,
yet the quantity of produce they now have on hand is im-
mense. Flour and pork are now selling here at twelve
shillings the hundred ; beef in proportion ; any quantities of
Indian corn can be had at ninepence per bushel. Three
times the quantity of tobacco and corn can be raised on an
acre here that can be within the settlement on the east side
of the mountains, and with less cultivation. It is, there-
fore, rational to suppose that, in a very few years, the vast
bodies of water in those rivers will labor under the immense
weight of the produce of this rich and fertile country, and
Spanish ships be unable to convey it to market. Do you
think to prevent the emigration from a barren country,
loaded with taxes and impoverished with debts, to the most
luxurious and fertile soil in the world ? Vain is the thought
and presumptuous the supposition. You may as well en-
deavor to prevent the fishes from gathering on a bank in
the sea which affords them plenty of nourishment. Shall the
best and largest part of the United States be uncultivated, a
nest for savages and beasts of prey ? Certainly not. Prov-
idence has designed it for some nobler purposes. This is
convincing to every one who beholds the many advantages
and pleasing prospects of this country. Here is a soil
richer to appearance than can possibly be made by art ;
large plains and meadows, without the labor of hands, suffi-
cient to support millions of cattle summer and winter ; cane,
which is also a fine nourishment for them, without bounds.
The spontaneous production of this country surpasses your
imagination ; consequently I see nothing to prevent our
herds being as numerous here, in time, as they are in the
Kingdom of Mexico. Our lands to the northward of Ohio,
for the produce of wheat, &c., will, I think, vie with the
Island of Sicily. Shall all this country now be cultivated
entirely for the use of the Spaniards? Shall we be their
bondmen, as the children of Israel were to the Egyptians ?
Shall one part of the United States be slaves while the other
is free ? Human nature shudders at the thought, and free-

men will despise those who could be so mean as to even
contemplate on so vile a subject.

Our situation is as bad as it possibly can be ; therefore,
every exertion to retrieve our circumstances must be manly,
eligible, and just.

We can raise twenty thousand troops this side the Alle-
ghany and Appalachian mountains ; and the annual increase
of them by emigration from other parts is from two to four
thousand.

We have taken all the goods belonging to the Spanish
merchants of post Vincennes and the Illinois, and are de-
termined they shall not trade up the river, provided they
will not let us trade down it. Preparations are now making
here (if necessary) to drive the Spaniards from their settle-
ments at the mouth of the Mississippi. In case we are not
countenanced and succored by the United States, (if we
need it,) our allegiance will be thrown off, and some other
Power applied to. Great Britain stands ready with open
arms to receive and support us ; they have already offered
to open their resources for our supplies. When once re-
united to them, "farewell, a long farewell, to all your
boasted greatness ;" the province of Canada and the inhabi-
tants of these waters, of themselves, in time, will be able to
conquer you. You are as ignorant of this country as Great
Britain was of America. These hints, if rightly improved,
may be of some service ; if not, blame yourselves for the
neglect.

The anti-federal sentiments shown in such expressions of
opinion naturally disturbed Madison, and he returned to
the Continental Congress with the intention of forcing the
question of the Mississippi, now by a legislative trick, as he
thought, left almost entirely in the hands of Jay. He was
supported in this by the strong feeling of the Virginia Leg-
islature, asserting in unmistakable language the importance
of acquiring the right of navigating the river. But he was

opposed by the indifference, or rather the interest, of the
Eastern and some of the Middle States. To them, the
navigation of the western river meant nothing ; for they were
more intent upon acquiring commercial privileges in the
Spanish West Indies, and were willing, almost eager, to se-
cure these at the expense of the claims applying to the Mis-
sissippi. It was on the vote of the four Eastern States, with
the assistance of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania,
that the restriction imposed upon Jay in his negotiations, of
insisting upon this right, had been repealed ; and this vote
was based upon such motives as were not likely to be
changed. For New York saw in the west a rival to her
commercial interests, and Pennsylvania, if not controlled,
was at least influenced, by the same jealousy. In 1786 the
feeling was so strong as to produce a talk of separation of
the Middle and Eastern States from the Southern, should a
determination of the matter be forced, and conclude to the
injury of the wishes of the former. * Yet, as Madison said,
would the Eastern States have remained quiet under a ces-
sion by Congress of the fishery rights for commercial privi-
leges applying to tobacco ? To yield the navigation rights
in exchange for liberty to export fish and flour into the
Spanish colonies involved, in his view, as great a sectional
sacrifice, the South and West being sacrificed to the North, f

* Monroe to Madison, 3 September, 1786.

\ Early in his negotiations, Gardoqui had said that as the Spanish
King "has no occasion for the codfish, oil, salmon, grain, flour, rice,
nor other productions, he may, considering the right which obliges his
subjects to provide themselves by their own industry or other useful and
important means, find it convenient to prohibit them, to remind this
nation \t. e. the United States] at present, as a friend, that they have
no treaty." Gardoqui to Jay, 25 May, 1786.

The threatening situation in the West, however, did pro-
duce a change of sentiment. New Jersey instructed her
delegates in Congress to labor for the navigation, while a
change in the Pennsylvania representation gave her vote to
the South. Rhode Island, believing an extensive land spec-
ulation was under the apparent indifference of her New
England sister States, added her influence to the same side.
Gorham of Massachusetts bluntly expressed the selfishness
of the East by avowing his wish to close the Mississippi, that
the inducements to move into the western country might be
lessened, and the drain on the population and wealth of the
Atlantic States thereby decreased. In spite of this, the
Spanish agent gained the impression that the general drift
of American policy was opposed to insisting on the right,
and he urged this upon his court. * Here the matter rested,
for the institution of a new government took it out of the
hands of the confederation, and gave it, with a legacy of
other undetermined questions, to the newly formed admin-
istration of President Washington.

In the Washington Papers are full summaries in the
President's writing of the correspondence between Jay and
Gardoqui, but without note or comment. Nor is there to
be found any note or memorandum to show whether there
was any special incident in the west, or on the Mississippi,
or in Spain, that should have brought this question before

*" It appears to me now, as it has long done, that they think here a
free port on the Mississippi will satisfy the wishes of the Americans,
and on that idea ground their expectation? that the instructions sent in
autumn last to Mr. Gardoqui will enable that gentleman to bring the
negotiations to a speedy termination." Carmichael to Jay, 29 April,

the Cabinet. In August, 1790, the matter was taken up,
and the various steps taken are detailed in the following
pages.

The instruments at hand for conducting a negotiation
were few and imperfect. Gardoqui had returned to Spain,
leaving his secretary Jose Ignacio de Viar, in charge, while
Carmichael, as merely charge at the Court of Madrid,
found it difficult to secure access to Florida Blanca, and
was compelled to depend more upon a certain " back-door "
influence than upon his own activity. The United States
had no diplomatic representative in England, but Gouverneur
Morris was there in an unofficial capacity, seeking to pave
the way for a settlement of differences and an exchange of
ministers. Jefferson, whose long service abroad would have
rendered his assistance valuable in a negotiation, was the
Secretary of State, and forced to depend upon such agents
as the infant diplomatic system of the government were sup-
plied with. In Portugal, closely connected with Spain in
everything but policy, there was no American representative,
and in France there was nothing higher than a charge
c? affaires. On the other hand, the Netherlands was the
only European power that had a minister resident regularly
accredited to the United States, and France was the only
power that could supply a means of diplomatic communica-
tion so high as a charge d' affaires — Otto. While the
European courts were fully cognizant of every step taken by
the American agents in Europe, and had an almost imme-
diate knowledge of all that they proposed, Jefferson acted
on imperfect knowledge, gained often from doubtful sources,
and secured long after the events described had happened,

when new combinations might have produced new situa-
tions. Six weeks were required for the passage of a letter
from London to New York, nine weeks were a fair run
from Paris, and sometimes nineteen weeks elapsed between
the delivery of a letter by a charge and its receipt by Jeffer-
son. Nor was this the only drawback, for it was reasonably
certain that before Carmichael's letters could leave Spain, or
Jefferson's be delivered to him, the Spanish court had read
them and were perfectly cognizant of what they contained.
Even the cypher used between these two was known to it.
A new danger to the United States appeared in the pros-
pect of war between Spain and Great Britain, in the event
of which a contest between the two powers in America was
most probable, as the weakness of the Spanish colonies
offered a tempting prize to the power of a nation almost
supreme on the ocean. The Spaniards had laid claim to
nearly the whole of the western coast of America, from
Cape Horn to the sixtieth degree of north latitude, and had
watched with a feeling of jealousy, aggravated by a sense of
injury, the establishment of a British settlement in Nootka
Sound, on Vancouver's Island. This inlet of the sea had
been first explored by Captain Cook in one of his voyages,
and, on the establishment of the English in India, became
a trading station, colonized by the English and recognized
by grants of land from the natives. After three years of
undisturbed possession, the little settlement was surprised
by the arrival of two Spanish ships of war from Mexico,
which seized an English merchant vessel — the Iphigenia —
imprisoned her crew, looted the vessel, and pulling down
the British flag on the settlement, raised that of Spain, and
subsequently treated all comers as intruders.

1 9

Spain, while recognizing that she had committed an ag-
gravated insult upon the English flag, was at first inclined to
to assume a high position, demanding that British subjects
should in the future refrain from trespassing on Spanish ter-
ritory; but, in consideration of the "ignorance" of those
who had landed at Nootka, the seized vessels were released.
Such a message was little suited to the disposition of Pitt or
of the English people, and in default of further reparation
from Spain, war must ensue, for which extensive prepara-
tions were made on both sides.

The Spanish were collecting their fleets at Cadiz and
Ferrol, and the king on May 5, 1790, announced to Par-
liament the prospect of war. A credit was given, but little
opposition appeared ; and while a peaceable settlement was
sought by sending a negotiator — Mr. Alleyne Fitzherbert *
— to Madrid, with instructions to insist on a full reparation
to the injured, before consenting even to a discussion of the
abstract rights involved, the collection of an army, fleets and
munitions of war was actively pushed, and plans formed for
attacking Spain in the West Indies and South America.

The news of the King's message reached the United States
in June, and was, as Jefferson termed it, "interesting news."
The aggressiveness of Great Britain was acknowledged.
"You will see by the papers enclosed that Great Britain is
itching for war. I do not see how one can be avoided, un-
less Spain should be frightened into concessions. The con-

* Fitzherbert had been sent to Paris in 1782 to negotiate the treaty of
peace between Great Britain and France and Spain ; and it was for his
services in bringing to a successful end the negotiations with Spain on
the Nootka question, that he was raised to the Irish peerage as Baron
St. Helen's.

sequences of such an event must have an important rela-
tion to the affairs of the United States." * " It was evident
they [the British Houses of Parliament] would accept
nothing short of an extensive renunciation from Spain as to
her American pretensions. Perhaps she is determined to
be satisfied with nothing but war, dismemberment of the
Spanish empire, and annihilation of her fleet. Nor does
her countenance towards us clear up at all." f But there
might be a compensation to America. " If the war between
France and Spain takes place, I think France will inevit-
ably be involved in it. In that case, I hope the new world
will fatten on the follies of the old. If we can but establish
the armed neutrality for ourselves, we must become the
carriers for all parties as far as we can raise vessels." J
Washington, just recovered from an illness that had almost
proved fatal, made the first mention of the possibility of
the Floridas being involved in the threatened war, but in-
sisted on the policy of neutrality. " It seems to be our
policy to keep in the situation in which nature has placed
us, to observe a strict neutrality, and to furnish others with
those good things of subsistence which they may want, and
which our fertile land abundantly produces, if circumstances
and events will permit us to do so. . .* . Gradually recover-
ing from the distresses in which the war left us, patiently
advancing in our task of civil government, unentangled in
the crooked politics of Europe, wanting scarcely anything
but the full navigation of the Mississippi (which we must

* Madison to Pendleton, 22 June, 1790.
t Jefferson to Monroe, 20 June, 1790.
\Jefferson to E. Rutledge, 4 July, 1790.

have, and as certainly shall have as we remain a nation),
I have supposed, that, with the undeviating exercise of a
just, steady and prudent national policy, we shall be the
gainers, whether the powers of the old world may be in
peace or war, but more especially in the latter case. In
that case our importance will certainly increase, and our
friendship be courted. Our dispositions will not be indif-
ferent to Britain or Spain. Why will not Spain be wise and
liberal at once ? It would be easy to annihilate all causes
of quarrels between that nation and the United States at this
time. At a future period, that may be far from being a fact.
Should a war take place between Great Britain and Spain, I
conceive, from a great variety of concurring circumstances,
there is the highest probability that the Floridas will soon be
in the possession of the former."*

In these phrases were compressed the policy of the gov-
ernment : neutrality, if possible, and an attempt to make
the difference between the European powers a means of
obtaining concessions from Spain long sought for. "The
part we are to act," wrote Jefferson to Carmichael, "is un-
certain, and will be difficult. The unsettled state of our dis-
pute with Spain, may give a turn to it very different from
what we would wish," — and Col. David Humphreys was sent
to Madrid to aid Carmichael, bearing a sketch of general
matters to be considered in the negotiation, drawn up by
Jefferson, f In introducing Humphreys to Carmichael,
Jefferson wrote : —

" With this information, written and oral, you will be en-

* Washington to Lafayette, II August, 1790.
f Post.

abled to meet the minister in conversations on the subject
of the navigation of the Mississippi, to which we wish you
to lead his attention immediately. Impress him thoroughly
with the necessity of an early and even an immediate settle-
ment of this matter, and of a return to the field of negotia-
tion for this purpose ; and though it must be done delicately,
yet he must be made to understand unequivocally, that a
resumption of the negotiation is not desired on our part,
unless he can determine, in the first opening of it, to yield
the immediate and full enjoyment of that navigation. . . .
It is impossible to answer for the forbearance of our western
citizens. We endeavor to quiet them with the expectation
of an attainment of their rights by peaceable means. But
should they, in a moment of impatience, hazard others,
there is no saying how far we may be led ; for neither them-
selves nor their rights will ever be abandoned by us.

"You will be pleased to observe, that we press these mat-
ters warmly and firmly, under this idea, that the war be-
tween Spain and Great Britian will be begun before you re-
ceive this ; and such a moment must not be lost. But should
an accommodation take place, we retain, indeed, the same
object and the same resolutions unalterably ; but your discre-
tion will suggest, that in that event they must be pressed
more softly, and that patience and persuasion must temper
your conferences, till either these may prevail, or some
other circumstance turn up, which may enable us to use
other means for the attainment of an object which we are
determined, in the end, to obtain at every risk." *

In the event of war the good offices of France, to assist in
the negotiations at Madrid, were to be asked. |

In his rough draft of "Heads of Consideration " for Mr.
Carmichael, drawn up by Jefferson 2 August, 1 790, the pos-
sibility of a necessary coalition with Great Britain against

* Jefferson to Carmichael, 2 August, 1790.
\Jeffersonto William Short, IO August, 1790.

Spain was considered. The inhabitants of the western
country required a vent for their surplus products, and the
natural vent was down the Mississippi. To deny the privi-
lege of navigating that river to the mouth to the Americans,
was to invite a complication not easily to be solved. Either
the federal government must take up the cause of the
western people and by force or negotiation obtain conces-
sions from Spain ; or it must reduce the Kentuckians to an
acquiescence in the arbitrary decrees of Spain ; or it must
consent to a separation of the western territory. To aban-
don the west or reduce it to obedience was equally imprac-
ticable, and it remained only to obtain concesssions. If by
force, the United States could act alone or in conjunction
with Great Britain "with a view to partition," and in the
latter case Jefferson noted :

"The Floridas (includ? N. Orleans) would be assigned
to us. Louisiana (or all the country on the west? waters of
y* Missi.) to them. We confess that such an alliance is
not what we would wish, because it may eventually lead us
into embarrassing situations as to our best friend, and put
the power of two n'bors into ye hands of one. L1? Lans-
downe has declared he gave the Floridas to Spain rather
than to the U. S., as a bone of discord with the H. of Bour-
bon, and of reunion with Gr. Br. Connolly's attempt (as
well as other facts) prove they keep it in view." *

The English and Spanish negotiations were continued
through the summer. On June 4th the Spanish ministry
declared that the release of the vessels had been a sufficient
reparation for actual injury, and there only remained the

*This document is printed in full post.

question of right to be determined, a question that the in-
structions to Fitzherbert prevented him from discussing
under such a declaration. The English demanded a res-
toration of the vessels, a full indemnity for the seizure, and
a reparation for the insult committed on the English flag.
Count de Florida Blanca replied that he would grant the
satisfaction demanded, on condition that the damages were
determined by an impartial judge, and that all the rights of
Spain should be positively reserved. (June 18.) England
continued her preparations and called upon Holland to assist
her, as she was bound to by treaty. In response a Dutch
fleet joined Admiral Howe at Portsmouth, and as a counter-
movement Spain collected a fleet at Cadiz.

Nor did Spain stand alone in the matter, for by the
pacte defamille France was bound to give her assistance in
an offensive or defensive war, and notice that such aid
might become necessary was served upon the French min-
istry. Coming as it did, when France was in the throes of
revolution, it naturally produced some difference of opinion,
with which questions of constitutional policy were com-
mingled. A few months before, Mirabeau had induced the
Assembly to decide that while the right of peace and war
belonged to the nation, war could be declared only by a
decree of the Assembly based upon a formal and pressing
(necessaire) proposal of the king, and approved by him.
The legislature, by controlling the supplies, could at any
time, even in the progress of a war, impose the necessity of
making peace upon the king. Such a decision need not
have proved embarrassing had not the country been bound
to perform certain acts, under certain contingencies, and
apparently without the power of questioning their justice or

expediency. The "Society of 1789," where, as in the
" Club des Jacobins," questions of public policy were dis-
cussed before being submitted to the Assembly, declared
that it was impossible to maintain the "family compact"
under the existing constitution. " They say that they cannot
adhere to engagements which never were just, which are
incompatible with the rights of man and the principles of a
free constitution, and which render the nation dependent
upon the will of one man, and that man a stranger. They
declare such treaties between kings to be conspiracies
against the people of their respective countries." *

. So distinctly colored as was this declaration with the
temper of the time as to be almost grotesque, Mirabeau
was too shrewd a politician not to recognize that it repre-
sented such a share of public opinion that it could not
wisely be ignored. He knew the advantage of preserving
the Spanish alliance, yet that alliance must be modified to
make it conform better with the prevalent ideas of the uni-
versal brotherhood of man, and also to render it palatable
to those who looked upon it as an instrument of monarchy
— a euphemism for tyranny. Besides, France herself had
important colonial interests in the West Indies, whose safety
would be jeopardized by a rupture of peace with Great
Britain. Spain had served notice that she would look else-
where for alliances, should France fail her, and demanded
an immediate state of the conduct the ministers intended to
pursue. It was Mirabeau who drew up the report express-
ing the opinion of the Comite Diplomatique on the com-
pact, and who laid it before the Assembly on the 25 th of
August. Earl Gower wrote of it : —

* Dispatches of Earl Gower, 9 July, 1790.

" It consisted in advising the Assembly to empower them
to examine that treaty in order to form out of it a national
compact, by leaving out all the articles offensive, and at the
same time to request the king to order his minister at the
Court of Madrid to enter into a negotiation with the Spanish
ministry upon those grounds. They proposed two decrees :

" i st. That all existing treaties shall be maintained by the
French nation until it shall have revised and modified them.

" and. That, before the thorough examination of treaties
which the nation may think proper to continue or alter, the
king shall be requested to make known to all the powers
with which France is connected that justice and the love of
peace are the bases of the French constitution ; that the
nation cannot admit in her treaties any stipulations which
are not purely defensive and commercial. That accordingly
they request the king to inform his Catholic Majesty that
the French nation, in taking all proper measures to maintain
peace, will abide by the engagements which her government
has contracted with Spain. That they also desire the king
to order his ministers to negotiate accordingly with the
Court of Spain, and to commission thirty ships of the line,
eight of which at least to be fitted out in the ports of the
Mediterranean.

"This report was taken into consideration yesterday
morning, and, after a short debate, the Assembly decreed
that they would abide by the defensive and commercial
engagements which the government has contracted with
Spain ; that the king should be desired to order his ambas-
sadors to negotiate with the ministers of the Catholic king
in order to strengthen, by a national treaty, tyes useful to
both people, and to fix with precision and clearness all stip-
ulations which may not be entirely conformable to the views
of general peace and to the principles of justice, which
shall always be the politics of the French ; and also, taking
into consideration the armaments of the different nations of
Europe, their progressive increase, the security of the
French colonies and commerce, they decreed that the king

shall be desired to order into commission forty-five ships of
the line, with a proportionable number of frigates and small
vessels."

These acts, a curious mixture of politics and sentiment,
were what appeared on the surface, and while seeking to
retain the expectancy of Spain for aid by a vote for ships,
delay was also the object. Nor was this all. The prepara-
tions of England on so large a scale, to secure what was
regarded as a very disproportionate end, could not but
arouse the suspicions of the continental nations that some
other object was to be attained. Late in July the Journal
des Debats et Decrets said : " II est impossible aussi que ces
armemens regard 1' Espagne seule. II est bien probable
qu'elles menacent egalement les possessions Francoises."*
Such a view was promptly disavowed by the French minis-
try ; but England knew the terms of the family compact, and
could not fail to be irritated by the vote of the Assembly
to increase the navy, though assured by M. Montmorin that
the increase would be very gradual, and by both M. Mont-
morin and M. Neckar of the desire of France for peace.
Earl Gower was instructed to notify the French ministry
that " any assistance offered to Spain will oblige the British
Cabinet to adopt such measures as may be most likely to
render that assistance ineffectual ;" and to still further sup-
port England's position, Hugh Elliott was sent on a secret
mission to France. It is to Mr. Oscar Browning that our
knowledge of his mission is due, and we quote his note : —

* Even in England the good faith of the ministry in asking for a
credit to arm against Spain was questioned, for there had already ex-
isted a belief that an expedition to the Baltic was on foot.

" Pitt was using the strongest and most haughty language
to compel Spain to submit to us, but if France joined her
these remonstrances would be ineffectual, and a European
war would break out. Mirabeau was not a minister, and
therefore Lord Gower could have no communication with
him, but he was chairman of the comite diplomatique of the
National Assembly, in whose hands, rather than in those of
the minister, lay the issues of peace and war. It was import-
ant to secure that Mirabeau should not only maintain the
principle that France was not bound to assist Spain under
the present circumstances, but should do all he could to
urge Spain to submit to the demands of England. If
Elliott was authorized to use any other arguments to Mira-
beau of a more delicate or secret nature, it would be a
reason for the correspondence having completely disap-
peared."

Whatever were the arguments used, they were so effective
that the popular party signified to Lord Gower "their
earnest desire to use their influence with the Court of Mad-
rid in order to bring it to accede to the just demands of his
Majesty, and, if supported by us, I am induced to believe
they will readily prefer an English alliance to a Spanish
compact." *

Count de Florida Blanca in the meantime was losing
heart. His efforts to secure the aid of France had resulted
in an apparent acquiescence, it is true, but the widespread
disaffection and mutiny in the French fleet and army would
make the aid an element of danger rather than of strength.
He had coquetted with the United States by throwing out a
hint that the right to navigate the Mississippi might be con-
ceded, f — this to prevent the possible alliance between the

* Cower" s Despatches, 22 October, 1790.

fOn September 2ist, Hamilton wrote to Washington speaking of a

United States and Great Britain. His own position was
precarious, and to serve as a figure-head for executing the
policy of another and irresponsible person, was not kind to
his temper. He thought it best to yield. "Je me rends a
vos conditions," he said to Fitzhebert, " non parce qu'elles
sont justes, mais parce que j'y suis force. Si la France
nous avait aide, je ne m'y serais jamais soumis, mais nous
ne pouvons tout seuls nous mesures avec nous. Faites done
ce que vous voulez." On the 28th October the convention
was signed, "by which it was agreed that the lands and
buildings of which British subjects had been dispossessed in
North America should be restored to them ; that British
subjects should not be disturbed or molested in carrying on
their fisheries in the South Seas, or in making settlements
for the purpose of commerce on the coasts of those seas in
places not already occupied ; and that on the other hand the

letter from Daniel Parker, dated London, the I2th of July, which men-
tioned that " he had just seen M. de Miranda, who had recently con-
versed with the Marquis del Campo, from whom he learned that the
Court of Spain had acceded to our right of navigating the Mississippi.
Col. Smith has also read to me a passage out of another letter of the 6lh
of July, which mentions that orders had been sent to the Viceroy of
Mexico and the Governor of New Orleans not to interrupt the passage
of vessels of the United States through that river."

On September 22d Lear, in a letter to the President, announced it a
based on " pretty direct information," and the letter of Gouverneu
Morris dated 2 July, reporting that the concession was "matter of com-
mon report," must have been in the President's hands for some time
Further than this, Lear in New York and King in Boston claimed to
have authentic information of a full accommodation between Grea
Britain and Spain — a premature conclusion, based upon mere rumors.
See also Humphreys' letter, post.

king of Britain should engage to take the most effectual
measures that these fisheries should not be made a pretext
for illicit trade with the Spanish settlements ; and with that
view it was further stipulated that British subjects should
not carry on their fisheries within ten leagues from any part
of the coast already occupied by Spain."*

This convention was used by the United States as a pre-
cedent when urging its claims in the Oregon question.

Congress adjourned on August i2th, and on the i5th the
President, accompanied by Jefferson, started on a journey
to Rhode Island which occupied about ten days. On their
return to New York the President addressed a series of
questions to the Vice- President, the Chief Justice and the
three members of his Cabinet, on the position to be taken
should Lord Dorchester, f the Governor of Quebec, wish to
strike the Spanish colonies by sending troops from Detroit,
through the territory of the United States. It is the replies
to these questions that are printed in the following pages,
and constitute the first discussion in diplomacy by Washing-
ton's advisers that we have a record of. The documents
speak for themselves, and the subsequent events may now
be described. Although such an application was never
formally made, the replies have an interest when brought
into comparison with Jefferson's negotiations with France
and Spain during his presidency, which led up to the pur-
chase of Louisiana.

* Stanhope, Life of Pitt, II, 62. The convention determining the
indemnity was made in February, 1793, and the port at Nootka was
not evacuated by the Spanish until 1795.

f Better known as General Guy Carleton. He was created Baron
Dorchester in 1786.

Humphreys, after a tempestuous passage of five weeks,
reached London on the morning of October 14, and found
that the confident tone the ministry had adopted in the
summer had altered. A feeling prevailed that Spain was
artfully putting off a settlement while sounding the attitude
of France, and the prospect of her assistance in case of
actual war.* Still war seemed more probable than peace ;
the stock market was uncertain, insurance was at war prem-
ium, the press gang was still at work, and all the usual prep-
arations for war were being pushed. "While the powers of
Europe are in such a political ferment, America is daily
growing of more importance in their view. A report has
prevailed in this place that Spain has lately made some
declaration, with respect to conceding to the United States
the free navigation of the Mississippi. I took considerable
pains to trace it, and yesterday was told Col. f Miranda had
seen it in a letter to the Spanish ambassador himself. My
informant received the intelligence from Miranda." } Six
Cherokee chiefs came to London, "as ambassadors from a
nation which (according to the English printed communi-
cation) has 20,000 men in arms ready to assist G. Britain
against Spain" — an assertion as ludicrous as it was prepos-
terous. Up to the hour of his leaving England — 4 No-
vember— Humphreys was unable to say whether the com-
plication would terminate in peace or war, although the con-
vention with Spain had then been signed nearly a week (28
October), and the immediate end of his mission to Spain

* Humphreys to the Secretary of State, London, 14 October, 1790.

f Count.

\ Humphreys to the Secretary of State, 20 October, 1790.

rendered abortive. On reaching Lisbon, two weeks later,
he learned of the agreement, and in vague terms of the
details covered.

Humphreys, however, determined to go to Madrid, and
leaving Lisbon on the 3d of December he reached the
Spanish capital on the lyth, after a tedious journey, travel-
ling from daylight to dark, and making but one stop about
an hour in the middle of the day. The convention was
then being "partially circulated," printed on a single sheet
in Spanish and French,* but for nearly two weeks the
special messenger sent no dispatch to the American Secre-
tary ot State. On the 3d of January, 1791, he broke silence
and in cipher wrote to Jefferson : —

[In cipher]

MADRID, 3 January, 1791.

I have had, sir, many conversations with Mr. Carmichael
on the subject of your letter to him. If it had arrived early
in summer, he thinks we might have obtained all our wishes.
Then the critical state of affairs induced the Comte de
Florida Blanca to throw out those general assertions that we
should have no reason to complain of the conduct of this
Court, with respect to the Mississippi, which gave rise to
the report its navigation was opened. That minister had
intimations from del Campo of the conferences between Mr.
Morris and the Duke of Leeds, which occasioned him to
say with warmth to Mr. Carmichael, now is your time to
make a treaty with England. Fitzherbert availed himself
of those conferences to create apprehensions that the
Americans would aid his nation in case of war. Long time
the conduct of Spain was fluctuating and undecided. After
a variety of circumstances (which Mr. Carmichael has ex-
plained in his dispatches that have miscarried, and which he

* Humphreys to the Secretary of State, Madrid, 18 December, 1790.

will repeat in others by me) a convention was formed
whereby the British gained substantially everything they at
first demanded. Want of money to support a war and the
Queen's intrigues, together with advice from the Comte
Montemorin that peace was essential to France, were prob-
ably the principal causes which compelled Spain to yield
the point after each side had tried which could hold out
the longest. The preparations cost Spain sixteen millions
dollars. Thus the crisis most favorable for the attainment
of our wishes is past. Unless there is some secret article in
the Convention by which England guarantees the posses-
sions of Spain in America, resentment may [indecipherable]
in the Spanish Court for having been obliged to receive the
law. They may also desire to be in readiness for events.
How far these or other motives may operate in producing
change of system with respect to the United States, re-
mains to be learnt from an adherence to the latter part of
your instructions to Mr. Carmichael.

The fact is clear that the United States are daily gaining
political consideration in Europe. Spain, guided by narrow
policy towards its colonies, fears the consequence of our
increasing strength and resources. The Compte de Florida
Blanca has been so long and so obstinately opposed to the
admission of foreign vessels into the Gulf of Mexico, that
the most he can ever be persuaded to do, will be to suffer
somebody else to negotiate, to whom, if there be blame for
inconsistency in policy, the fault may be imputed. But
the Compte not being well with the Queen, loses credit ;
and recent circumstances indicate that he is but the osten-
sible, while le Rena (at the head of the finance) is the real
minister. Mr. Carmichael thinks, that if the Compte will
not consent to open a negotiation with liberal views, it may
be possible to displace him and find a successor of better
dispositions : that is, if the Queen lives, but she is appre-
hensive of dying in childbed next month, which event
would give the Compte more weight than ever. Campo-
manes, who is the head of the judicators, Compte de Aranda,

and many others, entertain just ideas with respect to our
country. The first is high in influence and secretly an
enemy to the Compte de Florida Blanca ; the last, at the
head of opposition, will not come into office himself, but, in
case of a change of administration, some of his friends will
succeed. Mr. Carmichael, being on terms of intimacy with
the characters here, is certainly capable of effecting more at
this Court than any other American. . . .

Something also gives uneasiness to this Court. Affairs do
not go well. Frequent councils are convened. The gov-
ernment is feeble, jealous, mercenary and unpopular. The
King is a well-disposed, passionate, weak man. The Queen
(a shrewd, well-instructed woman, addicted to pleasure and
expense) governs the kingdom. She is not beloved. Nor
did either of them receive the usual acclamations of the
people when they returned from their country residence last
fall. The Queen has even been insulted, which makes her
appear rarely in public. For this offense twelve washer-
women have been confined, and their husbands banished
the kingdom, because they petitioned for their release.
Several natives of distinction have lately been exiled from
the capital to the provinces, among others the Comptesse of
Galvez. Compte Segur, a Frenchman accused of being the
author of a libel against the Queen, within a week past died
of rigorous confinement. This government, alarmed at the
success of the revolution in France, shows great distrust
and hatred of the French. Several have been arrested at
midnight and hurried out of the country. People begin to
think and even to speak in private circles freely. In some
provinces dissatisfaction prevails on account of new taxes.
Three regiments are just sent into Gallicia to quell those dis-
turbances, where an attempt was made to assassinate the new
general on the road. General Lacy (who commands at
Barcelona and has been obliged to menace the city by turn-
ing the cannon against it) is continually writing to Court
for men and military supplies. Tho' the Spaniards in many
places retain the appearance, habits and manners of a people

who have but lately lost their liberty, yet affairs are not ripe
for reformation, from want of leaders, information and
means of combination. The utmost diligence is used to
suppress intelligence from other countries. Notwithstanding
I had the necessary passports, at the frontier town I was
delayed a day and not permitted to proceed, until the
officers of police had put my letters under cover to the
police in Madrid. This having been done in my presence,
they delivered them to me, with an apology for the strict-
ness of their orders. On my arrival at Madrid, I went
directly to Mr. Carmichael, and upon his application to the
Compte de Florida Blanca, the letters (which had remained
in my trunk under the seal of government,) were returned
unopened into my hand. But notwithstanding all precau-
tions, letters, newspapers and pamphlets come from France
into this kingdom. Interesting paragraphs are copied, cir-
culated, and read with avidity. . . .

[In Cipher]

MADRID, 15 January, 1791.

Sir : I have employed my time here in communicating
according to instructions the sentiments of the President on
the navigation of the Mississippi, and other important points.
Mr. Carmichael's ideas are just ; his exertions will be power-
ful and unremitting to obtain the accomplishment of our
desires before his departure from this country ; the task
will now be difficult, if not impracticable, from the opinions
which are impressed on this court. I fear these are rather
riveted than impressed to the very substance of their former
jealous policy. I learn from other good authority, as well as
from Mr. Carmichael, that all the representations of Gardoqui
(when minister in America) tended to excite a belief that
the most respectable and influential people throughout the
United States did not wish to have the navigation of the
Mississippi opened for years to come, from an apprehension
that such an event would weaken the government, and impov-
erish the Atlantic States by emigrations. It was even pre-

tended that none but a handful of settlers on the western
waters, and a few inhabitants of the southern states, would
acquiesce in the measure.

At present affairs here are guided more by intrigue than
by reason. So that no one can answer for the consequence
of a negotiation. Means are used to bring our subject with
advantage into discussion. The king is just gone to hunt
for two days ; play is usual after the holidays ; his prime
minister and the family ambassadors only attended him.
Nothing can be ascertained until his return.

It is not improbable a change of ministry may soon take
place. The situation about the Court becomes every day
more critical. Nor is it less so in the country. The night
before last, twenty-two French and Italians were sent from
Madrid under guard, out of the kingdom, for speaking too
freely ; as was one Spanish Marquis to a distant province.

For nine days longer Humphreys remained in Madrid in
the character of a traveller, hoping that Carmichael could
obtain an audience with Count Florida Blanca. Disap-
pointed in this, he returned to Lisbon, leaving the conduct
of whatever questions might arise in the hands of Car-
michael.

"As the business with which he is now charged requires
to be managed with uncommon address and delicacy, I
have advised him to seize some good occasion for obtaining
a particular audience to explain our desires specifically, but
in the most discreet manner, with the reasons and motives
on which they are founded. And I have told him, that I
apprehended the sooner this could be done, the better it
would be ; since the affairs of Europe, far from being settled,
may soon produce a crisis highly favorable to the promotion
of our interests ; and since our western settlers cannot long
brook delay. Hitherto he had only found a casual oppor-
tunity (that is to say, immediately after my arrival) to sug-

gest to the minister, in general terms without abruptness,
our sincere disposition to be connected with Spain, in the
most liberal and friendly manner ; and for this purpose the
apparent expediency of making arrangements respecting
the navigation of the Mississippi, before any ill adventures
shall happen in that quarter."*

What occurred immediately after Humphreys' departure
is described in a letter that Carmichael wrote to Jefferson,
interesting not only in connection with this special mission,
but also as showing the difficulties under which Carmichael
was placed while in Spain.

MADRID, 24 January, 1791.

Sir : Colonel Humphreys delivered to me your letter of
the 6th of August on the i8th of the last month ; nothing
could equal my astonishment in finding that I have been
employing my time in a situation that has been for many
years disagreeable, so little to my own credit or to the sat-
isfaction of my own country.

The only method which I could take in the moment was
to show to a man who justly merits the confidence placed in
him, the pains I had taken for information, and how im-
probable it was that I should spend my time and even my
own fortune to procure intelligence without transmitting the
materials which I obtained with great difficulty and consid-
erable expense, that at least prove my zeal, tho' perhaps not
my talents.

The next object will be to forward copies of all the dis-
patches which I find by your letter have not reached the
Department. I cannot account for the detention of my
letters. I know that I have had powerful enemies here, who
from personal motives have in many instances endeavored
to injure me.

I discovered that a servant who had lived with me more

* Humphreys to the Secretary of State, Lisbon, 6 February, 1791.

than six years had received money to a considerable amount
from one of these persons, the C! Cabarras. He has paid,
and is paying, dearly the suborning my domestics, yet more
from his own imprudence than my efforts.

On the 26th of February, I gave an account of a friendly
conversation which I had with the Cl.e de Florida Blanca on
that subject, which terminated to our mutual satisfaction.

The President will have probably communicated to you
the letter I had the honor to write him on the first notice of
his nomination : Least that letter should not have met with
better fortune than so many others have done, I inclose a
copy, as also one I wrote from Aranjuez on being advised by
you that he had been pleased to continue me in my present
employment.

You will see that I have no interested motive to influence
my conduct ; I can say with truth that I have now to begin
life (so far as the expression may be applied to independ-
ence and domestic ease), and I thought I could have done
it with pleasure, until I received your letters by Colonel
Humphreys.

I announced to the Department of Foreign Affairs the
time and the manner in which I received the cyphers sent
me. Colonel Humphreys has seen by the covers of those
cyphers, and by certificates I took from persons who were
present, or who delivered them, that it would have been
highly imprudent in me to have made use of them. If
they have ever been employed, no letter in cypher has ever
reached me.

I sent duplicates of these certificates immediately to the
department, and I find that by the list which you send me
of letters received that these have not come to hand.

You will pardon this detail. It is necessary for my own
tranquillity, which has suffered more than I can express for
several years past, and more particularly since I have re-
ceived your last letter. If my letters since the 26th of Feb-
ruary have reached you, you will be convinced that no one
here in the diplomatic line was so early or better informed

than I have been with respect to the apparent rupture be-
tween this country and Great Britain. I knew how it
would end, because I knew that measures begun in folly
would terminate in humiliation, and humiliation might lead
to something more.

Something however might have been done in a moment
of projects and apprehension, had not a certain negotiation
carried on our part at London transpired, and which I think
was known here rather from British policy than from the
vigilance of the Marquis del Campo. Entirely unacquainted
with this manoeuvre, although in correspondence with the
person employed, I was suspected to be in the secret.
This suspicion banished confidence, which returns by slow
degrees. This circumstance induced me to stop entirely
my correspondence with G. M. ; to continue it would have
done harm, and certainly could do no good.

I have seen extracts from the President's letter commu-
nicated to the Duke of Leeds, perhaps mutilated or forged,
to serve here the views of the British Cabinet : I do not yet
dispair of obtaining copies of those letters thro' the same
channel that I procured the first account of the demands of
G. B., and the signature of the late convention.

You will easily conceive that I must now discretionally
obey (from the change of ciicumstances) the latter part of
the instructions given me ; but, sir, the opportunities of
seeing the minister in the character I hold, are so rare, that
there is little room for information ( ?) . However active,
however punctual, I may be, I must wait until every ambas-
sador, every minister, even if there was one from the Repub-
lic of Ragusa, have had their audience, before I can obtain
mine. You will see by the enclosed paper No. i,* the con-
versation I have had with the minister. I have endeavored
indirectly to suggest ideas of the necessity of a speedy
determination in this government to adopt the measures
pointed out by your last letters. These suggestions have
been made to persons who have now, and probably will

*Missing.

have in future, much influence in the Cabinet, if the Queen
lives. I shall communicate to you the effects which my
representations may produce, and with Colonel Humphrey's
advice and approbation. If occasion offers, and circum-
stances permit, I shall decidedly press the business.

This government is weak ; the ministry is in a ticklish
situation ; the Queen governs, and governs with caprice ; the
people begin to dispute their sovereigns ; and altho' they have
no chiefs to look up to, the dissatisfaction is general. . . .

There is probably something in agitation here with re-
spect to the affairs of the north. I shall endeavor to develop
this business. Here they hold themselves in readiness to
arm. The object is doubtful and unaccountable. It is a
mixture of haughtiness and timidity. In fact, after having
blundered into humiliation abroad, they want to appear
respectable at home. This is an observation made to me
by the Cl. de Campomanes, Governor of the Council of
Castile, who is, with those he can influence, decidedly of
opinion that it is the interest of his country to form liberal
and lasting connections with the United States. ... *

WM. CARMICHAEL.

Gouverneur Morris had been authorized in October, 1 789,
to confer with the British ministers in order to learn their
sentiments on the matters of controversy pending between
the United States and Great Britain, and arising mainly
from the treaty of 1783 — that is, the detention of the western
posts by England, the question of indemnification for negroes
carried off contrary to treaty, a commercial treaty, and an ex-
change of ministers between the two powers. Morris had
reported in substance that the ministers "equivocate on
every proposal of a treaty of commerce, and authorize in
their communications with Mr. Morris the same conclusions

*This letter was received by Jefferson, March 3131.

which have been drawn from those they had had from time
to time with Mr. Adams, and those through Maj? Beckwith :*
to wit, that they do not mean to submit their present advan-
tages in commerce to the risk which might attend a discus-
sion of them, whereon some reciprocity could not fail to be
demanded — unless indeed we would agree to make it a
treaty of alliance, as well as of commerce, so as to under-
mine our obligations with France. This mode of stripping
that rival nation of its alliances they tried successfully with
Holland, endeavored at with Spain, and have plainly and
repeatedly suggested to us. For this they would probably
relax some of the rigours they exercise against our commerce.
That as to a minister, their Secretary for Foreign Affairs is
disposed to exchange one, but meets with opposition in his
cabinet, so as to render the issue uncertain."! Hence Jeff-
erson concluded "that it would be dishonorable to the U. S.,
useless, even injurious, to renew the propositions for a treaty
of commerce, or for the exchange of a minister : and that
these subjects should now remain dormant, till they shall be
brought forward earnestly by them."} The President re-
ported to the Senate, 14 February, 1791, that from these
conferences of Morris, he did " not infer any disposition on
their part to enter into any arrangements merely commercial

* Major, afterwards Sir George Beckwith, had served in the British
army through the Revolution, aud from 1787 to 1791, when there was
no British minister accredited to the United States, he was entrusted
with " an important and confidential mission," acting, in fact, as an un-
recognized diplomatic agent. It was for his services in the West Indies
that he was knighted.

f Jefferson's summary of Morris's letters.

J Jefferson's report to the President, 15 December, 1790.
4

. . . unless it could be extended to a treaty of alliance,
offensive and defensive, or unless in the event of a rupture
with Spain."

Here ended the episode. It may be remembered that
in July, 1797, William Blount was expelled from the Senate
for being concerned in a conspiracy to deliver New Orleans
into the hands of the British, and for having instigated the
Creeks and Cherokees to assist the British to conquer
Louisiana.

WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD.

Washington, August, 1890.

[Secret]
UNITED STATES, 27 August, 1790.

Provided the dispute between Great Britain and
Spain should come to the decision of arms, from a
variety of circumstances (Individually unimportant and
inconclusive, but very much the reverse when com-
pared and combined), there is no doubt in my mind that
New Orleans and the Spanish ports above it on the
Mississippi, will be among the first attempt? of the
former, and that the reduction of them will be under-
taken by a combined operation from Detroit.

The consequences of having so formidable and enter-
prising a people as the British on both our flanks and
rear, with their navy in front, as they respect our
western settlements which may be seduced thereby, as
they regard the security of the Union and its commerce
with the West Indies, are too obvious to need enumer-
ation.

What then should be the answer of the Executive
of the United States to L* Dorchester, in case he
should apply for permission to march troops through
the territory of the U* States from Detroit to the
Mississippi ?

What notice ought to be taken of the measure, if it
(43)

should be undertaken without leave, which is the most
probable proceeding of the two ? *

* August 27, 1890, Washington placed on paper these questions,
and sent them to the Vice- President, the members of his Cabinet, and
the Chief Justice, requesting their opinion in writing. A distinction,
perhaps of no importance, was made in the manner of asking these
gentlemen; for the opinion of the members of the Cabinet was « re-
quested to be given," but « Mr. Jay will oblige the President of the
United States by giving his opinion." As to the form used with Mr.
Adams, no record appears.

REPLY OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT.

NEW YORK, 29 August, 1 790.

SIR : That New Orleans, and the Spanish ports on
the Mississippi, will be among the first attempts of the
English, in case of a war with Spain, appears very
probable : and that a combined operation from Detroit
would be convenient to that end cannot be doubted.

The consequences on the western settlements, on
the commerce with the West Indies, and on the gen-
eral security and tranquillity of the American confed-
eration, of having them in our rear, and on both our
flanks, with their navy in front, are very obvious.

The interest of the United States duly weighed, and
their duty conscientiously considered, point out to
them, in the case of such a war, a neutrality, as long
as it may be practicable. The people of these States
would not willingly support a war, and the present
government has not strength to command, nor enough
of the general confidence of the nation to draw the
men or money necessary, until the grounds, causes and
necessity of it should become generally known, and
universally approved. A pacific character, in opposi-
tion to a war-like temper, a spirit of conquest, or a
disposition to military enterprise, is of great import-
ance to us as to preserve in Europe: and therefore, we
should not engage even in defensive war, until the
(45)

necessity of it should become apparent, or at least
until we have it in our power to make it manifest, in
Europe as well as at home.

In order to preserve an honest neutrality, or even
the reputation of a disposition to it, the United States
must avoid as much as possible every real wrong, and
even every appearance of injury to either party. To
grant to Lord Dorchester, in case he should request it,
permission to march troops through the territory of
the United States, from Detroit to the Mississippi,
would not only have an appearance offensive to the
Spaniards, of partiality to the English, but would be a
real injury to Spain. The answer therefore to his
lordship should be a refusal, in terms clear and decided,
but guarded and dignified, in a manner which no
Power has more at command than the President of the
United States.

If a measure so daring, offensive and hostile as the
march of troops through our territory to attack a
friend, should be hazarded by the English, without
leave, or especially after a refusal, it is not so easy
to answer the question, what notice ought to be taken
of it.

The Situation of our Country is not like that of the
nations in Europe. They have generally large num-
bers of inhabitants in narrow territories : we have
small numbers scattered over vast regions. The
country through which the Brittons must pass from
Detroit to the Mississippi, is, I suppose, so thinly in-

habited, and at such a distance from all the populous
settlements, that it would be impossible for the Presi-
dent of the United States to collect militia or march
troops sufficient to resist the enterprise. After the
step shall have been taken there are two ways for us to
proceed : one is war, and the other negotiation. Spain
would probably remonstrate to the President of the
United States, but whether she should or not, the
President of the United States should remonstrate to the
King of Great Britain. It would not be expected I
suppose, by our friends or enemies, that the United
States should declare war at once. Nations are not
obliged to declare war for every injury or even hos-
tility. A tacit acquiescence under such an outrage,
would be misinterpreted on all hands; by Spain as in-
imical to her, and by Britain as the effect of weakness,
disunion and pusillanimity. Negotiation then is the
only other alternative.

Negotiation in the present state of things is attended
with peculiar difficulties. As the King of Great
Britain twice proposed to the United States an ex-
change of ministers, once through Mr- Hartley and
once through the Duke of Dorsett, and when the
United States agreed to the proposition, flew from it :
to send a minister again to St. James's till that Court
explicitly promises to . send one to America, is an
humiliation to which the United States ought never to
submit. A remonstrance from sovereign to sovereign
cannot be sent, but by an ambassador of some order

or other : from minister of state to minister of state, it
might be transmitted in many other ways : a remon-
strance in the form of a letter from the American
Minister of State to the Duke of Leeds, or whoever
may be Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, might be
transmitted, through an envoy, minister plenipotentiary,
or ambassador of the President of the United States,
at Paris, Madrid or the Hague, and through the British
ambassador at either of these courts. The utmost
length that can now be gone with dignity, would be to
send a minister to the Court of London, with instruc-
tions to present his credentials, demand an audi-
ence, make his remonstrance, but to make no estab-
lishment, and demand his audience of leave and quit
the kingdom in one, two or three months, if a minister
of equal degree were not appointed and actually sent
to the President of the United States from the King of
Great Britain.

It is a misfortune that in these critical moments and
circumstances, the United States have not a minister
of large views, mature age, information and judgment,
and strict integrity, at the Courts of France, Spain,
London and the Hague. Early and authentic intelli-
gence from those courts may be of more importance
than the expense; but as the representatives of the
people, as well as the legislatures, are of a different
opinion, they have made a very scanty provision for
but a part of such a system. As it is, God knows
where the men are to be found who are qualified for

such missions and would undertake them. By an ex-
perience of ten years, which made me too unhappy at
the time to be ever forgotten, I know that every
artifice which can deceive, every temptation which can
operate on hope or fear, ambition or avarice, pride or
vanity, the love of society, pleasure or amusement,
will be employed to divert and warp them from the
true line of their duty and the impartial honour and
interest of their country.

To the superior lights and information derived from
office ; the more serene temper and profound judgment
of the President of the United States, these crude and
hasty thoughts concerning the points proposed, are
humbly submitted, with every sentiment of respect and
sincere attachment, by his most obedient and most
humble servant,

JOHN ADAMS.

The President of the United States.

OPINION OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE.

NEW YORK, 28 August, 1790.

SIR : The Case which I had yesterday the Honor of
receiving from you, gave occasion to the following
Remarks and Reflections.

Whether the Issue of the Negociations depending be-
tween the British and Spanish courts is Peace or War,
it certainly is prudent to anticipate and be prepared
for the consequences of either event In the present
state of things it would doubtless militate against the
interests of the U. S., that the Spanish territories in
question should be reduced, and remain under the
Government of his B. majesty ; and probably that cir-
cumstance would strongly unite with those others
which must naturally lead him to regard the Posses-
sion of these Countries as a desirable Object.

If Permission to march Troops for that Purpose,
thro' the territories of the U. S., should be requested,
it will be necessary to consider

1. Whether the Laws of Nations entitle a belli-
gerent power to a free Passage for Troops thro'
the Territories of a neutral Nation? and

2, In Case the Right to such Passage be not a
perfect one, whether circumstances render a Re-
fusal or a compliance, most adviseable on the
present occasion? .

(50)

The Right of Dominion involves that of the exclud-
ing (under the Restrictions imposed by Humanity) all
Foreigners. This Right is very rigidly exercised by
some States, particularly the Empire of China.
European Nations consider this as a general Right or
Rule, and as subject to Exceptions in favor not only
of nations at Peace, but also of Nations at War. The
exceptions with respect to \heformer do not touch the
present question. Those which relate to the latter,
seem to be comprized within two Classes, viz- cases of
urgent necessity, and cases of Convenience. The pres-
ent case belongs to the latter. Vattel, who well un-
derstood the subject, says in the 7* chapter of his
3"? Book —

That an innocent Passage is due to all Nations with
whom a State is at Peace, and that this comprehends
Troops equally with Individuals. That the Sovereign
of the Country is to judge whether this Passage be
innocent — that his Permission must be asked — and that
an Entry into his Territories without his Consent, is a
violation of the Rights of Dominion — that if the neutral
Sovereign has good Reasons for refusing a Passage,
he is not bound to grant it ;— but that if his Refusal is
evidently unjust (the Passage requested being unques-
tionably innocenf) a nation may do itself Justice, and
take by Force, what it was unjustly denied— so that
such Requests may be refused in all cases, except in
those rare Instances, where it may be most evidently
shown that the Passage required is absolutely without
Danger or Inconvenience.

If the Passage in contemplation should appear to be
of this Complection, a Refusal would generally be
deemed improper, unless the United States should
declare and make it an invariable maxim in their
Policy, never to permit the Troops of any Nation to pass
thro' their country. Such a measure might be wise, in
case the the U. S. were in capacity to act accordingly;
but that not being as yet the Case, it would perhaps in
the present moment be unreasonable.

I say " such a measure might be wise" — whether it
would or not, is a question that involves others, both
legal and political, of great magnitude. Nations have
perfect Rights. Regard to mutual Convenience may
and often does induce Relaxations in the Exercise of
them ; and those Relaxations, from Time and Usage,
gradually assume to a certain Degree the Nature of
Rights. I think it would appear on a full investigation
of the Subject, that the United States being a new
Nation, are not bound to yield the same Relaxations,
which in Europe from long Practice and Acquiescence
amount almost to an implied Cession ; and therefore,
that they may justly exercise rigorously the Right of
denying free Passage to foreign Troops. It is also to
be observed, that if they deny this Priviledge to others,
it will also be denied to them ; but this leads to politi-
cal consequences and Considerations not necessary now
to develop or investigate.

If a Passage should be requested and insisted upon,
on the Ground of its being perfectly innocent, and ac-

companied with such Terms and Precautions, as that a
Refusal, altho' justifiable, would not appear to be more
than barely so ; then it will be advisable to calculate
the Probability of their being restrained by such a
Refusal.

If the Probability should be, that they would never-
theless proceed; then it would become important to
consider whether it would not be better to grant Per-
mission, than by a Refusal to hazard one of two en-
evitable Inconveniences, viz' that of opposing their
Progress by Force of arms, and thereby risque being
involved in the war ; or of submitting to the Disgrace
and Humiliation of permitting them to proceed with
impunity. In my opinion it would in such a Case be
most prudent, considering the actual state of our
affairs, to consent to the Passage. The answer there-
fore to be given to Lord Dorchester, in Case he should
apply for Permission to march Troops thro' the Terri-
tory of the U. S. from Detroit to the Mississippi, will I
think necessarily depend on the nature of the Propo-
sitions contained in the application, compared with the
beforementioned Principles and Probabilities.

As to the notice proper to be taken of the measure,
if it should be undertaken without leave ? There ap-
pears to me to be no choice. Such a measure would
then be so manifest a Departure from the usage of
civilized Nations, so flagrant and wanton a violation of
the Rights of Sovereignty, and so strong and indecent
a Mark of Disrespect and Defiance, that their march

(if after Prohibition persisted in) should I think be
opposed and prevented at every Risque and Hazard.

But these Remarks in my Judgment retain but little
Force when applied to the leading of Troops from
Posts in their actual Possession, thro' Territories un-
der their actual Jurisdiction, altho' both the Posts and
the Territories of right belong to the U. S. If there-
fore they should march Troops from such posts, thro'
such Territories, that measure would not appear to me
to afford particular cause of complaint. On their
arrival by such a Route at the Mississippi, they may
in virtue of the 8'h Article of the Treaty navigate it up
to its source, or down to the ocean.

This Subject naturally brings into view a question
both difficult and important, viz' whether as the Pos-
session of the Floridas would afford G. Britain ad-
ditional Means and Facilities of annoying the U. S. the
latter would for that Reason be justifiable in endeav-
oring to prevent it by direct and hostile opposition ?
The Danger of permitting any Nation so to prepon-
derate, as to endanger the security of others, intro-
duced into the Politics the Idea of preserving a
Ballance of Power. How far the Principles which
have thence been inferred, are applicable to the present
Case, would merit serious Inquiry, if the U. S. had
only to consider what might be right and just on the
occasion ; but as the state of their affairs strongly re-
commends Peace, and as there is much Reason to
presume that it would be more prudent for them at

present to permit Britain to conquer and hold the
Floridas, than engage in a War to prevent it, such In-
quiries would be premature.

With the most perfect Respect and Esteem I have
the Honor to be, Sir,

Your most obt. and most humble servant,

JOHN JAY.
The President of the United States.

OPINION OE THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Opinion on the Questions stated in the President's
note of August 27, 1790.

I am so deeply impressed with the magnitude of the
dangers which will attend our government if Louisiana
and the Floridas be added to the British Empire, that
in my opinion we ought to make ourselves parties in
the general war expected to take place, should this be
the only means of preventing the calamity.

But I think we should defer this step as long as
possible ; because war is full of chances which may re-
lieve us from the necessity of interfering ; and if neces-
sary, still the later we interfere the better we shall be
prepared.

It is often indeed more easy to prevent the capture
of a place, than to retake it. Should it be so in the
case in question, the difference between the two opera-
tions of preventing and retaking, will not be so costly
as two, three, or four years more of war.

So that I am for preserving neutrality as long, and
entering into the war as late, as possible.

If this be the best course, it decides in a good de-
gree what should be our conduct if the British ask
leave to march troops thro' our territory, or march
them without leave.

It is well enough agreed in the Law of Nations, that
(56)

for a Neutral power to give or refuse permission to
the troops of either belligerent party to pass through
their territory, is no breach of neutrality, provided the
same refusal or permission be extended to the other
party.

If we give leave of passage then to the British
troops, Spain will have no just cause of complaint
against us, provided we extend the same leave to her
when demanded.

If we refuse (as indeed we have a right to do), and
the troops should pass notwithstanding, of which
there can be little doubt, we shall stand committed.
For either we must enter immediately into the war, or
pocket an acknowledged insult in the face of the
world ; and one insult pocketed soon produces an-
other.

There is indeed a middle course, which I should be
inclined to prefer, that is, to avoid giving any answer.
They will proceed notwithstanding. But to do this
under our silence, will admit of palliation and produce
apologies from military necessity ; and will leave us
free to pass it over without dishonor, or to make it a
handle of quarrel hereafter, if we should have use for
it as such. But if we are obliged to give an answer,
I think the occasion not such as should induce us to
hazard that answer which might commit us to the war
at so early a stage of it ; and therefore that the passage
should be permitted.

*If they should pass without having asked leave, I
5

should be for expressing our dissatisfaction to the
British court, and keeping alive an altercation on the
subject, till events should decide whether it is most
expedient to accept their apologies, or profit of the
aggression as a cause of war.

TH: JEFFERSON.
August 28, 1790.

HEADS OF CONSIDERATION ON THE NAVIGATION OF
THE MISSISSIPPI, FOR M? CARMICHAEL.

2 August, 1790.
We have a right to the Navig'n of the Missi.

1. by Nature.

2. by Treaty.
It is necessary to us

More than half the territory of the U. S. is on the
waters of that river.

200,000 of their citizens are seated on them.
These have no other outlet for their tob?, rice, corn,
hemp, lumber, house-timber, ship-timber, etc.
We have hitherto borne the indecision of Spain, Because
we wish peace.

because our Western citizens have had vent at home
for their productions.
A surplus of production begins now to demand foreign

markets.

Whenever they shall say 'We cannot, we will not, be
longer shut up,' the U. S. will soon be reduced to the
following dilemma :

1. to force them to acquiescence.

2. to separate from them, rather than take part in a
war against Spain.

3. or to preserve them in our Union, by joining them
in the war.

The ist is neither in our principles nor our power.
2. A multitude of reasons decide against the 2d.

One only shall be spoken out : the Nation that gives
(59)

up half its territory, rather than engage in a just war
to preserve it, will not keep the other half long.

3. the third is the only alternative we must necessarily
adopt.

How are we to obtain that navigation ?
A. By Force.

I. Acting separately.

that we can Effect this with certainty and prompt-
itude all circumstances decide.

Obj. We cannot retain N. Orleans, for instance, were we
to take it.

Ans. A moderate force may be so secured so as to hold
out till succoured. Our succours can be prompt and
effectual.

Suppose after taking it, we withdraw our force.

If Spain retakes it by an expedition, we can recover
it by a counter-exped'n, and so, as often as the case
shall happen.

Their expeditions will be slow, expensive, and lead
to catastrophe. Ours sudden, economical, and a
check can have no consequences.

We should associate the country to our union, the inhab-
itants wish this.

they are not disposed to be of the Spanish govern-
ment.

It is idle in Spain to suppose our Western habitants will
submit to their gov'm't.

they could be quiet but a short time under a gov'm't
so repugnant to their feelings. Were they to come
under it for present purposes, it W? be with a view
to throw it off soon. Should they remain they would

communicate a spirit of independence to those with
whom they should be mixed.

II. Acting in conjunction with Gr. Br. with a view
to partition, the Floridas (includ? N. Orleans)
would be assigned to us.

Louisiana (or all the country on the West? waters
of y6 Missi.) to them.

We confess that such an Alliance is not what we would
wish ;

because it may eventually lead us into embarrassing
situations as to our best friend, and put the power of
two n'bors into y6 hands of one.
L1? Lansdowne has declared he gave the Floridas to
Spain rather than to the U. S. as a bone of discord
with the H. of Bourbon, and of reunion with Gr. Br.
Connolly's attempt* (as well as other facts) proves
they keep it in view.
B. By Negociation.

I. What must Spain do of necessity ?

The conduct of Spain has proved the occlusion of
the Missi. is system with her ; if she opens it now,
it will be because forced by imperious circum-
stances. She will consequently shut it again
when these circumstances cease.
Treaty will be no obstacle.

irregularities, real and pretended, in our navigators,
will furnish colour enough, perpetual broils, and
finally war will ensue.

* On this mission of Connolly see Gayarre, History of Louisiana
under the Spanish Domination, 235, and Brown, Political Begin-
nings of Kentucky, 182 , — one of the publications of the Filson Club,
and of great value.

prudence, and even necessity, imposes on us the law
of settling the matter now, finally, and not by halves,
With experience of the past, and prospect of the
future, it W? be imbecility in us to accept y6 naked
navigation. With that, we must have what will se-
cure its continuance : that is, a port near the mouth,
to receive our vessels, and protect the navigation.
But even this will not secure the Floridas and Louisiana
against Gr. Brit.

if we are neutral, she will wrest those possessions
from Spain.

the inhabitants (French, English, Scotch, Ameri-
cans) would prefer EngH to Spain.
II. What then had Spain better do of choice ?

Cede to us all territory on our side the Missis-
sippi.

on condition that we guarantee all her poss'n
on the western waters of that river, she agreeing
further to subsidize us, if the guarantee brings us
into the war.

Should Gr. Br. possess herself of the Floridas and Louisi-
ana, her governing principles are Conquest, Coloni-
zation, Commerce, Monopoly.
She will establish powerful colonies in them,
these can be poured into the gulph of Mexico, for
any sudden enterprise there.

or invade Mexico their next neighbor by land;
whilst a fleet co-operates along shore, and cuts off
relief.

and proceed successively from colony to colony.
With respect to us, if Gr. Br. establishes herself on our
whole land board, our lot will be

bloody and eternal war

or indissoluble confederacy.

Which ought we to choose ?

What will be the lot of the Span, colonies in the jaws

of such a confederacy ?

What will secure the Ocean against Monopoly?
Safer for Spain that we should be her neighbor, than

England.

Conquest not in our principles : inconsistent with

our govm't.

Not our interest to cross the Mississippi for ages,

And will never be our interest to remain united with

those who do.

Intermediate chances save the trouble of calculating

so far forward.
Consequences of this cession, and guarantee.

1. Every subject of difference will be removed from
between Spain and the U. S.

2. Our interest w!f be strongly engaged in her retain-
ing her American possessions.

3. Spain will be quieted as to Louisiana and her ter-
ritories west of that.

4. She may employ her whole force in defence of
her islands and Southern possessions.

5. If we preserve our neutrality, it will be a very
partial one to her.

6. If we are forced into the war, it will be, as we
wish, on the side of the H. of Bourbon.

7. Our privateers will commit formidable depred'n
on y« Brit, trade, and occupy much of their force.

8. By withold'g supplies of provision, as well as by-

concurring in exped'ns, y? Brit isl<?s will be in im-
minent danger.

9. Their expences of precaution, both for their con-
tinental and insular poss'ns will be so augmented,
as to give a hope of running their credit down.

In fine, for a narrow strip of barren, detached,
and expensive country, Spain secures the rest of
her territory, and makes an ally where she might
have a dangerous enemy.*

* These heads are in Jefferson's MS., but differ somewhat from those
printed in his Works, ix, 412.

HEADS OF CONSIDERATION ON THE CONDUCT WE ARE
TO OBSERVE IN THE WAR BETWEEN SPAIN AND GR.
BRITAIN, AND PARTICULARLY SHOULD THE LATTER
ATTEMPT THE CONQUEST OF LOUISIANA AND THE
FLORIDAS.

[12 July, 1790.]
The danger to us sh<? G. B. possess herself of Louisiana

and the Floridas.

Beyond the Missi. a territory equal to half ours.
She would seduce our Cis-Missi. possessions.

Because N. Orleans will draw to it the dependence
of all those waters.

By her language, laws, religion, manners, goven?,
commerce, capitals.

By the markets she can offer them in the gulph of
Mexico.

She would then have a territory the double of ours.
She would take away the markets of the Atlantic
States,

By furnishing the same articles cheaper, tob?, rice,
indigo, bread, lumber, fur.

She would encircle us completely, her possessions
forming a line on our land boards, her fleets on our
sea board. Instead of two neighbors balancing each
other, we should have one with y6 strength of both.
Would the prevention of this be worth a War?
Consider our abilities to make a war.
Our operations would be by land only.
How many men would it need to employ? — their

cost?

(65)

Our resources by taxation and credit equal to this.

Weigh the evil of this new accumulation of debt.

Against the loss of market and eternal danger and

expence of such a neighbor.
But no need to take a part as yet. We may choose our

own time for that.
Delay gives us many chances to avoid it altogether.

They may not single out that object.

They may fail in it.

France and Spain may recover it.
The difference between preventing and retaking,

overbal6? by benefits of delay.

Enables us to be better prepared.

To stipulate with Spain and France advantages for

our assistance.
Suppose these our ultimate views, what is to be done at

this time?

1. As to Spain.

If she be as sensible as we are, that she cannot save
Louisiana and the Floridas, might she not prefer
their Independc? to their Subject1? to Gr. Br. ?
Can we not take advantage of C* D'Estaing's pro-
pos'n to communicate thro' the court of France our
ideas on this subject and our readiness to join them
in guarantee ?

This might save us from a war, if Gr. Br. respects
our weight in a war. If she does not, it would place
the war on popular ground.

2. As to England, say to B.[eckwith] : —

That as to a treaty of commerce we h<? never de-
sired it but on terms of perfect reciprocity.

That therefore we never thought to give any price for
it but itself.

That we had wished for it to avoid giving mutual
bounds to the commerce of both nations.
But that we have the measures in our own power
which may save us from loss.

That as to the alliance they propose, it would in-
volve us against France and Spain.
And considered even in a moral view, no price could
repay such an abandonm1. of character.
That we are truly disposed to remain strictly neutral.
Tho' we must confess yl. we sh"? view in a very ser-
ious light attempts to extend themselves along our
frontier, and destroy all balance in our neighborhood.
[The latter sentiment it might be advantageous to express,
because if there be any difference of op'n in her
councils whether to bend their force agl. North or
South America (and certainly there is room for dif-
ference) and if these operations be nearly balanced,
the possibility of drawing an enemy the more on
themselves, might determine the balance.]*

* A single sheet in Jefferson's MS., undated and without signature.
It is the first draft of a paper drawn up by Jefferson as the basis of a
reply to the mission of George Beckwith, some particulars of which are
given in a note to the opinion of Hamilton, in the pages following. The
paper as completed is printed, with errors, in the Works of Jefferson^
ix, 409, and differs in many details from this draft

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

NEW- YORK, Sept. 15, 1790.

The urgent avocations in which I have been en-
gaged, towards putting in a train of execution the laws
of the last session affecting my department, and a de-
sire of reflecting maturely, and giving the reasons for
the result of my reflections fully, have caused me to
delay longer than I wished the answer to the questions
with which you honored me, and I hope will excuse
the delay.

The judgments formed, in particular cases, are al-
most always connected with a general train of ideas in
respect to some more comprehensive principles or re-
lations ; and I had thought it advisable to lay that train
before you, for the better explanation of the grounds
of the opinions I now give, or may hereafter have oc-
casion to give, on the like subjects, in obedience to
your commands.

I feel no small regret in troubling you with the
perusal of so voluminous a discussion ; but as I thought
it would be satisfactory to you to have the reasons of
the opinions you required fully submitted to your
consideration, I conceived it to be more consistent
with my duty to risk some intrusion on your time,
than to withhold any consideration that appeared to
me of weight enough to enter into the determination.

Tht President of the United States.
(68)

OPINION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

NEW- YORK, Sept. 15, 1790.

Answer to Questions proposed by the President of the
United Stales to the Secretary of the Treasury.

QUESTION THE FIRST.— "What should be the answer
of the Executive of the United States to Lord Dor-
chester, in case he should apply for permission to
march troops through the territory of said States, from
Detroit to the Mississippi ?"

ANSWER. — In order to a right judgment of what
ought to be done in such case, it may be of use pre-
viously to consider the following points :

First. — Whether there be a right to refuse or con-
sent, as shall be thought most for the interest of the
United States.

Secondly. — The consequences to be expected from
refusal or consent.

Thirdly. — The motives to the one or to the other.

As to the first point, if it were to be determined
upon principle only, without regard to precedents or
opinions, there would seem to be no room for hesita-
tion about the right to refuse. The exclusive juris-
diction which every independent nation has over its
own territory, appears to involve in it the right of pro-
hibiting to all others the use of that territory in any

way disagreeable to itself, and more especially for any

(69)

purpose of war, which always implies a degree of
danger and inconvenience, with the exception only of
cases of necessity.

And if the United States were in a condition to do
it without material hazard, there would be strong in-
ducements to their adopting it as a general rule never
to grant a passage for a voluntary expedition of one
power against another, unless obliged to it by treaty.

But the present situation of the United States is too
little favorable to encountering hazards, to authorize
attempts to establish rules, however eligible in them-
selves, which are repugnant to the received maxims
or usages of nations.

It is therefore necessary to inquire what those max-
ims or usages enjoin in the case suggested.

With regard to usage, it has been far from uniform.
There are various instances, in ancient and modern
times of similar permissions being demanded — many,
in which they have been granted; others in which
they have been refused, and the refusal acquiesced in ;
but perhaps more in which, when refused, a passage
has been forced, and the doing of it has often been
deemed justifiable.

Opinions are not more harmonious. Among those
who maybe considered as authorities on such subjects,
Puffendorf and Barbeyrac confine within narrow limits
the right of passage through neutral territories ; while
Grotius and Vattel, particularly the former, allow to it
greater latitude. Puffendorf treats it not as a natural

right, but as derived from compact or concession;
especially when the enemy of a neighboring state de-
sires leave to march troops through a neutral country
against its neighbor. For it seems (says he) to be a
part of the duty which we owe to our neighbors, espe-
cially such as have been kind and friendly, not to suffer
any hostile power to march through our country to
their prejudice, provided we can hinder the design with
no great inconvenience to ourselves. And as it may
have a tendency to. make our own country the theatre
of the war (since the power intended to be attacked
may justifiably march within our limits to meet the
approaching enemy), he concludes that it is the safest
way of acting in such case, if we can do it without any
considerable prejudice to our own affairs, to deny the
enemy passage, and actually to oppose him if he en-
deavors to force it without our consent. But if we
are either too weak to hinder his progress, or must on
this score engage in a dangerous war, he admits that
the plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our
neighbor.

Examples, he adds, have little force on the decision
of the question. For, generally, as people have been
stronger or weaker, they have required passage with
modesty or with confidence, and have in like manner
granted or refused it to others.*

Barbeyrac, in his Commentary on Grotius, is still

* Puffendorf s Laws of Nature and Nations, pages 239, 240.

stronger against the right of passage.* He affirms
that, even though we have nothing to apprehend from
those who desire a passage, we are not therefore
obliged in rigor to grant it. It necessarily follows,
says he, from the right of property, that the proprietor
may refuse another the use of his goods. Humanity,
indeed, requires that he should grant that use to those
who stand in need of it, when it can be done without
any considerable inconvenience to himself; but if he
even then refuses it, though he transgresses his duty,
he does no wrong, properly so called, except they are
in extreme necessity, which is superior to all ordinary
rules. Thus far, and no further, extends the reserve
with which it is supposed the establishment of prop-
erty is accompanied.

Grotius, on the other hand, expresses himself thus : f
A free passage ought to be granted to persons where
just occasion shall require, over any lands, or rivers,
or such parts of the sea as belong to any nation ; and,
after enumerating several examples in support of his
position, he concludes that the middle opinion is best;
to wit, that the liberty of passing ought first to be de-
manded, and if denied, may be claimed by force.
Neither, says he, can it be reasonably objected that
there may be suspicion of danger from the passing of
a multitude ; for one man's right is not diminished by

* Note I on Book II., Chap. III., § xiii.

f Rights of War and Peace, Book II., Chap. II., § xiii., Nos. I, 2, 3, 4.

. 73

another man's fear. Nor is the fear of provoking that
prince against whom he that desires to pass is engaged
in a just war, a sufficient reason for refusing him pass-
age. Nor is it any more an excuse that he may pass
another way, for this is what every body may equally
allege, and so this right by passing would be entirely
destroyed. But it is enough that the passage be re-
quested, without any fraud or ill design, by the nearest
and most convenient way. If, indeed, he who desires
to pass undertakes an unjust war, or if he brings peo-
ple who are my enemies along with him, I may deny
him a passage ; for in this case I have a right to meet
and oppose him, even in his own land, and to inter-
cept his march. Thus it would seem to be the opin-
ion of Grotius, that a party engaged in a just war has
a right, of course, to a passage through a neutral ter-
ritory, which can scarcely, if at all, be denied him,
even on the score of danger or inconvenience to the
party required to grant it.

But Vattel, perhaps the most accurate and approved
of the writers on the laws of nations, preserves a mean
between these* different opinions. This is the sum
of what he advances: That an innocent passage is
due to all nations with whom a state is at peace, for
troops equally with individuals, and to annoy as well
as to avoid an enemy. That the party asking and the
party asked are both, in different degrees, judges of

* Book III., Chap. VII., §§ 119, 120. I2I« I22i I23-
6

the question when innocent? That where the party
asked has good reasons for refusing, he is not under
any obligation to grant, and in doubtful cases his judg-
ment ought to be definitive ; but in evident ones, or
those in which the harmlessness of the passage is
manifest, the party asking may, in the last resort, judge
for himself, and after demand and refitsal may force
his way. That nevertheless, as it is very difficult for
the passage of a powerful army to be absolutely inno-
cent, and still more difficult for its innocence to be
apparent, a refusal ought to be submitted to, except in
those very rare cases when it can be shown in the most
palpable manner that the passage required is abso-
lutely without danger or inconvenience. And lastly,
that this right of passage is only due in a war not
materially unjust.

Perhaps the only inference to be drawn from all this
is, that there exists in the practice of nations and the
dogmas of political writers a certain vague pretension
to a right of passage in particular cases, and accord-
ing to circumstances, which is sufficient to afford to
the strong a pretext for claiming and exercising it
when it suits their interests, and to render it always
dangerous to the weak to refuse, and sometimes not
less so to grant it.

It is, nevertheless, a proper inquiry, whether a re-
fusal could be placed on such ground as would give a
reasonable cause of umbrage to the party refused, and
as in the eye of the world would justify it.

Against the propriety of a refusal are the following
circumstances : That there is no connection between
us and Spain, which obliges us to it. That the pas-
sage asked will be down rivers, and for the most part
through an uninhabited wilderness, whence no injury
to our citizens or settlements will be apprehended :
and that the number of troops to be marched, espe-
cially considering the route, will probably not be such,
as on their own account, to be a serious cause of alarm.
These circumstances may give our refusal the com-
plexion of partiality to Spain, and of indisposition
towards Britain, which may be represented as a devia-
tion from the spirit of exact neutrality.

In support of the propriety of a refusal, the follow-
ing is the only assignable reason ; that it is safer for
us to have two powerful, but rival nations, bordering
upon our two extremities, than to have one powerful
nation pressing us on both sides, and in capacity, here-
after, by posts and settlements, to envelop our whole
interior frontier.

The good offices of Spain in the late war ; the dan-
ger of the seduction of our western inhabitants ; the
probable consequences to the trade of the Atlantic
States, are considerations rather to be contemplated as
motives, than alleged as reasons.

The first reason, however, is of a nature to satisfy
the mind of the justice of a refusal; admitting the
authority of the more moderate opinions, which have
been cited. And the danger, too, upon the supposi-

tion of which it is founded, appears to be obvious
enough to vindicate it, in the opinion of the disinter-
ested part of mankind ; little likely as it may be to
engage the acquiescence of the party whose wishes
would be thwarted by the refusal. It deserves, not-
withstanding, to be noticed on this point, that the
ground of dissent would not result from the thing
itself — that is, the mere passage — but from the nature
of the acquisition, to which it would give facility.
This circumstance may somewhat obscure the clear-
ness of the conclusion, that there is a perfect right to
refuse.

But upon the whole, there does not appear to be
room enough for a scruple about the right, to deter
from refusal, if upon examination it shall be found
expedient.

Does the right of consenting to the passage stand
upon ground equally unexceptionable ?

This question Vattel answers in the following man-
ner : * " When I have no reason to refuse the passage,
the party against whom it is granted has no room for
complaint, much less for making it a pretence for war ;
since I did no more than what the law of nations en-
joins. Neither has he any right to require that I
should deny the passage, because he is not to hinder
me from doing what I think is agreeable to my duty,
and even on occasion when I might with justice deny

* Vattel, Book III., Chap, vii., Section 127.

the passage, it is allvivable in me not to make uscoimy
right ; especially when I should be obliged to support
my refusal by my stvord. Who will take upon him to
complain of my having permitted the war to be car-
ried into his own country, rather than draw it on my-
self? It cannot be expected that I should take up
arms in his favor, unless obliged to it by a treaty."
And Puffendorf admits, as has been before noted, that
if we are either too weak to hinder his progress, or
must on that score engage in a dangerous war, the
plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our neighbor.

Nothing need be added to reasoning so perspicuous
and convincing. It does not admit of a moment's
doubt, as a general rule, that a neutral state, unfettered
by any stipulation, is not bound to expose itself to a
war, merely to shelter a neighbor from the approaches
of its enemy. It remains to examine, if there are any
circumstances, in our particular case, capable of form-
ing an exception to that rule.

It is not to be forgotten that we received from
France, in our late revolution, essential succor, and
from Spain valuable countenance, and some direct aid.
It is also to be remembered, that France is the inti-
mate ally of Spain, and there subsists a connection by
treaty between the former power and the United
States.

It might thence be alleged that obligations of grati-
tude towards these powers require that we should run
some risk, rather than concur in a thing prejudical to

either of them, and particularly in favor of that very
nation against which they assisted us. And the nat-
ural impulse of every good heart will second the
proposition, till reason has taught it that refinements
of this kind are to be indulged with caution in the
affairs of nations.

Gratitude is a word, the very sound of which im-
poses something like respect. Where there is even an
appearance upon which the claim to it can be founded,
it can seldom be a pleasing task to dispute that claim.
But where a word may become the basis of a political
system, affecting the essential interests of the state, it
is incumbent upon those who have any concern in the
public administration, to appreciate its true import and
application.

It is necessary, then, to reflect, however painful the
reflection, that gratitude is a duty, a sentiment, which
between nations can rarely have any solid foundation.
Gratitude is only due to a kindness or service, the
predominant object of which is the interest or benefit
of the party to whom it is performed. Where the
interest or benefit of the party performing is the pre-
dominant cause of it, however there may result a debt,
in cases in which there is not an immediate adequate
and reciprocal advantage, there can be no room for the
sentiment of gratitude. Where there is such an ad-
vantage, there is then not even a debt. If the motive
to the act, instead of being the benefit of the party to
whom it is done, should be a compound of the inter-

est of the party doing it and of detriment to some
other, of whom he is the enemy and the rival, there is
still less room for so noble and refined a sentiment.
This analysis will serve as a test of our true situation,
in regard both to France and Spain.

It is not to be doubted, that the part which the
courts of France and Spain took in our quarrel with
Great Britain, is to be attributed, not to an attachment
to our independence or liberty, but to a desire of di-
minishing the power of Great Britain by severing the
British Empire. This they considered as an interest
of very great magnitude to them. In this their calcu-
lations and their passions conspired. For this, they
united their arms with ours, and encountered the ex-
penses and perils of war. This has been accom-
plished ; the advantages of it are mutual ; and so far
the account is balanced.

In the progress of the war * they lent us money, as
necessary to its success, and during our inability to
pay they have forborne to press us for it. The money
we ought to exert ourselves to repay with interest,
and as well for the loan of it, as for the forbearance to
urge the repayment of the sums which have become
due, we ought always to be ready to make propor-
tionate acknowledgments, and when opportunities
shall offer, returns answerable to the nature of the
service.

* France has made us one loan since the peace.

Let it be added to this, that the conduct of France
in the manner of affording her aid, bore the marks of
a liberal policy. She did not endeavor to extort from
us, as the price of it, any disadvantageous or humili-
ating concessions. In this respect, however, she may
have been influenced by an enlightened view of her
own interest. She entitled herself to our esteem and
good will. These dispositions towards her ought to
be cherished and cultivated ; but they are very distinct
from a spirit of romantic gratitude, calling for sacri-
fices of our substantial interests, preferences incon-
sistent with sound policy, or complaisances incompat-
ible with our safety.

The conduct of Spain towards us presents a picture
far less favorable. The direct aid we received from
her during the war was inconsiderable in itself, and
still more inconsiderable compared with her faculty of
aiding us. She refrained from acknowledging our
independence; has never acceded to the treaty of
commerce made with France, though a right of doing
it was reserved to her, nor made any other treaty with
us; she has maintained possessions within our ac-
knowledged limits without our consent ; she persever-
ingly obstructs our sharing in the navigation of the
Mississippi, though it is a privilege essential to us, and
to which we consider ourselves as having an indisput-
able title. And perhaps it might be added upon good
ground, that she has not scrupled to intrigue with
leading individuals in the western country, to seduce

them from our interests, and to attach them to her
own.

Spain therefore must be regarded, upon the whole,
as having slender claims to peculiar good will from us.
There is certainly nothing that authorizes her to ex-
pect we should expose ourselves to any extraordinary
jeopardy for her sake. And to conceive that any con-
siderations relative to France ought to be extended to
her, would be to set up a doctrine altogether new in
politics. The ally of our ally- has no claim, as such,
to our friendship. We may have substantial grounds
of dissatisfaction against him, and act in consequence
of them, even to open hostility, without derogating in
any degree from what we owe to our ally.

This is so true, that if a war should really ensue be-
tween Great Britain and Spain, and if the latter should
persist in excluding us from the Mississippi (taking it
for granted our claim to share in its navigation is well
founded), there can be no reasonable ground of doubt
that we should be at liberty, if we thought it our in-
terest, consistently with our present engagements with
France, to join Britain against Spain.

How far it might be expedient to place ourselves in
a situation which, in case France should eventually
become a party in the war, might entangle us in oppo-
site duties on the score of the stipulated guarantee of
her West India possessions, or might have a tendency
to embroil us with her, would be a mere question of
prudential and liberal calculation, which would have

nothing to do with the right of taking side against
Spain.

These are truths necessary to be contemplated with
freedom, because it is impossible to foresee what events
may spring up, or whither our interests may point ;
and it is very important to distinguish with accuracy
how far we are bound, and where we are free.

However vague the obligations of gratitude may be
between nations, those of good faith are precise and
determinate. Within their true limits, they can hardly
be held too sacred. But by exaggerating them, or
giving them a fanciful extension, they would be in
danger of losing their just force. This would be con-
verting them into fetters, which a nation would ere long
be impatient to break, as consistent neither with its
prosperity nor its safety. Hence, while it is desirable
to maintain with fidelity our engagements to France,
it is advisable, on all occasions, to be aware that they
oblige us to nothing towards Spain.

From this view of the subject, there does not appear
any circumstance in our case capable of forming an
exception to the general rule ; and, as it is certain that
there can hardly be a situation less adapted to war
than that in which we now find ourselves, we can, with
the greatest sincerity, offer the most satisfactory ex-
cuse to Spain for not withholding our consent, if our
own interests do not decide us to a contrary course.

The conclusion from what has been said is, that
there is a right either to refuse or consent, as shall be

judged for the interest of the United States; though
the right to consent is less questionable than the right
to refuse.

The consequences to be expected from refusal or
consent present themselves next to consideration.
Those of consent shall be first examined.

An increase of the means of annoying us in the
same hands is a certain ill consequence of the acquisi-
tion of the Floridas and Louisiana by the British.
This will result not only from contiguity to a greater
part of our territory, but from the increased facility of
acquiring an undivided influence over all the Indian
tribes inhabiting within the borders of the United
States.

Additional danger of the dismemberment of the
western country is another ill consequence to be ap-
prehended from that acquisition. This will arise as
well from the greater power of annoying us, as from
the greater power which it is likely would be pursued
by that nation, if in possession of the key to the only
outlet for the productions of that country. Instead of
shutting, they would probably open the door to its in-
habitants, and by conciliating their good will on the
one hand, and making them sensible on the other of
their dependence on them for the continuance of so
essential an advantage, they might hold out to them
the most powerful temptation to a desertion of their
connection with the rest of the United States. The
avarice and ambition of individuals may be made to
co-operate in favor of those views.

A third ill consequence of that acquisition would
be, material injury, in time to come, to the commerce
of the Atlantic States. By rendering New Orleans
the emporium of the products of the western country,
Britain would, at a period not very distant, have little
occasion for supplies of provisions for their islands
from the Atlantic States ; and for their European mar-
ket they would ' derive from the same source copious
supplies of tobacco and other articles now furnished
by the Southern States : whence a great diminution
of the motives to establish liberal terms of commercial
intercourse with the United States collectively.

These consequences are all expressed or implied in
the form of the question stated by the President. And
as far as our consent can be supposed likely to have
influence upon the event, they constitute powerful
objections to giving it.

If even it should be taken for granted that our con-
sent or refusal would have no influence either way, it
would not even then cease to be disagreeable to con-
cur in a thing apparently so inauspicious to our inter-
ests. And it deserves attention, that our concurrency
might expose us to the imputation either of want of
foresight to discover a danger, or of vigor to with-
stand it.

But there is almost always in such cases a compari-
son of evils; and the point of prudence is, to make
choice of that course which threatens the fewest or the
least, or sometimes the least certain. The conse-

quences of refusal are therefore to be weighed against
those of consent.

It seems to be a matter taken for granted by the
writers upon the subject, that a refusal ought to be
accompanied with a resolution to support it, if neces-
sary, by the sword ; or in other words, to oppose the
passage, if attempted to be forced, or to resent the in-
jury, if circumstances should not permit an effectual
opposition. This, indeed, is implied in the nature of
the thing; for to what purpose refuse, unless it be in-
tended to make good the refusal ? or how avoid dis-
grace, if our territories are suffered to be violated with
impunity, after a formal and deliberate prohibition of
passage ?

There are cases in which a nation may, without
ignominy, wink at an infraction of its rights; but this
does not appear to be one of them. After having been
asked its permission and having refused it, the pre-
sumption will be that it has estimated the consequences,
calculated its means, and is prepared to assert and up-
hold its rights. If the contrary of this should turn
out to be its conduct, it must bring itself into contempt
for inviting insult which it is unable to repel, and man-
ifesting ill-will towards a power which it durst not re-
sist. As, on the one hand, there cannot be conceived
to be a greater outrage than to pass through our
country, in defiance of our declared disapprobation;
so, on the other, there cannot be a greater humiliation
than to submit to it.

The consequence therefore of refusal, if not effectual,
must be absolute disgrace or immediate war. This
appears, at least, to be the alternative.

Whether a refusal would have the desired effect, is
at best problematical. The presumption, perhaps, is,
that Great Britain will have adverted to the possibility
of it; and if, under the uncertainty of what would be
our conduct, she should still have resolved on prose-
cuting the enterprise through our territory, that she
will at the same time have resolved, either to ask no
questions, or to disregard |our dissent. It is not un-
likely that the reasoning of the British cabinet will
have been to this effect : — If the United States have no
predilection for Spain, or if their views of their own
interest are not opposed to the acquisition we medi-
tate, they will not withhold their consent ; if either the
one or the other be the case, it ought to be determined
beforehand, whether their enmity be a greater evil,
than the projected acquisition a good; and if we do
not choose to renounce the one, we must be prepared
to meet the other.

A further ill consequence of the refusal, if ineffectual,
not wholly destitute of weight, is this, that Great Brit-
ain would then think herself under less obligation to
keep measures with us, and would feel herself more
at liberty to employ every engine in her power to
make her acquisition as prejudicial to us as possible ;
whereas, if no impediment should be thrown in the
way by us, more good humor may beget greater

moderation, and, in the progress of things, concessions
securing us may be made, as the price of our future
neutrality. An explicit recognition of our right to
navigate the Mississippi to and from the ocean, with
the possession of New Orleans, would greatly mitigate
the causes of apprehension from the conquest of the
Floridas by the British.

The consequences of refusal or consent constitute
leading motives to the one or to the other ; which
now claim a more particular discussion.

It has been seen that the ill effects to be appre-
hended from the conquest of the Spanish territories in
our neighborhood are, an increase of the means
whereby we may be hereafter annoyed, and of the
danger of the separation of the western country from
the rest of the Union ; and a future interference with
the trade of the Atlantic States, in a manner, too, not
conducive to the general weal.

As far as there is a prospect that a refusal would be
an impediment to the enterprise, the considerations
which have been mentioned afford the strongest in-
ducements to it. But if that effect of it be doubtful,
the force of these inducements is proportionably dimin-
ished ; if improbable, it nearly ceases. The prospect
in this case would be, that a refusal would aggravate
instead of preventing the evil it was intended to obvi-
ate. And it must be acknowledged that the success
of it is, at least, very doubtful.

The consideration that our assent may be construed

into want of foresight or want of vigor, though not to
be disregarded, would not be sufficient to justify our
risking a war in our present situation. The cogent
reasons we have to avoid a war are too obvious and
intelligible, not to furnish an explanation of and an
apology for our conduct in this respect.

Whatever may be the calculations with regard to
the probable effect of a refusal, it ought to be pre-
dicated upon the supposition that it may not be re-
garded, and accompanied with a determination to act
as a proper attention to national dignity would in such
an event dictate. This would be to make war.

For it is a sound maxim, that a state had better haz-
ard any calamities than submit tamely to absolute
disgrace.

Now it is manifest, that a government scarcely ever
had stronger motives to avoid war, than that of the
United States at the present juncture. They have
much to dread from war ; much to expect from peace ;
something to hope from negotiation, in case of a rup-
ture between Britain and Spain.

We are but just recovering from the effects of a long,
arduous, and exhausting war. The people but just
begin to realize the sweets of repose. We are vul-
nerable both by water and land ; without either fleet
or army. We have a considerable debt in proportion
to the resources which the state of things permits the
government to command. Measures have been re-
cently entered upon for the restoration of credit,

which a war could hardly fail to disconcert, and
which, if disturbed, would be fatal to the means of
prosecuting it. Our national government is in its in-
fancy. The habits and dispositions of our people are
ill suited to those liberal contributions to the treasury,
which a war would necessarily exact. There are
causes which render war in this country more expen-
sive, and consequently more difficult to be carried on,
than in any other. There is a general disinclination
to it in all classes. The theories of the speculative,
and the feelings of all, are opposed to it. The support
of public opinion (perhaps more essential to our gov-
ernment than to any other) could only be looked for
in a war evidently resulting from necessity.

These are general reasons against going into war.
There are others, of a more particular kind. To the
people at large the quarrel would be apt to have the
appearance of having originated in a desire of shield-
ing Spain from the arms of Britain. There are several
classes of men to whom this idea would not be agree-
able, especially if the Dutch were understood to be in
conjunction with the British. All those who were not
friendly to our late Revolution would certainly dislike
it. Most of the descendants of the Dutch would be
unfriendly to it. And let it not be overlooked, that
there is still a considerable proportion of those who
were firm friends to the Revolution, who retain pre-
possessions in favor of Englishmen, and prejudices
against Spaniards.

In a popular government especially, however pre-
judices like these may be regretted, they are not to be
excluded from political calculations.

It ought also to be taken into the account, that by
placing ourselves at this time in a situation to go to
war against Great Britain, we embark with the weak-
est party — with a total uncertainty what accession of
strength may be gained — and without making any
terms with regard either to succor, indemnity, or
compensation.

France is the only weight which can be thrown into
the scale, capable of producing an equilibrium. But
her accession, however probable, ought not to be
deemed absolutely certain. The predominant party
there may choose to avoid war as dangerous to their
own power. And if even obstacles should not arise
from that quarter, it cannot be foreseen to what ex-
tent France will be in condition to make efforts. The
great body of malcontents comprehending a large pro-
portion of the most wealthy and formerly the most in-
fluential class — the prodigious innovations which have
been made — the general and excessive fermentation
which has been excited in the minds of the people —
the character of the prince, or the nature of the gov-
ernment likely to be instituted, as far as can be judged
prior to an experiment — do not prognosticate much
order or vigor in the affairs of that country for a con-
siderable period to come.

It is possible, indeed, that the enthusiasm which the

transition from slavery to liberty may inspire, may be
a substitute for the energy of a good administration,
and the spring of great exertions. But the ebullitions
of enthusiasm must ever be a precarious reliance.
And it is quite as possible that the greatness, and per-
haps immaturity, of that transition, may prolong licen-
tiousness and disorder. Calculations of what may
happen in France must be unusually fallible, not
merely from the yet unsettled state of things in that
kingdom, but from the extreme violence of the change
which has been wrought in the situation of the
people.

These considerations are additional admonitions to
avoid, as far as possible, any step that may embroil us
with Great Britain. It seems evidently our true policy
to cultivate neutrality. This, at least, is the ground
on which we ought to stand, until we can see more of
the scene, and can have secured the means of chang-
ing it with advantage.

We have objects which, in such a conjuncture, are
not to be neglected. The Western posts, on one side,
and the navigation of the Mississippi, on the other, call
for a vigilant attention to what is going on. They are
both of importance. The securing of the latter may
be regarded in its consequence as essential to the unity
of the empire.

But it is not impossible, if war takes place, that by a
judicious attention to favorable moments, we may ac-
complish both by negotiation. The moment, how-

ever, we became committed on either side, the advan-
tages of our position for negotiation would be gone.
They would even be gone in respect to the party with
whom we were in co-operation ; for being once in the
war, we could not make terms as the condition of
entering it.

Though it may be uncertain how long we shall be
permitted to preserve our neutrality, that is not a suffi-
cient reason for departing from it voluntarily. It is
possible we may be permitted to persist in it through-
out. And if we must renounce it, it is better it should
be from necessity than choice ; at least till we see a
prospect of renouncing with safety and profit. If the
government is forced into a war, the cheerful support of
the people may be counted upon. If it brings it upon
itself, it will have to struggle with their displeasure
and reluctance. The difference alone is immense.

The desire of manifesting amity to Spain, from the
supposition that our permanent interest is concerned
in cementing an intimate connection with France and
Spain, ought to have no influence in the case. Ad-
mitting the existence of such an interest, it ought not
to hurry us into premature hazards. If it should
finally induce us to become a party, it will be time
enough when France has become such, and after we
shall have adjusted the condition upon which we are
to engage.

But the reality of such an interest is a thing about
which the best and the ablest men of this country are

far from being agreed. There are of this number, who,
if the United States were at perfect liberty, would prefer
an intimate connection between them and Great Brit-
ain as most conducive to their security and advantage ;
and who are of opinion that it will be well to cultivate
friendship between that country and this, to the
utmost extent which is reconcilable with the faith of
existing engagements : while the most general opin-
ion is, that it is our true policy, to steer as clear as
possible of all foreign connection, other than commer-
cial * and in this respect to cultivate intercourse

with all the world on the broadest basis of reciprocal
privilege.

An attentive consideration of the vicissitudes which
have attended the friendships of nations, except in a
very few instances, from very peculiar circumstances,
gives little countenance to systems which proceed on
the supposition of a permanent interest to prefer a par-
ticular connection. The position of the United States,
detached as they are from Europe, admonishes them
to unusual circumspection on that point. The same
position, as far as it has relation to the possessions of
European powers in their vicinity, strengthens the
admonition.

Let it be supposed that Spain retains her possessions
on our right, and persists in the policy she has
hitherto pursued, without the slightest symptom of

* In Mr. Lodge's edition there is no mark of omission.

relaxation, of barring the Mississippi against us; where
must this end, and at a period not very distant? In-
fallibly in a war with Spain, or separation of the West-
ern Country. This country must have an outlet for
its commodities. This is essential to its prosperity,
and if not procured to it by the United States, must be
had at the expense of the connection with them. A
war with Spain, when our affairs will have acquired
greater consistency and order, will certainly be to be
preferred to such an alternative. In an event of this
sort, we should naturally seek aid from Great Britain.
This would probaby involve France on the opposite
side, and effect a revolution in the state of our foreign
politics.

In regard to the possessions of Great Britain on our
left, it is at least problematical, whether the acquisition
of them will ever be desirable to the United States.
It is certain that they are in no shape essential to our
prosperity. Except, therefore, the detention of our
Western posts, (an object, too, of far less consequence
than the navigation of the Mississippi,) there appears
no necessary source of future collision with that power.

This view of the subject manifests that we may have
a more urgent interest to differ with Spain, than with
Britain. And that conclusion will become the stronger,
if it be admitted, that when we are able to make good
our pretensions, we ought not to leave in the possess-
ion of any foreign power the territories at the mouth
of the Mississippi, which are to be regarded as the
key to it.

While considerations of this nature ought not to
weaken the sense which our Government ought to
have of any obligations which good faith shall fairly
impose, they ought to inspire caution in adopting a
system, which may approximate us too nearly to
certain powers, and place us at too great a distance
from others. Indeed every system of this kind is liable
to the objection, that it has a tendency to give a wrong
bias to the Counsels of a Nation, and sometimes to
make its own interest subservient to that of another.

If the immediate cause of the impending war be-
tween Britain and Spain be considered, there cannot
be drawn from thence any inducements for our favor-
ing Spain. It is difficult to admit the reasonableness
or justice of the pretensions on her part, which occa-
sion the transactions complained of by Great Britain,
and certainly the monopoly, at which these pretensions
aim, is entitled to no partiality from any maritime or
trading people. Hence considerations, neither of jus-
tice or policy, as they respect the immediate cause of
the quarrel, incline us towards Spain.

Putting, therefore, all considerations of peculiar
good will to Spain or of predilection to any particular
connection out of the question, the argument respect-
ing refusal or consent, in the case supposed, seems to
stand thus :

The acquisition of the Spanish territories bordering
upon the United States, by Britain, would be danger-
ous to us. And if there were a good prospect that

our refusal would prevent it, without exposing us to a
greater evil, we ought to refuse. But if there be a
considerable probability that our refusal would be in-
effectual, and if being so, it would involve us in war or
disgrace, and if positive disgrace is worse than war,
and war, in our present situation, worse than the
chances of the evils which may befall us from that ac-
quisition, then the conclusion would be that we ought
not to refuse. And this appears to be the true con-
clusion to be drawn from a comprehensive and accu-
rate view of the subject; though first impressions are
on the other side.

These reflections also may be allowed to come in
aid of it. Good or evil is seldom as great in the reality
as in the prospect. The mischiefs we apprehend may
not take place. The enterprise, notwithstanding our
consent, may fail. The acquisition, if made, may, in
the progress of things, be wrested from its possessors.
These, if pressed hereafter, (and we are willing to ac-
cept it,) may deem it expedient to purchase our neu-
trality by a cession to us of that part of the territory
in question, which borders on the Mississippi, accom-
panied with a guarantee of the navigation of that river.
If nothing of this sort should happen, still the war will
necessarily have added millions to the debt of Britain,
while we shall be recruiting and increasing our re-
sources and our strength. In such a situation, she
will have motives of no inconsiderable force for not
provoking our resentment. And a reasonable confi-

dence ought to be reposed in the fidelity of the inhab-
itants of the Western country; in their attachment to
the Union ; in their real interest to remain a part of it,
and in their sense of danger from the attempt to sepa-
rate, which, at every hazard, ought to be resisted by
the United States.

It is also to be kept in view, that the same danger,
if not to the same extent, will exist, should the terri-
tories in question remain in the hands of Spain.

Besides all this, if a war should ever be deemed a
less evil than the neighborhood of the British in the
quarter meditated, good policy would still seem to re-
quire, as before intimated, that we should avoid put-
ting ourselves in a situation to enter into it, till we
had stipulated adequate indemnities and considerations
for doing so; that we should see a little further into
the unravelment of the plot, and be able to estimate
what prospect there would be by our interference of
obviating the evil. It deserves a reflection, that if those
territories have been once wrested from Spain, she will
be more tractable to our wishes, and more disposed to
make the concessions which our interests require, than
if they never passed into other hands.

A question occurs here, whether there be not a
middle course between refusal and consent; to wit, the
waiving an answer, by referring the matter to further
consideration. But to this there appear to be decisive
objections. An evasive conduct in similar cases is
never dignified — seldom politic. It would be likely to

give satisfaction to neither party — to effect no good —
to prevent no ill. By Great Britain it would probably
be considered as equivalent to a refusal — as amount-
ing to connivance by Spain — as an indication of timid-
ity by all the world.

It happens that we have a post on the Wabash, down
which river the expedition, it is presumable, must go.
If the commannding officer at that post has no orders
to the contrary, it will be his duty to interrupt the
passage of the British troops ; if he does, it would seem
necessary for them, in order to the safe passage of their
boats, with their artillery, stores, provisions, and bag-
gage, to take that post. Here then would be a passage
through our territory, not only without our permission,
but with the capture of a post of ours, which would be
in effect making war upon us. And thus silence, with
less dignity, would produce the same ill consequence
as refusal.

If, to avoid this, private orders were to be sent to
the commanding officer of that post, not to interrupt
the passage, his not being punished for his delinquency
would betray the fact and afford proof of connivance.

The true alternative seems to be, to refuse or con-
sent : and if the first be preferred, to accompany it with
an intimation, in terms as free from offence as possible,
that dispositions will be made to oppose the passage,
if attempted to be forced ; and accordingly, as far as
practicable, to make and execute such dispositions.

If, on the contrary, consent should be given, it may

deserve consideration whether it would not be expedi-
ent to accompany it with a candid intimation that the
expedition is not agreeable to us, but that thinking it
expedient to avoid an occasion of controversy, it has
been concluded not to withhold assent. There are,
however, objections to this mode. In case of consent,
an early and frank explanation should be given to Spain.

QUESTION THE SECOND. — " What notice ought to be
taken of the measure, if it should be undertaken with-
out leave, which is the most probable proceeding of
the two?"

If leave should be asked and refused, and the enter-
prise should be prosecuted without it, the manner of
treating it has been anticipated; that is, the passage,
if practicable, should be opposed; and if not practic-
able, the outrage should be resented by recourse to
arms.

But if the enterprise should be undertaken without
asking leave, which is presumed to be the import of
the question, then the proper conduct to be observed
will depend upon the circumstances.

As the passage contemplated would be by water, and
almost wholly through an uninhabited part of the
country, over which we have no actual jurisdiction, if
it were unaccompanied by any violence to our citizens
or posts, it would seem sufficient to be content with
remonstrating against it, but in a tone that would not
commit us to the necessity of going to war; the ob-
jections to which apply with full force here.

100

But if, as it is to be feared will necessarily be the
case, our post on the Wabash should be forced, to
make good their passage, there seems to be no alter-
native but to go to war with them, unwelcome as it
may be. It seems to be this, or absolute and unquali-
fied humiliation ; which, as has been already noticed,
is in almost every situation a greater evil than war.

In every event, it would appear advisable immedi-
ately to convene the Legislature; to make the most
vigorous measures for war; to make a formal demand
of satisfaction ; to commence negotiations for alliances ;
and if satisfaction should be refused, to endeavor to
punish the aggressor by the sword.*

ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
Secretary of the Treasury.

* The opinion of Hamilton is of special interest, as he had held some
informal interviews with Major Beckwith upon the attitude of the
United States towards Great Britain in this Spanish affair. The nego-
tiation of Gouverneur Morris at London had reached the ears of Lord
Dorchester, presumably in some official manner, and may have sug-
gested to him the expediency of sending a similar agent to New York
to sound the American Executive upon certain questions then pending
between England and the United States, in which the interests of
Canada were involved. Beckwith was the agent selected, and on the
8th of July he held his first communication with Hamilton, and proved
that he had a full acquaintance with Morris's mission, and expressed
the belief that the British Cabinet was disposed to enter into an alliance,
as well as friendly intercourse, with the United States. This led up to
a suggestion on Beckwith's part, that, if war should occur between Eng-
land and Spain, it would be for the interest of the United States to take
part with the foriner power. The points in dispute between the United

101

States and England were touched upon, and Indian hostilities disa-
vowed by Lord Dorchester. The tenor of Beckwith's communication,
based as it was upon a letter from Lord Dorchester, was such as to
convey the impression that it was not made without some knowledge
and probable suggestion on the part of the English Cabinet.

Hamilton noted down the main points of this conversation, and sub-
mitted them to the President and Jefferson. The first views of the
latter have already been given in these pages (p. 65, ante), but they
were more distinct and sharply defined in this draft than as afterwards
expressed. In the draft he says the alliance proposed "would involve
us against France and Spain; and, considered even in amoral view, no
price could repay such an abandonment of character." In the com-
pleted paper this is toned down to "as to an alliance, we can say noth-
ing till its object be shown, and that it is not to be inconsistent with ex-
isting engagements." But all agreed that in the event of war the
United States expected to be strictly neutral.

With this opinion, Hamilton again met Beck with on the 22d of July.
As the British agent had no particulars of an alliance to offer as the
basis of a negotiation, Hamilton said that " the thing is in too general
a form to admit of a judgment of what may be eventually admissible or
practicable. If the subject shall hereafter present itself to discussion in
an authentic and proper shape, I have no doubt we shall be ready to
converse freely upon it. And you will naturally conclude that we shall
be disposed to pursue whatever shall appear, under all circumstances,
to be our interest, as far as may consist with our honor. At present, 1
would not mean either to raise or depress expectation.

"Major Beckwith seemed to admit that, as things were circum-
stancd, nothing explicit could be expected, and went on to make some
observations, which I understood as having for object to sound whether
there existed any connection between Spain and us ; and whether the
questions with regard to the Mississippi were settled.

" Perceving this, I thought it best to avoid an appearance of mystery,
and to declare without hesitation,

" « That there was no particular connection between Spain and the
United States within my knowledge, and that it was matter of public
notoriety, that the questions alluded to were still unadjusted.' "

IO2

Mr. Douglas Brymner, the courteous archivist of the Dominion of
Canada, informs me that the letters of Major Beckwith to Lord Dor-
chester on his American mission are still in existence, but not in a con-
dition in which they are available. I am therefore unable to give
the Major's versions of these conversations.

When, in October, Hamilton received the decree of the French
Assembly addressed to Spain (page 26, ante), he thought that " though
of a qualified tenor," it looked " pretty directly towards the eventual
supporting of Spain." — Hamilton to Washington, 17 October, 1790.

OPINION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR OFFICE, 29 August, 1790.

SIR: In answer to your secret communication of
the 27th instant, and the questions stated therein, I
humbly beg leave to observe,

That the United States, by not being under the ob-
ligation of any treaty, either with Spain or England,
are in a situation, to grant, or deny, the passage of
troops, through their territory, as they shall judge fit.

The granting or refusing therefore the expected
demand of a free passage to the troops of England,
through the territory of the United States, in order to
attack the dominions of Spain upon the Mississippi,
will depend upon a due estimation of the consequences
arising from either alternative.

The United States are too well aware, of the great
and permanent evils, which would result from Eng-
land's becoming possessed of the Mississippi and West
Florida, to concur in any arrangements to facilitate
that event.

The law of nations establish the principle, that every
neutral nation may, refuse the passage of troops
through its territory, when such passage may tend to
its injury.

In the present case, the passage of the British troops,
would be to effect an object directly contrary to the

104

interests and welfare of the United States. If there-
fore the demand should be made, it may be refused,
consistently with the principles of self preservation,
and the law of nations.

But there are two modes of refusal. A denial un-
accompanied by any other act ; and a denial accom-
panied by force to oppose the passage, if it should be
attempted, after having been refused.

The first mode is all that can with propriety be done
in the present state of things. If after the denial, the
british troops should proceed, they become the aggres-
sors, and establish a just cause of war, whenever the
interests of the United States shall dictate the measure.
Although a denial, unaccompanied by any other act,
might be unpleasant to great Britain, yet she would
not probably think it, of itself, a sufficient cause for
waging war against the United States. But if a force
should be actually opposed to the passage of the
troops, a war with great Britain would appear to be
the inevitable and immediate consequence.

The true interests of the United States dictate a
state of neutrality in the affairs between Spain and
England. Should the United States be dragged into
the war in the present moment, the loss of their com-
merce might justly be expected; the source of their
revenue would be cut off, and the proposed system of
public credit fatally postponed, if not entirely blasted.
These are serious evils and to be avoided if possible.

It is however to be remarked that it is highly im-

105

probable that Spain would enter into the war, unless
she expected to be supported by France. Nor does
there appear any solid objections to the expectation,
but the present debilitated and convulsed state of
France. The family compact and other treaties be-
tween the two kingdoms will continue to exist, not-
withstanding the situation of France, until formally
renounced. This has not been the case. The prob-
ability therefore is, that France will be combined with
Spain.

If this should be the case, every effort on the part of
France will be employed to associate America in the
war. And it is a question of great moment whether
the United States could strictly comply with the
treaty of friendship and commerce entered into with
France on the 6th of February, and observe an exact
neutrality.

Although it would seem hardly possible that either
England, or France and Spain combined, would make
such offers to the United States as to counter-balance
the advantages of Neutrality, yet the case may be
otherwise, or the United States may be so obliged to
enter into the war in order to avert a greater evil.

These considerations with their extensive relations
unite in dictating an answer to Lord Dorchester in
terms as little exceptionable as possible.

That the United States had recently manifested
their sincere desires, not only to continue at peace
with Great Britain, but to cement the same by com-
8

io6

mercial arrangements which might be reciprocally
beneficial.

But that the real causes of dispute between England
and Spain were too little understood at present by the
United States for the President to consent to a meas-
ure which would seem to be inconsistent with that
strict neutrality the United States would desire to
observe.

But if notwithstanding this answer, or if no request
should be made for the purpose, and the troops march
through the territory of the United States, to attack
the dominions of Spain, it might be proper for the
President of the United States to convene imme-
diately the legislature, if the occasion should be so
urgent as to require their meeting at an earlier day
than the adjournment, and to lay the whole affair be-
fore them, with his opinion of the measures to be pur-
sued. For the Congress are vested with the right of
providing for the common defence, and of declaring
war, and of consequence they should possess the in-
formation of all facts and circumstances thereunto
appertaining.

In the mean time the dispositions and designs of
the contending parties will unfold themselves. The
terms of each side be known and estimated, and the
United States better able than at present to judge of
the exact line of conduct they ought to pursue.

I have the honor with perfect Respect to be Sir
Your humble Servant H. KNOX.

The President of the United States,

INDEX.

Adams, John, reply to the President, 45.
Aranda, Count, 33.

Barbeyrac, 70, 71.

Beckwith, Major George, 41, 66, 67 note, 100 note,

Blount, William, 42.

Browning, Oscar, 27.

Brymner, Douglas, 102.

Cabarras, Count, 38.
Campo, Marquis del, 29 note, 32, 39.
Campomanes, Compte de, 40.
Carmichael, William, 17, 32, 34, 36, 37.
Cherokee Chiefs in London, 31.
Clark, looting a Spanish store, II.
Connolly's mission, 61.

Diplomacy of the Revolution, 7, 48, 49.
Dorchester, Lord, 30, 43, 46, 53, 100 note,

Elliot, Hugh, 27.

Family compact of France and Spain, 24, 26.
Fitzherbert, Alleyne, 19, 24, 32.
Florida Blanca, 9, 24, 28, 32.
France, aid to United States, 77.
French Revolution, felt in Spain, 34.

Galvez, Comptesse, 34.
Gardoqui, 9, 16, 17.
Gower, Earl, 25, 26, 27, 28.
Gratitude, 77.

(107)

io8

Great Britain, 7, 22, 41, 47.
Green, 10, II.
Grotius, 70, 71, 72.

Hamilton, Alexander, 28 note, 68, 69, loo.
Humphreys, David, 21, 31, 32, 36.

Jay, John, 9, 10, 44, 50.

Jefferson, Thomas, 17, 19, 21, 41, 56, 59, 60, 65.

King, Rufus, 29 note.
Knox, Henry, 103.

Lacy, General, 34.
Lear, Tobias, 29 note,
Leeds, Duke of, 39, 48.

Madison, James, 10, 14.

Mirabeau, 24, 25, 28.

Miranda, Compte, 29 note.

Mississippi, navigation of, 10, 15, 16, 22, 32, 36.

Montmorin, 27, 33.

Morris, Gouverneur, 17, 29 note, 39, 40.

Neckar, 27.

Neutrality, policy of the United States, 20.

Nootka Sound, 18, 29.

Otto, 17.

Parker, Daniel, 29 note.
Puffendorf, 70, 71.

Queen of Spain, 33, 34.

S6gur, Compte, 34.

Smith, Wiltiam I., 29 note.

Society of 1789, 25.

Spain, 8, 9, 18, 23, 24, 32, 34, 35, 40, 75, 80.

log
Treaty of 1783, 8, 9, 10.

Vattel, 51, 70, 73, 76.
Viar, Jose Ignacio de, 17.

Washington, George, 10, 20, 30, 43.
Western Territory, 10, II, 12.
West Indies, 25, 81.

P7I

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Full text of "The United States and Spain in 1790 : An episode in diplomacy described from hitherto unpublished sources"

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