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'N1TED STATES

_ _i

AT IN AM ERICA

THE UNITED STATES

AND
LATIN AMERICA

110» 100' 90* 80° 70° 60» 60" 40' 30* 20'

SOUTH AMERICA

THE UNITED STATES

AND
LATIN AMERICA

BY
JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE

PH.D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND DEAN OF THE
COLLEGE FACULTY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Author of "From Isolation to Leader -ship , "
"America as a World Power," etc.

GARDEN CITY NEW YORK

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

1920

TO THE MEMORY OF

MY FATHER

WHOSE DAILY COMMENTS ON PUBLIC QUES-
TIONS WERE MY FIRST LESSONS IN THE STUDY
\

OF POLITICS

AND TO
MY MOTHER

WHO IMPARTED TO ME A LOVE OF HISTORY
AND WHOSE APPROVAL IS STILL THE RICHEST
REWARD OF MY EFFORTS

PREFACE

THIS book is based on a smaller volume issued by
the Johns Hopkins Press in 1900 under the title " The
Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish
America," which contained the first series of Albert
Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History. That volume
has been out of print for several years, but calls for
it are still coming in, with increasing frequency of late.
In response to this demand and in view of the wide-
spread interest in our relations with our Southern
neighbors I have revised and enlarged the original
volume, omitting much that was of special interest at
the time it was written, and adding a large amount of
new matter relating to the events of the past twenty
years.

Chapters I, II and V are reprinted with only minor
changes; III, IV and VI have been rewritten and
brought down to date; VII, VIII and IX are wholly
new.

J. H. L.

BALTIMORE,

May 7, 1920.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I THE REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES . 3

II THE RECOGNITION OF THE SPANISH-AMERI-

CAN REPUBLICS 48

III THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES IN

REGARD TO CUBA 83

IV THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE PANAMA

CANAL 144

V FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO . . 193

VI THE Two VENEZUELAN EPISODES . . . 238

VII THE ADVANCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN

THE CARIBBEAN 261

VIII PAN AMERICANISM 292

IX THE MONROE DOCTRINE 320

INDEX . . 335

MAPS

SOUTH AMERICA Frontispiece

THE CARIBBEAN Facing page 262

THE UNITED STATES

AND
LATIN AMERICA

THE UNITED STATES AND
LATIN AMERICA

CHAPTER I
THE REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

THE English colonies of North America renounced
allegiance to their sovereign more through fear of
future oppression than on account of burdens actually
imposed. The colonies of Spain in the southern hemi-
sphere, on the other hand, labored for generations
under the burden of one of the most irrational and
oppressive economic systems to which any portion of
the human race has ever been subjected, and remained
without serious attempt at revolution until the de-
thronement of their sovereign by Napoleon left them
to drift gradually, in spite of themselves, as Chateau-
briand expressed it, into the republican form of gov-
ernment. To carry the contrast a step further, when
the conditions were ripe for independence, the Eng-
lish colonies offered a united resistance, while the
action of the Spanish colonies was spasmodic and dis-
concerted. The North American revolution gave
birth to a federal republic, that of the South to a
number of separate and independent republics, whose
relations with one another have at times been far
from amicable. The causes for these striking dif-

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

ferences are to be explained not alone by race psy-
chology, but by a comparison of the English and
Spanish colonial systems and of the two revolutions as
well. The history of the English colonies and of their
revolt has been pretty well exploited, but information
in regard to the Spanish-American revolution and its
causes, although the sources are abundant, is not easily
accessible to English-speaking people.

By virtue of the celebrated Bull of Pope Alexander
VI, the Spanish-American colonies were looked upon
as possessions of the crown, and not as colonies of
Spain. Their affairs were regulated by the king, with
the assistance of a board called the Council of the
Indies. This council, which was on a footing of
equality with the Council of Castile, was established
by Ferdinand as early as 1511, and was modified by
Charles V in 1524. It was to take cognizance of all
ecclesiastical, civil, military, and commercial affairs re-
lating to the colonies. From it proceeded the so-called
Laws of the Indies, and all colonial offices in the gift
of the crown were conferred by it. In the course of
time, however, the personnel of this council became
merged with that of Castile, and for all practical pur-
poses the colonies became dependencies of the Spanish
nation.

There were from the first establishment of Spanish
rule in America, two viceroyalties on the continent.
The viceroy of New Spain ruled over Mexico and
Central America, whilst all South America subject to
Spanish control was for about two centuries under
the viceroy of Peru. In regions too remote to be
under his immediate control, audiencias, or courts of
justice, were established, the president of the audiencia

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

being known by the title of captain-general. Thus
audiencias were established at Quito in 1542, at Char-
cas (in modern Bolivia) in 1559, in New Granada in
1564, in Chile in 1568, and later at Caracas and at
Buenos Aires. In 1740, New Granada was raised to
the rank of a viceroyalty, with its capital at Bogota;
and in 1776 the same dignity was conferred on Buenos
Aires. There were thus on the southern continent
three viceroyalties widely separated : one on the Main,
one on the Atlantic, and one on the Pacific.

The powers of the viceroy, or captain-general, as
the case might be, were limited only by the audiencia,
consisting of from three to five members, always of
Spanish birth, whose functions were largely advisory,
but who had the privilege of corresponding directly
with the Council of the Indies, and who in case of
emergency sometimes went so far as to depose the
viceroy.

It should be borne in mind that in Spanish America
the native Indian races were not driven beyond the
frontier of civilization, as they were by the English
settlers, but became, and remain to this day, an in-
tegral part of the population. There was thus in the
Spanish colonies an unusual admixture of races.
There were (i) European Spaniards; (2) Creoles, or
children born in America of Spanish parents; (3)
Indians, the indigenous race; (4) Negroes of African
race; (5) Mestizos, children of whites and Indians;

(6) Mulattoes, children of whites and negroes; and

(7) Zambos, children of Indians and negroes.

The maladministration of Spain's colonies may be
summarized under two heads : ( i ) acts of oppression
against the native Indian race, and (2) regulations of

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

a commercial and political character, which acted in
restraint of the economic and social development of
her own offspring in America.

Under the first head may be mentioned the mita, or
forced labor in mines, farms, and factories, and the
repartimiento, or encomienda, which was an allotment
to Spaniards of territory including the native inhabi-
tants as peons or vassals. In spite of humane re-
strictions placed by law upon them, these institutions
degenerated into systems of fearful oppression, which
led, in 1781, to the heroic but unsuccessful efforts of
Tupac Amaru, the last of the Incas, to free the land
of his fathers from the cruel rule of the Spaniard.
So deep-seated was the dissatisfaction and so formid-
able the revolt, that it was not suppressed for more
than two years. The unfortunate Inca and most of
his family were cruelly put to death.

The economic and commercial restrictions imposed
upon the colonies require fuller notice. The whole
object of Spain's colonial policy was to extract gold
and silver from America and to force Spanish manu-
factures and products upon that country. Commerce
was confined to Spain and to Spanish vessels.

No South American could own a ship, nor could a cargo
be consigned to him; no foreigner was allowed to reside in
the country unless born in Spain ; and no capital, not Spanish,
was permitted in any shape to be employed in the colonies.
Orders were given that no foreign vessel, on any pretence
whatever, should touch at a South American port. Even
ships in distress were not to be received with common hospi-
tality, but were ordered to be seized as prizes, and the crews
imprisoned.1

1 Hall's «• Journal on Chili, Peru, and Mexico/' 2 Vols. Edinburgh,
1824, Vol. I, p. 249.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

As late as 1816, when the United States protested
against the blockade established by General Morillo,
as contrary to international law, M. Onis, the Spanish
minister, replied that the object of the blockade
was to maintain the laws of the Indies, which dur-
ing the Napoleonic wars had been somewhat relaxed,
adding :

You are aware that, agreeably to those laws, no foreign
vessel was allowed to trade with the dominions of his majesty
on that continent without a special license, and that vessels
found near or evidently shaping a course towards them were
liable to confiscation as interlopers.

When, later in the year, a United States commissioner
was sent to Cartagena to reclaim American vessels so
seized, the Spanish viceroy gave him to understand
that he did not pretend to be acquainted with the law
of nations.2

Not only were the colonists prohibited from en-
gaging in manufactures which interfered with those of
Spain, but restrictions were even placed on agriculture
in the interests of the Spanish producer. Thus the
cultivation of flax, hemp, and saffron was forbidden
under severe penalty; the cultivation of tobacco was
not allowed; and grapes and olives could be raised
only for table use, so that oil and wine had to be
imported from Spain. Upon one occasion (in 1803)
orders were sent " to root up all the vines in certain
provinces, because the Cadiz merchants complained of
a diminution in the consumption of Spanish wines." 8

The carrying out of this commercial system in all

*Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 156-159.

• Hall's " Journal," Vol. I, p. 296. See also Rodney's report on South
America, in Vol. IV, Am. St. Pap., For. Rel,

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

its details was entrusted to the Casa de Contratacion,
or House of Trade, which was located at Seville until
1717, when it was transferred to Cadiz. The India
House, as it was called, was established by warrant of
Queen Joanna in I5O3.4 To this house were to be
brought all merchandise for the colonies and all prod-
ucts from them of whatever character. The colonial
trade was thus limited to one Spanish port. The af-
fairs of the house were in charge of three commis-
sioners or judges, who had jurisdiction, civil and crim-
inal, over all cases arising out of the trade with Amer-
ica. Their authority was subordinated to no other
court or council but that of the Indies.

Not only were no foreigners allowed to go to the
Spanish colonies, but careful restrictions were placed
on the movement of Spaniards to and from America.
In 1511 King Ferdinand had by a special order per-
mitted all subjects of Spain without distinction to go
over to the Indies upon entering their names at the
India House; but in the years 1518, 1522, 1530, and
1539 several orders were passed "that no person
reconciled, or newly converted to our holy Catholic
faith, from Judaism or Mahometanism, nor the chil-
dren of such, nor the children or grandsons of any
that had worn the St. Andrew's Cross of the Inquisi-
tion, or been burnt or condemned as heretics, or for
any heretical crime, either by male or female line,
might go over to the Indies, upon pain of forfeiting

* A full history of the India House and an account of its regulations
is given by Veitia Linage 'in his " Norte de la Contratacion," Seville, 1672;
translated into English by Captain John Stevens under the title, " Spanish
Rule of Trade to the West Indies," London, 1702. Linage was for a
number of years Treasurer and Comptroller of the India House. A
good summary of the history and regulations of the House is given by
Prof. Bernard Moses in his " Casa de Contratacion " in the Papers of the
Am. Hist. Ass. for 1894, and in the third chapter of his " Establishment
of Spanish Rule in America."

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

all their goods, of an hundred lashes, perpetual ban-
ishment from the Indies, and their bodies to be at the
king's disposition." 5

The commissioners might " grant passes to mer-
chants to go over, or return if they came from thence,
including married merchants, provided they have leave
from their wives, and give 1,000 ducats security to
return within three years." 6

There were also strict rules about passing from one
province in America to another. This could not be
done without special leave from the king.7 " The
inhabitants of the Indies may not come to Spain with-
out leave from the viceroys, presidents or governors
of the places of their habitation, in which they are to
express the causes of their coming, and whether it is
to stay here or return." 8 " In the Indies, the mag-
istrates are directed to apprehend any persons they
find are gone over without leave, to imprison them
till they can send them back into Spain, upon pain of
losing their employments." 9 In 1594 and 1602 it was
decreed that persons going over without leave should
be sent to the galleys for four years. In 1622 King
Philip IV decreed that a person simply going aboard
a ship bound for the Indies without leave should be
immediately sent to the galleys for eight years.10
Other decrees equally severe were issued from time
to time.

In order to keep the trade strictly under control
and to properly protect it, intercourse with the colo-
nies was held only once a year. Two squadrons, con-
sisting of merchant ships and convoys under com-

6 Linage, " Norte de la Contratacion," p. 107. • Ibid., p. 114.

6 Ibid., p. no. • Ibid., p. 109.

T Ibid., p. 113. 10 Ibid., p. 109.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

mand of an admiral and vice-admiral, made the trip
each year. The fleet for New Spain (Mexico) sailed
in the spring, and that for the mainland in the early
fall. The first touched at some of the islands and
then went to Vera Cruz; the latter touched first at
Cartagena and passed on thence to Porto Bello, where
the fair was held about the middle of March. This
fair was the great event of the year, and lasted forty
days from the time of the arrival of the fleet. From
this point goods were distributed by way of Panama
to Peru, Chile, and even across the continent to
Buenos Aires. The gold bullion was sent in turn to
this point by the viceroy of Peru. It came in fifteen
days from Potosi to Arica, thence by sea in eight days
to Callao, and in twenty days from Callao to Panama.
The viceroy of Peru was to take care to have the
plate at Panama by the middle of March. At Porto
Bello it was taken aboard the galleons. About the
middle of June the galleons met the fleet from New
Spain at Havana, and from that point the two fleets
with their convoys proceeded in greater safety to
Spain. Thus for two centuries all intercourse be-
tween Spain and her colonies at one end of the line
was limited at first to Seville, and then to Cadiz ; and
at the other to Vera Cruz and Porto Bello.11 At a
later period this arrangement was modified to some
extent, and Buenos Aires was made a port of entry.
The reason for not permitting trade with Buenos
Aires during the earlier period was the fear that the
British and Dutch would smuggle through that port.
While the relations of the colonies with Spain were
kept under the strictest control, intercourse with for-

11 Linage, " Norte de la Contratacion," pp. 191-193.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

eign nations, although absolutely prohibited under the
severest penalties, could not be entirely prevented. In
speaking of Spam's restrictive policy, a British naval
officer, who was on the South American station during
the revolution, says:

Unfortunately, however, for that system, the South Ameri-
cans, notwithstanding the network of chains by which they
were enveloped, had still some sparks of humanity left, and,
in spite of all their degradation, longed earnestly for the
enjoyments suitable to their nature; and finding that the
Spaniards neither could nor would furnish them with an
adequate supply, they invited the assistance of other nations.
To this call the other nations were not slow to listen ; and, in
process of time, there was established one of the most ex-
traordinary systems of organized smuggling which the world
ever saw. This was known under the name of the contra-
band or forced trade, and was carried on in armed vessels,
well manned, and prepared to fight their way to the coast,
and to resist, as they often did with effect, the guarda costas,
or coast blockades of Spain. This singular system of warlike
commerce was conducted by the Dutch, Portuguese, French,
English, and latterly by the North Americans. In this way
goods to an immense value were distributed over South
America; and although the prices were necessarily high, and
the supply precarious, that taste for the comforts and luxuries
of European invention was first encouraged, which after-
wards operated so powerfully in giving a steady and intelli-
gible motive to the efforts of the Patriots in their struggle
with the mother-country. Along with the goods which the
contraband trade forced into the colonies, no small portion
of knowledge found entrance, in spite of the increased ex-
ertions of the Inquisition and church influence, aided by the
redoubled vigilance of government, who enforced every
penalty with the utmost rigor. Many foreigners, too, by
means of bribes and other arts, succeeded in getting into the
country, so that the progress of intelligence was gradually
encouraged, to the utter despair of the Spaniards, who knew
no other method of governing the colonies but that of mere

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

brute force, unsupported by the least shadow of opinion, or
of good will.11

The trade carried on by foreign interlopers grew to
such alarming proportions that before the middle of
the eighteenth century Spain found it necessary to
relax the restrictions upon the private trade of her
own subjects. This led, about 1748, to the discon-
tinuance of the annual fleets or galleon trade.

The political administration of the country was
absolutely in the hands of Spaniards, who as a rule
were not allowed to marry, acquire property, or form
any permanent ties in America. In the summary of
charges against Spain appearing in the Argentine
Manifesto of 1817, one of the specifications is, that of
one hundred and sixty viceroys who had governed in
America, four natives of the country alone were num-
bered; and of six hundred and two captains-general,
all but fourteen had been Spaniards.

The monopoly of Spanish trade in South America
was partially surrendered by the treaty of Utrecht,
signed in 1713, at the close of the War of the Spanish
Succession. By this treaty England agreed to recog-
nize Philip V as king of Spain and the Indies, and in
turn was granted the assiento, or contract for supply-
ing the Spanish colonies with African slaves.13 The
importation of negroes into the Spanish possessions
had been carried on under contract from the very first.
The assiento, which had been previously granted to
Spanish subjects, was, in 1696, granted to the Portu-
guese Company of Guinea, and in 1702 to the Royal

12 Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, pp. 253-254.

11 "The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great
Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America."
Printed by John Baskett, London, 1713.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

Guinea Company of France; but in 1713 England
secured this lucrative monopoly and became the great
slave-trading power of the world.

The assiento of 1713, which was very carefully
drawn up in 42 articles, granted to an English com-
pany the sole right of supplying slaves to the Spanish
West Indies and to South America for the period of
thirty years from May i, 1713. By it the Queen of
England undertook to see that the company chartered
by her should introduce into the Spanish West Indies,
including South America, 144,000 negroes of both
sexes and all ages within thirty years, at the rate of
4,800 a year. The company was to pay a duty of
33% pieces of eight (dollars) for each negro im-
ported. In addition to the 4,800 a year, other negroes
might be imported at a duty of 16% dollars each, thus
encouraging larger importations. The negroes could
be brought in either Spanish or English vessels,
manned with English or Spanish sailors, provided only
no cause of offense be given to the Catholic religion.
The majority of the negroes were to be taken to
Cuba and Porto Rico, and to the ports on the Main;
but of the 4,800, the company had the right to take
1,200 to Buenos Aires, 800 to be sold there and 400
to be carried to the provinces up the Plata and to
the kingdom of Chile. They were also allowed to
carry negroes across the isthmus from Porto Bello
to Panama, and there re-ship them to Peru. Either
Englishmen or Spaniards could be employed in the
business, provided that there were not more than four
or six Englishmen in any port, and that these should
be amenable to the laws in all respects as Spanish
subjects. By no means the least remarkable provision

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

of this treaty was that their British and Catholic ma-
jesties were each to receive one-fourth of the profits
of this traffic.

Ships engaged in this trade were to be searched on
arrival at port, and all merchandise found on board
was to be confiscated and heavy penalties inflicted.
On condition, however, that the company should not
attempt any unlawful trade, his Catholic Majesty
granted them the privilege, during thirty years, of
sending annually a ship of 500 tons to the fair at Porto
Bello. The Spanish king was to be concerned one-
fourth in the profits.14 It seems that the company
stretched this privilege to the utmost. The ship always
stopped at Jamaica, took on all the goods she could,
and carried along with her five or six smaller vessels
laden with goods. When she got near Porto Bello, all
her provisions were put in the tenders and the goods
these bore taken aboard. She then entered the harbor
laden down to the water's edge. Thus this single ship
was made to carry more than five or six of the largest
galleons.16

Thirty years before the Spanish colonies began their
war of independence, the British government had en-
tertained the idea of revolutionizing and separating
them from Spain. This idea seems to have arisen in
1779, during the administration of Lord North, when
Spain joined France in the alliance with the American
colonies against Great Britain.18 It was suggested at

14 " The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great
Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America."
London, 1713.

18 Ulloa, " Voyage to South America." English translation, London,
1806, Vol. I, p. 105.

""Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 266 ff. This
volume is rich in information in regard to England s Spanish-American
policy.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

first, no doubt, as a measure of retaliation, but was
frequently agitated in later years with the avowed
object of opening up South America to British com-
merce. The same idea was the basis of Miranda's
scheme for the liberation of his native land.

Francisco de Miranda17 (1754-1816), a native of
Caracas, Venezuela, was the first Spanish-American
patriot. He was with the American army for a time
during the Revolutionary War, but in what capacity
is not quite settled. It is stated by some writers that
he held a commission under LaFayette. The success
of our war inspired him with the hope of freeing his
own country from Spanish control. He confided his
views to his friends in the United States, particularly
to Alexander Hamilton, " upon whom he fixed his
eyes as a coadjutor in the great purpose of his life."
Shortly after Miranda had returned to his native land
his schemes were discovered. He fled to the United
States, and later to England, where he had repeated
conferences with Pitt. Finding no help for his revo-
lutionary schemes in England, he went to the conti-
nent and traveled through France, Germany, Turkey,
and Russia. At the Russian court he was warmly
received, but was soon dismissed at the demand of the
Spanish minister. At news of the dispute between
England and Spain about Nootka Sound in 1790, he
hastened to England and communicated his scheme
to the British ministry. Pitt lent a ready ear to his
views as long as the dispute lasted, with the intention
of making use of him in the event of a rupture with
Spain. But when the dispute was peaceably settled,

17 \V. S. Robertson, " Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of
Spanish America" (1909).

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Miranda's hopes fell to the ground and he left Eng-
land. His scheme was only temporarily abandoned,
however. He considered himself to have been ill-used
by Pitt on this occasion, as he subsequently stated to
Rufus King, the American minister to England.

The French Revolution was now well under way,
and the wars upon which the republic was entering
offered an attractive field for a soldier of republican
ideas. In April, 1792, Miranda went to Paris with
introductions to • Petion and the leading Girondists,
hoping that the revolutionary party might help him in
his plans. He was given a commission as brigadier-
general in the French army, and served in responsible
posts under Dumouriez on the eastern frontier. He
conducted the siege of Maestricht and commanded the
left wing of the French army at the disastrous battle
of Neerwinden, March, 1793, in which Belgium was
reconquered by the Austrians. Dumouriez now de-
clared against the Convention, but his troops having
refused to follow him, he went over to the Austrians
in company with the Duke of Chartres, Louis
Philippe. Miranda fell under suspicion of treason
and was forced to undergo a court-martial, but was
acquitted. For some unexplained reason he was
shortly after thrown into prison. He soon secured
his release, but for several years disappears from pub-
lic view. His services in behalf of the republic re-
ceived in time due recognition. His name appears on
the Arc de Triomphe in Paris in the list of the heroes
of the Revolution.

In January, 1798, Miranda returned to England.
As Spain was now the close ally of France, he hoped
to secure the cooperation of Great Britain in his

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

scheme. He also hoped to secure aid from the United
States. The people of Kentucky and Tennessee were
far from satisfied with the provisions of the Spanish
treaty of 1795 in regard to the navigation of the Mis-
sissippi River. Then, too, just at this time, war be-
tween the United States and France seemed inevitable,
on account of the resentment by France of the Jay
treaty and her treatment of the American representa-
tives. Washington had been called from his retire-
ment at Mt. Vernon to assume the post of commander-
in-chief of the army, while the active command was
to be given to Hamilton. Hamilton had expressed
great interest in Miranda's projects and was a man of
known ambition. His appointment, therefore, as the
virtual commander-in-chief of the American army
made Miranda hopeful of his cooperation.

Mr. King, the American minister at London, en-
tered heartily into the plans of General Miranda, and
his correspondence on that subject, during the year
1798, with his government and with Hamilton is quite
voluminous.18 For a time it seemed as if Great Britain
and the United States would cooperate for the pur-
pose of revolutionizing Spanish America. The plan,
as entertained by Miranda and Hamilton, was for Eng-
land to supply the naval force and the United States
the land forces. Miranda believed that six or eight
vessels of the line and four or five thousand troops
would be sufficient,19 though Hamilton thought it
would require ten thousand troops. England's partici-
pation in the scheme depended upon the relations be-

18 " Life and Correspondence of Rufus King," New York, 1894, Vol. II,
App. 5. For further information regarding his relations with Miranda,
see extracts from his Memorandum Bock, in Vol. Ill, App. 3

18 See Miranda's letter to President Adams, March 24, 1798. "Life
and Corresp. of King," Vol. II, p. 654.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

tween France and Spain. Mr. King wrote to his gov-
ernment, February 26, 1798:

Two points have within a fortnight been settled in the
English cabinet respecting South America. If Spain is able
to prevent the overthrow of her present government and to
escape being brought under the entire control of France,
England (between whom and Spain, notwithstanding the
war, a certain understanding appears to exist) will at present
engage in no scheme to deprive Spain of her possessions in
South America. But if, as appears probable, the army
destined against Portugal, and which will march through
Spain, or any other means which may be employed by France,
shall overthrow the Spanish government, and thereby place
the resources of Spain and of her colonies at the disposal of
France, England will immediately commence the execution of
a plan long since digested and prepared for the complete
independence of South America. If England engages in this
plan, she will at Philadelphia propose to the United States to
cooperate in its execution, Miranda will be detained here,
under one pretense or another, until events shall decide the
conduct of England.20

England's policy in regard to South America for the
next twenty years substantially confirmed the inter-
pretation of her motives here given by Mr. King.

During the summer of 1798 Mr. King had several
conferences with the British ministry in regard to the
Spanish-American question, but it was always under-
stood that they were personal and wholly unauthor-
ized. What occurred at these interviews was, of
course, always communicated to the American govern-
ment, but as they were unofficial and communicated
merely in the nature of information, the State De-
partment preferred to keep the matter on the same

20 " Life and Corresp. of King," Vol. II, p. 650.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

basis and did not refer to the matter in its dispatches
to Mr. King. This caused him no little annoyance.21
In the same way no notice was taken of General
Miranda's letter to President Adams.

Hamilton, however, was very frank in the expres-
sion of his views both to General Miranda and to Mr.
King. Under date of August 22, 1798, he wrote to
the latter:

I have received several letters from General Miranda. I
have written answers to some of them, which I send you
to deliver or not, according to your estimate of what is
passing in the scenes where you are. Should you deem it
expedient to suppress my letter, you may do it and say as
much as you think fit on my part in the nature of a com-
munication through you. With regard to the enterprise in
question, I wish it much to be undertaken, but I should be
glad that the principal agency was in the United States —
they to furnish the whole land force necessary. The com-
mand in this case would very naturally fall upon me, and I
hope I should disappoint no favorable anticipation.

The United States, however, succeeded in coming
to an understanding with France, while England was
unwilling to deal such a serious blow to Spain as long
as there was a chance of arraying her against Na-
poleon. The communication of the views of the Brit-
ish government at Philadelphia, to which Mr. King
referred as a preliminary, was never made. Miranda's
hopes finally fell through at the reestablishment of
peace in Europe by the treaty of Amiens, which lasted
until 1803. He lingered in Europe some time longer,
until, wearied out by years of fruitless negotiation
with the British government, he, for the time being,

81 Sec King's letter to Hamilton, March 4, 1799. " Life and Corresp.,"
p. 662.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

gave up all hope of success in that quarter and re-
turned once more to the United States.

Arriving in New York from England in November,
1805, Miranda proceeded to lay his cause once more
before Mr. King, who had so warmly befriended him
in London, and to solicit his cooperation in fitting
out an expedition for South America. While express-
ing his full sympathy with the cause, Mr. King stated
emphatically that he could render him no assistance,
nor could any individuals safely do so, without the
countenance of the government. He, therefore, ad-
vised Miranda to go to Washington and lay his plans
before the administration. This Miranda did. He
was admitted to informal conferences both with Presi-
dent Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison. Upon
his return to New York he represented to those in-
terested in his schemes that he had secured from the
government a secret sanction of his project, and that
the administration, though unwilling to take the ini-
tiative, would support the undertaking so soon as the
standard of revolution should once have been raised
on the Spanish Main. Miranda's chief supporter was
Colonel Smith, surveyor of the port of New York,
whose influence as a public official in close touch with
the administration was decisive in persuading many
adventurous spirits to join the expedition with the be-
lief that it was really secretly backed by the govern-
ment of the United States.

Miranda left New York in the early part of Feb-
ruary, 1806, in the Leander, with an imperfectly
equipped force of about 200 men, most of whom were
commissioned as officers and promised commands in
the South American army, which was expected to

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

spring from the soil at the magic touch of Miranda's
step upon the shores of his native land. The ship
proceeded to Jacquemel, San Domingo, where Mi-
randa expected to get the necessary supplies and re-
inforcements. Here disappointments awaited him,
disputes with the ship's captain ensued, and over a
month was fruitlessly spent, while the Spanish au-
thorities on the Main had time to put themselves on
the alert. It was not until the last of April that the
expedition, reinforced by two schooners, appeared off
the coast of Venezuela near Porto Cabello. They
were attacked by two Spanish vessels, which captured
the schooners with about sixty men and large stores,
while the Leander ignominiously took to flight.

Miranda then sailed for Barbados, where he
solicited aid from the British admiral, Lord Cochrane,
in command on the West Indian station. Lord
Cochrane, without definite instructions from his gov-
ernment, but acquainted with its general policy in
regard to South America, and knowing of the close
relations in which Miranda had stood for years with
the British ministry, decided to assist him in landing.
With this understanding he signed with Miranda an
agreement to the effect that in the event of the success
of the expedition, Great Britain should always be held
on a footing with the most favored nation, and that
British ships should receive a deduction of ten per
cent, upon duties paid by all other nations, except the
United States.22 On the twentieth of June, the ex-
pedition left Barbados under convoy of a part of
Admiral Cochrane's squadron, and on August 2, 1806,
effected a landing near Coro, Venezuela. They easily

28 " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

took possession of the town, the unarmed inhabitants
fleeing before them. Here Miranda remained about
ten days, issuing proclamations and vainly waiting for
the natives to join him. His position, meanwhile, was
becoming unsafe, so he abandoned it and took posses-
sion of the little island of Aruba off the coast. Lord
Cochrane, seeing that the expedition was a failure,
and not wishing further to compromise his govern-
ment, sent no reinforcements and finally ordered the
withdrawal of the ships that had accompanied the ex-
pedition. Miranda was offered a convoy back to
Trinidad, which he accepted, leaving Aruba, Septem-
ber 27, 1806. At Trinidad the members of the expedi-
tion dispersed.23

The Americans who had taken part in the expedi-
tion and survived were prosecuted in the United States
courts for violation of the neutrality laws. They
claimed that they had enlisted in the undertaking with
the connivance of the government at Washington.
Jefferson's enemies made great political capital of the
affair. Members of the cabinet were summoned as
witnesses, but refused to appear. Privately Jefferson
and Madison both denied most emphatically having in
any way committed the government to Miranda's
undertaking, or having acted in any way in disregard
of our obligations to Spain.24

Aside from accomplishing nothing, the expedition
of 1806 was a great injury to Miranda's cause. He
himself lost prestige as a military leader and brought
his character into question as having misrepresented
his connection both with the British and United States

a* See Sherman, " General Account of Miranda's Expedition," N. Y., 1808.
24 H. A. Washington, " Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 474;
" Madison's Writings," Vol. II, pp. 220, 225.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

governments. However, upon the occupation of
Spain by Napoleon in 1808, Miranda again hastened
to England and urged upon the ministry the claims
of his country, in whose interests he had now been
laboring incessantly as an exile for more than twenty
years. We cannot but admire his tenacity of purpose
in the face of the most disheartening failures.

Not only did the British government lend its en-
couragement, through Lord Cochrane, to the filibuster-
ing expedition from the United States with which
Miranda hoped to revolutionize Venezuela, but about
the same time it sent an expedition against the prov-
inces of the Plate. This attack, like the assistance
given to Miranda, was ill-timed and not properly fol-
lowed up. The policy seems to have been outlined by
Pitt, but was put into execution after his death by the
short-lived ministry of Grenville and Fox. The gov-
ernment of the Duke of Portland, which succeeded
after a few months, and in which Castlereagh and
Canning were the most conspicuous figures, did not
deem it expedient to follow up the undertaking.25 In
fact, the fate of the expedition was already sealed
when Portland came into power.

The victory of Trafalgar had given the English
control of the Atlantic. A force of some 6,000 men
was dispatched to the South Atlantic without its desti-
nation being known. It proceeded to Rio Janeiro, Por-
tugal then being in alliance with England. The vice-
roy of the Plate became alarmed and prepared to
defend Montevideo, which he thought would be the
first point of attack. The expedition, however, passed
by and proceeded to the Cape of Good Hope, which

28 " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII. p. 3J4 ff.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

it wrested from the Dutch. In 1806 a dash was made
from the Cape for the river Plate. Sir Home Popham
commanded the fleet, and General Beresford the land
force, which amounted to 1,635 men. On June 6 the
squadron arrived at the mouth of the Plate. The
ships had some difficulty in ascending the river, but
on the 25th they came to anchor at a point fifteen miles
below Buenos Aires. The city was captured with
little or no resistance, the inhabitants having been
led to believe that the British had come to liberate
them. The contents of the public treasury were
handed over to the invaders. The inhabitants were
required to swear allegiance to George III, private
property was respected, the free exercise of their re-
ligion was allowed, and all officials who took the oath
were continued in office. When Beresford refused to
proclaim the independence of the province, or to give
any assurance for their future independence, the in-
habitants, who had now learned how insignificant the
invading force really was, began to prepare for re-
sistance. A leader was readily found in the person
of Jacques Liniers, a Frenchman, who had been for
thirty years in the service of Spain. He and Juan
Martin de Puyrredon began an organized movement
for the expulsion of the English. On the I2th of
August, Beresford, who had remained all this time
without reinforcements, was compelled to surrender.
Troops ordered to his support from the Cape did not
arrive until later.

Sobremonte, the viceroy, had deserted Buenos
Aires and established himself at Montevideo. The
people of Buenos Aires, therefore, deposed him and
chose Liniers in his place.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

During the fall other English reinforcements ar-
rived, and in January, 1807, Montevideo was taken by
assault. As soon as the defeat of Beresford was
known, General Whitelocke was sent to take com-
mand of the united English forces of the Plate, now
some twelve thousand in number. He arrived in the
spring. The reconquest of Buenos Aires now seemed
an easy matter. It had been taken in the first instance
by sixteen hundred men ; there were now ten thousand
available. On June 28 the British landed at the small
port of Ensenada, forty-eight miles below Buenos
Aires. The fighting continued on the outskirts of the
city in a desultory maner and without any decisive
action for several days. But finally, owing to the bad
generalship and incompetency of Whitelocke, his
troops got into such a muddle that half the force was
captured or disabled. On July 6, Liniers decided to
send a flag of truce with the proposal to surrender all
the English prisoners, including those taken with
Beresford, provided Whitelocke would evacuate the
territory of Buenos Aires. One of Liniers' asso-
ciates, Alzaga, insisted that the terms of surrender
should include Montevideo. This demand seemed pre-
posterous, but the clause was finally inserted, and to
their surprise agreed to, so complete was the demorali-
zation of the English. On July 7 the terms of capitu-
lation were signed.28 Thus through a lack of decision
in the cabinet and a display of incapacity in the field,
without parallel in British annals, the empire of the
Plate was lost.27

With Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808, the

»• See Watson, " Spanish and Portuguese South America." 2 Vols,
London, 1884, Vol. II, p. 271 ff.
37 See "Letters and Despatches of Castkreagh," Vol. VII, p. 316 ff,

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Spanish-American question came to the front once
more. Miranda returned to London and was de-
tained there by the cabinet, as before by Pitt, with a
view to using him if occasion should require. At the
same time Castlereagh, now Foreign Secretary, had
other solutions of the question in view. It was pro-
posed, and the matter seriously discussed in the cabi-
net, to alienate the colonies from Spain, if possible,
without revolution; and, instead of establishing repub-
lics according to Miranda's plans, to unite them all
under a prince of the House of Bourbon. Louis
Philippe, Duke of Orleans, was suggested as the most
suitable person for the new crown. Some thirty years
prior to this, immediately upon the recognition by
Spain of the independence of the United States, Count
de Aranda had advised Charles III to forestall the
movement for independence, which must inevitably
come in his own provinces, by establishing among them
three great empires — one in Mexico, one in Peru, and
one on the Main — each to be ruled by a prince of the
royal family of Spain.28

Chateaubriand brought forward a similar plan sev-
eral years later at the Congress of Verona. The present
scheme was suggested by General Dumouriez in the
interests of his friend, the Duke of Orleans. Several
memorials on the subject, both by Dumouriez and the
duke, were presented to the British government in 1807
and i8o8.29

Napoleon's invasion of Spain constitutes at once
the most contemptible and the most disastrous chapter
in his career. In 1807, under the terms of an agree-

" Romero, " Mexico and the United States," Putnam, 1898, p. 287.
'•"Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

ment with Godoy, the unworthy favorite of the queen
and the virtual ruler of Spain, a French army was
introduced into the kingdom for the nominal purpose
of punishing Portugal for her refusal to join the
continental system. The Portuguese royal family,
fully appreciating the danger in which they stood, fled
to America and founded the empire of Brazil, which
in 1815 was declared independent of Portugal. The
Spanish rulers attempted to follow their example, but
their intended flight became known and they were pre-
vented by the populace from leaving the capital. In
the meantime a disgraceful quarrel having arisen be-
tween the old king, Charles IV, and Prince Ferdinand,
Napoleon, whose troops were now firmly established in
Spain, stepped in as arbiter between father and son
and summoned them both to meet him on the northern
frontier. Having purposely lingered in France beyond
the appointed time, he succeeded in enticing them over
the border to Bayonne, where he compelled both to
renounce forever the crown of Spain and the Indies,
which he forthwith bestowed upon his brother Joseph.
When the truth dawned upon them, the Spanish nation
rose to a man. Napoleon had unwittingly aroused the
latent principle of nationality; he had put into action
a force which was new and one which the statesmen
of Europe had hitherto left out of account, but which
was to prove the most potent factor in the new epoch
of political history introduced by the French Revo-
lution.

Provisional juntas were rapidly organized in the
various provinces of the kingdom of Spain and affairs
administered in the name of Ferdinand VII. The
Junta, or as it is better known, the Regency of Cadiz,

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

rapidly gained a position of national importance and
became the chief executive body of the Spanish nation.
The American provinces, which had long been restive
under Spanish rule, now claimed the same right of
self-government that the provinces of the Peninsula
had assumed, and began to depose the Spanish gov-
ernors and to set up juntas of their own, still acting
in the name of Ferdinand VII. The Americans
claimed that they were not politically a part of Spain,
but connected only through the sovereign, and that
with the removal of the sovereign the connection
ceased. The Regency of Cadiz, on the other hand,
maintained that the colonies were integral parts of
Spain, and claimed, therefore, the right to govern them
in the absence of the sovereign.

The first throes of revolution were felt in 1809,
almost simultaneously in Upper Peru, Quito, and
Mexico. These movements were quickly suppressed
with great cruelty. In the year 1810 the revolution
opened upon a vast scale. All the Spanish colonies
on the mainland, with the exception of Lower Peru,
revolted at the same time and proclaimed their inde-
pendence of Spain, although still professing allegiance
to Ferdinand VII, the dethroned king.

The colonial authorities were deposed in most cases
by force of public opinion and without violence. The
revolution was municipal in character, that is to say,
the cabildos, or town councils, the only popularly con-
stituted political bodies in the colonies, assumed the
initiative in the work of revolution and named the
juntas. The junta of the capital city in each province
was usually recognized as the chief executive body
for that province, and assumed for the time being

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

all the functions of government. National conventions
were then called in many cases to decide upon the form
of government. These in most cases entrusted the
executive power to regencies or triumvirates, almost
all of which rapidly gave way to military dictatorships.

The Regency of Cadiz had anticipated trouble from
the colonies and had recognized their rights as free-
men by inviting them to send deputies to the national
Cortes, but at the same time had abridged those rights
by allowing them only a very limited representation,
absurdly out of proportion to their population and
commercial importance. Upon the establishment of
the provisional governments or juntas in the colonies,
the Regency refused them the freedom of trade that
had been promised, declined the proffered mediation
of England, and proceeded to stigmatize the Ameri-
cans as rebels and to declare them guilty of high
treason, although they had been guilty only of the
same conduct that the Spaniards themselves were pur-
suing at home.

Venezuela then (1811) declared herself independent
of both the Spanish nation and of the Spanish mon-
arch, and adopted a republican constitution. The pro-
mulgation of the Spanish constitution of 1812 further
encouraged the spirit of independence in the colonies,
but when Ferdinand was restored in 1814, the colonies
were still governed in his name, for the revolution of
Venezuela, which alone had declared for independence,
had been crushed out. Had Ferdinand acted with
any moderation or judgment, his American posses-
sions would have been saved to his crown. But the
refusal of the colonies, wrhich had now enjoyed prac-
tical self-government for several years, to take upon

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

them without conditions the yoke of absolute author-
ity, was met with the proclamation of a war of re-
conquest. Reconciliation was thereafter no longer
possible, and independence only a question of time.
By the close of 1815 the revolution had been put down
in all the provinces except La Plata. There it was
never suppressed. For this reason we shall first trace
rapidly the course of the revolution in the south, of
which San Martin was the directing power.

Jose de San Martin was born in 1778 in Paraguay,
his father being the governor of Misiones. When
eight years of age, his family went to Spain and he
was entered as a pupil in the Seminary of Nobles at
Madrid. At the age of twelve, he joined a regiment
as cadet and saw his first service in Africa. He served
in the Spanish army for more than twenty years, and
won promotion as well as special distinction for brav-
ery. In the battle of Baylen, where a detachment of
Napoleon's disciplined troops was beaten by an army
of recruits inspired by patriotism, San Martin, then a
captain, won a gold medal and a commission as lieu-
tenant-colonel for his conduct. Hearing of the
struggle for liberty in his native land, he resigned his
commission and returned to America. He was almost
unknown personally, but his reputation as a brave sol-
dier and a skilful tactician procured for him immediate
employment. At this time the Argentine Republic had
two armies in the field, the one operating near at home
against the Portuguese in Uruguay and the Spanish
in Montevideo, and the other in Upper Peru (Bolivia)
against the forces sent by the viceroy of Peru to sup-
press the Argentine revolution. San Martin was
soon given the command of this army in the north,

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

succeeding General Belgrano. He soon placed his
army in an excellent state of discipline and put a check
to the advances of the Peruvian army.30

On May 16, 1814, the Argentine naval force, under
command of an Irishman named Brown, defeated and
almost entirely destroyed the Spanish squadron sta-
tioned at Montevideo, and that city soon after sur-
rendered to the besieging army of Alvear, San
Martin's old comrade in the Spanish army. Alvear,
whose political influence was much greater than San
Martin's, now aspired to the conquest of Peru, and
therefore desired the command in the north. This San
Martin willingly relinquished to him. He had other
plans in mind, and the state of his health demanded
rest. Upper Peru had been the high-road from Peru
to Buenos Aires in times of peace, and was, therefore,
naturally looked upon as the line of advance for the
liberating army. San Martin, however, after a care-
ful study of the question, had become convinced that
this was not the strategic line of approach, that the
Argentine Republic would never succeed in conquer-
ing1 Peru from this quarter. His idea was to carry
the war to the west, to cross the Andes, occupy Chile,
and, having secured a naval base there, to attack Peru
from the coast, continuing military operations in the
north merely as a diversion. The success of this plan
depended upon the performance of two apparently im-
possible tasks — the passage of the Andes and the crea-
tion of a navy on the Pacific. San Martin was by far
too shrewd a man to advocate such an undertaking
before maturing his plans. He, therefore, confided it

80 Mitre, "The Emancipation of South America." Translated by
Pilling. London, 1893.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

only to a few of his intimate friends, and, taking ad-
vantage of his ill health, asked, as a favor for him-
self, the government of the obscure province of Cuyo,
where from its capital of Mendoza he could place him-
self in communication with the Chilean patriots.

On August 10, 1814, San Martin was appointed
governor of Cuyo, and at once devoted himself to the
development of the plans which led to the emancipa-
tion of half a continent and gave him his place in the
world's history. The revolutionary movement in Chile
had just been crushed out. It was begun in 1810
and the general course of events had been somewhat
similar to the Argentine movement, but it had fallen a
victim first to disputes between the Patriot leaders and
finally to the troops of the viceroy of Peru. It would
require more space than we can give to trace the vary-
ing fortunes of the cause in Chile through the stirring
events that marked the leadership of Dr. Rosas, of the
Carrera brothers, and of Bernardo O'Higgins. After
the final collapse, O'Higgins, with a number of other
Patriots, fled over the Andes to Mendoza and readily
entered into the plans of San Martin. It took the
latter two years to organize and equip an army and to
convince the government of Buenos Aires of the prac-
ticability of his plan.

At length, on January 17, 1817, he began the pas-
sage of the Andes with about 5,000 men, 1,600 horses,
and 9,000 mules, the latter carrying the field artillery,
ammunition, and provisions. The summit of the
Uspallata Pass is 12,700 feet above the sea-level, 5,000
feet higher than the Great St. Bernard, by which
Napoleon led his army over the Alps. In many other
respects San Martin's achievement was more remark-

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

able. Each piece of artillery had to be carried sus-
pended on a pole between two mules, or, where the road
was particularly dangerous, dragged by ropes. There
were chasms that could be crossed only by cable
bridges. The march over the Andes occupied three
weeks. Both men and animals suffered greatly from
soroche, the illness caused by rarefied atmosphere.

At the foot of the mountain, at Chacabuco, the van-
guard of San Martin's army defeated a body of 4,000
Royalists, and thus opened the road to Santiago, which
San Martin entered February 14, 1817. The Chileans
chose him Supreme Director of their government, but
he declined the office, and O'Higgins was chosen.

San Martin's great object was to crush the colonial
power of Spain in its stronghold, Peru. Having by
the successful passage of the Andes and the victory
of Chacabuco in a measure justified his plan of cam-
paign, he returned to Buenos Aires for reinforce-
ments. The Royalists meanwhile retreated to the south.
On February 18, 1818, the independence of Chile was
proclaimed. A month later the Patriots were sur-
prised at Cancha-Rayada and almost routed, but within
two weeks the army was again ready for action, and
on April 5, 1818, encountered the Royalists at Maipo.
This battle was a complete victory for the Patriots
and decided the fate of Chile. Only one or two for-
tresses in the south were now held for Spain. Five
days after the battle of Maipo, San Martin returned
once more to Buenos Aires and began organizing an
expedition for the liberation of Peru. Puyrredon,
now Supreme Director, supported his undertaking.

While San Martin was soliciting aid from the Ar-
gentine Republic, the Chileans were not idle. They

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

saw that the only way of insuring their independence
was by the creation of a navy. Through its agent in
London, the Chilean government secured the services
of Lord Cochrane, an English naval officer of great
distinction and remarkable talents, who by a curious
turn of fortune had been brought into unmerited dis-
grace and dismissed from the British service.31 He
reached Valparaiso in November and hoisted his flag
on board the O'Higgins, December 22, 1818. During
the course of the next year, Cochrane made two at-
tempts to take Callao, the seaport of Peru, but with-
out success beyond harassing the enemy in some of
the smaller coast towns. In February, 1820, by a bril-
liant move, he captured Valdivia, a strongly fortified
town still held by the Spaniards in southern Chile.

San Martin returned to Chile in January, 1820, and
began to assemble at Valparaiso the army destined for
the invasion of Peru. Of the 5,000 men, two-thirds
were from Buenos Aires, while nearly all of the offi-
cers were Argentine or European volunteers. Of 65
foreign officers, 37 were British and 3 were from the
United States. There were, besides, 30 English officers
in the Chilean navy. The expedition sailed on August
21, 1820, on board the fleet commanded by Cochrane.
San Martin landed his army at Pisco, to the south of
Lima, and sent an expedition into the interior under
General Arenales, who had served the Patriots for
years in Upper Peru. In October, San Martin re-
embarked his troops and landed them again at Huacho,
a point seventy miles north of Lima. Meanwhile the
Spanish squadron, completely demoralized by the ap-

" See Cochrane (Earl Dundonald), " Service in Chili." 2 Vols. Lon-
don, 1859.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

pearance on the Pacific of Lord Cochrane, whose dar-
ing exploits were well known, was lying under the guns
of Callao Castle. On the night of November 5, 1820,
Lord Cochrane led a force of volunteers, consisting
of 180 seamen and 100 marines, in open boats right
under the batteries of Callao, surprised and over-
powered the crew of the Esmeralda, the largest Span-
ish frigate, and, cutting her loose, carried her off to
his own squadron.

After Cochrane's exploit at Callao, the moral effect
of which was very great, he urged upon San Martin
an immediate advance upon Lima, but San Martin had
two campaigns before him, the one military, the other
political. On first landing at Pisco he had issued an
order to his army in which he said, " Remember that
you are come not to conquer, but to liberate a people ;
the Peruvians are our brothers/* And in spite of the
impatience and restlessness of his officers, he steadily
adhered to his plan, to the no small loss of his military
prestige and ultimately to his retirement from the
scene of activity. His purpose was by the presence of
the liberating army to give the people of Peru a chance
to rise and throw off the yoke of Spain. To this end
he scattered proclamations and addresses of a revolu-
tionary character broadcast through the land and
quietly awaited results. The contest in Peru, he said,
was not a war of conquest and glory, but entirely of
opinion; it was a war of new and liberal principles
against prejudice, bigotry, and tyranny.

People ask why I don't march to Lima at once ; so I might,
and instantly would, were it suitable to my views, which it
is not. I do not want military renown ; I have no ambition
to be the conqueror of Peru; I want solely to liberate the

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

country from oppression. Of what use would Lima be to
me if the inhabitants were hostile in political sentiment?
How could the cause of independence be advanced by my
holding Lima, or even the whole country, in military pos-
session? Far different are my views. I wish to have aM
men thinking with me, and do not choose to advance a step
beyond the gradual march of public opinion. The capital is
now ripe for declaring its sentiments, and I shall give them
the opportunity to do so in safety. It was in sure expecta-
tion of this movement that I have hitherto deferred advanc-
ing; and to those who know the full extent of the means
which have been put in action, a sufficient explanation is
afforded of all the delays that have taken place. I have been
gaining, indeed, day by day, fresh allies in the hearts of the
people, the only certain allies in such a war. In the sec-
ondary point of military strength, I have been, from the
same causes, equally successful in augmenting and improving
the liberating army; while that of the Spaniards has been
wasted by want and desertion. The country has now become
sensible of its true interests, and it is right the inhabitants
should have the means of expressing what they think. Public
opinion is an engine newly introduced into this country; the
Spaniards, who are utterly incapable of directing it, have
prohibited its use ; but they shall now experience its strength
and importance.*2

The campaign of Arenales in the interior was suc-
cessful. In the presence of the liberating army, the
people everywhere rose in revolt. San Martin's
method of conducting the campaign was the correct
one. Public opinion was soon aroused in the capital
itself, and the Royalists finally decided to evacuate
Lima. The viceroy retired with his forces to Cuzco
in the highlands. In response to an invitation from
the city authorities, the Patriots entered Lima July 6,
1821. San Martin himself entered without ceremony

83 Hall's "Journal," Vpl, I, p. 181. Report of Conversation with San
Martin in Cajlao Roads.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

after dark a few days later. The independence of
Peru was proclaimed July 28 with imposing cere-
monies in the great square of Lima. San Martin was
proclaimed Protector of Peru. He proceeded to or-
ganize a civil government, and established the cele-
brated Order of the Sun, distinctively aristocratic in
character.

San Martin had played a great part thus far, but
he had reached the zenith of his influence and power.
Dissensions soon arose. The task he had undertaken
was difficult in the extreme. It was much easier to
acquire power than to use it. At the time of the evacu-
ation of Lima by the Spaniards, he said to Captain
Hall:

For the last ten years I have been unremittingly employed
against the Spaniards; or rather in favor of this country,
for I am not against any one who is not hostile to the cause
of independence. All I wish is that this country should be
managed by itself, and by itself alone. As to the manner
in which it is to be governed, that belongs not at all to me.
I propose simply to give the people the means of declaring
themselves independent, and of establishing a suitable form
of government; after which I shall consider I have done
enough and leave them.**

When the time came he kept his word.

While San Martin was leading the army of libera-
tion from the Argentine Republic to Chile, and from
Chile to Peru, Simon Bolivar, the liberator of the
north, was pursuing his chequered career in Venezuela
and Colombia, unfurling the standard of revolution
wherever he could get a foothold. He was a man, in
every respect, the opposite of San Martin, fiery, im-

«« Hall's " Journal," Vol. I, p. 194.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

petuous, wholly given over to personal ambition,
neither a statesman nor a soldier, but one of the great-
est revolutionary leaders of any age or country. His
ignorance of military affairs led him into undertakings
from which an experienced soldier would have held
back, but his indomitable pluck carried him safely
through all calamities, and his wonderful enthusiasm
fired his followers even in the midst of disaster.

This remarkable man, whose reputation in the new
world stands second to that of Washington alone, was,
like Miranda, a native of Caracas. Sprung from a
family of wealth and influence he had, like most young
South Americans of his class, received his education
abroad, and had for several years led a dissipated life
in Paris. At first he held himself aloof from the revo-
lutionary leaders, but after the accomplishment of the
revolution of Caracas, April 19, 1810, he was per-
suaded to join the Patriot cause, and was sent to
London to solicit assistance from Great Britain.34

The junta of Caracas, like those subsequently
formed in the south, professed to act in the name of
Ferdinand VII, and fearing the influence of Miranda,
then in London, whose advocacy of absolute indepen-
dence had been open and avowed, they instructed Boli-
var and their other agents not to allow him to come
to Venezuela. Miranda came in spite of them, how-
ever, under an assumed name, and was everywhere
received with enthusiasm. Under his influence a con-
gress was elected which, on July 5, 1811, declared
Venezuela a republic, free and independent of all for-
eign dominion. Miranda was appointed Director.
This was the first South American declaration of inde-

34 Holstein, " Life of Bolivar." Boston, 1829-

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

pendence. The formal independence of the Argentine
Republic was not declared until July 9, 1816, although
the country had been self-governing for several years.

The Patriot cause was ruined, however; by the
earthquake of March 25, 1812, which almost destroyed
the city of Caracas and several towns of importance.
Twenty thousand people are supposed to have per-
ished. As the disaster occurred on Holy Thursday,
the clergy were not slow to turn it to political account
and to persuade the people that it was a direct chas-
tisement of Heaven upon them for their rebellion
against Spain. The cause of the Patriots steadily lost
ground until the fall of Porto Cabello, through the
inefficiency of Bolivar, caused its complete collapse.
Miranda was forced to sign with Monteverde the
treaty of Vittoria, July 26, 1812, on the basis of com-
plete submission and a general amnesty. It is hardly
necessary to add that the Spanish general did not
abide by the terms of the capitulation. Miranda him-
self was detained by Bolivar, as he was on the point
of embarking for England, accused of having received
bribes from the Spaniards and of being unwilling to
share the fate of his followers, and treacherously
handed over to the Spaniards. He was sent to Spain
and after languishing for three years in a dungeon at
Cadiz, died July 14, 1816. His fate was a sad blot
upon the reputation of Bolivar.

The revolution in New Granada, which had been
inaugurated July 20, 1810, was still holding out and
thither Bolivar proceeded to offer his services to the
Patriots of that province. As soon as he had firmly
established himself in influence and power, he per-
suaded the government that their only safety lay in

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the reconquest of Venezuela. He was provided with
troops, and in May, 1813 crossed the frontier and took
several important cities. He now assumed a new atti-
tude and became a self-appointed dictator. He pro-
claimed a war of extermination against Spaniards and
adopted a new system of dates: " 3d year of Indepen-
dence and ist of the War to the Death." He entered
Caracas in triumph August 6, 1813. He proclaimed
himself dictator with the title of Liberator. Mean-
while Marino, another Patriot leader, had landed in
the eastern part of Venezuela near Cumana and de-
clared himself dictator. There were thus two dic-
tators and no cordiality between them. Before they
could come to an agreement the enemy had recovered
their position. In December, 1814, the last Patriot
force was defeated.

Bolivar and Marino retired once more to New
Granada. Bolivar was made captain-general of the
forces of New Granada, his title of Liberator was
recognized, and another, that of Illustrious Pacificator,
bestowed upon him. A second time he undertook the
conquest of Venezuela from the west. Dissensions
soon arose between Bolivar and the other leaders. He
was refused reinforcements and foolishly marched
against the Patriot garrison of Cartagena. He was
now forced to give up his command, and embarked for
Jamaica, May, 1815.

Meanwhile Ferdinand had been restored to the
throne of Spain, and an army of 10,000 men, com-
manded by Marshal Morillo, the ablest Spanish gen-
eral of the time, had been sent to reduce the provinces
on the Main. This expedition reached Cumana in
April, 1815, and before the end of the year all the

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

colonies, with the exception of the provinces of the
River Plate, were reduced to submission.

Far from giving up hope, however, Bolivar pro-
ceeded to Haiti, and from that island, in May, 1816,
made a descent upon the eastern part of Venezuela,
but was routed by the Spaniards in July, and soon
returned to Haiti. A few of the Patriots still kept
the field, and towards the close of the year Bolivar's
partisans secured his recall. On December 21 he left
Haiti with a second expedition for the relief of his
native land. He determined now to direct all his
efforts, not as hitherto, to the support of the Patriot
cause in the capital, but to the holding of the great
plains of the Orinoco. With this territory as a base,
he carried on, during the year 1817, in conjunction
with the Llanero horsemen of General Paez, a des-
perate struggle with the Spaniards. When the rainy
season of 1818 began, Bolivar's army had been cut
almost to pieces, he had lost prestige as a general, and
his civil authority amounted to nothing. Only the
cavalry of Paez maintained the Patriot cause. Still
the position of the Spaniards was not much better.
Morillo had 12,000 men scattered about, but neither
money, arms, nor supplies. He reported to the viceroy
of Peru: "Twelve pitched battles, in which the best
officers and troops of the enemy have fallen, have not
lowered their pride or lessened the vigor of their at-
tacks upon us."

In February, 1819, the second Congress of Vene-
zuela convened at Angostura. The Dictator resigned,
but was unanimously elected President and given abso-
lute power in all provinces which were the actual
theater of war. The army was, reorganize^ by the

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

accession of foreign troops, in particular the British
legion, consisting of 2,000 well equipped men, which
achieved much of the success of the next year. Boli-
var now conceived the idea of crossing the Cordillera
and reconquering New Granada. General Paez was
to attract the attention of Morillo on the plains in
front, and a demonstration was to be made on the
coast near Caracas, while Bolivar marched to the west.
This movement changed the whole face of affairs and
had a similar effect to the passage of the Andes by
San Martin. New Granada was won by the battle
of Boyaca, August 7, 1819. Morillo was now iso-
lated in Venezuela. In December, 1819, a congress of
delegates from Venezuela and New Granada met and
decreed the union of the two provinces in the Republic
of Colombia. Bolivar was named provisional Presi-
dent. An armistice was signed by Bolivar and Morillo
in November, 1820, which gave the Patriots breathing
time. The Spanish troops remaining in Venezuela
were defeated by Bolivar in the battle of Carabobo,
June 23, 1821. Only a few fortresses on the coast
were still held by the Spaniards.

Bolivar entered Caracas once more in triumph and
tendered his resignation, an act always considered by
him necessary for giving the proper dramatic setting
to such occasions. Congress took no notice of it, but
drew up a constitution providing for a limited presi-
dential term of four years. The Liberator, " as he
feared," was elected President. He repeated his resig-
nation, but added that he would yield if Congress per-
sisted. Congress did persist.

After the battle of Boyaca, Bolivar had sent General
Sucre by sea to Guayaquil, nominally to aid the new

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

state against the Royalists, but in reality to induce it
to join the Republic of Colombia. Sucre met with
reverses, and had to call on San Martin for assistance
from Peru. Meanwhile Bolivar was advancing by
land. On July n, 1822, he entered Guayaquil in
triumph, and two days later, on his own responsibility,
announced its incorporation with Colombia. The
junta resigned and took refuge on board the Peruvian
squadron in the harbor. On the 25th San Martin
arrived by sea, and Bolivar sent two of his aides to
welcome him " on Colombian soil." On the following
day San Martin went ashore and he and Bolivar met
for the first and last time. They had two private in-
terviews, after which San Martin sent his baggage
aboard his ship and announced that he would sail after
attending the ball to be given that night in his honor.
At the public banquet that evening Bolivar rose and
proposed a toast : " To the two greatest men of South
America — General San Martin and myself." San
Martin also proposed a toast: "To the speedy con-
clusion of the war ; to the organization of the different
republics of the continent; and to the health of the
Liberator of Colombia" — words which well con-
trasted the personal and political aims of the two men.
San Martin and Bolivar had been unable to agree upon
any plan for the expulsion of the Spaniards from the
highlands of Peru. The self-denying patriot gave way
before the man of ambition. To O'Higgins he wrote :
" The Liberator is not the man we took him to be."
Upon his return to Peru, San Martin wrote to Boli-
var : " My decision is irrevocable. I have convened
the first Congress of Peru; the day after its installation
I shall leave for Chile, convinced that my presence is

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the only obstacle which keeps you from coming to
Peru with your army." On the 2Oth of September,
1822, he laid his resignation before the Congress, and
issued an address to the nation. " The presence of a
fortunate soldier/' he said, " however disinterested he
may be, is dangerous to a newly founded state. I have
proclaimed the independence of Peru. I have ceased
to be a public man." These words, whether inten-
tionally so or not, were prophetic of Bolivar's subse-
quent career. San Martin wrote to O'Higgins : " I
am tired of hearing them call me tyrant, that I wish to
make myself king, emperor, the devil. On the other
hand, my health is broken, this climate is killing me.
My youth was sacrificed to the service of Spain; my
manhood to my own country. I think I have now the
right to dispose of my old age."

Bolivar's jealousy of San Martin prolonged the war,
which might have been brought to a close in a few
months, for nearly three years. After the withdrawal
of San Martin, Bolivar became Dictator of Peru. On
December 9, 1824, was fought the last battle for South
American independence. On the little plain of Aya-
cucho, 1 1, 600 feet above the sea, General Sucre de-
feated and captured the forces of the viceroy. Upper
Peru was organized as a separate republic, with the
name of Bolivia.

Bolivar had been proclaimed President of Peru for
life, but the unpopularity of this measure led him to
leave the country in 1826, never to return. That same
year he summoned the Congress of Panama, but his
plans for the union of South America in one republic
failed. San Martin's idea finally triumphed. In 1829
Venezuela separated itself from Colombia and passed

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

a decree of perpetual banishment against Bolivar. In
April, 1830, through pressure of public opinion, Boli-
var resigned the presidency of Colombia and retired
into private life. Congress voted him an annual pen-
sion of $30,000. A month later Quito and Guayaquil
separated from Colombia and formed the independent
state of Ecuador. Even the name Colombia was
dropped by the remaining state, and the old name of
New Granada adopted. In 1857 the name Colombia
was assumed once more.

Bolivar died in a small house near Santa Martha,
December 17, 1831, having witnessed the failure of
his most cherished plans. San Martin had retired to
Europe in 1823 with his only child, a daughter named
Mercedes. They lived a retired life in Brussels. Once
only, in 1828, he returned to his native land, but was
received with such denunciation by the press of Buenos
Aires that he quickly turned his face towards Europe
again. He died at Boulogne, August 17, 1850.
Thirty years later the Argentine people had his re-
mains brought back to his native land. In May, 1880,
with imposing ceremonies, they were laid to rest in the
Cathedral of Buenos Aires.

Mexico was twice revolutionized. The first struggle
began in 1809 and 1810, and was carried on spasmodi-
cally until 1817. The second revolution broke out in
1820 on receipt of the news from Spain of the revolu-
tion of March, 1820, and the re-adoption of the con-
stitution of 1812. The old revolutionists demanded
the proclamation of this constitution in Mexico, but
the Viceroy Apodaca opposed them. Augustin de
Iturbide, a native Mexican, who in the first revolution
had steadfastly adhered to the cause of the king, now

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

defected to the popular side with a large body of
troops which the viceroy had entrusted to his com-
mand. On February 24, 1821, he issued the cele-
brated document known as the Plan of Iguala, from
the town of that name. In it he proposed the main-
tenance of the Roman Catholic religion to the exclu-
sion of all others, the independence of Mexico from
Spain, and the establishment of a limited monarchy.
The Imperial Crown of Mexico was to be offered first
to Ferdinand VII ; in the event of his declining, to the
younger princes of his house; and in the event of
their refusal, the duty of naming an emperor was to
fall to the representative assembly of Mexico. The
personal and property rights of Spaniards in Mexico
were carefully guaranteed. In securing the interests
of Spaniards and of the clergy, those who had most
to lose, this plan differed essentially from the revo-
lutionary policy of the other Spanish colonies. On
the other hand, the Creole element was satisfied with
the promise of independence and a representative gov-
ernment. The revolutionary army became known as
" the Army of the Three Guarantees," these being ( i )
the maintenance of the religious establishment in its
present form, (2) independence, and (3) the union of
Americans and Spaniards.85 This ingenious document
received immediately the widest approval.

The Viceroy Apodaca had practically abdicated
when his successor, General O'Donaju, arrived from
Spain. As the latter had come without troops, there
was nothing left but for him to recognize the revolu-
tion as an accomplished fact and make the best terms
for his country he could. Accordingly he met Iturbide

••Hall's "Journal," Vol. II, p. 188.

REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

in conference at Cordova, and after a brief discussion
signed the treaty bearing that name, August 24, 1821.
It was agreed that a provisional junta should be ap-
pointed, that O'Donaju should be a member, and that
the junta should proceed to carry into effect the plan
of Iguala. O'Donaju then persuaded the Royalists to
open the gates of the capital, and on September 27,
1821, Iturbide entered. Shortly thereafter O'Donaju
died from the yellow fever, thus leaving Iturbide free
to carry out his plans. The Spanish government, of
course, repudiated the treaty of Cordova.

The Congress, which assembled in pursuance of the
program of Iguala, was divided between Imperialists
and Republicans. In spite of the opposition of the
latter, Iturbide had himself proclaimed emperor and
his family ennobled. Congress soon fell into disputes
with the emperor, who finally, in October, 1822, dis-
solved it by force. A few months later Santa Anna
inaugurated a counter-revolution from Vera Cruz,
which resulted in the abdication of the emperor. Itur-
bide was allowed to leave the country. He retired to
Italy, where he resided until toward the close of 1823,
when he went to London. In May, 1824, at the solici-
tation of certain of his partisans, he sailed again for
Mexico,36 ignorant of the decree of perpetual banish-
ment passed against him by the Congress a few weeks
before. He landed at Tampico July 12, but was seized
and executed a few days later. The new assembly
then in session adopted a constitution, and the Republic
of Mexico was launched upon what was to prove, for
years to come, a career of turbulence and anarchy.

•• See the statement of Iturbide in regard to his political life published
in the Pamphleteer, London, 1827.

CHAPTER II

THE RECOGNITION OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN
REPUBLICS

THE struggle of the South American peoples for
independence was viewed from the first with feelings
of profound satisfaction and sympathy in the United
States. From the commencement of the revolution
South American vessels were admitted into the ports
of the United States under whatever flag they bore.
It does not appear that any formal declaration ac-
cording belligerent rights to the said provinces was
ever made, though a resolution to that effect was in-
troduced into the House by committee as early as
December 10, iSii.1 Such formal action was appar-
ently not deemed necessary and, as there was no
Spanish minister resident in the United States at. that
time to protest, our ports were probably thrown open,
as a matter of course.2 The fact that they were ac-
corded full belligerent rights from the first was after-
wards stated by President Monroe in his annual mes-
sages of 1817 and 1818 and in his special message
of March 8, 1822.*

At an early date of the revolution commissioners
arrived in Washington seeking recognition of inde-
pendence, and agents were forthwith dispatched to
South America to obtain information in regard to

1 Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. Ill, p. 538.

1 Wharton's Digest, Sec. 69, and Moore's Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I,
p. 177.

* "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, pp. 13, 58, and 116.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

the state of the revolutionary governments and to
watch the movements of England and other Euro-
pean powers. Joel R. Poinsett was sent to Buenos
Aires in 1811, and the following year Alexander
Scott was sent to Venezuela.4 In 1817 Caesar A. Rod-
ney, Theodorick Bland, and John Graham were dis-
patched as special commissioners to South America.
They proceeded to Buenos Aires, where they arrived
in February, 1818, and remained until the last of
April. Rodney and Graham then returned to the
United States while Bland proceeded across the con-
tinent to Chile. Their reports were transmitted to
Congress November 17, i8i8.5 In 1820 Messrs. J. B.
Prevost and John M. Forbes were sent as commercial
agents to Chile and Buenos Aires. Reports from
them on the state of the revolutions were transmitted
to Congress, March 8 and April 26, 1822.°

In the meantime a strong sentiment in favor of the
recognition of South American independence had
arisen in the United States. The struggling colonies
found a ready champion in Henry Clay, who, for a
period of ten years labored almost incessantly in their
behalf, pleading for their recognition first with his
own countrymen and then, as secretary of state under
the Adams administration, with the governments of
Europe. His name became a household word in South
America and his speeches were translated and read
before the patriot armies.

In spite of the fact that our own political interests
were so closely identified with the struggling republics,
the President realized the necessity of following a neu-

• Lyman, " Diplomacy of the United Statea," 2 Vols. Boston, 1828.
Vol. II, p. 432. Romero, " Mexico and the United States."

• Given in full in Am. St. Papers. For. Rel.. Vol. IV, pp. 217-270.
•Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 818-851.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

tral course, and in view of the aid the colonies were
receiving from citizens of the United States, called
upon Congress for the enactment of a more stringent
neutrality law. Clay delivered a vigorous speech in
opposition to this measure in January, 1817. His
greatest effort in behalf of South America, however,
was his speech of March 25, 1818, on the general
appropriation bill. He moved an amendment appro-
priating $18,000 for the outfit and year's salary of a
minister to the United Provinces of the Plate. With-
out waiting to hear the report of the three commis-
sioners who had been sent to inquire into the state of
the revolutionary governments, he urged that a minis-
ter be regularly accredited to Buenos Aires at once.
In a speech, three hours in length, he concluded the
arguments he had begun the day before. Painting
with even more than his usual fire and enthusiasm the
beauties and resources of the Southern continent, he
said:

Within this vast region, we behold the most sublime and
interesting objects of creation; the loftiest mountains, the
most majestic rivers in the world; the richest mines of the
precious metals; and the choicest productions of the earth.
We behold there a spectacle still more interesting and sublime
— the glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of people strug-
gling to burst their chains and be free.7

He went on to say that in the establishment of the
independence of the South American states the United
States had the deepest interest. He had no hesita-
tion in asserting his firm belief that there was no
question in the foreign policy of this country, which
had ever arisen, or which he could conceive as ever

* Demon's " Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 139.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

occurring, in the decision of which we had so much
at stake. This interest concerned our politics, our
commerce, our navigation. There could be no doubt
that Spanish America, once independent, whatever
might be the form of the governments established
in its several parts, those governments would be
animated by an American feeling and guided by an
American policy. They would obey the laws of the
system of the new world, of which they would com-
pose a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe.8
The House turned a deaf ear to his brilliant rhetoric.
The motion was defeated by a vote of 115 to 45, but
Clay did not abandon the cause of South America.

Two years later he reopened the question in a direct
attack on the policy of the administration, which
greatly disturbed President Monroe. On May 20,
1820, he again introduced a resolution declaring it
expedient to send ministers to the " governments in
South America which have established and are main-
taining their independence of Spain." His arraign-
ment of the administration became more violent than
ever:

If Lord Castlereagh says we may recognize, we do; if not,
we do not. A single expression of the British minister to
the present secretary of state, then our minister abroad, I
am ashamed to say, has molded the policy of our government
toward South America.

A charge of dependence upon Great Britain in affairs
of diplomacy was as effective a weapon then as it
has been since in matters financial. Clay's resolu-
tion passed the House by a vote of 80 to 75, but

• Benton's " Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 142.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

still the executive arm of the government did not
move. In 1817 and 1818 the question of South
American independence was continually before the
cabinet for discussion. President Monroe seemed
strongly inclined toward recognition, but in this he
was opposed by Adams and Calhoun, who were un-
willing to act in the matter without some understand-
ing with England, and if possible with France. Our
relations with Spain in regard to the Indian troubles
in Florida were in a very strained condition and any
action taken at that time in recognition of South
America would have involved us in war with Spain
and almost inevitably with other European powers.
The President, therefore, as a matter of expediency
postponed the action which his sympathy prompted,
and, in his annual message of November 16, 1818, ex-
pressed his satisfaction at the course the government
had hitherto pursued and his intention of adhering to
it for the time being.9 Under the President's direction,
however, efforts were made to secure the cooperation
of Great Britain and France in promoting the inde-
pendence of South America.10

In 1819 an amicable adjustment of our differences
with Spain seemed to have been reached by the nego-
tiation of a treaty providing for the cession of the
Floridas to the United States and the settlement of
long-standing claims of American citizens against
Spain. An unforeseen difficulty arose, however, which
proved embarrassing to the administration. The Span-
ish monarch very shrewdly delayed ratifying the
treaty for two years and thus practically tied the

9 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II. p. 44.

10 " Adams's Diary," September. 1817, to December, 1818, " Betters and.
Pespatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, pp. 404 and 458,

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

hands of the administration during that time as far
as the South American question was concerned.

In spite of the awkward position in which the ad-
ministration found itself, Clay, who was opposed to
the treaty on account of its unwarranted surrender
of our claims to Texas, continued to plead the cause
of South America. Early in the year, 1821, a decla-
ration of interest in the South American struggle, in-
troduced by him, was carried by an overwhelming
majority (134 to 12), but the administration held
back another year until the de facto independence
of the colonies no longer admitted of reasonable doubt.
Meanwhile the Florida treaty had been ratified. On
March 8, 1822, President Monroe, in a special mes-
sage to Congress, expressed the opinion that the time
had come for recognition and asked for the appro-
priations necessary for carrying it into effect. The
President's recommendation was received with ap-
proval, and in due course the sum of $100,000 was
appropriated for " such missions to the independent
nations on the American continent as the President
of the United States may deem proper." In accord-
ance with this act Mr. R. C. Anderson of Kentucky
was appointed minister to Colombia, Mr. C. A. Rod-
ney of New Jersey to the Argentine Republic, and
Mr. H. Allen of Vermont to Chile, in 1824, and Mr.
Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina to Mexico in 1826.

While the United States government was concern-
ing itself with the political interests of the Spanish
provinces, Great Britain was quietly reaping all the
commercial advantages to be derived from the situa-
tion and was apparently well satisfied to let things
follow the drift they had taken. By the destruction

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

of the combined fleets of France and Spain at Trafal-
gar, in 1805, Nelson had won for Great Britain un-
disputed control of the Atlantic and laid open the
route to South America. Ever since the assiento of
1713 had placed the slave trade in her hands, Great
Britain had realized the possibilities of South Ameri-
can commerce, and the intercourse, which had been
kept up with that country after the termination of
the slave monopoly by smugglers, now that the dan-
ger was removed, became more regular and profitable.
During the changes of ministry that followed the
death of Pitt, the policy of England in regard to
South America was weak and vacillating. We have
already called attention to the political indecision that
marked the attack upon the provinces of the Plate.
With Napoleon's invasion of Spain and the national
uprising it occasioned, British policy became once more
intelligible. It was wisely deemed of more impor-
tance to spare the colonies and to win Spain over
to the European alliance against Napoleon, than to
take her colonies at the cost of driving her perma-
nently into the arms of France. Meanwhile British
commerce with the South American states was stead-
ily growing and that too with the connivance of Spain.
At the close of the Napoleonic wars, Spain, fearing
that England, through her desire to keep this trade,
would secretly furnish aid to the colonies in their
struggle for independence, proposed to the British gov-
ernment to bind itself to a strict neutrality. This
England agreed to, and when the treaty was signed,
there was, according to Canning, " a distinct under-
standing with Spain that our commercial intercourse
with the colonies was not to be deemed a breach of

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

its stipulations." " Notwithstanding this tacit com-
pact, British commerce suffered greatly at the hands
of Spanish privateers and even Spanish war vessels.
Numbers of British merchantmen were capture.d by
Spanish ships, carried into the few ports left to Spain
on the Main, and condemned as prizes for trading
with the insurgent colonies. Thus at the time of the
acknowledgment of South American independence by
the United States, a long list of grievances had ac-
cumulated in the hands of the British ambassador at
Madrid, and in spite of urgent and repeated remon-
strances, remained unredressed.

Canning was deterred from making final demands
upon the government of Madrid by the consideration
that he did not wish to hamper the constitutional gov-
ernment of Spain, which had come into being by the
revolution of March, 1820, and against which the other
powers of Europe were preparing to act. The con-
dition of affairs on the Spanish Main was, however,
critical and demanded instant redress. He decided,
therefore, to take matters into his own hands without
harassing the government of Spain, and to dispatch a
squadron to the West Indies to make reprisals. In a
memorandum to the cabinet on this subject, Novem-
ber 15, 1822, in which he outlines his policy, he com-
mends the course of the United States in recognizing
the de facto independence of the colonies, claiming a
right to trade with them and avenging the attempted
interruption of that right by making reprisals, as a
more straightforward and intelligible course than that
of Great Britain, forbearing for the sake of Spain to
recognize the colonies, trading with them in faith of

11 Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 10.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the connivance of Spain and suffering depredations
without taking redress. It was not necessary, he
thought, to declare war against Spain, for " she has
perhaps as little direct and available power over the
colonies which she nominally retains as she has over
those which have thrown off her yoke. Let us apply,
therefore, a local remedy to a local grievance, and
make the ships and harbors of Cuba, Porto Rico, and
Porto Cabello answerable for the injuries which have
been inflicted by those ships, and the perpetrators of
which have found shelter in those harbors." In con-
clusion, he says that the tacit compact, which sub-
sisted for years, by which Spain was to forbear from
interrupting British trade with the South American
colonies having been renounced by Spain, and the old
colonial system having been revived in as full vigor
as if she had still a practical hold over her colonies
and a navy to enforce her pretensions, " no man will
say that under such circumstances our recognition of
those states can be indefinitely postponed." 12

While Great Britain was thus considering the ex-
pediency of following the example of the United
States in the recognition of Spain's revolted colonies,
the powers of central Europe had taken upon them
the task of solving the difficulties of that unfortunate
country both at home and in America. The restored
rule of the Bourbons in Spain had been far from
satisfactory to the great mass of the people. In
March, 1820, the army which Ferdinand had assembled
at Cadiz to be sent against the rebellious colonies, sud-
denly turned against the government, refused to em-
bark, and demanded the restoration of the constitution

13 Stapleton, " Official Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 48 ff.

'SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

of 1812. The action of the army was everywhere
approved and sustained by the mass of the people, and
the king was forced to proclaim the constitution and
to swear to uphold it. The March revolution in Spain
was followed in July by a constitutional movement
in Naples, and in August of the same year by a
similar movement in Portugal; while the next year <.
saw the outbreak of the Greek struggle for independ-
ence. Thus in all three of the peninsulas of Southern
Europe the people were struggling for the right of
self-government. The movement in Greece was, it
is true, of an altogether different character from the
others, but it was a revolt against constituted author-
ity and therefore incurred the ill-will of the so-called
legitimists. The powers of Europe at once took alarm
at the rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and pro-
ceeded to adopt measures for the suppression of the
movements to which these ideas gave rise. The prin-
ciple of joint intervention on the part of allied govern-
ments in the internal affairs of European states had
been developed in the years immediately following
the overthrow of Napoleon and was the outcome of
the wholly anomalous condition in which he had left
the politics of Europe. In the hands of Prince Met-
ternich, the genius of reaction against French revo-
lutionary ideas, this principle had become the most
powerful weapon of absolutism and now threatened
the subversion of popular institutions throughout Eu-
rope.

The rapid development of this doctrine of interven-
tion in the seven years immediately following the sec-
ond fall of Napoleon not only seriously menaced the
liberties of Europe, but also threatened to control the

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

destiny of the new world. At the Congress of Vienna
Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia
had formed a close union and had signed the treaty
upon which the peace of Europe rested for the next
half century. The agreement made at Vienna was
reaffirmed with some minor changes, after the second
overthrow of Napoleon, at Paris, November 20, 1815.
France was now practically excluded from the alliance.
This treaty undertook especially to guard against any
further disturbance of the peace of Europe by Napo-
leon or France. One of the most significant features
of the treaty, or what was to prove so, was the agree-
ment definitely laid down in the sixth article, provid-
ing for meetings of the powers at fixed periods.

The first conference held in accordance with this
understanding was that at Aix-la-Chapelle in October,
1818. France was readmitted as a member of the
alliance and her territory evacuated by the allied
armies. The quintuple alliance thus formed declared
that it had no other object than the maintenance of
peace; that the repose of the world was its motive
and its end. The language of the declaration had
been in a large measure neutralized to suit the views
of the British government. Lord Liverpool had said
to Castlereagh before the meeting of the conference:
" The Russian must be made to feel that we have a
parliament and a public, to which we are responsible,
and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into
views of policy which are wholly incompatible with
the spirit of our government." The members of the
British cabinet, except Canning, did not object seri-
ously to the system of congresses at fixed intervals,
but to the declarations publicly set forth by them.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Canning, on the other hand, objected to the declara-
tions and to the conferences themselves, " meetings for
the government of the world," as he somewhat con-
temptuously termed them.

It had been generally supposed that the question of
the Spanish colonies would come up for discussion
at Aix-la-Chapelle. Castlereagh assured the United
States, through Bagot, the British minister at Wash-
ington, that while England would act with the allied
powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in mediation between Spain
and her colonies, her mediation would be limited en-
tirely to the employment of her influence and good
offices and that she would not take any measures that
might assume a character of force.13

The revolutions that took place in Spain, Naples,
and Portugal in 1820 presented an occasion for another
meeting of the allies. In November the representa-
tives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia met in conference
at Troppau, and issued a circular setting forth what
they had already done for Europe in overthrowing the
military tyranny of Napoleon and expressing the de-
termination " to put a curb on a force no less tyran-
nical and no less detestable, that of revolt and crime."
The conference then adjourned to Laybach, where
they could, with greater dispatch, order the move-
ments they had decided to take against the revolution-
ists of Naples. Austria, being more intimately con-
cerned with the political condition of the Italian pen-
insula than either of the other two powers, was en-
trusted with the task of suppressing the Neapolitan
revolution. The Austrian army entered Naples

11 Bagot to Castlereagh, October 31, 1818 Mem. of a Conversation
with Adams. " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII, p. 66.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

March 23, 1821, overthrew the constitutional gov-
ernment that had been inaugurated, and restored Fer-
dinand II to absolute power. The revolution which
had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by
a detachment of the Austrian army.

England held aloof from all participation in the pro-
ceedings at Troppau and Laybach — though Sir Charles
Stuart was present to watch the proceedings. In a
circular dispatch of January 21, 1821, the British
government expressed its dissent from the principles
set forth in the Troppau circular.

The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged
for October, 1822, at Verona. Here the affairs of
Greece, Italy, and, in particular, Spain came up for
consideration. At this Congress all five powers of
the alliance were represented. France was uneasy
about the condition of Spain, and England had to send
a delegate out of self-defense, as her interests were
largely involved. Castlereagh was preparing to de-
part for the congress, when his mind gave way under
the stress of work and more remotely of dissipation,
and he committed suicide. Canning then became sec-
retary for foreign affairs, and Wellington was sent
to Verona.

The congress which now assembled at Verona was
devoted largely to a discussion of Spanish affairs.
Wellington had been instructed to use all his influence
against the adoption of measures of intervention in
Spain. When he found that the other powers were
bent upon this step and that his protest would be un-
heeded, he withdrew from the congress. The four re-
maining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona,
November 22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

the preamble, of the " Treaty of the Holy Alliance."
This treaty of the Holy Alliance, signed at Paris,
September 26, 1815, by Austria, Russia, and Prussia,
is one of the most remarkable political documents
extant. It sprang from the erratic brain of the Czar
Alexander under the influence of Madame Crudner,
who was both an adventuress and a religious enthusi-
ast. Its object was to uphold the divine right of
kings and to counteract the spirit of French revolu-
tionary ideas by introducing " the precepts of justice,
of chanty, and of peace " into the internal affairs of
states and into their relations with one another. No
one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and
it had been without influence upon the politics of
Europe. The agreement reached at Verona gave
retrospective importance to the Holy Alliance, and
revived the name, so that it became the usual designa-
tion of the combined powers. The following alleged
text of the secret treaty of Verona soon became cur-
rent in the press of Europe and America. Although
it has never been officially acknowledged and its
authenticity has been called in question, it states pretty
accurately the motives and aims of the powers. The
first four articles are as follows :

The undersigned, specially authorized to make some ad-
ditions to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having
exchanged their respective credentials, have agreed as
follows :

ARTICLE I. The high contracting parties being convinced
that the system of representative government is equally
incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim
of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right,
engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, to use
all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe,
and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where
it is not yet known.

ART. II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the
press is the most powerful means used by the pretended
supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those
of Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally
to adopt all proper measures to suppress it not only in their
own states, but also, in the rest of Europe.

ART. III. Convinced that the principles of religion con-
tribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of
passive obedience which they owe to their Princes, the high
contracting parties declare it to be their intention to sustain,
in their respective states, those measures which the clergy
may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their own interests,
so intimately connected with the preservation of the author-
ity of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering
their thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for
them, and solicit his constant cooperation in their views of
submitting the nations.

ART. IV. The situation of Spain and Portugal unites un-
happily all the circumstances to which this treaty has par-
ticular reference. The high contracting parties, in confiding
to France the care of putting an end to them, engage to
assist her in the manner which may the least compromise
them with their own people and the people of France, by
means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of
twenty millions of francs every year, from the date of the
signature of this treaty to the end of the war.

Signed by Metternich for Austria, Chateaubriand for
France, Bernstet for Prussia, and Nesselrode for Russia.14

Such was the code of absolutism against which
England protested and against which President Mon-
roe delivered his declaration.

14 For the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laybach, and Verona,
see "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh." Vol. XII; "Life of Lord
Liverpool," Vol. Ill; "Political Life and Official Correspondence of
Canning": Chateaubriand's " Congres de Verone," and W. A. Phillips,
*' The Confederation of Europe, 1813-1823." The text of the treaty of
Verona is published in Niles' Register, August 2, 1823, Vol. 24, p. 347,
and in Elliot's "American Diplomatic Code," Vol. II, p. 179.

• SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The Congress broke up about the middle of Decem-
ber, and the following April, the Due d'Angouleme
led a French army across the Pyrenees. By October
the constitutional party had been overthrown and
absolutism reigned supreme once more in western
Europe. In England alone was there still any sem-
blance of constitutional government.

The Congress of Verona was the last of the joint-
meetings of the powers for the discussion of the
internal affairs of states. It marked the final with-
drawal of England from the European alliance.
Henceforth she took up a position distinctly hostile
to the principles advocated by her former allies and
her policy in relation to Spanish America practically
coincided with that of the United States.

The great majority of the English people sympa-
thized deeply with the constitutional movement in
Spain and were ready to take up arms in support of
the Spanish people. The protest of England having
been disregarded by the powers at Verona, it became
necessary for the cabinet, in view of the preparations
going on in France for the invasion of the Peninsula,
to say what they contemplated doing. In February,
1823, Lord Liverpool circulated among his colleagues
a minute prepared by Canning, which gave at length
the reasons, military and other, why it would be
unwise for England to undertake the defense of
Spain. In the first place, the war against Spain was
unpopular in France, and if Great Britain should
take part in the war, the French government would
avail itself of the fact to convert it into an English
war and thus render it popular. Second, England
would have to undertake the defense of Spain against

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

invasion by land, and her naval superiority would
not materially aid the Spaniards or baffle the French.
Third, the continental powers were committed to the
support of France. Fourth, there was a possibility
that the invasion of Spain would be unsuccessful.
Fifth, on the other hand, it might meet with success,
in which event France might assist Spain to recover
her American colonies. Here, he says, England's
naval superiority would tell, " and I should have no
difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by
every means in our power, perhaps Spain from send-
ing a single Spanish regiment to South America, after
the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but
certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or
assistance for that purpose." Sixth, in case of the
invasion of Portugal by France and Spain, he thought
England would be in honor bound to defend her, in
case she asked for aid. The military defense of Port-
ugal would not be so difficult as a land war in Spain.15
In accordance with this determination Canning dis-
patched a letter to Sir Charles Stuart, British ambassa-
dor at Paris, March 31, 1823, in which he spoke of
recognition of the colonies as a matter to be deter-
mined by time and circumstances, and, disclaiming
all designs on the part of the British government on
the late Spanish provinces, intimated that England,
although abstaining from interference in Spain, would
not allow France to acquire any of the colonies by
conquest or cession. To this note the French gov-
ernment made no reply and England took this silence
as a tacit agreement not to interfere with the colonies.

" " Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. Ill, p. 231. " Official Correspond-
ence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 85.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The British government continued, however, to watch
closely the movements of France.16

As the invasion of Spain drew near to a successful
termination, the British government had reason to
suspect that the allied powers would next direct their
attention to the Spanish colonies with a view to forc-
ing them back to their allegiance or of otherwise dis-
posing of them, that is, by cession to some other Euro-
pean power. It was already in contemplation to call
another European congress for the discussion and set-
tlement of this question. As this was a subject of
vital interest to the United States, Canning invited the
American minister, Mr. Rush, to a conference, August
1 6, 1823, in which he suggested the expediency of an
understanding on this question between England and
the United States. He communicated to Mr. Rush
the substance of his dispatch of March 31 to Sir
Charles Stuart. Mr. Rush said he understood the
import of this note to be that England would not re-
main passive to any attempt on the part of France to
acquire territory in Spanish America. Mr. Canning
then asked what the United States would say to going
hand in hand with England in such a policy. Mr.
Rush replied that his instructions did not authorize
him to give an answer, but that he would communi-
cate the suggestion informally to his government. At
the same time he requested to be enlightened as to
England's policy in the matter of recognizing the inde-
pendence of the colonies. Mr. Canning replied that
England had taken no steps in the matter of recogni-
tion whatever, but was considering the question of
sending commissioners to the colonies to inquire into

*• Stapleton, " Political Life of Canning," Vol II. p. .18.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the condition of affairs. For the present these com-
missioners would be sent to Mexico alone.17

Mr. Stapleton in his " Life of Canning " simply
says that as Mr. Rush was not authorized to enter
into any formal agreement, Canning thought the de-
lay of communicating with Washington would render
such proceeding of no effect, and so the matter was
dropped.18 This, however, we learn from Mr. Rush's
dispatches, is not the whole truth. Several communi-
cations passed between them after the conversation
above given, which throw a totally different light
upon the affair.

In an unofficial and confidential letter to Mr. Rush,
dated August 20, 1823, Canning asked again if the
moment had not arrived when the two governments
might come to an understanding in regard to the
Spanish-American colonies. He stated the views of
England as follows: (i) That the recovery of the
colonies by Spain was hopeless; (2) That the question
of their recognition as independent states was one of
time and circumstances; (3) That England was not
disposed, however, to throw any obstacle in the way
of an arrangement between the colonies and the
mother-country by amicable negotiation; (4) That
she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colo-
nies for herself; and (5) That she could not see the
transfer of any portion of them to any other power
with indifference. He added " that if the United
States acceded to such views, a declaration to that
effect on their part, concurrently with England, would
be the most effectual and least offensive mode of

17 Rush's " Residence at the Court of London," p. 406.

18 " PoJitical Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 24.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

making known their joint disapprobation of contrary
projects; that it would at the same time put an end
to all jealousies of Spain as to her remaining colonies,
and to the agitation prevailing in the colonies them-
selves by showing that England and the United States
were determined not to profit by encouraging it." 1J>

Prior to the formal recognition of South America,
the United States had repeatedly expressed the wish
to proceed in the matter hand in hand with Great
Britain,20 but that act placed the United States on an
altogether different footing from England. .Canning
seemed to forget in the wording of his proposal that
the United States had already, in the most formal
manner, acknowledged the independence of the Span-
ish colonies. In reply Mr. Rush reminded him of
this fact and of the desire of the United States to
see the colonies recognized by England. In other re-
spects, he believed that the views unfolded by Mr.
Canning in his note were shared by the United States,
but he added that he had no authority to avow these
principles publicly in the manner suggested.

As soon as Rush's first dispatch was received Pres-
ident Monroe realized fully the magnitude of the issue
presented by the proposal of an Anglo-American alli-
ance. Before submitting the matter to his cabinet he
transmitted copies of the dispatch to ex-Presidents
Jefferson and Madison and the following interesting
correspondence took place. In his letter to Jefferson
of October i7th, the President said:

I transmit to you two despatches which were receiv'd
from Mr. Rush, while I was lately in Washington, which

19 Rush's " Residence at the Court of London," p. 412.

20 " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, p. 458. Bagofs
reports of interviews with Adams.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

involve interests of the highest importance. They contain
two letters from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the
holy alliance, against the Independence of S°. America, &
proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U
States, in support of it, against the members of that alliance.
The project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression
of opinion, somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is ex-
pected by Mr. Canning, will have a great political effect,
by defeating the combination. By Mr. Rush's answers,
which are also enclosed, you will see the light in which he
views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone.
Many important considerations are involved in this proposi-
tion. Ist Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European
politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others,
presuming that a concert, by agreement, of the kind pro-
posed, may lead to that result? 2d If a case can exist in
which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is
not the present instance, precisely that case? 3d Has not
the epoch arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand,
either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the
U States, & in consequence, either in favor of Despotism
or of liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware of that
necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present occur-
rence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce
& mark the commenc'ment of that career.

My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal
of the British govt. & to make it known, that we would
view an interference on the part of the European powers,
and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an
attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with
them, they would extend it to us. I am sensible however
of the extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy
to have yours, & Mr. Madison's opinions on it.21

Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th,
displays not only a profound insight into the inter-
national situation, but a wide vision of the possibili-
ties involved. He said:

ai Hamilton, "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VI, pp. 323-325.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The question presented by the letters you have sent me,
is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my
contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a
nation, this sets our compass and points the course which
we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us.
And never could we embark on it under circumstances
more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should
be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe
Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with
cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set
of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly
her own. She should therefore have a system of her own,
separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last
is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our en-
deavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of
freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this
pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in
it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the
bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free gov-
ernment, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which
might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great
Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of
any one, or all on earth ; and with her on our side we need
not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most
sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would
tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once
more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would
purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her
wars. But the war in which the present proposition might
engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war,
but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the
American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign
powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle
•with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own
principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this,
we can effect a division in the body of the European powers,
and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely
we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion,
that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great
Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

our two continents, all Europe combined would not under-
take such a war. For how would they propose to get at
either enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion
to be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our
protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of
nations, by the interference of any one in the internal affairs
of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now
continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself
Holy.22

Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the
wisdom of accepting the British proposal of some
form of joint action, but he went even further and
suggested that the declaration should not be limited
to the American republics, but that it should express
disapproval of the late invasion of Spain and of any
interference with the Greeks, who were then struggling
for independence from Turkey.23 Monroe, it ap-
pears, was strongly inclined to act on Madison's sug-
gestion, but his cabinet took a different view of the
situation. From the diary of John Quincy Adams,
Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the
whole of November was taken up by cabinet discus-
sions on Canning's proposals and on Russia's aggres-
sions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed any
alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The
composition of the President's message remained in
doubt until the 2ist, when the more conservative views
of Adams were, according to his own statement of
the case, adopted. He advocated an independent
course of action on the part of the United States, with-
out direct reference to Canning's proposals, though
substantially in accord with them. Adams defined his

*•* Ford, " Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. X, pp. 277-278.
a* Hamilton, " Writings of James Madison," Vol. IX, pp. 161-162.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

position as follows : " The ground that I wish to
take is that of earnest remonstrance against the in-
terference of the European powers by force with
South America, but to disclaim all interference on our
part with Europe; to make an American cause and
adhere inflexibly to that." 24 Adams's dissent from
Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly to
the influence of Clay, who advocated a Pan American
system, partly to the fact that the proposed coopera-
tion with Great Britain would bind the United States
not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the Span-
ish possessions, and partly to the fear that the United
States as the ally of Great Britain would be com-
pelled to play a secondary part. He probably carried
his point by showing that the same ends could be
accomplished by an independent declaration, since it
was evident that the sea power of Great Britain would
be used to prevent the reconquest of South America
by the European powers. Monroe, as we have seen,
thought that the exigencies of the situation justified
a departure from the sound maxim of political iso-
lation, and in this opinion he was supported by his
two predecessors in the presidency.

The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in
favor of an alliance with Great Britain and a broad
declaration against the intervention of the great
powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part
of the world, have been severely criticised by some
historians and ridiculed by others, but time and cir-
cumstances often bring about a complete change in
our point of view. Since our entrance into the great
world conflict several writers have raised the question

8« W. C. Ford, " Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," in Mass. Hist. Soc.
Proceedings, second series, Vol. XV, p. 392.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

as to whether the three elder statesmen were not right
and Adams and Clay wrong.25 If the United States
and England had come out in favor of a general
declaration against intervention in the concerns of
small states and established it as a world-wide princi-
ple, the course of human history during the next cen-
tury might have been very different, but Adams's
diary does not tell the whole story. On his own
statement of the case he might be justly censured by
posterity for persuading the President to take a nar-
row American view of a question which was world-
wide in its bearing. An important element in the
situation, however, was Canning's change of attitude
between the time of his conference with Rush in
August and the formulation of the President's mes-
sage. Two days after the delivery of his now famous
message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of
the form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's
zeal has much abated of late." It appears from Rush's
correspondence that the only thing which stood in the
way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's
unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the
South American republics. On August 27th, Rush
stated to Canning that it would greatly facilitate joint
action if England would acknowledge at once the
full independence of the South American colonies.
In communicating the account of this interview to his
government Mr. Rush concluded :

Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the
recognition be made by Great Britain without more delay, I
am on my part prepared to make a declaration, in the name
of my government, that it will not remain inactive under

See especially G. L. Beer, " The English-Speaking Peoples," p. 79-

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy
Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that
I will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before
the world.2*

About three weeks later Canning, who was growing
restless at the delay in hearing from Washington, again
urged Rush to act without waiting for specific instruc-
tions from his government. He tried to show that the
proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the
American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for
the question at issue was American as much as Euro-
pean, if not more. Rush then indicated his willing-
ness to act provided England would " immediately
and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of
the new states." Canning did not care to extend full
recognition to the South American states until he
could do so without giving unnecessary offense to
Spain and the allies, and he asked if Mr. Rush could
not give his assent to the proposal on a promise of
future recognition. Mr. Rush refused to accede to
anything but immediate acknowledgment of independ-
ence and so the matter ended.27 As Canning could
not come to a formal understanding with the United
States, he determined to make a frank avowal of the
views of the British cabinet to France and to this
end he had an interview with Prince Polignac, the
French ambassador at London, October 9, 1823, in
which he declared that Great Britain had no desire
to hasten recognition, but that any foreign interfer-
ence, by force, or by menace, would be a motive for
immediate recognition; that England "could not go

Rush's " Residence at the Court of London," p. 419.
Ibid., pp. 429, 443.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish
America upon an equal footing with other powers,
whose opinions were less formed upon that question."
This declaration drew from Polignac the admission
that he considered the reduction of the colonies by
Spain as hopeless and that France "abjured in any
case, any design of acting against the colonies by
force of arms.'* 28 This admission was a distinct vic-
tory for Canning, in that it prepared the way for
ultimate recognition by England, and an account of
the interview was communicated without delay to
the allied courts. The interview was not communi-
cated to Rush until the latter part of November, and
therefore had no influence upon the formation of
Monroe's message of December 2.29

Before the close of the year the British government
appointed consuls to the South American states, and
about the time of their departure, an invitation was
sent to the courts of St. Petersburg, Paris, and Vienna
to a conference to be held at Paris to " aid Spain in
adjusting the affairs of the revolted colonies." A copy
of this invitation was also handed to the British am-
bassador at Madrid, but in such a form as to leave
him in doubt as to whether his government was invited
to the conference or not.30 While the discussion as
to the proposed conference was going on and before
Canning had announced what action his government
would take in the matter, President Monroe's mes-
sage arrived in Europe.

Spanish America was not the only part of the west-
ern continent threatened at this time by European

»8 " Political Life of Canning." Vol. II, p. 26.

a* Rush's " Residence at the Court of London," p. 448.

•°" Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 33.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

aggression. On the 4th of September, 1821, the em-
peror of Russia had issued an ukase, in which he
claimed the northwestern coast of North America
down to the 5ist degree. This claim was incompatible
with the pretensions of both England and the United
States, and was stoutly opposed by them. This was
a part of the territory known as the Oregon country,
which continued in dispute between England and the
United States until 1846. In July, 1823, Adams de-
clared to Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister to the
United States, " that we should contest the right of
Russia to any territorial establishment on this con-
tinent, and that we should assume distinctly the prin-
ciple that the American continents are no longer sub-
jects for any new European colonial establishments."
This language was incorporated substantially in the
President's message.

The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely
separated paragraphs that occur in the message of
December 2, 1823. The first, relating to Russia's
encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring
near the beginning of the message, was an assertion
to the effect that the American continents had as-
sumed an independent condition and were no longer
open to European colonization. This may be re-
garded as a statement of fact. No part of the con-
tinent at that time remained unclaimed. The second
paragraph relating to Spanish America and occurring
near the close of the message, was a declaration
against the extension to the American continents of
the system of intervention adopted by the Holy Alli-
ance for the suppression of popular government in
Europe.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

The language used by President Monroe is as fol-
lows :

1. At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government,
made through the minister of the emperor residing here,
a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the
minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange
by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests
of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent.
A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty
to the government of Great Britain, which has likewise been
acceded to. The government of the United States has been
desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the
great value which they have invariably attached to the
friendship of the emperor and their solicitude to cultivate
the best understanding with his government. In the dis-
cussions to which this interest has given rise and in the
arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion
has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which
the rights and interests of the United States are involved,
that the American continents, by the free and independent
condition which they have assumed and maintain, are hence-
forth not to be considered as subjects for future coloniza-
tion by any European powers.31

2. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating
to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it
comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our
rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent
injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the
movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more
immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious
to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political
system of the allied powers is essentially different in this
respect from that of America. This difference proceeds
from that which exists in their respective governments ; and
to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the
loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the
wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which

•l "Messages and Papers of the Presidents,' Vol. II, p, 209.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is
devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amica-
ble relations existing between the United States and those
powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on
their part to extend their system to any portion of this
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With
the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power
we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with
the governments who have declared their independence and
maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great
consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we
could not view any interposition for the purpose of op-
pressing them, or controlling in any other manner their
destiny, by any European power in any other light than as
the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the
United States. In the war between those new governments
and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their
recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall con-
tinue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in
the judgment of the competent authorities of this govern-
ment, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the
United States indispensable to their security.32

The President's message reached England while the
discussion in regard to the proposed congress at Paris
was still going on. It was received with enthusiasm
by the liberal members of Parliament. Lord Broug-
ham said:

The question with regard to South America is now, I
believe, disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently
happened than which none has ever dispersed greater joy,
exultation, and gratitude over all the free men of Europe:
that event, which is decisive on the subject, is the language
held with respect to Spanish America in the message of the
President of the United States.

•' " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 2iS.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
Sir James Mackintosh said :

This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths
(for so I delight to call them; and I heartily pray that they
may be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty)
cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by
every enlightened citizen of the earth.18

They evidently had reference to the second clause
alone, the one relating to Spanish America. The
other clause, the one against European colonization
in America, seems not to have attracted much atten-
tion. Canning, however, saw the bearing of it and
objected to the principle it set forth, which was
directed against England as much as against the
allies. He was evidently a little taken aback at the
turn his proposal had taken. The President's mes-
sage really settled the question before Canning had
announced what action his government would take.
Some little chagrin is apparent in the tone of his
letter to Sir William a Court, British minister at
Madrid, December 21, 1823.

While I was yet hesitating [he says], what shape to give
to the declaration and protest which ultimately was conveyed
in my conference with P. de Polignac, and while I was more
doubtful as to the effect of that protest and declaration, I
sounded Mr. Rush (the American minister here) as to his
powers and disposition to join in any step which we might
take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part of the Euro-
pean powers against Spanish America. He had no powers;
but he would have taken upon himself to join with us if
we would have begun by recognizing the Spanish-Ameri-
can states. This we could not do, and so we went on with-
out. But I have no doubt that his report to his government
of this sounding, which he probably represented as an over-

*» " Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 276.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

ture, had a great share in producing the explicit declaration
of the President."

The conference with Prince Polignac here referred
to was that of October Qth quoted above. It was not
until after the receipt of President Monroe's message
in Europe that Canning framed his answer to the
Spanish communication informing him of the pro-
posed meeting in Paris for the discussion of the South
American question. In that reply he stated to the
Spanish government very fully his views upon the
question at issue. He said that while England did
not wish to precede Spain in the matter of recognition,
yet she reserved to herself the privilege of recogniz-
ing the colonies when she deemed it best for her in-
terests and right to them. He said that these views
had been communicated fully from time to time to the
powers invited to the congress and he concluded with
the statement: "It does not appear to the British
cabinet at all necessary to declare that opinion anew,
even if it were perfectly clear (from the tenor of M.
Ofalia's instruction) that Great Britain was in fact
included in the invitation to the conference at Paris." 35

While Canning and Monroe acted independently of
each other, the expression that each gave to the views
of his government was rendered more emphatic and
of more effect by the knowledge of the other's atti-
tude in the matter. Another point to be noted is
that Monroe's message was made public, while Can-
ning's answer was for some time known only to the
diplomatic corps.

The determination of both England and the United

84 " WhartQiTs Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 272.
*8 " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 42.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

States to oppose the intervention of the allies in South
America had the desired effect. Conferences in an-
swer to the invitation of Spain were held in Paris,
but they were participated in only by the ordinary
representatives of the powers invited, resident in that
capital, and their only result was to advise Spain
not to listen to the counsels of England.

All further discussion that took place between Eng-
land and Spain in reference to recognition of the col-
onies by Great Britain was confined to the status of
the revolutionary governments, and upon this point
their views were so divergent that Canning finally
announced to the Spanish government that, " His
Majesty would, at his own time, take such steps as
he might think proper in respect to the several states
of Spanish America without further reference to the
court of Madrid; but at the same time without any
feeling of alienation towards that court, or of hos-
tility towards the real interests of Spain." 36

The French troops continuing to occupy Spain after
the time stipulated by treaty, Canning sought an ex-
planation from France, but without satisfactory re-
sults. He therefore determined at a cabinet meeting
held December 14, 1824, to recognize Mexico and
Colombia forthwith. On January i, 1825, after the
ministers had left England with instructions and full
powers, the fact of recognition was communicated
officially to the diplomatic corps and two days later
it was made public. That this recognition was a re-
taliatory measure to compensate England for the
French occupation of Spain was understood at the
time and was distinctly avowed by Canning two years

88 " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 54.

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

later.37 In a speech delivered December 12, 1826,
in defense of his position in not having arrested the
French invasion of Spain, he said:

I looked another way — I sought for compensation in an-
other hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ances-
tors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain,
it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New
World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.

In spite of the great indebtedness of South America
to Canning, this boast falls somewhat flat when we
remember that the Spanish colonies had won their
independence by their own valor and had been rec-
ognized as independent governments by the United
States two years before Great Britain acted in the
matter.

Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private secretary and biog-
rapher, says that the recognition of Spanish-Ameri-
can independence was, perhaps, the most important
measure adopted by the British cabinet while Canning
was at the head of the foreign office. He sums up
the reasons and results of the act as follows:

First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British
interests ; being especially calculated to benefit our commerce.
Next, it enabled this country to remain at peace, since it
compensated us for the continued occupation of Spain by a
French force, a disparagement to which, otherwise, it would
not have become us to submit. Lastly, it maintained the
balance between conflicting principles; since it gave just so
much of a triumph to popular rights and privileges, as was
sufficient to soothe the irritation felt by their advocates at the
victory, which absolute principles had obtained by the over-

*7 " Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. II, p. 242. Letter to Granville.
On the general question of recognition, see " Life of Lord Liverpool,"
Vol. Ill, pp. 297-304.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

throw of the constitutions of Spain, Portugal, and Naples;
and it dealt a death-blow to the Holy Alliance, by disabusing
its members of the strange fancy, with which they were
prepossessed, that the differences between them and the
British ministers (where they did differ) were merely feints
on the part of the latter to avoid a conflict with public
opinion.88

The United States government did not relax its
efforts in behalf of the South American states with
the recognition of England, but continued to exert
itself in order to secure the acknowledgment of their
independence by the other powers of Europe, par-
ticularly Spain.39 Mr. Clay tried to get the other
members of the alliance, especially the emperor of
Russia, to use their good offices with Spain for the
purpose of inducing her to recognize her late colonies,
but the emperor of Russia, the head of the alliance,
continued to preach to Spain " not only no recognition
of their independence, but active war for their sub-
jugation." To the request of the United States he
replied that, out of respect for " the indisputable titles
of sovereignty," he could not prejudge or anticipate
the determination of the king of Spain.40 It was some
ten years before Spain could be persuaded to renounce
her ancient claims.

»8 " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. i.

19 Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, pp. 794-796, and Vol. VI, pp.
1006-1014.

•• Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 850 ff.

CHAPTER III

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD
TO CUBA

THE Cuban question had its origin in the series of
events that have been narrated in the two preceding
chapters — the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the
resulting paralysis of Spanish power in America. The
declaration of President Monroe, enforced by the well-
known attitude of England, dealt the death-blow to
Spanish hopes of recovering the Southern continent.
Hence the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, which had
remained loyal to the king, were clung to with all the
greater tenacity as the sole remains of the imperial pos-
sessions over which the successors of Ferdinand and
Isabella had ruled for three centuries. The " Ever-
faithful Island of Cuba " was rewarded for her loyalty
by the concession of certain liberties of trade and in-
vited to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes — a
privilege which was subsequently withdrawn. Spain
was now too weak to protect her two West Indian de-
pendencies— the remains of her former glory, but her
very weakness secured their possession to her. The
naval and commercial importance of Cuba, " the pearl
of the Antilles," made it a prize too valuable to be ac-
quired by any one of the great maritime powers with-
out exciting the jealousy and opposition of the others.
Henceforth, to borrow the figure of a contemporary
journalist, Cuba was to be the trans- Atlantic Turkey,

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

trembling to its fall, but sustained by the jealousies of
those who were eager to share the spoils.

The strategic importance of Cuba, commanding to
a large extent the commerce of the West Indies and of
the Central American states, and, what was of vital
interest to us, the traffic of the Mississippi valley, at-
tracted at an early period the attention of American
as well as of European statesmen. In a letter to Presi-
dent Madison in 1809, Jefferson, in speaking of Na-
poleon's policy in regard to the Spanish-American
colonies, said :

That he would give up the Floridas to withhold inter-
course with the residue of those colonies cannot be doubted.
But that is no price; because they are ours in the first mo-
ment of the first war ; and until a war they are of no
particular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he
will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent
our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be
a price, and I would immediately erect a column on the
southern-most limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra
as to us in that direction.1

President Madison expressed his views on the
Cuban question in a letter to William Pinkney, October
30, 1810:

The position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an
interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although
they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied
spectator at its falling under any European government,
which might make a fulcrum of that position against the
commerce and security of the United States.2

1 H. A. Washington, " Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 443.
'"Madison's Works," Vol. II. p. 488.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

This was the first statement in the evolution of a
Cuban policy consistently adhered to by the United
States until the successes of the Mexican war super-
induced larger ideas of the mission and destiny of the
Union.

As early as 1817 fears as to the fate of Cuba were
raised in the minds of the American public by news-
paper reports to the effect that England had proposed
a relinquishment of her claim against Spain for the
maintenance of the British army during the Peninsular
campaign, amounting to £15,0x^0,000, in return for the
cession of the island.3 Reports of this nature were
circulated for several months on both sides of the
Atlantic, but the question did not assume any very
great importance until 1819, when the treaty for the
cession of the Floridas to the United States was
being negotiated with Spain. It was then insisted by
the British press that the acquisition of the Floridas
would give the United States such a preponderating
influence in West Indian affairs as to render necessary
the occupation of Cuba by Great Britain as the natural
and only off-set.4 The Florida treaty was ratified
after some delay, which, however, does not appear to
have been caused by the British government, as was
supposed at the time. The British papers, neverthe-
less, continued to condemn in strong terms the treaty
as well as the inaction of their government in not mak-
ing it a pretext for the seizure of Cuba.

As the preparations of France for the invasion of
Spain in 1823 progressed the fate of Cuba became a

8 Niles's " Register," under date November 8, 1817.

' For a full discussion of the question see the pamphlet by J. Freeman
Rattenbury, entitled, " The Cession of the Floridas to the United States
of America and the Necessity of Acquiring the Island of Cuba by Great
Britain." London, 1819.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

question of absorbing interest in America. There was
little hope that the island would continue a dependency
of Spain. It was rumored that Great Britain had
engaged to supply the constitutional government of
Spain with money in her struggle with France and
would occupy Cuba as a pledge for its repayment.
Both Spanish and French journals spoke of British
occupation of Cuba as a matter no longer to be
doubted, and the presence in the West Indies of a
large British squadron, sent nominally for the purpose
of suppressing piracy, seemed to lend color to the
reports.5 The British press was clamoring for the
acquisition of Cuba. The Packet declared : " The
question then comes to this, shall England occupy
Cuba, or by permitting its acquisition by the United
States (which they have long desired) sacrifice her
whole West India trade ? There can be no hesitation
as to the answer."

The British government, however, officially dis-
claimed all designs upon Cuba, but this disclaimer did
not fully reassure the American government, and our
representatives abroad were instructed to exercise a
close scrutiny upon all negotiations between Spain and
England. In the spring of 1823 Mr. Forsyth was suc-
ceeded by Mr. Nelson at the court of Madrid. In his
instructions to the new minister, which went much be-
yond the usual length and were occupied almost ex-
clusively with a discussion of the Cuban question, John
Quincy Adams used the following remarkable words :

" In looking forward to the probable course of
events for the short period of half a century, it seems
scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the an-

6 Niles's " Register," March and April, 1823.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

nexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be in-
dispensable to the continuance and integrity of the
Union itself." We were not then prepared for an-
nexation, he continued, " but there are laws of political
as well as physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed
by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but
fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its
own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable
of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North
American Union, which, by the same law of nature,
cannot cast her off from its bosom." 6

President Monroe consulted Jefferson on the subject
of Spanish-American affairs and the entanglements
with European powers likely to arise therefrom. Jef-
ferson replied, June n, 1823:

Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to
us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great
calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guarantee-
ing its independence against all the world, except Spain, ii
would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But
should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for
it ; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us,
or the island will give itself to us when able to do so.T

During the summer of 1825 a large French squad-
ron visited the West Indies and hovered for several
weeks about the coasts of Cuba. This action on the
part of the French government, without explanation,
excited the alarm of both England and the United
States and drew forth strong protests from Mr. Can-
ning and from Mr. Clay. Canning wrote to Gran-

•"H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also Brit.
and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, pp. 114-236.

1 H. A. Washington, " Writings of Jefferson," Vol. VII, p. 288.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

ville, the British minister at Paris, that he could not
consent to the occupation of Havana by France, even
as a measure of protection against possible attacks
from Mexico and Colombia.8 Again some two months
later he wrote :

As to Cuba you cannot too soon nor too amicably, of
course, represent to Villele the impossibility of our allowing
France (or France us, I presume) to meddle in the internal
affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with
the mother-country. Next to that I wish it independent,
either singly or in connection with Mexico. But what
cannot or must not be, is that any great maritime power
should get possession of it. The Americans (Yankees, I
mean) think of this matter just as I do.9

The expressions of the United States, as to the de-
signs of France, were as emphatic as those of England.
Mr. Clay declared " that we could not consent to the
occupation of those islands by any other European
power than Spain under any contingency whatever." 10

In this connection Canning wished to bring about
the signature, by England, France, and the United
States, of " ministerial notes, one between France and
the United States, and one between France and Great
Britain, or one tripartite note signed by all, disclaim-
ing each for themselves, any intention to occupy Cuba,
and protesting against such occupation by either of
the others." n The government of the United States
held this proposal under advisement, but on France
declining, it was dropped.12 In 1826 when an attack

• " Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. I, p. 265.
8 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 275.

19 Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 855. Also " Wharton's Digest,"
Sec. 60.

11 Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning." Vol. Ill, p. 154.

18 Mr. Clay to Mr. King, October 25, " Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

upon Portugal was feared Canning advised, in case of
such an attack, the immediate seizure of Cuba by Great
Britain as more effective than half a dozen Peninsular
campaigns.18

The Cuban question was involved in the long debate
on the proposal of the executive of the United States
to send delegates to the congress of Spanish-American
republics assembled at Panama in 1826. This debate
occupied the attention of Congress during the winter
and spring of 1826, and was engaged in with great
earnestness. One of the chief objections to the pro-
posed mission was the fact that the question of Cuba
and Porto Rico would come up and that the United
States government had already committed itself to the
foreign powers on that subject. The report of the
Senate committee on foreign relations declared that,

The very situation of Cuba and Porto Rico furnishes the
strongest inducement to the United States not to take a
place at the contemplated congress, since, by so doing, they
must be considered as changing the attitude in which they
hitherto have stood as impartial spectators of the passing
scenes, and identifying themselves with the new republics."

The Southern members were united in their opposi-
tion to the Panama mission, and in fact to any closer
alliance with the new republics, for the reason that
the latter had adopted the principle of emancipation
and any further extension of their influence would
jeopardize the institution of slavery in the United
States. For the same reason they were opposed to
the transfer of Cuba to any other European power. If
a change from its connection with Spain were neces-

'* Canning to Earl of Liverpool, October 6, 1826.
14 Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 863.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

sary they favored annexation by the United States,
and meantime they were strongly opposed to the gov-
ernment entering into any engagement with foreign
powers or in any way committing itself on the Cuban
question."

The declaration of Mr. Clay against the interference
of England and France in the affairs of Cuba was
consistently adhered to under the administrations of
Jackson and Van Buren.

In 1838-39, the British government dispatched spe-
• cial commissioners to Cuba and Porto Rico to report
on the condition of the slave trade. The presence of
these agents in Cuba gave rise to reports that Great
Britain contemplated revolutionizing the island, or at
least occupying it for the purpose of suppressing the
slave trade. The United States gave Spain to under-
stand that we would not consent to British control in
whatever way it might be brought about. Mr. For-
syth wrote to Mr. Vail, our representative at Madrid,
July 15, 1840:

You are authorized to assure the Spanish government, that
in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from
her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend
upon the military and naval resources of the United States
to aid her in preserving or recovering it.16

Again, Mr. Webster in January, 1843, wrote to Mr.
Campbell, United States consul at Havana:

The Spanish government has long been in possession of
the policy and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba,

18 Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VIII, pp. 427, 428, and Vol. IX,
pp. 90 218.

18 H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also " Wharton's
Digest," Sec. 60.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

which have never changed, and has repeatedly been told
that the United States never would permit the occupation
of that island by British agents or forces upon any pretext
whatever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest
it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval
and military resources of this country to aid her in preserving
or recovering it.17

A copy of this letter was also sent to Washington
Irving, our representative at Madrid to make such
use of as circumstances might require.18

During the first period of our Cuban diplomacy the
efforts of this government were directed toward pre-
venting the acquisition of the island, or the establish-
ment of a protectorate over it, by Great Britain or
France. With the Mexican war, however, and the
growing conviction of " manifest destiny," our foreign
policy assumed a much bolder and more aggressive
character, and during the next fifteen years all manner
of schemes for the southward extension of our terri-
tory were suggested and many of them actually under-
taken. Cuba became an object of desire, not only in the
eyes of the slave-holding population of the South as an
acquisition to slave territory, but of a large part of
the nation, because of its strategic importance in rela-
tion to the inter-oceanic transit routes of Central
America, which seemed the only feasible line of com-
munication with our rapidly developing interests in
California. Consequently various attempts were
made to annex the island to the United States, both by
purchase from Spain and forcibly by filibustering ex-
peditions.

17 " Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60.

18 Mr. Upshur, who succeeded Mr. Webster as secretary of state, wrote
to Mr. Irving to the same effect, October 10, 1843.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

In June, 1848, under the administration of Presi-
dent Polk, Mr. Buchanan, secretary of state, wrote
to our minister at Madrid, directing him to open nego-
tiations with the Spanish government for the purchase
of Cuba. After referring to the dangers of British
occupation and to the advantages of annexation, he
said : " Desirable, however, as this island may be to the
United States, we would not acquire it except by the
free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by
justice and honor would be too dearly purchased."
He stated that the President would stipulate for the
payment of $100,000,000, as a maximum price.19 This
offer was rejected by the Spanish government. The
minister of state after several months' delay finally re-
plied " that it was more than any minister dare to
entertain any such proposition; that he believed such
to be the feeling of the country, that sooner than see
the island transferred to any power, they would prefer
seeing it sunk in the ocean."

Under the Whig administration of Taylor and Fill-
more no effort was made for the purchase of Cuba.
On August 2, 1849, Mr. Clayton wrote to Mr. Bar-
ringer that the government did not desire to renew the
negotiation for the purchase of Cuba made by the
late administration, since the proposition had been con-
sidered by the Spanish government as a national in-
dignity; that should Spain desire to part with Cuba,
the proposal must come from her.

About this time active preparations were going on
for the invasion of Cuba by an armed expedition
under the Cuban patriot Narciso Lopez. On August

»• Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders, June 17, 1848, H. Ex. Doc. No. 121,
Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. XXVI.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

ii, 1849, President Taylor issued a proclamation
warning all citizens of the United States against tak-
ing part in such expedition and saying, " No such per-
sons must expect the interference of this government
in any form on their behalf, no matter to what ex-
tremities they may be reduced in consequence of their
conduct." 20 A few days later the entire force of
Lopez was arrested by the United States marshal just
as it was on the point of leaving New York.

Nothing daunted, Lopez traveled through the south-
ern and southwestern states secretly enlisting men and
making arrangements for their transportation to Cuba.
Many men of prominence at the South were in open
and avowed sympathy with the enterprise. In the
spring of 1850, Lopez called upon Gen. John A. Quit-
man, governor of Mississippi, who had served with
great distinction in the Mexican war, and offered him,
in the name of his compatriots, the leadership of the
revolution and the supreme command of the army.
Quitman's sympathies were thoroughly enlisted in the
movement, but he declined the honor on account of
the serious aspect of political affairs, particularly what
he considered the encroachments of the federal gov-
ernment upon the rights of the states. He made
liberal contributions of money, however, and gave
Lopez sound advice about his undertaking, insisting
that he must have an advance column of at least 2,000
men to maintain a footing on the island until reinforce-
ments could go to their aid.21

30 "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. V, p. 7.

21 J. F. H. Claiborne, " Life and Corresp. of John A. Quitrnan," Vol. II,
PP 55-56. and Appendix, p. 385.

In June the Grand Jury of the United States Circuit Court at New
Orleans found a bill against John A. Quitman. John Henderson, Governor
of Louisiana, and others, for setting on foot the invasion of Cuba. Quitman's

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Unfortunately for Lopez he did not follow the ad-
vice of Quitman. A company of volunteers altogether
inadequate for the successful accomplishment of the
enterprise was collected at New Orleans. There Lopez
chartered a steamer, the Creole, and two barks, the
Georgiana and the Susan Loud. Three-fourths of the
volunteers had served in the Mexican war. The first
detachment comprising 250 men left New Orleans in
the bark Georgiana, April 25, 1850, under the com-
mand of Col. Theodore O'Hara. They proceeded to
the island of Contoy off the coast of Yucatan in the
territory of Mexico. There they were joined three
weeks later by Lopez and 450 followers in the Creole.
The entire command, with the exception of the crews
of the two barks and a few others to guard the stores,
embarked in the Creole and effected a landing at Car-
denas, but the natives did not come to the aid of Lopez
and after holding the town for twelve hours he reluc-
tantly reembarked and headed for Key West. The
Creole was pursued by the Pizarro, a Spanish war
vessel, which steamed into the harbor just as she cast
anchor. For a few moments the Spaniards seemed to
be on the point of preparing to open fire on the Creole,
but when they saw the United States custom-house of-

view of state sovereignty did not admit the right of the United
States Courts to proceed against the chief executive of a sovereign state.
He sought the advice of friends throughout the South as to what course
he should pursue. None of them admitted the right of the United States
Courts to indict him and several of them advised him that it was his duty
to assert the principle .of state sovereignty even to the point of calling
out the state militia to protect him against arrest. Others advised him to
submit under protest so as to avoid an open breach. This course was
finally adopted, and when the United States marshal appeared on the
3rd of February, 1851, to take him into custody, he yielded, causing at
the same time an address to be issued to the people of Mississippi, in
which he resigned the office of governor. After proceedings which lasted
two months. Henderson was acquitted and the charges against Quitman
and the others dismissed.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

ficers take possession of her they changed their minds
and left the harbor.

The two barks, which had been left with a small
guard at the island of Contoy, were captured by Span-
ish warships, taken to Havana, condemned as prizes
and the men put on trial for participation in the Lopez
expedition. As these men had committed no act of
hostility against Spain, and had, moreover, been seized
on neutral territory, the United States government at
once issued its protest and demanded their release.
The Spanish government replied that these men had
been described as pirates by the President of the
United States in his proclamation warning citizens
against joining the expedition and were, therefore,
beyond the pale of the protection of the United States.
After heated negotiations which lasted several months
and seriously threatened the peace of the two coun-
tries, the prisoners were released, but it was declared
to be an act of grace on the part of the Queen and not
a concession to the demands of the United States.22

Lopez was prosecuted by the United States govern-
ment for violation of the neutrality laws, but escaped
conviction and at once set about organizing another
expedition. On August 3, 1851, the third and last ex-
pedition of Lopez, consisting of over 400 men, left
New Orleans. After touching at Key West the
steamer proceeded to the coast of Cuba and landed the
expedition at Bahia Honda. The main body under
Lopez proceeded into the country where they had been
led to expect a general uprising of the Cubans. Col.
W. S. Crittenden, who had served with bravery in
the Mexican war, was left in command of a smaller

" Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 41, Thirty-first Cong., Second Sess.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

body to bring up the baggage. This detachment was
attacked on the I3th and forced to retreat to the place
where they had landed, where about fifty of them ob-
tained boats and tried to escape. They were, however,
intercepted off the coast, taken to Havana, sentenced
before a military court, and executed on the i6th.

The main body under Lopez was overcome and dis-
persed by Spanish troops on the 24th. Lopez was
taken prisoner, tried, and executed. Many of his fol-
lowers were killed or died of hunger and fatigue and
the rest made prisoners. Upon receipt of this news
Commodore Parker was at once ordered to proceed in
a frigate to Havana to inquire into the charges against
the prisoners executed, and the circumstances of their
capture, trial, and sentence. To these inquiries the cap-
tain-general replied that he considered those executed
as pirates, that they had been so denounced by the
President of the United States in his proclamation,
that he was not at liberty to furnish a copy of the
court records, but would send them to Madrid and to
the Spanish minister at Washington.23

When the news of the executions at Havana reached
New Orleans the excitement was intense. The office
of the Spanish consul was broken into, portraits of
the Queen and Captain-General of Cuba defaced, the
Spanish flag torn in pieces, and the consul burned in
effigy in LaFayette Square. The consul had to flee
from the city for safety and the property of certain
Spaniards residing in New Orleans was destroyed. A
long correspondence ensued between the two govern-
ments. The United States agreed to pay an indemnity

28 H. Ex. Doc. No. i, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also 26 Annual
Message of Fillmore, December 2, 1851. " Messages and Papers of the
Presidents" Vol. V, p. 113.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

for injuries to the public property of Spain, but not
for the destruction of property belonging to Spanish
residents, who were entitled only to the same protec-
tion afforded our own citizens.24

A few weeks after the last Lopez expedition the
British and French representatives at Washington
notified our government that orders had been issued
to their squadrons in the West Indies to repel by force
any attempts at the invasion of Cuba from any quarter.
Our government replied that such action on the part
of England and France could " not but be regarded by
the United States with grave disapproval, as involving
on the part of European sovereigns combined action
of protectorship over American waters." 25

In order to allay the uneasiness caused by the at-
tempts of filibusters, supposed to be encouraged or at
least connived at by the government of the United
States, the Spanish government requested Great Brit-
ain and France, in January, 1852, to secure the sig-
nature by the American government in conjunction
with them of an abnegatory declaration with respect
to Cuba.26 Accordingly in April, 1852, the British and
French ministers at Washington brought the subject
to the attention of this government in notes of the
same date, suggesting a tripartite convention for the
guarantee of Cuba to Spain.27

To this proposal Mr. Webster replied in part as
follows :

34 H. Ex. Doc. No. i, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.

36 Mr. Crittenden to Comte de Sartiges, October 22, 1851. See also
Pres. Fillmore to Mr. Webster and Mr. Webster's reply. 2 Curtis's " Life
of Webster," p. 551.

86 Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, Lord Howden to Earl Gran-
ville, January 9, 1852.

27 Comte de Sartiges to Mr. Webster, April 23, 1852. Sen. Ex. Doc.
No. 13, Thirty-second Cong., Second Sess.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

It has been stated and often repeated to the government
of Spain by this government, under various administrations,
not only that the United States have no design upon Cuba
themselves, but that, if Spain should refrain from a volun-
tary cession of the island to any other European power, she
might rely on the countenance and friendship of the United
States to assist her in the defense and preservation of that
island. At the same time it has always been declared to
Spain that the government of the United States could not
be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to an Euro-
pean power.

He reminded them, furthermore, that " the policy of
the United States has uniformly been to avoid, as far
as possible, alliances or agreements with other states,
and to keep itself free from national obligations, except
such as affect directly the interests of the United States
themselves.'' 28

The matter was again urged upon the United States
by the British and French governments in notes to
Mr. Webster, dated July 9, 1852, in which the inde-
feasibility of the Spanish title to the island and its
bearings upon the neutrality of the proposed Central
American canals were dwelt upon. The death of Mr.
Webster postponed for some time the answer of the
United States, but the proposal was finally rejected
in a notable dispatch prepared by Webster's successor,
Edward Everett.

With the growth of the slavery conflict, which had
now become paramount to all other questions, the an-
nexation of Cuba had become a party issue, and the
return of the Democratic party to power, in 1853, was
hailed by the southern extremists as a signal for the

2« Mr. Webster to Comte de Sartiges, April 29, 1852. To Mr. Cramp-
ton, same date, to same effect.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

acquisition of the long coveted prize. This expecta-
tion was further heightened by the declaration of
President Pierce, in his inaugural address, that the
policy of his administration would " not be controlled
by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion," and
that the acquisition of certain possessions not within
our jurisdiction was " eminently important for our
protection, if not in the future essential for the preser-
vation of the rights of commerce and the peace of
the world."

William L. Marcy, of New York, was appointed
secretary of state and for the mission to Spain the
President selected Pierre Soule of Louisiana, a
Frenchman by birth and education, who had been
exiled for political reasons. His appointment under
the circumstances created unfavorable comment both
in this country and in Europe, and his sojourn of
several days at Paris on the way to his post at Madrid
caused the French government some annoyance. Louis
Napoleon advised the court of Madrid not to receive
him, as his views on the Cuban question were well
known to be of a radical character.

In his instructions to Mr. Soule, July 23, 1853, Mr.
Marcy emphasized the importance of our relations
with Spain in view of the rumors of contemplated
changes in the internal affairs of Cuba and of the re-
cent interposition of England and France. He di-
rected him to try to negotiate a commercial treaty
with Spain favorable to our trade with Cuba, and
pointed out the urgent necessity of allowing a " quali-
fied diplomatic intercourse between the captain-general
of that island and our consul at Havana, in order to
prevent difficulties and preserve a good understanding

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

between the two countries." 29 The difficulty of set-
tling disputes arising in Cuba had been the subject of
frequent remonstrances on the part of the United
States. The captain-general was clothed with almost
" unlimited powers for aggression, but with none for
reparation." He exercised no diplomatic functions
and was in no way subject to the authority of the
Spanish minister at Washington.

Upon the arrival of Mr. Soule in Spain, he found
that Mr. Calderon, the head of the cabinet, was
strongly opposed to any commercial treaty or agree-
ment which would promote intercourse between the
United States and the dependencies of Spain, and
equally averse to allowing the captain-general any dip-
lomatic powers.80 Mr. Soule was by nature hot-
headed and impetuous and could suffer anything
sooner than enforced inactivity. Whatever may have
been the intentions of the executive in sending him,
he had come to Madrid for the purpose of consum-
mating the long cherished scheme of acquiring Cuba.
Accordingly, on February 23, 1854, he wrote to Mr.
Marcy that the affairs of the Spanish government were
about to reach a crisis, that a change of ministry was
imminent, and that contingencies involving the fate of
Cuba were likely to arise which might be of great in-
terest to the United States. He, therefore, asked for
definite instructions. Relying upon these representa-
tions and upon Mr. Soule's judgment, Mr. Marcy
transmited in due time the necessary powers, author-
izing him to negotiate with Spain for the purchase of
Cuba, or for its independence, if such an arrange-

39 H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-third Cong., Second Sess., p. 3.
80 Mr. Soule to Mr. Marcy, November 10, and December 23, 1853, and
January 20, 1854.

100

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

ment would be more agreeable to Spanish pride, in
which event the United States would be willing to
contribute substantial aid to the result.

In the meantime, however, the Black Warrior affair
had strained the relations of the two countries almost
to the point of rupture. This case, involving the
seizure of an American steamer by Spanish officials
at Havana for an unintentional violation or neglect
of custom-house regulations, was of an unusually ex-
asperating character.

As soon as the department at Washington was fully
informed of this outrage, Mr. Marcy forwarded all
the documents in the case to Mr. Soule and directed
him to demand of the Spanish government a prompt
disavowal of the act and the payment of an indemnity
to the owners of the vessel and of the cargo, the
extent of the injury being estimated at $300,000. On
April 8 Mr. Soule presented a formal demand on the
part of his government. No answer to this note hav-
ing been received, on the nth he repeated his demands
much more emphatically, calling for an indemnity of
$300,000, insisting that all persons, whatever their
rank or importance, who were concerned in the perpe-
tration of the wrong, be dismissed from her majesty's
service, and finally declaring that non-compliance with
these demands within forty-eight hours would be con-
sidered by the government of the United States as
equivalent to a declaration that her majesty's govern-
ment was determined to uphold the conduct of its
officers.

Mr. Calderon replied, on the I2th, that whenever
her majesty's government should have before it the
authentic and complete data, which it then lacked, a

101

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

reply would be given to the demand of the United
States conformable to justice and right; that the per-
emptory tone of Mr. Soule's note suggested to the
government of her majesty " a suspicion that it was
not so much the manifestation of a lively interest in
the defense of pretended injuries, as an incomprehen-
sible pretext for exciting estrangement, if not a quarrel
between two friendly powers." To this note Mr.
Soule replied that the suggestion made as to the mo-
tives of the United States in seeking redress was " but
little creditable to the candor of her Catholic majesty's
government, and comes in very bad grace from one
who, like your excellency, cannot but be aware that the
records of this legation, as well as those of her Catho-
lic majesty's department of state, are loaded with
reclamations bearing on grievances most flagrant,
which have never been earnestly attended to and were
met at their inception with precisely the same dilatory
excuses through which the present one is sought to
be evaded."

Meanwhile the aspects of the case were altogether
changed by a private agreement between the Havana of-
ficials and the owners of the Black Warrior, by which
the ship and her cargo were released. Mr. Soule con-
tinued, however, according to instructions from Wash-
ington, to demand compensation for the damages sus-
tained by the owners and passengers not compensated
for by the return of the ship and cargo, and also repa-
ration for the insult to the United States flag. The
Spanish government, however, refused to recognize
any ground for reparation after the restitution of the
ship and cargo, and persisted in contradicting, without
the support of any evidence whatever, the facts as

1 02

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

presented by the United States, although they were all
certified to in proper legal form.

On June 24 Mr. Marcy wrote that the President
was far from satisfied with the manner in which our
demands were treated by the Spanish government, but
that before resorting to extreme measures he was de-
termined to make a final appeal to Spain for the ad-
justment of past difficulties and for the guarantee of
more friendly relations in the future. Although satis-
fied with the spirited manner in which Mr. Soule had
performed the duties of his mission, the President was
considering the expediency of reinforcing the demands
of the United States by the appointment of an ex-
traordinary commission of two distinguished citizens
to act in conjunction with him. He instructed him,
therefore, not to press the affair of the Black Warrior,
but to wait until the question of the special commis-
sion could be laid before Congress.

During the summer there was a change of ministry
in the Spanish government, which, as was not infre-
quently the case, was attended with more or less seri-
ous disorders. In August Mr. Marcy wrote that in
view of the unsettled condition of affairs in Spain and
for other reasons not stated, the purpose of sending
a special mission had, for the present at least, been
abandoned. Without pressing matters Mr. Soule was,
nevertheless, to avail himself of any opportunity
which might be presented, of settling the affairs in
dispute and of negotiating for the purchase of Cuba.

Under the same date he proposed to Mr. Soule the
plan of consulting with Mr. Mason and Mr. Buchanan,
our ministers at Paris and London, for the purpose of
overcoming any obstacles that England and France

103

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

might interpose. This suggestion led to the celebrated
meeting at Ostend and the so-called manifesto.

In accordance with the instructions of the President,
Messrs. Soule, Mason, and Buchanan proceeded to
make arrangements for the proposed conference,
which was held at Ostend, in Belgium, October 9, 10,
ii, 1854. They then adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle for
a week, where the reports of their proceedings were
prepared.

The greater part of the report is taken up with an
enumeration of the advantages that would accrue to
the United States from the acquisition of Cuba, and
an elaborate exposition of the ways in which the inter-
ests of Spain would be promoted by the sale. The only
specific recommendation of the report was that a pro-
posal should be made through the proper diplomatic
channel to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to
assemble, to purchase Cuba from Spain, the maximum
price to be $120,000,000. The report then proceeds
to discuss the question, what ought to be the course of
the American government should Spain refuse to sell
Cuba ? The ministers declared :

After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far
beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it
will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in the
possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace
and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then,
by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in
wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this
upon the very same principle that would justify an individual
in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there
were no other means of preventing the flames from destroy-
ing his own home.

104

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

The report also recommended that all proceedings
in reference to the negotiations with Spain " ought to
be open, frank, and public/' This recommendation,
together with the general character of the report, in-
dicates that its authors were rather bent on making
political capital of the affair at home than on seriously
furthering negotiations at Madrid. As a matter of
fact the Ostend Manifesto made Buchanan an accept-
able presidential candidate to the southern wing of the
Democratic party and played no small part in securing
for him the nomination in i856.31

The objectionable features of the report were
politely but firmly repudiated by the administration in
Marcy's reply to Soule and Soule promptly resigned
his mission. This fact was generally overlooked at
the time, while the unfortunate publicity given to the
proceedings at Ostend brought endless censure upon
President Pierce and Secretary Marcy.

In spite of the " jingo " policy attributed to the
Pierce administration, the complications arising out of
the seizure of the Black Warrior were not made a
casus belli, as might easily have been done. After
Mr. Soule's return to the United States the negotia-
tions were continued by his successor. The conduct
of the officials concerned in the seizure was disavowed,
and the indemnity claimed by the American citizens
concerned was paid. The administration closed on
terms of comparative friendship with Spain, although
there were numbers of claims still unadjusted. The
Cuban question figured conspicuously in the campaign
of 1856. The platform of the Democratic party was

S1 The correspondence relating to the Black Warrior case and to the
Ostend conference is contained in H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-third Ccng.,
Second Sess.

105

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

strongly in favor of acquisition, while the new Repub-
lican platform stigmatized the Ostend manifesto as the
highwayman's plea.

Until the Buchanan administration all negotiations
for the purchase of Cuba had been undertaken on the
authority of the executive alone. An effort was now
made to get the two houses of Congress to concur in
an appropriation for this purpose. It was thought that
united action on the part of the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the government would produce some
impression on Spain. Accordingly, in his second,
third and fourth annual messages, President Buchanan
brought the matter to the attention of Congress, but
his appeal met with little encouragement. In January,
1859, Senator Slidell, the chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, reported a bill carrying
$30,000,000, to be placed at the disposal of the Presi-
dent as a preliminary sum for the purchase of Cuba.82

This report created violent opposition, and in Feb-
ruary the bill was withdrawn by Mr. Slidell at the
urgent request of his friends.

The annexationist and filibustering schemes of the
decade immediately preceding the War of Secession
were prompted by two motives. The one was the
extension of slave territory, or at least the thwarting
of the schemes of emancipation for Cuba which Great
Britain was urging upon the Spanish government.
The other was to secure, by the occupation of this
strong strategic position, undisputed control over the
proposed interoceanic canal routes of Central America
and communication by this means with the new states
on the Pacific coast. These motives for annexation

11 Sen. Report No. 351, Thirty-fifth Cong., Second Sess., Vol. I.

106

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

were removed, the one by the abolition of slavery in
the United States, and the other by the construction
of the great transcontinental railroads which estab-
lished direct overland communication with the Pacific
states. During the period following the civil war,
therefore, our policy was mainly concerned in urging
upon the Spanish government the abolition of slavery
in Cuba, the establishment of a more liberal form of
government through independence or autonomy, and
the promotion of more untrammelled commercial in-
tercourse with the United States.

The abolition of slavery in the southern states left
the Spanish Antilles in the enjoyment of a monopoly
of slave labor, which in the production of sugar, espe-
cially, gave them advantages which overcame all com-
petition. This led to the formation of a strong Span-
ish party, for whom the cause of slavery and that of
Spanish dominion were identical. These were known
as Peninsulars on Spanish immigrants. They were the
official class, the wealthy planters and slave-owners
and the real rulers of Cuba. On the other hand there
was a party composed of Creoles, or native Cubans,
whose cry was " Cuba for the Cubans ! " and who
hoped to effect the complete separation of the island
from Spain, either through their own efforts or
through the assistance of the United States. Not in-
frequently in the same family, the father, born and
brought up in the Peninsula, was an ardent loyalist,
while the son, born in Cuba, was an insurgent at heart,
if not actually enlisted in the ranks.

The Spanish revolution of September, 1868, was the
signal for an uprising of the native or Creole party in
the eastern part of the island. This movement was

107

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

not at first ostensibly for independence, but for the
revolution in Spain, the cries being " Hurrah for
Prim!" "Hurrah for the Revolution!" Its real
character was, however, apparent from the first and
its supporters continued for a period of ten years,
without regard to the numerous vicissitudes through
which the Spanish government passed — the provis-
ional government, the regency, the elective monarcky,
the republic, and the restored Bourbon dynasty — to
wage a dogged, though desultory warfare against the
constituted authorities of the island. This struggle
was almost coterminous with President Grant's ad-
ministration of eight years.

At an early stage of the contest the Spanish authori-
ties conceived it to be necessary to issue certain decrees
which were contrary to public law and, in so far as
they affected citizens of the United States, in violation
of treaty obligations. On March 24, 1869, the cap-
tain-general issued a decree authorizing the capture on
the high seas of vessels carrying men, arms, munitions,
or effects in aid of the insurgents, and declaring that
" all persons captured in such vessels without regard
to their number will be immediately executed." 33 By
another decree the estates of American citizens sus-
pected of sympathy with the insurgents were confis-
cated.84 Secretary Hamilton Fish protested against
these decrees so far as they affected citizens of the
United States, as they were in violation of the pro-
visions of the treaty of 1795.

On July 7, 1869, the captain-general issued another
decree closing certain ports, declaring voyages with

•• Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 7, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess.
** Ibid.

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THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

arms, ammunition, or crew for the insurgents illegal,
and directing cruisers on the high seas to bring into
port all vessels found to be enemies. On July 16 Mr.
Fish called the attention of the Spanish minister to this
decree, saying that it assumed powers over the com-
merce of the United States that could be permitted
only in time of war; that the United States would not
yield the right to carry contraband of war in time of
peace, and would not permit their vessels to be inter-
fered with on the high seas except in time of war; that
if Spain was at war she should give notice to the
United States to that effect, and that a continuance of
the decree or any attempt to enforce it would be re-
garded as a recognition by Spain of a state of war in
Cuba. This declaration produced a prompt modifi-
cation of the decree so far as it concerned the search
of vessels on the high seas.

As our commercial interests at large, as well as the
interests of individual citizens, were deeply affected
by the condition of the island, President Grant deter-
mined at the beginning of his administration to offer
to mediate between Spain and the insurgents. Gen-
eral Daniel E. Sickles was appointed minister to Spain
and his instructions, under date of June 29, 1869, di-
rected him to offer to the cabinet at Madrid the good
offices of the United States for the purpose of bring-
ing to a close the civil war then ravaging the island
and establishing the independence of Cuba. Mr. Fish
instructed General Sickles to explain to the Spanish
government that he used the term civil war advisedly,
not as implying any public recognition of belligerent
rights, but a condition of affairs that might not justify
withholding much longer those rights from the insur-

109

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

gents.35 In reply Spain agreed to accept the good of-
fices of the United States, but on conditions that were
impracticable and unsatisfactory. At the same time
the Spanish government allowed the purport of Gen-
eral Sickles's note tendering the good offices of the
United States to get out, and it was accepted by the
press as indicating the purpose of the United States
to recognize the Cubans as belligerents if its offer of
mediation were refused. No Spanish cabinet could
possibly endure the odium of having made a concession
to the Cubans under a threat from an outside power.
The Spanish government therefore requested the with-
drawal of the American note.

After the rejection of the offer of mediation Presi-
dent Grant decided to recognize the Cuban insurgents
and in August, 1869, while on his way from New
York to New England on the Fall River boat he signed
a proclamation of Cuban belligerency which he for-
warded to Washington with a note to Secretary Fish,
requesting him to sign, seal, and issue it. Mr. Fish dis-
approved of this step, and while he affixed the seal
and signed the document, he did not issue it, but kept
it in a safe place to await further developments.
Grant's attention was diverted by Wall Street specu-
lations in gold and the crisis that followed on " Black
Friday/' He failed to notice at the time that the
secretary of state did not carry out his instructions,
and later he thanked Mr. Fish for having saved him
from a serious mistake.36

For some time the United States had been urging
upon Spain the importance of abolishing slavery in

88 House Ex. Doc. No. 160, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess.
••C. F. Adams, "The Treaty of Washington," in "Lee at Appomattox
and Other Papers," p. 119.

IIO

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

Cuba as a necessary condition to the complete pacifica-
tion of the island. During the fall of 1869 Spain gave
repeated assurances to the United States of her readi-
ness to effect emancipation in Cuba as soon as hos-
tilities should cease, but the Spanish government could
never be brought to enter into any definite engagement
on the subject. In fact as regarded the slavery ques-
tion the cabinet of Madrid found itself unable to
choose between the horns of the dilemma. The United
States and Great Britain were urging the immediate
abolition of slavery, while the most influential up-
holders of Spanish rule in Porto Rico as well as in
Cuba were the slaveholders themselves. The insur-
gents on the other hand had abolished slavery by a
decree of the assembly of February 26, 1869, promis-
ing indemnity to the owners in due time and providing
for the enrolment of liberated slaves in the army.37
On January 26, 1870, Mr. Fish wrote to General
Sickles :

It becomes more apparent every day that this contest can-
not terminate without the abolition of slavery. This govern-
ment regards the government at Madrid as committed to that
result. . . . You will, therefore, if it shall appear that the
insurrection is regarded as suppressed, frankly state that
this government, relying upon the assurances so often given,
will expect steps to be taken for the emancipation of the
slaves in the Spanish colonies.

The British representative at Madrid, Mr. Layard,
was instructed to second the suggestions of the United
States minister in regard to the abolition of slavery
in the Spanish colonies.

*T Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 113, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess.

Ill

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

From the outbreak of the insurrection the Cuban
patriots had the sympathy of the great mass of the
American people, and that of the administration, al-
though the latter was kept within the bounds of public
law and treaty obligation, so as to avoid giving of-
fense to Spain. The government did all that treaty
obligations demanded of it to prevent the violation of
the neutrality laws. Numbers of filibustering expedi-
tions did, however, escape from American ports, and
those that were arrested at the instance of the Spanish
government through its representatives in this country
usually escaped conviction in our courts for want of
evidence.

In June, 1870, the question of granting belligerent
rights to the Cubans was brought before Congress in
the form of a joint resolution introduced into the
House. Personally General Grant sympathized with
the Cubans and was disposed to grant them the rights
of belligerents, but his judgment was again overruled
by the counsels of Mr. Fish. On June 13, during the
heat of the debate on the question of belligerency, the
President sent to Congress a message embodying
the views of the executive. At Mr. Fish's instance the
message took the ground that the facts did not justify
the recognition of a state of war, although Mr. Fish
himself had made use of the term civil war in his
instructions to , General Sickles. The Secretary had
almost to force the President to sign this message,
though General Grant was afterwards satisfied as to
the wisdom of the measure.88 The message said in
part:

88 Private journal of Mr. Fish, quoted by Prof. J. B. Moore in the
Forum, May, 1896.

112

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

The question of belligerency is one of fact not to be
decided by sympathies with or prejudices against either
party. The relations between the parent state and the
insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of
international law. Fighting, though fierce and protracted,
does not alone constitute war ; there must be military forces
acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war —
flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, etc., — and to
justify belligerency there must be, above all, a de facto
political organization of the insurgents sufficient in char-
acter and resources to constitute it, if left to itself, a state
among nations capable of discharging the duties of a state,
and of meeting the just responsibilities it may incur as such
toward other powers in the discharge of its international
duties.

This message provoked a long and animated discus-
sion in the House next day and sharp criticism on the
part of the Cuban sympathizers of the President's con-
duct in thus " intruding himself into the House for
the purpose of controlling their deliberations/' The
debate continued until June 16, when the resolution
passed the House by a vote of 80 to 68.39 It was taken
up by the Senate, discussed and amended, but finally
lost.

The conclusion of an agreement on February 12,
1871, for the submission to a mixed commission of
claims of American citizens arising in Cuba,40 took
away all our pressing grievances against Spain and
for more than two years our diplomatic relations were
on a comparatively friendly basis. Good feeling be-
tween the two countries was further promoted by the
proclamation of the Spanish republic in 1873 and by

19 Congressional Globe, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess., p. 4438.
40 '* Treaties and Conventions of the United States" (Malloy's Ed.),
Vol. II, p. 1661.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the prompt action of General Sickles in extending to
it the recognition of the United States. After striving
in vain for more than two years to reconcile and unite
the contending factions of Spain, King Amadeus on
February n, 1873, abdicated the royal authority and
returned to the nation the powers with which he had
been intrusted. The Cortes at once proclaimed a
republic. General Sickles had on January 30 tele-
graphed to Washington for instructions in case the
republicans should succeed in their efforts. On the
day after the abdication, he received directions to rec-
ognize the republican government when it was fully
established and in possession of the power of the na-
tion. Three days later, in the uniform of a major-
general of the United States army he was given an
audience by the president of the assembly and formally
recognized the republic.

On March 6, Congress by joint resolution, in behalf
of the American people, tendered its congratulations to
the people of Spain. It seemed at last as if our rela-
tions with Spain were on a good footing. General
Sickles urged upon the new republican government the
abolition of slavery and the concession of self-govern-
ment to Cuba.

But such cordial relations did not long continue.
On October 31, 1873, the steamer Virginius, sailing
under American colors and carrying a United States
registry, was captured on the high seas by the Tor-
nado, a Spanish war vessel, and on the afternoon of
the first of November taken into the port of Santiago
de Cuba. The men and supplies she bore were bound
for the insurgents, but the capture did not occur in
Cuban waters. General Burriel, the commandant of

114

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

the city, summoned a court-martial, and in spite of the
protests of the American consul, condemned to death
at the first sitting four of the passengers, General W.
A. C. Ryan, an Irish patriot and three Cubans. They
were shot on the morning of November 4. On the
7th twelve other passengers were executed and on the
8th, Captain Fry and his entire crew, numbering
thirty— six, making the total number of executions
fifty-three. As soon as news of the capture reached
Madrid, General Sickles called upon President Castelar
and represented to him the difficulties that might arise
in case the ship had been taken on the high seas bear-
ing United States colors. Upon General Sickles's sug-
gestion the President of the Spanish republic at once
telegraphed to the captain-general to await orders be-
fore taking any steps in regard to the captured vessel
and crew.

In accordance with instructions from Mr. Fish,
General Sickles on November 14 protested by note
against these executions as brutal and barbarous and
stated that ample reparation would be demanded. The
next day he received from the minister of state an
ill-tempered reply, rejecting the protest as inadmissible
when neither the cabinet at Washington nor that of
Madrid had sufficient data upon which to ground a
complaint. On the day this reply was received General
Sickles, following out telegraphic instructions from
Washington, made a formal demand by note for the
restoration of the Virginius, the surrender of the sur-
vivors, a salute to the United States flag, and the pun-
ishment of the guilty officials. In case of a refusal
of satisfactory reparation within twelve days, General
Sickles was instructed by his government, at the expi-

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

ration of that period, to close the legation and leave
Madrid.

The formal reply to General Sickles's demand for
reparation was received November 18. The Spanish
government declared that it would make no reparation
until satisfied that an offense had been committed
against the flag of the United States, and that when so
convinced through her own sources of information or
by the showing of the United States, due reparation
would be made.

The representations made at Washington by the
Spanish minister were of a much more satisfactory
character than those made to General Sickles at
Madrid. Mr. Fish, therefore, instructed General
Sickles to remain at his post until the 26th, and if
no accommodation were reached by that time he could
demand his passports. By the time this dispatch
reached Madrid General Sickles had already asked for
his passports, but had not received the reply of the
Spanish government. On the 26th he received a note
from the Spanish minister asking for a postponement
to December 25 and promising that if by that time
Spain could not show that she had the right on her
side — i.e., that the Virginius was not entitled ta sail
under the United States flag — she would comply with
the demands of the United States. General Sickles
replied that he could not accept such a proposal, but
that he would inform his government of it and take
the responsibility of deferring his departure.

Meanwhile the Spanish minister at Washington had
proposed arbitration, but Mr. Fish declined to submit
to arbitration the question of an indignity to the
United States flag. The minister then asked for a

116

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

delay, but Mr. Fish told him that delay was impossible
in view of the approaching meeting of Congress.
Unless settled beforehand the question would have to
be referred to Congress. This firm stand brought the
Spanish minister to time and on November 27 a propo-
sition was submitted and accepted by Mr. Fish, by the
terms of which Spain stipulated to restore the vessel
forthwith, to surrender the survivors of her passengers
and crew, and on the 25th of December to salute the
flag of the United States. If, however, before that
date Spain should prove to the satisfaction of the
United States that the Virginius was not entitled to
carry the flag of the United States, the salute should
be dispensed with, but in such case the United States
would expect a disclaimer of intent of indignity to its
flag.

The Spanish envoy submitted to the state depart-
ment a large number of documents and depositions to
show that the Virginius had no right to sail under the
United States flag. These were referred to the at-
torney-general, and on December 17 he gave his opin-
ion that the evidence was conclusive that the Virginius,
although registered in New York on September 26,
1870, in the name of one Patterson, who made oath
as required by law that he was the owner, was in fact
the property of certain Cubans and was controlled by
them. In conclusion the attorney-general said:

Spain, no doubt, has a right to capture a vessel, with an
American register, and carrying the American flag, found in
her own waters assisting, or endeavoring to assist, the insur-
rection in Cuba, but she has no right to capture such a vessel
on the high seas upon an apprehension that, in violation of
the neutrality or navigation laws of the United States, she

117

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

was on her way to assist said rebellion. Spain may defend
her territory and people from the hostile attacks of what is,
or appears to be, an American vessel; but she has no juris-
diction whatever over the question as to whether or not
such vessel is on the high seas in violation of any law of
the United States. Spain cannot rightfully raise that ques-
tion as to the Virginius, but the United States may, and, as I
understand the protocol, they have agreed to do it, and,
governed by that agreement and without admitting that Spain
would otherwise have any interest in the question, I decide
that the Virginius, at the time of her capture, was without
right, and improperly carrying the American flag.41

This decision was communicated to the Spanish au-
thorities and, according to the agreement, the salute
to the United States flag was dispensed with, and on
January 3, 1874, the Spanish minister, on behalf of
his government, expressed a disclaimer of an intent of
indignity to the flag of the United States. Spain later
paid indemnities to Great Britain and the United
States for the families of those who had been executed.

Meanwhile General Sickles offered his resignation
by cable in consequence of certain reports that his con-
duct had been disapproved. Mr. Fish replied that such
reports were unauthorized, that no dissatisfaction had
been expressed or intimated and that it was deemed
important that he remain at his post. Ten days later,
General Sickles requested that the telegram tendering
his resignation and the reply be published. Mr. Fish
declined to do so, as the resignation was hypothetical.
On December 20, General Sickles again tendered his
resignation and it was accepted.

After the settlement of the Virginius affair the gov-

41 The correspondence relating to the case of the Virginius is in Foreign
Relations for the years 1874, 1875, and 1876.

118

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

ernment of the United States addressed itself once
more to the task of forcing a settlement of the Cuban
question in general. In his instructions to Mr. Cush-
ing, who succeeded General Sickles, Secretary Fish
expressed the policy of the administration at consid-
erable length. After reviewing the main facts of the
insurrection which had then lasted more than five
years, with little or no change in the military situation,
and after referring to the rejection by Spain of the
offers of mediation made by the United States at an
early day of the trouble, he said :

In these circumstances, the question what decision the
United States shall take is a serious and difficult one, not to
be determined without careful consideration of its complex
elements of domestic and foreign policy, but the determina-
tion of which may at any moment be forced upon us by
occurrences either in Spain or in Cuba.

Withal the President cannot but regard independence, and
emancipation, of course, as the only certain, and even the
necessary, solution of the question of Cuba. And, in his
mind, all incidental questions are quite subordinate to those,
the larger objects of the United States in this respect.

It requires to be borne in mind that, in so far as we may
contribute to the solution of these questions, this government
is not actuated by any selfish or interested motive. The
President does not meditate or desire the annexation of
Cuba to the United States, but its elevation into an inde-
pendent republic of freemen, in harmony with ourselves and
with the other republics of America.4*

For some months Mr. Cushing was occupied with
the settlement of the indemnities in the Virginius case.
After nearly two years had elapsed since the instruc-
tions above quoted, the Grant administration deter-

*a Foreign Relations, 1874-75, P- 859.

IIQ

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

mined, in view of the unchanged condition of the
Cuban struggle, to bring matters to an issue and to
force, if need be, the hand of the Spanish government.
On November 5, 1875, Mr. Fish addressed a long
letter of instruction to Mr. Cushing. After reviewing
the course of the insurrection, the interests of the
United States affected thereby, the numerous claims
arising therefrom, many of them still unsettled, the
persistent refusal of Spain to redress these grievances
and the general neglect on her part of treaty obliga-
tions, he concluded :

In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the
war, or of any change in the manner in which it has been
conducted on either side, he (the President) feels that the
time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments
to intervene, solely with a view to bringing to an end a
disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace
in the island of Cuba. No government is more deeply in-
terested in the order and peaceful administration of this
island than is that of the United States, and none has suf-
fered as the United States from the condition which has ob-
tained there during the past six or seven years. He will,
therefore, feel it his duty at an early day to submit the
subject in this light, and accompanied by an expression of the
views above presented, for the consideration of Congress.

Mr. Cushing was instructed to read this note to the
Spanish minister of state. At the same time a copy
was sent to General Robert C. Schenck, United States
minister at London, with instructions to read the same
to Lord Derby, and to suggest to him that it would
be agreeable to the United States if the British gov-
ernment would support by its influence the position
assumed by the Grant administration. In the course

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THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

of a few days copies of this note were sent to our rep-
resentatives at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Lisbon,
and St. Petersburg, with instructions to communicate
its purport orally, or by reading the note, to the gov-
ernments to which they were accredited and to ask
their intervention with Spain in the interests of ter-
minating the state of affairs existing in Cuba.

As the result of Mr. Cushing's friendly representa-
tions and in view of the President's message discounte-
nancing recognition of either independence or bellig-
erency, the Spanish minister, Mr. Calderon, received
the communication of November 5 threatening inter-
vention, in good part, and expressed his intention of
answering it after he should have had time to con-
sider it carefully.

The reply of Great Britain was given to General
Schenck in an interview with Lord Derby on January
25, 1876. It was in substance that he was convinced
that Spain would not listen to mediation, and that the
British government was not prepared to bring pres-
sure to bear upon her in case she refused; that the
Spanish government hoped to finish the Carlist war
in the spring and would then be in a position to put
forth its whole military strength for the reduction of
Cuba; in conclusion, therefore, Lord Derby thought
" that if nothing were contemplated beyond an ami-
cable interposition, having peace for its object, the
time was ill-chosen and the move premature." The
answers of the other powers were unsatisfactory or
evasive, none of them being willing to bring pressure
to bear upon the government of young Alfonso, while
the Carlist war was on his hands.

The answer of Spain was finally given in the form

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UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

of a note dated February 3, 1876, addressed to the
representatives of Spain in other countries, including
the United States, communicated to Mr. Gushing Feb-
ruary 19. This answer, written by Mr. Calderon was
in good temper. He stated that the insurrection was
supported and carried on largely by negroes, mulat-
toes, Chinese, deserters, and adventurers; that they
carried on a guerrilla warfare from their mountain re-
treats, that Spain had sufficient forces in the island to
defeat them in the field; that the triumph of Spain
would soon be followed by the total abolition of slav-
ery and the introduction of administrative reforms.
The number of vessels of war and troops in Cuba was
enumerated to show that Spain was putting forth a
reasonable effort to bring the rebellion to a close, and
statistics were quoted to show that the trade between
Cuba and the United States, as well as the general
trade of the island, had actually increased largely since
the outbreak of the insurrection. Finally he declared
that while individual foreigners had suffered, Spain
had done justice to all claims presented.

In conversation with Mr. Cushing, Mr. Calderon in-
timated that Spain, although she would resist to the
uttermost armed intervention, might be willing under
certain circumstances to accept the mediation of the
United States in Cuba, and he invited a frank state-
ment of what the United States would advise or wish
Spain to do with regard to Cuba. In reply to this
suggestion, Mr. Fish, after disclaiming on the part of
the United States all intention of annexing Cuba,
stated the following points as the wish of his govern-
ment:

(i) The mutual and reciprocal observance of treaty

122

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

obligations, and a full, friendly, and liberal under-
standing and interpretation of all doubtful treaty pro-
visions, wherever doubt or question might exist.

(2) Peace, order, and good government in Cuba,
which involved prompt and effective measures to re-
store peace, and the establishment of a government
suited to the spirit and necessities of the age.

(3) Gradual but effectual emancipation of slaves.

(4) Improvement of commercial facilities and the
removal of the obstructions then existing in the way
of trade and commerce.

In reply to these suggestions Mr. Calderon handed
Mr. Cushing a note, dated April 16, 1876, in which
he represented that his majesty's government was in
full accord with Mr. Fish's suggestions.

This assurance on the part of the Spanish govern-
ment completely thwarted Mr. Fish's plans, and, to-
gether with Lord Derby's reply, put all further at-
tempts at intervention out of the question.

The substance of Mr. Fish's note threatening inter-
vention appeared unofficially in the press of Europe
and America in December, 1875, and attracted such
general attention that in January the House asked for
the correspondence. In reply Mr. Fish submitted to
the President for transmission the note of November
5, together with a few carefully chosen extracts from
the correspondence between himself and Mr. Cush-
ing,43 but nothing was given that might indicate that
the United States had appealed to the powers of
Europe to countenance intervention. As rumors to
this effect had, however, appeared in the press, the
House called the next day for whatever correspon-

*• House Ex. Doc. No. 90, Forty-fourth Cong., First Sess.

I23

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

dence had taken place with foreign powers in regard
to Cuba. Mr. Fish replied that " no correspondence
has taken place during the past year with any Euro-
pean government, other than Spain, in regard to the
island of Cuba," but that the note of November 5 had
been orally communicated to several European gov-
ernments by reading the same.44 This was putting a
very strict and a very unusual construction upon the
term " correspondence," to say the least. The dis-
patches, notes, and telegrams that pass between a gov-
ernment and its representatives abroad are the gener-
ally recognized means of communicating with foreign
powers, and are always spoken of as the correspon-
dence with those powers. The whole affair reveals a
curious lack of candor and of courage on the part of
Mr. Fish. He was trying to shield either the admin-
istration or himself, and did not wish the American
public to know that he had reversed the time-honored
policy of the state department by appealing to the
powers of Europe to intervene in what had been uni-
formly treated, from the days of John Quincy Adams
and Henry Clay, as a purely American question.

This correspondence was suppressed for twenty
years. On March 24, 1896, the Senate called for
" copies of all dispatches, notes, and telegrams in the
department of state, from and after the note from
Secretary Fish to Mr. Cushing of November 5, 1875,
and including that note, until the pacification of Cuba
in 1878, which relate to mediation or intervention by
the United States in the affairs of that island, together
with all correspondence with foreign governments re-
lating to the same topic." On April 15 President

44 House Ex. Doc. No. 100, Forty-fourth Cong., First Sess.

124

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

Cleveland transmitted the "correspondence" called
for, which forms a document of 137 pages.45

The Cuban struggle continued for two years longer.
In October, 1877, several leaders surrendered to the
Spanish authorities and undertook the task of bring-
ing over the few remaining ones. Some of these paid
for their efforts with their lives, being taken and con-
demned by court-martial by order of the commander
of the Cuban forces. Finally, in February, 1878, the
terms of pacification were made known. They em-
braced representation in the Spanish Cortes, oblivion
of the past in respect of political offenses committed
since the year 1868, and the freedom of slaves in the
insurgent ranks.46 In practice, however, the Cuban
deputies were never truly representative, but were men
of Spanish birth designated usually by the captain-
general. By gradual emancipation slavery ceased to
exist in the island in 1885. The powers of the captain-
general, the most objectionable feature of Spanish
rule, continued uncurtailed.

In February, 1895, the final insurrection against
Spanish rule in Cuba began, and soon developed the
same features as the " Ten Years' War." The policy
of Maximo Gomez, the insurrectionary chief, was to
fight no pitched battles but to keep up incessant skir-
mishes, to destroy sugar plantations and every other
source of revenue with the end in view of either ex-
hausting Spain or forcing the intervention of the
United States. With the opening of the second year
of the struggle, General Weyler arrived in Havana as
governor and captain-general, and immediately in-

45 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 213, Fifty- fourth Cong., First Sess.
•• Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 79, Forty-fifth Cong., Second Sess.

125

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

augurated his famous " Reconcentration " policy. The
inhabitants of the island were directed by proclama-
tion to assemble within a week in the towns occupied
by Spanish troops under penalty, if they refused, of
being treated as rebels. The majority of those who
obeyed the proclamation were women and children
who, as a result of being cooped up in crowded vil-
lages under miserable sanitary conditions and without
adequate food, died by the thousands.47 In the prov-
ince of Havana alone 52,000 perished.

Public opinion in the United States was thoroughly
aroused by the execution of policies which not only
excited sympathy for the unfortunate inhabitants of
Cuba, but which paralyzed the industries of the island
and destroyed its commerce. American citizens owned
at least fifty millions of property in the island, and
American commerce at the beginning of the insurrec-
tion amounted to one hundred millions annually.
Furthermore, numbers of persons claiming American
citizenship were thrown into prison by Weyler's orders.
Some of them were native Americans, but the ma-
jority were Cubans who had sought naturalization in
the United States in order to return to Cuba and claim
American protection.

Other Cubans, including many who were still Span-
ish subjects, established themselves in American ports
and furnished the insurgents with arms and supplies.
On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland issued a proc-
lamation calling attention to the Cuban insurrection
and warning all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States against doing any of the acts prohibited
by the American neutrality laws. Notwithstanding

47 Sen. Doc. No. 25, p. 125, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess.

126

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

all the efforts of the administration, illegal expeditions
were continually being fitted out in the United States,
and while the great majority of them were stopped by
port officials or intercepted by the navy, some of them
succeeded in reaching the coasts of Cuba. President
Cleveland's proclamation recognized insurgency as a
status distinct from belligerency. It merely put into
effect the neutrality laws of the United States. It did
not recognize a state of belligerency and therefore did
not bring into operation any of the rules of neutrality
under international law. President Cleveland con-
sistently refused to recognize the Cubans as belliger-
ents. In February, 1896, Congress passed a joint
resolution, by a vote of 64 to 6 in the Senate and
246 to 27 in the House, recognizing a state of war
in Cuba, and offering Spain the good offices of the
United States for the establishment of Cuban inde-
pendence. Notwithstanding the overwhelming ma-
jority which this resolution had received, the Presi-
dent ignored it, for it is a well recognized principle
that Congress has no right to force the hand of the
President in a matter of this kind. It amounted
merely to an expression of opinion by Congress.

In April, 1896, Secretary Olney addressed a note
to the Spanish minister in which the United States of-
fered to mediate between Spain and the insurgents for
the restoration of peace on the basis of autonomy.
Spain rejected this offer, claiming that Cuba already
enjoyed " one of the most liberal political systems in
the world," and suggesting that the United States
could contribute greatly to the pacification of the island
by prosecuting " the unlawful expeditions of some of
its citizens to Cuba with more vigor than in the

127

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

past." In his last annual message to Congress,
President Cleveland reviewed the Cuban situation at
length and, in conclusion, declared:

When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the
insurgents has become manifest and it is demonstrated that
her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its
rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its
reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means
nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and
the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the con-
flict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations
to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher
obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and
discharge.

The McKinley administration, which began March
4, 1897, soon directed its attention to the Cuban ques-
tion. It was unfortunate that with this question
rapidly approaching a crisis the State Department was
in feeble hands. John Sherman, the veteran senator
from Ohio, was appointed secretary of state by
McKinley in order to make a place in the Senate for
Mark Hanna, who had so successfully conducted Mc-
Kinley's campaign. General Wood ford was sent to
Madrid to succeed Hannis Taylor, and he was in-
structed to tender again the good offices of the United
States, to remind Spain of the resolution passed by
the previous Congress, and to warn her that another
Congress was soon to assemble.49 Six days after the
receipt of General Woodford's note the Spanish min-
istry resigned, and on October 14 the liberal ministry
of Sagasta assumed office. Its first act was to recall

*• Spanish Dipl. Corresp. and Docs, (translation, Washington, 1905),
pp. 7, 8.

49 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 568.

128

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

General Weyler, and to appoint General Blanco to suc-
ceed him as governor and captain-general of Cuba.
The new ministry promised to grant autonomy to
Cuba, and President McKinley in his message of
December 6, 1897, declared his intention of allowing
time for the new policy to be tested.

It was soon evident that the grant of autonomy had
come too late. The Cubans would no longer be satis-
fied with anything short of independence. On Jan-
uary 13, 1898, there was serious rioting in Havana,
deliberately planned as a demonstration against the
autonomy scheme, and Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee
cabled his government that it was evident that auton-
omy would prove a failure, that he doubted whether
Blanco could control the situation, and that it might
be necessary to send warships for the protection of
Americans in Havana. The suggestion as to warships
met with a prompter response than General Lee had
expected. The United States battleship Maine was
immediately dispatched to Havana, where she arrived
January 25 and was assigned an anchorage by the port
officials.50 While she was lying quietly at anchor in
Havana harbor, attention was suddenly diverted from
Cuba to Washington by the Dupuy de Lome incident.
On February 9, 1898, the New York Journal published
in facsimile a letter from the Spanish minister at
Washington to a friend in Cuba which severely criti-
cized President McKinley's policy and referred to him
as " a would-be politician who tries to leave a door
open behind him while keeping on good terms with the
jingoes of his party." The letter was genuine, though
surreptitiously acquired, and was of such a character

80 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 1025.

129

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

that it could not be overlooked. When called on for
an explanation, Sefior de Lome admitted having writ-
ten the letter but questioned the accuracy of the trans-
lation. He claimed that the language which he had
used was permissible under the seal of private corre-
spondence. When General Wood ford, acting under
instructions from Washington, informed the Spanish
minister of foreign affairs that the President expected
the immediate recall of Sefior de Lome, he was in-
formed that the latter's resignation had already been
accepted by cable.51

Before the excitement over this incident had sub-
sided, the battleship Maine was suddenly blown up in
Havana harbor on the night of February 15, and two
of her officers and two hundred and fifty-eight of her
crew were killed. After a careful examination of wit-
nesses and of the wreck, an American naval court of
inquiry reported that the destruction of the ship was
due to a submarine mine.62 A Spanish board of in-
quiry, after examining a number of witnesses who
had seen or heard the explosion, made a brief report
the following day to the effect that the ship had been
destroyed by an explosion in the forward magazine.
It is generally admitted that the American report was
correct, but the responsibility for the mine has never
been disclosed.

As soon as the report of the court of inquiry was
made public, the American people, who had displayed
great self-control, threw aside all restraint and the
country witnessed an outburst of patriotic fervor such
as had not been seen since 1861. " Remember the

§1 Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1007-1020.

•* Sen. Doc. No. 207, Fifty-fifth Cong., Second Sess.

I30

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

Maine" became a watchword, and the demand for
war was overwhelming. President McKinley decided,
however, to make one more effort at a diplomatic set-
tlement. He proposed an armistice between Spain and
the insurgents pending negotiations for a permanent
adjustment through the friendly offices of the Presi-
dent of the United States. In reply the Spanish gov-
ernment made counter-propositions to the effect that
the questions arising out of the destruction of the
Maine be submitted to arbitration and that the pacifi-
cation of the island be left to a Cuban parliament.
Meanwhile, the governor-general would be authorized
to accept a suspension of hostilities, provided the in-
surgents should ask for it and agree to disarm. This
was simply an invitation to the insurgents to submit,
in which case Spain would consider what degree of
autonomy was needed or practicable. The President
considered the Spanish reply as a rejection of his pro-
posal and determined to submit the entire question to
Congress.63 This meant war, for public feeling in
America was at the highest pitch of excitement, the
" yellow " press was clamoring for war, and it was
with the greatest difficulty that the President, who
really wanted peace, had held Congress in check. The
message to Congress was held back a few days in
consequence of a telegram from General Lee, who
urged that he be given time to get Americans safely
out of Havana. During this period of delay the repre-
sentatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France,
Great Britain, Italy, and Russia made a formal appeal
to the President for peace, and the Pope persuaded the
Queen of Spain to authorize General Blanco to sus-

•* Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 731.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

pend hostilities. This concession did not meet fully
the American ultimatum and seemed too much like
another play for time. The Spanish minister was,
therefore, simply informed that the President would
notify Congress of this latest communication. Presi-
dent McKinley was later severely criticized for not
giving greater consideration to this note and for
merely alluding to it in his message instead of trans-
mitting it in full. Had he given it greater considera-
tion, war might have been delayed a few months, but
it would not have been averted, for Spain was not
willing to make concessions that the Cubans at this
late date would have regarded as satisfactory.

In his message to Congress of April n, 1898, Presi-
dent McKinley referred to the Maine only incidentally
as " a patent and impressive proof of a state of things
in Cuba that is intolerable/* He suggested forcible
intervention as the only solution of the question and
declared that it was justified, not only on grounds of
humanity, but as a measure for the protection of the
lives and property of American citizens in Cuba, and
for the purpose of putting a stop to a conflict which
was a constant menace to our peace.54 Two days later
the House passed a resolution by vote of 324 to 19,
directing the President to intervene at once to stop the
war in Cuba with the purpose of " establishing by the
free action of the people thereof a stable and indepen-
dent government of their own in the island." On the
same day the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
reported a resolution demanding the immediate with-
drawal of Spain from the Island of Cuba, but the
minority report urging in addition the immediate rec-

** Richardson, " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. X, p. 147.

I32

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

ognition of the Cuban republic as then organized was
at first embodied in the Senate resolution by a vote of
67 to 21. It was feared by members of the Senate
that if we liberated Cuba without first recognizing the
so-called republic of Cuba, the island would inevitably
be annexed by the United States. After two days of
hot debate, the Senate reconsidered, and the House res-
olution prevailed. On April 19, the anniversary of the
battle of Lexington and of the first bloodshed of the
Civil War in the streets of Baltimore, the fateful reso-
lutions were adopted in the following terms :

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States in Congress assembled,

First, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of
right ought to be, free and independent.

Second, That it is the duty of the United States to de-
mand, and the Government of the United States does hereby
demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its
authority and government in the island of Cuba, and with-
draw its land and naval forces from Cuban waters.

Third, That the President of the United States be, and he
hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual
service of the United States the militia of the several States
to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolu-
tions into effect.

Fourth, That the United States hereby disclaims any dis-
position or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
control over said island except for the pacification thereof,
and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to
leave the government and control of the island to its
people.58

As soon as these resolutions were approved by the
President, the Spanish minister asked for his pass-

""U. S. Statutes at Large," Vol. XXX, p. 738.

133

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

ports, thus severing diplomatic relations, and Wood-
ford was directed to leave Madrid. The North At-
lantic Squadron, then at Key West under command
of Rear- Admiral William T. Sampson, was immedi-
ately ordered to blockade the northern coast of Cuba,
and Commodore George Dewey was ordered from
Hong Kong to Manila Bay for the purpose of cap-
turing or destroying the Spanish fleet. During the
war that followed, foreign public opinion, outside of
England, was decidedly hostile to the United States,
but in the face of the victories of Santiago and Manila
Bay this sentiment underwent a marked change, and
Spain abandoned whatever hopes she had cherished of
European intervention. By the end of July, 1898, the
American as well as the European press was beginning
to ask why the war should not be brought to a close.

After the surrender of Santiago General Miles em-
barked for Porto Rico with a force of 16,000 men,
and in a two-weeks' campaign overran most of that
island with the loss of three killed and forty wounded.
A large number of troops had also been sent to the
Philippines. It was evident, therefore, that while the
war had been undertaken for the liberation of Cuba,
the United States did not feel under any obligation to
confine its military operations to that island. Having
met all the demands of honor, Spain asked the French
government to authorize the French ambassador at
Washington to arrange with the President of the
United States the preliminary terms of peace. The
negotiations begun on July 26 resulted in the protocol
of August 12, in which Spain agreed to the following
demands : first, the immediate evacuation of Cuba and
the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty; second,

134

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

the cession of Porto Rico and one of the Ladrones by
way of indemnity; and third, the occupation by the
United States of " the city, bay and harbor of Manila
pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall
determine the control, disposition, and government of
the Philippines." 56

By the terms of the protocol Paris was selected as
the place of meeting for the peace commissioners,
and here negotiations were opened on October i. The
United States delegation was composed of William
R. Day, who resigned the office of Secretary of State
to head the mission; Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; William
P. Frye, President pro tern of the Senate; Senator
George Gray of Delaware ; and Whitelaw Reid, editor
of the New York Tribune; with John Bassett Moore,
Assistant Secretary of State, as Secretary. An entire
month was taken up with the Cuban question, the
Spanish commissioners striving in vain to saddle the
Cuban debt either on the United States or on the
people of Cuba. The Philippine question occupied
most of the next month. When the commissioners
were appointed, President McKinley had not fully
made up his mind on this important question. His
first intention seems to have been to retain the bay
and city of Manila as a naval base and a part or pos-
sibly the whole of Luzon. Public sentiment in the
United States in favor of acquiring the whole group
made rapid headway, and after an extended trip
through the South and West, during which he sounded
opinion on this question, the President instructed the

•• Spanish Dipl. Corresp. and Docs., p. 206; Foreign Relations, 1898,
p. 819.

135

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

commissioners to demand the entire group. The com-
missioners were later authorized to offer $20,000,000
for the cession. This offer, which was recognized by
the Spanish commissioners as an ultimatum, was
finally accepted under protest. On other points the
United States secured what had been demanded in
the protocol, and the treaty was signed December 10,
1898."

The treaty was submitted to the Senate January 4,
1899, and precipitated a memorable debate which
lasted until February 6. The principal opposition
came from Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, who de-
clared that the proposal to acquire and govern the
Philippine Islands was in violation of the Declaration
of Independence, the Constitution, and the whole
spirit of American institutions. The treaty could not
be ratified without the aid of Democrats, and the re-
sult was in doubt when Bryan went to Washington
and advised his friends in the Senate to vote for rati-
fication, saying that the status of the Philippines could
be determined in the next presidential campaign. The
outbreak of hostilities between the Filipinos and the
American troops occupying Manila put an end to the
debate, and on February 6 the treaty was ratified.

When the United States demanded the withdrawal
of Spain from Cuba, it was with the declaration that
" The United States hereby disclaims any disposition
or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
control over said island except for the pacification
thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is
accomplished, to leave the government and control of
the island to its people." Never has a pledge made by

«T Senate Doc. No. 62, Fifty-Fifth Cong., Third Seas.

136

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

a nation under such circumstances been more faith-
fully carried out. The administration of Cuba during
the period of American military occupation was a
model of its kind. General Leonard Wood, the mili-
tary governor, and his associates found the cities and
towns crowded with refugees and reconcentrados, and
governmental affairs in a state of the utmost con-
fusion. They established order, relieved distress, or-
ganized hospitals and charitable institutions, undertook
extensive public works, reorganized the system of pub-
lic schools, and put Havana, Santiago, and other cities
in a sanitary condition. In a hospital near Havana
Major Walter Reed, a surgeon in the United States
army, demonstrated the fact that yellow fever is trans-
mitted by the bite of a mosquito. This discovery was
at once put to the test in Havana, and the city was
rendered free from yellow fever for the first time in
one hundred and forty years.58

In the organization of a government for the island,
the first step was to take a census of the inhabitants,
determine the proper basis of suffrage, and hold
municipal elections for the purpose of organizing local
government. This work having been successfully ac-
complished, a constitutional convention, summoned by
General Wood, convened in the city of Havana,
November 5, 1900. By February 21, 1901, the con-
vention had agreed upon a constitution modelled in
general after that of the United States. The new con-
stitution provided for the recognition of the public
debts contracted by the insurgent government, but was
silent on the subject of future relations with the
United States. This subject had been brought to the

8J Report of the Military Governor of Cuba, 8 vols., 1901.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

attention of the convention early in February by Gen-
eral Wood, who had submitted for incorporation in
the constitution certain provisions which had been
drafted in Washington. The convention objected to
these proposals on the ground that they impaired the
independence and sovereignty of the island, and that
it was their duty to make Cuba " independent of every
other nation, the great and noble American nation
included."

The United States, however, had no intention of
withdrawing from the island until this matter was sat-
isfactorily adjusted. A provision, known as the Platt
Amendment, was therefore inserted in the army ap-
propriation bill of March 2, 1901, directing the Presi-
dent to leave the control of the island to its people so
soon as a government should be established under a
constitution which defined the future relations with the
United States substantially as follows:

I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into
any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or
powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence
of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign
power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military
or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over
any portion of said island.

II. That said government shall not assume or con-
tract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and
to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate
discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island,
after defraying the current expenses of government shall
be inadequate.

III. That the government of Cuba consents that the
United States may exercise the right to intervene for the
preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a
government adequate for the protection of life, property,

138

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations
with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the
United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the
government of Cuba.

IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its
military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and
all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained
and protected.

V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far
as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other
plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the
cities of the island. . . .

VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the pro-
posed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto
being left to future adjustment by treaty.

VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the
independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as
well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will
sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling
or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed
upon with the President of the United States.

VIII. That by way of further assurance the government
of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent
treaty with the United States.59

These articles, with the exception of the fifth, which
was proposed by General Leonard Wood, were care-
fully drafted by Elihu Root, at that time Secretary of
War, discussed at length by President McKinley's
cabinet, and entrusted to Senator Platt of Connecticut,
who offered them as an amendment to the army ap-
propriation bill. In order to allay doubts expressed
by members of the convention in regard to the third
article, General Wood was authorized by Secretary
Root to state officially that the intervention described
in this article did not mean intermeddling in the af-

69 U. S. Statues at Larg-, Vol. XXXI, p. 897.

139

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

fairs of the Cuban government, but formal action on
the part of the United States, based upon just and
substantial grounds. With this assurance the conven-
tion adopted the Platt amendment June 12, 1901, and
added it as an appendix to the constitution.

On May 20, 1902, Tomas Estrada Palma was in-
augurated as first president of the Republic of Cuba,
and General Wood handed over to him the government
of the island.60 The Americans left a substantial
balance in the Cuban treasury. The total receipts for
the entire period were $57,197,140.80, and the expen-
ditures $55,405,031.28. The customs service, which
furnished the principal part of the revenues during the
period of military occupation, was ably administered
by General Tasker H. Bliss.61

While the Platt amendment determined the political
relations that were to exist between Cuba and the
United States, there had been no agreement on the
subject of commercial relations. The sugar industry,
which had been almost destroyed by the insurrection,
was dependent upon the willingness of the United
States*to arrange for a reduction of its tariff in favor
of the Cuban product. Otherwise Cuban sugar could
not compete with the bounty- fed beet sugar of Europe
or with the sugars of Porto Rico and Hawaii, which
were now admitted to the American market free of
duty. President Roosevelt had hoped to settle this
question before the withdrawal of American troops,
and he had urged upon Congress the expediency of
providing for a substantial reduction in tariff duties on

00 Documentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government,
in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, Appendix A.

*l Documentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government,
In Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, Appendix B.

I4O

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

Cuban imports into the United States, but a powerful
opposition, composed of the beet-sugar growers of the
North and West and of the cane-sugar planters of
Louisiana, succeeded in thwarting for two years the
efforts of the administration to do justice to Cuba.
All attempts to get a bill through Congress failed.62
In the meantime a reciprocity convention was agreed
upon in the ordinary diplomatic way December n,
1902, under which Cuban products were to be ad-
mitted to the United States at a reduction of twenty
per cent. As the Senate failed to act on this treaty
before the 4th of March, 1903, President Roosevelt
convened an extra session of the Senate which rati-
fied the treaty with amendments, and with the very
unusual provision that it should not go into effect until
approved by Congress. As the House was not then in
session, this meant that the treaty had to go over until
the fall. The Cuban situation grew so bad that the
President finally convened Congress in extra session
November 9, 1903. In a special message he urged
prompt action on the treaty on the ground that the
Platt amendment had brought the island of Cuba
within our system of international policy, and that it
necessarily followed that it must also to a certain
degree come within the lines of our economic policy.
The House passed the bill approving the treaty No-
vember 19 by the overwhelming vote of 335 to 21,
but the Senate, although it had already ratified the
treaty, permitted the extra session to expire without
passing the measure which was to give the treaty ef-
fect. When the new session began December 7, the
Cuban treaty bill was made the special order in the

62 Senate Docs. Nos. 405 and 679, Fifty-Seventh Cong., First Sess.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Senate until December 16, when the final vote was
taken and it passed. Under the reciprocity treaty com-
mercial relations with Cuba were established on a firm
basis and the volume of trade increased rapidly.

In August, 1906, President Palma was reflected
for another term, but the Cubans had not learned the
primary lesson of democracy, submission to the will
of the majority, and his opponents at once began an
insurrectionary movement which had for its object
the overthrow of his government. About the middle
of September President Roosevelt sent Secretary Taft
to Havana for the purpose of reconciling the con-
tending factions, but Mr, Taft's efforts proved un-
availing and President Palma resigned. When the
Cuban Congress assembled, it was found impossible to
command a quorum. Under these circumstances Sec-
retary Taft assumed control of affairs on September
29 and proclaimed a provisional government for the
restoration of order and the protection of life and
property. A body of United States troops under com-
mand of General Franklin Bell was sent to Cuba to
preserve order and to uphold the provisional govern-
ment. On October 3, 1906, Secretary Taft was re-
lieved of the duties of provisional governor in order
that he might resume his duties in Washington, and
Charles E. Magoon was appointed to take his place
at Havana.63 In his message to Congress December 3,
1906, President Roosevelt declared that while the
United States had no desire to annex Cuba, it was
" absolutely out of the question that the island should
continue independent " if the " insurrectionary habit "

98 Secretary Taft's report on the Cuban situation was sent to Congress
December 17, 1906.

142

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

should become " confirmed." The second period of
American occupation lasted a little over two years,
when the control of the government was again re-
stored to the people of the island and the American
troops were withdrawn.

CHAPTER IV
THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE PANAMA CANAL

THE cutting of the isthmus between North and
South America was the dream of navigators and en-
gineers from the time when the first discoverers ascer-
tained that nature had neglected to provide a passage.
Yet the new continent which so unexpectedly blocked
the way of Columbus in his search for the Indies
opposed for centuries an insurmountable barrier to
the commerce of the East and the West. The piercing
of the isthmus always seemed a perfectly feasible
undertaking, but the difficulties in the way proved
greater than at first sight appeared. There were
( i ) the physical or engineering problems to be solved,
and (2) the diplomatic complications regarding the
control of the canal in peace and its use in war. The
weakness of the Spanish-American states, whose terri-
tories embraced the available routes, and their rec-
ognized inability either to construct or protect a canal
made what might otherwise have been merely a ques-
tion of domestic economy one of grave international
import. In this respect, as in others, the problem
presented the same features as the Suez canal. To
meet these difficulties three plans were successively
developed during the nineteenth century : ( i ) a canal
constructed by a private corporation under interna-
tional control, (2) a canal constructed by a private
corporation under the exclusive control of the United
States, and (3) a canal constructed, owned, operated,

144

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

and controlled by the United States as a government
enterprise. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty provided for
the construction of a canal in accordance with the
first plan; several unsuccessful attempts were made
to raise the necessary capital under the second plan;
while the third plan was the one under which the
gigantic task was actually accomplished.

The comparative merits of the Nicaragua and
Panama routes long divided the opinion of experts.
American engineers generally favored that through
Nicaragua. The length of the Nicaragua route, from
Greytown on the Atlantic to Brito on the Pacific by
way of the San Juan river and through Lake Nica-
ragua, is about 170 miles. The elevation of the lake
above the sea is about no feet. Its western shore
is only twelve miles from the Pacific, with an inter-
vening divide 154 feet above the sea. From the south-
east corner of the lake flows the San Juan river,
1 20 miles to the Atlantic, with an average fall of
about 10 inches to the mile. The serious objections
to this route are: (i) the lack of harbors at the
terminals, Brito being a mere indentation on the coast,
rendering the construction of immense breakwaters
necessary, while at Greytown the San Juan broadens
out into a delta that would require extensive dredging;
and (2) the enormous rainfall at Greytown, exceed-
ing that known anywhere else on the western conti-
nent— nearly 25 feet.

The Panama route from Colon on the Atlantic to
Panama on the Pacific is about 50 miles in length,
with a natural elevation nearly double that of Nica-
ragua. There are natural harbors at each end which
are capacious and able to accommodate the heaviest

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

shipping. The Panama Railroad, built along the line
of the proposed canal, in 1850-55, gave this route an
additional advantage. There were, however, certain
disadvantages: (i) the unhealthfulness of the vicinity,
rendering labor scarce and inefficient; (2) the heavy
rainfall, 10 to 12 feet at Colon; and (3) the treacher-
ous character of the geologic structure, due to its
volcanic origin, through which the cut had to be made.
The impossibility of making even approximate esti-
mates of the cost of the work in such a deadly climate
and through such an uncertain geologic formation
was one of the greatest difficulties to be overcome.
The De Lesseps plan provided for an open cut through-
out at the sea-level, at an estimated cost of $170,000,-
ooo. The work was begun in 1884 and prosecuted
until 1888, when the gigantic scheme collapsed, after
the company had expended about $300,000,000 and
accomplished less than one-third of the work.

Great as the engineering problems of the various
canal schemes have been shown to be, the importance
to the world's commerce of the object in view would,
in all probability, have led to their solution and to
the construction of a canal long before the United
States undertook the Panama enterprise, had it not
been for difficulties of an altogether different char-
acter, complications arising out of the question as to
the status of the canal in international law. The
diplomatic difficulties in the case of an interoceanic
canal are very great. It cannot be regarded as a
natural strait, like the Dardanelles, the Danish Belts,
or the Straits of Magellan, which were for a long
time held under exclusive jurisdiction, but are now
free to all nations. Nor, on the other hand, could an

146

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

isthmian canal be compared to the Kiel canal, which
is within the territory of Germany, and which, al-
though open to commerce, was specially designed to
meet the needs of the German navy. Such canals as
this are built by the capital of the country through
which they pass, and are protected and controlled by
its government.

No one of the republics to the south of us, through
whose territory it was proposed to build a canal, could
raise the capital for its construction or insure its
protection when completed. No company chartered
by one of these governments could have raised the
necessary capital without some further guarantee.
Hence it was that all companies organized for this
purpose had to secure their charters from some more
powerful nation, such as the United States or France,
and their concessions from one of the Central Ameri-
can states. This rendered necessary a treaty between
the state granting the concession or right to construct
a canal through its territory and the state chartering
the company. The claims of other states to equality
of treatment in the use of such a canal constituted
another element that had to be considered.

With the establishment of the independence of the
Spanish-American republics the question of the con-
struction of a ship canal across the isthmus became
a matter of general interest, and it was one of the
proposed subjects of discussion at the Congress of
American Republics summoned by Bolivar to meet
at Panama in 1826. In the instructions to the United
States commissioners to that congress, Mr. Clay
authorized them to enter into the consideration of that
subject, suggesting that the best routes would likely

147

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

be found in the territory of Mexico or of the Central
Republic. As to the diplomatic status of the canal,
he said:

If the work should ever be executed so as to admit of the
passage of sea vessels from ocean to ocean, the benefits of it
ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation,
but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the
payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls.1

In 1835, and again in 1839, the United States Sen-
ate passed resolutions authorizing the President to
enter into negotiations with other nations, particularly
Central America and New Granada, for the purpose
of protecting by treaty either individuals or companies
who might undertake to open communication between
the two oceans, and of insuring " the free and equal
navigation of the canal by all nations.'* Presidents
Jackson and Van Buren both commissioned agents
with a view to carrying out these resolutions, but with-
out success.

While a prisoner at Ham in 1845, Prince Louis
Napoleon Bonaparte secured from the government of
Nicaragua a concession granting him power to organize
a company for the construction of a waterway to be
known as " Le Canale Napoleon de Nicaragua." After
his escape from Ham, he published in London a
pamphlet entitled " The Canal of Nicaragua, or a
Project for the Junction of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans by means of a Canal." 2

Although the United States government was a party
to endless negotiations in regard to an inter-oceanic
canal, there were only three treaties of any practical

1 Report of International American Conference, Vol. IV (Hist. App.),

P 14^.

• Snow: " Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy," p. 328.

148

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

importance prior to the close of the nineteenth cen-
tury, by which it acquired rights and assumed obli-
gations on that account.3 These were (i) the treaty
with New Granada (Colombia) of 1846; (2) the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England of 1850; and
(3) the treaty with Nicaragua of 1867. We shall
proceed to examine these in detail.

The treaty with New Granada was signed at Bo-
gota, December 12, 1846, and ratified by both govern-
ments in 1848. It did not differ materially from the
general draft of treaties, except in the thirty-fifth
article, which was of a special character and related
to the Isthmus of Panama. By this article " the gov-
ernment of New Granada guarantees to the govern-
ment of the United States that the right-of-way or
transit across the Isthmus of Panama, upon any modes
of communication that now exist or that may be here-
after constructed, shall be open and free to the gov-
ernment and citizens of the United States," for the
transportation of all articles of lawful commerce upon
the same terms enjoyed by the citizens of New
Granada.

And in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and con-
stant enjoyment of these advantages, and for the favors they
have acquired by the 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of this treaty,
the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously to
New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neu-
trality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that
the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be
interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this
treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also
guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and

' Our treaties with Mexico and Honduras, although covering the case
of canal constructions, were of no practical importance, as the routes
through these countries were not feasible.

149

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

property which New Granada has and possesses over the
said territory.4

This treaty was to remain in force for twenty years,
and then, if neither party gave notice of intended ter-
mination, it was to continue in force, terminable by
either party at twelve months' notice. This treaty
was in full force when the Panama revolution of 1903
took place. Under the protection of this treaty the
Panama Railroad Company, composed mainly of citi-
zens of the United States, secured a charter from New
Granada, and between 1850 and 1855 constructed a
railroad across the isthmus along the line of the pro-
posed Panama canal. In consequence of the riot at
Panama in 1856, efforts were made by the United
States to modify this treaty so as to give the United
States greater control and power to protect the means
of transit, but without success.5 Other attempts to
modify it in 1868 and 1870 likewise failed.6

In 1862 the Granadian government, through its rep-
resentative at Washington, notified the United States
that a revolutionary chief, who was then trying to
subvert the Granadian confederation, had sent an
armed force to occupy the Isthmus of Panama, and
the government of Granada called upon the United
States to enforce its guarantee. Simultaneously the
same information was received from the United States
consul at Panama, and the President instructed the
United States naval commander at that port to pro-
tect at all hazards and at whatever cost the safety of
the railroad transit across the isthmus.

« Correspondence in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal, the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the Monroe Doctrine. Government Printing
Office, 1885, p. 5. Referred to hereafter as " Collected Correspondence.

* Ibid., pp. 23-27.

* Ibid., pp. 27 and 40.

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

The Granadian government, however, was not satis-
fied with this action, and urged the United States to
land a body of troops at Panama, suggesting that it
consist of 300 cavalry. Under the circumstances,
President Lincoln hesitated to take such action with-
out consulting Great Britain and France, and Mr.
Seward instructed our representatives at London and
Paris to seek an understanding with those govern-
ments in regard to the matter. He declared:

This government has no interest in the matter different
from that of other maritime powers. It is willing to inter-
pose its aid in execution of its treaty and for the benefit of all
nations. But if it should do so it would incur some hazard
of becoming involved in the revolutionary strife which is
going on in that country. It would also incur danger of
misapprehension of its object by other maritime powers if it
should act without previous consultation with them.'

In a conference between Mr. Adams and Lord John
Russell, the latter declared that he did not consider
that the contingency had arisen which called for inter-
vention; that so far as he could learn, no attempt had
been made to obstruct the free transit across the
isthmus. The French government took substantially
the same view.8 In questions of a similar nature that
arose later, the attorney-general of the United States
expressed the opinion that the guarantee by the
United States of Granadian sovereignty and property
in the territory of the isthmus was only against for-
eign governments, and did not authorize the United
States to take sides with one or the other party in the
intestine troubles of that nation.

7 Seward to Adams, July IT, 1862.

• " Collected Correspondence," pp. 7 and 8

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

In April, 1885, the Colombian government, which
was embarrassed by civil war, called upon the United
States for the fulfillment of the treaty of 1846, to
secure the neutrality and sovereignty of the isthmus.
President Cleveland at once sent a body of troops to
the isthmus with instructions to confine their action
to preventing the transit and its accessories from be-
ing interrupted or embarrassed. As soon as peace
was reestablished, the troops of the United States were
withdrawn.9

Four years after the signature of the above treaty
with Colombia, and two years after its ratification by
the Senate, the United States and Great Britain exe-
cuted what is popularly known as the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. It is of great importance to understand clearly
the circumstances under which this treaty was nego-
tiated.

For very obvious reasons, the Isthmus of Panama
was for many years the objective point of all canal
schemes, but as the engineering difficulties of this
route began to be fully appreciated, attention was
directed more and more to that through Nicaragua.
The occupation by Great Britain, under the assump-
tion of a protectorate, of the territory about the mouth
of the San Juan river, which belonged to Nicaragua
and Costa Rica, and in which the Atlantic terminus
of the canal would fall, was a source of no little un-
easiness and perplexity to the United States. In June,
1849, Mr. Hise, charge d'affaires of the United States
in Central America, negotiated without the authoriza-
tion or knowledge of his government, a treaty with

• Mr. Scruggs to Mr. Bayard, April 16, 1885, For. Rel., also " Messages
and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, p. 326.

152

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

Nicaragua which gave the United States exclusive
rights in the construction of a canal through the terri-
tory of that state.10 This treaty was not submitted
to the Senate, but was made use of in the negotia-
tions that were opened shortly thereafter with Great
Britain for the purpose of ousting her from her posi-
tion of control over the mouth of the San Juan. A
few months later, September 28, 1849, Mr- Squier
signed with Honduras a treaty which ceded Tiger
Island, in the Bay of Fonseca, to the United States,
thus giving us a naval station on the Pacific side of
the isthmus. This treaty, like that negotiated by Mr.
Hise, was unauthorized and never submitted to the
Senate.11 Both treaties were used, however, in bring-
ing England to the signature of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. This activity in treaty-making was occasioned
by the acquisition of California and the rush to the
gold fields by way of the isthmus.

During the period that elapsed between Mr. Ban-
croft's withdrawal from London and Mr. Lawrence's
arrival as the representative of the United States, Mr.
Clayton instructed Mr. Rives, who was on his way to
Paris, to stop in London and hold a conference with
Lord Palmerston on the Central American question.
At this date the United States was striving simply
for equal rights in any waterway that might be opened
through the isthmus and not for any exclusive rights.
Mr. Rives declared to Lord Palmerston " that citizens
of the United States had entered into a contract with
the state of Nicaragua to open, on certain conditions,
a communication between the Atlantic and Pacific

10 "Collected Correspondence," p. 94.
1 */&»<*., p. 14.

153

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

oceans by the river San Juan and the Nicaragua lake;
that the government of the United States, after the
most careful investigation of the subject, had come
undoubtedly to the conclusion that upon both legal
and historical grounds the state of Nicaragua was the
true territorial sovereign of the river San Juan as
well as of the Nicaragua lake, and that it was, there-
fore, bound to give its countenance and support, by
all proper and reasonable means, to rights lawfully
derived by their citizens under a grant from that
sovereign/' He further said :

That the United States would not, if they could, obtain any
exclusive right or privilege in a great highway, which
naturally belonged to all mankind, for they well knew that
the possession of any such privilege would expose them to
inevitable jealousies and probable controversies which would
make it infinitely more costly than advantageous ; that while
they aimed at no exclusive privilege for themselves, they
could never consent to see so important a communication
fall under the exclusive control of any other great commer-
cial power; that we were far from imputing to Her Britannic
Majesty's government any views of that kind, but Mosquito
possession at the mouth of the San Juan could be considered
in no other light than British possession, and his lordship
would readily comprehend that such a state of things, so long
as it was continued, must necessarily give rise to dissatisfac-
tion and distrust on the part of other commercial powers."

The negotiations thus opened by Mr. Rives were
continued by Mr. Lawrence upon his arrival in Eng-
land, but were shortly thereafter transferred to Wash-
ington, where Mr. Clayton succeeded in arranging
with Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer the terms of a con-
vention which was signed April 19, 1850. The inten-

** " Collected Correspondence," pp. TI and 12.

154

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

tion of the two governments, as declared in the pre-
amble, was to set forth " their views and intentions
with reference to any means of communication by
ship canal which may be constructed between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the way of the river
San Juan de Nicaragua, and either or both of the lakes
of Nicaragua or Managua, to any port or place on
the Pacific ocean."

By the first article Great Britain and the United
States bound themselves never to obtain or maintain
any exclusive control over the said ship canal; never
to erect or maintain any fortifications commanding
the same or in the vicinity thereof, or to colonize or
exercise dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the
Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America; and
never to make use of any alliance, connection or in-
fluence with any of these states to obtain any unequal
advantages in regard to commerce or navigation
through the said canal.

The second article provided for the neutralization
of the canal in the event of war between the contract-
ing parties. The third guaranteed protection for the
persons and property of the parties legally undertak-
ing the construction of the canal. The fourth related
to gaining the consent of the states whose territory
the canal should traverse. The fifth article provided
for the neutralization and protection of the canal so
long as it was managed without discrimination against
either of the contracting parties, and stipulated that
neither of them would withdraw its protection with-
out giving the other six months' notice. In the sixth
article the contracting parties promised to invite every
state with which they were on terms of friendly in-

155

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

tercourse to accede to this convention. In the seventh
article the contracting parties agreed to lend their sup-
port and encouragement to the first company offering
to construct the canal in accordance with the spirit
and intention of this convention. The eighth article
was of special importance. It declared that " the gov-
ernments of the United States and Great Britain hav-
ing not only desired, in entering into this convention,
to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish
a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their
protection, by treaty stipulations, to any other prac-
ticable communication, whether by canal or railway,
across the isthmus which connects North and South
America, and especially to the interoceanic communi-
cations, should the same prove practicable, whether by
canal or railway, which are now proposed to be es-
tablished by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama." 13

Such are the main stipulations of the celebrated
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which remained in force until
1901, and which during that period probably called
forth more discussion than any treaty which the
United States had ever signed.

In after years a large number of people on this
side of the Atlantic, forgetting the object and aim of
the treaty and the circumstances under which it was
negotiated, thought that the United States conceded
too much and violated the principle of the Monroe
Doctrine in giving England a position and interest
in America which she did not before possess. This
opinion was held by some prominent statesmen at the
time the treaty was negotiated, notably by Buchanan,
who poured forth severe criticism and ridicule upon

»• " Collected Correspondence," p. 99.

156

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

it. While it was before the Senate for ratification,
he wrote to a friend :

If Sir Henry Bulwer can succeed in having the two first
provisions of this treaty ratified by the Senate, he will de-
serve a British peerage. The consideration for our conces-
sions is the relinquishment of the claim to the protectorate
of the Mosquito shore — so absurd and unfounded that it has
been ridiculed even by the London Times. Truly Sir Henry
has brought this claim to a good market when he found a
purchaser in Mr. Clayton. The treaty altogether reverses
the Monroe Doctrine, and establishes it against ourselves
rather than European governments.1*

Let us see what the interests cxf the two signatory
powers were at that time in Central America. The
United States had recently acquired California by
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the rapid de-
velopment of the Pacific states made the canal a ques-
tion of greater importance to the United States than
ever before. The great transcontinental railroads,
which some fifteen years later established direct over-
land communication with the Pacific states, were then
hardly thought of.

England's interest in the canal, on the other hand,
was rather a prospective one, but farsighted as usual,
she had provided for future contingencies by occupy-
ing several years before, under the guise of a pro-
tectorate over the Mosquito Indians, Greytown at the
mouth of the San Juan river, the Atlantic terminus
of the canal. In addition to the Mosquito coast, Eng-
land at this time held the Bay Islands and Belize, or
British Honduras. The United States, it is true, had

14 Mr. Buchanan to Hon. John A. McClernand, April 2, 1850, " American
Hist. Rev.," Oct., 1899.

157

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

never recognized the claims of Great Britain to domin-
ion over the Mosquito coast. These claims, which
dated back to the eighteenth century, when British
wood-cutters in search of mahogany, and smugglers
entered the territory occupied by the Mosquito Indians
and established cordial relations with them, had been
abandoned by the treaty of 1786 with Spain, but were
revived in 1841, when a ship of war was sent to San
Juan del Norte to announce the protection of England
over the lands of the Mosquito king and to raise the
Mosquito flag.15 In 1848 the English and Indians
drove the Nicaraguans out of the town and changed
the name to Greytown.

The United States uniformly denied the rights of
the Mosquito king to sovereignty over the district,
and consequently the pretensions of the inhabitants of
Greytown to political organization or power derived in
any way from the Mosquitos. In his instructions to
Mr. Hise soon after the occupation of Greytown, Sec-
retary Buchanan said:

The object of Great Britain in this seizure is evident from
the policy which she has uniformly pursued throughout her
history, of seizing upon every available commercial point in
the world whenever circumstances have placed it in her
power. Her purpose probably is to obtain control of the
route for a railroad or canal between the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans by way of Lake Nicaragua. . . . The government
of the United States has not yet determined what course it
will pursue in regard to the encroachment of the British
government. . . . The independence as well as the inter-
ests of the nations on this continent require that they should
maintain an American system of policy entirely distinct
from that which prevails in Europe. To suffer any inter-
ference on the part of the European governments with the

18 " Wharton's Digest," Sec. 295.

158

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

domestic concerns of the American republics, and to permit
them to establish new colonies upon this continent, would be
to jeopard their independence and ruin their interests. These
truths ought everywhere throughout this continent to be
impressed upon the public mind; but what can the United
States do to resist such European interference whilst the
Spanish-American republics continue to weaken themselves
by civil divisions and civil war, and deprive themselves of
doing anything for their own protection.

Whatever the rights of the case, Great Britain was
in actual possession of the Atlantic terminus of the
proposed canal, and the United States was not pre-
pared forcibly to oust her, even if such a course had
been deemed advisable. The United States had no
rights in the case at this time by treaty with Nica-
ragua or otherwise, none of the statesmen of that day
having been broad enough in their views or bold
enough to consider the territory of Nicaragua as "a
part of the coast-line of the United States." All that
could be opposed to England's de facto possession
was the Monroe Doctrine, and England held that her
claim antedated the declaration of that principle of
American diplomacy. Mr. Clayton cannot, therefore,
be justly charged with a violation of the Monroe Doc-
trine, for the effect of the treaty was to leave Eng-
land weaker territorially on this continent than she was
before.

The Clay ton-Bui wer treaty left open several minor
questions that required adjustment before the canal
enterprise could be pushed forward with success.
Chief among these were the dispute between Nica-
ragua and Costa Rica in regard to their boundary
line and the controversy between Great Britain and
Nicaragua in regard to the territory claimed by the

159

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Mosquito Indians. In April, 1852, Mr. Webster and
Sir John Crampton agreed upon a basis for the set-
tlement of Central American affairs, and drew up and
signed a proposal to be submitted to Nicaragua and
Costa Rica.16 This proposed basis for a treaty was
rejected by Nicaragua, which left the questions in-
volved in the same unsettled position.

A much more serious obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of the objects of the Clay ton-Bui wer treaty than
the failure of the above proposal arose from the wide
divergence of opinion between the British and Ameri-
can governments in regard to its interpretation. The
discussion involved two principal points : ( i ) Whether
the abnegatory clauses of the first article, were merely
prospective in character and directed against future
acquisitions in Central America, or whether they re-
quired Great Britain to abandon her protectorate over
the Mosquito coast at once; and (2) whether the Bay
Islands came within the purview of the treaty. It
was expressly stipulated that Belize or British Hon-
duras was not included in Central America and there-
fore not affected by the treaty one way or the other.
A declaration to this effect was filed at the state de-
partment by the British minister, Sir Henry Bulwer.
In reply, Mr. Clayton, after conference with the chair-
man of the Senate committee on foreign relations,
acknowledged that British Honduras did not come
within the scope of the treaty, but at the same time
carefully refrained from affirming or denying the
British title to that settlement or its alleged dependen-
cies.17 This left open the question as to whether the

18 " Collected Correspondence," p 102.

1T Ibid., p. 234, also Whar ton's Digest, Vol. II, p. 190.

1 60

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

Bay Islands were dependencies of Belize or of the
Republic of Honduras.

Shortly after the failure of the Crampton-Webster
proposals, Great Britain took advantage of the un-
certainty that existed in regard to the status of the
Bay Islands and by a formal proclamation, issued
July 17, 1852, converted her settlements on those
islands into " The Colony of the Bay Islands." When
the United States government expressed its surprise
at this proceeding, the British government replied that
the Bay Islands were dependencies of Her Majesty's
settlement at Belize and therefore, by explicit agree-
ment, not within the scope of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty.18

In 1856 an effort was made to terminate the diffi-
culties arising out of the different constructions put
upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by the negotiation
of a supplementary convention. On October 17 of
that year a treaty was signed in London by the Ameri-
can minister and Lord Clarendon, known as the Dal-
las-Clarendon treaty. It provided (i) for the with-
drawal of the British protectorate over the Mosquito
Indians; (2) it regulated the boundaries of the Belize
settlements on the basis of a compromise; and (3) it
provided for a cession of the Bay Islands to Hon-
duras, upon condition of the ratification of a treaty
already negotiated between Great Britain and Hon-
duras, which virtually erected an independent state
of the islands, exempt in many particulars from the
sovereignty of Honduras, and under the protectorate
of Great Britain.

The first two clauses were acceptable to the United

18 " Collected Correspondence," p. 248.

161

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

States Senate, but it was deemed proper to amend
the third by striking out all that part of it which
contemplated the concurrence of the United States in
the British treaty with Honduras, and simply to pro-
vide for a recognition by the two governments of
the sovereignty of Honduras over the islands in ques-
tion.19 Great Britain rejected this amendment and
the Dallas-Clarendon treaty fell through. Great Bri-
tain and the United States were thus thrown back
upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with its conflicting
interpretations.

In October, 1857, the President was notified in-
formally that the British government had decided to
dispatch Sir Wm. Ouseley, a diplomatist of well-rec-
ognized authority and experience, to Central America
to make a definite settlement of all matters in dispute
between the United States and England; that the
efforts of the new plenipotentiary would be directed
to those objects which had been dealt with in the
Dallas-Clarendon treaty of 1856, viz., the cession
of the Bay Islands to Honduras, the substitution of
the sovereignty of Nicaragua for the protectorate of
England over the Mosquitos and the regulation of the
frontiers of Belize; that it was the intention of Her
Majesty's government to carry the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty into execution according to the general tenor
of the interpretation put upon it by the United States,
but to do so by separate negotiation with the Central
American republics, in lieu of a direct engagement
with the federal government.20

President Buchanan replied that he would be satis-

19 " Collected Correspondence," p. 286.
*°Ibid., p. 262-263.

162

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

fied with this course and that upon receiving an offi-
cial assurance to that effect, he would change the
character of the message he had already prepared for
Congress. On the 3Oth of November, 1857, tne Brit-
ish government submitted to the United States the
alternative of referring the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to
the arbitration of any European power which the
United States might prefer to select or of adjusting
matters by negotiations with the Central American
republics, as already outlined in Sir William Ouseley's
prospective mission.21

At this stage of the negotiations matters were fur-
ther complicated (i) by the negotiation of the Cass-
Yrissari treaty of November 16, 1857, between the
United States and Nicaragua for protection of the
transit route and (2) by the invasion of Nicaraguan
territory by a band of filibusters under General
Walker, bent on the subversion of the lawful govern-
ment of the country. The treaty was not ratified,
however, and the Walker expedition was arrested by
the interposition of the United States navy.

The United States government not having given
any definite answer to the British proposal to sub-
mit the treaty to arbitration, the British government
delayed dispatching Sir William Ouseley on his mis-
sion. In the negotiations which took place during
this delay the question of the abrogation of the Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty was discussed between the two gov-
ernments. In his message of December 8, 1857, Pres-
ident Buchanan had suggested the abrogation of the
treaty by mutual consent as the wisest course that
could be pursued in view of the increasing complica-

" Ibid., p. 276.

163

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

tions to which the varying constructions of it were
giving rise. The British government took up this
suggestion and expressed its willingness to concur in
such a course, but also expressed the opinion that
the initiative should be taken by the government which
was dissatisfied with its provisions.

The British minister was, however, directed by his
government to make it perfectly clear to the govern-
ment of the United States, that to abrogate the treaty
was to return to the status quo ante its conclusion in
1850; that Great Britain had no kind of jealousy re-
specting American colonization in Central America,
and did not ask or wish for any exclusive privileges
whatever in that quarter.22 Finally, Sir William
Ouseley was dispatched on his mission and during
the years 1859 and 1860 succeeded in negotiating
treaties with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua,
the provisions of which were in substantial accord
with the rejected Dallas-Clarendon treaty.23

The treaty with Nicaragua signed at Managua, Jan-
uary 28, 1860, though restoring to that republic nom-
inal sovereignty over the Mosquito territory, reserved
to the Indians the right of retaining their own cus-
toms, assigned boundaries to that reservation in all
probability greatly beyond its true limits, and con-
firmed grants of land previously made in that terri-
tory. Notwithstanding these facts, in his annual mes-
sage of December 3, 1860, President Buchanan de-
clared that the United States government was satis-
fied with the final settlement. His words were :

22 " Collected Correspondence," p. 280.
28 Ibid., pp. 294-302.

164

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

The discordant constructions of the Clayton-Bulvver treaty
between the two governments, which at different periods of
the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a
final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government.**

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was negotiated with the
expectation that the construction of a ship canal would
rapidly follow, but the unfortunate entanglements that
grew out of the variant constructions put upon that
treaty by the contracting powers deferred to an in-
definite period the accomplishment of the object it
was designed to promote. By the time these differ-
ences were adjusted the attention of the American
public was centered upon the first throes of the gigantic
struggle of the war of secession and the canal ques-
tion was for several years completely overshadowed.
The government of the United States emerged from
that struggle with larger ideas of its position among
the powers of the world and with broader views of
national policy. Mr. Seward gave expression to that
feeling in the purchase of Alaska, in his interposition
in Mexico and in his efforts to secure a position for
the United States in the West Indies. In order to
strengthen the position of the United States he wished
to purchase Tiger Island, a possession of Honduras
in Fonseca bay on the Pacific coast. As this island
lay in Central America, Mr. Seward could not take
any steps in the matter without the consent of Great
Britain, on account of the renunciatory clause with
respect to that territory in the Clayon-Bulwer treaty.
He, therefore, directed Mr. Adams, April 25, 1866,
to sound Lord Clarendon as to the disposition of the
British government toward the United States acquir-

24 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. V, p. 639.

165

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

ing a coaling station in Central America. In this
dispatch we find the first suggestion of a repudiation
of the Clay ton-Bui wer treaty on the ground that it
was a special and not a general contract, and that the
work for which it had been negotiated had never been
undertaken. Mr. Seward uses these words :

At the time the treaty was concluded there was every
prospect that that work would not only soon be begun, but
that it would be carried to a successful conclusion. For
reasons, however, which it is not necessary to specify, it
never was even commenced, and at present there does not
appear to be a likelihood of its being undertaken. It may
be a question, therefore, supposing that the canal should
never be begun, whether the renunciatory clauses of the
treaty are to have perpetual operation. Technically speak-
ing, this question might be decided in the negative. Still, so
long as it should remain a question, it would not comport
with good faith for either party to do anything which might
be deemed contrary to even the spirit of the treaty."

The subject was brought to the attention of Lord
Clarendon in a casual way by Mr. Adams, but it was
not pressed and Mr. Seward refrained from disre-
garding the renunciatory clause of the treaty.

In 1867, a treaty between the United States and
Nicaragua, covering the case of an interoceanic canal,
was negotiated and ratified by both parties. It granted
to the United States the right of transit between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans on any lines of communi-
cation, natural or artificial, by land or by water, then
existing, or that might thereafter be constructed, upon
equal terms with the citizens of Nicaragua, and the
United States agreed to extend its protection to all

" Collected Correspondence," p. 303.

166

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

such routes of communication, and " to guarantee the
neutrality and innocent use of the same/' The United
States further agreed to employ its influence with
other nations to induce them to guarantee such neu-
trality and protection.26

This treaty, like the treaty with Colombia of 1846
and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, contemplated the neu-
tralization of the canal. It in no way infringed our en-
gagements with England under the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, but in providing for the joint guarantee of
other powers, was in accord with the provisions of
that treaty.

In 1873, Mr. Hamilton Fish directed General
Schenck to remonstrate, if upon investigation he found
it to be necessary, against British encroachments upon
the territory of Guatemala as an infringement of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty.27

In spite of the doubts expressed by Mr. Seward in
the dispatch to Mr. Adams above quoted, as to the
perpetual character of the obligations imposed by the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the obligatory force of that
instrument after the readjustment of 1860 was not
seriously questioned until interest in the canal ques-
tion was suddenly aroused anew by the concession
granted by Colombia to Lieutenant Wyse in 1878, and
the subsequent organization of a French construction
company under the presidency of Ferdinand de Les-
seps, the promoter of the Suez canal.

The prospect of the speedy construction of a canal
under French control, for which De Lesseps' name
seemed a sufficient guarantee, produced a sudden and

*• " Collected Correspondence," p. 132.
a? Ibid., pp. 310-12.

167

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

radical change of policy on the part of the United
States. In a special message to Congress, March 8,
1880, President Hayes made the following statement
of what he conceived to be the true policy of this
country in regard to a Central American canal :

The policy of this country is a canal under American
control. The United States cannot consent to the sur-
render of this control to any European power, or to any
combination of European powers. If existing treaties be-
tween the United States and other nations, or if the rights
of sovereignty or property of other nations stand in the way
of this policy — a contingency which is not apprehended —
suitable steps should be taken by just and liberal negotiations
to promote and establish the American policy on this sub-
ject, consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected
by it.

The capital invested by corporations or citizens of other
countries in such an enterprise must, in a great degree, look
for protection to one or more of the great powers of the
world. No European power can intervene for such pro-
tection without adopting measures on this continent which
the United States would deem wholly inadmissible. If the
protection of the United States is relied upon, the United
States must exercise such control as will enable this country
to protect its national interests and maintain the rights of
those whose private capital is embarked in the work.

An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will
essentially change the geographical relations between the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and between
the United States and the rest of the world. It will be the
great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our
Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast-line of the
United States. Our merely commercial interest in it is
greater than that of all other countries, while its relation
to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of
defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of para-
mount concern to the people of the United States. No other
great power would, under similar circumstances, fail to

168

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

assert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally
affecting its interests and welfare.

Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I
repeat, in conclusion, that it is the right and the duty of
the United States to assert and maintain such supervision
and authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus
that connects North and South America as will protect our
national interests. This I am quite sure will be found not
only compatible with, but promotive of, the widest and most
permanent advantage to commerce and civilization.28

The message itself was accompanied by a report
from the secretary of state, Mr. Evarts, in which he
called attention to the mutual engagements entered
into between the United States and Colombia by the
treaty of 1846 in reference to a transit route across
the isthmus and declared that the guarantee of the
neutrality of the isthmus and of the sovereignty of
Colombia over the same would be a very different
thing when the isthmus should be opened to the in-
terests and ambitions of the great commercial na^
tions.29

President Garfield, in his inaugural address, ap-
proved the position taken by his predecessor on the
canal question,30 and very soon after assuming the
portfolio of state, Mr. Elaine outlined the new policy
to our representatives in Europe, cautioning them,
however, against representing it as the development
of a new policy and affirming that it was " nothing
more than the pronounced adherence of the United
States to principles long since enunciated by the high-
est authority of the government. "

** " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VII, p. 585.

" Collected Correspondence," p. 313.
*° "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol, VJIJ, p. "•

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

This dispatch of Mr. Elaine is remarkable for sev-
eral reasons, but chiefly for the fact that it com-
pletely ignores the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, there being no allusion to that celebrated con-
vention either open or implied. Aside from this there
are three points to be noted. In the first place Mr.
Blaine calls attention to the rights and duties devolv-
ing upon the United States from the treaty with
Colombia of 1846, and states that in the judgment of
the President the guarantee there given by the United
States requires no reinforcement, or accession, or
assent from any other power; that the United States
in more than one instance had been called upon to
vindicate the neutrality thus guaranteed; and that
there was no contingency, then foreseen or appre-
hended, in which such vindication would not be within
the power of the nation.

In the second place, Mr. Blaine declared with em-
phasis that during any war to which the United States
of America or the United States of Colombia might
be a party, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile
nation through the canal of Panama would be no
more admissible than would the passage of the armed
forces of a hostile nation over the railway lines join-
ing the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United
States, or of Colombia. This declaration was in direct
opposition to the second article of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. Mr. Blaine then proceeded to expatiate upon
the remarkable development of our Pacific slope and
the importance of the canal in facilitating communica-
tion between our Atlantic and Pacific states, alluding
to the canal in this connection, in the very apt phrase
of President Hayes, as forming a part of the coast*

170

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

line of the United States. It does not appear to have
occurred to Mr. Elaine that the same arguments ap-
plied with equal force to Great Britain's American
possessions to the north of us, which likewise ex-
tended from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and were like-
wise entering upon a period of unusual development.

The third point to be noted in the dispatch is the
statement that the United States would object to any
concerted action of the European powers for the pur-
pose of guaranteeing the canal or determining its
status.81 This declaration was supposed to be nothing
more than a reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine.

A copy of this document was left by Mr. Lowell at
the British foreign office on the I2th of July, 1881.
No formal notice of the dispatch was taken by the
British government until November, when Lord Gran-
ville replied that, as Mr. Blaine had made the state-
ment that the government of the United States had
no intention of initiating any discussion upon this
subject, he did not propose to enter into a detailed
argument in reply to Mr. Elaine's observations. He
wished, however, merely to point out that the position
of Great Britain and the United States with reference
to the canal, irrespective of the magnitude of the
commercial relations of the former power, was de-
termined by a convention signed between them at
Washington on the iQth of April, 1850, commonly
known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and her majes-
ty's government relied with confidence upon the ob-
servance of all the engagements of that treaty.82

Before this reply reached Washington, Mr. Blaine

•* " Collected Correspondence," pp. 322-326.
"Ibid., p. 326.

171

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

had again taken up the question of the canal in a
special dispatch of November 19, 1881. In this dis-
patch he addressed himself specifically to a considera-
tion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and urged upon the
consideration of the British government modifications
of such a radical character as to amount to a complete
abrogation of the treaty. The grounds of objection
to the treaty were stated in full. In the first place
it was declared that the treaty had been made more
than thirty years before under exceptional and ex-
traordinary conditions, which were at least temporary
in their nature and had long since ceased to exist.
The remarkable development of the United States on
the Pacific coast since that time had created new
duties and responsibilities for the American govern-
ment which required, in the judgment of the Presi-
dent, some essential modifications in the treaty. The
objections to the perpetuity of the treaty were then
stated in full. First and foremost was the objection
that the treaty by forbidding the military fortification
of the proposed canal practically conceded its control
to Great Britain by reason of her naval superiority.
The military power of the United States in any con-
flict on the American continent was irresistible, yet
the United States was restrained from using this
power for the protection of the canal, while no re-
strictions could be placed upon the natural advantages
that England enjoyed in this regard as a great naval
power. A more serious objection to the treaty, how-
ever, was urged in the statement that it embodied a
misconception of the relative positions of Great Britain
and the United States with respect to interests on this
continent. The United States would not consent to

172

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

perpetuate any treaty that impeached " our right and
long-established claim to priority on the American
continent."

In the third place, at Jhe time the convention was
agreed upon, Great Britain and the United States were
the only nations prominent in the commerce of Cen-
tral and South America. Since that time other nations
not bound by the prohibitions of that treaty had be-
come interested in Central America, and the republic
of France had become sponsor for a new canal scheme.
Yet by the treaty with England the United States was
prevented from asserting its rights and the privileges
acquired through treaty with Colombia anterior to the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

In the fourth place, the treaty had been made with
the implied understanding that British capital would
be available for the construction of a canal. That
expectation had never been realized, and the United
States was now able to construct a canal without aid
from outside resources.

In conclusion, Mr. Blaine proposed several modifi-
cations of the treaty which would leave the United
States free to fortify the canal and to hold political
control of it in conjunction with the country in which
it might be located.33

A few days after the dispatch was written, Lord
Granville's answer to Mr. Elaine's first dispatch
reached Washington, and on the 2Qth of November,
Mr. Blaine wrote a second dispatch equally volumin-
ous with the one of November 19. In this he re-
viewed the discussions which had taken place between
1850 and 1860 in regard to the treaty with a view to

8S " Collected Correspondence," pp. 327-332.

173

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

showing that it had never been satisfactory to the
United States and had been the cause of serious mis-
understanding. He failed, however, to make mention
of the settlement of 1860 and the declaration of Presi-
dent Buchanan that the United States was satisfied
with that adjustment.

The full reply of the British government to Mr.
Elaine's arguments was given in two dispatches dated
respectively January 7 and 14, 1882. Lord Granville
took exception to certain conclusions which Mr. Elaine
had sought to establish by analogy with the conduct
of Great Britain in regard to the Suez canal. His
lordship fully concurred in what Mr. Elaine had said
as to the unexampled development of the United States
on the Pacific coast, but reminded him that the de-
velopment of her majesty's possessions to the north
of the United States, while less rapid, had been, never-
theless, on a scale that bore some relation even to
that of the Pacific states. In the view of her majes-
ty's government, the changes desired by the United
States would not improve the situation as regarded
the canal, while the declaration that the United States
would always treat the waterway connecting the two
oceans " as part of her coast-line " threatened the in-
dependence of the territory lying between that water-
way and the United States.

Her majesty's government believed that the only
way to relieve the situation was to extend the invita-
tion to all maritime states to participate in an agree-
ment based on the stipulations of the convention of
i850.34

The task of replying to Lord Granville's two dis-

»* " Collected Correspondence," pp. 340-352.

174

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

patches fell upon Mr. Elaine's successor in the State
Department, Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Frelinghuy-
sen's voluminous dispatch of May 8, 1882, reiterated
in the main the arguments advanced by Mr. Elaine.
He adduced evidence at great length to try to show
that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was a special contract
for the accomplishment of a specific object, which had
never been achieved, and was no longer binding; that
Great Britain had violated the treaty by converting
her settlement of British Honduras into a possession
without ever receiving the assent of the United States,
and that such act would entitle the United States to
renounce the treaty. The dispatch was further char-
acterized by a direct appeal to the Monroe Doctrine
in these words:

The President believes that the formation of a protectorate
by European nations over the isthmus transit would be in
conflict with a doctrine which has been for many years
asserted by the United States. This sentiment is properly
termed a doctrine, as it has no prescribed sanction and its
assertion is left to the exigency which may invoke it. It has
been repeatedly announced by the executive department of
this government, and through the utterances of distinguished
citizens; it is cherished by the American people, and has
been approved by the government of Great Britain.

After quoting a part of President Monroe's message
of December 2, 1823, and reviewing the circumstances
under which it was delivered, Mr. Frelinghuysen said :

Thus the doctrine of non-intervention by European powers
in American affairs arose from complications in South
America, and was announced by Mr. Monroe on the sugges-
tion of the official representative of Great Britain."

18 " Collected Correspondence," pp. 160-161.

175

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

In his reply of December 30, 1882, Lord Granville
proved conclusively that Article VIII. of the treaty
was understood by the American government during
the discussions of 1850-1860 as establishing a general
principle applicable to all waterways connecting the
two oceans. In answer to the second point, Lord
Granville adduced the notes exchanged between Mr.
Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer in July, 1850, which
made it perfectly clear that, in the understanding of
both governments at that time, the claims of Great
Britain to Belize or British Honduras were not affected
one way or the other by the treaty.36

In a later dispatch, August 17, 1883, Lord Gran-
ville briefly touched upon Mr. Frelinghuysen's ap-
peal to the Monroe Doctrine, reminding him very
pertinently that neither the American administration
which negotiated the treaty nor the Senate which
ratified it considered that they were precluded by the
utterances of President Monroe from entering into
such a treaty with one or more of the European
powers.37

The correspondence on the treaty closed with Mr.
Frelinghuysen's dispatch of November 22, 1883, in
which he reiterated with no small degree of bluntness
and pertinacity the arguments of his earlier dispatches.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was designed at the time
of its execution to establish a permanent principle of
control over interoceanic communication in Central
America. No provision was made, as in most treaties,
for its abrogation, and the American government could
not terminate it without the consent of Great Britain

89 " Collected Correspondence," pp. 353-359'
87 Ibid., p. 364.

176

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

for fear that she would return to her position of
vantage at the time the treaty was made. For this
reason, while Mr. Frelinghuysen claimed that the
treaty was voidable, he did not actually declare it void.

Mr. Elaine's efforts to secure a modification were
the result of the development of a new policy by the
United States and the arguments presented by Mr.
Elaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen in support of this policy
were disingenuous and flimsy. It may be safely said
that no state papers have ever emanated from our
government on so serious a question equally lacking
in logical consistency and moral force.

The result was that Great Britain refused to consent
to a modification of the treaty and the United States
saw before her the alternative of abiding by the terms
of the treaty or ultimately resorting to war with
England.

In December, 1884, Mr. Frelinghuysen negotiated
a treaty with Nicaragua providing for the construc-
tion of a canal by the United States to be under the
joint ownership and protection of the United States
and Nicaragua. The United States also guaranteed
the integrity of the territory of Nicaragua. When Mr.
Cleveland became president this treaty was still be-
fore the Senate for consideration. Mr. Cleveland
withdrew the treaty, and in his first annual message,
December 8, 1885, reverted to our traditional policy.
He declared himself opposed to entangling alliances
with foreign states and declared :

Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier
dividing the two greatest maritime areas of the world, must
be for the world's benefit, a trust for mankind, to be removed
from the chance of domination by any single power, nor

177

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize for
warlike ambition.88

No discussion as to the validity of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty took place between the two govern-
ments after the close of President Arthur's adminis-
tration. Mr. Cleveland's message above quoted was
accepted as a reaffirmation of the treaty on the part
of the American government.

Upon two occasions subsequently questions arose
between the two governments involving the stipula-
tions of the treaty. In 1888, and again in 1894,
the United States felt called upon to protest against
British interference in the affairs, of the Mosquito
coast.89 The ground of interposition on the part of
Great Britain was alleged to be found in the treaty of
Managua, signed between Great Britain and Nica-
ragua on the 28th of January, 1860. This convention,
it will be remembered, was one of the three treaties
entered into by Great Britain with Central American
republics with a view to removing the causes of dis-
pute in the construction of the Clayton-Bui wer treaty.
The treaty of Managua assigned a district to the
Mosquito Indians within the limits of the republic
of Nicaragua. The sovereignty of Nicaragua over the
district was recognized, but the Indians were secured
in the possession and enjoyment of their own domestic
customs and regulations. It was agreed, however,
that nothing in the treaty should prevent the Mos-
quitos at any subsequent date from voluntarily agree-
ing to absolute incorporation with the republic of

»• " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, p. 327.
«• See Mr. Bayard to Mr. Phelps, Nov. 23, 1888. For. Rel., 1888, Pt. I.
pp. 759-768.

178

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

Nicaragua. By the terms of the treaty the protec-
torate of Great Britain over the Mosquito coast was
to cease three months after the exchange of ratifica-
tions.

In reply to the protest of 1888, Lord Salisbury said
that her majesty's government had no intention to
assert a protectorate in substance or in form over the
Mosquito nation, but that according to the convention
with Nicaragua of 1860, Great Britain undertook "to
secure certain rights and privileges to the Mosquito
Indians, and in the event, which has arisen, of the
Mosquito Indians complaining that their rights are
infringed by Nicaragua, by whom is remonstrance
to be made to Nicaragua unless by Great Britain, with
whom she has concluded the convention in ques-
tion?"40

In the spring of 1894, yet more serious trouble
arose. The Mosquito territory was invaded by the
troops of Nicaragua and Bluefields was surrounded.
The British consul at that point protested against this
act as contrary to the treaty of Managua. The pro-
test being unheeded, a force of troops was landed
from the British ship Cleopatra and on March 9, the
Nicaraguans were forced to retire. Mr. Bayard was
instructed by telegraph " to ascertain and report fully
by cable the occasion for this action." The British
government disavowed all intention of violating the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which it recognized " as ex-
tant and in full force."

In July, 1894, United States marines were landed
at Bluefields to protect American interests and to
restore order. Later the British government assured

•• For. Rcl., 1889, p. 468.

179

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Mr. Bayard that its action had been wholly uncon-
nected with any political or conventional question
touching the Mosquito reservation, but simply to pro-
tect British interests.

By a convention signed November 20, 1894, the
Mosquito Indians surrendered their rights under the
treaty of 1860 and were incorporated with Nicaragua.
This voluntary incorporation took away all further
occasion for interposition on the part of Great Britain,
and Mr. Bayard reported that it was received with
" the most open expression of satisfaction at the for-
eign office." 41

The attempts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to bring
about a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
were, as we have seen, unsuccessful. In fact, their
only effect was to strengthen the British government
for the time being in the determination to hold us
more strictly to the terms of that convention. In 1896
Secretary Olney in a review of the situation declared :

Upon every principle which governs the relations to each
other, either of nations or of individuals, the United States is
completely estopped from denying that the treaty is in full
force and vigor. If changed conditions now make stipula-
tions, which were once deemed advantageous, either inappli-
cable or injurious, the true remedy is not in ingenious at-
tempts to deny the existence of the treaty or to explain away
its provisions, but in a direct and straightforward application
to Great Britain fpr a reconsideration of the whole matter.48

It was precisely in this spirit that Secretary Hay
undertook in 1899 to negotiate a new treaty with Eng-
land. The original draft of the Hay-Pauncefote

41 See Foreign Relations, 1894, App. i. "Affairs at Bluefields," pp.
*a Senate Doc. No. 160, Fifty-sixth Cong., First Sess.

180

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

treaty, signed February 5, 1900, provided for a neu-
tralized canal and drafted for its control rules sub-
stantially in accord with the Constantinople conven-
tion of 1888, providing for the regulation of the
Suez canal. The most important provision of the new
treaty was that authorizing the United States to con-
struct and to assume the management of an isthmian
canal, either directly or through a company. The
United States Senate, however, amended the treaty
in three important particulars: (i) by declaring that
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was theneby superseded ;
(2) by providing that the restrictions in the regula-
tions governing the use of the canal should not apply
to measures which the United States might adopt
for its own defense and for the maintenance of public
order along the canal; and (3) by cutting out entirely
the article providing for the adherence of other
powers. The British government refused to accept
these amendments, and a year elapsed before an agree-
ment was finally reached.43 The revised treaty which
was ratified by the Senate December 16, 1901, was
a compromise between the original draft and the Sen-
ate amendments. The new treaty abrogated in ex-
press terms the Clayton-Bulwer convention, and pro-
vided that the United States might construct a canal
under its direct auspices, to be under its exclusive
management. The principle of neutralization was
nominally retained, but under the sole guarantee of
the United States, with power to police the canal,
and the clause of the first draft forbidding fortifica-
tions was omitted.44

48 Moore, "Digest of Int. Law," Vol. Ill, p. 211.
** Foreign Relations, 1901, p. 245.

181

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

This convention removed the principal diplomatic
obstacles which stood in the way of constructing a
canal through the isthmus. For several years the
United States had been investigating the cost of con-
structing a canal through Nicaragua, that route being
the one which had always been considered most feasi-
ble by the great majority of American engineers. Two
commissions, one in 1895 anc* another in 1897, had
reported favorably on the practicability of that route.
A third commission, headed by Admiral John G.
Walker, was appointed under act of March 3, 1899,
which authorized an expenditure of $1,000,000 for the
purpose of making a thorough investigation of all
available routes. While the Walker commission was
carrying on investigations in Nicaragua, at Panama,
and along the Atrato river, the various financial in-
terests concerned in the choice of routes were actively
at work in Washington, each trying to influence Con-
gress in favor of its particular project. The New
Panama Canal Company had secured, at the time of
the reorganization, an extension of its concession to
October, 1904, and subsequently another concession
to October, 1910, but the validity of the latter arrange-
ment was in doubt. The company could not raise the
necessary funds to continue the work at Panama and
was therefore threatened with the forfeiture of its
franchise and property. It concluded, therefore, that
its only hope lay in transferring its concession and
property to the American government. With this end
in view, an active lobby was maintained at Washing-
ton for the purpose of influencing public opinion in
favor of the Panama route.

But the Panama Company had a powerful rival

182

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

in the Maritime Canal Company, which held a charter
from Congress and had secured a concession from
Nicaragua. This company had started work at Grey-
town in 1890, but having been forced from lack of
funds to stop work in 1893, was now urging Con-
gress to make its enterprise a national one. It found
a ready champion in Senator Morgan of Alabama,
who had for years taken a lively interest in the canal
question and who had strong convictions as to the
superiority of the Nicaragua route. In 1900 Nica-
ragua declared the concession of the Maritime Canal
Company null and void, and granted a new con-
cession to a group of New York capitalists known
as the Grace-Eyre-Cragin Syndicate. The Maritime
Canal Company, however, refused to abandon its
claims, and a contest between the two concerns was
carried to the lobbies of Congress. The opposition of
the transcontinental railroads to a canal at either point
brought into play another set of powerful interests,
usually arrayed against the plan which appeared for
the time being most likely to succeed.45

On November 16, 1901, the Walker commission
after a thorough investigation of the Nicaragua and
Panama routes made its report. It estimated the cost
of construction of the Nicaragua canal at $189,864,062,
and the cost of completing the Panama canal at $144,-
233»35& To this latter sum had to be added the cost
of acquiring the rights and property oTthe French
company, which had stated to the commission that it
estimated its interests at $109,141,500, making the
total cost of the Panama canal $253,374,858. The
commission expressed the opinion that the interests of

48 Johnson, " Four Centuries of the Panama Canal," Chap. VIII.

183

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the French company were not worth over $40,000,000.
In conclusion the report stated :

After considering all the facts developed by the investiga-
tions made by the commission and the actual situation as it
now stands, and having in view the terms offered by the New
Panama Company, this commission is of the opinion that the
most practicable and feasible route for an isthmian canal, to
be under the control, management, and ownership of the
United States, is that known as the Nicaragua route.**

A bill was promptly introduced into the House of
Representatives by Mr. Hepburn providing for the
construction of the canal through Nicaragua, and on
January 9, 1902, this bill passed the House by the
almost unanimous vote of 308 to 2. The report of
the commission had meanwhile created great conster-
nation among the stockholders of the New Panama
Canal Company, and on January 4, 1902, a definite
offer to sell out to the United States at $40,000,000
was made to the commission by cable. On January 18,
the commission filed a supplementary report which
recommended the adoption of the Panama route in-
stead of that through Nicaragua.

When the Hepburn bill came up for discussion in
the Senate, the situation had thus been radically
changed, and a long debate ensued as to the relative
merits of the two routes. Senator Morgan continued
to fight for Nicaragua as the traditional American
route, declaring that the Panama Company could not
give a valid transfer of its property and interests.
But this objection was cleverly met by Senator
Spooner, who offered an amendment, which was vir-

46 Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission (Sen. Doc. No. 54, Fifty-
seventh Cong., First Sess.).

184

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

tually a substitute, authorizing the President to ac-
quire the rights and property of the French company
at a cost not exceeding $40,000,000; to acquire from
the Republic of Colombia, upon such terms as he
might deem reasonable, perpetual control of a strip
of land, not less than six miles in width, extending
from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, with
jurisdiction over said strip; and to proceed as soon
as these rights were acquired, to construct a canal.
But should the President be unable to obtain a satis-
factory title to the property of the French company
and the control of the necessary strip of land from
the Republic of Colombia " within a reasonable time
and upon reasonable terms,'* then he was instructed
to secure control of the necessary strip through Nica-
ragua and to proceed to construct a canal there. The
bill as amended passed the Senate June 19, 1902, by
a vote of 67 to 6. The House at first refused to con-
cur in the Spooner amendment, but after a conference
it finally gave way and the measure was adopted by
a vote of 260 to 8. The act was signed by President
Roosevelt June 28.47

Attorney-General Knox was sent to Paris to make
a thorough investigation of the affairs of the Panama
Company. He reported that it could give a clear title.
The next step was to secure a right of way through
Colombia. After considerable delay Secretary Hay
and Mr. Herran, the Colombian charge d'affaires,
signed, January 22, 1903, a canal convention, by the
terms of which the United States agreed to pay Colom-
bia $10,000,000 in cash and an annuity of $250,000
for the lease of a strip of land six miles wide across

«T U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXII, Pt I, p. 481.

185

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the isthmus. Objection was raised to this treaty
because it failed to secure for the United States full
governmental control over the canal zone, but it was
considered the best that could be gotten and it was
ratified by the United States Senate March 17, 1903.

The Colombian Senate, however, did not regard the
treaty with favor. They felt that Panama was their
greatest national asset, and they knew perfectly well
that in spite of threats to the contrary President Roose-
velt was determined not to adopt the alternative of
the Spooner amendment and go to Nicaragua. After
discussing the treaty for nearly two months, they
finally rejected it August 12 by the unanimous vote
of all the senators present.48 They probably thought
that they could get better terms from the United States
and particularly that they might reserve a fuller
measure of sovereignty over the isthmus. President
Roosevelt declared that the action of the Colombian
Senate was due to an " anti-social spirit " and to the
cupidity of the government leaders, who merely
wished to wait until they could confiscate the $40,000,-
ooo worth of property belonging to the French com-
pany and then sell out to the United States. This view
is not borne out by the dispatches of Mr. Beaupre,
the American minister, who repeatedly warned Sec-
retary Hay that there was a " tremendous tide of
public opinion against the canal treaty," which even
the Colombian government could not ignore. The
charge of bad faith against Colombia does not come
in good grace from a country whose constitution also
requires the ratification of treaties by the Senate.

As soon as the Hay-Herran convention was rejected

48 Senate Doc. No. 51, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess., p. 56.

186

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

by the Colombian Senate, the advocates of the Nica-
ragua route began to take courage and to demand
that as the " reasonable time " allowed in the Spooner
act for the President to acquire the right of way
through Panama had expired, it was now his duty to
adopt the Nicaragua route. The directors of the
French company were again in a state of consterna-
tion. If they could not sell to the United States
they would have to sacrifice their property entirely,
or sell to some other purchaser at a lower figure. It
was rumored that Germany was willing to buy their
interests. The directors of the company were so
completely demoralized that William Nelson Cromwell,
their American attorney, hastened to Paris to dissuade
them from taking any rash step. The rejection of
the Hay-Herran treaty was a great disappointment
to the inhabitants of the isthmus, who considered this
action a sacrifice of their interests, and some of the
foremost citizens conferred with the American agent
of the Panama Railroad Company as to the advisa-
bility of organizing a revolution. Before taking any
step in this direction, it was considered advisable to
send one of their number to the United States, and
Dr. Amador was selected for this mission. He had
conferences with William Nelson Cromwell and with
Secretary Hay. The latter merely outlined what he
considered the rights and duties of the United States
under the treaty of 1846, but refused of course to
commit the government to a definite support of the
revolutionary project. Amador was somewhat dis-
couraged at the result of his conference with Hay,
but his hopes were revived by the sudden arrival
of Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the former chief engineer

187

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

of the French company, who entered with enthusiasm
into the revolutionary scheme.49

The Colombian Congress adjourned October 30
without any reconsideration of the treaty, and Presi-
dent Roosevelt at once ordered the Boston, Dixie, At-
lanta, and Nashville to proceed within easy reach of
the isthmus. Their commanders received orders to
keep the transit open and to " prevent the landing of
any armed force with hostile intent, either govern-
ment or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of
Panama." The Nashville arrived off Colon Novem-
ber 2. It can hardly be denied that these measures
created a situation very favorable to revolution.50

The revolutionists had been greatly disappointed
at Dr. A'mador's failure to get a definite promise of
support from the American government, but their
spirits revived when they learned of the presence
of American war vessels. Still they were slow in
taking advantage of their opportunities and the gov-
ernment at Washington was growing impatient. At
3.40 P. M. November 3 the following dispatch was
sent to the American consuls at Panama and Colon:
" Uprising on isthmus reported. Keep Department
promptly and fully informed. Loomis, Acting." At
8.15 a reply was received from the consul at Panama:
" No uprising yet. Reported will be in the night.
Situation is critical." At 9 P.M. a second dispatch
was received from the same source : " Uprising oc-
curred to-night, 6 ; no bloodshed. Army and navy
officials taken prisoners. Government will be organ-
ized to-night." 51

49 Johnson, "Four Centuries of the Panama Canal," pp. 162-171.
60 Senate Doc. No. 53, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess.
81 House Doc. No. 8, Fifty-eighth Cong., First Sess.

1 88

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

Before the Nashville received the order to prevent
the landing of armed forces, 450 Colombian troops
arrived at Colon. The principal officers were pro-
vided with a special train to take them across the
isthmus to Panama. When they arrived they were
seized by the revolutionary leaders and locked up for
safe-keeping, while the railroad officials saw to it
that there were no trains for their troops to use.
The next day Commander Hubbard landed fifty ma-
rines from the Nashville at Colon, and a day later
the officer in charge of the Colombian forces was
persuaded by a generous bribe to reembark his troops
and leave. Events continued to follow one another
with startling rapidity. On the 6th the de facto
government was recognized and a week later Bunau-
Varilla was received by President Roosevelt as envoy
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Re-
public of Panama. Such hasty recognition of a new
government was of course without precedent in the
annals of American diplomacy, and it naturally con-
firmed the rumor that the whole affair had been
prearranged. On October 10 President Roosevelt
had written a personal letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, edi-
tor of the Review of Reviews, who was a strong ad-
vocate of the Panama route, in which he said :

Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if
Panama were an independent state, or if it made itself so at
this moment ; but for me to say so publicly would amount to
an instigation of a revolt, and therefore I cannot say it."

This letter throws an interesting light on an article
in the Review of Reviews for November of the same

Literary Digest, October 29, 1904.

189

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

year in which Dr. Shaw discussed the question,
" What if Panama should Revolt? " and outlined with
remarkable prophetic insight the future course of
events.

In his annual message of December 7, 1903, the
President discussed the Panama revolution and under-
took to justify his course under the treaty of 1846.
This message failed to allay public criticism, and on
January 4, 1904, he sent a special message to Con-
gress in defense of his action. He held that Colombia
was not entitled " to bar the transit of the world's
traffic across the isthmus/' and that the intervention
of the United States was justified, (i) by our treaty
rights, (2) by our international interests, and (3) by
the interests of " collective civilization." The " legal "
argument in this message, if we may dignify it by
that name, is reported to have been prepared by Root
and Knox, both at that time members of the Cabinet.
Several years later, after Mr. Roosevelt had retired
from the presidency, he expressed the real truth in a

public speech when he said :

If I had followed traditional conservative methods I should
have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two
hundred pages to the Congress and the debate would be
going on yet, but I took the Canal zone and let Congress de-
bate, and while the debate goes on the canal does also.

The reason why the President did not wish the
matter to go before Congress again was that he
had decided upon the Panama route, and he knew
that when Congress convened in December, the situ-
ation remaining unchanged, action would be taken
to compel him to adopt the alternative of the Spooner

190

HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL

amendment and go to the Nicaragua route. His ob-
ject in the hasty recognition of the Panama revolu-
tion was therefore to make the Panama route an ac-
complished fact before Congress should meet. This
was the attitude definitely assumed in the message
of January 4, 1904, in the course of which he said:

The only question now before us is that of the ratification
of the treaty. For it is to be remembered that a failure to
ratify the treaty will not undo what has been done, will not
restore Panama to Colombia, and will not alter our obliga-
tion to keep the transit open across the Isthmus, and to pre-
vent any outside power from menacing this transit.

The treaty referred to was the convention with
Panama which had been signed November 18, 1903,
and which was ratified by the Senate February 23,
1904, by a vote of 66 to 14. By the terms of this
agreement the United States guaranteed the independ-
ence of the Panama Republic, and agreed to pay the
Panama Republic a sum of $10,000,000 upon the ex-
change of ratifications and an annual rental of $250,-
ooo a year beginning nine years thereafter. Panama
on her part granted to the United States in perpetuity
a zone of land ten miles wide for the construction
of a canal, the United States receiving as full power
and authority over this strip and the waters adjacent
as if it were the sovereign of the said territory.53 The
construction of the canal was at once undertaken and
the work was carried through successfully by General
Goethals and a corps of army engineers. It was
opened to commerce August 15, 1914, though it was
not completed at that time and traffic was subsequently
interrupted by landslides.

81 Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 543.

191

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Colombia naturally felt aggrieved at the course
pursued by President Roosevelt and refused to rec-
ognize the Republic of Panama. She objected to his
interpretation of the convention of 1846. In this
convention the United States pledged itself to keep
the isthmian transit open and guaranteed Colombia's
sovereignty over the same. This treaty established
an obligation to Colombia alone, and it is difficult to
accept the President's view that it established an
obligation to the world at large against Colombia.
Colombia demanded that the whole question be sub-
mitted to arbitration. As the United States had al-
ways held the ground that disputes arising out of the
interpretation of treaties should be settled by arbitra-
tion, it was inconsistent for the United States to re-
fuse to arbitrate. But President Roosevelt did refuse.
The Panama episode created strained relations with
Colombia and made a very bad impression throughout
Latin America. The United States has since been
eyed with suspicion by its weaker Southern neighbors.
The Taft and Wilson administrations both tried to
appease Colombia by a money payment, but this sub-
ject will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

192

CHAPTER V
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

THE attempt of Louis Napoleon to establish a Euro-
pean monarchy in Mexico under the tutelage of France
was the most serious menace that republican institu-
tions in the new world have had to face since the
schemes of the Holy Alliance were checked by Monroe
and Canning. The thwarting of that attempt may be
accounted one of the greatest triumphs of American
diplomacy. The internal disorders common to South
and Central American republics have always been a
fruitful source of embarrassment to the United States,
on account of the liability to European intervention to
which these governments continually subject themselves
in such periods by their open and flagrant disregard
of international obligations. Of no country is this
statement truer than of Mexico, where the well-nigh
interminable strife of parties gave rise between the
years 1821 and 1857 to thirty-six different govern-
ments. In 1857 a favorable change occurred in the
affairs of the republic. A constituent congress, elected
by the people of the different states, framed and
adopted a republican constitution which promised
better things for the future. Under the provisions of
this constitution an election was held in July (1857)
and General Comonfort chosen president almost with-
out opposition. His term of office was to begin De-
cember i, 1857, and to continue four years. Within

193

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

one brief month, however, President Comonfort was
driven from the capital, and ultimately from the coun-
try, by an uprising headed by General Zuloaga. As
soon as Comonfort abandoned the presidency, General
Benito Juarez, the president of the Supreme Court of
Justice, became according to the constitution, the presi-
dent de jure of the republic for the remainder of the
unexpired term, that is, until December i, 1861. Gen-
eral Zuloaga had, however, assumed the name of presi-
dent, with indefinite powers, and the entire diplomatic
corps, including the minister of the United States, had
recognized his government. But Zuloaga was speedily
expelled, and the supreme power seized by General
Miramon, the head of the church party, whom the dip-
lomatic corps likewise recognized. Meanwhile Juarez,
the constitutional president, had proceeded to Vera
Cruz, where he put his administration into successful
operation.

For several months, Mr. John Forsyth, the Ameri-
can minister, continued at the city of Mexico in the
discharge of his duties. In June, 1858, however, he
suspended his diplomatic connection with the Mira-
mon government. Our relations, which had been bad
under former governments, were now rendered almost
intolerable under that of Miramon by outrages towards
American citizens and personal indignities to Mr. For-
syth himself. His action was approved by President
Buchanan, and he was directed to return to the United
States. All diplomatic intercourse was thus termi-
nated with the government of Miramon, but as yet
none was established with the Juarez government. The
ultimate success of the latter became, however, so
probable that the following year the President sent

194

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

a confidential agent to Mexico to inquire into and re-
port upon the actual condition of the belligerents, and
in consequence of his report, Mr. Robert M. McLane
was dispatched to Mexico, March 8, 1859, " with dis-
cretionary authority to recognize the government of
President Juarez, if on his arrival in Mexico he should
find it entitled to such recognition according to the
established practice of the United States." On the
7th of April, Mr. McLane presented his credentials
to President Juarez, having no hesitation, he said, " in
pronouncing the government of Juarez to be the only
existing government of the republic." He was cor-
dially received by the authorities at Vera Cruz, and
during all the vicissitudes of the next eight years the
United States government continued to extend its sym-
pathy and moral support to the government of Juarez
as the only one entitled to the allegiance of the people
of Mexico.

Juarez thus came forward, in the role of reformer,
as the champion of constitutionalism and the suprem-
acy of the state against the overreaching power, in-
fluence, and wealth of the church party. He was a
full-blooded Indian, without the slightest admixture
of Spanish blood. In December, 1860, he finally suc-
ceeded in overthrowing the party of Miramon and
driving the latter into exile. Immediately, on reoccu-
pying the city of Mexico, the Constitutionalists pro-
ceeded to execute with severity the decree issued at
Vera Cruz nationalizing or sequestrating the property
of the church.

The most difficult question which the new govern-
ment had to face was that of international obligations
recklessly contracted by the various revolutionary

195

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

leaders who had successively been recognized as con-
stituting the government of Mexico. In consequence
of debts contracted and outrages and enormities per-
petrated, for the most part during the regime of Mira-
mon and the church party, the governments of Eng-
land, France, and Spain determined to intervene in
Mexico.

The grievances of the British government were
based on the following facts : non-settlement of claims
of British bondholders; the murder of the British
vice-consul at Tasco; the breaking into the British
legation and the carrying off £152,000 in bonds be-
longing to British subjects, besides numerous other
outrages committed on the persons and property of
individuals.1

The claims of the British bondholders referred to
had been recognized by the Pakenham convention of
October 15, 1842, and formed into a consolidated fund
of $250,000, which was to be paid off, principal and
interest, by a percentage on import duties at the
custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico. This con-
vention was not carried out by the Mexican govern-
ment, and on December 4, 1851, Mr. Doyle signed on
behalf of Great Britain a new convention, in which not
only the claims under the Pakenham convention, but
others, recognized by both governments, were likewise
formed into a consolidated fund, on which the Mexi-
can government bound itself to pay five per cent, as a
sinking fund and three per cent, as interest until the
debt should be paid off. This five and three per cent,
were to be met by a percentage of customs receipts.

1 Brit, and For. St. Pap., 1861-62, Vol. LII. Also HottSC E*e?,
No. 100, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

196

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

In 1857 tne sinking fund was to be raised to six per
cent, and the interest to four per cent.

Two days after the signing of this Doyle convention
the Spanish minister in Mexico also signed a conven-
tion on behalf of some Philippine missionaries, known
as the " Padre Moran " convention, on almost the
same basis as the British. The consolidated fund in
this case was $983,000, the sinking fund five per cent.,
and the interest three per cent.

The interest was paid on both funds in almost the
whole amount, but the sinking fund was not kept up.
Succeeding agreements were made in 1858, in 1859,
and in 1860, by which the custom-house assignments
to satisfy both conventions (British and Spanish)
were raised from twelve per cent, in 1851, to twenty-
nine per cent, in i86o.2

It will thus be seen that the British and Spanish
claims were perfectly legitimate. The French claims,
however, were of a somewhat different character.
During Miramon's administration arrangements were
made through the agency of Jecker, a Swiss banker,
by which $750,000 were to be raised through an issue
of $15,000,000 of bonds. These bonds fell into the
hands of Jecker's French creditors and were pressed
by the French government, which thus demanded the
repayment of twenty times the original sum advanced.
A claim was made also for $12,000,000 for torts on
French subjects.3

When the Liberal party came into power again in
1860, they were unable to meet the situation and
showed a disposition to question the obligatory force

3 Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LIT, p. 359.
' VVharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 312.

197

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

of engagements entered into by their various revolu-
tionary predecessors. The British government had
undertaken to provide against this contingency upon
the occasion of extending recognition to the Juarez
administration. Under date of March 30, 1861, Lord
John Russell wrote to Sir Charles Wyke, recently ap-
pointed minister to Mexico, as follows :

The instructions addressed to Mr. Mathew, both before
and since the final triumph of the Liberal party, made the
recognition by Great Britain of the constitutional govern-
ment contingent upon the acknowledgment by that govern-
ment of the liability of Mexico for the claims of British
subjects who, either in their persons or in their property,
for a long series of years, can be proved to have suffered
wrong at the hands of successive governments in Mexico.4

And further on in the same communication the
attitude of the British government is expressed yet
more strongly :

Her majesty's government will not admit as an excuse for
hesitation in this respect the plea that the robbery was
committed by the late government. For, as regards this, as
indeed all other claims, her majesty's government cannot
admit that the party who committed the wrong is alone
responsible. Great Britain does not recognize any party as
constituting the republic in its dealing with foreign nations,
but holds the entire republic, by whatever party the govern-
ment of it may from time to time be administered, to be
responsible for wrongs done to British subjects by any party
or persons at any time administering the powers of govern-
ment.

Mexico, however, was slow to admit this principle
of international law. In a letter to Lord John Rus-

* Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LIT, p. 237.

198

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

sell, June 25, 1861, and in other communications, Sir
Charles Wyke urged the necessity of a naval demon-
stration against Mexico. His plan was to take pos-
session of the custom-houses of Vera Cruz, Tampico,
and Matamoros on the Atlantic, and of one or two
on the Pacific, lower the duties so as to attract the
great bulk of trade from other ports, and pay them-
selves by the percentage to which they were entitled
by treaty stipulation.

On the I7th of July, 1861, President Juarez brought
matters to a crisis by the publication of a decree, the
first article of which declared that " all payments are
suspended for two years, including the assignments
for the loan made in London and for the foreign con-
ventions." 5

On the 23rd, Sir Charles Wyke, the British min-
ister, demanded the repeal of this law within forty-
eight hours. On the 24th, the French minister de-
manded its repeal within twenty-four hours. These
demands were not complied with and diplomatic rela-
tions were immediately broken off by the British and
French representatives.

The Spanish government had acted somewhat in ad-
vance of the other governments and was already pre-
paring to back its claims by an armed expedition
against Mexico. The rupture with the British and
French governments very naturally pointed to joint
action with Spain as the best means of securing their
interests. The United States government, which had
just entered upon one of the greatest struggles of
modern times and had its hands practically tied as
far as Mexico was concerned, regarded the contem-

• Brit, aad For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 294.

199

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

plated intervention of European powers in Mexico
with grave apprehension, not to say suspicion. So
great was the uneasiness occasioned in the United
States by the measures in contemplation and so
strong was the desire to ward off the threatened
danger to republican institutions on this continent,
that Mr. Seward authorized (September 2, 1861) the
negotiation of a treaty with Mexico for the assump-
tion by the United States of the payment of the in-
terest, at three per cent., upon the funded debt of
Mexico (the principal of which was about $62,000,-
ooo) for the term of five years from the date of the
decree of the Mexican government suspending such
payment, " provided that the government of Mexico
will pledge to the United States its faith for the reim-
bursement of the money so to be paid, with six per
cent, interest thereon, to be secured by a specific lien
upon all the public lands and mineral rights in the sev-
eral Mexican states of Lower California, Chihuahua,
Sonora, and Sinaloa, the property so pledged to become
absolute in the United States at the expiration of the
term of six years from the time when the treaty shall
go into effect, if such reimbursement shall not have
been made before that time." 6 All this, of course,
was subject to the confirmation of the Senate.

This step was communicated informally to the Brit-
ish and French governments, and the validity of the
convention was to be conditioned upon those govern-
ments engaging not to take any measures against
Mexico to enforce the payment of the interest of the
loan until time should have been given to submit the

• Mr. Seward to Mr. Corwin, Sept. 2, 1861. House Exec. Doc. No. 100.
p. 22, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

200

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

convention to the ratification of the United States
Senate at its approaching session. It was also to be
a condition that, if the convention should be ratified,
Great Britain and France should engage, on their part,
not to make any demand upon Mexico for the interest,
except upon its failing to be punctually paid by the
United States.7

Grave objections to Mr. Seward's plan of paying the
interest on the Mexican debt were entertained both
in Paris and in London. The French minister of
state, M. Thouvenel, said to the British minister at
Paris:

It might not be possible to prevent the United States offer-
ing money to Mexico, or to prevent Mexico receiving money
from the United States, but neither England nor France
ought in any way to recognize the transaction."

Lord Lyons declared to Mr. Seward:

That her majesty's government were as apprehensive as
Mr. Seward himself could be, of an attempt to build upon a
foundation of debts due, and injuries inflicted, by Mexico, a
pretension to establish a new government in that country.
Her majesty's government thought, however, that the most
effectual mode of guarding against this danger would be
for Great Britain, the United States, and France to join
Spain in a course of action, the objects and limits of which
should be distinctly defined beforehand. This certainly ap-
peared more prudent than to allow Spain to act alone now,
and afterwards to oppose the results of her operations, if she
should go too far."

7 Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LIT, p. 325.

8 Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, Sept. 24, 1861. Brit, and For. St. Pap.,
Vol. LI I, p. 329.

9 Earl Lyons to Earl Russell, Oct. 14, 1861. Brit, and For. St. Pap.,
Vol LII, p. 375.

2OI

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

The British government avoided beforehand the
necessity of a point-blank refusal of the plan of Mr.
Seward, in case the treaty should go through, by
declaring that the interest on the funded debt was not
the only cause of complaint, but that there remained
over and above that the outrages perpetrated upon
British subjects still unredressed.

Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the United States min-
ister to England, did not approve the plan of guar-
anteeing the Mexican interest, and in his dispatch to
Mr. Seward of November i, 1861, he expressed his
opinion rather more frankly than is usual for a min-
ister to do in discussing an instruction from the state
department.

You will permit me here, however, to make a single remark
in this connection upon the importance of appearing to divest
the United States of any personal and selfish interest in the
action it may think proper to adopt. The view customarily
taken in Europe is that their government is disposed to resist
all foreign intervention in Mexico, not upon any principle,
but simply because it is itself expecting, in due course of
time, to absorb the whole country for its own benefit. Hence
any proposal like that which I had the honor to receive,
based upon the mortgage of portions of Mexican territory as
security for engagements entered into by the United States,
naturally becomes the ground of an outcry that this is but the
preliminary to an entry for inevitable foreclosure. And
then follows the argument that if this process be legitimate
in one case, why not equally in all. As against Great Britain
and France, it would be difficult to oppose to this the abstract
principle contained in what has been denominated the Monroe
Doctrine, however just in substance."

While Mr. Corwin was still in negotiation with the

»• Thirty-Seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 100, p. 201.
202

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

Mexican government in reference to some method of
releasing Mexico from her complications with the al-
lied governments of Europe, the United States Senate,
in reply to two successive messages of the President,
passed a resolution, February 25, 1862, declaring the
opinion " that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty
that will require the United States to assume any por-
tion of the principle or interest of the debt of Mexico,
or that will require the concurrence of European
powers." This effectually put an end to Mr. Seward'a
plan.

Meanwhile Sir Charles Wyke had reopened nego-
tiations with the Mexican government and negotiated
a treaty which might have satisfied British claims, but
the treaty was thrown out by the Mexican congress by
a large majority, and also disapproved by the British
government in view of an agreement entered into with
France and Spain unknown to Sir Charles Wyke.11

The agreement referred to was the convention
signed at London, October 31, 1861, between Spain,
France, and Great Britain, in reference to the situation
of affairs in Mexico and looking to armed interven-
tion for the purpose of securing their rights. The
preamble of the convention recites that the three con-
tracting parties " being placed by the arbitrary and
vexatious conduct of the authorities of the republic
of Mexico under the necessity of exacting from those
authorities a more efficient protection for the persons
and property of their subjects, as well as the perform-
ance of the obligations contracted toward them by the
republic of Mexico, have arranged to conclude a con-

11 Sir C. Wyke to Earl Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Brit, and For. St.
Pap., Vol. LII, p. 398.

203

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

vention between each other for the purpose of com-
bining their common action." The most important
article of the convention in view of its subsequent vio-
lation by the Emperor Napoleon, was the second,
which declared that :

The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek
for themselves, in the employment of coercive measures
foreseen by the present convention, any acquisition of terri-
tory, or any peculiar advantage, and not to exercise in the
subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character
to impair the right of the Mexican nation to choose and
freely to constitute the form of its own government.

The fourth article, recognizing that the United
States also had claims against Mexico, provided:

that immediately after the signing of the present convention,
a copy of it shall be communicated to the government of the
United States, that that government shall be invited to
accede to it. ... But, as the high contracting parties
would expose themselves, in making any delay in carrying
into effect articles one and two of the present convention, to
fail in the end which they wish to attain, they have agreed
not to defer, with a view of obtaining the accession of the
government of the United States, the commencement of the
above-mentioned operations beyond the period at which their
combined forces may be united in the vicinity of Vera Cruz."

The advisability of inviting the cooperation of the
United States had been the subject of considerable
discussion and difference of opinion among the three
European governments. England and France had
urged the cooperation of the United States, while
Spain had opposed it.

12 Thirty-Seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 100,
pp. 186-7.

204

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

In compliance with the fourth article the conven-
tion was submitted to the government of the United
States by a note dated November 30, 1861, signed
jointly by the representatives of Spain, France, and
Great Britain at Washington.

Mr. Seward's reply conveying the declination of the
United States to the invitation to cooperate with the
three allied European powers in the demonstration
against Mexico was dated December 4, 1861. After
reviewing the substance of the convention, he said :

First. As the undersigned has heretofore had the honor
to inform each of the plenipotentiaries now addressed, the
President does not feel himself at liberty to question, and
he does not question, that the sovereigns represented have
undoubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether
they have sustained grievances, and to resort to war against
Mexico for the redress thereof, and have a right also to levy
the war severally or jointly.

In the second place, Mr. Seward expressed the sat-
isfaction of his government that the allied powers had
clearly repudiated in the convention all idea of carry-
ing on the war for their own ambitious ends and all
intention of exercising in the subsequent affairs of
Mexico any influence of a character to impair the right
of the Mexican people to choose and freely to consti-
tute the form of their own government.

It is true, as the high contracting parties assume, that the
United States have, on their part, claims to urge against
Mexico. Upon due consideration, however, the President
is of opinion that it would be inexpedient to seek satisfac-
tion of their claims at this time through an act of accession
to the convention. Among the reasons for this decision
which the undersigned is authorized to assign, are, first,

205

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

that the United States, so far as it is practicable, prefer to
adhere to a traditional policy recommended to them by the
father of their country and confirmed by a happy experience,
which forbids them from making alliances with foreign na-
tions; second, Mexico being a neighbor of the United States
on this continent, and possessing a system of government
similar to our own in many of its important features, the
United States habitually cherish a decided good-will toward
that republic, and a lively interest in its security, prosperity,
and welfare. Animated by these sentiments, the United
States do not feel inclined to resort to forcible remedies for
their claims at the present moment, when the government
of Mexico is deeply disturbed by factions within, and ex-
posed to war with foreign nations. And of course, the same
sentiments render them still more disinclined to allied war
against Mexico, than to war to be waged against her by
themselves alone.

In conclusion, Mr. Seward referred to the fact that
the United States government had authorized their
representative in Mexico to enter into a treaty con-
ceding to the Mexican government material aid, which
might, he hoped, enable that government to satisfy
the just claims and demands of the allied sovereigns
and so to avert the war which they have agreed
among each other to levy against Mexico.18

As already related, the efforts of the executive in
this direction were not approved by the Senate and
the negotiations in regard to guaranteeing the interest
on the Mexican loan were broken off. The treaty
negotiated by Mr. Corwin was in fact never sub-
mitted to the Senate, for by the time it was ready
the French forces occupied a part of Mexican terri-
tory, and it was feared that a loan to Mexico under

18 House Exec. Doc. No. 100, pp. 187-190, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second
Sess. Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LI I, p. 394.

206

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

such conditions would be considered a breach of
neutrality.

In pursuance of the London convention, Vera Cruz
was occupied in the early part of 1862 by a Spanish
force of 6,000 men under command of Marshal Prim ;
a French force of 2,500, which was largely reinforced
soon afterward ; and a force of 700 British marines.

The first intimation of the real purposes of the Em-
peror Louis Napoleon was given in the letter of in-
structions of M. Thouvenel to the admiral command-
ing the French expedition to Mexico, dated November
n, 1861. He said that in case of the withdrawal of
the Mexican forces from the coast into the interior of
the country, an advance upon the capital might become
necessary. He reminded the admiral of the self-ab-
negatory character of the second article of the conven-
tion, but continued :

There are, however, certain hypotheses which present
themselves to our foresight and which it was our duty to
examine. It might happen that the pressure of the allied
forces upon the soil of Mexico might induce the sane por-
tion of the people, tired of anarchy, anxious for order and
repose, to attempt an effort to constitute in the country a
government presenting the guarantees of strength and
stability which have been wanting to all those which have
succeeded each other since the emancipation.

To such efforts the admiral was expressly told that
he was not to refuse his encouragement.1*

In view of this order, the British government at
once instructed its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that,
while there was nothing to be said against the reason-
ing of the French government in reference to the prob-

14 House Exec. Doc. No. 100, p. 174, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

2O7

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

able necessity of marching against the city of Mexico,
he was to decline to take part in the advance into the
interior, and that the fact, that the whole available
British force was only 700 marines, would be suf-
ficient reason for declining.15

The seriousness of the situation was fully appre-
ciated by the United States government. Shortly after
the occupation of Vera Cruz by the Spanish forces and
the announcement of the outfit of a French force to
follow up the advantage, Mr. Charles Francis Adams
wrote to his government from London :

It is no longer concealed that the intention is to advance
to the capital, and to establish a firm government, with the
consent of the people, at that place. But who are meant by
that term does not appear. This issue is by no means palat-
able to the government here, though it is difficult to imagine
that they could have been blind to it. Feeble murmurs of
discontent are heard, but they will scarcely be likely to count
for much in the face of the obligation under which the action
of the emperor in the Trent case has placed them. The
military occupation will go on, and will not cease with the
limits now assigned to it. It is not difficult to understand the
nature of the fulcrum thus obtained for operations in a new
and a different quarter, should the occasion be made to use
it. The expedition to the city of Mexico may not stop until
it shows itself in the heart of the Louisiana purchase.18

About this time reports began to be circulated that
the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria would
be invited by a large body of Mexicans to place him-
self on the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican
people would gladly hail such a change. To what-

18 Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LIT, p. 381.

16 Adams to Seward, January 24, 1862. House Ex. Doc. No. 100 p. 206,
Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

208

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

ever extent such reports might be credited, the United
States could not call into question the good faith of
the parties to the London convention. The British
government, as the issue showed, acted with perfect
sincerity in the matter; and the Spanish government,
whatever may have been its original intentions, fol-
lowed the lead of Great Britain. When the reports
in regard to Maximilian were first circulated, the Brit-
ish government declared to its agent, Sir Charles
Wyke, that:

If the Mexican people, by a spontaneous movement, place
the Austrian Archduke on the throne of Mexico, there is
nothing in the convention to prevent it. On the other hand,
we could be no parties to a forcible intervention for this
purpose. The Mexicans must consult their own interests.17

At the time, however, the attitude of the British
government was not at all understood. Mr. Adams
wrote :

Great Britain occupies the post of holding the door, whilst
her two associates, with her knowledge, go in, fully pre-
pared, if they can, to perpetrate the act which she, at the
outset, made them denounce, at the same time that she dis-
avowed every idea of being made to participate in it.18

In the face of armed invasion, the Mexican govern-
ment assumed a more reasonable attitude, and on the
1 9th day of February, 1862, the plenipotentiaries of
Spain, Great Britain, and France signed, at Soledad,
with the secretary of state of the Mexican govern-
ment a preliminary agreement or convention, in which

"Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LIT, p. 418.

18 H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, p. 209, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

209

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

they recognized the constitutional government as then
organized. Declaring that they had " no designs
against the independence, sovereignty and integrity of
the Mexican republic," they agreed to open negotia-
tions for the settlement of all the demands which they
had to make at Orizaba. During the negotiations the
forces of the allies were to be allowed to leave the
unhealthy locality of Vera Cruz and occupy the three
towns of Cordova, Orizaba, and Tehuacan, with their
natural approaches. In the event of negotiations be-
ing broken off, the allies agreed to abandon the towns
above named before reopening hostilities.19

The convention of Soledad proved, however, of
short duration. On the pth of April, 1862, the rep-
resentatives of the allies announced in a formal note
to the Mexican government, " that not having been
able to agree about the interpretation which ought to
be given in the present circumstances to the conven-
tion of the 3ist of October, 1861 (the convention of
London), they have resolved to adopt for the future
an entirely separate and independent line of action.
In consequence, the commander of the Spanish forces
will immediately take the necessary measures to re-
imbark his troops. The French army will concentrate
in Paso Aucho as soon as the Spanish troops have
passed from this position, that is to say, probably about
the 2oth of April, thereupon beginning their opera-
tions." 20 According to instructions already alluded
to, the British force, which was limited to 700 marines,
had declined to advance into the interior, and hence
was not present when the breach occurred.

19 H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p. 46, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sets.

20 Ibid., p. 48.

2IO

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

In spite of all appearances to the contrary, the
French government still persisted in disavowing to the
United States government, in the most emphatic terms,
all designs upon the independence of the Mexican re-
public. Even after the rupture at Orizaba, M. Thou-
venel assured Mr. Dayton, the United States minister
at Paris, that all that France wanted was that there
should be a stable government in Mexico, not an
anarchy with which other nations could have no relar
tions.

That if the people of that country chose to establish a
republic it was all well; France would make no objection.
If they chose to establish a monarchy, as that was the form
of government here, it would be charming (charmant), but
they did not mean to do anything to induce such a course of
action. That all the rumors that France intended to establish
the Archduke Maximilian on the throne of Mexico were
utterly without fqundation."

M. Thouvenel's disclaimer to the British government
was equally emphatic.22

To return to the situation of affairs at Orizaba, the
disagreement between the allies requires some explana-
tion. The immediate cause of the rupture and of the
withdrawal from the convention of London was the
protection extended by the French agents to General
Almonte, Padre Miranda, and other leading men of
the reactionary or church party who had been banished
from the country and who now from the French camp
maintained an active correspondence with Marquez,
Cobos, and other notorious chiefs of the armed bands

31 Dayton to Seward, April 22, 1862.

"Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, May rS, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. No. 54.
p. 746, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.

211

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

then in open rebellion against the constituted govern-
ment of the country. Almonte and his associates
openly favored the scheme of placing Maximilian on
the throne.

The Mexican government demanded the removal of
General Almonte and his associates from the camp of
the allies, and in this demand the British and Spanish
representatives concurred. A somewhat stormy con-
ference was held between the commissioners of the
allied powers at Orizaba, April 2, 1862, at which the
French agents virtually said that they did not regard
the convention of London or the preliminaries of Sole-
dad as binding upon them. Specifically then the two
causes of the rupture were ( i ) the persistency of the
French commissioners in opposing the removal of the
Mexican exiles, and (2) their refusal to take part in
the conferences which had been arranged by the con-
vention of Soledad to be held with the Juarez govern-
ment at Orizaba, April 15, 1862. The British govern-
ment heartily approved of the action of its agent, Sir
Charles Wyke, in breaking up the conference and put-
ting an end to the joint action of the three powers.23
The policy of Spain was completely in accord with that
of England.

The French government was not satisfied with the
convention of Soledad, but did not dispute its validity,
and declared that if the negotiations should be broken
off, its provisions in regard to the withdrawal of the
troops from their vantage ground must be observed.
The French government further assumed that, when
negotiations with the Mexican government should be
broken off, the allied forces would proceed to act

« Earl Russell to Sir C. Wyke, May 22, 1862.

212

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

jointly under the convention of London.24 The Brit-
ish and Spanish governments, however, having become
convinced of the duplicity of the French government
in the matter, terminated the London convention with-
out further discussion and ordered the immediate
withdrawal of their forces and agents from Mexican
territory.

The government of Louis Napoleon, thus left to its
own devices by the withdrawal of Great Britain and
Spain, and by the helpless condition, for the time be-
ing, to which the war of secession had reduced the
government of the United States, greatly reinforced
its Mexican expedition and placed General Forey in
command. Soon after the withdrawal of the British
and Spanish contingents, General Almonte instituted a
government in the territory occupied by the French
and assumed the title of " Supreme Chief of the Na-
tion," but it soon became evident, as Mr. Dayton ex-
pressed it, that instead of the emperor having availed
himself of the services of General Almonte, Almonte
had availed himself of the services of the emperor.
Accordingly, shortly after General Forey assumed
command, he issued an order dissolving the ministry
of Almonte, depriving him of his title and limiting him
thereafter " in the most exact manner to the instruc-
tions of the emperor, which are to proceed as far as
possible, with other Mexican generals placed under
the protection of our flag, to the organization of the
Mexican army."

The misfortunes which had overtaken Mexico and
the dangers that threatened the permanence of her re-

34 Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, April 25, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. No. 54,
p. 694, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.

2I3

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

publican institutions, had now thoroughly alarmed her
sister republics of Central and South America, and a
correspondence began between them relative to organ-
izing an international American conference to oppose
European aggression.

During the remarkable series of events that took
place in Mexico in the spring of 1862, Mr. Seward
consistently held to the opinion well expressed in a
dispatch to Mr. Dayton, June 21, 1862 :

France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to
determine for herself the cause. We have a right and
interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she
makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican and anti-
American government, or to maintain such a government
there. France has disclaimed such designs, and we, besides
reposing faith in the assurances given in a frank, honorable
manner, would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not
anticipate a violation of them.25

For some months the French troops gradually ex-
tended their military operations and occupied a greater
extent of territory without, however, any material
change in the situation. The Juarez government still
held the capital. In the spring of 1863, however, mili-
tary operations were pushed forward with greater ac-
tivity, and in June, General Forey organized a junta of
government composed of thirty-five Mexican citizens
designated by decree of the French emperor's minister.
The members of this supreme junta were to associate
with them two hundred and fifteen citizens of Mexico
to form an assembly of two hundred and fifty
notables. This assembly was to occupy itself with

11 H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p. 530, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sesf.

214

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

the form of the permanent government of Mexico.
The junta appointed an executive body of three, of
whom General Almonte was the head.

On the loth of July, 1863, the capital of Mexico
was occupied by the French army, and on the follow-
ing day the Assembly of Notables declared :

1. The Mexican nation adopts as its form of government
a limited hereditary monarchy, with a Catholic prince.

2. The sovereign shall take the title of Emperor of
Mexico.

3. The imperial crown of Mexico is offered to his im-
perial and royal highness the Prince Ferdinand Maximilian,
Archduke of Austria, for himself and his descendants.

4. If, under circumstances which cannot be foreseen, the
Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand Maximilian, should not take
possession of the throne which is offered to him, the Mexican
nation relies on the good will of his majesty, Napoleon III,
Emperor of the French, to indicate for it another Catholic
prince."

The crown of Mexico was formally offered to Maxi-
milian by a deputation of Mexicans headed by Senor
Estrada, October 3, 1863; but Maximilian replied that
he could not accept the proffered throne until the
whole nation should " confirm by a free manifestation
of its will the wishes of the capital.'' This was a wise
decision, had it been given in good faith and had it
been wisely adhered to, but the sequel shows that the
archduke was either not sincere in his protestations or
else was woefully deceived by representations subse-
quently made to him. Six months later he accepted
the crown without the question having been submitted

3$ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. u, pp. 254-268, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess.

215

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

to the wishes of any but a very small portion of the
Mexican people.

In spite of the declaration of the Mexican Assembly,
which showed so unmistakably the hand of Napoleon,
the French government continued to repudiate the
designs imputed to it against the independence of
Mexico, and Mr. Seward continued to express, offi-
cially at least, the satisfaction of the American gov-
ernment at the explanations vouchsafed by France.
September n, 1863, he stated the case as follows:

When France made war against Mexico, we asked of
France explanations of her objects and purposes. She
answered, that it was a war for the redress of grievances;
that she did not intend to permanently occupy or dominate
in Mexico, and that she should leave to the people of
Mexico a free choice of institutions of government. Under
these circumstances the United States adopted, and they have
since maintained entire neutrality between the belligerents,
in harmony with the traditional policy in regard to foreign
wars. The war has continued longer than was anticipated.
At different stages of it France has, in her intercourse with
us, renewed the explanations before mentioned. The French
army has now captured Pueblo and the capital, while the
Mexican government, with its principal forces, is under-
stood to have retired to San Luis Potosi, and a provisional
government has been instituted under French auspices in the
city of Mexico, which being supported by arms, divides the
actual dominion of the country with the Mexican govern-
ment, also maintained by armed power. That provisional
government has neither made nor sought to make any com-
munication to the government of the United States, nor has
it been in any way recognized by this government. France
has made no communication to the United States concerning
the provisional government which has been established in
Mexico, nor has she announced any actual or intended de-
parture from the policy in regard to that country which her

2l6

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

before-mentioned explanations have authorized us to expect
her to pursue.27

The probable acceptance of the crown by Maxi-
milian was, however, the subject of frequent communi-
cations between the governments of France and the
United States. In the course of a somewhat familiar
conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French
minister of state, in August, 1863, Mr. Dayton ex-
pressed the fear that in quitting Mexico France might
leave a puppet behind her. De Lhuys replied : " No ;
the strings would be too long to work."

The chances of Maximilian's success in Mexico had
been from the first deliberately calculated on the basis
of the probable success of the Southern Confederacy;
and, therefore, the cause of the Juarez government and
the cause of the Union were considered the same. The
active sympathy of the Unionists with the Mexican
republic made it difficult for the administration to
maintain neutrality. This difficulty was further en-
hanced by the doubt entertained in the United States
as to the intentions of France. In this connection Mr.
Seward wrote to Mr. Dayton, September 21, 1863, as
follows :

The President thinks it desirable that you should seek an
opportunity to mention these facts to Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys,
and to suggest to him that the interests of the United States,
and, as it seems to us, the interests of France herself, re-
quire that a solution of the present complications in Mexico
be made, as early as may be convenient, upon the basis of
the unity and independence of Mexico.28

27 Seward to Motley, Sept. xi, 1863, Dipl. Corr., 1863; Sen. Ex. Doc.
No, ii, p. 479, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess.

88 Sen. Ex. Doc. No* n, p. 464, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess.

217

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

In reply, the French minister declared that the ques-
tion of the establishment of Maximilian on the Mexi-
can throne was to be decided by a majority vote of the
entire nation; that the dangers of the government of
the archduke would come principally from the United
States, and the sooner the United States showed itself
satisfied, and manifested a willingness to enter into
peaceful relations with that government, the sooner
would France be ready to leave Mexico and the new
government to take care of itself, which France would,
in any event, do as soon as she with propriety could;
but that she would not lead or tempt the archduke
into difficulty, and then desert him before his govern-
ment was settled. He said that the early acknowl-
edgment of that government by the United States
would tend to shorten, or perhaps to end, all the
troublesome complications of France in that country;
that they would thereupon quit Mexico.29

To this communication, Mr. Seward replied that the
French government had not been left uninformed of
the opinion of the United States that the permanent
establishment of a foreign and monarchical govern-
ment in Mexico would be found neither easy nor de-
sirable ; that the United States could not anticipate the
action of the Mexican people; and that the United
States still regarded Mexico as the scene of a war
which had not yet ended in the subversion of the
government long existing there, with which the United
States remained in the relation of peace and friend-
ship.30

29 Dayton to Seward, Oct. g, 1863, Sen. Ex. PPC, No. 11, p. 47», Thirty-
eighth Cong., First Sess.

»° Seward to Dayton, Oct 23, 1863. Ibid,

2lS

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

Before formally accepting the crown, the archduke
visited England with a view to securing a promise of
recognition for his new position. He was, of course,
to pass through Paris, and in view of his approaching
visit, Mr. Dayton asked for instructions as to his con-
duct on the occasion. Mr. Seward replied, February
27, 1864:

I have taken the President's direction upon the question.
If the Archduke Maximilian appears in Paris only in his
character as an imperial prince of the house of Hapsburg,
you will be expected to be neither demonstrative nor reserved
in your deportment toward him. If he appears there with
any assumption of political authority or title in Mexico, you
will entirely refrain from intercourse with him. Should
your proceeding be a subject of inquiry or remark, you will
be at liberty, in the exercise of your own discretion, to say
that this government, in view of its rights and duties in the
present conjuncture of its affairs, has prescribed fixed rules
to be observed, not only by this department, but by its repre-
sentatives in foreign countries. We acknowledge revolutions
only by direction of the President, upon full and mature con-
sideration.'1

The archduke visited London in company with his
father-in-law, Leopold of Belgium. The British gov-
ernment declined to act on the subject at that juncture,
" but gave them reason to hope that, so soon as the
action in Mexico would appear to justify it, they would
acknowledge him." 32 Spain and Belgium were ready
to follow in the wake of France.

About the time of this visit of Maximilian to Eng-
land, Mr. McDougall, of California, introduced in
the Senate a resolution declaring " that the movements

11 Dip. Corr., 1864.

•3 Adams to Seward, March 24, 1864.

219

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

of the government of France, and the threatened
movement of an emperor, improvised by the Emperor
of France, demand by this republic, if insisted upon,
war." This resolution was not carried, but some days
later, on the 4th of April, 1864, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed by a unanimous vote a resolution
declaring its opposition to the recognition of a mon-
archy in Mexico. Mr. Seward, fearing a rupture with
France on this account, took pains to inform the gov-
ernment of that country, through Mr. Dayton, that
this action of the House was in no way binding on the
executive, even if concurred in by the Senate.

The formal acceptance of the crown of Mexico by
Maximilian took place April 10, 1864, at Miramar, the
palace he had built near Trieste, in the presence of the
Mexican deputation. The next day the Emperor and
Empress of Mexico, as they styled themselves, set out
for their new dominions by way of Rome, where they
received the blessing of the Pope. Before leaving
Europe Maximilian signed with the Emperor of the
French a convention in the following terms :

The French troops in Mexico were to be reduced
as soon as possible to 25,000 men.

The French troops were to evacuate Mexico in pro-
portion as the Emperor of Mexico could organize
troops to replace them.

The " foreign legion," composed of 8,000 men, was
to remain in Mexico six years after all the other
French troops should have been recalled.

The expenses of the French expedition to Mexico,
to be paid by the Mexican government, were fixed at
the sum of two hundred and seventy million francs
for the whole duration of the expedition down to

220

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

July i, 1864. From July ist all expenses of the Mexi-
can army were to be met by Mexico.33

The resolution of the House referred to above came
very near producing the rupture that Mr. Seward was
striving to avert, or at least to postpone, during the
continuance of the war of secession. When Mr. Day-
ton visited M. Drouyn de Lhuys just after the resolu-
tion reached Europe, the remark which greeted Mr.
Dayton when he entered the room was : " Do you
bring us peace, or bring us war?" Mr. Dayton re-
plied that he did not think France had a right to
think that the United States was about to make war
against her on account of anything contained in that
resolution; that it embodied nothing more than the
principles which the United States had constantly held
out to France from the beginning.

The Confederate agents were taking advantage of
the resolution to stir up trouble between the United
States and France. In fact they had long caused
reports to be spread in Europe, and had succeeded
in gaining credence for them, to the effect that the
United States government was only awaiting the ter-
mination of domestic troubles to drive the French
from Mexico. The French naturally concluded that
if they were to have trouble with the United States,
it was safest for them to choose their own time.84
Napoleon was all the while coquetting with the Con-
federate government, and holding above Mr. Seward's
head a veiled threat of recognition of Confederate in-
dependence. The Confederate government quickly
caught at the suggestion of an alliance between Maxi-

88 Dipl. Corn, 1865, Part III, pp. 356-849.

84 Dipl. Corr., 1864; also Sen. Ex. Doc. No. n, Thirty-eighth Cong.,
First Sess.

221

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

milian and the South with the power of France to
back them. A Confederate agent was actually ac-
credited to the government of Maximilian, but did not
reach his destination. Although Napoleon's calcula-
tions were based on the overthrow of the Union, and
although he had assumed at the outset, with England
and Spain, an attitude decidedly unfriendly to the Fed-
eral government, nevertheless he was not willing to
go the full length of recognizing the Confederacy as
an independent power while the issue of the conflict
was still in doubt.

In speaking of Slidell's movements in Europe and
the encouragement given him in France, Mr. Bigelow
wrote to Mr. Seward, February 14, 1865 :

I am strongly impressed with the conviction that, but for
the Mexican entanglement, the insurgents would receive very
little further countenance from the imperial government, and
that a reconciliation of the national policies of the two
countries on that question would speedily dispose of all other
sources of dissatisfaction.

As the war of secession seemed nearing its end, the
French papers became uneasy in view of possible inter-
vention in Mexico by the United States on the ground
of the Monroe Doctrine. This principle of American
diplomacy, which was likened to the sword of Damo-
cles suspended over the head of Maximilian, was
discussed in all its bearings on the present case by the
journals of Europe.85

Throughout all this period of turmoil, the United
States recognized no authority in Mexico but that of
the Juarez government. In April, 1864, the French

•• Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III, pp. 380-385.

222

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

minister at Washington complained that serious com-
plications with France were likely to arise out of
grants of land made by "ex-President Juarez" in
Sonora to emigrants from California. The French
government regarded these grants as illegal and pro-
posed to send forces there to prevent the parties from
taking " illicit possession."

In May, 1864, the French government sought ex-
planations in regard to a club formed in New Orleans,
called the " D. M. D.," Defenders of the Monroe Doc-
trine. Mr. Seward replied that the object of the club,
so far as the government had been able to ascertain,
was to bring moral influences to bear upon the gov-
ernment of the United States in favor of a mainte-
nance of the Monroe Doctrine, but not to act in vio-
lation of the law, or of the well-understood govern-
mental policy of neutrality in the war which existed
between France and Mexico. Members of the associa-
tion did, however, actually start on an expedition to
Brownsville, but the steamer was taken possession of
by United States officials. During the year 1864 con-
stant complaint was made by the French government
of shipments of arms to the Juarez government from
California and from various points along the Rio
Grande, particularly Brownsville, in violation of
American neutrality.

Shortly after the surrender of General Lee, several
Confederate officers of high position and influence went
to Mexico and identified themselves with the govern-
ment of Maximilian. Dr. Wm. M. Gwin, a former
United States Senator from California, organized a
plan for colonizing the states of northern Mexico with
ex-Confederates. This scheme was the subject of sev-

223

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

eral representations to the French government on the
part of Mr. Seward. He reminded them that the sym-
pathies of the American people were already consider-
ably excited in favor of the republic of Mexico; that
they were disposed to regard with impatience the con-
tinued intervention of France in that country; and
that any favor shown to the proceedings of Dr. Gwin
by the titular Emperor of Mexico or by the imperial
government of France would tend greatly to increase
the popular impatience. He further requested an as-
surance that the pretenses of Dr. Gwin and his asso-
ciates were destitute of any sanction from the Emperor
of France.

Among the most prominent Confederates connected
with this scheme were Matthew F. Maury, the dis-
tinguished geographer and naval officer, who became
a naturalized Mexican citizen and was appointed Im-
perial Commissioner of Immigration and an honorary
councillor of state; and General John B. Magruder,
who was charged with the supervision of the survey of
lands for colonization. It was hoped that the promi-
nence of these men and the high rank they had held
under the Confederate government would, in the gen-
eral uncertainty that prevailed as to the treatment of
the South by the victorious Union party, induce many
persons to emigrate to Mexico. Maximilian issued a
special decree, September 5, 1865, regarding coloniza-
tion with a view to inducing Southern planters to emi-
grate to Mexico with their slaves — the latter to be
reduced to a state of peonage, regular slavery being
prohibited by the laws of the empire. This scheme
was altogether impracticable.

In July, 1865, Maximilian finally made an effort to
224

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

secure recognition of his government by the United
States. On the I7th of July, the Marquis de Mon-
tholon, the French minister at Washington, called at
the department of state and informed Mr. Seward
that a special agent had arrived at Washington, bear-
ing a letter signed by Maximilian and addressed to
the President of the United States, a copy of which
the marquis presented to the secretary of state. On
the 1 8th, Mr. Seward delivered back the copy of the
letter to the Marquis de Montholon, and said that, as
the United States were on friendly relations with the
republican government of Mexico, the President de-
clined to receive the letter or to hold any intercourse
with the agent who brought it. The French govern-
ment expressed to its representative at Washington
its annoyance and embarrassment at this step, and
said that Maximilian should have taken measures to
learn the disposition of the United States before send-
ing the agent.86

Mr. Tucker, in his book on the Monroe Doctrine,
makes the statement that Mr. Bigelow, who succeeded
Mr. Dayton as minister to France, announced to the
French government that the United States would rec-
ognize the empire of Maximilian upon the immediate
withdrawal of the French troops from the territory of
Mexico, but that this statement, made upon the envoy's
own authority, was disavowed by the President. This
is hardly a correct version of the case. It seems that
Mr. Bigelow, in the course of a conversation with M.
Drouyn de Lhuys, asked him, " in his own name, and
without prejudicing the opinion of his government, if
he did not think that the recognition of Maximilian by

«• Dipl. Corn 1865, Part III.

225

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the United States would facilitate and hasten the re-
call of the French troops." 3T

On the 3rd of October, 1865, Maximilian issued a
decree at the city of Mexico, the first article of which
declared :

All persons belonging to armed bands or corps, not legally
authorized, whether they proclaim or not any political princi-
ples, and whatever be the number of those who compose the
said bands, their organization, character and denomination
shall be tried militarily by the courts-martial; and if found
guilty even of the only fact of belonging to the band, they
shall be condemned to capital punishment, within the twenty-
four hours following the sentence."

The United States, through Mr. Bigelow, protested
to France against this decree, as repugnant to the
sentiments of modern civilization and the instincts of
humanity. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied with a touch
of sarcasm:

Why do you not go to President Juarez ? We are not the
government of Mexico and you do us too much honor to
treat us as such. We had to go to Mexico with an army to
secure certain important interests, but we are not responsible
for Maximilian or his government. He is accountable to you,
as to any other government, if he violated its rights, and you
have the same remedies there that we had."

The American government was now relieved from
the burden of civil war, and for several months the
correspondence of Mr. Seward had been assuming a
more decided tone. On September 6, 1865, he re-
minded the French government that the attention of

»T Tucker, p. 104; Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III.
«• Sen. Ex: Doc. No. 5, p. 3, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.
••Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward, Nov. 30, 1865, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 5,
Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.

226

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

the country was now no longer occupied by the civil
war, and that henceforth both the Congress and the
people of the United States might be expected to give
a very large share of their attention to questions of
foreign policy, chief among which was likely to be
that of their relations with France in regard to Mexico.
About this time Major General Schofield was sent to
Paris on a mission, the precise object of which was
long a matter of mystery. It appears from John Bige-
low's memoirs that Grant, Schofield, and a number of
other army officers were bringing great pressure to
bear upon the government to intervene by force and
drive Maximilian from Mexico. Seward, with his
usual political sagacity, concluded that the best method
of holding Grant and his followers in check was to
send Schofield to Paris on an informal mission. Ac-
cording to the latter, Seward said to him : " I want
you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahogany and
tell him he must get out of Mexico." Seward knew
perfectly well that Schofield would not be as belliger-
ent in the presence of the Emperor as he was in Wash-
ington, and above all he had confidence in Bigelow's
tact and ability to handle Schofield when he arrived in
Paris. The plan worked beautifully. Neither Bige-
low nor Schofield reported just what took place at the
interview with the Emperor, but we may be sure that
Schofield did not say in Paris what he had intended
to say when he left Washington. After Bigelow re-
turned from Paris in 1867, he had a conversation with
Seward in which the latter said:

I sent General Schofield to Paris to parry a letter brought
to us from Grant insisting that the French be driven head

227

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

over heels and at once out of Mexico. It answered my pur-
pose. It gave Schofield something to do, and converted him
to the policy of the Department by convincing him that the
French were going as fast as they could. That pacified
Grant and made everything easy.40

On November 6 Seward wrote:

The presence and operations of a French army in Mexico,
and its maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force
and not the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause
of serious concern to the people of the United States. . . .
They still regard the effort to establish permanently a foreign
and imperial government in Mexico as disallowable and im-
practicable. For these reasons they could not now agree to
compromise the position they have hitherto assumed. They
are not prepared to recognize any political institutions in
Mexico which are in opposition to the republican govern-
ment with which we have so long and so constantly main-
tained relations of amity and friendship.

Finally, on December 16, 1865, Seward addressed
what was practically an ultimatum to France. He
pointed out the likelihood that Congress, then in ses-
sion, would direct by law the action of the executive
on this important subject, and stated that :

It has been the President's purpose that France should be
respectfully informed upon two points, namely: First, that
the United States earnestly desire to continue and to cultivate
sincere friendship with France. Second, that this policy
would be brought into imminent jeopardy, unless France
could deem it consistent with her interest and honor to desist
from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico, to
overthrow the domestic republican government existing there,
and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which

40 Bigelow, " Retrospections of an Active Life," Vol. IV, p. 42; Ban-
croft, " Life of Seward," Vol. JI, p. 435.

228

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that
country.

In conclusion he added :

It remains now only to make known to M. Drouyn de
Lhuys my profound regret that he has thought it his duty
to leave the subject, in his conversation with you, in a
condition that does not authorize an expectation on our part
that a satisfactory adjustment of the case can be effected on
any basis that thus far has been discussed.

As late as November 29, 1865, the French govern-
ment, through the Marquis de Montholon, still in-
sisted on recognition of Maximilian by the United
States as the only basis for an arrangement for the
recall of the French troops.41

The formal reply to Mr. Seward's note of December
1 6 was received through the Marquis de Montholon,
January 29, 1866. M. Drouyn de Lhuys still insisted
that the French expedition had in it nothing hostile to
the institutions of the new world, and assuredly still
less to those of the United States. He called attention
to the fact that the United States had acknowledged
the right of France to make war on Mexico, and con-
tinued : " On the other part, we admit, as they do, the
principle of non-intervention ; this double postulate in-
cludes, as it seems to me, the elements of an agree-
ment/' He also contended that the right to make
war implied the right to secure the results of war;
that they had to demand guarantees, and these guar-
antees they could not look for from a government
whose bad faith they had proven on so many occa-

41 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, p. 98, Thirty -ninth Cong., First Sess.

229

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

sions; that they found themselves engaged in the
establishment of a regular government, which showed
itself disposed to keep its engagements; that the Mexi-
can people had spoken, and that the Emperor Maxi-
milian had been called to the throne by the will of the
people of the country.42

Mr. Seward's counter-reply was dated February 12,
1866. He declared that the proceedings in Mexico
were regarded in the United States as having been
taken without the authority, and prosecuted against
the will and opinions of the Mexican people; that the
United States had not seen any satisfactory evidence
that the people of Mexico had spoken and called into
being or accepted the so-called empire, and that the
withdrawal of the French troops was deemed neces-
sary to allow such a proceeding to be taken. He
added, however, that :

France need not for a moment delay her proposed with-
drawal of military forces from Mexico, and her putting the
principle of non-intervention into full and complete practice
in regard to Mexico through any apprehension that the
United States will prove unfaithful to the principles and
policy in that respect which, on their behalf, it has been my
duty to maintain in this now very lengthened corre-
spondence.48

He concluded with a virtual ultimatum :

We shall be gratified when the Emperor shall give to us
. . . definite information of the time when French military
operations may be expected to cease in Mexico.

48 House Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.
•» Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III; also H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-ninth-
Cong., First Sess.

230

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

Napoleon finally decided that, in view of the Euro-
pean situation, he could not risk a war with the United
States, and in the issue of April 5, 1866, the Moniteur
announced that the Emperor had decided that the
French troops should evacuate Mexico in three de-
tachments: the first to leave in November, 1866; the
second in March, 1867; and the third in November,
1867. In the course of a conversation with Mr. Bige-
low the day following M. Drouyn de Lhuys acknowl-
edged that this statement was official.44 The decision
of the emperor was officially made known to the
United States in a note of April 21, 1866. Seward
had very fortunately left a loophole in his dispatch of
February 12, in the statement that the United States
would continue to pursue its policy of neutrality after
the French evacuation. De Lhuys said :

We receive this assurance with entire confidence and we
find therein a sufficient guarantee not any longer to delay
the adoption of measures intended to prepare for the return
of our army.40

American historians have usually attributed Na-
poleon's backdown to Seward's diplomacy supported
by the military power of the United States, which was,
of course, greater then than at any other time in our
history. All this undoubtedly had its effect on Na-
poleon's mind, but it appears that conditions in Europe
just at that particular moment had an even greater
influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican
scheme. Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's
ultimatum Napoleon was informed of Bismarck's de-

44 H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, p. 42, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.
*• Ibid.

231

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

termination to force a war with Austria over the
Schleswig-Holstein controversy. Napoleon realized
that the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without
any corresponding gains by France, would be a serious
blow to his prestige and in fact endanger his throne.
He at once entered upon a long and hazardous diplo-
matic game in which Bismarck outplayed him and
eventually forced him into war. In order to have a
free hand to meet the European situation he decided
to yield to the American demands.

About the time that the French government an-
nounced its intention of withdrawing its forces from
Mexico, it was found that troops were being enlisted
in Austria for the Mexican " foreign legion." The
United States government at once took measures to
prevent the French troops from being replaced by
Austrians by declaring to the Austrian government
through Mr. Motley, " that in the event of hostilities
being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian sub-
jects, under the command or with the sanction of the
government of Vienna, the United States will feel
themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as con-
stituting a state of war by Austria against the republic
of Mexico; and in regard to such war, waged at this
time and under existing circumstances, the United
States could not engage to remain as silent and neu-
tral spectators."46

Mr. Motley seems to have been somewhat surprised
and puzzled at the sudden and emphatic change of
tone in the instructions of his government, and failed
to carry them out in the spirit intended by Mr. Sew-
ard. This brought forth a sharp reprimand. Mr.

«6 Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 328.

232

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

Seward expressed his strong disapproval of the posi-
tion taken by Mr. Motley in his communication of
the instructions of the department to the Austrian gov-
ernment, and directed him to carry out his instructions
according to the strict letter, adding:

I refrain from discussing the question you have raised,
" Whether the recent instructions of this department harmo-
nize entirely with the policy which it pursued at an earlier
period of the European intervention in Mexico."

Mr. Motley was instructed to withdraw from
Vienna in case troops were sent from Austria to
Mexico. The embarkation of troops for this purpose
was stopped. Austria was in a great state of excite-
ment over the approaching war with Prussia, and,
besides needing all her available troops at home, did
not care to antagonize the United States.

It was now a question of great interest in this coun-
try and in Europe, whether Maximilian would with-
draw from Mexico with the French troops or attempt
to maintain himself there without foreign support.
Napoleon sent one of his aides to Mexico to make
known his intentions to Maximilian. This fact was
communicated to the United States government,
October 16, 1866:

Mr. de Castelnau has for his mission to make it well
understood that the limit of our sacrifices is reached and
that if the Emperor Maximilian, thinking to find in the
country itself a point of sufficient support, may wish to en-
deavor to maintain himself there, he cannot for the future
count on any succor on the part of France. But it may
happen that, deeming it impossible to triumph through his
own resources over the difficulties which surround him, this

233

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

sovereign may determine to abdicate. We will do nothing
to dissuade him from this, and we think that on this hypothe-
sis there would be ground to proceed, by way of election, in
the establishment of a new government.47

When the time came for the withdrawal of the first
contingent of French troops, no action to that end
was taken by the French government, and the United
States had once more to seek an explanation. The
Emperor assured the American government, however,
that he had decided from military considerations to
withdraw all his troops in the spring in a body, as the
recent successes of the insurgents would render any
large reduction of his forces perilous to those who
remained. He further stated that he had counselled
Maximilian to abdicate.48 To the surprise of every-
one, however, Maximilian seemed to think that honor
demanded that he should remain in Mexico and share
the fate of his supporters.

After the withdrawal of Mr. Corwin, owing to the
unsettled state of affairs in Mexico, the United States
had no one accredited to that government until May,
1866, when Mr. Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, was ap-
pointed. He left New York for his post in November,
1866, accompanied by Lieutenant General William T.
Sherman of the army. They proceeded in the U. S. S.
Susquehanna by way of Havana, but as they found the
principal Mexican ports on the Atlantic still occupied
by the French, they proceeded to New Orleans, from
which point Mr. Campbell tried to establish regular
communication with President Juarez. The President
had first decided to dispatch General Grant with Mr,

•T Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part I, p. 387.

•• H. Ex. Doc. No. 30, Fortieth Cong., First Sess.

234

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

Campbell, in the hope " that some disposition might
be made of the land and naval forces of the United
States without interfering within the jurisdiction of
Mexico, or violating the laws of neutrality, which
would be useful in favoring the restoration of law,
order and republican government in that country."
This demonstration was intended to insure the with-
drawal of the French army according to the promises
of the Emperor. A hitch occurred through some ques-
tion raised by General Grant and General Sherman
was substituted.49

The French army was withdrawn in the spring of
1867, and it very soon became evident that Maxi-
milian's cause would speedily collapse. In view of the
almost inevitable capture of Maximilian, Mr. Seward
telegraphed to Mr. Campbell at New Orleans, April
6, 1867:

You will communicate to President Juarez, promptly and
by effectual means, the desire of this government, that in case
of capture, the prince and his supporters may receive the
humane treatment accorded by civilized nations to prisoners
of war.

Some of the prisoners already taken had been sum-
marily executed.

Mr. Campbell at once dispatched a special mes-
senger, who succeeded in getting through to the head-
quarters of Juarez, and who returned with an answer
from the Mexican government, dated April 22, 1867.
This answer not only undertook to defend the execu-
tion of prisoners above referred to, but also intimated
that similar severity would be practiced on Maximilian

•• Dipl. Corr, 1866, Part III.

235

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

and his leading associates, if captured, on the ground
that, by his harsh decrees, he had placed himself be-
yond the pale of the law of nations.50

Maximilian and his chief supporters were taken
prisoners, May 15, 1867. This information was re-
ceived in the United States toward the last of the
month, and along with it a report, not well authen-
ticated and which afterward proved to be false, that
they had been executed on the i6th. As soon as these
rumors reached Washington, Mr. Seward telegraphed
to Mr. Campbell, then at New Orleans, June i, 1867,
directing him to proceed at once to the residence of
the President of Mexico and enter on his mission, and
if necessary to urge clemency to Maximilian and the
other prisoners of war. Mr. Campbell failed to act
under these instructions. He requested first that a
public vessel of the United States should be detailed
to carry him to Mexico. When it was found that no
ship was available, for this purpose, he was ordered
to proceed to Havana and thence by the British or
French line of steamers to Vera Cruz. He replied
that under the circumstances he did not think it be-
coming the dignity of the representative of the United
States to return to Mexico under the flag of a nation
which had shown such hostility to that country. He
thus remained at New Orleans from the first to the
fifteenth of June. He was then ordered peremptorily
to proceed at once according to instructions. He re-
plied that he was ill and was afraid to go by way of
Havana, where yellow fever was raging; that he would
resign, if desired. The same day Mr. Seward tele-
graphed him that his resignation would be accepted.

80 Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part III.

236

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

Mr. Seward then informed Mr. Romero, the Mexi-
can minister at Washington, that Austria, France, and
Great Britain had appealed to the United States to use
its good offices to avert the execution of Prince Maxi-
milian. He strongly recommended clemency to Presi-
dent Juarez, as good policy, and requested Mr. Romero
to make the same known to his government at once.
This was June 15, the same day that Mr. Campbell's
resignation was accepted. On the 2ist, Mr. Seward
requested Mr. Romero to inform President Juarez that
the Emperor of Austria would restore Maximilian to
all his rights of succession upon his release and re-
nouncing forever all projects in Mexico.51

Meanwhile Maximilian of Hapsburg, Miguel Mira-
mon, and Tomas Mejia had been tried by court-martial
and sentenced to death, June 14. The sentence was
confirmed by the government on the I5th, and the
execution fixed for the i6th, but at the request of
Maximilian's counsel, it was suspended by order of
President Juarez until the iQth, in order to allow the
prince to arrange certain business affairs of a private
character. At seven o'clock on the morning of June
19 the prisoners were shot.

81 Sen. Ex. Doc. Nov, 20, Fortieth Cong., First Sess.

237

CHAPTER VI
THE Two VENEZUELAN EPISODES

As a result of Elaine's unsuccessful attempt to
force Great Britain to relinquish her rights under the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty the Monroe Doctrine had fallen
somewhat into disrepute when in 1895 ft was suddenly
revived in a striking and sensational way by President
Cleveland's intervention in the Venezuelan boundary
controversy. The dispute between Great Britain and
Venezuela in regard to the boundary line between the
latter and British Guiana was of long standing. In
1814, by treaty with the Netherlands, Great Britain
acquired " the establishments of Demerara, Essequibo,
and Berbice," now known as British Guiana. From
that time on the boundary line between British Guiana
and Venezuela was a matter of dispute. Venezuela
always claimed the line of the Essequibo river.

In 1840, Sir Robert Schomburgk, acting under the
instructions of the British government, established a
line some distance to the west of the Essequibo river
and marked it by monuments on the face of the coun-
try. Venezuela at once protested. The British gov-
ernment explained that the line was only tentative
and the monuments set up by Schomburgk were re-
moved.

Various other lines were from time to time claimed
by Great Britain, each one extending the frontier of
British Guiana farther and farther to the west. The

238

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

British Colonial Office List, a government publication,
in the issue for 1885, put the area of British Guiana
at about 76,000 square miles. In the issue of the
same list for 1886 the same statement occurs in ref-
erence to British Guiana with the change of area to
" about 109,000 square miles." Here was a gain of
33,000 square miles without any statement whatever
in explanation of how this additional territory had
been acquired.

After the failure of repeated efforts on the part of
Venezuela to secure an adjustment with England, she
finally came to the conclusion in 1882 that the only
course open to her was arbitration of the controversy.
She persistently urged arbitration, but Great Britain
refused to submit to arbitration any but a compara-
tively small part of the territory in dispute. In 1887
Venezuela suspended diplomatic relations with Great
Britain, protesting " before her British majesty's gov-
ernment, before all civilized nations, and before the
world in general, against the acts of spoliation com-
mitted to her detriment by the government of Great
Britain, which she at no time and on no account
will recognize as capable of altering in the least the
rights which she has inherited from Spain and re-
specting which she will ever be willing to submit to
the decision of a third power."

After repeated efforts to promote the reestablish-
ment of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and
Great Britain and after repeated offers of its good
offices for the purpose of bringing about an adjust-
ment of the controversy, President Cleveland finally
determined to intervene in a more positive manner
with a view to forcing, if need be, a settlement of

239

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the controversy. This resolution on the part of the
American executive, with a full statement of its views
on the general principles involved in the dispute, was
forwarded to Mr. Bayard for transmission to the
British government in Mr. Olney's dispatch of July 20,
1895.* After reviewing the history of the controversy
Mr. Olney stated in the following concise form what
he considered the important features of the situation
as it then existed:

1. The title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very
large extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the one
hand and the South American republic of Venezuela on the
other.

2. The disparity in the strength of the claimants is such
that Venezuela can hope to establish her claim only through
peaceful methods — through an agreement with her adversary
either upon the subject itself or upon an arbitration.

3. The controversy, with varying claims on the part of
Great Britain, has existed for more than half a century,
during which period many earnest and persistent efforts of
Venezuela to establish a boundary by agreement have proved
unsuccessful.

4. The futility of the endeavor to obtain a conventional
line being recognized, Venezuela for a quarter of a century
has asked and striven for arbitration.

5. Great Britain, however, has always and continuously
refused to arbitrate, except upon the condition of a renun-
ciation of a large part of the Venezuelan claim and of a
concession to herself of a large share of the territory in
controversy.

6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the
instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and promoting
the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two
countries, by pressing for arbitration of the disputed
boundary, by offering to act as arbitrator, by expressing its

1 For. Rel., 1895-96, Part I, p. 552.

24O

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

grave concern whenever new alleged instances of British
aggression upon Venezuelan territory have been brought to
its notice, the government of the United States has made it
clear to Great Britain and to the world that the controversy
is one in which both its honor and its interests are involved
and the continuance of which it cannot regard with indif-
ference.

The greater part of the dispatch was taken up with
a discussion of the bearing of the Monroe Doctrine
upon the case and the most striking feature of it was
that the Monroe Doctrine was appealed to by name.
Mr. Olney's statement of the Monroe Doctrine is
worthy of the most careful consideration as it was the
fullest and most definite official construction of its
meaning and scope that had been given to the world.
He said:

That America is in no part open to colonization, though
the proposition was not universally admitted at the time of
its first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We
are now concerned, therefore, only with that other practical
application of the Monroe Doctrine the disregard of which
by an European power is to be deemed an act of unfriendli-
ness towards the United States. The precise scope and
limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended.
It does not establish any general protectorate by the United
States over other American states. It does not relieve any
American state from its obligations as fixed by international
law, nor prevent any European power directly interested
from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited
punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate
any interference in the internal affairs of any American state
or in the relations between it and other American states. It
does not justify any attempt on our part to change the estab-
lished form of government of any American state or to pre-
vent the people of such state from altering that form accord-

241

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

ing to their own will and pleasure. The rule in question has
but a single purpose and object. It is that no European
power or combination of European powers shall forcibly
deprive an American state of the right and power of self-
government and of shaping for itself its own political for-
tunes and destinies.

Lord Salisbury's reply to Mr. Olney was given in
two dispatches of the same date, November 26, 1895,
the one devoted to a discussion of the Monroe Doc-
trine, the other to a discussion of the rights of the
controversy as between Great Britain and Venezuela.
In the first dispatch Lord Salisbury argued that Mr.
Olney's views went far beyond the scope of the Mon-
roe Doctrine, that no attempt at colonization was be-
ing made, and that no political system was being im-
posed upon any state of South America. He also
denied that the Monroe Doctrine was a part of inter-
national law, since it had not received the consent of
other nations, and he utterly repudiated Mr. Olney's
principle that " American questions are for American
discussion."

In the second dispatch of the same date Lord Salis-
bury enters fully into the rights of the controversy
between Great Britain and Venezuela, controverting
the arguments of the earlier part of Mr. Olney's dis-
patch, which he characterizes as ex parte.

In view of the very positive character of Mr. Olney's
dispatch and of the assertion that the honor and inter-
ests of the United States were concerned, the refusal
of Great Britain to arbitrate placed the relations of
the two countries in a very critical position. The
American executive, however, had intervened for the
purpose of settling the controversy, peaceably if pos-

242

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

sible, forcibly if need be, and President Cleveland did
not now shrink from the logic of events. In a mes-
sage to Congress, December 17, i8Q5,2 he laid before
that body Mr. Olney's dispatch of July 20, together
with Lord Salisbury's reply. He not only reaffirmed
the soundness of the Monroe Doctrine and its appli-
cation to the case in question, but claimed for that
principle of American diplomacy a place in the code
of international law.

In regard to the applicability of the Monroe Doc-
trine to the Venezuelan boundary dispute Mr. Cleve-
land declared:

If a European power by an extension of its boundaries
takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring
republics against its will and in derogation of its rights, it
is difficult to see why to that extent such European power
does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government
to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This
is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be
" dangerous to our peace and safety/' and it can make no
difference whether the European system is extended by an
advance of frontier or otherwise.

In regard to the right of the United States to de-
mand the observance of this principle by other nations,
Mr. Cleveland said:

Practically the principle for which we contend has pe-
culiar, if not exclusive, relation to the United States. It may
not have been admitted in so many words to the code of
international law, but since in international councils every
nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforce-
ment of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly
claim, it has its place in the code of international law as

'"Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. IX, p. 655.
243

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned;
and when the United States is a suitor before the high tri-
bunal that administers international law the question to be
determined is whether or not we present claims which the
justice of that code of law can find to be right and valid. The
Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of
international law which are based upon the theory that
every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims
enforced.

Mr. Cleveland concluded that the dispute had
reached such a stage as to make it incumbent upon the
United States to take measures to determine with suf-
ficient certainty for its justification what was the true
divisional line between the republic of Venezuela and
British Guiana. He therefore recommended that Con-
gress make an appropriation for the expenses of a
commission, to be appointed by the executive, which
should make the necessary investigations and report
upon the matter with the least possible delay. " When
such report is made and accepted,'* he continued, " it
will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States
to resist by every means in its power, as a willful
aggression upon its rights and interests, the appro-
priation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise
of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which
after investigation we have determined of right be-
longs to Venezuela." " In making these recommenda-
tions/' he added, " I am fully alive to the responsibility
incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that
may follow.'*

The publication of this message and the accompa-
nying dispatches created the greatest excitement both
in the United States and in England, and called forth
the severest criticism of the President's course,

244

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

The main grounds of this criticism were the con-
tentions :

1 i ) That the Monroe Doctrine was not a part of in-
ternational law and therefore its observance as such
could not be urged upon other nations.

(2) That it was not even an established principle of
American diplomacy, since the original declaration was
merely a protest against apprehended aggression on
the part of a combination of European powers which
had long since ceased to threaten this continent.

(3) That even granting that the Monroe Doctrine
was a declaration of American policy, it was merely
a policy and imposed no obligation on the government
to enforce it except where our interests were directly
concerned.

(4) That the occupation of a few thousand acres of
uninhabited territory by Great Britain, even if it did
rightfully belong to Venezuela, was not a matter that
affected the interests of the United States one way or
the other or that threatened the permanence or stability
of American institutions.

(5) That granting the wisdom and correctness of
the President's position, the language of his message
and of Mr. Olney's dispatch was indiscreet at best and
unnecessarily offensive to British pride.

It may be well to consider these objections in de-
tail. In regard to the first point it may be said that
neither President Cleveland nor Mr. Olney asserted
or maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was a part
of international law by virtue of its assertion by Presi-
dent Monroe and succeeding presidents. The position
they took was that the Monroe Doctrine was an Ameri-
can statement of a well recognized principle of inter-

245

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

national law, viz., the right of a state to intervene in a
controversy between other states, when it deems its
own interests threatened. Mr. Cleveland declared:
" The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those
.principles of international law which are based upon
the theory that every nation shall have its rights pro-
tected and its just claims enforced." Mr. Olney's
analysis of the doctrine was clearer and more specific.
He said : " That there are circumstances under which
a nation may justly intervene in a controversy to
which two or more other nations are the direct and
immediate parties is an admitted canon of international
law." After discussing the general principle of in-
tervention, he adds : " We are concerned at this time,
however, not so much with the general rule as with
a form of it which is peculiarly and distinctively Amer-
ican." 3

In answer to the second objection it is only neces-
sary to refer to accepted works on public law and to
the official correspondence of the state department to
show that the Monroe Doctrine had for three-quarters
of a century been the cardinal principle of American
diplomacy.*

The third point, namely as to the expediency of en-
forcing the Monroe Doctrine in all cases of European
aggression on this continent, raises an important ques-
tion. If, however, the Monroe Doctrine is a wise
principle and one which it is our interest to maintain,
it is right that it should be asserted on every occasion
of its violation. The force of precedent is so great

* Olney to Bayard, July 20, i8gs.

* Moore's " Digest of Int. Law," Vol. VI, pp. 368-604, especially
Mr. Fish's Report on Relations with the Spanish-American Republics of
July 14, 1870, pp. 429-431-

246

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

that in the present state of international law, it would
be dangerous to do otherwise.

In the fourth place while it was perfectly true that
the occupation of the disputed territory by Great Bri-
tain could not in itself conceivably endanger the peace
and integrity of the United States, yet as the open
violation of a principle upon which we had laid so
much stress we could not in honor and dignity have
overlooked it.

As to the tone of Mr. Olney's dispatch and of Mr.
Cleveland's message, it must be acknowledged that
while the positions assumed were in the main correct,
the language was in some cases unfortunate, either
from vagueness or generalization. Thus Mr. Olney's
statement, that " 3,000 miles of intervening ocean
make any permanent political union between a Euro-
pean and an American state unnatural and inexpedi-
ent,"— whatever he may have meant by it — appears
in view of Great Britain's connection with Canada, to
have been both untrue and calculated to give offense.
Likewise Mr. Cleveland's reference to " the high tri-
bunal that administers international law " was too
rhetorical a figure for a state paper.

It has, indeed, been suggested that President Cleve-
land and Mr. Olney deliberately undertook to play a
bluff game in order to browbeat the British govern-
ment. In any case, it should be remembered that the
test of a diplomatic move is its success, and judged
from this standpoint Mr. Cleveland's Venezuelan pol-
icy was vindicated by the results. The British gov-
ernment at once adopted the most friendly attitude
and placed valuable information in its archives at the
disposal of the commissioners appointed by President

247

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Cleveland to determine the true boundary line. On
November 12, 1896, before the final report of this
commission was made, a complete accord was reached
between Great Britain and the United States by which
the terms of a treaty to be ratified by Great Britain
and Venezuela were agreed on, the provisions of which
embraced a full arbitration of the whole controversy.
Lord Salisbury's sudden change of front has been the
subject of much interesting speculation. How far he
was influenced by the South African situation has
never been revealed, but it undoubtedly had its effect.
President Cleveland's message was sent to Congress
December 17. Before the end of the month came
Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal, and on the
3rd of January the German Kaiser sent his famous
telegram to Paul Kruger. The attention of England
was thus diverted from America to Germany, and Lord
Salisbury doubtless thought it prudent to avoid a
rupture with the United States in order to be free
to deal with the situation in South Africa.

The Anglo-Venezuelan treaty provided that an arbi-
tral tribunal should be immediately appointed to de-
termine the true boundary line between Venezuela
and British Guiana. This tribunal was to consist of
two members nominated by the judges of the Supreme
Court of the United States and two members nomi-
nated by the British Supreme Court of Justice and
of a fifth selected by the four persons so nominated,
or in the event of their failure to agree within three
months of their appointment, selected by the king of
Sweden and Norway. The person so selected was to
be president of the tribunal, and it was expressly stip-
ulated that the persons nominated by the Supreme

248

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

Court of the United States and England respectively
might be members of said courts. Certain general
rules were also laid down for the guidance of the
tribunal.5

A treaty embodying substantially these proposals
was signed by the British and Venezuelan representa-
tives at Washington, February 2, 1897. The decision
of the tribunal which met in Paris gave a large part
of the disputed area to Great Britain and this occa-
sioned further criticism of President Cleveland's ac-
tion in bringing the United States and England to the
verge of war on what was termed an academic issue.
The award was a matter of secondary importance.
The principle for which the United States contended
was vindicated when Great Britain agreed to arbi-
trate. It was a great triumph of American diplomacy
to force Great Britain just at this time to recognize
in fact, if not in words, the Monroe Doctrine, for
it was not long before Germany showed a disposition
to question that principle of American policy, and the
fact that we had upheld it against England made it
easier to deal with Germany.

The attention of Europe and America was drawn
to Venezuela a second time in 1902 when Germany
made a carefully planned and determined effort to test
out the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would
fight for it. In that year Germany, England, and Italy
made a naval demonstration against Venezuela for
the purpose of forcing her to recognize the validity
of certain claims of their subjects which she had per-
sistently refused to settle. How England was led
into the trap is still a mystery, but the Kaiser thought

6 Foreign Relations, 1896, p. 254.

249

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

that he had her thoroughly committed and that if
she once started in with him she could not turn against
him. But he had evidently not profited by the ex-
perience of Napoleon III in Mexico forty years earlier
under very similar circumstances.

In the case of Germany, though the facts were
somewhat obscured, the real purpose of the interven-
tion was to collect claims which originated in contract
between German subjects and the government of Ven-
ezuela. One claim was for the recovery of interest
seven years in arrears on five per cent, bonds, for
which Venezuelan customs were pledged as security.
Another was for seven per cent, dividends guaranteed
by the Venezuelan government on the capital stock of
a railroad built by German subjects at a cost of nearly
$20,000,000. There were still other claims amount-
ing to about $400,000 for forced loans and military
requisitions.6

These claims were brought to the attention of the
United States government by the German ambassador
on December n, 1901. Their dubious character, re-
garded from the standpoint of international law, led
Germany to make what purported to be a frank avowal
of her intentions to the United States, and to secure
for her action the acquiescence of that government.
Her ambassador declared that the German govern-
ment had " no purpose or intention to make even the
smallest acquisition of territory on the South Ameri-
can continent or the islands adjacent." This precau-
tion was taken in order to prevent a subsequent asser-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine. In conclusion the Ger-
man ambassador stated that his government had de-

* Foreign Relations, 1901, p. 193; 1903, p. 429.
250

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

cided to " ask the Venezuelan government to make a
declaration immediately, that it recognizes in principle
the correctness of these demands, and is willing to
accept the decision of a mixed commission, with the
object of having them determined and assured in all
their details." At the same time the British govern-
ment demanded a settlement of claims for the destruc-
tion of property and for the ill-treatment and im-
prisonment of British subjects in the recent civil wars,
as well as a settlement of the foreign debt.

On December 16, 1901, Mr. Hay replied to the
German note, thanking the German government for
its voluntary and frank declaration, and stating that
he did not consider it necessary to discuss the claims
in question; but he called attention to the following
reference to the Monroe Doctrine in President Roose-
velt's message of December 3, 1901 :

This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial rela-
tions of any American power, save that it in truth allows
each of them to form such as it desires. In other words,
it is really a guarantee of the commercial independence of
the Americas. We do not ask under this doctrine for any
exclusive commercial dealings with any other American
state. We do not guarantee any state against punishment
if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not
take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-
American power.

A year later, after fruitless negotiations, the Ger-
man government announced to the United States that
it proposed, in conjunction with Great Britain and
Italy, to establish a pacific blockade of Venezuelan har-
bors. The United States replied that it did not recog-
nize a pacific blockade which adversely affected the

251

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

rights of third parties as a valid proceeding. The pow-
ers then proposed to establish a " warlike blockade,"
but " without any declaration of war." This device
was resorted to at the suggestion of the German gov-
ernment, in order to avoid a formal declaration of
war, which could not be made without the consent of
the Bundesrath. Meanwhile, Venezuela's gunboats
had been seized and her ports blockaded, acts which
Mr. Balfour admitted on the floor of the House of
Commons constituted a state of war ; and on December
20 a formal blockade was announced in accordance
with the law of nations, which created a status of bel-
ligerency.7

The hostilities thus commenced were brought to
a close by the diplomatic intervention of the United
States. Acting under instructions from Washington,
the American minister Herbert W. Bowen succeeded
in persuading Venezuela to recognize in principle the
claims of the foreign powers and to refer them to
mixed commissions for the purpose of determining
the amounts.8 Great Britain and Italy agreed to this
arrangement, but the German Kaiser remained for a
time obdurate. What followed Germany's refusal to
arbitrate is described in Thayer's " Life and Letters
of John Hay " in the following words :

One day, when the crisis was at its height, [President
Roosevelt] summoned to the White House Dr. Holleben,
the German Ambassador, and told him that unless Germany
consented to arbitrate, the American squadron under Ad-
miral Dewey would be given orders, by noon ten days later,
to proceed to the Venezuelan coast and prevent any taking

7 Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 419, 454; Moore, "Digest of Int. Law,"
Vol. VII, p. 140.

8 Moore, *' Digest of Int. Law," Vol. VI, p. 590.

252

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

possession of Venezuelan territory. Dr. Holleben began to
protest that his Imperial master, having once refused to
arbitrate, could not change his mind. The President said
that he was not arguing the question, because arguments
had already been gone over until no useful purpose would
be served by repeating them; he was simply giving informa-
tion which the Ambassador might think it important to
transmit to Berlin. A week passed in silence. Then Dr.
Holleben again called on the President, but said nothing of
the Venezuelan matter. When he rose to go, the President
asked him about it, and when he stated that he had re-
ceived nothing from his government, the President informed
him in substance that, in view of this fact, Admiral Dewey
would be instructed to sail a day earlier than the day he,
the President, had originally mentioned. Much perturbed,
the Ambassador protested; the President informed him that
not a stroke of a pen had been put on paper; that if the
Emperor would agree to arbitrate, he, the President, would
heartily praise him for such action, and would treat it as
taken on German initiative; but that within forty-eight
hours there must be an offer to arbitrate or Dewey would
sail with the orders indicated. Within thirty-six hours Dr.
Holleben returned to the White House and announced to
President Roosevelt that a dispatch had just come from
Berlin, saying that the Kaiser would arbitrate. Neither
Admiral Dewey (who with an American fleet was then
manceuvering in the West Indies) nor any one else knew of
the step that was to be taken; the naval authorities were
merely required to be in readiness, but were not told what
for.

On the announcement that Germany had consented to
arbitrate, the President publicly complimented the Kaiser on
being so stanch an advocate of arbitration. The humor of
this was probably relished more in the White House than
in the Palace at Berlin.9

The Holleben incident, as narrated for the first
time by Thayer, was immediately called in question.

• Thayer, " Life and Letters of John Hay," Vol. II, pp. 286-288.

253

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

It will be noted that Thayer does not in any way
quote Hay in the matter, and in the three volumes
of " Diaries and Letters " of John Hay, privately
printed by Mrs. Hay in 1908, there is no reference
of any kind to the incident. It is evident that Thayer
got his report of the interview directly from Roose-
velt himself. It is said on good authority that while
Colonel Roosevelt had no documentary evidence to
support his statements at the time that he gave them
to Thayer, such evidence came to hand in an inter-
esting way shortly after the appearance of the book.
Two German-Americans who had been intimate friends
of Holleben promptly wrote to Colonel Roosevelt pro-
testing, not against the facts as stated, but against
the use that was made of them. Both correspondents
stated that they had been told of the interview at
the time by Holleben. Admiral Dewey confirmed the
statement as to the preparedness of the fleet in a letter
dated May 23, 1916, which was published four days
later in the New York Times. In it he said :

I was at Culebra, Porto Rico, at the time in command
of a fleet consisting of over fifty ships, including every
battleship and every torpedo-boat we had, with orders from
Washington to hold the fleet in hand and be ready to move
at a moment's notice. Fortunately, however, the whole
matter was amicably adjusted and there was no need for
action.

In a speech delivered to several thousand Repub-
lican " Pilgrims " at Oyster Bay, May 27, Colonel
Roosevelt made the following interesting comments
on Dewey's letter:

Just today I was very glad to see published in the papers
the letter of Admiral Dewey describing an incident that

254

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

took place while I was President. When we were menaced
with trouble I acted up to my theory that the proper way
of handling international relations was by speaking softly
and carrying a big stick. And in that particular case Dewey
and the American fleet represented the big stick. I asked,
on behalf of the nation, the things to which we were en-
titled. I was as courteous as possible. I not only acted
with justice, but with courtesy toward them. I put every
battleship and every torpedo-boat on the sea under the
American flag and Dewey, with instructions to hold himself
ready in entire preparedness to sail at a moment's notice.
That didn't mean that we were to have war. Dewey was
the greatest possible provocative of peace.10

After the agreement to arbitrate had been made,
the situation was further complicated by the demands
of the blockading powers that the sums ascertained
by the mixed commissions to be due them should be
paid in full before anything was paid upon the claims
of the peace powers. Venezuela insisted that all her
creditors should be treated alike. The Kaiser, from
what motives it is not quite clear, suggested that this
question should be referred to President Roosevelt,
but as the United States was an interested party, Sec-
retary Hay did not think it would be proper for the
President to act, and it was finally agreed that the
demands for preferential treatment should be sub-
mitted to the Hague Court.

During the summer of 1903 ten mixed commissions
sat at Caracas to adjudicate upon the claims of as
many nations against Venezuela. These commissions
simply determined the amount of the claims in each
case. The awards of these commissions are very in-
structive, as they show the injustice of resorting to

10 Washington Post, May 28, 1916.

255

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

measures of coercion for the collection of pecuniary
claims which have not been submitted to arbitration.
Belgian claimants demanded 14,921,805 bolivars and
were awarded 10,898,643; British claimants demanded
14,743,572 and were awarded 9,401,267; German
claimants demanded 7,376,685 and were awarded 2,-
091,908; Italian claimants demanded 39,844,258 and
were awarded 2,975,906; Spanish claimants demanded
5,307,626 and were awarded 1,974,818; United States
claimants demanded 81,410,952 and were awarded
2,313,71 1.*1

The decision of the Hague Court, which was ren-
dered February 22, 1904, held that the three allied
powers were entitled to preferential treatment; that
Venezuela had recognized in principle the justice of
their claims while she had not recognized in principle
the justice of the claims of the pacific powers; that
the neutral powers had profited to some extent by
the operations of the allies, and that their rights re-
mained for the future absolutely intact.12 This de-
cision, emanating from a peace court, and indorsing
the principle of armed coercion, was received with no
small degree of criticism.

During the discussions on the Venezuelan situation
that took place in Parliament in December, 1902, the
members of the government repeatedly repudiated the
charge of the opposition that they were engaged in
a debt-collecting expedition/ and tried to make it ap-
pear that they were protecting the lives and liberties
of British subjects. Lord Cranborne declared:

11 Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 (Sen. Doc. No. 316, Fifty-eighth Cong.,
Second Sess.); Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 871.

12 Foreign Relations. 1904, p. 506 For a full report of the case see
Sen. Doc. No. 119, Fifty-eighth Cong.. Third Sess.

256

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

I can frankly tell the House that it is not the claims of the
bondholders that bulk largest in the estimation of the govern-
ment. I do not believe the government would ever have taken
the strong measures to which they have been driven if it had
not been for the attacks by Venezuela upon the lives, the
liberty, and the property of British subjects.

During the same discussion, Mr. Norman said:

This idea of the British fleet being employed to collect the
debts of foreign bondholders is assuredly a mistaken one. It
was said by Wellington once that the British army did not
exist for the purpose of collecting certain debts. It is still
more true of the British fleet that it does not exist for the
purpose of collecting debts of bondholders. People who lend
money to South American republics know what the security
is and what they are likely to get in return, and they ought
not to have the British fleet at their backs.

To this Mr. Balfour, the prime minister, replied:

I do not deny — in fact, I freely admit — that bondholders
may occupy an international position which may require
international action ; but I look upon such international action
with the gravest doubt and suspicion, and I doubt whether
we have in the past ever gone to war for the bondholders,
for those of our countrymen who have lent money to a
foreign government; and I confess that I should be very
sorry to see that made a practice in this country.

Against President Roosevelt's contention that the
coercion of an American state was not contrary to the
Monroe Doctrine, provided that it did " not take the
form of acquisition of territory by any non-American
power," Signor Drago, Minister of Foreign Relations
of the Argentine Republic, vigorously protested in a
note dated December 29, 1902." This note contained

II Foreign Relations, 1903, p. i.

257

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

a restatement of the " Calvo doctrine," which takes
its name from a celebrated Argentine publicist. In
his well-known book on international law, Calvo con-
tends that a state has no right to resort to armed
intervention for the purpose of collecting the private
claims of its citizens against another state. This doc-
trine, which has received the indorsement of most
of the Latin- American states, was applied to public
bonds in the note above referred to and is now usually
known as the '* Drago doctrine." Signer Drago held,
first, " that the capitalist who lends his money to a
foreign state always takes into account the resources
of the country and the probability, greater or less,
that the obligations contracted will be fulfilled without
delay. All governments thus enjoy different credit
according to their degree of civilization and culture,
and their conduct in business transactions," and these
conditions are measured before making loans. Sec-
ond, a fundamental principle of international law is
the entity and equality of all states. Both the acknowl-
edgment of the debt and the payment must be left
to the nation concerned " without diminution of its
inherent rights as a sovereign entity."
He said further:

As these are the sentiments of justice, loyalty, and honor
which animate the Argentine people and have always inspired
its policy, your excellency will understand that it has felt
alarm at the knowledge that the failure of Venezuela to
meet the payment of its public debt is given as one of the
determining causes of the capture of its fleet, the bombard-
ment of one of its ports and the establishment of a rigorous
blockade along its shores. If such proceedings were to be
definitely adopted they would establish a precedent dangerous
to the security and the peace of the nations of this part of

258

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES

America. The collection of loans by military means implies
territorial occupation to make them effective, and territorial
occupation signifies a suppression or subordination of the
governments of the countries on which it is imposed.

The doctrine so ably expounded by Dr. Drago
attracted much attention during the next few years
and was given a place on the program of the Third
Pan American Conference held at Rio de Janeiro in
July, 1906, Dr. Drago had made his proposal as
" a statement of policy " for the states of the American
continents to adopt. After full discussion the Rio
Conference decided to recommend to the governments
represented " that they consider the point of inviting
the Second Peace Conference at The Hague to con-
sider the question of the compulsory collection of pub-
lic debts; and, in general, means tending to diminish
between nations conflicts having an exclusively pecu-
niary origin." 14

As a result of this action the United States modified
the regular program prepared by Russia for the Sec-
ond Hague Conference by reserving the right to in-
troduce the question of an " agreement to observe
certain limitations in the use of force in collecting
public debts accruing from contracts." General Hor-
ace Porter presented to The Hague Conference a res-
olution providing that the use of force for the col-
lection of contract debts should not be permitted until
the justice of the claim and the amount of the debt
should have been determined by arbitration. A large
number of reservations were introduced, but the fol-
lowing resolutions were finally adopted by the votes

14 Am. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. II, p. 78.

259

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

of thirty-nine states, with five states abstaining from
voting :

The contracting powers agree not to have recourse to
armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from
the government of one country by the government of another
country as being due to its nationals.

This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the
debtor state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbi-
tration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any " com-
promis " from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration,
fails to submit to the award.15

18 Am. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. II, Supplement, p. 82.

260

CHAPTER VII

THE ADVANCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
CARIBBEAN

AT the beginning of the nineteenth century Spain
was still in possession of all the shores of the Carib-
bean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, but the downfall
of her vast colonial empire was rapidly approaching.
By the secret treaty of San Ildefonso she agreed to
cede Louisiana back to France, and in 1803 Napoleon
sold the entire province to the United States. This
was our first acquisition of territory on the Gulf of
Mexico, and it insured a free outlet for the vast region
of the Mississippi valley. The boundaries of the
province were indefinite, and there ensued a long con-
troversy with Spain as to whether Louisiana included
West Florida on the one hand and Texas on the
other. These questions were finally adjusted by the
Florida treaty of 1819, which ceded both East and
West Florida to the United States and fixed the west-
ern boundary of Louisiana on the Gulf at the Sabine
river. By this treaty the United States gained un-
disputed possession of the region extending from
Mobile bay to the Mississippi, but abandoned the claim
to Texas.

It was not many years before American settlers
began pouring into Texas and came into conflict with
the government of Mexico, which had by this time
become independent of Spain. There followed the

261

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

war of independence and the establishment of the
Republic of Texas in 1836. Texas promptly applied
for admission to the United States, but mainly through
the opposition of the Abolitionists she was kept wait-
ing for nine years. The new republic was recognized
by the United States and by the principal powers of
Europe, but Mexico refused to concede independence.
Texas was thus in constant danger of attack from
Mexico and unable to secure admission to the Ameri-
can Union. In April, 1844, a treaty providing for
the annexation of Texas was submitted to the Senate
by President Tyler, but it was rejected by that body.
Under these circumstances the public men of Texas
lent a ready ear to British and French intrigues. Great
Britain wished to encourage the development of Texas
as a cotton-growing country from which she could
draw a large enough supply to make her independent
of the United States. If Texas should thus devote
herself to the production of cotton as her chief ex-
port crop, she would naturally adopt a free trade
policy and thus create a considerable market for
British goods. Great Britain, therefore, consistently
opposed the annexation of Texas by the United States
and entered into negotiations with France, Mexico,
and the Republic of Texas for the express purpose
of preventing it. Lord Aberdeen proposed that the
four powers just mentioned should sign a diplomatic
act, or perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition
from Mexico and peace, but preventing her from ever
acquiring territory beyond the Rio Grande or joining
the American Union. While the United States would
be invited to unite in this act, it was not expected
that the government of that country would agree to

262

80°

U.§. Possessions
U.S. Protectorate
U.S.Financial Administration

70°

IIBBEAN

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

it. Despairing of being received into the American
Union, Texas was apparently ready to accept the
British proposal, but Lord Aberdeen's plan was de-
feated by the refusal of Mexico to recognize under
any conditions the independence of Texas. Aberdeen
was willing to coerce Mexico and, if need be, to fight
the United States, but Louis Philippe was not willing
to go that far. Meanwhile the Texas question had
become the leading political issue in the United States.
The Democratic platform of 1844 demanded "the re-
annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period,"
and on this platform Polk was elected President.
Tyler, however, did not wait for his successor to
carry out this mandate of the American people, but
in the last days of his administration pushed through
Congress a joint resolution providing for the admis-
sion of Texas.1

Mexico promptly severed diplomatic relations with
the United States. As Mexico had never recognized
the independence of Texas, she had of course never
agreed upon any boundary with the new republic.
This was a matter which had to be adjusted and there
were also a number of private claims of American
citizens against the government of Mexico which that
government refused to settle. President Polk took
up both questions with characteristic vigor, and on
the refusal of Mexico to receive a special minister
sent by him for the purpose of discussing these ques-
tions, he ordered General Taylor to occupy the dis-
puted area between the Nueces river and the Rio

1 E. D. Adams, " British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1845 "
(1910); Justir. H. Smith, "The Annexation of Texas" (1911) and "The
War with Mexico," 2 vols. (1919); Diplomatic Correspondence of the Re»
public of Texas, edited by G. P. Garrison (Annual Reports, Am. Hist. Ass'n*
1907, 1908).

263

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Grande. Thus began the Mexican War, which es-
tablished the boundary of the United States on the
Rio Grande and added the vast region of New Mex-
ico and California to the Union. Here the tide of
American expansion to the South was stayed for a
full half century.

With the decline of the Spanish power Great Britain
had succeeded to naval supremacy in the Caribbean.
As has been related in previous chapters, the United
States and Great Britain long regarded Cuba with
jealous eyes and had a controversy lasting for half
a century over the control of the proposed Isthmian
canal. Secretary Seward at the close of the civil
war sought to strengthen the position of the United
States in the Caribbean by the acquisition of Santo
Domingo and the Danish West Indies. In 1867 a
treaty was concluded with Denmark providing for
the cession of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John
for $7,500,000, on condition that the inhabitants
should by popular vote give their consent. In under-
taking these negotiations the United States was in-
fluenced on the one hand by the desire to acquire a
naval base, and on the other by the fear that these
islands might fall into the hands of one of the greater
European powers. The plebiscite in St. John and St.
Thomas was overwhelmingly in favor of the cession,
and the treaty was promptly ratified by the Danish
Rigsdag, but the Senate of the United States took
no action until March, 1870, when Senator Sumner
presented an adverse report from the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the treaty was rejected.

In 1867 Admiral Porter and Mr. F. W. Seward,
the assistant secretary of state, were sent to Santo

264

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

Domingo for the purpose of securing the lease of
Samana bay as a naval station. Their mission was
not successful, but the following year the president
of the Dominican Republic sent an agent to Wash-
ington proposing annexation and requesting the United
States to occupy Samana bay at once. In his annual
message of December 8, 1868, President Johnson ad-
vocated the annexation of Santo Domingo and a joint
resolution to that effect was introduced into the House,
but it was tabled without debate by an overwhelming
vote. President Grant became much interested in this
scheme, and soon after entering the White House he
sent one of his private secretaries, Colonel Babcock,
to the island to report on the condition of affairs.
Babcock negotiated a treaty for the annexation of
the Dominican Republic, and another for the lease
of Samana bay. As Colonel Babcock was without
diplomatic authority of any kind, the Cabinet re-
ceived the treaties in silent amazement, and Hamilton
Fish, who was secretary of state, spoke of resigning,
but Grant persuaded him to remain in office. The
annexation treaty was submitted to the Senate in Jan-
uary, 1870, but encountered violent opposition, espe-
cially from Sumner, Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations. It was finally rejected June 30
by vote of 28 to 28.

The advance of the United States into the Caribbean
was thus delayed until the Spanish War. As a result
of that conflict the United States acquired Porto Rico
and a protectorate over Cuba. The real turning-point
in the recent history of the West Indies was the Hay-
Pauncefote treaty of 1901, under the terms of which
Great Britain relinquished her claim to an equal voice

265

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

with the United States in the control of an Isthmian
canal on which she had insisted for half a century.
While the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was limited in terms
to the canal question, it was in reality of much wider
significance. It amounted in effect to the transfer-
ence of naval supremacy in the West Indies to the
United States, for since its signature Great Britain
has withdrawn her squadron from this important stra-
tegic area. So marked was Great Britain's change
of attitude toward the United States at this time that
some writers have concluded that a secret treaty of
alliance was made between the two countries in 1897.
The absurdity of such a statement was pointed out
by Senator Lodge several years ago. England's
change of attitude is not difficult to understand. For
one hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar Eng-
land had pursued the policy of maintaining a navy
large enough to meet all comers. With the rapid
growth of the navies of Russia, Japan, and Germany
during the closing years of the nineteenth century,
England realized that she could no longer pursue a
policy of isolation. Our acquisition of the Philip-
pines, the Hawaiian Islands, and Porto Rico and our
determination to build an Isthmian canal made a large
American navy inevitable. Great Britain realized,
therefore, that she would have to cast about for
future allies. It was on considerations of this kind
that she signed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with the
United States in 1901, and the defensive alliance with
Japan in 1902. In view of the fact that the United
States was bent on carrying out the long deferred
canal scheme, Great Britain realized that a further
insistence on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer

266

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

treaty would lead to friction and possible conflict.
She wisely decided, therefore, to recede from the
position which she had held for half a century and
to give us a free hand in the acquisition and control
of the canal at whatever point we might choose to
build it. In signing the Hay-Pauncefote treaty she
gracefully recognized the fact that the United States
had paramount interests in the Caribbean which it
was unwise for her to contest. Since the signature
of that treaty American supremacy in this area has
not been seriously questioned.

The determination to build a canal not only ren-
dered inevitable the adoption of a policy of naval
supremacy in the Caribbean sea, but led to the formu-
lation of new political policies to be applied in the
zone of the Caribbean — what Admiral Chester calls
the larger Panama Canal Zone — that is, the West
Indies, Mexico and Central America, Colombia and
Venezuela. The policies referred to included the es-
tablishment of protectorates, the supervision of
finances, the control of all naval routes, the acquisi-
tion of naval stations, and the policing and admin-
istration of disorderly countries. -

The advance of the United States in the Caribbean
since the Spanish War has been rapid. The acqui-
sition of Porto Rico and the establishment of a pro-
tectorate over Cuba were the natural outcome of that
struggle. In 1903 we acquired the canal zone under
circumstances already described. The following year
President Roosevelt established financial supervision
over the Dominican Republic. In 1915 the United
States landed marines in Haiti and a treaty was soon
drafted under which we assumed financial supervision

267

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

and administrative control over the affairs of that
country. In 1916 we acquired by treaty from Nica-
ragua an exclusive right of way for a canal through
her territory and the lease of a naval station on Fon-
seca bay, and in 1917 we acquired by treaty from
Denmark her holdings in the West Indies known as
the Virgin Islands. These successive steps will be
considered in detail.

The methods employed by President Roosevelt in
the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone described
in a previous chapter caused indignation and alarm
throughout Latin America and created strained rela-
tions with Colombia. The Colombian government
refused to recognize the independence of the Republic
of Panama and demanded that her claim to Panama
as well as her interests in the canal should be sub-
mitted to arbitration. Colombia claimed that Presi-
dent Roosevelt had misinterpreted the treaty of 1846,
which established mutual obligations between the
United States and Colombia with reference to the
isthmus, by construing its provisions as obligations
to the world at large against Colombia. As the United
States had always advocated the submission to arbi-
tration of questions involving the construction of
treaties, the demand of Colombia proved embarrfft-
ing, but both Secretary Hay and his successor, Sec-
retary Root, rejected the demand for arbitration on
the ground that the questions involved were of a
political nature.2

In January, 1909, shortly before the close of the
Roosevelt administration, Secretary Root undertook

8 House Doc. No. 1444. Sixty-second Cong., Third Sess., pp. 2, 3;
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. i, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sesp., pp. 47, 48.

268

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

to reestablish friendly relations with Colombia through
the negotiation in the city of Washington of three
treaties, one between the United States and the Re-
public of Colombia, one between the United States
and the Republic of Panama, and one between Colom-
bia and Panama. In the treaty between Colombia
and Panama the Republic of Colombia recognized
fully the independence of Panama, and the Republic
of Panama made an assignment to Colombia of the
first ten installments of $250,000, the amount due
annually to the Republic of Panama from the United
States as rental for the canal. According to the treaty
between the United States and the Republic of Pan-
ama, concluded November 18, 1903, the payment of
this annual sum was to begin nine years from date.
It was now agreed that the first annual payment
should be regarded as due four years from the ex-
change of ratifications of the said treaty, so that of
the $2,500,000 to be paid to Colombia, half would
be paid by the United States and half by Panama.
In the new treaty between the United States and Pan-
ama the necessary modification of the treaty of 1903
was made so as to permit of this assignment of the
first ten installments to Colombia. In the treaty be-
tween the United States and Colombia the most im-
portant provision was as follows:

The Republic of Colombia shall have liberty at all times
to convey through the ship canal now in course of construc-
tion by the United States across the Isthmus of Panama the
troops, materials for war, and ships of war of the Republic
of Colombia, without paying any duty to the United States ;
even in the case of an international war between Colombia
and another country.

269

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

It was further provided that the products of the soil
and industry of Colombia should be admitted to the
canal zone subject only to such duty as would be
payable on similar products of the United States
under similar conditions, and Colombian mails were
to have free passage through the canal zone on pay-
ment of such duties or charges as were laid on the
mails of the United States.3

These tripartite treaties were of course to stand
or fall together. The United States and Panama
promptly ratified the agreements to which they were
parties, but Colombia rejected the arrangement with
indignation. In fact, when the terms of the settle-
ment were made public, the Colombian adminstration
that urged their acceptance was overthrown, and the
Colombian envoy who participated in the negotiation
of the treaties was forced to flee from the country
with an indignant mob at his heels. Colombia was
not to be appeased by the paltry sum of $2,500,000.

The Taft administration made repeated efforts to
placate Colombia, but without success. On Septem-
ber 30, 1912, Mr. Du Bois, the American minister
to Colombia, submitted to Secretary Knox an inter-
esting review of the whole question in the course of
which, after referring to the friendly relations that
had so long subsisted between the two countries, he
said:

Nine years ago this was changed suddenly and unex-
pectedly when President Roosevelt denied to Colombia the
right to land her troops upon her own soil to supress a
threatened revolt and maintain a sovereignty guaranteed
by treaty stipulations. The breach came and it has been

8 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. i, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 24-34.

270

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

growing wider since that hour. By refusing to allow
Colombia to uphold her sovereign rights over a territory
where she had held dominion for eighty years, the friendship
of nearly a century disappeared, the indignation of every
Colombian, and millions of other Latin-Americans, was
aroused and is still most intensely alive. The confidence and
trust in the justice and fairness of the United States, so long
manifested, has completely vanished, and the maleficent in-
fluence of this condition is permeating public opinion in all
Latin-American countries, a condition which, if remedial
measures are not invoked, will work inestimable harm
throughout the Western Hemisphere.*

Mr. Du Bois reported that on inquiry of promi-
nent Colombians of the causes of the rejection of
the Root proposals he received replies to the follow-
ing effect:

Five years after President Roosevelt had taken Panama
from us with rank injustice, your government, still under
his chief magistracy, offered us a paltry $2,500,000 if Co-
lombia would recognize the independence of her revolted
province, fix our frontier at a further loss of territory, open
all our ports free to the refuge of vessels employed in the
canal enterprise, and exempt them from anchorage or ton-
nage dues, renounce our rights to all of our contracts and
concessions relating to the construction and operation of the
canal or railroad across the isthmus, release Panama from
obligation for the payment of any part of our external debt,
much of which was incurred in the interest of Panama, and
enter into negotiations for the revision of the treaty of 1846,
which five years before had been openly violated by the
United States in their failure to help maintain the sovereignty
over the rebellious province which they had solemnly guar-
anteed. The reply was to this, banishment of our minister
who negotiated the treaty, and all South America applauded
our attitude."

4 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. i. Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., p. 35.
8 Ibid., p. 41.

271

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Mr. Du Bois then proceeded to state at length Co-
lombia's claims which he summarized as follows:
" Panama Railroad annuities, $16,000,000; value of
railroad, $16,446,942; Panama Canal rights, $17,500,-
ooo; cost of Costa Rican boundary arbitration, $200,-
ooo; total, $50,446,942. [The total should be $50,-
146,942.] Besides this sum, Colombia has lost the
Province of Panama, whose value cannot be readily
estimated." 6

In conclusion he urged the importance of a speedy
adjustment of the differences with Colombia in the
following words:

South America is advancing along commercial lines with
giant strides. The character of the future relations of the
United States with that country will be of signal importance.
Friendly intercourse with all Latin America should be care-
fully developed and maintained, and especially is this im-
portant with Colombia, which borders the isthmus, has
fine ports on both oceans, and is destined to become an
influential factor in the political and commercial life
of South America, especially in all countries bordering
on the Caribbean sea. To approach Colombia in a con-
ciliatory spirit and seek a renewal of her ancient friendship
would not only be a wise and just move on the part of the
United States, but as Colombia and all South and Central
America firmly believe that the government of the United
States was unjust in the Panama incident, from which has
come infinite distress to Colombia, it would be a benevolent
and fraternal act, and the time to move is the present, before
the canal opens and while the public sentiment of both coun-
tries is in harmony with the movement.7

At the time that the above report on relations with
Colombia was prepared by Mr. Du Bois he was in

6 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. i, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., p. 44.
' Ibid.

272

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

this country, having come home to confer with the
Department of State as to the program to be fol-
lowed in the settlement of the differences with Colom-
bia. On his return to Bogota, Mr. Du Bois sub-
mitted the following proposals to the Colombian gov-
ernment: (i) ratification of the Root treaties, involv-
ing the payment to Colombia of the first ten install-
ments of the annual rental of the canal zone amount-
ing to $2,500,000; (2) the payment of $10,000,000 by
the United States to Colombia for the right to build
an interoceanic canal by the Atrato route and for the
lease of the islands of Old Providence and St. An-
drews as coaling stations; (3) the good offices of the
United States on behalf of Colombia in bringing about
an adjustment of the boundary line between Colombia
and Panama; (4) the submission to arbitration of the
claims of Colombia to reversionary rights in the Pan-
ama Railroad assumed by the United States under
Article XXII of the treaty of 1903 between the United
States and Panama, estimated by Mr. Taft's secretary
of war at over $16,000,000; and (5) the granting of
preferential rights to Colombia in the use of the
Panama Canal.

The Colombian government promptly rejected these
proposals and in reply demanded " arbitration of the
whole question of Panama or a direct proposition
on the part of the United States to give Colombia
compensation for all the moral, physical, and financial
losses which she sustained as a result of the separa-
tion of Panama." The Colombian minister declared :

Should Colombia grant any territorial privileges to the
United States after the wrong that country has inflicted upon
this republic, it would result in intense agitation and possible

273

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

revolution. It seems as though your people have never
fully realized the enormity of the wrong the United States
has perpetrated against the Colombian people.

Mr. Du Bois then asked whether Colombia would
accept $10,000,000, the good offices of the United
States in settling the differences with Panama, arbi-
tration of the reversionary rights in the Panama Rail-
road, and preferential rights in the canal, without
granting to the United States any privileges or con-
cessions whatever. Receiving a negative reply to this
proposal, Mr. Du Bois, acting on his own responsi-
bility, then inquired informally whether $25,000,000
without options of any kind would satisfy Colombia.
The answer was that Colombia would accept nothing
but the arbitration of the whole Panama question.
Mr. Du Bois was instructed February 20, 1913, to stop
negotiations. In reporting the matter to the President,
Secretary Knox said that Colombia seemed determined
to treat with the incoming Democratic administration.8

When the Wilson administration came in, Secre-
tary Bryan took up the negotiations with Colombia
where Knox dropped them, and concluded a treaty
according to the terms of which the United States
was to express " sincere regret that anything should
have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of
cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between
the two nations," and to pay Colombia $25,000,000.
The treaty further granted Colombia the same prefer-
ential rights in the use of the canal which the Taft
administration had proposed, and in return Colombia
agreed to recognize the independence of Panama and
to accept a boundary line laid down in the treaty.

• Sen. Ex. Doc. No. i, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 53-79-

274

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

This treaty was submitted to the Senate June 16,
1914. As soon as its terms were made public ex-
President Roosevelt denounced it as blackmail, and
wrote a letter to the chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs requesting to be heard be-
fore any action was taken on the treaty. During the
first session of the Sixty-sixth Congress in 1919 the
Colombian treaty was reported from the Committee
on Foreign Relations with important amendments.
Article I, containing expressions of regret on the part
of the United States for the events that had taken
place on the isthmus, was entirely stricken out. The
clause giving Colombia the right to transport through
the canal its troops, materials of war, and ships of
war, " even in case of war between Colombia and
another country," was amended by the elimination
of the words in quotations. The sum of $25,000,000,
instead of being paid in cash, was to be paid in five
annual installments. The Senate refused, however,
to give its consent to the ratification of the treaty
even in this form, and it is understood that it was
proposed to cut the payment to Colombia down to
$15,000,000.

A great nation like the United States, which has
always professed to be guided in international ques-
tions by high standards of justice and morality, can-
not afford to delay indefinitely the settlement of a
dispute of this kind with a weak nation like Colombia.
President Roosevelt's action in the Panama matter
made a bad impression throughout Latin America and
caused our policy in the Caribbean to be regarded
with grave suspicion. As to Colombia's rights in
the matter, Secretary Bryan made the following state-

275

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

ment in his argument before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations in support of the treaty :

It is contended by some that the action taken by the United
States was based upon the necessities of the case, and those
necessities, as stated by those who take this position are, that
Colombia was not able to build the canal herself and was
not willing to sell to the United States upon reasonable terms
the right to build the canal. Those who take this position
put the United States in the attitude of exercising the right
of eminent domain in the interest of the world's commerce;
but the exercise of the right of eminent domain does not
relieve those who exercise it of liability for actual damages
suffered. Take, for illustration, the condemning of a block
of ground for a public building. Suppose that every lot
owner excepting one is willing to sell his land to the govern-
ment at its market value, but that one of the lot owners,
whose lot is necessary to the erection of the building, asks
more than the land is worth. The government proceeds to
condemn the property, but it does not attempt to escape from
paying what the land is actually worth, and the actual value
of the property is not reduced one dollar by any effort that
the owner may make to obtain for it more than it is worth.
If it is contended that the price offered by the United States
prior to Panama's separation was a reasonable one, and that
Colombia ought to have accepted it, that valuation cannot be
reduced merely because Colombia was not willing to accept
the offer. This illustration is based upon the theory adopted
by those who say that Colombia was entirely in the wrong
in refusing to accept the offer made by the United States,
but this theory, it will be remembered, is disputed by the
people of Colombia, who defend the position their govern-
ment then took and, as has been said before, they have ever
since asked that the controversy be arbitrated by some im-
partial tribunal.*

In 1904 President Roosevelt made a radical de-
parture from the traditional policy of the United

• Sen. Ex. Doc. No. i, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 87-88.

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UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

States in proposing that we should assume the finan-
cial administration of the Dominican Republic in
order to prevent certain European powers from re-
sorting to the forcible collection of debts due their
subjects. On September 12, 1904, Minister Dawson
reported to the State Department that the debt of
Santo Domingo was $32,280,000, the estimated rev-
enues from customs receipts $1,850,000, and the pro-
posed budget for current expenses $1,300,000, leav-
ing only $550,000 with which to meet payments of in-
terest, then accruing and in arrears, amounting to
$2,600,000. About $22,000,000 of this debt was due
to European creditors. Most of this indebtedness had
been incurred by revolutionary leaders who had at
various times taken forcible possession of the govern-
ment and hastened to raise all the money they could
by the sale of bonds, leaving the responsibility with
their successors. The European creditors of Santo
Domingo were pressing for the recognition of their
claims. Germany seemed especially determined to
force a settlement of her demands, and it was well
known that Germany had for years regarded the Mon-
roe Doctrine as the main hindrance in the way of
her acquiring a foothold in Latin America. The only
effective method of collecting the interest on the for-
eign debt appeared to be the seizure and adminis-
tration of the Dominican custom-houses by some for-
eign power or group of foreign powers. President
Roosevelt foresaw that such an occupation of the cus-
tom-houses would, in view of the large debt, con-
stitute the occupation of American territory by Euro-
pean powers for an indefinite period of time, and
would therefore be a violation of the Monroe Doc-

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UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

trine. He had before him also the results of a some-
what similar financial administration of Egypt under-
taken jointly by England and France in 1878, and
after Arabi's revolt continued by England alone, with
the result that Egypt soon became a possession of the
British Crown to almost as great a degree as if it
had been formally annexed. President Roosevelt con-
cluded, therefore, that where it was necessary to place
a bankrupt American republic in the hands of a re-
ceiver, the United States must undertake to act as
receiver and take over the administration of its
finances.

The policy that he was about to adopt was stated
as follows in his annual message of December 6,
1904:

Any country whose people conduct themselves well can
count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that
it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency
in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its
obligations, it need fear no interference from the United
States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results
in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may
in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention
by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the
adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine
may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant
cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an
international police power.

About the same time Minister Dawson was directed
by Secretary Hay to suggest to the Dominican govern-
ment that it request the United States to take charge
of its customs. As the Dominican government saw
no other way out of its difficulties, it responded to

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UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

this suggestion, and on February 4, 1905, a protocol
was signed by Mr. Dawson and the Dominican for-
eign minister which provided that the United States
should guarantee the territorial integrity of the Do-
minican Republic, take charge of its custom-houses,
administer its finances, and settle its obligations, for-
eign as well as domestic. In calling the new agree-
ment a " protocol " instead of a " treaty," the Presi-
dent had probably not intended to submit it to the
Senate, but the proposal to depart so radically from
our past policy created so much criticism that the
Senate was finally asked to ratify the protocol in reg-
ular form. This they failed to do, but the President
did not propose to be thwarted in this way. As the
Senate would not sanction his appointment of a re-
ceiver of customs for Santo Domingo, he drafted a
modus vivendi, under the terms of which the Presi-
dent of the Dominican Republic appointed a receiver
of customs named unofficially by President Roosevelt,
who proceeded to administer the affairs of the re-
public under the protection of the United States navy,
whose ships the President could as commander-in-
chief order wherever he pleased. The President's
course met with determined opposition both in and
out of Congress, but as he was bent on having his
way and continued to carry out his policy without
the sanction of the Senate, that body finally decided
that it would be best to give the arrangement a definite
legal status. On February 25, 1907, the Senate agreed
to the ratification of a revised treaty which omitted
the territorial-guarantee clause, but provided that the
President of the United States should appoint a gen-
eral receiver of Dominican customs and such assist-

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UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

ants as he might deem necessary; that the govern-
ment of the United States should afford them such
protection as might be necessary for the performance
of their duties; and that until the bonded debt should
be paid in full, the Dominican government would not
increase its debt except with the consent of the United
States. In the meantime, under the interim arrange-
ment, conditions in Santo Domingo had greatly im-
proved, the customs receipts had nearly doubled, and
the creditors had agreed to compromise their claims,
so that the total debt at the time the above treaty
was ratified amounted to not more than $ 17, 000,000. 10
In spite of the criticism that President Roosevelt's
policy encountered, the Taft administration not only
continued it in Santo Domingo, but tried to extend
lt to Nicara£ua and Honduras. The five republics
of Central America had been for years in a state
of political and economic disorder as the result of
wars and revolutions. In 1906 there was a war be-
tween Guatemala and Salvador, in which Honduras
became involved as the ally of Salvador. President
Roosevelt invited President Diaz of Mexico to unite
with him in an offer of mediation, which resulted
in a peace conference held aboard the U. S. S. Marble-
head. At this conference the belligerents agreed to
suspend hostilities and to attend another conference
for the purpose of drafting a general treaty of peace.
The second conference was held at San Jose, Costa
Rica, but President Zelaya of Nicaragua declined to
send a representative because he was unwilling to
recognize the right of the United States to intervene

10 Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 298; Moore, " Digest of Int. Law," Vol. VI,
i. 518-529; Am. J
upplement, p. 231.

280

pp. 518-529; Am. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. I, p. 287, and Documentary
Su

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

in Central American affairs. At this time Zelaya was
systematically interfering in the internal affairs of
the other Central American states, and exercised such
complete control over the government of Honduras
that Guatemala and Salvador were endeavoring to stir
up revolutions against him in that state and in Nica-
ragua. War was about to break out in the summer
of 1907 when President Roosevelt and President Diaz
again intervened diplomatically and persuaded the Cen-
tral American governments to suspend warlike prepa-
rations and to attend a conference in the city of
Washington. In November the delegates of the five
Central American states met in the Bureau of Ameri-
can Republics and were addressed by Secretary Root
and the Mexican ambassador. The delegates adopted
a general treaty of peace, providing for the settlement
of existing differences and for the establishment of
a Central American court of justice composed of five
judges, one to be elected by the legislature of each
state. The five republics agreed to submit to this tri-
bunal all controversies of whatever nature that might
arise between them which could not be settled through
ordinary diplomatic channels.

But President Zelaya of Nicaragua, who still con-
trolled Honduras, continued his interference in the
affairs of the other republics by encouraging revolu-
tionary movements and sending out filibustering ex-
peditions. He was also hostile to the Central Ameri-
can court of justice, and it became evident that there
was little chance of permanent peace as long as
Zelaya remained in power. When, therefore, in Oc-
tober, 1909, members of the conservative party started
a revolution at Bluefields against Zelaya's government,

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UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the movement was regarded with sympathy in the
other Central American republics and in Washington.
Conditions became so intolerable that many people
in Nicaragua and Honduras appealed to the United
States to intervene for the purpose of restoring order.
President Diaz of Mexico was friendly to Zelaya
and informed the United States that he did not care
to take any further action. This brought to an end
the cooperative efforts of the two governments and
thereafter the United States had to act alone. Noth-
ing was done, however, until two Americans were
executed by Zelaya's order in November, 1909. As
a result of these executions, which were without legal
excuse and attended by barbarous cruelties, President
Taft promptly severed diplomatic relations with
Zelaya's government. In a dispatch to the Nicaraguan
charge, December i, 1909, Secretary Knox said:

Since the Washington conventions of 1907, it is notorious
that President Zelaya has almost continuously kept Central
America in tension or turmoil; that he has repeatedly and
flagrantly violated the provisions of the conventions, and,
by a baleful influence upon Honduras, whose neutrality the
conventions were to assure, has sought to discredit those
sacred international obligations, to the great detriment of
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala, whose governments
meanwhile appear to have been able patiently to strive for
the loyal support of the engagements so solemnly undertaken
at Washington under the auspices of the United States and
Mexico.

He added that under the regime of President Zelaya
republican institutions had ceased to exist in Nicaragua
except in name, that public opinion and the press had
been throttled, and that prison had been the reward of

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UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

any tendency to real patriotism. The government of
the United States was convinced, he said, " that the
revolution represents the ideals and the will of a ma-
jority of the Nicaraguan people more faithfully than
does the government of President Zelaya." "

This note caused the speedy downfall of Zelaya's
government. He tried to perpetuate his party in
power by resigning the presidency to Dr. Madriz,
but President Taft refused to recognize the Madriz
government, and a few months later it was over-
thrown and the revolutionary party came into power,
first under the presidency of Estrada and then under
that of Adolfo Diaz.

The revolution had paralyzed agriculture and com-
merce and thrown the country into financial chaos.
In October, 1910, the United States government sent
Thomas C. Dawson to Managua to investigate con-
ditions and to straighten out the political and financial
affairs of Nicaragua. While he was engaged in this
task, Secretary Knox negotiated at Washington two
treaties, one between the United States and Honduras,
signed January 10, 1911, and a similar treaty between
the United States and Nicaragua, signed June 6.
These treaties were intended to place the two countries
concerned under the financial supervision of the United
States. They provided for the appointment in each
case of a collector of customs approved by the Presi-
dent of the United States, and made the customs re-
ceipts responsible for loans to be advanced by Ameri-
can bankers. The collectorship of customs was im-
mediately established in Nicaragua without waiting
for the ratification of the treaty by the Senate, and

11 Foreign Relations, 1909, p. 455.

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UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

through the efforts of the State Department American
bankers made preliminary loans to the Nicaraguan
government. When the Senate rejected the treaty, the
bankers refused to make further loans, and the situa-
tion was almost as bad as ever. In October, 1911,
General Mena, minister of war and head of a fac-
tion of his own, was elected by the Assembly president
of the republic, but as this was contrary to an agree-
ment which had been made with Dawson, it did not
meet with the approval of the United States, and
President Diaz removed Mena from office and forced
him to flee from the capital. Shortly afterwards Mena
was taken seriously ill, and the opposition to President
Diaz fell again under the control of Zelaya's fol-
lowers. As President Diaz was unable to guarantee
protection to the life and property of foreigners, he
asked the United States for assistance. In answer to
this request American marines were landed at Corinto
and assumed control of the national railway which
connected that port with the capital and the principal
cities. The American minister made a public an-
nouncement to the effect that the United States in-
tended to keep open the routes of communication and
to protect American life and property. This an-
nouncement was a great blow to the revolutionists.
Some of their leaders surrendered voluntarily to the
American marines, while others were attacked and
forced to surrender positions along the railroad which
they insisted upon holding. In these operations seven
American marines lost their lives. Since 1912 a
legation guard of one hundred marines has been main-
tained at the capital of Nicaragua and a warship has
been stationed at Corinto.

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UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

After the revolutionary movement was thus over-
thrown, Secretary Knox negotiated a new treaty for
the purpose of helping the Nicaraguan government
out of the financial straits in which it found itself.
Great Britain was threatening to force the payment
of its claims and certain German interests, which were
operating banana plantations in Costa Rica, were try-
ing to secure from the Nicaraguan government a con-
cession for the construction of a canal from the
Great Lake to the Atlantic along the San Juan river.
According to the terms of the Knox treaty the United
States was to pay Nicaragua $3,000,000 in return
for an exclusive right of way for a canal through
her territory, a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca,
and the lease for ninety-nine years of the Great Corn
and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean. This treaty
was submitted to the Senate February 26, 1913, but
the close of the Taft administration was then at hand,
and no action was taken.

The Wilson administration followed the same pol-
icy, however, and in July, 1913, Secretary Bryan sub-
mitted a third treaty with Nicaragua containing the
provisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition
certain provisions of the Platt Amendment which de-
fines our protectorate over Cuba. This treaty aroused
strong opposition in the other Central American
States, and Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras filed
formal protests with the United States government
against its ratification on the ground that it would
convert Nicaragua into a protectorate of the United
States and thus defeat the long-cherished plan for a
union of the Central American republics. They also
claimed that the treaty infringed their own rights.

285

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

In 1858 Costa Rica had been granted perpetual rights
of free navigation in the lower part of the San Juan
river, and Nicaragua had agreed to consult her before
granting any concessions for the construction of an
interoceanic canal. Salvador and Honduras objected
to the establishment of a naval base in the Gulf of
Fonseca in close proximity to their coasts. They
also asserted proprietary rights in the Gulf of Fonseca,
claiming that Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as
successors of the old Central American Federation,
exercised joint ownership over the gulf. Efforts were
made by the United States to arrive at a settlement
with Costa Rica and Salvador on the basis of a money
payment, but without success. Moreover, the Senate
of the United States objected to the protectorate
feature of the treaty and refused to ratify it, but the
negotiations were renewed, and on August 5, 1914,
a new treaty, which omits the provisions of the Platt
Amendment, was signed at Washington. This treaty,
which was finally ratified by the Senate, February 18,
1916, grants to the United States in perpetuity the
exclusive right to construct a canal by way of the
San Juan river and Lake Nicaragua, and leases to
the United States for ninety-nine years a naval base
on the Gulf of Fonseca, and also the Great Corn
and Little Corn Islands as coaling stations. The con-
sideration for these favors was the sum of $3,000,00x3
to be expended, with the approval of the Secretary
of State of the United States, in paying the public
debt of Nicaragua, and for other purposes to be
agreed on by the two contracting parties.

In consenting to the ratification of the treaty the
Senate, in order to meet the objections raised by Costa

286

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

Rica, Salvador, and Honduras, attached to their reso-
lution of ratification the proviso " that nothing in said
convention is intended to affect any existing right
of any of the said states." This reservation did not
satisfy Costa Rica and Salvador, who took their cases
to the Central American Court of Justice, requesting
that Nicaragua be enjoined from carrying out the
provisions of the treaty. Nicaragua refused to be a
party to the action, but the court nevertheless as-
sumed jurisdiction. Its decision in the case of Costa
Rica was announced September 30, 1916. It declared
that Nicaragua had violated Costa Rica's rights, but,
as the court had no jurisdiction over the United States,
it declined to declare the treaty void. A similar de-
cision in the case of Salvador was handed down on
March 2, 19 17.12

Neither Nicaragua nor the United States has paid
any attention to the decision of the Central American
Court of Justice, which was set up under such favor-
able auspices by the Washington conventions. As a
matter of fact, the court had not fulfilled the ex-
pectations of those who had been interested in its
establishment, but it was unfortunate that it should
have received its coup de grace from the United
States. Furthermore, it has been charged that the
State Department, under the Knox regime, exploited
the situation in Central America for the benefit of
American capitalists, and that the Wilson adminis-
tration has for years maintained a minority party
in power through the presence of a body of American
marines at the capital and a warship at Corinto. On
the other hand, it cannot be denied that as a result

" D. G. Munro, " The Five Republics of Central America," p. 257-

287

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

of American policy, Central America has been freer
from wars and revolutions for a longer period than
at any other time in its history. The better element of
the population appears to be satisfied with the situa-
tion.13

The treaty with the negro republic of Haiti, rati-
fied by the Senate February 28, 1916, carries the new
Caribbean policies of the United States to the farthest
limits short of actual annexation. Shortly before the
outbreak of the European war, Haitian finances were
in such bad shape as the result of internal disorders
that there was grave danger of European intervention,
and the United States was considering the question
of acquiring supervision over the finances of the re-
public. In June, 1915, a crisis in the internal affairs
of Haiti seemed imminent and, at the request of the
State Department, Read-Admiral Caperton was or-
dered to Haitian waters. Towards the latter part
of July the government of President Guillaume was
overthrown, and he and members of his cabinet
took refuge in the French and Dominican legations.
These buildings were entered by a mob, Presi-
dent Guillaume was slain at the gate of the French
legation, his body cut in pieces, and dragged about
the town. Admiral Caperton at once landed a force
of marines at Port au Prince in order to protect the
lives and property of foreigners. An additional force
was brought from Guantanamo and the total number
raised to two thousand and placed under the command
of Colonel Waller. There was but slight resistance
to the landing of the marines, but a few days later

18 For recent and authoritative information on Central American affairs.
see the volume by Dana G. Munro, " The Five Republics of Central
America." (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1918.)

288

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

a conflict occurred in which two Americans were
killed.14 On August 12 a new president was elected
who cooperated with the American forces in their
efforts to establish peace and order, and on September
1 6 a treaty with the United States was signed at Port
au Prince. This treaty provides for the establishment
of a receivership of Haitian customs under the con-
trol of the United States similar in most respects to
that established over the Dominican Republic. It also
provides for the appointment, on the nomination of
the President of the United States, of a financial ad-
viser, who shall assist in the settlement of the foreign
debt and direct expenditures of the surplus for the
development of the agricultural, mineral, and commer-
cial resources of the republic. It provides further
for a native constabulary under American officers ap-
pointed by the President of Haiti upon nomination
of the President of the United States. And it ex-
tends to Haiti the main provisions of the Platt Amend-
ment. By controlling the internal financial adminis-
tration of the government the United States hopes
to remove all incentives for those revolutions which
have in the past had for their object a raid on the
public treasury, and by controlling the customs and
maintaining order the United States hopes to avoid
all possibility of foreign intervention. The treaty
is to remain in force for a period of ten years and
for another period of ten years if either party pre-
sents specific reasons for continuing it on the ground
that its purpose has not been fully accomplished.

The latest acquisition of the United States in the
Caribbean is that of the Danish West Indies, or Virgin

14 Secretary of the Navy, Annual Report 1915, pp. 15-17.

289

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Islands. Reference has already been made to the
treaty negotiated by Secretary Seward in 1867 for the
purchase of these islands, which was unfortunately
rejected by the Senate. Another attempt at purchase
was made by President Roosevelt in 1902. A treaty
providing for the cession of the group to the United
States was signed at Washington on January 24 of
that year and approved by the Senate February 17,
but this time the Danish Rigsdag refused to give its
approval. President Roosevelt was moved by the con-
sideration that the Danish Islands were of great stra-
tegic importance in connection with the problem of
guarding the approaches to the Panama canal. The
commercial value of the islands is also great. More-
over, the United States was confronted by the possi-
bility of their falling under the control of Germany
or some other European power, which might use them
as a naval base. Had Germany been successful in
the recent war, she might have forced Denmark to
sell or cede the islands to her. In view of this pos-
sibility, negotiations were taken up again with Den-
mark in 1916, and on August 4 Secretary Lansing
concluded a treaty by which the United States ac-
quired the islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and St.
Croix, together with some adjacent small islands and
rocks, for the sum of $25,000,000. This treaty was
duly ratified by the Senate and the ratifications were
exchanged January 17, 1917.

The rapid advance of the United States in the
Caribbean, described in the preceding pages, naturally
aroused the fears of the smaller Latin-American states
and lent color to the charge that the United States
had converted the Monroe Doctrine from a policy of

290

UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

benevolent protection to one of imperialistic aggres-
sion. As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine has
never been regarded by the United States as in any
sense a self-denying declaration. President Monroe
said that we should consider any attempt on the part
of the European powers " to extend their system to
any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our
peace and safety." The primary object of the policy
outlined by President Monroe was, therefore, the
peace and safety of the United States. The protec-
tion of Latin-American states against European inter-
vention was merely a means of protecting ourselves.
While the United States thus undertook to prevent
the encroachment of European powers in Latin Amer-
ica, it has never admitted any limitation upon the pos-
sibility of its own expansion in this region. The
silence of the Monroe Doctrine on this question has
been remedied to some extent by President Wilson,
who, at the outset of his administration, gave the
assurance that " the United States will never again
seek one additional foot of territory by conquest."
This declaration, followed by his refusal to be forced
into war with Mexico, has done much to remove the
suspicion with which our recent policies in the Carib-
bean have been regarded by our Southern neighbors.
His sincerity was further attested by his ready ac-
ceptance of the proffered mediation of the ABC
powers in the Mexican embroglio and by the encour-
agement which he has given to the Pan American
movement.

291

CHAPTER VIII
PAN AMERICANISM

THE Pan American movement, which has for its ob-
ject the promotion of closer social, economic, financial,
and political relations between the independent repub-
lics of the Western Hemisphere, has attracted much at-
tention in recent years. The Pan American ideal is an
old one, dating back, in fact, to the Panama Congress
of 1826. The object of this congress was not very
definitely stated in the call which was issued by Simon
Bolivar, but his purpose was to secure the independ-
ence and peace of the new Spanish- American repub-
lics either through a permanent confederation or
through a series of diplomatic congresses. Henry
Clay, who was secretary of state at the time, was
enthusiastically in favor of accepting the invitation ex-
tended to the United States to participate in the con-
gress. President Adams agreed, therefore, to the ac-
ceptance of the invitation, but the matter was debated
at great length in both House and Senate. In the
Senate the debate was particularly acrimonious. The
policy of the administration was denounced as dan-
gerous, and it was asserted that a participation in the
congress at Panama could be of no benefit to the
United States and might be the means of involving us
in international complications. One of the topics pro-
posed for discussion was " the manner in which all
colonization of European powers on the American

292

PAN AMERICANISM

continent shall be restricted.'* The Senate Committee
on Foreign Affairs objected strenuously to the United
States in any way committing itself to guaranteeing
the territory of any other American state. The slav-
ery question also projected itself into the debate,
mainly because the negro Republic of Haiti was to be
represented and because most of the other states had
proclaimed the emancipation of slaves. The Senate
finally agreed to the nomination of Richard C. Ander-
son, of Kentucky, and John Sergeant, of Pennsyl-
vania, as envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipo-
tentiary to the assembly of American nations at
Panama, and Congress made the necessary appropria-
tion. The delay proved fatal to the plan, however, for
the American delegates did not reach Panama until
after the congress had adjourned.

In view of the opposition which the plan encoun-
tered in Congress, the instructions to the American
delegates were very carefully drawn by Secretary Clay
and their powers were strictly limited. They were
cautioned against committing their government in any
way to the establishment of "an amphictyonic council,
invested with power finally to decide controversies be-
tween the American states or to regulate in any re-
spect their conduct. Such a council might have been
well enough adapted to a number of small contracted
states, whose united territory would fall short of the
extent of that of the smallest of the American powers.
The complicated and various interests which appertain
to the nations of this vast continent cannot be safely
confided to the superintendence of one legislative au-
thority. We should almost as soon expect to see an
amphictyonic council to regulate the affairs of the

293

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

whole globe. But even if it were desirable to estab-
lish such a tribunal, it is beyond the competency of
the government of the United States voluntarily to
assent to it, without a previous change of their actual
constitution."

The delegates were also instructed to oppose the
formation of an offensive and defensive alliance be-
tween the American powers, for, as Mr. Clay pointed
out, the Holy Alliance had abandoned all idea of as-
sisting Spain in the conquest of her late colonies. Con-
tinuing, he said :

Other reasons concur to dissuade the United States from
entering into such an alliance. From the first establishment
of their present constitution, their illustrious statesmen have
inculcated the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading
maxim of their foreign policy. It is true, that in its adop-
tion, their attention was directed to Europe, which having
a system of connections and of interests remote and different
from ours, it was thought most advisable that we should not
mix ourselves up with them. And it is also true, that long
since the origin of the maxim, the new American powers have
arisen, to which, if at all, it is less applicable. Without,
therefore, asserting that an exigency may not occur in which
an alliance of the most intimate kind between the United
States and the other American republics would be highly
proper and expedient, it may be safely said that the occasion
which would warrant a departure from that established
maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such
is believed now to exist. Among the objections to such
alliances, those which at all times have great weight are,
first, the difficulty of a just and equal arrangement of the
contributions of force and of other means between the
respective parties to the attainment of the common object;
and secondly, that of providing beforehand, and determining
with perfect precision, when the casus foederis arises, and
thereby guarding against all controversies about it. There

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PAN AMERICANISM

is less necessity for any such alliance at this juncture on the
part of the United States, because no compact, by whatever
solemnities it might be attended, or whatever name or char-
acter it might assume, could be more obligatory upon them
than the irresistible motive of self-preservation, which would
be instantly called into operation, and stimulate them to the
utmost exertion in the supposed contingency of an European
attack upon the liberties of America.1

The British government sent a special envoy to
reside near the congress and to place himself in frank
and friendly communication with the delegates. Can-
ning's private instructions to this envoy declared that,

Any project for putting the U. S. of North America
at the head of an American Confederacy, as against Europe,
would be highly displeasing to your Government. It would
be felt as an ill return for the service which has been ren-
dered to those States, and the dangers which have been
averted from them, by the countenance and friendship, and
public declarations of Great Britain; and it would probably,
at no distant period, endanger the peace both of America
and of Europe.

The Panama Congress was without practical results,
and it possesses merely an historical interest. As a
matter of fact, only four republics, Colombia, Central
America, Peru, and Mexico, were represented. Sev-
eral treaties and conventions were drafted with the
view mainly of combined defense against Spain, but
ratification was withheld by all of the states except
Colombia, which gave only a partial approval to what
had been done. Before adjourning, the Congress of
Panama decided to meet again at the town of Tacu-

* International American Conference, Vol. TV (Historical Appendix),
p. 122. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890.

295

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

baya, near the city of Mexico, and to continue its ses-
sions at stated intervals. But as the result of the
failure of the states represented at the congress to
ratify the agreements arrived at, and as the result of
internal disorders, the plan was not carried out, al-
though Mexico issued invitations for another congress
in 1831, 1838, 1839, and 1840.

In 1847 tne republics of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador,
New Granada, and Peru held a so-called " American
Congress " at Lima, which drafted a treaty of con-
federation, one of commerce and navigation, a con-
sular convention, and a postal convention. These
treaties were not ratified and, therefore, the congress
was without practical results. The preamble of the
proposed treaty of confederation referred to the na-
tions assembled as being " bound to each other by the
ties of a common origin, a common language, a com-
mon religion, common customs, and the common cause
for which they have struggled, as well as by their
geographical position, the similarity of their institu-
tions, and their analogous ancestors and reciprocal in-
terests." It is evident, therefore, that this particular
congress was Spanish-American rather than Pan
American.2

In 1856 the republics of Peru, Chile, and Ecuador
signed at Santiago a treaty of confederation, known
as " the Continental Treaty," for the purpose of " ce-
menting upon substantial foundations the union which
exists between them, as members of the great Ameri-
can family, which are bound together by the ties of
a common origin, similar institutions, and many other

3 International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix),

p. 202.

296

PAN AMERICANISM

signs of fraternity." This treaty was not ratified. It
seems to have been dictated by a spirit of hostility to
the United States as the result of the filibustering en-
terprise of William Walker in Central America.

The question of a " continental " league was dis-
cussed between Costa Rica and Colombia in 1862.
After stating that, " There are not always at the head
of the Great Republic moderate, just, and upright men
as those who form the administration of President
Lincoln," Costa Rica continued:

If our Republics could have the guaranty that they have
nothing to fear from the United States of North America,
it is indubitable that no other nation could be more useful
and favorable to us. Under the shelter of her powerful
eagles, under the influence of her wise institutions, and
under the spur of her astonishing progress our newly-born
nationalities should receive the impulse which they now need,
and would be permitted to march with firm step, without
experiencing the troubles and difficulties with which they
have had to struggle. ... In view of the above considera-
tions, the idea has occurred to my government that a new
compact might be draughted by which the United States of
North America should bind themselves solemnly to respect,
and cause others to respect, the independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of the sister republics of this con-
tinent; not to annex to their territory, either by purchase or
by any other means, any part of the territory of the said
republics ; not to allow filibustering expeditions to be fitted up
against the said nations, or to permit the rights of the latter
to be in any way abridged or ignored.8

In January, 1864, the government of Peru issued
invitations to all the governments of the Spanish na-

• International American Conference, Vol. IV7 (Historical
p. 208.

297

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

tions of America to join in a congress to be held at
Lima. The objects of the meeting as stated in the
invitation were " to declare that the American nations
represented in this congress form one single family,"
to improve postal facilities, to exchange statistical
data, to provide for the settlement of all boundary
disputes, and " to irrevocably abolish war, superseding
it by arbitration, as the only means of compromising
all misunderstandings and causes for disagreements
between any of the South American republics." In
accepting the invitation to the congress Colombia ex-
pressed the opinion that " the United States ought not
to be invited, because their policy is adverse to all kind
of alliances, and because the natural preponderance
which a first-class power, as they are, has to exercise in
the deliberations, might embarrass the action of the
congress." So far as definite results were concerned,
this congress at Lima was of no greater importance
than its predecessors.

The French invasion of Mexico and the war be-
tween Spain and the republics on the west coast of
South America in 1865-66 brought about a realization
of their danger on the part of the Spanish-American
republics and a fuller appreciation of the friendship
of the United States. In the war between Spain on
the one hand and the allied republics of Peru, Chile,
Bolivia, and Ecuador on the other, the United States
declared its neutrality as usual, but at an early period
of the struggle Secretary Seward offered to mediate
between the warring nations. Spain refused to ac-
cept this offer, and the war dragged on in a state of
" technical continuance " merely. The offer of media-
tion was again renewed by Secretary Fish, with the

298

PAN AMERICANISM

result that a conference was held at the State Depart-
ment in 1870 attended by the representatives of Spain,
Peru, Chile, and Ecuador. While it was found im-
possible to conclude a formal peace, the delegates
signed an armistice April n, 1871, by which the de
facto suspension of hostilities was converted into an
armistice which was to continue indefinitely and could
not be broken by any of the belligerents without three
years' notice, given through the government of the
United States, of intention to renew hostilities.*

Within ten years of the^ signature of this perpetual
armistice, war broke out between Chile, on the one
hand, and Peru and Bolivia, on the other (1879-83).
The subject of dispute was the nitrate deposits of
northern Chile. In 1880 Chile signed with Colombia
an arbitration treaty which provided that in case the
two parties should be unable in any given case to agree
upon an arbitrator, the matter should be referred to
the President of the United States. Article III of this
treaty was as follows :

The United States of Colombia and the Republic of Chile
will endeavor, at the earliest opportunity, to conclude with
the other American nations conventions like unto the pres-
ent, to the end that the settlement by arbitration of each and
every international controversy shall become a principle of
American public law.

A few weeks later, without waiting for the ratifica-
tion of this treaty, Colombia issued invitations to
the other Spanish-American republics to attend a
conference at Panama for the purpose of securing
their adherence to the treaty. The failure to in-

4 Moore, " Digest of International Law," Vol. VII, pp. 9-10.

299

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

elude the United States in the invitation to the con-
ference was explained by our minister to Colombia
as being due " to the reason that the position
assigned to the government of the United States by
the proposed treaty is to maintain and exercise a
friendly and judicial -impartiality in the differences
which may arise between the powers of Spanish Amer-
ica." 5 The continuance of the war between Chile and
Peru led to the indefinite postponement of the con-
ference.

On November 29, 1881, Secretary Elaine extended
" to all the independent countries of North and South
America an earnest invitation to participate in a gen-
eral congress, to be held in the city of Washington on
the 24th day of November, 1882, for the purpose of
considering and discussing the methods of preventing
war between the nations of America." He expressed
the desire that the attention of the congress should be
strictly confined to this one great object, and he ex-
pressed the hope that in setting a day for the as-
sembling of the congress so far ahead, the war that
was then in progress on the South Pacific coast would
be ended, and the nations engaged would be able to
take part in the proceedings.6 In this expectation Mr.
Blaine was disappointed. The war between Chile and
Peru continued, and the invitations to the conference
were withdrawn.

Toward the close of President Cleveland's first ad-
ministration, the Congress of the United States passed
an act authorizing the President to invite the republics

8 International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix),

300

p. 217.

• Ibid., p. 255.

PAN AMERICANISM

of Mexico, Central and South America, Haiti, Santo
Domingo, and the Empire of Brazil, to join the United
States in a conference at Washington on October 2,
1889. Among the subjects proposed for discussion
were the adoption of a customs union, the improve-
ment of the means of communication between the vari-
ous countries, uniform customs regulations, a uniform
system of weights and measures, laws for the protec-
tion of patents and copyrights, extradition, the adop-
tion of a common silver coin, and the formulation of
a definite plan for the arbitration of international dis-
putes of every character. When the conference as-
sembled, Mr. Elaine was again secretary of state, and
presided over its opening sessions. The conference
formulated a plan for international arbitration and
declared that this means of settling disputes was " a
principle of American international law." Unfortu-
nately this treaty was not ratified by the governments
whose representatives adopted it. The most lasting
achievement of the conference was the establishment
of the Bureau of American Republics in Washington.
While the conference was in session Brazil went
through a bloodless revolution, which converted the
empire into a republic. Thus disappeared the only
independent monarchy of European origin which ever
existed on American soil.

Scarcely had the Washington conference adjourned,
when the United States and Chile got into an ugly
wrangle and were brought to the verge of war over
an attack on American sailors on shore leave at Val-
paraiso. During the civil war between President Bal-
maceda and the Congressional party, the American
minister, Mr. Egan, admitted to the American legation

301

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

certain adherents of the President. The people of
Chile resented the action of the American minister,
and were further aroused against the United States
by the detention of the Ita ta, a vessel which left San
Diego, California, with a cargo of arms for the Con-
gressional party and was overhauled by an American
warship. The United States cruiser Baltimore was
lying in the harbor of Valparaiso when news of this
incident was received. Members of her crew who
happened to be on shore leave were attacked by the
populace and several of them killed. As this attack
upon American sailors appeared to be due to resent-
ment against the official acts of their government, an
apology was immediately demanded, but refused.
After considerable delay, President Harrison had just
laid the matter before Congress when a belated apol-
ogy from Chile arrived, and war was fortunately
averted. The charge that the United States had in-
terfered in behalf of one of the parties in a civil
strife created an unfavorable impression throughout
Latin America and counteracted, to a considerable
extent, the good effects of the Washington conference.
The Second International American Conference
was held in the city of Mexico 1901-02. This confer-
ence arranged for all Latin-American States to be-
come parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 f°r
the pacific settlement of international disputes, and
drafted a treaty for the compulsory arbitration of
pecuniary claims, the first article of which was as
follows :

The High Contracting Parties agree to submit to arbitra-
tion all claims for pecuniary loss or damage which may

302

PAN AMERICANISM

be presented by their respective citizens, and which cannot
be amicably adjusted through diplomatic channels and when
said claims are of sufficient importance to warrant the ex-
penses of arbitration.

This treaty was signed by the delegates of seventeen
states, including the United States of America.7

The Third International American Conference was
held at Rio de Janeiro in 1906. Among other things
it extended the pecuniary claims convention drafted by
the previous conference for another period of five
years, and recommended to the governments repre-
sented that they invite the Second Hague Conference,
which had been called for 1907, " to examine the
question of the compulsory collection of public debts,
and, in general, means tending to diminish between
nations conflicts having an exclusively pecuniary
origin." 8 Added significance was given to the Rio
conference by the presence of Secretary Root who,
although not a delegate, made it the occasion of a
special mission to South America. The series of nota-
ble addresses which he delivered on this mission gave
a new impetus to the Pan American movement.

The Fourth International American Conference was
held at Buenos Aires in 1910. It drafted treaties re-
lating to patents, trade-marks, and copyrights. It ex-
tended the pecuniary claims convention for an indefi-
nite period. And finally, it enlarged the scope of the
Bureau of American Republics and changed its name
to the Pan American Union;8 A fifth conference was

7 Second International American Conference, English text (Mexico,
Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 309.

a Third International American Conference, Minutes, Resolutions, Doc-
uments (Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional. 1907), p. 605.

• Bulletin of the Pan American Union, Vol. 31, p. 796.

303

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

called to meet at Santiago, Chile, in 1914, but was
postponed on account of the European war.

The conferences above described were political or
diplomatic in character. Besides these there have been
held two Pan American scientific congresses in which
the United States participated, one at Santiago, Chile,
in 1908, and one at Washington, December, 1915, to
January, 1916. There have also been held two Pan
American financial conferences in the city of Wash-
ington, the first in May, 1915, and the second in Jan-
uary, 1920. These conferences have accomplished a
great deal in the way of promoting friendly feeling
and the advancement of science and commerce among
the republics of the Western Hemisphere. The First
Financial Conference recommended the establishment
of an International High Commission, to be composed
of not more than nine members resident in each coun-
try appointed by the Minister of Finance of such coun-
try for the purpose of carrying on the work of the
conference. This recommendation was adopted by the
various countries, and the Congress of the United
States, by act of February 7, 1916, authorized the
establishment of a section in this country. The Inter-
national High Commission carries on its labors largely
through the various national sections. Its first general
meeting was held at Buenos Aires in April, 1916.

The American Institute of International Law, or-
ganized at Washington in October, 1912, is a body
which is likely to have great influence in promoting the
peace and welfare of this hemisphere. The Institute is
composed of five representatives from the national so-
ciety of international law in each of the twenty-one
American republics. At the suggestion of Secretary

304

PAN AMERICANISM

Lansing the Institute at a session held in the city of
Washington, January 6, 1916, adopted a Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Nations, which was as
follows :

I. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and
to conserve its existence; but this right neither implies the
right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself or
to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts
against innocent and unoffending states.

II. Every nation has the right to independence in the
sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is
free to develop itself without interference or control from
other states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere
with or violate the rights of other states.

III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of
every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and
all nations have the right to claim and, according to the
Declaration of Independence of the United States, "to as-
sume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal
station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God
entitle them."

IV. Every nation has the right to territory within de-
fined boundaries, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
its territory, and all persons whether native or foreign
found therein.

V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations
is entitled to have that right respected and protected by all
other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the
right of one is the duty of all to observe.

VI. International law is at one and the same time both
national and international ; national in the sense that it is
the law of the land and applicable as such to ihe decision
of all questions involving its principles; international in
the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and
applicable as such to all questions between and among the
members of the society of nations involving its principles.10

10 Am. Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, p. 212.

305

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

This Declaration has been criticized as being too
altruistic for a world in which diplomacy has been
occupied with selfish aims.

On the same day that the above Declaration was
made public, President Wilson delivered a notable ad-
dress before the Second Pan American Scientific Con-
ference then in session at Washington. In the course
of this address he said :

The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States
on her own authority. It has always been maintained, and
always will be maintained, upon her own responsibility. But
the Monroe Doctrine demanded merely that European gov-
ernments should not attempt to extend their political systems
to this side of the Atlantic. It did not disclose the use which
the United States intended to make of her power on this
side of the Atlantic. It was a hand held up in warning, but
there was no promise in it. of what America was going to
do with the implied and partial protectorate which she ap-
parently was trying to set up on this side of the water, and
I believe you will sustain me in the statement that it has
been fears and suspicions on this score which have hitherto
prevented the greater intimacy and confidence and trust be-
tween the Americas. The states of America have not been
certain what the United States would do with her power.
That doubt must be removed. And latterly there has been a
very frank interchange of views between the authorities in
Washington and those who represent the other states of this
hemisphere, an interchange of views charming and hopeful,
because based upon an increasingly sure appreciation of the
spirit in which they were undertaken. These gentlemen have
seen that, if America is to come into her own, into her
legitimate own, in a world of peace and order, she must
establish the foundations of amity, so that no one will here-
after doubt them. I hope and I believe that this can be ac-
complished. These conferences have enabled me to foresee
how it will be accomplished. It will be accomplished, in the

306

PAN AMERICANISM

first place, by the states of America uniting in guaranteeing
to each other absolute political independence and territorial
integrity. In the second place, and as a necessary corollary
to that, guaranteeing the agreement to settle all pending
boundary disputes as soon as possible and by amicable pro-
cess ; by agreeing that all disputes among themselves, should
they unhappily arise, will be handled by patient, impartial
investigation and settled by arbitration; and the agreement
necessary to the peace of the Americas, that no state of
either continent will permit revolutionary expeditions against
another state to be fitted out in its territory, and that they
will prohibit the exportation of the munitions of war for
the purpose of supplying revolutionists against neighboring
governments.

President Wilson's Pan Americanism went further
rfian some of the Latin-American states were willing
to go. A treaty embodying the above proposals was
actually drafted, but some of the states held back
through the fear that, though equal in terms, it would
in fact give the United States a plausible pretext for
supervising the affairs of weaker states.11

President Wilson has not hesitated to depart from
many of the fundamental ideas which have hitherto
guided so-called practical statesmen. His handling of
the Mexican situation, although denounced as weak
and vacillating, has been in full accord with his new
Latin-American policy. On February 18, 1913, Fran-
cisco Madero was seized and imprisoned as the result
of a conspiracy formed by one of his generals, Vic-
toriano Huerta, who forthwith proclaimed himself dic-
tator. Four days later Madero was murdered while
in the custody of Huerta's troops. Henry Lane Wil-
son, the American ambassador, promptly urged his

11 John Bassett Moore, " Principles of American Diplomacy," pp. 407-408.
307

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

government to recognize Huerta, but President Taft,
whose term was rapidly drawing to a close, took no
action and left the question to his successor.

President Wilson thus had a very disagreeable sit-
uation to face when he assumed control of affairs at
Washington. He refused to recognize Huerta whose
authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs in
various parts of the country. It was claimed by the
critics of the administration that the refusal to recog-
nize Huerta was a direct violation of the well known
American policy of recognizing de facto governments
without undertaking to- pass upon the rights involved.
It is perfectly true that the United States has con-
sistently followed the policy of recognizing de facto
governments as soon as it is evident in each case that
the new government rests on popular approval and is
likely to be permanent. This doctrine of recognition
is distinctively an American doctrine. It was first
laid down by Thomas Jefferson when he was secretary
of state as an offset to the European doctrine of divine
right, and it was the natural outgrowth of that other
Jeffersonian doctrine that all governments derive their
just powers from the consent of the governed. Huerta
could lay no claim to authority derived from a ma-
jority or anything like a majority of the Mexican
people. He was a self-constituted dictator, whose au-
thority rested solely on military force. President Wil-
son and Secretary Bryan were fully justified in refus-
ing to recognize his usurpation of power, though they
probably made a mistake in announcing that they
would never recognize him and in demanding his elimi-
nation from the presidential contest. This announce-
ment made him deaf to advice from Washington and

308

PAN AMERICANISM

utterly indifferent to the destruction of American life
and property.

The next step in the President's course with refer-
ence to Mexico was the occupation of Vera Cruz. On
April 20, 1914, the President asked Congress for au-
thority to employ the armed forces of the United
States in demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest
of American marines at Vera Cruz, and the next day
Admiral Fletcher was ordered to seize the custom
house at that port. This he did after a sharp fight
with Huerta's troops in which nineteen Americans
were killed and seventy wounded. The American
charge d'affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, was at once
handed his passports, and all diplomatic relations be-
tween the United States and Mexico were severed.

A few days later the representatives of the so-called
ABC powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, tendered
their good offices for a peaceful settlement of the con-
flict and President Wilson promptly accepted their
mediation. The resulting conference at Niagara, May
20, was not successful in its immediate object, but it
resulted in the elimination of Huerta who resigned
July 15, 1914. On August 20, General Venustiano
Carranza, head of one of the revolutionary factions,
assumed control of affairs at the capital, but his au-
thority was disputed by General Francisco Villa, an-
other insurrectionary chief. On Carranza's promise to
respect the lives and property of American citizens the
United States forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz
in November, 1914.

In August, 1915, at the request of President Wilson
the six ranking representatives of Latin America at
Washington made an unsuccessful effort to reconcile

309

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

the contending factions of Mexico. On their advice,
however, President Wilson decided in October to rec-
ognize the government of Carranza, who now con-
trolled three-fourths of the territory of Mexico. As
a result of this action Villa began a series of attacks
on American citizens and raids across the border,
which in March, 1916, compelled the President to send
a punitive expedition into Mexico and later to dis-
patch most of the regular army and large bodies of
militia to the border.12

The raids of Villa created a very awkward situa-
tion. Carranza not only made no real effort to sup-
press Villa, but he vigorously opposed the steps taken
by the United States to protect its own citizens along
the border, and even assumed a threatening attitude.
There was a loud and persistent demand in the United
States for war against Mexico. American investments
in land, mines, rubber plantations, and other enterprises
were very large, and these financial interests were par-
ticularly outraged at the President's policy of " watch-
ful waiting." The President remained deaf to this
clamor. No country had been so shamelessly exploited
by foreign capital as Mexico. Furthermore it was
suspected and very generally believed that the recent
revolutions had been financed by American capital.
President Wilson was determined to give the Mexi-
can people an opportunity to reorganize their national
life on a better basis and to lend them every assistance
in the task. War with Mexico would have been a very
serious undertaking and even a successful war would

11 " Affairs in Mexico," Sixty-fourth Cong., First Sess., Sen. Doc. No.
324. The World Peace Foundation has issued two pamphlets containing
documents on Mexico under the title of " The New Pan Americanism,"
Parts I and II (February and April, 1916).

310

PAN AMERICANISM

have meant the military occupation of Mexico for an
indefinite period. President Wilson's refusal to be-
come involved in war with Mexico convinced the
world of his sincerity and gave him a hearing during
the Great War such as no political leader of any nation
ever before commanded.

It has been charged that there was a lack of con-
sistency between the President's Mexican policy and
his Haitian policy. The difference between the two
cases, however, was that the Haitian situation, if taken
in time, could be handled without bloodshed, while the
same method applied to Mexico would have led to a
long and bloody conflict. It would be easy enough to
go into Mexico, but exceedingly difficult to get out.
The most novel feature of the President's Mexican
policy was his acceptance of the mediation of the
ABC powers and his subsequent consultation with
the leading representatives of Latin America. This
action has brought the Pan American ideal to the point
of realization. It has been received with enthusiasm
and it has placed our relations with Latin America on
a better footing than they have been for years.

It has been suggested by more than one critic of
American foreign policy that if we are to undertake
to set the world right, we must come before the bar
of public opinion with clean hands, that before we
denounce the imperialistic policies of Europe, we must
abandon imperialistic policies at home. The main fea-
tures of President Wilson's Latin- American policy, if
we may draw a general conclusion, have been to pledge
the weaker American republics not to do anything
which would invite European intervention, and to
secure by treaty the right of the United States to inter-

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

vene for the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and for the establishment of self-government. The
test of such a policy is the degree of unselfishness with
which it is carried out.

The loyalty of the Latin-American states to the
principles of Pan Americanism was put to a severe
test when the United States entered the Great War.
When President Wilson announced to Congress the
severance of relations with Germany and declared his
intention of protecting our commerce on the high seas,
he expressed the confident hope that all neutral gov-
ernments would pursue the same course. He prob-
ably had especially in mind our Latin- American neigh-
bors, but if so, his expectation was not fully realized.
Only eight of the twenty Latin- American republics
eventually entered the war: Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
Five others broke off relations with Germany : Bolivia,
Peru, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Uruguay.
Seven remained neutral : Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay.13

Only two Latin-American states, Brazil and Cuba,
took an active part in the war. At the request of the
British government in December, 1917, Brazil sent
two cruisers and four destroyers to European waters
to cooperate with the British navy, and a few months
later a group of Brazilian aviators took their place on
the Western front. A number of physicians and sev-
eral Red Cross units from Brazil also cooperated with
the Allies. Cuba turned over to the United States sev-
eral German steamships interned in her waters. A

11 Percy A. Martin. "Latin America and the War" (issued by the
World Peace Foundation, August, 1919).

312

PAN AMERICANISM

compulsory military service law was passed and a
number of training camps established. In October,
1918, the Cuban government announced that it had
25,000 troops ready to send to France, but the armi-
stice was signed before arrangements could be made
for their transportation. The only active service ren-
dered by Cubans was in the field of aviation, where
several individuals won high distinction.

Of the A B C powers Argentina and Chile re-
mained neutral. So also did Mexico. Brazil was thus
the only one of the larger states that actually entered
the war. The relations between Brazil and the United
States have almost always been peculiarly close and
friendly. From the outbreak of the European war
strong sympathy for the allied cause was manifested
in Brazil, and a league for aiding the Allies through
the agency of the Red Cross was organized under the
presidency of Ruy Barbosa, the most distinguished
statesman of Brazil and one of the most brilliant
orators of Latin America. Brazil's experience during
the period of neutrality was very similar to that of the
United States. Her commerce was interfered with
and her ships were sunk by German submarines. A
few weeks after the United States entered the war,
Brazil severed relations with Germany and seized the
forty-six German ships interned in Brazilian harbors.
In a circular note of June 2 the Brazilian government
declared to the world that it had taken this step because
the Republic of Brazil was bound to the United States
" by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of
political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of
America and the principles accepted by international
law," and because it wished to give to its foreign

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UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

policy, in this critical moment of the world's history,
" a practical form of continental solidarity — a policy
indeed which was that of the old regime on every oc-
casion on which any of the other friendly sister na-
tions of the American continent were in jeopardy."
President Wilson's reply to this note expressed the
deep appreciation of the United States and the hope
that the act of the Brazilian Congress was " the fore-
runner of the attitude to be assumed by the rest of the
American states." On October 26, 1917, on the re-
ceipt of the news of the torpedoing of another Brazil-
ian ship by a German submarine, a resolution recog-
nizing " the state of war initiated by the German Em-
pire against Brazil " was adopted by the unanimous
vote of the Brazilian Senate and by a vote of 149 to i
in the Chamber of Deputies.14 Brazil's enthusiastic
support of the United States and of the allied cause
has been recognized by those powers in giving her
representation on the Council of the League of
Nations. In fact at the first meeting of the Council
in London in February, 1920, Brazil was the sole
American power represented.

Argentina, the largest and most important of the
states of Spanish origin, remained neutral throughout
the war, notwithstanding the fact that a large part of
the population and some of the leading newspapers
were strongly pro-Ally. When the United States de-
clared war, Senor Drago, the former minister of for-
eign affairs and author of the doctrine that bears his
name, issued a statement in which he said:

The war between Germany and America is a struggle of

"Martin, "Latin America and the War," pp. 13-15-

314

PAN AMERICANISM

democracy versus absolutism, and no American nation can
remain neutral without denying its past and compromising
its future.

About the same time a note was sent through Am-
bassador Naon stating that " in view of the causes
which have prompted the United States to declare
war against the government of the German Empire,"
the Argentine government recognizes " the justice of
that decision." But German propaganda, which had
its headquarters in Buenos Aires, and the attitude
of President Irrigoyen kept the country out of the
war. Popular indignation was aroused by the Lux-
burg disclosures, which revealed the fact that the
German representative, after coming to an under-
standing with the President, had advised his gov-
ernment that two Argentine ships then approaching
the French coast " be spared if possible, or else sunk
without a trace being left" (spurlos versenkt). The
Senate and Chamber of Deputies passed by large ma-
jorities a resolution severing relations with Germany,
but to the surprise of everybody President Irrigoyen
expressed himself as satisfied with Germany's dis-
avowal of Luxburg's conduct and continued his policy
of neutrality.

Chile was so far removed from the scene of the war
in Europe and had so few ships engaged in European
trade that her government did not have the same
provocation that others had. Furthermore, German
propaganda had made great headway in Chile and the
Chilean army, trained by German officers, was strongly
pro-German. In the navy, on the other hand, senti-
ment was strongly in favor of the Allies. This was a
matter of tradition, for since the days of Lord

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UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Cochrane, whose exploits have been described in an
earlier chapter of this book, the Chilean navy has
followed English ideals. Under these circumstances
Chile remained neutral, though before the end of the
war public sentiment had shifted to the side of the
Allies.15

Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay in severing re-
lations with Germany proclaimed their adherence to
the principle of American solidarity. Paraguay's neu-
trality was due to her isolation. Colombia, still smart-
ing under the loss of the Isthmus, was not disposed to
take sides with the United States. In Venezuela most
of the government officials were under German in-
fluence. Panama and four of the five Central Ameri-
can republics declared war on Germany, Salvador
alone remaining neutral. Cuba and Haiti also de-
clared war on Germany, while the Dominican Republic
severed consular relations. Mexico proclaimed its
neutrality, but permitted its soil to become a hot-bed
of German intrigue and President Carranza exhibited
at times a spirit of hostility to the United States which
tended to increase the tension that already existed be-
tween the two countries.

In an article on " The European War and Pan
Americanism " le Ambassador Naon of the Argentine
Republic draws the following interesting conclusions,
conclusions that are all the more interesting because
his country was not one of those that took the course
to which he gives his approval. He says : " The politi-
cal action developed by the different governments of

18 Enrique Rocuant, "The Neutrality of Chile and the Grounds that
Prompted and Justified It," (Valparaiso, 1919).

16 Reprinted in International Conciliation, Inter- American Division,
Bulletin No. 20 (April, 1919).

3l6

PAN AMERICANISM

the continent in the presence of the European conflict,
especially since the breaking out of hostilities between
the United States and Germany, has not been either
the best advised or the most propitious for achieving
the consolidation of Pan Americanism." The situa-
tion created by the European war, he continues, "af-
fected the entire continent in the same manner and
with the same political and economic intensity as the
United States, and both self-interest and moral obliga-
tions ought to have counseled the consummating of
solidarity, here and now, by making common cause
and endorsing the attitude of the United States to the
extreme limit, until the disturbing force should be
overcome. The political action of America did not
take this direction, however. Some of the most im-
portant governments of the continent, going counter to
the political aspirations and doubtless to the political
interests of their own countries, adhered to the policy
of neutrality. In America this was equivalent to a
policy of isolation, and thus the solidarity of the con-
tinent was broken, with consequent prejudice to Pan
Americanism. Yet even if in those countries, the
action of the governments could not be counted upon,
nevertheless, the sentiment, expressed in eloquent
manifestations of public opinion and in complete dis-
agreement with that attitude of the governments, per-
sisted throughout the crisis. Thus the spirit of Pan
Americanism was saved, and we are justified in be-
lieving that there will come a reaction which will
restore the disturbed equilibrium and save the mighty
interests involved."

Ambassador Naon believes, however, that Pan
Americanism has many obstacles in the way of its com-

317

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

plete realization. Among them he mentions " the
recognition of politico-intellectual inferiorities " by
the peace conference at Paris in the classification of
nations as great powers and small powers. The funda-
mental principle of Pan Americanism he believes to
be the doctrine of equality. He further points out
that as long as American states remain, whether as the
result of their own shortcomings or not, in these con-
ditions of inferiority in world politics, "there will
continue to exist for the United States the causes that
gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine and consequently all
its objections will continue to exist." Finally he says
that "the idea of solidarity is being weakened or
thwarted by another idea, the unwholesome one of
Latin Americanism, which is a Teutonic idea in its
tendencies, and which is trying to replace it, basing it-
self upon supposed antagonisms of interests and ideals
between the other countries of America and the United
States. This purpose, which is anarchical, might
cause American solidarity to fail if, in virtue of neg-
lecting to foster this tendency, it should succeed, by
pandering to paltry prejudices and flattering national
vanities, in gaining a footing in the thought of the
other governments of the continent to the extent of
constituting itself a political force, capable of replac-
ing the system of solidarity which Pan Americanism
seeks, by a system of a continental equilibrium : a sys-
tem which has just failed in the European conflict."

This summary of the views of the distinguished Ar-
gentine statesman is sufficient to show that his analysis
of the situation is correct. The weakness and back-
wardness of certain states, specifically those in the zone
of the Caribbean, lies at the heart of the difficulty. As

318

PAN AMERICANISM

long as they remain in their present condition the
United States must continue to protect them against
European intervention and, when occasion arises,
supervise their affairs in order to prevent them from
provoking such intervention. As long as it is neces-
sary to pursue this course the United States will have
to rest under the suspicion of having imperialistic de-
signs on its weaker neighbors, and it is this suspicion
which perpetuates the spirit of Latin Americanism
which in turn must be overcome before we can fully
realize the ideal of Pan Americanism.

319

CHAPTER IX
THE MONROE DOCTRINE

IN the foregoing chapters we have discussed the
origin and the more important applications of the
Monroe Doctrine. There remain, however, certain
general aspects of the subject which require special
consideration. In any discussion of the Monroe Doc-
trine it is important to bear in mind that it was
in its origin and has always remained purely an ex-
ecutive policy. Neither house of Congress has ever
expressly sanctioned the language of President Monroe
or attempted to formulate a new definition of the
policy. On January 20, 1824, a few weeks after Mon-
roe's famous message, Henry Clay made an effort
to get Congress to endorse the policy announced by
the executive, but his resolution was tabled.1 In 1856
Senator Clayton, who as secretary of state had nego-
tiated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, declared that he
would be willing to vote to assert the Monroe Doc-
trine and maintain it, but that he would " not expect
to be sustained in such a vote by both branches of
Congress. Whenever the attempt has been made to
assert the Monroe Doctrine in either branch of Con-
gress, it has failed." And he added, "You cannot
prevail on a majority, and I will venture to say that
you cannot prevail on one-third, of either house of
Congress to sustain it." 2 In fact, the Monroe Doc-

1 Moore, " Digest of International Law," Vol. VI, p. 404.
*lb\d., p. 427.

320

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

trine never received anything approaching legislative
sanction until 1895, when, in response to President
Cleveland's message on the Venezuelan boundary dis-
pute, Congress appropriated $100,000 to pay the ex-
penses of the commission which he proposed to ap-
point.

For nearly a hundred years we have successfully
upheld the Monroe Doctrine without resort to force.
The policy has never been favorably regarded by the
powers of continental Europe. Bismarck described it
as " an international impertinence." In recent years
it has stirred up rather intense opposition in certain
parts of Latin America. Until recently no American
writers appear to have considered the real nature of
the sanction on which the doctrine rested. How is it
that without an army and until recent years without
a navy of any size we have been able to uphold a
policy which has been described as an impertinence
to Latin America and a standing defiance to Europe?
Americans generally seem to think that the Monroe
Doctrine has in it an inherent sanctity which prevents
other nations from violating it. In view of the gen-
eral disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired, dur-
ing the past few years, this explanation will not hold
good and some other must be sought. Americans have
been so little concerned with international affairs that
they have failed to see any connection between the
Monroe Doctrine and the balance of power in Europe.
The existence of a European balance of power is the
only explanation of our having been able to uphold
the Monroe Doctrine for so long a time without a
resort to force. Some one or more of the European
powers would long ago have stepped in and called our

321

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

bluff, that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe Doc-
trine or fight for it, had it not been for the well-
grounded fear that as soon as they became engaged
with us some other European power would attack
them in the rear. What other satisfactory explana-
tion is there for Louis Napoleon's withdrawal from
Mexico, for Great Britain's backdown in the Vene-
zuelan boundary dispute, and for the withdrawal of
the German fleet from Venezuela in 1902?

While England has from time to time objected
to some of the corollaries deduced from the Monroe
Doctrine, she has on the whole been not unfavorably
disposed toward the essential features of that policy.
The reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has
been an open-door policy, and has thus been in gen-
eral accord with the British policy of free trade. The
United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for
the establishment of exclusive trade relations with
our Southern neighbors. In fact, we have largely neg-
lected the South American countries as a field for the
development of American commerce. The failure
to cultivate this field has not been due wholly to
neglect, however, but to the fact that we have had
employment for all our capital at home and conse-
quently have not been in a position to aid in the
industrial development of the Latin- American states,
and to the further fact that, our exports have been
so largely the same and hence the trade of North and
South America has been mainly with Europe. There
has, therefore, been little rivalry between the United
States and the powers of Europe in the field of South
American commerce. Our interest has been political
rather than commercial. We have prevented the es-

1322

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

tablishment of spheres of influence and preserved the
open door. This situation has been in full accord with
British policy. Had Great Britain adopted a high
tariff policy and been compelled to demand commer-
cial concessions from Latin America by force, the
Monroe Doctrine would long since have gone by the
board and been forgotten. Americans should not for-
get the fact, moreover, that at any time during the
past twenty years Great Britain could have settled
all her outstanding difficulties with Germany by agree-
ing to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrine and give her
rival a free hand in South America. In the face of
such a combination our navy would have been of little
avail.

Contrary to a widely prevailing opinion the Mon-
roe Doctrine has undergone very little change since
the original declaration, and the official statements
of the doctrine have on the whole been very con-
sistent. The only important extension was made
hss than two years after the original declaration,
when, in October, 1825, Secretary Clay, acting under
the direction of President John Quincy Adams, who
assisted in formulating the doctrine, notified the
French government that we could not consent to the
occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico " by any other
European power than Spain under any contingency
whatever." Similar declarations were made to the
other European powers, the occasion being the fear
that Spain would transfer her sovereignty over these
islands to some other government. President Mon-
roe had declared that the American continents were
closed to colonization from Europe, meaning by colo-
nization very probably, as Professor John Bassett

323

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

Moore says, " the acquisition of title to territory by
original occupation and settlement."3 He had made
no declaration against the transfer of sovereignty in
America from one European power to another. In
fact he positively renounced any such idea, when he
said: " With the existing colonies or dependencies of
any European power we have not interfered, and
shall not interfere." Here, then, within two years
we have a distinct advance upon the position taken
by President Monroe. Yet this advanced ground was
held by succeeding administrations, until President
Grant could say in the case of the same islands in his
first annual message:

These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to
transfer from one European power to another. When the
present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become in-
dependent powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-
control in the determination of their future condition and
relations with other powers.*

And Secretary Hamilton Fish said a few months later
that the President had but followed "the teachings
of all our history " when he made this statement.6

The failure of Elaine and Frelinghuysen to oust
Great Britain from her interests in the canal under
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by an appeal to the Monroe
Doctrine and the successful enforcement of the doc-
trine by President Cleveland and Secretary Olney in
1895 have been discussed at sufficient length in pre-
vious chapters. While the policy of Cleveland and

• Political Science Quarterly. Vol. XI. p. 3.
4 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VII, p. 32.
8 Foreign Relations, 1870, pp. 254-260; Moore, " Digest of International
Law," Vol. VI, p. 43».

324

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Olney was vehemently denounced at the time, it is
now generally approved by American writers of
authority on international law and diplomacy.

When President McKinley decided to demand from
Spain the cession of the Philippine Islands, the oppo-
sition that the step encountered was based to some
extent on the fear that it would amount to a re-
pudiation of the Monroe Doctrine, that if we invaded
the Eastern Hemisphere we could not expect to keep
Europe out of the Western. The use of the term
hemispheres in connection with the Monroe Doctrine
has, of course, been merely a figure of speech. The
Monroe Doctrine dealt with the relations between
Europe and America, and Eastern Asia never came
within its purview. As a matter of fact, the Monroe
Doctrine has been more fully and more frequently
asserted since the acquisition of the Philippines than
ever before. The participation of the United States
in the First Peace Conference at The Hague was
taken by many Americans to mark the end of the old
order and the introduction of a new era in American
diplomacy, but, contrary to their expectations, this
meeting was made the occasion for an emphatic and
effective declaration before the assembled body of
European nations of our adherence to the Monroe
Doctrine. Before the Convention for the Pacific Set-
tlements of International Disputes was adopted, the
following declaration was read before the conference
and the treaty was signed by the American delegates
under this reservation:

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so con-
strued as to require the United States of America to depart
from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering

325

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy
or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall
anything contained in the said convention be construed to
imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of
its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.6

Prior to the Roosevelt administration the Monroe
Doctrine was regarded by the Latin-American states
as solely a protective policy. The United States did
not undertake to control the financial administration
or the foreign policy of any of these republics. It
was only after their misconduct had gotten them into
difficulty and some foreign power, or group of for-
eign powers, was on the point of demanding repara-
tion by force that the United States stepped in and
undertook to see to it that foreign intervention did
not take the form of occupation of territory or inter-
ference in internal politics. The Monroe Doctrine has
always been in principle a policy of American inter-
vention for the purpose of preventing European in-
tervention, but American intervention always awaited
the threat of immediate action on the part of some
European power. President Roosevelt concluded that
it would be wiser to restrain the reckless conduct of
the smaller American republics before disorders or
public debts should reach a point which gave Euro-
pean powers an excuse for intervening. He held that
since we could not permit European powers to re-
strain or punish American states in cases of wrong-
doing, we must ourselves undertake that task. As
long as the Monroe Doctrine was merely a policy of
benevolent protection, which Latin-American states
could invoke after their unwise or evil conduct had

•"Treaties and Conventions of the United States" (Compiled by W.
M. Malloy), vol. II, p. 2032.

326

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

brought European powers to the point of demanding
just retribution, it was regarded with favor and no
objection was raised to it; but the Roosevelt declara-
tion, that if we were to continue to protect Latin-
American states against European intervention, we had
a right to demand that they should refrain from con-
duct which was likely to provoke such intervention,
was quite a different thing, and raised a storm of
criticism and opposition.

The Roosevelt interpretation of the Monroe Doc-
trine was undoubtedly a perfectly logical step. It was
endorsed by the Taft administration and has been ex-
tended by the Wilson administration and made one
of our most important policies in the zone of the
Caribbean. President Roosevelt was right in draw-
ing the conclusion that we had arrived at a point
where we had either to abandon the Monroe Doc-
trine or to extend its application so as to cover the
constantly increasing number of disputes arising from
the reckless creation of public debts and loose financial
administration. It was absurd for us to stand quietly
by and witness the utterly irresponsible creation of
financial obligations that would inevitably lead to
European intervention and then undertake to fix the
bounds and limits of that intervention. It is inter-
esting to note that President Wilson has not hesi-
tated to carry the new policy to its logical conclusion,
and he has gone so far as to warn Latin-American
countries against granting to foreign corporations con-
cessions which, on account of their extended character,
would be certain to give rise to foreign claims which
would, in turn, give an excuse for European inter-
vention. In discussing our Latin-American policy

327

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

shortly after the beginning of his administration,
President Wilson said:

You hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin
America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capital-
ists in the United States. They are not granted concessions.
They are invited to make investments. The work is ours,
though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them
to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not
a privilege, and the states that are obliged because their terri-
tory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise
and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that
foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs — a
condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become in-
tolerable. . . . What these states are going to seek, there-
fore, is an emancipation from the subordination which has
been inevitable to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the
splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they
have again and again been able to demonstrate.

These remarks probably had reference to the oil
concession which Pearson & Son of London had ar-
ranged with the president of Colombia. This conces-
sion is said to have covered extensive oil interests
in Colombia, and carried with it the right to improve
harbors and dig canals in the country. However, be-
fore the meeting of the Colombian Congress in Novem-
ber, 1913, which was expected to confirm the conces-
sion, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson & Son,
withdrew the contract, alleging as his reason the oppo-
sition of the United States.

Prior to the Great War, which has upset all calcu-
lations, it seemed highly probable that the Platt Amend-
ment would in time be extended to all the weaker states
within the zone of the Caribbean. If the United States
is to exercise a protectorate over such states, the right

328

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

to intervene and the conditions of intervention should
be clearly defined and publicly proclaimed. Hitherto
whatever action we have taken in Latin America has
been taken under the Monroe Doctrine, — a policy of
doubtful legal sanction, — which an international court
might not recognize. Action under a treaty would
have the advantage of legality. In other words, the
recent treaties with Caribbean states have converted
American policy into law.

The imperialistic tendencies of our Caribbean pol-
icy, whether they be regarded as logical deductions
from the Monroe Doctrine or not, have undoubtedly
aroused the jealousies and fears of our Southern neigh-
bors. One of the results has been the formation of
the so-called ABC Alliance, based on treaties between
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the exact provisions of
which have not been made public. This alliance doubt-
less serves a useful purpose in promoting friendly
relations between the three great states of South
America, and since the acceptance of the mediation
of these powers in Mexico by President Wilson there
is no reason to regard it as in any sense hostile to
the United States. While the United States may
very properly accept the mediation of other American
states in disputes like that arising out of the Mexican
situation, the United States would not feel under any
obligation to consult other American states or accept
their advice on any question involving the enforce-
ment of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States has
always maintained the Monroe Doctrine as a principle
of self-defense, and, consequently, on its own author-
ity. In 1825 the Brazilian government proposed that
the United States should enter into an alliance with

329

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

it in order to maintain the independence of Brazil in
case Portugal should be assisted by any foreign power
in her efforts to reconquer Brazil. Secretary Clay re-
plied that while President Adams adhered to the prin-
ciples set forth by his predecessor, the prospect of
peace between Portugal and Brazil rendered such an
alliance unnecessary.7

In recent years the proposal has been more than
once made that the Monroe Doctrine be Pan Ameri-
canized. This proposal was discussed by Mr. Root in
his address before the American Society of Interna-
tional Law in 1914 in the course of which he said:

Since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon
this nation's right of self-protection, it cannot be trans-
muted into a joint or common declaration by American states
or any number of them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil
were to contribute the weight of its influence toward a similar
end, the right upon which that nation would rest its declara-
tion would be its own safety, not the safety of the United
States. Chile would declare what was necessary for the
safety of Chile. Argentina would declare what was neces-
sary for the safety of Argentina. Brazil, what was neces-
sary for the safety of Brazil. Each nation would act for itself
and in its own right and it would be impossible to go beyond
that except by more or less offensive and defensive alliances.
Of course such alliances are not to be considered.8

President Wilson in his address before the Second
Pan American Scientific Congress in 1916 agreed in
part with this when he said : " The Monroe Doctrine
was proclaimed by the United States on her own
authority. It has always been maintained, and always
will be maintained, upon her own responsibility."

7 Moore, " Digest of International Law." Vol. VI, p. 427.
• " Addresses on International Subjects," Elihu Root, p. 120.

330

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Declara-
tion of Rights and Duties of Nations, drafted by the
American Institute of International Law, was dis-
cussed by Mr. Root in his address before the Ameri-
can Society of International Law in 1916. He said in
part:

Whether the United States will soon have occasion or will
long have the ability or the will to maintain the Monroe
Doctrine lies in the uncertain future. Whether it will be
necessary for her to act in defense of the doctrine or
abandon it, may well be determined by the issue of the
present war. Whether when the occasion comes she will
prove to have the ability and the will to maintain the doctrine,
depends upon the spirit of her people, their capacity for pa-
triotic sacrifice, the foresight and character of those to whose
initiative in foreign affairs the interests of the people are
entrusted. W'hether the broader doctrine affirmed by the
American Institute of International Law is to be made
effective for the protection of justice and liberty throughout
the world depends upon whether the vision of the nations
shall have been so clarified by the terrible lessons of these
years that they can rise above small struggles for advantage
in international affairs, and realize that correlative to each
nation's individual right is that nation's duty to insist upon
the observance of the principles of public right throughout
the community of nations.9

It is not probable that our participation in the Great
War will result in any weakening of the Monroe Doc-
trine. That principle has been fully justified by a
century of experience. It has saved South America
from the kind of exploitation to which the continents
of Africa and Asia have, during the past generation,
fallen a prey. It would be strange indeed if the

9 " Addresses on International Subjects," by Elihu Root, p. 425.

331

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

United States, having insisted on the non-interference
of European powers in America when it was itself a
weak power from the military point of view, should
now in the plenitude of its power relax what has been
for so many years the cardinal principle of its foreign
policy. The abandonment of our policy of neutrality
and isolation does not by any means mean the abandon-
ment of the Monroe Doctrine. President Wilson
made this quite clear in his address to the Senate on
January 22, 1917, when he said:

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with
one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the
doctrine of the world ; that no nation should seek to extend
its polity over any other nation or people, but that every
people should be left free to determine its own polity, its
own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, un-
afraid, the little along with the great and powerful. I am
proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alli-
ances which would draw them into competitions of power,
catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and dis-
turb their own affairs with influences intruded from without.
There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power.

The policy of isolation or the avoidance of entan-
gling alliances, which so many Americans confuse with
the Monroe Doctrine, is in principle quite distinct from
it and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the position
and importance of the United States as a world power.
The difference in principle between the two policies can
perhaps be best illustrated by the following supposi-
tion. If the United States were to sign a permanent
treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal
in the event of attack from some European power, on
condition that England would unite with us in oppos-

332

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

ing the intervention of any European power in Latin
America, such a treaty would not be a violation of the
Monroe Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that
principle. Such a treaty would, however, be a depar-
ture from our traditional policy of isolation, originally
announced by Washington and Jefferson.

The participation of the United States in the League
of Nations would, if that League be considered an en-
tangling alliance, be a departure from the policy of
isolation but not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.
In order to allay the fears of Americans on this point,
President Wilson caused to be inserted in the consti-
tution of the League of Nations the following clause :

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the
validity of international engagements, such as treaties of
arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doc-
trine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

This clause did not serve the purpose for which it
was intended, and a heated controversy at once arose
as to the meaning of the language employed. When
the treaty came before the Senate this clause was
the object of attack, and Senator Lodge included
among the fourteen reservations which he proposed
the following one on the Monroe Doctrine:

The United States will not submit to arbitration or to in-
quiry by the assembly or by the council of the League of
Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions
which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or
relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as
the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by
the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly
outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and en-

333

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

tirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said treaty
of peace with Germany.

The recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by the
League of Nations, taken in connection with the
Senate's assertion of the exclusive right to interpret
its meaning, has caused some of the Latin-American
countries to delay joining the League until the
Monroe Doctrine is clearly defined. In February,
1920, Salvador brought this subject to the attention
of the United States in a formal note in which she
argued that, as the Monroe Doctrine was so variously
interpreted by prominent thinkers and public men
even in the United States, it should be officially de-
fined.10 In reply Salvador was referred to what Presi-
dent Wilson had said on the subject of the Monroe
Doctrine in his address of January 6, 1916, before the
Pan American Scientific Congress at Washington.11
These remarks have already been quoted in Chapter
VIII.12 Salvador was informed that no further defi-
nition was deemed necessary. The speech referred to
may, therefore, be considered the latest official inter-
pretation of the Monroe Doctrine.

10 The New York Times, February 8, 1920.

11 The New York Times, March 2, 1920.
18 Ante, pp. 306-307.

THE END

'334

INDEX

ABC Alliance, offers to medi-
ate in Mexican crisis, 309;
divided in Great War, 313;
attitude towards United
States, 329.

Aberdeen, Lord, tries to pre-
vent annexation of Texas by
United States, 262, 263.

Abolitionists, oppose admission
of Texas, 262.

Adams, C. F., minister to Eng-
land, views on the Mexican
situation, 202 ; warns his gov-
ernment against designs of
Louis Napoleon on Mexico,
208; on Mexican policy of
Great Britain, 209.

Adams, John Quincy, opposes
joint action with England,
70, 71 ; influence on Monroe's
message of December 2, 1823,
72; informs Russia that
American continents are no
longer open to European
colonization, 75 ; views on
Cuba, 86; appoints delegates
to Panama Congress, 292,
293.

Aix-la-Chapelle, conference of
1818, 58, 59.

Alexander I, Czar of Russia,
and Holy Alliance, 61.

American Institute of Interna-
tional Law, 304 ; adopts Dec-
laration of Rights and Du-
ties of Nations, 305-306.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 266.

Arbitration, international, of
Venezuelan boundary dis-
pute, 248, 249; of pecuniary
claims against Venezuela,
255, 256.

Argentina, British invasion of,
23-25; beginnings of revolu-
tion in, 30; remains neutral
in Great War, 314, 315.

Assiento, contract for supply-
ing slaves to Spanish col-
onies, 12-14.

Audiencia, in Spanish colonies,

4, 5:

Austria, suppresses revolution
in Naples and in Piedmont,
59, 60; warned not to send
troops to assistance of Maxi-
milian in Mexico, 232, 233.

Balfour, A. J , on forcible col-
lection of pecuniary claims,

257.

Baltimore, U. S. Cruiser, mem-
bers of crew attacked by
Chileans, 302.

Barbosa, Ruy, Brazilian states-
man, 313.

Bay Islands, British claims to,
157, 160, 161.

Beaupre, A. M., minister to
Colombia, 186.

Belize, British claims to, 157,
160, 161.

Bell, J. Franklin, in Cuba, 142.

Belligerent rights, accorded to
Spanish colonies, 48; with-

335

INDEX

held from Cubans, 110-113;
House resolution, 113; joint
resolution of Congress, 127.

Bigelow, John, minister to
France, 222, 225, 227.

Bismarck, Prince, on Monroe
Doctrine, 321.

"Black Friday," no.

Black Warrior, c^ase of, 101-103.

Blaine, J. G., outlines new canal
policy, 169-171 ; proposes
modifications of Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, 172-173; calls
International American Con-
ference at Washington, 300,
presides at opening session,
301.

Blanco, Ramon, governor of
Cuba, 129.

Bliss, Tasker H., in charge of
Cuban customs, 140.

Bolivar, Simon, character, 37;
joins patriot cause, 38; career
in Venezuela and Colombia,
39-42; in Ecuador and Peru,
43, 44; interest in Isthmian
canal, 147; summons Pan-
ama Congress, 292.

Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon, in-
terest in Isthmian canal, 148 ;
designs on Mexico, 207;
places Maximilian on the
throne, 214-220; forced to
withdraw troops, 226-232.

Bonaparte, Napoleon, invasion
of Spain, 26-28 ; cedes Louisi-
ana to United States, 261.

Bowen, Herbert W., minister to
Venezuela, 252.

Brazil, becomes a republic, 301 ;
stands by United States in
war with Germany, 312-314.

British Guiana, dispute over
boundary of, 238-249.

British Honduras. See Belize.

Brougham, Lord, on Monroe's
message of December 2, 1823,
77-

Bryan, William J., favors rati-
fication of Spanish treaty,
136 ; tries to adjust differences
with Colombia resulting from
Panama Revolution, 274-276 ;
negotiates treaties with Ni-
caragua, 285, 286; refuses to
recognize Huerta, 308.

Buchanan, James, proposes
purchase of Cuba, 92; con-
nection with Ostend Mani-
festo, 104, 105; recommends
congressional action on Cu-
ban question, 106; criticises
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 157,
suggests abrogation of, 163,
announces satisfactory ad-
justment of disputes growing
out of, 165.

Buenos Aires, captured by the
British, 24.

Bulwer, Sir Henry Lytton,
signs canal treaty, 154.

Bunau-Varilla, Philippe, and
Panama revolution, 187 ; first
minister from Republic of
Panama, 189.

Bureau of American Republics,
301, 303.

California, acquisition of, 264.

Campbell, L. D., minister to
Mexico, 234-236.

Canal. See Panama Canal,
Nicaragua Canal.

Canning, George, on commer-
cial relations with Spanish
colonies, 54-55; on recogni-
tion of, 55-56; on European
congresses, 58, 59; on French

336

INDEX

intervention in Spain, 63, 64 ;
conferences with Rush on
schemes of the Holy Alli-
ance, 65-67, 72; interviews
with Prince Polignac on
Spanish-American situation,
73. 74 J comments on Mon-
roe's message of December
2, 1823, 78, 79; decides to
recognize Mexico and Colom-
bia, 80, 81; opposes French
occupation of Cuba, 88.

Caribbean Sea, naval suprem-
acy in, 261, 264-266; new
American policies in, 267.

Carranza, Venustiano, succeeds
Huerta, 309; recognized by
United States, 310, permits
German intrigue, 316.

Casa de Contratacion, 8.

Castelar, Emilio, President of
the Spanish Republic, 115.

Central American Court of
Justice, 281-287.

Chile, liberation of, 32, 33;
war with Spain, 298; with
Peru, 299-300; quarrel with
United States, 301, 302; re-
mains neutral in Great War,
315, 3i6.

Claims. See Pecuniary claims.

Clay, Henry, advocates recog-
nition of South American in-
dependence, 49-51, 82 ; Cuban
policy of, 88; views on
Isthmian Canal, 148; and
Panama Congress, 292-295 ;
applies Monroe Doctrine to
Cuba and Porto Rico, 323.

Clayton, J. M., secretary of
state, signs canal treaty, 154;
criticised by Buchanan, 157;
on refusal of Congress to en-
dorse Monroe Doctrine, 320.

Clayton-Bui wer treaty, 154-
156; disputes arising out of,
159-165; attempts of Elaine
and Frelinghuysen to secure
modifications of, 172-177;
alleged British violation of,
178-180; abrogated, 181.

Cleveland, Grover, transmits to
Congress correspondence of
Secretary Fish on Cuba, 125 ;
recognizes state of insur-
gency in Cuba, 126; ignores
resolution of Congress rec-
ognizing belligerency, 127 ;
message on Cuba, 128;
canal policy of, 177; asserts
Monroe Doctrine in Ven-
ezuelan boundary dispute,
238-239.

Cochrane, Lord (Earl Dun-
donald), commander of Chil-
ean navy, 34. 35-

Colombia (New Granada), war
of liberation, 39-42; signs
canal treaty of 1846, 149, 150;
rejects Hay-Herran conven-
tion, 186; demands arbitra-
tion of Panama question,
192 ; strained relations with
United States arising out of
Panama Revolution, 268-276;
remains neutral in the Great
War, 312, 316.

Commerce, British, with Span-
ish colonies, 53-55-

Conference. See International
American.

Convention of London of 1861,
providing for joint interven-
tion in Mexico, 203.

Costa Rica, protests against
protectorate over Nicaragua,
285-287.

Cromwell, W. N., attorney for

337

INDEX

French Panama Canal Com-
pany, 187.

Cuba, British or French ac-
quisition opposed by United
States, 84-90 ; annexation
schemes, 91-106 ; " Ten Years'
War" in, 107-125; insurrec-
tion of 1895, 125-129; inter-
vention of the United States
in, 130-133; American occu-
pation of, 136-140; reciproc-
ity with, 140-142; second
period of American occupa-
tion, 142, 143; enters war
against Germany, 312, 313.

Cushing, Caleb, mission to
Spain, 119-124.

Dallas-Clarendon treaty, amen-
ded by Senate and rejected
by Great Britain, 161, 162.

Danish West Indies, annexa-
tion proposed by Seward,
264; purchased by United
States, 289, 290.

Davis, Cushman K., commis-
sioner to negotiate peace with
Spain, 135.

Dawson, T. C, minister to
Dominican Republic, negoti-
ates treaty establishing finan-
cial supervision, 277-279.

Day, W. R., commissioner to
negotiate peace with Spain,

135-

Dayton, W. L., minister to
France, 214, 217, 219, 221.

DeLesseps, Ferdinand, begins
construction of Panama
canal, 146 ; effect on canal pol-
icy of United States, 167-169.

DeLhuys, Drouyn, French
minister of state, 217, 221,
225, 231.

Dewey, George, at Manila Bay,
134; prepared to arrest Ger-
man action against Venezu-
ela, 253, 254.

Diaz, Porfirio, president of
Mexico, joint mediator with
President Roosevelt in Cen-
tral American affairs, 280-
282.

Dominican Republic, under
financial supervision of Uni-
ted States, 276-280.

Drago, L. M., Argentine minis-
ter, on war between Germany
and United States, 314, 315.

Drago Doctrine, 257-260.

DuBois, J. T., minister to Co-
lombia, efforts to settle dif-
ferences arising out of Pan-
ama Revolution, 270-274.

Evarts, W. MM report on obli-
gations of United States with
respect to Isthmus of Pan-
ama, 169.

Ferdihand VII, of Spain, de-
throned by Napoleon, 27 ; res-
toration of, 29; attempts to
recover American colonies, 40.

Filibusters, Cuban, 92-06.

Financial supervision, over
Dominican Republic, 276-
280; over Nicaragua, 283;
over Haiti, 289.

Fish, Hamilton, secretary of
state, Cuban policy of, 108-
124; on British infringement
of Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
167; acts as mediator in war
between Spain and republics
on West coast of South
America, 298, 299.

Florida treaty, 52, 85, 261.

338

INDEX

Fonseca Bay, naval base on,
offered to United States by
Honduras, 153, leased from
Nicaragua, 286.

Forsyth, John, secretary of
state, 90 ; minister to Mexico,

194-

France, interest in Cuba, 87, 88,
97; claims against Mexico,
197; severs diplomatic rela-
tions with Juarez govern-
ment, 199; decides on joint
intervention in Mexico, 203 ;
supports Maximilian on
Mexican throne, 220-234.

Frelinghuysen, F. T., corres-
pondence with Lord Granville
on Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
175, 176; signs canal treaty
with Nicaragua, 177.

Frye, W. P., commissioner to
negotiate peace with Spain,
135-

Garfield, J. A., canal policy of,
169.

Germany, intervention in Ven-
ezuela, 249-252; forced to
withdraw, 252-255.

Goethals, G. W., in charge of
construction of Panama
Canal, 191.

Gomez, Maximo, leader of
Cuban insurrection, 125.

Grace-Eyre-Cragin Syndicate,
secures concession for canal
through Nicaragua, 183.

Grant, Ulysses S., Cuban policy
of, 108-124; favors driving
French from Mexico, 227;
proposes annexation of Santo
Domingo, 265; on Monroe
Doctrine, 324.

Gray, George, commissioner to

negotiate peace with Spain,
135.

Great Britain, secures monop-
oly of slave trade, 12-14;
entertains idea of revolution-
izing Spanish America, 14-
22, 26; sends expedition to
the Plate, 23-25; commercial
relations with Spanish Amer-
ica, 53-55; attitude towards
Holy Alliance, 60, 63; recog-
nizes independence of Mex-
ico and Colombia, 80; atti-
tude towards Cuba, 85, 86, 90,
97 ; signs Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, 154; disagrees with
United States as to interpre-
tation of the treaty, 160-164;
refuses to relinquish rights
under treaty, 174; interferes
in affairs of Mosquito Indi-
ans, 178-180; claims against
Mexico, 196; severs diplo-
matic relations with Juarez
government, 199; decides on
joint intervention in Mexico,
203; grows suspicious of
France, 207-209; withdraws
troops from Mexico, 212,
213; controversy with Vene-
zuela over boundary of Bri-
tish Guiana, 238-249; inter-
venes in Venezuela for col-
lection of claims, 249-252;
opposes annexation of Texas
by United States, 262-263;
attitude towards Monroe
Doctrine, 322, 323.

Greytown, British occupation
of, 157-160.

Guiana. See British Guiana.

Gwin, W. M., plan for coloniz-
ing ex-Confederates in Mex-
ico, 223.

339

INDEX

Hague Conference of 1907,
resolutions on forcible collec-
tion of contract debts, 259-260.

Hague Court, decision in Ven-
ezuelan case, 256.

Haiti, occupied by U. S. Ma-
rines, 288; agrees to Ameri-
can financial supervision,
289; declares war on Ger-
many, 316.

Hamilton, Alexander, inter-
ested in Miranda's projects,
17-19.

Harrison, Benjamin, dispute
with Chile, 302.

Hay, John, secretary of state,
negotiates new canal treaty
with England, 180, 181 ; ne-
gotiates canal treaty with
Colombia, 185; calls Ger-
many's attention to Monroe
Doctrine, 251 ; advises sub-
mission of Venezuelan case
to Hague Court, 255.

Hay-Herran convention, signed,
185; rejected by Colombia,
186, 187.

Hay-Pauncefote treaty, pro-
visions, 180, 181 ; practical
recognition of American su-
premacy in Caribbean, 265-
267.

Hayes, R. B., announces new
canal policy, 168.

Hepburn Bill, 184.

Hoar, G. F., on acquisition of
the Philippines, 136.

Holleben incident, 252-254.

Holy Alliance, treaty of the, 61.

Honduras, Knox treaty estab-
lishing financial supervision
over, 283; protests against
protectorate over Nicaragua,
285.

Huerta, Victoriano, Mexican
dictator, 307-309.

India House, 8.

Indies, Council of the, 4, 5;
laws of the, 4.

International American Con-
ference at Washington, 300,
301 ; at Mexico, 302 ; at Rio
de Janeiro, 303 ; at Buenos
Aires, 303.

International High Commis-
sion, 304.

Intervention, European doc-
trine of, 57.

Isthmian canal, difficulties of,
144; comparative merits of
Panama and Nicaragua
routes, 145, 146; international
questions involved in, 146, 147.

Italy, intervention in Vene-
zuela, 249-252.

Itata, case of the, 302.

Iturbide, Augustin de, leads
revolution against Spain in
Mexico, 45, 46; proclaims
himself emperor, 47.

Jefferson, Thomas, interview
with Miranda. 20: letter to
President Monroe on Can-
ning's proposals, 68-70 ; views
on Cuba, 84, 87; on recogni-
tion of de facto governments,
308.

Juarez, Benito, president of
Mexico, 194; recognized by
United States, 195; suspends
payment on foreign debt, 199 ;
driven from capital by the
French, 214, 215; urged by
United States to spare Maxi-
milian's life, 235; orders his
execution, 237.

340

INDEX

King, Rufus, correspondence
with Miranda, 17-20.

Knox, P. C., investigates title
of Panama Canal Company,
185 ; tries to settle differences
with Colombia resulting from
Panama Revolution, 270-274;
Central American policy, 282-

Lansing, Robert, secretary of
state, negotiates treaty for
purchase of Danish West
Indies, 290; suggests adop-
tion of Declaration of Rights
and Duties of Nations, 305.

Latin America, and the Great
War, 312-318.

Laybach, conference of powers
at, 59.

League of Nations, and Mon-
roe Doctrine, 333, 334.

Lee, Fitzhugh, consul-general
at Havana, 129.

Lincoln, Abraham, views on
Panama canal, 151.

Liverpool, Lord, on conference
at Aix-la-Chapelle, 58; on
French intervention in Spain,
63.

Lodge, H. C.f on alleged secret
alliance with England, 266;
reservation of Monroe Doc-
trine, 333.

Lome, Enrique Dupuy de, inci-
dent and recall, 129, 130.

Loomis, F. B., acting secretary
of state, 188.

Lopez, Narciso, Cuban patriot,
92-96.

Louis Napoleon. See Bona-
parte.

Louis Philippe, suggested as
possible ruler for Spanish

America, 26; and annexation
of Texas, 262, 263.
Louisiana, ceded to United
States, 261.

McKinley, William, Cuban
policy of, 128-132; demands
cession of Philippine Islands,
135.

McLane, R. M., minister to
Mexico, 195.

Mackintosh, Sir James, on
Monroe's message of Decem-
ber 2, 1823, 78.

Madero, Francisco, murder of,
307.

Madison, James, receives Mi-
randa informally, 20; favors
joint action with England
against intervention of
powers in Spanish America,
70; views on Cuba, 84.

Magoon, C. E., provisional
governor of Cuba, 142.

Magruder, J. B., accepts office
under Maximilian in Mexico,
224.

Maine, U. S. battleship, sent to
Havana, 129; blown up, 130.

Marcy, William L., secretary of
state, Cuban policy of. 99-105.

Maritime Canal Company, se-
cures concessions from Ni-
caragua, 183.

Mason, John Y., connection
with Ostend Manifesto, 104.

Maury, M. F., accepts office
under Maximilian in Mexico,
224.

Maximilian, Archduke Ferdi-
nand, suggested for Mexican
throne, 208-211; offered the
position of Empei or of Mex-
ico, 215; not recognized by

341

INDEX

the United States, 218, 219;
career in Mexico, 220-234;
death, 237.

Mexico, becomes independent
of Spain, 45-47; frequent
changes of government in,
193; claims of foreigners
against, 196; joint interven-
tion of England, Framce, and
Spain, 203-212; war with
United States, 263, 264; re-
lations with United States
under Huerta, 307-309; un-
der Carranza, 309-311; hot-
bed of German intrigue, 316.

Miles, Nelson A., occupies
Porto Rico, 134.

Miranda, Francisco de, plans
for revolutionizing Spanish
America, 15-19; organizes
expedition in New York, 20;
attempts to land in Vene-
zuela, 21, 22; takes part in
Venezuelan revolution, 38 ;
imprisonment and death, 39.

Monroe, James, attitude toward
South American struggle for
independence, 52, 53; letter
to Jefferson on Canning's
proposals, 67, 68 ; message of
December 2, 1823, 76, 77.

Monroe Doctrine, text of mes-
sage of December 2, 1823,
76-77 ; and Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, 157, 159, 175, 176; and
French intervention in Mex-
ico, 222, 223; asserted by
President Cleveland in Vene-
zuelan boundary dispute, 238-
249; tested by Germany, 249-
255; imperialistic tendencies
of, 290, 291, 329; President
Wilson's statement of, before
Pan American Scientific Con-

ference, 306-307; an execu-
tive policy, 320; relation to
European balance of power,
321, 322; attitude of England
toward, 322; consistently in-
terpreted, 323; does not per-
mit transfer of American
colonies from one European
power to another, 323, 324;
reservation of, at Hague
Conference, 325, 326; as ap-
plied by President Roosevelt,
326, 327; proposals to Pan
Americanize, 330 ; probable
effects of Great War on, 331,
332 ; distinct from policy of
isolation, 332, 333; recog-
nized in covenant of League
of Nations, 333 ; Lodge reser-
vation, 333; definition of,
demanded by Salvador, 334.

Moore, John Bassett, secretary
of commission to negotiate
peace with Spain, 135; on
Monroe Doctrine, 323.

Morgan, J. T., advocates Ni-
caragua canal route, 184.

Mosquito Coast, Great Bri-
tain's claims to, 157-159;
British interference in, 178-
180.

Motley, J. L., minister to Aus-
tria, 232, 233.

Naon, R. S., Argentine ambas-
sador to the United States,
on " European War and Pan
Americanism," 316-318.

Napoleon. See Bonaparte.

New Granada. See Colombia.

Nicaragua, signs canal treaty
of 1867 with United States,
166; canal treaty of 1884
withdrawn from Senate by

342

INDEX

Cleveland, 177; sovereignty
over Mosquito Coast, 178-
180; relations with United
States under Roosevelt, 280,
281 ; under Taft, 282-285 ;
under Wilson, 285-288 ; treaty
of 1916, 286.

Nicaragua Canal, comparative
merits of Nicaragua and
Panama routes, 145, 146;
draft of treaty for construc-
tion of canal, 152, 153; route
investigated by Walker com-
mission, 182.

O'Higgins, Bernardo, Chilean
patriot, 32, 33.

Olney, Richard, secretary of
state, on Cuba, 127; on Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty, 180; in-
terpretation of Monroe Doc-
trine in Venezuelan boundary
dispute, 240.

Ostend Manifesto, 104, 105.

Ouseley, Sir William, mission
to Central America, 162-164.

Palma, T. E., first president of
Cuba, 140, 142.

Panama, Republic of, recog-
nized by President Roose-
velt, 189; leases Canal Zone
to United States, 191.

Panama Canal, comparative
merits of Panama and Ni-
caragua routes, 145, 146;
treaty of 1846 with Colom-
bia, 149; opened to com-
merce, 191.

Panama Canal Company, or-
ganized by De Lesseps, 167;
reorganization and extension
of concession, 182; offers to
sell to United States, 184, 185.

Panama Congress, 292-295.

Panama Railroad, 146, 150.

Panama Revolution, 187-189.

Pan American Financial Con-
ferences, 304.

Pan American Scientific Con-
ferences, 304.

Pan American Union, 303.

Pan Americanism, definition
of, 292; promoted by Presi-
dent Wilson's Mexican policy,
309, 311; put to test in the
Great War, 312-317.

Pecuniary Claims, against Mex-
ico, 196, 197 ; British policy in
regard to, 198; attempt to
collect by force from Vene-
zuela, 249-257 ; Resolutions
of Second Hague Confer-
ence, 259, 260; considered by
International American Con-
ferences, 302, 303.

Peru, liberation of, 33-37; war
with Spain, 298; with Chile,
299, 300; severs .relations
with Germany, 316.

Philippine Islands, ceded to
United States, 135, 136.

Pierce, Franklin, Cuban policy
of, 99-105.

Platt Amendment, text of, 138-
139; treaty with Nicaragua
embodying, defeated by Sen-
ate, 285, 286; applied in part
to Haiti, 289.

Poinsett, Joel R., 49, 53.

Polk, J. K., and Mexican War,
263, 264.

Porter, Horace, presents reso-
lution to Hague Conference
of 1907 on forcible collection
of pecuniary claims, 259.

Porto Rico, cession of, de-
manded by United States, 135.

343

INDEX

Quitman, John A., relations
with Lopez, 93-94.

Recognition, withheld from
Huerta, 308. See Belliger-
ent Rights.

Reed, Walter, yellow-fever in-
vestigations, 137.

Reid, Whitelaw, commissioner
to negotiate peace with Spain,

135.

Roosevelt, Theodore, and Cu-
ban reciprocity, 140-142 ;
signs canal bill, 185; de-
nounces Colombia's rejection
of Hay-Herran convention,
186; recognizes Republic of
Panama, 189; on acquisition
of Canal Zone, 190; creates
strained relations with Col-
ombia, 192; on Monroe Doc-
trine, 251 ; interview with
Holleben on German inter-
vention in Venezuela, 252-
254; refuses to arbitrate
Panama question, 268; de-
nounces Bryan treaty with
Colombia as blackmail, 275;
establishes financial super-
vision over Dominican Re-
public, 276-280 ; Central
American policy, 280, 281 ;
attempts to purchase Danish
West Indies, 290; interpreta-
tion of Monroe Doctrine,
326, 327.

Root, Elihu, author of Platt
Amendment, 139 ; attempts to
settle differences with Co-
lombia, 268-270; visits South
America, 303; on Monroe
Doctrine, 330, 331.

Rush, Richard, minister to
England, conferences with

Canning on schemes of Holy
Alliance, 65-67, 72, 73.
Russia, claims to northwestern
coast of America, 75.

Sagasta, P. M., Spanish minis-
ter, Cuban policy of, 128.

Salisbury, Lord, reply to Ol-
ney's dispatch on Venezuelan
boundary dispute, 242 ; agrees
to arbitration of the boundary
dispute, 248.

Salvador, protests against pro-
tectorate over Nicaragua,
285-287 ; requests official defi-
nition of Monroe Doctrine,
334-

Sampson, W. T., blockades
Cuba, 134.

San Ildefonso, secret treaty of,
261.

San Martin, Jose de, takes part
in Argentine revolution, 30-
32; liberates Chile, 32, 33;
liberates Peru, 33-37; rela-
tions with Bolivar, 43, 44;
death, 45.

Santo Domingo, annexation
proposed by Seward, 264, by
Grant, 265. See Dominican
Republic.

Schenck, Robert C, minister
to England, 120.

Schofield, J. M., informal mis-
sion to France, 227.

Seward, W. H., views on
Panama canal, 151; favors
expansion, 165; raises ques-
tion as to binding force of
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 166;
proposes to assume payment
of interest on foreign debt
of Mexico, 200; declines to
unite with European powers

344

INDEX

in measures against Mexico,
205, 206; attitude towards
French in Mexico, 214-231 ;
efforts to annex Santo Do-
mingo and Danish West
Indies, 264, 265.

Shaw, Albert, and Panama
Revolution, 189.

Sherman, John, secretary of
state, 128.

Sherman, W. T., selected for
special mission to Mexico,

234, 235-

Sickles, Daniel E., mission to
Spain, 109-118.

Slave trade, 12-14.

Slavery, in Cuba, 89, 90, 106,
107, in.

Slidell, John, introduces bill for
purchase of Cuba, 106.

Smuggling, in Spanish colonies,
II.

Soule, Pierre, mission to Spain,
99-105.

Spain, colonial policy of, 4-12;
revolution of 1820, 56, sup-
pressed by French army, 63 ;
revolution of 1868, 107; re-
public proclaimed in, 113;
treaty of 1898 with United
States, 136; claims against
Mexico, 197; decides on joint
intervention in Mexico, 203;
withdraws troops from Mex-
ico, 212, 213 ; extent of colo-
nial empire at beginning of
nineteenth century, 261 ; war
with Chile, Peru, Bolivia,
and Ecuador, 298, 299.

Spanish-American republics, ac-
corded belligerent rights, 48;
recognized as independent
by United States, 53, by Eng-
land, 80.

Spanish Colonies, revolt of, 28.

Spooner, J. C, offers amend-
ment to canal bill, 184.

Sucre, Antonio Jose de, Vene-
zuelan general, 42-44.

Suez Canal Convention, and
Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 181.

Sumner, Charles, opposes an-
nexation of Danish West
Indies and Santo Domingo,
264, 265.

Taft, W. H., proclaims pro-
visional government in Cuba,
142 ; tries to settle differences
with Colombia resulting from
Panama Revolution, 270-274;
relations with Nicaragua and
Honduras, 280-285 ; and
Huerta revolution, 308.

Taylor, Hannis, minister to
Spain, 128.

Taylor, Zachary, issues procla-
mation warning Americans
against aiding Lopez expedi-
tion against Cuba, 93; and
Mexican War, 263.

Texas, claim to, abandoned by
the United States, 261; es-
tablishment of independence
of, 262; admitted to Union,
263.

Thayer, W. R., version of Hol-
leben incident, 252-254.

Trade, with Spanish colonies,
monopoly of, 12-14.

Troppau, conference of 1820,

59-
Tupac Amaru, last of the In-

cas, 6.
Tyler, John, and annexation of

Texas, 262, 263.

Utrecht, treaty of, 12.

345

INDEX

Venezuela, declares indepen-
dence, 38; war of liberation,
39-42; dispute with Great
Britain over boundary of
British Guiana, 238-249 ; in-
tervention of Germany, Eng-
land, and Italy in, 249-252 ;
neutral in Great War, 312,
316.

Vera Cruz, landing of Ameri-
can Marines at, 309.

Verona, Congress of, 60-63.

Viceroy, office of, in Spanish
colonies, 4, 5, 12.

Vienna, Congress of, 58.

Villa, Francisco, Mexican in-
surrectionary chief, 309, 310.

Virgin Islands. See Danish
West Indies.

Virginius, case of the, 114-118.

Walker, J. G., head of com-
mission to investigate canal
routes, 182; report of, 183,
184.

Walker, William, invasion of
Central America, 163.

Webster, Daniel, Cuban policy
of, 90, 97.

Wellington, Duke of, with-
draws from Congress of
Verona, 60.

Weyler, Valeriano, captain-
general of Cuba, 125, 126, 129.

William II, Emperor of Ger-
many, intervention in Vene-
zuela, 249-252; forced to
withdraw, 252-255.

Wilson, Henry Lane, ambas-
sador to Mexico, 307.

Wilson, Woodrow, submits
treaty with Colombia adjust-
ing differences resulting from
Panama Revolution, 274, 275 ;
Central American policy,
285-287; Haitian policy, 288,
289 ; relations with Latin
America, 291 ; interpretation
of Monroe Doctrine, 306,
307; Mexican policy of, 307-
311; Latin-American policy,
309, 311; opposes concessions
to foreign capitalists in
Latin America, 328 ; proposes
to extend Monroe Doctrine
to the world, 332.

Wood, Leonard, military gov-
ernor of Cuba, 137-140.

Woodford, S. L., minister to
Spain, 128, 130, 134.

Wyke, Sir Charles, British
minister to Mexico, 198, 199,
203, 207.

Wyse, L. N. B., secures conces-
sion for Panama Canal, 167.

Zelaya, president of Nicaragua.
280-283.

346

THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS
GARDEN CITY, N. Y.

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